INTERORGANIZATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF PARTICIPATION AND POWER IN COMMUNITY PLANNING

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ABSTRACT

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By

Peter Craig Bishop

Social participation and power have been of long-standing interest in the sociological literature. Social status and attraction to a group have been validated as important determinants of participation in group activities. Likewise, a subject's power within the group has been correlated with participation, information, and identification of other members with the subject. Another source of participation and power, however, forms the central place in this research, namely determinants derived from interorganizational ties outside the group.

A population survey was administered to 111 volunteer members of a community planning agency to measure the above variables. Behavioral measures indicated various types of participation rates, and the measures of individual power were included in the survey. Results showed that the organization's influence on its representative was the strongest correlate of attendance

rate in these planning groups. The power of the representative's organization showed little relationship with the individual's power. The implications of the former findings and the reasons for the failure of the latter are discussed in terms of interorganizational theory and influence.

Individual committees within the agency were then analyzed separately. A task-oriented working group of committees emerged which displayed markedly different individual characteristics and participation patterns from the other groups. The remaining groups more closely approximated the classic voluntary organizational model. Such community planning groups, therefore, may well fill a double role--that of a voluntary organization along with the coordination of interorganizational relations between organizations within the same institutional sector of the community. The members of those interorganizational working groups respond more from their structural role as representatives of various organizations than as individual voluntary participants. Social participation and voluntary associations must allow for this unique interorganizational form.

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Peter Craig Bishop

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DEDICATED TO

Amanda Beck, my colleague

and

Charlene Bishop, my wife

who are a part of this accomplishment in the untold ways of sharing both their knowledge and their care throughout.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Social Participation

Two of the most important concepts of sociology are social participation and power. Participation is of course at the root of all social interaction. Rarely, however, is participation considered problematical in the study of social relations because it is almost always present. In other words, without participation in social relations, social relations themselves exist in only the most theoretical sense. In this study, however, participation in community decision-making is a distinct dependent variable to be discussed and explained.

Unfortunately little can be said about social participation in general theoretical terms since its global nature is taken for granted in most situations. On the empirical level, numerous studies have produced some of the firmest sociological conclusions in determining the factors which contribute to participation in voluntary organizations. By the same token, little has been done to delineate the various forms and implications of participation in the whole range of social relations.

Participation has been theoretically treated most often in connection with the political aspects of behavior. One of the earliest sociological treatments by Alexis de Toqueville (1945) credited social participation with the maintenance of American democracy. In his travels, Toqueville was amazed at the associations which Americans created and sustained. As opposed to the aristocratic society, Toqueville postulated that the move to associational participation was concomitant with the development of egalitarian social organization since each individual in such a society was individually powerless. In modern terminology such a theory would read that since society was no longer organized according to ascribed status characteristics, voluntary associations of an economic and welfare nature must assume the role of uniting the individuals in a common effort. From this conception has followed the normative prescriptions of upper status groups to participate in "community affairs," in essence to take up the task of their aristocratic predecessors.

Toqueville also pointed to the complementary effect of associations, that of increasing the power of the individual when acting in concert with others. Thus organizing for political effect has been one of the major determinants in the popularity of voluntary associations. In fact, Toqueville felt so strongly

about the American propensity to move in this direction, he commented

> The English often perform great things singly, whereas the Americans form associations for the smallest undertakings. It is evident that the former people consider association as a powerful means of action, but the latter seem to regard it as the only means they have of acting.

Thus from the earliest days of the Republic, social participation has been an important aspect of the social interaction, one which deserves perhaps more attention than it has received.

Another theoretical treatment of participation discusses the implications of participation for the society as a whole. Speculating on the unusual cases of community decision-making in which community leaders by any measurement were resoundingly defeated, William Kornhauser (1959) set about to describe a type of society unheard of in the days of Toqueville, one in which the participation in voluntary associations was reduced to near zero. Without the aristocratic or secondary forms of association, rulers are in direct contact with the mass of the population. Such contact, unfiltered by a multitude of associations, leads to more rigid enforcement and apathetic acceptance of societal norms and standards. Legitimate and nonviolent means of affecting group decisions are unusable, opening greater possibilities for violent social change. Thus

the effect of social participation for Kornhauser was to create reciprocal exchanges between the individual and the group. The association wanted a commitment from the individual to "stay within the system" in return for which the individual's own power was augmented by the organization's power. He saw the role of social participation as an essential integrative force in society which, by dividing men on relatively inconsequential matters, prevented their ultimate division on issues which would destroy the society. By the same token, the rulers of the society were held accountable by each of these associations which acted as protectors of the individual's interests. The importance of the benefits of such integration cannot be overstated; neither can we discount the role of participation in achieving such benefits. This study will, therefore, concentrate on the factors associated with participation.

Social Power

A concomitant and equally important variable in community studies is, of course, that of power. Before discussing the complexities of this subject, its inclusion and importance for this study must be explained. Without proof, we shall accept as an assumption that all social relations leave the participants changed in some way. These alterations take place either in the cognitive or affective structures or the behavior of the individual

which in turn may affect participants of other social relations. The ability that one participant has in affecting another is considered the power that the first participant possesses. Since all social relations produce such effects and since power is defined as the ability to produce such effects, then all social relations contain the dimension of power. Thus with the inclusion of power we are dealing with two of the most fundamental aspects of human behavior.

In explicating the term power, we can begin with its meaning in the physical sciences, i.e., the ability to do work. The same conception can be retained in adapting the term for sociology by changing the object of the work to the effects upon human cognition, affections, and behavior. Power in this context, however, is only a construct because the quantity itself can only be approached indirectly through its effects. Thus the definition which we shall use is not a direct but rather a probability statement. The power of actor A is the probability that A can produce effects in the cognitive, affective, or behavioral set of actor B. We shall elaborate on this definition through the work and writings of others.

As with almost every sociological topic, we begin with the conceptions of Max Weber (1946), the first to rationally organize this subject. In this case, Weber's

definition of power has not been significantly altered since it was originally proposed: "In general, we understand by 'power' the chance of a man or a number of men to realize their own will in a communal action even against the resistance of others who are participating in the action."

Three important considerations have followed from Weber's original discussion of this topic. The first is that power is generally expressed as a probability statement. As stated above, power is not a quantity which we measure directly, but rather through its effects (Gamson, 1968). Its existence is, therefore, conceptual, much as the concepts of intelligence, attitude, organizations, etc. which have no reality of their own except to explain facts which we have documented. This probabilistic quality of power is addressed more directly by Dahl (1957) and used by Harsanyi (1962) and March (1966) in their fundamental discussions of power. Dahl uses the conception of probability even more explicitly by positing two courses of action for the individual being influenced (actor B). B has a probability to perform an action without any interference from A. On the other hand, he may have a different probability for that action given that A attempts to influence B's action. Dahl defines A's power as the change in the probability of that action as a result of

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A's intervention. This conception is only marginally different from the initial view that power affects the cognitive, affective, or behavioral set of B.

Another concern about the amount of power is the necessity of having resistance for a genuine use of power. It will be our position that such resistance is not necessary. First of all, Weber says that A imposes his will <u>even</u> against another's will--in other words, as the limiting case. His definition does not exclude the possibility of imposition of will without such resistance. A clear case of power without resistance would be Erich Fromm's (1965) position that the alienated members of society require explicit direction. As opposed to resisting such control, the authoritarian personality described welcomes directives from another. One can still speak of power, however, because the probability of B's behavior changes once the will of A is made known.

The research setting for this study will also provide a case of power without resistance. The setting will be a power vacuum in which no one individual is inclined to take control. The individual who eventually directs the actions of the group changes the probability of behavior for all other members without encountering any resistance. Examples of extreme socialization to accept control or extreme powerlessness would also be indistinguishable from the no resistance category.

Thus the disposition to accept direction may range from cooperation to resistance without destroying the concept of power in any case.

Another concern raised by Weber's definition is the possibility of power being an institutional as well as an individual quantity. By stipulating that a number of men could impose their will as well as one man, Weber left open the possibility that power may be attributed to organizations as well as to individuals. We shall make use of this conception later in this analysis since a great deal of time will be spent investigating the organizational dimensions of power in contrast to the individual, interpersonal dimensions.

In sum, then, the three concerns which Weber raised in his definition were that power was the change in the probability of certain behavior, that power could be attributed to an organization, and that power did not necessarily have to overcome resistance to be called power. Another theoretical issue is the generally agreed upon asymmetrical nature of power. This aspect of power relations has in fact often achieved definitional status. Unfortunately, we must again disagree with the accepted tradition and admit the possibility of a symmetrical power relation, in which the change in the probabilities of behavior is equal and reciprocal. The existence of such a state rarely affects research

results nor is it often the case, but one cannot discount the theoretical possibility.

The issue of the basic measurement of power is one fraught with increasing concern among social scientists. We have already seen that Dahl treats the change in probability of behavior as the amount of power in a relationship. Cartwright (1960) approaches the amount of power differently by identifying two quantities which determine the amount of power: the degree of incompatibility between the uninfluenced and the influenced behavior and the strength of the pre-existing behavior. The amount of power necessary to change B's behavior is directly proportional to both of these quantities. Such an approach is describing power by its constituent roots as opposed to Dahl's phenomenological outcome description.

Another issue regarding the total amount of power is the total quantity of power available in any social system. As mentioned above, most others consider only the asymmetrical influence of A on B. In all but the most extreme social relations, however, there is a reciprocal relation of power from B on A. Admitting this possibility opens up the question of the total amount of power in the system and how that power is relatively distributed between the actors in the system. One conception, that which seems to have the insight of common sense, is that the total amount of power in a

system is a fixed quantity which must be shared by the actors. This conception goes under the rubric of "zero-sum" since any change of power with respect to any actor in the system must be balanced by an equal and opposite change in the combined amount of the other actors. Thus, the sum of all changes is zero. The nonzero-sum conception, of more recent origin, was introduced by the functionalist school to explain certain phenomena. Arnold Tannenbaum (1968) discussed this conception and developed a measuring instrument, called the control graph, to show empirically that power differs in different situations. Even though various groups in work organizations hold different relative power positions, Tannenbaum was able to show that the total amount of power, as perceived by members of the organization, differs for different organizations. Rossi (1972) has spoken in terms of creating power in much the same categories as the economic system creates money as a result of the multiplier effect. Another part of this research project (Bishop & Beck, 1973) has shown that the two measures of power both conform to the zero-sum conception in that respondents classify power according to a zero-sum perspective. The subject of this study, however, will make little use of either the zero-sum or nonzero-sum conceptions since it principally refers to changes in power distribution as opposed to cross-sectional analysis.

Thus far, the term "power" has been the major focus of attention. We have defined the term, shown some of the practical cases which are included under the conceptual definition, and discussed the concern over the total amount of power available in the system. We could proceed to discuss more of the dimensions of power as outlined by Dahl, such as its scope, means, base, extension, etc.; but little would be gained by such an extensive discussion. The base or resources for power will be of great concern to us at a later time, but it would benefit us little to include it in a long list of other attributes at this time.

Rather let us proceed to distinguish power from other terms which are often related, namely the concepts of influence, authority, and dominance. Although power has been well researched, the conceptual clarity of terms has not been the most precise. For example, Laswell and Kaplan (1950), although writing in Power and Society, speak largely of influence and the use of influence. Likewise, Gamson (1968) refers to potential influence and active influence while leaving the term "power" out of any analytic discussion of the subject. Collins and Gutzkow (1964) speak of the difference between states of power and acts of power. In sum, one of the major differentiations to be made is that between the possession of power and its use. For this distinction,

we shall follow Cartwright's (1960) terminology and speak of power as the passive possession of the ability and influence as the potential put to use in a concrete situation.

The usefulness of this distinction is found when the activation of power is at issue.

> In summary, it is evident that the decision whether to engage in an act of influence is complexly determined and is governed by at least four considerations: (a) the net advantage to the individual in performing the act, (b) the consequences of the act for the group, (c) the subjective probability that the act will be successful, which depends in part upon the individual's assessment of his own power, and (d) the prospect of being rewarded for fulfilling role expectations. (Cartwright, 1960)

Since this study will be largely cross-sectional in nature, actual influence attempts will not be analyzed. The distinction remains important, however, in determining when those in power will use their power. Studies have found the correlation between power and influence is between .8 and .9 in one study and .35 and .65 in another. Further work needs to be done concerning when the correlation will be high and when it will be low.

Another concept often confused with power is that of dominance. Although not generally used as often as influence, dominance is employed regularly in discussions of power structures. Thus the concept of dominance implies a continued patterned response to

power over time and can best be understood in terms of one of the six models of power proposed by March (1966). In attempting to compile an exhaustive list of power systems, March outlines a basic six: chance, basic force, force activation, force conditioning, force depletion, and process. Without outlining each of these explicitly, the force conditioning model is the closest to the state of power dominance. Within this conception, actor B is conditioned to respond positively to the influence attempts by actor A over time. Thus a stimulus response model is underlying this conception. It no longer becomes necessary for A to convince and coerce compliance from B in each attempt. The measurement of continuing structures of community power rely on the concept of dominance since, in such a complex interactive system, only the large-scale power structures can be determined with any accuracy. Such large-scale structures tend to be the dominants in a community--hence the reliance on this term.

A final concept often associated with power is that of authority. As opposed to the concepts of influence and dominance, the concept of authority was elaborated by Weber (1946) along with the basic concept of power. The additional element implied in the term "authority" is the legitimacy of the command or attempt at influence. Legitimacy is variously defined as the

rightness, correctness, or normativeness of the command. Although legitimacy is ordinarily based on a normative system beyond the actors in the system, it is essentially the shared agreement between the actors that A has a basic right to command B at certain times to perform certain acts. This shared system can be used as the sole resource for power without the necessity to continually reinforce the compliance of B in the situation (Freund, 1968). Because of the continued and patterned nature of authority, such systems tend to create dominants; and dominants, through their ability to maintain themselves in power, tend to create legitimacy systems surrounding their power. Often it is difficult to distinguish the two concepts except that initially dominance is a time-dependent phenomenon where authority is a result of the support of those being influenced because of election, appointment, or some other agreed-upon method of selecting those with power.

One final distinction in the elaboration of power has been proposed by Gamson (1968). He sees an essential difference in the use of power by those in authoritative positions versus those not in such a position. He refers to the latter as partisans, and their use of power is termed influence. On the other hand, authorities are those who have the capacity to

make binding decisions on the group, and their exercise of power is termed social control. Again, in this research, these distinctions will not contribute directly to our use of power and influence, but mentioning these distinctions will limit the area which this study is intended to encompass. As we have reviewed these studies, we are going to be speaking of power rather than influence. Power will be treated for the most part in its dominant aspects as part of a continuing structure of power. The individuals to use this power will be partisans as opposed to authorities since no regulatory or binding decisions can be made in the research setting under investigation.

One final general consideration of power must be discussed before moving to the specific hypotheses relating this discussion to the research at hand. Previously we said that the bases or resources for power were the only dimension, other than its total amount, proposed by Dahl (1957) which had relevance to the subject at hand. Two basic perspectives emerge from the two preceding forms of power structure, namely authority and dominance. The first perspective is the functionalist school previously identified with the nonzero-sum conception of power. The basic assumption of the functionalist perspective is that power is a force within a social system used to attain scarce and valuable

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resources for the system as a whole. Thus the power distribution is marked by consensus and legitimacy as necessary and good for the maintenance of the system. Power is accorded certain individuals since they will use the power most wisely for the good of the whole group, and the consensus is that, since those in power should be in power, they confer the legitimacy of command upon them. The functionalist argument for stratification, the Davis-Moore (1945) hypothesis, is an argument along similar lines.

In direct contrast to the functionalist school is the conflict school which holds exactly opposite assumptions about the nature of power. In opposition to the assumptions of consensus and legitimacy stand the assumptions of conflict and dominance. When conflict is taken as the basic process in society, the motivating force for social action is the distribution of scarce resources. Those who have a disproportionate share of such possessions also maintain a dominant power position. Simon (1953) expresses this view in a unique analytic insight while attempting to define power. Though his analysis may be open to question, he states that during stable periods power can be operationally defined by the respective value position of individuals or groups. In unstable periods, power is equivalent to the value potential of those same individuals. Thus he assumes a

high correlation between power and the values of the system, equating control of the system with economic and social dominance irrespective of authoritative position. Thus the overall conception of power is one of despotic self-interest with little or no normative restraints on the use of power. Dahrendorf (1959), Mills (1962), and Domhoff (1967) would be archetypes of this school with property, authority, and prestige as the respective bases of social power.

The perspective in this study will differ from the preceding positions and utilize the exchange principles of Homans (1961) and Blau (1964) in arriving at power hypotheses. Thus the essential thesis will be as stated by Homans

> Social behavior is an exchange of goods, material goods, but also non-material ones, such as symbols of approval or prestige. Persons that give much to others try to get much from them, and persons that get much from others are under pressure to give much to them. This process of influence tends to work out at an equilibrium to a balance of the exchanges. (Homans, 1961)

Thus, it is an open question whether the actors share common goals or conflict over scarce resources. The extent of their exchanging resources in harmony or conflict is totally dependent on the situation. Certain amounts of force conditioning and with it legitimacy and dominance remain to stabilize and provide continuity to the system. These latter variables,

however, can be treated as variables along with the other resources of wealth, honor, and status rather than as the essential bedrocks of power. The exchange concept utilizes the principles of rational economy, remembering full well that individuals are far from rational in many cases. In most cases as a guiding principle, however, the concept of rationality should stand in good stead throughout this analysis.

In conjunction with this conception, the resources of power tend to fall into a three-way categorization. Gamson's (1968) terminology of inducements, constraints, and persuasion almost exactly parallels that of Etzioni's (1961) remunerative, coercive, and normative resources. This breakdown actually encompasses only two types of resources, material and nonmaterial. Reward and coercion are simply the positive-negative application of similar resources depending on the resource position of the person being influenced. The promise (or threat) of an annual salary of $10,000 is dependent on an individual's present salary and would be a reward or a coercion dependent on that initial position. Persuasion or normative resources, on the other hand, refer to the manipulation of nonmaterial resources. For instance, French and Raven (1959) outline three types of resources for power other than reward and coercion. Their concept of legitimate power is authority as specified previously

where legitimacy is the prime basis for the influence attempt. Expert power is the belief that the individual making the influence attempt knows more so that his commands should be heeded. Therefore, the individual being influenced will acceed to his wishes in the interest of performing the task correctly. A final resource is referent power or that based on the identification of B with A. In order to distinguish this type of power from the reward or coercion one allows himself to be directed simply on the desire to be like the individual identified with. The individual making the influence attempt promises no rewards or praise. The attempt is successful based on the desire of B to be like A in his behavior. Thus we have two types of material resources, reward and coercion, and three types of nonmaterial resources, legitimate, expert, and referent. In this ensuing study, we will be able to test the effects of all but one of these types of power.

