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NUCLEAR POWER CHOICES AND THE FUTURE

BY

Tommy Joe McPeak

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Resource Development

1981

“

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ABSTRACT
NUCLEAR POWER CHOICES AND THE FUTURE

BY

Tommy Joe McPeak

From the completion of the first commercial nuclear
power plant in 1957 to the present, there has been an
increasing failure to meet nuclear power goals. This
has occurred in spite of substantial efforts to meet the
goals through various technological and institutional
innovations.

Large investments of both public and private capital
have been used in the development of the nuclear power
industry. However, the health of the industry is being
threatened by the seeming intractibility of several choices
surrounding it. Major choices involve the international
resource aspects of nuclear power with the accompanying
responsibility for sharing the energy wealth of the world,
the nuclear weapons proliferation issue, the waste disposal
challenge, and the proper degree of governmental control
and implementation.

Part of the problem examined is the wide-spread and
inadequate perspective of the major choices such that public
and private decisions are being made without an adequate
knowledge base. Another facet of the problem is how to

quantify at least a portion of the emotion-laden issues

‘r

H I

Tommy Joe McPeak

in order to facilitate a less emotionally-based decision.

The problem of perspective is first addressed at
the international level by demonstrating the interconnectedness
of the world energy economy and how nuclear power is an
integral energy resource within it. Then the proliferation
question is examined, followed by an investigation of
alternate waste disposal techniques.

A sociotechnical evaluation of nuclear power is
made, together with an analysis of Michigan resident reaction
to the growing presence of nuclear power. Finally, an
effort was made to help quantify the nuclear choices by
determining the relationship between the current nuclear
power shortfall and 0.8. oil importation.

Research data for this study was obtained through
interviews with personnel at major utility companies,
the Edison Electric Institute, Michigan Public Services
Commission, Michigan Committee for Jobs and Energy, the
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and appropriate divisions
of the 0.8. Department of Energy. Unpublished utility
company correspondence, load forecasts, fuel cost data,
legal proceedings, and a public opinion poll were also
used.

The major findings of the study are as follows:
nuclear power can have a significant impact on promoting
energy self-sufficiency in many countries possessing

limited fossil fuels, rapid implementation in either the

()

(J

154

Tommy Joe McPeak
industrialized or developing nations will benefit developing
nations disproportionately by making international supplies
of fossil fuels more affordable, the problem of nuclear
weapons proliferation is not likely to be aggravated by
increased expansion of the nuclear power industry abroad,
and present restrictions on U.S. exportation of nuclear
reactors, fuel, and technology may be counterproductive.
Also, considering all the various methods for disposing
of high-level radioactive wastes, salt-bed storage remains
the most viable, and the major social obstacle to the
growth of the nuclear power industry in Michigan as well
as the nation is either an unwillingness to bear dispro-
portionate risk, or an inability to properly perceive
the magnitude of the risk compared to alternate methods
of equally large-scale electrical generation, or both.

An additional finding, based on a review
of thirteen reputable forecasts from various sources
made over the period from 1964 to 1975, is that installed
1980 nuclear capacity fell short of the forecast 119,000
megawatts by 64,000 megawatts. The energy-equivalent
of this shortfall was nineteen percent of all 1979 U.S.
oil imports, or over 1.5 million barrels of imported oil
per day. This corresponds to 23.746 barrels of imported

oil per nuclear megawatt per day.

To the memory of my mentor and friend,

Dr. Ronald L. Shelton

ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Lord Jesus Christ said: "I am the vine, you
are the branches; he who abides in Me, and I in him, he
bears much fruit: for apart from Me you can do nothing"
(John 15:5). I have found this to be true for me in both
spiritual and secular endeavors, and therefore give Him
the credit for any worthwhile accomplishment. Secondly
I owe a debt of gratitude to Dr. Eckart Dersch, Committee
Chairman, as well as to other members of the Committee.
Thanks are expressed to Eleanor Boyles and Ann Silverman
for their assistance in the Government Documents section
of the Library, and also to numerous persons at the U.S.
Department of Energy, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Consumers Power Company, Detroit Edison Company, and
Lansing Board of Water and Light. My sincere appreciation
goes to the Institute of Public Utilities of Michigan
State University for their partial funding of this project.
Finally, I thank my parents for their constant love and

encouragement.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES O O I O O O O I O O O I O O O O O 0

LIST OF FIGURES O O O O O O O O O O O O O I O O O

INTRODUCTI ON C O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 0

CHAPTER

I.

II.

III.

Iv.

NUCLEAR POWER: AN INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY

Why Nuclear Power? . . . . . . . . .
How Much Nuclear Power? . . .

The Drive for Energy Self- -Sufficiency
Nuclear Role in Developing Nations .
International Views on Cost . . . . .
The International Market . . . . . .

TO EXPORT OR NOT TO EXPORT: THE PROLIFERATION

ISSUE 0 O O O O O I O O O O O C O I O O O

The Problem . . . . . . . . . .
The U. S. Government Position . . .
The U. S. Nuclear Industry Position
Position of U.S. Allies . . . . . .
The Third World Position . . . . .
The Net Effect . . . . . . . . . .

THE WASTE DISPOSAL SITUATION . . . . . .

Makeup of Nuclear Waste . . . . . . . .
Progression of the Nuclear Waste Issue
The Most Promising Method of Disposal .
Alternative Disposal Methods . . . . .
Environmental Considerations . . . . .
Institutional Considerations . . . . .

NUCLEAR POWER: A SOCIOTECHNICAL EVALUATION

History of Public Attitude . . . .
The Total Social Cost of Nuclear Power

The Problem of Perception: A Case Study
Nuclear Power and the Future . . . . .

iv

Page
vii
viii

11

11
13
19
23
31
35

39
39

49
55
62
66

70

7O
76
82
87
92
97

102

102
112
120
132

CHAPTER Page
V. NUCLEAR POWER IN MICHIGAN . . . . . . . . . . 137
Michigan Nuclear History and Development . 137

Overview of Fermi 1: Experience of Atomic
Power Development Associates and Power
Reactor Development Company . . . . . . 137

Background on D. C. Cook 1 and 2, Big
Rock Point, and Palisades . . . . . 145

Midland l and 2: Progress and Problems . 151

Fermi 2: Progress and Problems . . . . . 156

Greenwood 2 and 3: The Decision to
Cancel . . . . . 158

Implications of the Three Mile Island
Accident for Nuclear Power Plants in
Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161

Performance of Michigan Nuclear Power
Plants Compared with that of Other Nuclear
Power Plants in the United States . . . . . 164

Contribution of Nuclear-Generated
Electricity to Total Electricity in
Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169

A Look at Historic Contribution . . . . . 169
Looking at An Old Michigan Forecast . . . 171
Nuclear Power's Future Contribution . . . 173

Impact of Electric Automobiles on Demand
for Electrical Power in Michigan . . . . . 177

Overall Projected Electricity Demand for
MiChigan I O I O O O O I O O O O I O O O O 180

Impact on Michigan of Nuclear Shutdowns or
Delays O O O I O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 181

Review of Some Conclusions of the Michigan
Energy Resource Research Association
(MERRA) O O O O O O I O O O O O O O O O O O 182

Review of Michigan Society of Professional
Engineers' Policy Statement . . . . . . . . 187

The Policymaking Process and Michigan's
Electrical Energy Future . . . . . . . . . 189

Discussion of Michigan Legislature Special
Joint Committee On Nuclear Energy: May
1979 to september 1980 O O O O O O O O O O 193

V

w."
' a

CHAPTER

v1. THE NUCLEAR powsn SHORTFALL . . . . . . . .

Background for Determining the Shortfall
1964 Federal Power Commission Furecast
1968 Bureau of Mines Forecast . . . . .
1972 Interdevelopment Forecast . . . . .
1972 Atomic Energy Commission Forecasts
1973 National Petroleum Council Forecast
1973 National Water Commission Forecast
1973 Coal A e Forecast . . . . . . . . .
1973 Citizen's Advisory Committee on
Environmental Quality Forecast . . . . .
1974 Electrical World Forecast . . . . .
1974 Public Utilities Fortnightly Forecast
1975 Department of the Interior Forecast .
1975 Electrical World Forecast . . . . . .
Summary and Analysis of Forecasts . . . .

.VII. NUCLEAR POWER TRANSLATED INTO OIL . . . . .

Background for Translating Nuclear Power
into oil . . . .

Determining Btu of Oil Used by Utilities .

How Much Oil Does a Megawatt of Nuclear

Replace? O O I O O O O O O O O O O I
How Much Oil Could Be Replaced by the
Nuclear Shortfall? . . . . . . . .

Testing Some Statements in the Media . . .
Reasons for the Measurement' s‘Valadity . .

SMARY AND CONCLUS IONS O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 0

APPENDIX 1:

APPENDIX 2:

ADDITIONAL CALCULATIONS . . . . . . . . .

ADDITIONAL TABLE I O O O O O O O O O O O

BIBLIWRAPHY O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 0

vi

Page
198

198
213
218
223
225
226
227
229

230
231
232
232
233
234

241
241
243
247
249
254
255

258

269
283
284

TABLE
1.

LIST OF TABLES
Page

PREDICTED GROWTH IN REACTORS AND POPULATION IN
LATIN AMERICA . O O O C O C O O I O O O O O O O 24

CONSIDERATIONS FOR EVALUATING PROLIFERATION
POTENTIAL O O O O O O O O O O I O O O O O O O O 44

NUCLEAR POWER PLANT EFFICIENCIES 1970, 72-79 . . 205

SUMMARY OF 1980 FORECASTED CAPACITIES AND
SHORTFALLS (In Megawatts) . . . . . . . . . . . 235

NUCLEAR POWER PLANT STATUS AS OF SEPTEMBER 30,
1979 C O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 239

DELIVERIES OF FUEL OIL FOR ELECTRIC GENERATION
1979 C O O O O O O O O O O O O I O O O O O O O O 244

PETROLEUM PRODUCTS USED FOR ELECTRIC GENERATION
1979 O C O C O O O C I O O I O O O O O O C C C O 248

vii

FIGURE

1.
2.

5.
6.

LIST OF FIGURES

Page
1979 TOTAL CONSUMPTION OF ENERGY BY TYPE . . . . 6
1979 GENERATING CAPACITY OF THE ELECTRIC UTILITY
INDUSTRY 0 O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 7

RADIOACTIVE DECAY OF PWR SPENT FUEL . . . . . . 71

MODEL OF A NATIONAL RADIOACTIVE WASTE REPOSITORY
IN A SALT MINE O O O O O O I O O I O O O O O O O 84

LOCATION OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS IN MICHIGAN . . 139
FRANCHISE SERVICE AREA OF PRIVATELY OWNED

UTILITIES, GENERAL SERVICE AREA OF RURAL
ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES AND MUNICIPAL SYSTEMS . . 140

viii

I

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I NTRODUCT I ON

One of the most relevant issues today is the "energy
crisis" . . . a misnomer because the word “crisis” suggests
something temporary. However, the phenomena of increasing
costs for most forms of energy is not temporary.

The energy shortages and threats of shortages
have even resulted in legislation requiring the President
to have a standby national gas rationing plan ready for
implementation at all times.1 These increasing costs,
shortages, and threats of shortages make up what is commonly
called the “energy crisis".

During the recent period of rising costs for energy
(which roughly began at the time of the 1973-74 Arab oil
embargo), increasing attention has been given to alternate
methods of supplying the world's energy needs other than
via the traditional fossil fuels of petroleum and natural
gas. The reason for this desire to especially decrease
dependence on petroleum is due to the fact that most indus-
trialized nations must import a substantial amount of
what they use. This dependence on imported oil weakens

national security to the extent that the sources could

 

1Pub. L. 93-159 (27 November 1973), Emergency
Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 627.

a.»

2
become unreliable in time of peace or war.

Because of the increading desire for energy in-
dependence, numerous viable technologies have been empha-
sized. Nuclear power is one technology that has been
thought for years to hold the answer to the world's present
and future energy problems. However, there have been
many complex issues and choices surrounding this industry
which have made it controversial to the point of becoming
less viable than many people in the early nuclear era
anticipated.

The topic of nuclear power can best be discussed
in terms of: (1) choices that must be made if it is to
remain a viable industry, (2) the anticipated future of
nuclear power, and (3) how present choices may impact
upon the anticipated future.

Several of the choices affecting the nuclear power
industry include whether or not to pursue the nuclear
power option or rely on existing fossil-fueled plants
and new technologies for electricity generation, how to
dispose of nuclear wastes, how and whether to exploit
the national and international nuclear power market, how
to deal with the nuclear weapons proliferation issue,
and whether, in general, to have more or less nuclear
power. It should be emphasized that the proper framework
for making these choices is contained in the following

three questions: (1) Is nuclear power physically and

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3
biologically reasonable and possible?; (2) Is nuclear power
feasible from an economic and engineering standpoint?;
and (3) Is nuclear power institutionally acceptable?

The future of nuclear power is discussed in terms
of projected installations, its contribution to world
energy supply, current and future major suppliers of nuclear
reactors and fuel, major users of nuclear power in the
future, and the potential future favorable impact that
nuclear power could have on decreasing oil importation
and increasing energy independence.

Of course the current public and private choices
that will be made regarding the nuclear power industry
will impact heavily on its futute. There is a significant
component of the world society that wants to see nuclear
power play an increasing role in supplying the world's
energy needs. There is another component that believes
that the proper course is away from nuclear power and
along a decentralized and renewable "soft-energy" path.

An ardent spokesman for this component is the well-known
author and speaker, Amory B. Lovins, who asserts that
"Available renewable sources are not cheap, easy, or instant,
but they are cheaper, easier, and faster than the synfuel

1

plants or still costlier power stations."

Both the choices surrounding nuclear power, and

 

1Amory B. Lovins, "How Much Energy Do We Need?”,
National Geographic, February 1981, p. 73.

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its probable future need to be viewed at the international
level, the national level, and the state level. This
tri-level examination takes place in varying degrees throughout
this study. However, Chapter 5 especially focuses on
the choices and the future of nuclear power in Michigan,
while Chapters 6 and 7 focus on the U.S. situation.

Since the choice of more or less nuclear power
can play a major role in supplying the neergy needs of
the world, it is useful to devote part of this study to
determining as precisely as possible what the impact has
been on the United States. The benchmark selected for
this determination is the energy-equivalent impact on
U.S. oil importation of the current nuclear power shortfall.

The United States imported 48.4 percent of its
petroleum in 1979,1 and through the first half of 1980
the amount was 43.8 percent.2 It was demonstrated to
the United States during the 1973-74 Arab oil embargo
what a small disruption in the flow of imported oil can
do to the orderly functioning of a highly energy-intensive
society. It is the opinion of many people that such a
heavy dependence on imported oil places the United State's
national security in a very precarious position. This
may be the most serious problem associated with the energy

crisis. There was great optimism following World War II

 

1See appendix 1, pt. a and pt. b for derivations.

2Ibid., pt. c.

5
that the development of nuclear power would avert any
such energy crisis. However, nuclear power in 1980 was
not developed even to the level of forecasts made in the
early 1970's. _
In the United States during 1979, nuclear energy
accounted for 3.5 percent1 of the energy inputs to the

U.S. economy (see figure 1). This energy input went to

2

the electric utility industry where 9.1 percent of the

installed generating capacity was nuclear (see figure
2). The total electricity generated in 1979 was 2,247,372
million kilowatt-hours (kwh).3 Of this amount, 11.4 percent
was generated by nuclear power plants,4 and 76.0 percent
was generated by the burning of coal, petroleum, or natural
gas.5

However, the 11.4 percent contribution from nuclear
sources was considerably less than the amount forecast
by various agencies of the Federal government as well as
private industry during the preceding fifteen years.

Since the shortfall in nuclear power was made up for with

increased reliance upon fossil fuels, a very interesting

 

1See appendix 1, pt. d for derivation.

2Ibid., pt. e.

30.8., Department of EnerQY: Energy Information
Administration, Monthly Energy Review, September 1980,
p. 62.

4See appendix 1, pt. f for derivation.

SIbid., pt. 9.

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question arises: How much of the 48.4 percent dependence
on foreign oil in 1979 was brought about by the failure
to achieve the level of nuclear power forecast for that
year? Chapters 6 and 7 answer this question.

This paper is not intended to be an argument for
more or less development of nuclear power. Almost everyone
has an opinion regarding the safety and necessity of nuclear
power, especially in the wake of a major event at the
Three Mile Island 2 nuclear plant near Harrisburg,

Pennsylvania in April 1979.1

Therefore, the purpose of

this particular discussion is not primarily to evaluate

the desirability of nuclear energy compared to other forms

of energy, but rather to make the aforementioned determination
of the relationship between U.S. oil imports and the U.S.
nuclear power shortfall, and also consider the major
attributes, issues, and choices accompanying nuclear power
generation.

For the purposes of this discussion, only the
electrical capacities and energy outputs of the electric
utility industry will be dealt with. The discussion is being
restricted to this source of electricity because the forecasts
made for electricity from various types of fuel over past

years were made with reference to the public utility sector

of the indpstry, and did not include any references to

 

1"Accident Triggers Pitched Battle Over Nuclear
Future", ENR, McGraw-Hill's Construction Weekly, 5 April
1979, pp. IO-ls.

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the private generation of electricity. The total installed
generating capacity of the electric utilities at the end
of 1979 was 598,298 megawatts (Mw).1 There was an additional
installed capacity of 17,388 Mw at the end of 1979 that
was considered privately owned and utilized industrial
generating capacity,2 e.g. General Motors, Dow Chemical, etc.

In order to measure the relationship between the
current dependence on imported oil and the shortfall in
nuclear power, various forecasts for nuclear power to
be installed by 1980 will be analyzed and compared to
what was actually installed. The result will be the deter-
mination of an average shortfall. This average nuclear
shortfall can then be translated into percentage of total
oil imports for 1979.

The general outline of this paper will be as follows:
Chapter 1 will be a discussion of the international resource
aspects of nuclear power and who could (and will) develop
it most readily; Chapter 2 will cover the nonproliferation
issue that has resulted in severe restriction of U.S. trade
in nuclear reactors, fuel enrichment, and reprocessing:
Chapter 3 is a discussion of the current technical and

institutional mechanisms for dealing with the long-lived

__

lMelvin E. Johnson, telephone interview, U.S.
Department of Energy: Energy Information Administration,
Coal and Electric Power Statistical Division, Office of
IEata and Interpretation (Washington, D.C.), 17 December

980.

2Ibid.

 

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10
nuclear wastes; Chapter 4 is an evaluation of the nature
and scope of sociotechnical challenges faced by the nuclear
power industry: Chapter 5 is an overview of the present
and projected roles of nuclear power in the State of Michigan;
Chapter 6 will interpret and summarize thirteen U.S. nuclear
forecasts for 1980: and Chapter 7 will primarily be a
determination of the current level of dependence on imported
oil brought about by failure to meet the various nuclear

forecasts discussed in Chapter 6.

0! E:

. .
» §
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CHAPTER 1
NUCLEAR POWER: AN INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY

Why Nuclear Power?

The international market for nuclear power plants
is growing. This growth is taking place for reasons which
depend greatly on the unique situation of each country.
Reasons justifying introduction or expansion of nuclear
power in some countries are not sufficient for others.1

Some nations lack domestic supplies of coal, oil
or natural gas. Hydroelectric power may also be inadequate
or unavailable. These countries do not have the benefit
of diversified energy sources as the United States or
the Soviet Union does. They must therefore either import
a substantial proportion of their energy in the form of
fossil fuels, or they can install nuclear power plants.

Economic justification is another reason for the
building of nuclear power plants around the world. It
may not always be economical to pursue a course of nuclear
power for the generation of electricity, but this depends

on the particular country. For example, some countries

 

1Mitre Corporation, Nuclear Power Issues and Choices
(Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing, 1977), pp. 4-7.

11

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have power grids that are not designed to accommodate
the output from the normal size modern nuclear power plants
of about 1,000 Mw. At present the capital costs per unit
of generating capacity of small nuclear plants that would
be appropriate to existing power grids in many countries
are high. The costs are high even against the cost of
imported fossil fuels.

A major reason for utilizing nuclear power is
for freeing up petroleum for other purposes. Since petroleum
is used greatly in transportation, it would be a boon
to any economy to increase petroleum availability by de-
creasing its use in oil-fired power plants.

The view also exists that petroleum is too valuable
a resource to simply burn for the electricity it can produce -
which only utilizes about one third of its energy content
in conventional power plants. In the future, as petroleum
and natural gas prices rise and the anticipated shift
to special processing of coal as a substitute occurs,
it may be that nuclear power will be more essential for
freeing up coal for the production of synthetic oil and
gas.

Some nations have undoubtedly been influenced
toward nuclear power by other than economic factors.
A major factor is no doubt a desire for increased security
in supply of energy. Most nations are no different than

the United States in wanting to be at least energy secure,

a? " .

ID

“a

f»

75?

13

if not energy self-sufficient. While energy self-sufficiency
is an elusive goal for most countries, national security

is a minimum goal that generally all countries feel they

must attain. Several countries can make progress toward
greater energy security by utilizing the uranium within

their own borders while lacking any significant deposits

of fossil fuels.

Another motive for acquiring nuclear power is
prestige. There are no doubt many countries where the
economics of nuclear power are highly questionable. How-
ever some of them are pursuing nuclear power as the symbol
for entrance into twentieth century technology. It tends
to I'distinguish" them from the class of countries known
as “developing nations".

A final significant motive for acquiring nuclear
power is to enhance the expertise of the country's scientific
community in the field of nuclear technology. A country
might have no plans to construct nuclear weapons, yet
might want to have the technology available should a

perceived need for nuclear weapons arise.

How Much Nuclear Power?

It has been said that any energy problem is the

1

whole world's. This is true in view of the fact that

 

1Richard Knox, 'A Thought for the 1980's”, Nuclear
Engineering International, January 1980, p. 15.

ene
and
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CC"?

“-11

14

energy transactions take place in an international market,
and very few countries are self-sufficient. A recent
study of the National Academy of Sciences has indicated
that worldwide investment in nuclear power between now
and the year 2010 could amount to about one trillion dollars.1
It appears that a substantial portion of this investment
will occur in the countries most dependent on imports,
the reason being that they will be most affected by increasing
costs of imported fuels.

The World Energy Conference suggests a world program
for the installation of nuclear capacity by the year 2020
of between 3,200,000 Mw and 5,500,000 Mw.2 The need
for increasing nuclear capacity is simply due to the in-
creasing worldwide demand for energy.3 In the European
community, energy demand will have increased by the year
2000 by between 1% and 2 times; the anticipated growth
rate is similar for the United States and Japan; and in
the remaining part of the world, energy demand may increase

by two to three times by the start of the twenty-first

 

 

century.
1National Academy of Sciences, Energy in Transition:
1985-2010 (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences,
, p. 79.
2

C. Allday, "Nuclear Power, Politics and Public
Opinion", Nuclear Energy, April 1979, p. 78.

3M. Davis, ”Nuclear Power's vocation in the Energy
Strategy of the European Community”, Nuclear Energy,
February 1979, p. 16.

15

At the present, oil is meeting much of the energy
demands of the world. However almost every country is
feeling some economic strain from the escalating costs
of petroleum, and there are increasing possibilities of
using the threat of price increases or embargoes as diplomatic
bargaining factors. All countries of the world, whether
they are producers or exporters, need to cooperate in
finding solutions to the problems of energy supply.

While nuclear power cannot alone solve the challenge
of increasing energy demand, it is most often listed in
conjunction with coal as one of the two major energy suppliers
for the next two decades or more. This position was taken
by the National Academy of Science's study that began in
1975.1 In the United Kingdom, the electrical supply industry
has carried out several analyses, and there have been
speeches by the Chairman of the Electricity Council, the
Central Electricity Generating Board, and the Scottish
Electricity Board. They all concluded that nuclear power
is the best way to meet their growing electrical needs.2
It appears that two 1,250 Mw nuclear power stations will
be needed per year in the late 1980's which will rise

to approximately three each year by the late 1990's.

 

1National Academy of Sciences, Energy in Transition:
1985-2010 (washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences,
1979), pp. 18-19.

2Sir John Hill, "Quest for Public Acceptance of
Nuclear Power", Nuclear Energy, October 1979, p. 303.

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16

The European Economic Community, aligned by the
Euratom Treaty, forsees an important role for energy from
both nuclear and coal in helping to provide economic pros-
perity for its members (Luxembourg, Denmark, Belgium,
Italy, Ireland, France, Germany, U.K., and Netherlands).1
The Community was sixty percent dependent on imported
oil in 1973, but by 1977 was only fifty-one percent dependent.
Since directives were approved by their Council of Ministers
in 1975 prohibiting the construction of future large oil-
fired and gas-fired power plants, it appears that the
shift to coal and nuclear is succeeding.

Other studies have emphasized the dual and essential
roles of both nuclear and coal power for the near term.
Among them are the 1977 study by the Mitre Corporation,
Nuclear Power Issues and Choices.2 A second concurring
study also funded by the Ford Foundation was done by Resources
for the Future and published in 1979 under the title Energy:

The Next TwentyYears.3 A ”think tank” study by Resources

 

1M. Davis, “Nuclear Power's_yocation in the Energy
Strategy of the European Community“, Nuclear Energy,
February 1979, pp. 15-17.

2Mitre Corporation, Nuclear Power Issues and Choices
(Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing, 1977).

3Resources for the Future, Energy: The Next Twenty
Years (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing, 1979).

17

for the Future titled Energy in America's Future: The
Choices Before Us came to similar conclusions.1 Two studies
by the U.S. Government Accounting Office forecast shortfalls
in electrical energy without the growth of the nuclear
power industry, and also support the higher technology
breeder reactor.2

The shift to nuclear power is making the most
notable progress in France. They set a goal of 36,200 Mw
of added nuclear capacity to be installed between 1970

and 1985.3

Earlier delays are being overcome, and twenty-
six stations are currently under construction. Between
1980 and 1985, the total amount of electricity from nuclear
will be fifty-six percent.4 The French are simply responding
to the high costs of imported oil, and have as a goal
a high degree of energy self-sufficiency.

The French are also the leaders in the design
and construction of breeder reactors which create plutonium

fuel for additional reactors. The reason for building

breeders is to become energy independent - even with regard

 

1Resources for the Future, Energy in America's
Future: The Choices Before Us, cited by Nuclear Engineering
International, October’I979, p. 10.

2Cited in "GAO Supports LMFBR', Nuclear News,
July 1979, p. 42.

3"Political Will - A Key Factor in Large Nuclear
Programme“, Nuclear Engineering International, March 1979,
p. 47.

4Richard Masters, ”What Lessons From France?',
Nuclear Engineering International, January 1980, p. 15.

18

to the importation of uranium. If breeder reactors are
used, the marginal uranium deposits of France will be
practical whereas they would not be if only light water
reactors are used. Light water reactors are the most
common type used in the United States.

In addition, France is developing its own reprocessing
technology to reclaim the fissionable material from the
spent fuel rods. This is in contrast to practice in the
United States whose policy has been to store the spent
fuel while awaiting a decision at some indefinite time
regarding their reprocessing or permanent storage as wastes.

A situation that France and other energy-dependent
countries are naturally aware of is the relatively inexpensive
use of fissionable materials obtained from the breeder
as well as reprocessing compared to enriched uranium.

No doubt this is the major reason for their emphasis on
construction of the fast breeder reactor.

Similar to France's situation is that of Japan,
although Japan is even more dependent on imported energy
than France. Japan's commitment to nuclear power is ironic
in the fact that they are the only country to have experienced
the horror of atomic bombing. Yet adequate nuclear capacity
is considered to be of vital strategic importance in Japan's

economic and political future.1 Through careful efforts

 

1Richard Masters, "Towards Greater Independence”,
Nuclear Engineering International, December 1979, p. 53.

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19

to maintain public support, Japan's need for adequate
nuclear power is presented logically as a key component
in a broadly-based and long-term energy and industrial
strategy. The efforts are mainly being geared toward
reducing their overwhelming dependence on imported oil.
Even by 1990 when the expectation is that nuclear
power will be accounting for ten percent of Japan's total
energy supply, there is anticipated to still be a sixty

1 Also, since

percent dependence on imported oil and coal.
Japan has no uranium, and does not wish to substitute depen-
dence on imported uranium for dependence on imported fossil
fuels, they are actively pursuing development of the breeder
reactor and full capability in the fuel cycle.

Japan regards it as a legitimate right to pursue
all aspects of nuclear power technology because of its
energy vulnerability implied by heavy importation of fossil
fuels. At present the installed capacity of nuclear power
stations in Japan is second only to that in the United

States.2

The Drive for Energy Self-Sufficiengy
A desire for energy self-sufficiency seems to
be the driving force behind nuclear power. Italy has

been referred to as being the most vulnerable industrial

 

1 2

Ibid. Ibid.

20

nation to the energy crisis.1 Romania is planning to
achieve energy self-sufficiency by 1990 at which time
eighteen percent of the energy would be from nuclear.2
Approximately thirty percent of Switzerland's electrical
power production is from nuclear plants, their only other
sources being hydroelectric and imported oil. In a national
referendum, a vote of 'yes' has allowed nuclear construction
to continue with an additional plant planned for 1985
and another by 1990.3

western Europe has decided as a whole that if
they are not to be dependent on the Arab countries for
oil or be ”under Russia's thumb“, they must have sufficient
energy for meeting all their needs. They are therefore
calling for the fullest use of all energy resources available
to meet the deficit created by escalating costs of oil,
and recognize that this deficit cannot be met without
increased reliance on nuclear power.4

The Soviet Union is moving ahead rapidly with

nuclear power in their own country. Intellectual leaders

 

l'Italians Discuss Their Energy Future", Nuclear
Engineering International, December 1979, p. 3.

2"Country Seeks to Regain Energy Self-sufficiency”,
Nuclear News, September 1979, p. 53. ‘

3'Despite Sabotage, Swiss Programme Continues",
Nuclear EngineeringyInternational, January 1980, p. 9.

4Bruce Adkins, ”Helping the Politicians”, Nuclear
Engineering International, January 1980, p. 16.

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21

writing in Kommunist, which is the Soviet Communist Party's
publication for discussion of policy issues, state that
”It is impossible to build up the energy base for developed
socialism without atomic power“.1 They went on to suggest
that large power parks with several reactors at each site
might be a more efficient method of building up their
nuclear capacity. This idea is not unique to the Soviet
Union, having been discussed in most all industrialized
countries where the demand for large concentrated electrical
generation exists. The Soviet Union is also actively
implementing breeder technology.2

Eastern European countries have an even firmer
commitment to nuclear power than the Western European
countries. The leaders of the Eastern European countries
plan to have an additional 37,000 Mw of nuclear capacity
by 1990. They also will be supplied some electricity
from across the borders of Russia.3

China too is beginning to aggressively develop
its nuclear technology for the purpose of supplying electrical
power. In 1979 a group of Chinese nuclear scientists

visited the United States for a month-long tour of nuclear

 

1Cited in ”Nuclear News Briefs", Nuclear News,
November 1979, p. 28.

2Simon Rippon, “International Conference on the
Breeder and Europe“, Nuclear News, December 1979, p. 63.

3"Summit Stresses Nuclear", Nuclear News, August
1979, p. 52.

faci
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of M:
that
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22

facilities, followed by a two-week tour of Canadian plants.
A Chinese representative said that the Chinese now regard
nuclear energy as an important part of their aggressive
program of the 'Four Modernizations', which include science
and technology, agriculture, education, and military.1

At the second International Scientific Forum on
an Acceptable World Energy Future held by the University
of Miami Center for Theoretical Studies, a consensus emerged
that nuclear energy will play a major role in the next
century's energy supply system, and the breeder will be
an integral part of that system.2

In short, nuclear power is a strategic factor
being employed around the world to combat the higher costs
of fossil fuels, especially petroleum. It is playing
an increasing role in the strategies of many countries
to enhance their economic stability and national security
by decreasing dependence on rapidly escalating costs of
energy that come from outside their borders.

One major prerequisite for the growth of the inter-
national nuclear industry is capital - and it appears
that it will be forthcoming. At the 1979 International
Conference on Financing Nuclear Power the view of the

bankers present was that “We cannot preserve world stability

 

1Debby Graves, "Nuclear Contingent Tours U.S.
Nuclear Facilities", Nuclear News, May 1979, p. 67.

2"Nuclear Seen as Key to World Energy Supply”,
Nuclear News, January 1979, p. 44.

A

23

without a substantial nuclear power program“.1

Nuclear Role in Developing Nations

Of particular interest is the part that nuclear
power may play in satisfying some of the energy demands
of developing as opposed to industrialized nations. An
ideal area to investigate this potential is that of Latin
America, which is regarded by some as an emerging nuclear
market2 (see table 1). An example of extensive nuclear
power growth plans is in the country of Brazil whose increase
in electrical demand cannot be taken care of by coal or
hydroelectric power. Brazil's situation is not unique,
and Latin America appears to offer the greatest external
market for all exporters of nuclear reactors and associated
services for the next ten years.3

There is a psychology behind a developing country's
readiness to accept the nuclear option. It is based somewhat
on a desire to enter the world of twentieth-century technology

with all its perceived advantages that accompany a higher

standard of living. It is interesting that most of the

 

1"Bankers: 'It Has To Be - We'll Find The Financing'",
Nuclear News, November 1979, p. 41.

2Octave Du Temple and Edward Hennelly, “Latin
America: Emerging Nuclear Market“, Nuclear News,
September 1979, p. 59.

31bid., p. 64.

24

 

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25
opposition to the nuclear option occurs in the most developed
nations that have an efficient industrial base and adequate

1 It is a given that vast quantities

energy supplies.
of energy will be required to bring the developing nations

from their low standards of living to even the standards

of much of Europe - let alone the United States. Therefore
people in the third world countries naturally will not

advocate abandonment of nuclear power.

Moreover, they are looking to the industrialized
nations to provide them with ways of producing more energy.2
The recent National Academy of Sciences Study, Energy
in Transition: 1985-2010, recognizes that the world market
for energy is growing, especially in the developing countries.3
They feel this growing demand for energy will make them
increasingly important in the global energy picture.

In addition, as industrialization progresses,
there will be a consequent greater reliance on electric
power, of which developing nations now have very little.

As they develop, and as personal incomes increase, they

will want better housing with more lighting and appliances,

 

1Sir John Hill, "Quest for Public Acceptance of
Nuclear Power", Nuclear Energy, October 1979, p. 302.

2C. Allday, "Nuclear Power, Politics and Public
Opinion”, Nuclear Energy, April 1979, p. 78.

3National Academy of Sciences, Energy in Transition:
1985-2010 (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences,
1979), p. 81.

26

not to mention air conditioning.1
Developing nations currently account for less
than ten percent of the current consumption of internationally

2 However as mentioned above, their rate

traded energy.
of growth in energy consumption is much higher, so that
their share may reach as much as twenty percent by the

3 This increasing demand will make substitution

year 2000.
with nuclear, where possible, even more necessary from an
economic and security standpoint.

A large part of the energy needed by developing
countries will have to be imported. In addition, heavy
investments in electric power will be necessary, even
if fuel can be obtained inside the country.4 The reason
is that oil is likely to be preempted by transportation
uses, and in most developing countries coal would have
to be imported from the United States or Australia.

It is therefore likely that the developing nations

will concentrate their investments in nuclear and hydroelectric

power, at least until the end of the century.5 This will

 

1Ibid.

2Mitre Corporation, Nuclear Power Issues and Choices
(Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing, 1977), p. 67.

31bid.

4National Academy of Sciences, Energy in Transition:
1985-2010 (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences,
1979), p. 82.

51bid.

CE

I

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tc
cc
te
1a
of

27
therefore not only be increasing imports of oil in most
cases, but also enriched uranium, unless they develop
breeder reactors which is considered too high a technology
for developing nations to achieve or maintain. An exception
to the use of breeder reactors may be in India which is
constructing, with the aid of France, a 15 Mw fast breeder
test reactor.1
Following is a view of the role that nuclear power
may play in developing nations by the National Academy
of Sciences:2
As energy growth occurs in developing nations,
electricity demand will probably grow more rapidly
because electricity prices are less sensitive to fuel
costs. If the market is the principal determinant
of relative demand, and if there are no non-economic
constraints on the rate at which nuclear capacity
can be expanded, then two-thirds or more of electric-
ity would probably be supplied by nuclear power, with
coal a distant second, consumed mostly in the United
States.
For many developing nations it may be a question
of either nuclear power growth or retarded economic growth -
and the increasing potential for economic growth in developing
nations will not be given up easily. Although there are
worthy arguments regarding uncoupling the relationship
between Gross National Product and the level of energy

consumption, there is little debate over energy being

 

1"India Planning to Build Fast Reactors”, Nuclear
EngineeringInternational, December 1979, p. 6.

2National Academy of Sciences, Energy in Transition:
1985—2010 (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences,
1979), pp. 76-77.

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28

an essential ingredient for industrialization to occur
in the first place. The already stringent balance of
payments problem of many developing nations is only being
aggravated by increasing costs of fossil fuels, and the
developing countries may be forced to adopt nuclear power
at a more rapid rate than is socially and technologically
wise.

There are problems associated with installing
nuclear power plants in the developing countries that
cannot be overlooked. As mentioned earlier, a major factor
is the inadequacy of many power grids to handle the enormous
amounts of energy that is generated by a modern-size nuclear
plant. In the early years of the nuclear power industry,
smaller plants were common. However there are significant
economies of scale to be realized in building larger plants.
which are lost in the design of the smaller ones which
would be more suited to the needs of most developing countries.

Nuclear power plants represent a very large form
of capital investment. Their competitiveness with other
forms of electric generation is due to substantially lower
fuel costs. Developing countries have more than the normal
difficulties in financing and implementing capital intensive
projects. If forced to install very capital intensive
power plants whose competitiveness depends on the rate
of increase in the prices of fossil fuels, the arguments

for doing so have less force. However it should be mentioned

29
that there are several suppliers who are beginning to
tailor their designs to the less intensive power needs
of developing nations.

Another problem is that of still being dependent
on imported fuel, albeit enriched uranium instead of fossil
fuels. The only way around this situation is use of the
breeder reactor, which is largely untenable for developing
nations.

In addition, nuclear power represents a technology
that is very sophisticated for most developing nations.

The technology must first of all be imported, and construction
supervised by foreign engineers. The developing countries
largely lack regulatory bodies adequate to supervise such

an industry, and the operators of the plants themselves
represent an elite far removed from the average technological
skills of their society. This has caused some concern

that the nuclear plants might be run in something less

than the most efficient and safe manner.

Even if nuclear power were abundant in a developing
nation, there might be very limited use of the electrical
capacity in the industrial, transportation, and especially
agriculture sectors. This largely depends on the industrial,
economic, and technological capabilities of the country
for utilizing energy in electrical form as opposed to
fossil fuel form. The use of large amounts of electrical

energy as opposed to other forms may require a substantial'

peri
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part

CCUH

the
deve

effe

30 '

period of technological adaptation that may be impractical
even in the long run. It can therefore be said that the
extent to which nuclear power is an economic response
to high world oil prices will therefore depend on the
particular circumstances of the individual developing
countries.1

There is also an alternative option for alleviating
the energy stress produced by rapid economic growth in
developing nations. While the likelihood of its being
effective are questionable, there is a certain amount
of support for it. The option is to keep the cost of
petroleum on the world market at a level such that the
developing nations will not be pressured into installing
nuclear power. This could perhaps be accomplished by
intensively developing nuclear power in the industrialized
countries of the world that consume approximately ninety

2 If the industrialized

percent of the world's fossil fuels.
nations continue to consume this percentage of the world's
fossil fuels, and the developing nations do not incorporate
nuclear power or some other form on a large scale - the

developing nations could be precluded from ever attaining

the benefits of an industrialized society.

 

1Mitre Corporation, Nuclear Power Iggues and Choices
(Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing, 1977), p. 16.

