PROBLEMS "IN DIRECTED
IMAGERY-INTERFERENCE IN VISUALIZINE
IMAGERY A5 A FUNCTION OF THEMATIC CONTENT

Dissertation for the Degree of -Ph.D.
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
IRA MOSES
I 9 7 T

 

 

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I Michigan State
University

 

This is to certify that the
thesis entitled
Problems in Directed Imagery-Interference
in Visualizing Imagery see Function of Thematic Content

presented by

' Ira Moses

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

Ph . D . Psycho logy

degree in

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Date April 4, 1977

 

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ABSTRACT

PROBLEMS IN DIRECTED IMAGERY-INTERFERENCE IN
VISUALIZING IMAGERY AS A FUNCTION OF THEMATIC CONTENT

By

Ira Moses

Observations by Reyher (1963) and Weitzman (1967) raise questions
for directed imagery research and therapy. [They report respectively
that subjects may not be visualizing the requested images or may be
visualizing images different than those specifically requested. These
two types of interferences in image formation were investigated more
thoroughly in this study.

Incorporating different levels of aggression in imagery, this study
hypothesized that subjects would report a greater number of failures to
image (NO) and a greater number of images different than those specifi-
cally requested (SUB) for the higher level of aggression. Differential
effects of defense mechanisms were also investigated.

Forty undergraduates (20 male and 20 female) were assigned to two
male and two female experimenters. With the order of presentation
counterbalanced, three narratives (10 images per narrative) were pre-
sented: (Low) aggression depicted a shouting match, (HI) aggression
depicted slapping parents and (CONTROL) which contained only highly
implausible images (a science-fiction narrative) and no aggression.

Fer the frequency of failures to image (NO), the mean of the high
aggression narrative was greater than.mean of low aggression (p .05),
as predicted. Confounding the results, however, was that the mean of

the implausible (CONTROL) narrative was greater than the Low aggression

narrative (p_.05) and not significantly different from the mean of the
High aggression narrative. For the frequency of visualizing different
images (SUB), though not significant, the mean of High aggression
narrative is greater than the mean of Low aggression in the predicted
direction. Confounding the results was the finding that the mean of the
highly implausible Control narrative was less than the mean of both Low
and High aggression narratives.

Since both the High and Low aggression narratives were not homo-
genous groups of images, a post hoc analysis was computed in an effort
to clarify the questions of the above findings. Ranking all the images,
regardless of the narrative in which they were embedded, revealed sig-
nificant (p .05) correlations between Judges rank order of aggression
and (N0) r = .85 and (SUB) r = .63. A significant correlation for rank
order of plausibility was also found, (NO) r = .73 and (SUB) r = .38.
Plausibility versus aggression as a predictor for imagery problems was
discussed.

No relationship between type of defense and (NO) and (SUB) was found.
Also noteworthy was that every image regardless of content had a propor-
tion of (No) or (SUB), ranging from 7% to 60%. 0f the 1200 image requests,
there were 190 reports of (N0) and 179 reports of (SUB), yielding a total
of 369 (30%) deviations from the requested images. Ninety-two percent
of all the subjects reported either type of interference in imagery

(NO or SUB).

Reyher, J. Free imagery: An uncovering procedure. Journal of
Clinical Psychology. 1963. $2, ASA-#59.

 

 

Weitzman, B. Behavior therapy and psychotherapy. Psychological
Review. 1967. 1;, 300-317.

 

PROBLEMS IN DIRECTED IMAGERY-INTERFERENCE
IN VISUALIZING IMAGERY.AS A FUNCTION OF

THEMATIC CONTENT

By

Ira Moses

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR or PHILOSOPHY

tspartment of Psychology

1977

\inT I‘II

To Matthew, whose dirty diapers
helped me avoid my dissertation
and whose smile bring ,joy to

those around him.

To Marsha, my best friend.

11

soi‘

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to thank the members of my Committee for their Special
contributions: Dr. Reyher, who has throughout my career given me
the proper balance of discipline and freedom to engage in innovative
research; Dr. Abeles, who was able to hold rein on my impatience;
Dr..Aniskiewicz provided the emotional support through.my struggles;
Dr. Freed, who provided the theoretical input; and finally, my out-
side reader, Dr. Lee of Sociology, who made my dissertation orals a

day that I'll never forget.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

LISTOFTABLES......................... v

INTRODUCTION 1

METHOD 5
APPENDICES

A. HISTORICALANDTHEORETICAL REVIEW OF IMAGERY. . . . . . 26

B . AVERAGE RANK ORDER OF INCREASING PLAUSIBILITY
OFALLIMAGES.................... 52

C. AVERAGE RANK ORDER OF AGGRESSIVENESS OF ALL
MGES O O C O O C O O C O I O O O O O O O O O O O C O 514'

BBLImRAPHY o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o 55

iv

LIST OF TABLES

Table Page

1. Percentages and Combined Percentages of
Subjects Reporting Failures to Image (no)
and/or Substitutive Images (sub) Distributed
Across the Three Stimulus Narratives . . . . . . . . . ll

2. Analysis of Variance for the Effects of Type of
Story, Sex of Subject, Sex of Experimenter, and
Experimenter on the Frequency of No Imagery . . . . . l2

3. Analysis of Variance of the Effects of the Type
of Story, Sex of Subject, Sex of Experimenter,
and Experimenter on the Frequency of Substi-
tutive Imagery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

h. Spearman Rank Order Correlation Between Subjects
Rank for the Dependent Variables (fno and fsub)
and Rank on the Defense Mechanism.Inventory . . . . . 15

5. Per Image Frequency of Subjects Failure to
Visualize Requested Image fno: Rank of fno:
Frequency of Intrusive Other Images fsub’
Rank fsub: Judges Rank Order of Plausibility
of an Image Occurring (Plausible), and Judges
Rank Order of Aggression (Aggression) . . . . . . . . l6

6. Difference in Correlation Coefficients . . . . . . . . . l9

INTRODUCTION

Recent research (Wilkins, 1971, Weitzman, 1967, Wilson and
Reyher 1976) raises critical issues for the behavioral as well as all
imagery therapies. Wilkins (1971) evaluated the components of system-
atic desensitization psychotherapy and concluded: "Neither training in
muscle relaxation nor the construction of a graded hierarchy of fear
relaxant scenes nor the concomitance of instructed imagination to muscle

relaxation are necessary conditions for treatment success; instructed

 

imagination by itself is the only necessary elemen ." He further sug-

 

gests, as does Wilson (1974), that the therapeutic effect is due to
social variables of the patient-therapist relationship and cognitive
variables of expectancy of therapeutic gain, feedback of success, train-
ing and attention control, etc., rather than to the mutual antagonism
between muscle relaxation and anxiety.

Weitzman (1967) raised further questions about directed imagery
therapy and systematic desensitization in particular. He reported that
all subjects had a flow of imagery unrelated to the imagery described
by the therapist, and that these possess psychodynamic properties which
have as yet an undetermined influence on the therapeutic effectiveness
of directed image and behavior modification procedures.

Singer (197h), Wilkins (1971), Foreyet (1973): Wilson (1971, 197“):
Reyher (1969), and others suggest that the main or total effect of
directed imagery may have nothing to do with the presence of imagery per

se but rather is due to the presence of other variables such as task

1

2
demands, suggestion, hypnosis, therapist expectation or a variety of
other non-Specific variables. Furthermore, evidence has been cited
in the above discussion which suggests that during directed imagery
the patient may be: 1) not visualizing imagery, and/or 2) visualizing
other images not related to the content directed by the therapist.
The assumption of the ability of a person to follow and produce Specif-
ically suggested imagery was further challenged by laboratory investi-
gations and on the basis of spontaneous visual imagery in emergent
uncovering psychotherapy (Morishige and Reyher, 1975; Reyher, 1963),
after a variable period of imagery, most clients will experience
anxiety, symptoms and/or resistance to dramatic imges or to certain
innocent appearing images (duck, orange). These are called "hot"
images and often are very difficult for the client to imagine upon
request. Also, many clients are not able to form images of key persons
in their lives. These clinical observations led to an investigation by
Reyher and Smeltzer (1968) which showed that visual images in reSponse
to emotional laden stimulus words indeed were characterized by greater
anxiety, primary process and need for defense than were verbal associa-
tions to the same words. On the basis of both clinical and laboratory
observations and findings, Morishige and Reyher (1975), have concluded
that spontaneous visual imagery (free imagery) is governed by repressed
strivings.

Taking into account the evidence of the dynamic properties during
free imagery and the evidence cited above on the presence of irrelevant
imagery during directed imagery, one can challenge the assumption that
imagery is continually present during directed imagery. Though Wilkins

(1972) has shown that only the instructions to image are necessary for

obtaining results in systematic desensitization, Weitzman (1967) and
Moses (197A) have shown that very often the subject is visualizing
substitutive (non-instructed) imagery. Furthermore, we can infer from
psychodynamic theory that the type of imagery and the ability to image
varies with the type of defenses available to the individual.

The purpose of the present investigation was to determine if the
subject's ability to image and to follow images varies along two main
dimensions: 1) content of the imagery and 2) the defensive dynamics
of the subject. (The measurement of "an ability to image" presents a
major methodological roadblock in that we are forced to rely on the
subject's reporting of images. Therefore, to be conservative in our
inferences from the data, we will focus on the reportability of images
as the dependent variables.)

