SENATORIAL AMBITION AND LEGISLATIVE BEHAVIOR

Thesis for the Degree of Ph. D.
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ABSTRACT

SENATORIAL AMBITION AND LEGISLATIVE BEHAVIOR

By

Murray Frost

Several assumptions implicit in ambition theory were tested by examining the background and behavior of the 85 United States Representatives who sought Senatorial nominations in the 1950-1968 period (referred to as RSTs). This research supports ambition theory on some accounts, but also challenges it on several accounts.

Joseph Schlesinger's work on ambition theory assumed that opportunity is a major stimulus to ambition. A model was developed which views progressive ambition as a function of (a) the opportunity structure and other aspects of the destination office (i.e. Senate), (b) characteristics of the situation at the origin (i.e. House), and (c) the characteristics of the individual or agent. The data for the 85 RSTs indicate that RST participation in Senatorial contests varied directly with the level of opportunity implicit in a classification of Senate situations based upon the party and re-election plans of the incumbent (e.g. the greatest likelihood for RST entry occurred in the Party Succession situation of sharing the incumbent's party and the latter not being a candidate for re-election). This impact of opportunity upon progressive ambition was in contrast to the other two sets of variables in the model. RSTs could not be differentiated from other Representatives

on the basis of the personal characteristics examined; and although several aspects of this House situation differed (e.g. RSTs came from larger and more competitive districts), these were not statistically significant--nor were there consistent differences in legislative behavior patterns.

Schlesinger's development of opportunity structure rested upon the previous pattern of successful nominations. If his assumption were correct, one would expect that RSTs from state parties where Congress was a major penultimate office for Senatorial nominees would face less competition for the Senatorial nomination than other RSTs. But the data indicated that less than half of the RSTs came from such states (nor were RST opponents affected by this aspect of opportunity structure) and that the degree of competition for the nomination was not related to the pattern of nominees' penultimate office.

A major assumption of ambition theory is that a legislator's behavior is a response to his office goals. This leads to the hypothesis that RSTs would change their behavior in their ultimate House term if it were inappropriate for their prospective Senate constituencies. The data indicated that only 40% of the RSTs were Ready--i.e. already adhering to the appropriate strategy. But of the others, approximately two-thirds were Reluctants (i.e. did not change their behavior to conform) and only one-third were Responders. However, late-starters (RSTs whose candidacies occurred late in the term and only after a vacancy occurred)--omitted from this analysis--were even less

likely to have changed their behavior in their last term, suggesting some impact of progressive ambition upon behavior.

In summary, some of the findings supported ambition theory, but some did not. Since there was some evidence for the impact of opportunity upon progressive ambition, and for the impact of progressive ambition upon legislative behavior, the value of ambition theory as a heuristic model was not impaired.

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By

Murray Frost

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In November 1970, New York City Mayor John Lindsay denied reports he might be a Presidential candidate saying, "It's not viable politically...because I am an enrolled Republican and also because it's unheard of for a mayor at any time to run nationally. It's never been done in the United States and people don't change very easily."[1] Despite such a strong statement of the relationship between opportunity structure, ambition, and careers, this area has been studied by comparatively few political scientists. The relationship between these variables and political behavior has not been studied extensively either.

This study focuses upon several of these relationships for a select group of American politicians. Those examined in this study are the 85 members of the House of Representatives who made attempts to become members of the Senate while still serving in the lower house, during the two decades (ten election years) from 1950 to 1968. Any attempt to learn about the achievement of this "progressive ambition"[2] must include the unsuccessful--i.e. those who

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[1] Los Angeles Times, November 10, 1970, Pt. I, p. 11.

[2] See Joseph A. Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in the United States (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1966), p. 10 for the definition of this term.

either lost the election or who lost the struggle for the nomination--and not just those who were successful.

The major stimulus for this study has been the work of Joseph Schlesinger focusing upon ambition and the attainment of public office. In his major study, Ambition and Politics, he defines the structures of opportunity in the various states (and national government) for the major offices. In other words he begins by tracing the careers of Senators and Governors and defeated candidates for these two offices. His major theoretical contribution is to relate this to party theory, discussing both the nature of party organization as well as the degree of convergence of the parties in their behavior.

Although his theoretical and empirical work revolves around the progressive ambitions of officeholders, his concern with who will want to advance involves the assumption that the opportunity structure in a state will excite or restrain a man's ambition. "The most reasonable assumption is that ambition for office, like most other ambitions, develops with a specific situation, that it is a response to the possibilities which lie before the politician."[3] He recognizes that there are factors other than the opportunity structure which affects ambition--for instance a man's age may serve to modify his ambitions. Our conception of the forces giving rise to progressive ambitions for the Senate is broader. The "specific situation" involves both his

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[3]Ibid., p. 8.

current office and the one to which he aspires, as well as personal factors.

Schlesinger notes that "In ambition theory the emphasis in analyzing such data is not on how one advances in politics but on who will want to advance."[4] But his data on who wants to advance is drawn from the careers of those who succeeded in their ambition, or who were nominees. The opportunity structure is shaped by the successes and failures of those seeking the nomination. This study, therefore, examines the accounts of the nomination struggles of these Senatorial candidates that constitute the population.

The relationship of ambition to behavior is perhaps the underlying concern of Schlesinger. "The central assumption of ambition theory is that a politician's behavior is a response to his office goals."[5] But Schlesinger's discussion is a theoretical one without any reference to data. He suggests the need to examine the interaction of strategies of advancement and opportunities in order to explain legislative or political behavior. But Ambition and Politics--as he admits--neglects this in order to fully develop the structure of opportunity. The study reported here will examine the impact of Senatorial candidacy upon their behavior in the lower house.

This study, therefore, centers about three broad questions. 1) In Chapters II and III we ask: How were

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[4] Ibid., p. 15; emphasis in the original.

[5] Ibid., p. 6.

these Representatives who tried to become Senators[6] different from, or similar to, other members of the lower house? In other words, do Representatives with progressive ambition for the Senate differ from their colleagues with either discrete or static ambition (i.e. content to continue in the House for the remainder of the term or longer)? Did they have different backgrounds, careers, constituencies, patterns of legislative bahavior? 2) In Chapter IV we focus on: What was the nature of their Senate nomination contests? For example, how many faced serious competition for the nomination? Did RSTs in state parties where Congress was the predominant penultimate office for the Senate nomination face less opposition than other RSTs to their attempted "promotion"?[7] 3) In Chapter V we examine: What effect does candidacy for the Senate position have upon the behavior of the legislator while he still is in the House? For instance, does his roll call behavior or his degree of specialization change?

Senatorial Ambition Model

The "model" underlying the analysis in Chapters II and III says that the decision by a member of the House of Representatives to become a Senator is a function of three sets of variables. One set revolves around the "agent"--the individual's personal characteristics and background.

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[6]These are referred to as RSTs--Representative-to-Senator-Tryers--throughout this study.

[7]See Herbert Jacobs, "Initial Recruitment of Elected Officials in the U.S.--A Model", Journal of Politics, XXIV (November, 1962), pp. 703-16, for the useful differentiation of "initial recruitment" and "political promotion".

The second set concerns the contest or environment at the "origin"--or House of Representatives. The third set concerns the situation at the "destination"--or Senate. Although the model may use the language of transportation analysis--e.g. origin and destination--it can be reconciled with other "models" concerning recruitment.

For instance, Barber[8] noted that the literature concerning the relationship between political recruitment and official behavior has been studied in three ways. Some have focused upon political variables such as the political organization and degree of competition. Other studies have concentrated on sociological variables such as the socio-economic background of the decision-makers and candidates. While still other studies have concentrated on psychological variables, primarily the motivational characteristics of politicians. He then combined aspects of all three, and suggests that recruitment patterns are a function of motivation ("Do I want it"), resources ("Can I do it"), and opportunity ("Do they want me").

Our model, too, suggests that there are "agent" or personal elements--such as occupation, previous public office experience, and other aspects of political careers (such as age). Motivation and other personality variables could be included here. This study, however, involved only published data and involved no interviewing which would be helpful if

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[8]James David Barber, The Lawmakers: Recruitment and Adaptation to Legislative Life (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965).

not essential in ascertaining this subset of variables, and they therefore are omitted.

Our model also suggests that the level of resources available is important in determining whether a Representative will try for the Senate. Many of these resources may stem from his situation in the House. The nature of his House constituency--e.g. the size of his district--may aid his Senate candidacy. His seniority, committee assignments, and specialization may be resources in themselves or be important assets with which to attract resources. Similarly his legislative behavior--i.e. his voting record--may be a resource to gain still other needed resources such as money, workers, and votes.

Our model makes reference to opportunity too; it is viewed as part of the environment at the destination--the Senate situation. Certainly which party holds the Senate seat and what the re-election plans of the incumbent are, are two important factors which will affect a Representative's decision to seek the Senate seat. The degree of competition for the seat is another important factor--a competitive situation may be assumed to be less attractive to a legislator than the prospects of an easy victory in a safe state. Similarly the prospects of competition for the nomination may influence his decision. The previous pattern of public office holding of Senatorial candidates is another aspect of opportunity. It may make him the object of speculation concerning the office, and/or it may affect his ambition--which is one aspect of his motivation--and/or the ambition of

other officeholders or prospective candidates.

It is these three sets of variables--1) agent or personal characteristics, 2) origin or House-related characteristics, and 3) destination or Senate situation factors--that determine whether a member of the House of Representatives will seek promotion to the Senate.

A. Personal Characteristics

Very few studies have examined the characteristics of office-holders with progressive ambition. Although Schlesinger develops the concept of progressive ambition and differentiates this desire for higher office from the desire to be re-elected (static ambition) and the intention of holding an office until the end of the term (discrete ambition), he does not present any data. His theoretical discussion assumes that the opportunity structure gives rise to ambition.

Soule is one of the few authors who have discussed the characteristics of a set of progressively-ambitious officeholders. His published study of members of the Michigan state House of Representatives, however, is largely concerned with political socialization--e.g. time and source of political socialization, formal education, and certain psychological traits or values.[9]

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[9]John W. Soule, "Future Political Ambitions and the Behavior of Incumbent State Legislators", Midwest Journal of Political Science, XIII (August, 1969), pp. 439-54. Also see his Ph.D. dissertation cited there: John W. Soule, "The Influence of Political Socialization, Interpersonal Values and Differential Recruitment Patterns on Legislative Adaption: The Michigan House of Representatives" (unpublished

One of the variables that Schlesinger examined for its impact upon ambition was age. "The younger a man is when he enters politics the greater the range of his ambition and the likelihood of his developing a career commitment."[10] Age at entry into public office, therefore, could be used as an indicator of progressive ambition. We would hypothesize, therefore, that Representatives with progressive ambition for the Senate, will have entered public office at a younger age than their colleagues in the House. An alternate hypothesis, however, is also suggested by Schlesinger.[11] It is possible that late starters may use the advantages gained before entering public office to aid their rapid promotion. His data suggest that earlier starters do not necessarily gain major nominations (i.e. Senator or Governor) earlier. The earlier starters may be more career oriented and appear to have more years of public office experience before seeking major office.

Another variable that many authors have examined is that of occupation. Jacobs called it the crucial social variable in his model of initial recruitment.[12] Most studies of the social backgrounds of decision-makers have noted the over-representation of lawyers in legislative bodies. They have offered a variety of reasons for this. Jacobs places

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Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of Kentucky, 1967).

[10] Op. cit., p. 176.

[11] Ibid., p. 182.

[12] Op. cit., p. 709.

the most emphasis upon the lawyer's role of broker; he frequently is engaged in bargaining with outsiders and exchanging ideas. But he also notes other aspects of his occupation--e.g. that it leaves him time to seek office, that he is already at the fringe of politics often contacting governmental officials. The lawyer's skills of verbal manipulation, comprehension of complex and technical information, and his experience in human relations have been noted by some, in addition to his bargaining skills. Others have speculated about the prestige and class status of the legal profession. Still others have commented upon the blending of the legal occupation and a political career in terms of the flexibility of his work schedule, the relatively slow change in the profession enabling a defeated lawyer to return easily to his practice, and the aid that a political career can give to his legal career and income (even a political defeat may serve as advertising for his occupation). Schlesinger suggests the over-representation of lawyers among Governors and legislators may be due to their monopoly of public offices relating to the administration of law through the court system.[13]

All of these explanations for the over-representation of the lawyer in legislative bodies are plausible, and there are some data to support each of them. But once a lawyer has reached the legislature, is he more likely to have a progressive ambition (e.g. for the Senate) than other legislators? Some of the reasons noted earlier may relate to

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[13]See, Joseph Schlesinger, "Lawyers and American Politics: A Clarified View," Midwest Journal of Political Science, I (May 1957), pp. 26-39.

political promotion as well as initial recruitment. For instance we noted the speculation about the ability of a lawyer to return to his legal practice if defeated, as a spur to a legislative career; but it also can serve to minimize the risks of seeking higher office. In other words, there are reasons to expect lawyers in the House of Representatives to be more likely than non-lawyers to have progressive ambition for the Senate.

There is some indirect evidence of the lawyer-legislator's ambition. For instance, Jewell and Patterson note that "Senates in the United States tend to contain a higher proportion of lawyer-legislators than do houses of representatives."[14] And there are more lawyers in the national House of Representatives than there are in state legislatures. Zeller's study of state legislatures in 1949 indicated 19% of those serving in the lower house were lawyers compared to 33% of those in the upper house.[15] A recent survey--of the 89th Congress--found lawyers to be 55% of the House and 67% of the Senate.

More directly, Eulau and Sprague note that in the four state legislatures surveyed by the State Legislative Research Project, lawyers were more likely than non-lawyers to acknowledge "their ambitions as reasons for seeking

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[14]Malcolm E. Jewell and Samuel C. Patterson, The Legislative Process in the United States (New York: Random House, 1966), p. 107.

[15]Belle Zeller (ed.), American State Legislatures, (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1954), p. 71.

legislative office."[16] They begin their political careers at an earlier age, and this may be assumed to indicate a greater degree of ambition. And it is relevant to note that the lawyer-legislators in that study were more likely than non-lawyers to be interested in politics at an earlier age--e.g. in each of the states over 70% of the lawyer-legislators for whom data on this question was ascertained were interested in politics at the time of college or earlier (the range was 72% to 84%) compared to 44% to 59% for non-lawyers.[17] Early political socialization was found to be related to progressive ambition by Soule.[18] This data suggests that the lawyer-legislator's ambition preceded his choice of occupation. Nevertheless, occupation of the Representative can be used as an indicator of progressive ambition. We would hypothesize, therefore, that more RSTs than other Representatives will be lawyers.

Studies of careers have shown that there are many paths to an office. For instance, when Schlesinger traced career paths using such minimal landmarks as first office, office experience, and penultimate office (by types--e.g. statewide elective, or law enforcement), he found over 30 such paths leading to the Senate with no single route followed

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[16] Heinz Eulau and John D. Sprague, Lawyers in Politics: A Study in Professional Convergence (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1964), p. 77.

[17] Ibid., recalculation of Table 3.1, p. 57.

[18] Op. cit., p. 446 .

by as much as 10%.[19] But as his study noted there were linkages between offices--e.g. manifest functional relationships such as legislative offices, and the sharing of similar electorates. Of course all Representatives and Senators share the same function of legislator, and therefore all of the men in this study have this office experience in common.

But one may suppose that earlier career paths may be related to a Representative's seeking Senatorial office. Therefore one may hypothesize that the first office, and public office experience of RSTs will differ from that of other Representatives. For instance, Schlesinger concluded, "The higher the office, the more complex the typical career leading to that office."[20] Therefore since the Senate is a higher office than the House, it is reasonable to hypothesize that Representatives who have Senate ambitions will have more complex careers than Representatives without such ambitions. Similarly we may examine whether those who are successful in their attempt to move to the Senate have different career patterns than those who lose or those who are unsuccessful in their attempts to gain the nomination. Schlesinger's data for all Senators and all defeated Senatorial candidates (not just those whose penultimate office was the House) indicated more complex careers for winners than losers.[21] Mezey suggests that this may be a function of majority-minority party

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[19] Ambition and Politics, p. 92.

[20] Ibid., p. 196.

[21] Ibid., p. 96.

status.[22]

Complexity was measured by the difference between use of an office as a first office and as a penultimate office. Individuals whose careers include more offices may be said to have a more complex career than those with no or only one prior public office.

Complexity may also be measured by different kinds of office experience. A Representative who only has had legislative experience may be said to have a less complex career than one who has had either law enforcement or administrative experience prior to his election to the House. Therefore it is reasonable to hypothesize that RSTs more than other Representatives would have had law enforcement or administrative experience.

Since a politician's career time is limited, it is reasonable to assume that if law enforcement or administrative experience is expected, that these men will start their public office career in these offices. Therefore we could hypothesize that RSTs more than other Representatives will have used these offices as first offices.[23]

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[22]Michael L. Mezey, "Ambition Theory and the Office of Congressman," Journal of Politics, XXXII (August, 1970), pp. 563-79.

[23]But other contradictory hypotheses are also possible --for instance if we assume a planned career, our study focuses upon a group of men who felt they ought to serve in the lower House before trying to get to the Senate; it may be reasonable to assume that these men might also feel they ought to serve in the state legislature before attaining national legislative office. Therefore state legislative office as a first public office could be hypothesized to be more common among RSTs than other Representatives.

Another logical framework from which to hypothesize, may center about the idea of deviancy. Since only a small proportion of Representatives try to become Senators, they may be viewed as a deviant group. If their Senate ambition is a sign of deviancy, perhaps their earlier career will also deviate from the norm. Therefore we would expect the careers of RSTs--whether it be first public office, or office experience--to differ from other Representatives.

One other agent characteristic--if, and where, the RST attended college--will be investigated (although still other personal variables--such as personality traits--would be theoretically relevant). Chroniclers of decision-makers' backgrounds have noted that the latter have a higher level of education than the general populace. Soule's study indicated that Michigan state legislators with a college degree were more likely to have progressive ambition than legislators with less education.[24] Apparently legislators with more education are more likely to be confident of their ability to handle higher office.

Since college was an important political socialization agent for state legislators, the location of that education can be important in their career (and behavior). For example, Vines demonstrated the relationship between place of law school education and the civil rights record of judges in the Fifth Circuit.[25] Although a college education may be broadening

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[24] Op.cit., p. 447.

[25] Kenneth Vines, "Federal District Judges and Race Relations Cases in the South," Journal of Politics, XXVI (May, 1964), p. 351.

for all, attending a college in another state should result in a less local or parochial outlook. This reduced localism may breed a broader outlook and ambition. Therefore we would hypothesize that 1) RSTs would be more likely than other Representatives to have attended a college, and 2) RSTs would be more likely than other Representatives to have attended an out-of-state college.

B. House Situation

The second set of factors affecting the decision of a Representative to become a Senatorial candidate centers around the nature of his situation in the House. This includes district characteristics such as the size and competitiveness of the district, aspects of his career in the House such as his seniority and committee assignments, and aspects of his behavior including specialization, party cohesion, and liberal-conservatism. The importance of these factors stems, in part, from their effect upon the level of resources which a Representative can acquire for use in his attempt to gain the Senate seat.

For instance, Schlesinger observed, "When two offices have the same or similar electorates, it is logical to expect movement from one to the other."[26] We would hypothesize, therefore, that a disproportionately large number of RSTs were elected to the House of Representatives in At-Large elections. These men have already faced a statewide electorate successfully. They have already put together a party nucleus--a

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[26] Ambition and Politics, p. 99.

team of advisors and workers--who have been able to solicit enough money, endorsements, and other forms of support to win a plurality of the votes from a statewide electorate. In general, we may hypothesize that the larger the share of the Senate constituency that falls in a Representative's district, the more likely he is to run for the upper house.

He is also more likely to run for the Senate seat if the degree of competitiveness of his two constituencies--i.e. his current one in the House and his prospective one for the Senate--are similar. Schlesinger has suggested that nuclear party organizations and officeholders in competitive situations are likely to adopt similar strategies of trying to minimize party differences by adopting moderate policies in order to appeal to that portion of the electorate which can become the margin of victory by swinging to either party.[27] In contrast to this moderating tendency of competitive parties, he suggests that dominant parties will try to emphasize party differences. In either case, a Representative who faces the same needs in both his House and Senate situations will be in a better position to press for the Senate seat, than a Representative whose House and Senate needs differ. The "organizational tensions" of the latter situation may inhibit some Representatives' progressive ambitions for the Senate, in contrast to the former situation where the most appropriate pattern of behavior in the House also is the most appropriate for his Senate situation. We would hypothesize, therefore,

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[27] Ibid., see Chapter 7.

that RSTs are more likely than other Representatives to come from situations in which the competition of their House district is similar to that of their states' Senate seat. We can also expect to find that more of the unsuccessful tryers for the Senate nomination (Ts) than successful nominees will be from "organizational tension" situations. Similarly, those RSTs who win the Senate seat can be hypothesized to be more likely than losers to have similar House and Senate competitive situations.[28]

The city in which the Representative lives may be considered a resource or at least an aid to acquire resources. If we assume that a Representative may be better known in his home town than elsewhere in his district or the state, then Representatives from larger cities should be at an advantage when seeking the Senatorial nomination. But Matthews has pointed out that large cities, as the birthplace of Senators, were under-represented, while small towns and cities were over-represented. He suggests that a small town background may be advantageous because it combines aspects of both rural and urban life. He also notes that perhaps the small town resident "is exposed to a cross-section of the community, to those 'above' and 'below' his position on the social ladder" in contrast to the isolated rural resident or the segmented urbanite.[29]

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[28]A discussion of the relationship of the absolute--rather than the relative--degree of competitiveness to progressive ambition for the Senate appears later on pp.

[29]Donald R. Matthews, U.S. Senators and Their World (New York: Vintage Books, 1960), p. 16.

V.O. Key's analysis concerning the effect of primaries upon state political systems suggests a more refined hypothesis. Key found that because of the differential turnout of one-party areas in the dominant party's primary, that a disproportionate number of candidates for state office come from the party's safe areas. For instance, he reported, that in the decade or so prior to the primary system in Massachusetts 25% of the Democratic nominees for statewide office came from Boston and vicinity, and 40% of the Republicans came from Boston. In the first four decades of primaries there, 59% of the Democrats came from the Boston area, while the proportion of Republicans declined to 25%.[30] This analysis suggests that Democrats from large cities--which are usually the stronghold of Democrats--would be at an advantage compared to Democrats from other areas. Similarly, rural areas and small towns and cities are more likely to be G.O.P. strongholds, and Republicans from these areas would be at an advantage compared to Republicans from larger cities. Our hypothesis is that these assumed advantages would lead to an over-representation of these types among RSTs when compared to other Representatives.

As the Representative's career progresses in the House --i.e. as he gains seniority--his position in that chamber improves. He becomes more knowledgeable concerning the issues, procedures, as well as other legislators and actors in the legislative process. This places him in a stronger position to gain the resources necessary to run a successful Senate

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[30]V.O. Key, Jr., American State Politics: An Introduction (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), pp. 155-6.

campaign. His higher seniority may enable him to gain more important committee assignments, which may also help him fulfill his Senate ambition.

This speculation would lead us to hypothesize that a higher proportion of RSTs than Representatives without progressive ambition serve on the committees considered to be more important. Similarly, if seniority improves a Representative's ability to amass the resources necessary for a Senate contest, then we can assume that these Representatives will be more likely to have progressive ambition and we would expect a higher proportion of RSTs than other Representatives to have high seniority. But on the other hand, if a Representative has sufficient power in the House, he may have no interest in any other office. Therefore a more realistic hypothesis would be to suggest a curvilinear relationship between seniority and progressive ambition. Specifically we would hypothesize that RSTs would be less likely than other Representatives to be either newcomers to the House or among its more senior members.

The relationship between a Representative's progressive ambition for the Senate and his legislative behavior will be developed further later, and will be the subject of empirical testing in Chapter V of this work. But at this point the linkage involves such questions as: Do RSTs vote more often with their party than do other Representatives? Are they more likely to be liberals or conservatives? Are they more likely to be generalists or specialists?

Our model so far suggests the situation in the House --including legislative behavior--is a factor for the

Representative to consider in determining whether to try for the Senate. Our initial concern focuses upon the relationship of legislative behavior as a resource or an aid to gaining the resources necessary to make an attempt to gain the Senate seat. Obviously the situation at the Senate level is crucial; there can be no single national answer about the utility of a liberal record in gaining a Senate seat (even though it may be possible to argue that a candidate with a statewide constituency must be more receptive to the more "liberal" demands of the urban interests for governmental services). Nevertheless, the initial speculation offered here will be without reference to the Senate situation.

Specialization is one of the norms of behavior in many legislatures.[31] Specialization may evolve from the legislator's background--an educator turned legislator may focus his attention upon the school problem, or a retired army officer may consider military affairs his specialty as did one of the RSTs in this study (Rep. Frank Kowalski). Or it may come from prior specialization in a state legislature. Or it may spring from one's committee assignments--a member of the Ways and Means Committee may specialize in tax legislation. Although committee assignments in Congress often benefit a legislator's relationship with his district--i.e. an argument that a particular committee assignment is important for the district and for re-election will be given prime consideration by the

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[31]For example, see Matthews, op.cit., pp. 95-7; John C. Wahlke, et.al., The Legislative System: Explorations in Legislative Behavior (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1962), chapter 9.

Committees on Committees[32]--the relationship between district and committee assignments is far from perfect. It is not unlikely, therefore, that a legislator's degree of specialization or area of specialization is not related to his ambition--either his immediate static ambition or his future progressive ambition.

It is possible to assume, then, that the generalist's role may fit the needs of a legislator with progressive ambition better than would the specialist's role. A generalist may be better able to meet the interests and demands of a new constituency better than a specialist (especially if the characteristics of the districts differed). In addition, a generalist would be better able to adjust to a new committee assignment than would a specialist. Our speculation, therefore, is that if a legislator is a generalist, his perspective will be broader and he would be more likely to think about future progressive ambitions for the Senate. The "model" would lead us to hypothesize that RSTs would be less likely to be specialists than other Representatives. But in view of the labor involved in calculating an Index of Specialization for a matched sample of Representatives who could serve as a control group, and because there are no previously published findings for the House of Representatives using the measure of specialization developed by Matthews, this hypothesis will not be tested in this study. Instead, we speculate that an RST's level of specialization is related to his degree of

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[32]See Nicholas A. Masters, "Committee Assignments in the House of Representatives", American Political Science Review, LV (June, 1961), pp. 345-57.

success in satisfying his progressive ambition for the Senate. We would hypothesize, therefore, that specialization is inversely related to success; we would expect to find more generalists among those who won their attempts to move to the Senate than those who lost, and we would expect to find the least proportion of generalists among those who were unsuccessful in even gaining the Senate nomination (the Ts).

It is difficult to consider a legislator's degree of liberalism as a resource without further knowledge about the composition or make-up of his statewide constituency. But Soule's study of progressive ambition among the Michigan state legislators found "a small association between liberal-conservatism as an ideology and political ambition."[33] It may be appropriate to speculate that those who see a more positive role for government in the solution of problems (i.e. a more liberal ideology) may have progressive ambition for the Senate. The Senate is considered to be the more liberal of the two branches,[34] and a liberal in the House may feel that he would feel more comfortable and be able to accomplish more if he were in the Senate. In addition a liberal stance may be assumed to be more receptive to urban interests, and so a Representative may view his liberal record as an important resource in any attempt to be elected from a statewide constituency. Having this resource--i.e. a liberal voting

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[33] Op.cit., p. 453. He found gamma = .12, .10.

[34] Lewis A. Froman, Jr., Congressmen and Their Constituencies (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1963), Chapter 6.

record--may contribute to his decision to become a Senate candidate. Therefore the hypothesis to be tested at this point in the study is: RSTs are more likely than other Representatives to be liberals. In Chapter V of this study, this hypothesis will be refined to take the Senate situation into consideration.

If we were to treat party cohesion independently from liberal-conservatism--despite their high interrelation which has been commented upon by many observers[35]--our model to this point does not suggest any clear relationship between party cohesion and the decision to seek Senate office. It is possible to argue that those with progressive ambition will be more likely than the average Representative of his state and party to show high party cohesion because they would want party support for their future race, which might be more likely to go to a loyal party man than a maverick.[36] On the other hand, it is logical to assume that the statewide constituency is approximated best by the average constituency, and therefore the party cohesion level of the average legislator in the state party would be the level of cohesion of those with progressive ambition. But it may also be possible to speculate that a

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[35]Matthews, op.cit., p. 133; W. Wayne Shannon, Party, Constituency and Congressional Voting: A Study of Legislative Behavior in the United States House of Representatives (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1968), Ch.IV.

[36]See, Murray Frost, "Roll Call Cohesion in the New Jersey State Legislature, 1956-1957", (Unpublished M.A. Thesis, Michigan State University, 1959), for an indication of higher cohesion among those with future political ambition. But it should be noted that New Jersey had a very strong party system at that time, and even then the finding was not statistically significant.

candidate for the Senate would have to appeal to more or different voters than a Representative and that a record of independence (i.e. low party cohesion) might be more fruitful for a Senate candidate. There is some data in Soule, for example, that notes that those with progressive ambition were more likely than other state legislators to be Trustees. Trustees are more independent and therefore are less likely to be voting with their party.[37]

In this portion of the study, then, we are interested in examining the party cohesion level of Representatives with progressive ambitions for the Senate to see if there are any patterns that are independent of state situations, even though the model at this point would not lead us to expect one relationship more than another.

We have just related several aspects of the situation at the so-called "origin"--i.e. the House of Representatives--to the availability of, or ability to gain, resources, which in turn would affect a Representative's decision to seek the Senate seat. We hypothesized, for instance, that Representatives whose House district's competitiveness matched that of their Senate seat's would be more likely to run for higher office. Similarly, we felt that power and resources increased with better committee assignments and seniority, but that too much power in the House might inhibit progressive ambitions.

This suggests that the decision to become a candidate

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[37]See, Roger H. Davidson, The Role of the Congressman (New York: Pegasus, 1969), p. 161, for his finding that Delegates expressed more party loyalty than Trustees.

for a higher office (i.e. progressive ambition) is not only a function of the resources available (and of the candidate's personal characteristics--already discussed--and the opportunity for office--to be discussed) but also of the political risk involved. Seligman's model sees the "role of parties in the recruitment of political leadership...as the product of the inter-action between the internal organization dynamics and diverse party environments as mediated by the structure of political opportunity and political risk."[38] Effective political opportunity refers to conditions, motivations, and resources present or available to the prospective candidate. These are similar to the three sets of variables in our model. "Political risk refers to the extent of the losses in status, income, and influence when a person loses political office."[39] One of Seligman's associates defined political risk in terms of the "candidates' perception of the costs and benefits associated with candidacy..."[40]

Risk is not only a function of the office he seeks, but of the one he holds now. If, for example, competition for his House seat is strong, he may be in a high risk situation. If his current job is already risky, he may be more likely to seek another office. Schlesinger hypothesized,

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[38]Lester Seligman, "Political Parties and the Recruitment of Political Leaders," Political Leadership in Industrialized Societies: Studies in Comparative Analysis, ed. Lewis J. Edinger (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1967), p. 295.

[39]Ibid., p. 299.

[40]Roland E. Smith, "Political Recruitment and Political Risk in an Oregon Election," (Paper presented to the 1970 American Political Science Association Meeting), p. 5.

"We would expect...that those congressmen who did seek to become governor or senator would be men who either came from unsafe seats or were sure of advancement."[41] So rather than merely examine the competitiveness of the House district in relation to the Senate seat, as suggested earlier, we would also hypothesize that RSTs would be more likely than other Representatives to come from competitive districts.

Similarly, if a Representative has low seniority and/or poor committee assignments, he may feel that a try for the Senate--even in unfavorable circumstances (i.e. even if he were likely to lose and cost him his House seat)--would not constitute "a great loss". Therefore, contrary to our earlier speculation that high seniority and/or good committee assignments are important for gaining the resources necessary for a Senate candidacy and hence expecting a disproportionate number of RSTs in these categories, it is possible to assume that poor assignments and low seniority reduce risks and constitute a more attractive situation for a candidate with fewer resources. "...When political risk is low, a political career can and will attract more of the weakly motivated and those with more meager resources."[42] Therefore, it is possible that the hypothesized relationship between importance of committee assignment and the likelihood of progressive ambition may be an inverse one rather than a direct relationship

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[41] Ambitions and Politics, pp. 17-18.

[42] Lester Seligman, "Opportunity, Risk, Selection and Decision-Making: A Model of Political Recruitments", (Paper presented to the 1970 American Political Science Association Meeting), p. 30.

or the curvilinear relationship hypothesized earlier.

Not only may an inferior influence position in the House minimize the risk of losing that office, but it may also serve to stimulate ambition for higher office. For instance, Rep. James Scheuer at the time of his candidacy for the Democratic nomination for Mayor of New York City was quoted as saying, "I came into Congress late and I realize I don't have power...But City Hall is something else."[43] So may the Senate be "something else" with its fewer members, less hierarchical structure, and more evenly distributed power.[44]

C. Senate Situation

The decision of a Representative to become a Senatorial candidate is not merely a function of his own characteristics (or motivations) and of the situation at the "origin" (i.e. the House) which affects his resources, but also of the situation at the "destination" (i.e. the Senate) which provides him with the opportunity. Opportunity is not merely the legal expiration of a Senatorial term after six years. A potential candidate must consider whether his party holds that seat and whether the incumbent plans to run for re-election. He must consider the likely degree of competition for that seat. He must consider who are the prospective competitors. The latter, of course, is partially influenced by the patterns of office-holding of Senatorial candidates of his party in his state.

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[43] New York Times, June 7, 1969.

[44] See Lewis A. Froman, Jr., The Congressional Process: Strategies, Rules, and Procedures (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967), p. 7.

All of these aspects of opportunity--in addition to his motivation and resources--will determine his decision to become a candidate for the Senate.

The motivation or other personal characteristics of candidates who enter certain Senate situations (such as challenging the incumbent Senator of his own party) can be expected to differ from those whose candidacies represent different Senate situations (such as running to fill a vacancy caused by a Senator's death). The House situation (and its resources and risks) can be expected to differ too. And so may still other aspects of the Senate situation--e.g. incumbents of safe Senate seats may attract more challengers from their own party than occupants of competitive seats.

The focus of this portion of the study concerning the effect of the Senate situation upon progressive ambition concentrates upon the RST in one Senate situation as compared to RSTs in other circumstances, rather than comparing him to other members of the House who do not demonstrate progressive ambition for the Senate. It tries, in part, to examine an inference stemming from Seligman and others that high political risk situations attract different kinds of candidates than low risk situations.[45] Our use of the term here, refers to the chance of defeat, in contrast to Seligman's usage which refers to the cost of defeat. In our current usage, challenging an incumbent Senator in a primary is an extremely risky situation --and we would expect it to attract a different type of RST

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[45]Seligman, "Opportunity.".

than would other situations.

The classification of Senate situations used here involves two of the aspects noted above--the party relationship of the RST and the incumbent, and the incumbent's re-election plans. The RST is either of the same party as the incumbent Senator, or he is not; the incumbent is either running for re-election, or he is not. Combining these two variables, four different Senate situations are derived:

I) Party Challenge--The RST and the incumbent are in the same party, and the incumbent is running for re-election.

II) Party Succession--The RST and the incumbent are in the same party, but the incumbent is not running for re-election.

III) Opposition Party--The RST and the incumbent are in different parties, and the incumbent is running for re-election.

IV) Open-ended--The RST and the incumbent are in different parties, but the incumbent is not running for re-election.

The assumption made here is that RSTs who compete in Party Challenge-type Senate situations (Group I) are more ambitious than RSTs who seek Senate seats in apparently less risky situations. Therefore, we would expect that these Party Challenger RSTs would be more likely than other RSTs to conform to the hypotheses noted earlier.

Nomination Struggle

Our focus to this point has been upon progressive ambition for the Senate and factors which may lead to it--personal, House, and Senate characteristics, or to state it another way: motivation, resources, and opportunities. But

the focus now shifts to part of the struggle to fulfill that ambition--namely the nature of the struggle for the Senate nomination.

Schlesinger's work on ambition theory is not directly concerned with the actual contest for the nomination for the major offices. The opportunity structure for these offices are developed, and the assumption is made "that opportunities arouse expectations and, in turn, give direction to personal ambitions."[46] The emphasis of ambition theory is "not on how one advances in politics but on who will want to advance."[47] But the evidence for who wants to advance is drawn from those who have succeeded in gaining the nomination in the past. The opportunity structures--the patterns of previous public offices held by the candidates--for the Senate emerge from contests for these nominations. The patterns are reinforced or modified by still other contests for the nomination.

If 21% of the Senatorial candidates between 1914 and 1958 had Congress as their penultimate office, it is because these 169 Representatives (or ex-Representatives) won their nomination contests.[48] Some of these primary elections (or convention ballots) may have been unanimous or nearly so, but others were extremely close. Did Representatives from states with certain emerging patterns have more trouble than others? Did Representatives since 1958 have less trouble gaining the

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[46] Ambition and Politics, p. 15.

[47] Ibid., emphasis in the original.

[48] Data was re-calculated from Ambition and Politics, pp. 92 and 95.

nomination if they were in state parties where Congress was the predominant penultimate office for the Senate nomination, than if they came from states with different patterns? Did Representatives with certain characteristics which are assumed to be advantageous actually have less of a struggle to gain the nomination than other Representatives?

An accounting and analysis of the nomination struggles of the RSTs in the two decades from 1950 to 1968 would contribute to the answer to these questions. It would also constitute a partial test of the assumption that the opportunity structure turns on--and presumably cools off--expectations and ambitions. The determination of the degree of competition faced by the RSTs in their contests to gain their Senate nominations is essential in the determination of the appropriate legislative strategy for RSTs. This, in turn, is necessary for an assessment of the impact of Senatorial ambition upon the behavior of the RSTs while still in the House. Hence this unit lays part of the groundwork for the last analytical unit of this study.

Although some collective statistics are available on the proportion of primaries won by different margins, there is no compendium of accounts of nomination struggles for any series of United States Senate contests. Such a collection would have to refer to newspaper files, books and articles on state politics or on particular candidates, and the occassional case study. Many of these sources have been examined in order to present the brief accounts of each of the nomination contests for each of the RST Senate candidacies included in this

study. This material is found in the Appendix.

Chapter IV is an analysis of some aspects of these struggles. The model described above--and tested below--in part, assumes that certain personal attributes, House behavior patterns, and Senate situation characteristics either constitute resources or facilitate their accumulation for use in a Senate contest. These were hypothesized to contribute to progressive ambition. In this portion of the study, these variables are hypothesized to contribute to a successful struggle for the Senate nomination. For instance we speculated that being a generalist would be an asset encouraging progressive ambition; now we hypothesize that Representatives with that asset will face less competition in their attempt to gain the Senate nomination. Since the theoretical framework here is no different than the one previously outlined, the hypotheses will not be detailed at this point, but rather are noted at the outset of the analysis in Chapter IV.

Behavior Change

The final focus of this study is upon the impact of Senatorial ambition upon the Representative's behavior while still in the lower house. Schlesinger makes it clear that this is a part of the development of ambition theory, but that he ignored that problem in his major work Ambition and Politics.

> ...Ambition theory can be brought to bear on specific overt acts such as the votes of a legislator or the policy proposals of a governor. In this instance ambition theory does not pose a criterion different from the widely held and occasionally tested hypothesis that a legislator responds to his constituency; it differs in that it asserts that the constituency

> to which the legislator is responding is not always the one from which he has been elected, and that it is more important to know what he wants to be than how he got to be where he now is.[49]

The "ambitious politician must act today in terms of the electorate of the office which he hopes to win tomorrow."[50] But alternate strategies of advancement have to be considered. But Schlesinger apologizes, "Regretfully, in this study I shall not do much with the strategies of advancement...Nevertheless, it is through the interaction of opportunities and strategies that ambition theory can hope to explain the specifics of legislative or other political behavior."[51]

Schlesinger notes that ambitions change over time, and "A legislator's votes...are therefore a consequence of current rather than possible future ambitions."[52] The examination of the impact of an RST's Senatorial ambition upon his legislative behavior in the House, therefore, can reasonably be limited to his ultimate term in the House. One way of judging the impact is to determine whether his behavior in that term differed from his earlier behavior. But the need to change his behavior would depend upon whether his behavior already conformed to the pattern called for by his strategy of advancement.

Two basic strategies were assumed. One was aimed at the party faithful, and would be most appropriate when the candidate faced strong competition for the nomination. This

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[49] P. 5.

[50] Ibid., p. 6.

[51] Ibid., p. 16.

[52] Ibid., p. 10.

so-called Nomination-strategy calls for the RST to be like the other legislators in his state party--i.e. his party cohesion and liberalism should match the average legislator's of his state party.

The second strategy aims at winning votes from the uncommitted and the opposition, and is most appropriate for competitive general election situations. This Election-strategy, therefore, calls for the RST to have a lower party cohesion score than the average state party representative, and to be more moderate. A low level of specialization--i.e. being a generalist--is recommended in each strategy.

The prescribed strategy is based upon the level of competition for the nomination as calculated for the analysis of nomination struggles, and the competitiveness of the Senate seat as it was defined for use in Chapters II and III of the study.

Our analyses center around two foci--one concerns whether some RSTs are more likely than others to be Ready (i.e. already adhering to their prescribed strategy prior to their ultimate term), and the other examines whether some of the RSTs who are not Ready are more likely to Respond to their new constituency while others are Reluctant to change their behavior. For instance, we would expect RSTs with similar House and Senate situations--e.g. congruent constituencies, or similar levels of competitiveness--would be more likely to be Ready than other RSTs. Similarly we would expect RSTs from state parties with a favorable opportunity structure--i.e. Congress is a predominant penultimate office for Senators --to be more likely to be Ready than other RSTs.

Our expectations concerning which RSTs would be more likely to change their inappropriate behavior occasionally stem from contradictory assumptions. For instance, some have viewed lawyers as more likely to have experience in clientele relationships in which they represent viewpoints other than their own and therefore could be expected to Respond to their future constituency. Others do not expect different behavior from lawyers than non-lawyers, and therefore would not hypothesize different proportions of Responders and Reluctants among these occupational groups.

Similarly young Senatorial candidates may be viewed as ambitious and less settled in their patterns and therefore more likely than older RSTs to be Responders. On the other hand older candidates may see their attempt as their only chance to gain the Senate seat (while the younger candidate may still be a viable candidate in the future even if he were to lose), and therefore be more likely to adapt their behavior.

An RST with many years of public office experience may be considered a professional who is prepared to do whatever is necessary to gain the office he seeks, and therefore will be more likely to be a Responder than the "amateur" with little previous political experience. On the other hand a man who tries for the Senate without a long record of public office experience may be considered ambitious, and therefore more likely to adapt his behavior to his new needs.

These contradictory hypotheses are tested in the final portion of this paper.

Study's Population

Before presenting any analysis, it is necessary to define in more detail the nature of the population being studied. The time-frame for this study is 1950 to 1968. The group to be studied consists of all members of the House of Representatives who were candidates for the Senatorial nomination. We are not examining Senatorial candidates whose last public office was the House, but rather those who were candidates while still in the lower chamber. In states where the Senatorial nomination is decided by primary, there are few problems about identifying those eligible for this study. But in the states that nominate Senatorial candidates in party conventions, challenge-primaries (or convention-primary situations) or situations requiring a special nomination process, there may be some room for dispute of the candidate designation. Therefore special mention must be made of the cases in which the Representative is considered to have run for the Senate nomination, even though he did not risk his House seat.

Four Representatives are considered to have been serious contenders for the Senate nomination although failing to secure the nomination in their party's nomination convention. Rep. Andrew Jacobs (Democrat) tried in Indiana in 1950; Rep. Frank Kowalski lost to ex-Representative and HEW Secretary Abe Ribicoff in the Democratic convention in Connecticut in 1962; Rep. Samuel Stratton was a serious contender until he got blitzed in the Democratic convention in New York in 1964 by Robert Kennedy's late but successful drive; Rep. Otis Pike of New York was a contender for the Senate

nomination in the 1968 Democratic convention, but did not enter the primary which took place subsequently. Jacobs, Stratton, and Pike were able to continue as candidates for re-election to the House, and the latter two were re-elected. Kowalski, who could have run for the House that year as this nomination was purposely not set until after the Senate contest, refused to do so.

When Senator Francis Case died on June 22, 1962, the task of naming the Republican candidate to succeed him fell to the South Dakota Republican State Central Committee. They met on July 9, 1962, and it took them 20 ballots to make their decision. Rep. Ben Reifel was one of six contenders for the nomination. He ran fourth on the first ballot, and was still fourth on the nineteenth ballot, although his position had varied some in the intermediate ballots; he did not receive any votes on the final ballot which saw Lieutenant Governor Joseph Bottum chosen as nominee. Reifel maintained his House seat and was re-elected to the 88th through 91st Congresses.

Another unusual contest occurred when an incumbent resigned in the middle of his term. When Price Daniel resigned in January 1957 to become Governor, a successor was chosen in an election held in April without any party designations. There were 22 candidates, but three of them received 92% of the vote. The three candidates were Rep. Martin Dies and Ralph Yarborough, both Democrats, and Republican Thad Hutcheson. Yarborough received approximately 38% of the vote, about 75,000 votes more than Dies. Dies retained his House seat, but did not seek re-election in 1958.

Another Representative who did not sacrifice his House seat when he made a formal bid to gain the Senate nomination, was John Dent, Democrat of Pennsylvania. He unsuccessfully challenged Sen. Joseph Clark in the 1968 Democratic Senatorial primary while at the same time running for re-nomination to the House of Representatives. He won his House nomination contest and was returned to the 91st Congress in the November 1968 election.

These seven men are considered as having tried for the Senate nomination and are included in the analyses. There were 78 additional Representatives who tried for the Senate nomination while still members of the House. The names of these 85 men, the year of their attempt, and their level of success are noted in the table below.[53]

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[53]The short-hand expressions used in the code for level of success in that table will also be used throughout the text of the study. RSW stands for Representatives who were successful in their attempt to move to the Senate while still a member of the House; RSL stands for Representatives who lost the Senatorial election; RS combines these two groups; T signifies those Representatives who failed to win their bid for the Senatorial nomination; and RST represents all of these sub-groups combined.

TABLE 1

LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES WHO TRIED FOR THE SENATE
1950-1968

(Code: RSW-Representative was elected Senator; RSL-Representative was defeated in Senatorial election; T-Representative failed to win Senatorial nomination)

YEAR	NAME	PARTY	STATE	LEVEL OF SUCCESS
1950	Carroll	Dem.	Colorado	RSL
	Case	Rep.	South Dakota	RSW
	Douglas	Dem.	California	RSL
	Jacobs	Dem.	Indiana	T
	Kunkel	Rep.	Pennsylvania	T
	Monroney	Dem.	Oklahoma	RSW
	Nixon	Rep.	California	RSW
	Smathers	Dem.	Florida	RSW
1952	Aandahl	Rep.	North Dakota	T
	Beall	Rep.	Maryland	RSW
	Beckworth	Dem.	Texas	T
	Gore	Dem.	Tennessee	RSW
	Granger	Dem.	Utah	RSL
	Jackson	Dem.	Washington	RSW
	Kennedy	Dem.	Massachusetts	RSW
	Mansfield	Dem.	Montana	RSW
	McKinnon	Dem.	California	T
	Potter	Rep.	Michigan	RSW
	Ribicoff	Dem.	Connecticut	RSL
	Sasscer	Dem.	Maryland	T
1954	Battle	Dem.	Alabama	T
	Bender	Rep.	Ohio	RSW
	Cotton	Rep.	New Hampshire	RSW
	Curtis	Rep.	Nebraska	RSW
	D'Ewart	Rep.	Montana	RSL
	Harrison	Rep.	Wyoming	RSL
	Howell	Dem.	New Jersey	RSL
	Hruska	Rep.	Nebraska	RSW
	Martin	Rep.	Iowa	RSW
	Sutton	Dem.	Tennessee	T
	Warburton	Rep.	Delaware	RSL
	Yorty	Dem.	California	RSL
1956	Davis	Rep.	Wisconsin	T
	Dodd	Dem.	Connecticut	RSL
	Young	Rep.	Nevada	RSL
1957	Dies	Dem.	Texas	T*

TABLE 1-CONTINUED

YEAR	NAME	PARTY	STATE	LEVEL OF SUCCESS
1958	Byrd	Dem.	West Virginia	RSW
	Engle	Dem.	California	RSW
	Kean	Rep.	New Jersey	RSL
	Keating	Rep.	New York	RSW
	McCarthy	Dem.	Minnesota	RSW
	Prouty	Rep.	Vermont	RSW
	Scott	Rep.	Pennsylvania	RSW
1960	Anderson	Dem.	Montana	T
	Bentley	Rep.	Michigan	RSL
	Burdick	Dem.	North Dakota	RSW
	McGovern	Dem.	South Dakota	RSL
	Metcalf	Dem.	Montana	RSW
	Thomson	Rep.	Wyoming	RSW
1962	Bass	Rep.	New Hampshire	RSL
	Brewster	Dem.	Maryland	RSW
	Curtis	Rep.	Massachusetts	T
	Dominick	Rep.	Colorado	RSW
	Durno	Rep.	Oregon	T
	Inouye	Dem.	Hawaii	RSW
	King	Dem.	Utah	RSL
	Kowalski	Dem.	Connecticut	T
	Merrow	Rep.	New Hampshire	T
	Pfost	Dem.	Idaho	RSL
	Reifel	Rep.	South Dakota	T
	Seely-Brown	Rep.	Connecticut	RSL
	Van Zandt	Rep.	Pennsylvania	RSL
	Yates	Dem.	Illinois	RSL
1964	Bass	Dem.	Tennessee	RSW
	Bruce	Rep.	Indiana	T
	Gill	Dem.	Hawaii	RSL
	Lloyd	Rep.	Utah	T
	McIntire	Rep.	Maine	RSL
	Montoya	Dem.	New Mexico	RSW
	Stratton	Dem.	New York	T
	Taft	Rep.	Ohio	RSL
1966	Duncan	Dem.	Oregon	RSL
	Ellsworth	Rep.	Kansas	T
	Roncalio	Dem.	Wyoming	RSL
	Walker	Rep.	Mississippi	RSL
1968	Curtis	Rep.	Missouri	RSL
	Dent	Dem.	Pennsylvania	T
	Dole	Rep.	Kansas	RSW
	Gurney	Rep.	Florida	RSW
	Hansen	Rep.	Idaho	RSL
	Mathias	Rep.	Maryland	RSW
	Pike	Dem.	New York	T

TABLE 1-CONTINUED

YEAR	NAME	PARTY	STATE	LEVEL OF SUCCESS
	Resnick	Dem.	New York	T
	Selden	Dem.	Alabama	T
	Schweiker	Rep.	Pennsylvania	RSW

*Dies was one of 22 candidates running without party designation in a winner-take-all-election--i.e. the candidate with the highest vote was to be elected. Dies ran second.

To summarize the scope of this dissertation: 1) we will examine three sets of factors related to progressive ambition for the Senate by members of the House of Representatives; these revolve around agent or personal characteristics, the context at the origin or House, and the situation at the destination or Senate; 2) we will examine the nature of the struggle for the Senate nomination; and 3) we will examine the impact of Senatorial ambition upon the Representative's behavior while still in the House.

CHAPTER II

AGENT AND ORIGIN CHARACTERISTICS AND SENATORIAL AMBITION

Introduction

The major focus of this part of the study is to determine whether Representatives who manifest their progressive ambition for the Senate by seeking the nomination while still a member of the House differ from their House colleagues in other ways. The resulting analysis should contribute to our knowledge of political ambition. The model that underlies the analysis in this chapter focuses upon the factors that may lead to the Representative's decision to seek the Senate seat. The model--described more fully in the previous chapter--states that the decision to seek "promotion" from the House to the Senate is a function of three sets of variables.

One set revolves around the agent--i.e. the individual's background and personal characteristics, such as his age, his political career, and occupation. The second set of factors concerns his situation at his origin--i.e. the House of Representatives; it includes such factors as the size and competitiveness of his House district, his position in the House as seen in his seniority and committee assignments, and his behavior in the House as seen in his specialization and aspects of his roll call behavior such as party cohesion and liberal-

conservatism. The third set of factors contributing to his decision to become a Senatorial candidate revolve around the situation at his destination--i.e. the Senate; it includes attention to such variables as the party and re-election plans of the incumbent, the competitiveness of the Senate seat, and the opportunity afforded by a previous pattern of Congressmen running for the Senate.

Agent Characteristics

A. Age

One of the personal characteristics examined was age. One line of speculation suggested that the RST, marked by greater ambition than other Representatives, would have started his political career at an earlier age. Therefore one would hypothesize that RSTs gained their first public office at an earlier age than other Representatives; similarly we could expect RSTs to have entered the House at an earlier age too. But an alternate hypothesis, also suggested by Schlesinger, was that the later starters used the advantages gained before entering public office to aid their rapid promotion, and that they gained major nominations no later than early starters.

An examination of these hypotheses for the RSTs shows little difference between them and other Representatives. The data for other Representatives was based upon a control group that was randomly selected--using a table of random numbers--from the House membership of the 86th Congress, which was elected in 1958, close to the midpoint of the time period covered by this study (1950-1968). This group of 85 equaled

the number of RSTs, and was constructed so as to exclude any Representative who became an RST during the period of the study. This randomly selected group was 67% Democratic compared to 65% for the 86th Congress. This similarity led to the conclusion that this group was representative of the 86th Congress and therefore acceptable as a control group for the RSTs, even though Democrats constituted only 51% of the latter group.

The median age for the RST entering public office was 31 which was only two years ahead of the median for the control group. A similar two year difference existed for the age at entry into the House. Although there are some differences in the distributions indicating earlier starters among the RSTs --e.g. 41% of the RSTs gained their first public office before they were 30, compared to only 33% of the control group, and 39% of the RSTs were in the House before they were 40 compared to 33% of the control group--these differences are not great enough to alter the conclusion that RSTs do not start their public office career or House career earlier than other Representatives.[54] See Table 2.

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[54]See Walter Oleszek, "Age and Political Careers," Public Opinion Quarterly XXIII (Spring 1969) pp. 100-2, and Joseph Schlesinger, "Political Careers and Party Leadership," Political Leadership in Industrialized Societies: Studies in Comparative Analysis, ed. Lewis J. Edinger (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1967), pp. 266-293, for other data on age at entry into House office.

TABLE 2

Age at Entry into First Public Office and House of Representatives, RSTs and Control Group (86th Congress)

	FIRST PUBLIC OFFICE		HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES	
AGE	RST*	CONTROL	RST	CONTROL
20-24	8	2	-	-
25-29	26	26	2	2
30-34	19	29	13	11
35-39	11	6	18	15
40-44	13	9	22	20
45-49	4	10	19	19
50-54	2	2	6	10
55-59	-	1	3	7
60-64	1	-	2	1

*Reifel is excluded as his age at entry into public office is unknown.

There are some differences within the RST group for first attaining public office depending upon the office. For example, the median age for attaining first public office for the RSTs whose first office was law enforcement was 28, but for local elective office it was 35. The highest, of course, was for Congress (median age at entry was 40) which does have a constitutional minimum age requirement of 25. The medians for RSTs by first public office are as follows: Law enforcement: 28, State legislature: 29, Administration: 29, Local elective: 35, Congress: 40. This compares with the control group distribution as follows: Law enforcement: 28, State legislature: 32, Administration: 32, Local elective: 32, Congress: 43. See Table 3. It is interesting to note that the median age for entering the House for RSTs who started there was only one year more than for RSTs beginning their career elsewhere (41 and 40 respectively).

TABLE 3

Median Age at Entry into First Public Office, RSTs and Control Group

FIRST PUBLIC OFFICE	MEDIAN AGE	
	RST	CONTROL
Law Enforcement	28	28
State Legislature	29	32
Administration	29*	32
Local Elective	35	32
Congressional	40	43
Total	31	33

*Heifel is excluded as his age at entry into public office is unknown.

Nor were RSTs more likely to seek the Senate seat at an earlier age than others. The median age of all RSTs at the time of their attempt for the Senate seat was 50, which was only a year older than the age of all non-incumbent Senatorial candidates in a recent year (1964); the median age of Representatives who had gained their party's Senatorial nomination was 49.

B. Occupation

The over-representation of lawyers in legislatures has been documented and discussed frequently. Some of the reasons for the preponderance of lawyers in legislatures would also be relevant to an expectation of their over-representation among the politically ambitious RSTs also. For example, their ability to return to their occupation reduces the risk of defeat and may spur RST status.

But an examination of the occupations of RSTs with those listed by Congressional Quarterly for Representatives in

the 84th to 90th Congresses indicates virtually no difference. Fifty-four percent (54%) of the RSTs were lawyers compared to an average of 56% of all House members. The distribution for other occupations also was virtually the same for the two groups of Representatives--with one exception: 11% of all Representatives had teaching listed as one of their occupations, but 17% of the RSTs had been in that profession. See Table 4.

TABLE 4

Occupations of RSTs and House of Representatives

OCCUPATION	RST	AVERAGE FOR REPRESENTATIVES 84th-90th CONGRESSES*
Law	54%**	56%
Business	29%	32%
Teaching	17%	11%
Agriculture	14%	11%
Journalism	7%	8%
Other Professions	2%	3%

*Data from various issues of Congressional Quarterly.
**Totals add to more than 100% because some Representatives had more than one occupation.

The findings here that lawyers are not more likely than other Representatives to have ambition for political promotion to the Senate supports the general findings of Eulau and Sprague. They conclude, "Lawyer-politicians do not differ much from politicians who are not lawyers."[55] Their suggestion of convergence of the legal and political profession results in a pursuit of variables other than occupation--other agent variables, as well as House and Senate situation ones--to explain the phenomenon of political ambition.

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[55] Op. cit., p. 84.

