

BLACK LEADERSHIP IN CENTRAL CITY:
ENVIRONMENT AND RESPONSE

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ABSTRACT

BLACK LEADERSHIP IN SOUTHERN

ENVIRONMENTS

Donald R. Smith

This research is a study of leadership patterns in a medium-sized Midwestern city. It constitutes a small proportion of the total body of studies of black leadership have been conducted in the Northern cities. The research is a contribution to the literature.

Leaders were selected by means of a series of informal interviews coupled with analyses of local newspapers and a "loop-routine" controversy over school busing. Semi-structured interviews focusing on goal and tactical preferences were conducted with each leader. A standardized questionnaire also was used to gather demographic and attitudinal data from leaders. Finally, census data were used to develop an analysis of the political resources available to or lacking for leaders in the local black subcommunity.

One of the research tools devised in this study was a categorical typology of black leadership. The typology

ABSTRACT

BLACK LEADERSHIP IN CENTRAL CITY:

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By

Douglas J. Hoekstra

This research is a case study of black leadership patterns in a medium-sized Midwestern city in which blacks constitute a small proportion of the population. Since most studies of black leadership have focused on Southern or large Northern cities, the research helps to fill a void in the literature.

Leaders were selected by means of wide-ranging informant interviews coupled with analyses of local issue-areas and a "non-routine" controversy over school busing. Semi-structured interviews focusing on goal and tactical preferences were conducted with each leader. A standardized questionnaire also was used to gather demographic and attitudinal data from leaders. Finally, census data were used to develop an analysis of the political resources available to or lacking for leaders in the local black subcommunity.

One of the research tools devised in this study was a categoric typology of black leadership. The typology

moderate occupational roles rather than the organization distinguished militants and moderates by their time-orientations in the subcommunity proved the most frequent bases for leadership activities. The goals to each and their preferred action models; the goals of separatism and integration were also distinguished. As a part of this analysis, James Wilson's concept of the status goal is extended to the ends of subcommunity autonomy developed in the recent resurgence of Black Power and nationalist ideologies. The resulting typology of militant and moderate separatists and integrationists specifies four dimensions on which these leadership types differ: goals, tactics, loci of organizational activity and models of group action.

Leaders were found to vary considerably in the degree of complexity with which they could formulate and express their goals. These variations were associated most strongly with high income and educational levels, as well as with a high level of reported contact with white leaders. Differing goal preferences had a structuring effect on leadership behavior by leading to differing perceptions of the "cues" in local issues, differing patterns of organizational and institutional activity and different patterns of intra-leadership communication. These tendencies also helped to account for the stability of local issue-areas over time.

Other patterns of leadership behavior were also found: most of the black leaders in Central City were

moderates; occupational roles rather than the organization of followings in the subcommunity proved to be the most frequent bases for leadership activities; local black organizations were not generally rooted in or sustained by the resources of the black subcommunity; and leaders and organizations in conflict situations generally sought to gain access to policy-makers rather than to mobilize the black subcommunity itself.

black 1 These patterns were explicable only through an examination of the local political environment for black leaders. Central City offered to potential black leaders a subcommunity of limited resources: its numbers were small, economic resources limited and it also lacked the network of supportive institutions and organizations found in many larger cities. However, the local structure of opportunities outside the subcommunity made available new occupational and organizational roles which became the bases for leadership activities. As well as being consistent with the career and income aspirations of an upwardly mobile leadership elite, these positions frequently provided access to policy-making processes relevant to the interests of the subcommunity.

However, these opportunities also tended to reduce past leadership ties to the subcommunity, and to produce problems of role strain for individuals experiencing contradictions between their leadership and occupational roles.

Role strain was especially salient for leaders undergoing "militant mobility," a process through which state and private agencies seeking "representative" black leaders recruited from the small group of local activists who had organized in the black core area--thereby detaching these leaders from their original organizational base.

The analysis of the relationship between subcommunity and opportunity structures in the political environments of black leaders is theoretically suggestive for future research. Propositions about these and other leadership patterns in Central City were summarized in the last chapter.

A DISSERTATION

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Department of Political Science

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1974

DEDICATION

To Ellen and

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1974

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Though it is impossible to name all of the individuals who have contributed to this dissertation, the names of those individuals should be specified at least.

Special thanks go to Dr. Herbert A. Simon, who has provided guidance and insight throughout my undergraduate years, and who supervised my thesis. During my dissertation, when Dr. Garfinkel accepted my proposal, and during my stay at the University, Dr. Paul Conn assumed the role of advisor. His suggestions and insight were invaluable. Dr. John H. Gilman was also of great help. He has been a constant presence and assisted me in this work. In sum, my research was greatly assisted by the support and suggestions of my advisors.

DEDICATION:

To Ellen and my parents.

Those individuals in Central City who so freely made themselves available for lengthy interviews also deserve my thanks. Though my interpretations may not always match their perceptions, without them this dissertation would have proved impossible.

Finally, I wish to thank my wife. As always, she was supportive and understanding, despite the demands of her own dissertation.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Though it is impossible to name all of the persons who have contributed to this research, the efforts of some individuals should be specifically cited.

Special thanks go to Dr. Herbert Garfinkel, who has provided guidance and inspiration since my undergraduate years, and who supervised the writing of this dissertation. When Dr. Garfinkel accepted a position at another university, Dr. Paul Conn assumed the formal chairmanship, and his suggestions and insight proved very useful to me. Dr. Alan Grimes was also of great assistance, and continually encouraged me in this work. In sum, my research was greatly assisted by the support and suggestions of my committee.

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PREFACE

Prefaces of puffery usually make large claims for the pages which follow, while more modest prefaces push forward their work as being only possibly of some minor merit. However, claims of merit seem best left for concluding chapters and modesty is a virtue which can be assumed of most graduate students. Thus, it seems most useful in this preface briefly to state the relevance of the research to be discussed and to describe the general organization of the chapters to follow.

This research can easily claim "relevance" as the word is used in the current argot: it is an analysis of urban black leadership patterns at a time when many black leaders are urging the virtues of "going local" or building independent institutional bases in the urban subcommunity; it focuses on black leadership activities during a local school busing controversy at a time when this issue seems not only important to blacks, but also to mass publics and social scientists; finally, this study takes role strain as a central problem for local black leaders who are personally tempted to pursue his own independent course, working in very different ways with varying methods and varying concepts. As a result, a serious reader of this research literature has faced with a sometime confusing blur of terms and types--"militants"

many national leaders, a politics of racial identity has become paramount. "community leaders"

Perhaps more importantly, however, this work is relevant in a number of ways to the past research on patterns of urban black leadership. From Thompson's work in New Orleans to Walker's in Montgomery, much of the research on local-level black leadership has had a distinctly southern accent. The exceptions to this pattern have occurred in cities such as Providence, Los Angeles and Chicago. The following chapters seek to extend this research by developing a typological analysis and case study in a rather different setting--a medium-sized, midwestern city with a relatively small (9.3%) black population. The argument in the following pages will be that the choices, constraints and resources facing black leaders in this setting differ considerably from those confronting leaders in the more frequently studied larger cities; in the research literature to this point, the consequences of these differences between cities for the range and distribution of black leadership types have not been explored sufficiently--a task also begun in this research.

One of the main difficulties underlying past research on local black leadership is that of comparability. Research efforts have followed a familiar pattern--each researcher has tended to pursue his own independent course, working in varying cities with varying methods and varying concepts. As a result, a serious reader of this research literature is faced with a sometime confusing blur of terms and types--"militants"

and "moderates" and "conservatives" and "tokens," "civil rights leaders," "community leaders" and so on; in addition, few of the studies even attempt to account for the differing patterns of goals, means and activities in differing cities. It would be an exaggeration to claim that the research in these pages single-handedly "solves" these problems of comparability. However, it does seek to account for the strategies adopted by local leaders working in a political environment unlike those of the larger cities, and it does entail a greater (and more explicit) effort to develop comparability than in most of the past research on local-level black leaders. Hence, the first chapter explores past research in some detail not only to describe and discuss findings and methods, but also to locate within it those terms, concepts and categories of analysis which also can be used in this research. In particular, variants of some of James Wilson's concepts are used--which offers some basis of comparison between this research and Wilson's study of black leadership in the Chicago of 1960.*

Hopefully, comparability will be possible in the future tense as well; the typological analysis developed here should be applicable in other cities. Though based on local leaders, the resulting typology analyzes a wide range of leadership types and also (again, unlike most of the research reviewed) deals with the inter-leadership

*James Q. Wilson, Negro Politics: The Search for Leadership (New York, 1960).

conflicts originating in the complex of integration-coalition, black power-separation issues so salient for urban blacks in recent years.

The first chapter describes and evaluates much of the research of the past two decades on local black leadership. Wilson's discussion of leadership goals and means and his concepts of "militance" and "moderation" are discussed in detail. In addition, the more general literature dealing with organizations and group conflict is used in an attempt to tease pattern out of these discrete efforts in urban research.

The second chapter develops a typology of local black leaders. Leaders are differentiated by their goals and tactics, the models of action they prefer and the loci of activity for differing leadership types. The chapter distinguishes between militant and moderate leadership and identifies those status goals which are similar in form and function, though not in content. Research methods used in Central City are also discussed at length.

Chapter III uses census and voting data plus informant interviews to analyze the constraints on and opportunities for black leadership in Central City. The context for strategies of coalition and "infiltration" is clarified through description of the local environment and comparisons to near-by cities with larger black populations. Central City's black subcommunity is described in terms of its

patterns of migration, employment, income, education, and to housing and politics. The patterns of black leadership. In a way Chapter IV analyzes the nature of leadership goals. These goals are found to have a "structuring effect" on local leadership behavior, and also to vary considerably in complexity and militance. This chapter also considers the conflict of status and welfare goals in a local controversy.

Chapter V describes leadership tactics and evaluates the constraints and resources characterizing Central City's main black organizations. In addition, the concepts of militant mobility and role strain are developed.

The sixth chapter is a case study of what has proved to be the most salient issue for recent black leaders in the city--the local busing-integration controversy. The case study focuses on the organizational and decision-making activities of local leaders, the collapse of public consensus for local black leaders and the lack of opinion consensus in an unmobilized subcommunity.

Undoubtedly, this controversy has implications for the present and future effectiveness of black leadership, a topic taken up in the last chapter. This chapter summarizes the main propositions flowing from this research and elaborates an analysis of the relationship between subcommunity and local opportunity structures as a framework for future research.

The work which follows hopefully will contribute to an understanding of the patterns of urban black leadership. In a sense, continued research of this type only confirms the tongue-in-cheek comment of one local leader who, at the end of an interview, commented, "I'm not sure why you guys keep studying black leaders. I guess we just must be interesting." chapter reviews that research on urban black leadership. A review of research literature is not only a traditional prelude to one's own research, but in some instances such a review is also useful in demonstrating the similarities of comparability and methodology encountered by other political scientists. In addition, the work of James Wilson is given particular attention as a "starting point" for development of the typological analysis of urban black leaders begun in the second chapter.

Strategies of Research

Obviously, it is not appropriate to review all of the literature on black leadership in cities. The intention here is to review representative selections from the literature focusing on urban black leadership and then briefly to examine the links between these specific research efforts in the black subcommunity and the more general leadership literature.

The studies centering specifically on black urban leaders can be subdivided in terms of the two general strategies of research most frequently employed: the description of subcommunity "power structures" and the development of

CHAPTER I

A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

This chapter reviews past research on urban black leadership. A review of relevant literature is the traditional prelude to one's own research, but in this instance such a review is also useful in demonstrating the difficulties of comparability and methodology encountered by other political scientists. In addition, the work of James Wilson is given particular attention as a "starting point" for development of the typological analysis of local black leaders begun in the second chapter.

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The studies centering specifically on black urban leaders can be subdivided in terms of the two general strategies of research most frequently employed: the description of subcommunity "power structures" and the development of

black leadership typologies. The differences between these strategies are hardly absolute; for example, though Wilson developed a leadership typology, he gave most attention to the structural characteristics of subcommunity leadership, and Burgess, while discussing the black power structure of Durham, developed a typology of leadership styles. The difference between the two strategies of research seems more one of emphasis and initial research focus than of extremely clear-cut distinctions. The first research to be examined centers on subcommunity leadership structures.

Selected Literature on Subcommunity Leadership Structures*

This work shares two characteristics: first, this body of research was built upon the reputational approach initially used by Hunter in the Negro subcommunity of Regional City; in this research the reputational approach functioned to define, locate and identify black leadership; second, in most cases the structure of political leadership in the subcommunity was assumed to be derived largely from the institutional structure of society. For example,

*See Floyd Hunter, Community Power Structure (Chapel Hill, 1953), pp. 114-150; M. Blaine Burgess, Negro Leadership in a Southern City (Chapel Hill, 1960); Ernest A. T. Barth and Baha Abu-Laban, "Power Structure and the Negro Sub-community," American Sociological Review (February, 1959), pp. 69-76; Harold W. Pfautz, "The Power Structure of the Negro Sub-community: A Case Study and a Comparative View," Phylon (Summer, 1962), pp. 156-166; Tilman C. Cothran and William Phillips, Jr., "Negro Leadership in a Crisis Situation," Phylon (Summer, 1961), pp. 107-118.

**See evaluation of this goal, this chapter, p. 27.

"success" in Negro business institutions was viewed as generally transferable to a position of political leadership in the subcommunity; thus, "economic dominants" were preponderant among black leaders.* In the black leadership literature interesting research has been done by Hunter, Burgess, Barth and Abu-Laban, Pfautz and Cothran and Phillips. Their research centered in Atlanta, Durham, Seattle, Providence and Little Rock, respectively. Although most of the research focused on only one subcommunity at a time, the ultimate goal was to further inter-community comparisons and, possibly, theory-building by constructing a typology of differing subcommunity leadership structures.**

Methodology

Hunter's central (and controversial) contribution to the study of urban leadership was the reputational approach used in his study of Regional City. The heart of this approach, of course, was to locate and to define leaders through a panel of supposedly knowledgeable judges. In the identification of black leaders, Hunter used seven Negro judges to select and to rank subcommunity leaders who were then in turn questioned about leadership patterns. These

*One of the problems with this assumption has been the comparatively underdeveloped institutional structure of many black subcommunities in the past--thus forcing many black leaders to develop other "bases" for their leadership; see Ladd's "issue leadership," this chapter, p. 42.

**See evaluation of this goal, this chapter, p. 27.

interviews revealed a pattern of mutual choice among the leadership elite and a clear differentiation between "organizations of top influence"¹ and the lower-ranked groups. Though Hunter concluded that there was a "high degree of social organization within the Negro community,"² he did not consider whether the identifiable structure of leadership which he found actually existed or was the product of a methodology which assumed its existence in the first place.

Despite the difficulties with the reputational approach, Barth and Abu-Laban in Seattle, Pfautz in Providence and Cothran-Phillips in Little Rock replicated Hunter's methodology. Barth-Abu-Laban, for example, used a panel of black respondents supposedly "representative of the various institutional areas of the subcommunity"³ and finally "found" a clique of "the top ranking seven leaders."⁴ Pfautz's rationale for use of the reputational approach was that "in view of the small size of the Negro sub-community"⁵ all of the leaders would be well known and known to each other.* Cothran and Phillips, however, were fairly explicit about the possible limits of the reputational approach:

Analytically, two elements essential to the legitimation of leadership are stressed: first, the degree to which the individual is known; and second, the degree to which the relevant role and status (power) of the individual are known.⁶

The research of Elaine Burgess in Durham marked an effort to overcome sole reliance on the prominence-notoriety

played golf, but also had discussions "which help to clarify

*For evaluation of this position, see this chapter, p. 28.

salient as the definition of leadership. Indeed, of the studies with the community power-orientation hers was the most methodologically complete.⁷ Burgess's "power nominees" were chosen by three groups: the usual panel, interviews with the leaders themselves and a class-stratified areal sample. In addition, Burgess traced through the activities of the "power nominees" in differing issue areas. She found "striking agreement"⁸ in the identification and ranking of leaders by all three groups, and a substantial overlap between the "power nominees" and the leaders active on specific issues.

Social-Demographic Characteristics

Hunter found that the "topmost leadership" of the Negro subcommunity differed somewhat in occupational characteristics from the leadership personnel in the larger community, where leaders were recruited largely from industry and commerce. Black professionals and a few of the businessmen employing comparatively large numbers of people dominated the hierarchy of subcommunity leadership. Hunter's data gave a composite picture of Atlanta black leaders:

"the leaders . . . live apart from their followers,"⁹ their average age was 54.3, median age 51, few of the leaders were born in the city, most were Protestants, and most belonged to an elite association, the "23 club," where they not only played golf, but also had discussions "which help to clarify

group thinking and provide the basis of group solidarity on major problems or community issues."¹⁰

Pfautz also found that Negro leadership in Providence was "essentially a matter of professionals, minor managers and officials, and small businessmen."¹¹ In short, for both Hunter and Pfautz, leadership goals were formulated by a relatively homogeneous group of middle-aged men who had succeeded in a business or profession.

However, Barth and Abu-Laban in Seattle found many more women (44%) represented in the leadership ranks, a considerably lower mean age (44.8) and self-employed leaders who supervised far fewer employees than in Atlanta. The differences may be accounted for by Seattle's differing demographic characteristics--higher median incomes, a larger middle class and a smaller population of blacks than in Atlanta. For black leaders in Seattle, organizational activism was the basis for leadership:

One major differentiating characteristic of the top seven leaders is the degree to which they participated with others in organizational committee activities. This supports the contention of several of the respondents that "the top leaders in the community got there because they were very active in organizational work." The belief was expressed that if such activity ceased the top leadership position would quickly be lost.¹²

On most demographic variables the leaders in Crescent City (Durham) resembled those in Atlanta.¹³ Burgess argued that these characteristics of Durham's black leaders showed them to be "most strictly, not people known to be powerful, but people known to have access to sources of power"¹⁴--organizational position, status, wealth, skill.¹⁵ In Durham

black professionals had "long been part of the power structure," and "capable members of the middle class" could move easily into the relatively fluid leadership structure.

Key members of the black middle class--ministers--seemingly played differing roles in different cities. In Atlanta, ministers "were not considered top leaders in a policy-making sense by those within the leadership group itself. . . ." ¹⁶ According to leaders interviewed, the professional role of the minister and the maintenance needs of his organization seemed to conflict with a general leadership role: "they [only] want to increase the size of their own organizations." ¹⁷ However, in contrast to Hunter, Tillman and Cothran in Little Rock found ministers to be the largest occupational group among Negro leaders. Arguing that comparative independence from the white-dominated economic structure freed individuals to be local leaders in the Little Rock integration crisis, the authors found black businessmen, dependent on whites for credit, goods and business permits, to be underrepresented in the local black leadership.

black leadership were a response to this social structure:
Goals

The references in the community power literature to structure of segregation, but at obtaining, presumably for black leadership goals attempted to distinguish different kinds of goals, to link distinctive goals with specific leadership types, and to demonstrate how the social structure of segregation conditioned the goals selected by black leaders. The leaders in Atlanta, "while entertaining discussion of political matters tend to a conservative approach to

issues."¹⁸ Their goals fell into the category of "protest within the status quo."¹⁹ For example, during Hunter's period of research, the goals publicly articulated were carefully limited to seeking positions within the political parties, placing some policemen on the municipal force, obtaining two new parks and recreational facilities, getting concessions on school building facilities and obtaining an equal pay base for black and white teachers.²⁰ Increased Negro voting meant most of these goals eventually were achieved.

Hunter did not simply ascribe the nature of these limited goals or the style of conservative leadership to the upper status positions occupied by most of these black leaders; rather, his emphasis was upon the "structural handicaps" faced by all black leaders. The most obvious structural handicap was the existing pattern of segregation. Because it was "operative in the general community of Regional City, Negro leaders, as well as followers, [had] to adapt themselves to the situation."²¹ The goals articulated by the black leadership were a response to this social structure; these goals aimed not at massively overturning the entire structure of segregation, but at obtaining, presumably for the entire black community, specific, tangible, material rewards--jobs, pay increases, parks.*

*Hunter seemed to link "conservative" black leadership to what Wilson called welfare goals. Wilson made a similar linkage between "moderates" and such goals; see this chapter, pp. 47-54.

However, the black subcommunity did provide manpower for and require services of the city. Given this situation, many white leaders were understandably interested in the "stability" of the black subcommunity. These circumstances seemed to offer both an opening and a problem for black leaders. On the one hand, they could formulate limited goals in such a way as to "play to" the concern of white leaders: for example, funding was ensured for the building projects of the Community Association when black leaders argued that such projects reduced juvenile delinquency and "quieted unrest" among Negroes. On the other hand, this opening also led to tensions among stated leadership goals:

. . . the Negro leaders maintain themselves in semi-power positions . . . by appealing to the fear of the general community concerning the unrest of their community, while on the other hand they appeal to their people on the basis that they are actively working out the problems which may be defined as causing the unrest they say they would assuage.²²

Only limited goals which did not directly threaten the existing social structure were consistent with subcommunity leadership ultimately dependent upon and subordinate to the Regional City "leadership elite." For white leaders such goals seemed to permit continuance of the segregated status quo, while black leaders pointed to concessions for their constituents "and [took] credit for them as real achievements."²³

Another less obvious structural handicap arose from the role and "philosophical" conflicts within the black subcommunity itself. As already noted, the role conflicts were

linked to the particular maintenance needs of some organizations--such as those headed by ministers and undertakers; these traditional sources of local black leadership were, in Atlanta, so concerned with expanding their own organizations as to be unable to adapt to community-wide leadership roles.²⁴

The "philosophical conflicts" reflected the basic goal choices before the leadership:

The conservative leaders are prone to say, "Now is not the time to act." . . . Education . . . and a gradual approach to solving problems appeal to this group. On the other hand, the aggressive leaders are more militant and are unwilling to let much time elapse before seeing progress in meeting their demands.²⁵

The leadership response was "to mediate between the two groups" as a broker. In order to do this, subcommunity unity--"a united stand on common issues"--increasingly was emphasized as an end in itself. In sum, the formulation and articulation of the limited leadership goals--as well as the predominantly conservative type of leadership--can be viewed as responses to the external constraints of a segregated social structure and the internal constraints of role and goal divisions within the black subcommunity.

While the "leaders in Regional City [were] motivated, at least in some measure, to maintain their segregated subcommunity," the Pacific City leaders studied by Barth-Abu-Laban gave priority to the goal of integration.²⁶ Asked for the major issues in their community, black leaders mentioned such issues as "minority housing" and general civil

rights legislation most often, while only one isolated reference was made to an issue such as "police brutality." The status goal of integration took precedence:

. . . having worked for "liberal legislation," "better education," and "better housing on an open market," Negro leaders prefer not to risk these gains by supporting segregated institutions.²⁷

That the goal priorities or the reported weightings given different issues might reflect interests growing out of the particular status positions of black leaders was not considered by Barth and Abu-Laban.

Three patterns relevant to leadership goals can be selected out of the research done by Burgess in Durham: the process of leader-follower interaction, the shift to desegregation goals and the emerging consensus among most of the leadership.

In Durham group goal formulation arose out of the interaction between leaders and their most "motivated and articulate followers."²⁸ Though the black underclass was generally inarticulate,²⁹ "communication lines [were] open for the more articulate at several levels." Very clearly, both the leaders and their "articulate" followers came mainly from the middle and upper levels of the black stratification system in Durham; the goal given priority--desegregation--reflected the preoccupations of the black middle and upper classes.³⁰ Though the "power leaders in the forefront of the battle tended to feel that the masses favored an end to segregated patterns," in fact Burgess's class samples showed that while 79.1% of the upper class favored the

desegregation goal and 67.8% of the middle class, only 45.4% of the lower class clearly did so.³¹ However, in Durham as in Seattle, the goal of desegregation had emerged to take priority over any other.³² "The struggle against segregation shifted from the narrower confines of the legal arena to the broader sphere of community organization. All issues now bear on desegregation."³³ These new goals, related tactics and leadership styles were a change from the past when black leaders came as "emissaries seeking such concessions as the white community [might] be willing to grant."³⁴ As part of the new militancy of the drive toward desegregation, negative inducements were used more frequently. For the first time ever in Durham, black leaders withdrew support from all "progressive community projects (such as a six million dollar school bond issue)" as a means of increasing their "bargaining power," and later began mass litigation "to expand the limited integration they had won."³⁵ Differing "social orientations" correlated with age. Burgess linked these goal priorities to shifts in leadership types: "... within the Negro leadership structure there exists a diversity of race-leader types identifiable by the leader's stand on desegregation. ... the desegregation issue will result in a shift in power from certain types of race leaders to others."³⁶ For many of the older leaders, it was too late to learn the habit of speaking and acting forcefully, but the younger men, whose courage and ambition led them to take such stands, found their positions of power in the Negro community strengthened.³⁷

*Chapter VI, pp. 352-358, discusses the relationship between leadership activities and black opinion in the sub-community during the Central City busing controversy.

Burgess found some dissension among the black leaders "over the means of achieving their goals," but, as in Atlanta, the need to present a solid front to white community leaders tended to unite the black leadership. More importantly, because the structure of black leadership was not as closed as in Atlanta, the private bargaining necessary to achieve public consensus among differing leadership types could occur.³⁸ As a result, though there were differences, "there [was] no sharp split between the accommodative and protest leaders."³⁹

For Pfautz, both the occupational roles and the age of black leaders had "social-psychological implications." The former made "not only for a relative lack of power . . . but also a serious gap in available perspectives for formulating strategy and tactics in community power struggles";⁴⁰ the latter posed the problem of political generations⁴¹ possibly unable "to deal with the rapidly changing form and content of race relations."⁴²

Thus, differing "social orientations" correlated with age and organizational variables:⁴³ leaders having "integration orientations" had an average age of 43.3 years and were most active in and identified with the more "militant" organization in Providence, the Urban League (!); the "middle-roader leaders" had an average age of 58.5 years and two of them were "the only members of their generation to play active roles in the 'new' Urban League, suggestive of their broker role,"⁴⁴ and finally, the leaders with a

"segregation orientation" had an average age of 70.2 years and were most active in the locally less militant N.A.A.C.P.

In Providence, the rather close numerical divisions among differing leadership types had the effects of giving strength to the "middle-roaders" and of moderating protest activity.⁴⁵ Thus, as in Durham and Atlanta, "while [leadership] . . . is currently more militant than it has been in the past, it is typically a matter of 'protest within the status quo.'"⁴⁶

However, with the impact of the school integration crisis in Little Rock, local black leaders began moving away from this limited type of protest. The conflict welded together both the subcommunity and its leaders "in their support of the integration ideal."⁴⁷ The "absence of overt dissension" and the "unity of purpose among [the] leaders" made desegregation "a 'generalized goal' in the Negro community." Adherence to this status goal became the sine qua non of black leadership; issue leadership was converted into general leadership in the subcommunity:

It was obvious that the desegregation issue [was] so dominant among the social problems facing the Negro community that most respondents confused general leadership within the community with leadership in the desegregation crisis.⁴⁸

Leadership Structures

Hunter and Burgess presented two contrasting models of "closed" and "open" structures of subcommunity leadership; differences occurred in terms of the specific forms the

leadership group took, the types of leaders occupying different positions and the relationship of subcommunity leaders to community-wide white leadership.

For Hunter the structure of leadership within the black subcommunity generally paralleled the white power structure of Regional City.⁴⁹ The top policy-making group tended toward closure--for example, almost all the leaders knew each other "well" or "socially"; basic decisions on policy matters were made by these "top leaders"; ministers and civic associations functioned mainly as communications channels "to apprise large numbers of people of these decisions."⁵⁰

The process of decision within the upper group is called "getting it straight," that is, policy is informally cleared between top leaders, and the line is set, before it goes to the underlying mass of people.⁵¹

However, the power⁵² of Negro leaders was severely restricted. The power of decision was limited to their businesses and professions and the organization of services on a subcommunity-wide basis. For larger issues or projects the white leaders had to be appealed to or consulted with; subcommunity leadership was clearly subordinate to the white leadership elite of Regional City. Indeed, the tensions among the limited goals of black leaders, as discussed earlier, were correlates of this "structural weakness"⁵³ in the black subcommunity:

... no members of the Negro group are called upon to contribute to top policy-making in the larger community . . . the sub-community stands alone in its

isolation from the sources of power as no other unit within the metropolitan area.⁵⁴

That contact between white and black leaders which did take place was limited to two instances: the contact between the political leaders of both communities (where white leaders had responded to increased black voting) and contacts between white "professional personnel in civic and social work"⁵⁵ and the top black leaders. These contacts were generally superficial, according to Hunter, because both the white politicians and the professionals were "sub-ordinate to larger powers," and represented only the "under-structure" which implemented but did not initiate the policies of Regional City's leadership elite.⁵⁶ "The structural relationship to the sources of . . . policy decision must accordingly be indirect for most of the top Negro leaders."⁵⁷

The shared values of segregation also worked to limit even these superficial contacts.

The top policy makers in the white community are vigilant that the pattern of "fraternization" between the under-structure professionals and sub-community personnel be kept within bounds of the existing mores as interpreted by them. . . . On the basic issues revolving around segregation, the top leaders in the larger community are adamant in maintaining the present alignment of relationships.⁵⁸

"Aggressiveness" or undue "militance" made it difficult for a black leader literally "to deliver the goods" to the black subcommunity. Black leadership had to remain acceptable to whites, but in doing so threatened its base of support in the black subcommunity.

black "liberals" oriented toward integration goals.

. . . the real leaders in the sub-community are not generally known to the top white policy-makers. Only two men who rated high among the leaders in the sub-community were selected by the top white leaders . . . neither of [them] is considered an aggressive leader in his own community. . . . The acceptable leaders in the larger community tend to be less acceptable in the Negro community.⁵⁹

In contrast, Burgess found Durham's black leadership was "aggressive and informed to the point that it is, as a group, ahead of the masses."⁶⁰ The structure of leadership varied from that in Atlanta in that it was relatively "open" while Atlanta's was "closed," the dominant leadership type was different and the relationships of black and white leaders were considerably different than in Atlanta.

Burgess characterized the leadership structure as a "power process . . . [which] is not closed. . . . From the apex of community leadership and organization, specific policies are executed in a radiating process involving the other leaders and associations of the sub-community."⁶¹ In contrast, in Regional City the "understructure" only implemented decisions made by a comparatively closed group of "top leaders."

Leadership types were also more differentiated in Durham. While in Atlanta's rigid structure of racial relations the leadership choices were "accommodation" or "protest," in Durham Burgess found a range of leadership types which she refers to as "conservatives," "moderates," "liberals," and "radicals." Also, while Atlanta's leadership was dominated by the "conservatives," Durham's was dominated by black "liberals" oriented toward integration goals.

The relation of top black leaders to white leaders in the city also was different than the pattern Hunter cites in Atlanta. Many black leaders in Durham did have access to their white counterparts; there was awareness of the leadership structure on both sides; and "communication and interaction channels do operate at more than a superficial level between the two leadership structures."⁶² In short, "white leaders in Crescent City are more willing to deal with the real Negro leaders."⁶³ This structure of relationships permitted the growth of different types of black leadership and a possible division of labor among them--an entirely different situation from that of Atlanta, where only one "type" of black leader was regarded as legitimate by whites. Unfortunately, the possible reasons for these differences between Atlanta and Durham are not dealt with in the local research.

The characteristics of leadership structures varied and successfully to make collective demands on considerably in the other studies. For example, in contrast to Hunter's research, Barth and Abu-Laban reported finding "no genuine power structure of the type found in Regional City,"⁶⁴ mainly because* Seattle's black leaders did not occupy high positions in the economic organization or general institutional structure of the city. There were leaders, but they were not decision-makers as Hunter, Barth and Abu-Laban defined the term.⁶⁵ Since the base for black leadership

*The logic is theirs and reflects methodological assumptions.

was so tenuous, most of the leaders shared another characteristic: ed from overt leadership activities during the

. . . each had taken part, at one time or another, in inter-racial activities in an "equal status" context in which he (or she) acted as a spokesman for the Negro community. Here . . . is a case of "prestige drainage," with the Negro leaders draining prestige from the white leaders with whom they were in contact.⁶⁶

In contrast to Seattle, Providence respondents had "complete unanimity regarding the top three leaders,"⁶⁷ an indication of "the clarity with which the power structure of the Negro subcommunity is perceived." At the time of Pfautz's study, the beginnings of a turnover in leadership personnel were visible. The traditional "accommodating" leadership was threatened by the "integration-oriented" younger leaders, and the direct action model of protest was becoming an increasingly obvious alternative for black leaders.⁶⁸ Unlike the other cities, the leadership schism in Providence had temporarily "weakened [the] ability to present a solid front and successfully to make collective demands on the dominant group."⁶⁹ However, as previously discussed, in Little Rock the school crisis brought not schism, but the uniting of the subcommunity behind the new leaders. Cothran-Phillips hypothesize that the then-new type of leadership was the product of the crisis. "Ostensibly, situations of racial harmony are conducive to the [accommodating] type of leadership. However, in situations of racial crisis, protest

⁶⁶ See Nines and Pierce's "cyclical pattern," p. 40, and Garfinkel's comments on "critical conditions," p. 39, also this chapter.

leadership seems to become dominant."⁷⁰ The old leaders, who refrained from overt leadership activities during the school crisis, adjusted to the new protest leadership either by redefining their own role to one of behind-the-scenes-advisor or by trying the techniques and strategy of the protest leadership. As in each of these studies, excepting Atlanta, the role of the old "accommodating" Negro leader was rapidly becoming untenable.

The newly dominant protest tactics marked a change in the base of black leadership in Little Rock. Where accommodation-leaders had been largely dependent on white support,⁷¹ the new protest leaders gained prestige through support of the black subcommunity and "rejection by a considerable part of the white community."⁷² Interracial leadership contacts reflected the alteration in dominant leadership types: 69% of the black leadership felt that such contacts had decreased.⁷³

Despite the change in leadership in the black subcommunity, a pattern of relations between white and black leaders similar to that in Atlanta continued:

. . . organizational contacts . . . appeared to be between the secondary white leaders and front-line Negro leaders. . . . Negro leaders have little, if any, contact with the core of the white power structure; and in the absence of this contact, any significant communication is between top Negro leaders and secondary white leaders.⁷⁴

*See Hines and Pierce's "cyclical pattern," p. 40, and Garfinkel's comments on "critical conditions," p. 59, also this chapter.

Evaluation of Literature on Subcommunity
Leadership Structures

Barth and Abu-Laban state what seems to be the ultimate goal for the foregoing body of research:

Such case studies offer a valuable, if partial, approach to the comparative study of communities. . . . [They] demonstrate the fruitfulness of attempts to develop a typology of power structures within the framework of comparative community theory.⁷⁵

To develop such a typology, however, demands the use of comparable measures, concepts and definitions. While this research does share a focus on the structure of leadership in the black subcommunity, as well as methodological variants of the reputational approach, it lacks the comparability of terms which would permit any theoretical integration--let alone the construction of a typology of subcommunity power structures. For example, it is not even clear that the kinds of descriptive terms central to most of these analyses--such as "accommodating" leadership, "protest" leadership or "moderate" leadership--are operationally defined in similar ways.⁷⁶

This failure of comparability is, of course, common in the social sciences, but it has two immediate effects on the utility of this research on black leadership: first, one cannot easily account for some of the differences reported here; Why are ministers top leaders in Little Rock, but not in Atlanta? And why are there variations in terms of dominant leadership types and in the form of the leadership structures between Durham and Atlanta? Truly, variations in time or setting or tradition may account for some

of these differences--but then so might conceptual or definitional differences in the research. Second, lacking a commonality of concepts, the comparability of the "cases" represented on any empirically based typology* is missing; the goal set by Barth and Abu-Laban cannot be reached.

Another potential difficulty lies with the reputational approach. From the operational definition of leadership in terms of reputation rankings to the assumption that there is an identifiable structure of leadership, the flaws of this particular approach have been much discussed, and hardly require repetition here.⁷⁷ Most of the criticism has been directed at the use of the reputational approach in analyzing "power structures" in entire cities. Where the potential universe of leadership is so large and possibly distant from the observer, a panel of judges--no matter how "knowledgeable"--may be reporting common assumptions about, rather than observations of city leadership.

The context of the research problem changes considerably, however, when variants of the reputational approach are used in smaller black subcommunities.** The salience of the racial question for all members of the black community⁷⁸ and the much smaller number of people involved may well reduce the gap between the reputation for and the

*See the discussion of categoric typologies, pp. 31-32.

**This approach may also offer a practical first step for researchers having the "handicap" of whiteness, and may reduce the danger of selecting leading Negroes, instead of Negro leaders.

actual exercise of leadership itself. Indeed, in most of the research cited, consensus of the "top leaders" was very high and, in the instance where Burgess skillfully combined decision-making analysis with the reputational approach, the leaders identified by each method were very similar.⁷⁹ Though difficulties certainly remain, variants of the reputational approach may have their uses for research in the black subcommunity.

Some very general patterns do recur in the literature cited, even with the problems of precise comparability already mentioned. In most instances an identifiable black leadership structure was found, all of the leaders were characterized by relatively high socio-economic status within the black subcommunity and most of them faced problems of leadership arising from the pattern of structural subordination and economic-political dependence on whites.

Perhaps the most striking pattern is the shift in leadership goals. In this respect, Atlanta probably stands as representative of most of these cities, pre-1954. As we have seen, the Atlanta black leadership of 1953 advanced limited goals; the other leadership studies (which all come at later dates⁸⁰) reveal shifts toward the goal of racial integration, shifts accompanied by greater use of litigation and direct action tactics.

This shift grew out of the Supreme Court decision of 1954 on school desegregation, a decision which altered the external constraints on black leaders. The decision

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redefined the environment of racial relations and enormously widened the potential area of conflict; no longer did black leaders have to operate within the constraints of a segregated system, asking only for favors on parks and payrolls; now, with the goal of integration supplied by the Court itself, the leadership could begin to thrust directly against the traditional structure of racial relations. The change in the judicial environment not only supplied the goal--integration--which characterized the "new" leadership, but also altered the nature of the available means. With the law "on their side," black leaders no longer necessarily had to ask for favors--now they could demand changes of the white leadership. In a sense, then, the direction of change was "from the top down." Both the new goals and the new tactics of "protest" leaders were implicit in the Court's decision.

Recently again shifts in black leadership goals--some of them rather dramatic--seem to have taken place, as can be seen in the typology developed in the next chapter. A background to some of these more recent shifts may be supplied by examining another mode of analysis--the development of specific typologies of urban black leadership.

Black Leadership Typologies

These typologies represent one of the main methodological responses to the flux and diversity of urban black leadership; all of them draw upon the tradition of Weber's

"ideal types (or what Merton later called paridigms)".

According to Weber, the ideal type specifies something "with which the real situation or action is compared and surveyed for the explication of certain of its useful components."⁸¹ Weber's original assumption was that the ideal type would be employed not for the study of generic categories, but mainly for the study of

individual concrete patterns which are significant in their uniqueness . . . the goal of ideal-type concept construction is always to make clearly explicit not the class or average character but rather the unique individual character of cultural phenomena.⁸²

Weber, then, argued for the formulation of logically possible pure types of "unique individual character"--types which could be used in testing hypotheses. "The comparison of the ideal type and 'the facts'" is a "heuristic device [which] guides the investigation"; if there should be a "divergence from reality" in the type, it still "fulfills its logical purpose" for it acts "as the test of an hypothesis."⁸³

Most of the urban leadership research has used the more limited categoric typology, focusing on the types of black leadership which they have found, rather than all those types logically possible.⁸⁴ According to Blue in his work on patterns of racial stratification, the categoric differs from the ideal typology mainly

in that it does not consider all the theoretic possibilities of type models but deals with the type models that are constructed from empirical instances of the phenomena.⁸⁵

These typologies thus are based upon the "empirical instances" of black leadership, and provide a means for reducing the complexities of that phenomenon to a more coherent level.

McKinney describes this category of typologies as follows:

[It] is a purposive, planned selection, abstraction, combination, and accentuation of a set of criteria that have empirical referents, [which serve] . . . as a basis for comparison of empirical cases. . . . [It] has the scientific function of "ordering" the concrete data.⁸⁶

The categoric typology can be of the polar or continuum types, either contrasting two constructs at the end points of a scale (old vs. new leaders), or placing the types in different positions along some sort of continuum (conservative, moderate, militant). Research representative of the typological approach to black leadership has been done by Hines and Pierce and Montgomery, Killian and Grigg in Tallahassee, Ladd in Winston-Salem and Greenville, Thompson in New Orleans and Walker in Atlanta.*

Daniel C. Thompson:
The Biracial Structure

Thompson's description of the "complementary patterns" of white and black leadership in New Orleans

*See Ralph H. Hines and James E. Pierce, "Negro Leadership After the Social Crisis: An Analysis of Leadership Changes in Montgomery, Alabama," Phylon (Spring, 1965), pp. 162-172; Lewis M. Killian and Charles Grigg, Racial Crisis in America: Leadership in Conflict (Englewood Cliffs, 1964); Everett C. Ladd, Jr., Negro Political Leadership in the South (Ithaca, N.Y., 1966); Daniel C. Thompson, The Negro Leadership Class (Englewood Cliffs, 1963); Jack L. Walker, "The Functions of Disunity: Negro Leadership in a Southern City," Journal of Negro Education (Summer, 1963), pp. 227-236.

made clear the structure of relations between the two groups.

. . . the patterns of intergroup leadership are determined very largely by the majority group . . . each social type of leader among white men of power will choose a complementary type of Negro leader with whom he is willing to negotiate. Consequently, the achievements of Negro leaders cannot be understood except within the total context of the social reality within which they operate.⁸⁷

Thompson used three interrelated criteria to identify black leadership types: their differing "conception[s] of the Negro race and race relations," their differing attitudes toward race and race relations and their actual behavior in race relations.⁸⁸ Each of the black leadership types in Thompson's three-unit typology was paired with the type of white leader with whom he would normally have contact.

The "Uncle Toms" were those black leaders who accepted the status assigned them by white supremacists. This leader accepted paternalistic relationships with white leaders as his due. Favors were to be politely requested, not demanded and, when granted, such favors were held up by these leaders as examples of what white authorities had done for Negroes. The "Toms" worked most frequently with those white leaders who "categorically [denied] . . . the principles of equal citizenship"⁸⁹ and believed in the racial inferiority of blacks. Though the "Toms," as Myrdal earlier recognized, were primarily the instruments of white leadership, Thompson pointed out "that they get things done." The "Tom" was allowed to seek certain limited ends--for example,

improved working conditions or somewhat higher salaries for Negroes. In exchange, however, the local "Toms" did not encourage the organization of labor unions for blacks or the use of mass protests. By the time of Thompson's research, these leaders were generally discredited in the black sub-community.⁹⁰

Unlike the "Uncle Toms," the "racial diplomat" did not accept segregation. However, he did recognize "the ways of the South," and worked within them.⁹¹ One of his chief roles was "to interpret the peculiar needs of Negroes in terms of general community well-being."⁹² Thus, such leaders were instrumental in successfully linking black needs to city-wide projects such as the Community Fund agencies.

The "diplomat" tended to work with the "white moderates." Thompson characterized these moderates as "middle-of-the-roads," occupying the center between white integrationists and segregationists. The moderate was "a kind of eclectic [with] no definite, defensible philosophy of race relations."⁹³ The moderates may have found it most congenial to work with the "racial diplomats" because the "diplomats" were "generally middle-class oriented. To [the diplomats], a successful Negro leader is one who possesses all of the traditional middle class traits."⁹⁴ Therefore, the "diplomats" emphasized planning, organization and even "the scientific approach" in working gradually toward integration. Thompson concluded "that if the actual achievements

of Negro leaders in race relations were compared, those of the racial diplomat would rank highest."⁹⁵

The "race man" was the most "militant" of the black leadership types. He was noted for "his unwillingness to compromise the basic principles of freedom."⁹⁶ While the "Uncle Toms" accepted the biracial system and the "racial diplomat" worked within it, the "race man" completely rejected segregation--publicly, emphatically, repeatedly.

The "race man" worked in tandem with the white "liberal." However, only a few white liberals from the "wealthy respected families" were dedicated to the general goals of equal rights and integration of the races; not one of them occupied a political position in the city.

According to Thompson, an impasse had developed in New Orleans: though the black community rejected the "Toms" as leaders, white leaders would work with no other "leaders" and "tended to refuse to do business with Negro diplomats and race men."⁹⁷

Killian and Grigg: The
Permanency of Protest
Leadership

In Racial Crisis in America, Lewis Killian and Charles Grigg give over a chapter to a description of Negro leadership in Tallahassee.* What emerges from their research is a polar typology of "old leaders" and "new leaders."

*This seems a fuller accounting of the research in Tallahassee than a journal article on the same subject: Lewis M. Killian and Charles U. Smith, "Negro Protest Leaders in a Southern Community," Social Forces (March, 1960), pp. 253-257.

The old leaders resembled Thompson's "Toms" and Myrdal's "accommodating" leaders. They held their positions primarily because they were acceptable to white leaders in the city. They were also acceptable to Tallahassee Negroes "because accommodation was regarded as the most practical and effective mode of adjustment in the existing power situation."⁹⁸

Killian and Grigg argued that the Court's decision of 1954 changed this "situation" and made possible new forms of leadership. The change in black leadership crystallized during a "crisis in race relations"--the boycotting of Tallahassee's segregated buses. The old leaders were replaced by the new leaders, who not only planned, inspired and organized the boycott, but afterwards as well "continued to maintain their position(s) of leadership."⁹⁹ Killian and Grigg saw them as the new permanent leaders of the black subcommunity.

This new leadership was "uncompromising in opposition to segregation" and sought gains for blacks through "formal demands and requests, boycotts, lawsuits and voting."¹⁰⁰ As in New Orleans, most of the white leaders were unwilling to negotiate with the new black leadership, but the old leaders had lost subcommunity support.¹⁰¹

Killian and Grigg placed the new black leadership in a national context:

The "new" leaders are becoming permanent leaders not because of the attractiveness of their personalities or their skill at organizing, but rather because they

adhere rigorously to the form of militant leadership which is becoming the trend for Negroes throughout the United States. . . . Most significant for the prospects of cooperation and negotiation, however, are the indications that even the protest leader, the "race man," may be under pressure to adopt increasingly extreme modes of militancy.¹⁰²

Jack Walker: The
Division of Labor

In his case study of the sit-ins in Atlanta, Walker found a somewhat different pattern than did Killian and Grigg. Indeed, Walker's analysis of the functional relationships among the leaders in his typology also called into question the common assumption that a weak minority group must maintain unity and solidarity in order to gain its objectives.¹⁰³

Walker's hypothesis was that

disputes among the leadership tend to increase, not decrease, the effectiveness of the Negro community's battle against the institutions of segregation.¹⁰⁴

Walker developed a typology of leadership in which each leadership type performed functions necessary to the creation, negotiation and resolution of racial crises.

The polar points of the typology were occupied by "protest" and "conservative" leaders. These types were differentiated by social characteristics and differences over tactics and goals.¹⁰⁵ Protest leaders were students, members of "Negro improvement groups," college teachers, younger businessmen and ministers; conservative leaders were primarily older businessmen. The conservative leaders were engaged in activities and institutions which were based in the black subcommunity but had links to the white

community.* Protest leaders "deal more exclusively with the Negro community than the conservatives, [and have] closer contact with the . . . deprivations suffered by the Negro."¹⁰⁶ In a sense, the protest leaders were marginal to both white and black institutions:

[they] have fewer reasons to try to protect institutions, both charitable and commercial, that presently exist in the Negro community . . . they stand outside the economic and social life of the established community and they try to keep the dominant leaders, both white and colored, at arm's length.¹⁰⁷

The tactics of the protest leaders--demonstrations and boycotts--were opposed by conservatives because such tactics presumably destroyed effective negotiations. Goal differences also increased the tensions between black leaders. While the protest leaders "conduct[ed] their affairs strictly on the basis of their moral principles,"¹⁰⁸ and sought an immediate end to all segregation, the conservatives had rather different objectives:

. . . the conservative leaders have each made adjustments to the traditional position of the Negro in Southern society. Although none seems completely satisfied, in varying measures they have given up efforts to penetrate the dominant white society and consequently they have a greater commitment to the institutions within the Negro community. . . .¹⁰⁹ The conservative leaders were much more acceptable to the whites because they tended to concentrate primarily on improving the economic welfare of the Negro without demanding an immediate end to segregation.¹¹⁰

*Not only were the business enterprises of the conservatives tied to the white community, but also to the Y.M.C.A., the Urban League and many black churches--all of which the conservatives had worked hard to develop--and all dependent on white financial support.

The third leadership type in Atlanta could be called the "marginals." These were the "several influential men who stand between these two groups [protest and conservative leaders] and are not so deeply committed to either political style."¹¹¹

In the sit-in controversy in Atlanta each leadership type performed a specific function.¹¹² The protest leaders created a crisis situation that required resolution, but having done so, could not in turn negotiate with the white businessmen.* The conservative leaders then utilized their reputations in and connections with the white community to negotiate a settlement of the controversy (boycotted lunch counters were desegregated after a "cooling-off" delay of six months). In fact, the antagonism between the black conservative and protest leaders "was functional because it made the conservatives seem more reliable and responsible in the eyes of the whites."¹¹³ In turn, these antagonisms were moderated by the "marginals," who had maintained their lines of communication with both leadership types.

Killian and Grigg's analysis of Tallahassee argued a kind of "replacement hypothesis": protest leaders had permanently replaced the older leaders as the dominant leadership type in the black subcommunity. Walker's "division of

*Wilson's comment is appropriate here: ". . . the discretion of the protest leader to bargain after he has acquired the resources with which to bargain is severely limited by the means he was forced to employ in order to create those resources." "The Strategy of Protest," Journal of Conflict Resolution (September, 1961), p. 293.

labor" hypothesis differed: each leadership type performed a specific and necessary function in the crisis situation-- and this increased the effectiveness¹¹⁴ of black leadership.*

Hines and Pierce:
The Cyclical Pattern

The typology of black leaders developed by Hines and Pierce in Montgomery, Alabama, also questioned the permanency of the new protest leadership type. However, while for Walker a kind of functional coexistence among differing leaders arose from the objective need to perform different functions in any given crisis situation, Hines and Pierce posit a cyclical pattern: the differing functions performed by different leadership types made each specific type most appropriate in differing social and political contexts.¹¹⁵

The famous Montgomery bus boycott of 1955-57 marked a change in black leadership. Pre-boycott leaders (mainly teachers and ministers) played the familiar accommodative role; "fundamentally powerless," they depended on their "acceptability to whites" to gain occasional favors.¹¹⁶ "At the inception of the boycott, pre-protest leaders attempted to 'work things out'"¹¹⁷ but they failed. The new black leaders took over and began to interpret the conflict in terms of their goals:

*The division of labor and effectiveness of local leadership in Central City are discussed in detail in Chapter VII.

At the start, there were no broad and comprehensive demands for total redress of the "wrongs" inflicted for generations¹¹⁸ . . . [but later] the base was broadened to include the larger issues of segregation and racial discrimination.¹¹⁹

The process of the boycott itself altered the dominant type of black leadership--from accommodative to assertive--and the goals articulated--from limited to more sweeping status goals.*

However, with the post-boycott phase came "the decline of Negro participation and group action";¹²⁰ the leadership structure altered again.**

The reversion to accommodation as the leadership form . . . was an accomplished fact within eighteen months after the boycott. Since that time, Negro leadership has remained in the hands of those who tacitly or explicitly subscribe to the theory of accommodation.¹²¹

Black leadership was situational in nature: in the crisis situation "the protest leader replaces the accommodative type as a response to public demand for social action"; with the realization of some of the protest's goals (here, the ending of formally segregated buses), "the protest leader, having served as a unifying force, is no longer needed and the accommodative leader can resume routine and perhaps more realistic goal achievement."¹²²

Everett Ladd: Political Style

For Ladd, black leadership had always been "defined" by the local structure of racial relations.¹²³ Since the

*See pp. 47-49, this chapter.

**This change coincided with Martin Luther King's leaving Montgomery to become a national leader.

lack of institutional bases for black leadership characterized this structure of relations, most Negro leaders were "issue leaders," who were particularly "dependent upon popular approval of their handling of issues of race."¹²⁴ Thus, political style became important--both to blacks and social scientists--as an indicator of "where [a leader] wants to lead his race and how he proposes to get there."¹²⁵

Ladd's typology of black leadership was a typology of political styles (defined as a composite of a leader's characteristic goals, means and rhetoric) based upon his findings in Winston-Salem, North Carolina, and Greenville, South Carolina. Since the content of different styles seemingly varied in differing locales, Ladd based his definitions of different leadership types on a "functional equivalency"--"the kind of threat to the existing race relation's structure which whites find contained in a given style."¹²⁶ Thus, the "most feared" black leaders were defined as the most "militant," and so on. The three styles on his continuum of leadership types (conservative, moderate, militant) were a product of the comparative loosening of racial relations in the urban south since, so Ladd argued, "differentiation in the continuum of race leadership styles varies . . . directly with the degree of permissiveness in Negro-White relations."¹²⁷

Conservatives emphasized those welfare goals least resisted by most southern whites, and tended toward "emptying the race problem of its dynamic content"¹²⁸--articulating

easily agreed upon goals. Accordingly, they rejected direct action tactics and tried to work through negotiation. Their rhetoric¹²⁹ centered upon amelioration of specific problems, rather than direct confrontation of the entire structure of racial relations.

In his rhetoric, then, as in race goals and means, the conservative leader imitates white political leaders. His approach is essentially one which he uses whites using successfully. His model is white middle-class politics. The golden words of this type of politics are moderation, consensus, respectability, persuasion, and access.¹³⁰

At the opposite end of the continuum was the militant style of leadership. The rhetoric of the militant was necessarily blunt, direct and high in race content; the intention was to sharpen, not reduce conflict. These leaders stressed precisely those status goals of racial integration most resisted by whites,¹³¹ and most successful in mobilizing large numbers of blacks.¹³² The tactics linked to this mobilization process involved what the conservatives found most obnoxious--mass involvement in direct action tactics. Ladd ties together tactical preferences and socio-economic status position within the black community:

Most Conservatives . . . are "haves," and as such they feel separated from the "have nots." As a "have," the Conservative at the least is hesitant about altering the system. . . . The Militant, in contrast, . . . has no doubts that he will gain from a drastic alteration of the existing system. Association with the Negro masses becomes a vehicle for economic and status advancement.¹³³

At the center point of the leadership continuum was the moderate leadership style. The goals of the moderates

were not clearly identifiable as similar to either those of the conservatives or those of the militants; support was given to "both sets of goals under different circumstances."¹³⁴ Moderates also tended not to rely upon direct action tactics, but mostly "upon negative inducements effected through the normal, regularized channels for political decision-making"¹³⁵ --political threats, organization and registration of voters, etc. The rhetoric of moderates did identify areas of racial injustice, but avoided the highly emotive content favored by the militants.¹³⁶

Evaluation of Typological Literature

In contrast to the literature on subcommunity leadership structures, the typological literature has done very little definitional spadework on the question of "who is a black leader?" However, the particular research interest seems to center upon interracial political leadership. It is interracial because it is concerned with the position of blacks in relation to other Americans,¹³⁷ and because all of the leaders discussed here must have--or try for--some kind of contact with white leaders; it is political because of its concern with the "authoritative allocation of values" for the society.¹³⁸ Both of these concerns are relevant to the central leadership activity of goal choice:

. . . in general, Negro leaders were thought of as persons able to make decisions affecting the choice of race objectives and/or the means utilized to realize these objectives.¹³⁹

The typologies cited offer differing ways of classifying the ends-means choices of black leaders. Most of them (with the exception of Killian-Grigg in Tallahassee) reflect the movement from dichotomized to differentiated urban black leadership--which, in turn, parallels the changes in the structure of racial relations in the urban south.¹⁴⁰ While in the past the choice for most black leaders was either to work within the existing social structure as a "Tom" or to defy it from without as a "militant," the changes of the last twenty years--from alterations in the law to the acceleration of urbanization in the south--increased the options available to black leaders in the cities. Ladd, for example, argued that the third unit found on most of these typologies --the moderates--was "made possible by the development of greater permissiveness in Negro-white relations."¹⁴¹

Thus, most of the post-1954 typologies ring changes on the three basic units: conservative, moderate, militant. However, all of the research shares the basic problem of selecting the proper typological base. As a result of methodological variations in selecting the base, theoretical integration of this research is very difficult.¹⁴²

Even a cursory examination would show much variation in the typological bases. For example, Thompson used three criteria (concepts, attitudes, behaviors), to place differing leadership types along his continuum, while Hines and Pierce used time-attitudinal criteria (pre-boycott accommodating, etc.), and Ladd employed political style (goals,

means, rhetoric) for the same purpose. Given these variations, as well as probable differences between cities, it is understandable that the literature shows differing functional relations among black leadership types (in Walker, Killian-Grigg, Hines-Pierce).