Aggression was chosen as the imagery content in this experiment
due to its potency and prevalence in clinical experience, as well as
its prevalence in many directed imagery techniques. Blatant aggression
is less socially Opprobrious than blatant sexuality and the best inven-
tory of defenses (DMI) primarily involves anger and aggression. Clin-
ical experience with emergent uncovering psychotherapy (Burns and
Reyher, 1976; Morishige and Reyher, 1975) has shown that hostile aggres-
sive impulses often are repressed, particularly if they are directed
towards a parent and if they are of a murderous nature. The aim.of
aggression can take verbal expression, such as an insult, or physical
expression as hitting and/or killing. Thus, the intensity, aim, and
object of aggressive impulses determine whether a client will be able
to form a particular image upon request.

The following hypotheses were formulated:

1+

Hypothesis I: Failure to form an image upon request is a joint

 

function of the aim and intensity of the aggressive impulses
being depicted.

Hypothesis II: The Spontaneous formation of an image different

 

from the one requested (substitutive imagery) is a joint function
of the aim and intensity of the aggressive impulses being depicted.

Hypoth6818 III: Image failure is a function of type of defense.

 

Hypothesis IV: substitutive image formation is a function of

 

type of defense.

Though not a formal hypothesis, sex differences were also monitored.

Since boys exhibit more overt physical aggression that do girls
(Ferguson, 1970), male subjects should report fewer failures in image

formation and fewer substitutions.

METHOD

Subjects and Experimenters

 

Forty (20 male and 20 female) subjects ranging in ages from 17
to 29 were randomly selected from a group of undergraduate psychology
students who volunteered for an experiment titled "Visual Imagery".
Because the imagery involved interaction with parents, having both
parents living was a criteria for participation.

Two male and two female experimenters were used. One male and one
female were advanced students in clinical psychology, with each having
three years of supervision in psychotherapy. The other male was an
advanced undergraduate student majoring in psychology. All had exten-

sive research experience involving imagery.

Materials and Experimental Setting

 

The laboratory room was sound—proofed and windowless, and it con—
tained a large, black reclining chair (used by the subjects) and one
small straightback chair (for the experimenter). A six-channel Grass #5
polygraph stood conSpicuously against one wall, flanked by a cot on an
adjacent wall.

For monitoring periods of imagery, two concealed indicator lights
were activated by two telegraph keys, adjusted for minimal tension,
that were attached to the arm rests in such a manner that they could

be activated easily by the forefinger of each hand.

Stimulus narratives. Three stimulus narratives (made-up stories)

 

were used. Two were intended to stimulate different degrees of anger-
aggression while one was neutral in this reSpect. The low anger-

aggression story depicted a shouting match.between the subject and a

5

professor; the high anger-aggression story depicted a slapping fight
between the subject and his or her parents. The neutral (control)
story depicted an implausible space fantasy devoid of anger-aggression.
Abstract words were identified and eliminated because Paivio (1969)
found that the latency of tachistoscopic visual recognition is longer
for abstract words than concrete words. Since plausibility might be
an influencing variable, each scene in the three stories was rated

for plausibility. This was also done with respect to aggression.

Defense mechanism inventory. The DMI (Gleser and Ihilevich, 1969)
is a paper and pencil test designed to measure the relative intensity
of five major groups of defenses. The measures are derived from.the
manner in which the individual responds to conflict in his actual
behavior, his fantasies, his thoughts and his feelings. Five clusters
of defenses are identified:

"1. Turning against object (TAO). This class of defenses deals
with conflict through attacking a real or presumed external
frustrating object. Such classical defenses as identifica-
tionawith-the-aggressor and displacement can be placed in
this category.

2. Projection (PRO). Included here are defenses which justify
the eXpression of aggression toward an external object
through first attributing to it, without unequivocal evi-
dence, negative intent, or characteristics.

3. Principalization (PRN). This class of defenses deals with
conflict through invoking a general principle that "splits
off" affect from content and represses the former. Defenses
such as intellectualization, isolation, and rationalization
fall into this category.

h. Turning against self (TAS). In this class are those defenses
that handle conflict through directing aggressive behavior
toward S himself. Masochism and auto-sadism.are examples of
defensive solutions in this category.

5. Reversal (REV). This class includes defenses that deal with
conflict by responding in a positive or neutral fashion to
a frustrating object which might be expected to evoke a
negative reaction. Defenses such as negation, denial,
reaction formation, and repression are subsumed under
this category."

Validity studies show the DMI is related to MPPI scores, Haan's
Defense Scales, and reveal a stability of defenses over time and age.
Reliability was also reported. TAO and PRO are substantially nega-
tively correlated with PRN and REV. The authors conclude that, "Both
hostility and projection are considered more primitive, immature reSpon-
ses to conflict than is principalization." The relationship between
the defenses is relatively stable with low inner-correlation. The
moderately high correlations between PRN and REV may be attributable
to the common defense of repression of affect. My study attempts to
use this instrument in an eXploratory manner but, due to its relative

novelty, will refrain from any directional hypotheses.

Procedure

Before entering the laboratory, subjects were given a consent form
and they were also notified in writing that they could terminate the
experiment at any time and still receive full credit. In a.matter-of-
fact tone of voice, the experimenter asked the subject to complete a
brief questionnaire and then come into the laboratory where the exper-
imenter was waiting. When the subject entered the laboratory, he was
asked to be seated. He was given the following instructions:

"Now I'd like you to sit down in this chair pushing it all
the way back, and position yourself in order that your fingers
can easily depress the telegraph keys." (Experimenter adjusts

the length of the keys to the subject's reach and then tapes
the keys in place.)

 

8

The subject was then tested for his or her ability to form visual
images upon request (directed imagery):

"Now I'd like you to close your eyes and visualize an

image of an automobile. Please describe it for me when you

see it." (Experimenter lets subject describe the image for

30 seconds.)

Resistance to visual imagery is commonplace (Burns and Reyher, 1976);
Morishige and Reyher, 1976); Reyher, 1963, in press) and its most typical
manifestations were managed as follows:

If the subject stOpped short of the allotted 30 seconds or asked
what he or she should do next, the experimenter replied, "I'd like you
to just keep describing the automobile for a little while longer." If
the subject asked any questions about the procedure or opened his'or
her eyes, the experimenter merely repeated.the initial request, "I'd
like you to close your eyes and get an image in your mind's eye of an
automobile." If the subject reported he or she could not form.the
requested image, the experimenter responded, "Just wait for an image
of a car or any other image to come into your mind's eye and describe
it." If the subject asked any other questions, the experimenter replied,
"I know you may have some questions concerning this experience, and I
will be glad to answer them at the end of the eXperiment." If the sub-
ject could not image anything after one minute, the experimenter ter-
minated the proceedings by asking the subject, "For the purpose of my

interest in imagery, could.you tell me how you felt when I requested

you to close your eyes and when I asked you to image."

Practice Stimulus Narrative

 

The experimenter gave the subject the following instructions

before reading a practice story:

171).) .l‘

9

"Keeping your eyes closed, I would now like to rehearse
what we'll be doing during the experiment. Any time you get
the same imagery that I am describing, depress the telegraph
key on your right and hold it down with your forefinger. Any
time you visualize any other image, please release the right
key and depress the key on your left and hold it down. When
you do not see any images, release both keys. let me briefly
review. Only the right key is held down whenever you see the
images that I am describing. o'nISr" the left key is held down
when you are visualizing images different from.my directions.
For example, if I am describing an image of a car and you are
able to visualize that car, you would hold the right key down.
If you suddenly get a different image, for example, you see a
book, then you would release the right key and depress the left
key. And finally, whenever there are no images in your mind's
eye, simply release both keys. To help you separate your right
from your left with your eyes closed, we've put some tape on
the right-hand key whereas the left key has nothing on it.
Before we begin, could you please review what you have to do for
this experiment.

"Now I would like you to close your eyes and follow in
your imagery the following story that I am going to read.
Any time you are following the story in images, hold the
right key down; any time you are seeing images other than
those described in the story, hold the left key down. When
you do not see any images, release both keys.”
After reading the rehearsal story, the experimenter checked with

the subjects as to their understanding of the procedure.

Scoring. As the experimenter read the list of instructed images,
he or she monitored the indicator lights and marked the protocol
accordingly:

a) If the subject signalled that he or she was following the

images, no marks were made.

b) If the subject signalled a substitutive image (fsub): the

experimenter placed a check in the appropriate place on
the protocol.

c) If the subject signalled no imagery (fno), the experimenter

placed in parentheses whatever scenes the subject was unable

to image.

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Inquigy. The experimenter inquired where apprOpriate, "I noticed
when I described the image you signalled that you were seeing
some other image. Can you recall what it was?"
Also, where appropriate, the experimenter queried, "I noticed when
I described the image you signalled that you were not having

any images", to confirm the absence of a key press.

Experimental Stimulus Narratives

 

The three experimental narratives were administered in a counter-
balanced order. Upon completing the last narrative, the subjects were
given the Defense Mechanism.Inventory and a brief questionnaire (see
Appendix) concerning their expectations and reactions to the experiment.
The subjects were also asked, "Was there anything particularly upsetting
about this experiment?", and "Did you have any reactions to this experi-

ment?"

