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I‘ vb ”RI?”' I‘MIH": \\ ll l lllllllllllllll L 3 1293 10064 3083 , LIBRARY This is to certify that the thesis entitled THE EFFECTS OF PARTICIPATION AND INFORMATION ON INTENTION AND BEHAVIOR presented by Joseph Alex Messicci has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for Ph. D. degree in PSYChOloqy Major professor Date ’10’10‘ 7X 0-? 639 OVERDUE FINES ARE 25¢ PER DAY , PER ITEM Return to book drop to remove this checkout from your record. THE EFFECTS OF PARTICIPATION AND INFORMATION ON INTENTION AND BEHAVIOR By Joseph Alex Messicci A DISSERTATION Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Psychology 1978 ABSTRACT THE EFFECTS OF PARTICIPATION AND INFORMATION ON INTENTION AND BEHAVIOR By Joseph Alex Messicci This study examined the effects of different methods groups use to identify problems on measures of individual statements about future performance and actual performance of a simple task. A review of literature integrated theory and empirical findings in the areas of attitude-behavior relationships, the risky-shift phenomenon, group problem-solving, and a model of behavioral intentions, and suggested that key independent variables would be the level of participation by an individual in group problem- identification process and the type of information processed by the group. Subjects were 136 undergraduate students who participated in a group problem-identification process or a control condition prior to obtaining signatures on a petition-like form. The study used a posttest-only 2 x 2 design with appended control group. The levels of the Participation factor were voluntary (interacting group) or required (Nominal Group) participation by subjects in the group process. The Information factor levels were group identification of problem components and problem-identification Joseph Alex Messicci group sessions suggest a mediating role of problem-solving as a covert and spontaneous activity occurring during the problem- identification process. Based on the results of this study, several areas of further research are suggested. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to express my appreciation and gratitude to Dr. John H. Wakeley who, as chairman of my committee, provided guidance and support of exceptional quality throughout my graduate career; to Dr. Eugene Jacobson for serving as a model of scholarly enquiry; to Dr. Neal Schmitt for his knowledge and encouragement of experimental rigor; and to Dr. John Casbergue for his dedication and skill in the application of psychological principles to organi- zational issues. For his valuable contribution to my professional development, I sincerely thank Dr. Carl Frost. The resources and experiences made available to me through Dr. Frost and the Scanlon Plan Associates, Inc. have strongly influenced the direction of my professional growth. I have enjoyed and appreciated the many friends whose warmth, humor, and wisdom helped me more than they may realize. I hope that in giving they have also received. Finally, for her willingness to grow with me, for knowing when encouragement was needed and giving it freely, and for exten- sive technical and editorial assistance and advice, I am deeply appreciative to my wife, Ardith. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v Chapter 1. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE . . . . . . . . . . I Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . l Attitudes and Behavior . . . . . . . . . 5 Group Process and Productivity . . . . . . . TO The Risky Shift Phenomenon . . . . . . . . l4 Intentions and Behavior . . . . . . . . . 25 Group Problem Solving . . . . . . . . . . 32 Scope of the Present Study . . . . . . . . 42 Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 II. METHODOLOGY AND EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN . . . . . . . 48 Subjects . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 Experimental Design . . . . . . . . . . . 48 Experimental Tasks . . . . . . . . . . . 50 Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 Independent Variables . . . . . . . . . . 56 Dependent Variables . . . . . . . . . . . 59 Manipulation Checks . . . . . . . 60 Rating Problem-Identification Items . . . . . 62 Statistical Analyses of Experimental Data . . . 64 Statistical Analyses of Manipulation Check Questionnaire . . . . . . 65 Debriefing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 III. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 Manipulation Checks . . . . . . . . . . . 67 Hypothesis 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 Hypothesis 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 Hypothesis 2a . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 Hypothesis 2b . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 Hypothesis 2c . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 Hypothesis 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 Hypothesis 3a . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 Hypothesis 3b . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 Chapter IV. Hypothesis 3c Hypothesis 4 Hypothesis 5 Summary of Results DISCUSSION Interpretation of Data from the Manipulation Check Questionnaire . Implications of Manipulation Check Data for Experimental Results Role of Problem- Solving in Experimental Results : Intention- Performance Relationship . Relationships Between Experimental and Control Conditions . . . Limitations on Interpretation of Findings . Implications . . . . . . . APPENDICES . A. B C. D G. H. CONTROL GROUP ACTIVITY GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS TO ALL EXPERIMENTAL GROUPS TARGET TASK SIGNATURE FORM INSTRUCTIONS FOR DATA GENERATION PHASE FOR SUBJECTS IN VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION CONDITIONS . . INSTRUCTIONS FOR DATA GENERATION PHASE FOR SUBJECTS IN REQUIRED PARTICIPATION CONDITIONS INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONSENSUS PHASE IN VOLUNTARY AND REQUIRED PARTICIPATION GROUPS . DEPENDENT MEASURE OF INTENTION . MANIPULATION CHECK QUESTIONNAIRE BIBLIOGRAPHY iv . 100 . 101 . 109 . 111 . 113 . 115 . 118 . 121 . 123 . 125 Table 10. LIST OF TABLES Number of Groups and Subjects in Each Condition Inter-item Correlation Coefficients for Manipulation Check Questionnaire Items . . . . . . Means, Standard Deviations, and Univariate F-ratios for Manipulation Check Questionnaire Items Means and Standard Deviations of Manipulation Check Questionnaire Items in Experimental Conditions Means, Standard Deviations and t-value of Number of Problem-Identification Items Generated in Voluntary and Required Participation Conditions . . . . . Correlation Coefficients Between Measures of Intention and Performance and Resulting tfvalues . . gyvalues of Differences Between Conditions for Intention-Behavior Correlations Means and Standard Deviations of Measures of Intention and Performance in Experimental and Control Conditions . Analysis of Variance (AOV) Summary Table for Experimental Conditions . . . . Means, Standard Deviations, and F-ratios of Dependent Measures Under Experimental and Control Conditions . . . . . Page 51 68 69 71 73 75 77 79 80 81 CHAPTER I REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE Introduction Renewal is not just innovation and change. It is also the process of brin ing the results of change into line with our purposes. IGardner, l964, p. 7) The task of reconciling externally-imposed change, produc- tivity,.and renewal (i.e., internal planned change) is endless for any organization. Managers often find themselves caught between continuing needs for short-term productivity and recognition that unless time is taken for restructuring, relearning, and renewal, responses to the demands of reality are likely to gradually decrease in effectiveness and increase h1cost (Likert, l967). Those who have attempted such reconciliation (whether managers, researchers, or change agents) have often keenly experienced the difficulty identified in Gardner's comment, i.e., in giving direc- tion to the methods of coping with change such that the total organization is advantaged. The simplicity of Gardner's statement (i.e., doing what one intends to do, or insuring congruence between behaviors, results, and goals) is deceptive. In fact, its vagueness may elicit intentions or responses characteristic of a Theory X orientation (McGregor, l960); the resulting pattern of tightened hierarchical control throughout the organization demonstrates what Likert (1967) described as a liquidation of the human assets I necessary for the organization to function effectively. But if an arbitrary increase in authoritarian control is dysfunctional, so also is an arbitrary loosening of controls. In this regard, McGregor states that "abdication is not a workable alternative to authoritarianism" (1960; p. 46). What approach, then, should an organization, or a department, or a work team take when it has acknowledged its needs for both productivity and renewal? Nhat processes or activities will serve to promote both individual and organizational goals? More specifically, under which situations will individuals more effectively participate (i.e., exercise influence on decisions affecting them)? Are there quali- tative differences among types of "participation"? Hill exercising influence in a group situation affect an individual's subsequent behaviors? Hill different types of group situations affect differ- ently the degrees to which goals or action plans are accomplished. The basic objective of using scientific knowledge to improve productivity has spurred research from the beginnings of industrial psychology. However, as culture, experiences, and perspectives change, so too must new ways of resolving problems be found. (In this regard, earlier methods (e.g., "bureaucracy," industrial engineering) which were once seen as pre-eminent in the quest for greater productivity (and may have been singly important at their inception) are not now seen as obsolete but, alone, as inadequate to meet the current needs of organizations. The growth of the practice of organization development (OD) reflects the acknowledgement that, in order to achieve and maintain high productivity, basic issues of human relationships must be addressed. Implied in much of the OD literature is the assumption that by allowing organization members to exercise more influence in matters relevant to their work situation, the total amount of control available to the organization over its exigencies will increase (Benne, Bennis, & Chin, l976). The purpose of this study is to determine whether different group processes for identifying components of a problem can affect 1) individual intention levels (as measured by anticipated level of future performance), 2) performance levels actually attained, and 3) the correspondence between intention and performance levels. Literature is reviewed in several areas of relevance. The broad area of attitude-behavior relationships is explored for its historical importance to both theoretical and methodological aspects of the current problem. The role of group process in productivity is examined emphasizing the diversity of resources and needs brought to the group by its individual members. The extensive but temporally compact literature on the “risky-shift'phenomenon is reviewed and interpreted as reflecting the role of group process in influencing individual intentions-to-perform. As an integration of these issues, a model of behavioral intentions is presented; this model has demonstrated promise in resolving many of the discrepan- cies in attitudinal research results. Finally, a group technique for problem identification (Nominal Group Process) is described. The NGP, by maximizing individual participation, has demonstrated superiority to the more common "interactive“ group procedures in generating a diversity and large number of responses to a presented problem. This study attempts to create a situation where problem- solving and individual performance occurred in a manner not unlike the everyday experience of organization members confronted with a demand for productivity. Participants are confronted with tasks (meeting and discussing in groups, soliciting signatures from strangers) for which they probably possess the behavioral reper- toire; the tasks have a specified and proximate time limit; the degree of success in performance of tasks has no bearing on the amount of reward received (credit points toward a final course grade) although the portion of the task performed does affect the reward received; under varying degrees of familiarity with the focal task of obtaining signatures on a petition-like form, participants state individually the performance level they intend to reach; and the focal task is performed individually following a group interaction. Thus, the reward system is seen as similar to common wage structures wherein performance levels do not immediately affect the level of pay, but also where "attendance factors" (i.e., the decision to be available for performing) do determine the amount of reward received. The pattern of group meetings followed by individual action is seen as common in organizational life. Several types of organizational functions require members to deal with the public: sales, membership outreach, political action drives, and charitable solicitation provide examples of necesary public (and often individual) contact. Finally, members of an organization are often required to set goals for themselves; while such goals are occasionally set publicly (e.g., at a departmental meeting), widely espoused managing-by-objectives approaches have generally suggested private goal-setting between an employee and the super- visor. This study suggests that the most efficient and effective use of group time in identifying components of a problem occurs under a highly structured condition characterized by required participation of all participants; that conditions of voluntary participation are less effective in influencing group members' individual intentions and behavior; and that intentions and behavior are further affected by the degree to which groups examine objective aspects of the problem with or without reaching group consensus as to which components are most important for maximal performance. Attitudes and Behavior The concept of attitude has attracted the attention of several major areas of interest within psychology, although not necessarily to the advantage of its development as a construct. De Fleur and Hestie (1975) describe the concept of "set" as developed through early experimental psychology studies of human conscious— ness: "states of readiness or mental preparedness . . . which materially altered perception, reaction time, recall, and various other of the 'mental processes'" (p. 24). This definition has survived virtually intact; Harriman (l965) defines attitude as "a readiness to respond in a certain way when the appropriate situation occurs; a mental set" (p. 17). A somewhat different approach to attitude coincided with the development of social psychology in the early lQOOs. Faced with the need to explain differential responses to social structure, Thomas and Znaniecki defined attitude as "a process of individual consciousness which determines individual activity in the social world . . . [including] tendencies, feelings, ideas, needs, fears, interests and thoughts" (l9l8; in Liska, 1975, p. 1). Rapid growth in empirical studies of a social psychological nature generated considerable interest and effort on attitude measurement. The primary concern of such work was measurement reliability, with a subsequent tendency to define attitude as that which is measured by an attitude scale. Conceptual development as such received little attention, while the use of attitude measures in empirical research was becoming more acceptable. Lost somewhere in the flurry of increasingly sophisticated measurement activity was the initial concern of attitude theorists, that of not only identifying but also explaining individual differences. Concern for the validity dimensions of attitude, while low, did surface in a classic study by LaPiere (l934; in Liska, l975). Hhile touring the United States for two years with a young Chinese couple, LaPiere noted the responses and receptivity of employees at various hotels, motor camps, and restaurants. Overwhelmingly service was not only available, but often seemed of a higher than usual quality. When these same establishments were later mailed a questionnaire inquiring as to whether they would serve Chinese customers, approximately 92% said that they would not. While there are certainly concerns about LaPiere's measurement process, this study identified what would only much later become an issue of interest to attitude researchers: the lack of consistency between verbal statements (usually seen as a direct indication of latent states of readiness or disposition) and actual behavior. Beginning in the l9505, researchers rediscovered the issue of attitude inconsistency. Replications of the LaPiere experiment obtained similar results, and attitude-behavior inconsistency was also found in areas as diverse as health practices, cheating behavior, alcohol use, prejudice