Correlates of Voluntary Participation and Community Power

Up to this point, the discussion has been largely definitional and typological, attempting to discover the complexities and intricacies of the two areas of participation and power. More time was obviously devoted to the study of power because it is often the more variable and therefore the more interesting quantity

in research projects. We must now begin to pin these concepts down by investigating the empirical record that has been gathered in determining the factors associated with increased social participation and social power. In order to capsulize the discussion, we shall, perhaps at some violence to the complexity of the subject matter, restrict review to these most recent studies which summarize past literature and perhaps contribute a new awareness. The amount of material ignored in this reduction is, of course, many times that included, but we shall see that such archetypal studies provide sufficient light to illuminate the direction we must take.

The participation studies that have developed this theoretical area can be represented by the most recent comprehensive treatment of social participation (Babchuk, 1969). Without intentionally slighting the pioneering work of Chapin (1939) and Kamarovsky (1946) and the follow-up studies of Hatt and Reiss (1951), Rose (1954), Axelrod (1956), Maccoby (1958), and Rose (1962), each of these early researchers have contributed to a field which is contained in the cumulative work of the latest studies.

Babchuk (1969) begins by outlining the many functions which voluntary associations serve in this society. Ranging from expressive activities and personal interest to distributing power and supporting

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the normative order, these organizations offer individuals multiple reasons for membership. The types of organizations as well which are considered part of the social participation scene range from churches and service organizations to professional associations and community agencies. The variety which such organizations present makes the application of unified theory a near impossibility. Perhaps because of such complexity, however, the range of determinants for participation in such organizations is equally varied.

In all studies, social class invariably emerges as the best predictor of social participation. Other generally accepted predictors are length of community residence, marital status, home ownership, and sex. An equal number of areas remain that are not so clearly related. The total time devoted to such participation, the effect of community size, and the overall extent of such participation are still much in doubt. Babchuk (1969) contributes some well-documented findings to these question areas and also adds a longitudinal dimension to the question of participation which is much needed.

The quality and findings of such research endeavors is indeed high. We would be mistaken, however, to assume that such studies have relevance to the subject at hand, namely participation in community

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decision-making. Along with some minor lacunae in the participation research, a major hypothesis needs to be tested which has received scant attention. While documenting the participation of individuals in the varied community associations, little has been done to complete the process of political accountability proposed by Toqueville (1945) and Kornhauser (1959) and to evaluate the effects of these organizations on the political process itself. Although we have great predictive validity concerning the extent of an individual's participation, we have little empirical evidence to add to the oft-repeated thesis of the pluralist society that its citizens participate in the political process through their voluntary organizational memberships. The area, formally called interorganizational relations, has only recently begun to attract exploratory research. A great deal needs to be done before this area can claim the results of participation at the individual level.

Certain macrological studies of interorganizational phenomena have shown considerable power in predicting outcomes of community decision-making. The first attempt in this area was made by Amos Hawley (1963). He developed a measure of interorganizational activity on the community level through a ratio of managers and professional personnel to working class personnel in a community (MPO ratio). Hawley's

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hypothesis was that the lower the MPO ratio, the higher the concentration of power in the community, and hence the greater efficiency with which community decisions could be made. The link between the decision-making efficiency and the acceptance of urban renewal programs, Hawley's dependent indicator, may be open to question. Nevertheless, he found that across 197 communities the lower the MPO ratio, the further the community proceeded in the urban renewal process. [He argues from these findings that participation and power in the community are systemic properties which are not necessarily reducible to individual relations.]

A more direct approach (Turk, 1970) discusses the level of local and extra-community integration which determines the establishment of an organizational network around a new poverty effort. The extent of local and extra local integration, in fact, controlled the effects of poverty demand in the establishment of such an agency. [Turk concludes that the interorganizational network, both within and outside the community, is a pre-existing condition which is necessary for community cooperation on such a topic. Turk also concludes that the use of interorganizational phenomena as independent predictors aside from individual sources of variation was established through his and the research of others.

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As a result, some analyses of interorganizational relations concentrate on the internal structures of one community in attempts to distinguish the levels of interaction and mechanisms which interact on the individual.

In response to the question of the effects of interorganizational relations on community decision-making, these studies are perhaps the most instructive. They suggest that the interpenetration of organizations with each other is a precondition for cooperation on community matters and, hence, a precondition for community decision-making. Although such studies do not outline the specific mechanisms by which such participation is carried out, they at least point in the direction of organizational influences on decision-making.

Other studies of a more intensive nature into the actual workings of a community, however, do not add much more to the question of organizations participating in community decisions. For instance, Aiken and Hage (1968) have outlined the type of organizations most likely to engage in joint programming. By the same token, Levine and White (1961) postulated, but did not rigorously test, the exchange conception as a predictor of interorganizational cooperation. Their analysis included the resources of clients, personnel,

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and funds which must be shared and exchanged for organizations to remain viable. Finally, Litwak and Hylton (1962) looked at the role of cooperative funding ventures as a type of interorganizational cooperation, but again with no implications for organizations participating on a community problem area. As we shall see with respect to the power studies, all participation behavior concentrated too often on the individual level of behavior as opposed to utilizing these insights in the design of organizationally based research.

Participation on the community decision level should perhaps be more appropriately treated in connection with the community power studies. Unfortunately, we receive little aid from one of the most prevalent forms of community studies, the reputational power study. This methodology, pioneered by Floyd Hunter (1953), seeks to determine those individuals in a community which possess the greatest amount of power. The technique is essentially cross-sectional and singularly uninterested in the actual use of such power in concrete decision-making situations. Therefore, such studies have little or nothing to say about the participation rates of any sector of the community within an actual decision.

The other major methodology of measuring community power, the decision method, pays explicit

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attention to the participation of individuals in various decisions. Such participation is, however, less a variable in the study than a precondition which defines the population to be investigated. All individuals who have participated in a pre-selected set of community decisions become the subjects in the study. Those who are on the winning side of the decision are rated as powerful and those on the losing side as not as powerful. Along with other problems associated with this method (Anton, 1963), this technique does not allow us to determine who the participants are relative to those who do not participate since no attempt is made to contact the latter or to test any hypothesis concerning who would be expected to participate.

The Interorganizational Perspective

Of these two common techniques in the measurement of community decision-making, none offers any information on the participants in the actual decisions which determine the form and shape of the community. Such information is sorely needed, however, in order to complete the circuit of accountability and representation postulated for the pluralist society. The most pertinent information has been provided in a study by Freeman et al. (1963) which attempted to compare the decision method with the reputational method in the same

community. He found that the two methods agreed only 33% of the time when choosing 32 top community leaders. Increasing this percentage of agreement is a major factor when we turn to the measurement of power; but for the present the only significance of finding is that, for the most part, those reputed to have the most power in the community either do not participate in its decisions or do not emerge victorious from such participation. Since most community studies allude to a two-tier model of community participants, such as policy makers and policy executors (Hunter, 1953), professionals and citizens (Dahl, 1960), and institutional leaders and effectors (Freeman, 1963), this lack of agreement is not surprising. The problem is, however, that the model does not explain the characteristics of the individuals in each category, namely who will participate in community decisions and who will not. The most important point missing is, in fact, the relationship between these two groups. One group appears to set policy while another appears to carry out that policy through actual community participation. The exact relation between these groups has heretofore eluded researchers. These questions remain despite the large number of participation studies carried on in the community. Perhaps the question must be answered with another question, namely who has the power in the community? The

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participation of individuals could well be determined by the power and influence structure of the community.

Correlates of Community Power

Research on this question suffers from the opposite problem of participation research, namely a glut of studies which purport to provide definitive answers. The reputational and decision methods of measuring community power produced different models of the power structure in the communities studied. The correlation between method and outcome, in fact, has been too strong to be ignored (Walton, 1966). With such disagreement over the results, neither of these studies seems to be able to accurately describe the power structure in a community.

In Freeman's (1963) study, however, the researchers attempted to increase the level of agreement between the two methods by capitalizing on one finding which emerged from their study. It seemed that reputational leaders, while not participating themselves in the decisions, were generally the leaders of those organizations which did participate. With this lead, Freeman formulated and tested the hypothesis "that reputation should correspond with the participation rate of organizations rather than the participation rates of individuals." Thus the measures of participation in decisions were recalculated

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by including the participation of all members of an organization in the score for the leader of that organization. This changed doubled the percentage of agreement between reputational and decision methods to 65% of all possible agreements.

Such a dramatic increase in the similarity of these two generally contradictory measures leads one to look to the organizational base of power as not only the resolution of the discrepancy between these two methods but also the possible link between these two types of community leaders. Another study lends even greater weight to this developing hypothesis.

In an attempt to avoid the pitfalls of these power measures, Perucci and Pilisuk (1970) developed an independent measure of power based on the structure of interorganizational interaction. From a list of all community members who held executive or policy-making positions with any organization in the community, they extracted 26 individuals (2%) who held such positions in three or more organizations and whom they identified as interorganizational leaders (IOL). These leaders were matched with a comparable set of leaders (OL) drawn from the remaining 98% and compared on all measures of power. The interorganizational leaders were consistently more powerful than the matched set. One explanation for this difference, however, may simply

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have been exposure because of participation in more organizations. In testing such a possibility, this study showed that a subset of interorganizational leaders formed a closed sociometric resource network through the interlocking positions which they held on respective boards. This last group of eleven inter-organizational leaders were called interorganizational resource leaders (IORL) because of their close contact with each other on these boards. In comparison with other interorganizational leaders, all with the same number of organizational memberships, the IORL was again consistently higher on reputed power and were even more socially homogeneous. From these findings, the authors imply that power is not attributable as much to individuals as it is to the roles which those individuals fulfill in their respective organizations. Since these individuals could command considerable more resources on any community decision than any other comparable number of individuals and since the closed nature of the network suggested that those resources would be utilized on the same side of any issue, the distinct impression is one of organizational resources determining power much more than the various personal characteristics generally hypothesized as determinants of power. Another benefit of this method is that it can be carried on without interference in the community or

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What is the point of these studies in relation to the problems of participation and power alluded to previously? Both Freeman's (1963) and Perrucci's (1970) studies depart from the usual type of participation and power study. Therefore, that they both arrive at similar conclusions, namely that organizational affiliation explains participation rates and power distributions, is remarkable in that their methodologies are completely different and they do not depend upon one another for support. With such evidence, therefore, we shall assume as our major focus that organizational affiliation will have measurable effects on participation and power in community decision making.

The implications of these assumptions for the problems raised earlier are many. First of all, assuming the organization as the primary unit of analysis speaks more to the structure of the community as opposed to conceiving of the community as a set of face-to-face interactions, the organizational approach simply utilizes the next level of analysis. The conception of the community as a set of interorganizational relations, though not well researched to this point, contains more rational appeal.

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A second advantage of the organizational approach is that it obviates the problem of limiting participation to voluntary organizations. When the community is conceived of in terms of all organizations, both voluntary and work organizations are included. When an issue is raised for decision, all organizations, or at least those affected, will include their representatives whether they be work or voluntary organizations. Confining the analysis to either group seems to be a reduction in the field of inquiry which does not do justice to the subject matter.

A third advantage to the organizational perspective is that it lays a better foundation for the correlates on participation in decision-making. Assuming a rational economic model for organizational behavior (which is more accurate that it would be for individual behavior), participation for organizations is made much more predictable. Among others, Hickson (1971) has attempted to justify the open systems model of organizational behavior in which the organization is composed of subsystems, each coping with its designated area of uncertainty. Participation rates in such a conception are fixed, according to Hickson, "for subunits, unlike individuals, are not free to make a decision to participate, as March and Simon (1958) put it, nor to decide whether or not to come together in political relationships. They must. They exist to do so."

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Let us examine a community through the same perspective. Organizations are the subunits of a community. Therefore, a collective community decision will affect that community's organizations more than it will affect the individual community residents. Or to put it more accurately, community decisions affect individuals in their organizational roles much more than in their families, friendships, or self-determined behaviors. The organizational roles may be work-related or voluntary; yet it will be through the organization that the individual feels the impact of a particular decision. By the same token, the organization will provide the vehicle by which the individual can affect the decisions of the community. Therefore, organizations affected by a community decision cannot do otherwise than attempt to affect that decision. Such an impulse will in turn affect the behavior of that organization's representatives as to the extent of participation and the amount of power they are able to exert on the decisions. According to the previous discussion, organizational leaders will set general policy and in critical cases, mandate specific actions, while organizational representatives, those individuals attached to the organization with the specific task of dealing with that aspect of the organization's environment, will act in accordance with that policy or mandate.

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Another equally important advantage of the organizational perspective is that it reduces the variety of participatory behavior to some function of the individual's role specifications. We have previously referred to the voluntary bias in participation studies. At the same time, we are well aware that certain individuals attend committee meetings, community discussions, and even social gatherings more out of the necessity to fulfill role prescriptions than any internal motivation or satisfaction derived from the participation experience.

The fifth and final advantage of the organizational perspective is the long-awaited resolution of the elitist and pluralist conceptions of community power. Each has been, for these many years, attempting to determine the community power structure, if any, or at least the power distribution. The preliminary discussion on power, however, identified the confusion which surrounds the terminology associated with this issue. Along with the basic concept of power as the probability to affect the outcomes of cognition, affection, and behavior, we have been able to identify three other terms which have consistently been used in its place, some with justification, some without. In the interest of establishing some order in this field, we have identified influence as the active use of power, authority as the legitimate

use of power, and dominance as the continued use of power. If we have three separate concepts, however, it would be entirely possible to posit three variables operative in a community depending on the emphasis on activity, legitimacy, or continuity. Three methods of measuring power structure, including the positional which has been considered the least valid of the three for sociological analysis, actually chart the community according to these three concepts. The reputational measure, which claims to describe an elitist structure which influences all community decisions, is actually measuring those individuals who tend to be dominant or which are part of a dominance structure. Secondly, the decision method concentrates on the actual decisions made and the participation in those decisions--in other words, those actively using influence. The decisions method often, therefore, describes the pluralistic influence structure of the community. Finally, the positional method, generally the method of political science studies, investigates those with popular support in the community through legitimate elections or appointments. A third structure is therefore delineated, namely the authority structure or the use of legitimate power. We thus have three methods, reputational, decisional, and positional, which, far from being in contradiction, are simply measuring different variables

in community decision making; dominance, influence, and authority respectively. They can all claim to measuring power, but in its various forms and aspects.

This insight is also consistent with the organizational perspective of the community proposed above. If we assume that community decisions have their major effect on organizations and on individuals in their organizational roles, then it will be the organizations and their actions which will determine the three types of power structures in the community. The positional structure will be determined by the authority of organizational leaders over the members in the organization. The extent of authority and its relevance to the complete community structure will be a function of the number of individuals affected by such authority and the scope of actions covered. For instance, a mayor affects a large number of community residents but the scope of behavior which he controls is circumscribed by the legal system and the community budget. Conversely, the top management of a corporation may control only a few individuals but their livelihood depends directly on that corporation.

A similar structure can be developed for the use of power in the community, namely the influence structure. Those organizations most affected by community decisions will participate more consistently in the formation of community policy. The more open an organization is to

such an environment, the more likely it will be to support full-time individuals to deal with that environment. Such individuals will form the influence structure as continuous participants and active power users in community decision-making.

The dominance structure of the community will be made up of those individuals who have great authority in the community and are simultaneously affected by and therefore motivated to participate in community decisions. Such leaders may also form themselves into a closed resource network as discovered by Perucci (1970), but such a network does not follow deductively from the theory.

With a further elaboration of this analysis, the relationships between these separate power structures could be further specified and operationalized. Unfortunately, this study cannot purport to test this conception. Because of its limited scope, we must confine ourselves to testing only corrolaries of this theory in a limited setting. Since the interdependency of organizations and the extent to which organizations are affected by community decisions has been increasing (Litwak & Hylton, 1962), a new organizational form has been found appropriate in some communities to handle certain continuing issue areas. This form of inter-organizational exchange is called the coordinating

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council, an organization with an interorganizational focus. Although the budgets afforded such agencies are often substantial, the permanent staff is often skeletal. The overriding purpose of the organization is simply to provide a forum for community or inter-organizational exchange of information and community decision-making. Such an agency with its interorganizational dimension may partially validate the theory proposed above.

To briefly summarize the previous argument: Classical participation and power studies focused on individual behavior and power in community decision-making. More recent studies have pointed to the inter-organizational network as the prime determinant of participation in decisions and the influence exercised in such decisions. If coordinating agencies are in fact a microcosm or open forum for this process, then the individual behavior and power in such organizations should reflect the role of a representative of an organization rather than the individual characteristics of the participant. Although further specification is required, this statement is the overall intent of this study. Granted it does not test the complete organizational character of community decision-making, it does attempt to assess the impact of a deductive corrolary of that system.

Hypothesis

In order to distinguish the respective dependent variables in this overall hypothesis, we would look first to the importance which the organization places on an individual representative's participation. Thus we are conceiving of the individual participant as essentially a representative attending because of the organization's interest in the proceedings and outcomes. The exact degree of importance, however, may not be communicated to the representative. Perhaps a more suitable measure would be the importance which the individual himself attached to his participation as a representative of the organization. Although this variable is more social-psychological and therefore less a structural role prescription, we should discover a closer relationship because the perceptions of the representative would have direct effects on his behavior. The major hypothesis of participation would therefore read as follows:

Hypothesis A-1:

An individual's participation in the coordinating agency will be associated with the extent to which he perceives his participation as important to the organization he represents.

In order to compare the relative strength of this factor with the more traditional factors of social

participation, we shall construct three more hypotheses which will cover some of the more common individual explanations.

The first of these alternative hypotheses will be the attraction hypothesis based upon Homan's (1961) hypothesized relationship between liking and social interaction. In other words, an individual's attraction to the agency would be expected to strongly correlate with his participation. Because of the relatively isolated units and hence reduced organizational interaction within this agency, individuals have little knowledge or feeling for the agency as a whole. Therefore, the basis for this hypothesis will be the committee which the individual is more intimately associated with.

Hypothesis A-2:

An individual's participation in the coordinating agency will be associated with the extent to which he is attracted to the committee on which he serves.

The final two comparative hypotheses for participation depend on the accumulated research on participation in voluntary associations (Babchuk, 1969). The popular conception of participation in such coordinating agencies is quite close to the ideal typical voluntary participation. In other words, such participation contains all the emotional connotations of charity, volunteerism, good of the community, generally

associated with more traditional types of volunteer participation. Therefore, we shall use the prime predictor of such participation as the independent variable in the second alternate hypothesis, namely social status.

Hypothesis A-3:

An individual's participation in the coordinating agency will be associated with his social status.

Although social status is the best predictor of such behavior, it is by no means the only determinant. The extensive list of the generally agreed upon factors was presented above. Rather than test each one of those factors, however, we shall determine how similar participation in the coordinating agency is to other forms of social participation. Therefore, the final comparative hypothesis will relate participation in this agency to all other forms of participation.

Hypothesis A-4:

An individual's participation in the coordinating agency will be associated with his participation in other non work-related organizations.

Through this hypothesis, whatever the factors for voluntary participation may be, they will be compared with the organizational hypothesis through their predication of participation in voluntary associations.