RESULTS

Ninety-two percent of the subjects indicated either of the two
types of interferences in imagery (no) or (sub), i.e., only three sub-
jects reported all the images without interferences. Seventy-five
percent reported failure in image formation (no) and eighty-three
percent reported substitutive imagery (sub). The percentages dis-
tributed across the three stimulus narratives are presented in

Table l.

Table l

Percentages and Combined Percentages of Subjects
Reporting Failures to Image (no) and/or Substitutive
Images (sub) Distributed Across the Three Stimulus Narratives

 

 

 

Types
Interference Combined
Stimulus Narrative fno fsub fno + fsub
(CONTROL) Implausible 53% 58% 75%
(LOW) Aggression 30% 55% 65%
(HI) Aggression 75% 68% 90%

 

Hypothesis I: Image failure is a joint function of aim and inten-

 

sity of aggressive impulses, received unambiguous support.

Table 2 reveals that frequency of image failure (fno) was the only
significant (.05 level) main effect in a three-way analysis of variance.
Experimenter, sex of experimenter, and sex of subject were not influ-
encing variables. There were no significant interactions. As predicted
(Table 2), a multiple pair-wise comparison of means (Duncan) showed that
the mean difference, between nonviolent, peer-aggression (i = 0.9) and
violent, father-aggression (i = 2.0), contributed significantly to the
overall F. Surprisingly, however, the mean difference between implaus-
ibility (i = 1.85) and nonviolent, verbal aggression also contributed

significantly.

Table 2

Analysis of Variance for the Effects of Type of Story, Sex of Subject,

 

 

 

 

Sex of Experimenter, and Experimenter on the Frequency of No Imagery
Source SS df MS F
Between
Sex of Experimenter (S.E.) 22 l 22 2.1
Sex of Subject (8.8.) l 1 l -
Experimenter (E.) 29 3 9.7 .96
Error 3AM 3h 10.1 -
Within
Story 28 2 1h 1+.s*
Story x (3.5.) 1 2 1 —
Story x (S.E.) 1 2 1 -
Story x (E.) 12 6 2 .6
Error 213 68 3.1 -
Total 61:8 119
* P .05

Table 3

Analysis of Variance of the Effects of the Type of
Story, Sex of Subject, Sex of Experimenter, and
Experimenter on the Frequency of Substitutive Imagery

 

 

 

Source 88 df MS F

Between

Sex of Experimenter (S.E.) 13 1 13 3.7

Sex of Subject (5.3.) 6 1 6 1-7

Experimenter (E.) 1+0 3 13 3.7

Error 18 3h 3.5 -
Within

Story 5 2 2.5 1.h

Story x (8.8.) 5 2 2.5 1.1+

Story X (S.E.) 1 2 1 _

Story X (E.) 17 6 2.8 1.6

Error 116 68 1.7 -
Total 329 119

 

A more refined analysis was accomplished by rating each of the 30
scenes from.the three stimulus narratives in terms of aggressive con-
tent and by computing a correlation between a rank ordering of scenes
with aggressive content and fno- Three raters working independently
identified 17 scenes having aggressive content and ranked each scene
in order of increasing aggression. Their percentage of agreement varied
between 92% and 98% with a median of 95%. This was considered to be

satisfactory for research purposes, and a subsequent correlation

l3

1h
(Spearman Rho) of .85 between the judges rankings and the fno rank of
each scene was significant at p .05. Plausibility was subjected to
the same analysis with percentages of agreement between the two raters
for the same 17 scenes ranging between 88% and 9h%. The Obtained rank

order correlation of .73 for fno also was significant (.05 level).

Hypothesis II: Substitutive image formation is a joint function

 

of aim.and intensity of aggressive impulses, received somewhat ambiguous
support.

Like Table 2, Table 3 shows that there were neither significant
main effects nor interactions, but the mean differences between the
stories all were in the predicted direction. These means were, reSpec-
tively, 1.8, l.h and 1.2 for violent, father-aggression, nonviolent
peer aggression, and the control-implausibility narrative. However,
more palpable support for the hypothesis was provided by a significant
(.05 level) rank order correlation of .63 between the rated aggression
of scenes and fsub' This time the rank order correlation (.38) between

plausibility and fsub was not significant.

Hypothesis III: Image failure is a function of type of defense,

 

received no support.
Table h shows that none of the rank order correlations (Spearman)

between type of defense and fno were significant.

Table h

Spearman Rank Order Correlation Between subjects Rank
for the Dependent Variables (fno and fsub) and
Rank on the Defenses of the Defense Mechanism.Inventory

 

 

 

Defense TAO PRO PRN TAS REV
fno .17 .17 .05 -.22 .03
fsub .25 .30 .03 - .30 - .10

 

 

Hypothesis IV: Substitutive image formation is a function of type
of defense, received no support.

Table h shows that none of the rank order correlations (Spearman)
between type of defense and fsub were significant.

An examination of Table 5, which gives the ranking of the 17 aggres-
sive scenes, suggests that aggression must reach a threshold of intensity
before there is an increase in fno and fsub above the individual's base

rate.

15

 

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Plausibility. Table 6 shows that the plausibility of a scene, as

 

well as the level of aggression, is highly correlated.with‘both depen-
dent variables. Since aggression and plausibility are associated, the
foregoing support for Hypotheses I and II is vitiated. The present

study thus cannot ascertain whether aggression or plausibility is the

more potent variable.

Table 6

Difference in Correlation Coefficients

 

 

 

 

no sub

raggression .85 .63
r

plausibility .73 .38

ragg ' rprob. +.12 +.25

p..05

Debriefing. The results of the debriefing are consistent with the
outcome of the statistical analysis. Ninety-five percent of the sub-
jects said that some images were harder to get than others. Twenty
percent of them.thought that the experiment had something to do with
their ability to form images, but none of them.guessed the Specific
eXperimental hypotheses. Perhaps the most significant information
gleaned was that twenty-five percent of the subjects revealed that
they withheld some images. One source of information that might elu-
cidate the reasons(s) for this resistance is the substitutions. These

appeared to be indicative of a variety of well-known defenses, not

included in the DMI, which can be interpreted to mean that the scenes

Ill-ll ..
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20
not imaged were indeed anxiety-producing for the subjects. That is,
they were hot images. Unfortunately, there were no provisions for an
independent assessment of anxiety. Nevertheless, the concreteness of
depictive visual imagery provides an impressive documentation of anxiety-
motivated defenses, as illustrated by the following alteration substitu-
tions to the scene, "You slap your mother": "Just see us standing
there", "Threatening but not hitting", "Brothers come into room", "Saw
myself crying", "Could only see my mother hanging the laundry", "Another
scene in the antique store", "See myself swimming", "I couldn't see her
slap me, just crying", "Just saw myself standing there", "Just saw par-
ents checking car and discussing", "Saw her sitting there", "Just
talking to his mom", and "Yelling not hitting".

The experimental findings fully verify the clinical Observations that
the client's/subject's imagery is not a passive point-for-point reproduc~
tion of the therapist's/experimenter's stimulus narrative. This means
that the use of imposed visual imagery and graded anxiety-producing images
associated with implosive therapy and systematic desensitization, reSpec-
tively, may not be influencing variables in the mediation of their thera-
peutic effects. 'With reSpect to systematic desensitization, Wilkins
(1971) concluded that these effects might be mediated.by the social
variables in the patient-client relationship and by expectancy of thera-
peutic gain. His conclusion is supported by a line of inquiry into the
nature of suggestibility (Reyher and'Wilson, 1973; Reyher and Pottinger,
1976 ; wilson, 1971:) . Wilson has shown that suggestibility increases
while the subject waits silently for instructions, but that it decreases
while the subject speaks. Such a passive-receptive attitude character-
izes the situation for the client not only in implosive therapy and

systematic desensitization but also for biofeedback, covert aversive
conditioning and others (Reyher and Pottinger, 1976).

21

The lack of sex differences might be interpreted in at least two
ways: one, sex differences only appear in behavior, not at the level
of imagery; and two, sex differences are not associated with plausi-
bility, which is the sole influencing variable. unfortunately, the
eXperimental design does not permit a differential evaluation of
these two possible interpretations.

We were surprised by the large number of failures in image forma-
tion and substitutions associated with the implausible stimulus nar-
rative, particularly in view of the perfusion of fantasy in our
culture via the vehicles of TV, movies and literature. The expression
of aggressive drives in their most primitive and unsocialized forms
apparently is not more plausible for most individuals than seeing
little green men.

Plausibility, however, is not an issue for free imagery since
all visual images, regardless of plausibility, are Spontaneous. Even
hot images may be either plausible (e.g., a duck with extended neck,

a purple Spot, the bow of a large boat) or implausible (e.g., Loch

Ness monster with head of Teddy Roosevelt, a fish with an elephant's
trunk for its snout). moreover, the clarity and definition of plausible
and implausible images appears to be the same. Whether the visual
images are hot appears to be the critical issue.

The question of plausibility also is irrelevant for systematic
desensitization, which focuses on personal, anxiety-producing images
or scenes from the clients' own experience. In psychoanalytic terms,
anxiety associated with the persons, places and events in question is
a phobic process, and, therefore, involves the externalization of

repressed drives. However, it remains to be seen if the visualization

22
of phobic objects are more reliably formed by the client than the revis-
ualizations of Spontaneous hot images or even imposed neutral scenes.
If the latter were found to be true, then, of course, our findings
would no longer be applicable.

