


A HUMANISTIC THEORY OF
SELF IN CONFLICT INTERVENTION

Dissertation for the Degree of Ph. D.
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
JEAN WARNER PEEK
1973



This is to certify that the

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A HUMANISTIC THEORY OF SELF
IN CONFLICT INTERVENTION

presented by

JEAN W. PEEK

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

PH.D. degree in CURRICULUM


Major professor

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ABSTRACT

A HUMANISTIC THEORY OF SELF IN CONFLICT INTERVENTION

By

Jean Warner Peek

An analysis of seven identified models of change agent intervention to release interpersonal or intergroup conflict blockages placed these interventions on a continuum of perceived effect upon persons in conflict; the continuum envisions a range from coercive/controlling relationship of agent to client to a more autonomous/sharing relationship between members of a synergetic group or dyad. The analyses of the seven models is secondary to the theoretical purpose of the study which is to propose an eighth model of self in the process of humanistic intervention in conflict blockage.

In order to establish the premise that conflict is essential to the humanistic agent of intervention, research from the fields of sociology, psychology, religion, political science, and education was examined to demonstrate classical writing and current thinking on the positive aspects of conflict and to differentiate among the concepts of violence, competition, and conflict. Conflict was established as a force of essentially positive potential within the humanistic stance in education. The problems which remained were: first, the establishment of a continuum of conflict interventions

which moved toward the more humanistic processes of conflict intervention; and secondly, to synthesize the models into a theory of Self for the humanistic change agent to examine with the view of having all models as open alternatives to his interventions to unblock and having the commitment of existing within and being changed by every intervention he chooses to make.

Following the review of related literature, each of the seven models of intervention were analyzed in separate chapters. These models were originally isolated by William Houston and the author while research fellows in values at Southern Illinois University, Edwardsville. The models of intervention are:

1. Neutrality
2. Status Quo Supportive
3. Depreciating
4. Directive
5. Creative Problem Solving
6. Clarification
7. Supportive

In attempting to move from this list and to contain all of the list as alternatives for the humanistic agent, it was necessary to examine several theories of conflict intervention from the various fields. Kotarbinski's sociological theories of praxeology (the science of efficiency) and agonology (the science of struggle) contributed to the view that alternatives must be open even if they are not valued. Ghandi's theory of satyagraha (which embodies the involvement of the interventionist in the change and which provides a theory of respect and love for the "other" while engaging in a struggle for truth through love and nonviolence) played an important role in the development of

the model of Self. Abraham Maslow's work, particularly his vision in Eupschyian Management, began to draw Kotarbinski and Ghandi's theories into one theory. Finally, the theories of involvement in a selfish/unselfish unity in conflict as expressed by Maslow, Dewey, Simmel and Taoist works drew the model finally together into a statement of theory for practicing humanistic agents of change to investigate. This model of self intervention includes all of the other models as possible alternative actions for change while seeing even the most coercive models discussed as events which might be entered into by an interventionist who anticipated his own change as a result of his love, truth, and non-violent intentional exchange with a client who might perceive the exchange as negative.

The theoretical effect is to provide the humanistic change agent a model which can successfully include all other models of change proposed by writers identified with more controlling and coercive educational theories. Thus, the humanist is allowed to consider the use of alternative models even while valuing the human being he touches and the human being he is in the processes of conflict and change. As the model of self intervention emphasizes the importance of the agent's self change and human intentions, the ultimate vision is one where each man is the person in conflict, the person released from the blocks of conflict, and the agent who effects the release. The theory looks toward man as autonomous, seeking, and socially humanistic.

A HUMANISTIC THEORY OF SELF IN CONFLICT INTERVENTION

by

Jean Warner Peek

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to

Michigan State University

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for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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College of Education

1973

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DEDICATION

To Janie, without her patience and love so many happy and growthful experiences would not occur . . . she is always a person of my own heart . . . who brings me gently back to myself

and to our children of last year, this year, and next year . . .

Stephanie, Beth Ann, Timothy, Mark, Dion, Merri, Jerri, Sean, Barb, and David.

PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Beyond the school buildings, beyond the politics of board and bond elections, beyond the positions and the status, and beyond, even, the interpersonal relationships of colleague, peer, student, and teacher, lies the great machine of American education. Some call it a great polisher, others a great leveler; some see it as the essential element in a melting pot. For those who remember the experience of having been through the machine there are many more violent images called to mind; and these see in the machine that social or cultural phenomena which causes things that stick out to get knocked off.

It may only be a pity that the most beautiful flower is early plucked to adorn our tables or that the ripest fruit and choicest beast is that which we hold most appetizing. It becomes more severe a problem when that which is chosen is so rare that duplication or repetition is unlikely or impossible, when we knock off the last of a rare species of animal which even man in his own rarity cannot duplicate or when the rushing waters of a mountain stream are dammed or diverted for someone's play.

The problem grows beyond reason when we turn on those humans, whose rare resources may lead us to beauty and whose unfortunate uniqueness calls forth our anger to victimize those differences, to knock the edges off the human race so that in some way we all become alike and measureable quantitatively. We then knock off edges until every man will be a king

with a free will to rule in harmony with equal beings over a culture and a world so barren and bleak and sterile that our once paradise will not have even the joy of the contrasts of personal hell but will be, rather, a common limbo.

I work in the field of teaching. It may be an assumption to say that I can teach anything to anyone at any age; but I do not believe it an assumption to say that human beings do learn and that they seem to learn different things differently and that they seem to learn to choose what to learn and how to learn not only out of the mystique of individual heredity, but also out of their associations with fellow human beings. I feel it is also reasonable to say that some things are learned more powerfully because of the way they are encountered. When these things are learned they cause change in the totality of the individual. The individual has an effect on the totality of the culture which then transmits more powerfully the experience to other human beings. For better or worse, according to the way you have been changed, this is the beginning of the teaching-learning process, of education.

I feel it is also reasonable to assume that change causes conflict in some proportion to the dissonance caused by the confrontation of new choice, belief, or action with the old. Here, I feel, we come to the problem of just what constitutes a leveling force to make the individual more like some other individual. There are two propositions which I would like to set forth at this point; First, "real" change will set forces in motion which will eventually involve confrontation with some other human being; and second, the conflict which is born of "real" change is something which is profitable in terms of human growth and something which can be used to reach out for the best growth in terms of each individual involved in the conflict.

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I do not believe that much has been done in education to encourage conflict as an essential part of what might be a humanistic growth experience. More often individuals who conflict with established societal patterns are leveled or are isolated or are destroyed. We humans tend to fear those who are different; we tend to fear not only the individuals who are different but also those small groups which threaten the larger group. This fear leads us to stifle the dissent, to execute the visionary, to imprison the experimenter, to shun the stranger, and to be systematic in our destruction of the minority. It is not the conflict which destroys all of these stick outs but rather the response of the threatened and powerful. It is not the new idea itself which turns upon the inventor--the frankenstein monster is not evil and destructive--but the response of the powerful to the invention. Given this, it is my feeling that the idea of motivation for learning or changing is no more than a complex curiosity, perhaps ever changing and elusive, while the problem of analyzing responses to change, to conflict, to confrontation, is one that can be dealt with by persons with some skills in various fields. Yet, even the problem of response must involve the complex fields of perception, communication, sociology, psychology, and heredity. I do not have skills in all of these areas as I limit my beginning theory to an analysis of response patterns to perceived conflict situations in the field of education.

For helping me and confronting me in what I am able to do, I owe much to many people. I would like to mention a few of them.

First of all, my parents, Bess and Gene, who allowed me freedom to grow differently from them and were still proud.

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To the late William Houston, a friend and colleague research fellow at NEXTEP at Southern Illinois University, I owe much of the basic analysis of the response patterns. I hope I've expanded our mutual ideas in a way he would have. Bill was a twenty year Navy chief who had dropped out of high school and, on the way to becoming the highest ranking enlisted man in the Navy, acquired his high school diploma, his bachelors, and his master's degrees; Bill's year at NEXTEP was his first year as a full-time college student. He died shortly before completing his doctoral degree. Bill knew what it was like to have confronted society and to have been forced to conform or be destroyed; his choice of the service was a kind of limbo I imagine many unique, poor, and alone people have chosen.

I also want to thank my close friend, John Kolesa, who taught for eighteen years, had eight kids, and is now a bricklayer and farmer. He confronted me with patience, quiet, respect, and trust--things I felt, at the time, I could expect from no man so much unlike myself.

And to close friends who are sometimes teachers and sometimes students: Art Draper, Jack Evans, Chris King, Dave and Larry Reynolds, Bob Ross, Bob Stanish, Jim Crawford, Joe Roberts, Bob Dunn, Mike Kenney, Bill Shaw, Wes Walker, Bill Nelson, Ann Shelly, Ruth Belleville, Norm Sterchele, Gary Ebrecht, Lu Bruch, Paula Stein, and Keith Ward, thanks for so changing me without demanding I be like you.

There are some persons who remain as teachers in the best sense; I can only hope our exchanges have approached sharing. First of all, Troy Stearns, my chairman for my doctoral work, is a lesson in openness, sharing, assistance; in the best sense of the progressive and humane

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men he worked with in his long teaching career which ranged from work with Dewey and Counts to teacher education and curriculum innovation in Asia, Africa, Europe, and the United States, Troy is the essence of the good teacher. Other teachers have given me freedom to grow. I want to thank Dale Alam and Charles Blackman for sharing their excitement about the work being done at Michigan State University. To George Ferree, George Myers, Pat Rode, John Suehr, and Virginia Wiseman, at Michigan State University, and Merrill Harmin and Jules Zanger at Southern Illinois University, Edwardsville, who taught me how alive and beautiful higher education can be; thank you all for all you have shared with me to help me grow.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Martin Haberman, writing in the 1971 ASCD Yearbook Freedom, Bureaucracy, and Schooling presents a thesis for my introductory chapter when he states: "Hoping for organizations to radically change themselves is a victory of expectation over experience. Competition in the tradition of economic liberalism is a more effective process of change."¹

For too long the American humanistic education movement has hopped along on one leg fettered by the perception that all competition was inherently evil because of the generally negative examples set by business, science, and athletics in influencing the education of youth. It is certainly time to admit what those who have engaged extensively in any kind of laboratory learning, micro teaching, or encounter group experience have known for a long time; that is, that conflict, competition, and confrontation can be the basis for the greatest leaps in personal growth. Adversity, not sentimentality, is the essence of the growth experience, of learning. Success comes from being properly prepared, intellectually and emotionally, to meet the challenge of achievement. If educators wish to concentrate on

¹Martin Haberman, "Educating the Teachers: Changing Problems" in Freedom, Bureaucracy and Schooling, Vernon F. Haubrick, (ed.), ASCD 1971 Yearbook, p. 118.

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success experiences for human beings, the way to do it is to give human beings the tools to meet the challenges they feel willing to face. This is necessary even if one of the tools must be, as it must often be, the ability to know one's real limits and to meet the challenge of facing those limits with wisdom. Such wise, rational, and growing human beings form organizations which also reflect these qualities. Yet, change does not occur in organizations. Any change that is planned change is imposed change. The planning of change involves manipulation of human beings; the assumptions behind such manipulation are diverse and complex. Nevertheless it is, in the long run, the principle of coercive manipulation through the expertise of some self, group, or organic change-agent that remains the dominant feature of planned change. Even the most "humanist" of change theorists discover that they are in the process of accepting the authority, if not the responsibility, for changing a human being or a human organization. At this point, these theorists cop-out. They begin to talk of the "collaborative" aspects of the "helping relationships". They begin to speak of the responsibility of the "expert" in discovering or freeing data or structures which the "client-system" needs in order to move forward. In reading the literature of planned change one does not get the impression that change occurs without the use of some unblocking agent with a predetermined unblocking strategy and new "collaborative" goals established for direction when the client system has been freed.

This is, of course, so much nonsense. Dewey knew it and we are beginning, in education, to understand it again. Yes, there are blocks which momentarily inhibit movement of people or organizations. The

fact remains, however, that human beings do move forward--sometimes at a very quick pace indeed. If there is a need for someone to assist in unblocking, this person will emerge from the group. Certain individuals will take the lead and the individual or group will be freed. Unfortunately, the problem exists that such "helpers" move so clumsily that the freeing of an entity often involves attendant damage and, at times, extinction of that entity. There is a need to perfect the science of intervention, or the unblocking response to conflict, and there is a need to assist every individual to grow to leadership and growthful intervention in relieving the conflict blocks in his group. There is no need to plan what happens after one has helped another; this seems akin to bearing eternal responsibility for the person whose life has been saved.

System analysis, rational emotive therapy, the "science" of educational administration, welfare programs, and the sequence and scope theories of curriculum all fall into the very mixed bag of eternal responsibility described above. Perhaps a solution to this burden of responsibility is to train oneself to intervene in a situation which one determines to be blocked; recognition of blockage becomes the primary concept while pre and post planning of strategies and goals becomes secondary to the motion of unblocking. In this theory, the change-agent bears the moral responsibility only to himself. He may choose to continue in some other relationship with the entity now unblocked, but this choice belongs to some other field than that of change-agentry. A person cannot know just what direction is best. To assume that he does is to play God--an act much more difficult in an art/science such as education than it is in, for example, the

materialism of the assembly-line process where goals are clearly non-human and problems of change affect human beings only in so far as those humans are useful to products manufactured. From this emphasis on the individual and the moral and professional responsibilities of the individual to intervene for change, the conclusion might be drawn that this definition of change-agentry is concerned only with human change and not with the buildings, the hardware and software, the academic disciplines, the skills and fields, etc. This is true. There are no important changes in material goods save in the way that human beings in the process of growth may immediately view these goods as momentary crutches to assist them. If humans do so view these as necessary to their growth, it is not the business of the change-agent to be concerned with this belief unless it is, of itself, a blockage perceived by the change-agent as needing removal.

Does the change agent, given this disinclination toward planning and structuring goals, have any method of predicting and determining his intervention points? Yes, he does so by whim; and, as Thoreau has written, whim is the prepared and able individual's weapon against ideological and technological control. Whim, the pleasure of being acceptant toward one's own feelings, gives the freedom to guide the unblocking of others in the direction they need to pursue. One cannot produce change without removing blocks to growth. One cannot be a change-agent unless one is self-satisfied, actualized, by the efforts to change that he produces. Despite this emphasis on whim, which does admit that any person may act as a change-agent, the most effective person for the agent's position is

he who has perfected skills in many areas and who brings these skills into play with the timing and care of the professional.

Yet, I do not advocate the training of individuals to be change-agents. Such people train themselves; they emerge. A change-agent cannot be predetermined; a system might seek the most honest, least fearful, employees or consultants and look to their emergence as agents of change. Change-agents emerge when all trust others to be loveable and capable and trust that human beings work toward ends that are good and pleasurable for them. There is no real choice save for an organization to wait for such appropriate emergence. The daily and excellent administration of a system has little to do with change; no decision to control a human organization or group of organizations has ever been effective for long. The problem, however, is not just one of returning to some laissez-faire concept such as those advanced by William Graham Sumner long ago; a change-agent can be of assistance by choosing to free men more quickly than they might free themselves. Yet, to do this is not the same as planning where they go after the agent has intervened in their lives or their organizations. What is needed is a science of conflict response and intervention which presupposes no desire to plan the future goals of the client-system but which operates as a sort of human crowbar to break the system which blocks progress. This means that the change-agent, the interventionist, must carefully examine his reasons for seeing blockage and for choosing just here and now to intervene.

Organizations are the people in them. These people must be equipped to meet challenges. They must be helped to realize the

problems of working with others from other cultures, of other values systems, and of other goals. If interventionists can provide individuals with the ability to face challenges by operating from a variety of possible responses to threatening situations, those who intervene will have gone a long way toward helping people in crisis situations to use their own knowledges and emotions adequately to respond bravely to the stress of conflict, to the emotion of confrontation, and to the fact of change. In this way changes begin which are responsive to those involved rather than changes which attempt to make those unfortunately involved responsive to them.

Even if one agrees that change comes from human beings and if one realizes the need in a humanly responsive organization for those who create change and those who face it to confront honestly, one still must face the researched fact that change or an attempt to change will evoke withdrawal in those who are new to the idea.² When we face, as change-agents, the resistance of those we hope to change, we must remember that any conflict behavior on the part of a resisting individual is an expression of his that the organization (the party, the country, the family, the group) to which he has seen himself as belonging is not meeting his needs. Leland W. Howe in his unpublished doctoral dissertation (1969) had this to say:

" . . . as this study demonstrates, (disruptive) behaviors may be

²Jack R. Frymier, Fostering Educational Change, (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1969), p. 8.

viewed from another perspective not as necessarily anti-organizational but as, essentially in many cases, a drive toward health on the part of the demonstrators. In this view, the demonstrations are simply highly visible indications that the organization is not meeting the needs of at least those persons who are demonstrating."³

In a recent convention on "Conflict and Confrontation", I spoke to this same point in demonstrating, through statistical reference, the fact that those who strike out against an institution or in an interpersonal situation are not those inalterably opposed or removed from the situation but, rather, those who are involved enough and capable enough to express their feelings of dissonance and diassociation.⁴ Social anomie is a reflection of non-involvement not a reaction against involvement; those who are truly alienated neither hate nor love the person or situation with them. John Gardner in Self-Renewal (1963) said: ". . . the (disruptive) behavior is more likely to be perceived as 'self-renewing' and thus, prized at least in the long run, as healthy for the organization."⁵

Conflict is a viable, a human(istic), endeavor; it is the frustration at not being fairly met, of being cut off or unprepared, which makes competition, conflict or encounter inhumane. Change comes about through helping individuals learn how to face themselves, others, new ideas, and new structures so that they feel adequate and

³Leland Wright Howe, "Toward A Humanistic Model of School Organizational Development", (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Michigan State University, 1969), pp. 8-9.

⁴Jean W. Peek, "Confrontation and Conflict", MASB Reporter, (reprint of Nov. 2, 1972 speech, Michigan Association of School Board).

⁵John W. Gardner, Self-Renewal: The Individual and the Innovative Society, (Harper Colophon, 1963), pp. 33-40.

involved in the situation. In education--especially in curriculum and instruction--humanists must encourage confrontation. People must be assisted in their preparation to be involved. If educators can help people discover alternative models of resolution and/or communication within the encounter situations, educators will then be able to establish institutions for education which are democratically participatory and responsive.

Purpose

The purpose of this study is to examine general models of intervention in perceived blocks to human needs by change-agents in public school education and to develop a humanistic intervention model for handling the conflict blockages which inhibit the free exchange of ideas and emotions necessary to relevant and responsive educational goals.

The model I propose in Chapter X goes far beyond the structures of the seven models I analyze in Chapters III through IX, and it proposes human qualities of introspection and personal analysis for growth which might identify this model with religious thought for some readers. The transition between Chapters IX and X is a difficult one to make for Chapter IX deals with a sensitive and supportive, but traditional, change methodology while Chapter X proposes a transcendence of group identity and an internalization of change which the reader must accept or experience as an alternative to our present methods and models of change. Yet, Chapter X is a method of intervention in conflict which is a particularly effective model; it is, for me, the ideal proposed not only for changing self but

also for changing others and the organizations we all must build in a society.

Need

"In a national seminar focused on needs for more relevance in curriculum (Danforth Foundation, et. al., 1970) it was concluded that the most important single change schools should make would be their mechanisms for developing responsiveness in curriculum."⁶

The great difficulty in establishing responsive practice and decision-making structures in education seems to be that school officials seek to re-establish status quo when faced with the stress of confrontation by pressure groups.⁷ This results most often in increasing the pressures rather than working toward any collaborative effort among students, community people, school executives, and faculty which would establish some meaningful change and improvement in curriculum and instruction.

Dr. Glenys Unruh has said: "One of the most useful functions of theory is that of serving as a guide to new knowledge by suggesting testable hypotheses and engendering research."⁸ All curriculum and

⁶Danforth Foundation. Institute for Development of Educational Activities, and National Association of Secondary School Principals. "Toward a More Relevant Curriculum: Report of a National Seminar", quoted in Glenys G. Unruh, "Toward a Theory of Responsive Curriculum Development", (unpublished doctoral dissertation, St. Louis University, 1972), p. 21.

⁷M. A. Chesler, "School Crisis and Change", cited in Student Unrest: Threat or Promise?, (Washington, D. C., Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1970), pp. 100-121.

⁸Glenys G. Unruh, "Toward a Theory of Responsive Curriculum Development", (unpublished doctoral dissertation, St. Louis University, 1972), p. 8.

instruction may be seen as theory in action. Few absolutes have been discovered in either the art or the "science" of education on which educators can lean and on which educators can expect clients to depend. The emotion of the curriculum/instruction process demands the individual's introspection for new ideas being constantly tested and researched. The emotion engenders conflict and confrontation which must be dealt with before decisions can be made.

The need to establish models for responding to the confrontations of developing curriculum/instruction decisions parallels a single teacher's need to learn how to handle a single disruptive child. In order for the change-agent to survive the vagaries of community responsiveness, he must learn stop-gap measures and move toward a plan for encouraging greater responsiveness to community even while utilizing the emotion of a moment or confrontive situation.

If educators assume that the curriculum change-agent has a sane values system and the leadership ability necessary to curriculum/instruction development and change, then they must assume that any stop-gap confrontation technique is valid so long as the agent moves toward techniques which open him and his work to greater confrontation by seeking greater relevance and community responsiveness.

This study, then, seeks to define styles of response by agents and to suggest the models of interaction which will be utilized as a result of the use of a certain style. Various psychological theories will support the response styles and the models of interaction proposed. However, I will not attempt to justify any

particular theory, and the language used in describing a given style of response will not be the technical language of the psychologist.

Definition of Terms

Curriculum/instruction--any process which is in any way connected to the teaching-learning function within the school.

Conflict/confrontation--any blockage in the teaching-learning process which inspires a person or persons to utilize skills to produce unblocking.

Change-agent-interventionist--only those individuals or groups which produce catharsis in the human beings being blocked in their efforts to help others or themselves by the teaching-learning process they favor. A change-agent's work is his own effort to choose places to disrupt complacent and ineffective systems in those places the agent sees as blockages. The change-agent determines the blockage area.

Intervention--any action taken or attitude established by a change-agent which causes conflict to become momentarily or effectively unblocked.