Thus the major hypothesis to be tested in this study is the relation between participation in a

coordinating agency and the importance an individual attaches to his role as a representative of an organization.] The remaining three hypotheses are meant to encompass, in a general way, related theories of social participation in order to gauge the relative strength of the organizational hypothesis.

This study also contains another important dependent variable in the form of power. As before, it would be impossible to test the complete concept of related power structures presented above. Another corrollary follows from the theory, however, that the power of the organization has significant effects on the power of the individual within the coordinating agency. We must be clear, however, what type of power we are measuring. We would expect that those who participate in the activities of the coordinating agency and have power in that organization to be part of the community-wide structure, were we to test the complete community. This hypothesis is developed from that theory, however, since the organizational component should offer the individual his main power resource. The concept closest to that which we can measure will be influence, even though individual decisions are not analyzed. In fact, the members of each individual's committee will rate each other member on the value of his contribution. Since the judgments are based upon actual input and simply

not reputations for power, the influence concept of power is the most appropriate. We shall therefore report the major power hypothesis accordingly.

Hypothesis B-1:

An individual's influence in the coordinating agency will be directly related to the influence of the organizations he represents.

Alternative hypotheses will again be related to this major hypothesis to test its relative strength. The first type of alternative hypothesis will relate interpersonal resources for power, as discussed above, to an individual's influence in the coordinating agency. French and Raven (1959) propose five such bases of influence. Reward power and coercive power are the first two of their resources. Such resources, however, cannot be applied in this situation since individuals are involved in resource exchange primarily through their respective organizations. Rarely does anyone on the committee meet with or speak with other members outside committee meetings. Therefore, the reward and coercive aspects of power are contained in the major hypothesis.

A second resource for power is legitimacy. Much research (Raven & French, 1959; Torrance, 1955; French & Snyder, 1959; Bass & Wurster, 1953) has supported the position that the formal conferral of leadership on

individuals in small groups acts as a power resource which can be used in successful influence attempts. Unfortunately, this source of influence cannot be evaluated in this research because of the small number of individuals with authority in the agency. The governing Board has such power, but rarely do board members interact with other members of the agency. Likewise, each committee has a chairman, but that is only one individual among 20 or 30, hardly a sufficient number to test hypotheses. Therefore, we must exclude legitimate power from this analysis.

A fourth resource identified by French and Raven (1959) was expert power. Classic experiments by Haimon (1949) and Levinger (1959) have shown the powerful effects of perceived competence on individual influence. The coordinating aspect of the agency makes the possession and use of information a particularly appropriate resource for influence. Thus the amount of expertise possessed by each individual will be used as an interpersonal resource for influence.

Hypothesis B-2:

An individual's influence in the coordinating agency is directly related to his task-specific expertise.

A final interpersonal resource identified by French and Raven was the extent to which individual B identified with individual A. Other than the rewards

that are to be derived from such identification in terms of positive affect and regard, an individual will accede to another's influence if that person perceived the individual attempting the influence as like himself. Such a condition is akin to the studies which have shown that liking can also be a means of influence (Lippit, 1952; Hurwitz et al., 1953; Borgatta & Bales, 1956; Hollander & Webb, 1955). Therefore, we shall include this resource as well among the relative interpersonal resources.

Hypothesis B-3:

An individual's influence in the coordinating agency will be directly related to the extent to which members of the agency identify with the individual.

One final resource for influence in such a group is the consistent relationship between extent of participation and power in small groups. A number of studies have supported the strong positive relationship (Collins, 1960; Caudill, 1958; Blau & Scott, 1962). Most studies, however, report only the number of communications initiated (Collins & Geutzkow, 1964) since attendance at such meetings is assumed. Because of the large variance in attendance in this type of agency, the whole range of participation will be included in this hypothesis.

Hypothesis B-4:

An individual's influence in the coordinating agency will be directly related to the extent to which he participates in the meetings of the agency.

Thus the major hypotheses for this study are related to the two dependent variables, participation and power. Each dependent variable is related to a major organizational variable. Thus we expect that the organizational environment of a coordinating agency, in particular, will have distinct effects on the behavior of individual participants. Specifically, the importance which the participant places on his participation will be expected to increase that participation. Likewise, the reward and coercive types of power are expressed in terms of organizational power outside the coordinating agency. Both hypotheses are compared to the classical correlates of voluntary participation and interpersonal power. With these types of hypotheses included, not only can the significance of the major hypotheses be tested, but their relative strength of explanation can be analyzed.

The following chapter will attempt to operationalize these variables so that the hypotheses can be empirically tested. Throughout this analysis, which may become confused because of the different dependent variables and different types of hypotheses, we shall

retain the order begun in this chapter, namely dealing completely with the participation hypotheses before moving on to the power hypothesis in each chapter. Within each section, likewise, we shall treat the organizational hypotheses first before reviewing the comparative hypotheses in each section. Hopefully, the logic of the analysis will then be evident with a minimum of difficulty.

CHAPTER II

METHOD

Data for this study were collected in conjunction with a demonstration project designed to increase consumer participation in comprehensive health planning. The particular agency under study is responsible for a three-county region surrounding a medium-size city in the Midwest. Comprehensive health planning in this region is largely an attempt to bring some type of order and coordination into the health delivery system. Some of its major programs have been to design an experimental health delivery system, establish a family health center for Model Cities residents, and implement a priority ranking system for capital budgeting decisions. However, these major programs had little community impact since the experimental health delivery system was not funded, the family health center closed after the design grant expired, and the need for a capital budgeting manual was usurped by the State Certificate of Need regulations for capital expenditures.

Aside from devising new programs, this agency provides review and comment functions for Federally funded health programs in its region. The pressure of funding deadlines is generally so strong, however, that the review process is either shortened to meet the deadlines or completed following the funding decisions. One major impact of review and comment was to assist in preventing a major University from establishing a clinical facility in conjunction with its new medical school. This decision resulted in the University's establishing a closer working relationship with the community facilities for advanced training of medical students. Generally, however, the agency simply approves a program and lends some community support to its implementation.

Another major outcome of the review and comment process is to keep interested individuals and the organizations they represent informed of recent developments in the health care system. The measurable outcomes of this function are few, but the supporters claim that increased exposure also increases the coordination of these programs. Even though the assumption that awareness is a sufficient condition of coordination would be open to question, the trademark of the health planning effort is continuing discussion of recent events and programs. For this reason, the classic organizational model of goal-directed behavior and rational means-ends

logic fails to describe this agency. Given that its focus is the coordination of existing organizations without the legislative reserves of a governmental body, this agency acts largely as a clearinghouse for information and an arena for the public negotiations between health groups. Thus the interorganizational model proposed by Litwak and Hylton (1962) has been adopted as a more descriptive of this agency's activities.

The membership of the agency is drawn from the full range of organizations and community groups which could benefit from this on-going discussion. The only two restrictions for membership is that consumers, those not engaged in health as an occupation, constitute at least 51% of the membership and that they reflect the demographic and organizational characteristics of the community.

The organization is administered by a Board of Trustees with 45 members which has final authority in all matters. Fifteen members of the Board also serve as an Executive Committee which meets monthly in place of the Board and which can take actions in its place. Five standing committees perform the preliminary functions of program design, review, and comment before recommending action to the Board. Each committee is ideally to meet monthly but only two even approximate that goal. Any member who wishes may serve on more than

one committee and Board members frequently hold concurrent membership on planning committees. Committee chairmen, in fact, are automatically Board members. In all, 23 members belong to more than one group in the agency.

The consumer participation project, the overall grant for this paper, proceeded through many stages of approval at the local level prior to final approval by the agency on 15 July 1971. Prior to the approval date, work had begun on constructing a pre-experimental survey to be administered to all agency members. This instrument was designed to test many factors related to participation and influence in the agency and will be used as the primary source of data for this study. A draft of this survey was pre-tested in the South Central Michigan Planning Council serving Battle Creek, Kalamazoo, and surrounding counties on 5 and 6 August 1971. Volunteers from the Board of Trustees in this agency consented to be interviewed by members of the research team. The purpose of the pre-test was to evaluate the clarity of the items and the best method of administering the instrument. As a result of this pre-test and with the consultation of many professors at Michigan State University, the final survey format was completed on 13 August 1971.

The survey consisted of three main sections and took approximately one hour to complete. In the first

section, the interviewer asked the respondent questions concerning the influence of various groups in the agency, his level of information and knowledge about CHP, the organization he represented and other organizational affiliations. The respondent was then asked to complete a self-administered portion of the survey which included general attitudes about comprehensive health planning and this particular agency, a powerlessness scale, a rating of organizational influence in the community, an identification of problem areas, an assignment of various tasks to groups within the agency, and demographic information. The third section consisted of the respondent identifying individuals from a list of agency members and describing the frequency of communication with each. For the individual members of his own committee, the respondent was asked to agree or disagree with statements concerning the member's activity in the committee and also to identify the organization which each member represented. In all, 169 separate variables were included in this survey, some of which were re-coded and scaled for further analysis.

The final survey was administered to 98 individuals (78% of 125 possible) from 17 August through 30 September 1971. The complete agency list was randomly divided between the two principal researchers who conducted all the interviews. The interviewers operated

independently with frequent meetings to discuss problems with the survey during this period. At the annual meeting of the agency on 30 September 1971, 16 new members were added to the agency. One of the researchers interviewed 13 of these recent arrivals during the month of October bringing the total number of respondents to 111 (78% of 141 possible).

The bulk of this chapter is designed to provide a detailed analysis of the operational measures for the hypothesized variables along with a discussion of the research design and the instrumentation in general. Since the list of measures is long and since the analysis of each one's characteristics could well be tedious, let us first discuss the general outline of the review of this material. We have already established that this study concerns two major dependent variables: participation and influence in a coordinating agency. Therefore the remaining part of this chapter will be divided according to these two major topic areas.

Because the dependent variables (participation and influence) form the basic division of this study, they will be treated first in each section. An explanation of the operational definition for each dependent variable will be given along with a description of the variable's range and measures of central tendency. When two or more operational definitions are used to

measure the abstract concept, the correlations between the different measures will be presented to conclude each treatment.

Following each dependent variable to be explained, each hypothesis will be presented containing the independent variable to be discussed. Each measure for the independent variables will then be discussed in the same manner, explaining the origin of the measure and an analysis of the distribution. Within each section, those measures derived from the organizational perspective will be presented first.

After each variable has been operationalized, the measures of association and tests of significance for the analysis of the results will then be treated. Correlations will be reported throughout this chapter relating the dependent and independent measures among themselves. The meaning of these correlations will be explained in the section following their use. Although such a presentation is out of order, it will more clearly follow the logical order of the methods chapter.

Participation: Dependent Measures

One of the two major concepts analyzed in this study is that of social participation. Generally such studies are carried on throughout the whole community or social strata so that simple membership or general

measures of involvement are standard measurement techniques. Since this study is focused on only one organization, however, much sharper and more precise measures are both necessary and possible. Thus the measures of social participation used in this study concentrate on actual meeting attendance and the verbal interaction which takes place within such meetings.

Since the survey was administered between 13 August and 30 September 1971, attendance figures were calculated to include the time period from six months before the inception of the survey to six months following its completion. The dates for attendance would be therefore 1 February 1971 through 31 March 1972, a 14-month period. Again because of the centrality of the participation variable, the operationalizing of this variable cannot be left to only one operational definition.

The first of these measures is the simple raw total of meetings attended. Although most committees were nominally expected to meet once a month, the median attendance during this period was only two meetings. Such a figure, however, does not accurately reflect the complete attendance pattern of the agency since it is highly skewed toward the 22% who never attended a meeting during that period and the 16% who only attended once. Therefore, although more than half the members attended two meetings or less, this figure simply represents the

fact that a significant portion of the members were chronic nonattenders. The range of high attenders, of course, is much broader, ranging to a maximum of 24 meetings.

Although all committees had similar meeting schedules in theory, the actual rates of committee meeting varied considerably. The least active committee, in fact, only met three times during the 14 months. The Executive Committee, on the other hand, which made policy decisions in place of the Board of Trustees, met 16 times during the same period. Therefore, some of the differences in total number of meetings attended was a direct result of the individual committee schedules. A second measure of participation, percent of meetings attended or attendance rate, was therefore developed to account for this variation. The overall attendance rate also documented low meeting attendance with a median rate of 28%. Such a figure is again weighted by the considerable number, 22%, who had zero attendance rate. With over half of the agency members attending meetings only one-fourth of the time, the choice of participation as a problematic condition is certainly warranted. Such rates also suggest that broader studies in social participation cannot adequately operationalize the concept through simple membership in

organizations without having the actual participation overreported since many individuals may be members in name only.

Even though attendance is a more accurate measure of participation than simple membership, many small group studies have shown that participation varies even within the group which actually attends (Bales et al., 1951; Stephens, 1952). Thus the actual verbal participation within meetings was included as the third measure of participation. Although these measures are accurate only for the minority of members who did attend, differentiating within that minority is also important for the consequences of participation. In order to collect this data, one of the project researchers attended all agency meetings except two for the period of one year following the completion of the pre-experimental survey, 52 meetings in all. Among other interaction measures, the observer recorded each person speaking. Since the data collection for this measure did not begin until after the administration of the survey, only the six months following the survey was available, specifically from 1 October 1971 through 31 March 1972. The number of times an individual spoke during this period was divided by the number of meetings attended to arrive at the interaction rate per meeting. These data showed that half of the members who attended

spoke more than eight times per meeting, a considerable interaction rate. The range of interaction, as before, was quite extensive from a minimum with zero frequency to one committee chairman with an average of 81 interactions per meeting.

Because of the skewed nature of all of these participation measures, each measure was dichotomized at the median value in order to create categories of high and low participators for each variable. Thus the substantial proportion of members at the zero and one levels of each of these measures will not spuriously inflate subsequent correlations. These different measures are also interrelated among themselves. The following correlation matrix shows that those variables of nearly equal precision relate more strongly than those of more widely disparate meaning.

Table 2-1

Q-Correlations of Participation Measures

	Attendance Rate	Times Speaking/mtg
Number Meetings Attended	.97	.40
Attendance Rate		.60

For example, the two attendance measures are near perfectly correlated while the number of meetings attended is only moderately correlated with the other end of the

precision continuum, the times speaking per meeting. Had simple membership been included as a variable in this analysis, which in this case is a measure with no variance, one would expect it to correlate more strongly with the attendance measures. Another emergent pattern is the stronger relationship between the two attendance measures as opposed to either attendance measure with communication. Aside from the fact that the attendance measures are derived from the same figures, the differences may also speak to different types of behavior in attending meetings versus taking part in those meetings. These correlations are strong enough to allow the use of these measures as dimensions of the one concept of participation. We may find, however, different determinants for these two distinct aspects of participatory behavior.

Participation: Independent Measures

The major hypothesis for this section on participation tests the influence of an individual's organizational backing for his participation behavior.

Hypothesis A-1:

An individual's participation in the coordinating agency will be associated with the extent to which he perceives his participation as important to the organization he represents.

As with participation, however, the importance of the variable of representation suggests that the various dimensions contained in this concept should be explored through the use of distinct measures. Therefore, we have developed three measures of representative status which is intended to tap the major variations in this variable.

The first measure of representative status verifies the nature of the represented organization or group. Two possible groups could be important for the individual's participation behavior, those groups which the individual formally represents and other groups, generally of a more unorganized nature, whose interests the individual feels he represents. These two types of representation, called formal and informal representation respectively, were determined through the following series of items on the survey.

Formal and Informal Representation Items

1. Were you selected to formally represent any group in this agency?
2. If so, which group was this?
3. Quite often, individuals feel they represent groups which they were not formally selected to represent. Do you feel you represent any of these groups?
4. If so, which groups are these?

Of the 102 individuals who responded to these questions, 74% reported that they formally represented some group. Such a high figure for formal representation is an indication of the selection processes of the staff of this agency in originally organizing the self-perpetuating Board and committees. The By-Laws for the agency stipulate that a number of different organizations and demographic groups be represented. This method of selecting individuals, however, may contribute to the low participation rates since formal representatives may not be interested or motivated to participate if their organizations or groups have no interest to pursue in health planning. Without organizational or personal interest, a large number of nonattenders would be expected.

Of the same 102 individuals, 50% reported that they felt that they informally represented some group. The effects of such informal representation may be mixed. As a perception, informal representation may lead to higher participation rates. By the same token, the lack of formal sanction limits the extent to which that group may affect the representative's behavior. The analysis of the relationship between these types of representation and participation will be interesting in the next chapter.

Because of the incomplete overlap of these two types of representation, only 10 of the 102 respondents reported that they did not represent any group either

formally or informally. The 92 respondents who did report some type of representation were asked the following items to determine the second and third dimension of representative status, namely the strength of the representative link.

Strength of Representation Scale

1. How likely is it that the people you mentioned would find out what you do at the agency?
   (Very likely, Probably, Maybe, Unlikely, Very unlikely)
2. Do you feel that the people you mentioned expect you to do anything particular at the agency?
   (A great deal, Quite a bit, Some, Little, None)
3. How much do these people influence what you do?
   (A great deal, Quite a bit, Some, Little, None)
4. How important is it that you have these people to back you up?
   (Very important, Somewhat important, Fairly important, Not too important, Not important at all)
5. Are you more likely to speak up at meetings with these people backing you up?
   (Very likely, Probably, Maybe, Unlikely, Very unlikely)

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6. Do you feel that your contribution will carry more weight with these people backing you up? (Very likely, Probably, Maybe, Unlikely, Very unlikely)

These six items were intended to form a scale, but their distributions present initial misgivings about the possibility of combining these items into one scale.

Table 2-2

Percentage of Responses in Each Category of Representation Scale

Item	N	5 Very High	4 High	3 Medium	2 Low	1 Very Low	
#1	90	47	19	14	11	9	Find out
#2	89	24	33	10	17	17	Expectation
#3	89	20	25	16	18	21	Influence
#4	88	47	25	13	5	11	Importance
#5	89	30	21	7	25	17	Speak up
#6	90	39	39	9	6	8	Contribution

Although relational conclusions cannot be strictly drawn from distributions, the respondents seemed to answer these questions more positively when the question concerned an area other than their own behavior. For instance, when asked about their organization finding out about them (#1), being important (#4), and adding weight

to what was said (#6), the responses were skewed with two-thirds or more giving positive responses. For those items which inquired about the effects of the organization on individual behavior, particularly whether the organization influenced the representative (#2) or induced him to speak (#5), half or more of the responses were neutral or negative. Thus these items seemed to tap an independent streak such that respondents were correctly reporting the lack of influence, unaware of that influence or unwilling to admit to the influence. The analysis of these questions with respect to their actual behavior will show which of these possibilities is, in fact, the case.