Plausibility only is an issue for psychotherapeutic methods util-
izing directed imagery. Accordingly, diverging operational definitions
must be develOped to differentiate between these two confounded sources
of failure in image formation. A.suitable Operational definition of
a hot image in directed imagery requires four progressive criteria:
First, there is image failure--either there are no images or there
are substitute images. Second, there are contingent reactions
(anxiety, symptoms and/or resistance) in reSponse to the request to
form.images. However, an elicitation of contingent reactions does
not settle the issue in favor of the image being either hot or implaus-
ible. These contingent reactions could be caused by the subject's
failure to form the directed image. Therefore, the third part of the
progressive operational definition must be invoked. This is a second
request by the experimenter for the subject to image the failed
image or scene, but to eliminate the possibility that the subject has
not lost the ability to image per se, the eXperimenter asks him/her
to begin with an image or scene just prior to the failed one. If the
image or scene in question is failed again, a third request is made.

If this is followed by a diminution or abatement of contingent reace
tions, then a decision is made in favor of implausibility as the cause
for the failure in image formation because the subject may be more
likely to adjust to such failures than to the continued activation of

repressed strivings by the revisualization of hot images. Conversely,

23
if there is an intensification of contingent reactions, then the issue
is decided in favor of the image being hot. However, this might be an
incorrect decision because the subject's repeated failures to produce
the requested images may have exacerbated feelings of inadequacy,
thereby intensifying contingent reactions. Therefore, the final and
differentiating fourth part of the progressive Operational definition
is the generation of a chain of increasingly drive-depictive images,
in re3ponse to the requests for revisualization, concurrent with the
intensification of contingent reactions. This would not happen for
implausible, but neutral images.

We have discussed several hypothetical mechanisms for mediating
the effect of implausibility upon image formation. The absence of
the palpable expression of anger in the neutral stimulus narrative
suggests that a non-drive factor may be responsible. One such possi-

bility is visual memory storage. Freud's Observation in The Ego and

 

the_£d anticipates this element as he argues, "We must not be led...
to forget the importance of optical mnemonic residues (images) or to
deny that it is possible for thought processes to become conscious
through reversion to visual residues." This notion has been advanced
by Segal (1971) who contends that visual imagery depends in part on
stored information. This dependence upon the storage of one's past
visual experiences may account for the effort by some of our subjects
to form the scenes of the implausible stimmdus narrative by incor-
porating science-fiction scenes previously seen in television and
other visual media. Another possible explanation is that the implaus-
ible stimulus narrative activated anxiety-producing drives and affects

not manifestly identifiable. yet another possible explanation is that

I'll .
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21+
the disorientation, loss of reality contact, alienation, etc., in the
stimulus narrative may have been.anxiety-producing to some of the sub-
jects.

The failure of the DMI to correlate with success or failure in
image formation is puzzling. Since the DMI deals with subject's con-
sciously eXperienced behavior in hypothetical situations, it might have
been that the unconscious dimensions of defenses were not tapped. In
addition, the categories of defenses appear to be too broadly defined
and represent a potpourri of different defenses. Finally, the defenses
operating at the level of visual imagery may be much different from
those operating in interpersonal, TAT type situations. Fortunately, a
perusal of the protocols clearly revealed some of the defenses used by
the subjects, particularly in connection with substitutions and alter-
ations in scenes. The "Attenuation of Affect" (n = 10) represents the
taming of affect. Rather than reporting the Specifically requested
image, the subjects reported the immediately preceding, less aggressive
images instead. "Regression to Passive Mastery" (n = 69) represents a
change from an active to passive mode of mastery of affect. For example,
a subject might have seen him.or herself standing still being hit
instead of hitting. "Substitute Formation" (n = 6) represents an
acceptable displacement and/or condensation of repressed strivings
activated by a particular scene or image in the narrative. "Denial"

(n = 37) represents the omission of a Specific anxiety-producing ele;
ment, e.g., "I saw blood.but not the mouth". "Reaction Formation"

(n = h) represents the substitution of an opposite behavior for an
anxiety-producing one in the stimulus narrative. In the shouting

match with the professor, one subject reported "smiling not yelling".

nil-1“! ![.{il.‘l

‘4‘! rl\ It'll! (It; .[nl‘ I III. .[ . [Ii ll i‘.‘ Iil

25
"Displacement" (n = h) represents the substitution of a less anxiety-
producing Object of a drive by another less threatening one, as the
subject who reported visualizing kicking a wastebasket but not seeing
a professor.

The empirical facts are clear: in the course of using a stimulus
narrative, most subjects do not form all the scenes in their mind's
eye, the number of image failures and substitutions increases with the
intensification of conflict and not all substitutions or Spontaneous
images are reported. Consequently, we must conclude that those methods
of psychotherapeutic intervention that require the client to form
imposed images do not necessarily achieve their desired ends by means
of the imagery per se. Contextual variables and other variables
implicit in the interpersonal relationship between therapist and client

must be taken into account.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL REVIEW OF IMAGERY

Imagery stands at the crossroads of all psychological theories and
therapies. The status and function imagery serves in each of the major
theoretical frameworks ranges from the level of relative meaninglessness
(S-R psychology) to that of a "primary" status (psychoanalytic theory).
Imagery has varying status in the history of psychology. According to
Piaget (1962), imagery was originally conceptualized as a direct product
of thought and sensation (and held to be a residual trace of the latter).
The status of imagery was then raised to where it was considered, along
with association, as the fundamental element of thought. In the late
1890's, imagery came to be disregarded as a symbolic function and was
considered as an extension of perception, i.e., an accurate copy of
Objects and events. Findings in the laboratories of Binet and‘wurzberg
schools in the early 1900's showed the presence of hmageless thought and
thus quickly led to the dismissal of imagery as being at most an auxil-
iary function of thought. This attitude was strongly maintained in
American psychology and to the subsequent disregard of interest in
imagery studies. It has been only in the past ten years that psychology
has experienced a reversal in its attitude towards imagery, Segal (1971),
Richardson (1969), and Shaheen (1972). These recent works have elevated
imagery to the status of being considered one of the most important
effects in learning, memory, and psychotherapy;

Observations of different theoretical schools, however, are not
necessarily mutually exclusive. Bugelski (1971) reviews some of the
necessary conditions for imagery production. The prototype for image

formation as a condition sensation (Leuba and mawrer) appears in the

26

27
classical conditioning paradigm of the continual pairing of a buzzer
with a light. Eventually the light presented alone will elicit an
auditory "hallucination" of hearing the buzzer. Imagery is thus con-
sidered as a phenomenon, like sensation, which occurs when a motor
reSponse to an external stimuli is blocked: "When a motor reSponse is
blocked, impulses diverted from the motor center can spread out to...
other sensory centers and initiate activity therein from what amounts
to a central source." This lack of overt activity is considered a
necessary condition among other theorists. Imagery during dreams and
sensory deprivation experiments are seen as a function of the individ-
ual's body being in a state of inhibition. Theorists argue the converse,
that any action is likely to interfere with an image. Fischer notes an
inverse relation between high "M" on the Rorschach (indicative of high
imagination) and motility. This reverse relationship between imagery-
fantasy and action is also indicated in an interesting study by Biblow
(1973) who reported that subjects high in fantasy are less likely to be
aggressive, regardless of the content of the fantasy, than those of,a
low fantasy level.

Much of the work in cognitive psychology has attacked the notion
that imagery is a mere static phenomenon, a form of a perceptual trace.
Segal (1971) addresses himself to the problem of processing the stimmli
in imagery and perception. Segal claims that "The measurement of imagery
is similar to the measurement of perception - both involve phenomenolog—
ical experiences based on patterns of response within the optic tract
and brain, the only difference is that with perception there is clearly
defined physical stimulus." He argues that imagery may depend not only

on stored information'but on relevant physical stimuli present in the

28
environment. Expanding on the studies of Perky (1910), Segal found
that physical stimmli are partially processed and assimilated into
images (when the subject is requested to image with eyes open). Gazing
at an unpatterned visual field, the subject is asked to have images of
various objects (rather neutral in character: food, animals, etc.).
During the request to image, an undetected but supraliminal photograph
is flashed onto the field of vision. .As Perky found, Segal discovered
that oftentimes the photograph was incorporated into the image without
the subject's knowledge of the external stimuli being present. He con-
cludes that the image, compared to the percept, is the predominant
determinant (in other words, assimilation is greater than accommodation).
Segal concludes from.this line of research that the emergence and for-
mation of an image does not depend entirely on the revivication of past
images nor is it a mere replay of previous experiences. (His study may
be considered a possible test of what Freud considered to be the residue
of the previous day in dream.imagery.) Image formation, Segal argues,
is an active process in which the observer constructs images not only
out of past experiences and memory, but also from any currently avail-
able sensory input. His research in imagery, however, epitomizes the
underlying problem in research.methodology in this area. It is obvious
that studying image formation with eyes Open as Opposed to eyes closed
leads to a great deal of contamination and confusion. One could argue
that what Segal is studying is not necessarily image formation but
rather the effects of noise. One must be very cautious in generalizing
his findings to studies utilizing imagery with eyes closed. (His work
may also be interpreted to provide evidence to have eye closure during

imagery therapy since during the eyes open condition the subject may

29
assimilate stimuli from the environment for defensive purposes, i.e.,
to avoid reporting stressful internal imagery, discussed later.) The
relationship between imagery and perception as shown above suggests
the utilization of the same brain pathways. Further evidence is reported
by Singer (1973) who found that subjects processing visual signals (eyes
open) are less likely to report visual daydreams, whereas reports of
auditory fantasies were unaffected.