2Sir John Hill, "Quest for Public Acceptance of
Nuclear Power”, Nuclear Energy, October 1979, p. 307.

trie
arc:

trac‘

31
Some developing countries are looking to the indus-
trialized world to take the lead in installing large
amounts of nuclear power capacity, thereby leaving the
traditional and smaller-scale technologies predominantly

1 This argument is sometimes misunderstood.

for them.
It is not that the industrialized countries should not
make nuclear power plants available around the world,

but rather that they can most readily take advantage of
nuclear technology in their own countries, thereby leaving
more of the depleting oil and coal reserves for the less
developed. The entire world is involved in the phenomena
of increasing energy costs, and one solution might be

for industrialized nations to utilize nuclear power to

the greatest practicable extent, while making the same

technology available to developing countries as required.2

International Views on Cost
In comparison to fossil fuels, electricity from
nuclear power plants has in most cases a slight advantage
over coal, and is significantly cheaper than electricity
from natural gas or petroleum. While most critics will
concede that on the surface this conclusion may be valid,

they believe the advantage is lost in the form of externalities

 

1C. Allday, ”Nuclear Power, Politics, and Public
Opinion", Nuclear Energy, April 1979, p. 78.

21bid., p. 80.

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for:

othe

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disc

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32
or social costs. However the Mitre Corporation study
funded by the Ford Foundation, Nuclear Power Issues and
Choices, concluded that ”nuclear power compares favorably
with coal even when the possibility of accidents is included".1
Their conclusion was not that nuclear power should be
developed to the exclusion of coal but rather that both
forms of energy were essential. Regarding externalities
other than risks of a nuclear mishap, they state:
We do not believe therefore that consideration of
social costs provides a basis for overriding our conclusions,
based on economic analysis, of the comparative attractive-
ness of the two technologies (coal and nuclear) and
the desirability of maintaining a mix.2
The study readily admits a degree of uncertainty
surrounding nuclear power that makes an absolute cost
comparison impossible. However they agree that despite
these uncertainties, “our analysis leads us to the conclusion
that nuclear power will on the average probably be somewhat
less costly than coal-generated power in the United States.3
The factors affecting the cost attractiveness
of nuclear power in developing nations have already been
discussed, and so additional comparisons for nuclear power
in the United States and Europe will be examined.
The study Energy in Transition: 1985-2010 by the

National Academy of Sciences includes the statement (with

 

1Mitre Corporation, Nuclear Power Issues and Choices
(Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing, 1977), p. 18.

 

21bid., p. 17. Ibid., pp 7-8.

ad

COS

con
for
a h

rel

33

a dissenting view) that “In most regions, the average
cost of nuclear electricity is less than that of coal-
generated electricity, and the difference is likely to
continue in the future".1 The precondition essential
for this advantage is listed in a dissenting opinion as
a higher utilization factor than might occur due to safety-
related nuclear plant shutdowns.2

A recent survey of the forty-eight U.S. nuclear
utilities resulted in a favorable response toward nuclear
power over coal from the forty-three that replied. Their
cost comparisons indicated that electricity from nuclear
power plants had been more economical than that from coal

3 The reasons given were that

for the previous three years.
the costs of generating electricity from fossil fuels
had increased while the costs of generating electricity
from nuclear power plants had remained relatively stable.
The French government's permanent commission on
nuclear electricity production has reported that nuclear

electricity can be generated for one half the price of

oil-generated electricity.4 Of course the greater

 

1National Academy of Sciences, Energy in Transition:
1985-2010 (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences,
1979), p. 19.

2Ibid.

3"Nuclear Generation Costs Stable in 1978:AIF',
Nuclear News, July 1979, p. 33.

4"Nuclear Electricity Now Half the Price of Oil",
Nuclear News, September 1979, p. 53.

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34

dependence on imported petroleum relative to the United
States is the reason for much of this difference.

At the request of the Swedish Ministry of Industry,
a study of the costs of nuclear power in Sweden was conducted.
The main purpose was to determine the real costs of electricity
produced by nuclear power plants compared to that from
other stations. Included in the calculations were considerations
of capital investment, direct disposal costs, decommissioning,
plus other factors which were not unique to nuclear power.
The results of the study show that "In Sweden nuclear
power plants produce electricity considerably cheaper
than other generating plants, with the exception of some
hydroelectric plants“.1

At a joint meeting of the European Nuclear Conference
79 and the Seventh Congress of the European Atomic Forum,
a session was devoted to the economic analysis of nuclear
power. While the session did not stimulate any comparison
of cost estimates from different countries, special national
reports had been prepared for the meeting and most of
them showed a “clear-cut advantage for nuclear power over
coal and oil'.2

There are some additional economics in the utilization

 

10.;Vesterhaugh and B. Blomsnes, "Trends in Nuclear
Power in Sweden", Nuclear EngineeringyInternational,
December 1979, p. 77.

2"More Than Just TMI and Schmidt's Speech”, Nuclear
News, July 1979, p. 65.

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35

of nuclear power that have to do with fuel transportation
and storage. The National Academy of Sciences states
that in the international uranium market, ”the main reason
uranium would normally be preferred by importers is its
lower transportation costs".1 Of course uranium requires
special handling compared to oil or coal, and therefore
the reduction in costs of shipment are not totally proportional
to its lower bulk. They also point out that nuclear fuel
supplies have an advantage in that they are more readily
stockpiled than coal, thus making nuclear electricity
less subject to interruption by strikes, bad weather,
and transportation disruptions.2

It is reported that in France the storing of three
months of oil stocks costs the same as 18 to 2 years of

3

uranium stockpiling. The European Economic Community

also found that it is "far cheaper to stockpile energy

in the form of uranium".4

The International Market

The international market for nuclear power equipment

 

1National Academy of Sciences, Energyiin Transition:
1985-2010 (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences,
1979), p. 79.

21bid., p. 19.

3"More Than Just TMI and Schmidt‘s Speech", Nuclear
News, July 1979, p. 65.

4'Uranium Cheaper to Store Than Fossil Fuels",
Nuclear News, December 1979, p. 46.

V
PW-
..Q

36
and service is large and growing annually, albeit not
without setbacks and problems in almost every country
involved. There are approximately five hundred nuclear
power plants of 30 Mw and over in the world which are
either operating, under construction, or on order.1 These
installations occur in thirty-seven countries. While
the United States has the most nuclear power plants in
operation and has traditionally been the major exporter
of nuclear equipment and services to the world, this leading
position in exportation may be changing.

There are several countries that now manufacture
and service all segments of the nuclear power industry,
most of them having gained their technology from the United
States, and their first experience with U.S. manufactured
reactors. Westinghouse Nuclear Europe, the largest
supplier in the world, with headquarters in London, seems
to be shifting from the sale of nuclear plants to the
sale of technology. A company spokesman recently said
”you can sell plants and make a profit on the sale or
you can sell technology and licenses and make money out
of that”.2

This trend toward selling technology may result

 

1"World List of Nuclear Power Plants”, Nuclear
News, August 1979, pp. 69-87.

2D. E. Richards, ”Westinghouse Experience Over
the Past 10 Years in Negotiating and Constructing Nuclear
Power Plants", Nuclear Energy, December 1979, p. 380.

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both

37

in short-term profits for the companies doing the selling,
but it has also caused them to lose sales to the competitors
they have created, notably France and West Germany - and
perhaps in the future, Japan. Also the nuclear steam
supply systems can already be manufactured in Spain, Italy,
Belgium, Sweden, and Holland, to name a few examples.1

The Soviet Union is aggressively exploiting the
international nuclear power plant market, as is Canada.
At the present time the Soviet Union is concentrating
its efforts mostly in Eastern Europe, but this may change
as the international market grows.2 However there is
much uncertainty about the rate of growth of the international
nuclear power plant market, and the industry is currently
bothered with the shortage of new orders.3

In conclusion, there is a growing world market
for nuclear power plants which is being promoted by the
rising costs of petroleum and the desire of countries
to achieve a reasonable level of energy self-sufficiency
in order to prevent economic or political security from

being compromised. The cost attractiveness of nuclear

power varies depending on the particular circumstances

 

lIbid., p. 371.

Z'Russians Win Order in Turkey”, Nuclear News,
July 1979, p. 72.

3N. H. Jacobson, 'CNA Annual Conference", Nuclear
News, August 1979, p. 112.

38

of each country but seems to have somewhat equal appeal
to both developing and industrialized nations, providing
that non-economic factors do not predominate. The generation
of electricity from nuclear power appears to be less expensive
than that from coal or other fossil fuels. Also the costs
of shipment and stockpiling of uranium fuel as opposed
to fossil fuels favors the use of nuclear. The scope
of the international market for nuclear power plant sales
is large and there is considerable competition for it.

This gives rise to the proliferation issue discussed
in the next chapter, i.e. should nuclear power reactors
and technology be sold and shipped abroad when they could
result in proliferation of nuclear weapons via diversion
of the nuclear fuel cycle? If nuclear power is an inter-
national commodity as has been demonstrated in this chapter,
the increased use of it around the world is almost inevitable.
The choice of whether or not to export is a major choice

facing the American people and the nuclear power industry.

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CHAPTER 2
TO EXPORT OR NOT TO EXPORT: THE PROLIFERATION ISSUE

The Problem

It is generally acknowledged that it is not in
the best interests of world peace and stability for more
than a minimum number of nations to have nuclear weapons
capability. What is not generally acknowledged is that
the existence of a civilian nuclear power industry could
or might promote a nuclear weapons capability. The recent
study by the U.S. Nonproliferation Alternative Systems
Assessment Program (NASAP) expressed its central concern
that 'As nuclear power systems and supporting civilian
research and development activities become more widespread
or as more advanced systems develop, their abuse, whether
overt or covert, may provide a more attractive route to
a nuclear weapons capability, whether national or subnational,

than other routes."1

 

1U.S., Department of EnerQY: Assistant Secretary
for Nuclear EnerQY: Nuclear Proliferation and Civilian
Nuclear Power, Report of the Nonproliferation Alternative
Systems Assessment Program (NASAP), Executive Summary,
Draft, December 1979, p. iii. NASAP began in late 1976
and was restructured to respond to President Carter's
nuclear power policy statement, which was released in
April 1977. The restructured goal of NASAP and the ensuing
study has been to provide recommendations for the development
and deployment of more proliferation resistant civilian

39

U.S.
the I
can 1
life:
think
nucle
issue
and t.

the U

40

There is substantial disagreement between the
U.S. government and other governments of the world regarding
the magnitude of this risk, and whether it is a risk that
can be mitigated via attention focused merely on the pro-
liferation issue. There is also a wide gap between the
thinking of the U.S. government and many of the private
nuclear industries in this country. In discussing this
issue, the position of the U.S. government will be presented
and then contrasted with opposing views within and without
the U.S. borders.

There seems to be general agreement from all quarters
that nuclear weapons proliferation should be avoided.
There also seems to be general agreement that all peoples
of the world should be allowed the opportunity to benefit
from the “nuclear genie” who can, among other things,
supply large amounts of electrical energy at competitive
prices which might be less volatile than the prices associated
with fossil fuels.

The major proliferation debate centers around
the contribution that nuclear power programs can make
to nuclear weapons programs. This contribution depends

on the presence of sensitive materials and facilities

 

nuclear power systems and institutions. The draft report,
dated December 1979 and released January 17, 1980 consists
of nine volumes and an executive summary. It is published
as DOE/NE-OOOl. Copies of the draft documents are available
from the Technical Information Center, P.O. Box 62, Oak
Ridge, Tennessee 37830 (Attn: NASAP Report).

used
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(more

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41

used in the processes associated with civilian nuclear
electrical power. Sensitive material is weapons-usable
material. When separated from other materials, both uraniwm
enriched to high concentrations in the isotopes 0-235
(more than about twenty percent) or 0-233 (more than about
twelve percent) and plutonium are considered to be weapons-
usable materials, whether in oxide or metallic form.1
Sensitive facilities are those that can produce,
or can be easily modified to produce, weapons-usable material.
The facilities of greatest concern are those used for
enriching or reprocessing reactor fuel. The proliferation
risks arise because of the similarities in the materials
and facilities used in manufacturing nuclear weapons and
generating nuclear electric power. It is a widely held
view that the similarities provide significant opportunities
for abuse of the nuclear fuel cycle.
The logic behind creating a civilian nuclear power
industry in order to acquire nuclear weapons capability
is lacking, i.e. it would be the most difficult method.
However, some argue that given existing civilian facilities,
it would be more economical to divert part of the processes
for the manufacture of nuclear weapons than to build separate

nuclear weapons facilities from the ground up. In addition,

the technical expertise that would be acquired in the

 

11bid., p. 3.

non-

civi.
for '
it he
tech:
of ti
was t
which
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42
implementation of a civilian power industry could be useful
in the diversion of those facilities and materials to

non-peaceful purposes.

The U.S. Government Position

While the United States was the creator of the
civilian nuclear power industry and has been responsible
for transfer of this technology to much of the free world,
it has also set the guidelines for spread of much of nuclear
technology. A major development in the implementation
of these policies was the Non-Proliferation Treaty which
was negotiated and opened for signatures in 1968, and
which entered into force in 1970. The Treaty involved
the acceptance by non-nuclear-weapons states of international
safeguards on all their peaceful nuclear activities, and
their agreement not to acquire or manufacture nuclear
weapons.1 The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
was also established early, in 1957, under United Nations
auspices to regulate the international transfer of nuclear
technology. The most recent U.S. statement of its policies
was the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, which codified
U.S. terms for nuclear cooperation.

There are two major approaches to the proliferation

 

10.5., Department of Energy: Assistant Secretary
for Nuclear Energyo Nuclear Proliferation and Civilian
Nuclear Power, Report of the Nonproliferation Alternative
Systems Assessment Program, Program Summary, Draft, December
1979, p. 8.

life

43

issue. One method focuses on technical measures that
can be employed to inhibit diversion of civilian nuclear
power to weapons capability. The second method focuses
on institutional and policy measures. The technical approach
will be discussed first.

In the recent NASAP report, a table of basic technical
considerations was compiled against which to evaluate
the proliferation potential of any nuclear setting. This
information is included in table 5, and is centered
around three major groups of assessment factors. These
groups are:

Resources required - the technological base,

personnel, and financial resources needed for the

specified proliferation activities in light of their
inherent difficulty.

Time re uired - the approximate times needed for
the specified proliferation activities, including
preparation, removal, and conversion.

Risks of detection - the chances and consequences
of detection of theiproliferation activities, including
preparation, removal, and conversion, and the possible
timeliness of detection.(l)

The most important conclusions of the NASAP pro-
liferation resistance assessments are that:

All fuel cycles entail some proliferation risks;

there is no technical fix that will permit operation

of a nuclear-power fuel cycle with material that cannot
be diverted to use in nuclear weapons or that will

 

10.8., Department of Energy, Assistant Secretary
for Nuclear Energy, Nuclear Proliferation and Civilian
Nuclear Power, Report of the Nonproliferation Alternative
Systems Assessment Program, gyoliferation Resistance,
Draft, December 1979, pp. l-12, 1-14.

n
t

’It

NatUi

I

r...

t

 

TABLE 2

CONSIDERATIONS FOR EVALUATING PROLIFERATION POTENTIAL

 

 

General Factors

(1)
(ii)
(iii)

The number sites with significant quantities
of sensitive nuclear materials

The need for storage and transport of these
materials

The quantity of these materials

 

Form of the
(11!)
(v)
(vi)

(vii)

Material

The accessibility (radiation level) of these
materials '

The quality (isotopic mixture and chemical
form) of the materials

The resources required by different routes
to prepare for, remove, and convert these
materials to nuclear-weapons purposes

The times required by these activities

 

Nature of the Facility

(viii)

(ix)

The resources and time required by different
routes to adapt the facility to nuclear-weapons
purposes .

The resources and time required for covert
replication of fuel-cycle facilities

 

Degree of Protection

(x)
(xi)
(xii)

The likelihood of detection of abuse

The amenability to institutional arrangements
The amenability of the materials and
facilities to safeguarding

 

 

 

 

Evolution
(xiii) The evolution of programs in countries at
different stages of deployment.
SOURCE: U.S., Department of EnerQY: Assistant Secretary

for Nuclear

Energy, Nuclear Proliferation and Civilian

Nuclear Power, Report of the Nonproliferation Alternative
Systems assessment Program, Proliferation Resistance,
Draft, December 1979, p. 1-13.

44

 

45

preclude a determined owner-operator from designing
a proliferation strategy.

The light water reactor fuel cycle with spent
fuel discharged to interim storage, however, does
not involve directly weapons-usable material in any
part of the fuel cycle and is a more proliferation-
resistant nuclear-power fuel cycle than other fuel
cycles which involve work with highly-enriched uranium
or pure plutonium.

Substantial differences in proliferation resistance
also exist between the fuel cycles if they are deployed
in non-nuclear weapons states. Some of these differences are
technical in nature (e.g., no reprocessing in once-
through fuel cycles), and some result from institutional
arrangements (e.g., limited deployment of existing
international enrichment services).

On the other hand, with the progressive introduction
of technical and institutional measures to improve
proliferation resistance, these differences may be
reduced by the time the fuel cycles eventually come
into widespread use. The differences will remain
until the necessary improvements have been made, not
only in newer facilities, but also in older ones.

The vulnerability to threats by subnational groups
varies between fuel cycles; whereas once-through fuel
cycles are susceptible to only the most sophisticated
threats, closed fuel cycles are vulnerable to a wide
range of threats.(l)

It should be explained that "once-through" fuel

cycles refer to those involving indefinite storage of

spent fuel rods whereas ”closed” fuel cycles refer to

those whose spent fuel is reprocessed and results in the

accumulation of weapons-usable materials.

The second major approach to the proliferation

issue is the institutional one. What follows is a discussion

of current U.S. policies, assessment approaches, procedures,

 

11bido’ pp. 1-15, 1.16.

46

and major U.S. government observations.

Briefly stated, the reason for the spread of sensitive
fuel-cycle activities and facilities is due to international
uncertainties about the adequacy and accessibility of
uranium supplies (whether warranted or not), and anticipation
of growth in demand for nuclear fuel. Some countries
are moving toward their own enrichment capabilities and
some toward plutonium-based fuel cycles. Some nations
are making the same moves to reduce operational, economic,
and political dependency on foreign nations for supplies
of uranium or enrichment services. In spite of these
moves, the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation
organization estimates that less than five percent of
the anticipated world installed nuclear capacity will
be provided by fast breeder reactors in the year 2000.1

In order to prevent the further spread of sensitive
materials and facilities, the U.S. government has reaffirmed
its intention to act as a reliable supplier, has re-opened
its order books for enrichment services, is expanding
its enrichment capacity, and has explored the concept
of an international fuel bank as a buffer against temporary
bilateral supply problems. The U.S. is also working with

other nations toward greater international cooperation

 

1U.S., Department of Energy, Assistant Secretary
for Nuclear Energy, Nuclear Proliferation and Civilian
Nuclear Power, Report of the Nonproliferation Alternative
Systems Assessment Program, International Perspectives,
Draft, December 1979, p. 1-3.

 

in

wea

47

in spent-fuel storage.1

In building its nonproliferation strategy, the
0.5. government recognizes that consideration must be
given not only to nuclear development and nonproliferation
concerns but also to the differing interests of suppliers
and consumers, and of nations with nuclear programs in
various stages of development. Their strategy does not
require the resolution of all the issues at once, and
the U.S. feels its strategy should be flexible enough
to take into account the legitimate technology development,
economic, and program interests of suppliers and users.

Also, nuclear power systems, as they evolve, should not
significantly enhance the development of a dedicated nuclear-
weapons program for any nation.

There are several characteristics of institutional
arrangements and possible impacts on proliferation resistance
that are considered significant. First of all, the group
or nation obtaining nuclear power capacity should incorporate
among the partners a genuine aversion to abuse of the
facilities or materials handled by them. Secondly, there
must be ownership by the proper group such that the cost
of any abuse would fall fully on them - thereby acting
as a deterrent. Also, proper management and staffing
can significantly impact the effectiveness of safeguards.

Finally, the quantity and location of sensitive facilities

 

lIbide’ pa 1-7.

affe

48

affect their vulnerability to proliferation threats.
The basic U.S. approach is to reduce proliferation
risks by reducing the number or geographic spread of nationally-
controlled sensitive facilities. A suggested alternative
is the construction of sensitive facilities and handling
of sensitive materials by an international organization
of some kind. There could also be substantial economies
of scale in the construction of a few worldwide facilities
rather than many small and scattered ones. On the other
hand, these technological economies could be offset by
administrative, regulatory, and transportation diseconomies.
Sanctions and the threat of sanctions are viewed
by some as an important element of any nonproliferation
effort. The threat of terminating a fuel or technology
transfer agreement could be a sufficient deterrent to
misuse of the nuclear power facilities. This is due to
the large monetary investment in such facilities as well
as dependence upon their energy. It has also been suggested
that further sanctions outside the nuclear arrangements
could be employed, e.g. through the United Nations.
The attitude of the U.S. government toward the
proliferation challenge is summarized well by the following
statement:1
Two tasks confront the U.S. in working to foster

a world nuclear-power regime less vulnerable to proliferation.
The first task is to limit the damage that may be

 

11bid., p. 1-25.

I
.si,"

49

done by the proliferation vulnerabilities in the

existing regime. Carrying out this damage-limiting

task might entail holding the line against the spread

of spent-fuel reprocessing activities. The second

task is to begin now to move toward a longer-term

policy framework for the future use of nuclear energy,

a framework containing fewer proliferation vulner-

abilities. Such a framework would serve as a means

of incorporating into a safer set of possible outcomes

the expanding nuclear activities of many nations that

today have programs in various stages of development.

The U.S. government is suggesting an evolutionary

approach, which by necessity will be an incremental approach
toward increased control and participation in the international

nuclear arena.

The U.S. Nuclear Industry Position

The U.S. nuclear industry and the U.S. government
disagree substantially over the ”means“ to achieve the
'end'. The U.S. nuclear industry also does not want to
see nuclear weapons proliferate around the world. However
it sees the present policies and actions of the U.S. govern-
ment as simply crippling their business and limiting their
participation in the world nuclear marketplace, while
failing to further the goal of nonproliferation.

The U.S. nuclear industry has been the unquestioned
leader in supplying nuclear technology to the world.
While the early British and French nuclear programs floundered
over the utilization of natural uranium reactors designed
for weapons production, the United States continued to
use reactors based on enriched uranium fuel. By the

beginning of the 1970's, the United States had emerged as

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more

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itrah
that

PEtit

it Ex

 

 

50

the dominant actor in the nuclear reactor market with
revenues from export sales exceeding the combined revenues
of all other exporters.1
In 1974 and 1975, while not receiving a single
domestic reactor sale, General Electric and Westinghouse
acquired twelve new foreign orders. A Westinghouse executive
testified that the company receives about twenty-five
million annually from licensees, and General Electric
reported that roughly forty percent of its nuclear profits
come from foreign companies.2
However, with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act
of 1978, significant constraints were placed on the exporting
of nuclear materials and facilities. The Act contains
more stringent regulations on nuclear exports that those
prevailing in other countries or in multilateral agreements.
Abraham Katz of the U.S. Department of Commerce feels
that ”this has placed U.S. producers at a distinct com-
petitive disadvantage in the international nuclear market."3

An Exxon Company vice-president has corroborated this

 

1Charles K. Ebinger, International Politics of
Nuclear Ener , (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications,
1978), p. 24.

2"'Reactor Exports: New Life for Industry in Third
World", People & Energy, January 1979, p. 12.

3Abraham Katz, Assistant Secretary for International
Economic Policy and Research, U.S. Department of Commerce,
speech at Executive Conference on International Nuclear
Commerce, New Orleans, Louisiana, 9-11 September 1979,
appearing in Executive Conference Digest, (La Grange Park,
111.: American Nuclear Society, 1980), p. 6.

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51

observation in his statement that “While U.S. industry
can and does compete vigorously on the basis of product
quality and selling price, we must squarely confront the
injuries to national as well as commercial interests which
are inflicted by unrealistic and unproductive export policies
and by bureaucratic disabilities."1
Gordon C. Horlbert, president of the Westinghouse
Power Systems Company has described U.S. nonproliferation
policy as a tragic failure to translate legitimate concerns
over proliferation into policies that enhance achievement
of the goal.2 Westinghouse has argued for (1) an amendment
of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, (2) improved
export licensing performance, (3) support for the IAEA
activities including international plutonium storage,
and (4) U.S. progress in the development of reprocessing,
in view of continued reprocessing activities by other

countries.

Concern over export constraints is a very real

 

1William T. England, Vice President for Corporate
Affairs & General Counsel, Exxon Nuclear Company, speech
at Executive Conference on International Nuclear Commerce,
New Orleans, Louisiana, 9-11 September 1979, appearing
in Executive Conference Digest, (La Grange Park, 111.:
American Nuclear Society, 1980), p. 6.

2Gordon C. Hurlbert, President, Westinghouse
Power Systems Company, speech at Executive Conference
on International Nuclear Commerce, New Orleans, Louisiana,
9-11 September 1979, appearing in Executive Conference
Dggest, (La Grange Park, 111.: American Nuclear Society,
), p. 2.

vas

vehd
ment
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52

issue with the U.S. nuclear industry. When South Africa
was looking to purchase two nuclear reactors from an American
vendor, the arrangements were disrupted by the State Depart-
ment who threatened to prevent export licenses from being
issued unless certain stipulations were met. The net
result was South Africa's prompt approach to a French
firm who was happy to fill the profitable orders.

In January of 1978, the President issued an executive
order that environmental impact studies would be required
on nuclear exports. This restriction could have complicated
the export business to an even greater degree if the order
were interpreted to include consideration of broad health,
safety, and environmental impacts of the reactor in its
intended location within the receiving country. Fortunately
for the industry, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission decided
to consider only impacts on the U.S. or on the global
commons in its nuclear export proceedings.1

As a result of U.S. government policies with regard
to exportation of sensitive facilities and materials,
the U.S. nuclear industry is being increasingly looked
upon as an unreliable supplier to other countries. Closely
coupled with concerns over reliability of supply has been

the widespread belief among trading partners that the

U.S. is unilaterally altering prior international commitments.2

 

1The Energy Daily, 1 February 1980, p. 1.

2England, Executive Conference Digest, p. 6.

agre
gcve
and

exec

ark

 

 

53

There is considerable feeling that existing U.S. trade
agreements have been modified as a direct result of U.S.
government nonproliferation efforts, and to the detriment
and expense of both vendor and customer. A nuclear company
executive has said 'If future U.S. undertakings are to
be accorded any value in the international community,
we are obliged to honor those commitments contained in
existing agreements for cooperation and supply agreements.1
The United States has especially lost credibility
in Latin America with regard to its reputation as a reliable
supplier. In fact, U.S. export policies may have helped
European firms to gain ground in this market.2 The develop-
ment of a Spanish-speaking independent consortium to develop
nuclear power is on the horizon. They can use their own
uranium resources, Spain and Argentina's technical expertise,
with the help of Canadian and European technology.3
Because of the decision to not proceed with the
Clinch River breeder reactor project, the United States
may be falling behind technologically in the development
of advanced reactor designs. The reason for not going
ahead with the breeder reactor program is simply that

the United States, with its abundant fossil fuels and

 

1Ibid., p. 7.

2Octave Du Temple, ”Latin America: Emerging Nuclear
Market", Nuclear News, September 1979, p. 64.

3Ibid.

54

uranium reserves, can afford to use the 'once through"
fuel cycle. This “stow away“ policy with the spent fuel
rods (referred to as "throw away' by opponents) may not
be affordable to other countries and certainly does not
seem to be acceptable for both economic and energy security
reasons. The estimated value of the fissile material re-
maining in the spent fuel elements of a modern-sized nuclear
power plant of 1,000 Mw is about ten million dollars.
If this material was reprocessed rather that "stowed away",
uranium resources could be extended by perhaps forty percent
if simply reused in light water reactors.1

It is feasible that the United States may need
to import advanced breeder technology, should a decision
be made at some later date to rapidly implement it. United
States reactor manufacturers such as Westinghouse and
General Electric are even now seeking technical information
on the French Super Phoenix fast-breeder design, in case
it proves commercially competitive.2

The position of the U.S. nuclear industry is that
if the United States wants to maintain its ability to
exercise a leadership position in developing the nonpro-

liferation strategies, it must retain its leadership in

 

1James J. Duderstadt and Chihiro Kikuchi, Nuclear
Power: Technology on Trial (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan
Press, ), p. .

2Jonathan Spivak, ”France Pursues Drive to Replace
Oil Imports With Nuclear Energy", Wall Street Journal,
8 March 1980, p. l.

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55

nuclear power. Moreover, actions taken in the name of
proliferation which in effect reduce U.S. nuclear power
capability and technological leadership, will serve to
weaken the future U.S. position in influencing desirable

nonproliferation arrangements.1

Position of U.S. Allies
The European and Japanese allies, who have far
less fossil fuel resources than the United States, believe
that U.S. nuclear energy policies are unduly parochial

and restrictive.2

The irony is that the United States

is still trying to persuade the rest of the world to adopt
them. To paraphrase a statement in the London Times,

"The fact of the matter is that the United States is trying
to teach by example without having any attentive pupils.'3
Other countries have shown a clear determination to move
ahead with their breeder and reprocessing programs regardless
of current U.S. nonproliferation policies.

The international proliferation debate has become

even more polarized since the 1973-74 Arab Oil Embargo,

 

1George J. Stathakis, Vice President and General
Manager, Nuclear Energy Programs Division, General Electric
Company, “The Nuclear Weapons Proliferation Problem: Can
We Lead Without Leadership2', address to the Atomic Industrial
Forum Conference on International Commerce and Safeguards
for Civil Nuclear Power, New York City, 15 March 1977.

2Charles K. Ebinger, International Politics of
Nuclear Energy, (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications,
1978), p. 5.

3England, Executive Conference Digest, p. 7.

56

as nations who possess few fossil fuel resources have

moved to develop nuclear power to protect their economies

from the vagaries of another major disruption of oil supplies.
The United States is matched by few countries in its wealth
of energy options.

For those countries that lack the abundant alternatives
of the United States, the use of nuclear power is viewed
as the only viable short-term solution to reduce their
dependency on imported oil. However they are equally
determined to not become dependent on the importation
of either uranium or enriched uranium for fuel.

Since the United States developed early the best
technology for nuclear power plants and fuel, it naturally
has had a competitive edge in supplying such technology
to the world. The U.S. has even used the European Atomic
Energy Community (EURATOM) as a vehicle for ensuring the
commercial dominance of American companies in the European
nuclear market.1 In addition, by guaranteeing long-term
delivery of enriched uranium supplies, the Europeans were
thus discouraged from developing their own enrichment
and reprocessing technology.

The result of U.S. efforts to dominate European
nuclear commerce has been a great amount of distrust of

U.S. motives in promoting a firm international nuclear

 

lEbinger, International Politics of Nuclear Energy,

p. 15.

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57

nonproliferation system. From the European perspective,
U.S. tenders of technical assistance, assured deliveries
of low-cost enriched uranium supplies, and Export-Import
Bank financing for U.S. firms selling nuclear reactors
abroad appear to be designed to maintain commercial dominance
of the European nuclear market rather than to limit the
proliferation of European enrichment plants from which
bombs can be manufactured.1

From the European and Japanese perspectives, the
efforts of the U.S. to dominate the enrichment technology
in the name of nonproliferation served to maintain a monopoly
on the reactor fuel market. This is because the best
available nuclear reactor technology for years has relied
on enriched uranium.

Sensitive nuclear facilities have been further
diffused in Europe because of the European perception
that the United States did not have a proper regard
for the energy needs of their own countries, as they were
dependent on the importation of enriched uranium fuel.
This perception grew out of observations that the U.S.
government subsidization of uranium enrichment costs has
been adjusted without adequate concern for the fuel demands
of other countries.

Several other factors have tended to encourage

U.S. allies to become independent with regard to the uranium

 

11bid., p. 29.

58

fuel cycle: (1) the continuing domestic debate on private
ownership of enrichment technology, (2) the U.S.
curtailment of some future contracts for enriched uranium
in June 1974, and (3) the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's
decision in March 1975 to halt all exports of nuclear
fuel and reactors pending a case by case examination of
physical security measures.1

Another factor tending toward the spread of sen-
sitive nuclear technologies has to do with the economic
strength of major European suppliers of nuclear technology.
The industry is very capital intensive and requires a
minimum number of orders to turn a profit. Several of
the European governments feel they must retain a viable
nuclear industry in order to preserve national economic
and political stability. If there are not enough orders
placed within the European community, it becomes essential
that they find foreign markets in order to maintain the
commercial viability of their nuclear industries. Some
of the eagerness to tap the foreign markets has resulted
in controversial sales - for example to Brazil and South
Africa by Germany and France, respectively.

However, just when France and Germany were exhibiting
greater willingness to follow the U.S. lead, the U.S.
government announced to a surprised international nuclear

community on October 28, 1976, that it would engage in

 

1Ibid., p. 42

59

reprocessing and plutonium recycling in the future only
if they were found to be consistent with U.S. international
objectives.1
This announcement was disturbing to the Europeans
and Japan because after the Arab Oil Embargo, millions
of dollars had been invested in developing their own complete
uranium fuel cycle. It began to appear that the United
States was again trying to maintain its monopoly in the
enrichment processes by sabotaging the efforts toward
self-sufficiency by its allies, under the theme of nonpro-
liferation.
Moreover, considerable investments have been made
around the world in breeder reactors utilizing plutonium.
If the nonproliferation efforts and policies of the U.S.
were too broadly and thoroughly applied, they would tend
to slow the development of the breeder technologies to
the detriment of the countries developing them.2
If the U.S. were so inclined, and were successful
internationally in discouraging development of the breeder
reactor in favor of light water reactors with a once-through

fuel cycle, the possibility of a uranium shortage would

no doubt loom as a large possibility in the minds of the

 

10.8., Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (1976),
cited in Charles K. Ebinger, International Politics of
Nuclear Energy (Beverly Hills, CaIif.: Sage PuBIications,
1978), p. 61.

2Mason Willrich, "A WOrkable International Fuel
Regime”, The Washington Quarterly, spring 1979, p. 20.

60

U.S. allies. This possible shortage of uranium would
tend to encourage development of the breeder rather than
discourage it.

It is clear that the paramount interests of the
Europeans and Japanese are energy security and political
stability. Their extensive research and development ex-
penditures in the breeder technology, as well as investments
amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars for enrichment
and reprocessing facilities reinforce this observation.

The fact is that a country cannot be energy independent,
or perhaps under a world crisis situation - even energy
secure, if it is dependent on external sources of enriched
uranium.

It is noteworthy that no reactor using highly
concentrated fissile material as fuel, such as plutonium
has yet had any significant commercial use.1 This fact
suggests that energy security considerations may be paramount
in the decision to pursue the breeder reactor with its
plutonium fuel cycle, and attendant weapons-proliferation
potentials.

England regards the technology of the fast breeder
reactor as clearly essential, in spite of the proliferation
risks associated with the use of plutonium. She regards

breeder technology as a means of guaranteeing that growth

 

1Albert Wohlstetter and others, Swords From Plowshares,
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), p. 5.

uLSIP

61

in nuclear power will not be constrained in the long run
by uranium supply limitations. It was recently stated
that for England, "The (breeder) technology also has some
insurance value in that the earlier fast reactors are
introduced, the greater the security of fuel supply."1
In spite of some public opposition to nuclear
power in Germany, their program is continuing - and
in the area of sensitive facilities and materials. The
former president of West Germany, Herr Walter Scheel has
publicly appealed for a greater use of nuclear power ”to
solve the country's energy problems." 2
Japan has made a very large commitment to nuclear
power and is pursuing the rapid development of its own
enrichment and reprocessing facilities. Japan has expressed
regret in the apparent loss of support for nuclear power
in the United States and has called for renewed U.S. leader-
ship in all aspects of nuclear power and the nuclear fuel

3

cycle. It is clear that the nonproliferation policies

of the United States are viewed by some allies as indicative

 

1"Energy Technologies for the United Kingdom -
An Appraisal for RD & D Planning" from Energy Paper No. 39,
cited in "Five-Star Rating for Nuclear Technology", Nuclear
News, March 1980, p. 62.

2"Wind of Change Starts to Blow for Nuclear",
Nuclear Eggineering International, April 1980, p. 5.

3Toshi Ito, Kansai Electric Company, (Osaka,
Japan), speech at Executive Conference on International
Nuclear Commerce, New Orleans, Louisiana, 9-11 September
1979, appearing in Executive Conference Digest, (La Grange
Park, Ill.: American Nuclear Society, 1980), p. 2.

 

inf

is a.

P. 12

 

62

of a self-seeking nuclear industry, a government lack

of sensitivity to the energy needs of others, an effort
to retain a dominant position in the sales of reactor
fuel, and a naivete about the ability of the U.S. nonpro-

liferation policies to accomplish their goals.

The Third World Position

The attitude of the Third World toward the non-
proliferation efforts of the United States is summarized
well in the following statement from International Politics
of Nuclear Energy:1

Most of the nuclear "have-not" nations reject

the notion of superpower strategic nuclear parity

as a stabilizing geopolitical force: they reject

the argument that horizontal nuclear proliferation

is more a threat to world stability than the vertical
proliferation of nuclear weapons held by the superpowers;
and they assert the right of all sovereign nations

to foster their economic independence and strategic
security.

Many of the third world countries look upon nuclear
power as a means of breaking out of the position of economic
dependency that has been their lot since the time of the
industrial revolution. Moreover, the implementation of
the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has seemed to them
to have as its goal the perpetuation and protection of
the interests of those few countries with investments
in fuel enrichment and reprocessing. Such an argument

is difficult to refute.

 

1Ebinger, International Politics of Nuclear Energy,

p. 12.

Sta
the

prc

is
pol
pCVt
pom
the}
tel:
the
Bra:
{Epz
serv
expo

and

63

While the United States and other nuclear-weapons
states have behaved rather responsibly with regard to
the use of nuclear weapons, the Third World regards ”vertical"
proliferation (increasing strike capability) by the existing
weapons states as much of a threat to world peace as the
possible "horizontal” proliferation (ownership of nuclear
weapons by additional countries) that could result from
the spread of sensitive facilities and materials.1
For the above reasons, much of the Third World
is not supportive of the current U.S. nonproliferation
policies with their attendant implications that the major
powers of the world will be responsible users of nuclear
power, whether for civilian or military purposes, while
they would not. A further consideration is fuel supply
reliability in the international market. For example,
the reasons leading up to Germany's agreement to provide
Brazil, a non-NPT signatory, with uranium enrichment and
reprocessing technology were (1) the curtailment of enrichment
services by the U.S. in 1974, (2) the abrogation of coal
export contracts by firms in west Virginia and Virginia,
and (3) the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's denial of
nuclear fuel to Brazil's Angra I and Angra II nuclear
plants after March 1975.2

For a country such as South Africa that is developing

its own enrichment complex, to cooperate with the IAEA

 

1 2

Ibid., p. 46. Ibid., p. 54.

64

and to agree to the terms of the NPT would mean that their
enrichment facilities would be open to international in-
spection and would, in their view, allow the West to acquire
valuable commercial information. This same access to
U.S. enrichment facilities is denied to South Africa.
The Third Wbrld also rejects the argument that
the acquisition of enrichment and reprocessing facilities
would automatically mean that the nations would build
nuclear weapons. They cite the examples of Germany and
Japan, among other "near-nuclear“ states, who could have
built weapons but have chosen not to do so.
The Third Wbrld wants to be removed from its Third
WOrld status, because whatever way it is viewed, ”third
world" denotes something less than first class status.
The drive for prestige as a nation is important as never
before, as suggested in Arms Control and Security: Current
Issues:1
In our epoch, the evidence is everywhere of the
dominant role of national status-seeking and the drive
to 'feel equal'. An entire philosophy of resentful
Third WOrld economies bears the telltale name
'dependency theory'. Third World proposals for a
'New Economic and Social Order' reflect a veritable
obsession with eradicating the stigmata of inferiority.
The walls of every international conference room,

from OPEC to the U.N. General Assembly resound with
strident demands for equal status.