Ladd offered the most interesting "solution" to this problem of the typological base: Since the frequency and content of different black leadership styles is conditioned by the general structure of racial relations in a given city, the researcher should allow that structure to define for him the "meaning" imputed to different leadership styles. Thus, as we have seen, the "most feared" leader in the area was defined by Ladd as the most "militant" black spokesman. Ladd's method presumably assists in the categorization of leaders, while allowing for and indeed building upon local variations.¹⁴³

Ladd's approach avoids conventional comparative analysis--analysis which uses general, overarching categories of comparison (protest leadership, conservative leadership, etc.), which retain similar meanings in different urban settings. Of course, the danger in Ladd's approach is that of getting "too close" to the local data and of cutting off the comparative dimension completely. Ladd's approach, then, offers a kind of methodological trade-off: making leadership style a locality-specific variable may more accurately reflect local variations in black leadership,

while making comparative analysis of leadership types potentially more difficult.

Negro Politics

In Negro Politics¹⁴⁴ James Q. Wilson developed an attenuated typology of black leaders, focusing only on "volunteer Negro civic leaders,"¹⁴⁵ and not including other potential leaders--bureaucrats, politicians, voluntary association staff personnel, etc. However, four segments of his Chicago research are most relevant to the research in Central City: his discussion of goals; his distinction between moderate and militant leadership types; his analysis of role strain;¹⁴⁶ and his assessment of local leadership effectiveness.

Goals

"Welfare" ends are those which look to the tangible improvement of the community or some individuals in it through the provision of better services, living conditions, or positions. . . . "Status" ends are those which seek the integration of the Negro into all phases of community on the principle of equality--all Negroes will be granted the opportunity to obtain the services, positions or material benefits of the community on the basis of principles other than race.¹⁴⁷

Thus, for Wilson, status goals were concerned first with such issues as integration of the public schools and the opening of all-white public housing units to Negroes of similar incomes, while welfare goals gave priority to more or better schools for black children and the construction of additional low-income housing units for the poor.¹⁴⁸ Leaders with welfare goals argued that the Negro was poor

and first and most urgently needed things--while such remote ends as integration of the races could come later. The analysis of leaders with status goals reversed these priorities: the principle of equal access on non-racial grounds to the life of the general community was given priority because its achievement would make possible all consequent gains. Indeed, merely to improve the material conditions of the Negro subcommunity might further institutionalize and perpetuate segregation.¹⁴⁹

The construction of a hospital which would be segregated by virtue of its location in Chicago was opposed by leaders with status goals.¹⁵⁰ Though an immediate "plus" for local blacks needing the facilities, a segregated hospital was seen as running counter to the principle of integration. For leaders with welfare goals, the new hospital was viewed as a clear gain for the subcommunity.

Status goals, which Wilson describes as remote and general principles, differ in form as well as content from those welfare ends oriented to immediate, specific and tangible gains.* Wilson argued that these analytical distinctions between goals were useful for future research because the choices for black leaders increasingly required either deciding on "the desirability of a welfare as contrasted with

*The typology developed in Chapter II distinguishes the content of "new" and "old" status goals, while noting their similarities in form and function. See Chapter II, pp. 85-89.

a status goal," or at least "reaching an optimum balance" between the two goals."¹⁵¹

Moderate and Militant Leaders

The militant leader characteristically saw issues in a simplified form,¹⁵² attempted to combine them,¹⁵³ presented a maximum number of demands to public agencies,¹⁵⁴ and infused all of his goals and demands with the vocabulary of high moral principle.¹⁵⁵

Wilson found that in cases where the same information was shared equally "the protestor will see simplicities where the moderate sees complexities."¹⁵⁶ Typically, while moderates were pondering the legal and political ramifications of integrated "open housing," a militant leader announced that "this whole housing problem could be solved in a few months."¹⁵⁷ The agglomeration of many issues into one large issue represented the militants' impatience with "piecemeal reform." The status goals of the militants also served as a rough kind of analysis, leading to their insistence that the same dimension of race discrimination underlay all issues. Thus were "total" solutions necessary, and the more limited demands of other leaders were viewed with some disdain. To the militants, demands were to be made not only firmly, but in large number: a militant addressing the Board of Education in Chicago listed ten demands covering every aspect of school board policy, while a moderate leader, in a similar statement a year later, made only three recommendations, all of them focusing on a single aspect of board policy.¹⁵⁸ Finally, all

of the militant's demands were necessarily stated in a distinctive manner:

He tends to speak of these matters in terms of their rationale, rather than in relation to immediate needs, and justifies his demands with an appeal to an elaborate and highly general set of values and rights.¹⁵⁹

The moderates, who felt most at ease discussing specific and concrete problems rather than long-range and more inclusive issues,¹⁶⁰ clearly placed these problems in a time perspective much longer than that used by the militant. "Progress" had been and would be made in small increments, and these gradual changes over time would lead to still more change. "Time is seen not only as a necessary perspective from which to view race issues, but also as an inevitable component of progress, a vaguely real agent of change."¹⁶¹

Though the militant seemingly shared in many of the characteristics of Mannheim's "utopian thinking" or even Hoffer's "true believer,"¹⁶² he was not an ideological isolate. Many of his organizational links were to white liberals and radicals (a situation which continues in Central City), and often he was an active member of a "wide range of liberal causes and associations."¹⁶³ In contrast, the moderate, as a consequence of his social and business positions, rarely raised race issues with whites because to do so "would detract from other matters or destroy a relationship."¹⁶⁴

Accordingly, as men recruited from business and the professions and "accustomed to working within the limits of the status quo," the moderates tended to see the world "as

it is" and "to accept the existing constraints on action without pressing for far-reaching or unprecedented changes."¹⁶⁵ The moderates were also the advocates and perhaps the agents of "institutionalization,"* favoring stable organizations with steady goals. They were "predisposed to move in customary ways and avoid the unusual, the disturbing, the utopian."¹⁶⁶ Moderates were

less willing to alter the mission of an organization to strike out at a target of opportunity not previously agreed upon as being within its purview. To do so would mean a sacrifice in other goals--such as friendly relations with supporters¹⁶⁷ . . . the maintenance of the organization should take precedence over the pursuit of attractive ends. . . .¹⁶⁸

Wilson also found that the status ends of militants and the welfare ends of moderates were linked to differing tactical preferences. Seeking "inclusive solutions of a public nature," the militant leader had the most confidence in general "politico-legal solutions," but ironically the least confidence in local politicians, black or white."¹⁶⁹ Their dislike for politicians was rooted in the machine nature of Chicago's political organization. Militant leaders did not view the distribution of individual favors as a legitimate goal for collective political action.¹⁷⁰ On the other hand, the emphasis on legislative means was more than a reflection of past victories or future hopes:

Rather, the effort to "politicize" the race question seems to be another attribute of style, representing the urge for the quick, the decisive, the comprehensive, and the permanent. A new law can cut through

*See p. 66, this chapter.

laborious bargaining or the need to educate or induce; it can be sweeping in its scope, and it will endure. For all these reasons, it is attractive to the protest leader.¹⁷¹

The militant, then, was generally disposed to favor either legal compulsion or group protest. Group action was often seen as having intrinsic value in mobilizing blacks on their own behalf* and was also consistent with the preferences and assumptions implicit in the militant style: direct action avoided the constraints on leadership behavior which worked on those who valued access to white leaders and was consistent with the moral tenor of the movement.¹⁷² In the service of larger ends, direct protest was seen as necessary and proper--while other goals (such as retaining influence or maintaining organizations) were viewed as "morally inferior."¹⁷³

Moderate leaders had less confidence in any mass protest. They generally rejected direct protest tactics because (1) they valued most their access to white leaders and protest tactics were seen as destroying that access; (2) because this access was viewed as more effective in getting results than was protest; and (3) because many Negro professionals and businessmen had a "temperamental distaste" for what they regarded as "vulgar" behavior.¹⁷⁴

As men accepting the limitations of the status quo, moderates were much less critical of black politicians than

*This insight was later used by militant separatists in Central City, who used protest means to cohesion ends; see Chapter II, p. 103.

were the militants, but their greatest support was given to "legal solutions"--court action and litigation.¹⁷⁵ In fact, the race moderate sometimes saw the role of Negro organizations as properly confined to bringing suit on behalf of Negroes deprived of rights guaranteed them under law.¹⁷⁶ Where law provided no base for court action, moderates preferred a "negotiated settlement in which one deals with people 'at the top.'"¹⁷⁷ These situations, not surprisingly, displayed the moderate's forte--his skill at bargaining. The bargaining, though, seemed to be a distinctive kind: moderates did not rely on the "negative" sanctions of possible protest, but rather on "access," "persuasion" and "education," offering whites positive inducements for their cooperation. However, in Wilson's account, the fundamental problem for these black bargainers was their lack of such inducements: "the Negro is in no position to provide them either himself or out of the resources he controls."^{178*}

Wilson argues that the conflict over appropriate means between moderates and militants was at its core a dispute over how best to maintain an organization. Given his greater access to whites, "protest was not inherently valuable to the bargainer; indeed, he may find it positively harmful."¹⁷⁹ However, those leaders with less access used

*Efforts to structure situations so as to create resources with which to bargain are considered in the discussion of the protest model and its local applications, Chapter II, pp. 101-102.

protest means to maintain both their organizations and their followings.

Agitation may be a means to maintain an organization (such as the NAACP) even at the expense of access to other organizations (such as the Board of Education).^{*} Or, agitation may serve to create a sense of awareness and morale among followers which, over the long run, would be more important as a source of permanent strength for the protest leaders than some concession from a city government.¹⁸⁰

Role Strain^{**}

Wilson implies that effective leadership roles were sometimes incompatible with the constraints felt by most members of the black subcommunity. These constraints evolved from the workings of what Wilson called "race values."

Race values were the "highly general, widely shared images of desirable states of affairs in the Negro community."¹⁸¹ Such values were "verbal expressions of race consciousness"--a consciousness presumably arising from the salience of race for Chicago blacks.¹⁸² These values were "fragmentary, partially unspoken, and often inconsistent."¹⁸³ However, to Wilson, the race values were significant because they implied

^{*}In Central City, where the NAACP for a time had considerable access to the Board as well as virtual representation within the ranks of school administrators, "agitation" by the organization was limited to a few court cases; see p. 95, Chapter II; pp. 187-188, Chapter III; and Chapter VI on the busing controversy.

^{**}The term refers to "the felt difficulty in fulfilling role obligations" (W. J. Goode, "A Theory of Role Strain," American Sociological Review, 25, p. 483). These difficulties can arise from many sources, but in the instances discussed here, the "strain" results directly from conflicting demands made upon those occupying leadership roles.

a "sense of collectivity"; they were concerned with "what the race as a whole ought to do and believe."¹⁸⁴ The content of the race values revolved around broad appeals for unity, demands for more effective leadership, fear of a "sell-out" by leaders and a general desire to eliminate the color bar.

These race values served as criteria for evaluating leadership activities. As a consequence, black leaders had to present a "race justification" for their positions because "it is difficult for a civic leader to take a public stand that is contrary to what has been labeled as the 'race' position."¹⁸⁵ These "race positions," which Wilson saw as evolving out of the general but vague race values, meant that leaders not assuming "correct" stances would be subject to harsh criticism.¹⁸⁶ Those leaders most directly exposed to their black attentive publics--leaders of voluntary associations, neighborhood groups and the like--were the most reluctant to expose themselves to this kind of criticism.

Wilson argues that the creation of "race positions" unfortunately reduced the "unfettered public discussion of alternatives."¹⁸⁷ For most local black leaders, the race values operated as constraints on action, while giving no specific guidelines for action. Thus, on the one hand, race values, as highly general and sometimes inconsistent preferences, set the outer boundaries which few issue leaders could afford to violate, while on the other hand, they provided no compensatory cues for specific actions on specific

issues. Indeed, as civic issues became more complex,¹⁸⁸ the ambiguity of the race values became even more pronounced: while these values helped maintain unity on simple issues such as opposition to local white violence, they were of small use on issues such as the proposals for a South Side branch of the county hospital and the plans for urban renewal. For Wilson, race values and the emergence of race positions were linked not only to a reduced discussion of alternatives in the subcommunity and a slighting of complexities, but also to the placement of "ideology at the center, not the periphery of action"¹⁸⁹--which was viewed as a major constraint on leadership activities.

In Central City, where a number of blacks have entered mainly white institutions, the problem of role strain continues to be important, but alters in form. Most commonly, role conflicts occur for those individuals attempting to be black leaders while having largely white constituencies. As in Chicago, the constraints on leadership activities are greatest for those blacks most directly exposed to attentive publics or constituencies--but, in this case, mainly white constituencies. The tentative "solution" for many of these leaders--union and Urban League officials, a city councilman, school administrators--is to adopt a "moderate" orientation toward whichever goals they seek.* This particular form of role strain is possibly typical where blacks have begun to "infiltrate" important institutions in a city, but--as found

*See Chapter II, pp. 85-87.

in the leadership interviews--it is experienced by local black leaders as perhaps their most accute problem.**

Leadership Effectiveness

In his assessment of the effectiveness of leaders in the black subcommunity, Wilson reached two interesting conclusions: that the constraints of formal organization should be avoided where possible, and that the emphasis on status goals should be reconsidered. The costs of formal organization ranged from the need to retain membership support to the intensification of disagreements over means and ends, especially when such conflicts were tied to competition for office and influence within an organization.¹⁹⁰ For reasons paralleling Selznick's description of the "infusion of value" in an institution, Wilson argued that "the maintenance of an organization often supersedes or modifies the substantive ends which are being sought."¹⁹¹

Perhaps Wilson's most controversial assessment concerned the relative merits of status and welfare goals. For Wilson, the condition of black "powerlessness" in truth did not apply to all areas of potential leadership activity.

For some ends . . . the Negro can do nothing to remedy his powerlessness. . . . [However] when seeking ends that elicit less irreconcilable passions, scraps of power can be collected and assembled. Certain things can be done: more police protection can be demanded; less discriminatory insurance rates can be pressed for; firms can be induced to hire Negroes. Here, when Negroes fail to act effectively it is more often a case

**Local leadership perceptions of role strain are discussed at length in Chapter V.

of failures internal to the Negro community than of constraints imposed by the larger community. . . .¹⁹²

In short, outside the boundaries set by the most "irreconcilable passions," there were issue areas in which Negro civic action could make a difference--although perhaps in "not as many areas as militant Negroes would like to believe."¹⁹³ Wilson concluded that

one implication of this study is not that Negro leadership is irrelevant, but that it may be decisively relevant only to a certain range of ends--principally welfare ends.¹⁹⁴

In the last chapter of the Central City research, these propositions are evaluated in relation to local black leadership.

Evaluation

The critical response¹⁹⁵ to the analytical framework developed in Negro Politics indicates possible areas of difficulty in Wilson's study. For example, in commenting on Wilson's inclusion of blacks without mass followings in his discussion of leadership, Saul Alinsky insisted upon his definition of leadership: "The simple fact is that . . . a bona fide leader has an independent power base and a visible following."¹⁹⁶ Wilson's contrary view was that

if one were to accept the definition of leadership implicitly held by many . . . the persons considered as "organizers" would be the only "true" leaders in the community . . . it is maintained here, however, that there are many leadership functions, all of which serve--well or ill--the purposes of the group.¹⁹⁷

There seems no apparent reason why those not meeting Alinsky's criteria--men who nevertheless engage in necessary leadership activities (for example, negotiation of the

crises initiated by the Alinsky-style leaders¹⁹⁸ or mobilization of needed financial resources)--should be defined out of one's analysis. Alinsky's view of leadership logically grew out of his own experiences, but use of it would confine analysis to only one type of leader--the militant organizer--and cut off inquiry into the functions performed by individuals not meeting his definition.

Perhaps a more important difficulty with Wilson's analysis was stated rather bluntly by Harry Scoble: "Nothing much was happening in Chicago at the time of the field research."¹⁹⁹ As a result, Wilson's model of black leadership may be somewhat static, as pointed out by Herbert Garfinkel:

[Wilson's] model is undoubtedly sound as a standard framework with which to confront normal organizational and political situations. But the tendency is to reckon only with these "normal" relationships when stabilized conditions maximize community apathy, and when career ambitions and organizational supports depend on "maintaining connections" in status quo channels of influence. But there have been critical conditions in the history of the Negro protest when normalcy did not prevail, and when protest leadership and organization changed dynamically.²⁰⁰

At the local level, such "critical conditions" can develop when previously muted conflicts between leaders erupt on a highly salient public issue, and when local black leaders discover only tenuous subcommunity support for their positions. The research in Central City, though using Wilson's work as a starting point, has avoided a situation in which "nothing much was happening" by focusing on a subcommunity

experiencing just such critical conditions in the controversy over school integration.

That generally critical conditions developed in the leadership conflicts of the last decade and that black leadership has "changed dynamically" since the period of Wilson's field research seems certain. In the intervening years, the leadership context has been altered by the debate over black power, the resurgence of black nationalism, the urban riots of the sixties and the growing black population in major cities.

Given these conditions, the relationships between goals and local leadership types may have changed considerably. Thus, while urban moderates today may espouse the integration goals of yesterday's militants, the latter, in their current form, may claim goals of separate development associated in the past with black "conservatives." For many whites today, these leadership types are mainly distinguishable by the means they advocate: local moderates are seen as "responsible" as a consequence of their preference for coalition and legal action, while some militants are viewed as radical not necessarily because of the content of their goals, but as a result of their seeming preference for inflammatory rhetoric and occasional violence. Thus, though Wilson's concept of status goals and his distinctions between militant and moderate continue to be useful in local

research,* changes in leadership goals and the relationships of ends to tactics must also be taken into account. The typological analysis begun in Chapter II seeks to do this.

Black Leadership Literature: An Overview

Some of the general literature concerned with leadership, organization and intergroup conflict offers a means for summarizing the differences of the last few decades between traditional and protest leaders, the differing forms of organization within the subcommunity and the process of leadership differentiation, all of which are implicit in the foregoing research.

The fundamental condition of traditional black leadership²⁰¹ was powerlessness; very few of the conventional resources of power²⁰² were theirs. Lacking both these resources and most of the basis for charismatic, traditional or legal authority,²⁰³ black leadership tended to be imposed

*Harry Scoble (see footnote 199), and Robert Crain, et al., The Politics of School Desegregation (Garden City, 1969), 415 pp., are examples of research employing many of Wilson's terms of analysis. Following his research in post-riot Watts, Scoble hypothesized that black leaders of all types had become more "militant," and that welfare goals increasingly were being stressed in black demands. In the course of their study of the school desegregation issue in several cities, Crain, et al. distinguished black community leaders and civil rights leaders by their adherence to welfare and status goals, respectively. While Wilson had linked militant leaders to protest tactics, Crain's later research found that most black leaders asserting the status goal of integration "seemed to be quite conservative in the types of actions they are willing to take" (p. 182). Furthermore, the researchers suggested, albeit briefly, that the status goal of integration can sometimes be accompanied by a "welfare-orientation" (p. 116). See the discussion of moderates and tactics, Chapter II, pp. 95-98.

("determined by superior authority"²⁰⁴), not emergent. The primary basis for traditional black leadership, then, lay in selection by and acceptability to whites. However, because "the stability of the leadership in the Negro community is a functional necessity for the leaders in the community at large,"²⁰⁵ a bargaining situation existed:²⁰⁶

(1) white and black leaders sought conflicting ends through the exchange of compensations; (2) the ends were not completely incompatible; (3) a mutually agreed upon ratio for the exchange of compensations existed. Thus, specified "favors" by white leaders were exchanged for "responsible" black leadership which would not threaten the existing structure of racial relations.

The weight of the evidence in the research cited shows that traditional subcommunity leadership was, in Lewin's phrase, "leadership from the periphery."²⁰⁷ Generally provided by the "economically successful" and by those blacks "who have distinguished themselves," peripheral leaders tended to identify with whites and to seek their approval, while de-emphasizing their minority group membership.²⁰⁸ This resulted in a lukewarm leadership "fundamentally eager to leave the group."²⁰⁹

The previously low levels of political participation and organizational activity among the Negro masses²¹⁰ made possible white selection as the basis for black leadership. This lack of a mass base²¹¹ further constrained even the imposed black leadership: the appearance of "leadership"

could be maintained only by favors brought back from the white community, not by any kind of sustained protest activity by blacks. Even those organizations which potentially could mobilize mass protest, North or South--political organizations, labor unions, churches, the Urban League and the NAACP--frequently depended on white financial support.²¹²

The traditional black leadership can be viewed as a leadership response to the constraints of a particular social situation:* with few resources for protest, the limits of a segregated and economic social system and the low levels of black organization and activity, traditional leadership in fact may have been most appropriate for the black sub-community. However, with the changes flowing from the Supreme Court's school integration decision of 1954 (as already discussed), the tasks for black leadership changed--and thereby changed black leadership as well.

. . . it has been repeatedly observed that as a group moves from one task to another, the situational demands alter in such a way that different forms of participation assume leading qualities, and different members may [become] . . . leaders.²¹³

Situational changes further the circulation of leadership elites largely because the traditional leaders "are usually so married to the definition of the situation as it existed at the time of their initial involvement"²¹⁵ as to make new leadership a necessity.

*Situation is used here to mean "the set of values and attitudes with which the individual or the group has to deal in a process of activity and with regard to which this activity is planned and its results appreciated. Every concrete activity is the solution of a situation."²¹⁴

The post-1954 generation of emergent* black leaders was generally younger, and more dedicated to the goal of racial integration and the accompanying tactics of active protest. The reformulation of tactics--from bargaining to protest--also meant a change in the relationship of leaders and followers. Leaders now had to maximize their influence with blacks in order to mobilize them to bring pressure to bear upon white institutions via protest tactics:

Protest is distinguished from bargaining by the exclusive use of negative inducements (threats) that rely, for their effect, on sanctions which require mass action or response.²¹⁶

Theories of intergroup conflict show that the use of these protest tactics can be linked to further changes in the skills required of leaders and the organization of their followers: the increase in intergroup hostilities meant that "leaders arise who are adept in conflict,"²¹⁷ while, according to Coser, "conflict with another group leads to . . . increased cohesion of the group."²¹⁸ Although, in Hemphill's view, all leadership is characterized by the "initiation of structure" within a group,²¹⁹ this seems especially true of leadership in the context of sharp intergroup conflict:

The enduring consequence of intergroup conflict is toward recasting the organization . . . that prevail[s] within each group to strengthen its role in the conflict.²²⁰

*Emergent, unlike imposed leadership, is "conditioned upon consent of followers."²²¹ It is similar, then, to the "issue leadership" of Ladd.

Indeed, there is some evidence in the black urban leadership literature that different leadership types characteristically utilized differing forms of social organization. Traditional leaders were most often integrated into the institutional structure of the black subcommunity; group ends presumably were served by the acceptability to and the contacts with whites arising from black leaders' positions in the institutional structure. Protest leaders, in general, did not seem to occupy such positions: for example, Walker found them to be marginal to both black and white institutions,²²² and Ladd characterized them as "have-nots" seeking to alter the existing institutional arrangements."²²³ These leaders did, however, form protest organizations to reach their goals. Using the terms of Harbison and Myers,²²⁴ many of the protest leaders could be characterized as "organization builders"--those leaders most concerned with innovation, defining new goals and the creation of organizations instrumental for these goals.

The significance of the varying forms of social organization linked with different leadership types is that leadership behavior seems to vary with organizational structure.²²⁵ Though Selznick has been concerned mainly with leadership in large-scale organizations, his analytical distinctions between institutions and organizations may be suggestive here. Selznick distinguishes between an organization as an "expendable tool, a rational instrument engineered to do a job," and an institution as "more nearly a

natural product of social needs and pressures--a responsive adaptive organism."²²⁶

Institutionalization is a process. It is something that happens to an organization over time. . . .²²⁷
 In what is perhaps its most significant meaning, "to institutionalize" is to infuse with value beyond the technical requirements of the task at hand . . .
 [this process] is largely a reflection of the unique way in which [the institution] fulfills personal or group needs . . . the result is a prizing of the [institutional] device for its own sake. . . .²²⁸

Because there is "a close relation between 'infusion with value' and 'self-maintenance,'" groups faced with "new problems and altered circumstances" usually seek to preserve institutions.*²²⁹

In this context, it is not surprising that the traditional conservative leadership, which drew both its psychic and material rewards from high status in the institutions of a segregated subcommunity,²³⁰ found it difficult to adopt the protest style of leadership--leadership which threatened the very basis of the existing institutional arrangements. At the same time, protest leaders--generally younger and less integrated into existing institutions²³¹--were free to create organizations which could be used as "instruments" in the struggle for racial integration. In turn, the organizational context conditioned leadership behavior:

*This proposition is relevant to Wilson's contention that local black leaders might profit by avoiding the constraints of formal organization. See discussion in last chapter.

A rapidly developing organization which has certain goals to achieve under emergency time-pressures presents an entirely different time pattern from a stable organization. . . . In the former case, the leadership pattern may emphasize initiative, creativity, daring and, to some extent, a rejection of traditional pathways to goals and even a reformulation of organizational goals.* The organization may be one in which there is tremendous upward mobility and high motivation. In the latter case of the older . . . institution, the pattern may be one of conformity to tradition, [and] an emphasis upon conventional pathways to conventional goals. . . .²³⁴

Only to emphasize the shift in subcommunity leadership from traditional-institutional leaders to protest-organization leaders, however, is to oversimplify the differentiation of black leadership. For example, the objective need to perform differing leadership tasks and the situational changes faced by black leaders both worked to increase the need for and the number of differing leadership types.

Walker²³³ and Wilson²³⁴ suggest that the performance of one leadership function (such as initiating direct action tactics) often "cancels out" the opportunity to perform another needed function (for example, negotiating an end to a "crisis"); more generally, Selznick suggests that each organization and its leadership developed their own special

*The enormous flexibility on goals exhibited by many protest organizations and by their leaders has been striking. Stokely Carmichael, for example, moved from integration to black power to the study of Nkrumah in a few years; Floyd McKissick shifted readily in the mid-sixties from the integration to the black power emphases; and both S.N.C.C. and C.O.R.E. shifted from integration goals and white allies to black power and routine condemnations of white liberals within a period of about eighteen months. To say that leadership and organizational goals were flexible is to understate the case.

competencies or inadequacies or both.²³⁵ Taken together, these analyses indicate the necessity for a division of labor in which different leaders and organizations perform differing, but necessary functions. In addition, within each organization the differentiation of leadership is encouraged by the primary organizational needs "for goal achievement or achievement of 'valued states' and for maintenance of the group."²³⁶ Because only rarely can leaders simultaneously meet both needs equally well, "it is to be expected that . . . two primary modes of leadership will appear" within the group.²³⁷

Situational changes also increase the chances for differentiation among black leaders. Leadership "unity" or "consensus" on meaningful goals is usually fleeting at best. For example, the civil rights movement in general was characterized by consensus only so long as the focus was upon the first layer of racial discrimination--in public accommodations, schools, etc. When greater attention was given over to increasingly complex forms of discrimination --in housing, employment, voting--the movement lost much of its cohesiveness, and began spinning off black power, separatist, nationalist and other ideologies.

However, there are signs that follower expectations can sometimes work to decrease "permissible" differentiation among black leaders. While increased "permissiveness" in racial relations has the effect of also increasing leadership differentiation,²³⁸ (e.g., widening the range of

possible leadership styles) in Sherif's words, "this range of alternatives for leadership tends to narrow down as the movement encounters resistance or oppression."²³⁹ Ironically, this "narrowing down" process may further handicap minority-group leadership, once certain parts of the "division of labor," or specific leadership tasks are defined by followers as illegitimate (e.g., when all negotiators are "Toms" and all black politicians "Oreos"). The relationship between differentiated and effective leadership is further considered in the last chapter.

The general leadership and organizational literature brings pattern to the more limited local black leadership research which has been reviewed and evaluated in this chapter. The next chapter develops a typology of black leaders in Central City, and discusses the methods of research used.

FOOTNOTES

¹Floyd Hunter, Community Power Structure: A Study of Decision Makers (Chapel Hill, 1953), p. 115.

²Ibid.

³Ernest A. T. Barth and Baha Abu-Laban, "Power Structure and the Negro Subcommunity," American Sociological Review (Feb., 1959), p. 71.

⁴Ibid., p. 73.

⁵Howard W. Pfautz, "The Power Structure of the Negro Subcommunity: A Case Study and a Comparative View," Phylon (Summer, 1962), p. 160.

⁶Tilman C. Cothran and William Phillips, Jr., "Negro Leadership in a Crisis Situation," Phylon (Summer, 1961), p. 108.

⁷Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., Toward a Theory of Minority Group Relations (New York, 1967), p. 19.

⁸M. Elaine Burgess, Negro Leadership in a Southern City (Chapel Hill, 1962), pp. 97-98.

⁹Hunter, op. cit., p. 120.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 126.

¹¹Pfautz, op. cit., p. 162.

¹²Barth and Abu-Laban, op. cit., p. 74.

¹³Burgess, op. cit., p. 102. There is one major exception: education. The exceptionally highly educated Durham leadership had 15.3 mean years of education and, of the thirty-one "power nominees," nineteen had taken graduate work.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 81.

¹⁵For fuller discussions of possible bases of influence or power, see Robert A. Dahl, "The Analysis of Influence in Local Communities," in Social Science and Community Action, ed. by Charles R. Adrian (East Lansing, 1960); and Peter H. Rossi, "Theory, Research, and Practice in Community Organization," in Social Science and Community Action, ed. by Charles R. Adrian (East Lansing, 1960).

¹⁶Hunter, op. cit., p. 117.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 118.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 126.

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰Ibid., p. 141.

²¹Ibid., p. 138.

²²Ibid., p. 140.

²³Ibid., p. 141.

²⁴Ibid., pp. 117-118.

²⁵Ibid., p. 143.

²⁶Barth and Abu-Laban, op. cit., p. 76.

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸Burgess, op. cit., p. 82.

²⁹Ibid., p. 157. Forty percent of the lower class sample could not even name one of the subcommunity leaders.

³⁰Ibid., p. 196.

³¹Ibid., p. 159.

³²She is much less clear, however, as to why this change in priorities occurred when it did.

³³Ibid., p. 193.

³⁴Ibid., p. 166.

³⁵Ibid., p. 142.

³⁶Ibid., p. 177.

³⁷Ibid., p. 143.

³⁸Ibid., p. 192. Evidently, white leaders accurately perceived the consensus of black leadership since three quarters of them reported to Burgess that all Negro leaders were behind the push for school desegregation.

³⁹Ibid., p. 162.

⁴⁰Pfautz, op. cit., p. 163.

⁴¹See the discussion of "The Problem of Political Generations," in Social Movements, ed. by Rudolf Heberle (New York, 1951), pp. 120-127.

⁴²Pfautz, op. cit., pp. 162-163.

⁴³Ibid., p. 163.

⁴⁴Ibid.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 164.

⁴⁶Ibid.

⁴⁷Cothran and Phillips, op. cit., p. 113.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 112.

⁴⁹Hunter, op. cit., p. 114.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 118.

⁵¹Ibid.

⁵²Ibid., p. 139. Hunter uses "power" here to mean "the ability of personnel to move goods and services toward defined goals."

⁵³Ibid., p. 141.

⁵⁴Ibid., pp. 147-148.

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 137.

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 142.

⁵⁷Ibid.

⁵⁸Ibid., p. 138.

⁵⁹Ibid., pp. 141-142.

⁶⁰Burgess, op. cit., p. 161.

⁶¹Ibid., p. 192.

⁶²Ibid., p. 175.

⁶³Ibid., p. 162.

⁶⁴Barth and Abu-Laban, op. cit., p. 76.

⁶⁵Hunter, op. cit., p. 24. Decision makers are "persons of dominance, prestige and influence . . . able to enforce their decisions by persuasion, intimidation, coercion, and, if necessary, force."

⁶⁶Barth and Abu-Laban, op. cit., p. 74.

⁶⁷Pfautz, op. cit., p. 161.

⁶⁸Ibid., p. 165.

⁶⁹Ibid., p. 160.

⁷⁰Cothran and Phillips, op. cit., p. 107.

⁷¹Ibid., p. 117.

⁷²Ibid.

⁷³Ibid., p. 109.

⁷⁴Ibid., p. 115.

⁷⁵Barth and Abu-Laban, op. cit., p. 70.

⁷⁶Blalock, op. cit., p. 21.

⁷⁷See Robert A. Dahl, "A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model," American Political Science Review (June, 1958), pp. 463-469; Nelson Polsby, "The Sociology of Community Power: A Reassessment," Social Forces (March, 1959), pp. 232-236; and Polsby, "Three Problems in the Analysis of Community Power," American Sociological Review (Dec., 1959), pp. 796-803; and Raymond E. Wolfinger, "The Study of Community Power," American Sociological Review (Oct., 1960), pp. 636-644.

⁷⁸For example, see James Q. Wilson, Negro Politics: The Search for Leadership (New York, 1960), pp. 16-17.

⁷⁹Burgess, op. cit., pp. 97-98.

⁸⁰Barth and Abu-Laban in 1959, Burgess in 1960, Cothran-Phillips in 1961 and Pfautz in 1962.

⁸¹Max Weber, The Methodology of the Social Sciences (United States, 1949), p. 93.

⁸²Ibid., p. 101.

⁸³Ibid., p. 102.

⁸⁴For discussion of this, see "Howard Becker--Typological Analyst," in Charles P. Loomis and Zona K. Loomis, Modern Social Theories (Princeton, 1961), pp. 30-34.

⁸⁵John J. Blue, Jr., "Patterns of Racial Stratification: A Categorical Typology," Phylon (Winter, 1959), p. 364.

⁸⁶John C. McKinney, "The Development of Methodology, Methods and Techniques in American Sociology Since World War I," (Michigan State University pre-publication distribution, 1954), p. 53.

⁸⁷Daniel C. Thompson, The Negro Leadership Class (Englewood Cliffs, 1963), p. 59.

⁸⁸Ibid.

⁸⁹Ibid.

⁹⁰Ibid., p. 79.

⁹¹Ibid., p. 68.

⁹²Ibid.

⁹³Ibid., p. 64.

⁹⁴Ibid., p. 70.

⁹⁵Ibid., p. 69.

⁹⁶Ibid., p. 75.

⁹⁷Ibid., p. 79.

⁹⁸Lewis M. Killian and Charles Grigg, Racial Crisis in America: Leadership in Conflict (Englewood Cliffs, 1964), p. 81.

⁹⁹Ibid., p. 87.

¹⁰⁰Ibid., p. 88.

¹⁰¹Ibid., p. 87.

¹⁰²Ibid., pp. 88-89.

¹⁰³Pfautz, op. cit., p. 160. This seems to be Pfautz's implicit assumption.

¹⁰⁴Jack L. Walker, "The Functions of Disunity: Negro Leadership in a Southern City," Journal of Negro Education (Summer, 1963), p. 228.

¹⁰⁵Oddly enough, Walker first states that the main differences are only over tactics, not goals (p. 231), but later furnishes the evidence reported here concerning obvious goal differences.

¹⁰⁶Ibid., p. 231.

¹⁰⁷Ibid.

¹⁰⁸Ibid., p. 232.

¹⁰⁹Ibid., p. 231.

¹¹⁰Ibid., p. 235.

¹¹¹Ibid., p. 232.

¹¹²Ibid., p. 233. Walker also cites evidence of similar divisions of leadership labor in Knoxville, Tennessee, and Winston-Salem, North Carolina.

¹¹³Ibid., p. 233.

¹¹⁴Ibid., p. 259. Walker defines effectiveness as simply "the removing of the institutions of segregation."

¹¹⁵This approach is very close to the situational emphasis in leadership theory; for example, see this chapter, pp. 67-68.

¹¹⁶Ralph H. Hines and James E. Pierce, "Negro Leadership After the Social Crisis: An Analysis of Leadership Changes in Montgomery, Alabama," Phylon (Spring, 1965), pp. 165-166.

¹¹⁷Ibid., p. 167.

¹¹⁸Ibid., p. 168.

¹¹⁹Ibid., p. 167.

¹²⁰Ibid., p. 170.

¹²¹Ibid., p. 172.

¹²²Ibid.

¹²³Everett C. Ladd, Jr., Negro Political Leadership in the South (1966), pp. 2-3.

¹²⁴Ibid., p. 4.

¹²⁵Ibid., p. 146.

¹²⁶Ibid., p. 150.

¹²⁷Ibid., p. 199.

¹²⁸Ibid., p. 159.

¹²⁹Ibid., pp. 169-170. Rhetoric includes "the language, tone and manner with which leaders publically refer to matters involving race and race relations."

¹³⁰Ibid., p. 172.

¹³¹Ibid., pp. 182-183.

¹³²Ibid., p. 184.

¹³³Ibid., p. 189.

¹³⁴Ibid., p. 200.

¹³⁵Ibid., p. 212.

¹³⁶Ibid., p. 215.

¹³⁷Thompson, op. cit., p. 57.

¹³⁸Ladd, op. cit., p. 3.

¹³⁹Ibid., p. 4.

¹⁴⁰Since the bulk of this research was done in the urban south, this condition limits the generalizations one can make about northern areas.

¹⁴¹Ladd, op. cit., p. 198.

¹⁴²Blalock, op. cit., pp. 18-21.

¹⁴³The operational process for selecting the "most feared" black leaders is not as clear as it might seem at first: "Most feared" by whom? Mass publics? White leaders? Political officials? Mass media? And is any "fear," no matter how irrational or inaccurate, accepted as the basis for one's typology? See Chapter II, p. 189.

¹⁴⁴Wilson, op. cit., p. 342.

¹⁴⁵Ibid., p. 255.

¹⁴⁶W. J. Goode, "A Theory of Role Strain," American Sociological Review, 25, pp. 483-496.

¹⁴⁷Wilson, op. cit., p. 185.

¹⁴⁸Ibid.

¹⁴⁹Ibid., p. 186.

¹⁵⁰Ibid., pp. 189-190, p. 207.

¹⁵¹Ibid., p. 185.

¹⁵²Ibid., p. 215.

¹⁵³Ibid., pp. 215-216.

¹⁵⁴Ibid., p. 216.

¹⁵⁵Ibid.

¹⁵⁶Ibid., p. 215.

¹⁵⁷Ibid.

¹⁵⁸Ibid., p. 216.

¹⁵⁹Ibid.

¹⁶⁰Ibid., p. 232.

¹⁶¹Ibid.

¹⁶²Ibid., p. 217.

¹⁶³Ibid., p. 218.

¹⁶⁴Ibid., p. 233.

¹⁶⁵Ibid., p. 234.

¹⁶⁶Ibid.

¹⁶⁷Ibid.

¹⁶⁸Ibid., p. 235.

¹⁶⁹Ibid., p. 221.

¹⁷⁰Ibid., p. 222.

¹⁷¹Ibid., pp. 221-222.

¹⁷²Ibid., p. 224.

¹⁷³Ibid.

¹⁷⁴Ibid., p. 241.

¹⁷⁵Ibid., p. 239.

¹⁷⁶Ibid.

¹⁷⁷Ibid., p. 240.

¹⁷⁸Ibid., p. 244.

¹⁷⁹Ibid., p. 245.

¹⁸⁰Ibid., p. 225.

¹⁸¹Ibid., p. 170.

¹⁸²Ibid.

¹⁸³Ibid., p. 172.

¹⁸⁴Ibid.

¹⁸⁵Ibid., p. 178.

¹⁸⁶Ibid., pp. 180-183.

¹⁸⁷Ibid., p. 184.

¹⁸⁸Ibid.

¹⁸⁹Ibid.

¹⁹⁰Ibid., p. 291.

¹⁹¹Ibid.

¹⁹²Ibid., p. 289.

¹⁹³Ibid., p. 309.

¹⁹⁴Ibid., pp. 309-310.

¹⁹⁵See Saul Alinsky, "Power and Leadership," The Nation, (Feb. 25, 1961), pp. 174-175; M. Elaine Burgess, review, Social Forces (Oct., 1961), pp. 95-96; Herbert Garfinkel, American Political Science Review, (Dec., 1961), pp. 934-935; Allen D. Grimshaw, Annals of the American Academy (May, 1961), pp. 234-235.

¹⁹⁶Alinsky, op. cit., p. 174.

¹⁹⁷Wilson, op. cit., p. 269.

¹⁹⁸See the argument of Walker, op. cit., pp. 227-236.

¹⁹⁹Harry Scoble, "Effects of Riots on Negro Leadership," in Riots and Rebellion, ed. by Louis H. Masotti and Don R. Bowen (Beverly Hills, 1968), see footnote 2 on p. 344.

²⁰⁰Garfinkel, op. cit., p. 934.

²⁰¹Though called traditional here, this same type of leadership is variously characterized as "old" (Killian-Grigg), "conservative" (Hunter), and even as "Uncle Toms" (Thompson).

²⁰²See Dahl and Rossi in Adrian (ed.), op. cit.

²⁰³Max Weber, "The Three Types of Legitimate Rule," in Complex Organizations: A Sociological Reader, ed. by Amitai Etzioni (New York, 1961), pp. 4-14.

²⁰⁴E. P. Hollander, Leaders, Groups and Influence (New York, 1964), p. 6.

²⁰⁵Hunter, op. cit., p. 143.

²⁰⁶James Q. Wilson, "The Strategy of Protest: Problems of Negro Civic Action," Journal of Conflict Resolution (Sept., 1961), p. 291.

²⁰⁷Kurt Lewin, "The Problems of Minority Leadership" from Resolving Social Conflicts, ed. by Gertrud Weiss (1948), reprinted in Alvin W. Gouldner, Studies in Leadership (New York, 1950), p. 193.

²⁰⁸Ibid., p. 193.

²⁰⁹Ibid.

²¹⁰Wendell Bell, et al., Public Leadership (San Francisco, 1961), pp. 84-87.

²¹¹Wilson in Journal, op. cit., p. 297.

²¹²Walker, op. cit., p. 231.

²¹³Cecil A. Gibb, "Leadership: Psychological Aspects," International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (United States, 1968), p. 93.

²¹⁴William Thomas and Florian Znaniecki, "The Definition of the Situation," Readings in Social Psychology (New York, 1947), pp. 76-77.

²¹⁵Edgar Chasteen, "Public Accommodations: Social Movements in Conflict," Phylon (Fall, 1969), p. 236.

²¹⁶Wilson in Journal, op. cit., p. 292.

²¹⁷Muzafer Sherif, In Common Predicament: Social Psychology of Intergroup Conflict (Boston, 1966).

²¹⁸Lewis Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (Glencoe, 1956), p. 95.

²¹⁹J. K. Hemphill, "Why People Attempt to Lead," in Leadership and Interpersonal Behavior, ed. by L. Petrullo and B. M. Bass (New York, 1961).

²²⁰Sherif, op. cit.

²²¹Hollander, op. cit., p. 6.

²²²Walker, op. cit., p. 231.

²²³Ladd, op. cit., p. 189.

²²⁴Arnold S. Tannenbaum, "Leadership: Sociological Aspects," International Encyclopedia . . ., op. cit., p. 102.

²²⁵For example, see Muzafer Sherif and Carolyn Sherif, An Outline of Social Psychology (New York, 1956).

²²⁶Philip Selznick, Leadership in Administration (Evanston and New York, 1957), p. 5.

²²⁷Ibid., p. 16.

²²⁸Ibid., p. 17.

²²⁹Ibid., p. 21.

²³⁰For a somewhat exaggerated attack on this group, see E. Franklin Frazier, Black Bourgeoisie (New York, 1957).

²³¹However, these leaders were located in the middle-upper strata within the black subcommunity.

²³²Daniel Katz, "Social Psychology and Group Processes," in Annual Review of Psychology (Stanford, 1951), as quoted in Selznick, op. cit., p. 102.

²³³Walker, op. cit., p. 228.

²³⁴Wilson in Journal . . ., op. cit., p. 293.

²³⁵Selznick, op. cit., see discussion on pp. 49-53.

²³⁶Cecil A. Gibb, in International Encyclopedia . . ., op. cit., p. 94.

²³⁷Ibid., p. 94.

²³⁸Ladd, op. cit., p. 199.

²³⁹Muzafer Sherif, "If the Social Scientist is to be more than a mere Technician . . . ," Journal of Social Issues (Jan., 1968), p. 52.

CHAPTER II

A TYPOLOGY OF LOCAL BLACK LEADERSHIP

An awareness of the studies of local black leadership discussed in the first chapter was essential to the research in Central City. However, it proved inappropriate to use locally any one of the approaches or typologies described in Chapter I--reaffirming once again the difficulties of developing over-arching leadership typologies intended to apply in a variety of settings.* Factors of time and place¹ evidently affect the development and distribution of differing leadership types to such an extent that typologies developed elsewhere (in other times and places) cannot be transferred in toto to the local situation.

In the next chapter, the Central City black subcommunity is described in detail in terms of the demographic patterns of migration, population, employment, income, education and housing, as well as relations between local police and the subcommunity and the constraints upon the development of black politics in Central City. Variations in some of these subcommunity characteristics may account in large measure for the inter-city variations in leadership types. For example, given the patterns traced in Chapter III, one

*See discussion in first chapter, pp. 44-47.

reasonably would predict for Central City a lower incidence of "militant" leaders of subcommunity-based organizations than in cities, such as Chicago and Los Angeles, where the resources of numbers and institutional development are more available.* Again, given Central City's new but growing black middle class² which finds a large number of local and state "white-controlled" institutions available for both personal mobility and "infiltration" as a group tactic, as discussed in the next chapter, it is not surprising that positions in these institutions frequently will serve as bases for black leadership. Another important source of variation is that Central City differs in size from those cities in which other typological analyses were developed. Cities such as Chicago, Atlanta and Los Angeles* offer a considerably different context for local minority leadership than a medium-sized city with a relatively small black population and a very different political history.

Thus, variations in city and subcommunity characteristics make certain leadership types more or less likely to occur locally; hence, the general typologies of moderates and militants, radicals and conservatives developed elsewhere frequently do not completely "fit" the local situation. This condition establishes one of the primary tasks for this research: the development of an empirically based categoric

*See leadership list, this chapter, p. 117.

**Research in these cities was done by Wilson, Hunter and Scoble, respectively.

typology which adequately distinguishes among a range of leadership types, and can be used for analysis of local leadership behavior. This typology is described here and further developed in the next three chapters.

However, given the research done elsewhere, local analysis hardly begins de novo. Though typologies such as Wilson's may not be entirely appropriate for research in the Central City subcommunity, such work continues to have a good deal of conceptual utility; in the discussion which follows, variants of concepts used in past research (particularly Wilson's) will be employed.

As the first chapter states, in an ideal typology paradigms are developed and then data are gathered to measure the paradigm's divergence from or congruity with a given "reality." However, categoric typologies focus on the leadership types located through research, rather than delineating all those types logically possible. Therefore, the typology developed in Central City--as with most of those developed in the leadership studies already discussed--is constructed out of the data themselves, particularly the informant and leadership interviews. In Blue's words, a categoric typology "deals with the type models that are constructed from empirical instances of the phenomena,"³ while according to McKinney, the categoric typology

is a purposive, planned selection, abstraction, combination, and accentuation of a set of criteria that have empirical referents, [which serve] . . . as a basis for comparison of empirical cases. . . . [It] has the scientific function of "ordering" the concrete data. . . .⁴

The specific methods used to collect data as a basis for this typology⁵ are discussed in this chapter, pp. 106-119.

The categoric typology distinguishing among Central City leaders is of the continuum type--no doubt reflecting the continuing movement from dichotomized to differentiated black leadership.* The typology is mainly based upon the ends-means choices of local leaders. However, the varying models of group action given priority by differing leaders, and the locus of organizational/issue activity are also described. Therefore, the typology of local leaders is based upon an ordering of the differences between leadership types in terms of (1) goals, (2) means, (3) loci of leadership activity, and (4) action models preferred (coalition, protest, cohesion). These variables consistently discriminate between local leadership types.

Terms

"Militants," "moderates," and "new" and "old" status goals are typological terms requiring clarification. In Wilson's analysis, the terms militant and moderate were used as generic titles for leadership "styles"; in Negro Politics, these terms encompassed a variety of theoretically separable categories--goals, means, rhetoric, class, organizational affiliation and so on. The terms are used in more limited fashion in this typology. Both terms refer mainly to the

*For a brief discussion of polar and continuum typologies and differentiated leadership, see p. 44, Chapter I.

means component--specifically, to time-orientations, action preferences and the increments of policy change acceptable to differing types of leaders.

The time perspective of moderates is relatively long: necessary changes are seen as usually occurring in small increments over time. Their preference is for action on specific, tangible and concrete matters--for example, gaining four new jobs for blacks with a construction company, or moving a limited number of blacks into key positions. These activities are seen as eventually leading to attainment of an end goal--though among leaders in Central City the goal can and does vary (unlike in Negro Politics). The time perspective of militants is different: in their eyes, positive change usually results not from a slow step-by-step process (which is often explicitly scorned), but from a concentrated effort designed to alter a given situation at the fastest possible rate. Thus, militant separatists demand immediate community control, while local militant integrationists seek immediate school integration through the courts. What militants share is the urge for the quick, the decisive and the comprehensive change.

There are also leadership differences concerning the acceptable increments of policy change. In Central City, the militant separatists are not satisfied with the prospect of comparatively autonomous neighborhood schools; instead, they desire total control over all policing, taxing and political functions in the black subcommunity, and

shape their actions toward these ends. Those who readily settle for less are generally viewed as "Toms," or in one person's words, as "the downtown boys who sell out every day."⁶ Nor are militant integrationists satisfied with the building of a new West Side school or integration of the elementary grades; rather, only complete integration of the entire school system is acceptable. In encompassing time-orientations, acceptable increments of change and action preferences, the terms militant and moderate, as used here, refer to characteristic ways of moving toward given goals--whether goals of integration, community control or whatever.

A distinction is also made between "new" and "old" status goals. The old status ends are the integration goals described by Wilson in Chicago more than a decade ago.* In Central City these goals continue to be held by the large number of militant integrationists, but new goals of "separate development," "community control" and "black autonomy" have been developed by the young militant separatists. These ends are referred to as the new status goals because in both form and function they parallel the old status goals.

In both instances, the form is the same in that both new and old status goals are goals of principle for which most other gains may be traded off. Thus, the militant separatists are unwilling to work with those viewed as

*See Chapter I, pp. 47-49.

conservative blacks, even when such arrangements would be useful, because to do so would mean working with "the white man's agents" in the subcommunity.⁷ And the militant integrationists in Central City have been willing to go down to defeat rather than give up on a matter of principle--in this case, complete integration of the school system.* The formulations of the goals themselves have a great deal to do with the staunchness with which they are maintained; both new and old status goals function as a kind of causal analysis: gaining goal x is seen as making possible all other consequent gains--gains which would not accrue to blacks until the goal of principle (whether integration or control of the subcommunity) had first been achieved.** Therefore, the incremental changes viewed so hopefully by moderates are often viewed by militants as far from satisfactory.

The logic implicit in the following comments is representative of these militant tendencies.

. . . look, the reason I want black kids to go to those schools [integrated schools] isn't just because there are white kids there. It's because we want what you've

*This is a description, not an interpretation of their behavior. Ultimately, of course, "losing" at the local level (see Chapter VI) can be the basis for a successful court case which will "force" school integration.

**This view of "militants" is milder but not dissimilar to Glazer's view of "radicals": ". . . the radical believes that there can be no particular solutions to particular problems but only a general solution. . . . [For them] nothing ever changes short of the final apocalyptic revolutionary moment when everything changes." Nathan Glazer, "The Limits of Social Policy," Commentary (Sept., 1971), p. 52.

already got. The books, the teachers, and all that are only in the white schools now, and so I want my son to have those facilities--that's the only way for us to move up, it's the key to everything we want . . . there's nothing bigger [more important] around here. . . . [militant integrationist--emphasis added.]

In order to have right collective action, you've got to have the proper analysis* . . . as long as [white men] control our lives we're not going to get anything but some crumbs from Model Cities . . . we're trying to get Africans to define themselves as people and take control of this community . . . until we do this [take control] nothing's going to happen. . . .⁸ [militant**separatist--emphasis added.]

Types: Goals

Though militants have goals which are similar in form and function, the content of these goals clearly differs. The militant integrationists, as the term implies, work for the immediate attainment of integration. In practice, this preference has led to a focus on school integration--which has become a local battle fought through

*This speaker was a former college student.

**"Militants" and "moderates" could also be defined in a manner similar to Ladd's research in Negro Political Leadership in the South--as locality-specific variables, the application of which is defined by local views concerning which leaders are militant and which are moderates. However, as discussed in pp. 46-47 in Chapter I, this method poses problems. In Central City, for example, those blacks here categorized as militant integrationists are generally regarded as "responsible" by white informants. On the other hand, voting publics evidently view militant integrationists with some trepidation--voting such a leader out of office and then electing a moderate separatist leader. If one seeks to anchor the meanings of militance and moderation solely in local perceptions, in Central City who is the militant and who the moderate? In addition, by using militant and moderate to refer to means preferred, one at least leaves open the possibility of comparisons between typologies developed in different settings--an opportunity seemingly minimized by Ladd's methodology.

the courts, board of education and recall elections and a seemingly endless round of meetings, pro and con. In contrast, militant separatists reject integration in all spheres, and argue for the "autonomy" of the subcommunity. The preferred forms and extent of community control vary between militant and moderate separatists, with the militants calling for the most extreme version: all political, social and economic functions and institutions in the subcommunity would be controlled by local blacks and, in effect, the subcommunity would become a sovereignty unto itself.* Some militant separatists call for the drawing of legal boundaries around the black subcommunity; as a first step, others propose that whites forcibly be kept out of the black West Side.** Through much of this might be dismissed as only rhetoric, in fact a radical form of community control does represent the substance of militant separatist goals.

In the context of local leadership, militants of both stripes represent the purest examples of clear goals, and the most systematic relating of means to ends. In short, ideologies are clearest at the opposing ends of the leadership continuum. However,--though this was not often recognized by those interviewed--considerable ambiguity

*Depending on one's views, the term "separatist" initially may seem rather harsh. However, given the content of these leaders' goals, as developed in this and the next chapter, the term seems both fair and accurate.

**See flier distributed in the subcommunity, Chapter III, pp. 167-168.

remains. The militant integrationists are frequently unable to specify the limits, if any, of the integration they desire; only a few have thought through the relationship between their integration goals and possible questions of group identity, intermarriage or cultural distinctiveness. Militant separatists, too, though drawing from the ideological well of various black nationalisms, sometimes seem uncertain as to how a radical form of community control allows for the collection of resources adequate to group purposes. Thus, though the end points in the typology of local leadership represent the most ideologically pure formulations of goals, ambiguities in these goals and tensions between goals and means still remain.

As might be imagined, a state of mutual scorn and hostility exists between militant integrationists and militant separatists. In fact, though, the most effective and sustained opposition to the integrationists comes from the moderate separatists. From the formation of PACE, to the recalling of white and black integrationists on the school board, to the subsequent election of one of their own leaders, the moderate separatists have most effectively organized in opposition to the militant integrationists.