Humanist(ic)--any person or plan which focuses upon the inherent regard each person has for all others involved. Any person or plan placing the human process above the impersonal product. Any person or plan visualizing the affective state of all involved as being the prime determinant of positive growth for all involved.

Limitations

1. In no way do I intend the models presented here to cover all of the complex forms of human action and interaction

incorrectly subsumed under the conflict rubric.

Especially, there is no effort to deal with the actual violence and subtle violence which occurs between groups with separate goals and with populations so large as to prevent reasonable communication systems. My efforts are aimed at interventions to unblock conflict within relatively small groups with human beings who are operating within or in connection to systems having generalized commonalities.

2. I have created a continuum for the first seven models which defines the first models as being more autocratic and the final models as more autonomous. My bias will be obvious. Yet, my final model will demonstrate a value I see even in the most coercive of the first models. Therefore, this thesis does not purport to create a taxonomy of intervention models; to do so would, I believe, violate the fluidity of the models in practice. I isolate them here for examination with the purpose of inclusion in the model I create in Chapter X.
3. This is a thesis of a curriculum generalist. Neither in my review of the literature nor in the seven models have I attempted to include the vast research and theoretical writing in the field. Each model is easily a dissertation topic. Rather, I present my vision of interaction models I have experienced with the intent of adding a new theoretical model of humanistic interaction in conflict blockage. A limitation of this type of dissertation is the inability

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of the writer to include all the interesting materials available for each model.

4. Finally, I do not attempt to prove in any quantitative/empirical study the existence of the seven models or the efficacy of the model I create. The literature of change, conflict, intervention, etc. provides many empirical studies to demonstrate the existence of intervention strategies by these titles and by others which can be so translated. It is beyond the scope of my effort to include such efforts or to discuss the effect of combination interventions utilizing several models simultaneously.

The Problem of the Author

If the reader examines the statements, the purpose, the definitions, and the limitations of the thesis presented above, the problem becomes clear. Theoretically, it is possible to present a school system where the electives and the stimuli are so varied as to present conflict to the individual or group; it is also theoretically possible to claim a support system within which the individual determines the program, through open dialogue and confrontation, which best suits his present and continuing needs to arrive at his truths. As Ray Houghton has said: "Implications of such a system would be: (a) that individuals are capable of making their own decisions and that when left to their devices will

tend to make "good" decisions; and (b) that process is preferable to stasis in an essentially dynamic world."⁹

I accept the theory. Ivan Illich presented a possibility. Paul Goodman provided another more realistic possibility. I face the reality, in this dissertation, of the world, divided as it is between humans benevolent in their control, those who wish to control for the sake of power, and "humanists" who face complex problems interpersonally when dealing with other's control and the principles the humanists expouse in facing this reality. I provide a temporary vision of the human being choosing to intervene, to unblock, for change but choosing not to involve himself in the long term effects of his intervention. I term this a temporary vision for, theoretically, all persons will come to the point where they intervene with themselves and where the world is a humanistic, self-determining, body of individuals.

This dissertation shall be divided into 11 chapters. Chapter I seeks to outline the problem, define terms, set limitations, and establish goals. Chapter II is a review of the literature of change and conflict with an emphasis on resolution techniques. Chapters III through IX explore seven response and intervention techniques and attempt to analyze the conditions under which such techniques might be used. Chapter X proposes a technique of conflict resolution and change-agent role which I term humanistic. Chapter XI is devoted to conclusions, suggestions for research, and reflections on the value of this dissertation work to the author.

⁹Raymond W. Houghton, "Dimensions for the Future", To Nurture Humaneness: Commitment for the '70's, Mary-Margaret Scobey and Grace Graham, eds., (Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, NEA, Washington, D. C., 1970), p. 235.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

Before I can examine alternative responses to conflict situations (blockages) or before I can propose a model for humanistic change-agentry (intervention), it seems necessary to review the literature of conflict response and change-agentry. It is interesting to note at the beginning of this review of literature that my computerized search of the ERIC materials revealed only one article which attempted to combine the concepts of humanness and conflict. ERIC obviously does not cover all available materials, but it does provide insight into recently funded empirical studies. There seems to be little concern by funding agencies for solving conflict through humanistic methods. Most of these materials are involved in helping groups control other human beings through analysis of psychological, sociological, technological, or economic defects exhibited by these human beings. It was necessary to select ideas and theories from studies primarily philosophical in order to formulate background for a way of acting which I felt I had personally evolved after several years of being placed, or choosing to place myself, in positions of conflict and change-agentry in the field of education. It has been exciting to follow the efforts of a fellow graduate student, Robert Dunn, at Michigan State University in his efforts to live this role and describe and analyze it for his doctoral dissertation. None of Dunn's materials or conclusions are

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herein contained and none of my experiences, research, or theories are contained in his dissertation. However, I suspect that a reader would much profit by reading Dunn's accounts of his work at Walter French Junior High School in Lansing, Michigan, while, at the same time reading the theories I arrived at after involvement in change-agent experiences involving conflict intervention.

Although my own experiences in education have led me to the conclusions and recommendations I reach in the final two chapters of this work, along the way certain writers have given me support. It is literally impossible and probably absurd to attempt a cogent review of the literature separately or in combinations involving the concepts of change, conflict and confrontation, humanism, and curriculum and instruction. The work of the National Training Laboratories (NTL), of the University of Michigan's Center for Conflict Resolution, of the various areas for humanistic thought and effort, of the ASCD, and of the many separate studies of these concepts is beyond the scope of one person. I attempt, therefore, to cite a few of the works that support my thesis and a few which seem to be opposed to the humanistic theories of conflict and change-agentry. In a few instances, the effort to be humane and to plan change is combined; generally this effort fails, and control and planning dominates the humanistic philosophy.

As I worked, over the past seven years, in this area, one seminal influence seemed to provide a philosophical basis for my efforts in the field and, now, in theory; that work belongs to the sociologist Georg Simmel. Quite frankly, Simmel leaves me a bit confused; for, although he provides me a philosophical base, often he becomes far too cynical (to satisfy my needs) in his analysis of human beings' ultimate motivations.

Simmel's work entitled Conflict presents the rationale for my assumption that conflict is necessary to the humanistic stance, that it is valuable to the humanist to recognize and to engage in honest conflict and confrontation in order to achieve authenticity. Simmel first saw conflict as an interaction, a sociation, which aims at a peace, a resolution of the tensions which have created conflict--hate, envy, need, desire. Simmel saw men as achieving some unity, or some congruence in Carl Roger's terms. Simmel said:

The individual does not attain the unity of his personality exclusively by an exhaustive harmonization, according to logical, objective, religious, or ethical norms, of the contents of his personality. On the contrary, contradiction and conflict not only precede this unity but are operative in it at every moment of its existence.¹

Simmel's vision of the unity of the individual leads me to a like vision of the unity of the group. From this I can see that a group must experience emotional and ideological contradiction and conflict in order to achieve unity on a position. I have always found conflict, often conflict which eliminated ideas rather than seeking resolution of ideas, in such groups on their way to "change". Simmel spoke to the elimination of dissenting opinion in this fashion:

If we did not even have the power and the right to rebel against tyranny, arbitrariness, moodiness, tactlessness, we could not bear to have any relation to people from whose characters we thus suffer. We would feel pushed to take desperate steps--and these, indeed, would end the relation but do not, perhaps, constitute 'conflict'.²

¹Georg Simmel, Conflict, trans. by Kurt H. Wolff, (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1955), p. 15.

²Ibid., p. 19.

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Often, in education, we reach some point where we believe we have improved curriculum, instruction, etc., but where we have only eliminated, or successfully intimidated, the opposition to the change that leadership planned. The change-agent must work to interfere with such practice for two reasons: first, the practice of eliminating any philosophical entity is undemocratic and, generally, inhumane; second, changes which come about as a result of such practice are likely to be destructive not only to those eliminated but also to the creativity and the unique humanity of those who continue to exist within the "changed" structure. In my introduction to this dissertation, I mentioned a favorite theory of mine--"things that stick out get knocked off". This theory, which is supported by research on groups and leadership in Berelson and Steiner,³ operates only when an authoritarian atmosphere prevails in an organization; in a democratic, humane, organization of the type described by Abraham Maslow in Eupsychian Management⁴ getting knocked off is not one of the possibilities unless it is self-initiated. When conflict operates along the guidelines established by humanistic theory, it provides such "unconditional positive regard" for the conflicting human beings, each for each, that extinction is impossible. It is unfortunate that such extinction of dissenters takes place within groups that contain individuals with common goals, common

³Bernard Berelson and Gary A. Steiner, Human Behavior: An Inventory of Scientific Findings, (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1964). Sections A2.2, p. 330; B1, p. 331; B1.1a, p. 332; B1.3b, p. 335; B2, p. 337; B2.2, p. 337; B3, pp. 338-9; C1.1, p. 34; C3.3, p. 343.

⁴Abraham H. Maslow, Eupsychian Management: A Journal, (Illinois: Dorsey Press, 1965), p. 173.

philosophical features. We tend to confront strangers objectively and to hold our uniqueness in reserve in a pattern of non-judgmental humanness⁵; the closer we come to touching, however, it seems the closer we are to wronging the humanness of others. It is no accident that our newspapers report that the greatest violence, extinction behavior, occurs not between strangers but among members of the same family or social group. Simmel said that:

the degeneration of a difference in convictions into hatred and fight ordinarily occurs only when there were essential similarities between the parties. The (sociologically very significant) 'respect for the enemy' is usually absent where the hostility has arisen on the basis of previous solidarity.⁶

Thus, we can see, if we agree with Simmel's research on conflict, that the fact that confrontation exists demonstrates a tie to the group for all of the factions in conflict. (The sociological phenomenon of war does not enter into this discussion; however, I feel that even this unique phenomenon exhibits the tendency described above. Seldom donations enter into war without having a common ground of interest which might be settled through some less violent form of conflict resolution if individuals of power on all sides were to operate out of a humanistic base rather than a base demanding dominance and submission.)

All of Simmel's theories present a problem for the change-agent who determines to operate out of a humanistic base. He must see that the presence of conflict within a group is a healthy sign of

⁵Simmel, op. cit., p. 44.

⁶Ibid., p. 48.

the groups' democratic spirit; he must realize that, with the solution of conflict which he assists to provide, the group will move toward extended unity of purpose and establishment of customs and rules; he must see that this same establishment of customs and rules leads a group away from the democratic process and toward the extinction of dissidents; and he must endeavor to encourage or to act personally to place stress upon these same customs and laws to provide room for further conflict which will again begin the process of democratization and humanization. In other words, change is constant for the sake of growth and the unblocking of a conflict leads to the need for the unblocking of the stasis resulting from the resolution. The process is circular, never ending.

From this we can see the "inevitability of conflict".⁷ From this inevitability of conflict and the result and change, we can determine that there is instability and "instability is proof of something the matter, of absence, deficiency, incompleteness."⁸ This constant--instability--determines the need for a person who can live with the instant and produce models for those who are disturbed by the unstable condition. This person may be unique in his recognition and acceptance of the instability; in his realization of his actualized state of authenticity, he must act. However, realizing as he must, that no act is universally specific, he acts as Dewey's scientific man and "experiments with this and that agency

⁷Joan Bondurant, Conflict: Violence and Nonviolence, (Illinois: Aldine/Atherton, 1971), p. 13.

⁸John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), p. 107.

applied to this and that condition until something begins to happen: until there is, as we say, something doing. He assumes that there is change going on all the time, that there is movement within each thing in seeming repose; and that since the process is veiled from perception the way to know is to bring the thing into novel circumstances until change becomes evident."⁹ Dewey describes here the change-agent acting in a creative way to examine the process and to have a personal effect upon it to bring the process into focus for himself and others and to confront the forces of conflict even if they are, seemingly, the forces of stable repose. To proceed in this fashion requires a person of a "high degree of rational control over feelings--control that can then allow for adequate inquiry, and for the thought that must precede the deed."¹⁰

We have, then a person in the process of reacting to something, of having a vision of the inhumane or the inefficient and responding to that vision. We do not have a man alone for he is, according to Simmel, tied to the process which he examines;¹¹ he is the most involved party but the one who in his subjective response is able to act with the most objective effect. This "reaction process" may be the most important class of all conflict processes.¹² This person

⁹Ibid., p. 113.

¹⁰Bondurant, op. cit., p. 22.

¹¹Simmel, op. cit., pp. 26-31.

¹²Kenneth E. Boulding, Conflict and Defense: A General Theory, (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 24.

acts as an anti-entropic force for his group; without his intervention the group deteriorates either becoming structurally stable and repressive or unbecoming. If no intervention occurs, individuals will seal themselves from each other and no conflict or growth will occur.¹³ This person must then intervene. If he does so choose, he must either choose a process of manipulation or he must risk intervening as a human being who may fail, who may injure the purpose of the group, individuals in the groups, or himself. His intervention is either his responsibility to himself or it is others' subservience to his design. He may involve himself so that he risks change or he may involve others so that they enter his perceptual field as effective and growing. This is the dilemma. Some authors advocate change-agentry tied to a solution of the problem; these authors often cover this assumption that such a solution can be predetermined by citing efforts at democratic processes along the way or prior to the determination of solutions. Few authors advocate the entry into the process without a plan, without an agenda, but with the strength of having confidence in ability and willingness to risk self-change. Before I can so advocate the latter style, the planned change innovation design must be carefully examined.

In the introduction to the Planning of Change Bennis, Berne, and Chin aptly expressed the predicament good people who teach, or who help others in any way, quickly discover; they said:

¹³W. A. Rosenblith, afterword in Norbert Wiener, The Human Use of Human Beings, (New York: Avon Books, 1967), pp. 265-281.

The predicament we confront, then, concerns method; methods that maximize freedom and limit as little as possible the potentialities of growth; methods that will realize man's dignity as well as bring into fruition desirable social goals.

Concerning the methods of change, we can observe two idea systems in the contemporary scene that are directly counterposed: the law of non-intervention and the law of radical intervention.¹⁴

They establish their concept of "planned change" as "the only feasible alternative to these methods",¹⁵ it is, they say, "a method which employs social technology to help solve the problems of society."¹⁶ The foundation of their work lies in the "application of systematic and appropriate knowledge to human affairs for the purpose of creating intelligent action and change."¹⁷ The authors accept the responsibility for establishing a plan and an outcome for the plan. In many of the articles contained in their collection the authors face the possibility that the means change the ends in the process; but it seems, to me, that this is never a concept they might seek to disestablish, that is, they never choose only to act without great concern for the end. Their view of humanistic involvement includes responsibility for all that comes from that choice; their consequences are not only their own but are consequences they impose on others for whom they feel responsible.

¹⁴Warren G. Bennis; Kenneth D. Benne; and Robert Chin, The Planning of Change, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), p. 2.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 3.

There is a kind of coercion which they recognize between change-agent and "client system" no matter how democratic the involvement may be.¹⁸ Karl Mannheim said that he is concerned about the aspect of control which exists in planned change. Mannheim admits that "If this (democratic, parliamentary) control is destroyed in the effort to establish a planned society, planning will be a disaster, not a cure"¹⁹ Yet, Mannheim continued, with the other authors in this group, to advocate planning change even while failing to completely investigate the stage of social technique which he termed "invention". The concepts argued in the last chapters of this dissertation would be seen by Mannheim as falling into his "invention" stage which he placed, historically, as preceeding the stage of planning. Kenneth Benne attempted to keep the methodology of planning democratic by establishing five democratic norms, rules by which change-agents who believe in democracy should live. These norms are:

Democratic Norm 1: The engineering of change and the meeting of pressures on a group or organization toward change must be collaborative.

Democratic Norm 2: The engineering of change must be educational for the participants.

Democratic Norm 3: The engineering of change must be experimental.

Democratic Norm 4: The engineering of change must be task-oriented, that is, controlled by the requirements of the problem confronted and its effective solution, rather than oriented to the maintenance or extension of the prestige or power of those who originate contributions.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 14.

¹⁹Carl Mannheim, "Freedom under Planning", in The Planning of Change, p. 140.

Democratic Norm 5: The engineering of change must be anti-individualistic, yet provide for the establishment of appropriate areas of privacy and for the development of persons as creative units of influence in our society.²⁰

It is obvious that Benne has given his work on change serious, democratic, and humanistic thought. The problem seems to be in his wanting to do too much, in his desire to see the change-agent as collaborator with the administrator or daily problem solver of the organization. This same thesis is echoed in the work of Ronald G. Havelock. In A Guide to Innovation in Education, Havelock attempted to set up an "ideal" example of how a change-agent works. Havelock emphasized relationships with and acceptance by the "client-system". At times Havelock seemed to find this pleasant atmosphere the key to "successful" change. This work does not lend itself so well to the rubric of humanism as does Benne's work. Rather, Havelock seems to have established a guide to good administrative practice rather than an effort to analyze what he briefly discusses as the "catalytic" nature of the change-agent.²¹ Bennis, Benne, and Chin face the problems of the emotions and the individuality of the change-agent in their Introduction to Part Two of The Planning of Change; they come quickly to the conclusion that the change-agent must "learn

²⁰Kenneth D. Benne, "Democratic Ethics and Human Engineering" in The Planning of Change, p. 142.

²¹Ronald G. Havelock, A Guide to Innovation in Education, (Center for Research on Utilization of Scientific Knowledge, Institute for Social Research, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1970), p. 7.

to use his own feelings and "emotional apparatus"²² and that "No cookbook can tell him exactly what idea to use".²³ In other words, the change-agent must trust his own feelings and create his own model for intervention. How then, if we recognize the vast variables which occur in the identity of the agent for change, can we assume that this agent can plan for an end which results from the interplay between his complexity and the many complexities certain to exist within his "client system"? The authors of The Planning of Change admit that:

A change-agent always encounters varying degrees of low predictability and lack of control. Therefore the despairs of the change-agent over the limits of his ability to act 'scientifically' must be converted to an acceptance of incomplete predictability as a condition of his work. We propose that a midpoint between unrealistic demands for predictability and control and defeatist acceptance of the all-too-true realities of unanticipatable consequences is the position for the change agent to occupy. He must become a 'probability expert'.²⁴

In this tacit admission that Walden Two will never come about as a result of planned change, but that its only hope is for a totalitarian atmosphere as Skinner suggested,²⁵ we have the failure of the behavioral scientist to become effective in the long range democratic planning of change. It is unlikely that, in the long run,

²²Bennis; Benne; and Chin, op. cit., p. 193.

²³Ibid., p. 195.

²⁴Ibid., p. 7.

²⁵B. F. Skinner, Walden Two, (New York: MacMillian and Company, 1948).

even the most behavioristic manipulation of man will be successful; it is unfortunate that the behaviorists will have some effect on some human persons especially in the extremely totalitarian organizations and governments. It is equally sad that men of such human vision and designs such as those mentioned above, including B. F. Skinner, should devote so much of their time to efforts to control the futures of other human beings.

What, then, is an alternative to the behavioristic-humanism described above. First of all, we must deal with the concept of humanism as an educational ideal. One tenet of humanism seems to be that all persons are of value, that each human being can bring a unique skill to a situation and that every skill has value and use because it is of the human who offers it. If this is true, then we cannot establish a change-agent skill as being of greater value than an administrative skill or a skilled human acting as a minute gear in the operation of an organization.

We might come to the conclusion that the change-agent is, if anything, less human in his instance of change for he removes himself from the involvement of his initial cathartic act by choosing, from his own human experience, to effect that act upon other persons in the hope of helping. We might go so far as to deny the existence of the helping relationship as a facet of change-agentry and see, instead, this agent acting out of his own perceptions and skills to do what he feels must be done without hoping for a relationship between his action and the involvement of the individual or group it affects. The change-agent is an eclectic therapist who encounters his clients at his will and infects them with his power and beauty,

but who denies to them access to him to use as a crutch. The humane change-agent understands that the thrust of his work is to hurry persons and their organizations toward that way which they will find eventually without his assistance. He assumes that persons work to their own good ends and that they will seek and find the competence to solve their own problems. His intervention is his own need, at times his own pain, to work for the swift evolution of that which will come naturally. In evoking his power, he recognizes that he will place himself in the position of being forever unable to evoke the same power again but will change and grow so much as those he touches change and grow. In this human relationship which begins with a less human intervention the agent may become client and the client agent--the existence of the conflict (the blockage) and the decision to attempt to unblock is all. The events which alter all concerned and the outcomes of those events cannot be determined.

Little has been written about this catalytic aspect of change-agentry. Perhaps in the Satyagraha theory of non-violent intervention we find the most supportive evidence that such change-agentry can and does exist. However, prior to any discussion of Satyagraha, the theories of praxeological change-agentry must be discussed. The agent who chooses to intervene does so with intelligence as well as desire and the praxeological theories of efficiency and the theories of efficient conflict resolution can be of use to that person who designs intervention in human processes.

As I stated above, the praxeological approach concentrates on efficiency above all else. There are no moral, value or emotional considerations save that they reflect an effort to provide an approach

most efficient to resolve the blockage perceived by the agent of change. So basic to the praxeological approach is the science of conflict that this science has been given its own term, agonology (the science of struggle).²⁶ The Polish philosopher Tadeusz Kotarbinski is the creator of this science of struggle. Generally, in Kotarbinski's terms, agonology employs all methods to efficiently defend against "an enemy assumed to be, by comparison with one's own side, richer, stronger, and less scrupulous."²⁷ We can see how agonology differs from the humanistic-behavioristic approaches described earlier. In attempting to be moral, collaborative, and public relations-oriented, the American behaviorists have made their abilities subject to some sort of Judaic-Christian ethic which is also the foundation of humanism, and they have seen their change-agent designs as operating in a pseudo-democratic state even while they face the problem of being essentially coercive in their planning of change. This dilemma has not been solved for them as they are unable to separate their essential emotion and western morality from their task of change and the consequent involvement with those changed. Agonology, on the other hand, sees only the efficient end to conflict as important; the means are not important nor are the human beings in the process important. In valuing the efficient end of conflict the basic process of resolution for agonologists is one of avoidance. The

²⁶Margaret Fisher, "Contrasting Approaches to Conflict" in Conflict: Violence and Nonviolence, p. 184.

