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THE ROLE OF WORKERS' SELF-MANAGEMENT
IN SOCIALIST DEVELOPMENT: AN EXAMINATION
OF WORKERS' COUNCILS IN POLAND AND YUGLOSLAVIA

BY

Ginger E. Macheski

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Sociology

ABSTRACT
THE ROLE OF WORKERS' SELF-MANAGEMENT

IN SOCIALIST DEVELOPMENT: AN EXAMINATION
OF WORKERS' COUNCILS IN POLAND AND YUGOSLAVIA

BY

Ginger E. Macheski

This paper examines both theoretically and empirically,
the role of workers' self-management in socialist develop-
ment. Marx's concepts of alienation and human nature are
used to develop a framework to examine data provided by
existing studies of workers' councils in Poland and Yugoslavia.

The major findings of this study are while the legis-
lative role of workers' councils in both countries appear
to promote socialist goals, this premise is not upheld in
the actual functioning of the councils. The viability of
Polish workers' councils has been successfully mitigated,
and Yugoslav councils are controlled by management.

This paper concludes that in order for actual control
by the producers to be realized, future forms of self-
management must not solely attempt to integrate workers
into existing managerial forms of organizational control,
but must challenge and restructure the underlying production
process.

Implications for further research are explored.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
LIST OF TABLES ii
I. INTRODUCTION 1
II. THEORETICAL GOALS OF SOCIALIST WORKERS' COUNCILS 2
III. THE HISTORY OF POLISH AND YUGOSLAV WORKERS'
COUNCILS 16
IV. THE FUNCTIONING OF POLISH AND YUGOSLAV WORKERS'
COUNCILS 20
V. DISCUSSION 26
VI. CONCLUSION 29
NOTES 31

LIST OF REFERENCES 37

Table
Table

Table

Table

LIST OF TABLES

PERCEIVED INFLUENCE
INFLUENCE WITHIN WORKERS' COUNCILS

PARTICIPATION AND SUGGESTIONS AT YUGOSLAV
WORKERS' COUNCIL MEETINGS

CHARACTERISTICS OF YUGOSLAV WORKERS'
COUNCIL MEMBERS

ii

Page
23
23

25

25

I . INTRODUCTION

There is a substantial body of Marxist literature1 which
identifies workers' self-management as a potential vehicle
under socialism for challenging the dehabilitating social
relations that have been established by capitalism. Predicted
benefits of workers' self-management range from "the wither-
ing away of the state"2 and the end of alienation3 to the
more modest claim of providing channels of worker input into
the production process. In addition to these theoretically
oriented treatises, there exists a number of studies which by
survey or observation discuss the structure and functioning
of existing forms of socialist self-management. A majority
of these studies depict workers' councils as a model of
socialist participation.

Very few attempts have been made to integrate the two
bodies of literature.4 The theoretical predictions are
sparsely grounded in concrete conditions and the studies of
participation are largely unconnected to any theoretical
orientation. As a result, the theoretical assertions remain
speculative and the empirical studies provide little insight
into the impact of these structures.

A number of questions can be raised by looking closely
at workers' councils. In particular, do workers' councils
provide an alternative to capitalist relations of production?
What new avenues of input or access to control do workers'
councils provide? Is there some basis for the theoretical
predictions? In other words, what changes do workers' councils
bring about in the structure of work? In workers' control

1

2

over their own lives? And what implications do these changes
have for the theoretical postulates? These questions deline-
ate the concerns of this paper.

By clarifying the theoretical basis of socialist self-
management and then using the resulting framework to examine
the structure and functioning of workers' councils in two
socialist countries, an attempt will be made to gain insight
into the role of workers' councils in the process of social—
ist transformation.

The focus of analysis is Poland and Yugoslavia. The
well-publicized Yugoslav system of workers' self-management
and the less familiar Polish experience with workers' coun-
cils will be examined. These two socialist countries‘have
some basic similarities that facilitate analysis, yet retain

sufficient differences to provide comparisons.5

II. THEORETICAL GOALS OF SOCIALIST WORKERS' SELF-MANAGEMENT

Before we can begin to examine the role of workers'
councils in the socialist development of Poland and Yugoslavia,
the term "socialist development" must be clarified. What
are the criteria for socialist development? What are the
goals and the tasks for this process?

Attempts to answer these queries have produced many
different responses with a wide range of basic premises.
These premises range from how the communists achieved power,
i.e., was there a workers' revolution,6 to what form of
government is present, i.e., centralized vs. decentralized.7

These criteria each have some useful points to offer, but as

3
a whole, provide little insight to the problem of developing

a framework from which to judge the impact or importance of
new forms of social organization. A more useful approach
is outlined by Braverman.8 Instead of delineating sets of
criteria with which to judge the validity of a particular
country's claim to socialism, Braverman maintains that so-
cialism should be considered as a process which begins at
the inception of communist rise to power and evolves into
new structures and forms of social organization.9 By utili-
zing the idea of socialism as a process, as a proposed tran-
sition from capitalist forms of organization toward the de-
velopment of socialist forms of organization, or the develop-
ment of social institutions which promote communist goals,
the problem of defining socialism can be translated into
theoretically delineating the processes involved and examining
the related structures and processes within each country that
is attempting the transformation. Under this approach, iden-
tifying which countries are "socialist" becomes relatively
unimportant. Any country which proclaims itself as socialist
can thus be considered. The important focus becomes that of
identifying which processes within each country are developing
toward the goals of socialism, and which processes are contra-
dicting these goals.10
To begin the examination of the processes involved in
the development of socialism, we must have some understanding
of what is meant by socialist goals. This is a task that
can not be fully delineated here. However, certain themes

in Marx's writings can be identified which provide a sufficient

4
framework for the purposes at hand.

The theme of human development can be found throughout
the works of Marx. To him, a person's development of his/
her potential is structured by the predominant social re-
lations which are created by the existing organization of
production. Under capitalism, Marx documents conditions
which restrict or even negate the possibility of anything
but segmented and stunted personal development.11 Thus,
socialism represents an attempt to change these limiting
structures, to create a system under which individual poten-
tials can be more fully realized.

