This is to certify that the

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AND POLICING RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

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THE RELATIONSHIP OF FEDERAL FUNDING TO CRIMINOLOGY
AND POLICING RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

By

Jim Thomas

A DISSERTATION

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ABSTRACT

The Relationship of Federal Funding to
Criminology and Policing Research in the Social Sciences

By Jim Thomas

An increasingly prominent feature of social research in the past
two decades has become its sponsorship by Federal agencies. This so-
called marriage between researchers and Federal sponsors has been
viewed as destructive by some, essential by others. By examining
Federal sponsorship of criminal justice research, particularly
policing studies, within the context of a sociology of knowledge,
two issues are addressed: 1) The ideological configurations underly-
ing knowledge production, and 2) The possible politicization of
research by Federal funding.

Two research strategies have been employed. First, drawing the
distinction between state power and state apparatus, the organizational
processes underlying Funding decisions for one particular agency, the
National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice (NILECJ)
are examined. By examing the state's organization for the production
of knowledge, insights into how state power is translated into research
by state apparatus becomes possible, and also helps identify particular
features, both structural and interactional, which radiate state power.
The organizational study entailed interviewing key NILECJ personnel,
Congressional aides and other persons related to Institute activity,
and also included attending legislative hearings and other appropriate
sessions. It also entailed a documentary analysis of legislation,
policy documents and NILECJ correspondence and memorandums. Two
findings emerged from the organizational study: 1) State power is

mediated by a variety of structural and interactional features such as individual discretion, _sub_ _rosa_ rules, and tacit understandings of particular persons, as well as by conflicting and contradictory goals or strategies between state agencies and the social environment. As a consequence, funded research cannot be understood simply as a direct expression of state power and the corresponding interests such power serves; 2) Although the findings suggest that criminal justice research is politicized, this politicization may reflect features of the research community at least as much as it does any particular ideological perspective of either state power or state apparatus.

The _second_ strategy employed a precise coding instrument for a _content_ _analysis_ comparing funded and non-funded policing studies in six sociological and criminal justice journals. Two findings emerged from the content analysis: 1) Federal funding does not seem to generate research results that are more politicized than non-funded research, and 2) There are several ideological biases found in both funded and non-funded research, but these ideological features may be embedded in research activity itself rather than derive from the influence of state sponsorship.

There are several conclusions derived from this study. _First_, the relationship between the state and the activities it sponsors cannot be understood solely by examining formal rules and procedures or intents of Federal agencies and corresponding authorizing legislation. This is because there exists a variety of factors which mediate between state activity and other features of the social world. _Second_, the content analysis suggests that the politicization of research occurring in both funded and non-funded policing studies

seems to originate in the preconceptual stage of research, suggesting
that the prior ideology of the researcher may be a normative feature
of research rather than shaped by state sponsorship. Third, a sociology
of knowledge requires a theory of both structural and individual
ideology as well as a theory of the state in modern industrial society
in order to more adequately account for the production of the politi-
cization and ideological figures underlying knowledge production.
This project is a first step in this direction.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Dissertations are usually a collective effort from divers sources, and this one is no exception. I thank Jim McKee and Rick Hill for their intellectual support for the past five years, and Dick Peterson for his patience and time-consuming assistance, which, while probably driving him to occasional dispair, kept me from it. I also wish to thank Jim Zuiches for useful comments he made on the proposal.

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The tolerance of friends like Mike Young, Harry Mika, Peter Grimes, Gerry Bennett, Ron Kirschenheiter, Ginny Samuelson, Martha Mikko, Barb Keane and Greg Hill was absolutely crucial. And somehow Barb kept it all together. Thanks.

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INTRODUCTION

An increasingly prominent feature of social research[1] since the
1960s has become its sponsorship by the private and state economic
sectors.[2] This has been variously called the "new political economy"
(B.L.R. Smith, 1975), "the revolution in government science" (Dupre
and Lakoff, 1962: 9-15), "the New Federalism"[3] (Muelder, 1971: 1-10;
Price, 1964: 33), the managerial revolution (Kerr, 1964: 28), or
simply the response to the crisis in American education. Through the
sponsorship of graduate and postgraduate training programs, research
and development projects and plants, support to secondary and higher
education, private research contracts, in-house research agencies and
investigatory commissions, grants, subsidies and conferences, the
state sector especially continues to contribute heavily to social
research activity.[4] As Dupre and Lakoff (1962: 20) have observed:

> In terms of sheer size, industrial research and development,
> the majority of it financed by the government, dominates the
> American science establishment. . .But even more important is
> the nature of the links that R&D has forged between public and
> private interests.

Since this was written, the Federal government has become even
more heavily involved in research support. Yet, the nature of the
links between Federal support and research activity remains little-
examined. As will be discussed in Chapter 2, these links are
variously viewed as the reflection of a benevolent state's

philanthropic efforts to contribute to the well-being of its members, as a sign of social enlightment, or as a means of class domination.

SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE CONTEXT

The study of the social organization and the social content of knowledge is usually assigned to the realm of the sociology of knowledge. The central maxim of the sociology of knowledge is that knowledge cannot be adequately understood without an examination of its social context. A sociology of knowledge context is useful for the examination of state-sponsored research because it allows for examination of the genesis of one particular form of knowledge, scientific knowledge, as a _social_ process, a process created and shaped by a variety of social factors. By examining the conditions under which certain procedures and contents of knowledge are followed and produced, and the factors which may direct attention to certain problems and topics rather than others, it may become possible to increase understanding of the existence of ideas as, in part, contingent upon the historically-shaped features of the social world, such, for example, as the modern state. Most traditional sociology of knowledge positions, however, appear inadequate for the task of addressing the complex interrelationships between contemporary knowledge production and the underlying social bases, and these positions should be examined before proceeding.

Inquiry into the social context of knowledge began in the so-called preliterate era of history (Barnes and Becker, 1938), and extant recorded attempts to understand the social elements of knowledge are found at least as early as Socrates' interrogation of

Theaetetus. In modern times, 18th century thinker Claude Helvetius was one of the first to suggest that ideas were socially derived. Kent's later 18th century critique and dialectical synthesis of dogmatic rationalism and empiricist skepticism ultimately inspired Hegel's subsequent attempts to demystify the development of knowledge by viewing it as the dialectical becoming of Reason, brought about through the activity of world-historical agents. Hegel's radical critique of Kantian epistemology led in turn to Marx's early theory of ideology which located the content of a society's ideas within the beliefs and attitudes of a dominant class. The Hegelian-Marxian view, in turn, influenced a number of early influential thinkers (e.g., Scheler, Lukács, Mannheim). August Comte's so-called "positivist" social theory of the early 19th century was a response to the "negativism" of the Hegelian position. In contrast to the subjectivism and "negation" of Hegelian thinking, Comte sought objective (i.e., positive) features, laws, and development in history and social interaction. These positions, positivism,[5] neo-Kantianism, and Hegelian-Marxian variants are the three dominant intellectual influences in the sociology of knowledge.

Twentieth century sociologists of knowledge would appear to share a common definition or theme by focusing on those social features which shape knowledge or on the processes whereby categorical frames of reference, perceptual ordering techniques and interpretive frameworks, or "mapping" techniques are rooted in social conditions (e.g., Mannheim, 1936: 2; Barnes, 1948: 215; Staude, 1967: 165; Timasheff, 1948: 441; Maquet, 1951: 5). But several issues begin to emerge here, which can be described within the intellectual traditions in which they occur.

The fundamental point of divergence between the Positivist, Neo-Kantian, and Marxian-Hegelian[6] positions is on the relationship of knowing subject to the object known, or more simply, on the subject-object relationship.

1. _Positivism_. For positivists, knowledge production is an order-creating production of human intellectual functions. For positivists, knowledge conforms to features of an objective world. Processes underlying the social organization of knowledge are typically viewed as forms of social organization designed to apprehend as accurately as possible the noumenal features of autonomous objects. The analytic focal point is one of examining, in Durkheim's dictum, a world of "social facts" as "things," and the methodological task involves a search for laws or causes of the genesis of knowledge. Four inter-related features characterize this conception of sociology of knowledge. _First_, knowledge is _reductionist_ in that it is reducible to an independent entity which

> . . .presents us with society conceived of as a thing-like facticity standing over against its individual members with coercive controls and molding them in its socializing processes (Berger and Pullberg, 1964: 196).

In this view,

> . . .the reflective powers of cognition become drastically limited as thought becomes defined in terms of a unified, scientific order wherein factual knowledge is derivable from and subsumed under natural scientific principles (Hearn, 1973-4: 143).

Second, positivism is _objectivist_ in that there is an assumed correspondence between an object and the subject's conception of that object, and empirical variables represented in theoretical propositions are presumed self-existent. The _phenomenal_ relationship

between knowing subject and object known is denied by conceptualizing knowledge as a pre-existing phenomenon which is "already there," and the practical side of knowledge, that is, the component of human creativity, is ignored. The result, as Habermas (1972: 307) has argued, is that the framework which provides the precondition of the meaning of propositions is suppressed. Third, this view rejects inquiry into the historicity underlying knowledge by concealing the historical configurations through which knowledge exists as a product of human transformative activity. This leads to a view of concepts as immutable, temporally frozen and static. Finally, in this perspective there can be no programmatic content because theory is severed from practice. That is, there is no direct connection between theoretical ideas and action such that there exist theoretically-derived imperatives that lead necessarily to specific forms of conduct.

In sum, the presuppositions which guide selection, shape interpretation and suggest application are not problematic for a sociology of knowledge derived from this position. Studies typically focus on establishing and measuring correlations between knowledge, as the dependent variable, and various operationally-defined features of the social world as independent variables (e.g., Peterson, 1969; Manis, 1968; Simonton, 1976; Useem, 1976a, 1976b, 1976c), or are viewed as a functional element in system maintenance (e.g., Etzioni, 1968; Parsons and Platt, 1973; Merton, 1968a; 1968b; Vandervelde and Miller, 1975).

The fundamental drawback of a positivist approach is that knowledge is not recognized as a constituent element of the human subject's

practical activity which may be historically contingent. Further, by severing theory from practice, there occurs a fact/value distinction such that knowledge becomes viewed as value-neutral. As a consequence, power relations and ideological biases, which are believed purged from inquiry, may re-enter knowledge production unrecognized, thus, perpetuating value and power relations in the guise of value-neutrality. Finally, the objectivism of this position results in a reification of experience in that categories and concepts which form cognitive frameworks become static, taken-for-granted, and viewed as invariant features of a "real world."

The problem, then, with positivist approaches is that a) They fail to recognize the historical character on which facts are based, which results in severing subject and object by excluding the historically-shaped process of knowledge as human activity which transforms the world; b) They over-emphasize an unproblematic, immediately-given world of experience rather than focus on experience as mediated by a complex of factors; c) There is a view of the world that abstracts individual phenomenon from their context rather than examines them as part of a social totality to which all features of the social world are connected, and d) There is an inability to understand its own scientific methodology. The appeal to "facts," as Lukács (1971:5) has reminded us, has already been comprehended by a theory, a method, and "wrenched from their living context and fitted into a theory." This may create an ideological bias that shapes both the organization and outcomes of knowledge production.

2. Neo-Kantianism. For neo-Kantians, as for positivists, knowledge is an order-creating activity. Unlike positivists,

neo-Kantians view the world as constituted by the powers of the subject

(rather than by features of the object) in that objects of knowledge

conform to the subjective structures and mental states of the knower,

that is, to the cognitive structure of those producing the knowledge.

The methodological task for this position becomes one of identifying

those social processes and factors which contribute to the formation

of knowledge production. In this position, it is the social conditions

or context of knowledge production which shapes the cognitive activity

of the subject of knowledge rather than a search for causes and general

laws derived from the mechanics of autonomous objects. This position

derives from Kant's attempts to overcome the subject-object split in

18th century epistemology and to establish a "science" capable of

integrating value statements. Kant set himself the task of examining

the possibility that, as Copernicus had suggested,

> Failing satisfactory progress in explaining the movement of the
> heavenly bodies on the supposition that they all revolved round
> the spectator, he [Copernicus] tried whether he might not have
> better success if he made the spectator to revolve and the stars
> to remain at rest (Kant, 1965: 22).

Kant attempted to overcome the subject-object separation by

logically demonstrating how thought created the forms of its objects

of cognition. There are two major variants of neo-Kantian thought

relevant to a sociology of knowledge. In the first, the genesis of

knowledge is sought in the historical and ideological context in

which thought occurs, and the task for analysis is to describe the

emergence of knowledge from this context. Verstehen analysts such

as Wilhelm Dilthey, Max Weber, and especially Max Scheler and Karl

Mannheim reflected a response against the positivist tradition of the

19th and early 20th centuries. Mannheim's work has been particularly

influential among sociologists of knowledge. Mannheim's Ideology
and Utopia represented a rejection of that form of Marxism dominant
especially in the years after World War I and the Second International.
His work attempts to overcome positivist emphasis on the object of
knowledge, an emphasis which either excluded the subject, or considered
the subject merely as epi-phenomenal. A Mannheimian position shares
with positivists the view that social reality is given in that the
specific features and structures of a society are naturally occurring
rather than outcomes of practical human activity. Mannheim's position,
however, includes a historical component in which knowledge is seen
as emerging out of specific historical conditions which reflect, for
example, economic positions, social statuses, or power differentials.
History, for Mannheimians, represents a series of events that give
shape to, and which in turn guide the construction of styles of thought
and of world view.[7] Mannheim's sociology of knowledge, derived
especially from the thought of Lukács (e.g., Lukács, 1971a, 1971b),
proceeds from the assumption that there is nothing in the analysis of
thought which can stand above history, and by identifying when and
where particular world views, perspectives and styles of thought
emerged, and by correlating them with the content of thought, we
can impute to specific groups a particular "ideological consciousness,"
socially derived, which will explain the differences between competing
interpretations of the social world. The concept of world view
allows Mannheim to examine not only knowledge within a historical
context, but also to include an evaluative element that allows the
observer to account for subjective, non-rational elements in knowledge.
For a Mannheimian position, then, there is no fact/value distinction

insofar as both facts and values are historically contingent. By identifying two components of world view, a) the _perspective_ of the knower which may limit or distort knowledge, and b) ideological content of knowledge, Mannheimians believe it is possible to impute historical meaning, bodies of thought, ideas, beliefs and psychological states of mind to specific groups, be those groups classes, political bodies, or interest groups (e.g., D.L. Smith, 1965; Schwendinger and Schwendinger, 1974; Ringer, 1969).

There is a second variant of neo-Kantian sociology of knowledge, unrelated to Mannheim's work, that focuses on the processes through which the knowing _subject_ constructs a social world through interaction and negotiation. This is the _phenomenological_ variant. Whereas Mannheim's position stressed the historical and ideological features as components of knowledge, the phenomenological approach employs a restricted definition of knowledge which is limited to studying that information required by persons to "make sense" of the common stock of shared beliefs and assumptions about the world which provides the basis for structuring social interaction and interpreting experience. Adherents to this position do not focus on the social content or socio-historical genesis of ideas. Knowledge production is instead viewed as part of the interaction processes of everyday life, in that knowledge arises from negotiation and interaction in socially-constructed contexts, and must be continually reaffirmed in each new encounter. This position implicitly makes the distinction between "knowledge" and "science," with the former deriving from social processes and the latter from specific application of techniques which do not, for this position, become the primary problematic. The task

for inquiry includes recovering the subject's meaning systems and thus entails an understanding of the meanings of a given social situation within the specific context in which such meanings occur for the participants. The contributions of Bar-Hillel (1954), Law (1975), Barnes and Law (1975), Douglas (1970), and of those not usually associated with the sociology of knowledge (e.g., Coulter, 1973; Manning, 1977) proceed from a common premise: Knowledge is a social act to be understood by grasping the manner in which meanings are created, exchanged and maintained through the manipulation of symbols.

Both neo-Kantian perspectives succeed in overcoming some of the problems of a positivist position, but in so doing, they have created others. Both Mannheimian and phenomenological variants avoid reductionism in that knowledge is not conceptualized as an independently-existing phenomenon isolated from imputed or self-created meaning of the human subject. Both variants also avoid objectivism in that they reject the position that the object of knowledge is a more-or-less direct copy of reality, and both variations are premised on the necessity of understanding the phenomenal reconstruction of the object. But Mannheimians do not go far enough, and phenomenological neo-Kantians seem to approach radical subjectivism while possibly introducing a subtle form of methodological objectivism. For Mannheimians, investigation of the genesis of knowledge goes no further than analysis of the impact of the ideological features of the historical period which shapes thought. There is no examination of the relationship between the genesis of the historical period itself, or of the connection of forms of knowledge arising from and

within it. This removes historical reflexivity from a Mannheimian approach in that two crucial problematics, the genesis of self-knowledge and ideology, are excluded.

For the phenomenological variant, knowledge is a phenomenal object built up from human interaction and corresponding to human understandings, but it removes the objective element of humanly-constructed artifacts (including ideology, consciousness and social structure). The subjectivism of the phenomenological variant requires a methodological de-emphasis, if not actual elimination, of the object of knowledge. But it seems to flirt with methodological objectivism in that, although the knowledge which is examined is conceptualized as phenomenal, the knowledge of that knowledge is treated by researchers as if it were a map of reality, so to speak, whose "fit" corresponds to an existing state of affairs.

Both variants, then, but the phenomenological in particular, remain at the level of reified consciousness in that neither adequately examines the self-formation of consciousness. As a result, like positivists, neither position is able to adequately critique the immediacy of either social relations or social interaction. Where a Mannheimian position attempts to overcome the fact/value distinction by recognizing the constitution of values as embedded in forms of consciousness specific to a particular period, the phenomenological approach, because of the exclusion of historical contingency from analysis, maintains the fact/value distinction as radically as positivists. Both variants maintain the separation between theory and practical activity in that neither position generates theoretically-derived imperatives for action.

In sum, the value of neo-Kantian analysis is, as Remmling (1975) has reminded us, the critical elevation of epistemological theory and the abolition of crude realism which confronted the knower with autonomous objects. Unfortunately, neo-Kantians, while not severing the subject from the object as radically as do positivists, nonetheless adopt a contemplative, dualistic stance in that the methodological program is one of reconstruction of a phenomenal object by a subject who has no active relationship to the social world from which knowledge springs.

3. <u>Hegelian-Marxian</u>. The Hegelian-Marxian position takes divers forms, but for convenience may be divided into two variants. The first a <u>structural</u>, and the second a <u>phenomenological</u> view, correspond to traditional materialist and Hegelian emphasis respectively.[8] Marxian social analysts, despite their differences, view analysis of social knowledge as a means of demystifying the class-bound nature of knowledge. For Marxian sociologists of knowledge (as typified, for example, by Lukács, 1971a), conventional knowledge, as reflected in the outcomes of "bourgeois science," functions as an apologia for the existing social order by failing to see the historical content of concepts of inquiry as a necessary component for analysis, and by reproducing in thought the existing social order in that concepts are uncritically accepted and analytically removed from their social context. The result of such a removal constitutes an <u>ideological</u> bias of social knowledge which perpetuates the dominant social order by maintaining the dominant form of consciousness. This is termed a false consciousness in that the conventionally accepted premises and judgments regarding the nature

and operation of the social order can be demonstrated to be inconsistent with the existing state of affairs. By reconstructing the <u>historical genesis</u> of consciousness, as one aspect of human self-reproduction, the effects of ideological distortion on the production of social knowledge, for example, can be illustrated.

Each Marxian position grounds forms of social life in the transformation processes of human activity, and each examines the development of the emergence and modification of social structure and social relations as reflecting the particular state in the development of a society's productive relations. The primary difference between the two variants is one of emphasis on the importance of class conflict and what should be considered the primary analytic focal point of inquiry. The structural perspective tends to examine knowledge as a means of facilitating capitalist accumulation, or as a productive force (e.g., Lukacs, 1971a; D. Smith, 1974). The phenomenological perspective tends to focus on cognition, experience, or features of interaction as mediated by various factors (e.g., class conflict, ideology, social structure: Marcuse, 1968, 1972; Horkheimer, 1972; Shaw, 1972, 1975; Wellmer, 1971). Both variants reject the subject/object, fact/value theoretical distinctions. The structural position tends to over-emphasize the economic determinants underlying social structure and interaction and minimize discretional and situational factors of knowledge production. It also over-emphasizes the degree to which state and ruling class interests coincide, and it is not evident that knowledge production conforms so directly with either private requisites or system requisites of capitalist order. Although the phenomenological

position tempers the structural view, it tends towards idealism in that material structure is de-emphasized in favor of ideology and interaction processes, and suggests that changing thought and experience in turn will transform social praxis. This view tends towards abstract theorizing rather than empirical analysis. For both variants, the intent of analysis is emancipatory. For the structuralists, knowledge is a weapon in class conflict. For the phenomenological position, knowledge, although class-bound, is the means of recognizing and overcoming forms of unnecessary social domination. In this latter position, the proletariat is not necessarily viewed as the sole, or even primary, agent in social struggle.

The Marxian position overcomes both objectivism and subjectivism by preserving the identity of the subject and object. In contrast to the neo-Kantians for whom the factors which turn the material world into a unified experience which generates knowledge are unproblematic forms of apperception and understanding, for Marxians, material production and corresponding social relations structure the world. The genesis of knowledge derives from modes of perception by which production, control, and reproduction of social order is conducted:

> The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men, the language of real life. Conceiving, thinking, the mental intercourse of men, appear at this state as the direct efflux of their material behavior (Marx, 1974: 47).

This means that for a Marxian position, knowledge production and ideology on one hand, and the processes by which the material

world (to include forms of consciousness and social relations, as well as the world of physical objects) on the other, are inseparably bound together as necessary elements in understanding the genesis of knowledge. It means also that necessary forms of social organization are bound up and reflected in the processes and outcomes of knowledge production, including forms of social domination and control, existing forms of productive relations, and preferred means of cognition.

A Marxian approach also dissolves the theory-praxis separation by exploring the gaps in conventional ideologically-bound theories of knowledge (as well as the outcomes of inquiry derived from such theory) in order to identify prevailing forms of domination. As a consequence, in Marxian thought there is an imperative for emancipatory action, whoever the agent of such action may be, that derives directly from the theory.

In sum, sociology of knowledge is an area over which there is no general agreement. There has been no consistent body of developed thought since Karl Mannheim, and there is no framework from which an analysis of the social production of knowledge can proceed unproblematically. The fundamental epistemological and practical issue, however, is that of the relationship between subject and object. It is upon this relationship that the problems of objectivism and reductionism, the criteria for adequate understanding, and the programmatic nature of a particular position depend. Marxian—especially critical—theorists have attempted to clarify the subject-object relationship, but few are directly engaged in analysis of the

social organization of knowledge production, and the Hegelian-Marxian position remains undeveloped. Drawing from the discussion of the three traditions, however, it becomes possible to identify several critical issues for the sociology of knowledge.

ISSUES FOR THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE

Traditional approaches to the sociology of knowledge tend to exclude several issues. This dissertation is guided by the judgement, drawn from Marxian and critical theories, that a sociology of knowledge, at the minimum, must address the following processes in the production of knowledge:

1) It should go beyond simple recognition of knowledge as a constitutive feature of social life. It must attempt to reconstruct not only the processes underlying the genesis of knowledge, but also of the existing social order which conditions historical self-transformative activity, of which the production of knowledge is itself one component.

2) A sociology of knowledge cannot stop at identifying the ideological configurations underlying cognition, social organization and content of research, but must also account for the genesis of ideology itself. This requires a theory of ideology which must be developed to address (a) the production of consciousness, (b) the development and guidance of cognition, (c) the production and application of interactional rules (including both normative and scientific bases of the procedures and social organization of knowledge production), and how these components in turn shape the production of concepts and order the interpretation of data.

3)   There must also be an examination of the <u>power</u> <u>relations</u> which are embodied in knowledge production as a social activity such that ideology and social organization become developed or transformed in a manner which unequally serves particular interests at the expense or exclusion of others. This may result, for example, in particular questions, procedures and programs of inquiry being systematically discouraged or eliminated in favor of others.

4)   There must be included a <u>theory</u> <u>of</u> <u>the</u> <u>state</u> to provide an understanding into the penetration and outcomes of state <u>power</u> and state <u>apparatus</u> into a variety of levels of knowledge-producing social organization (To include education, research sponsorship, legislation and legitimation activity).[9] If federal funding does influence knowledge production, then state mobilization of resources for research represents a deliberate exercise of state power which such a theory of the state must take into account.

5)   There must be a historical component. This component must not be a historical relativism (e.g., Mannheim) in which all ideas are contingent upon a temporal moment reconstructed as uncritical subjective retroflection on the sequence of temporal events under-lying a "self-conscious present." For as Lukács (1971a: 12) has argued:

> . . .it is perfectly possible for someone to describe the essentials of an historical event and yet be in the dark about the real nature of that event and its function in the historical totality, i.e., without understanding it as part of a unified historical process.

Rather it must become possible to uncover the specific historical configurations which shape the development of an object of knowledge by the subject, which returns us to the first issue (above), requiring

that knowledge be recognized as a constitutive feature of social life.
If knowledge production is _mediated_ on several levels (e.g., interac-
tional, organizational, legislative or normative) by a variety of
complex, but interrelated factors (such as occurring and recurrent
social conflicts and crises, ecological crises, social disturbances
and historical options for action), it must become at least minimally
possible to identify the interconnections between levels and
features and the potential contradictions which are generated as
the result of both structural factors, and of self-transformative
activity. This, taken as a complex process, is the historical
component required by a sociology of knowledge.

6) Finally, the program of a sociology of knowledge must contain
an emancipatory rather than a disinterested component (e.g., Habermas,
1972a, 1973; Schroyer, 1973; Horkheimer, 1972). This program
requires the overcoming of both fact/value and subject-object
distinction such that knowledge production is recognized as embodying
power relations, and once power relations are identified, they are
critiqued by the degree to which they contribute to, or constrain,
the elimination of unnecessary forms of social and intellectual
domination and constraint. If the basis of knowledge is an _expansion_
of theoretical, empirical and conceptual domains of thought, then it
is critical that a sociology of knowledge facilitate struggle against
social constraints upon both the activity of knowledge production and
the limitations of our conceptual apparatus.

In sum, a sociology of knowledge must consider that the genesis
of knowledge may be shaped by power and ideology embodied in the
social organization of research. The current status of the sociology

of knowledge does not provide adequate conceptual or theoretical

tools for such an examination, although the Marxian framework indicates

possible directions for initiating such an examination.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

One particularly effective way to begin drawing together the

issues in an analysis of the production of social knowledge* may be

to focus on a topic that is both dramatic and fundamental to the

issues of control, ideology, and social influence. One such topic

is Federal funding of criminal justice—especially policing—research.

Police, as used here, refers to federally, state or municipally

sanctioned social control agencies mandated to enforce laws, and

legally empowered with authority to carry out this mandate. Policing

research refers to any study that (a) focuses on police activity or

behavior, organizations, purposes, effect or functions, tactics,

strategies and goals of police; (b) uses police as a major dependent

or independent variable; or (c) claims to provide insights, explana-

tions or understandings about the activity, processes, development, or

occupational features of policing, or about the relationship of

police to the duties performed or the interactions and encounters

with civilians.

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*Knowledge production connotes social practices involving the
creation, dissemination, results, and purposes of knowledge, as well
as the application of it. My concern in this project is with
features which may shape the genesis of knowledge. By knowledge
production is meant the processes and content through which knowl-
edge (i.e., those ideas or bodies of data which are generally
considered empirically verifiable) come into being through the
collective activity of persons organized for producing knowledge.

Policing studies are an appropriate focus for several inter-related reasons. First, the "crime crisis" atmosphere of the mid-1960s led to a number of Presidential commissions, facilitated the creation of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) and its research arm, the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice (NILECJ, or The Institute), which is the focal point of the organizational analysis of this study. Implicit in the approach of federal response to the crime crisis was the belief in the validity of scientific research as a potential instrument for controlling crime—given sufficient resources and commitment. Federal resources were channeled into divers studies of crime and the criminal justice system, including social research projects examining the characteristics, operations, strategies and effectiveness of policing. This funding bonanza has encouraged a dramatic growth of research into crimino-logical problems, especially in the past ten years. Second, because of the centrality and enormous visibility of police, increasing atten-tion has been focused on the capacity of the police to fulfill their mandate as "crime fighters." The function of police appears, for some observers, to be highly problematic. Yet, because of the prevailing view of policing as a crime-fighting activity, an examination of sponsored and nonsponsored policing studies will allow for organizing and assessing the content of such research, as well as for examining the relationship of such research to funding agencies. Third, police serve as a means of social control by all levels of state apparatus (e.g., federal, state and municipal). Because the state is both sponsor and executor of policing functions, that is, of the primary

means of social control, the relationships between power and knowledge are salient features of the state's sponsorship of policing research.

If the state, as embodied in the federal government, mobilizes knowledge of a specific character, then it might be the case that federal sponsorship of policing research has become a dominant influence on the direction and content that criminal justice research reflects. Although selected theoretical issues will be taken up separately in the appropriate empirical chapters, the central question for this project is simply this: What are the processes underlying the federal sponsorship of policing research, and does this sponsorship have an impact on the procedures and content of funded and non-funded research? This question bears most directly on two issues described in the previous section, the issues of state power in shaping research and the issue of the ideological content of research. By state power is meant the resources which enable the federal government to create a mandate, whether legislative or implicit, and to carry out that mandate. State apparatus refers to the various agencies or other instruments through which human activity is intended to serve state power. This distinction is useful in identifying the often-conflicting procedures that occur at one level or the other in the sponsorship of knowledge. An analysis of state-generated outcomes of policing research should indicate whether the state is able to directly penetrate the research process by injecting its needs and preferences into research content. An examination of the processes that bring research projects into being should contribute into whether state apparatus operates in such a way as to exclude or encourage particular research topics or procedures in generating knowledge.

If ideological biases shape the genesis of knowledge production, an analysis of research outcomes should allow for identification and description of those ideological configurations.

This project is not intended to address every possible issue, nor is it intended to fully develop any single issue. By initially addressing elements of two issues, organizational operations and research outcomes, it will be possible to indicate how each issue might be more fully developed and how the remaining issues might be integrated into a cohesive framework in which to ground a sociology of knowledge. This will be suggested in the conclusion. It remains to outline the procedure of this project.

SUMMARY OF THE PROJECT

My intention in this project is to examine federal support of policing research by examining the typical processes involved in the selection and allocation of resources, and by juxtaposing this with a comparision of funded and nonfunded research outcomes as reflected in selected publications. The data collection is designed to identify the organizational processes underlying the sponsorship of knowledge in NILECJ, and also to identify and classify the patterns in the content of funded and nonfunded policing research. Two research strategies have been employed, an organizational analysis and a content analysis. In this project, knowledge is not being viewed as an epi-phenomenon, but as a constituent feature of social life that both mediates and is mediated by other forms of social organization (e.g., state power and apparatus, social conflict, societal norms, or ideology). But this assumption is also a working hypothesis

to be examined throughout the study, and discussed in the conclusion. One way to minimally avoid both the objectivism of positivists and the subjectivism of neo-Kantian approaches is to view knowledge production from the dual perspective of both embodying human activity (e.g., organizational activity which sponsors it) and of being an embodiment of ideological features (e.g., the contents of research). The organizational analysis is intended to investigate the production process of knowledge in one of its phases, the solicitation and selection process of NILECJ. This will allow for a more-direct examination of the state power and state apparatus distinctions by allowing comparison of one segment of state apparatus (NILECJ) as it carries out the directives of state power. From the organizational analysis, I have attempted to locate some of the mechanisms that shape the genesis of funded research, and this has been done by examining selected structural and interactional features of NILECJ activity.

At the theoretical level, by examining the state's organization for the production of knowledge by examining a particular agency, insights into how state power is translated into research by state apparatus should become possible. Issues particularly relevant to this project include:

1) Suggesting actual processes, criteria and specific rules involved in funding;

2) Searching for possible conduits of state power by which state influence is transferred to the research process, possibly establishing ideological, practical and political connections between state power (as reflected, for example, in legislation or

formal organizational rules) and state apparatus (as embodied in agency practices); and   ·

   3) Identifying features embodied in state apparatus that mediate state power and formal rules.

The organizational analysis will proceed in two ways. First, by interviewing those persons who have been instrumental in shaping policy and in allocating resources for policing social research in NILECJ and by attending selected legislative and agency meetings and work sessions, it may be possible to identify whether certain social practices (e.g., federal funding) contribute to the development of certain kinds of knowledge and whether the impact of such practices is embodied in particular forms of thought. An examination of legislative documents, agency policy statements, funding solicitations and proposals will supplement interviewing and impressionistic observation in obtaining an understanding of the formal procedures which organizations profess to follow, as well as of the justification and mandate of action.

The second research strategy involves an examination of the substantive content and cognitive patterns of research as reflected in journal articles. A content analysis will allow for the tracing of possible effects of the socially organized production process by comparing funded with nonfunded research in the six journals. A content analysis will provide clues to the genesis of research by examining the object of knowledge (i.e., research outcome) and will allow for the imputing of cognitive patterns to the subject by identifying the methodological and theoretical procedures and

ideological patterns. It will also allow for analysis of the object by examining the epistemological and political features of research. At the theoretical level, five ideological issues can be addressed:

1) The degree to which funding may shape a particular research field by directing the procedures and content of both funded and non-funded knowledge; 2) At the subjective (or phenomenal) level, the degree of autonomy which exists between researcher and sponsor, and between research field and funding. If the procedures or content appear to be influenced by funding processes, then "scientific autonomy," often considered to be a basic feature of science, must be reexamined; 3) The possibility that funding generates a "spin-off" effect that shapes nonsponsored as well as sponsored research may be useful in assessing the ideological connections between research and the state production of ideology through research sponsorship; 4) The degree to which methodological or thematic pluralism exists within the research community might be examined by assessing the degree to which both funded and nonfunded research appear to be adopting the attitudes, definitions, apparatus and techniques required by the needs of a particular set of sponsors; 5) The possibility that what is often assumed to be agency bias or state ideological connections may be rooted within the very structure of the research process itself.

In sum, the organizational analysis will allow examination of one moment of the research process by providing insights into selected features of human activity (e.g., the retionales, processes, and mechanisms) which effect research, as well as any intervening organizational factors which may mediate the state-research connection. The content analysis is intended to reveal aspects of the <u>expressive</u>

state of the <u>subject</u> (particularly those aspects entailing ideology),
as well as <u>indexical</u> features of the object by focusing on specific
features conveyed in the articles.*

These two strategies are intended to contribute to the issues of
the previous section by 1) allowing both subject and object of knowl-
edge to be incorporated within the same framework, 2) providing an
initial departure point (through examination of legislation, for
example) by which to examine how state power may direct state apparatus,
which in turn may shape research, and 3) illustrating how a multiplicity
of forms of human <u>activity</u> other than actual research activity (e.g.,
activities of legislation, administration, interaction), as examples
of the larger <u>social totality</u>, may shape knowledge production. Although
the two research strategies are connected only through their common
goal of attempting to unite both subject and object of knowledge—
albeit at an elementary level—they nonetheless provide a framework
for a sociology of knowledge that might eventually address the issues
outlined in this chapter.

These strategies and the issues they are designed to address are
not easily presented. This introduction is meant to provide a general
discussion of the most salient issues involved. <u>Chapter 2</u> assesses
the body of literature addressing both state and private sector funding.
An attempt has been made to evaluate the literature by grounding the
studies within their corresponding tradition, and to conclude by
indicating the deficiencies of most other works. <u>Chapter 3</u> is a brief

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*<u>Indexical</u> and <u>expressive</u> are commonly used in content analysis to
refer to the message and mood of a work and its author respectively.

chronology of federal support of knowledge production. It is meant to illustrate the increasing federal involvement and to demonstrate that this involvement is historically contingent upon the growth and intervention of the state at particular historical mounts. Chapter 4, the organizational analysis, will examine state involvement in, and agency implementation of, supporting activities for research within the context of state power and state apparatus. Chapter 5 is what might be called a "decoding" of the outcomes of research such that the features of both research as object and researchers as subject might be identified. The concluding chapter will summarize the results by relating their implications to the issues raised in the introduction. There will also be a brief suggestion for a future research agenda derived from this project.

CONCLUSION

There should be a final word on what this dissertation will and will not do. First, it is not an attempt to develop a specific sociology of knowledge, nor is it an attempt to critique existing approaches. There will be no theory of power relations, of ideology, of the state or of knowledge production. It reflects instead an attempt to examine one facet of one kind of knowledge production in contemporary U.S. society.

At the empirical level, this project eventually may 1) provide data which could allow for modest contribution to clarification of perspectives in the sociology of knowledge, and 2) help illuminate aspects of Marxian and critical theory, including the capitalist state

theses and theories, and forms and effects of ideological influence on social life.

This study is limited by several factors: 1) the lack of theoretical development in Marxian and critical theory, as well as the fledgling state of theories of the contemporary state in industrial society, of ideology, and of the sociology of knowledge itself, make it difficult to do much other than address preliminary issues, problems which must eventually be resolved: 2) the relatively short time alloted for dissertation writing (itself a reflection of the social organization of knowledge production) limits discussion to a summary of some crucial issues, and to mere allusion to others; and 3) the university and federal resources allotted for an organizational analysis, while helpful, are insufficient for a temporally-extended and substantively intensive examination of the federal agency chosen as the analytic focal point. This reflects the difficulty, though certainly not the impossibility, of studying the importance of state support of knowledge production on the form and content of the result.

Although my discussion is influenced by the Marxian-critical tradition, the methodology is eclectic. This eclecticism is justified, however, by the lack of unified framework in the sociology of knowledge from which to draw. I do, however, hope to accomplish at least the following: 1) an examination of knowledge as a phenomenal outcome of human activity, by approaching "social facts" as conditioned by social factors which may guide or conceal our prejudgments of data; 2) the positing of a number of "ifs" (e.g., if facts are preformed by federal intervention or epistemological bias; if the concepts and ideas of research are primarily those of a dominant class (e.g., Marx, 1974: 64);

suggest how, _if_ dominant ideas are perpetuated by state penetration, a sociology of knowledge might be refined, by indicating significant social factors which affect knowledge production; 3) The acquisition of empirical data which can be integrated into a post-dissertation examination of a) the ideological dimension underlying the reproduction of certain power relations which may be embedded in particular forms of knowledge, b) some processes through which academics are mobilized to study social control mechanisms, and c) factors which may mediate both the formal political processes and dominant forms of knowledge production in contemporary society, especially through interaction processes which possibly generate various social and structual contradictions; and 4) most importantly, a contribution to the process of developing a theoretical framework capable of incorporating both the reconstruction of self-formative human activity and the processes underlying and shaping this activity. This last feature is important because if moderately successful, it will allow for the possibility of avoiding both reductionism and objectivism, while incorporating both subject and object within a historically-grounded theory.

At this point, there appears to be no satisfactory methodological alternatives to the ones I have adopted. But by retaining the critical-theoretical commitment, I shall remain aware of the fundamental limitations of this study while recognizing the necessity to transcend these limitations. At stake in such a modest project is the acceptance of an underlying challenge issued by critics from divers perspectives, that there can be no such thing as a sociology of knowledge (e.g., Schroyer, 1973; Popper, 1965, 1972; Child, 1941a,

1941b; von Schelting, 1936: 674; who calls the sociology of knowledge
<u>nonsense</u>). At stake, then, is whether in fact it is possible to move
beyond ideology in order to transcend what Reis (1964) has called
"the images and the false authorities" in the historicity of human
transformative activity. The objective, if not immediate social
transformation, is at least modest theoretical transformation.

