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thesis entitled

Antonio Gramsci, Italian Communism,
and Education

presented by

John R. Hall

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

the Ph. D. degree in Secondary Education
and Curriculum
(History of Education)

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Date 16 February 1980

ANTONIO GRAMSCI, ITALIAN COMMUNISM AND EDUCATION

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A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Secondary Education and Curriculum

1980

ABSTRACT

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By

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It can be said that Italian communism from its earliest days to the present has experienced three phases: (1) The Revolutionary, from 1919 to 1926, in which it was believed that the Leninist revolution was near. The PCI was formed, Mussolini came to power, and the PCI was banished from Italy in this period. (2) The Intermediary, from 1926 to 1935, during which thoughts of the revolution were postponed until after the defeat of fascism. The PCI found itself fragmented into three parts: the incarcerated, the underground, and the exiled; and the party leadership was controlled to a considerable extent by Moscow. (3) The National, extending from 1935 to the present, when the PCI began to shift from the traditional communist objectives to those which could be called socialist within a national liberal-democratic framework. It has become, in the eyes of many, an establishment party, and it appears to adhere rigorously to the Italian national Constitution in its dealings with other parties and with the Italian society, though internally, at the leadership level, it remains rather authoritarian.

An assumption in this study is that educational views of a group are reflective of its sociopolitical substratum. In the case of the PCI one sees a different educational position with each of the three phases mentioned above. In the Revolutionary period, propaganda reigned supreme, propaganda being defined as speaking or writing with the primary objective of effecting a specific end. Propaganda was relied upon in part because there was no time and little willingness to seek supportive evidence. The message was emphasized. During the Intermediary era the PCI needed to find explanations for the success of fascism, particularly after Hitler's rise to power; hence Italian communists were in a more receptive mood with regard to the search for evidence. Although there was no abatement of propaganda in this period, an approach to knowledge which might be termed educational was beginning. Education is defined in part as the search for and use of evidence, permitting conclusions to be drawn from it.

In the third stage, the National, party education, propaganda and indoctrination are increasingly supplanted by an educational approach in which the Italian national educational system becomes the most important educating instrument of the party. Its educational outlook is consonant with the liberal-democratic environment in which it operates because the socialist values of the party are bound up in it to a large extent. The individual is to be recognized as important within a social setting, and evidence is to be highly regarded in the learning process.

The second leader of the party, Antonio Gramsci, has contributed substantially to the educational philosophy of the party through his prison writings. His belief in the dignity of the individual student is taken as the keynote of the Italian communist approach to the question of education, and his educational position is contrasted with that of Amadeo Bordiga, the first leader of the PCI, and with that of Lenin.

This dissertation is dedicated to my beloved and wonderful wife, Mina, who supported me unstintingly with advice, criticism, and sacrifice through the long years of graduate work. I remain indebted to her with all my heart.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Need for the Study

The importance of the Italian Communist Party will become clear if one reflects upon its position in Italy today. Italy is a highly industrialized nation in the heart of Europe, and the interests controlling her are of great significance to Europe and the world. The Italian Communist Party[1] has been on the threshold of sharing governmental power at the national level in Italian politics since 1976, and it possesses the largest membership of any communist party in the free world. A question which needs answering is: Have these communists jettisoned their revolutionary inclinations of former years and genuinely adopted the parliamentary way of accomplishing objectives, or are they using parliament instrumentally to obtain the ultimate Marxian goals with the intention of abolishing the parliamentary way of life upon achieving those ends?

Two objections of Washington to the prospect of the Italian Communist Party, or the PCI, gaining power in Italy are the following: (1) It is "antidemocratic"[2] and therefore it would jeopardize the continuing efforts toward democratization within the Italian society. (2) It would "weaken the already shaky North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), undermine the precarious equilibrium

between the Soviet Union and the United States on which détente is based, and further decelerate the process of European integration."[3]

The objections of Moscow to the prospect of the PCI gaining power in Italy principally relate to Russian security. Edward Crankshaw states that "from Moscow's standpoint, the first duty of a foreign communist party is not to conduct experiments in revolution or succor the working class but to underwrite the security of the Soviet Union."[4] This security might be gravely threatened if the Italian Communist Party, remaining true to its reputed "revisionism," were to obtain all or a share of power in its national government. Crankshaw further states that "a successful show of independence on the part of any Communist party beyond the immediate reach of the Soviet Army is something the Russians regard with apprehension, alarm and even fear, for its disruptive effect on their Eastern European satellites."[5] Arrigo Levi, writing in Foreign Policy, feels that "from the Kremlin, quite a few recent actions by the PCI . . . must be considered subversive 'interference' in their [the Kremlin's] own affairs. But the PCI . . . will find it difficult not to continue offering some support for dissidents in the East. . . ."[6] One could guess that a communist party successfully abiding by a liberal-democratic constitution would be a severe indictment of the USSR in the eyes of many communists throughout the world and would probably set loose waves of disaffection throughout Eastern Europe.

The study of the Italian communist views regarding education is one way of ascertaining the veracity of this party's revisionism. Stalinism or Leninism hardly mixes with a liberal-democratic[7]

educational posture and it would be reasonable to assume that the contradictions of such a mismatch would not long remain hidden. A need exists, therefore, to perceive the nature of Italian communist sentiment toward or against the public educational system of Italy which, because of its obsolescence and insensitivities, has elicited reforming proposals and suggestions as well as spasms of disgust in the form of riots and property destruction from students and others representing many sectors of the Italian society.

There is a need to know if the PCI is now sabotaging Italian public education in the interest of propagating sectarian interests; if the party relies primarily upon its own party education or upon the system of public education; and if its "educational" message is today one of monolithic solidarity with Moscow. Perhaps the Italian party has demonstrated through its current educational stance along with its other positions and actions that "a communist party may change"[8] from a conspiratorial Leninist revolutionary group to one resembling a typical European social democratic party without losing its identity. There is a need to know.

The Purposes of the Study

The following are the purposes of this dissertation:

(1) To show how the educational objectives of the Italian Communist Party, the PCI, have become consonant with those of the Italian liberal-democracy in which it is situated. (2) To show how the PCI moved through three stages, each possessing different political and social imperatives, viz., the Revolutionary, the Intermediate,

and the National of which it presently is a part. (3) To demonstrate why each of these three stages possessed its own peculiar educational orientation. (4) To indicate how and why the PCI has become increasingly loyal to national and liberal-democratic goals without abandoning its loyalty to a socialist reconstruction of society. (5) To compare the leadership and educational philosophies of two prominent PCI leaders, Antonio Gramsci and Palmiro Togliatti, with Lenin. (6) To point out some of the endemic characteristics of the Italian life which have had and continue to have a bearing on education, e.g., the Church, the South, the existing public school system, and the fragmented and demoralized contemporary socio-political situation.

The Scope of the Study

The historical development of the Italian Communist Party will be examined from a period shortly prior to its formation to the late 1970s. Using this historical development as a base, the educational views of the party will then be seen as emerging naturally from it, with the assumption being that educational orientations are by-products of basic socio-political attitudes and forces. The study includes brief examinations of the interrelationship of the PCI with Moscow, the Church, Italian fascism, the Italian Socialist Party, southern Italy, the post-war national educational system, and its behavior in a Western parliamentary-style democracy, since 1945. The scope will also include a presentation of the educational views of the very influential Italian Communist Party leader Antonio Gramsci

and compare them with Amadeo Bordiga and Palmiro Togliatti, other Italian Communist Party leaders, and Lenin.

The scope and direction of this dissertation depend upon the writer's conception of the Italian Communist Party, the PCI, so a description ishereby offered: Now, at the beginning of the 1980s, the PCI may be described as a communist party which, within the relatively benign conditions of a Western democracy, maintains its position as an organizer and leader of the working classes; emphasizes the democratic, and increasingly national aspect of its heritage externally while retaining a considerable degree of authoritarianism internally; attempts to avoid both party splits and the demagogic exploitation of controversial subjects; seeks to extend its mass base by appealing to the socialist-democratic sentiments of the middle and lower stratas of the population; believes that socialist structural reform must be achieved not through radicalism and violent acts but gradually and democratically while still within the capitalist system in a manner which will move the nation out of that system by gradually depriving it of power centers such as municipal and regional governments, labor unions, academic councils, etc.; and finally, which asserts its independence from any and all other communist parties and organizations while yet affirming its sympathy with their Marxian goals.

The PCI is structured in ascending order around cells, sections, federations, and the central organization. Basically there have been two different types of cells, i.e., those organized in geographical localities and those situated in work areas. Cells

through the 1960s have gradually been supplanted by the next highest unit of organization, the sections, which "began to take over the tasks of socialization and of activating and guiding the rank and file."[9] Cells and sections are operated by volunteers, but federations, which at the next level generally coincide in their territorial jurisdiction with the province, are staffed by full-time professional politicians and support staff, most of whom are paid. These paid officeholders

> have the task of coordinating party activities, including the designation of the candidates who will appear on the party tickets, in the territories under their jurisdiction. . . . This power is limited, however, by the fact that the national leadership must be in agreement with their selection of candidates, at least in the more important posts.[10]

At the highest level, the party is organized around the Central Committee which is elected by the annual party congresses and which in the interval between congresses supposedly possesses pre-eminent power. The Central Committee appoints the directorate and secretariat. In 1962 the Central Committee had 140 members, the directorate 19, and the secretariat seven; the Central Committee since 1956 has met four or five times a year while the secretariat "which in practice is the true executive organ of the Communists and forms the core of the directorate, meets about twice a month."[11] There are also assemblies in addition to the annual congresses, both of which debate agendas that the secretariat of the Central Committee largely determines.

Party electoral commissions decide upon slates of candidates for elective office. Since 1956 delegates to the assemblies have been

able to add or withdraw names, something that was prohibited in previous years. Also, since 1956, members have had the right to withdraw from the party whereas "prior to that time the only way to leave the party was to be expelled from it."[12] In summation, it may be claimed that there is more than a little Leninist democratic centralism within the party, a holdover from its earlier days, but that despite authoritarian measures, it cannot be called a Leninist, or Stalinist party today, in 1979.

It should also be stated that although the core of the party mechanism is hierarchical and centralized, it is "able to direct and coordinate the actions of its local administrators only partially."[13] Furthermore, it is a fact that among the large number of card-carrying members there are many who are somewhat less than zealous supporters, that the editorial pages of Rinascita and L'Unita, two party publications, include a great variety of ideas not all of which would have the unqualified support of the party leadership, and that a rather significant number of communist voters support the party at the polls solely out of protest against the ruling Christian Democrats. With this party structure in mind related political phenomena such as voting behavior, alliances and desire for national power may be investigated in the text of this dissertation. The scope, therefore, includes the political as well as the historical and educational dimensions mentioned above.

The Limitations of the Study

This dissertation will exclude fascist political or educational doctrine; Catholic educational philosophy; secret societies such as the Mafia, political terrorists of the left, e.g., the Red Brigade and its variants, or of the right, e.g., neo-fascist groups. It will have nothing to say about American intervention in the Italian scene, though the Allies in connection with World War II are mentioned; and no analysis of trade or professional schools in Italy is undertaken.

Definitions

In order for the reader to better understand the substance of this study, the following definitions and clarifications are offered:

Marxian Education: Marx believed that although education and propaganda should be used in preparing the masses for revolution, it was the action of revolution itself which served as the major educating force in society. Education for him involved elements of both voluntarism and determinism since the revolution itself was a product of men acting in a social environment which had been previously determined by the actions of former generations of humans.

Education: The presenting of evidence without an interest in the ends to which it may be used. The student is free of constraint from the instructor and the educational establishment to conclude what he will on the basis of the evidence presented. Education also involves the moral assertion that the instructor should

help the student realize his potentialities to love, to be happy, to use reason and to develop "specific potentialities like artistic gifts."[14]

Propaganda and Indoctrination: The presenting of ideas with or without evidence in the interest of effecting certain results. The desire to bring about a certain effect supplants the dispassionate presentation of evidence in importance, and it involves manipulation of the student. Unlike education, there is an "absence of faith in the growth of potentialities and [there is] the conviction that [the student] will be right only if the [instructors] put into him what is desirable and cut off what seems to be undesirable."[15]

The PCI: The Italian Communist Party.

The PSI: The Italian Socialist Party.

The DC: The Christian Democratic Party.

Liberal-Democratic Attitude: That socio-political stance which accords protection to the individual while respecting the rights of the masses.

Socialism: A system involving public ownership of the essential means of production in a pluralistic society where liberal-democracy could operate under law in all areas of human endeavor.

The Organization of the Dissertation

This study is organized around the framework of three historical periods: 1919 to 1926 (Revolutionary), 1926 to 1935 (Intermediary), and 1935 to the present (National). Beginning in 1919

during the turmoil leading up to the factory occupations in northern Italy of the next year, the Italian communists first emerge as an identifiable group. The split in the Italian Socialist Party in 1921 resulting in the formation of the Italian Communist Party in that same year was the next development, to be shortly succeeded by Mussolini's rise to power in 1922 and the banishment of the PCI in 1926. The party survived outside of Italy until the conclusion of the Second World War but to a great extent it found itself under the protection and guidance of Moscow through the later 1920s and early 1930s. The party later moved toward a position of greater independence vis-a-vis the Russians, the first indications of its intentions to do so appearing in its concerns for the Italian nation publicly announced as early as the mid-1930s.

In the post-war era, the PCI has developed more independence from Moscow and has immersed itself in Italy's liberal-democracy as an increasingly active and supportive participant. It has an important stake in the survival of the constitutional democracy in Italy though it endeavors to move gradually and legally toward a basic socialistic restructuring of society.

The basic assumption of this work is that the educational goals of a group are linked with the socio-political orientation of that group. So it is with that in mind that the socio-political positions in each of three PCI phases, called the Revolutionary, the Intermediary and the National within the historical framework cited above, are investigated with the idea of yielding causes for the particular educational positions of those phases. Chapter II, a

brief history of the PCI, therefore serves as the basis upon which Chapters III, IV, and V, all dealing with the PCI's versions of education, are founded. The party relied primarily upon indoctrination and propaganda in the Revolutionary period, but slowly abandoned them, though never completely, in favor of education during the National period. Education is examined primarily as the PCI has viewed it through its leaders and journal contributors, and it is broken into the three parts of elementary, secondary and university to facilitate organization.

It should be stated that this writer is responsible for the translations into English of the various primary and secondary Italian-language materials used in this study.

Footnotes--Chapter I

[1]Hereafter frequently termed the "PCI" in this dissertation.

[2]Peter Lange and Maurizio Vannicelli, "Carter in the Italian Maze," Foreign Policy 33 (Winter 1978/79): 169.

[3]Ibid., pp. 169-70.

[4]"Europe's Reds: Trouble for Moscow," New York Times Magazine, 12 February 1978, p. 20.

[5]Ibid., pp. 19-20.

[6]Arrigo Levi, "Italy's 'New Communism,'" Foreign Policy 26 (Spring 1977): 28.

[7]In this study, unless otherwise indicated, the word "liberal" denotes its mid-20th century democratic position as opposed to its 18th and 19th century bourgeois stance.

[8]Levi, p. 30.

[9]Giorgio Galli and Alfonso Prandi, Patterns of Political Participation in Italy (London: Yale University Press, 1970), p. 95.

[10]Ibid., p. 100.

[11]Ibid., p. 101.

[12]Ibid., p. 103.

[13]Ibid., p. 240.

[14]Erich Fromm, Man for Himself: An Inquiry into the Psychology of Ethics (New York: Fawcett World Library, 1968), p. 209.

[15]Ibid.

CHAPTER II

THE ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY 1919 TO THE PRESENT

The Italian Communist Party and the Revolutionary Period 1919-1926

The Factory Occupations of 1920

The Italian Communist Party, or the PCI, was organized in 1921. In the years immediately preceding its formation much had occurred which was to have a direct bearing upon the history of this party, perhaps the most important being the factory occupations of 1920, the outgrowth of industrial malaise and dislocation in post-war Italy.

In the factories, elected workshop committees had come into existence during the course of the war. While the government acquiesced in their existence in the interest of pleasing the workers whose increased efforts were needed for the promulgation of the war, the employers were opposed to these committees since they were seen as infringements upon managerial prerogatives. Antonio Gramschi, a future leader of the PCI, and the staff of his journal L'Ordine Nuovo attempted to "transform these committees into fully representative councils (the factory councils), through which the workers would win a share in factory management and acquire technical knowledge and experience, as a first step towards the revolutionary expropriation of industry."[1] Gramsci also saw these factory councils as

intermediaries between the vanguard of the party and the masses to whom they were to be responsible.[2] The councils gained considerable importance during the high tide of leftist "revolutionary" discontent in September and October of 1920 when hundreds of factories in northern Italy were occupied by their workers.

These factory occupations amounted to defensive strikes and although there was talk of revolution, it remained only talk. The trade-union and socialist leaders proved to be disunited in this episode; they did not initiate the occupations, nor did they agree on short- or long-range objectives once they had decided to participate. It was, in fact, a combination of leftist bickering and purposeful governmental inaction which doomed the efforts of the workers as they sat uselessly in the factories for weeks. It could be said that Italian bolshevism in 1919 and 1920 consisted mainly of chaotic outbreaks in large segments of the Italian people and that not only did the ruling classes overreact with inappropriate bitterness, but that it was the fascists who would emerge victorious in this three-way standoff involving the government, the industrialists and the workers. The fascists escalated terror to new heights of intensity <u>after</u> the collapse of the "revolution," their rationale being the assertion that they alone could preserve the Italian society from bolshevism.[3]

The Formation of the Italian Communist Party in 1921

The factory council movement had been defeated by the beginning of October 1920, but this did not mean that all advocates of leftist revolution faded into oblivion. Most Italian socialists,

called Maximalists, stood for a maximum program of immediate socialization but they were ineffectual when it came to action. The other two branches of the Socialist Party, or PSI, were the right-wing reformers and the extremists, the latter being those who, in January of 1920, split off from the PSI at the Socialist Congress in Livorno to form the Communist Party of Italy. This split occurred because the extremists were the only group in Italy to accept the orders sent by the Third Communist International, hereafter called the Comintern, demanding complete adherence by all socialist and communist parties to its directives in the future. It should be stated that this split aided the rise of Mussolini's fascism which assumed power in 1922.

The Bordiga and Gramsci Factions

Amadeo Bordiga, the first leader of the PCI, was ideologically close to the Maximalists. He and his followers embraced a rationalistic and rigidly mechanical formula which provided answers through deduction to questions regarding everything from practical matters to the ultimate objectives of the working class movement.[4] He advocated complete abstinence from elections and parliament while concentrating on preparation for the violent overthrow of the government. Bordiga felt that the party should be a "sect consisting of a small number of intransigent revolutionaries whom the masses would then follow into revolutionary action"[5] and he therefore desired the 1921 split which produced the new Italian Communist Party, or PCI.

In June of 1921, however, the Comintern requested a "united front" be formed between the Italian Communist and Socialist parties, and in December the Comintern stated that communist parties were to cooperate with non-communists in usurping and sharing political power if the opportunity arose. Finally, it ordered a new fusion of the two Italian leftist parties since the Socialist Party had now agreed to follow its orders. Bordiga steadfastly refused all of these orders because he feared his communist party would be contaminated by the "revisionist elements" of the non-communists in any close association.

Antonio Gramsci agreed with the Comintern and he replaced Bordiga as party secretary in April of 1924. The new secretary saw the party as one which should be "of the masses, 'not a party which uses the masses to produce a heroic imitation of the French Jacobins,'"[6] and, prior to January 1921, he had desired to work for his objectives within the Socialist Party rather than split from it. Arrested by the fascists at the end of 1926, Gramsci remained in prison a little more than ten years, and died in 1937. The ideas produced in his prison writings have continued to exercise an important influence over the PCI and "they reveal Gramsci as a Marxist thinker of unparalleled range and depth of culture: alongside them Lenin's theoretical works look crude indeed."[7]

Some Gramscian Political Concepts

Gramsci learned much from Lenin's success and he agreed with Lenin's struggle against the Marxist faction known as the Economists.

This group felt that the proletariat should confine its activities to the economic realm with the objective of obtaining an amelioration of economic conditions and avoid the political arena since any revolutionary political activities by the proletariat could frighten the bourgeoisie into reaction. The Economists tended to believe that the bourgeois revolution would occur more readily, indeed automatically, if the bourgeoisie were ignored by the left. Both Lenin and Gramsci felt that the Economists were overly deterministic and mechanical and hence unrealistic; both used a partially voluntaristic and pragmatic approach to problems. Gramsci, in not meeting with the political success of Lenin, was repeatedly forced into doubting, analyzing and questioning. Perhaps this perplexity coupled with his probity contributed to the relatively open quality of the PCI as opposed to the strictures of the Russian Communist Party which, by the late 1920s, was dogmatically embracing truth as that which served its leadership.

Gramsci spoke of the importance of the Marxian concept of superstructure by which he meant the entire complex of institutions, ideas and practices bound up in the political and civil sections of society. The character of the superstructure differed in the East and West. Gramsci claimed that "in Russia the state was everything while the civil society was primitive and tremulous but in the West there are proper relations between them [and] . . . in the revolutionary shaking of the state one notices the robust condition of the civil society."[8] This meant that the revolutionary tactics which succeeded in Russia by simply conquering the political structure of

power could not be used in the West since conquest of the state in the latter area could never be accomplished without a preceding conquest of its complex civil society. Italian conditions must be taken into account, therefore, if Marxism is to succeed.

Gramsci's method of conquering the civil society was through the development of "hegemony." By this he meant the moral and cultural predominance of a class in society "obtained by consent rather than force, . . . over other classes."[9] Under the bourgeoisie this hegemony is held by the agents of capitalism, but it is precisely in this area of civil society that the proletariat must make great incursions prior to the assumption of political power through the proletarian revolution. A cardinal distinction between Gramsci and Lenin in the matter of their concepts of hegemony proves to be of interest here as Sarafino Cambareri tells us that

> Lenin . . . spoke of hegemony . . . only when the proletariat triumphed after having imposed its dictatorship creating the appropriate conditions for this objective, since the masses are not able to take possession of the culture. . . . The Gramscian concept is that the working class must exercise its leading function through the political-cultural hegemony before the . . . conquest of power.[10] (Italics added.)

Gramsci conceived of hegemonic progress in the superstructure, in large part educational though it was to be, as a phase of the struggle for power, and he referred to this phase as the "war of position" which was contrasted to the "war of maneuver." According to Palmiro Togliatti, the emerging leader of the PCI after 1926, Gramsci used the latter term to denote the quest for power through violent revolution, but by the former he envisioned the efforts of the "mature class under the direction of the revolutionary party

when violent action is not possible or when preparation for it is in progress."[11] This meant that there could only be different versions of war, and none of peace, prior to the actual conquest of political power.[12] Yet this "war" would be different in practice from Lenin's hegemonic phase if for no other reason than the fact that the effort to promulgate it had to rely on persuasion since those conducting the war of position were acting prior to the assumption of power by their class, hence the importance of education in the Gramscian scheme.

A point to remember in connection with this scheme is Gramsci's continual emphasis on organic relationships. He had condemned the idealist Croce, the materialist Bukharin, the doctrinaire Bordiga, and all species of sectarians including the Maximalists for their common affliction, i.e., the detachment of their theories from life. He thought their ideas were stilted, rigid and unrealistic as a consequence. After 1926 when the confines of prison disallowed him the opportunity of testing his theories in practice, an exercise which he always considered to be vital, he bore his criticism in mind and attempted as best he could to write objectively from his cell in a manner which would not separate his preponderance of theory from its grounding in life. Just as theory was to be inseparable from practice, so the party leadership was to be linked organically with the rank and file of the party; the party itself was to be linked with the working class;[13] and the working class, through its hegemonic efforts, was to become eventually linked in an organic sense with society.

The Italian Communist Party and the Intermediary Period 1926-1935

By 1926 the PCI was declared illegal in Italy. By 1928 an Italian communist named Giorgio Amendola could describe the party as divided into three parts: first, a segment working surreptitiously within Italy; second, the emigres in exile; and third, those who were jailed in Italy, each with a different political life. He asked, "'Which one controls the movement?'" He also wondered, "'In what way can and should the right of directing the movement remain with the arrested leaders, and how can the emigrated leaders succeed in leading a movement while remaining within the country . . . of their operations. . . ?'"[14] Scattered though it was, the PCI did not pass out of existence in the intermediary years, but its remnants fell into virtually complete dependence upon Moscow. Perhaps if conditions within Italy had permitted an actual communist revolution that succeeded in the early 1920s the PCI might have declared its independence from Moscow then as it has later done. However, the fascist attack upon the Italian communists coupled with the historic example of the success of the Russian Bolshevik revolution encouraged Palmiro Togliatti, who lived in Russia through these intermediary years, to lodge himself within the embrace of the Russians through the Comintern.

In a comparison of Gramsci and Togliatti, the "distinction which usually emerges after a cursory examination is that Gramsci was a 'theoretician' and Togliatti a 'politician,' that Gramsci was an 'idealist' and Togliatti was a 'realist'" yet, "the political stature

of Gramsci is not less perspicuous than the theory of Togliatti. Gramsci who presided at the formation of the new group of party leaders was not less 'realistic' than Togliatti would be 'idealistic' in 1944 when he promoted the 'new party.'"[15]

Togliatti headed the PCI, first, in its worst days at the height of the fascist power, second, through its most exhilarating moments in the Resistance, and third, through the first two decades of the post-war era when it realized steady, and sometimes spectacular Italian political success. He was out of Italy from 1926 to 1944 organizing clandestine Italian congresses, assuming a position in the secretariat of the Comintern, and representing it in the Spanish Civil War.

The Comintern in the 1920s and 30s can be seen in three periods, states Franz Borkenau: "During the first period [it] is mainly an instrument to bring about revolution. During the second period it is mainly an instrument in the Russian factional struggles. During the third period it is mainly an instrument of Russian foreign policy."[16] From 1929 to 1934 Stalin moved left against Bukharin, Romsky and Rykov on the right, and the Comintern now directed European communists to regard social democracy as "social fascism" and to cease all trade union and parliamentary activities. The economic depression that was now to strike Europe seemed to underscore the Comintern claim that the revolution was at hand and those communists throughout Europe who refused to believe and comply were banished from their respective parties. The result was a rapid drop of party membership in most areas of Western Europe. Within Italy this was a

savage period for the communists who, in carrying on "semi-public methods of propaganda . . . [were] actually destroyed"[17] as a group.