Few attempts have been made to elaborate the goals of
socialism beyond this basic human development orientation.
The most recent discussions of socialism focus on "is this
country still socialist" debates,12 i.e., is the U.S.S.R.
actually state-capitalism? Out of these debates, Gordon,13
in his article "Capitalist Efficiency and Socialist Efficiencyfl
has crystalized two underlying basic orientations toward
socialist transition:

". . . two main logical conceptions have

dominated traditional Marxian views of

socialist transition . . . Each of those

conceptions corresponds to a different . l4

ViSion of the ultimate communist objective."
In other words, throughout Marxian literature, two pictures
of future communist society have been developed. Assumptions
about socialist goals are implicitly contained within these
orientations.15

The simplest of these two views is the 'free labor'

concept. This version of communism is that of a society free

5
from want and much of the drudgery of labor. This type

of communist society would be identified by a minimum

of socially necessary labor time equally divided among all
members of society. This means that the total amount of
work needed to produce a high standard of living for all
the members of the society would be negligible. This work
would be equally shared by all those in the society. To
reach this goal, the task of socialism would be to develop
the productive forces16 in order to reduce the labor time
necessary to fulfill the needs of society and to develop
mechanisms which would ensure the equal distribution of
both socially necessary labor time and newly liberated free
time.

Insignificant socially necessary labor time is also an
important feature of the second orientation, the 'collective
labor' view of communism. As in the free labor view, this
labor would be distributed equally among all members of the
society. But in addition to these characteristics, dramatic
changes would be seen in the social relations of society.
The organization of society would promote shared collective
or co-operative relationships through which everyone is
equally free and responsible. This focus on social relations
complicates the task of social transformation. Not only must
the productive forces of society be developed and expanded,
but two additional tasks must be undertaken in the socialist
transformation to achieve the communism pictured in the
collective labor conception. The relations of production

must continually be developed in a manner that increases

6
avenues for workers' participation in collective and re-

sponsible social relations. Secondly, mechanisms must be
created to ensure that both the work to be done and the
new co-operative relations are equally distributed among
all members of the society.

Support, in the form of selected quotations, for both
these conceptions can be found in the works of Marx, Mao,
and Lenin. Rather than engage in a futile attempt to dis—
cern what these monumental thinkers really meant, it is per-
haps more useful to subject each perspective to a test in

the context of the focus of this paper.17

What tools does
each view give us to understand the development of contem-
porary socialism; to evaluate the experience of existing
socialist countries?

By these criteria, the fundamental differences between
the two conceptions become clear. Both conceptions stress
the need for continually developing and expanding the pro-
ductive forces of the society during socialist transition.18
However, the free labor view of communism focuses almost
exclusively on peoples' fight to master nature, or the
struggle to develop means to provide all peOple with the
material requisites of life. Through this focus,the inter-
dependent character of relations between people is ignored.
The social relations of production are of concern only to the
extent necessary to determine the distribution of the work
load. Without an emphasis on the social character of pro-

duction, this view gives us no framework from which to under-

stand the human dynamics of the system; how the people of

7

the society are to be involved in the process, both in
terms of developing their potentials and in terms of their
political power. A logical, albeit extreme extension

of the free labor view would be a technological or economic
deterministic approach to the tasks of the socialist tran-
sition. One would look for increases in the productive
capacities and the standard of living in a country, along
with trends toward a more equitable distribution of wealth
as indicators of advances in socialist development.19
Development of technology, not people, would be the path

to communism.

In contrast, within the collective labor View, the
social character of production is central. Therefore, from
this perspective, a society would be seen as moving along
the path to communism if, in addition to developing the
forces of production, the relations of production were
organized in such a way as to both maximize the ability of
the working class to increase its control over the means of
production and the society as a whole and to promote the
development of human potential. This emphasis provides
an important starting point in the examination of the social
dynamics of existing socialist countries. Changes in the
relations of production, as well as in the amount of work,
become important elements to examine. Thus, an understand-
ing of the role of workers' self-management is crucial in
evaluating existing socialist countries within this view.

However, this orientation, as presented, lacks develop-

ment. Before we can critically analyze the functioning of

8

existing forms of workers' self-management, two aspects

must be clarified. How would this focus on social relations
be developed? And what changes would be made in a society's
structure to facilitate this aim?

To answer these questions, a twofold process must be
undertaken; first, we must have an understanding of what is
meant by human development, and secondly, an understanding
of the structural constraints which hinder this development
under capitalism. By looking at Marx's concept of alienation
we can begin to gain insight into these issues. Marx dis-
cusses the negative effects capitalist organization has on
human development through prevalent social relations by
elaborating a theory of alienation. Alienation can be exa—
mined both in terms of Marx's formulation of human nature20
and the interrelation of social organization and human de-
velopment potentials.

For Marx, as with his other concepts and indeed his
entire analysis, human nature is not a final and unchanging
phenomenon. Instead, human nature is a dynamic social pro-
cess within which certain potentialities or capabilities
of people are either given expression or are thwarted. As
Israel explains, for Marx:

"Man is the totality of social relations seen
in a historical perspective. His social re-
lations are changed through the development
of the productive forces, which alter the
existing structure of a society1 which in turn
changes his SOCial relations.

This unique interactive definition stems from two central

assumptions Marx makes about the nature of people: 1) people

are active social beings, and 2) people relate to nature

through their activities.

First among all things for Marx is the belief that
people are social beings. A person lives in relation to
other people and is a product of this interaction. In this
way, Marx's definition of human nature is a sociological
definition, he views humankind not as individuals but ra-
ther in the context of all people.22 Thus, an understanding
of the nature of people can not be separated from the so-

23 An important part of this social setting is

cial setting.
the labor process. The distinctive characteristic of hu-
man work for Marx is that this labor is conscious and pur-
poseful.24 It is through the interaction of their labor
and the social environment that people are able to create
products to satisfy their needs. Human labor is a con-
scious and active process.

"By this acting on the external world and

changing it, he at the same time changes his

own nature."
For Marx, people are active, creative beings. Through a
unified labor process, a person creates mechanisms to satis-
fy his/her needs and in turn his/her potentials are developed.

But it is precisely within these processes that the

phenomenon of alienation arises. For example, the unity of
conception and execution in labor is an essential component
in the creative development of people. However, this unity
is not inviolable. It is possible within the labor process
for a division to occur; for one person to conceive of a

project while another executes the task. The social relations

which develop from this and other separations are both the

lO

process and results of alienation.

For Marx, capitalism epitomizes this process of segmen-
tation and separation. Under capitalism, all traits by
which Marx distinguished humans from other organisms have
been severed. Thus, alienation is the disruption of the ba-
sic relations of people; a person's relation to his/her
activity, the product of that activity, other people, and
human species being.26 This disruption must be analyzed in
the context of the social structure under which it occurs,
capitalism.

This point raises questions about the source of aliena-
tion. As Novack has suggested:

"The alienation of the worker and his labor
means that something has basically changed
in the life of the worker. What is it?
Normally, everyone has some creative capa-
bilities, certain talents lodged in him,
untapped potentialities for human develop-
ment which should be expressed in his labor
activity. However, once the institution of
wage-labor is prevglent, these possibilities
become nullified."
In other words, a starting point for understanding the sources
of alienation lies in the wage labor-system. Let us focus
on what is meant by wage-labor, and by what processes this
institution has evolved.