Neisser (1971) further describes the intimate relationship between
imagery and perception. Both imagery and perception are active construc-
tions rather than.mere passive registration of recall. Furthermore, "a
subject is imaging whenever he employs some of the same cognitive
processes that he would use in perceiving, but when the stimulus input
that would normally give rise to perceptions is absent... Our images
must be based on what we remember and what we remember is often based
on images." Neisser's treatment of imagery, however, is still lacking
when we consider that imagery involves a great deal more than percep-
tion. An important point emphasized by Neisser is that imagery is not
a unitary phenomenon. He finds a wide range of phenomena falling under
this rubric even within the mental life of a single individual.

By studying memory, very strong relationships between imagery and
language also appear. Paivio (1969) found that imagery and verbal
processes are two mechanisms which are differentially effective in
sequential and non-sequential memory tasks, language and learning.
Language is conceptualized as being linked to two interconnected coding
systems. Comprehension and production of language, he considers, can be
mediated by non-verbal imagery. For example, the recall of the sentence

"The red-haired boy is peeling an orange", one may remember the image

30
prior to repeating the sentence. Imagery and verbal processes, he pos-
tulates, vary on the dimension of concreteness and.meaningfu1ness.
"The availability of imagery", Paivio hypothesizes, "is assumed to vary
directly with item.concreteness or image-evoking value, whereas verbal
processes are presumably independent of concreteness but functionally
linked to meaningfulness and codability." As reviewed by Bugelski,
imagery has direct effects on the ability to recall words. werds that
cannot excite any visual reaction (therefore, not a basis for imagery)
leave the subject without a foundation of learning. Verbal systems,
Paivio continues, can deal with.more abstract units of information and
information that has to be stored sequentially. Imagery, however, is
specialized for symbolic representations of concrete situations and
information that is stored,spatially. The dimension of concreteness
as a property of imagery, however, may be an artifact of experimental
studies utilizing paired associative learning rather than a naturalistic
property of imagery. Clinical experience reveals abstract relation-
ships that are continually exposed and experienced by individuals that
can be vividly expressed in one's imagery.

In opposition to the criticism by Brown and others (who argue that
imagery changes are too slow, too general, and are not manifest in many
people), Paivio claims that imagery may operate on an unconscious, non-
verbalized, short-circuited level. Language and imagery are coded and
interconnected on different levels. At the elementary level, there is
a "rapidly fading perceptual image" or what Paivio considers iconic
memory. The second level is representational, in which the symbolic

unit is stored in long-term memory as a concrete image. The third

31
level, referrential, contains associative connections between image and
verbal representation. Finally at the associative meaning level, there
are sequences of words and images or both.

Superior memory is thus seen to be dependent on the increased avail-
ability of a number of different coding systems fOr the effective storage
and retrieval of information. Citing Paivio, Singer concludes, "visual
imagery, when readily generated, may be more effective than verbal media-
tion because information and the image are spatially organized permitting
a rapid readout of the relevant components, whereas the information in
verbal storage is sequentially organized as a string of"mental words'
that take up more space in memory, or require longer search time with
less sufficient retrieval of the relevant reSponses during recall or
both". Sequential information thus provides less information in a given
period of time than imagery in which one can scan an entire situation
instantly.

Thus, experimental psychology has readily recognized the extreme
potency of imagery. It has strong links with perception, learning, and
memory. It is more than a condition sensation or a.perceptual trace.

As Paivio theorizes, the arousal meaning evoked by a word or other sym-
bol is an organismic reaction with affective, motor (including verbal)
or imaginal components. This consideration begins to take imagery into
account during the development of the individual, and in its inter-
relatedness with the other aspects of the individual's functioning.

Werner and Kaplan (1963) consider the develOpment of symbols in
imagery from an organismic-developmental framework. Their orientation
rests on several assumptions. Any activity, behavior, or organ is

dependent upon the context, field or whole of which a constitutive part,a

32

i.e., the functional significance of prOperties is determined by the
larger whole. Behavior, therefore, gains it significance only from
the study of the overall functioning of the organism, The activities
of an organism are also considered as functioning towards the realiza-
tion of ends imminent in the activity of the organism as a whole (the
assumption of directiveness). This is not a conscious effort but
rather a built-in process.

The developmental nature of their orientation assumes that the
organism.is naturally directed towards a series of transformations
(including the quite popular developmental concept which considers
development proceeding to increasing differentiation and hierarchic
integration from earlier glObal and undifferentiated states). Devel-
Opment, they further propose, maintains a general continuity with the
exception of qualitative changes brought about by the emergence of
novel functions and structures. Genetically earlier structures (e.g.,
imagery) are not lost but are subordinated to more advanced levels of
functioning (e.g., language) and subject to re-emerging during periods
of conflict and stress. The environment is, therefore, "cognisized"
or known in the form of perceptualized Objects. Compared to animals
and infants, man gains increasingly more freedom from stimulus deter-
mined patterns of behavior by means of constructing tangible tools
(symbols) out of the prOperties of the environment and cognitive
Objects which mediate between man and his physical milieu. The most
significant of man's instrumentalities is the symbol.

Symbols are qualitatively different from signals (or signs);
symbols represent, compared to signs and signals which merely elicit

or inhibit actions. Sign theory is based on Spatio-temporal contiguity

33
and lacks the representative function of symbols. One way to concep-

tualize the difference is seen in a brief experiment proposed by‘Werner
and Kaplan. Fer example, by repeating a word over and over again, the
word will begin to lose its inner dynamic organization and experience
though it can maintain its external tie to its object. This can be
easily eXperienced.by constantly repeating the word "car". After a
while, it will develop a "lapse of meaning" though no matter how many
times one repeats the word, the associative relationship between the
word and its object will not be lost. Continuous pairing of reinforce-
ment is not how symbolic vehicles and referrants are linked. (Before
continuing, some definitions may be in order: a referrant is an entity
which is represented (e.g., father), whereas the symbolic vehicle (e.g.,
visual, auditory, etc.) is the structure of the configuration and the
symbol (e.g., a dragon) is the entity which it represents. The proto-
symbol (a visual image of a dragon) presents rather than represents.)
Werner and Kaplan explain the relationship of symbols to protosymbols.
A protosymbol is important in the genetic process of symbolization in
that it can be transformed into a true symbol by progressive differen-
tiation: "from true symbols we distinguish, then, those productions
whereby the vehicular structure (imagery, verbal patterns, etc.)
directly present a meaning rather than represent it... Though on the
surface often indistinguishable from.true symbols, protosymbols lack
the intentional act by which a vehicle form is taken to represent the
referran ". The symbol, therefore, is conceptualized as a productive,
progressive act rather than a static, copy phenomenon. Symbols (lan-
guage, imagery, etc.) are activities in‘which.things are organismically

expressed.

3%

During ontogeny there is a transformation from knowing things of
action to objects of contemplation. Development proceeds from outward
reaction to inward reflection marking the internalization of sensory
motor patterns. Starting from a "premordial matrix of compressed affect,
postural elements, etc., the referrential object as a meaningful entity
issues forth though still remains linked to its underlying process of
schematization". During develOpment, there is a change in the symbolic
process mainly in the form of increasing integration of the symbolic
forms. Symbolic vehicles become more conventional (language as compared
to imagery), referrants become more complex and abstract, the addressees
become peers rather than parents and the addressor matures physically.
Mbst significantly for the focus of this study, there is increasing dis-
tance between the referrant and symbol from the primordial sharing situa-
tion in which there was little differentiation in the child's experience
between himself and the referrential Object. A more external interper-
sonal representation thus emerges. The distancing between a person and
the symbolic vehicle is on two levels. The external distancing develOps
from immediate affective-motor-imaginal transactions to language. Verbal
phonal material is more readily shaped by external interpersonal events
than the genetically earlier imagery. The internal distancing occurs
when the meanings of the vehicles expressed become less egocentric and
less idiosyncratic. Genetically earlier symbols are highly individual-
ized in view of private experiences, personal feelings and reactions and
thereby lackjprecision and stability necessary for the communication to
others. (This is a brief explanation of the difficulty inexperienced
therapists have in communicating and.understanding psychotic language.

The sharp decrease in the distance between the referrential object

35
and the symbolic vehicle that occurs in this language makes it a non-
consensual means of representation.)

Thus, it is shown that the relationship between a vehicle and its
referrant is not a simple one. The active denotative referrence does
not merely operate with already formed expressive similarities but is
also productive, i.e. , it brings forth latent expressive qualities
between the vehicle and the referrant , though allows for the establish-
ment of semantic correspondence through schematization. The idea of a
dynamic schematization is implied to infer dynamic, victoral, mobile
processes rather than a static copy model.