 

1Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Arms Control and Security:
Current Issues, ed. welfram F. Hanrieder (Boulder, Colo.:
WestView Press, 1979), p. 295.

65

At the symbolic level, nuclear power reactors
are anything but trivial. Moreover, the Third World per-
ceives a real need for nuclear power if the fossil fuel
prices are forced too high by the bidding of richer and
more developed nations. The poor countries could have
their situation improved by either utilizing nuclear power
themselves (complete with their own or shared fuel enrichment
and reprocessing facilities) or by the developed nations'
extensive implementation of it.

It does appear that the shortage of cheap energy
in the world is affecting economic growth almost everywhere.
It is also generally the case that the effects of a weak
world economy are felt most by the poorer countries.
It is a point well taken that as the gap between the rich
and the poor countries grows, “circumstances of great
social and political uncertainty and unrest (fostered
by the economic gap) . . . are likely to exaggerate threats
to their security and (cause them to) become involved

1 The task is to keep the economic

in military action."
gap from broadening as much as possible, by making available
the energy required for growth, whether it is fossil or

nuclear.

 

1Frank Barnaby, "Maneuvers in the Indian Ocean",
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May 1980, p. 9.

66

The Net Effect
The solution to the proliferation issue is not
simple, and may be unattainable. The current status of
U.S. nonproliferation efforts are summarized by the following
States General Accounting Office statement:1
U.S. efforts to defer worldwide commercial re-
processing and the premature separation of plutonium
are having only limited success. In spite of the
administration's policy, many countries are reprocessing
or continue plans to develop commercial reprocessing
industries. Recognizing these plans and the resulting
excess plutonium that may be produced, effective
international safeguards and controls over the produc-

tion, storage and use of separated plutonium are needed.
No such systems currently exist.

The statement that 'No such systems currently
exist” implies that the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the
International Atomic Energy Agency are not effective or
broad-based enough at present.

Currently, almost all nuclear plant fuel is enriched
in the United States, but by 1990, thirty-five to forty
percent will be handled elsewhere. In addition, world
capacity is expected to triple during the same period.2
It appears that the spread of sensitive facilities is

going to occur regardless of U.S. efforts to prevent it

 

1U.S., General Accounting Office, Report to the
Congress by the Comptroller General of the United States,
Nuclear Fuel Reprocessin and the Problems of Safe uardin
A ainst the Spread 0 Nuclear Weapons, 18 March 1980,
p. 52.

2Exxon Corporation, Public Affairs Department,
World Energy Outlook (New York: Exxon Corporation, 1980),
pp. 14-15.

67

via its nonproliferation policies. This position is supported

in a statement made in a reputable study by Resources

for the Future, Inc.:1

Moreover, there is the possibility that U.S. policy
generally and the passage of the Act (Non-Proliferation
Act of 1978) in particular may have effects on nuclear
weapons proliferation just the opposite of those in-
tended. The specter of U.S. denial of uranium and
enrichment service and of an American veto of repro-
cessing by third parties may serve as an inducement
to the development of indigenous enrichment and repro-
cessing capabilities and premature interest in breeders.

Similar conclusions were arrived at in a 1977

Mitre Corporation study, Nuclear Power Issues and Choices.2

The National Research Council's Committee on Nuclear and

Alternative Energy Systems (CONAES) came to a like conclusion.

Their assessment was that there was no "technical fix"

that would avert the nuclear proliferation problem - not

even the stopping of the construction of nuclear power

plants.3_ .
Another study concluded that the trend toward

proliferation of sensitive facilities and materials could

be turned around but such a reversal was not likely.

 

1Resources for the Future, Ener : The Next
Twenty Years (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing,
1979), p. 446.

2Mitre Corporation, Nuclear Power Issues ang
Choices (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing, 1977),
p. 4.

3Cited in “Breeders Needed Says CONAES", Nuclear
EngineeriggInternational, March 1980, p. 8, from National
Research Council's Committee on Nuclear and Alternative
Energy Systems (CONAES), Ener in Transition 1985-2010
(San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, I979).

68

It stated further that if a turn-around were to occur,
it would have to be by some form of international agreement.1
One needs to focus on the essential cause of the
likely failure of the U.S. nonproliferation efforts.
The basic reason can be reduced to the fact of the essential
discriminatory nature of the present system,2i.e. it appears
that the nuclear ”haves" are trying to prevent peaceful
nuclear technology from falling into the hands of the
nuclear 'have-nots'. While the proliferation risks will
increase with the spread of sensitive technologies, the
risks to world peace may increase at a greater rate if
countries are not allowed the benefits of peaceful uses
of nuclear power.
One author has advocated an international system
for the sharing of nuclear technology with ”real“ (as
opposed to token) participation on the part of those desiring'
a voice.3 This system would avoid the current major power
domination that currently exists in the IAEA. Among other
things, this new international body would supervise and
make available (1) the reprocessing of plutonium from
reactors, (2) nuclear fuels, notably those based on plutonium

and highly enriched uranium, and (3) more distantly, the

 

lWohlstetter, Nuclear Policies: Fuel Without
the Bomb, p. xiv.

2Bloomfield, Arms Control and Security: Current
Issues, p. 295.

31bid., p. 300.

69

uranium enrichment process.

Finally, it appears that the nonproliferation
policies of the U.S. government may have served the interests
of the U.S. nuclear industry in the past by protecting
their market. No doubt these policies also had a beneficial
effect in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons technology.
At the present however, the policies are largely ineffective
in attaining their goal, may even be counterproductive,
and are generally opposed by the U.S. nuclear industry,

U.S. allies, and third world countries. The existing
policies are operating against the business efforts of
the U.S. nuclear industry by restricting their ability to
compete in the growing international nuclear market.

They are also fostering the growth of competition from
former customers.

A related and complicated issue is that of nuclear
waste disposal examined in the next chapter. Since most of
the concern is over the high-level and long-lived wastes,
the study will focus on them. The waste disposal challenge
is an integral part of the issues dealt with in the first
two chapters in the sense that nuclear power will be stymied
in its international growth by failure to provide safe
and adequate long-term storage for the nuclear power plant
waste by-products. Nuclear weapons proliferation could
also be enhanced by failure to securely store spent fuel
rods as well as reprocessed materials such as weapons-

grade plutonium and concentrated uranium.

CHAPTER 3
THE WASTE DISPOSAL SITUATION

Makeup of Nuclear Waste

The most ubiquitous environmental challenge to
the nuclear power industry is the problem of nuclear wastes
with their requirements for long-term storage and disposal.
Of the more than three hundred radioactive substances
created as a result of fission in nuclear power plants,
the environmental concern centers around only a handful,
known as the "actinides”.l

As an example of the very slow decay process,
plutonium has a half-life of 24,600 years. The waste
disposal challenges associated with nuclear power amount
to million-year challenges for the actinides and thousand-
year challenges for many of the remaining fission by-products,
as illustrated in figure 3. These challenges of disposal
have been increasingly publicized of late although they
have been recognized since the dawn of the nuclear era.

The quantity of radioactive waste to be disposed

of is not as great a challenge as the time during which

it remains toxic to life. Recently it was pointed out

 

1Gerald Garvey, Nuclear Power and Social Planning
(Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath) 1977), pp. 42-43.

70

71

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

105
105
TOTAL ACTIVITY
104
5: 103
a r/
g 102
so
3 <3“ is is 3e: 1%
.5. 1 ' d a \t
10
Te-99
10° ‘
NIT-231 9’06
10'1 w
9‘l
I429 u- s
10'2 1
10° 10' 102 103 10" 105 105
TIME AFTER REMOVAL
FROM REACTOR (1(3)

Fig. 3. umOAcnvroECAvorrwxanTrua'

SOURCE: Office of Nuclear Waste Isolation,
Battelle Project Management Division, The Disposal of
Spgnt Nuclear Fuel (Springfield, Va.: National Technical
Information Service, December 1979), p. 17.

72

that about five thousand metric tons of radioactive waste
has been generated since the beginning of atomic power
usage. This quantity was made to appear quite small in
comparison to a similar quantity of environmentally persistent
chemical wastes that are generated in a single year.1

Nuclear wastes may take various physical forms.
The current Administration's policy of non-recycling of
spent fuel dictates that plans be made for storage of
un-reprocessed spent fuel. This form of waste contains
large amounts of usable uranium and plutonium. If spent
fuel were reprocessed, only the true wastes would need
to be disposed of.2 The location for long-term storage
would not likely be different according to the form of
the waste, but the encasement and mechanics of storage
would.

Regarding the storage of spent fuel, it could
be stored in the form of the complete fuel assembly, or
it could be stored in the form of (1) full fuel elements,
(2) fuel elements with end fittings removed, (3) fuel

pins from the bundle intact, but separated, or (4) chopped

 

1Thomas H. Maugh II, "Toxic Waste Disposal A Growing
Problem”, Science, 25 May 1979, p. 281.

2Atomic Energy of Canada, Public Affairs Dept.,
Nuclear Fuel Waste (Ottawa, Ontario: Atomic Energy of
Canada, 1980).

73

1 The various alternatives provide opportunities

fuel pins.
for reducing the storage package sizes which would tend
to have more uniform thermal characteristics.

Although presently not the policy, the high-level
radioactive wastes from nuclear power plants could be
concentrated and reduced in volume considerably by the
reprocessing cycle. By reprocessing, the uranium and
plutonium could be extracted for manufacturing more fuel.
There is about two hundred times more uranium and plutonium
in spent fuel than in the equivalent high-level waste
remaining after the reprocessing cycle (approximately
99.5 percent of all uranium and plutonium is removed in
reprocessing).2

There are storage problems unique to storing both
spent fuel and concentrated high-level waste. High-level
waste is usually in the form of a borosilicate glass package.
This package can contain the same amount of residual waste
from approximately four to six packages containing complete
fuel rod assemblies.3 The reliability of glass as a medium
for storage has been recently questioned however. .Very

intensive studies have been conducted that have shown

 

1Office of Nuclear Waste Isolation, Battelle Project
Management Division, The Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel
(Springfield,.Va.: National Technical Information Service,
December 1979), p. 16.

3

21bid., p. 26. Ibid., p. 27.

74
glass unreliable in some cases.1 The problem with glass
has been breakdown under the particle bombardment from
the wastes, and also the accompanying elevated temperatures.
Also, as radioactive decay progresses, chemical reactions
can occur which change the ability of the glass to contain
the high-level wastes. However, while glass has not been
seriously discounted, the suggestion has been made that
the crystalline structure of ceramics provides a better
storage medium, as opposed to non-crystalline glass.2

The problems of heating and damaging of the waste
containers are generally less with spent fuel because
of its lower concentration of the actinides. Although
there are economies of size in the concentrated glass
or ceramic form of storage, the concentration might have
to be reduced to manage the heating effect. In such a
case, the size advantage would be negated.

While not an argument for reprocessing as opposed
to storage of spent fuel per se, there is a problem of
fission product gas that must be dealt with either before
or in the spent fuel repository. Processed high-level

waste is free of this gas, although it would be possible

 

1Richard A. Kerr, ”Nuclear Waste Disposal: Alternative
to Solidification in Glass Proposed", Science, 20 April 1979,
pp. 289-91.

21bid.

75

to modify the preset form, composition, and geometry of
the spent fuel to remove the fission product gas if'
necessary.1

While the United States seems to have adequate
uranium resources for the foreseeable future, and as a
partial result has chosen to not reprocess its spent fuel,
this policy could change. Factors that could bring this
about might be (1) increasing extraction and environmental
costs in mining with regard to net energy gain,2 (2) in-
creased environmental constraints, (3) failure to implement
the breeder reactor with consequent greater use of light
water reactors than anticipated, (4) increased international
demand for U.S. uranium fuel exports, and (5) change in
U.S. Administration attitudes that might favor reprocessing.

If a decision were made at a future date to retrieve
the stored spent fuel for reprocessing, in order to reclaim
the uranium and plutonium, special provisions would have
to be made in the initial storage process.3

There is another reason why retrievability is

 

1Office of Nuclear Waste Isolation, Battelle Project

Management Division, The Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel,
p. 28.

2Resources For the Future, Energy in America's
Future: The Choices Before Us (Baltimore: John Hopkins
University Press, 1975), p. 355; and U.S., Department
of Energy: Preliminar Safety and Environmental Information
Document: FueI CycIe Facilities, January 1980, 7:1-1 to
1-15.

3Office of Nuclear Waste Isolation, Battelle Project
Management Division, The Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel,
p. 20.

76
desirable. It must be kept in mind that serious plans
are being made and research conducted for long-term storage
of high-level wastes for the first time. Therefore since
undoubtedly some mistakes will occur, new technologies
developed, and better designs created along with better
operational procedures, it would seem desirable to postpone
any irreversible methods of storage.1 If the option of
retrievability for a period of years following emplacement
is to be maintained, necessary steps would have to be
taken in the areas of design of the repository, the waste
emplacement, and monitoring systems making possible corrective

actions if necessary.

Progression of the Nuclear Waste Issue

During the early years of atomic testing and develop-
ment, mostly surrounding the Manhattan Project and development
of the first atomic bombs, the radioactive wastes were
generated almost exclusively as a result of government
research. After World War II the Atomic Energy Agency
was formed and civilian control began to take upon itself
responsibility for greater proportions of the conduct
and handling of the fuel cycle. After the completion
of the first commercial nuclear power plant in 1957, the

amount of nuclear waste slowly began to mount. It became

 

10.8., Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Secy ED-177 -

Advance Notice of Rulemaking on Technical Criteria for

Regulating Geolo ic Dis osal OiiHi h Level Radioactive
Wastes, 10 CFR Part 65, 23 ApriI 1980, p. 19.

 

 

77

increasingly clear that some method would have to be devised
for dealing with both long and short-term disposal of
radioactive wastes.
Efforts to store high-level radioactive wastes
in the past have resulted in occasional breachments of
storage vessels, as well as long distance migration of
radioactive substances from underground burial sites,
finally entering underground water. Seventy-five million
gallons of high-level wastes had been stored in special
storage tanks throughout the United States by April 1969.
During the period of storage, there have been fifteen known
leaks from the containers with tens of thousands of gallons
leaking into the ground.1
The failure of past temporary methods of dealing
with high-level waste disposal has precipitated much public
concern, contributing to much of the current public
opposition to nuclear power. Progression toward the development
of effective long-term waste disposal methodologies are
necessary however, even if there was not a single additional
nuclear power plant constructed. The reason is the large
amount of spent fuel elements which are being stored at
nuclear reactor sites at the present time. The storage
space is limited, and it is approaching the point where

the spent fuel must be removed to a permanent disposal

 

1Garvey, Nuclear Power and Social Planning, p. 43.

78

location in order for the plants to continue removing
spent fuel rods at the time of refueling. This refueling
occurs normally around one and a half years after initial
loading.

In addition, military and government research
is still generating quantities of high-level waste which
must be adequately dealt with. However, depending on
the growth of the nuclear power industry, the wastes from
civilian power plants could assume much larger proportions
compared to the military sources of the past.

In spite of the caution regarding projections
of future growth in the U.S. nuclear power industry expressed
in Energy: The Next Twenty Yeggg, it was conceded that
future growth seemslikely.1 An in depth study of all
the ramifications of nuclear power by the Mitre Corporation
concluded that "nuclear power is one of the options (for
supplying electricity) that should be pursued."2 James
J. Duderstadt and Chihiro Kikuchi, engineers at the University
of Michigan, in their new book stress that "the real choice
is not whether to use nuclear power, but rather the balance

between our dependence on nuclear power and coal to meet

 

1Resources for the Future, Energy: The Next Twenty
Years (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing, 1979),
p. 423.

2Mitre Corporation, Nuclear Power Issues and
Choices (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing, 1977),
p. 4.

79

1 This same recognition

our future demand for electricity."
that nuclear power will play a significant role intmeeting
the U.S. energy needs for at least the next twenty to
thirty years was put forward very well in an extensive
and long-term study by the National Academy of Sciences.2
It has been felt for a long time that the solution
to long-term storage of radioactive wastes was to place
them in underground salt formations. In 1970, the Atomic
Energy Commission made a "tentative" selection of a salt
formation near Lyons, Kansas for a disposal site.3 Later
it was found that public opposition was greater than anticipated.
The implications of the Lyons, Kansas site selection by
the Atomic Energy Commission seemed to be to the Lyons
citizens that their town was ”next to nowhere", and it
would not matter if part of their township was made a
radioactive "dumping ground." Various reasons were published
for rejection of the site, however, the most credible one
probably being that the integrity of the underground salt

formation had already been breached by various holes drilled

during oil exploration and other excavation activities.

 

1James J. Duderstadt and Chihiro Kikuchi, Nuclear
Power: Technolo on Trial (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan
Press, 79), pp. - 5.

2National Academy of Sciences, Committee on Nuclear
and Alternative Energy Systems (CONAES), Energy in Transition:
1985-2010 (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1979).

3U.S., Atomic Energy Commission, Annual Report
to Congresgfiof the Atomic Energy Commission for 1970,
January 1971, p. 49.

80

The original tentative decision to store wastes
at Lyons was based on a study called Project Salt.Vault,
carried out by the Oak Ridge National Laboratory from
1965 to 1967. It is now fifteen years since the beginning
of that study and no such permanent site for storage has
been prepared.

On November 15, 1978 however, Dr. John M. Deutch
of the U.S. Department of Energy announced the Department's
intention to go ahead with a long-term waste disposal
site to be located in a salt bed near Carlsbad, New Mexico.1
The site would be used for storage of high-level military-
generated radioactive wastes, and the application for
a storage license was planned to be submitted to the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission by 1981. It was hoped that wastes
could be first buried by 1985, and if the plan were accepted
the costs would be around $400 million for excavation
and construction. The costs for such a depository have
doubtless increased since that time.

Currently there is a presidential directive to‘
aggressively proceed with long and interim storage of
high-level nuclear wastes which was given in the President's

2

Message to Congress on February 12, 1980. In part he said:

 

1"N. M. A-Waste Burial Planned”, Facts on File,
15 December 1978, p. 961.

2Presidential Message to the Congress, "Compre-
hensive Radioactive Waste Management Program”, Weekly
Compilation of Presidential Documents, 12 February 1980,
Vol. 16, No. 7.

81

. . . for disposal of high-level radioactive
waste, I am adopting an interim planning strategy
focused on the use of mined geologic repositories
capable of accepting both waste from reprocessing
and unreprocessed commercial spent fuel. An interim
strategy is needed since final decisions on many steps
which need to be taken should be preceded by a full
environmental review under the National Environmental
Policy Act. In its search for suitable sites for
high-level waste repositories, the Department of Energy
has mounted an expanded and diversified program of
geologic investigations that recognizes the importance
of the interaction among geologic setting, repository
host rock, waste form, and other engineered barriers
on a site-specific basis. Immediate attention will
focus on research and development and on locating
and characterizing a number of potential repository
sites in a variety of different geologic environments
with diverse rock types. When four to five sites
have been evaluated and found potentially suitable,
one or more will be selected for development as a
licensed, full-scale repository.

It is important to stress the following two points:
First, because the suitability of a geologic disposal
site can be verified only through detailed and time-
consuming site-specific evaluations, actual sites
and their geologic environments must be carefully
examined. Second, the development of a repository
will proceed in a careful, step-by-step manner. Experience
and information gained in each phase will be reviewed
and evaluated to determine if there is enough knowledge
to proceed with the next stage of development. We
should be ready to select the site for the first,
full-scale repository by about 1985 and have it operational
by the mid 1990's . . .

It does appear that definite steps are finally
going to be taken to implement high-level waste storage.

However, there are several methods of disposal possible.

82

The Most Promising Method of Disposal

The current trend is toward the use of mined geologic
repositories.l There is an obvious need to store wastes
in locations where any geologic changes take place over
a very long period of time. The reason for this is that
many of the fission products of nuclear reactors require
at least a thousand years of storage for radioactive decay
to render them harmless, while some of the actinides may
require up to a million years for them to lose their ability
to inflict radiation damage upon humans.

There are various locations that appear to have
the geologic stability essential for such long-term storage.
The geologic formations should be relatively isolated
from circulating ground water; they should be able to
contain the waste without losing their properties upon
which the decision to store was based; they must be capable
of being thoroughly technically analyzed; and it must
be economically and technically feasible to construct
a long-term waste disposal facility within it.2

Various mining techniques already available could

generally be used in constructing a repository. However,

 

1U.S., Department of Energy: Proposed Rglemaking

on the Storagg and Disposal of Nuclear Waste, 15 April
1980' p. 11-280

2Ibid.

83
there are some ways in which a repository differs from
an ordinary mine:1

-The objective is to bury material rather than to
remove ore.

-The radioactive wastes add thermal energy to the
geologic formation.

-The mine extraction ratios are much lower.

Figure 4 illustrates a model of a radioactive
waste repository in a salt mine. Burying in salt is attractive
for several reasons. One of the major concerns of waste
disposal is having it inadvertently escape into ground
water. The very existense of water-soluble salt beds
testifies to the absence of circulating ground water.
In addition, depending on whether spent fuel rods or concentrated
glass or ceramic-enclosed high-level waste is deposited,_
if the heat generated was sufficient, the salt would slowly
melt over the containers further isolating them from the
environment. Of course this would complicate any efforts
toward retrievability. That is a reason why this melting
phenomenon would be most appropriate to solidified and
concentrated high-level waste with the uranium and plutonium
reprocessed.

Overall guidelines for disposing of the high-level
wastes in a repository will now be discussed. (First of

all, the containment and isolation of the wastes will

 

1Office of Nuclear Waste Isolation, Battelle

Project Management Division, The Disposal of Spent Nuclear
Fuel, p. 22.

Radioactive Wastes, by Charles

(Oak Ridge, Tenn.: USAEC Division of Techn cal Informat on Extension, 1969).

 

by,

U:
$.s
es
o:
:4:
To
3%
0o

Model of a national radioactive waste repository in a salt mine

SOURCE: U.S., Atomic Energy Commission,

high-level mine
4
Fox,

/,/
n
’“m

 

Fig.
H.

85

be achieved by placing the packaged waste hundreds of
meters below the ground surface. After placement, the
chances of their re-entering the biosphere are very low,
the only possibility receiving much consideration being
via ground water.
The time of dealing with the high-level wastes
can be divided into three periods:1
Operational period -- the time when the repository
is open and during which waste can be emplaced or
retrieved.
Thermal period -- the period after closure of the
repository when radioactive levels and heat production
are dominated by fission product decay.
Post-thermal period -- the time following decay of
the short-lived radionuclides, during which the radiological
hazard is dominated by the decay of actinides and
their daughters.
The mined geologic disposal system is composed
of the subsystems made up of the natural site itself,
the container for the waste, and the constructed repository.
The disposal site itself would be sufficiently removed
from any population centers to insure added protection.
The natural system includes natural barriers that
will serve to keep radionuclides from reaching man for
the desired amount of time, keep the waste in place, limit

transmigration via underground water, and prevent or make

difficult intrusion by human trespass. There are several

 

lU.S., Department of Energy, Proposed Rulemaking
22 the Storage and Disposal of Nuclear Waste, pp. II-43 and
11-44 0

86

factors which could affect the natural system, and fall
under the broad categories of geologic, tectonic, hydrologic,
and resource factors.

Under the category of geologic factors one must
consider (among others) the structure and thermal properties
of the system. The rock types currently being considered
by the U.S. Department of Energy for storage of high-level
wastes are salt, granite, shale, tuff, and basalt.1 There
are several locations where deposits of these rock types
appear suitable for a repository.

Regarding tectonic factors, of greatest consequence-
might be faulting, seismic activity, uplift, or natural
stress states. The possible repository sites are being
investigated with a view toward ensuring low hazards associated
with these tectonic factors. These factors, while seeming
insignificant in the short term, must be carefully considered
when planning a repository that must retain its integrity
of purpose for tens to hundreds of thousands of years.

In terms of the longest time that might be needed to store
high-level wastes, it does appear that any discussion
of long-term storage must be viewed in a very real sense
as "interim" storage.
Although the necessity of keeping high-level wastes

isolated from ground water has already been mentioned,

 

lIbide' p. 11-72.

87
it should be stressed that "knowledge of ground water
hydrology is perhaps the most important requirement for
understanding the long-term behavior of a mined geologic

'1 Therefore, on the basis of all known acceptable

repository.
hydrologic criteria, numerous sites in the United States
have been evaluated and found satisfactory for waste
repositories.

Regarding resource factors, a major consideration
is the possibility that mineral or energy resources in
the proximity of the repository might become economically
extractable in future years. While the repository would
initially be located where such a possibility would be
minimal, it is difficult to determine what effects future
technologies and demand might have on the economies of

extraction. Again, the repository site must be selected

to minimize these possibilities.

Alternative Disposal Methods
.Various research groups throughout the United
States have conducted studies on several locations for
permanent storage of high-level radioactive wastes. Their
efforts received a boost from the conclusion of President
Carter's interagency task force, i.e. that salt beds may
not be the best location for storage. One interesting

suggestion for long-term storage is to use various locations

 

llbid., p. II-76.

88

off the coast where a particularly suitable red clay is
found on the ocean floor. This clay has certain chemical
and physical properties that would prevent radioactive
wastes from entering the ocean waters when the wastes
are buried only slightly beneath the surface of the ocean
floor. The mechanics of the process would be to store
wastes in bullet-shaped canisters that would be dropped
from the water's surface through a chute of some kind
with the canisters hitting the clay hard enough to bury
themselves perhaps thirty meters under the ocean floor.
The clay would flow in behind the canister, sealing it
from exposure to the ocean water.1

The foregoing suggestion for subseabed disposal
was predicated upon high-level wastes being concentrated
after being reprocessed. Much of the mechanics of the
process would doubtless not be suitable for disposing
of entire fuel rod assemblies. The U.S. Department of
Energy is currently more interested in deep sea burial
in remote regions of the ocean. At the most desirable
regions, a thick deposit of sediment has formed over very
long periods of time. It appears that the sediments are
the result of the collection of wind-blown fine dusts
from the continents and other sources that have filtered

down to the ocean floor over time. The sediments range

 

1Richard A. Kerr, ”Geologic Disposal of Nuclear
Wastes: Salt's Lead is Challenged", Science, 11 May 1979,

89
from tens of meters up to a kilometer in depth and the
sedimentation process is still continuing. It would be
feasible for the waste containers to be slowly covered
by the sedimentation and protected from the water environ-
ment and the very minimal aquatic life in those regions.

Another method of possible disposal is called
the 'very deep hole“ disposal concept. In this method,

a hole would be drilled between ten thousand and fifty
thousand feet. The packaged spent fuel would be placed
deep within the earth. After drilling the holes and the
wastes put in place, the hole would be sealed and monitored
as in the mined geologic disposal method.

There are some concerns with this method however.
It is very difficult to determine geologic effects at
such great depths. Neither remote sensing or manned exami-
nation is possible. Retrievability would be impossible with
such a method and the tolerances required in drilling
the hole required for such storage may be technologically
impossible at present. The placing of the waste containers
would be difficult because of inadequate cable technology,
and general alignment would also pose problems.

The rock melting concept as a means for disposing
of wastes has its problems also. The basic idea is to
place the waste deep underground in such a concentrated
fashion that the radioactive heat of decay would melt

the rock surrounding it. Over a period of time the rock

90
would cool and solidify, thus trapping the radioactive
material in a relatively insoluble mass, deep underground.
The problems center around the inadequacy of testing and
observing the geologic strata at the proposed depth of
ten thousand feet or so, both before and after storage.
Of course retrieval would be impossible and only very
concentrated high-level wastes would be suitable for such
a disposal method.

Disposal of high-level wastes by mined geologic
disposal on an island has been given some consideration
because of the added remoteness it would afford from socio-
economic activity. Many small islands have no mineral or
agricultural value, being created by volcanic activity
thousands of years earlier. Many islands, because of their
location would be free from the possibility of advancing
ice caps or severe climactic changes. Nonetheless there is
some question about the interaction between the water envi-
ronment of the island and the ocean body surrounding it.
Such a selection could have international repercussions.

Disposal in the ice sheets of the polar regions
has been proposed. The process would involve drilling
relatively shallow holes into the ice near the center
of the polar caps. The waste containers would be deposited
and covered with water and allowed to freeze over. The
heat from the waste containers would melt the ice around

them and they would slowly descend to the bed rock under

91
the ice sheet. While it is known that the center of the
ice sheets slowly migrate outward and are eventually broken
off as icebergs, the length of time for this transmigration
should be sufficient to allow the wastes to decay to a
harmless level.

Deep well injection disposal would utilize technology
that is well developed and already being used for low-
level radioactive liquids in the Soviet Union. The spent
fuel would be mechanically or chemically processed to
produce a liquid or cement slurry. This slurry would
be injected under tremendous pressure into a porous layer
such as sandstone that lies between an upper and lower
layer of shale. Between the shale layers the waste would
be effectively isolated in perpetuity.

Transmutation, while not a disposal method, should
be mentioned because it could reduce what perhaps might
be a million-year disposal problem to a thousand-year
one.1 It has been suggested that this could be done by
reentering the actinides into the fuel cycle by putting
them back into the cladding of fuel elements. In the
reactor, the actinides would be transmuted by neutron
bombardment into shorter lived by-products that would

require storage for less than one thousand years.

 

1Garvey, Nuclear Power and Social Planning, p. 44.

92

Environmental Considerations _
The U.S. Department of Energy published a five
volume study in May 1980, regarding the effect upon the

1 This.

environment of the current U.S. spent fuel policy.
study deals with the environmental impacts from radioactive
wastes in the following circumstances: (1) nuclear power
facilities, (2) independent spent fuel storage facilities,
(3) during transportation of spent fuel, (4) geologic
repository (assumed to be in a salt formation), (5) during
fuel reprocessing (if resumed) and fabrication, and (6)
at facility decommissioning.

The study states that each phase of encounter
with high-level wastes (as well as low-level) will result
in some small amounts of radioactivity being released
to the environment. Also it was pointed out that the
work force would be exposed to limited amounts of radiation
and would experience occupational accidents comparable
to the rate of those involved in similar type work.

The effects of radiation doses on populations
was looked at in terms of the population living within
fifty miles of the above facilities and activities. The
effects were also examined on the United States population

and the world population. The study is based on an assumption

 

1U.S., Department of Energy, Final Environmental
Impact Statement: U.S. Spent Fuel Policy,§.VOls., May
1980.

93
of 1985 start-up of storage facilities and also examined
the effects of delaying start-up until the year 2010.
The doses of radiation from the above facilities and
activities range from about 1,000 man-rem to the world
population if disposition begins in 1985 as opposed to
85,000 man-rem if fuel disposition is delayed until the

year 2010.1

About half of the dosage is received by pe0ple
living within fifty miles of the facility. For the sake

of perspective, natural radiation doses in the same period
to the world population is calculated to be about 200

x 109 man-rem.

For the alternatives which assume disposal or
storage facility startup by 1985, the total health effects
measured in malignancies and genetic effects in the world
population range from two to thirty-two. For contrast,
the worldwide natural radiation dose during this same
period would result in 120 million health effects. If
the disposal facility start-up is delayed until the year
2010, the total health effects in the world population
range from thirty-four to one hundred and thirteen. WOrldwide
natural radiation induced health effects during the same
period will be about 200 million.2 It is important to

note that while the total numbers are small, it does appear

that there are some marginal reasons for early implementation

 

1Ibid.,._VOl. 1, Executive Summary, p. 16.

2Ibid., p. 20.

. 94
of long-term waste disposal facilities.

The environmental risks from major abnormal events
and accidents such as tornadoes or criticality were deter-
mined to be less than one rem per man. Also transportation
and storage risks were evaluated and included sabotage
scenarios. It should be kept in mind that the clandestine
diversion of high-level radioactive wastes would not be
attractive to most people because of the inherent risk
that could result from improper handling, and the knowledge
necessary for diverting it to any directed purpose.

There are additional environmental factors to
be evaluated in the mined geologic disposal of high-
level radioactive wastes. Some of them will be discussed.

The land used at the waste disposal facility could
be degraded to a degree by the activities of transportation
and excavation during the disposal process. However,
after decommissioning the site, the land could be re-
turned to its original or an improved condition.

During construction and operation of the facility,
a certain amount of water would be required for operations,
and therefore sites would be selected where the impact
on the local water supply would be acceptable. The nickel
and chromium used in the making of stainless steel which
is used in the construction of the waste storage containers
are mostly imported. This is a constraint that is not

expected to be significant. The energy required for

95
construction and operation fall within the range of any
large industrial activity, and pose no problem. The envi-
ronmental impacts of noise, non-radioactive pollutant dis-
charges into the air and water during construction and
operation, waste rock storage and disposal, and aesthetics
are all environmental factors which must be taken into
consideration and mitigated wherever possible.

It has been determined that operational phase
radiation doses to the population would amount to 0.1
percent of the dose that the same population would receive
from naturally occurring sources. The long-term impacts
of a mined geologic repository focus mostly on the effects
of possible release of radionuclides into the biosphere.
The facility will be designed to minimize any such release,
and the effects, should any such release occur, would
be difficult to measure because of their small magnitude.

There could be a minimal change in the surface
temperature of the ground (less than one degree Fahrenheit)
from the heat generated by the decaying buried isotopes.

It is not felt this would adversely affect the plant or

animal biota. Should any uplift of the ground occur,

it would be minimal and have little environmental impact.

The transportation impacts would center around the established
rail and highway systems. Some additional land would

be needed for transportation routes to the site but should

be no greater than that of any comparable industrial project.

96

Since there is some public concern over the trans-
portation of high-level wastes to central disposal facilities,
it should be stressed that spent fuel shipping containers
are carefully designed to ensure a substantial margin
of safety. The Atomic Energy Commission was developing
containers able to withstand derailings at normal speeds,
and canisters that could absorb the impact of being dropped
from considerable heights onto solid concrete without
rupture.

There is great public debate over the shipment
of radioactive materials, and very occasionally a mishap
involving some low-level radiation materials occurs.
Unfortunately the distinction is not often made between
the million or so shipments of low-level radioactive materials
which occur on a routine basis each year, and the much
more seldom shipments of high-level radioactive materials.1

The amount of land dedicated to the construction
of long-term waste disposal facilities should be brought
into perspective. However the following analysis, while
useful, applies only to the waste left to be stored after
reprocessing, which is currently not being done. A typical
power plant produces approximately the equivalent of ten
canisters of high level waste each year. If these canisters
were stored in rows, ten meters apart, about ten square

miles would be needed to accommodate all of the radioactive

 

1Duderstadt and Kikuchi, Nuclear Power: Technology
on Trial, p. 107.

97

wastes produced over the next thousand years, at the current
rate of production.1 In addition, the cost of waste disposal
and plant decommissioning together amounts to only about

0.7 mills per kilowatt-hour generated over the life of

a nuclear plant, a nominal expense considering the revenue
generated by the plant over the useful operating time

of some thirty to forty years.2

Institutional Considerations

Governor Edmund Brown of California once made
as astute observation when he said that nuclear power
was ”fundamentally a political issue." The social and
political aspects of dealing with long-term waste disposal
must be managed in a variety of institutional settings.
There has been much study on the proper Nuclear Regulatory
Commission regulations and guidelines for such an activity.
Several voluminous environmental impact studies have been
undertaken and completed that go into great detail in
assessing the effects of long-term waste management by
various means.

The licensing of water basin storage for spent
fuel, both at nuclear power plants and reprocessing plants,
has been going on for nearly twenty years. The safety
parameters for such storage could be extended to mined

geologic disposal sites with less stringent guidelines

 

1 2

Ibid., p. 113. Ibid.

98

appropriate to the reduced risk. The reduced risk is
of course due to the lack of proximity to an operating
reactor or a reprocessing facility. The knowledge already
exists for meeting the safety parameters prescribed for
on-site storage of spent fuel presently in effect.

Because of the Atomic Energy Commission's unfavorable
experience with the citizens of Lyons, Kansas in their
first attempt at establishing a mined geologic disposal
facility, and undoubtedly tensions in other states where
tentative sites were being investigated, the Department
of Energy plans to follow a program of close cooperation
with states that have likely sites for mined geologic
disposal facilities. Meetings with representatives of
the governors' offices will be held, and technical as
well as non-technical discussions carried on. While nothing
is said about any state's right to reject a proposed location
of a mined geologic disposal facility, The President said
in his statement on February 12, 1980 that ' Our relationship
with the states will be based on the principle of consultation
and concurrence . . .."1

Both Congress and the Administration have supported
legislation that lays the groundwork for the establishment

of mined geologic disposal facilities. The Department

 

1Presidential Message to the Congress, "Compre-
hensive Radioactive waste Management Program", Weekly
Compilation of Presidential Documents, 12 February 1980,
.vo1. 16, No. 7.

99
of Energy has also made extensive environmental studies
and gathered data in order to comply with the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969. The Department of Energy
approach to satisfying environmental procedures in a rapid
manner will be to “eliminate repetitive discussion."

In order to insure state and federal cooperation,
President Carter established a "State Planning Council”.
The Council is composed of fifteen governors or other
elected officials, and four from the Executive departments
and agencies. In addition to the frequent consultation
with the states, there will be opportunity for the public
to review the proceedings.

Specific supporting statements for mined geologic
disposal have come from both the Nuclear Regulatory Commission

1

and the Environmental Protection Agency. The NRC stated :

We agree that a repository should be developed and
tested as soon as possible.

Similarly, EPA statedZ:

We agree with the Department that the option selected
for implementation appears to be the best of those

 

1J.B. Martin, letter dated October 25, 1979 to
C. Heath (DOE), “Comments on draft EIS (DOE/EIS-0046-D)
by the NRC staff” as cited in U.S., Department of Energy,

Propgsed Rulemaking on the Storage and Dispgsal of Nuclear
Waste, 15 April 1980, p. III-33.

2W. N. Hedeman, Jr., letter dated September 27,
1979, to D. Heath (DOE), ”Comments on draft EIS (DOE/FIS-
0046-D) by EPA" as cited in Department of Energy, Proposed
Rulemaking on the Storgge and Disposal of Nuclear Waste,
Po III-530

100

considered . . . . It is also unlikely that there
would be any viable alternative available in the near
future. For this reason we believe DOE's program
should be vigorously pursued.

In summary, the actinides, because of their very
long half-lives and extreme toxicity, must be isolated
virtually permanently from the environment. The current
professional leaning toward mined geologic disposal over
other alternatives comes at the culmination of about thirty
years of research on this matter. The environmental consider-
ations seem to have been thoroughly investigated, and
the environmental impact of not proceeding with mined
geologic disposal facilities may outweigh the impact from
proceeding, i.e. in terms of radiation effects upon the
population. .

It seems that particularly burdensome and lengthy
proceedings have accompanied the nuclear power industry
growth and associated activities in years past. Perhaps
because of past experience there seems to be emerging
evidence of a well organized program and commitment to
dealing with the high-level waste disposal challenge in
a more expeditious manner than heretofore.

One of the most fascinating psychological phenomena
of this age is how the public perceives and reacts to
the presence of nuclear power technology. The fact that

the international market for nuclear power plants is growing,

supports the observation that a society makes tradeoffs

101
when deciding to accept or reject a technology and its
associated externalities, e.g. the French and Japanese
acceptance in return for increased national security and
energy independence.

It is also apparent that France is less concerned
with proliferation than the United States - as it exports
nuclear power plants and technology in order to keep its
own reactor manufacturing industry healthy. The same
willingness to live in less than a risk-free world is
demonstrated by the forthright manner in which France
and other European countries are dealing with nuclear
wastes. These sociotechnical aspects of nuclear power

are examined in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 4“
NUCLEAR POWER: A SOCIOTECHNICAL EVALUATION

History of Public Attitude

The public attitude toward nuclear power prior
to 1955 was generally favorable. The public concern that
did exist about nuclear power was generally born out of
knowledge of the devastating effects of the two atomic
bombs used on Japan near the end of World War II. Following
the war, the dominant concern was with the effects of
atomic bomb and weapons development.