Moderate separatists sometimes use language similar to their more militant brethren both in rejecting integration goals and in describing their own goals of development-in-the-ghetto and community control. However, the moderates differ from the militants in four main ways: (1) moderates

	MODERATE INTEGRATIONISTS	MILITANT INTEGRATIONISTS	MODERATE SEPARATISTS	MILITANT SEPARATISTS
GOAL PREFERENCES	immediate attainment of integration (old status goal)	integration as an <u>ultimate</u> end	limited community control as an ultimate end	immediate attainment of radical community control (new status goal)
MEANS	infiltration & coalition legal action	economic development coalition & negotiation	subcommunity issue-organization temporary coalitions	permanent organization in sub-community
LOCUS OF ACTIVITY	NAACP school board	Urban League Model Cities Black churches unions	PACE school board Model Cities	Malcolm X Institute (BLF)
ACTION MODELS (priorities)	1. coalition model 2. legal action	1. coalition model 2. limited protest model	1. cohesion model 2. temporary coalition	1. cohesion model

Figure 1.--Typology of Local Leadership.

do not suggest violence as an appropriate means to their ends;* (2) moderates seem less intense in their adherence to stated goals; (3) moderates are willing to work with whites in temporary coalitions; and (4) moderates, as described earlier, differ in terms of time orientations and increments of policy change found acceptable.

Therefore, unlike the militant separatists, moderates speak of the autonomy of the black subcommunity as an ultimate end toward which they are gradually moving; but the intensity and clarity with which they articulate the content of these formal goals is much less than for the militants** (a situation which is reversed when the interviews move to the topic of the means to be used). Indeed, the borrowed quality found in many of the ideas of the moderate separatists suggests the division of labor at this end of the leadership spectrum: though they see themselves as bold street leaders, in fact the militant separatists seem mainly responsible for the abstract formulation of separatist goals--formulations usually paralleling the national currents of black nationalist rhetoric and literature. A version of these goals is carried to the moderates

*It is this characteristic--plus the seeming congruence of some separatists' ends and white conservative preferences--which allows whites publicly to ally themselves with moderate separatists.

**For example, in a typical conversation with an informant who would be classified as a moderate separatist, she was asked if "independence" for the black community--which she stated as her goal--meant the black area in the city would become a separate sovereignty. The response was simply, "I haven't thought about that."

through their direct involvement (often as part of their jobs) in the black subcommunity,* since this involvement frequently brings them into contact with young blacks. In turn, moderates adopt somewhat watered-down versions of militant separatist goals, thereby, for example, converting nationalist analyses of land as the basis of independence into moderate calls for neighborhood-controlled schools.

The moderate integrationists, on the other hand, are an example of what Crain viewed as a welfare-orientation toward the old status goals of integration.** They, too, have an "incrementalist" approach to policy change, and long time perspectives. Their adherence to the integration goals of the militants seems largely pro forma. When asked to discuss the content of these goals, their responses tend to be brief and non-specific. For them, integration seems to be a "given"--a preferred state which helps explain and orient the more immediate activities with which they are mainly concerned. Interviews with these leaders quickly veer into discussions of these "practical matters." When separatist goals are rejected it is not generally because of some implicit view of a preferred society or because separatists' goals are wrong in principle--the usual arguments among militant integrationists--but because, in the words of one moderate, "they just won't work."⁹ Unlike both

*Chapter V contrasts the institutional positions of differing leadership types.

**See p. 61, Chapter I.

types of militants, then, the moderates generally are somewhat "fuzzy" about their goals; in interviews they tend only to state their goals, to accept them as unexplored "givens," and to be much more interested in other topics.

Means

Variations also occur in the tactics/means used and advocated by differing leadership types. For the militant integrationists "infiltration,"* coalition and legal action are emphasized. The process of infiltration has been most marked in the educational system; thus, the pressures of the local NAACP for school integration have been conveniently directed to a system which had a black member on its board, a black attorney (who was simultaneously an attorney for the NAACP), and a number of black school administrators. The militant integrationists have also found it desirable to work in tandem with sympathetic whites and mainly white organizations. These coalitions often have been only implicit and few have been based on any formal exchange relationships; most frequently the coalitions have been based simply on shared agreement on the principle of school integration.** When infiltration and coalition have failed, the militants have turned to the courts, successfully drawing

*See pp. 186-188, Chapter III.

**As argued below, the coalition between whites and moderate separatists is quite different in nature; this chapter, p. 97.

upon considerable legal talent and devising sophisticated strategies.

In contrast, moderate integrationists--though accepting the desirability of school integration--tend to focus their activity in the economic sphere. Over the past six years, these leaders have been concerned mainly with such matters as integrating the central business district work force, launching apprenticeship and work-training programs and increasing the number of blacks employed in local construction projects. All these efforts are viewed as bringing the Negro into the "economic mainstream." Even the initiation of MEDCOL (a black-run laundry funded by Model Cities)--which could logically be viewed as developing a separate black economic base--is seen instead as a chance "to develop administrative skills which should lead to good jobs."¹⁰

Moderate integrationists in effect adopt a chain of means: economic development is the main means for achieving integration,¹¹ while coalition and negotiation are the appropriate tactics for gaining economic development. The coalitions associated with these leaders range from the unions to the interests represented on the Urban League's Board of Directors, and can sometimes act as constraints on leadership behavior. Perhaps as a result, the moderate integrationist tends to adopt a careful "negotiating style" in his rhetoric and actions. However, moderate integrationists

often are institutionally located so as to be quite susceptible to pressures from whites.

It is in part to avoid these potential pressures that separatists prefer the tactic of organization in the black subcommunity. However, to this point, the militant separatists have been able to organize only a rather tenuous constituency among young blacks in the subcommunity, while the moderates have developed short-run organizations representing a broader section of the subcommunity. Though the militants have a strong ideological commitment to permanent organization as the means of mobilizing the subcommunity, the moderates have usually only developed temporary issue-organizations such as PACE, which opposed integrationist plans for the schools. However, the fact that moderate separatists sometimes are able to organize on such issues in the subcommunity is evidence that there presumably is a black constituency opposed to the busing-integration goals of the militant integrationists.

Perhaps ironically for those moderates desiring a form of separate development for the black subcommunity, temporary coalitions with whites have proved essential to their goals. Thus, the strange alchemy of time and events has recently allowed blacks to work with the "conservative" Citizens for Neighborhood Schools, thereby legitimating the organization's efforts as non-racist, while the goals of the CNS presumably allowed for the development of community-controlled all-black schools. Clearly though, as revealed

in the interviews, coalitions are still viewed somewhat differently by differing leadership types: for both militant and moderate integrationists white-black coalitions of various kinds are seen as not only useful, but proper, given the integration goal; in a sense, these coalitions are precursors of the integrated states for which the coalitions are presumably striving; on the other hand, the moderate separatists tended to view their coalitions only instrumentally--the coalitions being seen as both useful and temporary, but nothing more. White-black coalitions are a means implicit in integrationist ends, but this is not the case for separatists.

Locus of Activity

Since, as we have seen, some leaders are most concerned with issues of school integration, some with economic development and others with organization in the subcommunity, the locus of leadership activity varies across the typology. Conflicts between leadership types are minimized by these partially separated issue-institutional areas. For example, militant integrationists and separatists do not contest for control of the NAACP or representation on the local school board; in each case, militant separatists have viewed these institutions as basically irrelevant to their immediate purposes--just as integrationists are not eager to gain control of the Malcolm X Institute. As a result, conflicts between differing militant types are largely confined to rhetorical "put-downs" and, in fact, most of the leaders

at opposite ends of the leadership typology do not even know each other personally (though they certainly know of each other).

However, leadership conflict does occur in two main situations: (1) where different leadership types become active in the same issue-institutional area and (2) where similar leadership types from widely disparate backgrounds are forced to work together. The first condition has occurred in the local school board, and in the Model Cities program, as is apparent on p. 92. A moderate separatist actually helped lead a campaign to recall integrationists (including a black) on the school board, and was then elected himself to the same position. The situation also occurs in the Model Cities Agency when leaders with different goals are sometimes forced into contact. Here the separatists scorn the integrationists as, at best, "conservatives," while in the accurate words of one local party official, "the bourgeoisie blacks look at Model Cities with horror for giving all that money to radicals."¹¹

The other condition applies when leaders who are similar on preferred goals and means but different in terms of occupational activity work together on various projects. The relationships between black union officials and ministers who have worked together are representative of this pattern. While ministers generally phrased their complaints rather delicately ("the union people are used to working against somebody they have to negotiate with, so sometimes

they jump the gun a little"¹²), some black union officials are more blunt in their assessment of the black ministers:

. . . the ministers are the only ones with a potential mass base. The only problem is that they don't have all their marbles. We found out they didn't know what they were doing. People get involved with them and then get fucked over. . . . They are stupid. . . .¹³

Nevertheless, the separate loci of leadership activity help to minimize overt conflicts, and even lead, in some cases, to a rough division of labor. Thus, while the militant integrationists can center their activities on behalf of school integration in the school board and the NAACP, the moderate integrationists try to develop economic resources through the Urban League and the occasional activities of the unions, with the black churches playing a supportive role; and while the moderate separationists work for eventual community control through temporary coalitions with whites and issue-organizations in the subcommunity the militant separatists are given a free hand to organize on a permanent basis in the black area of the city.

Models

During the interviews statements of means and ends were probed in order to get at the logic underlying specific positions. In some cases there was none, but for the most articulate leaders there are abstract models of action which clearly governed their specific comments and actions. These models are included in the typology both because they varied by leadership type, and also because they stated some of the key differences among these leaders. Models of protest,¹⁴

coalition and cohesion underlie leadership activities in Central City.

The main assumption underlying the protest model is that blacks in Central City and elsewhere are politically powerless. To gain entrance into the system of bargaining relationships which characterizes local politics, blacks need resources with which to bargain. Having few of the conventional resources to exchange, blacks try to structure a protest situation so as to create those resources, as King did throughout the South in the last decade. A protest situation gains these ends mainly by enlarging the number of people involved in a given conflict--in Schattschneider's phrase, expanding the scope of participation.¹⁵ Through the publicity and drama attendant to a well-organized protest, varying publics can at least be made aware that there is an issue on which they may take sides. The key to the success of the protest (though this differs for protests conducted under the aegis of the cohesion model, see below) is the eventual mobilization of those publics which can bring pressure to bear upon officials from whom the protestors desire policy changes. If protest can mobilize these publics (white liberals, church leaders, businessmen, etc.), then protest leaders have created new political resources for themselves; thus, these leaders have something with which to bargain, e.g., if certain policy changes are conceded, protest leaders will then call off the protest and, presumably, end the pressures from publics or persons excited by the protest.

This model of action is fairly indirect, depending for its success, as it does, upon the arousal of persons outside the initial group of protestors. Hence, a course of action which at first might appear simple--for example, getting fifteen people to picket city hall or sit-in at a store--is, in fact, a complex process involving protest constituencies, publics which may "enter" the protest, and those being protested against (not to mention the role of the communications media). Successful use of this model demands sophisticated leadership--which has been the main difficulty in local protests by blacks.

The coalition model can be used in conjunction with or as an alternative to the protest model (in Central City, usually the latter). Quite simply, the adherents of this model call for a coalition of differing groups, black and white; these groups (labor, liberals, blacks, etc.) work together for presumably shared ends, aiming their collective influence at specific targets--policy-makers or institutions.* These groups can be "coalitions of principle"--coalitions based mainly on shared ideologies or specific principles--"exchange coalitions"--coalitions based on the resources members can explicitly exchange with each other (possibly resources made available by achieving the coalition's specific goals)--or coalitions of a mixed type, with both shared ideologies and exchange relationships.

*A national example of such a coalition is the collection of allied groups which successfully pushed through the Civil Rights Act of 1965.

However, to local separatists both protest and coalition models share a common failing in their dependency on whites: while protestors are seen as depending upon whites implicitly allying themselves with the specific "cause" of the protest, coalitionists are viewed as dependent upon the explicit support of whites in the coalition. The reasoning by local separatists is that whites--who are racists--cannot and, as a matter of principle, should not be depended upon for support of black efforts. Instead, the proper model for action is that of building cohesion and solidarity in the black subcommunity itself. For this end, white publics and coalition members are irrelevant.

In Central City the militant separatists have used two main methods for furthering cohesion: one is to build separate black institutions within the subcommunity--institutions which do not depend on white largess or support* and which are seen as eventually providing an independent power base from which "non-dependent" black leaders can "deal" with white authorities.¹⁶ Another method is to continue formally to aim protests at these white authorities, but to use this protest primarily as a means of building solidarity in the subcommunity by arousing young blacks and generally "raising consciousness" in the subcommunity--in short, using protest means for cohesion ends. These organizational efforts to further "cohesion" do not require that

*Reality being less tidy than models, these institutions actually do depend on "white" funding--though this feature is not emphasized by local militants.

black rhetoric and goals be congruent with or acceptable to the desires of whites--as in the protest and coalition models. In contrast, separatist leaders using a cohesion model are "freed" from white restraints and can use whichever means or forms of rhetoric prove most effective in the subcommunity itself.

Both forms of this cohesion model have been used in Central City: thus a "sit-in" was organized at a local high school in order to mobilize young blacks in the subcommunity, and the Malcolm X Institute has taken as its task the development of a black-controlled power base in the subcommunity. As discussed earlier, moderate separatists have found themselves in a situation where organizational and electoral coalitions with whites have proved useful. Though the militants stoutly continue to resist such means, the moderates view these temporary coalitions as the means to creating a more "independent"¹⁷ black subcommunity.

In the past, moderate integrationists have tried a limited version of the protest model. In order to force downtown stores to hire more blacks, local ministers threatened a black boycott of the stores, and daily picketing of the stores during the Easter season, with the possibility of civil disobedience. The director of the Human Relations Commission (also a black) obtained promises that the stores would hire more blacks in the future (a few did) and persuaded the black ministers to call off their protest. The brief incident illustrates the leadership skills necessary

for implementation of a protest model. Seemingly, the black ministers fell short--it is debatable whether they would have been able to sustain a protest, they were unable to mobilize much white support and they settled for minimal promises of future action. The protest did not seem to have been carefully thought through by the ministers in advance of their "threat."

Basically though, all of the integrationist leaders give at least verbal priority to the coalition model. Most of the resulting coalitions have been based upon shared principles, rather than extensive exchange relationships. For some of the militant integrationists a brief "let down"¹⁸ followed the failure of the "pro-busing" coalition to achieve its desired ends, but these leaders then turned to legal action.

None of these models is "original" in the thought of local leaders,* but they do represent the more general strategies for change underlying the specific actions of differing leadership types. The main conflict of ideas for local blacks is between the coalition model favored by all integrationists and the cohesion model pushed by the young separatists. However, in a sense, both of these models can be said to have failed in their local implementation. For separatists--faced with all the constraints of numbers, skills and resources traced in the next chapter--the cohesion

*The antecedents of these models can be found in the work of King, Rustin and the black nationalists.

model has yet to produce any situation even vaguely resembling an autonomous subcommunity controlling its own institutions; and for integrationists--faced with the fading of local white support and the strength of anti-busing sentiment--the coalition model has not proved out in the conflict over school integration.

Research Methods

Before examining the leadership types in detail, it would be useful to summarize the methods used in this research.* The research had four main stages: the "familiarizing" phase, the informant interviews, the leadership interviews and the collection of quantitative data through a standardized questionnaire. Each stage of the research made possible the next stage--the familiarizing process leading one to know whom to talk with and about what, the informant interviews developing background information and selecting out leaders and the leadership interviews leading into the use of the questionnaire.

In a sense, what is called here the familiarizing process was both the most important facet of research conducted in a specific locality and also the hardest to describe. It is difficult to describe because it was the research stage responsible for giving one a "feel" for some of the intangible factors which affected the leaders to be

*For descriptions and discussion of the varying methods used in other research on urban black leadership, see Chapter I.

studied, e.g., what were the prevailing expectations as to how local leaders will and should behave? Why were some groups respected and others scorned? What were the main issues of controversy in the subcommunity? This familiarizing process included a range of activities--observing the public behavior of the black city councilman, attending NAACP meetings and the larger church meetings during the busing controversy, reading the local black paper, spending time in conversations with Model Cities staff, and so on. However, this familiarizing process also involved the collection and analysis of relevant census and other data describing the black subcommunity. When coupled with informant discussion on such matters as relations with the police and problems concerning education, housing and highways, these data were used to describe and analyze the local political environment, and the availability or scarcity of differing resources for local black leadership. This discussion is the subject of Chapter III.

The information acquired during the "familiarizing process" provided a means of checking later information from the formal interviews. It soon became apparent that many of the "stories" shared in the subcommunity varied considerably from one account to another (for instance, there were at least three main versions of the events leading to the high school sit-in of the recent past). However most persons seemed in general agreement with the names concurrently being suggested in informant interviews as "outstanding

leaders." Given the central importance of the informant and leadership interviews in this research, these conversations also assisted the interviewer in later perceiving possible shadings of fact by those formally interviewed. The sense of context provided by the familiarizing process allowed one to know that a Model Cities board member discoursing upon his "independence of mind" was, in fact, generally viewed as being controlled by another leader in the subcommunity, or that a minister claiming Martin Luther King as his role model really never participated in or even attended nightly meetings. In sum, the sense of context provided by this process of becoming familiar with the local subcommunity made possible the more formal stages of research.

The second stage of research consisted of a series of interviews with informants--those persons whom one had reason to believe were knowledgeable about or had information on local leadership and the nature of the subcommunity. These interviews had three purposes: (1) the further gathering of the kinds of contextual information referred to above; (2) discussion of recent events in which local leaders had been involved--the high school sit-in, the controversies over Model Cities, and especially the busing issue and (3) the selection of persons thought by the informants to be leaders in Central City's black subcommunity.

Each informant was promised confidential status. Although this promise was initially viewed as a routine step in this type of research, it turned out to be an

important one. As a result of uneasiness over discussing black leaders with a white interviewer but also as a result of rumored "undercover work" by local police concerned with drug traffic on the city's West side, some informants were originally suspicious when approached for an interview.*

In addition, some claimed their identities had been revealed by previous academic research (though these stories may have been apocryphal, Central City is located close to a suburb with a large university).** However, once interviewed, most informants were candid to the point of not only discussing events and leaders in the city, but also passing along much unsubstantiated gossip about the sexual and economic peccadillos of local leaders. Interviews ranged in length from twenty minutes to about four hours,*** and usually averaged about seventy-five minutes.

*Some incidents were both amusing and frustrating. One informant refused to review over the telephone comments made in her interview, claiming the phone was tapped. Another informant was the subject of three letters and four phone calls before finally agreeing to an interview. Frequently informants would muse over "whether I should be telling you this stuff"--"stuff" which often seemed fairly innocuous. Interestingly, most white informants did not press for assurances of anonymity--but almost all black informants did so.

**Specifically, three informants claimed that earlier research--described by one as a "computer study"--had violated their confidences.

***The longest interview with an informant took place over three separate meetings. The interviewee had lived his entire life in the city, and was eager to recount what he knew of local black history; unfortunately, one of the leaders he selected as "outstanding" later proved to be dead. The shortest interview (twenty minutes) was with the black head of an important city agency who had been informed by

Initially, a list of possible informants was developed on the basis of formal organizational listings, newspaper accounts and what the researcher already knew about persons involved in various ways with the local subcommunity (for example, university personnel who worked and did research in Central City, active lawyers, etc.). In turn, almost all informants suggested other informants, and the information from the interviewing process began to accumulate. As a by-product of this relatively lengthy process (62 informant interviews), over time one could probe certain areas where information seemed scarce, devise increasingly more detailed questions about specific events and leaders and tentatively develop and then reject or refine propositions about local leadership. Thus, this stage of the research was crucial in the development of an empirically based categoric typology of local black leaders. In form, this phase of research resembles the "cobweb" method of which Dahl speaks:

[The researcher] would begin with some individual . . . have him describe his picture of the community He would thus have the names of [additional] people. . . . He would then interview these individuals, who would give him further names and descriptions, and so on, until he, or they, or his time,* or his funds, or his bourbon were exhausted.¹⁹

her secretary--for unknown reasons--that the interviewer was there to arrange a university conference on black leadership--featuring the agency and its leader. When it was discovered that this was not the intent, the interview was rather abruptly terminated.

*In this case, time pressures, not bourbon, ended the informant interviews at a point at which most of the information was becoming repetitive.

Great care was taken to weave a symmetrical web, e.g., to interview informants from varied background which represented differing interests or institutions. It was apparent that interviews solely with Urban League or NAACP representatives would greatly influence the types of persons being selected as leaders; for example, in this case certain persons did not qualify as leaders in the eyes of the integrationists--the leader of a sit-in, a young organizer for what was viewed as a "black power group," and a woman who initiated a local branch of the National Welfare Rights Organization (all of whom appear on the final leadership list, see p. 117). In turn, leaders of such prominent groups as the NAACP and the Urban League were also disqualified as "real" leaders by some other informants.* In both instances differing implicit concepts of leadership seemed to be applied. On the one hand, for some informants, "middle class Negroes can't be leaders because they're not close enough to the black community," while for other informants "those few radicals don't lead anyone anywhere--they're just hot air and a lot of talk."²⁰

One group viewed leadership as the task of gathering a mass following--usually through organization in the sub-community (a concept consistent with the cohesion model);

*The ideological criterion perhaps underlying these choices is shown by the comment made by a person who was asked why he had excluded all individuals associated with the NAACP or Urban League from his list: "Because they're non-relevant [sic] organizations and can't do much for black people." However, it should be noted that some individuals were named on almost all leadership lists, see p. 117.

the other group of informants seemingly accepted a wider range of leadership functions--negotiating and bargaining, acting as spokesman, raising money, directly influencing policy "behind the scenes" and so on.* To have interviewed only those accepting one or the other of these standards would have meant a final leadership list composed almost entirely of either community-organizer types (of whom there are relatively few in Central City) or those who were judged to be leaders by virtue of their organizational positions or activities in conventional politics.** In order to avoid "defining away" differing leadership types the sample of informants interviewed had to include a wide range of

*These differing concepts of leadership were also very clearly associated with differing leadership types, as discussed in Chapter V. The initial hypothesis that differing types of leaders self-consciously would conceptualize leadership in differing ways derived from the series of informant interviews.

**The assumption here is that not only those persons with mass followings may be viewed as leaders. As in Wilson's research in Chicago, black leaders in Central City seem to perform a variety of functions from "spokesman" to "negotiator" to "organizer," and not all of these functions necessitate a mass following. Narrow definitions of subcommunity leadership sometimes constrict research to a few types deemed "legitimate" leaders--see comments on Alinsky and Wilson, pp. 58-59, Chapter I. One past study in Central City labeled as a "non-leader" a black politician with a largely white constituency--the rationale being that the "non-leader" was thus not free to act as a race leader (R. William Holland, "School Desegregation and Community Conflict" [unpublished dissertation, 1972], pp. 59 and 61). However, there is no apparent reason for all local black leaders to fit the mold of "race leader"; indeed, doing so in Central City would be difficult. In fact, this particular "non-leader" was selected as an "outstanding leader" by more informants than any other, is one of the key "behind the scenes," non-public negotiators on behalf of certain black interests, and is the main public and private source of resistance to the Mayor's efforts to take over the black-directed Model Cities agency.

activities and perspectives. Thus, the informants ranged from a Black Muslim* and a youth who claimed to have organized the 1971 "riot" (see pp. 165-168, Chapter III), to black ministers, union officials and a woman who led resistance to the I-96 highway (pp. 154-156, Chapter III), to the individuals associated with the two main black organizations in the city--the NAACP and the Urban League.

Informant interviews were used rather than the panel technique so often used in the past to select local leaders. The use of a panel to select leaders in the Central City black subcommunity would have raised major problems. One difficulty would have been the possibility that a panel of "experts" might select leaders only on the basis of reputation, rather than actual leadership activities. In contrast, the use of informant interviews allowed the interviewer to probe for the specific kinds of activities/behaviors which led to particular individuals being selected as leaders. In addition, the large number of interviews allowed for the inclusion of perspectives not easily represented in the much smaller panel.

A small panel would have had not only the problem of conflicting views of what leadership is, as discussed above, but also the related problem of issue-area leadership: many of the informants--and the leaders selected--were active only in a given issue-area (school affairs, Model Cities politics,

*The Muslims are a very small and relatively non-vocal group in the local subcommunity. None of their members were cited as leaders or activists.

Urban League programs, etc.), and not across the whole range of issues and problems which concerned blacks in Central City. As a result, some informants simply did not know of leaders active in issue-areas with which they were unfamiliar --a pattern which emerged not only from informants' comments, but from leadership interviews as well. Finally, the usual research purpose behind the use of panels of supposed "knowledgeables" is the analysis of a community "power structure." However, the main goal of the informant interviews was the development of a categoric typology of black leadership. The central concern was not so much with the hierarchies of a power structure as with the range and distribution of differing leadership types in the city.

In short, information about black leaders in Central City was collected in a series of informant interviews rather than through the use of a panel not only because of the traditional difficulties with the panel technique, but also because of the lack of a clear local consensus as to what a leader was and was not, the existence of leadership specific to only some issue-areas and the difference in research goals between this research and studies which have utilized panels.

In the first informant interviews, only verbal responses were recorded in developing a list of those selected as local leaders. Later, however, a list of the names most often mentioned was used and, after their initial comments on local leaders, informants were asked to evaluate

the persons on this list (see Appendix A). Informants were told that Negro leaders were "those able to make decisions or formulate policies significantly affecting racial problems and issues in Lansing's black community." This "effects" or "impacts" element of leadership was definitionally emphasized in an effort to persuade informants to select persons they considered to be "outstanding leaders," rather than to develop an exhaustive list of all possible leaders, including marginal cases.

In compiling a final list, each informant selection was treated as a single "vote" for a given leader.* These "votes" distributed themselves in such a way as to indicate with some clarity which persons generally were considered important black leaders in the city. This distribution is shown on p. 117.

At one time or another eighty-seven different names were suggested as leaders, though most individuals were mentioned only a few times or by only one interviewee. The final listing consists of all those selected as "outstanding leaders (see instruction in Appendix A)" by one-third or more of all informants; below the one-third "cut-off,"

*Though it might have been possible to weight these "votes" in a variety of ways, these options were finally rejected as unwise. While the criteria for weighting some selections more heavily than others all involved highly subjective assessments concerning informants' knowledge, candor or experience, the selections themselves represented the considered judgments of a large number of people from varying backgrounds. Therefore, since the informant sample seemed adequate and weighting would open a methodological Pandora's box, each selection was finally counted as one "vote."

selections were scattered among a number of individuals, each drawing a few selections.

On some leaders there was comparatively clear consensus (the top three were selected by 84.2%, 73.7% and 62.1% of informants, respectively), while other selections seemed more problematic (Muhammed being selected by only one-third of informants, for example). On this final list, there is a relative paucity of "street leaders" (four out of seventeen)--blacks who create their own followings and organizations in the subcommunity itself.* It is possible that the informant sample was skewed in some way, or that informants considered only those men of consequence with the most immediate influence upon the subcommunity. However, consistent with the data and arguments of the next chapter, it seems more likely that the Central City "political environment"--the constraints and opportunities of the local political and economic structure, and the resources present or absent in the subcommunity itself--makes some bases for leadership more available than others. Most local black leadership is based upon associations with existing institutions or organizations, ranging from the NAACP to Model Cities, rather than the organization of mass followings in the subcommunity; given its size, disintegration and minimal institutional network, the black subcommunity by itself does

*This mode of leadership is close to Hemphill's description of the main activity of all leadership as "the initiation of structure," p. 64.

NAME**	SELECTION*	ACTIVITY
James Faraday	48	City councilman
Eugene Nelson	42	State representative
Harriet Campbell	36	(Former) member, board of education
Josephine Warrick	30	Director, Model Cities
George Graeber	29	Attorney
Tom Wilson	29	Human Relations Commission
Rev. Johnson	28	Minister, Baptist Church
Johnny Washington	27	Equal Opportunity Officer, State Housing Authority
Robert Jones	27	NAACP president
J. C. Wilson	27	Board of education
Lloyd Thompson	26	Model Cities policy board
Ed Lawson	25	Hodcarriers union
Willene Easton	24	Negro businesswomen's committee
Hattie Hosler	23	Model Cities staff
Cavanaugh Smith	21	Urban League
Kensha Muhammed	19	Malcolm X Institute

*Of 62 interviews, in five, leaders were not selected; the highest possible total would be 57 selections.

**Names have been changed to preserve anonymity.

Figure 2.--Leadership List.

not offer a particularly inviting basis for leadership (see discussion in following chapter, pp. 182-192).

The third stage of the research consisted of semi-structured interviews* with the leaders selected. The purpose of these interviews was to develop a further basis for the categoric typology of local leadership. Thus, the interviews focused on goals-means differences between leaders and their activities in specific issue-areas. The interviews can be classified as semi-structured in that clear priorities were established for each interview (goals-means-activity on busing issue), while open-ended questions encouraged interviewees to speak freely on the selected subjects. These interviews seem similar in form to those conducted by Wilson in Negro Politics.²¹

All leaders were questioned in particular detail about their roles in the local integration-busing controversy. A case study of black leadership roles on this issue is the subject of Chapter VI. The busing controversy proved especially appropriate to local leadership research because (1) it provided a test of whether informant-selected leaders actually were "active" on this highly salient issue; (2) it was an issue which most clearly distinguished leadership types in terms of goals and means; and (3) it was an issue which began to reveal some of the previously muted conflicts among Central City black leadership.

*The methodological bible for this elite interviewing was Lewis Anthony Dexter's, Elite and Specialized Interviewing (Evanston, 1970).

Finally, a questionnaire was distributed to all leaders interviewed (see Appendix B). The division of labor between interview and questionnaire was such that the interview focused on goals, tactics and issue activity, while the questionnaire sought to collect demographic data and to test for attitudinal changes over time. The questionnaire thus contains a demographic section (age, education, income, etc.), an expanded version of the Crain militancy scale,²² and questions concerning social and leadership contacts with whites. All leaders were also asked for their selections of other local black leaders; this question was again intended both as a further check on informant selections and as a test of relations between differing leadership types.

The next chapter considers in detail the local environment in which all the leadership types must operate. The environmental variables of migration, population, education, income, employment and political structure are important in that they lead to a preponderance of certain types of local black leaders and make some leadership strategies seem more promising than others.

FOOTNOTES

¹In terms of future research analyzing/typologizing urban black leadership, two broad alternatives seem possible: one possibility is to continue the production of locality-specific typologies--as seemingly done in Atlanta, Durham, Chicago, Los Angeles, etc. Though this pattern of research might not be immediately productive in developing explicit theories of urban black leadership, continual comparison of the analyses developed might be useful. However, another broad alternative is to re-direct research in black leadership, turning it to a deeper analysis of those factors of "time and place"--local political and economic structures, city size, available resources in the subcommunity and so on--which in their variations may produce differing types of black leadership. In short, city and subcommunity characteristics, often either ignored or treated in most of the research as merely contextual, might instead be considered as independent variables, in effect "producing" differing leadership types; indeed, a typology of "political environments" in the future might prove more relevant than the continued repetition of local research analyzing black leaders in a manner so constrained by time and place. For an example of exploratory work in political environments, see Peter K. Eisinger, "The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities," American Political Science Review (March, 1973), pp. 11-28. These issues are discussed at greater length in the final chapter.

²See Chapter III on subcommunity characteristics.

³See Chapter I, p. 31.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Other typologies are discussed in Chapter I, pp. 30-47.

⁶Informant interview.

⁷Ibid.

⁸Both comments from informant interviews.

⁹Informant interview.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Remarks on the protest model are derived from Michael Lipsky, Protest in City Politics (New York, 1968).

¹⁵E. E. Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People (New York, 1960).

¹⁶Paraphrase of separatist comments in interviews.

¹⁷Informant interviews.

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹Robert A. Dahl, "Hierarchy, Democracy, and Bargaining in Politics and Economics," in Research Frontiers in Politics and Government, Brookings Lectures of 1955 (Brookings Institution, 1955), p. 52.

²⁰Informant interviews.

²¹The brief description of Wilson's methodology is in Negro Politics, pp. 10-11.

²²Robert L. Crain, et al., The Politics of School Desegregation (New York, 1969), p. 350.

CHAPTER III

SUBCOMMUNITY CHARACTERISTICS AND LOCAL LEADERSHIP

The demographic characteristics of Central City's black subcommunity help to determine the resources available to local leaders. Resourceful leaders can loosen existing constraints by raising issues, causing crises and building organizations, but the shape of a given subcommunity usually sets the boundaries within which leaders must act and choose. Most simply, a black population which is both small and poor generally leaves less scope for local leadership initiative than one which is large and increasingly prosperous. The presence or absence of various resources--such as numbers, organization or money--usually influences the choice of goals and means by leaders as well as the types of leaders likely to emerge in the subcommunity.

This chapter considers how the shape of Central City's black subcommunity establishes constraints and possibilities for would-be leaders by examining in detail subcommunity characteristics in terms of migration, employment and income, education, housing, relations with the local police and the patterns of city politics. How a subcommunity which is low in autonomy and affords only a tenuous organizational

base affects differing types of leaders and their selection of strategies is discussed in the conclusion.

Black Migration to Central City

Table 1 shows the gradual growth of Central City's black population. Local blacks started with an extremely small base (only 13 Negroes in 1850) which then increased gradually as a percentage of the city population until 1890. Though its total numbers increased after the turn of the century, the black population did not increase at as fast a rate as the total population of the city, moving only from 1.0% of the Central City population in 1850 to 1.1% in 1910. Most of the black migrants at this time came from within the state, not from the deep south.¹ There was a large enough population for blacks to establish two churches and a few rooming houses and eating places, but their low numbers in the total population posed no political or economic threat to the white population. Thus, while Negroes held traditional jobs as garbage collectors, street cleaners and general service workers, they lived in clusters of modest dwellings within racially mixed neighborhoods and were not barred from public facilities.²

The rate of total population growth in the city reached its peak in 1920, and has since grown more slowly,* while in every decade since 1910 local blacks have increased

*Indeed, most of the increase in total population for the last three decades has come from annexation of outlying areas.

Table 1.--Black population growth in Central City: 1850-1970.

Year	Total Population	Negro Population	Percent Negro
1850	1,229	13	1.0
1860	3,074	27	0.9
1870	5,241	77	1.5
1880	8,319	208	2.5
1890	13,102	341	2.6
1900	16,485	323	2.0
1910	31,229	354	1.1
1920	57,327	698	1.2
1930	78,397	1,409	1.8
1940	78,753	1,638	2.1
1950	92,129	2,971	3.3
1960	107,805	6,745	6.3
1970	131,546	12,234	9.3

Source: U.S. Census of Population, 1850-1970.

more rapidly. Post-war increases in in-migration account for much of the increased growth rate in Central City's black population. In 1917 blacks from the deep south began arriving in search of improved employment. Their numbers remained small until 1919 when more migrants arrived from Tennessee, Mississippi, South Carolina and Arkansas--not only quickly doubling the size of the black subcommunity, but also changing its composition from predominantly "acculturated" northern blacks to rural southern blacks. Again, Negro migration to Central City reached a peak in the three years following the end of World War II, and between 1952-1955, following the Korean War. Most of the migrants continued to come from southern states.³

The traditional push-pull pattern for Negro migration seems to apply to Central City blacks. In a study

of black families migrating to the city between 1940-1950, the three push factors most often cited were the inequities of the southern sharecropping system, the low wages in the south and the unemployment resulting from increased use of new farm machinery.⁴ The pull factors were the chance for factory jobs in the north and the presence of relatives in Central City. The presence of friends or relatives generally seems to have been more important for blacks than whites in deciding to move to Central City, as Table 2 demonstrates.

Table 2.--Comparison of reasons given for moving to Central City, by race.

Reasons Given	Percent White	Percent Non-White
Job opportunities or transferred by work	79	48
Family and/or friends lived here	14	45
For children's sake	0	4
Married mate living in Lansing	2	0
No special reason	5	3

Source: Housing Study for Central City Community Renewal Program, 1968.

Today, about 45% of the city's black population has migrated from other states, and most migrants still come from the south (see Table 3). However, near-by cities with larger black populations (Flint and Detroit in Table 3)

have somewhat higher proportions of their black populations coming from the south.

Table 3.--Residential mobility for Negro populations in Central City, Detroit and Flint, 1970.

	Central City	Detroit	Flint
Total black population	12,234	660,524	54,250
Percent born in different state	44.9	40.8	48.2
Percent of persons born in different state coming from:			
Northeast States	1.4	3.0	1.7
North Central States	16.7	8.2	9.2
Southern States	81.8	87.9	88.1
Western States	0.8	0.9	1.0

Source: "Social Characteristics of the Negro Population for Areas and Places," in General Social and Economic Characteristics, 1970.

In addition, the black population of Central City shows a very different pattern of age-grading than present for U.S. urban non-whites. For example, in each age category in Table 4 (after five years of age), Central City's blacks have a higher percentage of older people; the general distribution of ages for urban non-whites populations is tilted towards youthful categories--in comparison, Central City's black population is somewhat "older." There is also evidence that the later streams of black migration to Central City have brought in higher status blacks than the previous

migrants from the south. Tables 5 and 6 compare migrant and resident populations, finding the former group higher on educational and occupational measures, particularly those persons coming from Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas rather than non-metropolitan or rural environs.⁶

Table 4.--Comparison of age-groupings, U.S. urban non-whites and Central City non-whites, 1970.

Age	Percent Central City Non-Whites	Percent U.S. Urban Non-White
Under 5 years	14.0	50.5
5-14 years	26.6	11.5
15-24 years	19.3	11.5
25-34 years	13.8	7.4
35-44 years	10.5	5.6
45-54 years	7.1	4.7
55-64 years	5.0	3.5
65 years and over	3.7	2.5

Source: "Social Characteristics of the Negro Population for Areas and Places," in General Social and Economic Characteristics, 1970.

Table 5.--Percentage of Negroes completing one or more years of high school, by migration status, in Central City, 1955-1960.

Non-Migrants	Total In-Migrants	In-Migrants From	
		Other SMSA	Nonmetropolitan Areas
58.2	64.9	72.6	50.3

Source: "Subject Reports, Mobility for Metropolitan Areas," in U.S. Census of Population, 1960.

Table 6.--Percentage of Negro employed males in white-collar occupations by migration status, in Central City, 1955-1960.

Non-Migrants	Total In-Migrants	In-Migrants From	
		Other SMSA	Nonmetropolitan Areas
7.6	23.9	35.1	4.6

Source: "Subject Reports, Mobility for Metropolitan Areas," in U.S. Census of Population, 1960.

Nevertheless, many in Central City may have perceived the rapidly increasing black population of the last three decades as a threat. Since 1940 population trends in Central City have paralleled those in most northern central cities, with white families increasingly moving to the suburbs and leaving the central city to blacks.⁷ In 1952 the city was redistricted in such a way as to reduce potential black voting power.* Also, though previously there had been no exclusively black residential section, with the increased black migration to the city whites in the 1940's began to use deed restrictions and refusals to sell to enforce housing segregation.⁸

Certain tentative patterns emerge from a survey of black migration to Central City. First, Central City's black population, though rapidly growing, remains a

*For more discussion of the redistricting, see pp. 171-172 this chapter.

relatively low percentage of the city's total population.* Ironically, the black population may have increased rapidly enough to seem a threat to some whites, while still remaining too small numerically to dominate the city's political or economic life.** These numbers are important to black leaders: since the black subcommunity by itself would provide only a narrow base of support, even if fully mobilized, one of the first tasks for black leaders has been the search for allies.*** However, this task is difficult because, as Wilson argues, "smaller Negro communities . . . lack the resources that come with large numbers for supporting a vigorous civic life."⁹ Thus, black leaders in Central City frequently have little to exchange for needed white support.

Second, Central City has a relatively "new" black middle class. Only a few blacks had occupations in professional-managerial categories in 1950 (see Table 7), and, as discussed, it was the later streams of migration which seemed to bring more high-status blacks to the city (Tables 5 and 6). As in most other cities studied,¹⁰ many of Central City's black leaders come from middle-class and professional statuses. With its comparatively recent middle

*For example, Central City has a lower percentage of blacks than most of the cities in the research discussed in Chapter I.

**For an argument linking black mobilization with "intermediate percentages" of local populations, see Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., Toward a Theory of Minority Group Relations (New York, 1967), pp. 176-189.

***See this chapter, pp. 182-192.

class, Central City's black subcommunity has not yet developed the intricate network of organizations and institutions characteristic of cities having both the larger black populations to support these organizations and the long-established middle-class to fund and head them.

Table 7.--Distribution of occupations for Central City black males in labor force, by year.

Job Category	1950	1959	1970
Professional-Managerial	6.16*	11.45	10.58
White-Collar**	2.85	4.8	19.63
Blue-Collar***	89.27	68.87	69.40****

*Numbers show percentage of total black labor force in specific job categories.

**All sales and clerical positions.

***Includes craftsmen, foremen, private household workers and all laborers.

****Percentages do not total 100% because some categories are not reported here--for example, the "farm laborer" and "job not reported" categories.

Source: "Social Characteristics of the Negro Population for Areas and Places: 1970," General Social and Economic Characteristics; "Nonwhite Population--Occupation Group . . ." in 1960; Population Census: General Social and Economic Characteristics and "Race and Class of Worker . . ." in 1950; Population Census: General Social and Economic Characteristics.

Third, the data on black migration patterns in Central City reveal possible sources of political stability* in the city's black subcommunity. For example, as we have seen, recent migration has brought in blacks from metropolitan areas with higher occupational and educational levels than nonmigrants residing in the city; the city also has a somewhat "older" population than typical for U.S. urban non-whites. The older population and growing middle class has become both a source of and an audience for "moderate" leadership in Central City.

Employment and Income

The occupational profile of Central City's blacks has altered considerably during the last twenty years. Table 7 demonstrates several changes in the distribution of general occupational categories. While the percentage of the black male labor force in blue-collar jobs has dropped, many more blacks have moved into sales-clerical and managerial-professional positions. In the short time between 1950-1959, the percentage of blacks in professional-managerial categories almost doubled, and numerically almost quadrupled (from 54 in 1950 to 210 in 1959). This increase is consistent with the data in Tables 5 and 6 on high status in-migration in the latter half of the 1950's. The most dramatic increase in sales-clerical positions, however, occurred in the past

*"Stability," as used here, refers to the comparatively low incidence of violent protests or riots in Central City.

decade, the percentage more than quadrupling. The latter increase may have been assisted in 1968 by threatened boycotts and picketing aimed at stores in the central business district which were accused of job discrimination.

As seen in Table 8, when compared with state-wide figures for non-whites, Central City blacks by 1970 had clearly developed the occupational base for a substantial middle class: proportionally, Central City non-whites have about twice as many in the professional-managerial and sales-clerical categories combined. Blacks in Central City are still "disadvantaged" in comparison to the city's white population--blacks having higher percentages in lower income blue-collar jobs and fewer persons in professional-managerial groupings; however, the ratio of white to non-white percentages in Central City is considerably less than for the state-wide white and non-white categories.*

Most of Central City's black male workers draw their incomes from private wages or salaries, while very few are self-employed--suggesting the underdevelopment of black-owned businesses. But as Table 9 illustrates, a considerably higher proportion of the black labor force works in government jobs than is true for the white labor force. The high percentage of government workers mainly reflects the

*Presumably, this means Central City non-whites are "better off" in comparison to the city's white population than state non-whites are when compared to state white populations. However, since state-wide data are obviously not for urban areas only, they may be somewhat misleading. Most comparisons in this chapter are limited to urban areas.

Table 8.--1970 distribution of occupations for state and city, by race.

Job Category	Central City Non-Whites	Central City Whites	State Non-Whites	State Whites
Managerial- Professional	10.58	21.16	8.60	23.2
White-Collar	19.63	31.22	7.80	13.4
Blue-Collar	69.40	47.43	72.00	56.1

Source: ". . . Labor Force Characteristics by Race: The State," "Occupation of Employed Persons for Areas and Places," and "Social Characteristics of the Negro Population for Areas and Places," in General Social and Economic Characteristics, 1970.

Table 9.--Source of income for male workers, 16 years and over, by race, 1970.

	Central City Non-Whites	Central City Whites
Percentage of employed black males receiving income as private wage or salary workers	80.4	75.6
Self-employed workers	1.7	4.6
Government workers	17.9	11.9
Percentage of all government workers employed by <u>city</u> government	33.9	61.5

Source: "Social Characteristics of the Negro Population for Areas and Places" and ". . . Class of Worker for Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas," in General Social and Economic Characteristics, 1970.

opening up of state and federal jobs to blacks in this state capitol, about two-thirds of government workers being employed by the state or federal government. Table 10 demonstrates how little Central City blacks have penetrated city government positions, as opposed to blacks in near-by Detroit and Flint. Though there are naturally more positions available with the state government in a capitol city, the sharply differing percentages for blacks holding local government jobs may also reflect the larger black populations of Detroit and Flint and the (perhaps consequent) greater political mobilization of blacks in these two cities.* For example, both Flint and Detroit have had black mayors-- while Central City did not even have a black city councilman until 1967.

Central City also has higher unemployment for black males than the two larger cities (Table 11). In Central City, black males over sixteen years are twice as likely to be unemployed as their white counterparts (Table 12), blacks also having a higher proportion of their work force employed less than half the year (Table 13). Using the latter percentage as a conservative measure of underemployment, a comparison of Central City, Detroit and Flint also indicates that black workers in Central City are more likely to work half a year or less.

*For further discussion of the Mayor's appointment and employment policies, see p. 181.

Table 10.--Source of income for black male workers, 16 years and over, by city, 1970.

	Central City	Detroit	Flint
Percentage of employed black males receiving income as private wage or salary workers	80.4	83.9	92.2
Self-employed workers	1.7	2.7	1.5
Government workers	17.9	13.4	6.2
Percentage of all government workers employed by city government	33.9	61.7	62.6

Source: "Social Characteristics of the Negro Population for Areas and Places," General Social and Economic Characteristics, 1970.

Table 11.--Employment status: black males, 16 years and over, by city, 1970.

	Central City	Detroit	Flint
Percentage of civilian labor force unemployed	11.0	9.8	6.6

Source: "Economic Characteristics of the Negro Population," General Social and Economic Characteristics, 1970.

Table 12.--Employment status: Central City males, 16 years and over, 1970.

	Non-White	White
Civilian labor force	2,633	30,791
Employed	2,343	29,114
Unemployed	290	1,677
Percent of civilian labor force unemployed	11.0	5.4

Source: "Employment Status . . for Areas and Places," and "Economic Characteristics of the Negro Population," General Social and Economic Characteristics, 1970.

Table 13.--Central City workers in 1969 by weeks worked.

	Central City Non-Whites	Central City Whites
Percentage of male labor force working 26 weeks or less	18.1	12.2

Source: "Labor Force Characteristics, by Race," General Social and Economic Characteristics, 1970.

These employment problems tend to be concentrated in the inner-city black neighborhoods, where the unemployment rate is actually about 21%.¹¹ Here, 60% of the unemployed have been without work for six months or longer, half of the unemployed last worked at unskilled jobs and almost half had less than a high school education. The city's typical unemployed black is

between the ages of 16 and 22; the head of a household; . . . has been exposed to some vocational training since leaving school; does not own a car or other reliable means of transportation; is receiving some form of public assistance; . . . and is responsible for the care of at least one child during normal working hours.¹²

The Central City area economy does not seem to be growing rapidly enough to absorb many of the unemployed. Though the area economy is relatively diversified--with manufacturing, state government, retail trade and a university present--in terms of generating jobs it has tended for a number of years to be stable or growing only slightly. Few employers are presently enlarging their labor forces, nor is such expansion anticipated. In the few job categories still expanding, employers seek skilled technical and professional personnel.¹³ Thus, job opportunities expand most rapidly for the upper tenth of Central City's black work force.

Differences between cities in median incomes for black families may reflect the somewhat slower growth of Central City's economy (Table 14). Nevertheless, median incomes for blacks in Central City have increased dramatically over the last two decades (Table 15), reflecting the change from a relatively undifferentiated labor force, 90% of which was blue-collar (Table 7), to one with considerable occupational variation and a growing middle class.

However, for many black families the increase in incomes requires both husband and wife to work, even when the family has young children. A glance at Table 16, for

Table 14.--Median incomes for black families, by city, 1969.

	Central City	Detroit	Flint
Median family income	\$8,171	\$8,645	\$8,825

Source: "Income in 1969 of the Negro Population for Areas and Places," General Social and Economic Characteristics, 1970.

Table 15.--Black median incomes in Central City, by year.

	1949	1959	1969
Central City black median income	\$4,021*	\$5,182**	\$8,171

*This figure is the median income for all Negroes.

**Medians for 1959 and 1969 are for families.

Source: "Income in 1969 of the Negro Population for Areas and Places," in General Social and Economic Characteristics, 1970, and "Nonwhite Population . . . Income in 1959 for Selected Standard Metropolitan Areas," in Population Census: General Social and Economic Characteristics, 1960 and "Income in 1949 of Persons, by Race" in Population Census: Detailed Characteristics, 1950.

Table 16.--Central City women in labor force with young children, by race, 1970.

	Central City Non-Whites	Central City Whites
Number of married women with children under age six	663	9,141
--number working	355	2,712
--percentage	53.5	29.7

Source: "Employment Status by Sex, for Areas and Places," General Social and Economic Characteristics, 1970.

example, reveals a much higher percentage of black married women with children under age six who work than is the case for the white population. Given the level of incomes earned by many black males, the high degree of local underemployment and the general instability of many of the unskilled jobs held, it is probably necessary for these mothers to work. The black population of Central City also has a higher proportion of working mothers with young children than do non-whites in Detroit and Flint (Table 17).

Table 17.--Black women in labor force with young children, by city, 1970.

	Central City	Detroit	Flint
Number of married women with children under age six	663	32,851	3,148
--number working	355	13,994	1,579
--percentage	53.5	36.0	50.2

Source: "Employment Status by Sex, for Areas and Places," General Social and Economic Characteristics, 1970.

While the mother works, the children usually seem to be cared for by relatives, older children in the family and occasionally by neighbors.* These patterns of child-rearing seem to be preferred to day-care centers, and the center established by the local Model Cities agency is underutilized.¹⁴ It is difficult to state with any certainty

*The basis for these comments is casual observation in the black core area of the city and conversations with staff workers from Model Cities and the Board of Education.

whether these child-rearing arrangements hinder the development of young children, though the possibility should not be discounted. What is implicit in these data, however, is that there is a great deal of economic pressure--and perhaps necessity--for mothers of young children to work. Thus, the rise in family incomes may entail some costs.

The general increase in median incomes is distributed among occupational categories in predictable fashion, with professional-managerial groupings well above the black median and laborers well below. In each occupational category except laborers, blacks earn lower median incomes than whites in Central City (see Table 18); indeed, black professionals and managers--from whose ranks come the bulk of local black "influentials"--earn median incomes of almost \$400 less than white craftsmen and foremen. These income differentials even at the highest income levels for blacks help to explain why it is sometimes difficult to fund black organizations in Central City.

Table 19 clarifies the distribution of black incomes in relation to state-wide and local populations. At the two extremes, one quarter of Central City's black families earn under \$4,000 per year, while two-fifths earn \$10,000 and over; though the highest income grouping is close to state-wide non-white percentages, Central City has proportionally more persons in the lowest income category, fewer in the middle group between \$5,000-9,999 and a lower median income.

Table 18.--Median earnings in 1969 for civilian labor force in selected occupations.

	Central City Non-Whites	Central City Total Population
All males, 16 years and over, with earnings	\$7,355	\$8,549
Professional, managerial and kindred workers	\$9,250	\$10,843
Craftsmen, foremen and kindred workers	\$7,935	\$9,617
Operatives, including transport	\$7,848	\$8,207
Laborers, except farm	\$4,346	\$4,304

Source: "Income in 1969 of Families, Unrelated Individuals," General Social and Economic Characteristics, 1970.

Table 19.--Income comparisons for Central City and state, 1969.

	Central City Non-Whites	Central City Whites	State Non-Whites	State Whites
Median family income	\$8,171	\$10,839	\$8,536	\$11,303
Percentage of families under \$4000	24.8	9.7	21.3	9.8
Percentage of families earning \$5000-\$9999	30.7	29.1	33.8	27.6
Percentage of families earning \$10,000 and over	38.2	57.9	39.4	59.2

Source: "Income in 1969 of the Negro Population for Areas and Places," and "Income in 1969 of Families . . . for Areas and Places," General Social and Economic Characteristics, 1970.

Comparing local populations, in the middle category (\$5,000-9,999), white/non-white percentages are rather close, although Central City non-whites proportionally have more than twice as many persons under \$4,000 and a considerably smaller upper-income bracket. For Central City blacks, the lowest income category is dominated by female-headed families: these family units are a large minority of all local black families (29.4%), and pull in mean incomes of only \$4,453; in the black core area of the city, of all black families below the poverty level 72.25% are headed by a woman.¹⁵

In summary, the economic resources of Central City's black subcommunity can be viewed in relation to the larger subcommunities of Detroit and Flint and to the city's white population. Compared to local whites, the usual disadvantages can be seen: blacks have a smaller middle class, fewer professionals and lower median incomes, combined with a higher percentage in the poverty class under \$4,000. Clearly, the black subcommunity will have fewer economic resources with which to support leaders and organizations. Perhaps more surprisingly, Central City suffers in economic comparisons to the metropolitan areas with larger black populations: thus, in comparison to the black populations of Detroit and Flint, Central City blacks have higher unemployment, higher underemployment, higher percentages of working mothers with young children and a lower median income. In relation to state-wide non-white data, Central

City also has proportionally more persons under incomes of \$4,000 and fewer individuals in the middle groupings between \$5,000-9,999. In short, the financial resources available to Central City black leaders are likely to be comparatively limited.

On the other hand, if the majority of urban black leaders continue to come from the middle class, Central City should have a sufficient pool of potential leaders. In only twenty years the black labor force has changed from its predominantly blue-collar makeup in 1950, as professional-managerial and white-collar jobs have opened up (Table 7). In fact, by 1970 twice as many blacks in Central City occupied either professional-managerial or sales-clerical positions as in the state-wide data for blacks (Table 8). State government jobs at all levels have become available to local blacks, though penetration of local government positions is much less than in other cities. The job profiles and income-employment data suggest that there is a large pool of potential leaders from the middle class in Central City, but that these leaders will face a large low-income group and limited economic resources in the black subcommunity.

Education

Table 20 highlights the black educational disadvantage in relation to the city's white population, blacks having fewer individuals completing high school and college but almost twice the white percentage completing eight years

Table 20.--Educational comparisons for Central City and state, by race, 1970.

Educational Attainment	Central City Non-Whites	Central City Whites	State Non-Whites	State Whites
Percentage completing 8 years or less*	33.5	18.8	34.1	24.1
Percentage completing high school	26.2	34.5	25.1	34.7
Percentage with some college	13.3	21.0	11.5	19.9
Median years of school completed	10.9	12.2	10.6	12.1

*All categories refer to persons 25 years and older.

Source: "Educational Characteristics for Areas and Places," "Educational Attainment . . . Race," and "Social Characteristics of the Negro Population for Areas and Places," in General Social and Economic Characteristics, 1970.

or less. Central City blacks also seem to perform less well within the school system than do whites. On thirty-nine tests administered in five grades during the 1969-70 school year, for virtually all tests given, blacks on the average performed considerably less well than other schoolchildren, falling below the national average levels of performance and averaging seven-tenths of a grade below the performance of the city's other schoolchildren.¹⁶ The lack of educational credentials, reflected in both performance levels and the low percentage completing high school, helps funnel the

black labor force toward the generally lower-paying unskilled jobs and away from the sectors of expanding employment.*

However, this is only a part of the picture. When compared to state non-whites, blacks in Central City have somewhat higher proportions of their population finishing high school and attending college (Table 20). Again, when compared with the large black populations of Detroit and Flint, local blacks do marginally better: both black men and women complete slightly more median years of schooling and graduate higher proportions from the local high schools (Table 21).

Table 21.--Black educational comparisons, by sex and city, 1970.

Educational Attainment	Central City	Detroit	Flint
<u>Black males 25 years and older</u>			
--median years completed	10.6	10.3	10.5
--percentage high school graduates	37.1	33.7	33.9
<u>Black females 25 years and older</u>			
--median years completed	11.1	11.0	11.0
--percentage high school graduates	41.8	39.8	38.7

Source: "Social Characteristics of the Negro Population for Areas and Places," General Social and Economic Characteristics, 1970.

*It should be noted that Central City's black males are at more of an educational disadvantage than black women: for males, twenty-five years and over, median years of school completed are 10.6, while only slightly more than 37% have completed high school; the figures rise somewhat for black women--11.1 median years and 41.8% high school graduates.