FOOTNOTES

[1]The term _social research_ is used here, following Orlans'
discussion (1967: 2) of the generation of social knowledge. Social
research is a broader more neutral expression and suggests a commitment
to inquiry in the social domain than does "social science," or
"behavioral research," both of which are fraught with ambiguities
and definitional problems because of varying uses of social scientists.
The distinction between basic and applied research is here considered
irrelevant because of the often indistinguishable difference between
either. Further, there will be no distinction made between research
grants and contracts because of the often arbitrary distinction
between them (see, e.g., Horowitz and Katz, 1975: 148).

Support can, as Schaffter (1969: 50) reminds us, refer to the
source that furnished the funds or the source that expended funds to
pay for research. Sponsored research as used in this project refers
to funds furnished by the original source.

[2]_State_ here refers to the legitimately sanctioned administrative
apparatus at the federal, state and county or municipal levels which
raise and expend revenues and govern residents. The emphasis is on
the federal level because of its primacy in guiding and regulating
aspects of social life (see, e.g., O'Connor, 1973).

[3]Chelimsky (1975) identifies the "new Federalism" as referring
primarily to Nixon's policies of decentralizing federal projects and
reestablishing local control over federally-funded projects. But the
term appears to originate with Price (1964) and has been used also
to refer to Johnsonian policies of the 1960s.

[4]Although the private sector has in the past, and continues to,
support social research, both the absolute and the proportional
degree of social research by private funding agencies have decreased
sharply in the last 20 years (see, e.g., NSF, 1973a, 1973b; Historical
Statistics, 1970: 964-66; Ford Foundation, 1975; Guggenheim Foundation,
1975; Rockefeller Foundation, 1975).

[5]Positivism is a broadly-defined term, and here refers to what is
also called, in later chapters, a social factist position. The term
positivism is used here to maintain the connotation of the intellectual
traditions identified with positivism which the term "Social factist"
does not convey. A more complete discussion of Social Factist positions
will appear in Chapter 5, Section I-D.

[6]These distinctions expand that of Wolff (1943: 104), who
identified two attitudes dominant in the sociology of knowledge, the
first _empirical_ (which lies in "finding out or explaining concrete
phenomenon"), and the second _speculative_ (in which the central interest
is in developing through contemplation, theories of knowledge). These
correspond very generally, though not precisely, with positivist and
neo-Kantian positions.

[7]Style of thought refers to a particular mode of interpreting and verifying our information regarding the world. World view is a broader concept, and although it also provides an interpretative framework, it includes the specific "global outlook" either of an age or of an individual. World view is used here instead of the German term Weltanschauung.

[8]The traditional materialist view emphasizes links to what might be labelled "orthodox Marxism" in that "it has become codified in one version by existing socialist regimes" (Peterson, 1979, personal communication). This view also includes the positivistically oriented political economists (e.g., Sherman, 1977; Syzsmanski, 1977), and Structuralists (e.g., Godelier, 1978, Althusser, 1970; Castells, 1977).

The second view stresses links to the Hegelian dialectical tradition and draws more heavily from idealism, and might be labelled "Western Marxism" (see, e.g., Anderson, 1977), and includes critical theorists (e.g., Schroyer, 1973; Habermas, 1972, 1973) and others (e.g., Kosik, 1976; Sartre, 1963).

[9]As Chris Vanderpool has observed (personal communication), the influence of the state has always been a focal point of inquiry in the sociology of science, in which state policy toward science has been examined as far back as the early Chinese dynasties. But discussions of state influence have remained primarily descriptive, and have not been developed at the theoretical level. The post-industrial state particularly has systematically organized personnel and techniques for the production of knowledge, making such a theory of the contemporary state especially useful for understanding the development of social research.

Chapter 2: The Sponsorship-Research Connection

THEORETICAL ISSUES

Although there has been a large body of literature addressing both state and privately sponsored research, there have been few studies which empirically examine the actual effects of this relationship, and fewer still which examine the degree to which state science policy[1] and patronage may effect the form, content, and practical implications of the state-research partnership.

The purpose of a review of the literature discussing sponsored research is three-fold. First, it will provide a review of what has been done, what topics are considered important for discussion, and the general views of the patron-researcher relationship held by observers. Second, it will provide an occasion to review the background assumptions (Gouldner, 1971: 29) from which discussion and inquiry proceeds. This includes an identification of the presupposed general ontology which provides a conceptual view both of relevant objects for analysis, and of the world in which such objects are embedded. Third, it will include the identification of the general epistemological approach used in various studies so that we can examine the kinds of analyses we are asked to accept as "understandings," and evaluate the consistency, adequacy and implications of analyses in order to determine what kinds of understandings are offered. Embedded in views of sponsored intellectual activity are reflections of the features, assumptions, and attitudes about both the nature of intellectual activity and the patrons of this activity. Three perspectives of the private and federal sector sponsorship-

research connection can be identified and classified according to

1) the results and purposes of research, 2) the flow of influence between sponsorship and intellectual activity, and the value imputed to such activity as seen by the commentators, and 3) how the various perspectives fit within the three intellectual traditions identified in the previous chapter.[2]

The perspectives of the relationship between science and sponsorship fall into three general categories:[3] 1) Instrumental, 2) Enlightenment, or discovery-push, and 3) criticism. Three additional categories, although relatively common, are not included in this review. These were excluded because, although providing useful supplemental information, they only tangentially bear on the funding-research connection. The first are "how to" essays describing how to set up tax-free donations (e.g., Taft, 1967). Second are reports by government agencies or related commissions addressing how sciences might be better integrated into politics (e.g., Reports, 1969a, 1970, 1971a, 1971b); or how policy might improve social science (Reports, 1969b); or how the efficiency of the relationship can be improved (e.g., Reports, 1962a, 1970b); or why the relationship should exist at all. This latter type usually centers around defenders of, and hucksters for, the relationship who appear before fiscal watch-guards during allocating time (e.g., Reports, 1955, 1960, 1962b, 1970c, 1971c). Third are histories describing the growth of intellectual activity and its sponsorship. Several excellent studies provided historical background useful for this project, including Rashdall's (1895) class analysis of the universities of Great Britain and Europe from medieval times through the 19th century. Ross's (1976) historical

analysis of the universities of Great Britain, the United States and Medieval Europe provides excellent material for understanding the importance of outside aid and influence in the growth of the universities as centers of intellectual activity. Works by Baritz (1960), Rivlin (1961), Dupree (1957), Kidd (1959), Dupre and Lakoff (1962) and Miller (1970) each provide, from various perspectives, useful discussion of the late-19th century growth of research. B.L.R. Smith (1975), Schaffter, (1969) and Lyons (1971) each provide detailed discussion of government involvement in specific research agencies. Klare (1969) and Gouldner (1968a) have presented in-depth accounts of research sponsored by the Department of Defense, and I. Horowitz (1974) has focused on one specific government project, Project Camelot, in describing the history, effects and implications of research. The three remaining perspectives that will be addressed correspond roughly to each of the three intellectual traditions identified in Chapter I.

1. <u>Instrumental</u>. The first perspective, corresponding to the social factist view, might be called the instrumental perspective. It contains a sometimes-latent, sometimes-direct practical component in that knowledge is viewed as a disinterested practice which guides policy and activity, and is seen as providing a basis for a social engineering effort. This view contains two variations

a. <u>Demand Pull</u>. The first is a <u>demand-pull</u> perspective, and focuses on the relationship between funding and research. It views sponsorship as both beneficial and necessary, and views knowledge as turned towards a practical "good" by policy implementation. Knowledge

is <u>need-induced</u>, and research becomes an instrument in the hands of specialists trying to meet specific social needs. Writers proceeding from this perspective stress the role of science in formulating policies, addressing and overcoming specific social crises or problems, or contributing to the general welfare by offering specific solutions to social, economic, political or ecological questions. Research is viewed as a servant of those controlling it. Some concede the possibility that funding may politicize research (e.g., Gans, 1971; Kash, 1972; Hall, 1972), but such politicization is judged to be benign. Hallet (1971: 39), for example, has argued that politicization occurs not because of heinous public policies or Machiavellian government programs, but rather because researchers have misused their academic positions for their own political and social ends. Some researchers (e.g., Wohlstetter, 1964; Brodie, 1964) have emphasized the instrumental value of both scientists and of knowledge, especially the former because their expertise and insights are judged to directly contribute to "responsible" policy making.

Government, then, is seen as supporting science because of its importance to national security and welfare. Science, it is judged, cannot flourish without government support (e.g., Kreidler, 1964: 142). Thus, science and government are viewed as necessarily and inextricably bound in a symbiotic partnership for the good of both. Wescoe (1970) has argued that universities are change-making institutions enabling society to become accommodated to changing needs, and former MSU president John Hannah, once acting Under-Secretary of defense in the 1950s, went a step further and argued that the role of the university is to mold the nation's youth into functional citizens in our economic

system, and he once told a 1961 parents' convocation at Michigan State University:

> Our colleges and universities must be regarded as bastions of
> our defense, as essential to the preservation of our country
> and our way of life as supersonic bombers, nuclear-powered
> submarines, and intercontinental ballistic missiles (cited in
> Klare, 1969).

A large body of literature from this perspective focuses upon the growth of state-sponsored policy-oriented research, and upon personnel involved in these activities, and upon the functions research fulfills. Brooks (1964), for example, has distinguished five advisory functions of scientific advisors sponsored by the federal government, and Horowitz and Katz (1975) have identified four models of policy-oriented social science.[4] Another policy approach is reflected in the open-systems model of the study of the emerging relationship between federal expenditures and the university (e.g., Vandervelde and Miller, 1975). They argue that through the mechanism of federal aid, government responses to serious national problems are a means of system maintenance, and they attempt to demonstrate how, by viewing cities as a living system composed of organized and interacting parts, an urban grant university could churn out knowledge which might be employed to formulate policies to specific urban problems, thus maintaining systemic equilibrium.

Despite misgivings about the dangers of the nature of some patronage (e.g., Horowitz and Horowitz, 1971: 193), some critics of particular features of research sponsorship view support in general, as essentially beneficial. B.L.R. Smith, a former student of Don K. Price's at Harvard, and later a RAND corporation analyst, has

acknowledged an increasing ideological battle underlying conflict
between the private and state sectors in the shift toward greater
roles for government in research activity, but he argues that proper
management decisions can guide the federal government in addressing
actual or potential crises which may occur. Smith (1966: 254) prefers
policy research to be done by private corporations, not by the
universities, in order to keep the latter free from client influence.

Others see the universities especially as conditioned by national
development, and research is viewed as necessary to promote economic
and political growth. Knowledge becomes in this view a vital invest-
ment (e.g., McCormack and Fuller, 1968; Silk, 1960; Oates, 1970;
May, 1970), and some feel that the only criticism to be made of
government sponsorship of research is that the government is not
giving enough (e.g., Williams, 1970; Rivlin, 1970; Auburn, 1970;
Bowen, 1970; Millett, 1970). Turner (1967: 115) has argued that the
central issue in our complex 20th century society is management of an
industrial society, not a "falsely hypothesized capitalist-proletariat
conflict," and the universities must take the lead and assist private
enterprise in managing, initiating, and executing better management
of global affairs. Thus, intellectual activity must be oriented towards
solving the problems of corporate capitalism and sponsored intellectual
activity will provide a profitable return.

Others who view sponsored research and the resultant knowledge
as an instrumental investment include Case (1965), Harrar (1965), and
Machlup (1962: 37). Case sees aid abroad as a means of sponsoring
projects which can serve as a training facility for the recipient

nations. For Harrar, grants facilitate establishment of permanent
fronts that help achieve social and intellectual continuity, and in
general ultimately facilitate capital accumulation. Broughton
(1965: 27) sees foundations as "investment bankers of the public
sector," and Jordan (1959) has described how since Tudor England,
elite groups have learned that ostensible generosity can contribute
to maintaining public order and manipulate social changes through
instrumentally greasing the appropriate wheels. Tybout (1972: 153)
has concluded that if private benefits are expected in sufficient
amount, these will justify private investment in, and commitment to,
R&D projects, and he even proposes a National Institute of Technology
to divert public funds towards industrial research—a means of social-
izing costs in order to increase private profits.

Some observers, however, while supporting patronage of research
in principle, are critical of the methods of resource allocation
(e.g., Boulding, 1962, 1971; Dror, 1960, 1971; Chinitz, 1971).
Others are critical of the lack of attention given to particular
topics (e.g., Wing, 1973).

The instrumentalist perspective, then, sees research as deriving
largely from the response to problems and puzzles occurring external
to science itself. Research does not occur "for its own sake," nor
does it derive from a scientific ideal or primarily in response to
an internal logic. Rather it is part of a tension between needs of
society (as defined either by clients or "experts") on the one hand,
and the activities of researchers to meet those needs on the other.
Research is mainly understood as the practical activity of persons
addressing concrete social, political and economic problems. Unlike

the next discussed enlightenment model, research sponsors are not
viewed as a benevolent force. The state, for example, is considered
a coordinating instrument employed to resolve puzzles in society,
the solution of which are necessary for a smoothly functioning and
profitable system. Analytically, the focus of this prespective is
on the instrumental function that knowledge serves in "improving
society" according to unproblematic norms, goals or values. This
requires adherents to focus primarily on funded activity in relation
to the types of problems addressed and the results attained in apply-
ing research findings to these problems. The needs of the social
system stimulate research rather than the other way around, and
these needs prod researchers to produce appropriate knowledge. Unlike
the discovery-push view inherent in the enlightenment model in which
autonomously-acting researchers produce knowledge which in turn
leads to social reform, the demand-pull model presents research as
shaped by the sponsors who in turn are responding to perceived
societal needs which demand reform or technological development, and
this response pulls science activity along in its wake (e.g., Ashbee,
1974).

b. <u>Organizational perspective</u>. This second variant abstracts
almost entirely from the content of research or the values of research
outcome or content. The <u>organizational</u> perspective is concerned
especially with research as part of a "system" or as a form of organi-
zation. Adherents focus primarily on the research and allocation
policies of agencies or recipients, or on the bureaucratic processes
of rule-making, rule-applying and rule-guided behaviors, or on the
organizational structure of research or funding agencies. The analytic

concern is with development of organizational theory rather than
development of theories of research sponsorship, and sponsorship is
used as the entry-point into an examination of bureaucracy or formal
organizations. Far more empirical than the often-polemical demand-
pull variant, these approaches typically study the organizational
dynamics operating within, or outside of, the organization.[5] As Burns
(1966: 168) has argued, two directions have typically been taken by
organizational theorists, and these directions are observable in this
perspective. First are those who construct typologies of bureaucratic
forms, with key variables being environmental change or conflict
(e.g., Sebring, 1977; Pfeffer, Salancik and Leblebici, 1976; Staw and
Szawajkowski, 1975; Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; Vogel, 1974); charac-
teristic forms of utility produced or of means of producing it
(e.g., Seiber, 1972; Machlup, 1962; Marxsons, 1972; McNaul, 1972;
Hall, 1972); authority structures (Child, 1973; Ouchi and McGuire,
1975); or organizational goals, growth, or development (e.g., Sundquist,
1978; Siedman, 1975; Kallen, 1966). Second is the development of
behavioral theory of organizations informed by decision theory
(e.g., Salancik and Pfeffer, 1974; (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1974).

Although organizational studies have been subject to internal
critiques by practitioners (e.g., Pennings, 1975; Terreberry, 1968),
the popularity of this perspective may be increasing. The organizational
perspective posits a world that operates according to static "laws."
Human action is a dependent variable or an irrelevant variable, and
organizations become abstract reifications of an objectified concep-
tual apparatus. This perspective attempts to understand sponsorship
of research by examining forms of organization of funder and recipients,

and the assumptions about goals, means, successes, costs, or problems are typically provided by the organization itself.

Both variants have several limitations. Each perceives the object of analysis, whether organizational features or processes, or the outcomes or purposes of research, as autonomous activity which may be reduced to a phenomenon operating independently of other social elements. Further, historical processes are excluded from analyses, as are ideological factors or historically-shaped alternatives for practical organizational activity. Even though knowledge production is viewed as deriving from societal need or organizational decision-making and not developed autonomously (as it is for the discovery-push model) knowledge production is nonetheless seen as being amenable to examination in isolation from other forms of social organization (e.g., division of labor, relations of production, and culturally and socially-defined meanings) which underlie such decisions. Both variants reflect, therefore, a reduced and partial view of funded intellectual activity in which both sponsorship and research activity are routinized, rationalized and ritualistic. The topic of analysis becomes not so much sponsored research as the dynamics or the utility or importance of the organizations which do the funding or researching. Power relations between research and patron are ignored, as are the power relations between those employing the results of the research and those affected by the application. Power relations, insofar as they are examined, to be the internal power relations operating between stratified layers of an organizational hierarchy. For the organizational variant, the methodological

focus is on discovering laws governing behavior of individuals within organizations or governing the dynamics of organizational operations and growth. Both approaches, then posit a world of pure objectivity in which those forces which structure activity, social structure, and social institutions become invisible, and the historical and existential characteristics and dynamics of organizations, research processes, policy needs or social relations are not viewed as continually changing over time, but are temporally frozen. This results in a one-sided and distorted view of the object of analysis by eliminating the human subject as a self-transforming social subject. In short, the instrumental perspective tells us little about the relationship of funding to research activity, despite the sometimes-useful insights provided into the uses of research for policy-making.

Further, this position tends to view ideology as a political factor to be tolerated or wary of (demand-pull), or as a variable affecting the operations of an agency within its environment. Neither view both ideology and organizational structure, processes or outcomes as possible epiphenomena of a larger social totality. Both see research as necessary to overcome problems and help to preserve an established social order, rather than as a tool for exploring substantially new alternatives for social organization.

In short, the results and purposes of research are not examined beyond the immediate requirements of funders, nor are the implications of "findings" pursued for the purpose of discovering their potential ramifications. Nor is the very structure of knowledge examined for the purpose of understanding both epistemological and practical

limitations of research, and the goals, values and premises upon which both funding activity and knowledge production themselves lie remain unproblematic. The uncritical acceptance of sponsorship and the consistent neglect to examine the practical bonds which connect knowledge as instrument to its application (actual or potential) which such sponsorship creates and serves, fatally weakens this view as one capable of providing adequate understandings about funded research activity.

2. <u>Enlightenment perspective</u>. The second general perspective of sponsored research views the twentieth century as a period of progressive humanism, and research patronage thus reflects attempts to contribute to human freedom through the search for truth. Unlike the demand-pull perspective, which views societal need as shaping how knowledge production develops, this perspective is one of <u>discovery-push</u> in that social and theoretical changes flow from discoveries of disinterested scholars pursuing knowledge by following a logic internal to the scientific process itself. Intellectual activity, in this view, is autonomous in that it occurs for its own sake, even though knowledge ultimately benefits individuals and society by enlightening both.

For some observers, research progress conforms to an idea. Adherents of this view typically present apologias for patronage of research and higher education (as the proper medium for research activity), and often have direct ties with patronage agencies.[6] John Dewey (1946: 107) defended support of science because he judged it to be the ultimate answer to the unity of the individual and community. Dewey felt that operation of "cooperative intelligence

as displayed in science is a working model of the union of freedom

and authority." From this perspective, science is an autonomous

activity--it is principally the pursuit of truth and is accountable

to nothing and to no one who is not a part of that pursuit (Kaplan,

1964: 3; Price, 1965). Others would agree, and would add that both

state and corporate philanthropy (as foundation support of research

is often called) is intended to, and in fact does, gratify human

needs by preserving human freedom and extending academic freedom and

knowledge primarily through expansion of an enlightened consciousness,

an ideal consciousness, rather than by technical application of

research outcomes to specific problems, as in the demand-pull view

(e.g., Kidd, 1959; Andrews, 1950; 1956; 1965; Dickinson, 1962; Hardee,

1962; Sloan, 1951; Marts, 1953; Sieber, 1972). Foundations, for

instance, are viewed as public trusts employed to support research

and "do good" for society (e.g., Reeves, 1970: 40; Andrews, 1950,

1965). Emerson Andrews, former director of philanthropic research at

Russell Sage Foundation, has argued that foundations are oriented

towards "doing good works" (Andrews, 1950: 27-42), and has written

that foundations

> . . .are the only important agencies in America free from the
> political controls of legislative appropriations and pressure
> groups, and free from the necessity of tempering programs to
> the judgments and the prejudices of current contributors
> (Andrews, 1965: 6).

This view that foundations are a-political and consequently able to

support unconstrained research is shared by others who submit that

foundation support reflects the measure of civilization and love for

humankind by the sponsors (Marts, 1953: 3), and that private

patronage of research and education is a reflection of the "spirit of

unselfish men" (Marts, 1953: 31), or that patronage reflects generous

persons afraid of outliving their income (Dickinson, 1962: 30). The

general view of foundations as motivated by highly idealistic motives

(e.g., Watson, 1970; Reeves, 1970) is summed by Hardee (1962: 109):

> This product of the capitalist society, which distributes some
> of the rewards of capital to cultural and humanitarian activities,
> is a tangible result of the realization by property owners and
> managers of duties and responsibilities over and above those
> imposed by law. It is likewise a refutation of the dogma that
> American culture is purely materialistic.

Universities, the primary centers of funded intellectual activity,

are viewed variously as bastions of free and untrammelled research

activity which will ultimately solve most of the nation's problems

and meet most of its needs (e.g., Kerr, 1971; Brewster, 1970), or

as knowledge factories cranking out researchers, personnel and

information (e.g., Knight, 1960; Hester, 1970) according to an "ideal"

(Kerr, 1964: 85; Wolff, 1969), which in turn will lead to an enlightened

society. For some observers, notably Price (1962, 1964, 1965),

science has changed the political and economic relations of society.

In his classic work on the scientific estate, Price (1962) poses the

image of scientific patronage by the state as a benevolently neutral

force whose more-or-less autonomous practitioners are not at all

oriented or concerned with political power, nor affected by external

political forces, but who nonetheless engage in activities which

have in part contributed to a fusion of the public and private

economic sectors. Price's basic assumption is that state sponsoring

agents make decisions according to rational considerations which are

intended to impartially present all sides of a question and select

the most appropriate solutions, which would appear to put him within

the ranks of the demand-pull analysists, except that Price views

research as a free and unconstrained activity and politicization

occurs at the policy level, not in the research process itself.

For Price, knowledge production itself is always objective and

disinterested, and the outcomes are detached from political influence

or meddling. Scientific researchers, as neutral experts detached

from politics, represent a "fourth estate" (Price, 1965), existing

alongside the administrative, political and professional estates, each

of which may try to control the scientific estate.[7]

Like Price, Nagi and Corwin (1972: 9), B. Barber (1952), and

Merton (1968a) have each viewed science as a disinterested, autonomous

activity with the primary goal being "truth." For Barber, science is

a moral enterprise, and he suggests that basic research, because it

is unfettered by needs of practicability, is even more moral than

applied research (1952: 84-100). Communality and disinterestedness

are the two primary features of science, and the intent (as well as

the reward) in scientific activity is in "doing good." The rewards

to practitioners are nonmaterial, and industrial research particularly

has contributed much to American welfare and scientific advance.

Merton has argued that the primary goal of science is the extension

of "certified knowledge," and he, like Barber, views science as

"communistic" (i.e., egalitarian and communal), and disinterested

activity (Merton, 1968a: 604-15).

J. R. Killian, the first science advisor to the President of the

United States, has argued that C. P. Snow's fears of government misuse

of research are obviated by the organizational independence of

Presidential advisory committees and other mediating agencies standing

between science and the state apparatus (Killian, 1962: iii-v).

Killian has pleaded for more scientists and engineers to participate

in scientific activities oriented towards policy and public administra-

tion. Killian's views reflected the transition from "old" anti-

Federalist to new state-interventionist attitudes towards research

activity which occurred in the transition periods of the 1950s. This

transformation of attitudes, as Price (1964: 35) has argued, has

broken down the former political opposition to Federal involvement

in programs insofar as such patronage is seen as a defense of the

"American way," even though, as Price notes with some irony, such

intervention sometimes "involved more government controls that some

avowedly socialistic states have ever managed."

The belief that scientists-as-practitioners must be supported

derives from the position that scientists have become a necessary

elite, whether political (e.g., Price, 1965), or a-political (Wood,

1964: 69), capable of providing expertise to policy makers. Others

who argue for an elite of knowledge-producing technocrats include

Flash (1971), Lackoff (1971), Lyons (1971), and Reicken (1971).

This elite, it is judged, would serve the public interest to prevent

ideological interests from interferring with decision-making (e.g.,

Lyons, 1971). More recently, Primack and von Hippel (1974) have

contended that scientists must use their expertise to exert political

and legal pressure to compel government and industry to responsibly

apply the products of research and to implement responsible policies.*

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*Contrast this view with Ravetz (1977), for example, who argues
that scientists are individually cut off from social decisions and
their consequences by remoteness and by subservience (1977: 86).

Emerging from this discussion are several features embedded in this perspective. First, is the perception that research conforms to, or is guided by, an abstract ideal of knowledge or truth towards which practitioners strive. Methodologically, the relationship between research and its sponsors may be understood by comparing the existing state of affairs against the standards posited as "ideal." The methodological focus falls upon the internal dynamics of scientific processes, and upon the logic which guides research.

Second, from this perspective, knowledge production is viewed as free and unrestricted, and it proceeds according to internally-motivated theoretical principles (e.g., Goodwin, 1975). The federal research connection is viewed as asymmetrical. Although scientists may be viewed as having significant input into government policy, research itself is nonetheless not seen as particularly affected by politicization at the practitioner level, but is affected rather by internal conditions resulting from the actual practice of research activity. Consequently, sponsorship of research is seen as a valuable and necessary activity, not because of its instrumental effectiveness, but because it contributes to the growth of science, and leads, therefore, to enlightenment. Practitioners must therefore be supported so they can expand empirical and theoretical limits (i.e., create knowledge) which in turn will push social or structural change in other areas of society. One assumption underlying this model is that there exists free and unconstrained rational dialogue between scientists and policy makers and that research problems and procedures are decided upon the basis of "the better argument," and not through political decisions or outside influences, and that policy decisions

are made on the basis of solid evidence of "science," not on factors external to science. This perspective is highly ideological in that research is viewed as intrinsically "enlightened," "good," even moral. Research as a work process is viewed as containing intrinsic rewards for the practitioners; funded research is viewed as rewarding activity. Further, adherents of this perspective typically assume either tacitly or explicitly that the goals of corporations, universities, or government correspond to something called "society's goals." Thus, state patronage of research and academic expansion in the universities and in industry are viewed as indispensable and interrelated features of a "national interest."

Although some observers concede that occasionally some goals may require modification, the view is that not only is there no contradiction between goals of private and research interests, but the goals of both can be fostered, and any conflicts overcome through continued support of research. The consistent belief of adherents of this model is that with proper reform of practitioners and with attention to moral problems and corresponding consideration and integration of policy implications into research, scientists in general, and social scientists in particular can play an effective role in improving society by generating the correct knowledge and using their positions as an informed elite to influence state policy into making elightened decisions. This leads to inattention to power relations by adherents of this approach, since intellectual activity is viewed as divorced from power influence. These studies also become apologias for more science activity as well as more patronage to support it.

In sum, from this perspective, knowledge of the funding-research connection is severed from the <u>material</u> component of practical social activity, and knowledge and its production assume the appearance of an independent existence.

3. <u>Sponsorship critics</u>. The two previous perspectives tend to be supportive of sponsorship, ranging from wildly enthusiastic to tacitly sympathetic. A third perspective, reflecting two variants, covers a variety of positions, but is distinguished from the previous perspectives by one particular shared feature: They are, for varying reasons, highly critical of research patronage. The two variants, the first, a collection of general criticisms, the second reflecting a Marxian-oriented, or class-dialectical model differ from each other in that the general criticisms a) lack systematic analysis of the growth or development of knowledge, of its applications, and of the problems underlying the ideological biases and consequences of research, and b) tend to be highly rhetorical and lacking in empirical support. The Marxian positions, in contrast, with varying degrees of success attempt systematic analysis of concrete topics, and while these, too, may tend towards rhetoric, they nonetheless attempt reasoned judgment supported by concrete analysis.

a. <u>General criticisms</u>. In this view, patronage is viewed as potentially dangerous because it represents concerted action by agents representing some power structure and possesses the potential or tendency to repress, even enslave, social members. There is alarm in the writings of these* observers, a warning against the dangers of an

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*Perkins and Wood (1960) have provided an excellent summary of some of the early writers who have felt that patronage of research, especially by the state, created latent dangers.

often-unidentified foe attempting to impose its will and attain its interests through sponsorship of research. Sometimes these warnings are well-reasoned and cogent. C. P. Snow, for example, was one of the earliest critics of sponsored research. Snow saw a dangerous tension between "freedom," as reflected in those forms of social organization which guided the application and shaped the content of such activity. Snow's famous warning against the dangers of biased and mistaken scientific advice which, when implemented by governments or sponsors seeking to support vested or short-sighted interests has been repeated by other observers. Some of these observers view patronage as fundamentally conservative (e.g., Young, 1965; Lindeman, 1970), and Patman's Congressional probe of private foundations in the early 1960s reinforced a "conspiracy" view of the conservative nature of foundations when it uncovered financial abuses and discovered that many smaller foundations were linked to the CIA, as have more recent disclosures of CIA involvement and manipulation of government agencies, universities, and foundations. Nielson (1972), for example, has argued that private grant-making foundations, despite their potential as mechanisms for reform, represent a virtual denial of America's basic democratic ideals. He calls foundations aristocratic institutions living on privileges and indulgence of an egalitarian society (Nielson, 1972: 3), and Schorr (1971) agrees. In his cynical view, state-sponsored research promotes greed by perpetuating public values through uncritical state policies. Raskin (1971) goes one step further and employs the metaphor of a body-politic divided into over-lapping "knowledge colonies." In Raskin's view, knowledge

becomes a means by which the state perpetuates repressive authority structures and dominates its "subjects."

Others have an equally cynical view of the dangers of the relationship between patronage of research and its potential results. Some suggest, in contrast, that social scientists have a strong personal anti-industry research bias. Radom (1970) has asked industrial social scientists if they serve industry needs; they said "no." So Radom concludes that Baritz' contention of a funding-research connection is a potentially bias-laden relationship is mistaken. Orlans (1973) continues his earlier conservative cynicism (e.g., Orlans, 1967, 1971) and argues that social science research is far more limited than either establishment or radical critics contend, and serves instead as a rationale for political action or inaction and as a mode of political discourse. This, he implies, makes a question of bias irrelevant, since results are not intended for instrumental purposes anyway. R. J. Barber (1966) has argued that federal science policy through the mid-1960s was not an effective means for expressing national goals for uses of scientific resources, but the problem is one of planner bias, not of misplaced optimisms in utility of research.

In contrast, Baritz (1960) has argued that the social sciences are powerful instruments in improving corporate goals. Baritz has concluded that the sponsorship of knowledge production subverts the critical function of scientists because those who control purse strings, he argues, can and often do, effectively trigger intellectual abandonment of "wider obligations of the intellectual who is a servant of his own mind" (Baritz, 1960: 194). Green (1971) echos Baritz, and argues

that involvement of social scientists with government poses serious threats to the independence of social science which may affect the categories of discourse and more broadly, the selection and structure of problems to be studied. This view has received support from Van Dyne (1976) and Ridgeway (1969). Rosenthal, Jacobson and Bohm (1976), too, have convincingly demonstrated that university research into nutritional value of certain foods becomes dangerously biased when the professors have direct or even indirect connections with food corporations.

In another vein, Deutscher (1966), Gouldner (1968) and Broadhead and Rist (1976) have all warned against the blind unproblematic alliance between sociology and upper bureaucracies of the welfare state, which in Gouldner's words (1968: 11) could only produce the "market research of liberalism." Hoult (1968) and Nicolaus (1972)* were less than subtle when they extended the argument against the client-agency trend they perceived among sociologists. Hoult, critiquing the value-neutrality position of mainstream sociology, has called for an activist orientation among sociologists to counteract the conservative trend among researchers, and has labelled a-political scientists "cowards and cads." Nicolaus went one step further. Responding to Talcott Parsons' view that sociologists' research represents a "marriage" between academic professionals and "practical men," Nicolaus suggested that this reflects not as much a marriage as it

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*Nicolaus ordinarily writes from an explicit Marxian position, but his here-cited works criticizing research are not based in a Marxian framework, thus justifying his inclusion under the category of "general criticisms."

does brothel activity, with sociologists in the "subservient" female role (Nicolaus, 1972: 46-7).

Others, however, feel the dangers of sponsorship of intellectual activity comes not from conservatives, but from the penetration of liberal or leftist ideas into research. Orlans (1973), for example, while conceding that there is in principle nothing wrong with social reform, nonetheless warns of a "protagonist" flavor in social science, intended to generate social reform through government support. Rush (1972) sees the universities as a phase in a Marxist-Leninist plan to wreck the nation, a view seemingly shared in part by former San Francisco State University president and current member of the U.S. Congress S.I. Hayakawa (1971), and Wormser (1958). That latter has gone so far as to argue that communists and leftists have infiltrated foundations weakening the free-enterprise system with their "philosophy of giving," especially to reform (i.e., "socialist") projects.

Others are uncomfortable with sponsored research, particularly by that of the state, not so much because of a fear of a left-wing or right-wing conspiracy, but because of a perceived politicization of knowledge (e.g., McHale, 1965; Lyons, 1971; Hallett, 1971). Some have warned that research is challenged or reinforced by the value structures of clients (e.g., Miller, 1968; Denizen, 1970), and Blume (1974: 1) has argued that the social institution of modern science is essentially political and that the scientific role is an integral part of the political system of the modern state. It is Blume's view that

> . . .extrinsic social and cultural values of scientists, their
> other roles, and their loyalties other than to science _typically_
> intrude into the evaluation and control process in science (Blume,
> 1974: 78).

This theme has been developed more thoroughly by Salomon (1973) who

locates the source of this politicization in <u>both</u> the political system

and within the scientific process itself:

> . . .there is no need to indict the economic form of modern
> societies, their political regimes or their ideologies to
> account for the alienation of the researcher from the state.
> The essence of contemporary science is that it is both
> organized research and the deliberate exploitation of its
> results (Salomon, 1973: xv).

For Salomon, the relationship between science and power is governed

not by the logic or values of scientific thought, but is contingent

upon partisan and conflicting pressures of the political processes

(Salomon, 1973: 144).

Other critics have attempted to demonstrate how patronage

politicizes research. Krohn (1972) argues that politicization

underlies the transformation of research patterns in recent years.

His view challenges the technological growth explanation which holds

that the changing patterns in university structures and in research

patterns reflect a response to technological development (see, e.g.,

Ashbee, 1974), and instead locates the source of this transformation

in qualitative or structural changes of society. Carter (1967) has

challenged the oft-accepted (and self-stated) NSF goal that funds to

support academic research are impartial rather than policy-oriented.

He cogently argues that much NSF "basic" research has significant,

though indirect, policy implications. He cites how penetration of

NSF funds, such as those allocated to the Brookings Institute for

research on econometric models of the U.S. economy, lead to significant

and practical conclusions about U.S. fiscal policy. Friedland (1976)

has suggested that federal funding on all levels is shaped by demands

of special interest constituencies, rather than allocated on the

basis of need or on an immanent rationale. In a related context,

Frieden and Kaplan (1977) have convincingly argued that allocation

of government resources is not necessarily decided on the basis of

need, but instead is subject to particularistic criteria rather than

to a "best argument" approach. Focusing on two federal commissions,*

Wilson (1971, 1978), too, has shown how the politicization of

conclusions of state-sponsored social science research commissions

often depend upon the political views and attachment of the partici-

pants rather than on objective conclusions, and Lipsky and Olson

(1976) and Blauner (1968) have described how riot commissions, for

example, are not intended to extend knowledge so much as to provide

the state sector with a means of defusing riots by de-politicizing

them. This cosmetic feature of commission research is supported also

by Rist (1973) who criticizes the manner in which patronage of certain

kinds of research reflects impression management rather than rigorous

inquiry, by Platt (1971) and Skolnick (1969), who have each criticized

commissions investigation, civil disturbances and racial tensions,

and by Lipsky (1971) who argued the government commissions tend to

contribute to the existence of various tensions through investigation

commissions.**

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*Wilson examined the National Commission on Causes and Prevention
of Violence, and the Committee on Obsenity and Pornography.

**These arguments seriously challenge the view of Bell (1966)
who contends that federal commissions are one mechanism for integrating
social research into policy decisions.

Other more subtle critics have examined the effects of sponsored research on specific topics. Galliher and McCartney (1973), for instance, have demonstrated that trends in juvenile delinquency research have been shaped by and accommodated to interests and emphases of research patrons. McCartney (1970) has demonstrated that a "hard data" approach seems to be favored by funding agencies, and this in turn influences researchers to apply this approach to their research in order to secure funding. McCartney (1971: 1) suggests that although the argument that sponsorship of research determines trends in research is oversimplified, nonetheless, with some exceptions, those specialty areas that receive funding grow, while those that do not receive funding, with but one exception (demography), decline.

One of the most interesting and prolific students of state patronage of research has been Michael Useem, who has argued that government sponsorship of social science research has significantly influenced both the targets and the methodology of research. Useem has attempted to develop an empirical argument demonstrating what he calls the "externalist" view of paradigmatic influence. Useem shows with some success that the federal government has managed to inject its priorities into the research decisions of academic social scientists (Useem, 1976a: 160). He also suggests that the government's objective to acquire policy-relevant research has lead to significant paradigmatic changes among research practitioners (1976c: 625), and has argued that state patronage of science and art represent a new form of political and cultural domination (1976b). Although Useem acknowledges that some state patronage appears to be oriented towards

projects of no apparent utility to the patronizing agency, such research is likely to have a conservative impact on the paradigms employed by the recipients of funds since government criteria are gradually incorporated into paradigms (Useem, 1976b: 799-800). Useem concludes that government support for academic social research is not allocated in conformity with the priorities of the social sciences, but rather is interest-oriented (1976a), and further, that researchers come to adapt to an ideology of the patronage agency in that the source of the practitioners' legitimizing ideology

> . . .is the social scientist's direct relationship to the government's program of research support. Those who receive federal research funds are significantly more sanguine about the benefits and operation of the funding system than are those who are without sponsorship (Useem, 1976d: 230).

Useem adds that funded practitioners seem to be slightly more liberal on political issues than nonfunded practitioners, but tend to take a more conservative stance on the particular issue around which their own research centers (Useem, 1976d: 230).

In sum, these criticisms range from mildly hysterical criticisms to sophisticated and cogent arguments. But they are a-theoretical, and tend to neglect the sources of the politicization they describe.

b. Class models.* With varying degrees of cogency and sophistication, some observers have contended that the class model of influence is most useful in explaining the relationship between sponsorship and research. This view identifies class domination as a form of

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*Whitt (1979) employs the term "class-dialectical model" and avoids the term "Marxist." Because not all class models presented in this discussion are dialectical, the term "class model" is preferred to "class dialectical" model.

repression, and research patronage reflects an attempt to repress, or to mediate class conflict and perpetuate a "ruling class" hold on society. One of the earliest to analyze the relationship between scientific inquiry and capitalism was Bernal (1952), who argued that inquiry reflects profit-oriented activity rather than activity intended to address human needs. Aptheker (1966, 1972) and D. Smith (1974) have identified the business connections of the Regents of the University of California in the 1960s. From this they conclude that a "ruling class" controls the universities, and freely employs university resources to suppress the working class and thereby strengthen their own position.* For Aptheker (1972), research is explained as a new productive feature of capitalism and reflects the "proletarianization" of researchers, and will ultimately (and inevitably) bring "correct" Marxian theory to the working class in order to guide revolutionary praxis. This view is shared in a somewhat different, though related, context, by Syzmanski (1977), and Noble (1977) in a cogent and well-researched analysis illustrates the degree to which knowledge in the United States has increasingly been integrated into, and now has itself become, a force of production.