Labor under capitalism is wage-labor, a contractual
agreement under which one person sells his/her labor power,
his/her ability to do work, to another. The essential fac-
tor in this process is the transfer of control. A person no
longer may claim responsibility for his/her labor or the

product of that labor, they are now controlled by the capita-

list. Marx discusses three conditions within the productive

ll

forces of capitalist society which create and in turn are
strengthened by this fundamental change in the labor pro-
cess. They are: l) the development of private ownership
of the means of production, i.e., private property under
capitalism, 2) the evolution of the division of labor, and
3) the relationships created by the reduction of labor to
a commodity. These three characteristics are not totally
separate facets of capitalist production systems, but are
interrelated phenomena within the overall market structure
of capitalism. In combination, these characteristics result
in the subordination of labor to capital.28

The relationship of the capitalist private property
system of ownership to alienation is probably the clearest
to discern. Under capitalism, the means of production, the
tools and technology needed to produce, are owned by indivi-
duals. This separation of the means of subsistence from
those who produce creates the basis for wage-labor. Now those
who do not own must enter into an agreement with those who
own the means of production in order to survive. PeOple must
sell their labor power for a wage. As the institution of
private property becomes widespread, it leads to both the
process of alienation (people are separated from the mecha-
nisms of productions and must enter into a wage-labor contract)
and a product of alienation (the objects people create do
not belong to them, but are added to the capitalists' store-
house).

The second condition through which labor is alienated

under capitalism, division of labor, is closely related to

12

the concept of private property. While the institution of
private ownership of the means of production underlines the
social relationship between the individual and the tools

and products of production, the division of labor emphasizes
the connections between the individual and the organization
of the production process.

An important distinction must be made when discussing
the division of labor. In all societies, there exists some
division of the tasks necessary to the maintenance of that
society. Each individual alone could not possibly provide
him/herself with more than the bare means of subsistence.

It is only through this social division of labor, the break-
down of tasks into occupations or branches or production,
that society as a whole is able to develop and progress. On

the other hand, the manufacturing division of labor, which

 

exists within the capitalist labor process,29 is the divi-
sion of the processes involved in making a product into many
separate tasks done by different workers. This breakdown
denies the worker any connection with the finished product
of his/her activity. The worker acquires only the knowledge
required to perform one small part of the product's manufac-
ture. S/he is no longer aware of the entire process, the
product does not appear as a direct result of his/her work,
severing the essential creative unity between conception and
execution. In this divided production, the individual is
given a limited role, and only a fraction of his/her know-
ledge and capabilities are brought to use. People are aliena-

ted from their potentialities and from the possibility of

13

full human development.

It is through the expansion of capitalist private pro-
perty and the increased segmentation of the production
process within the manufacturing division of labor that la-
bor becomes a commodity. A commodity is a product which is
related to other products through an exchange value. With-
in capitalism, this exchange value is not based upon intrin-
sic human needs nor societal use, but merely upon equivalent
exchanges of these products' most common denominator: money.
In the capitalist market, ten dollars of gold and ten dollars
of grain are of equal value, no matter how many people are
hungry. Ten dollars of labor power may be exchanged for ten
dollars of equivalent worth in any product, no more or no
less. This places the mechanism of human survival, labor,
squarely within the vagarities of the market. If the supply
of labor power is large, wages are reduced. If technological
advances increase productivity, labor power loses exchange
value.

Labor as a commodity is something to be disposed of, to
be bought and sold. Accordingly, workers begin to View their
labor power as an object, a thing they own which must be
bartered for survival. People must compete with other people
for the beneficial sale of their work capability. People
become things to other people. The social base of this pro-
cess becomes masked by the appearance of these commodity
relations between things.

In summary, in the Marxian perspective, alienation is

the result of specific historical conditions organized in a

l4

definite mode of production. It is these facets of social
organization which limit the development of collective so-
cial relations, and therefore, are the focus of change under
the collective labor model of socialist transformation.
The planners of socialist countries must consciously develop
mechanisms which contradict these processes and develop new
bases for collective social relations.

Within socialist countries, insofar as the institution
of capitalist private property has been abolished, and inso-
far as the means of production are collectively owned by
the people through the state, this condition of alienation
has been reduced. Profit no longer falls into the hands of
private individuals but belongs to the society as a whole.
In both Poland and Yugoslavia, only a small portion of in-
dustry remains in private hands.30 Therefore, this struc-
tural component of alienation has little importance in our
study of socialist development.

However, developed forms of both division of labor and
commodity relations are still very much present in the struc-
ture of most socialist countries. Under capitalism, mental
work is divided from manual work, responsibility and autho-
rity are hierarchically distributed, and the production
process is segmentalized into minute and meaningless tasks.
All these mechanisms serve to take responsibility for and
control of the labor process away from the worker. These
limiting structures are also found in the industrial concerns
of Poland and Yugoslavia.

Although the economies of socialist countries have been

15

dramatically restructured, labor as a commodity relations
prevail. Workers must still sell their labor power under
market-like conditions. A worker's well-being depends upon
selling his/her labor power. Competition between workers
for material rewards abounds, and in many instances, is en-
couraged by incentive programs.31
The presence of these restrictive structures within a
socialist country in no way negates the feasibility of the
socialist goal of new forms of social relations. Only a
simplistic application of the Marxian theory of historical
development would imply that the mere abolition of private
property systems of capitalism would totally negate the
existence of capitalistic social and economic relations.

Rather, as Braverman points out in his introduction to Labor

and Monopoly Capital, Marx's analysis of historical develop-

 

ment indicates:
". . .that the same productive forces that are
characteristic of the close of one epoch are
also characteristic of the opening of the suc-
ceeding epoch; indeed how could it be other-
wise, since political and social revolutions,
. . ., do not on the morrow provide a society
with a brand new technology."32
Therefore, when attempting to gain an understanding of
socialist countries, the problem is not one of merely
documenting how far short these countries fall of their
communist ideal or how closely they resemble capitalism.
Rather, the challenge lies in attempting to identify, given
the continued existence of forms of capitalist social and

economic relations, the trends and processes within these

countries which represent changes in these limiting structures.

16

The direction of our examination of workers' councils
is now clear. Workers' councils, in order to play a part
in the building of collective social relations, must function
in such a way as to challenge the position of labor as
a commodity, and begin to restructure the manufacturing di-

vision of labor within the work process.