The racial composition of the local schools (immediately before the busing controversy) is detailed in Table 22. The Central City school board, under some pressure from the local NAACP, began serious efforts to desegregate secondary schools in 1967, and all these schools have now been desegregated. However, the desegregation process has depended heavily on so-called "one-way busing" of Negroes, and has aroused resentment in the black subcommunity. Recent disorders in the high schools have also accompanied desegregation. Before the busing issue arose, most of the elementary schools remained segregated,* but eventually the school board--under court pressure--moved away from the neighborhood school to the cluster-school concept in order to desegregate all elementary schools. This plan--and the increased busing which accompanied it--aroused intense local opposition. Chapter VI traces the growth of this controversy, the strategies developed by black organizations and the involvement of black leadership elites in this issue area.

Housing Patterns

The development of Central City's black subcommunity matches the common growth pattern for black ghettos first described more than thirty years ago by Chicago sociologists.¹⁷ Since the turn of the century most local Negroes have lived in a single pocket immediately west of the central business

*The measure used here--and in Table 22--is the federal standard of 5% deviation from community racial composition.

Table 22.--Blacks as percentages of Central City elementary and secondary schools, 1971.

<u>Elementary</u>	
<u>School</u>	<u>% Negro</u>
Allen	26
Attwood	12
Averill	10
Barnes	5
Bingham	4
Cavanaugh	2
Cedar	4
Cumberland	12
Elmhurst	5
Everett	4
Fairview	15
Forest Road	10
Forest View	17
Foster	15
Genesee	19
Gier Park	8
Grand River	11
Gunnisonville	1
Harley Franks	22
High	8
Holmes	36
Horsebrook	1
Kendon	9
Lewton	7
Lincoln Center	29
Lyons	9
Main	88
Maple Grove	4
Maple Hill	10
Maplewood	2
Michigan	84
Moores Park	12
Mt. Hope	1
North	2
Northwestern	5
Oak Park	6
Pleasant Grove	10
Pleasant View	19
Post Oak	2
Reo	9
Sheridan Road	7
Valley Farms	0
Verlinden	23
Wainwright	14
Walnut	18

Table 22.--Continued.Elementary--Continued

<u>School</u>	<u>% Negro</u>
<u>Wexford</u>	26
<u>Willow</u>	34
<u>Woodcreek</u>	14
Total.....	14

The schools which are underscored are classed as segregated, using federal standards of 5% deviation from community ethnic composition.

Secondary

<u>School</u>	<u>% Negro</u>
C. W. Otto Jr.	8
Dwight Rich Jr.	16
Gardner Jr.	14
Pattengill Jr.	10
Walter French Jr.	15
Total.....	12
Eastern High	5
Everett High	6
Hill High	18
Sexton High	20
Total.....	11

Percentages rounded to nearest whole percent.

Source: Official Report of the Citizens Advisory Committee on Educational Opportunity, Appendix B, ethnic data.

district. Though initially somewhat dispersed among the white residents, blacks in this pocket reached ghetto proportions during the 1940's and increased still faster in the 1950's. Thus, twenty years ago most of the city's black populace was concentrated in the area bounded by Michigan Avenue, Huron and Pine Streets and the southern arc of the Grand River.¹⁸

The subcommunity resembled the classic black ghetto, simultaneously exhibiting increased spatial concentration and outward expansion. The core area (see Figure 3) was the port of entry for most black migrants, and their influx plus the tight housing market of the 1940's and the housing segregation enforced by real estate agents increased black residential concentrations. However, by the mid-1950's, the tight housing market had disappeared and the rate of white suburbanization increased, thus opening up housing in the areas contiguous to the black ghetto. A high concentration of black residents continued as whites moved out and blacks moved in; during the 1950's the three census tracts containing most of the black population saw 3,517 whites depart and 3,070 black replacements arrive. Expansion occurred as the ghetto, under the pressures of a population more than doubling in a decade, gradually moved west and north.*

*Many black spokesmen "escaped" the black core area. See the map locating leaders' residences in Chapter V, p. 293.




Figure 3.--Map of Core Area.

Other characteristics of the traditional black ghetto also continued, especially poor housing and informally enforced segregation. In terms of housing conditions, ghetto density continues to be the highest in the city (17.2 persons per acre), and 41% of all core area housing units have been rated as in poor condition.¹⁹ Most blacks live in older houses (Table 23). Rapid turnover tends to be the pattern in many black neighborhoods, almost one-half of black families having moved into their housing only in the last two years (Table 24). Overcrowding is reduced from earlier levels, but some non-whites still have more persons per room than is common in the white population (Table 25). Black owner-occupied housing has low median value (\$15,900) in the local housing market and, despite median rents of only \$111 for black renters, blacks earning less than \$10,000 continue to pay disproportionate amounts of their income for rent (paying over 35% as the median percentage of income for rent²⁰).

Table 23.--Year structure built for black homeowners in Central City.

1960 to March, 1970	--	19.6%
1950 to 1959	--	11.4%
1949 or earlier	--	69.4%

Source: "Structural, Equipment and Financial Characteristics of Housing Units with Negro Head of Household," Census Tract.

Table 24.--Year moved into housing unit for blacks in Central City.

1968 to March, 1970	--	47.0%
1960 to 1967	--	39.4%
1959 or earlier	--	15.0%

Source: "Structural, Equipment and Financial Characteristics of Housing Units with Negro Head of Household," Census Tracts, 1970.

Table 25.--Persons per room as percentage of occupied housing units in Central City by race, 1970.

	Central City Non-Whites	Central City Whites
1.00 or fewer persons per room	85.9	94.2
1.01-1.50 persons per room	11.2	4.9
1.51 or more persons per room	3.0	0.9

Source: "Occupancy, Utilization and Financial Characteristics of Housing Units," and "Occupancy, Utilization and Financial Characteristics of Housing Units with Negro Head of Household," Census Tracts, 1970.

Real estate agents have helped to perpetuate housing segregation by "guiding" blacks to ghetto housing, with often profitable results: in a 1965 sample of residents, an examination of rents paid for single family dwellings compared with assessed valuations concluded that 82% of Negro renters received less than average value for their rent dollar, compared with 37% of white renters.²¹ Perhaps as a result, most blacks avoid real estate salesmen.*²² Financial institutions also raised barriers to black housing by showing interest chiefly in mortgages for new homes in the suburbs and by assuming that property desired by blacks would decline in value.²³ Possibly because of difficulties in credit arrangements, a lower proportion of blacks owned homes than did whites at the same income level.²⁴

The development of the spatially concentrated black subcommunity was disrupted by a series of forced relocations in the 1960's. The major causes of residential relocation were housing code enforcement and private demolition, state capitol redevelopment, Oldsmobile expansion and the I-496 corridor. Stricter enforcement of health and building codes throughout Central City occasionally forced blacks out of overcrowded housing; more often, private demolition eliminated housing units in the subcommunity, as new service stations and apartment buildings frequently proved more

*It is interesting to note that several informants and leaders interviewed described "the real estate interests" as the most powerful or dominant group in the city. Many were convinced that real estate men "run the city and control the politicians."

profitable than the old housing stock. By the end of the decade, expansion of the capitol complex had also forcibly relocated 126 families (of whom 47 were low-income residents), and the city's oldest church, Collins AME (now Trinity AME).²⁵ However, the capitol expansion affected comparatively few black families. In 1961 Oldsmobile began enlarging its parking facilities and, by 1966, had purchased and razed 179 housing units, mainly owned by blacks and including some of the worst housing in the city.²⁶ Both the state capitol and the Oldsmobile expansions occurred gradually over a prolonged period, and major dislocations did not occur.

Instead, the most disruptive impact on the black subcommunity came from the construction of the I-496 corridor. The corridor was a one-block wide swath from Main to St. Joseph Street, skirting the southern edge of the central business district and bisecting the black core area (Figure 3). The area was densely populated by low-income Negro families residing in low value and often substandard housing. In all, 273 black families were forced to move. Some black businesses between Birch and Pine Streets were able to relocate.* The period of state acquisition and clearance coincided with the Oldsmobile expansion to the immediate south of the highway corridor, and a slowing in the

*This, at least, is the report of official relocation studies.²⁷ Black informants, however, insist that these businesses were most often eliminated; constant references are made to the "disappearance" of black-owned businesses caused by the highway clearance. When informed of the official reports, several black informants simply said the reports lied.

construction of lower-priced housing in the city.²⁸ In addition, no public housing was locally available until 1967 (and then only 100 units), residents were allowed less time to relocate and prices paid by the state were lower than those which had been paid by Oldsmobile. Indeed, almost all homeowners felt that the first offer of payment from the state highway department was too low, and many considered the \$200 offered for moving costs and property loss to be inadequate.²⁹

As the difficulties of the relocation process became clear, a small group of blacks in the subcommunity organized themselves.

It began by just talking about our problems. Then we went to the city council--which was conservative then--and told them of the problems with the highway. We were surprised . . . they weren't interested, and wouldn't even appropriate money to study the problems of people being displaced. . . . Only later would they do anything at all.³⁰

Although the tentative route had been known for four years before council action, when the city council formally approved the I-496 route through Central City in July of 1961, no steps were taken to aid in relocation. By 1963, white citizen and church groups were urging the council to consider whether public housing would be necessary for the black families to be displaced. Only in September of 1965 was the Central City Housing Commission established to provide low-income housing, and not until late in 1966 did the city create its own Relocation Office to handle relocation

efforts in the city.* Clearly, the city moved late to cope with relocation difficulties, several citizen and church groups made efforts which preceded black protests and black residents only organized themselves when the highway's impact became obvious. Said one former resident of the neighborhood:

I think a lot of people don't understand it [the highway clearance] right away--or even believe it. Most of us didn't think much about it or bother with it until they [highway officials] were right there at the front door . . . then everyone was mad and we weren't offered much to move--but it was too late to do anything.**31

The center of Central City's black core area will continue to be the area of the city most affected by future residential displacements. Housing projections over the present decade call for 775 families to be displaced by "neighborhood improvements," 300 families by industrial activity and 120 families by capitol expansion by 1980³²--in all, affecting at least 1,200 families, mostly black. Some blacks see this continuing process as a deliberate effort by the city: "They want to break up the black

*The characteristics of those forced to relocate are clear from the records on file in the City Relocation Office: most of the families were headed by women, lived in overcrowded conditions, and had young children.

**The Federal Highway Act of 1962 specified that personal contact with each individual or family being displaced was necessary. Such contacts were made and the relocation process was supposedly explained. On the basis of personal reports, though, the explanations were not clear or were not understood, and the "threat" to the neighborhood was not originally taken very seriously. For a report of a similar process among low-income Italians, see Herbert Gans, The Urban Villagers (New York, 1967).

neighborhood so we won't be solid or a power bloc."³³ At any rate, housing and forced relocation will continue to be highly salient issues for local blacks in the foreseeable future.

In its impact upon the resident black population, the forced relocations seemed both to reflect and to reinforce existing lines of stratification within the subcommunity. By far the largest number of blacks relocated within the ghetto, thereby increasing its density and overcrowding,* and forcing the boundaries of the ghetto outward.³⁴ Some low-income black families moved away from the ghetto to the new public housing facilities, though these sites were selected by the Housing Commission and were sometimes the focus of intense neighborhood opposition.

In contrast, for upwardly mobile middle- and upper-income blacks relocation offered clear opportunities. Taking advantage of changes in FHA lending practices, the "filtering down" of a large number of homes in Central City and the general loosening of the housing market, many of these families used the relocation period to move to areas outside the traditional core area. These families integrated two previously all-white areas: the peripheral subdivisions in southwest Central City and the blocks immediately west of the old core area.

*For example, in a random sample of Relocation Office files, one quarter of the families were "doubling up."

The income differences reflected in the dispersal of Central City's black population mean that the middle- and upper-income groups which traditionally provided most core area leadership often now are separated spatially from the black ghetto of the past--and from the concentration of problems characteristic of the area. Indeed, the link between residence and income for Central City blacks is similar to the patterns for the general population: low-income families continue to be concentrated at the center of the traditional ghetto, while middle- and upper-income groups move toward new neighborhoods at the periphery and beyond. For local blacks this dispersal is justifiably welcome as a sign of "racial progress," or integration. However, the developing patterns of residence in which separate black neighborhoods are distinguished by sharp socioeconomic differences do have implications for local black leadership: it is more difficult for any black to speak for the people in the city's core area, when he is not of that area himself.

Comparisons between the black core area and a new middle-income black neighborhood suggest some of the differing social and economic characteristics.* Census tracts 15, 16 and 18 represent the area with the bulk of Central

*The differences would be even greater if one compared the core area with higher-income black populations scattered throughout the new subdivisions. However, the Negro populations are generally too low in these subdivisions to permit comparisons with the much larger number of blacks living in the core area.

City's black population; respectively, the tracts are 78%, 72.3% and 92.5% black in population. Tracts 15 and 18, however, mainly cover the older black core area, while tract 16 has only recently been penetrated by blacks (the areas are shown in Figure 3). Until 1965, most of the neighborhood of middle-income housing had been solidly white; that year the first black resident purchased a lot through a white friend; for a short time the neighborhood was "integrated," but then whites began moving out. That this neighborhood is very different than the contiguous ghetto is clear even to a casual observer: after crossing Jenison Street, one abruptly shifts from a neighborhood of run-down housing and littered streets to one of curving streets, large lawns and substantial homes.

Census data bear out the difference. Compared to the black core area, the neighborhood represented by tract 16* is higher on family median income, years of school completed, percentage of high school graduates and median value of owner-occupied units (Table 26), while having a much lower proportion of families below the poverty level. Houses are generally somewhat newer in tract 16 (Table 27), and home-owning is the dominant pattern, while renter-occupancy is much more common in the core area (Table 28).

*Again, differences would be even sharper if census tract 16 did not contain, at its fringe, a small section of run-down housing, spilling over from the core area. However, the differences between tract 16 and tracts 15 and 18 remain sizeable.

Table 26.--Socio-economic measures for Central City census tracts 15, 16 and 18.

Variables	Tract 15	Tract 18	Tract 16
Median family income	\$7,744	\$4,684	\$11,528
Median years of school completed	9.9	10.2	12.1
Percentage of high school graduates	29.1	33.1	54.5
Median value of owner-occupied units	\$13,700	\$15,600	\$19,600
Percentage of all families below poverty level*	26.1	25.5	10.5

*Excludes inmates, Armed Forces personnel, college students and unrelated individuals under 14 years.

Source: "Economic Characteristics of the Negro Population," "General and Social Characteristics of the Negro Population," and "Occupancy, Utilization and Financial Characteristics of Housing Units," Census Tracts, 1970.

Table 27.--Year structure built in tracts 15, 16 and 18.

Year Built	Tract 15	Tract 18	Tract 16
1960 to March 1970	11.0	0.0	6.7
1950 to 1959	2.0	4.9	26.2
1949 or earlier	87.0	95.1	67.1

Source: "Structural, Equipment and Financial Characteristics of Housing Units," Census Tracts, 1970.

Table 28.--Percentage of black housing units which are owner-occupied or renter-occupied in tracts 15, 16 and 18.

Owning/Renting	Tract 15	Tract 18	Tract 16
Owner-occupied	33.0	50.9	83.1
Renter-occupied	67.0	49.1	16.9

Source: "Occupancy, Utilization and Financial Characteristics of Housing Units," Census Tracts, 1970.

Unemployment is substantial in Tract 16 (11.5% of male labor force over sixteen years), but even higher in the core area (16.5%* in tracts 15 and 18).³⁵ The occupational distributions also differ, with almost three times as many professional-managerial-administrative positions in tract 16 as in the core area, and a lower proportion of blue-collar workers (Table 29). Mothers with young children also seem under more pressure to work full-time in the core area; for example, while in tract 16 only 11% of women with children under age six work (in conventional husband-wife family units) in the core area, 34% do so.³⁶ A comparison of occupational distributions in the black core area and the middle-income neighborhood to the distribution for Central City's white population shows the size of black-white gaps: predictably, the black middle class neighborhood much more closely resembles the white distribution, as Table 30 demonstrates.

*The core area figures should probably be even higher since about 5.5% of the area's labor force is not reported or accounted for in the 1970 census.

Table 29.--Occupational distribution for males 16 years and over, by census tract, 1970.

Job Categories	Tracts 15 and 18 (Core Area)	Tract 16
Professional, technical, managers, administrators and kindred workers	7.6	22.1
Sales and clerical	20.9	19.4
Blue-collar (craftsmen, foremen, operatives, laborers,* service and private household workers)	71.5	58.5

*Does not include farm laborers.

Source: "Economic Characteristics of the Negro Population," Census Tracts, 1970.

Table 30.--Comparison of occupational distributions, 1970.

Job Categories	Tracts 15 and 18 (Core Area)	Central City White Population	Tract 16
Managerial-professional	7.6	21.2	22.1
White-collar (sales and clerical)	20.9	31.2	19.4
Blue-collar (craftsmen, foremen, service & private household workers, laborers, etc.)	71.5	47.4	58.5

Source: "Economic Characteristics of the Negro Population" in Census Tracts, 1970 and "Occupations of Employed Persons for Areas and Places," in General Social and Economic Characteristics, 1970.

In conclusion, housing is not only an issue to which black leaders must respond, but also a source of some difficulty for these leaders. The high number of forced relocations and the rapid population turnover in housing suggest the difficulties for those who would organize in the core area.* On the other hand, given the opening up of the housing market, the black professionals who continue to perform leadership functions for the subcommunity are increasingly unlikely to come from the core area. This situation poses basic problems of identification. For the large number of blacks continuing to live in the core area it is difficult to "identify with" or respond to the leadership proffered by middle-class blacks who live elsewhere; explained one black, "Don't tell me you're a leader, if you lead from East Central City [a suburb]!"³⁷ But difficulties of identification also arise for those trying to be leaders but separated from core area blacks by spatial and socioeconomic barriers. Their problem is to extend their contacts in the core area, and to recognize the most salient issues for core area blacks, while living outside the area. One would-be black leader typified this problem:

I think I'm bright enough to know what should be done [in the subcommunity], but sometimes I don't know what they [core area residents] think, or if they have opinions. . . . All I can do is try to speak on behalf of them--and I should.³⁸

*See Chapter V's discussion of two such efforts: John Washington and the Malcolm X Institute.

The spatial reinforcement of socio-economic barriers leads to a "spokesman" concept of leadership for many middle-income blacks, particularly the militant integrationists. They will speak "on behalf of" the core area residents, though in fact they may not be aware of their most pressing problems. Thus, though housing has been the area of greatest dissatisfaction for core area residents,³⁹ leaders frequently give the housing issue lower priority.

Police and the Subcommunity

Perceptions of Central City police also differ among blacks. Though most residents of the core area are unfavorably disposed toward the local police,⁴⁰ many blacks in leadership positions are considerably more sanguine. Comments such as "We don't have any police brutality in this town," or "All in all, I guess the police do alright" are common.

Citizen complaints about police activities are subjected only to internal investigation within the police department. Blacks frequently direct complaints not to the police, but to the Human Relations Commission, which is headed by a black. These complaints are passed on to the police department for its own investigations. Blacks in Central City have never brought much pressure on the department to hire blacks--perhaps because of disdain for the police. The force has only eight black policemen, all hired since 1965. The deliberate recruitment of black policemen has not been a department policy; the main emphasis is upon

increasing the professionalism of the force, and educational requirements have been upgraded to include at least sixty college credits.

Police view street-violence, crime and drugs as their main problems in the black core area.⁴¹ Three small riots have occurred since the mid-sixties, all of them short and causing comparatively few injuries and little property damage. In one case, however, the Mayor threatened to have all looters shot on sight, though this was not done (probably because there were few looters).

The sequence of events in the September, 1971, "riot" was typical:⁴² the sparking incident was the street-corner shooting of two blacks by a white man; the following night black youths threw bricks at passing cars, fire-bombed a building with U.S. Army offices, and hurled bricks and firebombs at firemen; the Mayor responded the next day by saying that the initial shooting only provided an excuse to riot; several black spokesmen tried to calm the youths during the day, but the following night, after several rocks were thrown, officers blocked off traffic in a fifteen-block area (closely corresponding to the black core area in Figure 3), and the violence gradually ended.

Some of the events illustrate the gap between middle-class black leaders and the angry youths in the core area. For example, in a newspaper story written by one of the young blacks, the director of the Human Relations Commission was slightly referred to as "a Central City Negro employed

by the city."⁴³ And in contrast to the local black leaders speaking for racial integration, the mimeographed sheet which sought to supply a rough ideological base for the riot called for an extreme form of black community control (see p. 167).

Though Central City's over-all crime rate has increased more slowly than in larger cities,⁴⁴ both blacks and police report disproportionate amounts of theft and drug use in the core area. Police activity in the area is correspondingly higher.⁴⁵ The traffic in heroin and cocaine has been locally controlled by black dealers; ironically, one of the main drop-off points for heroin is assumed to be the "West Side Drop-in Center," established by the city as a place of recreation in the core area.⁴⁶ Though black informants claimed that "drugs are ruining us," or "are our number one problem," few steps have been taken by blacks themselves to reduce drug use in the subcommunity. There have been a few ministerial conferences, and a new Methadone and Detoxification Center has been established, but subcommunity leaders have taken no concerted action.

A number of blacks insist that whites have deliberately used the drug traffic to pacify the subcommunity. One black minister reflected this attitude:

I know for a fact that our West Side is loaded with dope. . . . It's been said by some, and I believe

*The antipathy some black leaders felt toward the city's Model Cities agency was strengthened when rumors spread after the riot that the flier had been printed at the Malcolm X Institute--which is funded by Model Cities.

The white media (television, radio, and newspapers) are in cahoots with the white police force. Since Monday night the Black people of Central City have been rebelling against the white power structure of this city. Activities have been in the form of throwing bricks at whites who drive through the Black community, and fire-bombing building[s], such as the military intelligence building at Ottawa and Butler.

The activities were sparked by the shooting of a brother and sister on Monday by a white boy. The white boy was in the Black community at 4:30 in the morning. The white boy tried to buy some pussy from the sister. When the sister refused to allow herself to become a prostitute the white boy shot her three times and her male companion, who was standing nearby, once.

The Black community responded immediately when the people got word of the murder attempt. Bricks and bombs began to fly, and will continue to fly!

Why the bricks at white people?

Because whites who drive through the Black community at night are the source of crime in the community. It's whites in the Black community at night who buy stolen goods taken from the homes of Black workers. It's the whites in the Black community at night who bring the dope into the Black community. It's the whites in the Black community at night that try to make the Black woman a prostitute! That's why the bricks fly at the white people at night, to stop crime and indecency in the Black community.

Why bricks at all white people? They all don't sell dope, buy stolen goods or approach sisters.

Because it is the duty of all whites to stop their brothers. If those who are innocent will stop coming through the Black community, then only the guilty will come. Then only the guilty will be tricked. Whites this is a warning to you! The people and white media claim they do not know why Blacks are in the streets. THEY KNOW!!! They all are receiving a copy of this notice. THEY KNOW! They don't tell you because they want to start a riot. Mayor Smith and Police Chief Jones know, but they want an opportunity to shoot some "Niggers."

The Black activist[s] of Central City are demanding an end to the harrasement of the Black people of Central City, by police when whites are the real criminals.

Figure 4.--Flier Distributed During Riot, September, 1971.

We demand:

- (1) All whites stay out of the Black community after dark. This is your final warning!
- (2) Black people be given the taxes collected from the Black community in order that we can police and build our own community. Jones and his pigs are not doing the job.
- (3) All institutions; police department, fire stations, schools, etc. be turned over to the Black community to operate.

Then the Black community will be a healthy place to live and raise a family.

it, that dope has been pushed into ghettos to cool down the black movement, to keep people apathetic. . . .⁴⁷

It is certain that drug use is increasing, and even formally reported cases of addiction in the city are disproportionately black: for example, forty-two out of ninety-two addicts admitted to the local hospital between July, 1970, and July, 1971, were black.⁴⁸

Although in the past local police have been charged with ignoring the drug traffic in the core area, a series of recent raids on west side "dope pads" has occurred.⁴⁹ The immediate effects have been a reduction in the number of black drug dealers (thus opening the market to Chicano entrepreneurs), and an increase in the street price of heroin.⁵⁰

With the exception of the militant separatists, local black leaders seem not so much concerned with stories of police brutality as with accounts of police inefficiency. Their main complaint is that black neighborhoods are open to drug dealers and petty criminals because police ignore these areas. Stories are repeatedly told of calls to police which go unanswered for hours. The police chief defends the department, citing computer reports which show faster response times for police in the predominantly black west side,⁵¹ but the criticism continues. Indeed, many of the black leaders living in or near the core area have very strong "law and order" views:

_____ was arrested at the [high school] sit-in, and they found out he was a draft-dodger and returned him

to Texas for a trial. . . . They paroled him and allowed him to return here. . . . Now he's back, walking around, causing trouble. . . . Can you imagine that? What are we coming to?

In Central City, after a person is arrested, you see them out on the streets again the next day--they should keep them in jail a good long while before their trials, so they can't get out. . . . I don't care if they keep 'em in there for years!⁵²

Black Politics in Central City

The patterns of black politics in Central City support Wilson's contention that "the structure and style of Negro politics in . . . Northern cities . . . reflects the politics of the city as a whole."⁵³ Particularly in Central City, local black politics are shaped by the formal structures of city government.

Central City has a Mayor-Council, non-partisan form of government. Recent charter revisions have strengthened the Mayor's office. Elected by popular vote every four years, the Mayor is the city's chief executive officer, responsible for the yearly budget and general supervision of the executive and administrative work of the city, though his appointments to city and county boards are subject to council approval. The City Council acts as a legislative body, and is responsible for passing ordinances, approving most mayoral appointments and maintaining legislative oversight of administrative activities. The Mayor has no vote on the council except in cases of a tie-vote, and he may veto council action. Six of the eight votes on the council are necessary to override the Mayor's veto.

Certain aspects of the city's formal structure--specifically the non-partisan ballot and the altering of ward arrangements--generate constraints on black political activity. The non-partisan ballot provides no party cues around which a black bloc vote might be organized, and directs existing party organizations away from local politics. Therefore, black voters are required to have relatively high levels of political information in order to differentiate among the array of names on the local ballot.

Changes in local units of representation have also diminished the potential impact of the black vote: ward lines have been redrawn and "at-large" constituencies created. In the past, Central City used a large number of wards which generally were drawn to reflect the ethnic or religious characteristics of neighborhoods. In a city where the tiny Negro population was somewhat dispersed, council representation was based on eight wards, each electing two councilmen. However, as the black population increased in number and concentration, a black attorney almost won a council seat in 1952. That same year the city was redistricted, and the present arrangement was made for four large wards with only one councilman from each, and four councilmen to be elected at-large. The ward lines were redrawn and the black core area is now split between wards three and four, with blacks a minority in each; this redistricting was seen by some blacks as a move to reduce the power of the black vote.⁵⁴

The creation of city-wide council constituencies also presumably reduced the chances for a successful black candidacy. In the twenty years since the change in representation there has been only one successful black at-large candidate, and his actions on behalf of the black subcommunity are necessarily restricted by his mainly white constituency. In short, these aspects of the formal structure destroy what has been the basis for most urban black representation on city councils--the relatively small, racially homogeneous ward.⁵⁵

The black role in local politics is also affected by less tangible factors such as the low visibility of city politics, the economic-growth orientation of top policymakers, the widely shared assumptions about the proper scope of city politics, and what is assumed to be the conservative "power elite" in Central City. The seemingly low visibility of local politics is reflected in turnouts for city elections, which only rarely exceed one-third of the registered voters--and which are similarly low in the black core area. This low visibility seems to be the product of the restricted nature of local policy-making (most "issues" involve balancing budgets and the routine housekeeping functions of government), the absence of party identifications to structure political conflicts and excite voter interest, and the staggered schedule of local elections in which the Mayor and all councilmen never run simultaneously. Another possibility not to be ignored is that most citizens are satisfied

with what they know of city politics. A majority of the city's voters are Republican, and the low-key "good government" approach in local politics may well seem satisfactory--though clearly not to the black leaders in Central City.

The issues which do arouse the interest of wider publics often are neighborhood-related. For example, one of the more heated controversies of recent years revolved around the issue of locating a low-income housing project in a section of the city. The aroused residents of the neighborhood brought petitions to the City Council, forced the issue onto the ballot and won the referendum overwhelmingly.* Again, the issue of school busing and the "neighborhood school" (discussed in detail in Chapter VI) is currently the only local issue exciting mass publics.

Most of the city's policy-makers also seem to share a common definition of the proper role for local governments: local government should be producer-oriented, directly promoting economic growth and establishing a "good climate" for local businesses. Thus, in Central City, much attention is given to the urban renewal projects which, in the words of one businessman, "spruce up the downtown and make the city better for business";⁵⁶ at \$4,089,841, the downtown renewal project is the big ticket item in the city budget.⁵⁷ Establishing a good business climate is linked to what is seen as the proper scope of policy-making in the

*Table 34 indicates the black-white vote on the referendum. The issue has since gone to the courts.

city. The hallmarks of good government are felt to be properly balanced budgets, low taxes and efficient services.*

. . . producer-oriented political activity often expresses itself negatively; that is, nothing should be done that might hinder the community's growth. The city should have "a good reputation." Politics should be conducted in a low key. The image of stability and regularity in city finances must be assured. Friendliness toward business in general should be the traditional attitude of city officials.⁵⁸

Thus, Central City politics usually produce few proposals for innovative city policies, but instead emphasize the virtues of the "good government" approach. Many blacks account for the traditionally limited concerns of local government through power elite explanations. Repeatedly, the socially prominent white realtors and businessmen are cited as the controlling elite which manipulates local government for its own ends;** though evaluation of this belief is beyond the scope of this research, it does seem that the structural barriers discussed above are of equal importance in "explaining" the difficulties of local black politics.

*One city official stated this position quite succinctly: "I think we should have a disciplined city government--like a good business. Our planning should be careful . . . our use of the taxpayer's money should be cautious. . . . We should run a tight ship--and I guess we do."

**The research of a decade ago may give some credence to these views: Form and Sauer found most local decision-makers to be white conservatives who lived for years in the Central City area, with the "economic dominants" having the greatest influence on local policy-makers. The findings were a result of using the reputational approach in Central City. See William A. Form and Christopher Sauer, "Community Influentials in a Middle-Size City," Institute of Community Development publication (East Lansing, 1959).

In fact, the low visibility of local politics and the commonly held belief in a white power elite might seem to offer opportunities for black political mobilization: given the minimal interest in local politics among whites, the organization of a solid black voting bloc could have a great electoral impact; also the widely presumed existence of a white "power elite" might seem to offer black leaders a target for rhetoric, a necessary enemy against which to organize local blacks. Neither the organization of a large black vote nor the use of the white elites as targets has yet occurred, in large part because of (1) the limits on incentives available to black political leaders, (2) the structural context of city politics and (3) the existing patterns of co-optation.

Assuming that political like other leaders must maintain their followings by use of differing incentives,⁵⁹ Central City's black political leaders face serious problems. To garner the largest possible black vote, appeals would have to be directed to the black lower class in the core area. By and large, the material incentives (jobs, favors, patronage), which are traditionally useful in inducing lower class support in a "machine" city⁶⁰ are not available to local black politicians. For example, neither the black city councilman nor the member of the Board of Education has access to many such incentives.* Intangible

*The Mayor, however, does have these incentives available--thus, a black Mayor would be in a different position.

incentives or racial appeals--which have been useful elsewhere in mobilizing a black vote⁶¹--might also be used, but as we have seen, the formal structure of city politics imposes mainly white constituencies on black politicians. In the strategic context of large wards and city-wide constituencies, the successful black politician is likely to avoid the kinds of direct racial appeals which might well arouse as many whites as Negroes. In addition, the process of informal co-optation,⁶² through which Central City's unions, schools and state agencies have begun to share power within institutions, lessens the chances for those blacks not occupying electoral positions to use racial appeals.* Upwardly mobile blacks are aware of the role constraints in their new positions as supervisors in the state highway office, or assistant principals in the high schools or presidents of union locals; though recognized as black spokesmen, their appeals cannot be directly racial in nature. Not surprisingly, their rhetoric is one emphasizing "fair play," "community responsibility" and the "need for communication."⁶³ Of course, most of the political and positional leaders are also middle class--by income, education and occupation--as well as spatially separated from the black core area, making it even more unlikely for them to direct racial appeals to the lower class. A small group of leaders within the black subcommunity (the militant separatists) do use racial appeals, though they never hold political office.

*See the co-optive saga of John Washington, as described in Chapter V, pp. 283-286.

All of these factors contribute to the unmobilized black vote in Central City. Mobilization requires a high percentage of registered voters who can vote as a sophisticated bloc--selecting out and supporting favored white or black candidates, while voting against others. The largest barrier to this kind of mobilization is the low percentage of local black voters who are registered.⁶⁴

However, those blacks who do vote form a rather sophisticated bloc. When the first black candidate ran successfully for the Board of Education in 1969 the mainly black precincts* overwhelmingly supported her (Table 31). When the black councilman ran in 1971 black support again was strong (Table 32). Of course, neither the black population nor the black vote is large enough to give victories to blacks with city-wide constituencies, and both successful black candidates have had to develop general support. Harriet Campbell, in running for the Board of Education, finished first in a field of nine candidates, and James Faraday, the city councilman, has developed increasing electoral support in all wards of the city (see Table 33).

Where direct racial cues are absent, black voters still seem able to distinguish "friends" and "enemies." For example, when then-Mayor Burningham was faced by challenger

*It is sometimes difficult to isolate the black vote since, of course, no racial identification of voters is kept in official records. However, certain areas of the city are overwhelmingly black. The returns from this core area, which coincides with precincts sixteen and seventeen in ward four and precinct one in ward three, are used here.

Gerald Ravski, who was not seen as friendly to blacks, Burningham pulled 77.9% of the vote in the mainly black sixteenth precinct. Even in a comparatively complex referendum vote, blacks voted overwhelmingly in favor of placing low-income housing in a white neighborhood, as shown in Table 34.

Table 31.--Percentage of vote for Negro board candidate in selected black precincts, April, 1969.*

	Harriet Campbell	All Opponents
Ward 4, precinct 16	48.5	51.5
Ward 4, precinct 17	48.0	52.0

*Nine candidates ran for the Board of Education and each voter could vote for five in these precincts. Many voters evidently cast ballots only for the black candidate, with Campbell drawing about one-half of all votes and the remainder being split up among the other eight candidates.

Source: Election returns, Office of the City Clerk.

Table 32.--Percentage of vote for Negro councilman candidate in black precincts, April, 1971.*

	James Faraday	All Opponents
Ward 3, precinct 1	72.0	28.0
Ward 4, precinct 16	60.5	39.5
Ward 4, precinct 17	57.1	42.9

*Four candidates ran for at-large seats on the City Council and voters could vote for one person.

Source: Office of the City Clerk.

Table 33.--Votes for black candidate as percentage of top vote-getter, by ward and year.

	1967 Percentage of Top Vote-Getter	1971 Percentage of Top Vote-Getter
Ward 1	73.6	99.9
Ward 2	69.9	86.2
Ward 3	74.4	WON
Ward 4	90.7	WON

Source: Office of the City Clerk.

Table 34.--Percentage of votes for low-income housing project, 1970.

	Yes	No
City-wide vote	35.8	64.2
Black precincts*	73.0	27.0

*Ward four, precincts 16 and 17.

Source: Office of the City Clerk.

However, there are signs of the undermobilization of black voters in the traditional time lag for black politicians,⁶⁵ the continued presence of a white councilman in the fourth ward and in the stance of the Mayor vis-à-vis the black subcommunity. Although in the last twenty years the local black population has increased rapidly from its initially small base, elected black officials did not appear in local politics until the last five years. This time lag

is no doubt linked to the "newness" of much of Central City's black populace, including many higher status blacks, and the structural barriers of large wards and city-wide constituencies; it also reflects the difficulties of organizing for political ends in a subcommunity generally characterized by low income and education levels.⁶⁶

The time lag seems to be ending--but in rather unusual fashion. Blacks have gained office not by organizing other blacks as a voting bloc (in neither case, have the successful black candidates depended on black votes for their margins of victory), but by successfully appealing to city-wide constituencies or by being appointed to official positions. Unlike cities where ward organization eventually converts black majorities into black officials, Central City Negroes are beginning to be elected to city office without ever successfully organizing the voters in the black subcommunity--as indicated by the very low proportion of registered black voters.

Though the potential black vote is split between two wards, most of it is concentrated within ward four (precincts sixteen and seventeen). However, no black councilman has been elected from the ward, partly because of low levels of black voting* and political disorganization. The

*Though comprising about a fourth of the potential vote in the ward, blacks generally cast less than 10% of the vote in the ward, as calculated by using total votes from "black precincts" sixteen and seventeen.

disorganization was apparent in the last attempt of a black candidate:

. . . he [the candidate] wasn't too sure about the running business . . . signs were put up too late in the campaign. . . . The community was split because some people didn't like him . . . he didn't talk to the right groups. . . . It was strictly amateur night. . . .⁶⁷

This politically unorganized black subcommunity poses little threat to the present Mayor, who is seen as consistently hostile by blacks. Leaders consider the Mayor to have used the racial issue in his first campaign for office, which was largely based on the "threat" posed by the low-income housing project. One white politician claimed that

he ran an anti-establishment, Wallace-type campaign, . . . he wasn't explicitly anti-black, but I think everyone got the right idea. . . . He won by getting the "mud-sill vote"* and a good amount of white union support.⁶⁸

In his first term, the Mayor has been responsible for the firing of a black Model Cities aide involved in a protest, maintained steady criticism of Model Cities and its black director, threatened to "get the jobs"⁶⁹ of prominent blacks who criticized the police and charged the black councilman with being "unfit for public office" because of unpaid bills at the city utility. In addition, few blacks have been hired for city hall jobs during the Mayor's tenure. For example, while the city in 1971 increased salaried jobs by 16%, minorities in the same classification declined by 5%.⁷⁰ The Mayor has also appointed relatively few blacks

*This phrase refers to a southern rural voter-- coming from an area where mudsills are common to most houses.

to city positions, even to the Model Cities agency, and none at all to his official cabinet. Because of its campaign support, UAW local 652 black officials have been given two appointments.

Black leaders are unanimously negative in their feelings toward the Mayor.* Many hope that the black councilman will challenge him for office in the future, though there is fear that the Mayor "has dirt" on the councilman's alleged sexual and economic activities.

In general, there are strong constraints on black political activity in Central City: blacks are a minority of the city population (9.3%), few voters are registered and black politicians face the problems posed by large wards, city-wide constituencies and non-partisan ballots.

Conclusion: Coalition and Infiltration

The characteristics of the black subcommunity and the political and economic environment of the city establish the context within which local black leadership must operate. The demographic data discussed in this chapter directly affect (1) the kinds of resources⁷¹ available or not available to leaders, (2) the appropriateness of differing strategies, (3) the types of black leaders likely

*Though a few blacks initially supported him, the Mayor today is talked of with great scorn: "He's a racist," "He has this racial hang-up," "He's a little man," "He stabs you in the back," "He is completely irresponsible" are a few typical comments. Stories abound of the Mayor telling black leaders to control "their" people, of the Mayor threatening to make an issue of the murder of the daughter of a prominent official by a black, etc.

to appear and (4) the level of competition among these leaders.

The most basic datum for Central City blacks is population size: though increasing, the black population is still small, both relatively and absolutely. In terms of absolute number, the black population of slightly more than 12,000 does not provide the basis for the intricate network of organizations, groups and institutions characteristic of the larger black populations in major cities. For example, Central City's black subcommunity has relatively few civil rights organizations (only the NAACP and the Urban League), only a small newspaper published sporadically by college students and no elaborate black economy in the core area.*

It is possible that a certain critical mass is necessary for the extension and elaboration of subcommunity institutions, and that Central City blacks simply do not have sufficient numbers. In addition, though, the black core area has been faced with the necessity of shifting residents and businesses in the forced relocations of the last few years, while physical intrusions into the black core--via "neighborhood improvement projects," street and highway extensions and capitol expansion--seem likely to continue. Small numbers plus shifting populations** and forced relocations contribute to the underdeveloped network

*The exception to this general pattern is the church in the black core area, as discussed in Chapter V.

**See Table 24, p. 152.

of organizations and institutions in Central City's black core. In short, the black subcommunity is non-autonomous: it not only lacks its own (black) political representatives, but also has little in the way of its own newspapers, organizations or businesses.

This situation affects the opportunity structures⁷² available to potential leaders: those who would advance themselves as leaders through organizational links or by attaining prominent organizational positions find that few such groups are available in the core area. Instead, the main organizational choices are the local branches of the NAACP and the Urban League, neither of which is a neighborhood-based organization, and both of which--in their local manifestations--implicitly require leadership by middle-class integrationists. Thus, with the exception of the black churches, the local opportunity structure for potential black leaders points away from the core area--toward government jobs, service in local branches of national organizations or political office. The "bias" in this opportunity structure is obvious: leaders using blatant racial appeals or showing any fondness for violence are not likely to head the local Urban League or NAACP--or to hold government jobs or political offices with white constituencies. Only two alternatives to the existing structure of opportunities have been developed: the creation of his own organization and following by one leader, and the development of the Malcolm X Institute, as discussed in Chapter V.

The organizational underdevelopment of the subcommunity also influences leadership behavior in conflict situations. For example, given an elaborate network of groups, the "threat" of the I-496 highway could have been instantly publicized in the subcommunity, and then greeted with the predictable cries of outrage and defiance and a series of condemnations from various neighborhood organizations. Instead, as we have seen, word of the highway and the impending demolitions spread slowly, and a few of those affected finally organized themselves into a small group which, following the lead of some white citizen groups, protested to the city council.⁷³ Black leaders simply do not have the backing of a large number of subcommunity organizations; in conflicts, they sometimes must speak alone or create their own ad hoc groups.

Institutional underdevelopment in Central City has also meant that fewer individuals, organizations or businesses have a stake in the maintenance of a segregated subcommunity.⁷⁴ Thus, when the housing market opened somewhat for middle-income blacks in the 1960's, there were few barriers to their moving in the way of institutions or businesses in the core area requiring their support. The consequent dispersal of middle- and upper-income blacks probably weakens the chances for future development of core area institutions, though it increases the degree of racial integration in the local housing market; not surprisingly, given

their goals, militant separatists sometimes express bitterness about this situation.

Central City's black population is also still small in relation to the total population of the city, and thus affords a rather narrow base of support for blacks who wish to influence white leaders in the city. As discussed, even this small population is politically unmobilized, and the unavailability of the resource of large numbers is reinforced by structural constraints. Nor does this small sub-community seem to have the potential economic resources of the larger near-by black populations of Detroit or Flint, Central City blacks having higher unemployment and underemployment, and lower median incomes.*

In a sense, Central City's black leaders have been faced with a choice between two models of action: "organizing the black community," or gaining positions of some authority and working with whites.** Given the constraints of time and limited resources, most leaders have felt the need to give priority to one or the other approach. One Urban League official reflected on this choice:

Look, I don't have the time to go out and talk to everyone in the community, and sit on street corners discussing their problems. . . . _____ could do that because he had the time. But I think what we're doing is more practical in the long run.⁷⁵

These local options are somewhat parallel to the alternatives debated nationally by blacks over the last

*See this chapter, pp. 131-143.

**See Chapter II, pp. 100-106.

decade.⁷⁶ As envisioned by its proponents in Central City, community organization would entail the building of separate, distinctively black institutions in the core area. This strengthened subcommunity would then provide a power base for future dealings with the city. This mode of organization implies a different kind of local leadership: most of the current middle-class leaders are not particularly adept at making the sorts of appeals necessary to build a mass base of support in the core area.

However, black leaders in Central City clearly do lack certain resources: they do not have the power of large numbers, the mobilization of the subcommunity electorate, the network of supportive organizations and institutions in the core area or very abundant economic resources. Lacking these resources, most leaders have not tried to organize a permanent base of support in the core area, but have given priority to the tactics of coalition and "infiltration."* Through coalition, they have sought to find the necessary allies and to build upon white support; through infiltration, leaders have sought to locate themselves in the institutions (mainly governmental), seen as most affecting Central City blacks--school boards, city councils, Human Relations Commissions, Model Cities.

The integrationists coming out of the NAACP seem to have been most successful in the infiltration tactic. For

*This word was used by one of the more perceptive black leaders in Central City, and seems a succinct description of the approach used.

example, of the members of the local NAACP's education committee in the recent past, one has become a member of the Central City Board of Education, three have become local principals, one became the attorney for the Board of Education, one became director of elementary education and one member became the State Superintendent of Education. With some understatement, one former member of the committee says, "We decided to infiltrate the 'power structure.'"

Given the formal and implicit role requirements of positions as local board members and administrators, middle-class blacks seem most likely to work their way into key institutional positions. However, the sustained efforts to attain these positions are not merely a passing tactic used by Central City leaders; these efforts are also among the main mechanisms of personal upward mobility. Though each new position gained is presented as a symbol of growing black influence in the city's dominant institutions, in most cases it also represents an added increment of status, and income, and perhaps power for a specific stratum of the subcommunity: the black middle class.

For low-income blacks, infiltration/upward mobility frequently is not viewed as bringing group gains, but as part of a process by which black spokesmen become increasingly distant from the subcommunity.*⁷⁷ When asked about how they

*This generalization is supplied through leadership and informant interviews, not through non-elite interviews in the core area.

were viewed by low-income blacks, many of the leaders interviewed were aware of this problem: "You won't be believed if you come from the 'establishment,' and I'm seen that way," and "A lot of them call me Uncle Tom, I guess," are representative comments.⁷⁸ These role strains are exacerbated by the lack of material incentives available to blacks in key positions--incentives through which followings might be built or retained in the ghetto area--and by the increasing residential separation of the middle class.

For many blacks in Central City the desire to infiltrate the city's institutions has been matched by the relatively recent opportunity to do so. Only in the last seven years have blacks moved into leadership positions in the city council, Human Relations Commission, school board and local unions. In turn, these opportunities have brought problems. Role conflicts for black leaders with white constituencies are common, while resentment from those blacks who have not "made it" threatens leadership support in the black subcommunity.

Though Central City's black leaders sometimes claim to speak for or on behalf of blacks in the core area, in fact most of the leaders have bases of power independent of black mass support. Many of them hold either appointive or electoral offices, which allow them to participate in the policy-making processes of various institutions and to influence the white community on issues which seem to involve the interests of blacks. It is these formal positions or

offices, not strong organizational or mass support from the ghetto, which provide the basis for most leadership roles.

In these positions, individuals repeatedly must speak to whites on behalf of blacks, perhaps explaining the wide currency of the spokesman concept of leadership among local black leaders.

Though an active group or organizational life within the subcommunity does not provide the independent bases for competing leaders, some attempts have been made to create mass followings. Political and positional leaders have not been enthusiastic about these efforts: one leader who spent time listening to and trying to organize young blacks in the core area was faced with opposition from other black leaders and eventually joined a research company; Model Cities projects have also not pleased many black spokesmen who fear that the program may provide alternative bases for leadership by "radicals."⁷⁹

However, to this point, organization in the core area provides only a tenuous basis for leadership; the problems of numbers, money and organization are still present. Also, the subcommunity is hardly monolithic and the ideal of "organizing the community" in fact comes to mean either organizing among black youths, as the militant separatists have attempted, or among the more conservative constituencies served by the core area churches.

The argument of this chapter has been that the patterns of migration, education, employment, income and politics

traced here establish the range of possibilities for local black leaders, making available some resources, while foreclosing others. As discussed, though there is a large pool of potential leaders in the growing black middle class, the resources generally available in the black subcommunity are severely limited. The fundamental decision made by black leaders is that Central City's black subcommunity does not provide an independent power base sufficient in numbers, internal mobilization, organizational resources or money for them to have much impact on the life of the city. The possible impact of a highly organized subcommunity is diminished even further by the structural constraints discussed in this chapter. Thus, the turning away from the subcommunity to the tactics of coalition and infiltration has seemed wisest to most black leaders, particularly where such approaches complement their career and income aspirations.

The situation is not so simple that these leadership choices are mere dependent variables, with the demographic data summarizing independent or even "causal" variables. Instead, black subcommunities with differing characteristics make certain courses seem more "sensible" than others, as many local leaders argue:

We just don't have that much [in the subcommunity]. . . . It's better to get friends than enemies, because there are a lot more of them [whites], than there are of us [blacks] in this city. . . . So I look for people who are interested and will help us--that seems the best thing to do. . . . There are a few rabble-rousers around, but in this town we get a lot more done. We're realistic, you know? . . . In my job I can get people jobs: they just talk because that's all they're

able to do. . . . These [other] leaders just talk for themselves and two or three other people; they don't have the skills, they don't have the things to work with, they're just talking in circles. . . . It makes more sense to me to try to influence whites than to hang around the corner shouting--that just won't work. . . .⁸⁰

The "things to work with," then, seem available through coalition and infiltration, not through organization in a subcommunity of limited resources. In contrast, in the larger cities with burgeoning black populations (such as Detroit or Flint), talk of community organization, separate black institutions and black political control may seem more relevant, given subcommunity characteristics, than it does in Central City. The predominance of such topics in the recent literature no doubt reflects the paucity of research done on smaller black subcommunities in medium-sized cities--like Central City. The following chapter considers the types of leadership goals developed in this setting.

FOOTNOTES

¹Douglas K. Meyer, "The Changing Negro Residential Patterns. . ." (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, 1970), p. 58.

²Augustus Feweh Caine, "Patterns of Negro Protest: A Structural-Functional Analysis" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, 1964), pp. 117-118.

³For information on Central City migrants from 1940-1950, see Rose T. Brunson, "A Study of the Migrant Negro Population. . ." (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State College, 1955); and a description of states of origin for local migrants in Walter R. Banks, "A Source of Social Protest: The Predicament of the Status Inconsistent Negro" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, 1963), Appendix A, Table 1 (4-B), p. 202.

⁴Meyer, op. cit., p. 61.

⁵Adapted from Meyer, Table 14, p. 70.

⁶Ibid., Table 15, p. 70.

⁷Ibid., p. 25.

⁸Ibid., pp. 92 and 94.

⁹James Q. Wilson, Negro Politics: The Search for Leadership (New York, 1960), p. 99.

¹⁰For example, see the research literature discussed in Chapter I.

¹¹This is the estimate of Systems Research, Incorporated, as reported in Improving the Quality of Urban Life: Third Year Action Plan and Planned Variation Submission, prepared by City Demonstration Agency, 1972, p. IV-11.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Ibid., pp. IV-11, 12.

¹⁴Interviews with local Model Cities staff.

¹⁵Computed from Table P-6, "Economic Characteristics of the Negro Population: 1970, for Census Tracts with 400 or more Negro Population," Census Tracts, 1971, p. P-44.

¹⁶Third Year Action Plan, op. cit., pp. IV-25, 26.

¹⁷For example, see E. Franklin Frazier, "The Negro Family in Chicago," in Contributions to Urban Sociology, ed. by Ernest Burgess and Donald Bogue (Chicago, 1964), pp. 404-418, and similar descriptions of the black ghetto in St. Clair Drake and Horace R. Cayton, Black Metropolis (New York, 1945), pp. 174-213.

¹⁸Equal Housing Opportunity Study, prepared by Lensworth Cottrell, Jr., for Community Renewal Program, 1968, p. 1.

¹⁹Ibid., pp. 4, 8.

²⁰Computed from Table H-2, "Structural, Equipment and Financial Characteristics of Housing Units: 1970," Census Tracts, 1971, p. H-15.

²¹Cottrell, op. cit., p. 22.

²²Ibid., p. 23: 89% of respondents in this sample reported avoiding real estate agents.

²³Meyer, op. cit., p. 115.

²⁴Cottrell, op. cit., p. 23.

²⁵Meyer, op. cit., p. 149.

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Relocation Study, prepared by Lensworth Cottrell, Jr., for Community Renewal Program, 1968, p. 7.

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰Informant interview; this person was one of those who had to relocate.

³¹Informant interview.

³²Cottrell, Relocation Study, op. cit., p. 22.

³³Informant interview.

³⁴Meyer, op. cit., p. 165.

³⁵Table p-6, "Economic Characteristics of the Negro Population: 1970, Census Tracts with 400 or more Negro Population," Census Tracts, 1971, p. P-44.

³⁶Ibid.

³⁷Informant interview.

³⁸Leadership interview.

³⁹Cottrell, Equal Housing Opportunity Study, op. cit., Table 11: "Attitude Toward City Services and Institutions, Comparisons of Rankings on Degree of Dissatisfaction by Race," p. 19.

⁴⁰Ibid.

⁴¹Based on interviews with police and public statements of city officials.

⁴²This sequence is reconstructed from interviews with officials and two persons claiming participation in the "riot," as well as articles in the Central City State Journal, Sept. 2-10, 1971.

⁴³Abduhl M. Jamal, "Black Community Revolts in Retaliates [sic] to Murder Attempt," Project Grapevine, September 23, 1971.

⁴⁴William Ringle, "Crime Rise . . . Below National Rate," State Journal, March 31, 1972.

⁴⁵Norman Sinclair, "Police Deny West Side 'Slowness' Charge," State Journal.

⁴⁶This was persistently reported in all interviews.

⁴⁷Informant interview.

⁴⁸Norman Sinclair, "Time for Action Is Now," State Journal.

⁴⁹Norman Sinclair, "City Heroin War Surfaces in Police Arrests," State Journal, May 7, 1972; "19 Arrested in Heroin Ring," June 23, 1972, and "Raid Chokes Off Dope," June 24, 1972, State Journal.

⁵⁰Reports from core area black ministers.

⁵¹Norman Sinclair, "Quick Police Runs Noted," State Journal.

⁵²Leadership interviews; these attitudes contrast sharply with the sentiments expressed by black leaders in Washington, D.C., against the new local detention laws.

⁵³Wilson, op. cit., p. 22.

⁵⁴Caine, op. cit., p. 209.

⁵⁵For example, see Harold M. Baron, "Black Powerlessness in Chicago," in Black Liberation Politics, ed. by Edward Greer (Boston, 1971), pp. 33-34; and Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, "Negroes in City Politics," in Roots of Rebellion, ed. by Richard P. Young (New York, 1970), pp. 200-218.

⁵⁶Informant interview.

⁵⁷Downtown Project, p. E-1, State Journal, Feb. 13, 1972.

⁵⁸Oliver P. Williams and Charles R. Adrian, "Community Types and Policy Differences," in City Politics and Public Policy, ed. by James Q. Wilson (New York, 1968), p. 18.

⁵⁹Peter B. Clark and James Q. Wilson, "Incentive Systems: A Theory of Organizations," Administrative Science Quarterly (September, 1961), pp. 129-166.

⁶⁰Wilson, Negro Politics, op. cit., p. 54.

⁶¹James Q. Wilson, "Two Negro Politicians: An Interpretation," Midwest Journal of Political Science (November, 1960), pp. 346-369.

⁶²As distinguished by Selznick, "formal" co-optation reflects a need to establish the legitimacy of an institution and its actions without actually sharing power--for example, by appointing powerless "token" Negroes to certain positions. "Informal" co-optation refers to the need to adjust an institution to new centers of power in the community by actually sharing power--for example, by moving blacks into positions of authority in union locals. See Philip Selznick, TVA and the Grass Roots (Berkeley, 1953), pp. 259ff.

⁶³These phrases were used repeatedly during interviews.

⁶⁴Staff from the A. Phillip Randolph Institute have been working to increase local black voter registration.

⁶⁵For further discussion of the "time lag," see Wilson, Negro Politics, op. cit., pp. 24-25.

⁶⁶There is debate as to the degree of political participation by urban blacks; see Morris Janowitz and Dwaine Marvick, Competitive Pressures and Democratic Consent (Ann Arbor, Michigan Governmental Studies No. 32), p. 26; Marvin E. Olson, "Social and Political Participation of Blacks," American Sociological Review (August, 1970),

pp. 682-697; and Nicholas Babchuck and Ralph V. Thompson, "Voluntary Associations of Negroes," American Sociological Review (October, 1962), pp. 647-655.

⁶⁷Informant interview.

⁶⁸Ibid.

⁶⁹Norman Sinclair, "Racism Cries Raised at Mayor," State Journal, p. B-1.

