h ‘L ‘. ‘- V. s x . ABSTRACT BLACK LEADERSHIP IN AN URBAN SETTING BY John Troy Williams This dissertation is devoted to a study of black community leadership in a northern city. "Durant," a community of 200,000, is a major center of the automobile industry. Using a social power frame of reference, black leaders were identified and their effectiveness gauged. Both the reputational and issue methods were used to pro- vide the names of leaders. In the reputational approach, a modification of the Miller-Form Technique utilizing knowledgeables representing five institutional sectors was used to provide the initial list of leaders. Black leaders mentioned most frequently were interviewed and asked to identify other important leaders. In the issue approach, names of leaders were obtained by examining four important issue-areas--education, Open occupancy, police-black community relations and human relations. John T. Williams The reputational approach yielded the names of twenty-eight leaders. The issue approach revealed nine leaders who were designated as tOp leaders. Seven of the issue leaders were among the most frequently nominated blacks on the reputational list. Two important issue leaders were not revealed by the reputational method. A knowledge of major issue-areas appeared to provide the most accurate approach to community leadership. However, the reputational method was useful in identifying secondary leaders who were not active in major issue-areas. A typology of radical-liberal-moderate-conserva- tive was used to categorize leadership styles. All the tOp leaders (issue leaders) were identified as liberals. The reputational list contained moderates and conservatives but no black leaders were identified as radicals. There were radical spokesmen in the community but they had limited constituencies. Interviews with leaders were devoted to the general nature of the racial climate in Durant and focused on the leader's role in the issue-areas. The issue approach pro- vided much material related to the effectiveness of black leaders and to the social power of the black community. Ten propositions summarize the major findings. Where possible the results are related to other published studies. The use of both the reputational and the issue method to identify leaders appeared to be validated by " ‘I. 0V .- o - to: .. ~‘I... ' . .,_ . u.- .- .,-. “- John T. Williams the results. The theoretical approach to black leadership in terms of social power and conflict also appeared to be analytically meaningful. Results indicated that there was no single group of black leaders--no black "power structure" in the community. The leadership group tended to vary from issue to issue. The black community showed considerable ambivalence toward black leaders but tended to unite behind them on major issues. There was evidence that black leaders were beginning to receive a respectful hearing from some community elites and that blacks could occasionally unite with other groups to achieve limited goals. However, the black community remains relatively powerless to achieve major social and economic goals. BLACK LEADERSHIP IN AN URBAN SETTING BY John Troy Williams A THESIS Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY College of Social Science 1973 a we. _.., ‘~-, a..‘ 5‘ p2,. 9 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Many individuals have contributed in various ways to this study. The members of the doctoral committee have been most helpful. Professor John Useem with his_compre- hensive knowledge of contemporary society and particular interest in social power; Professor Charles Press with his special competence in both community studies and political theory; and Professor Douglas Miller with his broad knowledge of American social history and special interest in Social Darwinism have corrected errors and sharpen the focus of this study.~ The author is particularly indebted to Professor James McKee, chairman of the committee. Without Professor McKee's knowledge and enthusiasm, it would have been im- possible to finish this study. Professor McKee's interest in and concern for America's social problems and his warm regard for individual students have made his classes a special treat for hundreds of Michigan State students. Many leaders in the black community assisted the author and he is deeply indebted to them. He sympathizes with those who have been deprived of the opportunity to exercise all the rights of citizenship and hopes that his documentation of this deprivation has not inadvertently ii given offense to those who have been kind enough to help him with his research. The author is also grateful to the public officials and agency leaders in the white com- munity who assisted him. It is good to know that a number of these white leaders are aware of the difficulties and problems that confront the black community and that they want to help. The author wishes to express his appreciation to the librarian and the library staff of the "Durant" Journal and to the administration and staff of the "Durant" Public Library for having assisted him with this project. He also wishes to thank the staff and in particular the director, Dr. Richard Chapin, of the Michigan State University Library for the many kindnesses extended to him. He is grateful to Dean George Hawkins of Purdue University and to the adminis- trative staff of the university library including Director Joseph Dagnese, deceased Director John Moriarty, Associate Director Oliver Dunn and Assistant Director Keith Dowden for a sabbatical and a leave of absence. He appreciates the sympathetic assistance received from Northern Illinois University Library Director Clyde Walton and Associate Director Katherine Walker. He is grateful for the encourage- ment given to him by his family, particularly his mother, . Donna Williams. Finally,he is indebted to Mrs. Judy Spratling who typed the manuscript and helped to ferret out mistakes. iii Needless to say, none of these individuals are responsible for errors in content or interpretation. The author alone is responsible for the final product. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF TABLES o o o o o o 0 V. o o o o o '0 o o o o LISTS Chapter I. II. III. IV. VI. VII. INTRODUCTION C C C C O C C O O O O O O O O DURANT: THE COMMUNITY SETTING . . . . . . Early History of Durant . . . . . . . . Ethnic Backgrounds of Durant's POpulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Durant's Economy and Universal Motors The United Automobile Workers (UAW) Government and Politics . . . . . Education . . . . . . . . . . . . The Hobbs' Foundation . . . . . . Education and Fine Arts Center Churches and Religion . . . . The Black Community in Durant The Black Community Today . Black Education .‘. . . . Black Social Institutions Black Housing . . . . . . SOCIAL POWER AND BLACK COMMUNITY LEADERSHIP CONFLICT THEORY AND BLACK COMMUNITY LEADERSHIP C C C O O O I O O O I O O O O 0 THE PROBLEM O O O O O O C O O O O O O O O 0 THE LEADERS OF DURANT'S BLACK COMMUNITY . . THE HUMAN RELATIONS COMMISSION . . . . .‘. Passage of the HRC Ordinance . . .-. . . Repeal of the HRC Ordinance . . . . . . . V viii 29 31 33 36 42 44 45 47 48 49 50 58 58 59 63 73 90 102 115 117 120 VIII. IX. The Second HRC Ordinance . . . . . . . . . Ineffectiveness of the New Human Relations Commission . . . . . . . . . . . Appointment of an HRC Director . . . . . . Continuing Ineffectiveness of the Human Relations Commission . . . . . . . . Resignation of Bruce Allan . . . . . . . Black Leaders View the Human Relations Commission Issue-Area . . . . . . . . . . Failure of Black Leaders to Create a Viable Human Relations Commission . . . . EDUCATION AND THE BLACK COMMUNITY . . . . . Black Criticism of the Durant School System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Durant Board of Education . . . . . . . . Black Protest Action . . . . . . . . . . . Renewed School Disturbances . . . . . . . Civil Rights Commission Investigation . . Lincoln High Human Relations Commission Controversy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Continuing Black Criticism of Educational Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Black Leaders View the Issue-Area of Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Limited Success in Implementing Black Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . POLICE-BLACK COMMUNITY RELATIONS . . . . . . Early History of Black Complaints . . . . Efforts to Improve Police-Black Community Relations . . . . . . . . . . . Civil Disturbances . . . . . . . . . . . . Attempts at Arbitration . . . . . . . . Continuing Black Criticism of the Police Department . . . . . . . . . . . . The Wallace Rally . . . . . . . . . . . . NAACP Dinner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Continuing Black Complaints of Police Brutality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Selection of Vice Squad Head . . .«. . . . Ombudsman Appointment . . . . . . . . . . Renewed Complaints from the Black Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Institute of Community Studies Survey ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Black Police Officer Dissatisfaction . . . vi 126 131 133 135 143 146 147 150 156 157 160 165 167 170 174 175 178 180 180 182 184 186 189 191 194 195 197 198 199 202 204 Black Leaders View the Issue-Area of Police-Black Community Relations . Black Leaders Possess Limited Resources With Which to Effect Change HOUSING . Attempts to Promote Open Occupancy . Board of Education Support for Open Occupancy CRC Hearing Proposals for an Open Housing Ordinance Mayor Milton Resigns . Reaction to the Mayor's Resignation The Black Solidarity Rally . Successful Passage of the Open Occupancy Ordinance Referendum on Fair Housing . Effect of the Open Occupancy Ordinance Black Leaders View the Issue-Area of Housing . Inability of Blacks to Effect Changes in Segregated Housing Black Powerlessness Study Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research Durant's Black Leaders and the Future X. OPEN XI. BIBLIOGRAPHY SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION . vii O 205 208 209 210 212 213 222 223 223 226 229 232 238 243 245 246 259 261 263 265 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. LIST OF TABLES Comparative POpulation Growth in Durant and DetrOit O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 0 Ethnic BaCkground O O O O O O O O O O O 0 Country of Origin . . . . . . . . . . . . Black Population in the City of Durant and Goodrich County . . . . . . . . . . . Occupational Employment in Selected Midwestern Communities . . . . . . . . . Percent of Employed Persons in White- Collar Occupations . . . . . . . . . . . Average Hourly Earnings . . . . . . . . . Universal Motors' Employment in Goodrich county 0 O I O O O O O O O O O I O O O O Median School Years Completed by Those Twenty-Five Years Old or Older . . . . . Racial Distribution of Pupils in the Durant Public Schools . . . . . . . . . . Church Affiliation . . . . . . . . . . . Churches in Goodrich County . . . . . . Black Family Income . . . . . . . . . . . Community Unemployment . . . .~. . . .». Home Ownership . . . . . . . . . . .'. . Neighborhood Profile of Social Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii Page 33 34 34 36 38 40 40 41 45 46 49 51 55 56 59 61 17. Black Enrollment in Elementary Schools . . . . 151 18. Black Enrollment in Junior High Schools . . . 152 19. Black Enrollment in Senior High Schools . . . 152 20. Racial Distribution of Teachers in the Durant Public Schools . . . . . . . . . . . . 153 21. Black Students and Teachers in Junior High SCh001 O C O C 7 O O O O O O O O O O O O O 155 22. Black Students and Teachers in Senior High SChOOl O I O I I O I O O O O O O O O O O 155 ix LISTS Page List of Reputational Leaders . . . . . .-. . . . . . 103 List of Issue-Area Leaders . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 a" CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION This thesis devoted to black community leadership in a northern community is intended to be a modest addition to a rather limited corpus of academic studies devoted to black leadership. Prior to the 1960's, social scientists displayed little interest in most aspects of the black experience. Attempts to account for this indifference of the academic community to the black community has led to a variety of explanations. A sociologist has attributed this lack of interest to the current emphasis in his field on empiricism and professionalism,1 while political scientists have found it related to their disciplines close ties with elite interests.2 Whatever the cause, it is apparent that there is a real need for additional studies of the black community and its problems. With this in mind, this study of black leadership has been undertaken in the hope that 1Everett C. Hughes, "Race Relations and the Socio- logical Imagination," American Sociological Review, XXVIII, No. 6 (Dec. 1963), pp. 879-890. 2David Easton, "The New Revolution in Political Science," American Political Science Review, LXII, No. 4, (Dec. 1969), p. 1059. .v‘ . . \.