and discrimination, patriotism, child-rearing practices, and hiring the handicapped (Liska, l975). The following explanations for attitude inconsistency have been summarized by Liska (1975) and DeFleur and Hestie (1975): l. subject/researcher differences in interpreting the attitude stimulus, e.g., "prejudice" may possess a wider range of meanings for a researcher than for a person involved in the anti-bussing movement; 2. differences between the measurement situation and the environment in which the behaviors would actually occur, with anonymity and lack of social or peer influence characterizing the research setting; 3. the lack of subject's ego-involvement in and/or the unusual nature of the target attitude or behavior in the experimental setting; 4. unfounded assumptions that the subject is able and willing to formulate an accurate self-perception of position on the pre- sented attitude object and to accurately discriminate between that position and the sample behaviors or attitudes reflected in the scale items; and 5. measurement at inappropriate levels of specificity, as when attitudes toward a general group (e.g., race) are examined to deter- mine attitude toward a specific individual instance or person. Following an extensive review of the literature, Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) suggest that the issue of inconsistency with which attitudes are operationally defined. Several studies are presented in which the constructs identified as attitude more closely resemble beliefs or behavioral intentions. Furthermore, those variables experimentally manipulated and measured are oten found to differ from the key variable of a particular theory. For example, "dissonance theory . . . at the conceptual level . . . deals only with cognitions, i.e., beliefs. Opera— tionally, however, these cognitions are often manipulated by changing behavior and assessed by measuring attitude" (p. 50). Following their critical examination of major attitude theories, Fishbein and Ajzen define attitude as "a person‘s location on a bipolar evaluative or affective dimension with respect to some object, action, or event. An attitude represents a person's general feeling of favorableness or unfavorableness toward some stimulus object. In our conceptual framework, as a person forms beliefs about an object [through direct or inferential experience], he automatically and simultaneously acquires an attitude toward that object. Each belief links the object to some attribute; the person's attitude toward the object is a function of his evaluations of these attributes" (p. 216). It is important to note that this definition includes events and actions as attitude "objects." That is, individuals, drawing on their experiential history and evaluation patterns, can develop an affective position about a behavior as well as about a person or object. This distinction is vital to Fishbein and Ajzen's assertion that another construct, intention, mediates between attitude formation and behavior. Indeed, it is the delinea- tion of the relationship between beliefs, attitudes, and intentions that allows not only reconciliation of major attitude theories, but also the explanation of discrepancies and inconsistencies in the attitude literature. A more complete description of the con- cept of "intention" will be presented in a later section of this study. At this point, it is sufficient to define intention as the result of both an individual's attitude toward a behavior and his/her perception of and willingness to comply with relevant social norms. Of similar importance for the purpose of this study is the idea that beliefs, whether acquired by direct experience, 10 observation, or inference, are the basic unit in development of an attitude. It is thus the acquisition of information and its processing by learned patterns of evaluation that result in atti- tude. Fishbein and Ajzen effectively criticize much attitudinal research (as well as what seems to be the artifact of inconsistency) by noting that "the effects of a given manipulation on attitude can be understood only if its effects on the person's beliefs are known" (p. 284). Group Process and Productivity, The importance of groups in human behavior is axiomatic; in fact, the tendency to form freely chosen groupings for a wide range of purposes is seen as uniquely human (Steiner, 1972). Despite its ubiquitous nature, there is less than consensus among theorists as to just what a group is. For the purposes of this study, Shaw's "minimal definition of a group" will suffice: "a group is defined as two or more persons who are interacting with one another in such a manner that each person influences and is influenced by each other_person" (italics his; 1976, p. 11). Groups are therefore primarily action-oriented; given the controversy over the necessity of purposefulness as a definitive feature, it can be said that groups exist in doing things rather than to do things (Heick, 1969). Interest in the productivity of groups in the work setting would seem to extend to prehistory, certainly at least to the point at which humans discovered that cooperation and division of labor led to greater rewards. And if, as Shaw states, the business of 11 groups is influence, then effective government, military and religious institutions were certainly aware that strategic use of small groups is often the most direct way of influencing larger groups (constituents, conscripts, and congregations, respectively). Indeed, the evolved rules for grouping characteristic of classical religious and military structure exemplified Weber's rational bureaucratic structure for work organizations (Bennis, 1973). Steiner (1972) describes historical trends of research into the role of groups. From approximately the 18805 to the 19305, emphasis was on effects of the group on individual productivity (this coincides with and probably reflects the practices of Taylor's scientific management approach; Filley and House, 1969). Prior to World War II, researchers focused on the apparent superiority of group productivity in ad hoc situations. From the late 19405 to the present, Steiner reports a decreasing concern with productivity and increasing emphasis on group process variables (largely reflected in the T-group movement). While this latter statement may be accurate with regard to the most commonly investigated research variables, major proponents of group process awareness are explicit in their assumptions that such process variables are of concern primarily because of their effects on group and individual productivity. ‘Thus,Likert.sees the work team as the basic unit through which the productivity-facilitating "principle of supportive relationships is effected. This principle states that The leadership and other processes of the organization must be such as to insure a maximum probability that in all interactions and all relationships with the organization 12 each member will, in the light of his background, values, and expectations, view the experience as supportive and one which builds and maintains his sense of personal worth and importance. (1967, p. 47) Likewise, Argris asserts that Groups are systems with organic parts. Individuals are one important organic part of a group. Therefore, the group increases its probability of being effective to the extent that its ihdiVidual participants have a rélatively high degree of self-acceptance, confirmation, and essentiality; that they own up to, are open toward, and experiment with ideas and feelings; that they help others to do the same; and that they tend to communicate these behaviors by using directly verifiable information and by minimizing attri- butions, evaluations, and contradictions. (1970, p. 43; italics mine) In a more extreme conceptualization, Weick (1969) suggests that to consider an organization (or group) as an entity is inaccurate and confusing. Weick states that the group should be defined by its processes for handling information, and refutes the purposeful intent of organizations as a key definitional component (e.g., as in Schein, 1970); in this regard he states that planning is best based on an accurate ascription of meaning to past behaviors. The business of the group, therefore, is deciding on which processes will most effectively remove the ambiguity from incoming information to allow appropriate actions to be taken. This emphasis on the "processing" role of the group is reiterated by Steiner (1972) in identifying task demands and resources as determining maximum potential productivity; the difference between this and actual productivity is seen as attributable to process variables. Steiner further suggests that the most apprOpriate utilization of process is indicated by the nature of the task: "The 13 quality of the group product reflects the degree to which the group process corresponds to that which is prescribed" (p. 37); and that when the group is allowed to choose from among a large number of processing patterns, the probability is lowered that they will choose the best possible approach: "Rules that impose a single, advantageous division of labor upon a group may therefore result in higher productivity than do rules that permit a high degree of choice" (p. 55). Despite the inevitability (indeed, the necessity) of group formation within most work settings, serious problems often confront those who attempt to increase the group's productivity. McGregor comments, "The real problem is that we have given so little atten- tion to group behavior that management does not know enough about how to create the conditions for individual growth and integrity in the group situation" (p. 230). He cautions, however, that "The success of any form of social influence or control depends ultimately upon altering the ability of others to achieve their goals or satisfy their needs" (1960, p. 20). Thus, the activities of the group (and its perceived raison d'etre) must meet the needs of the group members as well as the needs of the "group" for productivity. The psychological needs brought to the group situation are described by Argyris (1970) as needs for self-acceptance, confirma- tion (obtaining information from others which validates one's view of one's self), essentiality (commitment to the system resulting from the opportunity to use one's central abilities and express one's central needs), and psychological success, which occurs as 14 a. the individual is able to define his own goals, b. the goals are related to his central needs, abilities, and va ues, c. the individual defines the path to these goals, d. the achievement of the goals represents a realistic level of aspiration for the individual. A goal is realistic to the extent that its achievement represents a challenge or a risk that requires hitherto unused, untested abilities. (p. 39) How can these needs of the individual be reconciled with the group's need for imposition ofa limited number of process rules if productivity is to be enhanced? What processes and events occur in the course of group activity which help integrate individual and group needs and result in high levels of performance? These issues will be approached by looking at the effects of group interaction on individual willingness to take risks. The Risky Shift Phenomenon The social psychological literature has since the early 19605 contained a body of research on a phenomenon called the risky shift. In essence, this phrase describes the tendency of individuals to make choices on a hypothetical problem which are consistently "riskier" after group interaction than prior to interaction. As such, the term “risky shift" is misleading: it is not the shift that is risky for the individual or group; rather, a revision occurs in recommended solutions to hypothetical problems which (relative to the distribution of original recommendations) are seen as entailing more risk for the hypothetical subject of the presented situation (Brown, 1976). With this clarification in mind, the term "risky shift" will be used in describing this literature. 15 Although some studies have used tasks involving betting or gambling, or problem solving under a reward/punishment paradigm, the majority of studies demonstrating the risky shift have used the Choice-Dilemmas Questionnaire (COQ; Kogan & Wallach, 1964). This instrument presents twelve short situations; for each, the subject must indicate the probability of success level at which he/she would recommend (to the hypothetical subject of the story) the more appealing but riskier alternative solution. That these recommenda- tions should tend toward riskier positions after group discussion aroused interest due to the then prevailing view that group inter- action would result in either a compromise (i.e., averaging) or more conservative recommendation. Such views were supported by research indicating that groups focus more attention on deviant members, are more cautious and deliberate in drawing logical conclusions, are more likely to identify errors in judgment, are more cautious in aspirations after poor performance, and give more moderate estimates of weights and odors (Clark, 1971). Four major hypotheses have been advanced to explain the risky shift: familiarization, leadership, diffusion of responsi- bility, and risk as a cultural value. The following review of these hypotheses is drawn largely from the work of Clark (1971), Moscovici and Doise (1974), and Dion, Baron, and Miller (1970). The familiarization hypothesis explains risky shift as occuring through the individuals' increased awareness of the com- ponents of the target problem. As such, the effect can occur in other than group interaction situations, e.g., in individual or in 16 nominal group sessions where subjects are grouped but no inter- action occurs. Bateson (1966) found that individual subjects required to write briefs identifying the positive and negative aspects of each alternative for the CDQ items demonstrated the risky shift without experiencing group discussion. In a similar study, Flanders and Thistlewaite (1967) obtained similar findings, with significant risky shifts occuring in all treatment conditions except the control group, and with no difference between the group discussion and individual sessions. In explaining this apparent pseudogroup effect, Bateson suggested that the process of uncer- tainty reduction through familiarization is a major mediator of risk-taking by its effect on the individual's emotional process (i.e., essentially through fear reduction). Flanders and Thistle- waite disagree, and interpret familiarization as allowing greater comprehension of the problem and thus enhancing risk-taking through cognitive processes which have little relationship to the indi- vidual's emotional states. In light of the failure of several other researchers to replicate these findings, however, these hypotheses have largely been ignored. In explaining the results obtained by Bateson and by Flanders and Thistlewaite, Dion et a1. (1970) suggest that matters of weak experimental design (i.e., accepting a "no difference" between conditions as indicative of a strong effect) and the effects of instructions (causing individual treatment subjects to anticipate a subsequent group discussion) may account for the results. Finally, Teger, Pruitt, St. Jean, and Haaland (1970) suggest that different mechanisms may result in 17 risk-taking under both familiarization and group discussion condi- tions, but were not able to specify the nature of the familiarization mechanism. It would appear, then, that the occurence of a risky shift does require a group discussion. Since what is being documented is in fact a group-induced shift in behavior, theories of social influence are of relevance. The leadership hypothesis states that high risk-takers are usually perceived as group leaders, tend to be more active in the group discussion, and thus influence other group members toward positions of greater risk. This hypothesis offers as support studies which found high positive correlations between a person's initial level of risk-taking and the degree to which other group members saw that person as influential in the discussion (e.g., Wallach, Kogan, & Bem, 1962). Critics of this hypothesis suggest that subjects who have experienced a risky shift will attribute influence to that person who was initially most risky, and that the leadership "effect" may reflect little more than causal inferences made by the subjects. More direct tests of the leadership hypothesis found that a risky shift occurred in groups with homogeneous levels of initial risk (Hoyt and Stoner, 1968; Vidmar, 1970); that with male subjects, high risk persons were not perceived as more influential in discussion of low risk items ‘ (Wallach, Kogan, & Burt, 1968); and that high-risk persons were not influential in arguing for a conservative position (Edwards & Hillems, 1970; cited in Clark, 1971). 