Klare (1969) has demonstrated the degree to which universities and research centers are dependent upon the support of a multiplicity of defense projects, and his conclusion is that sponsored research

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*Useem, et al. (1976), however, have argued from their own studies that there is little evidence to indicate that this position is valid, an argument Useem (1978) develops further in arguing for a role-incumbency theory rather than a capitalist-state theory of expanding federal apparatus.

is strongly shaped by the needs of a military establishment which exists

for the protection of vested interests.

Other attempts to demonstrate ruling class connections between

patronage sources and the results of patronage include Schulman,

Brown and Kahn (1972) and David Horowitz. The Schulman group has

examined the Russel Sage Foundation as a case study of research

support. They argue that Sage professional practices (and by impli-

cation other funding agencies as well) mesh with the interests of

those who rule rather than with the interests of those ruled. By

focusing on organizational linkages, they conclude that Sage restricts

linkages to a social science elite, and this contributes to the

control of organizational structures of the sociology profession,

and they conclude that one effect of sponsorship is to decrease the

amount of knowledge available to the members of society to solve

their problems (Schulman, et al., 1972: 33-4). David Horowitz

(1969a, 1969b, 1969c), too, has argued that corporate and state links

to research create a "brain trust" that serves that the needs of

capitalist production, and has argued:

> Can anyone honestly believe that the foundations, which are
> based on the great American fortunes and administered by the
> present-day captains of American Industry and Finance, will
> systematically underwrite research which tends to undermine
> the pillars of the status quo, in particular the illusion
> that the corporate rich who benefit most from the system do
> not run it—at whatever cost to society—precisely to ensure
> their continued blessings? And where will the venture capital
> to establish the validity of radical ideas come from. . .?
> (Horowitz, 1969b: 44)

Horowitz examines international research projects and so-called

national research centers specializing in foreign research, and

judges that the U.S. is producing a certain kind of knowledge that

is intended to increase production while maintaining the social

stability in countries in which U.S. corporations have heavily invested.*

He concludes:

> . . .so long as discretion over the vast majority of research
> funds and all innovative financing remains outside the university
> community, it is fatuous to speak of disinterested scholarship
> (Horowitz, 1969b: 44).

There have also been several excellent recent related analyses

of the relationship between state support of the educational system

and capitalism. Katz (1975), Bowles and Gintis (1976), Karrier,

Violas and Spring (1973), Cohen and Lazerson (1972) and Spring (1972)

have all attempted to show how the university structure and its

activities may be understood as the state's response to systemic

crises throughout the 20th century. This response, they argue reflects

both a transformation of the state and of capitalism, and also functions

to alleviate the political, economic and social tensions and better-

integrate competing classes into the production processes of corporate

capitalism.**

Despite differences among and between authors of each variant,

there are nonetheless several shared features. First, although not

all so far as Ledeen (1971) who has suggested that, like Fascist Italy,

social science research may pose a danger to society through a

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*Compare this view with, for example, Case (1965) who, from the same "factual" base presents an ideologically conflicting interpretation of foreign research projects. Case adopts a "White man's burden" thesis, arguing that U.S.-based research funding emancipates the "natives," thereby releasing them from their primitive existence.

**These views conflict sharply with the views of some theorists, such as Wood and Zuckerman (1970) who argue that class antagonisms between universities and their environment are disappearing, or that research has eliminated class distintions.

repressive, systematic amelioration of social problems, or Deutscher (1972) who believes that the "tailor-made man" view prevalent among social scientists is amenable to manipulation and leads to more efficient controls and constraint there is nonetheless, a consistent and urgent warning that both sponsored research as well as the practice of sponsorship may constitute a form of repression that must be guarded against. Second, knowledge, despite its emancipatory potential, will not necessarily lead to enlightment unless the power relations underlying the production of knowledge are recognized and thwarted. Third, there is a consistent suspicion, even overt hostility, towards sponsors—often recipients—of research funding. This perspective views the results and purposes, the topics, the theory, and the methodology of research as being influenced, shaped, or even determined by the sponsoring agents in order to better meet the needs of those agents. Here the similarities end.

The class view proceeds from a methodology which holds that the social world may be explained by identifying specific forces which shape and define the various features of it. The class position views knowledge as being shaped both by structural features of society and by the internal practices of scientific activity. Ideologically, sponsored research, from this perspective, is viewed as a de facto centralized effort which has become a force which heavily affects the form, content and direction of scientific practices. Sponsored intellectual activity is viewed as being organized by power relations which lead to varying forms of unequal power, intellectual, economic, and social stratification. Research is shaped by its patrons who intend to use the knowledge produced for particularistic ends, but not

necessarily need-induced as for demand-pull. But unlike the demand-pull model, the class-Marxian view does not view knowledge solely as a dependent variable. Instead, knowledge is seen as both product and producer of the social world and of persons involved in it. Although knowledge may be used as a component of social engineering, class-Marxian adherents do not view the outcomes of such applications as necessarily beneficial, and in fact, they view it as detrimental as long as application is guided by the particularistic goals of the principle of capital accumulation. From this position, knowledge production is viewed as being bound up with the interests of the social norms and structures which guide and inform it. As a consequence, knowledge can become constraining rather than emancipatory, thus setting the class-Marxian adherents in opposition with the discovery-push followers. In the class-Marxian view there is an activist tone absent from the other perspectives (including the general criticisms) in that there is an action-imperative urging change through some form of direct action. One task for adherents is to identify the power relations and the sources that guide knowledge in order to not only understand the state-research connection, but to transform it.

The class-Marxian view, then although it subsumes divers positions, attempts to overcome the subject-object distinction by viewing knowledge production, both genesis and application, as an outcome of human activity as shaped by class structure and system imperatives required by the mode by which persons transform themselves and their social world (i.e., the productive relations). Thus, both the concepts and the application of the social organization of knowledge itself become problematic.

CONCLUSION

These three perspectives correspond generally to the divers
views reflected in discussion of sponsored intellectual activity.
Although not logically exhaustive, they are theoretically and
methodologically exclusive insofar as they reflect incompatible
analytical focal points and interpretions from incompatible conceptual
frameworks. For a sociology of knowledge, the demand-pull and
enlightenment perspectives are inadequate for providing understandings
of the social origins of knowledge, specifically of the impact of
funding on intellectual activity. The latter conceptualizes knowledge
as an independent variable of sorts, and the social roots of knowledge
are posited as occurring internally to the scientific process itself.
The former position views knowledge as a dependent variable, pulled
along by social forces. Neither position grasps knowledge and sponsor-
ship as an interconnected process.

Further, these perspectives, then, with the exception of the
general criticisms,* correspond more-or-less to the three traditions
of thought outlined in the previous chapter. Both the instrumentalist
and enlightenment perspectives, corresponding to social factist and
neo-Kantian traditions respectively, maintain to varying degrees the
separation of the subject and object. The demand-pull approach
particularly views the knowledge-creating subject as reacting to

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*The general criticisms are an exception because they represent
no consistent tradition. It is not that they are spread across the
three traditions, but because the three traditions are simply inappro-
priate for classification of these divers general criticisms.

external factors which exist more-or-less independently of the knowledge production process. The subject (whether research or human agent) of knowledge is not conceptualized as contributing to the construction of the social world which demands the attention of knowledge production. The enlightenment model maintains the subject-object split by viewing the objective world as being largely the product of mental productions, and the program is to explain social knowledge production in terms of the mental processes (as scientific activity) that creates or shapes the world.

Neither position views social knowledge production as a form of human production or reproduction processes which structure <u>both</u> the social system which requires knowledge as well as the cognitive apparatus (e.g., modes of perception and interpretive frameworks) of researchers.

Adherents of the class model, on the other hand, attempt to unify the subject and object by examining how social and structural features, viewed as a process of human self-transformative activity, shape, and in turn are shaped by, the production of knowledge, which is itself part of structure-shaping activity. Whether the primary analytic focal point is class and class struggle (e.g., D. Smith, 1974), or "system requisites" (e.g., Habermas, 1975), or some other attempt to unify subject and object by viewing knowledge production as one component of a larger social organizational process, all attempt, in theory, to conceptualize both social knowledge production, the practitioners who produce it, and the form of social organization of the larger society, including the mode of organization by which knowledge

is produced as well as the mode of organization of society itself, as essential ingredients of the problematic.

The task now becomes one of sorting out several of the questions raised by the competing perspectives. An <u>organizational</u> <u>analysis</u> will provide insights into the relationship between the state and research, from which it should be possible to obtain insights into how priorities are defined by funding agencies, how resources are allocated, and what ideological factors may contribute to funding decisions. A <u>content</u> <u>analysis</u> is intended to indicate the actual impact of federal sponsorship on policing studies. In short, it is now time to examine the federal connection to knowledge production.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Science policy here is generally defined as "... .the collective measures taken by a government in order, on the one hand, to encourage the development of scientific and technical research and, on the other, to exploit the results of this research for general political objectives" (Salomon, 1977: 45-6). It includes, more specifically, de jure procedures, the formal rationale as reflected in legislative mandates and formal operating procedures, and de facto procedures, as reflected in actual implementation of rules, rationale for action, and actual outcomes.

[2]Although some variants discussed below are clearly models, even theories, the term perspective is preferred here to model because perspective suggests a general view to the study of funding which may include divers theoretical or methodological approaches which nonetheless have other specific features (e.g., intellectual tradition, judgment of research value). Model, on the other hand, can imply either an analogy, a metaphor, or a specific set of rules and procedures for inquiry which a general essay may not possess. Because many of the studies lack a clear theoretical or empirical focus, the term perspective seems most appropriate. Further, perspective, as Mannheim (1938: 273) reminds us, signifies the manner in which one views an object, what one perceives in it, and how the object is qualitatively construed in thinking.

[3]Nielson (1972: ix) splits models of studies of foundations into a) "self-congratulatory" outputs of foundations or their sympathizers, and b) "the ill-informed screeds of the Old Right on the one extreme, and the New Left on the other, and the neo-Know-Nothings like George Wallace in between." Other models include Salomon's pluralistic/ centralization dichotomy corresponding to the U.S. and European systems, respectively (Salomon, 1977: 49-50); and Useem's (1976b: 786-89) four models of government as 1) responding to crises in arts and sciences, 2) government as response to economic crises, 3) government as consumer of science and art for its own programs, and 4) government as constructing scientific and cultural instruments to preserve ideological hegemony. Other attempts at classification include Galliher and McCartney (1973: 77-8) and their trichotomy of a) apprehensive, b) benign and c) misuse perspectives of patronage; Bohme's (1977) views of science as developing according to models of a) normal and revolutionary science, b) continuity models, and c) evolutionary/Darwinian models. Finally, Layton (1977) identifies two models of development: a) Discovery-Push and b) Demand-Pull. Models of scientific growth correspond to benefits (or dangers) of patronage.

[4]Brooks lists the five as: 1) analysis of technical aspects of major policy issues and interpretation of them for policy-makers. 2) evaluation of specific scientific or technological programs for the purpose of aiding budgetary decisions or providing advice on matters affecting public welfare or safety, 3) study of specific areas of science

or technology for the purpose of identifying new opportunities for
research or development in the "public interest," 4) advise on organi-
zational matters affecting science or a particular mission of an agency
involving the use of scientific resources and 5) advise in election
of individual research proposals for support (pp 74-5).

Horowitz and Katz identify the four models as 1) a tool for
promoting social change, 2) a tool for controlling social change, and
3) a tool for identifying change and also for harnessing such change
for established agencies, and 4) more ambiguous is the model that
concerns the role of social science in technical improvement of agency
performance, that is, science as a measuring or evaluation service.

[5]Crozier (1972) has distinguished between institutional and
organizational analysis. Advocates of the former try to show why,
historically or functionally, a particular social activity takes on
a certain form, and emphasizes those features which determine forms
and models of organization, such as constraints imposed by history
and function and divers forms of interdependence (Crozier, 197: 240).
The critics in the general criticism variant tend to take an institu-
tional approach. Organizational analysis, on the other hand, is
concerned not so much with details of the origin and development of
the various types of organizations, but is used to discover how
problems of cooperation within the organization as a whole, or between
the organization and its environment, can be resolved, and what skills
the different solutions require and at what cost.

[6]Among strong supporters of research funding who have an interest
in maintaining such support (not all of whom identify with the
perspective) include those connected with foundations (e.g., Marts,
Andrews, Sloan), or with sponsoring agencies (Killian, Orlans, Price),
or with recipient agencies (Alpert, B.L.R. Smith, Waterman), or of
large universities (Hannah, Kerr, Brewster).

[7]The demand-pull view and some variants of the discovery-push
view (e.g., Price) both may share the characteristic of knowledge as
an instrumental means of reform or social change guided by "experts."
The difference is one of the source of knowledge and of the rationale
of application. The enlightment view considers knowledge production
as inspired by researchers freely plying their craft, driven by an
interest in transcendent values implied by "scientific truth." The
instrumental view considers knowledge as a means to an end as defined
by policy makers, not scientists, and knowledge production derives
from external needs, and is not guided primarily by processes internal
to science. In this latter view, researchers are primarily technicians.

Chapter 3: The Historical Connection

HISTORY OF FUNDED RESEARCH

Although it is not the purpose of this project to present
historical explanation or interpretation, a brief historical overview
is necessary to provide a background and to clarify and illustrate
assumptions and premises guiding later interpretations and conclusions.
Further, the support of research, especially social research, has
been, and continues to be, undergoing historical changes. Funded
social research practices in 1960, for example, were not identical
with what they have become in 1978. They have become more specialized,
more extensive, and more systematically managed and evaluated.
Sponsored research reflects a changing relationship between the state
and private sectors on one hand, and knowledge production activity
on the other, that has evolved in the United States over the past
three centuries. A historical section will provide an imagery of
sponsored research as a process of this continuing transformation to
help avoid viewing the patron/researcher connection as a static
relationship, temporally frozen. By placing policing studies within
the context of this on-going relationship, we should be able to more-
easily recognize how policing studies and agencies supporting policing
research reflect by a moment in a long transition period which has
become accelerated in the past half-century, especially in the past
two decades.

Government support of science in the United States goes back as
far as 1636 when the General Court of Massachusetts appropriated 400
pounds toward the founding of what later become Harvard College. But

it wasn't until the new republic was formed after 1780 that a formal
relationship began to take shape. Unlike the experience of the new
French Republic, where the 17th century revolutionary messianism
politicized science and divided scientific study from control of the
State (Salomon, 1973: 18), in the new American Republic support of
science became primarily the responsibility of state agencies. Price
(1962: 31) has described how the American Revolution swept away the
united apparatus of authority based on that system:

> Thus, the alliance between science and the republican rev-
> olution first destroyed, and then rebuilt of a different
> pattern, the forms of organization and the systems of per-
> sonnel that determine the practical working authority in
> the modern state.

The leaders of the new republic, especially Jefferson and Madison,
recognized the importance of science, and Madison unsuccessfully
attempted to include within the Constitution provisions for supporting
science, and he urged that premiums be granted to encourage scientific
inquiry (Dupree, 1957). In the late 18th and early 19th centuries,
state support was limited primarily to higher education through land
grants, especially through allocation of federal lands in the West.
Up through the Civil War, scientific research was conducted by
individuals, and advancement of knowledge derived from "practical
men" rather than from systematic research (Dupree, 1957: 46).
Sponsorship of science by the state was ad hoc, but during the Civil
War, the military advantages to be derived from research became
apparent, especially in transportation and weapons.

Following the War, government involvement in research declined,
although increasing support was given to agriculture through the land
grant colleges. The first Morrill Act, finally passed after six years

of Congressional wrangling, provided support for agriculturally-
oriented land grant colleges, and began organizing farming in the
1860's and 1870's. Prompted by a growing public interest in conserva-
tion from the 1880's, and pressured by lobbyists from land grant
colleges, especially those which had been conducting informal research
and experimentation and even organized formal "experiment stations,"
Congress passed a series of bills setting up the mechanism for
government support of scientific research. The original Morrill Act
(1862), innovating methods of distributing state resources of the
public domain (Axt, 1952: 42), the Hatch Act (1887), promoting
scientific investigation and experimentation (Kidd, 1959: 3), and the
Morrill Act of 1890, further strengthening government involvement in
intellectual activity by providing funds for instructional purposes
to higher education, each effectively shaped a policy of state involve-
ment in science that continued through World War II.

Four effects of state policy toward higher education in the 19th
century became evident. First, there was a greater expansion of public
higher education than otherwise would have occurred. Second, there
was a more rapid acceptance of the natural sciences as a regular part
of the college curriculum (Axt, 1952: 62-63). A third affect of
agricultural research was that "success," implying ability to control
a problem, led to regulation derived from that understanding. Finally,
the government was providing the justification, rationale and mechanisms
which still guide government patronage of science to the present day.
Financing of research focused on "practical" and "scientific" projects
with immediate benefits and this in turn led to bureaucratic expansion
through more staff and more appropriations for government agencies

involved, although as Dupree (1957: 160) points out, this did not necessarily mean more resources for research.

A series of early-20th century legislative actions including the Adams Act (1906), The Smith-Lever Act (1914), and the Smith-Hughes Act (1917) began to form the structure of the state's penetration into the knowledge industry, and reflected explicit policies of mass education, state controlled education, and emphasis on practical research and knowledge.

When World War II broke out, state and private research support were closely intertwined. To assist the government in coordinating and advising on research relating to national defense in government laboratories, industry, and educational institutions, the privately-controlled National Academy of Sciences was chartered by Congress in 1916.* The NAS offered its services to Wilson, who accepted, and a National Research Council was formed, composed of Academy members and other scientists. It was initially financed by private foundations and reverted to this status after the war. NAS acquired "official" status when the Council of National Defense, a federal coordinating agency, requested its cooperation early in 1917. During the war, Congress created the privately controlled National Research Council, operated mainly on funds provided by Rockefeller and Carnegie Foundations, and established a Committee on Research in Education Institutions for the purpose of informing scientists in

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*The NAS actually came into existence during the Civil War, but lapsed until reorganized in 1916.

Universities about projects and problems in which the government
was interested. Wartime research was typically derived from private
foundations rather than from the Federal Government. If projects were
successful or of sufficient interest to the government, state support
in the form of commissions or plant facilities were then often
provided.

Evolving coeval with state support in the 20th century were
private foundations, a peculiarly U.S. institution. Although generous
private support to education existed in the U.S. since the 17th century,
it was not until the turn of the 20th century that private foundations
created solely for the purpose of "philanthropic" research support
began to function as systematic conduits for channeling resources
into education and research projects. The General Education Board
(1902), founded by J. D. Rockefeller, considered the first foundation,
was formed out of an interest in integrating a southern rural economy
into the northern industrial system (Brown, 1977). By promoting
education and health care, the productivity of the southern worker,
both white and black was increased (Brown, 1977), and subsequent
foundations (e.g., Russell Sage, 1907: Rockefeller Foundation, 1913;
Commonwealth Foundation, 1918; Kresge Foundation, 1924; The Duke
Endowment, 1924: The Guggenheim Foundation, 1925; and the Ford
Foundation, 1936) are all still functioning to promote the needs of
an industrial sector by promoting the needs of capital-intensive
society in concert with social development.

By 1915, the Carnegie and Ford Foundations had combined annual
revenues at least twice as great as appropriations of the Federal
Government, and was one-fifth of the total income of college funds

allocated for the same purposes (Horowitz, 1969b: 38). Foundations, however, are becoming increasingly _less_ important as patrons of research, both in absolute dollars and relative to the state. Their assets have been declining over the past decade, and in fiscal years 1974-76, their assets declined by three billion (or 8.5 percent) (New York Times, 6 November 1977: 55).

Although the growth of recent government involvement in patronage of science is usually placed as an outgrowth of World War II, its origins begin much earlier. The reform and so-called progressive movements of the late 19th and early 20th centuries spurred the state-- especially at the Federal level--to provide an increasingly efficient government through which public administration of reforms could be enacted (Weinstein,   ) thus laying the foundation and creating the justification for a greatly expanded public bureaucracy involved in a growing number of areas of private life. The enlightened conservatism of Franklin Roosevelt's "New Deal" during the repression, which reached fruition under Johnson's "Great Society," contributed to the centraliza- tion and further bureaucratization of public involvement in private activities. It also established stronger liaisons with the social sciences in the unversities. Social science, especially sociology, has been largely a social reform oriented occupation and sociologists have provided a good deal of the bureaucratic social reform knowledge necessary to make the Federal programs "work." The social reform goals of the new public service bureaucratization served to strengthen the industrial productivity apparatus, and especially during the 1950's and 1960's, the government apparatus for coordination of research activity became increasingly formalized and highly rational. The New

Deal, then, responding to the social and economic crises of the 1920's,

and 1930's, consolidated the mechanisms and provided the direction for

the rationalization of growing government involvement in a number of

areas, including patronage of research.

During World War II, Roosevelt created the National Defense Research

Committee (NDRC) headed by Vannevar Bush, and made it directly responsible

to the President. It was given wide and flexible powers for mobilizing

scientific resources for war (Rivlin, 1961: 32). In 1941, the NDRC and

a parallel Committee on Medical Research were brought together under the

new Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD), also headed by

Bush. In a decision that affected government involvement in the coming

three decades, the OSRD decided not to set up its own laboratories, but

rather to work through contracts, using existing facilities wherever

possible. Research support, however, was confined primarily to military

projects, although some social research projects relating to military

problems were conducted. Following the conclusion of hostilities,

enrollment and student fees dropped at most colleges and universities

and the OSRD found it necessary to relieve the universities of the

sudden burden by subsidizing professors who were increasingly spending

less time on teaching and more on OSRD research (Rivlin, 1961: 33).

A series of legislative acts reaffirmed the Federal Government's

increasing acceptance of responsibility for research and education.

The Council of Economic Advisors (CEA), for example, was created by

the Employment Act of 1946 with the primary social goals of promoting

maximum employment, production and purchasing power.[1] Also, in 1946,

the Truman-appointed President's Commission on Higher Education submitted

six volumes in 1947-48 recommending expansion of federal activities in higher education.

OSRD disbanded when World War II ended, although some projects were taken over by other agencies. Bush, reluctant to leave research and development to the military, urged that a National Research Foundation be created, and in 1947, the President's Research Board recommended the establishment of a National Science Foundation (NSF). Although the legislative history of the NSF began as early as 1945 when the first of many proposed bills were introduced in the Senate, it was not until 1951 that NSF, with a modest initial budget of approximately $255,000 (but increased 15-fold the following fiscal year) and directed by former OSRD Officer Allan T. Waterman, began systematically supporting research activity. Throughout the 1950's, a number of non-profit research corporations, many sponsored by defense agencies, were established,[2] and various committees designed to coordinate and advise government agencies became necessary. J. R. Killian, Jr., became the first science adviser to the President in 1957, and at the same time, independent science Advisory Committee reporting directly to the President was also established. By the end of the 1950's, the government and science had joined in a firm and indispensable partnership shaped by the past and preparing for the future.

The development of social science support evolved much more slowly. The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace at Stanford University began in 1919 to gather documents on World War I and 20th century European political and economic movements, and by 1969 the Institute's functions were, in the words of Herbert Hoover, to:

...demonstrate the evils of the doctrine of Karl Marx—
whether Communism, Socialism, Economic Materialism, or
Atheism—thus to protect the American way of life from
such ideologies, their conspiracies, and to reaffirm the
validity of the American system (quoted in Aptheker, 1972:
68).

Proud of its conservative perspective, the Hoover Institute is

currently enjoying a resurgence of resources and prestige (New York

Times Magazine, July, 1978).

The Social Science Research Council (SSRC), founded in 1923

through the efforts of Charles E. Merriam, is usually accepted as the

first agency created specifically for support of social science

research, but it was not until after World War II that support to the

social sciences was given with any degree of system or generosity.

The Institute for Social Research (ISR) was organized at the University

of Michigan in 1946 for several purposes, including conducting sample

surveys on problems of "major significance to society" and to help

integrate the social sciences by providing facilities for research on

multidisciplinary problems (ISR, 1971: 5), but the social sciences

were still viewed suspiciously by Congress. In 1946, the U.S. Senate

voted to exclude from the then-pending NSF-establishing Bill, the

specific provisions which would have created a Division of the Social

Sciences. But in 1954, recommendation for NSF approval was made by

the Senate and proceeded on an exploratory basis. In 1956 the Center

for Research in Social Systems (CRESS) was founded as a Special Opera-

tions Research Office (SORO) but reorganized in 1966 following disclo-

sures of its participation in Project Camelot into two divisions. The

first was a "cultural information" analysis center (CINFAC), known prior

to Operation Camelot as "Counter-Insurgency Information Center"—

ironically keeping the same acronym and functions. The other was the Social Science Research Institute (SSRI).

In the late 1960's, a number of special commissions[3] were created to advise the government on aspects of social science research, particularly on how to increase the useful application of the social sciences in the solution of contemporary social problems. Not surprisingly, the committees consistently recommended that the social sciences were vital to American interests and were critically important in contributing to various social problems. The Behavioral and Social Science Survey Committee (BSSSC) (1969: 1) and NSF (NSF, 1969: 58-62) reflected the instrumental vision of the other commissions and agencies when they reasoned that the social sciences can provide data linkages, help resolve crises and problems, and add depth of understanding of human social behavior and institutions, and apply this understanding in better ways to design social policies to facilitate management of social affairs.

In sum, after a slow beginning, social science research received a quantum increase or state support in the 1960's, and became viewed as an instrument to guide state policies directed towards social engineering. During this time, policing agencies as well as research which focused on policing and social control also received considerably increased support. It is against this background that the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) and the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice (NILECJ), it's research branch, were established.

EVOLUTION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESEARCH

Prior to the late 1960's, there was little concern for, let alone systematic development of, research problems related to criminal justice. The Internal Association of Police Chiefs (IACP), first convened to combat post-Civil War "lawlessness" in the West and in large urban and border areas, evolved various research committees in the early 20th Century, and the current IACP Research Committee functions to study, evaluate, and determine ways of improving law enforcement techniques through research, as well as to act as a repository and clearing house for relevant information (The Police Yearbook, 1969: 225). Once crime became defined as a major social problem in the 1950's and 1960's, other organizations, such as the National Institute for Police and Community Relations, founded in the mid-1950's[4] and the Law Enforcement Science and Technology Center of Illinois Institute of Technology, which contributed to Criminal Justice research by providing forums for exchange of ideas and for suggesting directions for further research (see, e.g., Yefsky, 1967) typified the various research agencies which emerged to address the "crime problem."

In 1969, the Ford Foundation established Harvard Law School's Center for Advancement of Criminal Justice, with emphasis on: (1) research programs dealing with crime and administration of justice, and (2) fellowships permitting "key" criminal justice practitioners to engage in advanced study and training (e.g., McNamara, 1972). The Police Foundation, created in 1970 with a $5 million grant from the Ford Foundation, established a prestigious and politically powerful research organization intended to provide a reformist direction in

policing practices. Although its original pool of approximately $30 million has been drastically depleted, the Foundation is currently expanding its activities by seeking outside funding rather than by sponsoring research from its own diminishing resources.

Federal agencies engaged in sponsorship of policing research include, for example, the Center for Studies of Crime and Delinquency of the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH). The Center has, for the past decade, operated on a modest budget of about $4-5 million a year. Although its work has occasionally overlapped the Institute's, the focus of the Center does not focus on criminal justice research. The Center

> ...is the focal point in NIMH for research, training, and related activities in the areas of crime and delinquency, individual violent behavior, and law and mental health interactions (NIMH, Vol: 1-2).

The Center stresses

> ...the development of improved means for understanding and coping with problems of mental health as these may be re- flected in various types of deviant, maladaptive, aggressive, and violent behaviors that frequently involve violations of the criminal or juvenile law (Shah and Lalley, 1973: 1).

It also encourages utilitarian research, which includes basic research if it has an evident goal to which new knowledge may be applied. The Center's programs include research and training, consultation, technical assistance and grant support toward the development of innovative and effective programs for law-violating behavior (see, e.g., NIMH, 1970).

A second agency which has been engaged in planning and operational grants, particularly for planning for administration of other agencies,

is the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), through its
model cities programs.

Third has been the Department of Labor's special project in
1968-1969 in which it was involved in the pilot program to improve
correctional institutions. Other federal agencies engaged in support
of criminal justice social research include the Federal Judicial Center,
with a budget of about $4 million devoted to research and development
for the goal of improving federal judicial administration, personnel
and practices, and the National Science Foundation (NSF).

The most active federal supporter of all forms of criminal justice
research has remained the Department of Justice. Social research
agencies within the Department of Justice include the Bureau of Prisons,
the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. These four agencies
combined, however, make up only about 20 percent of the Department's
total expenditures for social knowledge production and most of the
focus is on statistical accumulation and program evaluation. With the
creation of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration in 1968, and
its research unit, the NILECJ, the Department became a major funder
of criminal justice research. LEAA has received over $6 billion in
the first decade of its operations, and although the yearly appropria-
tions have decreased somewhat through both fiscal reductions and infla-
tion, the agency still retains a substantial budget. LEAA's research
commitment of $58 million in fiscal year 1976 made its budget the
fourth largest of any nonsocial service federal mission, behind only
the Department of Agriculture's extension service ($168 million), the
Bureau of Census ($66 million), and the Office of Education's Bureau

of School System's ($67 million). It was the 12th largest of any

federal agency engaged in social knowledge production. LEAA criminal

justice research includes development of science and technology,

forensic medicine, police tactics, and demonstration projects for

controlling crime or improving criminal justice operations. The

production of social knowledge is carried out by its Institute (NILECJ),

which will be the focus of Chapter 4.

SECTION C: HISTORY OF LEAA AND NILECJ

The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration was an outgrowth of

the earlier Law Enforcement Act of 1965 (PL 89-197) which provided

the Attorney General or its delegate with $10 million, and authorization

to establish programs, research, or other activities which might lead

to the improvement of law enforcement and control of crime.* This

Act terminated in 1968, and was superceded by PL 90-351, President

Lyndon Johnson's Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.

This Act created LEAA, which replaced the former Office of Law Encorce-

ment Assistance.

With an initial budget for fiscal year 1969 of $63 million,

LEAA was designed to provide federal assistance for fighting crime at

State and local levels. The LEAA provided aid to localities to

establish programs for recruiting and training police, modernizing

equipment, and reorganizing law enforcement agencies and for developing

and improving the operation of the criminal justice system. The LEAA

mission was to stop crime, or as the title of the act—oft-repeated

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*A more detailed legislative history will be provided in Chapter
4.

by President Johnson--promised, to make the streets safe for Americans.
The LEAA viewed research as essential to crime reduction, not only for
defining problems, but also for measuring success. The initial
budget allocated $10 million to establish the National Institute of
Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice (NILECJ). In 1974, Congress
gave LEAA responsibility for juvenile delinquency prevention and
control, consolidating programs previously located in the Department
of Health, Education and Welfare, and a second research arm of LEAA,
the National Institute of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
(NIJJDP) was established. This research agency will not be included
in this project.

There was hesitation from Congressional Legislative participants
to create a mechanism that might be interpreted as the first step
toward the establishment of a national police force, so the 1968
Act explicitly provided the policy caveat that law enforcement was
local, not a national problem. Although the establishment of LEAA
reflects somewhat a breaking away from the long tradition of federal
abstention from law enforcement, it did nonetheless retain an
explicit, intentional decentralized format. Two additional safeguards
reflected what White and Krislov (1977: 13) described as a "pluralistic
resolution of severe ideological differences" in Congressional
shaping of the Authorization Act. These were (1) the establishment
of a Troika nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate,
and consisting of the LEAA administrator and two deputies, of whom
no more than two could be members of the same party, and (2) the
implementation of a block-grant method of funding which broke from the

system of direct categorical grants, and provided instead allocations directly to state agencies. Block grants are allocated, according to population, to 57 jurisdictions, including the 50 states and seven territories and trusts. Allocations go directly to State Planning Agencies which then channel the money in the form of subgrants for state and local use (LEAA, 1979).

The 1968 Act provided federal support for three general goals: (1) the encouragement of states and units of local government to prepare and adopt comprehensive plans derived from local assessment of problem areas; (2) the authorization of block grants to states and local governments to improve and strengthen law enforcement, and (3) the encouragement of research and development directed toward the improvement of law enforcement and the development of new methods for the prevention of crime and the detection and apprehension of criminals. To meet these goals, the Act established: (1) planning grants to every state to develop comprehensive criminal justice improvement plans, in coordination with State Planning Agencies; (2) block grants, which are substantial sums of money allocated to each state on a formal basis by population, but since reformulated, and current legislation pending may modify population and include need (based on crime rates and needs of the criminal justice system of an area to address needs); (3) State Planning Agencies (SPA's) in each state and ten regional planning units to develop plans, coordinate and distribute funds through subgrants to state and local agencies; (4) Discretionary Grants, permitting the LEAA Director to award funds directly as perceived needed to supplement or implement particular

projects; (5) the evaluation of studies of federally-funded programs, and most importantly, for the social sciences, at least; and (6) the establishment of a research and development program (NILECJ).

Although various persons or groups were involved in the establishment of the Institute, New York Congressional Representative James H. Scheuer is usually cited as the motivating force:

> The National Institute was primarily the 'creation' of DISPAC Chairman James H. Scheuer, who was assisted by Representative Robert McClory in offering it as a Floor Amendment to the Administration Bill on August 3, 1967. Although the concept of the Institute derived from some of the thinking of the landmark President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice (Katzenbach Commission of 1965-67), it generated limited discussion at the time (DISPAC,* 1977: 9).

The Institute was created for the purpose of providing for and encouraging:

> ...training, education, research and development, for the purpose of improving law enforcement and developing new methods for the prevention and reduction of crime, and the detection and apprehension of criminals (PL 90-351: Sec. 401).

The Institute's authorizing legislation provided the mandate for (1) making grants for the support of research, demonstrations or special projects in Criminal Justice related areas; (2) continuing studies and undertaking programs of research to develop new or improved approaches, techniques, systems, equipment and devices to improve and strengthen law enforcement; (3) examining the causes (or, in the terminology preferred later, the correlates) of crime; (4) recommending activities by which agencies or individuals working in criminal justice-related fields could improve or strengthen law enforcement; (5) carrying out programs of instructional assistance consisting of research

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*DISPAC is the House Subcommittee on Domestic and International Scientific Planning, Analysis and Cooperation.

fellowships, and assistance to state and local law enforcement and criminal justice training programs. The Institute currently is one of several agencies within LEAA, and the Director of the Institute is responsible to the LEAA administration. Current legislation before Congress, however, provides for a restructuring of LEAA. If this legislation passes, the Act would provide for the establishment of a Bureau of Criminal Justice Assistance responsible to the Attorney General. The research functions of LEAA would be conducted by a National Institute of Justice (NIJ); the National Criminal Justice Information and Statistics Service. Statistics Development System would be replaced by a Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) and LEAA would become the third component in the triad, responsible for Juvenile Justice, Block Grants, and Community Action Programs. The purpose of this reorganization is to try to depoliticize research and other assistance functions (see, e.g., House Subcommittee Session, 26, April, 1979). NIJ and BJS would be supervised by policy boards, but LEAA would not, reporting more-or-less directly to Congress and to an Oversight Committee.

This historical overview provides a brief background describing the steady penetration of the state into the support of knowledge production in general, and criminal justice research in particular. It remains to examine the impact of this penetration upon research.

FOOTNOTES

[1]After the war, New Deal Congressional Representatives such as Senator Harley Kilgore saw scientific research as a means of promoting full employment, but were afraid the business interests would suppress research developments of scientific developments which threatened their markets (Gilpin and Wright, 1964: 3-4). As Cook (1964) argues, this argument was not unjustified.

[2]Much of the sponsored social science research in the 1950's was sponsored through defense agencies. The Human Resources Research Office (HumRRO) operated under contract with the Army, and was established in 1951 to develop methods of improving training of the U.S. soldier, and for behavioral science research on motivation, leadership and "man/weapon" systems. Other agencies include the Institute of Defense Analyses (1956), used by the joint Chiefs of Staff; Analytic Services, Inc., and the Mitre Corporation, both created by the Air Force (1958); System Development Corporation, a spin-off from RAND (1956) and by far the most influential and powerful patron of social research until the NSF expanded in the 1960's, the RAND Corporation. Rand originally started in 1946 as an Army Air Corps project at Douglas Aircraft, and two years later was organized as a nonprofit organization set up by Henry Ford II and his $100,000 interest-free loan and an additional bank credit guarantee of $300,000.

[3]The more prominant include the Advisory Committee on Government Programs in the Behavioral Sciences created by the National Academy of Sciences (1965); The National Science Board's Special Commission of the Social Sciences (1968); and the Behavioral and Social Sciences Survey Committee (BSSSC) established jointly by several standing organizations, including NAS and SSRC (1966). The purpose of each of these committees was to provide recommendations and guidelines by which: (a) the social sciences might be made more "marketable" to the Federal Government and (b) the Federal Government might derive maximum benefit from the "products" of social research.

Chapter 4: The Organizational Connection

Section 1: Formal Organization Structure
(NILECJ)

INTRODUCTION

One way to examine the relationship between sponsored research

and knowledge production in the social sciences is to focus on the

funding agencies themselves. Although the content analysis in the

next chapter can provide insights into the products of funded and

nonfunded research, it reveals little of the processes involved in

the allocation of resources for research, or of the organizational,

interactional, political and ideological dynamics which may affect

the selection by which some studies receive funding while others

do not. An organizational analysis may facilitate an assessment

of whether, and if so, how, sponsorship may be one source of

certain research biases. An organizational analysis may be useful

in several ways. First, if politicization does occur at the funding

level, one question becomes how does it occur? Politicization

refers to explicit values, assumptions, biases or ideologies which

intrude into the research process and function to distort the formu-

lation of research questions, the source of data, or the processing

or interpretive procedures. These values and assumptions correspond

to and serve explicit interests (of agencies, classes or social

groups).* By examining an agency's priority-setting, topic-targeting

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*For example, some research on political surveillance that focused
on development of more-effective methods of stifling activities of
lawful welfare rights organizations could be called "politicized"
because the implicit assumption that such activity must be suppressed
is embedded in formulation of the research problem, in the research
outcomes, and in the intended application of knowledge.

processes, and research proposals submitted for consideration, it may

be possible to determine whether certain topics, paradigms or research-

ers are systematically excluded and others favored. Second, as a

variety of observers (e.g., Miller R., 1968; I. L. Horowitz, 1974;

Deutscher, 1976b; Baritz, 1970; Useem, 1976; Weiss, 1978) have

suggested, evidence indicates that researchers may tend to view the

world through agency eyes. If researchers do modify research to

meet perceived agency needs or preferences, there should be discern-

ible mechanisms which encourage or at least facilitate such behaviors.

If researchers adopt agency needs such that research in the social

sciences is becoming transformed, then it might be useful to examine

what it is that researchers are allegedly adopting, and if such

congruence between agency and research goals is being elicited

through funding, how, by whom, and for what purpose. An examination

of a funding agency may also indicate whether such agencies attempt,

or even desire, to shape research topics and procedures to a

particular mold which conforms to agency mission. Third, if funding

agencies either themselves politicize studies or indirectly encourage

particular political biases, then analysis of policy setting and

implementation should allow insights into the location and extent

of penetration of agency preferences. Fourth, an organizational

analysis should reveal, at least partially, the sources of influence,

constraints and power arrangements to which agencies are themselves

subject, and which may serve to shape agency decisions and policies.