The Italian Communist Party and the National Period 1935 to the Present

The United Front Against Fascism

In January 1933, Hitler gained power. By the end of 1934, Stalin was directing European communists through the Comintern to consider the "social fascists" as "social democrats." The vilified were not supposed to be friends, as they and all other bourgeois democratic and liberal elements were to be used in the fight against the Nazis. Stalin had finally recognized that nazism and fascism could not be defeated by the old bolshevik tactics of splitting trade unions, expelling schismatics and calling for the proletarian revolution; instead, alliances must be formed as soon as possible with any group opposed to Hitler. The united front policy of the Comintern was the result, but the communists who participated in these groups were cautioned against forgetting the delayed proletarian revolution and communist conquest of power and were told that they must never relinquish control of these cooperative movements.[18]

Throughout these radical shifts Togliatti remained loyal to the Comintern though it would not be fair to characterize him as a "yes" man in Stalin's entourage. Bocca sees him as attempting to "reconcile obedience with reason"[19] and Ernesto Ragionieri writes about his "ability to conduct a prolonged polemic with success despite internal and external obstacles" and the "firmness with which, through bending and compromises, haltings and deviations, he is

successful in maintaining substantially unaltered the principles inspiring the prospective policy."[20] According to Blackmer, Togliatti appears to be a man who was

> entirely capable of decisive and ruthless action when the chips were down, [but] he was instinctively a man of moderation and compromise. Consistently opposed to sharp ruptures, he preferred to believe that unity could be preserved without either destroying one of the contending factions or establishing by superior force a purely artificial consensus. He was clearly worried by the course events were taking as Stalin consolidated his rule, in the Soviet Union and in the Comintern as well. But being both a realist and a dedicated Communist, Togliatti would set aside his personal convictions if they happened to clash with the higher demands of the movement to which he was irrevocably committed.[21]

The PCI in these years worked indefatigably for the defeat of fascism. It had no time to think of correcting the national system of education in Italy, and no time to engage in the abstrusities of Marxian dialectics or to seek out and expel opportunists or sectarians. Instead, it pursued with some misgivings but without any apparent slip of its determination, a working relationship with non-communist antifascists in a united front that even involved an attempted rapproachment with the Church.

Gramsci had warned his comrades about the power of the Catholic Church in Italy: ". . . the liberal state had to find a system of equilibrium with the spiritual power of the Church: the workers' state must also find a system of equilibrium."[22] By 1936 when the combined strength of Hitler and Mussolini made the PCI more mindful of the search for allies, its Central Committee made the following statements directed to the Catholic Church of Italy from its position in exile:

> The absolute respect of the religious opinions and the defense of the liberty of conscience of the masses are for the communists a question of principle. [We] . . . understand and respect the profound aspirations of justice, liberty, peace and of universal human brotherhood which nourish the religious belief. . . . The position of the communists toward religion is not dictated by cynicism and base opportunism. . . . [We] do not declare war against religion but rather against the social bias of exploitation, of misery and of war, against that economic power which . . . is concentrated in the hands of a small number of men who decide at their pleasure the destiny . . . of the people.[23]

Togliatti and the Central Committee realized that there could be no hope of any lasting change in the Italian society while the PCI and the Catholic Church regarded each other with enmity. Gramsci's words of caution had led the way and now the Church was seen by the PCI as a possible weak link in the fascist society since its professed ends conflicted with those of the fascist state; just as the Church harbored reactionary elements which could be isolated, so it nourished progressive groups that could be harnessed by the party in its cause.

Perhaps the major reason why increasing attention was being focused on the Church in this period by the party was that it seemed to be inseparable from Italian nationalism. One of the many statements which indicated how things would develop came from Togliatti in an article entitled "The Policy of National Unity of the Communists" from 1944. He said in it: "We will gather up the flag of national interest which fascism has dragged in the mud and betrayed--and we will make it ours."[24] He continued:

> When we defend the interests of the nation, when we put ourselves at the head of combat for the liberation of Italy from the German invasion we are in the line of the true and great traditions of the proletarian movement. We are in the line of the doctrine and of the traditions of Marx and Engles

> who never repudiated the interests of their nation, always defended it as much against foreign aggression and invasion as against the reactionary groups which trample it underfoot. We are in line of the great Lenin who affirmed feeling proud of Russia. . . . We are in the line of Stalin. . . .[25]

Could this be a tacit admission by the most prestigious communist of post-war Italy that the force generated by the world proletarian movement paled beside the tremendous power released through the nationalism displayed in the spectacle before him? However, the new nationalism of the proletariat would be divested of those errors of bourgeois nationalism such as "aggression and oppression of other people";[26] one could say that "'the bourgeoisie ceased being nationalists when they became imperialists.'"[27] Togliatti had made a virtue out of necessity.

The Resistance

Mussolini capitulated 25 July 1943. In the period between this date and the conclusion of the war, the Resistance movement, which was dominated by the political left, came close to accomplishing what the Risorgimento did not: a social and emotional unification of the Italian people. Committees of national liberation were formed and the PCI was one of the many political elements to join them. A PCI resolution which was approved by the National Liberation Committee of the North (CLNAI) states the following about the Italian Resistance and the forthcoming Italian nation:

> "There will be no place tomorrow among us for a reactionary regime, however masked, nor for a limp democracy. The new political, social, and economic system will not be other than a clear and effective democracy. The CLN of today is a prefiguration of the Government of tomorrow. In tomorrow's Government this is certain: worker's peasants, artisans, all the

> popular classes will have a determining weight, . . . and a place adequate to this weight will be held by the parties which represent them. Among these is the Communist Party, which is included in the CLN on a plane of perfect parity with the other parties, with equal fullness of authority today and of power tomorrow. . . . Whoever works against this union of them works against the Nation."[28]

Although there was an element of self-interest at work among the partisans of the Italian Resistance, "some of the very best elements in the country were prominent in [it], and it provided a fine training in social consciousness as well as a new kind of idealistic patriotism. No one who lived through such an experience could forget it; never before had so many citizens participated so actively in national life."[29] H. Stuart Hughes writes about the vision of the Resistance which "sought to bridge the gap between Communists and democrats--and also the chasm which had so long separated Catholics from anticlericals--by creating a new and nonsectarian socialism." He continues with the assertion that the Resistance "strove to supplant the old political parties with a new movement which would bring to national leadership men who were both more public-spirited and more technically competent than the usual parliamentary politicians of the old stamp." He found that these types of men rarely gained positions of power within the movement or in the political parties after the conclusion of the war; this was unfortunate because these young men of the Resistance "tended to think first of their own country's needs, rather than of Moscow's orders, and [they] preferred a political system in which the essentials of personal liberty were preserved."[30]

In April 1944, Togliatti returned to Italy after an 18-year absence to find a turbulent situation not entirely unlike that existing in the wake of World War I. He moved decisively to defuse what could never have succeeded: a communist revolution amidst the political conservatism of the middle and upper classes and, more importantly, the guns of the Allied soldiers. Marshal Badoglio's government took power following the departure of Mussolini but the communists at first had refused to cooperate with it because it had been appointed by Victor Emmanuel III, the king who was besmirched by his association with the fascists.

Togliatti induced the PCI to continue the cooperation with the Italian Socialist Party which had been initiated in the united front and in the 1943 "Unity of Action Pact" that had partially closed the breach suffered between them in August 1939 as a result of the Molotov-Ribbentrop deal. He signed the manifesto dissolving the Comintern in April 1943 and then, after the removal of Mussolini, he moved the PCI toward cooperation with all other anti-fascist parties and with the vilified king in an attempt to complete the war effort. The PCI entered the coalition governments of Marshal Badoglio, Ivanoe Bonomi and Alcide de Gasperi while Togliatti himself entered the Badoglio government as minister without portfolio serving as vice-premier from December of 1944 to June of 1945.

The Years 1945 to 1956

The political position of the Italian Community Party in the immediate post-war period.--At the end of the war the PCI found itself

in an Italy controlled by conservative powers. Togliatti knew that a successful revolution would never be permitted by the victorious Allies and he therefore began the long Gramscian journey toward building a basis for eventual communist hegemony. This would require, among other things, sensitivity to national problems and therefore independence from Moscow, peace, a mass party willing to participate in the non-communist government and educational reform. Unlike the Revolutionary Period, from 1919 to 1926, when the PCI was continually preoccupied with its defense and with preparation for a possible revolution, or the Intermediary Period, from 1926 to 1935, in which the party was literally torn apart, the post-World War II era has provided the opportunity for it to expand through peaceful methods consonant with the parliamentary democracy in which it was now ensconced.

A new type of mass party was found to be necessary to take advantage of the situation which parliamentary politics forced upon the PCI. If the party failed to maintain those ties with the masses formed through its leadership role in the Resistance and turned itself into a party of propagandists and conspirators, its retreat would isolate it from involvement in the affairs of the nation and its tasks would be difficult to fulfill. The party should be a national party concerned with problems of the nation, one which attempts to solve those problems with solutions applicable in the present, but one which is also directed toward the accomplishment of new objectives, those of the Gramscian hegemony, and it should incorporate elements of all the categories of Italian society except those

of the large capitalists.[31] It should also try to avoid the debilitating intraparty splits which in the past bore their share of the responsibility for the confusion leading to the rise of the Black Shirts and which in the present could prove to be an obstacle to the formation of such a national party.

The PCI had secured a reputation as one of the most effective of the Italian antifascist fighters, a reputation it had been building since its inception as a party in 1921. It probably was the best organized and disciplined of all Italian antifascist groups in exile; within Italy it had carried on courageously in the face of fascist intimidation before it was declared illegal in 1926, and it had pursued its objectives in that country after 1926 through the underground. Its history of hardship tempered it for leadership in the Resistance, and its membership climbed from around 10,000 adherents in 1943, to about 400,000 in 1944, and to some 2,166,448 by 1946. By 1947 the figure was 2,252,715 and, despite a slight decline in the number the following year, the party had regained the 2.2 million figure in 1949 and went on to measure about 2.5 million enrollees in 1950.[32]

These very large membership numbers did not encourage Togliatti's intransigence in favor of promoting communist revolutionary activities. Indeed, he was to continue working toward the mutual accommodation of his party and the Italian nation-state. The Constitution which became effective 1 January 1948 was a "mixture of Marxist, Catholic, and Liberal doctrines" and, although it "was not . . . a very reformist document" one could say that "it did not prevent

reform in the future."[33] An important point to be made here is that the PCI did not obstruct the Constituent Assembly, which was charged with creating the constitution, by adamantly holding out for the passage of Marxian ideas in such key areas as the economy or religion, but rather that it accommodated itself to the conservative pressures with the belief that by breathing life into resurrected democratic institutions, the essential reforms would come in time. However, this did not stop them from verbalizing their objectives in a way generally consonant with parliamentary democracy.

Giuseppe Mammarella informs us that in the first months after the war the PCI attacked the system of monopolistic capitalism which had been protected since the end of the 19th century and which had received favorable treatment through the fascist era. It did so by advocating "Management Councils" which were to include democratically elected representatives of the factory workers as well as representatives of capital, and which were to become involved in management decisions. In this manner the party intended to move toward a planned and controlled economy through the avenue of industry. But though there were as many as 500 of these councils by 1946, this approach ultimately failed largely because of the fact that Italy was experiencing a high rate of inflation causing the workers to demand higher wages to which the capitalists agreed in turn for the abandonment of the council idea. Thereafter these councils decreased in number with the result that the PCI transferred the locus of its energies from the industrial to the political arena.[34]

By 1949 the Italian level of production, as a whole, had reached the prewar marks but there were extensive areas of impoverishment and great residues of bitterness as the rewards of the revived economic system were very selectively bestowed. The Italians worked assiduously, but frequently the conspicuous consumption flaunted by those more fortunate few sabotaged what little existed of social consciousness among them. One might say that the various governments--Badoglio, Bonomi, Parri, and De Gasperi--did not demand enough from the people, that they were ineffectual and refused to implement a satisfactory system of austerities. Yet these governments

> had too little command over their own bureaucracy, to say nothing of their command over the people as a whole. And the people had too little faith in, or respect for, their own government to have collaborated with a ration-system. But these deficiencies and attitudes of the government and the people in the immediate post-war period were only extreme manifestations of more deep-rooted and fundamental problems. Even in "normal" times, both before and after the war, the governments of Italy have lacked the support and consensus of the people, who themselves have lacked the social solidarity necessary to accept common sacrifices for common goals.[35]

The Cold War and the Italian communist political position, 1948-1956.--Togliatti's tenure of office as Vice-Premier ended in May of 1947 when he and his party were expelled from De Gasperi's government just prior to completion of the work of the Constituent Assembly. The PCI then commenced a series of strikes and demonstrations with the objective being to force the government into readmitting them to a coalition but, failing in this latter endeavor, the party backed off into gatherings and assemblies. The party began to campaign against economic aid from the West, calling it a tool of

American imperialism. By September 1947 the Cominform had come into existence; in February 1948 the coup d'etat had occurred in Prague, taking Czechoslovakia into the Soviet camp; and in that same year, 1948, the Berlin blockade caused tensions to rise even higher. The Cold War had begun.

The short-range strategy of the party changed somewhat during these years of the Cold War, and yet there remained throughout this period a continued though subdued commitment to the long-range alliance strategy involving the Gramscian hegemony that it had been building since 1935. Being out of the government the PCI had to assume the position of an opposition party but it remained faithful to the terms of the Constitution because violating it would have risked destroying the hegemonic work already accomplished and would have resulted in a grave crisis in the Constituent Assembly which had yet to complete its tasks.[36] There is evidence that Togliatti and the large segment within the PCI which were wedded emotionally to the Gramscian methods, found the bald domestic and international confrontations of the Cold War unpalatable. For example, we have the statement to an American agency, the INS, made by Umberto Terracini, a member of the Directory of the party, that splitting the world into two hostile blocs was inherently dangerous.

Although he was officially reproved by Togliatti for this, Terracini was shortly thereafter readmitted to the fold after admiting his error. However, as the communist Pietro Secchia observed, Terracini could never have made such a remark without the approval of Togliatti, and no one, including the Russians, was fooled.[37] In

parliament the communists, despite appearances to the contrary during the height of the Cold War, cooperated with other parties including the Christian Democrats,[38] moderated through their influence the occupation of southern land by the peasantry in the interest of broad electoral alliances,[39] and concentrated on "the compactness and effectiveness of the party itself."[40]

Yet there was also within the party a continuing feeling of respect for the importance and legacy of the communist social, economic, and political experiment that had been continuing in Russia since 1917. There was a Stalinist group within the PCI which was encouraged by the Cold War confrontations and which now emphasized class warfare and support of Moscow in international affairs. Its presence promoted ideological clashes between the PCI and the Christian Democratic Party with the latter being labelled in colorful epithets of the Marxian lexicon reserved for class enemies, while in a country where many still believe in demons, Togliatti was portrayed as the devil incarnate during the electoral campaign of 1948. His name also appeared in the depiction of a pool of blood in one anticommunist poster and in another his head was seen as crushed beneath the hoofs of a charging squadron of cavalry.[41]

The Italian elections of June 1946 saw the PCI receive 18.9% and the Socialist Party, the PSI, 20.7% of the popular vote. Their combined figure of 39.6% exceeded that of the Christian Democratic party, the DC, which collected 35.2% of the vote, an outcome reflecting the popularity of the left in the Resistance. However, in April 1948, the results were the reverse, with the PCI-PSI "Popular Front"

gathering only 31.01% while the DC received 48.5%[42] of the vote, a direct result of the Cold War in which the PCI especially was seen as a supporter of Moscow in the heart of Western Europe. Yet its returns to communist orthodoxy were just that--apparent. By the early 1950s the prospect of Russian bayonets aiding an Italian proletarian revolution, always a negligible possibility in the post-war conditions when the USSR was so preoccupied with Eastern European affairs and the US was on the alert against any communist advance, had faded into insignificance.

In the first half of the 1950s PCI adult membership declined and, from 1951 to 1956, it hovered around the two million mark,[43] but the party continued to climb at the polls and would do so at every national election in this 1948-1956 period. In 1953 the PCI vote was 6,121,922, a figure which represented 22.6% of the voting public. This amounted to a 3.7% increase since 1946.[44] Some of this vote was generated out of protest against the attempt of the Prime Minister De Gasperi to alter the election laws in such a manner as to permit the centrist coalition of four parties headed by his Christian Democratic Party, to continue in power. This new law, dubbed by the opposition the "fraudulent law"--legge truffa--would have permitted any party or group of parties tied by alliance to occupy 65% of the seats of the Chamber of Deputies, or 380 out of 590 seats if it could obtain 50.1% of the vote at the polls.[45] The attempt failed and in 1954, the year of De Gasperi's death, the law was repealed.

De Gasperi had in effect resurrected the old classical liberal state which had been dismantled by the fascists, but the trouble

was that this type of state was ill suited for a modern democracy. Classical liberalism throughout the Western world, while bestowing equal civil rights, denied equal political rights to the masses[46] and Italy was no exception. By 1953 the mass parties on the left, the PCI and the PSI, had stated in effect that if liberalism were to remain the basic structure of the state in the foreseeable future, it must be a democratic rather than bourgeois liberalism, or one sympathetic to the problems of the masses.

The Christian Democratic Party, through compromises with the parties of the right and left, has dominated Italian politics from 1947 to the present year, 1979; it encompasses political forces of a rather widely divergent sort, but it tends generally more toward the centrist position. The Liberal Party in these years gratived rightward toward a strong affiliation with big business interests. Confindustria, the chief organization of big business which controls much but not all of Italian industry, had changed its policy of compromises by the mid-1950s. With demands of reform emanating from the left and center of the Italian political spectrum, it had moved to the support of the Liberal Party and away from the Christian Democrats. The most exciting Italian political development in the period after 1953 was, however, the gradual movement of the Socialist Party, the PSI, toward the assumption of governmental power in coalition with the Christian Democrats.

In these years of the Cold War when the Church moved into a period of reaction, when Italian politics was marked heavily with a conservative orientation and when the term "immobilismo" could

describe accurately the efforts of the national legislature, there was nonetheless an acute awareness by the leaders of the left and by many progressives situated in more centrist positions on the political scene, that the masses had never been brought into the state. In the immediate post-war period, there were grounds for believing that the united front against fascism could integrate the society. However, with the onset of the Cold War, with the ejection of both Socialist and Communist ministers from the government in 1947, and with the failure of the left in the polls during 1948, millions of workers were excluded once more from the mainstream of national political activism. During the electoral campaigns of 1953 Pietro Nenni, the leader of the PSI, mentioned in a speech the possibility of supporting the government in an "opening to the left." Though it would be ten years before the "impossible" DC-PSI coalition would be formed, many of the preconditions were already present, for example: the continued governmental stalemate coupled with the feeling of most who were left of center in Italian politics that something constructive in the way of reforms for the alienated middle- and lower-class masses should be accomplished.

Perhaps the major reason why such an opening to the left could occur was due to the dramatic changes occurring in the international arena. The Cold War had begun to wane even before the death of Stalin on 5 March 1953. The disturbances in Eastern Europe followed shortly as people throughout the communist world perceived some uncertainty and confusion at the top of the power structure in Russia. By mid-1955 Khrushchev had emerged as the single most powerful individual in

the USSR, and it was on 24 February of the following year that he made his secret denunciatory speech detailing the crimes of Stalin to the XX CPSU Congress in Moscow.

The Years 1956 to the Late 1970s

Khrushchev's speech and the repercussions.--At the time of this secret speech in 1956 the ambiguous position of the PCI in Italian affairs appeared to be increasing. On the one hand the party had not completely divorced itself from its Leninist revolutionary heritage which accounted for its antidemocratic internal traditions and its propensity to support the USSR in international affairs. On the other hand the party leadership never seriously deviated from its long-range commitment to work for the Gramscian hegemony. This included widening the mass base of the party and working democratically through alliances with other parties toward common goals; it also implied the desirability of an increasingly independent position vis-a-vis the USSR. However, just as revolution had been unrealistic for the Italian communist so democratic methods seemed to be ineffective in the face of the economic and social problems of millions of Italians.

When the content of Khrushchev's speech became known it caused concern throughout the world. The collapse of the myth of Stalin aggravated existing differences within the PCI as some, the old-line Stalinists, conditioned by 30 years of obeisance to their master, cherished his memory despite the revelations; others, like Giorgio Amendola, wanted to emphasize the "Italian" way to socialism

and free themselves from any vestige of Soviet tutelage.[47] Togliatti, finding himself in a delicate position because of his direct complicity with Stalin, suggested that the dictator was not entirely responsible for his crimes against humanity and that such elements of the Soviet society as the growth of the bureaucratic apparatus; the tendency of the Soviet leadership to usurp the initiative of the masses; and the inclination of those leaders to view all errors as evidence of capitalistically inspired sabotage were also at least partly to blame.[48] Togliatti, however, while making excuses for the discredited Soviet socio-political behavior, made it clear that the Italian party was not to be considered as simply an appendage of Moscow.

He spoke of the independence that had been asserted by the PCI against the Comintern as early as 1924 in certain policy matters. He also stated that at the VII Congress of the Comintern which met in 1935 and proclaimed the policy of the United Front,

> the parties which were growing stronger, were united, and were well directed, already felt that a central international organization could make only general observations and judgments on the situations and tasks of our movement, . . . [The] decisions and practical political accomplishments were to be fully entrusted to the initiative and responsibility of the single parties.[49]

Claiming that since the war "all our initiatives were exclusively ours . . . because they were dictated by the conditions in which we work in Italy," he used the term "polycentric" to describe the world communist movement. This meant that there was no longer a single source of authority within the movement, but rather that progress toward a unified end was to be accomplished by the various parties

through following diverse paths.[50] Although Togliatti appeared to support the Russians in the Hungarian episode of 1956, and the PCI seemed to continue supporting the Soviet line through the end of the 1950s, years in which the triumph of Sputnik, the Russian moves in Berlin and the Soviet economic advanced had occurred,[51] it was the PCI's clear denunciation of the 1968 Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia which demonstrated the extent to which the Italian party had broken free of the Russians.

By 1961 there had developed within the PCI a new challenge from its left wing whose criticism of the inadequacies of Soviet society bore directly upon the PCI itself. Crystallizing around Pietro Ingrao, they wanted more democratic participation of the masses in the PCI and in the social and economic decisions of their lives.[52] They also felt that the PCI should emphasize Gramsci's "war of movement" to a greater extent by confronting the bourgeoisie through union activities both in and out of the shop while it should deemphasize the parliamentary strategy of the "war of position."[53]

This view was partially challenged by Giorgio Amendola and the revisionists of the PCI's right wing. He also wanted the party to be further democratized from within. Party discussions should be more open and institutional guarantees should allow communist minorities to express their opinions within a framework of "loyal opposition." Amendola also wanted to improve PCI-PSI relations and move politically with the socialists toward effecting reform in all areas of the Italian society. Neither the ideas of Ingrao's left wing nor those of Amendola's right wing resembled the philosophy or methods

used in Soviet politics. As for the old-line Stalinists in the PCI, they had lost all of their political influence within the party by the mid-1960s.[54]

The Church and the Italian Communist Party in the Italian society.--Italy is more than 99% Catholic, yet most of these people are only nominally Catholic since only about 40% attend church.[55] There has been a historic struggle between the clerical and secular people in Italy since at least the end of the 4th century A.D. when St. Ambrose quarrelled with the Emperor Theodosius. In the 19th century the success of the Risorgimento established the political victory of the secular authorities over the Church. The secular state was controlled by the lay middle and upper classes, but with the 1929 Lateran treaties between Mussolini and the Church, the latter found new strength and, following the Second World War, it "acquired an influence in politics which it never had before in the history of united Italy," an influence which would be "material and political rather than spiritual."[56]

Both the Church and the PCI grew in political power following World War II to the point where an unreserved confrontation probably would have decimated the society through civil war. This was prevented because, despite mutually hostile attitudes, each side informally attempted to find common ground with the other. Togliatti was now able to follow Gramsci's advice through concrete political action; he attempted to find a way in which, while neither Catholicism nor Italian Communism would have to compromise their respective world

views, broad contacts would be established and maintained, and a solid and durable political accord might be reached. He demonstrated his concern for national unity when he supported the constitutional measures guaranteeing religious education and organization along with freedom of conscience. He was to "cast the decisive votes of the party in favor of including in the Constitution the 1929 Lateran Pacts which perpetuated the Church's special status in the state."[57]

On the Catholic side, Pius XII was a conservative pope who reigned from 1939 to 1958. He believed that Marxism in any form was sinful and he felt that Italy was practically under siege, especially in the years immediately following World War II. Believing that he must intervene where religion and morality intersected politics, his threat to withdraw the sacraments from voters supporting the PCI in the elections of 1948 was very effective. In 1949 he excommunicated all communists, and thereafter he regarded not only the socialists as dangerous but even such proposals as free education and free medical treatment as alarming. The stage was set for the 1958 ascension to the papal throne of John XXIII, a man whose ideas and personality provided the sharpest contrast with his predecessors, and one with whom Togliatti found some reciprocity in the matter of locating a modus vivendi in Italian Catholic-Communist relations.

Indeed, where Pius IX in 1861 had condemned "'progress, liberalism, and modern civilization,'" Pius X in 1907 had added a "long list of further 'modernistic' errors" and Pius XI "after 1922 had encouraged authoritarianism in Church and State. . . . John was anxious to repair some of the bridges which had been so hastily

burnt. . . ."[58] In May of 1961 he issued his encyclical letter Mater et Magistra, Mother and Teacher. This document endorses a mixed economy and pointedly rejects the old liberal laissez-faire approach which historically has tended to favor the rich and impoverish the lower classes. Governments have a duty both to intervene for the protection of the victimized and defenseless but also to promote individual freedom in all spheres of life as long as "the basic rights of each individual person are preserved inviolate."[59] The encyclical also observes that in the affairs of society Catholics will frequently encounter those who subscribe to other religious and philosophical persuasions and that although Catholics should not deviate from "the integrity of religion or morals . . . they should weigh the opinions of others with fitting courtesy and not measure everything in the light of their own interests. They should be prepared to join sincerely in doing whatever is naturally good or conducive to good."[60]

This seemed to sanctify cooperative efforts by Catholics with any person or political party ready to work for social reform, and it would therefore later be seen as support for the opening to the left advocated by the Christian Democrats in early 1962. This projected opening to the left featured both reform proposals that could be supported by the socialists and the possibility of including the PSI in a future governmental coalition, developments that would be highly unlikely with Pius XII on the papal throne.

On 6 March 1963 Pope John received Khrushchev's daughter and son-in-law in a private audience, a gesture which shocked millions.