C. Career

One of the personal (or agent) characteristics that was assumed to be related to the seeking of Senatorial office by members of the House of Representatives, was the nature of their previous public office career. Schlesinger concluded that those running for higher office had more complex careers. In other words, it is reasonable to hypothesize that Representatives seeking a Senate nomination will have a more complex career than other Representatives. Similarly he found winners to have had a more complex career than losers.

Career complexity can be calculated in several ways. One simply is the total number of public offices held; a Representative who has held only one public office prior to being elected to the House may be said to have a simpler career than someone who has held two or three offices. Another way to measure career complexity is to note the different kinds of public office experience a Representative may have had. A Representative who has had only manifest experience--i.e. prior legislative experience--may be said to have a simpler career than another Representative who has had such non-manifest experience as law enforcement or administrative positions.

Analysis of the career data for the 85 RSTs and the randomly selected control group chosen from the 86th Congress indicates very little difference in their public office experience profiles. For example, almost half of each group had prior experience in the state legislature (41% of the RSTs and 42% of the control group Representatives). Approximately one-fifth of each group had administrative experience (19% for

each group), and approximately one-tenth had local elective experience (9% for the RSTs and 13% for the control group).[56] Approximately one-third had law enforcement experience--29% of the RSTs and 35% of the control group. It should be noted that each group had virtually identical proportions of lawyers (54% of the RSTs and 56% of the control group). RSTs, then, are not more likely than other Representatives to have had a more complex career as marked by such non-manifest office experience as law enforcement or administration.[57] See Table 5.

TABLE 5

Prior Office Experience of RSTs and Control Group

PRIOR OFFICE EXPERIENCE	RSW (N=33)		RSL (N=28)		RS (N=61)		T (N=24)		RST (N=85)		86th CONG. CONTROL (N=85)	
State Legislature	14	42%*	10	36%	24	39%	11	46%	35	41%	36	42%
Law Enforcement	12	36	9	32	21	34	4	17	25	29	30	35
Administration	7	21	6	21	13	21	3	13	16	19	16	19
Local Elective	4	12	2	7	6	10	2	8	8	9	11	13
Statewide Elective	1	3	-	-	1	2	2	8	3	4	1	1

*Totals do not add to 100% because Representatives may have had more than one previous public office.

Nor have RSTs served in more offices than other Representatives. The 85 RSTs held 193 offices (including the

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[56]The definitions of office experience used here were the ones used by Joseph A. Schlesinger in How They Became Governor (East Lansing: Governmental Research Bureau, Michigan State University, 1957). Local elective experience, for instance, is limited to mayor, councilman, alderman, school committeeman, and county commissioner.

[57]This conclusion remains valid when the comparison is made between the RSTs and the entire House membership in the 85th Congress as reported in Schlesinger, "Political Careers," p. 279.

House of Representatives) before they tried for the Senate, an average of 2.3 offices. The control group of 85 men held slightly more offices, 214 for an average of 2.5 positions. Both groups had one-fourth of their members come to Congress without any prior public office experience.

The original model led to the expectation of more complex careers. Since a politician's career time is limited, it would have been reasonable to expect that RSTs would begin their public office careers in different offices. But in view of the lack of difference in total office experience between RSTs and other Representatives, it is not surprising to find that there were virtually no differences between them concerning their first public office experience. Identical proportions--25% started in Congress, and the difference between RSTs and the control group never varied more than three percentage-points (15% of the RSTs started in administrative positions, compared to 12% of the control group). Approximately 30% (31% of the RSTs and 29% of the control group) started in the state legislature--more than any other office; approximately one-fourth (24% of the RSTs and 26% of the control group) begain their career in law enforcement positions. Only 6% (RSTs) and 8% (control group) began in local elective office despite the large number of available positions, while no one began in statewide elected positions. See Table 6. It appears, therefore, that one cannot differentiate RSTs from other Representatives by examining the kind of public office in which they began their career, or the offices in which they served prior to their House membership.

TABLE 6

First Public Office of RSTs and Control Group

First Public Office	RSW		RSL		RS		T		RST		86th Congress Control	
State Legislature	9	27%	8	29%	17	28%	9	38%	26	31%	25	29%
Law Enforcement	9	27%	7	25%	16	26%	4	17%	20	24%	22	26%
Congress	7	21%	6	21%	13	21%	8	33%	21	25%	21	25%
Administration	5	15%	5	18%	10	16%	3	13%	13	15%	10	12%
Local Elective	3	9%	2	7%	5	8%	-	-	5	6%	7	8%
Totals	33	100%	28	100%	61	99%	24	101%	85	101%	85	100%

Schlesinger's data indicated differences between winners and losers--i.e. unsuccessful Gubernatorial and Senatorial nominees had simpler careers than those who were elected. Might there be similar differences among the RSTs? A re-examination of Tables 5 and 6 indicates that those who were unsuccessful in their attempts to gain the Senate nomination (the Ts) are different from other Representatives seeking the Senate seat (the RSs), as well as from Representatives without such progressive ambitions. Basically, they are more likely to have had experience in the manifest positions (state legislatures and statewide elective office), then the RSs or the control group. Forty-six percent (46%) of the Ts had state legislative experience compared to 39% of the RSs and 42% of the control group; 8% of the Ts had held a statewide elective office while only 2% of the RSs and 1% of the control group had such experience. Similarly, the Ts are more likely to have begun their careers in a manifest position--either the state legislature or Congress--and less likely than RSs to have begun in either law enforcement, administration, or local government.

Although winners (RSWs) and losers (RSLs) have similar first public office patterns, the winners held a greater number of offices which gave them a wider range of experience.

A comparison of the two major career characteristics discussed above (first public office and office experience) for Representatives who ran for the Senate while still a member of the lower house during the 1950-1968 period, with all Senatorial candidates in the 1914-1950 period whose last public office was the House of Representatives, shows no significant

differences.[58] In other words, if the latter group--despite the difference in definition--can be considered early RSs, then we may say that the career patterns of recent RSs (since 1950) are similar to earlier RSs (1914-1950). The table below does show some minor variations, e.g. the higher proportion among recent RSs who started in the state legislature (28% compared to 20%), and the lower proportion among recent RSs who have administrative office experience (21% compared to 33%).

TABLE 7

Career Characteristics of "Recent RSs" and "Earlier RSs"*

PUBLIC OFFICE	FIRST PUBLIC OFFICE "EARLY"	FIRST PUBLIC OFFICE "RECENT"	OFFICE EXPERIENCE "EARLY"	OFFICE EXPERIENCE "RECENT"
State Legislature	20%	28%	33%	39%
Law Enforcement	27	26	40	34
Congress	20	21	**	**
Administration	19	16	33	21
Local Elective	13	8	14	10
Statewide Elective	1	-	5	1

*Recent RSs are RSTs 1950-1968; Early RSs are Senatorial candidates whose last public office was the House of Representatives (1914-1950). Early RS data is recalculated from Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics, pp. 92 and 95.

**All RSs had Congressional service, by definition.

D. Education

The last personal characteristic examined at this point concerns college education. The model suggested first of all that RSTs would be more likely than other Representatives to have attended college. Secondly, an education away from the home state was assumed to be more broadening

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[58]The data was recalculated from Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics, pp. 92 and 95.

resulting in a broader perspective, including ambition. Therefore RSTs were hypothesized to be more likely than other Representatives to have attended an out-of-state college.

An examination of Table 8 indicates support for both of these hypotheses. First of all, only 4 of the RSTs (5%) did not attend college, compared to more than twice that (10 or 12%) of the control group who did not attend college. Soule's speculation that a Representative without a college education cannot aspire to higher office in this modern era, is supported.[59] It is interesting to note that the four RSTs who did not attend college or law school had other compensating traits that may have stimulated their progressive ambition. Three of the four had lengthy public office careers, ranging from 19 years to 33 years service. The fourth only had 3 years of previous political experience, but was a self-made millionaire; he also was unsuccessful in his bid for the Senate nomination.

TABLE 8

Education and Mobility of RSTs and Control Group

	RSTs			86th CONGRESS CONTROL		
PLACE OF COLLEGE ATTENDANCE	N	% OF THOSE WITH COLLEGE	% OF ALL	N	% OF THOSE WITH COLLEGE	% OF ALL
Same State as Represented	50	62%	59%	53	71%	62%
Adjacent State	13	16	15	9	12	11
Another State, Same Region	3	4	4	3	4	4
Elsewhere	15	19	18	10	13	12
Did Not Attend College	4	-	5	10	-	12
Total	85	101%	101%	85	100%	101%

[59] Soule, op.cit., p. 447.

The second hypothesis was supported also. Sixty-two percent (62%) of the RSTs who attended college, did it in the state they later represented; a slightly higher proportion (71%) of the other Representatives who went to college did so in their home state. In addition, 19% of the RSTs attended college in another region of the country compared to only 13% of the college-attending control group.

E. Summary

The model assigned considerable importance to personal or agent characteristics of the Representative in determining whether he would demonstrate progressive ambition for the Senate. But the personal data examined here did not seem to differentiate the RST from other Representatives. There was a tendency for the RST to be better educated and to have received his college training outside of his native state. But RSTs were not differentiated by their previous occupation. Nor did they begin their public office careers appreciably earlier. Nor was their first public office, nor their public office profiles markedly different than other Representatives.

Origin Characteristics

The second category of variables affecting the decision to become a Senatorial candidate concerns the situation at the origin, i.e. in the House of Representatives. This includes characteristics of his district such as size and competitiveness, aspects of his House career such as his seniority and committee assignments, and aspects of his behavior such as the degree of specialization, liberal-conservatism, and party

cohesion.

A. Relative Constituency Size

Schlesinger had suggested that the sharing of electorates by two offices would lead to movement between them. Therefore we would expect a disproportionate number of Representatives who were elected to the House from At-Large districts to run for the Senate. The analysis concerning the proportionate size of Congressional Districts of RSTs bears this out; only about 2% of the House of Representatives are elected from At-Large districts, but 16% of the RSTs represent an entire state. In general the larger the share of the Senate constituency that falls in a Representative's district, the more likely he is to run for the upper house. Only approximately 11% of the Representatives come from districts that constitute 20% or more of the state's population,[60] but 50% of the RSTs come from districts with more than 20% of the state's population.[61]

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[60]This figure was derived from the size of state delegations in the 85th and 90th Congresses (elected in 1956 and 1966 respectively) and rest on an assumption of equal districts in a state. In other words congressional districts in states with five or fewer districts are assumed to contain 20% or more of the state's population, and no actual examination was made for malapportioned districts which actually may have had less than one-fifth of the state's population.

[61]For RSTs these calculations were made. For RSTs who tried for the Senate in the years 1952-58, and 1962-68, the data used was the last census prior to the election--i.e. 1950 for the former and 1960 for the latter. For those who made the attempt in the year of the census (1950 or 1960), the latest census information was used whenever it was possible--i.e. the district was not changed during the subsequent redistricting, or where it was composed of whole counties and therefore its size could be calculated.

Table 9 shows a distribution of RSTs and all Representatives (under the definitions noted above). It also shows that although RSWs are more likely than RSLs to come from small districts (i.e. 1-19% of the state's population), Ts are even more likely to be from these districts; the figures are 52% of RSWs, 36% of RSLs, but 63% of Ts.

TABLE 9

Proportionate Size of Congressional Districts (CDs) for RSTs and All Representatives

CDs AS A % OF ENTIRE STATE	RSW (N=33)	RSL (N=28)	T (N=24)	RST (N=85)	ALL REPS. (N=870)
1-19%	52%	36%	63%	49%	89%
20-79%	33	43	25	34	9
100% (At-Large)	15	21	13	16	2
Total	100%	100%	101%	99%	100%

Representatives from the larger districts are more likely than those from smaller districts to be successful in gaining the nomination. Approximately two-thirds (64%) of the Representatives from districts with 1-19% of the state's population won nomination (i.e. were RS rather than T), while 79% of those from districts with 20-79% of the population, and 79% from At-Large districts won nomination.[62]

B. City Size

Not only may the relative constituency size effect the decision to become a Senatorial candidate, but so might

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[62]An analysis of the nomination contests in these districts will be discussed in Chapter IV.

the size of the city in which the Representative resides. If we assume that a legislator is more likely to be known in his home city than elsewhere in his district or the state, then Representatives from larger cities have a resource (or at least a recourse to resources) that the rural or small town legislator lacks. Key's data on the "friends and neighbors" effect in the one-party Southern states supports this assumption.[63]

But Matthews' data concerning the birthplace of Senators--rather than current residence under discussion here--indicates an under-representation of large cities and an over-representation of small towns and cities. His explanation suggests that a small town background combines aspects of both urban and rural life.

V.O. Key's analysis concerning the effect of the direct primary upon state political systems suggests a more refined hypothesis. He found that one-party areas produced a disproportionately higher turnout in the majority party primary, which in turn gave candidates from these areas an advantage.[64] Generally these one-party areas for the Democrats are the large cities. Therefore we would hypothesize that more Democratic RSTs than other Democratic Representatives come from large cities. For the Republicans, the safe areas are more likely to be the small towns and rural areas. Therefore we would hypothesize that disproportionately more Republican RSTs than other Republican Representatives will be from these areas; we would

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[63]See V.O. Key, Southern Politics in State and Nation (New York: Vintage Books, 1949) passim.

[64]American State Politics, Chapter 5.

expect to find large-city Republicans to be under-represented.

The Senators in this study contributed to the small-town bias of the Senate reported by Matthews. Of the 33 RSWs in our study, 19 (or 58%) came from cities with a population between 2500 and 40,000 at the census nearest to their election. This compares to 39% for our control group of Representatives sampled from the 86th Congress, and 42% of the Representatives who were unsuccessful in their attempts to get to the Senate (either on Election Day or in securing the nomination). In addition, there are proportionately fewer RSWs from the large cities (over 100,000), than there are in the other two comparison groups just noted. This seems to lend support to Matthews' speculation about the advantages of a small-town background.

But these findings are not equally applicable to both parties. Although both Democratic and Republican RSTs from small cities are over-represented compared to other Representatives of their party, Democrats from large cities are slightly over-represented (35% of the Democratic RSTs are from cities over 100,000, while 32% of the Democrats in the control group are from that size cities) while Republican RSTs from these large cities are disproportionately fewer than other Republican Representatives (19% of the Republican RSTs compared to 36% of the control group Republicans). In addition, rural Democrats are under-represented among the RSTs, while there are proportionately three times as many Republican RSTs from rural areas as there are Republican Representatives in the control group.

The data reported in Table 10 support the refined hypothesis concerning the Republicans--those from rural and small towns are assumed to have an advantage and they are over-represented as compared to other Republican Representatives; and those from medium and large cities are under-represented. The data for the Democrats lend only partial support to the hypothesis--Democratic RSTs from the large cities are slightly over-represented (35% compared to 32% of the Democratic control group), but so are those from small cities, while those from medium size cities (40,000 to 100,000) are under represented.

But this discussion equates two cities of comparable size regardless of their dominance in a state. For example, Cheyenne, Wyoming (population of 44,000) is in the same category as Altoona, Pennsylvania (population of 69,000). But Cheyenne is the largest city in the state, while Altoona is about 3% of the size of Philadelphia. Therefore a second analysis of city residence was made, using the population of the city of residence as a proportion of the population of the largest city in the state.

This analysis showed that Representatives coming from the largest city in the state were more likely to try for the Senate. Twenty-six percent (26%) of all RSTs came from their state's largest city, while only 18% of other Representatives came from them. In general, a similar pattern for both Republicans and Democrats is indicated. RSTs from the proportionally smaller cities (i.e. less than 10% of the largest city, or 10-49% of the largest city) are under-represented, while those from the larger cities (50-99% of the largest city) or the

largest cities are over-represented, (or at least are not under-represented). This seems to support the initial assumption that the size of the city of residence may be a resource or an aid to obtaining the resources necessary to run for the Senate, and therefore Representatives who come from these larger cities are more likely to seek the Senate office.[65]

TABLE 10

Size of City of Residence for RSTs and Control Group

CITY SIZE POPULATION (IN THOUSANDS)	DEMOCRATS		REPUBLICANS		TOTAL	
	RST	CONTROL	RST	CONTROL	RST	CONTROL
Rural (<2.5)	7%	16%	21%	7%	14%	13%
Small (2.5-39.9)	47	37	50	43	48	39
Medium (40-99.9)	12	16	10	14	11	15
Large (100+)	35	32	19	36	27	33
Total	101%	101%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	43	57	42	28	85	85
CITY SIZE POPULATION (AS PROPORTION OF STATE'S LARGEST CITY)						
< 10%	42%	51%	62%	68%	52%	56%
10-49%	19	25	14	18	16	22
50-99%	5	2	7	7	6	4
100%	35	23	17	7	26	18
Total	101%	101%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	43	57	42	28	85	85

C. Competition of House Seat

The competitiveness of a Representative's seat can affect his political ambition for a Senate seat in several ways. If a legislator is already facing a risky situation

[65] A further discussion of city size, in relation to the nomination struggle is discussed in Chapter IV.

--i.e. his House seat is competitive--then he may feel that seeking a higher office (e.g. Senate seat) involves no additional risk to his political career. We would hypothesize, therefore, that RSTs are likely to come from competitive seats--or at least more likely than other Representatives.

A Representative's electoral strategy, including his behavior in the legislature, will be shaped by the degree of competition he faces in his district. Legislators from competitive situations, it may be assumed, will try to minimize party differences and to adopt more moderate positions on issues. In contrast, the safe legislator may be assumed to be trying to emphasize party differences, thereby placing his minority-party opponent at a disadvantage.

If the electoral strategy most appropriate for reelection to the House, were also the most appropriate to gain the Senate seat, it could spur progressive ambition among Representatives in that situation. Or, to put it another way using Schlesinger's conceptualization, if the "organizational tensions" of the House situation and the Senate situation differed, we would expect this to discourage ambition for the higher office. We would hypothesize, therefore, that RSTs are more likely than other Representatives to come from situations in which the competitiveness of their House seat is similar to that of their states' Senate seat. Similarly, we would hypothesize that success in gaining the new office was also related to the absence of "organizational tensions"; specifically, we would hypothesize that those who won their Senate seats were more likely than losers to have similar House and Senate

competitive situations.

The measure of House seat competitiveness can be a simple one. For instance, many have used the traditional rule of thumb definition that a competitive seat is one won by less than 55% of the vote in the last election. For our purposes the application of this definition to House seat competitiveness is reasonable. An incumbent trying to determine how much danger he is in and what is the most fruitful strategy for reelection probably will base this judgement on the level of competition he faced in his last election; he need not note the history of that seat and therefore need not average it out over several previous elections.

But when he makes the calculation of the degree of competition he faces for the Senate seat, he might want to examine more than just the last race for that position six years earlier. He might want to consider trends in statewide elections since that contest. Therefore, the measure of Senate seat competitiveness used in this study involves an examination of the outcomes of the statewide elections for Senator, Governor, and President for the six years prior to the election under consideration. Operationally, a Senate seat is considered Safe if the dominant party won two-thirds or more of these statewide elections. Relating this to the Representative's party, a Senate seat is considered Safe if the Representative's party won two-thirds or more of these statewide elections; it is called Competitive if the Representative's party won at least one-third but less than two-thirds of these elections; and it is labeled Hopeless if the Representative's

party won less than one-third of these races.

The vast majority of Representatives, including RSTs, come from safe districts. There is a slight tendency, however, for RSTs to be more likely than other Representatives to come from competitive seats, as hypothesized; 27% of the RSTs won their last House election by less than 55% of the vote, compared to only 21% of all House elections in the same period from 1948 to 1966 which were won by that narrow margin (18% of the control group chosen from the 86th Congress had competitive elections).

But a closer examination of the data found in Table 11 indicates some striking variations among the sub-groups of RSTs. Winners were least likely to come from a competitive House district--only 12% of the RSWs did, compared to 32% of the RSLs and 42% of the Ts. This means that not all RST sub-groups were more likely than other Representatives to come from competitive districts--RSWs were less likely than the control group to be facing serious election competition. More significantly, however, it suggests that a Representative from a safe seat is less likely than one from a competitive seat to risk his position to seek an elusive promotion; 53% of RSTs from Safe House seats failed to win the Senate seat they sought, compared to 83% of those from competitive districts.[66]

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[66] If one were to combine the 85 RSTs and the 85 control group Representatives into a single group, the data would indicate that Safe seat Representatives were more likely than Competitive seat Representatives to avoid Senate candidacy (53% to 39%), and to win the Senate seat if they did become a candidate (22% to 11%); Competitive seat Representatives, on the other hand, were more likely to lose--50% were losers (24% were RSLs and 26% were Ts) compared to 25% of the Safe seat Representatives (14% were RSLs and 11% were Ts).

TABLE 11

House and Senate Seat Competitiveness for RSTs and Control Group

HOUSE-SENATE			RSW		RSL		T		RST		CONTROL GROUP	
S	S	(AGREE)	13	39%	1	4%	8	33%	22	26%	30	35%
S	C		13	39	14	50	5	21	32	38	30	35
S	H		3	9	4	14	1	4	8	9	10	12
C	S		1	3	-	-	3	13	4	5	3	4
C	C	(AGREE)	2	6	5	18	3	13	10	12	7	8
C	H		1	3	4	14	4	17	9	11	5	6
Total				99%		100%		101%		101%		100%
Agree			15	45%	6	21%	11	46%	32	38%	37	44%
Disagree			18	55	22	79	13	54	53	62	48	56
Total				100%		100%		100%		100%		100%
House:	Safe		29	88%	19	68%	14	58%	62	73%	70	82%
	Compet.		4	12	9	32	10	42	23	27	15	18
Total				100%		100%		100%		100%		100%
Senate:	Safe		14	42%	1	4%	11	46%	26	31%	33	39%
	Compet.		15	45	19	68	8	33	42	49	37	44
	Hopeless		4	12	8	29	5	21	17	20	15	18
Total				99%		101%		100%		100%		101%
N			33		28		24		85		85	

S=Safe
C=Competitive
H=Hopeless

Schlesinger's speculation was that politically ambitious Representatives either were from competitive House seats or were seeking a relatively safe higher office. Our data supported the hypothesis when it showed more RSTs were from competitive seats than other Representatives. The data supported the logic of the hypothesis when it showed that RSTs from safe seats were more likely to win than RSTs from competitive seats--indicating safe-seat Representatives are less likely than marginal Representatives to risk their seat for an

uncertain Senate position.

But many Representatives did risk their political career--there were more losers (RSLs and Ts) than winners (RSWs). Schlesinger's hypothesis concerning competitive House or safe Senate seats being the source for RSTs was only partially supported. Although most (53%) of the RSTs came from either competitive House seats or were seeking a safe Senate seat, an identical proportion of the control group Representatives who did not seek Senate office were in similar electoral situations; that combination, therefore, was not more likely to produce candidates than non-candidates.

The next hypothesis to be tested--derived from Schlesinger's speculation about organizational tensions--was that RSTs were more likely than other Representatives to have similar levels of competition for their House and Senate seats. Our data did not support this hypothesis. If one compares the total group of 85 RSTs to the control group, then the RSTs actually had slightly less competition-agreement situations; 38% of the RSTs had agreement, compared to 44% of the control group.

Again there were striking differences among the RST sub-groups. RSLs were most likely to come from organizational-tension (or disagree) situations--79%. This organizational tension may have contributed to their defeat at the polls. But the other group of losers--the Ts who lost their nomination bids resembled the most successful group (54% of the Ts and 55% of the RSWs came from organizational tension--or

disagree--situations).[67]

The hypothesis that electoral success among RSTs was related to the absence of organizational tensions caused by differences in House and Senate seat competitiveness is supported only if RSWs are compared to all losers combined (i.e. RSLs and Ts). But the data above indicate that the losers are not a homogeneous group, as the RSLs and Ts have markedly different patterns. The different patterns among the three subgroups of RSTs indicate that the impact of similarities and differences in House and Senate competition upon progressive ambition is not uniform for all RSTs.

D. Seniority

The discussion in Chapter I above on the relationship between seniority (or terms of service in the House) and progressive ambition left the issue unresolved. On the one hand seniority was seen as an aid to gaining resources necessary for a Senate contest. The longer the legislator served the more likely he was to become knowledgeable about the issues of the time, about the intricacies of legislative procedure, and

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[67]In these analyses, agree situations included only those instances where the House and Senate seats were both rated safe or competitive for the RST; Senate seats classified as Hopeless were considered a separate category, and all of these RSTs would automatically be in disagree situations because no House seat could be classified as such. But considering Hopeless seats as Competitive does not change the basic findings reported above, and actually adds an anomaly. RSTs and the control group have virtually equal proportions of agree-situations (48% and 49% respectively); RSLs still are least likely to be from agree situations (only 36%); and here Ts are most likely to come from agree-situations (63% of the Ts, with RSWs in the middle with 48% agree-situations).

about the actors in the legislative process whether they are other legislators or administration or interest group spokesmen. Seniority also increased the likelihood of gaining more important committee assignments. Seniority, therefore, could be expected to increase effectiveness which in turn would be an asset to a Senatorial candidate providing him with resources or facilitating his search for resources. This line of speculation leads to a hypothesis expecting RSTs to be more likely than other Representatives to be veterans with high seniority, and less likely to be a newcomer.

But increased effectiveness brought about by higher seniority may also result in more satisfaction with his House career, and therefore less desire to leave it for the Senate. It would also serve to increase for him the risk--either due to the great absolute loss of power if defeated, or due to the small marginal gain from a Senate seat compared to the potential loss of a valued position--of trying to gain the Senate seat. This increased risk could be expected to reduce the likelihood of progressive ambition. The hypothesis derived from this line of speculation is that RSTs compared to other Representatives would be less likely to be high in seniority and more likely to be low in seniority.

The data reported in Table 12 supports the theorization focusing upon risk rather than resources. Most RSTs are relatively low in House service, rather than being senior. For instance 49% of the RSTs sought the Senate seat before the end of their third term in the House. The average length of service was 4.1 years for RSTs, but 5.3 years for all members of

the House for the 81st to 90th Congresses.[68]

TABLE 12

Terms of Service in the House for RSTs and All Representatives

TERMS OF SERVICE	RSTs		HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 81st-90th CONGRESSES	
1-2	157	45%	1286	30%
3-5	128	37	1368	32
6-9	56	16	1083	25
10+	5	1	605	14
Mean	4.1		5.3	

In the period from the 81st Congress to the 90th, Witmer records 4,342 terms of service. Of these 30% were a legislator's first or second terms, 32% were his third through fifth, 25% were his sixth through ninth, and 14% were his tenth term or higher. The 85 RSTs served a total of 346 terms; of these 45% were either first or second terms, 37% were third through fifth, 16% were sixth through ninth, while only 1% were tenth or higher.[69] This suggests strongly that RSTs (or more properly speaking RST terms) are less likely to be relatively senior compared to all other Representatives (i.e. their terms); and they are more likely to be of relatively lower seniority.

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[68]Averages for each of the 81st to 88th Congresses are from T. Richard Witmer, "The Aging of the House," Political Science Quarterly, LXXIX (December, 1964), p. 538; averages for each of the 89th and 90th Congresses were calculated from the Congressional Directory; a mean of these averages was then calculated. The other data used here on terms of service of all Representatives are also drawn from this article.

[69]If only those terms within the time period bounded by the 81st and 90th Congresses were considered, then the figures are 248 terms, 42%, 35%, 21%, and 2% respectively.

If we examine numbers of RSTs (rather than their terms), 38% (or 32) of the RSTs sought the Senate seat while still in their first or second terms; another 34% (29) were in their third through fifth terms, 24% (20) were in their sixth through ninth terms, and only 5% (or 4 men) were in their tenth or eleventh term.

A comparison of the length of House service for the three sub-groups of RSTs shows some clear differences between winners (RSWs) and losers (RSLs and Ts). For instance, only 21% of the winners were in their first or second House terms, while almost half (48%) of the losers were. Almost half (48%) of the RSWs had three to five terms of service, but only one-fourth (25%) of the losers did. No winner had more than nine terms of service, but 8% of the losers did. The mean number of terms of service for RSWs was 4.4, compared to 4.0 for the Ts and 3.8 for the RSLs; medians were 4, 3, and 2 terms respectively.

An analysis of the proportion of electoral successes at each level of House seniority suggests that there may be a critical point of seniority at which to try for the Senate from a House seat. At least in the period under consideration, newcomers (one or two terms of seniority) and veterans (nine or more terms) were not as successful as those with three to eight terms of service. None of the 5 RSTs with nine or more terms of service were elected to the Senate, and only about one-fifth (7 of 32, or 22%) of the newcomers made it to the upper chamber on that attempt; this compares to more than half of the medium-service RSTs being successful (26 of 48,

or 54% of those with three to eight terms in the House). This relationship holds even when the level of competition for the Senate seat is held constant. For example, of the RSTs trying to gain a safe Senate seat, 40% of the newcomers won compared to 63% of the medium-service RSTs; the proportions were 20% and 55% respectively for the competitive Senate seats; and 14% and 33% respectively for the "hopeless" seats. Medium-service RSTs, therefore, were more successful than either newcomers or veterans.

E. Committee Assignment

The theoretical discussion above concerning seniority in the House and progressive ambition is also relevant to the question of the relationship between committee assignment and progressive ambition. Service on important or highly rated committees may be viewed as a resource or an aid to obtaining resources. This would lead to a hypothesis that RSTs are more likely than other Representatives to serve on the top committees, and less likely to serve on the lowest rated committees. Or, alternately, service on top committees may increase satisfaction with one's House career and may increase the risk of seeking Senate office. This would lead to the hypothesis that RSTs are less likely than other Representatives to serve on the top committees, and more likely to serve on the least preferred committees.

In order to test these alternate hypotheses, a ranking of the House committees was necessary. Several methods have been used by various authors. The method adopted here, was the one used by Masters in his study of the committee

assignment process in the House.[70] He compiled a list of Democratic and Republican freshman committee assignments as listed in the Congressional Directory for the first session of each of the 80th to 86th Congresses. This method was extended for the 87th through 90th Congresses. When the total number of freshman assignments for each committee is divided by the number of committee members, the result is an index number that can be used to rank the importance of the committees. This method rests upon the assumption that freshmen seldom will be assigned to the more important committees.[71] Table 13 presents this data for each party separately and for both combined.

One can divide the distribution into three categories. Category I can be viewed as containing the most important committees--having less than 10% of its places filled by freshmen. Category II includes committees with 10-19% freshmen, and Category III are those committees with over 20% freshmen.

The committee classification for each party is identical for fifteen of the twenty committees. In four of the remaining five, the categories are adjacent (District of Columbia, Government Operations, Merchant Marine and Fisheries, and Public Works); the House Un-American Activities Committee was rarely staffed with Democratic freshmen, while the Republicans did it frequently. In view of these similarities, a single ranking, combining the data for the

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[70] Op.cit.

[71] This is one of the methods used by Matthews in U.S. Senators and Their World (p. 151) and it correlated highly with his more elaborate methods using net changes. George Goodwin, in "The Seniority System in Congress." American Political Science Review, LIII (1959), relies primarily upon net shifts to rank committees but also notes

Democrats and Republicans, was used.

TABLE 13

FRESHMAN COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENTS, 80th to 90th CONGRESSES

	DEMOCRATS			REPUBLICANS			TOTAL		
COMMITTEE*	FR.	TOT.	% FR.	FR.	TOT.	% FR.	FR.	TOT.	% FR.
Category I									
RU	0	86	0%	0	55	0%	0	141	0%
WM	0	157	0	3	118	3	3	275	1
AP	7	309	2	10	230	4	17	539	3
FA	15	194	8	4	145	3	19	339	6
AS	20	223	9	7	175	4	27	398	7
Category II									
COM	19	197	10	16	147	11	35	344	10
DC	11	158	7	20	117	17	31	275	11
HUAC	2	54	4	9	45	20	11	99	11
JUD	22	201	11	27	145	19	49	346	14
HA	22	158	14	18	111	16	40	269	15
AG	32	207	15	27	150	18	59	357	17
PW	28	199	14	36	149	24	64	348	18
Category III									
BC	38	186	20	30	140	21	68	326	21
ED	39	186	21	29	131	22	68	317	21
GO	28	191	15	39	135	29	67	326	21
MM	29	187	16	38	136	28	67	323	21
INT	44	183	24	32	142	23	76	325	23
SCI	22	89	25	12	54	22	34	143	24
PO	49	153	32	30	119	25	79	272	29
VA	41	158	26	39	117	33	80	275	29

*RU=Rules, WM=Ways and Means, AP=Appropriations, FA=Foreign Affairs, AS=Armed Services; COM=Interstate and Foreign Commerce, DC=District of Columbia, HUAC=Un-American Activities, JUD=Judiciary, HA=House Administration, AG=Agriculture, PW=Public Works; BC=Banking and Currency, ED=Education, GO=Government Operations, MM=Merchant Marine and Fisheries, INT=Interior and Insular Affairs, SCI=Science and Astronautics, PO=Post Office, VA=Veterans' Affairs

Category I consists of: Rules, Ways and Means, Appropriations, Foreign Affairs, and Armed Services. Category II includes: Interstate and Foreign Commerce, District of Columbia, Un-American Activities, Judiciary, House

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that assignments of freshmen "bears out this listing remarkably well..." (p. 433).

Administration, Agriculture, and Public Works. Category III contains: Banking and Currency, Education and Labor, Government Operations, Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Interior and Insular Affairs, Science and Astronautics, Post Office and Civil Service, and Veterans' Affairs.

The data in Table 14 appear to support the theorization considering committee assignments as a resource. A greater proportion of RST committee assignments are on the top committees than are the assignments of all members of the House of Representatives--36% compared to 28% respectively. This is true for the committee assignments of each of the sub-groups--RSWs, RSLs, and Ts. But the proportion of RST committee assignments on the lowest ranked committees is only one percentage point less than the proportion for the whole House. This is due to the higher proportion of low committee assignments for the losers among the RSTs (the RSLs and Ts). In addition it should be noted that RST committee assignments on the middle range committees is proportionately less than those of all House members.

TABLE 14

RST's Ultimate House Committee Assignments and All House Committee Assignments

COMMITTEE RATING		RSW		RSL		T		RST		ALL HOUSE	
Top	(I)	19	42%	12	32%	10	32%	41	36%	1692	28%
Medium	(II)	14	31	8	21	9	29	31	27	2038	34
Low	(III)	12	27	18	47	12	39	42	37	2307	38
Total		45	100%	38	100%	31	100%	114	100%	6037	100%

These data are in contrast to the data on House

seniority. There RSTs were less likely than other Representatives to have high seniority and more likely to be low in seniority; this was considered to support the risk theorization that reasoned that RSTs with a lot of seniority did not want to risk their seat in a Senate bid. But the analysis of committee assignments, indicates a higher proportion of top committee assignments among the RSTs than among other Representatives.

In addition, we find the probability of success greater when serving on a top committee. Of those RSTs who served on a committee classified as a top committee, 46% (19 of 41) were elected to the Senate. But of those whose best committee assignment was one of the middle rated committees, only 39% (9 of 23) were elected; and only 24% (5 of 21) of those whose best assignment was one of the low rated committees were victorious. This relationship again contrasts to the data on seniority, where the highest proportion of successes came in the middle categories of seniority (three to eight terms, rather than one to two or nine and over).

Even though the data showing a greater proportion of RSTs among the top committees, and showing that success varied directly with committee assignment, support the resource theorization and suggest that RSTs are not inhibited by the risk--several limitations should be noted. First of all, few Representatives in important positions on committees sought the Senate seat. Only one chairman (Engle of Interior) and only two ranking minority members of standing House committees (Keating of Judiciary, and Nixon of HUAC) tried for

the Senate while still in the House. All three were elected to the Senate. The Senate elections of Engle and Nixon can be considered safe ones (over 55% of the vote). Keating had to be cajoled into seeking the office, as he argued that he could be of more service as ranking member of the Judiciary Committee.[72]

There were six Representatives who ranked second and who tried for the Senate. Two (Beall of District of Columbia, and Byrd of House Administration) made it to the Senate, two (Curtis of Ways and Means, and D'Ewart of Interior) were unsuccessful Senatorial candidates, and two (Beckworth of Commerce, and Bruce of HUAC) did not succeed in winning the nomination.

Beall's and Byrd's committees of high seniority are generally viewed as unimportant despite their Category II classification. Beall's election turned out to be competitive, but Byrd's was safe. The defeats of Curtis and D'Ewart were narrow, the former receiving 48.6% of the vote, and the latter gaining 49.6%.

Secondly the relationship between committee assignment and the probability of success does not hold when the competitiveness of the Senate seat is held constant. Members serving on the best committees are more successful than other RSTs, but they are also most likely to be running for safe Senate seats; RSTs on the best committees who seek competitive or hopeless Senate seats are not the most likely to win,

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[72]See the account of his nomination on pp. 318-20.

compared to RSTs seeking similar seats but serving on lower rated committees.

In addition the data seem to indicate that RSTs on the best committees are more likely to seek Safe Senate seats and least likely to seek Hopeless Senate seats compared to RSTs on the lowest rated committees who are least likely to seek Safe seats and most likely to seek Hopeless seats. One interpretation of this is that those on the best committees are least likely to risk their seat on apparently hopeless situations, while those on poor committees feel that the election loss will cost them relatively little. This suggests support for the risk theorization.

F. Specialization

Specialization was one of the areas of legislative behavior that was examined for its relationship to progressive ambition. Although specialization is a norm of behavior in most legislatures, the basic hypothesis proposed in Chapter I was that specialization was inversely related to success in the quest of the Senate seat. The generalist, rather than the specialist, was assumed to be better able to meet the interests and demands of a new constituency (especially if the districts differed in their nature). It was felt that a generalist would be better able to adjust to the frustration of a new committee assignment should the RST's former committee assignment be unavailable to him in the Senate. The generalist's broader perspective was assumed to be a stimulus to progressive ambition, as well as a resource. In addition one could

speculate that since specialization is one of the sources of influence in the legislature, specialists would be more satisfied with their House seat and would be less likely to have progressive ambition for the Senate.[73]

The measure of specialization used was that developed by Matthews in his study of the United States Senate. His Index of Specialization was based upon "the proportion of all public bills and resolutions introduced by each senator that were referred to the two committees receiving the largest number of the bills and resolutions he sponsored."[74] As an example, Rep. Wesley D'Ewart of Montana introduced 62 bills in his ultimate term in the House; of these 51 were assigned to the Interior Committee, 3 to the Agriculture Committee, and the other 8 were assigned to 7 other committees; his Index of Specialization was .87 (54 bills to the 2 highest committees as a proportion of 62 bills introduced). Rep. Joseph Resnick, on the other hand, introduced 68 bills in his first term in the House, which were assigned to 15 different committees with Agriculture receiving 13 and Judiciary 11; his Index of Specialization, therefore, was .35 (24 bills of 68 introduced assigned to the 2 highest committees).

Matthews classified scores below .50 as low and those above .70 as high. This study modified this slightly to consider those

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[73] Of course, the added influence stemming from specialization may be an aid to gathering resources, and so might actually stimulate Senatorial candidacy.

[74] Op. cit., p. 275.

Representatives who had two-thirds of their bills assigned to the two highest committees (i.e. an Index of .67) as being high in specialization; moderate specialization, then was .50 to .66, with the definition of low specialization unchanged.

Matthews recognized several limitations of his measure: "This index is based on the arguable assumption that the bills and resolutions introduced by a senator adequately reflect the scope of his legislative interests. Moreover, the jurisdictions of Senate Committees are sufficiently broad and overlapping that two bills on very different subjects may be referred to the same committee while two bills on similar subjects may be referred to different committees. By assigning equal weight to all bills and resolutions, the index overlooks the fact that some are more important than others."[75]

The two examples cited above were not the extremes of the RST data. Several RSTs had scores of 1.00 in some of their House terms, while scores ranged down to .25, not including the two RSTs who introduced no bills in a complete term in the House. The numbers of bills introduced ranged up to 109; and one RST saw his bills sent to 17 different committees.

The range of scores, bills introduced, and committees receiving them suggests that the relationship between specialization and progressive ambition may not be a strong one.

Matthews' work on specialization in the Senate demonstrated a strong relationship between seniority and specialization. For instance, 44% of the high seniority

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[75] Ibid.

Senators were High in specialization compared to 17% and 5% of those with moderate and low seniority respectively.[76] This led us to analyze the index of specialization for a single term, rather than combining the RST's scores into a single composite score.

The penultimate term was chosen as the data base for the analysis. This is the last term before the Representative declares his candidacy for the Senate, and so it was felt his behavior in that period would be most influential upon his decision. Analysis of this data indicates that eventual winners (RSWs) were more likely to be specialists than were the losers (RSLs and Ts). Thirty-one percent (31%, or 9 of 29) of the RSWs had high scores on the index of specialization compared to only 15% of the losers. An index number based on the proportion of Low scores less the proportion of High scores, shows RSWs with an index of +7, RSLs +22, and Ts +33. See Table 15. This is contrary to the expectation of our hypothesis, which said that specialization was inversely related to success in seeking the Senate seat. This relationship holds even when seniority is held constant; RSW newcomers (one to two terms of seniority) are more likely to specialize than RSL or T newcomers (Low less High indices of +37, +50, and +75 respectively) and RSW oldtimers (six or more terms of seniority) are also more likely to specialize than RSLs or Ts with that much seniority (Low minus High indices of -14, 0, and +25 respectively).

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[76] Ibid., Recalculated from data in Table 36, p. 107.

TABLE 15

Index of Specialization and RST Success

INDEX OF SPECIALIZATION	RSW		RSL		T		RST	
PENULTIMATE TERM								
High (.67+)	9	31%	3	13%	3	17%	15	21%
Medium (.50-.66)	9	31	12	52	6	33	27	39
Low (.49+below)	11	38	8	35	9	50	28	40
	29	100%	23	100%	18	100%	70	100%
%Low - % High		+7		+22		+33		+19
ULTIMATE TERM								
High (.67+)	3	10%	6	21%	4	17%	13	16%
Medium (.50-.66)	10	33	11	39	9	39	30	37
Low (.49+below)	17	57	11	39	10	43	38	47
	30	100%	28	99%	23	99%	81	100%
%Low - % High		+47		+18		+26		+31

But if the ultimate term in the House is used as the data base--which is not unreasonable as that is when the RST's interest in his Senate constituency is at its peak--then the original hypothesis (generalists are more successful than specialists) is supported. Only 10% of the RSWs[77] were High in specialization compared to 21% and 17% of the RSLs and Ts respectively; similarly 57% of the RSWs were Low in specialization compared to 39% of the RSLs and 43% of the Ts (Low less High indices are +47, +18, and +26 respectively).

Given the widely different results for the penultimate and ultimate terms, and the wide range of scores on the Index of Specialization, the best that can be said of the relationship between specialization and progressive ambition and success is that it is unclear.

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[77]Excluding the 2 RSWs who introduced no bills.

G. Liberal-Conservatism

The Senate has been recognized as the more liberal of the two houses of Congress. One explanation is that Senators, who represent a statewide constituency are likely to include large urban areas whose citizens' demands for governmental services are greater, must be more liberal than Representatives whose constituencies may not include these urban areas.[78]

A reasonable hypothesis, therefore, would be that a Representative who seeks a Senate seat would be more liberal than his other House colleagues. First of all, he would consider his more liberal record as a resource in appealing to the statewide constituency with its urban residents. Secondly, his liberal record also might serve as a motivation for his progressive ambition--he might be more dissatisfied with the House than his more conservative colleagues, and he may feel he could accomplish more and gain more personal satisfaction in the more liberal Senate.

Soule's study of progressive ambition among members of the Michigan lower house did find some relationship between liberalism and progressive ambition.[79] Therefore, it is reasonable to hypothesize that RSTs will be more liberal than their colleagues.

Alternate hypotheses are reasonable also. For instance, liberals would be at a disadvantage in the South.

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[78]Lewis A. Froman, Jr., Congressmen and Their Constituencies, Chapter 6.

[79]Op.cit., p. 453.

Rather than merely comparing an RST's liberal-conservatism score to the entire House, it would be more reasonable to compare it to other members of the state delegation--especially of the same party. So one alternate hypothesis--maintaining the logic underlying the earlier hypothesis--is that RSTs will be more liberal than other Representatives from the same state (or regional) party.

But still other alternatives are possible. For instance, it may be that RSTs accentuate the state party tendency, i.e. if the state is liberal the RST will be more so, but if the state party is conservative the RST will be more so.

In order to test these hypotheses (and alternates), measurements of liberal-conservatism were needed. Matthews' study of United States Senators utilized the roll calls compiled by New Republic in its ratings of individual legislators.[80] The same source of data was used in this study, with one exception. New Republic did not rate the legislators in the 86th Congress, and the Federalism scores compiled by Congressional Quarterly were used instead for that two-year period. In view of the reference to Matthews' method, it should be noted that this study included all the roll calls used by New Republic rather than omitting those dealing with foreign policy as Matthews did. In both studies only those roll calls on which the legislator took a position were included; in other words, abstentions without any announced position

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[80] Matthews, op. cit., pp.276-78 for a description of his method.

(through pairing or otherwise) were omitted and did not affect the Representative's score on the Index of Liberal-Conservatism.

Matthews chose to consider all scores above .67 as liberal, and those at .33 or below as conservative, with the scores between labeled as moderate. But the meaning of these scores will vary with the roll calls chosen by New Republic to classify the legislators. For instance, in the 88th Congress 45% of the Democrats received a perfect liberal score or 1.00, and an additional 26% (for a total of 71%) would be classified as liberals. But in the 90th Congress only 8% had perfect liberal scores and only a total of 62% would be classified as liberal.

In order to eliminate this variation from Congress to Congress, the scores had to be "normalized" in some way. Rather than comparing a legislator's score to all other legislators, it was decided to compare him to others of his own party. This was done by categorizing the scores for each party in each Congress into quartiles based upon the scores at the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles.[81] If there were no clustering of scores at the breaking points, each party would have equal proportions of Very Liberal, Liberal, Conservative, and Very Conservative legislators.

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[81]There was one exception. In the 80th Congress, scores of the Republicans were clustered to the extent that two quartile lines fell on the same score; the breaking points were shifted in order to come as close to these points as the distribution permitted. It should also be noted that the 25th percentile was placed at the liberal end of the scale for Democrats, while it was at the conservative end for the Republicans.

After these scores are calculated, there are still a number of ways the hypotheses can be tested. For instance, one may use the four categories based on the quartiles of Very Liberal (VL), Liberal (L), Conservative (C), and Very Conservative (VC). The RSTs' distribution of these scores for each term between the 80th and 90th Contresses could be compared to a distribution of all legislators' scores for that period. On this basis, RSTs are more liberal than other House members. Sixty-two percent (62%) of the Republican RST terms were Liberal or Very Liberal compared to only 47% of all Republican terms; 68% of Democratic RST terms were L or VL compared to 53% of all Democratic terms. To state it another way, RST VL terms were 8.1% of all Representatives' terms, and the proportion declined at each category with RST VC terms only 3.2% of all Representatives' terms. See Table 16.

But RSTs are not a representative sample of all Congressmen, so a more proper analysis would involve a comparison of RSTs to those in their own states. The use of all scores from an RST's state would still present a biased picture as the large states would be given a disproportionally heavy weighting. Therefore the single score and category of the median Representative of the state party (or regional party if the state party contained fewer than four Representatives) can be used. Comparing the liberal-conservatism scores of all RST terms between the 80th and 90th Congresses to the state party median Representatives' scores still shows

TABLE 16

Liberal-Conservative Rating of Terms of RSTs, State Party Medians, and All Representatives, 80th-90th Congresses

Ideological Ratings	Democrats						Republicans						Total
	RSTs		State Party Medians		All Reps.		RSTs		State Party Medians		All Reps.		RST All
VL: Very Lib.	47	38%	43	34%	841	32%	57	40%	30	21%	458	23%	8.1%
L : Liberal	38	30	47	38	555	21	32	22	40	28	493	24	6.7
C : Conserv.	31	25	29	23	611	23	21	15	48	33	358	18	5.4
VC: Very Cons.	9	7	6	5	615	23	34	24	26	18	703	35	3.2
Totals	125	100%	125	100%	2622	99%	144	101%	144	100%	2012	100%	

Republican RSTs as more liberal; 49% of the median state party Republican terms were L or VL compared to 62% of the RSTs'. But Democratic RSTs are no longer more liberal than their party colleagues; although only 53% of all Democratic terms are L or VL compared to 68% of RST terms, 72% of the median Democratic terms are L or VL. In other words, Democratic RSTs are slightly more conservative than their median state party colleagues. See Table 16.

Another way to show this comparison is to rate the score of each RST term in relation to his state party median's score--i.e. the RST is either More Liberal, the Same, or Less Liberal (or More Conservative) than the state median on the liberal-conservatism continuum. Using this measure, Republican RSTs are still more liberal than their state party median colleagues; 42% of the time the RST and the state party median are in the same category, but in 38% of the terms the RST is More Liberal in 18% of the terms but More Conservative in 20% of the terms. See Table 17.

TABLE 17

RST Liberalism-Conservatism in Relation to State Party Median for All Terms, 80th - 90th Congresses

RST COMPARED TO HIS STATE PARTY MEDIAN IS:	DEMOCRATS		REPUBLICANS	
More Liberal	23	18%	54	38%
Same	77	62	61	42
Less Liberal	25	20	29	20
	125	100%	144	100%

Rather than compare terms of service, which gives

a senior man more weight in these results--for instance, Keating alone contributes 6 of the 57 VL RST terms and 6 of the 54 More Liberal ratings for the Republicans--a single average score for each RST can be used.[82]

In view of the assumption that an RST's record will influence his decision to seek the Senate nomination, the scores used in computing this average does not include his last term in Congress (and does not precede the 80th Congress).[83] The earlier findings remain--Republican RSTs are more liberal than their state party median colleagues, while the Democratic RSTs are barely more conservative (or the same--depending on the method used) than their party colleagues. Fifty-four percent (54%) of the Republican RSTs were L or VL compared to 42% of the median Republicans from the same states. One-third of the Republicans averaged a higher or More Liberal score than the median, while only 18% were lower or More Conservative (48% agreed on their average rating). For the Democrats, 73% of the RSTs were L or VL compared to 76% of the median Democrats. But equal proportions of RSTs were higher as were lower, suggesting no over-all difference between Democratic RSTs and the median Democrats (in fact 68% agreed on their averaged rating). See Table 18.

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[82]The arithmetic mean of the category "grades" with an equi-distant scale was used; if the mean was equi-distant between two categories, the score of the last term was given double weight.

[83]The analysis also excludes Dies whose attempt for the Senate nomination occurred in the first session of the 85th Congress; it also excludes 14 RSTs who made the bid for the Senate in their freshman term.

TABLE 18

Liberal-Conservative Average Rating for RSTs, 80th Congress to RST's Penultimate Congress

	DEMOCRATS				REPUBLICANS			
			STATE PARTY				STATE PARTY	
AVERAGE RATING	RST		MEDIAN		RST		MEDIAN	
Very Liberal	14	38%	13	35%	11	33%	5	15%
Liberal	13	35	15	41	7	21	9	27
Conservative	9	24	9	24	9	27	16	48
Very Conservative	1	3	-	-	6	18	3	9
	37	100%	37	100%	33	99%	33	99%
RST COMPARED TO HIS STATE PARTY MEDIAN IS:								
More Liberal		6		16%		11		33%
Same		25		68		16		48
Less		6		16		6		18
		37		100%		33		99%

The conclusion that Republican RSTs are more liberal than other Republican Representatives, while Democratic RSTs may be considered more conservative than other Democratic Representatives may stem from a number of factors. For instance, some analysts have associated youth with liberalism.[84] Others have hypothesized a relationship between competitiveness of one's district and liberal-conservatism. For instance the speculation of Downs, and others, would lead us to believe that legislators from marginal districts must be moderate in order to attract

voters from the opposite party (i.e. Republicans will be more liberal, and Democrats more conservative). And of course the thrust of Schlesinger's work is that the nature of the office which the legislator seeks--in this instance, the competitiveness of the Senate seat--will affect his behavior.

A review of the data reported earlier in this chapter indicates that the RST is probably younger in view of his lower seniority (as compared to all members of the 81st to 90th Congresses), is more likely to come from a competitive district (as compared to all elections for Representative in that period), and he is less likely to be seeking a safe Senate seat (at least as compared to the control group in the 86th Congress). These distributions would indicate that the pattern of RST ideology can be explained by the three variables noted: age, House competitiveness, and Senate seat competitiveness.

But a closer examination of the data indicates that the age of the RST and the competitiveness of his House seat cannot explain why Republican RSTs are more liberal and Democratic RSTs are more conservative than their party colleagues. For instance, Table 19 indicates that younger RSTs

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[84] E.g. Angus Campbell, et.al., The American Voter (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1960), pp. 210-11.

are not more liberal than older RSTs. In fact older Republican RSTs are more liberal than younger Republican RSTs, while younger Democratic RSTs are as likely to be more liberal as to be more conservative than the state party median representative.

Similarly, Table 19 indicates that contrary to the hypothesis, RSTs from competitive House districts are not more moderate than RSTs from safe districts. Again the data for Republican RSTs is opposite the hypothesis--safe Republican RSTs are actually more liberal than competitive Republican RSTs--while the data for the Democratic RSTs indicates equal distributions of more liberal and more conservative among safe and competitive RSTs.

In contrast to these two failures to link the explanatory variable to the RST pattern, is the data on the Senate seat competitiveness. Republican RSTs seeking a competitive Senate seat are more likely to be liberal than those seeking a safe Senate seat as hypothesized, while Democrats seeking a competitive seat are more likely to be conservative than those seeking a safe Senate seat as hypothesized.

Although these comparisons are based on small numbers because most RSTs agreed with their state party median (68% of Democratic RSTs were in the same category as the median, and 48% of the Republican RSTs were), and the differences may not appear large, they are in the hypothesized direction and therefore suggest a possible relationship between the Senate constituency and the behavior of the RST while he still is in the House.

TABLE 19

Age, House District Competitiveness, and Senate Seat Competitiveness, and Liberal-Conservative Average Ratings for RSTs Compared to State Party Medians, 80th Congress to RST's Penultimate Congress

	Democratic RSTs					Republican RSTs				
	More Lib.	Same	Less Lib.	Total	Index*	More Lib.	Same	Less Lib.	Total	Index
Young (under 50)	5	18	5	28		4	5	4	13	
	18%	64%	18%	100%	00	31%	38%	31%	100%	00
Old (50 +)	1	7	1	9		7	11	2	20	
	11%	78%	11%	100%	00	35%	55%	10%	100%	25
House District:										
Safe	4	20	4	28		9	13	4	26	
	14%	71%	14%	99%	00	35%	50%	15%	100%	20
Competitive	2	5	2	9		2	3	2	7	
	22%	56%	22%	100%	00	29%	43%	29%	101%	00
Senate Seat:										
Safe	2	8	-	10		3	5	3	11	
	20%	80%	-	100%	20	27%	45%	27%	99%	00
Competitive	2	13	3	18		6	7	3	16	
	11%	72%	17%	100%	-06	38%	44%	19%	101%	19
Hopeless	2	4	3	9		2	4	-	6	
	22%	44%	33%	99%	-11	33%	67%	-	100%	33

*Index is constructed by subtracting the Less Liberal percentage from the More Liberal percentage.

Another source of hypotheses concerning RST liberal-conservatism is Fishel's study of the ideology of non-incumbent Congressional candidates which tested several hypotheses relating such variables as party structure (i.e. district competitiveness), constituency characteristics, age and public office experience, to the candidate taking an ideologically "polar position".[85] He reported that there was no relationship between district competitiveness and ideological position for the Democrats, although his data indicated 57% of the competitive district Democrats were liberal (the polar position for Democrats) compared to 53% of the safe-district Democrats (and 57% for the safe Republican--or "hopeless"--districts), which was counter to his hypothesis that competitive district legislators were more likely to be moderate than those from safe districts. The data for the Republicans also contradicted this hypothesis as competitive Republicans were more likely to be in the "polar position" (i.e. conservative for the Republican party) than were those from safe districts.

He hypothesized that younger candidates would be more likely to be liberal. This meant he expected his younger Democrats to be in the polar position (liberal) more frequently than older Democrats, and his older Republicans to be in their polar position (conservative) more frequently than younger ones. But he found that the younger candidates of both parties were more likely to be conservative,

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[85]Jeff Fishel, "Party, Ideology, and the Congressional Challenger," American Political Science Review, LXIII (December, 1969), pp. 1213-32.

so that his data contradicted his hypotheses--older Democrats but younger Republicans were in the polar positions.[86]

The data on RSTs agrees with Fishel's findings. Defining Very Liberal as the polar position for Democrats, and Very Conservative as the polar position for Republicans, our data also finds the older Democrat and the younger Republican to be in the polar position; and the competitive RST to be more likely to be in the polar position than the safe RST. See Table 20.

Our findings on the liberal-conservatism of RSTs can be summarized as follows: 1) Republican RSTs were more liberal than other Republicans; 2) Democratic RSTs were like their colleagues or were more conservative (depending on the method of measurement used); 3) RSTs seeking competitive Senate seats were more moderate--i.e. Republicans were more liberal and Democrats were more conservative--than RSTs seeking safe Senate seats; 4) neither the RST's age nor the competitiveness of his House district was consistently related to the liberal-conservatism nature of his voting record in the House; 5) among RSTs older Democrats and younger Republicans were more likely to be "ideologues" (i.e. to be

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[86]The other hypotheses tested also produced mixed results. Although rural Republicans were more conservative than suburbanites who were more conservative than urban representatives as hypothesized, suburban Democrats were most liberal which was unexpected. Republicans with public office experience were less likely to be polar or conservative than those with no previous experience, as hypothesized, but Democrats without public office experience were virtually as likely (only 1 percentage point more liberal) to be liberal as those without the experience.