18 The leadership hypothesis does not of itself seem able to account for the risky shift phenomenon. This in no way dismisses the contribution Of those group members whose confidence and assertiveness are reflected in their contributions to the group discussion. Indeed, Dion et al. (1970) suggest that a variant of the leadership hypothesis, the rhetoric-of—risk hypothesis (that influence occurs through the predominance of risk-oriented state- ments in the discussion) merits closer investigation. It appears, however, that the behavior of the group leader or most influential person is not sufficient to elicit the risky shift. An early explanation of the risky shift was presented in the diffusion-of-responsibility hypothesis by Wallach, Kogan, and Bem: "It is possible that there is at work in these groups a process of diffusion or spreading of responsibility as a result of knowing that one's decisions are being made jointly with others rather than alone. Increased willingness to take risk would eventuate from this decreased feeling of personal responsibility" (1962, p. 85). Studies often cited in support of this hypothesis have found the risky shift in conditions where group discussion and consensus with differing levels of "responsibility for others" was manipulated (Wallach, Kogan, & Bem, 1964); where risk for a greater reward also increased the probability of an expected painful stimulation (Bem, Wallach, & Kogan, 1965); and in the predicted directions for groups homogeneous in levels of anxiety and defensiveness (Kogan & Wallach, 1967a). Dion et a1. (1970) summarize the implied causal chain of the diffusion-of-responsibility theory as "1) group 19 discussion creates affective bonds; 2) affective bonds permit diffusion of responsibility; 3) diffusion of responsibility reduces fear of failure; 4) reduced fear of failure produces the risky- shift" and identify the assumptions that "a) Group discussion is the necessary and sufficient condition to produce the risky— shift . . . b) The affective bonds produced by the group discussion permit diffusion of responsibility . . . c) Responsibility-diffusion is the essential reason for the risky-shift . . ." (p. 312). Reluctance to accept the diffusion of responsibility theory fully is based on several studies which offer contradictory findings about the major derivative hypotheses of this theory. Thus, Kogan and Wallach (1967b) found the risky shift in both an interacting group and in groups that only listened to a tape recording of the interacting group discussion. Similarly, Lamm (1967) found the risky shift in groups which either observed or listened to another group discussion. In an interesting variation, Teger and Pruitt (1967) compared the interacting discussion group with a group that only exchanged information about their preferred risk levels; both groups produced the risky-shift. Finally, Pruitt and Teger (1969) found no risky shift when the group discussion did not focus on the relevant problem issues. This set of evidence would indicate, then, that it is the presentation, generation, or consideration of problem-relevant issues, and not group discussion, which may be the sine qua non of risky-shift. This implication is interesting in light of the general disregard in which the familiarization 20 hypothesis is held (i.e., the hypothesis that familiarity with the problem causes the risky shift). In a major challenge to the hypothesis that affective bonds cause the risky shift, Dion, Miller, and Magnan (1970; cited in Dion et a1., 1970) found greater risky shifts in low cohesive groups, and speculate that "as group members become more attracted to one another, they also become more loathe to minimize personal responsibility or displace responsibility for failure onto their fellow group members." A similar explanation is presented by Baron, Roper, and Baron (1974) in accounting for their finding of a "stingy shift," i.e., a conservative shift on the dimension of generosity (despite subject beliefs in the social desirability of generosity). Baron et a1. suggested that this shift may have occurred due to the generous subjects' reluctance to use coercive influence on the less generous subjects (perhaps assuming that the less generous had less available money to donate). Despite its intuitive appeal, then, the diffusion of responsibility“theory is characterized by contradictory experimental findings relative to its derivative hypotheses. While this does not allow the theory to be regarded as the sole causal explanation of the risky shift, the diffusion of responsibility theory is still seen as having potential for further development as a contributory factor to the risky shift (Dion et a1., 1970). Integrating and broadening the implications of the familiari- zation, leadership, and responsibility-diffusion hypotheses 21 is the position that the degree of risk-taking occurring in any situation reflects a general cultural value. In summarizing the cultural-value interpretation, Dion et a1. state when an individual confronts a decision problem that contains an element of risk, the problem elicits one of two cultural values: risk or caution. . . . Once a cultural value becomes salient, two mechanisms postulated by the relevant information hypothesis presumably lead group members to shift their final decisions in a direction consistent with the value. First, the value censors the flow of information during discussion so that more verbal statements support the value than oppose it. Since no single group member possesses all the relevant information, the value-oriented discussion provides each individual with additional reasons for agreeing with the under- lying cultural value. Second, group discussion informs each group member of the level of risk other group members are will- ing to take. By revealing the distribution of risk prefer- ences, group discussion establishes a social reality against which indivdiuals can concretely define "riskiness." (1970, p. 342) Studies cited in support of the cultural value theoryinclude findings that individuals tend to see themselves as at least as risky as their peers (Wallach & Wing, 1968; Stoner, 1968; Levinger & Schneider, 1969; Willems, 1969; Baron, Dion, Baron, & Miller, 1970). That specific Choice-Dilemma Questionnaire items reflect relatively stable cultural values is indicated by the discovery of the ”cautious shift," i.e., that some items generally elicit more conservative positions (Nordhoy, 1962, cited in Dion et a1., 1970; Stoner, 1968; Levinger & Schneider, 1969). At least one cross-cultural study (Carlson & Davis, 1971) has found major differences in the values ascribed to specific CDQ items. Using Ugandan 13th year students and United States college students, the experimenters found significantly more conservativerchoices in the 22 Ugandan sample. The only CDQ item eliciting a risky choice involved the decision of an organization president about building a plant in an underdeveloped country. According to Clark (1971) "the main function of the group discussion is informative; it makes clear the level of risk that others will assume in a given situation" (p. 261). The importance of information exchange has been discussed in the above section on responsibility-diffusion (Teger & Pruitt, 1967; Lamm, 1967; Pruitt & Teger, 1969). With its emphasis on information exchange, the cultural value theory allows for the effects of leadership variables and of situations characterized by responsibility diffu- sion in mediating the type and amount of information which is available to the group members. Furthermore, the cultural value approach offers a more comprehensive and less easily refuted explanation than does familiarization theory. Despite the large amount of evidence in its support, cultural value theory does present some problems. Although occa- sional studies continue to find risky shift occurring without discussion (i.e., with information exchange only, as in Clark, Crockett, & Archer, 1971), the most serious challenge to the cultural value theory is found in studies indicating that when false or contrived norms were presented, the subjects tended consistently to conform to the perceived expectations of others (i.e., the false norms) than to choose along the value dimension reflected in the item (Baron et a1., 1970). Nevertheless, the cultural value interpretationiyfthe risky shift phenomenon appears to be the least 23 refuted of the major theories, and also allows for consideration of factors outside the risk-caution dimension. Other hypotheses have been suggested which broaden the implications of the risky shift literature. Moscovici and Boise (1974), for example, see the risky shift as reflecting a more general group polarization effect. This polarization, or "consensus [developed] closer to the extreme of the scale which already attracted the individual answers as a whole" (p. 278), is seen as applying to the total range of value dimensions including, but not limited to, the risk dimension. A similar interpretation refers to this effect as the "choice shift" phenomenon (Pruitt, 1971) and has resulted in studies involving dimensions, among others, of altruism (Schroeder, 1973), generosity (Baron et a1., 1974), and political opinion (Moscovici & Zavalloni, 1969). In applying an even more inclusive model Vinokur (1971) and Burnstein, Miller, Vinokur, Katz, and Crowley (1971) suggest that the individual's subjective expected utility (SEU) of outcomes can be used to accurately predict the subject's initial risk level and to account for decision shifts in terms of cognitive processes. These findings are of interest since the model of behavioral inten- tions discussed in the following section is very similar to the SEU model. The phenomenon of risky shift has, for many years, provided the basis for an intriguing look at the relationship between atti- tude and behavior. The literature as a whole, however, has been duly criticized for methodological and conceptual weakness (Dion 24 et a1., 1970;Cflark, 1971; Cartwright, 1973). Since what is actually being affected in the risky shift is of an attitudinal nature (Pruitt, 1971), the literature reflects, as may be expected, problems similar to those encountered during the development of the attitude concept. For example, the early emphasis on attitude measurement reliability may be seen in the "instrument-bound" nature of most risky shift studies: the vast majority of studies have used the Choice-Dilemma Questionnaire or a similar instrument. The criticism that much attitude research has focused on tasks of a play-like nature also applies in this case: little of consequence is implied for the subject who is asked for advice on a critical interpersonal or career problem while assured that such advice cannot be implemented since the subject of the problem does not exist. Likewise, seldom, if ever, is an individual able to choose in advance the range of probability of reward for a required behavior. While the literature to date on the risky shift is interesting, little investigation has been done into the conse- quences of the risky shift. While some studies have created anti- cipations of reward and punishment contingent on a "risk" type decision (Wallach et a1., 1964; Bem et a1., 1965), such studies examine only the effects of a passive (for the subject) consequence. The issue not addressed involves situations where, following a decision (risky or otherwise), the individual will be expected to perform the behaviors implicit in that decision. In additionto the instrument-bound nature of risky shift studies, methodological criticism focuses on the use of a pretest 25 (McCauley, Teger, & Kogan, 1971), the possibility that the risky shift may be an artifact (Brown, 1976), use of a within-subjects experimental design (Pruitt, 1971), and weak designs resulting from the belief that a single mechanism is responsible for the shift (Dion et a1., 1970). Cartwright (1973) expanded criticism of the risky shift literature to include motivation of the investigators and characteristics of the media of communication, both of which encouraged the continuation of restrictive situational research and delayed examination of those broader implications and assump- tions often accepted at face value. An appropriate summary to this review of the risky shift literature can be found in Brown (1976). Decrying the confusion resulting from the overwork of a basically insignificant effect, Brown attempts to refocus interest on a broader class of issues: "The basic idea is that knowledge of a distribution of options, taken for a completely new situation, teaches one how to realize or make manifest the value he held all along" (p. 169), and that what is important are "the laws determining how one manifests a value or virtue in completely novel circumstances" (p. 170). Intentions and Behavior As the attitude literature is often characterized by incon- sistency between the conceptual variable and the manipulated and dependent variables, so too does the risky shift literature seem to be ignoring a relevant construct which could account for incon- sistency of empirical findings. In fairness to researchers of the 26 risky shift phenomenon, the biases of their overall conceptual environment (i.e., social psychology) may not have allowed suffi- cient consideration of less "social" and more "individual" factors. One approach which did attempt this was the work of Vinokur (1971) and McCauley et a1. (1971) with a subjective expected utility (SEU) model of individual choice. The concept of a behavioral intention as mediating between the individual's attitudes and behaviors has only recently received serious development. The value of this concept is obvious, especially as regards the risky shift studies. In responding to the Choice-Dilemma Questionnaire items, subjects are in fact stating behavioral intentions: i.e., the course of action that they would recommend. An indirect measure of the sensitivity of intentions can be inferred from the findings that the occurrence of a risky shift is dependent on the nature of the instructions given to the subjects (Willems, 1969; Willems & Clark, 1969); this implies that intentions can be highly situation-specific and can directly influence the referent behavior. Given this factor, some Of the variation in risky shift studies may be due to subjective inter- pretation of instructions. For example, do subjects think in terms of actually giving advice, or do they adopt the set “If I were in this situation . . . "? Such a difference in interpretation would be expected to affect the types of responses provided. Furthermore, the specific nature of behavioral intentions would also help explain (the occasional tendencies of subjects to ignore desirable cultural values in favor of situational variables (Baron et a1., 1974). 27 Fishbein and Ajzen (1975), in an extensive review and inte- gration of attitude literature, conceptually differentiated between beliefs, attitudes, intentions, and behavior. Beliefs represent the information which an individual possesses about an object, event, or action. The belief is a probabilistic linking of either descriptive (from direct experience or observation) or inferential (through vicarious or cognitive processes) information with attri- butes. The authors suggest that beliefs can be directly measured by scaling procedures which allow the subject to identify his perceptions of the probability relationship between an object and a range of relevant attributes. Attitudes are described by Fishbein and Ajzen as an individual's "location on a bipolar evaluative or affective dimen- sion with respect to some object, action or event . . . [repre- senting a] general feeling of favorableness or unfavorableness toward some stimulus object . . . as a person forms beliefs about an object, he automatically and simultaneously acquires an attitude toward that object" (p. 216). Attitudes are thus directly depen- dent on beliefs, both as the substance of the particular attitude and since beliefs contribute to the evaluative or affective patterns characteristic of the individual. Thus, attitudes can be changed by manipulation of information, of attributes, or of evaluative patterns or tendencies. Fishbein and Ajzen present the concept of behavioral inten- tion as strongly predictive of eventual behavior. Preventing a 28 perfect predictive capacity are, of course, environmental inter- ference in performing the intended behavior (i.e., opportunity), inadequate skills, and motivational considerations (for the most part, these latter two constraints on behavior can be accounted for in the model of behavioral intentions). The concept does, however, allow for the integration of major attitude theories, and appears to resolve the issue of attitude inconsistency. The Fishbein and Ajzen model of behavioral intentions is as follows: I. = (AB) w1 + (E) w2 where "I_is the intention to perform behavior 8; AB is the attitude toward performing behavior 8; §N_is the subjective norm; and w] and w2 are empirically determined weights" (p. 301). Attitude toward the behavior (AB) is defined as "where phis the belief that performing behavior §_1eads to conse- quences or outcome 1; e_is the person's evaluation of outcome 1; and p_is the number of beliefs the person holds about performing behavior 8? (p. 301). The subjective norm, SN, represents both the person's belief as to whether people who are important referents to him think that he/she should or should not perform the behavior and the person's motivation to comply with this perceived norm. Thus "where bi is the normative belief (i.e., the person's belief that referenEe group or individual j_thinks he should or should not perform behavior 8); m1. is the motivation to comply with referent _i_; and p_is the number of_relevant referents" (p. 302). Finally, the motivation to comply is seen as equivalent to a behavioral intention, and is determined by the individual's attitude toward the specific behavior of compliance and his/her perception of relevant social norms about compliance. Again, all components of intentions are based on beliefs which are formed using available direct or infer- ential information. Manipulations of information should therefore affect intentions in a predictable manner. Several studies have found high multiple correlations between the attitudinal and normative components of the theory and intentions to use contraceptives (Jaccard & Davidson, 1972), to choose cooperative or competitive strategies in a game situation (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1970), and to sign up for an alcoholic treatment program (McArdle, 1972; cited in Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975, p. 310). Studies examining the weighting (i.e., relative importance) of the attitudinal and normative components of intentions have found important factors to be sex of the subject (Fishbein, 1966), the object target of the behavior (Glassman, 1971), the nature of the behavior as related to formal social acceptance (Carlson, 1968), 30 and situational variables (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1970). The latter study, along with others by Ajzen and Fishbein (1974), Darroch, and Hornik (respectively, 1971 and 1970; cited in Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975), found that when A and SN components of intentions B were held constant, attitude toward the object (A0) was reduced to nonsignificance or greatly attenuated. Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) present this as evidence that "the inconsistent attitude-intention relationship can largely be attributed to variations in the degree to which the general attitude measure (A0) is related to the two determinants of intentions (AB and SN)"—(p. 318). This is of highly practical significanCET- if,-elg., one wishes to determine the receptivity of a course of action among employees, rather than asking for Opinions about the object involved (a new incentive or management plan, for example) data should be gathered about the employees' attitudes toward the behaviors implied in such a change and their perceptions of the normative environment regarding those behaviors. Such an approach, necessitating more detailed investi- gation, could also serve an educational function of clarifying any misperceptions of what exactly is implied, and thus help change the A and SN components in a direction facilitative of the pro- 8 posed change. Fishbein and Ajzen suggest that the predictive utility of intention depends on the specificity of behavior, situation, target, and time: the more specific are each of these variables, the more likely that the intention will correspond to the eventual behavior. It may be useful at this point to refer to the comments 31 of Weick (1969) that organizational planning seldom comes to fruition. Although this gap between intention and goal attainment is certainly affected by the volatile environment in which many organizations exist, an additional factor may be the general lack of behavioral specificity (and a surfeit of "objects,“ i.e., goals and directives). In committing, for example, to an organizational goal, consideration of intention-specific variables would allow for anticipation of various kinds of conflict or resistance, the resources required, differential scheduling demands, and so forth. Examination of the implications of the goal would also allow for a background against which subsequent feedback and results could be more meaningfully evaluated, and would encourage awareness of both quality and acceptance dimensions of the goal or decision (Maier, 1967). The need for specific information should not be equated with a particular style of gathering and coordin- ating such infbrmation, but should reflect the nature of the task at hand and the competence and availability of resources (Steiner, 1972, Vroom & Yetton, 1973). Determining the predictive accuracy of intentions (through multiple regression weighting) is often not possible or feasible in an organizational setting; it should, however, be possible and feasible to increase the predictive accuracy of intentions by maxi— mizing the amount and relevance of information upon which intentions and decisions are based. Earlier sections of this review identified the diversity of individual needs brought to the problem-solving situation, the tendency of groups to assume risky positions 32 following informational input (and usually group discussion), and the need for groups to meet the productivity needs of their parent organization. But individuals also bring to the problem-solving situation a diversity of resources and experiences; a group tendency toward risk based on cultural values may not always be appropriate to the problem at hand; and organizational needs may not always be defined in such a way as to allow adequate processing. The following section will examine a technique which may assist in integrating these factors by maximizing factual and normative input. Group Problem Solvjpg_ The primary functions of the group as a problem solving entity can be seen as 1) adequately and accurately processing a diversity of informational input, while 2) meeting the needs of individual members, and 3) allowing its members to develop realistic behavioral intentions toward tasks subsequent to the group decision. While the group enjoys many advantages over individual action in this regard, it also suffers some limitations. Maier (1967) has identified the assets and liabilities of groups in problem solving activities. He states that while groups offer a greater sum total of knowledge and information, a greater diversity of patterns with which to approach the problem, increased acceptance of the group decision, and better comprehension of the decision; they may also be characterized by social pressures of majority influence, the tendency to discontinue the decision process at the first generally acceptable solution regardless of quality, 33 are often subject to dominantion by an individual, and they may become merely a forum for interpersonal or political struggles which can affect the quality of the group product. Maier further describes the factors which may either facilitate or inhibit the group process: disagreements which lead to either interpersonal conflict or innovation; perceptions of interests as mutual or conflicting; risk taking tendencies as they relate to product quality; excessive or inadequate time requirements; and who or which group is seen as the target of a change effort. Likewise, group products may reflect, to their advantage or not, excessive tendencies toward confbrmity (Moscovici, 1974) or the influence of a vocal and consistent minority (Moscovici & Nemeth, 1974). Maier suggests that the critical integrative function, therefore, is held by the group leader, who must be aware of and skillful in processes of human interaction. As stated earlier, the leader must also possess the knowledge and skills to structure the problem solving process in a manner appropriate to the focal issue (Steiner, 1972, Vroom & Yetton, 1973). If the group, then, is in a key position to facilitate change needed by the organization (Likert, 1967), deficiencies in functioning can result in its failure to positively influence rele- vant behaviors in the organization; worse, it may elicit additional resistance to change. Such resistance is a statement by the individuals involved that they perceive the change as not meeting either their needs or the needs of the organization and as 34 threatening what has been a workable pattern of existence (Klein, 1976). Specifically, Lippitt suggests the conditions under which resistance occurs: when the purpose of the change is not clear, when persons affected by the change are not involved in the planning, when an appeal for change is based on personal reasons, when the habit patterns of the work group are ignored, when there is poor communication regarding the change, when there is fear of failure, when excessive work pressure is involved, when the "cost" is too high, or the reward inadequate, when anxiety over job security is not relieved, when "vested interest" of the individual or a sub-unit of the organization is involved, when there is a lack of respect and trust in the initiator, and when there is satisfaction with the status quo (1969, pp. 146- 148 . To the extent that a problem-solving group suffers the liabilities identified by Maier, its members will not be able to understand and accept the dimensions of their target problem or fully and realis- tically commit to solutions; they will therefore not be able to adequately anticipate or re5pond to those issues of resistance which affect wider acceptance of the group product. Early in the development of social psychology. several studies were reported by Lewin (1947) which examined the role of group influence on individual decisions and behaviors. These studies focused on changing dietary habits in directions which had traditionally been resisted (use of organ meats, evaporated milk, cod liver oil and orange juice, and whole wheat bread), and compared a treatment using group discussion and public commitment against lecture-only and indivdiual instruction treatments. Results indi- cated the superiority of the group method for inducing and 35 and maintaining change in dietary habits. With more closely controlled studies, howver, Bennett (1955) found that in trying to persuade college students to volunteer as subjects for psychological experi- ments, only those conditions where a specific intention was stated and where there was a high degree of actual or perceived group consensus resulted in a higher probability of the behavior being performed. Contrary to Lewin's inferences, group discussion and public commitment were of themselves not significantly effective. Bennett thus appears to have anticipated two major facets of the Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) work: that intention is closely related to behavior, and that a critical component of the relationship is the degree of perceived consensus, i.e., a gross measure of the subjective norm component. Bennett did not, however, deal with that part of intention which Fishbein and Ajzen describe as "atti- tude toward the behavior." Given the diversities of knowledge and experience brought to the group situation, an effective use of these resources would affect not only perceived consensus but also individual attitudes toward the focal behavior; this could be expected to further strengthen the intention-behavior relationship by allowing the intention to be more "accurate," i.e., to be based more solidly upon shared knowledge of problem components and implica- tions. One vehicle by which group activity can be directed to both participative sharing of information and the development of consensus, while avoiding the undesirable side effects that may accompany group efforts at problem-solving, is the Nominal Group Process (NGP). 36 Nominal Group Process (Delbecq, Van de Ven, & Gustafson, 1975) is an approach to the generation of items in response to a presented problem statement. These items may be components or parameters of a problem, alternate solution options, or a listing of needs requiring responses. NGP is a highly structured activity, consisting of the silent individual generation of items in response to the problem, round-robin listing of the items, serial discussion of the items, and secret voting on the list of items by rank order- ing the most important 4-6 items; following tabulation of the votes, results are fed back to the group for further discussion, a second and final ranking vote which includes a weighting procedure, and final tabulation and feedback of the results. Since the most important aspects of the process focus on individual behaviors (item generation, round-robin presentation, voting), the process uses the group format "in name only" (nominal). The presented problem is very specific in nature, and is developed by the group facilitator (frequently a consultant) and a key individual within the organization (usually in a position to both sense problems and implement corrective action). That the problem statement be developed jointly is important: often the key organization person may unduly limit the scope of the perceived problem, and state it in such a way as to discourage further problem definition by the group. Some time prior to the scheduled NGP, the consultant discusses the problem statement with several of the identified group members to insure that the statement is comprehen- sive and relevant. At all times, however, the role of key person 37 or leader in formulating the problem is highly visible, and that person isrecognized as the initiator and overall coordinator of the change process (Hampton, Summer, & Webber, 1973). Group members must be accurately selected; participants may be any group affected by the problem, either providers or con- sumers of the goods or services in question. In most applications of NGP, the group is homogeneous (e.g., all either providers or consumers) although frequently group membership will cross hier- archical lines within Hreorganization. A further selection criterion for group membership focuses on the expected group product: diver- sity of the product is directly affected by the diversity of input and processes (Weick, 1969). The degree of structure in the process allows its use for resolution of conflict between factions; this intended "product" should also be reflected in membership critiera. Recommended group size is 6-12 members; fewer than six members may restrict the richness and variety of items generated and some aspects of the group process may not be apparent, whereas more than 11 or 12 participants may affect the recording, voting and discussion phases so as to greatly extend the amount of time needed. Total time required does not usually exceed 2 hours. Crucial to the success of NGP is the acceptance by all participants of certain rules: 1. following explanation and clarification of the problem statement, no verbal interaction is allowed during the individual writing down of items; 2. participants are to identify problem components both objective and affective in nature, but are not allowed (in a problem-identification NGP) to list items that are actually solutions; 38 3. after the silent generation of items, participants will, one at a time, read a single item from either objective or affective lists; 4. during this round-robin listing of items, no evaluations are allowed by other participants, although group members are encouraged to seek clarification of any item and to identify an item that they too have listed; 5. as they are presented, items are recorded on a flipchart and displayed in view of all participants; 6. group members are encouraged to "hitchhike," i.e., write down ideas that may occur to them based on a presented item; 7. when all items have been listed in round-robin style, the facilitator leads discussion of the listed items one at a time; 8. during serial discussion of the items, clarification, and statements of agreement or disagreement are allowed, but no items may be removed from the list; 9. during each rank-order voting phase, any item may be voted upon, i.e., the second round of voting is not limited to those items which received the most votes during the initial round, and 10. the group facilitator neither submits items nor votes. During the second round of voting (following a period of open discussion), each participant weights each of his ranked items such that the total of all values equals 100 (Casbergue, 1974). Final overall ranking becomes a priority list for action, with weighting used to break ties in rank. The "product" of a NGP session isa complete list of items generated (a group of 10 may be expected to list 40-80 items), and a record of the priority lists from first and second voting rounds and of ascribed item weights. It is apparent that NGP shares similarities with several more standard approaches. NGP allows for facilitated discussion (following the first vote) as does the interactive group process, permits idea presentation without evaluation as does brainstorming, and specifies individual idea generation and voting as does the 39 Delphi group. Furthermore, NGP avoids several of the undesirable effects of these processes. One study, for example, shows equiva- lent quantity of data generated and reported participant satisfaction for NGP and Delphi; total processing times, however, were 1% hours and five months, respectively (Van de Ven & Delbecq, 1974). The same study reported significantly higher data generation and participant satisfaction for both NGP and Delphi over the inter- active group process, and no significant differences on those two variables between NGP and individual interviews (although interviews would