The actual test for scaling items of this type is the correlation between the individual items. If all the items correlate positively, we can be assured that each item is testing the concept of strength of representation. The correlation matrix, however, offers little encouragement for combining these items into an overall scale of strength of representation. Some of the relationships between these items are quite strong. For instance the triad relating #1, 2, and 3 have correlations, all of which are significant at the .025 level. Likewise, the last three items, #4, 5, and 6, produce correlations even more significant at the .01 level. A middle triad (#3, 4, and 5) also produces

correlations at the .01 level. Empirically, it would seem that three separate scales are called for based on the significant correlations produced. The items, however, must be rationally similar to determine if the combination of each of these groups has any meaning beyond the empirical clustering.

Table 2-3

Q-Correlations of Representation Items

		2	3	4	5	6
		Expec-tation	Influence	Impor-tance	Speak Up	Contri-bution
Find Out	1	.27	.25	.07	.13	-.10
Expectation	2		.34	.10	.14	.21
Influence	3			.36	.42	.13
Speak Up	4				.59	.37
Contribution	5					.37

The first group contains the first three items which seems to measure the strength of the relationship between the represented organization and the individual. Thus the organization's finding out about the individual's behavior, the organization's expectations for the individual, and its subsequent influence could well produce a meaningful scale based on that link in the theory. The last three items also contain a unification principle which is complementary to the first, namely

the implications of the previous relationship on the individual's behavior and effect in the agency. For instance, the importance of the relationship, the verbal behavior, and the effect of such behavior is contained in these questions. Finding a link for the middle triad is, unfortunately, more difficult. Neither the positive-negative response items nor the individual-organization meaning of the items differentiates this group from the rest. This trend might also reflect the influence of the organization on the individual with the importance (#4) and the tendency to speak up (#5) as components of that influence. This index, therefore, would only duplicate the individual dimension and will not be pursued further.

As well as testing the significance of the implications of organizational background for participation, the representative status of the individual is also to be compared with other, more traditional explanations of participation in such an agency. For this reason, three auxiliary hypotheses were constructed with which to compare the strength of association between participation and representation. Such hypotheses will play the role of a baseline association with which we can establish the quality of data and the congruence of this naturalistic setting with other agencies and organizations previously tested. With such a baseline,

we can draw conclusions concerning the generalizability of these findings to other studies and organizations.

The first comparative hypothesis is drawn from the social-psychological applications of exchange theory via Homans (1961) and uses attraction to the working group as the independent variable associated with participation.

Hypothesis A-2:

An individual's participation in the coordinating agency will be associated with the extent to which he is attracted to the committee on which he serves.

The measure used for this attraction variable is a six-item scale which was included as part of the interview schedule.

Attraction Scale

RESPONSE: Strongly agree, Moderately agree, Neutral, Moderately disagree, Strongly disagree

1. You enjoy attending meetings of the committee.
2. The committee makes a valuable contribution to planning in the field of health services.
3. In general, you try to do what the committee expects a member to do.
4. The committee is dealing with the same things you are interested in.

5. You benefit from working with the committee.

6. You usually go along with the committee's decision on issues.

The scale is an adaptation of a similar approach by Jackson (1959) who used similar items to describe the parameters of a member liking the group. Plainly the dimensions of interest, normative behavior, agreement, worthwhileness, and benefit are reflected in these items.

Likewise, the respondents were generally favorable to the committee as reflected in the distribution of responses.

Table 2-4

Percentage of Responses in Each Category of Attraction Scale

	Item	N	5 SA	4 MA	3 N	2 MD	1 SD
Enjoyment	#1	93	33	40	8	11	9
Contribution	#2	93	14	40	25	13	9
Expectation	#3	94	32	45	7	10	4
Interest	#4	92	35	39	7	16	3
Benefit	#5	94	35	44	11	6	4
Agreement	#6	94	15	53	17	9	6

SA--Strongly agree; MA--Moderately agree; N--Neutral; MD--Moderately disagree; SD--Strongly disagree

Each item has a median and mode equal to four, a mildly positive response. Likewise, the means range from 3.6 for the last item to 4.0 for the next to last item. Thus the homogeneity of response lends a great deal of support to the fact that these items are tapping the same variable of attraction. Although some individuals did not agree that the committee was dealing with the same things they were interested in (#4) and others, almost exactly one in four, were neutral about the contribution their committee was making, the responses are uniformly favorable. Whether such an attitude is an actual reflection of the individual opinion of the group or simply a "nice" response to give the interviewer, of course, one can never tell. Although some indication was given that some respondents were answering on the basis of the latter motivation since their responses came so fast, we can only assume that the number is not a significant deviation from the actual attitude.

As before, the real test of the scale is in the correlational results among its items. In this case, all correlations are uniformly high which makes the formation of valid scale almost a certainty. Each of these correlations is significant at least at the .025 level which rules out chance variation in all but the most extreme cases. The highest correlations in this matrix also show some subtle internal clustering which

further supports the validity of the attraction scale. For instance, the correlations over .5 are between items 1 and 5 and between items 3 and 6. The first pair (Q = .55) speaks to the similarity of enjoyment and benefit which the members of the committee derive from attendance. The prevalence of and rewards derived from the expectations of the committee for the individual is also reflected in the second largest correlation (Q = .54). In this case, doing what the committee expects and going along with its decisions are both tests of the normative prescriptions of group membership. Thus even though these relationships are by no means monumental, they lend credence to the rational validity of the scale to complement its empirical validity as expressed in the complete correlation matrix. Such a scale will, therefore, be used to compare the strength of the representative base as a major correlate of participation.

Table 2-5

Q-Correlations of Attraction Scale

		2	3	4	5	6
		Contribution	Expectation	Interest	Benefit	Agreement
Enjoyment	1	.41	.36	.29	.55	.31
Contribution	2		.31	.27	.44	.29
Expectation	3			.25	.33	.54
Interest	4				.31	.40
Benefit	5					.29

The second comparative hypothesis is based on the more sociological findings that social status is the best single predictor of social participation.

Hypothesis A-3:

An individual's participation in the coordinating agency will be associated with his social status.

Though little theory has developed to explain this relationship, we could hypothesize increased leisure time, occupational role prescriptions, or class interests as the link between status and participation. For whatever reason, though, research has documented the relationship time and again (Babchuk, 1969). Our purposes are simply to accept this research and use status as a second comparison with the organizational variables as correlates of participation.

The measures for social status in this study will vary from the traditional because of the select occupational classifications which are attracted to health planning. Of the three classic components of socioeconomic status, education, income, and occupation, the last has always been the most difficult to measure (Centers, 1949; Warner, 1963; Duncan, 1961). The problem in this case is compounded since the occupational range in this agency is normal except for a large segment in the medical professional classification. The combination of these two conditions makes the use of

any extant occupational scale impractical since over half the frequency would be in one category. The very real status differences within this area, therefore, would be excluded as a variance to the overall index.

For these reasons, the extent of health-related education was substituted for occupation as the third measure included in the overall status scale. The items used to measure status were, therefore, the following.

Status Scale

1. Of these educational categories, which one best describes your educational background?
   (Grammar school, High school, Para-professional degree, Bachelor's degree, Master's degree, Ph.D. degree, Professional degree)
2. How much formal educational training have you had in any health-related field?
   (A great deal, Quite a bit, Some, Little, None)
3. Of these categories of annual family income, please indicate which category your family falls into?
   (Under $7,000, $7,000 to $12,000, $12,000 to $20,000, $20,000 to $30,000, Over $30,000)

The distribution of these measures is approximately normal. The only major deviation from normality was the large number of nonprofessional representatives

with no health-related education. Even with such a loading at the zero end of the scale, the median health-related education was still "Some." Thus the agency comprises two large groups, some with no health education and others with a great deal. The median general educational level was a Bachelor's degree, no doubt higher than a general random sample, but still seemingly inadequate for the type of technical planning decisions required of the agency participants. The half of the membership with less than the Bachelor's could very well have been lacking in the necessary skills to continue informed participation.

The median income for the group was the middle category of $12,000 to $20,000 with an approximately normal distribution. Thus the overall description of the population of this agency was higher than average education and income. The major internal differentiation was the extent of health-related education which formed a bi-modal distribution. These three variables will be included in one scale since the correlation matrix indicates that the measures are sampling the same conceptual domain. As would be expected, the two educational measures related most strongly (Q = .50) since health education would have been included in the general education category. The second strongest correlation is also the classic education-income relation (Q = .39).

The extent to which health education relates to income may have been reduced somewhat by the subjective judgment and implied comparison included in the health-education measure as opposed to the objective categories provided for the general education measure. The decreased relation may be an artifact of the measuring instrument, but it is not small enough to invalidate the possibility of forming a status scale from these variables. This scale will be used as the second comparative base for the organizational correlates of participation.

Table 2-6

Q-Correlations of Status Scale

	Health Education	Income
General Education	.50	.39
Health Education		.26

A final comparative hypothesis will be tested, closely akin to the previous socioeconomic predictor of participation. As Babchuk (1969) has pointed out, social status, as the best predictor of participation, is by no means the only correlate. Other correlates were examined in the previous chapter along with some effects which are still disputed. As with the status variable, all of these independent measures could be evaluated as predictors of participation and evaluated

against the organizational explanation. Such a process, however, may suffer from the depths of tedium.

Another possibility would be to combine all other predictors of social participation into a scale. With the trouble of reaching a significant correlation and normal distribution in scales, however, one might seriously doubt the wisdom of attempting to form such a scale. A final alternative is to have all other predictors of social participation represented by the outcome of the process, the participation itself. Since this alternative was considered the most feasible, we must now present the hypothesis which forms the final comparative base.

Hypothesis A-4:

An individual's participation in the coordinating agency will be associated with his participation in other nonwork-related organizations.

In attempting to measure social participation, we shall take the most well-worn scale available, the Chapin scale (1948), and use it without modification. Little need be said regarding this scale except that certain levels of participation are tested for each reported organization up to five organizations. The levels of participation are contained in the following four items.

Social Participation Scale

RESPONSE: Yes, No

1. Do you regularly attend meetings at any of these organizations?
2. Do you make financial contributions to any of these organizations?
3. Do you serve on any committees for these organizations?
4. Have you ever held office in any of these organizations?

With the items weighted such that the first item has a weight of "1," the second item with "2," and so on, the possible scores range from 10 to 100. The median score for such external participation was 70. Unfortunately, few other studies report the raw figures in their use of this scale so that they provide no indication of the representativeness of this agency. The use of the scale, however, is primarily intended as a third comparative base with respect to the organizational correlates of participation. A higher correlation with this variable will indicate that participation in this agency is akin to the general stream of social participation. Low relations with the dependent variable will indicate the opposite, namely that participation in planning and

coordination is a distinct type of participation for which different correlates would be expected.

Thus the four hypotheses concerned with participation in this agency have been reduced to levels of measurement. The crucial variables of participation and representative status were operationalized using three distinct measures in order to tap different dimensions of the concepts involved. The comparative variables, used to establish baseline values for measures of association, were operationalized with a number of measures combined into one scale. Thus one value of association with each dependent measure can be calculated. Through this technique, both the significance of the participation-representation correlation can be determined as well as the strength of the correlation relative to other correlates of participation. Essentially, the same procedure will be used with respect to the other major subject of this inquiry, power in a coordinating agency.

Social Power: Dependent Measures

The second major section of this chapter will concern itself with the power aspects of behavior in this agency. As opposed to most community studies, the question of participation could not be taken for granted. Thus the last section attempted to deal with the

determinants in the planning and coordination that was carried on with this agency. Participation itself, however, does not determine the outcome of issues. Individuals will take sides and exert influence to have issues resolved in particular ways. Therefore, the power distributions in these issue areas are equally problematic and require just as much investigation. For this section, therefore, we shall follow the same format, initially analyzing the multiple measures of the dependent variable of power, after which the independent variables associated with power will be analyzed and interrelated.

Since power is such a crucial concept in this set of hypotheses, three measures are again used to reflect different dimensions in the power variable. The first two measures are based on the influence which an individual member exercises in the agency. The first is an external measure of such influence, rated by fellow committee members; the second is an internal measure which is provided by the perception of the respondent himself. A final measure of power is also internally perceptual but includes a wider subject area than what is considered as part of the responsibilities of the coordinating agency.

The first measure of power will be referred to as attributed influence since it is a collective rating

provided by an individual's fellow members in the agency. Since direct rating of individual's influence among naive subjects would be quite reactive, a more indirect method was chosen, namely constructing an artificial situation which the respondent could identify with. The item used to measure the extent of attributed influence was as follows:

> When you are undecided on an issue, he can usually persuade you to accept his viewpoint.
> (Strongly agree, Moderately agree, Neutral, Moderately disagree, Strongly disagree)

When the scores for all respondents who served on committees with the individual were summed and averaged, the result was the attributed influence score for each member of the agency. The average score was used in order to control for the number of individuals who rated each subject.

The median score for attributed influence was 3.2, indicating relatively balanced response categories in the one-through-five range. Such a measure of central tendency, however, also points up the reactivity of this measure since respondents were reluctant to answer such questions concerning fellow committee members. Such a measure was previously used on experimental laboratory subjects (Jackson, 1959) and mental patients in an experimental program (Fairweather, 1969). The

reluctance of community representatives participating in the normal processes of community decision making would be understandably higher than either of the two preceding cases. Therefore, the generally noncommital nature of the responses resulted. Such a bias, however, simply reduces the variance of the responses since the extremes are not freely reported. Finding significant relationships with this dependent measure may be particularly difficult.

Another measure of individual influence within the agency was the respondent's own rating of his influence according to the following measure:

> How much influence do you think you have on planning decisions in the agency?
>
> (A great deal, Quite a bit, Some, Little, None)

The median response of "Little" reflects two facts, one concerning the respondent, the other concerning the item itself. In responding to this item, subjects were reacting to a generally powerless state within this organization. Such a state was the result of the inability of the agency as a whole to accomplish tangible results and the added problem of one individual being simply one among many and the consequent difficulties of producing measurable effect. Reports of such powerlessness are common even among the most powerful

groups (Green et al., 1972). Thus those individuals who did respond that they had little or no influence were reflecting a genuine feeling about their positions.

The item itself, however, skews responses to the low categories because of the number of individuals in the agency. Apart from the feelings of powerlessness, actual power decreases with increasing size of the group (Coleman, 1973). Therefore, in an agency of over 100 individuals, little or no influence is the lot of all but a select few in the group. Asking the respondent for an estimate of his power in comparison with other members would have presented a more balanced and hence more variable measure of an individual's own influence.

The final measure of influence within the coordinating agency is also perceptual in nature, but the focus of the influence is more diffuse than the simple actions of the agency. A medical adaptation of the Neal-Seeman powerlessness scale offers an overall measure of an individual's attitude toward the problems of medical care and his role in overcoming these problems. The actual adaptation of the scale is presented below.

Powerlessness Scale

The following statements are grouped into pairs. Would you check one statement from each pair which best describes your feelings?

1. *A. Persons like myself have little chance of protecting our personal interests when they conflict with those of strong pressure groups.
   B. I feel that we have adequate ways of coping with pressure groups.

2. A. I think we have adequate means for preventing run-away medical costs.
   *B. There's very little we can do to keep medical expenses from going higher.

3. A. High quality medical care can be achieved by those of us who work toward it.
   *B. There's very little we can do to bring about high quality medical care.

4. *A. There's very little persons like myself can do to improve the community's knowledge about medical services.
   B. I think each of us can do a great deal to improve the community's knowledge of medical services.

5. *A. This world is run by the few people in power, and there is not much the little guy can do about it.
   B. The average citizen can have an influence on important decisions affecting his life.

6. *A. It is only wishful thinking to believe that one can really influence what happens in medical services today.
   B. People like me can change the course of medical services if we make ourselves heard.

*Indicates powerless response

The forced choice technique, of course, created quite a bit of consternation among those respondents who did not wish to take such a stand. Most complied in the end, however, and the distributions of their responses are presented in Table 2-7.

As is immediately obvious, only the first two items showed a balanced distribution approaching 50% in each response category. The consistently low powerless

response for items 3 through 6 is largely the result of the strength of ideological factors in responding. High quality medical care, community knowledge, the influence of the average citizen, and the possibility of affecting medical care are all generally assumed to be achievable goals through this agency. In fact, the existence and continued operation of such an agency would be difficult without such ideological agreement. The problematic nature of interest groups and the disagreement over the inevitability of rising medical costs led to the split response on items 1 and 2. The genuine disagreement over these items throughout the agency led to certain individuals feeling they could control these two factors and others feeling powerless with respect to them. For this reason, only these first two items referring to powerlessness with respect to interest groups and medical cost will be included in the powerlessness scale. The remaining items could be included with no trouble other than reducing the variability and sensitivity of the scale by adding such constant powerful response categories. The correlation among the first two items (Q = .26) is also high enough to warrant inclusion as a two-item scale. The distributions of the remaining items are so skewed that testing for correlational coincidence would be invalid. Those four

highly skewed items, therefore, will be discarded and the two first items will be included in the powerlessness measure of individual influence.

Table 2-7

Percentage of Powerless Response for Each Item

	Item	N	%
Interest Group	#1	95	41
Medical Cost	#2	95	48
Medical Quality	#3	102	5
Community Knowledge	#4	105	9
Power Elite	#5	105	13
Average Influence	#6	105	8

Thus the three measures for the dependent variable of power are attributed influence, perceived influence, and powerlessness. These three measures contain both externally and internally ascribed measures of power along with power which relates specifically to health planning and that which contains a broader focus. These differences notwithstanding, the correlation matrix presented in Table 2-8 shows that they are all measuring one aspect of a consistent power dimension. Had the two perceptual measures of self-rated influence displayed the strongest correlation in this matrix, the explanation of these relationships

would have been routine. With that correlation in fact the lowest, we must search in areas other than the internal-external distinction of rating for the strength of these relationships. The consistent high relationship of attributed influence with each of the other two measures indicates that attributed influence must contain common elements with each of the other measures which they, in turn, do not share with each other. That common element may be the focus of the influence measured in each case. The perceived influence measure is strongly directed to influence within the agency itself where the powerlessness specifically relates to problems, regardless of its relation to problems which the agency is handling. Finally the ability to persuade, the basis for the attributed measure, is not specific to either frame of reference. Therefore, attributed influence is most like perceived influence and powerlessness because its focus encompasses both of the areas covered. The two latter measures, however, do not correlate as strongly to each other because of their exclusive spheres of influence. We shall see the effects of this measurement tendency in the analysis of the results. Each measure, however, is reporting a special dimension of the power variable among these members. Such diversity of measurement should increase the variability

of the relationships with the dependent variables and hence the explanatory power of this approach.

Table 2-8

Q-Correlations for Power Measures

	Perceived Influence	Powerlessness
Attributed Influence	.46	-.41
Perceived Influence		-.28

Social Power: Independent Measures

The major hypothesis for this section stipulates that the organizational backing of an individual representative will have effects on the influence of that representative in the coordinating agency.

Hypothesis B-1:

An individual's influence in the coordinating agency will be directly related to the influence of the organization he represents.

The effects hypothesized will be in the direction of the power of the organization which the individual represents. Therefore, a major intent of this section is to develop measures of the power of organizations in the community to be used as the indicators for the independent variable in this section.