During the period between 1955 and 1961 however,
there was increasing journalistic interest in the dangers
of nuclear power. various minor accidents had occurred
in test reactors in the United States and abroad. The
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) issued the first major
safety report called WASH-7401 citing the possible catastrophic
consequences of a major reactor accident.

During this period however, the nuclear industry
was gearing up for rapid growth. While there was only
one plant in operation prior to 1961, there were fourteen

in operation with another thirty-nine under construction

 

1U.S., Atomic Energy Commission, Theoretical
Possibilities and Consquggces of Majgr Accidents’in Large
Nuclear Power Plants, 1957.

102

103

by 1968. Moreover, the size of the newer reactor was
ten-fold that of the early ones.

The first public concerns focused on the thermal
impacts of the cooling waters from the plants being released
into streams. In 1970, the Calvert Cliffs decision1 forced
the ABC to include environmental impacts in its licensing
decisions. This institutionalization of environmental
protection stimulated a shift in public focus from the
environment to the safety issues during the 1970's.

The question of risk has been an issue from the
very beginning for the nuclear power industry. It was
even felt that the risk was either so high or so uncertain
that the nuclear power industry might not develop because
of the cost of adequate insurance coverage. In view of
this problem, Congress passed the Price-Anderson Act of
1957 setting the limits of liability in an accident to
$560 million.

In an effort to determine what the actual risks
were for nuclear power, the AEC contracted in mid-1972
for a multi-million dollar study which was carried out
by Norman Rasmussen, Professor of Nuclear Engineering
at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and was

coded WASH-1400, or more informally, the "Rasmussen Report”.2

 

1Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Committee v. U.S.
Atomic Energy Commission, 449 F. 2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).

2U.S., Atomic Energy Commission, Reactor Safety
Study: An Assessment of Accidegp Risks in U.S. Commercial
Nuc ear Power Plants, August 1974.

 

104

Professor Rasmussen allayed the fears of the public
somewhat by comparing the chances of death caused by a
nuclear accident to those of being killed, for example,
in an auto wreck, an airplane crash, by drowning, or in
a fire. He concluded that the chances of a thousand people
being killed by a nuclear accident were considerably less
than the chances of the same number being killed by a
meteor crash.1 The concern for safety resumed later however,
in spite of various reassurances by the AEC. In 1978,
the NRC published the conclusions of its Risk Assessment
Review Group, which was appointed in 1977 to evaluate
the Rasmussen Report. The group was to: (1) determine
the value of WASH-1400, (2) evaluate the views of Rasmussen's
peers in the industry, (3) study the methodology used
by Rasmussen, and (4) recommend whether or not the report
should be used as a basis for decisions in the reactor
licensing process.2 To make a long story short, they
found some fault with the report, basically in the fact
that the methods to evaluate risk were not as reliable
as they were given credit for.

The findings of the NRC review group must have
aggravated the uneasiness that many electric utility com-

panies already felt with regard to the growing uncertainties

 

1Gerald Garvey, Nuclear Power and Social Planning,
(Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1977), p. 41.

2U.S., Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Annual Report
1978, 14 February 1979, p. 213.

105

of nuclear power, especially the uncertainty about what
the future commitment of the Federal government might
be. In a report on the review group's findings in an

1 the

early 1979 issue of Public Utilities Fortniggply,
nuclear power industry seemed to be very sensitive to
the “winds of change'.

No doubt they were glad to find out a month later
that in a total of 119 NRC decisions based to some degree
on the Rasmussen Report, only one required reviewing under
the new guidelines established. The reason given for
this was that the Rasmussen Report was not a major basis
for the decisions made by the regulatory body to issue
construction permits and operating licenses.2

Perhaps more important than the actual risks of
nuclear power is the way risks are perceived by the public.
It is a psychological fact that people tend to fear that
which they do not understand. The ABC and the utility
industry, being aware of this psychological principle,
have exerted great effort toward making the public more
informed regarding the operation of nuclear power plants.
In 1969, the AEC concluded that “more effort must be de-

voted to communications between the nuclear proponent

 

1"Nuclear Agency Becomes Critical of Rasmussen
Report“, Public Utilities Fortnightly, 15 February 1979,
pp. 31-32.

2"NRC Review Affirms Licensed Nuclear Facilities'
Safety', Public Utilities Fortnightly, 15 March 1979,
p. 30. ~

106

and the man-on-the-street with answers stated in simple
everyday language”.1

This approach to public skepticism was correct
according to a 1976 Gallup Poll which determined that
of the persons interviewed, forty-five percent would object
to a nuclear plant being built near their home, and forty-
two would not object. Yet of those persons surveyed who
had not followed the ongoing discussions in the media
regarding nuclear safety, seventy-one percent opposed
the building of a plant near their home.2

The conclusions that Can be derived from the Gallup
Polls regarding how to best assuage public opposition
to nuclear power are ambiguous however. The nuclear power
industry and the AEC for years have attempted to assure
the public of a very low risk factor with nuclear power,
and attempted to allay their fears by various public relations
efforts. Yet the psychological principle seems to have
failed them because a Gallup P011 in 1956 indicated only

twenty percent of the people surveyed were afraid to have

 

10.8., Atomic Energy Commission, Annual Repopp
of the Atomic Energy Commission for 1969, January 1970,
p. 2.

2George H. Gallup, The GallupyPoll: Public Opinion
1972-1977, 2 vols. (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources,
, :798.

107

a nuclear power plant in their community.1 while in 1976,
after twenty years of public relations efforts, the per-
centage had more than doubled to forty-five percent.2

In 1979, the industry is still trying to "educate"
the public however, and the public is still resisting
atomic power. At the Edison Centennial Symposium in San
Francisco in April 1979, some of the speakers seem to have
descried anew a need for public education with regard
to the science of nuclear power, and deplored what was
referred to as “scientific illiteracy".3

The perspectives with which one can view nuclear
risk are numerous. In 1969, the AEC proudly announced
that for the third consecutive year, refunds had been
given to various holders of nuclear liability commercial
insurance policies because of the high safety record achieved.4
In 1973, the AEC again proudly announced that in the sixteen
years of the nuclear power industry, with 180 power-reactor
years of operating experience, there was not a single
public radiation induced injury. They went on to repeat

1George H. Gallup, §pp_§3%lgp_§glli_¥gp%%g_gp%g%%p
1935-1971, 3 vols. (New Yor : Ran om House, - , : -

1401.

 

2Gallup, The Gallup Poll: public Opinion 1972-
1977, 2:798. .

3Richard L. Meehan, ”Nuclear Safety: Is Scientific
Literacy the Answer?', Science, 11 May 1979, p. 571.

4Atomic Energy Commission, Annual Report tgyCongress
of the Atomic Energy Commission for 1969, pp. 14-15.

108

the comment of the National Safety Council calling the
record "nothing short of extraordinary“.1

By 1978 however, the tenor of the Annual Report
had changed. The emphasis in 1978 was on the improvement
of reactor safety, in accordance with an amendment to
the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 which directed the
NRC to “develop a long-term plan for projects for the
development of new or improved safety systems for nuclear
power plants".2

New appreciation for public safety is indicated
by the fact that the designer of five east-coast nuclear
power plants brought to the attention of the NRC a computer
program error that made their derivations regarding safety
against earthquakes invalid.3 This did not mean that.
the plants were unsafe but rather meant that they did
not know what the built-in safety factor was. Since it
was an unknown factor that could affect public safety,
the NRC ordered the plants shut down while the safety
factor was re-calculated.

In addition, following the Three Mile Island event

involving a Babcock-and-Wilcox-built reactor and primary

 

1U.S., Atomic Energy Commission, 1973 Annual
Report to Congress, 2 vols., 31 January 1974, 1:37.

2U.S., Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Annual
Report 1978, 14 February 1979, p. 215.

3"Life: An Atom-Powered Shutdown", Time, 26 March
1979, p. 55.

109

cooling system, all of the remaining Babcock and Wilcox
installations throughout the country were shut down (or
encouraged to remain shut down if they were currently
being re-fueled) until a thorough safety study could be
conducted on each one of them. The total generating capacity
of these two shut-down groups was 12,256 Mw, or twenty-
three percent of all installed nuclear capacity.

However, the public attitude toward the NRC and
the nuclear power industry is something less than apprecia-
tive. Even though there has never been a single life
lost from a major nuclear accident, after the Three Mile
Island event the public seemed to earnestly look for oppor-
tunities to vehemently criticize both the industry personnel
and the technology.

During a 'CBS Reports" special program following
the Three Mile Island event, it was brought out that 2,835
incidents had occurred in 1978 that were considered violations
of NRC rules.l Of course almost none of these offenses
could be considered threats to public health or safety,
but that fact seemed to be irrelevant to the television
correspondent.

The reliability of mechanical and electrical devices
was also a focal point in an article appearing in Science

magazine. Four mechanical failures were listed: (1) spare

 

less, *css Reports", 1 May 1979.

110

auxiliary feedwater pump, (2) relief valve in the primary

coolant loop, (3) water level indicator, and (4) an automatic

system designed to contain radioactive leaks.l
It appeared that nuclear power had come full circle.

A form of power that was to be very competitive with

other energy forms had become so unpredictable in

terms of capital, time, and trouble that many utilities

were developing serious reservations about it.2
However it is surprising how resilient public

attitude has been toward acceptance of nuclear power following

3 showed

Three Mile Island. In March of 1975 a Harris Poll
supporters of nuclear power outnumbering those who opposed
it by three to one. Between April 1979 and January 1980,
more than forty publicly available polls were conducted

by leading pollsters, asking wide ranges of people, both
state and national, their opinions about the accident

and about nuclear power in general. Taken together, a
reasonably clear picture emerges of the public's reaction

to the accident.

The public generally regarded the accident as

 

lEliot Marshall, "A Preliminary Report of Three
Mile Island, Science, 20 April 1979, pp. 280-81.

2Morris K. Udall, I'Nuclear Power: On the Razor's
Edge", Public Utilities Fortnightly, 24 May 1979, pp.
13-15 0

3Cited in ”Public Opinion and Nuclear Power Before
and After Three Mile Island", Resources for the Future,
Resources (Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future,
January-April issue), p. 5.

lll
something that could have been avoided if better operational
precautions had been taken.1 However, one out of four
felt that the danger of the accident had been greatly
exaggerated by the press.

A most interesting fact arising from analyzing
all the polls is that only moderate increases in opposition
to nuclear power came about as a result of Three Mile
Island.2 Shortly after the accident, a previous twenty-
six percent gap between those who favored and those who
opposed building more nuclear power plants narrowed to
a one percent difference. However, by August of 1979
the gap had again widened to nineteen percent more in favor
than opposing. This trend has been erratic however, and
as of January 1980, the gap in favor of nuclear power
was twelve percent.

Surprising to many in the anti-nuclear movement,
there was only a slight increase in sympathy with them.
What appears to have occurred (and still seems to be the
case) was an increased polarization of views. There are
a few more hard-core proponents for nuclear power than
there are those favoring complete shutdown. The simple
matter is that despite Three Mile Island, many people
believe nuclear power is needed and still believe that
nuclear power is not unsafe or can be made safe. In a

Rocky Mbuntain regional poll, seventy percent of the

 

lIbid., p. 6. 2Ibid.

112

respondents said that they thought “the safety systems
for nuclear power plants can be perfected enough to prevent
accidents such as the one that occurred in Pennsylvania
from happening again".1

The net result of Three Mile Island and subsequent
controversy seems to have missed much of the potential
benefit, i.e. there is no doubt that public awareness
of the fact that there was a nuclear power debate was
enhanced, but there is little or no indication that the
understanding of the nuclear power process of generating

electricity was changed in the least.

The Total Social Cost of Nuclear Power
One of the most recent and comprehensive studies
completed on the social costs of coal and nuclear power
was done at the University of Chicago where work was
initiated under a grant from the National Science Foundation.
Their methodology is set forth is their summary section:2

A method is given - and applied - to determine the
optimum mix of fossil-fueled and nuclear-fueled electric
power generating plants, for the United States, for

the next thirty years. The criterion of judgement

is the total social cost, including both the apparent

or 'internalized' costs and the hidden or 'externalized'
costs. The method involves making estimates of as

many of the factors as possible that contribute to

the costs, finding the total cost implied by these

 

1Ibid., p. 7.

2Linda Gaines and others, TOSCA: The Total Social
Cost of Coal and Nuclear Power (Cambridge: Ballinger
Publishing, 1979), p. l.

113

estimates, and then varying the estimates widely to
determine how sensitive the choice of mix is to the
estimates. ‘

The factors that were considered and varied in
the study were as follows:1

Demand, as a function of time

Initial capital costs, including carrying charges
Operating and maintenance costs, apart from fuels
Fuel costs

Research and development including advanced system
costs

Property damage from pollution

Heat dissipation

Health effects of pollution

Safety of normal operations

Spent fuel storage

Large accidents

Terrorism, sabotage, and diversion

Discount rate of all factors except human life
Discount rate of human life

The costs were all computed for scenarios that
are all coal, seventy-five percent coal, an equal mixture
of coal and nuclear, seventy-five percent nuclear, and
all nuclear. The approach had its roots in the approach
of Pigou, who built a theory of public expenditure on
the idea that “public“ choices - choices made by govern-
ments - should provide maximum social benefits for a
given total social cost.2

The analysis deals only with conventional light

water reactors, of the boiling-water or pressurized-water

 

11bido' pp. 2-30

2A. C. Pigou, A Studyyin Public Finance, 3rd
ed. (London: MacMillan & Co., 1947), Part I, Chap. V,
as cited in Gaines, TOSCA: The Total Social Cost of Coal
and Nuclear Power, p. 6.

114

types. The analysis seemed to be unbiased and rather
comprehensive. For example, it is often mentioned that
a major cost factor not taken into consideration by nuclear
utilities is the research and development monies expended
by the taxpayer through the Federal government. This
was factored in.

Human health and safety costs were calculated
based upon the criteria of willingness-to-pay (e.g. for
insurance), discounted future earnings, and payments for
risk either taken or avoided. In the calculations, $1
million was used as the value of any single life.1

Regarding the costs of accidents, it first was
necessary to determine the probability of an accident.
Since the decision of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
to decline using the risk estimates of WASH-1400, and
in view of the fact that no subsequent substantial risk
assessment has been made, the group had to improvise.
They decided to assume that the risk assessment in WASH-
1400 was greatly in error - too low by a factor of one
thousand.2 Taking this much higher risk factor, they
completed the cost calculations.

Based on the most adverse assumption concerning

nuclear power, i.e. that no new technology would be

 

1Gaines, TOSCA: The Total Social Cost of Coal
and Nuclear Power, p. 21.

21bid., p. 102.

115

introduced during the study period, the cost of coal and
nuclear-generated electricity over the next thirty years
was as follows:1

- All coal $657 billion

- 1/4 nuclear $645 billion

- 1/2 nuclear $635 billion

- 3/4 nuclear $624 billion

- All nuclear $613 billion

These calculations were also based on an assumption

of no increase in fuel costs for either coal or uranium.
However, undoubtedly both will increase, and the increase
will affect the coal generation of power to a much greater
extent because of its larger percentage of total cost
relative to capital investment. If both coal and uranium
costs increased at equal rates, there would be a
savings of $135 billion by going all nuclear over the

2 as opposed to the $34 billion shown

next thirty years,
above with stable costs for both types of fuel.

Many other analyses have been conducted to determine
the total social costs of nuclear and coal power. While
no dollar value was affixed to the projections, the National
Academy of Sciences reported that the estimated annual

fatalities from the operation of a standard 1,000 Mw

power plant could range up to 120 for a coal plant and

 

11bid., p. 35.

2Ibid.

116

and only 0.9 for a nuclear plant.1

Another more comprehensive study was put forth
by Dr. Herbert Inhaber of the Atomic Energy Control Board
of Canada.2 What he attempted to show was that all forms
of power generation, even the most seemingly benign, (e.g.
solar, windmills, etc.) do involve transportation, manu-
facturing, assembling and maintenance risks that must
be considered. While some of his conclusions have been
subsequently criticized and then addressed again by Inhaber,
it is worthwhile that such comparisons be generated.

It is also a regrettable failure on the part of
the U.S. government that there is apparently no federal
agency charged with preparing and publicizing hazard com-
parisons for different energy forms, on a continuing basis.
Without such data, the public falls prey to the only basis
of decision making (for example in the nuclear power
issue), namely, sensationalized news media and perhaps
emotional reaction to it.

Numerous persons have been killed in gas fires

 

1National Academy of Sciences, Risks Associated
ElEh Nuclear Power: A Critical Review of the Literature,
1979, Summary and Synthesis chaps., as cited in David
Bodansky, "Alternative Choices for Future Sources of
Electricity Generation”, address prepared for the Governing
Board Seminar, American Public Power Association 1979
National Conference, Seattle, 15 June 1979.

2Herbert Inhaber, ”Risk With Energy from Conventional
and Non-conventional Sources”, Science, 23 February 1979.

117
and explosions, and there have been many deaths and injuries
in the mining and shipping of coal. Yet no one has asked
for a moratorium on the use of natural gas or coal.

In spite of the fear of radiation-induced health
effects both during and after Three Mile Island, a prelimi-
nary assessment of the radiation effects on the approximately
two million people residing within fifty miles of the
Three Mile Island nuclear station resulting from the accident

of March 28, 1979 is as follows:1

The projected number of excess fatal cancers due to

the accident that could occur over the remaining lifetime
of the population within fifty miles is approximately
one. Had the accident not occurred, the number of

fatal cancers that would be normally expected in a
population of this size over its remaining lifetime

is estimated to be 325,000. The projected total number
of excess health effects, including all cases of cancer
(fatal and non-fatal) and genetic ill health to all
future generations, is approximately two.

Since the 'CONAES Report"2 and the Resources for
the Future study, Energy: The Next Twenty Years3 stress
predominant dependence on coal and nuclear power for elec-
tricity generation for the next twenty to thirty years,

it would seem appropriate to examine in more detail the

 

1Bureau of Radiological Health, “Summary and
Discussion of Findings from: Population Dose and Health
Impact of the Accident at the Three Mile Island Nuclear
Station" (preliminary assessment), (Rockville, Md.: Bureau
of Radiological Health, 10 May 1979).

 

 

2National Academy of Sciences, Ener in Transition:
1985-2010 (San Francisco: W. B. Freeman, ).
3

Resources for the Future, Ener : The Next Twenty
Years (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing, 1979).

118

scope and nature of the wastes deriving from each. While
the costs in human sickness and death from many of the
by-products of coal-burning power plants have not been
determined, it is known that their effects are deleterious
to health. On the other hand, the effects of radiation
from nuclear power plants have been much more thoroughly
scrutinized.

The major waste product from the burning of coal
is carbon dioxide, produced from a normal-sized plant
at the rate of about five hundred pounds per second.
Other than possible climatic changes which are not fully
understood, carbon dioxide is not a problem. As for the
really dangerous gases that are emitted when coal is burned,
the most important are compounds of sulfur. The annual
effect from a typical plant is twenty-five fatalities,
60,000 cases of respiratory disease, and $25 million in
property damage.1 A single coal-burning power plant emits
as much nitrogen oxide as 200,000 automobiles, and scrubbers
or precipitators do not currently reduce this.

In addition, another class of pollutant released
in the burning of coal is hundreds of different organic

compounds, at least forty of which are known to cause

 

1Bernard L. Cohen, ”A Tale of Two Wastes", professor
of physics and of chemical and petroleum engineering at
University of Pittsburg and Director of Scaife Nuclear
Laboratories.

119

cancer, the best known being benzpyrene which is the
principal cancer-causing agent in cigarette smoking.1
Based on the best available or near-future technology,
perhaps ninety percent of the sulfur emissions could be
eliminated, but even at this level there would still be
five fatalities per year, or five thousand times the number
of deaths due to a nuclear power plant, according to this
study.2
If the dangers to life and health are greater
from the burning of coal than from the splitting of atoms
in a nuclear power plant reactor, why is there so much
of the public, the press, and the political forces.favoring
coal over nuclear? A possible explanation is that wastes
from burning coal do their damage through chemical reactions,
whereas nuclear wastes do theirs through the radiation
they emit. Even though they are very harmful, chemical
poisons are at least familiar, whereas radiation is viewed
by the public as something foreign and mysterious, and
therefore more to be feared.
Yet radiation is not new or mysterious. All surface
life has always been bombarded by radiation in the form
of cosmic rays, from natural radioactivity in rocks and
soil, from natural potassium and carbon in our bodies, and

from natural radon gas in the air we breathe. In short,

social welfare is not being optimized by choosing to burn

 

lIbid. 21bid.

120
coal rather than to split atoms to generate heat for

electricity in most cases.

The Problem of Perception: a Case Study

In order to demonstrate the problem which the
public seems to have in accepting the nuclear option, an
examination will be made of a recent decision made as
a result of a public opinion poll that was conducted in
the Lansing and surrounding area. Those persons questioned
receive their electricity from the Lansing Board of Water
and Light. Each customer received a note in late 1979
letting him know of the Board's need to add additional
generating capacity in order to meet the growing demands
for electricity in its service area. Four choices were
offered, and will be discussed separately.

The first choice was to add no additional power
supply at the time and rely solely on energy conservation
to reduce electricity demands to provide necessary capacity
to serve growth. The advantage would be no large capital
investment or debt. The disadvantage would be possible
forced conservation procedures if voluntary conservation
was not successful and growth in consumption continued.

The second option was installation by the mid-
1980's of a 160 Mw coal-fired steam turbine generating
unit at the Erickson Station located in Delta township.

This would provide adequate capacity to serve customers'

121
electrical needs into the early 1990's. Financing the
cost of this option requires borrowing $194 million which
would be paid solely from electric revenues. The advantages
are that the generating unit would be under exclusive
Board control, and the local economy would benefit from
increased Board employment and from approximately $17
million of wages paid workers during the plant's construction.
The disadvantages are an increased debt on the Board's
operation by approximately $194 million, the adverse impact
on air quality in the metropolitan area, and the cost
of electricity will be more expensive than the following
options, three or four. ‘

The third option involves ownership participation
in nuclear generating plants now under construction by
Consumers Power (Midland plant) and Detroit Edison (Fermi
Unit No. 2) and scheduled for operation in about 1984.
Financing the cost of this option would require borrowing
$122 million. The advantages are diversity in power supply
locations, a reduction of dependence on coal for producing
electricity, no adverse impact on air quality in the metro-
politan area, less indebtedness than under the second
option, and the power delivered to Lansing would be lower
in cost than the second option (power cost savings over
a thirty year period would be about twenty-seven percent,
or in money terms, about $250 million). The average resi-

dential customer's share of the projected power cost savings

122
would average $7.50 per month or $90 per year. The dis-
advantages are the business risk associated with nuclear
power, which are greater than with conventional coal-fired
generating plants due to regulatory uncertainty regarding
plant-safety and waste-disposal requirements, some loss
of control in partial ownership since plants would not
be operated by the Board, and the loss of benefit to the
Lansing economy with the loss of on-site construction wages
and increased Board employment.

The fourth option would require the Board to join
the non-profit Michigan Public Power Agency. In addition,
other cost-saving purchases can be pursued through this
agency. Presently eighteen municipal electric utilities
in Michigan are members of the Agency. The Board, by
joining this agency, could become a member of the projects
involving Agency ownership in Consumers Power Company
and in Detroit Edison nuclear plants. The total amount
of nuclear capacity owned by the Agency in these two plants
would include 100 Mw for the Board's use. The cost of
power delivered by the Agency to the Board would be about
the same as the cost under the third option. The advantages
and disadvantages of the third option are applicable to
this option also. An additional advantage is that the
debt incurred to finance ownership would be against the

Agency and not a direct debt to the City of Lansing.

123

The members of the Lansing Board of Water and
Light are appointed by the Mayor with City Council concurrence,
and are responsible under the Lansing City Charter for
making the decision. Acting under the pressure of special
interest groups and results from a public opinion poll,
the Board reluctantly chose the more expensive number
two option, coal.

The Board was originally planning to purchase
into the two nuclear plants. It was the least expensive
option for both the Board and the Board's customers.
It also would result in no local health risk or environmental
degradation, and provided maximum business flexibility
by membership in the Michigan Public Power Agency.

As the Board deliberations over whether to go
coal or nuclear progressed, there was a coalition of
opposition forming. The major forces were the environmental
interest group, Pirgim, which is essentially opposed to
nuclear power and has a “no-growth" economic philosophy;
a local newspaper figure; and a local political party
committee, among others. The coalition formed under the
name of Rate-Payers United. Their efforts in the media,
City Council, and Board of Water and Light meetings resulted
in considerable opposition to the purchase of nuclear
capacity, such that the Board commissioned Market Opinion
Research of Detroit to conduct a poll of a representative

number of Board customers to obtain their views on the

124

various options.1

The poll was conducted in mid-November of 1979,
and the results were published in December. Eight hundred
customers were polled regarding the four options - 500
in Lansing, 200 in East Lansing, and 100 in outlying areas.
As a result of the conclusions drawn from the poll and
the opposition previously mentioned, the Board of Water
and Light made the decision to build the coal plant addition
rather than purchase nuclear capacity.

There is an attitude of distrust and skepticism
toward big business and big energy companies in particular
today. There is a prevailing attitude that these
large enterprises thrive at the expense of the small entre-
preneur. There is particularly a distrust of the nuclear
power industry which is quite large and very capital intensive.

There is a widely held hope and even belief that
the energy situation is a temporary phenomenon that has
been brought about by inadequate attention to research
and development efforts in alternative technologies, and
also by a ”conspiracy" of large energy conglomerates to
control the price of energy. There is also a feeling
that the large government bureaucracy has partly caused

the energy situation, and with proper management, the

 

1Market Opinion Research, "Analysis of Lansing
Board of Water and Light Residential Customer Reactions
to Various Options for Additional Electric Generating
Capacity and Electricity Conservation" (Detroit: Market
Opinion Research, December 1979), Job no. 9367.

125

"crisis" will be alleviated. In addition, some people
blame the environmentalists for their efforts in the legislative
area that have resulted in restrictive and repressive
measures upon free enterprise. There is a fond hope that
there will be a rapid technological solution to rising
energy costs, i.e. a new technology such as nuclear fusion
which is wrongly purported to be nuclear-waste free.

The concerns of the public center around fear
of a nuclear major event (i.e. meltdown and steam explosion
resulting in breachment of the reinforced concrete containment
building) that could result in the deaths of hundreds
or even thousands of people in the immediate area surrounding
the plant. There is fear of the long-term effects of
low-level radiation that is improperly assumed to derive
from normal nuclear operation. It is feared that a nuclear
mishap would produce birth defects, cancer and severe
degradation of the environment. It is also feared that
nuclear wastes can not be handled and disposed of safely.

In the case of nuclear power, the public should
be aware of 211 the facts. One of the main causes of
the problems facing the nuclear industry today is that
it was ”over-sold", i.e. it was promoted in its infancy
to be very, very cheap, perfectly harmless to the environment,
risk-free - in short, an energy panacea. People were
not that naive in 1957 when the first power plant was

completed, and they are less so now.

126

The opposition to nuclear power often focuses
on a few factual statements from very credible sources
that show that nuclear power can be dangerous if impro-
perly safeguarded. They seem to be constantly searching
for and capitalizing on statements by nuclear engineers,
former employees of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
high-level scientific figures, etc. It is true that in
looking hard enough, a high credibility source can always
be found that will support almost any position, no matter
how radically out of tune it might be with the consensus
of peers. The focus of the Board of Water and Light's
efforts should have been on the position of the “consensus
of energy peers“, which unanimously favor nuclear over
coal in many situations where cost, health, and environmental
considerations indicate nuclear as a better choice.

The best method for attaining the desire of the
Board of Water and light to purchase nuclear-generated
electricity for the Lansing residents would have been
a strategy to reeducate the public. This methodology
would have been helpful because the public not only does
not have the correct facts upon which to base its opinions
regarding coal and nuclear (which will be clearly demonstrated
in an analysis of the results of the public opinion poll),
but they also have a fear of nuclear power based on their
erroneous knowledge. ‘The erroneous knowledge and consequent

fear have been fostered by an improper and imbalanced

127

presentation of facts, opinions, and possibilities in
the past. It is also going on now, and it can best be
countered by an approach based on an attempt to reeducate.

The relative advantages of the nuclear power option
were mentioned earlier. Briefly they are lower cost to
the consumer and to the Board of Water and Light, greater
energy diversity, no local environmental degradation,
and no pollution to cause adverse local health effects.

The nuclear-power option is compatible with the
existing organizational and technical structure, i.e. the
power would be sent over existing Consumers Power trans-
mission lines and distributed over the local Board of
Water and Light power grid. It is actually more compatible
than the coal-power option because of the lack of need
for a new generating station. The technical complexity
of nuclear power is higher than that of coal-power, and
regulatory complexity is greater. The complexity to the
consumer however, would be the same, i.e. either way,
he only has to flip on a light switch.

There are some cultural, social, ggganizational,
and psychological barriers to the nuclear power option.
The cultural barrier centers around the growing value
system based on the idea that smallness is better, or
bigness is bad: that a decentralized approach is the best
approach; that the concept of "appropriate technology”

is incompatible with massive power plants supplying only

128

one form of energy, i.e. electrical; and that the individual
is being ”swallowed up" in an increasingly complex and
overpowering system of forces. These cultural values

all serve to inhibit the choice for nuclear power.

The major social barrier to the nuclear option
is probably “conflict", i.e. when conflict and factionalism
exist within any society, any change that one faction
in the conflict adopts or espouses may automatically be
rejected by other groups. The change or innovation suffers
“guilt by association“. It does seem that because of
the value system mentioned above, which is essentially
anti-bigness, any idea or option proposed by a large business
entity will be opposed simply because of the existing
conflict in values between the large corporations and
the small individual consumer. The Board of Water and
Light is not that large, but when it advocates a nuclear
option, the Board is immediately associated in the minds of
the average consumer with the large nuclear power industry
with its billions of dollars in investments.

The organizational barrier to change is basically
the threat to the power and influence of the Lansing area
citizens over the source of their electrical power, i.e.
if their electrical power supplier joins the Michigan Public
Power Agency and buys electricity from Detroit Edison
and Consumers Power, the local autonomy and the political

control over the supplier will be diminished, albeit it

129

is hardly a constructive form of influence at present -

in fact it has been used in the recent case under discussion
to opt for a less desirable (based on the facts and stated
criteria of the local consumers) source of electrical

energy (the local coal-plant expansion).

The psychological barrier to change is probably
the most significant. The customers have an incorrect
perception of nuclear power, and have fears that are not
based on the facts. They also feel comfortable with the
fact that coal power has been used to supply their elec-
tricity in the past which they have been satisfied with,
and they wish to continue to obtain their electricity
from coal-fired plants . . . even if it costs more ($7.50
per month more per average customer) to do so.

In answer to the poll question: ”In your opinion,
what are the most important factors the Board of Water
and Light should take into account in making a decision
on various power generation options for the mid l980's?',
the following leading responses were obtained from the

eight hundred persons polled:1

- Cost (in some form) 41%
- Safety 15%
- Maintain independence 9%
- Environmental effects 7%

In examining the results of the poll in greater

detail, it is found that what the people say is most

 

lIbid., p. 5.

130
important to them is really not what is most important,
that they are basing many of their opinions on erroneous
or lacking information, and that there is a degree of
irrationality present that can be explained only in terms
of fear of nuclear power.

For example, one of the top reasons given by
customers for choosing coal over nuclear was that it was
'cheaper'.1 This is clearly incorrect since the customers
were told that electricity from a nuclear plant would
cost the average customer $7.50 less per month over a
thirty-year period than electricity from a coal-fired
plant.2 They favored coal over nuclear even though the
safety they were concerned about (next highest criteria
listed) would not be adversely affected at all by the
two nuclear plants not located in the area, which were
being built regardless of the Board of Water and Light's
decision, but on the contrary would be affected through
the introduction of carcinogens in the particulates and
sulfur dioxides from the local coal plant.

“Maintaining independence“ was a high-priority
item but favors nuclear over coal to the extent of $250
million, or twenty-seven percent savings over a thirty-
year period which would be realized in reduced debt to .

the city - and debt tends to restrict independence by

 

1Ibid., p. 9. 21bid., p. 15.

131

making one dependent on the financial institutions lending
the money: also the reliability of the power would be
greater coming from the Consumers Power and Detroit Edison
grids rather than only one local source because of their
greater number of plants and less probability of a power
shortage or brown-out; also independence would be enhanced
by the fact that the city would not be totally dependent
on coal whose prices and delivery could be unpredictable.

"Environmental effects" were also mentioned as
highly relevant by the eight hundred polled, and forty-
one percent agreed that a major disadvantage of a coal-
fired generator would be the negative impact on the air
quality of Lansing.1

It is clear that the choice of those polled of
coal over nuclear contradicts the very top four criteria
that the same people listed as major factors in selecting
a source of electrical generation. More important, they
contradicted themselves in the same poll and should have
been aware of their own contradictions.

It appears that psychological aversion to nuclear
power is the real cause of opposition. In a 1980 published
interview by the Media Institute of Washington, D.C.,

Dr. Robert L. Dupont, a recognized psychiatrist and expert
in the study and analysis of "phobias" gives some of his

opinions regarding the public apprehensions toward nuclear

 

11616., p. 10.

132

power. He made the following statement after viewing

thirteen hours of videotapes of nuclear-energy news coverage

on television:1

A phobia is a malignant disease of 'what ifs'. The
phobic thinking process is a spiraling chain reaction,
to use an atomic-energy analogy, of 'what ifs', and
each what if leads to another. 'What if this happens,
and then what if that happens, and then what if the
other thing happens?‘ Phobic thinking always travels
down the worst possible branchings of each of the
'what ifs' until the person is absolutely overwhelmed
with the potentials for disaster . . . Most of the
'nuclear disasters' I saw described on the television
tapes were 'what ifs'.

Nuclear Power and the Future
In the future, increased attention to the compar-
ative analysis of risks of other fuel cycles appears favor-

able to nuclear energy.1

The necessity of increasing
knowledge about the hazards of coal-burning is critical,
if enlightened choices are to be made in future energy
policy.

Because of the current attention being given to
nuclear power and its liabilities, Consumers Power Company
of Jackson, Michigan has had to alter some of its previous

policies regarding announcements of power-plant shutdowns.2

In the past, a written announcement was given as a courtesy

 

1Roger E. Kasperson and others, "Public Opposition
to Nuclear Energy: Retrospect and Prospect”, Science Technology
and Human Values (Cambridge: MIT Press, Spring 1980),
p. 21.

2R. J. Fitzpatrick and H. E. Spieler, Public
Affairs Planning and Research, Consumers Power Company,
conversation at offices in Jackson, Michigan, July 1980.

133

to local news media informing them of any shutdowns of
any of their nuclear power plants. The reasons for
the shutdowns were largely for routine maintenance, inspec-
tions, safety retrofits, or refueling. However, the notices
frequently made front-page headlines as if something
catastrophic had happened. The problem was solved by
including in the announcements all of the power plant
shutdowns, whether nuclear or coal. As a result, it was
no longer newsworthy.

There is an additional factor, however, that
tends to complicate a comparison between nuclear power
and coal. This is the matter of disproportionate risk.
The risk of living near a nuclear power plant can
be compared in one sense to the risk of living below a
large hydroelectric dam. If the dam were to break, the
damage would be concentrated on the residents in the immediate
downstream area. In the same way, the risk of injury
in the event of a 'worst possible" nuclear mishap is greatest
to those in close proximity to the plant.

With regard to coal burning, the risk of illness
or death due to inhalation of the emissions, though again
greater near the plant, is diffused over hundreds and even
thousands of square miles daily. This extent in turn de-
pends on the height of the stacks and the wind movement.
The risk of using coal for electrical power is also dis-

placed to the coal-mining regions in the form of ”Black Lung"

134
and mining accidents, to the railroad personnel that
transport the coal, and to automobile-train collisions.

Even though based on history - the risks of illness
or death of living near a nuclear power plant are almost
infinitely less than those of living near a coal-burning
plant, the risks are not nil. Since they are not nil
but are not measureable because of the absence of any
public deaths due to radiation from a nuclear power plant,
the public opposition could perhaps be allayed by allowing
nearby residents to benefit from their proximity.

This could be done by utilizing a cogeneration
process whereby the efficiency of the nuclear plant (or
coal also) could be at least doubled. This is accomplished
by diverting steam from the turbines and piping it to
surrounding areas to supply energy at a much cheaper cost.
This concept of compensating local residents for assumed
risks, whether real or imagined, is not new. President
Giscard of France has already announced plans to apply
this same principle by reducing electricity rates for
residents living near nuclear power plants.1

Finally, energy policy contains within it very
large social and political considerations. These consider-
ations are not nearly as well understood as the technical

factors. Though much social benefit could be derived from

 

1Jonathan Spivak, “France Pursues Drive to Replace
Oil Imports With Nuclear Energy”, Wall Street Journal,
8 March 1980, p. l.

135

a program to increase public awareness of the total costs

of nuclear power versus coal and other forms of energy,

this approach by itself would probably be inadequate.

The social and institutional characteristics of energy
systems which greatly affect public perceptions of them
deserve much more attention. Nuclear power, once a technical
issue, has become a political issue. As such, it must

be addressed as any other political issue by those who

have an interest in wise use of energy resources for the
future.

The next chapter helps to illustrate the choices
and the future of the nuclear power industry. The State
of Michigan already has a greater percentage of its elec-
tricity supplied from nuclear power than the nation as
a whole. It was also involved in the early development
of nuclear breeder technology, as well as an early experi-
mental commercial reactor.

While the people of Michigan are concerned with
the international choices and future of the nuclear power
industry only to the extent of the cumulative interest
of individual citizens, they have a more than proportionate
interest in the choices surrounding waste disposal and
the sociotechnical impact upon Michigan society. The
reason for this interest is first of all the availability
of numerous technologically feasible sites for long-term

waste disposal, as well as the demand for such sites created

136
by the spent fuel from Michigan's nuclear power plants.
Secondly, Michigan's heavy dependence on energy from outside
her borders is an inducement to find the most economical
and reliable sources of energy internally.

In addition, Michigan is in the process of completing
the installation of three new reactors at two sites that
will add substantially to already existing capacity.
Finally, Michigan's soft, yet energy-intensive and
industrially-based economy cannot withstand the increasing
costs of fossil fuels as well as those states with less

vulnerable energy-economies.

CHAPTER 5

NUCLEAR POWER IN MICHIGAN

Michigan Nuclear History and Development

 

Overview of Fermi 1: Experiences of Atomic
Power Development Associates and Power
Reactor Development Company

Some of the earliest development and operational
experience with the fast breeder reactor occurred in the
State of Michigan. It came about as the result of some
pioneering interest which was stimulated by a few individuals
at the Detroit Edison Company and at the Dow Chemical Company.

On January 10, 1955, the U.S. Atomic Energy
Commission (AEC) announced its Power Reactor Demonstration
Program inviting private enterprise to present plans for
building nuclear power reactors in cooperation with
the AEC. Then on March 30, 1955, the Detroit Edison
Company, on behalf of itself and the Central Hudson Gas
and Electric Corporation, the Cincinnati Gas and Electric
Company, Consumers Power Company, Delaware Power and Light
Company, Long Island Lighting Company, Philadelphia
Electric Company, Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation,
and the Toledo Edison Company, offered to participate in

the Power Demonstration Program by designing, constructing

137

138

and operating an experimental fast-neutron breeder reactor
electric power plant. On August 8, 1955 the AEC accepted
the proposal as a basis for negotiation. This, together
with studies jointly initiated by Detroit Edison and Dow

1 (Please refer to

Chemical, was the beginning of Fermi 1.
figures 5 and 6 for locations of this and other plants
discussed in this section, as well as franchise areas.)

