

PRIMARY ELECTION STRUCTURE
AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR

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
Primary Election Structure and
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ABSTRACT

PRIMARY ELECTION STRUCTURE AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR

By

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The primary election, a purely American institution, has received much scholarly attention, most of which is descriptive, normative, or of the case-study genre. The important empirical studies, chiefly by V. O. Key, deal with comparisons of states which nominate by primary with states which nominate in convention, with the influence of the primary on inter-party competition, or with the influence of incumbency or various levels of inter-party competition on primary election outcomes.

The present study investigates an additional important dimension of primary elections: structure. The basic research question is: is the behavior of voters and office seekers different in states which nominate in the open primary, than from states which nominate in the closed primary? We find that behavior does vary, and in ways contrary to theoretical expectations. Our data is all available gubernatorial primary and general elections held since 1900 (1533 of the 1600 total elections).

Theoretically, we expect political behavior to be more volatile generally in states with open primaries, wherein the potential for voter "raiding" exists, and wherein candidates have a larger potential electorate to which to appeal. From our theory, in open primary states we expect to find more voters switching parties between consecutive primaries, and fewer voters switching parties between a general election and the following primary election, when compared to closed primary states.

These expectations are substantiated. However, by assuming "raiding" to be the dominant motivation of the open primary voter who switches parties between the primary and the following general election, we expected greater variation in open primary states and, finding the reverse to be true, conclude that when open primary voters switch, it is to endorse a preferred candidate in the opposition party and not to raid in an attempt to nominate a weak one.

Also, from our theory, we expect more intra-party competitiveness in open primary states than in closed, assuming that the entry of non-party members into a partisan primary tends to intensify intra-party conflict. We construct various measures of intra-party competitiveness, derive hypotheses from our theory, and upon testing them find that intra-party conflict is less in open primary states than in closed, especially when one of the two parties is dominant. We find no difference between open and closed states in size of incumbent plurality and incumbent renomination rate. One hypothesized relationship is supported -- fewer renominated incumbents are reelected in open states than in closed. Difference of means and proportions tests are employed to test hypotheses.

We also find regional and party variations in intra-party competitiveness. We find primary nominations to be carefully orchestrated by party organizations in the Northeast states but typically less tightly controlled elsewhere, least so in the Border and Southern states. Yet despite regional variations, during the period 1920-60 voters generally behave as though the primary were a meaningful event: we find them voting in the primary of the party whose nominee is most likely to capture the reins of government and therefore, as Governor, execute policy. We also find Democratic candidates behaving in a theoretically predictable manner, typically competing for a nomination when it is worth having and leaving

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well enough alone when pursuit of the governorship is frivolous. On the other hand, for the period examined, we find Republican candidates behaving in theoretically unanticipated ways, vigorously contesting many primaries, the winner of which is likely to face defeat in the general election, and failing to contest many primaries, the winner of which is likely to win the general election. These findings evolve from correlating measures of intra-party competition with a measure of inter-party competition.

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I thank them all.

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PRIMARY ELECTION STRUCTURE AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR

By Terry Bruce Smith

Chapter I

Introduction and Theory

Introduction

Winston Churchill said it: "The first responsibility of a representative to his constituents is to get elected." In stating this, Churchill overlooks a less obvious but often more difficult responsibility of a representative: to get nominated.

"Nomination" is the antecedent act; once nominated by his party, a politician often is easily elected, and reelected. On the other hand, because of the nature of the nomination struggle, politicians frequently lose general elections in which all other objective factors would indicate certain victory. This initial step on the general election ballot, despite its obvious importance, is often underemphasized by political researchers, many of whom see the decisive election as being the one in which voters choose among the parties (and their previously-designated candidates) and determine who will control the government. Schattschneider, however, was not beguiled by this excessively casual view of the electoral process:

The nature of the nominating procedure determines the nature of the party; he who can make the nomination is the owner of the party. This is therefore one of the best points at which to observe the distribution of power within the party. (64)

The history of nominating procedure in the United States is a history of expansive democracy. From the legislative caucus to the nominating convention and finally to the direct primary, we note a constantly increasing role played by the voter.¹ No other democratic nation uses

the direct primary as a means of nomination.² Given the peculiarity of the system, American political scientists noted a need for detailed study of this institution at the dawn of the behavioral era of political science:

In the United States, more attention has been paid to nominating methods than in other countries. A nationwide study of the relative merits of the delegate convention system, the direct primary, the non-partisan primary, and other nominating devices needs to be made An analysis might be made of the operation of the primary where there is a short ballot and where there is a long ballot, where popular participation is high and where it is low, and where party traditions are strong and where they are weak. Standard specifications regarding petition requirements, tests of party allegiance and provisions against minority nominations should be worked out. (Merriam, 1930: 33)

Indeed, much literature on the topic of primary elections was available even by 1930, and much was to follow. But until 1949 this literature was either descriptive,³ and/or normative,⁴ and that which dealt with the topic empirically was of the case study genre, lacking theoretical importance and methodological rigor.⁵

There were a few useful contributions, in this preanalytic era in the study of primaries.⁶ Berdahl (1942) takes the first systematic, comparative look at the phenomenon of "raiding" -- the practice of sending or otherwise seducing voters normally affiliated with one party to vote in another's primary. He finds that, in Illinois and New Jersey during the 1930's, the degree to which party irregularity occurred seems to be a function of the ability of the urban party machines to entice "surplus" voters of the dominant party to vote in the minority party's primary. His study has a "good-government" normative bent, and he ends on an anti-machine prescriptive note, decrying the practice of raiding and calling for corrective legislation.

Ewing (1949) takes note of the fact that primaries were the "real

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elections" in the South and follows his article with a book (1953) devoted exclusively to the use of the primary election in the South as the alternative to two-party competition.

V. O. Key's Southern Politics (1949) is the first intensive analysis of the behavioral effects of primary elections on political systems. Key finds that in the South the primary did not serve as a satisfactory replacement for two-party competition, in that it deprived the organizations of both the dominant and the minority parties of their basic function -- nominating suitable candidates -- thereby weakening parties as effective governing institutions (385-462).

Key later looks at the behavioral manifestations of primaries in non-South states as well in American State Politics (1956). Focussing on the problem of "party atrophy," he finds a "tendency for popular interest to concentrate in the primary of the stronger party" (100), and " a marked decline . . . in the proportions of . . . contests settled by small margins [at the general election] " (103-04). He also notes that the primary is no guarantee of a genuine contest for the nomination; fewer than two-thirds of the Republican primaries featured a candidate's winning with less than sixty percent of the vote, and only two Democratic primaries in five were similarly contested (116).

Key shows that states which had retained the convention nominating system and states which had modified the primary with pre-primary endorsing procedures tended to maintain stronger party organizations and typically manifest a higher degree of inter-party competition than the states in which the primary by itself was the nominating vehicle (118-29).

Other literature which follows Key's 1949 study tends to substantiate his findings. Turner demonstrates that primaries do not provide a realistic alternative to inter-party competition in one-party Congressional

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districts. Standing and Robinson find that, like voters, candidates also tend to enter the primary of the dominant party more often than that of the subordinate party. Cutright and Rossi note that incumbents are inordinately favored in primaries due to superior personal organizational resources and the name-recognition factor, both factors weighing heavily in a political contest where the party identification cue is denied the voter. This analysis explains the earlier finding by Ewing (1953) that incumbents in the South win renomination more than ninety percent of the time (65), and partially explains why nominations for local offices in Iowa were frequently uncontested, as Porter finds.

Some of this literature compares the behavioral influences among several states. Other portions of the literature compares states nominating by primary and states nominating by convention. Nowhere does the literature deal directly with the problem of behavioral variance among states that have different primary structures. That is the problem analyzed in the present research.

Primary structure is intuitively a key independent variable in the study of voting behavior and candidate behavior in primary elections.

There are four distinct types of primaries:

1. The blanket primary, wherein the voter receives a ballot for all parties and may vote in more than one party's primary for different offices.
2. The open primary, wherein the voter receives a ballot for all parties but may vote in only one party's primary.
3. The closed-challenge primary, wherein the voter publicly requests and is given a ballot for one party, and may be asked to demonstrate party loyalty by swearing to support the party's candidates in the general election.
4. The closed-enrollment primary, wherein the voter is given the ballot of the party with which he enrolled when he registered to vote.

Intuitively, the differences among the above primary structures encourage greater or lesser party regularity among voters. Specifically, the more "closed" the primary, the more likely it is that voters will be constrained to vote in the primary of a party determined well before the election day, and the less likely it is that voters will be able to respond to campaign appeals and shifts in sentiment which take place during the period immediately preceding the election. It follows therefore that the more closed the primary, the more likely it is that primary election results for a given party will be determined by voters who regularly identify with that party. Conversely,

The ease with which voters may move from party to party under the open primary doubtless creates uncertainties for the party leadership in its efforts to control nominations as well as in tests of strength between leadership factions. The primary of one party may be raided by the voters of another in order to assure the nomination of a weak candidate who can be defeated in the general election. (Key, 1964: 391)⁷

In addition, the behavior of individuals seeking nomination should be affected by the structure of the primary in the state in which he seeks nomination. Specifically, the more open the primary, the more likely it is that a candidate's potential electorate will include more and more voters who do not regularly identify with his or any party. Therefore, a candidate's behavior -- whether or not to run, whether or not to challenge an incumbent -- will vary with the conditions imposed on his electorate by the primary structure.

Bone neatly sums up the present line of inquiry when he asks:

Does one method consistently produce demonstrably more capable nominees than another? Which system is the most "rational" from the standpoint of (1) the voter, (2) the candidate, (3) the party officialdom, and (4) party activists and adherents? Can any type of primary impose a high degree of responsibility on a party organization for the purpose of selection of candidates yet keep open the chan-

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nels of recruitment to qualified persons? These questions are far more easily raised than satisfactorily answered (268)

In what follows we attempt to answer satisfactorily these, and other, questions concerning the relationship between primary structure and political behavior.

Theory

The Use of Structural Variables in Election Research

There is much precedent for examining structural influences on political behavior.⁸ Voter registration procedures and residency requirements have received attention.⁹ So has the form of the ballot.¹⁰ Schlesinger (1966) has analyzed opportunity structures for elective offices in the states.

Various scholars suggest that primary election structure indeed may be an important independent variable. Bone indicates that "insurgents, mavericks," and other outsiders might prefer the open primary to the closed, because the potential electorate is larger, more diffuse, and more heterogeneous:

The real significance of the primary is that it helps to keep open and flexible the channels of recruitment to public office. It provides a method or alternative means of gaining power other than winning the support of leaders of the party. The open primary does this somewhat better than the closed. [Note: Bone supplies no data to substantiate this claim.] (281)

Key (1964) says much the same thing, although like Bone he provides no empirical evidence to support his statement:

[T]he open primary at times makes difficult maintenance of orientations differentiating the two parties and probably handicaps the lesser party in those jurisdictions in which one party holds a substantial advantage. The voters of the lesser party may find it more

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attractive to exercise a balance of power in the primary of the major party than to engage in the troublesome task of building up their own party. (392)

In a case study of the Washington blanket primary, Ogden argues that gross party irregularity -- massive crossover voting -- has not occurred. Of the thirty-four statewide contests he studies only four showed massive switching across party lines. It is clear, however, that the potential for switching exists, and where Washington voters perceived a clear opportunity to make an impact on one party's primary outcome, they did so. Despite Ogden's contention that "cross voting has been the exception rather than the rule, and . . . has had the effect of saving the regular parties from widespread raids on the part of non-members" (38), Bone (a professor at the University of Washington for some years) asserts that "the fact that weak partisans and mavericks can often win in the primaries is a major reason why the Washington legislature, despite pleading from party chairmen, will not adopt a closed primary" (272-73). Thus, we find argument and counterargument about the impact of primary structure, with little in the way of supporting evidence.

Rationality

One of the difficulties with the analyses cited above is their weak theoretical orientation, although admittedly the authors did not set out to construct a theory of political behavior in primary elections. By assuming rational political actors--both voters and candidates -- we are able to overcome much of the theoretical deficiency which characterizes research in this area. Curiously, Turner hints at the notion of candidate rationality in his early work, but no researcher has pursued his implicit line of inquiry, despite its promise:

Cross-filing in California and the blanket primary

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in Washington, combined with rapid population increases in these states, may create a fluid condition in which it is difficult for the potential candidate to calculate his chances. In the closed primaries of the Northeast, where the population remains much more stable, candidates seem better able to recognize impending defeat, and therefore withdraw. (207)

"Calculating chances" is of course the prime motivational stimulus for the rational candidate for nomination, who asks: "Can I win?" or at the very least, "Can I make an electoral impact sufficiently large to extract policy concessions, patronage, etc. from the victor?"¹¹ A candidate's estimating of his chances in an election does not take place in vacuo, however. "[A]mbition for office, like most other ambitions, develops with a specific situation, that it is a response to the possibilities which lie before the politician." (Schlesinger, 1966: 8). The situation to which Schlesinger refers is the structure of opportunities in a given state for a given office, and although his context is different from the present one, his theoretical foundation is applicable:

The central assumption of ambition theory is that a politician's behavior is a response to his office goals [T]he politician as office seeker engages in political acts and makes decisions appropriate to gaining office [O]ur ambitious politician must act . . . in terms of the electorate of the office which he hopes to win (6)

We assume that the rational candidate seeks nomination in the primary election because he wants to win, or minimally, because he expects to influence the eventual nominee's behavior. He therefore utilizes appropriate information about his chances for nomination or influence of the nominee.¹² An item of information which is of prime importance to his chances is the structure of the primary. *Ceteris paribus*, the more open the primary, the more incomplete the information, since a candidate's potential electorate tends to include a larger bloc of voters who do not

regularly identify with his or any party. The implications of this situational uncertainty are manifest in diverse ways, and are discussed in detail in the next section.

V. O. Key (1966) suggests that we may safely assume the existence of the rational voter: "[i]n the large the electorate behaves as rationally and responsibly as we should expect, given the clarity of the alternatives presented to it and the character of the information available to it." (7).¹³ He is of course discussing national presidential elections when he describes "an electorate moved by concern about central and relevant questions of public policy, of governmental performance, and of executive personality" (7-8), but it is probably more persuasive to assume Key's notion of rationality for the primary election voter than for the general election voter. In the primary there is no party cue to support the indolent voter, no "valence issues" with which a candidate may be associated, simply because he is of a certain party. Indeed, about the only meaningful information the primary voter does have concerns "personality and governmental performance."

We therefore assume that the rational primary voter votes for his most preferred candidate, if he can. If that candidate is of the voter's own party, then he can vote for him in his party's primary; and if the primary is open, he can also indirectly vote for his preferred candidate by crossing party lines and voting for a "weak" candidate in the opposition party ("raiding"). In the latter case the voter is usually reasonably certain that his preferred candidate is sure to win the nomination of the voter's own party.¹⁴

If the preferred candidate is not of the voter's party, and the primary is open, the voter can cross party lines and vote for him ("switching" as opposed to "raiding;" see note 23 for a detailed

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discussion of these phenomena). If the preferred candidate is not of the voter's party and the primary is closed, the voter will either abstain or vote for a "weak" candidate in his own party. Specific manifestations of the structural influence on primary voting behavior will be discussed in the following section.¹⁵

Hypotheses

To investigate the relationships between primary structure and political behavior we examine all available primary and general elections for Governor¹⁶ and all states using the primary to nominate between 1900 and 1968. There are a total of 1533 primary elections in the data collection (23 blanket, 303 open, 360 closed-challenge, and 847 closed-enrollment).¹⁷

Intervening Variables

Before developing the hypotheses, we must consider two related factors which might disturb otherwise strong relationships between primary structure and political behavior: a candidate's difficulty in getting on the ballot and pre-primary endorsement practices.