A model of power analysis was needed which accurately and efficiently rated organizations in the community. The approach which was adopted is similar to that employed by Tannenbaum (1968) in the power studies within organizations. A list of types or groups of organizations was drawn up which impacted on the health delivery system. Using a five-point scale, respondents to the survey rated each type of organization on its ability to affect community health decisions. Thus the open or nonzero-sum conception of power allowed each organization to be rated separately. All organizations were then ranked on their average rated power. The overall ranking by respondents to the survey is presented below.

All the distributions for each organization are approximately normal. The variance of those organizations ranked as most powerful is limited by the ceiling effect, the inability to give such organizations a score greater than five. Thus one-half of its potential variability is reduced by this limit. The consistent result of this ranking is that medical organizations rank in four of the top six places and that community organizations hold three of the bottom four places. Comprehensive Health Planning is coincidentally placed immediately between these two large

Table 2-9

Ranking of Community Organizations

	Mean	Std. Dev.	Diff. b/n means
Medical Professional Association	4.70	0.61	
			0.08
Physicians	4.62	0.65	
			0.11
Federal Government	4.51	0.75	
			0.24
Hospital Administration	4.27	0.78	
			0.29
State Government	3.93	0.78	
			0.07
Medical Schools	3.91	0.93	
			0.53
CHP Agencies	3.38	0.89	
			0.16
Community Opinion	3.22	0.87	
			0.26
Other Planning Agencies	2.96	0.82	
			0.02
City Government	2.94	0.90	
			0.19
Voluntary Organizations	2.75	0.81	

groups. Governmental organizations are also ranked among themselves from larger (Federal) to smaller (City).

In order to have a ranking which has sufficient frequency in each cell for analysis, this list must be condensed. Because of the distinct difference in character of the top half of the list from the bottom, the decision was made to dichotomize the list at the point of greatest difference between Medical Schools and CHP Agencies. Thus the organizations were classed as high power or low power organizations in the community. Rather than using the generic term of power in reference to these organizations, however, we shall further specify these organizations as dominant or sub-dominant since a reputational measure was used to arrive at these rankings.

The average score for dominant organizations was 4.4 which, in the language of the rating scale, affords these organizations "Quite a bit" of power or more. In a similar vein, the power accorded sub-dominant organizations was 3.1 which represented "Some" amount of power or less. Thus far, therefore, the rating scale for organizations seems to have classified organizations according to their reputational power and accorded them expected levels of dominance in the health system.

In order to include this information in this study, however, each individual must be attributed the

dominance status of the organization he represents. Organizational representation is, however, many times not a matter of record. In addition, even when the exact organization which an individual represents is known, the classification of that organization can be ambiguous. A parallel difficulty is created by the individual who may work in a sub-dominant organization but also serves as a representative of a dominant organization. Therefore, the attribution of the dominance status of the organization to the individual is by no means a simple process.

Such attribution was accomplished using an informed panel to rate each individual on the type of organization he represented. A select panel was utilized since the categories of organizational ranking were not accomplished until after the administration of the whole agency survey. A self-administered rating scheme was developed with the names of all the individuals in the study, the two categories of organizational dominance with the specific organizations in each, and a "Don't Know" column which was used equally for individuals unknown to the informant or when the individual's organization was unknown. The raters included in the panel consisted of three agency staff members who had been with the agency at least six months, the two staff members of the consumer participation project, and two

secretaries who had worked at the agency for at least eighteen months. The criteria for a successful classification of the individual was to be known and rated by at least three members of the panel in the same class with no more than one panel member assigning the individual to the opposite class. These criteria were developed to maximize the number of individuals included without treating those individuals with diffuse or less well-known organizational backgrounds equally with those whose representation and the power attributed to that representation was consistently sharp. The results of these criteria were the 45 of 143 agency members on the rolls at that time were excluded from analysis on this variable. Of the remaining 98, 52% were included in the dominant organizational category. Thus the distribution of these variables validated the criteria used by including sufficient numbers of individuals and providing a near perfect dichotomizing of individuals. Thus the organizational dominance hypothesized in the major hypothesis for this section has been operationalized using the above techniques.

As with other critical variables in this study, more than one measure is developed for each variable in the hypothesis. Organizational dominance is no exception. The second method of measuring organizational dominance as it affects the coordinating agency is

through funds contributed to the agency. Under the legislation allowing Federal allocations for such community planning endeavors, at least 50% of the total budget of the agency must be supplied by locally contributed funds; the remainder is the Federal contribution. Such local contributions are, therefore, very important to the agency's livelihood. Their importance is also enhanced by the difficulty the agency has in raising such funds. Those organizations which do contribute funds, therefore, a definite scarce resource, would be expected to have more influence in determining agency policy. Although such organizations may exert such influence through informal channels, this study will analyze the formal component which these organizations' representatives exert in committee meetings. Thus an organization contributing to the agency's matched funds for the year under study will be considered an operational measure of that organization's dominance transferred to the representative in terms of increased influence.

The list of contributors for the 1971-72 fiscal year included 22 community organizations. This group was principally composed of the larger industrial, financial, and health organizations in the community. Of the organizations which contributed, 14 (78%) had representatives as members of one or more committees

within the agency. Twenty-two representatives were thus identified from these 14 organizations. These 22 were given a score for organizational backing independent of the previous measure of organizational dominance. This measure may indeed cause problems because of its skewed distribution. Only 15% of the total agency population and 20% of those interviewed received positive scores on this variable. Unfortunately, nothing can be done about this distribution except to note that such a variable will be difficult to control later in the analysis. Nevertheless, this measure represents another source of interorganizational influence. Again the independent measurement of the critical variable of organizational dominance will allow divergent results to appear in the analysis.

Significance of the relationships in the results chapter is not the only outcome of this study. In many cases, significance can be achieved without the strength of association being important in determining the dependent variable. Such is often the case with the use of path analysis in determining the factors of a particular variable. Rarely do all the factors combined explain more than 10% of the variance although most are significant relationships. The factors do relate to the dependent variable greater than chance, but those same factors still may leave 90% of the dependent variable unexplained.

Thus the comparative hypotheses were developed to determine the extent to which the organizational dominance affects a representative's influence in comparison with other more documented sources of such influence.

As discussed in the previous chapter, interpersonal and small group resources for influence will be used as comparisons for the organizational bases. Of the multitude of interpersonal formulations, French and Raven's (1959) classification portrays probably the most used and well-known typology of the bases of influence. Of their five bases, we have been able to identify two in a purely interpersonal sense which have applicability to this study, expert and referent power. It is our intention at this point in time to operationalize their concept of expert power.

Hypothesis B-2:

An individual's influence in the coordinating agency is directly related to his task-specific expertise.

Although French and Raven do not distinguish varieties of expert power, we shall refer to two different resources in this area and measure these resources through two different operational measures. The two different resources are the generalized educational background necessary for credibility and influence and the task-specific information which forms the content

of influence attempts. Either or both of these resources in combination could be included in French and Raven's conception.

The generalized educational background will be operationalized using the same measure for health-related education as was associated with the index of socioeconomic status. Since this variable was essentially bi-modal with peaks at the extreme ends of the five-point scale, dichotomizing at the median value of "Some" will produce two groups, those with much health education and those with little or none. These two groups will be used to test the hypothesis that expert resources lead to influence and compare the effects of those resources with the organizational resources for influence.

A second type of expertise is that associated with the task-specific information necessary to plan for the health care system. In operationalizing this concept, a number of areas of information were identified. They were classified as general health information, organizational information, and task information. The three areas were tested using the following items.

Information Scale

RESPONSE: Correct, Incorrect

1. Please tell me what major department in the Federal Government finances the agency's annual budget?

2. Please tell me what a Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) is?

3. Please tell me the difference between an "A" agency and a "B" agency in Comprehensive Health Planning?

4. Would you give me the names of as many of the staff members as you know?

5. Would you name as many of the Planning Committees as you know?

6. Would you name the chairmen of these committees?

7. Would you name as many items of next year's work program as you can remember?

Emphasis in this test of levels of information was placed on organizational and program items because these areas were the most discussed and disputed at the early stage of organizational development which this organization found itself in. On the other hand, the substantive issues of health planning were still to come. Therefore, emphasis on health planning and medical care terminology would have consistently drawn low correct response rates and would have been essentially irrelevant to the type of knowledge needed in the organization at that time.

The following list of specific items and the correct responses gives an indication of the information level for different topics at this time.

Table 2-10

Percentage of Correct Response to Information Scale Items

	N	% Correct
I - General		
HEW	109	76
HMO	108	40
"A" agency	105	29
II - Staff Names		
Ben Helmuth	108	83
John Tinker	108	53
Charles Farr	101	47
Thomas Woodall	104	45
Molly Robins	102	43
III - Committee Names		
Board of Trustees (BT)		
Executive Committee (EC)		
Facilities and Services (FS)	102	65
Manpower and Education (ME)	103	40
Environmental Health (EH)	99	48
Health Economics (HE)	103	39
Urban Design (UD)	98	15
IV - Committee Chairmen		
Donald Spayd	101	28
Joe Hair	100	21
Oscar Portwood	100	20
Edward Mount	102	20
Robert Freeman	99	11
V - Work Program Items		
# 1 Goals, Objectives, and Priorities	99	8
# 2 Pre-paid Group Practice	99	34
# 3 Community Living	99	8
# 4 Restructuring Patient Care	99	26
# 5 Family Health Center	99	27
# 6 Health Information	99	6
# 7 Capital Budgeting	99	15
# 8 Water Monitoring	99	13
# 9 Consumer Participation Program	99	11
# 10 Sewage-Drainage System	99	9
# 11 Solid Waste Disposal	99	15

One of the highest response categories was the correct identification of the Federal Department which funds the agency. Information fell off rapidly as the general questions moved into more specific medical and planning terminology. The staff contained two individuals who were known by a high proportion of members. As the director, more people knew Ben Helmuth than any other staff member. John Tinker was also known by more than half the individuals interviewed, not for any particular status or job responsibility within the agency, but more for his inclination to meet and work with the people in the community as opposed to remaining in the agency office. The others were known predominantly by the committees for which they had staff responsibilities. The committees differentiated themselves largely on the basis of the frequency with which they met and hence the impact they were having on the agency as a whole. More of this relationship will be discussed in the following chapters. In general, only committee members knew the chairmen of their own committees. Therefore, these chairmen could be ranked according to the size of their respective committees.

The work program items give a fair indication of those items which were receiving attention at that time. Two of the three items which were identified by more than one-fourth of those interviewed were a

feasability study,pre-paid group practice and the recent funding of a design grant for a comprehensive medical center in the Model Cities neighborhood. The third work program item was the consumer participation project, under which the survey itself was being conducted. In sum, the directors of this project felt that the knowledge of the agency's work program and hence its purpose for the fiscal year was woefully low among the members in general.

As a measure of expertise, each of these five areas will be weighted equally by summing the scores for each area, dichotomizing each separately at the respective medians, and summing the resulting scores. A further dichotomization reduced the measure to a high information and low information categories suitable for analysis. Thus this measure stands with the generalized health education measure as resources for influence under the aegis of expert power as classified by French and Raven.

Another resource for influence which could have substantial effects on an interpersonal basis is the referent power, again identified by French and Raven. As discussed previously, the point of this concept lies in the tendency for individuals to believe in and agree with reference groups and significant others. Although the groups in coordinating agencies hardly warrant the

level of influence of family members or intimate friends, the motivation to do well in the group setting may lead certain individuals to be influenced by those they feel are like themselves.

Hypothesis B-3:

An individual's influence in the coordinating agency will be directly related to the extent to which members of the agency identify with the individual.

The operational definition for this concept is similar to the measure of attributed power presented earlier and is, in fact, from the same scale (Jackson, 1959). Each respondent is asked to rate all other committee members he knows on the following item:

In general, he is the same kind of person you are. (Strongly agree, Moderately agree, Neutral, Moderately disagree, Strongly disagree)

As before, the average response given to each individual is the extent to which other committee members identify with the individuals. The median for this variable is also 3.2, and it will be dichotomized at this value for analysis. As with the measure of attributed influence, the neutrality of the response may in fact be an indication of reactivity rather than a genuine response. Another potential problem with this measure with respect to attributed influence is the possibility of a

spurious or artificial correlation due to their being collected at the same time in the same manner. A consistent response to the one measure, due to reactivity, may also be produced in the other for reasons other than genuine relation or effect of the one measure on the other. No means are available to control for such a process. Simply to be aware of the possibility of spuriousness is sufficient for the present.

The final comparative hypothesis and independent variable is derived from small group studies.

Hypothesis B-4:

An individual's influence in the coordinating agency will be directly related to the extent to which he participates in the meetings of the agency.

As outlined above, participation itself in small group settings is often a correlate of influence with little other resources available to the individual. Therefore, we can hardly ignore such consistent findings in attempting to explore the strength of the organizational resources of power in contrast to the more traditional means to power in small groups.

The measures for participation in the committees of this agency have already been explored at great length. Little more need be said concerning these measures except that all three measures of participation used as dependent variables in the previous section will

now be three operational measures for the independent concepts of participation. One difference from previous research, however, is that attendance will be used as a resource for influence in this study where verbal participation alone has been tested in previous work. Therefore, the results of all of these participation measures will be used as a third comparative base for the strength of the organizational resources for influence.

Measure of Association

Because of problems of distribution and meaning in many of the measures and scales discussed, a large number of these measures were dichotomized to correct for such problems of measurement. In the interest of simplicity and directness, therefore, all measures in this study were dichotomized so that all tables could be produced as simple relations between dichotomized variables. Although some of the subtlety may have been removed by this process, such distinctions in a study of this type can often lead to more complex relationships than the theory or the methods can cope with. Therefore, four-fold relationships will be constructed throughout the analysis section.

In order to measure the strength of association between these dichotomous variables, a measure of association specifically designed for 2 X 2 tables will

be employed, entitled the Q-correlation (Davis, 1971). The value of the Q-correlation is a simple ratio of the difference between the cross-products and the sum of the cross-products in a 2 X 2 table. Thus intuitively, the greater the difference between the cross-products in one direction, the greater will be the measure of association, standardized by the sum of the cross-products. The basic advantage to Q is that it is calculated on dichotomous variables which approach 50:50 marginal distributions. The measure of association, therefore, is as distribution free as possible if all variables are dichotomized at the median as we have done. Thus correlations for different variables can be compared with the assurance that the distributions, equal in this case, are not affecting the size of the correlation. Since comparisons of strength of relationship are an important consideration in this study, this advantage to the Q-correlation is strong.

The technical aspects of the correlation are the same as any other standard correlation: (a) independent variables register Q = .00; (b) Q ranges from +1.00 to -1.00; (c) the value of Q has meaning as opposed to being an arbitrary amount. In the case of the correlation coefficient, the value represents the probability of doing better than chance in assigning an individual to one variable based on his score on the

other. For instance, a Q of .50 between status and social participation would mean that assigning an individual to a participation category on the basis of his status would produce outcomes 50% better than chance assignment. Without further elaborating the details, the advantage to this type of interpretation along with the distribution free comparison of Q-correlations across different variables makes such a measure of association an attractive method for discovering the strength of relationships.

Since the next chapter will also test hypotheses for levels of significance, the confidence intervals around each Q value must be calculated. These values are dependent solely on the level of confidence desired, the value of Q, and the cell frequencies as portrayed in the following formula:

$$Z = \frac{Q}{\frac{(1 - Q^2)\left(\frac{1}{A} + \frac{1}{B} + \frac{1}{C} + \frac{1}{D}\right)^{1/2}}{2}}$$

where: A, B, C, D are the frequencies in each of the four cells.

This formula will be used to test the significance of the hypotheses. An alpha level of .05 or better will be considered sufficient to reject the null hypothesis in each case.

Thus with the analysis set, the methodology for this study is determined. Beginning in the first chapter with the conceptual hypotheses, we have operationalized each variable with one or more measures and discussed the interrelationships between these measures. We are now prepared to test the hypotheses presented in the first chapter and compare the relative strength of the organizational approach to community participation and influence with many of the more well-documented determinants for those behaviors.

CHAPTER III

HYPOTHESIZED RESULTS

Having presented the methods of data collection and the operational definitions for this study, the results of the analysis for these measures must now be presented. This chapter will present the analysis and tests of hypotheses in the order in which they were discussed in the first chapter. Thus, the initial section of this chapter will deal with the hypotheses related to participation. Within this section, the hypothesis which relates the agency participation to representation of external organizations will be presented as the major hypothesis. Following the explanation of these measures, the three other hypotheses relating to participation will be tested and their strength of association compared with the major hypothesis of representation. The following section of this chapter will contain a similar procedure with respect to the dependent variable of power--first testing the major hypothesis then comparing it with the alternative hypotheses.

Correlates of Social Participation

The major hypothesis related to participation within this agency reads as follows:

Hypothesis A-1:

An individual's participation in the coordinating agency will be associated with the extent to which he perceives his participation as important to the organization he represents.

Because of the importance of these variables, multiple measures were developed to insure that all the dimensions reflected in this concept would be sampled. Thus, participation was subdivided into three dimensions: total number of meetings attended, attendance rate, and number of times speaking per meeting attended. Because the wide conceptual distinctions among these measures, each will be used as an indicator of participation. Likewise, the importance of the independent variable of representation necessitated sampling four dimensions of this concept. The first two measures, formal and informal representation, simply determine the representative status of the agency member. The respondent who reported representing on either or both of these same group measures was questioned further to determine the extent to which he was influenced by such status. For this purpose, the respondent was asked six items which divided themselves into two three-item scales

based on the intercorrelation matrix presented above. These two scales tested the influence of the represented organization on the representative and the effectiveness of efficacy of such backing for increasing the weight of the representative's contribution to agency decisions. As with participation, each of these four measures of representation will be analyzed independently and its relation to the dependent measures will be reported.

Thus the Q-correlation for the first hypothesis forms the 3 X 4 correlation matrix reported below:

Table 3-1

Q-Correlations of Representation and Participation

	Total Meetings	Attendance Rate	Times Speaking
Formal Representation	-.13	-.05	.14
Informal Representation	.19	.11	.18
Organizational Influence	.42[c]	.67[c]	.33[b]
Organizational Efficacy	-.31[b]	.01	.26[a]

[a] $P < .05$; [b] $P < .005$; [c] $P < .001$

This matrix shows, as with most multiple measure hypotheses, that the original assertion is supported in some aspects and not supported in others. Fortunately, the most important aspects of the hypothesis, as contained in the independent measure of organizational influence,

supported quite convincingly. Specifically, the strongest correlation (Q = .67) showed that organizational influence did indeed have a decided effect upon the member's attendance rate. Since these two measures are the central measures for their respective concepts, they provide the clearest test of the hypothesis. The effect of organizational influence on total meetings attended (Q = .42) could well be clouded by the range of possible meetings attended (3 to 16), an untested variance in the latter measure. Likewise, the effect of organizational influence on the number of times speaking (Q = .33) is not as strong as with attendance rate since the accountability of the member to his organization does not extend as strongly to his behavior within meetings as his attendance at the meetings in the first place. Furthermore, if the representative's organization expected particular outcomes from this agency, the representative would certainly have to attend such meetings. The correlation between his speaking and his influence in such meetings, however, is far from perfect, as we shall see in the next section. Thus we can conclude that to the extent that a representative feels that the organization he represents is interested in his behavior, his participation will reflect that interest in all aspects to some extent.