There were two basic groups that were responsible
for making Fermi 1 a reality, both of which had member-
ship from the aforementioned group of companies. The first
group was called Atomic Power Development Associates
(APDA). This group had the responsibility for providing
much of the supporting engineering, research, and develop-
ment work. The second group was called the Power Reactor
Development Company (PRDC). This group had the responsi-
bility of building, owning and operating the reactor.
Ultimately they were dissolved within a few months of each
other.

Five years and three months after the first
equipment was ordered, a milestone was achieved when the
entire primary system of the Fermi Plant, then the world's
largest liquid-metal-cooled reactor system, was filled to

operating level with 345,000 pounds of sodium. The fill

 

1Eldon L. Alexanderson, "Power Reactor Development
Company," Fermi 1: New Age for Nuclear Power, ed. E.
Pauline Alexanderson (LaGrange Park, 111): American
Nuclear Society, 1979), p. 39.

 

139

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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1962 - 63 Mw
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1971 - 635 Mw ...00'
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Fig. 5.

Location of nuclear power plants in Michigan

‘r-— -

t?

 

Fig- 6 FRANCHISE SERVICE AREA OF PRIVATELY OWNED UTILITIES
GENERAL SERVICE AREA OF RURAL ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES

A N D
ALPENA POWER COMPANY MUNICiPAL SYSTEMS
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140

 

 

141

was completed without incident during a 9-hour period
starting the night of November 30 and ending at 7:00 a.m.
on December 1, 1960.1

Over the following months, various high tempera-
ture problems were encountered as a result of the liquid
sodium method of cooling. However, these challenges were
met one by one, and on May 10, 1963 the Power Reactor
Development Company received a provisional operating
license for maximum power of one megawatt. Culmination of
the long APDA-PRDC effort occurred when the Fermi reactor
became critical at 12:23 p.m. on August 23, 1963.2

Low-power nuclear tests were begun immediately.
Since the program progressed smoothly and on schedule,
PRDC filed an application for a license for high-power
operations with the AEC on March 12, 1964. A milestone in
the history Of the Fermi Plant was reached on July 8, 1966
when the power was increased to 100 megawatts. This was
not only the culmination of years of engineering effort
on the Fermi reactor, but it was the highest power reached
by any fast reactor. By the end Of that month, the

reactor had been started about 390 times.3

 

lAlton P. Donnell, "Atomic Power Development
Associates-From Inception to Dissolution," Fermi 1: New
Age for Nuclear Power, p. 62.

 

2Ibid, p. 67.

31bid, p. 68.

142

On October 5, 1966 when the reactor was Operating
at 34 megawatts, during a power ascension the radio-
activity level in the inert gas blanketing the primary
sodium system rose substantially, indicating the presence
of gaseous fission products. A small amount Of this radio-
activity leaked into the building. The automatic
protective equipment performed properly, sealing the
building from the atmosphere and preventing any further
escape of radioactivity. Following the incident, investi-
gation revealed that fuel melting had occurred in at least
two of the subassemblies, and that the molten fuel had
penetrated the steel walls of the two subassemblies so
that they were physically bonded. The reason for the fuel
melting was Obstruction of coolant flow through three or
four subassemblies, caused by one Of six zirconium plates
that had become detached inside the reactor. It was later
decided to detach and remove the remaining ones since they
were not required for safe operation.

After much research, development, and learning
from the incident, the reactor was again started up on
July 18, 1970. However, much public and unfavorable
awareness of the incident was promoted by the book, W3

Almost Lost Detroit, by John Fuller. In response to

 

Fuller's book, Earl M. Page, a reactor physicist employed

143

by APDA and associated with the Fermi 1 project since 1960

1

published a counter-statement. Page attacked systematically

the three major themes or impressions conveyed throughout
the book. The impressions were stated as follows:2

1. We almost lost Detroit as a result of the Fermi 1
fuel melting incident of October 5, 1966.

2. Any mistake in nuclear power-plant design, construc-
tion, or operation will most likely lead to disaster.

3. The government performed a reactor-safety study
hoping to show that the risk to the public

is low, but when the risk turned out to be

high, they suppressed the study.

Earl Page successfully invalidated each Of John
Fuller's major arguments. "Losing Detroit" is impossible
even in the worst possible nuclear power-plant disaster -
because of the lack of a critical mass. However, fantasy
is Often more saleable than fact. Although the rebuttal
by Page seems to have been thorough, it was probably less
widely read than Fuller's book.

The Fermi 1 project continued through 1971 and
into 1972 on funds pledged by member companies of the
Edison Electric Institute and funds committed by the

Detroit Edison Company. During this period, all components

and systems operated without significant incident,

 

1Earl M. Page, ”We Did Not Almost Lose Detroit, A
Critigue of the John Fuller Book: 'We Almost Lost
Detroit'" (Detroit: Detroit Edison).

21bid. , p. 3.

144

demonstrating the Operating capability of large flowing
sodium systems. The experience, with minor difficulties,
made a substantial contribution to liquid-metal-cooled
fast reactor technology. From those favorable experiences,
it was concluded that continued Operation of the plant
would contribute significantly to fast-reactor development.

With continued operation in mind, PRDC and APDA
outlined a six-year program for optimum plant use. This
would cost $50 million. The program included Operating the
reactor to the extent of the life Of the existing fuel,
followed by operation with a uranium oxide fuel at a
power level Of about 400 megawatts. The program was never
realized because a lack of adequate financial support
forced the plant to be decommissioned.

The efforts on the part of Detroit Edison
Chairman, Walker Cissler, and the Edison Electric Institute
to raise the $50 million were laudable. Unfortunately
their efforts were stymied by a seeming loss of commitment
on the part Of the AEC to the project as expressed by
its unwillingness to contribute a remaining needed amount
of $6 million -- a relatively small amount compared to the
over $2.0 billion for the proposed Clinch River Breeder
Reactor Demonstration Plant. The reluctance of the utility
industry to contribute to Fermi was understandable.
Contributions by the utility industry to the ABC's proposed

demonstration breeder reactor were to be $250 million. The

145

money market was tight, and capital for needed expansion of
conventional generating facilities was difficult to raise.
It would not be prudent for the utility industry to

finance a project that in the opinion of the AEC was not
making a significant contribution to the national Liquid

Metal Fast Breeder Reactor program.1

Background on D.C. Cook 1 & 2,
Big Rock Point, and Palisades
Donald C. Cook 1 and 2 nuclear plants are located

in Bridgman, Michigan. The operating licenses were
issued on October 24, 1974 and December 23, 1977,
respectively. They are both pressurized water reactors
manufactured by westinghouse, with a combined capacity of
2,126 megawatts. These two plants are owned by the
Indiana and Michigan Electric Company Of Fort Wayne,
Indiana. It is noteworthy that these two units account
for seventy-five percent of the current operating capacity
in Michigan, but only ten percent of the output is

distributed in Michigan.2

It is possible that a larger
percentage of the output could be channeled to Michigan,
but this would involve reselling the power to one of the

two existing major utilities (Consumers Power or Detroit

 

1James E. Meyers, "The Decommissioning of Fermi,"
Fermi 1: New Age for Nuclear Power, p. 272.

2Michigan Energy and Resource Research Association
(MERRA), Toward a Unified Michigan Energy Poligy ("White
Papers" series) (Detroit: MERRA, 1980), p. 148.

 

146

Edison), or adjusting the franchise service areas - which
is not likely (see figure 2).

The Big Rock Point nuclear plant was Consumers
Power Company's first nuclear project and the fifth commercial
nuclear power plant in the nation. It is Of 63 megawatts
capacity and was issued an operating license on August 30,
1962. The reactor is of the boiling-water type,
manufactured by General Electric Company. This is a very
small reactor compared with the current normal size of 1,000
megawatts or more.

Nuclear-development programs sponsored by the
Atomic Energy Commission, electric utilities, and
suppliers have been carried on at Big Rock Point since the
start Of its operation. The Big Rock Point plant also
served as a training facility for preparing company
personnel for Operation Of the Palisades plant. In
addition, it provided training for personnel from other
utilities in the U.S. and abroad: from Niagara Mohawk
Power Corporation, Boston Edison Company, and from Canada,
Sweden, and India.1

The cost of Big Rock Point is striking in its
comparison with the construction costs Of current plants -

notwithstanding the much smaller size. For example, the

 

1Information from internal Consumers Power
Company information data sheets (Jackson, Michigan:
Consumers Power, 15 September 1979). P. 3.

147

cost of Big Rock Point was $25.8 million for 63 megawatts
capacity, or $410 per kilowatt capacity; the cost of
Palisades was $186 million for 635 megawatts or $293 per
kilowatt; and the cost of Midland l and 2 combined

(projected) is $3.1 billion1

for 1,333 megawatts or $2,326
per kilowatt capacity. However, this cost will be
considerably reduced (or the profitability of the plant
increased) by the fact that large amounts Of steam will
be sold to the Dow Chemical Company in Midland.

The current problem facing Big Rock Point has to
do with spent-fuel-rod storage.2 In June 1979, Consumers
Power Company requested approval from the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission for increasing the storage capacity
of the spent-fuel storage pool at Big Rock Point by
installing closer storage racks. This modification would
make possible fuel storage through approximately 1990.

The current spent fuel storage capability will be
exhausted in 1981. The storage of spent fuel is necessary
because national policy currently does not permit

reprocessing of spent reactor fuel, and no permanent

disposal facility has been constructed.

 

1Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, statement
before the Special Joint Committee on Nuclear Energy
(Lansing: Michigan Legislature, 3 March 1980).

2Interview with Judd L. Bacon, Managing Attorney,
Consumers Power Company, Jackson, Michigan, 20 November
1980.

148

Several intervenors have challenged the installa-
tion Of new storage racks, and public hearings will be
held during the early part of 1981. Since the next
refueling is scheduled for Fall of 1981, at which time the
extra storage capacity will be needed, it is essential to
the full operation of Big Rock Point that they are
successful in their application.

The Palisades Nuclear Power plant was issued an
operating license on March 24, 1971. It is interesting
that the license issued was a provisional one, subject to
review after the first eighteen-month trial period. When
application was made to change the provisional operating
license to a forty-year operating license, no action was
taken by the licensing board for one reason after another.
The result is that Palisades has been on a day-to-day
Operating basis since 1973 while the application is still
pending.1

As the Palisades plant was nearing completion,
several environmental groups intervened, opposing the
granting of a license on the grounds that cooling towers
and additional radioactive-waste equipment were needed.2

In order to resolve the Objections and Obtain an operating

 

11bid.

2"Palisades Plant Settlement Agreement between
Consumers Power Company and Michigan Steelhead and Salmon
Fisherman's Assn., et a1." (Jackson, Michigan: Consumers
Power, 12 March 1971).

149

license, Consumers Power consented to install cooling
towers and additional radioactive-waste equipment for an
approximate cost Of $30 million. Licensing delays caused
additional expenses Of $28 million, and inflation added
another $34 million. These required modifications
increased the final construction cost to $186 million, as
opposed to the originally planned $93 million.

In August 1973, operation was stopped because of a
steam-generator-tube leak. Upon investigation, it was
determined that some engineering design deficiencies and
improper water chemistry were causing steam-tube corrosion.
It took almost thirteen months to correct the situation
and resume operation.1

As a result of its losses, Consumers Power Company
filed suit in Federal District Court in Grand Rapids
against five firms which supplied components and'design
work for the Palisades plant. Settlements were Obtained
both in and out of court during 1976-77 for between $68
million and $88 million, depending on the future value of
certain uranium-fuel assemblies.2

Consumers Power then filed for approval to replace

the steam generators, but the application had not been

 

1Information from internal Consumers Power
Company information data sheets (Jackson, Michigan:
Consumer's Power, 15 September 1979).

2Interview with Judd L. Bacon, Managing Attorney,
Consumers Power Company, Jackson, Michigan, 20 November 1980.

150

approved as of Fall 1980. However, Consumers Power is

not anxious about this delay, since during a 1978 refueling
outage, inspections of the steam generators revealed that
no significant corrosion had taken place during the past
operating cycle. The need to replace the steam generator
is also not as urgent as earlier due to the declining rate

1 A current suit

of growth in power demand in the state.
between Consumers Power Company and the NRC has to do with
a $450,000 fine imposed for the alleged leaving open of
"containment-isolation valves". The fine was three times
the fine assessed against the operators of the Three Mile
Island Nuclear Plant, and the largest fine in nuclear
regulation history - for safety violations determined by

the NRC.2

It is noteworthy that the fine was a cumulative
total Of daily fines, that the burden of proof is on the
NRC tO establish that the valves were open the entire period,
and that the opened valves in themselves would not have
produced the series of events leading up to the mishap
at Three Mile Island.

Two other plants (Quanicassee l and 2) Of 1,100 mega-

watts each were scheduled to be completed in the early 1980's.

These plants were to be located just east of Bay City,

 

lIbid.

2Frank J. Kelly, Attorney General, Statement before
the Special Joint Committee on Nuclear EnerQY: 3 March
1980.

151

Michigan. However, they were both cancelled in 1974 after

Consumers Power had expended $13 million.1

Midland l and 2: Progress and Problems

On December 14, 1967 Consumers Power announced
its intention to construct its largest nuclear plant on
a 1,000 acre site in Midland, Michigan. The plant will
be the world's first industrial, cogeneration nuclear energy
center. It will be capable of generating 1,333 megawatts
of electricity for Michigan and at the same time delivering
large amounts of steam for industrial use at Dow Chemical.

During 1968, contracts were awarded for construction
Of various components of the nuclear plant. The Midland
units were scheduled for commercial operation in 1974 and

1975.2

On January 13, 1964, the company's application

for a construction permit was filed with the Atomic Energy
Commission. For the next four years the AEC conducted
licensing hearings. In addition, there were repeated legal
appeals from organizations and individuals Opposed to
construction of the Midland plant. Finally the AEC issued
construction permits for the Midland units on December 15,

1972. However, the repeated delays made it necessary for

the commercial-operation dates to be extended to 1979 and 1980.

 

11bid.

2Information from internal Consumers Power Company
information data sheets (Jackson, Michigan: Consumers
Power, 15 September 1979).

152

A sample of the context Of interventions that occur
against nuclear power plants can be found in the official
AEC proceedings leading up to the granting Of construction
permits for the Midland plant. The following excerpt from

AEC proceedings regarding the environmental impact of the

Midland nuclear plant is insightful:1

Intervenors on the other hand challenge the
(Consumers Power Environmental impact) survey as
completely inadequate and assign a 'conservative' value
of $36,000,000 to the flora and fauna to be disturbed
by construction. Approximately $30,000,000 of this
amount is for the losses Of bird and animal life alone.
The method used to arrive at these evaluations was
to estimate populations of species which could be expected
to be found in the area on the basis of existing studies.
Intervenors then estimated the number of each species
expected to be found and assigned an arbitrary value
to each bird and animal, for example, $10.00 per sparrow
and $10.00 per mouse. Intervenors' witness, Dr. Stuart
Holcomb, made no allowance for the effect Of predation,
although he conceded that predation would take a
considerable toll . . . nor did he make any allowance
for the fact that many of the birds to be found are
generally considered pests (indeed there are bounties
in the State of Michigan on some of them). He then
multiplied his final figure by 30, representing the
expected life of the plant of 30 years. The Board
finds this method of evaluation and calculation wholly
unsupportable. We note without further comment, for
example, that the figures shown include $151,000 per
year as the value of mice to be lost and $190,000 per
year for varieties of sparrows - a total of some
$10,000,000 over the life Of the plant for mice and
sparrows alone.

In 1973 and 1974, aspects Of construction work

at the plants were interrupted because Of the actions by

 

1U.S., Atomic Energy Commission, Before the Atomic
Safety and Licensing Board, in the matter of Consumers Power
Company (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), Initial Decision,
14 December 1972.

153

intervenors and the AEC. The intervenors continued to seek
revocation Of the construction permits. In addition, the
adverse economic climate being experienced by the electric
utility industry, and especially by Consumers Power, caused
additional delays. Consumers Power Company's financial
situation had been weakened by the previous extended outage
Of the Palisades plant, and the accompanying loss of revenue.
For these reasons the commercial-operation dates for Midland
Units 1 and 2 were extended to 1981 and 1982.

During 1975, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board,
the Michigan Court of Appeals, and the Michigan Supreme
Court gave favorable judgments to Consumers Power regarding
various intervenor actions. However, in 1976 the U.S.

Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
remanded to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for re-review
several Of the issues involved in the original granting

of construction permits, including re-evaluation Of Dow
Chemical Company's need for process steam from the nuclear
’ plant. In addition, there were issues of antitrust that
had to be settled.

Finally, in a unanimous decision of the U.S. Supreme
Court issued on April 3, 1978, the validity of the original
1972 construction permits was upheld. This action over-
turned the decision Of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit. In its Opinion, the U.S.

Supreme Court stated that "Administrative proceedings

154

should not be a game or a forum to engage in unjustified

l

Obstructionism'. In addition, the intervenors were

assessed $20,000 by the Supreme Court to be paid to Consumers
Power Company for court costs.2
In the meantime, the agreements for the purchase
Of large quantities of process steam by Dow Chemical from
the Midland Plant had become Obsolete due to the delays
in construction. As a result new agreements were signed,
based on Consumer Power's ability to place the Midland
Plant in commercial operation for process steam service
to Dow Chemical on or before December 31, 1984. Should
the construction deadline not be met, Dow Chemical would
have the option of buying out of the contract for approxi-
mately $300 million.3 Because of the construction delays
Observed in the past, there has been concern expressed by
the Dow Chemical Company about whether it should continue
4

to plan on the process steam's being available on time.

Currently the process steam is being supplied by Dow

 

lIbid.

2Constance Ewing Cook, Nuclear Power and Legal
Advocacy (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1980), pp. 99-100.

 

3Interview with Robert Fitzpatrick, Vice President
for Public Relations, Consumers Power Company, Jackson,
Michigan, 1 July 1980.

4Frank J. Kelly, Attorney General, statement before
the Special Joint Committee on Nuclear Energy: 3 March 1980.

155

Chemical's own power plants which are becoming Obsolete,
experiencing intermittent violations of EPA pollution
regulations, and generally preventing the company from
expanding its operations as it would prefer.1 There have
been public and private statements by management of Dow
Chemical in Midland to the effect that it should
seriously consider building new and additional process
steam generating capacity, and forget about being involved
in the Midland Plant.2
During construction, settling Of a generator building
became an issue, and while the issue has not been resolved,
the physical-settling problem has been remedied by loading
the building with sand to expedite the settling process.
Construction on the remainder of the plant is proceeding
on schedule, and as Of early September 1979, the Midland
project was approximately sixty-three percent complete.3
Consumers Power Company remains confident that a nuclear

plant at the Midland site will have the least impact on the

environment compared to any alternative, and that it can

 

1Interview with Judd L. Bacon, Managing Attorney,
Consumers Power Company, Jackson, Michigan, 10 November 1980.

2Informal conversation with Dow employee on 12 July
1980 in Flint, Michigan at U.S. Senator Carl Levin's
GasOhOl/Alcohol Conference.

3Information from internal Consumers Power Company
information data sheets (Jackson, Michigan: Consumer Power,
15 September 1979).

156

provide steam and electrical power at a rate that will keep
the region competitive with other parts Of the country.
Nonetheless, because of the current economic and
regulatory uncertainties with regard to nuclear power,
Consumers Power Company has no plans to construct another
nuclear plant after Midland is completed - for the fore-

seeable future.1

Fermi 2: Progress and Problems

The construction permit for Fermi 2 was issued
on September 26, 1972. It is a boiling-water-reactor type
with a capacity of 1,100 megawatts. Although plans for
the project were announced in 1968 and the initial completion
target date Of 1976 set, financial conditions at Detroit
Edison caused work on the plant to be halted in 1974.2
Work resumed in 1977 when the company's financial condition
improved. Another contributing factor was the sale of
twenty percent of the plant to two rural electric coopera-
tives, Northern Michigan Electric Cooperative, Inc., and

Wolverine Electric Cooperative, Inc.3

 

lGordon L. Heins, Vice President, Systems Operators,
Consumers Power Company, Jackson, Michigan, address at .
an "Energy Forum" on the Michigan State University Campus,
East Lansing, Michigan, 9 October 1980.

2"Fermi 2 Nuclear Power Plant”, Newsletter (Detroit:
Detroit Edison, Summer 1978).

31bid.

157

Fermi 2 shares the site with the old Fermi 1 plant
which now operates as a standby Oil-fired generating station.
The site is located thirty miles southwest of Detroit.

The new target date for completion in 1980 was set back
to early 1982 in order to 'allow the company to evaluate
the reports of President Carter's Special Commission, the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and other agencies
investigating the recent Three Mile Island incident".1

Fermi 2 was reported to be eighty-two percent
complete as of early 1980.2 However, the costs for construc-
tion have been escalating. The original cost for completion
in 1976 was $229 million, followed by $988 million for
completion in 1980, and now perhaps $1.7 billion for

completion in 1982 or 1933.3

The delays imposed by inter-
venors and regulatory revisions and additions seem to be
the major reasons for the escalating costs. Most of the
delays are beyond the control of the power companies.

Fermi 3 was an additional nuclear power plant planned
by Detroit Edison for completion in the late 1970's.

However, it was canceled in 1975 after only preliminary

studies were made and after only $6 million had been expended.

 

1"Fermi 2 Nuclear Power Plant", Newsletter (Detroit:
Detroit Edison, Summer 1979).

2Frank J. Kelly, Attorney General, statement before

the Special Joint Committee on Nuclear Energy: 3 March 1980.

31bid.

158

Greenwood 2 and 3: The Decision to Cancel

In May of 1971, the Board of Directors of Detroit
Edison approved a generation-expansion plan that included
Greenwood Units 2 and 3. The decision to build these plants
was made based on the success Of nuclear power that was
being demonstrated in that time period.1 This success
was demonstrated by the completion of nine nuclear units in
the U.S. between 1968 and 1971. The average project duration
was less than five years, and resulted in electrical capacity
costs that compared favorably with those of coal-fired power
plants. In addition, other power plants were proceeding
on schedule - including Fermi 2.

The construction of Greenwood 2 and 3 nuclear plants
was favored over coal in the early 1970's also because of
the passage of the National Environmental Protection Act
of 1979 and the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 which
established stringent particulate and sulfur-dioxide emission
parameters.2 It was very clear that although a high percentage
Of the emission from a coal-fired plant could be eliminated

by existing technologies, the removal Of the emissions

 

1Wayne R. Jens, Vice President, Nuclear Operations,
Detroit Edison Company, "Testimony, State of Michigan Before
the Michigan Public Services Commission, In the Matter of
the Application of the Detroit Edison Company for Accounting
and Ratemaking Authority Relating to Its Greenwood Nuclear
Units 2 and 3 Projects" (Case NO. U-6474), Spring 1980, p. 2.

21bid. , p. 3.

159

became increasingly expensive as attempts were made to
clean out the last few percentage points. Any legislation
changing the level of allowable emissions at the higher
levels could be disastrous to cost projections for a coal
plant due to the economic sensitivity at these levels.
Greenwood 2 and 3 construction was also encouraged
by the uncertain technology for removing coal sulfur
emissions and the difficUlty of siting a new coal-fired
generator plant in the Detroit Edison service area. Siting
problems were due to the need to improve ambient air quality
in almost all industrialized areas. In addition, the
Federal Government was supportive in its fuel-enrichment
services, and it appeared that it would assume responsibility
for disposing Of the nuclear wastes. Nuclear power was also
not a political issue in 1971. However, conStruction
was never begun on Greenwood 2 and 3. The reason was that
it was unnecessary in order to proceed with initial prepara-
tion. A considerable amount Of engineering and environmental
studies are required in order to even prepare an application
for a construction permit. Initial application was filed
in 1973 for a construction permit, but work was suspended
on the project in 1974. It was decided on February 26,
1979 to resubmit an updated application for a construction
permit. However, the accident at Three Mile Island began
on March 28, 1979. Soon after the accident it became clear

that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission would be using all

160

its resources to investigate the incident. Detroit Edison
was advised by the NRC that no work would be done on the
licensing of the Greenwood Units 2 and 3 for "some time".1
The situation was probably made to look more dismal because
of the fact that Greenwood 2 and 3 were to use Babcock-
and-Wilcox-type reactors, like those at Three Mile ISland.
It was then decided to stop work on the Greenwood Nuclear
Project pending the results of the NRC investigations.
A recommendation to terminate the Greenwood Nuclear Project
was made soon after, and was approved by the Detroit Edison
Board Of Directors on March, 24, 1980.2

The decision not to construct the Greenwood units
was based primarily on the following:3

1. Licensing uncertainty.

2. Financial risk of starting construction Of
a large nuclear unit.

3. Lack of a national and public commitment to
nuclear power.

4. Uncertain viability of reactor design (Babcock
and Wilcox).

5. Difficulty in obtaining adequate human
resources for the project.

6. Unresolved siting questions concerning Greenwood.

7. Unresolved issues with respect to high and low
level waste disposal and reprocessing.

 

lIbide' p. 270 21bido' p. 28.

31616.. pp. 28-29.

161

8. Projected inability to schedule the Greenwood
Nuclear Project to meet the forecast need, and

9. The need for increased amounts Of nuclear
accident insurance for property damage and
replacement energy costs during an outage.

The Greenwood Nuclear Project was canceled after

1 This

an expenditure by Detroit Edison Of $73 million.
was the most economical course Of action in view of the
foregoing criteria. It is doubtful if anyone will buy a
nuclear power plant for about five years,2 but Detroit
Edison has publicly stated that it would consider another

generation project in the future.3

Implications Of the Three Mile Island Accident
for Nuclear Power Plants in Michigan
Certainly the impact Of Three Mile Island has been
unfavorable to the entire nuclear industry. Even though
the NRC's order to shut down all Babcock and Wilcox reactors
following Three Mile Island did not affect the plants

operating in Michigan, several other actions did impact,

 

1Interview with Wayne H. Jens, Vice President,
Nuclear Operations, Detroit Edison Company, Detroit, Michigan,
12 November 1980.

21bid.

3Wayne H. Jens, Vice President, Nuclear Operations,
Detroit Edison Company, ”Testimony, State of Michigan Before
the Michigan Public Services Commission, In the Matter of
the Application Of the Detroit Edison Company for Accounting
and Ratemaking Authority Relating to Its Greenwood Nuclear
Units 2 and 3 Projects" (Case NO. U-6474), Spring 1980, p. 43.

162

or will impact, Michigan's Nuclear Power Program. They

are as follows:

1

1. A series of bulletins was issued to all

Operating nuclear power stations, informing
them of the details and circumstances Of the
accident and directing certain measures to be
taken to deal with possible similar conditions.
Licensees were required to review and modify
their operating procedure for Operator and
safety-system responses to various accident
conditions. Safety circuits were modified at the
D.C. Cook plant. NRC inspection personnel were
dispatched to the various plants to insure

that the prescribed steps had been followed.

Following Three Mile Island, the NRC temporarily
halted testing of personnel applications for
operator licenses pending the adding of special
training to deal with events similar to that

at Three Mile Island.

A number Of measures were required of all plants
in Michigan to improve their safety margins as a
result of the findings of the Three Mile Island
accident, e.g. increased testing of key high
pressure safety and relief valves, assuring

that all gaseous-and liquid-flow paths from

the reactor containment would be closed in
event'of a TMI-type accident, and verifying

the adequacy of power supplies and backup power
sources for safety components. It was conceded
that the Fermi 2 and Midland project-completion
dates could be adversely impacted by the NRC
longer-term requirements.

The requirement of ”Licensee Event Reports" and
a new NRC office to systematically assess the
significance of the various operating incidents
and malfunctions which are required to be
reported to the NRC.

 

1James G. Keppler, Director, Nuclear Regulatory

Commission Region III, before’the Special Joint Committee
on Nuclear Energy (Lansing: Michigan Legislature, 15
October 1979), 2:13, PP. 3-11. *

163

5. Utilities were asked to meet the criteria of
a Nuclear Regulatory Commission guide for
emergency planning for nuclear accidents along
with city, county, and state governments.

6. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission installed
direct phone lines from each operating reactor
control room to the NRC headquarters and regional
Offices - with a view toward establishing better
communication systems.

7. A Nuclear Regulatory Commission resident-
inspector program was expanded, to include
resident inspectors at all operating reactor
sites - backed up by inspectors operating out of
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission regional
office. Resident inspections were projected
to be assigned to the Big Rock Point and Fermi
plants in early to mid 1980. This will complete
resident inspection assignments in the State
Of Michigan.

Certainly there exists a potential for cost increases
for nuclear power as a result of safety modification
requirements following Three Mile Island. However, it
must be kept in mind that while the electricity costs from
nuclear power plants are going up due to improved safety
modifications and backfitting, the cost is also increasing
for electricity from coal-fired power plants due to increased
pressure to control emissions. In spite of the fact that
nuclear power-plant costs have increased at the rate Of about
$140 per kilowatt capacity over the five-year period prior

1

to 1978, the costs still compare favorably with coal.

 

1William E. Mooz, Cost Analysis of Light Water
Reactor Power Plants, Rank Report R-2304-DOE, June, 1978,
p. 31 as cited in the testimony of Gregory C. Minor before
the Special Joint Committee on Nuclear Energy (Lansing:
Michigan Legislature, 15 October 1979), 2:14.

 

 

164

Performance of Michigan Nuclear
Power Plants Compared With That of Other
Nuclear Power Plants ih the United States

 

There are several methods for comparing the
performance of nuclear power plants. It is important to
compare them on the basis of size, as well as when they
went into operation, i.e. age Of plant. The first comparison
will be made on the basis of average capacity factor.1

Big Rock Point's performance was compared with
that of other small demonstration plants Of similar age
that were still licensed to operate as of June 30, 1979.2
Many Of the smaller plants like Big Rock Point had been
removed from operation. In comparing Big Rock Point with
four other similar plants, it showed a capacity factor
since its initial operation through June of 1979 of 52.2
percent. This compared favorably with the average Of the
five plants of 53.3 percent.

The Palisades plant does not compare as favorably

with other similar plants. However, this is not due to

 

1Capacity factor, relative to design capacity, is
the percentage actually produced Of the electrical energy
that could have been produced if the unit had operated at
its design capacity for all Of the time during a period.
Capacity factors of less than 100 percent result from
operating units at less than their design powers, when the
units are not shut down, and from outages, scheduled and forced.

2Bill Scanlon, memorandum to Special Joint Committee
on Nuclear Energy (Lansing: Michigan Legislature, 1 November
1979) 1:22, data taken from Operating Units Status Report:
Data as of 6-30-79, NUREG-0020, V01. 3, No. 7, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, July 1979.

 

165

lack of operational expertise at Consumers Power, but rather to
design errors resulting in erosion of the tubing Of the

steam generator. As was mentioned earlier, Consumers Power
filed suit against five Of the companies involved in the
manufacturing/construction of the plant and won the case.

As a result of the design problems, however, the plant was
Off-line from August 1973 until early 1975. The capacity
factor Of the Palisades plant, since initial operation,

is therefore 37.0 percent as opposed to an average of 58.1
percent for the six plants Of its type combined.

The performance of D.C. Cook 1 was compared with that
of units with capacities greater than 1,000 megawatts which
came on line before January 1, 1977. It compares favorably
with a capacity factor of 60.5 percent as opposed to 54.2
percent average for eight plants combined. D.C. Cook 2 also
compared favorably with a capacity factor Of 66.8 percent
against an average of 50.9 percent for the total Of three
plants in its category. The performance Of D.C. Cook 2 was
compared with that Of units with capacities greater than
1,000 megawatts which came on line after January 1, 1977.

A second basis for comparing the performance Of

1

nuclear power plants is "forced-outage rates”. The four

operating nuclear power plants have an average cumulative

 

lAn "outage rate” is the percentage Of time that a
unit is out of service, i.e., not producing electricity.
There are two types of outage: scheduled (e.g., for re-
fueling or planned maintenance) and forced (e.g., when
a problem arises requiring a shutdown of the reactor).

166

forced outage rate from the date Of first commercial opera-
tion to June 30, 1979 Of 20.4 percent.1 At first glance,
this figure would seem to indicate a high outage rate when
compared with the average for all U.S. plants of 13.6 percent
in the first six months of 1979, 9.5 percent for 1978,

and 7.6 percent for 1977. However, only four operating
plants make up the average for Michigan, and one of the
four is only 63 megawatts (Big Rock Point). This plant is
much smaller than the U.S. average, and its outage rate
would tend to unfairly skew the Michigan average. In
addition, the Palisades plant has had problems with the
steam generator as mentioned before, which were unique - as
indicated by the successful law suits by Consumers Power
against the manufacturers and installers. The remaining
D.C. Cook 1 and 2 with a cumulative forced-outage rate of
11.7 percent compares favorably with that of all U.S.
nuclear plants combined Of 13.6 percent in the first six
months Of 1979, 9.5 percent for 1978, and 7.6 percent for
1977. In addition, the outage rates and capacity factors
tend to vary over a wide range from plant to plant, and

the small number of plants in Michigan does not provide a

 

10.8., Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Operating Units Status Report, Licepsed Operating
Reactors ("Grey Book"), Vol. 1, No. 9 (Sept. 1977) through
VOl. 3, NO. 7 (July 1979), as cited by Bill Scanlon, Committee
Staff Director, in the ”Staff Report on Incidents at
Michigan's Operating Nuclear Power Plants", Special Joint
Committee on Nuclear Energy (Lansing: Michigan Legislature,
15 October 1979), 1:4, p. 19.

167

statistically significant base for comparison to the national
average. The wide range in operation experienced is
indicated by comparing D.C. Cook 1 and 2, both of the same
design and capacity, which have experienced a cumulative
forced-outage rate of 6.0 percent and 17.4 percent
respectively from the date of first commercial operation
through June 30, 1979.

A third basis for comparison of Michigan's nuclear
power plants to other nuclear plants is according to its
compliance with U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission safety
regulations. A system was designed by James Keppler, Director
of Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Region III, to evaluate
(the regulatory performance of the nuclear power plants in his
region (which includes Michigan). Director Keppler states:1

I wish to make it clear that these numbers

are useful for indicating trends from year to year
but should not be used on an absolute basis to
compare different plants. The reason for the latter
is that different nuclear power plants have differing
regulatory and reporting requirements which they

must meet. This is due to the differences in plant
design and the time frames in which the licenses

were issued.

Director Keppler devised a weighting system for
different incidences of noncompliance with Nuclear Regula-

tory Commission regulations. The heavier weights were

assigned to those incidences which were considered to

 

1James G. Keppler, Director, U.S. Nuclear Regula-
tion Commission, Region III, letter to the Special Joint
Committee on Nuclear Energy (Lansing: Michigan Legislature
23 October 1979), 1:5, pp. 1-6.

168

contribute more to the possibility of.a dangerous situation
developing. He also had records kept of the number of
times a Situation of noncompliance occurred. These separate
incidences were multipled by the weights designated for
their category, and added to achieve a total for each separate
nuclear power plant in the region. In 1978, D.C. Cook
1 and 2 had a total of thirty-three incidences of non-
compliance compared to a regional average of nineteen
(six two-unit plants in Region III were taken as a basis
for comparison). The weighted value of the noncompliance
incidents was 290 for D.C. Cook 1 and 2 compared to 134
for the comparable plants in the region.

The Palisades plant experienced thirty-four
incidences of noncompliance compared with an average of twenty-
three in its category in Region III during 1978. The weighted
value Of the noncompliance incidents was 268 for the Palisades
plant compared with 214 for the average of all five comparable
plants in Region III.

Big Rock Point was not included in the rating system
because the system was not applied to plants that are
relatively old, or have peculiarities and problems that make

meaningful comparisons with newer plants difficult.

 

1James G. Keppler, Director U.S. Nuclear Regulation
Commission, Region III, letter to the Special Joint
Committee on Nuclear Energy (Lansing: Michigan Legislature,
30 June 1980), 1:6, p. l.

169

It appears that on the basis of the three methods
for comparing Michigan nuclear power plants with other
nuclear power plants in the United States, i.e., average
capacity factor, forced-outage rate, and incidences of
regulatory noncompliance - that there could be some
improvement. However, the improvement would not need to
be of a large magnitude in order to attain the Region III
and national averages for comparable plants. Also the
unusual conditions regarding the operation of Big Rock
Point and Palisades seem to account for much of the
variation from the average.

Contribution of Nuclear Generated Electricity
to Total ElectriCity in Michigan
A Look at Historic Contribution

Before looking at the role that nuclear power performs
in providing electricity for Michigan, it would be helpful
to compare Michigan's total capacity and consumption trends
to that of the nation as a whole. The increase in total
generating capacity (all types) in the State of Michigan
since 1972 has been 63.9 percent compared with 51.1 percent
for the United States.1 However, the change in electrical
consumption since 1972 in Michigan has been only 12.6 percent

compared with 26.8 percent for the nation as a whole.

 

1"Consumption of Electricity in the United States and
Michigan”, Staff Report, Special Joint Committee on Nuclear
Energy (Lansing: Michigan Legislature, 23 June 1980) 1:23,

pp. 3-4

170

It is clear that the slowing economic growth being
experienced in the United States has had a disproportionate
impact on the State of Michigan. As of December 31, 1979,
the total installed electric-generating capacity in Michigan
was 22,800 megawatts, or 3.7 percent of the U.S. total

1

capacity of 615,686 megawatts at that time. Michigan

citizens consumed 77.1 billion kilowatt-hours of electrical

energy in 1979.2
There are other Michigan trends that are noteworthy.

The end uses of electricity in the residential, commercial, and

industrial sectors differ markedly from those in the country

as a whole. Approximately 3.5 percent less electricity

is used in the residential, 4.5 percent less in the commercial,

~and 8.0 percent more in the industrial sector than in the

3 These differences are due to

United States as a whole.
the heavy concentration of industry in the state, and a
lower percentage use in residential units of electric heat
and hot-water systems.4
Regarding the percentage of electrical energy

produced from nuclear fission in Michigan compared with the

 

2

lIbid. Ibid.

3"Uses of Electricity Consumed in the United States
and Michigan", Staff Report, Special Joint Committee on
Nuclear Energy (Lansing: Michigan Legislature, 26 June
1980) 1:24, p. l.

41bid.

171

nation as a whole, Michigan is certainly a leader. With

the exception of the year 1974 when the Palisades plant

was shut down, Michigan has consistently produced, since
1972, a greater percentage of electricity within its borders
from nuclear fission than the United States as a whole.

In 1972, Michigan produced 3.2 percent of its electricity
from nuclear fission compared with 2.9 percent for the United
States.1 In 1979, 18.6 percent of the electrical energy
produced in Michigan was from nuclear fission compared

with 11.0 percent for the United States.2 Approximately 12
percent of Michigan's total electricity is exported to

other states, (mostly from D.C. Cook 1 and 2), and approxi-
mately 18 percent is imported.3 Nuclear energy accounts

for 5 percent of the total energy input to the Michigan

economy.4

Looking at an Old Michigan Forecast
In 1962, a study leading to a long-term forecast
for energy and the Michigan economy was proposed by Mr.

Walker Cissler of Detroit Edison. The proposal was made at

 

1"Sources of Electrical Energy Produced and Consumed
in the United States and Michigan", Staff Report, Special
Joint Committee on Nuclear Energy (Lansing: Michigan
Legislature, 30 June 1980), 1:25, p. 3.

21bid. 31bid.

4U.S., Department of Energy, Energy Information
Administration, "State Energy Data Report", April 1980.