Difficulty in Getting on the Ballot

It might be argued that there would be fewer candidates running for Governor in states wherein many petitions signatures must be garnered than in states where all a candidate must do is simply submit his name to the Secretary of State. There is a slight but insignificant tendency for a greater number of candidates to be on the ballot in "easy" states than in "difficult" states.¹⁸ However, Penniman's comments are appropriate to this purported problem:

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The excuse for requiring numerous signatures [on nominating petitions] is that otherwise there would be a plethora of candidates. The argument is of doubtful validity. If a man is well-known and popular or if he is brought forward by the machine merely to draw votes from a dangerous reform candidate, he will not be deterred by a somewhat oppressive requirement. On the other hand, if he is obscure and without backing and yet can offer himself because few signatures are required, his name will not add to the complexity of the ballot or injure the prospects of other candidates. The task of the voter is affected, not by the presence of other candidates -- he will pick the man he knows and wants as easily from among a dozen candidates as from among three -- but by the multiplicity of elective offices. (367)

Preprimary Endorsements

The pre-primary endorsing conventions are of two types: official (permitted by state statute) and unofficial (forbidden by state statute but held anyway by party "clubs" or "caucuses").¹⁹ The effect of both types on candidate behavior is about the same: far larger proportions of nominations are unopposed, not seriously contested or contested by only two men in endorsement states than in states without this provision.²⁰ Bone notes the broad impact of pre-primary endorsement systems:

[T]hey have strengthened and vitalized the parties. Designations are denied to nonentities, and candidates expecting to make a serious bid for nomination must solicit and obtain support from party activists. Pre-primary endorsements help to balance popular control and party control; and, in Colorado at least, have increased party competition because nearly every position on the ticket is filled most of the time. The convention links local committees with the state organizations and thereby reduces organizational atrophy. (278)

A number of the hypotheses developed below involve structural influences on the number of candidates contesting a nomination and the frequency of serious intra-party contests. Since pre-primary conventions limit candidate entry and mitigate intra-party strife, and thereby inhibit the behavior of rational candidates (many of whom desire a divisive primary election), we eliminate from our data those 136 primary elections

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preceded by pre-primary endorsing conventions. We are left with 1397 primaries (22 blanket, 276 open, 349 closed-challenge, and 749 closed-enrollment).

Inter-party Competition

There is one other factor which may intrude massively into relationships between primary structure and behavior: inter-party competition (see notes 12 and 15). The effect of differing levels of two-party competition on voter turnout and candidate entry rate is well documented for every level of elective office, and is best stated by Key (1956):

Such factors as urbanism and incumbency may affect the frequency of primary competition through time but . . . in the long run the incidence of primary competition is a function chiefly of the prospects for victory in the general election. (179)

Jewell (1960) notes that in Kentucky state legislative races, primary contesting increases with party dominance (527) and finds the same evidence when looking at legislative contests throughout the South (1967: 22). Standing and Robinson note similar tendencies in Indiana state and local contests (1071-77). Key (1956) describes similar variations in state legislative primaries in northern and Border states (1969-93). Wolfe also notes a strong relationship between party dominance and high levels of primary contesting for Governor, Senator, and Congressman from 1952-64 (94-96).

Clearly, levels of inter-party competition must be controlled for in analyzing the structure-behavior relationships. In the hypotheses which follow, two tests are made of each: (1) without, and (2) with controls for inter-party competition.

The Index of Inter-party Competition

A measure for inter-party competition which accounts for the rational behavior perspective described above. Rational voters and candidates look

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to the competitive nature of a party system for cues leading to appropriate behavior. The voter asks, "In which party's primary is my vote most likely to 'count'?" and he registers and/or votes according to the response to his question. The candidate asks, "How well can I expect to do in the general election, if I win the primary?" or, "If my goals are limited to influencing the eventual nominee, how likely is it that the nominee will win the general election, and therefore be able to respond to my influence through policy concessions, patronage, etc.?" and he either enters the primary race or he does not, according to his response.

Two objective indicators of the level of inter-party competition exist: average percent of the vote for a given office over time, and the frequency with which a given party wins a given office over time. Neither of these measures, taken separately, are particularly useful (although both are used separately in otherwise capable research efforts²¹); the former schemes fail to account for minority parties who win occasional elections, and the latter accentuates the occasional win while masking the long-term vote distribution.

Schlesinger (1955) devises a method which integrates the two indicators of competition, and we use a variation of his two-dimensional index. Our inter-party competition variable designates the competitive situation of the two major parties in a state for the five general elections immediately preceding a given primary election.

TABLE 1

THE INDEX OF INTER-PARTY COMPETITION

Competitive Status	Election Results for Five Preceding Gubernatorial Elections
minority	45% of 2-party vote; no wins
semi-competitive	45% of 2-party vote: 1 or more wins, or 45% of 2-party vote; no wins
competitive	45% but 55% of 2-party vote; 1 or more wins
semi-dominant	55% of 2-party vote; win all, or 55% of 2-party vote, 1 or more losses
dominant	55% of 2-party vote; win all

This index has two advantages: (1) it permits looking at a given election as a product of electoral tendencies in the immediate past, not as a product of an average situation established by some arbitrary and unchanging base date, and (2) it follows from the reasoning that rational candidates and voters would apply to an electoral situation. Specifically, a recent win gives hope for future success to a minority party member (either voter or candidate), despite the other objective indication of minority status: vote percent. On the other hand, a recent loss by the majority party instills fear for the future (and perhaps dispels party lethargy), despite its otherwise majority status. The index as constructed captures the nuance of likely calculations which political actors employ when determining their action vis-a-vis the primary election.

Longitudinal Hypotheses

Wide changes in the ratios of primary participation between the parties reflect fairly durable changes in the relative sizes of the groups of strong partisans, a matter of perhaps more significance than momentary shifts in voting strength in response to appeals of particular campaigns. (Key, 1956: 101-02)

Both candidates and voters are aware of the point of real decision in a political system; where one party dominates, it is the primary of that party; where the parties are competitive, it is the general election. It is also true that shifts over time either away from or toward a competitive situation in the general elections are recognized by rational political actors, who respond appropriately: "[a]s the average Democratic proportion of the general election vote declines, the proportion of all primary voters who vote in Democratic primaries declines but at a more rapid rate." (Key, 1956: 100).²²

Key offers these findings on the empirical basis of looking at all primaries, without regard for the type of primary. Below we develop hypotheses testing longitudinal variations in voter behavior as a response to the constraints placed on rational voting by primary structure.

The size of that portion of the electorate which switches from party to party in primary elections as a response to shifts in the two-party competitive situation is associated with the legal ease with which switching is permitted. Open primaries place the fewest restrictions on the voter; closed, the most. We expect more switching of voters where switching involves the least cost. This switching is reflected in change in one party's percentage of the total two-party turnout from one primary election to the next. Thus,

Hypothesis 1

For a given office, the more open the primary, the greater the variation from primary to the following primary in a party's percentage of the total two-party turnout.

Voter switching also takes place between the primary and the general election which follows. We expect that in an open primary more voters will participate in one party's primary and vote for the other

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party's nominee in the general election than in the closed primary, given that they have the relative freedom to do so. Thus,

Hypothesis 2

For a given office, the more open the primary, the greater the variation from a primary to the following general election in a party's percentage of the total two-party turnout.

Also reflected by primary structure is variation toward or away from inter-party balance for an office over time. For example, we expect that in a former one-party state that is trending toward a two-party competitive status, party turnouts in the primary will tend to approximate each other sooner in open than in closed primary states, where the shift in party turnout balance in the primary will lag because of the registration requirements which make party affiliation change more costly. Similarly, we expect that in a former two-party state that is trending toward one-party dominant, party turnouts in the primary will tend to resemble turnout in the general election sooner in open than in closed situations; i.e., voters will turn to the primary of the dominant party in a shorter time span. Thus,

Hypothesis 3

For a given office, the more open the primary, the less the variation from a general election to the following primary election in a party's percentage of the total two-party turnout.

To test these hypotheses, we compare Democratic primary and general election turnout percentages for all states, controlling for primary type. We calculate the average deviation for all appropriate election pairs, expecting that the deviation will be highest in open states for Hypothesis 1, lowest for Hypothesis 2.

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Static Hypotheses

Voter Behavior

Voters respond in various ways to the stimuli of a particular election, as well as over time. As noted, voters tend to participate in inordinate numbers in the primary of the dominant party. Also, given proper conditions, voters periodically conduct forays into parties with which they do not affiliate for the purpose of either nominating preferred candidates (switching) or nominating weak candidates (raiding).²³ Clearly, a voter is more capable of switching/raiding in an open primary situation, whether this action is organized by party leaders or not.

We expect, therefore, that behavioral manifestations of switching/raiding will be more apparent in open primary election results than in closed (see Hypothesis 2 for an indirect indicator of this expectation).²⁴ Specifically, these manifestations, as they should appear in open primary states when compared with closed states, are (1) smaller average pluralities for the leading vote-getter, (2) smaller average percentage differences between the leading vote-getter and the runner-up, (3) smaller average percent totals received by the two top vote-getters, (4) less incidence of incumbent renomination, (5) smaller average pluralities for an incumbent, and (6) less incidence of a renominated incumbent winning the general election. Thus,

Hypothesis 4

For a given office, the more open the primary, the smaller the average plurality for the leading vote getter.

For this and all subsequent hypotheses we test without and with controls for inter-party competition. For test purposes plurality is

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operationalized as a simple percentage of the total vote of the leader's party.

Hypothesis 5

For a given office, the more open the primary, the larger the average index of competitiveness.

The index of competitiveness measures the level of intensity of intra-party competition between the two leading candidates. It is operationalized by subtracting from 100 percent the difference in the vote percent of the top two candidates. The larger the index number, the more vigorously contested the primary.

Hypothesis 6

For a given office, the more open the primary, the larger the average index of fragmentation.

The index of fragmentation is a measure developed by Key (1949: 421) which he used to determine empirically the degree of fragmentation and factionalism in state Democratic parties in the South. It is calculated by subtracting from 100 percent the sum of the vote percent obtained by the two top vote-getters. The larger the index number, the more dispersed or fragmented the party.

Hypothesis 7

For a given office, the more open the primary, the smaller the percent of primaries won by incumbents seeking renomination.

Hypothesis 8

For a given office, the more open the primary, the smaller the average plurality for an incumbent seeking renomination.

Hypothesis 9

For a given office, the more open the primary, the

smaller the percent of general elections won by re-nominated incumbents.

Candidate Behavior

Ceteris paribus, the rational candidate responds to the nature of his electorate as determined by primary structure. Information about the electorate in open primary states is more uncertain than about closed primary electorates. The more open a primary, the less predictable is a given party's turnout, both in terms of size and composition. A candidate would thus be more uncertain of the effect of a campaign on his electorate because of its tendency toward increased heterogeneity. Heterogeneity in itself is not a delimiting factor -- the victorious nominee would have to face a varied electorate in the general election -- but a more heterogeneous electorate in a primary election, sans party cue, tends to make the candidate's perception of the primary outcome more random than would a campaign in a closed primary state.

Incumbency

In addition to the intervening influence of inter-party competition, we must control for an additional situational variable in the context of candidate behavior: incumbency. The literature is replete with discussions of the effect of incumbency on primary contesting, and most of it suggests that a given candidate's chances for nomination are greater in a primary in which the incumbent does not seek renomination.

Turner notes that in safe congressional districts between 1944 and 1950, only 35 of the 908 incumbents seeking renomination lost (four percent) and 472, or 52 percent, were unopposed (208). Ewing (1953) finds that 90.6 percent of all incumbent executives in the South won renomina-

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tion (65), and that uncontested primaries with the incumbent running outnumbered those without the incumbent running by a margin of seven to three (60). Jewell (1967) notes similar dampening influences of incumbency on contesting in state legislative races in Border and South states, and adds that competition for the nominations "varies inversely with the length of incumbency." (26) Key (1956) notes the inhibiting effect of incumbency on contesting of Missouri state representative primaries (175-76). Wolfe finds that "for all senatorial and congressional primaries outside the South [1952-64] the incumbency effect even results in less primary competition within the majority party than within the minority party," although he finds this not to be true for Governor (60).

There are two dissentors to the above evidence about the suppressive effect of incumbency. Epstein finds that in Wisconsin incumbency does not dampen contesting for state legislative seats (131-32: 200),²⁵ and Jewell (1960) notes that in Kentucky incumbency does not inhibit contesting when party competition is controlled for (528). However, no one offers findings supporting speculation that incumbency encourages primary challenges.

We suggest that hidden within these practically unanimous findings are interesting variations associated with different primary structures. We expect to find more contesting of primaries generally and more challenging of incumbents particularly in open primary states than in closed. Specifically, we expect that when comparing open primary states to closed, we will find (1) more "contested" primaries, (2) more candidates entering primaries, (3) more "serious" candidates entering primaries, (4) fewer unopposed nominees, and (5) a higher rate of challenging incumbents. In the hypotheses which follow, we test without and with controls for incumbency (and, as always, for inter-party competition).

Hypothesis 10

For a given office, the more open the primary, the more likely it is to be contested.

We operationalize "contesting" identically to Turner:

[W]e will assume that any primary contest in which the winner garnered two-thirds of the vote for the top two candidates was sufficiently one-sided so that most voters and politicians alike realized before the primary that there was little chance of defeating the [leading candidate]. (203)

We suggest that the nature of open primaries not only makes this pre-primary calculation less certain, it also provides the structural context for making post-primary evidence of the reasonableness of the pre-primary realization less persuasive; i.e., more open primaries will indeed wind up "contested" than closed primaries, regardless of the initial supposition about the vigorousness of the challenge.

Hypothesis 11

For a given office, the more open the primary, the larger the average number of candidates likely to compete for the nomination.

Given the relative incompleteness of information about open primary situations, we expect that in those states more candidates will have realistic expectations of winning or influencing the nominee than in closed states.

Hypothesis 12

For a given office, the more open the primary, the larger the number of serious candidates likely to compete for the nomination.

A "serious" candidate is defined as one who receives at least twenty percent of his party's primary vote, unless the leading candidate has less than fifty percent of the vote, in which case a serious candidate is de-

defined as one who receives at least ten percent (this qualification accounts for a number of bitterly contested primaries, especially in the South, where no candidate received as much as twenty percent, but where there were obviously several "serious" candidates). We expect more serious candidates in open primaries for the same reason we expect lower indices of dispersion: the relative situational ambiguity will encourage serious candidates for the governorship to join the race because of the existence of a large potential electorate to which appeals would be fruitless in a closed primary, where much of this electorate is either committed to vote in the other party's primary or kept from voting altogether by reason of unwillingness to declare a partisan affiliation.

Hypothesis 13

For a given office, the more open the primary, the fewer the percentage of elections with unopposed nominees.


This hypothesis is another indication of our expectation that potential challengers of strong nominees calculate more opportunity for a primary election upset in open primaries, given the diffuse character of the electorate, and are therefore more willing to contest an otherwise unopposed nomination.

Hypothesis 14

For a given office, the more open the primary, the larger the percentage of elections in which the incumbent is challenged.

The reasoning for this hypothesis is identical to that for Hypothesis 13, only "incumbent" is substituted for "strong nominee."

Chapter II of the thesis reports the results of tests of the hypotheses.



Conclusion

Chapter III is fundamentally a descriptive chapter delineating (1) regional variations in primary structure and behavior, and (2) the post-1900 history of primary structural variation and the dynamics of inter-party competition, plus an historical development, by party, of intra-party competition for Governor in all states.

Chapter IV is in two parts. First is a discussion of party organization as both an independent and dependent variable in the general context of primary elections. The literature on this topic is diverse and somewhat speculative about the impact of organizations on primaries; the evidence about the impact of primaries on party organization is less equivocal -- more scholars believe party organizations are seriously disrupted by primaries than believe primaries have little or no effect -- but the evidence about degree of impact, and indeed whether or not that impact is harmful in the long run, is the subject of much scholarly debate and will be considered in detail.

The final part of Chapter IV contains a concluding statement and suggestions for future research.

Summary

The study of nominating procedure is an important area of the study of political parties, and the study of the primary election process in the United States has received a fair amount of attention. Most of the analytical work either compares party systems using the primary with systems using other methods of nomination, or treats primaries generally as an independent variable associated with varying degrees of inter- and intra-party competition.

The present analysis looks at the different structures of primary elections and hypothesizes that variance in voting and candidate behavior is associated with distinguishably different types of primaries. In general, we expect parties in open primary states to be internally more competitive, and more volative electorally over time, than parties in closed primary states. We test for these expected variations, applying appropriate controls, and draw conclusions about the structural influence of primary elections on political behavior.

Backnotes, Chapter I

¹For a brief history of American nominating practices, see V. O. Key, American State Politics: An Introduction (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), 85-97; and V. O. Key, Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups (New York: Thomas R. Crowell, 1964), 370-76. See Arthur C. Wolfe, The Direct Primary in American Politics (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1966), 14-35, for a more extensive discussion of this topic, and for a history of early primary election legislation, see Charles Merriam and Louise Overacker, Primary Elections. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1928), chap. V.

²Wolfe notes that two primary-type elections are recorded in Australia (1952) and Great Britain (1957). These were ad hoc events aimed at purging dissident members of parliament and apparently have not been repeated. Wolfe: 55.