require a great deal more consulting time). One study has not found significant differences in the number of items generated between the NGP and interacting group process (Green, 1975). In explaining the results, Green states "First, the subjects were pervasively aware of the problems in the environment which were the focus of the problem identification task they performed. This was true because any problems existing in the environment adversely affected the subjects. Second, the voluntary status of the subjects means that they possessed an attitude of willing- ness to communicate by sharing their knowledge and identifying problems known to them" (p. 71). The NGP would seem, more so than brainstorming, to satisfy Osborne's (1957) suggestion that deliberate idea generation requires deferment of judgment in order to produce a large quantity of items. Indeed, Osborne's brainstorming technique has been shown, in both laboratory and field experiments, to produce fewer ideas than does individual effort (Taylor, Berry, & Block, 1958; Dunnette, Campbell, 4O 8. Jaastad, 1963). Both of these studies point to the inhibiting effects of group participation; as described earlier (Maier, 1967), these effects can be substantial and diverse. Nominal Group Pro- cess appears to avoid the inhibitory effects of brainstorming, and tlius increases productivity, by providing what Steiner has called "rules that impose a single, advantageous division of labor" (1972, p. 55). The high degree of structure in the nominal group process effectively counters dominance/withdrawal behaviors and superior/ subordinate relationships which would undermine the quality of both interactive and brainstorming groups. NGP also avoids formation of the power cliques identified by Schein (1969) as inevitable when using a voting mechanism to set priorities within interactive groups. The evidence for this latter point appears in the rank- priority lists; invariably two to four items will acquire a large number of rank points, with the other items sharply falling off in terms of rank popularity. Since voting is done secretly and ballots can be either returned to each participant or destroyed by the facilitator, there is little potential for recrimination by would-be power brokers. And since individuals had presented the particular problem aspects that each saw as most important, such rank point clustering would seem to indicate the development of true consensus, an element vital to effective implementation (Schein, 1969; Maier, 1967). Should the group charged with further action or implementation on the problems or solutions possess different membership than the NGP group, the complete item lists 41 and recorded rankings and weighting will provide relatively pure ir1terim communication between groups and across time (Schein, 1969). The Nominal Group Process would seem to be a valuable tool in organizational change efforts. Its ability to produce a diver- sity of informational input, to minimize disruptive group dynamics, and to allow consensus to be developed should, therefore, result in the assumption of realistic levels of risk; intentions formed under such circumstances should more completely reflect both attitudinal and normative issues, and thus be more accurately predictive of subsequent behaviors. Furthermore, the equalized opportunity to participate in the group, the well-defined role structure, and the greater level of shared information can be expected to contribute to group growth (Jacobson, 1956). An effective change process also contributes to the normative re- education of its participants (Chin & Benne, 1976). Such individual growth may occur through these behaviors which are experienced in the Nominal Group Process (Messicci, 1976, p. 13): 1. adherence to an agreed upon structure: perhaps a “new" experience for characteristically dominant or vocal individuals; 2. lessened anxiety over speaking in a group: (positing that anxiety is at least partially a function of uncertainty) each participant knows how frequently (number of items listed) and when (in round-robin order) he must speak; 3. favorable internal self-evaluation: upon comparison of item “quality" between self and others (status leveling); 4. participating in conflict over objective data rather than between personalities (Beckhard, 1969); 5. spending time in problem identification and communicating objective data to greatly facilitate consensus; 42 6. hitchhiking: covert rehearsal of and response to comments of others; and 7. clarification and defense of one's own items and challenge of items presented by others. Scope of the Present Stugy This study grew out of interest in the effect of group pro- cess on individual willingness to take risks and the relationship between that willingness and actual performance. The bodies of literature selected as appropriate to this interest included those on the often tenuous relationship between attitudes and behavior, the risky-shift phenomenon following group interaction, the effects of group processes on performance, and a conceptual differentiation between beliefs, attitudes, and intentions as they relate to behavior. Review of this literature has resulted in the following working assumptions: 1. As commonly measured, attitudes are inadequate to predict behavior; a highly specific and temporally proximate statement of intention, however, will be closely related to behavior. 2. The risky-shift (or more accurately, choice shift) phenomenon in fact reflects a change in individual intention--whether on hypo- thetical cases, contributions to charity, or games of chance. This shift is more likely to occur after an individual has been exposed to or has helped develop information about the focal problem and/or when the individual becomes aware of the levels of risk preferred by other members of the group. Under many different types of experimental manipulations, this shift has often been found to 43 occur in a direction which could be characterized as involving more “risk." 3. Beliefs, attitudes, and intentions are developmentally related. Intentions are composed of an individual's attitudes toward a focal behavior and of his/her perceptions that significant others approve or disapprove the performance of that behavior. 4. For any given task, group productivity may be enhanced by the application of the appropriate set of process rules. 5. As a group process produces more information of relevance to the components of "intention" it will have a greater effect on changes in intention and therefore on subsequent individual be- havior. These effects may occur by changing either the individual's attitude toward the focal behavior or the perception of how significant others expect the individual to behave. The Nominal Group Process was identified as a highly struc- tured approach to generating a large number of problem components, and therefore to maximizing the amount of problem-relevant infor- mation available to the group. NGP has generally been proved superior in this regard to the less-structured interactive process. The use of the terms "Nominal Group Process" and "interacting" groups, while currently acceptable in the literature, will not be used for the purposes of this study. Although these terms are broadly accurate, the degree of imprecision contained in them would serve to confuse a major dimension of this study, that of partici- pation. As indicated earlier, several components of the NGP are interactive in nature (speaking in a group, listening, responding); 44 likewise, the interactive group process certainly allows some ”nominal" activities, (viz., covert integrative and planning acti- vities, i.e., thinking, which at times distracts the individual's focus from the group activity). It is suggested, therefore, that the degree to which an individual is required to participate according to some plan is a more precise means of differentiating between these two group techniques. In this sense, NGP is seen as requiring participation (RP) and interactive groups are seen as characterized by voluntary particpation (VP). This differentiation is made with the acknowledgement that mere presence in the group situation may reflect a wide range of voluntariness, and that even adherence to the rules of Required Participation is ultimately voluntary. Finally, the assumption is made that the development of group consensus involves mutual exploration of expectations in regard to the target behavior, and, following from Bennett (1955), that public commitment may be irrelevant to the relationship between intention and performance. Changes in intentions and behavior will be examined only as they are affected by group problem-identification; problem-solving will not be formally allowed during group interaction. While this approach limits the generalizability of the current study, it makes most effective use of the Nominal Group Process and avoids con- founding what are two discreet activities. As stated earlier, both the reward structure and the nature of the focal task (obtaining signatures from strangers on a petition-like form) are intended to minimize the artificiality often characteristicmo cam: co_pew>ma com: cowumw>oo coo: coppmw>mo cam: 285$ 285$ immeasm 28:3 mamcomcoo mzmcmmcou smoH new: cowuecmcmo mono sum: cowumgmcmu mama cowumcmcmw mama cowumcmcmw memo comumawowucmm umswacmm \chHmawoWucmg acmoczrcp, :cwumawuwucmalmmcmaamm \cowumawuvucaa Agapcaro> mcovupuzoo _macmewcmnxm cw mamum mcmmccowumoao xumgu coppapagpcmz eo meowamw>mo ugmucmum new meow: e 33 72 for its non-significance; all groups demonstrated strong perceptions that the experimenter did not contribute to the content of the problem identification items. As described in the previous chapter, three student raters compared several flipcharts listing problem items identified by experimental groups with audio tape recordings of those respective groups. Two of the raters fround 100% of the tape recorded items equivalent to the flipchart items in all sessions. One rater found equivalence of 95%, 98%, and 98% in the first three sessions, respectively, and 100% equivalence in all other sessions. Based on this data, it would appear that the experimenter exerted minimal influence on the content of the items listed during the Data Gener- ation phase. Hypothesis 1 As shown in Table 5, groups using Required Participation generated significantly more problem identification items than did groups using Voluntary Participation [5(135) = -17.87, p_< .OOl]; Hypothesis 1 is therefore confirmed. Hypothesis 2 Contrary to the predictions of Hypothesis 2, a non- significant multivariate main effect was obtained for the degree of participation which characterized the group problem identifica- tion process [f(2,131) = 1.96, p_= .14]. However, the direction of data from Hypothesis 2b is of interest in light of the results described under Hypothesis 3. 73 ~00. v or m.m me.~m mo comoaawucotaa easesaam «em.e_- mm_ _m.¢ _m.e_ we =o_oaa_uwotaa atapespo> mapu>ap mu cowuww>mo new: momma cowupccou ucmucmpm ea 2 mampfi mcompwucou covenamowucma umbecmm new 33:3; E umpmxmcow mempH :owpmuweppcmuHuso—noca to gmnszz eo mspo>up use meowumw>mo vcmu=Mpm .mcmmz m opamh 74 The distribution of scores on the measure of intention is slightly skewed in the positive direction. A test for homogeneity of variance in this dependent variable indicated that population variance could be assumed to be homogeneous [Cochrans C (33,4) = .30267, p = .482]. Hypothesis 2a Univariate analysis of variance demonstrated no significant difference between Voluntary Participation and Required Participa- tkwiconditions for the measure of intention; Hypothesis 2a is therefore not supported. Hypothesis 2b Univariate analysis of variance demonstrated no significant difference between Required Participation and Voluntary Participa- tion conditions in the subject's performance of the individual "signature" task. However, the result of a step-down [rtest [§(1,131) = 2.799, 2_< .10] suggests some support for the prediction that Required Participation results in higher performance levels than does Voluntary Participation. Hypothesis 2c Univariate analysis of variance showed no significant effect by Participation on the difference between stated level of intention and actual performance, thus failing to support Hypothesis 2c. However, as shown in Table 6, the correlations between intentions and performance are highly significant in all conditions except one; 75 Table 6 Correlation Coefficients Between Measures of Intention and Performance and Resulting trvalues Conditions r df t-value Voluntary Participation/Data .29 31 1.66 Generation Required Participation/Data .52 30 3.36* Generation Voluntary Participation/Data .51 32 3.34* Generation with Consensus Required Participation/Data .66 35 5.18** Generation with Consensus Control .58 29 3.79** *p < .01 **p < .001 76 likewise, (as shown in Table 7), a significant difference on this measure was found only between Voluntary Participation/Data Generation and Required Participation/Data Generation with Consensus conditions. Hypothesis 3 Multivariate analysis of variance demonstrated a significant main effort for the Information factor [f(2,131) = 3.97, p_< .05], partially supporting Hypothesis 3. The distribution of scores on the measure of Performance is moderately skewed in the positive direction. A test for homogeneity of variance in this dependent variable indicated that p0pulation variance could cautiously be assumed to be homogeneous [Cochrans C (33,4) = .34132, p.= .15]. Hypothesis 3a Univariate analysis of variance demonstrated a non- significant effect [§(l,l32) = 2.65, p_= .10] of the Information factor on the stated level of intention; the prediction that the DG-C condition would result in a higher level of intention is not supported, although the magnitude of the obtained effect is of interest. Hypothesis 3b Step-down F-tests showed a significant effect, in the predicted direction, by the Data Generation with Consensus condi- tion on task performance levels [f_(l,13l) = 5.21, p < .05]. This 77 mo. v a... _m. mm. mm. mm._ _ozpeou Auuoo\amv mamcmmcou sup: cowumcmcmu mama mm. mm. rem._ \eowuaa_uwozaa umtmscmm Aulmo\a>v msmcwmcoo ;u_3 :owpacmcmo memo mo. mo._ \cowuaawowotaa acap==_o> Awa\amv caveatmeme memo oo.~ \cowoaawucpeaa umcwzcmm u-oa\am u-wo\a> wo\am cowuatmcmo ape: coeoeeeou \comumawowucma xcmuczpo> meowuopmgcoo cow>mcmmlcowucmucH .1 toe meowuwvcou amazomm mmococmmewo mo mwspm>1N m mpnmh 78 finding supports Hypothesis 3b that the DG-C condition will result in a higher level of task performance than will Data Generation alone. Hypothesis 3c Univariate analysis of variance demonstrated a significant main effect for Information on the difference between stated level of intention and actual performance [5(1.l32) = 7.524, p_< .01]. The direction of the effect, however, was contrary to that predicted. Examination of cell means showed that Data Generation resulted in smaller performance-intention differences than did Data Generation with Consensus. 0f additional interest is the direction of the differences themselves; Data Generation conditions produced inten- tions generally higher than actual performance, while Data Genera- tion with Consensus conditions resulted in performance levels higher than intention levels. Hypothesis 4 The multivariate analysis of variance did not show a signi- ficant interaction effect for levels of intention and performance. Likewise, a univariate analysis of variance showed no interaction effect on performance-intention differences. This lack of general support for Hypothesis 4 renders inappropriate additional analyses for Hypotheses 4a and 4b. Hypothesis 5 The Himmelfarb model described earlier, using one-way and multifactor univariate analyses of variance, demonstrated that on 79 mm.v~ mm.om N~.wp m.¢~ Fogpcou mamcmmcoo new: cowumcmcmw memo mm.m~ No.¢m F.F~ me.om \cowumamumugma umgwacom msmcmmcoo ;p_z copuecmcmw mono mo.m— ¢¢._N mm.m mm.wp \cowamnWUprmm >.Lm..:5_.o> cowumcmcmo mono m.p_ mp.mm om.- mm.mm \cowpmamomugmm oongcom cowomcmcmc mono mu.c~ mm.np m.op ¢.~N \cowumawowugma xgmuczpo> coppmw>mo new: :owumr>mo cum: cowppucou etaecaom czaucapm mocmscomcma cowpcmpca meowoeucou _ocpcoo new _mucmswcmaxm cm mucmscoecma use cowucmucH eo mmczmmwz eo mcomomw>mo ucmnceum new memo: m opnah 80 Fe. v nee mo. v qr Koo. Nmp.P «amm.~ mm. NmF._ mm._ mm. Nm_._ Fe. mucmEcomcmq mazes :owucmucfi >o< mumwce>wcs No. PmP.P «Pm.m op. _mp.~ om.~ Fm. Pmp._ me. mucmsgowcma OF. Nm_.~ mm.m mm. ~m_.P __.P mm. NmF.F coo. copucmucm mummpug czouunmum No. _mp.m Rum.m e—. Fmp.m om.p om. Pmp.m “Pm. >o< mumpca>Pu~=z m Hm m m Lle m m Hm m cowpeeLomcH cornmnpuwpcma cowumscoecm mwmxpm=< x covenawupucmm couumu meowuwucou pmocmewcmgxu toe mFaMP zcmEE=m A>o mo mvmapmc< m opnmp 81 levels of intention, levels of performance, and on performance- intention differences no significant effects occurred which would differentiate experimental and control conditions. Hypothesis 5 is thus without support. Table 10 Means, Standard Deviations, and F-ratios of Dependent Measures Under Experimental and Control Conditions Experimental Control Conditions Condition (Pooled) Dependent Mean Standard Mean Standard Measure Deviation Deviation df F-ratio Intention 20.81 10.62 24.9 18.12 1,162 2.922 Performance 21.77 13.04 26.29 14.79 1,162 3.25 Performance- .84 12.22 1.39 11.14 1,162 .05 Intention Summary of Results 1. Significantly more problem identification items were generated under the Required Participation conditions than under Voluntary Participation. 