²⁷Fisher, op. cit., p. 193.

issue is not communication of needs between the strong and the weak so that the strong, the expert behaviorists, may seek solution; rather, it is an effort to eliminate the conflict with minimal human and other resource costs. Given this, agonology becomes a most closed and rigid system of conflict resolution even while being the system most eclectic in its use of resolution response. The behaviorists, on the other hand, become a sort of middle of the road resolution system when they are involved in collaborative planning for change. The behaviorists' theories might be placed in the procedural school of conflict resolution. Kenneth Boulding, described this process of resolution:

If the parties can neither conquer nor avoid each other, some form of procedural resolution of conflict is likely. In procedural resolution, the parties have to stay together and live with each other; conflict, in general, may not be resolved permanently insofar as the parties continue to exist in contact, but particular conflicts may be resolved simply in the sense that they come to an end as social systems and are replaced by other conflicts and other systems.²⁸

Boulding described three types of procedural resolution methods, all of which would seem to describe the processes which Benne, Bennis, Chin, Lippit, Havelock, and others advocate in their works on planning change and innovations. Boulding said the three methods are:

1. Reconciliation--value systems of the images of the parties so change that they now have common preferences in a joint field;
2. Compromise--value systems are not identical and the parties have different optimum positions in the joint field; however, each party is willing to settle for something less than his ideal position rather than continue the conflict.

²⁸Boulding, op. cit., pp. 309-310.

3. Award--a settlement is reached because both parties have agreed to accept the verdict of an outside person or agency rather than continue the conflict.²⁹

If we assume that the effort to create change is an effort to choose among the many options available in an educational setting we can see how the behavioristic planning model is reflected in the three procedural styles described by Boulding. The change-agent enters the field in favor of a stance, usually one imposed by hierarchical authority, and attempts to change a system toward that stance. The system has felt conflict in moving toward any stance; the introduction of some agent for change releases some blocking but introduces other blocks as the agent continues through the course of the plan. The procedural resolution which Boulding has called "award" most accurately reflects the resolutions reached by agents with plans for change.

In both the agonological resolution methodology and the methodology of behaviorism there is a recognition, as basic to the theories, that there is "another"--an enemy. When we assume this "other" exists to be defeated efficiently, to be avoided so that our designs prevail absolutely, or to be changed by some dominance of expertise or power, we demonstrate a value that denies the equality, the humanness, of that "other". Such methods do not belong in a humane or in a democratic society; they may very well fit in a society dedicated to powerful action for efficient purposes or a society involved in the production of goods which must be consumed quickly so that more goods can be produced. These two societies are

²⁹Ibid.,

often one; Ivan Illich sees them as the same society and as the establishment of all Western schooling.³⁰

There are other methods of conflict resolution for change. One of the most important is the Satyagraha ("adherence to truth") philosophy of Gandhi. Before discussing this theory, it is necessary to note that it came about much like the praxeological theories did, as a result of the weak attempting to defeat the strong. It has, however, the flavor of the East and the flavor removes it from the Western design for efficiency and capitalistic consumption of goods; it is less involved with economics than are the other two theories discussed above.

Kenneth E. Boulding in Conflict and Defense: A General Theory presented Satyagraha as a alternative to the avoidance, conquest, and procedural forms of conflict resolution. He said that Satyagraha "assumes that the enemy is not merely another, to be crushed or excluded from the society, but is part of the same social system as the defenders."³¹ The guerilla writings of Mao support his belief in this concept when he says "let one hundred flowers bloom." Too often, as in Mao's case, the flowers are tended by a gardener who sees one kind of bloom as more productive than another and, although there may be no enemy to be crushed or excluded, there are persons or

³⁰Ivan Illich, Deschooling Society, (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), pp. 1-24.

³¹Boulding, op. cit., p. 336.

groups which need re-education, this re-education often takes the form, at worst, of agonology and, at best, of the Western behaviorists. Gandhi, in his emphasis on non-violence intended something more humanistic than does Mao; still, it is important to understand that Gandhi's theories developed as a reaction to a position of relative powerlessness in dealing with the conflicts in his society controlled as it was by those he did consider "others".

Gandhi saw that the existing laws were not only "rules of the game of economic and political competition. They are also a means of running the game, if some of the players can, as in fact they do, write the laws".³² The law becomes the situation which is the blocking force, the basic conflict; the law and the society which creates the law then must be the focus of the change-agent's efforts. The change-agent finds himself in a very odd position if he is a member of that society as well as the one who has chosen to change the society. The word "chosen" is important here because the individual change-agent recognizes the likelihood of personal defeat when he chooses, as Gandhi did, to oppose a more powerful force without violence and without destruction or compromise. Some other resolutions than avoidance, destruction, or procedural agreement must occur as a result of his change strategy. He cannot avoid the conflict; he is of it. He cannot destroy the more powerful entity; it is interwoven into the fabric of his existence and the existence of all he values.

³²H. L. Nieburg, "The Threat of Violence and Social Change", in Conflict: Violence and Nonviolence, p. 80.

He cannot make procedural deals, for those lessen his vision and subvert the society by dividing it. He must act in a way that encourages his opponent to grow and to change toward a vision of unity so different to the existing circumstance as to be revolutionary not evolutionary. Joan Bondurant in her article "Creative Conflict and the Limits of Symbolic Violence", described Gandhi's Satyagraha as "a means which potentially: (a) embraces a method of inquiry, (b) uses pressure but contains it, (c) focuses upon problem-solving rather than problem-creating. It is essentially a method for effecting change, and, when applied vigorously, it safeguards, and does not threaten, basic values."³³ Bondurant continued to discuss the objectives of Satyagraha and said that the primary objective of Satyagraha is "the constructive transforming of relationships in a manner which not only effects change (such as a change of policy) but also assures the restructuring of the situation which led to conflict. This calls for a modification of attitudes and requires fulfillment of the significant needs of all parties originally in conflict."³⁴ This introduces an element not essential to the other theories of conflict resolution discussed above; here there is no change-agent apart from the conflict, called in as a consultant by a system, but a change-agent who is a part of the process. This is very unlike the theories of change of the behaviorists who, even in their most collaborative musings, project upon the conflict some person whose skills and designs are just what is needed. Satyagraha also

³³Joan Bondurant, "Creative Conflict and the Limits of Symbolic Violence" in Conflict: Violence and Nonviolence, p. 122.

³⁴Ibid., p. 124.

gives us a person who is, himself, likely to be modified. It is not a procedural plan which bears the pressure of change and compromise; it is the initial agent himself. This theory is different from agonology in proposing that the issue in conflict resolution is not winning or neutralizing the dominant party in the conflict but the issue lies in the changing human attitudes and the "restructuring of the situation which led to conflict".³⁵ Margaret W. Fisher in "Contrasting Approaches to Conflict" saw the process of developing a theory of conflict adequate to our times as centering "upon the basic kind of ethical consideration that, in holding that power lay in pursuing and asserting truth, led to the development of Satyagraha".³⁶

We see in Satyagraha, then, an effort beyond one man or one group's designs for the "good". Yet, we see an effort by man, with a vision of the "good" to struggle to place that vision before those in power, to melt and to influence the prevailing vision, and to become a part of a larger truth apparent to everyone. All of these requirements seem to point to the initiator of such efforts of resolution as being the authentic person, the self-actualized man that the humanistic psychologists describe. Indeed Joan Bondurant's description of the Satyagrahi (one who uses Satyagraha) is pretty much in keeping with the descriptions we read in Maslow, Rogers, Allport, Moustakas, Jourard and others who have influenced the humanistic viewpoint in psychology. Bondurant said the Satyagrahi

³⁵K. Sathanam, Satyagraha and the State, (India: Asia Publishing House, 1960), p. 14.

³⁶Fisher, op. cit., p. 200.

"develops an interacting force with the opponent to produce a new movement in order to change the direction or even the content of the force thus generated. The opponent is engaged in a manner intended to transform the relationships into a form or pattern which could not earlier have been predicted with any precision. The subtleties of response from the opponent are channeled back into the Satyagrahi's movement and these responding pressures are given the maximum opportunity to influence subsequent procedures, and even the content of the Satyagrahi's own claim and objectives."³⁷

Bondurant, and other Western writers, have gone along a slightly less metaphysical path than Gandhi's followers. K. Santhanam in his monograph entitled Satyagraha and the State called the methods of Satyagraha three dimensional embodying love, truth, and non-violence.³⁸ The Western commentators neglect the concept of love and tend to translate it into some sort of respect for the enemy or loyal opposition concept. Santhanam saw the change-agent, the satyagrahi, as working within the societal structure to give good example, propaganda, and non-violent direct action to that society; the satyagrahi perverts Gandhi's theory when he indulges in the symbolic violence of demonstrations, fasts, and direct actions. "The satyagrahic methods of opposition to evil and injustice may be broadly classified as non-cooperation, refusal, and resistance", said Santhanam.³⁹ Santhanam went on to question even non-violent resistance

³⁷Bondurant, op. cit., p. 123.

³⁸Santhanam, op. cit., p. 14.

³⁹Ibid., p. 15.

and saw a great danger in such action violating the doctrine of truth expounded by Gandhi which "does not permit anyone to assume that his own conception of truth is superior to that of any other."⁴⁰

Gandhi saw his change-agent, the satyagrahi, as being above the state. He saw the acquisition of property as theft. He despised the technology of the West and often spoke passionately on the beauty of rural civilization and the greatness of the spinning wheel. He saw railroads and factories as evils; evils he could not avoid. He favored the traditional so far as to believe that sons should follow their fathers in trade.⁴¹ Gandhi's ideal satyagrahi is the "sthitha-pragna" (man of perfect understanding) as described in the last portion of the second chapter of the Bhagavad Gita. This has been summarized by Sri C. Rajagopalachari in the following words:

The good man does the tasks to which he is called and which appertain to his place in society. In all his activities, he does things like others outwardly; but inwardly he maintains a spirit of detachment. He does everything without selfish motive, and maintains equilibrium of mind in success and failure, pleasure and pain, joy and sorrow. Purified thus, the good man is qualified for further progress by constant meditation, prayer and devotion, and finally he sees himself in everything and everything in God. YOGA consists in living this dedicated life in the midst of worldly affairs.⁴²

From this description we can make a connection between the satyagrahi and the self-actualized agent of change. Yet, we can also determine that they are not identical. The self-actualized agent of change is

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 17.

⁴¹Ibid., pp. 20-24.

⁴²Ibid., pp. 12-13

the man of the Bhagavad Gita's description and he is the satyagrahi; but he is also a man of the modern world, a man who is selfish and powerful in his unselfishness and humility. He is a man who employs the efficiency of struggle of the agronomists, the careful personal planning and personal structures of the behaviorists; he is a man of humanistic vision and collaboration; and he is a man of truth, love, and essential non-violence. Above all, he is actualized and he recognizes and utilizes this state in those peak moments when he calls upon himself to be an agent of change.

There may be no way to bring a person to the point where he decides he is actualized. Abraham Maslow, in Toward a Psychology of Being, led me to believe that such a state cannot be striven for nor can it be denied; he agreed, I believe, with Lao-Tzu in feeling that "the way to do, is be" Maslow said:

To the extent that we try to master the environment or be effective with it, to that extent do we cut the possibility of full, objective, detached, non-interfering cognition. Only if we let it be, can we perceive fully. Again, to cite psychotherapeutic experience, the more eager we are to make a diagnosis and a plan of action, the less helpful do we become. The more eager we are to cure, the longer it takes. Every psychiatric researcher has to learn not to try to cure, not to be impatient.⁴³

And yet, we know that actualized persons do emerge with the appropriate skills to deal with the situations in which they find themselves. If we propose an actualized agent of change in curriculum and instructional practice and if that agent of change perceives, as I do, that unblockage of conflict is his primary purpose then it is

⁴³Abraham H. Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being, (New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1962), p. 173.

important to examine in an agronological/praxeological efficiency of struggle model, in a model utilizing the planning format, and in a model emphasizing aspects of conflict that involve loving, truthful, violence and non-violence, those conflict response patterns which we identify as existing in education, particularly in the area of education known as curriculum and instruction. The following seven short chapters are modifications of conflict response patterns that were identified by William Houston who worked with me as a research fellow in values at Southern Illinois University.⁴⁴ I have added my own examples, discussion, and conclusions to his identifications.

Chapter X presents a view of the actualized change-agent, his modes of operation, and his effects of change. As I stated in Chapter I, the model of Self Intervention presented in Chapter X presents a transcendent view of conflict intervention which constitutes a great cognitive leap from the previous seven models. Self Intervention attempts to include the previous models in a vision of change-agentry which unifies agent and client as one and which seeks intervention which is selfish and unselfish in its connection to other human beings. In this model, doing and being are unified in the taoistic sense. Therefore, the reader may wish to view Chapter X not as a model like the seven presented previously but as a model separate from the format and the thrust of the others. The final chapter is a personal statement about the effect of this work has had

⁴⁴William Houston, "Laboratory for Handling Disruptive Behavior", (unpublished papers in NEXTEP Research Fellowship, Southern Illinois University, Edwardsville, Illinois, 1967-1968).

on me and some conclusions concerning the value of research in this model of change-agentry.

CHAPTER III

THE NEUTRAL NON-MODEL INTERVENTION IN CONFLICT BLOCKAGE

In moving from one end of the continuum of intervention process which demonstrates authoritarian methodology to another which demonstrates less direct, more humane, democratic methodology, it is necessary first to consider resolution strategy which may be chosen, in a praxetelian sense, by an agent perceiving a blockage but which may represent no philosophy at all. The concept of neutral intervention is a difficult one to grasp; it is, however, not to be confused with non-judgmental intervention. Non-judgmental intervention is best seen as the open effort to clarify. The reader might do well to contrast the non-model presented here with the model of clarification of values, etc., presented in Chapter IX.

Neutral response to perceived blockage does not involve intent to unblock on the part of the person who identifies with the change-agentry function. Yet, when such a person, because of past involvement, status, or ability recognized by the blocked forces in conflict as having potential for relieving the stressful situation, refuses to participate or intervene to cause relief, the consequences of this course of action may have results more powerful than an active course would have.

A neutral response to a perceived blockage has been defined as "a verbal response, action, manner, or gesture in which no intent is implied".¹ Criteria for identifying such a response is:

1. the response does not support, reprove, or direct action against either side in a blocked conflict situation;
2. the response consists primarily of ignoring the expressed needs and the behavior of the blocked parties;
3. no attention is given to the affective behavior of the blocked parties;
4. the response avoids informational input of any kind which might assist the blocked parties.

The outcome of such a response cannot be safely predicted as there are occasions where the blocked parties do not recognize the agent's presence or do not recognize the situation to be blocked as the agent has perceived it to be. Nevertheless, not to respond is to respond; it has been my experience that the effects of such non-action are negative for all parties concerned and tend to be even more negative for the agent and for his future effectiveness as a interventionist.

Generally speaking, the agent, because of his past influence, will be looked to by the parties in conflict for assistance and intervention to lead to unblocking the conflict. When such aid is not

¹Houston, op. cit.

forthcoming, the anger of the conflicting elements unable to reach resolution is likely to turn, in unity, on the neutral force. Thus, one product of a change-agent's neutrality is to unify, temporarily, forces in conflict and to redirect their anger toward the neutral interventionist. This is not to say that such a ploy is successful generally in unblocking a conflict situation; it is to say that persons recognized as possessing qualities needed by a group will be rejected, at least emotionally, if efforts are not made to give those qualities to the group.

What we have, then, in terms of an intervention model (non-model) is a presentation of the individual agent as a part of the group or recognized as essential to the group who has, for some reason unknown to the conflicting elements of the group, chosen, at a point perceived by most group members to be vital to the success of the group, to respond without emotion or cognition. This response is self-alienating. The reaction of the others in the group will be to assist the perceived change-agent in achieving the alienation he has requested by remaining neutral. All sides in the conflict will act to punish the agent and to seek some other force to unblock the situation. This is to say that groups do naturally work to seek resolution and forces of intervention to relieve blockage. What occurs in the neutral response is to effect the emergence of a previously unrecognized person of ability to unblock, to intervene.

It is necessary to clarify here the assumption I have made that the reader acknowledges the change-agent designation to include all persons or sub-groups who so act in this capacity and not just a single individual. However, it has been a personal experience of mine

that the change function or responsibility is that of a lone individual in a group for any given situation and that the change function often is forced upon the same individual despite his capacity to unblock any given conflict situation. The emergence of a new agent is a phenomenon not sought or anticipated by either the recognized agent or the conflicting parties.


It might be argued that a neutral response by a very sophisticated agent might have the purpose of his retiring as the agent in the group and the purpose of assisting the group in its search for new leadership for conflict resolution. This theory simply ignores the definition of neutrality and it smacks more of a neurotic ego involvement on the part of the change-agent than it does of an effort to help. Such an action would be primarily directive in nature as the agent's past role would be intensified by his ability to create new agents. This seems to go beyond the actualized self of the agent and into some sort of blocking conflicting experience where the agent enters the conflict with an added block in order to participate in the chaos. Such an effort would seem to have a totally negative effect upon an already negative situation. Such an action might occur, but it would seem to signal the dissolution of a personality and a skill recognized by others to be healthy and helpful. One considers King Lear's confusion and his essential neutrality as he acts to give away power and to retain it at the same time; the process not only turns Lear, the agent of change as perceived by his daughters and his subjects, insane but also essentially destroys the lives and goals of the parties in conflict whom Lear might have helped with another


kind of resolution response. Even innocent parties outside the struggle are injured by such indecision which so decides.

How might we graphically envision the intervention response (non-response) which we have called neutrality? We must deal with several elements:


1. a group as a whole;
2. conflicting elements of the group blocking group progress by being in conflict;
3. the element of the group perceived as an agent of intervention and change;
4. the agent's neutrality;
5. the response to the neutrality when it is recognized by the group;
6. the reaction to this unhelpful stance; and
7. the search for new agents to unblock the conflict.

Figure 3.1






A & B redirect their antagonism and reject C.



A & B present elements for new change and dissolution of conflict and blockage



A & B adopt previous stance to await intervention by emergent change-agent D.

This model is seen only as one operative in a blocked/conflict situation. In no way can this situation bear resemblance to the concept of "trainerless" groups proposed by Jack R. Gibb in T-Group and Laboratory Method. Gibb said that: "Trainerless groups are optimally effective when significant norm-inducing activities occur in the total training community that produces a participative and

supportive climate for provisional learning. As the educational literature indicates, trainerless groups in other educational climates are often notably unsuccessful."² Gibb supported our thesis that skilled interventionists may contribute to the problems of the group when their decision to act or to be neutral is not helpful.³

Nor is the model of neutral response to be confused with theories of organization and management calling for more trusting, open, participative involvement by leadership. The neutral response is not an effort to become one with the problem and is not an effort by the perceived agent to more completely share the interventionist function. Such participative leadership and intervention will be demonstrated in Chapter X.

It might also be argued that the interventionist's general response is a non-directive or Taoist response which presents the agent as purposefully passive or stupid to the situation. There is more purpose in each of these non-actions than there is in neutrality. Alan W. Watts gave us some insight into these theories--and their sameness--when he said:

The way of liberation 'is the way down and out'; it is taking, as water does, the course of least resistance; it is by becoming stupid and rejecting the refinements of learning; it is by becoming inert and drifting like a leaf on the wind. What is really being said is that intelligence solves problems by seeking the greatest simplicity and the least expenditure of effort . . .⁴

²Jack R. Gibb, "Climate for Trust Formation" in T-Group Theory and Laboratory Method: Innovation in Re-Education, edited by Leland P. Bradford, Jack R. Gibb, Kenneth D. Benne, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1964), p. 299.

³Ibid., p. 300.

⁴Alan W. Watts, Psychotherapy East and West, (New York: New American Library, 1961), p. 65.

The style of the Taoist reflects a humane, yet praxeological approach. There is nothing either humane or efficient in the model of the neutral response presented above. We can observe, then, in this first model seen as possible for the unblocking agent, that the models are labels for complex sets of actions which may be devised by the change-agents or perceived by the parties affected by the agent's intervention, as efforts different from the rubric which might be immediately applied by an outside observer. The analysis of a set of actions which successfully unblock a situation in conflict is extremely difficult; for this reason this non-model and the set of six models in the following chapters are presented more as models of intervention in an immediate sense for an agent's consideration for planning than they are presented as total movements in a successful effort to seek resolution. Chapter X presents a more total action-oriented philosophy for the change process of unblocking a conflict.

CHAPTER IV

STATUS QUO SUPPORTIVE

An alternative response, that might be seen as coercive and tending toward the authoritarian end of the response continuums is a change-agent's response that tends to argue for the support of the status quo, or, to use a word in vogue, the establishment. Such a response is not one made on the basis of the issues involved in the blocked and conflictive situation but is, rather, one which considers only a perceived necessity to keep the organization unthreatened. Although a lone agent of change might choose to make such a response at some time, a pattern of status quo responses would seem to identify a person whose role was that of continuing administrative leadership where ideas and personal values are so often compromised in an effort to achieve conflict resolution. In a group which was not cohesive, where leadership had not been strong, and where group values had not been established, the change-agent's response might be an appeal for a return to previous structure or for a creation of structure. These responses, however, do not fall under the "status quo" rubric established here; rather, they would be seen as more direct actions or problem-solving elements designed to lead a chaotic situation to some solid ground, efforts to direct new organization.

Before providing examples and a model of the "status quo supportive" response, it is necessary to provide a clear definition

of the response as was done for the "neutral" response pattern identified in Chapter III. The definition of an intervention response which supports the status quo or the establishment is: a verbal or non-verbal response that has as its purpose the justification of leadership's action in the conflict and a plea to all group members for cooperation.¹ Some crucial criteria for the identification of such a response must include the following:

1. membership of the conflicting sides perceive the intervention as emanating from a hierarchial position as opposed to a position of participatory membership in the total group or a position seen by the blocked, conflicting, sub-groups as a change-agent position;
2. the interventionist himself views the intervention as an effort to support the established views of leadership in opposition to some dissident sub-group;
3. the intervention has an element of justification of a position held by those who have held leadership; the intervention does not only attempt to unblock in favor of established power but it also justifies the power;
4. the intervention and the agent initiating the "unblocking" seeks to enforce a policy that has been viewed by some sub-group as negative;
5. no effort is made to placate or to arbitrate the conflict; the effort is coercive in the extreme and dissipates the power of the sub-group if successful.