Fifth, an organizational analysis will clarify the debates reflected

in Chapter 2 over whether funding agencies are a) monolithic,

b) pernicious, c) enlightened, or d) innately political (e.g., conser-
vative or liberal), all of which are reflected as analytic models
throughout academia. Sixth, an organizational analysis should help
address the possibility that funding has influenced and shaped funded
and nonfunded research so completely that there is no significant
difference between the two, thus invalidating a comparison of the two
as categories in a content analysis. If such complete penetration
is the case, then funding processes should reflect explicit and
consistent ideological and methodological preferences consistent with
the distribution of features of research as derived from the content
analysis. Seventh, an organizational analysis will also reveal the
processes by which a legislatively defined mandate becomes translated
into action by the corresponding state agency, or more explicitly,
the manner in which abstract structural guidelines and constraints of
state power (in the form of legislative directives and general policy
statements) are interpreted and integrated into formal and informal
organizational behaviors by state apparatus. Finally, the distinction
between (state power and state apparatus is useful because it allows
identification of differences between formal power arrangements
intended by the state and the actual expression of those arrangements
after being mediated by various factors. By viewing NILECJ as an
organizational process which is interdependent with, but not the
same as, the executive and legislative power which has created and
sustained it, it becomes possible to examine how NILECJ activity may
circumvent state rules or tacit understandings implied by the power
arrangements, or conversely, how power arrangements may create under-
standings in the absence of formal rules.

Organizational activity is a reflection of human activity, and organizational processes require a complex of behaviors and procedures by individuals who construct, interpret, and carry out the rules affecting the operation of their organization. To avoid an over-emphasis on the structural aspect of patronage organizations, it becomes necessary to also examine how the individuals assigned to carry out the tasks of allocating resources for research accomplish their tasks. If there does exist a discrepancy between the goals and policies of the patronage organization, and the actual implementation and outcomes of these goals and policies, then the focus of influence could shift from the state _qua_ state to the role-incumbents of organizational positions.[1] By identifying _mediating_ factors that may exist at the structural, and especially at the interactional level, the locus of analysis shifts from invariant structures of an organization to one which restores a phenomenal element to the analysis of knowledge production by viewing organizational activity as part of human activity.

There are several general organizational models, each providing a particular imagery and problematic of organizations, to choose from in examining funding organizations. This analysis will be informed by the assumptions of negotiated order theorists (e.g., Manning, 1978, forthcoming; Goffman 1971, 1972, 1974; Day and Day, 1978; Silverman, 1972; Strauss, 1978), and of dialectical organizational theorists (e.g., Heydebrand, 1977; Goldman and Van Houten, 1977; Brown, 1978). The former position is derived from the assumption that social order is constructed out of the everyday processes of individual and group interaction, the latter from the assumptions that social order is a

feature of reproductive transformative human activity, and that such activity must be examined as a process containing contradictions and inconsistencies. The intent here is not to develop or define a theoretical perspective, nor to critique models of organizational analysis. The intent is rather to examine selected features of formal organizational structure and of individual discretionary behavior.

A dialectically-grounded negotiated order model is appropriate for several reasons. First, a negotiated order model will allow for an examination of the structural features of an organization in the context of how personnel respond to changing mandates, how changing mandates occur, and the nature of organizational constraints, goals and strategies. A negotiated order approach will facilitate the examination of how individuals, though bound by the structure of the organization, are able to take a self-conscious role in the transformative process of everyday interaction, agreements, temporary refusals and changing definitions of situations (e.g., Day and Day, 1977). Second, a dialectical approach will help identify how individual behaviors mediate, and are mediated by, conflicting forms of rationality, personal politics, ideology, or other features naturally occurring in organizational activity. Organizations, from this dual perspective, are viewed as possessing relatively explicit rules and existing within identifiable larger social structures. But unlike traditional system's theories, for example, which view organizational structure as immutable, and behaviors of organizational participants as being bound primarily by organizational rules reflecting formal rationality, the perspective which informs this study views organizations as changing, fluid, contradictory and partial, rather than

absolute (e.g., Manning, forthcoming). Organizations here are viewed

highly fragile social constructions, historically bound, and subject

to numerous temporal, spatial and situated events (e.g., Day and Day,

1977). More specifically, organizations are viewed as <u>structured</u>

<u>processes</u>, as outcomes[2] of practical human activity. As <u>processes</u>,

organizational structure as well as individual discretionary behaviors

are viewed as being mediated at several levels, including interactional,

organizational and, in the case of federal agencies, legislative and

political, and by a variety of complex, but interrelated factors

(such as public opinion, forms of social protest, types of social

protest, types of occurring or recurrent social conflicts and crises,

and historical options for action).

Previous attempts to examine the relationship of federal

connection to social research were discussed in Chapter 2. There

have, in addition, been various organizational studies of federal

agencies or programs (e.g., Oceanography; Wenk, 1972; Forest Rangers:

Kaufman, 1978). Of those relating to criminal justice, one of the

first and most influential was Blau's (1955) examination of the FBI,

featuring an analysis of reciprocal consultative networks and social

exchange. Other research focusing on federal agencies and criminal

justice have included histories of various components such as the

Office of Law Enforcement Coordination in the U.S. Treasury Department

(e.g., Phillips, 1963), or of judicial systems (e.g., Collins, 1978;

Heydebrand, 1977; Balbus, 1973), and more recently, Attewell and

Gerstein (1979) have examined the impact of federal drug control and

treatment programs on local jurisdictions. Others have focused on

the government's efforts to fight the "war on crime" (e.g., Harris, 1969, 1970; Clark, 1970), or histories of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (e.g., Rogovin, 1973; Peskoe, 1973; National Advisory Commissions, 1973, 1976; National Research Council, 1978; Vol. II), on the relationship of LEAA to specific locations (e.g., Purcell, 1973; Reid, 1973; Gude and Mannina, 1973: Gregware, 1973). Still others have confined themselves to LEAA's research arm, NILECJ. These have included the highly-critical National Academy of Science report (White and Krislov, 1977), general histories (e.g., Chelimsky, 1975), commentaries by former directors (e.g., Velde, 1975; Ewing, 1978, 1979), or theoretical interpretations (e.g., McLauchlan, 1975). None of these are particularly helpful in understanding the federal connection for criminal justice research. This inadequacy usually occurs because federal impact is not the intent of the authors. For some (e.g., McLauchlan, 1975; White and Krislov, 1977) it occurs, as shall be described in the appropriate sections below, because of over-simplification or conceptual rhetoric.

My own project is not intended to duplicate histories or analysis already compiled, although there is a good deal that is pulled together, especially in Chapter 3 and 4, that is not available elsewhere, particularly on institute history and current procedures. Nor is the intent here to critique existing studies of the Institute, although that may occur on occasion. The intent is rather to present the results of a preliminary organizational analysis in such a way that it may provide understandings into the connection between state power, as embodied in the legislative and executive branches of government, and state apparatus, as reflected in the procedures and

processes which are intended to implement that power, particularly as embodied by the Institute.

NILECJ is appropriate as an analytic focal point for several reasons. First, as an extension of LEAA, the Institute has high visibility, and is the primary agency, either federal or private, in the funding of criminal justice knowledge production. Second, it is a controversial agency,[3] and the issues surrounding this controversy are useful for illustrating the topics of a) federal funding, b) federal politicization and c) social control. Third, the Institute has undergone a series of transformations in the past decade, making the dynamic aspects of it more prominent.

The purpose of examining NILECJ is to illustrate the processes by which policy decisions are both formally prescribed, negotiated and implemented by identifying ways formal policies are set and carried out, as well as the ways in which organizational participants perceive, define, articulate and actuate organizational goals. The methodological tasks are to a) acquire information on the means by which goals are pursued, b) outline the organizational structure, c) delineate the organizational dynamics, and d) examine the identifiable organizational constraints and influences on policy, such as legislative and fiscal limitations, supervision patterns, available personnel and skills, and especially the sources of mediations operating between agency procedures and the environment on one hand, and between agency and its related components (internally) on the other.

Two issues seem particularly appropriate, because of their

utility, for organizing discussion of the funding agency-research

connection: 1) the formal structural make-up and procedures of a

federal funding agency, and 2) the processes of decision-making

and policy setting in actual practice. An organizational analysis

of NILECJ, will provide insights into the degree of fit between the

structural interface and actions of organizational participants,

and the degree to which actions coincide with mandate of the agency

in selection of research projects and in allocation of funds. This

examination will focus on, but not be restricted to the so-called

"Blair Ewing Period," named after the acting NILECJ director between

October 1976, and March 1979. To understand the Ewing period,

however, it is necessary to examine the structure of the Institute

and its relationship to LEAA, the research community, internal

offices and divisions, and those factors representing state power,

particularly the congressional and executive branches of federal

government.

METHODOLOGY

The organizational analysis is not intended to be an intensive

examination of the Institute. Its purpose is to identify possible

sources of politicization of research by focusing on selected

organizational operations, and to suggest direction for further

research. As a consequence, "Occam's Razor" has been applied to

pare away most discussion of organizational factors not bearing

directly on this project. There is a necessarily-heavy reliance on

informants, although informant responses were cross-checked both with

other informants and with historical, organizational, and federal

documents as a validation procedure. It should be stressed, however,

that the intent of this chapter is not so much to piece together

a definitive picture of Institute operations as viewed by informants

as it is to offer tentative insights into how Institute operations

provide the <u>potential</u> for politicization of the knowledge production

process. For example, the research was not designed to allow for

in-depth examination of the peer-review process. It becomes possible,

however, to identify general features of peer-review in practice, and

to compare these features against the ideal, and examine whether the

practice of peer review reflects a loosely-coupled Institute-Academic

community connection which allows for penetration of particular biases.

The intention was not to describe the organizational operation

in exhaustive detail, but to illustrate with appropriate data how the

Institute operates, and further, to show how such operations could

significantly shape knowledge production. Opinions were not taken as

"fact," nor were informant impressions used as the basis for assuming

a particular "objective reality." They were used as sensitizing

devices to indicate general procedures and features of one particular

aspect of federal funding, and to indicate directions for additional

research.

The data was collected through documentary analysis, impression-

istic observation, telephone and personal interviews* with informants

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*The difference between an interview and a "conversation" was
largely one of scheduling. If data-gathering interaction was scheduled
prior to its occurrence, it was called an interview; if it resulted
from serendipitous interaction and the same open-ended questions were
asked, it was a conversation that became transformed into an interview.

within LEAA/NILECJ, with researchers and others connected at some level with Institute operations, with congressional and legislative personnel, NILECJ Advisory Board members, and critics and supporters of NILECJ, including members of the NAS (White and Krislov, 1977) study group. Four three-day trips to Washington D.C. between March and June 1979, allowed monitoring of congressional hearings, NILECJ advisory board proceedings, and interviewing with and observation of Institute personnel and activities. Informants within NILECJ included division heads or, if unavailable, representatives, as well as program officers, were contacted, and between 300-400 pages of tightly-spaced, typed, pages of conversation were transcribed from tapes and notes. Interviews ranged in duration from 15 minutes to three hours, and were taped whenever possible, and when not, field notes were taken and later coded. A variety of documents, including legislative, LEAA/NILECJ policy, and Institute proposals, transcripts, minutes, solicitations, were collected and examined. Several thousand pages of documents were collected or examined.

A concept index was constructed to classify and code interview data. An independent coder was employed as a means of checking reliability and consistency of the index and my own coding procedures, and there were no substantial differences in classification. With this methodology, a systematic analysis of the Institute was initiated, beginning with the Crime Control Acts that provide the NILECJ mandate.

CRIME CONTROL ACTS: 1968-1979

The Institute has always been under the authority of the parent

agency, LEAA, and as a consequence, is shaped by the same legislation

and congressional intent as the larger organization. The LEAA program

was designed to serve as a precursor to revenue sharing by transferring

federal dollars to states through block grants with as few strings

attached as possible (Rector and Wolfle, 1973: 55). Although the

Institute did not participate in allocation of block grant programs,

it nonetheless shared the overall design intended for LEAA of providing

funds for state-oriented projects.* Further, the structure, scope and

mandate of NILECJ has been modified by the series of LEAA reauthoriza-

tion acts in 1970, 1973, 1976 and currently (June 1979) before Congress.

The original Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1968 (PL 90-351) required

that the LEAA administration be composed of an administrator and two

associate administrators, appointed by the President, confirmed by

the Senate, at least one of whom was required to be a member of the

opposition party. This tribunal structure was called _troika_. The

Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1970 (PL 91-644) continued the _troika_,

but strengthened the position of the Administrator by clarifying

administrative duties and powers, and also specified that administrative

decisions were to be made with the concurrence of one or both of the

Associate Administrators rather than by unanimous consent, as before.

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*See, for example, _Police Chief_ (unauthored, 1966: 20) for a list
of LEAA projects approved under the 1965 law. Thirty three projects
were shared by nine major research institutions, mostly corporations,
performing practitioner-suggested research. This was the format
anticipated for the Institute by the drafters of the 1968 Act.

This was a minor, but important (as will be shown in Section II) amendment
to the 1968 Act which clarified the relationship of Administrator to
Associates, thus removing some leadership ambiguity. The 1973 Crime
Control Act (PL 93-83) removed the requirement that insured at least
one membership post for the opposition party in the LEAA troika, which
some high-level LEAA/NILECJ personnel felt significantly lessened one
source of politicization within the Institute by eliminating a structural
"loyal opposition" which tended to be devisive. The 1973 Act also
reworded the Institute's purpose. Instead of being the "purpose of
the Institute to encourage research and development to improve and
strengthen law enforcement" (PL 30-351), it now became the purpose to:

> . . .encourage research and development to improve and strengthen
> law enforcement and criminal justice, to disseminate the results
> of such efforts to state and local governments, and to assist in
> the development and support of programs for the training of law
> enforcement and criminal justice personnel (PL 93-83, Part D:
> Sec. 402a).

Also in 1973, the Institute added a program evaluation component,
provided for the establishment of training programs for criminal justice
professionals and established a clearing house for exchange of informa-
tion about law enforcement and criminal justice, and made a nationwide
survey of estimated personnel needs in law enforcement and criminal
justice, and determined the adequacy of federal, state and local
programs to meet these needs (e.g., NILECJ, 1979: 3-4; PL 93-83, Part
D: Sec 402). In 1974, an Advisory Board comprised of practitioners
and academics in criminal justice-related fields was established.
The purpose of the Board is to assist the administration in setting
goals, develop research agendas, and select research priorities and

strategies. The advisory group is <u>not</u> a policy-making board, however, and acts only on those matters brought before it by the NILECJ director.

The 1976 Crime Control Act (PL 94-503) altered the status of NILECJ by modifying the appointment procedure of the NILECJ administrator. The 1968 Act had provided that the Institute be under the general authority of the LEAA administration, but the status of the NILECJ directorship was ambiguous. The 1973 legislation has codified appointment procedures, making the director an LEAA administrator appointee. The 1976 amendments made the Institute directorship an Attorney General appointment rather than LEAA appointment, apparently emphasizing the importance and autonomy of the post, although nothing was done to remove or attenuate LEAA supervisory authority. The 1976 amendments also stressed growing congressional interest in program evaluations (e.g., DISPAC, 1977: 9), directing the Institute to 1) develop criteria and procedures for such work and communicate them to the State Planning Agencies of LEAA, and 2) identify, catalogue and disseminate information on demonstrably successful projects. The 1976 Act also provided for further expansion of the Institute mandate. In addition to reaffirming its commitment to the 1973 goals, the Institute also undertook collaborative research with the National Institute on Drug Abuse to examine the relationship between drug abuse and crime and to evaluate the success of various types of drug treatment programs in reducing crime (LEAA, 1979: 4).

How the 1979 legislation will transform LEAA and the Institute remains in question, but should either the S-241 bill or the John Conyers House Bill, HR 2108, pass, the Institute will become

independent of LEAA, although it will remain within the Department of Justice directly under the Attorney General.

In sum, when the Institute was established as part of LEAA by the original authorizing legislation, research was not considered an integral part of the war on crime, at least when viewed in relation to the resources and interest placed on more dramatic aspects of crime control funded by LEAA (e.g., high technology, computer systems, intensive training of police personnel, futuristic weapons and equipment). Nonetheless, the Institute reflected the general LEAA legislative charge to "reduce the crime rate," a charge that was accepted and intensified until 1973. Despite the authorizing legislation, however, the Institute, especially after, but certainly not limited to, the restructuring of the appointment procedures of the director, was a "specific charge only in the most general sense" in that the actual implementation of the legislative mandate was largely a reflection of the style of the director, and often of his relationship to the LEAA administrator.

NILECJ DIRECTORS

The Institute is headed by a director and two associate directors, all political appointees, who have charge of implementing the legislative mandate. Yet they retain, as will be illustrated in Section II C, considerable discretion. The evolution of the directorship is important to the understanding of the operation of the Institute because of the relationship of the position both to congressional and executive political pressures, and to the creation and implementation of NILECJ policy.

Although PL 99-351 was formally enacted and became law on 19 June, 1968, then-President Johnson, who had that spring withdrawn from the Presidential race, waited until just prior to the 1968 elections to nominate Patrick V. Murphy for Administrator and Wesley Pomeroy and Ralph Siu for associate administrators. These nominations were not acted upon by the Senate, and were withdrawn by President Nixon when he assumed the Presidency in January 1969. During their brief tenure, Siu, although associate member of the troika, managed the Institute, but when Charles Rogovin and his associate Richard Velde (who himself became NILECJ Director in 1976) took over in early 1969, they decided, following heated disagreement and the final arbitration of Attorney General John Mitchell, to nominate Henry S. Ruth, Jr., as NILECJ director.[4] Ruth was subsequently confirmed, but soon voluntarily left the Institute and was replaced in 1970 by his deputy, Irving Slott, who served in an acting capacity until early 1971. When Nixon appointed Jerris Leonard as LEAA administrator in spring 1971, Leonard appointed Martin Danziger to head NILECJ. Danziger was succeeded by Gerald Caplan in fall 1973, when Donald Santorelli replaced Leonard. Caplan remained in his position when Velde succeeded Santorelli in 1976, but turnovers again occurred when the Carter Administration took office (see Section II).

The White and Krislov report (1977) has identified three, and when Blair Ewing is included, four, distinct periods in the Institute's development, each corresponding to the personal style of the individual director. In the first phase, particularly under Ruth, NILECJ, influenced by the politics and mood of the period, stressed applied research in keeping with both LEAA and NILECJ mandate to immediately reduce crime and bolster the criminal justice system through research. The period is characterized by ineffectiveness, political in-fighting, and confusion of purpose (see Section III). This was the result largely of LEAA political and personal bickering, both internally and with Congress, of inconsistent and temporary leadership at both Administrator and Director levels, and of structural problems, which thwarted policy-making and implementation, thwarted hiring, and according to both researchers and Agency informants, seriously reduced the credibility and legitimacy of the Institute as a viable organization among academics, and destroyed its credibility in Congress.

The second phase, from roughly 1971-1973, remained characterized by an emphasis on applied research intended to decrease crime rates. During this second phase, allocation strategy changed from one of supporting a variety of projects to instead focusing on a few large-scale projects on the theory that this would maximize the benefits of the investment. Also during this period, attempts at evaluation of Institute program effectiveness were begun. The Institute continued its "war on crime," in accordance with its original mandate to improve law enforcement and develop new methods for reducing crime, and detecting and apprehending criminals (see, e.g., PL 90-351, Title I, Part D: Sec. 401). NILECJ continued to be widely criticized for its

lack of success in reducing crime, for its inefficiency, and for its
apparent inability to account for either its program, or to justify
its expenses against the effectiveness of its programs. Specific
criticisms, summarized by DISPAC (1977: 19-23), included: 1) no long-
range research agendas, 2) directors politicized and lacking independ-
ence from the parent organization, 3) inadequate project review,
4) an image that the Institute lacked intellectual integrity,
5) no demonstrated research or program successes, and 6) poor research
quality. Critiques and critics of the Institute have been numerous
and voluable. Among the more prominent include the NAS report
(White and Krislov, 1977), which was critical of virtually every facet
of NILECJ; the 20th Century Fund (1976), critical of the entire LEAA
program, which judged that LEAA might better serve as an independent
research institute; and the National Advisory Committee on Criminal
Justice Standards and Goals (1977), which criticized the Institute's
"naivete" in expecting quick results from research, and compared
the Institute unfavorably with the NIMH Center.

White and Krislov (1977) identify the third period, 1973-77 as
Caplan period, which began when Donald Santorelli became LEAA
Administrator. The most significant change during this period was
a switch from focusing on the short-range goal of simply reducing
crime rates, as measured by official statistics (which were becoming
recognized as a problematic measure), to longer-range goals (which
also focused on reducing crime rates, despite their problematic
nature). NILECJ strategies included awarding a smaller number of
research grants, especially for basic research, and an emphasis on

establishing stronger connections with the academic community. Velde (1975) has written that the implicit goal of LEAA during his tenure was to "control crime," and emphasized the commitment of LEAA to police equipment, physical fitness and training programs. Missing from Velde's commentary is any sense that there exists non-technical means to control crime (even should one accept control as the primary goal), or that there are other components of the criminal justice system than law enforcement officers.

In the fourth phase, Blair Ewing became the acting director in May, 1977, and immediately implemented a number of substantive changes. Guided by the NAS report, changes in public, private and research attitudes, conceptual and empirical development of criminal justice research in the decades between 1968-1977, and the recognition of the importance of research by both the Carter Administration and LEAA personnel (see, e.g., Ewing, 1978: 266-68), Ewing's attempts to substantially change the Institute were facilitated considerably. When Ewing left the Institute and LEAA in April, 1979 (Ewing had come into the Institute when James Gregg was appointed acting LEAA Administrator, and Ewing accompanied Gregg as his assistant when the latter left LEAA to head another federal agency), it was acknowledged, even by his detractors, that Ewing had "turned things around." The impact of his style on the Institute will be developed more fully in a later section, but it should be mentioned here that his impact was most profound in two areas. First was in the development of existing staff into a team responsible for shaping program and direction by exercising more self-initiative which improved both morale and output,[5] and second was his stress on innovative basic research. Although Ewing publicly

stated that he tried to obtain a balance between basic and applied, it was felt that he emphasized basic research more than his predecessors.

A _fifth stage_, currently beginning, already appears to differ from the others in both form and content. Although definite judgments would be premature, the initial feeling is that the current Institute and LEAA Administration may be swinging back to a greater emphasis on applied research and attempting to remove initiative from staff in shaping programs. There is also a "wait and see" attitude regarding the proposed legislation that could radically alter the operation of the Institute.

To understand the structure of LEAA and NILECJ, it is useful to understand the general transitions and subsequent political and operational issues and problems that accompanied them, for these issues are, as shall be argued in Section II, one mediating factor which emerges as a source of politicization at the directorship level.

INSTITUTE STRUCTURE

The organizational structure of the Institute has changed considerably during the past decade. Even now, current House and Senate bills would radically restructure the Institute, removing it from under LEAA, and make it an independent research organization within a proposed Bureau of Justice, remaining within the Department of Justice. This is why it especially makes sense to view NILECJ structure as a complex of recurrent processes rather than as a monolithic agency with more-or-less invariant formal structural features and consistent goals. These processes, moreover, are shaped

by organizational features such as size, division of labor, and structural hierarchy.

The number of personnel vary, but informants agree there are currently (June, 1979) about 75 total full-time employees, including between 55-60 nonclerical professional staff.* The Institute is currently divided into four offices under the office of the Director. The Director's office is responsible for establishing priorities and is advised by an in-office Analysis Planning and Management unit. The Office of Research Programs is the primary research arm of the Institute, and employs almost half of the total personnel. It sponsors both basic and applied research.** The goal of the Research Programs Division is to both generate new knowledge in priority areas, and to build on existing knowledge in the criminal justice area. Its scope is broadly defined, in fact (perhaps purposely), vague. It consists of six divisions (LEAA, 1979: 10-23; LEAA, 1976). First, The Police Division, with the stated goal of advancing police science and strengthening police effectiveness, has supported research projects on patrol tactics, discipline (of police), corruption, and exercise of discretion and performance measures. Second, the Adjudication Division is oriented towards research on the judicial (e.g., courts, prosecution, juries) components of the criminal justice

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*Professional here refers to those persons responsible for creating and implementing the research projects. Especially during the Ewing phase, these persons tend to be Ph.Ds. from the social science and criminal justice field with strong methodological training.

**This distinction, although made for administrative convenience, is seldom made in practice. "Applied" research usually refers to research intended to have immediate, demonstrable results.

system, and has included studies on plea-bargaining, court management and sentencing. Third, the Corrections Division is mandated to increase knowledge of effectiveness of incarceration, types of treatment, sentencing procedures, and impact of imprisonment in general, in reducing crime. It has supported research on reintegration of offenders into the community and management improvement systems. Fourth, the Community Crime Prevention Division conducts research into the relationship between law enforcement systems and personnel and the individuals and communities they serve. It focuses on the relation-ship between the physical environment and crime, and is currently sponsoring research into urban collective disorder, environmental design, violent crime, white collar crime, and community cooperation in preventing crime. Fifth, the Center for the Study of Crime Correlates and Determinants of Criminal Behavior examines the factors which appear to co-exist with criminal behaviors and in criminal environments. Finally, the Associate Director for Science and Technology is responsible for "hardware" research and coordination of science and technology and demonstration programs.

The second office is that of Research and Evaluation Methods. The task of this office is to "obtain practical information on the costs, benefits, and limitations of selected criminal justice and crime prevention programs now in use throughout the country" (LEAA, 1979: 16). Third, the Office of Program Evaluation is responsible for supporting projects which evaluate the impact of applied research on solving problems in criminal justice areas. Finally, the Office of Development, Testing and Dissemination is involved in seeing that

knowledge produced is applied to specific criminal justice problems. It is also responsible for disseminating research findings and for maintaining a reference and dissemination service.

These four offices, plus the Office of the Director (and the Advisory Board) comprise the basic structure of the Institute.

FORMAL OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES

Several interrelated tasks comprise the primary activities of the Institute. First is the general articulation of goals and priority areas for research. Second is identifying the types of projects sought to meet these priorities. Third is determining funding allocations for specific offices, divisions, and projects, and finally is the actual selection process in which proposals are selected through review and negotiation processes by staff and outside sources.

1. Establishing Goals. The goals of the Institute are formally shaped from three directions. First is the executive and legislative prescriptions outlining general mission areas in which the Institute is required to operate, or in which it is suggested research support be concentrated. Second, the director of the Institute has responsibility, latitude, and authority for shaping policies. Third, the office and division staff, as the initiators and implementors of the everyday routine tasks, have considerable influence in the final substance and selection of Institute research projects.

The single most important source of formal policy is Congress. Through enactment of authorizing legislation and appropriations, Congress is able to shape the general direction of much of the Institute's work. Fiscal authority of Congress provides an effective

instrument for influencing the Institute. There are three fiscal processes affecting LEAA: 1) Budget, 2) Authorization, and 3) Appropriation. The Congressional Budget Committees are not involved in issues of policy, but rather set ceiling limits on policies and programs submitted by the executive branch for all federal programs. Budget committees review the entire budget submitted by the President, then come up with a counter-figure. The appropriations committees evaluate the line-item expenditures for each agency. Technically, LEAA is a mission within the Justice Department. This means that the Department has but one grant program in the administration of justice function (a function is the consolidated picture of programmatic areas within a federal department), and within the administration of justice's function, LEAA is a mission.

Authorization proceedings are the most important, and determine the substance of agency programs. They determine what a program looks like, and what it is supposed to do. Both the House and Senate have legislative jurisdiction over functions of a program, agency, or area. In the Senate, Massachusetts Senator Edward Kennedy's Judiciary Committee, and in the House, Michigan Representative John Conyers' Subcommittee on Crime each have jurisdiction over LEAA and both have introduced separate pieces of legislation to restructure both LEAA and the Institute. The authorization committees develop some semblance of a financial plan, the total authorized expenditures, and submit it to their respective peers. This is a relatively new process (enacted in 1974, functioning in 1975). The issues arising in current authorization hearings, according to both Institute and congressional

informants, have become more-or-less polarized into: First, the policy question of what LEAA/NILECJ is supposed to be doing, that is, whether it is a crime-fighting agency which aides state and local criminal justice systems, or whether it is supposed to furnish seed money for demonstration projects and for basic and applied research. Second, there has been a strong feeling that LEAA/NILECJ is simply not doing its job. These two issues form the basis for most of the anti-LEAA criticism,[6] and may result from historical, rather than LEAA/NILECJ policy deficiencies in that like the criminal justice system it services, the LEAA mandate is both unclear in practice and difficult to operationally define, in part because it is contingent upon the dominant issues and problems facing other components of the criminal justice system.

Budget hearings, then, set limits by mission, not by agency, at least in the case of LEAA and the Justice Department. One of the most serious threats to LEAA's budget in the 1979 hearings, however, was motivated by larger fiscal concerns, and apparently unrelated to substantive agency politics or operation:

> We just went through mark-up, where the senators review and decide what they are going to allow for each particular area, and when LEAA came up for discussion the senators decided that there's been a lot of bad press about the program, and it's been very controversial, and because of the controversy about the balanced budget this year, and the state's surpluses, which existed last year in all the states, like the state legislators passed amendments about the budget, and the Senate Committee came to the conclusion that they'd have to cut some kinds of state assistance. And it was either going to have to be in the form of categorical grants, one of which is LEAA, or in general revenue sharing and they decided to hold general revenue sharing at its present level, and that it would cut categorical grants, so they cut categorical grants 9. (Senate Aide: S-8).

The setting of research goals also derives from a variety of other sometimes incompatible and conflict-generating sources.[7] <u>First</u> is the executive office's priorities, which will be discussed further in Section II. This source includes the various critical reports and comments that emerge from the Attorney General's office, presidential policy statements, and behind-the-scenes in-fighting. <u>Second</u>, the Institute personnel themselves, especially in the Ewing period, have assumed much responsibility for constructing and implementing specific projects. This provides the agency with considerable individual latitude in defining and setting goals. <u>Third</u>, the Institute implemented an advisory committee composed of practitioners and researchers. The Advisory group is not a policy-setting board, and acts only on issues presented to it by the NILECJ Director. Nonetheless, informants consistently felt that the Board has considerable influence—based primarily on the prestige of its members and the utility of maintaining strong working relationships with individual board members—and this influence both directly and indirectly shapes Institute policy. <u>Fourth</u>, the Institute is currently evaluating the results of a 19-page survey mailed to "approximately 1,000 persons representative of the Institute's varied constituencies" (NILECJ Survey Cover Letter: Undated/1978), requesting information for future solicitations, future priorities, and possible directions for research. <u>Fifth</u>, state planning agencies reporting to LEAA provide suggestions based on their practical interests in criminal justice problems.

From these combined sources, ten Institute-acknowledged, arbitrary, sometimes overlapping, and perhaps ambiguous, long-term priority areas

have emerged to guide research for the next few years (e.g., Ewing,

1978: 274; LEAA, 1978: vii; LEAA, 1979: 7):

1) Correlates and determinants of criminal behaviors
2) Violent crime and the violent offender
3) Community Crime Prevention
4) Career Criminals and habitual offenders
5) Utilization and deployment of police resources
6) Pretrial processes: Consistency and delay reduction
7) Sentencing
8) Rehabilitation (of offenders)
9) Deterrence
10) Performance standards and measures for criminal justice

Within the priorities, the Institute is committed to a cumulative approach to research which involves identifying knowledge gaps of importance, commissioning or encouraging research in those areas, summarizing what is known, and synthesizing research findings both within and across priority areas (Ewing, 1978: 274).

This, then, is a rough overview of the institutionalized

sources involved in setting goals within the Institute.

2. <u>Articulation of Research Areas</u>. This area involves the

actual selection of general topic areas for research. The Institute

staff carries the primary responsibility for developing ideas,

writing solicitations and performing the administrative tasks

necessary for transforming solicitations into actual research

projects. For example, violent crimes has been identified as a

priority area, and staff from various offices and divisions may

decide that collective social disorders would provide a useful

topic area for research under this priority. The ideas are

generated from the bottom up, rather than filter from the top down.

One project monitor summarized the procedure:

QM: The [solicitations] come from the project monitors. We
    develop the solicitations. . .

JT: As suggested by the [director]?. . .

> QM: No, no!! We [e.g., staff] develop them. They are not
> suggested by the administration or above. We have to
> put our plans to the administrator eventually. We
> operate within general guidelines, but those particular
> areas aren't that specific. We still have a lot of
> leeway [in regard to specific priorities]. Like I said,
> I can do an open solicitation and [staff] people can
> propose whatever they want to. (QM: 1/1)*

There is, in fact, a certain pride among staff about their

self-perceived independence in drafting research ideas and subse-

quent solicitations, as one program officer** adamantly affirmed

when it was suggested that most ideas may come from the Institute

Director or from LEAA:

> NO!!! [Research ideas do] not come from the administrator!!!
> It [sic] comes from our [staff] level!!! It's rational and
> involves priorities that the <u>entire</u> Institute sets up for
> itself. (III: 5/A)

Although the staff role in determining research will be

addressed in the next section, it is important to recognize at this

point that staff discretion constitutes a form of substantive

rationality in that discretionary behaviors are intended to meet

or address agency needs in lieu of formal policies or rules. That

is, there are no systematic rules, procedures or strategies

(i.e., formal rationality) to guide selection or immediate evaluation

of either general research areas or specific research projects.

Once an idea has been more-or-less identified (there is often

considerable flexibility even after an idea is articulated),

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*All informants, both in LEAA/NILECJ and Congress, and private
practitioners were assured anonymity. Initials or numerals are
intended to correspond to sections and subsections of interview
notes or tape transcriptions, not to an informant's actual initials.

**The formal designation of staff is loose, and several terms
(e.g., project monitor, project/program officer) are used inter-
changeably.

proposals are written up by a project monitor or program officer and circulated among Institute staff, including persons in other divisions and officers. When it is felt that a feasible idea is adequately defined, a solicitation for research proposals is written and disseminated to the research community.

3. Distribution of funds. The LEAA budget, including line-items (i.e., specific expenditures within the Agency, such as NILECJ personnel salaries and total research allocation, although not individual projects) is authorized and approved by Congress. The money is then divided up within the Institute on the basis of division or office need, as determined by either fiscal requirements of long-term projects or anticipated needs of proposed projects. Although the total funds available is limited, staff has discretion over internal distribution, as shall be outlined in Section III.

AGENCY/RESEARCH- COMMUNITY CONNECTION

The next phase in the funding process is disseminating the solicitations, processing the applications, and choosing the appropriate projects. This involves four steps: 1) the communication of the solicitation to the research community; 2) the evaluation of proposals; 3) peer review and 4) final selection of projects to be funded.

The request for proposals, during the Ewing period, was organized around three funding mechanisms (LEAA, 1979: 8-9): a) grants, which are the monetary awards made to institutions for pursuit of projects which contribute to the Institute's mission, b) contracts,

which are agreements by which the agency purchases clearly specified

services or products from outside sources, and c) cooperative

agreements, which are relatively new funding mechanisms designed

to provide greater flexibility in obtaining assistance for federal

agencies from external sources.

Once the appropriate funding mechanism has been decided for

a particular project and the solicitation is in final form, a

solicitation is widely disseminated through formal networks (e.g.,

The Federal Register, The Institute's Research Bulletin, and for

competitive contracts, the Commerce Business Daily) and informal

networks, including "old boy" networks, previous winners of, or

applications for, research and known "experts" in a particular field.

> Each program solicitation spells out the specific application
> and review procedures to be followed, and specifies the dead-
> line. Generally, Institute solicitations call for submission
> of concept papers or preliminary proposals (LEAA, 1978: 1).

Once the proposals are received,

> . . .the Institute obtains written reviews from in-house
> reviewers [for each proposal] and at least two—often
> three—outside experts drawn from the criminal justice and
> academic communities, research organizations, and private
> industry. Usually, reviews are obtained at the concept
> paper stage and again at the proposal state (LEAA, 1978:2).

The external review process by experts in a particular field is

called peer review. Unlike the National Science Foundation or NIMH

Center, which rely on so-called "good will" of the academic community,

NILECJ has a technical assistance contract, competitively bid, with

Public Research Corporation/Public Management System (PRC/PMS) to

perform staff work by managing a list of consultants. PRC pays

reviewers according to a preestablished schedule computed for number

of pages, length of time, travel, and other expenses. PRC maintains

a list of eligible names ("eligibles") compiled from their own

sources, recommendations of reviewers, and suggestions from NILECJ.

The consultations are available for use to review proposals for

grants and other services. When reviewers are needed, a project

monitor will request from PRC a list of eligibles and in return

receive a list reflecting a cross-section of the criminal justice

or other appropriate areas.

The introduction of the peer review process was intended to

implement a competitive process for allocating awards, which would

exclude pressures from outside interests as well as safeguard

against internal politics at Institute, Administration, and even

Congressional and Executive levels. The unsolicited research

program was established as a means of overcoming the influences of

a few persons or particular interests which might monopolize

programs or projects by tapping into an "old boy" system. The

unsolicited research program, according to one program officer, was

> . . .intended to meet the needs that were axed or forgotten
> when it became necessary as the result of the National Academy
> of Sciences report [i.e., White and Krislov] as the result
> of the bitching of the staff around here, that the solicita-
> tions that went out were too subject to manipulation. There
> was an old-boy system, and they /the solicitations/ always
> went to the same people, and they went to the friends of
> friends of friends, or whatever. .and when the National Academy
> of Science brought that out, it was a perfect time to make a
> more competitive arrangement, a competitive arrangement in that
> you publish a plan of action about what you're going to spend
> your money on, then put out solicitations, and that doesn't
> allow for innovative ideas to come in (CT: 74).

Although the unsolicited research program would not necessarily

deflect pressure group influence away from other areas of NILECJ

operations, it nonetheless was originally designed to circumvent not

only pressure groups, but perhaps over-powerful internal groups and

pressures as well. One ostensible affect of this process (especially

the peer review system) has been the prevention by agency from

utilizing a self-perpetuating system of reviewers or researchers.

Peer review, in particular, assures (in principle) an "objective"

selection from a wide range of academicians and practitioners and

is supposed to eliminate particularistic criteria and subjectivism

by assuring impartial choices of reviewers, but as shall be shown

in Section III, there is some room for discretionary activity and

penetration of personal biases or judgment.

The final phase in the funding process is the selection of the

successful proposals through staff consultation and negotiation

after receipt of peer reviewer comments and hierarchical ordering

of proposals. Five formal criteria ostensibly guide the decision

process (LEAA, 1978: 2).

1) Compatibility with the Institute's legislative mandate
2) Relationship to the Institute's plan and priorities set
   by the Attorney General and the LEAA administration
3) Originality, adequacy and economy of the research design
   and methods
4) Experience and competence of the principal investigator
   and staff
5) Probability of acquiring important new knowledge that
   advances the understanding of or the ability to solve
   critical problems relating to crime and the administra-
   tion of justice.

As in other phases of NILECJ activity, there is considerable

flexibility at this stage, despite these apparently formal criteria.

Once a proposal is selected for funding, it is forwarded to the

Director, who then sends it to the LEAA administrator for final sign-off.*

Within these more-or-less formal procedures, there remains considerable latitude for staff discretion. This general outline has provided a summary of the formal organizational procedures specifying how the funding process works. The next step is to examine how, in practice, these formal policies are carried out at each stage of the funding process.