TABLE 20

Age and House District Competitiveness, and Liberal-Conservative Average Ratings for RSTs, 80th Congress to RST's Penultimate Congress

	Democratic RSTs			Republican RSTs		
	Polar Position (Very Liberal)	Other	Total	Polar Position (Very Conserv.)	Other	Total
Age:						
Young (under 50)	8	20	28	4	9	13
	29%	71%	100%	31%	69%	100%
Old (50 +)	6	3	9	2	18	20
	67%	33%	100%	10%	90%	100%
House District:						
Safe	10	18	28	3	23	26
	36%	64%	100%	12%	88%	100%
Competitive	4	5	9	3	4	7
	44%	56%	100%	43%	57%	100%

in the Very Liberal quartile if a Democrat and the Very Conservative quartile if a Republican) than other RSTs; 6) unexpectedly--but similar to Fishel's finding for non-incumbent Congressional candidates--RSTs from competitive districts were more likely to be "ideologues" than those from safe districts.

H. Party Cohesion

Party Cohesion is the last variable to be examined to determine whether Representatives who seek a Senate seat (RSTs) differ in other ways from their House colleagues. Our model relating Senate candidacy in part to factors related to the Representative's behavior in the House, does not suggest any basis upon which to speculate concerning the party cohesion level of the RST. It is possible to hypothesize that Representatives with progressive ambition for the Senate would be more likely to be loyal to their party, because they realize they need the support of their party in order to gain this new office. But American political parties are rarely so well organized that they can deny the nomination and election to a candidate who has demonstrated a low level of party loyalty in his previous legislative voting record.

It is possible, therefore, to speculate that RSTs who must appeal to a new and larger constituency will be best served by a previous voting record indicating independence--i.e. low party cohesion. Men with shifting constituencies due to altered ambitions may look to themselves for guidance on votes rather than to their party. Soule's data,

for instance, suggests that state legislators who have progressive ambition are more likely to view themselves as Trustees than Delegates.[87] Trustees are less likely to be loyal to their party, Davidson discovered in his study of the House of Representatives.[88]

The third alternative hypothesis--that RSTs will show average party cohesion, neither more nor less than the average Representative of the same state and party--is also logically defensible. The demands of the statewide constituency may be most adequately represented by the behavior of the average or median state-party legislator. If so, then the party cohesion of the RST would be most likely to match that of the median state-party legislator.

In order to test these divergent hypotheses, a methodology using roll call party cohesion scores had to be developed. There are several methodological factors to be considered in any analysis using a comparison of roll call party cohesion scores. One of these is the choice of roll calls. Users of roll call cohesion scores have utilized several different operational definitions of a party roll call. For example, one could use all roll calls including unanimous ones, or they could use only non-unanimous ones, or those in which a majority (or any other proportion) of one party opposes a similar proportion of the other party.

We have used the data found in Congressional Quarterly (CQ), and their definition of Party Unity roll call

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[87]Soule, op. cit., p. 452.

[88]Davidson, op. cit., p. 161.

is one "on which a majority of voting Democrats opposed a majority of voting Republicans." This definition apparantly was unchanged throughout the period of their studies.

A second element to be considered is what constitutes a vote. Unfortunately CQ did change this operational definition. From the 80th to 83rd Congresses, they included taking any stand on the issue by voting, pairing, announcing his position, or even answering a CQ poll on the question. But beginning with the 84th Congress they used only yea and nay votes, and excluded the other means of registering a position. Hence the results for the Congresses prior to the 84th and those subsequent to it are not exactly comparable. This study--as others have--has assumed their comparability, and no scores were re-computed as a result of their change in definition.

A third methodological question concerns the denominator upon which the cohesion score is based. Prior to the 84th Congress the denominator was the number of votes cast by the legislator (using the broad definition of a "vote"). A legislator's party unity score was the number of times he voted with his party divided by the number of his votes with and against his party (times 100)--i.e. (Y/Y&N)(100). But beginning with the 84th Congress the denominator was the total number of party unity votes for which the legislator was eligible. To illustrate: if there were 100 party unity votes and a legislator voted with his party 70 times, and against it 20 times, and was unannounced on 10, then for the 80th to 83rd Congresses, CQ would calculate his score as

78--i.e. (70/90)(100); but from the 84th Congress onward his score would be 70--i.e. (70/100)(100). There is a second reason, therefore, why scores prior to and subsequent to the 84th Congress are not exactly comparable.

This change in methodology is especially relevant to this study because candidacy for the Senate would probably result in a great reduction of votes cast because of the necessity of campaigning for the nomination in a statewide primary (or just traveling to get acquainted with the new electorate). In the earlier methodology absences or general pairs did not effect the cohesion score; but in the current CQ methodology, failure to vote would decrease the cohesion score. Therefore, it was necessary to use a consistent methodology. The cohesion scores of the RSTs for the 84th Congress onward were re-calculated using the same denominator as used in the 80th to 83rd Congresses.[89] For example, in the 90th Congress Rep. Resnick, deeply involved in a campaign to win the Senate nomination in New York, voted with his party on only 63 (or 64) votes out of 171 party unity votes while never opposing a majority of his party. His party unity score was considered to be 100 rather than the 37 reported by CQ.

Still another methodological factor must be noted in our use of the roll call cohesion scores reported by CQ. The

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[89]For the 83rd Congress CQ reported a legislator's party unity score only and not how many votes he cast with his party. Therefore the scores in the 83rd Congress could not be converted to the later methodology, but those of the 84th to 90th Congresses could be converted to the earlier methodology.

meaning of a numerical cohesion score (e.g. 85) varies from one Congress to another depending, in part, upon the nature of the bills and amendments subjected to roll call votes. For instance, the median cohesion score for the Democrats in the 82nd Congress was 87, but it was only 80 in the next Congress. Therefore the scores for each party in each Congress were categorized into quintiles ranging from highest cohesion (A) to lowest (E), based upon the scores at the 20th, 40th, 60th, and 80th percentiles.[90] In other words, except for tie scores at the dividing points, each party in each Congress had one-fifth or 20% of its members in each of the five categories. Therefore a score of 90 by a Democrat in the 82nd Congress was only a "C", but it was good enough for an "A" in the 83rd Congress. In effect this operation compares an RST's score to all of his party colleagues.

There are several methods of comparing the roll call party cohesion quintile scores, and these will be discussed as they are used in the presentation of the analyses.

Categorizing the scores of all Representatives of the same party in each Congress into quintiles, means that reporting the distribution of scores for RSTs automatically

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[90]This is not totally accurate for the 84th to 90th Congresses. The score used to determine the dividing point between quintiles was actually an artificial one constructed from party unity and party opposition scores at the appropriate percentile. For example, for the Democrats in the 90th Congress the 20th percentile party unity score was 83 and the party opposition score was 4; this results in a 95 (Y/Y&N)(100) as the artificial score at the 20th percentile required for a score of "A"; it is possible that no Democrat actually had an 83-4 score.

constitutes a comparison to the RSTs' colleagues. Using this method for all terms of the RSTs between the 80th and 90th Congresses,[91] the RST appears to resemble his colleagues. The five categories contain between 19% and 21% instead of the 20% expected hypothetically. Some partisan differences appear, however. Democratic RSTs are very unlikely to be in the lowest cohesion category (E) (only 6% of all terms compared to 22-26% for the other categories) while Republican RSTs are most likely to be in this category (31% compared to 16-19% for the other categories). See Table 21.

TABLE 21

Party Cohesion Level of Terms of RSTs, and Their State Party Medians, 80th-90th Congresses

PARTY COHESION LEVEL	TOTAL				DEMOCRATS				REPUBLICANS			
	RST		STATE PARTY MEDIAN		RST		STATE PARTY MEDIAN		RST		STATE PARTY MEDIAN	
A (High)	56	21%	27	10%	32	26%	24	19%	24	17%	3	2%
B	52	19	88	33	29	23	50	40	23	16	38	26
C	57	21	83	31	29	23	29	23	28	19	54	38
D	52	19	51	19	27	22	19	15	25	17	32	22
E (Low)	52	19	20	7	8	6	3	2	44	31	17	12
	269	99%	269	100%	125	100%	125	99%	144	100%	144	100%
INDEX: AB	40		43		49		59		33		28	
-DE	-38		-26		-28		-17		-48		-34	
	+ 2		+17		+21		+42		-15		- 6	

A more meaningful comparison, however, is between the RST and the median Representative of his state and party. Comparing the distribution of terms (See Table 21) for RSTs and their state-party medians, we see that both the Democratic

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[91] CQ--the source for this data--did not report party unity scores prior to the 80th Congress.

and Republican RSTs are lower in cohesion than their colleagues. For example, 49% of the Democratic RSTs' terms are in the two highest categories, while 59% of the Democratic median Representatives' terms are; 28% of the Democratic RSTs' terms are in the two lowest categories compared to only 17% of the median Democrats'. Republican RST terms are both more likely to be highly cohesive (33% of the RST terms compared to 28% of their colleagues') and low in cohesion (48% to 34%); but an index constructed by subtracting the proportion in the two lowest levels of cohesion from the proportion in the two highest levels shows the Republican RSTs are lower in party cohesion than the median Republican legislators.

This comparison between the party cohesion level of each term for RSTs and that of his state party median can be combined into a single figure. Table 22 indicates that the party cohesion level for Democratic RST terms is more likely to be lower than his state party median than to be higher; the data for Republicans are similar. Thirty-eight percent (38%) of Democratic RST terms are lower compared to 28% which are higher; in 34% of the terms the RST and the state party median are in the same category of party cohesion. For the Republicans, 33% of the RST terms are lower compared to 29% which are higher; there was agreement in 38% of the cases.

TABLE 22

RST Party Cohesion in Relation to State Party Median for All Terms, 80th-90th Congresses

RST COMPARED TO HIS STATE PARTY MEDIAN IS:	DEMOCRATS		REPUBLICANS	
Higher Cohesion	35	28%	42	29%
Same Cohesion	42	34	55	38
Lower Cohesion	48	38	47	33
Total	125	100%	144	100%

But the use of terms as the base of comparison of RSTs and the median representatives of their state and party, gives senior men more weight and so may not reflect an accurate picture of the relative level of party cohesion of the RST. Table 23 reflects the data using a single average score summarizing an RST's cohesion scores between the 80th Congress and his penultimate term in the House.[92] The average party cohesion scores for 54% of the Democratic RSTs were in the two highest categories (A and B) compared to only 30% in the lowest two categories (actually no Democratic RST averaged in the lowest quintile). But the average scores for the median state party representatives were even higher; 65% were in the two highest while only 8% were in the two lowest. Democratic RSTs, therefore, can be considered less loyal to their party than the average Democratic Congressman. The same is true for the Republican RST--he shows a slightly lower level of party cohesion than the median Republican

[92] As in the similar analysis of liberal-conservatism, an arithmetic mean of the categories using an equi-distant scale was constructed, with the last term given double-weight when the average was equi-distant between two categories.

representative. Thirty-six percent (36%) of the Republican RSTs were in the two highest categories, while 42% were in the two lowest categories for an "index" of -6. Of the median Republican legislators, 21% were in the two highest cohesion categories, and 24% in the two lowest, for an index of -3.

TABLE 23

Party Cohesion Average Rating for RSTs, 80th Congress to RST's Penultimate Congress

PARTY COHESION LEVEL	DEMOCRATS				REPUBLICANS			
	RST		STATE PARTY MEDIAN		RST		STATE PARTY MEDIAN	
A (High)	9	24%	7	19%	6	18%	-	-%
B	11	30	17	46	6	18	7	21
C	6	16	10	27	7	21	18	55
D	11	30	3	8	10	30	7	21
E (Low)	-	-	-	-	4	12	1	3
	37	100%	37	100%	33	99%	33	100%
INDEX: AB		54		65		36		21
-DE		-30		- 8		-42		-24
		+24		+57		- 6		- 3

The data in Tables 21-23 demonstrate in different ways that the RST--whether he is a Democrat or a Republican --shows a lower level of party cohesion than the median representative from the same state and party. The net differences between higher cohesion and lower cohesion are smaller for the Republicans than for the Democrats, regardless of the method of presenting the data.

But when we use a single figure to represent the average cohesion level of the RST compared to average cohesion of the median representative of the same state and party as

the RST (as constructed by averaging these comparisons--i.e. Higher, Same, Lower--for each term from the 80th Congress to the RST's penultimate term), this finding is altered partially. Democratic RSTs are still seen as being less loyal to their party than the average Representative of the same state and party. But Republican RSTs are now viewed as more cohesive than their party colleagues. Table 24 indicates that 33% of the Republican RSTs average Higher compared to 24% who average Lower, while 42% are the Same as the median state party representative's average. (For the Democrats the comparable data is 24% Higher, but 38% Lower, with 38% Same.)[93]

The proportion of RSTs who are the Same as their state party median is as large or larger than the proportion who are either Higher or Lower than their median colleague. Nevertheless, in each party the proportion of RSTs who differ from their state party colleagues is greater than the proportion who are the same. Therefore it is reasonable to measure whether RSTs are more or less cohesive than their party colleagues through construction of an index based on the proportion of Higher RSTs minus the proportion of Lower RSTs; a positive number indicates more party cohesion and a negative number indicates less party loyalty.

The literature on party cohesion contains contradictory hypotheses concerning the effect of competitive districts upon the level of party cohesion. Some have suggested that

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[93]The findings are basically the same even if the average of the RST's terms were compared to the average of his state party's median; in fact Republican RSTs are even slightly more likely to average Higher--39% compared to 33% (and a Higher-Lower index of +12 instead of +9).

TABLE 24

Party Cohesion Ratings for RSTs Compared to State Party Medians (80th Congress to RST's Penultimate Congress), and House District Competitiveness and Senate Seat Competitiveness

	Democrats		Republicans	
RST Compared to His State Party Median is:				
Higher Cohesion	9	24%	11	33%
Same Cohesion	14	38	14	42
Lower Cohesion	14	38	8	24
Total	37	100%	33	99%

	Higher Coh.	Same	Lower Coh.	Total	Index	Higher Coh.	Same	Lower Coh.	Total	Index
House Dist.										
Safe	7	10	11	28		6	13	7	26	
	25%	36%	39%	100%	-14	23%	50%	27%	100%	-04
Competitive	2	4	3	9		5	1	1	7	
	22%	44%	33%	99%	-11	71%	14%	14%	99%	+57
Senate Seat										
Safe	5	3	2	10		2	5	4	11	
	50%	30%	20%	100%	+30	18%	45%	36%	99%	-18
Competitive	4	7	7	18		6	7	3	16	
	22%	39%	39%	100%	-17	38%	44%	19%	101%	+19
Hopeless	-	4	5	9		3	2	1	6	
	-	44%	56%	100%	-56	50%	33%	17%	100%	+33

in a competitive district the legislator must cater to his district's needs which may lead him away from his party; he also has to try to capture votes away from the opposing party, and so he is less likely to follow his party. But while some have hypothesized that representatives from competitive districts would have lower party cohesion than those from safe districts, others have hypothesized that competitive district legislators support their party more often than safe representatives. The latter are freer to vote as they wish and may desert their party more frequently; in addition, some analysts feel, that those in competitive districts can win by maximizing the vote from their party adherents and that this can be done best by a record of party loyalty. Unfortunately, for those who wish a neat answer, various studies have confirmed each of the contradictory hypotheses.

The data in this study appear to support the latter hypothesis--RSTs from competitive House seats are more likely to have Higher party cohesion levels (i.e. higher than their state party median representative's cohesion level) than those from safe House seats. Although the differences are small for the Democratic party, they are clear for the Republicans; 23% of safe seat Republican RSTs are Higher cohesion while 27% are Lower cohesion (for an index of -4), compared to 71% of competitive Republicans who are Higher and only 14% who are Lower (for an index of +57). See Table 24.

When we examine the relationship between Senate seat competitiveness and the RSTs' relative party cohesion level, we find that Republicans and Democrats respond in opposite

ways. For the Democrats those competing for safe Senate seats show the most party cohesion with RSTs from competitive Senate seats showing less party cohesion, and those from "hopeless" Senate seats (i.e. being a member of the minority party when the seat is safe for the opposition) being least cohesive. Index scores for these three groups of Democratic RSTs are +30, -17, and -56 respectively. But for Republicans the picture is the reverse. RSTs trying for safe Senate seats show the least party cohesion, competitive Senate seat RSTs are more cohesive, and hopeless RSTs are most cohesive (index scores are -18, +19, and +33 respectively). See Table 24.

This finding is not surprising in view of the data on liberal-conservatism of RSTs reported earlier in this chapter. There we found that Democratic RSTs seeking a safer Senate seat were most liberal, competitive Senate seaters were conservative, and those in hopeless situations were most conservative (index scores there were +20, -6, and -11 respectively). The data for Republicans were reversed; hopeless RSTs were most liberal, competitive ones were more conservative, and those running for a safe Senate seat were most conservative (index scores of +33, +19, and 0 respectively).

An attempt to isolate the party cohesion dimension from the liberal-conservative dimension still resulted in the findings similar to the ones on party cohesion. The method used here was based upon the reasoning--but not the exact methodology--used by Matthews in his development of an Index

of Party Effort. He noted the strong relationship between ideology and party cohesion and tried to distinguish Senators who voted with their party merely because their ideological position led to it, from those who voted with their party beyond the expectations derived from their liberalism scores. His Index of Party Effort was derived from correlating Senators' party cohesion scores with their liberal-conservatism scores. Generally those who voted with their party more often than expected from the line of regression that was calculated, were considered to have a high party effort score, and those who voted with their party less often than expected were considered to have a low party effort score.[94]

The method used here also related party cohesion and liberal-conservative ratings. For Democrats, those who were "Higher Cohesion" were considered to be acting as expected if they were also "More Liberal", but were considered to be party-oriented if they were "Same" or "Less Liberal"; those who were "Same" on both cohesion and liberal-conservatism were acting as expected, but those who were "Less Liberal" were classified as party-oriented, while those who were "More Liberal" were viewed as ideologically-oriented (or low party-orientation); for those who were "Lower Cohesion", they were considered to be low party-oriented unless they were "Less

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[94] Matthews, op.cit., p. 280. Actually those scoring 4 cohesion points or more than expected were considered high party effort, those within 3 points were labeled as average party effort, and those 4 points or more below the expected value were called low party effort.

Liberal", in which case they were acting as expected. For Republicans, Higher Cohesion RSTs were considered to be high party-oriented if their liberal-conservative ratings were either More Liberal or Same, and to be acting as expected if it were Less Liberal; those who were Same for both were acting as expected, those who were Same on cohesion but More Liberal were considered to be party-oriented, while those who were Same on cohesion but Less Liberal were considered to be ideologically-oriented. For Lower Cohesion Republicans, they were considered to be acting as expected if they were More Liberal, but were considered to be ideologically-oriented if they were in the other two liberal-conservative categories. See Table 25.

TABLE 25

Party-Orientation Based on Relative Party Cohesion and Liberal-Conservative Ratings

RELATIVE IDEOLOGICAL POSITION	DEMOCRATIC RSTs HIGHER COH.	SAME	LOWER COH.	REPUBLICAN RSTs HIGHER COH.	SAME	LOWER COH.
More Liberal	E (2)	I (4)	I (0)	P (2)	P (3)	E (6)
Same	P (7)	E (10)	I (8)	P (6)	E (8)	I (2)
Less Liberal	P (0)	P (0)	E (6)	E (3)	I (3)	I (0)

E=Expected: 18 Democrats, 17 Republicans
P=Party-oriented: 7 Democrats, 11 Republicans
I=Ideologically-oriented (or low party-orientation): 12 Democrats, 5 Republicans

The data using this scheme supports the data using party cohesion level alone. Those from competitive House districts were more party-oriented than those from safe House seats (party-oriented minus ideologically-oriented index scores were -14 and -11 for safe and competitive Democratic RSTs

respectively, and +12 and +43 for the Republicans). And Democratic RSTs seeking safe Senate seats were most party-oriented, while "Hopeless" RSTs were least party-oriented (index scores were +10 for safe, -11 for competitive, and -44 for hopeless). For the Republicans safe Senate seat RSTs were least party-oriented (index of -18), competitive seat ones were more party-oriented (index of +25), and the hopeless ones were most party-oriented (index of +44).

Matthews study suggested several other hypotheses. He reported that of the Senators in his study, 1) Democrats were more likely to exhibit high party effort than Republicans,[95] 2) the more senior legislators were less likely to be in the high party effort category than more junior men,[96] and 3) those Democrats who had received "premature" committee assignments (i.e. good committee assignments despite little seniority) had increased party effort scores.[97]

The data on RSTs do not confirm the initial hypothesis; Democratic RSTs were less likely than Republican RSTs to be either party-oriented or Higher cohesion. Concerning seniority and party-orientation--the data for the Republicans conformed to the hypothesis (the most junior men were the most party-oriented and cohesive, and these declined with seniority), but for Democratic RSTs the most junior men (those whose Senatorial attempt occurred during their second

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[95] Ibid., p. 140.

[96] Ibid., p. 137.

[97] Ibid., p. 135.

term--those who served only one complete term had been omitted from this analysis) were the least likely to support their party.

The hypothesis that those with good committee assignments would show more party-orientation (and cohesion) than those with poorer assignments was also tested. Republican RSTs with the best assignments were less likely to support their party than those with worse assignments, while those with the lowest assignments were the most party-oriented. Using the party orientation data, the findings for the Democratic RSTs were the opposite; those with the lowest committee assignments were least likely to support their party, while those with the best committee assignments were highest scoring. See Table 26.

When summarizing this data on the party roll call behavior of RSTs, it is well to bear in mind that when several variables are being held constant (e.g. looking at Republican RSTs scoring lower than their state party medians), the number of cases becomes small (e.g. N=6 in this example); in addition, it should be recalled that frequently the differences were quite small too. But the data may still be suggestive of hypotheses concerning progressive ambition to be tested with additional or different data.

The data on the party cohesion roll call behavior of the RST generally indicated that the RSTs were less loyal to their party than their state party median colleagues. A variety of measures were used and on all of them, Democratic RSTs were less loyal than other Democrats. This was true,

TABLE 26

Seniority, Committee Assignment, and Party Orientation

	Democratic RSTs					Republican RSTs				
Total terms of service	Party Or.	Ex-pected	Ideo. Or.	Total	Index*	Party Or.	Ex-pected	Ideo. Or.	Total	Index*
2	3	3	7	13		4	-	1	5	
	23%	23%	54%	100%	-31	80%	-	20%	100%	+60
3-5	2	11	1	14		4	10	1	15	
	14%	79%	7%	100%	+07	27%	67%	7%	101%	+20
6+	2	4	4	10		3	7	3	13	
	20%	40%	40%	100%	-20	23%	54%	23%	100%	00
Committee assignment in penult. Congress										
I (High)	3	9	4	16		3	6	4	13	
	19%	56%	25%	100%	-06	23%	46%	31%	100%	-08
II	2	5	3	10		1	6	1	8	
	20%	50%	30%	100%	-10	13%	75%	13%	101%	00
III (Low)	2	4	5	11		7	5	-	12	
	18%	36%	45%	99%	-27	58%	42%	-	100%	+58

*Index is constructed by subtracting the Ideologically-oriented proportion from the Party-oriented proportion.

also, for the Republican RSTs on three of the four measures used; but when a single average was used to compare the RST to the median legislator in his state party, it indicated more Republican RSTs in the Higher Cohesion category than the Lower Cohesion category. For both parties, RSTs from safe House seats were less cohesive than those from competitive districts; apparently safe RSTs were freer to desert their party and to develop an appeal to a wider constituency. Democrats seeking a safe Senate seat were more likely to be High cohesion than other Democratic RSTs, but Republicans seeking safe seats were least loyal to their party. At first it was suspected that this was due to the finding that RSTs seeking competitive Senate seats were more moderate than those seeking safe seats. But when a measure was devised to isolate party loyalty from the ideological dimension, this basic pattern still persisted--i.e. Democratic RSTs seeking safe Senate seats still were more party-oriented than other Democratic RSTs, while Republican RSTs trying for a safe Senate seat were less party-oriented than other Republican RSTs. Using this party-orientation data, it was noted that Republicans were more party-oriented than the Democrats. Republican RSTs serving on the lowest-rated committees, and those with the lowest seniority, were most likely to be party-oriented. This was not surprising as Matthews' data on the party effort scores of Senators had also indicated that party effort declined with seniority. But the data for Democratic RSTs were contrary; those with the least service were the least party-oriented, and those with the lowest-rated

committee assignments were least party-oriented.

Conclusion

Our model posited the decision by a Representative to become a Senatorial candidate as a function of three sets of variables--agent or personal characteristics, origin or factors associated with service in the House of Representatives, and the situation surrounding the destination or Senate seat. This led to an investigation of whether RSTs can be distinguished from other Representatives by their personal background, or House situation.

The data on personal characteristics indicated that there were few differences between RSTs and other Representatives. But the data on House situation indicated several differences--although some were not statistically significant. RSTs were more likely to come from proportionally larger districts (i.e. At-Large seats or districts that represented 20% or more of the state's population) and larger cities than other Representatives. They were more likely to come from competitive districts than other Representatives, as was hypothesized. But contrary to expectations derived from Schlesinger's work, RSTs were more likely than other Representatives to come from organizational tension situations created by different degrees of House and Senate competition. RSTs had less seniority than other members of the House, suggesting minimal risk may be a more important stimulus to progressive ambition than high resources. But some limitations to this thesis can be seen in the fact that RSWs had

more seniority than other RSTs; it was noted, too, that those with very high seniority and those with very low seniority had lower success rates than those with moderate service. A more direct challenge to the minimal risk thesis was the data indicating that RSTs had better committee assignments than other Representatives. But few chairmen or ranking minority members sought Senatorial office, and there was some indication that RSTs with the best committee assignments were most likely to seek safe Senate seats--suggesting that they were reluctant to risk their positions in uncertain situations.

But the analysis of legislative behavior--as distinguished from these other aspects of the House situation--was less clear concerning differences between RSTs and other Representatives. There was no comparable data on specialization for non-RSTs, but comparisons between the different sub-groups of RSTs (i.e. RSWs, RSLs, and Ts) suggested no clear relationship between specialization and progressive ambition for the Senate.

The data on liberal-conservatism indicated RSTs were more likely than not to be in the same quartile as the median state party legislator; all RSTs were in the same quartile as their median colleague 51% of all terms, but only 42% of the Republican RST terms showed agreement between the RST and his median colleague. Similarly although 59% of all RSTs averaged (for the 80th Congress to their penultimate term in the House) in the Same category as their median, only 48% of all Republican RSTs did. So although Democratic RSTs were more likely to agree than disagree with their colleagues,

Republican RSTs were more likely to disagree than agree, however more were the Same than either More or Less Liberal.

The data on liberal-conservatism also showed Republican RSTs to be more likely to be liberal than conservative, while Democratic RSTs compared to their median were more conservative if there was any net difference. RSTs seeking competitive Senate seats were more moderate than those seeking safe seats. There was no consistent relationship for both parties between the RST's age or the competition of his House seat and the level of his liberal-conservatism relative to his state party median. But it was found that RSTs from competitive districts were more likely to take an ideologically polar position than safe RSTs; similarly older Democrats and younger Republicans were most likely to take the polar position.

The roll call data on party cohesion were classified into quintiles instead of quartiles. One result was a lower proportion of RSTs who were in the same category as their state party median. In only 34% of the terms did the Democratic RST agree with his median, while 38% were Lower; 38% of the Republican RSTs agreed, which was more than in either the Higher (29%) or Lower (33%) categories. Similarly 38% of the Democratic RSTs averaged (for the 80th Congress to their penultimate term in the House) in the Same category as their median, while an identical proportion were Lower; for the Republican RSTs more were in the Same category (42%) than in either the Higher (33%) or Lower (24%) categories.

Other findings on party cohesion indicated that RSTs

from safe seats were less cohesive relative to their median colleague than RSTs from competitive seats. Democrats trying for a safe Senate seat were more cohesive than those trying for competitive seats, but it was reverse for the Republicans --safe Senate seats and lower cohesion were associated for them. This was true even after party orientation was isolated from ideological considerations. Using the data on party-orientation indicated that Republican RSTs were more loyal to their party than Democratic RSTs (relative to their state party medians). But it also showed that half of the RSTs were in the relative category expected based upon their cohesion and ideological position. It also indicated that for Republican RSTs low seniority and poor committee assignments were associated with higher party-orientation, while for the Democrats low seniority and poor committees were associated with lower party-orientation.

Although there are some differences between RSTs and other Representatives on the basis of factors associated with the situation at the origin or House of Representatives (less when it comes to roll call behavior than other aspects), the impact of the Senate situation upon the Representative's decision to seek a Senate seat must be examined.

CHAPTER III

DESTINATION SITUATION AND SENATORIAL AMBITION

Purpose

The focus of this chapter is upon the third set of factors assumed to affect a Representative's decision to become a Senatorial candidate--the opportunity afforded by the situation at the destination office (the Senate). The legal opportunity of a vacancy--due either to the expiration of the term of office or the death of the office-holder--is essential, but other aspects of the opportunity situation must be examined too. Which party holds the Senate seat, and the re-election plans of the incumbent are two important questions of concern to the potential candidate. He must also consider the prospects of election--i.e. the competitiveness of the Senate seat--as well as anticipate the amount of competition from prospective opponents for the nomination. These potential candidates (RSTs and opponents) may be influenced by another aspect of opportunity--the career patterns found in their state party. This may be due to the candidate's internalization of certain expectations about Senatorial careers stemming from past patterns. Or the pattern may serve to put potential candidates into the forefront of speculation--a position of noteriety that

may be considered one of his resources or advantages which may enable him to attract other needed resources such as financial and organizational support.

The Senate situations will vary from case to case. In some situations, the RST will seek the Senate nomination in a very hospitable environment, while in other situations the RST will face a hostile environment. We assume that the RSTs deciding to run in the latter situation will differ from RSTs in the safer situation. This assumption stems from Seligman[98] who suggests that low risk situations attract different kinds of candidates than high risk situations. The focus in this chapter is upon one group of RSTs compared to other groups of RSTs rather than to other House members without progressive ambition for the Senate.

The classification of Senate situations used here is based upon the first two elements noted above--which party holds the Senate seat, and the incumbent's re-election plans. These can be combined into a single matrix. The RST is either of the same party as the Senate incumbent, or he is not; the incumbent Senator is either running for re-election, or he is not.

A further word on the operational definitions of incumbency and candidacy is necessary, however. Operationally, "incumbency" refers to the occupant of the Senate seat, regardless of the nature of his selection--i.e. whether he was elected to it, or appointed to fill a vacancy. The

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[98]"Opportunity", op.cit.

choice of this definition is based upon several factors. If the appointee is running for re-election, then the RST faces the situation of comparing his Congressional voting record to that of the incumbent. If the incumbent is not running for re-election, it would make little difference to the RST whether this was due to the death of an elected Senator or the retirement of an appointed one.

This is not to say an appointed incumbent seeking re-election has all of the advantages that an elected one has. Not having faced the electorate of the Senate constituency may be an important difference. The length of the term, however, is not related to the election/appointment issue. On occassion appointed Senators have had more seniority in the Senate when they faced re-election than have duly elected Senators. For example Sen. Ed Mechem of New Mexico was appointed to the Senate on November 30, 1962 and ran for re-election in November 1964; Sen. Ted Kennedy was elected to fill an incompleted term in November 1962, was not sworn until January 3, 1963, and also sought re-election in November 1964. In addition, it should be noted, we make no other references to length of service in our classification --an RST opposing a six-year Senator is not classified differently than one facing a three-term veteran.

The candidacy status of an incumbent (i.e. whether the Senator is "running" or "not running") refers to the situation at the time of the RST's decision to become a candidate. If an RST resolves to challenge the incumbent in his own party's primary, we consider him very ambitious

to be ready to run in such a risky situation. This evaluation of his ambition should not be changed if the Senator subsequently withdraws from the race. For instance Rep. Helen Gahagen Douglas (Democrat) decided to challenge Sen. Sheridan Downey (Democrat) for the Senatorial nomination in California in 1950; we would expect her to share certain characteristics with other RSTs who decided to run against incumbents. There is no reason to change our expectations of her characteristics or pre-candidacy behavior simply because Sen. Downey subsequently withdrew from the race.

If a Senator announces his retirement after the RST has entered the race for the Senatorial nomination, then the situation is classified as "incumbent running", even if he is not a candidate on Election Day or even on the Primary Election ballot. In the example cited above, Rep. Douglas is classified with other RSTs who were in the same party as the incumbent who ran for re-election. Rep. Richard Nixon (Republican) who also had announced his candidacy for Sen. Downey's seat is considered to be in the same category as other RSTs who decided to (and did) run against the incumbent Senator of the opposite party. Similarly, an RST's category does not change because the incumbent is eliminated in his own party's primary. Rep. Thomas Curtis (Republican) who decided to challenge Sen. Edward Long (Democrat) only to find himself running against a different opponent when Long lost his primary battle remains in the group which chose to oppose incumbents.

One unusual case was that of Rep. Clarence Young

(Republican of Nevada). He had announced that he was not a Senatorial candidate because Democratic incumbent Sen. Alan Bible was expected to be a candidate. In December Bible said he would retire; Young then became a candidate. But in May Bible decided to run after all. This situation was classified as incumbent not running.

Party similarity or difference, of course, refers to the designation of the RST and the incumbent (regardless of how the latter attained office). If the seat is vacant, the party identification of the last occupant is used.

Given this framework, four different Senate situations are derived:

I) Party Challenge--The RST and the incumbent are in the same party, and the incumbent is running for re-election (N=18).

II) Party Succession--The RST and the incumbent are in the same party, but the incumbent is not running for re-election (N=15).

III) Opposition Party--The RST and the incumbent are in different parties, and the incumbent is running for re-election (N=42).

IV) Open-ended--The RST and the incumbent are in different parties, but the incumbent is not running for re-election (N=10).

Party Challenge (I) and Party Succession (II) are in-party situations (N=33), while Opposition Party (III) and Open-ended (IV) are out-party situations (N=52). Party Challenge (I) and Opposition Party (III) are situations in which the RST had to be concerned about facing the incumbent (N=60), while Party Succession (II) and Open-ended (IV) are situations in which the incumbent was not a candidate at the time of the RST's decision to try for the Senate (N=25).

See Table 27.

TABLE 27

RSTs Classified by Senate-Incumbent's Candidacy and Party

		INCUMBENT RUNNING	INCUMBENT NOT RUNNING	TOTAL
RST:	Same Party	I (N=18)	II (N=15)	33
	Other Party	III (N=42)	IV (N=10)	52
Total		60	25	85

The single most interesting group to analyze are those who plan to challenge the incumbent of their own party (Group I). These Representatives may be viewed as the most ambitious. Certainly they are prepared to risk the most--they risk their seat in the House (usually a safe seat) to run in a race where the odds of winning are slight. Only about 1 out of 10 Republican incumbents seeking renomination are defeated, while the odds are 2 out of 100 for Northern Democrats, and a bit higher for Southern Democrats with 3 out of 10.[99]

These Representatives share the asset (or liability) a Senator has, of having a legislative record and not just a platform of promises to run on. But most do not share the Senator's statewide base of support. In fact only two of the eighteen (11%) in Group I had statewide elective experience, a lower proportion than the RSTs in any of the other three categories of Senate situations (these ranged from 17% to

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[99]V.O. Key, Parties, Politics, and Pressure Groups, (5th edition; New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1964), pp. 442-43.

50% with statewide experience).

The ambition of these RSTs would lead us to hypothesize several other characteristics. We would expect them to be younger and to have started a political career earlier and therefore not to be without political experience. They are not brash upstart Representatives out to build up a reputation for a subsequent race, nor are they oldtimers making a last-ditch fight. They probably have had political experience prior to coming to the House, perhaps in the state legislature, suggesting a legislative experience ladder for them to climb. Their personal ambition suggests that it need not stem from the opportunity structure in the state. Their ambition also suggests that their interest in the Senate does not stem from a frustrated House career--i.e. they would be expected to be from the better committees (even holding seniority constant). Their ambition, and early start suggests they are more likely than other RSTs to be lawyers and less likely to come from business occupations or agricultural occupations.

These Representatives have had ample time to plan a campaign strategy, and changes in their behavior in the ultimate term would not be as likely among this group--although a lack of statewide experience or organization may still result in behavioral changes prior to candidacy. Their ambition, longer planning period, and relatively safe House seats (in a relatively safe state)--suggests that their specialization in the House might be low. But we would expect relatively high level of party cohesion, or at least

similar to the state party pattern.

Although these hypotheses are stated to apply to all RSTs in this category, there are nevertheless several distinct groupings, and some differences may be expected. One sub-group is those who are risking their House seat to challenge an elected incumbent (there are nine in this group). One Representative (Dent) challenged an elected incumbent Senator, but simultaneously ran for re-election to the House; he obviously faced little risk, and his motives were other than personal ambition. Three Representatives (two in the same contest) challenged an incumbent who had been appointed to his position to fill a vacancy caused by the death of the elected Senator. These Representatives may have a shorter planning period than others in this category; and they clearly face less risk, as the appointed incumbent may not have built a statewide base of support either.[100] Still another sub-group are the five Representatives who prepared to run against the incumbent, only to find the incumbent Senator withdrawing from the race. Although there may be little theoretical ground upon which to differentiate the latter group from the first group, there are nevertheless some empirical differences. For example, those who gave up their House seat to run against the elected incumbent Senator were younger and less experienced than those RSTs in Group I who did not actually face an incumbent in

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[100] V.O. Key excludes these from his calculations of what happens to incumbent Senators in their re-nomination bids; see ibid., p. 438.

the primary.

Representatives who run against incumbents of their own party may be expected to resemble RSTs in Group II on some characteristics, as they both are the "in-party". On the other hand, Group I and Group III RSTs share the important characteristic of planning to run against the incumbent, the former in a primary and the later in the general election.

The data and analysis that follow will examine the relationship of the Senate situation and the selection of RSTs. Theoretically we assume that the Senate situation is the independent variable, and that if we find a preponderance of RSTs in a Group to have certain characteristics, we assume that the Senate situation tended to select or induce such Representatives to become Senatorial candidates. We will examine, therefore, the effect of the Senate situation upon agent characteristics (the personal and ambition attributes of the RSTs), origin characteristics (aspects of their House situation and behavior), and other destination characteristics (aspects of the situation surrounding the Senate seat they seek).

The impact of the Senate situation upon the Representative's decision to try for the Senate may be seen by examining the proportion of contests in each Senate situation which have RSTs competing. RST participation rates in contests varied directly with the degree of opportunity. They were least likely to be competing where the opportunity was the least--i.e. where a candidate would have to make his opportunity by challenging the incumbent in the primary, or

Party Challenge (I) situations--and most likely to be running when the opportunity was most favorable--i.e. being a member of the in-party trying to succeed the incumbent who was not seeking re-nomination, or Party Succession (II) situations. In the 1956-1966 period,[101] only 1.8% of all primaries in Party Challenge (I) situations had RSTs as candidates, compared to 36.8% of all Party Succession (II) primaries. The pattern was continued for the other two situation types. Assuming that the absence of an incumbent constitutes a greater opportunity for the out-party than if the incumbent were running, we would expect more Open-ended (IV) contests with RSTs than Opposition Party (III) contests; the data confirms this, with 27.8% of the former and 11.0% of the latter having RSTs running. Exclusion of uncontested primaries (or ones in which the winner had more than a 9-1 lead over his nearest opponent) does not alter the conclusion; RST participation rates in these situations ranked by the level of opportunity were as follows: II:42.9%, IV:25.0%, III:10.1%, I:3.9%.

Senate Situation and Agent Characteristics

Representatives who plan to challenge the Senate incumbent of their own party were assumed to be the most

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[101] This period was chosen because of the availability of data on Senate primaries in America Votes. Senate situations for the purposes of this analysis were determined by the incumbent's candidacy in the primary; contests involving RSTs were reclassified to meet this definition, even if the RST had entered the contest before the incumbent withdrew. Nominations by conventions and other means were excluded.

ambitious group of RSTs. This assumption led us to expect younger men who started their political careers earlier than other RSTs. Tables 28 and 29 tend to confirm that they started their political careers earlier. But on several of the other measures linking age and political careers, it is hard to distinguish them from those in Group II--Representatives who share the Senator's party but are running after the latter's withdrawal from the race (by death or announcement of retirement). The age characteristics of the in-party RSTs (Groups I and II) tend to differ from those of the out-party RSTs (Groups III and IV). Their start in politics is earlier, and they have served longer before attempting to reach the Senate; they also reached the House earlier. But their attempt to become a Senator is not earlier than out-party RSTs.

The differences within a group of RSTs are greater than differences between RSTs in different Senate situations, however. For instance, age at entry into public office ranged from 23 to 45 in Group I RSTs, 23 to 47 for Group II RSTs, 22 to 60 for Group III, and 23 to 51 for the ten RSTs in Group IV. The range of years in public office was from 5 to 33 in Group I, 9 to 30 in Group II, 2 to 27 in Group III, and 1 to 29 in Group IV.

Similarly, we find a wide range of offices serving as their initial public office. RSTs in each of the four groups began their political careers in each of the types of offices considered, with the exception of statewide elective. But there were some differences in the

TABLE 28

Senate Situation and Age at Political Career Points

	I		II		III		IV	
Entered First Public Office Before 30	10	56%	7*	50%	13	31%	4	40%
Entered House of Reps. Before 40	8	44	9	60	12	29	4	40
Tried for Senate Before 50	8	44	8	53	28	67	4	40
	N=18		N=15		N=42		N=10	

*Excludes Reifel for whom information on age at first office is unavailable.

TABLE 29

Senate Situation and Mean and Median Age At Political Career Points

	I	II	III	IV
Mean Age at First Public Office	31	33*	34	32
Median Age at First Public Office	28	30*	33	31
Mean Age at House Entry	41	39	42	44
Median Age at House Entry	42	39	42	46
Mean Age at Senate Try	49	50	48	50
Median Age at Senate Try	50	48	47	51
Mean Years of Public Office Exp.	15	14*	11	14
Median Years of Public Office Exp.	15	16*	9	11

*Excludes Reifel for whom complete information on first office is unavailable.

distribution of these offices among the four groups. Group I RSTs were slightly more likely than any other group to have begun their public office holding career in the state legislature, and they were less likely than the other groups

to have started in public offices related to the law enforcement field. But RSTs in Group IV had almost as high a proportion of state legislative beginners (40% compared to 44% of Group I)--so the legislative ladder hypothesized above for Group I RSTs does not appear to be exclusive (nor strong). See Table 30.

TABLE 30

Senate Situation and First Public Office

FIRST PUBLIC OFFICE	I		II		III		IV	
State Legislature	8	44%	5	33%	9	21%	4	40%
Law Enforcement	2	11	3	20	12	29	3	30
Congress	4	22	4	27	12	29	1	10
Administration	3	17	2	13	7	17	1	10
Local Government	1	6	1	7	2	5	1	10
Total	18	100%	15	100%	42	101%	10	100%

There do not seem to be any strong patterns along in-party/out-party lines, nor the other matrix dimension (incumbent running or not running for re-election).

There are such patterns, however, apparently linking occupation and Senate situation--i.e. certain Senate situations seem to attract RSTs with certain occupational backgrounds. For instance, lawyers were less likely (and businessmen more likely) to be challenging incumbents regardless of their party than not to be. See Table 31.

This avoidance of incumbents may reflect a perception of an unwritten rule among professional politicians to avoid conflict with incumbents if possible. This form of job protection is seen in the phenomenon of "incumbent reapportionment" when a legislature will draft new district

lines after a census with the objective of protecting incumbents rather than benefitting their party. Another line of speculation, however, is that lawyers, as more "professional politicians", are more concerned about their careers and try to avoid the more competitive situations. Some evidence for this speculation may be found in the data on RSTs which suggest that lawyers were slightly less likely than non-lawyers to run for "competitive" or "hopeless" Senate seats, and slightly more likely to run in "safe" seats; lawyers also were far less likely than non-lawyers to be involved in highly competitive Senate nomination struggles.

TABLE 31

Senate Situation and Occupation

OCCUPATION	I N=18		II N=15		III N=42		IV N=10	
Law	8	44%	11	73%	19	45%	8	80%
Business	5	28%	2	13%	15	36%.	2	20%
Teaching	5		2		7		-	
Agriculture	3		1		6		2	
Journalism	3		-		3		-	
Other Professional	1		-		1		-	

In view of the disproportionately large number of lawyers in the situations where Senate incumbents are not candidates, it is surprising to find that the proportion of RSTs with law enforcement public office experience is uniform in three of the four groups (only in Group I does much less than one-third of the RSTs have such experience). See Table 32.

It is interesting to note that those challenging incumbents are less likely to have had statewide elective

experience--whether gained from At-Large elections to the House of Representatives or from election to state offices --than those running where the incumbent is not a candidate (15% of the former compared to 32% of the latter).

TABLE 32

Senate Situation and Prior Public Office Experience

	I		II		III		IV	
PUBLIC OFFICE EXP.	N=18		N=15		N=42		N=10	
State Legislature	10	56%	6	40%	13	31%	6	60%
Law Enforcement	4	22	5	33	13	31	3	30
Statewide Elective	1	6	-	-	1	2	1	10
Administration	5	28	2	13	8	19	1	10
Local Government	1	6	1	7	4	10	2	20
Statewide Elective (incl. At-Large House of Reps.)	2	11	3	20	7	17	5	50

Senate Situation and Origin Characteristics

When we examined the total distribution of Republican RSTs as compared to that of a control group of Republican Representatives, we concluded that those who came from larger cities (100,000 plus--or even those over 40,000) were under-represented in the RST population, while those from rural areas (towns of less than 2500 population) were over-represented. When this distribution of residence is examined for the four Senate situations, we can see that Republican RSTs who challenge incumbents of their own party do not come from larger cities (the largest city was Rep. Ellsworth's Lawrence, Kansas with 33,000).

Although none of the Republican RSTs who challenged incumbents of their own party came from cities larger than 40,000 or those which were even one-half the size of their

state's largest city, 24% to 60% of the Republican RSTs in the other Senate situations did (e.g. 38% of the Republicans in Group II situations came from cities over 100,000). There is a slight tendency for large city Republicans to avoid incumbents regardless of their party status (31% of all Republican RSTs are in incumbent not running situations--Group II and IV, but 50% of all large city Republican RSTs are in such races).

Democratic RSTs from large cities, on the other hand, were over-represented while those from rural areas were under-represented. In contrast to the Republican RSTs, Democrats from large cities are more likely to seek out incumbents than to avoid them. Forty percent (40%) of the Democrats in Group I come from cities over 100,000, and 40% are from the largest city in their state; this contrasts to 29% of Group II RST Democrats. Incumbent opposing Democrats (Groups I and III) constitute 72% of Democratic RSTs, but 88% of large city Democratic RSTs are in that category. See Table 33.

TABLE 33

Senate Situation and Size of City of Residence, by Party

	DEMOCRATS				REPUBLICANS			
CITY SIZE	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
POPULATION	N=10	N=7	N=21	N=5	N=8	N=8	N=21	N=5
under 2,500	20%	0	0	20%	38%	25%	19%	0
2,500-40,000	40%	71%	38%	60%	63%	38%	52%	40%
40,000-100,000	0	0	19%	20%	0	0	10%	40%
100,000 & over	40%	29%	43%	0	0	38%	19%	20%
CITY SIZE AS PROPORTION OF STATE'S LARGEST CITY								
less than 10%	50%	71%	24%	60%	63%	63%	71%	20%
10-49%	10%	0	29%	20%	38%	13%	5%	20%
50-99%	0	0	10%	0	0	0	10%	20%
city is largest	40%	29%	38%	20%	0	25%	14%	40%

V.O. Key observed that the primary system over-represented members from a party's dominant area--i.e. Democratic areas contribute a disproportionate number of Democratic nominees for statewide office. Apparently the presence of an incumbent, whether he is of the same party or not, has a similar effect. Races against incumbents brings out Democratic candidates from large cities, but discourage Republicans from that area.

The relationship of the relative size of the Congressional District to the nature of the Senate situation is not as clear. Representatives from At-Large districts are disproportionately more likely to be in Group IV--out-party with incumbent not running--than in the other categories. See Table 34.

TABLE 34

Senate Situation and Proportionate Size of Congressional District

CD SIZE	I		II		III		IV	
1-19% of state	8	44%	7	47%	23	55%	4	40%
20-79% of state	8	44	6	40	13	31	2	20
100% of state (At Large)	2	11	2	13	6	14	4	40
Total	18	99%	15	100%	42	100%	10	100%

We had speculated that the Representatives who challenge incumbents of their own party are not likely to be newcomers to Congress. The data supports this hypothesis--only 17% were in their first or second term, compared to 33% of the other in-party RSTs and 46% of the out-party RSTs. In-party RSTs attempting to succeed their own party's

Senator, may have had to wait patiently for the opportunity --and in fact more than half of them had six terms or more in the House. See Table 35.

TABLE 35

Senate Situation and House Seniority

SENIORITY	I		II		III		IV	
1-2 terms	3	17%	5	33%	20	48%	4	40%
3-5 terms	9	50	2	13	13	31	5	50
6+ terms	6	33	8	53	9	21	1	10
Total	18	100%	15	99%	42	100%	10	100%

Our speculation above suggested that RSTs who challenge the incumbent of their own party can be assumed to be very ambitious. This ambition, we suggested, did not stem from a frustrated House career. In order to investigate this hypothesis, we will examine the committee assignments of RSTs in each of the four Senate situations. See Table 36.

From this table we can see that RSTs in Group I have the best committee assignments. Two-thirds of the RSTs in that Group had committee assignments in the top committees (Rules, Ways and Means, Appropriations, Foreign Affairs, and Armed Services). This compares to 60% for fellow in-party RSTs (Group II), 40% for Group III, and 30% for Group IV. More importantly, RSTs who oppose incumbents of their own party, do so from positions on the best committees--regardless of seniority. For instance 4 of 6 (67%) Group I high seniority RSTs have top committee assignments; this compares to 63% of the high seniority Group II RSTs, 67% of Group IIIs, and none of the Group IVs. Even Group I's low

TABLE 36

Senate Situation and Committee Assignment, by Seniority*

Committee Assignment	I					II					III					IV				
	Seniority					Seniority					Seniority					Seniority				
	H	M	L	Totals		H	M	L	Totals		H	M	L	Totals		H	M	L	Totals	
Highest Ranking Committees (I)	2	6	4	12	67%	3	1	5	9	60%	3	8	6	17	40%	1	2	-	3	30%
Medium Ranking Committees (II)	-	2	1	3	17%	2	1	3	6	40%	8	4	2	14	33%	-	1	-	1	10%
Lowest Ranking Committees (III)	1	1	1	3	17%	-	-	-	-	-	9	1	1	11	26%	3	2	1	6	60%

*Assignment is the highest assignment only. Low seniority is 1-2 terms; medium seniority is 3-5 terms; high seniority is 6 or more terms.

seniority members have good assignments--2 of 3 (67%) are on the highest ranking committees, compared to 60% of Group II's low seniority RSTs, 15% of Group III's, and 25% of Group IV's.

Taken together, both in-party groups try for the Senate while serving on top committees (64%)--compared to only 38% for the out-party. It may be that some out-party RSTs become candidates because of frustration with their House careers. Those with little seniority and who are serving on poor committees may feel the most frustration, or they may feel that they were risking little if they were to lose their bid for the Senate. Perhaps those on better committees can not only resist the temptation, but also refute the arguments of any recruiters seeking a candidate for an unfavorable race by arguing their utility in the House. Whatever the reason, it is interesting to note that out-party RSTs in Hopeless Senate situations are more likely than out-party RSTs in Safe or Competitive situations to be serving on low ranked committees.

One of the areas of legislative behavior we examined is that of specialization. We assumed that generalists were in a more favorable position than specialists for moving on to the larger statewide constituency. Our data indicated that Representatives who challenge the incumbent of their own party (Group I) show much less specialization than other in-party RSTs. Using the score in the penultimate term in the House,[102] we see from Table 37 that 41% of the RSTs in

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[102]Use of other periods for comparison, e.g. the

Group I are Low in specialization while 18% are High. This contrasts to 8% Low and 42% High in Group II.

TABLE 37

Senate Situation and Index of Specialization
(Penultimate Term)

SPECIALIZATION	I		II		III		IV	
Low (.49 & below)	7	41%	1	8%	17	52%	3	33%
Medium (.50-.66)	7	41	6	50	11	33	3	33
High (.67+)	3	18	5	42	5	15	3	33
Total	17	100%	12	100%	33	100%	9	99%

Opposition Party RSTs (Group III)--those opposing incumbents of the other party--also show similar low specialization (in fact they are even more likely to be generalists). Group IV resembles Group II, with the resulting pattern that those opposing incumbents regardless of in-party/out-party status are lower in specialization (almost half are generalists, compared to 19% of those not planning to face incumbents). Apparantly those who were ready to challenge incumbents were more likely to have the assumed asset of being generalist, while those who were waiting for a better opportunity seemed to be more likely to specialize in the meantime.

Of the RSTs who served at least two terms in the House, most increased the number of bills they introduced in the ultimate term (56%), and had the number of committees to which they were sent increased (54%). Although most RSTs

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ultimate term, or the median of all terms from the 80th Congress through the penultimate term, produce similar results.

had a lower Index score (61%), only 27% were in lower categories (but 16% were in higher categories). As many as 39% changed their committee receiving the most bills. In most of these aspects of specialization, those opposing incumbents tended to act similarly (e.g. 35% of Group I and 48% of Group III increased the number of committees receiving their bills, compared to 75% and 78% of Groups II and IV). Those in Group I were least likely to increase the number of bills, number of committees, score lower on the Index, and change specialization areas. One explanation of this lower rate of change for RSTs opposing incumbents of their own party, is that with the extra time to plan their campaign, there is less need for relatively late changes (and besides they are already lower in specialization).

Our original speculation was that although it was difficult to consider a legislator's record of liberalism or conservatism as a resource without further knowledge about the nature of his state, it was reasonable to hypothesize that the more liberal Senate would attract more liberal Representatives. An analysis of the liberal-conservative ratings of the four groups of RSTs in each party does not present a clear answer of whether some groups are more liberal than other groups. See Table 38. But a few patterns do emerge. The predominant pattern on liberal-conservatism reported in the previous chapter was that RSTs were very likely to be in the same average quartile as their state party median (68% of the Democrats and 48% of the Republicans agreed). The data here indicates that the

RSTs prepared to challenge incumbents of their own party were most likely of all groups to agree with their state party median (80% of Democratic Group I RSTs and 71% of Republican Group I RSTs agreed compared to 63% of the other Democratic RSTs and 42% of the other Republican RSTs). Apparently those expecting a close primary contest seem to seek protection by agreeing with state-party medians' degree of liberal-conservatism. The proportion of Group I RSTs agreeing (80%) was higher than other RSTs who had a competitive nomination struggle (63%) which in turn was higher than those RSTs facing little or no nomination competition (50%).

TABLE 38

Senate Situation and Liberalism-Conservatism*

IDEOLOGICAL RATINGS	I		II		III		IV	
Democrats								
VL: Very Lib. (Polar)	3	30%	1	20%	8	44%	2	50%
L	3	30	2	40	8	44	-	-
C	4	40	1	20	2	11	2	50
VC	-	-	1	20	-	-	-	-
Total	10	100%	5	100%	18	99%	4	100%
RST COMPARED TO HIS STATE PARTY MEDIAN:								
More Liberal	1	10%	1	20%	4	22%	-	-
Same	8	80	4	80	11	61	2	50
Less Liberal	1	10	-	-	3	17	2	50
Total	10	100%	5	100%	18	100%	4	100%
Republicans								
VL	2	29%	3	50%	4	27%	2	40%
L	4	57	1	17	2	13	-	-
C	1	14	1	17	5	33	2	40
VC: Very Cons. (Polar)	-	-	1	17	4	27	1	20
Total	7	100%	6	101%	15	100%	5	100%
RST COMPARED TO HIS STATE PARTY MEDIAN:								
More Liberal	2	29%	2	33%	5	33%	2	40%
Same	5	71	2	33	7	47	2	40
Less Liberal	-	-	2	33	3	20	1	20
Total	7	100%	6	99%	15	100%	5	100%

*Ratings are for averages 80th Congress to RST's penultimate Congress

The data in Table 38 also indicate that out-party RSTs are more likely to be polar or "ideological" (i.e. Democrats to be Very Liberal, and Republicans to be Very Conservative). This is not the expected relationship as one might assume that out-party RSTs presumably fighting an uphill battle against the incumbent or his successor might be more moderate. (However, it should be noted that our research reported in the previous chapter, as well as Fishel's, indicated that those from competitive districts were more polar, and out-party RSTs are more likely to come from competitive districts than in-party RSTs.)

The data on party cohesion and Senate situation (see Table 39) can be summarized succinctly: there is no consistent relationship between these two variables, when the data is disaggregated to distinguish Democrats from Republicans. For instance, where each out-party group of Democratic RSTs had more men agreeing with their medians than did each in-party group of Democratic RSTs, there was no pattern for Republicans. Where each in-party group of Republican RSTs were much lower in cohesion than out-party Republican RSTs, the data for Democrats indicate that those not running against an incumbent are in lower cohesion categories than the other Democrats.

TABLE 39

Senate Situation and Party Cohesion*

PARTY COHESION	I		II		III		IV	
Democrats								
A + B (High)	5	50%	1	20%	12	67%	2	50%
C	3	30	1	20	2	11	-	-
D + E (Low)	2	20	3	60	4	22	2	50
Total	10	100%	5	100%	18	100%	4	100%
RST COMPARED TO HIS STATE PARTY MEDIAN:								
Higher	4	40%	2	40%	3	17%	-	-
Same	4	40	-	-	8	44	2	50%
Lower	2	20	3	60	7	39	2	50
Total	10	100%	5	100%	18	100%	4	100%
Republicans								
A + B (High)	1	14%	2	33%	6	40%	3	60%
C	1	14	-	-	5	33	1	20
D + E (Low)	5	71	4	67	4	27	1	20
Total	7	99%	6	100%	15	100%	5	100%
RST COMPARED TO HIS STATE PARTY MEDIAN:								
Higher	1	14%	1	17%	5	33%	4	80%
Same	3	43	3	50	7	47	1	20
Lower	3	43	2	33	3	20	-	-
Total	7	100%	6	100%	15	100%	5	100%

*Average cohesion for all Congresses, 80th through RST's penultimate.