\ it might prove to be a contribution to the literature devoted to black leadership. Before turning to leadership in the black community, it is useful to note that there are several unique socio- logical characteristics of the.black community itself and that these unique characteristics undoubtedly affect the leadership styles and goals of black leaders. It is there— fore, relevant to mention two of the more important charac- teristics. First, it should be noted that the black com- munity is in reality a subcommunity. It represents a separate growth within the framework of a larger community which is histori- cally, culturally and self-consciously white . . . and represents in its institutional structure a weak and inferior imitation of the wider, essentially white community.3 The fact that the black community is a separate yet dependent part of the larger community has important implications for our study. Growing out of this dependency relationship is the fact that the black community is relatively powerless. Some writers have compared its relationship with the larger community to the relationship existing between an imperial power and a colonial possession. This, of course, means that the leaders of the black community have restricted chances of achieving important goals. This aspect will be examined in more detail in later chapters. A second 3Lewis Killian, "Community Structure and the Role of the Negro Leader-Agent," Sociological Inquiry, XXXV, No. 1, (Winter, 1965), p. 70. important characteristic of the black subcommunity is known as involution. Denied the right to participate fully in the life of the larger community, the black citizen is forced to seek most of his satisfactions and goals within the boundaries of the segregated black community although these boundaries may be psychological or social rather than ecological or geographical.. This thesis which will focus on black leaders, will analyze leadership styles and will attempt to re- late findings to other hypotheses developed in studies of black leadership. The first step in undertaking such a study is to review the pertinent literature with an eye to separating out significant problem areas and tenta- tive conclusions. In some cases, theories, conceptual- izations, typologies or models have been derived-and it is useful to see if these can provide meaningful insights or assist one in ordering data, clarifying concepts or relating findings to earlier studies. A review of the previous literature is therefore in order. A review of the literature devoted to case studies of black community leadership might conceivably be carried back to the-1920's when case studies of local communities * like the Lynd's Middletown began to appear.4 While these 4Robert S. Lynd and Helen M. Lynd, Middletown . . . (New York; Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1929). *Two excellent annotated bibliographies devoted to community studies are: Charles Press, Main Street Politics: early community studies were not limited to community leader- ship alone but dealt with all aspects of community life and culture, they did provide many insights into community lead- ership and leadership styles and served as models for later case studies of community leadership both black and white. With the publication of Floyd Hunter's Community Power Structure, a new interest in the local community was engendered and was focused in particular on community leadership.5 Hunter's study helped to popularize the term "power structure" which became a part of the vocabulary of most literate peOple. Hunter's methodological approach of formulating lists of leaders based on reputed power was widely imitated by other researchers. Some social scien- tists criticized Hunter's technique pointing out that he offered no empirical evidence to indicate that his reputed leaders actually were playing leadership roles. A group of investigators at Yale University headed by Robert Dahl turned to the task of studying community leadership by investigating specific political decisions in order to discover who played significant leadership roles. Dahl's Polic Making_at the Local Level, (East Lansing Institute for Community Development, MiEhigan State University, 1962). And Willis D. Hawley and James H. Savara, The Stud of Community Power: A Bibliographic Review, (Santa BarEara, California, AmeficanBibliographic Center-Clio Press, 1972). 5Floyd Hunter, Community Power Structure (Chapel. Hill, North Carolina: UnIVersity of North CaroIina Press, 1953). on ‘ I method of investigating issue-areas was reported in Who Governs? and was also widely imitated by others studying leadership in a variety of community settings.6 Recently investigators studying community-wide leadership have employed both the reputational and the issue-analysis (or decisional) approaches. Robert Presthus has used this dual approach to the study of community leader- ship in his study of two communities in New York state.7 Case studies of the black American have of course been appearing with increasing frequency. Most of the early studies did not focus specifically on black leader- ship, although some of them, like Myrdal's American Dilemma, devoted considerable attention to black leadership styles. Myrdal, in his landmark work, published in 1943, found two types of black leaders. The accommodating leader, utilized by the blacks to gain favors from the white com- munity, was by far the most prevalent type of black leader. Myrdal noted a second black leadership type--the protest leader. The protest leader was not as prevalent as the accommodating leader and was found principally in the urban North. 6Robert Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, I961) . . 7Robert Presthus, Men at the Top (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964). Recent studies of black leadership have noted the hostility and suspicion of many blacks toward black leaders. Myrdal saw evidence of this hostility in his day and explained it by pointing out that "the Negro hates the Negro role in American society, and the Negro leader, who acts out this role in public life becomes the symbol of what the Negro hates."8 The major study of black political leadership published prior to World War II was Gosnell's study of black leadership in Chicago.9 Gosnell concluded that blacks of the period did not get a great deal out of their political participation when rewards were weighed against black needs-—shortage of jobs, poor housing, inadequate public services-~but the machine did provide blacks with a number of jobs and white politicians did pay a certain amount of deference to black leaders and the black com- munity. Unfortunately, black politicians during this period, because of their historic alliance with the Republican Party, were often found voting against politi- cal measures designed to help their constituents. Floyd Hunter, in his study of community leader- ship in Atlanta, devoted some attention to black leader- lnnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma (New York: Har' Brothers, 1944), p. 774. Harold F. Gosnell, Negro Politicians (Chicago: “ ‘ of Chicago Press, 1935). ship. Hunter found that the political resources of the black community were limited and concluded that "none of the leaders in the Negro community may Operate in the same echelons of power as the top leaders in the total community . . ."10 As if to make up for past neglect, there have been in recent years many volumes appearing in print de- voted to blacks and the black experience and included among this growing corpus Of literature have been a number Of studies of black community leadership. Many Of these studies had dealt with black leadership in the South. In 1960, Elaine Burgess published a study of black leadership in Durham, North Carolina. Although Hunter had concluded that no blacks occupied tOp leadership positions in Atlanta, Burgess in her study of Durham found that some black leaders "hold positions of importance in the total community as well as in the subcommunity."11 Burgess be- lieved that Negroes have made substantial gains in Durham and felt that "the ability of-minority leaders to raise . . . issues to the level Of controversy has become a real source of power."12 10Hunter, op. cit., p. 139. 11M. Elaine Burgess, Negro Leadership in a Southern City (Chapel Hill, N.C.: UniV5?§IE?'5T'N6TEH‘C§EBIIHa Press, 1960), p. 76. lzIbid., p. 193. Burgess found that blacks tended to rank leaders in a fourfold classificationz» radical, liberal, moderate and conservative with the liberal leaders the most numerous. Burgess found that aggressiveness was a must for the contemporary black leader if he was to have the support of his constituents. Burgess noted that the black "power structure" in Durham was fairly fluid. The leadership group was undergoing a process of constant change as new men as- sumed positions of organizational responsibility and as patterns of race relations changed. Burgess found that there was a considerable amount of dissension among blacks over methods to be employed in achieving specific race goals. However, black leaders through a process of bargaining and compromise were able to achieve consensus and thus present a solid front to the ‘white community. Burgess concluded that neither personal character- istics, wealth, institutional position nor ideology is the basis for leadership within the subcommunity. Rather a combination of these factors is vitally important for today's leaders. The position Of the Negro is undergoing a continuous process Of change. What we_are attempting to understand is not a static phenomenon. Any model of ower in the sub-community must be dynamic.1 13Ibid., p. 186. Cothran and Phillips in their study of black leadership in Little Rock, published in 1961, noted two types of black leaders, the "accommodating" type leader and the "protesting" type. They found that the role of the "accommodating" type leader is rapidly becoming un- tenable. It has few adherents, today, and those who do survive are often subject to sanctions by the black com- munity. Cothran and Phillips found that while the "accom- modating" type leader gains his prestige through accept- ance and support by the white community, the "protesting" type gains his support by acceptance within the black com- munity. Rejection of the "protesting" leader by the white community is important for it "[bestows] a certain charis- matic quality on the victim and [tends] to leave no doubt in the minds of the Negro masses that the leader is more interested in their welfare than in personal aggrandize- ment."l4 Cothran and Phillips found that black leaders have few power resOurces and that their greatest source of power is refusal to cooperate with the white community when there is evidence of segregation or discrimination. 14Tilman Cothran and William Phillips, Jr., "Negro Leadership in a Crisis Situation," Phylon, XXII, NO. 2 (Summer, 1961), p. 118. -., .‘~ important characteristic of the black subcommunity is known as involution. Denied the right to participate fully in the life of the larger community, the black citizen is forced to seek most of his satisfactions and goals within the boundaries Of the segregated black community although these boundaries may be psychological or social rather than ecological or geographical.. This thesis which will focus on black leaders, will analyze leadership styles and will attempt to re- late findings to other hypotheses developed in studies of black leadership. The first step in undertaking such a study is to review the pertinent literature with an eye to separating out significant problem areas and tenta- tive conclusions. In some cases, theories, conceptual- izations, typologies or models have been derived and it is useful to see if these can provide meaningful insights or assist one in ordering data, clarifying concepts or relating findings to earlier studies. A review Of the previous literature is therefore in order. A review of the literature devoted to case studies of black community leadership might conceivably be carried back to the-1920's when case studies Of local communities * like the Lynd's Middletown began to appear.4 While these 4Robert S. Lynd and Helen M. Lynd, Middletown . . . (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1929). *Two excellent annotated bibliographies devoted to community studies are: Charles Press, Main Street Politics: r“ early community studies were not limited to community leader- ship alone but dealt with all aspects of community life and culture, they did provide many insights into community lead- ership and leadership styles and served as models for later case studies of community leadership both black and white. With the publication of Floyd Hunter's Community Power Structure, a new interest in the local community was engendered and was focused in particular on community leadership.5 Hunter's study helped to popularize the term "power structure" which became a part of the vocabulary of most literate peOple. Hunter's methodological approach of formulating lists Of leaders based on reputed power was widely imitated by other researchers. Some social scien- tists criticized Hunter's technique pointing out that he offered no empirical evidence to indicate that his reputed leaders actually were playing leadership roles. .A group of investigators at Yale University headed by Robert Dahl turned to the task of studying community leadership by investigating specific political decisions in order to discover who played significant leadership roles. Dahl's Poli Makingyat the Local Level, (East Lansing Institute for gommunity Development, Michigan State University, 1962). And Willis D. Hawley and James H. Savara, The Stud of Community Power: A Bibliographic Review, (Santa BarBara, CaIifornia, American—Bibliographic Center-Clio Press, 1972). sFloyd Hunter, Community Power Structure (Chapel. Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1953) D" a method of investigating issue-areas was reported in Who Governs? and was also widely imitated by others studying leadership in a variety of community settings.6 Recently investigators studying community-wide leadership have employed both the reputational and the issue-analysis (or decisional) approaches. Robert Presthus has used this dual approach to the study of community leader- ship in his study of two communities in New York state.7 Case studies of the black American have of course been appearing with increasing frequency. Most of the early studies did not focus specifically on black leader- ship, although some Of them, like Myrdal's American Dilemma, devoted considerable attention to black leadership styles. Myrdal, in his landmark work, published in 1943, found two types Of black leaders. The accommodating leader, utilized by the blacks to gain favors from the white com- munity, was by far the most prevalent type of black leader. Myrdal noted a second black leadership type--the protest leader. The protest leader was not as prevalent as the accommodating leader and was found principally in the urban North. 6Robert Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press,_l961). 