Piaget (1969) argues that internal representation (imagery) is 933
possible at birth but can emerge only at the later stages of sensory
motor develOpment. (This is in sharp contrast to psychoanalytic theory
which will be discussed later.) As Wolf (1967) summarizes, Piaget iden-
tifies a non-representational phase of symbolic functioning in which no

a priori psychic image of an object is utilized. In The Psycholog of

 

the Child (1969) , Piaget identifies a developmental hierarchy of his
semiotic (symbolic) function: deferred imitation--when the infant is
capable of imitating the behavior of a model absent from the room
(without an internal representation of that model); symbolic play;
drawing; mental imagery (the first sig: and stage of internalized
representation); and finally, language (which eventually overlays all
of the prior processes.) Piaget has apparently derived his non-repre-

sentational stage of functioning from two major works. In Mental

 

Imagery in Children, Piaget focuses exclusively on the use of imagery

 

in its relationship to solving perceptual motor problems (though Piaget

appears to want to consider his study as encanpassing all intellectual

36
functioning). After dozens of studies, he concludes that imagery is not
utilized and, therefore, cannot be acquired until a relatively late
stage of childhood. He concludes, "In short, the two main periods of
image development correspond to the pre-operational (before 7-8) and the
Operational levels... The images of the first period remain essentially
static and consequently unable to represent even the results of movements
and transformations and a fortiori unable to anticipate processes not
yet known. But at seven to eight years... imaginal anticipation makes
its first appearance, enabling the subject to reconstitute kinetic or
transformational processes." ThuS, in the Piaget model we can see a
transformation in the type of imagery available to the child. At the
pre-operational level, the child has only access to reproductive images
(which evoke Objects and events already known). Anticipatory images
which are representations of events not yet perceived (and cannot be
explained by just increasing flexibility of reproductive images) are
not realized until the level of concrete operations. This Observation
of Piaget may explain the controversy in experimental psychology as to
whether images are static cOpies or processes. In Piaget's model we
can see that both.types of images are present in the adult. It is easy
to see the complications that have arisen by attempting to generalize
from the Observations of one type of imagery. Piaget, however, may be
also making a mistake himself‘by attempting to generalize from.Observa-
tion of imagery in the service of intelligence and neglecting the prOp-
erties of imagery in symbolic functions in _t_o_‘_t_o_. In his studies of
pre-verbal children, there must be a great deal of artifact. Fbr
example, since the bulk of his research deals with perceptual motor

function, the infant's failure to solve such tasks may not be due to

37
the lack of imagery but rather to non-veridical imagery, poor motor

skills, etc .

In Play Dreams and limitation (1962), Piaget considers the symbolic

 

function as a general system of representation. Though at the expense
of misstating and misunderstanding several psychoanalytic constructs,
this study appears to be much less constricted than his study cited
above. Symbolic thought is seen to be a part of a continuum of thinking
and representation. Piaget, rejecting any dichotomy between primary and
secondary process, argues that there is no great separation between con-
scious and hidden symbols but rather a variety of intermediate stages
between conscious and unconscious symbolic assimilation. Every symbol,
he considers, can be at the same time conscious and unconscious. (Care-
ful reading of Freud and Fenichel, however, reveals that this is not in
too much disagreement with Freud.) For example, the mechanisms of
thought can be unconscious while its results conscious. To consider
the unconscious a region, as he attributes to Freud as doing, is inap-
propriate since symbols can have a variety of more or less remote
meanings. Piaget claims that the field of unconscious symbolism is
wider than that accounted for by Freud's censorship and repression.
Symbolism, according to Piaget, can be the beginning of conscious
assimilation rather than merely a function of censorship. Symbolism,

he further argues, extends far beyond the field of what can be con-
sidered censoring. The main thrust of his argument, as he cites work
by Silberer, is that symbolism must be considered an adaptive indepen-
dent function unassociated, and relatively independent, from repression
and censorship. He supports his position by citing the work of major

theorists. Adler, for example, considered symbols not to be a disguise

38
but rather a reflection either direct or allegorical of the subject's
present activity. Drawing heavily upon the work of Jung (it is no coin-
cidence that Piaget was analyzed by a student of Jung's), Piaget furthers
his argument for the independent status of symbolism. He offers one
interpretation of archetypes as general structures of thought that are:
l) inherent in the individual before he is socialized, and 2) common to
children. Altering Jung's archetype explanation, he suggests that imag-
ined representation due to symbolic assimilations which are found to be
universal may be a function of general childlike primitive thought forms
rather than innate ideas. Primitive symbolic thought, therefore, can'be
thought to be common to children, independent of censorship and repression.

According to Wo1f, Piaget's position stands in sharp contrast to the
psychoanalytic conception of the innate capacity to form hallucinatory
images, "but satisfaction is not possible, drive tension may be chan-
neled to activate the memory traces of an earlier satisfaction and as
a result the child hallucinates the previous occasion to satisfaction
as a perceptual reality... (These images are) the precursor of verid-
ical thought and constitute the primary model of ideation in psycho-
analysis".

Symbolism, Fenichel cites (l9h5, p. #8), "is not only a.method of
distortion; it is also a part of the primal prelogical thinking... In
dreams, symbols appear in both aspects, as a tool of the dream.censor-
ship and also as a characteristic of archaic pictorial thinking, as a
part of visualizing abstract thoughts". This double status of symbols
and images in psychoanalytic theory was not recognized by Piaget and
thus his criticisms are relatively mute. Fenichel, however, differen-

tiates between the archaic symbolism of prelogical thinking and the

39

symbolism which are derivatives of repressed ideas: "Whereas in distor-
tion the idea of a penis is avoided through the idea of disguising it as
a snake, in prelogical thinking penis and snake are one and the same;
that is, they are perceived by a common perception (this is somewhat
analogous to Werner and Kaplan's concept of a protosymbol)... the con-
scious idea of the snake replaces the unconscious one of penis.

Symbols, Freud acknowledged (1935), are formed from language,
colloquialisms, myths, fairy tales, jokes, etc. Though he did not
address himself specifically to the developmental process within indi-
viduals, be depicted the role of imagery in the continuum of conscious-

ness. In The Interpretation of Dreams and his Introductory Lectures,

 

 

he identifies three processes of dream work: 1) condensation in which
several elements are combined into one picture, 2) displacement in

which there is a shift in affect and associations, and 3) transformation

 

of thoughts into visual images. (This last process is considered another

 

form of displacement in which there is a change in the verbal expressions
into a visual one rather than just another substituted thought.) A
dream thought, Freud described, "is unusual so long as it is expressed
in an abstract form; but when once it has been transformed into pictoral
language, contrasts and identification of the kind which dream work
requires... can'be established.more easily than before between the new
form of expression and the remainder of the materials underlying the
dreams". This is so because in every language concrete terms are richer
in associations than perceptual ones. (This strikes some similar chords
as mentioned by Paivio.) Pictorial representation loses something,
however, in its translation. It is difficult to test whether the dream

element is to be taken in the positive or negative sense, to be inter-

ho

preted historically or symbolically. Freud continues, visual images
may also be a source of new material: "this pouring of the content of
thought into another mold may at the same time serve the purposes of
the activity of condensation and.may create connections which might
not otherwise have been present with some other thought; thus we find
that dream work transforms latent thoughts into perceptual forms. The
purpose of dream.interpretation is to retranslate the visual percepts
into language form. There is a regressive nature to Freudian visual
imagery since he argues that our thoughts originated in such perceptual
forms and sense impressions. Herowitz (1970) summarizes the psycho-
dynamics of image formation and considers its place in the continuum
of symbolic representation:

"To summarize, image formation is a more primitive system

and it tends to be under the influence of a primitive system

of regulation, the primary process. Images may be harder to

inhibit, and they may also be easily disguised through the

mechanisms of condensation, displacement, and symbolization.

Lexical representation develOps later, when prohibitions have

been internalized and inhibitory systems and the secondary

process have been developed. Also, words tend to be clear,

once they enter awareness: images may be fleeting and poorly

recorded in memory. Finally, images are more likely, than

lexical representation, to provide partial gratification

because they are more analagous to perception."

Considering the experimental and theoretical complexities of imagery,
it is no wonder that the integration of imagery into psychotherapy research
raises a variety of new problems and questions. In a comprehensive
review, Singer (l97h) offers a vivid example of the history and range of
imagery therapeutic applications.

Though some types of psychotherapy rely exclusively on imagery as
the predominant modality, while others tend to use imagery in a.more

adjunctive fashion (e.g., to overcome resistances, to elicit particular

hl
affects, etc.); regardless of the theoretical orientation of the thera-
pist, application and technique of imagery follow similar patterns of
directing the client to image a standardized episode or scene preceded
by the therapist directing the patient in progressive relaxation. The
thematic material and the directive role of the therapist are not as
variable as the theoretical orientations might support.

Singer (l97h) attributed the influence of Behaviorism as a deter-
rent for the growth and interest of imagery in the united States.
Dismissing the phenomenon of imagery as being "subjective", the beha-
viorist advocated the study of more "public" operations which were
overt and easily quantifiable. Psychotherapists in Europe, under the
influence of Jung, existentialism, and phenomenology, have been less
burdened by the methodical restrictions of Behaviorism.and were ini-
tially'more receptive to imagery.