2. The degree of participation characteristic of a group problem identification process had no effect on subjects' level of behavioral intentions or the difference between stated intention and level of performance. However, an interesting non-significant 82 effect was found for Required Participation on the measure of task performance. 3. In group problem identification, the combined processes of Data Generation and Consensus resulted in a significantly higher level of subsequent individual task performance than did Data Gener- ation alone. 4. A significantly greater difference between intention and performance levels was found for Data Generation with Consensus than for Data Generation alone. 5. No differences were found between experimental and control conditions on measures of intention, performance, or performance- intention differences. 6. Levels of intention were significantly correlated with task performance levels in all but one of the experimental condi- tions and in the control condition. With one exception (Voluntary Participation/Data Generation and Required Participation/Data Generation with Consensus) no significant differences were found on this measure between experimental conditions. CHAPTER IV DISCUSSION This study intended to demonstrate the effects of the degree of Participation and the types of Information characteristic of a group problem identification process on levels of individual intention and performance. The study also predicted that Partici- pation and Information would affect the "accuracy" of the behavioral intention, i.e., how closely it approximated the subject's eventual performance level. Results of the data analyses offer only partial support for the hypotheses of this study. The strongest support is for the prediction that requiring participa- tion increases the number of problem identification items gener- ated. Strong support was also found for the impact of Data Generation with Consensus in raising the levels of individual task performance; moderate but non-significant support was likewise provided for the effects of Required Participation in increasing levels of behavioral intention. Despite the generally high and significant correlations between intention and performance levels, however, neither Participation nor Information conditions signifi- cantly affected intention levels; in terms of the hypotheses of this study and the applicability of its findings, this result is critical. 83 Interpretation of Data from the Manipulation Check Questionnaire Some of the factors which may have affected the results of this study can be seen in the responses to the manipulation check questionnaire (see Appendix H). While item 1 demonstrated, as intended, a significant main effect on the Participation factor, Item 2 (also intended to differentiate on the basis of Participa- tion) showed an interaction effect indicating a contribution by the Information factor (see Table 3). The significant main effect on item 6 by Participation and the interaction effect on item 5, both of which were intended to demonstrate Information main effects, when considered with the interaction on item 2 suggest that this study failed to adequately manipulate the Information conditions. That is, this experiment did not deve10p conditions which, in terms of subject perceptions, could isolate the respective effects of Data Generation and Data Generation with Consensus. Of interestis the interpretation, supported by cell data, that consensus was as strongly perceived under Required Participation/Data Generation as under both Required and Voluntary Participation conditions of Data Generation with Consensus; per- ceived consensus deve10ped in the RP/DG condition without the Opportunity for free discussion or, indeed, without the concept being introduced during the experimental session. These same conditions created an interaction effect for item 2, perceptions of the degree to which members participated equally in the process. As described in the previous chapter, a significant correlation 85 was found between items 2 and 5. There is strong support, there- fore, for the belief that perceived consensus (whether or not it exists in fact) can result from a group process wherein partici- pation is perceived as equal. As consensus can be perceived when it may not exist, so also can equality of participation apparently be perceived when a group process is not structured for its occurrence. Thus, the Voluntary Participation/Data Generation with Consensus condition contributed to an interaction effect on item 2. It may be objected that item 2 is vaguely worded, and that the term "discussing" may have been interpreted by subjects in the DG-C conditions as referring to either the problem identifica- tion phase or to the consensus phase whereas item 2 could refer only to the problem identification phase of the RP/DG condition. However, the term "discussing" is also used in item 1 and did not prevent a significant differentiation between Participation conditions. Furthermore, the item was intended to demonstrate final perceptions by the subjects of the total group process rather than to identify weighted combinations of the phases across conditions. A more valid concern about item 2 involves the term "participated equally." In those conditions which reached con- sensus, there is no way of knowing whether subjects used as a referent the problem identification phase or the consensus phase; it is suspected, however, that the structured “equality" of parti- cipation in the Required Participation problem identification phases carried more weight as a referent. Under the VP/DG-C 86 condition, which contributed to the interaction effect observed on this item, the equality of participation may have been perceived under either phase (or both); furthermore, subjective criteria for the judgment of equality are unknown. Subjects may have literally interpreted "equally," or may have decided that a single contribution during the process indicated equality of participa- tion. In light of these issues, the results of item 2 warrant cautious interpretation. Concern may be voiced about the vagueness of the phrase "Most people" in item 5. While that phrase suggests only a majority/ minority distinction, the use of a five-point scale may have affected the subjects' interpretation of "most" as meaning anything from a simple majority to near unanimity. As with item 2, however, any bias that may have been introduced by these semantic issues can be expected either to be randomly distributed (and therefore of little consequence to the obtained effects) or, if assumed to have had an impact on the results, can be seen as interesting attitudinal effects of the manipulation (i.e., as consistent semantic patterns resulting from the various conditions). That item 6 (perceived expectations of performance) exhibits a main effect by the Participation factor rather than, as intended, by the Information factor seems to be a major theoretical problem. Indeed, the perceived expectations of others regarding a subject's performance should directly measure part of the Subjective Norm component of the Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) model of behavioral intention; in the experimental manipulation, 87 only conditions wherein consensus is allowed to develop were expected to provide the informational basis for the Subjective Norm. Closer examination indicates, however, that while there are significant differences between Participation conditions, the cell means strongly suggest a central tendency bias. Compounding this bias may be the lack of a mid-scale anchor; subjects may not have known whether the mid-scale point was to be interpreted as "I don't know" or "Neither agree or disagree." While the statisti- cal significance of the main effect in item 6 cannot be disputed, its theoretical significance is tenuous. In summary, the manipulation check questionnaire identifies possible weakness in the experimental design, indicates that sub- jects accurately perceived whether participation was required, suggests that requiring participation elicits a perception that consensus was achieved (when in fact it was not), and demonstrates that reaching a group consensus is related to the perception of equal participation in a group. Implications of Manipulation Check Data for Experimental Results In addition to the intrinsic interest of these findings, the manipulation check data suggest an explanation for some of the experimental findings of this study. As inferred from questionnaire responses, the experiment failed to create an independent consensus condition: perceived consensus was high in the non-consensus RP/DG condition, and the consensus VP/DG-C condition produced a high perception of equality of participation which was otherwise 88 characteristic of the Required Participation conditions. Perhaps this relationship between perceived consensus and perceived equality of participation also contributed to the superiority of the VP/DG-C condition in affecting both intention and performance levels. That is, intentions and performance may have occurred at a higher level for subjects who perceived group agreement on an issue and perceived that such agreement was reached without an externally imposed process. Such a dual perception would certainly seem to foster psychological success as described by Argyris (1970). Thus, while under all conditions the subjects were able to define their own goals (i.e., statements of intention), only the Voluntary Partici- pation conditions can be seen as allowing the individual to define the path to those goals (e.g., whether or not to participate in the process). Furthermore, to the extent that such freedom to choose a goal path and group agreement are positive cultural values, the perception that one has done so may positively affect both the subject's attitude toward the task behavior and the subject's perception of the subjective norm. According to the Fishbein and Ajzen model, this would elicit increased intention levels and (with specific and temporally proximate intentions) result in higher performance. 89 Role of Problem-Solving in Experimental Results As further explanation for the experimental findings, it is proposed that the impact of Participation conditions on subjects' attitude toward the focal behavior (AB) was less than Optimal. Although the Required Participation conditions generated signifi- cantly more items than did conditions of Voluntary Participation, the groups were instructed only to examine the problems or factors which should be considered if performance was to be maximized, i.e., the group task was problem identification. Frequently, however, group activity (especially in VP conditions) would tend toward problem-solving, at times as direct suggestions to other group members, and at other times as questions of the type "Can we do . . .?" directed to the experimenter. At such times, the experimenter reminded the group of their problem identification tasks. Beyond offering support for the truism that individuals seem prone to immediate problem-solving rather than problem identi- fication, this observation suggests that problem-solving information is also valid input for the AB component of the intention model. For example, after identifying "time of day" and "my appearance" as factors to be considered before doing the task, subject attitudes were probably influenced by the consideration of inferred specific behaviors ("when I will go, what I will wear"). It is also probable, therefore, that attitude formation toward the task would have been further affected if, in addition to problem identification, the group was allowed to discuss solutions such as the best time of day to 90 approach people or the most effective types of clothing to wear. The degree to which a condition allowed subjects to engage in problem-solving activity, whether overt or covert, may thus be a critical and uncontrolled variable in this study. One empirical demonstration of this is the strong but non- significant impact of the Information factor on level of intention. While both Participation and Information factors affected perfor- mance levels (albeit to a non-significant level in the former), only the Information factor, and specifically the consensus manipulation, affected intention levels to any appreciable degree. Condition VP/DG-C allowed more time than did VP/DG and more oppor- tunity than did the RP conditions for problem-solving activity: both problem identification and consensus phases occurred in VP/DG-C, and little behavioral structuring characterized the inter- action. The VP/DG and RP/DG conditions were generally of short duration and did not allow a consensus phase. The RP/DG-C conditions, while generally lengthy, allowed free discussion only during the consensus phase, and could thus be expected (if oppor- tunity for problem-solving is the critical variable) to produce less effect on the dependent measures; indeed, no condition other than VP/DG-C demonstrated a strong effect on the measure of intention. The opportunity for subjects to use problem identification information to solve the problem also explains the performance results. Again, VP/DG and RP/DG conditions show no impact on the performance measure. The RP/DG-C condition produced a strong, non-significant effect, and the VP/DG-C condition demonstrated a 91 highly significant effect. Both effects are seen as the result of problem-solving activities which occurred after the group session but before (or during) the individual task. Subjects must, at some point, have made deicsions about the specifics of doing the task; the beginning of this process was seen in the brief and tangential problem-solving comments which were observed by the experimenter during some of the group sessions. That the inferred effects of problem-solving are not solely the result of the consen- sus is indicated by the marginal main effect for the Participation factor; that the effects are more than reflections of the length of the sessioncn~of the amount of task-relevant information processed is shown by the stronger effect of the Information factor. The nature of the task may also have had an effect on any problem-solving which was occurring during the group session. The individual task, obtaining signatures in a public place for a short period of time, requires no unusual skills; delineating aspects of the task to be considered before attempting the task could thus be a simple and short exercise. As clearly demonstrated, the nominal group process used in the Required Participation condi— tions produced significantly more problem identification items than did the Voluntary Participation interaction. Within so few and simple task parameters, a greater number of itmes can be expected to reflect a greater specificity of problem conpoments. Such specificity may facilitate and encourage thinking in terms of implicit solutions. For example, the problem item “Where to go“ provides a much broader dimension on which to make a decision than 92 does the item "Finding a place with heavy pedestrian traffic flow" which suggests a solution to part of the task problem. Since the items generatedirlthe Required Participation condition more closely resemble the latter, those conditions (despite a high degree of behavioral structuring) may have approached the less controlled Voluntary Participation conditions in allowing information to be processed which stimulated thinking about solutions as well as about problem components. Intention-Performance Relationship It was expected that the conditions of this study would differentially affect the correspondence between intention and per- formance levels. That the major effect for this relationship occurred on the Information factor is thus not surprising in view of the results obtained for each of its components. Of interest, however, is the direction of the obtained effect. Actual perfor- mance exceeded intention in the Consensus condition; intention exceeded performance in the Data Generation condition. While the Data Generation condition produced more "accurate" intentions (i.e., a smaller intention-performance difference), the Consensus condition resulted in much higher performance. This finding offers further support for the possibility that problem-solving may have occurred in Consensus conditions thereby facilitating performance. The correlations between intention and behavior are highly significant in all conditions except VP/DG, strongly supporting the Fishbein and Ajzen assertion that intention will predict behavior to 93 the extent that the intention is specific and is made as little in advance of the behavior as possible, i.e., that it is temporally proximate. While the VP/DG condition was expected to have little effect on this measure, even the control condition produced a significant correlation. Although the VP/DG condition produced a small intention-performance mean difference, its non-significant intention-performance