³See Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 106 (1923), no. 11; Leon E. Aylsworth, "Primary Election Legislation of 1909-1910," American Political Science Review, 6 (1912), 60-74; Lamar T. Beman, The Direct Primary (New York: H. W. Wilson Co., 1926); Clarence A. Berdahl, "The Richards Primary," American Political Science Review, 14 (1920), 93-105; James H. Booser, "The Origin of the Direct Primary," National Municipal Review, 24 (1935), 222-23; Horace Flack, "Notes on Current Legislation," American Political Science Review, 6 (1912), 60-74; Frederic H. Guild, "The Indiana Primary," National Municipal Review, 11 (1922), 286-90; Charles Kettleborough, "Legislative News and Notes," American Political Science Review, 13 (1919), 264-66; Richard E. Manning, Party Affiliation (Washington, D. C.: Library of Congress, Legislative Reference Service, December 13, 1932); Charles Merriam, Primary Elections: A Study of the History and Tendencies of Primary Election Legislation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1908); Charles Merriam and Louise Overacker, Primary Elections (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1928); Louise Overacker, "Primary Election Legislation of 1926-27," American Political Science Review, 22 (1928), 353-61; Louise Overacker, "Primary Election Legislation of 1928-29," American Political Science Review, 24 (1930), 370-80; Louise Overacker, "Primary Election Legislation of 1930-31," American Political Science Review, 26 (1932), 294-300; Louise Overacker, "Primary Election Legislation of 1932-33," American Political Science Review, 28 (1934), 265-70; Louise Overacker, "Direct Primary Legislation in 1936-39," American Political Science Review, 34 (1940), 499-506; Ormund P. Ray, "Primary Legislation, 1924-25," American Political Science Review, 20 (1926), 349-52; and Ormund P. Ray, "Recent Primary and Election Laws," American Political Science Review, 13 (1919), 264-74.

⁴Congressional Digest (entire issue), "The Direct Primary System," 5 (1926), no. 10; Charles Evans Hughes, "The Fate of the Direct Primary," National Municipal Review, 10 (1921), 23-31; Oliver McKee, Jr., "Direct Primary: A Failure and a Threat," Atlantic Monthly, 148 (1931), 185-93; and T. Henry Walnut, "Gifford Pinchot and the Direct Primary," National Municipal Review, 11 (1922).

⁵See Ralph S. Boots, "The Trend of the Direct Primary," American Political Science Review, 16 (1922), 412-31; John E. Briggs, "The Iowa Primary Interpreted," National Municipal Review, 11 (1922), 282-86;

Richard S. Childs, "Rhode Island Tries the Primary," National Municipal Review, 38 (1948), 126-29; L. M. Holland, The Direct Primary in Georgia (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1949: Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences, 30, no. 4); Boyd A. Martin, The Direct Primary in Idaho (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1947); Arthur C. Millspaugh, "The Operation of the Direct Primary in Michigan," American Political Science Review, 10 (1916), 710-26; Daniel M. Ogden, "The Blanket Primary and Party Regularity in Washington," Pacific Northwest Quarterly, 39 (1948), 33-38; James K. Pollack, The Direct Primary in Michigan (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1943: Michigan Government Studies, n. 14); and Kirk H. Porter, "The Deserted Primary in Iowa," American Political Science Review, 39 (1945), 732-40.

⁶The reasons for the paucity of useful literature on primary elections are effectively summarized by Cutright and Rossi: "Primary elections are not the most dramatic of political phenomena, and much research has been directed toward that most glamorous of American elections, the general election of a President. But there are additional obstacles to the study of primary elections. For one thing, primary elections occur within each major party. Each party is a relatively homogeneous group, as compared with the variation in a wide number of socio-economic characteristics between parties. Hence, the factors which help to account for so much of the variation in the vote garnered by each candidate in a general election do not apply in primary elections." (262)

⁷Much more will be said about the true motivations of the primary voter later. Key's suggestion that voters "raid" another party's primary in order to nominate a weak candidate is only a partial explanation of voting behavior in "cross-over" situations. Indeed, Pollack suggests that most crossing is in support of a preferred candidate whom the voter intends to support in the general election. (60)

⁸For general discussion of the impact of structural variables, see Hugh Bone, American Politics and the Party System, 4th ed., (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1971), 459-71; Angus Campbell, The American Voter (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1960), chap. 11; V. O. Key, Jr., Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups, 5th ed., (New York: Thomas R. Crowell, 1964); chap. 23; Robert E. Lane, Political Life (New York: The Free Press, 1959), 307-17; and Lester Milbrath, Political Participation (Chicago: Rand, McNally & Co., 1965).

⁹See Ralph Goldman, "Move -- Lose Your Vote," National Municipal Review, 45 (1956), 6-10; Stanley Kelley, Jr., Richard E. Ayres, and William G. Bowen, "Registration and Voting: Putting First Things First," American Political Science Review, 61 (1967), 359-79; Donald R. Matthews and James W. Prothro, "Political Factors and Negro Voter Registration in the South," American Political Science Review, 57 (1963), 355-67; Morris Ogul, "Residency Requirements," Midwest Journal of Political Science, 3 (1959), 254-62; and Report on Registration and Voting Participation (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1963).

¹⁰See Robert C. Brooks, "Voter's Vagaries: The Value of Position on a Ballot," National Municipal Review, 10 (1921), 161-65; Henry M. Bain and Donald S. Hecock, Ballot Position and Voter's Choice: The Arrangement of Names on the Ballot and Its Effects on the Voter (Detroit:

Wayne State University Press, 1957); Angus Campbell and Warren Miller, "The Motivational Basis of Straight and Split-Ticket Voting," American Political Science Review, 51 (1957), 293-312; and Jack Walker, "Ballot Form and Voter Fatigue," Midwest Journal of Political Science, 10 (1966), 448-63.

¹¹This latter calculation is most important in the primary election where such concessions are often granted by the winner to the losing candidate(s) or faction(s) in the interest of party unity in the general election. Winners of general elections are typically not burdened by any such obligations, given the zero-sum nature of that election.

¹²The level of inter-party competition in a given jurisdiction is a critical variable, because it is the most important aggregate predictor of general election outcomes. It has obvious impact on a candidate's assessment of his chances of winning the general election, and it therefore intrudes upon his calculations about entering the primary contest to begin with. We will consider the effect of inter-party competition on behavior in detail below.

However, this cue is not present within the context of the primary election situation when viewed as an isolated event. And, of course, the candidate must prevail in the intra-party contest before the forces of inter-party competition even begin to come into play. Since the inter-party competition factor is, in this sense, analytically removed from the candidate's sum of information about his chances, information is by definition more incomplete for any given candidate at the primary election stage than for any given candidate at the general election stage.

¹³Indeed the SRC group, the most noted expositors of the social determinism model of voting behavior, suggests that rational voting was clearly operative in the 1968 presidential election. Philip Converse, et al, "Continuity and Change in American Politics: Parties and Issues in the 1968 Election," American Political Science Review, 63 (1969), 1083-1105.

¹⁴See Berdahl, *supra*.

¹⁵Inter-party competition influences voters as well as candidates in their behavior with respect to primaries: "As the normal balance of electoral strength shifts to the advantage of one party, popular attention tends to center in the direct primary of that party, the arena of governing decision in the politics of the state." (Key, 1956: 104). Yet when one holds inter-party competition constant, we expect that variation in voter behavior will still be associated with structural variation.

¹⁶Gubernatorial nominations seem to feature the highest turnout of any statewide constituency. Even in the 141 primaries in which the nominee for Governor was uncontested and the nomination for the U.S. Senate seat was contested, the total number of votes cast for the lone gubernatorial nominee was higher than the total cast for all the senatorial candidates in forty-seven percent of the elections, about the same in five percent, and lower in forty percent.

¹⁷I was unable to obtain results for sixty-seven of the total of

1600 primaries held for Governor between 1900 and 1968; this is slightly more than four percent of the total. Most of the gaps are pre-1920, when election data in many states, especially in the South, are fragmentary at best. The only post-1920 data missing are in Georgia (1924) and Nebraska (1936). There are 214 occasions in which one party held a primary for Governor and the other either nominated by convention or offered no candidate at all; most of these occurred in the South. My data are from a number of sources: Richard M. Scammon, ed., America Votes, 2-8 (Washington, D. C.: Government Affairs Institute, 1956-68) is the best source for recent primaries. Alexander Heard and D. S. Strong, Southern Primaries and Elections (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1950) contains the county-by-county results of gubernatorial primaries in the old Confederacy from 1920-48. Kentucky results were obtained from Malcolm E. Jewell, Kentucky Votes, 3 (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1963). Montana results were obtained from Ellis Waldron, An Atlas of Montana Politics Since 1864 (Missoula: Montana State University Press, 1958). Nevada results are found in John Koontz, Political History of Nevada, 5th ed. (Carson City: Nevada State Printing Office, 1965). All other data are from state manuals and bluebooks, or were obtained through personal correspondence with secretaries of state, state election boards, state libraries, or departments of political science in the state universities. The people in Nebraska were the most willing to help; the people in Utah did not even bother to answer my inquiries.

Only Connecticut and Delaware have never held a direct primary election for Governor, and only Delaware has never had provision for a gubernatorial primary.

¹⁸ Obtaining accurate information about candidacy requirements is nearly an impossible task. Many states change their requirements with practically the sitting of each new legislature. There were but two periods for which I could find reasonably reliable descriptions of requirements in most states: 1926-28 (from Merriam and Overacker) and 1954-56 (from the National Municipal League, Compilation of the 48 Direct Primary Systems). There are several gradations of difficulty in getting on the ballot: filing only; filing plus paying a fee or filing plus gathering a few petition signatures; and filing plus gathering a relatively large number of signatures (e.g., more than one percent of the party's vote total in the previous gubernatorial election). These requirements I designated as "easy." Filing, plus gathering a relatively large number of signatures with a geographical distribution (e.g., signatures from at least twenty counties), or any sort of pre-primary endorsement requirement, I designated as "difficult."

For the years analyzed, there were 400 candidates and sixty-nine elections with "easy" requirements, for an average of 5.8 candidates per election, while in the "difficult" states there were forty-six candidates in eleven elections for an average of 4.2. However, in seven of the primaries in "easy" states the largest number of candidates ever to run in the history of the gubernatorial primary appeared during the years examined (e.g., fourteen in Washington in 1924, sixteen in Ohio in 1926, and eighteen in Oklahoma in 1954). When these seven extreme cases are removed, the remaining sixty-two elections have 317 candidates running, for an average of 5.1, as compared to the 4.2 in the "difficult" states. It also must be recalled that the difficult states include pre-primary endorsement states like Utah and Colorado, where by law (Utah) or by

custom (Colorado) only two candidates may appear on a party's ballot.

¹⁹Of the 1533 available primaries, 136 (about nine percent) were preceded by a pre-primary endorsing convention.

Unofficial pre-primary endorsing conventions:

California: California Republican Assembly since 1942; California Democratic Council since 1953

Official pre-primary endorsing conventions (for both parties unless otherwise indicated:

Colorado: since 1942

Connecticut: since 1956, provides for a "challenge" primary for any losing candidate with more than twenty percent of the convention delegates. No one has requested a primary for Governor.

Idaho: 1963-71

Iowa: Democrats only in 1966

Massachusetts: 1932-37 and since 1951

Minnesota: 1921-23

Nebraska: 1944-56

New Mexico: 1949-55 and 1963-67

Rhode Island: since 1948

South Dakota: 1917-29. Since 1929, a post-primary nominating convention must be called if no nominee gets more than thirty-five percent of the primary vote. A convention has been called once, in 1930, and the leading vote-getter in the primary was not nominated in the convention.

Utah: since 1937. Utah has a curious system; both parties tightly control the nominations by selecting in convention a maximum of two candidates from each party, then they hold an open primary.

²⁰The evidence on this point is persuasive. In California the Republican Assembly endorsed thirty-five candidates for thirty-eight statewide contests between 1942-58. Twenty-six were not seriously challenged (seventy-four percent). Of the twelve contests involving "serious" intra-party battles, seven endorsees won and two lost (six percent of the total). In that period endorsed candidates for Governor received an average of ninety-four percent of the primary vote. The two Democratic Council endorsees received eighty-eight and eighty-two percent of the vote (Rowe).

In 1927 Colorado adopted its pre-primary system (wherein a potential candidate needs twenty percent of the delegate vote and three hundred petition signatures to be placed on the ballot); ballot position is according to size of delegate vote. Eyre and Martin assert that the assemblies nominate most candidates, not the primaries. "Prospective candidates who do not have broad support within the party are either eliminated or discouraged by the assembly system." (62) Bone notes that because of Colorado's system, three-fourths of the state house of representative nominations are uncontested (277).

²¹For the most noted example of the use of the first indicator, see Richard E. Dawson and James A. Robinson, "Interparty Competition, Economic Variables, and Welfare Policies in the American States," Journal of Politics, 25 (1963), 265-89. Actually, Dawson and Robinson combine a number of executive and legislative offices into a composite index of competition, concealing massive inter-office differences in many states. For an

example of the use of the second indicator, see Standing and Robinson (1068-70). They call a constituency "safe" for one party if that party has won at least five consecutive elections, and "competitive" if one party wins one of three consecutive elections, but they do not account for vote percentage.

For a systematic review of previous work on indices of inter-party competition, see David G. Pfeiffer, "the Measurement of Inter-Party Competition and Systemic Stability," American Political Science Review, (1967), 457-67. See also Paul T. David, "How Can an Index of Party Competition Best be Derived?", Journal of Politics, 34 (1972), 632-38; and see David B. Meltz, "An Index for the Measurement of Inter-Party Competition," (unpublished manuscript, Michigan State University, 1972), for a delicate measure of competition which seems to overcome many of the theoretical failings of earlier indices.

²²Turner notes a variation on Key's theme: ". . . the habit of primary competition develops only with long experience under one-party rule, although former one-party states retain the competitive pattern after their change of status. Recently converted one-party states have not yet developed the competitive pattern in their primaries." (206)

²³Sorauf's claim that there is "no evidence of raiding" (206) is overstatement. Berdahl documents considerable organized raiding in urban Illinois and New Jersey (38-50). Pollack notes that "[l]arge numbers of Democrats and independents have taken part in the well-attended Republican primaries" in Michigan (27). Millspaugh displays results from two Wayne County, Michigan wards in the 1912 gubernatorial contest (717-18):

	<u>Pct. 1, Ward 1</u>		<u>Pct. 1, Ward 2</u>	
	<u>Primary</u>	<u>General</u>	<u>Primary</u>	<u>General</u>
Republican	265	1	166	38
Democrat	12	259	2	147

Penniman notes statewide results of three Minnesota gubernatorial contests (336-37):

	<u>1918</u>		<u>1920</u>		<u>1922</u>	
	<u>Primary</u>	<u>General</u>	<u>Primary</u>	<u>General</u>	<u>Primary</u>	<u>General</u>
Rep	125,145	155,789	368,263	366,247	500,620	367,929
Dem	28,340	112,576	22,435	247,746	19,108	51,061

Martin cites the 1938 Idaho contest for Governor (70):

	<u>Primary</u>	<u>General</u>
Republican	86,855	77,697
Democrat	30,398	106,208

To be sure, all of the above elections took place in open primary states. Aside from Berdahl, there is no evidence to either prove or refute Sorauf's initial point in the context of closed primary states. But Bone notes: "Party politicians and candidates complain about 'raiding' or a crossover of voters aimed to nominate a weak candidate. Some voters may admit to a crossover but declare that it was for the purpose of getting the 'best man,' not the weakest, nominated. Many charges about raiding are hard to prove. It is contended by politicians and by many academicians that

the open and blanket primaries permit raiding, and the latter to a greater degree than the former [see Ogden, supra]. Although this is true, the contention that no raiding is possible in a closed primary may be seriously questioned. Even in closed primaries, voters insist on switching their parties; and both candidates and parties will encourage raiding if they can find ways to facilitate it." (270-71)

It is, of course, our contention that "facilitation" is easier in open primaries than in closed.

²⁴Wolfe finds a larger percent of voters crossing parties in open primary states (eleven percent) than in closed-challenge (seven percent) or closed enrollment (six percent). He also notes forty-five percent of the cross-over voters reporting having stayed in the crossed-to party in the general election. Wolfe's results are obtained from 1958 and 1964 Survey Research Center data, and his N is very small (sixty-two of the combined sample of more than 3000). (111)

²⁵Wisconsin is an open primary state.

CHAPTER II

THE IMPACT OF PRIMARY STRUCTURE: SOME TESTS

Introduction

In the previous chapter we developed hypotheses from notions of rational political actors responding to the structural constraints of primary election situations. We test these hypotheses in the sections which follow.

As noted, there are four types of primary elections -- blanket, open, closed-challenge, and closed-enrollment. The closed-challenge type is elsewhere called "semi-open" (Wolfe: 111) and its neither-fish-nor-fowl character presents us with an important analytical problem: do we consider it as open or as closed in testing our hypotheses? As it turns out, states which use the closed-challenge system manifest behavioral characteristics of closed states in some instances, open in others. Therefore, while we display voter and candidate behavior results of closed-challenge primaries in our tables, we test hypotheses excluding them.