⁷⁰Norman Sinclair, "City's Minority Job Data Scored," State Journal, Feb. 11, 1972, p. B-1.

⁷¹For discussion of the range of possible power resources, see Robert A. Dahl, "The Analysis of Influence in Local Communities," in Social Science and Community Action, ed. by Charles Adrian, Institute for Community Development, Michigan State University.

⁷²See Joseph Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics (Chicago, 1966).

⁷³This is the sequence of events as recounted by a leader initially involved in resisting the relocations.

⁷⁴Contrast this situation with the description of the Chicago subcommunity in Wilson, Negro Politics, op. cit., pp. 107-108.

⁷⁵Informant interview.

⁷⁶For example, contrast Bayard Rustin, "The Failure of Black Separatism," Harpers Magazine (January, 1970), pp. 25-34, with Stokely Carmichael and Charles V. Hamilton, Black Power (New York, 1967).

⁷⁷Informant and leadership interviews.

⁷⁸Leadership interviews.

⁷⁹Informant interviews.

⁸⁰Leadership interviews.

CHAPTER IV

PATTERNS IN LEADERSHIP GOALS

As first outlined in Chapter II, the sharpest goal conflicts in Central City occur between local integrationists and separatists, with the integrationists thrusting towards the large-scale entrance of blacks into the wider society and separatists opting for greater subcommunity autonomy*. This conflict is fundamental since these dissimilar goals literally move blacks in differing directions: in all its forms, subcommunity autonomy necessarily entails a turning-inward for those engaged in "getting ourselves together" (a cliché, but one frequently repeated in leadership interviews), while integrationists call for blacks to "start getting ourselves into the mainstream of American society."¹

Each set of goals is associated with various tactical preferences. For example, for integrationists the goal of "getting ourselves in" shapes the means of access and "infiltration" commonly used, while separatists assume that the goal of "getting ourselves together" demands organizational efforts in the subcommunity itself. The tactics and

*pp. 89-95.

organizations associated with these disparate goals* are the subject of the next chapter. This chapter uses interview materials and questionnaire data to develop the analysis of local leadership goals.

The intent is not to review in detail the substantive conflicts in leadership goals, but rather to discuss some of the basic patterns linked to shared and conflicting goals: specifically, the relationship between aspects of leadership structure and similarities and differences in goals; the measurement of the properties of complexity and militance in local leadership goals; and a brief case study of the continuing conflict between status and welfare goals in the subcommunity.

Goals and Leadership Structure

How do leaders view each other when goals are shared or in conflict? How do respondents describe themselves as leaders? The pattern of interview responses provides tentative answers to these questions--answers which have implications for the structure of black leadership in Central City.

When goals are shared, moderates and militants generally perceive each other favorably. Even when militants feel more forceful behavior would be appropriate, they

*The goals discussed in the interviews are also generally consistent with leadership opinions and behavior; thus, all leaders classified as integrationists supported the local busing-integration plan, and all separatists opposed it. See Chapter VI.

extend tolerance to the moderate integrationists as persons

whose positions are colored by their jobs or other pressures--many of them aren't able to be independent enough and, if you ask them privately and personally, they'll have different views than they can state in public. But they do their best.²

In turn, the moderate integrationists often state their "appreciation" for the activities of the militant integrationists; for example, the moderates repeatedly described one militant woman as "bright and aggressive," "a real fighter" and "almost always right."

The moderate separatists also applaud the efforts of the young militants, variously describing them as "real workers," "capable" and "speaking for people." Though moderates differ from militants in their time-perspectives, their acceptance of differing increments of change and their tactical preferences, nevertheless they seem to sense a rudimentary division of labor in which militants (who share their general goals) are necessary:

. . . we need someone to really push for integration and _____ does that. . . . They make this [civil rights] almost a full-time activity, don't they? I guess we want people like that, and I know I listen to them. . . .

[moderate integrationists]

They can get people excited, sometimes that's good. . . . _____ reminds me of the old saying, "Even in birth, there's got to be blood." See what I mean? . . .

[moderate separatists]³

The more articulate militants can sometimes persuade the moderates to join in views or activities which, if left to their own devices, the moderates would regard with great

skepticism. This process is particularly apparent in the busing controversy reviewed in Chapter VI. Thus, in the structure of local leadership the militants seem to have an impact on leadership activities disproportionate to their small numbers--a pattern made possible by the admiration of the moderates with whom they share general goals, if not specific tactics.

Evaluations of other leaders alter radically when goals are not shared--especially for the militants who accept goal-formulation as an important leadership activity. Hence, militant integrationists characterize separatists as "blow-hards," "kooks" and persons "afraid of competition"; and militant separatists view their integrationist counterparts as "not even Oreos," or "bourgies."*

Although moderates seem less introspective about their leadership activities than militants, they are a self-aware category. Of the twelve leaders defined by the typology as moderates (either integrationists or separatists), seven at some point in the interview explicitly referred to themselves as "moderates." To local leaders, the term is evidently useful in labeling leadership types. Though "moderate" may be an aspersion elsewhere, Central City moderates freely (and, compared to their beliefs and behaviors, accurately) identify themselves as such--perhaps reflecting

*Oreo cookies are black on the outside, white on the inside; the slang word "bourgies" was used frequently, is derived from "bourgeoisie" and is a term of contempt for middle-class blacks.

their numerical dominance in the local leadership structure and the low level of collective militance in the subcommunity.*

In each interview leaders were also asked directly to describe themselves and their beliefs about racial issues. Figure 5 shows both the distribution of leadership types and their self-classifications. The distribution indicates that Central City leadership is dominated by integrationist preferences and the moderate perspective. Only one militant separatist makes the final listing of those named as "outstanding leaders" by informants.** This distribution of leadership types is not surprising, however, given the subcommunity characteristics analyzed in the previous chapter: the availability of the NAACP, the Urban League and "white-controlled" institutions as organizational bases for leadership, coupled with the paucity of resources and independent bases for leadership activities within the subcommunity, helps to skew the distribution of leadership types.

Figure 5 offers a comparison of the typological classification and self-description for each leader. Leaders

*See inter-city comparisons on the Crain Militance Scale, p. 220.

**This leader refused to be formally interviewed by either white or black researchers. With the cooperation of a moderate separatist with extensive ties in the subcommunity, interviews with other young militants were arranged. These persons knew the non-respondent, and could discuss his views in addition to their own. When materials from these conversations are used, they are explicitly noted as "proxy interviews."

MILITANT INTEGRATIONISTS
(name & self-description)*

Harriet Campbell -- "Integrationist"
George Graeber -- "Believe we must live together"
Robert Jones -- Supports "democracy and integration"

MODERATE INTEGRATIONISTS
(name & self-description)*

Lloyd Thompson -- "I'm a moderate"
Willene Easton -- "I'm definitely against racism"
James Faraday -- "For integration"
Eugene Nelson -- "Believe in integration"
Josephine Warrick -- "I'm not a leader"
Cavanaugh Smith -- "A conservative or moderate supporter
of integration"
Tom Wilson -- "Crusader for integration"
Rev. Johnson -- "I care for people's needs"

MODERATE SEPARATISTS
(name & self-description)*

John Washington -- "I think for myself:"
J. C. Wilson -- "I'm a rational individualist"
Ed Lawson -- "I see both sides--considered an odd-ball"
Hattie Hosler -- "I'm a grass-roots person"

MILITANT SEPARATIST
(name & self-description)*

Kensha Muhammed -- none

*"How would you describe yourself and your positions on
racial issues?"

Figure 5.--Distribution of Leadership Types and Self-
Descriptions.

were "placed" in the typology on the basis of their responses in the interviews and their behavior on local racial issues. However, in each interview leaders were also asked "How would you describe yourself and your positions on racial issues?"* Figure 5 gives the key phrases used by respondents in the initial response to this question.

An unexpected pattern emerged in these self-classification responses: integrationists and separatists tended to respond differently to the question, the integrationist leaders generally (in at least eight of the eleven responses) citing their positions on issues, calling themselves "integrationists," "moderates," etc.; and the separatists consistently describing themselves in terms of some presumably personal characteristic, usually characteristics which asserted their distinctiveness or individuality--"rational individualist," "grass-roots person," "oddball." Initially these responses might seem puzzling because nothing in the substance of separatist views would seem to account for this consistent emphasis upon individual distinctiveness. However, the pattern of response is intelligible in the context of the subcommunity characteristics already discussed (in the previous chapter) and a structure of leadership dominated by integrationists. Thus, in a

*As an effort to trigger verbal responses in a semi-structured interview,⁴ the question is more broadly stated than it might be in a questionnaire--though the language of the question was identical in each interview. Interestingly enough, it is the potential ambiguity of the question which led differing leadership types to interpret it in differing ways.

subcommunity where the resources for successful separatist leadership are scarce and where leadership is dominated by moderate and militant integrationists, the somewhat isolated separatist leaders must either be or conceive of themselves as being "different" than the other leaders--and, indeed, locally they are. This sense of difference is asserted by the separatists in comments ranging from the mild to the profane:

I'm not close on issues with a lot of the others [leaders]. I try to be broad-minded and look at issues from different sides, but I think a lot of the others don't. . . .

. . . A lot of our leaders look like you [speaking to interviewer]: that's a nice coat you've got on, but how are you gonna do anything unless you get on the ground and get it dirty? Me, I'm part of everything--at the grass, roots, right here, where people are. I'm not part of that other group [with coats]. . . .

I'm an individualist, and I believe in having a rational basis for my views. . . . [referring to integrationists] 85% of them are fucked-up mother-fuckers. You've gotta stay down with the people and say "share me, my Ph.D.,* my resources. . . ." The middle class [leaders] are saying we have to meet other standards, standards of their materialism. They're on a lot of head-trips. They don't see fucked-up capitalism, they don't see anything. What a bunch of shit!⁵

In retrospect, the self-classification question asked in each interview was an ambiguous stimulus--though perhaps usefully so. The integrationists responded to the second part of the question and described their "positions on racial issues," while the out-numbered separatists evidently responded to the first part of the question ("How would you

*This leader claimed to be in the process of obtaining a degree as an "urban psychologist."

describe yourself. . . ."), proclaiming the self-conscious individuality of those who are, as one informant cryptically described them, "a minority of a minority."

From these interviews one may infer the basic shape of the local leadership structure: it is a bi-furcated structure with the main fissures paralleling the goal conflicts among leaders, and it is dominated by moderate integrationists, with separatists acutely aware of their minority status. The general acceptance of other leaders with whom goals though not tactical preferences are shared and the contrasting excoriations directed at leaders with divergent goals suggests the salience of goal consensus. Goal consensus has a "structuring effect" on local leaders in that communications and organizational activities are shared only when agreement on goals exists. Not surprisingly, when asked in the questionnaire to name the other "important black leaders in Lansing," 76.7% of the nominees were leaders in agreement with the respondent's stated goals.* In addition, leaders unanimously perceived the integrationist consensus in Central City. When asked in the interviews whether their views were similar to those of other black leaders, all integrationists responded affirmatively and almost all separatists** responded

*Of the seventy-three names suggested as leaders, fifty-six were judged to share goals with the interviewees; the question asked was "In your judgment who are the most important Black leaders in Central City?" See Appendix B.

**One individual refused to answer, claiming the question was "irrelevant" to his views.

negatively, characterizing most other leaders as "NAACP-types," "not thinking on the same lines," etc. Thus, though Central City leadership has serious goal conflicts between integrationists and separatists, the numerical dominance of the integrationists is commonly recognized.

Goal Characteristics: Complexity
and Militance

The variables of complexity and militance also can be used to characterize the nature of local leadership goals. These variables are important for analyses of leadership behavior: the differing levels of militance presumably make various leadership activities (negotiation, protests, riots, compromise, etc.) more or less probable, while the varying levels of complexity in goal formulation may indicate the ideological sophistication of the leadership elite.

As expected, the quality of leaders' discussions of goals varied a great deal. Though almost all were able to state general goals, some statements reflected prior thought and clearly ordered preferences while others consisted of a few sketchy and disconnected phrases.

All relevant interview responses (on goals) were evaluated and categorized by the criteria of complexity. Three mutually exclusive categories resulted: the first category, in which interviewee responses consisted only of broad phrases, with no particular development of statements or use of supporting arguments; category two, in which respondents coupled statements of preference with at least

some effort to develop or to support their answers;* and the third category, where statements were both developed and supported by additional argumentation, with the implications and ramifications of the preferred goals frequently being discussed as well. Fortunately, these interview responses were clearly patterned, and their categorization poses no problem.**

*For purposes of convenience, these responses are categorized as "average" in Tables 35-40.

**The following are examples of these differing categories of response:

Category 1

Q. As a leader in the community which kinds of goals do you favor?

A. (long pause) Progress, I'd say, mainly.

Q. Progress of what kind?

A. Progress to help people.

Category 2

Q. As a leader in the community, which kinds of goals do you favor?

A. The goals of integration.

Q. Why?

A. I look at it this way: ten or fifteen years from now if everyone was getting on a boat for the same planet [sic], we'd all be getting on together--that's how I think of it.

Category 3

Q. As a leader in the community, which kinds of goals do you favor?

A. I'm an integrationist, mainly for economic reasons. After all, what are the alternatives? Separation would make us a second-class small nation within a larger nation. Control of industry is in the hands of a relatively few men; we don't have the economic base for any kind of separation. There is also, I think, personal value in having contact with other [kinds of] people in an integrated situation, but economics is the greatest factor. . . . We are determined to enter the system--and we can. Separation cuts you off from access and decent education. . . . We're really talking about social mobility, not so

These variations in responses are clear, but the variables which might help to account for these differences are more difficult to ascertain. Tables 35-40 indicate how specific variables (drawn from questionnaire responses) are associated or not associated with the varying levels of complexity in leadership responses. As illustrated by Table 35, the income distribution for leaders giving "most complex" responses starts at a higher figure than for other types of respondents and has more individuals in the "\$20,000+" category, while the "least complex" respondents are more uniformly distributed through the income categories.* The association of incomes with complexity of responses is not a simple one since other types of respondents are also represented with incomes from \$16,000-\$20,000+, but taken as a group, category three respondents ("most complex") are clearly the most prosperous leaders.

One might hypothesize that the quality of responses would correlate with geographic origins--and indeed many of the leaders themselves suggested this relationship.** However, as Table 36 suggests, the association between geographic

much race. If it weren't blacks it'd be some other group trying to get in--and they've always had to work through that system. We [blacks] want to grab onto the system and make something of it. . . .

*Viewed collectively, these incomes further support the description of middle-class black leadership in Central City.

**Individuals from "out of town" were variously called "our most sophisticated," "most aggressive" and "smartest" leaders.

Table 35.--Complex responses by income distribution.




Table 36.--Complexity of responses by initial geographic location.

Responses	Location		
	Raised in Lansing	Came from South*	Came From Northern State*
Least complex	0	1	4
Average	1	2	0
Most complex	2	2	3

$\gamma = -.14^{**}$

*After age 18.

**Goodman-Kruskal index of order-association.

Table 37.--Complexity of responses, by leadership type.

Type	Responses		
	Least Complex	Average	Most Complex
Militants	0	1	2
Moderates	5	2	5

$$\gamma = -.58$$

Table 38.--Complexity of responses, government jobs.

Responses	Position	
	Government Jobs	All Others
Least complex	4	1
Average	2	1
Most complex	5	2

$$\gamma = .14 \quad P_c = .57$$

Table 39.--Complexity of responses, by educational level.

Responses	Education		
	Less Than High School	High School Graduate	College Graduate
Least complex	2	2	1
Average	0	2	1
Most complex	0	0	7

$$\gamma = .92 \quad P_c = .96$$

Table 40.--Complexity of responses by contacts with white leaders.

	Least Complex	Average	Most Complex
None or few	1	0	0
Some contacts	3	1	1
Many contacts	1	2	6

$\gamma = .82$ $P_c = .91$

origins (in Central City, northern or southern states) and the nature of interview responses is negative.* Table 37 also shows a negative relationship between militance and moderation in leadership types and the complexity of leadership discussions of goals, though militants are "under-

*Two related statistics are used in reporting the data of Tables 35-40: the Goodman-Kruskal index of order-association (γ) and the probability of concordance (P_c). The index requires only an ordinal scale of measurement, assumes no specific probability law and presents a simple interpretation when a number of ties are present in either ranking. The index states a difference in probability for same versus different ordering on the underlying variables for a randomly selected pair--conditional to a set of untied pairs. Though the relationships are presented as of interest in the context of this discussion, the usual approximations to find the level of significance cannot be used because of the small N in this research. Also used here is a related statistic, $(1+\gamma/2)$, the probability of concordance. P_c provides a direct probability interpretation of these data: for example, in terms of Table 38, P_c is an estimate of the probability that of two observations taken at random where one represents an individual holding a job in government and the other does not, the one with the governmental position is also the one with the "most complex" responses on questions about goals. In this instance, $P_c=.57$. Further information is available on these statistics in the references at the end of this chapter.

represented" in the local leadership. A number of informants also suggested that the most sophisticated black leaders were those "working for the government." Table 38 does show some relationship between the nature of occupational positions and the nature of interview responses; when occupations are dichotomized into government and non-government jobs and compared to responses, $\gamma=.14$, $Pc=.57$.*

However, the strongest association between variables is that between education and complexity.** Leaders who are college graduates are best able to state racial goals in complex terms, developing supporting argumentation and pointing out the implications of their positions, as seen in Table 39. These are also the leaders most likely to have extensive contact with white leaders in Central City--an important resource for a leadership structure not resting upon organization in the subcommunity itself. Table 40 shows the

*For a further analysis of the impact of occupational positions, see the discussion of role strain in Chapter V.

**One can speculate whether higher education itself is a prerequisite for the degree of complexity exhibited in some of the responses; lying behind the measureable variable (college graduation) may be other possibly more important factors. However, given the data available through questionnaires and interviews, level of education is associated with qualitatively different responses. Using an index of predictive association for categorical data, one can state that in predicting the nature of interview responses from the level of education, information about the latter category reduces the probability of error by .50.

association between complexity and the level of contact with white leaders.*

What then are the characteristics of the most ideologically sophisticated black leaders in Central City? Compared to other leaders, they are somewhat more likely to have higher incomes and jobs in government, and they are much more likely to be college graduates having many contacts with white leaders in the city. This composite "picture" suggests again the basic sources of influence for local black leaders--personally high status, discretionary time for leadership roles and opportunities to influence key policy-makers.

Having examined the varying complexity with which racial goals are discussed, another pattern in the interviews should also be noted: the manner in which many local leaders conceptualize racial problems tends to reflect their occupational roles. Thus, a black union president emphasizes the need for blacks and whites "to get together and negotiate their differences"--comparing black-white relations to the labor-management sessions with which he is familiar. A black lawyer discusses the busing controversy only in terms of possible litigation, never considering the rallying of political support for his views. "Mother Hosler," wife

*"How would you characterize your contacts with white leaders in the Central City area?"

Many contacts _____
 Some contacts _____
 Very few contacts _____
 No contacts _____

of a Baptist minister and, by her own frequently repeated description, "a good Christian," finds "the answer to all our [racial] problems" in "love and believing in God"; when asked whether local conflicts over school integration could be resolved, she urges upon the interviewer a pamphlet of biblical quotations (called "Nuggets of Wisdom"), recommends a book about "educating the whole man" (by Pat Boone), and conceptualizes the "race problem" in terms of religious universalism:

We've got to be together on the same level because God made all of us--you [whites] just came out of the stove a little before we did! If I cut my hand, it's the same red blood as when you cut yours. There'll be no peace until we come together and till we believe in God. . . .

A more current argot of counter-culture clichés and psychological jargon is used to analyze local racial conflicts by a black leader working as an "inner-city Mental Health co-ordinator."

We have to be concerned with whether we are "real" persons. We have to have an open mind and interact freely with persons and situations. . . . I think the greatest racial problem we have is that it's so easy to intellectualize and not internalize. . . . We have cognitive skills but no affective skills, so we have to raise the level of awareness [in order to] get ourselves together. . . .⁸

Asked how he feels as the only black on a Board of Education controlled by white conservatives, this leader maintains that he can diminish racial struggles by "turning every executive session into a sensitivity session."

For many leaders,* then, racial tensions are viewed not as matters involving mobilization, organization, conflict, coalition-building or any of the usual terms of group struggle, but as matters necessitating only "negotiation" akin to labor and management, or litigation, or shared religious belief, or even "raising the level or awareness [by] dropping our masks." Thus, for some leaders the conventional terms of racial conflict seem to be supplanted by modes of thought and description peculiar to their occupational role--whether labor union president, lawyer, organizer of religious services for "Senior Citizens" or "Mental Health Co-ordinator" in the inner-city. This pattern is further evidence of the seemingly low level of ideological sophistication among local leaders** and the prevalence of "part-time" leadership roles. Where priorities of time and energy must be allotted to regular jobs, it is perhaps not surprising that the language and concepts peculiar to an occupation "carry over" into the manner in which an individual conceptualizes problems in a part-time role as a black leader.

Militance

"Militance" is another variable commonly used in descriptions of black leaders. The Crain Militance Scale, one of the few attempts at measuring leadership militance

*This pattern of "occupational carry-over" can be found in the interview responses for seven of the fifteen leaders.

**However, in only one of the interviews with the leaders categorized earlier as giving the "most complex" responses is there any evidence of this pattern.

and first developed in an analysis of school desegregation concepts in eight northern cities,⁹ was included in the Central City questionnaire. The scale was extended in order to test for changes over time, with leaders being asked to reconstruct how they might have responded to the same questions a decade ago.*

Table 41 illustrates the expected "militant" responses, based upon Crain's research. The first three items catch the "willingness to take action"¹⁰ found in militant leaders impatient for the decisive and comprehensive change, with the characteristic time-orientations and preferred increments of change reflected in items one and two.** Item four presumably reflects the view that strong white opposition can only be overcome through militant pressures. Though the scale has its difficulties, it is one of the few systematic measures of the much-talked-about "militance," and is specifically useful in three ways for this research: it provides one more method for testing the categorizing of local leaders as militants and moderates (e.g., those grouped as militants "should" have higher militance scores), it provides a collective "militance score" for Central City leadership which can then be compared with the actual behavior of local leaders (e.g., a high score should be linked to a large number of militant behaviors),*** and

*See Appendix B.

**pp. 85-87.

***Crain does find this relationship, pp. 346-351.

most importantly, local use of the scale allows for comparisons to leadership beliefs in several other northern cities, as developed by Crain, et al.

Table 41.--Crain Militancy Scale.

Opinion Item*	Militant Response***
1. Too many times blacks** have compromised when they could have made more progress if they had held out a little longer.	agree
2. Unless you dramatize an issue through protests and demonstrations it seems that there is scarcely any progress made.	agree
3. It is sometimes better to have white resistance to black requests, because then you have a basis for bringing the overall problem to the public attention.	agree
4. The average white man really wants the black man to have his rights.	disagree

*Crain, et al., isolated this scale by pulling together associated items from a larger questionnaire used in their research. Measures of association (Q) between the items:

	2	3	4
1	.45	.73	.89
2	---	.62	.69
3	---	---	.54

**When first used in 1968, the items used "Negro."

***The scale is "scored" by allotting one point for each militant response.

Though this scale assumes a kind of global "militance" and does not distinguish militant leaders by the possibly differing content of their goals (as elaborated in the typology in Chapter II), nevertheless a comparison of militance scores by leadership types is interesting. Table 42 shows that the scores do move in the expected direction, militant integrationists having higher scores than either of the moderate groupings.

A collective militance score can also be calculated. Given the argument of Chapter III, in which the subcommunity is described as lacking the resources and independent bases of leadership necessary to sustain many militant leaders, and given the large number of moderates (twelve out of sixteen) in the final leadership listing, Central City leaders should have a comparatively low collective militance score. In fact, local leadership responses on the Crain Scale do support this inference. Table 43 compares Central City's "pooled" militance score against the cities studied by Crain.¹¹

In Central City, the scale was also extended over time: in addition to being asked their present response to each item, the questionnaire also elicited what leaders thought their responses would have been in 1963.* Although respondents' reconstructions of their past beliefs may be faulty, a clear pattern emerges in Table 44: despite a decade of political and racial upheaval, the rise of "new" black ideologies, rioting in major cities and what is

*See Appendix B.

Table 42.--Militance scores, by leadership types.

Types	Militant Integrationists	Moderate Integrationists	Moderate Separatists	Militant Separatists
Scores	2.00	1.50	1.25	---

Table 43.--Collective militance scores, by city.

	City	Score
High Scores	St. Louis	2.52
	Bay City*	2.40
	Buffalo	1.76
Medium Scores	San Francisco	1.72
	Newark	1.60
	Central City	1.53
Low Scores	Pittsburgh	1.32
	Baltimore	1.32

*In Crain's research, Bay City is a pseudonym.

Table 44.--Item responses, over time.

	Militant Response	1963		1973		Changes
		Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	
Item 1	agree	7	8	6	9	1*
Item 2	agree	5	10	5	10	0
Item 3	agree	1	14	1	14	0
Item 4	disagree	3	12	3	12	0

*The direction of the single reported change is interesting: a decade ago this respondent, the local president of the NAACP, would have agreed that blacks had compromised too soon--whereas he now disagrees. His response to the open-ended question ("How do you think your own views on racial issues have changed over the past ten years?") suggests his thinking: "I'm not as bitter as I was years ago, and I have developed new techniques that can be employed. At times, compromise will speed the achievement of goals. . . ."

conventionally reported as an increase in black "militance," the local leaders report that their views have undergone little change in the last ten years.

One might argue that these responses are only reconstructions of past positions--reconstructions possibly flawed by either inaccuracy or attempts to reduce cognitive dissonance. However, an additional open-ended item in the questionnaire turns up similar responses: asked "How do you think your own views on racial issues have changed over the last ten years?" eight leaders responded by citing some changes, but none of the responses suggested any increase in militancy.* As a further check on changes over time, in several interviews** leaders were explicitly asked to talk about their past views. The initial assumption was that at least some of the moderate separatists would report having "grown" into their current views after shifting away from the concern with integration goals in the early civil rights movement. Again, though, the verbal comments were consistent with the questionnaire responses on both the militance scale and the open-ended question; the tone of the responses was captured by one man's comment: "Basically, I've always believed what I believe [now], and I haven't seen any reason to change."¹³

*The responses to this question were disparate, and not easily coded. Examples of these responses are listed at the end of this chapter.¹²

**This probing for past positions was conducted in nine of fifteen leadership interviews.

This persistent claim of stable beliefs over an eventful decade is consistent with other characteristics of the local leadership. For example, with an average age of 45.7 years, most of the black leadership matured in the 1940's and assumed leadership roles in the next decade after the 1954 Supreme Court decision.* By the following decade, most of the local leaders were "established" in their occupations, families and roles in the subcommunity--and presumably settled in many of their beliefs as well. The "middle-aged" status of most leaders may explain why the resurgence of black nationalisms, "black power" and black-pride left little imprint on their views.

Occupational roles may also have limited the impact of these "new" ideas. Consider the seven leaders grouped in the earlier "most complex" category of responses: if one were to assume that these respondents would be most likely to take seriously "ideas" and "new" currents of thought, a survey of their jobs is revealing. Most of these positions--a state representative, a worker for the county's mental health program, an Equal Opportunity Officer in the state government, a lawyer for the Board of Education, and directorship roles in the Urban League and the city's Human Relations Commission--place leaders in institutional settings where the advocacy of "radical" perspectives would be rather unwelcome. In addition, the relative lack of ideological sophistication

*For a brief discussion of the impact of the Court's decision on leadership behavior, see pp. 29-30.

(only seven of the leaders being able fully to develop and support their arguments on goal preferences) and the low militance scores seem consistent with the rather static intellectual histories reported by Central City leaders. Thus, while elsewhere ideological wars have raged over organization of the lumpenproletariat, the forms of black identity and the application of Marxist doctrine to black subcommunities, in Central City most leaders have held firmly to the traditional goal of integration.*

Conflict and Choice: The Kingsley Facility

The "man on the street" in black subcommunities is usually described as holding to welfare goals and as being more attracted by immediate and tangible gains for himself and for blacks than by status goals.¹⁴ If Central City leaders are dominated by integrationists, occasional conflicts with the subcommunity seem likely; also, painful leadership choices between status goals and immediate gains may occur--as predicted by Wilson. These patterns of conflict and choice for local leaders can be seen in the controversy over the Kingsley Facility.

Since early 1970 the City Parks and Recreation Department had on its drawing boards plans to establish a "Neighborhood Facility" on the west side of Central City. This

*What integration means, however, has been revised by the militant integrationists. See the discussion of "raising the standard" during the busing controversy, Chapter VI.

Facility would house various social service agencies and could provide a gathering place for residents and groups in the black neighborhoods of the west side. Working with Model Cities' representatives, city planners eventually expanded the original plan to include not only a Neighborhood Facility, but also an indoor community recreation center and a large amount of open space for park-like areas. These additions to the initial plan were viewed as responses to the complaints of neighborhood residents that both "open areas" and indoor recreational facilities were unavailable in the "inner-city."¹⁵ Several meetings between planners and residents of the neighborhood were arranged and the assistant Parks and Recreation Director characterized the meetings as providing "plenty of neighborhood in-put."¹⁶

At the same time, much discussion among local school administrators and members of the Board of Education centered upon the need to replace the physically deteriorating Michigan Avenue Elementary School, which was also located in the black neighborhood on the city's west side. During the previous school year, the Board had been bitterly attacked by black parents for the condition of the school. Tentatively, school and city officials began to link the two projects: though formally separate efforts, a new elementary school could be located in close proximity to the expanded Neighborhood Facility--recreation center--park area, thus providing what planners envisioned as one large, centrally located community center with educational and service functions; part

of the attractiveness of the project was its provision of features often cited as lacking on the west side by black residents themselves--an attractive new school, coupled with service and recreational facilities and a park-like setting.

In January of 1973, the City Council authorized the Parks Department to seek a \$300,000. state recreation grant¹⁷ to help finance construction of the proposed community center. Officials proposed that the city acquire a site in the highest density black neighborhood on the west side.

Meanwhile, plans for a new elementary school had progressed to the point that three slightly differing staff proposals had been circulated among members of the Board of Education.¹⁸ All of the plans called for an elementary school of about 650 pupils to be located on 7.5 acres somewhere "west of Logan in the Huron-Allegan area."¹⁹ The main problem lay in the vague "somewhere." With the Board's previous rescinding of a busing plan which had begun integration of the elementary schools, the site selection posed serious problems: for the majority of board members wed to the concept of "neighborhood schools," the location of a new elementary school in the west side's black neighborhood meant a probable renewal of battles with the local NAACP, which already had filed a desegregation suit against the board in federal court; on the other hand, any further delay in building the new school would offend the neighborhood parents who had been pressing for a new school facility on the west side. Frustration was expressed by one Board member:

How the heck is an intelligent person supposed to guess what's going on? Half of 'em [blacks] want a new school and the rest don't know what they want: sometimes they can't talk about anything but the new school but when we turn around they're down on Kingsley. . . . I'll tell you one thing, though: we're not going to start busing kids around again . . . but we do need a new school. . . .²⁰

The NAACP Executive Board was also not pleased with the prospect of renewed conflict with the board. For the time, the general feeling seemed to be that their federal court case would determine the long-run outcome of the conflict with the Board. To the moderate integrationists the prospect of renewed conflict over school sites and attendance zones was not appealing; the recent recall vote,* special election and general election for Board members (all triggered by the busing controversy) had eliminated the NAACP's access to the Board of Education, if not to the Superintendent and administrative staff. Worst of all, opposition to a site located in the black subcommunity would align the organization against the apparent preferences of many parents and even the public statements of NAACP members (though these demands for a new school were always accompanied by the proviso that the school be integrated). Nevertheless, the NAACP leadership knew that eventually they would have to establish some position on the possibility of a new school.

The first step was the NAACP's scheduling of an "information meeting" with the school Superintendent in April. No unskilled politician, the Superintendent brought along his Elementary Education Director and Advisory

*See Chapter VI.

Specialist--both blacks. Possible school size, location, programs and cost were outlined, and the Superintendent stated his preference for an integrated school.* However, concerns about the educational prospects for the new school were crystallized as the possible links between the Kingsley Place Neighborhood Facility and the new school became clearer. Though the school and the Facility by this time were being presented as "completely separate projects,"²¹ a comparison of the likely sites for the two projects showed them to be either contiguous or only one block apart, depending upon the amount of land finally acquired.

The brief history of the "West Side Drop-in Center," also located in the core area, clarifies the distrust many parents and NAACP members felt for the proposed new Facility. Established after local disturbances in the late 1960's, the West Side Drop-in Center was supposed to provide an informal recreation and social center for black youngsters, and a place for neighborhood groups to meet. Instead, according to middle-class parents, the Center quickly became one of the drop-off points for heroin distribution in Central City (the Center is known locally as "the drug-store"), a haven for street-corner drug peddlers and a center for occasional gang

*The Superintendent's preferences were never in question, though; the NAACP concern was with a school board newly dominated by members of "Citizens for Neighborhood Schools," an anti-busing organization.

activities.* Its location--the corner of Butler and Kalamazoo--has become a short-hand phrase symbolizing ghetto degradation to the middle-class: "If you want to see how the other half lives, go to Butler and Kalamazoo!"²² Much of the blame for the situation is placed upon the former director of the Drop-in Center and what one informant described as his "goddamned laissez-faire attitude." The former director now sat as the sole black member of the school board, and vocally supported both the Facility and the new school for the west side.

One NAACP member expressed a common reaction to the prospect of the closely linked Facility and new school:

. . . When I heard about it, I could only think of one thing: the Drop-in Center, the Drop-in Center, the Drop-in Center! That place [the Facility] will turn out the same or probably worse, and that's all we need. The dealers and also that group that used to hang around the [Drop-in] Center will have a new place to have fun now . . . [and] our kids will be in that school surrounded by that group. You can see why we're upset.²³

Indeed, a glance at a map of the relevant area demonstrates why parents were concerned. If siting arrangements were completed, the new and probably segregated elementary school either would be situated next to or only one block from the prospective dangers of the Kingsley Facility--and only two blocks from the certain problems of the West Side Drop-in Center (see Figure 6). Few physical arrangements

*Following the murder of a Black Panther in another city, his friends invaded the Drop-in Center looking for the suspected murderers. Another time youngsters were lined up against the wall and "inspected" by members of a "gang." Such stories were constantly repeated during interviews.




Figure 6.--Relevant Sites in Kingsley Controversy.

of public facilities could have so neatly symbolized to middle-class parents of elementary school children the possibilities of downward-mobility, physical violence and the dangers of drugs for their children.

Though the militant integrationists in the NAACP would have opposed on principle the building of a probably segregated elementary school on the west side, it was the belatedly perceived linkage of the plan for the new school with the plans for a new Facility--with its connotations of another Drop-in Center--which alarmed the moderates and pushed the organization toward public opposition. However, at the same time, a quick tour of the aging Michigan Avenue School or a walk through the black west side would demonstrate the need for an adequate school facility and park and recreational space--demands which also were being directed to the City Council or the Board of Education. Thus, the dilemma for the NAACP was a choice between its traditional status goal or an immediate and tangible "gain" for the subcommunity.

Finally, though, the NAACP came out with a statement expressing its "concern" over the new school and Facility. The formal statement was a re-expression of the fear that the new school would have a nearly total black enrollment--an objection originally stated in the April meeting with the school Superintendent. But the new elements in the organization's statement were its comments on the proposed Kingsley Facility: the city was accused of building another facility

that would be a replica of the Drop-in Center with its "known drug traffic," and the NAACP charged that to locate a school near such a facility was improper; to the president of the NAACP, the building of the Facility was simply "another attempt to corral blacks in one area."²⁴ What elicited the public statement, though, was not only the prospect of a new segregated school but the accompanying likelihood of a mainly black Facility, recreation center and park dominated by "drugs and bums"* and placed next to the new school.

In response to the organization's accelerating opposition a mutually arranged meeting was set up between city officials (from the Parks and Recreation Department), Model Cities representatives (both staff and citizens) and the NAACP Executive Board. Of these three groups only the Executive Board opposed the projects. The Parks officials naturally supported their department's proposals, and Model Cities had been an active participant in planning the projects and suggesting possible sites. In addition--especially in comparison to the NAACP--most of the Model Cities participants saw themselves and their agency as somehow representative of the true sentiments of the west side subcommunity. This faith was based upon areal representation of the west side in the various boards and task forces of the agency, extensive staff contacts with black residents in the area, the agency's projects, many of which were directed to the

*This phrase was used in a public meeting about the Facility.

black core area, and what Model Cities staff usually described as a high level of "citizen involvement" in the work of the agency.* In contrast, to many persons associated with Model Cities, the NAACP appeared "irrelevant" or "middle-class."

In turn, many of those prominent in the NAACP were skeptical about the black leadership at Model Cities, a view stated by one of the more articulate members of the NAACP Executive Board:

Many people who would like to be leaders--and this is the Model Cities' philosophy--loudly proclaim that they represent the community, but that's just a ploy: without those jobs [at Model Cities], they'd be gone in a minute. . . . We're starting to get away from this community "grass-roots movement"--it has always been the educated middle-class which has provided the leadership [for blacks]. . . .²⁵

With this background of Model Cities-NAACP rivalry, plus evidence of "neighborhood in-put" at least on the Facility project, some city officials may have realized that the cards were somewhat stacked against the eleventh-hour opposition of the NAACP. Accounts vary of the meeting of the planners, Model Cities representatives and NAACP Executive Board, and precisely what happened in the meeting is a matter of dispute. To one outside observer from the school Superintendent's administrative staff, the outcome was clear enough:

. . . The [the NAACP] had to get off this issue [the new school and Neighborhood Facility] because they heard from the community. No one agreed with them, . . . so they backed off when they caught hell. . . .²⁶

*For evaluation of these claims, see Chapter V.

The president of the NAACP describes the same events rather differently:

No, there was no pressure at all. We've always known a school is needed there, but this [proposed] one had no racial balance. We never changed our position. We talked among ourselves about all these problems [the need for facilities]--we knew all about them. . . .27

At any rate, the NAACP backpedaled somewhat. Though not declaring its earlier statement inoperative, a week after the meeting with Model Cities representatives and city planners, the NAACP authorized a "clarifying statement" by the branch president.

We have been wrongly accused of being opposed to the development of this facility. We just expressed some concerns about it, which we still have.
. . . [Though recognizing the need for such facilities] we want to make sure these facilities don't serve a segregated clientele. . . .28

The statement repeated the demand for an elementary school "operated on a desegregated basis," but offered a compromise with city planners as to the location of the Kingsley Facility --asking only that it "not be placed in close proximity to the school [so] as to jeopardize the uninterrupted and safe education of the youngsters attending."

After the "clarification," the projects in question continued to move forward. The Kingsley Place Co-ordinating Committee, headed by the City Planning Director, met with residents in the affected areas to advise them of condemnation and relocation procedures; the school board continued its consideration of the west side site; projected completion of the project was scheduled for late 1974 or early 1975.

Summary: Goals and Leadership Behavior

The eventual resolution of the Kingsley controversy is uncertain, but the events of this conflict suggest the importance of some of the patterns discussed in this chapter: (1) the continued conflicts between welfare goals and status goals, old and new; (2) the structuring effect of shared goals as suggested by communications during the conflict and the emergence of issue-areas; (3) the low level of ideological sophistication displayed by some of the actors in the controversy and (4) the low level of militance in the local leadership.

Most clearly, the outlines of this dispute within the subcommunity conform to the classic pattern of conflicting status goals and welfare needs. Indeed, this local controversy is an analogue to Wilson's discussion of the Chicago hospital which also was to be segregated by virtue of its location:²⁹ while those with welfare orientations were pleased with the new facilities and services to be located in the subcommunity, other leaders and organizations were concerned with the probable racial segregation of these facilities in both Chicago then and Central City now.

The NAACP leadership was well aware that the organization's position conflicted with the desires of some* residents of the black core area. In fact, the newly elected

*As with the busing issue, leaders could never be sure how many "some" were, and had to depend on various straws in the wind--casual contacts, phone calls, relocation meetings. Asked if there were subcommunity pressures on the NAACP, one leader said laconically, "We did get feedback."

branch president upon taking office had announced

Too long the NAACP has been labeled a clique organization of professional or successful blacks. There has been an absence of communication with the total community, and especially with those black people who need advancement the most.³⁰

Faced now with opposition from at least some elements of that "total community," but also aware of its traditional concern for integration, the NAACP carefully positioned itself: the organization did not oppose the Facility per se--in fact, they welcomed it--but they insisted that the facilities not serve a "segregated clientele." Realistically, though, to locate a Neighborhood Facility offering various social services and an indoor recreation center in the heart of the black core area was almost to guarantee a "segregated clientele."* The real choice for the subcommunity was the simple but unpalatable one: either the Facility would not be built (or be built elsewhere), in which case it would not provide the immediate services in the core area, or it would be located in the black neighborhood--in which instance it would almost certainly be segregated. The dilemma was a

*There were a few wistful hopes held by leaders ducking the trade-off at the center of the controversy:

A. I hope there's a middle ground. I think what we have to do is build Kingsley, and then make it so attractive that lots of whites will come down here.

Q. But would they do that?

A. If we made it a good place to go.

Q. How?

A. I don't know really. Maybe we could give green stamps. [Laughs]

familiar one--as were the goal conflicts first pointed to by Wilson in a previous decade.

Rather surprisingly, not only the traditional goals of the integrationists, but also the "new" status goals of the separatists seemed to clash with the city's construction of a Neighborhood Facility. The reported "street-talk"* was that the city was going to establish in the Facility a medical center which would treat Negroes as "guinea pigs,"³¹ and that the entire project was only an effort to "buy off" blacks with a Facility while tearing down more homes in the subcommunity.

One self-identified "nation-builder" commented that

The right way is to do things for ourselves. . . .
Now what's going to happen? The city's going to run the place [the Neighborhood Facility]--not us: Black people should have control. . . . They're going to come in here and rip us apart again [by condemning homes and relocating residents] and we've got to have the power to stop that. . . .³²

Thus, the welfare gains promised by the new Facility may have conflicted not only with the traditional status goal of integration, but with the new status goal of subcommunity autonomy as well. These new status goals, then, are not just a collection of hoped-for tangible gains, accepted in lieu of integration--but a vision of an autonomous subcommunity, controlling its own institutions and powerful enough to deal on an equal basis with the white society. When

*The information in this sentence is "second-hand," as reported by an acquaintance in a city agency having "street contacts." However, the quoted comment is from an interview.

blacks, who "should have control," find instead that "the city's going to run the place," the militant separatists may view the Facility with as much distrust as the militant integrationists--though for different reasons. What this suggests is that it is perhaps not just the differing contents of the status goals which lead to conflicts with welfare gains, but also the form which these goals take: both the new and old status goals quickly translate into matters of principle which often conflict with the messy exigencies of city politics and the compromises and trade-offs involved in projects promising tangible gains for the subcommunity. To leaders with either set of status goals, any immediate program or project is not a "thing in itself," valuable only for the benefits it may bring, but rather an object to be aligned with the ultimate goals of either integration or subcommunity autonomy. Thus, in Central City, those with the old status goals distrust a Facility likely to "serve a segregated clientele," while persons holding to the new status goals scorn the project as not controlled by blacks. Wilson's initial analysis of status-welfare conflicts, then, can be expanded to include the new status goals* as well as the goal of integration.

However, during the brief controversy more than latent goal conflict was involved in the ambiguity of relations

*However, unlike the integrationists, the militant separatists were never directly involved in the controversy over the Facility and the school. Lacking the organizational and institutional resources of Model Cities or the NAACP, their role was limited to "street-talk."

between leaders and the residents of the subcommunity. For example, none of the NAACP leaders actually lived in the black core area where the Facility was to be built. In the absence of any certainty as to the majority views of the subcommunity,* the tactic adopted by all parties was to claim (in public) that they spoke for "the people" or "the community"; planners pointed to "neighborhood in-put," Model Cities to their contacts and programs in the subcommunity and the NAACP to its record of local support. This tactic--in even more exaggerated form--was also used on the busing issue (Chapter VI). Recognizing that there was no discernable groundswell of support for any of the black leaders or organizations, city officials were able to push ahead with their projects.

The Kingsley issue also suggests again the structuring effect of shared goals. Communications between individuals with conflicting goals were rare: the Model Cities representatives never talked to the NAACP leadership about site location or the Facility; the black member of the Board of Education "pushed" the new west side school, but never discussed his position with the integrationists; nor did the NAACP leadership communicate with either the Board member or the Model Cities staff--instead, the branch president said, "We talked among ourselves."

*Opinion theorists to the contrary, all the actors on this issue assumed that there really was a majority opinion in the subcommunity, if only it could be found.

Shared goals and communications help to shape differing issue-areas* for the local leaders. While the focus was on providing what was viewed as a long-overdue material benefit to the black core area, the Model Cities and Board of Education staffs could work without much visible interest by the local NAACP. However, when a threat to the principle and practice of integration became evident in the projects, the NAACP actively entered what it regarded (accurately) as "its" issue-area: the racial integration of the school system and other public facilities.

Shared goals not only help to carve out the issue-areas which leaders come to regard as their main interest, but also influence leaders and organizations in terms of the "cues" to which they respond. The NAACP, for example, never showed more than rhetorical interest in the planning and development of the new facilities (as Model Cities did), nor did it make an issue of the latest black families to be "relocated" for the projects,** nor did it criticize any specific feature of the plan (aside from the location of

*Issue areas are specified and discussed further in Chapter V.

**The city already had a long waiting list of relocated families needing adequate housing. Nevertheless, no black leader even mentioned a concern that the scheduled projects would generate still more relocated families. The NAACP was mainly concerned with the issue of integration, and those supporting the Facility thought the project worth the cost of increased relocations. Only one (white) city councilwoman criticized the city for the relocations necessitated by the scheduled construction. See discussion of relocations, pp. 153-157.

the Facility)--such as the clearance of land in a high-density area in order to provide 120 parking spaces. Instead, the NAACP became involved only when the issue of integration became salient. In a pattern of response repeated in the busing controversy, leaders and organizations engaged in personal or organizational activity only in response to cues defined by their main goals, and not to others. Thus, the chance for a "neighborhood school" and a "community facility" attracted the interest and involvement of the moderate separatists (associated with the school board and Model Cities) and persons "not hung up on integration."* The NAACP was never involved in the planning of the projects and only the belatedly perceived threat to the principle of integration mobilized the organization.

That this "threat" was only belatedly perceived reflects the low level of ideological sophistication for many of the local leaders. The Model Cities workers seemed genuinely surprised that the NAACP would object that the new facilities would be segregated--though they had themselves suggested a site in the black core area. The NAACP, too, was very late in recognizing and then expressing "concern" about projects which had been on the drawing boards for years. Indeed, the organization only moved on the issue when the linkage of the Facility and the new school finally was recognized by the moderates in the organization. A more

*Comment made by person involved in planning the Kingsley Facility.

sophisticated leadership--on both sides of this issue--would have been aware from the beginning of the principles implicit in the project.

Finally, the low level of militance in the Central City leadership is shown in the tactics selected by blacks. Protests, demonstrations, flamboyant rhetoric and threats might have marked a similar controversy elsewhere, but in Central City the leadership was not only slow to see the issue in the first place, but also reluctant to use such means. Instead, committee meetings, planning sessions and "behind-the-scenes" activity were used. The only acts aimed at widening the scope of participation and/or further publicizing the issue were the two public statements of the NAACP.

Clearly, black leadership goals are more than misty abstractions. As this chapter has shown, these goals have an impact on leadership behavior, helping to structure both activities and perceptions. The next chapter analyzes the tactics and organizations developed to further these goals.

FOOTNOTES

¹Though these goal-orientations clearly distinguish local leaders, they might easily be reformulated into an altered set of means and ends--with the development of sub-community autonomy through black-controlled organizations and institutions viewed as a prerequisite for eventual, though not immediate, integration into at least economic institutions. However, this formulation is not presented by interviewees, and when suggested to one separatist, the retort was that "integration is your 'solution,' but just more problems to me."

²Leadership interview.

³Ibid.

⁴See Lewis Anthony Dexter, Elite and Specialized Interviewing (Evanston, 1970).

⁵Leadership interview.

⁶A. Goodman and William H. Kruskal, "Measures of Association for Cross Classifications. III: Approximate Sampling Theory," Journal of the American Statistical Association (1963), pp. 310-364. Other references are the following: Leo A. Goodman and William H. Kruskal, "Measures of Association for Cross Classifications," Journal of the American Statistical Association (1954), pp. 734-784; Leo A. Goodman and William H. Kruskal, "Measures of Association for Cross Classifications. II: Further Discussion and References," Journal of the American Statistical Association (1959), pp. 123-163; William H. Kruskal, "Ordinal Measures of Association," Journal of the American Statistical Association (1958), pp. 814-861; also see William L. Hays, Statistics for Psychologists (New York, 1963), pp. 655-656 and an example of the use of the Goodman-Kruskal and the probability of concordance statistics in Edward J. Kaiser, Toward a Model of Residential Locational Behavior (Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1966), Appendix B, pp. 231-244.

⁷Hays, op. cit., pp. 603, 606-610.

⁸Leadership interview.

⁹Robert L. Crain, et al., The Politics of School Desegregation (New York, 1969).

¹⁰Ibid., p. 349.

¹¹Crain, op. cit., p. 350.

¹²"I've been able to evaluate my views more"; "Discrimination is extremely real, and I believe the double-standard still exists"; "My view is one of accepting the way things are, and fighting hard to change"; "It has always been a slow, painful process toward improving opportunities. . . ."

¹³Leadership interview.

¹⁴See Robert L. Crain, op. cit., p. 121; Harry Scoble, "Effects of Riots on Negro Leadership," in Riots and Rebellion, ed. by Louis H. Masotti and Don R. Brown (Beverly Hills, 1968); James Q. Wilson, Negro Politics (New York, 1960).

¹⁵Informant interviews.

¹⁶Gene Hashley, "NAACP Opposing Kingsley Place," State Journal, May 10, 1973, p. B-4.

¹⁷Curt Hanes, "State Funds Sought to Build New Recreation Center," State Journal, January 18, 1972, p. B-1.

¹⁸Informant interview.

¹⁹"NAACP Meeting: West Side School to Be Discussed," State Journal, March 31, 1973, p. A-3.

²⁰Informant interview.

²¹"NAACP Opposing . . . ," op. cit., p. B-1.

²²Leadership interview.

²³Ibid.

²⁴"NAACP Opposing . . . ," op. cit., p. B-1.

²⁵Leadership interview.

²⁶Informant interview.

²⁷Leadership interview.

²⁸Gene Hashley, "NAACP Clarifies Kingsley Stance," State Journal, May 18, 1973, p. B-4.

²⁹James Q. Wilson, op. cit., pp. 189-190, 207.

³⁰"Out to Help Needy Blacks: NAACP Planning to Break Up Clique," State Journal, January 3, 1972, p. C-4.

³¹This rumor was widespread and was later repeated by the president of the NAACP.

³²Separatist proxy interview.

CHAPTER V

TACTICS AND ORGANIZATIONS

This chapter examines the tactics favored by local leaders and the main black organizations in Central City. Though much of the discussion is descriptive, the "problems" of black identity, "militant-mobility" and role strain are also analyzed in terms of their impact on the city's black leaders.

Tactical Differences

The differences in preferred leadership tactics are consistent with the militant-moderate distinctions developed in the second chapter. Militants search for tactics which will somehow lead to a comprehensive "solution" of whatever they define as the problem.* Typically, a militant preferred integration because "it would mean tremendous changes in politics and job structures [sic]." Even where there is agreement on a tactic such as court litigation, militants and moderates offer differing rationales: to the moderate, "the courts are there--and eventually you may achieve part of what you want, in a civilized, democratic way"; but the militant's argument for the same tactic reflects both his

*See discussion of status goals as analyses, pp. 88-89.

shorter time-perspective* and his impatience for major changes:

You can play politics a long time before getting what one good court decision, when it comes, will give you. . . . When you win you get really basic changes that can't be washed away like in politics.¹

The moderates repeatedly urge limited solutions to specific problems--evidently viewing this tactical orientation as not only realistic, but virtuous:

You try to get everything you can get and then you compromise. That way we always end up with something. That's what the wise person does.

. . . Progress will always be gradual and you've just got to know that. . . .

. . . We [in the Urban League] didn't make as much noise as others, but we've been more effective: They [protestors] had no devices to give them staying power--which is what we've got. . . . Now the struggle goes on and they're gone--while we're pushing steadily all the time. . . .²


In each interview, leaders were asked to describe the tactics they favored. Table 45 shows the responses to this question.** The table organizes specific responses into larger categories, with key phrases from the responses listed for illustrative purposes. In all, there were twenty

*Another specific disagreement between a militant and moderate integrationist further illustrates these differences. The militant argued that integration of American schools "was already overdue" by 1955--because of the Supreme Court's decision in 1954. In contrast, when asked about integration of the local schools a moderate took a rather different position:

You know how I would have handled it? One year at a time--first the first grade, then the second and so on. . . . in twelve years the schools would have been integrated.

**The phrases listed beneath the categories of response represent the initial responses to the question. A number of respondents were then asked to clarify or to discuss their first responses.

Table 45.--Tactics favored by local leaders.



separable responses to the question (some persons citing more than one tactic), and two clear patterns emerge: the general preference for the conventional tactics of American politics, and the rather large number of responses citing individual efforts as "tactics" furthering group mobility.

The size of this latter category is surprising: in the context of the interviews, it had been assumed that most responses would cite differing forms of collective effort or organizational activities. Instead, 30% of all the responses dealt with individual efforts. The tenor of the remarks in this category (see Table 45) and in the follow-up discussion in the interviews, suggests a two-fold assumption shared by these respondents: one is the assumption that blacks must move out "into the system" and complete--thus, the rejection of separatists as being "afraid of competition"; the values of "competition" and "hard work" are firmly held by local integrationists--who represent five of the six responses in this category; the twin assumption is that blacks as a group will be judged by how well these "competing" individuals perform--thus, the injunctions directed to "getting along," "working hard," and "getting an education." These assumptions form the context out of which leaders can logically state individual characteristics as tactics for group mobility. The assumptions also imply the integrationist's view of black mobility as a matter largely of individual activity and work, not a

collective process in which blacks en masse gain power and income.*

The most obvious pattern in the responses is the preference for the conventional tactics of American politics:

. . . We need political activity within the power structure. . . .

The NAACP uses the principles of democracy--we petition and use court litigations. . . .

We should use the same tactics as for good business management: identify a problem, develop our tactics carefully and set our goal. . . .

Change within the system is possible: the main thing is access to institutions. . . . We always use persuasion, facts and position papers. . . .³

The election of more blacks or sympathetic officials is also frequently mentioned, as are coalitions with whites:

. . . We have to have the cooperation of those with political and economic expertise and power because we can't push integration unless others want to push it. I think coalitions are possible: poor whites are as discriminated against as anyone. . . .

. . . I think we can work with whites. I was amazed to get as much [white] support as I did [in a Board of Education recall election]. . . . There are a lot of whites in the middle ground and they can be shifted. There's no other choice than working in coalitions--ultimately it has to be done, because we can't do it alone. . . .⁴

Moderate separatists also accept coalitions with whites--and, in the recall election, actually formed one. However, they tend to downplay the long-run possibilities of coalitions unless certain conditions are met: "There has to be something in it for everyone"; "It only works if everyone's similar [in socio-economic status]--otherwise there's a clash." The separatists accept coalitions of

*See David Danzig, "The Meaning of Negro Strategy," Commentary, (February, 1964).

exchange* as pragmatic adjustments to certain situations; integrationists (in Central City) work in coalitions of principle with "the conscientious elements among whites" and view these efforts as symbols of an integrated future.

For most local leaders these tactical preferences are grounded in a remarkable optimism. However, the rationale for the optimism varies somewhat for differing leadership types. For the separatists, optimism seems based upon signs of a growing "black awareness" in the sub-community; thus one separatist says, "Things are going to work themselves out" because of the "growing bond among nitty-gritty people in the [black] community" and others repeat variants of the "getting ourselves together" theme. Integrationists tend to point to the rewards of "working in the system"--elected officials, new jobs, higher incomes--as portents of a future which will be still better. What is striking, however, is that these hopes are not based on optimism about the beliefs and acts of white Americans--when asked in the questionnaire whether "the average white man really wants the black to have his rights," none of the integrationists agreed. Instead, their optimism seems rooted in what might be called "system characteristics."