correlation thus supports the assumption of this study that this condition would have a very weak effect on the relationship between the dependent variables. The obtained relationship between intention and performance is of applied, as well as theoretical, significance. The high correlation between these two measures may reflect a self- fulfilling pr0phecy; there were no controls to insure that a subject performed the task for the required amount of time. It is possible, therefore, that some subjects remembered or noted their intention levels and discontinued the individual task after reaching an approximation of that level regardless of the time parameter for the task. Similarly, some subjects reported becoming so involved with the task that the time limit was slightly exceeded; this rule violation was probably not purposeful, since no rewards were specified for meeting or exceeding the intended level of performance. Despite this lack of control in the task performance phase, the occurrence of high correlations between intention and behavior reaffirms the proposition of Fishbein and Ajzen that levels of intentionare appropriate targets of change if behaviors 94 are to be affected. This suggestion is strengthened in light of the relatively unrewarding nature of the focal task. Relationships Between Experimental and Control Conditions Although the experimental conditions produced several interesting results, these conditions did not, when pooled, exhibit significant differences from the control condition on measures of intention or performance. This finding is in contra- diction to some major theoretical assumptions and empirical data upon which this study was based. It will be recalled from the first chapter of this study that the phenomenon of "risky-shift" was interpreted as reflecting a change in intention. Much "risky- shift" research was further interpreted as suggesting that for the shift to occur there must, at minimum, be a processing of informa- tion; critical infbrmation could apparently relate to either the focal task or to group perceptions of preferred risk levels or cultural norms. These types of information were then described as variations of the AB and SN components (respectively) of the Fishbein and Ajzen model of behavioral intention. The failure to find a significant difference between experimental conditions and a control condition which allowed neither task-related or group norm information (about the task) to develop thus adds more discrepant data to the risky-shift literature and apparently belies the Fishbein and Ajzen model of intention. As the nature of the individual task was above interpreted as contributing to results among the ex; rimental conditions, so 95 also may features of the task partially explain the lack of control group significance. The individual "signature" task is short, simple, and probably without a great deal of threat to the sub- ,jects. Such features may have severely lessened the potential for impact by the experimental conditions; i.e., any problem- identification or problem-solving activities for so simple a task may have been superfluous. Still another explanation may involve what occurred within the control conditions. Although the indivdiual task was not introduced until after the group activity (the "Lost at Sea" exercise) had ceased, the group task, while gamelike, involved problem-identification, problem—solving, and reaching group con- sensus. The resulting behavioral practice afforded by these activities, the attitudinal set acquired, or the degree of group cohesiveness developed in combination with the simplicity of the task may have reduced the relative impact on intention and behavior of the task-oriented activities in the experimental conditions. The manipulation check questionnaire was not administered to control groups; thus, no data exist about subject perceptions of group consensus, of expected performance levels, or of the perceived equality or voluntariness of participationirlthe control task. Limitations on Interpretation of fFindings The current study possesses some characteristics which may limit the degree of external validity which can be ascribed to its results. Foremost, of course, is the temporary nature of the study: 96 subjects were mostly unknown to each other before the study and were not involved in ongoing relationships. In addition, the duration of group interaction was short, and neither the group activities nor the individual task could be described as of intrinsic interest to the subjects. Conversely, the nature of the individual task, the types of group activity, and certain characteristics of the reward system were not unique to a laboratory study. The results of this study may thus be applied to external situations with a fair degree of confidence. Limitations on interpreting the results of this study are also evident from the statistical analyses conducted. Although no significant heterogeneity of variance was identified, a moderate effect was obtained under the measure of performance. This degree of variance heterogeneity may have contributed to a lowering of significance levels in tests between experimental conditions. Such an effect, given the problems of experimental design discussed above, can be seen as minimal, and may, in fact, reflect character- istics of the experimental manipulations. Of similar concern is the finding that the distributions of both dependent measures were positively skewed; there is, however, no reason to assume that such skewness reflect population characteristics seriously different from normal. Interpretation of this study must be further tempered with the acknowledgement that (as inferred from manipulation check questionnaire data) an independent consensus condition was not created. Likewise, it is possible that the control condition 97 allowed behavioral practice of critical variables and was, in fact, not an adequate control relative to the experimental conditions. Implications This study suggests that given a "stranger" group, a simple individual task, and insufficient time to attempt both problem identification and problem solving in a group situation, an inter- active group process for problem identification combined with the process of reaching a group consensus will result in higher levels of performance and may also produce a higher level of intended performance. Such effects can be expected to occur if the same indivdiuals are both part of the group process and are those per- forming the task, and if there is reason to believe that the group members hold essentially neutral attitudes toward the task. While generally requiring additional time, and demonstrating a weaker effect on intentions and performance, a Nominal Group Process combined with group consensus can also be expected to impact behavior. This approach may be more appropriate in a group whose interpersonal dynamics would otherwise interfere with an interactive process, where the problem is complex, or where the problem identification data is to be used by another group in per- formance of the task. The data gathering phase of the Nominal Group Process may also be used without a consensus condition, i.e., up to the point of listing problem items, if perceived group consensus, a feeling of equal participation, or a perception of expected (by other group members) performance level is to be 98 generated within a short period of time. This application would be appropriate only if the objective of the group was to increase aware- ness of the focal problem and not to define priorities for further action. This study further suggests that, in applied situations, it may not be possible to totally separate problem identification and problem-solving behaviors in a group interaction. In order to maximize the effect of a groupinteracthwion intention and perfor- mance, theref0re, some allowance for problem-solving should be structured into a problem-identification process. Finally, the data suggest that the combined perceptions of group consensus and of equal and voluntary participation may be a critical factor in maximizing intention and performance levels. This issue especially could benefit from further empirical study. For example, would the Required Participation conditions have elicited higher levels of intention and performance if a sense of "voluntary requiredness" was generated? This effect could be created by explaining the NGP process and asking for subject per- mission to proceed according to its high degree of structure. Another empirical question raised by this study involves the inferred covert problem-solving which occurred during problem identification processes. Do differences exist among conditions in the degree of problem resolution (i.e., in having made decisions as to how to approach the task) experienced by subjects? Would a voluntary/consensus condition still prove superior given a more 99 complex task, a task which may not allow as much diversion from the problem identification activity? Several other issues remain to be considered: what effect would publicly expressed statements of intention have on perceived expectations of performance? What is the relationship between these perceived expectations and actual performance? What results would be obtained with subjects having a group history and expecting to continue as a group, or with highly competitive or hostile intra- group relationships? Such issues provide a fertile source of further research possibilities. This study intended to integrate, in a unique manner, several areas of theoretical and empirical interest with the purpose of adding to existing knowledge of human social behavior. Experi- mental manipulations were desigend to demonstrate the relationship between attitude and behavior, and to examine group processes which could facilitate the achievement of human goals. The results obtained, the inferences made, and the perceptions identified have contributed to a more complete understanding of these relationships. APPENDICES 100 APPENDIX A CONTROL GROUP ACTIVITY 101 140. LOST AT SEA: A CONSENSUS-SEEKING TASK ( 51 mix I. To teach the effectiveness of consensus- seeking hehavior in task groups through comparative experiences with hoth in- dividual decision-making and group decisiiiii-making. II. To explore the concept of synergy in refer- ence to the outcomes of group decision- making. (.‘mup Sizc Five to twelve participants. Several groups may he directed simultaneously. (Syner- gistic outcomes are more likely to he achieved hy smaller groups. e.g.. five to seven participants.) 'l'imr' Required .‘\ppro.\imatcl_v one hour. .Ifutcriufs I. Pencils. 11. Two copies of the Lost at Sea Individual “’orksheet for each participant. III. :\ copy of the Lost at Sea (lroup \\'ork- sheet for each snhgri mp. IV. A copy of the Lost at Sea Answer and Ila- tionale Sheet for each participant. V. Newsprint and felt-tipped markers. Physical Setting Laphoards or desk chairs are hest for prij vacy in individual work. Tahles may he used. hut the dynamics involved are likely to he different. Pnuvws I. The facilitator distrihutes two copies of the Lost at Sea Individual \l'orksheet to 111. IV. V. 102 each participant and asks each person to complete the forms in duplicate. He ex- plains that participants are to work inde- pendently during this phase. .-\Iter fifteen minutes. the facilitator col- lects one copy from each participant. The other copy is for the use of the group. The facilitator forms suhgroups and di- rects them to particular work areas in the room. He gives one Lost at Sea (Iroup \\orkshcct to each group. The facilitator then reads the instructions to the groups, emphasizing that each memher of a group should partially agree with the group choices to cstahlish consensus. hut that they are not to use such techniques as aver- aging. majority-rule voting. or trading. IIe stresses that it is desirahle that effort he made to achieve success in this task. While the groups are engaged in their task. the facilitator scores the individual rank- ing sheets. The score is the sum of the differences hetween the "correct" rank for each item and its rank on the Individual \l'orksheet (all differences should he made positive and added). Higher scores have greater negative implications. The facil- itator then totals all individual scores for each group and divides hy the number of j group members to ohtain the average indi- vidual score for each group. After thirty-five minutes, the facilitator collects the. Group \Vorksheets and scores them as he did the Individual Worksheets. while the participants dehrief their con- sensus-seeking. He then prepares a chart such as the one following. summarizing the statistics. [97.1 I an crsity .-l.ssm'iulcs Publishers. Inc. 103 BEFORE GROUP DISCUSSION Average Score of Individual Most Accurate Group Score individual Example 55 45 1 2 3 Average lor all groups AFTER GROUP DISCUSSION _ Gain/Loss Gain/Loss Score tor Over Over Group Average Most Accurate Group Consensus Individual Individual Synergy‘ Example 40 + 15 + 5 Yes 1 2 >—- i _— 3 l Average tor all groups “Synergy is delined as the consensus score lower than the lowest individual score in the ' group. \‘I. The facilitator returns all Individual and VII. (Iroup “'orks‘hcets and distrihutes a copy of the Lost at Sea Answer and Rationale Sheet to each participant. After allowing the groups a few minutes to discuss the answers and rationale. the facilitator ana- ly/.es the statistics and explains the syn- ergy factor. The facilitator leads a discussion of the comparative outcomes of individual rank- iugs and group consensus rankings. Dis- cussion questions such as the following might he suggested hy the facilitator: - What hehaviors helped or hindered the consensus-seeking process? - \\'hat patterns of decision-making oc- curred? - Who were the influential memhersaud how were they influential? ° How did the group discover and use its informatiim resources? \\'ere these re- sources fully utilized? - “'hat are the implications of consensus- seeking and synergistic outcomes for Nu I975 .\mmul Hmnl/mek for (Jump l’rli‘llllulois intact task groups such as committees and staffs of institutions? - What consequences might such a proc- ess produce in the group's attitudes? \liriulions II. III. Process ohservers can he used to give feed- hack ahout either group hehavior or indi- vidual hehavior. A Iecturette on synergv and consensus- seeking can immediately precede the group problem-solving phase to establish a mental set toward cooperation. Each participant can be given only one copy of the Lost at Sea Individual Work- sheet and instructed to score his own sheet. Similar Structured Experiences: Vol. I: Stnictured Ex- perience II: Vol. II: 30; Vol. ”1:64. 69; '72 Annual: 77; Vol. IV: IIS. Lecturette Source: '73 Annual: ”Synergy and (:I niselisus-Seeking." Suhuutted hy Paul M. Nemiroff and \Villiaui A. Pasmore. 30 104 Paul M. Nemirofl' is a consultant to General Frmrls (.‘oqmration. lxrfaycttc. Indiana. He rc- Ireii'erl his BA. in psychology from l'(.'l.-\. his .\l.S. in organizational psychology from San Francisco State t'nircrsity. and is currently completing his l’h.l). in organizational behavior at Purdue l'nii‘crsity. l.ahrycttc. lnrliana. While at I’unluc. he has taught courses in both ml- ministratii'c scicnccs (llItl psychology. William A. Pasmore is a consultant to (.‘cncral Finals Corporation. Ixifaycttc. Indiana. llc is currently complcting his PhD. in the area ol‘organimtion rlci'clopmcnt at Purdue l'nircrsity. Illfllyl'lll’. liuliana. .\lr. l'asmorc's- hackgmuml is in l’tlsillr‘ss. organi:.ation rlci'cloprncnl. re- search methodology. rtml (caching. ‘ [.973 l llit crsity .-\.s.sor1'alcs Publishers. Inc. 105 LOST AT SEA INDIVIDUAL wonxsneer Name (Ironp-.- -_.__ ----__._ _ ___- lnstmr‘tions: You are adrift on a private yacht in the South Pacific. As a consequence of a fire of unknown origin. much of the yacht and its contents have heen destroyed. The yacht is now slowly sinking. Your location is unclear hecause of the destruction of critical navigational equipment and hecause you and the crew were distracted trying to hring the fire under control. Your hest estimate is that you are approx- imately one thousand miles south-southwest of the nearest land. Below is a list of fifteen items that are intact and undamaged after the fire. In addi- tion to these articles. you have a serviceahlc. ruhher life raft with oars large enough to carry yourself, the crew. and all the items listed helow. The total contents of all survivors' pockets are a package of cigarettes. several hooks of matches. and five one-dollar hills. Your task is to rank the fifteen items hclow in terms of their importance to your survival. Place the mnnhcr l hy the most important item. the mnuher2 hy the second most important. and so on through ninnher IS. the least important. -- _____ Sextant _- _. Shaving mirror __-__- Five-gallon can of water Mosquito netting One case of US. Army (I rations Maps of the Pacific Ocean Seat cushion (flotation device approved by the Coast (luardl __ Two-gallon can of oil-gas mixture Small transistor radio Shark repellent ..