7Robert Presthus, Men at the TOp (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964). Recent studies Of black leadership have noted the hostility and suspicion of many blacks toward black leaders. Myrdal saw evidence of this hostility in his day and explained it by pointing out that "the Negro hates the Negro role in American society, and the Negro leader, who acts out this role in public life becomes the symbol of what the Negro hates."8 The major study Of black political leadership published prior to World War II was Gosnell's study of black leadership in Chicago.9 Gosnell concluded that blacks of the period did not get a great deal out of their political participation when rewards were weighed against black needs--shortage of jobs, poor housing, inadequate public services--but the machine did provide blacks with a number of jobs and white politicians did pay a certain amount of deference to black leaders and the black com- munity. Unfortunately, black politicians during this period, because of their historic alliance with the Republican Party, were Often found voting against politi- cal measures designed to help their constituents. Floyd Hunter, in his study of community leader- ship in Atlanta, devoted some attention to black leader- 8Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1944), p. 7742 9Harold F. Gosnell, Ne rO Politicians (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1335). -u . m.- .\b \\ ship. Hunter found that the political resources of the black community were limited and concluded that "none Of the leaders in the Negro community may Operate in the same echelons of power-as the tOp leaders in the total community . . ."10 As if to make up for past neglect, there have been in recent years many volumes appearing in print de- voted to blacks and the black experience and included among this growing corpus Of literature have been a number of studies of black community leadership. Many of these studies had dealt with black leadership in the South. In 1960, Elaine Burgess published a study of black leadership in Durham, North Carolina. Although Hunter had concluded that no blacks occupied top leadership positions in Atlanta, Burgess in her study of Durham found that some black leaders "hold positions of importance in the total community as well as in the subcommunity."ll Burgess be- lieved that Negroes have made substantial gains in Durham and felt that "the ability of minority leaders to raise . . . issues to the level Of controversy has become a real source ofapower."12 10Hunter, op, cit., p. 139. 11M. Elaine Burgess, Negro Leadership in‘a Southern Cit (Chapel Hill, N.C.: UniVEFEIEy'Of'NOEEH“CErOIIna ress, 1960), p. 76. 12Ibid., p. 193. Burgess found that blacks tended to rank leaders in.a fourfold classification: radical, liberal,.moderate and conservative with the liberal leaders the most numerous. Burgess found that aggressiveness was a must for the contemporary black leader if he was to have the support Of his constituents. Burgess noted that the black "power structure" in Durham was fairly fluid. The leadership group was undergoing a process of constant change as new men as- sumed positions of organizational responsibility and as patterns of race relations changed. Burgess found that there was a considerable amount of dissension among blacks over methods to be employed in achieving specific race goals. However, black leaders through a process of bargaining and compromise were able to achieve consensus and thus present a solid front to the ‘white community. Burgess concluded that neither personal character- istics, wealth, institutional position nor ideology is the basis for leadership within the subcommunity. Rather a combination of these factors is vitally important for today's leaders. The position of the Negro is undergoing a continuous process Of change. What we are attempting tO understand is not a static phenomenon. Any model of ower in the sub-community must be dynamic.1 13Ibid., p. 186. Cothran and Phillips in their study of black leadership in Little Rock, published in 1961, noted two types of black leaders, the "accommodating" type leader and the "protesting" type. They found that the role of the "accommodating" type leader is rapidly becoming un- tenable. It has few adherents, today, and those who do survive are Often subject to sanctions by the black com- munity. Cothran and Phillips found that while the "accom- modating" type leader gains his prestige through accept- ance and support by the white community, the "protesting" type gains his support by acceptance within the black com- munity. Rejection of the "protesting" leader by the white community is important for it "[bestows] a certain charis- matic quality on the victim and [tends] to leave no doubt in the minds of the Negro masses that the leader is more interested in their welfare than in personal aggrandize- ment."14 Cothran and Phillips found that black leaders have few power resOurces and that their greatest source of power is refusal to OOOperate with the white community when there is evidence of segregation or discrimination. 14Tilman Cothran and William Phillips, Jr., "Negro Leadership in a Crisis Situation," Phylon, XXII, NO. 2 (Summer, 1961), p. 118. 10 Thompson, in his 1963 study of black leadership' in New Orleans reported conclusions that were comparable to those announced by Hunter. Thompson found that no Negro in New Orleans holds membership or participates in powerful decision-making organizations." He went on to note, "insofar as the formulation or execution of policies and practices governing the civic, political, economic, educational, professional and cultured life of the com- munity is concerned, Negroes are powerless."15 Thompson did find that the accommodating type of black leader had in some cases been replaced by a new more aggressive type of leader. Thompson categorized black leaders under three labels: "Uncle Tom," "Racial Diplomat," and "Race Man." A characteristic noted by Thompson and singled out by other researchers is the concerted effort made by black leaders to keep internal conflicts over policy within the black community so that a united front may be presented to the larger community. Thompson found no evidence that there was a single, monolithic, black, "power structure" for he noted, No one individual, or group can be identi- fied as the leader of the New Orleans Negro community. Instead, from the point of view Of 15Daniel C. Thompson, The Negro Leadership Class (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1963), “I p. 165. :- 11 influence, we can identify several segments or classes in the Negro community. Each of these segments or classes produces its own leadership.l6 ' In a 1963 study, Jack Walker found that in Atlanta there were two major black leadership categories--liberal and conservative. Walker noted that there was general a- greement between the two sets of leaders regarding goals but that they tended to disagree over tactics. However, Walker found that both liberals and conservatives served important functions. The liberal leaders initiated con- flicts with the wider community; the conservative leaders, utilizing their contacts with white elites, helped to re- solve the conflicts.l7‘ Killian and Grigg, in their 1964 study of the black leadership in Tallahassee, Florida, found that significant changes had occurred as a result of a bus strike. A new militant group Of Negroes had become the acknowledged leaders of the black community. Killian and Grigg found that white leaders would have preferred to deal with the old accommodating black leaders but realized that they no longer had general support. The whites were realistic enough to recognize and to deal with the new more militant black leaders. lGIbid., p. 8. 17Jack L. Walker, "Protest and Negotiation: A Case Study of Negro Leadership in Atlanta, Georgia," Midwest Journal of Political Science, Vol. 7, No. 2 (May, ' pp. - o 12 Killian and Grigg found that viewing racial problems as conflict relationships provided a framework within which the two races could achieve a more realistic understanding of each other's problems. Such an approach also was conductive to achieving a more meaningful con- 18 sensus between negotiating leaders. In Negro Political Leadership in the South, pub- lished in 1966, Everett Ladd described the more aggres- sive character of recent black leadership in two southern communities, Winston—Salem and Greenville. Ladd found that white leaders in these communities would have pre- ferred dealing with the Older, more deferential black leaders but recognizing that these men were no longer ac- ceptable to the black community, they were willing to negotiate with the new leaders. Ladd noted that in some cases whites were even appointing these new black leaders as representatives Of the black community to boards and commissions. Ladd found that in the larger community success as a civic leader or as a business man could Often be transferred by a candidate to the political arena. How- ever, the same situation did not prevail in the black community. The fact that a black candidate had led a 18Lewis M. Killian and Charles M. Grigg, Racial Crisis in America . . . (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1964). >4. . o u .. ‘1 p. , _.. I . v. . , -¢ o . an. v ...'n ... . .'-l \.. vi: ‘4. (I: 13 successful charitable fund drive or was a successful businessman was of only marginal interest to black voters. Black interest in their candidates focused on their ac- ceptability as race leaders. Ladd explained this differ- ence in attitude by pointing out that to the white com- munity politics is often an area Of only peripheral con- cern but to the Negro, politics can be vital, it can mean jobs, housing and access to the rights of full citizen- ship. Ladd found certain difficulties involved in establishing typologies of race leaderships. He saw that leadership styles vary from time to time and place to place. Therefore, Ladd established a continuum relation- ship made up of three categories: conservative, moderate and militant and defined these categories not in terms of absolute means or goals, but rather in terms of the ac- ceptability Of these three leadership styles to whites‘ and blacks. According to this definition, militants are always those Who, regardless of place or time, are "in their rhetoric, goals, and means, less acceptable to . . . whites than are moderates who in turn are less ac- 19 ceptable than conservatives." Ladd found that this relative continuum of styles is one that actually 19Everett.C.Ladd, Jr., Negro Political Leader-. ghipyin the South (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1966), p. 150. 14 represents the way whites and blacks view black race leadership. Noting that there are constant changes in most black leadership structures, Ladd offered the following explanation: Operating from weak institutional and status positions, possessing few sanctions with which to secure the compliance of their followers, and dealing with issues which involve the deepest and most vital political interests of Negroes, race leaders are ex- ceedingly vulnerable. Hence the fluidity potential of race leadership will remain high.20 In 1971, Mack Jones published a study of black political leadership in a number of southern communities. Jones found that in the South, black officeholders cannot effect the priorities of the bodies on which they serve and have only limited success in gaining benefits for their community. Benefits achieved by black officeholders are the result of contacts and pressure exerted on administra- tive Officials rather than through legislative action.21 Nelson, in a 1971 study of black leadership in a number of Alabama communities, found that there has been a recent tendency for black charismatic leaders to be replaced by black leaders who are specialists in problem 201bid., pp. 321-322. 21Mach H. Jones, "Black Officeholders in Local Governments of the South: An Overview," Politics 1971, . . u- ...- u ‘ "0.... ' c .- ., - .-- a.._.c. o... . . -.- ' ‘.4 "‘v o. .s. u... a. u.. a. . ‘Fo ‘ I. U .V‘. . It. 14 represents the way whites-and blacks view black race leadership. Noting that there are constant changes in most black leadership structures, Ladd offered the following explanation: Operating from weak institutional and status positions, possessing few sanctions with which to secure the compliance of their followers, and dealing with issues which involve the deepest and most vital political interests of Negroes, race leaders are ex- ceedingly vulnerable. Hence the fluidity potential of race leadership will remain high.20 In 1971, Mack Jones published a study of black political leadership in a number of southern communities. Jones found that in the South, black Officeholders cannot effect the priorities of the bodies on which they serve and have only limited success in gaining benefits for their community. Benefits achieved by black officeholders are the result of contacts and pressure exerted on administra- tive officials rather than through legislative action.21 Nelson, in a 1971 study of black leadership in a number of Alabama communities, found that there has been a recent tendency for black charismatic leaders to be replaced by black leaders who are specialists in problem 201bid., pp. 321-322. 21Mach H. Jones, "Black Officeholders in Local Governments of the South: An Overview," Politics 1971, No. 2 (March, 1971), pp. 49—72. ' .» pu .au' rub-q an n‘ c .4 an ... 0.. ‘10..- \ no... A... a._ . V . -. - .- 8.: a I ll! 15 areas. The charismatic leader still plays a ritualistic role but negotiations between the black community and the larger community are conducted by the cadre of special- ized leaders.22 Studies of black leadership in the North and West produced findings that were similar to those generated by studies of black leadership in the South. However, there were several significant differences. Black leaders in the northern urban centers appeared to be more confused about goals and tactics. They also appeared to be less effective in achieving concrete benefits for their com- munities.' An early study Of black leadership in the west was published in 1959 by Ernest. Barth and Baha Abu-Laban. Earth and Abu-Laban found that in Pacific City, black leaders did not play important roles in community decision- making. For in Pacific City, blacks "hold positions of little importance to the community's institutional struc- tures; their decisions have no serious ramifications for 23 the larger communicty."- Unlike most other black sub- communities, several respondents claimed that in Pacific. 22Harold A. Nelson, "Leadership and Change in an Evolutionary Movement . .-. ," Social Forces, Vol. 49, NO. 3 (March, 1971), pp. 353-371. 23Ernest Barth and Baha Abu-Laban, "Power Struc- ture and the Negro Sub-Community," American Sociological Review, XXIV, No. 1 (February, 1959), p. 76. 