In our tests we combine the blanket and open results and compare them to closed-enrollment results. By thus dichotomizing we have two samples of election results to which we apply the Difference of Means Test and the Difference of Proportions Test, as appropriate (Garrett: 127-38), to determine the significance of the variation in behavior between the relatively "pure" open and closed primaries.

Longitudinal Hypotheses

Voters will vote in the primary of the party with the more meaningful and/or interesting contests, if they can. Ceteris paribus, rational

voters will participate in the primary of the party whose candidates are likely to win the general election or where an active contest is taking place for the nomination. However, all other things are not equal; different structural restrictions are imposed on the ability of the voter to vote in the most meaningful primary. We expect that more voters in open primaries will switch parties between elections than in closed primaries, since fewer impediments (the most important being the changing of party registration) confront them. Repeating Hypothesis 1,

The more open the primary, the greater the variation from primary to the following primary in a party's percent of the total two-party turnout.

The average between-primary percent variations, cited in Table 2, monotonically decrease with increasingly closed primaries.¹

TABLE 2

AVERAGE INTER-PRIMARY PERCENT VARIATION IN DEMOCRATIC
PERCENT OF TOTAL TWO-PARTY VOTE, BY PRIMARY TYPE

Primary Type	Average Variation	Number of Election Pairs
blanket	17.76	10
open	9.67	126
closed-challenge	7.06	125
closed-enrollment	6.98	259
	<u>7.85</u>	<u>520</u>

Testing the hypothesis, we find the difference between the average variation of open and closed primaries to be significant at the .01 level (Table 3). Thus we reject the null hypothesis that primary type has no influence on between-primary variation in voting turnout.

TABLE 3

DIFFERENCE OF MEANS TEST OF THE AVERAGE BETWEEN-PRIMARY
PERCENT VARIATION IN DEMOCRATIC TURNOUT, BY PRIMARY TYPE

	Open	Closed
Mean	10.26	6.98
S.D.	9.16	6.15
N	136	259

$t = 3.77$ at 393 d.f.

Further, we expect some voter switching to take place between the primary and the general election. A voter who switches has three possible justifications for his behavior: (1) he wants to "raid" the other party in order to help nominate a weak candidate, (2) he wants to "switch" to the other party in order to help nominate a preferred candidate whom he intends to support in the general election, or (3) he simply wants to vote in the primary of the party whose candidates are most likely to win the general election.

Which of these rationales we assume to be operative dictates the direction of our hypothetical relationship between primary and general election turnout variation. Assuming justification (1), we suggest

Hypothesis 2:

The more open the primary, the greater the variation from a primary to the following general election in a party's percent of the total two-party turnout.

We find, in fact, the reverse to be true; i.e., open primaries feature less variation (see Table 4). We conclude that on an aggregate basis "raiding" occurs with less frequency than "switching" in open primaries (indeed, generally), and that in closed primary states a voter typically registers with the dominant party, votes in its primary, and votes his true party preference in the general election. The latter type of behavior is documented elsewhere for primaries generally but the

distinctions among primary types, especially the monotonic increment in variation that accompanies increasing "closedness," suggests that, while open primary states have the greater potential for gross voter volatility, they are actually more stable. On balance, in open states fewer voters abandon their primary election party in November than in closed states.

TABLE 4

AVERAGE PERCENT VARIATION BETWEEN PRIMARY ELECTION AND
FOLLOWING GENERAL ELECTION IN DEMOCRATIC PERCENT OF
TOTAL TWO-PARTY TURNOUT, BY PRIMARY TYPE

Primary Type	Average Variation	Number of Election Pairs
blanket	11.41	10
open	14.88	133
closed-challenge	18.21	132
closed-enrollment	<u>18.23</u>	<u>296</u>
	16.57	571

Testing the hypothesis, we find the difference in average variations to be significant at the .01 level (Table 5). Thus we can simultaneously reject the null hypothesis that primary type has no influence on primary-to-general election variation and our original alternative hypothesis that open primaries and relatively large variations are associated.

TABLE 5

DIFFERENCE OF MEANS TEST OF THE AVERAGE VARIATION BETWEEN
PRIMARY AND FOLLOWING GENERAL ELECTION IN DEMOCRATIC
PERCENT OF TOTAL TWO-PARTY TURNOUT, BY PRIMARY TYPE

	Open	Closed
Mean	14.64	18.23
S.D.	10.57	10.62
N	143	295

$$t = -3.32 \text{ at } 436 \text{ d.f.}$$

Finally, we expect many voters to respond to short-term change in the competitive status of the two parties as manifest by the variation

between the general election percent and the following primary election percent. Open primary states will tend to reflect a closer balance between general and primary election results than closed states, and variations should be smaller. Repeating Hypothesis 3,

The more open the primary, the less the variation from a general election to the following primary election in a party's percent of the total two-party turnout.

Table 6 indicates that the hypothesis is sound.

TABLE 6

AVERAGE VARIATION BETWEEN GENERAL ELECTION AND FOLLOWING
PRIMARY ELECTION IN DEMOCRATIC PERCENT OF TOTAL TWO-
PARTY VOTE, BY PRIMARY TYPE

Primary Type	Average Variation	Number of Election Pairs
blanket	10.87	10
open	14.84	132
closed-challenge	17.64	134
closed-enrollment	<u>17.81</u>	<u>297</u>
	16.96	573

Testing the hypothesis, we find the difference in average variations significant at the .01 level (Table 7). We reject the null hypothesis that primary type has no influence on general-to-primary election variation.²

TABLE 7

DIFFERENCE OF MEANS TEST OF THE AVERAGE VARIATION BETWEEN
GENERAL ELECTION AND FOLLOWING PRIMARY ELECTION IN
DEMOCRATIC PERCENT OF TOTAL TWO-PARTY TURNOUT,
BY PRIMARY TYPE

	Open	Closed
Mean	14.67	17.64
S.D.	11.07	9.92
N	141	294

$t = 2.72$ at 433 d.f.

In summary, we note that primary structure is an independent influence upon short-term fluctuation of primary and general election voting. One aspect of the open-closed dichotomy which is intuitively of importance is the different physical nature of the voting process in states with the two types of primaries. In all states the general election ballot is secret -- barring fraud a voter's vote is known only to himself. In open primary states the primary ballot is also secret -- the voter votes in one party's primary and discards the unused paper ballots or flips the voting machine lever which forever conceals his choice of party. But party affiliation is public information in closed primary states. A voter's candidate choices may be his information alone, but not his party. There are therefore probably a number of social and psychological pressures, some subtle and some not-so-subtle, brought to bear on the voter, especially at the time of party declaration during the voter registration state, in closed primary states. Many voters may resist these influences -- ethnic, religious, racial, marital, etc. Some will not. The important point is that the privacy of the ballot at both elections in open primary states permits every voter greater flexibility and independence in his behavior, and therefore encourages more rational action, than do closed primary states, wherein a crucial stage of the voting process is quite public.³

Thus we should not be surprised that in open states more voters switch parties between primaries than in closed states, because it is easier to do so in the former than in the latter. Similarly, more voters switch parties between the primary and the general election in closed primary states than in open, because if switching is to take place, it can be privately consummated only in the general election polling booth.⁴

In open primaries voters typically switch parties in order to vote for a

preferred candidate in the general election.

It is possible, of course, that the larger variation noted in closed primary states can be attributed to "raiding." This is most unlikely, however, for one overriding reason: the organizational resources needed to entice a sufficiently large number of voters to change party registration to make a raid successful are huge at the local level (Berdahl, 1942: loc. cit.). To mobilize such resources for a statewide incursion would probably not be possible, and there is no iron-clad guarantee that the attempt would accomplish the desired goal: the "strong" candidate might win anyway, or the "weak" candidate might capture the imagination of the voters during the campaign and win the general election.

An additional explanation for this finding is that since the closed primary of one party by its nature excludes a portion of the electorate from voting therein, the primary electorate is ceteris paribus smaller than the general election voter pool, and the larger difference found in closed states reflects an increase in the absolute number of voters between the two elections, relative to the increase found in open states, where the pool is theoretically equal for both elections.

The switching which occurs between the general election and the following primary is in part the reverse dynamic of the primary-general switching: voters return to their "home" party, and they do it in larger numbers in closed states than in open. But the results of the general election also influence the switching. The voter in open primary states seems to follow more closely the short-run tides of inter-party balance, using the previous general election outcome as one cue to future primary behavior, whereas the voters in closed states, barring re-registration, finds his future primary behavior predetermined.

Static Hypothesis

In what follows we note interesting and frequently unexpected variations in intra-election political behavior associated with different primary structures. We have already noted the controls we introduce: intra-party competition and incumbency. In the hypothesis tests we refine the Index of Competition slightly in order to control for competition in a relatively "pure" way; we eliminate the "semi-competitive" and "semi-dominant" categories, because the N's are rather small compared to the other classifications and because their exclusion clearly makes the remaining three categories analytically discrete.

Voter Behavior

As described in Chapter I, when comparing open and closed primary states, we expect to find the following in open states: smaller pluralities for the leading vote-getter and incumbent, larger average indices of competitiveness and fragmentation, less incidence of incumbent renomination and less incidence of reelection of renominated incumbents. Anticipating the actual display of the results, generally we find larger average pluralities for leaders in open primaries (but no difference for incumbents), less competitiveness and fragmentation, no difference in incumbent renomination rates, and less incidence of incumbent reelection, the last finding being the only one consistent with a hypothesized relationship.

Plurality

Expecting voter raiding/switching to accrue to the benefit of challengers of leading candidates in open primaries, while leading candidates in closed states will be faced with no such threat, we offer Hypothesis 4:

The more open the primary, the smaller the average plurality for the leading vote-getter

In Table 8 we note findings in clear contravention of the hypothesis.

TABLE 8

AVERAGE PLURALITY OF LEADING VOTE-GETTER IN PRIMARY,
BY PRIMARY TYPE

Primary Type	Average Plurality	Number of Elections
blanket	66.1	22
open	68.1	276
closed-challenge	65.2	349
closed-enrollment	<u>63.6</u>	<u>750</u>
	65.0	1397

In testing the hypothesis, we note in Table 9 the marked variation in average plurality where the parties are dominant which contributes to a significant overall difference.⁵ While pluralities are actually slightly lower where the parties are not competitive in open states they are higher by more than ten percent in situations of dominance. Also note how plurality size decreases with increasing party fortunes.

TABLE 9

AVERAGE PLURALITY OF LEADING VOTE-GETTER IN PRIMARY,
BY PRIMARY TYPE, CONTROLLING FOR INTER-PARTY COMPETITION

Primary Type	Minority	Competitive	Dominant**	All**
open	73.5 (54)	68.4 (139)	61.4 (56)	68.0 (298)
closed	<u>75.3 (87)</u>	<u>68.3 (297)</u>	<u>50.9 (205)</u>	<u>63.6 (749)</u>
	74.6 (141)	68.3 (436)	53.2 (261)	64.9 (1047)

Competitiveness and Fragmentation

We anticipate more competitiveness and fragmentation in open primary states for the same reason we expect lower pluralities: more raiding/switching, and a more volatile electorate generally, in theory anxious to thrash the front-runner and disrupt, even embarrass, the other party. We

offer Hypotheses 5 and 6 and for both find closed primaries manifesting the characteristics expected of open:

The more open the primary, the larger the average index of competitiveness.

The more open the primary, the larger the average index of fragmentation.

In Table 10 we note the general tendency of intra-party competitiveness and fragmentation to increase, the more closed the primary.

TABLE 10

AVERAGE INDICES OF COMPETITIVENESS AND FRAGMENTATION,
BY PRIMARY TYPE

Primary Type	Average Index of Competitiveness	Average Index of Fragmentation	Number of Elections
blanket	57.1	10.7	22
open	53.6	10.1	276
closed-challenge	58.1	11.2	349
closed-enrollment	<u>61.4</u>	<u>12.0</u>	<u>750</u>
	59.0	11.4	1397

The differences between high and low average are not stunning for either index but the general direction of increase is apparent, although not monotonic -- note the average indices for the blanket primary. The variations become more distinct as we test the hypotheses (see Tables 11 and 12). Again note the wide variance in index averages where the parties are dominant. Also note the direct relationship between increased intra-party competitiveness and fragmentation and party success level.

TABLE 11

AVERAGE INDEX OF COMPETITIVENESS, BY PRIMARY TYPE,
CONTROLLING FOR INTER-PARTY COMPETITION

Primary Type	Minority	Competitive	Dominant**	All**
open	45.0 (54)	52.3 (139)	65.1 (56)	54.0 (298)
closed	<u>46.3 (87)</u>	<u>54.9 (297)</u>	<u>77.5 (205)</u>	<u>61.4 (749)</u>
	45.8 (141)	54.1 (436)	74.8 (261)	59.2 (1047)

TABLE 12

AVERAGE INDEX OF FRAGMENTATION, BY PRIMARY TYPE, CONTROLLING
FOR INTER-PARTY COMPETITION

Primary Type	Minority	Competitive	Dominant**	All
open	7.6 (54)	10.9 (139)	12.0 (56)	10.7 (298)
closed	<u>7.4 (87)</u>	<u>8.6 (297)</u>	<u>20.7 (205)</u>	<u>12.0 (749)</u>
	7.5 (141)	9.3 (436)	18.8 (261)	11.6 (1047)

It is rather clear from all three measures of intra-party voter behavior that strictly intra-party battles seem to be contested more bitterly when the nominating primary is limited only to voters who regularly identify with a party, and especially when that party dominates a state's political system.

Incumbency

Elections are a form of "regularized recall." Periodically the record of an incumbent administration is subjected to popular review. If the voters approve, the incumbent (or at least his party) retains power; if not, he is in a sense "recalled from office."

Only in America does the electorate have a dual opportunity to scrutinize an incumbent's conduct in office -- once at the primary, and (assuming he prevails at this initial step) again at the general election. A number of states prohibit their Governors from seeking reelection. In those states where reelection is permitted, incumbents have been notably successful at getting renominated -- of the 435 incumbents seeking renomination, 373, or 85.7 percent, won their primary.⁶

We expect that the rate of incumbency success in primaries will vary with primary structure. Specifically, we expect that fewer incumbents will win renomination in open primaries, because anti-incumbent voters will be more able, and therefore more likely, to register their

disapproval of the incumbent's administration at the primary rather than waiting until the general election. Repeating Hypothesis 7,

The more open the primary, the smaller the percent of primaries won by incumbents seeking renomination.

Table 13 indicates that there is very little variation among primary types both in incumbency success percent and in incumbent's plurality.

TABLE 13

PERCENT OF NOMINATIONS WON BY INCUMBENT, AND AVERAGE PLURALITY OF INCUMBENT, BY PRIMARY TYPE

Primary Type	Percent Won	Average Plurality	Number of Elections
blanket	90.0	68.4	10
open	83.8	69.2	105
closed-challenge	87.2	70.0	117
closed-enrollment	<u>85.2</u>	<u>69.2</u>	<u>203</u>
	85.7	69.6	435

As a rule, incumbency renomination rate decreases as party dominance increases, but slightly fewer incumbents are renominated, and by slightly smaller pluralities, by dominant parties in closed states than in open states (see Tables 14 and 15). Given the high rate of incumbency renomination and large incumbency pluralities, we thus conclude that even in open primaries much of the crossover voting is pro-incumbent. Whether this pattern continues through the general election is examined in Hypothesis 9.

TABLE 14

PERCENT OF NOMINATIONS WON BY INCUMBENT, BY PRIMARY TYPE, CONTROLLING FOR INTER-PARTY COMPETITION

Primary Type	Competitive	Dominant	All
open	92.6 (54)	77.8 (36)	87.4 (111)
closed	<u>91.1 (90)</u>	<u>74.0 (73)</u>	<u>85.2 (203)</u>
	91.7 (144)	75.2 (109)	86.0 (314)

TABLE 15

AVERAGE VOTE PERCENT OF INCUMBENTS, BY PRIMARY TYPE,
CONTROLLING FOR INTER-PARTY COMPETITION

Primary Type	Competitive	Dominant	All
open	77.7 (54)	61.4 (36)	72.2 (111)
closed	77.4 (90)	56.9 (73)	69.4 (203)
	<u>77.5 (144)</u>	<u>58.4 (109)</u>	<u>70.4 (314)</u>

Earlier we noted that the incumbent renomination rate exceeds eighty-five percent. The incumbent reelection rate is somewhat lower; of the 373 renominated incumbents, 270 were reelected (72.4 percent).

A different political dynamic is at work here: we return to the inter-party struggle, still suspecting that primary structure will have an influence. We anticipate that a disproportionate share of incumbents suffer general election defeat in open primary states, where anti-incumbent forces (having failed to oust him in the primary) can covertly or overtly enlist the support of the opposition party in the general election. To be specific, intra-party feuds are more efficaciously carried over into the general election in open states than in closed. In Table 16 we find support for Hypothesis 9:

The more open the primary, the smaller the percent of general elections won by renominated incumbents.