The simple state of being a representative of one type or another, however, does not seem to affect participation in the same manner. Although representing an organization or group is a necessary condition for that group to be important to the member, its effect on participation is limited simply to that conditional effect. Thus we can further conclude that simple representation is not enough to increase participation. That representation must be accompanied by an active organizational influence upon the individual.

So far the hypothesis is upheld in all its aspects. The dimension of organizational efficacy, however, relates in an odd fashion to the respective dimensions of participation. One would be hard pressed to explain the significant correlation with total meetings attended and the almost zero correlation with attendance rate. To this point, all the measures of representation have related consistently with the dependent measures of participation. The explanation for this difference begins with the fact that the attendance rate measure is a ratio of total meetings attended and the total number of meetings possible to attend for any representative. Even though those who consider their organizational efficacy high still attended fewer meetings, the number of meetings they were allowed to attend may also have been less. The

net result of these two changes would be to decrease the number of low attenders with respect to attendance rate, thus reducing the absolute value of the negative correlation. In sum, the individuals with high organizational efficacy scores may have attended less meetings yet maintained an average attendance record because they belonged to committees which met less often.

This explanation was tested by computing the partial correlation between organizational efficacy and participation controlling for the meeting frequency of the committees to which they belonged. For this and the subsequent analysis of meeting frequency, the high frequency group was identified as the Executive Committee, Facilities and Services, and the Environmental Health Committee which maintained a frequency of almost one meeting per month for each group. The low frequency group, on the other hand, consisting of the Board of Trustees and the Manpower and Education Committee and Health Economics Committee, barely met once every two months over the course of the attendance data. The partial correlations of the representation measure with total number of meetings ($Q = -.15$) and attendance rate ($Q = -.10$) are similar enough to support the hypothesis that the low total meeting score was a result of the fact that low meeting committees contained an inordinate number of individuals with high organizational efficacy

scores. We can thus conclude that the correlation of organizational efficacy with the attendance measures are not significantly different from zero. This form of representative influence, therefore, has little effect on attendance.

The situation is not the same with respect to a member's behavior within meetings. Since the number of times speaking per meeting attended includes only those individuals who attended a meeting during the period of observation, the positive correlation somewhat counters the slightly negative correlation discovered with respect to attendance. The significant relationship, however, arises from the fact that two of the three items in the efficacy scale relate directly to the member's behavior within the meeting, specifically the likelihood of his speaking and the weight which his contribution would have. It is not surprising, therefore, that individuals with positive attitudes in these directions should speak significantly more often than those without such attitudes.

In summary, therefore, we shall conclude that the major hypothesis in relating an individual's representation to his participation within the coordinating agency is upheld in its most important aspects. Although strictly being a representative was not important enough to affect participation, it was a precondition for the

effects attributable to the importance which the individual attached to such representation. The individual's evaluation of the efficacy of his representation, however, related only to his behavior within the meetings once his attendance was assured. Its lack of relationship with attendance measures could be interpreted as a partial disconfirmation of the hypothesis.

The alternative hypotheses presented above relate to various personal and situational factors traditionally related to participation in a voluntary contest. These three alternative hypotheses read as follows:

Hypothesis A-2:

An individual's participation in the coordinating agency will be associated with the extent to which he is attracted to the committee on which he serves.

Hypothesis A-3:

An individual's participation in the coordinating agency will be associated with his social status.

Hypothesis A-4:

An individual's participation in the coordinating agency will be associated with his participation in other nonwork-related organizations.

Thus for these three hypotheses, the independent variables are respectively: the attraction of the member for the committee, his combined income and educational status, and his voluntary participation in

other contexts representing the host of other factors associated with voluntary participation. The results for these three hypotheses are presented below with respect to the three measures of participation hypothesized earlier:

Table 3-2

Q-Correlations of Alternative Factors and Participation

	Total Meetings	Attendance Rate	Times Speaking
Attraction	.51[b]	.49[b]	.61[b]
Status	.36[a]	.24	.06
Organizational Activity	.51[b]	.47[b]	.35
Organizational Influence	.42[c]	.67[c]	.33[b]

[a] $P < .05$; [b] $P < .005$; [c] $P < .001$

The previously discussed relationships with organizational influence have been included for comparative purposes since one of the reasons for testing these relationships is to evaluate the relative strength of each of these factors in their associations with the dependent variable. Before discussing those comparisons, however, we should turn our attention to the significance of these alternative factors in themselves.

Obviously, the attraction index is most consistently related to the measures of participation. Thus

Homans' (1961) dictum, that individuals speak more frequently to those they like, is borne out in this empirical test. Homans, however, also cautions that the relationship between attitudes and behavior in this area is reciprocal which, in this case, suggests that the attraction may be a post hoc explanation of attendance behavior as much as a determinant of such behavior. With this in mind, we must be particularly careful with this relationship not to impute causality since individuals may just as easily be legitimating their attendance by reporting favorable attitudes. Nevertheless, the association cannot be denied since the correlations are so strong.

The supposedly best structural predictor of voluntary behavior, socioeconomic status, lives up to its advanced billing, though it too maintains a consistent relationship with the attendance measures. Status fails to relate to behavior within meetings. The reason for this low correlation will be discussed in the following chapter where the effects of status in different types of groups is treated in depth. In sum, the combined educational and income status measure did relate to the total number of meetings attended and only slightly less to the attendance rate.

When all possible determinants of voluntary participation are included under the measure of such

participation, the relationship becomes quite significant, rivalling the importance of the attraction relationships. Thus, to some extent, these consistent relations show that participation in a coordinating agency does have elements quite similar to participation in other, more voluntary organizations. Thus to characterize such a coordinating agency as a completely work-related organization ignores as much of the motivation which prompts members to join and participate as to classify it simply in terms of the classic conception of voluntary organizations. In the following chapter, we shall attempt to distinguish more clearly the actual differences present in this one organization.

First, however, we must further investigate the role of representation in this agency. Even though the simple fact of representing an organization had no significant effects on participation, there may be other characteristics which we can distinguish for individual representatives. For this reason, the following correlation matrix relates the two types of representative status with the other independent variables in this section (Table 3-3). The wide range of correlations in this matrix shows that formal and informal representation are indeed two distinct dimensions of an individual's background. For instance, although only 53% of the formal representatives were of high status,

such a figure takes on more importance when we see that only 19% of those not formally representing outside organizations were also of high status. Conversely 88% of high status individuals were formal representatives as compared with only 61% of the low status group. Such figures substantiate the Q-correlations of .66 and the fact that individuals of high status are also more frequently formal representatives.

Table 3-3

Q-Correlations of Representation and Alternative Independent Measures

	Attraction	Status	Organizational Activity
Formal Representation	.00	.66	.41
Informal Representation	.27	.01	.05

The same relationship exists between formal representation and outside organizational activity. Again only 54% of formal representatives have high organizational activity scores. When only 33% of the nonrepresentatives have such scores, the subsequent interpretation says more about the nonrepresentatives than it does about the representatives. The figures suggest that the most unusual case is the nonrepresentative who has high status and/or high organizational participation. For example, individual nonrepresentatives

have 58% fewer high status individuals than would be expected from the random assignments of status and formal representation.

The implications for these findings are important both for the ideology of community participation and for the research on voluntary organizations. The popular conception of the community representative is some combination of the man-on-the-street as a representative of the ordinary man and the effective community participant with high status in the community and knowledge of its many issues. Although not conclusive, the evidence from this research suggests that the member of this agency who formally represents only himself is of low status and participates only minimally in other aspects of the community. Those representing formal interests and organizations fit more comfortably into the typical stereotype; yet the conception of the typical community participant does not allow for such formal representation.

Perhaps even more important are the modifications suggested for the field of voluntary participation. Even though the influence of the organization has now been shown to have important implications for participation, the role of formal representation itself must also be accounted for in such a theory. When 88% of the high status individuals, the par-excellence voluntary participators, are simultaneously formal representatives

of other community organizations, the effects of such representation must be investigated. Unfortunately, the answers lie in comparative research across different types of organizations, in particular specifying the degree of involvement of other formal organizations in the community. The present research effort can only outline the problem and suggest that, in organizations which have work-related functions, the representative status of the individual plays an equally important role with his individual status in determining his behavior within such an organization.

Along with the specification of the effects of formal representation, this research also points up the difference in the individuals who formally and informally represent groups or organizations. As opposed to the formal representative, the informal representative showed no differentiation with respect to the structural or behavioral measures of status (Q = .01) or voluntary activity (Q = .05). Rather informal representatives distinguished themselves on their degree of attraction to the committee (Q = .27). These differences point up a crucial difference between informal and formal representation, namely that where formal representation is a structural role imposed on the individual, informal representation is to a great degree created or perceived by the individual. By definition, the member is not

chosen to the agency based on his informal representative status. In addition, though not formally measured, the groups mentioned in connection with informal representation were less often identifiable organizations and more frequently large unorganized groups such as "the poor," "educators," and "the black community." Thus the perceptual character of this form of representation correlates more highly with the perceptual measure of attraction to the agency and less with the structural characteristics of individual's status and behavior.

In summary, then, the organizational effects upon behavior in this coordinating agency are substantial. In comparison with attitudinal and other structural determinants of such participation, the strength of the organization's influence on the individual affected all forms of participatory behavior. Particularly with respect to attendance rate, the pressure from the representative's organization equalled or exceeded the strength of the relationship for the other variables. The efficacy attached to such organizational backing by the representative only influenced his behavior once he attended meetings. Finally, the simple status of being a formal or informal representative did not produce any direct effects upon behavior. These variables did produce sufficiently interesting correlations with the alternative independent variables, however, to imply that the

representative status is not equally distributed across all classifications of representatives. The weight of this combined evidence leads us to the general conclusion that the long neglected area of structural role prescription and their effects on participation in a voluntary organization have considerable empirical basis. Conversely, we must begin to distinguish between types of voluntary organizations since this coordinating agency exhibits characteristics more applicable to work organizations. In effect, a coordinating agency may well be a work organization whose focus is the interorganizational network of other organizations as opposed to the limited organizational goals of the typical organization. It would then take its place between the ideal type of voluntary organization functioning as an outlet for charitable and philanthropic behavior and the ideal type goal-directed work organization. Such organizations, based on these findings, certainly require further specification.

Correlates of Power

The second major question of this research goes beyond participation behavior in a coordinating agency and proceeds to evaluate the effectiveness of such participation in terms of the influence of the individual member. As with the previous discussion of participation, one major hypothesis relates the external

interorganizational network to the behavior of members within the agency. In this case, the major dependent variable is the dominance of the represented organization in the health delivery system. In addition, other variables normally associated with influence in the small group are also hypothesized to relate to an individual's influence within this agency. The discussion of the results of these hypotheses will follow this format.

First of all, then, the major hypothesis in determining individual influence is as follows:

Hypothesis B-2:

An individual's influence in the coordinating agency will be directly related to the influence of the organizations he represents.

As with all critical variables in this study, a number of different measures have been employed to tap the various dimensions of the independent and dependent variables. Thus influence has been divided into attributed influence, perceived influence, and powerlessness. The first two concepts refer to the influence as exercised and perceived within the agency itself. Another factor in these measures is the external vs. internal evaluations of influence. The second and third measures, in contrast to the first, provide an internal measure of influence. Likewise, the concept

of organizational dominance is being measured by a ranking of organizations as well as specific financial contributions provided to the agency by organizations represented by individual agency members. The results of the inter-correlations between these variables are presented below.

Table 3-4

Q-Correlations of Organizational Dominance and Individual Influence

	Attributed Influence	Perceived Influence	Powerlessness
Organizational Dominance	-.09	.06	-.49[a]
Organizational Contribution	-.01	.20	-.02

[a] $p < .005$

It would seem that few of the individuals and organizational power measures supported the hypothesis. Only one relationship, in fact, was significant, that between organizational dominance and powerlessness (Q = -.49). The most important conceptual difference between powerlessness and the other power measures is that it refers to problems of the health care delivery system as a whole as opposed to problems or issues specifically dealt with in this agency. Thus it would seem that dominant organizations in the community, which according

to the ranking are most of the medical organizations, feel relatively capable of handling the problems of interest group pressure and rising cost. These same organizations, however, cannot or do not translate this perceived dominance in the larger community to a dominant position within the coordinating agency through their representatives. A number of explanations for this lack of relation is possible.

One possible explanation is that organizational dominance in the community does not affect the influence distribution within the agency. Such an explanation would be consistent with the goal of such coordinating agencies. By including community representatives as at least 51% of the voting membership, the enabling legia-lation intended to provide a counter-balancing force to the existing dominance of health organizations. These results may confirm that these goals have been based on the lack of relation between traditionally dominant organizations and their representative's influence within the planning agency.

Another explanation is possible, however, in the form of an intervening variable. Dominant organi-zations may be able to exert influence within health planning if their interests would be served by doing so. In other words, an organization would be prone to exert such influence were the outcomes of health planning able

to affect the operation of that organization. Certain dominant organizations could conceivably, however, be unaffected by a new agency with no regulatory or legislative power and little operating budget. The lack of participation on the part of health insurance carriers and third-party payers may be an extreme form of such benign neglect. Such organizations, acknowledged as some of the most influential in determining cost and policy in the health delivery field, may be so powerful that they can, in effect, ignore the health planning process with no repercussion upon their operations.

By the same token, if some dominant organizations can remain completely aloof from health planning, other less secure but equally powerful organizations could be members of health planning boards but find it unnecessary to assert their influence in making decisions. We must again be careful of the distinction between influence and dominance. The latter concept implies continued power with little need to reinforce the response of subdominants. In contrast to such passive possession of power, influence refers to the active use of power in arriving at decisions. Bachrach and Baratz (1962) draw the implications of this distinction in their admonition to not forget that certain individuals may be powerful enough to need to influence only rarely because the issues which could threaten their interests do not arise.

Such "nonissues" could well be the interest group pressure and rising cost that dominants felt well able to handle on the powerlessness measure. The intervening variable, therefore, in this specific case, would be the potential effect that health planning might have on a particular organization. The interaction of potential effect and organizational dominance would thus be the major determinant of a representative's influence. Such organization power would only be operative in situations and concerning those issues which would potentially affect the organization's operations. The lack of relation between organizational dominance and individual influence would be explained, not by the increased power of general community representatives, but rather because of the decision of some dominant organizations not to use that power since no gains would be forthcoming. Unfortunately, this project did not measure potential effect on the community organizations as a variable so that a final choice cannot be made between these rival hypotheses. The next step in such a research direction would be, of course, to resolve that issue.

Given the lack of relationship for the major hypothesis, the comparative purposes of the alternative hypothesis is somewhat vitiated. These other independent variables will still be reviewed, however, to document the continuity of these power measures with that of

other research and to replicate those small group studies referred to earlier in the natural setting of an operating agency. For these purposes, the three alternative hypotheses are presented:

Hypothesis B-2:

An individual's influence in the coordinating agency is directly related to his task-specific expertise.

Hypothesis B-3:

An individual's influence in the coordinating agency will be directly related to the extent to which members of the agency identify with the individual.

Hypothesis B-4:

An individual's influence in the coordinating agency will be directly related to the extent to which he participates in the meetings of the agency.

Because of the two basic dimensions of information pertinent to health planning, general education and task specific information, the first two independent measures refer to Hypothesis B-2. Likewise, all three measures of participation previously employed are included as independent measures in this analysis. The following correlation matrix presents the results of the tests to the three preceding hypotheses (page 128, Table 3-5).

A review of these correlations confirms earlier predictions that these independent influences are indeed associated with power in one form or another. All but

one of these measures relates quite strongly with attributed influence. The lack of significance for general education can perhaps be explained by the lack of knowledge on the part of those rating the influence of their fellow committee members. One would have external information on all the other variables except the educational degrees held by the individual.

Table 3-5

Q-Correlations of Alternative Factors and Power

	Attributed Influence	Perceived Influence	Powerlessness
General Education	.20	.36	-.33[a]
Specific Information	.44[b]	.70[d]	.04
Identification	.54[d]	.06	-.20
Total Meetings Attended	.42[c]	.50[c]	-.23
Attendance Rate	.49[d]	.48[c]	-.31
Times Speaking	.48[b]	.24	.06

[a] $P < .05$; [b] $P < .01$; [c] $P < .005$; [d] $P < .001$

The correlates of perceived influence are equally explainable, however, in terms of what the individual knows of himself. For instance, an individual would be able readily to judge his level of information and his attendance record much easier than how often he spoke at a meeting and, even more importantly, how

other committee members identified with him. Thus, those items of information which were difficult or impossible to ascertain would not relate as strongly with the outcome measure.

Such an explanation, however, has interesting implications for the measurement and evaluation of power. The issue has already been raised concerning the relative lack of outcomes for this agency as a whole. Therefore in judging either one's own or another's relative influence within the group, the ultimate criterion, namely the ability to persuade or exert pressure on another's behavior, is lacking because the discussion rarely reaches the decision stage. Had all the independent measures related with attributed and perceived power, one could not distinguish between those that were used as a basis for judging power versus those that happened to relate to effective uses of power. Given that respondents judge another's influence and not their own on the basis of identification and times speaking, they are using these variables as the basis for judging such influence as opposed to simply relating to the ultimate criterion of effecting decisions. This evidence, however, is again not conclusive to decide between the rival explanations. Further controlled research would be necessary utilizing groups which were forced to exert influence in making final decisions and compared with those which did not

come to such decisions. If the variables actually substitute for the judgment of influence, the strength of relationship in the two groups should significantly differ.

Although neither organizational power measure showed consistent results with the individual's influence within the coordinating agency, certain conclusions can be drawn concerning the type of individual who represents dominant organizations:

Table 3-6

Q-Correlation of Organizational and Alternative Factors

	Info.	Ident.	Total Meetings	Attend. Rate	Times Speaking
Organizational Influence	.11	.25	.14	.10	-.29
Organizational Contribution	.07	-.02	.06	.75	-.25

The strongest relation by far is that representatives of organizations which have contributed funds to the agency are extremely careful about attending meetings on a regular basis (Q = .75). Such representatives have a 65% attendance rate compared to a 49% rate for those which have not contributed. Another characteristic of both measures of organizational dominance is that such individuals do not speak as often at meetings which they do attend (Q = -.29, -.25). The

differential speaking rates of individuals expected to have considerable power will be discussed more fully in the next chapter. For now we can simply point out the strikingly high attendance rate in comparison with lower speaking rates.