16 City "most Negroes are not conscious of being members of a racial community as they are in many other cities."24 Barth and Abu-Laban felt this was a reflection of the rather unique character of the black community in Pacific City and stressed the need for researchers to note the total community setting in any study of minority sub—. communities. James Wilson, in his study of black political leadership published in 1960, has described changes in the black leadership structure in Chicago over a period of years. Wilson noted that in the past black leaders were people of general prestige who were recognized as leaders because of their occupational or social position. Many of these early leaders were ministers or professional men. Today, Wilson finds that the new black leadership group contains a large number of leaders who are profes- sionals associated with black voluntary organizations and these organizations (Urban League, NAACP) tend to supply the tone and rhetoric of black protest. Wilson noted that the middle class which provides :much of the black leadership today tends to support goals ‘which at-times may appear irrelevant to the ghetto Negro. Open occupancy which is a very meaningful issue to the upward-aspiring, middle-class Negro may only be of 24Ibid. 17 peripheral interest to those blacks who are obligated to remain or prefer to remain in the ghetto. Wilson found that there were many lines of division within the black community but noted that these divisions are rarely allowed to become public issues. He explained this unique cohesiveness by pointing out that, almost all Negroes of any stature are de- pendent upon the Negro rank-and-file for power, income and status. . . . This de- pendence does not require the Negro entre- preneur always to act as if the interests of the Negro community were his goal. But it does require that the Negro leader not allow himself to be conspicuously or dra- matically identified with a position or course of action at odds with the consen- sual interests of the race.25 Wilson appears to support those who maintain that conflict is inevitable if blacks are to improve their status. He said: Given the need for vigorous leadership, and given the magnitude of the problems and the relative lack of other forms of influ- . ence, it is difficult to see how Negroes can perform the protest function without utili- zing tactics (such as racial appeals, ex- treme demands, and emotional rhetoric) that in different circumstances would be considered improper. It is inherently contradictory to look for "responsible" militants who will lead a "reasonable" protest movement. Conflict is inherent in social change, and the disadvantages which rise in prOportion to the intensity of 25James Q. Wilson, Negro Politics . . . (New York: The Free Press, 1960): P. 306. 18 such conflict must simply be weighed as a cost against the value of the ends being served.2 Pfautz, in his 1962 study of Providence, Rhode Island, also found that black community leaders were relatively powerless. Pfautz noted three types of leader- ship styles and categorized these as "integration" oriented, "segregation" oriented and "middle road." Unlike other investigators, Pfautz found a fairly high degree of consensus among blacks regarding the leaders in the subcommunity. Pfautz concluded that in cities with a relatively small black population "there may be less of a gap between 'reputation' and 'behavior' in the case of Negro sub-community leaders."27 James McKee, in his 1962 study of black leadership in Grand Rapids, found that leadership tended to be polar- ized around two organizations, the Urban League and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). The NAACP was primarily interested in "status" goals--the elimination of segregation--while the Urban League was primarily interested in "welfare" goals--issues that would provide Negroes with tangible material benefits. While the NAACP was more aggressive than the Urban League 26Ibid., p. 309. 27Harold Pfautz, "The Power Structure of the Negro Sub-Community: A Case Study and a Comparative View," Phylon, XXIII, No. 2 (Summer, 1962), 165. 19 in its attempts to achieve it's goals, a majority of the Negro leaders spoke more approvingly of the Urban League. McKee found that the issues of major concern to the black community were those related to housing, jobs and education. Negroes were also quite concerned about juvenile delinquency and about police-black community relations. McKee noted that Negro leadership in Grand Rapids is changing. Organized labor offers blacks the chance to develop leadership potential. Many of the new leaders are college educated professionals who can present the Negro case with skill. McKee found no monolithic black "power structure" in Grand Rapids. He reported, Negroes, including Negro leaders, agree that no one person, or even one group of persons, can speak for or legitimately repre- sent the Negro community. In that sense, there are no leaders of the Negro community. But there are numerous leaders in the Negro community.28 Of particular significance was the fact that in Grand Rapids, in spite of the improved political skills of the Negro, black leaders remain relatively powerless. McKee summed up the situation by observing "leaders . . . have no ready access to the important centers of decision- 28JamesMcKee, Negro Leadership in Grand Rapids (East Lansing, Michigan: Michigan State UniverSity, Institute for Community Development, 1962), p. 2. 20 making in the community. They are leaders without power. . . .29 Lee Bowman,_in 1965, published a study of black leadership in a northern community of 200,000. Bowman found black leaders more concerned about business and professional advancement than with race-related goals. Most of the leadership in the black community was pro- vided by black protest organizations. These organiza- tions had an ideology that was a combination of militant and moderate views. Bowman found that black leaders who favored militant goals often failed to implement their views with action programs}0 Kenneth Clark in his study, Dark Ghetto, published in 1965, gives an interesting description of an attempt by a group of important Harlem business and professional men to constitute themselves as a black "power structure" dedicated to assisting black public leaders who were occupying exposed positions. Unfortunately, this power group proved to be largely ineffective.- Frequently, these self-constituted elites found that they were unable to influence decisions and since many in the group were 291bid. 3oLee Bowman, "Racial Discrimination and Negro Leadership Problems: The Case of 'Northern Community, ggcial Forces, Vol. 44, NO. 2 (December, 1965), pp. 173- 6. a4 21 themselves officeholders, they found that they were also vulnerable to attacks from the larger community.31 John Strange, in his 1966 account of black politi- cal leadership in Philadelphia, concluded that black leaders in that city labored under a number of serious handicaps. Strange found that the black commitment to the Democratic party made it difficult for them to extract concessions from that party. Strange predicted that even when blacks in Philadelphia came to constitute more than half of the pOpulation of the city, they would find that the bureaucratization and professionalization of the govern- ment machinery would prevent any dramatic improvement in the black condition.32 Lee Sloan investigated the black leadership struc- ture in Pontiac, Michigan and reported the results in his 1967 doctoral dissertation. Sloan used the reputational approach to identify important black leaders. He then conducted open-ended interviews with these black leaders and with leaders from the larger community. Undoubtedly, one of Sloan's most significant observations was that "a basic characteristic of Negro 31Kenneth B. Clark, Dark Ghetto . . . (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), pp. 186-189. 32John H. Strange, "Racial Segregation in the Metropolis," in MetrOpolitan Politics (Boston: Little, Brown & CO., 19661) pp. 41952. 1‘. 22 community leadership is its relative powerlessness."33 He went on to Observe; "many of the problems of Negro leadership stem directly from the fact the Negro leaders must Operate from a weak base of power."34 The powerless- ness of black leadership, Sloan found, led to demands by the black subcommunity for greater militancy and made the black leaders extremely vulnerable. Harry Scoble, in a 1967 study of black leadership in Los Angeles, notes that since the Watts Riot, leader- ship in that community has become increasingly specialized and fragmented. Scoble finds that there are fewer demon- strations and that blacks have turned to welfare goals and self-help programs. Scoble finds that black leaders press for concessions from the larger community and white elites appear to be responding to these demands but this respon- siveness is "more verbal and visible than . . . substan- Scoble finds that ianos Angeles the current weakness of labor unions and of the Democratic party-- traditional allies of the black community--has served to handicap black leaders in their attempts to achieve new goals. 33Lee-Sloan, "Negro Community Leadership in.a Northern City," (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State Uni- versity, 1967), p. 228. 34Ibid. 35Harry M. Scoble, Negro Politics in Los An eles (Los Angeles, Institute of Government and Public A airs, UOCOLOAO' 1967), p. 240 ' ‘ “. 23 In a study published in 1968, Harold Baron found that blacks in Cook County "hold less than one percent of the effective power in the Chicago metrOpolitan area."36 Baron found that black political leaders had failed to give effective support to such vital issues as urban re- newal and education and had accepted instead the traditional .political patronage rewards. Thus it appeared that they had forfeited the opportunity to gain concessions for their black constituents. In his 1969 study of San Francisco, Young found that the militancy of protest leaders had forced black political leaders to be more aggressive in their actions y}g_é gig the wider community. Black politicians realize that they_must work with black protest leaders or risk defeat at the polls. Wilson in several of his studies has noted the prevalence of middle—class black leaders who frequently have limited rapport with the poor. However, Young found that in San Francisco the black leadership group is made up of individuals from both working-class and middle-class backgrounds and tha both groups of leaders appear to have good rapport with ghetto blacks.37 36HaroldM. Baron, "Black Powerlessness in Chicago," Transfaction, Vol. 6, NO. 1 (November, 1968). p. 33. 37Richard Young, "The Impact of Protest Leadership on Negro Politicians in San Francisco," Western Political anrterly, Vol. 22, No. 1 (March, 1969). PP.’94-11I. 24 Palley in his study of black leadership in Newark-- a city with a black population of 54 percent--found among black leaders a tendency toward militancy and a sense of urgency regarding the need for rapid change. Black leaders showed a preference for radical and militant organizations. Black leaders rarely mentioned the Urban League and 60 per- cent Of them viewed the NAACP with negative or hostile feelings.‘ Palley found that among black leaders, age rather than economic status, education or occupation was the most reliable indicator of militancy or-radicalism.38 As we have noted, it is apparent that during the sixties there were regional variations in black leadership goals and in black leadership achievements. Southern black leaders appeared to be more successful than their northern counterparts in achieving racially-oriented goals. Northern black leaders appeared to be increasingly pessimistic about what the future might hold for them. There have been a number of attempts to account for the regional difference in leadership effectiveness. Several investigators felt that southern black leaders were more effective because they had created superior organizations and had developed more effective leadership 38Marian Palley et al, "Subcommunity Leadership in a Black Ghetto . . .," UrBan Affairs Quarterly, Vol. 5, NO. 3 (March, 1970), pp. 291-312. ' o». 25 techniques. It was also noted that the goals of the two black leadership groups were sometimes quite different and because of this, the pattern of protest that achieved success in the South was not always apprOpriate in the North. In this connection, Clark notes: "patterns of litigation, legislation, and other forms of governmental action that seemed appropriate to the amelioration of the racially determined condition of the southern Negro are inapprOpriate to the predicament of the northern Negro. "39 Wilson finds that one important reason for leader- ship success in the Sputh has been the clear-cut set of issues that faced the black community. Wilson in dis- cussing the struggle in the South says: The Negro community responded to what were regarded as manifest injustices and public outrages.‘ Anti-Negro violence, police oppression, the denial of ordinary public services, and other oppressions represented specific causes. They tended to unify the Negro community. Few could doubt that there were injustices . . . Common decency seemed to demand a redress, and by simply calling attention to it in a forceful manner, some corrective action could be had. . . . 39Kenneth B. Clark, "The Negro and the Urban Crisis,” in A enda for the Nation, ed. Kermit Gordon- (Washington, D.C.: THe BroOkings Institute, 1968), p. 119. 40James Q. Wilson, "The Strategy of Protest: Problems of Negro Civic Action," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 5, No. 3 (SeptemBer, 1961); P. 295. 