172

a meeting of the Michigan Economic Development Commission
of the Michigan Department of Commerce. The proposal was
carried out, and resulted in a book published in 1967.1
The published study was to make projections and
forecasts up to and including the year 1980 for the
different forms of primary energy - coal, natural gas,
petroleum, hydroelectricity, and nuclear. It also placed
the forecasts in perspective by outlining the prospects
in key Michigan industries and the possibilities of
financing economic expansion.
It is almost uncanny that a forecast was made for
18.7 percent of the electricity in 1980 to be produced
by nuclear means.2 This is almost identical to the 18.6
percent actually experienced in 1979.3 Since little
change in total Michigan installed capacity has occurred
in 1980, the forecast was about as close as possible.
It is true that in the same forecast a projected consumption

of 95.3 billion kilowatt-hours in Michigan was made for

1980 (compared to 77.1 billion actually experienced in

 

lMichigan Energy Survey Committee, Energy and The
Michigan Economy: A Forecast (Ann Arbor: The UniVersity
of Michigan, 1967). -

 

2Ibid., p. 194; this forecast was made by James
H. Climer, then Market Research Supervisor for Consumers
Power Company.

3Sources of Electrical Energy Produced and Consumed
in the United States and Michigan", Staff Report, Special
Joint Committee on Nuclear Energy, 1:25, p. 3.

173

19791). However the nuclear forecast retains a large amount
of its validity because it did not suffer disproportionately
as the growth in total electrical demand declined with
a declining Michigan and national economic-growth rate.

The 1967 study was certainly cognizant of Michigan's
dependence on the automobile industry and the dispropor-
tionate impact of national economic swings.2

Modern transportation and communication tech-

niques mean that any region is highly responsive to
changes in the national economy. It cannot be
emphasized too often that this is particularly
true for a region such as Michigan whose economic
fortunes are so closely tied to a single industry
with nationwide markets.

Nuclear Power's Future Contribution

The future contribution of nuclear power to the
total electrical supply in Michigan is very difficult to
anticipate at this time. It is known that the average
lead time for bringing on line a nuclear power plant is
ten to fourteen years - and even longer in some cases. How—
ever, the lead time is determined more by the regulatory
process (which seems to be very dependent on the political

climate) than by any other single factor. Evidence of this

is found in the completion of some early U.S. nuclear power

 

1"Consumption of Electricity in the United States
and Michigan”, Staff Report, Special Joint Committee on
Nuclear Energy, 1:23, p. 4.

2Michigan Energy Survey Committee, Energy and The
Michigan Economy: A Forecast, p. 47.

174

plants in approximately three years, and the current comple-
tion times being experienced in some other western nations of
well under ten years. It can be projected with some certainty
what the nuclear capacity will be in Michigan in 1990,
i.e, simply the present installed capacity plus the Midland
and Fermi 2 units which are well on their way to completion.
It is unlikely that any regulatory reforms or change in
public attitude would allow any additional nuclear capacity
to be on line by 1990. Beyond 1990 there will probably
be more nuclear power.

The current attitude of the major utilities in
the state is pessimistic for the short term. Consumers
Power remains, in theory, committed to nuclear power.
However, while John Selby, President of Consumers Power,
has made it clear that he remains determined to complete
the Midland plant, he said on at least one occasion that

1

he regretted that it had ever been started. Gordon L.

Heins, Vice President of Systems Operations at Consumers
Power, also made a recent statement that the company had

no present plans for future nuclear power plants.2

 

1John R. Emschwiller, "Nuclear Nemesis: Using the
Law's Delay, Myron Cherry Attacks Atomic Power Projects",
The Wall Street Journal, 10 March 1978, p. 1; as cited in
Constance Ewing Cook, Nuclear Power and Legal Advocacy
(Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1980), p. 105.

 

2Gordon L. Heins, Vice President, System Operations,
Consumers Power Company, at ”Energy Forum" on the Michigan
State University Campus, 9 October 1980.

175

What is really being said is that there will be no more
nuclear plants built in the present regulatory climate.

Although Wayne Jens, Vice President of Nuclear Opera-
tions at Detroit Edison, was pessimistic regarding the near-
term purchase of any nuclear power plants,1 he affirmed

that Detroit Edison will definitely consider future nuclear

2

generation projects. Walter J. McCarthy, Jr., President

and Chief Operating Officer of Detroit Edison, also stated

the Company's position in an address prepared for "Energy

Event '80” in Troy, Michigan:3

All of the technical, strategic, and managerial
reasons still exist today for the development of
new nuclear power plants. What does not exist
is a clear government policy that is fairly sure
to persist for a long enough period of time that
utility managements can be sure of completing the
plant, of being able to predict its costs, and
be able to operate it upon completion. Nuclear
power - can America really do without it?

I don't think we can do without it.

 

lInterview with Wayne H. Jens, Vice President,
Nuclear Operations, Detroit Edison Company, Detroit,
Michigan, 12 November 1980.

2Wayne H. Jens, Vice President, Nuclear Operations,
Detroit Edison Company, "Testimony, State of Michigan Before
the Michigan Public Services Commission, In the Matter of
the Application of the Detroit Edison Company for Accounting
and Ratemaking Authority Relating to Its Greenwood Nuclear
Units 2 and 3 Projects" (Case No. U-6474), Spring 1980, p. 43.

3Walter J. McCarthy, Jr., President and Chief
Operating Officer, Detroit Edison Company; address delivered
at "Energy Event '80" in Troy, Michigan, 5 May 1980, pp. 16-17.

176

A recent study of the Energy Administration of the
Michigan Department of Commerce has projected the Michigan
nuclear capacity in the year 2000 to be 10,320 megawatts.1
This would be 5,009 megawatts more capacity than that
presently operating and under construction. This forecast,
if met, would require the construction of roughly five
more modern-sized nuclear power plants in Michigan by the
year 2000.

The Michigan Energy and Resource Research Associa-

2 made a

tion (MERRA), in its 1980 "White Papers" report,
projection of nuclear capacity in the year 2000 for Michigan
by extrapolating in a different manner from the data utilized
in the aforementioned Michigan Department of Commerce report.
MERRA used U.S. Department of Energy historical data to
determine that a single 1,000-megawatt nuclear plant

produces approximately 0.06 quad of energy per year.

Based on the "most probable” estimate of about one-half

quad of nuclear energy by the year 2000, MERRA estimated

that five new 1,000-megawatt nuclear generating plants

would be required by the year 2000. These five plants

 

1Michigan, Department of Commerce, Energy Administra-
tion and the Michigan Energy and Resource Research Associa-
tion (MERRA), Michigan Energy Prospects to the Year 2000
(Lansing: Michigan Department of’Commerce, November 1979),
p. 19.

2Michigan Energy and Resource Research Association
(MERRA), Toward a_Unified Michi an Ener Polic ("White
Papers" series) (Detroit: MERRA, 98 ), p. 4 .

 

177

do not include the Midland and Fermi 2 plants now under
construction. It is interesting that the Michigan Department
of Commerce and MERRA made the same projections for
additional capacity for the year 2000 by two different
methodologies.
Impact of Electric Automobiles on
Demand for Electrical Power in Michigan
There is much discussion about the rate at which
electric automobiles will be introduced into the market. There
is also a large question as to the impact it will have
upon the need for additional electrical-generating capacity.
Martin W. Gilmore of the Governor's Energy Awareness Advisory
Committee made a recent statement that from 25,000 to 40,000
electric vehicles could be on Michigan highways by the

end of 1983.1

Electric automobiles are not new, but they
are receiving a lot more attention of late - especially at
the "Michigan Energy Expo '80”, in the Fall of 1980.

The major automobile manufacturers have prototypes

that operate from lead-acid batteries. The Bradley Company,
which manufactures various automobile accessory kits,

is presently marketing an electric automobile for $14,400.
Half of its weight is made up of 1,600 pounds of lead-acid

storage batteries that must be periodically recharged.

 

1Interview with Martin W. Gilmore, Program Director,
Michigan Governor's Energy Awareness Advisory Committee,
Lansing, Michigan, 8 August 1980.

178

If electric cars were recharged during the night at off-
peak periods, there could be an increased use of now under-
utilized existing capacity. This would be a welcome
increase in business for the utilities if such a pattern
of recharging were to evolve.

In its 1979-1980 Long-Term Electric Forecast
Summary,1 Consumers Power Company projected an average
annual increase in electrical demand due to electric
vehicles from 1979-1994 of 0.2 percent. The forecast assumes
that the marginal penetration of new passenger electric
vehicles will reach about 12 percent by 1989 and about
14 percent by 1994. This would imply that up to 10 percent

2 The

of total passenger cars by 1994 would be electric.
projection made by Consumers Power of 1,390 million kilowatt-
hours for electric vehicles in 1994,3 was based on interviews
with automobile-industry personnel, among other sources.4'

The Detroit Edison Company was not as optimistic
in its long-term forecast for electricity to be supplied

for electric vehicles, i.e., 208.8 million kilowatt-hours

 

1Consumers Power Company, 1979-1980 Update: Long-
Term Electric Forecast Summary (Jackson, Michigan:
Consumers Power,'l979), p. 1:7.

3

21bid., p. 1:22. Ibid.

4Interview with Philip L. Bickel, Director of
Corporate Planning, Consumers Power Company, Jackson,
Michigan, 21 October 1980.

179

by the year 1994.1 However, the principal engineer for

load forecasting suggested that the projection would perhaps
be revised upward in the future.2

An interesting twist that would increase greatly
the demand for electric automobiles, and in turn the demand
for cheap and abundant electricity, could be in the making
at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California.
At the present time, an ”aluminum-air fuel" electric cell
is being developed with ten to fifteen times the power

3 Such cells

output per pound of the lead-acid cell.
would not be recharged but rather would have their aluminum
plates replaced every 1,000 to 3,000 miles. At the time

of replacement, a reaction product would be removed for
recycling. A prototype aluminum-air-powered vehicle could

be on the road by 1986 with an accelerated program - according
to John F. Cooper, a research chemist who helped develop

4

the cell. If such cells are feasible, a viable method of

 

lDetroit Edison Company, Load Forecast: Electric
Energy Use and Demand 1981-1995 (Detroit: Detroit Edison,
2 October 1980), Table A-l4B.

2Interview with George L. Ball, Principal Engineer-
Load Forecasting, Detroit Edison Company, Detroit, Michigan,
12 November 1980.

3"Aluminum and Water-Fueled Cell Looks Good in
Tests for Electrics", Energy Insider, vol. 3, No. 22
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy, 27 October
1980) I p- 8.

 

41bid.

180

decreasing reliance on oil imports would have been

found - and for a sector of the economy (i.e., transporta-
tion) that has not been amenable to such shifts to alternative
energy sources in the past. Since large amounts of electrical
energy are required to make aluminum, (and no doubt to recycle
the "reaction product") there could be an unforeseen demand
for large nuclear plants, justified to a great extent on

the basis of national security. The Pacific Northwest,

where a large amount of aluminum manufacturing is centered,
has already begun to turn to nuclear power - as the potential
for cheap hydroelectric power has been practically exhausted.

Overall Projected Electricity
Demand for Michigan

 

 

In spite of the economic recession currently
impacting the electricity demand in the State of Michigan,
both Consumers Power and Detroit Edison are projecting
growth in electricity demand to continue in the years ahead,
although at a much slower rate than the traditional annual
seven percent experienced in the early 70's. Consumers Power
Company is projecting an average annual growth rate in
demand of 2.75 percent between the years 1979 to 1994.1

The Detroit Edison Company is projecting an average annual

 

1Consumers Power Company, 1979-1980 Update: Long-
Term Electric Forecast Summary (Jackson, Michigan: Consumers
Power, 1979), 9. 1:2.

181

growth rate in demand of 2.72 percent during the same period

using 1979 as the base.1

Impact on Michigan
of Nuclear Shutdowns or Delays

The impact of a nuclear moratorium either in Michigan
or nationally would have large impacts on (1) oil burned
for generating electricity, (2) electrcity costs to consumers,
and (3) electrical-system reliability. For example, with
regard to the Midland nuclear plant now under construction,
each year of delay in completing the plant results in an
additional burning of 1.5 million barrels of oil.2 This
amounts to slightly over four percent of the 34,667,312

3 A similar

barrels of oil produced in Michigan in 1978.
increase in oil use might be expected if Fermi 2 were shut

down after it began operation,4 or a total of near nine

 

1Detroit Edison Company, Load Forecast: Electric
Energy Use and Demand 1981- 1995 (Detroit: Detroit Edison,
2*October 1980), p. I- 1.

 

2David A. Lapinski, Senior Staff Engineer, Power
Resources and System Planning, Consumers Power Company,
letter to Tommy J. McPeak (Jackson, Michigan: Consumers
Power Company, 6 November 1980).

3Michigan, Department of Commerce, Energy Administra-
tion and the Michigan Energy and Resource Research Association
(MERRA), Michigan Energy Prospects to the Year 2000 (Lansing:
Michigan Department of Commerce, November 1979), p. 25.

 

4David A. Lapinski, Senior Staff Engineer, Power
Resources and System Planning, Consumers Power Company,
letter to Tommy J. McPeak (Jackson, Michigan: Consumers
Power Company, 6 November 1980).

182

percent of the oil produced in Michigan in 1978 from the
inoperation of just these two plants.

If a nuclear moratorium were imposed in the State
of Michigan, the net replacement-power cost in 1981 for
Consumers Power alone would be $240 million, increasing

1 If there were a national

to $625 million by 1985.
moratorium on nuclear power plants, the net replacement
power cost in 1981 for Consumers Power would be $311

2 Without

million, increasing to $703 million by 1985.
the Palisades, Big Rock, and Midland nuclear power plants,
the electrical load will exceed installed capacity by 1987,
and rotating blackouts might be needed to keep load in

step with capacity.3

Review of Some Conclusions of the Michigan
Energy Resource Research Association (MERRA)
The Michigan Energy and Resource Research Associa-
tion's ”White Papers" recognizes the cutback in plans for
U.S. nuclear plants in the past few years.4 However, it

regards this reduction to be primarily the result of adverse

economic conditions and reduced forecasts for electricity

 

1D.M. Zwitter and M.J. Hipple, Consumers Power
Company, internal correspondence to Gordon L. Heins (Jackson,
Michigan: Detroit Edison, 14 June 1979). p. l.

3

2Ibid. Ibid.,attached memorandum, p. 2.

4Michigan Energy and Resource Research Association
(MERRA), Toward a Unified Michigan Energy Policy, p. 143.

183’
demand rather than a rejection of nuclear power.

MERRA also argues for a balanced approach to the
energy situation, in which nuclear power will play an integral
part:1

While other energy forms (other than nuclear)

may be used to generate electricity, certain economic
and legislative constraints on oil and gas; pro-
duction, transportation, and environmental
constraints on coal: and a number of practical
scientific and engineering constraints on alternative
energy forms require that we utilize all power

and cost-effective technologies available, resulting
in a generation mix, rather than relying totally

on any one source of primary energy.

The point is well taken that if there were a
reversal in the current economic trends, especially in the
industrial community, the impact on future generation supply
to meet demand could be dramatic. The difficulty in fore-
casting demand over the ten-to-fourteen-years lead time
for construction of a large coal or nuclear power plant is
very problematical. The lead times for large power plants
are considerably longer than the lead times for making
industrial-plant additions - in the event of an economic
upturn. The need to maintain adequate reserve margins is
also emphasized in order to meet unexpected load demands.
These unexpected load demands could be due to unusually
severe weather conditions in the immediate service area or in

surrounding areas that might thereby be unable to assist

the stricken area in Michigan. It would not be wise to be

 

lIbid.

184

totally dependent on oil because of the heavy importation
content (approximately fifty percent). Nor would it be well
to depend exclusively on coal - because coal-generated
electric capacities can be threatened or cut back by wet,
frozen, or strike-depleted coal supplies.1
MERRA projects a gradually decreasing growth rate
in electricity demand, compared with historical averages,
in the coming years. There is also a shift expected in
the utility industry's mix in generating capacity. -The
trends indicate an increase in coal utilization, and a
decrease in oil and natural-gas burning through 1990.
The slack left by restriction in oil and natural-gas burning
will be made up for with increased nuclear power generation,
whose contribution will accelerate near and after 1990.2
The shifts that are projected, according to MERRA, do take
into account the "economic and political factors confronting
the electric utility industry",3 i.e., in spite of the
political factors affecting nuclear power. The current

significant legislative pressure to reduce or eliminate

oil and natural gas as long-term fuel for new generating

 

1Nucleonics week, Vol. 19, No. 10, 9 March 1978, p. l,
as cited in Michigan Energy and Resource Research Associa-
tion, Toward a Unified Michigan Energy Policy, p. 144.

2Michigan Energy and Resource Research Association,
Toward a Unified Michigan Energy, p. 145.

3Ibid.

185

stations is expected to continue for the foreseeable future.
This will undoubtedly make nuclear power more attractive,

in the future, being the only viable alternative for genera-
ting large amounts of electricity, other than coal.

Michigan is almost entirely contained within the
power-grid system called the East Central Area Reliability
Coordination Agreement (ECAR) extending to the west border
of Indiana, to the south border of Kentucky, and to the
east border of west Virginia. The projected reserve margin
in Michigan is about 1.4 percent less than the projected ECAR
average, but the estimates for growth in net energy demand
and peak hourly demand are also 1.0 percent less.1 However,
should the planned electrical-plant additions be delayed,
MERRA feels that difficulties in meeting demand will occur.
It also suggests the possibility that they may be more
serious than in ECAR as a whole because of the smaller
projected Michigan reserve margin.2

MERRA is optimistic for the future of nuclear power
in the U.S., and also in Michigan. As was mentioned earlier,
it is in agreement with a projection of five new 1,000-
megawatt nuclear plants on line by the year 2000. It also
speaks optimistically of the breeder reactor, suggesting
that any problems of implementation will not require major

new technical discoveries:3

 

lIbid., p. 147. 2Ibid., p. 148. 31bid., p. 156.

186

Although a major engineering effort is necessary
to demonstrate and deploy any energy concept, no
technological breakthroughs are required for the
LMFBR (Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor).

MERRA has several conclusions that are noteworthy:1
1. Nuclear power is technologically capable of
assuming a greater role in the energy picture of
the state, if social and political forces are
tempered with the resource realities of the future.
2. With the use of nuclear cogeneration for
process heat and other projected applications,
significant portions of our total energy
production may also be nuclear generated in the
future.
3. Increased electrification of the economy will
be necessary to support greater industrialization,
newer technologies, and pollution—preventing and
resource-conserving devices such as electric cars.
Nuclear energy will be required to supply an
increasing portion of this need.
MERRA feels the State of Michigan should undertake
a study to determine how it can best be assured of future
sites for construction of energy-generation projects - nuclear
included. Any steps taken should consider all resource
limitations, environmental restrictions, political opposi-
tion, with due regard for public health and safety.
Regarding policy recommendations, MERRA rejects
the idea of a nuclear power moratorium, whether a state-
imposed ban or from the federal level in the form of
moratoria on licensing, construction, or operation of
proposed, under construction, or operating nuclear power

plants in the State of Michigan. The constitutionality

 

lIbid.

187

of such a move is questioned, in addition to whether a strong
and growing Michigan economy could be maintained without
existing and planned nuclear power plants. Cooperation
with federal authorities is argued for, in order to find
ways to site, license, and construct plants within a short
time period - largely by means of regulatory reform. The
same cooperation is encouraged in the search for satisfactory
locations for nuclear-waste repositories.

Finally, MERRA concludes that Michigan should become
an "Agreement State" under the provisions of Section 274b
of the Atomic Energy Act. Michigan was authorized to do
this under Public Act 54 of 1965, but has not yet done so.1
The purpose of assuming this status is so that Michigan can
share certain of the federal regulatory functions now
reserved for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission without
such an agreement. The net result of such participation
would be an increase in the expertise and capabilities

in the area of nuclear energy and radiological health.

Review of Michigan Societygof Professional
Engineers' Policy Statement2

This policy statement, arrived at "after debate and

due consideration", is addressed to the State of Michigan.

 

lIbid.

2Michigan Society of Professional Engineers,
"Nuclear Power Policy", statement; (Lansing, Michigan:
Michigan Society of Professional Engineers, 7 April 1979).

188

It encourages development of all U.S. energy options in view
of the heavy dependence on imported oil and the growing
instability of many oil-producing regions of the world.

1

It agrees with the National Academy of Sciences and Ford

2 studies that coal and uranium will be primary

Foundation
fuels for electric power production for the next twenty years.
The Michigan Society of Professional Engineers

concede that the uses of neither coal or nuclear power
are without risks - yet the risks are ”acceptable”.
Compared with coal for electrical generation, 'nuclear
energy, at its present advanced state of development and
deployment, is felt to be the cleanest, safest, and least
expensive option". Several components to an overall

3

nuclear program are recommended:

1. Presidential support for an accelerated light-
water-reactor construction program.

2. Accelerated project for disposal of military
nuclear wastes as a demonstration effort for
high-level wastes from commercial power plants.

 

1National Academy of Sciences, Committee on Nuclear
and Alternative Energy Systems (CONAES) Eneggy In Transition:
1985-2010 (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1979).

 

2Resources for the future - administered and sponsored
by the Ford Foundation, Energy: The Next Twegty Years
(Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing, 1979).

3Michigan Society of Professional Engineers, "Nuclear
Power Policy", statement; (Lansing, Michigan: Michigan
Society of Professional Engineers, 7 April 1979).

189

3. Greater certainty in the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission licensing process with a view toward
ultimately cutting the review period by one-half.

4. A national educational program on nuclear power.

5. Continued nonproliferation efforts.

6. Resumption of spent-fuel reprocessing, breeder-

reactor development, and expeditious construction
of off-site spent-fuel storage facilties.

The Policymaking Process and
Michigan's Electrical Eneggy Future

Supported by a National Science Foundation grant,
some professors at the University of Michigan have developed
a system called "Valve-Oriented Social Decision Analysis"
(VOSDA).1 In a letter to the Special Joint Committee on
Nuclear Energy of the Michigan State Legislature,2 they
discuss alternatives in the energy policy-making process
with regard to electrical utilities. They believe that the
most effective actions which could be taken by the Michigan
Legislature to deal with the energy issues would be in the
choice of an appropriate policy-making process rather than
attempting to choose between various alternative energy

options, e.g. nuclear, coal, conservation, solar, etc.

 

1Kan Chen, J.C. Mathes, Keman Jarboe, and Sydney
Solberg, Value-Oriented Social-Decision Analysis (VOSDA).
funded by NSF Grant 08877-16294, 1 January 1978 to 31
December 1980, (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan).

2Kan Chen and others, ”The Policymaking Process and
Michigan's Electrical Energy Future”, letter to Special
Joint Committee on Nuclear Energy (Lansing: Michigan
Legislature, 9 June 1980), 1:28.

190

Three theoretical levels of energy-policy decisions are
presented.

The first level has to do with regulatory policy-
making which has been traditionally carried on by the Michigan
Public Services Commission in cooperation with the legislative
process. These policies have to do with granting of franchises
to utilities and setting allowable rates of return on
investment.

Strategic planning is the second level of energy-
policy decision-making. This planning has traditionally
been done by the utilities themselves. This is one of
the most sophisticated types of planning that a utility
does. It requires an understanding of the demands and
trends in demand of various segments of the electrical
marketplace. To give an idea of the complexity of this
process, an overview will be presented of the "potential
independent variables" that Consumers Power Company took
into consideration in preparing its 1979-80 electric fore-

1

cast update. For the residential sector, eighteen

potential independent variables were ”attempted';2 for the

3

commercial sector, there were thirteen variables; for the

industrial sector, there were fourteen variables.4

 

1Consumers Power Company, 1979-1980 Update: Long-
Term Electiic Forecast Summary, (Jackson, Michigan:
Consumers Power, 1979).

3

21bid., p. 12. Ibid., p. 16. 4Ibid., p. 18.

191

Working with this total of forty-five independent variables
requires large amounts of historical data, future projections
from diverse sources, and a tremendous degree of expertise
to arrive at required annual projections of demand and
supply extending fifteen years into the future.
The third level of energy-policy decision-making
is the operational planning level. This sphere of planning
focuses on specific choices such as power-plant size, loca-
tion, timing, type, and connection with the existing power
grid. This level has also traditionally been handled by
the power companies, but has been increasingly influenced
by political and social factors.
The University of Michigan study group identified
to the Special Joint Committee on Nuclear Energy four basic
models for the energy-policymaking process:1
A 1. Private utilities continue to do both strategic
and operational planning; the State is limited
to its traditional role of monitoring and
approving these plans.

2. The State does both strategic and operational
planning; private utilities merely implement
these plans.

3. The State contributes to and cooperates in
strategic planning by the private utilities
as well as approves the strategic plans after

they are produced, leaving operational planning
to the utilities.

 

1Kan Chen and others, "The Policymaking Process and
Michigan's Electrical Energy Future", letter to Special
Joint Committee on Nuclear Energy (Lansing: Michigan
Legislature, 9 June 1980), 1:28, pp. 2-3.

192

4. The State produces strategic plans upon
which private utilities are directed to develop
a set of consistent operational plans, which
will be examined and approved by the State.

There is general agreement between the utilities
that there must be a degree of cooperation in the policy-
making process. However, there is sharp disagreement as
to what level the cooperation should take place on. The
study group lists the pros and cons of each of the four
alternatives above. One of the strongest pros for the
choice of option one (status—qua) is that "it has worked
in the past".1 One of the strongest cons of option four
is that ”the State does not now, and will not likely in
the future, have a viable process and the technical know-
ledge to do strategic planning".2

It is doubtful that there will be any dramatic
changes in the policymaking process which would include

quantum increases in State participation. However,

the threat of such participation, growing out of social

and political issues surrounding the nuclear-power option,

has unquestionably affected the strategic and operational

planning by the utilities.

 

1Ibid., p. 4

2Ibid., p. 6.

193

. Discussion_of Michigan Legislature
Special Joint Committee on Nuclear Energy:
May 1979 to September 1980

The Special Joint Committee on Nuclear Energy was
created by the Michigan Legislature in May of 1979 by House
Concurrent Resolution 160 to study a range of issues related
to nuclear energy in Michigan. In addition, it investigated
various possible alternatives for meeting the future electrical-
energy needs in the State. Seventeen meetings were held:
one for organizing, two for establishing formal findings
and recommendations, and the remaining fourteen for having
expert testimonies from various government officials and
informed citizens. Among other questions, the Committee
discussed the possibility and impact of nuclear accidents,
Michigan's preparedness for an emergency, the economics
of nuclear energy, radioactive wastes, alternative energy
sources and their economic feasibility, and Michigan's
energy-policymaking processes.

In the draft final report of the Committee,1 it
is clear that there has been a degree of energy wisdom
imparted to its members. Throughout the proceedings,
extending over approximately fifteen months, there were

testimonies favoring nuclear power, and those opposing it.

There were very few "neutral" testimonies, the neutrality

 

1Special Joint Committee on Nuclear Energyr Final
ggeport: 2ndgommittee Draft (Lansing, Michigan: Mich gan
JLegisIature, 8 September 1980).

 

194

being assessed by the observed biases apparent in the
testimonies. The content of the testimonies and the degree
to which one—sided data were employed to substantiate claims,
testify to the very emotional and political nature of
the nuclear-power issues.

Three basic questions were addressed by the
Committee:1

1. What are the feasible alternatives to the use
of nuclear energy?

2. How are public-policy decisions being made
on nuclear energy and other methods, and how
might these decision-making processes be improved?
3. What are issues of particular significance
related to nuclear power itself which should
be of concern to State government in Michigan?

The first question presupposes that there are
feasible alternatives to the use of nuclear energy. The
fact of its being asked presupposes that alternatives should
be sought. The conclusions of the Committee correctly
do not focus on alternatives in the sense of ”replacements”
for nuclear energy: but rather upon a conservation-renewable
resource path. Of course the successful implementation
of such a path is out of the sphere of interest of the
nuclear-power industry, and probably out of the sphere
of control of any governing body - local, state, or national.

However, it is not out of the control of the free-market

mechanism which still largely allocates supply and demand

 

Ibid., p. 3.

195

for electricity. Regarding the two alternatives of coal
and nuclear for generating electricity, the Committee did
conclude that:1

Quantitatively, the health risks associated with

power from coal-fired plants are probably higher

than those associated with power from nuclear

plants . . .

Regarding the second question, it was concluded
that the utilities largely made the policy decisions on
electrical-energy production in Michigan. It also concluded
that there is currently no capability in Michigan State
government for independently evaluating the electrical
energy needs of the future, in the State. It also concluded
that it does not presently possess the capability for deciding
between the best alternatives or for particpation in the
decision-making for energy policy.2
The Committee's third question, relating to nuclear

power issues of "particular significance”, focused on
several widely debated issues. The issue of waste disposal
was properly characterized as involving more than just tech-
nical questions, which the Committee observed were largely
answered - in the view of ”many experts".3 Other issues

considered were the possibility of nuclear accidents and

the steps necessary to protect the surrounding population.

 

2

1Ibid., p. 11. Ibid., p. 15. 3Ibid., p. 17.

196

In concluding a discussion on the present and
projected roles of nuclear power in Michigan, it can be
said with some certainty that there will be more of it,
if those currently having control over the implementation
process retain their control. There is currently no expertise
to replace that amassed by the utilities over years of
experience in supplying cheap and abundant energy in the
most useful form of electricity. It is doubtful if an
alternative source of such expertise could be assembled
without dramatically increasing the costs of electrical
energy. '

The Special Joint Committee on Nuclear Energy of
the Michigan Legislature made a statement early in its

findings which summarizes well the overall nuclear-power

and energy situation:l

Nuclear power is a complex technology for
producing electrical energy with steam-driven
generators of enormous generating capacity. Because
use of nuclear-power technology has serious economic,
social and environmental consequences and because
uses of other available technologies for meeting
electrical energy needs have such consequences also,
public—policy decisions relating to nuclear power are
among the most difficult and challenging. Such policy
decisions cannot be made by considering nuclear power
alone. Every method for meeting electrical-energy
needs, by reducing the need for electrical energy or
by building electrical-generating capacity, has
advantages and disadvantages . . . benefits and costs.

 

 

1Ibid., p. 3.

197

The next two chapters explore the current impact
of past and present U.S. choices with regard to the role
that nuclear power plays in meeting energy demand. The
degree of this impact is measured in terms of imported
oil that is required to replace the energy that could'
have been supplied by the nuclear power plant capacity
shortfall for the year 1980. This imported-oil-equivalent
is then quantified both in terms of percentage of total
oil imports as well as the amount of imported oil that
can potentially be replaced by every installed megawatt

of nuclear power.

CHAPTER 6
THE NUCLEAR POWER SHORTFALL

Background for Determining the Shortfall

There were a total of seventy-one operational
nuclear power plants in the United States at the start
of 1980.1 These plants represented a "nameplate rating"
capacity of 54,594 Mw.2 Capacity expressed as ”nameplate
rating" refers to the actual rated output of the electrical
generators of a power plant. There is about a five percent
difference in nameplate rating capacity and net capacity,3
which is nameplate rating capacity less the needs of the
power plant. Another kind of capacity is "maximum dependa-
ble capacity" which represents the dependable main-unit
net capacity, and varies throughout the year because the

unit efficiency of each generator varies with seasonal

cooling water temperature variations which can be significant.

 

1U.S., Department of Energy, Energy Information
Administration, Annual Report to Congress 1979, 3 vols.,
n.d., 2:153.

2Melvin E. Johnson, telephone interview, U.S.
Department of Energy: Energy Information Administration,
Coal and Electric Power Statistical Division, Office of
Data and Interpretation (Washington, D.C.), 17 December,

980.

3U.S., Department of Energyr Energy Information
Administration, Monthly Energy Review, September 1980, p. 102.

198

199

Usually maximum dependable capacity is the highest net
dependable output of the turbine generator during the
most restrictive seasonal conditions (usually summer).l
For the purposes of this discussion, nameplate rating
capacity will be used. This method of expressing capacity
was selected because it can be applied to both nuclear and
non-nuclear power plants, and it does not vary due to
changes in efficiency of operation throughout the year.
Where forecasts are analyzed that were expressed in something
other than nameplate rating capacity, the forecasts were
modified to express nameplate rating capacity.

The nuclear capacity forecasts which will be eval-
uated here were made between 1964 and 1975. The first
two forecasts to be examined were obtained directly from
very intensive government studies and the remainder were
obtained from The Energy Index, which is a lengthy volume
published annually by the Environment Information Center

2 The Energy Index contains various data

in New York.
and forecasts concerning the entire energy field. For

the purposes of this investigation, all forecasts pertaining
to nuclear power for the year 1980, that appeared in The

Energy Index through 1975, were included. This is not

 

1Ibid., p. 98.

2Environment Information Center, Energy Reference
Department, The Energy Index, vol. 1 covering the period
1970-73, and one vol. per year thereafter, New York: Envi-
ronment Information Center.

200

to suggest that all reputable forecasts were included
by the publisher, but the forecasts should be representative
in that they were at least a broad sampling. Also, since
all of the nuclear forecasts published by The Energy Index
were included, it was felt that any possible bias in the
mathematical conclusions of this paper would be negated.

Before examining thirteen different forecasts
in some detail, there are two concepts of electrical power
generation that should be explained. One is ”utilization"
and the other is "efficiency". Utilization is usually
expressed in percent and is also referred to as ”productivity"
as well as "average capacity factor”. Simply stated,
utilization is the ratio of the actual energy output of
a power plant over a period of time (usually a year) to
the maximum possible energy output of the same power plant
operating at maximum rated capacity without any interruptions
over the same period of time. To illustrate, the utilization
of the total nuclear utility industry in 1979 will be
calculated.

Nuclear capacity at the end of 1979 was 54,594 x

103 kw,1 and nuclear power output in 1979 was 255,155 x

6 2

10 kwh.

 

lKilowatt is denoted by ”kw", and 1,000 kw is
equal to one megawatt.

2U.S., Department of Energyr Energy Information
Administration, Monthly Energy Review, September 1980,
p. 62.

201

Using this current information,

U a EO/Cmr' (1)

(255,155 x 106 kwh/yr)/(54,594 x 8,760 x 103

kwh/yr)

U

.53352, or 53 percent, where

U

utilization,
E0 = energy output in kwh/yr, and

Cmr = maximum rated energy output in kwh/yr.

Utilization has varied considerably over the years
but becomes more stable on the average as the number of
power plants increases. It is a highly erratic figure
when only a few power plants are involved and when they
are intermittent in operation. For example, the utilization
for a single power plant could be one hundred percent
if it operated continuously at maximum capacity for one
year, but only seventy-five percent if it had to be shut
down a fourth of the time for repairs, safety checks,
modifications, or refueling, as is periodically necessary
with nuclear power plants. During 1978, of the five non-
communist countries with ten or more reactors, the United
States had the highest utilization factor.1

However, the United States did not likely retain
this lead in 1979 because of shutdowns for safety checks

and modifications. The first of these major shutdowns

was at five east-coast plants starting the week of

 

1Ibid., March 1979, p. 70.

202

March 19, 1979,1 and the second major shutdowns followed

the Three Mile Island incident and began on April 27,
2

1979. To demonstrate the effect of these shutdowns on
utilization in the United States, the utilization factor
for the month of May 1979 will be calculated.

The capacity of the plants involved in the first

3

shutdowns amounted to 4,107 Mw and that of the second

4 The sum of all shutdown capacities

totaled 8,149 Mw.
is 12,256 Mw or twenty-two percent of all year-end 1979
installed nuclear capacity. The power output for May
1979, essential for the determination of utilization,
will be calculated based on the operating plants having

the same utilization factor as all plants had in 1979.

Data:
utilization factor in 1979 -- .53352
remaining capacity operating after shutdowns -- 54,594 Mw
- 12,256 Mw a 42,338 Mw.

Utilization:

3

(X kwh output)/(42,338 x 10 kw)(8,760) = .53352,

 

1"Life: An Atom-Powered Shutdown", Time, 26 March
1979, p. 55.

2Eliot Marshall, "Assessing the Damage at TMI”,
Science, 11 May 1979, p. 596.

3"Life: An Atom-Powered Shutdown", Time, 26 March
1979, p. 55.

4U.S., Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Annual Report
1979, February 1980, pp. 301-311, and Eliot Marshall,
”Assessing the Damage at TMI”, Science, 11 May 1979, p. 596.

203

and x - 197,872 x 106 kwh.
Utilization for May 1979:
(197,872 x 106 kwh)/(54,594 x 103 kw)(8,760) = .41375,

or 41 percent.

It is clear from the above calculations what this
kind of interruption can do to the annual utilization
factor for the entire nuclear power industry. Moreover,
utilization will probably not increase significantly
in the near future based on past trends and the current
1980 situation. Utilization has gradually decreased since
March of 1979 - the month prior to the Three Mile Island
event.1

The term "efficiency“ refers to the ratio of the
amount of energy output of a power plant to the quantity
of energy used to produce that output. The energy output
is usually expressed in kwh and must be converted to British
Thermal Units (Btu's) if efficiency is to be expressed
as a percent, because energy sources are usually expressed
in Btu's. Throughout the calculations of this discussion,

2 Another method of

one kwh was equated to 3,414 Btu.
expressing this relationship is by Btu input per kwh of

output (Btu/kwh). The ratio for the nuclear power industry

 

1U.S., Department of Energy, Energy Information
Administration, Monthly Energy Review, September 1980,
p. 70.

2See appendix 1, pt. h for derivation.

204
in 1979 was 10,769 Btu/kwh.1 Efficiency can be derived

as a percentage by one of the two following methods.

Data:

efficiency 8 (energy out)/(energy in).
Calculate efficiency:

(3,414 Btu)/(10,769 Btu) = .3170.

01'

Data:
total energy output in 1979 -- 255,155 x 106 kwh
total energy inputs in 1979 -- 2.748 x 1015 Btu.2

Convert energy output to Btu equivalent:

15

(255,155 x 106 kwh)(3,414 Btu/kwh) = .8710 x 10 Btu.

Calculate efficiency:

15

(.8710 x 1015 Btu)/(2.748 x 10 Btu) = .3170.

The efficiency of nuclear power plants has remained almost
constant for the past several years, as the data and calcu-
lations on table 3 indicate.

Nuclear power forecasts can be expressed in several
different ways. The various methods include expression
in terms of (l) generating capacity, (2) percentage of

total generating capacity, (3) generated electricity,

 

1U.S., Department of Energyo Energy Information
Administration, MonthlyEnergy Review, September 1980,
p. 107.

ZIbIdo' p. 60

205

 

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206

(4) percentage of total generated electricity, (5) energy
inputs to nuclear power, and (6) percentage of total energy
inputs to the economy. In the following forecast analyses,
if the forecast was not made in terms of simple generating
capacity, the generating capacity was extrapolated from
the data given, by procedures which will be shown. This
standardization of forecast data was necessary in order
to derive the measurements in chapter 7 which are the
major purpose of this discussion.

There are several factors that have introduced
a slight but not significant error in the validity of
some of the forecasts. One is the fact that most if not
all the forecasts were based on an assumption of higher
utilization than has been actually experienced in the
nuclear power industry thus far. For example, one forecast
made the assumption of an eighty-five percent utilization
factor,1 and another, seventy-five percent.2 Since expec-
tations for these high utilization factors seem to have
been common until recently, it has been assumed in this
paper that the other forecasts, which did not specify

a utilization factor, were estimating a similarly high

 

1U.S., Federal Power Commission, National Power
Survey, 2 pts., October 1964, 1:204.

2U.S., Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines,
An Energy Model For the United States, Featuring Energy
Balances For the Years 1947 to 1965 and Projections and
Forecasts to the Years 1980 and 2000, by Warren E. Morrison
and Charles L. Readling, information circular 8384 (Wash-
ington, D.C.: Government Printing Office), 1968, p. 114.

207

one. Where utilization factors were specified in the
forecasts, the forecasts were adjusted upward on the basis
of the fifty-three percent utilization factor experienced
by the nuclear power industry during 1979. The rationale
here was that what is really being forecasted is the contri-
bution of nuclear power to the total electrical needs
of the United States, and the variable of utilization
would have to be compensated for by greater capacity.
Eleven of the thirteen forecasts do not specify utilization
however, and therefore there was no way to adjust the
forecasts for their probable high estimates. This variable
would tend to render forecasts lower than they would otherwise
be.