TABLE 16

PERCENT OF GENERAL ELECTIONS WON BY RENOMINATED INCUMBENT,
BY PRIMARY TYPE

Primary Type	Percent Won	Number of Elections
blanket	44.4	9
open	68.5	89
closed-challenge	72.3	102
closed-enrollment	<u>75.5</u>	<u>173</u>
	72.1	373

In the hypothesis test (see Table 17) we find small percent variations between primary types, one of which is significant. Although our level of confidence is not breath-taking, we reject the null hypothesis that primary structure has no effect on incumbency reelection rate and accept our alternative hypothesis.

TABLE 17

PERCENT OF GENERAL ELECTIONS WON BY RENOMINATED INCUMBENT,
BY PRIMARY TYPE, CONTROLLING FOR INTER-PARTY COMPETITION

Primary Type	Competitive	Dominant	All (*)
open	56.9 (51)	85.7 (28)	66.3 (98)
closed	<u>63.4 (82)</u>	<u>92.6 (54)</u>	<u>75.7 (173)</u>
	60.9 (133)	90.2 (82)	72.3 (271)

Candidate Behavior

We predict the following in open states as compared to closed: more primaries will be "contested," fewer nominees will be unopposed, more incumbents will be challenged, and more candidates will enter primaries. In fact, with one exception, we find the reverse to be true for all candidate behavior measures; closed primary states feature the above characteristics.

Contesting, Unopposed Nominations, and Incumbent Challenges

We theorize that the compositional uncertainty of the open primary electorate encourages a relatively large number of citizens to contest nominations that would otherwise go unopposed and to challenge incumbents who would otherwise have a free ride, with the consequence of more genuine "contests" for the nomination (i.e., where the runner-up has at least half the front-runner's vote). Hypotheses 10, 13, and 14 follow therefrom:

The more open the primary, the more likely it is to be contested.

The more open the primary, the smaller the percent of elections with unopposed nominees.

The more open the primary, the larger the percent of elections in which the incumbent is challenged.

Table 18 delineates the actual frequency of contested gubernatorial nominations, and in Table 19 we test the hypothesis. Note that slightly more open primaries are contested by uncompetitive and competitive parties where no incumbent is seeking renomination, but that more closed primaries are contested in every other category. Also note the increased rate of contesting on two other dimensions: incumbent to non-incumbent and not competitive to dominant.

TABLE 18

PERCENT OF PRIMARIES CONTESTED, BY PRIMARY TYPE

Primary Type	Incumbent Running	No Incumbent Running	Total
blanket	40.0 (10)	58.3 (12)	50.0 (22)
open	32.6 (105)	57.3 (171)	48.2 (276)
closed-challenge	43.9 (117)	55.4 (233)	51.6 (349)
closed-enrollment	38.9 (203)	61.0 (546)	55.0 (749)
	38.7 (435)	58.9 (963)	53.2 (1397)

TABLE 19

PERCENT OF PRIMARIES CONTESTED, BY PRIMARY TYPE, CONTROLLING FOR INTER-PARTY COMPETITION

All Primaries

Primary type	Minority	Competitive	Dominant (*)	All*
open	40.0 (50)	45.7 (138)	60.7 (56)	48.3 (298)
closed	39.1 (87)	48.8 (297)	72.2 (205)	55.0 (749)
	39.4 (137)	47.8 (435)	69.7 (261)	53.1 (1047)

All Primaries, Incumbent Running

Primary Type	Minority	Competitive	Dominant	All
open	--	20.8 (53)	55.6 (36)	33.9 (115)
closed	--	26.7 (90)	57.5 (73)	38.9 (203)
		24.5 (143)	56.9 (109)	37.1 (318)

TABLE 19 (continued)

All Primaries, Incumbent Not Running

Primary Type	Minority	Competitive	Dominant	All
open	40.0 (50)	61.2 (85)	70.0 (20)	57.4 (183)
closed	<u>39.1 (87)</u>	<u>58.5 (207)</u>	<u>80.3 (132)</u>	<u>61.0 (546)</u>
	39.4 (137)	59.3 (292)	78.9 (152)	60.1 (729)

Table 20 displays the percent of unopposed nominations. Note that more unopposed nominees are found in open primaries, but that the results found in Table 21 show several instances of lower percent unopposed for open primaries. This is because only one of the twenty-two blanket primaries (considered "open" for hypothesis-testing purposes) records a nominee without opposition. Again, note fewer nominations going by default when no incumbent runs and as party fortunes increase.

TABLE 20

PERCENT OF NOMINATIONS UNOPPOSED, BY PRIMARY TYPE

Primary Type	Incumbent Running	No Incumbent Running	Total
blanket	0.0 (10)	8.3 (12)	4.5 (22)
open	26.7 (105)	22.2 (171)	24.2 (276)
closed-challenge	23.3 (117)	19.3 (233)	21.8 (349)
closed-enrollment	<u>24.6 (203)</u>	<u>15.9 (546)</u>	<u>18.3 (749)</u>
	23.9 (435)	17.7 (963)	19.9 (1397)

TABLE 21

PERCENT OF NOMINATIONS UNOPPOSED, BY PRIMARY TYPE,
CONTROLLING FOR INTRAPARTY COMPETITION

All Primaries

Primary Type	Minority	Competitive	Dominant *	All
open	38.0 (50)	20.3 (138)	14.3 (56)	22.5 (298)
closed	<u>34.5 (87)</u>	<u>23.9 (297)</u>	<u>4.9 (205)</u>	<u>18.3 (749)</u>
	35.8 (137)	22.8 (435)	6.9 (261)	19.5 (1047)

TABLE 21 (continued)

All Primaries, Incumbent Running

Primary Type	Minority	Competitive	Dominant	All
open	--	30.2 (53)	16.7 (36)	24.3 (115)
closed	--	<u>37.8 (90)</u>	<u>9.6 (73)</u>	<u>24.6 (203)</u>
		35.0 (143)	11.9 (109)	24.5 (318)

All Primaries, Incumbent Not Running

Primary Type	Minority	Competitive	Dominant (*)	All (*)
open	38.0 (50)	14.1 (85)	10.0 (20)	21.3 (183)
closed	<u>34.5 (87)</u>	<u>17.9 (207)</u>	<u>2.3 (132)</u>	<u>15.9 (546)</u>
	35.8 (137)	16.8 (292)	3.3 (152)	17.3 (729)

Finally, we note the frequency of incumbency challenges in Table 22 and the test of Hypothesis 14 in Table 23. Incumbency seems more perilous in closed primaries than in open; the variation is especially noteworthy when considering challenges by "serious" candidates. Note what inter-party competition level does to the challenge rate, and also note that no incumbent goes unopposed in a blanket primary.

TABLE 22

PERCENT OF INCUMBENT CHALLENGES, BY PRIMARY TYPE

Primary Type	More Than One Candidate	More Than One Serious Candidate	Number of Elections
blanket	100.0	40.0	10
open	70.3	52.5	105
closed-challenge	78.4	59.5	117
closed-enrollment	<u>74.4</u>	<u>59.1</u>	<u>203</u>
	74.2	56.6	435

TABLE 23

PERCENT OF INCUMBENT CHALLENGES, BY PRIMARY TYPE,
CONTROLLING FOR INTER-PARTY COMPETITION

More Than One Candidate			
Primary Type	Competitive	Dominant	All
open	57.4 (54)	83.3 (36)	70.4 (115)
closed	61.1 (90)	89.0 (73)	74.4 (203)
	59.7 (144)	87.1 (109)	73.0 (318)
More Than One Serious Candidate			
Primary Type	Competitive	Dominant	All (*)
open	33.3 (54)	75.0 (36)	49.6 (115)
closed	45.6 (90)	79.5 (73)	59.1 (203)
	41.0 (144)	78.0 (109)	55.7 (318)

Thus for the three hypotheses tested above we note an increasingly familiar pattern: intra-party disputes tend to elicit more pugnacious behavior among both voters and candidates in closed primaries than in open.

Number of Candidates

We speculate that the more uncertain electorate of the open primary tends to encourage larger numbers of citizens generally to enter the nominating fray, and brings out a larger number of office-seekers who take their politics seriously, as stated in Hypotheses 11 and 12:

The more open the primary, the larger the number of candidates likely to compete for the nomination.

The more open the primary, the larger the number of serious candidates likely to compete for the nomination.

The findings displayed in Table 24 have no clear pattern, but Table 25 shows curious differences among inter-party competition levels. In open primary states a relative abundance of candidates compete for seemingly quixotic nominations and relatively few compete for valuable ones. This especially occurs when no incumbent is running.

TABLE 24

AVERAGE NUMBER OF CANDIDATES, BY PRIMARY TYPE

Primary Type	Incumbent Running	Incumbent Not Running	Total
blanket	4.1 (10)	4.0 (12)	4.0 (22)
open	2.9 (105)	2.9 (171)	2.9 (276)
closed-challenge	2.6 (117)	3.5 (233)	3.2 (349)
closed-enrollment	<u>2.7 (203)</u>	<u>3.5 (547)</u>	<u>3.2 (749)</u>
	2.7 (435)	3.4 (963)	3.2 (1397)

TABLE 25

AVERAGE NUMBER OF CANDIDATES, BY PRIMARY TYPE,
CONTROLLING FOR INTER-PARTY COMPETITION

All Primaries

Primary Type	Minority (*)	Competitive	Dominant**	All*
open	2.67 (54)	2.89 (139)	3.41 (56)	2.92 (298)
closed	<u>2.07 (87)</u>	<u>2.73 (297)</u>	<u>4.77 (205)</u>	<u>3.25 (749)</u>
	2.30 (141)	2.78 (436)	4.48 (261)	3.16 (1047)

All Primaries, Incumbent Running

Primary Type	Minority	Competitive	Dominant	All
open	--	2.41 (54)	3.39 (36)	2.77 (111)
closed	--	<u>2.21 (90)</u>	<u>3.67 (73)</u>	<u>2.72 (203)</u>
		2.29 (144)	3.58 (109)	2.74 (314)

All Primaries, Incumbent Not Running

Primary Type	Minority (*)	Competitive	Dominant**	All*
open	2.67 (54)	3.20 (85)	3.45 (20)	3.04 (187)
closed	<u>2.07 (87)</u>	<u>2.95 (207)</u>	<u>5.37 (132)</u>	<u>3.44 (546)</u>
	2.30 (144)	3.02 (292)	5.12 (152)	3.34 (733)

There are two conclusions we may draw about candidates in open primary states: they are either sublimely rational or ridiculously irrational. They either hotly contest hopeless causes to build voter interest in the minority party and not fragment the party when in a position of dominance so as to conserve organizational strength, or they vigorously compete for

a useless nomination for the sheer hell of it and consciously ignore primaries from which the victor marches virtually unimpeded to the governor's mansion. Looking at the variations in average number of serious candidates (Tables 26 and 27) gives no clue to which conclusion we should correctly draw about open primary candidates, because the patterns there are the same.

TABLE 26

AVERAGE NUMBER OF SERIOUS CANDIDATES, BY PRIMARY TYPE

Primary Type	Incumbent Running	Incumbent Not Running	Total
blanket	1.7 (10)	2.0 (12)	1.9 (22)
open	1.7 (105)	2.1 (171)	2.0 (276)
closed-challenge	1.7 (117)	2.2 (233)	2.0 (349)
closed-enrollment	<u>1.8 (203)</u>	<u>2.2 (546)</u>	<u>2.1 (749)</u>
	1.7 (435)	2.2 (963)	2.0 (1397)

TABLE 27

AVERAGE NUMBER OF SERIOUS CANDIDATES, BY PRIMARY TYPE,
CONTROLLING FOR INTER-PARTY COMPETITION

All Primaries

Primary Type	Minority (*)	Competitive	Dominant**	All
open	1.85 (54)	1.97 (139)	2.21 (56)	1.97 (296)
closed	<u>1.55 (87)</u>	<u>1.86 (297)</u>	<u>2.67 (205)</u>	<u>2.07 (749)</u>
	1.66 (141)	1.90 (436)	2.57 (261)	2.04 (1047)

All Primaries, Incumbent Running

Primary Type	Minority	Competitive	Dominant	All
open	--	1.54 (54)	2.08 (36)	1.70 (111)
closed	--	<u>1.59 (90)</u>	<u>2.10 (73)</u>	<u>1.76 (203)</u>
		1.57 (144)	2.09 (109)	1.74 (314)

All Primaries, Incumbent Not Running

Primary Type	Minority (*)	Competitive (*)	Dominant (*)	All
open	1.85 (54)	2.25 (85)	2.45 (20)	2.13 (187)
closed	<u>1.55 (87)</u>	<u>2.00 (207)</u>	<u>2.99 (132)</u>	<u>2.18 (546)</u>
	1.66 (141)	2.07 (292)	2.92 (152)	2.17 (733)

Our best clue to support the conjecture that candidates in open primary states are relatively irrational may be found in noting the following: about the same number of candidates run when an incumbent seeks renomination as when one does not. Candidates in closed states recognize the a priori advantage of the incumbent and fewer challenge him, while more contest the nomination when no incumbent is in the race (see Table 25).

Yet open primary candidates may be challenging incumbents at a relatively greater rate because they are operationalizing precisely the argument we put forward earlier; i.e., incumbents are easier to defeat in open primary states. Though we find incumbent renomination rate variance and primary structure to be unrelated, the theory is nevertheless suggestive and may indeed be a practical stimulus to higher candidate entry in open states.

Summary

Primary structure does matter. Different types of primaries present different opportunities and hazards, benefits and costs to political actors, who respond to the structural imperatives with varying degrees of rationality.

We have examined two types of political actors: the voter and the candidate. We find the typical voter voting in the most meaningful and/or interesting primary. We further find him changing parties if the meaningful/interesting primary is transferred from one party to another over time. But we find variance in his ability to change which is determined by the structural prerequisites of primary elections.

Further, we find voting behavior at a given primary election influenced by primary structure. Contrary to expectations, we find fiercer intra-party struggles in closed primary states than in open states,

especially in situations of party dominance. Apparently, the entry of non-party members into a partisan primary moderates intra-party conflict. Open primary voters cross over, not to raid, but to endorse, and by so doing possibly make comfortable runaways out of many contests which would otherwise be viciously-contested brawls, if left strictly in the hands of regular party voters.

In addition, we find, again contrary to expectations, more candidate activity in closed primaries than in open, and in addition we speculate that candidates behave more rationally in closed situations. Apparently candidates prefer the relatively predictable electorate which the closed primary affords (especially when their party is dominant); the risks of attempting to appeal to the broadened electorate of the open primary states apparently outweigh the potential benefits; thus fewer candidates seek nomination in open primary states.

The difference explained by primary structure, while significant in many instances, are not particularly large in absolute terms; we had expected primary type to be a more effective discriminator among behavioral patterns. Clearly, our theory explains but a portion of the variation.

One factor which provides an alternative explanation for the variance is that of predictability, noted above. For candidates, the decision to compete for the nomination is based on, inter alia, the degree of risk involved in winning, first, the intra-party contest, and then the inter-party one. The predictability of the electorate is among the most important risk-creating factors.⁷ The more open the primary, the more heterogeneous the electorate, and the less predictable the outcome in the primary. The more closed the primary, the more likely party supporters only will be voting, and the more likely the issues raised in the campaign and the campaign outcome itself can be predicted by the potential candidate.

Thus we expect to find more intra-party competitiveness in closed states, as indeed we do find.

At the same time, the predictability factor helps explain lower contesting rates where incumbents are seeking renomination. The advantages of incumbency in gubernatorial primaries are tremendous; only one incumbent in eight is denied renomination by the voters. Ceteris paribus, challenging an incumbent is futile, because the outcome is predictably unproductive; therefore all intra-party competitiveness rates are lower in primaries where incumbents are running. Thus, both where predictability is high (incumbent seeking renomination) and where it is low (in an open primary state), intra-party competition should be at a minimum. Where predictability is moderate -- where actual outcomes may not be assumed but where at the same time parameters of the outcomes are fairly well-defined -- contests for the nomination are likely to be vigorous.

Another variable which has an influence on intra-party activity is that of state size. We find that in large, populous states competition for nominations is inhibited, presumably due to the higher costs of mounting a campaign there.⁸ For all elections in which both parties hold primaries and are at least semi-competitive, there are significantly fewer "serious" candidates -- those whose interest in the contest is genuine -- in the primaries of the more populated states (see Table 28).