26 Wilson supports Clark's view that the problems facing the black community in the North and in the South have, until very recently, been characterized by some significant regional differences. In the North, the most significant problem-areas appeared to be economic and social rather than political or legal and black leaders experienced some difficulty in formulating specific race- advancement gOals, related to these problem-areas. For in dealing with specific issues such as inadequate housing and unemployment, northern black leaders found it difficult to devise effective strategies because the problems them- selves were so complex and the solutions.so Obscure. Our brief resume of other leadership studies has served to indicate some of the problems and conclusions that have been pointed up by these studies and to present some of the conceptualizations related to black leadership that these studies have generated. Briefly, we might note that most studies show that black leaders are becoming increasingly more aggressive in their leadership styles and goals. In a number of cases, there is a change in leadership type from ministers and professional men to leaders of voluntary organizations and labor unions. Black leaders who are most acceptable to the white community are Often viewed with suspicion by the black community. 27 Several studies find a good deal of dissatisfaction or at least ambivalence in the black community toward black leaders. This is particularly true among ghetto blacks who feel that their needs are not served by middle-class, black leaders whose goals and life-styles are completely at vari- ance with their own. Some investigators find that black leaders are effective, others do not, but most conclude that black leaders do not possess the requisite power to gain important goals for their black constituents. Conceptualizations of black leadership have resulted in a number of descriptive typologies of leadership, the most prevalent having three categories that are labeled in various ways to indicate militant, moderate and conservative leadership styles. However, one study finds that leadership styles vary from time to time and place to place. Attempts are also made to correlate leadership styles with goals and with types of protest organizations. Finally, studies show that conflict is an essential ingrediant of most successful protest activity which indicates clearly why a more aggres- sive style of leadership is demanded. Building on previous studies, this thesis describes black leadership in a middle-sized industrial community and attempts to relate the results to earlier studies. Chapter V will contain a more detailed description of the methodo- logical approach used in this thesis but here it is suf- ficient to note that the research was guided by these kinds 0‘1 28 of questions: Who are the leaders in the black community? DO black leaders have ready access to important centers of decision-making within the larger community? Are there re- occuring changes in the make-up of the black leadership stratum? Do black leaders possess legitimacy in the sub- community? In the larger community? These types of questions related to leadership, power and conflict served as guide posts in our research. In attempting to answer these types of questions, the two conceptual tools of social power and conflict were found to be most useful. These concepts, described in later chapters, provided additional insights into leadership styles and goals during the course of this analysis of community leadership. However, before turning to these conceptual tools, let us focus on the community we will be concernedeith in this study.‘ CHAPTER II DURANT: THE COMMUNITY SETTING In this chapter, we will be describing the-com- munity which we have identified with the pseudonym of Durant.* Durant is a middle-sized industrial community located in the Middle west. The city has had both its apologists and its detractors and indeed it is difficult to be ambivalent about the community. Durant's un- official historian in a poem written on the fiftieth anniversary of Universal Motors paid tribute to the city in the following fashion: "Durant . . .--a good place and a time to be alive; we share the best the modern world has in it. A better place and time? There never was one."1 Others have been less enthusiastic. A writer for Commonweal after visiting the city commented: "The grey- ness and the lack of hills, the factories and the used-car * The pseudonym "Durant" has also been used in the footnotes documenting this study. lClarence Young, "Big Crossing Place" (Durant, Hobbs Foundation, 1962): p. 4. 29 30 lots shroud whatever vitality and hope the land and the people once possessed."2 The bleakness of the city has also been described in rather vivid fashion in two novels by Catherine Brody, NobodyStarves3 and Cash Item.4 This image has also been evoked in a doctoral dissertation dealing with the com- munity. “The author, Peirce Lewis, describes the city in the following way: Durant is a picture of drab uniformity. . . . The dozen blocks of the business district are distinguished by buildings which compensate for lack of beauty by an abundance of neon and imitation tile. Lewis concluded that Durant cannot escape its past; the scars of thirty years are too deeply etched across its face. No number of upper-middle-class ranch houses in the outskirts will obliterate square miles of ugly monotony. Nor can Durant escape what it is: a company town whose eco- nomic health hangs on the single thread of Universal Motor's sales. However, these contrasting laudatory and critical views do not necessarily provide one with a completely L 2Phil Tracy, "Cold Night in Durant," Commonweal, XCI, No. 16 (January 23, 1970), p. 447. 3Catherine Brody, Nobody Starves (New York: Longman' 3 Green and Co., 1932). 4Catherine Brody, Cash Item (New York: Longman's Green.and Co., 1933). 5Peirce Lewis, "Geography in the Politics of Durant," (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1958), pp. 20-29. 3'4 ‘l ». I. 31 objective description of the community. Certainly there are many undesirable characteristics about the city. It is not physically attractive; it does not offer some of the special amenities and services found in many cities; and it has a number of major social problems. However, the community appears to Offer other advantages. For whites from the South and from the rural areas of the state and for culturally deprived blacks, the community may represent the Opportunity to achieve certain desired material and vocational goals. Middle-class business and professional men, too, may find that Durant offers ready opportunities for financial rewards with less compe- tion from peer groups than might be encountered in more prestigious communities. Early History of Durant The recorded history of Durant begins when a fur trader settled in the area in 1819. The site was selected because it was the spot where the Durant River could easily be forded. Settlers from western New York were attracted to the region and Durant became the trading center of the whole area. In the 1860's and 1870's lumbering became one of the major industries in the state and for thirty years Durant was one Of the state's major lumbering centers. Eventually, the stands of pine were depleted but by then the city was the flourishing center of the carriage 32 industry. By 1900, Durant was known as the "Vehicle City" and had an annual production of 150,000 wagons and carriages--twice as many as South Bend, its nearest com- petitor. A number of the early entrepreneurs in the carriage business became interested in the automobile and soon several firms were established to manufacture cars. The relationship between the carriage manufacturers and the automobile manufacturers remained close for some time. The early automobile was in essence a carriage with a motor, and carriage manufacturers supplied the bodies, springs and wheels for these early cars. In 1908 several of the struggling automobile com- panies were merged into a single corporation--Universa1 .Motors. This company, destined to become the largest auto- :mobile manufacturer in the world, expanded until it had plants in many other communities but Durant remained its largest single manufacturing site. Durant experienced a tremendous period of populaé tion growth during the first three decades of the twentieth century. The population increase, as shown in Table l, was on a percentage basis, greater than that experienced during this period by its larger neighbor and rival manu- facturing center, Detroit. 33 TABLE 1 COMPARATIVE POPULATION GROWTH IN DURANT AND DETROIT 1......— Durant Detroit Durant Percent Detroit Percent Year Population Increase Population Increase 1900 13,103 285,704 1910 38,550 194.2 465,766 63.0 1920 91,599 137.6 993,678 113.3 1930 156,492 70.8 1,568,662 57.9 1940 151,543 -3.2 1,623,452 3.5 1950 163,143 7.7 1,849,568 13.9 1960 196,940 20.7 1,670,144 -9.7 1970 193,317 -l.8 1,511,482 -9.5 Source: U.S. Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census, 1970 Census of Population Number of Inhabitants. (Washington D.C., U.§. Govern- ment Printing Office, 1971), p. 24-15. Ethnic Backgrounds of Durant‘ s Population During Durant's boom period, agents employed by Universal Motors scoured the country recruiting workers and peOple poured into the city from other sections of the state: from adjacent states in the Middle West; from states in the Southeast and from foreign countries. Un- like other industrial centers, there was a heavier immi- gration from southern states while there was a correspond- ingly smaller influx of people from eastern and southern Europe. There were, however, a large number of immigrants 'I. 34 from Canada and from the British Isles. In Tables 2 and 3, the census statistics for Durant's ethnic ante- cedents are contrasted with those for Detroit to highlight some of the ethnic variations. TABLE 2 ETHNIC BACKGROUNDS Durant Detroit Foreign Born 5.4 12.1 Natives of Foreign or Mixed Parentage‘ 13.4 20.1 Foreign Stock 18.4 32.1 Source: U.S. Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Census_gf Population: 1960. General Social and Economic Characteristics. (washington, D.C., U.S. GOvernment Printing Office, 1962): pp. 24-179, 24-277. TABLE 3 COUNTRY OF ORIGIN Durant Percentage, Detroit Percentage Total Population 196,940 1,670,144 Foreign Stock 37,063 537,446 U.K. 4,939 13.3 46.493 8.6 Canada 10,534 28.3 98,803 18.3 Poland 3,143 8.4 106,739 19.8 Italy 1,438 3.9 47,689 8.9 Germany 3,402 9.2 54,256 10.1 U.S.S.R. 1,637 4.4 33,142 6.2 Source: U.S. Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Census of Population: 1960. General Social and EOOnomic Charactgristics. (washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), pp. 24-179, 24-277. 35 Many of the new residents tended to consider Durant as only a temporary place of residence and con- tinued to maintain strong ties with their former home communities. When periods of slack employment developed in the automobile industry, they frequently returned to their old communities and remained there until employment was again available in Durant. This tended to give a certain transcient quality to the community. It also re- sulted in rather limited involvement on the part of many of the auto workers in the on-going political life of the community. The result was that city government was largely dominated by the original residents of the city. Blacks were not a numerically important segment of the city's pOpulation during its early period of industrial growth as is indicated in Table 4. In the 1920's, blacks began to arrive in fairly large numbers. However, job opportunities for blacks in the automobile industry were still limited to janitorial and foundry employment. Following World War II, as Table 4 indicates, there was a substantial increase in black mi- gration as many production-line jobs were made available to blacks. Moreover, the past decade, 1960-1970, has seen Durant's black population growing at a rate (58.7) that is larger than that experienced by Detroit.6 6U.S. Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census, 1970 Census of Population and Housin (Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing ice, ), p. 24-11. 36 TABLE 4 BLACK POPULATION IN THE CITY OF DURANT AND GOODRICH COUNTY DURANT GOODRICH COUNTY Percent of Percent of Black Total Black Total Year POpulation P0pu1ation POpulation POpulation 1910 397 1.0 416 0.6 1920 1,701 1.9 1,757 1.4 1930 5,725 3.7 5,825 2.8 1940 6,599 4.4 6,708 2.9 1950 13,906 8.5 14,277 5.3 1960 34,521 17.5 36,990 9.9 1970 54,237 28.1 60,338 13.6 Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Census of Populatign. 1920, V. 2, pp. 66, 1344. 1940, V. 2, Part 3, pp. 785, 899. 1950, V. 2, Part 22, pp. 45, 46, 119, 173. 1960, V. 1, Part 24, pp. 36, 38, 62, 137. 1970 General Population Characteristics, pp. 79, 178. Negro Population in the United“ States: 1790-1915, p. 814. Negroes in the United States: 1920-1932, p."749. Durant's Economy and UniversaI’Motors The economic life of Durant is dominated by its dependence on Universal Motors. A Federal Reserve Bank report notes: "Probably in no other city of comparable size in the United States has any single firm attained the industrial supremacy which Universal Motors has in Durant."7 This dominant position is clearly indicated 7Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Growth and Prosperity_in Five Midwestern Cities (Chicago, Federal Reserve Bank, 1955), p. 31. \. ‘ 1 '~ ~- I\. 37 in Table 5 which provides comparative employment statistics for Durant and for three other cities in the area. It shows that manufacturing and more specifically automobile manufacturing, dominates the economic life of the community to a much greater degree than is true of other communities. The results of this type of economic domination are pervasive and far-reaching. Several of these results have been discussed in some detail in an economic report dealing with Durant and Goodrich County prepared by the Battelle Institute.8 The Battelle report indicates that_communities like Durant that have economies dominated by a single indus- try experience the following problems: (1) They are particularly vulnerable_to economic cycles and economic recessions. (2) They tend to have a slower economic growth than communities with a more varied economic base. (3) They experience difficulty in attracting new and varied economic enterprises be- cause of the dominant position of their major industry. 8Battelle Memorial Institute, Goodrich County @00gomic Conditions (Columbus, Ohio, Battelle Memorial ofltltute, ' pp. 1-8. t i “-—. .