In April of the same year he released his encyclical Pacem in Terris which stated: "Just as an individual man may not pursue his own interests to the detriment of other men, so on the international level, one state may not develop itself by restricting or oppressing other states."[61] This and other assertions in this important document could apply to both East and West in the matter of imperialism, colonialism, ideology, and military development; it had the effect of transcending the old Cold War dichotomy and appealing to the humanness of mankind. Pope John probably knew that when he rescinded his predecessor's edicts against voting for the Marxists and when he removed the Vatican from direct intervention in internal Italian politics he would be encouraging the left and increasing the drawing power of the PCI at the polls. In fact, there was an increase of more than a million votes for the PCI in the 1963 election as compared with that of 1958.

Paul VI, the successor to John XXIII, retreated from Pope John's advanced position in the matter of contact with the communists, and by 1965, had condemned all Catholics who desired to continue the dialogue with the PCI. Nevertheless, it is generally agreed that the Vatican has continued to play a decreasing role in the Italian political world since the tenure of Pope John despite the resurgence of Pope Paul's political intervention in the elections of 1976, and that this has tended to reduce to some extent the type of direct and embittering political confrontations it had formerly had with the PCI. Also, discussions continued while Pope Paul began a policy entitled "Ostpolitik" calling for cordial relations with communist

governments which Pope John Paul II has continued, as evidenced by his Polish trip in 1979.

> In spite of the anti-Communist barrage of the previous decade, the Catholic and Communist groups inside Italy had always been in contact with each other, both inside and outside of the political sphere. The Communist Party was too large and too rooted in Italian society to have been kept at arm's length, on the margins of Italian life.[62]

In 1964 Pietro Ingrao, the prominent "New Leftist" member of the PCI, was advocating "a direct Communist-Catholic dialogue . . . concentrating . . . on attracting the Catholic masses, negotiating with the Catholic political, economic, and social organizations and with the Church itself."[63] A year later the Central Committee of the PCI called for a kind of confederation of parties, especially of the left, somewhat in the fashion of the old popular front, with each of the various parties retaining its identity. This, among other things, would facilitate "negotiating with the Catholics, and on a more equal basis."[64] In February 1966 the PCI was "praising the Ecumenical Council, denouncing the state atheism and applauding the efforts of Pope Paul . . . to promote a peaceful settlement in Viet Nam. Luigi Longo [the heir apparent to Togliatti in the party] called for a direct dialogue with both the Christian Democratic Party and the Roman Catholic hierarchy."[65] All of these efforts failed in the short run and yet the relations between the two great Italian subcultures continue and are expanding at the grass-roots level, especially between the left wing of the Church-related Christian Democratic Party and the right wing of the PCI.

The problem of the South.--As recently as 1953 it was determined that although the South contained "41 per cent of the land area of Italy and has 37 per cent of the population, it accounted in 1953 for but 19.6 or 21.2 per cent of the country's national income depending upon whose estimate is used."[66] The North responded to the diffusion of technology, business practices and capital emanating southward from northern France, western Germany and England in a way that the South could not. Many of the preconditions for industrialization existed in northern Italy at the time of the Risorgimento, such as geographical proximity to this Western European industry, favorable cultural traits and a modicum of natural resources. Early northern industrial development encouraged further satellite growth[67] which had already put it out of reach of southern development when the PCI was formed in 1921.

The poverty of the land in the South[68] had induced the emigration of some six million people to northern Italy between 1945 and 1971.[69] Land reform efforts have repeatedly come to naught as land too poor to farm in the South has been frequently abandoned.[70] However, even if there had been no lure of work in the North and the peasants had remained in their villages, reform efforts there would have been severely hampered because of the selfishness, individuality and social as well as biological misery of the people. Edward C. Banfield states that there are societies

> in which the level of biological well-being is even lower, but in which people are not chronically unhappy. What makes the difference between a low level of living and la miseria comes from culture. Unlike the primitive, the peasant feels himself

> part of a larger society which he is "in" but not altogether 'of." He lives in a culture in which it is very important to be admired, and he sees that by its standards he cannot be admired in the least; by these standards he and everything about him are contemptible or ridiculous. Knowing this, he is filled with loathing for his lot and with anger for the fates which assigned him to it.
>
> "Getting ahead" and "making a good figure" are two of the central themes of the peasant's existence. But he sees that no matter how hard he works he can never get ahead.[71]

The southern peasant has been frequently suspicious of all others, especially those in authority, and he has felt that calamity of one sort or another ending in death is more than a remote possibility. In addition to this pervading fear, he usually has been quite poor, academically ignorant and mainly desirous of achieving the short-run economic advantage for himself and his family. Banfield calls this latter characteristic "amoral familism";[72] it has crippled collective social action in the community, town, region and nation, and it has reduced existence to a state not unlike Hobbes' war of all against all. These characteristics have existed in northern Italy also, though in a less marked degree, and the mass exodus of the southern peasantry probably has reinforced the traits among the northerners.

Carlo Levi observed these peculiarities in 1935 while in exile from the fascist government. Forced to reside in a village in the barren province of Basilicata in southern Italy, he saw that these characteristics were aggravated by the worst of the peasants' social enemies, who were not the absentee land owners, but rather the

> middle class village tyrants. This class is . . . no longer able to fill its original function. It lives off petty thievery and the bastardized tradition of feudal rights. Only with the

> suppression of this class and the substitution of something better can the difficulties of the South find a solution.[73]

With regard to the state, he quotes a peasant: "Everyone knows . . . that the fellows in Rome don't want us to live like human beings. There are hailstorms, landslides, droughts, malaria and . . . the State. These are inescapable evils; such there always have been and there always will be."[74]

In the 1960s and 1970s these peasant characteristics have persisted, though perhaps they are undergoing some amelioration as modernization slowly arrives. Realizing that measures must be taken to bring the southerners into the mainstream of the Italian nation, efforts were extended in this direction after World War II by the national government. In 1950 the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, a governmental investment board for the South, was set up with substantial funds. Its task was to develop the infrastructure for a future industrial, commercial and agricultural "take-off" with the idea that once the new economic potential of the South became sufficiently attractive, private initiative would move in to take advantage of it. Tax credits and reduced interest on loans were offered to private northern industrial and commercial firms as inducements to expand in the South but generally the public rather than the private corporations proved to be more cooperative in these efforts.

The northern private industries have preferred to expand in the North while using the seemingly unending stream of emigrants produced by southern unemployment as the industrial need for labor dictated. By 1957 the government directed the publicly owned firms of

the state holding companies, the IRI and ENI, to divert 60% of their new investments to the South as it began shifting from agriculture and public works projects to industrial development there. However, this order was non-enforceable for several reasons, one of them being governmental bureaucratic inefficiency.[75]

There was much political infighting and a great deal of community and regional competition for the appropriations, and, though there were some improvements, there were also many complaints about what was done and how it was accomplished.

> It was said that reforms were tackled piecemeal with far too little coordinated planning between the Cassa and other governmental agencies. Moreover, political considerations affected the allocation of money, with the result that development organizations were often staffed by second-rate politicians or clients of some notable who was ready to trade his electoral support. Whole villages were built in which no one ever came to live; dams were built from which the water trickled profitlessly into the sea. A fairly high percentage of the money--some said a good third--must have been completely wasted.[76]

The reforming institutions and their governmental personnel were frequently either corrupted or were suspected by the populace of being corrupt as many were drawn into the vortex of clientelismo,[77] perpetuated largely by the same stratum of middle-class village and town notables that plagued the South during Levi's exile. The Cassa became too frequently a system of patronage with loyalty to the Christian Democratic Party among the most important considerations influencing its financial disbursements.

Yet perhaps there was less corruption than the Italians claimed, since, as Kogan states, "these are difficult charges to prove, and most Italians take graft and corruption for granted, assuming them

to exist even when they do not."[78] It can be said, however, that both corruption and the suspicion of corruption sabotage planning and the execution of plans. The net result of the reform and modernization efforts has been some political and economic progress in the South. By the conclusion of the 1960s this could easily be seen in the reduction of unemployment and underemployment; the disappearance of the old latifondio;[79] the three-fold increase in agricultural production as compared to 50 years ago; and the gradual extension of welfare benefits as well as television sets into the rural areas. Yet, because the North continued to grow at a faster rate, the economic gap between it and the South has continued to expand, though perhaps the "cultural and ideological gap was lessening."[80]

What has been the role of the PCI in the South? Its efforts to establish hegemony there have not succeeded for several reasons. First, while southern Italy has been basically an undeveloped society the North is by comparison quite developed. A basic problem of the PCI has been that "[it imposed] a strategy developed by Togliatti for the advanced, industrial North upon the backward, agricultural South"[81] thus weakening the southern strategy because the South necessitates special consideration. Second, the PCI, a modern political party, has had "a hard time breaking down the barriers of personalism of traditional southern Italian politics."[82] Third, the PCI has been unable to devise successful strategies reconciling landlessness with property possession. A landless peasant is a laborer when he can find work, but when he obtains a piece of land he becomes a property owner. The former is frequently prone to be revolutionary; the latter, as

possessories of "the most conservative capitalist institution ever developed,"[83] suddenly becomes politically retrogressive in communist eyes.

In the fourth place the party has failed to link the northern proletariat with the southern peasantry as Gramsci desired. He felt that leaders must arise from the peasantry through the encouragement of the northerners under the guidance of the party, but this has failed to occur. The result has been that the southern leaders come from the same class which Levi heaped abomination upon, the provincial petty bourgeoisie, thus perpetuating the political evils of clientelism and localism. Fifth, the PCI lost the position of leadership in the struggle for agrarian reform, which it held in the years following World War II, to the DC Party. The central government set up reform agencies in the South but because the Christian Democrats controlled the government, they controlled these agencies, and turned them into "massive patronage organizations."[84] The old clientelismo involving personal relations with a notable was transformed by the DC into "clientelismo of the bureaucracy"[85] financed by the resources of the state. The PCI has not been able to prevail against it.

However, Tarrow asserts that PCI activity in the South has been important because it assisted in the dismantling of the regressive latifondi through its mobilization of the peasantry; it is hated by the Mafia and distrusted by the Catholic Church; and "its presence has helped convince the Italian state to begin a massive program of economic development in the region."[86] Finally, Tarrow claims that

> since the major cause of political dualism [between North and South] has been the clientele system in southern Italy, true integration occurs only as new agencies of political expression and representation arise to take its place. The most important agent of this type in southern Italian politics is the Italian Communist Party.[87]

National politics and the Italian Communist Party in Italy--1956 to the late 1970s.--Reforms have languished in all areas of the Italian society because no major policy has enjoyed the necessary support among the elites of the various parties. Even reform proposals which have been stripped of the essentials have a difficult time in Parliament and, if they are passed, years frequently elapse before partial implementation is realized. The Church and its allies constitute one of the basic segments of the society. It is contradicted by both the liberal and republican factions which were instrumental in the construction of the national state during the Risorgimento on the one hand, and the two major parties of the left, the PSI, or Italian Socialist Party, and the PCI on the other. The Liberals and leftists clash because the former cling to vestiges of earlier versions of economic and political liberalism, while the latter desire a collectivist society with equitable distribution of its wealth. The clerical, liberal and leftist views could be seen as ultimately irreconcilable, and this, coupled with the tradition of ideological intransigence at key historical points in the last century, has resulted in paralysis at the policy level of politics.

Yet there has developed a means of reconciling conflicting demands at political levels below the summit.

> In Parliamentary committee negotiations, in the seclusion of prefectural conference rooms, in the horse-trading that goes on over the allocation of seats on a city council or the division of a regional budget between different communities, elites . . . have developed a consensus on procedural rules of the game that contrasts with the ideological conflicts that mark their public debates. While little normative consensus on goals has developed to provide a legitimate basis for reconciliation at the summit, new modes of political exchange have arisen to provide a working consensus that could, someday, be translated into a more legitimate basis for political action.[88]

This working consensus has been a slow process; it has been both devoid of ideological content and mired in particularism, thus sabotaging efforts for a coherent, well-defined policy.

This has tended to encourage the growth of a large national bureaucracy, infamous for its inefficiency, corruption and procrastination. It has been self-serving, alert to its own comfort and perpetuation, and it has been in large measure unresponsive to the Constitution, the Parliament and the needs of the people. It has been frequently responsive to the bribe, or la bustarella, however, which is so all-pervasive, or thought to be so all pervasive by the people that

> the Roman Catholic Church has come out with advice for priests who hear confessions, suggesting that it is not a sin to offer or pay a bribe to a public servant when it appears to be the only way a citizen can get a service to which he has a right, and it is not a sin to accept payment for assistance to the public that goes beyond the call of duty.[89]

These characteristics have produced cynicism and hostility in the people toward the state since the bureaucracy has represented the state in their eyes, hence it has played a crucial role in thwarting the cultural, spiritual and ideological unity of the nation.[90]

Togliatti's views of the Italian nation-state were not so bitter. He felt that its "progressive democracy" was something to

work with on the way to socialism. Progressive democracy was no substitute for the dictatorship of the proletariat because it "'would not strike radically at the roots of capitalist property. But this did not mean that the most unfair privileges of capital, of the great property and its most reactionary forms would not be abolished.'"[91] In June of 1956 he declared to the Central Committee of the PCI that this democracy, had it been realized in the form that the national Constitution framed it, "would have been a democracy of a new type, different not only from anything experienced in Italy prior to fascism but different from the traditional type of capitalistic democracy." He continued with the important statement:

> We have derived from this the general orientation of our political struggle which has been a democratic struggle for the application of the Constitution of the republic in its political and economic principles, and for the realization of those reforms which, . . . it indicates more or less explicitly.[92]

However, the most significant reforms for the communists would be those considered preparatory to the emergence of socialism.

The problem was that the party seemed to be paralyzed: revolution was impossible but acting democratically in a corrupt and inefficient democracy seemed to be self-defeating. Membership declined. In 1954 there were 2.1 million members;[93] by 1968 there were 1.6 million representing a drop of nearly 25%.[94] The party has remained, however, primarily working class in social composition, though urban workers themselves "were in the majority only in the immediate postwar years."[95]

Countering the mounting malaise within the party were the results at the polls. Where, in 1958 it had received 22.7% of the

ballots, up .1% from 1953, in 1963 it would receive the votes of 25.3% of the electorate. Translated into whole numbers that meant that where 6,704,763 people voted for the party in 1958, over a million more, or 7,767,072 would choose the PCI in 1963.[96] Italy was now experiencing an economic growth rate higher than that of the Western European average.

This economic development achieved in the years 1952-1963 has been called the "Italian miracle." Growth in the industrial segment of the economy proceeded at a "rate of almost 6 per cent annually in the two decades 1951-1971" which means it had "been exceeded by Japan alone among the major capitalist countries. Its GNP doubled in twelve years (1950-62) and it appeared well on the way to repeating the performance before the recession of 1971-2."[97] Yet Italy's progressive democracy was unable to deal with the urban problems in areas such as housing, transportation and education which were exacerbated by the surge in urban population growth associated with this economic development. Though many in the PCI dropped out, many outside the party voted communist as a protest against the continuing inefficiency, insensitivity and corruption of local and national government.

The parliamentary posture of the PCI has been an indication of its desire to work harmoniously with other parties toward basic structural reforms anticipatory of the Marxist objectives it has never denied. Although loyalty to the party has been basic, the PCI has placed great emphasis upon its parliamentary performance not only because of the desire to accommodate itself to Italian conditions

(La via Italiana al socialismo) but also because the parliament "is the only major public institution in which the communists have been on an equal footing with the other parties, even though in the role of the permanent opposition."[98] It can be shown that even at the height of the Cold War the communist deputies both on the floor of the legislative chambers and in legislative committees were cooperative and dedicated to the smooth functioning of the parliament.[99]

Parliament is also important to the PCI because its strength as a party lies essentially at the grassroots level where the national democratic voting procedures allow it to produce for the legislative bodies a delegation reflective of its popular strength. It has not been represented, however, in the executive branch which has been the DC bailiwick since 1947, and it has been faced on several occasions with DC attempts to strengthen that branch at the expense of parliament, hence the PCI support of increased parliamentary control over the executive branch. Communists have also supported legislation dealing with "facilitation of popular participation in politics and government, decentralization of power, particularly to the regions, . . . and, . . . reduction in the power of big business interests."[100] Communist proposals are presented in political language which could be accepted by the non-communists rather than in the sectarian terms appropriate only to the traditional communist mentality. This responsible parliamentary behavior exists today because other parliamentary groups accept the legitimacy of its delegation and are willing to accept its proposals as well when the measures are agreeable.[101]

Historically communists have disagreed with the Liberal view of Parliament. This consisted primarily of the ideas that these legislative bodies functioned as barometers of the political sensitivities of the state, that they represented the people in countering excesses of the government and so served to check it, and that they were able to govern in their own right. This was true because each of the delegates to parliament, while representing a local constituency and therefore promoting its local interests, also represented the entire nation in his person, and hence subordinated his particular interests to those of the whole.[102]

Communists have generally seen parliament as a ratifier of the already existing will of the people, hence the entity of greatest importance was not parliament but the party which in its role of the vanguard enlightened the people to the point where a discernible "general will" could be elicited. In parliamentary activities and the electoral campaigns leading up to it the PCI now appears to be moving with reservations toward the Liberal position of valuing parliament in its own right as a legitimate political organ of sensitivity and governance in the affairs of the nation. This appears in the parliamentary behavior of the PCI delegates though it is not so evident among the party leadership which still retains some loyalty to the notion that "parliament [cannot be] a forum of open discussion, where the political will of the people is formed."[103]

The PCI enters into electoral campaigns today in a fashion resembling other Italian political parties complete with hoop-la and spectacle. Though the party engages in "clientelistic activity [as do]

all Italian parties"[104] it has not been done as blatantly as others. The relatively clean record of the Italian communists in local government has given them something to protect, and the PCI candidates have watched each other closely to ensure that proper election behavior among them prevails. It has been stated by one of them that this tight scrutiny has been even more effective than a system of democratic centralism in forcing compliance with acceptable electioneering tactics.[105]

Individuals running for office have been subjected to the same exhausting rounds of speechmaking, partying, deliberation and argument as the candidates of other parties. Some party members have criticized other communists who have placed a greater premium upon stentorian qualities of speaking voices and physical endurance than upon the cogency of reasoning.[106] However, there also has been a notable element of selflessness and devotion to duty displayed by many PCI candidates and their supporters as typified by the campaign of Maria Antonietta Macciocchi cited in the source above. Activity of the party sections has increased considerably during the electoral periods. One study revealed that in many sections only about 10% of the members were involved in the daily activities of party affairs, and that 15% of them attended the important annual congresses, while only 20% of the members took a serious part in the campaign of 1970.[107]

The party has been attempting to gain legitimacy at the mass level as well as the elite level of party alliances since the conclusion of World War II. It has been solidly based on the working class

though it has drawn support from other segments of society as a mass party must. This has included the middle classes, the traditional enemy of the proletarian movement, which have played such a crucial role in the grand transformation of the Italian society in the 1950s and 1960s. If the middle classes had been such a moving force in the development of the post-war Italian nation, and this nation was being accepted by the PCI, there should be a legitimate place within the nation for these middle classes, at least for the foreseeable future, according to revised PCI opinion. The old sterile and rigid class arguments were falling apart; it could even be said that the PCI was supporting petty bourgeois interests.

> Since the 1960's, the [PCI] claim seems . . . to be that even a full-fledged socialist economy can and should be pluralistic and tolerate small property within the context of a controlled market. The notion that the ceti medi [middle classes] are merely tactical allies is sharply rejected, and party leaders insist that these strata are strategic allies of the working class.
>
> The PCI thus forecasts a mixed economy, largely to avoid the hypercentralization and inefficient production and distribution of consumer goods that characterizes the USSR and other socialist countries. But while the PCI defends a role for small producers, it is an error to claim that it favors unfettered individualistic, rather than cooperative, development in such spheres as agriculture or commerce. In fact, the party is on record since 1956 with the claim that small firms will be able to survive economically only if they band together in cooperative or associative forms.[108]

The party has attempted to widen its influence in nearly all sectors of the Italian society, being prevented by its doctrine and tradition from working with only those belonging to the monopolistic circles of Italian capitalism. It has constructed a far-ranging net of social groups including cooperatives, women's groups, youth groups, and cultural organizations. The idea is for it to be

"present" throughout as much of the society as possible, but for this to be done, non-committed or hostile people must become supportive. Yet how does a party accomplish this in a country where 63.2% of the people polled in a 1972 study believed that "political parties serve only to create discord among Italians"[109] and 44.5% interviewed in another 1972 study claimed to have no interest in politics?[110]

The alliance strategy of the PCI since World War II has been an attempt to gain working agreements with as many acceptable non-communist groups as possible. According to Stephen Hellman, this has been essentially a conservative policy since it has gathered together indiscriminantly any and all groups which have axes to grind against the powers that be. It also has been somewhat counterproductive in that these groups do not all desire progressive resolution to their disputes. Criticism from the left wing of the PCI has attempted without success to pressure the party into discarding the quantitative alliance system in favor of a strategic alliance system with a view toward selecting the most progressive groups for any given bloc. Hellman indicates that economic motives, upon which one might expect all Marxist political policy to be founded, have been supplanted in the case of the PCI by political motives, some of which may be seen as opportunistic, with the result that economic flaws existing in this wide-ranging alliance system have been permitted to continue.[111]

An example of this is the PCI position in the South where it has frequently chosen to support the conservative small-holder rather than the propertyless agricultural workers and their more radical and, for the communist, traditionally acceptable demands. The party has

also chosen to attack commercial wholesalers and chain stores as monopolistic forces but it defends the small shopkeeper as largely innocent of contributing to the inflationary spiral these larger units induce. The fact is, however, that in 1972 there were "1.2 million commercial firms of all types, [but] over a million employ two people or fewer," a situation which in itself contributes to the high rate of inflation in a rather substantial manner.[112]

This is political expediency. The PCI has recruited the reactionary, or very conservative groups of smallholders, artisans and shopkeepers, all the older, more traditional segments of the middle and lower middle classes, while it is hesitant about courting the newer middle-class groups such as the clerks, technicians and other white-collar workers. This has been true in large part because of short-run considerations at the national level of the PCI which view the "special legislative status . . . [and] the organized political leverage of the older, more established groups"[113] as a distinct advantage in indiscriminantly broadening its mass base. It has been seen also as an attempt to establish a hedge against the inveterate tendency of the middle classes to move to the right in troublesome periods. Yet this approach to building alliances has seriously hampered the political maneuverability of the PCI since its policies have frequently contradicted its natural inclinations which would be to support the demands of the landless in rural areas and the new categories of the middle class, many of which are unionizing in the urban areas.[114]

In its alliance strategy with other parties, the PCI has been primarily concerned with the relations it has had with the PSI and the DC. The socialists have been allied rather closely in the past with the communists but their differences have produced periods of mutual alienation. Throughout most of the 1960s with the "Opening to the Left" in effect, the PCI has found itself politically isolated as the PSI defied tradition and joined in a series of governmental coalitions with the Christian Democrats. The PCI did continue throughout this time, however, to collaborate with the PSI in local elections and in local governmental bodies, being always desirous of maintaining relations with a prospective partner in a future national governmental coalition. The socialists have continued to lose at the polls throughout the post-war era while the communists have steadily gained except in the 1979 elections when the PCI for the first time lost some votes. Yet "although there is no hard evidence that socialist electors have been shifting to the PCI, it is clear that the electoral 'space' occupied by the Left has grown only slightly in the last twenty-five years."[115]

In 1972 the PCI agreed upon the "Historic Compromise." This referred to the decision to join in a national governmental coalition with the DC should the opportunity arise. It meant also that the party was willing to assume a share in democratically bestowed power prior to the realization of the reforms, the agitation for which had served as the basis of its appeal to the Italians, a risky venture in a nation of volatile voters. What it does not want at the present is to assume national power either alone or in a coalition of

the leftist parties because it fears the kind of reaction which destroyed the Allende government in Chile would be repeated in Italy.[116]

Local government and the Italian Communist Party.--The PCI has had many electoral victories at the local governmental level. In the 1975 local elections, the PCI reached a new high of approximately 33%. This paved the way for the national elections the following year, June 1976, in which the party, increasing its vote by 7.2% over the last national elections of 1972, scored an impressive 34.4%, the best showing ever made by the party in a national election. As a result, in part, of communist work done at the local level of government, 52.7% of the voters wanted the PCI to participate in a national government according to a poll taken in March of 1976, two months prior to the national elections.[117]

By mid-1977 the party governed 6 of the 20 administrative regions and 45 of the 94 provinces. It had mayors in Bologna, Turin, Florence, Naples and Rome.[118] As of October 1977, the communists, either independently or in coalition with other left-wing forces, governed 2,779 of the 8,068 municipal councils, called communes; hence they governed 54% of the entire population. Italy's five largest cities, viz., Rome, Milan, Naples, Turin and Genoa, were governed by left-wing forces and of the 100 most populous cities 65 were administered by left-wing administrations. Smaller communes, however, do not possess as high a percentage of leftists in their governing bodies as evidenced by the fact that there are 6,089 communes with a population of less than 5,000 but these forces govern only 1,878 of them.[119]

In some communes, such as Bologna, where the communists gained power in 1945 and have since retained it, the PCI has had to act in such a manner as to induce a feeling of trust and security within the electorate. Norman Kogan, for example, declared in 1962 that because the communists and socialists were so distrusted, the communes over which they ruled were scrutinzed by the prefects, those officials of the central government who have the power to dissolve communal councils and dismiss their officials, in a much closer manner than the communes administered by the other parties. The result was that "left-wing communes are the best governed in Italy, and few have been involved in the scandals."[120] According to Newsweek

> . . . the Communists . . . in Naples, . . . have been the major power in a coalition government since last June. They have managed to reduce corruption and clean up the city's filthy streets. They have been unable, however, to solve the mountainous problems they inherited, including high unemployment and the crippling of tourism and fishing by an outbreak of cholera two years ago. Nonetheless, one Neapolitan businessman admits: "The Communists may not have done much here, but they have shown themselves much more open and attractive than the last lot we had."[121]

And finally, the Vice Chairman of Fiat Umberto Agnelli states: "'If . . . I look at the facts, at the Party's actual behavior on the local level, I cannot but admit that good administration is guaranteed in those localities where the PCI is in power.'"[122]

The PCI has desired democratic participation in communal government so that policy will result from the political demands of a broad popular base consisting of many social classes. It recognizes today that the ruling or administrating efforts of one class would be both inadequate in the modern pluralistic conditions of

society and dangerous in that a reaction from the right might develop with calamitous results. Second, it desires that these communes "should be regarded as general governing bodies on their territory, that is, they should be able to exert directive functions in all spheres. The communes only have jurisdiction over the social services--transport, schools, hospitals--but have no power whatever to influence economic processes."[123] Because the Italian economy has always been in difficult straits with the power to influence economic processes emanating from the same sources above, which have continued to emphasize high profits for the few, the communes are frequently left in very impoverished condition, some being financially bankrupt. The communists have wanted the communes to be local autonomous bodies, responsible for basic economic decisions as the Constitution has stipulated, and therefore able to influence basic structural changes toward decentralization, humanized social services, and improved economic possibilities.