III. THE HISTORY OF POLISH AND YUGOSLAV WORKERS' COUNCILS

To what extent do the workers' councils in Yugoslavia
and Poland aid in the accomplishment of these aims? A brief
examination of the history of workers' councils in each of
these countries is a useful point of departure in answering
this question.

As previously noted, tensions between Yugoslavia
and the Soviet Union culminated in a breach of all relations
between the two countries in 1948. Up until this time,
Yugoslav economic development closely followed the Soviet
model. Workers' participation was limited to membership on
committees called workers' representative councils. The
function of these committees was largely advisory.33 Cut
off by the breach from all former trade partners, technical
advisors, and external sources of investment, the centralized
economy of Yugoslavia faltered. Major economic reforms
oriented toward decentralizing economic control were intro-
duced in 1950. An important facet of this decentralization
process was the LAW OF WORKERS' SELF-MANAGEMENT OF 26 JUNE,
1950. Through this legislation, the rights of management

were given to workers' councils. In general, workers' councils

17

exercise these rights by:

l) Approving the basic plans and final
accounting of the enterprise;

2) Making decisions for the management of
the enterprise and fulfillment of the
economic plan;

3) Electing the management committee;

4) Making enterprise regulations, subject
to the approval of the management committee
of the regional association of the enter-
prise;

5) Evaluating the work of management;

6) Distributing that part of the enterprise's
profit which remains after taxes.34

This 1950 law constitutes the formal basis for self-manage-
ment. Subsequent legislationhas further strengthened and
clarified the position of workers' councils. In 1957, re-
visions were made which gave workers' councils more control
over the distribution of income within the enterprise. Wages
fixed by the state were abolished and each enterprise was
left free to develop its own basis for the distribution of
net income after taxes between capital, wages, and welfare
allocations.35 From 1965 on, legislation has emphasized
the concept of enterprises as free associations of work part-
ners and has strengthened the independent responsibility of
the enterprises.
The system of workers' self-management through workers'
councils is entrenched in the Yugoslav economy,36 having
been established and promoted by those in power.37
The origin and subsequent development of workers' coun-

cils in the Polish People's Republic provides a vivid con-

trast. In comparison to the Yugoslav system, Polish workers'

l8

councils are the product of a far more spontaneous process.
During the twenty year span of the Polish Republic, la-

38 After World War II, union leaders

bor unions flourished.
resumed their activities in socialist Poland. Their inde-
pendence was not challenged until the forced merger of the
Polish Socialist Party with the Polish Communist Party (PRR)
in 1949. The PRR consolidated its control with the LABOR
DISCIPLINE LAW OF 1950.39 Unions were no longer autonomous
organizations. Instead, their newly legislated function

was to support the government policies by mobilizing the work
force to meet production quotas and discipline the labor
force. Management authority was highly centralized and state
appointed. Wages were tied to the meeting of production
quotas, and strikes were outlawed. Labor unions became a
social branch of management. A Six Year Plan for economic
development was instituted. The percentage of national in-
come used for reinvestment was increased,40 and as a result,
consumption levels failed to keep pace with the increased
production. Public discontent with these developments cul-
minated in 1955 at the end of the Six Year Plan, when worker
unrest resulted in numerous strikes and acts of sabotage.4l
Technical workers campaigned against the inefficiency and
waste of the system and demanded more autonomy. These acts
of resistance paved the way for the return to power of
Gomulka and promises of liberalization. Some of the more
restrictive labor laws were repealed. Workers' councils,

many of which had been formed by the striking workers, were

institutionalized. The WORKERS' COUNCIL LAW OF NOVEMBER:

19

1956 allowed for the establishment of workers' councils in
manufacturing, agricultural, and construction industries,

provided that the majority of workers voted for them. Si-
milar to the Yugoslav system, the councils' authority ex-

tended to the following functions:

1) Determining the organization and regulation
of the enterprise;

2) Advising on improvements in production;

3) Determining production norms, wage schedules,
and within set limits, the distribution of
end of year bonuses;

4) Expressing opinions on the activity of the
enterprise and approving the final balance
sheet.

The popularity of these councils was immense, and by
1958, all major production units had established them.43
However, the period in which the councils functioned effec-
tively was very brief.44 The conflicts inherent between
party appointed directors, state-mandated plans, and workers'
management became manifest.45 The PRR reacted to these ten-
sions by introducing a new form of self-management, a
Conference of Workers Self-Government.46 These Conferences
were composed of members of existing workers' councils, the
union shop committee, and the party committee.47 The execu-
tive committee of the worker's councils was enlarged to in-
clude the director of the plant, the chairperson of the
union committee, and a party representative. The function
of workers' participation was changed from managerial to

advisory. Under this system, the workers' councils were

charged with the execution of the Conference decisions. The

20

parallels to the earlier subordination of labor unions are
clear. By 1960, Polish Workers' Councils were dominated by
the state apparatus. However, the permanence of this sub-
ordination should not be overestimated. Strikes and demon-
strations by workers continually challenge these restric-
tions.48

Several tenative observations can be drawn about the
impact of workers' councils on socialist development from
the preceding historical background material. While little
insight can be gained about changes in the manufacturing di-
vision of labor from these legislative accounts, the struc-
tural changes in the position of labor should be noted.
Under both systems, workers were given control over wage
issues, both in establishing wage schedules and distributing
portions of the enterprise's profits. Although workers must
still enter into labor contracts, the exchange conditions
of this contract may now be set by the workers. The empha-
sis in the Yugoslav laws of 1965 upon the free association
of partners within an enterprise highlights the potential
for co-operative social relations inherent in this change.
The provisflmuswhich give workers' council the responsibility
for determining the rules and regulations of the enterprise

further return control over labor power to the worker, with-

in a collective framework.

IV. THE FUNCTIONING OF POLISH AND YUGOSLAV WORKERS' COUNCILS
However, the enactment of these potentials into legis-

lation does not guarantee their successful application.

21
Rather, the actual functioning of workers' councils in
both Poland and Yugoslavia must be examined in order to
determine to what extent these dimensions are manifest
in reality.

Although there are many studies which examine the
functioning of workers' councils in Yugoslavia, little
information is available about the Polish system.49 Most
of the studies accessible to Western scholars document the
political history of the Polish councils. The remaining
few which examine the actual workings of the councils are
based on field observations, and are primarily descriptive
presentations of personalities, work settings, and reports
of meetings. As a result, the following discussion will
primarily focus on data obtained from the Yugoslav system,
supplemented with excerpts from accounts of the Polish
councils.