¹Houston, op. cit.

On the continuum which sees the possible intervention styles as moving from coercive and authoritarian toward clarifying and participatively democratic, the "status quo" response is at once the most coercive and the most authoritarian approach possible. Yet it is one often used especially where large groups (school systems, industry, government, etc.) establish intermediaries to dull the protests of the minorities within the larger group. Seldom does the perception of change-agent or interventionist enter into the planning of either the established leadership or the oppressed and complaining sub-group. The response is predicated on the ability of the leadership of the establishment to "sell" their interventionist to the sub-group as a person who represents all interests in the conflict. Perhaps the greatest example of this in schools in the United States is the ombudsman office created by the establishment, supported and staffed by the establishment, and effective only if the establishment allows it to be. Elsewhere, the ombudsman has been a viable force growing from a participating community; in schools in the United States the idea has been effectively subverted to the ends of the establishment.

Perhaps the best brief discussion of the type of society which most often produces the "status quo" response is presented by Hannah Arendt in her volume On Violence. Arendt distinguished the direct action of the tyrant from the Status Quo Supportive action of the bureaucrat. She said:

Bureaucracy is the form of government in which everybody is deprived of political freedom of the power to act; for the rule by Nobody is not no-rule, and where all are equally powerless we have a tyranny without a tyrant.²

Arendt helps us see the difference between the neutral response ("no-rule") by a perceived interventionist and the response which supports a status quo where no persons can be identified but a hierarchy does indeed exist and does coerce sub-groups into submission to policy without reasonable discourse. Arendt also adds a clarification to the end of the intervention continuum we draw in these chapters when she notes the dehumanization of the bureaucracy and the lack of direction for action. One recalls the frustration of trying to discover the reasons behind the school rules which were so frustrating to us as children and the "answers" so often given by the harried teacher or principal who could only plea for obedience to rules from somewhere else which made also little sense to him; one recalls, and still sees, the "regular" bathroom times of the day and the "times" when we sing, read, or play. Arendt quoted Jens Litten, a German student, when she supplied the term *praxisentzug* ("the suspension of action")³ to the action taken by bureaucracies to control forward movement, change, or unblocking interventions. Arendt also makes us aware of how close we are to violence when we demand obedience to a depersonalized hierarchy; not the violence which comes out of the anger at being ignored which occurs in the

²Hannah Arendt, On Violence, (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World Inc., 1969), p. 81.

³Ibid., p. 81.

neutral response discussed in Chapter III but the violence of revolution, of physical destruction not frustration. An appeal to a sub-group in conflict to subvert its own needs for the irrational needs of the depersonalized bureaucracy is an appeal to human beings to deny their emotions. Such an appeal to the "rational" is irrational itself. Arendt said that "to cure man of them (rage and violent emotions) would mean nothing less than to dehumanize or emasculate him".⁴ Arendt saw this effort to dehumanize when one provides interventions in behalf of the bureaucratic establishment; she said: ". . . the greater the bureaucratization of public life, the greater will be the attraction of violence. In a fully developed bureaucracy there is nobody left to whom one can present grievances, on whom the pressures of power can be exerted".⁵

We have, then, a response which supports the established power not identifiable persons, a response which denies emotions as a viable part of the group process, and a response which is no response at all but, rather, a restatement of previous policy. In short, a response that is authoritarian and coercive in the extreme. Yet, we do have a process occurring which does involve thought and persons acting toward some goal; we have more of an unblocking model of conflict intervention than we have in the non-model of neutral response presented in Chapter III.

Kenneth Boulding provided us with a definition of an authoritarian epistemological process in Conflict and Defense: A

⁴Ibid., p. 64.

⁵Ibid., p. 81.

General Theory. This definition presents a vision of the bureaucracy and the inability of interventions made in support of the established order. Boulding said:

In the authoritarian process, the image and the inference are stable, the image is sacred and not to be touched, and the authority is supposed to be capable of drawing the right inferences so that revisions can be made only in the perception of the message. If the message conforms to expectations, this of course confirms the image. If the message does not conform to expectations, the message is rejected as false.⁶

Such an image and such a message to support the image is unlikely to support change, even change supportive of the eventual survival of the establishment. Bureaucracies, Status Quo Supportive operations, contain within them the seeds of their eventual destruction. The eventuality in the process, however, is destructive of the human beings and their immediate needs. John Dewey in Reconstruction in Philosophy noted this effect when he wrote:

Where there is change there is of necessity numerical plurality, multiplicity, and from variety comes opposition, strife. Change is alteration, or 'othering' and this means diversity. Diversity means division, and division means two sides and their conflict.⁷

and

The tendency to treat organization as an end in itself is responsible for all the exaggerated theories in which

⁶Boulding, op. cit., p. 288.

⁷Dewey, op. cit., p. 108.

individuals are subordinated to some institution to which is given the noble name of society. Society is the process of associating in such ways that experiences, ideas, ⁸emotions, values are transmitted and made common.

In dealing specifically with an intervention by a change-agent to unblock a conflict situation in education with the effect of supporting the status quo, one must deal not only with the negative aspects, the coercive, authoritarian aspects, of supporting what is likely to be a bureaucracy; but one must also deal with an essential reblocking of the learning process as the product and the order of the establishment always tends to control the individual's progress toward his own goals. For this reason, the present concepts of state assessment of schools, educating persons with a wide variety of goals and past achievements, must be viewed as a fine example of a change-agent intervention which tends to be supportive of the purpose of the establishment to control the product; we must also view the intervention of state assessment as an intervention which in no way deals with human beings' learning but deals only with the establishment's need to provide rationale for its own existence and worth. Yet, no tyrant, no human needing to control others, is necessarily behind the creation of such change/intervention movements. The bureaucracy creates men to support it. Dewey also responded to this particular educational example of status quo intervention when he said:

⁸Ibid., pp. 206-207.

Acquisition of skill, possession of knowledge, attainment of culture are not ends: they are morals of growth and means to its continuing.

and

The idea of education as preparation and of adulthood as a fixed limit of growth are two sides of the same obnoxious untruth.⁹

And, yet, the Status Quo Supportive response is one used almost as much in determining (not-determining) future actions as the neutral (non-involvement, non-commitment) response. We seem to operate, within this democratic state, as if we did not care or as if we only cared for womb-like protection from ourselves.

Elements which might be necessary to be present to identify an intervention which is Status Quo Supportive are:


1. the group as a whole--not divided clearly but with an indicated place of dissent;
2. an element of the group perceived, established, as an instrument of intervention and change;
3. a graphic demonstration of the dissent being re-subsummed into the organizational paradigm or being rejected from the whole;
4. a vision of the re-established whole.

These elements are presented graphically in the next four illustrations:



⁹Ibid., p. 185.

Figure 4.1


The Status Quo Supportive Intervention



- A Status quo
- B The wedge of dissent
- C Established interventionist,
ombudsman, agent of unblockage



- B Options:
1. To remove or be removed from the group
 2. To re-think dissent, to become re-educated, to re-cant, to be re-cycled



The status quo exists as before-untouched by the dissent or by the intervention.

The intervention in favor of the status quo tends to eliminate opposition; it can have the effect of eliminating dissenting factions or re-educating them so subtly as to cause no growth of opposing outside forces and to leave no infection inside the organism, the establishment. This is not the medical paradigm of diagnosis and prescription which will be mentioned in Chapter VII on problem solving for there is no healing aspect involved, no attention given to the dissent other than recognition. Rather this response is much closer to the neutral response than to any other. As Alan DeWitt Button has written in The Authentic Child: "'Come let us reason together,' like so many bromides, sounds fine and may even be effective in making us think, for a while that we are reasoning. But what actually happens is the imposition of the stronger set of values and prejudice upon the weaker set."¹⁰ The next response, and those following, begin to recognize emotional contexts in dealing with human beings as individuals or groups; the Status Quo Supportive response does not recognize anything more than an irritation to be removed or solved.

The Status Quo Supportive response belongs on the continuum because it does involve action of some sort, involvement as it were. In this way it differs from the non-model of neutral response presented in Chapter III. It differs from the model of Depreciation in Chapter V because there is no affective recognition, even negative,

¹⁰ Alan DeWitt Button, The Authentic Child, (Boston: Random House, 1969), p. 40.

of the dissenting, conflicting, parties and there is no recognition of the other party as a valid entity.

CHAPTER V

DEPRECIATION

A different problem is faced in attempting to present a model of depreciating or reproving response than was faced in Chapters III or IV. In those chapters the difficulty of the model was in demonstrating how a non-response or a response essentially ignoring persons in the process could be responses at all; they might be better modeled in terms of avoidance of conflict or blockage rather than in the terms of intervention or change of blocked/conflictual situations. Yet, in their own way, they do envision a reaction to conflict that must be noted. The problem in presenting responses which recognize the emotional context of blocked communications or interactions is one of placing a process on paper. It might suffice to discuss the singular, non-interpersonal, responses of Chapters III and IV; but interaction of emotion and idea almost requires a script to provide examples. Script analysis is unweildly in this attempt to provide brief models to exemplify the praxeological options available to the agent of intervention. Therefore, some extensive reference to works of other authors is more in keeping with the process of the next five chapters than it was necessary to the models of the last two.

A response that intends to punish, to mock, to denigrate a conflicting party is one which does not recognize his humanity, his personal value, even while it is one that reflects emotion and extended attention to the threat the individual, or the group, presents

to the dominant force. Although we no longer deal exactly with the anommimity of the bureaucracy as we did with the Status Quo response, we are forced to deal with a response in which the interventionist does not respect or investigate the intellectual or emotional dissent of the lesser party. The conflict reflects, as it did in the Status Quo response, a dominant group unwilling to allow a sub-group to participate or to change. Here, at least, the coercive/authoritarian continuum reflects a real and recognized threat of change and the conflict is perceived as a blockage to the larger group's line of progress. The product of the sub-group is evaluated by the established agent of change and is seen as disruptive or negative in the process. The process of conflict is not valued by the interventionist, and his effort is to unblock the process of the larger group not to consider both processes as one. A definition of such a depreciating response is: "A verbal response, action, manner or gesture that contains reproof or hierarchial disapproval of the dissenting group and which seeks to dissipate dissent through the force of negative propaganda."¹

Essentially an Ad Hominem response, for it argues against the existence rather than with the facts or emotions of the conflict, the depreciating response has the positive effect of recognition of the dissenting party even while having the negative effect of attempting to lessen the self of those individuals who dissent. In such responses to the threat of minority opinion and needs, we place all of the words of prejudice toward peace, religion, and so on that

¹Houston, op. cit.

have characterized man's inhumanity to man throughout the ages. The crucial criteria for such a response is:

1. the response has the purpose of declaring the displeasure of power with the dissent;
2. the response really or subtly indicates behavior which must be corrected by the dissenter;
3. the response contains a threat to the assumed freedom of the dissenter;
4. the interventionist making the response views the intervention as an effort to support the more powerful group;
5. the intervention has an element of justification of a position held by those who have power; the intervention does not only attempt to unblock in favor of established leadership but it also justifies the power of that leadership;
6. the intervention and the agent initiating the "unblocking" seeks to enforce a policy that has been viewed by some subgroup as negative;
7. no effort is made to placate or to arbitrate the conflict (on the contrary, an effort is made to antagonize which is authoritarian and coercive in its effect of denegating the opposition in the vision of the majority);
8. there may be no relationship between the blocked situation, the conflict, and the intervention (in fact, one effect is to lessen the stress of the blockage by creating other, more negatively emotional, areas of conflict so that the

dissenter is forced to defend aspects of his person which he had not considered a part of the conflict).

Once again, the choice of this option on the part of an intervention agent has the effect of identifying that agent as a part of the establishment and as a tool for the coercion, manipulation, of minority dissenting parties. The transaction here seems to employ a child strategy of denigration to effectively eliminate the adult strategy of considered confrontation by previously loyal parts of the system; it may, however, be incorrect to label such a strategy "child like" when it is one which is used so often in the workings of government, business, and education. Obviously, no matter what psychological label is attached to this interventionist response, the outcome is to disestablish the intellectual, emotional, human bonds which might have grown stronger and more organizationally healthful if encouraged and explored.

Clark Moustakas in Creativity and Conformity spoke of the value of open disagreement in the classroom when he said: "In the classroom confrontation, the child must have the right to be in disagreement with his teacher. Paradoxical as this seems, when persons can openly disagree, it is possible for them to establish genuine bonds."² Yet, the tendency even among leaders who characterize themselves as responsive and democratic, is not to trust that such bonds will be established through the natural processes of dissent and affection but to attempt at the very best to structure such

²Clark Moustakas, Creativity and Conformity, (New York: Van Nostrand-Rineholt, 1967), p. 46.

relationships, to manipulate toward "good" interpersonal effectiveness, and to attack dissenters who fail to move toward the good and human ends devised by the established power. All of these actions, of course, reprove and depreciate the dissenter. The depreciating response, however, holds no desire to aid the dissenter in moving toward a positive re-education in the eyes of leadership; but this response simply attacks, giving the dissenter the choice of defending other areas than the one he was concerned with or of joining the fold after having been chastised.

The depreciating response is at once more human and more violent than either of the responses discussed in Chapters III and IV. Chalmers Johnson writing in Revolutionary Change gave us insight into the nature of such responses when he said that "we may define violence as action that deliberately or unintentionally disorients the behavior of others. Violence is either behavior which is impossible for others to orient themselves to or behavior which is deliberately intended to prevent orientation and the development of stable expectations with regard to it".³ Thus, the disorientation of the dissenters is an act of violence; their attention has been turned away from the problem they identified for the group and must focus on the personal aspects of the interventionist's attack which not only depreciates them personally but disorients their confrontation. Such a response may well unblock a conflict situation and lead to

³Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change, (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1966), p. 8.

resolution for the established group. It also will not produce such a violent reaction as the Neutral response or possible withdrawal as did the Status Quo response. It does, through the human recognition of the dissent, dehumanize the process of the dissenting group; it does do violence to those persons who dissent by disorienting their purposeful drive and by presenting them with authority's rebuke for their existence as less able, less desirable, members of the larger group.

Such a depreciating response to a blocked situation will have the eventual effect of strengthening a new dissident group who has learned the tactic by observation of leadership or by the sad experience of members of the new group. The concept of strength in this new group may be misleading to the reader; strength here is the ability to manipulate the situation to one's own ends. Thus, when the larger group demonstrates its violence in putting down rebellion, new conflict situations may see the use of such violent and denegrating tactics by members previously supportive of the larger group. Georg Simmel clarified this possibility for us when he said:

. . . the degeneration of a difference in convictions into hatred and fight ordinarily occurs only when there were essential, original similarities between the parties. The (sociologically very significant) 'respect for the enemy' is usually absent where the hostility has arisen on the basis of previous solidarity.⁴

and

⁴Simmel, op. cit., p. 48.

. . . all customary norms are related to one another through solidary interdependence, since the violation of a single one weakens the principle and thus every other.⁵

The larger group, once again as with the previous responses, sows the seeds of its own eventual destruction by engaging in destructive behavior toward its own members. The elimination of the blockage, the resolution, is not a viable end as the means (the real ends) have determined the future destruction of the group. Eventually, because of the successful defeat of a dissident group through violent or negative action, the larger group will face a variety of conflict situations and be forced to deal with them. Simmel said: ". . . if one finds oneself against a diffuse multitude of enemies, one gains more often particular victories, but has great difficulties in achieving decisive actions which definitely fix the mutual relationship of the forces."⁶ In other words, coercive action by perceived leadership will lead to a non-growthful and chaotic organization where the whole focus of leadership is the attempted suppression of conflict which seems to emerge from more and more directions as the organization ages.

However, agents of change do act in ways which reprove or depreciate groups in conflict with the larger group's goals. Persons seen as intervention agents to unblock conflict do accept the role of attack agent for leadership. One has a vision of the change-agent described by Ronald G. Havelock in A Guide to Innovation in Education

⁵Ibid., p. 95.

⁶Ibid., p. 91.

be aggressive and angry is formed in all self-actualized people, who are able to let it flow forth freely when the external situation 'calls for' it."⁸ Such anger is purposeful but it cannot be used as a reproof to another human.

The elements necessary to distinguish a depreciating response from a response from an agent such as Maslow envisions are:

1. the depreciating response is a strategy used by an interventionist who represents authority and who seeks to disorient the dissenting minority elements by means of ad hominem attack (the agent is therefore seen as belonging to the larger portion of the group);
2. the agent's attack is upon the dissenting minority but it does not deal with the issue blocked in conflict but rather with other aspects of the dissenting group or individual;
3. the desired, and violent, effect is to disrupt the dissenting group and dissipate their purposeful confrontation;
4. the end result envisions a group whole again with the members of the dissenting group disorganized and lessened;
5. a consequence of such polarization by violence is to educate other groups in the process of attack and dissent (the final figures demonstrate the emergence of new

⁸Abraham H. Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being, (Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1962), p. 183.


as a person who does not act with any growthful intent but acts to injure or to disorient what he, or his collaborators, perceive to be disruptive elements in the organization. Intent is the all important concept here for prodding and clarifying may be interventions which anger another human being; reproof also angers but it seems to have a different intent. Havelock's description of the catalyst change-agent has more the tone of an agent of reproof or depreciation than one assisting in the other's growth. Havelock said (and his introductory statement here is philosophy enough to assure the negative tone):

Most of the time most people do not want change; they want to keep things the way they are even when outsiders know that change is required. For that reason some change agents are needed just to overcome this inertia, to prod and pressure the system to be less complacent and to start working on its serious problems.⁷

The "system" might read human beings. The "outsider" might read agents of authority. "Prod" here reads coerce. Havelock's change-agent is designed, throughout his work, to be a servant of the majority. The change-agent model proposed in Chapter X is of an agent who seeks to intervene and who may see his intervention to unblock the essence of the situation as opposed to Havelock's concept of support of generalized majority goals even while acting as an outside agent to prod the organization and the persons in it. Abraham Maslow pointed out the difference between prodding for self and being used as a prod to others. He said that "the ability to

⁷Havelock, op. cit., p. 7.

groups of dissent and the efforts required to contain the groups which turn the larger group from its wholeness, its purpose).



- A The larger group
- B The dissenters blocking the larger group's progress
- C The intervention agent representing the larger group's goals

C's plan of reproof, depreciation, symbolic or real violence to the body of B but not to the area of conflict between A and B

B--dissenting group B^{1,2,3,4} sub-groups created as a result of reproof, depreciation, symbolic or real violence.

B^{1,2,3,4} are new elements of dissent which have new conflicts with A and new members but who have learned C's tactics to disrupt A. The larger group has educated the smaller group to violence, symbolic or real.

Figure 5.1

The Depreciating Intervention

CHAPTER VI

DIRECTION

In an intervention style which remains more toward the authoritarian end of the continuum than not we find the change-agent unblocking forces, which he perceives to be in conflict and which have turned to him, by giving directions of some kind or by advocating some path of investigation or right action which will lead toward an outcome advantageous to all but conforming, more or less, to the expectations of the majority with whom the change-agent identifies. The intervention response is made toward the blockage as opposed to reacting to the blockage by supporting the Status Quo (Chapter IV) or by attacking a party deviating from the established design (Chapter V); the problem is important to the interventionist here. The effect of this response to the blocked situation may be to cause essential change in the structure of the controlling or majority factors in the total system in conflict. Such was not the effort in any of the three intervention responses described in the preceding three chapters.

Because this response deals with the unblocking of a situation and with the future change of organizational structure (or individual personality, etc.) this response has many sub-groups which are too numerous to delineate in this thesis. Rather, let the reader expand the examples given and construct appropriate analogies wherever the reader observes an agent operating in this fashion. It is my opinion that much of what goes on in the industry, the society, and

the schooling of the Western world falls into this intervention model at best or into the three previously described models at worst. All of these processes of intervention may have human use for human good, but the emphasis placed on the first four response models to conflict situations is extreme. Over the past seven years, various colleagues and I have questioned educators regarding their responses to perceived conflict or blocked communication; approximately three-quarters of all those tested responded by using one of these four models (Chapters III through VI) or by utilizing combination response patterns which emphasized these models in the extreme.

Before going further, it is necessary to provide a beginning definition for this very broad response model. The definition of an intervention response which gives direction or which advocates a path of investigation toward solution of the conflict is: a leadership response to perceived conflict or blockage which calls upon a recognized change-agent to effect unblockage either by direction or by introduction of a planned course of action or investigation.¹ The planned course of action or investigation may call for collaborative planning and interpersonal relationships among all humans involved in the process; however, the cognitions and affect of persons involved are seen as necessary to the solution of an organizational problem rather than of real importance in and of themselves. At all times the planning or direction toward solution is the force which guides the change-agent in his work with others involved. Some crucial criteria for the identification of such a response must include the following:

¹Houston, *op. cit.*

1. the forces in conflict perceive a need for removal of the blockage which keeps them from resolving their differences or the interventionist is accepted as an arbitrator of the conflict;
2. the interventionist either perceives a solution not only to the blockage but to the issues which he is capable of providing by direction or perceives that the parties blocked are able to collaboratively develop with his leadership a plan of action or investigation which leads to unblocking the conflict and to reaching problem solutions;
3. the parties in conflict are perceived by the interventionist as part of a whole system rather than isolated groups and the interventionist works to direct or to institute a plan which operates for the whole rather than a part or a hierarchy;
4. most often, the interventionist works from status quo premises but toward unblockage and problem solution which may modify the status quo;
5. effort to placate and to arbitrate the conflict is made or the entities in conflict are directed toward cooperative efforts;
6. the interventionist effort is less coercive than in the three previous models but assumes rational and organizational solution as a result of unblocking the conflict;
7. the interventionist is more likely to be an outside agent agreed upon by the blocked entities in this model than he is in the three previous models;

8. the interventionist often acts in a reward-punishment situation to effect control of the process and to eliminate or to placate persons deviating from the plan or directed change.