SECTION II: STRUCTURAL MEDIATIONS: SLIPPAGE

An understanding of the formal structure and procedures of Institute operations is insufficient for understanding the operation or rationale of many Institute actions or decisions because of the operation of factors which mediate between formal structure (as state power) and actual Institute behaviors and activity (as state apparatus). Mediations here refer to the interposing of features of social interaction or social structure between formal Institute procedures (e.g., legislative mandate or explicit rules corresponding to formal rationalization of operating procedures) such that Institute procedures or individual activities are modified or transformed in a way that may contravene or circumvent formal rules, thus allowing for outcomes not intended by formal procedures. The concept of

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*Although the NILECJ Director will have sign-off authority under the currently-proposed legislation, at present the LEAA Administrator continues to have final sign-off responsibility. To sign-off simply means the signing of a project's papers in order to authorize release of funds for the project.

mediations allows for the analysis of nonorganizational features which

may impinge, often subtly and indirectly, upon Institute operations

in a way not amenable to other models of organizational analysis.[8]

Two concepts, slippage and loose coupling, seem particularly fruitful

for examining the structural and interactional features which may

generate sources of mediating influences which affect Institute

activity. The intent in this section is not to identify all possible

mediations, nor to develop a theory of model of mediations in

organizational analysis. The purpose is rather to illustrate how

two observed components of NILECJ funding activity, one the structural

features of the Institute derived from the agency's location within

a larger organizational framework, and the second largely contingent,

situational, particularistic and derived from choice-responses to

structural features based on social interaction, comes between the

official stated goals defined by state power, and the actual operation

of state apparatus. The emerging picture is one of a social process

shaped by structural sources which simultaneously allow for, and are

amenable to, penetration of influence of sources which neither state

power nor state apparatus are able to exclude, nor which are intended

to be excluded. The effect of such influences is to weaken the

formal mechanisms of state control, and this in turn creates

slippage at the structural level and loose-coupling at the inter-

actional level.

Slippage is used here as a metaphor to imply space between

structural features of an organization and its environment where

explicit rules are made inapplicable by the penetration of intervening factors.* Unlike loose-coupling, which implies connections which are flexible and not tightly maintained, slippage implies lack of connections which create an imperfect fit between state power and implementation of that power by state apparatus. The state loses its grip, or slips, so to speak, resulting in loss of control over activities by state power. The concept of slippage will facilitate an illustration of factors which mediate state power in three ways: 1) through an identification of interest or pressure groups that penetrate decision-making processes, 2) by identifying congressional and executive branch actions that are not the result of formal procedures and which serve to circumvent formal procedures, and 3) by examining the effects of the research community on decisions and policy.

A. Interest groups. The Institute itself does not seem to be directly pressured by organized interest groups, which operate instead mostly at congressional level. Formal groups which pressure the Institute indirectly at the congressional level include practitioners such as the International Association of Police Chiefs (IACP), National Rifleman's Association (NRA), American Bar Association (ABA), the United States Conference of Mayors, the National League of Cities, and other organizations which feel they have something to gain (or lose) by appealing in various ways to Congress, especially during authorization hearings, for consideration of their particular

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*It is not always clear whether these factors actually create slippage, or whether the slippage allows for such penetration. It is probably some of both.

interests. This also includes individuals representing a particular

constituency (e.g.., mayors, police chiefs, lawyers). Requests may

include funding for specific projects, more representation on the

of the Institute or its operations. For example, during House

Subcommittee on Crime Hearings on LEAA held in various cities in

February 1979, a steady parade of representatives from various

interest groups jockeyed for position in the power/resource lottery

and anticipated rewards forthcoming if the correct strategies were

presented.[9] An illustrative example of the operation of lobbyists

is reflected in the confirmation hearings of Norval Morris, Dean of

the University of Chicago Law School, before the Senate Judiciary

Committee hearings (28-29 September 1978). Chairing the hearing

was Utah Senator Orrin Hatch, considered one of the three most

conservative members of the Senate* (see, e.g., Scott, 1979: 2).

On the second day of testimony, Hatch had focused on Morris' contro-

versial belief that handguns should be controlled. After "setting up"

Morris with pointed questions and damaging commentary, Hatch called

on representatives from the NRA who denounced Morris' views on gun

control as described in Morris' work The Honest Politician's Guide

to Crime Control (Morris and Hawes, 1969), and vehemently opposed

Morris' nomination. Hatch then called on Glen D. King, executive

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*Hatch is also leader of the ultra-conservative Republican New
Right and member of the Congressional Advisory Board of New Voice,
a right wing religious lobby which believes that liberalism (such
as Morris') is unChristian (e.g., Detroit Free Press, 15 June 1979:
6A).

Director of IACP said that although he himself had misgivings, the IACP nonetheless supported Morris. King's hostility towards Morris' position was clear throughout his testimony, and when asked about Morris' work, King replied that he had not fully read the Morris book because he "had no time to read such fiction." Morris, a highly qualified criminal justice practitioner and member of the NILECJ Advisory Board, was not confirmed. The primary reasons, according to informants, was the hostility towards him by pressure groups and conservative senators.

If conservative interests are protected by some groups, citizens and community groups, though far less effective, are operating to counter such interests. Such groups, however, were probably marginally effective despite some successes.[10]

A second, less important influence from groups which may reflect special interests or particular political biases, derives from the criticisms of commissions, committees or other formal and quasi-formal bodies attached to, or sponsored by the government (e.g., National Academy of Science Report (White and Krislov, 1977); National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, 1976; National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, 1973; Mitre Corporation Reports, 1976). The LEAA-Sponsored White and Krislov study, for example, identified a variety of problems within the Institute, and these criticisms were used as the basis for specific changes made by Ewing and others during the Ewing phase.[11]

In sum, although the Institute is not, on the surface at least, surrounded and overwhelmed by lobbyists or interest groups, there are

powerful lobbyists which represent particular interests who operate
at the congressional level who are able to inject their needs,
indirectly or directly, into agency activity by influencing Congress
to shape LEAA/ NILECJ legislative mandate to meet these needs. This
also has an indirect effect on Institute personnel which affects
procedures, but this will be addressed in Section III.

   B. <u>Executive/Congressional mediations</u>. The Institute has,
during its existence, been shaped and influenced not only by
congressional intent, as reflected in codified legislation, but also
through the intercession both directly and indirectly, of the
discretionary behaviors of individuals in executive and congressional
branches of government. Not only through the threat of fiscal
restriction and statuatory revision, but also through indirect and
not always subtle threats, criticisms, or overt actions, Institute
personnel may alter their activity. Institute and non-Institute
personnel claimed that this had not been a serious problem since
the late Representative John Rooney had attempted to direct LEAA's
direction and mission, and the first impression most informants
tried to convey (although this was invariably later modified) was
that fiscal and legislative activity are the only "<u>real</u>" source of
congressional influence, and that "people on the Hill" are not
concerned about the activities of the Institute so long as it does
not generate any controversy or embarrassing programs. This last
qualification itself suggests a form of influence with explicit
political implications, but that notwithstanding, there appear to
be other sources of exerted influence from executive and congressional

levels not so obvious to Institute personnel. The current authorization proceedings are illustrative of how indirect influences might shape Institute operations. John Conyers, long an outspoken critic of LEAA, voiced general approval of LEAA and particularly the Institute during committee mark up* sessions for LEAA reauthorization (e.g., 26 April 1979). Conyers reminded participants during hearings the previous February that NILECJ had undergone such a transformation since its inception that he, for one, could now be counted among its supporters. Conyers was careful to specify, however, that he remains adamantly opposed to an agency that would function as a revenue-sharing device merely to shore-up an existing justice establishment. Conyers' remarks were taken by some Institute personnel to indicate a mandate for continuing what they described as innovative and unconventional research. On the other hand, the failure of President Carter's nominee, Norval Morris, for LEAA Administrator to be confirmed was felt by some to reflect a practical concern caused by the opposition of interest groups, that should LEAA become a forum for controversial ideas, or if agency resources already threatened by reduction, were to be spent debating issues rather than supporting research, it could destroy both LEAA and the Institute. This, some Institute persons felt, was a subtle reminder of the political limits on which occasionally impinged upon policy decisions, and clearly marked the risks involved in overstepping

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*A mark up session is the revising of a piece of legislation, line-by-line, in committee prior to putting that legislation before the House or Senate for final vote.

implicit rules which, to the politically astute bureaucrat, were as

clearly articulated (and subject to possible negative sanctions) as

official policy. One Institute "old-timer" was credited with saving

several newer staff members from "considerable loss of face" by

stopping a research solicitation that, although apparently "safe"

and addressing a timely and important topic, did not reflect

consideration of the possible reactions from Congress or the public:

> One of the people downstairs put out a solicitation on that
> topic, and one of the people up here who's been around for
> a long time said "no, no, no, you can't do this. I mean
> how absurd does that sound, LEAA is going to [do a study on
> this particular topic] which could be twisted and manipulated
> in a highly embarrassing manner].." That's how it would be
> translated (II: 1-11).*

Changes in the executive office may also mediate Institute

operations and create a source of politicization. The Institute had

not yet taken shape when Nixon took office in January 1969. Key

positions had not yet been filled, research projects had not yet

been implemented to provide a shape for policy-setting, and the

actual targets for research remained unclear. During the 1968

election, Nixon had campaigned on an anticrime platform, and the

emphasis on controlling crime was translated into reducing crime

rates, which in turn led to the implicit (though sometimes explicit)

interest throughout LEAA in developing programs designed to reduce

crime. But as former U.S. Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach

(1969: 7) has argued, there is no real connection between the rise

in street crime, the real problem, and other forms of civil disorder

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*This informant required that nothing be phrased that might
identify him as a source of information of any kind. Transcripts
available for inspection.

(e.g., civil rights and student protests) on which Nixon based much of his "law-and-order" campaigning. The dramatic and demogogic cry to stop the "crime wave" by Nixon and his Attorney General was directed largely at two groups: Political activists and the urban inner-city dwellers. Nixon's approach to crime was not aimed at correcting alleged politicay injustices, cleaning up slums or addressing the issues of poverty, but in locking up more malefactors. Nixon had argued:

> If the conviction rate were doubled in this country it would do more to eliminate crime in the future than a quadrupling of the funds for any governmental war on poverty (cited in Harris, 1969: 74).

Dramatizing the crime problem by alluding to social unrest, while also attempting to address problems of "street crime" had serious consequences for any agency caught up in this contradictory policy. In the early 1970s when the evaluation of such programs was attempted, it revealed a problem in the Institute:

> The interest in evaluation was encouraging, but it had unfortunate consequences for the development of the Institute: it hardened and intensified LEAA's commitment to the goal of directly controlling crime, even for the research program. It involved Institute staff in a lengthy and complex planning process using specific reductions in crime rates as perform-ance measures; and it produced sharp change in research and development (R&D) strategy (White and Krislov, 1977:19).

Nixon, then, shaped a research program characterized by two features. First was an emphasis on technology. Locking up criminals presupposed their capture, so funds were channeled into police technology and training programs which, it was believed, would facilitate the capture of felons who could then be removed from

the streets, making them safe.* Second, Nixon made Washington, D.C. the target of massive anticrime programs, using LEAA/NILECJ funds to address drug-related crime, violent crime, and other property-related crime that victimized primarily the middle-class, and targeted ghetto-poor as objects for control. In all, between 1969-1972, LEAA pumped $11,145,000 into crime control efforts in the capitol (see, e.g., Gude and Mannina, Jr., 1973).

It should not be inferred from this that Nixon's sole interest was in eliminating urban crime. Harris (1970: 166-68) has observed that two months after Nixon entered the White House, urban critics (e.g., the National League of Cities and the United States Conference of Mayers) accused the Nixon-appointed administration of siphoning funds from LEAA planning grants and diverting them into low-crime rural areas. Whether Nixon was attempting to use LEAA/NILECJ as a political instrument to repay southern senators for support during the 1968 election or whether this was an independent LEAA policy decision is difficult to determine at this point.

The point to be made here is that under the Nixon administration, as under Johnson's before him,[12] LEAA/NILECJ became a political football, and this shaped the direction and scope of Institute research by emphasizing a particular kind of research and ideology—technological and applied research, and a control-oriented ideology—while discouraging other types of research as well as ignoring other components of the criminal justice system. The NAS report (White and

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*The Watergate tapes suggest that some of Nixon's rhetoric on crime may also have reflected as much cynicism as political ideology.

Krislov, 1977. 177-78) cites congressional testimony illustrating
late representative John Rooney's hostility towards research, which
Institute personnel felt to be indicative of a significant number of
congressional personnel during the Nixon period. This tended to
politicize the Institute not only by generating particular types
of activity (e.g., emphasis on technological hardware) applicable to
crime control, but also excluded more-general research applicable
to other components of the criminal justice system. This politici-
zation also hindered the activities of the Institute director in
developing broad, innovative research programs.

Congressional political jockeying is also reflected in the
1968 tripartite leadership structure.[13] This _troika_ was prohibited
from action without the unanimous agreement of all three members,
which weakened not just LEAA by paralyzing decision-making and
inhibiting planning and policy-setting (e.g., Chelimsky, 1975), but
also discouraged the establishment of an effective research program
and created confusion among Institute personnel regarding both
policy and goals. Then LEAA administrator Charles Rogovin, describes
the problem:

> I had represented to [Institute Director Henry Ruth] that he
> could design his own research program and enjoy real freedom
> and flexibility in implementing it. I have rarely been more
> in error.
>
> Time and again Ruth's initiatives were frustrated by the
> disagreements among Velde, Coster (the associate administrators]
> and myself. Despite a wealth of experience in assessing the
> quality of research institutions and individuals during his
> service as Deputy Director of the Crime Commission and in
> academic life, he was second-guessed on every judgment. His
> selections for key staff positions in the Institute were debated
> endlessly and often without conclusion. For literally months,
> the man responsible for a multimillion dollar research budget
> could not get authority to make grants or enter into research
> contracts for any amount (1973: 18).

Rogovin also felt that the debates over "hardware vs. software" research mired the Institute down in near-fatal involvement in high technology research that failed to address the critical issues of crime and criminal justice. This high technology research was seen by Rogovin, in retrospect, to reflect political criteria:

> Perhaps my former colleague Richard Velde sensed the congressional winds most accurately. He always insisted that a long-range research program would have better prospects in the appropriations process if it had early and demonstrable hardware successes.

Perhaps Velde was able to sense Nixon's political wind and exploit it, but most informants shared the opinion of a former high-level LEAA official who suggested that although Velde was known as a good "political in-fighter," he was not adept as an LEAA leader:

> There is also the possibility that people who are very dull and stupid and arbitrary and status quo oriented can defeat [a number of reform-oriented acts or research ideas]. Velde, now, never wanted to change things much. He wanted things to be efficient. *

At any rate, Velde's tenure at LEAA was short. The executive office, through choice of appointments, unofficial suggestions and official pronouncements is able to guide the direction of the Institute. Former acting director Blair Ewing (1978: 271) explains one way this was done:

> The new National Administration which took office in January, 1977, made it clear from the beginning that it intended to reorganize LEAA, that it wished to support basic as well as applied research, that it wanted research to be useful as well as of high quality, and that it wanted to support civil as well as criminal justice research. The

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*For Velde's self-view, see Velde, 1975. Velde sees as his successes (e.g., emphasis on technology and police equipment and physical fitness programs for police) what others have identified as his failures.

President's Reorganization Project in OMB [Office of Management and Budget], the Attorney General, and LEAA have reached agreement on a reorganization plan for LEAA which will incorporate these kinds of changes.

When Nixon resigned and Ford took over, Ford retained Velde as

Administrator of LEAA.

But it was clear he was a dead duck and a lame duck or both. And as soon as Ford lost, Carter called up LEAA administrator Velde within a month or so. . .he actually had the Attorney General call Velde and fire him. He /i.e., Carter/ didn't even call him into his office, he didn't call him personally, he told Griffin Bell to fire Velde. Velde was fired. . . it was as quick and as neat as that (QN: 8-9).

One Institute program director suggested that Bell's hostility

towards LEAA may have been one major factor in contributing to the

decline of the technological orientation of research (and Velde's as

well). One example of technological R&D often used by critics of

LEAA is the "shooting shoe," allegedly developed to enable police

to have a secret weapon of sorts, a pistol, in the toe of their

shoe that could be triggered in an emergency. This was largely a

myth created for political reasons according to one program director:

Before I became involved in the Institute there may have been an emphasis on technology which no longer exists. Velde's shoe and the [bulletproof] vest, these are legitimate. . . But the [shooting] shoe? No, no. . .it was never [begins laughing] it was never designed [begins laughing harder, almost uncontrollably]. . .it was never designed to [raises foot to hip level] bang! bang! bang! It was never designed to do that. No. But it was designed to have removable pads to go climbing up Mount Everest, or some place, God! Bell was antishoe, and he used the case of the shooting shoe in his criticisms of the Institute and LEAA* (EG/ 19-5).

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*Informants with a sense of LEAA history suggested that the "shooting shoe" was not created by Bell, but used by him to attack Velde. Other informants suggested that Bell knew Velde would be leaving without being fired, and that Bell may have wanted to embarrass Velde as much as possible before the departure.

Bell's antagonism to Velde's technological emphasis was seen as the "writing on the wall," so to speak, and for some, marked the beginning of the deemphasis of technology, which became a formal deemphasis later on.

A former NILECJ officer explained how political and internal bickering can mediate Institute practices by creating an environment which may hinder or facilitate director activity:

> Caplan, interestingly enough, was a Democrat, but had been appointed to a whole series of jobs by the Republicans, and the new administration felt uncomfortable with that apparently, because they did not ask him to leave immediately, but it was clear that there was an expectation that he should leave once he'd arranged for some other position. They wouldn't press him, but on the other hand, in early February there appeared in the office a fellow named [X] appointed with the expectation that he would take over as the director of the Institute and he was assigned to Jerry Caplan but in effect he didn't work for Jerry Caplan. He was sort of Jerry Caplan's replacement. And so time passed and finally in March, Caplan decided it was time to leave. . .when he left, the administration apparently was not prepared to appoint [X] immediately and so [Ewing] was named acting director. By the time [Ewing] had left, Caplan and Ewing had worked well together. Caplan's view at this juncture was that Ewing had undertaken to begin to manage the place because in the last couple of months he was there, Caplan wasn't managing it. . .He was out for a time, and Ewing had taken over, and Caplan was withdrawing gradually and when he left he recommended that Ewing be named the director and that [X] not be named the director, and that [X] should be pulled out of there. The LEAA Administrator told Ewing to put [X] to work, so he gave him a series of tasks to do which was extremely awkward since he was likely to be Ewing's boss. [X] didn't perform on those, and when pressure was applied to the Attorney General in the summer to appoint [X] as Director of the Institute, the response was basically that he wasn't performing and that he [i.e., the acting LEAA Administrator] certainly would not wish him to be appointed as director of the Institute, so he wasn't and he left the agency. So when Ewing took over, it wasn't clear at all that he was going to be there very long as acting director, but as it turned out, he was there 23 months, longer than all of the others with one exception. It was unclear as to whether he had a mandate to run the place or whether he was a caretaker, and by the time [X] left, it became clear that Ewing would be running the place, and was to restructure it. (26: 5-5)

The difficulties the directors faced, then, beginning with
Henry Ruth and continuing through the Carter appointees, have
continued to be largely infused with internal and external political
bickering. White and Krislov (1977: 8) note that during the Nixon
years:

> Whether reporting to a hostile Congress or to a divided LEAA,
> administration [under the mixed-party troika], the early
> directors had a political rather than a research task. This
> characterization of the role of the Institute directors
> varies only in degree, never in kind, throughout the history
> of the Institute.

The current acting director, Harry Brattin, is the seventh
Institute director in twelve years, and the current debates over
the form of the restructuring of LEAA and the Institute indicate
that it may be a few years before the Institute benefits from
steady leadership at the director level.

The point here is that one primary source of mediation is
in part ideological, in part structural. Whatever the intent of
the legislative mandate, it is politicized by both the executive
office (especially the President and Attorney General).* By
shaping the direction of the Institute either through direct
pressures such as favored projects (e.g., Nixon and his emphasis
on a) technological anticrime equipment and b) projects targeted
for Washington, D. C., or through specific appointments of personnel
(e.g., John Mitchell as Attorney General), executive discretion

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*There was no evidence to indicate that the Justice Department,
particularly the FBI, were at all involved in attempts at politiciza-
tion, contrary, for example, to Chelimsky (1975) who suggested that
some competition and interference might be forthcoming from other
agencies within the Justice Department, particularly the FBI.

Figure 1: **LEAA Administrators and NILECJ Directors, 1968-79:**

(Leadership Discontinuity in the Department of Justice Program)[1]

	Attorneys General of the U.S. Department of Justice	Administrators of Law Enforcement Assistance Administration	Directors of National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice
1968	Ramsey Clark		
1969	John Mitchell (1/69-3/72)	Patrick Murphy (10/68-3/69) Charles Rogovin (3/69-6/70)	Ralph Siu (10/68-3/69)** Robert Emerich (3/69-7/69)* Henry S. Ruth (7/69-5/70)
1970		Richard W. Velde (6/70-4/71)*	Irving L. Slott (5/70-8/71)*
1971		Jerris Leonard (4/71-3/73)	Martin B. Danziger (8/71-2/72* 2/72-7/73)
1972	Richard G. Kleindienst (3/72-6/72*,6/72-5/73)		
1973	Elliott L. Richardson (5/73-10/73) Robert Bork (10/73-12/73)*	Donald Santarelli (3/73-8/74)	Harry A. Scarr (7/73-10/73)* Gerald M. Caplan (10/73-5/77)
1974	William B. Saxbe (12/73-2/75)	Richard W. Velde (9/74-2/77)	
1975	Edward M. Levi (2/75-1/77)		
1977-79	Griffin B. Bell (1/77-9/79) Benjamin R. Civiletti (9/79-present)	James M. H. Gregg* (3/77-10/78) Henry S. Dogin (10/78-3/79* 3/79-present)	Blair Ewing* (5/77-3/79) Harry Bratt* (4/79-present)

*Served in either acting or unconfirmed capacity
**Siu was also Associate Administrator of LEAA

[1]Sources: Richard A. Rettig (1976), unpublished manuscript, RAND Corporation, Washington, D.C.; Hammond Almanac, Signet (1979), New York; LEAA Public Information Office, Washington, D.C.

can exploit the slippage between the agency and its environment in
a way that allows mediation of formal rules and structure.

Further, the lack of steady leadership subverts Institute
effectiveness by removing program continuity and creating a
situation laden with ambiguity and uncertainty for Institute
personnel. This leads to a situation where no long-term policies
are or have been established, and no precedents set to facilitate
operations when formal rules seem inapplicable. This does, however,
create loose-coupling, which in the case of the Institute, provides
for more individual discretion than might otherwise occur.

INTERNAL STRUCTURE

There are other more general features of the Institute which
can mediate state power and state apparatus. For example, prior
to the Ewing phase, the Institute had been strongly practitioner-
oriented, in part because of the political preferences which
dominated during the Nixon administration, and in part because of
the lack of respect of many scholars for NILECJ and its work.
Ewing felt that the Institute, because it lacked any clear constit-
uency, should build upon the research community, and saw as one
of his primary goals the need to remove the hostility that criminal
justice researchers were perceived to feel towards the Institute.
Ewing felt

> The only thing approaching a constituency that the National
> Institute had was a group of interested agency professionals,
> police chiefs and so forth, but that's very small and they're
> very fickle. One of the things I set out to do was to create
> a constituency and the only constituency that's really likely

> for a research agency is a research constituency, primarily,
> but not exclusively, located in the academic world, so we began
> very active courting with the academic world and there's, of
> course, a very fine line between courting and prostitution.
> I think we successfully walk that line on the side of courting.
> (BE: 4:68)

Structural changes which led to stronger Institute academic
community links included the introduction of the peer review process
and other highly-visible attempts to integrate researchers more
directly into the operation of the Institute (e.g., an advisory
board, and workshops, which existed prior to Ewing, but were used
more effectively by him). During the Ewing period, the division of
labor and specific job requirements were more tightly assigned and
personnel became responsible for fulfilling their assigned tasks.
The tasks may be defined formally or loosely, but personnel were
required to "do the job." This was credited not only with improving
morale, but also with encouraging interaction of Institute personnel
both with each other and with outside researchers. This may have
contributed to the flexibility of staff by providing an opportunity
to develop individual projects and pursue private studies one
afternoon a week, both of which may have led to a deeper apprecia-
tion for, and closer ties with, researchers, both at personal and
at collegial levels.

The addition of a staff of Ph.D.s. transformed the Institute
from what was described as one of professional bureaucrats (charac-
terizing the first half-decade, especially under Nixon), and criminal
justice practitioners, to academically-trained personnel from a
variety of disciplines, and created an ambiance of theoretical,

methodological and thematic sophistication that the Institute had

previously lacked. This change in personnel may, in part, account

for the self-stated personal mission expressed by many to "advance

science." It might be assumed that research-oriented Ph.D.s may

be inclined to follow the norms of the research community rather

than the norms of law enforcement and control practitioners. The

introduction of student aides and multi-year graduate interns also

contributed to a change in mood and orientation by bringing in

"fresh blood" for the purpose of continuously infusing new ideas

and for developing a more collegial atmosphere.

Another less direct mediating structural factor involves what

O'Connor (1973) has identified as a symptom of the on-going fiscal

crisis of the state. The Institute employee union, LEAA local 2830,

has been fighting for more staff funding and benefits, and for

higher salaries and better recruitment policies (see, e.g., Senate

Hearings, 13 March 1979: 9), arguing that this would improve morale,

thus improving performance. The point to be made here is that the

Institute personnel, as members of society, are subject to the

same pressures and conflicts as other societal members. Thus, the

Institute, through the social actions of its members (e.g., in

struggling for worker benefits the same as other members of the

working class) are taking part in the kinds of activity that

generate larger—in this case fiscal—crises. This occurs because

increased employee and other benefits require larger allocations for

personnel, or else reductions in agency size and operations. This

contributes, according to O'Connor's cogent thesis, to rising costs

of maintaining both state power and state apparatus, which in turn

generates further conflicts in instrumental functionability and

social legitimacy, for example. The point here is that mediations

occur on a number of levels, and a complete analysis of the Institute's

activity must also include an understanding of the larger social

processes in which state power becomes mediated by human activity,

to include the participants within state apparatus.

STRUCTURE OF THE RESEARCH COMMUNITY

The work of the Institute is in many ways limited by the composi-

tion and structure of the academic community. The degree to which a

particular research area is shaped by the state of the field is

illustrated by the evolution of the Collective Disorder Project

which evolved out of a January 1978, workshop on collective violence.

The questions, approaches and general orientations were discussed by

the participants who represented a variety of criminal justice

specialties, and Robert Shellow (1978: 111-112) reminded the partici-

pants that collective violence research could proceed in two directions:

a) either announcing that general proposals would be solicited on

collective disorders, in which case there would be a general reflec-

tion of the state of the field, or b) soliciting researcher proposals

that would expand specific areas of collective disorder research.

In either case, the proposals would be limited by a lack of development

since, in his (and others) opinion it was an underdeveloped area. His

point was that in either case, the limitations of the field constrained

the options open to the Institute in identifying specific needs, other

than the general one of expanding existing literature, empirical limits
or theoretical analysis.

The theoretical development, the normative structure of the
practitioners and the manner in which questions are formulated and
inquiry procedures designed as well as the purposes for which research
results are intended, as well as who is doing the research all serve
to shape the kinds of knowledge that is sponsored. Even though the
Institute may solicit specific topics or veto the final proposals or
modify research procedures, the actual research proposals come from
the research community. Current fads, unpopular theories, and innova-
tive new developments of research may reflect normative procedures
of scientific activity, discourse, and dissemination (see, e.g., Merton,
1968; Cole, 1970; Cole et al., 1978; McCartney, 1970; McKee, 1967;
Smigel and Ross, 1970; Stehr and Larson, 1972; Chase, 1970; Beyer,
1978; Pfeffer, Leong and Strehl, 1977). Although some approaches may
be encouraged or retarded by Institute procedures, or by funding or
lack of it, the structure of the state of knowledge within the
research community itself is the ultimate source of the tools of
knowledge production, including the fundamental ideas of basic research
as well as the methodological and interpretative frameworks employed:

> . . .we're subject to the same fads that occur in the academic
> community. In the academic community there's a dissatisfaction
> with rehabilitation, there's an interest in incapacitation and
> deterrence research, and a growing interest in biosocial correlates
> of crime and delinquency. And you know, this has an impact on our
> program [by overrepresenting these topics and appropriate
> methodologies]. . . .there has been a growing sophistication
> in methodology and statistics, and that has had an impact on us.
> We become much more methodologically oriented, far more method-
> ologically sophisticated (QM: 1-2/45-6).

The Institute is often criticized by outsiders for not funding radical researchers, and it is usually assumed this is because of an ideological bias of the Institute, or reflects the bias of state power. There may be some truth in this criticism, but it seems to be tempered somewhat by the claim shared by several program officers that "We're hungry for good Marxist analyses." This may or may not reflect the attitudes of other officers, but another staffer accounted for the lack of Marxian-sponsored research by alluding to its lack of empirical development within the criminal justice field and the relatively few Marxian practitioners in the area. It was also suggested that the few Marxian-oriented researchers engaged in criminal justice research were either unwilling to apply or simply did not feel that such research could be found acceptable by the Institute.

Informants consistently acknowledged that the most exciting research being done was by radical and critical research, although they conceded that a proposal examining strategies intended to "smash the state" would most likely not be funded, but they continually stressed that "deviance pays," in that research raising new questions and posing new solutions is highly sought, but difficult to find. There was general agreement that the Institute was correctly perceived as supporting research that might be labelled "conservative" in that it supported a) traditional modes of examining a problem, and b) did not seriously challenge the existing status quo of criminal justice. But they consistently argued that this conservatism was not so much a reflection of Institute ideology (although its true more so of LEAA,

but this, they suggested, could be because most support and input

came from state planning agencies rather than from LEAA-instigated

programs), but rather reflected the conservative nature of the field

in general, and the social relations among researchers and between

researchers and criminal justice practitioners.

In sum, whatever the source of the ideology of Institute-

sponsored research, it seems that it is not located solely within

the Institute, and that the research community itself mediates

between that knowledge which is solicited and that which is ultimately

produced.

CONCLUSION

In sum, formal procedures and rules are mediated by a variety

of structurally-located factors, only a few of which have been

identified and tentatively described here. The targeting of research

areas and the selection of research proposals particularly are

subject to the penetration of influences which are not located within

formal Institute procedures (e.g., operational rules) or within the

source of Institute mandate (e.g., state power). Two generalizations

might be drawn: First, there is considerable potential because of

slippage between the Institute and its environment for policization

of research to occur other than as a direct result of state power.

Second, if politicization of research does occur, these slippage

areas, as possible sources, must be incorporated into an appropriate

analytic framework. The preceding analysis focused on factors at

the structural level which might impinge upon, and thereby shape,

Institute activity. It remains to be seen whether Institute behaviors
themselves are direct expressions of the state power it ostensibly
serves, or whether Institute behavior itself serves to mediate
the state research connection.

SECTION III: INTERACTIONAL MEDIATIONS: LOOSE-COUPLING

INTRODUCTION

Karl Weick (1976: 1) has observed that the primary questions in
organizational analysis continue to be "how does an organization go
about doing what it does, and with what consequences for its people,
processes, products, and persistence?":

> . . .the answers say essentially that an organization does
> what it does because of plans, intentional selection of means
> that get the organization to agree upon goals, and all of this
> is accomplished by such rationalized procedures as cost benefit
> analysis, division of labor, specified areas of discretion,
> authority invested in the office, job descriptions, and a
> consistent evaluation and reward system. The only problem with
> the portrayal is that it is rare in nature.

If the argument in the preceding section was successful, then
it should be clear that slippage between the Institute and its
authorizing and public environments (the latter including both
researchers and the constituency, including practitioners and society)
generates ambivalence, contradiction and especially ambiguity in
rules and procedures. This creates a second set of factors that
mediate between formal Institute policies and actual application of
rules to specific situations. These factors are the individual
behaviors and activities of Institute personnel which derive from
discretionary opportunities and correspond to subjective rationality.
Subjective rationality refers to those processes which are guided

by strategies, policies, justifications and behaviors which charac-
terize an act of thought and reveal intelligent insights into the
components of a given situation as seen contextually (see, e.g.,
Manning, forthcoming), but do not necessarily correspond to, or even
reflect, consistency with formal procedures established by either
state power or formal Institute apparatus. The activities shaping
these processes are derived less directly from the structure of the
Institute, and depend on the situated activities of Institute
personnel. These include 1) the specific features of interaction
as they affect funding of the Institute, 2) Institute personnel and
the day-to-day interaction frameworks which they construct, 3) the
rationalizations and justifications for nonroutinized behaviors as
well as the processes for restructuring routine rules and behaviors,
and 4) the division of labor fragmentation of authority, and the
thrashing-out processes which occur because of limited resources
and political realities.

The working assumption of this section recognizes that the
specific structure of an organization both confines and defines the
behaviors and choices or organizational participants, but also
recognizes that slippage between the meaning of formal rules and
the actual methods of implementing those rules creates a situation
allowing for a wide range of individual flexibility and discretion.
This chapter is informed by both dialectical and negotiated order
perspectives. The advantage of integrating a negotiated order model
with a dialectical model is that it facilitates the identification of
mediating features of an organization by articulating the effects
of individual behaviors that might otherwise remain hidden. But rather

than focus on what Goffman (1972: 84-88) has called <u>situated activity</u> <u>systems</u>, which examine, but do not transcend, the complexities of face-to-face interaction and concrete content of individual behaviors, a broader framework is needed that can encompass interaction as it affects organizational outcomes. In contrast to the <u>visible</u> policy statements of an organization which create the structural context for individual behavior (and were discussed in Sections I and II), the <u>invisible</u> policies, that is, those <u>sub</u> <u>rosa</u> rules which supplement, facilitate or contravene the formal organizational rules must be integrated into analysis. Unlike formal policies, which may be identified by examining organizational documents, formal operating procedures or authorizing legislation of funding agencies, the informal operations are what Gusfield (1975: 4) has described as immediate, local and situational. Documentary analysis provides a background against which to identify the formal rules governing behaviors of organizational participants, but such an examination cannot identify the actual <u>practices</u> which may circumvent those rules. An interactional approach becomes useful for two reasons. First, it will supplement the content analysis of the next chapter by suggesting ways in which Federal funding policies might be modified by individual practices, thus mediating the state-research connection. Second, it will help clarify the sources of funding policies and help identify sources at the interactional level, that might allow for the politicization of funded research. One useful concept for a dialectically-grounded negotiated order approach is that of <u>loose-coupling</u>.

LOOSE-COUPLING

Loose-coupling (e.g., Weick, 1976; Manning, 1979) may be useful

to illustrate the degree to which individual discretion in interpre-

tion of organizational policies occur. Loose-coupling refers to

decisions, behaviors, policies, and the like, which are made in

that grey area between organizational interdependence and individual

autonomy. The concept of loose-coupling is a metaphor that maintains

the structural connection between individual and organizational

behavior while preserving the phenomenological linkage between

behaviors and organizational environment. Loose-coupling allows for

analysis that retrieves the subject of analysis while simultaneously

not losing the object. It allows for the examination of organiza-

tional activity as human activity, rather than as abstract systems of

rationality or as objective systems interacting with other systems.

Although the concept itself is largely sensitizing and a-theoretical,

it is amenable to incorporation within a theoretical framework, thus

making the concept more powerful than a mere sensitizing device.

Loose-coupling conveys the image that coupled events, such as

congressional suggestions that community crime prevention become

a research focus, and a corresponding Institute solicitation for

such research, such as the project on domestic disorder, are

responsive and interdependent, but that each event preserves a certain

independence and preserves also ontological and logical individuality

(e.g., Weick, 1976: 3).

The intent here is neither to expand nor develop a loose-coupling

model. Its methodological relevance is accepted and loose-coupling

is borrowed in order to map out a description of the coupling elements within the Institute's research-funding processes. Rather than focus solely on "tight-coupling," that is, on technical rules and systems of formal authority, loose-coupling necessitates focusing on the manner through which participants in an organization construct a "social reality," molding formal rules through negotiation and interaction to create a social order appropriate to their situation. This section will present selected illustrative examples of loose-coupling in order to examine the connection between Institute staff and the larger agency (LEAA) structure, and at a higher level of abstraction, the state (Federal) apparatus. By examining how individuals within the Institute actually <u>do</u> Institute work, it becomes possible to identify <u>sources</u> <u>of</u> <u>mediations</u> which occur as the result of loosely connected points between NILECJ and various features of its operation. The discussion will proceed by focusing on 1) goal establishment, 2) budget setting, 3) implementation of research and 4) the research-community-NILECJ connection.

1. <u>Institute goal establishment</u>. Especially during the Blair Ewing phase, the Institute, through its official literature and rhetoric presented itself as an agency that relied on a formalized set of goals externally shaped by a variety of sources. There is limited opportunity for Institute personnal to have significant impact on structuring of formal goals of the Institute, if not actual mandate, and particular individuals may even have minimal input either through informally offering suggestions to influential persons with whom they are in contact, or through testimony at congressional hearings.

However, although the Institute's goals are formally set by the congressional and executive branches of government, the NILECJ director does retain wide latitude in setting organizational goals (see below) and by various committees appointed to suggest policy.* Such policy-advising committees, judging by the recommendations reflected in their minutes and by the subsequent legislation, are highly effective in shaping the organizational structure and mission of the Institute.

2. <u>Budget</u>. It is easy to overemphasize the importance of fiscal policies, so it must be understood that there is absolutely no evidence to indicate that the size of a grant reflects the importance of a project or the quality of research. Fiscal matters do, however, reflect features of Institute interaction. Because the Institute's budget is a fixed sum set by law, there is virtually no opportunity for NILECJ staff to upwardly adjust the size of their fiscal pie. There is little apparent squabbling internally over funds, and many staff, in fact, feel somewhat uneasy even about increasing the yearly allotment, and one program director summed up the feeling shared by most informants:

> There are a lot of people around here, and I'm one, who's not
> in favor of more money than what we have, and I'm not concerned
> if we keep what we have or even reduce it slightly. I think
> that as the organization gets too large, things get messed up.
> Right now, we get about $23 million, and I'm in favor of keeping
> it there, and letting inflation have the effect of reducing how
> much we can do. By letting inflation have its impact, we can

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*It should be remembered that the NILECJ advisory board is not a policy-setting board, and in its official capacity acts only on matters presented to it, thus making its <u>de jure</u> (though not necessarily <u>de facto</u>) role a-symmetrical.

limit ourselves to high quality in a few areas rather than poor
quality in a lot of areas. Maybe among administrators, the budget
stuff and [golden fleece awards] are fiscal threats. But maybe
the rest of us are concerned about getting a "bum rap," about
getting the image that all of what we do is garbage (QM: 35).

The awareness that increased budgets can lead to operational

problems which could in turn result in personal criticisms against

program directors or administrative headaches (e.g., monitoring large

projects with inadequate mechanisms or staff), is a common theme among

informants, and suggests that there may occur here a low-level mediat-

ing mechanism. The lack of aggressive fighting or planning for higher

budgets or of not encouraging multi-year labor-intensive, high-capital

projects, suggests that there is at least an ambivalence regarding

budget. This suggests that even should Institute personnel feel

budget increases are necessary, there is no unanimity regarding the

necessity or desirability of such increases, let alone a feeling that

increased budgets will generate increased research quality.

A division is relatively free to distribute resources on any

combination of projects of varying sizes, thus allowing for some fiscal

discretion. Within divisions, informants consistently deny significant

"in-fighting," or operational jealousy over the distribution of funds

for a particular project. Informants agree that the following corres-

ponds to how the allocation meetings between divisions usually proceed:

[After deciding that general topics shall coincide with the
priority areas] we decide whether it's worthwhile or not—when
the planning begins for all the groups, what's planned for in
dollar figures far exceeds what we know will be real, and any
arguments, decisions, and so forth, then begin. We pare it down
to the figure that it has to be pared down to—we know what the
limit is, and dividing up each year by precedent. It works down
in the planning process (s/4/14).

The individual responses occurring during this group negotiation process are viewed by informants as being motivated by a variety of factors, including ego-investment (personal commitment to a particular program or issue), political acuity (self-serving projects designed for personal advance, for ideological expression or to avoid "boat rocking"), awareness of Institute needs and goals, or by political or ideological perspectives. Negotiation also occurs within divisions:

> Say there was a project that we wanted to do this next fiscal
> year, but our money was cut back and we had to postpone it,
> then we put that back in for consideration. Then there are a
> bunch of project spaces, and we discuss our focus in each
> research area, and decide we want to divide up the money
> and do something in each subarea on violent crime or white
> collar crime, or environmental crime prevention (MN/7).