TABLE 28

STATE POPULATION SIZE AND AVERAGE NUMBER OF
SERIOUS CANDIDATES, BOTH PARTIES

	Most Populous	Least Populous
Mean	3.65	4.00
S.D.	1.25	1.54
N elections	172	254

t = 2.59 at 424 d.f., significant at .05

A final factor which may be operative is the apparent congeniality of the closed primary state to strong two-party competition, compared to the open states (see Table 29). Either the closed primary structure provides a better political climate for strong inter-party competition than open, or conversely, party leaders and lawmakers in competitive states are more likely to favor closed primaries than open. The former we can only guess about, but we know that the latter is at least plausible; party organizations prefer the closed to the open primary (Bone: 274), and would be especially likely to institutionalize this preference in a competitive state, where the consequences of raiding would be relatively disastrous. (Even though we find raiding to be more a threat than a reality, politicians nevertheless behave reasonably by adopting closed primaries in an attempt to reduce the potential for opposition pillage of their primary.)

TABLE 29

PRIMARY TYPE AND INTER-PARTY COMPETITION STATUS

	Competitive		Minority/Dominant	
	percent	N	percent	N
closed-enrollment	66.0	(182)	34.0	(95)
blanket/open	59.5	(81)	40.5	(55)

Backnotes, Chapter II

¹The total number of elections in Table 2 and the remaining tables in this section are considerably less than the maximum of 698 (1397/2) due to the fact that many election pairs are eliminated because one of the two parties does not hold a primary during a given year. For example, if we include the approximately 150 Democratic primaries in the South where for dozens of consecutive primaries the variation was 0.0 (i.e., no Republican primary was held), the average variation between closed enrollment primaries would be less than five percent.

The average variation figures cited are the sum of all intra-state pair variations.

²We also look at turnout for the primary immediately following a general election where one party wins the governorship for the first time in several elections, expecting increases in the turnout percent for the newly-incumbent party and decreases for the losing party. For the limited sample of elections having usable data, we find support for this expectation (see Table 30). But the differences between open and closed primaries in this regard are most curious (see Table 31). The most unusual item is the average decrease in turnout in the incumbent's party in open primary states. As it turns out, Washington, the lone blanket primary state, contributes heavily to the unexpected results among open primary states (see Table 32, which lists Democratic primary and general election turnout in Washington since the adoption in 1936 of the blanket primary).

TABLE 30

DIFFERENCE OF MEANS TEST OF THE AVERAGE VARIATION BETWEEN
CHANGE-OF-PARTY GENERAL ELECTION AND FOLLOWING PRIMARY
ELECTION IN DEMOCRATIC PERCENT OF TOTAL TWO-PARTY
TURNOUT, WINNER AND LOSER

	Winner	Loser
Mean	3.58	-6.04
S.D.	10.72	12.86
N	22	17

t = 2.49 at 37 d.f., significant at .05

TABLE 31

DIFFERENCE OF MEANS TEST OF THE AVERAGE VARIATION BETWEEN
CHANGE-OF-PARTY GENERAL ELECTION AND FOLLOWING PRIMARY
ELECTION IN DEMOCRATIC PERCENT OF TOTAL TWO-PARTY
TURNOUT, WINNER AND LOSER, BY PRIMARY TYPE

Winner		
	Open	Closed
Mean	-3.90	7.07
S.D.	5.25	10.84
N	7	15

$t = 3.19$ at 20 d.f., significant at .01

Loser		
	Open	Closed
Mean	-7.41	-4.82
S.D.	16.97	7.30
N	8	9

$t = .39$ at 15 d.f., not significant

TABLE 32

DEMOCRATIC PERCENT OF TWO-PARTY TURNOUT IN PRIMARY AND GENERAL
ELECTIONS FOR GOVERNOR IN WASHINGTON SINCE 1936

	Primary	General		Primary	General
1936	80.1	71.2	1956	56.7	54.8
1940	66.0	49.6	1960	42.2	50.7
1944	27.8*	51.7	1964	34.7	44.0
1948	51.0	48.3	1968	51.4	44.7
1952	62.2	47.4			

Years underlined = incumbent Democrat running in both primary and general election

*unopposed Democratic nominee

³In the 1972 primaries in New Jersey and Illinois federal courts ruled that closed primaries were unconstitutional, thus permitting, as it turned out, Republican raids into the Democratic presidential primary in New Jersey and into the gubernatorial primary in Illinois, where the Daley machine candidate was upset by a reform candidate who Republicans calculated would not present as serious a challenge to their incumbent in November as would the Daley candidate. The Democrat won.

⁴Until recently public Republicanism in the rural South was practically felonious, as was public Democracy in much of the rural Midwest and upper New England. Since the closed-enrollment primary prevailed in these areas, the pressures to register with the dominant party were enormous, but there was little that could be done about the maverick voter who insisted on voting for a candidate of the outlaw party in the general election. There is a story about a town in New England which for years had never had a registered Democrat but always recorded one Democratic vote in the general election. One year there were two Democratic straight-ticket tallies, a phenomenon which moved an election judge to charge: "The son-of-a-bitch musta voted twice."

⁵For this and all subsequent tables the following key applies regarding the statistical significance of the difference of the two means or proportions:

(*) = significant at the .05 level, one-tailed test

* = significant at the .05 level, two-tailed test

** = significant at the .01 level, two-tailed test

In addition, the "all" category in the Index of Competition dimension includes "semi-competitive" and "semi-dominant" states.

⁶Four incumbents were forced into a runoff primary, and all four lost.

⁷See Gordon S. Black, "A Theory of Political Ambition: Career Choices and the Role of Structural Incentives," American Political Science Review, 66 (1972), 148ff but especially 148-50 for a theoretical discussion of "risk."

⁸See Black, 146-49, for a theoretical discussion of the impact of size of the electoral unit on behavior.

CHAPTER III

GUBERNATORIAL NOMINATIONS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: REGIONAL AND LONGITUDINAL VARIATIONS

Introduction

We have indicated that voting and candidate behavioral variation is associated with different primary types. Below we note that various aspects of gubernatorial nominations differ over time and among regions of the United States.¹

Primary Type and Political Era

During the present century the number of states conducting gubernatorial primaries has increased from zero in 1900 to a current forty-seven (the largest number ever). The number of states holding primaries, as well as the proportions of different types, has remained rather stable since 1920; during the decade prior to 1920 (the height of the Progressive Era), the number of states with primaries nearly doubled (see Appendix A, Type of Primary, for Selected Years; and Appendix B, Primary Type, by State and Year).

Post-1920 structural changes are displayed in Table 33; note the regional variations. The Mississippi River appears to be a dividing line of sorts: to the east lays fairly strong party control of nomination, either through the convention or the closed primary, and to the west is both open country and relatively open nominating structure.² Boots notes this tendency in 1922, contending that states are in two groups with respect to primary elections: (1) the populous urban eastern states "in which fairly stringent party tests have been maintained by law or tradition and in which the party organizations . . . still manage nominations to a considerable degree . . ." (426), and (2) the less populous rural west,

north-central, and mountain states,

where there is possibly more individual thinking, where at any rate party ties sit more loosely, perhaps because of frequent insurgent movements, largely agrarian. The voter desires to vote in the primary of the party whose candidate will be elected. Primaries are by law, or become by practice, open. Party labels are largely meaningless and the voter so regards them. (428)

TABLE 33

TYPE OF PRIMARY, BY REGION, FOR SELECTED YEARS

Year	Primary Type				
	blanket	open	challenge	enrollment	no primary
1920					
NE	-	1	2	6	3
MW	-	3	3	3	-
B	-	-	2	4	-
S	-	-	2	8	-
W	-	2	2	4	3
	0	6	11	25	6
1940					
NE	-	-	2	5	5
MW	-	4	3	2	-
B	-	-	2	4	-
S	-	-	2	8	-
W	1	3	1	6	-
	1	7	10	25	5
1960					
NE	-	-	2	7	3
MW	-	4	3	2	-
B	-	-	2	4	-
S	-	-	2	8	-
W	1	5	1	6	-
	1	9	10	27	3

Note: In many states the primary was optional and the minority party nominated by convention. In this table, only those states in which there is no provision for a gubernatorial primary for any party are included in the "no primary" category.

In the half-century since Boots wrote, his observation (though perhaps not his rationale) seems to have been supported and extended. New York and Indiana dropped the primary and returned to the convention system

in the mid-twenties (each state having used it three times), while in the west the blanket primary was developed (1934 in Washington and 1967 in Alaska). In 1968 all seven of the strictly open primaries were either in the Midwest or West regions.

Regional Behavioral Variations

Numerous accounts of the politics of regions of the United States are available.³ The literature on regionalism generally notes three important characteristics of American party politics: (1) relatively strong party organizations in the Northeast, (2) relatively weak organizations west of the Mississippi, and (3) the dominance of the Democratic Party in the South and its semi-dominance in Border States. Following from the above, it is likely that nominations will be more closely controlled by party organizations in the Northeast (i.e., less contesting, fewer candidates, larger winning pluralities, etc.), and that there will be more intra-party competition in South and Border Democratic primaries than elsewhere.

Contesting

An average of 52.6 percent of all 1397 primaries are contested (i.e., the runner-up had at least half the vote of the winner). There are clear regional variations in contesting (see Table 34); more contesting occurs in South and Border states, due to the existence of the Democratic primary as the "real election" there. But in the regions with traditions of two-party competition, considerably fewer primaries are contested in the Northeast than in the Midwest and West.

TABLE 34

PRIMARY CONTESTING RATE, BY REGION, BOTH PARTIES

Region	Number of Elections	Number Contested	Percent Contested
NE	373	150	40.2
MW	423	205	48.5
W	270	156	57.8
B	152	101	66.4
S	<u>179</u>	<u>123</u>	<u>68.7</u>
	1397	735	52.6

Number of Serious Candidates

On the average there are slightly more than two "serious" candidates for each gubernatorial nomination, but there are major regional variations (see Table 34). Party organizations in the Northeast seem best able to restrict serious challenge to organization candidates, and the Dixie Democrats, having no unified party organization, manifest considerably more party factionalism.

TABLE 35

AVERAGE NUMBER OF SERIOUS CANDIDATES, BY REGION, BOTH PARTIES

Region	Number of Elections	Average Number Serious Candidates
NE	373	1.69
MW	423	1.92
W	270	2.16
B	153	2.25
S	<u>178</u>	<u>2.70</u>
U.S.	1397	2.04

Plurality

One indicator of party organization control of nominations should be found in the size of the winning candidate's plurality. Strong organizations should be able to produce relatively large turnouts for the

avored candidate, when compared to weak organizations and especially intra-party factions. Again we find the Northeast manifesting this indicator most strongly in Table 36.

TABLE 36

AVERAGE PLURALITY BY WINNING CANDIDATES, BY REGION, BOTH PARTIES

Region	Number of Elections	Average Plurality
NE	373	73.4
MW	423	68.4
W	278	61.9
B	153	56.5
S	<u>178</u>	<u>50.9</u>
U.S.	1397	65.8

Intra-Party Competitiveness

A further indicator of organizational strength is not only how large a turnout the machine can obtain for the favored candidate, but also how much distance it can put between him and his closest rival. Our index of competitiveness measures this phenomenon, and our expectation that primaries are less competitive in the Northeast than elsewhere is fulfilled (see Table 37).

TABLE 37

AVERAGE INDEX OF COMPETITIVENESS, BY REGION, BOTH PARTIES

Region	Number of Elections	Average Index of Competitiveness
NE	373	46.6
MW	423	54.8
W	270	63.8
B	153	71.2
S	<u>178</u>	<u>77.3</u>
U.S.	1397	59.0

Regional and Longitudinal Variations

Inter-party Competition

Between 1920 and 1960 we note distinct trends over time and clear differences among regions in the primary and general election turnout (see Table 38).⁴

TABLE 38

REPUBLICAN ELECTION TURNOUT: A COMPARISON OF PRIMARY AND
GENERAL ELECTION PERCENT OF THE TWO-PARTY VOTE,
BY REGION, 1920-1960

Region	1920		1930		1940		1950		cumulative
Northeast									
primary	80.5	(33)	64.5	(34)	68.0	(33)	52.2	(37)	67.5 (137)
general	55.8	(53)	52.2	(53)	57.3	(55)	50.0	(51)	53.8 (212)
Midwest									
primary	81.2	(38)	66.0	(38)	76.1	(38)	60.6	(36)	71.1 (150)
general	64.4	(38)	55.0	(38)	59.8	(38)	52.3	(38)	57.9 (152)
West									
primary	62.7	(25)	35.4	(28)	40.1	(32)	28.9	(31)	40.8 (116)
general	51.5	(41)	46.7	(39)	53.0	(41)	50.2	(36)	50.4 (157)
Border									
primary	33.2	(10)	29.6	(10)	23.1	(14)	22.4	(13)	26.4 (47)
general	44.9	(17)	37.2	(18)	39.4	(16)	37.5	(16)	39.7 (67)
South									
primary	1.1	(1)	1.3	(1)	2.9	(1)	2.5	(4)	2.2 (7)
general	15.0	(33)	9.4	(32)	10.0	(32)	17.7	(31)	12.5 (128)
U.S., non-South									
primary	72.0	(106)	54.5	(110)	57.6	(117)	45.3	(117)	57.1 (450)
general	55.5	(149)	49.7	(148)	58.8	(150)	49.3	(141)	52.4 (588)
U.S., all									
primary	71.4	(107)	54.0	(111)	57.2	(118)	43.9	(121)	53.5 (457)
general	48.2	(182)	42.5	(180)	50.3	(182)	43.6	(172)	45.2 (716)
U.S., all Pres. (gen.)	62.1	(3)	39.1	(2)	46.3	(3)	56.6	(2)	50.9 (10)

Numbers in parentheses are number of elections.

100

In every region but the South, Republican percent of the two-party vote in primary elections has decreased substantially since 1920. During the same time, Republican general election turnout decreased also, but not nearly so dramatically.

Since 1930, the beginning of the Democratic era of national politics, Republican primary turnout decreased about ten percent but general election turnout increased slightly. During the 1930's and 1940's Republican general election turnout for governor was well above that for President, and was well below presidential turnout during the 1950's, indicating that gubernatorial elections on the whole are independent of national political forces. The regional variations during these eras are particularly strong testimonials to the degree to which gubernatorial elections exist as events largely independent of the tides of presidential politics.⁵

The correlation between the average Republican primary and general election turnout is high: for the decades analyzed, $r = .91$ for all states and $r = .71$ for all non-South states.⁶ These correlations provide further confirmation of the previously-noted rationality of the voter, who, ceteris parabus, votes "in the primary of the party whose candidates will be elected [in the general election]," as Boots puts it.

Intra-Party Competition: Democrats

Within the two major parties we also detect significant regional and longitudinal variations in contests for gubernatorial nominations. These variations are clearly associated with the general election chances of Democrats, and not at all associated with the general election chances of the Republicans.

For the Democrats (1920-60) we note relatively stable indices of competitiveness within regions across the four decades, with the Northeast

being the least competitive and the South the most (see Table 39). The most striking exceptions to this stability occur in the Midwest and West during the 1930's, when Democratic general election chances were greatly increased, especially when compared to the previous decade; this period is the only one in which intra-party competition outside the Border-South area approached traditional levels of competitiveness within those regions. However, the 1930's and the 1950's featured nearly identical average levels of success for Democrats in general elections (57.5 percent versus 56.4 percent), whereas the average levels of competitiveness were quite different (67.6 versus 54.2). Wolfe attributes this to the general increase in inter-party competition between the 1930's and the 1950's (61), but since the data displayed in Table 38 suggests no such increase, we can only speculate that our regional averaging process obscures important intra-state shifts toward two-party competition which lead Wolfe to make his statement.

Note the influence of the South on Democratic election results: the old Confederacy consistently adds six or seven percent to both the average general election percents and the index of competitiveness.

The correlation between average indices of competitiveness and Democratic general election turnout are positive and moderately high: $r = .64$ for all states and $r = .54$ for all non-South states. These relationships are in the expected direction and their strength indirectly reaffirms our rational candidate theory; i.e., the vigorousness with which candidates contest a nomination is a function of the likelihood that the eventual nominee will win the general election.

The index of fragmentation is by its nature much more stable than the index of competitiveness; two candidates can bitterly contest a nomination, but if they are the only two candidates the index of fragmentation

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will be at its minimum. It is apparent only in situations of multifactionalism (permanent or transient), which is seldom found outside the South. We note only one decade in which fragmentation on a national level is more than 10.0 -- the 1930's -- and during that period we find our only evidence of serious fragmentation regionally: 25.4 in the South.