Senate Situation and Other Destination Characteristics

From what opportunity structures do Representatives who challenge incumbents of their own party arise? Our earlier speculation assumed greater personal ambition for these RSTs, and therefore little relationship to the opportunity structure in his state. They would be as likely to come from states where Congress was the major (or one of two predominant) penultimate office Senatorial nominees, as not.

If we examine those states which have a pattern (i.e. one office--including "no office"--contributes at least 30% of the party's nominees for Senator), we should

expect RSTs from states with Congress as a pattern to be as frequent as RSTs from states where Congress does not account for at least 30% of these nominees for the Senate. Table 40 shows that Group I RSTs come closest to this hypothesized 50-50 split. RSTs from states with Congress as a pattern do outnumber those from states without Congress as a pattern.

TABLE 40

Senate Situation and Penultimate Office Pattern for Senate Nominees (State Party Opportunity Structure)*

PENULTIMATE OFFICE PATTERN	I		II		III		IV	
Congress: 30% or more of Senate nominees	10	59%	8	62%	11	30%	5	83%
Congress: Less than 30% of Senate nominees	7	41	5	38	26	70	1	17
Totals**	17	100%	13	100%	37	100%	6	100%

*Data on penultimate office patterns from Schlesinger, Ambition & Politics, pp. 151-2, and 109-11 for one-party Southern states.

**State parties with no pattern, or those whose patterns are not listed in Schlesinger, are omitted.

It is interesting to note that the other in-party group has a very similar pattern. The out-party groups, however, are very clearly different from each other. Thirty percent (30%) of Group III RSTs come from states where Congress is a pattern as the penultimate office for Senate nominees, while 83% of Group IV are from those states. RSTs from the latter, then, are most strongly tied to the opportunity structure of their state; only one Group IV RST comes from a state where an office other than Congress was the

dominant pattern.

If we combine this Group (Group IV) with the Group with the second highest proportion from Congress-patterned states (Group II) we can observe a pattern related to the key variable of whether the incumbent (regardless of party status) is a candidate for re-election. When the incumbent is running (as we have operationally defined it), 39% of the RSTs come from states where Congress is a pattern, but when the incumbent is not a candidate 68% of the RSTs come from Congress-patterned states.

Representatives who challenge incumbent Senators of their own party are most likely to be competing in a safe Senate situation; 72% of Group I RSTs are running for safe seats. Other in-party RSTs are almost as likely to be competing for a safe seat (60%). This is in sharp contrast to the two out-party groups (Groups III and IV). Only four out-party RSTs compete for a Senate seat that can be considered safe for the out-party--and in all of these instances the incumbent is running for re-election (and in three of the four the RST is successful). One third of out-party RSTs (i.e. 17 of 52) are competing for Senate seats in situations where their party has not been very successful in statewide races for Senator, Governor, or President--i.e. where their party has won fewer than 30% of these elections in the previous six years. No in-party RST is involved in such "hopeless" races. See Table 41.

If a House district has the same level of competition as the state--e.g. if they are both safe, or if they

are both competitive--then it is reasonable to assume that the House constituency shares more characteristics with the statewide Senatorial constituency than does a district whose competition is different from the state's. Similar levels of competition also suggest that similar electoral and behavioral strategies would be successful, so that RSTs from such "agreeing" districts should suffer fewer "organizational tensions". It was hypothesized, therefore, that since Representatives from such districts have an advantage, a large proportion of RSTs would come from such situations.

TABLE 41

Senate Situation and Senate and House Competitiveness

COMPETITIVENESS HOUSE-SENATE		I N=18		II N=15		III N=42		IV N=10	
C	C (Agree)	-		2		6		2	
C	S	1		1		2		-	
C	H	-		-		7		2	
S	C	5		4		21		2	
S	S (Agree)	12		8		2		-	
S	H	-		-		4		4	
House:	Compet.	1	6%	3	20%	15	36%	4	40%
	Safe	17	94	12	80	27	64	6	60
Total			100%		100%		100%		100%
Senate:	Compet.	5	28%	6	40%	27	64%	4	40%
	Safe	13	72	9	60	4	10	-	-
	Hopeless	-	-	-	-	11	26	6	60
Total			100%		100%		100%		100%
	Agree	12	67%	10	67%	8	19%	2	20%
	Disagree	6	33	5	33	34	81	8	80
Total			100%		100%		100%		100%
Maximum Potential Agreements		14		12		19		4	
Agree as Proportion of Potential			86%		83%		42%		50%

C=Competitive
S=Safe
H=Hopeless

When we examine Table 41, we note that 38% of the RSTs come from such situations. But in-party RSTs are more likely than out-party RSTs to do so--two-thirds of Group I come from safe House seats and are competing for safe Senate seats; and two-thirds of Group II come from "safe-safe" or "competitive-competitive" situations. This compares to only about one-fifth for each of the two out-party groups.

Some of this difference is due to the fact that RSTs may come from competitive or safe House seats, while the Senate seat they seek may be classified as competitive, safe, or "hopeless"--and, as we observed, only out-party RSTs were involved in "hopeless" races. The better base for comparison, therefore, ought to be the theoretically maximum number of agreements. For example, Group I RSTs come from 17 safe House seats, and 1 competitive seat; they are competing for 13 safe Senate seats and 5 competitive seats. The maximum number of times a House seat and a Senate seat can agree on competitiveness, therefore, is 14. Using this as the denominator, or base for comparison, we find that Group I RSTs come from "agreeing" districts in 12 of the 14 possible cases or 86%; this figure is 83% for Group II. This is in sharp contrast to the 42% of Group III, and the 50% of Group IV.

Table 41 also indicates that Representatives who challenge the incumbent Senator of their own party are most likely of all RSTs to come from safe seats. In fact, only one Representative from a competitive district--Rep. Glenn Davis, Republican of Wisconsin--challenged the Senator of

his own party. The other in-party group of RSTs also was very likely to come from safe seats (80% compared to 64% and 60% for out-party Groups III and IV respectively).

We speculated that RSTs whose district competitiveness agrees with that of the Senate seat they seek may have an advantage. This expectation may then be linked to the amount of competition they would face in gaining the nomination. From Table 41, we saw that the in-party has a much higher proportion of such agreements than the out-party. But a hypothesis that contests for Senate nominations involving in-party RSTs involve less competition than those with out-party RSTs, would not be supported by the data. See Table 42.

TABLE 42

Senate Situation & Nomination Contest Competition

NOMINATION COMPET.	I		II		III		IV	
Low Competition (Winner: 90-100%)	-	-	3	20%	17	40%	4	40%
Moderate Compet.	2	11%	6	40	17	40	4	40
High Competition (Winner: 60%)	16	89	6	40	8	19	2	20
Totals	18	100%	15	100%	42	99%	10	100%

It is not surprising that contests involving a primary battle against the incumbent are highly competitive. But the other group of in-party RSTs (Group II) still show twice as much high competition contests as those occuring in out-party contests. When the competitiveness of the Senate seat is held constant, in-party competition for the nomination

is still more likely to occur than contests in the out-party (e.g. 73% of in-party safe seats have high nomination competition, compared to 25% of out-party safe seats; 55% of in-party competitive seats have high competition, compared to 19% of out-party competitive seats). "Hopeless" seats--all occuring in the out-party, are most likely to have moderate competition, but with more low competition races than high competition ones (only 3 of 17--18% --are high competition).

It is interesting to note that the findings on nomination competitiveness and eventual election outcome observed by Goldman for the presidency does not hold for these Senate races.[103] He observed that when the party in power has high conflict nomination it is less likely to win than when it has low conflict; from 1832 to 1956 it won 16 of the 23 (70%) of the elections following low conflict in its nomination contest, but only 3 of 9 (33%) when there was high conflict. For the out-party, the reverse is true; low conflict suggests forthcoming defeat while high conflict was correlated with a higher rate of victory; the out-party won 2 of 15 (13%) elections after low conflict nomination contests, but 11 of 16 (69%) after high conflict.

These Senatorial contests show a different pattern. The in-party won 2 of the 3 elections following low competition nomination contests involving RSTs; it won 13 of the

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[103]Ralph M. Goldman, "The National Party Conventions," Present Trends in American National Government, ed. Alfred A. Junz (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), pp. 31-47.

20 (65%) elections following high competition nomination contests. The out-party won 8 of 21 (38%) low nomination competition elections, and 2 of 10 (20%) high nomination competition elections.

The comparison made here, of course, is not between Presidential nominations and elections and all Senatorial contests, but includes only that portion of the latter involving RSTs. Nevertheless, it implies that the convention system which encourages consensus striving among professional politicians, functions quite differently than the primary system which places the decisions not only in the hands of the party electorate, but also gives a greater role to candidates self-recruited and otherwise independent of party organization influence.

Conclusion

Senate situations were classified on the basis of two variables--whether or not the incumbent Senator was of the same party as the RST, and whether or not the incumbent was a candidate for re-election. It was assumed that RSTs in the Party Challenge (I) situations--i.e. ready to battle the incumbent in the party primary--were the most ambitious of the four groups; they were ready to make an opportunity where many would consider none existed.

Two alternate lines of speculation flow from this assumption. One is that the ambition of these RSTs--their willingness to risk their seat to challenge the incumbent--stems from already possessing many other assets for the race.

Schlesinger, for instance, assumed that one asset--opportunity structure--can give rise to ambition. One may assume that the availability of other assets may spur Senatorial ambitions to the point of challenging the incumbent. One may hypothesize, therefore, that these men were more likely to already have faced a statewide electorate successfully, to come from a city whose size could be considered typical for that party (i.e. large city for Democrats and smaller cities for Republicans), to have more experience in the House and in public office, to be on the best committees in the House, to be generalists, to be liberal, to be from districts that did not show organizational tension with the state constituency by sharing similar levels of competitiveness, and to come from state parties where Congress was the predominant pattern for Senate candidacy.

But another line of speculation is also possible. These men are so ambitious--so driven by inner motivations, which were not examinable through the non-interview techniques used here--that they ignore their lack of assets in their drive to attain their goal. We already observed that these men did not seem stymied by their apparant lack of opportunity.

The data were far from consistent, but may be seen as more supportive of the former line of reasoning than the latter--i.e. RSTs who are prepared to challenge the incumbent of their own party may feel ready because they already have many assets. If we examine the data from this point of view, we can see that Democratic RSTs in the Party Challenge (I)

situation were most likely of the Democratic RSTs to reside in the state's largest city, while Republicans in this situation were least likely of the Republican RSTs to come from such cities. Party Challenge RSTs were least likely to be newcomers to Congress (i.e. in their first or second term). They were most likely to be serving on the highest ranking committees--even when seniority was controlled. They were most likely to be free from organizational tensions caused by differing levels of competition in their House and prospective Senate constituencies. They were most likely to be at the same level of liberal-conservatism as their state party median legislator. In addition, their mean number of years of public office experience was the highest of the four groups (although their median number of years of experience was not as high as the other group of in-party RSTs). Similarly we may note that their ratio of generalists to specialists was the second highest of the four groups.

But Party Challenge RSTs were least likely of any of the groups of RSTs to come from At-Large districts, or to have had any other statewide elective office. In addition, they were less likely than two of the three other groups of RSTs to come from state parties in which Congress was a major penultimate office for Senatorial candidates--in fact they came closest to an even split (59% from such state parties and 41% not) suggesting they ignored this aspect of opportunity.

Several other of their characteristics should be noted. If an early start in politics is evidence of ambition,

then Party Challenge RSTs exhibited this trait as they had the lowest median age (as well as proportion under 30 years of age) at the time of gaining their first public office. Our speculation concerning the occupation of ambitious Representatives was that they would be more likely than other Representatives to be lawyers; our data for all RSTs compared to other Representatives did not bear this out. Our hypothesis here (consistent with our original speculation)--that the Party Challenge group of RSTs would have a higher proportion of lawyers than other groups of RSTs--again was contradicted by the data, as Group I RSTs had the lowest proportion of lawyers of any of the four groups of RSTs.

When we examine broader groupings of RSTs--either in-party compared to out-party, or those prepared to challenge incumbents compared to those competing only after the withdrawal of the incumbent--we can see some differences. Most of the differences between in-party and out-party RSTs are readily explainable, but a few do not lend themselves to apparent explanations. It is not surprising to find in-party RSTs starting their public office careers earlier, or having longer careers--being from the majority party these opportunities were greater. Therefore their safer House seats and greater seniority is to be expected.

These in-party RSTs also have better committee assignments, regardless of their seniority or party affiliation. The greatest difference occurs among those of low seniority (i.e. in their first or second term); in-party RSTs are much more likely to be serving on the highest

rated committees (5 of 8 or 63%) than are out-party RSTs of low seniority (only 4 of 24 or 17%). This suggests that out-party low-seniority Representatives serving on poor committees may feel that they have little to lose by running against the incumbent Senator or his successor, while out-party Representatives on more highly prized committees may be more likely to demur from an uphill race and so do not appear frequently among RSTs. Additional evidence may be seen in the fact that out-party RSTs in Hopeless situations are more likely to be on a low-rated committee than are out-party RSTs in Safe or Competitive situations.

But there seems to be no apparent explanation for the finding that in-party RSTs are less likely than out-party RSTs to come from At-Large House Seats. Their low proportion of organizational tension situations may be seen as unusual, too, as one might expect the in-party to be more tolerant of divergence and so more likely to entertain favorably candidacies stemming from situations in which House district competitiveness differed from Senate competitiveness.

Those who are prepared to challenge incumbents, whether they are in their own party or not appear to share certain characteristics. They are more likely to be businessmen and less likely to be lawyers than are RSTs who ran when the incumbent was not a candidate. This may reflect the professionalism of lawyers (in contrast to the competitive orientation of businessmen). Professionals--including professional politicians--may share an unwritten expectation of job protection, and so lawyer-politicians avoid conflict

with incumbents if possible. The relative reluctance of lawyers to challenge incumbents may be due to a greater concern for their political career--e.g. they are also a little less likely to run in Hopeless or Competitive Senate situations and slightly more likely to run in Safe situations, as well as much less likely to run in highly competitive nomination struggles.

RSTs who challenge incumbents are more likely than other RSTs to have certain traits or behaviors that are deemed assets, but lack other apparent assets. They are more likely than other RSTs to be generalists and they are more likely to come from cities typical of their party (i.e. their states' largest cities for Democrats, and other than the largest cities for Republicans). But they are less likely to come from state parties where Congress is the predominant penultimate office for Senate nominees, and they are less likely to have had statewide public office experience (including Representative At-Large). There are other assets for which there is no clear pattern which distinguishes the two groups of RSTs running against incumbents from the other RSTs.

In summary, we have examined the role of the Senate situation--as defined by the RST's party relationship to the incumbent and the latter's plans concerning re-election --upon a Representative's decision to run for the Senate. We saw RST participation vary directly with the degree of opportunity in the situation--they avoided situations with little opportunity and ran where the situation was more

favorable. We also examined the implied impact of the situation upon the RSTs by comparing RSTs running in one situation with RSTs running in the other situations. Here the picture was not always consistent, but several apparent patterns were discussed.

CHAPTER IV

NOMINATION STRUGGLE ANALYSIS

Purpose and Hypotheses

The focus of the analysis so far has been upon the factors that might lead to Senatorial ambition among Representatives. We examined agent or personal characteristics, as well as aspects of the situation at the origin (House) and destination (Senate). The focus of this chapter now shifts to examine the struggle to fulfill this progressive ambition. Its emphasis is upon the nomination contest.

Much of the work on recruitment and ambition is not concerned with the nomination contest. These studies are concerned with those who have cleared the hurdle of gaining the nomination and do not examine how much difficulty was faced in clearing the hurdle. Schlesinger, for instance, is interested in the opportunity structure and assumes that these patterns in the states arouse (or diminish) ambitions. He is concerned with who advances, not how he advances. But his opportunity structure is based on those who have been successful in gaining the nomination.

Although it is useful to know that about one-fifth of the Senatorial candidates between 1914 and 1958 had service in the House of Representatives as their last public office experience, it is also useful to know that some of

these men won nomination easily while others barely gained it because of strong competition within the party's nomination machinery. This study has recognized the principle that a process cannot be adequately understood if only the successes are examined. It recognized the importance of studying abortive efforts to gain the Senatorial nomination along with successful ones by including in the study Representatives whose attempts to gain the Senatorial nomination were unsuccessful. (In fact, in the 1950 to 1968 period, Representatives who were unsuccessful--Ts--were 28% of the RSTs.)

An implication of Schlesinger's ambition theory is that Representatives from states where there is a pattern of Congress being the predominant penultimate office for Senate nominees would face less opposition for the Senatorial nomination than Representatives in other states; conversely, Representatives seeking the nomination in states where some other office is the predominant one would face greater opposition. Similarly, our assumptions that certain characteristics and behavior patterns were likely to contribute to progressive ambition for the Senate, would lead us to expect that RSTs who possessed these would have less trouble gaining the Senate nomination.

The purpose of analyzing the degree of nomination competition, therefore, is to test these hypotheses that factors assumed to be advantageous to progressive ambition actually contributed to reducing the struggle for the Senate nomination. But the analysis of nomination

competition is also important in this study because it is an essential element in the determination of the most appropriate strategy for RSTs and therefore in the analysis of the affect of ambition upon legislative behavior.

The determination of the degree of competition for the nomination is based upon the outcome of the contest rather than a description of the maneuvering involved. There are several reasons for this. First of all, much of this activity is not public, occuring in private away from the prying eyes of the press; thus much of the activity that would be needed to evaluate the competition of the nomination struggle is unavailable. Even some of the activity that is carried out in public goes unreported in the press; this is especially true if the research must rely upon other than the newspapers in each state. There were occassions when the New York Times did not report any news of a Senatorial nomination struggle other than the results of the primary (this was true for even the relatively rare event of a Representative challenging the incumbent Senator of his own party).[104] Even if the histories of individual races were complete, their use would involve subjective evaluations of what constituted candidacy, or serious competition. For example the names of potential candidates may be mentioned in the press--but does that constitute candidacy or must the person make some overt public efforts? How can one differentiate behind-the-scenes activity which constitutes a

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[104]The New York Times Index did not carry any references to the 1952 Aandahl-Langer race in North Dakota.

serious threat from that which is mere jockeying for position without any significance in the nomination struggle? In contrast, the use of the distribution of the vote in a primary or convention is an objective criterion, not easily susceptible to subjective evaluation; a 2-1 majority is a 2-1 majority.

Although the determination of the degree of competition for the nomination is based upon the outcome of the nomination struggle rather than accounts of the preliminary fighting, knowledge of the latter is important for understanding the process. For example, Richard Nixon's nomination is considered to be virtually uncontested as he received 95% of the votes cast for Republicans in the 1950 Republican primary in California.[105] This classification ignores the role of the endorsement by the extra-party organization, the California Republican Assembly (CRA); it does not take cognizance of such prior events as the 13-12 vote by its endorsement committee to overrule the 6-3 recommendation of its subcommittee on the Senatorial nomination to endorse someone else. Although the ultimate classification of the Nixon nomination struggle ignores these facts, they should not be lost entirely from our attention. Similarly, although Rep. Sam Stratton polled less than one-seventh of the votes in the 1964 New York State Democratic Party convention, and thus was classified as running in a "hopeless" situation, we must remember he was the leading contender

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[105] A discussion of the problems involved in classifying contests in California's cross-filing era is on p. 162.

for the nomination until he was wiped out by the last-minute blitz of Attorney General Robert Kennedy.

Thus a compilation of accounts of the struggles faced by RSTs seeking the Senate nomination is valuable even though the classification of the nomination struggles is based solely upon the outcome of the contest. Although data on primaries are readily available, there is no collection of accounts of nomination contests for any group of Senatorial candidates. In view of this gap, the accounts of the nomination struggles involving RSTs are included in the Appendix of this study.

The nomination contests were classified into five categories. Some RSTs ran unopposed, while some of the others faced such token opposition that the RST received over 90% of the vote. These RSTs are grouped together into a "very safe" category--"AA", to use a shorthand expression.

When an election contest is to be decided by a plurality vote rather than a majority vote, the best test of the amount of competition in that election is the ratio of the winner's vote to that of his nearest competitor. Only the Southern states utilize majority elections in primaries (requiring a run-off election if no one gains a majority). In none of these Southern primaries involving an RST, did the winner have a 2-1 lead over his nearest competitor but fail to gain an absolute majority and have to be in a run-off primary. Therefore those RSTs who won by a 2-1 (or better) margin over their nearest competitor were grouped together into an "A" or "safe" category.

Another group of RSTs won nomination, but their margin over their nearest competitor was less than 2-1 (these races were labeled "B"--signifying competitive victories). The next group of RSTs lost such competitive races --i.e. they received 50% or more of the votes received by the winner (these contests are classfied "C"--competitive defeats). The last group of RSTs are those who competed for the nomination, but failed to receive at least half of the number of votes received by the winner (these are designated "D"--denoting a "hopeless" contest).

A note must be made here concerning California's cross-filing primaries of the 1950's. These permitted the entry of a candidate in the primaries of both parties, although a candidate had to gain the nomination of his own party in order to claim the nomination of any other party. In examining the question of whether an RST's entry into a nomination contest scared off other contestants--or examining whether certain RST characteristics or behavior or Senate situation characteristics precluded others from challenging an RST--it was necessary to exclude cross-filed competitors running in the opposition party's primary. Therefore, with one exception, classification of nomination contest competitiveness is based only on candidates registered in that party. This means that Rep. Clair Engle is viewed as running unopposed (AA) even though he faced two Republican challengers (beating the nearest one by over 4 to 1). The single exception is the 1952 Democratic primary where Rep. Clinton McKinnon was beaten by Republican incumbent Senator

William Knowland; the latter beat McKinnon by a 3-2 margin and the election was designated "C"--competitive defeat.

One method of analysis would bifurcate the RSTs into one group that were in safe nomination contests, i.e. had little or no opposition ("AA" and "A" categories), and another group that were in competitive races ("B" and "C"). This operation would isolate those RSTs who ran in hopeless races. These men may be expected to be different than their other RST colleagues. For example they may be poor politicians who badly misperceived their chances of victory--blinded either by their ideology, ambition, or ineptitude. Or they may be sacrificial lambs of a factional fight. An examination of the nine men and contests indicates several factors. Two men started the race without any prominent opposition, only to find themselves challenged in the late stages of the contest by notables. Rep. Frank Kowalski (Democrat of Connecticut) ran into the desire of Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare (and ex-Governor--and ex-Representative--who ran unsuccessfully for the Senate in 1952) Abe Ribicoff to escape the HEW morass after his Supreme Court ambition was squelched. Rep. Sam Stratton (Democrat of New York) ran into the desire of Attorney General Robert Kennedy to find a political base for his Presidential ambitions after his Vice Presidential chances were squelched. These two RSTs actually risked little as they had the opportunity to run for re-election to their House seats; Stratton did so and was re-elected to the House, while Kowalski was given the opportunity to do so, but refused.

Three other RSTs in this category risked little in their bids for the Senate. Rep. Ben Reifel (Republican of South Dakota) ran in a special convention to select a Senatorial candidate when the incumbent died after he had won the primary; Reifel did not even attend the convention. Rep. Andrew Jacobs (Democrat of Indiana) had been renominated for the House several weeks earlier and was a contender in the state nominating convention even though he did little in advance to gain support there. Rep. Otis Pike (Democrat of New York) ran a poor third in the endorsing convention, and subsequently decided to seek re-election to the House rather than run in the Senate primary.

Rep. John Kunkel (Republican of Pennsylvania) was the candidate of the conservative faction. Rep. James Sutton (Democrat of Tennessee) ran as a conservative trying to defeat Sen. Estes Kefauver and his liberal record. Rep. Chester Merrow was the most liberal of the four candidates for the Republican nomination in New Hampshire in 1962. Rep. Lindley Beckworth was a liberal Texas Democrat who entered the primary after the incumbent dropped out because he feared a fierce fight with the more conservative State Attorney General Price Daniel.

If this group of RSTs who polled less than one-half of the winning nominee is excluded from consideration, one can hypothesize that those RSTs who faced little or no competition for the nomination shared certain characteristics and behavior patterns that distinguished them from their colleagues who faced stiffer competition for the Senate

nomination.

What kind of characteristics or behavior would be associated with low nomination competition for the RST? Generally, we would expect those characteristics theoretically linked to progressive ambition to be linked to low nomination competition. One reason we expected these linkages is that these variables were viewed as resources or aids to gain the resources necessary for success, which facilitated progressive ambitions. The analysis here directly tests the linkage between these characteristics and nomination success (or competition). Our original theoretical framework (ignoring the findings in the previous chapters for the present) would suggest, for example, that those with more experience would have less trouble gaining the Senatorial nomination than those with less experience. Similarly, those RSTs whose current position or previous experience involved serving in a public office that had a statewide electoral constituency would face less competition than other RSTs. The reasons suggested for the over-representation of lawyers in legislatures, along with the findings of greater proportions of lawyers in upper houses, lead us to hypothesize that RST lawyers would have less trouble gaining the nomination than RSTs with other occupations. Viewing home-state education as a resource (it produces familiarity with the state's political history and culture as well as its potential leaders), we would expect RSTs who gained their college education in the state during this important period of political socialization to encounter less opposition for

the nomination than those educated elsewhere.

We would expect RSTs who show the same degree of party cohesion as the median Representative of the same state and party to have lower competition than the RST who deviates from this norm. The generalist--i.e. a Representative with a low score on the Index of Specialization--should be in a better position to win support from the more diverse Senate constituency, than the Representative who specializes highly. Representatives from typical party areas--i.e. Democrats from large cities, and Republicans from small cities or rural areas--should fare better than their colleagues from "atypical" party areas (i.e. large city Republicans, and rural and small city Democrats). All other things being held constant we would expect Representatives from safe House districts to fare better than those from competitive districts; if safe Congressional Districts are assumed to be in safe areas, then a higher primary turnout there should aid that candidate.[106] Similarly RSTs from larger districts should fare better than those from smaller districts.

RSTs who come from states where the predominant (or at least a major) source of Senatorial nominees come from Congress, should face less competition than RSTs who come from states with other patterns. Where the RST does face competition for the nomination, we would expect those opponents whose last office had a statewide elective

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[106]See V.O. Key, American State Politics, Ch. 5.

constituency or those whose last public office involved legislative experience (either in the state legislature, House of Representatives, or the Senate) should provide the most competition, while those with no previous public office should be the easiest to beat. RSTs challenging an incumbent should face the most competition, but we can also expect a high degree of competition for the in-party's nomination for Senator. And, of course the previous literature concerning primaries tells us that RSTs running for a safe seat will face the most competition, while close contests in competitive seats should be less frequent, and still less frequent where the seat is classified as "hopeless". If we assume that competitiveness can be used as a surrogate measure for district characteristics, then House districts whose degree of competitiveness agrees with that of the Senate seat may be assumed to be similar to the Senate constituency. A logical hypothesis, is that RSTs from "typical" districts would face less competition for the Senate nomination than those from "atypical" districts. Therefore, we would hypothesize that RSTs from situations where both House and Senate competitiveness agree would be less likely to encounter a strong struggle for the nomination than those whose House and Senate constituencies exhibit different degrees of competitiveness.

These hypotheses suggest that these characteristics somehow cause the nomination struggle pattern. But there may be a degree of anticipatory reaction--the self-fulfilling prophecy. RSTs expecting a tough fight may avoid

such races and they may seek out those situations where they would have less problems. A competitive nomination struggle (or the prospects of one) may serve to recruit certain kinds of RSTs and repel others. The most direct linkage, of course, is that the characteristics examined enable the RST to overcome his opposition more easily.

An alternate theory would lead us to expect no systematic differences between those RSTs who had little or no competition and those who faced stiffer struggles. Whether or not an RST faces opposition, or how severe this competition is, depends on factors other than those associated with the RST. If RST entry into the Senate arena is a function of his personal characteristics (among other factors such as those related to his House--or origin-office--and those related to the Senate--or destination-office), this would also apply to the RST's opponent.

Any theory concerning the outcomes of nomination contests would have to focus on more than just the public office experience, personal characteristics, and legislative behavior of one candidate (or even all candidates). And this shortcoming could not be overcome by merely including such factors as the Senate situation, the competitiveness of the Senate seat, and state career pattern for the Senate nomination.

These factors alone do not determine how well the nominees will fare. Such factors as the nature of the campaign waged by the candidates and their organizations are important too. References would have to be made to

the nature of the electorate and to other contests or factors that might effect turnout and voting behavior in the primary.

Findings

In contrast to the hypothesis that those with more experience would face less nomination competition, there is a slight tendency for the reverse to be true. The mean number of years of experience of RSTs facing little or no opposition was 12 years, compared to 14 years for RSTs involved in competitive nomination struggles. The group with the highest mean (and median) number of years of experience was group "B" (16 years)--those RSTs who won by less than 2 to 1 margins. Those who faced no competition (or virtually none) had the least years of experience (a mean of 11 years and a median of 9).

Those RSTs who serve (or served) in congruent constituencies--i.e. those who held offices involving a statewide electorate, whether it be a state governmental office or an At-Large seat in the House of Representatives, were less likely to face strong competition for the nomination than would be expected. Fifty-six percent (56%) or 9 of 16 of the RSTs who had been elected by a statewide constituency (and who were in the four groups under consideration here--i.e. excluding those who ran in so-called "hopeless" nomination contests) faced little or no competition for the nomination. Such low competition nomination struggles were 58% of all such contests.

Statewide experience was less likely to reduce nomination competition than local government or law enforcement experience which produced highly competitive contests in about 30% of the races. See Table 43, which also indicates that RSTs with state legislative experience were more likely than expected to be involved in a high competition contest.

TABLE 43

Previous Public Office Experience and Nomination Struggle (NS)*

PUBLIC OFFICE EXPERIENCE	LOW NOMINATION STRUGGLE		HIGH NOMINATION STRUGGLE		TOTALS	
Statewide Elective (incl. At-Large House of Rep.)	9	56%	7	44%	16	100%
Statewide Elective	1	33%	2	67%	3	100%
State Legislature	16	48%	17	52%	33	100%
Administrative	6	46%	7	54%	13	100%
Law Enforcement	16	70%	7	30%	23	100%
Local Government	5	71%	2	29%	7	100%
N	44**	(58%)	32	(42%)	76	(100%)

*NS will be used to signify Nomination Struggle in all tables to follow.

**N is total number of RSTs in the analysis and not the total number of offices. The latter exceeds the number of RSTs, as many had more than one kind of public office experience.

Lawyers, as expected, did have an easier time gaining the nomination than most other occupations (RST farmers had the easiest with only 20% facing strong opposition). Sixty-five percent (65%) of the RST lawyers were in Low Competition contests. See Table 44.

TABLE 44

Occupation and NS

OCCUPATION	LOW NOMINATION STRUGGLE		HIGH NOMINATION STRUGGLE		TOTALS	
Law	28	65%	15	35%	43	100%
Business	11	52%	10	48%	21	100%
Teaching	6	55%	5	45%	11	100%
Agriculture	8	80%	2	20%	10	100%
Other	1	14%	6	86%	7	100%
N	44	58%	32	42%	76	100%

Although there is a slight tendency for RSTs who attended college in the same state they represented to have had less competitive races than those who attended college elsewhere (62% of the former were in Low Competition nomination struggles compared to 56% of the latter), the differences are far from significant, and those attending in a different region have as little competition as the stay at-homes. RSTs with no college education (or law school) were most likely to face a highly competitive nomination struggle. See Table 45.

TABLE 45

Place of College Education and NS

PLACE OF COLLEGE EDUCATION	LOW NOMINATION STRUGGLE		HIGH NOMINATION STRUGGLE		TOTALS	
Same state	28	(62%)	17	(38%)	45	(100%)
Elsewhere	15	(56%)	12	(44%)	27	(100%)
Adjoining state	6	(55%)	5	(45%	11	(100%)
Same region	1	(33%)	2	(67%)	3	(100%)
Different region	8	(62%)	5	(38%)	13	(100%)
None	1	(25%)	3	(75%)	4	(100%)
N=	44	(58%)	32	(42%)	76	(100%)

We hypothesized that RSTs whose party cohesion agreed with the state median would face less competition than those who deviated from this norm. Our data, although inconclusive, do not confirm this hypothesis. If we focus upon the mean comparative score (i.e. an average of the ratings of the RST being higher, the same, or lower than the state median) for all terms from the 80th Congress through the penultimate House term, then those who scored lower than their state average faced less competition. Two-thirds (67%) of those who averaged lower than their state median were involved in Low Competition nomination contests, compared to 54% of those averaging the same, and 53% of those scoring higher. (See Table 46.) Analysis (not shown here) holding Party label constant, indicates that Democratic RSTs are more likely than Republicans to conform to the hypothesis.

TABLE 46

Party Cohesion and NS

PARTY COHESION RST COMPARED TO HIS STATE PARTY MEDIAN IS:	LOW NOMINATION STRUGGLE		HIGH NOMINATION STRUGGLE		TOTALS	
Higher	9	53%	8	47%	17	100%
Same	15	54%	13	46%	28	100%
Lower	12	67%	6	33%	18	100%
High (A + B)	19	63%	11	37%	30	100%
Medium (C)	6	50%	6	50%	12	100%
Low (D + E)	11	52%	10	48%	21	100%
Extremes (A + E)	10	59%	7	41%	17	100%
Not Extreme (B - D)	26	57%	20	43%	46	100%
N=	36	57%	27	43%	63	100%

The use of the ultimate term in the House indicates

that those RSTs who score the same as their state medians are more likely than the others to be involved in a high competition race (45% of those scoring the Same are in high competition contests compared to 42% and 38% of those scoring Lower and Higher respectively).

There is a slight tendency for those averaging moderate in their party cohesion to be more likely to be involved in high competition nomination contests than those scoring High or Low in cohesion. There is also a tendency for those at the extremes (A and E) to be less threatened by a high competition contest.

But it should be noted that all of these tendencies are far from statistically significant. In other words, the null hypothesis that there are no differences cannot be rejected. And it must be noted again, that the effect of cohesion scores upon the extent of nomination competition is very different for Democrats than Republicans. Moderately cohesive Democrats are most likely to be involved in High Competition nomination struggles, while Moderately cohesive Republicans are least likely. Democrats at the extreme ends of the cohesion continuum (A and E scores) are most likely to have High Competition nomination contests, but such Republicans are least likely to have serious nomination competition.

We hypothesized that the generalist would face the least opposition for the nomination. Again there is a tendency for the data to agree with the hypothesis, but the results are not statistically significant. Of those scoring

low on the Index of Specialization, 64% were in Low Competition nomination contests; this compares to 52% of the medium specialists, and 50% of those who were high in specialization. See Table 47.

TABLE 47

Specialization (Penultimate Term) and NS

INDEX OF SPECIALIZATION	LOW NOMINATION STRUGGLE	HIGH NOMINATION STRUGGLE	TOTALS
High (.67+)	7 (50%)	7 (50%)	14 (100%)
Medium (.50-.66)	13 (52%)	12 (48%)	25 (100%)
Low (<.50)	16 (64%)	9 (36%)	25 (100%)
N	36 (56%)	28 (44%)	64 (100%)

Our hypothesis concerning the effect of the city of residence upon the nomination struggle assumed that large cities were Democratic strongholds and therefore Democrats coming from those cities would have an advantage in the nomination system. Similarly our assumption for the Republicans was that the rural areas and smaller cities were the safe Republican areas and therefore would contribute a disproportionately high number of votes in a primary and therefore aid Republican RSTs from those areas. But the data do not support these hypotheses. Of the Democratic RSTs we are examining here, 57% (21 of 37) were in Low Competition nomination contests. Exactly the same proportion (57%, 8 of 14) of the Democrats from cities over 100,000 were in Low Competition contests too. Democrats from cities of 40,000-100,000 did exceptionally well (all 3 were Low), while those from rural areas had much competition (2 of the

3 were High).

Similarly, 59% of the Republicans were in Low Competition contests. Republicans from rural areas and those from cities over 100,000, had approximately this same proportion. Each group had 63% in Low Competition (5 of 8). Republicans from cities in the 40,000-100,000 range, like the Democrats, did not face any serious competition for the nomination.

If we refer to the size of the city of residence in relation to the largest city in the state, the findings are basically the same. Republicans from the largest city and Republicans from cities which are less than 10% of the largest city have the same proportion of low competition elections (only the cities in the 50-99% group are disproportionately easy contests). And for the Democrats those from the largest cities, 64% have low competition nominations, but this is a smaller proportion than for Democrats coming from cities in the 10-49% and 50-99% categories. Democrats from cities whose population is less than 10% of the largest city, face the most opposition (only 36% of these had Low Competition nominations). See Table 48.

Although the size of the RST's city of residence does not appear to have much effect upon competition, the proportionate size of the Congressional District does. Those serving from At-Large districts have little competition in over two-thirds of the races (only 4 of 13, or 31% face high competition). RSTs from the smallest districts (1-19% of the state) face the most competition (almost half, 17 of 36 or

47% are in the High Competition category). See Table 49.

TABLE 48

Size of City of Residence and NS

CITY SIZE POPULATION	LOW NOMINATION STRUGGLE		HIGH NOMINATION STRUGGLE		TOTALS	
Democrats						
<2.5K	1	33%	2	67%	3	100%
2.5 - 40K	9	53%	8	47%	17	100%
40 - 100K	3	100%	0	0%	3	100%
100K+	8	57%	6	43%	14	100%
CITY SIZE AS PROPORTION OF STATE'S LARGEST CITY						
<10%	5	36%	9	64%	14	100%
10-49%	5	71%	2	29%	7	100%
50-99%	2	100%	0	0%	2	100%
100%	9	64%	5	36%	14	100%
N=	21	57%	16	43%	37	100%
Republicans						
<2.5K	5	63%	3	38%	8	101%
2.5 - 40K	10	50%	10	50%	20	100%
40 - 100K	3	100%	0	0%	3	100%
100K+	5	63%	3	38%	8	101%
<10%	14	58%	10	42%	24	100%
10-49%	2	40%	3	60%	5	100%
50-99%	3	100%	0	0%	3	100%
100%	4	57%	3	43%	7	100%
N=	23	59%	16	41%	39	100%

TABLE 49

Congressional District Size and NS

CD Size	LOW NOMINATION STRUGGLE		HIGH NOMINATION STRUGGLE		TOTALS	
1-19% of state	19	53%	17	47%	36	100%
20-79% of state	16	59%	11	41%	27	100%
100% of state (At-Large)	9	69%	4	31%	13	100%
N	44	58%	32	42%	76	100%

One of the assumed effects of the state career pattern for Senatorial nominees is that it attracts candidates who conform to that pattern, while warding off those with deviating backgrounds. One would expect, therefore, that RSTs coming from states where Congress is a major penultimate office source (30% or over) of Senatorial nominees, would face less opposition for the nomination than those running where Congress is not a major source. But our data contradict this hypothesis; over half (15 of 29, or 52%) of the RSTs from states where Congress is the penultimate office of at least 30% of Senatorial nominees face high competition. This compares to only 37% of those RSTs coming from states where Congress is not a major source of Senatorial nominees. See Table 50.

Several RSTs challenged incumbent Senators. These races were always highly competitive and were thought to be distorting the results. But if we exclude the races where incumbents were the winners or the runner-up, we still find a higher proportion of competitive nominations among those RSTs coming from states where Congress was a major penultimate office (35%) than where Congress was not a pattern (29%).

A more detailed categorization of state career patterns shows that RSTs from states where there is no penultimate office pattern for Senate nominees face little opposition when they are trying for the nomination. Only 2 of 8 (25%) faced serious competition. Apparently the entry of a Representative in these races tends to ward off others. In the two instances where there was serious competition, one

was a situation of an RST (Aandahl) challenging an incumbent Senator; the other (Duncan) involved a hotly contested primary revolving around the Vietnam issue, suggesting that issues induced Duncan's opponent to enter the race rather than ambition.[107]

TABLE 50

State Party Career Pattern* (Penultimate Office) and NS

PENULTIMATE OFFICE PATTERN	LOW NOMINATION STRUGGLE		HIGH NOMINATION STRUGGLE		TOTALS	
Congress: 30% or more of Senate nominees	14	48%	15	52%	29	100%
Congress: Not 30% or more of Senate nominees	27	63%	16	37%	43	100%
N	41	57%	31	43%	72	100%

*States where information was incomplete were omitted; but states where "no pattern" was the pattern are included in the category of: Congress is not 30% or more of Senate nominees.

Source of patterns: Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics, pp. 109-11 and 151-2.

This lack of opposition in "No Pattern" situations, differs sharply with the high degree of opposition found in situations where Congress and another office each contribute at least 30% of the Senate nominees. Only one of these RSTs (13%) had an easy ride--the other seven faced high competition.

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[107]This is confirmed by the account of the nomination struggle found elsewhere in this study which notes that Duncan's opponent was originally one of his backers and entered the race only when their views on the Vietnam war became irreconcilable.

But the opposition did not necessarily come from the other predominant office. In fact in only 1 of the 8 cases where RSTs faced any opposition (7 High and 1 Low) and came from a state where Congress and another office each contributed at least 30% of the Senate nominees did the opposition come from the other predominant office. Vermont's pattern included both Congress and statewide elective office as the major penultimate offices for Republican Senate nominees, and Rep. Winston Prouty's opposition was ex-Governor Lee Emerson. In three of the cases the RST battled the incumbent, but in the other four someone other than a person with the predominant penultimate office was the main challenger for the RST.

If the state's career pattern is assumed to effect the candidacy decision of RSTs and opponents alike--but we have already seen some evidence challenging this--then we can expect that the major source of competition would come from the state's patterned penultimate office. But this is not the case. Excluding races where the incumbent was one of the two leading contenders for office, where an ex-Senator was attempting a comeback, where there was no predominant penultimate office pattern, and where there was insufficient information about the pattern, we find that over three-fourths (27 of 34, or 77%) of the races involved the RST battling a person not coming from the predominant pattern.[108] In addition, it should be noted, where the

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[108]This, of course, includes all non-incumbent challengers to an RST who is running in a state where Congress is the only major source of Senate nominees.

RST faces an opponent from the major penultimate office contributor he is as likely to have strong competition as where the opponent does not fit the pattern (57% and 56% respectively were High Competition). See Table 51.

TABLE 51

State Party Career Pattern for Opposition* and NS

PENULTIMATE OFFICE PATTERN	LOW NOMINATION STRUGGLE		HIGH NOMINATION STRUGGLE		TOTALS	
Opponents Fit State Pattern	3	43%	4	57%	7	100%
Opponents Do Not Fit State Pattern	12	44%	15	56%	27	100%
N	15	44%	19	56%	34	100%

*Nomination contests involving incumbents or ex-Senators, and those coming from states without a predominant pattern or where the information is incomplete are omitted.

Source: Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics, pp. 109-11 and 151-2.

The penultimate office of the competitors offers only little guide to the degree of competition for the nomination that can be expected. Opponents whose last public office was a statewide elective one were less likely to be involved in a Low Competition race with the RSTs than a High Competition race with him (4 of 10 were Low Competition). State legislators opposing an RST were more likely to be involved in a close contest than not (3 of 4 or 75% were in High Competition races). Those with no public office experience were least likely (with the exception of the one ex-Senator) to do well--only 5 of 13 or 38% were in competitive

races, while the other 62% received less than half of the number of votes that the RST received. See Table 52.

TABLE 52

Source of Competition (Penultimate Office) and NS

OPPONENTS' PENULTIMATE OFFICE	LOW NOMINATION STRUGGLE		HIGH NOMINATION STRUGGLE		TOTALS	
Statewide Elective	4	40%	6	60%	10	100%
State Legislature	1	25%	3	75%	4	100%
No Office	8	62%	5	38%	13	100%
Administrative	2	33%	4	67%	6	100%
Law Enforcement	1	50%	1	50%	2	100%
Local	1	50%	1	50%	2	100%
House of Reps.	1	50%	1	50%	2	100%
ex-Senator	1	100%	-	0%	1	100%
Incumbent	-	0%	11	100%	11	100%
N=	19	37%	32	63%	51	100%

One of the strongest relationships found in this data is between the Senate situation and the degree of nomination competition. By far the most competitive races are those involving an incumbent. All of the 16 RSTs in the Party Challenge (Group I) situation--i.e. the RST is of the same party as the incumbent who is planning to run for re-election --faced strong opposition for the nomination.

Our hypothesis also said that the other in-party RSTs--those in Party Succession (Group II) situations trying to retain the Senate seat for their party--would face more competition than RSTs trying to regain the seat. This too was confirmed by the data; almost half (46%) of the RSTs in Party Succession situations were in the High Competition category, but this compared to only 24% of Opposition Party

situations (Group III) and only 10% of Open-ended (Group IV) situations. Combining these figures, we can restate the data as follows: 76% of in-party RSTs face high competition for the Senate nomination, compared to only 21% of out-party RSTs. See Table 53.

TABLE 53

Senate Situation and NS

SENATE SITUATION	LOW NOMINATION STRUGGLE		HIGH NOMINATION STRUGGLE		TOTALS	
Party Challenge (I)	-	0%	16	100%	16	100%
Party Succession (II)	7	54%	6	46%	13	100%
Opposition Party (III)	28	76%	9	24%	37	100%
Open-Ended (IV)	9	90%	1	10%	10	100%
In-Party (I&II)	7	24%	22	76%	29	100%
Out-Party (III&IV)	37	79%	10	21%	47	100%
N	44	58%	32	42%	76	100%

The other major aspect of the Senate situation--the competitiveness of the Senate seat, based upon the proportion of statewide elections for Senator, Governor, and President in the previous six years that were won by each party--is also highly related to the degree of struggle the RST faces in gaining the nomination. As expected, safe Senate seats are most likely to involve high nomination competition (73%, 16 of 22), with so-called "hopeless" seats attracting the least competition (only 3 of 15, or 20% were high competition).[109] Competitive Senate seats

[109]One of these three was Rep. Clinton McKinnon (Democrat of California) who did not face any other Democrat

were between these two proportions--one-third of these seats were High Competition nominations. See Table 54.

TABLE 54

Senate Competition and NS

SENATE SEAT COMPETITION	LOW NOMINATION STRUGGLE		HIGH NOMINATION STRUGGLE		TOTALS	
Safe	6	27%	16	73%	22	100%
Competitive	26	67%	13	33%	39	100%
Hopeless	12	80%	3	20%	15	100%
N	44	58%	32	42%	76	100%

If we assume that when a House constituency has the same degree of competitiveness as the Senate seat, the constituencies are alike in other characteristics, then we would hypothesize that such RSTs should face lower competition for the Senate nomination than RSTs whose district competitiveness does not agree with the Senate seat's. Similarly, the absence of "organizational tension" that is assumed when House and Senate seat competition agree, also suggests less competition for the nomination. But the data tends to disagree with this hypothesis. Of the 28 RSTs whose district's competitiveness agrees with the Senate seat competitiveness (i.e. both are competitive, or both safe) 57% (16) face high nomination competition; this compares to 33% of those where the degree of competitiveness does not agree.

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in trying to overturn the favored Republican incumbent, but rather was beaten by the latter, Sen. William Knowland, who cross-filed in the Democratic primary.

But the means of classifying House constituency competitiveness and Senate seat competitiveness were not the same. Not only did we use different measures of competitiveness, but House seats were either safe or competitive for the RST, while Senate seats could either be safe, competitive or "hopeless" for the RST. If those trying for "hopeless" seats are eliminated from our calculations, then there are 33 RSTs in disagreeing situations, but only slightly more in high competition struggles--39%, or 13 of 33. So the findings are still inconsistent with the hypothesis.

Another way of "normalizing" the data--i.e. equalizing the probabilities of agreement--is to determine the maximum number of agreements that were mathematically possible for Low Competition RSTs and for High Competition RSTs.[110] Those in Low Competition races were in agreement in 12 cases of a maximum of 19 or 63%. But RSTs in High Competition struggles had their House and Senate constituency competitiveness agree in 16 of a maximum of 22 cases, or 73%. So again it appears that those whose House and Senate competitiveness agree are more likely to face high competition for the nomination, than those where there is

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[110]There were 13 RSTs from competitive House seats and 31 from safe House seats; there were 26 from competitive Senate seats, 6 from safe Senate seats, and 12 from hopeless Senate seats. The maximum number of agreements among those from competitive seats was 13; the maximum number from safe seats was 6 for a total of 19. For the high competition RSTs the figures are: 6 competitive House and 26 safe House, and 13 competitive Senate, 16 safe Senate, and 3 hopeless Senate; this produces a mathematical maximum of 6 competitive agreements and 16 safe agreements for a total of 22.

disagreement--in contrast to the hypothesis. See Table 55.

TABLE 55

House and Senate Competitiveness and NS

COMPETITIVENESS HOUSE-SENATE		LOW NOMINATION STRUGGLE		HIGH NOMINATION STRUGGLE		TOTALS	
C	C (Agree)	7	78%	2	22%	9	100%
C	S	1	33%	2	67%	3	100%
C	H	5	71%	2	29%	7	100%
S	C	19	63%	11	37%	30	100%
S	S (Agree)	5	26%	14	74%	19	100%
S	H	7	88%	1	13%	8	101%
Agree		12	43%	16	57%	28	100%
Disagree		32	67%	16	33%	48	100%
	N	44	58%	32	42%	76	100%

Summary

The degree of nomination competition faced by a Representative seeking a Senatorial nomination was hypothesized to be the function of several variables associated with RST characteristics, his behavior in the House of Representatives, and the nature of the circumstances surrounding the Senate seat. Only the relationship of the latter --specifically the in-party/out-party status of the RST and the candidacy of the incumbent, and the competition of the Senate seat--to the nomination struggle was supported strongly by the data. Other hypothesized relationships either were contradicted by the data, or were only slightly supported by it.

RSTs who opposed incumbents were most likely to have strong competition for the Senate nomination; other in-party RSTs were more likely than out-party RSTs to have

highly competitive nomination struggles. Safe Senate seats were most likely to have high competition for the nomination, and "hopeless" seats were least likely.

The data concerning the aspect of the Senate environment related to the state's career pattern as seen in the pattern of penultimate office experience of Senate nominees, did not confirm the hypothesized relationship, however. In fact, the data tended to support the opposite. We had hypothesized that RSTs coming from states with Congress as a major supplier of Senate nominees, would be less likely to encounter serious nomination competition than RSTs from states where Congress was not a primary penultimate office. But more than half of the RSTs from states where Congress supplied 30% or more of their party's Senate nominees faced high nomination struggles (15 of 29 or 52%), compared to 37% (16 of 43) of the RSTs from states where Congress was not a pattern. If we confine the analysis, however, only to those states in which Congress was the only major source of Senate nominees, and to those states in which some office other than Congress was the only major base office (i.e. exclude states without a predominant penultimate office pattern, and states in which Congress and another office each served as a base office for over 30% of a party's Senatorial nominees), then there is virtually no difference between RSTs from these two categories--38% of RSTs from Congress-dominated states had high competition and 40% of RSTs from other office-dominated states did.

The data for a number of hypothesized relationships

also tended to disagree with the expected findings. We hypothesized more experienced RSTs to be less likely to face opposition for the nomination than less experienced RSTs; we hypothesized that those with statewide electoral office experience and those with state legislative experience would have the least nomination struggle; RSTs who received their college education in the same state they served would have the least nomination struggle; those whose party cohesion scores agreed with the median state party legislator's would have the least nomination competition; large city Democrats and rural and small city Republicans would have the least nomination struggle; RSTs battling opponents whose penultimate office conformed to the state pattern would have the most competition for the nomination; and RSTs whose House seat competition agreed with the level of competition for the Senate seat for which they were competing would face less nomination competition than other RSTs. For each of these hypotheses, the data disagreed with the expected findings. In all but the last case, the tendency was slight. But in the latter the chi-square was significant--i.e. the original hypothesis stated as a new null hypothesis was rejected by the data at the .05 level of significance.

Our hypothesis that generalists would face the least nomination competition and those highly specialized would face the most was not disputed by the data. Similarly we did find, as expected, that At-Large Representatives were least likely to face a highly competitive nomination struggle

and those from the smaller districts (1-19% of the state's population) were most likely to have strong nomination competition.

In summary, the data seems to indicate that the degree of nomination competition faced by an RST was a function of several aspects of the Senate situation--and perhaps some other variables we did not examine--rather than a function of the characteristics and behavior of the RST.

Other Variables in the Nomination Struggle

If, as suggested above, the outcome of the nomination struggle--both in terms of who enters a race as well as how strong a race is run--depends upon factors in addition to those associated with the RST, then an examination of nomination struggle accounts (found in Appendix I) for some of these variables may give us additional insights. For example, let us review the role of the gubernatorial office, and the role of party factionalism and consensus-seeking machinery.

The two manifest offices for Senator are the United States Representative and the Governor. The former shares a similar legislative function reinforced by being called upon to solve the same national problems. The Governor shares the statewide electorate of the Senator. There are several interfaces between the RST and the gubernatorial office of interest to us. One occurs when there is a contest between an RST and a Governor, or former Governor--

certainly we cannot understand the outcome of this contest by focusing upon only one of the actors. Another interface occurs when the Senatorial nomination and the gubernatorial nomination become intertwined. For instance, when a drop-out from the gubernatorial race becomes a candidate for the Senatorial nomination, or even when the Representative with progressive ambition has to decide which of the two statewide offices (Governor or Senator) to seek.

An illustration of the latter situation was noted in the account of John F. Kennedy's nomination. He was interested in running for statewide office in 1952, but he was willing to defer to the plans of his party colleague, Gov. Paul Dever. When the latter decided to seek re-election, Kennedy declared his candidacy for the Senate.

Another example occurred in the 1962 Republican race in Pennsylvania. Rep. James Van Zandt told Pennsylvania politicians in 1962 that he was available for either the Governor or Senator race, and in fact announced for Governor first. He bacame a Senatorial candidate only after he and another gubernatorial candidate worked out a "harmony ticket" with Van Zandt running for Senator. His candidacy was subsequently supported as part of a compromise that saw the withdrawal of his slate mate and the latter's opponent in the gubernatorial race in favor of another Representative, William Scranton.

The situation of gubernatorial race dropouts joining a Senate race is illustrated in Connecticut in 1962. Former Governor John Davis Lodge (whose last office had been that

of Ambassador to Spain) originally was one of seven competitors for the Republican gubernatorial nomination. But when the incumbent Republican Senator withdrew from his re-election attempt, Lodge became a Senatorial candidate--as did Rep. Horace Seely-Brown. The Republican state convention resolved the gubernatorial nomination first, and there was an immediate attempt behind closed doors to give the runner-up the Senatorial nomination. But Seely-Brown felt he had the votes and refused to withdraw.

In other situations--e.g. New York in 1958--there were attempts to induce a gubernatorial nominee to become the Senatorial nominee instead. It was unsuccessful there, and Rep. Kenneth Keating was finally drafted.

Representatives fought Governors for the Senatorial nomination in three races, all of which had at least a touch of factionalism. Rep. John Kunkel and Governor James Duff engaged in a clear factional fight in Pennsylvania in 1950, which Duff won easily. The other two Representatives were more successful: Rep. Carl Curtis beat Gov. Robert Crosby in Nebraska in 1954 (which maintained Nebraska's custom of never sending a Governor directly to the Senate) in a race which took on a tinge of factionalism as many pro-Eisenhower elements supported Crosby over the more conservative Curtis; Rep. Ross Bass engaged Gov. Frank Clement in 1964 in a re-play of the Bourbon-anti-Bourbon factionalism of earlier Tennessee politics. In none of these states were Governors accustomed to being Senate nominees, but in both Tennessee and Nebraska Congress was the penultimate office for at least

40% of the nominees.

Former Governors--either those who went from the Governor's mansion on to subsequent offices, or those who held no other public office--were more frequent major candidates opposing RSTs. Eight RST races were against former Governors (nine if Rep. Gene McCarthy's contest against Hjalmar Peterson who served for Governor for four months is included; another ex-Governor ran poorly in a multi-candidate race--i.e. Jim Folsom in Rep. Armistead Selden's race against Lt. Gov. James Allen in Alabama in 1968). Generally, former Governors did poorly against RSTs; in only one contest did a former Governor win against an RST, and in most races they trailed far behind the winner.

The single exception was Abraham Ribicoff, who had been Governor of Connecticut from 1955 to his resignation in 1961 to assume his Cabinet position; he easily beat Rep. Frank Kowalski in the Democratic state convention in 1962. The Governor who did best in a losing effort was John Bonner in Montana in 1960 who ran only 12,000 votes (and 9 percentage points) behind winner Rep. Lee Metcalf in the four-man race there; he ran ahead of the other RST involved in that race, Rep. LeRoy Anderson. Bonner had served as Governor in 1949-53, before Republicans captured the Governor's mansion.

Two former Governors were in the six-man race that took place in the South Dakota Republican State Central Committee convention in 1962. The closest competitor to winner Lt. Gov. Joe Bottum was Sigurd Anderson who was Governor from 1951-5 before becoming an FTC commissioner

and before passing on the Governorship to Joe Foss. The latter served from 1955-9 before Democrats won the office; he too was one of the six candidates and finished third on the twentieth and last ballot. Foss trailed Rep. Ben Reifel on the first ballot--which proved to be Reifel's high point.

Rep. Winston Prouty did not have too much trouble against former Governor Lee Emerson in Vermont in 1958, beating him by a 65-35 margin; Emerson had served as Governor in 1951-5. The other RSTs all had better than 2-1 leads over their ex-Governor opponents. Rep. Walter Granger beat Herbert Maw by a 3-1 margin in Utah in 1952, after the latter had served from 1941-9. Rep. Keith Thomson beat Frank Barrett by better than 2-1 margin in 1960; the latter had served as Governor of Wyoming in 1951-3 and as Senator in 1953-9. Rep. Horace Seely-Brown won by a 3-1 margin in the Connecticut Republican state convention over John Davis Lodge, who had been Governor from 1951-5 and had served as Ambassador to Spain from 1955 to 1961. Rep. Robert Dole, in 1968, beat former Gov. William Avery who had served from 1965-7 before being defeated in 1966; Avery had also served in the House of Representatives, but Dole had better than a 2-1 majority.