There are two points here. First, the internal distribution of funds is made informally by staff rather than by predefined rules of distribution which mandate specific funds for specific projects, and second, that the rationale is negotiated according to recommendations and preferences of Institute staff, not by state power. In other words, the funds targeted for specific research areas are largely contingent upon staff ideology, perspectives, understandings and meanings as well as upon formal rules of state power or apparatus. An Institute veteran described the rationale that had occurred in a recent division budget meeting:

> Now if I have a $2 million budget to work with this year, and
> the administrator says to the police division with a $2 million
> budget, "Why don't you take $500,000 of that money and give it
> to Joe Doaks, or he says, because he's much more politically
> astute, he might say,, "I want it to go for a particular type
> of research," which might earmark it for Joe Doaks. That
> means the police division now only has one-and-a-half million
> to work with, so you propose a number of things you would like
> to do. Some of them would maybe not fit, you just couldn't
> get bosses to buy off on. They either do not agree that it is

important which is a legitimate professional disagreement, or they think that it would somehow be damaging to the reputation of the organization because it's risky research and that it's not money well spent. That could also be considered a legitimate professional disagreement. So you have a pot of money and you have a lot of projects you decide to do. Well, now all of a sudden you've found which projects you can work in, and you start dividing up the money. Well, it depends on what state you're at in that particular subject. If you were going to look at response time, for example, and no one had done any work in response time before, and when you want to do the piece of work, you find that the only valid way of measuring those times are to put an observer in the car for a long period of time, and that automatically means that the project is going to eat up a lot of money, because that costs. If, for example, at this stage in time, you were going to do some more work on response time, it might not have to cost as much as it did originally because we have a massive body of data looking at response time. A good amount of money could probably be spent on doing secondary analysis. This becomes a much-less expensive project, just because of the methodology of doing it, what you have to do to get the information you need. Then you have some pieces of work where you're not sure where you want to go. You think it's important, but you're not going to stick $500,000 for a piece of work that, who knows what we're going to do with it. I mean, really it could end up a great thing or a complete bust. So you do conceptual pieces, work that is more conceptual in nature. And it's maybe the the type of armchair philosophizing or secondary analysis of existing data. . .Let's pull all the literature together and see what it has to say———this becomes a lost less expensive, and it could be a very profitable project. You could come up with something. You could consider from the very beginning that it was an important thing to be done, that it was the necessary first step, and the necessary first step was not something that you wanted to or could spend a lot of money on because of the nature of the problem, a very important problem. It just happens that you can do a very important part of the work on that problem for $100,000 instead of $1 million. There's different ways of looking at allocations and justifications expenditures. (CT:82)

This suggests that many of the factors underlying financing and selecting research projects are practical and pragmatic. It also suggests that the amount of funds expended on a given project is not an adequate indicator of the degree of commitment to a research project or area. The application of an intensity index (e.g., NAS

Standards and Goals, 1976: 20) as a measure of the commitment of an

agency was criticized by agency personnel. An intensity index is

believed to measure the relative importance of projects in relation

to one another by calculating the ratio of expenditures on a

particular project or category of R&D to the total agency research

expenditures, thus providing an index to agency ideology, intentions,

or goals:

> Because we invest $5 million in one project and $1 million in
> another, this doesn't mean that we favor or think that the big
> project is more important, because very often it could be
> exactly the opposite. The sum does not represent priority.
> The sum represents the dollar figure that we figure is needed
> to get the job, the research job, accomplished (EG: 72).

Another program director was more explicit:

> If you take an index like that and use it as you measure, it's
> measuring mixed reality. I mean, the administration's priorities,
> and interplay with the agency's priorities, and interplay with
> the institute's priorities which are somewhat different from
> the agency's. . .I mean they're interested in research, and the
> agency is interested in action. That's an index of a lot of
> interplay of decision makers. (CT:83)

And again:

> It's unfair to take a strict budget. . .I mean, we live in a
> political environment, we operate in a political environment,
> and you just can't take a budget and think it's important.
> I mean, there are different levels. There's the administrator
> and what the administrator considers priorities, what the
> administration considers priorities, and what the institute
> director considers priorities. Then there's the working people,
> and what they consider priorities. They might agree. In all
> likelihood, they do not agree!!

There are two points to be made here. First, budget allocations,

either within an office or a division, or between projects and programs

within a division, are not seen by personnel as objective, unproblematic

indices of either the significance of a research area or of an agency

or of staff commitment to a topic or area. This suggests that

interpretation of agency goals or intentions based on budget or funding ratios may be neither accurate nor adequate. It is the underlying situational definitions imputed to a project, as well as the project's significance to, and impact upon, the research and practitioner community, which are more important than an expenditure ratio.

Second, this indicates a variety of elements that reflect the loosely coupled connections between state power and state apparatus which are capable of mediating allocation of funds. Further, although staff is limited by budgetary contraints, these constraints do not prevent specific topics from being addressed, nor does budget appear to be a methodological or ideological constraint in selection of research topics. It is fully possible, as several staff have done, to implement complex research on a variety of topics by developing specific strategies that will allow research to be conducted within budget constraints. Budget limitations may be circumvented by a variety of methods in order to accomplish research goals, and budget need not necessarily limit the creative program officer from pursuing a particular topic.

In sum, the interplay between a host of factors must be examined before the significance of a particular project or series of projects can be identified. The most important of these factors seems to be the negotiation processes that occur at various stages of decision-making between program officers and other staff who develop ideas and between officers and division/office directors, and on up the administrative ladder.

3. Implementation of Research. In this state of Institute activity occurs the greatest flexibility and individual discretion.

There are three processes which occur at this stage. <u>First</u>, research areas are identified. This process most directly connects Institute personnel to formal goals and priorities. <u>Second</u>, the drafting and dissemination of solicitations involves interaction between Institute personnel and offers access to a variety of personal elements which may politicize research in accord with the personal style of the persons writing up the solicitation. <u>Third</u> is the review and selection of proposals which connects personnel in the Institute to research practitioners. Here, particularly, loose-coupling mediates the state/research connection.

    a. <u>Identification of institute priorities and research areas</u>. Personal considerations and individual interpretation of goals are a major source of specific research projects. Prior to the Ewing phase, it was felt that "Caplan had funded all his friends. He denied money to his enemies." This setup, an old-boy system according to informants, not only discouraged many academics from applying, but also created narrow topic areas. Informants and institute policy documents reveal that the director, given the authority and mandate from the LEAA administrator, is able to reorganize a variety of Institute structural features which in turn affect the selection process (see Section II). The changes of Ewing, for example, were credited with changing the operation of staff in two ways. First, Ewing emphasized basic research which encouraged staff to develop a less immediate view towards the impact of results of research:

> Basic research was very much encouraged in the last couple
> years, which it should have been, because it took us that
> long to really believe that we could do basic research,
> because we were so sure before that the government would
> never approve any basic research, that we didn't even try (QN: 6).

The <u>structural</u> changes implemented at the discretion of the
director had <u>interactional</u> consequences at the level of the staff
operation. The emphasis on basic research not only freed staff
from a perceived set of criteria required by "government" which
constrained what could and couldn't be done, but weakened the
connection between state power and state apparatus by (a) allowing
more staff discretion, and (b) removing the perceived narrow focus
of applied research with relatively more explicit definition, and
expanded the nature of research to include projects which could not
be as easily evaluated as applied (in that the results were less
immediately tangible). It also led to a shift in Institute focus
from the state as primary client to the research community and its
corresponding scientific and professional norms. In addition, this
created considerably more latitude for individual discretion by
opening up new potential constituency and new research areas, formerly
perceived as closed, which allowed for considerable mediation of the
selection process.

Further, program officers, as members of the public, felt free
to allow this membership to suggest topics. As members of an informed
public, many had definite positions regarding the direction and focus
of criminal justice research which they attempted to integrate into
research areas. Informants, with few exceptions, self-identified
themselves and the Institute as liberal or progressive, and suggested
that their personal values and ideology shaped the preferences of
topics, methodology and theoretical orientations. They also suggested
that government research might be methodologically positivistic or

ideologically conservative because of the dominant inquiry systems
and state of the field in the social sciences. Staff would feel
more proclivity for research traditions in which they had been
trained rather than new interpretative analytic models, and would
thus tend to reflect their own intellectual backgrounds rather than
these newer models which usually required a period of time before
influencing bureaucratic agencies.

The latitude available to institute personnel, then, from
director through division operatives, creates an individualized
interpretive schema that mediates formal rules. This occurs on a
variety of levels, two common ones being a) the view of the mandate
that guides action, and b) interpretation of specific policies.
Prior to the Ewing period, the Institute staff lacked the degree of
flexibility that was developed under Ewing. There was little
opportunity to develop research projects as proposals, since
proposals were submitted unsolicited. There lacked the formal and
informal links with the research community to the extent that were
developed under Ewing. There was no encouragement for individual
initiative in development of individual staff projects or self-
development of staff capabilities, and there was no effort to initiate
innovative research because of a general personnel malaise. Those
and other features of the pre-Ewing period have been summarized both
in the White and Krislov report (1977) and in congressional testimony
(e.g., DISPAC, 1977).

One result of this flexibility is that Institute personnel may
have available to them the perogative of interpreting policy. One

program officer defined the Institute mandate of crime control in his

own terms, as making the criminal justice system more effective and

fair, and viewed "control" only in the loosest possible sense, and

"crime was expanded to include research concepts themselves, as well

as wider definitions (white collar and environmental, for example),

and alternative solutions to crime problems that extended beyond

the typical "offender" focus. Another program officer viewed the

mission of the Institute as

> . . .advancing the state of practice by advancing the state of
> knowledge. This can be done by encouraging people to work, or
> to inquiry, in certain areas. . .so the Institute focuses on
> two general approaches or strategies. First to improve the
> substance of research, and second, to improve the practitioners
> and researchers. . .

This officer stressed the reform commitment his office had

towards the criminal justice system, and criticized the parochialism

among social scientists and felt, as did nearly the entire Institute

staff, that "studies from so-called prominent researchers are often

just trash!!!" They believed that much of the criticism of the

Institute should be shared by the research community for its lack of

development which hindered the various individually-defined as well

as the formally-defined mission of the Institute.

One officer self-identified his mission as directed towards

the research community in general as well as towards the federal

government, and understood his mission to be one of overcoming at

least some of these problems within the research community.

> It's parochial, very parochial [among criminal justice researchers]
> because nobody knows what anybody else is doing. I think one
> mission of the Institute is to overcome this parochialism. This
> can be done through money and time. Money would shape how
> researchers spend their time, and in a sense direct the kinds of
> research they would do, and this would in turn provide more

studies which in turn would provide more material in the field
for students to look at, which in turn would provide more
material in the field for students to look at, which in turn
would provide models and exemplars. This would contribute to
breaking down the damaging parochialism (X: 9/69).

This response suggests, as do the responses of others, that there

is a pervasive feeling the Institute support of research can shape the

field in general, not just funded research, not just criminal justice

research but social science research in general.

One person suggested:

The money goes to the professors, who get graduate assistants,
and this in turn begets a cycle of research from the funds.
The methods and topics and procedures can be influence and
you have to look at funding as sort of seed money.

Whether funding has had, or even can have, such an effect is

problematic, but the point here is that some persons view their job

as one that transcends state or agency needs, and is guided by an

ideal of "quality science." If this attitude is as pervasive and

intense as informants convey, this occupational attitude could be a

primary mediating factor between state power and state apparatus,

for it indicates how loosely normative systems and ideological

perspectives may be coupled to components of state operations.

The flexibility in interpreting rules also leads to a distinction

between what is considered formal Institute policy which may indicate

the preferred research expected by formal rules, and "common sense"

(reflecting substantive rationality) which is guided by ambiguous,

often vague rules which lead to the acceptance of "quality" research.

It is the latter set of rules, relating to sound methodology, good

research, "interesting and worthwhile topics" in the area of criminal

justice, to which staff claimed to adhere:

There are companies and people out there that can write a
beautiful proposal but couldn't tie their own shoestrings when
it comes to doing a worthwhile piece of work, an imaginative
piece of work, a work where they want to go out on a limb and
try something different, or where they really do that something
extra to get it. They're not going to do that. They're going
to meet the contractual arrangements, write a proposal, and
can meet all the points that you lay out to them as the criteria
for the judgment of the proposal, and they can meet it all
beautifully, and they're going to do a very mediocre piece of
work for you. And depending on what you have in mind, <u>you might
want somebody who cannot write that kind of a proposal</u> who is
not going to meet all those final criteria. . . We don't have
many people doing that kind of work (5/78/II).

In sum, the formal rules that appear to guide the carving out
of research areas and selection of topics are not always the best
clue to predicting outcomes or especially to imputing meanings to
specific outcomes. For example, a congressional suggestion to
"crack down on political disorder" may connect with a project idea
on political disorder that is not intended to examine civil violence
as something upon which the government must "crack down." Or a study
on the use of more effective police force may have been suggested by
the executive branch (e.g., Attorney General) to examine how it might
be made more effective, but the final study may be one that recom-
mends that police should not be used in civil disorders, or that
police should be disarmed. This suggests that the activity of
Institute staff, as part of state apparatus, are loosely coupled to
the dictums and organizational requisites of state power such that
staff activity, often discretionary, sometimes arbitrary, and usually
subject to substantive rather than formal rationality, mediates the
formal legislative mandate or informal pressures of the executive and
legislative branches. This means that what finally is identified as
an important research area may or may not be a reflection of the intent

of persons exercising state power. This occurs not because of arbitrary or nonidentifiable "unanticipated consequences" or organizational activity, but because organizational activity has been modified (or mediated) by a succession of identifiable Institute procedures, director discretion, staff implementation, and research community operations.

b. <u>Solicitation procedures</u>. The mediating effects of loose-coupling occur also in the solicitation procedures. Once a general idea idea for research has been decided, a staff member, usually the originator of the idea, or one with a particular claim to expertise in the area, will draft a brief statement soliciting proposals from researchers. The increase in college-trained personnel who were encouraged to maintain personal links with the academic community was credited with transforming the solicitation process from a mechanical bureaucratic task into a reasonably creative exercise. The solicitations, according both to informants and to a review of selected solicitations, are designed to respond to "Institute goals," but these goals are defined very generally. For example, in the solicitation for proposals on collective disorders, applicants are advised to respond to institute goals by addressing several general objectives: 1) to provide a state of the art review of the literature on issues related to collective disorders, including a historical perspective; 2) to gather national data from both participant and regulatory groups on the descriptive and dynamic features of collective disorders and related factors, and 3) to provide a recommended research program incorporating a historical

perspective, development of current research and theory, and development

of basic and policy-oriented research programs. The loosely-coupled

nature of the Institute organizational structure and procedure

enables this particular research project to be mediated at a variety

of points. In addition to the influence of the project officers who

initiated the project and drafted the solicitation, the recommenda-

tions and influence of the participants in the workshop on collective

disorder were, as examination of workshop transcripts and the

research solicitation reveal, also influential.

Once the solicitation has been drafted and disseminated and the

proposals are submitted, the review process begins, and both staff

and reviewers have available considerable discretion based on

substantive, rather than formal rationality. Penetration of substan-

tive rationality occurs at several points. For example, although

the "old-boy" system has been minimized, there nonetheless remain

favorite siblings who may receive preferential treatment. In addition

to ensuring that particular individuals are aware of proposed solici-

tations, it is also possible for program personnel to encourage

last minute solicitations from favored researchers. Especially if

the field of competition is weak, such "inside dope" could provide a

considerable advantage to the favored sibling, at the expense (and

perhaps subsequent exclusion) of those not so fortunate.

Although the institute staff have no review responsibilities,

prior to sending proposals out for review staff performs a screening

to eliminate those proposals that are "clearly unsuitable." There

are a few formal guidelines for this screening (e.g., incomplete

proposals, crank requests), but there were also a set of tacit, <u>sub</u> <u>rosa</u> rules that appear to operate, although it was difficult in this project to ascertain the nature or extent of those rule. Nonetheless, there was evidence from self-reports that at this initial stage of the review process some projects may be excluded solely on the personal bias of the screener. Further, institute personnel may suggest (or require) methodological changes which constitute another potential access point of subtle bias, for as shall be argued in Chapter 5, research procedures themselves may contain latent and fundamental political implications.

The peer review process, as described in Section I of this chapter, was intended to make grants competitive and to assure a "fairly high standard" of research. Informants estimate that 90% of all awards are made on the basis of solicitation and peer review. The peer review process is another point of access for penetration of mediating. This occurs in several ways. First, although the reviewers are selected by a private corporation contracted for the purpose, the project officer requests a set of characteristics which significantly constrain the choices available. Next, it is possible to request additional eligibles to choose from:

> If they [i.e., Public Research Corporation] send me a list of
> maybe 20 people that we think can do the review. I can take
> a look at that list and say, OK, we need three people, and I
> cannot find two that I'm satisfied with on the list, I would
> just get back in touch with them and say I need more names
> (9/9: 81).

To what extent peer reviews may be biased, and for what reasons, was not determined, and there is no evidence to indicate that the procedures are not used in good faith. This discussion is <u>not</u> meant

to imply lack of personal integrity of agency personnel or research practitioners, but to indicate how formal procedures may be circumvented.

Further, proposals are not, according to informants, reviewed anonymously. This allows for the possibility of biased readings (pro or con) which lead to the acceptance or rejection of a paper on name rather than content. The extent to which such biased readings occur would be difficult to ascertain, especially if the bias was not intentional (and what reviewer would be candid enough to concede that the peer decision was made simply because, as a reviewer admitted in a different context "Fuck the contents! The author's a schmuck and should be shot!").

The primary lesson from this is that there occurs a point at which, at the discretion of the Institute staff or of reviewers, an opportunity exists to significantly circumvent established rules. This circumvention may derive from arbitrary or rational rules, but nonetheless, the formal rules are mediated by such activities, which in turn may affect the research ultimately produced by shaping who is funded and for what purpose.

c. <u>Proposal selection</u>. The selection of proposals for funding admits another level of mediation, that between the academic community and the Institute. It has been argued that, especially within the past few years, the institute in many ways reflects the research community (e.g., methodological and topical emphasis, shared ideology). Informants have noticed what they describe as a remarkable consistency between staff and reviewer decisions and judgments, perhaps resulting

from the greater NILECJ research community affinity. The research

community itself provides a discretionary component which must be

considered in an analysis of funding agency processes, since the

research itself comes from outside the Institute. The two most

obvious mediating factors are: 1) the proposals submitted and

2) the peer review process. The agency is somewhat, although not

totally, constrained by the nature of the proposals that are submitted.

Although a solicitation may define a proposed topic with some

precision, and even though the Institute is able, at various points

in the processes to modify or clarify the methodological or conceptual

features of a successful proposal, the researchers and their staff

actually conduct the research and are free to pursue their research

unfettered and to write their conclusions as they wish. This means

that what is written and accepted as a proposal does not necessarily

assure that any latent agency ideological or political perspectives

will occur also in the research or in the dissemination of the results.

Further, although some researchers may intentionally orient

research findings towards perceived agency needs (e.g., Maines, 1978,

Useem, 1976a, 1976c), or attempt to strategically tailor proposals

to increase probability of funding, this does not mean that such

tailoring is necessary or even desirable. Besides the ambiguity of

explicit Institute mission, and despite the belief that federal agencies

seek a specific type of research, there is no evidence to indicate

that the Institute itself has such a clear sense of mission that it

can define it clearly and unambiguously, let alone that a researcher

could match it. On the contrary, it appears that the preferences

of the Institute personnel are too diverse to identify so simply as "policy research oriented," "preferring hard statistics" or "aiming research at social control." A review of successful proposals reveals thematic, political, and procedural diversity not closely fitting a predefined set of stereotypical ideological or political features.

One final mediating mechanism is of interest here. Between the Institute and the successful proposal author, there occurs the possibility of bargaining and negotiation in various ways. One way in particular provides a useful illustration for how mediation may occur in a loosely-coupled system. For example, a review panel may insist (or recommend) that a researcher's staff include a certain type of person (police practitioner, police "expert," minority representative). The degree to which a research staff may comprise a predefined proportion of "types" is shaped by mediating influences not only of immediate participants (i.e., the Institute, the required personnel, the latitude of research in choosing personnel), but also of larger ongoing social struggles (such as civil rights and related activity), without which such considerations as minority representation, for example, would have been unlikely. It allows for the penetration of an additional mediating factor. For example, a study on participants in political demonstrations would most likely be conducted very differently if staff persons added at NILECJ's suggestion were a police practitioner interested in developing effective techniques for controlling social movements, or if the persons were social activists opposing such control. That such staff

situations can reflect a source of political contention and unsatis-factory representation is reflected in the current project on domestic disorder in which the controversy of the politics of staff led to the protest resignation of at least one prominent research advisor (see, e.g., Seven Days, 30 March 1979: 5).

CONCLUSION

The purpose in examing the organizational and interactional procedures of the Institute was to try to identify the degree to which the Institute, as an example of state apparatus, directly reflects the state power which authorizes it. An attempt was made to identify the informal features of day-to-day enactment of institute organizational procedures that indicate a loosely-coupled series of procedures that mediate a) the legislative mandate, b) the formal organizational rules, and c) the research selection process. From the results we may tentatively conclude that the slippage which occurs between Institute structure and its environment, as well as the loosely-coupled connections which exist as the result of situational activity, make the state/research connection far more complex than is ordinarily assumed by conventional studies as outlined in Chapter 3. NILECJ cannot be said to operate solely as a direct expression of state power, nor can it be said to directly reflect only dominant class interests. The mediating features which come into play between the state apparatus—NILECJ—and those points with which NILECJ comes in contact, as well as between NILECJ and state power, require an analytic apparatus capable of identifying

not only the interests served, but also the factors which mediate attempts to serve those interests.

This study suggests that formal structures and formal rationality are mediated by informal procedures and substantive rationality. In comparing the structure of the Institute with the actual processes of carrying out the agency activities, several tentative conclusions can be made. First, it would appear that activity within the Institute consists of behaviors loosely-coupled to the structures of the organization. This has several implications: a) The outcomes of research cannot be known in advance, and the funding process is thus guided by other criteria than a logical sequence of desired outcomes. No authority can mandate a research outcome by legislating it into existence. This means that the Institute, in actual practice, must rely on substantive rather than formal rationality, in evaluating research ideas, established funding policies, and strategies for implementing actions. There exist no formalized criteria for assessing "final production" (despite "evaluation programs," which are most effective in assessing the efficacy of research application, but not the more difficult task of evaluating the benefits or worth of research results, especially over the long term). Thus, assessment and judgments of a project to be funded (as well as criteria for later evaluation) must be based on particularistic, often ad hoc criteria, rather than universalistic principles of legislative and organizational rules.

Second, despite the strong penetration of state power which directs organizational activity, there nevertheless exists a high

degree of discretion and individualistic criteria for selecting appropriate behavior at the fundamental operational level of the Institute. This challenges the view that state power causes organizational activity and outcomes, and that individual behaviors are necessarily direct expressions of state interests, in that structural slippage and discretionary activities of institute participants substantially mediate state power and state apparatus on one hand, and state apparatus and research on the other.*

Third, the sources of influence upon the Institute, though powerful in themselves, exercise relatively little direct coordination or interference into the Institute's operation at the research level. This is in part because of several features identified in the Institute funding processes, including contradictions that generate organizational rule conflict (see, e.g., Manning, forthcoming). These occur in several ways: a) The general rules of formal rationality often conflict with the specific requirements of staff operations. b) The general directions mandated for the organization can be carried out only if the research itself is successful. Yet, the research outcomes are always problematic and tentative. This suggests that the specific policy decisions regarding which research projects to fund cannot necessarily be decided on the basis of formal rules, but instead must be based on the merits of the probability of a

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*Although the findings suggest that the link between state power and agency activity is not as direct as is sometimes assumed, it does not mean that state power is not effective in shaping agency activity, or perhaps more importantly, in shaping ideological and normative frameworks at sources beyond agency activity.

successful project based on substantive rationality. c) The problem

of inconsistent directions remains a source of contradictions. The

problem of deciding for whom research is conducted (e.g., for its

own sake? For legislative considerations? For criminal justice

practitioners? For reform-oriented social engineers? For criminals?)

remains. d) The rationality of the researchers in both peer review

and in knowledge production may or may not coincide with agency needs,

and when incompatible, this may create organizational conflicts in

that goals may go unfulfilled, results may be controversial, or

projects may have limited, if any application. e) The norms of face-

to-face work groups may be shaped by sex/gender, ethnicity, personal

ideology, variations in interpretation of agency mandate and goals,

as well as by research consultants and participants. f) Social

pressures of various kinds may occur in that knowledge may be viewed

in part as itself embodying social conflict. That is, knowledge is

both symbolic and instrumental, and struggle over control of knowledge

takes the form of battle over appropriate questions, definitions, and

desired outcomes. g) Dual rules do exist within the Institute. First

are those stipulated by the mandate, and these are contradictory and

vague. They are often either difficult or impossible to fulfill, or

often are not even considered as relevant as operating guides for

fundamental actions. The Institute's priority guidelines, which are

the primary guiding principles, are so vague as to be easily contravened

with reasonable justification. So contradictions exist between the

formally stipulated rules and the discretionary procedures employed

by staff in that the former are inapplicable or inappropriate to the

fulfillment of agency goals in some circumstances.

If this chapter has been successful, it should be clear that, in the case of NILECJ, knowledge production is mediated by discretionary behavior of those participating in the funding process, to include both researchers and Institute staff. This means that a) NILECJ cannot be viewed as a monolithic agency, since it contains variations within its own structure; b) that the Institute, as a component of state apparatus mediates state power such that an understanding of federal funding cannot focus solely on the state itself; and c) that the funding process is not guided by a set of prespecified norms, plans or policies that are intended to define procedures or topics of research, or are intended to encourage researchers to mold research to an ideological or functional need of the agency.

This suggests that it may be premature to conclude that federal funding necessarily intrudes into the research process in a way that alters research content or procedures. It remains, however, to examine the outcomes of federally sponsored research as compared with nonfunded research to examine whether there is a difference between funded and nonfunded research.

FOOTNOTES

[1]The implications of such a relocation of locus is beyond the immediate concern of this paper. Nor is such a relocation meant to imply that role-incumbents be made the primary focal point for analysis, a position for which there is no compelling evidence. Underlying this relocation is a theoretical conflict over the nature of capitalist society, particularly over the capitalist state formulation (e.g., O'Connor, 1973; Habermas, 1975) as opposed to an "inner group" formulation of the crisis nature of contemporary capitalism, (e.g., Miliband, 1969; Useem, 1978; Mills, 1956). The former argue that because of the crisis nature of contemporary capitalism, the state has necessarily taken an increasing responsibility for maintaining the requisites for smooth capital accumulation. For adherents of this perspective, the state operates according to the logic of system imperatives, and these imperatives, rather than the characteristics of particular role incumbents, are problematic. For the latter perspective, individual or group characteristics of role incumbents are primary for study. This project may offer some modest contribution to the debate by providing empirical support that might eventually be used to counter recent studies of the state in capitalist society such as Useem's (1978) argument, for example, that we may understand capitalism by understanding the characteristics of persons filling positions within the capitalist state. See also Footnote 9.

[2]Outcome, as used here, refers to the socially-produced resources and conditions of material life, the concrete historical forms of social relations, social organization and social control mechanisms, the forms of knowledge and technology that guide an organization's goals and strategies, as well as consciousness (as a product of interaction, ideas and language), history and ideology (see, e.g., Hydebrand, 1977: 85).

[3]There exists a common view among many academics and others that LEAA and the Institute function in the service of politically conservative interests. Both LEAA and the Institute have long been criticized (e.g., by community, congressional, public and even governmental sources) of being subject to the influences of police practitioners by its emphasis on technical hardware research, which included dramatic projects (e.g., armored personnel carriers such as Louisiana's "Big Bertha"), surveillance and computer information devices (e.g., Michigan's MINT system), Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) in Los Angeles, and "Stop the Robberies, Ensure Safe Streets (STRESS), the Detroit equivalent of "soldiers of occupation", according to some critics). The dramatic imagery of these projects as control-oriented techniques for repression was not wasted on ideologues. Although the investment in technical research has changed in the past five years, but it may also have been that the dramatic projects somewhat exaggerated the perception of an LEAA commitment to paramilitary research.

A second reason for the conservative image of LEAA derives from the lack of a strong constituency in the research community from its

Footnotes, Con't.

inception. The failure of the original planners of the agency to develop a broad-based constituency within the research community prior to the planning, allocation, and implementation of research programs, created a dependence upon practitioners, particularly the police, for as one long-time staffer complained, the early LEAA policy makers did not seem to recognize that the criminal justice field consists of more than police and chiefs and officers. During the Ewing phase, steps were taken to create a constituency and the effects will be developed in Sections II and III.

The third reason for the conservative image of LEAA may be located within the research community itself, reflecting a possible conservative bias of researchers. One NILECJ official suggested:

> I have a feeling it's historical. . .I mean, who first started doing the work? Look at Wolfgang and Skolnick and Reiss's work. They're individuals doing the work with their own philosophies, and then the midwest researches at Northwestern or Indiana, RAND, these are groups doing research for the government for a long time, and they have clearances. RAND has worked for the Defense Department, and probably the CIA and any number of security agencies. People who work there are going to have to have security clearances. And when they go out to expand their market, and they start getting into police research, it's the same types of people going to do that kind of work (CT: 91).

When the Institute first started funding criminal justice research, not only did they lack close ties with the academic community, but the state of criminal justice research was such that it was done in a very traditional manner by researchers already committed both ideologically and professionally to organizations either directly or indirectly engaged in supporting an established social order according to traditional views of control.

In sum, this conservative image is accurate in the sense that the NILECJ supports conventional, status-quo oriented research. It is nonetheless willing to support unconventional, even subversive researchers according to informants, but will not support or solicit "politically suicidal projects":

> It's a political environment, and if we are going to do something really off-the-wall, we have to figure, is it going to work? Is it worth the fight? Do I have a chance? Is it worth it to see whether it even flies or not? Sometimes it's worth the fight, or you don't have a chance of winning at all, so it's not worth even trying. And that goes right up the line. . .Like, the dissolution of the FBI. That would really bend some noses. Now do you believe that the Justice Department is going to fund work to dissolve the FBI without a

Footnotes, Con't.

fight? No!!! There are political realities about what can be
done, what is risky, and what cannot be done.

Further, personnel often fight to fund unconventional research,
so the source of alleged NILECJ conservatism does not seem to lie in
a political conservatism of either agency policy or personnel, but
in two sources: 1) the early policies of LEAA/NILECJ under Nixon,
and 2) the research community itself, which in the 1960s was
intellectually conservative, although usually considered politically
liberal.

To call the Institute conservative, then, is a gloss-over the
meaning of the term as it embodies a world view and imagery that,
as suggested in Chapter 5, reflects a traditional view of social
science and neglects historical transformation of social activity.

[4]Underlying the debate over the director was the disagreement
over the purpose of the Institute. Velde felt the Institute should
be technically oriented, and argued "for someone skilled in the
esoterica of systems analysis and operations research" (Rogovin,
1973: 18). Regovin wanted "someone with criminal justice experience
and credibility, coupled with a reputation sufficient to engage the
attention of the researchers whom we would hope to attract to work
on the problems of criminal justice" (Rogovin, 1973: 17-18). Ironi-
cally, both men were democrats, and Rogovin, who was considered the
more liberal of the two, appealed to arch-conservative Mitchell and
won.

[5]A story has circulated around the Institute for several years
about one of the country's leading criminologists calling Blair
Ewing and asking if he had replaced his entire NILECJ staff, because
the quality of work had improved so dramatically in such a short
time. No, Ewing responded, he simply gave them more latitude and let
them demonstrate their own capabilities.

[6]Current authorization hearings, judging from transcripts and
from congressional and LEAA/NILECJ informants, have not gone badly for
NILECJ. Much of NILECJ-directed criticism of past years seems to
have disappeared. It was noted at the 26 April 1979 House subcommittee
session that an outspoken civil rights activist and congressional
Representative from Texas has gone so far as to say that LEAA did not
need restructuring, since the problems were primarily of administra-
tion and leadership rather than ideology.

[7]It should be remembered that LEAA was originally intended to be
a form of revenue sharing, which allows autonomy to individual states
by returning funds to states with few, if any, restrictions on state
use. Block Grants are funds for which states are obliged to submit

plans which can be modified by the federal government, although states retain considerable discretion in distribution. This is the primary mode of funding by LEAA. <u>Categorical grants</u> are allocated funds which are subject to congressional supervision and control.

[8]Four theoretical perspectives are appropriate for addressing policy-making by state apparatus. For some theorists (e.g., Miliband; 1969; Mills 1956; Useem 1978) the primary source of influence exists within the social connections to which agency incumbents belong. This view generally holds that personal attachments, group memberships, and social and educational background shapes the consciousness of higher level decision makers, most of whom share a common ideology and common interests. Capitalist state theorists (Altvater 1973a, 1973b); Habermas 1975; O'Connor, 1973), with much cogency and theoretical and empirical support, argue that decisions of policy-makers cannot be understood without also understanding the role of the state in contemporary society. According to this view, the state has increasingly taken on functions that the private economic sector has become unwilling or unable to perform. In this view, influence is a form of authority deriving from the state's function of fulfilling the requisites of capitalist social relations. This intervention by the state in a multiplicity of social, political and economic areas serves to mediate social conflicts generated by structural contradictions in the current form of industrialization, in an attempt to maintain a smoothly-functioning and profitable economic order.

Adherents of a rationality model of the state, as adumbrated by Weber and reflected in the works of open-systems theorists, view the structure and policies of the state as a sign of an increasing-complex social order that requires increasingly sophisticated means of coordination. These Weberian-oriented theorists would argue that sources of influence derive from increasingly sophisticated technical rules which extend system rationality in order to rationalize social relations containing certain power and authority relations which serve to facilitate the efficiency and effectives of policy making. In this view, the state represents a type of formal rationality through which goal attainment and efficiency are secured by functionally-related positions and roles (e.g., Weber, 1966; 1967). Rationalist models, however, do not adequately account for interconnections between an organization and other social elements, nor do they adequately account for interactional features of organizations.

Finally, interactionist theorists (e.g., Manning, 1978; Silverman, 1972; Brown 1978; Weick, 1976) view the primary source of policy to be set of negotiated outcomes occurring among agency personnel, and between agency personnel and external sources.

[9]It is clear what effect pressure groups have had, and an examination of the identity, strategies, and results of lobbying directed at LEAA/NILECJ at the congressional level would be exceedingly useful for an understanding of how much slippage may exist between

state power and state apparatus. It might, of course be argued that such groups in fact support state power and become integrated within it because of similar interests, but such an argument must also be able to account for the mediating features of such interaction.

[10]Congressional staff (e.g., from Proxmire, Conyers and Kennedy offices) felt that especially in recent years, citizens groups and other indirect public pressures had a strong mediating effect on LEAA/NILECJ policy. The nature, identity and effectiveness of such groups was not pursued in this research. Their existence and interests are occasionally alluded to in congressional testimony by congressional participants, but transcripts give little direct account of the groups themselves, nor any indication of their operational strategies or effectiveness.

[11]The White and Krislov study has been criticized for poor methodology, highly polemical conclusion, and a superficial conceptualization and analysis. These criticisms have some validity, but even more damaging to their report is the degree to which analysis of the Institute is ripped out of the social context in which in functions (e.g., the U.S. criminal justice system, the new federalism or state-capitalism) and examined in isolation of the federal policies and other social factors which shape or constrain activity. The report tends to identify the problems of Institute operation as existing within the Institute itself (e.g., lack of leadership or purpose, lack of clear policies), which may be partially accurate, but lack of leadership, for example, is in part the direct result of congressional (and other) forms of politicization occurring external to the Institute. Further, the Institute, during the time of the NAS report, was shaped by Nixon and Mitchell, and a full understanding of the Institute cannot be undertaken without also including the political connections linking the Institute to the policies and politiquing which shaped it.

Despite 18 months, a six-person staff and generous LEAA resources, the White and Krislov study remains atthe most superficial level of objectivistic organizational analysis because of the low-level conceptualization of the problem and total lack of any guiding theoretical frame by which to inform inquiry. The report's boast (1977: ix) that the staff "in many ways got to know more about the Institute than the Institute itself" is both cavalier and inaccurate, for the report does not raise the wider issues (e.g., the relationship between federal sponsorship to research, the state of research within the criminal justice areas, the political pressures and requisites shaping institute function and operation, and the ideological connections underlying the mission and operation of the Institute). Their report does provide useful background information and data not yet found elsewhere, but the report's reputation far exceeds any reasonable justification.

[12]Harris (1970: 167) argues that Johnson had used LEAA as a means for political maneuvering. Johnson modified the appointment structure

of the LEAA administrator, changing it from an attorney general to a Presidential appointment to promote his own political ambitions by appeasing conservative Southern Senators (E.G., McClellan and Strom Thurmand).

[13]In the original Senate (S. 917) and House (H.R. 5037) versions of the 1968 Act, LEAA was to be administered under the control of the Attorney General. Ramsey Clark became Acting Attorney General and was confirmed as Attorney General in 1967 during congressional debates on the act. Clark, an outspoken liberal democrat (see e.g., Clark, 1970), was considered by many as too liberal to oversee such a potentially powerful agency:

> Despite his intelligence, humanity, fundamental decency and genuine concern for reform of criminal justice in the United States, Clark alienated many members of the Congress by his view of the needs and directions for a reform effort that he articulated in congressional testimony and public speeches. Among these were Senators McClellan and Hruska. McClellan was Chairman of the Criminal Laws and Procedures Subcommittee of the Senate's Judiciary Committee and Hruska was the ranking Republican member. Both were determined that a program with the potential power of the one proposed by the Johnson Administration, in the crime field where both Senators regarded themselves as expert, would not be placed under the control of an Attorney General whose views were as unacceptable--even anathematic--as were Ramsey Clark's (Rogovin, 1973: 12).

[14]"Hardware" refers to technology employed by policing agencies and included research on radio technology, prototype police cars, police watches, ballistics, computers, helicopters and urban combat weaponry. Software is typified by research in nontechnical aspects of policing, such as correlates of crime, effectiveness of components or strategies of the criminal justice system (such as mandatory sentencing, alternatives to incarceration, improving police response time), and preventive or demonstration projects. Projects involving high-technology research had a certain dramatic appeal for those persons who felt that reduction of crime through more effective policing was LEAA's primary goal. The belief that LEAA would soon win the crime war is typified by Attorney General Richard Kliendienst's testimony before the House Committee on the Judiciary in 1973 when asked of LEAA was judged to be a temporary program:

> Yes sir. In other words, as the crime rate goes down, the money goes down. When we get it down to acceptable limits in a free society, then I hope I would have the opportunity as a private citizen to come back here before this committee and recommend that you eliminate this aspect of LEAA. Maybe the Institute you ought to keep in terms of research and expertise, but certainly these large block grant funds can be phased out (cited in Chelimsky, 1975: 204).

Chapter 5

The Ideological Connection: Procedures and Content of Funded and
Nonfunded Research

Section I: Procedures and Funding

INTRODUCTION

The primary task of this chapter is to examine whether federal

funding politicizes research. The image of the academic as a person

whose mind ranges freely through the entire world of ideas (e.g.,

Barber, 1952; Merton, 1968) may be subverted if the funding process

penetrates research activity in such a way as to impose an ideological

bias at any of the various stages of research.* By systematizing

already existing knowledge, and by producing new forms of knowledge,

one could expect funded research to create the appropriate theoretical

formulations as defined by funding agencies, for the purpose of meeting

the needs of specific agency mandate.