A second factor contributing to the margin of
error is the expectation of an efficiency which is higher
than has been experienced to date. For example, one forecast
based its projected capacity on an assumption of thirty-
eight percent efficiency or an output of one kwh for every
8,900 Btu input.1 While other forecasts did not specify
efficiency factors, it must be assumed that some of them
also counted on a higher-than-experienced efficiency factor.
To the extent that they did, the capacity forecasts would
be lower than necessary to meet the contribution of electricity
anticipated from the nuclear power industry in the various

projections.

 

1Ibid.

208

A third error factor that would tend to compensate
somewhat for the other two is the slowing of the rate
of growth of energy usage that has been experienced in
recent years.1 It seems that no widespread anticipation
existed for the Arab oil embargo of 1973-74, and until
that time a continued growth rate not much less than had
been experienced in the past was expected in the future.
The forecasts of nuclear capacity which were made before
the Arab oil embargo reflect this expectation.

During and after the embargo, one would expect
the forecasts to have dropped because of the higher costs
of energy which would tend to encourage conservation and
therefore reduce the need for additional power plants.
The forecasts did not drop however, because of the commit-
ment of the Federal government, in response to the Office
of the President, to make the United States energy-indepen-
dent by 1985. This was the thrust of the much touted
Project Independence of 1974 that was shelved by the end
of that year. Again, it is not felt that these three
error factors are large enough to significantly affect
the measurements of this investigation, especially since
the third factor would seem to offset the first two.

The thirteen long-term nuclear power forecasts
to be examined are for the year 1980. At the time of

this writing however, year-end 1980 data was not available.

 

1See appendix 2, table 7.

209

Because of the lack of availability of year-end 1980 data
and the likelihood of subsequent 1980 data revisions,
the forecasts will be analyzed against year-end 1979 energy
data.

This comparison with 1979 data will not present
a problem because of the high degree of correlation between
almost all the major 1979 and 1980 energy parameters.
In addition, the long-term nuclear power forecasts
which were expressed in terms of capacity, did not always
indicate whether they applied to the beginning of 1980
(year-end 1979) or the end of the year. This analysis
will deal with them as if they applied to the beginning
of 1980.

To illustrate the small variation between year-
end 1979 energy data and the probable 1980 year-end data,
several types of energy information are compared. First

of all, total U.S. energy consumption in 1979 was 78.022

x 1015 Btu.1 As of December 1980, the preliminary projection
for total U.S. energy consumption in 1980 was 77. x 1015
Btu.2

Second, the total installed electrical generating

 

1U.S., Department of Energy, Energy Information
Administration, Monthly Energy Review, March 1980, p. 2.

2Information Specialist, telephone interview,
U.S. Department of Energy, National Energy Information
Center (Washington, D.C.), 17 December 1980. This preliminary
data came from the in-house publication: "Short-Term Energy
Outlook - December 1980".

210
capacity at the end of 1979 was 598,298 Mw.1 The total
generating capacity as of October 31, 1980 was 608,875
Mw.2 The October 31 figure probably includes four newly
1980-licensed nuclear power plants,3 two of which were
not on-line, and the other two "not up to full power".4
The two plants not on-line are classified in a new category
following the ending of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) moratorium on the licensing of new reactor units.
Since the two units are not licensed for on-line operation,
there is a question as to whether they should even be
included in operating capacity figures. The other two
nuclear units not up to full power, and licensed in August
and September 1980, will not make substantial contributions
during the year. Therefore the year-end 1980 total generating

capacity should not differ to a large extent from that

of 1979.

 

1Johnson, telephone interview, U.S. Department
of Energy, 16 December 1980.

2Ibid.

3Susan F. Gagner, telephone interview, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Public Affairs Office (Washington,
D.C.), 16 and 17 December 1980. Salem 2 (1,115 Mw) and
Farley 2 (829 Mw) were issued ”limited licenses" to begin
low-power testing in April 1980 and October 1980, respec-
tively: North Anna 2 (907 Mw) and Sequoyah 1 (1,140 Mw)
were issued full-power operating licenses in August 1980
and September 1980, respectively; these four plants repre-
sent 3,991 Mw generating capacity.

4Loring Mills, telephone interview, Edison Electric
Institute (Washington, D.C.), 16 December 1980.

211

Third, there were seventy-one nuclear reactors1
with a combined capacity of 54,594 sz operating at year-
end 1979. The addition of two new plants licensed to
operate in August and September, as mentioned in the pre-
ceding paragraph, does not change this figure substantially.

Fourth, the total electricity generated in 1979

3

was 2,247,372 million kwh compared to 1,911,622 million

4

kwh through October 31, 1980. This most recent total

can be projected through the end of 1980:

(1,911,622 x 106 kwh/10 mo.)(12 mo.) = 2,293,946 x 106 kwh.

This 1980 projection is only 2 percent above 1979:

(2,293,946 - 2,247,372 x 106 kwh)/(2,247,372 x 106 kwh) =

.02, or 2 percent.

According to Edison Electric Institute projections, there

will only be about a 1.3 percent increase in the total

 

1U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information
Administration, Annual Report to Congress 1979, 3 vols.,
n.d., 2:153.

2Johnson, telephone interview, U.S. Department
of Energy, 17 December 1980.

3U.S., Department of Energy, Energy Information
Administration, Monthly Energy Review, September 1980,
p. 62.

4Johnson, telephone interview, U.S. Department
of Energy, 16 December 1980.

212

1

electricity generated in 1980 over 1979. It therefore

appears that there will only be a minor change in total
electricity generated in 1980.

Fifth, the electricity generated from nuclear
power plants in 1979 was 255,155 million kwh2 compared

3

to 208,077 million kwh through October 31, 1980. This

most recent total can also be projected through the end

of 1980:

(208,007 x lo6 kwh/10 mo.)(12 mo.) = 249,608 x 106 kwh.
This is only 2 percent below that of 1979:

(255,155 - 249,608 x 106 kwh)/(255,155 x 106 kwh) = .02,

or 2 percent.

The rate at which nuclear power is providing elec-
tricity will probably increase slightly through the end
of the year with the licensing for commercial operation
of the two aforementioned units in August and September
1980. Hence, the difference between 1979 and 1980 elec-
tricity generated from nuclear may be even less than two

percent. It can be seen from the foregoing five comparisons

 

1Carl Tolby, telephone interview, Edison Electric
Institute (Washington, D.C.) 16 December 1980.

2U.S., Department of Energy, Energy Information
Administration, Monthly Energy Review, September 1980,
p. 62.

3Johnson, telephone interview, U.S. Department
of Energy, 16 December 1980.

213
that the long-term nuclear power forecasts for 1980 can
be analyzed against presently available year-end 1979
data. The results of these analyses should be very similar
to those obtained from using year-end 1980 data, not currently
available. All thirteen forecasts will be examined in order,
from the oldest in 1964 to the most recent one selected,
which was published in September of 1975. There is an

apparent trend from higher to lower forecasted capacities.

1964 Federal Power Commission Forecast
The first forecast to be examined is from a lengthy
two-volume outlook for the total power industry prepared
by the Federal Power Commission over sixteen years ago,

in 1964.1

While this survey dealt with all aspects of

the power industry, there was a noticeably significant
optimism and emphasis with regard to the future of nuclear
power. The 1964 Federal Power Survey was the most detailed
of any of the forecasts examined, and the forecast for
nuclear power in 1980 was expressed in a variety of ways:
(1) 70,000 Mw installed capacity with a utilization factor
of 85 percent,2 (2) as a percentage (13.3) of total generating
capacity,3 and (3) 19 percent of total generated electricity.4

The accuracy of each one of these expressions

 

1U.S., Federal Power Commission, National Power
Survey, 2 pts., October 1964, pt. 1.

3

2Ibid., p. 204. Ibid., p. 207. 41618., p. 204.

214

of nuclear forecasting will be evaluated separately.

It should first be mentioned, however, that the respect-
ability of the Federal Power Survey was very high. To
demonstrate this point, the following is a comparison

of some of the projections made in 1964 and the most recent

data from the U.S. Department of Energy for year-end 1979.

Total energy inputs into economy:

15 Btu,1 and

year-end 1979 data shows -- 78.02 x 1015 Btu.

1964 Federal Power Survey -- 82 x 10

Percent of total energy into electrical power:
1964 Federal Power Survey -- 30.5 percent,2 and

year-end 1979 data shows -- 31.3 percent.3

Energy into electric generation:

1964 Federal Power Survey -- 25.1 x 1015 Btu,4 and

year-end 1979 data shows -- 24.4 x 1015 Btu.5

 

lIbid., p. 37.

2U.S., Federal Power CommiSsion, National Power
Survey, 2 pts., October 1964, 1:37.

3See appendix 1, pt. i for derivation.

4U.S., Federal Power Commission, National Power
Survey, 2 pts., October 1964, 1:37.

5U.S., Department of Energy, Energy Information
Administration, Monthly Energy Review, September 1980,
p. 25.

215

Total electrical energy output:

12 1

kwh, and

2

1964 Federal Power Survey -- 2.8 x 10

12

year-end 1979 data shows -- 2.2 x 10 kwh.

Total installed capacity:

1964 Federal Power Survey -- 525 x 106kw,3 and

year-end 1979 data shows -- 598 x 106 kw.4

With the exception of the forecasted total installed
generating capacity, these five parameters were remarkably
accurate to have been made over sixteen years ago.

The first aspect of the Federal Power Commission
forecast, i.e. 70,000 Mw installed capacity, differed
from the year-end 1979 installed capacity of 54,594 Mw.
However, the output (E0) of 70,000 Mw at a utilization
factor of eighty-five percent is much greater than the
output of the same capacity at a utilization factor of

fifty-three percent, the utilization factor experienced

 

10.8., Federal Power Commission, National Power
Survey, 2 pts., October 1964, 1:35.

2U.S., Department of Energy, Energy Information
Administration, Monthly Energy Review, September 1980,
p. 62.

3U.S., Federal Power Commission, National Power
Survey, 2 pts., October 1964, 1:35; the probable reasons
for this low total capacity forecast were the expectations
of much higher utilization of newer power plants with
better technology, higher efficiency, and retiring of
older equipment.

4Johnson, telephone interview, U.S. Department
of Energy, 16 December 1980.

216
in 1979. The following calculations will demonstrate

the difference utilization makes on total energy output.

Using equation (1) and the 1979 fifty-three percent U factor,

E0 8 UCmr' therefore

8 (0.53)(70,000 x 103 °

. 320 x lo9 kwh.

8,760 kwh)

E0

For an eighty-five percent U factor,
E0 . (0.85)(70,000 x 103 ' 8,760 kwh)

E a 520 x 109 kwh.

0

In order to make this forecast for 70,000 Mw capacity
with a utilization factor of eighty-five percent valid,
the capacity will have to be adjusted upward to achieve
the forecasted power output at eighty-five percent utilization
when the utilization in practice has only been fifty-three
percent. The question therefore is: What capacity
(Cmr/8,760)h would be required, operating at a utilization
factor of fifty-three percent, to produce the same output

as 70,000 Mw at a utilization factor of eighty-five percent?

Using equation (1),
Cmr = Eo/U, and capacity a Cmr/8'760 hours
Capacity . (520 x 109 kwh)/(0.53)(8,760)h

= 110,000 Mw.

It can be seen that the utilization factor is

a very important part of a forecast since in this case

217
it changed the capacity forecast from 70,000 Mw to 110,000
Mw, or an increase of fifty-seven percent. In order to
apply this 1980 forecast to year-end 1979 installed capacity,
a standard procedure will be employed throughout this

discussion.

Nuclear shortfall:
110,000 Mw (nuclear forecast in 1964) - 54,594 Mw (year-
end 1979 installed capacity) a 55,000 Mw (nuclear shortfall).

The second manner in which the Federal Power Com-
mission expressed its forecast was as a percentage of

total generating capacity, i.e. 13.3 percent.

Data: current total capacity is 598,298 Mw.
The forecast 1980 nuclear generating capacity
is found by
(598,298 Mw)(.133) - 79,600 Mw.
Therefore the nuclear shortfall is

79,600 MW - 54,594 MW 8 25,000 Mw.

The third method of expressing the 1980 forecast
was as a percentage of total generated electricity, which

was nineteen percent.

Data: year-end 1979 nuclear capacity was 54,594 Mw,
total generated electricity was 2,247,372 x 106kwh, and

the 1979 kwh generated per Mw of nuclear capacity was

218

4,673,682 kwh/Mw.1

The forecast 1980 nuclear power output is found by
(2,247,372 x 106 kwh)(.l9) . 430 x 109 kwh from nuclear,
and the derived nuclear capacity forecast is found by

(430 x 109

kwh)/(4,673,682 kwh/Mw) I 92,000 Mw.
Nuclear shortfall:

92,000 Mw - 54,594 MW 8 37,000 Mw.

The forecast of 92,000 Mw required to supply nineteen
percent of the total electricity generated in 1980 is
the forecast to be used in the conclusions of this chapter
and Chapter 7. It best represents the intent of a nuclear
forecast, i.e. to indicate the percentage contribution of

nuclear power to the total power needs of the United States.

1968 Bureau of Mines Forecast
The second forecast appeared in 1968, and is a
very detailed energy model for the United States prepared
by Warren E. Morrison and Charles L. Readling of the U.S.

Bureau of Mines.2

Mr. Morrison lends a significant amount
of credibility to his energy model because of his position

as Research Coordinator in Energy Studies in the Bureau of

 

1See appendix 1, pt. j for derivation.

2U.S., Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines,
An Energy Model For the United States, Featuring Energy
Balances For the Years 1947 to 1965 and Projections and
Forecasts to the Years 1980 and 2000, by Warren E. Morrison
and Charles L. Readling, information circular 8384 (Washing-
ton, D.C.: Government Printing Office), 1968.

219
Mine's Division of Mineral Economics. He had no doubt
learned from his experiences in preparing a similar report

in 1964.1

The 1968 report consisted of five "cases" and
seventeen "composite cases” for a total of twenty-two

different models for energy projections. The case selected

for the nuclear forecast to be used here was the ”conventional"
energy model including all energy sources in the model.2

In this model, a low and high nuclear capacity forecast

was made along with accompanying energy inputs and outputs:

Low High
70,000 Mw 110,000 Mw
4.076 x 1015 Btu in 6.434 x 1015 Btu in
458.0 x 109 kwh out 723.0 x 109 kwh out

total energy input to economy -- 88.0746 x 1015 Btu
As in the previous forecast, there are several
methods of projection used. It would not be the best
to use the capacities alone because first of all they
are based on an assumption of a utilization factor of

seventy-five percent.

 

1U.S., Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines,
Summary Energy Balances fer the United States: Selected
Years 7- , by Warren E. Morrison, information circular
8242 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office), 1964.

2U.S., Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines,
An Ener Model For the United States Featuring Energy
BaIances For the Years 1947 to 1965 and Projections and
Forecasts to the Years 1980 and 2000, by Warren E. Morrison

and Charles L. Readling, information circular 8384 (Washing-
ton, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1968), p. 114.

 

 

220

To demonstrate:

9 3

(458.0 x 10 kwh)/(70,000 x 10 kw)(8,760) = .75,

and

(723.0 x lo9 kwh)/(110,000 x 103 kw)(8,760) a .75.

Nor would it be well to update these capacity
forecasts on the basis of 1978 utilization because the
1968 forecast is based on an assumption of 88.0746 x 1015
Btu total energy into the economy, and the actual energy

15 Btu. (This

input to the economy in 1979 was 78.02 x 10
slowing down of total energy consumed in the United States
was not anticipated by the writers of the 1968 forecast.
It would also not be appropriate to derive a capacity
forecast from the 1968 projections for “energy into" nuclear
power for the reason of the total energy-growth slowdown,
and also because the power plants were assumed to operate
at an efficiency of thirty-eight percent.1

The best method of extrapolating a forecast from
the 1968 forecast data would first be to determine what
percent of the total energy consumed is forecast to
be used in nuclear power plants. This percentage could
be applied to the current updated expectation of total
energy in 1980 and therefore updated nuclear energy inputs
would be available, based on the overall decrease in energy

growth in the United States.

 

11bid.

221

The derived energy inputs to nuclear power can
then be translated to kwh output, still using the assumed
efficiency factor of thirty-eight percent. This new output
should reflect the intent of the original forecast, incor-
porating the decrease in energy growth rate, and can be
easily translated into capacity forecasts to attain the
kwh-output derived by the procedure just described.

It would also be desirable to have a mid-range
forecast from the 1968 projections since at the end of
this chapter, an "average" shortfall in nuclear power
will be determined from all of the forecasts, several
of which have "low", "medium”, and "high" divisions. A
medium forecast was therefore extrapolated from the lower
and upper projections of this 1968 forecast according

to the following calculations:

15 15 15

Btu = 2.358 x 10
15

6.434 x 10 Btu - 4.0760 x 10 Btu,

15

(2.358 x 10 Btu)/2 a 1.179 x 10 Btu,

and

15

15 Btu = 5.255 x 10 Btu,

15

1.179 x 10 Btu + 4.0760 x 10

which is the mid-range forecast energy input.

Next is to determine what ratio of the total energy

forecasted was projected to be diverted into nuclear power.

Low:
15

15

(4.076 x 10 Btu)/(88.0746 x 10 Btu) = .04628

222

Medium:
15 15
(5.255 x 10 Btu)/(88.0746 x 10 Btu) = .05967
High:
15 15
(6.434 x 10 Btu)/(88.0746 x 10 Btu) = .07305.

Then these results are applied to the year-end

1979 total energy inputs to the economy.

Low:

15

(.04628)(78.02 x 10 Btu) = 3.611 x 1015

Btu

Medium:
15 15
(.05967)(78.02 x 10 Btu) = 4.655 x 10 Btu
High:

15

15 Btu) a 5.699 x 10 Btu.

(.07305)(78.02 x 10

The efficiency factor originally forecast was
thirty-eight percent, and another way of expressing it
is in Btu/kwh, i.e. 8,900.0 Btu input per one kwh output.1

Therefore the energy output can be determined.

Low:

(3.611 x 1015 Btu)/(8,900.0 Btu/kwh) a 405.7 x 109 kwh
Medium:

(4.655 x 1015 Btu)/(8,900.0 Btu/kwh) = 523.0 x 109 kwh
High:

(5.699 x 1015 Btu)/(8,900.0 Btu/kwh) = 640.3 x 109 kwh.

 

1Ibid.

223

The kwh outputs can now be equated to nuclear

capacity based on 4,673,682 kwh/Mw (productivity for 1979).

Low:

(405.7 x 109 kwh)/(4,673,682 kwh/Mw) = 86,810 Mw
Medium:

(523.0 x 109 kwh)/(4,673,682 kwh/Mw) = 111,900 Mw
High:

(640.3 x 109 kwh)/(4,673,682 kwh/Mw) a 137,000 Mw.

Finally the various shortfalls can be obtained.

Low:

86,810 Mw - 54,594 Mw a 32,220 Mw
Medium:

111,900 Mw - 54,594 Mw = 57,310 Mw
High:

137,000 Mw - 54,594 Mw = 82,410 Mw.

1972 Interdevelopment Forecast
This forecast included projections for both 1975
and 1980.1 The forecasts for electricity from nuclear
power became larger as they projected further. This trend

will be seen by evaluating the shortfall in both 1975 and

 

1"World Energy Supply/Demand During a Period of
Crisis", Interdevelopment, 1972, p. 67, cited by Environ-
ment Information Center, Energy Reference Department,
The Energy Index, vol. 1 (New York: Environment Information
Center, May 1974), p. 17.

 

224
1980 projections of this forecast. The 1975 projection

will be reviewed first.

Forecast data for 1975: energy into nuclear

15

was 3.340 x 10 Btu, and total energy into the economy

was 83.481 x 1015 Btu.

Actual data for 1975: energy into nuclear was

1.90 x 1015 Btu,l and total energy into the economy was

70.71 x 1015 Btu.2

Forecast nuclear ratio of total inputs:

15 15

(3.340 x 10 Btu)/(83.481 x 10 Btu) I .04001.

Updated input based on results above:

(70.71 x 1015 Btu)(.04001) . 2.829 x 1015 Btu.

Nuclear shortfall:

15 15

(2.829 x 10 Btu - 1.90 x 1015 Btu)/(2.829 x 10 Btu)

= .33, or 33 percent.
Now the 1980 evaluation:

Forecast data for 1980: energy into nuclear

15

was 9.490 x 10 Btu, and total energy into the economy

was 102.581 x 1015 Btu.

Actual year-end 1979 data: total energy into economy

15

was 78.02 x 10 Btu, and nuclear capacity was 54,594 Mw.

 

1U.S., Department of Energy, Energy Information
Administration, Annual Report to Congress 1979, 3 vols.,
n.d., 2:7.

2Ibid.

225

Forecast nuclear ratio of total inputs:

15 15

(9.490 x 10 Btu)/(102.581 x 10 Btu) 8 .09251.

Updated input based on results above:

15 15

(78.02 x 10 Btu)(.09251) = 7.218 x 10 Btu.

Energy output at .3170 efficiency (10,679 Btu/kwh):

15 9

(7.218 x 10 Btu)/(10,769 Btu/kwh) 8 670.2 x 10 kwh.

Converting to capacity forecast:

(670.2 x 109

kwh)/(4,673,682 kwh/Mw) a 143,400 Mw.
Nuclear shortfall:

143,400 MW - 54,594 MW 8 88,810 Mw.

The shortfall based on the 1980 forecast is sixty-
two percent while that of 1975 was thirty-three percent,

as determined above.

1972 Atomic Energy Commission Forecasts
The fourth and fifth forecasts were prepared by
the Atomic Energy Commission in early and late 1972.1
Each of the forecasts have a 'low', "most likely", and

'high' projection.

The fourth forecast and the nuclear power shortfalls

follow:

 

1U.S., Atomic Energy Commission, Nuclear Power,
1973 - 2000, 1972, p. 1, cited by Environment Information

Center, Energy Reference Department, The Ener Index,
vol. 1 (New York: Environment Information Center, May
1974), p. 38.

226

Low:

127,000 Mw - 54,594 Mw = 72,000 Mw.
Most likely:

132,000 Mw - 54,594 Mw = 77,000 Mw.
High:

144,000 Mw - 54,594 Mw = 89,000 Mw.

The fifth and revised forecast, and the nuclear

power shortfalls follow.

Low:

132,000 Mw - 54,594 Mw = 77,000 Mw.
Most likely:

151,000 Mw - 54,594 Mw = 96,000 Mw.

High:
166,000 Mw - 54,594 Mw

111,000 Mw.

1973 National Petroleum Council Forecast
Forecast number six appeared in 1973 in a pub-

lication prepared by the National Petroleum Council.1

Forecast data for 1980: energy into nuclear

15

was 11.349 x 10 Btu, and total energy into the economy

was 102.581 x 1015 Btu.

 

1U. 8., National Petroleum Council, U. S. Energy
Outlook - New Energy Forms, 1973, p. 6, cited by Environment
Information Center, Energy Reference Department, The Energy
Index, vol. 2 (New York: Environment Information Center,
December 1974), p. 61.

227

Year-end 1979 data: total energy into the economy
was 78.02 x 1015 Btu.
Forecast nuclear ratio of total inputs:

15 15

(11.349 x 10 Btu)/(102.581 x 10 Btu) I .11063.

Updated input based on ratio above:

15 15

(78.02 x 10 Btu)(.11063) 8 8.631 x 10 Btu.

Energy output at .3170 efficiency (10,769 Btu/kwh):

15 9

(8.631 x 10 Btu)/(10,769 Btu/kwh) 8 801.5 x 10 kwh.

Converting to capacity forecast:

(801.5 x 109

kwh)/(4,673,682 kwh/Mw) a 171,500 Mw.
Nuclear shortfall:

1973 National Water Commission Forecast

Forecast number seven appeared in a 1973 publication
prepared by the National Water Commission.1 The forecast
was expressed both in'terms of capacity and percentage
of total electricity. Percent of total capacity can be
. derived with the forecast total capacity. Both percentage
of total capacity and percentage of total electricity
generated will be used to derive the forecasts, although

only the forecast derived from the percentage of total

 

1U.S., National Water Commission, Water Policies
for the Future, 1973, p. 172, cited by Environment Infor-
mation Center, Energy Reference Department, The Ener
Index, vol. 2 (New York: Environment Information Center,
December 1974), p. 111.

228
electricity will be used in the conclusion. The purpose
of evaluating the forecast in these two ways is to test'

the overall soundness of the forecast.

Forecast data for 1980: nuclear capacity was
140,000 Mw, total capacity was 665,000 Mw, and the ratio
of nuclear generated electricity was .280.

Year-end 1979 data: nuclear capacity was 54,594
Mw, total capacity was 598,298 Mw, and the total electri-
city generated was 2,247,372 x 106 kwh.

Forecast nuclear ratio of total capacity:
(665,000 Mw)/(140,000 Mw) a .211.

‘ Updated capacity forecast based on above ratio:

(598,298 Mw)(.211) = 126,000 Mw.

Nuclear shortfall:

126,000 MW - 54,594 MW 8 71,000 Mw.

The second method using ratio of total electri-

city generated by nuclear will be calculated.

Energy output from nuclear:

6 9

(2,247,372 x 10 kwh)(.280) 8 629 x 10 kwh.

Converting to capacity forecast:

(629 x 109

kwh)/(4,673,682 kwh/Mw) = 135,000 Mw.
Nuclear shortfall:

135,000 Mw - 54,594 Mw 8 80,000 Mw.

It can be seen from the 9,000 Mw (eleven percent)

229
difference resulting from applying two methods to the

forecasts, that the projections were relatively consistent.'

1973 Coal-Age Forecast

Forecast number eight appeared in the mid-April

1

issue of Coal Age in 1973. The forecast had three com-

ponents: (1) energy into nuclear, (2) energy output from
nuclear, and (3) percentage of total energy into nuclear.
The forecast will be derived in terms of the percentage-of-
total-energy-into-nuclear factor. No adjustments in the
forecast are needed for a changed efficiency factor since
the forecast implies an efficiency very close to the present

experience of 31.70 percent.

Forecast data for 1980: energy into nuclear

15 9

was 6.720 x 10 Btu, nuclear energy out was 630 x 10 kwh,

and the ratio of total energy inputs was .070.

Determining the Btu equivalent of energy out:

9 15

(630 x 10 kwh)(3,414 Btu/kwh) = 2.15 x 10 Btu.

Calculating the efficiency:

15 15

(2.15 x 10 Btu)/(6.72 x 10 Btu) = .320, or 32.0 percent.

The energy into nuclear cannot be used for

 

1"U.S. Energy Consumption by Source from 1971
to 2000", Coal A e, mid-April 1973, p. 59, cited by Environ-
ment Information Center, Energy Reference Department,
The Energy Indey, vol. 1 (New York: Environment Information
Center, May 1974), p. 43.

230

extrapolating capacity because if 6.72 x 1015 Btu was

indeed seven percent of total energy, then total energy

in 1980 would have to be (6.72 x 1015

96 x 1015 Btu. However, the year-end 1979 total energy

15

Btu)/(.070) or
inputs to the economy was only 78.02 x 10 Btu. Therefore
the forecast capacity will be derived from the forecast

seven percent of the new total energy inputs to the economy.

Energy into nuclear:

(78.02 x 1015 Btu)(.070) = 5.46 x 1015 Btu.

Energy output at .3170 efficiency (10,769 Btu/kwh):
15 9

(5.46 x 10 Btu)/(10,769 Btu/kwh) = 507 x 10 kwh.
Converting to capacity forecast:
(507 x 109 kwh)/(4,673,682 kwh/Mw) = 108,000 Mw.

Nuclear shortfall:
1973 Citizen's Advisory Cgmmittee on
Environmental Quality Forecast
Forecast number nine was published in 1973 by

the Citizen's Advisory Committee on Environmental Quality.1

Data: year-end 1979 total energy inputs was

 

lCitizen's Advisory Committee on Environmental
Quality, "Sources of U.S. Energy Supply", Citizen Action
Guide t9 Energy Conservation, 1973, p. 10, cited by Environ-
ment Information Center, Energy Reference Department,
The Energy Index, vol. 1 (New York: Environment Information
Center, May 1974), p. 16.

231

15

78.02 x 10 Btu, and the forecast nuclear input as

a ratio of total inputs was .070.

Energy in:

15 15

(78.02 x 10 Btu)(.070) I 5.46 x 10 Btu.

Energy output at .3170 efficiency (10,769 Btu/kwh):
15 9

(5.46 x 10 Btu)/(10,769 Btu/kwh) a 507 x 10 kwh.
Converting to capacity forecast:
(507 x 109 kwh)/(4,673,682 kwh/Mw) = 108,000 Mw.

Nuclear shortfall:

108,000 Mw - 54,594 Mw 8 53,000 Mw.

1974 Electrical World Forecast
This Electrical World1 forecast was based on net
additions of capacity per year through 1995. Since the
actual forecast additions began with the year of publication,
1974, the additions were added to the known installed

capacity at the end of 1973 to derive a 1980 forecast.

Data: forecast additions of nuclear capacity
1974-80 was 65,556 Mw, installed nuclear capacity at the
end of 1973 was 21,000 Mw,2 and the year-end 1979 installed

 

lU.S., Federal Power Commission, Electrical World,
15 September 1978, p. 55, cited by Environment Information
Center, Energy Reference Department, The Energy Index,
vol. 2 (New York: Environment Information Center, December
1974), p. 116.

2U.S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
Statistical Abstract of the United States 1979, September
1979, p. 608.

232
nuclear capacity was 54,594 Mw.
Capacity forecast:
65,556 Mw + 21,000 Mw = 87,000 Mw.
Nuclear shortfall:

87,000 MW - 54,594 MW 8 32,000 MW.

1974 Public Utilities Fortnightly Forecast
The eleventh forecast appeared in the September 26,
1974 edition of Public Utilities Fortnightly,1 a public

utilities industry journal.

Data: most likely was 132,000 Mw, high was 144,000 Mw,
and year-end 1979 installed nuclear capacity was 54,594 Mw.
Shortfall for “most likely” forecast:
132,000 Mw - 54,594 Mw - 77,000 Mw.
Shortfall for 'high' forecast:
144,000 Mw - 54,594 Mw = 89,000 Mw.

1975 Department of the Interior Forecast
Forecast number twelve was prepared in 1975 by
the U.S. Department of the Interior and had two parts:
a lower forecast based on petroleum being available at

seven dollars a barrel, and a higher one being predicated

 

1"Nuclear Forecast", Public Utilities Fortni htl ,
26 September 1974, p. 44, cited 5y Environment Information

Center, Energy Reference Department, The Ener Index,
vol. 2 (New York: Environment Information Center, December
1974), p. 115.

233
upon oil being sold at eleven dollars a barrel.1 Since
the price of oil could be fifty dollars a barrel by Spring

2 the higher forecast will be the only one considered.

of 1981,
The logic behind the forecasts is that the higher the
price of oil, the higher the installed nuclear capacity
is likely to be. If true, this nuclear forecast for 1980

is significantly understated. Nonetheless, an evaluation

of the higher forecast will be used.

Data: forecast nuclear capacity for 1980 was
93,000 Mw, and year-end 1979 capacity was 54,594 Mw.
Nuclear shortfall:

93,000 MW - 54,594 MW 8 38,000 MW.

1975 Electrical World Forecast
The thirteenth and last forecast for nuclear power

to be examined appeared in the September 15, 1975 edition

3

of Electrical World separated by one year from a similar

 

10.8., Department of the Interior, Energy Pers ec-
tives, February 1975, p. 171, cited by Environment Information
Center, Energy Reference Department, The Energy Index,
vol. 3 (New York: Environment Information Center, December
1975), p. 123.

2Statement made by Saudi Arabian Oil Minister,
radio broadcast, United Press International, 18 December
1980.

3U.S., Federal Power Commission, Electrical World,
15 September 1975, p. 47, cited by Environment Information

Center, Energy Reference Department, The Ener Index,
vol. 3 (New York: Environment Information Center, December
1975), p. 116.

234
forecast made by the U.S. Federal Power Commission, cited
earlier in this discussion. The forecast for installed
capacity in 1980 was only increased by 2,000 Mw. The

forecast again took the form of net additions per year.

Data: forecast additions of nuclear capacity
1975-80 was 61,796 Mw, installed nuclear capacity at the
end of 1974 was 32,000 Mw,1 and the year-end 1979 installed
nuclear capacity was 54,594 Mw.

Capacity forecast for 1980:
61,796 Mw + 32,000 Mw 8 94,000 Mw.

Nuclear shortfall:

94,000 MW - 54,594 MW 8 39,000 MW.

Summary and Analysis of Forecasts

Table on the following page is a summary of
the various forecasts and shortfalls derived from the
previous thirteen projections made during the years 1964
through 1975. It can be seen that the averages of the
low, medium, and high nuclear power plant capacity short-
falls were 52,000 Mw, 64,000 Mw, and 84,000 Mw respectively.

Not only have there been significant nuclear fore-
cast shortfalls in the past, but the gap between nuclear

power forecast and what is likely to be installed in

 

1U.S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
Statistical Abstract of the United States 1979, September
1979, p. 608.

235

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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236
future years seems to be increasing. For example the
forecast published by Public Utilities Fortnightly,1 mentioned
earlier, anticipated an installed capacity of 87,000 Mw
in 1978, 103,000 Mw in 1979, and 132,000 Mw in 1980.
The shortfall was 33,000 Mw in 1978, 48,000 Mw in 1979,
and may be considered to be between 73,000 Mw and 75,000 Mw

at the end of 1980.2

It seems that the question asked

by Mr. Ken McKenna by the title of his article in Nation

magazine in 1961 is still pertinent, i.e. “Whatever Happened

to Atomic Power?'3 The earlier forecasts for nuclear

power were optimistically high as one would expect from

McKenna's statement of history that 'During the immediate

post-World War II years, the subject of nuclear energy

had a breathless fascination for public and industry alike.4
Yet there has been much concern expressed in the

years since about the lack of development of nuclear power

as was originally anticipated. This prompted President

Kennedy to make the statement that the atomic program

5

"has fallen far short of expectations." It also prompted

 

1"Nuclear Forecast", Public Utilities Fprtnightly,
26 September 1974, p. 44, cited 5y Environment Information
Center, Energy Reference Department, The Energy Index,
vol. 2 (New York: Environment Information Center, December
1974), p. 115.

2See appendix 1, pt. k.

3Ken McKenna, "Whatever Happened to Atomic Power?",
Nation, 14 January 1961, pp. 29-32.

5

4Ibid. Ibid.

237

Senator Jennings Randolph of West.Virginia in early 1974,
in referring to the nuclear power shortfall, to comment
that "It's one of those problems that we must solve..."1
The optimistic attitude that existed toward nuclear power
at the beginning of 1975 dimmed considerably by the end
of the year, and during 1976, due to two judicial decisions,
the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission for the first time
stopped issuing full-power operating licenses through
the end of the year.2

Also, electric utility orders placed for nuclear
reactors dropped from a high in 1973 of thirty-six to
a low of three in 1979. Moreover, the forecast for numbers
of nuclear power plants to be built by the year 2000 drOpped
from an estimated two thousand in the late 1960's to five
hundred during President Ford's time in office to between
350 to 400 during the early part of President Carter's
presidency.3 The most recent outlook for total nuclear
power plants to be installed by the year 2000 has no doubt
been affected greatly by the April 1979 event at Three
Mile Island and the escalating costs of building any new

power plant - nuclear or coal.

 

1"Energy Crisis: If We Delay we Court Disaster",
U.S. News and werld Report, 28 January 1974, pp. 67-69.

2Environment Information Center, Energy Reference
Department, The Energy Index, vol. 4 (New York: Environment
Information Center, December 1976), p. 12.

3Ibid.

238

The most recent annual report of the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission1 gives a good indication of what
to expect for at least the next fifteen years or so (see
table 5). Including the seventy-one currently operational
power plants, there are at present only 193 nuclear power
plants either operating, under construction, holding limited
construction permits, announced or ordered, or under review
for a construction permit. Unless both the current downward
trend in development and the increasing public opposition
to nuclear power changes drastically and very rapidly,
the number of operating plants at the turn of the century
will fall far short of the 350 to 400 anticipated during
the early part of President Carter's Administration.

A final review of forecast operating capacity
for 1980 has shown a significant drop in expectations
between September 30, 1979, which was the date of the
latest Nuclear Regulatory Commission forecast,2 and year-

end 1980.3

The forecast in September 1979 for additional
installed capacity by the end of 1980 was 18,866 Mw.

However, only 2,047 Mw had come on line through December,4

 

10.8., Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Annual Report

1979, February 1980, pp. 301-311.

2Ibid.

3Susan F. Gagner, telephone interview, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Public Affairs Office (Washington,
D.C.), 16 December 1980.

4Ibid., North Anna 2 (907 Mw) and Sequoyah 1
(1,140 Mw).

239

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240

and only 4,202 Mw is expected to come on line in 1981.1
This drop in forecast over a thirteen-month period of
16,819 Mw represents an eighty-nine percent decrease in
forecast added capacity by the end of 1980. The fact
is that none of the forecasts which have reflected an
optimistic attitude toward the growth of nuclear power

in the United States have come to pass. Most of the reasons

were covered in the previous chapters.

 

1Ibid., McGuire (1,180 Mw), Salem 2 (1,115 Mw),
LaSalle 2 (1,078 Mw), and Farley 2 (829 Mw).

CHAPTER 7
NUCLEAR POWER TRANSLATED INTO OIL

Background for Translating Nuclear Power Into Oil

The previous chapter of this study attempted to mea-
sure the amount of the current nuclear power shortfall based
on thirteen different forecasts made in past years. This
chapter will attempt to translate the nuclear power shortfall
in terms of imported oil, i.e. how much imported oil would
be needed at oil-fired power plants operating in the United
States, to generate the amount of electricity that could
have been generated by the current 64,000 Mw nuclear capacity
shortfall?1

There are several pieces of data that are essential
to making this determination, some of which are not readily
available. First of all it must be determined how many
kilowatt-hours were generated per megawatt installed nuclear
capacity in 1979. Secondly, it must be determined how
much imported oil would have been required by 1979 oil-
fired plants to generate the amount of electricity that

was generated per megawatt of nuclear capacity. Finally,

 

1See table 4, Chapter 6.

241

242

this amount of oil can be used as a basis for determining
total amounts of imported oil replaced by any given nuclear
power plant or represented by any nuclear capacity forecast
or shortfall. This amount of imported oil can also be
expressed as a percentage of total oil imports during
1979.

It has been determined that the average number
of kilowatt-hours generated per megawatt installed nuclear
capacity in 1979 was 4,673,682.1 Next, the Btu input
required by an oil-fired plant to produce this amount
of electricity must be derived, from which barrels of
imported oil may be extrapolated. The problem of accurately
determining Btu input per kilowatt-hour output of oil-
fired plants is not an easy task, however. The reason
is that although the kilowatt-hour output of oil-fired
plants in 1979 is readily available from U.S. Department
of Energy data, there is no highly accurate data available
in aggregate form that tells the total Btu input used
to produce this known kilowatt-hour output. The reason
is that the public utilities are only required to report
to the Coal and Electric Power Statistical Division of
the Department of Energy the total barrels of oil and
total tons of petroleum coke that were used in 1979, but
are not required to list the types of petroleum products

used or in what quantities of each. It is important to

 

1See appendix 1, pt. j for derivation.

243
have this information in order to determine the total
Btu content of the oil products which, for example, range
from 6,287,000 Btu per barrel for residual fuel oils to
5,670,000 Btu per barrel for kerosene. In addition, none
of the Btu contents of the fuels used by the utilities
are the same as the average Btu content of a barrel of

imported crude oil, which is 5,802,000 Btu per barrel.1

DeterminingBtu of Oil Used by Utilities

The method employed to determine the Btu content
of the oil products used by the public utilities in 1979
is not complicated. They report what the deliveries of
all types of fuel- oil were. However, the amounts
delivered are not the amounts consumed because of
some drawing down of 1978 inventories and stockpiling
a portion of the 1979 deliveries. Nonetheless, there
should be a very close correlation between the percentage
of total deliveries a particular fuel oil represents and
its percentage of total oil products consumed during the
same year, 1979. The deliveries to the oil-fired public
utility power plants in 1979 are listed in table 6. Now
some answers can be derived for 1979.