Perhaps the most coercive of direction models is that of the King or the God. As this symbol is placed apart from the group but is essential to it, a "divine right" syndrome is in operation and the persons in conflict are given commands or are forced to obey laws without opportunity for questioning or for clarification. This differs from the coercive support of the interventionist for the Status Quo and is seen as being less violent as the directions presented are often kindly and are most often accepted by those in conflict as being desirable solutions to the blockage. This is the extreme hierarchical position where the interventionist is the absolute leader and where it is virtually unthinkable to question the intervention. Modern societies and organizations tend to reject intervention by such absolutes but they also tend to recreate such absolutes within their structures. Parents, especially males, have been seen in such a relationship to their families in the Western world for a long time; only recently have such relationships in the family been seriously questioned in the United States. In education, as the schooling of children moved further and further away from dependency on an establishment which was God's and toward a loose governmental structure, the concept of in locus parentis appeared. The leadership-teachers, administrators, adults-of the schools have assumed for some time the right to absolute direction of children. This concept is also being challenged and suggestions and applications for removal of this hierarchy and absolute dictatorship are being accepted.

Less directive are the aims of the syndrome best represented by science in the medical profession. The diagnosis-prescriptive medical syndrome has begun to take the place of accepted direction without diagnosis. It is my opinion that this syndrome is equally directive and that we have now changed only the name of the direction from God, King, Parent, or Teacher to Scientist. It is also my contention that this medical syndrome is too simplistic and too emergency/sickness oriented to have value as more than a minor tool in education.

Most representative of this new direction is B.F. Skinner who has devoted his life to the establishment of a society and an educational establishment which could best dictate the growth, functioning, control, and happiness of human beings. It is significant that much of the work which constitutes "proof" for the behavioral psychologists has been done to animals in laboratories or under controlled conditions. There is much to be learned about efficiency and planning from these scientists, but there is much which is patently coercive and hierarchial in the mode of the old gods and kings. B. F. Skinner has attempted to defend his behavioristic psychology by demonstrating that human beings are absolutely environmentally controlled and unable to transcend environmental influence, that man must accept the influence of environment and plan to shape himself toward greater knowledge and management, that the individual must be subject to the control of the group through his environment, and that self-expression is selfish and harmful not only to the individual but to the society.

Skinner has found all human interaction manipulative and directing. He has found the more permissive social organizations and

the more autonomous person examples of either perfect controls accepted or ineffective efforts to manipulate leaving the group or the individual lost and eventually seeking more effective controls for more purposeful direction. Skinner discussed change in Beyond

Freedom and Dignity:

It is a surprising fact that those who object most violently to the manipulation of behavior nevertheless make the most vigorous efforts to manipulate minds. Eventually freedom and dignity are threatened only when behavior is changed by physically changing the environment. There appears to be no threat when the states of mind said to be responsible for behavior are changed, presumably because autonomous man possesses miraculous powers which enable him to yield or resist.²

and

Up to a point the literature of freedom and dignity have played a part in the slow and erratic alleviation of aversive features of the human environment, including the aversive features used in intentional control. But they have formulated the task in such a way that they cannot now accept the fact that all control is exerted by the environment and proceed to the design of better environments rather than of better men.³

It is exciting for the humanist to note that Skinner goes so far as to admit the possibility of "aversive features used in international control". However, Skinner immediately returns to the need for such intentional controls of the environment and the denial of autonomous man. He remains clearly at the direction intervention stage and will do no less than advocate his reality that all human action, emotion, and thought are of that stage. In one more example of the Skinner direction model, Skinner wrote in the unlikely, for Skinner, periodical

²B. F. Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity, (New York: Bantam/Vintage, 1971), p. 86.

³Ibid., p. 77.

entitled New Humanist and said in an argument which might be applied to the final model of my thesis in Chapter X as a ploy of devil's advocacy for the statements in that chapter:

What we feel when we have feelings and what we observe through introspection are nothing more than a rather miscellaneous set of collateral products or by-products of the environmental conditions to which behavior is related. (We do not act because we feel like acting, for example; we act and feel like acting for a common reason to be sought in our environmental history.) Do I mean to say that Plato never discovered the mind? Or that Aquinas, Descartes, Locke and Kant were preoccupied with incidental, often irrelevant, by-products of human behavior? Or that the mental laws of physiological psychologists like Wundt, or the stream of consciousness of William James, or the mental apparatus of Sigmund Freud have no useful place in the understanding of human behavior? Yes, I do. And I put the matter strongly because, if we are to solve the problems that face us in the world today, this concern for mental life must no longer divert our attention from the environmental conditions of which human behavior is a function.⁴

Yet, despite Skinner's dedication to control one feels that he is not so much a coercive and manipulative person as a person who has lost faith in man's ability to individually transcend the environment; much of what he wishes for man is healthy and growthful in essence. I do not perceive Skinner's direction to be as de-humanizing as Neutrality (Chapter III), Status Quo Supportive (Chapter IV), Depreciation (Chapter V), or the god-king-parent-teacher-scientist absolutism which preceeded this brief look at the behaviorism of Skinner.

Rather, Skinner provides a half-way stance between the divine right of authority and the concepts of benevolent and collaborative control advocated by self-styled humanists and planners of "Innovation"

⁴B. F. Skinner, "Humanism and Behaviorism", New Humanist, Vol. 88, No. 9, (London, January, 1973), p. 356.

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in human structures. Foremost among these are the writers on planned change in education: Bennis, Benne, Chin, Lippitt, Havelock, Bradford and Gibb to name a few. These authors emphasize the collaborative, participative, nature of the intervention process. Rather than designing an end and directing the means as a true behaviorist might, they are careful to work with the persons, especially the hierarchy, in the process as a means of making what often is a pre-determined end seem more palpable and, therefore, more successful to the individual and his group.

Ronald Havelock writing in A Guide to Innovation in Education said:

. . . We have found that most practicing change agents organize their work and their thinking about innovation of specific projects in which they are involved, projects which have a defined beginning and an end and a sequential history.⁵

Havelock rejected the behaviorist S-R response and suggested what he called a rational problem-solving model which the reader might do well to contrast with a less coercive problem-solving model, presented in Chapter VII. Havelock stated with a stimulus in his model but "subdivides the responsive 'activity' into four steps: (1) a decision to do something, (2) an active attempt to define what the problem is, (3) a search for potential solutions, (4) an application of one or more potential solutions to see if it will satisfy the need."⁶ To accomplish

⁵Havelock, op. cit., p. 4.

⁶Ibid., p. 5.

these responsive activities, Havelock identified the person of change-agent, a human who may act in three primary ways: catalyst, solution giver, and process helper. Havelock virtually ignored the solution giver which Skinner might emphasize and he seems not to experientially understand the concept of catalyst, which will be examined in Chapter X of this thesis; Havelock's model is based on the change-agent as "process helper". What Havelock meant by this is that the interventionist, change-agent, is primarily a "how to" guy and, as Havelock said, that's what his book is all about. But, more than a "how to" guy, Havelock's change-agent comes across as a public relations expert; more than a collaborative helper, he comes across as a pleaser and a subtle manipulator. Havelock said: "The first task of the change-agent is to establish contact and build a relationship with the people he wants to help."⁷ Havelock went on to emphasize this first step by saying: "While innovation is generally difficult it can become impossible if there is a bad relationship between the change agent and his client."⁸ Havelock completed his emphasis on the acceptance of the change-agent and on the change-agent's conforming and pleasing role when he stated:

. . . the outsider who initiates change would do well to enlist the inside support of some member who both understands the client system and is familiar with the change process. Preferably, this insider would be someone within the system, either as a leader, an influential, or a gatekeeper.⁹

⁷Ibid., p. 11.

⁸Ibid., p. 39.

⁹Ibid., p. 51.

Havelock, and those who identify with the science of change-agentry as it is now generally defined in educational circles, tends to disassociate with the behavioralism of Skinner and, yet, to cling to a behavioristic stance modified primarily by the concept of collaborative planning which is, in the long run, little more than a weakened and benevolent Skinnerism. Bennis, Benne, and Chin in The Planning of Change supported Havelock when they said:

. . . we view collaboration as a necessary ingredient of the planned change concept. It is necessary not only because it generates the necessary trust that facilitates the collection and interpretation of meaningful data, but also because the positive aspects of the relationship quo relationship are vitally necessary in order to overcome some of the strong fears of and resistance to change in the client system.¹⁰

According to these authors, collaboration is a technique designed to weaken the opposing force; this would seem to pervert the humanistically cooperative stance so much as to place this part of the intervention model of Direction more in the model of Status Quo intervention described in Chapter IV. The need to coerce here is, in my opinion, less human and less honest than is Skinner's model. Indeed, the authors of The Planning of Change begin to admit the coercive nature of their model when they said: "A relationship between a change-agent and client cannot be truly 'permissive', 'totally democratic', and so on. A kind of coercion is present, a coercion hopefully in the service of liberation . . ."¹¹ One is reminded of nothing so much

¹⁰Bennis; Benne; Chin, op. cit., p. 13.

¹¹Ibid., p. 14.

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as the slogan from the Viet Nam War--"we were forced to destroy the village in order to liberate it."

And yet in the movement toward T-Group change effort one of these same authors, Kenneth Benne, examined, with fellow authors Bradford and Gibb in their work entitled T-Group Theory and Laboratory Method, the nature of trainerless, participative, groups versus the nature of trainer, persuasive, groups and determined that, in a supportive and participative total community, the trainerless groups become more productive, more trusting, more encouraging of diversity, more creative, and more leaderful.¹² It is not quite so easy to totally condemn the pioneer efforts in the planning of change made by these men and others. Although they are basically behavioristically/control oriented, their work has made efforts to transcend scientific paradigms and to explore varieties of self-direction and actualization beyond Skinner's vision of man and environment. Perhaps these aspects of the "sensitivity" group work and the leaderless support groups better belong in a discussion of the interventionist models entitled Person Supportive and Clarifying which are examined in Chapters VIII and IX.

Finally, in discussing the very complex model I have entitled Direction, a new aspect of direction and planning for change must be briefly mentioned. There is some doubt that the aspect of machine controlled change or unblockage of conflict can be safely subsumed under this rubric of Direction. It may be that the human and individual

¹²Leland P. Bradford; Jack R. Gibbs, and Kenneth D. Benne, (eds.), T-Group Theory and Laboratory Method: Innovation in Re-Education, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1964), pp. 294-299.

intention controls the machine model as well as other intervention models. I would hope this is true for then the machine does not control man. However, at the present time, the use of machines to arbitrate disputes, to unblock humans in conflict, to gather influencing data, or to provide emotional, intellectual, and physical feedback to individuals or groups, seems so controlled by hierarchy and so godlike and absolute in application that I feel it best belongs as a part of the model of direction.

First of all, the systems approach to decision-making is a branch of the earlier planned change model of Direction. The system approach has taken many turns but it is most often associated with the data gathering and analysis skills of the computer. It is frightening to note that this approach was originally necessitated by and designed for modern warfare--the violent interventions which have been purposely avoided in this thesis--and that this approach led to such successful recent adventures in actual violence as the Viet Nam War and in the symbolic violence symbolized by the Watergate scandals of the systems prone Nixon administration. Yet, educators seem dedicated to introducing this planning device to learning in the guise of greater individual instruction, greater space utilization, greater responsive and participative planning. This may be a useful tool for education, but the proof of its value is yet to be presented with a balance sheet outlining its destructive contributions to humanity. One useful text in discovering the broad applications the

system approach to education may have is New Look at Education by John Pfeiffer.¹³

Beyond the actual use of the computer, education is experiencing a whole host of experimental models of machine induced direction which are given value by way of education's concern for the medical diagnosis and prescription mode. Even free spirits in educational circles advocate hardware for audio-visual "approaches" to learning and examine the use of Alpha-biofeedback machines to assist in strengthening the creative, contemplative spirit in learners. Given the worship for machinery that we in the United States have, it is impossible to evaluate such use of hardware or systems approaches in terms of long-run effectiveness as intervention strategies or models. It may well be that the effective and human use of machines will present the least coercive model; for now, I feel it belongs in the model of Direction toward planned solution or investigation.

It is necessary to look at the necessary elements of an intervention model of Direction. This is the most complex, if not the most abstract, model to be presented in this dissertation. It is complex because, although Direction is most often seen as belonging to the more authoritarian end of a freedom continuum, it is a more human, and often a more humane, intervention than the others described previously in this dissertation. This model, along with the model of problem-solving presented in Chapter VII, is a transition model from the coercive/control end of the continuum to the more open and autonomous models presented later. And, this is the last model where


¹³John Pfeiffer, New Look at Education: Systems Analysis in Our Schools and Colleges, (New York: The Odyssey Press, 1968).

the concept of the interventionist as a specialist representing recognized conflict unblocking talents is apparent. The elements of this model of Direction are:

1. the group as a whole but with areas of dissent or blockage;
2. an outside interventionist or an insider separate for the time of unblocking from the total group;
3. either a model of direction by the agent unblocking the conflict or a model of the agent modifying the structure through collaborative effort;
4. the desired effect is to reshape the form or direction of the total group.


Figure 6.1

Direction by Fiat




The structure of the original system or its direction

Entities (A,B,C) from system emerge and are involved in blocked, conflict, relationship. Dotted lines represent areas of tentative relationship and continued direction/structure




Change agent (E) gives directions and elements must come together for the health of each entity. The change agent is either totally from outside or is removed from the system to perform the direction function. No feedback to E is necessary for directed change




Entities come together to represent a new structure or new goals. New structure represents E's analysis of needs, structure and direction

Figure 6.2


Direction by Collaborative Planning for Change




The structure of the original system or its direction



Entities (A,B,C) from system emerge and are involved in blocked, conflict, relationship. Dotted lines represent areas of tentative relationship and continued direction/structure.



Entities examine areas of relationship and collaborate with the change-agent (E) in order to determine new structure and direction. ----- Each entity not only examines relationships in blocked situation but also gives feedback to central planner.



The whole returns reshaped and with new direction as a result of collaborative planning

Figure 6.1 may be seen to represent the divine right of absolute direction sometimes transferred to human beings as a result of their hierarchial or traditionally dominant positions with relationship to the structures with which they are associated. This concept also essentially represents the diagnostic-prescriptive medical model wherein the patient has a sickness and the doctor solves the problem without his prescription being scrutinized by the patient. Extreme behavioristic science might advocate such arbitrary and non-human manipulation of environment.

Figure 6.2 may be seen to represent a direction model but one where the unblocking agent is not entirely godlike but purports responsibility to the entities in conflict and demonstrates a desire to collaborate with the entities in order to reach an agreed new structure and direction. Feedback lines exist but are less vital

than the lines of direction which emanate from the intervening party. The image for those originally blocked is seen as more representative of their original desires but, in reality, the needs which caused blocked communications and conflict have not been met have been compromised.

Figure 6.2 can also graphically demonstrate the effect of machine intervention in human conflict for the machine is only partially responsive and primarily directive.

CHAPTER VII

CREATIVE PROBLEM SOLVING

There is an obvious and natural connection between the system mentioned in Chapter VI and the Creative Problem Solving model of this chapter. In many instances the essential mechanism of problem solving is identical to the mechanics involved in the more directive models of Chapter VI. The major distinction between these two general models--Direction and Creative Problem Solving--is the emphasis the latter places on the person involved in the process of unblocking. Interventions described in the last chapter reflect a greater desire for convergence of structure, thought, and emotion; the whole design, for example, of the benevolent behaviorists of collaborative planning in Chapter VI is to bring the individual or the conflicting entities back together. The interventionist seeks to unblock primarily to establish a plan for solution and unity.

Although unity may be an alternative which is considered by the interventionist who utilizes a Creative Problem Solving model, the emphasis is a divergent thinking with the goal of creative unblocking not for the sake, necessarily, of creating a unity but for the sake of freeing human beings to move toward the solution(s) most ideal for them. There may be, at the end of this unblocking intervention, a division of whatever previous unity existed prior to the conflict and blockage.

The freedom continuum, then, has been moved along past the middle line and into the area where organization and consensus becomes less important than the individual and his autonomous decision-making. It is precisely at this point where most modern organizations and most definitions of change-agentry for intervention in conflict are left. Yet, it is my belief that it is at this point and even further into the next three models that one arrives at the essence of change-agentry, at its actualized state. This is not to say that the models described previously contain no value. It is to say that they are used far too often and this model and others to follow are ignored because they concentrate on individuality, divergence, emotion, and intuition as opposed to the emphasis on organization for structure's sake, convergence, cognition, and quantitative evaluation of the four models we have already outlined.

There are many definitions for the Creative Problem-Solving processes discovered by various schools involved in this generalized model. The definition which seems to best fit our concentration on conflict blockage through intervention by a change-agent is this one: The intervention has as its goal the restructuring of conflict situations in order to redirect divergent movements by all concerned toward greater cognitive and emotional growth in ways best suited to the individuals involved as opposed to outcomes which might recreate a previously established group or organization.

Some crucial criteria for an intervention determined to be problem solving and creative would be:

1. the interventionist chooses to intervene in a conflict blockage perceived by the interventionist;

2. the interventionist presents certain creative problem solving strategies which are accepted and participated in by parties in conflict.
3. no outcome other than unblocking each individual's creative potential is sought;
4. no individual or group goal or structure is held in greater value by the interventionist than any other;
5. there is no coercion to involve any party with group decision although a subtle coercion to act rationally and to move creatively toward a more healthy state may be noted as essential to the intervention process initiated;
6. in the process the interventionist becomes one of the participants and may release himself to change;
7. in the process, new interventionists may emerge to create better models for solution or further unblocking;
8. the interventionist's role becomes one of initiator based on original perception and becomes fluid not static as a coercive/control interventionist might be;
9. the outcome is not necessarily an efficient structure for production but may be efficient and personalized for individual creative growth.

This is a new role for the interventionist; a role that is more immediate, less likely to be permanent and less likely to control the outcome of the intervention. It is also a role that is more difficult to accept in the Western world. To be powerful and creative and to learn to be content with those moments when your power and creativity are useful to the group is not generally in keeping with the competitive

and hierarchial world we know and understand. The world created by this model--and moved even further away from the other models by the three models to follow--is a world of trust and interpersonal risk. It is not a model for secure outcome. It is not a model where change can be easily predicted and controlled. Moreover it is a model of learning for all involved as opposed to the past models where teacher (intervention agent) and learner (parties in conflict) are role divided.

There are few formal organizations which apply this model to resolve conflict. One hears of certain aspects of the model being applied at the executive levels or in the creative communications industries; however, the model is most often applied for cognitive expansion and not for structural change or emotional unblocking. Before presenting my effort to demonstrate graphically this model, clarification would, perhaps, be helpful to the reader. Process has been of greater importance to Creative Problem Solving than has been the writing in the field. Yet, limited as the linear field of this dissertation is, I believe some light can be shed by referring to certain efforts to define Creative Problem Solving.

Arnold Toynbee commented on the need, in United States education, for emphasis on creative problem-solving when he said:

. . . if America is to reassure and foster all the creative ability she has in her, a new and right spirit of change has to be injected into her educational philosophy. The rather rigid egalitarian models of educational selection and treatment, which seem to me to be tenaciously held by the affluent majority of American people, will, I should press, have

to be refashioned to include the creative talents of the coming generations.¹

Brainstorming, the best known sub-model of Creative Problem Solving, was first called organized ideation in 1938 when it was developed by Alex Osborn in the business world. The concept can be traced back to Hindu teachers who used the method with religious groups.² Osborn supported Toynbee's analysis for the need for such creative models in the organizations of our society when he said: "Civilization is the product of creative thinking."³

Osborn went on to analyze the inventions of man and to cite the role ingenuity has played in developing a new country. Osborn, however, felt that as a country grows more structured, formal efforts to open creativity to all the people must be made. It is time, he said, to reach out for imaginative exercises and not to expect them to exist within the natural environment.⁴ There is structure here and even connection to the purposeful behaviorism of the followers of Skinner. Yet, Osborn came from the ranks of competitive business and did not represent the most creative use of the Creative Problem Solving models.

¹Taken from a letter to Calvin W. Taylor, Professor at the University of Utah, from Arnold Toynbee, April 18, 1968.

²Quoted from paper NEXTEP #77, and #78 by Sarah Sowell, Southern Illinois University, 1967. (mimeographed).

³Alex Osborn, Applied Imagination, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1963), p. 2.

⁴Ibid., p. 2, 58.

Calvin W. Taylor presented a vision of creativity beyond the structure of organization use when he said:

Imitative processes are not the same as creative processes. Nor are the good learner and the creative producer necessarily the same person, because receiving and reproducing existing knowledge--knowledge that someone else has earlier produced--is a different psychological process from thinking and producing something new of your own.⁵

Taylor went on:

all this leads to the conclusion that what is needed in education is not just more of the same. In other words, we want students to be not merely learners but also thinkers; not only memorizers and imitators but also searchers and innovators; not merely scholars of past knowledge but also producers of new knowledge . . .⁶

Robert Eberle, who was most responsible for introducing me to understanding the field work in Creative Problem Solving, has identified forces in education which resist the development of creative imagination. He listed these forces in Scamper, his recent short book of creative games for imagination development; Eberle said these are the forces which are organized to stamp out creative imagination:

Pressuring children to conform may very well be the major cause for the inhibition of creative-imaginative expression.

Activities selected and goals set by adults, standardized home and school routines, controls exercised by clubs and organizations, and

⁵Calvin W. Taylor, "Creativity--What Is It?", AC'CENT ON TALENT, Vol. 1, No. 1, (September, 1966), p. 1.

⁶Ibid., pp. 1-2.

inflexible school curricula are examples of the repressing society in which the child lives.

Domination by others and the threat of retaliation serve to choke off creative-imaginative response. To be told: 'That's a stupid idea.' or 'Why don't you grow up and act your age?' destroys feelings of self-worth and effectively blocks creative imagination.

Imaginative thought and expression requires playing around with ideas, toying with possibilities, and roaming around in the world of make believe. The non-acceptance of play attitudes, particularly in association with school work, establishes a rigid, restrictive environment.⁷

It can be seen, then, that the Creative Problem-Solving model serves to connect us with the model of Direction in that the exercises and definitions created by Osborn can be made to serve the purposes of an existing organization; however, workers in the field of education, such as Taylor, Eberle, Gowan, Torance, Williams, Suchman, Rogge, and others, have seen the problem-solving efforts as a move toward individual creative growth and even, in Eberle's definitions, as opposed to the structure of the established school system.