Curiously, the major impetus in EurOpe for the use of imagery in
therapy was an engineer with relatively no knowledge of psychotherapy.
Desoille's (circa 1930) procedures have become the prototype for imagery
methods: first the patient, with eyes shut, reclines on a couch; the
therapist then directs him.initia1ly in progressive relaxation and then
directs him to visualize specific imagery scenes, and then finally
through particular metaphorical scenes depictive of conflicts and life
prOblems. Desoille conceptualizes that the therapist serves as a guide
for the patient through highly symbolic-metaphorical imagery episodes.
These episodes of imagery allegedly represent major prOblem areas of
living (one's own personality characteristics, Opposite sex parent, same
sex parent, social constraints, Oedipal conflict, etc.). These "guided

waking dreams" are directed by the therapist who encourages the patient

 

A2

to confront and overcome his conflict by means of symbolic trials and
struggles. During periods of resistances and fears, the therapist inter-
venes actively by having the patient visualize a magical Opportunity to
increase his strength. This series of imaginal episodes or "trips", in
lieu of extended discussion and analysis of patient-therapist dynamics,
are considered to have intrinsic curative prOperties. Through the trips,
the patient supposedly experiences mastery, accomplishment, catharsis,
and a re-education of new approaches to conflicts. Regardless of Desoille's
theoretical validity, Singer argues, as will further be discussed later,
that the imagery serves to desensitize the patient from some frightening
experiences and anxiety.

Singer notes an attempt to integrate imagery with more traditional
therapy is provided by Fretigny and Virel in the use of "onirotherapy".
Unlike Desoille, they focus on transference and resistance and give the
patient more freedom.by using less directed imagery. Though still rely-
ing on symbolic and metaphorical representation of the patient's conflicts
and imagery, they allow the patient's imagery to unroll as freely as pos-
sible after suggesting a particular direction or episode. Their central
focus, however, is still on the "oneirodrama"--the dramatic confronta-
tion through imagery (symbolic) of the critical problems of the patient.
Imagery again is identified as the critical variable: "Inhibitions are
translated into metaphoric form.and can be relieved only to the extent

that an opportunity for expression is oniric or a dream like form is

 

possible." The work.has generated a series of research, particularly on
the physical correlates of their onirotherapy (e.g., periods of oniro-
therapy were differentiated by alpa rhythm and minimal responsibility

to the environment).

1+3

Another version of guided imagery has been developed by Leuner, a
trained analyst, who utilizes ten standardized.imagery scenes designed
to systematically accelerate therapy by exploring major dimensions of
potential conflict and growth. Leuner's "guided affect imagery" again
uses some rather highly symbolic and metaphorical representations of
the patient's conflicts. As in the above approaches, progressive relax-
ation is utilized prior to imagery. An example of some of the episodes
the patient is directed through is as follows: an image of a meadow (to
train him in imagery and also to serve as a representation of a beginning);
an image of the patient climbing on a mountain (to Obtain information
about the patient '8 competency and aspiration); and image of a stream
(to experience energy as well as analgesic and relieving experiences);

a rose (to elicit sexual material); a swamp (to evoke instinctual
material), etc.

Singer describes Leuner's position as follows: "Confrontation with
real people in the patient's life takes place in an ongoing symbolic
drama and is worked out there rather than through transference--the
therapist in less likely to become a focal point of fantasyu" A summary
of research demonstrates some support for Leuner's symbolic representa-
tions. For example, Singer cites a significant correlation between the
height of the mountain described in the patient's imagery and scores on
a projective test of striving. In another experiment, images of a rose
were found to elicit subsequent sexual imagery. Further examination of
some of the more recent American applications will give the reader addi-
tional information into the diversity of the field.

Another revision of Desoille's method is the psychosynthesis tech-

nique (Assagioli and Gerard). Various symbolic and abstract episodes

4h
are utilized, including visualization of affective states and "controlled
visualization of extended symbolization" (e.g., taming a wild horse in
imagery leads to growth by preventing the avoidance of frightening situa-
tions). Emphasis is placed on the "existential" experiences, catharsis,
and peak experiences.

Transactional analysis and Gestalt therapy incorporate imagery and
dream techniques individually as well as in groups (e.g., having the entire
group image and share the fantasy of a.member which is reported to be a
productive experience). Moving away from the "uniformed packaged" imagery
content, Shorr (1972, psycho-imagination therapy) directs the patient to
imagine a hypothetical situation in which.he helps the patient work through
an anticipated real life situation by providing insight and undercutting
resistances.

Similarly, Johnsgard (1969) utilizes the patient's own nightmares as
stimulus material for imagery. Again, however, he follows the same basic
pattern as the above by having the patient initially undergo progressive
relaxation followed by revisualization of the nightmare, with subsequent
direction of a symbolic success experience (e.g., directing the patient
to image himself climbing Mt. Everest). Scheilder (197%) uses imagery
more adjunctively'by conceptualizing that symbolic manipulation is not
independently sufficient, but rather opens the way for directive discus-
sion about experiences and relationships, undercuts redundancy, and breaks
up blockages in therapy.

Behavior modification techniques are distinctively American and rely
heavily on imagery. The most widely used and accepted form of behavior
therapy incorporating imagery is Welpe's systematic desensitization
(1969, 1961). He prescribes three integral components for the desensi-

tization procedure: 1) the construction of a hierarchy of images ranging

1+5
from the least to the most frightening approximations of the feared per-
son or behavior, 2) progressive relaxation, and 3) visualization of the
lowest item.image on the fear hierarchy paired with instructed relaxa-
tion. As the patient begins to experience relaxation with the least
anxiety-producing imagery, he then proceeds up the hierarchy until he
is able to image the most frightening scene without a great deal of
anxiety, with the ultimate goal of permitting him to perform the act.

Instead of a hierarchy, several procedures begin with the most
noxious imagery. Cautela formulated "covert aversive therapy"--instead
of physically punishing undesirable behavior, the patient learns to
image noxious imagery that he himself can pair with the undesirable
behavior. Prior to any undesirable behavior, the patient visualizes a
preplanned noxious stimuli which serves as a form of covert punishment.
The most dramatic treatment, however, is that of Stampfl's (1967) implo-
sive therapy in which the therapist takes the most directive role by
exposing the patient to a series of extremely frightening images of
feared situations. Stampfl argues that while the patient visualizes
these images he does not experience the feared consequences and, there-
fore, his original fear will be extinguished.

As an alternative to noxious imagery, various behaviorists suggest
the use of positive and self-reinforcing images (Cautela) which can.be
used as a reinforcement whenever needed. Obsessive thought sequences,
self-derogatory remarks, impulsive acting out, etc., have allegedly
been altered through self-reinforcement.

Recent research (Wilkins, 1971, Weitzman, 1967, Wilson and Reyher
1976) raises critical issues for the behavioral as well as all imagery

therapies. Wilkins (1971) evaluated the components of systematic

II, ’I llitiflllll' all. lull

1+5
desensitization.psychotherapy and concluded, "neither training in muscle
relaxation nor the construction of a graded hierarchy of fear relaxant
scenes nor the concomitance of instructed imagination to muscle relaxa-

tion are necessary conditions for treatment success; instructed.imagina-

 

tion by itself is the only necessary element." He further suggests, as

 

does Wilson, that the therapeutic effect is due to social variables of
the patient-therapist relationship and cognitive variables of expectancy
of therapeutic gain, feedback of success, training of attention control,
etc., rather than to the mutual antagonism.between:muscle relaxation and
anxiety. 'Wilkins proposes a learning theory model to explain the effect
of imagery: The imagined conditioned stimuli is not followed'by the
unconditioned stimuli and.the subject becomes aware of the absence of
negative reinforcement and experiences positive reinforcement for non-
avoidant behavior through fantasy; This line of argument is supported
by Singer (197%) who postulates that imagery provides the patient with
the experience of control over previously uncontrollable processes,
thereby leading to a subsequent increase in self esteem.

Foreyt and Hagen (1973) in a controlled study compared a covert
sensitization group with: l) a placebo (suggestion.group), and 2) a
no-treatment group, finding no difference between the treatments. Covert
sensitization and suggestion groups were found to be equivalent, unlike
the no-treatment group, indicating that the results may'be due to fac-
tors such as suggestion and attention. Again the exact role and con-
tribution of imagery to the treatment outcome is not clear.

Weitzman (1967) raised further questions about directed.imagery
therapy and systematic desensitization in particular. He reported

that all subjects had a flow of imagery unrelated to the imagery

1+7

described by the therapist, and that these possess psychodynamic prOper-
ties which have as yet an undetermined influence on the therapeutic
effectiveness of directed imagery and behavior modification procedures.

Singer (197%). Wilkins (1971). Free-yet (1973). Wilson (1971, 1971+).
Reyher (1969) and others suggest that the main or total effect of direc-
ted imagery may have nothing to do with the presence of imagery per se
but rather is due to the presence of other variables such as task
demands, suggestion, Impnosis , therapist expectation or a variety of
other non-specific variables. Furthermore, evidence has been cited in
the above discussion which suggests that during directed imagery the
patient may be: 1) not visualizing imagery and/or 2) visualizing other
images not related to the content directed by the therapist. tune assump-
tion of an ability to follow and produce specifically suggested imagery
is further challenged by Bugelski (1971): "imagery cannot be dictated
or directed by the imager. Dnages are involuntary occurrences, subject
to no one's personal control. Even when someone suggests the desired
images, they may not emerge or occur. Furthermore, any attempt to evoke
a static image quickly results in one image giving way to another."

One approach that offers additional data as to the nature of imagery
and also avoids many of the demand characteristics of directed imagery is
the observation of the subjects' spontaneous (non-directed) imagery.