From 1914 to 1958 Kansas Republicans chose statewide officeholders (including Governors) as their Senate nominee in more than half of the instances; Connecticut Republicans did the same in over 40%, while South Dakota Republicans and Vermont Republicans used statewide offices as the penultimate office for over 30% of their Senate

nominees. So it may not be surprising to see Republican former Governors attempting to gain the Senate nominations in these states. Democratic ex-Governors seem to be more likely to enter against RSTs where there is no pattern for their entry.

In summary, data on nomination contests for RSTs suggests that when their opponent is the Governor it is likely to be a result of factionalism. The data also showed that generally former-Governors are not formidable opponents for RSTs.

These accounts of the interface between RSTs and Governors supports the observation made earlier. An adequate analysis of nomination contests cannot be based upon factors related to only one of the participants--even when added to Senate situation factors applicable to all of the candidates in a particular contest. It is also apparant that the Senatorial nomination contest does not occur in an environment soley concerned with that nomination.

Party organization, for example, may be geared to capturing a range of offices. Their coalition-seeking (or consensus-seeking) machinery may be effective or not, depending in part upon the extent of factionalism. This factionalism may be tied to individual politicians whose career lines permit them to be independent; or it may be tied to more systematic differences in coalitions organized to gain particular offices.[111]

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[111] See, Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics, pp. 202-06 for a discussion of opportunity structure and party organization.

If American parties are really national organizations trying to capture higher political offices, as Schlesinger suggests,[112] rather than being ruled by local interests, then local factionalism should not be a major factor in the careers of the RSTs in this study.

Although factionalism was involved in several RST nomination struggles, these usually were liberal-conservative ideological contests and not mere local rivalries. On occasion they were tied to Presidential nominating politics, indicating a role of nationwide coalitions for higher office.

Many of these factional fights were attempts to dislodge the incumbent Senator. The liberal Rep. Helen Gahagan Douglas was planning to challenge the more conservative Sen. Sheridan Downey in 1950; the latter withdrew and the conservative Democratic forces in California substituted publisher Manchester Boddy. Rep. George Smathers' contest with Sen. Claude Pepper in Florida in 1950 was fought along conservative-liberal lines. Rep. Fred Aandahl and Sen. William Langer were engaged in virtually an ideal-type factional fight--each was the leader of an organized faction within the North Dakota Republican party. Rep. Albert Gore's successful attempt to unseat Sen. Kenneth McKellar was fought along traditional Tennessee factional lines--liberals opposing the conservative Crump forces.

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[112] Ibid., p. 204.

The States' Rights-loyalist conflict in the Alabama Democratic party in 1952 continued into the 1954 primary where Rep. Laurie Battle challenged Sen. John Sparkman. Rep. James Sutton ran as a conservative, attacking Sen. Estes Kefauver's liberal record. And conservatives eager to teach Sen. Alexander Wiley the lesson of his political life finally endorsed Rep. Glenn Davis to try to unseat him in the primary. Incumbents were successful in four of these races (Langer, Sparkman, Kefauver, and Wiley), but RSTs beat incumbents Pepper and McKellar.

Other factional fights included the contests involving Governors that were noted above: Kunkel-Duff, Curtis-Crosby, and Bass-Clements. The Summerfield faction's candidate in the 1952 Republican primary in Michigan was Rep. Charles Potter, whose major opponent was the more independent State Auditor General John Martin. The Dole-Avery race in Kansas in 1968 was among other liberal-conservative confrontations.

During the Johnson administration, several Senate primaries involving RSTs seemed to focus upon the President's Vietnam policy. This was the major issue in the Oregon Democratic primary in 1966, when Howard Morgan entered the primary to dispute Rep. Robert Duncan's defense of President Johnson's policy. Sen. Joseph Clark's opposition to the Vietnam war was one of the issues that brought Rep. John Dent into the nomination race for Senator in Pennsylvania in 1968. And it was the issue inducing the candidacy of Rep. Joseph Resnick into the New York Senatorial race in

1968.

The latter contest was an integral part of the struggle for the Presidential nomination. Paul O'Dwyer was clearly the McCarthy forces' Senatorial candidate, while Eugene Nickerson was the candidate of the Kennedy clan; Rep. Resnick was an outspoken supporter of President Johnson, who endorsed Humphrey's candidacy when the President declined to run for re-election.

The Kunkel contest involved Presidential nominating politics as well as the traditional local factionalism. Gov. Duff's animosity to the Grundy faction supposedly stemmed, in part, from activities at the 1948 Presidential nominating convention.

The activity of "Eisenhower" Republicans and more conservative Republicans opposing each other in Senate contests, as well as subsequent coalitions in the Republican and Democratic parties, suggests a continuing struggle by coalitions organized for capturing national office.

The role of RSTs as participants or leaders in factional struggles is not unexpected. They are a known quantity--i.e. they have a legislative voting record that can be contrasted with the incumbent Senator's or other opponent's views.[113] Coalition-seeking--or consensus-seeking--machinery may be part of the party structure, or

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[113]See, Francis Carney, "The Rise of the Democratic Clubs in California", Cases on Party Organization, ed. Paul Tillett (New York: McGraw Hill, 1963), p. 59 for an example of Rep. Yorty using this argument in the CDC convention in 1954.

it may be outside the party. Several states use endorsing conventions--e.g. Utah, Colorado, and Wisconsin--to officially endorse or limit the number of candidates running in a Senatorial primary. In our case studies we saw Rep. David King of Utah challenged by two neophytes in the convention, but only having to battle one of them in the primary. In Wisconsin, the Republican convention endorsed Rep. Glenn Davis in an attempt to unseat incumbent Sen. Alexander Wiley.

In Pennsylvania, the policy committee of each party makes endorsements. And some slate-making precedes the primaries there, as the account of Rep. James Van Zandt's nomination in 1962 indicated. Party leaders were active in slate-making in several states. They, of course, were active in states retaining the convention system of nomination (e.g. New York and Connecticut--see accounts of Keating, Stratton, and Resnick/Pike nomination struggles, as well as Kowalski's unsuccessful attempt), but were also active in states with primaries (e.g. Illinois--see Yates' nomination in 1962).

The action of the CDC (California Democratic Council) in the endorsements of candidates is an example of extra-party coalition-seeking machinery. Their endorsements of Rep. Samuel Yorty in 1954 and Rep. Clair Engle in 1958 helped to avoid serious nomination struggles. Similarly, CRA (California Republican Assembly) endorsement of Rep. Richard Nixon in 1950 eliminated any serious competition in the primary.

Although our case studies include several instances of state party leaders choosing a Representative as their Senatorial candidate, these are the exceptions. Party leaders appear more likely to avoid RSTs than to select them. One explanation of this may be that the local party leaders are not interested in national issues. Their focus is upon state and local offices, and therefore state and local issues. They, therefore, seldom think of the Representative in Washington when thoughts of slate-making arise. This focus on state and local issues also means that they are more likely to be in communication with state and local politicians rather than Washington based Representatives. Not only does this constant contact with local politicians increase the party leaders' knowledge of these officials and their abilities, but it may serve to create obligations that can be paid off with a nomination for higher office. The Representative, isolated from the state's political leaders, may become more independent of them--and this perceived independence may further limit their chances of selection as a Senatorial candidate.

But, it should be noted, the Representative has a chance to gain publicity and other resources--and to become aligned with broader liberal-conservative or national coalitions--so that a challenge to party leaders is a conceivable career path. The RSTs in our study seem more likely to be self-starters, than to be recruited by others. The fact

that more RSTs came from states where Congress was not the penultimate office pattern for Senatorial nominations, than from where it was the expected jumping-off office, lends support to this statement.

Conclusion

This part of the study has focused upon the struggle for the Senate nomination. We examined the accounts of these contests involving RSTs; we observed several interfaces between them and gubernatorial elements, and also noted the role of factionalism and consensus-seeking machinery associated with the party organization. Much of our attention was focused upon analyzing the hypothesized relationship between the competition faced by the RST for the Senatorial nomination and the three sets of factors outlined in the theoretical framework of this study--i.e. agent, origin, and destination factors.

Of these three sets of factors, those associated with the destination office (i.e. the Senate) had the strongest relationship to nomination competition. Needless to say, challenging the incumbent for the nomination results in a fierce struggle. But RSTs involved in Party Succession situations--i.e. the RST's party occupied the Senate seat, but the incumbent was not seeking re-nomination (Group II Senate situations)--also faced more competition than RSTs in the out-party situations.[114] RSTs running in safe

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[114]But it should be noted that the same generalization applies to Senatorial primaries not involving RSTs. An examination of all non-RST Senatorial primaries between

situations are more likely to be involved in competitive nomination struggles than those in competitive or "hopeless" Senate situations--the prospects of election victory helps to induce RSTs into a race.

The linkage of these Senate situation variables with the nomination struggle supports the model outlined earlier in Chapter I. It also indirectly supports ambition theory which assumes that opportunity affects ambition which affects behavior.

But a more direct test of this opportunity-ambition linkage does not support ambition theory. Less than half of the RSTs came from states with an encouraging opportunity structure--i.e. where Congress was a major source of Senatorial candidates. In addition, RSTs from states where Congress was a major source of Senatorial nominees actually faced more opposition for the nomination than did other RSTs (this was true even when contests involving the incumbents were excluded). Nor was the entry of non-RSTs or the competition they faced in their contests with RSTs linked to the state party career pattern. Most of the non-RSTs who were the major competitors in these races did not come from public offices conforming to the pattern for their state party--and those who did

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1956 and 1966 inclusive, indicated that the in-party Party Succession situations had more nomination competition than did out-party situations. That data also indicated that non-incumbent in-party situations involving RSTs were as likely to show high nomination competition as those not involving RSTs; but out-party situations involving RSTs were less likely to be competitive than out-party situations that did not include RSTs as candidates (in other words, out-party RSTs apparently were more likely to scare off opposition).

were as likely to have strong competition from the RST as those who did not.

Another hypothesis stemming from ambition theory also was not supported. We hypothesized that RSTs whose House district competition was similar to the Senate seat --i.e. there was no "organizational tension" involved--would face less competition for the nomination than other RSTs. But they actually were more likely to have high nomination competition than other RSTs (again, this was true even when races involving incumbents were excluded).

Compared to this "mixed success" of linking Senate situation factors and nomination competition, is the almost complete failure to link RST personal characteristics or RST House behavior or situation variables, and the competition of the nomination struggle faced by the RST. This should not be surprising. First of all, we reported earlier in the study that RSTs could not be differentiated easily from other Representatives on the basis of either their personal characteristics or their House situation (or behavior). In other words, these variables are not as important as we had expected at first. Secondly, the RST is not the sun around which all else revolves. If no other candidate enters the race, it may be due to the functioning of consensus-seeking machinery within the party or auxiliary organization, or other factors, rather than stemming from the characteristics or behavior of the RST. For example, we observed the role of party leaders in Connecticut, Illinois, New York, and Pennsylvania races; and we observed the role of CDC and CRA in

several California races, as well as endorsing conventions in several other states. If another candidate does enter, then the competitiveness of the struggle should depend upon the major opponent's characteristics and previous political behavior as much as upon the RST's. For example, we noted the importance of Governors in several races, and also the impotence of former Governors.

Furthermore, the outcomes of the nomination struggle will depend upon factors other than the candidates' characteristics and previous political behavior. How well they build an organization, and how skillfully they campaign may be independent of their personal characteristics or legislative behavior. The nature of the electorate, the existence of other hotly contested nomination contests, the development of national issues by forces outside of the particular campaign all contribute to the nomination struggle outcome--and yet are not found within our examination of agent, origin, and destination variables. For example, we observed several contests in 1966 and 1968 in which the Vietnam war was the overriding issue, limiting the impact of a man's previous record of liberalism-conservatism or party cohesion upon other potential candidates or the electorate.

This chapter (and the Appendix) recorded the degree of competition faced by the RST in his bid to gain the Senate nomination. Basically, nomination competition was treated as the dependent variable--we hypothesized that agent, origin, and destination characteristics would affect the nomination struggle. We noted at the outset, however, that the

anticipation of the degree of competition for the nomination may act as an independent variable affecting the decisions of RSTs (or other candidates) to enter the race. It may also affect their legislative bahavior. In the next chapter, we will analyze the impact of nomination competition (along with election competition) upon the RSTs' legislative behavior in their ultimate term in the House of Representatives.

CHAPTER V

STRATEGY-APTITUDE AND BEHAVIOR CHANGE

Introduction

The ambition theory postulated by Schlesinger[115] asserts that a legislator responds to his constituency, and that this constituency may be the one for the office he seeks rather than the one he holds. This would lead us to expect that Representatives might behave differently when they ran for the Senate than in their earlier terms in the House. His theory also states, "A legislator's votes... are...a consequence of current rather than possible future ambitions."[116] The latter statement suggests that the effects of an ambition for higher office may not manifest itself until later. A Congressman with Senatorial ambition may not behave with that constituency in mind until his ultimate term in the House of Representatives. For some Representatives a premature shifting of behavior could lead to a struggle for re-election to the House and seriously damage his progressive ambition.

A simplistic hypothesis would suggest that the

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[115]Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics; see especially Ch. I.

[116]Ibid., p. 10.

Representative seeking a Senate seat (i.e. an RST) will act differently in his ultimate term in the House than in his previous service there. A slightly more sophisticated notion would be to expect some RSTs to be more likely to change than others. For example one may expect that those facing serious competition for the seat will be more likely to change their behavior.

But several other complexities must be considered too. One must consider the adequacy of the previous behavior. An RST who already has an ideal pattern for a Senate candidate should not be expected to change. For instance, if we assume that generalists rather than specialists are best able to respond to the needs of a statewide constituency, then an RST who is already a generalist should not be expected to change his pattern of bill introduction, while a specialist may be expected to broaden the areas of his concern as evidenced in his sponsorship of bills.

One must also take into consideration whether the RST's greatest concern is with the nomination or with the election. The strategy of a candidate facing a serious primary challenge followed by a safe general election contest should differ from a candidate who faces no primary opposition but has a competitive Senate election ahead of him.

Methodology

The most appropriate strategy for a candidate to take depends, at least in part, upon the extent of the competition he faces for the nomination and in the final

election contest. A Representative who faces strong competition for the nomination for a safe Senate seat, must appeal to a different electorate than one facing no nomination competition but facing a difficult Senatorial election contest. The former must appeal to an electorate composed of his party's membership; the latter must appeal to the entire constituency--or at least that portion that can be wooed with a reasonable expectation of success.

Using the two variables of nomination competition and Senate seat competitiveness, one can develop a set of elementary strategies for RSTs. These are considered elementary, because the situation is more complex than is indicated merely by nomination and election competitiveness,[117] and because a more elaborate strategy involving a mix of party, candidate, and issue themes is possible.[118] A few RSTs faced no serious competition for the nomination or the general election. This is an unusual situation as safe seats customarily attract several candidates who fight it out in the dominant party's primary (or convention). These enviable RSTs need not change their behavior, but face no prospects of penalty if they do.

A second group of RSTs are running for Senate

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[117]See Lewis A. Froman, Jr., "A Realistic Approach to Campaign Strategies and Tactics," The Electoral Process, ed. M. Kent Jennings and L. Harmon Zeigler (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966), pp. 1-20.

[118]See John H. Kessel, "A Game Theory Analysis of Campaign Strategy," The Electoral Process, ed. M. Kent Jennings and L. Harmon Zeigler (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966), pp. 290-304.

seats in safe situations, but face serious competition for the nomination. These RSTs are most likely to be concerned with the nomination contest and therefore with winning votes within their own party. Theirs is a "Nomination-strategy".

A third group of RSTs have little or no competition for the Senate nomination, but are trying to win a competitive Senate seat or one which may be regarded as safe for the opposing party. Being in a competitive race, their strategy is the more classic one of trying to win adherents from the other party as well as uncommitted independents while trying to hold the loyalty of his party's identifiers and activating other support. Theirs is an "Election-strategy". Although it is possible to differentiate a minority party strategy from a majority party one--e.g. the former wants to minimize differences between the parties, while the latter may try to emphasize party identity and to maximize differences between himself and his opponent[119]--it is reasonable to assume that both parties in a competitive situation face similar problems and would use a similar strategy.

The most unfortunate group of RSTs are those who face strong opposition for the nomination, and then face the prospect of a tough election in November. Although it may be possible to determine a distinct rational strategy for these RSTs, it is also reasonable to assume that

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[119]See Froman, "A Realistic Approach," p. 13.

their first task is to gain the nomination (for if they do not survive that round there is no bell to summon them for a second round). Therefore rather than develop a "Nomination-Election strategy", these RSTs were considered to be operating within a "Nomination-strategy".

Determination of the degree of competition for the nomination was made on the basis of the results of the nomination struggle. Those who ran unopposed or who beat their nearest competitor by a 2-1 margin or better (AA and A categories respectively) were considered as having no competition; those who won by less than 2-1, or those who lost the nomination struggle were considered as facing high competition (B, C, and D categories). Senate seat competitiveness, however, was based on the classification used earlier which in turn was based upon statewide elections for President, Senator, and Governor in the previous six years. Seats classified earlier as Competitive or "Hopeless" were considered as competitive for this analysis.

RSTs following a "Nomination-strategy" were expected to appeal to their party's membership. It was assumed that the best way of doing this was to be in the mainstream of their state (or regional) party behavior pattern. They would be neither more liberal nor more conservative than the average state party congressman. They would not support their party (on roll call votes) less than the average state party Representative, nor would their party cohesion scores exceed those of the average legislator. RSTs following a Nomination-strategy, therefore, would be expected to be in

the same category of party cohesion and liberal-conservatism as the average (median) congressman from that state and party.

It was assumed that generalists--those who sent less than 50% of their bills to two committees--were best attuned to meet the needs of a new and larger constituency. Therefore both the "Election-strategy" and "Nomination-strategy" calls for RSTs to be generalists.

Those following an "Election-strategy" were expected to appeal to the electorate outside of their party. This, it was assumed, requires the RST to be less cohesive than other Representatives. It is logical to assume that it is easier for an RST to gain support from independents and voters of the other party, if he does not enjoy a reputation for party loyalty (as measured by roll call cohesion scores). A Democrat can gain more support from Republicans and independents if he were not a highly cohesive Democrat. Or to put it in other words, the "Election-strategy" RST was expected to be in a lower category of party cohesion than the average Representative from his state (or regional) party (or to be in the same category if the median state party representative was already in the lowest category--E). It was also assumed that a legislator who is more moderate than the average Representative from his state party is more likely to attract voters from the opposition while holding his own supporters. (This ignores, for this analysis, the fact that the candidate must gain support from the party organization and volunteers, and financial support, in

order to make the strongest appeal for voter support--and the strategy aimed at gaining voters may not be sufficient for victory in the face of reductions of these other types of support.) Therefore, Republican RSTs were expected to be in a higher category than the state party median on the liberal-conservative continuum; and Democrats were expected to be in a lower category. As noted above, all RSTs were expected to be generalists.

The next step was to determine if the legislator's behavior was in conformance with his assigned strategy. For cohesion and liberal-conservatism, an average was used for all the terms from the 80th Congress to an RST's penultimate term. For specialization, only the penultimate term was used, based upon the assumption that specialization developed over the legislator's career and only his most recent term reflected his degree of specialization (roll call behavior was assumed to be independent of seniority and so an average of previous terms could be used). Averages were constructed based upon the relative position of the RST and the state party median Representative each term (i.e. an average of the relative RST rankings of Higher, Same, and Lower than the state norm were used), rather than comparing the average score of the RST to the average score of the state party median Representative.

Most of the RSTs in this analysis were not performing according to their assigned strategies. Omitted from the analysis here are RSTs with only one term, those who faced no competition for the nomination and were also

running for safe seats, and RSTs whose behavior was unlikely to be affected by Senatorial ambition as their opportunity to be a candidate developed late in their last House term when the elected incumbent died or announced his retirement. Of the 54 RSTs remaining, only 35% (or 19) were in the relative cohesion category called for by their strategy. Almost half (48% or 26) were in the "optimal" ideological category; 43% (or 23) were generalists. Thirty-nine percent (39% or 21) were correct on two or more of the three types of behavior.

The next step in this analysis was to examine the behavior of the RST in his ultimate term in the House. It was assumed that the effects of the Senatorial ambition and candidacy would manifest itself then. Because of the variation in the date of the primary, the entire ultimate Congressional term was used rather than data for the individual sessions within a Congress. As expected more RSTs were behaving in accordance with their strategy in their ultimate House term. Forty-one percent (41% or 22) are "correct" on roll call cohesion, and also ideological position (the latter figure represents a slight decline from the average through the penultimate term). Forty-six percent (46% or 25) are correct on two or more of the three types of behavior.

In addition a determination was made of how many RSTs were fluctuating between their ultimate term and earlier terms. Almost half (48% or 26) had different relative positions in two of the three types of behavior.

The RST's performance (or, for roll calls, his performance relative to the state party median) in his earlier House career (i.e. prior to his ultimate Congress) was compared to both the "optimum" suggested by his assigned strategy, and to his behavior subsequently. Thus for each RST we could determine whether he was more right than wrong--i.e. performing according to the expectations of his strategy--in his ultimate term, and in his earlier House career; and we could determine whether he had changed his relative position more often than not between these two periods. It should be noted that if an RST's behavior in his ultimate term was closer than in his earlier congressional behavior to the optimal behavior called for by his assigned strategy, then he was considered as right in his last term. For example, if his strategy calls for a cohesion level Lower than the state party median, and the RST's relative position moved from Higher to Same, he was considered as being correct in the ultimate term.

Thus if we define "correct" as being correct on two or more of the three types of behavior as noted above, and if we define "change" as changing relative positions on two or more of the three types of behavior, then an RST could be classified into one of eight categories. These categories are noted below, along with the number of RSTs in each group.

i) Penultimate terms: correct, changed, and ultimate term: correct (5);

ii) penultimate terms: correct, changed, and

ultimate term: incorrect (3);

iii) penultimate terms: correct, did not change, and ultimate term: correct (10);

iv) penultimate terms: correct, did not change, and ultimate term: incorrect (3);

v) penultimate terms: incorrect, changed, and ultimate term: correct (12);

vi) penultimate terms: incorrect, changed, and ultimate term: incorrect (6);

vii) penultimate terms: incorrect, did not change, and ultimate term: correct (2);

viii) penultimate terms: incorrect, did not change, and ultimate term: incorrect (13).

Several different classificatory schemes can be used to combine these eight categories into a smaller number of broader types. For instance one can create four broader categories by using only 2 of the three variables. If we use only adherence to the strategy in the penultimate terms and in the ultimate Congress and ignore whether an RST was more likely to change than not, then four groups (i and iii, ii and iv, v and vii, and vi and viii) are formed. Or one may choose to focus upon behavior in the ultimate term, and upon the degree of change; if so, then four different groups emerge (i and v, ii and vi, iii and vii, and iv and viii).

Or, to use one final example, one may note that a purpose of this analysis may be seen as determining which RSTs <u>respond</u> to their new prospective constituencies by changing their inadequate behavior so that it conforms to

their assigned strategy, which RSTs are reluctant to make the correct adjustment, and which RSTs are ready having no need to change their behavior as it already is optimal for their strategy to gain the Senate seat.

Thus three ideal types are formed from the eight previously noted: Responders (group v), Reluctants (groups vi, vii, and viii), and Readies (groups i, ii, iii, and iv). Strategic groups (i.e. Election-strategy, and Nomination-strategy) are mixed with the three types. An illustration of each of these three ideal types can be found within the group of Election-strategy RSTs. Candidates in this strategy group faced no (or little) challenge in the primary, but faced a serious challenge in the general election (either being in a competitive situation, or being a candidate of the "minority party" in a "hopeless" situation). The Election-strategy calls for the RST to be lower in cohesion in order to attract uncommitted citizens and voters from the other party. He was to be more moderate (i.e. Lower on the relative liberal-conservative spectrum if he were a Democrat, and Higher if he were a Republican) than the average state party Representative for the same reason. And it was assumed being a generalist would aid his cause.

Richard Nixon is a good example of the Responder. In his penultimate term in the House (his only one) he was in the Same category on the cohesion scale as was the median California Republican (in this case it was the middle category--i.e. "C"). He was more conservative than the median California Republican (he was in the Conservative category,

while the norm was Liberal--bearing in mind that these categories are based upon the distribution of all Republicans rather than all Representatives or fixed scores for classification). He was neither a generalist nor a specialist, based upon his Index of Specialization score.

But in the ultimate term, he dropped to the lowest category of cohesion while the median California Republican remained in the same category. He became more liberal, joining the median in the Liberal category. And he became a generalist--not only reducing his score from .57 to .42, but also introducing three times as many bills (22 instead of 7) and having them assigned to a broader range of committees (11 compared to 5 in the penultimate term). He won that election, and moved on to other positions subsequently.

At the other end of the spectrum are the Reluctants. Rep. Clifford McIntire, Republican of Maine opposed Sen. Ed Muskie in the 1964 election. McIntire was usually higher in party cohesion than the other New England Republicans (he scored Higher three times and the Same twice in his five complete terms prior to his ultimate House term), while the strategy calls for a Lower relative cohesion rating. He always was more conservative than other New England Republicans, rather than more moderate as suggested by the strategy (he was either in the Conservative or Very Conservative quartiles, while the average New England Republican was either in the Liberal or Very Liberal quartiles). And he was in the middle category on the Index of Specialization. In his ultimate term he was still Higher on cohesion, and

more conservative than the median New England Republican and he was still in the middle category on specialization. (He did show some shifting of scores rather than categories, however--e.g. his Index of Specialization dropped from .57 to .50, and from a B average cohesion to a D in the ultimate term). Rep. McIntire lost his bid for the Senate.

Rep. Charles Mathias, Republican of Maryland, was less cohesive and more liberal than the median Republican in his region. He also was a generalist, sponsoring 87 bills which were assigned to 15 committees, and with an Index of Specialization of .40. He was Ready for a Senate bid. No change was necessary, and in his ultimate term he continued to be less cohesive (remaining in the lowest category), and more liberal (remaining in the Very Liberal category), and a generalist (actually dropping to a .32 score). This position no doubt aided him in his Senate election and he was able to overcome the "hopeless" rating on his Senatorial chances provided by an examination of the elections for President, Senator, and Governor in the previous six years.

Hypotheses

The purpose of this analysis is to examine two questions: (1) Are certain Representatives who later seek a Senate nomination more likely to follow a Senate strategy prior to their ultimate term in the House than other such Representatives? Or to use another notation, do some Senate-seeking Representatives have a greater likelihood to have a Senate "strategy-aptitude" than other Senate-seeking

Representatives? (2) Of those Senate-seeking Representatives whose behavior patterns do not conform to the a priori successful strategy, are some more likely than others to change their behavior?

Our twin foci, therefore, are upon "strategy-aptitude" and "behavior change" of RSTs. We want to compare those that can be called "Ready"--i.e. already following the assigned Senate strategy prior to their ultimate term--to those who are not. And within this second group we want to compare those who do not change their behavior sufficiently or correctly ("Reluctants") to those who change their behavior to the assigned strategy ("Responders").

House situations which are identical with (or at least similar to) Senate ones should produce more candidates who are Ready for their forthcoming Senate situation. For example, we would hypothesize that RSTs who serve At-Large would be more likely to be Ready than RSTs from other districts. Similarly, if we assume that similar conditions of competitiveness indicates other characteristics in common, then RSTs whose House districts' competition agrees with the level of competition of the Senate seat should be more likely to be Ready than other RSTs.

Democratic RSTs from large cities may be assumed to better be able to appeal to an electorate that is important for success in a statewide Senatorial contest, whether it be against a Democratic opponent in the primary, or a Republican in the general election. If the base of support for the Republican party is the small city and rural areas,

then Republican RSTs from these areas should be Ready for primary contests which are aimed at appealing to this base. In other words smaller-city (and rural) Republicans assigned to a Nomination-strategy are hypothesized to be more likely to be Ready than other Republican RSTs.

If the pattern of the penultimate office for Senate nominees is an indication of the opportunity structure within that state, and if it is reasonable to assume that it may affect RSTs before their ultimate House term, then we may hypothesize that RSTs coming from state parties in which Congress is a major penultimate office (i.e. 30% or more) of Senate nominees are more likely to be Ready than RSTs from state parties where less than 30% of the nominees served in Congress as their last public office prior to their Senate nomination.

Are some RSTs who are not behaving in accord with their assigned Senate strategies more likely to change their House behavior in their ultimate term than other RSTs? There may be some basis to expect some RSTs with certain characteristics to be more likely to respond to their prospective Senate constituencies than other RSTs.

For instance some analysts studying the role perceptions of lawyers in legislatures have speculated that their experience in clientele relationships where they represented viewpoints they did not necessarily share as their own would make them responsive to their constituents.[120]

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[120]Davidson, op.cit., p. 88.

This suggests that lawyers might be more likely than non-lawyers to play the purposive role of Tribune. Other speculation, however, suggested that the lawyer sees himself as independent of his clients;[121] this suggests a Trustee role rather than a Delegate role. The range of speculation also includes the idea that it may be unreasonable to expect any differences between lawyers and other occupations: "The affinity of law and politics suggests that lawyers should not be expected to differ from non-lawyers in the taking of those roles that are typically associated with the central core of 'legislator'."[122] The data of these studies are also mixed. Although both Davidson's study of the House of Representatives and the State Legislative Research Project's (SLRP) study of four state legislatures found lawyers less likely to adopt the purposive role of Tribune than non-lawyers,[123] there seems to be little relationship between occupation and the representative roles of Delegate or Trustee. Davidson reported no relationship,[124] while the differences in the SLRP data were slight and not consistent in each of the four states (e.g. non-lawyers were more likely to adopt the Trustee role than were lawyers in two states while the opposite was true in the other two states; lawyers were less likely to be Delegates than non-lawyers in two states,

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[121] Eulau and Sprague, op.cit., p. 91.

[122] Ibid., p. 88.

[123] Ibid., p. 97, and Davidson, op.cit., p. 89.

[124] Ibid., p. 138.

more likely in one state, and as likely in the fourth).[125]

Similarly one may speculate about the relationship between the candidate's age and his responsiveness to his prospective Senate constituency. The older candidate may have a greater need to conform to the strategy that will bring him success because he may not get another chance at a Senatorial seat or even another public office if he loses. A younger Representative seeking a Senate seat is also interested in victory, but may feel that a defeat will not mark the end of his political career. This suggests that older RSTs will be more likely to "correct" their legislative behavior so that it conforms to the assigned strategy, than younger RSTs. For example 64-year old Rep. Walter Granger is under greater pressure to be successful than 49-year old Rep. John Carroll. The latter may get another chance at the Senate race (and in fact he won on his third attempt) while the former will probably have this chance only. On the other hand older legislators may be more settled into a pattern of behavior and find it difficult to change. Similarly a Representative seeking the Senate seat while still young (operationally defined in this study as under 50) may be viewed as ambitious and one may expect such men to do whatever is necessary to gain their goals.[126]

Similar reasons can be suggested concerning a

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[125]Eulau and Sprague, op.cit., p. 91.

[126]Granger was a Responder, while Carroll was classified as a Reluctant. But 65-year old Rep. Wesley D'Ewart was a Reluctant, while 37-year old Richard Nixon was a Responder.

relationship between the amount of public office experience and the response to the new constituency. A Senate candidate with a lot of public office experience (operationally defined as 12 years or more) may be considered a professional who knows what he has to do to win in contrast to the amateur.[127] On the other hand--and as noted above--a Senate candidate with little prior experience may be viewed as ambitious and therefore willing to do what is necessary to win as well as being less constrained by an ingrained pattern.

One other relationship between RST characteristics and the likelihood of changing legislative behavior in order to gain the Senate seat may be hypothesized. A legislator who is surrendering an important committee may be more motivated than one who is surrendering a less significant committee assignment. The latter may be seeking the Senate seat out of frustration, which may be cured either by gaining the Senate seat or by being free of the House of Representatives. We would hypothesize, therefore, that RSTs serving on high prestige committees will be more likely to change incorrect behavior patterns than those serving on undesirable committees.

Findings

An examination of the data, presented below, indicates that none of these hypotheseswere confirmed at the customary .05 level of significance. Some support--i.e.

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[127]See, James Q. Wilson, The Amateur Democrat:Club Politics in Three Cities (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962) for a contrast of the professional and amateur orientation to politics.

the proportions were at least in the hypothesized direction --occurred in some instances.

These findings taken together suggest that there is no clear relationship between constituency or RST characteristics and being Ready for Senatorial candidacy by already adhering to the suggested strategy. Similarly, there is no clear relationship between constituency or RST characteristics and revising one's incorrect behavior to conform to the suggested strategy.

If the operational definitions of the variables, and other facets of the methodology are valid, then one must conclude that the causes of legislative behavior are complex. A simple linkage between Senatorial candidacy and legislative behavior is not sufficient. Nor are the simple relationships between RST and constituency characteristics examined here sufficient to explain the variation in RST behavior.

The following section--including tables--present the data testing the hypotheses outlined above as well as several other possible relationships.

The data in Table 56 contradicts the hypothesis made earlier. It was felt that Representatives-At-Large would be most likely to be Ready in view of the fact that the geographical constituencies for the House and Senate coincided--were congruent.[128] But the data indicate that

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[128]See, Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics, Ch. 7 for a further elaboration of the electoral relationships of nuclear offices.

only one of the four At-Large Representatives studied here --25%--was Ready. Other RSTs were more likely to be Ready. As expected, RSTs from districts that contained small proportions of the state's population (1-19%) were less likely to be Ready than those from the proportionally larger districts (20-79%); 38% of the former were Ready compared to 44% of the latter.

TABLE 56

District Size and Strategic Aptitude-Behavior Change (SABC)*

	1-19%			20-79%			AT-LARGE (100%)		
Readies	13	38%		7	44%		1	25%	
✓ C ✓**	4	12%		-	-		1	25%	
✓ C X	1	3		2	13%		-	-	
✓ - ✓	6	18		4	25		-	-	
✓ - X	2	6		1	6		-	-	
Responders	7	21%	33%	3	19%	33%	2	50%	67%
X C ✓									
Reluctants	14	41%	67%	6	38%	67%	1	25%	33%
X C X	4	12%		1	6%		1	25%	
X - ✓	2	6		-	-		-	-	
X - X	8	24		5	31		-	-	
Total	34	100%	100%	16	101%	100%	4	100%	100%

*"Strategic Aptitude-Behavior Change" will be abbreviated as SABC in all of the tables to follow.
**The first and last symbols represent "stragegic aptitude" for the penultimate and ultimate time periods respectively; the middle symbol represents "behavior change":
✓= correct on 2 of 3 measures of legislative behavior
X= incorrect on 2 of 3 measures of legislative behavior
C= changed on 2 of 3 measures of legislative behavior
-= unchanged on 2 of 3 measures of legislative behavior

The data may be seen as providing additional evidence for the proposition that geographical boundary congruence does not mean the constituencies are identical.

The data developed by Schlesinger[129] indicated that there were different levels of competition for various statewide offices--implying differences in office holder-electorate relations. For example, the At-Large House seat in Wyoming was dominated by Republicans while the Senate seats were dominated by the Democrats; Rep. Thomson of Wyoming was one of the three non-Ready At-Large Representatives. Similarly Rep. Young of Nevada was not Ready and the At-Large House seat was more competitive than the Senate seat in that state, although both were dominated by the Democrats. (Vermont's House and Senate seats were virtually equally safe for the Republicans in the 1914-1958 period covered by Schlesinger, although Rep. Prouty was not Ready.)

It is interesting to note that the single Representative-At-Large conforming to his assigned strategy was Rep. Frank Kowalski of Connecticut. His strategy was a Nomination-Election one which was assumed to be the same as the Nomination-strategy on the grounds that his first task was to win the nomination. But the operational determination of whether he faced competition for the nomination was based on the ex post facto results of the nomination contest. Rep. Kowalski faced a relatively late albeit successful blitz by HEW Secretary (and former RST and Governor) Abe Ribicoff. If he were assigned the Election-strategy--calling for Lower cohesion rather than Same, and

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[129]Joseph A. Schlesinger, "The Structure of Competition for Office in the American States," Behavioral Science, V (July 1960), pp. 197-210.

for Lower liberalism rather than Same--he would have lost his status as a Ready (in his only penultimate term he was Higher on cohesion which was incorrect for either strategy, and he was the Same on liberal-conservatism which was correct for a Nomination-strategy but incorrect for an Election-strategy; his generalist rating on specialization was suggested for either strategy).

But it should be noted the contest occurred within a convention setting. A major difference normally attributed to nomination by convention rather than primary is that the convention represents the party professional who keeps his eye on the bipartisan electorate of the forthcoming general election in contrast to the primary which forces the candidate to appeal to a partisan electorate. Perhaps it could be argued that a Nomination-strategy not be assigned to RSTs running in a convention system. But after Ribicoff's potential entry into the race became a real threat, Kowalski's planning focused upon gaining the 20% of the convention vote necessary to demand a primary--suggesting a Nomination-strategy.

A further examination of the table indicates that two of the three At-Large Representatives not adhering to their assigned strategy changed their behavior (i.e. changed behavior on at least two of the three behavior measures)--as did "strategically-apt" Kowalski--and that three of the four ended their ultimate term conforming to their assigned strategy.

Another test of the broader thesis that RSTs whose

House constituencies resembled their Senate constituencies would be more likely to be Ready than other RSTs was made using House and Senate seat competitiveness. To refresh the reader's memory, House competitiveness was dichotomized on the basis of the electoral margin in the RST's latest election; Senate seat competitiveness was based upon the proportion of statewide elections for President, Senator and Governor won by the RST's party in the previous six years. Even though these were measured differently, it was felt that similar conditions of competitiveness implied other similarities.

The data reported in Table 57 indicate only a two percentage point difference in the hypothesized direction; 40% of the RSTs whose House and Senate districts were equally competitive were Ready compared to 38% of those where there was a difference. If Representatives whose Senate districts were rated as Hopeless--i.e. they were the minority party in situations where the seat was considered safe for the opposition majority party--were omitted from this analysis (because House seats could not be rated Hopeless and therefore agreement was impossible) then identical proportions of RSTs were Ready. If Hopeless Senate seats were considered as competitive, then 32% of RSTs whose House and Senate seats were both competitive or both safe were Ready compared to 44% for RSTs whose House and Senate district competitiveness differed; this is counter to the hypothesized relationship.

TABLE 57

Senate Competitiveness and SABC

	AGREES WITH HOUSE COMPETITIVENESS			DISAGREES WITH HOUSE COMPETITIVENESS		
Readies	6	40%		15	38%	
✓ C ✓	3	20%		2	5%	
✓ C X	1	7		2	5	
✓ - ✓	2	13		8	21	
✓ - X	-	-		3	8	
Responders X C ✓	3	20	33%	9	23	38%
Reluctants	6	40	67%	15	38	62%
X C X	2	13		4	10	
X - ✓	1	7		1	3	
X - X	3	20		10	26	
Total	15	100%	100%	39	99%	100%

The lack of a strong positive relationship suggests that either similar competition between two districts is a poor surrogate measure for determining shared characteristics, or that such similarities are not sufficient to explain "Readiness" for Senate candidacy.

Democratic RSTs from relatively large cities (i.e. the state's largest city or one at least half as large as that) were hypothesized to be more likely to be Ready for a Senate seat than other Democrats. A Democrat living in a large city was assumed to be representing its voters, and these were assumed to be an important group in a Senate nomination or election contest.

The data in Table 58 indicate that one-half of the Democratic RSTs from large cities were Ready, in contrast to only one-third of the Democratic RSTs from the relatively smaller cities or rural areas. This general support for the

hypothesis was not at a statistically significant level, however.

TABLE 58

Relative Size of City of Residence and SABC for Democrats

	SMALL (UNDER 50%)			LARGE (50% & OVER)		
Readies	7	33%		5	50%	
✔C ✔	1	5%		1	10%	
✔C X	2	10		-	-	
✔- ✔	4	19		2	20	
✔- X	-	-		2	20	
Responders X C ✔	5	24	36%	1	10	20%
Reluctants	9	43	64%	4	40	80%
X C X	2	10		2	20	
X - ✔	1	5		-	-	
X - X	6	29		2	20	
Total	21	100%	100%	10	100%	100%

The small town rural base of the Republican party led to a variation of this basic hypothesis for that party. Republican RSTs faced with a serious challenge for the nomination (i.e. a Nomination-strategy) were seen as more likely to be Ready if they came from a small town or rural area than such RSTs from larger cities. Of the 10 Republicans who were assigned a Nomination-strategy (or a Nomination-Election-strategy), 8 were from relatively small cities and one-half of these were Ready. But so was one of the two larger city Republicans. Republicans assigned an Election-strategy were less likely to be Ready--3 of the 9 from smaller cities and 1 of the 4 from larger cities. If small city Republicans assigned a Nomination-strategy were compared to all other Republican RSTs, then there would be general

support for the hypothesis although not at a statistically significant level (one-half of the former, compared to one-third of the others, were Ready).

If a state party's opportunity structure influences the ambitions of officeholders, then one may assume that their behavior may also be affected. Therefore despite Schlesinger's caveat noted earlier that "A legislator's votes...are...a consequence of current rather than possible future ambitions,"[130] it is reasonable to assume that RSTs from state parties where Congress was the penultimate office for 30% or more of the Senatorial candidates would be more likely to be Ready than other RSTs. The data presented in Table 59 below, support this hypothesis but not to a statistically significant degree. Forty-four percent (44%) of the RSTs from state parties where Congress was a penultimate office for more than 30% of the nominees were Ready. This compares to 37% for the other RSTs.

The data just presented were concerned with hypotheses related to the question of whether the tendency to behave prior to the ultimate term in the House in accordance with a strategy gauged for a Senate contest is related to the RST's personal or constituency characteristics. Although several relationships between certain characteristics and being "Ready" were indicated by the data, none was at the customary statistically significant levels.

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[130]Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics, p. 10.

TABLE 59

State Party Career Pattern and SABC

	CONGRESS IS PENULT. OFFICE FOR 30% OR MORE OF SENATE NOMS.			CONGRESS IS NOT PENULT. OFFICE FOR 30% OF SENATE NOMS.		
Readies	10	44%		11	37%	
✓C✓	2	9%		3	10%	
✓C X	2	9		1	3	
✓ - ✓	4	17		6	20	
✓ - X	2	9		1	3	
Responders						
X C ✓	6	26	46%	6	20	32%
Reluctants	7	30	54%	13	43	68%
X C X	3	13		3	10	
X - ✓	1	4		1	3	
X - X	3	13		9	30	
Total	23	100%	100%	30	100%	100%

The second focus of this unit is upon the likelihood of behavior change by those who were not acting in accordance with their assigned Senate strategies. Are there factors which would influence an RST to "Respond" to his assigned strategy by changing his behavior in order to better conform to it, or other "factors" which would make an RST "Reluctant" to change his behavior sufficiently or correctly?

Our speculation, noted above, focused upon four variables--occupation, Senatorial candidate's age and experience, and the prestige of the RST's committee assignments. The data used to test these hypotheses are reported below.

Table 60 shows little difference between lawyers and non-lawyers. Of the 14 lawyers who were not Ready, 5 (or 36%) were classified as Responders and the remainder as Reluctants; this distribution is virtually identical for the non-lawyer with 7 of 19 or 37% classified as Responders.

In addition there was only a slight difference (5 percentage points) between the proportion of Readies in the lawyer and non-lawyer groups. Lawyers' careers may differ from those of non-lawyers--e.g. monopolization of certain law enforcement offices and an earlier entry into public office[131]--but their behavior patterns are not so easily differentiated. Eulau and Sprague found little difference in their role perceptions, Derge found them unlikely to be voting together as a cohesive bloc,[132] and these data now suggest that there is no relationship between occupation and behavior change (or "strategy aptitude" either) for RSTs.

TABLE 60

Occupation and SABC

	LAWYERS			NON-LAWYERS		
Readies	10	42%		11	37%	
✓C✓	1	4%		4	13%	
✓C X	2	8		1	3	
✓- ✓	5	21		5	17	
✓- X	2	8		1	3	
Responders X C ✓	5	21	36%	7	23	37%
Reluctants	9	38	64%	12	40	63%
X C X	3	13		3	10	
X - ✓	1	4		1	3	
X - X	5	21		8	27	
Total	24	101%	100%	30	100%	100%

Our speculation concerning the relationship between the RST's age at the time of his Senatorial candidacy and

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[131] Ibid., p. 178 for evidence of the latter.

[132] David R. Derge, "The Lawyer as Decision-Maker in the American State Legislature," Journal of Politics, XXI (August 1959), pp. 426-31.

the likelihood of his "Responding" to correct behavior that did not conform with his assigned strategy ranged across all possibilities. The younger (or inexperienced) candidate may be more ambitious and therefore likely to change, but it may also be a sign that he is not yet a professional willing to take whatever steps are necessary for election.

The data, as noted in Table 61 below, indicate that younger Senate candidates (below 50 years old) are more likely to Respond and correct their behavior so that it conforms to their assigned strategy than are older Senators. Thirty-nine percent (39%, 9 of 23) of the younger candidates who were not Ready were classified as Responders; this compares to 30% (3 of 10) of the older non-Ready RSTs. This is not a statistically significant difference, however.

A larger difference--but still not statistically significant--can be seen when comparing the proportion of Ready candidates in each age group. One-half of the older Senate candidates were Ready prior to their ultimate term in the House, while approximately one-third of the younger candidates were Ready. This suggests that older candidates are less likely to risk their House seats unless they feel they are "Ready" for the Senate bid.

Our speculation concerning experience--years in public office--also ranged on both sides of the question. Experience might suggest professionalism and willingness to change behavior to gain the support necessary for victory. But it might also suggest a deeply set pattern resistant to incentives for change.

TABLE 61

Age at Senate Attempt and SABC

	YOUNG (UNDER 50)			OLD (50 & OVER)		
Readies	11	32%		10	50%	
✓C ✓	1	3%		4	20%	
✓C X	1	3		2	10	
✓- ✓	7	21		3	15	
✓- X	2	6		1	5	
Responders X C ✓	9	27	39%	3	15	30%
Reluctants	14	41	61%	7	35	70%
X C X	5	15		1	5	
X - ✓	2	6		-	-	
X - X	7	21		6	30	
Total	34	100%	100%	20	100%	100%

The data indicate virtually no difference between inexperienced and experienced RSTs in their rate of Responding to "incorrect" behavioral positions. Thirty-seven percent (37%) of the inexperienced were Responders (7 of 19), compared to 36% (5 of 14) of the experienced. The data on experience reflected the data on age at Senate try, in that a slightly higher proportion of the experienced RSTs were Ready--42% compared to 37% of the inexperienced. Again suggesting--although very mildly--that experienced RSTs are less likely than inexperienced RSTs to take the risk unless they were "Ready" for the Senate. See Table 62.

Slightly higher proportions of young, and inexperienced behaved in accordance with their assigned strategy by the end of their ultimate term. Fifty-six percent (56%) of the RSTs under 50 at the time of their attempt, and 57% of the less experienced were correct in their ultimate House term compared to 50% of the older, and 50% of the more

experienced RSTs.

TABLE 62

Political Experience and SABC

	INEXPERIENCED (UNDER 12 YEARS)			EXPERIENCED (12 OR MORE YEARS)		
Readies	11	37%		10	42%	
✓C ✓	2	7%		3	13	
✓C X	-	-		3	13	
✓- ✓	7	23		3	13	
✓- X	2	7		1	4	
Responders X C ✓	7	23	37%	5	21	36%
Reluctants	12	40	63%	9	38	64%
X C X	5	17		1	4	
X - ✓	1	3		1	4	
X - X	6	20		7	29	
Total	30	100%	100%	24	101%	100%

We had speculated that those giving up a prestigious committee assignment to run for the Senate were motivated to run and hence more likely to change their behavior than an RST who ran while serving on a less desirable committee. The data bear out this hypothesis. Although Readiness was not clearly linked to the ranking of the highest committee assignment, the proportion of those Responding by changing their "incorrect" behavior appears to be related to committee assignment. Almost half of the RSTs who had a High prestige committee assignment and who were not Ready were in the Responder category--47% (8 of 17). This compares to 30% (3 of 10) of the RSTs whose highest committee assignment was in the middle level, and 17% (1 of 6) of the RSTs with Low prestige committee assignments only. See Table 63.

TABLE 63

Highest Committee Assignment and SABC

	COMMITTEE RATING								
	HIGH			MEDIUM			LOW		
Readies	14	45%		3	23%		4	40%	
✓ C ✓	4	13%		1	8%		-	-	
✓ C X	2	6		-	-		1	10%	
✓ - ✓	7	23		2	15		1	10	
✓ - X	1	3		-	-		2	20	
Responders	8	26	47%	3	23	30%	1	10	17%
X C ✓									
Reluctants	9	29	53%	7	54	70%	5	50	83%
X C X	3	10		2	15		1	10	
X - ✓	1	3		1	8		-	-	
X - X	5	16		4	31		4	40	
Total	31	100%	100%	13	100%	100%	10	100%	100%

By the end of the ultimate term 65% (20 of 31) of High committee assignment RSTs were behaving in accordance with their assigned strategy. This contrasted sharply with those who had only Low committee assignments--only 20% of this group (2 of 10) were correct by the end of their ultimate term; 54% (7 of 13) of the middle group were conforming before they left the House.

Conclusions

The analysis in this chapter was based upon the theory that a legislator's behavior was in response to the needs of his perceived constituency. A member of the House of Representatives who seeks the Senate nomination while still a member of the lower house has changed his constituency during his ultimate term in Congress. If we assume that the RST's actions prior to his ultimate term in the House were in response to his House constituency, and that

those in this ultimate term in the House were in response to his prospective Senate constituency, then we would expect changes of legislative behavior. These changes would occur if the RST's behavior was not already in accordance with a strategy aimed at securing the Senate seat. His earlier House behavior might fit his Senate strategy because of the similarity of his House and Senate constituencies (e.g. an At-Large House seat), or because his ambition for the Senate seat led him to anticipate his later needs, or because of "circumstancial variables" (i.e. "the particularities and accidents of the historical, day-to-day progression of events").[133]

A Senate strategy was assigned to the RST on the basis of the competition he actually had for the nomination and upon the competitiveness of the Senate election based on the record of statewide elections for President, Governor, and Senator for the previous six years.

Those who had serious competition for the nomination were assigned a Nomination-strategy that called for appealing to their party's membership. This called for being in the mainstream of party cohesion and ideology. Those who won nomination easily but were presumed to face strong competition in the general election because of the previous pattern of elections were assigned an Election-strategy aimed at appealing to an electorate outside of their party. This called for lower party cohesion, and for

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[133] Wahlke, et.al., op.cit., pp. 18-21.

a more moderate ideological position. Both strategies called for the RST to be a generalist, as measured by his Index of Specialization.

Our analysis had two foci: one examined whether some RSTs were more likely than others to be following their assigned Senate strategies prior to their ultimate House term (i.e. were Ready); the second looked at whether some RSTs were more likely than others to adjust behavior that did not conform to their assigned strategies (i.e. were Responders rather than Reluctants).

We hypothesized the following groups of RSTs to be more likely to be Ready than other groups of RSTs: 1) At-Large Representatives, 2) those whose House competitiveness agreed with their Senate competitiveness, 3) Democrats from large cities, 4) Republicans from small cities who were trying to appeal to their own party's membership because of a competitive primary race, and 5) those from state parties where 30% or more of the Senatorial candidates had House service as their penultimate office.

We also speculated about the relationship between the legal profession and being a Responder, as well as the role of age and experience. And we hypothesized that those who served on the most desirable committees would be more likely to be Responders than Reluctants.

Our data contradicted the hypothesis concerning At-Large Representatives, showed no difference between larger and smaller city Republicans, and supported the hypothesis concerning House and Senate competitiveness by only two

percentage points, and the one on penultimate office pattern by seven percentage points. The hypothesis concerning large city Democrats was supported by a seventeen percentage point difference, which was not significant at the .05 level.

Concerning Responders and Reluctants, the proportions of non-lawyers Responding was only one percentage point more than lawyers; similarly less experienced RSTs differed from more experienced ones by only one percentage point. There was a nine percentage point difference distinguishing younger Senatorial candidates. Only the hypothesis concerning the prestige of committee assignments was given any considerable support and this was not statistically significant.

Some support for the general thesis is found, however, in the data comparing late starters--i.e. RSTs whose candidacies did not materialize until later in the ultimate term in the House--to other RSTs. Although both groups had approximately equal proportions of Ready legislators (36% of the 11 late starters who could be assigned a Nomination or Election-strategy, compared to 39% of the RSTs analyzed in the previous section), late starters were much less likely to change their strategically incorrect behavior. Only one late starter (14% of the non-Ready RSTs) could be classified as a Responder, compared to 36% of the other non-Ready RSTs.

In another analysis, all RSTs with more than one

term of office[134] were classified on the basis of their change on roll call behavior. Of the 13 late starters, 7 (54%) showed no change in behavior, 4 (31%) showed a change on either cohesion or ideology, and only 2 (15%) changed on both forms of roll call behavior. Of the 57 other RSTs, 21 (37%) showed no change, 21 (37%) showed change on one, and 15 (26%) showed a change on both. Or to state it another way, the 13 late starters had 8 changes or an average of .62 changes. The other 57 RSTs had 51 changes or an average of .89.

If we include specialization, then the 13 late starters had a total of 14 changes for an average of 1.08, compared to 75 changes for the 57 other RSTs for an average of 1.32. Although equal proportions (23%) had no changes, late starters were more likely to have only one change (58% compared to 35% of the other RSTs) while non-late starters were more likely to have two changes (30% to 17%) or three changes (12% to 8%). This is a further indication that those RSTs whose candidacy did not materialize until later in the ultimate term were less likely than other RSTs to be changing their behavior.

But the data reported in the previous section generally do not support the hypotheses that flowed from a broader theoretical statement. This suggests that either the methodology used to operationalize the variables was

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[134]This includes the three RSTs dropped from the analysis presented in the previous section because they faced neither nomination nor election competition.

inadequate or the theoretical statement needs revision.

There are several aspects of the methodology used here that may be questioned. The strategies developed here are elementary. They refer only to party cohesion, liberal-conservatism, and specialization. No other forms of legislative behavior are included. Nor are other aspects of roll call behavior noted. The deficiencies of relying on roll calls at all has been noted elsewhere[135] and these weaknesses are relevant here--e.g. equal weight for all bills included, reference only to floor action while most significant action frequently occurs in committee. Certainly one wrong vote on a major issue of concern to the constituency may undo the little accomplished by dozens of votes with one's party that were meaningless or unknown to the electorate.

These campaign strategies are elementary because no differentiation is made between style issues and position issues. This distinction, first made by Berelson et. al.,[136] may have different impact upon the electorate, and a campaign strategy applying these types of issues to different audiences may be the most successful.[137] Nor are other elements

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[135]See, among others, Wilder Crane, Jr., "A Caveat on Roll-Call Voting Studies of Party Voting," Midwest Journal of Political Science, IV (August, 1960), pp. 237-49; Lee F. Anderson, Meredith W. Watts, Jr., and Allen R. Wilcox, Legislative Roll-Call Analysis (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966); and Frost, op. cit.

[136]Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee, Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1954).

[137]See Froman, "A Realistic Approach".

of an electoral strategy noted--e.g. buildup of either party symbols or the personality of the candidate. Roll call performance is not the only way to win votes. Although votes are the ultimate support which must be won, other support may be crucial to informing the electorate of past performance--specifically financial aid and party workers.

We delineated two strategies--one for those with a serious struggle for the nomination, and another for those who faced little competition for the nomination but who faced competition in the general election. We made no modification for those facing both nomination and general election contests. Although one may defend this decision by noting that the RST must meet his nomination competition successfully if he is to remain in the race, and therefore may be assigned a Nomination-strategy, nevertheless a candidate faced with competition in both the primary and general election cannot ignore the latter contest while trying to appeal to his party's membership.

Another aspect of our strategy methodology which may account for our findings is that competition for the nomination is based upon the outcome of that contest, but competition in the general election is not similarly based. The identical use of outcome for general election contests as nomination contests would have resulted in the reclassification of the competitiveness of ten races. Three men--Mansfield, Martin and Montoya--would have their races called competitive and would be re-instated into these analyses from which they were dropped; seven men whose Senate election

races were considered competitive, won easily (i.e. over 55%) and so would have been dropped from the analysis. It should be noted that nomination contest competition must be based on outcome as there are no other pre-contest data. The fact that some RSTs never reached the final general election contest necessitated the measurement of Senate seat competition based on previous electoral outcomes.

A more serious problem is the designation of the appropriate behavior for each strategy. The Nomination-strategy called for roll call behavior in the same category as the median state party legislator. This may be too restrictive; perhaps calling for the same or higher party cohesion would be more logical if the aim is to win the support of the party faithful. Being a strong party man should be a more convincing campaign claim than a platform of not being different than the average or median representative.

The Election-strategy calls for lower cohesion, but a more moderate ideological position also. But the high association between these two indices[138] raises some questions about the possibility of satisfying both strategic requirements. To require a Democrat to have lower cohesion is to ask him to be more conservative; but to require a Republican to have lower cohesion is to ask him to be more liberal.

Still other aspects of the methodology may have contributed to the results--e.g. the periods used as the basis of comparison. For behavior before the effect of the

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[138]See Matthews, op. cit., among other sources.