— -.. ., . "; ,zo. ~ ‘-~1‘ 38 TABLE 5 OCCUPATIONAL EMPLOYMENT IN SELECTED MIDWESTERN COMMUNITIES DURANT SMA DETROIT SMA Number Percent Number Percent Total Employment 142,926 1,316,448 Employment in Manufacturing 77,466 54 565,064 42 Industries Employment in the Manufacture of Transportation 61,689 43 165,867 13 Equipment SAGINAW SMA LANSING SMA Number Percent Number Percent Total Employment 64,010 95,741 Employment in Manufacturing 30,640 48 38,361 40 Industries Employment in the ManufaCture 9,795 15 25,255* 27.9* of Transportation Equipment Source: U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. County Business Patterns 1970 (Washington, D. C., U. S. Government PrintingO Office, 1971), pp. 141- 144. *1967 figures from the Battelle Memorial Institute, Goodrich County Economic Conditions (Columbus, Ohio, Battelle Memorial Institute, 1969), pp. 1- -11, 1-12. 39 (4) They frequently lack service-related enterprises--restaurants, hotels, and amusement and entertainment facilities-- because of the inability of these enter- prises to meet the wage standards in the community. (5) They are perceived as "factory towns" and this image, which has rather negative connotations for many peOple, may cause individuals and business organizations to view them as undesirable communities. As-the Battelle survey indicates, the economic domi- nation by Universal Motors has had a noticeable impact on Durant. Because of the relatively high wage scales in the automobile industry, there are fewer people employed in white-collar positions in Durant than in communities of comparable size. This lack of white-collar employment is indicated in Table 6 which compares the percentage of white- ~.' ~ . . - Ho, .- u ‘u ”v a ~-‘ I ,‘- ua -' .~. H"... - 40 TABLE 6 PERCENT OF EMPLOYED PERSONS IN WHITE-COLLAR OCCUPATIONS Durant Detroit Grand Rapids Lansing Saginaw 36.4 40.2 45.6 48.0 41.0 1* Source: U.S. Census of Population, 1960, General Social and Economic Characteristics, pp. 24-181, 24-182. Almost everyone in Durant is aware of the fact that when Universal Motors is having a successful year the whole community reflects this prosperity. The reason for this is twofold--the company is the major employer in the community, and the average hourly wage paid by Universal Motors and its suppliers is higher than the state and national average wages for comparable types of employment. Table 7 shows the high hourly earnings paid in Durant and compares them with the. average earnings on the-state and the national level for the same type of employment. TABLE 7 AVERAGE HOURLY EARNINGS Fourth Quarter, 1970 ==============:: ‘\_, Durant State U.S.’ «mujfiacrturing Employment $4.53 $4.16 $3.41 fi’pyoyfllent in the Mfgr. fh/anSPox-tation Equip. 4.57 4.41 4.11 so\/': . Qvga«- Manpower Quarterly Rev1ew, V6 #4 and V7 #1 (jOint issue) Second Series, 1971. pp. 21, 27, 31. II 41 However, recently it has become apparent that employment at Universal Motors is not expanding at a rate sufficient to provide additional jobs for the metropolitan area's growing population. Indeed, as Table 8 indicates, the total number of employees at Universal Motors was smaller in 1970 than it was in 1956. This decrease in employment level is the result of certain production ef- ficiencies achieved by the company. TABLE 8 UNIVERSAL MOTORS' EMPLOYMENT IN GOODRICH COUNTY —- — Universal Motors Year Employment Percent Change 1956 74,434 1958 56,612 -23.9 1960 65,458 +15.6 1962 66,546 + 1.37. 1964 67,317 + 1.12 1967 72,649 + 7.92 1970 60,526 -16.69 Source: Figures provided by Universal Motors. Unfortunately, Durant has grown so accustomed to depending on Universal Motors as its major source of employ- Wat"t11atlalmost no effort has been made to attract new 1.40215 try. The Battelle report indicates that there is no ch7 daisyency actively engaged in recruiting new industry 42 for Durant and that, in fact, there is only one organiza- tion, a utility company, that does any work of significance in this area. The report notes that the recruitment of new industry will require special efforts because the dominant role of Universal Motors and the community's high wage levels tend to discourage other industrial concerns from locating in Durant. The United Automobile Workers (U.A.W.) The early history of Universal Motors was one of rather harsh paternalism toward its employees. This pattern of continuing paternalism was broken with the victory of the U.A.W. in the epoch—making, sit-down strike of 1937. The union victory was achieved only after a protracted struggle. This struggle was a difficult one because the union was con- fronted not only with a powerful industrial organization but also with its allies--the municipal authorities in Durant. At the time of the strike, the mayor was a Universal hkmors' employee, the city manager had been a former plant dbfision manager and the chief of police was a former mmmany detective. During the course of the strike, the City police worked very closely with company officials.9 &wemm3ry the involvement of both the governor of the state \\’_,, _ 9Sidney Fine, Sit-Down . . . (Ann Arbor, Michigan, 2% [Jn-‘LVersity of Mich1gan Press, 1969) , p. 108. . . V~' “ v -u _. .tv. nut-o...— 0 III a " Ou- u.‘.. I "I. .. ;-.. v- I “ .5. l 1‘- ‘... u t v v..: 'I. . o . ‘ ‘I 3 b, 1‘. . i! ."‘ H, F 43 and President Franklin Roosevelt probably helped to counter- balance corporate power and to assist labor in achieving an equitable settlement. The successful termination of the strike was a significant milepost in the history of organized labor. For, encouraged by this victory, the CIO went on to organize unskilled labor in many additional industries.. Since 1937, the UAW has continued to play an important role in the civic affairs of Durant. Although it does not actively support political tickets, the UAW keeps a watchful eye on political issues and will take a position if it feels its interests are involved. In a number of cases, the union has been in- strumental in defeating issues which it felt might place in jeopardy its historic conunitmenti to certain social and economic goals. Moreover, relations between the corporation and the union have been somewhat more amicable recently and this improved rapport allows some problems to be resolved before they evolve into political issues. Today, a repre- sentative from the Industrial Association and a.union official meet periodically to' discuss a wide range of zxflitical iSSues of mutual concern to management and labor. Because of the rather conservative vieWpoint of '%my'llnion members regarding local issues, the union can- ’Jot‘ always support issues at the local' level with the same fen/or that it shows at the national level. Union support ... .a v. .- u . .Iv n... n v-“ cw ‘1‘. CH O.- I. l in. .. I .._: . o 44 of race-advancement.issues appears to be viewed by many UAW members with a great deal of ambivalence.* Government and Politics Durant has a non-partisan, council-manager form of municipal government. Councilmen are elected by wards. Following each election, the council selects one of its members to serve as mayor. The city manager is responsi- ble to the council. His authority is rather limited. The council tends to select local citizens to fill the manager's post rather than professional managers with broad experience in the field. Durant normally turns in democratic majorities for candidates on the state and national tickets. During the; first three decades of this century, the city was a Republi- can stronghold. However, Republican control of the city was shattered in 1932. In that year, for the first time in their history, Durant and Goodrich County returned a nmjority for the Democratic presidential candidate. Four years later, Durant gave FDR a two-to-one majority. Today, the city continues to give solid support to most democrats mathe state and national tickets. Many of Durant's citizens suspect that a power structure made up of R. B. Hobbs, an early automotive Q%Jfie:£333eneur, plus the current top echelon of Universal %k,z7453 ' executives "runs the town." Undoubtedly the i 45 company does become involved in issues that affect corpo- rate interests but it appears that the rather conservative orientation of a majority of the city councilmen makes it unnecessary for economic elites to become deeply involved in local partisan politics. Education The most recent census figures that are available show that the educational median for Durant's citizens is higher than the medians for most comparable industrial communities in the area. Table 9 indicates some of these educational medians. TABLE 9 MEDIAN SCHOOL YEARS COMPLETED BY THOSE TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OLD OR OLDER 1f, Durant Detroit Grand Rapids Lansing Saginaw 1905 10.3 909 " 1006 906 Source: U.S. Census of Population 1970, General Social and Economic Characteristics, pp. 24-180, 245‘ 371, 24-373, 24‘375. The racial distribution of students in the Durant school system is shown in Table 10. The Durant Board of Education is the policy-making body for the Durant school system. Traditionally it has had more elite representation among its membership than II? “we 9». - N. Ii - nun-.Il-“..-.--Iv.luu "nu-AvAv-.v.o.. .v-.-.-nn- .h-z<--I— n.~u-.~. 2- un.-.-.-.- they vahnhuhuvh-Qunuuhfini III .uI'IOQI‘-.. .~<~ HJma woman Add us Pomumeoo mcflmfimu Awmvv womucmonmm peopsum Roman was , CHI-H 0mm .aHan .mHoomom huesdfifiou.pcmuso .udsusov eoflunnfluumflo Hedomm mHoonom oaanom.ucmuso .moa>u0m mcaumma was noncommm .maooaom mpacsafioo Deanna "mousom woe gasp mama. ham.m wm mmo.m . H NNH 1.«.. 0H . Nw.fiwb.m. * v ¢ Andaman swam Hoflsmm mqm.m pm hmm.m m was 4 ma me eeo.w . m m mempm.£mflm Howsob mbmamm mm hmmsva N mmv « mm N¢ womsafl « 0N mv %. N we . N ..... Mm. . . N w M M N .1 m 1.. m m m 1,. m m m a a a e a a a a a a u 1 u 1 u 1 u 1 u 1 4 4 1 4 1 Agzmom zaHozH .2909 @933 532mm qaazmHmo mxofim zaonmzd mqoomom maflmdm,NHmucmEmHm Hhmd mmmzmammm mfloomum,UHAMDm BZdMDQ.QmB 2H qumDm ho ZOHBDmHMBmHQ A.J.,- February 12, 1971. 145 Exactly one month later, the Human Relations Commission was again meeting. Most of the discussion was devoted to the goals of HRC and why it had been in- effective during its eight years of existence. Allan sat quietly for more than an hour as the discussion was taking place, then he said "I don't think I'm a quitter but I've had it about up to here. I've taken abuse. My. life has been threatened. I've had it. I've had enough grief for the rest Of my days. I am herewith resubmitting my resignation. Period, paragraph." The commission adjourned to discuss the resigna- tion in private and then reassembled a few moments later. Allan said that everyone agreed that he would resign as executive director Of HRC. During the course of the meeting Vice-Chairman Marvin Gridley had been critical Of the achievements of HRC. He declared we've done nothing. We're just spinning our wheels and wasting our time.‘ I feel our days are numbered. The city is in a financial bind and they're looking for places to cut. The reason they're considering cutting us is simple. we are not doing anything. It's just a lot of rhetoric. Gridley went On to say "we cannot point to a single thing that we have done to lessen tensions in the community." Some members disagreed. However, the consensus was probably represented by one member who said "HRC can't 146 take all the blame . . ." the framers of the HRC Ordi- nance "didn't want it to be a strong Human Relations Commission."-66 The resignation of Bruce Allan appeared to be the final chapter in the history of the Human Relations Commission. Allan's resignation was brought about by a series of frustrations which he described in an inter- view. Allan was troubled by the fact that it had been impossible to establish separate areas of responsibility for the HRC director and for the HRC Board and also by the fact that he was being criticized by some black leaders for not attacking discrimination in Durant in a more aggressive fashion.67 However, probably the major frustration was the fact that the Human Relations Com- mission was a relatively powerless agency that was not going to effect any meaningful changes in the human re- lations climate in Durant. Black Leaders View the Human Relations aommission Issue-Area In interviews with Durant's black leaders, a number of criticisms of the Human Relations Commission were voiced. Blacks felt that the director, Bruce Allan, was not aggressive enough. Some blacks also criticized 66D.J., March 12, 1971. 67Interview with Bruce Allan, April 13, 1971. 147 Allan for failing to establish good rapport with the black community particularly with ghetto blacks. A black school administrator noted that officials frequently neglected to contact Allan when a crisis seemed to call for his intervention and on at least one occasion he was denied admission to a school with a troubled racial problem. However, most blacks realized that the major problem was- the fact that the ordinance establishing HRC did not pro- vide the commission with the appropriate power or authority. Lacking power resources, the commission was in many cases virtually ignored by other power loci in the community in- cluding the Board of Education and school officials, the City Council, the business community and the police depart- ment. Failure of Black Leaders to Create g Viable Human Relations Commission Blacks in the community once had high hopes that this agency was going to accomplish a great deal. They worked hard to inaugurate the first Human Relations Com- mission; saw it defeated in a referendum election; battled to Obtain a second human relations agency; struggled to see that it had a permanent director and staff; and came to its assistance when it was under attack from outside forces. The roster of those who were involved at some stage in the affairs of the Human Relations Commission 148 reads like a black Who's Who of Durant--Mayor Roger Milton; Commissioners Wilson, Hobart and Tower; City Councilman Tipton; Special Advisor to the governor Gridley; Civil Rights Regional Director Brenton; Clergyman-Asher and Ralston; NAACP Presidents Riggs, Hilton and Marles; Urban League Directors Marsh and Blane; businessmen Faunce and Haines; and civic leader Houston. Probably no issue of concern to black people had seen the involvement of so many black leaders. This is because they had hoped that HRC could effect meaningful changes in the human relations climate of the city. How- ever, after several years of struggle, they realized that the Human Relations Commission was not going to be an effective agency because the larger community was not going to allow it to be one. The Human Relations Commission Ordinance had not given the commission the requisite power to make it effective and the City Council representing the larger community was not prepared to allow it to play a meaningful role in community affairs. The ordinance and the commission were merely symbols of the City Council's acknowledgement of the need to respond to the black com- munity's demand for some action in the human relations area. However, the City Council realized that its response to black demands must not be in the nature of.truly effec- tive action for to do so would provoke the white community. 