This use of imagery was briefly considered by Freud (prior to l90h), who
focused on imagery as an adjunctive instrument to increase the attention
to the psychical perceptions of patients.

In therapy, Freud considered images as serving a double function.
When memory is repressed, there often emerges into consciousness an

unusually vivid image of a relevant object. The image partially

 

1+8

expresses but also screens from awareness the conflicted memory or idea.
Freud postulated, "It is possible for thought processes to become con-
scious through a reversion to visual residues and in many peOple this
seems to be the favored method." Thinking in pictures is thus consid-
ered an incomplete form of becoming conscious which stands nearer to
unconscious processes than thinking since it is ontogenetically as well
as philogeneticale altered and, therefore, represents a continuum
between the ego and the id.

Freud explains, "In order that he may be able to concentrate his
attention on his self-observation, it is an advantage for him to lie in

a restful attitude and shut his eyes. " (The Interpretation of Dreams,

 

1965). Singer summarizes briefly Freud's dabbling with imagery. 1n
the case of Fraulein Elisabeth VonR., 1895, Freud used imagery in an
effort to undercut resistances: "You will see something in front of
you or something will come into your head. Catch hold of it. It will
be what you are looking for. " Here we find Freud directing the patient

to image but not specifying what to image. In Studies in msteria (1966),

 

Freud encouraged his patients to get rid of images by describing them.
The continued presence of an image signalled to Freud that there was
still something remaining for the patient to talk about. Freud's eye-
closed, free reporting approach, however, was changed by 1901+.

The use of imagery in psychodynamic psychotherapy has been for the
most part neglected and limited to reports on the clients' spontaneous
production of imagery during free association (Jellinek, 19h9; Kanzer,
1958; and Warren, 1961) or occasional introductions of imagery during
the therapeutic hour (Goldeberger, 19573 Kubie, 19113; Kepecs, 1951+).

The first systematic use of spontaneous visual imagery in psycho-

dynamic psychotherapy and research was first reported by Reyher in 1963.

 

III.‘ {‘

1+9
The use of imagery was incorporated into a technique called "free imagery",

 

now called "emergent uncovering psychotherapy" (Burns and Reyher, in press,
Morishige and Reyher, 1975; Reyher and Morishige, 1971).

In the context of psychotherapy, the spontaneous visual imagery of
the patient (during eye closure) tends to become increasingly depictive
of repressed conflicts and affects. Formerly covert processes become
overt through the use of imagery.

Paraphrasing Reyher (1973) , the role of the therapist is to draw the
client's attention to manifestations of anxiety, symptoms, and/or resis-
tance and reintroduce into the client's mind's eye the images (hot
images) contingent with these manifestations. unlike other procedures

of imagery (Guided Daydream, Duplosive) , the therapist does not direct

 

the imagery but rather allows the patient to "unfold". Rather than

 

utilizing direct interpretation, the therapist relies heavily on non-
directive techniques (observing behavioral indices of anxiety and resis-
tance, e.g., laughter, increased volume in voice, etc.). The interpretive
work is left to the patient and as the patient's imagery becomes increas-
ingly depictive of repressed material, he begins to experience insight
and appropriate affect. This results in strengthening of ego functions
and the satisfaction of self-discovery.

An overview of the research generated by spontaneous imagery provides
some depictive evidence of the dynamic (as Opposed to static) properties
of imagery and suggests factors which would make it difficult for subjects
and patients to follow directed imagery. Reyher's work has investigated
variables which are important concomitants of imagery: degree of repres-
sion, anxiety, psychopathology, and primary process. Much of the early

research focused on the comparison of imagery with verbal association.

50
Reyher and Smeltzer (1968) presented stimulus words (depictive of neutral,
hostile, sexual and familial content) with two conditions of instruc-
tions. In one condition, the subject was instructed to close his eyes
and describe images and sensations. In the other condition, the subject
was instructed to keep his eyes Open and to verbalize the first thoughts
that came to mind after presentation of the stimulus word. Greater
anxiety (GSR), more primary process, and less success in establishing
defenses were reported for the imagery condition. Free imagery, they
concluded, was more regulated‘by primary process (as consistent with
theoretical descriptions). The omission of an eyes closed verbal asso-
ciation group, however, failed to control for the effects of requesting
the subject to close his eyes as well as keep his eyes closed in an
interpersonal situation (an implicitly anxiety-provoking experimental
task).

Reyher's findings have important implications for therapies that
utilize imagery. As cited above, the content of imagery varies widely
‘within and‘between the type of therapies. Imagery scenes can incorporate
highly remote and disguised symbolism (e.g., allegorical images from the
Guided Daydreams) or very blatant and stressful derivatives (e.g., implo-
sive therapy). Reyher considers the content of imagery an extremely
critical variable subject to the patient's dynamics:

"There is a reciprocal relationship between visual image and
drive; that is, an image will stimulate the drive that it depicts
and a drive will produce an image to depict itself (the drive will
seek out an appropriate Object). However, our clinical experience
strongly suggests that this reciprocal relationship is not symp
metrical. Imposed visual imagery (implosive psychotherapy) has
relatively little effect on drives in comparison to the effect of
a drive on visual imagery. One of the most reliable phenomena
produced by free imagery is the client's inability to revisualize
some hot images or to form images of certain peOple. This con-
tingency generally has great impact on the client as evidence
for the Operation of repression. It also makes us wonder if

clients going through implosive psychotherapy see the dramatic
imagery that the therapist conjures up.

51
"Since the inclusion of elements of the drive in the visual
imagery of a client is not an actual gratification or outlet,

but merely an expression of the drive through a protosymbol,

the drive is intensified along with a corresponding increase in

the regulation of the visual imagery by the drive until anxiety

triggers repression or until the person is prompted to obtain
gratification through behavior. The reintroduction of "hot"

images and dreams by the psychotherapist has a strong inten-

sifying effect on drives in contrast to imposed imagery because

they are spontaneous, idiosyncratic, and have particularly
intimate connections with a salient drive or drive-complex."

In conclusion, the study of imagery and symbolic function reveals
that a wide range of phenomena is incorporated under this rubric. Symr
bolic function, as shown above, is used by man in a variety of cognitive
and affective processes, and Operates at different levels of awareness
to the individual. All research and therapy is hampered by the fact
that reports of dreams, imagery, etc., all involve mediating one form
of representation through another (usually language), i.e., to describe
an image or a dream one must be able to verbalize it and, therefore,
suffer a great deal of contamination in studying the effects; to repre-
sent something in drawing, one must draw upon psychomotor abilities and
limitations. Pulling all the data from the divergent theoretical camps,
one can Observe certain patterns to imagery. Imagery has certain static
as well as dynamic properties. Developmentally, there are certain alter-
ations in imagery usually from more comon undifferentiated images to
more socially conventional and differentiated images. And finally,
imagery can operate in the service of certain functions as well as

being an independent function within individuals.

21.

22.

APPENDIX B

AVERAGE RANK ORDER OF INCREASING PLAUSIBILITY OF ALL IMAGES
(Derived From Three Independent Raters)

You.begin to circle the moon.

As you fly, you see a small dog fly by.

YOu fly over the department store.

YOu‘begin going higher and higher.

You see yourself lifting off the ground.

You'begin to flap your arms.

Little green men hand you a plaque which reads, "Welcome
Stranger".

Two little green men come towards you.
You slap your mother.
YOu lose your temper and hit your father.

‘YOu see blood running from your father's face (where you hit
him).

YOur mother angrily strikes you in the face.

Losing his temper, your father slaps you in the face.
YOu shake your fist at the professor.

YOu get angrier and shout at the professor.

The professor shakes his fist at you.

Yen stand up and approach the professor yelling.

The professor yells at you.

YOu grab the term.paper from the professor.

The professor grabs the term.paper out of your hand.

The door opens and you see the professor's face with a mean
and angry expression.

You arrive at the professor's office and angrily knock on
the door.

52

 

23.

21+.
25.
26.

27.
28.

30.

APPENDIX B (Cont'd.)
A small brown bird flies down and lands on your shoulder and
chirps in your ear.
You see your father's face get very angry.
YOu see the driver has a broken tooth.
You tell your father about the accident.
The car behind you slams into the back of your car.

YOu see yourself driving the family car to a grocery store in
your home town.

On your term paper you see a note, "You flunked for cheating,
come to the professor's office".

You are walking down the street in front of a department store.

53

l2.

13.

11+.

15.
l6.
17.

You

You

You

APPENDIX C

AVERAGE RANK ORDER OF AGGRESSIVENESS OF ALL IMAGES
(Derived From Three Independent Raters

lose your temper and hit your father.

slap your mother.

see blood running from.your father's face (where you hit

him).

YOur mother angrily strikes you in the face.

Losing his temper, your father slaps you in the face.

You
You
You

YOu

You
the

The
and

YOu

YOu

shake your fist at the professor.

stand up and approach the professor yelling.

get angrier and shout at the professor.

grab the term paper from the professor.
professor shakes his fist at you.

professor grabs the term.paper out of your hand.
professor yells at you.

arrive at the professor's office and angrily knock on
door.

door opens and you see the professor's face with a mean
angry expression.

see your father's face get very angry.
see the driver has a broken tooth.

car behind you slams into the back of your car.

at

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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55

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57

 

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58

 

 

 

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