It was suggested in Chapter 4 that a number of factors may mediate

the formal mandate of a funding agency, particularly the situated

behaviors of agency participants. The argument of that chapter was

that federal funding may not create the appropriate conceptual apparatus

and research content as directly as sometimes assumed by those who view

funding agencies to correspond exactly to the needs of a dominant class

or of state "steering requisites." There are several ways to formulate

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*Ideology here refers to the identifiable system of shared beliefs,
values and justifications and world views that organize cognition,
interpretation, and behavior and also provides the bases for corres-
ponding accounts of features of human activity, which correspond to
the standpoints of specific classes or groups in society.

a discussion of the social and political content of research. One
could focus on an internalist-externalist dynamic, assessing whether
changes in topic, procedures, or ideology appear to derive from
influences external to the scientific process (e.g., Blume, 1974,
Salomon, 1973, 1977), or to influences internal to it. One could
also conceptualize discussion within the context of theories of
modern state in industrial society which would present knowledge as
a structural mediating device intended to overcome contradiction-
generated social conflict and to insure smoother capital accumulation
(O'Connor, 1973; Habermas 1975; Altvater 1973a, 1973b). Elitist and
managerial views of knowledge production (e.g., Mills 1956; Useem,
1978; Milliband, 1969) would view knowledge production as reflecting
the activity of incumbents of offices who employ their position to
defend specific interests. The arguments underlying these debates are
complex, and no attempt will be made to address them here. But it
should be possible to provide insights that could be useful in
contributing to those debates by examing the ideological and procedural
features of funded and nonfunded policing studies. The methodological
problem becomes, as Nelson (1977: 577) has indicated, one of discover-
ing the content and character of the ideological connections existing
between researcher and inquiry activity in order to illustrate how
the ideological components shape content. This presupposes the
existence of such connections, but the presupposition is warranted
for several reasons. First, it is assumed that research procedures,
like organizational decisions, do not proceed randomly, but follow
implicit or explicit procedural rules guided by some rationale. Second,
it is assumed that these rules are products of either explicit "official"

policy or of individual choice, both of which reflect either organizational or personal criteria which can be justified or rationalized by an account. <u>Third</u>, accounts derive from perceptual, procedural, interpretative, and discursive features of social life and interaction and contain ontological, epistemological and value premises which shape how inquiry shall proceed. These premises are justified by rationales which are unexamined. These rationales are the ideological component of inquiry. Inquiry, then, derives from a more-or-less coherent view of the world from which and by which we organize experience, set goals and priorities, and select appropriate strategies for attaining the goals of human activity, If funding has an impact on either funded or nonfunded research, then the effect should be apparent in the perceptual, procedural, interpretative or discursive features of research.

The few empirical studies of the impact of federal funding on research agree that federal sponsorship may be one source of politicization of knowledge production (e.g., Miller, 1968; Denizen, 1970; Carter, 1967; Frieden and Kaplan, 1977). Evidence suggesting the politicization of federally-sponsored research has been submitted by Galliher and McCarney (1973) who argue that trends in juvenile delinquency research have been shaped by and accommodated to, interests and emphases of research patrons. McCartney (1970) has indicated that a "hard data" approach has been encouraged by funding agencies, and Useem (1976c) has shown with some success that the federal government has managed to inject at least some of its priorities into the research decisions of academic social scientists. Useem (1976a) has also suggested that state patronage of social science research has led to

significant paradigmatic changes among research practitioners, and
has argued that state patronage of science and art may even represent
a new form of political and cultural domination (1976d).

The possibility that federal support of knowledge production
may bias both the procedures and problematics of social inquiry has
serious implications for policing research. As a result of the "war
on crime," the federal government has, in the past decade, channelled
vast resources towards the support of agencies, commissions, programs,
and R&D activities intended to meet the so-called "challenge" of
reducing crime.

The various positions employed to examine the sponsorship-research
connection were examined in Chapter 2, and several images of the fund-
ing-research connection emerged:

1) Funding agencies are inherently conservative, and this
conservatism is reflected in research. 2) Funding possesses a danger
to social science because of its tendency to influence researchers
to accept the funding agency's mission and needs, and to define
problems in accordance with agency interests, thus shaping procedures
and content of research. 3) Funded policing research reflects an
attempt by state agencies to develop more efficient methods of
social control which serve to suppress social change or social conflict,
or which serve as a means of wresting power from the representatives
of "Capital" (e.g., Willhelm, 1977). 4) Sponsorship shapes not only
funded studies, but nonfunded as well. 5) Research topics of funded
research are highly ideological and oriented towards the interests
of a "capitalist" social structure which circumscribes research
problematics in a manner to which unfunded research is not as susceptible.

If policing studies are politicized by funding agencies, we could then suggest policing studies, to borrow Burger and Luckman's (1967: 104-16) phrase, provide the "conceptual machineries of universe maintenance" which produce knowledge intended to legitimize, enforce, reproduce, promote, as well as to justify, mystify and distort particular sets of social relations. As Bouchier (1977) reminds us, the major source of such legitimating theory is rationally organized knowledge. If such politicization occurs, we might then expect funded knowledge, as rationally organized, to differ significantly from nonfunded, which presumably lacks the same degree of rational organization. The view that support of research poses a serious threat to the independence of social science (e.g., Green, 1971; Baritz, 1960) is based on the assumption that social scientists who are not funded will retain, to a greater degree, freedom from ideological and procedural biases resulting from the penetration of sponsors into the research they are sponsoring. If this is so, then there should exist a significant difference between funded and non-funded research in both procedure, topic, and ideology. The examination of political content will be divided into two sections, one examining impact of funding on research procedure and thematic content, the second focusing on selected ideological ramifications of funding.

METHODOLOGY*

Employing a precise coding instrument, a content analysis of three sociology journals (American Journal of Sociology; Social Problems, and American Sociological Review), and two** policing journals (Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science; and Police Chief) was conducted on policing social research studies*** published between 1960-1977. A social study was operationally defined as any study that referred to the behavior of individuals or institutions (e.g., White and Krislov, 1978: 9). Excluded were any technical or policy studies which did not attempt to analyze some feature of a social event, situation or institution, or to address a theoretical or methodological issue of social analysis. Research was defined as

> . . .systematic, intensive study directed toward greater
> knowledge or understanding of the subject studied. Social
> research includes basic, applied, or policy research that
> studies either the behavior of individuals, groups or
> institutions or the effects of policies, programs, or
> technologies on behavior (NAS, 1978: 10).

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*A detailed discussion of the methodology employed for this chapter will be found in Appendix 1.

**After 1972, Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science appeared as Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, and an off-shoot, Journal of Police Science and Administration began publishing in 1973. The former journal was reviewed through 1977, although no relevant studies were found after 1972. The latter journal was reviewed from its first issue through 1977. Police Chief was reviewed from 1962-1977 because of the difficulty and/or impossibility of obtaining complete volumes from 1960-1961.

***For stylistic convenience, "policing social research studies" will be referred to simply as "policing studies."

To qualify as a research study, an article was required to contain at least one of four characteristics: a) a data source and a systematic method for tapping it, b) an identifiable theoretical perspective, c) be informed by an identifiable paradigm, and d) include the assessment or exploration of some thesis.

A policing study refers to any study that a) focuses on policing as an activity, behavior, organization, purpose or effect, or upon functions, social tactics or strategies and goals of officially-sanctioned social control agencies mandated to enforce laws by some federal, state or municipal (e.g., city, township, county) agency and legally empowered with authority to carry out this mandate; uses police or policing as a primary dependent or independent variable, or c) claims to provide insights, explanations or under-standings about the activity, processes, development or occupation of the social features of policing and its consequences for those policed or for those policing.

These general guidelines, perhaps by coincidence rather than precision, left little ambiguous or marginal articles, and also successfully excluded general discussions and polemical essays. Because these guidelines were relatively liberal, in the extremely rare cases where ambiguity remained, those articles were excluded.

(Insert Table 1 about here)

Using both indexical and expressive analytic models*, a list of categories was constructed to enable classification of methodological,

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*See Appendix I for fuller discussion.

Total funded (f) and nonfunded (nf) articles by three-year periods in selected journals, 1960-1977.

Journal	1960-1962 f	nf	1963-1965 f	nf	1966-1968 f	nf	1969-1971 f	nf	1972-1974 f	nf	1975-1977 f	nf	Totals 1960-1977 f	nf
American Sociological Review	0	0	0	0	1	0	2	0	0	0	1	0	4	0
American Journal of Sociology	0	0	1	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	1	3	4
Social Problems	0	0	1	0	2	2	1	1	3	4	1	4	8	11
Police Chief	1	0	7	0	0	2	0	11	5	18	0	18	13	49
Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science	0	9	1	6	2	5	0	8	0	0	0	0	3	28
Journal of Police Science and Administration	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	30	10	43	15	73
Totals:	1	9	10	8	5	10	3	20	13	52	14	66	46	165

theoretical, ideological, political, and policy characteristics of policing studies. The most relevant methodological categories are presented below.

PROCEDURES AND CONTENT OF RESEARCH

There are two general issues at stake in the debate over whether federally sponsored research politicizes procedures of the research process. First, the debate over the possibility of value-free research has largely subsided and most researchers acknowledge that values do penetrate the research process at some point. But most feel that research results themselves are not biased or distorted by this penetration. The belief that researchers freely choose their own problematic, select an appropriate research strategy (method, theory, and data source), and interpret the data in an "objective" fashion, still prevails. But Galliher and McCartney (1973: 78) cite three trends in delinquency research which challenge this belief: a) Sponsored research is cast in an aura of qualitative science (a finding supported by Useem, 1976c). b) Sociological specialities that coincide with missions of existing agencies are more likely to be supported than those specialties which have no corresponding agencies; and c) Scholars who are able to view problems and data from the same perspective as the grantors are most likely to receive funding. The question, of course, is whether federal sponsorship actually determines these trends, or whether it merely accentuates, benefits from, or reflects trends which already exist within the social sciences.

Second, theoretically, sponsored research may affect how
researchers "think." By suggesting how questions are asked and how
answers may be provided, federal sponsorship could, while maintain-
ing the belief in free and unconstrained research, nonetheless
promote an assumptive framework and shape world views of researchers.
This, as W. Miller (1973: 142) has reminded us, promotes an imagery of
the "proper state of things," especially the moral order and political
arrangements implicit in how we organize and interpret our research
findings.

The effects of these theoretical and methodological bases of
sponsored research may contribute to forms or strategies of social
control by generating (or prohibiting) questions and forms of
answers which have several explicit or implicit policy implications.
First, research may be intended to provide information to meet
explicit policy needs of an agency or program. ·Second, by encouraging
particular modes of addressing a topic, other modes may be excluded.
Indirectly, then, the political influence of sponsored research may
contribute to social problems by actually closing-off particular
ways of examining the social world through selective encouragement
of topics, questions, and methodologies (Schulman, Brown, and Kahn,
1972). Further, federal sponsorship may reinforce a particular
organizational form of the social science profession. According to
this view, the social sciences depend upon institutional largess
for their continued existence, and this dependence encourages a
certain "servility." Nicolaus (1972: 57) describes the relationship
more graphically by comparing sociologists in a fluctuating economy

to frogs in a drying pond: As the pool of available resources shrinks, the frogs within hop frantically to the center, since none wants to perish on the edges. This not only perpetuates the prevailing structure of the discipline, but also discourages "marginal" theoretical and methodological perspectives likely to be politically controversial.

These issues are interrelated and separated here for analytic convenience only, and they relate to funded and unfunded research alike. The intent of this section is to select one single issue, methodology, and examine: (a) whether the methodology of social research appears to have become politicized by the impact of federal sponsorship, and (b) some of the implications of the findings for social science research. An understanding of the methodological implications of funded research are the initial step towards an understanding of the ideological and political implications of social science research, which will be discussed in Section C of this chapter.

Politicization of research refers either to (a) the penetration and intervention of the interests of a specific federal agency such that the thematic or procedural operations of research conform to, or are shaped by, those interests, or to (b) a procedure that produces unanticipated or unrecognized political results. The objective here is not to "prove" or "document" an intention of researchers or of agency personnel to influence research. Since part of the task of this project includes the examination of nonfunded studies, it should

be possible to provide at least suggestive indications to the location or direction of research influences, independently of intent.

The three general views regarding politicization of social science outlined in Chapter 2 generate several research questions. First is the view that social science is an unpoliticized, disinterested, autonomous activity, a moral enterprise, a "communal and egalitarian" project or knowledge for its own sake designed to meet specific human needs and enlighten, and thereby emancipate, social members. If this view is correct, one would expect to find: (a) a diversity of research themes and procedures in published research derived from the diversity of human needs; (b) a concentration of research oriented towards questions of "human need" or social emancipation, deriving from the need to resolve contemporary social problems or social issues; (c) a number of articles critical of the status quo and challenging "nonmoral" social structures or policies restricting "social emancipation;" and (d) no significant difference between the characteristics and procedures of funded and nonfunded research.

Second is the view that knowledge has become politicized and that this politicization directly expresses elite (e.g., Useem, 1978) or class (e.g., D. Smith, 1974) hegemony; or reflects state activity as a mediating factor between contradictory and disruptive forces within the capitalist economic sector (e.g., O'Connor, 1974; Habermas, 1975; Baran and Sweezy, 1968; Miliband, 1969). According to this position, sponsored research is directed by one or more of three forces: (a) the ruling class, (b) the incumbents of positions of power, or (c) an "organizational logic" guided by the principles required for successful capital accumulation. Knowledge is produced as an instrument

to insure a smoothly functioning economy and to attain the goals and to perpetuate the interests of specific groups or to meet the requisites of system maintenance. Although some research may deviate, adherents of this position view the overwhelming body of research as falling within unspecified, yet definite, normative limits. If this view is correct, one should find: (a) a narrow range of research topics and procedures that (b) ask questions and provide answers that are limited primarily to the interests of a class or which meet systematic operational requisites, and (c) do not challenge the status quo; and (d) sponsored research should be more consistent with "class interests" or "capitalist organizational principles" than nonfunded, or at least differ significantly, both thematically and procedurally, since federal funding becomes, in effect, an independent variable in shaping research.

Finally, there is the view that nearly all knowledge production is politicized, but this politicization is determined by neither the economic form of society nor by specific groups, regimes, or ideologies. Adherents to this position submit the politicization occurs within the scientific process itself (e.g., Salomon, 1973), or derives from the extrinsic social and cultural values of scientists in that their roles, loyalties and world views intrude into the evaluation and control processes of science (e.g., Blume, 1974; Mannheim, 1938). If this view is correct, the social factors which influence sponsored research do not derive from the funding process, but from the very structure of the research process. If this view is correct, one should find (a) thematic and methodological pluralism resulting from the divers

roles and perspectives of practitioners in <u>both</u> funded and nonfunded

research; (b) no significant difference between funded and nonfunded

research, since funding is rejected as an "independent variable," and

(c) at least some studies should be critical of the <u>status quo</u>, critical

of other studies, or oriented towards critique of other problematics.

These three positions are reasonably exhaustive and mutually

exclusive, and provide a departure point for the examination of

whether or not federal funding may intervene in the knowledge produc-

tion process in such a way as to shape the research procedures,

categories, perceptual, interpretive and processing apparatuses, or

the outcomes of research.

Policing studies dramatically reflect a series of ideas about the

state and social control, about beliefs, attitudes and values, and

also about practical solutions to general problems which reflect one

of the three sources of politicization. Thus a researcher's methodology

may be used to identify both background and domain assumptions of

research. The statements of a research problem and selection of

procedures such as data source, research variables, problematic and

the organization and interpretation of data, and primary characteristics

of methodology are not automatic activities, but involve choice by the

researcher. The task here to examine federal funding as one possible

<u>social</u> factor which may influence choice. A clarification of the

relationship between funding and methodology is an initial step which

should facilitate an understanding of the ideological and political

issues involved in funded research and should also help us assess

which, if any, of the three views of politicization seem most adequate

in contributing to an understanding of issues raided by this relation-
ship.

RESULTS

The data were examined for two features in particular. First
was for development of identifiable trends over the 18-year period
for which journals were examined. Second was for any **significant**
differences (established as ten percent in categories of ten N or more)
between funded and nonfunded categories. The breakdown by three-
year periods was convenient as a presentational strategy. The results
do not appear to be a product of the tables as a presentational
artifact, and the three-year results are consistent within one and
two year chronological divisions.

Four categories particularly useful in analyzing the methodological
procedures underlying social research are 1) paradigm, 2) data
manipulation, 3) theoretical perspective, and 4) problematic.

1. **Paradigm.** The concept of paradigm in sociology is often
vague, and critics have argued which, or even whether, dominant
paradigms exist in the social sciences. The concept is nonetheless
useful. Discussions of various paradigms underlying social science
include Ritzer (1975, 1976), Truman (1965), Bryant (1965), Fallding
(1975), and Dawe (1971). Although the term has been defined in
various ways (e.g., Useem, 1976: 146-7; Kuhn, 1970, Masterman, 1970),
Ritzer's (1975: 157) is the most useful. He defines a paradigm as:

> . . .a fundamental image of the subject matter within a science.
> It serves to define what should be studied, what questions
> should be asked, and how they should be asked, and what rules
> should be followed in interpreting the answer obtained. The

> paradigm is the broadest unit of concensus within a science and
> serves to differentiate one scientific community or subcommunity
> from another. It subsumes, defines, interrelates the exemplars,
> theories, methods and instruments that exist within it.

As Alford (1975: 145) has argued, the concept allows us to avoid the

interfaces of logical adherence and deductive consistency which the

terms "theory" or "model" convey, yet provides a sense of the episte-

mological structure which guides inquiry by allowing for an identifi-

cation of the background assumptions and ontological presuppositions

underlying research. While an analysis of theoretical approaches

allows for an analysis of specific approaches within paradigms, an

analysis of the paradigm allows for a classification instrument that

subsumes competing theories, yet retains the basic epistemological

features common to competing theories. Although these issues will

not be addressed in this essay, analysis of paradigms provides

insights into issues including the problem of subject-object, fact-

value, and theory-praxis, each of which takes on a specific character,

depending upon the paradigm employed. Adopting Ritzer's classifica-

tion system, five distinct paradigmatic categories were defined:

(1) Social Factist, in which analysis focuses on objects as existing

independently from the perceiving subject, and in social sciences

poses as the primary problematic such concepts as norms, values or

roles, and in sociological theory is typically represented by, for

example, positivist, systems, or conflict perspectives; (2) Social

Constructionist, which addresses the subjective reconstruction of

the social world by the subject through interpretation, negotiation,

or meaning acquisition activity, and is typically represented by

qualitative interactionist approaches (e.g., dramaturgical analysis,

ethno-methodology, or phenomenology), and Weberian-oriented analysis; and (3) Marxian models, which emphasize features such as class struggle, historical-dialectical development, or production relations as the most significant problematic for analysis. Two additional paradigms, Critical Theory and Behavioral Models were unrepresented in this study, and will not be discussed.

The most striking finding in analysis of paradigmatic data (summarized in Table 2) is that there is relatively little difference in the number of social factist paradigms between funded and nonfunded categories. Although both funded and nonfunded research is grounded overwhelmingly in the social factist paradigm, it was expected that this paradigm would appear more frequently in funded studies because of federal agencies' alleged penchant for it. It is also reasonable to expect more social facts paradigms in funded than in nonfunded studies, and more social facts paradigms overall. There should also be fewer alternative paradigms among funded studies because of their so-called "radical" potential (e.g., Gouldner, 1968b), and because of the alleged need for applied studies that are more consistent with a natural science model (i.e., a social-factist approach) than are the other paradigms.

(Insert Table 2 About Here)

A second finding is that 98 percent of the articles citing funding were grounded in some identifiable paradigm, compared with 88 percent of nonfunded studies. Because occurrence of a specific paradigm was assumed to indicate more methodological rigor than

Table 2: Paradigm Summary

Distribution of paradigms by three-year periods, percentage (%) and number (N), for funded (f) and nonfunded (nf) policing studies, 1960-1977.

Paradigm	Year	1960-1962 f	1960-1962 nf	1963-1965 f	1963-1965 nf	1966-1968 f	1966-1968 nf	1969-1971 f	1969-1971 nf	1972-1974 f	1972-1974 nf	1975-1977 f	1975-1977 nf	Totals 1960-1977 f	Totals 1960-1977 nf
Social Facts	%:	100	22	90	75	60	60	33	85	100	85	86	85	85	79
	(N):	(1)	(2)	(9)	(6)	(3)	(6)	(1)	(17)	(13)	(44)	(12)	(56)	(39)	(131)
Social Constructionist	%:	0	0	10	0	40	10	67	10	0	8	7	11	13	8
	(N):	0	0	(1)	0	(2)	(1)	(2)	(2)	0	(4)	(1)	(7)	(6)	(14)
Marxian	%:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
	(N):	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	(1)	0	(1)
Nonidentifiable	%:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	7	2	2	2
	(N):	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	(3)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(4)
None	%:	0	78	0	25	0	30	0	5	0	2	0	2	0	9
	(N):	0	(7)	)	(2)	0	(3)	)	(1)	0	(1)	0	(1)	0	(15)

articles lacking an identifiable paradigm, this suggests that funded research likely increases the <u>appearance</u> of methodological rigor. This does not, of course, mean that funded studies are of higher quality, or more "correct," or even that they are, in fact, more rigorous. It only suggests that the chances of obtaining funding may be perceived by researchers to be greater if the methodology gives the appearance of methodological rigor.

Third, the lack of significant difference in occurrence between funded and nonfunded research challenges the view that funded research leads to overrepresentation of the social factist paradigm. This suggests a possible normative influence external to the funding process which influences the acceptance of social factist paradigms. For if influence occurs through the funding process rather than by some external process, there should be either a significantly higher percentage of funded than nonfunded social-factist studies, or non-funded social-factist paradigms would also be expected to vary as a function of the variations in funding allocations, especially in the increasingly-funded years of 1969-77. This is because, judging from the literature reviewed in Chapter 2, government funding is considered by many observers to be an independent variable of sorts in researcher's choice of paradigm (e.g., Useem, 1976a). The underlying assumption of this literature is that without federal influence, there would be fewer social factist studies. Further, if federal sponsorship sets the trend for <u>all</u> research, the nonfunded research should reflect (e.g., co-vary with) trends in funded research. Such, however, is not the case. Not only is there no paradigmatic plurality over the 18

year period, but the social factist paradigm has remained dominant
throughout.

The marginally greater percentage of social factist paradigms in
funded over nonfunded research may be a function of the significantly
greater difference in nonfunded social research which proceeds from
no identifiable paradigm in that the epistemological assumptions of
these nonparadigmatic studies were, in most cases, identical to the
social facts paradigm, even though the studies were not classifiable
in accordance with the definition employed for classification,

Fourth, despite the development of alternative paradigms in
the last decade, there has been no significant shift in either funded
or nonfunded policing research, although funded research has a more
than three-to-two ratio over nonfunded studies grounded in a social
constructionist paradigm, suggesting that funding may not discourage
employment of alternative paradigms and, in fact, may encourage them.
One possible explanation for this (which will be developed further in
Section C) may be as Lipset and others have suggested, that so-called
alternative paradigms are not necessarily inconsistent with ideologies
allegedly favored by federal agencies.

Finally, there is a conspicuous absence of Marxian and critical
paradigm usage which contributes to the conservative image of federal
agencies and the research they sponsor. Whether this absence reflects
exclusion by funders or avoidance of funding opportunities by Marxian
and critical researchers is difficult to determine. It may also be
possible that researchers adopting these perspectives are less likely
to study police.

In sum, there seems to be no apparent impact of federal funding upon research paradigms. The data from Table 2 suggest that the social factist paradigm is dominant in both categories of research, and if anything, funding may encourage research from alternative paradigms. It seems safe to conclude, at least tentatively, that federal funding may not be a primary shaper or determinant of paradigm choice.

2. Data Manipulation. The dominant mode of processing data in the studies examined was statistical manipulation,* as summarized in Table 3. The so-called "aura of science" associated with statistical manipulation is often assumed to be favored by funding agencies. From the data it would appear that this may not always be the case, since there is little difference between the percentage of funded and nonfunded studies employing some statistical technique. This suggests that the belief that funding agencies are committed to a quantitative numbers game may require reassessment, and that the opposite may, in fact, be the case.

(Insert Table 3 About Here)

Further, a scant one percent of nonfunded studies contained any historical discussion whatsoever, and no funded studies did. Data manipulation consistently reflected static, a historical interpretion. In sum, funding seems to reflect existing preferences for data manipulation of the research community rather than a particular form favored by funding agencies.

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*Statistical manipulation refers to the adoption of either descriptive or inferential statistical techniques, or to simple quantitative juxtaposition of data.

Table 3: Data Manipulation Summary

Distribution of Data Manipulation techniques by three-year periods, percentage (%)* and number (n),** for funded (f) and nonfunded (nf) policing studies, 1960-1977.

Technique of Data Manipulation		1960-1962 f	1960-1962 nf	1963-1965 f	1963-1965 nf	1966-1968 f	1966-1968 nf	1969-1971 f	1969-1971 nf	1972-1974 f	1972-1974 nf	1975-1977 f	1975-1977 nf	Totals 1960-1977 f	Totals 1960-1977 nf
Statistical	%:	0	0	40	25	60	30	33	75	62	65	71	68	57	60
	(N):	0	0	(4)	(2)	(3)	(3)	(1)	(15)	(8)	(34)	(10)	(45)	(26)	(99)
Ethnographic	%:	0	0	10	0	40	10	67	0	8	3	7	6	15	4
	(N):	0	0	(1)	0	(2)	(1)	(2)	0	(1)	(2)	(1)	(4)	(7)	(7)
Historical Interpretation	%:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	3	0	1
	(N):	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	(1)	0	(2)	0	(3)
Marxian	%:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	1
	(N):	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	(1)	0	(1)
General Essay	%:	0	78	20	50	0	50	0	20	15	19	14	14	13	24
	(N):	0	(7)	(2)	(4)	0	(5)	0	(4)	(2)	(10)	(2)	(9)	(6)	(39)
Other	%:	0	11	0	13	0	0	0	0	15	6	14	8	9	6
	(N):	0	(1)	0	(1)	0	0	0	0	(2)	(3)	(2)	(5)	(4)	(10)
None	%:	100	11	30	13	0	10	0	5	0	3	0	6	9	6
	(N):	(1)	(1)	3	(1)	0	(1)	0	(1)	0	(2)	0	(4)	(4)	(10)

*Percentages rounded upwards to nearest whole percent.
**Some studies used more than one form of data manipulation, resulting in total percentages of over 100%.

3. <u>Theory</u>. Given the overwhelming predominance of the social-
factist paradigm, it is not surprising that the date in <u>Table 4</u>
reveal the use of positivist/nomological-deductive meta-theoretical
perspectives, as a conception of explanation in both categories of
research. But contrary to the expectation that researchers ground
their inquiry within this perspective in order to <u>tailor</u> their
discourse to the perceived needs of the sponsoring agency (which
implies that this perspective is not the <u>normal</u> perspective), funded
research reflects this theoretical perspective nearly 10 percent
<u>less</u> than funded research. In addition, although the positivist/
nomological-deductive perspective is the dominant perspective, it
represents for funded studies less than one-half the total, with
qualitative interactionist studies reflecting about a quarter of
the theoretical perspectives. By contrast, nonfunded research
proceeded from this perspective in over 50 percent of the articles.
Interestingly, while virtually <u>all</u> funded research was informed by
<u>some</u> theoretical framework, 16 percent of nonfunded inquiry was
uninformed by any coherent or explicit theory.

(Insert <u>Table 4</u> About Here)

The greater theoretical diversity among funded studies suggests
that federal funding may, in fact, allow rather than discourage
theoretical pluralism, while the lack of such diversity among non-
funded studies may reflect reliance on existing normative models.
There are no obvious trends between 1960-77, and there is certainly
no indication that use of the positivist model has increased as a

Table 4: Theory Distribution

Distribution of Theoretical Perspectives by three-year periods, percentage (%)* and number (n) for funded (f) and nonfunded (nf) policing studies, 1960-1977.

Year		1960-1962 f	1960-1962 nf	1963-1965 f	1963-1965 nf	1966-1968 f	1966-1968 nf	1969-1971 f	1969-1971 nf	1972-1974 f	1972-1974 nf	1975-1977 f	1975-1977 nf	Totals 1960-1977 f	Totals 1960-1977 nf
Positivism/nomological-deductive	%:	0	0	50	25	40	40	33	75	31	56	57	68	44	53
	(N):	0		(5)	(2)	(2)	(4)	(1)	(15)	(4)	(29)	(8)	(38)	(20)	(88)
Existential/phenomenological	%:	0	0	10	0	40	10	67	0	0	2	0	3	11	2
	(N):			(1)		(2)	(1)	(2)			(1)		(2)	(5)	(4)
Interactionist	%:	0	0	30	0	20	10	0	5	46	14	21	15	28	12
	(N):			(3)		(1)	(1)		(1)	(6)	(7)	(3)	(10)	(13)	(19)
Conflict	%:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	1
	(N):										(1)				(1)
Exchange	%:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	1
	(N):										(1)		0		(1)
Marxian	%:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
	(N):												(1)		(1)
Structural/Functionalist	%:	0	11	0	25	0	10	0	0	23	2	7	5	9	5
			(1)		(2)		(1)			(3)	(1)	(1)	(3)	(4)	(8)
Other	%:	100	11	10	0	0	0	0	5	0	14	14	12	9	10
	(N):	(1)	(1)	(1)					(1)		(7)	(2)	(8)	(4)	(17)
None	%:	0	78	0	50	0	30	0	15	0	10	0	6	0	16
	(N):		(7)		(4)		(3)		(3)		(5)		(4)		(26)

*Percentages have been rounded to nearest whole percent.

response to increased funding. The contention, then, that funding generates a reliance on positivist modes (Galliher and McCartney, 1973; Useem, 1976a) should be reexamined. Parenthetically, the claim heard so often in the 1960's and early 1970's that functionalism was the dominant paradigm for the social sciences throughout the 1960's, is, for policing research at least, totally unfounded; only six percent of the combined research during this period reflected the functionalist position.

4. <u>Problematic</u>. Problematic refers to the focal point of analysis. It is the general problem around which inquiry is organized. This category seems more useful than either "topic" or "variable," both of which are too narrow. A topic could be, for example, "ethnic injustice," and dependent variable could be "arrest rates" or "reports of policy brutality." The concept of problematic, on the other hand, is the focal point of research and allows for the management of an otherwise unruly number of separate, and otherwise dissimilar, topics or variables by subsuming them within a single category that captures the essential features of similarity between them.

Given the "crime-crisis" atmosphere of the late 1960's, and the subsequent cornucopia of funds available for social research, it was expected that research problematics would reflect the critical social issues of crime, violence, civil rights, or other salient "crises" which served as the justification for Presidential commissions, research agencies (such as NILFCJ or the Ford Foundation sponsored Police Foundation) and research projects. If problematics are

determined by agency needs, it would be expected that funded research would be clustered around a small number of issues directly bearing on the mission of funding agencies (particularly LEAA), and that nonfunded research would reflect a reasonably wide range of issues more-or-less less evenly, with less emphasis on applied and more on knowledge-building research than funded. These expectations were unfulfilled.

(Insert Tables 5 and 6 About Here)

First, the data from Tables 5 and 6 do not reflect any of the major social crises of the 1960's, or early 1970's. The relationship of police and policing to problematic issues of the Vietnam War, civil rights, student activism, social movements, poverty and even crime itself are underrepresented in both funded and nonfunded research. Roughly one-third of both categories of research addressed some aspect of police/community relations, and 17 percent of funded (and only one percent of nonfunded) research addressed the problem of offenders. Although issues of policy, strategy and tactics for crime control were occasionally addressed as technical studies in nonsocial studies (e.g., "utility of two-way radios in beat patrol"), these were not common within social research. This suggests that, despite the possibility that knowledge production expenditures and funding activity and policies may themselves be prompted by a partic- ular social crises, it may not be the case that this in turn leads directly or necessarily to the successful penetration of the priorities

Table 5: Problematics (Total Number)

Number of problematics appearing in funded (f) and nonfunded (nf) policing studies, 1960-1977.

Year / Problematic	1960-1962	1963-1965	1966-1968	1969-1971	1972-1974	1975-1977	Totals 1960-1977
Police Work N: (e.g., characteristics of work, how police perform, what they "really do")	0 (1)	(4) 0	(2) 0	2 0	(2) (6)	(4) (4)	(14) (11)
Characteristics of Police N:	0 (1)	(2) (3)	(2) (3)	(1) (6)	(3) (30)	(1) (36)	(9) (79)
Police Agencies N:	(1) (6)	(2) (4)	(1) (3)	0 (3)	(1) (5)	(3) (8)	(8) (29)
Policy Issues N:	0 (1)	(1) (1)	0 (1)	0 0	(1) (1)	(2) (3)	(4) (7)
Offenders N:	0 0	(2) 0	(1) 0	0 0	(4) (1)	(1) (1)	(8) (2)
Public Relations/ Clients N:	0 (3)	0 (1)	(2) (3)	0 (11)	(4) (14)	(2) (17)	(8) (49)
Ethnic or gender within policing agencies N:	0 0	(1) 0	0 0	0 0	0 (3)	(2) (1)	(3) (4)
Other N:	0 0	(1) 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 (3)	(1) (3)

Table 6: Problematics (Percentages)

Percentage* of journals reflecting particular problematics in funded (f) and nonfunded (nf) policing studies, 1960-77.**

Year Problematic	1960-1962		1963-1965		1966-1968		1969-1971		1972-1974		1975-1977		Totals 1960-1977	
Police Work (e.g., characteristics of work, how police perform, what they "really do") %:	0	11	40	0	20	0	67	0	15	12	29	6	30	8
Characteristics of police %:	0	11	20	38	40	30	33	30	23	58	7	55	20	48
Police Agencies %:	100	67	20	50	20	30	0	15	8	10	21	12	17	18
Policy Issues %:	0	11	10	13	0	10	0	0	8	2	14	3	9	4
Offenders %:	0	0	20	0	20	0	0	0	31	2	7	2	17	1
Public Relations/ Clients %:	0	33	0	13	40	30	0	55	31	27	14	26	17	30
Ethnic or gender within policing agencies %:	0	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	14	2	7	2
Other %	0	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	2	2

*Percentages have been rounded to nearest whole percent.

**Totals exceed 100 percent because some journals reflected more than one problematic. Percentage was calculated by dividing total number of problematics in each chronological category by the number of policing studies within that category.

of federal agencies into the selection process of objects for social analysis.

Second, the data do not describe a pattern which indicates pluralism among problematics. Nearly half of the nonfunded articles were clustered around the problematic of police characteristics, two-and-a-half times more than funded studies. Approximately one-fourth of funded research focused on policy work (e.g., characteristics of police work, what police "actually do"), followed by characteristics of police personnel and the nature of police organizational structure. Despite the 39 percent cluster of funded studies around public relations issues, funded research appears to be distributed far more evenly than nonfunded. Judging from the data, it would appear that it may be premature to conclude that funding of police studies necessarily generates social research clustered around a few specific agency-defined problems or topics aimed at state-mediation of social conflict. This suggests that federally funded research has not led to the dominance of a particular set of questions of funding agencies or channelled the focus, especially of funded, but also of nonfunded, research to address primarily those problems which are consistent with a narrowly specified mission of a particular funding agency.

Third, the overwhelming abundance of seemingly benign topics and the scant percentage of studies focusing on policing policies or strategies for social control by either category of research suggests that funding is not as directly instrumental in maintaining the status quo or establishing power and domination as sometimes suggested by critics cited in Chapter 2. On the other hand, the lack of apparent knowledge-building around crucial issues of police

strategy and policy suggests that funded research may not be as

efficacious as assumed in providing useful information (or if a

subjective observation be permitted, any relevant information at all).

As White and Krislov (1977) have cogently argued, the primary

assumption of the creation of LEAA and NILECJ was that the "crime

war" could be "won" if sufficient resources were committed, and

knowledge production was seen as one of the critical weapons in

this war. Judging from the data, at the level of social knowledge

production at least, commitment and expenditure do not necessarily

produce the intended results. Whatever the ideological implications

of policing research, it is clear that funded research has not led

to a surge of policing studies which would appear to either dangerously

threaten civil liberties or suppress social or individual behavior.*

Nor has it led to studies which provide particularly innovative or

profound insights or analytic expansion of the relationship between

policing and society, as judged by the research questions chosen and

results obtained (see, e.g., White and Krislov, 1977).

Fourth, and perhaps most important, it is not what actually has

been studied by social scientists that is significant, but rather

what has not been examined. While the data do not demonstrate an

obvious intrusion of either federal or social control values into

the research process, neither do they indicate an abundance of

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*The same has not been true for other areas such as penal control
and especially domestic political surveillance and related forms of
social control, which have been criticized as being both a threat to
civil rights and often illegal.

criticism of present day policing studies. For example, studies of the relationship between agencies of social control and the suppression of problems are nonexistent, as are issues of police corruption, police surveillance, and other topics that might focus on police themselves as a social problem. There is a startling paucity of critical, or even moderately reformist research inquiring into the role of police, not only as the only dominant agent of force in U.S. society, but also into problems which police themselves may create, or even into the possibility that the police mandate or the police themselves may be problematic. A certain "common sense" view may suggest why _funded_ studies ignore such issues (the bone-proferring hand is not often bitten, although this, too, may be an unwarranted assumption), but it does not explain why nonfunded studies should ignore such issues. Neither does it explain why nonfunded studies would seem, in fact, to be more consistent with the needs of police and funding agencies than do funded studies.

CONCLUSION

Although the _dramatic_ nature of the relationship between social science and federal funding may be exaggerated by the relatively few researchers who are awarded enormous sums to conduct agency-specified problems, or who may, in fact, as Useem (1976a) has suggested, tailor their studies to fit the agency, a content analysis of five major journals does not support the contention that funding affects research procedures in policing social research. There is no evidence to support the hypotheses that funded research (a) encourages recipients

to adopt a positivist approach, (b) influences recipients to choose
narrowly defined problematics to fit policy needs of agencies,
(c) leads to an increasing use of statistical data manipulation,
or (d) threatens the independence of social research at the technical
level because of accepting "official" categories of discourse.

The predominant features of both funded and nonfunded categories
of research included (a) objectivistic, theoretical and methodological
procedures which seek to reproduce passive conceptions of a social
reality that occurs independently of any activity of the knower;
(b) a reductionist view of the social world that assumes that the
relationship between policing activity and society can be known in
accordance with "traditional science" or it cannot be known at all;
(c) a-historical research that fails to develop the historical
interconnections between features of social reality as a product of
human activity; and (d) an uncritical acceptance of common sense
definitions of authority, police, control, attitudes, or for that
matter, "research" and "knowledge." If the data here are representa-
tive, funded and nonfunded research differ very little, and if there
is a danger in federal sponsorship, it is not located in federal
support of the scientific process, but in the normative characteristics
of researchers who accept such support.

It must be emphasized that even should additional evidence
consistently support the claim that federal funding has no substantial
direct impact on politicizing methodological issues in social research,
or that funding does not itself politicize either funded research or
research in general, this in no way suggests that funded research is
"impartial," nonideological, or pluralistic. It merely suggests

that funding is not a decisive independent variable, and that the partiality and ideological issues may be understood by examining the socio-political relations which occur <u>outside</u> of the funding process.

The data, in fact, indicate that <u>research is politicized</u>, by whatever source, in that certain topics, questions, and modes of analysis are systematically excluded from <u>both</u> funded and nonfunded research alike. In fact, the two categories are alike enough to be examined as a single category.