149 The relevance of conflict theory in examing black power resources in an issue-area of this type is apparent. An examination of conflict situations makes it possible to evaluate the power resources of various loci of power.‘ Using this method, it appears that the business community (represented particularly by the Board of Realtors) and the City Council were both power loci with greater resources than the black community possessed. The major objective in investigating the four desig- nated issue-areas has been to assist us in our analysis of the effectiveness of black leadership. In the case of the Human Relations Commission, we find that black leadership has been relatively ineffective. This ineffectiveness does not result from a lack of leadership skills among black leaders but rather appears to result from the fact that black leaders are leaders without power. They do not have the power-resources that would give them ready access to important centers of decision-making. The story of the Human Relations Commission, then, is the story of the relative powerlessness of black leaders in Durant to make the agency an-effective instrument for social change and human understanding. CHAPTER VIII EDUCATION AND THE BLACK COMMUNITY In a survey of 109 cities Karl and Alma Taeuber found that Durant had the highest index of residential segregation of any city outside of the South.1 This residential segregation has resulted in rather marked racial imbalance in many of the schools. Table 17 shows the black enrollment in the various elementary. schools. Table 17 shows the segregated pattern of elementary education with nine of the forty-three schools having black enrollments of more than 90 percent while eighteen of the schools have black enrollments of 10 percent or less (eleven of these schools have black enrollment of less than 1 percent). 1Karl E. Taeuber and Alma F. Taeuber, Negroes in Cities (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1965), p. 39. 150 151 TABLE 17 BLACK ENROLLMENT IN ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS Black Enrollment Number of (Percent) Schools 100-91 90-81 80-71 70-61 60-51 50-41 40-31 30-21 20-11 10-1 OOHwaowtowxo * [.4 *Eleven schools had black enroll- ments of one percent or less. Source: Durant Community Schools, 22, 212., p. l. A somewhat better racial balance-~as indicated in Tables 18 and 19--is achieved in the junior and senior high schools. However, much remains to be done if the schools are to arrive at a racial balance that is representative of the mix existing in the community. As was noted earlier in Table 10, the black en- rollment remains a constant 42 percent of the total student enrollment at all three educational levels. How- ever, as Table 20 illustrates, the percentage of black teachers most nearly approximates the black student en- rollment in the elementary schools (30%). In junior high schools, the percentage of black teachers falls to 152 25 percent and in senior high schools, it drOps to 15 percent. TABLE 18 BLACK ENROLLMENT IN JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOLS (Percent) School Black Enrollment Polk 88 Adams 76 Jefferson 66 Madison 55 Monroe 27 Jackson 17 Van Buren 14 Harrison 2 Source: Durant Community Schools, 22, cit., p. 2. TABLE 19 BLACK ENROLLMENT IN SENIOR HIGH SCHOOLS IE: (Percent) School Black Enrollment Roosevelt 64 Washington 49 Taft 26 Lincoln 25 Source: Durant Community Schools, 92. cit., p. 2. 153 .wlm .mm ..uflo.ummflsmaoonom huHssEEOU “condo "mousom mwv mm th «.0 N H v mH mm N.o H v mummum swam soaomm mom vb hum o.o v N.o H mN VNH o o m mmmmum swam Howcsb mHOH on NH5 0 o N.o N om mom N.o N mm d .N .d N. d N d .N d N e m a m e m. a m a m 1 1 1 1 1 O a. o a. o o a. O a a e e e e a a a a u 1 u 1 u 1 u 1 u 1 4 4 4 1 1 memsusm smaocH Hobos muflsz smacmmm Hmucmfluo mxomam cMOHHmad maOObom mummumxwwmusmfimam HhmH.mwm2mBmmm mAOOSUm UHAmDm BZdMDQ mma 2H mammvdfia m0 ZOHBDmHMBmHQ AflHUdm ON mamda 154 Faced with the dilemma in attempting to achieve an equitable distribution of its black teachers in its "de facto" segregated elementary School system, the school administration has attempted to solve the problem by placing 39 percent of the black elementary teachers in the nine elementary schools with black enrollments of 91 percent or more; 44 percent of the black teachers in the sixteen schools with black student enrollments in the 11 to 90 percent range and 17 percent of the black teachers in the eighteen schools with black enrollments of 10 per- cent or less. Thus, most of the black teachers are con- centrated in the black schools but there is a sprinkling of black teachers throughout the system. In the junior high schools and senior high schools, where the percentage of black teachers is smaller than in the elementary schools, it appears that it has been easier to achieve a somewhat more equitable balance because the schools themselves have a better student racial balance. This is indicated in Tables 21 and 22. However, even here there are rather marked deficiencies. 155 TABLE 21 BLACK STUDENTS AND TEACHERS IN JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOLS Junior High Black Enrollment Black Teachers School (Percent) (Percent) Polk 88 55 Adams 76 44 Jefferson 66 27 Madison 55 25 Monroe 27 15 Jackson l7 16 Van Buren 14 10 Harrison 2 6 Source: Durant Community Schools, 22. cit., pp. 2,4. TABLE 22 BLACK STUDENTS AND TEACHERS IN SENIOR HIGH SCHOOLS J Senior High Black Enrollment Black Teachers School (Percent) (Percent) Roosevelt 64 19 Washington 49 20 Taft 26 13 Lincoln 25 12 Source: Durant Community Schools, gp. cit., pp. 2,4. 156 Black Criticism of the Durant ScHooI System The educational policies of the Durant Board of Education have been a source of controversy for a number of years. Black spokesmen maintain that the policies supported by the Board of Education are not providing equitable education for black children. Black leaders feel that black children attend schools that for all practical purposes are segregated institutions and that the board is not actively committed to a policy of inte— grated education. Black spokesmen maintain that these segregated schools are not equivalent to schools in white areas in terms of physical conditions or in terms of- levels of instruction. They maintain that school buildings in black areas are older than those serving white areas and are not maintained properly. Classrooms are over- crowded and teachers do not have adequate professional preparation. Those whites who-do teach in these schools, say black leaders, often are prejudiced or at least un- sympathetic to the problems and aspirations of-black students. Counselors tend to view blacks as fitted only fOr vocational courses and discourage black students from enrolling in college preparatory courses. Blacks complain that black teachers are discriminated against when pro- motions are involved. Black spokesmen also feel that the close ties between the Hobbs' Foundation and the Board of 157 Education sometimes are detrimental to the provision Of quality education for black children. Funds are used, they say, for facilities for special educational programs that might better have been devoted to the basic instruc- tional program. Durant Board of Education There is a fairly prevalent feeling in Durant that the Board of Education has long tended to represent "blue stocking" interests. Board members are usually business or professional men or industrial executives. They are normally high status persons who would never consider be- coming involved in local partisan politics but are proud to serve on this prestigous board. For several years, the black community had an effective spokesman on the Durant Board Of Education in the person of black physician, Alexander Waldron. Serving from 1963 to 1966, Waldron aggressively criticized the educational orientation of the board which he felt failed to recognize the special needs Of black children and the severe handicaps that hamper their educational progress. Dr. Waldron, who died quite suddenly in 1966, was succeeded by another black physician, Dr. Kingston who was appointed to fill our Dr. Waldron's term of office. To the chagrin of the black community, Dr. Kingston tends to espouse views that are more in keeping with the 158 traditional philosophy of the Board of Education. He believes his primary Obligation is to represent the entire community and he rarely attempts to act as a special spokes- man for the black community.2 In 1968 the League of Women Voters issued a report summarizing a two-year study of Durant public schools con- ducted by the league. The study which concentrated on the elementary grades made a number of critical comments about the school system. These included: School achievement scores . . . of children in Durant in basic subjects of reading and mathematics is low in comparison with other systems in the nation. Many thousands of children attend schools in Durant under adverse conditions--poorly prepared teaching staff, inadequate program services and antiquated buildings. Many children whose needs for expert teaching are greatest are being taught by the least qualified teachers. In finance drives, the Durant Board of Educa- tion has emphasized economy rather than the needs of children. The report also noted the need to provide the public with more information about programs and finances. This criticism reflected the rather widespread concern among some Durant citizens that the Hobbs' Foundation which sponsors and underwrites many special educational programs is, in effect, running the school system. Therreport noted: 2Interview with Dr. Kingston, March 31, 1971. 159 All monies to which the Durant School District takes title became public monies, no matter from what source they derive. Whether they come from local taxes, state or federal aid or gifts from donors, they must be budgeted, accounted and audited in accordance with comprehensive, consistent procedures. The report also recommended that the board adopt a uniform standard or policy in regard to the disciplining Of children. It summed up its findings by concluding that quality educa- tion was not generally available to Durant students.3 The Board of Education responded to the league report by calling it generally inaccurate and misleading. However, at a panel discussion sponsored by the Durant Federation of Teachers, panelists gave their approval to the report and indicated that their only reservation was that the report didn't go far enough in its criticisms and recommendations. Black leader and panelist, Dr. Albert Rodman, psychology professor at the community college compli- mented the League of Women Voters saying "you had the nerve to stand up and say that something is stinking in Denmark." Rev. John Koeniger Of the Unitarian Church said that he felt the present school board could not provide the requi- site leadership. He-noted that the board was not really representative of all segments in the community since it was made up of professional and managerial people whov 3League of Women Voters. Study of Durant Public Schools (Durant, League of Women Voters, 1968), pp. 8, 9, 16' I3, 140 160 were conservative and had a "vested interest in the status quo."4 Black Protest Action Following the assassination of Martin Luther King, black leaders and the black community began to react in a more aggressive fashion in their criticisms of problem areas. In education, Durant's black leaders asked that immediate attention be given to critical areas with particu- lar emphasis on increasing the number of black supervisors and counselors in the school system. This new aggressive- ness was also manifested in a number of other ways. White students enrolled in mixed schools complained that they were being harassed by black students.5 Several major outbreaks of violence requiring the assistance of the police depart- ment occurred in the schools. Washington High was closed and tear gas was required to break up a disturbance at Roosevelt High School. Reacting to the violence, a group of conservative white parents presented school Officials with a series of demands related to discipline and pro- motional policies that was in essence an indictment of the black community.6 4D.J., October 11, 1968. 5D.J., February 6, 7, 1968. 6D.J., April 5, 8, 1968. 161 The disturbances had hardly been settled at Washington and Roosevelt when they broke out at Taft High School and law enforcement officials and a black minister were called in. The minister succeeded in getting the black students to return to class.7 Criticism of the Durant school administration became more widespread. Black critics were joined by whites who protested against the alleged lack of order in the schools. Dr. Evans, superin- tendant of schools, responded by saying that he intended to maintain order but added: "Society cannot pass on to the schools all of the problems of society."8 A few weeks after these outbreaks, the second annual Community Relations Institute Sponsored by the Hobbs' Foundation was held. The program featured a number of dis- cussion groups in which ghetto blacks participated. Once again blacks reiterated their criticisms regarding the lack of adequate counseling for black youths in the school system and stressed the need for specialized training programs for the student not planning to attend college. Blacks also expressed the need in schools for discussions devoted to interracial problem areas. The following year, on the first anniversary of the King assassination, trouble broke out again in Durant's 7D.J., April 25, 1968. 8D.J.,April 25, 1968. 