Footnotes--Chapter II

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[46]J. Salwyn Schapiro, Liberalism: Its Meaning and History (New York: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1958), p. 32.

[47]Blackmer, Unity in Diversity, pp. 40-43.

[48]Togliatti, "Intervista a 'Nuovi argomenti,'" Opere scelte, pp. 705, 716, 719.

[49]Ibid., p. 726.

[50]Ibid., pp. 726-28.

[51]Blackmer, Unity in Diversity, p. 148.

[52]Ibid., p. 184.

[53]P. A. Allum, The Italian Communist Party Since 1945: Grandeurs and Servitudes of a European Socialist Strategy, Occasional Publication No. 2 (Reading: Univ. of Reading Grad School of Contemporary European Studies, 1970), p. 23.

[54]Blackmer, Unity in Diversity, p. 190.

[55]P. A. Allum, Italy--Republic Without Government? (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1973), pp. 48, 54.

[56]Norman Kogan, The Government of Italy (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1962), p. 29.

[57]Blackmer, "Continuity and Change in Postwar Italian Communism," Communism in Italy and France, p. 30.

[58]Mack Smith, p. 511.

[59]Anne Fremantle, ed., The Social Teachings of the Church (New York: The New American Library, 1963), p. 229.

[60]Ibid., p. 270.

[61]Ibid., p. 296.

[62]Kogan, A Political History of Postwar Italy, p. 193.

[63]Ibid., p. 206.

[64]Ibid., p. 208.

[65]Ibid., p. 212.

[66]Shepard B. Clough and Carlo Livi, "Economic Growth in Italy: An Analysis of the Uneven Development of North and South," The Journal of Economic History 16 (September 1956): 335.

[67]Ibid., pp. 338 ff.

[68]Southern Italy is defined as the islands of Sardinia and Sicily, and the mainland regions of Calabria, Basilicata, Puglia, Campania, the Abruzzi, and Molise.

[60]Elizabeth Wiskemann, Italy Since 1945 (London: Macmillan, 1971), p. 100.

[70]Kogan, A Political History of Postwar Italy, pp. 149-50.

[71]The Moral Basis of a Backward Society (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1958), pp. 64-65.

[72]Ibid., p. 10.

[73]Christ Stopped at Eboli, trans. Frances Frenaye (New York: Pocket Books, Inc., 1965), p. 214.

[74]Ibid., p. 63.

[75]Mack Smith, pp. 505-506.

[76]Ibid., p. 506.

[77]Clientism is the practice of exchanging favors in lieu of formal liberal-democratic political behavior. It personalizes political relationships and allows positions of political power to be given by those who are able to dispense the most favors. It has been practiced widely in southern Italy and to a lesser extent in the North.

[78]Kogan, A Political History of Postwar Italy, p. 60.

[79]The Latifondo was a type of great estate mainly devoted to pasterage and the growing of cereals which was frequently owned by absentee landlords, managed by middle-men and worked by impoverished peasants. (Christopher Seton-Watson, p. 23.)

[80]Mack Smith, p. 521.

[81]Tarrow, p. 366.

[82]Ibid., p. 194.

[83]Ibid., p. 299.

[84]Ibid., p. 349.

[85]Ibid., p. 326.

[86]Ibid., p. 4.

[87]Ibid., p. 11.

[88]Sidney Tarrow, Between Center and Periphery: Grassroots Politicians in Italy and France (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 1977), p. 253.

[89]Il Ponte 15 (1959): 1491. Quoted in John Clarke Adams and Paolo Barile, The Government of Republican Italy (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1962), p. 220.

[90]Joseph LaPalombara, Interest Groups in Italian Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1964), pp. 119-20.

[91]Gruppi, p. 74.

[92]Togliatti, "La via italiana al socialismo," Opere scelte, p. 755.

[93]Poggi, p. 372.

[94]Allum, The Italian Communist Party Since 1945, p. 39.

[95]Galli and Prandi, p. 122.

[96]Galli, Il Comportamento Elettorale in Italia, p. 332.

[97]Allum, Italy--Republic Without Government?, p. 25.

[98]Galli and Prandi, p. 261.

[99]Blackmer, "Continuity and Change in Postwar Italian Communism," p. 48. See also Galli and Prandi, pp. 271-74.

[100]Robert Putnam, "The Italian Communist Politician," Communism in Italy and France, pp. 200-201.

[101]Sidney Tarrow, "Communism in Italy and France: Adaptation and Change," Communism in Italy and France, p. 618.

[102]Guido de Ruggiero, The History of European Liberalism, trans. R. G. Collingwood (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), p. 365.

[103]Galli and Prandi, p. 263.

[104]Allum, The Italian Communist Party Since 1945, p. 20.

[105]Maria Antonietta Macciocchi, Letters from Inside the Italian Communist Party to Louis Althusser (London: NLB, 1973), p. 174.

[106]Ibid., p. 217.

[107]Peter Lange, "The PCI at the Local Level: A Study of Strategic Performance," Communism in Italy and France, p. 275.

[108]Stephen Hellman, "The PCI's Alliance Strategy and the Case of the Middle Classes," Communism in Italy and France, pp. 379-80.

[109]Giacomo Sani, "Mass-Level Response to Party Strategy: The Italian Electorate and the Communist Party," Communism in Italy and France, p. 502.

[110]Ibid., p. 497.

[111]Hellman, pp. 381-82.

[112]Ibid., pp. 392-94.

[113]Ibid., p. 386.

[114]Ibid., pp. 388, 391.

[115]Lange, p. 262.

[116]Hellman, p. 419.

[117]"Red Star Over Italy," Newsweek, 26 April 1976, p. 42.

[118]Jane Kramer, "A Reporter in Europe," The New Yorker 53 (2 May 1977): 110.

[119]Luciano Antonetti and Alexander Volkov, "Communists in Municipalities: The Experience and the Problems of the Left Giuntas in Italy," World Marxist Review 20 (October 1977): 95.

[120]Kogan, The Government of Italy, p. 157.

[121]"Red Star Over Italy," 26 April 1976, pp. 42-43.

[122]Sergio Segre, "The Communist Question in Italy," Foreign Affairs 54 (July 1976): 697.

[123]Antonetti and Volkov, "Communists in Municipalities," World Marxist Review, p. 73.

CHAPTER III

EDUCATION AND THE ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY IN THE YEARS 1919-1945

Introduction

In determining what type of education the Italian Communist Party advocated and used from its earliest days to the present, the term party education means, first, the endeavor to train party members within the organization through party "schools" to the point where the students not only are knowledgeable of and accept the version of communist doctrine taught, but also where they learn about the practical matters associated with their roles in the party, and second, the ideas of Gramsci pertaining to the party's attempts to develop hegemony outside of the national educational system. In both cases propaganda was the primary mode of instruction. By education is meant the attempt to impart knowledge using evidence in such a way that the student is encouraged to realize his potentialities. Some propaganda could be included in the educational process but in that case propaganda is usually subservient to the evidence, and those using it appear to be willing to change it when the evidence supports another approach.

From its earliest days the PCI has been interested in imparting information to its members with the avowed hope of raising their awareness of socio-political conditions. The primary mode of doing

this during the period 1919 to 1945 was propaganda rather than education. I. A. Snook argues that

> the indoctrinator intends that the pupil believe [the proposition] "regardless of the evidence." In full-blown cases of intention, this captures very well the difference between the indoctrinator and the educator. For the educator, the beliefs are always secondary to the evidence: he wants his student to end up with whatever beliefs the evidence demands. He is concerned with methods of assessing data, standards of accuracy, and validity of reasoning. The answers are subsidiary to the methods of gaining answers. The indoctrinator, however, is typically most concerned with the imparting of beliefs: these are what he strives to hand on. It is the evidence that is of subsidiary importance. . . . The indoctrinator will . . . make use of evidence, logic and proof--but it is a use of in order to further his aim: the beliefs are more important than the evidence.[1]

It is important to state that indoctrination and propaganda on the one hand and education on the other, are not mutually exclusive concepts, that they overlap both conceptually and in practice.[2] Where the precise line of demarcation lies is in many instances impossible to ascertain and frequently it is a matter of opinion despite the clear separation in emphasis of the two concepts.

Not having access to the national system of education in any significant sense until after the Second World War and not being reconciled to the existence of the Italian nation through much of this period, the efforts of the Italian communists remained primarily geared toward the use of propaganda to influence both its members in the party schools and those outside the party. One may judge from the tone of the journal L'Ordine Nuovo, initiated in Milan during 1919, that it was primarily devoted to propagandizing. According to Togliatti, Gramsci "loved the almost mathematical precision of reasoning and . . . [he] had a taste for the extreme exactness of

information [while he] disdained, but more than that, had a kind of moral repugnance for improvisation, for superficiality, and carelessness."[3] He used his reasoning abilities in these early years for propaganda as his statement below admits:

> The position of L'Ordine Nuovo consisted essentially of the following: . . . knowing how to translate into Italian the principal postulates of the doctrine and tactics of the Communist International: in the years 1919-1920 the [Ordine Nuovo] wanted to relate the proceedings [dire la parola d'ordine] of the factory councils and of the control of production, that is to say of . . . the expropriation of the expropriators, or the substitution of the proletariat for the bourgeoisie in the control of industry and therefore, necessarily, the state; . . .[4]

The emphasis upon propaganda was to continue unabatedly until the advent of Hitler forced a communist reconsideration of evidence explaining the fascist movement. From that time onward, though Italian communist propaganda persisted, it was increasingly necessary for the party to take into account ever-widening areas of phenomena in explaining its message. Political-military developments such as those associated with the Popular Front forced the party to cooperate with non-communist antifascists, while their efforts to liberate Italy induced feelings of nationalism in the communists despite themselves. All of this had important implications for Italian Communist ideas regarding education because it tended to dilute sectarian ideology and supplant it with a greater concern for and identification with the Italian national education system, which however unjust in its exclusiveness, did incorporate ideals of dispassionate scholarship and liberal respect for the individual.

In the heated days of the 1920 factory occupations. Gramsci and his circle "closed down Ordine Nuovo and started to live in the

factories, engaging in an endless round of organizational work, agitation, and propaganda."[5] In these years it was believed by some that there was a realistic chance for a bolshevik type of revolution to be induced in Italy and time was of the greatest importance, hence the emphasis was placed upon partisan bias and evidence was deemphasized. The fundamentals of the Marxist-Leninist labor movement as they were interpreted by the leaders of this group were taught in the factory councils, and were probably taught through timely repetition of salient points because the average worker could boast of only a limited formal education. Slogans were probably used generously and L'Ordine Nuovo itself both before and after the factory occupations was written at perhaps the equivalent of our American eighth or ninth grade reading comprehension level. The indoctrination was geared to the revolution which some thought was upon them, but with the collapse of the factory occupations came the realization by many Italian communists that class consciousness had not been sufficiently developed and that it would probably take a considerable length of time to do so.

The Educational Implications in Gramsci's Concept of Hegemony

According to Gramsci the extension of hegemony in Italy was to be accomplished primarily through educational means of one sort or another. The drive for hegemony linked the party leadership with the rank-and-file of the party, the entire party with the working class, and the working class with society as a whole. These organic connections had pedagogical implications, Gramsci felt, because the

new generation could learn from the experiences and values of its elders just as the latter could derive benefit from the perspective of the former. He said that "every teacher is . . . a student, and every student a teacher"[6] in society as well as the academic world, hence "every hegemonic relationship is necessarily a pedagogical relationship, and it exists not only throughout the nation among the diverse forces composing it, but throughout the entire world within the complex of civilized nations and continents."[7]

In the factory councils Gramsci saw "the most effective organ for mutual education and for developing the new social spirit which the proletariat has sensed in the lively and fertile experience of the working community."[8] Gramsci hoped that the worker-member's conception of himself would, with the aid of his factory council, be changed from wage-laborer to producer. This would be done if the worker

> sees himself as an inseparable part of the whole labour system which is concentrated in the object being manufactured, and only if he experiences the unity of the industrial process which in toto demands collaboration between manual workers, skilled workers, management employees, engineers and technical directors. The worker will see himself as a producer if--after he has become psychologically part of a particular productive process in a particular factory (e.g. in a car plant in Turin) and has come to think of himself as a necessary and indispensable factor in the activity of the social complex producing the car--he can now go one stage further and comprehend the whole of the Turin car-manufacturing process. . . . Starting off from this original cell, the factory, seen as a unit, as an act that creates a particular product, the worker proceeds to the comprehension of ever vaster units, right up to the level of the nation itself. . . . At this point the worker has become a producer, for he has acquired an awareness of his role in the process of production, at all levels from the workshop to the nation and the world. At this point he is aware of his class; he becomes a revolutionary because he sees the

> capitalist, the private property owner, as a dead hand, an encumbrance on the productive process which must be done away with.[9]

Gramsci is writing here about a process of self-education in which the worker, becoming aware of himself, his class, and his role in the whole productive process, is able finally to understand that he is part of an organic whole. In this consciousness he becomes transformed from citizen, the old liberal appellation, to comrade.

These workers were collectively the embodiment of the revolution and so their education was of critical importance; in fact education was to be a major determinant in the success of the revolution. Improving the working skills of the proletariat was to be recommended by Gramsci, and he asks the workshop delegates: "Why could you not set up inside the factory appropriate instruction departments, real vocational schools, in which every worker, rousing himself from the fatigue that brutalizes, would be able to gain knowledge of the processes of production and therefore improve himself?"[10] However, it was in the "knowledge of the process of production" involving the worker with others that Gramsci had primary interest rather than knowledge of the details necessary to perform any particular job within the factory; and while he devoted more attention to the individual than perhaps most other Marxists, he was after all, still a Marxist, which meant that the social rather than the individual dimension was emphasized.

Gramsci spoke of the necessity of proletarian self-discipline in building the communist hegemony in Italy. As the workers gained awareness of their deprivations through pedagogical relationships

they would gradually realize that some of their immediate self-interest should be forfeited for the purpose of furthering the long-range possibilities of the proletarian revolution.[11] This meant that not only must they defer fulfillment of their immediate desires, but that they must do their part in facilitating communist cooperation with the peasantry and various segments of the middle classes including the intellectuals, people with whom the annointed of Marx have rarely had easy relations. Gramsci realized that the 19th century Italian bourgeois revolution known as the Risorgimento was not a national effort of the masses and he believed it failed in large part because it was attempted without the southern peasantry; he had no intention of seeing that failure repeated. It would take discipline to forge the alliance and it would take discipline to encourage its growth once initiated.

While workers' self-discipline is Gramsci's ideal,[12] prior to its existence external force may be necessary for its formation. He wrote of the discipline that the workshop delegates "will require of the working masses" and he indicated that the central political-economic-social organs created at every level from the workshop to the national Workers' Council "will pursue, broaden and intensify the job of controlling, preparing and organizing the whole class for the duties of conquest and government."[13] However, discipline should not be understood as the passive and servile reception and mechanical execution of orders; rather, it should be considered "as a conscious and lucid assimilation of the directive to be accomplished. Discipline, therefore, does not annul the personality in an organic sense,

but only limits the irresponsible and arbitary impulse. . . ."[14] Discipline should not be an arbitrary, extrinsic, or exterior imposition, and it should be adhered to since it is "necessary to the order of democracy and liberty."[15] Discipline might require the formation of a coercive group of factory councils and soviets culminating in a temporary dictatorship of the proletariat, since the emergence of the party with indisciplined soviets and with apathetic worker participation would have been condemned by Gramsci as counter-revolutionary; the desiccation of its roots in the masses would have turned the party into an abstraction.

What Gramsci saw as the essential task for his revolutionary forces in Italy was, in short, the promotion of a mass transformation of attitudes which he thought could not be accomplished without the aid of two different types of intellectuals: the traditional and the organic.[16] The role of the first group "is entrusted to [it] by the dominant group in society for the exercise of the subordinate functions of both social hegemony and of the government."[17] By this he meant that they channeled the spontaneity of the great masses of the population in a direction dictated by the dominant social group from its controlling position in the world of production. He also meant that these intellectuals operate the machinery of state coercion, including the educational institutions, which legally guarantees the proper behavior of all groups in society, and he stated that they exist as "representatives of an historical continuity, uninterrupted by the most complex and radical changes in social and political forms."[18]

In many ways this group of intellectuals has been a distinct class, and it has been from their midst that much social fermentation has originated historically. These intellectuals can work most effectively for change if they form an emotional and ethical identification with the common people and eschew any notions of ivory-tower snobbishness. Gramsci considered ideas divested of concrete reference, ideas produced in isolation from the objective world, and ideas which evoke response only among intellectuals in a detached environment, as vacuous and of no use to the labor movement. True understanding as opposed to these abstractions can be experienced by the intelligentsia when they are organically related to the other stratas of society. In forming contacts with the proletariat and in helping to bring about that crucial alliance between the working class and the peasantry which Gramsci felt was absolutely necessary to the success of any Italian revolution, the intelligentsia could work toward forming organic relations.

This would be accomplished by these traditional intellectuals meeting kindred types called "organic" intellectuals through the medium of the communist party. Gramsci wrote: "Every social group, rising on the basis of an essential function in the world of economic production creates . . . organically one or more classes of intellectuals which give it homogeneity and the awareness of its proper function in the economic, social and political fields. . . ."[19] He saw these people as the specialists and directors which each class produces, and he hoped that they would be developed in increasing numbers because it is they who, more than the traditional intellectuals,

would be influential in encouraging the expansion of the working class and in creating favorable conditions for its hegemonic control in society. It is primarily they who, with the party, should lead the way to the grand transformation by working for a new unity of Marxian consciousness. They are supposed to rise out of the masses and yet be part of them, and they therefore also perform a mediating function between the proletariat on the one hand and the traditional intellectuals, the other classes including the peasantry, and the PCI itself, on the other.

So the organic intellectuals should perform an extraordinarily valuable educative service in the interest of furthering the hegemonic control by the working classes of society. Although these are specialists in production, such as technicians and foremen, the knowledge which the most progressive among them need possess should be broader than that dealing with mere job proficiency, for these people must form an integral relationship with the traditional intellectuals. The major function of the weekly L'Ordine Nuovo was "to develop certain forms of new intellectualism and to induce new concepts"[20] through propaganda, the idea being to encourage the formation of new organic intellectuals from within the proletarian class. To this end, a technical and industrial education could be obtained to be complemented for the most progressive students by the study of "technical science and historical humanistic views, without which [they] would remain 'specialist[s]' and would not become 'director[s]' (which is to say, specialist plus politician)."[21]

If promising individuals located too far from Torino desired the instruction given in the socialist school, presumably operated by the communists in the days prior to the formation of the PCI, they could obtain an education by reading the journal because all the summaries of the lessons studied and discussions heard at the school would be printed in it.[22] As for the students near at hand able to absorb more intellectual material, the journal

> L'Ordine Nuovo established a "School of Culture and Socialist Propaganda" in December 1919, attended by both university students and workers. Gramsci, Togliatti, Tasca, and Pastore gave frequent lectures there, as did several professors from the University. This school examined the idea of the Stato dei consigli, a new state completely replacing the liberal state by a "system of councils."[23]

Gramsci displayed a partiality for studying and education[24] throughout his career, and his writings became less propagandistic and more educational as time passed. In a passage revealing his deep inner respect for the individual he refers to everyone as an intellectual since all use their minds in at least some capacity, though he admits that not all perform intellectual tasks in society.[25] This declaration is important pedagogically because it implies both that people are not just empty vessels into which the "correct" information is poured by the authority and that there may be a legitimate place for independent judgment among them. It is important because it sets the tone not only for Gramsci's personal estimation of the masses which is different from that of both Bordiga, the first leader of the PCI, and Lenin, since it possesses greater respect and trust of the masses; but it is also important because it serves as a keynote of the PCI, and thus differentiates it from the Russian Communist

Party's assessment of Russian masses. This is as close to liberalism as Gramsci and the PCI ever came.

In the early days the PCI had the problem of defining itself and establishing its proper relationship with the bourgeoisie, with other leftists, and with the Soviet Union. It had been a Leninist party under Bordiga which meant that it was a small conspiratorial group composed mainly of professional revolutionaries. Unlike Lenin this early group waited for deterministic and mechanistic forces in society to invite them into the proletarian revolution, but like the earliest Christians waiting for the Second Coming, they waited in vain. Education for them consisted mainly of "unmasking" dissidents and cajoling the orthodox into keeping the faith. Bordiga "did not want to waste [his] time in theoretical discussion" and he "denounced the influence of the intellectuals and the insistence on education and study which was to be so characteristic of Gramsci's attitude."[26] For Bordiga, "education" consisted primarily of propaganda.

Gramsci wanted another kind of party, one which, though not a mass party, would have "organic" ties with the masses, but the impetus toward such a party was truncated by the accession to power of Benito Mussolini. Gramsci viewed his own version of education as absolutely vital to the cause of his party and the revolution. Where Bordiga was satisfied to wait on events, Gramsci, like Lenin, saw that only through the intervention of forces made "conscious" could a revolution come about, though ultimately the latter two differed on the methods which should be used to make the revolutionary forces conscious.

The educational process according to Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary is mental or moral development which is accomplished especially by instruction. Gramsci thought that educating the masses was identical with bringing class consciousness to them, and this meant enlightening them through Marxian doctrine as to who they were, why they occupied the position they did in society, and what lay ahead of them in terms of the development of both themselves and this society. This process could take months in some cases and years in others, depending upon the abilities and the state of "consciousness" of the students. However, with the successful conclusion of this instruction, those who had received it would, it was felt, be eager to act in the best interest of themselves and society by contributing to the revolution and the Marxian reconstruction of society.

Gramsci emphasized his version of education for two reasons: (1) he and his group lacked the political power with which to force the consciousness they envisioned upon the Italian people and (2) his trust of the masses was greater than that of most other communists. It is possible to argue that the second reason was encouraged because of the first, and that to create a mass of enlightened workers in a bourgeois society, the only alternative to the Bordigan illusions involved a heavy investment of effort in education entailing trust since it involves helping the student to realize his potentialities. This assertion, however, ignores the possibility of "enlightening" through Lenin's methods of propagandizing which abbreviated both the time of learning and the truth itself, and which essentially existed at the expense of education. The latter could have been Gramsci's

approach but, apart from some early propagandizing efforts, it was not.

Lenin found what appeared to be shortcuts to the time-consuming process of education. He saw that eagerness to act in the revolutionary manner could be artificially generated in the masses given appropriate instabilities and tensions in society, and given the effective usage of techniques such as staging, timing, and the manufacturing of propagandistic slogans. Appearances were emphasized rather than substances because appearances are malleable; and since the unlettered easily grasped and believed these appearances which were in effect simplified truths if not outright falsehood, Lenin knew that the people themselves were manipulable. This allowed him to use them as instruments in his move for power.

The Fascist Years--1922-1945

The ineptitude of the socialists and communists coupled with the determined actions of the fascists produced disaster for the entire left as well as the liberal elements in Italy when Mussolini acceded to power in 1922. As a result, throughout much of the next two decades, theory would triumph over practice among the broad stratas of the dispossessed Italian left instead of being united with it as many communists including Gramsci desired. Palmiro Togliatti succeeded Gramsci as the leader of the PCI. Since he owed his primary allegiance to the Marxian movement, and since it had found its most eloquent expression in the 1917 Russian Revolution, he held that experience sacred as did most adherents of the left in Italy. This

attitude was typified in the curriculum of a party school during the 1920s in which a course on the history of the Russian communist party occupied some 20 hours weekly, while another course dealing with the history of the PCI lasted only six hours a week.[27]

In 1927 Togliatti organized a party school at Soletta, Switzerland, in a modest house donated by a sympathetic socialist. Including elements of both propaganda and education, it drew "youthful cadres from the working class, hence the lessons of Marxism were very simple and there were studies of the movement in Russia and in Europe along with attention devoted to general culture."[28] Some of the schools were discontinued as a result of police action and some of the discontinued schools commenced again in other locations, as was the case with the Soleta school which, after closing due to the revelations of a suspected spy, reopened in Berlin.

Another type of party school, conducted under the most hostile conditions imaginable, was that operated informally within the fascist prisons. The PCI had very close contact with some of the more favorably situated prisoners, and Togliatti, in a letter of 1932, was worried about some of the younger imprisoned communists "'who have no experience in the revolutionary class struggle and who are most subject to the influence of fascist ideology. These comrades are full of enthusiasm but ideological virgins and politically very inexperienced.'"[29] He continued with the assertion that the "'school'" should be a permanent feature of the prison, and that it should seek to influence those susceptible of being influenced whether with or without other party allegiance as well as incarcerated comrades of the PCI.

So the foreign center of the PCI made arrangements for elementary educational materials to be smuggled into the prisons. Other kinds of reading materials such as prohibited books dealing with political economy, history, and Marxist classics, most written in French, penetrating the prisons disguised in an ingenuous manner, were read avidly and hidden secretly in the walls. The French, German and English languages were studied by these inmates in this order of importance because the prohibited literature was written in them. There also were officially approved readings available in the prison libraries or acquired easily elsewhere by the prison authorities consisting of classical literature and historical compendia. The study within the prisons was made as systematic as possible, and the total effort was accompanied by an elevation in general culture among the detained.[30]

By 1934 fascism could no longer be treated as a sign of bourgeois weakness, and the communists realized that there was something wrong with the proposition that "the bourgeoisie resorts to fascism because it cannot govern with the old systems";[31] it now had assumed its true proportions of license and power. Communists throughout Europe now regarded it as the major enemy and all of their resources were called up for use in the desperate struggle against it. This meant forming alliances with others including the despised socialists, alliances that were only temporarily disrupted by the Russian-German non-aggression pact of 1939 and hastily renewed at the time of the German invasion of Russia in 1941. Education was put in the service of this campaign, and the subject of fascism predominated

in the minds of the PCI educators, as is evidenced by Togliatti's lectures on this subject in these years.