Senate candidacy, roll call behavior was averaged over all terms from the 80th to the penultimate term. This starting date was brought about by the unavailability of cohesion data for sessions before the 80th Congress. Averaging was used rather than penultimate term because it was felt that a longer time period would give a more accurate picture of the Representative's behavior. Specialization, on the other hand, was viewed as affected by seniority and so an average of all terms was felt to be inappropriate. Measurements of behavior after the effect of Senate candidacy were made for the entire ultimate term. This results in some behavior being included in the measurements even after the RST's Senatorial ambitions have been squelched by a defeat in the nomination process. For example, Rep. Joseph Resnick was defeated in his bid for the Senate nomination on June 18, 1968 but four of the twelve roll calls used in the liberal-conservative index occurred after that date.

Some alternate base periods for comparisons are: a) the ultimate Congress to the penultimate Congress, b) the first session of the ultimate Congress to the first session of the penultimate Congress, c) the second session of the ultimate Congress to the second session of the penultimate Congress, d) the second session of the ultimate Congress to the first session of the ultimate Congress.

Roll call behavior was compared to the median state party legislator. The data in the chapter on party unity demonstrated that the use of the median often resulted in the more moderate behavior used as the norm. When the

appropriate behavior for a Senatorial candidate is then tied to this middle value, the effect appears to be compounded.

As was noted before, several groups of RSTs are omitted from this analysis--e.g. the three RSTs who faced no serious competition for either the nomination or the election. These could be assigned an Election-strategy--especially in view of the fact that they won by less than 55% of the vote--and included in this analysis. Also omitted were thirteen whose Senate candidacies came about after the incumbent's death or retirement in the last session (or very late in the first session) of the RST's ultimate term.

The three groups of RSTs--Readies, Responders, Reluctants--were based in part upon whether they were in accordance with their assigned strategy on two of the three measures prior to their ultimate term. This implies that the three measures were of equal weight, even though roll call behavior may be more significant than the pattern of bill introduction. Similarly the extent of the deviation from the assigned strategy category was not taken into consideration.

The second variable used to determine these types was whether the RSTs had changed on two of the three measures of behavior. For the roll call data this was a change relative to the state party median. In several cases it was the state norm that changed rather than the RST. The direction of the change is not noted, so that a change away from the strategic optimum is equated with a change toward the

strategically appropriate behavior.

Responders were defined as those who were wrong on two of the three measures in the penultimate time period, changed behavior on two of the three measures, and were right on two of the three measures in the ultimate term. In addition to the problems noted above, correct behavior in the ultimate term includes instances when the RST moved in the right direction even if he did not reach the behavior category prescribed by the strategy.

Finally, there are alternative definitions for the three types. For instance, Responders could include those who were wrong on two of the three measures in the penultimate time period, but correct on two of three in the ultimate. Other variations based on the previous comments are also possible.

The thrust of this lengthy review of the methodology is that the lack of confirmation for the hypotheses may be due to the operational definitions used in this analysis. But before any further analyses are recommended, a closer examination of the theoretical framework is warranted.

The theoretical basis for this analysis is the assertion that a legislator responds to his constituency, and that this constituency may be the one for the office he seeks rather than the one he holds. But this explanation of legislative behavior is only a partial one, and even this linkage is a complex one. Factors other than progressive ambition also affect the legislator's actions. His social background and psychological needs may bear upon his

behavior. His role expectations, as well as his other perceptions and values are important factors. For example his perceptions of the desires and demands of the relevant constituency, and his perceptions of the risk for ignoring these desires will influence his legislative behavior.

An objective evaluation of the risk faced by a legislator for ignoring the desires of a constituency would indicate a large measure of independence for the politician. Studies of voting behavior in Congressional elections have indicated a lack of knowledge among the public. In a study of the 1958 Congressional elections made by the Survey Research Center,[139] over half of the respondents said they had not heard or read anything about either candidate for Congress; less than 20% knew something--and this was often minimal--about both candidates. Even of those coming to the polls, almost half (46%) were unaware of either candidate and only one fourth (25%) were aware of both. In response to an open-ended question about information on the Representative, references to current legislative issues were only one-thirtieth of the comments made. If the electorate's awareness is so low, and if their record is even less known, then Congressmen are relatively free to vote as they wish. And, on the other side of the coin, their record will attract relatively few votes. This SRC study also showed the importance of party label--84% voted in accordance with

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[139]Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, "Party Government and the Saliency of Congress," Public Opinion Quarterly, XXVI (Winter, 1962), pp. 531-46.

their party identification--in Congressional elections.[140] Other studies have shown a high rate of straight party voting at least for the offices of President and Congress,[141] although the extent of Presidential coattails has been questioned.[142] A recent study has measured the impact of incumbency--apart from record and performance--on Senate races, and noted, "To the extent a Senate or House incumbent is re-elected mainly by virtue of his incumbency and not by his behavior in Congress or his constituency relationships or the attributes of a particular congressional campaign, these factors--stressed in journalistic analyses of congressional elections--are considerably reduced in importance."[143]

Other data from the Survey Research Center demonstrates a low significance attached to issues by voters. Leuthold reports on data from the Congressional elections of 1960 and 1962. Respondents were asked for the reasons for their voting decision. The first two responses were coded into one of four categories: issues, candidate, party, group support, or other (e.g. influences of relatives). Issues constituted only 5% of the responses in the

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[140] Ibid. Data in Table 4 were recalculated.

[141] V.O. Key, Jr., The Responsible Electorate: Rationality in Presidential Voting, 1936-1940 (New York: Vintage Books, 1966). Recalculation of 1960 data presented there indicates an 86% agreement.

[142] Warren E. Miller, "Presidential Coattails: A Study in Political Myth and Methodology," Public Opinion Quarterly, XIX (Winter, 1955-56), pp. 353-68.

[143] Barbara Hinckley, "Incumbency and the Presidential Vote in Senate Elections: Defining Parameters of Subpresidential Voting," American Political Science Review, LXIV (September, 1970), p. 842.

Presidential year and 13% in the off-year election. Party ranged from 31% in the off-year to 47% in 1960; candidate responses were 40-44% of the total coded responses.[144]

Primary elections--where the party cue is normalized --saw the role of the candidate increase to 64% of the responses, while issues constituted only 10%.[145]

But, it should be noted, issues are important incentives to attract campaign workers. Of the small proportion of the total electorate that also works in the campaign, 33% of their responses reflected issues.[146]

Not only are issues apparently insignificant in the voter's decision-making, but Froman notes that a campaign strategy relying upon issues is difficult to follow. Position issues (i.e. specific issues) are most effective on the opposition and uncommitted, but these people are most difficult to reach and/or convert.[147] The majority party need not refer to specific issues as much as the minority party.

The legislator's perceptions of his risks, however, will govern his behavior more than the evaluation of an objective observer. Several studies have noted that the perceptions of the candidates do not necessarily coincide with reality. The same SRC study that showed small voter

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[144] David A. Leuthold, Electioneering in a Democracy: Campaigns for Congress (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1968), p. 14.

[145] Ibid., p. 33.

[146] Ibid., p. 94. Also see Frank J. Sorauf, Political Parties in the American System (Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1964), Chapter 5, for a discussion of incentives.

[147] See Froman, "A Realistic Approach".

attention to issues, reported that incumbent winners placed great emphasis upon their personal record and standing (85% considered it very or quite important in their re-election). National issues, and traditional party loyalties were each listed by 46% as being very or quite important.[148]

Kingdon studied the perceptions of candidates for 33 offices in Wisconsin. His respondents were asked, "Would you tell me how important each of these [party label, issues of the election, personal characteristics of the candidates] is in determining the choice of the voters?" Only 34% of all respondents listed issues as all or very important, compared to 61% giving those responses for party, and 74% for candidates.[149] When these respondents were asked to indicate which of the three factors was most important and which second, issues were least likely to be viewed as most important (only 12% said they were most important compared to 40% for party and 48% for candidate) and most likely to be viewed as least important (53% saw issues as least important, compared to 15% for candidate and 32% for

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[148]It should be noted that the exact question is not reported in the study. "Personal record and standing" may refer to more than a voting record, for example errand-running can be an important factor in establishing a successful image. The data are from Miller and Stokes, op.cit., p. 542. For the role of constituency service, see John S. Saloma, III, Congress and the New Politics (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1969), Ch. 6; and Charles L. Clapp, The Congressman: His Work as He Sees It (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1963), Ch. 2.

[149]John W. Kingdon, Candidates for Office: Beliefs and Strategies (New York: Random House, 1968). Data recalculated from Table 2-1, p. 23.

party).[150] Kingdon's work is more likely to be cited for the differences in these perceptions between winners and losers. Losers were more likely to see party--a factor they could not control--as important in their defeat, while winners were eager to attribute the outcome to candidate factors. One explanation that he offers for his data, is a "congratulations-rationalization effect". Winners congratulate themselves for their victory while losers rationalize the defeat by blaming party. But both winners and losers each place less importance on issues than on party or candidate. Although the perceptions of the voters' level of information about the candidates' stand on the issues held by winners and losers differs, both groups were more likely to say that the voters were not informed, than to suggest they were very well informed.[151]

Not only will the legislator's perceptions of the election process have an impact on the relationship of his constituency and his legislative behavior, but so will the perception of his role. A legislator whose representational role or style--the "how" of legislative decision-making--is that of the trustee rather than the delegate will be more independent of his constituency regardless of whether it is a district or the entire state.[152] Our study did not include any data on this, and there is very little other

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[150] Ibid. Data recalculated from Table 2-2, p. 24.

[151] Ibid., see Table 2-3, p. 26.

[152] Wahlke, et.al., op.cit., Ch. 12.

literature linking ambition and roles. One of the few studies that does, is Soule's study of Michigan state legislators. His data indicate that legislators with progressive ambition are more likely to be trustees rather than delegates. He found no relationship between purposive roles and ambition. Those without progressive ambition were more likely to be district-oriented (as opposed to state and district oriented) than those with progressive ambition.[153]

Another set of perceptions that can affect the legislator's behavior concerns the demands and desires of his constituencies. Our knowledge of the work on cognitive dissonance, as well as psychology in general, would lead us to expect that the legislator may misperceive the opinions of his constituents. Not only do we have some impressionistic evidence of this,[154] but several studies have examined the legislators' perceptions of public opinion in their constituencies. For example, Miller and Stokes' study indicated correlations between constituency attitude and the representative's perception of constituency attitude varied from .17 on social welfare to .63 on civil rights.[155] Another recent study also indicated large gaps between the

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[153]Soule, op.cit.

[154]Lewis Anthony Dexter, "The Representative and his District," New Perspectives on the House of Representatives, ed. Robert L. Peabody and Nelson W. Polsby (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1962), pp. 3-29.

[155]Warren E. Miller and Donald F. Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," American Political Science Review, LVII (March, 1963), p. 52.

legislator's perception of constituency opinion on a series of constitutional amendments and how they actually voted.[156]

The nature of the other inputs into the system--such as the nature and strength of party appeals, interest group activity, administrative pressure--as well as "circumstantial variables" will affect the legislator's behavior.

There are some grounds, therefore, to question the likelihood of any strong relationship between Senatorial candidacy and legislative behavior change. The data presented in this analysis demonstrated no strong relationship between them.

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[156]See Donald D. Hedlund and H. Paul Friesma, "Legislative Perceptions of Public Opinion," a paper presented to the 1970 American Political Science Association meetings.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

This research was stimulated by the important work of Joseph Schlesinger on ambition theory. His work included several assumptions, and the research reported here may be viewed as a test of those assumptions, as well as an investigation of other hypotheses. Schlesinger assumed that a major stimulus to ambition is the opportunity structure present in a specific situation. Secondly, his development of these opportunity structures rests upon the previous pattern of successful nomination. A third assumption--described at one point as "the central assumption"[157]--of ambition theory is that a legislator's behavior is a response to his office goals.

These assumptions are tested by examining the 85 United States Representatives in the 1950-1968 period who were candidates for Senate nominations (referred to as RSTs in this study). Our focus, therefore, is upon political promotion (or progressive ambition) rather than initial recruitment.

The first assumption is tested by utilizing a "model" that views progressive ambition as a function of three sets of variables. In addition to the opportunity structure and

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[157]Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics, p. 6.

other aspects of the destination office, there are also characteristics of the agent or individual, and of the origin (or House) situation. Much of the writing on recruitment is devoted to examining the importance of individual characteristics (actually much of it is limited to merely enumerating these characteristics)[158]--e.g. his socio-economic position as well as his psychological attributes--and so these were hypothesized to be relevant. One of the psychological attributes noted is that of motivation; and one of the factors that affects the motivation of politicians already serving in a public office is their satisfaction with that office. In addition, Seligman and his associates have introduced the concept of risk into the recruitment literature;[159] a politician's current career will affect his perception of risk and hence his ambition. Barber's analysis noted resources in addition to motivation and opportunity as factors affecting the decision to become a legislator,[160] and our model views a Representative's record in the House either as a resource or as an asset to acquire resources. By comparing RSTs to other Representatives for these three sets of variables we were able to assess the importance of these factors. Additional insight was gained by classifying RSTs according to two major

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[158]See John C. Wahlke, "Behavioral Analyses of Representative Bodies," Essays on the Behavioral Study of Politics, ed. Austin Ranney (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962), p. 175.

[159]Seligman, "Opportunity".

[160]Op. cit.

aspects of their Senate situation--their party in relation to the incumbent, and the latter's plans concerning re-election--and then comparing these groups of RSTs to each other.

Schlesinger's development of an opportunity structure for an office was based upon the public office patterns of the nominees for that office. It did not take into consideration how easy or difficult it was for past nominees to establish that pattern. Unopposed nominations and those in which the nominee was barely able to win and hence influence the opportunity structure of subsequent politicians were given equal weight. If Schlesinger's assumption that opportunity leads to ambition is correct, an examination of the nomination contests faced by RSTs should show that those running where Congress was the major penultimate office for Senatorial nominees should have had less opposition than running where Congress was not a pattern. Similarly, the impact of the opportunity structure upon the ambition of RST opponents should be observable from an examination of their office patterns. Our study included such observations.

One way of testing ambition theory's assumption that a politician responds to his office goals--i.e. his future constituency--is to examine the impact of Senatorial candidacy upon the behavior of the RST while he still is in the House. Depending on the strategy most appropriate for attaining Senatorial office, and whether he is already conforming to that strategy, an RST may act differently in his last term in the House than in his earlier terms.

The results of the tests of these assumptions supports ambition theory on some accounts, but also challenges it on several accounts. The effect of opportunity can be seen clearly in the data on Senatorial primary contests in the 1956-1966 period. RST participation varied directly with the degree of opportunity. When opportunity was the greatest (in the Party Succession--or Group II--situation of being a member of the incumbent's party when he was not seeking re-election), RSTs were most likely to be present (in 36.8% of these races); and when opportunity was the smallest (in the Party Challenge--or Group I--situation of trying to deny the incumbent re-nomination), RSTs were least likely to be involved (in only 1.8% of these races). This suggests that opportunity had an effect upon shaping the progressive ambition of Representatives.

The role of opportunity stands in contrast to our findings concerning agent and origin (or House situation) characteristics. RSTs did not differ very much from other Representatives on the basis of their personal characteristics. This, of course, was contrary to our expectations which were that Representatives with progressive ambition for the Senate would differ from other Representatives. Although the House situations of RSTs did differ from that of other Congressmen (e.g. they came from larger cities, and larger and more competitive districts), the differences were not statistically significant. In addition, the data on behavior in the House were not always consistent.

The data presented in the section on the nomination

struggles of the RSTs challenged ambition theory on several accounts. Less than half of the RSTs came from situations in which the House of Representatives was a major (or "patterned") penultimate office for Senate nominees. RSTs from state parties where Congress was the patterned penultimate office had more competition than RSTs from state parties where Congress was not the pattern; this is the opposite of our expectations. Nor did the opponents of RSTs reflect the predominant penultimate office patterns; and opponents whose penultimate office was the patterned one had as much competition from RSTs as those whose office was not the patterned one. Additionally, speculation inferred from Schlesinger concerning organizational tensions--i.e. that those from districts without such tension would be favored--was not confirmed, as RSTs who came from House districts where competition was at the same level as the Senate seat actually faced a greater struggle for the nomination than those from "organizational tension" situations caused by differing levels of competition.

It may be noted, however, that the personal and House situation characteristics of the RST were not related to the level of nomination competition, either. But there should be no reason to expect the extent of the nomination struggle between an RST and others to be dependent upon the characteristics and behavior of only one of the contestants --especially since our data indicated these were inadequate variables with which to differentiate RSTs from other Representatives. The examination of the nomination struggle

accounts showed the importance of other factors such as the role of party leaders, factionalism, other strong actors such as Governors, other hotly contested nominations, and national issues influenced by outside forces rather than being controlled by the candidates. In addition, the explanations of the outcomes must include such key variables as their campaign skills and the demographic and electoral patterns of the district.

The data testing the third assumption dealing with the impact of progressive ambition for the Senate upon the Representative's behavior in the House, also were not wholly supportive of ambition theory. Approximately 40% of the RSTs could be said to be following a strategy seen as the best for gaining the Senate seat, prior to their ultimate term in the House. But, of significance here, is that of the remaining RSTs, only approximately one-third (36%) were Responders rather than Reluctants.[161] But on the other hand, RSTs who were excluded from this part of the analysis because they were "late starters"--i.e. their opportunity to seek the Senate nomination occurred late in their last House term when the incumbent died or announced his retirement--were even less likely to change their behavior than other RSTs not in the Ready category, suggesting an impact of ambition upon behavior.

Apparantly the linkage between a Representative's

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[161]Responders were defined as those who were not following the correct strategy (on at least 2 of the 3 behaviors) prior to their last term in the House, who changed their behavior (on at least 2 of the 3 behaviors), so that in their last term they acted in accordance with the assigned strategy (on at least 2 of the 3 behaviors).

legislative behavior and his future constituency is not strong. But the studies of the linkage between legislative behavior and current constituencies also indicate a weak relationship--or at least not a consistent one. In other words, legislative behavior is a complex phenomenon which does not lend itself to simple uni-causal explanations. In addition, it should be noted that there are alternative methods available to analyze the same data (e.g. different time periods, or different operational definitions of Responders, etc.).

We have indicated that our data sometimes supported ambition theory, but that on other occassions it did not. In view of the challenges to ambition theory and its assumptions, what can be said about its utility? First of all, it should be made clear that there was some evidence for the impact of opportunity upon progressive ambition, and for the impact of progressive ambition upon legislative behavior. But more than that, its utility as a heuristic model has not been impaired. It is still useful in developing fresh insight into the areas noted by Schlesinger in his concluding chapter in Ambition and Politics--federalism, party organization, inter-institutional relations (i.e. legislative-executive, and lower house-upper house), and the relation of decision-makers to the public in a democracy. For instance, Pres. Johnson's proposal for a four-year term for House members was immediately doomed when Representatives refused to accept any limitation upon their right to run for the Senate in the off-year elections. Prewitt's

examination of ambition as a source of public control over city councilmen, is another example.[162]

In addition to the testing of several assumptions of ambition theory, our research made other contributions to this field of research. By focusing upon the progressive ambition of members of the House of Representatives, it added to the meager literature on political promotion rather than the larger literature on initial recruitment. Their dynamics are different--the decision-mix for men risking their public office career to seek higher office is not the same as it is for persons starting their political careers. The model we developed focused on the situation at the office held (origin) as well as at the one sought (destination) and his own (agent) characteristics.

Our research addressed the concept of risk several times. Unfortunately, the results were not consistent. When we examined the House situations of RSTs compared to other Representatives, we concluded that minimal risk was a greater stimulus to progressive ambition than high resources. Those who had the least to lose (e.g. they had low seniority) were more likely to enter a Senatorial contest than those with high resources. (But there were inconsistencies here too, e.g. RSTs risked better committee assignments than other Representatives had--and perhaps as a result, RSTs with better assignments were more likely to be Responders than Reluctants.)

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[162]Kenneth Prewitt, The Recruitment of Political Leaders: A Study of Citizen-Politicians (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1970).

But when we examined this within the context of the level of opportunity provided by particular Senate situations, we found that although the data again were inconsistent, they lent more support to the assumption that RSTs were ambitious because of their resources, rather than the idea that the RSTs' ambition was so great that they ignored their lack of resources. In other words, those with the most to risk (rather than the least) tackled the situation with the least opportunity (i.e. the Party Challenge or Group I situation of challenging the incumbent in the primary).

Another contribution to the literature on ambition theory is the collection of accounts of the nomination struggles encountered by the RSTs. More important than the collection of these accounts, is the indication from their analysis that data on nomination contests should be included in any development of opportunity structures. Perhaps, adding a second dimension to Schlesinger's penultimate office patterns may be as fruitful as was his adding a second dimension to the classification of state party systems.[163]

Making the classification of opportunity structures more complex may be appropriate in view of the evidence of complexity found in this study. We demonstrated that the linkage of factors leading to ambition is not simple, and neither is the linkage between ambition and legislative

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[163]Joseph A. Schlesinger, "A Two-Dimensional Scheme for Classifying States According to Degree of Inter-Party Competition," American Political Science Review, XLIX (December, 1955), pp. 1120-28.

(or other political) behavior. For instance our data on which RSTs were Ready, and which of the others were Responders or Reluctants presented some expected patterns, but also some unexpected relationships (e.g. RSTs who were At-Large Representatives were not more likely to be Ready than other RSTs).

In addition to this classification of RSTs according to their "strategy-aptitude and behavior change", other methodological or operational innovations included the classification of Senate situations, and the development of methods to compare party cohesion and liberalism-conservatism scores across time periods as well as noting the need for state (or regional) standards to be used as yardsticks against which to measure performance. We also recognized the need for a method to measure party orientation or effort--i.e. to bear in mind that some votes with one's party majority are due to shared ideology rather than a feeling of party loyalty. Matthews' measure of party effort[164] (rather than the simple measure of party orientation developed here) should be used more extensively. Similarly, although we used Matthews' Index of Specialization[165] rather than develop a new tool to measure this aspect of legislative behavior, new insights would be gained by developing a better instrument and applying it to both the Senate and the previously uncharted House.

Other suggested areas of research which flow from

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[164] Op. cit., pp. 133-40.

[165] Ibid., p. 275.

this dissertation include improved application of the several operational definitions and methods developed or suggested here. In addition, a study which adds other Representatives who tried for other statewide offices would contribute to our knowledge about progressive ambition. As noted above, traditional studies of recruitment have collected data on the characteristics of decision-makers but often failed to test their effect upon behavior. Our focus in this study was upon the relationship of ambition and legislative behavior, but further studies examining the impact of previous political experience upon legislative behavior may be fruitful despite the evidence of the difficulty of explaining legislative behavior. For instance, Matthews' work on the effect of prior office experience upon Senatorial behavior should be replicated, in order to determine whether the relationships he uncovered were merely a function of the particular men, issues, and sessions he studied.

Finally, this research has contributed to the demonstration that opportunity structures are dynamic and not static. Schlesinger developed a picture of these structures at a single instant, but he recognized it was dynamic. What makes it dynamic is that politicians, with ambition stemming from other sources (e.g. self-motivation, or a supply of resources--including their own wealth, such as the Kennedys' or millionaire RST Resnick's) can overcome the advantages the opportunity structure may provide. This results in new patterns which encourage the political ambitions of others.

We began this dissertation with a quote from Mayor Lindsay suggesting how his ambition was limited by opportunity. One of the consequences of a study done over a period of years is that some comments may become dated or inapplicable. But Lindsay's change of party affiliation in August 1971 reinforces the comments made above--the opportunity structure is only one source of ambition, and those who are strongly motivated and highly endowed with political assets may seek to overcome an apparent lack of opportunity.

APPENDIX

NOMINATION STRUGGLE ACCOUNTS

Eighty-five Representatives sought the Senatorial nomination in the ten election years between 1950 and 1968. This Appendix presents accounts of their nomination struggles--who competed against the RST for the nomination, and how serious was the challenge.

Analyses of state career patterns examine the office experience and other characteristics of the nominee, but do not ask how close these men came to not surviving the competition for the nomination. Some state parties have very clear patterns--e.g. more than 30% of Nebraska's Republican Senatorial nominees served in Congress as their last public office, and no Governor went directly from that office to the Senate--and we would expect, therefore, little opposition when a candidate with the predominant office experience seeks the nomination. But in 1954 Nebraska's Rep. Carl Curtis and Gov. Robert Crosby were locked in a tight race (along with five other candidates). Similarly, more than 30% of the nominees of the Connecticut Democratic Party between 1914 and 1958 used Congress as their penultimate office before becoming a Senatorial nominee. Rep. Thomas Dodd faced no opposition for the nomination there in 1956, but in 1962 Rep. Frank Kowalski had serious competition

(so serious in fact that Kowalski never cleared the legal requirement of getting 20% of the convention vote in order to run in the primary).

The accounts of the nomination struggles faced by RSTs, therefore, will show some instances where the patterns noted in Ambition and Politics are not contested, and other instances where RSTs faced more (or less) competition than would have been expected if only the penultimate office patterns were used to predict nomination contests.

These accounts are drawn largely from the New York Times and Congressional Quarterly and specific page references are only rarely given, except when there is some controversy or difference of opinion. Occassionally other books and articles on the politics of a state or region, or biographies were used to supplement these sources.

After each account, an analytical summary is attached which summarizes the Senate situation, competitiveness of the Senate seat, the penultimate office pattern for Senatorial nominees of that party reported in Ambition and Politics (i.e. for the period ending in 1958), the degree of competition for the nomination, and the source of the struggle for the designation. Certain symbols are used there, which are explained elsewhere in this study. But the use of the symbols I, II, III, and IV for Senate situations, and AA, A, B, C, and D for the degree of struggle for the nomination can be noted here briefly. Senate situations designated I are those in which the incumbent is of the same party as the RST who runs for re-nomination; II--the incumbent

of the same party as the RST does not seek re-election; III --the opposing party incumbent seeks re-election; and IV--the incumbent of the other party does not seek re-election. Nomination struggles designated AA are those in which the RST runs unopposed or gets over 90% of the vote; A--the RST wins by more than a 2-1 margin over his nearest competitor; B--the RST's margin is less than 2-1; C--the RST loses, but polls more than half of the winner's number of votes; and D --the RST fails to get half of the number of votes received by the winner.

The nomination contest accounts are arranged chronologically, and by alphabetical order of the state within that.

1950 California Douglas Democrat RSL

When Representative Helen Gahagan Douglas announced on October 5, 1949 for the Senate seat held by fellow-Democrat Sheridan Downey, a liberal-conservative factional fight was anticipated. Although there was a change in the combatants, the factional fight did take place.

Sen. Downey, who had differed with the Truman administration on several issues, almost immediately announced his intention to run for re-election. But by March he was ready to withdraw from the race due to health reasons. Some of his supporters urged him to delay that announcement while they looked for another candidate and on March 2nd he said he had changed his mind and would still run. By March 28th they had found an opponent for Mrs.

Douglas and Sen. Downey announced his forthcoming retirement and urged the nomination of Manchester Boddy, the publisher of the Los Angeles Daily News. The Downey devotees became Boddy backers.

There was speculation that the opposition to Douglas of such party leaders as William Malone was based on their fear of the liberal--or as they called it the "radical"--faction, and also on the fact that those who had been favored by Downey in patronage matters were certainly to suffer at the hands of Douglas.[166]

She received 735,000 votes to Boddy's 379,000; conservative State Senator Earl Desmond received 97,000. Of these votes cast for Democrats, Douglas received 60.7%, Boddy 31.3%, and Desmond 8%. The Senatorial election campaign was a bitterly fought contest, which Nixon won by 681,000 votes; Douglas received only 40.8% of the vote.

Analytical Summary: Douglas (D)

Senate Situation: Democratic incumbent was running at the time of announcement, but subsequently withdrew (I).

Senate Competition: Democrats won 3 of previous 5 elections for President, Senator, and Governor (Competitive).

Career pattern: Congress (30-39%).

Nomination struggle competition: High--less than 2-1 over nearest competitor (B).

Nomination struggle source: non-office holder.

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[166]Dean R. Cresap, Party Politics in the Golden State (Los Angeles: Haynes Foundation, 1954), pp. 83-4.

1950 California Nixon Republican RSW

Representative Richard Nixon's nomination as the Republican Senatorial candidate in 1950 was made behind the scenes and not in the formal June primary. Nixon was in his second term as a Congressman from the 12th Congressional District that stretched from Los Angeles to his native Whittier. He had received some fame from the Hiss case when he served on the House Un-American Activities Committee.

There were two potentially serious contenders for the GOP nomination besides Nixon. One was Los Angeles County Supervisor Raymond Darby. But the decision had been made already by powerful forces that included the so-called "major axis" of the Los Angeles Times, San Francisco Chronical, and the Oakland Tribune.[167] Kyle Palmer of the Los Angeles Times notified Darby of the decision and convinced him to run for Lieutenant Governor instead. But when they tried to prevent a challenge to Gov. Earl Warren from his Lieutenant Governor Goodwin Knight it involved an endorsement of the latter for re-election. They then had to notify Darby that 1950 was not his year for state office.

A second competitor was Superior Court Judge Frederick F. Houser, a former Lieutenant Governor. He even managed to win the endorsement by a 6-3 vote of the subcommittee on Senatorial endorsements of the candidate committee of the California Republican Assembly. But the full

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[167] The term was used by John Gunther as quoted in Joseph P. Harris, California Politics (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), p. 59; the account of this nomination is taken from Cresap, op. cit., pp. 81-5.

committee overruled its subordinate and endorsed Nixon, by a narrow 13-12 vote. Houser got the picture and withdrew from the race.

As Dean Cresap noted apologetically, "The foregoing account may not fully and accurately describe the pre-primary activities of 1950, but it is a fact that, by the time of the primary elections, single Republican candidates sought nomination for United States senator, for governor, and for lieutenant governor."[168]

Actually Nixon did face token opposition from two Republicans (Ulysses Grant Bixby Meyer, and Albert Levitt) and from the cross-filed Democratic candidates. He received 95% of the votes cast for registered Republican candidates.

Analytical Summary: Nixon (R)

Senate situation: Democratic incumbent was running at the time of announcement, but subsequently withdrew (III).

Senate competition: Republicans won 2 of previous 5 elections for President, Senator, and Governor (Competitive).

Career pattern: Statewide office (30-39%)

Nomination struggle competition: None--received 95% of votes cast for Republicans in the cross-filed primary that included Democrats (AA).

1950 Colorado Carroll Democrat RSL

Governor William Lee Knous and Representative John A. Carroll were seen in December as headed for a primary battle for the Senate nomination. But President Truman appointed Knous to a judgeship clearing the way for Carroll

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[168]Cresap, op.cit., p. 82.

who won the nomination unopposed. Party harmony was deemed essential as the Democrats felt they could beat the Republican incumbent Eugene Millikan.

But Carroll, who had represented Denver and the 1st Congressional District for four years, was defeated by 29,292 votes receiving 46.7%.

Analytical Summary: Carroll (D)

Senate situation: Republican incumbent ran for re-election (III).

Senate competition: Democrats won 4 of previous 7 elections for President, Senator, and Governor (Competitive).

Career pattern: Statewide (over 50%)

Nomination struggle competition: Unopposed (AA).

1950 Florida Smathers Democrat RSW

Representative George Smathers successfully challenged the incumbent Senator Claude Pepper. Smathers was from Miami in populous Dade County (with approximately one-fourth of the registered Democrats), a Pepper stronghold (although the latter resided in Tallahassee). Although Smathers had earned a reputation as a Southern liberal in his two terms as Representative of the 4th Congressional District, he was to the right of Pepper. He waged his campaign as a conservative, attacking Pepper as pro-labor, pro-Negro, and pro-Communist.

Analytical Summary: Smathers (D)

Senate situation: Democratic incumbent ran for re-nomination (I).

Senate competition: Democrats won all 6 previous elections for President, Senator, and Governor (Safe).

Career pattern: Statewide (30-39%) and Administrative (30-39%).

Nomination struggle competition: High--winner had less than 55% (B).

Nomination struggle source: Incumbent.

1950 Indiana Jacobs Democrat T

On May 2, 1950 Rep. Andrew Jacobs, Sr., 44, was nominated for re-election to his second term in the House of Representatives from his Indianapolis district. In June he began campaigning for the Senatorial nomination to be made by the Democratic State Party Convention. He had been included in early speculation about potential candidates to oppose Republican Sen. Homer Capehart's bid for a second term.

His late entry was said to have been supported by Gov. Henry Schricker, although he made no effort to get support for Jacobs until the eve of the convention. The first candidate to announce and the eventual nominee was Alexander Campbell. Campbell, 43, had been an Assistant Attorney General in the Truman administration, and was a United States Attorney for northern Indiana before that. Also seeking the nomination was Professor Charles Price, who had some CIO support.

The convention vote was 1453 for Campbell, 363 for Jacobs, and 207 for Price. Campbell went on to defeat in November, gaining only 46.7% of the vote. But Jacobs was also defeated in his attempt for re-election to the House.

Analytical Summary: Jacobs (D)

Senate situation: Republican incumbent ran for re-election (III).

Senate competition: Democrats won only 1 of previous 7 elections for President, Senator, and Governor ("Hopeless").

Career pattern: Law Enforcement (30-39%).

Nomination struggle competition: Winner received 72% of the convention vote to RST's 18% (D).

Nomination struggle source: Assistant Attorney General (U.S.).

1950 Oklahoma Monroney Democrat RSW

The battle for the Democratic nomination for Senator needed two primaries before it was settled. The major contenders were four-term incumbent Elmer Thomas, and twelve-year veteran in the House from Oklahoma City (the 5th Congressional District) A.S. Mike Monroney. In the first primary Monroney led by 14,653 votes over Thomas, but could not win a majority as five other minor candidates were entered.

Monroney attacked Thomas' support of the Brannan Plan, as well as cuts in the Air Force made by Thomas' Military Appropriations subcommittee in the years prior to the Korean War. Thomas, in turn, accused Monroney of being a representative of city voters and against irrigation and flood control projects. He also offered his seniority as an argument for re-election.

Most of Monroney's lead in the first primary came from Oklahoma City and Tulsa, but he also cut into Thomas' rural base.

Monroney won the run-off primary and went to an easy victory in November getting 54.8% of the votes.

Analytical Summary: Monroney (D)

Senate situation: Democratic incumbent ran for

re-nomination (I).

Senate competition: Democrats won all 5 previous elections for President, Senator, and Governor (Safe).

Career pattern: Congress (over 40%)

Nomination struggle competition: High--run-off primary required (B).

Nomination struggle source: Incumbent.

1950 Pennsylvania Kunkel Republican T

The 1950 Pennsylvania Republican primary was one of the last tests for the Grundy faction. It was beaten decisively. Rep. John Kunkel was its standard bearer for Senator. His opponent was Governor James Duff.

There were reports that the Grundy faction was willing to give up its Senate fight if they could name the candidate for Governor. But when the county leaders met in late January 1950, forty-seven of the sixty-seven backed Duff. The Grundy group supported Jay Cooke for Governor. But Cooke, a Philadelphia investment banker who had been Stassen's manager in Pennsylvania in his bid for the Republican Presidential nomination in 1948, denied that he was part of any faction. And in fact several county leaders supported both Duff for Senator and Cooke for Governor. When fifty-one county leaders met in February to organize a slate, they endorsed Duff's nomination by acclamation, and his candidates for Governor (John Fine), Lt. Governor, and Secretary of Internal Affairs were accepted with only a smattering of expressed opposition (e.g. Cooke got five votes).

More was at stake in the primary than the Senatorial

and gubernatorial nominations. Control of the organization in anticipation of the 1952 Presidential campaign was at stake. And so was Duff's reputation. After the1948 national convention, Duff vowed to beat the Grundy machine which he felt had doublecrossed him when Sen. Edward Martin dropped his favorite son candidacy and the delegation supported Thomas E. Dewey.

As the primary campaign progressed, Kunkel was given little chance to win. Duff won easily, scoring better than a 2-1 victory. He carried fifty-one of the sixty-seven counties, and all but two wards in Philadelphia. The Grundy choice for Governor also lost, but polled over 150,000 votes more than Kunkel.

Analytical Summary: Kunkel (R)

Senate situation: Democratic incumbent ran for re-election (III).

Senate competition: Republicans won 3 of previous 5 elections for President, Senator, and Governor (Competitive).

Career pattern: Administrative (30-39%).

Nomination struggle competition: Winner had better than 2-1 margin over RST (D).

Nomination struggle source: Governor.

1950 South Dakota Case Republican RSW

In a safe one-party Republican state, Representative Francis Case challenged the two-term incumbent Senator Chan Gurney. Governor George Mickelson, who was elected in 1946 and re-elected in 1948 and who had been rumored as a Senatorial candidate, announced his retirement in early February.

The statement, giving family responsibilities as his reason, was made approximately two weeks before Rep. Case's official proclamation.

The Case-Gurney primary was waged primarily on personality. Case did have a lot of REA support against Gurney who was deemed unfriendly because of his public power position; Gurney ran behind Case in the rural areas. Gurney made few appearances in South Dakota, choosing to stay in Washington for much of the primary campaign.

Case received 59,300 votes (58.2%) to Gurney's 42,800.

Case had served seven terms as Representative of the 2nd Congressional District. The other Republican Representative (from the 1st Congressional District) was only in his first term having replaced Karl Mundt who had moved to the Senate.

Analytical Summary: Case (R)

Senate situation: Republican incumbent ran for renomination (I).

Senate competition: Republicans won all 7 previous elections for President, Senator, and Governor (Safe).

Career pattern: Congress (30-39%) and Administrative (30-39%).

Nomination struggle competition: High--winner received 58% of the vote (B).

Nomination struggle source: Incumbent.

1952 California McKinnon Democrat T

California's Senatorial primary in 1952 was unique. Cross-filing without any party designation on the ballot was

permitted. Sen. William Knowland was listed as the incumbent on both the Republican and Democratic primary ballots. Rep. Clinton McKinnon, a Democrat, was running in both primaries also. He was a 46 year old second termer from San Diego.

But the most unusual feature of the Democratic Senatorial primary was that the Republican incumbent won it --and by a very comfortable margin. Knowland gained 967,000 votes (60%) to McKinnon's 634,000 (40%). In the Republican primary Knowland's margin was of truly landslide proportions, winning 1,341,000 votes to McKinnon's 141,000--or about 90%.

Analytical Summary: McKinnon (D)

Senate situation: Republican incumbent ran for renomination; he also cross-filed in the Democratic primary (III).

Senate competition: Democrats won only 1 of previous 5 elections for President, Senator, and Governor ("Hopeless").

Career pattern: Congress (30-39%)

Nomination struggle competition: Republican incumbent Senator won Democratic primary with 60% of vote to RST's 40% (C).

Nomination struggle source: Republican incumbent Senator.

1952 Connecticut Ribicoff Democrat RSL

On July 28, 1952 Senator Brien McMahon died while he still had four years left to his term. Therefore Representative Abraham Ribicoff's Senatorial ambitions for 1952 could not have started before that date, and any changes found in his behavior in his last term as a Representative is not connected to his Senatorial ambition.

When McMahon died, the Democrats labeled as possible candidates included Ribicoff as well as Rep. John McGuire of Wallingford in the 3rd Congressional District. Also mentioned was Thomas Dodd who had been a special prosecutor at Nuremburg and who was a close friend of McMahon. The latter had lost control of the party to Chester Bowles and John Bailey in 1948. Dodd had run unsuccessfully for the Democratic nomination for Governor in 1948 losing in the nominating convention controlled by Bailey.

Other Democrats were mentioned as possible candidates in later days. The leading contender was Common Pleas Court Judge John Cotter of Hartford who had served as minority leader in the State House of Representatives. Also of Hartford was its former mayor Cyril Coleman. Ex-Governor Charles Welbert Snow who was Governor for two weeks in December 1946 to January 1947 was mentioned, as well as former Lieutenant Governor William Carroll. Superior Court Judge John Cullinan, and Mrs. Chase Going Woodhouse, former Representative from the 2nd Congressional District in the 79th and 81st Congresses and then special assistant to the Director of Price Stabilization, were noted too.

One Democrat who ostensibly gave up his job to run was A. Devitt Vanech, a Deputy Attorney-General. His announcement was a surprise to Connecticut party leaders who had never heard of him. The next day Republican Rep. Pat Hillings (California) charged that Vanech resigned to avoid a Congressional investigation on whether he had fraudulently acquired a license to practice law in Tennessee.

By August 13th, the New York Times said Ribicoff--from the 1st Congressional District--was moving into strong contention. They also reported that state party chairman Bailey could have the nomination himself for the asking. But Bailey--also of Hartford--threw his support to Ribicoff. Ribicoff was nominated on September 6th with the only other name placed in nomination being that of Vanech; he withdrew it before the convention worked its will.

A Hartford candidate was favored as the other Senator, as William Benton, running for re-election that year, was from Fairfield County (which was McMahon's home too).

In the general election, Ribicoff received 48.6% of the vote, losing by 28,960 votes.

Analytical Summary: Ribicoff (D)

Senate situation: Democratic incumbent died on July 28, 1952; election was to fill his term (II).

Senate competition: Democrats won 4 of previous 7 elections for President, Senator, and Governor (Competitive).

Career pattern: Congress (30-39%)

Nomination struggle competition: Unopposed (AA).

1952 Maryland Beall Republican RSW

In January 1952 Democratic Senator Herbert O'Conor announced his intention not to seek re-election. (O'Conor faced a primary challenge from Rep. Lansdale Sasscer.) Rep. J. Glenn Beall had already declared his candidacy. Two other Republicans also filed their intentions to run. One was Paul Robertson a local party leader in Baltimore, and the other was H. Grady Gore who was seeking his first

political office. The latter remained in the race, but lost to Beall by a 5-3 margin.

Beall had served in the House of Representatives from 1943 to 1953 (the 78th to 82nd Congresses) as the representative of the 6th Congressional District in Western Maryland.

Beall went on to beat George P. Mahoney who had beaten Rep. Sasscer in the Democratic primary. Beall received 52.5% of the vote.

Analytical Summary: Beall (R)

Senate situation: Democratic incumbent withdrew after RST entry (III).

Senate competition: Republicans won 3 of previous 5 elections for President, Senator, and Governor (Competitive).

Career pattern: Admistrative (40-49%).

Nomination struggle competition: High--RST was winner by 5-3 margin (B).

Nomination struggle source: First-time candidate.

1952 Maryland Sasscer Democrat T

Rep. Lansdale Sasscer was preparing to challenge incumbent Senator Herbert O'Conor in the Democratic primary, when the latter withdrew from the race. But the seven-term Representative soon drew opposition from George P. Mahoney who was the Democratic National Committeeman. Despite the support from most of the statewide Democratic organization including Baltimore leaders, Sasscer was not able to beat Mahoney in the primary.

Mahoney easily won Baltimore, and although he trailed

in the out-state vote, he received approximately 53% of the total statewide popular vote, and won the unit vote for the nomination. But he was not able to beat Rep. J. Glenn Beall in the Senate race, losing by 43,000 votes (he received 47.5% to Beall's 52.5%).

Analytical Summary: Sasscer (D)

Senate situation: Democratic incumbent withdrew after being challenged (I).

Senate competition: Democrats won 2 of previous 5 elections for President, Senator, and Governor (Competitive).

Career Pattern: Statewide (30-39%) and Administrative (30-39%).

Nomination struggle competition: High--winner had less than 55% to RST's 45% (C).

Nomination struggle source: Democratic national committeeman.

1952 Massachusetts Kennedy Democrat RSW

John F. Kennedy was unopposed in his quest for the Democratic Senatorial nomination in 1952. He was determined to seek statewide office, but was content to go for the office left uncovered by Governor Paul Dever. When the latter decided to seek re-election rather than attempt to unseat Sen. Henry Cabot Lodge, JFK took on that task. There was some speculation in the December before the election that Lodge may have alienated some important Bay State Republican leaders by leading the Eisenhower draft movement.

Kennedy represented the 11th Congressional District (Boston) in the 80th through 82nd Congresses.

Analytical Summary: Kennedy (D)

Senate situation: Republican incumbent ran for re-election (III).

Senate competition: Democrats won 3 of previous 6 elections for President, Senator, and Governor (Competitive).

Career pattern: No pattern.

Nomination struggle competition: Unopposed (AA).

1952 Michigan Potter Republican RSW

On April 18, 1951 Senator Arthur Vandenberg died. Democratic Governor G. Mennen Williams appointed Blair Moody to the seat.

Early speculation (February 1962) for the Republican nomination centered about the son of the late Senator, Arthur Vandenberg, Jr. The drawing power of the name was evident even to National Committeeman Arthur Summerfield, a conservative and a Taft supporter, as the victory of political unknown William Vandenberg as Lieutenant Governor in 1950 was still fresh in everyone's mind. Vandenberg was national chairman of Citizens for Eisenhower. He said he would enter the race only if it was deemed necessary to aid Eisenhower's nomination. When he announced his intention not to run (on February 15th), he said he would have become a candidate if a majority of the state Republican leaders had said he was the strongest candidate or if his candidacy would have greatly aided Ike's drive in the state. Vandenberg reported he found a lack of agreement on both factors. Pressure continued on him to become a candidate, but he remained with the Eisenhower team.

Former Governor Harry Kelly (1943-1947) announced he would not be a candidate at this time too. The first candidate to announce was John Martin, Jr. of Grand Rapids (Vandenberg's home), the elected State Auditor General. His candidacy was cooly received by party leaders because of his reputation of being independent of the state organization.

Representative Charles Potter of Cheboygan announced his candidacy on April 10th. He was the candidate of the dominant Summerfield faction.[169] When the primary was held in August there were four candidates: Potter, Martin, former Lieutenant Governor Dr. Eugene Keyes of Dearborn, and the executive secretary to the Mayor of Detroit (and ex-newsman) Clifford Prevost. Potter won the primary easily.

Analytical Summary: Potter (R)

Senate situation: Republican incumbent died April 18, 1951. Democratic appointee ran for re-election (III).

Senate competition: Republicans won 4 of previous 6 elections for President, Senator, and Governor (Competitive).

Career pattern: Congress (30-39%) and Administrative (30-39%).

Nomination struggle competition: High--RST had less than 2-1 margin (B).

Nomination struggle source: Nearest competitor was State Auditor General (elective office).

1952 Montana Mansfield Democrat RSW

1952 proved to be a bad year for incumbent Senators with nine being defeated. One of the four Republicans

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[169] See Stephen B. Sarasohn and Vera H. Sarasohn, Political Party Patterns in Michigan (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1957).

defeated was Zales Ecton, a member of the Conservative Class of 1946. His conqueror was Representative Mike Mansfield, a five-term legislator.

Neither candidate had primary opposition. The tranquility was needed as the final race in November proved to be a squeaker with Mansfield edging out the incumbent by 5,375 votes or 51.1%. The peace was needed too, because there was a five-man race to succeed Mansfield as the Democratic nominee in the 1st Congressional District. The winner was State Supreme Court Judge Lee Metcalf, who went on to the Senate himself later.

Analytical Summary: Mansfield (D)

Senate situation: Republican incumbent ran for re-election (III).

Senate competition: Democrats won 3 of previous 4 elections for President, Senator, and Governor (Safe).

Career pattern: Administrative (30-39%) and Law Enforcement (30-39%).

Nomination struggle competition: Unopposed (AA).

1952 North Dakota Aandahl Republican T

The Republican Senatorial primary in North Dakota in 1952 was a classic example of factionalism. Sen. William Langer, completing his second term in the Senate, was the leader of the Non-Partisan League faction. Rep. Fred Aandahl was serving his first term in the House after serving three two-year terms as Governor; he was the leader of the Republican Organizing Committee faction. The latter was formed by conservative Republicans in 1943 to fight the more liberal NPL.

Langer received 107,905 votes (58%) to Aandahl's 78,359. The primary victory was sufficiently large to sweep in enough NPL state legislative candidates to take control away from the ROC in one house of the legislature.[170] And the factional bitterness was strong enough for Aandahl to receive a write-in vote of over 10% of the votes cast in the November election, which Langer won easily receiving 66% of the total vote.

Analytical Summary: Aandahl (R)

Senate situation: Republican incumbent ran for re-nomination (I).

Senate competition: Republicans won all 7 previous elections for President, Senator, and Governor (Safe).

Career pattern: No pattern.

Nomination struggle competition: High--winner received 58% to RST's 42% (C).

Nomination struggle source: Incumbent.

1952 Tennessee Gore Democrat RSW

In June 1951 Senator Kenneth McKellar announced his intention to seek re-election to his seventh term as Senator. He had been the only popularly elected occupant of his Senate seat, beginning service on March 4, 1917.

On February 2, 1952 Representative Albert Gore, of the 4th Congressional District located in Middle Tennessee which had been anti-Crump territory,[171] announced his

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[170] Paul David, Malcolm Moos, and Ralph M. Goldman, Presidential Nominating Politics in 1952, Vol.IV: The Middle West (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1954), p. 243.

[171] V.O. Key, Jr., Southern Politics, p. 72.

candidacy for that Senate seat. There were two other candidates, but they received only nominal support and the race was between the 83 year old Senator and the 45 year old Representative; these other candidates were Dr. John Neal and Herman Ross.

Gore claimed a "middle of the road" record, but with heavy support of TVA and opposition to the Brannan Plan. Gore also emphasized McKellar's age.

McKellar was an early supporter of TVA, but became disenchanted when TVA head David Lillenthal wouldn't clear appointments with McKellar or Ed Crump who claimed the right to patronage. McKellar made only one speech and relied on Crump to deliver the vote in Memphis.

But the latter did not. Gore ran close to McKellar in Memphis, which was the latter's home city. In view of this factor and some others, the New York Times reported the following post-election speculation, "Political circles reported rumors of 'deals' and 'trade-offs' most of them hinting that the forces of Edward H. Crump, 83-year old political boss of Memphis, had failed to pile up legendary voting majorities for Sen. McKellar because of behind-the-scenes alliances that would assure the defeat of Gov. Browning, the arch political enemy of Mr. Crump." Additional evidence is the Gore-Browning split while both were "anti-Bourbon" with similar philosophies. But Browning was seen by some as an albatross around the neck of the anti-Bourbon faction as he accomodated to the right to work law, crushed a strike, and was indifferent on tax reform and was

considered politically inept.[172] Frank Clement the Bourbon candidate beat Browning ("a Bourbon deserter")[173] in the primary.

To summarize, the race was clearly a factional dispute between the reform movement or anti-Bourbons and the older conservatives or Bourbon faction of which Crump was a part.

Analytical Summary: Gore (D)

Senate situation: Democratic incumbent ran for re-nomination (I).

Senate competition: Democrats won all 6 previous elections for President, Senator, and Governor (Safe).

Career pattern: Congress (over 40%) and Law Enforcement (30-39%).

Nomination struggle competition: High--winner received 56% (B).

Nomination struggle source: Incumbent.

1952 Texas Beckworth Democrat T

Senator Tom Connally was 75 and in his fourth term when he was being challenged very hard by State Attorney General Price Daniel (42) for re-nomination. Connally was being attacked for his liberalism (especially on foreign affairs) while the Truman administration was being charged with graft and socialism.

On April 13th, Tom Connally withdrew from the race.

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[172] Norman Parks, "Tennessee Politics Since Kefauver and Reece: A 'Generalist' View," Journal of Politics, XXVIII (Feb. 1966), p. 149.

[173] Ibid.

Several names were mentioned in the immediate wake of speculation--such as two-term Rep. Lloyd Bentsen (31), eight-term Rep. William Poage (53), ex-Representatives Martin Dies (52) who had announced for Representative At-Large, Ed Gosset (50), and Maury Maverick (57). Ex-Governor Coke Stevenson, the conservative faction candidate who had lost the Senatorial nomination by 87 votes (out of approximately one million cast) to then Rep. Lyndon B. Johnson in 1948, was also mentioned. But the only serious challenge came from seven-term Representative Lindley Beckworth (39), who entered the primary only 3 days before the May 5th deadline.

Price Daniel won easily gaining about 71% of the vote to Beckworth's 22%; E.W. Napier polled the remaining 7%. The Republicans never fielded a candidate.

Analytical Summary: Beckworth (D)

Senate situation: Democratic incumbent withdrew from race before RST's entry (II).

Senate competition: Democrats won all 6 previous elections for President, Senator, and Governor (Safe).

Career pattern: Congress (30-39%).

Nomination struggle competition: Winner won by more than 3-1 over RST (D).

Nomination struggle source: State Attorney General

1952 Utah Granger Democrat RSL

Representative Walter Granger's attempt to capture the seat of conservative Republican Senator Arthur Watkins received White House endorsement in January 1952 when President Truman expressed hope that Granger would not have

any primary opposition. He did have opposition, however, in the person of Herbert Maw who had served two terms as Governor from 1941 to 1949. But the opposition proved to be of the token type as Granger received approximately 75% of the votes in the primary. Maw had been a leading liberal and a target of the Deseret News (the Mormon church's newspaper) in his 1948 drive for re-election.

Granger did meet more formidable foes in the final election, when Watkins got 54% of the vote and Eisenhower's plurality was more than double Watkins'.

Granger had served six terms in the House. The other U.S. Representative was a Democrat too, Mrs. Reva Bosone of Salt Lake City, but she was only in her second term. In addition he was a former Mormon bishop, while she was a non-Mormon.

Analytical Summary: Granger (D)

Senate situation: Republican incumbent ran for re-election (III).

Senate competition: Democrats won only 1 of previous 4 elections for President, Senator, and Governor ("Hopeless").

Career pattern: Congress (over 50%).

Nomination struggle competition: Low--RST won by 3-1 (A).

Nomination struggle source: ex-Governor.

1952 Washington Jackson Democrat RSW

Representative Henry Jackson had been mentioned for the Democratic nomination to oppose Senator Harry Cain as much as two years before he actually became a candidate.

Also mentioned was Representative Hugh Mitchell. But a year before the election both were listed as cool to the idea of tackling Cain. Mitchell ran for Governor in 1952 after a primary with a State Senator made prominent by heading a legislative crime investigating committee (Albert Rosellini, who did become Governor in 1957). Jackson was unopposed in the Senatorial primary.

In May 1951 President Truman announced the resignation of Monrad Wallgren from the Federal Power Commission stating he would run for either Governor or Senator. But Wallgren, who had been Governor, and a Representative and Senator before that, did not become a candidate.

Analytical Summary: Jackson (D)

Senate situation: Republican incumbent ran for re-election (III).

Senate competition: Democrats won 2 of previous 4 elections for President, Senator, and Governor (Competitive).

Career pattern: Congress (over 50%).

Nomination struggle competition: Unopposed (AA).

1954 Alabama Battle Democrat T

Rep. Laurie Battle, a four-term Representative from Birmingham challenged Sen. John Sparkman for his seat just two years after the latter was the Vice-Presidential candidate. Many viewed this struggle as a continuation of the "loyalists" versus State Righters factional fight. Sparkman was endorsed by organized labor, the small Negro electorate, and Sen. Hill. Battle had the endorsement of a majority of city newspapers.

Battle's campaign charged Sparkman's civil rights record was too liberal. Sparkman claimed that Battle was backed by Republicans, "Eisencrats", and Dixiecrats.

Two other candidates were in the race, but they drew only 20,000 votes combined (one was retired Rear Admiral John Crommelin, an ultra-conservative, and the other was 75 year old William Irby). Sparkman received 58% of the votes (Battle drew 38%), and a run-off primary was averted. Sparkman polled 82,5% of the vote against a Republican opponent in the General election in November.

Analytical Summary: Battle (D)

Senate situation: Democratic incumbent ran for re-nomination (I).

Senate competition: Democrats won 4 of previous 5 elections for President, Senator, and Governor (Safe).

Career pattern: Congress (over 40%).

Nomination struggle competition: High--winner received 58% to RST's 38% (C).

Nomination struggle source: Incumbent.

1954 California Yorty Democrat RSL

In November 1953 the statewide California Democratic Council (CDC) was formed, and in February 1954 it met in convention to endorse a slate of candidates for the June primary. The major struggle for the Senatorial nomination took place there.[174]

Several prominent names had been mentioned as

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[174]The major account of that convention, from which this description was taken, is Francis Carney, op.cit.

potential Senatorial candidates. The New York Times had noted Adlai Stevenson, former Secretary of the Navy Dan Kimball, and former Atomic Energy Commission chairman Gordon Dean. Carney noted that Cranston had reported soliciting General Omar Bradley, who would not become a candidate because he felt soldiers should not go into politics, and Robert Hutchins, who wanted a guarantee that there would be no primary opposition.

So the leading contender for the nomination was Representative Sam Yorty, a two-term Congressman from Los Angeles. Dewey Anderson of Los Altos who was director of the Public Affairs Institute, a research organization in Washington, was considered a contender by the New York Times but never mentioned by Carney.

Yorty had conducted an active pre-convention campaign getting promises of financial assistance as well as backing of some party, labor, and CDC leaders. Although he had a liberal record--and emphasized this in his attempts to woo CDC delegates--his campaign stressed a strong Air Force rather than the ideological issues which would have appealed to the CDC. He was also distrusted by some as a loner concerned about himself only; he had always been alarmed about the threat of Communist subversion, and some of his backers were labelling opponents as "Reds" or "left-wingers".

When George Miller, a leader of the CDC from Northern California, refused to endorse Yorty most of the Northern California delegations and some of the Southern delegations followed his lead. Yorty forces then tried to get the

endorsement at the Saturday evening February 6th session, but a charge of stampede was successfully hurled at the Yorty people and the roll call was postponed until Sunday morning.

That night Prof. Peter Odegard of the Political Science Department at Berkeley made a dynamic speech to the "liberal caucus" and emerged as the alternative to Yorty. Odegard agreed to run on two conditions: 1) that all the CDC endorsed candidates ran as a slate, and 2) that he received overt support from Miller, Richard Graves (the CDC-endorsed gubernatorial candidate) and Edward Heller, the party finance committee chairman. Miller and Graves agreed, but Heller could not be reached--either because of the lateness of the hour or because Yorty had already received a commitment from him. Odegard sought out Alan Cranston, the CDC President, and asked him to serve as his finance chairman. Cranston said he would have to check with Heller and with the members of the CDC finance committee. In addition to these problems, Odegard's overnight candidacy had not been cleared with the University of California or with his wife and family. Everything combined led him to withdraw his candidacy.