The legislation structuring workers' councils in both
Poland and Yugoslavia gives the councils authority to deter-
mine regulations and wage schedules and to approve financial
plans and balance sheets. Consequently, in terms of legal
authority, workers' councils are the major decision making
bodies of the production enterprises. But, do workers in
practice actually exercise their power? To what extent is
workers' council's dominance reflected in enterprise affairs?

These questions can be answered by examining the influ-
ence structure within enterprises. If workers' councils do
indeed fully exercise their legislated power, we would expect

councils to be perceived as more influential than management.

22
However, this proposition is not supported by the data.50

In study after study, Yugoslav workers perceive the enter-
prise's top management personnel as wielding the most in-
fluence. In addition, the professional staff and middle
management are also seen to possess more influence than
the plant workers' council (see Table 1). Observations in
a Polish factory report a similar situation. When asked
about the strength of the workers' council in his factory,
an ex-union member observed:

"We saw that during the workers' council's

presidium meetings, management sought to use

the new organizations in the same way in which

it had been using labor unions, i.e.,"gi com-

municate With and to control workers.

Further documentation of management's controlling posi-
tion can be found in a study in which workers' council
members were asked about the distribution of influence with-
in the council itself. Management was perceived as having
the most influence within workers' councils, and semi-
skilled and unskilled workers were thought to have the least
influence. Table 2 lists the rank order derived from this
study.

However, the weight of these observations should not
be accepted merely at face value. Workers' councils in
both Poland and Yugoslavia were given the power to censure
management proposals and decisions.52 Does this perceived
difference of the top management reflect tacit approval of
their programs by the councils? Is the director carrying

out schemes or programs promoted by the workers? Or is

management calling the shots?

23

Table 1.* PERCEIVED INFLUENCE

 

Group ' Average Rank Order
Top Management 1
Professional Staff 2

Middle Management 3
Workers's Councils 4.5

Board of Management# 4.5
Supervisors 6

The Party 7

Highly Skilled and Skilled Workers 8

Semi and Unskilled Workers 9

 

 

*This table was compiled from findings reported by

V. Rus, "Influence Structure in Yugoslav Enterprises,"
Industrial Relations, Vol. 9, No. 2, 1970 and
"Workers' Participation in Management in Yugoslavia,"
International Institute for Labor Studies Bulletin,
No. 9, 1972, p. 129-172.

#The Board of Management consists of the director, and
officials of the Workers' Council, trade union, and
Party cell.

Table 2.* INFLUENCE WITHIN WORKERS' COUNCILS

 

Group Rank Order

Top Management

Professional Staff

Middle Management

Supervisors

Highly Skilled and Skilled Workers
Semi and Unskilled Workers

 

O‘U'IiD-LONH

 

 

*Source: V. Bus, 92, cit.

 

24

Observational studies of Yugoslav workers' council
meetings provide some answers to these questions. As seen
in Table 3, the first proposition is supported. Not only
do management personnel participate twice as much as non-
management personnel in the meetings, but accepted propo-
sals or suggestions were three times more likely to have
been advanced by management personnel.

Meeting control by management was also observed by
Kolaja in his study of a Polish factory:

"We have observed in, that as soon as the
plant director entered the scene, he began

to dominate it with his verbal pronouncements,
while members of the weaving department work-
ers' council kept silent. The same obser-
vation can be made concerning the meetings

of the other two large bodies."53

The stratified nature of this participation is further
illuminated by looking at the composition of the workers'
councils. There is a disproportionate representation of
both managerial, personnel, and white collar workers
on the Yugoslav councils. Unskilled workers are sparsely
represented within council ranks, yet this group composes
over a quarter of the total work force (see Table 4). This
trend is accentuated in the composition of the Managing
Boards.54

There also appears to be a managerial/worker division
based upon topic of discussion. Workers in both Poland and
Yugoslavia were more likely to take part in discussions when
issues of the distribution of wages, bonuses, or benefits,

55

i.e., housing or vacations, were raised. Although it must

be noted, management participation did not drop off in these

25

*
Table 3. PARTICIPATION AND ACCEPTED SUGGESTIONS
AT YUGOSLAV WORKERS' COUNCIL MEETINGS
(in percentages)

 

 

 

 

. l
3 li KOLAJA (1959) L OBRADOVIC (1966)
yManagement Non-managerialVManagement Non-managerial'
jPersonnel Personnel jPersonnel Personnel ?
,1 ii 3
Participation i 66 34 W 65 35 i
. 1
_Accepted ;l t
lSuggestions ' 73 27 81 19 I
g l. 1 '

 

 

 

 

*This table was compiled from data presented by J. Obradovic,
"Participation and Work Attitudes in Yugoslavia," Industrial
Relations, Vol. 9, No. 2, 1970, and the previously cited
Kolaja Study.

 

Table 4.* CHARACTERISTICS OF YUGOSLAV
WORKERS' COUNCIL MEMBERS#
(in percentages)

 

 

 

 

 

 

KOLAJA VUSKOVIC % of all employed Ratio
(1959) (1965) (1965)
Managerial and White Collar: 29 23 15 1-5 .
Highly Skilled Workers ; 17 20 ll 1.8 l
Semi and Skilled Workers 5 54 49 45 1.01
Unskilled Workers ' O 8 29 .27
y 100 100 100
.— l

 

 

 

 

 

 

*This table was compiled from findings presented in the following
two studies: Kolaja, Workers' Councils: The Yugoslav Experience,
p. 17, and Vuskovic, "Social Inequality in Yugoslavia," p. 40,

a paper presented to the Conference of the Croatian Communist
Alliance, January 1973.

#It should be noted that due to different classification schemes,
the two years of data are only roughly comparable.

26

instances.

V. DISCUSSION

As seen in the above data, the actual functioning of
workers' councils does not appear to utilize the authority
legislated to the councils. Rather, the councils are domi-
nated by managerial and white collar personnel. From these
data, we may conclude that in reality, workers' councils do
not provide mechanisms for workers to collectively con-
trol their labor or represent their interests. Instead, the
self-management systems of Poland and Yugoslavia, while pro—
viding formalized channels of worker input, were transformed
into mechanismsthrough which staff and managerial policies
are transmitted.

Some tentative conclusions can be made in regard to the
role of these existing forms of workers' councils in social-
ist development. The trend indicated a continued domination
of the labor process by those in managerial and professional
occupations. Thus, workers' councils return little control
to the immediate producers. This trend strengthens the
separation of conception and execution within the labor pro-
cesses. It is interesting to note that in no reports were
issues relating to the manufacturing division of labor noted.
Issues involving the work process, when they were mentioned
at all in the recordings of workers' council meetings, were
limited to discussions of hours, production efficiency or
waste, and machine safety. In light of the stratified compo-

sition and participation within workers' councils, one would

27

expect this absence to continue. Changes in the organization
of work would directly challenge those occupations which
now dominate the direction of the workers' councils.