How much distillate fuel oil was used by the steam

 

10.8., Department of Energy, Energy Information
Administration, Monthly Energy Review, September 1980,
p. 107.

244

 

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aamm.m. Ao.maa. aauspanom aouoav Ammamo.mmv .a.vae.aavv aamzpamom amuoev
.aaamv.v v .m.aoa.am . aoumaaauman amuoev
ooo.ooa a.awv.am ammmm.mm a.amo.maw . . . . mamuos

amvaa. a.voa . .maao cognacamca
amm.aa a.aaa.m . . . . ocmmomox amaaa.vm m.aao.vav . . . . a amsaamom
amm.m a.maa . . . a amspamom amomv. m.amm.m . . . . m amsaamom
mmomv. m.~o~.m . . . v oumaaaumao
oaaa.aa v.oma.mm . . m ouoaaauman aaaoo.v m.mmm.ma . . . m oumaaaumao

auuos no uaouuoa mo aao mo mama amuos no naouumm uo aao uo mama

pomoucoOLom unconsoss oomuachHom macawsoss

 

 

n

coauusneou accumucH\ocanu:B moo

 

moaauooam sauna

 

 

mhma ZOHE¢QNZHU Uamfiomdm mom AHO Aflbh ho mHHMH>HAHQ

a uam<fi

245

electric plants?

Data: total bbl oil used for steam electric plants

was 492,606 x 103 bbl.1

Calculation:

3 3

(492,606 x 10 bbl)(.0445818)‘2’ = 21,961.3 x 10 bbl.

How much residual fuel oil was used by the steam

electric plants?

Calculation:

(492,606 x 103 bb1)(.9505753) = 468,259 x 103 bbl.

How much unfinished oil was used by the steam

electric plants?

Calculation:

3 3

(492,606 x 10 bb1)(.0016457) = 810.6 x 10 bbl.

How much distillate fuel oil was used by the gas

turbine/internal combustion electric plants?

Data: Total oil used for gas turbine/internal

3

combustion plants was 30,691 x 10 bb1.(3’

 

10.8., Department of Energy, Energy Information
Administration, Cost and Qualityeof Fuels for Electric
Utility Plants - 1979, June 1980, p. 64.

2See table 6 for this and folllowing percentages.
3U.S., Department of Energy, Energy Information

Administration, Monthly Energy Review, September 1980,
p. 64.

246

Calculation:

(30,691 x 103 bb1)(.861860) 8 26,451 x 103 bbl.

How much residual fuel oil was used by the gas

turbine/internal combustion electric plants?

Calculation:

(30,691 x 103 bbl)(.02256) = 692.4 x 103 bbl.

How much kerosene was used by the gas turbine/

internal combustion plants?

Calculation:

(30,691 x 103 bbl)(.11558) = 3,547.3 x 103 bbl.

How many barrels of petroleum coke were used by

electric utilities for generating electricity in 1979?

Data: short tons of petroleum coke used for generation

was 268 x 103 short tons,1 and one short ton contains
6.65 bbl.2
Calculation:
(268 x 103 short tons)(6.65 bbl/short ton) = 1,782 x lo3 bbl.

The similar fuels used in each type of electrical

generation are now added together.

Total distillate fuel oils:

21,961.3 x 103 bbl + 26,451 x 103 bbl = 48,412 x 103 bbl.

 

lIbid. 2Ibid., p. 107.

247
Total residual fuel oils:

3 3

468,259 x 10 bbl + 692.4 x 10 bbl 8 468,951 bbl.

The above series of calculations have determined
how much of each type of petroleum product was most likely
used for generating electricity in 1979. The next step
is to derive the total Btu content of these various fuels.
Table 7 is a compilation of the various fuels and a deriva-
tion of their total Btu contents, which is 3.2658 x 1015

Btu.

How Much Oil Does a Megawatt of Nuclear Replace?
In order to determine the barrels of oil it would
have taken to generate the amount of electricity that
was supplied by an average megawatt of nuclear capacity
in 1979, the efficiency of 1979 oil-fired plants must

be known, i.e. how many Btu/kwh?

Data: electricity from petroleum in 1979 was

6 1

303,525 x 10 kwh, and the energy content of petroleum

used was 3.2658 x lo15 Btu.

Calculation:

15

(3.2658 x 10 Btu)/(303,525 x lo6

kwh) = 10,760 Btu/kwh.

Since there were 4,673,682 kilowatt-hours generated

for each megawatt of installed nuclear capacity in 1979,

 

1Ibid., p. 62.

248

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mmaam. ooo.m~a.m mav.av . . . maao aosm oumaaaumaa

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coma aosm cams comm mom
mucoucoo sum amuoa

 

mucoucoo sum unconsona

 

 

 

 

mhma ZOHBCMNZNU UHKBUflAw mom Gama mBUDoomm

h wands

meqomamm

249
this can be equated to Btu input required at an oil-fired

plant.

Calculation:

(4,673,682 kwh)(10,760 Btu/kwh) = 50.289 x 109 Btu.

9

Now the required 50.289 x 10 Btu can be expressed

in terms of imported barrels of petroleum.

Data: Btu content of 1979 imported crude oil was
5,802,000 Btu per barrel.1
Calculation:

(50.289 x 109 Btu)/(5,802,000 Btu/bbl) 8 8,667.5 bbl.

This 8,667.5 barrels of oil is the amount of im-
ported oil that would be required at a 1979 oil-fired
plant in order to replace the amount of electricity that
was generated by an average installed megawatt of nuclear
capacity in 1979. On a daily basis this would amount
to: (8,667.5)/(365), or 23.746 barrels of oil per megawatt

of nuclear capacity.

How Much Oil Could Be Replaced by the Nuclear Shortfall?
Now the measurement that has been a central question
of this study can be made, i.e. how much of the imported
oil in 1979 can be attributed to the shortfall in nuclear

power plant capacity discussed in the last chapter?

 

1Ibid., p. 107

250

The low, medium, and high nuclear power shortfalls for
1979 are 52,000 Mw, 64,000 Mw, and 84,000 Mw respectively.
Each of these shortfalls will be expressed as a percentage

of total oil imports in 1979.

Data: oil imported in 1979 was 7,989,600 bbl/day,1

and the daily imported oil necessary to replace one Mw

nuclear capacity was 23.746 bbl/Mw.

Expressing as a percentage of 1979 oil imports,
Low:

.15,

(52,000 Mw)(23.746 bbl/Mw)day/(7,989,600 bbl/day)
or 15 percent.

Mediumu
.19,

(64,0001MW)(23.746 bbl/MW)day/(7,989,600 bbl/day)
or 19 percent.

,High:

(84,000 MM)(23.746 bbl/MM)day/(7,989,600 bbl/day) .25,

or 25 percent.

It has been demonstrated that the medium range
nuclear power shortfall in 1979 can be equated to nineteen
percent of all imported oil in 1979. This is certainly
not an inconsequential amount. If the highest forecast
examined in chapter 1 of 166,000 Mw had been met in 1979,

the equivalent of energy from imported oil could have

 

1See appendix 1, pt. 1 for derivation.

251
been reduced by an even greater amount as seen in the

example that follows.

Data: highest nuclear forecast examined was
166,000 Mw with a shortfall of 111,000 Mw.

Calculation:
(111,000 Mw)(23.746 bbl/Mw)day/(7,989,600 bbl/day) 8 .33,

or 33 percent.

An interesting question arises: If all electricity
generated by nuclear power in 1979 had been supplied by
oil-fired plants, how much additional imported oil would

have been necessary?

Data: nuclear capacity in 1979 was 54,594 Mw,
the oil imported in 1979 was 7,989,600 bbl/day, and the
oil needed to replace one Mw nuclear capacity was 23.746
bbl/Mw/day.

Calculation:

(54,594 Mw)(23.746 bbl/Mw)day/(7,989,600 bbl/day) = .16,

or a 16 percent increase in oil imports.

Another interesting question follows: How much
added nuclear capacity over and above the 54,594 Mw in-
stalled in 1979 would be necessary to replace all the
oil presently being imported to generate electricity in
oil-fired plants?

Data: oil used to generate electricity in 1979

252

was 562,870 x 103 bbl,1 and the oil replaced by energy

of each Mw nuclear/yr was 8,667.5 bbl.
Calculation:

(562,870 x 103 bb1)/(8,667.5 bbl/Mw) . 64,940 Mw,

or a total nuclear capacity in 1979 of

54,594 Mw + 64,940 Mw 8 119,534 Mw.

This capacity of 119,534 Mw needed to replace
all oil used for electric generation in 1979 is almost
identical to the medium-range nuclear capacity forecast
(119,000 Mw) examined in Chapter 6, and is less than the
high-range forecast (139,000 Mw) for 1980:

(119,534 MW - 119,000 Mw)/(119,534 Mw)

0.4 percent,

and

(139,000 Mw - 119,534 Mw)/(139,000 Mw) 14 percent less.

It would also be interesting to determine how
much of all imported oil is used for the generation of

electricity.

Data: oil used to generate electricity in 1979

was 562,870 x 103 bbl, and oil imported in 1979 was

2,916,200 x 103 bbl.
Calculation:

(562,870 x 103 bb1)/(2,916,200 x 103 bbl) 8 19.3 percent.

 

1See appendix 1, pt. m for derivation.

253
Of course, the oil used for electric generation
in 1979 expressed as a percentage of all oil consumed
in the United States, both domestic and imported, is less

as seen below.

Data: oil energy used to generate electricity

in 1979 was 3.2658 x 1015 Btu,1 and the total oil energy
consumed in 1979 was 34.984 x 1015 Btu.2
Calculation:
15 15

(3.2658 x 10 Btu)/(34.984 x 10 Btu) 8 9.3 percent.

Immediately following Three Mile Island, there
was a total of 12,256 megawatts of nuclear capacity shut
down, consisting of the Babcock and Wilcox type - like
installed at Three Mile Island, and the remainder belonging
to a group that were closed for rechecking earthquake

3

vulnerability. This capacity can be expressed in terms

of imported oil.

Data: oil needed to replace one Mw nuclear per
day is 23.746 bbl, and the total oil imported per day,
7,989,600 bbl.

 

1See table 7.

2See appendix 1, pt. b for derivation.

3"Life: An Atom-Powered Shutdown", Time, 26 March
1979, p. 55.

254

Calculation:
(12,256 Mw)(23.746 bbl/Mw)/(7,989,600 bbl) 8 .03643, or

3.6 percent of all imported oil.

Testing Some Statements in the Media

With the data that has been derived in this study
one can evaluate some of the statements that appear in
the media. Two published statements will be evaluated.

The first statement to be examined appeared in
the April 26, 1979 issue of Public Utilities Fortnightl .1
The writer in referring to six specific nuclear plants
that could come on line in 1979, said that the plants
could save an "estimated 240,000 barrels per day of oil”.
If he was referring to imported oil, which was clearly
implied, the statement was twenty-six per cent too high.
This was determined by obtaining from the NRC Annual
Report 19792 the capacities of the nuclear plants referred
to, which amounted to 7,518 Mw, and then calculating exactly

what this capacity meant in terms of imported oil.

Data: oil needed to replace one Mw nuclear per

day was 23.746 bbl.

 

1Lucien E. Smartt, "The Means Are at Hand to Reduce
Dependence on Foreign Oil", Public Utilities Fortnightly,
26 April 1979, p. 8.

2U.S., Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Annual Report
1979, February 1980, pp. 301-311.

255
Calculation:
(7,518 Mw)(23.746 bbl/Mw)day 8 178,500 bbl/day, or twenty-

six percent less than the stated 240,000 barrels per day.

A second statement to be evaluated appeared in
a post-Three Mile Island article put out by Cox News
Service.1 It said that: ”When a nuclear power plant the
size of Three Mile Island is closed, it means the nation
must import approximately another 30,000 barrels a day

of foreign oil”.

Data: oil needed to replace one Mw nuclear per
day was 23.746 bbl, and the capacity of Three Mile Island
Unit 2 was 906 Mw.2

Calculation:

(906 Mw)(23.746 bbl/Mw)day 8 21,500 bbl/day, or twenty-
eight percent less than the stated 30,000 barrels per

day.

Reasons for the Measurement's Validity
It should be stated that the determination that
nuclear power could have replaced nineteen percent of
1979 oil imports is not an uncomplicated conclusion

because of three unknowns: (1) If the forecast nuclear

 

1"Answers to Basic Questions About Nuclear Accidents",
Cox News Service, 4 April 1979.

2U.S., Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Annual Report
1979, February 1980, pp. 301-311.

256
capacity had actually been installed, would it have replaced
oil-fired power plants, or some other form of power gener-
ation resulting in less than a nineteen percent reduction in
oil imports?) (2) Since there are 17,388 megawatts of

1 not included in

private industrial generating capacity
this study, is it not likely that had the nuclear forecasts
been met, some of the private oil-fired capacity would

not have been used in favor of the purchase of cheaper
nuclear generated electricity, resulting in an even greater
decrease in oil imports?; and (3) Since in 1978 an amount
of fuel oil equivalent to 25.9 percent of oil imports

was used for heating in the United states,2 is it not
likely that some of this heating would have been replaced
by possibly cheaper nuclear generated electrical heat,
thereby further decreasing dependence on imported oil?

The first unknown simply makes the nineteen percent
conclusion somewhat uncertain, but the second and third
unknowns allow the conclusion that had the nuclear forecasts
been met, all imports in 1979 would have been cut by at
least nineteen percent.

Finally, this writer wishes to reiterate that

this is not a "position paper“ on the attributes or

 

1Melvin E. Johnson, telephone interview, U.S.
Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration,
Coal and Electric Power Statistical Division, Office of
Data and Interpretation (Washington, D.C.), 17 December 1980.

2See appendix 1, pt. n for derivation.

257

disadvantages of nuclear power. While it is entertaining
to consider the Westinghouse Corporation executive's view
that America will have 'nuclear power or no powerl",1
compared to the feelings of the Union of Concerned Scientists
who called for a shutdown of fifty-five nuclear plants
where the now repudiated Rasmussen Report was used to
justify operation,2 the opinion of this writer lies in
another direction.

It seems that a great amount of attention should
be given to the ideas presented in a report of the U.S.
Council on Environmental Quality called "The Good News
About Energy“. This encouraging report suggests that
many more consumer goods and services can and should be
urged out of each unit of fuel we use "whether it be a
barrel of oil or a ton of coal or uranium", and that by
pursuing a program of conservation technology the nation
could get by with only an additional 125 new coal and
nuclear power plants by the year 2000 instead of the 500

presently thought to be needed.3

 

lGordon C. Hurlbert, "The Anger of Decent Men”,
Public Utilities Fortnightly, 15 March 1979, p. 19.

2”NRC Review Affirms Licensed Nuclear Facilities'
Safety“, Public Utilities Fortnightly, 15 March 1979,
p. 30.

3U.S., Council on Environmental Quality, ”The
Good News About Energy", cited in “Low-growth Rate in
Energy Use Called Compatible With Economic Health”, Public
Utilities Fortnightly, 15 March 1979, p. 29.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The international market for nuclear power plants is
growing. The growth is not uniform throughout all coun-
tries because of the varying degrees of economic develop-
ment, energy intensiveness of major industries, existing
networks for electrical power distribution, econbmic capac-
ity to purchase fossil fuels in an increasingly competitive
international market, and other reasons.

One of the strongest arguments in the international
community for building nuclear power plants is economic.
Nuclear power is today less expensive from a direct-cost
standpoint than all fossil fuels priced in the internation-
al market. Most of the countries of the world that are
pursuing the nuclear option do not have an abundance of
fossil fuels, and some have practically none. The petroleum
that must often be imported is much more useful in fueling
the transportation sector than in generating electricity.

The amount of nuclear power needed in the world is in-
creasing as the demand for energy grows. The demand for
energy growth is in turn fueled by increasing population in
many countries of the world, accompanied by development
into more energy-intensive societies. In the European com-

munity, energy demand will have increased by the year 2000

258

259

by between 18 and 2 times. Similar growth is expected in
Japan. The growth in third-world nations will grow at an
even more rapid rate, but because of a smaller base, the
overall demand will not be as significant as the rate of
growth might suggest.

A desire for energy self-sufficiency seems to be a
major driving force behind nuclear power. Escalating fos-
sil-fuel prices and the heavy dependence of an industrial-
ized society on an uninterrupted supply of energy, are
causing countries around the world to protect themselves
from the effects of embargoes which could be brought about
by either political or economic circumstances.

The United States is not the only country in the
world interested in exploiting the international market
for nuclear reactors, technology, and fuel. While the
United States basically pioneered the nuclear power indus-
try, its former customers are now competitors in what now
appears to be a temporary "soft" market. As a result, the
competition for reactor orders is increasing.

Because of U.S. concern over the nuclear weapons pro-
liferation issue surrounding nuclear power plant expansion
abroad, various policies have been implemented at the
national and international levels to prevent such prolif-
eration. However, these restrictive policies seem to be

impacting more heavily on the U.S. nuclear manufacturing

260

industry, and there is currently a need for greater freedom ‘
for the U.S. industry to compete in the international mar-
ket by removal of various restrictive nuclear export pol-
icies.

There are three basic phases of concern in the non-
proliferation issue: (1) use of a nuclear power reactor to
generate weapons-grade material, (2) use of enrichment tech-
nology to produce uranium that is concentrated enough to
form a "critical mass", and (3) use of reprocessing tech-
nology resulting in the formation of weapons-grade plutonium.
The U.S. government has imposed restrictions on the sales
of reactors to certain countries, and has supported inter-
national measures for monitoring the nuclear fuel cycle.
However, the usefulness of these policies has been seriously
questioned by both public and private interests. It would
appear that there are better methods for acquiring nuclear-
weapons capability than diversion of the nuclear fuel cycle.
Moreover, the U.S. is foregoing what control it might have
over potential nuclear power users by relinquishing sales
to more eager competitors.

The growth of the nuclear power industry is dependent
in the long run on the proper disposal of the nuclear waste
products. There are more than three hundred radioactive
substances created as a result of fission in nuclear power
plants. However, the environmental concern centers around

a handful of long-lined "transuranics". The most

261

meticulous methods must be used for the disposal of these
few long-lived wasUeproductSa Plutonium is one of the most
toxic substances to be disposed of, and has a half-life of
24,600 years. The disposal of this and other similar wastes
amounts to a million—year disposal challenge.

The nuclear waste disposal issue has had a history
almost as long as the nuclear industry itself. At the
beginning of the nuclear era, it was almost casually as-
sumed by some scientists that nuclear wastes could be eas-
ily solidified in glass, encased in stainless steel con-
tainers, and placed in deep saltbed formations with com-
plete safety. Technologically, this method of disposal is
as viable as ever. However, the institutional hurdles have
been insurmountable to date. The first attempt at such
disposal was at Lyons, Kansas in 1970. However, due to
political opposition instituted by the residents, the pro-
ject was never carried out. As a result of this early suc-
cessful opposing of a federal waste repository, institu-
tional momentum was built up to prevent the selection
of alternative sites. The net effect has been a continual
build-up of nuclear wastes from both military and civilian
sources that is being stored temporarily by methods not
designed for the time period needed for the radioactive
decay to safe levels.

The concern over waste disposal is not focused on the

low-level wastes where the volume is much greater. Moreover,

262

the public attention given to high-level waste disposal
does seem to be out of proportion to other toxic waste dis-
posal problems such as those accompanying the chemical in-
dustry. Nevertheless, as a result of public concern,
various alternative methods of nuclear waste disposal have
'been researched. They include burial under the clay floors
found in some areas of the ocean, disposal in holes drilled
ten to fifty thousand feet into the earth, disposal in deep
rock formations in sufficient radioactive concentratioh
that the heat generated would melt the surrounding rock which
would effectively seal it off from the environment, storage
in mined areas on remote islands, disposal in ice sheets of
the polar regions, deep-well injection disposal, and a
transmutation process that would convert the long-lived
transuranics into shorter-lived alternative isotopes.

A most insightful view into the choices surrounding
nuclear power and how they may affect the future use of
this technology falls in the realm of sociotechnical evalu-
ation. After only limited investigation, it becomes clear
that public perception of nuclear power has heavy psycholog-
ical overtones and implications that have dramatically been
reflected in the public regulatory policies regulating the
nuclear power industry.

Public acceptance of nuclear power in the United States
has declined over the years in spite of intensive effects

to "educate" the public in nuclear power plant technology.

263

It has become clear to many students of this phenomenon that
the problem is not with the risks associated with nuclear
power alone, but rather with the problem of perception of
the magnitude of the risks.

While it has been conceded in the Rasmussen Report/that
a ”worst-possible" nuclear power plant accident could cost
three thousand lives, this possibility is so low as to make
it much safer than the best modern coal plant of comparable
size. It can be argued with good reason that some of the
public opposes nuclear power because of their realization
that the risks are distributed differently by nuclear and
coal plants, i.e., the risk of coal plants is widely distrib-
uted among the coal miners via mining accidents and "black
lung", the railroad worker who ships the coal, and the
public over thousands of square miles who breathes the one
hundred or so carcinogens pouring out of the stacks in the
fumes and particulate matter.

On the other hand, the risk from nuclear power, based
on all past history is negligible in comparison, on both
the broad society as well as those who live geographically
close to nuclear power plants. The problem is that if the
"worst case" nuclear accident did occur, its maximum impact
would be felt locally. Those who oppose nuclear power on
the basis of risk are acting upon the heavily studied "what

if?" psychological phenomena. In a democratic society,

264

individuals are certainly free to do so, unless they invest
the federal government with the power to regulate how such
risks are to be distributed.

A second problem uncovered in the sociotechnical evalu-
ation of nuclear power is the public's inability to deal
with different degrees of risk, i.e., anything other than
one hundred percent safe, a fifty-fifty chance, or "extremely
dangerous” is beyond the scope of most people's ability to
evaluate. Nuclear power does not fall into any of the fore-
going categories.

Before nuclear power will become accepted in any society,
there must be a decision on the part of the public that the
benefits to be derived are worth the risks (whatever the
risks are perceived to be). The evaluation of the benefits
seems to be most closely tied to the cost of energy in
general, and the degree that national security could be
threatened by disruption of energy flows from outside a
country's borders. Nuclear power is no longer primarily a
technical issue, but rather a political problem.

In Michigan, there is a capsule view of many of the same
issues and choices that are being faced in other states, in
the nation, and in other countries. The nuclear industry got
an early and healthy start in the State, but has faced in-
creased opposition in recent years. The problem of risk-
perception was well capitalized on by the previously mentioned

falacious book: The Day We Almost Lost Detroit. Nuclear

 

265

waste disposal has been an issue in the State because of
the need for such disposal for the local nuclear power in-
dustry, and also because of the various technologically
feasible sites for such disposal within the State. So
resistant are some citizens to the nuclear power industry
that efforts have been made to prevent the continued opera-
tion of one nuclear power plant by legal opposition to the
increased usage of existing spent fuel-rod storage facili-
ties.

In spite of such opposition to existing plants and
three new units under construction, the new plants are
scheduled for completion in the next few years, and will
place Michigan in a position of even greater dependence on
nuclear power than the comparative lead it already has
against the national average. Based on the discussions
of the recent Michigan Legislature's special Joint Com-
mittee on Nuclear Energy from May 1979 to September 1980,
it is doubtful that the State government will become any
more involved in the nuclear power industry in the State
than it already is via the Michigan Public Services Com-
mission.

A model has been developed for determining the im-
pact of past and present choices with regard to the build-
ing of a nuclear power industry on the energy economy of
the United States. The "yardstick" for measuring this im-

pact is the amount of imported oil energy-equivalent that

266

could have been supplied by the nuclear power plant capac-
ity that was forecasted to be installed by the end of 1980,
but because of the various local, national, and inter-
national concerns which were discussed, was not installed.

It was determined, based on thirteen reputable fore-
casts made over the period from 1964 to 1975 that the
medium forecast for nuclear capacity to be installed by
1980 was 119,000 megawatts. Based on actual installation,
a 64,000 megawatt shortfall was observed.

It was then determined what this capacity could have
replaced in terms of barrels of imported oil. The procedure
followed was to first determine the number of kilowatt-
hours that were generated per average megawatt of nuclear
power in 1979. It was then determined how many Btu of oil
at a 1979 oil-fired power plant would have been required
to produce the same amount of electricity. Following this
step, it was necessary to convert this Btu amount into
barrels of imported oil, which could then be applied to
the nuclear-capacity shortfall and expressed either in
terms of barrels of imported oil per megawatt (23.746), or
as a percentage of oil imports for 1979, which was nine-
teen percent. If the nuclear power plant capacity shortfall
had not occurred, it could have generated approximately
the energy-equivalent of all the oil-fired capacity in the
United States during the same year. Of course, this would

not eliminate the limited need of oil-fired plants during

267

peak-load periods. However, it could have helped sub-
stantially by eliminating the necessity of operating oil-
fired plants in the base-load, which has commonly occurred
when there were low reserve margins.

The usefulness of this model is not in telling a soci-
ety whether or not it should install more or less nuclear
power, but rather to provide a tool for measuring the
potential impact on the very strategic resource of oil and
more specifically, imported.oil. It is hoped that this
process will help quantify the very complex decision making
process with regard to nuclear power, so that one can more
intelligently make the ubiquitous tradeoffs.

In conducting this study, various other worthy topics
for research became apparent. One task might be to evalu-
ate how amenable the American public would be to federal
government control of the nuclear power industry (as in
France and Japan). Another interesting study would be to
evaluate just how effective different persuasive strategies
,are in gaining public acceptance for nuclear power, or if
they are effective at all. A third study might be to
evaluate the effectiveness of alternate types of educational
information in achieving the goals of more knowledgeable
public and private decision-making processes. A fourth study
which would be dependent on completion of the first three
mentioned above, would be an attempt to do a cost-benefit

analysis of the nuclear industry in the United

268

States--considering the costs involved in gaining the
acceptance of nuclear power via one of the above strategies
of a predetermined percentage of the population.

The nuclear power issues and choices are among the most
debated and formidable ones accompanying the phenomenon
called the "energy crisis". There are no clear-cut right
and wrong decisions regarding nuclear power, but there are
a very large number of tradeoffs. It is hoped that this
study has provided some additional tools and insights fer

making more intelligent choices among them.

APPENDIX 1

ADDITIONAL CALCULATIONS

Appendix 1, Part a

In order to obtain the most accurate answers
possible throughout this paper, the standard method of
rounding off numbers with each calculation to the maximum

number of significant digits was used. Following are

some examples:

(24._l_)(26.333) - 63_4_
(24.223)(13.9g . 338._9_
(24.16§)/(22._1_ . 1.0_9_
1.684_9_ + 1.2; a 2.9;
1.2; - 1.010; . .2;

269

Appendix 1, Part b

Problem:
Determine the percentage of total dependency on foreign

oil in the United States during 1979.

Data: domestic oil production in 1979 provided

18.064 x 1015 Btu1 of energy, and imported oil in 1979

provided 16.920 x 1015 Btu2

of energy.
Total oil utilized:

18.064 x 1015 Btu + 16.920 x 1015 Btu = 34.984 x 1015 Btu.
Percentage oil importation:

(16.920 x 1015 Btu)/(34.984 x 1015 Btu) = .484, or

48.4 percent.

 

1U.S., Department of Energy, Monthly Energy
Review, September 1980, p. 6.

2Ibid., p. 10.

270

Appendix 1, Part c

Problem:
Determine the percentage of total dependency on foreign

oil in the United States through June of 1980.

Data: domestic oil production through June 1980

provided 9.176 x 1015 Btu of energy,1 and imported oil

through June 1980 provided 7.177 x 1015 Btu of energy.2

Total oil utilized:

9.176 x 1015

Btu + 7.177 x 1015 Btu = 16.353 x 1015 Btu.
Percentage oil importation:
(7.177 x 1015 Btu)/(16.353 x 1015 Btu) = .438, or

43.8 percent.

 

1U.S., Department of Energy, Monthly Energy
Review, September 1980, p. 6.

2Ibid., p. 10: this is a total of crude oil and
refined petroleum products importation.

271

Appendix 1, Part d

Problem:
Determine what percentage of total energy inputs was

provided by nuclear power in 1979.

15 1

Data: nuclear energy inputs was 2.748 x 10 Btu,

and total energy inputs to the economy was 78.022 x lOlSBtu.2

Calculation:

15

(2.748 x lo15 Btu)/(78.022 x 10 Btu) = .035, or

3.5 percent.

 

lU.S., Department of Energy, Energy Information
Administration, Monthly Energy Review, September 1980,
p. 25.

2Ibid., March 1980, p. 2.

272

Appendix 1, Part j

Problem:
Determine what was the average amount of electrical energy

in kilowatt-hours generated by each megawatt of nuclear

capacity in 1979.

Data: installed nuclear capacity in 1979 was

54,594 Mw.1 and the energy output from nuclear plants

in 1979 was 255,155 x 106 kwh.2
Calculation:

(255,155 x 106 kwh)/(54,594 Mw) = 4,673,682 kwh/Mw.

 

lMelvin E. Johnson, telephone interview, U.S.
Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration,
Coal and Electric Power Statistical Division, Office of

Data and Interpretation (Washington, D.C.), 17 December
1980.

2U.S., Department of Energy, Energy Information

Administration, Monthly Energy Review, September 1980,
p. 62.

278

Appendix 1, Part f

Problem:
Determine the percentage of total kilowatt-hours (kwh)
generated by nuclear power plants in the United States
during 1979.

Data: total electricity generated during 1979

6 1

was 2,247,372 x 10 kwh, and the total electricity generated

by nuclear in 1979 was 255,155 x 106 kwh.2

Calculation:

6 6

(255,155 x 10 kWh)/(2,247,372 x 10 kwh) 8 .114, or

11.4 percent.

 

1U.S., Department of Energy, Energy Information
Administration, Monthly Energy Review, September 1980,
p. 62.

2Ibid.

274

Appendix 1, Part 9

Problem:
Determine the percentage of total kwh generated by coal,

petroleum, and natural gas during 1979.

Data: total electricity generated in 1979 was

2,247,372 x 106 kwh,1 electricity generated by coal in

1979 was 1,075,037 x 106 kwh,2 electricity generated by

6 kwh,3 and electricity generated

6 4

oil in 1979 was 303,525 x 10

by natural gas in 1979 was 329,485 x 10 kwh.

Total fossil fuel electricity:

6

1,075,037 x 10 kwh + 303,525 x 106 kwh + 329,485 x 106 kwh 8

1,708,047 x 106 kwh.

Calculation:

6

(1,708,047 x 10 kwh)/(2,247,372 x 106 kwh) = .760, or

76.0 percent.

 

1U.S., Department of Energy, Energy Information
Administration, MonthlyeEnergy Review, September 1980,
p. 62.

3 4

2Ibid. Ibid. Ibid.

275

Appendix 1, Part h

Problem:

Determine the number of British Thermal Units (Btu) in

a kilowatt-hour (kwh).

Data: 453.6 grams in one pound of matter, 4.184
Joules per calorie, and 1 degree Fahrenheit is 5/9 degree

Celsius.

(1 Btu is the energy input that will raise 1 1b of water
by 1 degree Fahrenheit. This same energy will raise 1
1b of water (453.6 gm) by 5/9 degree Celsius. The amount
of energy input would be 252 calories.)

Calculations:
(453.6 gm/lb)(5/9) 8 252 calories,
(252 cal/Btu)(4.184 J/cal) 8 1,054.368 J/Btu, and

(3.60 x lo6 J/kwh)/(l,054.368 J/Btu) . 3,414.3676 Btu/kwh.

276

Appendix 1, Part k

Problem:
Demonstrate the trend toward increasingly larger shortfalls

in nuclear power.

Data: forecastl for 1978 was 87,000 Mw, for 1979
was 103,000 Mw, and for 1980 was 132,000 Mw. Installed
capacity for 1978 was 53,700 Mw,2 54,594 Mw at year-end

1979,3 4

and could be considered to be either 56,641 Mw
or 58,585 Mw5 at year-end 1980.
Calculate shortfalls:
87,000 Mw - 53,700 Mw .‘33,ooo Mw,
103,000 Mw - 54,594 Mw 8 48,000 Mw, and

132,000 MW - 58,585 MW or 56,641 MW 8 73,000 MW or 75,000 MW.

 

l'Nuclear Forecast“, Public Utilities Fortni htl ,
26 September 1974, p. 44, cited by Environment Information
Center, Energy Reference Department, The Ener Index,
vol. 2 (New York: Environment Information Center, December
1974), p. 115.

20.8., Department of Energy: Energy Information
Administration, Annual Report to Congress 1979, 3 vols.,
n.d., 2:139.

3Melvin E. Johnson, telephone Interview, U.S.
Department of Energy; Energy Information Administration,
Coal and Electric Power Statistical Division, Office of
Data and Interpretation (Washington, D.C.), 17 December
1980.

4Added only North Anna 2 and Sequoyah 1 in 1980.

5Includes Salem 2 (1,115 Mw) and Farley 2 (829 Mw)
issued ”limited licenses” for low-power testing in April
and October 1980; also includes North Anna 2 (907 Mw)
and Sequoyay 1 (1,140 Mw) issued full-power licenses in
August and September 1980.

279

Appendix 1, Part 1

Problem:

Determine the total barrels of oil imported to the United
States in 1979.

Data: Btu content of oil imports in 1979 was
15 1

16.920 x 10 Btu, and the average Btu content per bbl
imported crude oil was 5,802,000 Btu.2
Calculation:
15

(16.920 x 10 Btu/yr)/(5,802,000 Btu/bbl) 8 2,916,200
3

x 10 bbl/yr, or

(2,916,000 x 103 bbl/yr)/(365) = 7,989,600 bbl/day.

 

1U.S., Department of Energy, Energy Information

Administration, Monthly Energy Review, September 1980,
p. 10.

2Ibid., p. 107.

280

Appendix 1, Part m

Problem:
Determine how many barrels of imported crude oil were

necessary to generate the electricity from oil-fired power

plants in 1979.

Data: Btu of oil used in generating electricity

15 1

in 1979 was 3.2658 x 10 Btu, and the average Btu per

bbl of 1979 crude oil imports was 5,802,000 Btu.2

Calculation:

15

(3.2658 x 10 BtU)/(5,802,000 Btu/bbl) 8 562,870,000 bbl.

 

1See table 7 of Chapter 7.

2U.S., Department of Energy, Energy Information

Administration, Monthly Energy Review, September 1980,
p. 107.

281

Appendix 1, Part n

Problem:
Determine the barrels of imported-oil-equivalent for all
the fuel oils used during 1978 for heating.

Kerosene 3

1 2 12

44,090,000 bbl at 5,670,000 Btu/bbl 8 250 x 10 Btu.

Distillate fuel oil:

533,069,000 bbl at 5,825,000 Btu/bbl 8 3,105 x 1012 Btu.
Residual fuel oil:
164,536,000 bbl at 6,287,000 Btu/bbl 8 1,034 x 1012 Btu.

Total Btu for heating:

250 x 1012 Btu + 3,105 x 1012

4,389 x 1012 Btu.

Btu + 1,034 x 1012 Btu =

Convert to barrels of imported oil:

12

(4,389 x 10 Btu)/(5,802,000 Btu/bbl) 8 756 x 106 bbl.

Express as percentage of total imports:

6 6

(756 x 10 bbl)/(2,916.2 x 10 bbl)* - .259, or

25.9 percent.

 

1U.S., Department of Energy, Energy Information
Administration, Energy Data Repgrts: Fuel Oil Sales Annual,
November 1979, p. 4; all other fuel amounts are from the
same page.

20.8., Department of Energy, Energy Information
Administration, Monthly Energy Review, September 1980,
p. 107: all other Btu values per barrel are from the same

page.

*The total import amount is derived in Appendix 1,
pt. 1.

282

APPENDIX 2

ADDITIONAL TABLE

TABLE 8

CONSUMPTION OF ENERGY 1949-1979

 

 

Total Gross

Energy Consumption

Change,From
Previous Year

 

Year (1015 Btu) (Percent)
1949 31.08 -5.7
1950 33.62 8.2
1951 36.11 7.4
1952 35.83 -0.8
1953 36.78 2.6
1954 35.73 -2.8
1955 39.18 9.6
1956 40.76 4.0
1957 40.81 0.1
1958 40.65 -0.4
1959 42.42 4.3
1960 44.08 3.9
1961 44.73 1.5
1962 46.80 4.6
1963 48.61 3.9
1964 50.78 4.5
1965 52.99 4.4
1966 55.99 5.7
1967 57.89 3.4
1968 61.32 5.9
1969 64.53 5.2
1970 66.83 3.6
1971 68.30 2.2
1972 71.63 4.9
1973 74.61 4.2
1974 72.76 -2.5
1975 70.71 -2.8
1976 74.51 5.4
1977 76.39 2.5
1978 78.15 2.3
1979 78.02 -0.2

 

 

 

SOURCE: U.S., Department of Energy: Energy

Information Administration, Annual Report to Congress
1979, 3 vols., n.d., 2:7.

283

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Detroit Edison Company. "Fermi 2 Nuclear Power Plant.“
Newsletter. Detroit: Detroit Edison, Summer 1978.

Detroit Edison Company. "Fermi 2 Nuclear Power Plant."
Newsletter. Detroit: Detroit Edison, Summer 1979.

Detroit Edison Company. Load Forecast: Electric Energy
Use and Demand 1981-I995. Detroit: Detro1t E son,
2 October 1980.

McCarthy, Walter J., Jr. President and Chief Operating
Officer. Detroit Edison Company. Address delivered
at ”Energy Event '80“. Troy, Michigan, 5 May 1980.

Page, Earl M. "We Did Not Almost Lose Detroit, A Critigue
of the John Fuller Book: 'We Almost Lost Detro1t '.
Detroit: Detroit Edison, n.d.

LANSING BOARD OF WATER AND LIGHT

Lansing Board of Water and Light. Notification via mailing
to all customers of the four options for additional
electric generating capacity and electricity con-
servation. Lansing, Michigan, Fall 1979.

Market Opinion Research. ”Analysis of Lansing Board of
Water and Light Residential Customer Reactions to
pvarious Options for Additional Electric Generating
Capacity and Electricity Conservation.“ Job no.
9367. Detroit: Market Opinion Research, December
1979.

SPEECHES

Bodansky, David. "Alternative Choices for Future Sources
of Electricity Generation.” An address prepared
for the Governing Board Seminar, American Public
Power Association 1979 National Conference. Seattle,
15 June 1979.

Stathakis, George J. Vice President and General Manager.
Nuclear Energy Programs Division. General Electric
Company. "The Nuclear Weapons Proliferation Problem:
Can We Lead Without Leadership?" Address to the
Atomic Industrial Forum Conference on International
Commerce and Safeguards for Civil Nuclear Power.

New York, 15 March 1977.

2 9 5
MI SCELLANEOUS

American Nuclear Society. Executive Conference Digest.
Executive Conference on International Nuclear Commerce,
9-11 September 1979.

"Answers to Basic Questions About Nuclear Accidents."
Cox News Service, 4 April 1979.

Atomic Energy of Canada. Public Affairs Department. Nuclear
Fuel Waste, Ottawa, Ontario: Atomic Energy of Canada,
98 .

Cohen, Bernard L. 'A Tale of Two Wastes." Professor of
physics and of chemical and petroleum engineering
at the University of Pittsburg and Director of
Scaife Nuclear Laboratories, 1980.

Michigan Society of Professional Engineers. "Nuclear Power
Policy." Statement. Lansing (Mich.): Michigan Society
of Professional Engineers, 7 April 1979.

Saudi Arabian Oil Minister. Statement broadcasted by United
Press International, 18 December 1980.