In 1935, for example, he delivered some lectures at the Italian division of the Lenin School in Moscow dealing with the topic: "The Adversaries." They aroused considerable interest among Italian as well as non-Italian students and teachers, but he found it necessary to speak simply and clearly because most of the Italians in attendance came from the working classes and the fascist prisons, and were therefore unaccustomed to studying in a formal course. In these lectures he not only defined fascism and described it from many angles, he attempted to reconcile the two communist policies which during this period coexisted, viz., the demands to cooperate with non-communist elements in the popular front against fascism, and the never-relinquished pursuit of the proletarian revolution which, though continuing, was for the moment subdued. He told these students, many of whom were to return to fascist Italy clandestinely:

> When we speak of "adversaries" we do not have in mind the masses enrolled in the fascist, social-democratic and Catholic organizations. Our adversaries are the fascist, social-democratic and Catholic organizations. But the masses belonging to them are not our adversaries; they are masses of workers whom we must make every effort to win over.[32]

He talked about how fascism in Italy mobilized a mass movement when the "big bourgeoisie won over the discontented petty-bourgeois masses," and how the PCI was misled:

> We didn't understand that there was an Italian social phenomenon underlying all this; we didn't see the deep-going social causes determining it; we didn't understand that the ex-servicemen, the misfits, were not isolated individuals but a mass, and represented a phenomenon having class aspects; we

> didn't understand that we could not simply tell them to go to the devil!
>
> Our job was to win over a part of this mass and neutralize the other, thereby preventing it from becoming a mass maneuvered by the bourgeoisie. We neglected these tasks.[33]

He told the students, many of whom were to be returned secretly to Italy, that it was necessary to infiltrate the fascist organizations such as the GUF, or the Fascist University Groups, the dopolavoro,[34] and the trade unions, and "organize the struggle for our principles inside of them."[35] This should be done despite any moral revulsions against associating with the fascists in them. He said that while he respected those feelings in other antifascists because they indicate principled behavior "their position is wrong because it is not in this way that one sticks to one's principles; otherwise, we could become hermits, go into a forest and worship communism there."[36]

Togliatti had less to say about education than Gramsci. Since Togliatti presided over the party during its greatest fluctuations in both membership and success he probably had less time to reflect upon the virtues of education because the practical matters of leadership, especially under such trying conditions, left little time for such long-range speculation. Although it is true that Togliatti was a theorist as well as a practitioner, it is also true that in matters of educational theory, he selected paths already trod by his ideological predecessor. For example, like Gramsci, he felt that education consisted of much more than simply work training. The student should be informed of the "slow, long, and toilsome" struggle of mankind against the "blind and brutal forces of nature" and against social and political oppression. Likewise the student

should come to realize a sense of identity with the "working community throughout the centuries" and learn to appreciate the value of his work, however humble or limited it might appear to be.[37] Yet Togliatti is important in this matter because it was under his leadership that the party expanded to such large proportions following the war and that plans proceeded toward the hegemonic control of the state.

When Togliatti assumed leadership over the fledgling party, it was already in a state of shock from Mussolini's attacks. Its tripartite division, the emigrated, the incarcerated, and the underground, hampered not only effective education, but effective internal communication. In addition, as if this were not devastation enough, it fell under the domination of Moscow in the latter twenties and early thirties, which meant that there was even less mediation between the PCI and the tremors of the wildly erratic policies emanating from the Kremlin after 1926 than there had been prior to that date when the PCI at least was based in Italy. Under the assaults conducted against the PCI by Mussolini and the control exerted over it by the Soviet leadership,[38] continued party activities inside Italy resembled nothing so much as the lemmings' march to the sea. It gradually dawned upon the Italian communists that conditions under a fascist dictatorship were somewhat "less conducive" to the fulfillment of Gramscian and Togliattian objectives than those under even the most depraved and inhospitable versions of bourgeois democracy, and so the content of education had to change.

Because the members of the party were scattered in this period and because its schools were frequently closed, the indoctrination given was probably sketchy and incomplete. There was little time or inclination to permit genuine education. Probably the party members who came closest to immersing themselves in education rather than propaganda were the incarcerated who were given the opportunity to read anything available in the prison libraries; and though that material would have been screened through the sectarian bias of fascism, certain classics in literature were allowed to be read, as mentioned above. There is the case of the imprisoned Gramsci who not only took advantage of this opportunity and who had a few books and journals sent in to him, though some were arbitrarily withheld from his possession, but who was able to produce a set of highly respected scholarly theories under the most aggravating conditions. What he wrote there, though unavailable to his party in those years, is today a basic guide to the communist strategy in Italy.

The Increasing Orientation of the Italian Communist Party Toward Italian National Education

Gramsci's Ideas Concerning Italian National Education

Gramsci was probably more free and open in his approach to truth than either Lenin or Togliatti and as a result he was willing to admit the legitimacy of knowledge emanating from sources outside the broad stratum of the labor movement to a greater extent than the others. Because Gramsci realized that the process of gaining hegemonic leadership by the proletariat and the peasantry was going to be a

lengthy affair, because he himself had long years to think in solitude about it, and because he recognized the Italian national entity in a way most communists did not, he had much to say about the Italian national system of education. He also provided suggestions as to where and how improvements in it could be made.

In speaking of the deficiencies of the Italian national education, as distinct from communist education or indoctrination, Gramsci said that the traditional Italian schools were oligarchies because they were operated by the leading class in society with the idea of perpetuating the superiority of this class by producing from it, through these schools, the leaders of the future. They have not been oligarchical because of the method of instruction, the acquisition of the ability to direct, or because of their alleged tendency to produce the superior man. This type of school has developed "from the fact that every social group has an appropriate type of school designed to perpetuate a traditionally determined directive or subordinate function for the group in its social stratum."[39]

Gramsci believed that prior to the onset of industrialization in Italy, this type of differentiation between the kind of education offered to the children of the ruling classes and that to the others, was rationally conceived. However, with the coming of industrialization came a need for a new kind of urban intellectual to be developed in a new kind of school, and this caused the questioning of something heretofore unquestioned, viz., the direction in which the society was going. This discussion killed the prestige of the ruling classes upon which the system of education had been based, and

the need arose for a new system and a new kind of schooling.[40] Gramsci wanted a single school which would initiate formal education with a humanistic orientation, i.e., one sensitive to human needs. This school should accommodate the inclinations of the student whether in the technical, manual labor, or intellectual areas[41] but it should also do so by exposing each child to both human history and the history of "things" in the same curriculum.[42]

This single or comprehensive school would be a combination elementary-secondary institution, and it would counteract the divisiveness in society advanced by the tendency to create greater numbers of technical and professional schools which become more specialized and which fill with students who have not received a thorough grounding in a general education curriculum. Appearing to be democratic because they seem to offer to the peasant the possibility to becoming an agronomist or to the laborer the possibility of graduating to the status of a skilled worker, these types of schools in reality attack democracy by perpetuating the traditional class divisions through recruitment which is restricted primarily to the technically qualified governing social and political classes and which as a result tends to discourage individual initiative on the part of those outside these classes. Even if hodmen, farmers, and geometrists become qualified in their trades they lack the political skills which should allow them as citizens to become rulers if only in the abstract sense of developing a reasoned consent to the policies and direction of the elected leaders. The unitary school "would take the child up to the threshold of his choice of work,

forming him during this time as a person capable of thinking, of studying, and of directing--or of controlling those who direct."[43]

The unitary school could only flourish, Gramsci felt, if the state were to make a serious attempt to finance it and to provide it with a favorable ratio of instructors to pupils. It should have dormitories, dining halls, specialized libraries and halls. The traditional structure of schooling in Italy consisted of four stages: (1) elementary; (2) gymnasium, or lower secondary; (3) liceo, or upper secondary; and (4) university along with the specialized professional, theoretical or practical schools. Gramsci saw the unitary school as encompassing the first three of these groupings in the curriculum and methods of teaching. The elementary part should last three to four years and the material should be taught in a relatively strict manner. The curriculum would stress the first elements of the Marxian conception of the world and would feature reading, writing, arithmetic, notions of geography, history, and the rights and duties of the student in society. The lower secondary should be reduced to four years and the upper secondary to two, meaning that a child who entered the school at six could graduate from it at the age of 15 or 16. This would be considerably earlier than he could complete the upper secondary in the traditional structure.[44]

Gramsci observed that children of educated parents and children who live in the cities possess advantages over children raised by uneducated parents and those in the country because of the greater exposure to the kinds of experiences which facilitate academic life.

The unitary school should attempt to duplicate the favored environment in the school and in the dormitories after school.[45]

The student should be freed from hypocritical and mechanical instruction and to this end the tutorial services of the better students should be utilized as well as the talent of the regular teaching staff. The liceo segment of this school should be considered as a transitory phase in which fundamental values of humanism, intellectual self-discipline and moral autonomy, so necessary in any later endeavor, should be created in the student. The study of the scientific method must begin, he thought, in the liceo part of the unitary school, and must not be reserved only for the universities. Gramsci also wrote about creativity in the liceo section of the projected unitary school, by which he meant the active encouragement of finding truth without suggestions or impulses from external sources. If success is achieved along this line, the truth discovered is creative even if it is an old truth.[46]

Gramsci believed that Latin and Greek should not be the focal point in the curriculum of this comprehensive school, as it had been in the past, and was during his lifetime in the traditional secondary schools. However, this would mean that the admitted educative principle which was bound up in the study of these languages and their concomitant literatures and political histories, would not be available for use in the schools and that a new educative principle must be forthcoming. It must develop

> in a didactic form which gives equivalent results in terms of education and personality-formation from early childhood to the threshold of the adult choice of career. In this period

> what is actually learned, or the greater part of it, must be--or appear to the pupil to be--disinterested, that is to say, not have immediate or too immediate practical purposes. It must be formative, while being "instructive"--in other words rich in concrete facts. In the present school, the profound crisis in the traditional culture and its conception of life and of man has resulted in a progressive degeneration. Schools of the vocational type, preoccupied with satisfying immediate, practical interests, are beginning to predominate over the formative school, which was not immediately "interested."[47]

The educational principle which he recommended revolved around the concept "work." He felt that it was work which enabled mankind to dominate the realm of nature with the purpose of transforming and socializing it, and that for work to be fully realized man must necessarily possess both "an exact and realistic knowledge of natural laws and . . . a legal order which organically regulates men's lives in common." In addition, he asserted that "men must respect this legal order through spontaneous assent, rather than as an external imposition--it must be a necessity recognized and proposed to themselves in freedom, and not be the result of coercion."[48]

However, Gramsci felt that a certain amount of coercion should be used in the early stages of formal schooling to encourage the habit of studying. Theoretical problems with internal freedom emerging out of externally imposed discipline aside, one may easily agree with his assertion that to study effectively is to work, that studying is an exhausting job involving "muscles, nerves and intellect," and that "it is a process of adaptation, a habit acquired with effort, tedium, and even suffering."[49] In effect, it involves a great deal of self-control, especially for those who are reared in non-intellectual families. Just as it is expected that many children from

non-intellectual or rural families will be deprived to a certain extent of educative experiences, so it is to be expected that they will similarly lack educative discipline. Since this is true, and since many of these individuals could be attending the comprehensive school should it be created, Gramsci stated that "it would be essential to resist the tendency to simplify studies which cannot become simplified without being distorted."[50]

Gramsci believed that the strictly individual conscience either did not exist, or was an extreme rarity because, as a rule, it reflects the individual's physical and social surroundings. He saw the social relationships experienced by typical Italian children in their homes, neighborhoods and towns as unfortunate because of the "fossilized and anachronistic" character of these relations. One aspect of society proving to be disadvantageous was folklore superstition which was and continues today to be especially prevalent in southern Italy and the islands, one of which, Sardinia, was Gramsci's birthplace. He desired to combat the notions of magic and other elements of "individualistic and parochial barbarism" found in folklore through instruction in both the natural sciences on the one hand and civil duties and rights on the other. The student must realize that there are objective natural laws which must be obeyed, that man himself creates the social and political laws by which his civil society operates, and that there is no place in civilized society for the destructive aspects of folklore.[51]

Gramsci insisted upon the importance of a unity between schooling and the life of the child. This can only come about, he

wrote, if the student, who may reflect an inferior culture, abandons that culture in favor of the advanced enlightenment of the teacher. The latter must always bear in mind the cultural differences separating the student from the instructor and must endeavor through every constructive method to narrow the hiatus between them in this matter. In so doing, he should always remember that the student is neither a passive receptacle nor a mechanical receiver of information,[52] and that "education is a struggle against the instincts bound to the elementary biological functions, a struggle against nature to dominate and create the 'real' man in his period."[53]

Knowledge absorbed by the student could be inert or rhetorical if it is true only in words. This would be the situation if the instruction were not the "living work of the teacher" or the product of his awareness of the cultural differences between the pupil and himself. Contrarily, absorbed knowledge would be "living" knowledge were the teacher to fulfill this requirement and to realize that, however effectively he taught, academic life is but a fraction of the life of the student, and that exposure of the latter to society is much more important than commonly credited. This is especially true because members of each new generation, all born without innate ideas, are educated by the preceding generation.[54]

Gramsci's consciousness of the limitations of formal education is far from being an admission of futility with regard to its effectiveness as an instrument in changing society; his is probably a realistic assessment of its powers. He states that a modern pedagogy

should include the following principles: "a friendly collaboration between the teacher and student; an open school; and the necessity of freely allowing the development of the spontaneous powers of the student under the vigilance but not the conspicuous control of the teacher"[55] as the child moves through the unitary school. Gramsci realized that the student should have rights, that he is not infinitely malleable, and that any future support of the Marxian refurbishment of Italy would be much more dependable and therefore valuable if it could be rendered out of a freely given consent developed in the student through his school years.

It should be noticed that Gramsci was plagued with the old revolutionary problem of "how to reconcile freedom and authority, spontaneity and discipline"[56] and that this problem reared its head in both his educational and political theories. A cardinal point in his political philosophy was the belief that "it is possible through education and explanation to persuade people to accept spontaneously decisions and ideas formulated by their leaders."[57] Gramsci never satisfactorily solved this dilemma in either education or politics though he earnestly tried to do so. According to H. Stuart Hughes, "there was something innocent about the totalitarian aspects of Gramsci's thought. Like Marx himself, he failed to draw the final implications of his own thinking and quite sincerely believed he was aiming at human liberation."[58] However, his views on education represented a considerable advancement in freedom and dignity for the student when compared to the educational environment of either the old Italian liberal or fascist systems.

Although Gramsci's ideas concerning Italian national education were written under abysmal conditions of imprisonment[59] and during a period when fascism seemed to be waxing in strength, the time came when they would bear heavily upon the national educational conditions and practice. Shortly after his words about education were written in the late 1920s and early 1930s the PCI began to realize the virtues of a change in its fighting tactics against fascism. It had been engaging in suicidal antifascist efforts inside Italy with the erroneous assumption that the world-wide capitalist depression coupled with a communist shove would overthrow Mussolini's regime, but now in the mid-1930s, PCI units in Italy became more secretive while the party simultaneously strengthened its organization outside the nation. By 17 August 1934 a "unity of action" pact had been concluded between the PCI and the Italian socialist parties that would lead the way to the collaboration of all antifascist elements in the Popular Front and the later Resistance.[60]

The Educational Implications of the Resistance

One may assert that the cooperation required of Italian communists in their relations with non-communist Italians in the Popular Front and the Resistance surreptitiously infected the resolve in many of these communists to stage the proletarian revolution should the opportunity for it later arise. It never did. The precedent of cooperation had been established and when this was combined with the conditions requiring a democratic posture in post-war Italy if any hope of success were to be envisioned, the old bolshevik notions of

revolution for Italy could not hope to be entertained by other than the irresponsible few.

This cooperation thus began to turn the PCI in the direction of national as opposed to strictly party or working-class concerns. The field of education understandably received little attention from the PCI in these periods when all party activity was subsumed under initially the resistance to and subsequently the defeat of fascism, including the education and indoctrination in the party schools. The increasingly national orientation of the party in these years from 1934 to 1945 imposed itself upon its educational concerns when the war was concluded and when Italian communists along with other Italians began reconstructing their nation.

As the work of Gramsci became available to the PCI in the post-war years it appeared that his ideas reinforced this trend.

> Gramsci's originality as a Marxist lay partly in his conception of the nature of bourgeois rule (and indeed of any previous established social order), in his argument that the system's real strength does not lie in the violence of the ruling class or the coercive power of its state apparatus, but in the acceptance by the ruled of a "conception of the world" which belongs to the rulers. The philosophy of the ruling class passes through a whole tissue of complex vulgarizations to emerge as "common sense": that is, the philosophy of the masses, who accept the morality, the customs, the institutionalized rules of behavior of the society they live in.[61]

If the "real strength" of any social order lies in the acceptance by the people of the Weltanschauung espoused by the rulers in that order, would not any effort to produce a change in that order necessitate a nation-wide effort toward the re-education of the masses? Also, would not any communist nation-wide effort be influenced in Italy at least in part by the modest liberal-democratic tradition of the

Risorgimento which persisted in that nation despite the interlude of Mussolini; which invested at least some of the political processes throughout the entire post-war era with which the PCI has had to come to terms; and which was supported by the victorious Allies? Gramsci would have answered affirmatively, and it may be said that generally the PCI has operated on the basis of accepting that tradition since 1945, though admittedly with some reservations.

Footnotes--Chapter III

[1]Indoctrination and Education (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972), pp. 55-56.

[2]Ibid., pp. 47-49.

[3]Fulvio Bellini and Giorgio Galli, Storia del partito comunista italiano (n.p.: Schwarz, 1953), p. 24.

[4]Paolo Spriano, Storia del partito comunista italiano, Vol. I: Da Bordiga a Gramsci (Torino: Giulio Einaudi, 1967), p. 49.

[5]Alastair Davidson, Antonio Gramsci: Towards an Intellectual Biography (London: Merlin Press, 1977), p. 143.

[6]Antonio Gramsci, Quaderni del Carcere, Vol. II (Torino: Giulio Einaudi, 1975), p. 1331.

[7]Ibid.

[8]Gramsci, "Sindacati e Consigli," L'Ordine Nuovo, p. 37.

[9]Gramsci, "Sindacalismo e Consigli," L'Ordine Nuovo, pp. 46-47.

[10]Gramsci, "Ai Commissari di Reparto delle Officine Fiat Centro e Brevetti," L'Ordine Nuovo, pp. 33-34.

[11]John Merrington, "Theory and Practice in Gramsci's Marxism," The Socialist Register 1968, ed. Ralph Miliband and John Saville (London: The Merlin Press, 1968), p. 159.

[12]Gramsci, Quaderni del Carcere, Vol. II, p. 751.

[13]Gramsci, "Ai Commissari di Reparto delle Officine Fiat Centro e Brevetti," L'Ordine Nuovo, p. 34. See also his "Sindacti e Consigli," L'Ordine Nuovo, p. 38.

[14]Gramsci, Quaderni del Carcere, Vol. III, p. 1706.

[15]Ibid., p. 1707.

[16]Traditional intellectuals were those associated with universities, governments, and the arts and sciences; organic intellectuals were those in white-collar positions such as technicians, foremen, etc.

[17]Ibid., p. 1519.

[18]Gramsci, Quaderni del Carcere, Vol. I, p. 475.

[19]Ibid., Vol. III, p. 1513.

[20]Antonio Gramsci, Gli Intellettuali e L'Organizzazione della Cultura, 6th ed. (n.p.: Giulio Einaudi, 1955), p. 7.

[21]Ibid.

[22]Gramsci, "Cronache dell' Ordine Nuovo,'" XXI, L'Ordine Nuovo, p. 468.

[23]Cammett, p. 81.

[24]James Joll, Gramsci (n.p.: Fontana/Collins, 1977), p. 41.

[25]Gramsci, Gli Intellettuali, p. 6.

[26]Joll, p. 41.

[27]Bocca, p. 121.

[28]Ibid., p. 147.

[29]Spriano, Vol. II, p. 362.

[30]Ibid.

[31]Palmiro Togliatti, Lectures on Fascism (New York: International Publishers, 1976), p. 7.

[32]Ibid., p. 1.

[33]Ibid., pp. 5-6.

[34]A system of organizations erected by Mussolini with the idea of extending totalitarian control to the after-work hours, dopolavoro, through sports, camping, theatre, and other associations.

[35]Ibid., p. 83.

[36]Ibid.

[37]Togliatti, Conversando con Togliatti, p. 72.

[38]Blackmer, p. 10.

[39]Gramsci, Quaderni del Carcere, Vol. III, p. 1547.

[40]Ibid., Vol. I, p. 483.

[41]Ibid., Vol. III, p. 1531.

[42]Ibid., Vol. I, p. 114.

[43]Ibid., Vol. III, p. 1547.

[44]Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 484-85.

[45]Ibid., pp. 485-86.

[46]Ibid., pp. 486-87.

[47]Ibid., Vol. III, pp. 1546-47.

[48]Ibid., p. 1541.

[49]Ibid., p. 1549.

[50]Ibid., p. 1550.

[51]Ibid., pp. 1540-42.

[52]Ibid., p. 1541.

[53]Ibid., Vol. I, p. 114.

[54]Ibid., and Vol. III, pp. 1541-42.

[55]Ibid., p. 114.

[56]Joll, p. 39.

[57]Ibid.

[58]Consciousness and Society, pp. 101-102.

[59]These ideas were included in his most important series of writings, his Quaderni del Carcere (Prison Notebooks). They were written with the benefit of only a few reference works and they constitute an admirable example of far-ranging scholarship which considers themes and individuals in, as well as outside, the labor movement in its nearly 3,000 pages.

[60]Delzell, pp. 123-30.

[61]Fiori, p. 238.

CHAPTER IV

EDUCATION AND THE PCI IN THE YEARS 1945 TO THE 1970s

Party Education

The educational problems of the PCI after the Italian liberation have been vastly different from those it faced before and during the liberation because now its educational concerns would center for the most part in the public school system. It continued some informational activities with a view toward increasing its membership and expanding its alliances, but this was done primarily by propaganda. It became obvious that the party genuinely desired to reform the national school system and that it believed such a reformed system would be of critical importance in the development of the nation and in the eventual realization of the goals of socialism. It came to place a much greater emphasis upon national education than it did upon party education in the years following World War II as the "Italian way to socialism" and the "Historic Compromise" were stressed.[1]

A central party school was created at the conclusion of the war which, according to a document of the PCI, trained the most promising youths and which completed its course every three months.[2] There were ten party courses taught in the years 1945 and 1946 with a total enrollment of 363 students at this central school, and at such regional schools as Reggio Emilia, Bologna, Ancona and others, 15

courses were offered in the same period with 209 students.[3] From 1945 to 1950 it is estimated that more than 60,000 students attended the various PCI schools in Italy.[4]

According to the communist parliamentary candidate for the 1968 general elections, Maria Antonietta Macciocchi, "it is impossible to speak of theoretical education in the PCI today" because of the strong prevalence of Italian communists to "mouth . . . obsolete" phrases such as "'the unity of the Left'" and "'the new unity of the South'" along with "other frontist alliance formulas" which have removed the party from "a Marxist-Leninist analysis of the motor forces of the revolution, the working class and its fundamental allies."[5] Armando Cossutta, a member of the leadership of the party, in effect confirms this when he states "after the electoral success of June 15, 1975, our party courses went over largely to training people for local administration." He continues with the information that there are permanent party schools throughout Italy.

> There are one central, four interregional and three provincial schools run by a Central Committee department. But we also have permanent training courses in all regions and the biggest provinces. . . . We have also correspondence courses for tens of thousands of people. We are preparing textbooks which will be brought out in series. Each book of the series is mailed to students and contains one lecture and certain questions they must answer. After three or four lectures, a conference is held in the province concerned to discuss problems of the economy, urban development, social maintenance, finance, education and public health. But, of course, schools alone are not enough. The best form of study is experience. . . . This is why we organize numerous interviews, conferences and meetings to compare notes; we transfer cadre members from one community to another to train them and ensure that the best experience is shared.
>
> In this way we communists contribute to the training of increasingly qualified people to direct administrative bodies, and this serves the fundamental interests of the working people and the country.[6]

The emphasis on administrative preparation and the deemphasis of traditional communist theory in these schools is further evidence of "the Italian way to socialism," of the desire of the party to push for practical solutions at the expense of the theoretical and sectarian. This allows it a reasonable chance to increase its mass base of support while forming workable alliances at the party level which promise to bear some fruit in the matter of essential reforms. The danger is that the continued disregard of fundamental communist theory throughout the party and especially in its schools could eventually cause it to become indistinguishable in its practice from others which, because of the paralysis at the elite levels, have abandoned to a considerable extent their party canons in the interest of realizing success in the press of the moment.

Italian Education Historically and Constitutionally Considered

School reform is seen as an integral part of the reform of the entire society, and any improvement in the former is usually associated with the latter in the view of communists. The school system has historically been controlled by the Ministry of Public Instruction. In 1876 the Sinistra, or the Left, came into power replacing the rightists of Cavour's beliefs who had ruled since the completion of the Risorgimento six years earlier. Although the Left advocated free and compulsory education and invested more heavily in the schools, education remained in a neglected state and would remain so through the conclusion of World War I, during the fascist interlude and through the post-war era. Its organization has remained

hierarchically centralized throughout this entire period with few fundamental changes being realized in the direction of decentralization. This has been a consequence of and a carry-over from the days when the modern Italian nation-state, conceived through the maneuverings of a few, was forced upon the many with the result that those in power perceived grave threats to the existence of the state in the opposition that developed. Those exercising power in the new liberal state of the Risorgimento doubted the abilities of those out of power to govern or educate themselves since the powerless had been ruled for so long by both foreign and native autocrats.

The Constitution which went into effect 1 January 1948, provides two major articles on education, numbers 33 and 34, and many articles on decentralization for the regions, provinces and communes.[7] Much of the attempted school and university reform advocated by the PCI since the effective date of the Constitution has been geared toward implementing these articles. Today the school system continues to be controlled by the Ministry of Public Instruction in a centralized fashion despite some positive steps taken in the direction of decentralization. For example, it still controls a standardized curriculum and entry to each grade level from elementary through the university as well as controlling entry to the professions through a system of state examinations.[8] The minister of public instruction, a member of the cabinet, is ultimately responsible for the "administration, supervision, and coordination of all activities in the areas of education, culture, and the arts."[9] The Constitution stipulates in Article 33 that "The Republic lays down general standards for

instruction," but the trouble has been that these "general standards" have been bureaucratized while edicts from the top have tended to ignore local needs.

There have been some steps taken toward decentralization, as mentioned above. For example, the schools at the local level are supervised by the provincial education departments, but true decentralization is defeated by the fact that these are in turn responsible to directorates which are responsible to the national ministry. The provinces provide the land, buildings and maintenance personnel for secondary schools while the communes do the same for elementary schools and the national government pays the salaries of all teachers.[10] The Higher Council of Public Education is the head advisory body for the national educational system including the elementary, secondary, and university segments, but its chairman is the minister of public instruction. The point is that any decentralization achieved seems to be only partial in that nothing can be instituted or implemented locally that does not have the assent of the national ministry which in turn has been stymied by the paralysis plaguing Italian governments since World War II. Some reforms have been accomplished in this period but these have been overshadowed by the inability of the Italians to enact others.