While the position of labor as a commodity is lessened
in the legislative form of the self-managment systems, there
is little evidence to suggest this is paralleled in the day—
to-day functioning of the councils.

These observations raise the question of whether the
shortcomings of the self-management systems are a matter
of education, i.e., do workers have the skills to effective—
ly utilize workers' councils, or form, i.e., is there some-
thing about the structure of workers' councils which negates
the possibility of effective utilization? This question
can not be definitely answered here. There are limitations
inherent within this examination of the actual functioning
of the Yugoslav and Polish workers's councils. The data
available do not necessarily cover all areas pertinent to
the theorectical concerns, nor are they of sufficient depth
to provide some important connections. To fully gauge
the impact of workers' councils on both the manufacturing
division of labor and labor as a commodity relations, more
information and study is warranted.

An important facet in mitigating labor as a commodity
relations is workers' control over the conditions of their
employment. We saw that workers' councils in both countries
had the authority, within limits, to set wage schedules. To
ascertain the reality of this proposition, we need studies

which focus on how this authority is utilized, both in terms

28

of the process involved and the resulting distribution of
wages.

The decentralized character of Yugoslav enterprises
pinpoints another important element in regard to labor as
a commodity relations. If workers in one firm act to maxi-
mize their own profit, what consequences does this have
for other workers and for the society as a whole? The
continual presence of inflation and unemployment in the
Yugoslav economy underscores the importance of further
study of this question.

As mentioned previously, little attention has been
given in studies of workers' councils to issues of work
organization. Therefore, changes in the manufacturing di-
vision of labor are difficult to discern. We need more
detailed information on both the organization of production
in these countries and an expanded account of issues re-
lated to production that are raised in workers' council
meetings. However, although Poland and Yugoslavia have dra-
matic differences in their economic organization, the struc-
ture and roles of both countries' workers' councils are
remarkably similar. This similarity suggests the need to
look at technology. The issue of technology must be addressed
both theoretically, i.e., the relationship of technology to
capitalism and to work organization, and empirically, i.e.,
where does the technology in each of these countries come
from. If the technology used in Yugoslavia comes from capi-

talist nations and Poland's technology from the bureaucratically

29

organized Soviet Union, we would expect the relations of
production in Poland and Yugoslavia to mirror the organiza-
tion in each of the respective countries. This possibility
further underscores the need to examine the organization

of work in Poland and Yugoslavia.

However, while these limitations represent important
considerations, some general observations about Polish and
Yugoslav workers' councils' role in socialist development
can be made. The goals of socialism imply not only changes
in power relations, but also changes in social relations.
The existing workers' councils in Poland and Yugoslavia
appear to be attempts to involve workers in the management
process without attention to the underlying process. No
attempt has been made within these existing structures to
create new organizations of the productive process which
might negate the dehabilitating effects of the manufacturing
division of labor. The knowledge and skills of the labor
process remain divided. Without this important component,

few changes in other social relations can be predicted.

VI. CONCLUSION

In summary, the findings of the paper are as follows.
The viability of Polish workers' councils has been success-
fully mitigated. The control of Yugoslav workers' councils
is held by the managers. Prospects for the development of
collective, co-operative social relations through these or-
ganizations are dim. In light of these experiences, it would

seem that in order for workers' councils to promote actual

30

control by the producers, future forms of self-management
must not solely attempt to integrate workers into existing
managerial forms of organizational control, but must chal-
lenge and restructure the underlying production process.
More work, along the lines previously mentioned, must
be done both in the area of theoretical analysis and in
the area of concrete examination of existing forms of social
organization, before the potential role of worker self-

management can be fully understood.

NOTES

Representative of this body of literature are: Mandel
and Novack, The Marxist Theory of Alienation, New York:
Pathfinder Press, 1976, and P. Vranicki's essay, "On
Alienation," in E. Fromm, Socialist Humanism, Garden
City, New York: Double Day Press, 1965.

 

 

This theme is elaborated in Workers Manage Factories in
Yugoslavia, by Marshall Tito, Beograde, 1950.

 

"Overcoming alienation ... begins with the emancipation
of the working class, the struggle for the dictatorship
of the proletariat, and ends with the realization of
social self-management in its most complete form."
Mandel and Novak, 1976, p. 34.

Attempts to integrate the theory and the praxis of
workers' councils are largely limited to the development
of economic models. The work of Benjamin Ward and
Wlodimierz Brus provide good examples of this type of
study. Also see H. Watchel, Workers' Management and
Workers' Wages in Yugoslavia; the Theory and Practice

of Participatory Socialism, Ithaca, 1973.

 

Prior to the inception of socialism, both Yugloslavia
and Poland had largely agriculturally based economies.
Poland had pockets of industrial development in the
North, while Yugoslavia's industrial development was
limited to the large cities and seaport regions. Al-
though both countries' experience with socialism began
at the end of World War II as members of the Soviet
bloc, there were differences in each country's communists'
ascension to power. Polish communists were installed

by the Red Army, while Yugoslav communists in a coali-
tion with nationalist partisans, fought and took con-
trol of the country with little outside help. The
economic organization of each country provides, perhaps,
the most vivid contrast. In 1949, Yugoslav-Soviet rela-
tions were severed. (For a developed discussion of
this breach, see: Claudin, The Communist Movement:

From Comintern to Cominform, New York: Monthly Review
Press, 1975, Vol. 2, Chapter 7.) Shortly after,
Yugoslav communists opted to decentralize the country's
economic and political systems. Results of this pro-
gram included the establishment of workers' councils,

an influx of western capitalist investments, and the
setting up of trade relations with the capitalist world
system. On the other hand, Polish communists continued
to develop Poland's economy along the lines of the
highly centralized Soviet model.

 

This position is most often held by sectarian political
groups. See: The Peoples' Democracies: Are They
Socialist States? by Viox Ouvriere, 1966, a SPARK pamphlet.

31

 

 

10.

ll.

12.

l3.

l4.

l5.

16.

17.

32

M. Lavigne in The Socialist Economies of the Soviet
Union and Europe, London; M. Robertson, 1974, presents

 

a clear summary of the various classification schemes
purposed.

This is expanded in both the introduction and concluding
chapter of Braverman's Labor and Monopoly Capital,
New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974.

These points can also be found in Critique of the
Gotha Programme by Marx and State and Revolution by
Lenin.