In sum, though, we must admit that the dominance of the organization represented by certain members does not act to increase the power of those members. As explained above, such a negative result may simply be accepted or may be explained as the absence of a necessary intervening variable before such dominance becomes operative as influence, namely the potential effect of decision upon the dominant organization. Under the latter conception, the hypothesis as stated would be correct but incomplete. Complementary research must be undertaken to determine potential effect as well as dominance in the health delivery network. Given the possibility of nonissues within health planning in conjunction with the consistent effects of organizational representation on the participatory behavior of members, one would expect such research to show that substantial influence is being derived from the external arena. We conclude this section, therefore, with this hope for future elaboration of these findings.

CHAPTER IV

EFFECTS OF ALTERNATIVE GROUP STRUCTURE

One of the limits to the generalizability of this study is that it investigates the correlates of participation and power in only one coordinating agency. For that reason, these results may be completely ideosyncratic and invalid for the majority of such agencies. The relative isolation of the working groups in this agency, however, may provide a remedy for this limitation. If the groups are found to differ on a significant dimension, certain conclusions can be drawn with respect to the operation of these relationships under the different conditions described by that dimension. In this fashion, some predictions for future replications under different conditions can be attempted.

Another benefit of analyzing these relations on the group level is to distinguish the individual variation which is associated with group differences. Such differences may be of two types: those variables irreducible to individual level and the cumulated individual variables. Because of the purpose to describe different group

contexts, primary emphasis will be placed on the group level variables. The structural effects of cumulated individual variables will also be treated in latter parts of the chapter.

Group Level Effects

The major difference between groups in this agency is that one group, the Board of Trustees, has final authority over agency budget and operations. All staff members deal with Board members in their respective areas of responsibility, and the Executive Director reports directly to the Board. All non-Board members are divided among five planning committees with similar internal structures. Each committee has a chairman who is automatically a Board member and a staff representative to support the committee in its work.

Thus the authority of the different groups could form the basis for comparing Board members with those who do not serve with this group. One might expect a heightened awareness of participation and influence among Board members and, therefore, stronger relationships between correlates of these two dependent variables. Subdividing the agency according to this criterion, however, would create serious distributional problems which would preclude full-scale analysis. For instance, the Board of Trustees contains 46 members, exactly one-third of all possible agency members. Only 33 of these

46 members were contacted for interviews, further reducing the total N for that classification. Finally, the Board has the second lowest group attendance rate of all committees in the agency. Therefore, we would expect to find a large degree of missing data based on lack of knowledge in many of the relevant variables. The decreased sample size, therefore, prohibits any type of correlational analysis among Board members alone. The same problem applies to the other groups in the agency with even greater force because all are initially smaller than the Board. Rather we must look for an interesting and potentially fruitful combination of groups within the agency which will provide a suitable distribution for replicating the previous analysis for each group.

Committees differ on other variables, however, as shown by the following table. The group level variables presented here are intended to be an exhaustive list of potentially relevant variables collected during this project.

From this array of data (Table 4-1), we would like to discover that variable which meets three criteria: inclusion of all agency members, approximately equal distribution of members, and theoretical interest in further replication. In order to bring some order into these variables, the intercorrelation matrix was

Table 4-1

Group Level Variables for Each Committee

	Board (BT)	Executive (EC)	Facilities (FS)	Man-power (ME)	Environ-mental (EH)	Economics (HE)	Urban Design (UD)
1) Number of Members	46	16	40	20	19	24	11
2) Number of Meetings (2/1/71-3/31/72)	7	16	12	7	13	8	3
3) Ave Members per Meeting	15	6	19	8	8	6	5
4) Group Attend. Rate (%)	33	38	48	40	42	25	45
5) Number of Formal Actions (12/70-2/72)	6	14	13	3	4	3	1
6) Non-Committee Members who know Committee(%)	--	--	38	33	47	31	8
7) Non-Committee Members who know Committee Chairman (%)	--	--	7	14	5	11	7

Committee Surveyed (%)	72	100	73	90	79	58	91

computed using Spearman's rank order correlation methods. From this matrix, we shall attempt to discover those variables which relate to each other and perhaps describe some central distinguishing characteristic underlying these committees. The percentage of the committee surveyed is only included in this table for the reader's information. Since it has no theoretical relevance, it is not included in the following analysis.

Table 4-2

Spearman Rank-Order Correlations of Group Level Variables

		N Meetings	Mem/ Mtng	Att. Rate	Actions	Know Com.	Know Chmn.
		2	3	4	5	6	7
N Members	1	.05	.88*	-.29	.31	.30	.33
N Meetings	2		.20	-.03	.76*	.90*	-.53
Mem/Mtng	3			.21	.53	.83*	-.05
Att. Rate	4				-.01	.20	-.53
Actions	5					.88*	-.48
Know Com	6						-.43

*P < .05

Of all the variables included, the number of individuals which could recall the committee on the information items (#6) would appear to be a central variable since it relates significantly with three of the other variables. Those correlates describe the well-known committees Facilities and Services (FS) and Environmental Health (EH) as meeting frequently (12 and 13 times respectively, r = .90), having a higher number

of members per meeting (19 and 8, r = .83), and formally acting on more proposals (13 and 4, r = .88). One could include such characteristics under some global concept of committee activity or centrality to the work of the agency. Thus the score of each committee on the information items would meet the criteria of interest and potential theoretical value. This item on the survey, however, did not include the Board of Trustees (BT) or Executive Committee (EC) as a possible response because the different level of these groups in the agency did not allow their combination into an information scale with the planning committees.

We must, therefore, turn to one of the three subsidiary measures which form the correlates of this committee score. In order to dismiss one of these measures, we must point out that the correlation of the number of members per meeting (#3) with the number of members on the committee (#1) is, of course, partially an artifact of the derivation of the former measure. Without this correlation, variable #3 relates to no other variable other than the information item and, therefore, can be excluded as central to this sample of group variables.

Of the two remaining variables, we shall use meeting frequency (#2) as the basis for dividing the agency into groups. This decision is based partially

on distributional considerations since including Executive Committee (EC), Facilities and Services (FS), and Environmental Health (EH) into one group provides an N = 75. The N for the less frequently meeting group is 101 since some individuals are included in both groups because of multiple membership. The division of the agency according to the number of formal actions (#5) would have left only 56 members in the high activity group as opposed to 120 in the other category.

Other criteria also suggest that meeting frequency will produce the best results after division of the agency. The high activity will include Environmental Health (EH) which ranked highest on the information scale (known by 47% of noncommittee members) despite its low number of formal actions. Another advantage is that the number of committee meetings is a more reliable measure than the number of formal actions. This report has already documented the small amount of substantive accomplishment in this agency up to this time. Therefore, measuring the number of formal actions required some fine distinctions between actions, all of which had little community impact. Another reason for choosing meeting frequency is that this variable affected all members of the committee equally since all members received adequate notice of upcoming meetings. Nonattenders would perhaps not be aware of

the actions taken or the implications which those actions had. Furthermore, each of the actions would have different meanings and effects for different members. All members, however, were informed of the meeting itself.

Of course, if the primary emphasis of committee activity were defined as measurable output, variable #5 (the number of formal actions) would be the more appropriate choice. The obvious advantage of this measure would be to segregate the workings of the Executive Committee (EC) and Facilities and Services (FS), the actual decision-making groups, from the rest of the agency. Environmental Health (EH) certainly met just as frequently without handling that level of work load since it was providing a different opportunity to its members, that of information exchange and discussion. By including EH, therefore, the concept of committee activity or centrality is meant to apply to the working groups in the agency, those groups which offer the community representatives a valid reason for attending. Within this group, such reasons include both decision-making and professional information exchange. In this study, the groups which offer its members these benefits will be considered working groups. Thus the frequency of meeting will be the distinguishing characteristic of these groups.

The relationship of meeting frequency with the other variables analyzed in this study is portrayed in Table 4-3, page 141.

After the justification for this group level variable, the lack of significant relationships with the individual is truly remarkable. Except for the number of meetings attended, which is a pure artifact of the committee frequency, and attendance rate which is related to the number, no other relationship achieved significance. Such an outcome can be viewed as a mixed blessing. Being able to explain individual differences on these committees would have further explicated the significance of the number of times the committee met. On the other hand, the ultimate purpose of this treatment is to discover differences in the relationships between these variables as a result of meeting frequency. Its independence from most individual level variables, therefore, increases the interest of whatever differences are discovered. Certain conclusions can be drawn from the direction and partial strength of these correlations with the proviso that the conclusions have more than the normal chance of being due to random variation.

The activity of the committee did encourage individuals to maintain a higher level of attendance. One could most probably point to the regularity of meeting as the active agent in this relationship.

Table 4-3

Q-Correlations of Individual Variables and Meeting Frequency

Participation Variables	Q
Number of Meetings Attended	.48*
Attendance Rate	.36*
Times Speaking per Meeting	-.18
Formal Representation	.24
Informal Representation	-.10
Organizational Influence	.15
Organizational Efficacy	-.20
Attraction	.25
Status	-.23
Organizational Activity	.24
Power Variables	**Q**
Attributed Influence	.29
Perceived Influence	.00
Powerlessness	-.17
Organizational Dominance	.12
Organizational Contribution	.19
Information	-.01
Identification	.20

*P < .05

Individuals knew that on a certain day of the month that committee would be meeting as opposed to having to wait for a sporadic meeting to be called. The activity of the committee also interested the interorganizational community because of the potential for action affecting those organizations. Thus the individuals on these active committees more often formally represented other organizations (Q = .24) and, in general, are more active themselves in organizations beyond the planning agency (Q = .24).

The surprising finding among these variables is the lower status among members of active committees. Although only significant at the .10 level, the lower status can be explained in terms of the hierarchical nature of the community power structure. For instance, Dahl (1960) makes a distinction between top leaders and subleaders. Hunter (1953) contrasts men of independent decision and executors of policy. Sanders (1958) proposes a more complex scheme distinguishing between key leaders, dominants, functionaries, organizational leaders, issue leaders, and spokesmen. However different types are classified, all descriptions of community power structures mention at least two levels--one to establish policy, one to carry out policy.

In this case, one does not expect policy makers to carry out the month-to-month problems of

interorganizational relations that an agency of this type is designed to handle. The actively working groups in this agency are, therefore, of lower status. For example, EH has the lowest proportion of high status individuals with 20%. In contrast, higher status individuals can afford to belong to the Board of Trustees, one of the low activity groups, and still remain less active in the execution of policy. It follows, therefore, that 63% of the Board of Trustees is high status individuals. As in the traditional work organization, the lower status individuals spend the time working on a problem while the higher status members have the authority of final decision. This division of labor is maintained in this organization between the higher status, less active Board of Trustees, and the lower status, more active planning committees.

These different groups also explain the lack of a strong relationship between status and participation. For an agency with a specific interorganizational character and task, these correlations may not be as important as in a purely voluntary association since the activity may be defined as interorganizational work. Thus, the less active groups, such as the Board, may indeed approach the volunteer model. We shall see, however, that the more active committees are more like work organizations.

The picture with regards to the power variables is not as clear. Aside from the participation measures already discussed, the only two strong characteristics were that members of more active committees attributed more influence to each other (Q = .29) and identified more with each other (Q = .20). Even these relations, however, were not significant. The latter relationship is an indication of the greater homogeneity and cohesion among the members of these working groups. Although the larger groups may have considerable hierarchical differentiation, the nature of their work attracts like-minded individuals dealing with the interorganizational relations. Thus the greater activity and necessity to work together filters deviants from the groups and leaves a more homogeneous residual. In total, though, high activity committees do not differentiate as sharply on the power variables as they did on the participation variables.

Social Participation Within Different Groups

Not only does the activity level of each committee differentiate the members, it also affects the relationships between the variables previously analyzed. The following table presents those relationships controlled for the activity level of the committee.

Table 4-4

Partial Q-Correlations of Participation Hypotheses Controlled for Meeting Frequency*

	Number of Meetings	Attendance Rate	Times Speaking
Formal Representation	---	---	---
Informal Representation	.07(-.13)	.12(.01)	.04(-.14)
Organizational Influence	.48(.06)	.61(-.06)	.43(.10)
Organizational Efficacy	-.15(.16)	-.10(-.11)	.25(-.01)
Attraction	---	.35(-.14)	.51(-.10)
Status	---	.32(.08)	.05(.01)
Organizational Activity	.61(.10)	.49(.02)	.44(.09)

*Number in parentheses is difference from original Q

The partial correlations in this table shift some values substantially from the original zero-order correlations. For instance, previous results showed that more high attracted individuals attend meetings more regularly (Q = .49) and also speak more often at such meetings (Q = .61). Here, however, we find that the relationship is less when controlled for meeting frequency (Q = .35 and .51) since high activity committees have a greater share of high attracted (Q = .25), high participating (Q = .48 and .36) individuals. Most likely the subject matter and the continuity of regular meetings combined to make members more satisfied with

these committees. Since these members also attended more often, part of the previous relationship is explained by this joint correlation. The relationship, however, is not reduced sufficiently to invalidate the original support for the respective hypotheses.

Equal but opposite shifts were produced in the correlations which describe the relation between organizational activity and participation. Even the correlations of organizational activity with meeting frequency was equal in direction and degree to that of attraction with meeting frequency, the effects of controlling for meeting frequency increased the strength of the correlations. Since organizational activity represents a host of determinants of participation, it was already an important correlate. These shifts do not change the previous distribution of variables to any considerable degree.

In order to examine any specification effects of meeting frequency, in which the relationships are either strengthened or reduced under different meeting conditions, the following table (page 147) presents the participation relationships for members of low activity committees. As the table shows, the significant changes in relation are in the areas of status and type of representation. Since the low activity committees meet on a sporadic basis and have less specific productive output, they are more akin to the classic conception of

the voluntary organization. In terms of the previous discussion on the consistency between status and participation, the increased relationship (Q = .36) could be predicted from existing theory. The fact that higher status individuals also speak more at such meetings merely makes this type of participation consistent with their attendance. We shall see that this consistency is reversed for high activity committees.

Table 4-5

Q-Correlations of Participation Hypotheses for Low Activity Committees[a]

	Number of Meetings	Attendance Rate	Times Speaking
Formal Representation	-.06(.07)	.06(.11)	.51(.37)[b]
Informal Representation	.07(-.12)	.21(.10)	-.19(-.37)[b]
Organizational Influence	.37(-.05)	.50(-.17)	.29(-.04)
Organizational Efficacy	-.18(.13)	-.18(-.19)	.26(.00)
Attraction	.42(-.09)	.47(-.01)	.62(.01)
Status	.31(-.05)	.24(.00)	.36(.30)[b]
Organizational Activity	.63(.13)	.58(.10)	.47(.12)

[a]Number in parentheses is difference from original Q

[b]$P < .05$ from original Q

Formal representatives also spoke more at such meetings (Q = .51) although the relation does not achieve

significance of its own. Unfortunately, the frequency distribution for this variable does not allow us to compare participatory behavior for formal representatives in high activity committees to determine whether the increased verbal behavior is also found in high activity contexts. If the relationship would not have been found in high activity committees, a possible explanation for its presence here rests on the sporadic nature of meetings. We shall see the role of information and verbal behavior in determining an individual's power in low activity rests on the lack of continuity and necessity for certain individuals in such committees to keep the majority informed of current events in the health field. An analogous situation may exist here in that formal representatives are precisely those individuals who have such information to pass along to the uninformed. In this light, the decreased relationship for informal participants is also possible since informal constituencies, by definition, do not provide a great deal of information to the representatives. These individuals, therefore, cannot participate in the meetings as much because they have nothing to say. As opposed to the previous lack of relationship, therefore, the actual fact of having a formal constituency does significantly affect participation in committees which do not meet often. It may, in fact, use these formal

representatives which keep these groups informed by acting as liaisons between the group and the health delivery network.

The relationships of these variables for high activity groups also leads to some interesting comparisons.

Table 4-6

Q-Correlations of Participation Hypotheses for High Activity Committees[a]

	Number of Meetings	Attendance Rate	Times Speaking
Formal Representation	---	---	---
Informal Representation	.13(-.06)	.16(.05)	.16(.00)
Org. Influence	.68(.26)	.76(.09)	.58(.25)
Org. Efficacy	-.09(.22)	.03(.02)	.24(-.01)
Attraction	---	.16(-.32)[b]	.43(-.18)[b]
Status	---	.45(.21)[b]	-.15(-.21)
Org. Activity	.57(.07)	.32(-.16)[b]	.42(.07)

[a]Number in parentheses is difference from original Q

[b]$P < .05$ from original Q

The issue of status and participation is again raised, but with different effects in this case. The attendance rate among high status individuals is even stronger (Q = .45) but this trend is not accompanied by any differentiation with respect to their verbal behavior within the meetings (Q = -.15). The difference between working committees and committees with low productivity has

already been explained. Its significance for this relationship is that high status individuals attend the working groups, not necessarily to contribute, but to monitor the outcomes of the committee. Thus they do not refuse to contribute all of the time, a mode of behavior which would result in a strong negative correlation, but rather they contribute only when necessary as opposed to their attendance which is regular and consistent. Such a discrepancy could ultimately be attributed to the difference between monitoring and attempting to direct the planning process--i.e., consistent monitoring and direction only when necessary.

The direction of the shifts in relations for other variables with respect to attendance rate is consistent with this conception. Since the high activity committees are more working groups and less groups from which individuals derive personal rewards, the importance of attraction to the group as a determinant of participation falls off. Likewise, the attendance rate at these committees is less related to other types of community, a further indication of the unique character of these groups. Finally, the influence of the organization upon individual participation actually increases from an already strong position for the agency as a whole. Thus when considering actively working groups in interorganizational relations, this evidence leaves

little doubt as to the importance of the organizational network in establishing the participation patterns within this agency.

Social Power Within Different Groups

The classification of committees according to meeting activity may also affect the relationships of power reported earlier. We would expect the relationships for the correlates of power to be generally strengthened for high activity committees since, as these committees have more effect on the decisions in health planning, the characteristics of power should be more apparent. This conception is put to test in the following table.

Table 4-7

Q-Correlations of Power Hypotheses for High Activity Committees[a]

	Attributed Influence	Perceived Influence	Powerlessness
Org. Dominance	-.10(-.01)	.07(.01)	-.39(.10)
Org. Contribution	---	.58(.38)[b]	.12(.14)
Information	.39(-.05)	.67(-.15)[b]	.00(-.04)
Identification	.70(.16)[b]	.51(.45)[b]	-.05(.15)
Number of Meetings	.47(.06)	---	---
Attendance Rate	.60(.11)	.71(.23)[b]	-.36(-.05)
Times Speaking	.57(.09)	.35(.11)	.51(.45)[b]

[a]Number in parentheses is difference from original Q

[b]$p < .05$ from original Q

The results of analyzing the power relationships for high activity committees showed no change in the correlates of attributed influence except for increasing the strength of the association with identification (Q = .70)--an already significant relationship. The effects on perceived influence and powerlessness, however, are worthy of comment.

It would seem that the major hypothesis for this section in the form of organizational contribution is partially supported despite the decreased size of the sample. For high activity committees, the organizational contribution is a more salient resource in the mind of the individual himself. In addition to discussing interorganizational problems and resolving interorganizational disputes, these groups are more likely to be aware of agency's financial condition and its need for matching funds. Those individuals who come to participate with such contributions obviously feel that such actions enhance their influence position.