. . . there's a great need for reform--but that's the basis of the American political philosophy and so reform is possible. . . . Some people are getting tired, but we won't compromise or back down; we can make it, we've just got to stick to it. . . .⁵

*See Chapter II, pp. 102-103.

Organizations

Five organizations are mentioned most frequently by informants and leaders as both important to and directed by local blacks:* The NAACP, the Urban League, the Black Ministerial Alliance, Model Cities and the Malcolm X Institute. The following discussion outlines the typical organizational tasks and the resources available to these groups, while also analyzing the constraints on each organization's activities and the relationship of each group to the subcommunity.

NAACP

The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People is, in many ways, the most important black organization in Central City. At least ten of the sixteen individuals named as leaders have been or are members, and the organization is viewed favorably by most subcommunity informants. A stable leadership coterie, composed mainly of upper-middle-class professionals, has been dominant in the group for the past fifteen years.

The main issue-area defined by the organization as its own usually does not require--or elicit--mass support from the subcommunity: whatever local issue is tied to the principle of integration immediately becomes the NAACP's

*Such groups as the Black Panthers, SNCC and CORE never appeared in Central City--which is consistent with both the subcommunity characteristics and the low militance levels already discussed in Chapters III and IV.

concern (as with the Kingsley Facility issue). Integration of local schools has been the focus of NAACP efforts for the past ten years because of the institutional positions and aspirations of important leaders in the organization,* the general feeling of the mainly middle-class membership that "education is the key,"⁶ the traditional emphasis on school integration by the national organization and, given the trend of court decisions, the increasing vulnerability of the local school system to litigation.

Though the great bulk of the cash collected locally is funneled to the national level, until recently the local NAACP has had greater financial resources than the white neighborhood groups it has faced in court.** In addition, the local NAACP is the repository of considerable expertise--over the past decade the organization skillfully prodded the school board into a verbal commitment to school integration, helped develop a local desegregation plan, defeated neighborhood groups in the state and federal courts and thrust some of its most active members into policy roles in the educational system.

However, the group's resources of money and skill rest upon a very narrow base. The separatists who scorn the organization as dependent on "white money" are not in

*The organization's leaders have included a local school board member, the Board's attorney, a State Superintendent of Education and several local school administrators.

**See Chapter VI on the busing controversy.

error on their facts: the NAACP president estimates that 70% of the local branch's contributors are white. In addition, the resource of legal skills is limited by demand and cost. The number of lawyers willing and competent to carry desegregation cases through the courts is limited, and the local branch must compete for their services. Once "hired," these lawyers--many of them white--must offer their services gratis or for only token fees (no pun intended). Two black lawyers from Central City have carried much of the branch's legal work for free*--though one of them also has been the lawyer for the school board. At times, the lack of immediately available legal talent has changed NAACP strategy, as discussed in the next chapter. Thus, upon close examination, the organization which often appears powerful and rich to threatened policy-makers** is, in fact, dependent upon limited funds and free legal services.

The relationship of the NAACP to the local sub-community is ambiguous. On the one hand, informants frequently characterized the organization as a "protector,"*** while on the other hand, comparatively few were members or

*"I spent forty-one days and nights in _____ on that case, and I never got a penny. I've never gotten a penny in all my years of cases! Not one! I even had to pay my own hotel and eating bills. . . !"7

**Speaking of the NAACP, one policy-maker sighed, "I suppose they'll bring in some of those hot-shot lawyers again. God, they'll outspend us and out-class us!"8

***Sample comments: "No, I've never belonged but they're O.K.--if there's trouble, they're usually right there, and I like that. . . . They protect our rights."9

habitual contributors. The current president describes subcommunity support as only "moderate," and complains about "the complacent community." Indeed, a recent membership drive brought few results, and the NAACP continues with about 750 dues-paying members (or about 0.7% of the city's black population). However, when special events are scheduled at the Sunday night meetings or when a rally is sponsored with the churches, attendance is large.

To a vocal minority, the organization is "irrelevant" because of its concern with the old status goals--what one informant called "paper integration." The leadership is aware of these views, as shown by its announced attempt to promote "communication with the total community."* The latest effort to shift from its litigation-status goal stance to a concern with actual job placements is the formation of an informal coalition with the local Urban League to increase the number of jobs for blacks in city government.** Though this effort has just begun, one separatist calls it an attempt to "get jobs for themselves"--a reference to the mainly white-collar positions being sought.

Urban League

However, job placement remains the main task of the Urban League. Typical of its efforts and its "style" in Central City has been the recent gaining of job placements

*See Chapter IV, p. 235.

**The target is an appropriate one: see Chapter III, p. 135, Table 10.

within the formerly all-white local construction unions; the League is now conducting a Labor Education Advancement Program (LEAP), to prepare minority workers for apprenticeship entry tests and formal admission to the construction trades. The promise of job openings was obtained only after lengthy negotiations with trade union and construction company officials. Persistence and negotiation are hallmarks of the local League, as acknowledged by the Executive Director:

Careful planning is the key. If you don't do your homework, you get chewed up. . . . That's why we started in 1910, and we're still here.

The staff of the Urban League works under two important constraints on its behavior--Community Chest funding and the nature of their Board of Directors. Chest funds are directed to "responsible" community organizations, and the League is well aware that it cannot promiscuously involve itself in local controversies while receiving these funds. Furthermore, a review of past Boards of Directors shows a consistent pattern: most Boards are composed of "representative" blacks from such institutions as Model Cities or local labor unions, individuals from the area's university, and prominent persons from the city (the wife of an owner of a real estate company, an individual active in teacher's organizations, etc.); blacks are always outnumbered on the Board. Neither Community Chest funding nor the composition of its Board of Directors encourages what is commonly viewed in the subcommunity as "militance." Instead, the Urban League

is most likely to precede its public announcements with long periods of negotiation and "informal contact."* The Urban League took no public position during the busing controversy because "it's out of our area and it wouldn't have done any good anyway."¹⁰ The staff is explicitly aware of these constraints, but points to the positive aspects of these arrangements--the steady flow of money into the organization, and what they view as the opportunity to work "hand in glove" with influential whites.

What is traded-off in the development of these relationships, however, is widespread support in the subcommunity:

They're not very militant--they [the Urban League] never get anyone mad. . . . They just sprinkle a few blacks on that Board. . . . That Board more or less decides what they can do--I sat on it until I finally quit. . . . I think they're very far removed from civil rights activity. . . .¹¹

Like the NAACP, the Urban League has become sensitive to its standing in the subcommunity. To expand interest in its program, the national organization has urged the local League to invite "young people" into its Board of Directors, but the Executive Director believes that "the young people haven't been around long enough to know what they're doing," and some of them, he adds emphatically, "are knuckleheads." This stance is consistent with his view of the most important requirement for effective black leadership: "political sophistication." In an organization where

*Says one staff member, "I do half my work at lunch, just talking with people and feeling them out."

negotiation and the steady accumulation of quiet gains is necessary, "militant youngsters" indeed may tilt the League in a new direction; not to recruit them, however, may further diminish support in the subcommunity.

Variations in internal structure also seem to insure that the Urban League will operate at some "distance" from the subcommunity. The NAACP is organized so that most decisions are worked out in the Executive Board and then usually submitted for discussion in a general meeting once a month. Though Executive Board decisions are not often overturned, they are sometimes subjected to considerable discussion and criticism.* This process allows for potential feedback from at least a segment of the subcommunity.

In contrast, in the Urban League the large Board of Directors (currently 33 members) is responsible for setting general policy, but the staff and the Executive Director control the daily work of the organization and the implementation of policy--as well as having great influence in shaping the Board's directives to themselves. The full-time staff appreciates the organizational power accruing to them from this structure--and contrasts it favorably with the NAACP's lack of staff and what one calls "their monthly mass meetings." However, the League's structure of decision

*For example, NAACP leaders concede that they have heard discussion in their meetings of dropping their drive for school integration and moving toward community control of neighborhood schools--an indication that some differing viewpoints are brought out in the meetings; also, see the Chapter VI discussion of the suit blocking the recall election.

making minimizes the opportunity for differing segments of the subcommunity to voice their concerns or interests in the organization.

Again, though, the Urban League--like the local NAACP--does not need enthusiastic support in the subcommunity in order to achieve organizational goals, but they do need steady funding and access to white-controlled institutions to obtain minority job placements. A staff member summarizes the League's position:

Quite often minority groups just stir up flak. We don't. We've got a method and it works. We're opening doors for those who want to better themselves.¹²

Black Ministerial Alliance

In contrast to the NAACP and the Urban League, the Black Ministerial Alliance* is rooted directly in the subcommunity or at least a segment of it. The Alliance has as its first priority, the provision of personal and family counseling,** with a secondary level of concern being "civil rights activity, integration, school busing and that kind of thing."¹³ The Ministerial Alliance has also helped to

*Though all informants referred to the group as the Black Ministerial Alliance or the "B.M.A.," the ministers themselves refer to it as the Central City Ministerial Alliance. The difference in title suggests that the members do not see themselves first as race leaders, but as ministers.

**The Alliance lists the areas for counseling in the following order: religious conflicts, pre-marriage counseling, marital problems, pre-divorce conflicts, drug problems, occupational and job conflicts, delinquency-child and youth, financial difficulties, education and school problems and racial conflicts.¹⁴

develop Senior Citizen programs with the Model Cities agency, was active in the recall election, and currently operates a day-care center in a Baptist Church.*

Some of the ministers' efforts have failed. As described in Chapter II,** their attempt to lead an Easter boycott of downtown stores had mixed results at best. The ministers also had nine of the fifteen board seats in a Model Cities funded corporation, MEDC (Ministerial Economic Development Corporation), which failed in part because of their business misjudgments. MEDC was terminated after a prolonged battle on the Model Cities' Policy Board--a conflict in which the differing views of ministerial competence were rehearsed again.***

Recently, the Ministerial Alliance, "in keeping with today's shift to 'living religion,'"¹⁶ obtained four acres of farmland, parcels of which were set aside for use by inner-city families. The ministers pointed out the symbolic import of what might otherwise be viewed as merely utilitarian: "Man must live by the sweat of his brow [and our]

*In addition, the ministers may play a role in getting out the black vote. Though the ministers contend that they are non-political and only urge residents to vote in elections, the county's Democratic chairman states that the ministers "are the people to see" in mobilizing the local black vote.¹⁵

**pp. 104-105.

***Informant's comment: "I never saw anything like it. That [conflict] just about tore the place up. The hassle took most of the night, and there was blood on the floor when we got finished."

punishment is to keep out the weeds and thistles, as it is written."¹⁷

Not unexpectedly, the ministers and the B.M.A. draw differing reactions. To their "constituents"--the families attending the fundamentalist churches--the ministers are "good Christian men" and "community-minded." However, others outside this constituency view them as "always blowing their own horns," or as "interested only in money";* to the young separatists the ministers are relics of the past, and such projects as the inner-city farm plots are the object of much hilarity.¹⁸

Since their organization depends upon subcommunity support, the ministers defend themselves against their critics. When, at a money-raising rally sponsored jointly with the NAACP, one of the speakers charged that the occasion marked the first time the Alliance had backed a community project, the organization responded promptly with a letter distributed in the subcommunity and printed in the local paper: admitting that with MEDC "we sought to assist but stumbled," the ministers attributed the defeat to "politics" and went on to claim that "no organization of leaders within the black community has met as long and as consistently the challenge of human need as this organization of black ministers and the churches that are led by them."¹⁹

Both the language and the fact of the letter are suggestive of certain patterns. As implied, the ministers

*Also see labor leader's comment, Chapter II, p.260.

do not consider either the NAACP or the Urban League to be organizations from directly "within the black community."* Rather, these organizations are seen as led by and based upon persons from the highest social and economic stratum within the subcommunity, and those who are physically and perhaps psychologically removed from the black core area. In turn, the B.M.A. views itself as an "organization of leaders" which, though lacking formal representation of interests in the subcommunity, is able to speak and act for the subcommunity as a consequence of its leaders' roles as pastors.** These views are not basically inaccurate--except that the ministers overstate their ability to "represent" the "community." As with the young militants, the ministers can speak for only a segment of the subcommunity, though an important one--the middle-class or "respectable" church-going poor. In fact, the ministers have only the most fleeting contact with the black lower-class (though the president of the B.M.A. lives only two blocks from the core area) and frequently do not even recognize the names of the young militants in Central City.²⁰

In general, the ministers seem naive about what they call "politics" in the city, and most of them come from rural backgrounds and southern seminaries. Nevertheless, in

*These views were also confirmed in the informant and leadership interviews.

**When the NAACP sought to rally black support during the busing controversy, they turned to the B.M.A. and the churches for assistance in arranging mass meetings and "workshops"; see Chapter VI.

the past decade they have been able to alter their traditional and more limited roles in order to participate in the "civil rights movement." In the view of an agency head who has worked with the B.M.A. for several years, "the ministers used to be very conservative but in the last few years they've become much more vocal and active--which, for them, is almost a revolutionary change."

Still the ministers are hardly exemplars of radical chic: though supporting the goals of a sit-in protest at the high school, the ministers publicly bewailed the destruction of property; the Alliance was also active in distributing anti-abortion petitions;* and one minister even referred to Martin Luther King's foe, J. Edgar Hoover, as "the greatest detective who ever lived."²¹ Though the president of the B.M.A. concedes that "there is somewhat of a housing problem" for blacks in Central City, his emphasis on drugs and crime as the main problems in the subcommunity probably reflects the main concerns of his constituents.

The ministers of the Alliance can be classified as moderate integrationists--favoring integration because, in the words of one minister, "We are all God's children," while giving over most of their efforts to specific programs for the immediate benefit of the subcommunity: the day-care center, Senior Citizen programs, etc. Unlike the

*It is unclear whether opposition to "abortion reform" actually would be one of the indices of a generally conservative position. What is reported here is the interpretation of this ministerial activity by informants.

NAACP and the Urban League, the Black Ministerial Alliance cannot carry on its programs without the support of their constituency, as represented in the church congregations. The fact of the defensive letter and the recent appointment of a "public relations director" for the organization illustrates the minister's need to maintain the confidence of their followings in the subcommunity. They do not represent a monolithic "community" but the ministers do have--and must maintain--a base of followers and financial support in an important part of the local subcommunity.

Model Cities

The Model Cities Agency is not a black organization as such. Its staff is quick to point out that the Model Cities neighborhoods include fewer Negroes than in comparable programs in other cities, and that the agency has had only one program aimed exclusively at blacks--the ill-fated MEDC. However, the Model Cities program claims extensive links to the local subcommunity,* and the agency's Director is black,** as well as most of its "task forces" and its Policy board. The black city councilman states flatly that "blacks control Model Cities."²²

*See Chapter IV, pp.231-232.

**p. 117.

The predictable local conflict* occurs between Model Cities and the rather inept Mayor, with the agency desiring as much autonomy as possible, and the Mayor seeking control of the money and jobs represented by the program. The Mayor's strategy has been to portray the agency as rife with misappropriated funds, as well as being inefficient and ineffective, but as a consequence of his universal unpopularity with local blacks,** the Mayor's repeated attacks aid the agency's work in the subcommunity.

Actually though, Model Cities is a much-disputed topic among blacks, too: though some believe the agency's programs have helped the young²³ and others cite specific improvements in the Model Cities neighborhoods, the black critics view the agency as a "rip-off" ("four-fifths of the money spent aids about one-fifth of the people involved"), and even concede that "the Mayor may be right."²⁴

The point of greatest tension between the agency and individuals in the subcommunity is the competition for jobs in the Model Cities program. For both the subcommunity and some of the organizers of the local program the initial assumption was that residents of the areas selected as Model Cities' neighborhoods would fill available administrative positions, the somewhat hazy rationale being that these persons would be most aware of the problems in the

*See Daniel P. Moynihan, Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding (New York, 1969).

**See Chapter III, pp. 181-182.

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subcommunity. Instead, appointments have been based on a mix of credentials, location and political criteria. Thus, some of the staff have been hired because of past experience in similar programs, other appointments have been based on the claim to residence in and knowledge of the subcommunity* and many jobs have been allotted after political clearance from the black councilman.²⁵

This mix of hiring criteria satisfies few of the job-hungry in the core area, and complaints that those hired "don't know the community" are frequent. These hiring practices, however, are an organizational response to the conflicting pressures on the agency. Thus, some jobs must be allocated to satisfy the city councilman who is the chief defender of the agency in city politics; other positions are used to help build and maintain support in the subcommunity; finally, an agency also faced with complex problems of planning and organization must employ the "credentialed," and so staff with expertise--and degrees--are also hired. Considering all of the conflicting needs of and pressures upon the organization, one staff member commented "this program is designed to fail."²⁶

Evaluation of the local Model Cities agency is beyond the scope of this research, but two patterns relevant

*For an integrationist's scornful view of this criterion, see p. 232.

**See also Peter Marris and Martin Rein, Dilemmas of Social Reform (Chicago, 1967), pp. 261-267.

to local black leadership should be noted: the relationship of the agency to the subcommunity, and the threat it poses to the dominant black leaders in Central City. Though claims of extensive subcommunity support are made, the Model Cities agency is only superficially a "black-run organization." The agency depends upon federal funding, not upon any direct financial support from the subcommunity; indeed, with the advent of general revenue-sharing, the agency's budget has been slashed and new hiring has ceased. The agency's claim of widespread involvement by the subcommunity is also dubious; for example, neighborhood elections for positions on Model Cities' task forces often bring turnouts as low as 2-3% of eligible residents. Those persons elected then complain of manipulation by the full-time staff of the agency²⁷--hardly a startling result for part-time participants lacking expertise applicable in the policy areas represented by the task forces. Thus, not only is the agency entirely funded by a dwindling supply of "white money," but the degree of subcommunity participation and power in the agency is also minimal.

However, the agency is seen as offering an independent base of support (a following, plus organizational and financial resources) for rival leaders. Perhaps sensing this possibility, the black councilman has moved in on the agency, asserting his influence wherever possible. Other leaders speak darkly of wild spending and the support of young militants for the program. In a city where black

leadership tends to arise out of either association with "powerful" organizations (NAACP, Urban League) or prominent roles in white-controlled institutions (the City Council, the Board of Education), the Model Cities program introduces a possible new base for black leadership--and one entailing direct organizational work in the subcommunity.*

With the agency's programmatic emphasis upon immediate improvements in the subcommunity, the new black leadership associated with Model Cities also has been less likely to share the integrationist perspective.**

The irony of the integrationist's fears about Model Cities leadership is that subcommunity participation in the agency is limited: core area residents continue to be dependent upon staff expertise and, with the slowdown of funding, their ultimate dependence on federal budgets is also clear.

Malcolm X Institute

The Malcolm X Institute intends to be independent of white support--even though some of its initial funding came from the Model Cities agency. Now supported by the

*This type of work has been the basis for the leadership roles of John Washington and Hattie Hosler; see p. 102. In a recent election in the city's fourth ward, a black candidate also came from a staff position with the local agency.

**Of the individuals listed as leaders, five have had major roles in the Model Cities agency--either sitting on boards or working as full-time staff. One of the five is categorized as a militant separatist and the remainder as moderate separatists (see discussion in Chapter II). Model Cities took no position during the busing controversy, and few of the agency activists seemed interested in the issue.

Black Liberation Front Internationale (which, despite its name, is largely confined to the near-by university), the institute sees itself as an educational institution with a general set of goals: "to teach what should have been taught, to learn what should have been learned, to do what should be done."²⁸ Hence, the Institute seeks to teach both a "proper" historical perspective and African "lifestyles"; the intended result of this re-education away from white values is new leadership for the subcommunity: says Kensha Muhammed, "the first objective of a student . . . must be to address the needs of peoples of African descent."²⁹

The Institute schedules classes and meetings in its rented house in the core area,* but its appeal has been limited mainly to young blacks. Though many middle-class black leaders see them as "trouble-makers" or "revolutionaries," in fact the Institute seems to have only a limited set of activities in the subcommunity, aside from its "educational" functions. For example, when asked the Institute's main activity in the recent past, members cite their investigation of the police slaying of a young black.³⁰ The investigation concluded that the incident was "murder"--but nothing else happened.

The incident is typical: despite rhetoric to the contrary, the Malcolm X Institute has carried on only limited

*Asked about the Institute, one integrationist could only discuss the house: "It's so dirty and messy. I know who was born in that house and it's a shame to see it spoiled. I wish they'd clean it up."

activities in the subcommunity, and has been able to organize only a limited following. One of the main handicaps is that only intangible incentives are available to the organization. Black youths attracted to the group must be held by the abstract appeals of Pan-African ideology, and the *esprit* of like-minded cohorts--but no jobs, cash or contracts are available through the organization.* Lacking the flow of tangible resources seemingly necessary to sustain daily organizational activity, the Institute can only occasionally become active--as it did during riots and the protest at a local high school.

Summary: Incentives and Issue-Areas

Figure 7 summarizes the discussion of black organizations in Central City. As the table indicates, the Black Ministerial Alliance and Model Cities are most directly and consistently active in the subcommunity, while the NAACP and the Urban League have a more distant relationship to the subcommunity per se--much of their support being drawn from the dispersed middle-class and from whites, and most of

*As originally planned, the Institute would have been only one part of an inner-city educational institution for black youth; the other part was to be a training center for aspiring journalists--while the Institute would deal with ideological education. After prolonged controversy, Model Cities closed down the training center, and it eventually collapsed as a private enterprise. Since then, the Institute has been kept open with help from campus groups, but now has no tangible incentives to offer--as it might have with the training center.³¹

	NAACP	Urban League	Model Cities	Black Ministerial Alliance	Malcolm X Institute
ISSUE AREAS	Cases involving principles of integration	Job placements	City services to the subcommunity	Crime, neighborhood preservation	Police activities
MAIN AREA OF ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITY	School integration	Job placements	Development of programs for Model Cities neighborhoods	Provision of services (day-care center, counseling, etc.)	Pan-African propaganda, police surveillance
DOMINANT LEADERSHIP TYPE	Moderate and militant integrationists	Moderate integrationists	Moderate separatists	Moderate integrationists	Militant separatists
RELATIONSHIP TO SUBCOMMUNITY	Distant	Distant	Active in subcommunity	Active in subcommunity	Occasionally active in subcommunity
INCENTIVES (to maintain organization)	Intangible	Tangible	Tangible	Intangible	Intangible
(to attract support)	Intangible	Comb. {board workers	Tangible	Tangible	Intangible
MAIN CONSTRAINTS ON ACTION TO ATTAIN STATED GOALS	Lack of lawyers, cash	Board, sources of funding	Complexity of problems, disorganization & conflicts in agency	Lack of political/organizational sophistication	Lack of following, resources
CONSTITUENTS	Middle-class blacks, liberal whites	Board of Directors, individual workers, white business men	White & black residents of Model Cities neighborhoods, City Council	Black church members	Core-area youth

Figure 7.--Summary of Organizational Characteristics.

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their key activities occurring "out of sight" in court-rooms and business offices.*

These groups also differ in terms of the incentives characteristically used by each organization both to main-
tain the organization (e.g., to sustain leadership involve-
ment in and the daily tasks of the organization), and to
attract a following (members, program participants or cli-
ents).

Sometimes the types of incentives used differ: for example, while the Urban League maintains its leadership activities and daily operations mainly through tangible, material incentives (a large paid staff), it attracts its general following through the intangible appeal of a program which draws contributors and Board members, though this appeal is combined with the material incentives of the organization's job placements for individuals in the subcommunity. Also, the B.M.A. combines an intangible appeal to black ministers who feel they should be active leaders in the subcommunity (several ministers mentioned Martin Luther King as their role model) with the material benefits of day-care centers, free farm plots and counseling services, all of which help to maintain a following for this "organization of leaders." In contrast, in an organization such as Model Cities, both the leadership activities of its staff and its

*Some activities also take place in bars. One of the Urban League staff claimed his best negotiating occurred over drinks: "After a few drinks, the truth comes out, and then we can deal."³² The staff member holds a Master's degree in Labor and Industrial Relations.

support in the subcommunity hinge on the continued flow of material benefits from the federal government.

Only two organizations depend solely on intangible incentives: the NAACP and the Malcolm X Institute. Neither can promise its leaders any rewards other than possible social prominence or personal satisfaction; both depend upon free services to continue their activities--whether legal or educational in nature; and both attract a following through intangible appeals--to either "integrationists" or "Pan-Africanists." Indeed, with both organizations mainly dependent on intangible incentives* and with supporters attracted in large part by the "rightness" of their respective "causes," there is in both a tendency to seek out conflicts which sustain the organization. Notably, interest and participation in the Malcolm X Institute rose after its leadership was involved in a demonstration and a small riot, and attendance at the NAACP's meetings increased during the busing controversy.** Not surprisingly, the NAACP and the Malcolm X Institute are the main organizational carriers of the competing status goals of integration and subcommunity

*It should be clear that the NAACP has much more money than the Institute, though most of it is sent to the national organization and the remainder is not sufficient for the legal activities of the organization--hence, the need to locate "committed" lawyers who will render free services.

**Conflict situations may also offer ways to test out re-defined goals. The next chapter analyzes the "re-definition" of integration as cause and complication of the busing controversy.

autonomy--and it is the intangible appeal of these goals which maintains organizational followings.

Figure 7 also illustrates the issue-areas handled by these organizations and their leaders. The categories are based upon observation of organizations and issues over a two-year period. As described earlier, the NAACP takes as "its" issue any case involving threats to or the possibility of achieving the principle of racial integration. Therefore, as in the instance of the Kingsley Facility, the organization usually initiates actions only when the integration "cues" in a given situation become clear, and such activities take priority over other possible concerns--such as the original planning of the subcommunity Facility.*

The Urban League is concerned with issues related to job placements, though the issues are only publicized when the usual tactics of the organization fail. For example, the issue of City Hall positions for "minorities" was made public through an exchange of letters and press statements only after it was apparent that the Mayor had no intention of negotiating the issue.

Model Cities' leaders see as their main issues the highly specific concerns of subcommunity residents with city services and facilities. The agency's Policy Board frequently becomes a sounding board for complaints from the subcommunity, and programs have been developed to improve such services as garbage collection and transportation--as

*See Chapter IV, pp. 239-240.

well as the planning of the Kingsley Facility. The Ministerial Alliance was responsible for bringing pressure on the local police to improve their performance in the sub-community through increased patrols and faster response rates.* The ministers have also led efforts aimed at neighborhood preservation, in one instance even leading a group of "hard-working citizens" to protest that the property assessments on their homes should be raised to reflect their increased value!** In contrast, the Malcolm X Institute has focused on what is seen as illegitimate police activity by investigating a slaying and encouraging "surveillance" of police activities.

These issue-areas exhibit stability over time. Organizations and leaders do not often "cross-over" from one issue-area to another even if they have very strong opinions about controversies outside their usual area of concern. For example, the leadership in both the Malcolm X Institute and the Urban League had definite views in the Central City busing controversy, but never became actively involved on either side of the issue.

This issue-area stability seems to be maintained by a number of factors. In some instances, the main goals of an organization give it a natural interest in some issues

*See Chapter III, pp. 169-170.

**These residences are located in an area where the city may have to purchase homes through condemnation procedures in the future. In the past, prices paid have reflected the assessed value of the property.³³

as opposed to others--the NAACP's interest in school integration, for example. These interests are backed by tradition (in Central City, the NAACP has always been preoccupied with the issue of integration, the Urban League with job placements, the ministers with the provision of various services in the subcommunity) and the expertise which grows out of experience. In Central City, for instance, only the NAACP has the resources to prepare and pursue a federal desegregation case.* For a leadership concerned with "doing the homework," the lack of organizational expertise can be a major barrier to initiating activities on a new set of issues. Furthermore, taking on new issues can threaten the more usual activities of an organization--an Urban League engaged in a constant round of negotiations with various local institutions can ill-afford aggressive support of busing plans in the midst of a city-wide controversy. Several leaders seemed to sense that their groups had only limited capital which was best invested in the immediate tasks of the organization:

Why should we get involved [in the busing issue]?
 What good would it do anyway? I think they're [NAACP]
 going to lose no matter what, and we'd just hurt our-
 selves. . . .³⁵

Organizations are also subject to internal constraints as to their "proper" functions: thus, the Urban League's Board of Directors sees the organization's

*The NAACP lawyer: "They [desegregation cases] take a hell of a lot of work, a lot of time and you've got to know what you're doing. I don't think many lawyers can do it--and we get the few who can."³⁴

traditional concerns as proper, and the Model Cities agency could not become involved in the busing issue "because we're a federally funded agency."³⁶

Finally, not to be ignored is the sheer weight of organizational habit--which can also be viewed as the culmination of the above factors. For groups such as the NAACP, the Urban League and the Model Cities agency, the process of "institutionalization" is well-advanced, and new activities at this point would be unwelcome.* For "looser" groups such as the B.M.A. and the Malcolm X Institute, organizational habit is furthered by other variables: for the B.M.A., the expectations of their parishioners tend to limit the group's activities to the properly "non-political," while the Institute's lack of organizational resources limits its activities to continuing discussions of Pan-African "lifestyles." When asked why his organization did not become involved in the local busing controversy, one leader's comment perhaps summarized the force of organizational habit: "I don't know. I guess we just never thought of it."³⁷

Black Identity: Tactic and Symbol

The emphasis of the militant separatists on black identity as a means to their organizational ends should be briefly noted. Two statements can be made about the use of black identity in Central City: it is much more salient to

*See Chapter I, pp. 66-67, for discussion of Selznick's distinction between organizations and institutions and an analysis of the distinction as it applies to the recent history of the Civil Rights movement.

the young separatists than to any of the integrationists, and it has more symbolic than practical import for the local leadership.

To the young blacks influenced by black nationalism, "identity" is seen as a basic means to their ends: "We won't be free until we know who we are."³⁸ The Pan-Africanism advanced by Muhammed and the Malcolm X Institute argues that "people of African descent" build unity through shared racial identity; "Mother Africa," though, is not only a focus for identity and sentiment (as with a white ethnic group), but also a vaguely "revolutionary force" for American blacks. An international black-white (or "third world" vs. "capitalist") struggle is anticipated by some--with this conflict culminating in black liberation.³⁹ Thus, the emphasis upon black identity is seen as a necessary prelude to revolutionary struggle--and immersion in the white world is viewed as inevitably corrupting.

We call them [blacks in the white world] "white fools." They don't know who they are or why. . . . They're just bought men.*⁴⁰

To the separatists, it seems essential that one's black identity be symbolized in readily observable fashion--hence, language, hair styles and dress take on inordinate importance as outward signs of an inner "blackness." During the period of interviews, certain symbolic fashions were obvious (Afros seemed less important as symbols than in the recent past, but broad-brimmed hats were "in"), but language

*This attitude no doubt reinforces the role strain felt by separatists; see discussion, pp. 287-291.

was the main carrier of symbolic blackness*--or of the new middle-class status. "Down-home" inflections, scornful references to whites and "bourgie" [bourgeoisie] blacks, and a skillful mix of "street language" and obscenity characterized the discussions with separatists to whom black identity was a central concern.⁴¹ To many of the integrationists, however, such language is repugnant. For example, one of the most flamboyant of local leaders,** a separatist able to combine in one sentence references to "cognitive skills," "group dynamics" and "fucked-up-mother-fuckers," was condemned as often by the middle-class integrationists for his language as for his positions on issues--the NAACP president criticizing him most succinctly:

. . . Whites react to his words, but we're used to that kind of language and grow up with it--so he doesn't impress us at all. We have a saying: "I may be a fool, but I'm not a damn fool!" I always think of that when I think of him, because he just wants to impress people that he's black. . . . That man is vulgar in speech, dress and attitude. . . .⁴²

To the integrationists, then, cultural politics is unappealing and questions of black identity are peripheral.***

*For further evidence of the sensitivity to "style" and language, see the note on p. 288 concerning the development of two vocabularies.

**Without being asked, seven of the eleven integrationists explicitly condemned this leader's language. When testifying in a federal judge's chambers recently, this leader's rhetoric was so colorful that the judge asked him to restrain his usual descriptive flair.

***One integrationist tells with bemusement how her daughter was "radicalized" at Howard University. Upon returning home, the daughter announced her dislike for "white money," so her parents told her they could no longer pay for

Although their homes may have Josh White song sheets on the piano and small African sculptures in the hallway, the integrationists--consistent with their "getting ourselves in" orientation*--view identity as rooted in personal strength or individual competence, not a racial subculture.

. . . our identity can't be lost--how could we lose it? If you're a strong black person, you're always going to be [that type of person]. . . .

. . . one's identity is a personal thing. I can't think of any ethnic group that's lost identity--Irish, Italians and so forth. . . . There's no such thing as acting black--our aspirations are the same [as whites], and we're in the same competitive system. I think we need economic identities.⁴⁴

"Militant-Mobility" and Role Strain

Leadership tactics and the development of black organizations in the subcommunity are shaped by "militant-mobility" and an emerging pattern of role strain. Role strain is reflected in what leaders feel they can and cannot do, while mobility changes the basis for leadership roles.

As noted in Chapter III, the absence of a strong and consistently active militant organization arising directly out of the core area can be partially accounted for

her education since their jobs as secretary and bartender only brought them such money. The parents now report that the daughter was "just going through a phase as a nationalist or something." One lady expressed an attitude toward "Mother Africa" which the separatists would regard with most horror:

I'm not interested in going to Africa--I haven't been all over the United States yet. But I might go someday because it's hot there and that would be good for my asthma.⁴³

*See Chapter IV, p. 198.

by the characteristics of the subcommunity itself:* institutional underdevelopment, population dispersion and rapid turnover, lack of subcommunity autonomy, etc. Therefore, the opportunity structure for would-be leaders points away from the unpromising core area. The remaining opportunities are in nationally based organizations or institutions such as the NAACP, Urban League or even Model Cities agency--and, increasingly, in private or governmental positions. It is the pattern of informal co-optation** into these positions which, in addition to the unpromising characteristics of the core area, pulls young separatist leaders away from what might seem their natural organizational "home" in the subcommunity.

Under the pressures of the Civil Rights movement of the 1960's, both state and private agencies created an array of new positions which were to be filled mainly by blacks***--directors of Human Relations Commission, Equal Opportunity Officers, minority consultants, etc. These new positions required individuals concerned with minority groups,**** who could develop programs aimed at aiding blacks or, at times, act as an in-house "enforcer," pushing a government

*See Chapter III, pp. 182-192.

**See footnote 62, p. 196.

***This was an unstated assumption, of course, but the large number of blacks holding these positions is hardly accounted for by chance.

****When these positions were initially created, the term "minorities" operationally translated into "blacks," but now has grown to encompass Chicanos and women.

agency or business to meet its own rhetorical commitments to equal rights and increased employment opportunities.

As viewed from inside the relevant institutions, these new positions required the recruitment of blacks both articulate enough to serve as public spokesmen for the institution and yet "representative" enough to be able to deal with the local black subcommunity. Thus, when persons in Central City acquired the skills and the following to claim that they could speak for the subcommunity, or a part of it, they then became potentially valuable to other organizations or institutions trying to recruit "representative" black spokesmen for the newly created positions. These new recruitment criteria were especially important to Central City blacks, who lived in a state capitol where several such positions opened up in state government.

Since "real" black spokesmen might not come from such traditional and middle-class organizations as the NAACP or the Urban League, recruitment for the new positions tended to focus on the small group of local activists who worked directly in and sought support from the core area. Hence, over the past six years, almost all leaders who have worked in the core area have been recruited by government or private agencies.⁴⁵ Hattie Hosler, wife of a Baptist minister and active for years in the core area, was selected as head of the Senior Citizens program by Model Cities; Kensha Muhammed, from the Malcolm X Institute, became a "consultant" for Productive Systems, Inc., an organization

working on job training for blacks; Carl Kenton, a man regarded as the most "radical" of local blacks in the mid-1960's, was given an executive position in state government; J. C. Wilson, a moderate separatist active in the core area, was selected as the "inner-city co-ordinator" for the county's Mental Health Department; finally, John Washington--perhaps the most articulate separatist in Central City--was named as Equal Opportunity Officer for the State Housing Authority.*

There is, of course, considerable irony in entering the "establishment" (or being seen as doing so) by first organizing a base of support in the black core area. However, the pattern is also the classic one of institutions co-opting potentially "threatening" leadership. By hiring "real" leaders** from the subcommunity itself, the institutions of state, local and county government could symbolize both their legitimacy and their earnestness in seeking "equal opportunities." The danger for blacks, however, was that these newly hired individuals might become powerless tokens.** What is clear, though, is the impact of this

*These occupations range in income approximately from \$8,500-\$18,000.

**If the implication of this research were accepted--that the subcommunity is not monolithic and leaders usually can represent only a segment of it--this recruitment pattern might have to be re-evaluated by these institutions.

***The recruitment pattern represents a curious revision of Lewin's "leadership from the periphery [p. 50]." The last chapter considers co-optation and leadership effectiveness.

pattern of institutional recruitment upon the type of black leadership developed in Central City: leaders seeking to organize support directly in the core area tend to be detached from that base of support by institutional recruitment patterns.

The Case of John Washington

The career of John Washington typifies this process of recruitment into new roles. Coming from a poor family in Detroit, Washington attended the local university and gradually acquired ties to the subcommunity through his marriage and work. After graduation, he obtained a position on the city newspaper, but then quickly moved on to a staff role with the new Model Cities agency. Though Washington had been active for years, it was with Model Cities that he acquired his notoriety among some local whites. Freed to work in the core area by the relative lack of structure in the early phases of the agency,* Washington was well-known as the organizer of a "Freedom Academy," and for participating in and being arrested during a sit-in demonstration.

Washington quickly became recognized as the main spokesman for young blacks in the core area. His ties to "militants" and his activities in the city finally incurred the wrath of the Mayor, and Washington was forced to resign

*Comments a leader from the Urban League: "He was always out shooting the bull. He could do it though, because he didn't have reports, programs, constituents or boards."⁴⁶ With his upward-mobility, Washington has now acquired several of these possible constraints.

from the agency. It was at this point that Washington's upward-mobility was supported by his leadership role and subcommunity following. Far from being hounded out of town by the Mayor's charges and the attendant publicity, Washington was quickly hired by a firm performing consulting and program evaluation services--for the Model Cities agency. From that position he was then recruited for his current role as Equal Opportunity Officer for the State Housing Authority. Hence, in one decade Washington had advanced from his background in a large and poor family in Detroit to an important position in the state's Housing Authority--his rise being furthered not only by his intelligence and hard work but also by his leadership in the core area.

The impact of this ascent upon his leadership role is dramatic. Washington is no longer freed from "reports, programs, constituents." Currently most of his time is taken up by his official chores--and by his new after-hours activity on the Authority's softball and basketball teams. Recognizing the inevitable changes, Washington now speaks in the past tense of "the time when I got my reputation as a leader."⁴⁷

The development of Washington's career typifies what has happened to many of the bright and aggressive "militants" of the past decade: in becoming upwardly mobile they have, in an important sense, left the subcommunity. Most, though not all of these individuals remain as black leaders in Central City, but the basis for that leadership

alters. Washington's role used to be based upon his organizational work in the core area, but his leadership is now based upon memories of his past activities and his current position with the powerful Housing Authority, in which he can sometimes speak for the interests of local blacks.⁴⁸ Thus, the shape of the leadership role assumed by the "co-opted" and upwardly mobile separatists and core-area organizers eventually comes to resemble that of the integrationists: leadership is based upon roles in or access to powerful organizations or institutions rather than the mobilization of direct support in the subcommunity itself.

The integrationists are well-aware of the effects of occupational mobility on subcommunity-based leadership, some of them even pointing out the similarities between the leadership roles and career lines of the main community-organizer of the mid-1960's, and the career of John Washington in the late 60's. Having been accused of "bourgie" status themselves, many of the middle-aged integrationists react with candid glee to the co-opting of John Washington.

He's been quiet lately and we don't hear as much from him as we used to. Hell, I saw him in the Eagle restaurant the other day, having a few martinis. [laughter] Why I guess he's changed now. . . .

. . . these guys [separatists] are always mouthing off until they get a good job. They they become solid [citizens], real solid. I think John's gettin' more solid all the time [laughter]. . . .

These kids do a pretty good job of ripping off the system they're always attacking. . . . I'll tell you why Washington has changed: because it all depends on who's paying you, that's why!⁴⁹

This pattern of militant-mobility further expands the explanation of the lack of subcommunity-based militant organizations and leaders. The traditional difficulties of organization in relatively poor and resourceless subcommunities certainly are relevant in Central City, as are the specific characteristics of the black subcommunity analyzed in Chapter III. Also relevant, however, are the career lines and patterns of co-optation discussed here: the ability to organize a following in the local subcommunity makes one a candidate for well-paying positions in institutions where such talents either establish one's "legitimacy" as a black spokesman or are viewed as relevant to institutional purposes; this pattern of militant-mobility does not necessarily terminate leadership roles, but does change their basis--and makes it difficult to sustain "grass-roots" organization and subcommunity-based leadership over time.

Jobs and Leadership

This process of militant-mobility can be parodied as merely the placing of hats over Afros, ties over dashikis; however, the resulting role strain is an important problem for individuals wishing both to prosper and to lead. Though most of the leaders seemed at least occasionally to experience role strain,⁵⁰ the proposition can be made that upwardly mobile separatist leaders experience the most acute role strain as a consequence of both their views and their "exposed" institutional positions.

The tension between the goals and means generally emphasized by separatists and their occupational roles is greater than for the integrationists. The latter seek as a central goal the entrance of blacks into the larger society, and emphasize tactics aimed at gaining access to policy-makers in key institutions; these goals and tactics are consonant with those occupational roles which entail "working in the system"--indeed, work roles in "white" institutions can be viewed as harbingers of an integrated future. However, for the separatists whose goals are the development of "community power" or "control" (here categorized as goals of subcommunity autonomy), and who emphasize both the growth of black-controlled institutions and the mobilization of mass support in the subcommunity as tactics, the tensions are much greater: occupying positions in white-controlled institutions can be viewed as contrary to the goals and tactics favored.

Differing concepts of leadership are also associated with the integrationist and separatist positions on goals and tactics. The integrationists generally concede the utility of a number of differing leadership functions:

Some people speak out, some raise money and others just help out where they can. . . . We can each do different things well. That's our strength. . . .⁵¹

In contrast, the separatists, consistent with the tactics they approve, favor a clear-cut leadership role: the organizer.

When you say leader, you're saying someone who formulates positions, who articulates positions . . . someone who thinks for himself . . . and then persuades people to follow him and organizes them in some way. That's a leader.⁵²

This ideal of the leader can be most closely matched when leaders are freed of the constraints of white organizations. Said one separatist leader in discussing her all-black organization:

You talk about leadership, but this is a real organization, the biggest one you'll see with blacks. The others all have 10% blacks, and all the rest whites. Here, it's all black. We're operated by blacks, and organized under a real black leader--me! . . . You couldn't run this program and I can and I'll tell you why--because I've got gifts and I'm black!⁵³

Given the tensions between the favored set of goals and tactics, the favored leadership type and their present occupational roles,* separatist leaders tend to think of their days of active leadership in the past tense (as in the case of John Washington) or to offer defensive rationales for their current positions:

. . . they may call me an Oreo, but I'm the same person I've always been, nothing's changed. . . . To a degree you have to compromise, but it doesn't matter whether

*Some of the leaders also develop two vocabularies as a method for handling their disparate roles and audiences. For example, one leader used psychological jargon during his interview and then skillfully switched to "jive" for his work in the core area. In another interview, a middle-class black who, through his work, must maintain daily contacts with the subcommunity, offered an amusing example of the two vocabularies. Interrupted in the middle of a cogent analysis of local leaders by a young man seeking a favor, he immediately altered his language: "Hiya brother, what's happenin'," being followed by a short but (to the interviewer) recondite discussion. As the young man left, the leader turned to the interviewer and whispered, "Now that's a militant."⁵⁴

you work in the plant or earn \$38,000, when the man pulls your coat, are you gonna respond? Sure you will--99% of the world does,--does what it has to. . . . My family's got to eat too.⁵⁵

The integrationists, though, often see their occupations as enhancing their leadership roles by giving them access to policy-makers and the "clout" accompanying prominent positions; these sentiments were summarized by one leader referring to his position with the state government: "This way I can get something done--I don't have to stand around outside hollering."⁵⁶

Certain patterns such as the absence of businessmen and the occupational dependence on state and federal funding are apparent in the listing of institutional positions in Figure 8. Of main interest, however, is the relationship between occupation and the probability of a leader's experiencing role strain. The table indicates whether the leadership types occupying differing positions must, by virtue of their occupations, engage in frequent contact with persons from the black subcommunity.

A mixed pattern is evident for the large group of moderate integrationists, some having frequent contact and some not. However, none of the militant integrationists have jobs with predominantly black clienteles. One of the militant integrationists is a housewife and former member of the Board of Education, one an administrator dealing mainly with other administrators, and one a lawyer with few

<u>Type</u>	Militant Integrationist	Moderate Integrationist	Moderate Separatist	Militant Separatist
	State Director, Youth Employ- ment Services(-)	Exec. Sec'y for Mich. Sec'y of State (-)	Union Presi- dent (+)	Consultant, Productive Systems** (+)
	Lawyer (-)	Engineer, State Highway Dept. (-)	Inner-City Coordinator, Mental Health Dept. (+)	
	Housewife (-)	City Council (-)		
		State Rep- resentative (-)	Director, Senior Citizens Program (+)	
		Director, Human Relations Commission (+)	Equal Opportu- nity Officer, State Housing Authority (±)	
		Director, Model Cities (-)		
		Exec. Director, Urban League (±)		
		Minister (+)		

Occupations
and Contact*

*(+)--job brings contact mainly with blacks.

(-)--job does not bring contact mainly with blacks.

(±)--mixed pattern.

**This information was supplied by informants, not through leadership interviews.

Figure 8.--Occupational Positions, by Leadership Type.

black clients.* In all the leadership interviews, the militant integrationists gave the fewest signs of role strain. One can tentatively hypothesize that, for the militant integrationists, the non-problematic nature of the relationship between their leadership and occupational roles arises not only from a shared ideological stance which requires working with whites, but also from the nature of their institutional positions, which are similar only in that they do not push these leaders into regular contact with core area blacks, who might either scorn their affluence or, more likely, cross-pressure them with claims which cannot be met.

In sharpest contrast, all the separatists must maintain regular contact with individuals from the subcommunity--and in roles in which they often must speak for other interests. Again, there is a certain irony: institutions recruited these leaders in part because of their assumed support in the subcommunity, and the leaders themselves try to retain their contacts with the subcommunity, even as they are upwardly mobile; but one can argue that it is the very persistence of these subcommunity contacts which tends to drive home the tensions between their preferred roles as black organizers and their roles as workers in "white" institutions.

I guess some of them see me as coming from "the man"--and maybe they're right, I don't know. . . .⁵⁸


*"Most of them [blacks clients] go elsewhere. Only about 5% of my case load, at most, involves blacks in any way. I'm expensive, you know."⁵⁷

Though these relationships remain hypothetical, it might be useful in other cities to test the proposition and prediction that role strain will be greatest for leaders with separatist ideologies and occupational roles (in "white" institutions) which require frequent contact with the black subcommunity--and least for integrationists who have infrequent occupational contact with local blacks.

However, there is some "strain" in all local leadership roles because of the conditions which work to separate Central City's predominantly middle-class leadership from blacks residing in the core area. For example, residential separation presumably reinforces as well as reflects status differences* and an examination of Figure 9 shows that only two leaders--both separatists--live in the core area. In addition, Central City's middle-class blacks have developed a distinctive social life, complete with "Miss Black Central City" contests,** an array of lodges and "TIL" ("Those Interested in Links"), a black women's club with a membership list reading like the subcommunity's "Who's Who." The prerequisites for these social activities effectively bar lower-class participation. Not surprisingly

*For a full discussion of this subject, see Chapter III, pp. 157-162.

**This beauty contest is sponsored by the Silver Leaf Lodge No. 534, Improved Benevolent Protective Order of Elks of the World. Despite their portentous titles, there is little evidence that the city's black lodges are influential in leadership activities--though one leader sheepishly admitted that he usually missed NAACP meetings because they conflicted with his "lodge night."



* See also Figure 3, p. 150.

Figure 9.--Residential Location by Leadership Type.

for an upwardly mobile leadership group, individual traits are emphasized as the means to success--and the core area's lower-class is the subject of some pointed comments.

I've worked hard for mine but a lot of blacks aren't very ambitious. But some people are gaining as much [by] not working, as by working. . . .

. . . [There is] the element that is unemployed and unskilled--they create discomfort and rowdiness especially for those who have to live near them. . . .

. . . [A union president speaking of recruiting construction workers] I take them out in the rain and they say, "I'm not going to work in that goddamn dirty place!" They want to start at the top, not work as apprentices anywhere--they only think of the big money and want to make it fast. . . . You've got to learn hard work--that's what I did, and it's the only way. . . .⁵⁹

Conclusion

This and the previous chapter further develop a composite picture of local black leadership. Unlike the stereotype of big-city leadership as highly "militant" and "ideological" and actively engaged in organizing the "black community," in Central City most leaders favor conventional political tactics, most black organizations have ambiguous relationships with the subcommunity, and occupational roles are highly salient--though in differing ways--for both separatists and integrationists. Any assessment of local black leadership ultimately hinges on an evaluation of the central trade-off made by most of these leaders: they have gained the advantages of co-optation and "access"--and the accompanying constraints on leadership activities. The next chapter traces these activities on the local busing issue,

while the last chapter evaluates the effectiveness of black leadership in Central City and summarizes the findings.

FOOTNOTES*

- ¹Leadership interview.
- ²Leadership interviews.
- ³Leadership interviews.
- ⁴Leadership interviews.
- ⁵Leadership interview.
- ⁶Informant interview.
- ⁷Leadership interview.
- ⁸Informant interview.
- ⁹Informant interviews.
- ¹⁰Informant interview.
- ¹¹Informant and leadership interviews.
- ¹²Footnote 10, op. cit.*
- ¹³Informant interview.
- ¹⁴"Free Counseling Initiated," State Journal, March 4, 1973, p. F-3.
- ¹⁵Informant interview.
- ¹⁶Neil Hunter, "Come, Till God's Gardens," State Journal, May 29, 1973, p. B-3.
- ¹⁷Ibid.
- ¹⁸Separatist proxy interviews (see p.202).
- ¹⁹"Concern Recorded," State Journal, March 17, 1973, p. A-6.
- ²⁰Informant interviews.

*Ibid. and op. cit. are used only when reference is made to a specific leadership or informant interview cited in an earlier footnote; otherwise, interviews are cited separately.

²¹Informant interview.

²²Leadership interview.

²³Informant interviews.

²⁴Leadership interview.

²⁵Footnote 22, op. cit., and informant interviews.

²⁶Informant interview.

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸Madelyn Bridgett, "Blacks Begin Plans," Grapevine Journal, January 30, 1973, p. 6.

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰Proxy interviews, op. cit.

³¹Leadership interviews.

³²Leadership interview.

³³Informant interview.

³⁴Leadership interview.

³⁵Leadership interview.

³⁶Informant interview.

³⁷Leadership interview.

³⁸Informant interview.

³⁹Proxy interviews, op. cit.

⁴⁰Footnote 38, op. cit.

⁴¹Proxy interviews, op. cit.

⁴²Leadership interview.

⁴³Leadership interview.

⁴⁴Leadership interviews.

⁴⁵Informant interviews.

⁴⁶Leadership interview.

⁴⁷Leadership interview.

⁴⁸Informant interviews.

⁴⁹Leadership interviews.

⁵⁰See pp.279-283, for comments on role strain.

⁵¹Leadership interview.

⁵²Leadership interview.

⁵³Leadership interview.

⁵⁴Leadership interview.

⁵⁵Leadership interview.

⁵⁶Leadership interview.

⁵⁷Leadership interview.

⁵⁸Footnote 55, op. cit.

⁵⁹Leadership interview.

CHAPTER VI

BLACK LEADERSHIP AND THE BUSING CONTROVERSY

Introduction

This chapter is a case study of the busing-desegregation conflict in Central City and the black leadership role in the controversy. The first section traces the main events, actors and strategies in the conflict from the early 1960's to the definitive District Court decision of 1973. Using the materials of the case study, the second part of the chapter reviews the relationship between the NAACP and the local school board, and also uses the concepts of issue-areas and role strain to develop an analysis of the variations in leadership activities on the busing issue. The last segment of the chapter also focuses on the busing-desegregation issue in considering the links between opinions in the subcommunity and black leadership goals.

A Decade of Desegregation

The decade of the 1960's brought to Central City both the issues of de facto segregation and busing for racial balance, and the actors who would play an important part in the busing crisis of 1971-73: the increasingly militant NAACP, a Citizen's Advisory Committee, a politically sophisticated school board and Superintendent,

an anti-busing citizen's group and a black spokesman against busing.

The 1954 Supreme Court decision had had little immediate effect in Central City. As described in Chapter III, a pattern of residential segregation by race had gradually evolved in the city, and school attendance merely reflected these residential patterns--or so school officials argued. However, there were also informal practices which helped maintain school segregation: the NAACP was later to claim that school officials deliberately had contained blacks at an overcrowded Main Elementary School, while permitting many white pupils to transfer to a near-by all-white school;¹ moreover, the school system evidently had used an informal quota system to limit the number of black teachers,² after hiring the first two black faculty in 1951. By the middle of the 1960's, black integrationists feared--with some reason--that the city was developing a dual school system: 71% of black students in the junior high system went to one school and three of the elementary schools (Kalamazoo, Main and Michigan) took in about half of the black grade school population.³

Frustrated by the lack of school integration in the city--but at the same time lacking any clear legal precedents against de facto segregation*--the NAACP's Education

*Comment by NAACP leader: "The school people used to just de facto us to death. Finally, we decided that it was segregation no matter what they called it."

Committee* in April of 1963 asked the local Board of Education itself to adopt a policy statement favoring "equal educational opportunity." The NAACP wanted boundaries shifted for West Junior High so as to bring in more whites, and asked for appointment of a Citizen's Committee to study "the long-range aspects" of the problem of integration. What they most wanted, though, was to undermine the rationale of de facto segregation previously offered by Board members and school administrators:

[We recommend] that the Central City Board of Education make a formal statement of policy favoring the elimination of school segregation regardless of the cause [emphasis added].⁴

The Board of Education was mainly composed of white "moderates" who felt it necessary to deal with the NAACP's concerns;⁵ thus, the Board did appoint a Citizen's Committee, as suggested by the NAACP, and later closed schools and shifted boundaries to promote integration. However, on the central goal of the NAACP--a change in the de facto segregation/patterns of residence rationale for existing racial imbalances--the Board resisted. In its requested "Equal Opportunity Statement" the Board members pointedly re-affirmed their commitment to the neighborhood school:

The Board of Education plans to continue its traditional practice of establishing attendance areas on a geographical basis because it believes that what happens in the community and in the homes . . . is of crucial importance to the effectiveness of teachers. . . . The Board of Education recognizes that this policy produces in some areas of the school district

*See Chapter III, pp. 187-188.

an imbalance of minority group pupils (sometimes referred to as de facto segregation). This undesirable result is caused by factors beyond the control of the Board of Education.⁶

Nevertheless, the Board gave succor to the NAACP by appointing to the new Citizen's Committee many of the initial "agitators" for integration.⁷ This committee of fifty persons was authorized to study de facto segregation, and sixteen months later handed in its report.

The committee identified Central City's pattern of segregated housing and noted that the pattern "unless modified by other means inevitably will lead to segregated education."⁸ The report specifically suggested that the school board discontinue operations in the elementary and junior high schools with the greatest racial imbalances, and that affected black pupils then be assigned in equal numbers to each of the remaining elementary and junior high schools.

Such a move would mean the effective end of black neighborhood schools and extensive busing of black school children around the city. Though the NAACP initially had wanted to shift boundaries so as to bring more whites to the predominantly black junior high, the integrationists now reasoned that the reports suggested one-way busing would draw the least white opposition.

To the Board as well the recommendation had a certain appeal: if, as the NAACP maintained, integration was more important to them than "neighborhood schools," why not eliminate black neighborhood schools and bus the children

into schools which would be integrated by virtue of their presence?