 

This perspective in no way implies the inevitability

of unidirectional development; that socialist countries
could never revert to capitalism. "Peaceful Transition
from Socialism to Capitalism?" Monthly Review, 15, 11,
1964, p. 569-590, discusses this possibility.

"Labor becomesexternal to the worker, i.e., it does

not belong to his essential being; ... in his work,
therefore, he does not affirm himself but denies him-
self, does not feel content, but unhappy and does not
freely develop his mind and physical energy, but morti-
fies his body and ruins his mind." Karl Marx, Early
Writings, (translated and edited by T.B. Bottomore),
New York: Pathfinder Press, 1964, p. 125.

For a discussion of this type see either R. Garundy,

The Crisis in Communism: The Turning Point of Socialism,
New York: Grove Press, 1970, or the July-August 1975
special issue of Monthly Review.

David M. Gordon, "Capitalist Efficiency and Socialist
Efficiency," Monthly Review, 3, 19, 1976, p. 19-39.

D. Gordon, 1976, p. 27.

This presentation of the 'Free Labor'/'Collective Labor'
dichotomy is simplified for reasons of clarity. Although
not self-identified as such, the article "On the Nature
of the Soviet State" by Ernest Mandel (New Left Review,
108, p. 23-47) could be seen as an example of the rfree
labor' view of communism. The work of Charles Bettlehiem
provides a clear elaboration of the 'collective labor'
orientation.

There are many important elements involved in increasing
the level of the development of the forces of production.
However, increasing automation of the production process
is often stressed in the 'free labor' view as a crucial
element in reducing socially necessary labor time.

An alternative understanding of the apparent fluctuations

18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

23.

24.

33

in the writings of Marx, Mao, and Lenin might be found
by tracing the development of these ideas in the context
of the writers' political struggles. A project of this
type, though beyond the scope of this paper, could pro-
vide valuable insights into the historical origins of
these two views.

Evaluation of the economic models of development under
socialism is beyond the scope of this paper. Again,
see the work of B. Ward or W. Brus for development of
this subject.

See Sweezy's articles "Socialism in Poor Countries,"
Monthly Review, Vol. 28, No. 5, October 1976, p. 1-13,
for a summary and critique of this approach.

 

The concept of human nature is given only a cursory
treatment in this paper. For a more developed presenta-
tion of Marx's concept of human nature and a discussion
of the resulting transformation under capitalism, see

B. Ollman, Alienation: Marx's Concept of Man in
Capitalist Society, London: Cambridge University Press,
1975.

 

 

Joachim Israel, Alienation: From Marx to Modern
Sociology, Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1971, p. 57.

 

 

"The real essence of man is not an abstraction inherent
in each particular individual. The real nature of man
is the totality of social relations." (Marx, 1964,

p. 45)

"The production of life, both of one's own labor and of
fresh life in procreation now appears as a double rela-
tionship: on one hand as a natural, on the other as a
social relationship. By social we understand the co-
operation of several individuals no matter under what
conditions, in what manner and to what end ... Thus it
is quite obvious from the start there exists a materi-
alistic connection of man with one another, which is
determined by their needs and their mode of production,
and one which is as old as men themselves." (Marx, 1964,
p. 50)

"We presuppose labor in a form that stamps it as exclu-
sively human. ... But what distinguishes the worst archi-
tect from the best of the bees is this, that the archi-
tect raises his structure in imagination before he erects
it in reality. At the end of every labor process, we

get a result that already existed in the imagination of
the labourer at its commencement. He not only effects

a change of form in the material on which he works, but
he also realizes a purpose of his own that gives the law
to his modus operandi, and to which he must subordinate
his will." (Marx, Capital, Vol. I., New York: Charles
Kerr and Co., 1926, p. 18)

25.

26.

27.

28.

29.

30.

31.

32.

33.

34.

35.

36.

34
Karl Marx, 1926, Vol. I, p. 173.

For further elaboration of this separation process, see
Ollman, Alienation, especially pages 133 and 134.

 

Mandel and Novack, 1976, p. 22.

Credit must be given here to Joachim Israel. In his
book, Alienation: From Marx to Modern Sociology, he
clarifies the structural processes of alienation.

 

A quote from Braverman underlines the importance of

this distinction: "While the social division of labor
subdivides society, the detailed (manufacturing) divi-
sion of labor subdivides humans, and while the sub-
division of society may enhance the individual and the
species, the subdivision of the individual, when

carried on without regard to human capabilities and
needs, is a crime against the person and against humani-
ty." (Braverman, 1974, p. 73)

By 1971 approximately 85% of all productive capital was
state owned in Poland. (Mesa-Lego, Comparative
Socialist Systems, Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg
Press, 1975, p. 408) In 1964, 90% of all Yugoslave in-
dustry was socialized. (Staar, Communist Regimes in
Easiern Europe, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press,
1977, p. 185) Admittedly, a large portion of the
agricultural sector of the economies in both the coun-
tries remains in private hands, but for the purposes

at hand this sector is relatively unimportant.

 

 

 

Although the threat of being out of work is minimized
in Poland, workers still compete for higher paying jobs.
Unemployment is ever present in Yugoslavia. In addi-
tion, both Poland and Yugoslavia utilize material in-
centive programs.

Braverman, 1974, p. 19.
Zukin, Beypnd Marx and Tito: Theory and Practice in

Yugoslav §9ciali§m, London: Cambridge University
Press, 1975, p. 56.

 

These functions are paraphrased from the Fundamental
Principles of the 1950 Law found in Workers Manage
Factories in Yugoslavia, by Marshall Tito, p. 47-55.

 

 

H. Watchell examines the results of this legislation
in Workers'Management and Workers Wages in Yugoslavia.

The extent that workers participate in these structures
is considerable. In 1968, roughly 6% of the people
working in enterprises of more than 70 people were
members of workers' councils. (International Institute

37.

38.

39.

40.

41.

42.

43.

44.

45.

46.

47.

35
for Labor Studies Bulletin, No. 9, 1972, p. 144).

 

Why did Yugoslav communists undertake this decentrali-
zation process? Three sets of explananthmushave been
suggested in answer to this question. The official
pronouncements underline decentralization as an impor—
tant element in the road to communism; as a first step
toward the withering away of the state. Political
historians emphasize decentralization as a way rival
political factions were placated enabling Yugoslav
communists to maintain power without Soviet support.
The third set of explanations centers around the need
for investment capital Yugoslavia faced after breaking
from the Soviet Union. It is argued that the economic
decentralization process was undertaken to attract
capital from the capitalist world. In all probability,
a combination of these rationals was considered by

the Yugoslav communists in their decision to decentra-
lize the economy.