What is at stake, then, is the location of the source of such politicization. First, the data presented may refute the view that social science is objective, disinterested activity, because the studies do not address a multiplicity of "human needs" or social conflicts. They address instead very narrow topics which, if not in the "interests" of funding agencies, are certainly not in conflict with those interests or with dominant political, social or institutional structures of society. Nor can the dominant practice of social science be termed a "moral" enterprise, for not only are moral issues virtually excluded from research processes in the studies examined, but the moral issues surrounding features of police, policing and social control are equally ignored.

<u>Second</u>, although federal funding as an <u>activity</u> may reflect crises of contemporary capitalism and may be <u>symbolic</u> responses to these crises, the data do not support the contention that support leads necessarily to the production of knowledge which is capable, or even intended, to address those crises. These crises do not, in fact, appear to be significantly reflected in the research process itself. It should again be emphasized that this does <u>not</u> mean that

traditional modes of inquiry do not function to perpetuate a specific set of dominant social relations and ideological interpretations. It merely suggests that such modes are not the <u>direct</u> <u>expression</u> of a dominant group manipulating research through the activity of federal funding.

The data seem to support, at least tentatively, the view that the scientific process itself is politicized, but this politicization does not come from funding activity. It may be suggested that this extrinsic source is <u>normative</u> in that it seems to derive from the perspective of the researcher rather than from imposed criteria, which introduces research characteristics derived from world views, ontological presuppositions and ideological justifications. This does not mean, as Salomon (1973) has argued, that the economic form of society or specific groups or reigning ideologies are not constituent features of the politicization process, for this assumption remains to be demonstrated. It suggests, rather, the next step of demonstrating the <u>ideological</u> implications of traditional social research, and of identifying the <u>social</u> <u>origins</u> of operant ideologies.

Section II: Ideology and Funding

The first ideological level is that of overt political content reflected in policing research. This includes topic, problematic, direction taken towards police, and explicit political orientation and stance toward established social order. The ideology derived from the practitioner influences not only research procedures, but discourse as well. Because funded research is judged to affect the

ideology of the practitioner by encouraging adherence to agency

mission and needs, we would expect the ideology of funded to differ

from nonfunded research in the direction of a) increased conservatism

(e.g., supportive of police), b) lack of procedural, thematic, or

conceptual innovation and c) consistency with agency purpose.

The data previously summarized in Tables 5 and 6 suggested that

the problematic of policing research differs little between funded

and nonfunded research. Although this does not necessarily mean

that there are no ideological differences between funded and non-

funded research which affects selection of problematic, it does

suggest that even should ideological differences occur, they do not

seem to directly penetrate the selection process. The differences

in ideological content may be further examined by focusing on four

additional salient features of policing research: a) general purpose,

b) view of police mandate, c) direction towards police, and d)

relationship of research to existing social relations.

A. <u>General Purpose</u>. The purpose is the ostensible intent for

which the research was conducted. Sometimes the purpose is explicitly

stated by the researcher, but most often purpose must be inferred

from the direction of the discussion or from the organization of

the data. Classification of a purpose is not difficult if classifica-

tion is not limited to only one purpose for a single article, which

prevents possible arbitrary classification when two or more purposes

are intended.

If funded research encourages researchers to shape research

procedures according to the needs of the funding agency, then three

expectations should be fulfilled. <u>First</u>, there should be significant difference between purposes of funded and nonfunded research, with funded research tending to be oriented more towards technical or policy research, and less towards critique, theory generation and category and typology building. <u>Second</u>, in all research there should be a dominant (arbitrarily defined as two-thirds) ratio of fact-finding, hypothesis-testing oriented research over other types. Judging from the results of other studies (e.g., Useem, 1976a, Galliher and McCartney, 1973), the federal government encourages "hard" data fact-finding, or other forms of research that may be readily applied to agency needs. This suggests that funded research more than nonfunded research will reflect this in the purpose of the research. <u>Finally</u>, one would expect a significant difference between policy-oriented and instrumental research in the funded and nonfunded categories. Conventional theorists (e.g., Useem, Baritz, McCartney) Critical Theorists (e.g., Habermas, 1972a, 1972b, 1974, 1975; Schroyer, 1975) and Marxian political economists (e.g., Baran and Sweezy, 1968; O'Connor, 1973; Schulman, Brown and Kahn, 1972) have argued that sponsoring agencies tend to require research results that are practical, that may be incorporated into policy or serve agency mandate, or that, at root, provide a potential instrumental function.

(Add Table 7 About Here)

The data from Table 7 challenge these expectations. First, the overwhelming majority of sponsored articles reflects some facet of extension of empirical limits, to include hypothesis testing (74

Table 7: General Purpose Distribution

Distribution of General Purpose Reflected in Police Studies by three-year periods, percentage (Z)* and number (n), for funded (f) and nonfunded (nf) policing studies, 1960-1977.**

Year:		1960-1962		1963-1965		1966-1968		1969-1971		1972-1974		1975-1977		Totals 1960-1977	
		f	nf	f	nf	f	nf	f	nf	f	nf	f	nf	f	nf
Generating Theory	Z	100	0	30	13	0	10	67	0	15	4	7	11	20	7
	(N)	(1)	0	(3)	(1)	0	(1)	(2)	0	(2)	(2)	(1)	(7)	(9)	(11)
Critique	Z	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	2	0	2	2	1
	(N)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	(1)	(1)	0	(1)	(1)	(2)
Fact/Finding Data Gathering, Hypoth- esis Testing	Z	0	11	60	50	100	40	100	75	77	83	71	79	74	72
	(N)	0	(1)	(6)	(4)	(5)	(4)	(3)	(15)	(10)	(43)	(10)	(52)	(34)	(119)
Category and Typol- ogy Building	Z	0	0	10	0	0	10	0	5	0	1	7	5	4	4
	(N)	0	0	(1)	0	0	(1)	0	(1)	0	(2)	(1)	(3)	(2)	(7)
Advocacy	Z	0	78	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	6	7	2	4	8
	(N)	0	(7)	0	0	0	0	0	0	(1)	(3)	(1)	(1)	(2)	(11)
Clarification of Theory, Principles	Z	0	11	10	13	20	10	0	15	15	14	0	9	9	12
	(N)	0	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	0	(3)	(2)	(7)	0	(6)	(4)	(19)
Policy/Technical Development Instrumental	Z	0	33	20	63	20	30	0	10	23	12	14	8	17	15
	(N)	0	(3)	(2)	(5)	(1)	(3)	0	(2)	(3)	(6)	(2)	(5)	(8)	(24)
Essay-General Discussion	Z	0	0	0	0	0	10	0	0	0	2	7	0	2	1
	(N)	0	0	0	0	0	(1)	0	0	0	(1)	(1)	0	(1)	(2)
Other	Z	0	0	20	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0
	(N)	0	0	(2)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	(2)	0

*Percentages have been rounded to nearest whole percent.

**Totals exceed 100 percent because some journals reflected more than one purpose.

Percentage was calculated by dividing total number of purposes in each chronological category by the number of policing studies within that category.

percent). There is, however, no significant divergence from the purpose of nonfunded articles (72 percent).

A second and somewhat surprising finding indicated that the frequency of policy-oriented, instrumental studies differed little between funded (17 percent) and nonfunded (15 percent). Not only was the frequency insignificant, the purpose of instrumental and policy-oriented analysis was (although the data were not tabulated to precisely indicate this) often a secondary intention.

Third, it was expected that the intention of generating theory would be relatively ignored among funded studies, and that it would occur significantly less than among nonfunded articles because of the alleged emphasis of applied as opposed to basic research among nonfunded practitioners. The intention of generating theory, however, occurred three times more often (20 percent, compared with 17 percent among funded studies, suggesting that contrary to some critics (e.g., Nicolaus), funding may not discourage researchers from addressing theoretical issues.

In the remaining six categories of purpose, there was virtually no significant difference between the funded and nonfunded research. The data, then, appear to offer tentative evidence to indicate that if sponsorship does draw the researcher into alleged agency purpose of molding research to agency need and purposes, either this effect is not as direct as is assumed, or the agency purpose does not differ from the purposes of nonfunded researchers.

B. <u>View of Police</u>. View of police refers to the function or primary mandate imputed to police by researchers, as reflected in

journal articles. The views were divided into three mutually-exclusive categories: 1) Civil servant/peacekeeping, in which police are viewed as "of the people," serving and responding to basic civil needs as civil servants responsible to the people of the community; 2) social control agents in which police are viewed as being "above" society, responsible for maintaining social order, independent of needs (this included the view that "order" was a civil need); and 3) "objective" or "ambiguous," which included those studies which attempted to be value neutral, as well as those which reflected vague views which took no stand regarding the role or the mandate of police.

This category attempts to identify what Lasswell (1965: 10-11) has identified as _miranda_, things to be admired (as opposed to _credenda_, things to be believed). _Miranda_ are symbols of sentiments and identification, and function to arouse admiration and enthusiasm, setting forth and strengthening loyalties. "View of police," then, may reflect a body of sentiments that could possibly influence research, and it might be expected that funded research, as ostensibly "pro-police," would reflect pro-police sentiment considerably more than nonfunded studies. The category is useful for two reasons. First, the image of police may define what questions are included or excluded from research. For example, viewing police as agencies of social control challenges the image of institutionalized force service "the people" democratically and impartially. As a consequence, the _sources_ of police power, of forms of particularistic legislative coercion which policy may embody, and of discretionary police practice which may control some groups or protect particular interests at the expense of others. _Second_, the view of police may serve to sustain or subvert both established views

of policing, and of ways of studying police. The posited view of a

particular topic reflects a form of ideology in that it submits an

appearance of the topic, such that analysis becomes what Horkheimer

(1978: 187) has called the "analysis of necessary appearance";

questions, problems and solutions become intertwined with an ideo-

logical perspective of what police are and what they do. By examining

the imagery perpetuated in funded and nonfunded articles, it should

be possible to identify differences in ideological views of police,

if any, assumed to exist between recipients of funding and their

nonfunded colleagues.

(Add Table 8 About Here)

Although no conclusive trends emerge, there is little profound

difference between funded and nonfunded views of police. The most

striking feature of the data is the degree to which studies are

"objective" in that they take no predefined view of police social role

or function. Although there is a slight difference between funded

(48 percent) and nonfunded (53 percent) studies proceeding from an

objective stance, the difference is inconclusive. One conclusion from

this may be that under the so-called guise of value-neutrality, the

existing arrangements of policing are left unexamined, and the justifi-

cations of these arrangements are not challenged. The result is the

elimination of whatever critical or innovative research might otherwise

be possible by posing policing organization or activity as problematic.

One might have expected, judging particularly from the perspective

that views state-funded research as a tool for creating appropriate

Table 8: View of Police

Distribution of View of Police by three-year periods, percentage (%) and number (n), for funded (f) and nonfunded (nf) policing studies, 1960-1977.

Year:		1960-1962		1963-1965		1966-1968		1969-1971		1972-1974		1975-1977		Totals 1960-1977	
Civil Servant/ Peace Keeping	%	0	33	10	25	60	40	100	40	23	17	7	6	24	18
	(N)	0	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(3)	(8)	(3)	(9)	(1)	(4)	(11)	(30)
Social Control	%	0	22	20	13	20	10	0	0	8	0	14	2	13	3
	(N)	0	(2)	(2)	(1)	(1)	(1)	0	0	(1)	0	(2)	(1)	(6)	(5)
Ambiguous Towards Civil Servant	%	0	33	10	25	20	10	0	25	8	27	7	15	9	21
	(N)	0	(3)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(1)	0	(5)	(1)	(14)	(1)	(10)	(4)	(35)
Ambiguous Toward Control	%	0	0	20	13	0	10	0	0	0	6	7	5	7	5
	(N)	0	0	(2)	(1)	0	(1)	0	0	0	(3)	(1)	(3)	(3)	(8)
Objectives (i.e., None Obvious or Ambiguous)	%	100	11	40	25	0	30	0	35	62	50	64	73	48	53
	(N)	(1)	(1)	(4)	(2)	0	(3)	0	(7)	(8)	(26)	(9)	(48)	(22)	(87)

social control mechanisms, that as a result of the social disorders
and heightened police visibility and apparent changing mandate in
dealing with those disorders, that a reasonable hypothesis would be
that there would have been greater focus on police agents of social
control and less on police as civil-servant/peacekeepers. This is
not the case. There is, however, beginning around 1972, a more
consistently "objective" stance in both sponsored and nonsponsored
research. Whether this reflects explicit political ideology or
so-called methodological neutrality is impossible to determine from
this data.

C. Direction. Direction refers to the practical attitude or
the underlying value orientations of the researcher toward the police.
In content analysis, these are conventionally broken down into
defense, acceptance, or opposition, and correspond to supportive,
objective, and conflict/advocacy categories used in this study.
Unlike the "view of police" category, which classifies and tabulates
the function of police without regard to the underlying value implica-
tions which may be included, direction entails tabulation of the value
orientations of the researcher, and the category also enables
identification of Miranda discussed previously. It was expected that
(1) funded research would tend to reflect the alleged needs, orienta-
tions and ideology of the funders and to be highly supportive of
police, or at least significantly more supportive than nonfunded
studies; (2) nonfunded studies would tend to be objective more
often, and (3) nonfunded research would reflect significantly greater
criticism of, or reformist notions toward, police and policing.

(Insert Table 9 About Here)

The data in Table 8 challenge all three expectations. First, although funded research tends to be slightly more supportive of police than nonfunded (35 percent compared with 30 percent), the difference is inconclusive, and certainly far less than expected. Second, although there is some difference between nonfunded and funded studies reflecting a "value-neutral" stance (66 percent compared to 57 percent), both categories represent the bulk of the studies for each category, suggesting that funding may not lead necessarily to the recipient adopting the view of the funding agency (assuming, of course, that the view of the funding agencies which support policing research tend to be supportive, rather than subversive of police). Also surprising is the finding that neither funded nor nonfunded research is particularly in conflict with, or opposed to, police or policing. Particularly surprising, in fact, was the finding that funded research tended to be twice as prone to criticized or reformist urges than nonfunded although the low N in this category makes any generalization difficult.

Although it was not an original hypothesis, one curious finding was the trend prior to and after 1968. Prior to 1968, both funded and nonfunded tended to lean in the direction of support for police, but after 1968, this sharply decreased, while the trend in objective direction increased especially in the years 1972-1977. If the view held by both the public and by the police of police and policing activity changed as social conditions required development of new strategies and presentation of new image of police, it is not

Table 9: Orientation Towards Police

Distribution of Orientation Towards Police (Direction) by three-year periods, percentage (%) and number (n), for funded (f) and nonfunded (nf) policing studies, 1960-1977.

		1960-1962 f	1960-1962 nf	1963-1965 f	1963-1965 nf	1966-1968 f	1966-1968 nf	1969-1971 f	1969-1971 nf	1972-1974 f	1972-1974 nf	1975-1977 f	1975-1977 nf	Totals 1960-1977 f	Totals 1960-1977 nf
Supportive	% (N)	100 (1)	67 (6)	80 (8)	25 (2)	60 (3)	50 (5)	33 (1)	35 (7)	15 (2)	27 (14)	7 (1)	23 (15)	35 (16)	30 (49)
Objective	% (N)	0 0	11 (1)	20 (2)	63 (5)	40 (2)	50 (5)	33 (1)	60 (12)	77 (10)	69 (36)	79 (11)	76 (50)	57 (26)	66 (109)
Reform Advocacy (Conflict)	% (N)	0 0	22 (2)	0 0	13 (1)	0 0	0 0	33 (1)	5 (1)	8 (1)	4 (2)	14 (2)	2 (1)	9 (4)	4 (7)

unreasonable to have expected that research trends would conform, at least modestly, to those changing social features of the 1960s. That is, as the role of police increasingly became challenged by "the public," these changing attitudes ought to have been reflected in policing research as well.

Surprisingly, there was no discernible trend in the direction of reform/conflict (or opposition) between 1960-77, even though changes in research attitudes towards police might have been expected as a result of the social conflicts of the late 1960s, during which police were highly visible as a means of social control. If it is true, as some critics of federal sponsorship suggest, that federally-sponsored studies tend to support police (as a mechanism of social control) more than nonsponsored studies, then one would expect that nonfunded studies would be more likely to be critical of police than nonfunded. As Table 9 suggests, such is not the case.

D. Status quo.* Finally, one measure of political ideology is the degree to which funded and nonfunded studies differ in their stance towards existing social relations. At the most fundamental level, ideology is defined as that set of justifications and images which account for existing social and political arrangements. Even (or perhaps especially) "value-free" research may be supportive of existing arrangements, or may challenge such arrangements. That is, because a study poses as "objective" or "neutral," this does not mean it may not be either supportive or subversive of existing social order.

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*A study would be considered a challenge to the status quo if it challenges the a) mandate of police, b) function, role or strategies of police support, or in turn which support the police.

It was expected that funded research would be far more conserva-
tive than nonfunded research for several reasons. First, according
to capitalist-state and traditional theorists alike, researchers
tend to structure the research project to the perceived needs of
the agency. This implies that funded studies will not be likely to
rock the boat, and that there should be a marked difference in the
discursive, intellectual and ideological tenor between funded and
nonfunded studies. That is, it is reasonable to expect nonfunded
studies to rock the boat more than funded studies. But such an
expectation is not the case.

(Insert Table 10 About Here)

The data reveal virtually no difference between funded and
nonfunded studies. Both are overwhelmingly conservative in that
neither "rocks the boat." While the accusation that funded research
is essentially conservative is supported by the data in Table 10,
there is no support for the correlary that nonfunded research is
less conservative. Both funded and nonfunded research are essentially
conservative in that neither pose as problematic the underlying
assumptions, justifications, power structures, or general sets of
social arrangements which underlie policing activity. It is difficult
to conclude that funding encourages servility, since nonfunded research
is as strongly protective of the status quo (if not more so) than
funded research, and equally open to the accusation of servility.

In sum, judging from the data presented here, there is no
conclusive evidence to indicate that funding shapes the political

Table 10: Status Quo Orientation

Distribution of Status Quo Orientation by three-year periods, percentage (%) and number (n) for funded (f) and nonfunded (nf) policing studies, 1960–1977.

Year:	1960–1962		1963–1965		1966–1968		1969–1971		1972–1974		1975–1977		Totals 1960–1977	
	f	nf	f	nf	f	nf	f	nf	f	nf	f	nf	f	nf
Yes % (N)	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	8 (1)	0 0	0 0	1 (1)	2 (1)	1 (1)
No % (N)	100 (1)	100 (9)	100 (10)	100 (8)	100 (5)	100 (10)	100 (3)	100 (20)	92 (12)	100 (52)	100 (14)	99 (65)	98 (45)	99 (164)

<u>content</u> of research. It would appear that the political content of social science policing research is not "perniciously" penetrated by the needs of the funding agency, by the direct requisites of state-sponsored system-maintenance, or by researchers "on the take." The content of policing research appears to reflect the dominant ideology of the social sciences, nothing more, nothing less. Any criticisms of the ideology funded policing studies, at least as evidenced by the data presented here, should be extended to the entire field of social science.

But if the political <u>content</u> of funded and nonfunded policing research does not significantly differ, it remains to be seen whether there might not be some other source of ideological penetration that might help, in part, to understand the ideological similarity between funded and nonfunded research. That is, by identifying some shared characteristic at the conceptual or procedural level, it may be at least somewhat clearer why there are such similarities between funded and nonfunded research.

Chapter 6
Conclusion

INTRODUCTION

This project has attempted to examine the impact of federal funding upon policing research by examining the sponsorship of activity of one government agency, NILECJ, and by juxtaposing with this examination an analysis of funded and nonfunded policing studies in six policing journals. Examining federal funding of policing research within a sociology of knowledge context allowed for an examination of the potential influence of one particular social factor, federal funding, on the production of scientific knowledge. It also allowed for an examination of the possible ideological basis of knowledge production, the operation of the state as it becomes organized for the production of scientific knowledge, and the production of ideological orientations, as embedded in procedures and content of inquiry, that may shape how the social world is conceptualized and interpreted.

This study attempted to overcome the subject-object distinction by viewing knowledge production, not as an epiphenomenon, but rather as a constituent feature of social life that both mediates and in turn is mediated by other forms of social organization (e.g., state power and apparatus, social conflict, societal norms, ideology). It attempted to avoid both the objectivism of positivism and the subjectivism of neo-Kantian approaches by viewing knowledge production from the dual perspective of an outcome (i.e., the content analysis) that embodied

and reflected social processes and social thought (i.e., the organizational analysis). This reflects a transcendence of the studies cited in Chapter 2 by 1) pointing to the operation of the state as a crucial component in the production of scientific knowledge, an understanding of which should be a sine qua non for a contemporary sociology of knowledge; 2) identifying selected social relations underlying the support of one particular form of scientific knowledge; 3) viewing knowledge production not solely as the arduous trek towards an idealized concept of "truth," but as possibly shaped by concrete material forces such as researcher ideology, state power, or state apparatus; and 4) introducing an ideological component into the analysis of knowledge production that derives from an examination of the content of the outcomes of research rather than from the subjective status imputed to the researcher.

Three general conclusions were drawn in this study. First, it does not appear that federal funding significantly shapes policing social research by influencing selection of procedures, theoretical orientation or by shaping content. Second, the contention by many observers that state funding produces necessarily conservative research more so than does nonfunded research appears a precipitous judgment. Finally, the view that policing research is directly tied to, or reflects a unilinear expression of state power or a "ruling class" is untenable. These three conclusions were developed in the appropriate chapters, but further exploratory discussion will indicate the significance of these findings and suggest directions for further research.

Even though the lack of significant differences between content
and procedures of funded and nonfunded policing studies do not appear
to be a direct function of the funding process, this does not assure
that so-called "scientific autonomy" prevails. The lack of varied
problematics and critical ideological perspectives suggests that
there may perhaps exist some more fundamental set of social factors,
perhaps at the normative level of the research community, that
systematically circumscribes procedures and content of research, or
leads to what has been described as the "faddist" nature of research
(e.g., Rein, 1976: 25; Oromaner, 1968). The conclusion to be drawn
from this is that there appears to exist in both funded and nonfunded
research epistemological features which lead to an ideological ordering
of research which ultimately shape how problems are viewed, how research
might be applied, and most importantly, what shall be omitted from, or
included in, inquiry. Characteristics of ideology will be examined
at the epistemological level, and particular components of research,
those of paradigm and history, will be discussed.

Funded and nonfunded research share, as evidenced by the data
presented in Chapter 5, two features: 1) Both derive overwhelmingly
from what shall be defined below as "traditionally-bound theory," and
2) both are ahistorical. The paradigmatic and historical components
of inquiry have been selected for examination because both are salient
features of research, and are useful in comparing differences between
inquiry approaches.

PARADIGMS

The paradigm is the fundamental conceptual level at which ideological features penetrate. Locating each paradigm within its conceptualization of the subject and object of inquiry will allow for the grounding of the discussion within the three general traditions that were presented as useful for the sociology of knowledge context discussed in Chapter 1. Although Ritzer (1975) identifies four paradigms (social factist, social constructionist, social behaviorist and Marxian), the subject-object distinction between paradigms reduces the categories to three by subsuming social behaviorist under the social-factist position. The intent here is simply to provide a brief description of the nature of the three paradigms to clarify the subsequent discussion of the relevance of a specific paradigm to ideology, and how specific paradigms, as mechanisms for ordering cognition and discourse, reflect "traditional" thought.

1. <u>Social Factist</u>. Social factist approaches view people as controlled by "things," such as norms, values, or social control agencies, or by biological or other 'natural' determinants. This position views the program of inquiry as one of compiling facts, describing, identifying or correlating aspects or characteristics of either the content of knowledge, the production of knowledge, or of the products of knowledge themselves. The preferred methodologies tend to be quantitative indices, construction and employment of "objective" questionnaires or interviews, and they tend to avoid observational techniques requiring subjective interpretations, since

denial of subjective states as an ingredient of analysis is a primary feature for this position. The salient features of the social factist paradigm have been discussed in Chapter 1, and will not be repeated here. This paradigm maintains the subject-object distinction by attempting to reproduce in ideas a strictly objective order, an order independent of the knower, thus leading to a contemplative conception of knowledge in that it reflects a 'distinterested' conception of nature and activity that occurs independently of any activity of the knower.

2. <u>Social Constructionist</u>. The social constructionist paradigm focuses on the processes through which the subject constructs the social world. It includes studies of the subjective meaning of behavior (e.g., <u>Verstehen</u> approaches), how persons "make sense" of their world (e.g., ethnomethodology), how persons actively construct a social reality to present to others (e.g., dramaturgical analysis), and in general includes hermeneutics, phenomenology and most interactionist approaches. The social constructionist view maintains the subject-object dichotomy, described in Chapter 1, by excluding from analysis the manner through which persons create the deeper underlying meanings other than those more or less immediately present. That is, the social order, structures interaction, and ideological features shaping interaction, meaning and behavior are excluded. In preserving the <u>subject</u> of analysis, the <u>object</u> as well as the mediating factors operating between subject and object are lost.

3. <u>Paradigms and Traditional Theory</u>. In spite of their differences, both social factist and social constructionist positions share one

important feature: They both are examples of what has been called

traditional theory (e.g., Horkheimer, 1972), in that they both share

a conception of the social world in which the knowing subject is

severed from the object. This leads to what Horkheimer (1972: 197)

has criticized as detached science in which

> [Science] corresponds to the activity of the scholar which
> takes place alongside all the other activities of a society
> but in no immediately clear connection with them. In this
> view of theory, therefore, the real social function of
> science is not made manifest; it speaks not of what theory
> means in human life, but only of what it means in the isolated
> sphere in which, for historical reasons, it comes into existence.

Traditional theory contains an unrecognized dualism: On the

one hand, persons live within a specific form of social organization.

The two primary elements of this organization are culture and economic

relations which are the products of human activity in the present

historical moment. On the other hand, this social world, even though

it is a social product, is experienced as existing outside of, or as

subject to, nonhuman processes, laws and mechanisms, such as depression,

war, or even language. This latter side of social reality corresponds

to the abstract, reified and unrecognized organizational principles

which guide social activity: This is not the world of human activity,

but as critical theorists and Marxists alike suggest, "the world of

capital." The fatal problem in traditional theory is that it cannot

grasp the subjective element (i.e., social activity) of objective

phenomenon. For social factists, the genesis of "objective facts"

perpetuates an uncritical examination of the basis of social organiza-

tion, and for social-constructionists, the emphasis on subjective

structures or mental states perpetuates the acceptance of unproblem-
atic categories of reasons, of thought, and of concepts, or as
Horkheimer has summarized traditional theory:

> In traditional theoretical thinking, the genesis of
> particular objective facts, the practical application of
> the conceptual systems by which it grasps the facts, and
> the role of such systems in action, are all taken to be
> external to the theoretical thinking itself (1972: 208).

4. <u>Marxian-Hegelian</u>. The Marxian-Hegelian paradigm attempts
to overcome the dualism of subject-object by viewing the social
world as the product of human activity, in which consciousness
(e.g., cognitive orientations, conceptual apparatus, beliefs,
attitudes), and the social world (e.g., institutions, social relations)
are reflections of human self-transformative processes. In this view,
not only the object itself is problematic, but also the relationship
of the object to the conceptual and theoretical apparatus applied to
it, and the relationship of the conceptual and theoretical apparatus
to the subject also become problematic. Thus, knowledge is not simply
an independently existing object becoming known by the knower (e.g.,
social factist) or a subject reconstructing or negotiating social
interaction within social contexts (e.g., social constructionists)
that become problematic. The problematic is rather the relationship
of an object of thought with the material conditions of social
existence that provide the starting point for analysis. The subject-
object dualism is thus overcome (in theory) by reuniting the human
subject with its object of attention (whether in production or in
theory) through the mechanism of praxis (practical human activity)
which forms the bond between the subject and object.

PARADIGMS, HISTORICAL ANALYSIS AND POLICING STUDIES

One feature of traditional theoretical approaches which sets

them apart from Marxian-Hegelian approaches is the lack of historical

analysis. The data from Table 3 indicated that the overwhelming

majority of <u>both</u> funded and nonfunded policing studies proceed from

a-historical analysis. It has been argued that there is little

fundamental difference between funded and nonfunded studies. There

is one point in particular to be made from this: Although the

political perspective of a researcher may guide particular questions,

suggest particular lines of practical activity, or guide the direction

of inquiry and subsequent discussion, there <u>nonetheless remains an</u>

<u>inherent epistemological bias with several explicit political</u>

<u>ramifications</u> to which an a-historical foundation contributes. <u>First</u>,

regardless of the political perspective or direction towards police,

for example, at the fundamental paradigmatic conceptual level of

traditional theory there remains a one-sidedness emphasizing either

the subject or the object. So-called facts of research are not

examined as having a historical character. A study of police

attitudes towards homosexuals, for example, may proceed through

attitude surveys, measuring "distance" between police and the target

group (a social factist approach), or by describing the perhaps

elaborate social "rituals" in which police may engage to maintain

distance from appearing homosexual through the selection and implemen-

tation of appropriate behaviorial strategies which present a virile

image when confronting gays (e.g., a dramaturgical, social-construc-

tionist approach). But neither approach includes as a necessary

component of inquiry the historical development of human sexuality
within a particular historically situated moment of human self-
transformation of social organization. Neither do such studies
integrate the historical character of the perceiving object (e.g.,
the research or the society which provides definitions) within
inquiry. The manner in which concepts of social control, police,
victim, offender, and so forth, themselves, arise out of human
activity and the actual connections between inquiry and human
activity on one hand, and the outcome of inquiry and projected
activity on the other, are eliminated from study.

The epistemological bias, then, refers to the establishment of
social objects or social processes which are views as independent
categories or independently operating processes which exist apart
from and independently of human practical activity, that is, as a
historically-grounded process of transformation of both material
(objective) and conceptual (subjective) world. The result is that
a more or less immutable social world is posited, a social world in
which social organization is not recognized as being mediated by
human self-formative activity. For policing studies this has three
consequences: First, there is a failure to recognize the historical
character on which accepted, "common sense" categories are based
(e.g., "crime," "victim," "control"). Although the problematic
nature of concepts of inquiry is bing increasingly questioned by
researchers (e.g., labeling theory, critical theory, negotiated order
theory), this questioning most often remains within the realm of
traditional theory, usually the neo-Kantian perspective, thus

glossing over the <u>historically</u> <u>mediated</u> processes of subjects engaged in self-creation of their social world. The result is that the connection of police research (or any research, for that matter) is removed from the context of practical activity, but such connections return has a hidden agenda in research which subtly shape ideology of both researchers as well as of those who are informed by such research. <u>Second</u>, there remains in policing studies an emphasis in both social factist and social constructionist approaches, a reliance on the <u>immediately</u> <u>given</u> experience (e.g., observation, a-historical documentary analysis, survey techniques), rather than a view of objects as the outcome of a complex series of mediations. A NILECJ-sponsored study of political dissent, for example, does not examine the <u>historically</u> <u>available</u> alternatives for action open to individuals, groups or movements involved in effecting social change, but rather relies on questionnaires of labor leaders and student activists, for example. <u>Third</u>, individual phenomenon are abstracted from their context and not examined within the <u>totality</u> of phenomena to which all features of the world are connected. The study of political protest cited in Chapter 4, for example, does not examine the forces that <u>prevent</u> social change from occurring, or the transformation of social organization which generates particular types of contradictions and social conflicts, but remains within static and unreflective categories. <u>Fourth</u>, there is an inability to examine in a self-reflective manner, the scientific methodology and the concomitant political ramifications. Thus, although the project leaders of the study on political dissent may view their study as "liberal," the

inherently conservative ramifications result <u>not</u> from their political

stance, but from the epistemological framework which serves as a

<u>de-facto</u> apologia for the existing social order and the forms of

thought which perpetuate it by excluding from analysis critically

relevant features.

Finally, the <u>practical</u> <u>connections</u> between policing and research

are ignored. Traditional theoretical approaches are inherently

unable to conceptualize the manner in which research may embody a

form of control-oriented practical, intellectual activity that has

been historically generated. The concepts and issues of policing

research, in being viewed as transhistorical (i.e., lying beyond,

or outside of, history) tend to mystify the relationship of police

in society, viewing them as "always there," as a necessary ingredient

of society, an assumption made <u>prior</u> to analysis. This perpetuates

what has been called a "false totality" (e.g., Kosík, 1977: 27)

leading to a "fixed superficiality, one-sidedness and immobility" of

facts.

The intent here is not to elaborate the theoretical position

from which this discussion derives, but rather to indicate there

does exist counter-positions, all based on an attempt to overcome

the a-historical view subject-object dichotomy (cf., Lukács, 1971a;

Kosík, 1976; Sartre, 1963; Habermas, 1972a, 1973; Horkheimer, 1972;

Wellmer, 1974; Schroyer, 1973). The point to be made is that the

<u>prima</u> <u>facie</u> political perspective of policing research is of little

substantive importance because at the most fundamental conceptual

level, the epistemological orientation itself contains explicit

political ramifications that function regardless of the political perspective of an individual researcher, or even the ostensible liberal or "radical" or reformist intent attached to the research by the researcher. Unless this is recognized and transcended, the search for politicization processes within the funding process, or at the level of researcher bias, or within the social content of research outcomes may create straw icons which conceal the most basic point of entry of politicization.

In sum, it does not appear that the funding processes themselves are the primary source of ideological, substantive, or procedural influence. Both funded and nonfunded research content, as reflected in policing studies, reflect an identical feature—that of being embedded in, and proceeding from, the rules and procedures of traditional theory. This suggests that the source of politicization lies much deeper than the funding process. The next question is where the source is located, and how it operates such that the normative and practical components of policing inquiry become interconnected. Although this research project was not designed to answer this question, it should be possible to conclude by suggesting further direction for research based on the finding of Chapter 4 and 5.

DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

Several directions appear to be fruitful for further research. From the historical discussion in Chapter 3, it appears that sponsored knowledge production is entering a new phase in which

social research is becoming increasingly <u>consolidated</u> by government

agencies, even though, in the case of NILECJ, at least, the state

of the field in particular academic disciplines may not be advanced

to the degree that sponsors can adequately develop it. This

consolidation may be necessitated by the need to overcome the

anarchy of the previous mode of knowledge production. As illustrated

in Chapter 3, prior to the last few decades, knowledge production

has been chaotic, and sponsorship has been unsystematic. This has

led to the need to: 1) Maintain a form of "quality control" in social

research. 2) Address specific social problems and to enable sharper

delineation of them, especially by policy makers in both state and

private economic sectors. 3) Maximize efficiency and economy of

knowledge production, which, unlike most other forms of highly

technical reproduction, remains a highly labor-intensive activity.

In addition, over the past two decades, the U.S. has undergone a

series of social, economic, and political crises which have

disrupted the social order, challenged the legitimacy and authority

of the state, and threatened to interrupt the process of capital

accumulation. For some (e.g., the demand-pull advocates cited in

Chapter 2), knowledge production is a means to meet the problems

caused or exacerbated by these crises, while for others (e.g., some

Marxian theorists), it is limited primarily to producing knowledge

which benefits a "capitalist class." The discussion in Chapters

4 and 5 suggest that both positions are inadequate, but both positions

direct attention to the topics germane to the sociology of knowledge

identified in Chapter 1, which will help refine and elaborate some

of the sociological features shaping knowledge production identified
in the organizational and content analyses. <u>First</u>, a theory of the
state is needed to contribute to an understanding of the procedures
and rationale of the state as it has organized itself for the support
of social research, and also of the intended application of the
outcomes of research. This must also include an analysis of those
social factors underlying the possible ways by which the state may
influence the research process in other, more fundamental, ways,
including support of education facilities and other methods of
shaping how persons perceive, interpret, and experience the existing
social order and social control. <u>Second</u>, a theory of ideology is
necessary in order to explain the political content, implications
and power relations embedded in policing research. Also included
in a theory of ideology must be an analysis of those social factors
underlying the normative and procedural bases of the research
community which may contribute to how the research community
produces a more or less consistent body of research, or follows
procedural rules that either encourage or inhibit theoretical
questions and interpretations from analysis. <u>Finally</u>, and most
important, there must be a cohesive theory of society that grounds
understanding of knowledge production within the production and
reproduction of social life in general as a historical transformation.

In sum, if this study has been successful, it should be clear
that the social basis of knowledge, as reflected by policing research,
reflects a variety of factors, some of which may be fundamental to
the epistemological structure of inquiry, and others located in the

research community, in the organization of state power, or in the
apparatus designed to carry out a particular mandate. These factors
are often inconsistent, contradictory, and mediate and are in turn
mediated by, additional social factors. It is this complexity that
must be sorted out by a sociology of knowledge and in turn, this
is what a sociology of knowledge can contribute to analysis of
policing research and the federal government's function in the
organization of it.

APPENDIX I: CONTENT ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY

APPENDIX I

CONTENT ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY

Employing idexical and expressive analytic models, the six

journals were examined for features that might be affected by

funding. An expressive model of content analysis is the attempt

to reveal a latent subjective state of either the source (e.g.,

the sponsor or the researcher), or a message (e.g., the published

study) through qualitative analysis that involves judgments and

impressionistic procedures for observation. Indexical content

analysis focuses not on lexical items (e.g., specific words), but

on what is conveyed in the message, given the specific context and

circumstances in which the message occurs. The two models were

juxtaposed to allow for analysis of subjective states (corresponding,

for example, to ideological states or direction towards policing),

as well as for analysis of specific features (e.g., data source of

a study). This juxtaposition facilitates attaching concrete features

of research to, for example, subjective states of researcher or

ideological status of a study.

Journal articles were judged as appropriate sources for data

because journals are, in a sense, the marketplace for the exchange

of ideas and knowledge. Although many scholars use books as their

medium, the ideas found in most books either appear first in journal

form, or appear in the citations and discussions of journal contrib-

utors. Journal articles disseminate empirical research, elaborate,

and represent ideas developed outside journal pages, and expand

methodological, theoretical and conceptual ideas. Although journal

articles may not represent a "balanced" view of the state of a given

field in that so-called "fringe" developments may be excluded, it

seems safe, nonetheless, to assume that mainstream journals are

representative of the dominant trends of the field.

JOURNAL SELECTION

Two principles guided journal selection: 1) Those chosen

were widely disseminated in their particular field. 2) They were

considered "respectable" academic journals by informants interviewed

in the field. The journals are intended to reflect a continuum

from relatively specialized academic articles written primarily for

academics and addressing specific theoretical, methodological or

empirical topics, to journals written for police practitioners and

criminal justice specialists.

PROCEDURE

Each journal was first randomly screened to insure that it

included the necessary type of articles. A tentative list of

metacategories (i.e., general abstract categories capable of

generating more specific empirical categories) was constructed.

Anticipated subcategories were tentatively assigned these general

categories, and others were added as necessary when suggested by

a particular reading. A pretest of the coding instrument was then

performed, and to avoid possible later bias, nonutilized journals

were employed for the purpose of this pretest. From the results of

the pretest, categories were sharpened, the mechanical skills of
coding, classification and recording were practiced and ambiguities
in definitions of categories were removed.

CODING

The coding proceeded by carefully reading each article.
First, an initial reading was conducted for both content and
context of categories, and a summary of each article was obtained.
This allowed for retrieval of information later in the event
additional categories were generated after articles were read.
Systematic and careful notes enabled coding from these notes rather
than continual referral back to articles. Although this process
was time-consuming, the rewards were commensurably greater. Notes
were color-coded by journal, by author, and by category. Second,
a second reading was performed for the purpose of actual coding.
A data sheet was constructed which allowed both for tabulation and
notation of particular categories. After each volume of a journal
was completed, the data was then transferred to a master sheet
which tabulated running totals.

Two self-check strategies were employed. The first, a
reinterpretive self-check involved coding off notes and coding
directly from each article, roughly one week apart, then comparing
the results. The consistency was over 99 percent. A second
strategy, time-lagged coding, involved recoding randomly selected
articles four to six months after the first coding, and then
comparing both original and later codings. The consistency was
approximately 99 percent.

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