Once again, we have a model so complex and diverse in definition as to defy exact placement on a continuum ranging from disinterest to coercion/control to individual cognitive and emotional freedom. Because the Creative Problem Solving model does involve itself so much with exercises and strategies, it seems to allow for less individuality than Eberle would like; and it seems to involve structures, while not coercive and absolutely controlling which do tend

⁷Robert F. Eberle, SCAMPER: Games for Imagination Development, (New York: D. O. K. Publishers, 1971), pp. 8-9.

to organize human behavior in an effort to free human creativity. Even Eberle, in the directions to his games in SCAMPER, recognized the necessity for leadership--"It takes at least two to Scamper, a child of three or older, and a young adult of any age. The adult, as game leader, may serve an individual child or a group numbering up to about thirty-five."⁸ And although Eberle recognized the need of the leader "to entertain extravagant and unrestrained ideas"⁹ and to change honestly, the leader remains the leader.

In some ways, my vision of the Creative Problem Solving model for intervention goes beyond the writers on creativity in that, ultimately, I envision the leader melting into the process and new leadership emerging. I am, however, not dealing with the variables of age, intellect, previous structures of those involved, etc., but am concerned with the generality of presenting a skeleton of intervention with creative problem solving into a blocked conflict situation as perceived by an individual who has skills in the areas of creativity and problem solving and who chooses to intervene.

It is certainly beyond the scope of this thesis to delve into all the possible literature on creativity or problem solving. The purpose is to present a series of options which might be chosen by an interventionist. To that end and to preserve the continuity of the continuum, the model presented in this chapter must not only

⁸Ibid., p. 15.


⁹Ibid.

reflect my vision but must also reflect less autonomous visions of the creative problem solving strategies. The distinguishing, skeletal, elements of such a model are:


1. the Creative Problem-Solving intervention is a strategy used by a person, with specific skills, who perceives a blocked and conflict situation and who chooses to attempt to unblock by introducing the entities in conflict to strategies which will allow for creative unblocking;
2. no party in conflict is under attack;
3. no directions are given and no plans for solution are developed by the interventionist;
4. the desired effect for the interventionist is the participation of blocked parties in a creative and problem-solving atmosphere;
5. the interventionist may: (1) introduce the strategy and act as resource; (2) introduce the strategy and withdraw, (3) introduce the strategy and participate completely;
6. the interventionist's opening strategy, if successful, may lead to continuing introduction of creative problem solving episodes by all involved;
7. the result of such encouragement of divergent solution-making may not be a unified group; rather than working toward a return to or restructuring of the original system, smaller systems may develop and new conflicts may be brought into the open for solution by the methods introduced originally by the agent of intervention.

In order to present graphically the possibilities of the Creative Problem Solving Model, it is necessary to demonstrate in three separate illustrations the range from Osborn's original production model which is so closely related to the model of Direction in Chapter VI to the standard leader--involved model which belongs to the writers in education on creative problem solving and, finally, to Figure 7.2 which presents a model of emergent interventionist in Creative Problem Solving which can act as a transition model toward the less structured models of Chapters VIII and IX.

Figure 7.1



Individuals or entities (A,B,C) within a common system (D) have an area of conflict or blockage (X). An interventionist E who is involved with A,B,C, within the system (D) perceives the blockage (-->) and initiates, with the agreement of A,B,C, Creative Problem Solving Strategies.




As a result of these strategies, the entities A,B,C, are unblocked. The nature of the previous relationship is changed with A,B, growing (for example) closer and being cooperative and C parting structurally. From A,B, and even altering the nature of the larger organization D. The interventionist E remains essentially untouched by his involvement. All are pleased with the outcome. The result is individually creative and does not divide the productive system but alters it creatively for greater


production. This illustration attempts to present a model much like that used in business and first created by Osborne. The effect is similar to the effect illustrated in the final model of Chapter VI save that the interventionist is a part of the system altered (D).

Figure 7.2

A Sub-Model of Creative Problem Solving Most Used in Educational Strategies. The Leader Exists as Leader but Subjects Himself to Change




Within the system D exists individuals or entities A,B,C,F,G, blocked in growth or in conflict (-->). The interventionist E chooses to introduce a Creative Problem Solving Model to intervene and to remove blocked areas. The interventionist E is recognized as a leader but may be a part of the blocked group A,B,C,E,F,G. He participates actively and honestly in the creative unblocking.




As a result of the creative effort all parties may alter their structure and direction. The leader E may change even while retaining recognized leadership. The system D may be altered. Alternatives may include decision to leave system D to form new system H. System H would then be a separate entity or might contain elements of A,B,C,D,E,F,G. There, is, in this sub-model, the element of involved leadership which changes but retains some influence for future intervention. This also is the first illustration where a newly creative and communicating (-->) force H is the positive result of intervention. This illustration attempts to depict the classic stance of educators in utilization of creative problem solving.

Figure 7.3


**A Sub-Model of Creative Problem Solving with an Emergent
and Changing Leadership Totally and Equally
Involved in Change**




Within a generalized common system D, exist communicating elements ABCDEFGH. Aspects of relationships are blocked and there is conflict among these equal parties. Some entities are directly conflicting (//); others reflect growth apart and do not touch. Equal entity E chooses to intervene with a creative problem solving strategy.



As a result of E's intervention, the conflict is unblocked and the structures and directions of ABCDEFGH are all redirected to the satisfaction of each. Alteration is made in the original system D. Possibilities exist (I,J) that entities will leave the larger organization or that new outside groups will have influence. The interventionist E may discover it is creatively productive for him to maintain nominal contact with other entities and hold tentative contact with the original system D.



New blockages may be perceived as conflicts requiring intervention. E may no longer wish or be able to assume the intervention role. This does not matter for F or some other entity will perceive the conflict of ABC and will introduce creative problem strategies to unblock and to restore the entities to a wholeness or to a new structure which meets their needs. Thus, it becomes a continuous re-evaluation of blocked areas of conflict. The emphasis here is on changing, emerging, team leadership and on (although not illustrated) the effort to intervene not only cognitively and structurally but also interpersonally. Lines of communication remain established even though new structures may exist and the old system may be seriously altered or may even be eliminated.



CHAPTER VIII

CLARIFICATION

Looking to the projected continuum along which these chapters lie, the intervention models have parted from the coercion and control aspects which tended to represent the methodology of the change-agent in the first four models and now have moved past the planned and collaborative intervention models of the last part of Chapter VI and of Chapter VII. With the emergent leadership model (Figure 7.3) of the last part of Chapter VII, we enter an area of intervention where interventions become sharing reactions, with leadership and control becoming more and more fluid a concept where it becomes difficult to state fully in linear terms the reactions of the participants in intervention exchanges. The mostly fixed patterns of reaction or intervention of earlier chapters begin more and more to look like patterns for prejudiced response for they are so inalterably involved with the words of coercion, control, leadership, and planning. Only the non-model of neutrality described in Chapter III remains ambiguous enough to deny the efficacy of words but also remains negative and harmful in its model of judgemental.

Although we do find work in the non-verbal area of Creative Problem Solving, it is primarily an intervention devoted to creating solution or solutions. And if Creative Problem Solving is a personal encounter, it creates an atmosphere not of acceptance but of need to progress toward some perfected state. The model presented here begins

to look toward the avoidance of all those "prejudices" which are so essential to the more authoritarian models and to begin, even, to lose concern about the concepts of authoritarianism and freedom. Certainly, here, I attempt to provide in a language those things which so clarify man's interpersonal relationships that the concept and the usefulness of even language itself disappears.

The movement, in the Clarification model of conflict intervention, is away from the intensional orientation toward involvement into the extensional orientation where the word is not the non-verbal reality.¹ But this goes too far into the "language" of the general semanticist and away from this attempt to present a model of clarification as an optional interventionist strategy to unblock perceived conflict.

A definition of the Clarification model of intervention cannot say the reality of the model; yet, I will attempt to define this model in this fashion: clarification consists of a verbal response or a non-verbal action, manner, gesture, or effort which shares with another one's availability as an interventionist who will effect interpersonal exchanges to assist the other in examining alternatives of cognition, emotion, action, etc., and the consequences of alternatives in a non-judgmental way and who will accept the other's eventual decisions. The interpersonal approach carries with it the hope that the other will intervene with the same intent when he perceives blockage and will use skills he has to clarify non-judgmentally. Also implied

¹S. I. Hayakawa, Symbol, Status, and Personality, (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1953), p. 113.

is an ultimate sharing of basic values in an honest, interested, and non-judgemental exchange.

This definition tends to overlap the definition of Chapter IX for the Supportive Intervention model but these two models have much in common and are difficult to separate exactly with words. Just as at the beginning of the models there was difficulty in exactly measuring the coercive and directing/controlling effect, here there is a more positive ambiguity in measuring the intensity, the quality, of difference between a clarifying and a supportive relationship in that both are essentially extensional, non-judgemental, and interpersonally complex.

It would be useful to attempt to establish criteria for the clarifying relationship and intervention which go beyond definition. Such criteria should include:

1. the interventionist perceives a need to clarify on the part of the entities blocked;
2. the entities in conflict accept the overtures of the interventionist and desire clarification of their blocked state;
3. there may be no common system which will be affected by the establishment of such an intervention for clarification;
4. the clarification has the purpose of assisting the parties in conflict to examine alternative methods for unblocking and the consequences of each alternative;
5. clarification need not lead to absolute unblocking for conflict may be accepted by the parties as a growthful

continuing relationship; this decision would then constitute unblocking;

6. clarification is non-judgemental on the part of the interventionist;
7. the interventionist seeks mutual clarification to assist him in unblocking the conflicts the others may not perceive which exist in him and in his relationships;
8. alteration of the entities is not a goal of the interventionist; that entities originally blocked alter as a result of clarification is totally their choice and is neither part of the interventionist's plan nor is considered an improve state.

There are some methodologies in education as well as the other "helping professions" which currently identify with the clarifying relationship as the ingredient basic to their philosophies. These methods do not fulfill all of the criteria above but they have a tendency to move ideally toward such criteria. A few examples of the structures and relationships of the model of Clarification intervention might serve to clarify the criteria above.

The most structured clarification efforts come, indirectly, from pure scientists in any field. Their efforts, though scientifically structured, intervene without direction in the blocked growth of learners who choose to attend lectures, to read books, to perform experiments, or to teach according to information gained without interpersonal contact. This information and research, in these days of such complete and immediate media, acts with almost the same mechanical surety as the computer but without the systematic plan for

change that the computer provides. Such information and research provides answers where questions have not been asked. It might be said that anyone who chooses to disseminate data without interpersonal contact with the receiver of the data has clarified and intervened in a process he is ignorant of. Yet, these same data are intended to influence and do influence through knowledge and affective clarification. The receiver of such data, however, is left to choose what pleases him based on unclarified past belief. It is unlikely that a receiver will attempt to cause himself dissonance, and so this clarification generally serves to support past prejudice immediately and to change slightly and without direction the receiver's established direction. Such data may unblock, and the sender intends to influence but not control in most cases, so the dissemination of information through media must be seen as an effort, generally, to clarify albeit a most structured and ineffective one.

The most influential educational movement in clarification technique is the values clarification methods most popularly presented by Rath, Harmin, and Simon in their text Values and Teaching. The clarification intervention originally proposed by these authors dealt with the highly structured teacher-student clarification of student values. As such, this was a highly structured interpersonal exchange involving an established hierarchy. In some ways this methodology might better be classified with the more directive or Problem-Solving Intervention models.

As a result of spending a year as a research fellow with Merrill Harmin, it is my personal conclusion from working with Harmin and others trained in this methodology that the interventions

are more effective when based on an equal status relationship rather than the teacher-student hierarchy. Much of the effort in the three-year research program called NEXTEP which Harmin directed at Southern Illinois University at Edwardsville was designed to look for new forms of public education and teacher education which would serve as non-hierarchical structures for mutual interpersonal clarification of values among those within the new structures. Harmin and his researchers also advocated new looks at curriculum in an interventionist strategy of clarifying the current curriculum values of fact and generalization.

Raths, Harmin, and Simon did not tend to view values as hierarchical as the developmental psychologists might; rather they saw values existing on a continuum from clear to unclear with the purpose of their strategies to establish, for the human who was blocked at the unclear end, a greater and more personalized "clarity of relationship to society".¹ The authors identified value rich areas and attempted to establish primarily verbal exchanges and strategies which would take another person through a process toward personal value clarity. The authors perceived these strategies to be value free but emphasized the need for open value sharing on the part of the initiator of such strategies. Not all things are values--the authors created a rigid list of crucial criteria to examine the value being clarified; items which did not fulfill all criteria were called value indicators. The criteria established by the authors were:

¹Louis Raths, Harmin Merrill, Sidney Simon, Values and Teaching, (Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Books, Inc., 1966), p. 4.

1. choosing freely,
2. choosing from among alternatives,
3. choosing after thoughtful consideration of the consequences of each alternative,
4. prizing and cherishing,
5. affirming,
6. acting upon choices,
7. repeating.²

Although the authors originally were interested only in providing a method of identifying personal values which led away from other, more authoritarian, less personal, ways and although the authors at first de-emphasized the use of clarification techniques in either knowledge examination or interpersonal social/emotional exchanges, these areas are currently being examined by Harmin and Simon and other proteges of the senior Raths. Harmin and Simon began publishing articles on subject matter still emphasizing values in 1968.³ Since then, these authors and others have expanded the original vision of clarification of values to clarification of other aspects of human growth and concern.

One of Values and Teaching's major contributions was a list of "clarifying responses" which was the basic method for responding to student verbal or non-verbal cues. The object of these responses was to assist the student in the examination of the seven criteria for establishing a value cited earlier. The authors emphasize brief, prodding, encounters, a non-judgemental attitude on the part of the teacher and judicious use of the process so that not too much is attempted and so that the response system does not become a "trick" or a pattern of speech which loses meaning. Appendix A of this

²Ibid., pp. 28-29.

³Merrill Harmin and Sidney Simon, "Subject Matter with a Focus on Values", Educational Leadership, (October, 1968), pp. 34-38.

thesis presents the original thirty clarifying responses and the explanation Raths, Harmin, and Simon presented in Values and Teaching.

Less structured examples of clarification exist as do more structured ones. Any attempt to intervene in the blocked patterns of another human being which has the intent of helping in a clarifying non-judgemental, non-coercive fashion might be termed "clarifying". Certainly, most of the eclectic and even the non-directive counseling practices are seen as clarifying by the practitioners. Even such a patterned and directive strategy as simulation and the various therapies which grow from it, such as T-A, primal scream, massage, and so forth attempt in their analysis and feedback to be more than just problem-solving exercises but attempt to clarify interpersonally--and essentially non-judgmentally--the individual's conflicts be they of values, facts, emotions, or communications interpersonally.

Perhaps no one has really begun to approach the total clarification technique called Satyagraha as developed by Gandhi. It at once combines the action and the resistance to other's negative action with the spirit of truth and love for self and other. Although Gandhi's Satyagrahi (the man who practices Satyagraha) was most often pitted against another human force, the essence of the philosophy is non-violence and non-resistance. There is no opposition in proper Satyagraha. Many times Gandhi's philosophy has been used improperly as a force of direct opposition as in sit-down and sit-in strikes in the United States and in India. However, despite this misuse, Satyagraha is most well used as a method of clarification of thought, emotion, action, value, and position of another.

K. Santhanam writing in Satyagraha and the State presented the essential elements of Satyagraha. Santhanam said:

The word 'satyagraha' was coined by Gandhiji to describe his method of action. Its liberal meaning is 'holding on to truth', i.e., to persist in the ways of truth in spite of all difficulties, dangers and sufferings. It may be even more accurate to define Satyagraha as action based on truth, love and non-violence.

These three words constitute the cornerstone of all Gandhiji's actions and teachings. They are not separate entities, nor is the meaning of any of these words a fixed concept. The word 'truth' is used to denote a wide range of ideas beginning with spoken truth to the ultimate truth of the universe, Brahman of the Vedanta. Similarly, 'love' is used to indicate all degrees of affection and kindness beginning with the instinctive attachment of the cow to its calf and ending with the compassion of Buddha for all living creatures. 'Non-violence' may, according to context, mean mere abstention from the use of physical force; but, in its highest form, it is used to indicate not only the absence of anger and ill will but the presence of active good will toward persons guilty of the most heinous crimes. Sometimes, truth is equated to God and embraces all other virtues. Similarly love or non-violence is occasionally described as the highest virtue, the possession of which implies perfection of character. From the point of view of a logician, all this appears to be confusing. But if one gives up the idea of taking any of these words out of context and converting it into a fixed abstract notion, there will be no difficulty in understanding its import in the particular context.⁴

Santhanam went on to justify the act of intervention, despite the seeming requirement of perfection felt above, when he discussed the time when it is appropriate for the satyagrahi, the clarifying one, to act. Santhanam said:

In this dynamic view of satyagraha, each person is bound to be on a different level and no one can claim to be a perfect satyagrahi. It does not mean that one has to

⁴Santhanam, op. cit., pp. 3-9.

sit quiet till he reaches perfection. It is the duty of everyone to act according to his best light in any particular context.⁵

Although the clarification technique of Stayagraha is primarily an interventionist model to unblock power relationships between the state with power and the minority without power, the techniques can be used for positive action between non-warring entities or with love and truth to unblock entities in conflict through example. As with most clarification interventions the unblocking comes from achieving a state beyond reason and a sense of detached interpersonalness which might be best described in Korzybski's concept of the extensional person and extensional relationships.⁶

As a final note, some have felt that the use of tactics reminiscent of Gandhi by radical groups in the clarifying of relationship between power and oppressed minority in the United States smacks more of Problem-Solving interventions at best and violence (an intervention purposely avoided, save for symbolic violence, in this thesis) at worst. This may be true of some radical efforts which claim to clarify.

It is my feeling however, that some of the most radical clarifications of our society have come from individuals who were essentially positive, non-judgemental save of the blockage they intervened in, and not self-seeking. Names like John Gardner of Common Cause, Ralph Nader in his interventions to relieve conflict between consumer and industry, Barry Commoner in the environmental clarifications, Buckminster Fuller and Marshall McLuhan in clarifying

⁵Ibid., p. 11.

⁶Hayakawa, op. cit., p. 86.

man's relationship to science, and Saul Alinsky in clarifying the state of the generalized poor in the abundant country.

There are some who would find the tactics of these men and others violent, uncompromising, and judgmental. My perception is that they represent forces of love, truth, and non-violence in helping clarify those conflict blockages in our society by powerfully and unselfishly intervening.

Saul Alinsky has, for me, been the person who best symbolized the model I present in Chapter X. However, the model of clarification intervention with Gandhi's concepts of love, truth, and non-violence is so important to my final model that I feel a need to quote from Alinsky's Rules for Radicals in this chapter. Alinsky believed in helping to improve others toward the ends that would make them most powerful and most congruent to their sense of the good; to do this he worked within the system that contained the people. He said:

As an organizer I start from where the world is, as it is, not as I would like it to be. That we accept the world as it is does not in any sense weaken our desire to change it into what we believe it should be--it is necessary to being where the world is if we are going to change it to what we think it should be. That means working in the system.⁷

and, in discussing his ideology, he gave a clarifying response to the concept of ideology as well as claiming that he sought clarifying interventions from others when he said:

To begin with, he (Alinsky, the organizer) does not have a fixed truth--truth to him is relative and changing; everything to him is relative and changing. He is a political relationist. He accepts the late Justice Learned Hand's statement that 'the mark of a free man is that ever-gnawing inner uncertainty as to whether or not he is right.' The consequence is

⁷Saul D. Alinsky, Rules for Radicals, (New York: Vintage Books, 1971), p. xix.

that he is ever on the hunt for the causes of man's plight and the general propositions that help to make some sense out of man's irrational world. He must constantly examine life, including his own, to get some idea of what it is all about, and he must challenge and test his own findings. Irreverence, essential to questioning, is a requisite'. Curiosity becomes compulsive. His most frequent word is 'why?'⁸

Given these examples from the extensive literature of clarification some of the elements necessary to a graphic view of the Clarification Intervention model can be established. Perhaps the element which most separates the model in this chapter from the Supportive Intervention model is the active adventure of the teacher, the exemplar of virtue, and the radical social clarifier into the minds, hearts, and structures of others who desire to or are encouraged to accept this intervention; although this excursion is less demanding than even the self-change of the final model in Creative Problem Solving (Chapter VII), it is more an act of intervention than the positive presence of the Supportive Model in Chapter IX. The elements of this model are:


1. the clarifying interventionist chooses to intervene in another's need for clarification that the agent perceives;
2. the interventionist utilizes strategies which appreciate the other person's position and which clarify without force;
3. the interventionist opens himself to love, truth, and non-violence to the immediate or eventual strategies for clarification by the other;

⁸Ibid., p. 11.


4. clarification interventions are generally directed toward conflicts and blockages within entities rather than those between or among entities.

Figure 8.1


The Leader of Teacher Clarifying Intervention



A, a leader or teacher, perceives a need in B, a student or less able individual, and proceeds to intervene by clarifying the areas A sees as unformed. This occurs over a long period of time.



B, grown whole from A's intervention, seeks to assist A in clarifying an area of concern.




A and B become whole

Figure 8.2


The Gandhian Satyagraha Intervention for Clarification
and Healing



A, a less powerful but a loving, truthful, and non-violent minority of individual, is attacked (A → B) by B; A perceives this attack to result from B's lack of completed self.




A intervenes in B's attack and clarifies B's incomplete aspects by non-violence truth, and love for B (A → B) which does not help B become whole but completes areas of prior need to attack.



Under A's continued clarification A and B become one in the sense of non-violence, truth, and love.

Figure 8.3

The Intervention for Clarification as a Mutual Experience



CHAPTER IX

SUPPORTIVE

The Supportive Intervention Model is at the autonomous end of the continuum created by this chapter and the six preceeding chapters. It is here that the contact made by the interventionist may utilize learned conflict unblocking skills as in the other models but it is also here that these skills must begin to evidence emotional truth to the parties in conflict. The cognitive effect of skills used is less important in this model than in the others; and despite the possibility that Supportive skills may be acquired through the most autocratic training, these skills are seldom truly effective with persons in conflict unless the interventionist is perceived as being "real".