Thus, on July 23, 1966, the Board authorized the transfer of all students residing in a portion of the West Junior High attendance area to Pattengill Junior High, beginning the next September--thereby shifting enough blacks into Pattengill to integrate it and also moving toward the eventual closing of mainly black West Junior High.

The Board also began consideration of a different proposal submitted by school superintendent Manders. In contrast to the one-way busing of Blacks entailed in the junior high transfers, the Manders Plan was for "cross-busing" of blacks and whites at the senior high school level, and was designed to end school segregation over the period of the 1966-67 and 1967-68 school years.

A white citizen's group quickly organized--not so much against the busing of blacks to Pattengill as in opposition to the cross-busing of the Manders Plan. The organizational effort was launched from those neighborhoods to be affected, if the Plan were adopted. The "Colonial Village--Eaton Downs Citizen's Committee" had an initial membership of about 200, but was able to acquire more than 2,000 petition signatures in the three days before the next regularly scheduled Board meeting.⁹ In response to the Committee's demands, the Board arranged for two "open meetings" where citizens could speak on the Manders Plan.

The two meetings revealed not only the predictably heated opposition of the neighborhood group, but also a black spokesman opposed to the Plan. J. C. Wilson, head of a black group called "The Grass-Roots Committee," argued that "the school system should get out of the bus system entirely"¹⁰--and received great applause from many whites in the audience. Blacks from the NAACP and the Human Relations Commission supported the desegregation plan. Encouraged by the evidence of some black opposition to busing, the neighborhood group met after the public meeting and re-formed itself into the People's Action Committee on Education (PACE)--and began working in coalition with Wilson's Grass-Roots Committee.*

Despite the broadened opposition, the school board in August gave final approval to both the junior high transfers and the Manders Plan for high school desegregation. Having failed to sway the Board through petitioning and speeches in the open meetings, PACE undertook legal action. On September 7, 1966--just before the school year was to begin--the County Circuit Court ruled that the Plan could not go into effect until the Court could study its constitutionality. Faced with possibly a full year's delay of the Plan, the Board went into conference with the Court and

*It proved impossible to trace whether other black leaders served on the G.R.C. and how many members it had. Integrationist leaders dismiss the organization as largely a figment of J. C. Wilson's imagination. When interviewed, Wilson was reluctant to discuss the G.R.C., preferring to talk about his current activities.

arranged a means whereby students affected by the busing plan could attend their newly assigned schools on a "voluntary" basis--allowing school officials to transport them by bus.

The Superintendent then used this arrangement to "squeeze" white resistance: students not reporting to their assigned schools were denied admission. Not being able to await the eventual outcome of the suit, most students (78%) "voluntarily" attended their assigned schools.¹¹ However, on September 13, the County Court ruled that school officials could not continue the maneuver and must maintain the past enrollment system until the courts ruled on the Manders Plan. The school system complied and the desegregation plan was dead for the 1966-67 school year.

However, PACE was eventually to be beaten by the decisions of both the courts and the school board. The Circuit Court injunction was reversed in 1969 by the State Court of Appeals, in a decision which maintained that school systems could use racial criteria in student assignments for the purpose of racial balance; a few months later the decision was sustained when the State Court of Appeals refused to consider the case.

Meanwhile, the Board--with support from the NAACP--had moved to desegregate Central City schools without using extensive cross-busing: in April of 1968, sweeping changes in junior and senior high boundaries were announced--without "open meetings"; at the end of the 1968 school year, West

Junior High was closed and its students (almost all black) bused to other junior highs which they then "integrated"; in June of 1970 the mainly black Kalamazoo Elementary School was closed and its students bused elsewhere.*¹²

The goal was to desegregate all junior and senior high schools by the end of 1972,** and the means used made black school-children a bused population: 80% of the students bused in Central City were black.¹³ Thus, by 1971 the NAACP and the integrationists reasonably could claim to have reached a large part of their goal: the junior and senior high schools were well on their way to being integrated via one-way busing. The next step was desegregation of the city's elementary schools.

The Report and the Reaction

Reacting to fights in the schools and a sit-in demonstration the previous November, the School Board tried in 1971 to establish Assistant Principals in charge of discipline in each school.*** However, many black leaders had begun to think that integration in the schools should extend beyond "body-mingling"--and other blacks wished to

*Furthermore, another "black school," Lincoln Elementary, had been closed at the end of the 1965 school year --and its students also distributed by bus to other schools.

**Using federal guidelines, (see p. 315), this goal was achieved, with the exception of one high school.

***The first Assistant Principal was to be assigned to Sexton High School, site of the black demonstration--which led several leaders to regard the Board's actions as anti-black.

move into jobs in school administration; together, they insisted that rather than appoint a host of new Assistant Principals the school system should appoint a black Deputy Superintendent. A broad coalition of support formed behind the idea.

The wanted a black Deputy Superintendent before the Board wasted money on those head-busters [Assistant Principals]. . . . Everyone was there [at a meeting with the Superintendent]: the ministers, people from Malcolm [Institute], bourgeois, the youngsters, the old mama's--like Mother Hosler, she was there, even James* came along. . . . That's the one time I can ever remember that everyone came together in one coalition. . . .¹⁴

When a black Deputy Superintendent was appointed,** the leadership was encouraged by the display of political muscle.

Hence, by 1971 the NAACP and the predominantly integrationist leadership could have the justifiable feeling that events were moving their way. Not only had concrete steps toward secondary school integration been taken and black infiltration of teaching and administrative ranks begun, but other factors also led to an optimistic outlook. Federal courts had begun to relax their requirements for establishing de jure segregation***--and the NAACP lawyers

*James Faraday, the city councilman, was usually cautious about involvement in potentially damaging causes.

**The school system had come a long way from 1951; by 1972, 9.2% of the system's teachers and administrators were black--a proportion which was increasing every year.

***For example, when the defendants in U.S. vs. School District 151 argued that their district's de facto segregation came about "innocently" and that they had no constitutional duty to undo the result of housing patterns, the

thought a case could be made against the local school system, if necessary. Several Board members and the school Superintendent also realized this possibility--which acted as a spur to further desegregation. Moreover, for the first time a black representative, Harriet Campbell,** sat on the School Board--and was to play a central role in the busing controversy. Finally, the black leadership saw the new school Superintendent, Carl Calelli, as "on our side," and a "leader for integration."¹⁶

In this context, the Board turned to the next phase of its desegregation program with a familiar tactic, again appointing a citizen's committee. The Citizen's Advisory Committee on Educational Opportunity was composed of fifty members and carefully chosen to be "representative of the ethnic, economic and geographical composition of the entire school district."¹⁷ Thus, the Committee included twenty-four men and twenty-four women, thirty-two whites, six Mexican-Americans and ten blacks.¹⁸ The blacks selected by this ticket-balancing logic generally were second-echelon activists--persons who had been active in the P.T.A. and on

District Court responded that school policies had "effectively rendered de jure the formerly extant de facto segregation." In the 1970 Davis vs. School District of the City of Pontiac case, the trial judge warned Boards of Education that

When the power to act is available, failure to take the necessary steps so as to negate or alleviate a situation which is harmful is as wrong as is the taking of affirmative steps to advance that situation. Sins of omission can be as serious as sins of commission.¹⁵

**See p. 177 and voting data, p. 178.

some educational issues, but who were neither mentioned frequently as "outstanding leaders" nor particularly prominent as militant integrationists in the city.* As the Committee began its work, however, it became apparent that all of the blacks favored cross-busing for desegregation.

By now the majority of the Board, as well as the Superintendent, were firmly committed to final desegregation of the Central City school system, an intent reflected in the tasks assigned to the Committee: it was to develop a plan and a time-table for final desegregation of all schools for the Board's consideration; it was to review the 1966 report of the first Citizen's Committee and suggest any appropriate changes in its recommendations; it was to recommend changes in existing policies regarding equal opportunity, and also to review recommendations by another committee** concerning educational facilities on the black West Side.¹⁹

The Board used the Citizen's Committee to legitimize what the controlling majority thought they had to do, under NAACP and court pressures--use extensive cross-busing to desegregate the elementary schools. Indeed, as the Committee was appointed, two neighboring school districts

*From the Superintendent's and Board's point of view it would have been politically counterproductive to select militant integrationist or NAACP leaders for a Committee expected to return a recommendation for extensive busing by the school system.

**The West Side Education Facilities Committee, see p. 312.

began operating cross-busing programs under federal court orders. The Committee was instructed to deliver its report by March 1, 1972.

However, in the intervening year the political context* for the Board's impending decision changed. With federal Judge Merhige's decision requiring metropolitan-wide desegregation in Richmond, "busing" became a national issue**--and with the similar Roth ruling in near-by Detroit, the issue acquired a particular salience for Central City voters. In addition, in the period before release of the Committee's report, a series of racial conflicts broke out in the local schools, and newspapers were filled with repeated accounts of fights, stoning incidents and school closings.²⁰ Student suspensions increased and both police and staff from the Human Relations Commission repeatedly were called to the desegregated high schools. In this situation, school administrators began to be deluged with calls from parents concerned about the rumored "busing plan" being formulated by the Citizen's Committee.²¹

By February--two months before the final report was produced--the "Citizens for Neighborhood Schools" (CNS) had organized. Anti-busing petitions signed by 11,000 voters were given to the Board, CNS members began to attend all

*For an analysis of the Board's changing tactics, see pp. 339-341.

**For a summary of events and reactions surrounding the busing issue see Theodore H. White, The Making of the President, 1972 (New York, 1973), pp. 86-88; 225-228.

public Board meetings, and petitions requesting a constitutional amendment barring busing for purposes of desegregation were sent to the state's Republican Senator.²² The CNS insisted it did not oppose integration of the schools but only busing. The organization listed six reasons for its opposition: safety hazards on school buses, the hindering of after-school activities, the extra time needed to reach students in an emergency, the costs of busing, increased air pollution caused by buses and "loss of community togetherness."²³

Emil Lawther, the president of CNS, spoke to the Board in February about the rumored busing plan: "We represent a majority of the people. It's time you listened to the petitions and desires of the majority." If busing were to come in the fall, Lawther threatened a CNS boycott of the schools, a campaign against the re-election of Board members, and the possible withholding of school taxes. By the week preceding release of the Citizen's Committee report, CNS had already announced that it was gathering signatures on petitions aiming to force a recall election for the six Board members favoring busing for desegregation.

However, other pressures were also brought to bear upon the Board of Education, the Superintendent and the Committee. The Central City teacher's union and a specialist from the Superintendent's own staff* publicly emphasized

*This individual, a black, recently had been appointed the school district's Advisory Specialist for Equal Educational Opportunities.

staff desegregation as the most important factor in any new desegregation plan.²⁴ The seventy-eight-page report from the West Side Facilities Study Committee introduced another complication: after hearings in the black neighborhoods of the West Side revealed the desire of both teachers and parents for a new neighborhood elementary school,* the Study Committee recommended both a new elementary school for the black neighborhood and school desegregation.

Clearly, to many black spokesmen the terms for acceptable desegregation were changing. Its recommendation of a new school, said the Study Committee, should "not be interpreted as a lessening of its commitment to the implementation of a district-wide desegregation plan"; instead, the elementary school in the black neighborhood should be integrated--but this time by busing in whites:

The burden of desegregation . . . should be shared equally by all and . . . present policy in which the major burden of desegregation is carried by one ethnic group should be discontinued. . . .²⁵

Well-publicized visits of black parents to the fifty-seven-year-old Michigan Avenue Elementary School (headline: "Mich. Ave. School Gets 'Dirty, Filty Mess' Label")²⁶ reinforced the subcommunity's demand for a new West Side facility.**

*Many black parents had felt "taken" when, at the NAACP's urging, schools in black neighborhoods were closed and black children bused. The eventual redefinition of what a meaningful desegregation plan would be (by the integrationist leadership) can be viewed as a partial response to these concerns in the black subcommunity; see pp. 360-362.

**See pp. 223-233, on the Kingsley Facility controversy.

Other groups also began to mobilize, led by the NAACP which announced that it would fight the recall election. "Concerned Citizens," a pro-integration group formed by black ministers, began holding meetings (in cooperation with the NAACP) in core area churches, and also presented its petitions to the Board of Education. GAIN ("Group Associated for Integration Now"), a small group of liberals --many from a suburb outside the school district--was formed by a Unitarian minister, and announced that it favored a metropolitan-wide plan for two-way school busing; it, too, sponsored meetings with the Concerned Citizens group at the Baptist Church.

Faced with these differing pressures, the school Superintendent and the Board decided on an "open meeting" strategy to "educate people about the [busing] plan."²⁷ Once the Committee's report was in--and before a final Board decision--the recommendations of the Committee would be "aired" in a series of public meetings where any citizen might speak. Already in February of 1972, Superintendent Calelli began meeting with principals, P.T.A. representatives and "interested persons"; in his first meeting he declared that the de jure-de facto distinction "was getting very blurry," and that the school system had a legal and moral "mandate to move toward desegregation."²⁸

In this situation of a determined Superintendent and a Board majority committed to further desegregation,* intense white opposition, black demands for cross-busing, changing court precedents, the NAACP's push for integration and the West Side's demand for a new school, the Citizen's Committee belatedly introduced its report at the April 20th Board meeting. The Committee stated that it sought the best method for "achieving the goal set before it," and that busing was an acceptable "tool" for the purpose of desegregation. However, the tensions in the city were reflected in splits within the Committee--which presented three different "busing plans" plus a minority report filed by fourteen of the Committee members.²⁹

Plan I proposed that the city's elementary schools be divided into geographic groupings, each with a "cluster" of seven to nine schools. Each school would have only two grade levels and students would attend continuously for two years before moving to a higher grade. This proposal called for the purchase of an additional twenty-five school buses and the busing of an additional 6,886 students.** Plan II was similar, but would keep students from kindergarten through second grade in their neighborhood schools--with

*By federal criteria, twenty-five Central City schools remained segregated--one high school and twenty-four elementary schools.

**The school district already operated forty-seven buses with 3,684 students being transported daily.

Table 46.--Central City school district ethnic count--
January, 1972.

<u>SECONDARY SCHOOLS</u>			
<u>School</u>	<u>Black %</u>	<u>School</u>	<u>Black %</u>
Eastern	5	Rich	16
*Everett	6	Gardner	14
Hill High	20	Pattengill	10
Sexton	20	French	16
Otto	8		
 <u>ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS</u>			
*Allen	30	Lyons	10
Attwood	13	*Main	85
Averill	11	Maple Grove	5
*Barnes	7	Maple Hill	13
Bingham	4	Maplewood	2
*Cavanaugh	3	*Michigan	82
*Cedar	4	*Moores Park	11
Cumberland	13	*Mt. Hope	1
*Elmhurst	5	*North	2
*Everett	3	Northwestern	7
Fairview	14	*Oak Park	7
Forest Road	11	Pleasant Grove	10
Forest View	19	Pleasant View	19
Foster	17	*Post Oak	2
*Genesee	22	Reo	10
Gier Park	8	Sheridan Road	6
*Grand River	11	*Valley Farms	0
*Gunnisonville	1	*Verlinden	24
Harley Franks	21	Wainwright	15
*High	8	*Walnut	19
*Holmes	32	Wexford	27
*Horsebrook	2	*Willow	33
Kendon	9	Woodcreek	13
*Lewton	7		

*Denotes schools officially classified as segregated; all enrollment percentages given to nearest whole per cent.

only an additional 2,016* students being bused each day. Plan III would have retained the current grade-level organization for the elementary schools with 11-31% minority student populations, and divided the remaining schools into two groups between which enough busing would occur to bring each school into the "proper" 11-31% range. This Plan required the busing of an additional 1,576 students.

The minority report (Plan IV) was different: the kindergarten through sixth grade system would be maintained in all elementary schools, and "a minimum number" of students would be bused to achieve the 11-31% range in each school; proponents estimated that this approach would mean the busing of 1,279 fewer students. The minority members of the Committee also requested deferral of any busing plan until the matter was clarified in the courts. All of the Plans, including the minority report, agreed with the recommendation that a new West Side elementary school be built.

A crowd of 700 listened as the options developed in the fifty-four-page report were read. None of the audience comments that followed, however, were directed to any of the four specific Plans. Instead--in a pattern to be repeated throughout the open meetings--busing was generally attacked and few reacted to the details of the four Plans. Clearly, any plan tinged with "busing" was intensely opposed. After

*The Committee's numbers were fairly close approximations of the actual number of children involved. For months the Committee had been running various busing plans through the computer of a near-by university.

hearing the Committee report, most speakers contended that busing would deprive parents of their freedom to choose to live in a neighborhood near a particular school. A black member of the Citizen's Advisory Committee had a different view:

The question here tonight is not really busing. Busing is only a tool and really shouldn't be an issue. . . . Your real concern is that one day possibly you might have to answer the question, "Guess who's coming to dinner?"³⁰

The Recall Election

The six open meetings scheduled by the School Board did not work as hoped for by either the Board's majority or the black integrationists. The meetings did not seem to "educate" publics about specific busing plans, focused as they were on general excoriations of the school bus. Nevertheless, the Board announced that it would give preliminary consideration to a desegregation plan on June 1 and reach a final public decision at its meeting of June 15.

The integrationists, too, had hoped to rally support to their views* and arranged for various black spokesmen, the League of Women Voters, GAIN, the West Side Neighborhood Association, Concerned Citizens and the Central City Association of School Administrators to endorse Plan I at the meetings. However, the opponents of busing dominated all meetings, and CNS speakers were able to recruit members

*Most black integrationists favored Plan I as the most extensive desegregation proposal.

for their organization through the publicity generated by the public forums.

The six open meetings tended to follow a certain form:* some of the speakers would call the busing plans "undemocratic" or "Communistic," others inevitably would ask that the busing plans be placed on the ballot and the more skillful rhetoricians would draw large ovations; J. C. Wilson, now a member of CNS, would call somewhat contradictorily for both the re-establishment of the neighborhood school and allowing any student to attend the school of his choice; and interspersed through the speeches would be a few liberal whites citing the values of a "multi-ethnic experience" for school children, while occasional blacks would condemn white hypocrisy or the "racist Board policy" of one-way busing for blacks.³¹

The public uproar over busing--which had only been increased by the series of open meetings--had two immediate effects on the School Board. First, one of the Board members who had been in favor of a busing plan and who had privately assured the integrationist majority of his vote,³² changed his position. Worried over the "lack of community support" and the swelling number of signatures on the recall petitions, he decided by late May to oppose adoption of any plan involving busing for desegregation. His switch in the face of CNS opposition encouraged the organization

*The headlines of this period suggest the tone of these meetings: "Uptight Crowd Lashes Busing"; "Busing Foes Query Costs, Real Value"; "200 Attend Fifth Busing Hearing."

(which immediately dropped its efforts to recall him), and reduced the integrationist majority on the Board to the "Central City Five."*

The intensity of the local opposition also began to influence the remaining integrationists who, by June 1, would have to vote on a busing plan. Left to their own personal preferences, most of the Board's majority would have opted for Plan I but, shaken by the strong opposition, some of the integrationists began to wobble--considering whether the Plans might be delayed or reviewed again. At this point the black Board member (Harriet Campbell), who had also favored Plan I, "shifted to the center," in the words of one informant. With Campbell's leadership, the Central City Five devised a desegregation plan which they hoped would be more acceptable to whites, without discarding the goal of elementary school desegregation.

As announced at the June 1 meeting, the "new" Plan was actually a softened version of Plans I and II, as initially proposed by the Citizen's Committee. The so-called "cluster plan" had four phases: in the first phase eight schools would be organized into two "clusters," with each school providing kindergarten through second grade levels for students from the surrounding neighborhood and with the remaining grades provided in different schools within each

*The changed vote was added to the ranks of the three Board members who consistently had stated their opposition to the busing plans. With a 5-4 split, the integrationists now had only narrow control of the Board of Education.

cluster. Advocates argued that busing would be delayed until the third grade; and that the first phase would entail the busing of only an additional 925 pupils. The second phase in 1973-74 would establish another cluster of four schools, with the same arrangements continuing. The third and fourth phases would require demographic studies to decide whether further cluster schools were needed to achieve racial balance in all elementary schools--thus delaying final desegregation until 1976.³³

Although Campbell and the integrationists had "hoped to moderate some of the opposition"³⁴ with the cluster school concept, the reaction was not favorable: any plan with the imprimatur of the Board would be strongly resisted by the CNS, and any shift away from Plan I was bound to be opposed by the militant integrationists.* Thus, Emil Lawther of the CNS saw the "forced busing" required in the first phase of the cluster plan as "only a crack in the dike which will widen to take in all schools in the district."³⁵ Other parents continued to insist that the plan was a "form of creeping socialism," would render the P.T.A. "completely ineffective," place their children in the roles of "social guinea pigs" and violate their "freedom of choice."³⁷

On the other side, the black integrationists condemned the cluster plan and spokesmen for GAIN and the West

*The local newspaper began a story ("Busing Plan Hit from Both Sides") by asserting that the Board's majority had "managed to alienate not only the community's avid anti-busers, but also many of the most vocal integrationists."³⁶

Side Neighborhood Association agreed that the plan "falls far short of integration." A black member of the Citizen's Committee insisted that the cluster proposal would perpetuate one-way busing of blacks, one integrationist called it "worse than no plan at all" and another capsulized the cluster proposal as "a political cop-out."³⁸

In reaction to this "cop-out" and bitter over the role of Harriet Campbell in arranging the compromise,* the militant integrationists persuaded the NAACP Executive Board to approve the filing of a desegregation suit against the Central City school district and its inadequate cluster plan. However, after a lengthy discussion at the branch meeting, the attempt to seek a court ruling that would require more extensive desegregation was held in abeyance. The moderates argued that the NAACP should "wait to see what happens," and pointed out the difficulties in immediately finding the necessary lawyers** and preparing a case.³⁹

Also, by this time the repeated attacks on the cluster plan by white citizens and the CNS were causing second thoughts among some blacks. Thus, NAACP activists argued in the meeting that the School Board, after all, had taken steps--however inadequate--to increase elementary school desegregation, and that the best strategy might be to defend the Board's integrationist members--a view

*See discussion of role strain, p. 350, this chapter.

**See analysis of NAACP, pp. 251-254, Chapter V.

underlined by the presence of NAACP activist Campbell on the Board. The militants lost and the suit was not filed; adopting the moderate's approach, the NAACP swung around to defend both the Central City Five and their cluster plan--which they previously had been attacking.*

In opposition, the Citizens for Neighborhood Schools had developed a two-fold strategy** designed both to block a final formal vote on the cluster plan--scheduled for the Board's June 15 meeting--and to remove the offending integrationists via a recall election. The organization filed a suit, and on the morning of June 15 the County Circuit Court granted a temporary injunction blocking Board action. A show-cause hearing was scheduled for the two sides to present their arguments.

What lay behind the CNS effort to block final Board action was the "back-tracking" precedent, which now began to shape the activities of all parties to the controversy. Based on decisions in recent cases before the federal courts (Keyes vs. Denver, 1969; Bradley vs. Milliken, 1970; Kalamazoo School District Case, 1971),⁴¹ once a school took affirmative action to desegregate it could not then "backtrack" from its plan. Thus, if the Board took formal

*NAACP President Robert Jones, who had supported filing a desegregation suit, publicly announced that "it's the feeling of branch members that they would like to see implementation of at least phase one (of the cluster plan), even though they don't think it goes far enough toward desegregation."⁴⁰

**See p. 338, for a contrast of CNS and PACE.

action approving the cluster plan, the backtracking precedents presumably would come into play--even if the Central City Five were recalled and CNS-backed candidates substituted for them; but if a final decision could be delayed, by CNS action (or, for that matter, if it had been delayed by the NAACP), then a recall election might remove the Board's integrationists without automatically triggering the backtracking precedents. Thus, conflicting scenarios were desired by the CNS--which wanted a delayed Board decision and a speedy recall--and the Central City Five and the NAACP--who wanted a delayed recall and a speedy decision.*

Their success at obtaining a temporary injunction and show-cause hearing plus their requests for a mandatory injunction--which would certainly block a final decision by the Board--convinced many in the CNS that they had succeeded. A local newspaper analysis ("Busing Plan May Be Dead") reflected that confidence: "Chances appear nil for additional school busing . . . --at least for this fall."⁴² But by moving to the courts the CNS had to counter the legal skills** available through the implicit alliance of the NAACP and the Central City Five.

*Another possibility for the CNS--which had already shifted one vote on the Board--was that the sustained popular pressure on the Central City Five might make them the Central City Four: "We hoped that just one more would change his mind--just one and they wouldn't have had a majority."⁴³

**One leader stated the matter more colorfully at the time the CNS went into Circuit Court: "They're playing in our ball park now."⁴⁴

The key man in the legal struggle was George Graeber, an experienced and skillful black lawyer who, as a militant integrationist, successfully had carried cases for the NAACP, and had been dominant in the organization's leadership for two decades (once being president for fourteen consecutive years). Graeber--truly the apotheosis of the "infiltration" tactic*--was now, incredibly enough, the attorney for the school board. With Graeber as attorney and Campbell as Board member, the local Board always knew the NAACP position on any issue, and the NAACP in turn knew in detail the inner workings of the Board of Education.

When the CNS argued in County Circuit Court that Board adoption of the cluster plan would constitute "irreversible" action, given the backtracking precedents, Board attorney Graeber responded that no constitutional body should be prevented from taking a vote, though one might later enjoin implementation of the decision reached.⁴⁵ All attorneys knew, of course, that once the Board voted to approve the cluster plan the backtracking precedents would become relevant.

Faced on the morning of June 15 with the unexpected injunction against Board action, Graeber moved quickly. In

*His roles in the NAACP and with the Board posed at least a potential conflict of interest situation for Graeber --who later was forced to resign. Though Graeber claims that when legal matters involving the Board were discussed among NAACP leaders he "would try not to say anything," other members recall him speaking at length. After the cluster plan was announced by the Board, Graeber was one of the militants who privately favored filing an NAACP desegregation suit against the Board--for which he was the attorney.

an executive session with the Board, the attorney pointed out that both the CNS legal activities and the court injunction were directed only at the cluster plan. He recommended that the Board quickly devise a similar but substitute plan, and then act on it at that night's public session. The new plan then could be put into effect since it technically would not have been the subject of the court injunction. The four Board members opposed to the cluster plan were outraged, and the Central City Five could not decide among themselves on a substitute plan--designing the cluster program had required prolonged effort, and Board members felt that "on the spot" it was impossible to arrange a new desegregation plan. Besides, several members thought the Graeber proposal unduly "tricky" or "too slippery."⁴⁶ Hence, despite the private maneuverings, no desegregation plan was discussed at the Board's public meeting on June 15.

On behalf of the Board, Graeber turned back to the courts and filed a petition asking that the temporary restraining order be lifted and that jurisdiction be shifted to the federal District Court. He argued that the federal courts had original jurisdiction since the case dealt with federal constitutional questions.⁴⁷ If jurisdiction were shifted, the case also would come before Judge Noel Fox--known as a "liberal," appointed by President Kennedy in 1962 and, most importantly, author of the backtracking precedent in the Kalamazoo case. However, retention of the case

in the County Circuit Court almost certainly would give CNS time enough to complete a recall election, which likely would doom the Central City Five and thus the cluster plan.

On June 26, Judge Fox lifted the County Court's restraining order, declaring that it had "prevented a duly constituted arm of the state . . . from exercising its constitutional authority."⁴⁸ The Judge also retained jurisdiction over any future litigation involving desegregation in Central City. Notifications of a special session were sent to all Board members, and on June 29 the Board finally approved the cluster plan, 5-3.* The Central City Five and the NAACP now knew the desegregation plan would be protected by the backtracking precedents--but CNS recall petitions continued to circulate throughout the city.

But the CNS was again frustrated as it plunged into the thicket of petition law. To be valid, the recall petitions directed at the Board members each had to be equal to at least one-fourth of the total votes cast in the school district during the 1970 gubernatorial election--no mean feat for a citizen's group. The organization calculated the required figure to be roughly 10,900 signatures, but could never get verification from city or township clerks within the school district.⁴⁹

The signatures were quickly garnered, but then a time-consuming comedy of contradictions began: the state

*The Board of Education actually divided 5-4 on the merits of the plan, but one member was out of town and could not return for the hastily called noon session.

election code specified that recall petitions should be formally filed with the secretary of the governmental unit involved in the recall--who would be Harriet Campbell, secretary of the Board of Education and also one of the targets of the recall. Seeking advice, CNS turned to the State Election Director who, acting in turn on advice from the state Attorney General's office staff, recommended that the petitions be filed with the county's Intermediate Board of Education. Emil Lawther, CNS president, turned in the petitions to the Intermediate Board's Superintendent--who the next day returned the petitions, advising Lawther that the county district had no role to play in a local recall. The CNS then reluctantly turned back to the Board of Education and filed the petitions with Harriet Campbell, who delightedly accepted the task of certifying the petitions for her own recall.⁵⁰

Nor surprisingly, more difficulties developed: Campbell, in charge of the petition count, left town for a two-week "business and vacation trip."⁵¹ It was decided that the original petitions did not contain the required number of valid signatures, and CNS was forced to re-circulate petitions to get still more signatures. When Lawther attacked the school officials for "arbitrarily" striking out names, Campbell countered that validation procedures were being conducted in accordance with legal guidelines--supplied by Board attorney Graeber.⁵² Final validation of the petitions was delayed until August 17, the

deadline for completing the process--with the Board again acting in accord with their attorney's advice. Coincidentally, August 17 fell within ninety days of the general election scheduled for November 7 and thus, by state law, no special election could be held--as CNS had hoped. Instead, the recalls were added to the November ballot.

Thus, with the recall successfully delayed until well after the beginning of the new school year, the NAACP knew its future case for citing the backtracking precedent would be even stronger: not only could it point to the Board's formal approval of a desegregation plan, but the plan also actually was to be implemented in the fall. On September 7, the school year began with no boycotts or demonstrations, but with the new cluster plan in effect. About 950 elementary school children were bused to the eight schools comprising the first "cluster" of phase one--or 800 more bused students than the previous year.⁵³

With both the school year and the desegregation plan launched, the NAACP turned to the impending recall election. The organization did little campaigning on behalf of the Central City Five, falling back instead on its legal resources. Over the opposition and skepticism of many of the moderate integrationists,⁵⁴ the Executive Board decided to file a lawsuit seeking to block the election itself. The suit charged that the recall election was designed to end Central City's desegregation program and thus violated "equal protection of the laws and equal educational

opportunity as guaranteed under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution."⁵⁵

Since the local Board was formally named as one of the defendants in the suit (for its part in finally certifying the recall petitions), the position of Board attorney Graeber became obviously untenable: his organization now had brought suit against his Board. When Lawther's CNS questioned whether Graeber was in a conflict of interests,⁵⁶ he reluctantly resigned as attorney for the Board. The NAACP suit was termed "outrageous" by CNS, and several of the Central City Five, as well as NAACP members, felt uncomfortable at the prospect of staving off likely electoral defeat through litigation.⁵⁷ When Judge Fox refused to delay the election, the NAACP decided not to appeal his decision.

Perhaps because the electoral result seemed certain the pro-recall period was characterized more by court action than active campaigning. The opposing arguments by now were familiar--the CNS called for "democracy," argued that the cluster plan "violated the will of the people," and demanded a return to the "neighborhood school," while white liberals cited the values of a "multi-ethnic experience" and blacks argued that desegregation would give them equal access to educational resources* and charged whites with

*Only one systematic study of the distribution of local educational resources existed. Conducted by a university undergraduate in Economics, a cross-section study of district schools indicated an equitable distribution

racism. A debate on the recall before a city club drew an audience of only thirty persons,⁵⁸ and the single joint appearance of the Central City Five was an October press conference.

Neither the NAACP nor Campbell (nor the Central City Five) seriously attempted to mobilize the black vote, and both "Concerned Citizens" and GAIN failed to campaign actively against the recall.⁶⁰ Most of the anti-recall support came from what one of the Central City Five privately labelled the "do-gooders": representatives of the minor and generally ineffectual Human Rights Party declared their opposition to the recall in October,⁶¹ a new group, CARE ("Citizens Acting for Responsible Education"), organized in September to defend the Central City Five--though not necessarily busing,* and in the week before the election

of "in-put resources (not counting students)," in the Central City school system:

There is no clear pattern of the schools in the most affluent areas attracting the most expensive or most experienced teaching staffs . . . [also]. There is no clear correlation between the affluence of the neighborhoods and the amount of resources allocated to the schools on a per-pupil basis. If anything, there is evidence of a slight tendency for more resources to be distributed to the schools in the lower-income areas. . . . The Central City School District has achieved a high degree of equity in these terms. . . .⁵⁹ This research was never discussed during the recall campaign.

*Formed by a group of about thirty P.T.A. and millage-vote activists only after six months of the CNS recall campaign, CARE was never effective. Though the group was divided on the merits of busing, they feared CNS and the recall as threats to the stability of the educational system. After gathering several thousand dollars for campaign advertising, the organization split over how the money should be used--some favoring a direct defense of the cluster plan, others wanting only to defend the "educational progress" wrought by the Board in years past.⁶³

the local newspaper declared that the five Board members had done "their duty under the [state] Constitution."⁶²

Meanwhile, CNS was already looking beyond the recall election. Emil Lawther stated that he would run for one of the vacant positions on the Board, and CNS began considering other candidates, who would have to oppose busing, be "strong on discipline" and "somewhat conservative."⁶⁴ Though not meeting the latter criteria, J. C. Wilson was being considered as a future CNS candidate: "He shows we're not against blacks."⁶⁵

Finally, after seven months, repeated delays and two lawsuits, the local electorate voted on November 7 to recall the Central City Five. Though the result was not a surprise, the removal of the Board members was only favored by about 55% of the voters,* not as high a percentage as anticipated. Some blacks speculated that adoption of the limited cluster plan might have reduced the margin of the recall defeat. Though the final result of the recall election was clear, interpretations varied: to one white informant, "they [the Central City Five] never had a chance-- everyone hates busing, in any size, shape or form, and for anyone."⁶⁶ Harriet Campbell disagreed:

There is a new glossary of terms: "busing" means "the niggers are coming," and "cross-busing" means "the niggers are coming [here], but we're also going there."⁶⁷

*Voters voted separately on each of the five Board members.

After the Recall: Victory in the Courts

Following state law, the Governor appointed temporary Board members to serve until the five positions could be filled in a special election in January of 1973. The CNS immediately began its campaign with a carefully selected slate of candidates: symbolically running together for the two Board positions which expired the following June were CNS president Lawther and the moderate separatist J. C. Wilson;* two CNS candidates also ran in tandem for the two Board positions expiring in June of 1975,** and one CNS candidate ran for the seat expiring in June of 1977.

Starting as a one-issue organization, CNS had begun to broaden its concerns to matters of school discipline and the need for a return to the "three R's." CNS candidates presented themselves as "average men" wresting control from the elites who had traditionally dominated the Board; thus one CNS candidate candidly described himself as "a common man who really doesn't know that much about the school system," while another insisted that "schools belong to the community, not to the liberals, utopians, idealists and social-planners."⁶⁹

Fearing control of the Board by these local "populists," the Central City teacher's union, in its ratings

*The black integrationists interpreted Wilson's candidacy as pure opportunism: "J. C.'s always moved with the wind. He always wanted to be a big leader and now [through CNS] he's got his chance."⁶⁸

**The five Board members recalled had been elected at differing times and thus had terms which did not expire simultaneously.

of candidates in the special election, evaluated all of the CNS candidates (on the basis of questionnaires and interviews) as either minimally "qualified" or "not qualified"--while all of the CNS opponents were ranked as either "well-qualified" or "highly qualified."⁷⁰

Though the main opponents of CNS were joined in an "informal coalition," the NAACP remained inactive in the campaign, limiting its role to "closely monitoring"⁷¹ the local School Board.* The cluster plan was still in effect, and the organization was waiting for the new Board to revoke the plan after the election before filing a suit in federal court citing the backtracking precedents.

The turnout for the special election was slightly less than 18% of the school district's registered voters, but the CNS candidates all defeated their opponents by wide margins.⁷² Three weeks later before a standing-room-only crowd, the Board voted to repeal the cluster plan. In addition, the members altered the Board's old policy statement on "Equal Educational Opportunity" by striking out the sentences committing the district to the goal of integrated, racially balanced schools and substituting a commitment to the neighborhood school. As a sop to the black subcommunity (and upon the urging of J. C. Wilson), the Board also

*The NAACP even chose not to endorse any of the candidates for the January election. The branch president commented privately, "that sometimes our endorsement can be the kiss of death."

re-committed itself to the eventual construction of a new West Side school.*

The NAACP had planned to file suit immediately after Board action, but a new militant-moderate debate slowed matters:⁷³ the new young attorney in charge of the case and a few of the militant integrationists were tempted by the Roth ruling in Detroit to try for a metropolitan-wide cross-busing plan for the Central City area; most of the NAACP membership, however, did not want unduly to complicate their suit and pointed out that, in a school system with only 21% "minorities," integration was possible within the confines of the single school district. After the metro-plan was beaten back, the NAACP filed suit in February, citing the backtracking precedents and asking for re-institution of the cluster plan--the same plan it had considered filing against only ten months before.

Federal District Judge Fox scheduled hearings on the suit, but urged the new Board and the NAACP to reach agreement on a plan. The judge then spent twenty minutes lecturing the new School Board attorney on desegregation case law, reminding him that the Board had a "sworn duty" to eliminate racial discrimination. Surprisingly, despite the judge's obvious predilections, the case law and the backtracking precedents, most of the CNS members on the Board thought they would win their case.⁷⁴

*See Chapter IV, pp. 223-233.

The "negotiations" between the Board and the NAACP quickly were stymied. The Board offered three "compromise plans," but all of them fell short of the cluster plan-- which was now the NAACP's minimum demand.⁷⁵ The NAACP lawyer also publicly called the Board's repeal of the cluster plan "a rape of the Fourteenth Amendment,"⁷⁶ which did not increase the possibility of a settlement.

With the case in the courts, the NAACP again sought support and money from the subcommunity and, turning once more to the B.M.A., organized a rally. Over one hundred persons attended, most of them from the church constituencies, and \$500 was collected for the NAACP.⁷⁷ Concurrently, voters showed their support for the Board in April by re-electing three Board members opposed to the cluster plan: the president of the School Board demonstrated the changing tone of the Board by stating that he disagreed "that desegregation is the law of the land."⁷⁸

On the morning of August 10, Judge Fox issued his decision. The ruling was in the form of a preliminary injunction which described the Board's rescinding of the cluster plan as "unconstitutional state action to impede, delay, obstruct and nullify a program lawfully adopted," and ordered an immediate return to the cluster plan. With the beginning of the fall semester only three weeks away, the Board sought a temporary stay of Fox's order from the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. The Circuit Court rejected the appeal, and the cluster plan was re-instituted.

J. C. Wilson called Judge Fox's decision "just another form of colonialism" and referred to the judge as "a do-gooder, white liberal honky."⁷⁹ The NAACP leadership, however, was jubilant.* Not only was the cluster plan to be re-established in the fall, but the hopes of the militant integrationists might also be realized: Fox's decision set the stage for a trial to determine if the local school system was unlawfully segregated, and NAACP spokesmen were claiming they had "no recourse but to seek what we consider to be constitutionally mandated, even if it is above and beyond the cluster plan."⁸⁰ Thus, the long and complex battle over busing ended in a victory for the NAACP--but the integrationists were now ready to raise the ante.

Busing and the Politics of Access:
1966-67 and 1971-73

During the decade of the 1960's, a close Board-client relationship had developed between the controlling majority on the Board of Education and the NAACP as an interest group. Aided by the dual roles of Graeber and Campbell, and black infiltration of administrative ranks--as well as the increasing legal vulnerability of the local school system--Central City's integrationist leadership, through the politics of access, was able to push the Board step-by-step, toward final desegregation. However, the busing controversy disrupted the relationship between the

*When one leader was asked over the telephone what he thought of the decision, his response was simply, "Hallelujah! Hallelujah!"

Board and the NAACP by at least temporarily expanding the scope of participation in Central City's educational politics.

Before the controversy of 1971-73, both the Board's majority and the NAACP had hoped that the desegregation of elementary schools would follow the scenario of 1966-67, when secondary schools had been desegregated: pressured by the NAACP, the Board would accept the conclusions of a "responsible" citizen's committee, and quickly institute a desegregation plan with a minimum of public conflict; no doubt there would be an organizational equivalent to PACE, but such a group would be handled in the courts, while the Board, as before, maneuvered the school system toward desegregation. Unfortunately for both the Board and the NAACP, since the first phase of local desegregation a number of variables had changed--some of which could have been controlled, but most of which could not.

One of the latter was national politics. In appointing the Citizen's Committee, neither the Board nor the NAACP would have known for certain in April of 1971 that by the following May the combination of the Merhige and Roth decisions plus the politics of George Wallace, President Nixon and the Democratic primaries would transform "busing" into a national issue which could arouse only bitter debate and intense opposition. Nor could they have predicted the rise of black-white tensions and open conflicts in the local schools--with each incident being followed by

a wave of headlines and television coverage and rising parental concern which would later focus on busing. Finally, the "learning experience" of the anti-busers would have been difficult to predict: in 1966-67, PACE had been able to mobilize only individuals in affected neighborhoods, and had then seen its hope and money dwindle away in the state courts; in 1971-73, CNS would organize a much larger following and then strike directly for control of the Board through the electoral process--as they had seen other groups do in Kalamazoo and Detroit.

There were other changes between 1966-67 and 1971-73 for which either the Board or the NAACP was responsible--such as the change in NAACP demands. In 1966-67 one-way busing of black school children had been accepted as the means for secondary school desegregation, but by 1971 black leaders were unanimous in labelling one-way busing both racist and unfair; they insisted that any new desegregation plan had to include cross-busing of blacks and whites.* For Central City whites, the earlier one-way busing had required an adjustment, sometimes painful, to a new population entering "their" schools--but now cross-busing further required sending their children out of the neighborhood to schools labelled by blacks themselves as

*For further discussion of this goal, see pp. 352-364, this chapter.

inferior.* Thus, change in what blacks viewed as an acceptable mode of desegregation helped provoke a more intense white response than in 1966-67.

The Board of Education also changed its tactics in selecting a Citizen's Committee and scheduling a series of open meetings on the busing plan. In 1966-67, the initial "agitators" for desegregation had been heavily represented on the first Citizen's Advisory Committee, and the expected advice had been duly rendered (see p. 301). However, for the second Citizen's Committee the Board and the Superintendent sought a body which would be "representative," both ethnically and ideologically.

In fact, the Committee's majority was not representative of majority sentiment in the city--as later events demonstrated--and it "over-represented" persons long active in P.T.A. and educational activities. But by structuring in greater diversity the revised selection procedures

*The opponents of busing initially found it difficult to develop a public language to describe these private fears. Thus, in their first appearance before the Board, the "reasons" cited by the CNS for its opposition to busing focused on peripheral concerns, such as the safety of buses (see p. 311). Later, the rhetoric became 1972-Populist in tone: the Board had "gone beyond" its legitimate powers, and the manipulations of a small group of Board members and black leaders had violated "the majority will." Direct racial references were avoided in public comments, but in talking with CNS enthusiasts at the open meetings blunt remarks were not uncommon: "We aren't going to their schools--those are nigger schools." However, any analysis of the anti-busing fervor which viewed it only as racism by another name (and many black leaders thought just that) would be overly simple. Though not characterized by any particular breadth of vision, many white parents genuinely seemed concerned with the safety and quality of the schools their children would have to attend, as well as preferring the "neighborhood school."

almost guaranteed a split Committee. Hence, when the Committee's recommendations came back to the Board there was a minority report favoring retention of the neighborhood schools, and even the pro-busing forces could not unite around one plan, offering instead three complex options. The Board had wanted both a "representative" body and a Committee which would ease the Board's political task by recommending a desegregation plan backed by its full authority, but in gaining the kind of Committee it sought the Board hindered the Committee in performing its implicit political function--a situation not unlike one of that year's national political conventions.

The Board and the Superintendent also assented to a series of public forums or so-called "open meetings."* In 1966-67 the Board reluctantly had agreed to two public meetings, had quickly made its decisions and, while PACE was in the courts, had then manipulated attendance zones and closed buildings so as to desegregate the secondary schools. In contrast, the prolonged meetings of 1972 kept the issue in the headlines, united the busing opposition and fueled what Schattschneider called "the contagion of conflict."⁸¹

*According to one member, the Board "thought that was the fair thing do," although Harriet Campbell was always skeptical about the value of the open meetings. Some school officials also hoped that the meetings would "educate people about desegregation." "Education" did occur--but of a different kind: the meetings dramatized public fury to Board members, the controlling majority dropped from six to five members, and the Board moved to the more limited cluster plan.

All of these variables--the sudden salience of the busing issue, the "learning experience" of the anti-busers, the local rise of violence in the schools, as well as the changing claims of the NAACP and the citizen participation encouraged by the School Board--not only shaped the controversy, but also altered the integrationists' relationship with the Board.* The NAACP suddenly found itself thrust into the politics of recall and Board elections, where its tactics of litigation, access and infiltration were irrelevant. Denied access by the results of the recall and the accession of CNS and J. C. Wilson to the Board, the organization shifted to an adversary role vis-à-vis the Board, finally moving into the courts to seek desegregation of the Central City schools.

Leadership Activities

Other patterns are also clear when examining the individual behavior of black leaders during the busing controversy. Significantly, on a major local issue extending over a two-year period no hidden leadership elite emerged; instead, the major black actors on the issue came from among

*For the Board, too, the busing controversy entailed considerable change. Formerly the center of a "closed" system of political relationships⁸² between the NAACP, school administrators and small attentive publics (such as the P.T.A. activists), the School Board abruptly came under the scrutiny of a hostile organization and aroused mass publics. Once CNS controlled the Board, the decline of the past policy-making elites was signalled by the new issues which arose--ranging from clothing codes to corporal punishment to the suitability of textbooks showing nude children.

those persons cited earlier by informants.* Integrationists and separatists also behaved in a manner consistent with their stated goals. Nine of the eleven integrationists** vocally supported the desegregation plans, while the separatists' views ranged from mild ("Those kids will be just as dumb when they come back on the bus") to intense opposition ("The stupidest plan I ever heard of"). Finally, moderate-militant differences came out in repeated debates within the NAACP: the militants lost to the moderates in the conflicts over filing a desegregation suit in opposition to the cluster plan and seeking a metropolitan-wide cross-busing plan, but won the debate over bringing suit to block the recall election.

The main variations in leadership activity are shown in Figure 10, which groups local black leaders by their level of activity during the entire busing controversy. Campbell, Graeber, Robert Jones and J. C. Wilson were most active: Campbell played a key role in devising the cluster plan, and held together the majority coalition in favor of a desegregation plan; indeed without Campbell on the Board

*The issue did bring greater attention to the new young attorney handling the NAACP's lawsuit. Several leaders themselves pointed to the attorney as a "comer," suggesting again the route to local black leadership roles as lying in the assumption of key organizational positions and access to organizational resources--rather than mobilization of a mass base. The young attorney was not well-known in the subcommunity.

**Of the remaining two integrationists one would not comment on the desegregation plans and the other privately supported the cluster plan but felt politically constrained in rendering public support.

Most Active	Harriet Campbell George Graeber Robert Jones J. C. Wilson
-------------	--

Active in Response to Cues from First Group	Willene Easton Tom Wilson* Rev. Johnson Cavanaugh Smith* Rep. Eugene Nelson
--	---

Verbal Activity	Kensha Muhammed John Washington Lloyd Thompson
-----------------	--

Little or No Activity	Hattie Hosler Ed Lawson Josephine Warrick* James Faraday*
-----------------------	--

*Occupational role limited activity (see text).

Figure 10.--Levels of Leadership Activity on
Busing-Desegregation Issue.

there might very well have been no desegregation plan. Graeber, too, turns up in a variety of scenes during the controversy: defending the Board in the courts, trying to persuade the Board to devise a new desegregation plan to escape the injunction of June 15, maneuvering the case into the federal courts, supervising the Central City Five's "long count" of the recall petitions--and always working simultaneously within the NAACP.* Robert Jones, as NAACP president, shaped the organization's desegregation strategy and repeatedly pushed the NAACP to go into the courts. J. C. Wilson, of course, provided the main black opposition to the integrationists; condemning both the black "bourgies" and the "do-gooder liberals," he allied himself with the CNS and succeeded Campbell to the Board after working for her recall.

The second group of leaders were also active on the issue, though mainly in response to the cues of the first group. Easton campaigned for the anti-recall forces and organized meetings; Tom Wilson brought the HRC into support of the cluster plan and also spoke for it in public meetings; Rev. Johnson helped to swing the B.M.A.** in favor of the

*When the researcher listed Graeber's activities in the course of an interview, an informant exclaimed, "Maybe we should name a school after him!"

**The B.M.S.'s final position in favor of the cluster plan was by no means assured. One minister was "converted" to support of the plan only after pressures from his wife. Another minister had a church in an area which was to be cleared by the city, and worried whether involvement on such an unpopular issue might reduce the money paid by the city to his relocated congregation.⁸³ In addition, some of the minister's parishoners opposed further busing of school children.

busing plans and to organize "rallies" and "workshops" in conjunction with the NAACP; Cavanaugh Smith, though he could not directly involve the Urban League in the controversy, spoke on behalf of the cluster plan, contributed money to the limited anti-recall campaign and developed a "community education program" designed to lessen fears about busing; and State Representative Nelson, despite his re-election campaign, issued a strong defense of local busing plans and worked in the House to block an anti-busing constitutional amendment.

Other blacks limited their roles to speaking for or against the busing plan; Muhammed and Washington were in opposition to the cluster plan and Lloyd Thompson favored it. Finally, only four leaders had little or no discernible activity on the issue: Hattie Hosler "attended meetings," but did little else, and Ed Lawson was generally disinterested in the busing issue; both the city councilman and the head of the Model Cities agency felt themselves to be politically constrained and did not become publicly involved in the controversy.

Variations: Issue-Areas, Organizational
Variations and Role Strain

The categories of analysis developed elsewhere in this research--issue areas, organizational resources and role strain--may help to account for some of the variations in local leadership activity.

Although the busing-school integration issue became one of the most intense and prolonged controversies involving local blacks, it clearly fell within the orbit of the NAACP.* The expectation expressed by many black informants was that the entire issue was, in the words of one, "the NAACP's baby." As the controversy spread, other leaders and groups (such as the B.M.A. and the H.R.A.) came in only at the suggestion of the NAACP. Most of the integrationists were in the NAACP, and it seemed appropriate to most leaders to concede the organization's central role on an issue where it had both access and expertise. Even some of the separatists tacitly conceded the issue to the NAACP, as they limited their activities and argued that busing and desegregation were "irrelevant to the concerns of progressive black people."⁸⁴

To the NAACP as well, school desegregation was "their" issue--but only if it could be handled through direct access to the Board, litigation or occasional public statements; when the electoral politics of the recall and special elections placed new demands on the NAACP, they left the Central City Five to defend themselves (except for the last-minute attempt to stop the election--again through the courts).

The way in which the NAACP defined its own issue-area led to a curious pattern: before the cluster plan was

*See the discussion of issue-area stability, Chapter V, pp. 273-276.

adopted, the NAACP helped to organize rallies seeking to mobilize black support for a desegregation plan and after the new CNS-dominated Board rescinded the plan, the NAACP again organized a rally to gather support and cash for its legal efforts; but during the campaign before the recall election (and, later, the special election), the NAACP made no moves to mobilize the subcommunity or to produce a black bloc vote against the recall. Thus the NAACP would seek subcommunity support either to pressure the Board or to advance its legal work--but rallying blacks in a campaign was outside its usual sphere of activity.* "We are not," said one NAACP leader, "a political party."

Despite their reluctance over electoral activity, the NAACP was the one black organization with the resources necessary to participate actively on the busing issue. Indeed, a controversy necessitating three lawsuits, the entanglements of petition law, and the complexities of de jure and de facto, backtracking precedents and desegregation case law seems almost designed for the peculiar competences of the local NAACP. Leaders with positions in state government, or Model Cities or the Urban League were not so fortunate, and lacked those organizational resources (access to the School Board and school officials, skills in litigation) which proved crucial in the resolution of the busing issue. The difficulties of non-NAACP leaders

*See Selznick's view of "institutionalization," Chapter I, p. 66.

are reflected in one's comment: "All I can do is talk--the action is somewhere else."

Role constraints also account for some of the variations in leadership activity. At least four leaders were blocked from greater involvement in the controversy due to their occupational roles: the city's black councilman and the director of the Model Cities agency avoided comment and activity on the issue; and though both felt strongly about the issue, the activities of the heads of the Urban League and the Human Relations Commission also were curtailed by their respective occupational roles as "negotiator" and "peacemaker."

However, role strain does not seem to be an "automatic" occurrence with a given set of roles; whether differing individuals experience tensions between their occupational roles and their status as black leaders partially depends upon how they conceptualize these potentially contradictory roles.

The two local black politicians illustrate this process. The city councilman viewed his black leadership role in terms of "behind the scenes" activity*--aiding individuals with problems, helping blacks to get jobs, settling conflicts. In his role as councilman, he acted as an ambitious office-seeker trying to satisfy several

*This role is widely known--and accepted--in the subcommunity. Two informants even used the same description of the councilman's black leadership role: "He covers his tracks."

constituencies:

I've got a Polish-Catholic as a campaign manager, which should help me with them. . . . I'm going after the [support of] Senior Citizens, the firemen and the police. . . . My issues are better delivery of city services, more parks and playgrounds. And the need for better police protection, law and order, and so forth. . . .⁸⁵

Usually, the two roles proved complementary, but the lengthy busing conflict brought pressure on the councilman either to support or disown the "busers." Knowing that outright opposition to the busing plan would undermine his standing with the subcommunity's integrationist leadership and that support of busing would be politically disastrous with his mainly white constituencies, the councilman fell back on the technical claim that the cluster plan was not "city business," but only a matter before the school district.

This non-position deeply angered the militant integrationists⁸⁶ but, given the way in which he defined his role as a politician, the councilman simply could not oppose the intense preferences of his constituents by publicly acting as a black leader.*

Maybe someday I'll find an issue I've got to live or die on--but I haven't yet. Till then, I'm not going to hang myself just so I can say I tried--that's stupid. . . . My voice wouldn't have made any difference on this [busing issue], so there's no need to die on it. I've got to protect my own hide.⁸⁷

In contrast, the black state representative from Central City came out in support of local busing; defining

*Privately, the councilman supported the cluster plan and cross-busing.

his political role almost in Burkean terms, he experienced no role strain.

I think busing is an acceptable vehicle for integration [sic] based on what the constitution mandates. . . . I'm not holding up my finger to test the winds in the 57th district. . . . The people I admire stand alone. My concept of representation is this: I serve the people for two years and do the best I can, and then I present my wares before the people and let them decide. . . .⁸⁸

Both black politicians were up for re-election during the conflicts over busing, both were ambitious for higher office, both were black leaders in Central City, and both had mainly white constituencies. It is the differing concepts of their political roles (and, more broadly, their differing views of political leadership) which seem to account for their differing reactions to the busing issue and the presence or absence of role strain.*

Role strain also shaped the strategy of the black leader in the Board of Education and the NAACP. Faced with intense popular disapproval, Harriet Campbell rallied the Board's dwindling majority around the cluster plan--but in doing so felt the strain between her role as black leader and her role as a politically sensitive Board member, trying to devise an acceptable plan:

I got a lot of calls saying "How can you do this to us? This is a sell-out!" . . . But I didn't support it [cluster plan] because it was right or because I

*This account has an intriguing conclusion for political moralists and students of politics: in spite of his dodging the busing issue, the black councilman lost his race for Mayor--while the state representative was re-elected with one of the larger winning percentages among candidates for the state legislature.

believed in it, but because I thought it was all that would be acceptable. . . . It was a compromise plan, nothing more. . . .⁸⁹

Having uncomfortably moved a great distance from her own preferences in order to build a majority around the cluster plan, Campbell then regarded the compromise as an un-negotiable minimum--which, to the end, remained the position of the Central City Five.