The result was a 949 to 383 endorsement of Yorty over Dewey Anderson.

The Democratic primary held in June included Yorty, two registered Democratic rivals, as well as the Republican incumbent Tom Kuchel and the Prohibition Party candidate. Yorty received 75% of the votes cast for registered Democrats, and had almost a 5-1 margin over his nearest Democratic

challenger, lawyer Leo Gallagher. His margin over Kuchel in the Democratic primary was narrower--less than 2-1.

But in the general election in November, Tom Kuchel, who had been appointed to fill out the vacancy occuring from Nixon's resignation to serve as Vice President, was the winner. Yorty received 46.1% of that vote.

Analytical Summary: Yorty (D)

Senate situation: Republican incumbent had been appointed to replace the Republican who resigned to become Vice-President (III).

Senate competition: Democrats won only 1 of previous 5 elections for President, Senator, and Governor ("Hopeless").

Career pattern: Congress (30-39%).

Nomination struggle competition: Low--RST had 5-1 margin over nearest Democratic competitor in cross-filed primary that included Republicans (A).

Nomination struggle source: non-office holder.

1954 Delaware Warburton Republican RSL

In the campaign prior to the nominating convention in Delaware, Representative-At-Large Herbert Warburton was expecting opposition from Mrs. Vera Davis, a State Representative from Dover. But it never materialized, and his nomination was unanimous. Rep. Warburton was in his first term as Representative. He had been city solicitor of Wilmington from 1949 to 1952.

Despite a convention challenge to Democratic incumbent J. Allen Frear, Jr., he won re-election by a relatively safe 56.9% (but only a margin of 20,122) over Warburton.

Analytical Summary: Warburton (R)

Senate situation: Democratic incumbent ran for re-election (III).

Senate competition: Republicans won 4 of previous 6 elections for President, Senator, and Governor (Competitive).

Career pattern: No office (30-39%)

Nomination struggle competition: Unopposed (AA).

1954 Iowa Martin Republican RSW

Representative Thomas Martin of Iowa City representing the 1st Congressional District had no primary opposition. At an August 1953 meeting of the state Republican Central Committee the name of Governor William Beardsley (1949-1954) was mentioned along with Martin's as possible Senatorial candidates. The Governor did not become a candidate for office and died on November 21, 1954.

Martin beat incumbent Guy Gillette getting 52.3% of the vote.

Analytical Summary: Martin (R)

Senate situation: Democratic incumbent ran for re-election (III).

Senate competition: Republicans won 5 of previous 7 elections for President, Senator, and Governor (Safe).

Career pattern: Statewide (30-39%).

Nomination struggle competition: Unopposed (AA).

1954 Montana D'Ewart Republican RSL

Representative Wesley D'Ewart, the Republican Representative from the 2nd Congressional District, faced primary opposition from Robert Yellowtail. The latter was

a Crow Indian leader from Grass Lodge, not far from Custer's last stand. D'Ewart received over 80% of the primary vote. But he did not fare as well against incumbent Senator James Murray; he did come close, however, losing by only 1,728 votes (or 49.6%).

Analytical Summary: D'Ewart (R)

Senate situation: Democratic incumbent ran for re-election (III).

Senate competition: Republicans won 2 of previous 6 elections for President, Senator, and Governor (Competitive).

Career pattern: No pattern

Nomination struggle competition: Low--RST better than 4-1 over opponent (A).

Nomination struggle source: Non-office holder--Indian leader.

1954 Nebraska Curtis Republican RSW

Senator Dwight Griswold had been elected in November 1952 to complete the remaining two years of Senator Kenneth Wherry's term, who had died in 1951. Griswold had not announced his intention to run, but his seat was viewed as safe if he did. On April 12, 1954 Griswold died of a heart attack.

Governor Robert Crosby had not intended to run for the Senate. But he now announced his candidacy and declared that his appointee would be someone who would not run. This ended speculation that he might resign and have himself appointed to the Senate seat--a ploy that does not rest well with voters. Crosby was elected Governor in 1952 after having served as Lieutenant Governor since 1947. Crosby was trying to buck a Nebraska tradition of never sending a

Governor directly to the Senate. He was also facing criticism on the issue of tax assessment equalization. Many of the pro-Eisenhower elements in the state backed him.

Also joining the race was Terry Carpenter who had served in the House of Representatives in the 73rd Congress (1933-1935) as a Democrat and who had sought statewide Democratic nominations in 1934, 1936, 1948, and 1950. He had changed party affiliation in 1952 and was a State Senator.

Representative Carl Curtis also changed his plans to seek re-election and entered the race. He had served eight terms in the House and was generally identified as a conservative.

The fourth serious contender was David Martin who was state party chairman from 1949 to 1954. He also was considered a conservative and came from the same county as Curtis. His candidacy was viewed as harmful to Curtis.

There were three other minor candidates in the race: Arthur Nielsen and James Harrison of Omaha, and John Overgaard of Lincoln.

Representative Curtis was the winner in the primary with approximately 40% of the vote. He then went on to easily defeat ex-Governor Keith Neville in the general election for the full six-year term, receiving 61% of the vote.

Analytical Summary: Curtis (R)

Senate situation: Republican incumbent died April 12, 1954 (II).

Senate competition: Republicans won all 8 previous elections for President, Senator, and Governor (Safe).

Career pattern: Congress (40-49%).

Nomination struggle competition: High--winner received 40% of the vote in a seven-man race (B).

Nomination struggle source: Governor was nearest competitor.

1954 Nebraska Hruska Republican RSW

The deadline for filing for the August primaries was 5 P.M. on July 1st. Senator Hugh Butler, who had been re-elected to his third term just two years before, died at 9:30 P.M. on July 1, 1954. Despite the fact that two people rushed to file their candidacy having mistakenly assumed the deadline was midnight, the nomination was to be made by the party state central committee--and within three days of the occurrence of the vacancy.

On July 3rd, Representative Roman Hruska of Omaha was nominated. Hruska was serving his first term as a Representative. He beat out his predecessor ex-Rep. Howard Buffet also of Omaha, who had served from 1943 to 1949, and 1951 to 1953 before retiring, by a 33 to 15 vote.[175] He won the election easily gaining 61% of the vote.

Analytical Summary: Hruska (R)

Senate situation: Republican incumbent died July 1, 1954 (II).

Senate competition: Republicans won all 8 previous elections for President, Senator, and Governor

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[175]See Alan Clem, "Popular Representation and Senate Vacancies," Midwest Journal of Political Science, X (February, 1966), p. 55.

(Safe).

Career pattern: Congress (40-49+).

Nomination struggle competition: Low--33-15 vote in state central committee (A).

Nomination struggle source: ex-Representative.

1954 New Hampshire Cotton Republican RSW

Representative Norris Cotton's Senatorial ambitions for 1954 could not have started before the closing days of the 1st session of the 83rd Congress. Senator Charles Tobey died on July 24, 1953 and the session adjourned on August 3rd.

The primary became a close three-cornered race. The man appointed to the vacancy, Robert Upton, sought to hold on to it. He was joined by Wesley Powell, who had lost to Tobey by only 1300 votes in the 1950 primary. Powell was Senator Styles Bridges' administrative assistant and had been his campaign manager for his two previous Senatorial races in 1942 and 1948.

Cotton, representing the 2nd Congressional District, was in his fourth term and was serving on the powerful Appropriations committee. He had always maintained close friendly relations with the state Republican organization and his electorate. He had conducted frequent regional meetings in town halls and post offices throughout his district; and he repeated the technique in the other Congressional District during the primary battle. His newsletters, written in a folksy humorous manner, had been reprinted frequently in the states' newspapers.

All three candidates identified themselves with

President Eisenhower, but all considered themselves conservatives. Cotton did make an issue of his eight years of experience in the House of Representatives, to which Upton responded by pointing to his own experience in the New Hampshire House of Representatives--i.e. his service in 1911. Upton's major political experience had been as party vice chairman from 1937 to 1952.

Cotton was the winner with 40%, Upton had 33%, and Powell 27%. He received 60% in the November general election.

Analytical Summary: Cotton (R)

Senate situation: Republican incumbent died July 24, 1953. Appointed Republican incumbent ran for re-nomination (I).

Senate competition: Republicans won all 7 previous elections for President, Senator, and Governor (Safe).

Career pattern: Congress (over 50%) and Statewide (30-39%).

Nomination struggle competition: High--winner 40%, nearest competitor in 3-man race 33% (B).

Nomination struggle source: Nearest competitor was the appointed incumbent (a former state legislator and ex-state party chairman).

1954 New Jersey Howell Democrat RSL

The case study of the nomination of Representative Charles Howell as the Democratic candidate for the United States Senate, could be cited as evidence for several conclusions or hypotheses offered in the literature of political science.

There is some evidence of the systems nature of

of our political parties; i.e. the Democratic choice, in part, depended on whom the Republicans would select. There is evidence that the possibility of a primary frightened a potential candidate away. There is some evidence that the nature of the Representative's district may effect his chances of succeeding to higher office; e.g. a Democrat who won a House seat in a normally Republican district was now at a disadvantage because the party feared the loss of that seat if he ran for another office.

The "leading contender" mentioned the earliest was State Treasurer Archibald Alexander who had lost the two previous Senate races in 1948 and 1952. But in both of those races he ran ahead of the Democratic ticket. In 1954, however, there were some party leaders who were dissatisfied with him and were urging other possibilities.

He was not regarded as a strong candidate, and there was speculation that his chances for nomination were tied to whom the Republicans nominated. If it were to be ex-Rep. Clifford Case (or Rep. Robert Kean), then the Democrats would hunt for a stronger candidate. If it were the incumbent Senator Robert Hendrickson--who was not regarded by Republicans as a strong candidate and was therefore under pressure to withdraw--or someone else, Alexander was seen as the favorite.

One of those prominently mentioned, reportedly judged to be the best candidate, and reportedly having the backing of Governor Robert Meyner, was Dwight Palmer a retiring industrialist. Palmer said he was interested but

would not step in the path of Alexander; friends reported he feared a primary battle. Palmer refused to run even after a meeting with Meyner on February 26th. He later was appointed to Meyner's cabinet as State Highway Commissioner and was slated to move into Alexander's position as State Treasurer.

Upon Palmer's withdrawal focus shifted to Representatives Howell and Peter Rodino, Jr. The latter had been representing the 10th Congressional District in Newark since his election in 1948.

On February 28th the race was reported to be between Alexander andHowell with Rodino as a dark-horse. On that date Palmer again refused to run and Meyner ordered the three prospective candidates to decide among themselves. Representative Harrison Williams, Jr. was mentioned by some as a compromise candidate, but was basically ruled out because his district had been Republican for the previous 20 years, and it was feared no other Democrat could retain that seat. He did win re-election in 1954, but lost in 1956 and became a successful Senatorial candidate in 1958.

On March 4th the nomination was offered to Howell after Alexander apparently withdrew, and on March 9th agreed to run.

Howell was serving his third term in the House, representing the 4th Congressional District which included his home city of Trenton and home county of Mercer (as well as Burlington County). From May 1953 to February 1, 1954 he had served as state party chairman, and was popular with

all factions in the party.

On March 11th Newark City Commissioner Salvatore Bontempo entered the Democratic primary. His candidacy was attributed to dissatisfaction with not having been appointed to a position by Meyner. He wasn't viewed as a threat as Howell had the endorsements of all 21 county party organizations. Two days later Bontempo withdrew after a two-hour meeting with Meyner.

After much maneuvering the Republicansnamed former Representative Clifford Case who went on to beat Howell by a margin of 3,370 votes or 50.1%.

Analytical Summary: Howell (D)

Senate situation: Republican incumbent did not run for re-election (IV)

Senate competition: Democrats won only 1 of previous 6 elections for President, Senator, and Governor ("Hopeless").

Career pattern: No pattern

Nomination struggle competition: Unopposed (AA).

1954 Ohio Bender Republican RSW

Two days before the 1st session of the 83rd Congress adjourned in August 1953 Senator Robert Taft died. He had been in the hospital for a month and ill for three months. There was immediate sympathy to have his son Robert Taft, Jr. be the Republican nominee in 1954 to try to regain the seat from the Democrat, Thomas Burke, who had been appointed by Gov. Frank Lausche in October. But Taft and other party leaders such as Sen. John Bricker felt he should gain political experience before attempting a Senate race, and he ran

instead for the Ohio House of Representatives.

Representative George Bender, representing the Cleveland suburbs of the 23rd Congressional District after six previous terms as Representative-At-Large, was mentioned as a candidate at the time of the Burke appointment. Another name mentioned then was State Attorney General C. William O'Neill, who had been mentioned also as a potential gubernatorial candidate (along with State Auditor James A. Rhodes who became the gubernatorial candidate in 1954 and Governor in 1963), and who eventually became Governor in 1957 when Lausche moved to the Senate.

But Bender did have primary opposition even though he had won the endorsement of the Republican State Committee in January 1954. His opponent--and as it turned out, almost his nemesis--was William Saxbe, the Speaker of the Ohio lower house, a lawyer from Mechanicsburg. Saxbe labeled as a politically ambitious 37 year old (who eventually was elected to the Senate in 1968) entered the race a week after Bender won endorsement. He waged a heated campaign, and despite the handicap of being relatively unknown in the state, came within 65,000 votes (out of 442,000 cast) of winning.

Bender went on to beat Burke by 2,970 votes.

Analytical Summary: Bender (R)

Senate situation: Republican incumbent died July 31, 1953. Democratic appointee ran for re-election (III).

Senate competition: Republicans won 3 of previous 7 elections for President, Senator, and Governor (Competitive).

Career pattern: Statewide (30-39).

Nomination struggle competition: High--winner received 57% (B).

Nomination struggle source: Speaker of the Ohio House of Representatives.

1954 Tennessee Sutton Democrat T

Rep. James Sutton challenged Sen. Estes Kefauver in the Democratic Senatorial primary in Tennessee in 1954. He called himself an ultra-conservative and berated Kefauver for his liberalism. But Kefauver beat Sutton easily (by over a 2 to 1 margin) despite the victory of Bourbon (conservative) Gov. Frank Clement in the Democratic gubernatorial primary against the more liberal ex-Governor Gordon Browning. Kefauver did well in Eastern Tennessee where he lived, was able to hold a thin margin in the Western part of the state that had a cotton plantation culture and was a strong center of support for conservative Democrats, and carried Sutton's Middle Tennessee (which had formed the core of the liberal anti-Crump faction).

Kefauver had no trouble in November against a Republican opponent, gaining 70% of the vote.

Analytical Summary: Sutton (D)

Senate situation: Democratic incumbent ran for renomination (I).

Senate competition: Democrats won 6 of previous 7 elections for President, Senator, and Governor (Safe)

Career pattern: Congress (over 40%) and Law Enforcement (30-39%).

Nomination struggle competition: Winner better than 2-1 over RST (D).

Nomination struggle source: Incumbent

1954 Wyoming Harrison Republican RSL

The 1954 Senatorial election was for the seat held by Democrat Senator Lester Hunt. The Republican nomination contest was in its early stages, with Ewing Kerr, a former state party chairman, receiving the support of the state party organization.

But on June 8, 1954, Sen. Hunt withdrew because of ill health and on June 19th he committed suicide. Only after Hunt's withdrawal did Rep. William Henry Harrison--related to the Presidents of the same name--enter the race.

Rep. Harrison won the primary, receiving more votes than the combined total of his three rivals--Kerr, Sam Hyatt (of Hyattsville), a cattle rancher and former president of the American National Cattleman's Association, and William Taber, a Cheyenne used car dealer who ran a poor fourth.

Harrison's November foe was former Senator Joseph C. O'Mahoney. Harrison lost by 3,438 votes, receiving 49.5% of the vote.

Analytical Summary: Harrison (R)

Senate situation: Democratic incumbent withdrew because of ill health on June 8, 1954. He died on June 19th (IV).

Senate competition: Republicans won 3 of previous 5 elections for President, Senator, and Governor (Competitive).

Career pattern: Congress (over 50%).

Nomination struggle competition: Low--RST better than 2-1 over nearest competitor (A).

Nomination struggle source: nearest competitors were a cattle rancher, and a former state party chairman.

1956 Connecticut Dodd Democrat RSL

Representative Thomas Dodd, representing the strongly Democratic 1st Congressional District including Hartford, was the only Democratic Representative in the Connecticut delegation in 1952 and 1954. He, therefore, seemed to be slated for the nomination although several other names were mentioned in the press. These included Chester Bowles, former Governor and Ambassador to India; ex-Senator William Benton; and Mayor Richard Lee of New Haven. Lee dropped out of the race by March.

When Eisenhower announced his decision to run for re-election, analysts rated the Connecticut seat held by Prescott Bush as safe for the Republicans.

There was some speculation in the press in 1955 that some Democratic strategists were looking forward to 1958 and a Ribicoff-Dodd ticket. Others speculated in 1956 that a Ribicoff-Lee ticket in 1958 would be very strong. It would not be unreasonable to assume that 1956 was viewed by some Democrats as a trial run for 1958. The 1958 nomination did go to Dodd.

In 1956 Dodd received only 44% of the vote and lost by over 130,000.

Analytical Summary: Dodd (D)

Senate situation: Republican incumbent ran for re-election (III).

Senate competition: Democrats won 3 of previous 7 elections for President, Senator, and Governor (Competitive).

Career pattern: Congress (30-39%).

Nomination struggle competition: Unopposed (AA).

1956 Nevada Young Republican RSL

Representative-At-Large Clarence Young of Reno was unopposed for the Republican nomination for Senator. Some of Young's friends said that he would not have sought the Senate seat held by Alan Bible, except that Bible had announced plans to retire; Bible changed his mind later. Young had contemplated the race in early 1955 but had indicated desires to remain in the House before Bible's retirement announcement.

Young was rated an even chance to beat Bible in view of previous Democratic party splits. Bible did face three opponents in the primary, but beat them all easily more than doubling the votes of his rivals.

Young considered himself a consistent Eisenhower supporter. He lost by 4,965 votes receiving 47.4% of the vote.

Analytical Summary: Young (R)

Senate situation: Democratic incumbent had announced he would not run for re-election. RST entered race, and then the incumbent decided to run (IV).

Senate competition: Republicans won 4 of previous 6 elections for President, Senator, and Governor (Competitive).

Career pattern: Congress (30-39%).

Nomination struggle competition: Unopposed (AA).

1956 Wisconsin Davis Republican T

The conservative-isolationist wing of the Wisconsin Republican party was out to stop Senator Alexander Wiley's

return to the Senate in 1956. Their search for a candidate concluded at their state convention when Rep. Glenn Davis received the endorsement over Sen. Wiley. But the battle did not end there, and Wiley emerged the victor both in the primary and in the general election.

Several potential candidates eliminated themselves. For example, Rep. John Byrnes chose to return to the House from the 8th Congressional District for a seventh term. Attorney General Vernon Thomson chose to run for the Governorship being vacated by Walter Kohler, who had managed to alienate all factions of the party.

When the convention convened in late May 1956, there were five candidates on hand to address the delegates: 1) Senator Wiley, 2) State Assembly Speaker Mark Catlin, Jr., 3) ex-Representitive Charles Kersten, 4) former State Supreme Court Justice Henry Hughes, and 5) political newcomer and ultra-conservative Howard Boyle. In the wings were 1) Lt. Gov. Warren Knowles who said he was available for any office the party wanted him to seek, although he had not announced any plans, 2) Rep. Lawrence Smith who received some write-in votes, and 3) Rep. Glenn Davis who received 420 write-in votes from the 2486 delegates (17%).

Rep. Davis' write-ins mounted to 1114 (only 130 short of the endorsement) on the second ballot, and he went over the mark on the third ballot.

The primary contest saw Wiley charging that it was those opposed to President Eisenhower who had engineered his convention loss; he assailed the role of Sen. Joseph McCarthy

in the state convention victory of Davis. Eisenhower refused to make an endorsement claiming, "I don't believe it is a place that the President of the United States should be interfering." He tried to differentiate it from his endorsement of his Secretary of the Interior Douglas McKay in Oregon saying he didn't realize McKay had primary opposition.

Davis charged he disagreed with Wiley on international affairs, but that he (Davis) actually supported President Eisenhower on domestic issues more often than Wiley. The latter led to Boyle's indictment of Davis' domestic program as too liberal.

The final primary totals gave Wiley 221,042 (49%), and Davis received 211,016 (47%), while Boyle played spoiler by receiving 19,826 (4%). Davis ran well throughout the state but carried only his own Congressional District and the 7th and 8th Congressional Districts considered to be McCarthy strongholds.

Analytical Summary: Davis (R)

Senate situation: Republican incumbent ran for re-election (I).

Senate competition: Republicans won all 6 previous elections for President, Senator, and Governor (Safe).

Career pattern: Law Enforcement (40-49%).

Nomination struggle competition: High--winner 49% to RST's 47% (C).

Nomination struggle source: Incumbent.

1957 Texas Dies Democrat T

When Martin Dies ran for re-election to his At-Large seat in November 1956, he already was an announced candidate for the Senatorial race forthcoming in 1957. The need for a special Senatorial election came about when Sen. Price Daniel won the Democratic gubernatorial nomination in August, and the Governorship in November.

The nomination/election contest was marked by struggles over the resignation and call for the special election, attempts to change the election law to require a run-off election, a ballot with over twenty contenders, but with three front-runners representing the Republican Party and the liberal and conservative factions of the Democratic Party.

Daniel announced he would resign his Senate seat effective January 15th (Inauguration Day) or earlier if his successor were elected rather than appointed. This unusual wording came about because it was feared that outgoing Governor Allan Shivers, an Eisenhower supporter, would appoint someone who would vote with the Republicans to organize the Senate on January 3rd (the lineup of forty-nine Democrats and forty-seven Republicans in the Senate meant that such an action could give the Republicans control of the Senate organization through Vice President Nixon's tie-breaking vote).

One section of the election code said a special election could be called with twenty days notice, even though a resignation is dated for a later date (the law was

written to cover Garner's election to the Vice Presidency from the House in 1932). But another section said that sixty days notice and a vacancy was required. Shivers adhered to the latter section and refused to call a special election without an unconditional resignation from Daniel. This conflict was finally resolved when Daniel resigned effective midnight January 14th, and Shivers (who was to serve until noon on the 15th) appointed an Eisenhower Democrat (William Blakely) who was to vote with the Democrats to organize.

The second election law conflict concerned a run-off election. The Republicans were united behind a single candidate, while the Democratic field grew almost every day until there were twenty candidates. The Democrats fearing that if only a plurality were sufficient for election, the Republicans might win (especially since party labels were not on the ballot), tried to change the law to require a run-off election if no candidate received a majority. The House passed such a bill in February, but the Senate refused to take it up.

Although over twenty candidates were on the ballot, the race was between three frontrunners: liberal Ralph Yarborough, conservative Martin Dies, and Republican Thad Hutcheson. About 135,000 votes separated these three on Election day, but 186,000 votes separated the fourth placed candidate from the top three.

Yarborough, a former assistant attorney general and judge who had lost to Daniel in the gubernatorial

primary in 1956 and who had lost two earlier liberal-conservative factional fights for the gubernatorial nomination, won with 365,000 votes (38%). Dies a conservative, who had served in the House from 1931 to 1945 before making a comeback in the 1952 election and who had tried for the Senate in a special election in 1941, received 291,000 votes (30%). Hutcheson, a Houston attorney, received 220,000 votes (23%).

Analytical Summary: Dies (D)

Senate situation: Democratic incumbent resigned to become Governor. Democratic appointee did not run for re-election. Special election without party designation or run-off (II).

Senate competition: Democrats won 5 of previous 7 elections for President, Senator, and Governor (Safe).

Career pattern: Congress (30-39%).

Nomination struggle competition: Winner had 38%, runner-up (RST) had 30% (C).

Nomination struggle source: Former assistant state attorney general and judge (and three-time unsuccessful candidate for gubernatorial nomination).

1958 California Engle Democrat RSW

Representative Clair Engle gave up 15 years of seniority and the chairmanship of the House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee to run for the United States Senate. The incumbent Senator William Knowland (R) had announced he was leaving the Senate to return to California; it was assumed, and correctly, that he would run for Governor.

When Knowland made his announcement on January 7,

1957, the New York Times listed several possible Democratic candidates. In addition to Rep. Engle, Rep. Chet Hollifield of Los Angeles was mentioned. So were State Senator Hugh Burns of Fresno, State Senator Robert McCarthy of San Francisco, Justice Paul Peak of the State Court of Appeals, and Dr. Carl Spaeth, dean of Stanford Law School. And of course Attorney General Pat Brown who was seen as having his choice of either Governor or Senator.

When Brown met with the California Democratic House delegation he added the name of Rep. John Shelley of San Francisco to that of Engle and Hollifield as Representatives with sufficient stature to seek state office. Most candidates awaited word from Brown as to his ambitions before pressing their own plans much further. The list grew, in the meantime, with a report that Los Angeles County Supervisor Kenneth Hahn was interested, and the same ambition was attributed to CDC President Alan Cranston.

Brown, meanwhile, was hinting he was going to seek the governorship--especially in view of a pending conflict between Knowland and Governor Goodwin Knight. On September 5, 1957 the New York Times reported that Engle--who represented the upstate 2nd Congressional District--was ready to run for the Senate; and on September 22nd that he was going to seek CDC endorsement. On October 31st Brown made his formal announcement for the gubernatorial nomination. On December 9th Prof. Peter Odegard of U.C.'s Political Science Department announced his intention of seeking CDC endorsement for the Senatorial nomination.

By the time the CDC convention met in January 1958 there were three serious contenders for its endorsement: Engle, Hahn, and Odegard. Although there was some resistance to party regular Engle, there was no substantial opposition and he won easily on the first ballot.[176]

There were no other Democratic opponents in the primary, but cross-filing was still permitted and the two Republican combatants were entered.

The Republicans, who had forced Knight out of the Governorship into Senatorial candidacy, lost both races. Engle won by 723,000 gaining 53% of the vote.

Analytical Summary: Engle (D)

Senate situation: Republican incumbent did not run for re-election (IV).

Senate competition: Democrats won none of the previous 6 elections for President, Senator, and Governor ("Hopeless").

Career pattern: Congress (30-39%).

Nomination struggle competition: None--received 4-1 margin over cross-filed Republican opponent (AA).

1958 Minnesota McCarthy Democrat RSW

The major contest for the nomination for Senator came in the pre-primary convention of the Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party, although Representative Eugene McCarthy did have two primary opponents too.

His major competition in the convention came from Mrs. Eugenie Anderson who had served as Ambassador to

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[176]See James Q. Wilson, op.cit., p. 183 for this account, and for a generally excellent analysis of the CDC.

Denmark and who was an active leader in the party. Her major strength came from her home district that included Hennepin County and its metropolis Minneapolis, she also had suburban and university support. Rep. McCarthy, a Catholic, had represented neighboring St. Paul (the 4th Congressional District) for ten years (81st to 85th Congresses) and was supported by organized labor. Lieutenant Governor Karl Rolvaag earlier had removed himself from the Senate race, seeking instead re-election as Lieutenant Governor.

McCarthy won the endorsement after a long floor fight which followed the endorsement committee's recommendation of both McCarthy and Mrs. Anderson as candidates for the Senate nomination. He then received 76% of the primary vote against Hjalmar Peterson's 20% and H.R. Miller's 4%.

He then went on to beat incumbent Senator Edward Thye in the general election receiving 53.2% of the vote with a margin of 72,218, and became the first Catholic Senator from Minnesota.

Analytical Summary: McCarthy (D)

Senate situation: Republican incumbent ran for re-election (III).

Senate competition: Democrats won 3 of previous 7 elections for President, Senator, and Governor (Competitive).

Career pattern: State legislature (30-39%).

Nomination struggle competition: Low--more than 3-1 over nearest competitor (A).

Nomination struggle source: State administrator (had served 4 months as Governor).

1958 New Jersey Kean Republican RSL

Neither the Republican nor Democratic party could attain pre-primary harmony, and both had close three-man races (the Republican winning by 24,000 and the Democrat by half that many).

The participants in the Republican primary were Representative Robert Kean, the son of a Senator, serving his tenth term representing the 12th Congressional District and the ranking member of the Ways and Means Committee; Bernard M. Shanley, the Presidential appointments secretary (who was accused of using patronage to aid his cause); and Robert Morris, the chief counsel of the Senate Internal Security subcommittee. The race ran the spectrum of political identification. Kean was viewed as a liberal, Shanley as a conservative, and Morris as still further right.

Other names had been mentioned in earlier speculation. The incumbent, H. Alexander Smith would have been 79 years old at election-time, and the press assumed he would not run. But when he learned that Kean was going to run for his seat, he announced his intention to run, on June 23, 1957 (Kean actually did not formerly announce until January 31, 1958). Smith eventually pulled out of the race and endorsed Kean.

Another name mentioned was that of Bergen County party leader and State Senator Walter Jones. Although Bergen County was the most Republican county in the state, it had been by-passed when the party was constructing statewide slates.

Representative Peter Frelinghuysen, Jr. was mentioned again, as he, Kean and Shanley were mentioned in the previous Senatorial race in 1954 (Shanley had also contemplated entering the 1957 gubernatorial race, but while he delayed his announcement Forbes rounded up enough pledges to win).

Secretary of Labor James P. Mitchell stated in both December and February that he was not interested in running for the Senate. The press also mentioned C. Douglas Dillon as a possibility.

There was no Republican organization candidate and most Republican leaders were neutral, although Bergen and Hudson Counties were for Shanley. Kean received 152,889 or 43%, while Shanley received 128,990 or 36%, and Morris trailed with 73,658 (21%).

The November race had been viewed as too close to predict. Kean lost with 47.7% of the vote and by a margin of 84,545 votes.

Analytical Summary: Kean (R)

Senate situation: Republican incumbent did not seek re-election (II).

Senate competition: Republicans won 4 of previous 6 elections for President, Senator, and Governor (Competitive).

Career pattern: Administrative (30-39%).

Nomination struggle competition: High--winner 43%, runner-up in three-man race 36% (B).

Nomination struggle source: Presidential appointments secretary (third man was a Senate committee counsel).

1958 New York Keating Republican RSW

The candidacy of Kenneth Keating can be classified as cajolery rather than a calculated career choice. A White House call on the eve of the convention was credited as a key factor. Keating was coerced into running, and the pressure included a telephone call from Vice President Nixon representing President Eisenhower. The seat was to be left empty by Irving Ives' illness-induced retirement.

Keating had been reluctant, arguing that he could be more valuable as the ranking member of the Judiciary committee. He had represented the upstate district for six terms. But it was felt he could attract the rural and small town vote upstate, and was necessary to help balance the nomination slate headed by Nelson Rockefeller of Westchester County as Governor and the Senatorial delegation headed by Jacob Javits of New York City.

The interaction with the problem of gubernatorial slate selection was almost continuous. The latter race was shaping up as a convention battle between Rockefeller and Leonard Hall, the former Republican national party chairman. Leaders kept hoping for a ticket that included both, with either running for Governor while the other ran for Senator. But both were determined to try for Albany and not Washington. And even when Hall counted his votes and withdrew from the gubernatorial race on August 17th, he still resisted the Senatorial nomination; he said 18 years in Washington as Congressman and party chairman were enough for him.

Further interaction came about in completing the

slate. When Keating was named by the convention, the nomination for State Comptroller went to Lundy of Queens; there had been speculation that if Assemblyman Joseph Carlino of Nassau had been the Senatorial nominee, then the Comptroller position would have gone to an upstater.

Carlino had declined to be a Senatorial candidate because of family and personal obligations. But Nassau County leaders did not want him to run for the Senate fearing they would lose their strong voice in the legislature; he was majority leader and next in line to becoming Speaker (which he eventually did).

The Speaker, Oswald Heck of Schnectady, had been mentioned for both Governor and Senator, and a draft for Senator movement was started on June 10th but was rejected by him on July 13th approximately 1½ months before the late-August convention.

Another draft movement for ex-Governor Thomas E. Dewey for Senator in the closing days before the convention convened was squelched by him; he had issued a similar statement in May when Ives made his formal announcement.

One of the gubernatorial candidates expressed a willingness to run for the Senate. He was United States Attorney Paul Williams of Manhattan.

On August 21st it was reported that state party chairman L. Judson Morehouse was sounding out county party chairmen with a list of eleven potential Senate nominees. The list included Keating, Hall, Carlino, Heck, and Williams noted above plus Rep. Katherine St. George of suburban

Orange County, Mrs. Charles Weis, Jr., the Republican national committeewoman, Assemblyman Malcolm Wilson of suburban Yonkers (who became Rockefeller's Lieutenant Governor), State Senators Elisha Barrett of Long Island and John Hughes of Syracuse, and former Assemblyman James Fitz-Patrick of upstate Plattsburg.

On the eve of the convention, several additional names were being mentioned. These included Dean William Myers of the Agricultural College at Cornell, George Hinman of Binghamton, an ex-Regent (who later became a Republican national committeeman), Clifford Furnas (Chancellor at the University of Buffalo and former Under Secretary of Defense), and State Senate majority leader Walter Mahoney (who had earlier withdrawn from the gubernatorial race).

Keating went on from this draft to win the Senate seat, as he had won his initial House election after being drafted as a candidate then. His opponent was New York County District Attorney Frank Hogan. The race was a close one with Keating winning only 51.2% of the vote.

Analytical Summary: Keating (R)

Senate situation: Republican incumbent did not seek re-election (II).

Senate competition: Republicans won 4 of previous 5 elections for President, Senator, and Governor (Safe).

Career pattern: Administrative (30-39%).

Nomination struggle competition: Unopposed (AA).

1958 Pennsylvania Scott Republican RSW

On March 5, 1958 a 28-man Republican steering committee endorsed Representative Hugh Scott for the Senatorial nomination. This virtually ended all competition, although Scott did have two primary foes. These were former State Treasurer Weldon B. Heyburn of Delaware County, and Harrison A. Moyer of Statington.

Scott was serving his eighth term in the House representing Philadelphia. The Senate seat had been held by Edward Martin (R) of Washington, Pennsylvania.

In the primary Scott received 74% of the votes to Heyburn's 16%.

In the final election he received 51.4% of the votes against Governor George Leader.

Analytical Summary: Scott (R)

Senate situation: Republican incumbent did not seek re-election (II).

Senate competition: Republicans won 3 of previous 5 elections for President, Senator, and Governor (Competitive).

Career pattern: Administrative (30-39%).

Nomination struggle competition: Low--winner had more than 4-1 margin over nearest competitor (A).

Nomination struggle source: Nearest competitor was former State treasurer.

1958 Vermont Prouty Republican RSW

The chronological order of the race for the Republican Senatorial nomination in Vermont in 1958 is as follows: on January 6, 1958 Lee Emerson, who had been Governor from 1951 to 1954 announced his candidacy; on January 11th

Representative Winston Prouty confirmed reports that he would run for the Senate; on April 29th incumbent Ralph Flanders, 78, announced his retirement. He said he was retiring for selfish reasons--he found the Senate too confining--rather than because of his strength or health.

Prouty was in his fourth term as Representative-At-Large. He had relatively little problem in the primary as he received 31,866 votes (65%) to Emerson's 17,468. His race against his Democratic opponent was closer, but he did gain the victory by 5,364 votes (52.2%).

Analytical Summary: Prouty (R)

Senate situation: Republican incumbent withdrew after RST's entry (I).

Senate competition: Republicans won all 7 previous elections for President, Senator, and Governor (Safe).

Career pattern: Congress (40-49%) and Statewide (30-39%).

Nomination struggle competition: High--65% to 35% (B)

Nomination struggle source: Ex-Governor

1958 West Virginia Byrd Democrat RSW

Representative Robert Byrd's major primary foe was 74 year old Fleming Alderson. He also had opposition from Jack R. Delligatti. But Byrd (40 years old), completing his third term in the House received 80% of the votes cast.

At the same time, there was a primary fight between former Representative Jennings Randolph and former Governor William Marland for the uncompleted term of Senator Matthew Neely who had died in January 1958.

Byrd and Randolph were elected by almost identical

margins (59% and 41%).

Analytical Summary: Byrd (D)

Senate situation: Republican incumbent ran for re-election (III).

Senate competition: Democrats won 4 of previous 7 elections for President, Senator, and Governor (Competitive).

Career pattern: Congress (30-39%).

Nomination struggle competition: Low--RST received 80%, had 7-1 margin over nearest competitor (A).

Nomination struggle source: non-office holder.

1960 Michigan Bentley Republican RSL

Representative Alvin Bentley had little difficulty beating Donald S. Leonard for the Republican Senatorial nomination. The latter had been Detroit and then Michigan State Police Commissioner, and the Republican candidate for Governor in 1954. Bentley won 72% of the primary vote.

Bentley was completing his fourth term as Representative of the 8th Congressional District in Central Michigan.

George Romney, then the head of American Motors and later Governor and Presidential aspirant, indicated on January 26, 1960 that he would consider a draft for the Senate. This was in response to a statement by Rep. Gerald Ford that Romney would make a good Senatorial candidate. But Romney did not consider it for long, because on January 30th he ruled himself out as a candidate for public office issuing a Sherman-type dictum about not running or serving.

But Bentley lost to his Democratic opponent by 120,000 votes, Bentley received 48.1%.

Analytical Summary: Bentley (R)

Senate situation: Democratic incumbent ran for re-election (III).

Senate competition: Republican won only 1 of previous 6 elections for President, Senator, and Governor ("Hopeless").

Career pattern: Congress (30-39%) and Administrative (30-39%).

Nomination struggle competition: Low--RST received 72% (A).

Nomination struggle source: Ex-State Police Chief (and former gubernatorial candidate).

1960 Montana Metcalf and Anderson Democrats RSW and T

The incumbent Senator James Murray (D) was 83 years old and in failing health. The first to contest his seat was Representative LeRoy Anderson (54) of Conrad and the 2nd Congressional District--the Eastern, and larger, section of the state. He had served in the State House and Senate and was in his second term in the House of Representatives. He attacked Murray's age.

The second candidate to try to wrest the nomination away from Murray--who had announced his intention to seek re-election--was a 36-year old lawyer, John Mahan a past national commander of the Veterans of Foreign Wars.

On March 16th Representative Lee Metcalf (49) of Helena and the 1st Congressional District filed for the Senatorial nomination. Although he had said earlier that he would never oppose Murray, he noted that a post-card poll he took indicated Murray could not be re-elected. Metcalf had served in the state Supreme Court before

beginning his four term service in the House of Representatives.

On April 28th Murray announced he would not run for re-election. But he continued to play an active role in the race. He endorsed John Bonner of Helena, who had been Governor from 1949 to 1953, and took potshots at Anderson and Metcalf calling them ingrates.

When the smoke of the June primary lifted, Metcalf had polled 45,339 votes or 35%, to Bonner's 33,246 (26%), Anderson's 26,152 (20%), and Mahan's 24,208 (19%).

Metcalf had another tight race in November against ex-Representative Orvin Fjare winning by 4,050 or 50.7%.

Anderson's district--which had been Fjare's--was much the larger district in population: 401,000 to 274,000. It also came closer to reflecting state averages on such factors as occupational distribution, education, etc. For example Montana's work force was categorized as 41.2% white collar, 41.0% blue collar, and 17.8% farm workers. In all three categories, the 2nd Congressional District deviated less than the 1st Congressional District from these averages. This was true for median income, unemployment level, and several agricultural measures such as average annual gross sales per farm. It was not true for median education level. But in all instances the differences were not great. It was also the site of the two largest cities Great Falls and Billings.[177]

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[177] CQ Weekly Report, August 21, 1964, passim.

Metcalf, Mansfield, and Murray--the Senators (all Democrats) from 1952 to the present--all came from the Western part of the state (Metcalf from Helena, Mansfield from Missoula, and Murray from Butte).

Analytical Summary: Metcalf (D) and Anderson (D)

Senate situation: Democratic incumbent withdrew after the entry of the 2 RSTs (I).

Senate competition: Democrats won 2 of previous 4 elections for President, Senator, and Governor (Competitive).

Career pattern: Law Enforcement (30-39%) and Administrative (30-39%).

Nomination struggle competition: High--4-man race, RST-winner received 35% and runner-up 26%; other RST ran third with 20% (B) (C).

Nomination struggle source: Ex-Governor ran second.

1960 North Dakota Burdick Democrat RSW

Whatever Senatorial ambitions that Representative Quentin Burdick may have had, it could not have been focused on the 1960 race before November 1959 when the incumbent, William Langer--who had been re-elected the previous November--died.

Burdick was serving his first term as Representative-At-Large when he was nominated by joint convention of the Democratic Party and the Non-Partisan League for the special election held in June of 1960. But Burdick had run for office six times before he finally won his first election to the House with 51.9% of the vote and a margin of 7,438. He ran twice for State Attorney, once for State Senator, once for Lieutenant Governor, once for Governor, and for

Senator in 1956.

In the Senatorial election he squeaked by Governor John Davis by 1,118 votes (50.3%).

Burdick had been a prime force in the alliance of the Non-Partisan League with the Democratic Party.

Analytical Summary: Burdick (D)

Senate situation: Republican incumbent died November 8, 1959. The Republican appointee did not seek re-election (IV).

Senate competition: Democrats won none of the previous 6 elections for President, Senator, and Governor ("Hopeless").

Career pattern: No pattern.

Nomination struggle competition: Unopposed (AA).

1960 South Dakota McGovern Democrat RSL

Representative George McGovern catapulted into the spotlight when he was elected to the House of Representatives in 1956 as he was the first Democrat to be elected to high office in South Dakota in twenty years. He repeated the trick in 1958. When he sought the Senatorial nomination in 1960, he was unopposed. He was defeated in the general election by incumbent two-termer Karl Mundt. McGovern tried again in 1962 when Sen. Francis Case died, and made it--by 597 votes.

Analytical Summary: McGovern (D)

Senate situation: Republican incumbent ran for re-election (III).

Senate competition: Democrats won only 1 of previous 6 elections for President, Senator, and Governor ("Hopeless").

Career pattern: State legislature (over 50%).

Nomination struggle competition: Unopposed (AA).

1960 Wyoming Thomson Republican RSW

Keith Thomson is the only Representative in this study who was elected to serve in the Senate but was never a Senator. He died a month after the election.

He had survived a primary and general election with healthy electoral majorities. He had served three terms as Representative-At-Large. The Cheyenne Republican took on Frank Barrett of Lusk in the primary. The latter had served in the House from 1943 to 1950, had been Governor from 1951 to 1953, and Senator from 1953 to 1959. Thomson received 31,596 votes (or 69%) to Barrett's 13,380, and 765 for Miff Butler, a political unknown.

In the general election Thomson received 56.4% of the votes against Raymond Whitaker who had run against Thomson for the House seat in 1958 and who had survived a four-man Democratic primary.

The incumbent Senator had been Joseph O'Mahoney (D) who had suffered a stroke in June 1959.

Analytical Summary: Thomson (R)

Senate situation: Democratic incumbent did not run for re-election (IV).

Senate competition: Republicans won 2 of previous 5 elections for President, Senator, and Governor (Competitive).

Career pattern: Congress (over 50%).

Nomination struggle competition: More than 2-1 over nearest competitor (A).

Nomination struggle source: Ex-Senator-Governor-Representative.

1962 Colorado Dominick Republican RSW

The general election for Senator featured another classic ideological confrontation. The Democratic candidate was incumbent Senator John Carroll, a liberal. His conservative Republican opponent was freshman Representative Peter Dominick, who had won the nomination without any primary opposition. Dominick represented the Denver suburbs and the northeast portion of the state in the under-represented 2nd Congressional District (the district contained 37% of the population and had 49% more than the mean), and was not well known outside of his district. But Carroll had failed to mend his fences, and Dominick won by 49,069 votes (53.6%).

Analytical Summary: Dominick (R)

Senate situation: Democratic incumbent ran for re-election (III).

Senate competition: Republicans won 3 of previous 6 elections for President, Senator, and Governor (Competitive).

Career pattern: No Office (30-39%).

Nomination struggle competition: Unopposed (AA).

1962 Connecticut Kowalski Democrat T

Speculation concerning the Democratic nominee to unseat Republican Senator Prescott Bush focused on the frontrunner, New Haven Mayor Richard Lee. But on Election Day in 1961, Lee made a surprisingly poor showing in his bid for re-election to a fifth term as Mayor, winning by only 4,000 votes. In the flux that followed that Pyrrhic victory, Representative At-Large Frank Kowalski declared his candidacy for Senator (on November 17th). He had been mentioned

earlier, along with Lee, ex-Senator William Benton, and Representative John Monagan of Waterbury (5th Congressional District), and Representative Emilio Daddario of the First Congressional District (Hartford). All three Representatives were in their second terms in the House.

By late December Abe Ribicoff--Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, but more importantly: ex-Governor, ex-Representative, ex-Senatorial candidate, and close friend and associate of state party boss John Bailey--was prominently featured in the speculation. He had already denied interest in the Senate seat; and he had subsequently noted that conditions might change. Reports continued to circulate that month that he had decided to run for the Senate. (A subsequent report claimed he had made his decision in December, but he did not want to resign from the Cabinet and had been asked by Pres. John Kennedy to stay on to press Congress for New Frontier legislation.)[178] A draft movement for him had begun also.

But Kowalski pressed his campaign, seeking endorsements from town committees--he had 21, mostly from smaller towns, by the end of January--and promising that he was in the fight to the end, including a primary. In May, Sen. Bush made his surprising retirement announcement. And in May, Kowalski continued to pick up some support (e.g. he won a primary for delegates in New Britain, Ribicoff's

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[178]Joseph I. Lieberman, The Power Broker: A Biography of John M. Bailey Modern Political Boss, (Boston: Houghton Miflin Co., 1966), p. 274; see pp. 272-284 for an account of that nomination struggle.

birthplace). By mid-June he claimed 200 delegates; the press credited him with 160; he needed 191 to get the magic 20% required for him to request a primary.

In mid-June as Ribicoff wrote to delegates requesting their support, and as he prepared to resign his Cabinet post, Kowalski continued to campaign. Kowalski's support came from the Teamsters' and Machinists' unions, some liberal groups, enemies Ribicoff and Bailey had made over the years, and those convinced by his anti-bossism campaign. Two days before the convention was to make its decision, Ribicoff resigned his Cabinet post; the next day President Kennedy sent him a supporting letter (much to Kowalski's dismay). Kowalski's claims had now escalated to 260 votes, although Ribicoff and Bailey claimed he didn't even have the magic 191.

When the convention met on July 14th, the first order of business was a test of strength. Kowalski forces, hoping to get into a primary, moved for a rule to prohibit switches after the roll had been called completely. They lost the test vote 762 to 176. After the slate for state offices had been completed, the key balloting for the Senatorial nomination began. Two hours later Ribicoff won, 786 to 163. Kowalski had failed to qualify for a primary.

As part of a unity gesture, the leaders asked Kowalski to run for re-election as Representative At-Large. He refused to compete for the nomination and said he would accept it only if won by acclamation. He lost that move too, and sat out the 1962 campaign, as Bailey found another

candidate of Polish descent to run for the At-Large seat traditionally offered to a minority group candidate.

Abe Ribicoff went on to beat Rep. Horace Seely-Brown in a relatively close race (Ribicoff received 51.3% of the vote).

Analytical Summary: Kowalski (D)

Senate siutation: Republican incumbent withdrew after RST entry (III).

Senate competition: Democrats won 3 of previous 5 elections for President, Senator, and Governor (Competitive).

Career pattern: Congress (30-39%).

Nomination struggle competition: RST received only 17% of convention vote and so could not run in primary (D).

Nomination struggle source: Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare (and ex-Governor and ex-RST).

1962 Connecticut Seely-Brown Republican RSL

The nomination of Representative Horace Seely-Brown as the Republican Senatorial candidate in Connecticut in 1962 is another illustration of the inter-relationship of the gubernatorial and senatorial nomination "systems". There are at least three inter-faces in this case. First, Seely-Brown's major competitor was a gubernatorial race drop-out; second, there was a last-minute attempt to give the gubernatorial runner-up the Senatorial spot as a consolation prize; third, the close battle for the nomination of the Governor effected the mood of the delegates, made them rebellious, and clinched the nomination for Seely-Brown.

This case study is also evidence for a behavioral

framework that involves a major role for the actors rather than a deterministic one. Seely-Brown's major competitor was John Davis Lodge. He had been a Representative from the 4th Congressional District from 1947 to 1951, Governor from 1951 to 1955, and Ambassador to Spain from 1955 to January 1961. He had originally entered the gubernatorial contest and was one of five contenders that trailed behind the major competitors, John Alsop and Edwin May (the latter a one-term Representative from the 1st Congressional District, and state party chairman from 1958 to 1961).

When Sen. Prescott Bush withdrew because of his health, in May, it caught everyone by surprise. It resulted in a re-calculation of career decisions for several people. One of these was Lodge, who dropped out of the Governor's race and announced his desire to be the Senatorial nominee. Also entering now were Representative Seely-Brown and ex-Rep. Antoni Sadlak. The latter served in the House from 1947 until his defeat in 1958, as Representative-At-Large--in Connecticut, a seat traditionally held by a representative of a minority group. Both Alsop and May refused to give up the battle for Governor in exchange for the Senate.

In the Senate race, Lodge was an early overwhelming favorite. He was better known, and considered a more vigorous and effective campaigner (for instance he spoke fluent Italian, in contrast to Seely-Brown for whom a major campaign asset had been his distribution of pot-holders). Lodge also was the personal choice of state party chairman Pinney as half of a ticket with Alsop. This latter factor, however,

may not have been an unmixed blessing. Pinney--backed by the Alsop forces--had won his position the previous November in a close (39 to 32) contest, after May resigned to run for the gubernatorial nomination, which proved to be a close and bitter race.

Lodge, in addition, made little effort to win delegates; instead he acted as if the nomination was his for the asking (he had acted the same while competing for the gubernatorial spot). There were still some factional scars remaining from his term as Governor. Also the appointment of delegates favored Eastern Connecticut, Seely-Brown's base. The latter, incidentally, actively sought delegate support, aided by Sadlak who acted as his campaign manager.

The gubernatorial battle lasted for hours and eight ballots, with Alsop finally beating May 337 to 317. When that race was decided Lodge-Alsop buttons appeared on the floor of the convention. This angered many delegates as Lodge had maintained that he was neutral in the gubernatorial contest but obviously had prepared the buttons in advance.

State Chairman Pinney arranged for a three-hour recess and tried to get Lodge and Seely-Brown to withdraw in favor of gubernatorial runner-up May. Lodge agreed, but Seely-Brown refused saying he had the votes (and besides they weren't sure May would accept the deal).

As the New York Times noted in its story on June 7, 1962, "Connecticut Republicans rose in rebellion today and nominated Rep. Horace Seely-Brown, Jr. of Pomfret for United

States Senator." The vote was 476 to 149.

Other participants during the nomination process included ex-Rep. Albert Morano, who had represented the 4th Congressional District in the 82nd to 85th Congresses (1951-59) and who had announced his candidacy on March 24, 1961 challenging Sen. Bush for presenting a reactionary image rather than a liberal one. Also entering after Bush's withdrawal was Miss Vivien Kellems who had run for Senator and Governor, previously, as an independent. She withdrew via a "denominating" speech at the convention.

Seely-Brown--who had represented Eastern Connecticut, i.e. the 2nd Congressional District in the 80th, 82nd-85th, and 87th Congresses (losing his bids for re-election in the intervening Congresses)--lost to Ribicoff in November by the relatively narrow margin of 25,828 votes (or 51.3% to the winner).

Analytical Summary: Seely-Brown (R)

Senate situation: Republican incumbent did not run for re-election (II).

Senate competition: Republicans won 2 of previous 5 elections for President, Senator, and Governor (Competitive).

Career pattern: Statewide (40-49%) and No Office (30-39%).

Nomination struggle competition: RST won by 3-1 margin in convention (A).

Nomination struggle source: Ex-Ambassador-Governor-Representative.

1962 Hawaii Inouye Democrat RSW

In late 1961 most Hawaiian politicians and observers felt that incumbent Senator Oren Long would retire and leave

the track clear for Representative-At-Large Daniel Inouye. For a while, however, Long didn't say anything about his plans but kept attending political banquets. But on March 9, 1962 the 73 year old Senator announced his retirement and his endorsement of Inouye.

Despite little campaigning he scored a 19 to 1 primary victory over Frank Troy, and a 7 to 3 victory over his Republican opponent in November.

Analytical Summary: Inouye (D)

Senate situation: Democratic incumbent did not run for re-election (II).

Senate competition: Democrats won 2 of previous 4 elections for President, Senator, and Governor (Competitive).

Career pattern: Not Ascertained--this was only third race for Senate seat.

Nomination struggle competition: None--RST had 19-1 margin over only other candidate (AA).

1962 Idaho Pfost Democrat RSL

Representative Gracie Pfost could have had no Senatorial ambitions for 1962 before July 23, 1962 when Senator Henry Dworshak died of a heart attack. Mrs. Pfost was named the Democratic candidate for the seat by the state central committee. All other potential candidates had conceded that their plans depended on her ambitions. She was completing her fifth term as a Representative from the 1st Congressional district. She was Idaho's first female Representative and would have been the state's first lady Senator had she been elected. She was defeated by Len Jordan, former Governor (1951-55) by only 4,881 votes; he

received only 50.9% of the vote. She ran well in her northern 1st Congressional District but lagged behind the larger 2nd Congressional District, especially in Ada County (Boise).

Analytical Summary: Pfost (D)

Senate situation: Republican incumbent died July 23, 1962 (IV).

Senate competition: Democrats won only 1 of previous 5 elections for President, Senator, and Governor ("Hopeless").

Career pattern: No Pattern.

Nomination struggle competition: Unopposed (AA).

1962 Illinois Yates Democrat RSL

The key to the Democratic Senatorial nomination in Illinois was, "Whatever Daley wants, Daley gets." Representative Sidney Yates of Chicago's 9th Congressional District was Chicago Mayor (and Democratic Party boss) Richard Daley's final choice; and he won the primary with no opposition other than perennial candidate Lar Daly (who did manage to get 23% of the vote).

Mayor Daley had some earlier preferences and they received attention accordingly. On June 4, 1961, the New York Times reported, "Mayor Richard J. Daley of Chicago, the state party leader, who normally would select the regular organization candidate has already endorsed Mr. Powell." The candidate referred to was Paul Powell, the Speaker of Illinois House of Representatives. He was described as a colorful politician who has served Southern Illinois as well as rural and small town interests for 26

years. Actually the endorsement of Powell was somewhat surprising as he had fought Daley in 1959 to become the Speaker after making a deal with the Republican Governor which netted him some Republican votes and the Speakership.[179] In 1961 he retained the position despite a Republican majority by winning over three of their votes.

The Democratic nominee was expected to come from downstate (which means anywhere but Chicago) as the political tradition was to have only one Senator from Cook County, and Sen. Paul Douglas was it.

Other downstate possibilities were mentioned by Douglas; in addition to Powell he named Rep. Melvin Price of East St. Louis, State Rep. Paul Simon of Troy, and Irving Dillard of Collinsville, a retired newspaper editor.

On December 2, 1961 Adlai Stevenson, former Illinois Governor and Presidential candidate and then Ambassador to the United Nations, said that Daley had asked him to run. After some consideration and a meeting with President Kennedy, Stevenson chose to remain with the administration.

Although the New York Times speculated that this increased Powell's chances, State Rep. Simon--an announced candidate by now--said it showed that Daley did not want Powell. (Peace Corps Director R. Sargent Shriver denied interest in the Senatorial job at that point.)

On January 2, 1962, Powell withdrew from the race, and four days later Yates had won endorsement. Yates had

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[179] New York Times, June 4, 1961, p. 54.

represented Chicago's 9th Congressional District since 1949. But his district was merged with freshman Democratic Rep. Edward Finnegan in the November re-apportionment by the state legislature. His competitors at the time of the announcement were Simon and Chicago businessman Arnold Maremount, but both dropped out before the primary. His selection was seen by some as an attempt by Daley to bolster his Cook County slate in the face of strong opposition from the ticket headed by the invincible Sen. Everett Dirksen.

Because of the aid Sen. Dirksen had given to the Kennedy Administration on some key issues, Yates people feared the President would not exert any effort to beat the Senate minority leader. Kennedy, after some delay, did come out strongly for Yates' election.

But between this speculation, the missile crisis giving publicity to Dirksen, the violation of political tradition by trying to have two Democratic Chicago Senators, plus Dirksen, plus some other possible factors (e.g. Yates' Jewish religious affiliation), he lost by 213,915 votes receiving 47.1% of the votes.

Yates sought re-election to the House in 1964 from his old seat, and ended up with the same Appropriations Committee assignment.

Analytical Summary: Yates (D)

Senate situation: Republican incumbent ran for re-election (III).

Senate competition: Democrats won 3 of previous 6 elections for President, Senator, and Governor (Competitive).

Career pattern: No pattern.

Nomination struggle competition: Won by over 3-1 margin (A).

Nomination struggle source: Perennial candidate with no previous political office.

1962 Maryland Brewster Democrat RSW

The Democratic primary for United States Senator in Maryland in 1962 was mainly a race between Representative Daniel Brewster and Blair Lee III, a state legislator.

Rep. Brewster had represented the Baltimore suburbs (2nd Congressional District) for two terms when he ran for the Senate. He was a lawyer-farmer and had served eight years in the Maryland House of Delegates before being elected to the House of Representatives. The last four years of his service in the Maryland state legislature--i.e. 1954-58--overlapped with the first four years service of his major primary opponent who also served eight years. Blair Lee III was the son of Col. E. Brooke Lee a longtime political boss of Montgomery County, a Washington D.C. suburban area. He was the grandson of Blair Lee, the first popularly elected Senator from Maryland.[180]

By 1962 Lee was viewed as ready for statewide office. Gov. J. Millard Tawes asked him to run as Representative-At-Large on his ticket. But instead he chose to run for Senator on the slate headed by gubernatorial hopeful and perennial

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[180] See Stephen Hess, America's Political Dynasties: From Adams to Kennedy (Garden City: Doubleday and Co., 1966) for a history of the so-called Lee dynasty of which Blair Lee III was a member, and for this account of the nomination struggle.

candidate George Mahoney. Tawes then combined with Brewster as Senatorial candidate to beat the Mahoney-Lee ticket.