The range of structures which demonstrate Supportive Interventions is wide. From the formal efforts to change behavior in the t-group, where "real" exchanges of emotional support characterize moments in the group when need and process overcome the behavioristic control and product of the traditional group, to the encounter among persons who touch each other briefly and who intervene unforgetably in that brief touching in each other's emotional lives.

The Supportive model is concerned with emotional support rather than with intellectual support. It is concerned with touching and being touched. There is, at times, a beginning formality, perhaps a structured encounter, which provides a safe atmosphere for the risk of support. Eventually, such risks must be taken person to person

without the structure of the training group. Ideally, any group process serves to eliminate the need for the group's support in each and every individual in the group; this is not to say the group cannot continue but is to say that, having achieved its purpose, the group can function only as an entertainment. All learning to share and to support others in order to help those others unblock conflicts is learning to be, alone.

The definition I have constructed for an intervention which is supportive of the persons experiencing conflict blockage is: A Support Intervention is an individual response, either in a structured or an unstructured process, to perceived conflict blockage; this response demonstrates emotional support for all involved and models health that the conflicting parties might strive for in an effort to unblock by accepting, with unconditional positive regard, the emotional needs of each other. The interventionist is a model of reception and acceptance and frees others to be the same by denying the conflicts which previously were seen to exist. There is no seeking for solution by the interventionist for the questions which produced conflict are no longer the essential identifying relationship but are replaced by a deeper respect for the humanity of the parties in conflict by those parties. Such an acceptance might mean that conflicts of ideas, for material goods, etc. might remain following the intervention; but the conflict is now between persons who accept the humanity and emotional truth of the other.

Some crucial criteria for the identification of a Supportive Intervention must include the following:

1. the interventionist perceives a conflict blockage and accepts the feelings of the persons in conflict;
2. the interventionist is accepted by the parties in conflict as a person able to process and to accept the feelings of each party;
3. the interventionist's unconditional positive regard, his empathy with each person involved, and his efforts to clarify the emotions of the conflict are seen as a model by the blocked parties;
4. no solution or resolution is sought by the person who chooses to intervene;
5. the intervention respects the autonomy of all involved parties and presents a model of acceptance and encouragement of differences;
6. the interventionist views the blockage as being caused by inability or reluctance of parties to be acceptant of different emotional reactions to a situation;
7. the result of the intervention may not be agreement, resolution of differences, or unity but rather is an assistance in accepting the other and understanding the other's position and emotion for each party in conflict.

One example of the most structured forms of Supportive Intervention may be seen in the efforts to modify behavior--or to create an atmosphere for taking risks to modify behavior--of the t-groups, encounter groups, sensitivity groups, human relations groups, etc. There are far too many variations of these experiences to allow even adequate discussion in this thesis. Such experiences range from the

highly structured exercises and groups which have goals of modifying participant behavior according to some ideal to unstructured and trainerless groups. Perhaps the most famous of these structured experiences is the t-group.

In a t (training) group, the persons who submit to this structure have the task of assisting each member toward some growth. The trainer's role is to establish processes for data collection, data analysis, and generally loose diagnosis and prescription.¹ The t-group is seen as an unstructured experience as contrasted with the structures and restrictions faced in the daily society of the participants. The participants, with the intervention and modeling assistance of the trainer, create society from immediate group experience. The data processed are from the "here and now", and conflict blockages are viewed as analogies for daily communication and societal conflicts outside the group. The t-group does not offer therapeutical assistance for a major assumption is that all persons in the group are essentially healthy individuals who wish to enhance and to explore that health in relationship with others of a like mind. The trainer as a supportive interventionist has a generally positive regard for those in the group despite the somewhat top-down relationship of trainer to participant. An important aspect of the t-group is the design which is established and the structure of intervention; although t-group trainers often deny pre-set agendas, the fact remains that the classic t-group of the National Training Laboratories is an experience designed and controlled by the

¹T-Group Theory and Laboratory Method: Innovation in Re-Education edited by Leland P. Bradford, Jack R. Gibb, and Kenneth D. Benne, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1964), p. viii.

trainer and his organization. Bradford, Gibb, and Benne described the design process in the following manner:

1. Design must support an integrative learning experience for each participant. This calls for developing creative interrelationships among a number of aspects of learning often treated as antitheses in educational programs--common and individual learning, emotions and ideas, involved action and objective analysis, practical experience and research knowledge, learning with the help of peers and learning from an expert teacher.
2. An adequate design is seen as a set of structures to induce and guide participant experience, analysis, and evaluation, with increasing initiative from participants in directing and evaluating their own learnings.
3. Finally, an adequate design achieves a balance between the use of tested methodologies and activities and the introduction of new training inventions which will advance staff learning and contribute to the professional knowledge of a growing community of laboratory trainers.²

Despite the agenda created by the design and training emphasis, the goals of the t-group experience are to assist the individual in unblocking social-emotional conflicts within the "safe" structure of the group in order to transfer group learning to daily life. The editors of T-Group Theory and Laboratory Method had this to say about the human relations goals of the T-Group:

The very complexity of the T-Group creates a variety of unanticipated consequences which, as the action unfolds, would be impossible to take into account. To some extent, however, the trainer's goals and methodology structure the situation; and while his operations, as in science, determine the results, consideration will be given first to the desired results and goals.

²Ibid., p. 79.

There are two major goals of the T-Group which can be indivisible in operation: (1) that group members become more aware of the enabling and disabling factors in decision making in groups and of their own behaviors and feelings in groups; (2) that group members utilize the the group as a crucible for increasing their repertoire of skills in managing group processes and their own behaviors in groups.³

I said earlier that the variations of the original T-Group are enormous not only in relationship to the original concept of training "normals" but also in relationship to various groups for therapy which may have trainers or be trainerless. Essential to all of these is the concept of group identification; and the support derived from such experiences, though often helpful and of value outside the group, is somewhat artificial in essence because of the designs and agendas of the various groups. The reader can see that the Supportive Intervention, if seen only in group context, might better fall into one of the earlier models. What determines the place of the Supportive Intervention on the continuum projected is not the use of the group nor the training for "back home" use of group techniques but the emotionally supportive atmosphere modeled by the trainer and, most often, practiced in conflict interventions by group members.

Beyond the group is the individual who possesses the ability and the spirit to intervene in conflict and to risk supporting the emotions of persons in the conflict process. William Schutz has offered a beginning to the description of the individual capable of bringing the Supportive Intervention into unstructured daily human interaction. Schutz said:

³Ibid., p. 272.

Awareness of feelings and emotions allows experience to be felt and integrated into the self. The person who is open to experience, and able to feel and to appreciate has more experiential elements than the constricted, denying individual who cannot allow himself to feel deeply . . .

The job of helping a person become more open and enriched is therefore, threefold: (1) removal of emotional blocks; (2) development of an awareness of himself and his feelings; and (3) development of a sensitivity and perceptiveness about other people and the world around him.⁴

Schutz's vision, despite his original identification with the more structured group process, is one of the individual growing to interact and intervene as a result of his own security, his joy, and with the goal of sharing with others his self so that others, especially those blocked in emotional conflict, might feel secure and joyful.

The Supportive Intervention eventually rests on the desire of the person choosing to intervene to fulfill two basic psychological needs not only for the parties he perceives to be in conflict but also for himself. As Freud said, man in order to become congruent, needs to be loved and needs to feel capable in the work he does. In Reality Therapy, William Glasser identified the two psychological needs necessary to the supportive relationship when he said:

Psychiatry must be concerned with two basic psychological needs: the need to love and be loved and the need to feel that we are worthwhile to ourselves and to others.⁵

⁴William C. Schutz, Joy: Expanding Human Awareness, (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1967), pp. 56-57.

⁵William Glasser, M. D., Reality Therapy: A New Approach to Psychiatry, (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), p. 9.

Lest the reader find the Glasser reference too therapeutically oriented, Glasser's definition of reality therapy allows us to envision the relationship of therapist and client as one which might occur between any persons. O. Hobart Mower in his introduction to Glasser's book said:

In Reality Therapy, the helping person becomes both involved with and very real to the patient in a way which would be regarded as utterly destructive of the transference as conceived and cultivated in classical analysis.⁶

Sidney Jourard, who goes far beyond the model of Supportive Intervention, relates the supportive relationship when he wrote about the dialogue situation portrayed in Martin Buber's work. Jourard said:

In dialogue, as Buber portrays it, each experiences the other as a person, as the origin and source of his intentional acts. Each participant aims to show his being to the other as it is for him. Transparency, not mystification, is one of the goals. It matters little whether the dialogue is nonverbal or verbal; whether it occurs between a philosopher and his pupil, a therapist and his patient, a parent and child, or two friends. The aim is to show oneself in willful honesty before the other and to respond to the other with an expression of one's experience as the other has affected it. Dialogue is like mutual unveiling, where each seeks to be experienced and confirmed by the other as the one he is for himself. Such dialogue is most likely to occur when the two people believe each is trustworthy and of goodwill.⁷

This dialogue and Carl Roger's concepts of non-directive therapeutic relationships which foster mutual unconditional positive regard are the basis for the furtherest reaches of the Supportive

⁶O. Hobart Mower, introduction to Reality Therapy, p. xii.

⁷Sidney M. Jourard, Disclosing Man to Himself, (Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1968), p. 21.

Intervention. To engage in a mutual intervention of this kind is to enter the "being" of the Taoist and the self-actualization of Maslow. This is the transition to the model I develop in Chapter X as a new way to effect change and to intervene. However, the Supportive model does have elements imbedded in the continuum which admit control as an important factor in intervention and which, reluctantly at times, envision relationships often termed professional which are essentially hierarchial and which structure one person as leader in the helping or controlling dialogue.

The elements necessary to distinguish the Supportive intervention from either the preceding Clarifying Intervention or the model in Chapter X are:

1. the Supportive Intervention may be a structured design to assist a person in a group to grow according to his own needs, or it may be an unstructured meeting of emotions, a dialogue, which discloses the agent who intervenes equally as well as the initial person who is blocked and in conflict about disclosure;
2. conflict here, as well as in the Clarifying Intervention, may not involve several parties but may be a blocked state within a single party which is unblocked by the support and modeling behavior of the interventionist;
3. the role of interventionist is fluid and may emerge from a group or be exchanged, back and forth, in dialogue;
4. there is no resolution to conflict between two parties necessary but simply an understanding and regard for the other who differs;

5. there is only revelation and acceptance when the interventionist unblocks a conflict area within another person--no change is predicted or desired beyond the change of interpersonal disclosure, trust, and positive regard.

Such elements represent three of the many possibilities of a Supportive Intervention to unblock conflict; these three represent levels of autonomous dealing with emotions of another person. The first figure below represents the design of the group method with the trainer supportively intervening and the effect creating a person whole with the group and capable of giving support. The second figure represents a Supportive Intervention by an agent perceiving two persons or entities in conflict which can be freed by providing a model and a support system for each. The third figure is the ideal, autonomous, Supportive Intervention which serves as a transition to the discussion of Chapter X. In Figure 9.3 an individual intervenes with emotional support in the inner conflict of another person. The intervention is not interference but acceptance of the oneness of the two as they meet.

The continuum projected in this thesis ends here. It has been an attempt to demonstrate possible interventions to unblock persons or groups in conflict; violence in terms of the physical destruction of war in all its major and minor manifestations has been ignored as an intervention to unblock. Large groups have not been considered in their economic, religious, cultural blockages to conflict. These were both beyond the scope of this thesis and are possibly beyond the scope of human intervention. The complexity

of the interventions, if there are any possible, necessary to free humans from their societal, organizational, violence is enormous. It is likely that the interventions described in the last seven chapters could receive some greater names but it is doubtful that the concept of intervention is applicable beyond rather small organizational structures.

The projected continuum ranged from negative and autocratic interventions to relatively autonomous and freeing interventions. The fact that these terms--autocratic and autonomous--are meaningless in the long run for the person who seeks to unblock himself will be demonstrated in Chapter X. However, for the sake of praxeological considerations the continuum projected is illustrated below:





Figure 9.1

The Supportive Intervention in Group



A represents a design of a group, possibly a t-group. B represents a designated trainer whose skills are the force which unifies the group C through J are group participants seeking support and change through connection with B and because of the process A (---) represents supportive interventions. Gradually, and ideally, B's supportive and the new support of membership unites the group. B seldom gains full membership because of the original design of the group process; the group unifies and connects with B under B's leadership.






Figure 9.2

The Supportive Intervention by an Agent to
Unblock Persons in Conflict



A perceives conflict blocking interpersonal effectiveness of B and C and intervenes in a supportive fashion. ABC become one and share interpersonal support even while B and C may retain superficial disagreements.






Figure 9.3

The Supportive Intervention as a Person
to Person Identification



A demonstrates (---->) support of B and acceptance of B with unconditional positive regard.



B returns the support in the way he can after learning from A's model of supportive intervention.



AB

AB are one in understanding and support.

CHAPTER X

SELF INTERVENTION

I seek, in this chapter, to express a reality of being in words all too inadequate. The past chapters, the continuum, all deal with forms of relating and becoming. The models proposed in the past chapters--even when attempted in combinations--are models which separate, dichotomize, man's intellect and his being. In this chapter, I propose a model which envisions the change-agent, the interventionist, as the self-actualized efficient Taoist who is all being and intervenes with his being, the world and the people in it, in ways unencumbered by either the dichotomy of emotion and intellect or the dichotomy of essence and existence.

To propose such a free agent of change will sound absurd to some readers. The agent I propose, however, is not some contemplative metaphysician; the interventionist, here, is purposive, pragmatic, and existential in addition to having the totality of contemplation that accompanies the metaphysician. To propose this agent in a short chapter as a model for intervention requires that the aspects of such an agent be explored.

In the writings on change, such an agent occurs incomplete as Gandhi's Satyagrahi, as Suzuki's Zen master, as Maslow's self-actualized man, as Roger's learner, and as Kotarbinski's praxeological

warrior. All of these theories are important to understand the role model I suggest, if not the man who is the model.

Given such a possibility, all the interventions presented in the past seven chapters become equally valid when this agent intervenes. They exist within the man and his interventions are with self; he is the person and the process. H.G. Creel in Chinese Thought from Confucius to Mao Tse-Tung presented the most complete model in his explanations of the purposive Taoist philosopher, but Creel finds such a person difficult to imagine. Creel said:

It seems doubtful that they (Taoists) actually expected to be taken altogether seriously. They were poking fun, acting as gadflies, and undoubtedly they performed a useful function.¹

Creel's scepticism is properly Taoistic, but I feel he has missed the point of Taoistic unity when he fails to realize that to be serious is not to be serious. Abraham Maslow understood this aspect of Taoist thought better when he created his picture of his self-actualized man. Maslow described the peak-experience and found it a rare thing among rare men; in this Maslow strayed from the possibilities I present here that the self-interventionist is all men and that "peak-experiences" are the daily lives of all men. What clouds men is the organizations to which they belong which often lock them into hierarchial and other-conflictual existences for long periods of life. Certainly all newly born human beings are "self-actualized" and are at constant "peak-experiences". In our effort to become as children though integration of experience and inner being we begin to reject

¹H. G. Creel, Chinese Thought from Confucius to Mao Tse-Tung, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), p. 114.

organization from outside even while being most capable of the greatest organization inside. Maslow described the "subjects" he saw in creative self-actualization in the following way:

Another observation was that SA creativeness was in many respects like the creativeness of all happy and secure children. It was spontaneous, effortless, innocent, easy, a kind of freedom from stereotypes and cliches. And again, it seemed to be made up largely of 'innocent' freedom of perception, and 'innocent', uninhibited spontaneity and expressiveness. Almost any child can perceive more freely, without a priori expectations about what ought to be there, what must be there, or what has always been there. And almost any child can compose a song or a poem or a dance or a painting or a play or a game on the spur of the moment, without planning or previous intent.

It was in this childlike sense that my subjects were creative. Or to avoid misunderstanding, since my subjects were after all not children (they were all people in their 50's or 60's), let us say that they had either retained or regained at least these two main aspects of childlikeness, namely, they were non-rubricizing or 'open to experience' and they were easily spontaneous and expressive. If children are naive, then my subjects had attained a 'second naivete', as Santayana called it. Their innocence of perception and expressiveness was combined with sophisticated minds.²

Yet, a picture of a sophisticated child as interventionist might frighten people. There is more to the quality than what Maslow saw. Children, even in their innocence and spontaneity, are often cruel. Earlier, I said that with the model of agency that I propose, all seven of the previously described interventions, many of which I have identified as coercive, become equal. Is, then, the agent here described capable of cruelty in order to achieve ends? No, because in this model nothing that is done is perceived by the agent to do harm;

²Maslow, op. cit., p. 130.

all his suffering, as perceived by others, and all the suffering others see him cause is not suffering but right action. As the agent transcends his importance and his involvement, his interventions transcend the quality of pain, slavery, and even death. This thought is basically Taoist but it has roots in German and American Transcendental thought as well as in modern philosophy in Heidegger's work. Creel, writing on the book Chuang Tzu, described such transcendence with recognition of the unity with worldly effort to effect change when he wrote, paraphrasing the Chuan Tzu:

The universe is the unity of all things. If one once recognizes his identity with this unity, then the parts of his body mean no more to him than so much dirt, and death and life, end and beginning, disturb his tranquility no more than the succession of day and night.³

Taoist concepts are very close to the more modern Zen Buddhism.⁴ To give an even more modern flavor we have the musings of the existential philosopher Martin Heidegger on the work of Zen Buddhist D. T. Suzuki; Heidegger is quoted by William Barrett in the following way:

'If I understand this man correctly'. Heidegger remarked, 'this is what I have been trying to say in all my writings'.

Barrett continued:

For what, after all, is Heidegger's final message but that Western philosophy is a great error, the result of dichotomizing intellect that has cut man off from unity with Being itself and from his own Being.⁵

The agent acts as the sophisticated child who cannot injure, who cannot dichotomize his transcendence and his reality. Perhaps

³Creel, op. cit., pp. 100-101.

⁴Ibid., pp. 200-202.

⁵William Barrett, ed. Zen Buddhism: Selected Writings of D. T. Suzuki, (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1956), p. xi.

Maslow's descriptions of the self-actualized man might be useful here in understanding this seeming paradox. Maslow often recognizes his debt to Taoist principles in writing about self-actualization; Maslow defined his very work in counseling as having roots in Taoism. Maslow said: "Counseling is not concerned with teaching in the ordinary sense of telling people what to do and how to do it. It is not concerned with propaganda. It is Taoistic uncovering and then helping".⁶ Briefly, given this debt to Taoism, let us examine Maslow's concept of self-actualization as contributory to the model of intervention I propose. Maslow said of the self-actualizer:

. . . the human being is so constructed that he presses toward fuller and fuller being and this means pressing toward what most people would call good values, toward serenity, kindness, courage, honesty, love, unselfishness, and goodness.⁶

In these healthy people we find duty and pleasure to be the same thing, as is also work and play, self-interest and altruism, individualism and selflessness.⁷

. . . the ability to be aggressive and angry is found in all self-actualizing people, who are able to let it flow forth freely when the external situation 'calls for' it.⁸

For self-actualizing people, there is a strong tendency for selfishness and unselfishness to fuse into a higher superordinate unity. Work tends to be the same thing as play; vocation and avocation become the same thing.⁹

I would like to relate Maslow's self-actualizer to Creel's purposive Taoist. Creel said:

The Tao is the absolute, the totality of all that is. If one regards himself as simply a part of that then it

⁶ Abraham H. Maslow, The Further Reaches of Human Nature, (New York: The Viking Press, 1971), p. 52.

⁷ Maslow, op. cit., p. 147.

⁸ Ibid., p. 183.

⁹ Ibid., p. 192.

is clear that no matter what happens to him, he cannot get out of it. One seeks then to become merged into the Tao; the Lao Tzu tells us:

This is called the mysterious absorption
He who has experienced it cannot be treated as an
intimate, or
rebuffed,
Cannot be helped, or harmed,
Cannot be honored, or humbled,
Therefore, he occupies the first place among
all the world's creatures.

This is the transition. One who is absorbed into the Tao cannot be hurt because he recognizes no hurt. One who cannot be hurt is impregnable. One who is impregnable is more powerful than all those who would hurt him. Therefore, he is the chief and the most powerful of creatures. The Taoist sage has no ambitions; therefore, he has no failures. He who never fails always succeeds And he who always succeeds is all-powerful.¹⁰

The Praxeological science becomes, then, a part of the interventionist who is self-actualized, taoistic. This coercive, controlling, defeating science of efficiency called praxeology becomes a growthful, freeing, success force in the hands of the agent I describe in this chapter. Margaret W. Fischer gave us the description of the praxeological approach needed to more completely describe the interventionist model I present; Fisher said:

The praxeological approach, on the other hand, elevates efficiency above all other values, takes no account of any ethical, moral, or emotional aspects of conflict except insofar as they may effect efficiency, seeks either victory or the denial of victory to the opponent, restricts means only by criteria based upon expediency, and assumes a basic need to guard at all times against human depravity.¹¹

¹⁰Creel, op. cit., pp. 110-111.

¹¹Margaret W. Fisher, "Contrasting Approaches to Conflict" in Conflict: Violence and Non-Violence, edited by Joan V. Bondurant, (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, Inc., 1971), p. 184.

Margaret Fisher proceeded to compare this science of efficiency with the Satyagraha of Gandhi. The distaste for the praxeological approach is clear. Fisher even cited the originator of praxeology, the Polish philosopher Tadeusz Kotarbinski, as finding the system he identified as ethically negative and distasteful.¹² The essence of Satyagraha has already been discussed in earlier chapters but Fisher's comparison of the two systems might be useful in identifying the essential and seemingly, paradoxical elements which I propose as parts of the self model of conflict intervention.

Objectives and Directives: Gandhian Satyagraha and Agonology¹³

Satyagraha

To achieve an agreement with the opponent acceptable to both sides, by engaging him on a search for 'truth' using only non-violent means.

Search for avenues of cooperation with the opponent on honorable terms; never take advantage of his difficulties.

Protect the opponent's person and his resources.

Reduce your demands to a minimum consistent with truth.

Avoid a static condition, but launch direct action only after exhausting all other efforts to achieve honorable settlement.

Agonology

To defeat the opponent, or at least avoid being defeated, using whatever means may be expedient.

Make the opponent's position as difficult as possible; make difficulties for both sides if they will embarrass the opponent more than they will you.