Elementary Education and the PCI

Gramsci's Ideas

Gramsci is seen by the PCI today as not only its chief political and social theorist, but as the "inspiration behind the

value which the battle for reform of the school possesses for both the workers' movement and the great national questions."[11] Gramsci believed that children should be treated "'as rational creatures with whom it is possible to discuss even the most serious matters.'"[12] The desire to treat children as rational creatures who possess rights may be seen as the keynote of the entire modern PCI educational reform effort in the elementary and secondary schools, for all facets of reform ultimately lead back to this central proposition. Gramsci saw through his own experience that this was an idea whose currency was found only rarely in the Italian schools of his day. He talked about the

> tedious experiences of the students and the difficult times encountered by the teachers in the bourgeois schools which possess cold environments, which are opaque to every inspiration, resistant to every force of a unifying ideal, whose youths attend not with the desire to improve themselves and to understand, but from the objective perhaps not mentioned and yet clearly held by all, to proceed with the idea of acquiring a title with a proper show of vanity and laziness, and to deceive themselves today and others tomorrow.[13]

Reform Proposals of the Italian Communists

Much of this type of student attitude mentioned by Gramsci above was derived from the disrespect with which any kind of progressive formal education was treated by the adults. The PCI today clearly states that it desires formal education to be more responsive to the needs of both democracy and the individual students. Its top executive board, the Directive, stated in 1972 that for the advance of democracy in Italy it would be necessary

> to carry on in the school a resolute democratic and antifascist battle, extending and reinforcing the struggle against bureaucratic centralism and the conservative and authoritarian spirit, to promote new forms of democratic government in the school with the prospect of non-corporative social management in which not only all the components of the scholastic life but also the forces which represent the collectivity, especially the local representative bodies such as the communes and district councils would be present.[14]

Italian communists since the Second World War have objected to the pattern of instruction which, though admittedly changing now, has been typical throughout Italy: small groups have been rewarded with a classical and literary humanistic education; others have been offered a technical education as an alternative on an even more limited scale, while the vast majority of students have been virtually ignored by exposing them to merely a few years, in many cases only five, of elementary education. They claim that this is a dual system which perpetuates class divisions. Ottavio Cecchi, a contributor to Rinascita, a weekly PCI journal, quoted the following from a book published by the staff of a journal ideologically to the left of the PCI named Potere Operaio:

> "School is class school two times. First because it succeeds in serving only the students coming from the privileged classes; second because the culture transmitted in the school is a culture of class. . . . The ultimate end of the school is to organize consent for the society and the type of social relations which it develops. . . . The Italian school has a violent and discriminatory character [and] it is a place where classes collide, [hence] we cannot neglect this field of battle."[15]

Many communists assert that the school has minimized education for most people in Italy and that it has denied to the select few the kind of contact with real life situations which is required in an effective education. They assert that the children in the elementary

schools are educated not so much for themselves and society as for conformance with a preconceived notion of class culture. The "hands-on" instruction and progressive techniques of mid-20th century American education have rarely been seen in Italy with the result that it is difficult for many, if not most, children to relate the activities within the schools to their lives outside and to their families, a point which Gramsci stressed when he advocated a greater unity between school and life. Most communist spokesmen for education would probably agree with Giuseppe Chiarante who wrote in Rinascita the following words about the goals of elementary education: ". . . they are clear at least in principle and easily enough definable--to furnish to all citizens without immediate concern for professional training those fundamental tools of communication, of analysis and of knowledge which are indispensable for the participation in a productive and civil life."[16] Enrico Berlinguer, the present General Secretary of the party, sees the ultimate objective of the elementary school as one which seeks a greater "organic unity with life and a more formative direction capable of furnishing the basic cultural instruments for understanding and acting in reality."[17] These views contrast sharply with the tradition of Italian conservatism and literary humanism which had the effect of separating academia from life.

The literature reviewed indicates that Italian communists want an elementary school which is free and obligatory for all children aged 6 through 11. Some desire it to begin a year earlier in the child's life because other European countries allow this, because children mature earlier today, and because it would reduce the duration

of the maternal school to two years,[18] thus decreasing its cost and allowing more people to avail themselves of this non-obligatory pre-elementary education. Berlinguer feels that this maternal school is an especially critical point in the educational chain because "it is at this level . . . that the consequences of the disparity of classes and of the social milieu begin their destruction of the young, and it is here that the first conditions exist for putting all Italian youth under equality."[19] Yet he claims in the same article that almost half of the children between the ages of three and five do not have a place in this school despite the positive commitments of the communes, various groups, associations and religious orders.

Many elementary schools in Italy do not have full-time scheduling, but rather use a double shift with some children attending only in the mornings and others only in the afternoons; many schools need their physical structures refurbished; and teachers need more money. Generally, building more schools and renovating existing structures have been the responsibility of local governmental bodies,[20] and these have been chronically short of cash.[21] Teachers' salaries are the responsibility of the national government, but its priorities lie in other areas. Though having improved in recent years, the low salaries have been the subject of bitter recriminations and have caused great difficulties for those who work in this profession.

Sandro Ferragni wrote in L'Unita during the 1962 academic year about a teacher of practical technology who had a paycheck for 36 teaching hours totaling 50,500 lire a week. As a magician working

in his spare time he earned 70,000 lire a month by charging 500 lire per person for admission; this amounted to 150 lire more an hour than he made teaching. He continued: "A police officer, a typist in a business office, and a salesman in a bookstore make more than a teacher."[22] It seems that the major ambition of most teachers is to leave school and find a better paying profession, while in the interim perhaps private lessons may be given.[23]

The matter of private lessons, called doposcuola, is another of the aspects of Italian schooling which is questioned by many communists. One states: "It has allowed . . . commercial speculation, it affects negatively the professional preparations of the teachers, and promotes a discrimination between those families which can and those which cannot pay."[24] The overcrowded classrooms make it difficult to teach the students properly, one of the results being the split-shift, and it also detracts from the performance of the teacher who has had to forego proper lesson preparation in order to supplement his inadequate teaching income. Romano Ledda believed that there were three ways to attack this depressing situation. First, pay the teacher not only for teaching but also for lesson preparation, correction of exams and cultural preparation. The increased pay will promote better lesson preparation, and an improved performance on his part in the classroom will mean fewer students will need the services of the doposcuola. Second, invest in more teaching assistants at all levels of schooling and thus more and better teaching may be accomplished in the classroom itself. Third, it is necessary to realize "the principle that there can be no more than 25 students in

the classrooms of the obligatory schools [elementary and lower secondary], and even less in the upper secondary classes."[25]

Secondary Education and the PCI

Gramsci's Ideas

Gramsci believed in the right of every student to study regardless of ability to pay. At the conclusion of his fifth year in the elementary school he received tens in composition, dictation, arithmetic, grammar, reading, history and geography--the highest possible score for a student, but he "suffered the same fate as so many other poor children . . . he had to give up school."[26] When he wrote that in the socialist order "'schools would educate intelligence, whomever the intelligence belonged to'"[27] Gramsci was no doubt writing about the right of students to study following their period of compulsory education when tuition became a consideration.

Gramsci also had something to say about the required Latin in the secondary schools. He cites the differences between studying and learning the language, the former being much too common in the schools, but the latter constituting a rare experience indeed. Latin is treated "like a cadaver on an anatomy table." It is dissected, analyzed and used most of the time not for the study of the language itself, but rather for a "cultural-scholastic tradition . . . [and] one studies it as an element in an ideal scholastic program, an element which summarizes and satisfies a series of pedagogical and psychological requirements. . . ."[28] He continued with the observation that this dead language is continually revived in examples and narrations which

could be studied in a live and useful language such as Italian. "None of the students learn Latin with the analytical method used. If a single student knew it the language would be alive; the enchantment would be destroyed and all would immediately enroll in the local Berlitz school."[29]

Reform Proposals of the Italian Communists

The overcrowded conditions in the years since World War II may be partly surmised from the following information concerning the public schools. In 1945 there were 3,262 scuola medie inferiori, junior high schools, and 508,418 pupils. In 1965 the corresponding figures were 6,511 schools and 1,801,231 students, and therefore a 99% rate of increase in schools but a 254% increase in the students had occurred at that level. If one considers all the public secondary schools, the various scuola superiori or upper secondary as well as the lower secondary schools, the figures represent an increase of 76% in the schools and a 245% rise in the students.[30] This was an especially acute problem for the northern urban areas which led in the creation of the "economic miracle" and which experienced a tremendous influx of immigrants from the South creating demands for housing, schooling and municipal services which far exceeded their accommodating capabilities. These problems in schooling were added to the already existing insuficiencies of all kinds in the South to form a distressing national picture.[31]

There were serious problems facing the youths who dropped out of school. The dry, formal and frequently heartless instruction of

the elementary school "effectively" weeded out the "undesirable" students by the conclusion of their programs and bestowed upon many others the "kiss of death" insofar as continuing in academia, with the result that unskilled youths had to face the rigorous demands of job-hunting in a nation without plentiful employment possibilities. People within the party such as Claudio Petruccioli, who spoke at the XI Party Congress, began supporting the extension of the obligatory period of education from the age of 14 to the age of 16 so as to "guarantee the reaching of a level of cultural and professional preparation which permits the development of a qualified worker."[32]

The call for the extension of minimum education to the age of 16 is reflective of a metamorphosis being experienced by the Italian society, as the following data illustrate: In the short space of ten years--from 1961 to 1971--the changes indicated in Table 1 have occurred; they testify to a remarkable increase in educational credentials in a population which has grown from 49,903,878 in the 1961 census to 53,744,737 in the 1971 census,[33] for a 7.6% rise. The decrease of six million elementary school graduates in the 1971 census may mean that many who would have terminated their schooling prior to the 1961 school year with the completion of the elementary experience had by the later year continued to higher levels of education. Although the percentages in the first three categories demonstrate a significant increase in the level of education across the general population, it also means that expectations are higher today.

Table 1.--Resident population over six years of age by level of education.

Level of Education	1961[34] Census Total	1971[35] Census Total	Percentage
University graduates (Laurea)	603,205	883,188	+46%
Senior high school graduates (Diploma)	1,938,816	3,363,969	+73%
Junior high school graduates (Licenza scuola media inferiore)	4,375,023	7,151,289	+63%
Elementary school graduates (Licenza)	27,588,007	21,586,160	-21%

Enrico Berlinguer spoke at the XIII party congress of the great contradiction between the number of secondary school graduates who have "quadrupled in 20 years and the more than 100,000 youths annually entering the labor market" on the one hand, and the fact that "the offer of positions in the work-world has not increased" on the other; thus the understandable anger and fury of these desperate youths.[36] He continued with the assertion that Italy could do something about this because her "resources are not lacking" and that it "is their use which must be changed." He stated that one of the ways to "create new resources is by instituting reforms."[37]

One of the very important educational reforms to occur in Italy since World War II has been the creation of a single middle school in accordance with the law of December 1962. It is compulsory and free, provides education for students from ages 11 through 14, and

has been demanded by countless Italian communists beginning with Gramsci who advocated a single school, though with the addition to it of the upper secondary level. Prior to the existence of this school, students at the age of 11 and upon completing the elementary school had been divided into academic and non-academic categories, with only those in the academic category who had attended the scuola media, or lower secondary, permitted to move into higher academic studies including the upper secondary and the university. The others were shunted to the scuola di avviamento al lavoro which was divided into different types of training for speedy entry into the world of work; the scuola post-elementare, which prolonged the elementary school for another three years with neither type giving access to the upper secondary school; the scuola tecnica which provided the foundation for certain professional studies; or the scuola d'arte which did the same for further studies in art.

The new middle school replaced this academic fragmentation with a single, unitary institution and delayed until the age of 14 the decisions regarding future education. Where, previously, entrance to university admitting upper secondary programs was reserved only to the academic scuola media graduates, from 1963 on, access to these higher academic programs has been permitted to all providing certain examinations were passed. The liceo classico, or Latin grammar school of the upper secondary level, is a case in point: a student who passed its Latin entrance examination could now be admitted regardless of his program in the new single middle school.

These reforms, namely the creation of the unified middle school and freer access to higher schools, were requested by the communists not only to rationalize the educational structure, but also to promote the rights of the children, many of whom, having been "tracked" from the age of 11 in non-academic areas, were later to find their conversion to academic fields barred when they experienced a change in preference. Another strong communist argument against the tracking system beginning at age 11 was the assertion that the determination of academic or non-academic categories for pupils was frequently a product of the socio-economic status of the family from which they came, and that permitting this system to continue was reinforcing the class division of the Italian society. The Avviamento and post-elementary schools did not offer sufficient training for their graduates to enter directly into the work world and so they, by their default, seemed to reinforce "the maintenance of an agrarian type of society--authoritarian and socially stratified. The rapid development of industrialization and the consequent social mobility of the 1950s, probably more than any pedagogical or political arguments, prepared the way for the elimination of this scholastic dichotomy."[38]

Yet, despite the admitted advancement which this single middle school represented for the Italian society in the eyes of the communists, it was criticized for "remaining within the structure, the system, and the cultural establishment which characterizes the school for the few."[39] Massimo Paci claimed that "many commit the error of judging the school of the masses exclusively in relation to

its . . . function with respect to the demands of the economic system"[40] which divide the society into classes. Berlinguer was to say that although

> something of the new has been realized as thousands of citizens including workers and women have gained more familiarity with the life and difficulties of school, thousands of large and small problems have been resolved with good will and good sense, new didactic experiences and initiatives have been realized with cultural benefit in many cases, and new democratic groups which have developed an active policy have laboriously come into existence at the base . . . only the first step toward a reform has been taken. The . . . crisis of the school has been aggravated by the free field accorded to bureaucratic hindrance, the confusion and frequent provocation of the ministerial circles and the old centralist mentality.[41]

There are also problems with Latin which remain at this level of schooling today. Italian communists wanted Latin excluded and science emphasized in the curriculum of this middle school, while the Christian Democrats wanted the retention of Latin. The compromise, which involved other parties and assertions, amounted to keeping the Latin but as an optional course in the third and final year of the curriculum. However, the fact of the matter is that "Latin still occupies a central position in the program which the teachers of literacy subjects (Italian, history and civic education, geography, and optional Latin) must follow. Many doubt that even newly trained teachers are capable of revising the educational tradition."[42]

The Latin requirements for graduation from all the upper secondary schools except for the liceo classico, the traditional and prestigious classical Latin grammar school, have been reduced and in some cases eliminated as a result of reforms instituted in February 1969 which the PCI supported. There are a total of eight different

types of upper secondary schools to which students may be admitted upon completing the unitary middle school. The first is the above-mentioned liceo classico which has a three-year program in the study of the classics preceded by a two-year course in the ginnasio, or lower secondary, on the classics with Greek and Latin being emphasized in both segments. Second is the liceo scientifico which has a five-year course stressing mathematics and science, though the communists charge that this school is really a liceo classico without the Greek and Latin language requirements. Third is the istituto magistrale, a four-year course in teacher training for the elementary schools which was expected to increase to five years in 1972. Fourth is the liceo artistico offering a four-year course in art and culture, and the fifth through the eighth are various types of istituti technici.

A basic complaint by the communists regarding the upper secondary system echoes that heard by them prior to 1963 about the lower secondary structure--its fragementation. There was and still is a desire of many communists, as with Gramsci, to unify these disparate groups and to shorten the distance between that part of the curriculum devoted to the cultural formation of the student, or what is termed basic or general education in the United States, and preparation for the world of work which is a second aspect of the curriculum. The upper secondary school has had a more difficult set of objectives to fulfill than the levels of schooling below or above it. Whereas the obligatory school, the elementary and lower secondary, has had a mission that clearly concerns imparting cultural awareness, and the

university finds itself absorbed in education for the professional life, the upper secondary must reconcile cultural instruction with preparation for work. Many Italian communists have desired the obligatory part of the schooling to extend at least a year into the upper secondary so as to provide a more thorough grounding in basic cultural awareness.[43]

Another idea which Gramsci elaborated upon and which has been repeated by many members of the party has been that concerning the educative value of work. It is asserted that a more unitary character to the curriculum with manual labor introduced into it as an educative principle would do much to develop a sense of "equality, justice and solidarity, and it would allow a re-evaluation of the productive work of which the working class has been the bearer."[44] There has continued to be, they claim, a clear and impassable barrier between intellectual and manual work with the result that destructive class discrimination continues in society.

The society in which this discrimination is found today is a different society than that of the time prior to the economic miracle of the 1950s and 1960s when a basically agricultural society had emerged from the destruction of the Second World War. Another telling complaint of the communists against the secondary school system has been that it has perpetuated the cultural configuration which had meaning in the old agricultural society where educated people moved into the public administration or the liberal professions. In essence, the criticism has stated that the society has changed but, apart from some

> internal adjustments, the old order of the secondary school is maintained. . . . The poverty of the scientific studies, the almost total absence of the science of society, the reduction of the notion of culture itself almost exclusively to the literary tradition and in particular to the Italian (it is enough to think of the widespread ignorance about music or art and, more in general, about the culture of other countries), the distance from, and more than that, the contempt toward doing things with the hands and productive manual labor--these have by now been analyzed many times and there is no need to insist upon them.[45]

What better way to illustrate the unity of theory and practice than to interject into the curriculum of the upper secondary school a study of and practice in manual labor? Gramsci would have applauded such a move.

The worker himself has been encouraged to learn, and it has been suggested since the days of the factory councils that he improve himself in his job skills as well as his cultural awareness. Claudio Petruccioli at the XI PCI Congress in 1966 stated that a "double scholastic system with morning and afternoon sessions for the secondary superior and . . . for technical and professional instruction ought to be created for the purpose of allowing working youths to continue their studies."[46] Apprenticeship in its various versions should be abolished and "new conditions of work and contract for the youth from 16 to 20 years of age" should allow a "reduction of work-time to six hours daily to permit study."[47]

At the same XI Congress a G. Luporini reported that it was no longer sufficient to expect the communist youth to simply negate every wish of his non-communist boss, and to expect that the only cultural preparation necessary for them could be learned "technically and professionally with much struggle through practical work."[48] Today it

is different, he insisted. Where in earlier days goals "were suggested fundamentally from the instinct of the class and from its expression in political militancy [the youth of today] want to understand many things . . . and not just propaganda on the ideal of socialism. . . . They desire to know what the objectives are toward which they march and they want to know for what the boss stands."[49]

Another topic of educational concern which is found with both Gramsci and the modern Italian communist is that dealing with academic standards. Nearly all want a school of the mass, an obligatory school, and want the student to possess the right to study, not only at the secondary schools, but at the universities as well. Yet they think this presupposes certain obligations on the part of the educators to resist diluting the course content and to "pursue the rigor and the seriousness in a new way, open to life, to the tension of its contradictions, and to the connection between the traditional and the experimentation of the new."[50] Again, "it is necessary to have a school where teaching and studying is accomplished with seriousness and rigor. Saying seriousness does not imply the backward and suffocating conception of a study separate from life, from the civil passions, from the moral tensions, from the tumult of history."[51]

Local School Districts

It should be noted that in educational concerns as in other policy matters, the PCI is taking a gradualist approach, called "revolutionary gradualism"[52] by one communist writer, and attempting to work in a responsible manner for basic reform. The fact that it does

not possess state power in Italy means that it deals with an existing educational system devised by a liberal monarchical state and modified by Gentile of the fascist period; it also means that it has been severely limited in what it can actually do to effect change in that system. This is true as well in those municipal areas where the PCI governs either by itself or in coalition with other parties, though in some cities such as Turin, for example, notable progress in education has been made.

Turin has recently been ruled by a communist/socialist administration. In 1975 it inaugurated a new education program which, if it has succeeded, will have alleviated several problems and accomplished several positive objectives simultaneously. The city had experienced the nation's highest rate of crime and one of the reasons for it, hypothesized the city fathers, was probably due to the absence of the working mother from her home and the consequent liberation of her children with no adult guidance. Though the city could ill afford it financially, it decided not to continue waiting for the central Education Ministry to act, and it launched the new program itself. This program was to be operated by both qualified teachers and their assistants who would provide a rich afternoon schedule of recreation, tours to the countryside and visits to museums, places of business, and factories, and would oversee periods of creative study as well. In addition to this the children were given free school lunches preceding the afternoon program, both of which were made possible in terms of scheduling because the Italian elementary schools, with few exceptions, operated only in the mornings during this period.

Finally, the city government in implementing this scheme was able to obtain the cooperation of Fiat and thus was able to secure the use of its plant busses when they were not scheduled to carry workers.[53]

Generally, local governmental financing, upon which much of the expense of education depends, has been in a deplorable condition. The communes have been either at or near the state of bankruptcy throughout the post-war period and the central government has been unwilling to relinquish fiscal control of these bodies by allowing them wider powers of taxation. The result is that it has had to intervene with the financial support necessary for many local projects, with each successive occasion reinforcing the dependence of these local bodies upon the central government. The PCI has not pushed as assiduously as it could have for reform in this area despite its desire to strengthen the local governments "which are its major centers of power [because] it knows that a battle with the Christian Democrats on this issue would result in an ideological contest between democracy and authoritarianism, which it prefers to avoid."[54] The significance of this for education is that the communists have usually been unable to enact meaningful reforms in those communes which they control, and unable to influence decisions in the communes where power is shared with other parties, because most meaningful reforms cost more money than is available.

Italian Universities and the PCI

With respect to the transition between the upper secondary and the university, Gramsci had some important ideas. He believed

that in his day educators in the public school system did not differentiate in the teaching methods used in the upper and lower secondary schools because they thought that the students in each were immature intellectually and morally, and that maturity in them would not be realized until their university days when it would blossom automatically. Gramsci said that this common teaching method for both schools failed to accommodate the gradually growing maturity of the upper secondary students with the result that they, having been conditioned by externally imposed discipline, were ill-prepared for the demands of self-discipline required in the university environment. This transition was difficult, Gramsci stated, because it "occurs immediately after the crisis of puberty when the impetuosity of the passionate instincts has not yet been completely controlled by the character and the moral conscience."[55] He continued with the assertion that this passage which in Italy has been generally too sharp and mechanical, could be more easily navigated if the upper secondary school would serve as a transitional bridge in which not only the study of the scientific method should commence rather than be delayed for the university curriculum, but in which the "fundamental values of humanism, the intellectual self-discipline and the moral autonomy to be used either in the university or in the practical-productive work outside the university . . . could be created."[56]

To understand some of the problems associated with the Italian universities, it should be remembered that many of them were founded in the Middle Ages, for example, the University of Rome which is about 700 years old, and the University of Bologna, allegedly the

oldest in Europe, which dates from the 12th century. In the consideration of this antiquity one is led to ruminate upon the development of universities in general. How true it is that they, despite the progressive and indeed at times revolutionary concepts engendered by them, plod along with antiquated practices that frequently other segments of society have long since jettisoned. In the case of the Italian university this is amply proven by many restrictive practices which run counter to the spirit of the liberal-democratic national Constitution, to which the communists frequently point in justifying their reform efforts throughout the entire Italian school system. Among the problems plaguing the Italian university have been the "baronial system," politicization, overcrowded conditions with insufficient physical facilities and teaching staff,[57] examinations, prohibition of assemblies, poor employment prospects for many graduates, and insufficient opportunity for all to enjoy the benefits of higher education.

The barons compose a select group of about 3,000 full professors,[58] called ordinari, possessing vested interests both inside and outside the university which they protect with great tenacity sanctified by tradition. They possess "almost limitless power over their retinues of ill-paid and insecure assistant professors and instructors"[59] on the teaching staff. The full professors also hold themselves aloof from the students, whom they rarely meet outside the classroom, and the only sense of common purpose they have seems to be related to preserving the status quo. Robert Wuliger claims that some of these university baronial fiefdoms "are supported by

Communists and Socialists, as well as by right-wing Christian Democrats"[60] and Burton Clark states that a "'Red Baron' can be a baron first and a Communist second.'"[61] Yet the PCI has spoken out against this academic restriction of democracy on numerous occasions. A suggestion by Gianfranco Ferretti writing in Rinascita would involve the expenditure of no monies in promoting a particularly important reform involving the restriction of their "extracurricular" activities; these professor-professionals spend little time actually teaching and much time off campus directing their private institutes or clinics, or engaging in consultation activities, for which they collect millions of lire each month. This is a problem plaguing university life throughout Italy and he claimed it could be terminated or at least drastically modified by law.[62]

According to Burton Clark, the central administration in Rome controls the administration of university financing, curriculum and personnel without input from the universities but also without any "procedure for implementation or enforcement."[63] It is neither a

> centrally administered bureaucracy nor a free bargaining marketplace. As a result, it manages to accumulate the damaging features of both, but nonetheless is capable of averting a final crisis. The system has a miraculous capacity to work out crises time and again by marginal adjustments that, while solving nothing, do provide sufficient equilibrium to keep things going.[64]

It is a system in which, though "disguised as a state bureaucracy . . . the advantages of patronage and favoritism outweigh those of civil service or professional achievement."[65] An article in Rinascita declared that

> the university is today a closed body dominated corporatively by the academics: the first fundamental democratic request is that of opening the directive organs including the councils of the faculty and the councils of the administration to the full representation of those below the professorial "chairs" such as the aggregati, incaricati [assistant professors], assistants and . . . students.[66]

This was the subject of much of the student activity of 1968, the demand of the students for more self-determination not only in course selection and curriculum development but in the actual governing of the universities. One could say that just as the "barons" perpetuate a bit of the feudal era in their fiefdoms and privileges, so the students demanded a return to the same era when it was their historical counterparts who actively operated the universities and who employed the professors. Yet these contemporary students representing all shades of political opinion from Catholics to communists demanded not dominance over the professors but a consultative relationship with them in which the students would hold some power of self-determination.

The student rebellions started in November 1967 when students occupied buildings on the campus of the University of Turin, and by February of the next year, the University of Rome was occupied along with the buildings on many other Italian university campuses. Some of the radical students attempted to use these demonstrations as a catalytic force for revolution against the entire society and were induced to violence. Many of the protesting students had seen the resemblance between the stability-through-paralysis of the central government and that of the universities, the latter being legally subservient political structures to the national government. There

were attempts on the part of many student revolutionaries, recently emerged from backgrounds of affluence, to link with the workers in an effort to extend the struggle to the entire society, but in the context of this turmoil the attempt became an exercise in futility, as it has in other times and places.

The Italian Communist Party was unprepared for these great student uprisings of 1968. However, in comparison to the French Communist Party which divorced itself from the French student efforts in that year, "the PCI [took] an incomparably more flexible and conciliatory position toward the [Italian] students and . . . [their] spontaneous strike movements."[67] Perhaps this flexibility was derived from uncertainty within the party ranks as typified by the contradictory advice given in Rinascita to the students and the Italian communists by its writers Robert Antonelli representing one point of view and Nora Federici along with Dr. Angiola Masucco Costa, representing others, all published in the inflammatory year of 1968.