This gain in supporting one aspect of the hypothesis was accompanied by a loss of significance for organizational dominance with respect to powerlessness (Q = -.39). Although the correlation was not reduced that much, the decreased sample size prevented the correlation from achieving significance. A potentially more important association, however, was

also achieved for high activity committees. In such situations, individuals who participate in the meetings also tend to be powerless with respect to the problems of interest group and rising cost. Two explanations are possible in this case.

One possible explanation is that the subleaders, highly active members of these committees, have little influence over the major issues outside the agency. A less likely possibility is that more powerless individuals speak more in order to obtain greater influence. This latter explanation, however, would also predict an increase in attendance for these powerless individuals, a relationship not, in fact, increased for high activity committees. Therefore, we shall take this increased relationship between powerlessness and verbal behavior as support for the differences noted earlier, namely that high status individuals attend more but speak less in high activity committees. The complete relationship would, therefore, be that high attenders tend to be of higher status within these groups and feel more powerful with respect to the problems of medical cost and interest group pressure. High verbal participators, on the other hand, tend to be of lower status and are more powerless on these problems. These findings support the conception of the composition of these groups as major leaders who attend and sub-leaders who actually participate.

The low activity committees present a much different picture of the bases of influence.

Table 4-8

Q-Correlations of Power Hypotheses for Low Activity Committees[a]

	Attributed Influence	Perceived Influence	Powerlessness
Org. Dominance	.11(.20)	-.19(-.25)[b]	-.67(-.18)[b]
Org. Contribution	---	.24(.04)	-.03(-.01)
Information	.70(.26)[b]	.85(.03)	.01(.03)
Identification	.40(-.14)	-.22(-.28)[b]	-.21(-.01)
Number of Meetings	.41(.00)	.45(-.05)	-.33(-.10)
Attendance Rate	.43(-.06)	.49(.01)	-.47(-.16)
Times Speaking	.47(-.21)[b]	.35(.11)	-.11(-.05)

[a]Number in parentheses is difference from original Q

[b]$P < .05$ from original Q

Where high activity committees generally increased the importance of all factors of influence except information, low activity committees felt that information was even more important (Q = .70). Conversely, they also seemed to subscribe to the axiom that "talk is cheap" since high verbal participators were less frequently accorded high power (Q = .47). Since these groups generally had fewer members in attendance, most members had the opportunity to speak and the differentiation between those who took this opportunity and those who did not was

less sharp. Therefore, the hierarchical differentiation of verbal participation within meetings does not emerge in these committees as in the high activity groups.

Another source of differentiation, however, which did have more effect on these groups was the level of information. Since these committees met infrequently, keep up with the proceedings of the agency and the health care system between meetings was much more difficult. Therefore, those individuals who kept the committee informed on these matters are accorded more power.

The major outcome of viewing these relationships under different conditions has then been to discover shifts in the bases of power. The next chapter will discuss these shifts in more detail. Suffice it to say at this point that although large differences were not discovered, the increased effect of organizational contribution showed, as with the participation variables, that the interorganizational network has increasing effect on groups the closer they approximate the model of a working, decision-making group as opposed to simply a membership group. Thus more refined techniques for distinguishing groups along this continuum may also show an increasing interorganizational pattern.

Structural Effects

One final method for analyzing these relationships is through the structural effects analysis pioneered

by Blau and Scott (1962). In this conception, groups in the agency are divided according to their ranking on each of the independent variables previously discussed. The method used to arrive at the group variables is to determine the number of individuals on each committee who rank above the median on a particular individual variable. Those committees for which more than half of the members are above the median are classified as high on that variable. The low committees on the group variable are, therefore, those for which less than half of the members are above the median. These measures should not be confused with the group level variables utilized above since these group variables are based upon individual level scores rather than measures which apply to the group as a whole. Controlling for these group averages, the individual effects of the same variables with respect to the dependent variables can be determined. Because of the distributions of these variables, most of the variables resist analysis in this fashion. Those with sufficiently uniform distributions are presented on page 157.

External organizational activity has been a strong correlate of participation, particularly in the low activity committees. When committees are divided on the basis of organizational activity, we continue to find that individuals with little external activity are affected on committees with high external activity.

Table 4-9

Percentage of High Meeting Attendance for Individual and Group Organizational Activity

		Group Organizational Activity	
		LO	HI
Ind. Org. Act.	LO	59% (N=27)	37% (N=27)
	HI	70% (N=20)	79% (N=28)

Table 4-10

Percentage of High Attendance Rate for Individual and Group Organizational Activity

		Group Organizational Activity	
		LO	HI
Ind. Org. Act.	LO	59% (N=27)	33% (N=27)
	HI	70% (N=20)	68% (N=28)

Both of these tables exhibit substantially lower participation for individuals with less organizational activity when their fellow committee members have more. High external activity leads to high participation in both cases, however. The presence of high activity seems to inhibit participation on the part of those who do not participate outside the committee. With more evidence of this nature, one could begin to piece together an explanation based on an atmosphere of expertise concerning voluntary participation. Those with high expertise scores are not affected in either type of group; presumably their experience with voluntary participation

allows them to function in many different situations. Individuals without such experience are highly sensitive to the predominant experience of the group. They seem less inclined to attend meetings where they are at a disadvantage with respect to voluntary participation.

The same inhibitory effect is discovered with respect to the status of the individual versus the predominant status of the group (Table 4-11). In addition, a double effect is observed with respect to the total participation of the individual (Table 4-12). Along with the inhibitory effects, therefore, we find that high status individuals attend more meetings if they are members of high status groups.

Table 4-11

Percentage of High Attendance Rate for Individual and Group Status

		Group Status	
		LO	HI
Individual Status	LO	64% (N=28)	37% (N=27)
	HI	63% (N=19)	64% (N=28)

Table 4-12

Percentage of High Meeting Attendance for Individual and Group Status

		Group Status	
		LO	HI
Individual Status	LO	64% (N=28)	41% (N=27)
	HI	63% (N=19)	75% (N=28)

In other analyses using the principle of structural effect, when the independent and dependent variables are positively correlated, the findings indicate that individuals tend to follow the group averages. For instance, in a group high on the independent variable, individuals low on that variable will have a greater proportion high on the dependent variable than will their counterparts in the low group. More individuals with a low value on the independent measure are high on the dependent if the committee is high on the independent. Rather than this enhancing effect, however, high values for the committee on organizational activity or status actually inhibit participation for members with low values for those variables. Thus if given a preference, a higher proportion of low status individuals can be expected to attend low status groups. High status individuals, likewise, tend to attend groups which have a higher proportion of other high status individuals. The correlation between status and participation is preserved, however, since the proportion of low status individuals preferring low status groups, the group of choice, is exactly the same as the proportion of high status individuals preferring those groups, although they do not prefer them. The proportion of low status individuals attending high status groups decreases from this level while the proportion of high status individuals

in these groups increases. High status individuals therefore preserve their absolutely higher participation rates according to previous theory.

Another effect is apparent in these findings which has significance for the overall attendance rate of the group. Since the low status preference and high status no-preference line is approximately 63%, the lower proportion of low status individuals in high status groups has greater potential range than the higher proportion of high status individuals. Therefore, the overall effect is to decrease the overall attendance for high status groups with respect to low status groups. In fact, the proportion of low status individuals in high status groups declined by 23% while the proportion of high status individuals increased by only 12%. The result is that groups high on the status variable have generally lower participation than committees low on the status variable despite the positive individual correlation. The result of this effect is that committees high on either of these variables has generally lower participation than committees low on the variable despite the positive individual correlation. For instance, the relationship between group status and attendance rate is presented in Table 4-13. This relationship is also representative of the effects of group status on the number of meetings attended and of

organizational activity on both participation measures. Thus although individual characteristics have substantial effects on behavior, the social system in which that behavior is carried out also has its effects.

Table 4-13

Group Status and Attendance Rate

		Individual Attendance Rate	
		LO	HI
Group	LO	38%	62%
Status	HI	49%	51%
		N = 102	Q = -.23

High status committees contain an almost equal share of low and high attenders (49% and 51% respectively). Low status committees, on the other hand, have better attendance rates (38% and 62%, Q = -.23), a finding directly opposite the relationship on the individual level (Q = .24). Because of the inhibitory effect of the high status group on low status participants, low status groups actually contain a lower proportion of low participators and a higher proportion of high participators. In order to maintain the positive relationship on the individual level, the preponderance of low status-low participators must be on the high status groups. The unavoidable conclusion is then that it is

precisely the discontinuity between the status of the group and the status of the individual accounts for low participation rates.

CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION

Organizational research encompasses two main streams: general theoretical findings which apply to all organizations and specific conclusions which describe in depth the operation and function of particular organizational forms. This study is largely of the latter type focusing upon a community planning organization in the health field and distinguishing the factors associated with individual participation and power in that setting.

Its ultimate purpose is, on the other hand, quite broad since such an organization represents one segment on the ongoing interorganizational relations in this field. This segment is, in addition to being representative of the interorganizational arena, also more limited and therefore more researchable than the multifaceted exchanges of every organization. Because of this complexity, the whole area on interorganizational relations has received scant treatment in research. The subject is, however, vital since the link between

the primary group and the community is generally accepted to be the associational or occupational organization. How these organizations relate among themselves, who participates in such a planning agency, and which organizations wield the most influence are some of the key questions addressed in this paper.

From interview questions matched against attendance records for members of this agency, two types of factors were elicited in explaining the participation in planning and coordination meetings. One type of factor was hypothesized largely as replications of previous work in voluntary participation. The direct effects of these variables happened to be straightforward and almost trivial in import: those individuals who were attracted to their committees and/or participated regularly in other voluntary organizations had better attendance records in this agency. So far, so good--but there is certainly nothing startling in the finding that motivated social joiners and boosters attend planning meetings.

A second level of factors derived from the agency's organizational environment provide more interest to this area since they relate directly to a member's organizational role as opposed to his individual interest. The interest which a representative's organization showed in his planning activity and, consequently, its

influence on that activity related to all forms of participation, in particular enhancing the representative's attendance role. The importance of this relation is that it introduces a completely different type of variable as a correlate to voluntary participation, namely a condition imposed upon the individual as opposed to characteristics of the individual himself.

In addition, the traditional conception of a "voluntary" organization may not completely apply to this planning agency. Although the normative restrictions and role expectations of some voluntary organizations are quite strict, particularly those which are political in nature, one of the essential differences between a voluntary and a work organization is that the rewards of the latter are primarily financial. Therefore, the reasons for joining and the consequences of leaving a work organization are closely related to basic individual needs and goals of survival as opposed to the more socially relevant rewards of status, esteem, etc. derived from voluntary associations. This differentiation of rewards underlies the finding that higher status individuals belong to more voluntary organizations since their basic needs are more adequately and, in many cases, more easily met.

The characterization of such organizations as "voluntary" does not imply that each member always wants

to join or attend. As well as freeing an individual to participate, social status may also prescribe participation in certain organizations. Hence, the finding that low income individuals attend meetings that they like and do not attend those they dislike contrasts sharply with the inability of the high income individual to base his decisions solely on attraction since income role prescriptions create noise in the system and destroy the one-to-one relationship. Thus more high income individuals attend when they dislike the group and do not attend when they do like it based on the exigencies of their status position.

Although the previous findings are well documented in other settings an individual's organizational role based on the influence exerted by his representative status also specifies behavior which goes beyond strict motivational desires. It is this role specification which transforms what appears to be a community organization into an extension of the work organizations in the community. When individuals participate in planning as appointed representatives of a work organization or even as part of the job responsibilities in a certain organization or occupation, the planning agency is no different from an interdepartmental task force within an organization since representatives do not participate as individuals for individual rewards but rather because

of organizational expectations. Although most community planning agencies are composed of a paid staff serving volunteer committees, this analysis makes the point that the volunteers may not be the typical "concerned citizens" but rather paid representatives of other organizations.

Only certain groups in the agency exhibit the characteristics of a work organization. These groups meet on a regular basis, either for professional information exchange or interorganizational decision-making, and display participation patterns more dependent on status than other groups do. These patterns are, in addition, hierarchical in a manner similar to the participation of community leaders and sub-leaders described in numerous other studies on community power. In these committees, higher status individuals attend and lower status individuals speak. Thus, we have working groups, monitored by higher status individuals, but in which most of the business seems to be carried on by the lower status participants. This pattern contrasts with the other committees in which attendance is based on participation in other voluntary organizations and speaking is solely a function of attraction to the group. Individual characteristics, therefore, model the behavior patterns in these committees where role prescriptions have the greatest effect in the actively working groups.

The implication of these findings is that within broad issue areas stable participation patterns in community affairs seems to have more validity than the predominately issue relevant participation suggested in some studies. Participation would most likely vary considerably across institutional sectors, but within the health care area, at least, the major participants in decisions represent a continuing group over time. Both the high attendance level for these groups and participation based on role rather than preference denote a continuing group participating within this agency.

Although planning does not represent the complete interorganizational scene, it is designed to include broad representation from many sectors. The informal interorganizational network, therefore, would most likely be even more restrictive, though perhaps no more stable, since that system is not obliged to include as many community representatives. One further implication may be that interorganizational negotiations are carried on within so-called "voluntary" organizations more than present theory has allowed. The assumption has been that interorganizational relations have by definition been completely detached from a formal organizational setting. Litwak and Hylton (1962), however, have attempted an integration of interorganizational

relations into an organizational setting. The participation within this agency tends to bear out their contention that

> coordinating agencies will develop and continue in existence when formal organizations are partly interdependent; agencies are aware of this interdependence, and it can be defined in standardized units of action.

Their study of the national community chest organizations supported this hypothesis. Our study has focused on the same problem from the local perspective and shown the effects of the interorganizational network on the participation within this agency. As community integration becomes more necessary, the system of achieving such integration may be more and more institutionalized by delegating those functions to identifiable organizations. The implications for further research in this area will be covered at the conclusion of this chapter.

The evidence is strong, therefore, for the participation of members in this agency based on their affiliation with the interorganizational network in the community although the direct effects of such variables were not strong. The influence of these members, however, is less dependent on the dominance of their organizations in the external system than was originally supposed. The greatest single factor for the lack of a one-to-one correspondence between power outside and inside the agency is an error in the previous theory.

As explained above, power in this agency would only be necessary when an organization's goals are threatened by the agency's decision. Powerless organizations could not apply sufficient resources to the problem, and dominant organizations would generally not be threatened in the first place. Observed influence, therefore, would be evident only when the potential for impact on an organization's goals is combined with the resources to influence that impact. As a result of the theoretically negative correlation between potential impact and resources, the relationship between observed influence and external dominance, a usable resource for internal observed influence, may approach some type of curvilinear relationship because of the differential need to use the dominance reserve. An analysis of "nonissues," those subjects which do not arise in health planning, may also be enlightening with respect to those organizations which would be able to successfully stifle any movement in those directions.

Another discontinuity in the correspondence between resources and actual influence lies in the perceptions of the individual. The findings showed that attributed influence related to all hypothesized sources of influence except organizational bases while perceived influence was dependent only on those for which the individual had direct knowledge, the most important being information.

The conclusion from these findings is that individuals have only a limited perspective on the sources of their own power. Although attributed influence and perceived influence are correlated, the relation is far from (Q = .46). The discrepancy is due to the bases of influence which are beyond the direct knowledge of the individual. A number of implications follow from this difference. First of all, most theoretical treatments of power and influence employ a rational economic model in which gains and losses are calculated and resources are used or spent for a specific end in any influence attempt. The assumption is one of conscious application of means to an end. The failure of such a model to explain the outcome of all influence attempts has been attributed to the lack of a common denominator on which to compare quantities of different resources (T. Clark, 1968). This analysis suggests another possibility. Individuals may have a deficiency or surplus in a resource category which they ignore in determining their power. Such a discrepancy could easily explain the lack of an influence attempt when power is available or its failure when the individual feels assured of success.

A second implication of this finding is the failure of individuals to correctly assess the power of another individual. Although the success of any specific influence attempt rests on P's perceptions of

O's resources, that perception may not follow the rules of rational economy either. In the case of reputational power measures, for instance, reputed power itself may be the sole resource available to an individual which, if brought to a test, would fail for lack of other resources. This possibility puts an extra burden on the structural analysis of power attempted in this study since attributed influence is equivalent to structural organizational resources only when those resources or the lack thereof are correctly assessed by the individual being influenced. The conclusion may be that sociological theory admit bluffing as a usable resource in an influence attempt.

Another argument which disputes the assumption that a planning agency is a reflection of the larger interorganizational network is based on the fact that individuals representing powerful organizations, while exhibiting no greater power within the agency, are the least powerless group with respect to the problems identified on the powerlessness scale (Protecting personal interest in conflict and containing rising medical costs). As members of powerful organizations, they feel that they can handle these problems which affect the larger society, but they are not regarded nor do they regard themselves as particularly powerful within this organization. Therefore, either the planning

agency does not represent the complete larger inter-organizational network or, if it does, powerful organizations do not transfer their power into it. Since the first is more likely, we must forgo, for the time being, major direct effects of the organizational environment in determining power within the organization.

Two major findings emerged from the division of this agency into more active and less active groups. With the higher attendance rates and more frequent meetings of the high activity groups, information about the proceedings was more constant so that information variance was less. The variable of information, therefore, had less effect as a differential influence resource. Conversely, since the more active groups had slightly more members per meeting, the differences between those who talked and those who did not were sharper, resulting in greater differentiation. For low activity groups, the effects were reversed--i.e., fewer members allowing for more discussion and less frequent meetings forcing members to rely on different external sources of information with more variance.

These differences in relationships raise another concern of general interest with regard to studies of social power. Attention should be directed to the fact that individuals must differ on a particular resource before it can be used as a source of differential power.

Although not as yet attempted, perhaps further research across groups could be conducted in which the relationships were controlled for the variance of the resource variable. Greater consistency may be apparent in different group settings with this line of attack.

The overall effect of this study, then, has been to look in depth at a planning agency, its members, and its environment. Since viewing such an agency as an intermediary between organizations and its members as primarily representatives of those organizations, a fruitful new approach to interorganizational analysis has begun. All too often we assume that all relations between organizations take place over the telephone, on the golf course, in the cocktail lounge--far beyond the prying instruments of social scientists. Conversely, we are too ready to accept the organizational chart and the Board minutes as accurate representations of organizational decision-making. A more valid conception of both would be to consider these two arenas of social behavior as the beginning and the end of the rationalizing process. Bureaucratic rules, authority, and the norms of rationality have long been accepted parameters of the organizational system. We forget that as resources become more scarce and expectations of efficiency increase, organizations themselves are going to move to adopt such regulations on their

behavior. Interorganizational relations, therefore, are going to be increasingly visible in public agencies. Informal networks will remain, as they have in the most bureaucratic organization, but the field of interorganizational relations should offer more opportunities for study in years to come.

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ABBREVIATIONS

APSR = American Political Science Review

ASQ = Administrative Science Quarterly

ASR = American Sociological Review