TABLE 39

DEMOCRATIC INTRA-PARTY COMPETITION: A COMPARISON OF INDICES
OF COMPETITIVENESS AND FRAGMENTATION WITH DEMOCRATIC
GENERAL ELECTION TURNOUT PERCENT, BY REGION, 1920-60

Region	1920		1930		1940		1950		cumulative
Northeast									
comp.	31.4	(34)	35.9	(34)	36.2	(33)	35.3	(36)	34.7 (137)
frag.	5.9		6.6		2.7		4.7		5.0
gen. el.	44.2	(53)	47.8	(53)	42.7	(55)	50.0	(51)	46.2 (212)
Midwest									
comp.	46.0	(33)	64.7	(38)	52.3	(35)	38.4	(36)	49.4 (142)
frag.	2.6		9.2		11.6		2.8		6.6
gen. el.	35.6	(38)	45.0	(38)	40.2	(38)	47.7	(38)	42.1 (152)
West									
comp.	62.9	(25)	82.4	(30)	58.5	(35)	59.3	(34)	65.4 (124)
frag.	9.1		18.0		12.6		99.7		12.4
gen. el.	48.9	(41)	53.3	(39)	47.0	(41)	49.8	(36)	49.6 (157)
Border									
comp.	75.8	(16)	82.0	(17)	77.4	(17)	73.9	(16)	77.3 (66)
frag.	15.9		14.2		14.8		16.1		15.2
gen. el.	55.1	(17)	62.8	(17)	60.6	(17)	62.5	(16)	60.3 (67)
South									
comp.	84.6	(30)	82.7	(33)	77.7	(31)	78.5	(31)	80.9 (125)
frag.	23.8		25.4		20.1		23.4		23.2
gen. el.	85.1	(33)	90.6	(32)	90.0	(32)	82.3	(31)	87.5 (128)
all non-South									
comp.	49.7	(108)	63.4	(119)	53.2	(120)	48.0	(122)	53.6 (469)
frag.	7.1		11.4		9.9		7.0		8.9
gen. el.	44.5	(149)	50.3	(148)	41.2	(150)	50.7	(141)	47.6 (588)
all									
comp.	57.3	(138)	67.6	(152)	58.3	(151)	54.2	(153)	59.4 (594)
frag.	10.7		14.4		12.0		10.3		11.9
gen. el.	51.8	(182)	57.5	(180)	49.7	(182)	56.4	(172)	54.8 (716)

Numbers in parentheses are number of elections.

Generally, outside the South, Democratic intra-party struggles seem to be limited to bifactional rivalries at best, and probably the typical situation is one wherein a transient "reform" faction challenges the state machine, perhaps eventually replacing it, perhaps yielding to another faction after a few elections. The regular Democratic organizations in the Northeast demonstrate a superior capacity for inhibiting both multifactionalism and competitiveness generally. At the other end of the spectrum, the relative inability of Southern Democratic parties to control either is clearly indicated here, and is well-documented elsewhere (Key, 1949).

The correlations between average indices of fragmentation and Democratic general election turnout are positive, high, and identical for both all states and all non-South states: $r = .73$. The tendency toward multifactionalism (though more limited than the tendency toward competitiveness) is a function of candidate perception of general election chances; i.e., at a given election more candidates will make a serious drive for nomination, the more likely the eventual nominee is to win the general election.

Also, for Democrats, the indices of competitiveness and fragmentation correlate highly: $r = .73$ for all states. The vigorousness of the primary struggle between the two leading candidates and the tendency for additional candidates to challenge strongly the leaders are associated.

Intra-Party Competition: Republicans

The patterns of intra-party competition for Republicans differ markedly from those of the Democrats (see Table 40). Part of this difference may be attributed to our exclusion of the South from the analysis -- there were less than ten Republican primaries held in the South from

1920 to 1960, compared to 128 general elections -- but curious variations result even when comparing non-South Republican results with non-South Democratic results.

TABLE 40

REPUBLICAN INTRA-PARTY COMPETITIVENESS: A COMPARISON OF INDICES
OF COMPETITIVENESS AND FRAGMENTATION WITH REPUBLICAN
GENERAL ELECTION TURNOUT PERCENT, BY REGION
(EXCLUDING THE SOUTH), 1920-60

Region	1920		1930		1940		1950		cumulative
Northeast									
comp.	73.7	(33)	59.9	(34)	48.9	(33)	44.5	(37)	56.4 (137)
frag.	9.1		9.0		5.2		4.9		7.0
gen. el.	55.8	(53)	52.2	(53)	57.3	(55)	50.0	(51)	53.8 (212)
Midwest									
comp.	72.0	(38)	65.9	(38)	60.7	(38)	47.7	(36)	61.8 (150)
frag.	12.9		11.2		9.9		8.0		10.5
gen. el.	64.4	(38)	55.0	(38)	59.8	(38)	52.3	(38)	57.9 (152)
West									
comp.	75.7	(25)	49.2	(28)	42.3	(32)	37.8	(31)	50.0 (116)
frag.	10.6		10.7		6.3		3.5		7.5
gen. el.	51.5	(41)	46.7	(39)	53.0	(41)	50.2	(36)	50.4 (157)
Border									
comp.	72.8	(10)	64.6	(10)	56.9	(14)	64.9	(13)	64.1 (47)
frag.	14.1		14.3		10.0		10.2		11.6
gen. el.	44.9	(17)	37.2	(18)	39.4	(16)	37.5	(16)	39.7 (67)
all non-South									
comp.	73.5	(106)	59.7	(110)	51.9	(117)	46.0	(117)	57.3 (450)
frag.	11.3		10.7		7.5		6.1		8.8
gen. el.	55.5	(149)	49.7	(148)	58.8	(150)	49.3	(141)	52.4 (588)

During the Republican decade of the 1920's, Republican intra-party competitiveness was more than half again as high as the Democrats' (73.5 versus 49.7). Although Democratic competitiveness was higher in all the remaining decades, the extraordinarily competitive Republican primaries during the 1920's make their four-decade average higher than that of non-South Democrats (but lower than the average competitiveness for all Democratic primaries).

From the 1920's through the 1950's we note monotonically decreasing competitiveness nationally for Republicans, and we note the same tendency in every region but Border states. Republican primary competitiveness is lowest in the West (despite being competitive with Democrats in general elections there), and highest in the Border states (despite being semi-competitive at best on a strictly percent basis in that region). We find the strongest Republican region -- the Midwest -- being less intra-party competitive (61.8) than the Democrats in two Democratic strongholds -- the South (80.9) and the Border states (77.3) -- and even less competitive than Democrats in the two-party competitive West (50.0 versus 65.4).

Perhaps the best indicator of the theoretically unanticipated behavior of Republicans is the correlation between average indices of competitiveness and Republican general election percent: $r = .03$. Although the r is in the expected direction, it is negligible in size and statistically insignificant.

At this point we might note that the Border states present a special problem for Republicans. Republican primaries there are more competitive than anywhere else, although the winner of a primary typically cannot be optimistic about his general election chances. There are two plausible explanations for the high rate of competitiveness in Border state Republican primaries. First, these states are often classified as "semi-competitive" for Republicans in the Index of Competition developed earlier in this thesis by virtue of an occasional general election win usually resulting from a massive, irreconcilable, but temporary Democratic Party split. These types of victories give hope (usually false) to Republicans for continued future success, leading to a tradition of strong contesting for the nomination. However, if the Democrats are able to reconcile their

differences during a Republican incumbency (and they frequently do), then the traditional division of the vote again prevails and the next Republican nominee will lose, often badly. But the memory of recent Republican victory lingers longer than rational analysis of the situation would suggest, and Republicans continue to contest vigorously the nomination for a typically futile assault on the governorship. Second, a tradition of strong intra-party competition for gubernatorial nominations might be an element of the political culture generally of Border states, and not just limited to the Democratic Party.

In any case, the high level of Republican intra-party competitiveness in Border states is theoretically anomalous, so we correlate competitiveness and Republican general election percentage excluding Border states. The r is .33, larger than with Border states included, but still statistically insignificant. Given the absence of relationship between Republican intra-party competitiveness and general election percent, we conclude that Republicans behave in a way not predicted by our theory, contesting many primaries the winner of which is likely to face defeat in the general election, and failing to contest many primaries the winner of which is likely to win the general election.

The same general pattern holds for Republican multifactionalism as manifest by the index of fragmentation. Border state primaries feature greater rates of fragmentation than any other region. Fragmentation has been constantly decreasing since the 1920's, but this decrease bears little relationship to the fluctuating fortunes of the Republican Party generally, as evinced by the correlations between fragmentation and general election percent: $r = .21$ for all non-South states and $r = .29$ for all non-South-and-Border states, with neither r being statistically significant.

However, Republican indices of competitiveness and fragmentation correlate highly: $r = .71$ for all non-South states. Like Democrats, Republicans simultaneously tend to contest nominations energetically and factionalize the party. The major difference between the parties is that Democrats usually beat each other up only when the bruised victor can still expect to defeat his Republican opponent in the second round, while Republicans beat each other up whenever they feel like it.

Summary

The history of gubernatorial primaries in the United States is not only one of varying structural influences, but is also one of regional and party variations. Although the first primary was held in the East, it became an important political institution only after usage in the South and after experimentation with form in the Midwest and West around the turn of the century.

Primary nominations are carefully orchestrated by party organizations in the Northeast states but are typically more "open" elsewhere: "open" in South and Border states because no monolithic party organizations exist to control the nominating process (and therefore outcome), and "open" in the Midwest and West because of a history of maverick politicians, insurgent political movements, and independent-minded voters.

Yet despite regional variations, voters generally behave as though the primary were a meaningful political event: they go to the primary of the party whose nominee is most likely to capture the reins of government and therefore, as Governor, execute policy. From our theoretical standpoint, Democratic Candidates for gubernatorial nominations also behave rationally; typically they fight for a nomination when the nomination is worth having and leave well enough alone when pursuit of the governorship is frivolous. Republican candidates do not seem to be

motivated by political realities of this sort.

There are several conceivable explanations for the curious nominating patterns in the Republican Party. First, during the period studied, important elements of the Republican leadership were something less than politically pragmatic, eschewing electoral victory for ideological or ethnic purity, while Democrats seemed generally more capable of responding to electoral demand for timely personalities and policies.⁷ It is possible that a number of Republican gubernatorial candidates were responding to stimuli other than that of electoral reality. We can imagine conservative Republicans challenging progressives, WASPs stinging ethnic candidates, etc., in states where a united front might have carried the day at the general election; or we can likewise envision a strong Republican organization in a safe state restricting entry of candidates representing groups or policies which would disrupt the homogeneity of interest within the party. Given these conditions, the lack of correlation between inter- and intra-party competition for Republicans is not unexpected.

Second, it is possible that during the forty years studied, Republican opportunity structures were out of phase with good Republican years; i.e., many Republicans were "ready" to compete for the governorship (having reached the appropriate penultimate office) during election years when Republicans could not expect to do well in the general election. Conversely, fewer Republicans were in a position in a state's opportunity structure to contest the nomination in years when Republicans could expect to be elected Governor. At the same time, Democrats might have been fortunate enough to have had numerous challengers "ready" in states where general election chances were good, and a minimum of challengers ready in bad years.

Finally, we note the possibility that during the era examined many

Republicans might have had office ambitions other than Governor which they were seeking to satisfy by running for Governor without much expectation of winning the election. Republicans interested in federal judgeships or positions in a national Republican administration would seek the gubernatorial nomination in relatively large numbers even (perhaps especially) in those states where general election chances were slim. Indeed we find, as noted before, Republican intra-party competition rates to be highest in Border states, where Republican general election chances were lower than in any other non-South region. A study of the careers of defeated Republican gubernatorial candidates (compared to the careers of defeated Democrats) would be required to substantiate this speculation, but we can visualize, in retrospect, our findings explained by a dissimilar orientation toward candidacy in the two parties. Stated generally, the Democrats sought the governorship for its own sake more often than the Republicans, who sought it because gubernatorial candidacy alone was perceived as being as valuable in the broader scheme of things as holding the office itself.

Backnotes, Chapter III

¹Penniman classifies U.S. political regions as follows (8):

New England: Maine, New Hampshire, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Vermont, Massachusetts.

Middle Atlantic: New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware.

Central: Illinois, Indiana, Ohio.

North Central: Minnesota, Iowa, Wisconsin, Michigan.

West Central: North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas.

Border: Oklahoma, Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee, West Virginia, Maryland.

Solid South: Texas, Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Georgia, South Carolina, Florida, North Carolina, Virginia, Alabama.

Mountain: Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Utah, Nevada, Colorado, Arizona, New Mexico.

Pacific: Washington, Oregon, California (Hawaii), (Alaska).

To simplify analysis using region as a variable, we collapse the nine categories into five:

Northeast: Penniman's New England, Middle Atlantic, and Central.

Midwest: North Central and West Central.

Border: (same).

South: (same).

West: Mountain and Pacific.

Since we are considering political regions, we include Penniman's Central states with Northeast states rather than Midwest; the party organizations and political styles of Indiana, Illinois, and Ohio more closely resemble the Eastern states than those of the Midwest; John H. Fenton, Midwest Politics (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966: 219).

²Currently every state which borders on Canada, from Michigan west (including Alaska), has either a blanket or open primary.

³In addition to Key (1949), Fenton (1966), and Lockard, see Daniel Elazar, American Federalism: A View from the States (New York: Thomas Crowell, 1966); John Fenton, Politics in the Border States (New Orleans: Hauser Press, 1957); and Frank Jonas, Western Politics (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1961).

⁴The primary elections noted in this table include only those in which both parties held a gubernatorial nominating primary; thus the discrepancy (especially in the South) between the number of general and primary elections.

The source for primary elections results in the 1960's -- America Votes -- does not list total votes cast for unopposed nominees. Thus

turnout percentages could not be computed for a number of elections during that decade, and useful figures for these elections are not available.

⁵See Key, 1956: 18-51, for additional comments on the separation of state and national electoral politics.

⁶Unless otherwise indicated, all correlations are significant at the .01 level.

⁷See Key, 1956: 152-65, for a discussion of this tendency in selected states.

CHAPTER IV: CONCLUSION

Party Organization and Primary Elections

The task of studying political parties generally and nominating procedure specifically would be simplified quite a bit if we had an objective, standard measure of strength of party organization.¹ "Delivering the vote" is one oft-suggested measure, but operationalization difficulties are apparent. The problem of measurement at the nominating stage is further complicated by situations such as Key (1956) describes: "In most of the safe districts the organization either is not strong enough to prevent occasional serious challenge of its man in the primary or perhaps that the organization uses the primary to settle its internal disputes" (181). In other words, party organizations control nominations except when they cannot prevent challenges or when they encourage challenges.

While most speculation about the relationship between party organization and primary elections is not as banal as Key's above statement, it is still tentative in tone and sometimes contradictory in direction. Below we review this literature in light of our findings.

Party Organization as an Independent Variable

The machine can lose its candidate time after time in the general election without greatly diminishing its strength or losing the grip of its leaders But if it loses in the primaries, it is out of business. Any organization that cannot carry the primary election is a defunct organization. (Kent: 11)

Without actually saying it, Kent is talking about "ownership" of the party, which obviously can remain largely in the hands of the party organization even when the formality of nomination belongs to the voter

in the primary election. Strength of party organization at the nominating stage can be indirectly determined by measures noted earlier (e.g., the indices of competitiveness and dispersion, number of candidates, number of unopposed nominations, etc.), and in the literature these measures are loosely known as primary "contesting" or "opposition."

Jewell (1967) notes that in Border States "the presence of a strong organization that recruits and endorses candidates has the effect of reducing opposition in the primary except in years when an opposition faction is organized" (21). Key (1964) says that "organizational solidarity [behind one candidate] is most likely to develop either when the chances of election are slight or when the strength of the opposition imposes internal discipline" (439). Jewell (1960) notes that there is less primary contesting for state legislative seats where party organization is strong, as it is in urban Kentucky (535), and in so saying introduces a second dimension into the relationship: geography.

Key (1956) detects more primary contesting in urban legislative districts in Ohio (177),² and Sorauf, apparently noting Key's findings, wonders that if party organization intervention tends to depress primary contesting, why does more of it take place in urban areas, where organizations are strongest (217)? Key suggests that it may be due to the pluralism endemic to urban life:

[T]he multiplicity of centers of power and of aspiration in highly urbanized areas may require the application of greater effort, ingenuity, and resources to monopolize party position than in otherwise comparable but predominately rural areas (1956: 178).

Although the above may hold for variations within a given state, our statewide findings comport with those of Jewell. Overall, the relatively urbanized Northeast features the least amount of primary contesting (for all measures) and the relatively rural South, the most. Since we

find that urbanization and primary contesting rates are inversely related, we conclude (no less tentatively than our predecessors, to be sure) that insofar as strong party organizations tend to be found in urban areas, "strong" party organizations are capable of controlling primary nominations and "weak" organizations are not.³

Finally, we note in Chapter I that in those states with pre-primary endorsing provisions, party organizations control nominations with nearly the impunity of parties in convention states. Key notes that the tendency to initiate (and retain) endorsing procedures is not universal, however; "perhaps the necessity to consolidate party strength to maximize the chances for victory under competitive conditions provides the fundamental explanation for [the] experimentation [of Massachusetts, Utah, Colorado, and California] with the pre-primary convention" (126), and the reason for its abandonment in one-party-dominant Nebraska and South Dakota.