It is estimated that during this period, 25% of the
Polish industrial labor force were members of a union.
(Kolaja, A Polish Factory, University of Kentucky Press,
1960, p. 2).

 

Sturmthal, "The Workers' Council in Poland," Industrial
and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 14, No. 3, April 1961,
p. 380-81.

In 1953, 40% of the national income was allotted to
accumulation. (Sturmthal, p. 381).

The incidents at Poznan and the Zeran automobile plant
are perhaps the most well known examples of these strikes.

Sturmthal, p. 386.

The number of active workers' councils in 1957 exceeded
5,600 (Statistical Yearbook, 1959, p. 393).

As early as 1958, Communist party leaders were making
distinctions in their speeches between supervision and
administration by the workers.

For a discussion of some of these conflicts see: Rawin,
"Social Values and Managerial Structure: The Case of
Yugoslavia and Poland," Jourgal of Comparative Admini-
stration, 2 No. 2, August 1970, p. 131-160.

"The New Law on Workers' Controls," Polish Perspectives,
No. 3, 11, March 1959, outlines this new formation.

After the passage of this law, no new workers' councils
were formed.

48.

49.

50.

51.

52.

53.

54.

55.

36

For example, the workers' riots of 1970 helped oust
Gomulka from power and install Gierek. For more recent
accounts, see: David Lascelles, "Poland," Financial
Times Survey, Friday, December 5, 1975, p. 33 and

Flora Lewis, "Many Poles Term Unrest Far Deeper Than
Economic," The New York Times, Wednesday, January 26,
1977.

 

 

 

This is not surprising considering both the short
period of their independent existence and the strin-
gent information controls present in the Soviet Bloc
during this period.

The only exception to this statement is reported in a
study by J. Kolaja, who found workers' councils to be
perceived as the most influencial by 57% of the
workers queried, with the director perceived as most
influencial by only 35% of the workers surveyed.
(Kolaja, 1965, p. 34).

Kolaja, 1960, p. 109.

In fact, in Yugoslavia, workers' councils play an
important part in the selection of the director and

may also vote on the renewal of the director's contract.
Kolaja, 1960, p. 108.

Managerial and white collar personnel accounted for

37% of these Boards in Kolaja's study. (Kolaja, 1965,

p. 17).

The data for this observation are found in the descrip-
tive accounts written by Kolaja on both countries.

LIST OF REFERENCES

LIST OF REFERENCES

Braverman, H., Labor and Monopoly Capital, New York: Monthly
Review Press, 1974.

 

Brus, Wlodzimierz, The Economics and Politics of Socialism,
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973.

Brus, Wlodzimierz, "Income Distribution and Economic Reforms
in Poland," Politico, 39(1), 1974, p. 5-28.

 

Brus, Wlodzimierz, Socialist Ownership and Political Systems,
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975.

Claudin, Fernando, The Communist Movement: From Comintern
to Cominform, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1975.

 

Fromm, E., Socialist Humanism, Garden City, New York: Double
Day Press, 1965.

 

Garundy, R., The Crisis in Communism: The_TurningPoint of
Socialism, New York: Grove Press, 1970.

 

Gordon, David M., "Capitalist Efficiency and Socialist
Efficiency," Monthly Review, 3, 19, 1976, p. 19-33.

 

Israel, Jonchim, Alienation: From Marx to Modern Sociology,
Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1971.

Kolaja, Jiri, A Polish Factory: A Case Study of Workers'
Participation in Decision Making, Lexington: University
of Kentucky Press, 1960.

Kolaja, Jiri, Workers' Councils: The ngoslav Experience,
London: Tavistock Pub. Ltd., 1965.

Lavigne, M., The Socialist Economies of the Soviet Union and
Europe, London: M. Robertson, 1974.

Mandel, E. and Novack, G., The Marxipt Theory of Alienation,
New York: Pathfinder Press, 1976.

Mandel, E., "On the Nature of the Soviet State," New Left
Review, 108, 197, p. 23-47.

Marx, Karl, Capital, New York: Charles Kerr and Co., 1926.

37

38

Marx, Karl, Early Writings (ed. T.B. Bottomore), New York:
Pathfinder Press, 1964.

 

Mesa-Lago, Carmelo, Comparative Socialist Systems, Pittsburg:
University of Pittsburg Press, 1975.

 

Obradovic, Josip, "Participation and Work Attitudes in
Yugoslavia," Industrial Relations, 9, 2, 1970.

 

Obradovic, Josip, "Workers' Participation: Who Participates?"
Industrial Relations, 14, 1, February 1975, p. 32-44.

 

Ollman, Bertrand, Alienation: Marx's Concept of Man in
Capitalist SoEIety, London, Cambridge University Press,
1975.

 

 

Ouvriere, Viox, The People's Democracies: Are They Socialist
States?, A Spark Pamphlet, 1966.

 

Rawin, John, "Social Values and Managerial Structure: The
Case of Yugoslavia and Poland," Journal of Comparative
Administration, 2, 2, August 1970, p. 131-160.

 

Rus, Velyiko, "Influence Structure in Yugoslav Enterprise,"
Industrial Relations, 9, February 1970.

Staar, R., Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe, Stanford:
Hoover Institution Press, 1977.

 

Sturmthal, Adolf, "The Workers' Councils in Poland,"
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 14, 3, April
1961, p. 380-394.

 

Sweezy, P. and Bettleheim, C., On the Transition to Socialism,
New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971.

 

Sweezy, Paul M., "Socialism in Poor Countries,
Review, 28, 5, October 1976, p. 1-13.

Monthly

Tito, Josip Broz (Marshall), Workers Manage Factories in
Yugoslavia, Beograde, 1950.

 

 

Watchel, H., Workers' Management and Workers' Wages in
Yugoslavia: The Theory and Practice of Participatory
Socialism, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press,
1973.

 

Ward, Benjamin N., The Socialist Economy: A Stpdy of
Organizational Alternatives, New York, 1967.

 

Zukin, Sharon, Beyond Marx and Tito: Theory and Practice
in Yugoslav Socialism, London: Cambridge University
Press, 1975.

 

, "Peaceful Transition from Socialism to
Capitalism?" Monthly Review, 15, 11, 1964, p. 569-590.

 

 

39

"The New Laws on Workers' Controls," Polish
Perspectives, 3, 11, March, 1959.

 

 

, "Workers' Participation in Management, Country
Series: Yugoslavia (No. 9)," International Institute
for Labour Studies Bulletin, No. 9, 1972, p. 129-173.

 

 

 

General References

Adizes, Ichak, Industrial Democracy: Yugoslav Style, New
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