Strike first at the opponent's most vital parts; use his resources against him.

Try to leave your opponent only one way out.

Economize your resources, but ensure one your own freedom of movement and restrict the opponent's even at some loss to yourself.

¹²Ibid., p. 192.

¹³Agonology is the branch of praxeological theory which specifically deals with conflict. Fisher adopted this term for purposes of comparison with Gandhi's Satyagraha. Fisher defines agonology as the "science of struggle". Ibid., p. 184.

Never lie; hold nothing back; keep the opponent, the public, and participants informed as an integral part of the movement.	Deceive the opponent. In general, refuse to disclose your intentions, but disclose them occasionally; the opponent may be deceived, or his next move be made more predictable by you.
Extend areas of rationality.	Commit 'irrational' acts at times to confuse the opponent. ¹⁴

Under the model I present, Gandhi's Satyagraha and Kotarbinski's praxeology are one and the same. There can be no defeat and no truth in what is done. There can be no opponent and no cooperation. The person is singular, and striking and protecting are the same. Demands are not dichotomized. All action is both direct and indirect, selfish and unselfish. There are no lies; all statements are truthful. Irrationality and rationality cannot be separated or identified.

All of this speaks of an interventionist who transcends description and technique. For the interventionist in this model, the unblocking is a further actualizing of self with greatest efficiency. All interference in what might be seen as others' conflicts is expression of the agent's need to further touch his own being. The perception of a blockage can only be an internalized challenge to further exist, to further experience. Sidney Jourard wrote about transcendence and challenge; he said:

To be challenged--by a person, by God, by a possibility that has been imagined, by a problem, or by a crisis--means that an individual cannot ignore the situation at hand and devote his attention elsewhere. Challenges, almost by definition, are attention-grabbing. A challenge is similar to a call for help.¹⁵

¹⁴Ibid., p. 190.

¹⁵Jourard, op. cit., p. 223.

Jourard identified the growth toward acceptance of such challenges which transcend the immediate man and are presented to the actualized, taoistic, learner. Jourard said:

Growth is the disintegration of one way of experiencing the world, followed by a reorganization of this experience a reorganization that includes the new disclosure of the world. The disorganization, or even shattering of one way to experience the world, is brought on by new disclosures from the changing being of the world--disclosures that were always being transmitted, but which were usually ignored.

Being is change. Change is in the world. The being of the world is always changing. My body is in the world, and it changes from instant to instant.¹⁶

Erich Fromm has said that "Faith that others can change is the outcome of the experience that I can change."¹⁷ The essence of all my references to various writings is my effort to change myself. This is what the final model is all about. I believe I am a part of all that I touch and I believe that all else is a part of me. To operate as an interventionist under such a belief is to be changed by all conflicts in which you choose to intervene. When others' blocks are released, no matter what strategy is chosen, I am released. There can be no planning of change for change is a constant and I am part of it; what I plan can only be what I am of the instant. The infinite possibilities I discover in being this model are not frightening; the unlimited freedom and the unending responsibilities are not overpowering for they represent my selfish gift to myself as well as my unselfish gift to the totality of our Being. This is not a pragmatic stance for there is no purpose that makes my action productive; there are no traces

¹⁶Ibid., p. 153.

¹⁷Erich Fromm, The Revolution of Hope: Toward a Humanized Technology, (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), p. 14.


of the past, rewards or punishments, which determine action. Nor is this model existential for I am not finite but transcend any existential removal from God but am, as in the Tao.

It returns, in a way, to the non-intervention model of neutrality. But where neutrality was not an act but a reaction to others, this model of self is both non-action and action for a self which is one with others. The interventions performed are spontaneous and natural. They are not strained as neutrality is. They are not Being-destructive as the Depreciation model is. They are not resistant to change as the Status Quo model is. They do not turn outside themselves to attain direction and control which is uncertain and unsuccessful as the Direction model does. They do not seek for creativity to solve problems but are creative in their harmony with the laws of the universe. They do not clarify and separate meaning from meaning or strive for that which is beyond reach of the learner in the moment. They do not seek to dichotomize intellect and emotion as supportive interventions might and as the other interventions do.

Rather, self-intervention does all of these and more of them in a state where the interventionist is one with Tao, the natural, and where the interventionist seeks the efficient and actualized action without a label in order to be one with the action, the unblocking, the conflict, and the persons involved.

The crucial criteria which I attempted to create for the other models may be created here by the reader for they are his. The elements necessary to present illustrations of this model of intervention may

also be created by the reader for those elements and the illustrations are him. Just as I am one with the reader and illustrated below.



CHAPTER XI

REFLECTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

What I would like to do in Chapter XI is to share some things I have learned for myself in the process of writing this dissertation. What I have said in the dissertation are personal learnings about conflict and the interventions people make in attempting to unblock the structures, communications, and emotions of their lives. My model of Self Intervention in the last chapter reflects a way I have experienced at times and a way I am become. I mentioned earlier in the dissertation that I did not wish to create even a rough taxonomy of conflict intervention despite my decision to communicate by a vision of a continuum. I do not even want to suggest all should experience the same vision that I've projected here either of the first seven models of intervention or of the model of Self Intervention. I want to present my experience honestly, and I hope that the reader will check out his own to determine the truth or falsity for him of what I have said here.

I am disappointed that some of my feelings about my model of Self Intervention simply have not been expressed in the depth I feel. In some ways I was too frightened or threatened by the task to give full freedom to my feelings. Perhaps this realization and the experience of relating it will allow me to examine my needs and my values more honestly in my future writings and actions not only as a professional but also as a person.

I was tempted to relate some of the success and much of the failure I have had in accepting the roles others have seen for me in change-agentry in education and in choosing to use my energy and skills in intervening in situations or persons I perceived to be blocked. I do not feel the narrative of these experiences would be worthwhile for the reader. I feel these stories of the past have continuing worth as a part of my person, but I would hope that the reader's "here and now" would allow him to place his own experiences in the context of these eight models and determine how complete and how accurate my perceptions were for him.

As one writes and invests self in the risk of the dissertation process, one grows so much as he risks. The conflicts of the process can be enormous and many valuable persons never complete the experience because they cannot unblock the emotions of the situation. For me, the value of the process has been more in the decision to involve myself with others who might be too critical of my work or my beliefs; the value of the dissertation is in the completion of the task. The block is released.

I shall be in conflict with the thoughts of this effort immediately; what has been an alive process soon joins other efforts as a dead product on the shelves of the library. At times, it will contribute to the growth of human beings in some way; hopefully, it will never, become so accepted as to block others' growth in their own ways and to their own ends. Best of all, there may even be those who read this work and find some joy in it.

A book--a dissertation--is a has been phenomona. It exists, only as part of a praxeological system; it is mechanistic and controlling.

The process of writing and creating is in the style of satyagraha; it is "adherence to truth". As writer and creator I am self adhering, I hope, to truth as I see it.

It seems to me that as I need to seek to intervene in my growth, my process of being self, so others might, in their own way, wish this process. It is not a process I see encouraged in any of our large enterprises or institutions. Perhaps such a process is too anarchistic, too chaotic, for our world of efficiency. I have experienced such an atmosphere of freedom to grow to self in small groups and in pockets of institutions. I feel some of my work as a teacher in public schools has led to more alternative pockets. I am much excited by the beauty of the people I see involved in letting other people grow. I acknowledged some of these persons at the beginning of this effort. My training forces me to make two final references even in this last chapter. I see these as the recommendation part of the chapter.

First of all, I would like to quote from Theodore Roszak's The Making of a Counter Culture. Roszak presented a powerful alternative to the conflicts of judgement which now awe educators involved in state assessment; competency-based programs, and other impersonal forms of judging the growth of our fellow man. Roszak commented on the myth of objective consciousness:

. . . our appraisal of any course of personal or social action would not be determined simply by the degree to which the proposal before us squares with objectively demonstrable knowledge, but by the degree to which it enlarges our capacity to experience: to know ourselves and others more deeply, to feel more fully the awesomeness of our environment. This, in turn, means that we must be

prepared to trust that the expanded personality becomes more beautiful, more creative, more humane than the search for objective correctness can make it.¹

If Roszak leads us to a vision of non-judgemental acceptance of the desire for growth of others, then Carl Rogers gives us a vision of the teacher acting non-judgmentally but with the power, beauty, and strength of being a person. Rogers saw this loved and capable being congruently:

. . . being the person that he is, and being openly aware of the attitudes he holds. It means that he feels acceptant toward his own feelings . . . Because he accepts his feelings as his feelings, he has no need to impose them on his students, or to insist that they feel the same way. He is a person, not the faceless embodiment of a curricular requirement, or a sterile pipe through which knowledge is passed from one generation to the next.²

It seems to me that if we attempt, as persons, to bring about honestly our own visions of the good and the true for ourselves, we will have gone a long way toward a world where all men value their own needs and learnings.

Finally, five years ago I taught at Northwest High School in St. Louis, Missouri; I chose to attempt to create an atmosphere of acceptance of diversity, acceptance of conflict and intervention, and acceptance of person. There are many ways I would be different now for I have grown and changed. I would hope I could now live more comfortably and contribute more freely and equally to that very open

¹Theodore Roszak, The Making of a Counter Culture, (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1969), pp. 236-237.

²Carl R. Rogers, On Becoming a Person, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1961), p. 287.

and creative atmosphere in which the people of those classes and I, as appointed teacher, existed for a year. I'd like to close this effort to write about conflict and intervention with a letter I sent those people after I moved to a position out of the classroom.

CHRISTMAS - TO NORTHWEST - 1969

When we started we fell into analysis, giving reasons, using logic to answer the other's questions about the reality of us.

"Are you for real, man?"

We often sat alone and we often walked, stoop-shouldered, through lonely halls even when we were surrounded by the love of the others who were always with us.

"Mom, I really haven't changed."

"I'm sorry, love, I'm really into these people."

All you blond, black, different shapes of male, female, and me, were wandering toward each other and desperately hoping to touch, to love, and to find capacity for holding tightly to all those things none of us could explain. I was called teacher and you student but we worked out those labels others had given us to deal with.

"Go ahead, send me to the office!"

"I can't ; I really can't do that."

"Phony!"

Soon, more soon for some, we sat together at times and walked touching shoulders, bumping each other's solitude and smiling at the agony we had separately suffered and now jointly celebrated. Parting we could be less apart. Letting go of the whys of our meetings and sharings and letting the existence of this good depth be, we said hello to others who could become us.

"I really, really love you."

"I love me, too. You really turn me on."

I shall never know all of the things that torture you and give you joy, but I am aware that your torture and your joy is in communion with my own. I love my pain and my ecstasy because it is yours, my students, my friends, my selves. Now, because of you, when I meet a person I am with him so much as you taught me. We search each other's eyes--these strangers and I--and begin somewhere that you led me to. We confront life together--all pleasure and all pain is shared.

"I know it's a dark night, stranger; but let me risk saying that I'd like to get to know you."

"Stragely enough, I feel the same about you."

We cannot hope to remember each other's names. Nor can we desperately cling to each other either to protect or for protection. Some of our acts will make us far more lonely than we now believe possible. Some of our acts will limit our possibilities to discover what we could

be. Yet, I feel a being with you, and I feel this sustains me in pain and heightens my joy. Let the destiny of our lives enter into the mystery and unpredictable essence of our growth as single souls, but let our compassion and our comprehension mingle freely as we part, in some way never to be parted or single or alone again.

There is no need to run outside
 For better seeing,
 Nor to peer from a window. Rather abide
 At the center of your being;
 For the more you leave it, the less you learn.
 Search your heart and see
 If he is wise who takes each turn:
 The way to do is be

Lao-tzu

Right On--Beautiful People!

Jean

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APPENDIX

APPENDIX A

THIRTY CLARIFYING RESPONSES

There are several responses that teachers who have worked with the clarifying approach have found very useful. A list of some of these is presented below. As the reader goes through the list, he might make note of some he would like to try; that is, make his own list. There are too many noted here to keep in mind at one time. It is probably best then, to gather a dozen or so together, ones which sound as if they could be used comfortably, and try them out, perhaps expanding or revising the list as experience dictates.

Be reminded, however, that the responses listed here are recommended as useful clarifying responses only when they are used in accordance with the ten conditions listed earlier. The acid test for any response is whether or not results in a person reflecting on what he has said or done, clarifying, getting to know himself better, examining his choices, considering what he prizes, looking at patterns in his life, and so on. If the response makes the student defensive, or gets him to say what the adult wants him to say, or gives him the feeling that the adult is nagging at him, it is being used improperly or with poor timing. An accepting, noncommittal attitude on the part of the person making responses is crucial.

The reader might note that some of the responses listed below are geared directly to one or another of the seven valuing components: prizing, searching for alternatives, thinking critically, choosing freely, incorporating choices into behavior, examining patterns of living, and affirming choices. Some other responses stimulate reflection in a more general sense. But, in all cases, responses are open-ended--they lead the student to no specific value. No one must deliver a "right" answer to a clarifying response. Each student must be permitted to react in his own personal and individual way.

1. Is this something that you prize?

To respond in a way that gets the student to consider whether he prizes or cherished something he has said or done helps him to clarify his values. The response could, of course, be in a different form and have the same intent, e.g., "Are you proud of that?", "Is that something that is very important to you?", "Is that idea very dear to you; do you really cherish it?" The particular situation in which the response is being made, as well as the age of the child to whom it is directed, will help determine the precise wording.

2. Are you glad about that?

This encourages the student to see whether things he feels, says, or does are things that he is happy about and make him feel good. One could also ask if the student is unhappy about something. Such questions stimulate a child to evaluate his life and to consider changing it if he finds it does not bring him satisfactions. Note how different the effect of this response is from the scolding, "Aren't you ashamed of that?" Clarifying responses are accepting and illuminating, not rejecting and moralizing.

3. How did you feel when that happened?

It advances clarification for a person to understand that his feelings are part of his understandings and awareness and that they have to be considered in decision-making. He needs to know that feelings are important, that we respect his right to have his own feelings, and that feelings do not have to be suppressed.

4. Did you consider any alternatives?

Note how this tends to widen, to open up the thinking of children (and adults). With this response, as with all the others in this list, teachers will need to accept whatever the student replies without judgment. After he answers the question, leave him with an honest, "Oh. Now I see," or "I understand," or "You stated your views clearly," or "I appreciate hearing what you say," or some nonjudgmental phrase or gesture.

5. Have you felt this way for a long time?

Questions that get at the same thing are, "When did you first begin to believe in that idea?" and "How have your ideas or understandings changed since the time you first considered this notion?" Here the person is pushed to examine the history of his beliefs or attitudes, to look at their origins, and to see if they are really his or if they have been absorbed unthinkingly. Note how the next response might follow after a student replies to this one.

6. Was that something that you yourself selected or chose?

This reminds persons that they can make their own choices, if they want to do so. An affirmative reply to this response might well be followed by response Number 7.

7. Did you have to choose that; was it a free choice?

Here, no matter what the student says, it is probably wise to say no more but to discontinue the conversation with some nonjudgmental closing.

8. Do you do anything about that idea?

This response helps persons see the responsibility for incorporating choices into actual living. A verbalization that is not lived has little import and is certainly not a value. Another way of saying the same thing: "How does that idea affect your daily life?", or "In what ways do you act upon it?"

9. Can you give me some examples of that idea?

This helps push generalizations and vague statements of belief toward clarity. Note also the relevance of the next response.

10. What do you mean by . . . ; can you define that word?

This also pushes understanding to clarity and helps prevent the mouthing of words students cannot really mean because they do not really understand them.

11. Where would that idea lead; what would be its consequences?

This encourages the student to study carefully the consequences of ideas. No meaningful choice can be made unless the consequences of alternatives are understood. Therefore, it is often very useful to help children examine the consequences of each available alternative. Accordingly, one could also ask, "What would be the results of each of the alternatives?", or "How would those ideas work out in practice?"

12. Would you really do that or are you just talking?

Again the encouragement to see the importance of living in accordance with one's choice.

13. Are you saying that . . . (repeat)?

It is sometimes useful merely to repeat what the student has just said. This has the effect of reflecting his ideas and prompting him to ask himself if he really meant that. It is surprising how many persons seldom hear what they say. Sometimes the phrase, "Did I hear you correctly?" can be used for this purpose.

14. Did you say that . . . (repeat in some distorted way)?

Sometimes a teacher does well to purposely twist what a student has said. Will the student attempt to correct the distortion? After trying it, one senses that the effect is much the same as response Number 13.

15. Have you thought much about that idea (or behavior)?

Of course one accepts whatever reply a student makes to this. It is destructive to the valuing process to attack a negative answer to

this question with something like, "Well, in the future it would be wise to think before you speak (or act)." An accepting and non-judgmental mood is vital for the valuing process.

16. What are some good things about that notion?

A simple request for justification of expressed ideas in some such non-judgmental words often brings dramatic re-evaluation of thinking on the part of students. Many persons rarely realize that there could or should be good, desirable, worthwhile aspects of ideas they hold. The ideas are just there, unexamined and unevaluated.

17. What do we have to assume for things to work out that way?

Many persons have neglected to examine the assumptions upon which they rest their ideas, aspirations, and activities. This probing helps persons understand better, make choices more wisely, and make valuing more possible. It is sometimes useful, in this context, to suggest an assumption that the student seems to be making and ask him if he has considered it, e.g., "Are you assuming that there was nothing good about the depression?"

18. Is what you express consistent with . . . (note something else the person said or did that may point to an inconsistency)?

To present such a disconcerting challenge, to note an exception, to relate things with other things, can produce real clarification if it is not done with an, "I think I have trapped you in an error" tone of voice. The idea is not to slap students down, but to open things up for them so that they can think with new insight, if they want to do so. (Happily, teachers trying this approach seem to find that most students do want to do so.)

19. What other possibilities are there?

This raises alternatives to students and thus it aids them in valuing. Sometimes this question is posed to a group and all alternatives are listed on the board, without judgment again. Of course, other students and the teacher, too, can say which alternative they prefer, but there is no judging a child because he chooses a different alternative. No teasing or otherwise deriding others' choices is tolerated or else there is no free choice.

20. Is that a personal preference or do you think most people should believe that?

To inquire whether a statement is intended as a personal preference or whether it is something that should be generally endorsed is one way of helping to distinguish an attitude or prejudice from a social principle. "Is this idea so good that everyone should go along with it?" is another way to get at this.

21. How can I help you do something about your idea? What seems to be the difficulty?

This question reminds the student that action is a component of life and intentions are incomplete until acted upon. Sometimes such questions uncover suppressed feelings or misunderstandings. Obviously, they locate real or imagined obstacles, too. Also try: "Where are you stuck?", or "What is holding you up?" (But be prepared to offer help if it's asked for.")

22. Is there a purpose back of this activity?

Asking students what, if anything, they are trying to accomplish, where they are headed with ideas or activities, sometimes brings the realization to students--and for the first time--that they might really have purposes and goals and that they might relate their on-going activities to those purposes and goals.

23. Is that very important to you?

This gets students to consider more seriously what is and what is not important to them. It is also often useful to ask students to put several things in order of rank. Assigning priorities is a variation, and a useful one.

24. Do you do this often?

"Is there any pattern to your life that incorporates this idea or activity?", one might inquire. The idea here is to help students see what is repeated in their lives and what is not and to leave them with the decision of whether or not to build a pattern.

25. Would you like to tell others about your idea?

Inviting a student to explain his ideas to the class or others provides two challenges. It tests to see whether he is committed to his beliefs strongly enough to affirm them in public. It also puts him in the position of thinking through his ideas well enough to explain them, and perhaps justify them, to others.

26. Do you have any reasons for (saying or doing) that?

This tests whether or not a choice has been made and to what extent that choice was based on understanding. DANGER: Avoid using that question to pull up short on a student who is obviously not thinking. If you want to tell a student that you believe that he is not thinking, tell him so. But use the above question when you really want a student to consider his beliefs or actions.

Incidentally, when a student does (or says) something and the teacher inquires, "Sonny, why did you do that?", the student often hears, "Sonny,

now why in the world did you ever do something as foolish as that?" "Why" questions are usually to be avoided when attempting to help students clarify their values. "Why" questions tend to make a student defensive, tend to prod him into making up reasons or excuses when he really has none in mind. Besides, the question, "Why did you do that?" carries with it the assumption that the student knows why, and that is perhaps the reasons he tends to concoct a reason when he has none. It is much more effective, for value clarifying purposes, to ask, "Do you have a reason?" and then sometimes follow up an affirmative reply with, "Would you mind telling me?"

27. Would you do the same thing over again?

This helps a student to evaluate things that he has done, to consider why he has done them, and perhaps to affirm the wisdom of doing it in the future. Do not use this question everytime someone does some-things that you do not like. That would be an example of not-so-subtle moralizing. Use the question when you want to stimulate thinking, and strive to keep it non-judgmental.

28. How do you know it's right?

When a child makes a moral or ethical judgment about something by saying that a thing is right or lovely or good, it is useful to ask how he knows that that judgment is correct. Sometimes we ask how he was able to decide. Note this dialogue.

TEACHER: "I see you're hard at work on that project, Jimmy."
 STUDENT: "It's not good to be lazy, you know."
 TEACHER: "How do you know it's not good?"
 STUDENT: "Everybody knows that. My parents always say it."
 TEACHER: (Walking away) "I see."

Thus may a teacher subtly and persistently suggest that one might think about such matters as rightness, or beauty, or goodness if one wants to do so.

29. Do you value that?

Merely picking out something a student has said or done and asking, "Is that something that you value?" helps to stimulate clarifying thinking. Perhaps such a question could have been added by Jimmy's teacher in the above dialogue, e.g.,

TEACHER: "I see. Is working something that you value then, Jimmy?"
 STUDENT: "Huh? I suppose so."
 TEACHER: "O.K., Jimmy. Thank you."

30. Do you think people will always believe that? Or, "Would Chinese peasants and African hunters also believe that?" Or, "Did people long ago believe that?"

Such questions are useful to suggest to a student that his beliefs may be unknowingly influenced by his surroundings, by his social milieu. It helps him gauge the extent to which he may be conforming. See also response Number 5.

Louis Rath, Merrill Harmin, and Sidney G. Simon, Values and Teaching (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Books, Inc., 1966), Pages 55-62.

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