Clearly, if state party organization leaders had the choice to make of the mode of nomination, they would choose the convention first and the primary last. In many states, their own corruption and incompetence forced the least-preferred choice upon them, and much organizational effort of the post-Progressive era has been directed at adapting essentially private party operations to public ownership.

Party Organization as a Dependent Variable

Ranney and Kendall suggest that the primary has not been particularly disruptive to established party leadership, which still controls most nominations (256). Key (1965) is not so charitable about the impact of the primary. Contending that the objective of the primary is to destroy party organization (168; 179), he suggests that

Statewide party hierarchies seem to disintegrate under the impact of the influences given free play by the primary. They cannot thrive under repeatedly successful assaults upon their proposals by those who, on the basis of some special or parochial appeal, can manage to win nominations through the primary. Only under rather exceptional sets of circumstances -- of party homogeneity, of monopolization of sources of campaign funds, of common desire for victory -- can formal party leadership maintain much control over the nominating process (167).

According to Key, the ravishing of party organization is manifest in several ways and varying degrees. One consequence is the formation of other groups to fill the vacuum vacated by the shattered organization, groups which center around charismatic and/or ambitious "self-starting" individuals, machines, ethnic-religious collectivities, etc. But in states with genuine two-party competition, organizations seem not to have been bothered much (120). Rowe agrees:

The effect of the direct primary on party machines varied from state to state. In some states the direct primary -- together with other factors, to be sure -- resulted in a substantial weakening and fragmentation of control by the central organizations and a corresponding decline of their influence over nominations. In other states, principally those with strong inter-party competition, party organizations succeeded in adapting themselves to the new formal conditions typically through slating or endorsing procedures. (17)

The most serious consequence of the primary, according to Key (1956) is the atrophy of the minority party, from which the "monopoly of opposition" is transferred into the primary of the majority party. The minority party is as a result left "less well equipped to perform the function of governance at critical moments when it is willy-nilly swept into office" (195). Clearly, Key believes primaries encourage the growth or continuance of one-party dominance in states which might be competitive if nominations remained exclusively the province of party conventions, and indeed finds a far larger proportion of uncontested state legislative

seats in states with the primary than in states nominating by convention, and even within selected states, before and after the adoption of the primary (188-93). The irony of this particular consequence of the primary is that these legislative seats do not become safe by virtue of a shift in the popular vote but by less frequent contesting of the general election by the minority party (which of course eventually creates electoral imbalance in a previously-reasonably-competitive constituency) (184).

Sorauf does not see the primary leading to one-partyism but instead tending to diminish or alter the organizational influence of both parties. He suggests that it alters the distribution of power within the party, which, unable to control nominations, is less able to control government (218). Indeed, Key (1956) notes that "the management of the affairs of party demands both continuous effort and a consolidation of the forces of leadership, if party is to perform effectively its role as an instrument of popular government" (121).

We find little evidence in outcomes of gubernatorial elections that would have us join Key's lament over the corpse of two-party competition in the states. Since the 1920's (by which time most states had gubernatorial primaries) we find the two parties decreasing in competitiveness only in Border States, while elsewhere either remaining competitive or increasing in competitiveness (see Table 38).

Thus, while competition may have decreased at the sub-state level since the introduction of the primary, it does not seem to be affected statewide, for Governor at least. Neither does party organization appear to be harmed in any disastrous sense, if our indirect measures of organizational strength are indicative. Where party organizations have been strong historically, they have remained strong, despite the primary. Where party organizations have been weak, primaries perpetuated that weakness.

On the whole, two-party competition for Governor has actually increased in states using the primary to nominate. We find recent dramatic increases in Republican percent of both general and primary election turnout as well as the emergence of active Republican organizations in the deep South; Key does not lead us to expect these developments (though admittedly Republicans in the South had no direction to go but up until the 1960's).

We therefore conclude that party organization is probably somewhat sturdier than Key gives it credit for, at least in the context of Governor. Strong organizations exert strong influence over primary outcomes, and weak organizations exert weak influence, but the primary itself does not cause strong organizations to become weak and weak ones utterly to collapse. It merely relocates the focus of power from the small group for whom politics is a vocation to a much larger group for whom politics is a twice-a-year thing, and a professional party organization which cannot to a degree manipulate voters, even at the nominating stage, is not worthy of the designation, much less any discussion of how much "strength" it has.

Conclusion

In this study we reconfirm some previous findings about the influence of inter-party competition and incumbency on primary election outcomes. Most of the literature suggests that incumbency inhibits intra-party competition; we find this consistently to be the case for Governor for several different measures. Most of the literature suggests that intra-party competition among candidates increases directly with a party's competitive status; we find support for this tendency in gubernatorial nominations also. Finally, the literature notes voter participation in

a given party's primary increases directly with that party's competitive status; our findings revalidate the earlier work.

More importantly, we offer findings which suggest important regional and party variations in intra-party competition measures; for all indicators we find the Northeast, the Midwest, the West, the Border States, and the South arrayed in increasing order of intra-party competition. We further find voters generally and Democratic candidates behaving rationally in the context of primary elections, with Republican candidates behaving relatively irrationally.

Most importantly, we offer findings which suggest important differences in political behavior to be associated with different primary election structures. Most of these findings run counter to the hypothesized relationships and to speculation about the topic found in the scanty literature which deals with primary structure.

As expected, we find more between-primary voter switching and less general-election-to-the-following-primary switching in open primaries than in closed. By assuming "raiding" to be the dominant motivation of the open primary voter who switches party between the primary and general elections, we hypothesized more primary-to-general election variation in open primaries and, finding the reverse to be true, concluded that when open primary voters switch, it is to endorse and not to raid.

The remaining unanticipated findings probably are explained by this factor also; entry of non-party members into a partisan primary seems to reduce intra-party conflict. In open primary states we find less competitiveness, fragmentation, contesting, fewer candidates, larger front-runner pluralities, and more unopposed nominations. We find no difference between open and closed states in incumbency plurality and renomination rate. One hypothesized relationship is supported -- fewer renominated

incumbents are reelected in open states than in closed.

Our findings consistently contravene commonly accepted propositions on this topic. It is intuitively sound and theoretically justifiable to expect more intra-party activity in open primary states. It is fairly clear that two assumptions -- the "raiding" assumption and the "desirable-heterogeneous-electorate" assumption -- are faulty.

It is not especially surprising that students of primary elections would latch onto "raiding" as an important, perhaps dominant, voter motivation. In so doing the researcher assumes the worst possible behavioral stimuli -- voting in the wrong party's primary for the wrong reason -- to be operative. But once a researcher has read The American Voter he may safely assume the worst about voter motivation with relative impunity. The author was thus beguiled, despite his use of rationality as a fundamental assumption (although there is nothing inherently "irrational" about raiding). Pollack and Wolfe tell us that switching to endorse occurs at least as often as raiding to disrupt. But switching is less dramatic conceptually, and we did not believe it had the motivational impetus of raiding. We consider ourselves disabused.

A dissection of the flawed "desirable-heterogeneous-electorate" assumption is difficult, because of its intuitive persuasiveness. It would seem that a potential electorate of perhaps several hundred thousand and non-party affiliates would entice all manner of candidates to run, to challenge the incumbent or the unopposed nominee. A smart campaign, a big turnout, and it's Upset City. Not so -- we find rational candidates preferring the relatively certain makeup of the closed primary electorate to the relatively uncertain composition of the open electorate.

In retrospect, perhaps our one finding which supports an hypothesis --

renominated incumbents lose more often in open state general elections than in closed -- has a hidden message: the heterogeneous electorate can be treacherous, especially when a candidate faces two in one election year. We apparently find candidates internalizing this particular nuance of rational political behavior, although almost certainly not by design.

Suggestions for Further Inquiry

There are a number of pursuable research problems implicit in the current research. The Governor is the most visible state executive, and we would expect more intra- and inter-party competition for this office than for, say, Secretary of State. Further investigation might examine the degree of inter-office electoral variation, and any patterns to the variation -- regional, party, and especially primary type.

In "Does a Divisive Primary Harm a Candidate's Chances?" Hacker finds the answer to be "No" (after some quaint prestidigitation with the data). Wolfe has some serious questions about Hacker's interpretations of his findings (105-09), and although our data supports Hacker -- the average general election plurality for a gubernatorial candidate whose nomination is not contested is 51.5 percent, but for the contested nominee it is 56.6 percent -- we believe that his treatment of the research question obscures more than it illuminates. Given what we find about the influence of primary structure, it is likely that a reinvestigation of Hacker's data controlling for primary type would prove most interesting.

Ten states have had more than one type of primary since they first adopted it. By examining variations within such states for the multitudinous local offices, one could note the impact of primary structure and at the same time have an automatic control for political culture, a

control which we do not have in the present inquiry, except perhaps in the "region" variable.

Note again the peculiar behavior we find among voters and candidates in states with the blanket primary.⁴ Almost without exception voters and candidates in blanket states perform as we hypothesize them to perform in open states generally, compared to closed states. Small N's prevent our making meaningful statements about blanket primaries for Governor (22 of 1397 total) but a test of the hypotheses developed here comparing, say, Washington state legislative primaries since 1935 with state legislative primaries in closed states might be fruitful.

Finally, we note two research areas of a more general nature: operationalizing the concept of "predictability" of election outcomes and measuring "strength" of party organization. Predictability involves much more than projecting the likely winner of an election and his percent of the vote. It involves analysis of the basic substructure of an election result: the composition and turnout of the electorate. In primary elections this problem has received little scholarly attention generally,⁵ and in the context of primary structure as an independent variable it has received none.

Pertinent research questions include: are the primary electorates of both parties more heterogeneous in open primary states than in closed, given the greater potential for crossover voting in the former? In a given state, is one party's electorate more heterogeneous than the other's, and if so, is the difference associated with consistently lower levels of intra-party competition? (From our theory we would expect the answer to the above questions to be yes). The composition of the primary electorate has been discussed by Ranney, but he makes no attempt to relate his survey findings to election outcomes, and he deals with only one

state, Wisconsin.

Turnout is a key independent variable, as well as an important intervening variable between primary structure and behavior.⁶ We know the best way to defeat an incumbent in a general election is for a challenger to increase turnout over that of the previous election.⁷ Does the same hold for the primary election? In the same vein, how would levels of intra-party competition generally vary with changes in turnout over time? Also, is total primary turnout as a percent of total general election turnout higher in open primary states than in closed, ceteris paribus? Electorate composition, electoral turnout (calculated as percent of previous turnout or as percent of eligible voters, depending on the research question), status of one's opponent, and primary election structure are all key components of predictability as it applies to the calculations made by a citizen who plans to seek a gubernatorial nomination.

Finally, we note early in this chapter a fundamental lacuna in the study of party organization: how does one assess organizational "strength?" We suggest several indirect measures, all of which turn out to be tautological.

There are several direct indicators which are intuitively of some importance in determining organizational strength generally: amount of financing and other resources available, predictability of career patterns, and longevity (adaptability), to name some critical ones. The operationalization of several of these variables is difficult: How accurate and realistic are campaign collecting and spending reports? How do we work with some of the "other resources" -- morale, manpower, etc.? What are predictable career patterns and how influential is the party organization in controlling political careers?

If we could establish standard measures of party organizational

strength, there would be dozens of answerable research questions which we cannot now solve. Relevant to the current research would be: Are party organizations weaker in open primary states? Ceteris paribus, are Republican organizations weaker than Democratic ones? Are primary outcomes more predictable in states where party organizations are strong?

Backnotes, Chapter IV

¹Cutright and Rossi note the double dilemma in measuring organizational strength at the primary election: "'Party organization' often means candidate organization Some candidates seem to be able to split the official party organization and organize an effective campaign without the blessing of top party officials In close elections, however, the official organization can swing a decisive vote in favor of one of two competing candidates and in such cases this decision is of overwhelming importance to the outcome of the election" (269).

²He attributes part of the intensification of primary contesting in urban Ohio to multi-member districts.

³See Wolfe (59) for an independent confirmation of this tendency.

⁴The blanket primary, in addition to being employed in Washington since 1935, was used in Idaho from 1909-13, and was adopted by Alaska in 1967.

⁵See the two works co-authored by Ranney for a discussion of these phenomena.

⁶See Key, 1956: Chapter 5, for a discussion of the influence of varying participation rates on primary elections and state political systems.

⁷Lewis A. Froman, "A Realistic Approach to Campaign Strategies and Tactics," in M. Kent Jennings and L. Harmon Zeigler, The Electoral Process (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), 12.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A




FIGURE 1

TYPE OF PRIMARY, FOR SELECTED YEARS

APPENDIX B

TABLE 11

PRIMARY TYPES, BY STATE AND YEAR

1900	02	04	06	08	10	12	14	16	18	20	22	24	26	28	30	32	34	36	38	40	42	44	46	48	50	52	54	56	58	60	62	64	66	68
ALAB.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
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Special notes (see Legend)	c; g (193d-present)	c	a; o	a; g (193d-present)	c; m	a through 195f, then c; h (1912-present)	a through 195h, then c; h (1-5f-present)	b; l	b through 196h, then c; g (1932-present)	a through 196h, then c; g (1951-present)	c	a through 196h, then c; h (1966-70)	b	b	a; h (1966, Democrats only)	a; i	d; g (1935 only)	f	a through 1962, then c	d through 1963, then c	j through 1966, then c	a through 1966, then c	d	b	b	a; i through 1962	c	a	k through 1966, then e	a	a through 193f, then c	b; g (1930-present)	a through 196h, then b	a through 1962, then c	c; g (1930-present)	c	c	j through 1910, then a; h (191f-present)	c; g (1922-present)	a; h (191f-2f)	a through 195h, then c	a; g (191f-present)	b; h (193f-present)	a	e	b	b	a	c
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See next page for Legend

Special notes (see Legend)

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 a through 1951, then c; h (1952-present)
 a through 1951, then c; h (1951-present)
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 b through 1941, then c; g (1932-present)
 a through 1941, then c; g (1931-present)
 c
 a through 1941, then c; h (1936-70)
 b
 a; h (1946, Democrats only)
 a; i
 d; g (1935 only)
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 a through 1942, then c
 d through 1943, then c
 j through 1944, then a through 1946, then c; n
 a through 1944, then c
 a through 1942, then c
 d
 b
 b
 a; i through 1942
 c
 a
 k through 1946, then e
 a
 a through 1931, then c
 b; g (1930-present)
 a through 1941, then b
 a through 1942, then c
 c; g (1930-present)
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 j through 1910, then a; h (1916-present)
 c; g (1922-present)
 a; h (1911-28)
 a through 1951, then c
 a; g (1911-present)
 b; h (1931-present)
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APPENDIX B (continued)

Legend

- a: general election held biennially
- b: general election held on presidential year
- c: general election held on off-year
- d: general election held on odd year preceding presidential election
- e: general election held on odd year following presidential election
- f: general election held in January of presidential year
- g: runoff primary held (dates)
- h: pre-primary endorsing convention held (dates)
- i: formal voter registration in urban areas only
- j: general election held annually
- k: general election held triennially
- l: first gubernatorial primary held 1972
- m: until 1958 voters registered by party, but candidates could run in
both party primaries, thus making the primary effectively "open"
- n: pre-primary endorsing convention held 1932-36; 1952-present
- o: held territorial primary in 1910

APPENDIX C

QUESTIONNAIRE SENT TO SECRETARIES OF STATE
FOR INFORMATION ABOUT PRIMARY STRUCTURE

Department of Political Science
Western Maryland College
Westminster, Maryland 21157

Dear sirs:

I am conducting research on state primary elections and am currently attempting to confirm the accuracy of data already collected concerning the type of primary election in your state since 1900. I very much need your help in locating some apparent errors in my information.* The following is what I show for your state; in the space indicated, please confirm or correct these dates:

YEARSCONFIRMED/CORRECTED YEARS

BLANKET (Voter receives ballot for all parties; may vote in more than one party's primary)

OPEN (Voter receives ballot for all parties; may vote in only one party's primary)

CLOSED: CHALLENGE (Voter requests and is given ballot for one party; may be asked to demonstrate party loyalty)

CLOSED: ENROLLMENT (Voter is given ballot of party with which he enrolled when he registered to vote)

ALSO, years of pre-primary endorsing convention, if any

Any help you can give me will be greatly appreciated. Thanking you in advance, I am

Sincerely yours,

Terry B. Smith

*My sources are Charles Merriam and Louise Overacker, Primary Elections (1927); National Municipal League, Compilation of the 48 Direct Primary Systems (1957); and appropriate Book of the States.

1

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