According to Robert Antonelli, the Italian university, in the year of these great student upheavals, displayed both the typical forms of the old backward authoritarianism and the responsiveness to "capitalistic development through the growing subordination of the direction of study, of research, and of professional formation, to the demands of the market of work dominated by the laws of profit." He felt that it was the students within the university structures who possessed the force "capable of opposing in a bloc the old forms of authoritarianism and the new expressions of the system," and that "the fundamental student objective is the destruction of the present

structure of power existing in the Italian university and the foundation of the radical new possibility of teaching and of study."[68]

Antonelli warned that unless the students would attempt to accomplish this as soon as possible, that is, during the transitory moment that was upon them, the forces of tradition would be recovered. He struck with the usual arguments against the oligarchic government of the tenured professors at both the teaching and administrative levels of the university, the marginal position in which all others in the university setting are placed, and "the lack of any liberty and possibility of student initiative in themes of reform, in decisions pertaining to professional and cultural formation in the choice of courses, or in the institution of new courses."[69] Furthermore he saw the "examination as a manifestation of academic authority and as a sanction of the development of memory . . . uprooted from any real process of cultural reality."[70] Finally, Antonelli suggested the abolition of these exams along with the "constitution at all levels (whether administrative or scientific) of joint committees of professors and students, to be engaged in effective and cooperative efforts, and to open both the principle of collegial research and that of teaching to new cultural experiments and hypotheses."[71]

The examinations are now conducted three times yearly. They are oral, last about ten minutes per individual and are conducted amidst some confusion since vast throngs of students who never appear on campus except at examination times must be tested as quickly and efficiently as possible. The examining board consists of three professors who, having probably never seen the student before, must

arrive at a decision regarding his knowledge and intellectual capabilities. Since the number of professors serving on the examining boards is in some institutions 50% less than the full teaching staff of those institutions, pandemonium is built into the system. This type of examination and the procedures involved in conducting it are severely criticized by many, especially in view of the overcrowded conditions which in some instances are ludicrous. As an extreme example, the modern University of Rome was built in the 1930s for 15,000 students, and although its facilities have expanded somewhat, they had not done so sufficiently to accommodate even half of its enrollment of 1975 which was 122,483. Naples University had nearly 79,000 and Bologna more than 53,000 students in that same year.[72] As a way of opposing the examination system, an informal demand grew for the so-called "countercourses" to be taught free of charge by voluntary faculty members and qualified students.

In an article written by Nora Federici we find a cautionary note regarding the student's demands for the abolition of exams and for the institution of the countercourses; she wondered if the latter would really accomplish the revolutionary objectives intended by its advocates.

> Indubitably these "countercourses" . . . would have a major formative value comparable to that of some official courses, but how many people could really avail themselves of this "counter-university" and obtain profit thereby? Would it not be as the situation is now--only a minority of students being able to participate, i.e., those who attend full-time at the university and those who are for social reasons or personal attitudes, able to involve themselves totally and profitably in this difficult work?[73]

There is a legitimate place in the university for seminars and laboratories, she insisted: "they should constitute a place of training for the youths who, together with professors and assistants, would debate there the arguments revealed in the formal lesson and they could propose, discuss and elaborate themes of research and exercise."[74] Furthermore, seminars and laboratories could serve some of the functions now inappropriately assigned to the examination; they could in short be vehicles for improving the level of preparation of the students. Examinations should be retained but their format should be revised to eliminate the "quiz" aspect.[75]

More conservatism could be seen in another article in Rinascita during March of 1968, where the author, Dr. Angiola Massucco Costa, has informed the students that it was "utopian and illusionary to demand total autonomy, or to claim power without knowing exactly in what it consists."[76] To prevent a stiffening and counter belligerence of the right with possibly disastrous consequences, they would have to

> avoid improvizations, prepare a more precise and deliberate appraisal of reality, and choose, among the sound and conspicuous results which their revolt will certainly have produced, the path of continued and constructive cooperation with the other revolutionary forces already operating in our society to which they will have had the merit of furnishing new stimulation.[77]

And finally, Berlinguer balanced "revolution" with conservatism when he stated that "the old authoritarian hierarchy and the intolerably repressive methods must be liquidated . . . [and] the right of meetings both of the students and of the teachers must be sanctified and exercised fully."[78] The students must, however, avoid "quarrelsome

and inconclusive assemblies" because this irresponsibility only encourages the fascist groups and provokes their agitation in turn. Therefore the students must learn to be "self-disciplined and organized."[79]

Actually the PCI was seen by many of the student radicals in 1968 and thereafter as an establishment party, one that, though mouthing Marxian precepts, had come to terms with the capitalist society; and as such, it was considered by them as indistinguishable from the Christian Democrats. In Bologna, which had been controlled by the PCI since World War II, student disturbances in that year brought down upon them the city police directed by none other than the communist municipal authorities. This had the effect of further reinforcing the charge of "establishment" hurled at the party by the radicals. Indeed, it must be admitted that in many of the student groups, the communist students were the most responsible and conservative of the lot.

Ottavio Cecchi, writing in 1974, said that the latter part of the 1960s were "good years" for the universities because of their "uncontrolled growth." Many students of this period wanted superior instruction but had no intention of advocating university reform; others used the universities for shelters while they were waiting for work. Soon it became apparent that "youths with the highest grades and academic honours were not successful in locating work. Some took the way of teaching but very quickly the lists of teachers --in a country which has a moderate amount of illiteracy, especially in the South--were also full, and there was nothing more to do for

anybody."[80] Taxi and bus drivers increasingly appeared with the university degree. Cecchi said that the government's education policies in those years were shortsighted and "today [it] gathers the fruits of these policies. The fruits are bitter [and] the cost of the university policy of the government in these years has been expensive. To pay it are the youths who have hoped to reach the university degree, that piece of paper which . . . today . . . represents the sign of mass aspiration."[81]

Writing in 1964 Cecchi estimated that in the next year there would probably be some 106,400 individuals likely to achieve university degrees, and he wondered whether they would be "successful in locating positions if the relations between school and job are not changed."[82] Since there were 97,761 who finished in 1973 and 102,747 in the 1974 academic year, his figures may prove to be about correct for 1975. Of these individuals those who received their degrees in the Gruppo Letterario, or the literary category, constituted by far the largest single category: 36,585 in 1973 and 39,697 in 1974,[83] a difficult category for which to find employment in a nation already burdened with the jobless. The communists continue to believe that a planned economy dominated by the political structure could more easily deal with the problem of the educated unemployed or underemployed by ensuring a stronger relation than now exists between the output of the universities and the needs of society.

The students who continue to the universities today are in overwhelming numbers the sons and daughters of the professionals, bureaucrats and capitalists; they are the "haves" of the Italian

society. The PCI has constantly urged that admission to the institutions of higher learning be liberalized and to this end it supported the use of a scholarship termed the pre-salario throughout the 1960s. Gianfranco Pintore, for example, in L'Unita advocated it because the pre-salario would enhance the right of all to study at these institutions on the basis of merit and thus it would tend to work toward the abolition of the class division of the school.[84] By 1975 the pre-salario had been instituted and it was paid to 180,000 of the 650,000 university students of the nation.[85] Theodora Lurie, writing in 1978, stated that it had become "a stipend of $280 to $560 a year awarded to needy students whose annual family income is less than $5,000" and who are able to score an average of 27 out of 30 on their exams.[86] The party continues to assert that anyone who is capable of succeeding in the universities ought to be allowed to enter them and to continue on the basis of performance rather than wealth or class, and that the old educational system based upon privilege should not be continued.[87]

A very important question which has been ignored by the Italian communists emerges here. If on the one hand they have desired a liberalized university admissions policy with anyone being admitted who is a graduate of any upper secondary school curriculum; but on the other they have desired a planned economy possessing greater coordination between the output of the universities and the requirements of society, it would not be difficult to see the problem that may be encountered. Any quota could easily be exceeded if all qualified students who applied were admitted to the universities and allowed

to enroll freely in the curriculum of their choice, provided prerequisites were fulfilled; the result would be, as it indeed is today, dire unemployment. However, restrictions enforcing the quotas would subvert both the individual liberties of the students and the Italian liberal-democracy while employment difficulties would simply be shifted from the university graduates to those who were never admitted. Because individual Italian communist writers have continued advocating each side without denying the other, one is led to believe that either opportunism is at work here or the party out of some measure of diffidence has refused to take the stand that is required--the crucial question being, to what extent is the Italian society to be controlled in this area?

Actually it has been easier to enter the universities as a student since 1969 because it was in that year that admission policies were liberalized by a law which enabled students who had graduated from the less prestigious secondary schools to enroll; by 1971 "all high school graduates had access to all departments at all institutions of higher learning."[88] This was a necessary step in the abolition of the monopoly the privileged have had in higher education. Yet

> following Guattopardo's logic--in order to change nothing one has to change something--this law seemed the best way to accommodate popular pressure backed by moderate-to-left parties and unions, without changing anything in the university core structure and power system.
>
> Enrollment jumped by about 16 percent [in 1970 as compared to the previous year] and has kept growing.[89]

The major difficulty in regard to university attendance continues today to be social discrimination, much of which originates

with devastating results in the home environment. Gramsci saw manifestations of it when he wrote of the academic advantage experienced by children emerging from affluent or relatively affluent homes and the greater degree of probability those children had of desiring to attend institutions of higher education, actually attending them, and doing so with more success than that realized by children produced in more "modest" surroundings. The problem continues to run deeper, therefore, than simply the deprivations experienced as a result of unfair university admissions policies; it has been rooted deeply in society, and it has been one with which the PCI has attempted to deal especially through the concept of the maternal school, that level of formal education preceding the elementary stage. The point should be made that the PCI has realized the necessity of interrelating educational reforms, perhaps more so than other Italian political parties, and it has perceived that success in some areas may be endangered by a lack of success in other areas. Failure in the working of the maternal school, the level of education most directly concerned with the problem mentioned above, probably means a perpetuation of social discrimination at the university level, and failure of the universities probably means the continuation of this social discrimination in the homes and a desultory maternity-school policy.

The PCI sees the educational system as too centralized today, and at the university level it is working toward both the implementation of university autonomy and the creation of the universities for each region. Probably its major effort at the level of higher education is devoted to organizing cooperative units of

students, teachers and workers. Dr. Angiola Massucco Costa believed that there were some tenured professors who supported the students in the uprisings of 1968 "not to the point of resigning . . . but with the clear will of establishing effective communication with them and of operating together for common democratic objectives."[90] She claimed that some of the tenured university professors expressed "some of the most advanced ideas" before the student demonstrations became radicalized and that "some among them were the signatories of the requests for resignations of the rettori [presidents] who proved to be too faithful to the constituted power."[91]

She called for the tenured professors and in fact all intellectuals, whether associated with an institution of higher education or not, to join with the students to prevent their isolation. The intellectuals and students should then unite in a "convergent action with those of the working class for a democratic redistribution of power and a new order of the Italian society."[92] Berlinguer has seen the struggle for educational reform in Gramscian terms as "part of the battle for an ideal and cultural hegemony of the working class and for the enrichment of its alliance with the intellectual force," hence "it is an essential obligation of the party."[93]

With regard to curriculum content, Nora Federici writing in Rinascita has stated that the university has no business ignoring technological progress since the latter is bound up in scientific progress which is irreversible and is therefore not an integral part of capitalism. Furthermore, she wrote that "there . . . should not be any contradiction between the cultural formation and the

professional preparation [of the student in the university]." Therefore, "disciplines such as history and philosophy should be introduced in the first year of course work in the different departments of study (e.g., the history of science, or the philosophy of science in the various departments of science and technology)."[94] Gianfranco Ferretti has noted regrettably that "the esteemed marble architecture . . . in many of our universities seems to be more important than microscopes or libraries."[95] Finally, Berlinguer had this to say on the matter of curriculum:

> Insofar as the content of the curriculum is concerned, one deals first of all with making the historical experience and the traditional ideal of antifascism an integral part of it. . . . In the second place one deals with binding the study and the life of the school to the reality of our epoch, the course of great movements of renewal, of new currents of thought, and of great scientific and technical conquests.[96]

Alessandro Natta warned that "the politics of reform and of scholastic programming have a real value only if they are conceived in the area of a different type of economic development," otherwise any innovation will be useless because it is in its function "subordinate to the economic-productive necessities of the present system."[97] However attractive such an outlook might be to the average communist, who in Italy could see it as containing more than a hint of opposition to Gramsci's words, it is a closed position, and some communist writers would disagree with it because it is closed.

Ettore Casari, e.g., advocated the open-minded and the scientific method which not only "encourages the determination to solve problems" but which should always induce one to "question why?" and which "teaches us . . . that one can find an answer to the precise

and sensible question."[98] Continuing with the matter of communist openmindedness, Paulo Bufalini wrote in Rinascita during 1968 concerning how his people fought to the last against the reactionary educational laws of the government:

> we had proposed . . . our plan for [a particular] law which we did not claim was perfect but which certainly in a large measure corresponded to the necessity of the university and to the aspirations of the students and the democratic and progressive professors. We are declaring ourselves always ready to negotiate and agree with what would respond to the real needs and to the requests of the university movement.[99] (Italics added.)

Giuseppe Chiarante stated that there are no simple solutions to the difficult problems of educational reform,[100] and in 1968 Bruno Vitale counseled his readers to "confront the new situation [in education] with open eyes, and without dogma."[101]

In view of the dogmatic qualities too many communists have displayed in the past, it is refreshing to come across disclaimers and denials regarding their possession of absolute truth in the matter of effecting educational reforms. Italian communist writers do frequently imply that they are uncertain and that they can learn from others outside of the communist ranks, an attitude which may be due to the relatively secure position of the party in Italy as Gordon J. DiRenzo suggests.[102]

Footnotes--Chapter IV

[1]The "Italian way to socialism" is a phrase used by Italian communists to indicate their awareness of the belief that peculiar or endemic national conditions must call forth peculiar or endemic communist responses for progress toward socialism to be realized. In the case of Italy, liberal-democratic conditions must be taken into account. This idea is related to the Polycentrism of Togliatti.

The "Historic Compromise" refers to the PCI decision reached in 1972 to join in a national governmental coalition with the Christian Democrats should the opportunity for it arise.

[2]La Direzione del Partito, Il PCI contro la guerra, il fascismo, per la libertà, democrazia, per l'indipendenze d'Italia (Rome: Società editrice L'Unità, 1945), p. 8, as cited by Poggi, p. 33.

[3]Informazioni riassuntive sull'attività delle Commissioni Centrali di Lavoro per L'anno 1946 (Roma: Stabil. Tip. UESISA, Commissione di Organizzazione, Ufficio Statistico, n.d.), pp. 14, 15, 19, 20, as cited in Poggi, p. 48. From this source it is impossible to ascertain whether these were different courses, the same course repeated, or even what the precise subject matter entailed. Being termed "party schools" should allow one to infer that they dealt with propagandistic materials as well as instruction concerning the practical operations of the party.

[4]VII Congresso Nazionale del PCI. Relazioni sull'attività dei Gruppi Parlamentari e delle Commissioni Centrali, Documenti per i delegati (n.p.: n.d.), p. 72, as cited in Poggi, p. 48.

[5]Macciocchi, p. 94.

[6]Antonetti and Volkov, "Communists in the Municipalities," World Marxist Review, p. 95.

[7]See the Appendix.

[8]See Article 33, Appendix.

[9]Anthony Scarangello, "Italy," The Encyclopedia of Education, Vol. V (New York: Crowell-Collier Educational Corp., 1971), p. 229.

[10]Kogan, The Government of Italy, p. 153.

[11]La Direzione del PCI, "Scuola: problemi urgenti e prospettive di riforma," Scuola & Universita 4 (1972): 3.

[12]Fiori, p. 23.

[13]Gramsci, "Cronache dell' 'Ordine Nuovo'" 20, L'Ordine Nuovo, p. 466.

[14]La Direzione del PCI, p. 3.

[15]Ottavio Cecchi, "Pisa: le idee degli studenti," Rinascita, 1 March 1968, p. 15, quoting from the book Relazione sulla scuola: Per un'opposizione alla politica attuata nella scuola dalla classe dominante (no author indicated), Libreria Feltrinelli, 1968, no page reference.

[16]"La Media Superiore: Una scuola da rifare: La Cultura e il lavoro," 28 January 1977, p. 15.

[17]"Il discorso di Berlinguer alla manifestazione del PCI," Rinascita, 9 December 1977, p. 22.

[18]Guglionesi Campobasso and Sandro D'Astolto, "Per un anticipo della scuola dell' obbligo," Rinascita, 22 July 1977, p. 29.

[19]"Il discorso di Berlinguer alla manifestazione del PCI," p. 22.

[20]The Encyclopedia of Education, Vol. V, pp. 229-30.

[21]Kogan, The Government of Italy, pp. 154-55.

[22]"Professori chiromanti per arrotondare lo scarse stipendio," 4 May 1962, p. 6.

[23]Ibid.

[24]Romano Ledda, "La questione del doposcuola," L'Unita, 31 March 1962, p. 3.

[25]Ibid.

[26]Fiori, p. 26.

[27]Ibid., p. 107.

[28]Gramsci, Quaderni, Vol. III, pp. 1544-45.

[29]Ibid.

[30]Sommario di Statistiche Storiche dell'Italia: 1861-1965 (Rome: Istituto Centrale di Statistica, 1968), Tavola 29, p. 42.

[31]See Togliatti's comments regarding the "economic miracle," Nella democrazia e nella pace verso il socialismo: I rapporti e le

conclusioni all'VIII, IX e X Congresso del Partito comunista italiano (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1963), pp. 217-18.

[32]XI Congresso del partito comunista italiano: atti e risoluzioni (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1966), p. 471.

[33]The 1961 census figure is in Annuario Statistico Italiano: 1965 (Rome: Istituto Centrale di Statistica, 1965), Tavola 10, pp. 10-11. The 1971 figure is in Annuario Statistico Italiano: 1975 (Rome: Istituto Centrale di Statistica, 1975), Tavola 9, pp. 10-11.

[34]Annuario Statistico Italiano: 1965, Tavola 16, pp. 20-21.

[35]Annuario Statistico Italiano: 1975, Tavola 12, pp. 26-29.

[36]Enrico Berlinguer, XIII Congresso del partito comunista italiano: atti e risoluzioni (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1972), p. 32.

[37]Ibid., p. 39.

[38]Antonio Santoni Rugiu, "The Evolution of the Italian Educational System 1956-1966," Comparative Education Review 11 (October 1967): 349.

[39]Berlinguer, "Il discorso di Berlinguer alla manifestazione del PCI," p. 19.

[40]"Scuola di massa; una conquista civile," Rinascita, 23 September 1977, p. 8.

[41]"Il discorso di Berlinguer alla manifestazione del PCI," p. 22.

[42]Rugiu, p. 351.

[43]Berlinguer, "Il discorso di Berlinguer alla manifestazione del PCI," p. 21.

[44]Achille Occhetto, "La scuola punto cruciale del rinnovamento," Rinascita, 23 September 1977, p. 7.

[45]Chiarante, "La Media Superiore: Una scuola di rifare: La cultura e il lavoro," p. 15.

[46]Petruccioli, XI Congresso del partito comunista italiano, p. 471.

[47]Ibid.

[48]Ibid., p. 481.

[49]Ibid., pp. 481-82.

[50]Achille Occhetto, "Costituente di massa per la scuola," Rinascita, 22 July 1977, p. 6.

[51]Berlinguer, "Il discorso di Berlinguer alla manifestazione del PCI," p. 21.

[52]Occhetto, "Costituente di massa per la scuola," p. 6.

[53]Dalbert Hallenstein, "Left-Controlled City Council Launches 'All-Day' Plan," Times Educational Supplement, No. 3147, 26 September 1975, p. 18.

[54]Galli and Prandi, pp. 231-32.

[55]Gramsci, Quaderni, Vol. I, p. 486.

[56]Ibid.

[57]Among the manifold problems plaguing these instructors is that of their pay which is not only very low but at times irregular. In one instance a group had not been paid for three months. Check Mario Passi, "Lo sciopero dei docenti è un contributo al rinnovamento dell'Università italiana," L'Unita, 30 January 1962, p. 3. Also see Luca Perrone, "Micropolitics of Barony: The Italian University Case," Harvard Educational Review 48 (November 1978): 490, ". . . the junior staff . . . bear the brunt of the teaching burden, but [their] official salaries range from $150 to $450 per month."

[58]Paul Hoffmann, "Italy's Faltering School System Beset From All Sides," New York Times, 9 March 1971, p. 39.

[59]Ibid.

[60]"Italian Universities and the Social Crisis," American Association of University Professors Bulletin 61 (October 1975): 234, 236.

[61]Burton Clark, Academic Power in Italy (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1977), p. 90, as quoted in Luca Perrone, "The Micropolitics of Barony: The Italian University Case," p. 489.

[62]"Università: nulla di fatto," 16 March 1963, pp. 25-26.

[63]Quoted in Perrone, p. 485.

[64]Ibid., p. 486.

[65]Ibid., p. 487.

[66]"Università contro Gui," Rinascita, 12 December 1964, p. 2.

[67]Daniel Singer, Prelude to Revolution: France in May 1968 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1970), p. 292.

[68]"Il rapporto tra docenti e giovani," Rinascita, 1 March 1968, p. 18.

[69]Ibid.

[70]Ibid.

[71]Ibid.

[72]Annuario Statistico Italiano: 1976 (Roma: Istituto Centrale di Statistica, 1976), Tavola 77, pp. 110-11.

[73]"Proposte dagli atenei," Rinascita, 1 March 1968, p. 17.

[74]Ibid.

[75]Ibid.

[76]"Professori codini e professori che lottano," 15 March 1968, p. 30.

[77]Ibid.

[78]XIII Congresso del PCI, p. 47.

[79]Ibid.

[80]"Università 'crescita zero?'" Rinascita, 1 February 1974, p. 40.

[81]Ibid.

[82]Ibid.

[83]Check Annuario Statistico Italiano 1975, Tavola 84, p. 124, and Annuario Statistico Italiano 1976, Tavola 79, p. 113 for the 1973 and 1974 figures, respectively.

[84]"Gli studenti delle medie chiedono il pre-salario," 26 April 1962, p. 7.

[85]Wuliger, p. 238.

[86]"Terror on Italy's Campuses," The Chronicle of Higher Education 16 (27 March 1978): 1, 7.

[87]Paolo Bufalini, "Il partito e gil studenti," Rinascita, 1 March 1968, p. 2, and Berlinguer, "Il discorso di Berlinguer alla manifestazione del PCI, pp. 19-22.

[88]Hoffmann, p. 39.

[89]Luca Perrone, p. 490.

[90]Costa, p. 30.

[91]Ibid.

[92]Ibid.

[93]Berlinguer, XIII Congresso del PCI, p. 48.

[94]"Proposte dagli atenei," Rinascita, p. 17.

[95]"Università: nulla di fatto," p. 25.

[96]Berlinguer, XIII Congresso del PCI, p. 47.

[97]"Miliardi alla scuola privata," Rinascita, 19 December 1964, p. 9.

[98]"Insegnare la scienza nella scuola di massa," Rinascita, 12 April 1974, p. 20.

[99]"Il partito e gli studenti," p. 2.

[100]"Università '68,'" Rinascita, 9 February 1968, p. 24.

[101]"La testa del rettore su un piatto d'argento," Rinascita, 16 February 1968, p. 9.

[102]Gordon J. DiRenzo, Personality, Power and Politics: A Social Psychological Analysis of the Italian Deputy and His Parliamentary System (Notre Dame, Indiana: Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1967), pp. 152-53.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The PCI's Changing Perspective

If one were to examine the comments of important Italian communists about their party at critical moments in the history of that organization, a changing perspective becomes apparent. For example, just prior to its formation in 1921 Antonio Gramsci, secretary of the PCI from April 1924 to November 1926, wrote this about his future party: It would

> through a central council of the national economy coordinate and unify the initiatives of production, attempt to socialize all capitalist industry, and all areas of work not yet absorbed by capitalist industrialization; it [would] tend to convert all in society to the status of the proletariat; but of an emancipated and regenerated proletariat which does not possess private wealth but which agrees to the administration of wealth in common and which derives from it that enjoyment and security of life which it deserves for its productive work.[1]

In 1925 Palmiro Togliatti, who would lead the Italian party for nearly 40 years, had the following to say about it:

> It is true in fact that the mainspring of historical development lies for us in the modification of the relations of production, but it is also true that the relations of production translate themselves into class relationships, [that] the class is an element which organizes itself, which acquires a consciousness, [and] which "desires" and is able to make its will, consciousness and organization count in the complete process of social transformation. It is the party which gives consciousness, organization, and will to the class.[2]

In 1946 Togliatti made this statement about the most decisive element in the movement of the PCI. It has been "the tendency to

constantly affirm the value of a democracy which should be open to every possible new development," a democracy "with an aversion not only to every form of totalitarianism and reaction, but also to any form of hardening [and insensitive] bureaucratic development of the political life."[3] Finally, Enrico Berlinguer, the present Secretary General of the PCI, had this to say about his party in 1975:

> [it] has struggled to guarantee all the fundamental liberties--the liberty of association, of speech, etc.--in the frame of a very advanced social and economic system, according to the Constitution of 1948 which we consider one of the most advanced in Western Europe from the point of view of democracy. And the communist party has played a decisive role in the formulation of this Constitution. We have never believed, not even in 1945, that a single party--or a single class--would be able to resolve the problems of our country.
>
> The Italian Communist Party is a mass party rather than a party of cadres as some other communist parties are. We have enrolled almost 1,700,000 members.[4]

One may see the decreasing emphasis on the proletarian class with each succeeding statement, and an inversely proportional emphasis upon an open-minded approach to what by 1975 have become in effect "national" problems.

The PCI and the Revolutionary Period: The Predominance of Propaganda over Education 1919-1926

The Italian Communist Party has undergone a considerable metamorphosis since its earliest days, but from those days to the present its educational philosophy has flowed from its basic political-philosophical orientation. The first period, that extending from the disturbances of 1919 and the factory occupations of 1920, prior to the formation of the party, to 1926, five years after its establishment, could be called the Revolutionary Period. In this segment of

time the revolution was expected from moment to moment, and even after the triumph of fascism in 1922, the belief lingered among many Italian communists that the revolution was just around the corner.