______. Twenty square feet of opaque plastic One quart of Mitt-proof Puerto Rican rum Fifteen feet of nylon rope - Two hoxes of chocolate hars Fishing kit The 1975 Annual Handbook for Group Fadlitarors 31 106 LOST AT SEA GROUP WORKSHEET (Iroup ,. mm--- .-,___.-. Instructions: This is an exercise in group decision-making. Your group is to employ the group consensus method in reaching its decision. This means that the prediction for each of the fifteen survival items must he agreed upon by each group memher hefore it hecomes a part of the group decision. Consensus is difficult to reach. There- fore. not every ranking will meet with everyone's complete approval. .\s a group. try to make each ranking one with which all group memhers can at least partially agree. Itere are some guides to use in reaching consensus. l. Avoid arguing for your own individual judgments. \pproach the task on the hasis of logic. to .\void changing your mind if it is only to reach agreement and avoid conflict. Support only solutions with which you are ahle to agree at least somewhat. .3. .\void "corillict-reducing" techniques such as majority vote. averaging. or trad- ing in reaching your decision. 4. View differences of opinion as a help rather than a hindrance in decision- making. Sextalit Shaving mirror Five-gallon can of water .\tosquito netting One case of US. Army (3 rations \laps of the Pacific Ocean _ __ Seat cushion {flotation device approved hy the (Ioast (luardl ._-_ -- 'I'wo-gallon can of oil-gas misture _- Small transistor radio - . - Shark repellent Twenty square feet of opaque plastic - _ ()ne quart of Ifitl-proof Puerto Rican rum _.....-. Fifteen feet of nylon rope -_,.-_.-H. Two hoses of chocolate hars . -__.-. Fishing kit ' 1.975 t on crsity .-\.s.s-ociatc.s Publishers. Inc. 107 LOST AT SEA ANSWER AND RATIONALE SHEET‘ According to the “experts." the hasic supplies needed when a person is stranded in mid ocean are articles to attract attention and articles to aid survival until rescuers arrive. Articles for navigation are of little importance: liven if a small life raft were capahle of reaching land. it would he impossihle to store enough food and water to suhsist during that period of time. 'l'liercfore, of primary importance are the shav- ing mirror and the two-gallon can of oil-gas mixture. These items could he used for signaling air-sea rescue. ()f secondary importance are items such as water and food. e.g., the case of Army (T rations. A hrief rationale is provided for the ranking of each item. These hriefexplanations ohviously do not represent all of the potential uses for the specified items hut. rather. the primary importance of cacti. I-Shaving mirror Critical for signaling air-sea I'escllc. Z—Two-gallon can of oil-gas misture (Iritical for signaling—the oil-gas misture \\ ill float on the water and could he ignited with a dollar hill and a match «diminish. outside the raft 'l. II—Five-gallou can of water Necessary to replenish loss hy perspiring. etc. ~I—One case of US. Army (I rations ProVides liasic food intake. S—Twenty square feet of opaque plastic Utilized to collect rain water. provide shelter from the elements. fi—Two boxes of chocolate bars A reserve food supply. 7-Fishing kit Ranked lower than the candy hars hecause "one hird in the hand is worth two in the hush." There is no assurance that you will catch any fish. B—Fifteen feet of nylon rope May he used to lash equipment together to prevent it from falling overhoard. 9-Floatiug seat cushion If someone fell overhoard. it could function as a life preserver. IO-Shark repellent Ohvious. II—One quart of I60-proof Puerto Riean rum Contains 80 percent alcohol—enough to use as a potential antiseptic for any in- juries incurred; of little value otherwise; will cause dehydration if ingested. 'Uf‘f'icers of the I'niteil States \lcrchant \Iarun-s ranked the fifteen Items and provided thc ‘ corn-t l” solution to the task. The 1975 Annual Ilanrlhook for (Jump I-‘acrlitalors 3'3 108 I2—Small transistor radio 0f little value since there is no transmitter (unfortunately. you are out of range of your favorite AM radio stations). Ill-Maps of the Pacific Ocean . Worthless without additional navigational equipment-it does not really matter where you are but where the rescuers are. Ill-Mosquito netting There are no mosquitoes in the mid Pacific. IS—Scxtant Without tahles and a chronometer, relatively useless. The basic rationale for ranking signaling devices ahove life-sustaining items (food and water) is that without signaling devices there is almost no chance of heing spotted and rescued. Furthermore. most rescues occur during the first thirty-six hours, and one can survive without food and water during this period. Reproduced from The 1975 Annual I lanrlhook for Group Facilitators john E. joncs and I. William PfciIIer. I‘lditors [.1 jolla. California: University Associates Puhlishers. Inc.. l973 ' 1975 University Associate: Publishers. Inc. APPENDIX B GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS TO ALL EXPERIMENTAL GROUPS 109 APPENDIX B GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS TO ALL EXPERIMENTAL GROUPS Today we will be using a group approach to problem-solving. The purpose of this session is to help you in preparing for a short individual task. Your individual task is to gather a maximum number of names or signatures and phone numbers of people with whom you are not close friends, during a 15 minute period in a public place. A public place is any non-residential area of generally open access where you can meet people that you do not necessarily know. For example, a dormitory floor is not public, but parts of a dormitory complex may be public. Likewise, your parent's home or your apartment is not public, but if you were to meet friends or neighbors in the Union building or on a street corner, that would be a public situation. Here is the form you will use in this task. (see Appendix C) Print your name and local address at the tap of this page where it says "Hi! I'm . . ."; then read the remainder of the paragraph. (When finished reading) In the upper right hand corner put your group number, which is . . . At the bottom of the page, print the words "time" and "place." You will indicate in those spaces when and where you obtain the signatures. All names or signatures that you obtain must be on this sheet. You may have as many as you think you will need. All names obtained will be checked against the campus directory to see whether the list was, e.g., passed around the dormitory floor. All lists must be returned within 24 hours after the end of this session, i.e., before . . . tomorrow. Place the forms in the envelope which is outside this door. llO APPENDIX C TARGET TASK SIGNATURE FORM lll APPENDIX C TARGET TASK SIGNATURE FORM Hi! I am (name) of (address) I am participating in a social psychology experiment supervised by the Department of Psychology, Michigan State University. As part of this experiment I am gathering signatures. If you would care to help me in this study, please sign your name and phone number below. To check on the accuracy of this list, the experimenter may contact you by phone. Beyond that, gg_gg§_will be authorized to contact you as a result of your signing this form. Your cooper- ation will be appreciated. Thank you. (Experimenter: J. Messicci, 452 8, Baker Hall) 112 APPENDIX D INSTRUCTIONS FOR DATA GENERATION PHASE FOR SUBJECTS IN VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION CONDITIONS 113 APPENDIX D INSTRUCTIONS FOR DATA GENERATION PHASE FOR SUBJECTS IN VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION CONDITIONS You may use these sheets of paper to make any notes that you wish during this process. (Distribute half-sheets of lined paper). As you think of parts of the "signature" problem, just speak out and I will list them on this chart. In approaching this task, you may want to consider both the objective parts of the problem (i.e., facts which others can verify) and subjective parts of the problem (i.e., beliefs or feelings about the problem). As an example, if the problem was to identify what was wrong with a particular course, an objective part of the problem might be that the syllabus was not given out until the third week of classes. A subjective part of the problem might be "I don't like the instructor's appear- ance.“ When you are thinking of parts of the problem, try to think in terms of a problem and not in terms of a solution. Going back to the example of the instructor, a problem would be "I don't like long hair on iristructorsfl' But if you say "The instructor needs a haircut" you are stating a solution and not a problem. Is this distinction clear? Today you will be stating parts of the problem, i.e., anything that you will have to con- sider before doing the signature task. During this process, participation is voluntary. No one should feel obligated to contribute. 114 APPENDIX E INSTRUCTIONS FOR DATA GENERATION PHASE FOR SUBJECTS IN REQUIRED PARTICIPATION CONDITIONS 115 APPENDIX E INSTRUCTIONS FOR DATA GENERATION PHASE FOR SUBJECTS IN REQUIRED PARTICIPATION CONDITIONS Subjects in all Required Participation conditions were instructed as follows: In identifying the parts of the "signature" problem, you will use these forms. (Hand out forms) The problem is stated at the top, and there is room forlisting both objective parts of the problem (i.e., facts which others can verify) and subjective parts of the problem (i.e., beliefs or feelings). As an example, if the problem was to identify what was wrong with a particular course, an objective part of the problem might be that the syllabus was not given out until the third week of classes. A subjective part of the problem might be “I don't like the instructor's appearance." When you are listing parts of the problem, be sure to state each item in terms of a problem and not as a solution. Going back to the example of the instructor, a problem would be "I don't like long hair on instructors." But if you say "The instructor needs a haircut," you are stating a solution and not a problem. Is this distinction clear? Today you will be stating parts of the problem, i.e., anything that you will have to consider before doing the signature task. You will have 7 minutes in which to write down all possible parts of the problem that you can think of. During this time no talking is allowed. If you finish ahead of time, do not disturb other group members who may still be thinking about the problem. Try to be as brief and to-the-point as you can in listing the parts of the problem. At the end of seven minutes (or earlier if it appeared that little activity had occurred for a minute or so), the experimenter asked "Is anyone still actively thinking about the problem?" If one or more subjects indicated that work was still occurring, another minute was allowed for completion. The instructions then continued: 116 the 117 Now that you have individually identified parts of the signature task problem, I will list them on this chart. During this process everyone is required to participate. We will start with , who will give me one of the problem items he (she) hasTlisted. The item can be either objective or subjective, and you do not have to say which it is, just give the item as you have it written. After I have written the item on the chart, will give me one of his (her) items, and so on, with each person giving one item at a time. You may give the items you have in any order you wish, but we will continue going around the group until all items have been listed. Even if someone else has given the identical item, if you have it listed on your sheet, you also must give it sometime during the process. If you run out of items, say "Pass" when it comes your turn. If a new problem idea occurs to you based on what has been presented by someone else, write it down on your list and present it when your turn comes around. Even if you have "passed," you may contribute more items, in turn, if they occur to you. Are there any questions about this part of the session? The process continued until all subjects had said "Pass" in same round. The experimenter then stated: We will now go through the items one by one. During this process you are free to ask any questions you have that will serve to clarify the items, but you are not allowed to evaluate any items. In other words, you may ask about the meaning of any item that you do not fully understand but you may not comment on whether you think an item is important or not. Are there any questions about item 1, (read item)__ ; etc. APPENDIX F INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONSENSUS PHASE IN VOLUNTARY AND REQUIRED PARTICIPATION GROUPS 118 APPENDIX F INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONSENSUS PHASE IN VOLUNTARY AND REQUIRED PARTICIPATION GROUPS Voluntary Participation groups assigned to the Data Genera- tion with Consensus condition were instructed: Now that you have identified what is involved in the signa- ture task, I would like you to reach group consensus as to which five of these items are most important to consider in getting a maximum number of names or signatures. Con- sensus does not mean that you must all agree on each item as most important, but you must not have serious disagree- ment about any of the final five items. Try not to use any voting or negotiating techniques such as "I'll agree to this if you'll agree to that." You are free to add items to the list if they occur to you; you may also collapse or combine any items that are already listed. You may discuss and evaluate the items in any manner you wish. Again, participation is voluntary in this process; no one should feel obligated to contribute to the discussion. Let me know when you have reached consensus. Required Participation groups assigned to the Data Genera- tion with Consensus condition were instructed: You will now use these slips (hand out slips) to rank those five items that you consider most important in doing the signature task. Within those five items, give a rank of 5 to that item you consider most important, a rank of 4 to the next important, and so on, giving a rank of l to the item that you consider least important of the five items. Do not talk during this period, and return the slips to me when you have finished. (After the results of the vote were displayed on the flipchart) Now that you have identified what is involved in the signature task, you must reach group consensus as to which five of these items are most important to consider in getting a maximum number of names or signatures. Consensus does not mean that you must all agree on each item as most important, but you must not have serious disagreement about any of the five final items. Do not use any voting or negotiating techniques such as "I'll agree to this if you'll agree to that." You 119 120 are free to add items to the list if they occur to you; you may also collapse or combine items that are already listed. You may use any items listed on the charts to reach consensus, including those which did not receive any votes. Likewise, your consensus is not limited to those items which received the most votes. Again, everyone must participate in the discussion and consensus. You are free to discuss and evaluate the items in any manner you wish. Let me know when you have reached consensus. APPENDIX G DEPENDENT MEASURE OF INTENTION 121 APPENDIX G DEPENDENT MEASURE 0F INTENTION I intend to obtain names on my sign-up sheet. I understand that these names are to be obtained by myself during a l5 minute period in a public place. I further agree not to deliver any information from the sign-up sheet to anyone other than the experimenter. 122 APPENDIX H MANIPULATION CHECK QUESTIONNAIRE 123 APPENDIX H MANIPULATION CHECK QUESTIONNAIRE Instructions: Read each of the following statements carefully. 0n the scale below each statement, circle the number that most accur- ately reflects your agreement or disagreement with that statement. 1 All group members were required to participate in discussing the "signature" task. Stron l Stron l Disaggeg I 2 3 4 5 Agrgey 2 All group members participated equally in discussing the "signature"problem. Strong1y Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 Disagree 3 I know more now about the problems involved in doing the "signature" task that I knew before the group discussion. Strongly Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Agree 4 I would have learned just as much about the "signature" task working alone as I did working with this group. Strongly Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Agree 5 M<>st people in our group would agree on what are the important problems in doing the "signature" task. Strongly Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Agree 6 The other members of this group expect me to get at least as many signatures as they each get. Strongly Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Agree 7 The group leader did not contribute to the list of problems that were identified. Strongly Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Agree 124 BIBLIOGRAPHY 125 BIBLIOGRAPHY Ajzen, 1., & Fishbein, M. The prediction of behavior from atti- tudinal and normative variables. Journal of Experimental Social Psycholo , 1970, 6, 466-487. Ajzen, 1., & Fishbein, M. 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