Lee was supported by Jack Pollack of Baltimore, but also had received an endorsement of the liberal Committee for an Effective Congress. The main bout was between Tawes and Mahoney, but the Brewster-Lee campaign warmed up to include charges against Lee of being the candidate of the bosses (Pollack) and a vehicle for his father to make a political comeback; Lee accused Brewster's law partner of some embarrassing connections. Hess notes this exchange was surprising in view of the similarity of the candidates' gentlemanly backgrounds including attendance at the same preparatory school and Ivy-league college. Lee also campaigned--at least in the Washington suburbs--for support on the grounds that the Washington suburbs had not had a Senator since his grandfather.

Brewster carried all but two of the 23 counties in Maryland, and all but one of the six districts in Baltimore (he lost in Pollack's balliwick). Brewster won 52% of the popular vote, Lee 29%, and three minor candidates shared 19%. But Maryland's nomination system in 1962 was a modified county-unit system. Brewster's vote total was good for 131 unit votes compared to Lee's 21 (the three minor candidates won no unit votes) or 86% to 14%.

He then went on to beat former Representative Edward Miller (1947-59) by a wide margin, getting 62.2% of the vote.

Analytical Summary: Brewster (D)

Senate situation: Republican incumbent did not run for re-election (IV).

Senate competition: Democrats won 2 of previous 5 elections for President, Senator, and Governor (Competitive).

Career pattern: Statewide (30-39%) and Administrative (30-39%).

Nomination struggle competition: RST received 52% with almost a 2-1 margin in popular votes, but had a 6-1 margin in county-unit votes (A).

Nomination struggle source: State legislator.

1962 Massachusetts L. Curtis Republican T

Rep. Laurence Curtis' attempt to seek the Republican Senatorial nomination in 1962 can be attributed to the 1960 census and the resulting re-apportionment, rather than to a long established ambition. When a state legislative committee drafted plans to draw up 12 Congressional Districts where 14 had existed before by eliminating the 10th Congressional District of Curtis and the 5th Congressional District of F. Bradford Morse, Curtis announced that he would seek the Senate seat--or run At-Large if a deadlock forced all seats to be At-Large. Morse too indicated he would run for the Senate.

Already in the race was George Cabot Lodge, the 34 year old son of the former Senator and Vice-Presidential candidate, Henry Cabot Lodge. George Lodge had resigned his post as Assistant Secretary of Labor for International Affairs in order to make the race to fill Pres. John Kennedy's seat in the Senate. Although many observers viewed

Republican Governor John Volpe as favored to win re-election, they doubted that a Republican could beat the Democratic nominee whether it be Ted Kennedy or Ed McCormack.

Morse decided to try for re-election to the House (and was successful), and the nomination struggle for the Senate nomination was a two-man affair between Curtis and Lodge. The first battle took place in the state party endorsement convention. In a very close contest that went to the wire, Lodge emerged victorious 936 to 848. Curtis pledged a primary battle, with the issue to be "inexperience, immaturity, and dynasty" . Curtis, 69, had been in public service almost continually since he became Assistant United States Attorney in 1923. But Lodge had been with the Labor Department for eight years. Curtis was more conservative than Lodge.

On Primary Day, Lodge received 244,921 votes (56%) to Curtis' 196,444. The observers noted above were partially correct--Ted Kennedy did beat Lodge (by 285,000 votes), but Volpe was not able to beat his Democratic opponent for Governor.

Analytical Summary: L. Curtis (R)

Senate situation: Elected Democratic incumbent resigned to become President. Democratic appointee did not run for re-election (IV).

Senate competition: Republicans won only 2 of previous 7 elections for President, Senator, and Governor ("Hopeless").

Career pattern: Congress (30-39%).

Nomination struggle competition: High--winner 56% to RST's 44% (C).

Nomination struggle source: Assistant Secretary of Labor.

1962 New Hampshire Bass and Merrow Republicans RSW & T

The 1962 New Hampshire Republican Senatorial primary had the state's two Representatives, the incumbent Senator, and the widow of the Senator whose death created the vacancy as candidates. Its contenders ranged from conservative to liberal. And it turned out to be a donnybrook with the winner getting only 31% of the vote and only 1692 votes more than the runner-up.

On November 26, 1961 Senator Styles Bridges died leaving 5 years remaining to his term. Governor Wesley Powell, a former aide to Bridges, said he was not interested in either Senate race (Sen. Cotton's seat was up too; Powell had run third in the 1956 primary against Cotton) and that his appointee would be free to run. He was under strong pressure to appoint the widow of Sen. Bridges but he did not. This invoked the ire of William Loeb conservative publisher of the Manchester Union Leader and contributed to his own loss in the gubernatorial primary.

He appointed 34 year old conservative Attorney General Maurice Murphy of Portsmouth who had been Powell's administrative assistant. The other conservative in the primary race was Mrs. Styles Bridges.

Representative Chester Merrow of Center Ossipee was a liberal and had represented the 1st Congressional District since the 78th Congress (1943).

The first candidate to declare himself officially

was Representative Perkins Bass of Peterborough and the 2nd Congressional District. He described himself as a moderate and an "Eisenhower Republican". He had been in Congress since 1955.

Bass was seen as the favorite and did eventually emerge the winner. He scored 31,037 (31%) to Mrs. Bridges' 29,345 (30%), Murphy's 24,204 (24%), and Merrow's trailing 14,417 (15%). He had a strong campaign organization. He was aided by the conservative split between Murphy and Mrs. Bridges. And he was also aided by the fact that Murphy and Merrow--both of the Eastern 1st Congressional District--were expected to hold down the majorities in heavily Republican Rockingham and Stratford counties in that district.

Bass represented the smaller of the two districts (332,000 to 275,000), but in most other characteristics the districts were similar. Bass' district had the second and third largest cities, while Merrow's had the first and fourth largest.

Partly because of the bad split in the Republican party--Governor Powell endorsed the Democratic candidate for Governor after he lost the primary--the Democrats won the Governorship and the Senate seat; Cotton won re-election as did the two Republican candidates for the House. Bass lost by 10,413 getting 47.7% of the vote.

Analytical Summary: Bass (R) and Merrow (R)

Senate situation: Republican incumbent died on November 26, 1961. Republican appointee ran for re-election (I).

Senate competition: Republicans won all 7 previous

elections for President, Senator, and Governor (Safe).

Career pattern: Congress (over 50%) and Statewide (30-39%).

Nomination struggle competition: High--RST-winner received 31%, runner-up 30%, third candidate had 24%, and the fourth (RST) had 15% (B) (D).

Nomination struggle source: Runner-up was non-office holding widow of Senator, third was appointed incumbent, and fourth was RST.

1962 Oregon Durno Republican T

When Rep. Edwin Durno entered the Senatorial race in February 1962, there were four candidates already. The leading contender, Sigfrid Unander had been a candidate for almost a year and was campaigning hard. This raised the question why Durno chose to enter, especially since his Congressional duties were expected to curtail his campaigning. Some speculated that Durno had been sent by the Republican National Committee as it had sent Secretary of the Interior Douglas McKay as a last-minute entry in 1956. One source suggested that Durno--who had won a very close election in 1960 (he received 51.1%)--figured he wouldn't be re-elected to the House so he might as well try for the Senate. Rep. Durno denied both suggestions.

Sigfrid Unnander, 48, was a former State Treasurer who was appointed to the Federal Maritime Commission after his unsuccessful gubernatorial primary in 1958 (when he lost to Mark Hatfield). Durno, 63, was a doctor who was elected to the State Senate when he was 59, and to the House when he was 61. The other contenders included Dr. Harold Livingston a Speech Professor, R. F. Cook a rancher, J. Bacaloff

a contractor, and Glenn Brixey a nurseryman.

Unander received 107,000 votes (50%) to Durno's 73,000 (34%) while the other four candidates shared 33,000 votes.

Analytical Summary: Durno (R)

Senate situation: Democratic incumbent ran for re-election (III).

Senate competition: Republicans won 3 of previous 6 elections for President, Senator, and Governor (Competitive).

Career pattern: No office (30-39%).

Nomination struggle competition: High--winner got 50% with almost a 3-2 margin over the runner-up RST (C).

Nomination struggle source: Ex-Federal Maritime Commission member (and former State Treasurer, and unsuccessful candidate for gubernatorial nomination).

1962 Pennsylvania Van Zandt Republican RSL

Representative James R. Van Zandt had a statewide office in mind for 1962. Early speculation in the press did not differentiate between gubernatorial and senatorial potentials. And Van Zandt's first statement, in the first week of January 1962 did not rule any out; he said he was open to a draft for either Governor or Senator, and he was also planning to seek re-election to the House. By the end of January he formally announced for Governor, becoming the fifth candidate.

On February 5th he announced for the Senate as the other half of a ticket that was headed by State Superior Court Judge Robert Woodside for Governor. The fact that

these two gubernatorial candidates worked out an agreement led to the ticket being called a "harmony ticket". But it faced anything but smooth sailing and it foundered within the month.

Senator Hugh Scott criticized the Woodside-Van Zandt ticket; he claimed that ex-President Dwight Eisenhower, now of Gettysburg, had endorsed Scott for the governorship and had labeled the ticket as "miserable"--at least in the context of saying a primary battle was preferable to "a miserable ticket". In typical Eisenhower fashion he wired Van Zandt in response to a query that he had endorsed Scott and that, "In my conversation with Sen. Scott about this matter, many frank and spirited comments were informally cast. None of these was in any way intended as personally derogatory." (It should be noted that when Scott released Ike's telegram to him it did not contain that phrase).

On February 15th Scott formally announced for Governor, although his faction and the Woodside-Van Zandt faction had been making exaggerated claims to support from county leaders for about a week. He said he was doing it reluctantly, because he really wanted to be a Senator.

On February 24th Scott and Woodside met and, as the New York Times stated it, "...indicated a willingness to withdraw under certain circumstances." On February 26th Woodside withdrew in favor of Van Zandt and urged Scott to do the same. Scott--who admittedly entered the race to prevent Woodside from gaining the nomination--announced the next day that he would withdraw if Rep. William Scranton

were named; he added that he would not object to Van Zandt as the Senatorial candidate. On March 2nd Scranton agreed, and a ticket with him and Van Zandt merely awaited official confirmation in the primary. Scranton won the primary easily, while Van Zandt ran unopposed.

The Woodside-Van Zandt faction had been backed by the financially powerful and influential Pennsylvania Manufacturers Association; he apparantly also had the support of the state party chairman George Bloom. The Scott faction had the backing of the Republican national committeeman and the organization he headed--the Independent Republican Alliance; it also had the support of the state party finance committee.

Many names had been put forth early as potential gubernatorial or senatorial candidates. Eisenhower was sounded out (he rufused) and Thomas Gates ex-Secretary of Defense was mentioned. Two Representatives besides Van Zandt were mentioned; these were Scranton of the 10th Congressional District and Rep. James Fulton in his eighth term representing the 27th Congressional District. Also mentioned were Walter Alessandroni, former chancellor of the Philadelphia Bar, and State Senator William Scot of Lansford.

Although Van Zandt lost one county from his district during reapportionment, this did not appear to be a factor in his Senatorial ambitions. Van Zandt was 63 years old and had represented the same central Pennsylvania area for 20 years at that time.

Despite some optimism because of Republican gains

in Pennsylvania in 1961, Sen. Joseph Clark won re-election by a 103,734 margin or 51.1%.

Analytical Summary: Van Zandt (R)

Senate situation: Democratic incumbent ran for re-election (III).

Senate competition: Republicans won 2 of previous 5 elections for President, Senator, and Governor (Competitive).

Career pattern: Administrative (30-39%).

Nomination struggle competition: Unopposed (AA).

1962 South Dakota Reifel Republican T

On June 22, 1962 Senator Francis Case, Republican, died. Senatorial ambitions for Rep. Ben Reifel for 1962 did not start before that date. The nominee was to be selected by the Republican State Central Committee on July 9th.

Six candidates were placed in nomination.[181] Rep. Ben Reifel, 56, was serving his first term in the House from the large East River First Congressional District, after having served as an administrator in the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Joseph Bottum was 59 and was the Lieutenant Governor, after having served as a state's attorney, in state administration, and as chairman of the state party in 1944-5. Sigurd Anderson, 58, was serving on the Federal Trade Commission after two landslide elections as Governor and an earlier career in such law enforcement positions as

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[181]Details are from Alan L. Clem, The Nomination of Joe Bottum: Analysis of a Committee Decision to Nominate a United States Senator (Vermillion: Governmental Research Bureau, University of South Dakota, 1963).

State Attorney General. Nils Boe, 49, had been a deputy state's attorney before being elected to the South Dakota House of Representatives and serving there as Speaker in 1956-7; he had been out of politics for four years. Joe Foss was the youngest of the candidates at 47, but had served as Governor for two terms after service in the State legislature, had tried unsuccessfully to unseat Rep. George McGovern in the First Congressional District four years earlier, and was in the public eye as Commissioner of the American Football League. The oldest candidate was 64 year old A.C. Miller who had been a state's attorney, had served in the State legislature as Speaker, and had been Lieutenant Governor, a judge, and was the Attorney General; he had unsuccessfully challenged Sen. Case in the primary held on June 5th.

The list of candidates obviously had politically experienced candidates. Early speculation in the two weeks of maneuvering that was available indicated Anderson was the front-runner, Foss the dark-horse, and Miller least likely to win.

On the first ballot Anderson led by a narrow margin over Bottum; Boe was third, Reifel was fourth with 10% of the vote, Foss fifth, and Miller trailed the pack. This ballot turned out to be the high for both Reifel and Miller. On the 20th ballot Joe Bottum finally won a majority, the nomination, and appointment to the Senate to complete the remainder of the term.

Bottum came within 597 votes (out of 254,000 votes

cast) of beating ex-Rep. George McGovern in the November general election.

Analytical Summary: Reifel (R)

Senate situation: Republican incumbent died June 22, 1962 (II).

Senate competition: Republicans won 6 of previous 7 elections for President, Senator, and Governor (Safe).

Career pattern: Congress (30-39%) and Statewide (30-39%).

Nomination struggle competition: State committee took 20 ballots; RST never received more than one-third of leader's vote (nor over 10% of total) (D).

Nomination struggle source: Winner was Lieutenant Governor.

1962 Utah King Democrat RSL

An influx of industrial workers made the Democrats hopeful of capturing the Senate seat of Republican Wallace Bennett. The candidate they chose to oppose the conservative Bennett was liberal David King. He was a second term Representative from Salt Lake City and the 1st Congressional District; he was the son of four-term Senator William King (1917-1941) who had also served in the House of Representatives.

King did face opposition from Calvin L. Rampton a Salt Lake City lawyer and Joseph Weston a Davis County author. Neither rival had sought political office before. Weston was dropped by the Democratic convention which certifies no more than two primary contenders, getting only 19 convention votes. Rampton got 35% of the convention votes, but scored only 23% of the primary vote. But he later went

on to higher political office, being elected Governor two years later in 1964.

King lost to Bennett by 15,099 votes (47.6%).

Analytical Summary: King (D)

Senate situation: Republican incumbent ran for re-election (III).

Senate competition: Democrats won only 1 of previous 6 elections for President, Senator, and Governor ("Hopeless").

Career pattern: Congress (over 50%).

Nomination struggle competition: Low--3 to 1 margin (A).

Nomination struggle source: Non-officeholder (first candidacy).

1964 Hawaii Gill Democrat RSL

As early as May 1963 there was speculation that freshman Representative-At-Large Thomas Gill (D) would challenge the incumbent Senator Hiram Fong in the November 1964 general election. Some other names were raised; these were John W. Goemans, a friend of the Kennedys and the director of the Honolulu office of the State Department, and William Norwood the chief of staff for Gov. John Burns.

But the only candidate to compete with Gill--who did not formally announce until April, 30, 1964--was State Senator Nadao Yoshinaga of Maui. He had the support of the powerful International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union (ILWU) and was the first candidate of the so-called Neighbor Islands to seek a Senate seat (the Honolulu-Neighbor Island conflict is similar to the urban-rural, city-outstate conflict in other states). But Gill received 64%

of the primary vote and did quite well in the outer islands.

Gill lost to Fong by 13,958 votes (53% to 47%) despite a landslide 78.8% for President Johnson. One analysis listed the following contributory factors: Fong's incumbency, his endorsement by the ILWU, his superior financing, normal Hawaiian pattern of split-ticket voting, statewide newspaper support, Democratic Party factionalism, Gill's inexperienced staff, failure of COPE and Teamsters to broaden their appeal in Gill's behalf, and "certain evanescent personal idiosyncracies."[182]

Analytical Summary: Gill (D)

Senate situation: Republican incumbent ran for re-election (III).

Senate competition: Democrats won 4 of previous 6 elections for President, Senator, and Governor (Competitive).

Career pattern: Not ascertained--this was only fourth Senatorial contest.

Nomination struggle competition: High--64% to 36%. (B).

Nomination struggle source: State legislator.

1964 Indiana Bruce Republican T

The 1964 Republican State convention--the site of the ultimate nomination struggle to choose a nominee to oppose incumbent Democratic Senator Vance Hartke--saw a three-man contest that required three ballots before it was decided. The two major contenders were Rep. Donald Bruce, a two-term Representative from Indianapolis who had had a

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[182]Daniel W. Tuttle, Jr., "The 1964 Election in Hawaii," Western Political Quarterly, . XVIII (June 1965), p. 483.

successful career as a radio broadcaster before being elected to the House. His major opponent was State Senator D. Russell Bontrager of Elkhart, who had been in the State Senate for fifteen years and was serving as majority leader. The third contender was former State Senator Edgar Whitcomb who lacked sufficient first ballot strength, but hoped to emerge victorious from a deadlocked convention.

The contest between Bruce and Bontrager was compared to a contest between a Barry Goldwater and a Robert Taft--both conservative, but with very different political styles. As can be seen from their background, Bruce was a crowd-pleasing orator, while Bontrager was a legislative craftsman.

On the third ballot Bontrager received 1142 votes to Bruce's 850 and Whitcomb's 178. But Bontrager was less successful against Hartke, polling only 45.7% of the vote.

Analytical Summary: Bruce (R)

Senate situation: Democratic incumbent ran for re-election (III).

Senate competition: Republicans won only 1 of previous 4 elections for President, Senator, and Governor ("Hopeless").

Career pattern: State Legislature (40-49%).

Nomination struggle competition: High--state convention needed 3 ballots (C).

Nomination struggle source: State legislator.

1964 Maine McIntire Republican RSL

In the June 21, 1963 issue of Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reports there was speculation that conservative Representative Clifford McIntire of the 2nd Congressional

District would be the most likely Republican opponent of incumbent Democratic Senator Edmund Muskie. They noted, "McIntire is known to be interested in the race and his conservative political stands would make him a favorite in the Republican primary over the other potential GOP contender, Rep. Stanley R. Tupper (R 1st District-South). Tupper a liberal Republican, currently plans to seek re-election to his own House seat."[183] Tupper never ran, and McIntire was unopposed in the primary.

McIntire had been in the House for six terms (Tupper was in his second term).

Muskie had not alienated any groups in Maine, and with the Goldwater debacle (he got only 31.2% of the vote and trailed Johnson by 143,563 votes) he had no difficulty winning re-election; in fact he got two-thirds of the vote (66.6%) and led by 126,471 votes. McIntire thus became the only Representative in this survey to win nomination and then to lose the Senatorial election by over 60%.

Analytical Summary: McIntire (R)

Senate situation: Democratic incumbent ran for re-election (III).

Senate competition: Republicans won 4 of previous 6 elections for President, Senator, and Governor (Competitive).

Career pattern: Congress (40-49%).

Nomination struggle competition: Unopposed (AA).

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[183] Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, June 21, 1963, p. 1024.

1964 New Mexico Montoya Democrat RSW

According to one estimate, Spanish-Americans constitute approximately one-third of the New Mexico electorate.[184] So when Senator Dennis Chavez died on November 18, 1962, it was generally assumed that a Spanish-American would seek the position. And it was speculated that he might be opposed within his own party by an Anglo.[185]

Representative-At-Large Joseph Montoya was one of the names prominently mentioned in the speculation. Dennis Chavez, Jr. made an early announcement that he would run for his father's seat, but never did. Anglos mentioned included the other Representative, Thomas Morris, and former Governor John Simms (1955-1957).[186] Montoya officially announced on August 18, 1963; he had been in the House since a special election in April 1957.

The nomination struggle was to take place under changing rules. A pre-primary nomination convention was passed to replace the pure primary system. This was pushed by the Anderson forces and was seen as part of an effort to get the Senatorial nomination for Montoya without a hot primary battle.[187] It was the Chavez forces that had pushed

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[184] Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, May 1, 1964, p. 820.

[185] Frederick C. Irion, "The 1962 Election in New Mexico," Western Political Quarterly, XVI (June 1963), p. 449.

[186] Ibid.

[187] A. Spencer Hill, "The 1964 Election in New Mexico," Western Political Quarterly, XVIII (June 1965), p. 500.

for a return to the primary in 1955 from the pre-convention system because despite Chavez's personal invulnerability, they could not control the convention and felt they could do better in a primary.[188] It was charged in 1964 that prominent Democrats were ordered not to run against Montoya in the convention. When the Senatorial nominating petitions of Norman Palmer, a rodeo bull-dogger who had traveled the state charging boss-rule, were invalidated by a narrow interpretation of the law, a serious split in the party became clear. But Montoya went on to beat incumbent Edwin Mechem who was a lame duck Governor when he resigned and had himself apponted to Chavez's vacant seat. Montoya received 54.7% of the vote and had a margin of 30,647.

Analytical Summary: Montoya (D)

Senate situation: Democratic incumbent died November 18, 1962. Republican appointee ran for re-election (III).

Senate competition: Democrats won 5 of previous 6 elections for President, Senator, and Governor (Safe).

Career pattern: Law enforcement (30-39%) and Administrative (30-39%).

Nomination struggle competition: Unopposed (AA).

1964 New York Stratton Democrat T

Sam Stratton's candidacy for the Senatorial nomination experienced a range of events from virtual unanimous support from aides of President John Kennedy in May 1963 to a blitzkrieg campaign by Robert Kennedy in August 1964. It

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[188] V.O. Key, Jr., American State Politics; op.cit., p. 126.

would appear that Stratton's ambition lay within his personal characteristics rather than the career structure in New York State. In 1962 Stratton tried to gain the gubernatorial nomination by a long hard campaign of meeting and persuading voters. But in New York, where party bosses still ruled the day and the nomination was made in a convention rather than a primary, his attempt was unsuccessful. The bosses chose a candidate who had never run for office before, but who had a supposedly magic name in New York City because of his relationship to a famous relative (i.e. Robert Morganthau). So for the 1964 nomination Stratton changed his strategy and confined his campaigning to convince party leaders (a lack of funds for a statewide campaign aimed at voters, helped him choose his strategy too).

While Stratton was trying to appeal to the party leaders, one of the party leaders--Robert Wagner, Mayor of New York City--was trying to decide whether he should be a Senatorial candidate himself again (he had run against Javits in 1956). The major political factor in his decision was that he had won re-election as Mayor after battling the bosses, and he was afraid that his successors could not continue the contest successfully. Personal factors--the illness and then death of his wife--entered into his decision mix also, and he finally let it be known in March that he was not a candidate.

Other potential candidates were being mentioned by leaders, the press, or themselves. For example ex-party potentate James Farley (75) claimed in a TV interview that

he would be the strongest candidate. Former Governor and then Under Secretary of State Averill Harriman (71) lined up a heavy speaking schedule and refused to take himself out of the resulting speculation. Similarly Queens County District Attorney Frank O'Connor scheduled two months of speeches on foreign policy and similar issues and called himself a "maybe candidate". The Liberal Party, which held the balance of power in New York (or at least the claim to it), put Harriman at the head of their list of acceptable candidates with U.N. Under Secretary Ralph Bunche second. The mass media mentioned New York County District Attorney Frank Hogan (he had run against Keating in 1958), and Under Secretary of Commerce Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Jr. State party chairman William McKeon responded to a question by saying the Democrats had many fine men to choose from and added Rep. Otis Pike to the list already noted. Erie County leader Peter Crotty had a list of 18 names (of which the New York Times mentioned 7, including State Controller Arthur Levitt). Former Congressional candidate, and more recently Ambassador to New Zealand, Anthony Akers announced his candidacy (an official candidacy was a rarity). Adlai Stevenson, in New York because of his position as Delegate to the United Nations, was urged to be a candidate, but within two weeks made a firm decision against running. Lawyer Louis Nizer said he would run for his first political office (i.e. the Senate) if Stevenson did not. A partial poll of county party leaders listed Stratton as the front-runner, Roosevelt second, and Levitt and O'Connor in third place.

Then on May 14th the New York Times disclosed that Attorney General Robert Kennedy was contemplating running for the Senate from New York. Several party leaders welcomed his entry openly, while others commented cautiously but favorably. Stratton urged that the delegates to the state convention who would be elected in the June 2nd primary should meet informally in mid-June to choose a candidate and then meet officially on September 1st, the date chosen by the Republican dominated state legislature for the Democratic Party state convention (a mid-June schedule was one Kennedy and his forces could not meet). On May 19th Kennedy commented that it would be better if a New Yorker ran and that he had no plans other than serving as Attorney General. The boom continued until June 23rd when Kennedy announced, "I will not be a candidate." Speculation at the time focused upon his dedication to the cause of civil rights which was about to benefit from a new law, and upon his personal family responsibilities just increased by the serious injury of Ted Kennedy in an airplane crash. Later speculation referred to his hopes of being chosen Vice President.

With this refusal speculation began. Howard Samuels, upstate industrialist, and Rep. Hugh Carey of Brooklyn were mentioned by the New York Times as people who were being mentioned by political leaders. City Councilman Paul O'Dwyer entered the race. Stratton moved ahead strongly now, picking up support among some New York party leaders.

On July 30th Stratton's Senatorial ambition received a serious blow--a death blow as it turned out. President

Lyndon Johnson announced that he would not choose a running mate from his Cabinet or Cabinet level officers. Kennedy had been informed of this decision the day before. On July 31st he met with his close advisors, and a strategy to gain the nomination emerged.

According to the New York Times, after Johnson's announcement excluded him from the Vice-Presidency (and probably from any active role in the new administration), Kennedy was willing to rest a year or so. But he saw no worthy political openings in 1965 or 1966. He decided to try for the New York Senatorial nomination if he could win it without a fight. His only hope to accomplish this was to get support from all groups. Anti-Wagner bosses were eager to find a candidate that would present a challenge to Wagner's leadership and were among Kennedy's earliest supporters; but, Kennedy felt he needed Wagner's endorsement also, and so his brother-in-law Stephen Smith began making calls to people to put pressure on Wagner. To gain the support of the Liberals, Arthur Schlesinger went to see Alex Rose and the other Liberal Party leaders. William Haddad, a Kennedy friend and former Reform Candidate for Congress, was sent to win support from the Reform forces (some of whom had swung to Stratton). Others, including State Chairman McKeon were sent to get upstate support.

The blitz was a success; Kennedy aides were able to convince everyone that he was on the way to victory, and to miss the bandwagon would be a costly mistake. Upstate support began to come in, reform ranks split, and Wagner

finally endorsed Kennedy's candidacy. On August 25th Kennedy formally announced.

On September 1st Stratton received 153 votes in the state Democratic convention to 968 for Kennedy. So Stratton, who changed his strategy and style, could not change his upstate affiliation nor alter his image as a politician who was aggressive and independent (and even anti-organization, as his 1962 bid for the gubernatorial nomination had emphasized).[189]

Kennedy went on to beat Keating in the general election gaining 53.5% and a 700,000 vote plurality.

Analytical Summary: Stratton (D)

Senate situation: Republican incumbent ran for re-election (III).

Senate competition: Democrats won only 1 of previous 5 elections for President, Senator, and Governor ("Hopeless").

Career pattern: Law Enforcement (30-39%).

Nomination struggle competition: More than 6-1 margin over RST in convention ballot (D).

Nomination struggle source: U.S. Attorney General.

1964 Ohio Taft Republican RSL

To the surprise of none, Representative-At-Large Robert Taft, Jr. announced his candidacy for the Republican nomination for the Senate seat of Democrat Stephen M. Young; the formal announcement came on December 6, 1963.

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[189]Speculation at the time suggested that Wagner feared Stratton's candidacy because these traits combined with his articulateness made him a serious threat to Wagner's party leadership.

What was somewhat more surprising was that Secretary of State Ted Brown chose to stay in the race. Brown had held state office since 1951, but had rarely discussed issues except those pertaining to his office--i.e. voting and registration. He conducted his campaign on an ultra-conservative platform--campaigning against the Civil Rights Bill (which Taft had voted for), against foreign aid, and for getting out of the United Nations if Communist China were admitted. He fought without organization support, as the state party organization headed by Ray Bliss had endorsed Taft, but with the aid of Goldwater backers.

Taft had been elected to the Ohio State House of Representatives in 1954 and re-elected in 1956, 1958, and 1960; in his last term there he served as majority leader. In 1962 he was nominated easily and elected easily to the United States House of Representatives as Representative-At-Large.

Taft beat Brown by a 4-1 majority. Some viewed it as a personal victory, others saw it as indicating trouble for the Presidential aspirations of Barry Goldwater.

Out of the 3,830,389 votes cast in the Senate election in November, Taft missed being Senator by 16,827; he polled 49.8% of the vote. This was in the same election that Johnson led Goldwater by over one million votes in Ohio.

Analytical Summary: Taft (R)

Senate situation: Democratic incumbent ran for re-election (III).

Senate competition: Republicans won 2 of previous 5 elections for President, Senator, and Governor (Competitive).

Career pattern: Statewide (30-39%).

Nomination struggle competition: Low--4-1 margin (A).

Nomination struggle source: State Secretary of State.

1964 Tennessee Bass Democrat RSW

After Senator Estes Kefauver died on August 10, 1963, the struggle for his seat was described as "the strongest Bourbon--anti-Bourbon confrontation since the defeat of Crump..."[190]

The Governor was Frank Clement, a member of the organization or Bourbon faction. He appointed 72 year old Herbert Walters, the National Committeeman, to fill the seat. Many felt that this was temporary, and that Gov. Clement would try to win the seat back for the Bourbons. But Senator Walters did announce his candidacy on January 31, 1964, despite the fact that he could barely speak above a whisper due to an operation for throat cancer several years earlier;[191] he withdrew, not unexpectedly, on April 27th.

Gov. Clement did announce on May 13, 1964. But in the interim the candidate of the anti-Bourbons had also entered. On February 16th came the announcement of Representative Ross Bass of the 6th Congressional District in Middle Tennessee. This area had been traditionally an anti-

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[190]Parks, op.cit., p. 156.

[191]Roger Winship Stuart, Meet the Senators (New York: Macfadden Books, 1963), p. 239.

Crump (or anti-organization) stronghold. As V.O. Key noted, the reasons for this are not clear. He observed that local explanations noted (a) the rivalry of Memphis (Crump home territory) and Nashville, (b) the feeling that Memphis and East Tennessee often formed a coalition that obtained preferential proportions of policy and patronage, (c) resentment of having the Governor, frequently from Middle Tennessee, controlled by Crump and Memphis, (d) a general sectional competition between Western and Middle Tennessee, and (e) the leadership of the Nashville Tennessean.[192] The latter had been under federal court receivership before World War II, and run by its staff; its liberal policies were continued by its new owner.[193]

Bass had been in Congress since his 1954 election to the 84th Congress. Incidentally he moved to Congress when the three-term incumbent, James Sutton, unsuccessfully challenged Kefauver in the Senatorial primary. Since then he had earned his reputation as the most liberal of the Tennessee Congressmen.

A third candidate was M.M. Bullard of Newport, a farmer and businessman. Although this was his first candidacy, he had been active in Tennessee politics. He had been a supporter of anti-Bourbon candidates dating back to 1934 and including Kefauver in 1948. But he became wealthier and more conservative with age. The New York Times

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[192]V.O. Key, Jr. Southern Politics, op.cit., p. 72.

[193]Parks, op.cit., p. 155.

speculated he may have cost Clement more votes than he took away from Bass.

The primary was a hard-fought battle with the Governor's record made an issue by Bass. But Bass emerged the victor by a margin of 96,968 votes over Clement; this was 50.8%. His vote for the Civil Rights Bill produced large Negro pluralities, and he carried his own Congressional District by a 2-1 margin. He then went on to defeat Howard Baker, Jr.

1966 saw a repeat Bass-Clement primary, except that Clement won. It was another bitter fight and this time Howard Baker, Jr. beat his Democratic opponent.

Analytical Summary: R. Bass (D)

Senate situation: Democratic incumbent died on August 10, 1963. Democratic appointee did not seek re-election (II).

Senate competition: Democrats won 4 of previous 5 elections for President, Senator, and Governor (Safe).

Career pattern: Congress (over 40%) and Law Enforcement (30-39%).

Nomination struggle competition: High--RST received 51% to runner-up's 36% (B).

Nomination struggle source: Governor.

1964 Utah Lloyd Republican T

The Republican Senatorial primary in Utah in 1964 was a contest between a staunch conservative--Dr. Ernest Wilkenson who resigned as President of Brigham Young University to make the race--and the more moderate Representative Sherman Lloyd. Lloyd, 50, was in his first term in

the House, but had served eight years in the State Senate from Salt Lake City.

The contest was extremely close, Lloyd getting 59,398 (or 49.3%) and Wilkenson receiving a scant 1,769 votes more. Wilkenson continued to have problems and Sen. Frank Moss returned to office easily, gaining 57.3% of the vote.

Analytical Summary: Lloyd (R)

Senate situation: Democratic incumbent ran for re-election (III).

Senate competition: Republicans won 3 of previous 4 elections for President, Senator, and Governor (Safe).

Career pattern: No office (over 50%).

Nomination struggle competition: High--50.7% to RST's 49.3% (C).

Nomination struggle source: non-officeholder.

1966 Kansas Ellsworth Republican T

Rep. Robert Ellsworth, 40, serving his third term in the House of Representatives challenged freshman incumbent Sen. James Pearson, 46, in the Republican primary in 1966. Ellsworth's liberal Republican qualifications were clear--e.g. he supported William Scranton at the 1964 Republican National Convention, and he was a member of the Wednesday Club, a liberal Republican organization in the House. One of the charges he made against Pearson was the latter's absenteeism.

Also challenging Pearson, were William Tarrant, a former Mayor of Wichita, and Mrs. Ana Anderson, a housewife.

Pearson received half of the votes, while Ellsworth got 41%.

Pearson won re-election to the Senate, getting 52.3% against his Democratic opponent ex-Rep. J. Floyd Breeding.

Analytical Summary: Ellsworth (R)

Senate situation: Republican incumbent ran for re-election (I).

Senate competition: Republicans won 7 of previous 8 elections for President, Senator, and Governor (Safe).

Career pattern: Statewide (over 50%).

Nomination struggle competition: High--winner 50% to RST's 41% (C).

Nomination struggle source: Incumbent.

1966 Mississippi Walker Republican RSL

The Republican revival in Mississippi in 1964 included the landslide election of Goldwater's electoral slate and the relatively easy victory of Prentiss Walker to the House of Representatives. As the first Republican Representative from Mississippi since Reconstruction, it was not unexpected that he might choose to run for Senator in 1966.

Walker had no competition for the Republican nomination for Senate. And Senator Eastland did not have much more competition in the November election. Democratic Presidential candidates may have lost in the previous two elections, but statewide Democratic officeholders continued their easy monopoly. Walker got only 34.6% of the vote (which, however, was more than the Republican Senatorial

candidates in Rhode Island and Alaska received).

Analytical Summary: Walker (R)

Senate situation: Democratic incumbent ran for re-election (III).

Senate competition: Of the 5 previous elections for President, Senator, and Governor, the Democrats won 3, the Republicans won 1, and a slate of Unpledged Presidential electors won 1 (Competitive).

Career pattern: Not Ascertained.

Nomination struggle competition: Unopposed (AA).

1966 Oregon Duncan Democrat RSL

The 1966 Oregon primary for the Democratic nomination for Senator was billed as a test for President Lyndon Johnson's Vietnam policy. Rep. Robert Duncan was a supporter of the President's Vietnam policy, while his opponent Howard Morgan (who had originally urged Duncan's candidacy) joined the race only after he found his views on the war were opposite. Morgan was a former State Party Chairman, and had served on the Federal Power Commission.

Other candidates had been mentioned in the early maneuvering to fill the seat vacated by fellow Democrat Sen. Maurine Neuberger. Her remarriage and unofficial residence in Massachusetts had given a clear indication that she would not run for re-election. One of these candidates mentioned was Rep. Edith Green. When she announced her plans to seek re-election for a seventh House term in January 1968, she noted that it was a difficult decision to make and that she had changed her mind several times. But one of the factors she considered was that she had no desire

to "exchange for the challenge of a freshman Senate seat on the back row, perhaps with committee assignments that would be far less important and meaningful to the people of this state, seniority on the Education and Labor, and Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committees on which I now serve." Still other potential candidates, according to the New York Times included ex-Rep. Charles Porter, ex-National Committeeman Monroe Sweetland, and ex-Governor Robert Holmes, and attorney Steve Anderson. But some of these potential candidates were reluctant to become a sacrificial lamb in a Senate race they felt they could not win. Governor Mark Hatfield was barred by the Oregon constitution from seeking a third term, and it was evident he would be the Republican nominee.

Duncan, who was serving on the Appropriations Committee, apparantly felt he could win. He received the endorsement of COPE and the support of much of the Democratic party organization. Duncan had been Speaker of the Oregon House of Representatives before gaining election to the House from the rural 4th Congressional District in 1962.

Duncan beat Morgan by a wide margin (62% to 35%), but Hatfield did go on to victory in November, beating Duncan by 24,000 votes (51.8%).

Analytical Summary: Duncan (D)

Senate situation: Democratic incumbent did not run for re-election (II).

Senate competition: Democrats won 3 of previous 5 elections for President, Senator, Governor (Competitive).

Career pattern: No pattern.

Nomination struggle competition: High--62% to 35% (B).

Nomination struggle source: Ex-Federal Power Commission member (and ex-party chairman).

1966 Wyoming Roncalio Democrat RSL

When Teno Roncalio won election as Representative-At-Large in 1964, he became a leading contender for the 1966 Senatorial nomination to unseat Republican incumbent Milward Simpson. Roncalio, an early supporter of the Kennedys, faced no competition in the primary. But early speculation had included the name of Mike Manatos a White House aide to Pres. Lyndon Johnson as a possible opponent. Manatos had been out of the state for 30 years, however, and his candidacy never materialized. Neither did the speculation by CQ, that State Supreme Court Justice John McIntire, a conservative might become a candidate.

Simpson announced his withdrawal from the race in February 1966 because of ill health. The Republican nominee, Governor Clifford Hansen, went on to beat Roncalio in the November election. Roncalio lost by 4,407 votes, gaining 48.2% of the votes.

Analytical Summary: Roncalio (D)

Senate situation: Republican incumbent announced his retirement after RST candidacy (III).

Senate competition: Democrats won 2 of previous 6 elections for President, Senator, and Governor (Competitive).

Career pattern: Administrative (40-49%).

Nomination struggle competition: Unopposed (AA).

1968 Alabama Selden Democrat T

Senator Lister Hill, 74, announced on January 20, 1968 that he would not run for re-election to a sixth term in the Senate. Two days later his close friend (and cousin) Rep. Armistead Selden, 47, an eight-term House member announced his candidacy. His major opponent had declared his candidacy before Hill's surprise announcement; he was former Lt. Gov. James B. Allen, 55, who had served in that office in 1951 to 1955 and more recently from 1963 to 1967 under George C. Wallace's gubernatorial reign.

Both of these candidates were considered conservatives. Both had allied themselves with Wallace's Presidential campaign--the wives of both were on elector slates pledged to Wallace.

Other candidates included the sole moderate Robert S. Smith, a lawyer who had been endorsed by several Negro groups. Also running were former Gov. James Folsom, and perennial ultra-conservative retired Rear Admiral John Crommelin.

In the first primary Allen received approximately 42% of the vote and led Selden (who received 35%) by 33,000 votes. Smith received 65,000 votes (15%).

The run-off primary a month later was even closer. Allen won 51% of the vote and led by about 7500 out of 389,000. In the General Election in November Allen received 70% of the vote.

Analytical Summary: Selden (D)

Senate situation: Democratic incumbent did not run for

re-election (II).

Senate competition: Democrats won 4 of previous 5 elections for President, Senator, and Governor (Safe).

Career pattern: Congress (over 40%).

Nomination struggle competition: High--51% to RST's 49% in the run-off primary (C).

Nomination struggle source: Lieutenant Governor.

1968 Florida Gurney Republican RSW

The victory of Republican Claude Kirk as Governor in 1966 gave Republicans hopes of capturing the Senate seat that was being vacated by Democrat George Smathers.

Gurney's forces made an early move and had letters sent by Senator John Tower soliciting funds for Gurney's Senatorial candidacy in August 1967. This was done without any notice to freshman Rep. J. Herbert Burke or seven-term Rep. Bill Cramer. Gurney's explanation was that some friends had formed a committee and convinced Tower to write the letter; Kirk's comment was that he was unaware of any other candidate. This intensified a factional split between Kirk and Gurney on one side and Cramer and Burke on the other. Reportedly Kirk-Gurney forces were to support Cramer in a 1970 bid for the seat of Sen. Spessard Holland (who would be 78 then).[194]

Gurney, a conservative whose district contained only 12% of Florida's registered Republicans (compared to

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[194]They did support Cramer's candidacy until Judge Harold Carswell whose nomination to the United States Supreme Court was defeated in the Senate, entered the Senate race in April 1970.

23% for Cramer's district, for example), faced some nomination competition from ex-Mayor Herman Goldner of St. Petersburg. Goldner, a liberal Republican, had bolted the party in 1964 to support President Lyndon Johnson over Barry Goldwater.

Gurney had no trouble beating Goldner--he even won in St. Petersburg which had the largest reservoir of Republican voters--winning the primary by a 4 to 1 margin.

Gurney went on to beat ex-Governor LeRoy Collins who had faced a run-off primary. Gurney received 55.9% of the vote winning by over 200,000 votes.

Analytical Summary: Gurney (R)

Senate situation: Democratic incumbent did not run for re-election (IV).

Senate competition: Republicans won only 1 of previous 5 elections for President, Senator, and Governor ("Hopeless").

Career pattern: Not ascertained.

Nomination struggle competition: Low--4 to 1 margin (A).

Nomination struggle source: Ex-Mayor.

1968 Idaho Hansen Republican RSL

Rep. George Hansen faced no opposition in his pursuit of the Republican Senatorial nomination to unseat Democrat incumbent Frank Church. Some observers felt it was a mistake for Hansen to give up his House seat and membership on the Agriculture and Interior Committees to challenge Church who appeared to be a likely winner.

The only other name mentioned in early speculations

was that of State Attorney General Allan Shepard who indicated he might challenge Hansen. But he did not.

Church had little trouble beating Hansen in the November election. Hansen received only 39.7% of the vote and trailed Church by almost 60,000 votes.

Analytical Summary: Hansen (R)

Senate situation: Democratic incumbent ran for re-election (III).

Senate competition: Republicans won 4 of previous 6 elections for President, Senator, and Governor (Competitive).

Career pattern: Statewide (30-39%).

Nomination struggle competition: Unopposed (AA).

1968 Kansas Dole Republican RSW

Senator Frank Carlson (Republican) had been expected to be a candidate for re-election despite his age (74), and there had been no talk of anyone challenging him for the nomination. In fact most Republican attention had been focused upon their attempt to regain the Governorship from Democrat Robert Docking. Rep. Robert Dole had squelched talk about his running for Governor, by announcing he would seek re-election to a fifth term to the House.

But when Sen. Carlson announced his retirement in December 1967, Dole decided to run for the Senate. Several potential opponents were mentioned--e.g. Rep. Garner Shriver and ex-Governors John Anderson, Jr. and William Avery. But only the latter's candidacy materialized. Avery was not only a former Governor (one term, 1965-67 before being beaten by Docking in 1966), but had also served five terms in the House. Dole was considered a conservative, while Avery was

more moderate.

Dole had campaigned hard, and although Avery decreased the gap in the closing weeks of the campaign, Dole had a relatively easy race, gaining a better than 2 to 1 election victory.

Dole went on to beat William I. Robinson in the November election receiving 52.3% of the vote.

Analytical Summary: Dole (R)

Senate situation: Republican incumbent was not a candidate for re-election (II).

Senate competitiveness: Republicans won 5 of previous 7 elections for President, Senator, and Governor (Safe).

Career pattern: Statewide (over 50%).

Nomination struggle competition: Low--better than 2 to 1 margin (A).

Nomination struggle source: Ex-Governor (and ex-Representative).

1968 Maryland Mathias Republican RSW

Early speculation focused upon Rep. Charles Mathias of the Western rural and suburban 6th Congressional District and Rep. Rogers Morton of the rural Eastern Shore 1st Congressional District. Mathias (46) was in his fourth term, and Morton (54) was in his third term.

When Morton announced his plans to run for re-election, the path to the Senate nomination was virtually cleared for Mathias. Mathias did face some minor opposition, but was able to beat his nearest competitor Harry Simms--a real estate developer and political neophyte--by better than a 5 to 1 margin.

Mathias went on to beat the incumbent Democratic Senator Daniel Brewster. Mathias received 535,000 (47.9%), Brewster 435,000 (38.9%), and George P. Mahoney running as an independent 148,000 (13.2%).

Analytical Summary: Mathias (R)

Senate situation: Democratic incumbent ran for re-election (III).

Senate competition: Republicans won only 1 of previous 5 elections for President, Senator, and Governor ("Hopeless").

Career pattern: Administrative (40-49%).

Nomination struggle competition: Low--5 to 1 margin (A).

Nomination struggle source: non-officeholder (first candidacy).

1968 Missouri T. Curtis Republican RSL

Rep. Thomas Curtis was in his ninth term in the House, representing his suburban St. Louis district, when he decided to run for the Senate seat of Sen. Edward V. Long. Curtis had only token opposition in the primary, rolling up 174,000 votes to Morris Duncan's 22,000 (a third candidate polled 2,000), or 88%.

But Sen. Long, hampered by a Life magazine expose charging corruption, faced stiff opposition from Thomas Eagleton and W. True Davis. Long, a middle of the roader was defeated by liberal Eagleton. Eagleton continued to roll along, defeating Curtis in the November election, receiving 51.1% of the vote.

Analytical Summary: T. Curtis (R)

Senate situation: Democratic incumbent ran for renomination (III).

Senate competition: Republicans won none of the previous 4 elections for President, Senator, and Governor ("Hopeless").

Career pattern: Administrative (30-39%).

Nomination struggle competition: Low--8 to 1 margin (A).

Nomination struggle source: Non-officeholder.

1968 New York Pike and Resnick Democrats T and T

The Democratic Senatorial nomination contest in New York in 1968 took place in a new electoral environment. First it was integrally involved in the struggle over the Presidential nomination. And second it took place under a new set of electoral groundrules. New York in 1967 had adopted a modified primary system. The state committee was to meet in March to make an endorsement; any candidate receiving 25% of the vote there could request a primary, as could anyone collecting 10,000 signatures on a petition, with at least 50 signers in each of 3/4 of the counties.[195] The primary was to take place in mid-June.

The earlier calendar--state conventions, where nominations for state office had been made, were usually held in late summer--did not seem to stir the party into its usual consensus-seeking slatemaking activity. In fact in August 1967 when state party chairman John Burns asked

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[195]The adoption of these more lenient rules suggests that the role of the party organization had already changed in New York State.

prospective candidates to come forward, he had to admit that the response was "something short of a stampede". It seemed that few were eager to run against Republican incumbent Jacob Javits, whom many viewed as unbeatable in 1968 despite his loss in 1966 in a race for Constitutional Convention delegate.

One who indicated an interest (or at least didn't close the door) was former Mayor of New York City Robert Wagner, who, it was said, was still eager to follow his father's footsteps into the Senate. The other one to express an interest was Morris Abram, a transplanted Georgia lawyer who was President of the American Jewish Congress and a delegate to the United Nations Human Rights Commission.

Other names had been mentioned--either by party leaders or the press. Brooklyn leader Stanley Steingut had urged U.N. Ambassador (and ex-Supreme Court Justice and Secretary of Labor) Arthur Goldberg, who rejected the suggestion. Other names that were bandied about included ex-Presidential aides Theodore Sorensen and Bill Moyers (the latter was then publisher of the Long Island newspaper Newsday), and Nassau County Executive Eugene Nickerson.

Some who eliminated themselves from contention were Theodore Kheel, a labor mediator, and Dr. Alan K. Campbell, a Political Science professor and former Deputy State Controller.

In August 1967, Rep. Joseph Resnick was one of those removing himself from the contention. He said he was eager to make sure that there would be a Senatorial candidate who

would support President Johnson and his Vietnam policy. But he was satisfied that there were such candidates, and so he announced for re-election to a third term in the House from his 28th Congressional District (which had not elected a Democrat before him for half of a century).

In November 1967, Resnick (43) was no longer convinced that such a Senatorial candidate existed, and he announced his candidacy for that nomination. He said he would withdraw in favor of Goldberg, but for no other, and certainly not for Wagner whom he regarded as a sure loser against Javits. By the end of January, Wagner may have shared that evaluation, as he declined to become a candidate.

By the end of January another supporter of Johnson and his Vietnam policy entered the race. Rep. Otis Pike (47) was in his fourth term from a normally Republican Congressional District at the tip of Long Island. He had earlier urged that the Democratic candidate be more conservative than Javits, and he was now proclaiming himself as that candidate. He was viewed as being very personable, and was sometimes called "the downstate Sam Stratton".

Meanwhile the anti-administration peace movement was considering entering a candidate in the Senatorial race. The Coalition for a Democratic Alternative--the dump-Johnson movement that was backing Sen. Eugene McCarthy's presidential candidacy--considered several alternate choices including its founder Allard Lowenstein, former New York City Councilman Paul O'Dwyer, State Senator Jack Bronston, and Representatives William Ryan and John Dow. There were

also reports that Manhattan Borough President Percy Sutton might be the candidate of this group. After much discussion this group subsequently (on March 16th) chose Paul O'Dwyer (60) as its candidate. The executive committee had recommended Lowenstein, but he chose to run for the House instead.

In February, according to the New York Times, budding candidate Abram sought approval of his foreign policy views by Senator Robert Kennedy, Vice-President Humphrey, and President Johnson. Kennedy said the statement was acceptable to him, as did Humphrey (after making some slight revisions). But President Johnson disapproved of the statement. Morris Abram, not by coincidence (according to reports at the time), was then offered the presidency of Brandeis University, which he accepted, and dropped out of the race.

Party leaders now started another wave of sounding out potential candidates. Kheel, Sorensen, and Goldberg, all of whom had refused earlier, were asked again and rejected it again. State Controller Arthur Levitt, who won re-election by a landslide in 1966, was unsuccessfully solicited. So were Sol Linowitz, Ambassador to the Organization of American States, and Howard Samuels, Under Secretary of Commerce. Representatives Richard Ottinger, Jonathan Bingham, and Richard McCarthy reportedly were being considered.

On March 14th, two days after the New Hampshire presidential primary and just 16 days before the state committee was to make its endorsement, it was reported that Percy Sutton (the Negro Borough President of Manhattan) was reconsidering his earlier refusal to become a candidate.

He apparently was going to be the Kennedy forces' candidate for the Senate. He had been closeted with Kennedy aides and with state chairman Burns, who was a Kennedy man. Sutton reportedly had informed the Coalition for a Democratic Alternative that he could not support McCarthy because he was being presented as a one issue man. On March 19th he officially announced his candidacy for the Senate.

But this candidacy was to receive several serious blows. Not unexpectedly some upstate party leaders complained that a Negro Senatorial candidate would hurt them in local races; in addition Harlem did not warmly receive his candidacy either (his announcement had noted defensively that his candidacy for the Senate would not deter his dedication to the black cause).

The most serious blow, however, was the action of the Liberal Party leaders. On March 28th--two days before the March 30th Democratic state committee endorsing convention--the Liberal Party's policy committee voted to endorse Javits for re-election to the Senate. If this recommendation were adhered to by the full state committee, it would be the first time in the party's 24-year history that it had endorsed a Republican for statewide non-judicial office. Javits received 18 of the 25 votes in the committee, Sutton received 4, and 3 voted to run their own candidate in November. Sutton immediately declared his disappointment and his decision to re-assess his candidacy. Several phone calls convinced Sutton that the Liberal Party's endorsement action had served to seriously dry up potential campaign

contributions for him. Despite predictions of victory from such supporters as Nassau County party chairman John English, Sutton announced on the morning of March 29th that he was quitting the race. The first assessments were that this withdrawal would help Rep. Pike (he was already supported by some Kennedy men such as former state chairman William McKeon). In fact Resnick issued a statement attacking the Kennedy machine for allying itself with "the most conservative Democrat north of the Mason-Dixon Line--namely Otis Pike". But that same afternoon efforts were launched to drum up support for another Kennedy team member, Eugene Nickerson the Nassau County Executive.

The next day, after a night of calls and conferences, the Democratic state committee endorsed Nickerson, giving him 58% of the vote. Rep. Resnick received enough support (largely from upstate areas) to get 30% of the vote, sufficient to run in the primary. Rep. Pike received the remaining 12% of the vote. Paul O'Dwyer had decided not to compete for the state committee endorsement, because he felt his support there was unrepresentative of his true strength which lay with the McCarthy clubs organized throughout the city and state.

The Liberal Party made its endorsement of Javits official the day after the Democratic committee met. Pike soon decided to drop out of the Senate race and return to his bid for re-election to the House. O'Dwyer collected the required number of signatures, and entered the primary.

The three-man Senatorial primary race continued to

be effected by developments in the Presidential nomination struggle. President Johnson's withdrawal from the race the very next day obviously undercut Resnick's candidacy. Resnick endorsed Humphrey, but the latter never entered the New York primary for convention delegates, and did not campaign in the state. Nickerson tried to separate his candidacy from Kennedy's by appointing a committee which included supporters of all of the presidential candidates. But Nickerson was Kennedy's candidate, and the assassination of the latter in California only two weeks before the New York primary seriously damaged his campaign.

The primary was extremely close. Paul O'Dwyer received 275,900 (or 36.3%), only 18,200 more than Nickerson's 257,000 (33.9%). Resnick trailed not far behind with 229,900 or 29.8%.

In the November three-man Senatorial election (the Conservative Party ran its own candidate), Javits' plurality was over one million votes.

Analytical Summary: Resnick (D) and Pike (D)

Senate situation: Republican incumbent ran for re-election (III).

Senate competition: Democrats won 2 of previous 5 elections for President, Senator, and Governor (Competitive).

Career pattern: Law Enforcement (30-39%).

Nomination struggle competition: Convention: 58% to RST's 30% and RST's 12%; primary: last RST did not run, other RST ran third getting 30% to winner's 36% (C) (D).

Nomination struggle source: Former city councilman won the primary; county executive led in the convention and came in second in primary.

1968 Pennsylvania Dent Democrat T

Rep. John Dent almost carried off what many thought to be impossible--the defeat of the incumbent in the Democratic primary. Sen. Joseph Clark had angered many party leaders in his twelve years in the Senate. Nevertheless Clark still won the endorsement of the Democratic State Policy Committee 43 to 0 with 5 abstentions. But as Clark's opposition to President Johnson's Vietnam policy mounted, Rep. John Dent decided to enter the race. Dent (60) was considered to be one of the state's western party leaders; he had served for 23 years in the state legislature and 10 years in the House of Representatives.

Pennsylvania law permitted him to seek both the Senate nomination and the nomination for re-election to the House. This dual entry led some to believe his Senate entry was not a serious one. But Dent's reply to a request for him to leave the Senate race for the sake of party unity, was that he "was in the race to stay, that I would not make a travesty of political aspirations, that this was no time for levity."

President Johnson's announcement not to seek re-election apparantly cooled off the bitter 1½ month primary campaign, and Dent practically stopped campaigning for the Senatorial nomination. Several days before the primary, observers were quoted as not expecting Dent to get over 30% of the vote. But instead Dent polled about 47% and trailed Clark by about 50,000 votes.

The split in the Democratic ranks did not heal,

and Clark was defeated by Rep. Schweiker.

Analytical Summary: Dent (D)

Senate situation: Democratic incumbent ran for re-election (I).

Senate competition: Democrats won 2 of previous 5 elections for President, Senator, and Governor (Competitive).

Career pattern: Law Enforcement (30-39%).

Nomination struggle competition: High--53% to RST's 47% (C).

Nomination struggle source: Incumbent.

1968 Pennsylvania Schweiker Republican RSW

Richard Schweiker faced no opposition in the Republican primary for the Senatorial nomination. He had also won the unanimous endorsement of the Republican State Committee for that position. Earlier speculation had mentioned some opposition to Schweiker on the grounds that both he and Pennsylvania's other Republican Senator both came from the Eastern part of the state (Scott was from Philadelphia, while Schweiker's district included some of the Philadelphia suburbs). Such sentiment, according to the New York Times, centered around State Secretary of Internal Affairs, John Taber of Pittsburgh.

The incumbent, Senator Joseph Clark, was not having as easy a time in the Democratic primary. The split in the Democratic ranks (among other factors) contributed to Schweiker's victory over Clark in the November election. Schweiker received 52% of the vote, drawing 282,000 more votes than Clark did.

Analytical Summary: Schweiker (R)

Senate situation: Democratic incumbent ran for re-election (III).

Senate competition: Republicans won 3 of previous 5 elections for President, Senator, and Governor (Competitive).

Career pattern: Administrative (30-39%).

Nomination struggle competition: Unopposed (AA).

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