George Graeber also felt the obvious strain of being an NAACP leader and the lawyer for the Board of Education. At a turning point in the evolution of the NAACP's legal strategy, the organization considered whether to slap the Board with a desegregation suit after the initially disappointing cluster plan was adopted, but Graeber felt constrained from giving legal advice to the organization because of his position with the Board.* Moreover, for the NAACP quickly to file a suit against the Board would have required the immediate services of a lawyer expert in such cases; only Graeber could then** provide such services--and he was the lawyer for the Board against which the suit was to be filed. Thus, the organization dropped the possibility of a suit.

*In retrospect, the advice he would have given is clear:

The moment that [cluster] plan was adopted I would have petitioned the court saying that the plan was totally inadequate and getting the court to review it. That would've stopped CNS in its tracks.⁹⁰

**The NAACP later acquired the services of a young lawyer, who brought the eventually successful suit to the Federal District Court.

Graeber's position with the Board undoubtedly had been advantageous to the NAACP, but the main reason for his continuance in the position was that, in his role as a lawyer, he reveled in the work: "I love it! It's fascinating! It's the kind of work I really enjoy."⁹¹ When the contradictions between his black leadership and professional roles became apparent, Graeber painfully resigned as the Board's lawyer. However, by then the integrationist's strategy was set: in large part because of Campbell's unswerving support for the plan and because Graeber had been unavailable as either lawyer or advisor, the NAACP had decided to defend the cluster plan.

The Subcommunity and Leadership Goals

Did black leaders accurately reflect the sentiments of the subcommunity on the busing issue? Without exception, all leaders publicly claimed that they spoke for the black majority: the integrationists argued that blacks wanted better schools for their children, and that they realized busing would equalize educational resources; but J. C. Wilson claimed to have conducted a "door-to-door survey" in which 90% of black parents opposed busing and the cluster plan.* However, none of the activists in the busing controversy really knew if there was a black "majority opinion"--though all assumed it--and its existence was never tested by any sustained attempt to mobilize the subcommunity.

*No evidence of this "survey" was ever produced.

These conflicting claims led to a search for available measurements of subcommunity opinions, but only one survey of any kind had been conducted during the desegregation conflict--a survey of parental attitudes toward the cluster plan by the Board of Education.⁹² In August of 1972 (one month before the cluster plan went into effect) the Board mailed questionnaires to parents of children attending those schools immediately affected by the plan. Of the eight school areas surveyed, two were overwhelmingly black in population: Michigan Ave. School was 84% black and Main Street School was 88% black. The remainder of the schools were predominantly white in composition.

Examination of the responses by parents of children at the two mainly black schools may at least partially indicate subcommunity attitudes toward the controversial cluster plan.

Table 47 shows that, in comparison to the predominantly white schools, parents from Main and Michigan Avenue schools cited fewer disadvantages in the cluster program, but were much more uncertain about the program than most white parents. Tables 48 and 49, derived from questions about possible advantages of the desegregation plan, reveal the same pattern: black parents generally see more potential advantages than white parents do, and many fewer blacks can see "no advantages"--but again the levels of black uncertainty are extremely high. The willingness on the part of blacks to see more advantages and fewer disadvantages may

Table 47.--Disadvantages,by school. "What disadvantages do you see in the cluster program?"

	Physical*	Financial**	Curriculum***	Extra-Curricular****	Uncertain*****
<u>White Schools</u>					
Barnes	68.9	33.8	17.6	17.6	21.6
Elmhurst	78.9	64.6	46.9	38.8	12.2
Lewton	67.6	54.3	40.0	32.4	20.0
Maple Hill	75.0	47.7	31.8	34.1	13.6
Everett	75.0	38.9	20.4	13.0	17.6
Cavanaugh	82.8	49.5	30.1	20.4	12.9
<u>Black Schools</u>					
Main	41.9	11.6	11.6	14.0	53.5
Michigan Ave.	31.0	4.8	7.1	4.8	69.0

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*Physical--Disadvantages related to safety, lack of access to children, parental inconvenience, leaving familiar elements of neighborhood, loss of free choice.

**Financial--Unnecessary expense, increased cost, waste of tax dollars.

***Curricular--Strained parent-teacher, student-student, student-teacher relationships, academic deterioration.

****Extra-Curricular--Lack of access to after school activities.

*****Uncertain--Informants indicated they did not know at that time or needed to know more about the program before they could react to it.

Table 48.--Advantages, by school. "What advantages do you see in the cluster program?"

	Uncertain	Social	Curricular	No Advantages
<u>White Schools</u>				
Barnes	10.8	14.9	20.3	67.6
Elmhurst	15.0	12.9	9.5	69.4
Lewton	13.3	14.3	11.4	69.5
Maple Hill	15.9	6.8	6.8	75.0
Everett	16.7	13.9	13.0	68.5
Cavanaugh	8.6	7.5	7.5	80.0
<u>Black Schools</u>				
Main	53.5	27.9	18.6	11.6
Michigan Ave.	66.7	16.7	19.0	9.5

Table 49.--Advantages received, by school. "What advantages do you feel your child/children will receive by being in the cluster school program?"

	Uncertain	Physical	Social	Curriculum	No Advantages
<u>White Schools</u>					
Barnes	10.8	14.9	16.2	14.9	71.6
Elmhurst	15.0	10.2	9.5	9.5	72.1
Lewton	13.3	10.5	14.3	11.4	71.4
Maple Hill	20.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	74.0
Everett	13.0	17.6	13.9	11.1	67.6
Cavanaugh	9.7	6.5	8.6	7.5	79.6
<u>Black Schools</u>					
Main	53.5	18.6	27.9	18.6	14.0
Michigan Ave.	71.4	14.3	14.3	16.7	11.9

reflect a greater confidence in the local school system--a confidence suggested by Table 50.

Table 50.--School approval, disapproval.

Respondents were asked to indicate approval or disapproval of school operation in the areas of curriculum and course content, discipline and work habits, personal guidance and social skills, school-community interaction and school board. Responses were assigned values of 6 to 1 with highest value (6) indicating greatest approval (favorable) and the lowest value (1) indicating lowest approval (unfavorable).

Barnes	2.7
*Main	3.5
Elmhurst	2.5
Lewton	2.6
Maple Hill	2.6
Everett	2.6
Cavanaugh	2.8
*Michigan Ave.	3.0

*Black schools.

However, the high percentage of "uncertain" responses among blacks is further evidence that neither integrationists nor separatists had mobilized the black subcommunity. Indeed, after twenty months of controversy, repeated statements by black spokesmen, a series of public meetings, constant newspaper and television coverage, the circulation of recall petitions and the maneuverings of the Board and the

NAACP--over 70% of the immediately affected black parents remained "uncertain" about the desegregation plan.

Two conclusions can be inferred from these data. First, whatever else might be said about blacks carrying on the busing battle in courts and boardrooms, local leaders clearly had failed to "educate" the subcommunity about the issue. Second, none of the local leaders were implementing the opinion consensus of the subcommunity, and their claims to be doing so were so much froth. The data generally offer more support to the integrationists than the separatists--but confusion and uncertainty were more evident than any mass commitment to the cluster plan. No leader could speak for the black consensus on this issue because none existed.

More than a decade ago James Q. Wilson noted the dilemma of black leaders faced with choices between the welfare goals preferred by the "man in the street" and the status goals of integrationists. The busing conflict in Central City suggests two modifications of the dilemma: organizational leadership, as we have seen, may not need widespread support in the subcommunity and thus, for these individuals, the "dilemma" of goal choice is considerably lessened; moreover, frequently there may be no consensus even on welfare goals in the subcommunity or on complex issues such as the busing conflict. There may be no consensus of subcommunity opinion--leaving leaders with status goals relatively free to follow their own inclinations.

An examination of the controversies over the Kingsley Facility and school busing also shows that leaders with the status goal of integration reduce the overt conflicts between their goals and subcommunity preferences by the use of two rhetorical devices: coupling and conversion.

Conversion is the process by which integrationist leaders change demands for immediate and tangible gains into the more familiar language of status goals. When there was a local push to place more blacks in administrative positions within the schools,* integrationists promptly cloaked the drive for more jobs in the garments of integration: their desire, as presented to school officials, was not merely for jobs, but for a school staff which would reflect the number of minority students within the schools; to have integrated schools required an integrated staff. Again, when parents charged that Michigan Avenue School was a "dirty, filthy mess"** and demanded physical improvements, integrationists converted their claims into a demand for school integration.

Goal coupling occurs when black leaders respond to subcommunity desires by simply linking them to their own goals. Hence, when West Side residents wanted a new neighborhood school and the integrationists wanted to desegregate the school system, the NAACP proposed both that a new West Side school be built and that it be integrated by busing

*See p. 307.

**See p. 312.

in white students. As one jaundiced though not original member of CNS remarked, "They want to have their cake and eat it too." Again, in the case of the Kinglsey Facility, West Side residents wanted a new facility, and the NAACP wanted an integrated facility; thus, the leaders demanded that the city both build and then integrate the new facility, however unrealistic that position may have been.*

In both cases the rhetoric of addition increased the support integrationists might expect from the subcommunity--while in each instance avoiding the basic tension between status and welfare goals. The suggestively labeled devices of coupling and conversion are ways in which leaders try to "adjust" their own goals to the evident opinions of the subcommunity. Thus, when Wilson's dilemma does occur, it is not insoluble for the integrationist leadership.**

As seen in the Kingsley controversy, the integrationist leadership is not insensitive to intense preferences in the subcommunity--and, in the busing conflict such pressures helped to re-shape leadership demands. In Central City, at least some black children had been bused to predominantly white schools since 1964--at the insistence of the

*See Chapter IV, pp. 223-233.

**This discussion further suggests the highly indirect opinion process linking black publics and the predominantly integrationist leadership: leaders usually seem to acquire only "impressions" of what differing segments of the subcommunity desire; they frequently redirect and re-formulate these opinions into goals consistent with their own preferences, and then, in their roles as black spokesmen, press their claims on behalf of local blacks.

NAACP. By the time of elementary school desegregation, parental dislike of one-way busing was both intense and widespread. Though parents were not necessarily opposed to busing per se, one-way busing of blacks was viewed as simply unjust: it was "unfair," it "put the burden on us," it was "racist."⁹³

The integrationists and the NAACP had managed--over strong opposition--to desegregate the city's secondary schools with mainly one-way busing of blacks to "white schools," and, in retrospect, it seems likely that they could have used the same means to desegregate the elementary schools; indeed, most leaders agreed that "this time around" white opposition would have been minimal. However, partly in response to the subcommunity's intense dislike for one-way busing, black leaders had begun to re-define what meaningful desegregation would be:

I fought for integration, and if it took busing one-way, that was O.K. But it's not right that just blacks have to do this, and I think we should go beyond that now. . . .

. . . I used to favor one-way busing--but now I think that's erroneous. There's a negative feeling that black youngsters get when they're the only ones being bused around. They're not dumb, and it makes 'em feel inferior. . . .

. . . [Black] parents are getting tired of the damn thing, and saying "Why should just my kids be bused? How about your kids?" We've got to change that. . . .⁹⁴

In the past, the integrationists had been mainly concerned with the final goal of integrated schools, but as the subcommunity's dislike for one-way busing became ever

more pronounced, leadership demands on the Board also began to encompass the means of integrating the schools. Despite the predictably intense white reaction, and the likelihood of a court struggle which possibly would retard final desegregation until the late 1970's, black leaders stated that in the desegregation of the elementary schools, only two-way busing would be acceptable. Thus, the emerging consensus against one-way busing precipitated a broadening of black leadership demands on the School Board--which, in turn, led to the busing (or, more precisely, the cross-busing) controversy.

However, the broadening of the integration goal to include "proper" means reflects not only the shifting opinions of the subcommunity but also the dynamic nature of status goals. As discussed previously,* in a conflict situation status goals quickly tend to become matters of principle, with agreements and compromises often falling short of the goal. Thus, groups which attract followings through the intangible appeals of status goals tend to be conflict-seeking organizations** which move from controversy to controversy seeking complete attainment of their goals. With these organizations as the main carriers of status goals, each "success"--each partial fulfillment of the key principle (whether integration or subcommunity autonomy)--seems to lead to an escalation of demand. Given the logic implicit in

*See Chapter II, pp. 85-89.

**Chapter V, pp. 271-273.

status goals, it is not surprising that the Central City NAACP in only one decade has moved from a request that the Board change the language in a policy statement to serious consideration of a metropolitan-wide cross-busing plan.

These goals of principle are inherently more difficult to compromise. For example, in a demand for four more jobs for blacks in a given institution, an agreement can be made to offer two or three positions; but how does an institution compromise with a demand for a fully integrated school system, meeting federal guidelines and achieved by means of cross-busing? Thus, the status goal of integration is not a static "given," but a complex of ideas which periodically re-shapes itself; in Central City, it is the uncompromising, escalating and principled characteristics of the militants' status goals which leads to continuing change in what integration means to integrationists.

Finally, in examining the busing conflict one must note what seems to be the ultimately symbolic nature of the integration goal. Though the non-legal arguments behind the leadership push for final integration of the schools relied on pragmatic assertions that black children would get a better education in integrated schools which had superior resources, these claims were rarely considered in the light of available evidence. Research showed an equal distribution of teacher and financial resources between "rich" and "poor" school districts,* and in 1972 the early evidence did

*See note on p. 329, this chapter.

not indicate superior academic performance by "bused" blacks, as opposed to children in mainly black schools.

However, on the basis of the leadership interviews. one suspects that the integrationists' arguments about better educations and equalized resources only lent a patina of pragmatism to their core beliefs. To many black leaders school integration was more than their surface arguments would make of it: to them, it was a symbol of a completely integrated society in which blacks would have equal access to all institutions and opportunities.⁹⁵ Thus, to these leaders the immediate costs of the busing conflict were acceptable.

FOOTNOTES

¹Judith Brown, "Remember, Fox Ordered Kalamazoo to Bus," State Journal, July 26, 1973, p. B-4.

²Judith Brown, "Busing Foes to Conclude Testimony in School Suit," State Journal, July 18, 1973, p. B-3.

³R. William Holland, "School Desegregation and Community Conflict" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, 1971), p. 102.

⁴Ibid., p. 98.

⁵This behavior of the Central City Board is consistent with Crain's hypothesis that board members generally act in line with their personal predispositions on desegregation, and not in accordance with a political role. See Robert L. Crain, et al., The Politics of School Desegregation (New York, 1969).

⁶Holland, op. cit., p. 100.

⁷Ibid., p. 108.

⁸Ibid.

⁹Ibid., p. 113.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 114.

¹¹Ibid., p. 118.

¹²"Integrated School System Near," State Journal, March 19, 1972, p. B-3.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Informant interview.

¹⁵Citation of decision from Roger D. Anderson, The Constitution and De Facto School Segregation, prepared for Middle Cities Education Association, 1973, p. 9.

¹⁶Leadership interviews.

¹⁷"Board Appoints New Members," State Journal, April, 1971.

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰"Fights Close Everett; Police Arrest Six,"
"Student Suspensions Increasing," State Journal, March, 1972.

²¹Judith Brown, "Calelli on 'Hot Seat': Desegregation Plan Rumors Alarm Parents," State Journal, Feb. 5, 1972, p. A-3.

²²Informant interviews.

²³"Anti-Busing Plea Made," State Journal, Feb., 1972, p. 1.

²⁴Judith Brown, "Teacher Union Seeks New Image," Feb. 9, 1972, p. B-1, and "Mixing Races Not Enough, Says Schoolman," State Journal, March 19, 1972, p. B-3.

²⁵Judith Brown, "Multi-Purpose School Proposed," State Journal, Feb. 25, 1972, p. B-1.

²⁶"Michigan Avenue School Gets 'Dirty, Filthy Mess' Label," State Journal, Feb. 30, 1972, p. B-1.

²⁷Informant interview.

²⁸"Calelli on 'Hot Seat' . . . ," op. cit.

²⁹"Summary of Desegregation Plans," State Journal, May 5, 1972, p. B-4.

³⁰Researcher present at meeting; also Judith Brown, "Parents Express Pro, Con Views," State Journal, April 21, 1972, p. 1.

³¹Personal observation at meetings.

³²Leadership interviews.

³³Judith Brown, "Schools Unveil Busing Plan," State Journal, June 2, 1972, p. 1.

³⁴Informant interview.

³⁵Judith Brown, "Uptight Crown Lashes Busing," State Journal, June 8, 1972, p. 1.

³⁶Judith Brown, "Busing Plan Hit from Both Sides," State Journal, June 14, 1972, p. B-1.

³⁷"Uptight Crowd . . . ," op. cit.

³⁸"Busing Plan Hit . . . ," op. cit.

³⁹Informant interviews.

⁴⁰"School Busing Lawsuit Tabled by NAACP," State Journal, June 5, 1972, p. B-1.

⁴¹Anderson, op. cit., pp. 6-8.

⁴²Judith Brown, "Busing Plan May Be Dead," State Journal, June 18, 1972, p. B-1.

⁴³Informant interview.

⁴⁴Leadership interview.

⁴⁵"Busing Plan May Be Dead," op. cit.

⁴⁶Informant and leadership interviews.

⁴⁷Judith Brown, "City Busing Petition Asks Court Move," State Journal, June, 1972.

⁴⁸Judith Brown, "Court Lifts Ban on Busing Plan," State Journal, June 27, 1972, p. 1.

⁴⁹Judith Brown, "Recall Petitions Filed with Board," State Journal, June 15, 1972, p. B-1.

⁵⁰Ibid.

⁵¹Judith Brown, "Expect School Recall Vote Delay," State Journal, July 28, 1972, p. B-1.

⁵²Ibid.

⁵³Judith Brown, "Busing Start Peaceful," State Journal, Sept. 7, 1972, p. B-5.

⁵⁴Informant interview.

⁵⁵Judith Brown, "Suit Asks Recall Block," State Journal, Oct. 18, 1972, p. B-5.

⁵⁶Judith Brown, "NAACP Bids to Block School Board Recall," State Journal, October 19, 1972, p. B-4.

⁵⁷Leadership and informant interviews.

⁵⁸Judith Brown, "Ousting or Commending Board Members Debated," State Journal, Oct. 20, 1972, p. B-1.

⁵⁹From paper by Martin Lowry appearing in M.S.U. Economist, as reported by Mike Wagoner, "City Spreads School Case Evenly in Rich, Poor Areas, Survey Shows," in State Journal, Oct. 4, 1972, p. B-1.

⁶⁰Informant interview.

⁶¹"HRP Airs Opposition to Recall," State Journal, Oct. 4, 1972, p. B-2.

⁶²"Recall Not Justified for Board," State Journal editorial, Oct. 29, 1972, p. C-2.

⁶³Informant interview.

⁶⁴"Reasons Against . . . ," State Journal, Nov. 5, 1972, p. F-3.

⁶⁵Informant interview.

⁶⁶Informant interview.

⁶⁷Personal observation; also Mike Wagoner, "Cluster Change Condemned," State Journal, March 2, 1973, p. B-1.

⁶⁸Leadership interview.

⁶⁹Judith Brown, "Busing, 3 R's Vital," State Journal, Dec. 20, 1972, p. B-3.

⁷⁰Judith Brown, "Board Race Gets Hotter," State Journal, Jan. 9, 1973, p. B-3.

⁷¹Mike Wagoner, "Rights Movement Marks Mixed Year," State Journal, Dec., 1972.

⁷²Judith Brown, "'Yellow Peril' Busing. . . ," State Journal, Jan., 1973.

⁷³Informant interview.

⁷⁴Leadership interview.

⁷⁵Leadership interview.

⁷⁶"Cluster Change Condemned," op. cit.

⁷⁷Ibid.

⁷⁸Judith Brown, "Sparse Crowd Hears School Board Candidates," State Journal, March 13, 1973, p. B-3.

⁷⁹"Good Intentions Pave Both Busing Roads," State Journal, August 11, 1973, p. A-3.

⁸⁰"Busing . . . ," State News, August 13, 1973, p. 13.

⁸¹E. E. Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People (New York, 1960).

⁸²See Holland, op. cit.

⁸³Informant interview.

⁸⁴Leadership interview.

⁸⁵Leadership interview.

⁸⁶Leadership interviews.

⁸⁷Leadership interview.

⁸⁸Leadership interview.

⁸⁹Leadership interview.

⁹⁰Leadership interview.

⁹¹Ibid.

⁹²C. Dwayne Wilson, "Preliminary Analysis of Cluster Parent Survey Data," Dec. 18, 1972, submitted to the Central City Board of Education; the questionnaire return rate was 42%.

⁹³Informant comments.

⁹⁴Leadership interviews.

⁹⁵Paraphrase of leader's comments.

CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The limitations of case studies are well known. However, such an approach can be valuable when the case study relates its findings to previous research, and when the "case" in question extends the range of settings studied--as in the foregoing analysis of black leaders, goals and organizations in a medium-sized midwestern city with a small black population. In particular, though, the case study approach can be useful in generating propositions and hypotheses for further research. Thus, this chapter seeks briefly to summarize the research in Central City and to point out some of the implications of that research. As a summarizing device, the findings are organized into clusters of propositions dealing with the nature of the local black subcommunity and opportunity structure, the development of black organizations, the range of leadership types and goals, and the problems of goal conflict and leadership efficacy.

The Subcommunity and Opportunity Structures: Impacts on Leaders

Two fundamental conditions shape the strategies and types of black leadership found in Central City: (1) As a

result of the nature of the black subcommunity, potential leaders lack both the resources of numbers and money and the elaborate network of organizations and institutions more common to the larger cities; (2) the opportunity structure for upwardly mobile blacks directs leaders away from attempts to organize followings in the subcommunity as a basis for their leadership roles (see pp. 182-192 for specific discussion related to these propositions).*

Certain characteristics of the subcommunity limit the resources available to leaders: a population of slightly more than 12,000 does not seem to provide the critical mass necessary for the extension and elaboration of subcommunity institutions, nor can a minority group which is only 9.3% of the city population generally use its sheer numerical weight as a political resource. Efforts to organize even this relatively small subcommunity are further handicapped by a high rate of population turnover (p. 152), repeated physical intrusions in the form of highways and planning projects (pp. 153-157), and a pattern of housing which reinforces the existing socio-economic stratification of the city's black population (pp. 157-162). Hence, the subcommunity is non-autonomous: it lacks its own (black) political representative and has little in the way of its own newspapers, businesses or community-based organizations.

*Pages are cited throughout this chapter where fuller discussions of and evidence for the propositions can be found.

Economic resources are also limited: though local blacks are developing a substantial middle-class, in comparison to the near-by metropolitan areas with larger black populations (Detroit and Flint) local blacks have higher unemployment rates, higher levels of underemployment and lower median incomes (pp. 131-143).

Coupled with a subcommunity offering little in the way of numbers, money and organization to potential leaders is an opportunity structure dominated by the local branches of the NAACP and the Urban League and an increasing number of jobs with the state government (pp. 183-184). Given the political structure of the city, opportunities for black politicians also depend upon their ability to gain support from largely white constituencies (pp. 170-182). In addition, individuals adept at organizing followings in the subcommunity are frequently recruited by state or private institutions interested in using these skills for their own purposes (pp. 279-286).

This structure of opportunities seems to give an advantage to some types of leaders. (3) Given the implicit role requirements of the jobs opening to blacks in the local opportunity structure, leaders from middle-class backgrounds are advantaged in obtaining these positions. Moreover, (4) the positions and resources available to local leaders seem most relevant to the goals of the integrationists.*

*See discussion of leadership efficacy, pp. 383-391, this chapter.

(5) Local black leaders generally view themselves as fulfilling a "spokesman" concept of leadership. Located in occupational roles in "white-controlled" institutions only recently opened to them and aware of the paucity of political resources in the black subcommunity, most leaders perceive themselves as being well situated to speak "on behalf of" the powerless core area residents.* However, given the class differences and the difficulty upwardly mobile leaders have in maintaining their core area contacts, it is not surprising that local leaders may not always be aware of core area problems and opinions. Thus, though housing has been the area of greatest dissatisfaction for core area residents, none of the local organizations has made housing a central concern; again, core area leadership differences emerge in perceptions of police activity (p. 164, p. 170), and in the controversy over the Kingsley Facility (pp. 223-233).

Their occupational roles frequently do provide these leader-spokesmen with access to policy processes affecting local blacks. However, the access resulting from an accelerating process of informal co-optation in which local unions, schools and state agencies have begun to share institutional power, has a price: (6) Local black leaders

*Both the concept and the uncertainties of this type of leadership were captured in one leader's comments: I think I'm bright enough to know what should be done but sometimes I don't know what they [core area residents] think, or if they have opinions. . . . All I can do is try to speak on behalf of them--and I should.

frequently experience role constraints which limit their leadership activities (pp. 286-292; pp. 348-352). Most leaders must enter local controversies with some restraint, and individuals are not generally free to make direct racial appeals in their leadership roles because of their concurrent occupational roles as supervisors in the state highway department, or assistant principals or presidents of union locals, etc. (pp. 176-177). Role strain (pp. 54-57) clearly limited the involvement of some leaders in the bus-ing controversy, though the differing behavior of the two black politicians indicates that individual leaders can interpret their occupational roles in such a way as to reduce role strain (pp. 348-350).

(7) Role strain is most acute for separatist leaders as a consequence of their favored set of goals and tactics and their "exposed" institutional positions (pp. 289-292). While integrationists seek goals and favor tactics consonant with occupational roles which entail "working in the system" and indeed can view their jobs as harbingers of an integrated future, both moderate and militant separatists--with their goals of subcommunity autonomy and black-controlled institutions--experience greater tensions: not only must they work in mainly white institutions, but their occupations also usually require regular contact with individuals from the subcommunity--and in roles in which they often must speak for other interests. We hypothesized that it is the very persistence of these subcommunity contacts which drives

home the tensions between the separatists' preferred roles as black organizers working for subcommunity autonomy and their actual occupational roles in white institutions. In contrast, integrationist leaders seem to have relatively infrequent occupational contact with local blacks.

The nature of the local subcommunity and the structure of opportunities further affects both the basis for most leadership roles and the level of competition between differing leaders. (8) The basis for most leadership roles is formal organizational positions or occupational roles, and not strong organizational or mass support from the ghetto.* Also, (9) the level of competition between differing leadership types is reduced by the relative absence of independent bases for leadership within the subcommunity.

Ironically, the lack of independent bases for leadership roles in the subcommunity is partially a product of the new job opportunities opening to blacks in the city (pp. 279-286). During the past decade, both state and private agencies created an array of new positions to be filled by blacks--for example, directors of Human Relations Commissions, Equal Opportunity Officers, minority consultants, etc. These agencies have tried to recruit blacks judged to be "representative" enough to be able to deal with the local subcommunity, and have sought out the small

*Occupations for the differing leadership types are listed on p. 290.

group of generally militant* activists who have worked directly in and sought support from the core area. By hiring "real" leaders from the subcommunity itself, state and private agencies can symbolize both their legitimacy and their earnestness in seeking "equal opportunities." Thus, over the past six years almost all leaders who have worked in the core area eventually have been recruited by these agencies (p. 281)--and in their new occupations have been detached from their former base of support in the subcommunity. (10) The process of militant mobility makes it difficult to sustain organizations based in the subcommunity.

(11) The organizational-institutional underdevelopment of the local subcommunity affects leadership behavior in conflict situations: most leaders will seek access to policy-makers or influential whites rather than attempting to mobilize subcommunity support. This general pattern of conflict behavior can be seen in the controversies over the highway (pp. 154-156), the Kingsley Facility (pp. 223-233), and the busing plan (pp. 299-336). Black leaders simply do not have the backing of a large number of subcommunity organizations; in conflicts, their choices are limited to seeking access, speaking alone or creating small ad hoc groups. (12) Because of the lack of politically relevant resources in the subcommunity, most leaders have not tried to organize a permanent base of support in the subcommunity

*This term is used in the specialized sense discussed earlier, pp. 85-87.

but have instead given priority to the tactics of coalition and "infiltration." Through coalition, they have tried to find the necessary allies and to build upon white support; through infiltration, leaders have sought to locate themselves in the institutions (mainly governmental) seen as most affecting Central City blacks--school boards, city councils, Human Relations Commissions, Model Cities (pp. 182-192).

Faced with a local situation in which the problems of numbers, money and organization make the black subcommunity at best a tenuous base for leadership activities and in which new occupational opportunities promise not only access but personal mobility, it is not startling that most local leaders select these tactics. It is the argument of this research that the variables of subcommunity and opportunity structures also go far toward explaining the basis for most local leadership roles, the emergence of a spokesmen concept of leadership, the widespread experience of role strain, the level of intra-leadership competition and the difficulty in sustaining organizations within the black subcommunity.

Issue-Areas and Organizational Activity

The traditional tactic of "organizing the community" is something of a misnomer in Central City, given the diversity of interests, age, background and class in the local black population. (13) The black subcommunity is not

monolithic and differing organizations represent differing segments of it. In Central City, the Urban League and the NAACP drew most support from the middle-class, Model Cities provided tangible benefits to residents in the core area, the Malcolm X Institute developed an appeal to young blacks, and the Black Ministerial Alliance drew its main support from members of the various black churches. It would be difficult to unite these disparate groups within any one organization, and indeed on only one temporary issue was there ever anything approaching general organizational unity in Central City (pp. 306-307).

(14) Local leaders also tend to limit their leadership activities to specific issue-areas, which exhibit stability over time (pp. 274-276). Organizations and leaders do not often "cross over" from one issue-area to another. In some instances the main goals of an organization give it a natural interest in some issues as opposed to others--the NAACP's interest in the school integration controversy, for example. These organizational interests are backed by tradition and the expertise which grows out of sustained organizational experience on a given issue. Also, moving into a new issue-area may threaten the usual activities of an organization and even call into play internal organizational constraints on such activities.

Since the locus of organizational activity for differing leaders also varies, conflicts between differing leadership types are minimized. For example, militant

integrationists and separatists do not contest for control of the NAACP or the Malcolm X Institute. Where organizational activities or issue-areas are shared by differing types of leaders, the situation changes. Thus: (15) conflicts between leaders most often will occur either when differing leadership types become active in the same issue-area or when similar leadership types with differing backgrounds must work together. Instances reflecting these patterns can be seen in the conflict between leaders with differing goals during the school busing controversy, and in the reactions of black ministers and union leaders forced to work together in the same organization (pp. 99-100).

Agreement between leaders on basic goals has important consequences for group activities in the black subcommunity. (16) Goal consensus has a structuring effect in that both lines of communication and organizational efforts are confined to leaders who generally agree as to the proper goals for blacks (pp. 238-240). This proposition is derived from leadership activities on both the integration and Kingsley Facility issues.*

Shared goals also help to shape the variety of issue-areas by suggesting situational "cues" to which leaders may respond. Leaders do not engage in across-the-board activity on all conceivable issues, but instead show

*Also supporting this proposition is the pattern of naming other leaders. When leaders were asked to name the "other important black leaders in Central City," 76.7% of the nominees were individuals in agreement with the respondent's stated goals (p. 206).

interest in and communicate among themselves about only those selected issues which come to their attention when they seem relevant to their goals. Hence, the NAACP leadership never showed any particular interest in the planning or the development of the new Kingsley Facility, nor did they make an issue of the relocation of additional black families for the project or criticize any other aspect of the plan. Instead, the organization was activated only when it became clear that the project posed a threat to the principle of integration.

The research in previous chapters analyzes the activity of differing groups in the various issue-areas in terms of typical organizational tasks and resources, constraints on each organization's activities and the relationship of each group to the black subcommunity (pp. 251-269). One of the conclusions of this analysis is that (17) organizations which depend upon intangible appeals to both leaders and followers tend to be conflict-seeking organizations. In Central City, only two organizations (the NAACP and the Malcolm X Institute) depend mainly upon intangible incentives, and in both there is more of a tendency to seek out conflicts which help to sustain the organization than in groups using more tangible benefits to maintain staff and follower support (pp. 270-273).

Leadership Types

A categoric typology of leadership was also developed from the research in Central City. (18) Central City's leaders can be characterized as militant or moderate integrationists or separatists, with moderate integrationists being numerically predominant (Chapter II). Militance and moderation usually refer to leadership styles and encompass a variety of theoretically separable categories. Here, the terms are used in more limited fashion to refer to the means component--specifically to time-orientations, action preferences and the increments of policy change acceptable to differing types of leaders. Moderates are characterized by long time perspectives, acceptance of necessary changes as occurring in small increments over time and a preference for actions on specific and tangible matters which are seen as leading eventually to attainment of an end goal; militants see positive change as resulting not from a gradual step-by-step process, but from a concentrated effort designed to alter a given situation at the fastest possible rate, and what all militants share is the urge for the quick, the decisive and the comprehensive change.

Thus, the terms militant and moderate refer to characteristic ways of moving toward given goals, although in this typology the goals may differ. The basic distinction between goals is that made between old and new status goals. The old status goals are the traditional integrationist goals

described by Wilson more than a decade ago.* The new goal of subcommunity autonomy, emerging from the development of "Black Power" and the resurgence of various black nationalisms in the past decade, is categorized as a status end because it parallels old status goals in both form and function: both are goals of principle for which most other gains may be traded off and both function as causal analyses in that gaining the specified goal is seen as making possible all other consequent gains (pp. 87-89). Using these distinctions between militant and moderate means and new and old status goals, a four-fold typology of leaders is developed. The typology distinguishes differing leaders by not only their preferred goals and tactics, but also by their organizational activity and the differing action models given priority (see Figure 1, p. 92).

(19) Most local leaders are not militants. Moderate tactics are preferred in most conflicts and moderate leaders are the single largest group among the city's leadership. Moreover, application of the Crain Militance Scale to local leaders places them (collectively) among the less militant black leaders, in comparison to the eight northern cities studied by Crain (pp. 219-220). Many of the local leaders also seem ideologically unsophisticated--their intellectual histories being rather static (pp. 221-222),

*The content of these traditional goals is not permanently fixed, however. A conflict situation such as the busing controversy offers leaders and organizations the opportunity to re-define and to extend the meaning of the goal of integration (pp. 360-363).

and their interview responses varying considerably in complexity (pp. 207-214). (20) The most ideologically sophisticated leaders are those with higher educational and income levels, jobs in government, and a large number of contacts with influential whites (see Tables 37-40, pp. 211-212). This pattern suggests again the continuing sources of influence for local black leaders--personally high status, discretionary time for leadership roles and opportunities to influence key policy-makers.

A Review of the Status-Welfare Conflict
and Leadership Efficacy

James Q. Wilson's study of black leadership in Chicago has been the analytical "starting point" for this research, and has supplied a general approach for the analysis of local black leadership. However, on two matters treated by Wilson this research reaches somewhat different conclusions.

Wilson argues that leaders frequently experienced conflict between their preferences for status ends and the more tangible and immediate welfare goals held to by the black "man on the street." However, the Central City research suggests some limiting conditions. (21) The status-welfare goal conflict is lessened by the absence of mass consensus on welfare ends and/or an organizational leadership which does not need mass support from the black subcommunity. The former condition seemed to exist on the school integration-busing issue, while the latter state describes the relationship

of many of the local black organizations to the subcommunity (see summary Figure 7, p. 270). The existence of either condition tends to free leaders to follow their own preferences. (22) Leaders with status ends can further reduce overt goal conflict by use of the rhetorical devices of coupling and conversion, e.g., tying status ends to welfare-oriented demands from the subcommunity or simply changing demands for tangible and immediate gains into the more familiar language of status ends (pp. 358-360). Derived from the local research, these propositions suggest that the status-welfare conflict may not be inevitable and that, when the predicted goal conflicts do exist, leaders can sometimes "adjust" their public demands to the evident consensus of the subcommunity.

These patterns also suggest the tenuous and indirect nature of the opinion process in the subcommunity studied. With an unmobilized subcommunity, a number of black organizations not requiring mass support and a leadership based largely on occupational or organizational roles, there are few formal mechanisms for obtaining information about opinions in the subcommunity (for example, see pp. 352-358). However, mass opinions in the subcommunity are not irrelevant to local leaders. (23) Though there is no direct linkage between the opinions of relevant mass publics and the actions of local leaders, intense preferences in the subcommunity can alter leadership behavior. The leaders opposed to the Kingsley Facility modified their positions

in response to strong subcommunity interest in the project, and the integrationists' new insistence on two-way busing during the latest school integration conflict was a reaction in part to widespread discontent among local blacks with mainly one-way busing plans.

A second way in which local patterns differ from Wilson's Chicago is relevant to the larger question of leadership efficacy. For Wilson, an evaluation of Chicago leaders was contingent on the answer to a prior question: given the local situation, what can black leaders do? His argument implied that, with the then-existing constraints on local black leaders, their efficacy would be increased only if they shifted from status to welfare goals:

For some ends . . . the Negro can do nothing to remedy his powerlessness. . . . [However], when seeking ends that elicit less irrenconcilable passions, scraps of power can be collected and assembled. Certain things can be done: more police protection can be demanded; less discriminatory insurance rates can be pressed for; firms can be induced to hire Negroes. . . . One implication of this study is not that Negro leadership is irrelevant, but that it may be decisively relevant only to a certain range of ends--principally welfare ends.¹

However, in contrast to Wilson's analysis, Central City black leadership seems clearly "relevant" to a wide range of ends. Welfare gains do stem from leadership activities, but leaders can now "deliver" on status goals as well. For example, though the busing conflict might seem to have sparked "irreconcilable passions," changes in desegregation case law (in the years since Wilson's research) allowed local integrationists to attain

the final desegregation of all Central City schools. In the altered context of 1974, Wilson's belief that only welfare ends were attainable no longer holds--at least in Central City.

There are several examples of how local leaders are now able to assemble the "scraps of power" on behalf of both integration goals and immediate, material gains for blacks: school desegregation has been achieved only through the persistent efforts of the militant integrationists and the NAACP, and the Urban League has slowly moved many businesses and labor unions toward economic integration; at the same time, control of Model Cities has meant an immediate flow of jobs and money to the subcommunity, and (using Wilson's examples), the B.M.A. has obtained "more police protection," while Cavanaugh Smith has induced several firms to "hire Negroes."

However, the way in which these gains have been realized points to the central trade-off for local black leaders: attendant upon the advantages won by informal co-optation, infiltration and the politics of access are significant limitations on leadership activities. Central City leadership is constrained leadership. Black activists may be councilmen, Equal Opportunity Officers and directors of Human Relations Commissions and Model Cities agencies--but these positions inescapably limit their leadership roles, even on so salient an issue as busing.

The simple interpretation of such limitations is to charge blacks with having been co-opted and thus removed from leadership roles. However, a more general proposition might apply to Central City's constrained leadership: if one assumes a variety of possible leadership functions ("spokesman," "organizer," "negotiator," etc.), it seems likely that (25) the process by which individuals acquire the resources which allow them to perform specific leadership functions makes it unlikely that these same persons can then perform other leadership functions. In some instances this pattern is very clear: the standards of the Bar did not permit lawyer Graeber both to hold his position (and to have his access) with the Board of Education, and to organize the opposition to its cluster plan; in other cases, the unwritten requirements for roles as Director of the Human Relations Commission or Board of Education member or Equal Opportunity Officer work against performing certain leadership functions; thus, a black leader's occupational role as "peacemaker" for the H.R.C.--though it is crucial in giving blacks ready access to the Commission--hardly allows the leader to organize protest groups in the subcommunity.* In short, access has a price.

*The H.R.C. Director defines his role as follows: I'm working within the establishment to sensitize people. . . . For contacts with the people in the community we have twenty-one field representatives working in areas of tension. They find the aches and pains, and I'm the doctor. . . . Sure, I could put on a sweatshirt and some baggy pants and go out there and talk about the trash the white man's puttin' down on 'em, but what good would it do?. . . No, I don't think that would resolve anything, unless I dropped my job.

However, (26) the main limitation on the collective effectiveness of local leaders is not that they are "co-opted" or members of a vague "establishment," but that the leadership is functionally undifferentiated, e.g., too many leaders perform essentially similar functions.* For example, the local leadership has so many "insiders," with access to policy-makers through the leader's occupational or organizational roles that, as a result, few if any of the black leaders function as organizers in the subcommunity itself.

Both the romance and the utility of "community organization" are often highly exaggerated, but the relative absence of organizational bases in the subcommunity does have a considerable impact on local black leaders. Given the under-organized subcommunity and the lack of interest groups or direct votes (or opinion surveys) which might indicate whether substantial support exists for leadership efforts, black leaders find it difficult both to verify their hunches about the opinions of the "man on the street" and to shape these opinions. This difficulty is reinforced by the nature of the tactics most commonly used: the past organization of protests frequently required at least some evidence of numerical support in the way of volunteers, marchers, or arrestees; but with the local politics of access leaders usually have not asked for such support--and, given the ambiguity of leader-subcommunity relations, they cannot

*The implicit assumption here is consistent with Jack Walker's hypothesis about the division of labor in Atlanta's leadership (see Chapter I, pp. 37-40).

be certain whether putative support actually exists. The lack of clear cues about existing opinions also hinders leaders in shaping opinions or "educating" the subcommunity about relevant issues in local controversies involving blacks--a failure evident in the busing conflict.

Greater organization in the subcommunity could also improve the strategic position of those blacks with access; for them, any mobilization of mass support for leadership demands could be an additional resource in a bargaining situation.* Leaders in bargaining situations also might be able more easily to position themselves as "responsible moderates" if there were organizations functioning as "scare groups" in the subcommunity--groups which seemed more "militant" or violent to whites. However, in the absence of leaders actively engaged in organizing the subcommunity, all of these possibilities remain unlikely.

As discussed above, those leaders who most probably would function as "community organizers" are removed from the subcommunity--and from these roles--by the relatively recent process of militant mobility. The result is an attenuated division of leadership labor: almost all local leadership is based upon roles in or access to powerful organizations or institutions, rather than the direct mobilization of support in the subcommunity--with the consequences traced above.

*See Chapter I, p. 62.

Finally, in speculating about the effectiveness of black leadership, one must again note that the resources and positions available to local leaders seem most relevant to the goal of integration. This proposition is neatly symbolized by the irony of the separatist leader who works as an Equal Opportunity Officer: despite his goal preferences, his job requires daily work on behalf of integrated housing. In general, the occupational positions held by proponents of greater subcommunity autonomy are of little assistance in reaching their goals. Whether in their roles as union president, consultant or Model Cities worker, they frequently are able to distribute specific material benefits to blacks--but the "strings" of federal funding and white supervision are fully visible. On the other hand, through positions allowing for access, negotiation or litigation, the dominant integrationists have been able to desegregate the schools and gain black admittance into trade unions and businesses. Judged by the leaders' own goals, the integrationists seem more effective.

Interestingly, in the interviews all leaders saw themselves as effective--though often they were less certain about the efficacy of other leaders. These responses may mirror the ultimate subjectivity of judgments about efficacy, but research on black leadership can hardly ignore the subject. The brief discussion here tentatively suggests that Central City's integrationist leaders are generally effective in moving toward their goals and that their

activities can be "relevant" to a wider range of ends than Wilson hypothesized, but that a relatively undifferentiated leadership is handicapped in a variety of ways by lack of organization in the subcommunity.

Future Research

The foregoing research seems useful in four ways. First, it has generated a number of propositions, hypotheses and deductions potentially useful to analysts concerned with patterns of urban black research. Hopefully, future researchers can further test in both similar and different settings propositions about militant-mobility, role strain, issue-area stability, organizational resources and the nature of available incentives, etc. Second, this research has extended the range of cases studied in the literature on local black leadership. Unlike past research, which has generally tended to focus on either southern cities or large northern cities with substantial black populations, this study deals with a medium-sized midwestern city with a comparatively small black population. The research suggests that this different setting has major consequences for black strategies and the range and distribution of differing leadership types. Third, the categoric typology of black leaders developed in this setting may offer advantages to future researchers: it elaborates a set of categories which may be useful in similar cities; it extends Wilson's concept of status ends to the black goals which have emerged in the last decade; and it specifies the terms "militant" and "moderate" in

such a way as to be both more precise and less time-bound than in much of the past research.

Finally, this case study may be theoretically suggestive; from it, one can speculate that two broad categories of variables--the subcommunity and opportunity structures--may "explain" most of the observable differences between local black leaders in differing cities. In Central City, the first category referred to the population size, educational and economic characteristics of the subcommunity, while the opportunity structure was defined as those occupational and organizational roles available to black leaders in the city. These two variables are not rigidly deterministic; that is, given knowledge of the local conditions summarized by these variables one cannot always predict leadership behavior. Instead, the local subcommunity and opportunity structures interact to establish a political context within which some leadership choices seem more rational than others.

As we have seen in Central City, the black population of slightly more than 12,000 does not provide the basis for the intricate network of organizations, groups and institutions, characteristic of the larger black populations in major cities. The subcommunity has not only lacked the critical mass seemingly necessary for the extension and elaboration of subcommunity institutions, but also has been characterized by transient populations and a series of forced relocations necessitated by urban renewal, plant

expansions and new highways. Thus, most potential leaders have not tried to organize a permanent base of support in the subcommunity but have instead turned to an opportunity structure offering leadership positions in national black organizations not directly rooted in the local subcommunity (such as the Urban League or the NAACP), or key roles in "white institutions." These positions are not only consonant with income and career aspirations, but also provide the access and influence which become the basis for black leadership roles.

If, with Wilson, we view black leaders as constantly seeking to create or to use available political resources in a bargaining process,² the logic of the relationship between environmental variables and leadership behavior becomes clear. The characteristics of the local subcommunity and opportunity structures make available some political resources, or make more or less probable the creation, by leadership actions, of other resources, and leaders in turn tend to assume and to sustain roles consistent with the resources they can create or use.

Thus, in a hypothetical subcommunity with a large black population and an elaborate network of subcommunity institutions and organizations, but with a relatively closed opportunity structure, the setting encourages local leaders to "organize the community," as in the cohesion model,* or to use the subcommunity itself as a basis for political

*pp. 103-106.

position, or to convert available numbers into political resources through protest. However, if the narrowed context for leadership is that of a small and unmobilized subcommunity and a relatively open structure of opportunities--as in Central City--then most leaders will use their occupational or organizational roles to provide access to policymakers, and will minimize attempts to organize a base of leadership in the subcommunity.* Leaders could choose the latter approach, but such a choice faces the constraints described earlier and is difficult to sustain, given the workings of the local opportunity structure and the resulting militant-mobility. Thus, because the characteristics of the subcommunity and opportunity structures make some political resources available and some non-available to potential leaders, Central City organizations and leaders generally engage in access-bargaining and do not follow the protest or cohesion models used elsewhere. Figure 11 develops a speculative typology of political environments in an effort to trace the possible relationships between

*It may be important here to distinguish between full-time and part-time leaders. The latter may be most likely to use those political resources easily available for their leadership activities, while the former may be more likely to attempt to create political resources not at hand. If the distinction holds--and there is currently no hard evidence one way or another on this point--then the immediate constraints generated by local subcommunity and opportunity structures may govern the behavior of part-time leaders more than the behavior of those who occupy full-time roles as local leaders. However, in cities such as Central City, it seems probable that most black leaders will be "part-timers."

Subcommunity as Base for Leadership Activities	Local Opportunity Structure as Base for Leadership Activities	Leadership Characteristics
+	+	Highly differenti- ated and competitive leadership
+	-	Generally militant leadership with tactical emphasis on mobilizing black subcommunity
-	+	[Central City] Generally moderate leadership with tactical emphasis on access- bargaining
-	-	Condition of "non- leadership"; white liberals likely to be main "spokesmen" for blacks

Key: + = Generally available as realistic base for leader-
ship activities.

- = Generally unavailable as realistic base for
leadership activities.

Figure 11.--Possible Variations in Political
Environments and Leadership Patterns.

subcommunity and opportunity structures and leadership characteristics.

Clearly, this treatment of environmental factors as independent variables related to the variations in leadership behavior is consistent with the assumptions in other areas of recent research,³ and also reflects Wilson's early concern with inter-city differences between black leaders.⁴ However, the research on urban black leadership still has a common difficulty in assigning "weights" or priorities to specific variables. Since both subcommunity and opportunity structures are conceptual categories which presumably summarize a number of more specific variables, it is possible that some of these variables should have more explanatory "weight" than others.

For example, in discussing subcommunity characteristics we have examined variables ranging from population size to income and educational levels to migration patterns. It is at least conceivable that one basic subcommunity characteristic--for instance, relative and absolute population size--has more explanatory power for analyses of local leadership than any or all of the other subcommunity characteristics considered. Again, in considering the local opportunity structure it may be that the presence or absence of influential positions in government explains more about leadership strategies than the general range of opportunities for the upwardly mobile. This and other research on local black leadership allows one only to speculate at this

time as to the relative importance of differing variables in the subcommunity and opportunity structures; one of the tasks for future research will be the comparison of leadership in differing settings in order to establish priorities among the many environmental variables seen as conditioning leadership behavior.

In general, two broad alternatives seem possible for this future research. One alternative is to continue the production of locality-specific studies. Though this pattern of research might not be immediately productive in developing explicit theories of urban black leadership, continual comparison of the analyses might be useful. However, as discussed previously, the continuation of this tradition of local research leads to a confusion of varying leadership types, terms and concepts which frequently makes inter-city comparisons--let alone, theory-building--very difficult. However, another broad alternative is to develop a common framework for comparative research by viewing black leadership behavior as primarily a response to the resources made available from the subcommunity and opportunity structures. Such an approach might give direction to efforts to examine environmental variables and leadership behaviors in differing settings.

For this research, there are certain immediate needs: the need for key indices, the need for greater comparability, the need for longitudinal studies. As a consequence of the weighting problem discussed before, social scientists cannot

yet say which specific factors seem most important in explaining black leadership behavior in a variety of cities. Thus, in order to trace the relationship between political environment and leadership response, intense and detailed--and time consuming--analyses of specific cities still seem necessary. However, if a "shorthand" method could be developed through which researchers could use only a few indices to accurately "type" subcommunities as, for example, mobilized or un-mobilized and opportunity structures as relatively open or closed, then large-scale comparative analysis would seem more feasible.

However, even within single-case studies greater comparability is currently possible. What is needed is simply a greater sensitivity to the need to compare local findings both to other settings and other research. Given the realities of limited resources, the tradition of single-case studies is likely to continue, but potentially a division of labor can emerge in which such studies re-examine in a new setting the findings of past research and suggest both indices and concepts useful in broader comparative research.* Not to be ignored in the emphasis on the comparative, however, is the need to develop longitudinal studies of black leadership patterns in specific cities. It would be not

*For example, the concepts of status and welfare ends, developed in a single-case setting by Wilson, were used later in research comparing desegregation conflicts in Several American cities (Robert Crain, et al., The Politics of School Desegregation [Garden City, 1969]).

only fascinating but theoretically interesting to return to the previously studied Durhams, Atlantas and Chicagos, and to analyze the changes over time in local black leadership. In addition, those longitudinal studies which went back in time would be a useful corrective to the a-historical tendencies of leadership research which only briefly generalizes about the past while intensively studying the present.

It is customary to close these projects with a paean to future research. However, to put baldly what has been suggested above, future research on urban black leadership which only repeats the pattern of past research will hardly be useful. Hopefully, with the selection of key indices for use in large-scale comparative research, coupled with a greater comparative sense in the single-case studies and the development of longitudinal analysis, this area of research will become more competent in explaining the patterns and variations in local black leadership--particularly if the broad framework suggested above gives direction to a body of research often characterized by disparate and unrelated studies.

In conclusion, we should note that the research in Central City may also have some relevance to black leaders themselves. For example, the research implies that if economic and occupational opportunities open up to upwardly mobile black leaders two sets of tensions which affect their leadership activities are predictable: tension between

occupational and leadership roles, or what has been called role strain, and tension between the evidently growing number of middle-class blacks, who form the traditional pool for local leadership, and the large number of blacks whose economic condition remains static or worse.⁵

Perhaps most importantly, though, this research suggests the limited utility of one of the most popular tactics--or slogans--of the past decade: "organizing the community." Community organization seems relevant only in cities where certain prerequisites are met by the potentially mobilizable population. Central City--with its small numbers of blacks, few organizations and minimal economic resources--is not such a city.

However, Central City does seem to reflect a nationwide tendency for blacks to turn to organized politics as a means of both personal and, presumably, group mobility. For example, the two individuals most often named as local leaders were both elected politicians. The movement into politics poses new constraints on black leaders, and also raises the question of what blacks--or any minority group--can expect from American politics.⁶ However, organized politics may be one means for blacks to collect those "scraps of power"⁷ of which Wilson spoke more than a decade ago.

FOOTNOTES

¹James Q. Wilson, Negro Politics: The Search for Leadership (New York, 1960), p. 289.

²James Q. Wilson, "The Strategy of Protest: Problems of Negro Civic Action," Journal of Conflict Resolution (Sept., 1961), pp. 291-303.

³For example, see Peter K. Eisenger, "The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities," American Political Science Review (March, 1973), pp. 11-28; John H. Kessel, "Governmental Structure and Political Environment," American Political Science Review (Sept., 1962), pp. 615-620; Leo Schnore and Robert Alford, "Forms of Government and Socio-Economic Characteristics of Suburbs," Administrative Science Quarterly (June, 1963), pp. 1-17; James Q. Wilson (ed.), City Politics and Public Policy (New York, 1968).

⁴James Q. Wilson, "Two Negro Politicians: An Interpretation," Midwest Journal of Political Science (Nov., 1960), pp. 346-369.

⁵See Ben J. Wattenberg and Richard M. Scammon, "Black Progress and Liberal Rhetoric," Commentary (April, 1973), pp. 35-44.

⁶James Q. Wilson, "The Negro in Politics," Daedalus (Fall, 1965), pp. 949-973.

⁷Negro Politics, op. cit., p. 289.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

LEADERSHIP QUESTIONNAIRE A

Listed below are the names which have been most often suggested to me as Black leaders in Central City. Black leaders are considered to be those persons able to make decisions and formulate policies significantly affecting racial problems and issues in Central City's Black community.

1. Please add to this list any other names of persons you consider to be leaders in the Black community.
2. Please draw a line through names of any persons whom you do not consider to be leaders.
3. Use check marks (✓) to show which persons you consider to be the most outstanding leaders in Central City's Black community.

If your own name appears on this list, please ignore it.

Thanks.

(Names listed alphabetically)

APPENDIX B

LEADERSHIP QUESTIONNAIRE B

How many years have you lived in Central City? _____

Where were you raised? City _____ State _____

No. of children _____

Age _____

Years of schooling:

1-6 _____

7-11 _____

High school graduate _____

Attended college _____

Graduated from college _____

Attended or completed graduate school _____

Were most of these schools segregated by race? Yes ___ No ___

What church do you attend, if any? _____

What is your occupation? _____

On your job, are the people you deal with (fellow-employees, or customers and clients) predominantly Black? Yes ___ No ___

Approximate FAMILY INCOME for 1973:

0-1999 _____	8000- 9999 _____	16000-17999 _____
2000-3999 _____	10000-11999 _____	18000-19999 _____
4000-5999 _____	12000-13999 _____	20000 or more _____
6000-7999 _____	14000-15999 _____	

Could you please check off responses to the following statements as you think you would have answered in 1963 and then in 1973?

- A. Too many times Blacks have compromised when they could have made more progress if they had held out a little longer.

In 1963, I would have agreed_____	In 1973, I agree_____
disagreed_____	disagree_____

- B. Unless you dramatize an issue through mass protests and demonstrations it seems that there is scarcely any progress made.

In 1963, I would have agreed_____	In 1973, I agree_____
disagreed_____	disagree_____

- C. It is sometimes better to have white resistance to Negro requests, because then you have a basis for bringing the overall problem to the public's attention.

In 1963, I would have agreed_____	In 1973, I agree_____
disagreed_____	disagree_____

- D. The average white man really wants the Negro to have his rights.

In 1963, I would have agreed_____	In 1973, I agree_____
disagreed_____	disagree_____

How would you characterize your
social contacts with whites?

Many contacts_____

Some contacts_____

Very few contacts_____

No contacts_____

How would you characterize your contacts with white leaders in the Central City area?

Many contacts_____

Some contacts_____

Very few contacts_____

No contacts_____

How do you think your own views on racial issues have changed over the last ten years?

Please list the organizations of which you have been a member over the last five years; also indicate if you have been an officer in any of these groups.

In your judgment, who are the most important Black leaders in Central City?

Thanks for your time.

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