The factory occupations seemed for many to be in the very vortex of the revolution leading to the "inevitable" emergence of socialism. Evidence could be "justifiably" ignored in the formation and presentation of the message because either socialism was to be the wave of the future, in which case carelessness would not matter, or it could be the wave of the future, in which case time and the "right moment" might be the most important consideration. Propaganda in one of its definitions is described by Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary of 1976 as "the spreading of ideas, information, or rumor for the purpose of helping or injuring an institution, a cause, or a person." In the dispensing of information it was this approach which was emphasized even in the "educational circles" which were formed in some of the factories where the message supplanted the evidence in importance.

In L'Ordine Nuovo, the material tended to be written in a journalistic style and, though rather broad in its sweep, it qualifies as both propaganda and educational material with the former predominating. With the collapse of the factory occupations, the reassessment by those who called themselves "communist" resulted in the formation of their party under the leadership of Bordiga as they split from the socialists in 1921. Bordiga was hardly one to examine realistic evidence, and his ideological leadership consisted in waiting for preordained and deterministic forces to sweep his group up

once again into a revolutionary fervor, this time with success to be "assured." Bordiga was not interested in education, and the newly formed party had to await great world developments which would turn it away from its alleged revolutionary propensities.

The Intermediary Period: The Increasing Importance of Education 1926-1935

The second phase was more complicated and has been termed the Intermediary Period. In it the Italian communists were forced to abandon their earlier expectations for a rapidly approaching proletarian revolution as it gradually dawned upon them after 1926 that it was not just around the corner; instead they found themselves grappling against fascism in a cooperative effort with other communists. The proletarian revolution had to be postponed while the immediate task of vanquishing fascism was undertaken. The educational implications of this were important for two reasons: First, the element of time underwent a change in the thinking of the Italian communists. Where previously there was felt to be insufficient time to prepare for the revolution, now the probable date of that revolution was pushed far into the distant future for those of the PCI who "kept the faith." This meant that time could now be taken to examine information for its evidence and that therefore one of the reasons for the existence of propaganda was now generally elimitated. Second, it became increasingly necessary to examine realistic evidence which was used to explain the reasons why the grip of fascism seemed to be so unshakable in Italy and, after 1933, in Germany. The old explanations showing fascism to be simply a virulent form of liberal-capitalism

were becoming patently absurd even to many of the most doctrinaire members of the PCI by the mid-1930s.

This called for a reassessment of the situation, one that aligned explanations to a much greater extent with objective conditions, and therefore, one which more frequently tended to elevate these efforts from propagandizing and indoctrinating exercises to education-related research. Propaganda and indoctrination continued throughout the Intermediary Period, as can be seen in any reading of the literature of this era or in examining the curricula of the various party schools set up outside Italy, but the share of activity devoted to locating evidence and supporting it with logic and proof increased considerably over the Revolutionary Period.

The PCI and the National Period: The Ascendancy of Education over Propaganda, 1935 to the Present

Although Gramsci's active political life fell within the Revolutionary Period, and his major writing, the Prison Notebooks, the Quaderni del Carcere, was produced in the Intermediary Period, his greatest influence upon the party and the nation had to await the post-war segment of the third and last period, the National Period. It may be claimed on the basis of his writings that he viewed education differently than his great Russian precursor, Lenin, whose organization provided the model for the Italian communists in the first years of their existence, and whose views pursuant to education will briefly be indicated in the following digression, prior to considering the importance of the National Period.

The Leninist Approach to Education

Where Marx discounted the importance of ideas in history and seemed to assert that a rise in class consciousness would be an inevitable by-product of men's actions in bringing about the proletarian revolution, Lenin believed the revolution could be the by-product of knowledge and consciousness. He also felt that the masses possessed a spontaneity which, uncorrected by leadership, would either doom them to aimless and ineffectual actions, or to a trade-union consciousness that really made them a part of capitalism. Though Marx felt that the irrationality of the masses would be transformed into rationality with the spontaneous initiation of the revolution, Lenin believed that it was the function of the party to induce both rationality in the masses and their revolutionary activity at the most propitious moment.

The party was to be a centrally organized, disciplined, and unscrupulous force dedicated to the victory of Marxism and willing to use any means to achieve it. The party institutionalized distrust, insecurity and hierarchical control by emphasizing the "centralism in the concept of democratic-centralism," while "orthodoxy, or the ability to make correct decisions, became identified with the power to make decisions."[5] Lenin's emphasis upon expediency and his preoccupation with the question of power as evidenced by his willingness in 1917 to take it and worry about the political task later;[6] his pessimistic appraisal of the masses; and his consequent approval and use of manipulative techniques all had implications for education. Since the Leninist party considered itself to be the elite of the

working classes, the guardian of its true interests and the vanguard of its aspirations, since authority therefore emanated downward, and since the party believed it had a monopoly of truth as determined by its leadership,[7] education was seen as the inculcation of that truth in the masses.

The masses were seen as manipulable, and hence a dilatory attitude with regard to developing the "true" enlightenment or consciousness of the masses could be taken. They could be educated after the assumption of power rather than before if it suited the expediency of the leaders, but how easy it would be under the press of gaining and maintaining power, to delay the complete education program designed to endow the masses with consciousness. If it is finally promulgated it must always defer to considerations of power and to the whims of the top political leaders since it exists by their grace and its content is constituted by their pronouncements.

Truth is given, bestowed, inculcated, or forced upon the student who is distrusted and patronized. Education here does not mean helping the student to realize his potentialities, search out evidence, or concentrate on mental or moral development, but, based upon the absence of faith in the development of desirable traits in the student, it means dictating the "truth" to him. One who is "educated" or conscious under these circumstances follows orders and sees things in conformity with the "line." This type of mass "education" sabotages any realistic appraisal by the party of true mass sentiments and the necessity of manufacturing them must be plagued

by the question of their effectiveness, a preoccupation which creates its own slavery.

The PCI Approach to Education

The above was the Leninist approach to education. Has it also been the Italian communist approach? There have been similarities, but there are differences as well. One may say that the leading position of the PCI in the Italian labor movement has entailed a concomitant assumption of leadership in the realm of education, as has been the case with the Leninist party. The PCI has assumed that it has possessed the Marxian consciousness, the dispersion of which among the masses is the sine qua non of their future happiness and prosperity. This assumption has frequently resulted in propaganda and indoctrination especially in the Revolutionary and Intermediary Periods, but also somewhat in the National Period, and yet its attitude in the propagating of the Marxian message is significantly different from that of the Leninist. Despite some rather dramatic gyrations in the political position of the PCI during the nearly 60 years of its history, one central point around which these oscillations have occurred has been that of trust rather than distrust of the masses.

It may be said that the socio-political preconditions for the National Period began to coalesce long before the completion of the Second World War and the redemption of Italy from fascism. The earliest signs are to be found in the Popular Front of 1935 which was originally planned by the French and Italian communists with the "idea

of common action alongside Socialists and middle class democrats"[8] against fascism; by the time of the Resistance these conditions had advanced to a high-water mark of elation and cooperation which has yet to be duplicated. Bound up inextricably in this cooperation was the feeling, at this point yet inchoate, that the destiny of the PCI was linked with that of the Italian nation, and that both Marxism on the one hand and the Italian nation and culture on the other possessed viable and unifying ideals for the future as well as the present.

Since it is the supposition of this writer that the educational philosophy of a group is a product of its Weltanschauung, and thus its socio-political orientation, we may expect that the National Period would reveal an educational stance in which national and democratic concerns would figure prominently. In the Revolutionary Period the emphasis was placed upon party education, indoctrination and propaganda rather than education. However, the National Period has reversed this and has placed the emphasis upon the latter. The Italian communist of the 1970s probably would claim that the ultimate objective of a classless society characterized by altruism, harmonious social and economic arrangements and individual self-fulfillment is attainable only through efforts related in quality to that end. These efforts include the inducement of an awareness of both human dignity and human rights along with a consciousness by the individual of himself within his natural, and especially his social environment.

The Italian communists emphasize the social rather than individual dimensions of human existence. They claim that man does not exist in and by himself, that he could never be a recluse and experience the full measure of what it means to be human. Individual consciousness or awareness is stressed, but it is always consciousness or awareness within an environment, whether natural or social. Perhaps this is the greatest criticism which the PCI could lay at the doorstep of the traditional aristocratic and 19th century liberal Italian educators: their educational fare reinforced the isolation of classes and individuals with the result that their humanness appeared to be diminished.

Growing out of this consciousness within an environment is the realization that labor is necessary to transform the environment into a beneficial habitat for man, hence Italian communists, echoing Marx, stress the importance of labor and production in man's basic life. Labor, therefore, possesses formative and educational values which the PCI has claimed should be part of the curriculum of the public schools, both as an activity and as a study.

Marxist ontological views regarding the relation of freedom to necessity, that freedom is seen to be the recognition of necessity, were not mentioned in the literature reviewed, though hints were revealed by many PCI writers. For example, Gramsci's reference to forcing the young student into studious ways and contemporary allusions, under the onus of severe unemployment, to establishing a closer relationship between the needs of the society and the output of the educational institutions. Generally, however, the sense of

freedom predominated in the researched literature, thus accounting for perhaps the greatest distinction between the advocacies of the PCI and those of a typical Leninist.

These ideas could not only be taught more effectively through techniques of education in a reformed public school system, say the communists, they would reach more people than could be approached through the party schools using their tools of propaganda and indoctrination, thus increasing the mass base of PCI supporters.

The National Period has seen some essential educational reforms, headed by the unitary junior high school, and the increasing support of mandatory education at least through age 14. Teachers' salaries have improved. There is also general agreement among most responsible political parties as to the destructiveness of the past educational system under both traditional liberalism and, after 1922, fascism, since they featured separate schools and several inflexible tracks with the effect of encouraging the continuing domination of a particular class in society. Not only was this scheme contradicted by the PCI, it was and is contrary to the intent of the Italian national Constitution. The rising rate of literacy is important and so is the appearance "today [of a] much more homogeneous and integrated [society] than that which existed thirty years ago . . . due to the processes of acculturation of the masses . . . and to the expansion of the obligatory school."[9] The journey ahead, though, will be long and arduous, and there will be a continuing need for the support of the masses in any reform laws which are enacted by Parliament.

These laws are necessary for improvement to be realized in the schools, but they are in and of themselves not sufficient. First, there is a continuing need to use them as a basis for further innovation and as a means of escaping from the education-insensitivity and inefficiency of the past. Second, there should be a broad understanding in society that its needs should more closely determine educational output, that instead of massive unemployment of the highly educated, some means of channeling, as consistent with freedom as possible, might be used to bring each into closer alignment with the other. Third, it is necessary to combat the notion of some groups that Parliament is irrelevant in the matter of school reform, or any other reform, and that the only method lies in the use of terror and violence. Fourth, the support of the masses is of critical importance in effectuating any laws.

With regard to the support of individuals, Berlinguer has this advice: "there is no need to say: I don't know, I am not an expert, I don't know how to speak, or I am not needed. The school has need in the first place of workers, of the simple men and women; it has a need for obligation, for participation, for democratic tension."[10] Insofar as the institutional and social dimensions of the masses are concerned, he said:

> in our society, education of the citizen does not depend exclusively upon the school, but rather it is completed through a plurality of centers and institutions. But because this multiplicity exists, the specific task of instruction must be the highest responsibility of the public school. So that it fully faces this responsibility, it is fundamentally necessary that society participates with its different aspects in the life of the school.[11]

The PCI feels there is a need to recognize the essential unity of the formal educational establishment and the society, and that just as the various levels of the educational system should be interrelated and mutually supportive so the expectation of an effective reform campaign in the schools and universities would not be realistic without concomitant support action in the society. One form of support is the recognition of the right of students to study apart from any economic reasons. Italian communists feel that aid ought to be extended to any impoverished student capable of succeeding in the upper secondary schools and universities; if this could be effectuated, a great step could be taken in the direction of democratizing society.

In attempting to link the needs of education and society, the party recognizes the necessity of free expression and differences of opinion in the educational system as well as society. Many Italian communists are very outspoken on the virtues of pluralism and of democratic participation. They claim that they are not infallible, that valuable insight into the problems and creditable solutions do come from outside the communist ranks and sometimes from sources other than the left. It has been stressed by many including Gramsci and Berlinguer that Marxism does not exist at the expense of other knowledge but that rather Marxism complements and rests upon it; hence scholarship outside of the narrow confines of Marxism is to be encouraged, and cooperation with any group advocating progressive and democratic solutions to educational problems endorsed. The student movement for educational reform is not a single movement, declared

Berlinguer, but rather is composed of many movements, and "there is a need to recognize the possibility of different movements and forces working together" for common goals.[12]

The Italian communists have talked of the desirability of workers and university students joining forces, especially during the 1968 disturbances, without, however, investigating at any length the difficulties attendant upon the realization of such a suggestion. The 1968 student agitations did not accomplish much in the universities beyond the energetic revelation of their afflictions to the Italian public and the world. True, admissions were eased and more students were able to attend from hitherto prohibited schools, e.g., those of the upper secondary system other than the liceo classico and liceo scientifico, but

> student overload on the fine texture of bureaucracy and oligarchy . . . caused short-term adjustments such as the further increase and stratification of junior faculty. But neither the reform laws nor the pressure of the student movement were able to change the baronial prerogatives of the senior faculty, their scarcity, their discretion, and their accumulation of outside jobs and status. The . . . research [became] poorer, the student overcrowding worse, and the senior professors even more remote.
>
> . . . Far from changing the initial "logic" of the system, the effect . . . has been the accentuation of the bottleneck by increasing the number of students while leaving unchanged its inner workings--a restricted number of full professors, a very high ratio of junior and nontenured staff to full professors, and an alarming dropout rate.[13]

By mid-1977 Achille Occhetto claimed that the major difference between that year and 1968 from an academic standpoint was that in the latter year "there is an attempt to expand the same expectations of the movement through a political and cultural struggle"[14] presumably

because so many of the reformers' objectives had by 1977 been deflected or defeated.

Yet hope should not be lost and the struggle should continue. There was everything to gain by its continuation, and communists could learn much from the example of a don Milani, a Catholic priest-educator who had long experience as a teacher of children. According to Luciano Della Mea, writing in Rinascita, don Milani

> is a comrade, a communist. . . . He was against piece work, against militarism, against the draft, against the rich, against hypocrisy, superficiality . . . against despotic authority . . . and this for one who believes in the redemption and in paradise. . . .
>
> In short, don Milani was not a schismatic and not an opportunist, and this is the essence of what it is to be or become a communist. . . . For don Milani everything was school because life is school, and therefore to create a good school one needs to know how to live with simplicity, that is to say with purity which is not an alibi. . . . He has been more severe with himself than with the others, . . . he has given an irreversible lesson in democracy. . . .[15] (Italics added.)

This is indistinguishable from humanistic socialism. Furthermore it seems to be indicative of a rather important moral strand of Italian communism, that for example subscribed to by the novelist Ignazio Silone prior to his departure from the party, and one which cannot be ignored with impunity by other more bureaucratically-minded and traditional Italian communists. Educational reform is seen by the moral group as a crusade, and it could be encapsulated in the following quotation from Giorgio Napolitano speaking at the XIII Congress of the PCI: "With the transformation of the Italian public school, the possibility of a rapid elevation of the cultural level of the working class and of cultural progress without precedent in the history of our country becomes plausible."[16]

Problems, Desires and Objectives
for the Present and Future

With the completion of the war, cooperation began to fade but the PCI embarked upon the task of gaining power and, except for the first few months when talk of revolution was bandied about among its members without seriousness, and the Cold War in which its position was not only ambivalent but defensive, the party has assiduously pursued power within the limits imposed by the Italian democratic-republican constitution. Three of the many problems lying ahead of the PCI in the 1980s will be the following:

1. It has been established that the party has moved into a position whereby it can be said to be situated within the Italian political system. While it does not accept the economic and social basis of this system, it has become reconciled to working within the parliamentary framework in order to change the economic, social, political, and of course educational structure of that system. It therefore works gradually for reform; yet this very process opens up one of the basic contradictions of the party. If it proves to be successful, and reforms are instituted which carry the society toward the socialist objectives, there will come a time when those capitalists who still possess power will refuse further movement in the socialist direction, at which point the PCI must decide to carry the struggle forcefully or to remain working peacefully for its reforms. If it chooses the former it belies its newly acquired legitimacy within the system; if it opts for the latter it becomes indistinguishable from European social democracy.

2. The PCI faces another grave problem in that it must attempt to create as broad an alliance structure as possible with political forces outside of communism in order to bring about the reforms it desires. Yet, as Peter Lange indicates, this tactic might very well conflict with the efforts of the PCI to exert the pressure needed to change the prevailing national political and social policies, because this kind of pressure could alienate would-be political allies.[17]

3. As the PCI has continued to gain at the polls through the post-war period, until the 1979 election when it was set back slightly, it may be seen that an electoral victory admitting them to power would also be placing responsibility in their hands, and that a mediocre performance in an environment virtually guaranteeing mediocrity, or worse, would reflect unfavorably upon the entire party and its efforts. Participation in a coalition government would not give the PCI sufficient power to implement its reforms and it would seem that the party could only lose by entering such an arrangement, yet in the last few years it has actively attempted to do so. It is presently aware that, given its mass base, it cannot remain out of power indefinitely and that it must produce, given the opportunity, lest it be judged a paper tiger by friends and foes alike.

The PCI disagrees with the typical liberal state because the communist view is that the much-vaunted disinterest of that type of state is in actuality partial to the propertied interests and protects the distribution of wealth and privilege which heavily favors the well-to-do stratas. The communist would say that the bourgeoisie

is under a misapprehension if it conceives of its education as serving universal interests of great humanistic concerns and therefore as serving society. It serves special interests only; and the same may be said of bourgeois democracy. When the PCI talks of "democracy" it means, at least ideally, the type of democracy related to Rousseau rather than to Locke, though the party has been severely criticized by people to the left of it as having come to terms with the bourgeois liberal establishment; for many years the far left in fact has considered the PCI to be an establishment party little different from the Christian Democrats.

The PCI also disagrees with the concept of universal monolithic communism. It was true that Bordiga, Gramsci and Togliatti all had submitted to Moscow's direction, but they had also displayed independence on frequent occasions. Bordiga refused the Comintern's request that his PCI fuse with the PSI and Gramsci's theories while related to Leninism were profoundly different. Togliatti and the PCI asserted their independence in 1928 from the Comintern when they rejected repeated requests from it that Togliatti assume a position in its central organs.[18] Yet the most drastic declaration of Italian independence vis-a-vis Moscow was made in the mid-1966 interview with the journal Nuovi Argomenti in which Togliatti described the international Communist movement as "polycentric." Finally, Berlinguer speaks: "For a long period of time--for example during the Comintern--a special function of leadership of the Soviet communist party was recognized. We ourselves at that time had recognized that function--but now the sun is definitely set on that period."[19]

It is the writer's belief that the PCI is doing what it claims to be doing, that is, working through democratic means for a qualitative change in a socialist direction, and that what distinguishes it from the various socialist parties is the assumption among its members that the revolutionary alternative rests in its arsenal. It has not hurled anathemas against the concept of socio-political revolution. In certain times and places, the party would say, this type of activity, the launching of a revolution, is not only permissible but advisable. Modern Italy is not one of those places and the post-war era has not been one of those times, they would claim, though admittedly a drastic change in conditions could bring a volte-face of the PCI in the direction of revolution. Although one could say the same for most Italian political parties, the nearness of the revolutionary tradition to the PCI and the characteristic discipline of the party would probably induce it to arrive at a revolutionary boiling point with greater speed than would be experienced by the other establishment parties of the left and center in the Italian political spectrum. In everyday practical political, social, and educational affairs, the far left in Italy is correct, the PCI has become an establishment party.

The party displays a trust of the masses as exemplified in an accepting attitude toward pluralism in modern society and one can therefore say that it is relatively open-minded when compared to the postures of other communist parties. It can even be shown that Italian communists are less dogmatic and more democratically oriented than many other so-called democratic segments of the Italian populace.[20]

Although the PCI has been working toward a definite set of socialistic objectives, Giorgio Napolitano, a member of the PCI Directorate, has this to say about them:

> We do not believe that the public sector of the economy should be expanded: it is already sufficiently large in Italy. . . . We are convinced that a party of Marxist formation in a country like Italy should not aim at total state ownership of the means of production. This should not be considered a necessary condition for achieving socialist ends and values in an industrialized, Western-style economy. The role of private initiative, and even large-scale private industry, the function of profit and the market economy, cannot and should not be denied. The characteristic feature of our Party's program today lies in its refusal to abandon economic development to spontaneous activity, in its insistence on democratic control of the use of the "surplus," and in the guidance given by democratic public powers to social and economic transformation, thus ensuring continuity and a new quality of development, not merely a steadier overall growth.[21]

The PCI not only tolerates and cooperates with many groups and individuals outside the party, and even outside the left, it is willing to learn from them.

This spirit of cooperation is not something recently adopted by the PCI. It is true that many examples of uncooperative, even obstreperous behavior could be cited in this party's history since World War II, but many of these incidents were defensive in nature, and occurred prior to the broad social and political legitimization that it has acquired in the Italy of the 1970s. One could return to the employment of the famous liberal Piero Gobetti on the staff of the communist journal L'Ordine Nuovo during the early revolutionary days prior to the formation of the PCI; to the numerous incidents of cooperation with the non-communists and even non-leftists during the Popular Front; and to the communist contributions to the writing

of the Constitution provided in the early post-war period when the party shared political power at the national level with others.

In the 1968-69 Italian social turmoil perpetrated by radical workers, students, and others, the PCI demonstrated a rather conservative position, but by then the old-line Stalinists within it had virtually disappeared; it had become a fully responsible party, one which acted self-consciously in a very parliamentary way in its relations with its constituency and with other parties. As Antonio Gramsci, the paterfamilias of Italin communism, had claimed, conditions in Italy would not allow the bolshevik type of revolution to occur there, with the result that communist victory required other tactics of a predominantly educational and propagandistic nature. It appears that nearly 35 years of active social-political participation within a liberal-democratic framework have transformed what initially was a Leninist revolutionary party into a provisional proponent of the liberal-democratic regime; a proponent which desires ultimately to move in to socialism using the parliamentary methods of this liberal-democratic state and one whose socialism, should the PCI achieve it, would be largely conditioned by its present liberal-democratic experience.

In conclusion, the trust of the party for the masses of Italians as indicated by its willingness to involve itself in the affairs of Italy using the liberal-democratic levers available, its desire to demonstrate responsible and dignified political behavior, and its expressed wish to implement the Constitution to an extent at

least as great as any other Italian political party--these together with its struggle for a meaningful educational system in Italy draw from this writer a tentative vote of confidence in its activities of the present and hopes for the future.

Footnotes--Chapter V

[1]Gramsci, "Partito di Governo e Classe di Governo," L'Ordine Nuovo: 1919-1920, pp., 91-92.

[2]Togliatti, Conversando con Togliatti, p. 156.

[3]Togliatti, "Programmazione o politica dei redditi?," Opere scelte, p. 1161.

[4]Enrico Berlinguer, "La vittoria del 15 giungo," Il compromesso storico, ed. Pietro Valenza, 3rd ed. (Rome: Newton Compton, 1976), p. 294.

[5]Alfred G. Meyer, Leninism (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 100.

[6]Bertram D. Wolfe, Three Who Made a Revolution: A Biographical History (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1964), p. 296.

[7]Harold Swayze, Political Control of Literature in the USSR, 1946-1959 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), p. 11.

[8]Stuart Hughes, p. 251.

[9]Paci, "Scuola di massa; una conquista civile," p. 8.

[10]"Il discorso di Berlinguer alla manifestazione del PCI," p. 22.

[11]Ibid., p. 21.

[12]Ibid., p. 22.

[13]Luca Perrone, p. 490.

[14]"Costituente di massa per la scuola," p. 7.

[15]"Piangere un po'meno nella valle di lacrime," 15 July 1977, p. 45.

[16]XIII Congresso del partito comunista italiano: atti e risoluzioni, p. 399.

[17]"The PCI at the Local Level: A Study of Strategic Performance," Communism in Italy and France, p. 266.

[18]Spriano, Vol. II, p. 184.

[19]"La Vittoria del 15 giungo," il compromesso storico, p. 295.

[20]DiRenzo, p. 196.

[21]"The Italian Crisis: A Communist Perspective," Foreign Affairs 56 (July 1978): 798-99.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

PARTS OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ITALIAN REPUBLIC[1]

Part I: Rights and Duties of Citizens

Title II: Ethical-social relations

ARTICLE 33: The freedom of art and science and freedom of instruction in them is affirmed.

The Republic lays down general standards for instruction and institutes state schools of all orders and grades.

Organized groups and private persons have the right to establish schools and educational institutions without burden to the state.

The law, in fixing the rights and obligations of non-state schools which request parity, must assure full liberty to them and must assure to their students a scholastic treatment equipollent to that of students of the state schools.

A state examination is required for admission to the various orders and grades of school, or for passing any of them, and in order to qualify for practice of a profession.

Institutes of higher learning, universities and academies, have the right to give themselves autonomous regulations within limits established by the laws of the state.

ARTICLE 34: The school is open to all.

Elementary instruction, imparted for at least eight years, is obligatory and gratuitous.

Those of capacity and merit, even if without means, have the right to attain the highest grades of study.

The Republic renders this right effective by means of scholarships, allowances to families, and other aids which must be assigned by competition.

Part II: The Organization of the Republic

Title V: The Regions, the Provinces, the Communes

ARTICLE 114: The Republic is divided into Regions, Provinces, and Communies.

ARTICLE 115: The Regions are constituted as autonomous bodies with their own powers and functions according to the principles fixed by the Constitution.

ARTICLE 117: Within the limits of the fundamental principles established by the laws of the state, the Region legislates in regard to the following matters, provided that such legislation is not in conflict with the interest of the nation or of other Regions.

Organization of the offices and of the administrative bodies dependent on the Region;

Communal boundaries;
Urban and rural local police;
Fairs and markets;
Public charities and health and hospital assistance;
Professional instruction, training of artisans and scholastic assistance;
Museums and libraries of local bodies;
City matters;
Tourist trade and hotel industry;
Street railways and automobile lines of regional interest;
Thoroughfares, aqueducts, and public works of regional interest;
Lake ports and lake navigation;
Mineral and thermal waters;
[etc.].

The laws of the Republic may delegate to the Regions the power to issue norms for their execution.

ARTICLE 118: The administrative functions pertaining to the subjects listed in the preceding article reside in the Regions, except those of exclusively local interest which by the laws of the Republic may be attributed to the Provinces, the Communes, or other local bodies.

. . . The Region normally exercises its administrative functions by delegating them to the Provinces, to the Communes or other local bodies or by making use of their officials.

Footnote--Appendix

[1]Kogan, The Government of Italy, pp. 192-93, 205-206.

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