162 schools. Police used tear gas to break up groups of students in areas adjacent to Roosevelt High and parents were called to proctor the halls at Roosevelt and Washing- ton.9 Later in the month, trouble developed at Taft High. Black student demands included more black counselors; more black history books; an end to police intervention in school disturbances; and equal disciplinary treatment of black and white students.10 During this period the state Civil Rights Commis- sion heard a series of complaints from the Lancer Club, a group of young activists, dedicated to improving the conditions of the black man in Durant. In discussing education, the Lancers complained that the textbooks used in the Durant schools did not prOperly represent the black man's-role in history. They also noted that black students were more apt to be punished for misconduct than were white students. Club spokesmen also complained that school counselors "deliberately steer Negro youths away from college preparatory courses and discourage them from taking those courses which would challenge them to develop their minds."11 9D.J., April 3, 4, 5, 1969. loD.J., April 23, 1969. llD.J., March 17, 1968. 163 The director of the Durant Office of the state Civil Rights Commission, Mrs. Kay Brenton, spoke at a public forum shortly after this regarding problems in the black community. She noted that because of dg_fggtg segregation most black students and teachers were con- centrated in eleven schools. She pointed out that a number of these schools were not in good physical condition. She reiterated the complaint that there were few black admin- istrators and counselors in the school system. Mrs. Brenton also noted that black students maintained that they were steered into the "general course" rather than into the college preparatory.course. She said that the "general course" did not even adequately prepare a student for apprenticeship programs in the skilled trades. She also noted that students complained about discipline in the schools, maintaining that it was based on white, middle- class standards and values.12 In 1969, Black students at Durant Junior College demanded that_more black students be given positions on the school newspaper; that more black history courses be offered; and that more black instructors and counselors be appointed. There were also complaints that there were not enough blacks in the college choir and that not enough blacks were chosen as choir soloists. Apparently feeling 129.J., April 30, 1968. 164 that their demands were not receiving an adequate hearing from the college administration, a group of about forty students from the college "Black Union" ravaged Durant's Art Center where they destroyed furnishings and art objects valued at $4,000.- It appeared that the Art Center was selected because there had been a conflict withe the Fine Arts Department over the content of some courses. The students were later apprehended, tried and fined.13 In 1969, at a forum held under the auspices of a black church, a black teacher told the audience: "Feel free to go into the schools. You're paying for them."- He told parents that they should make certain that black children who were capable of taking college preparatory work were enrolled in the appropriate courses. He also criticized the placement tests used in the school system noting that these utilized materials that were more familiar to the middle-class, white child than to the ghetto, black child.14 In October;.l969, the members of the Durant Board of Education were offended when the Durant Journal, long considered by many to be the spokesman for business and industrial interests in the community, published an edi- torial calling on the Board of Education to open its_ 13211;! May 2, 1969; January 10, March 3, 1971. 14D.J.,..August 25, 1959. 165 private discussion meetings to the public. The editorial noted: "Under the board's present system the public is justified if it concludes that what it's permitted to see at regular board meetings is for the most part mere rubber- stamping of policies forged in private." In reference to the board's response to the League of Women Voter's study Of education, the editorial noted: It is rather ironic that the board dis- cussed its reply to the League of Women Voters in a private meeting. Rather than face-to-face discussion, the board put to- gether a position justifying the present system and dispatched it via the U.S. mail. The editorial concluded: Refusal by a school board to permit the public to hear its dialogue is, in fact, fostering public ignorance, which results in suspicion and misunderstanding. And promoting ignorance is hardly a laudable goal of any educational endeavor.15 Renewed School Disturbances Starting in November, 1970, a series of disruptions took place at Lincoln High School culminating on November 24 in a number Of skirmishes between groups of black and white students.16 The public, the press, students and school Officials were all alarmed at the violence. It was con- sidered to be the worst disruption in the history of the Durant school system. 15D.J., October 11, 1969. 16D.J., November 25, 1970. 166 Black students had been complaining for some time about the school. They were concerned about the lack of black-related materials in the instructional program but their major complaint was in regard to the hostility they felt was manifested toward blacks by both white teachers and white students. Following the incidents that occurred on November 24th, police were assigned to the school but there was no further violence and the school recessed for the Thanks- giving break. When Lincoln High reopened on November 30th, strict security measures were in force and remained in force until December 18th. Black councilmen complained about the use of police in the disturbance at Lincoln. Councilman Bill Eaton main- tained that the Board of Education was responsible for creating the problems in the schools and that when these problems got out of hand and erupted into violence, the board abrogated its responsibilities and called the Durant police. Eaton complained that the police were acting as a kind of gestapo for the school administration and he asked the council to undertake an investigation of school problems. Black Councilman Floyd Tipton echoed these senti- ments. Tipton said the police shOuld be called to "quell the violence" but that they should not be used to patrol the schools. This he felt should be done by parents. Tipton noted that the administration had forbidden parents 167 to enter the school building. "I think this is totally wrong," he said. Any time the parents are willing to volunteer to come into the schools, they should be wel- come. It is their school, the administration is paid by their tax dollars, and most impor- tant, these are their young people in the schools that are creating the disturbance.17 However, on December 17th, approximately one hundred Durant police Officers arrived at Lincoln and were deployed in every classroom where they proceeded to search the students. Twenty black students who were con- sidered to be ring-leaders were served with subpoenas to appear before a citizens grand jury. Black students main- tained that the search procedure had been directed pri- marily at-them.18 Civil Rights Commission -_ Investigation A black mother had requested assistance in the school controversy from the state Civil Rights Commission and the commission during December and January conducted a series of meetings and interviews at Lincoln. The report, of the Civil Rights Commission aroused a good deal of con- troversy when it was released. It began by pointing out that much of the racial friction and antipathy was based l7D.J., December 1, 1970. 18D.J., December 18, 1970. 168 on the fact that "polarization on the basis Of race exists within the student and adult community of Lincoln Community High School."19 The report noted that there was little interaction or communication between white and black students. White students, parents and teachers blamed black students for being the physical aggressors in inci— dents between blacks and whites. Black students felt that both white teachers and white students were increasingly hostile toward them. The parents and students of both races felt that discipline was a major problem. White students felt that school officials were afraid to punish black students. Black students felt that they are more severely punished than white students for similar infrac- tions. The report recommended greater student participa- tion in locating problem areas and recommending solutions. It also recommended student dialogue and seminar sessions to increase understanding and awareness between black and white students. The report recommended that teachers with skills and sensitivity in human relations be hired to teach at Lincoln. In addition, it recommended that in- service programs directed at increasing racial understand- ing be undertaken and it called on the Durant school system 19Civil Rights Commission, Durant Lincoln Community Hi h School: A Report of Fact FindingZCiviI Rights Com- m1ss1on, I971), p. 14. 169 to annunciate its expectation that teachers maintain a professional and unbiased attitude in all their relation- ships with parents and children. The report recommended increased parental involvement in the operation Of the schools. It criticized the disciplinary policy of the schools and recommended a parent or parent-student review board. The Durant Board of Education maintained an am- bivalent attitude toward the report. Mr. Don Klinger, president of the board, admitted that there were problems at Lincoln High School but maintained that the report had errored in some of its conclusions.20 The principal of Lincoln, noting the criticism leveled at his administra- tion for not fostering communications between blacks and whites, maintained that dialogue groups had been formed in the past but had dissolved because of lack of interest and participation. However, the report met with the approval Of the executive director of the Urban League, Martin Brown, who said: "The criticisms just enforce what we and some. other community groups have been saying all along."~ Mrs. Mary Digby, Durant realtor and president of the con- servative "Save Our Schools" (SOS) group called the report "unfair, biased and racially bigoted."21 2°D.J.,January 28, 1971. 21D.J., January 27, 1971. 170 Mrs. Digby's group of conservative whites had sent a-telegram to the governor earlier in the month asking him to guarantee Lincoln High parents "the right to send children to school for an education and not have their lives and safety threatened." The governor replied that he felt these situations were best handled at-a local level and that he had been informed that the community and the school system were addressing themselves to the problem. Mrs. Digby characterized the governor's answer as "in the "22 The SOS dispatched a usual manner of a politician. second telegram to the governor which said in part "while subversive groups play at revolution, we, the peOple, are the victims! Must every generation of students be sacri- ficed while elected officials appease, and politicians dance to the tune of a few more votes?"23 Lincoln High Human Relations COmmission Controversy In January, it was prOposed that a school Human Relations Commission with black and white parents as par- ticipants should be formed. The selection of the black participants for this commission resulted in a great deal of controversy. A meeting was called for the purpose of electing representatives. At the meeting, black parents 22D.J., January 11, 1971. 23D.J., January 27, 1971. 171 asked school representatives to grant to the new Human Relations Commission the authority to review school ad- ministrative decisions at Lincoln High. When this request was rejected, many blacks left the meeting. Black leaders said that there had been a prior agreement among blacks to stage a walk-out if their demands were not met. However, some blacks who-did not know about the projected walk-out remained and elected a slate of representatives to the Human Relations Commission.* Black leaders con- sidered this to be a-"OOp out" and refused to recognize these delegates as the legitimate_representatives of black parents. They called a meeting at which a new slate of officers for the school's Human Relations Commission was elected. Those blacks who had been elected at the earlier meeting and who were not sanctioned by the black community were barred from this meeting. A petition calling for the removal of the top administrative leaders at Lincoln High was also drafted by the seven hundred parents in attendance at this meeting who styled themselves as "Black Students and Parents for Justice in Our Public Schools." James Homes of the NAACP and Martin Brown of the Urban League indicated that they supported these demands.24 That the issue was tending to polarize the com- munity was indicated by the fact that only one caucasion, fl 24D.J., November 25, 1970. 172 Elwood Carson, of the Urban League was allowed to attend the meeting of black parents. Polarization was also in- dicated by the fact that the next meeting of the Durant Board of Education was attended by a large group of white parents in a gesture Of support for the board's policies. At this meeting, the board was presented with a petition signed by 1,800 persons indicating support of the school administration at Lincoln High.25 White parents who might have been expected to show some sympathy for the black position began to assume a more rigid stance. Thus, the chairman of the Durant Human Relations Commission who was the parent of a child attend- ing Lincoln complained about "outside agitation" that was being used to "stir up" black parents.26 This reference by whites to "outside agitators" occurred so often that the Urban League saw fit to respond in the following way: It is inaccurate for school Officials to refer to Urban League staff members as outsiders. When they are working at the request of involved community members, they are anything but outsiders. It is believed that black students were facing subtle and Open racism on the part of white students and administration. Past ex- perience with similar situations has shown that the administration approach resulted 25D.J., December 3, 1970. 26D.J., November 29, 1970. 173 in little change in the sources of problems-- they only relieved symptoms. The Urban League official went on to point out that in this case the Urban League was only following out the mandate of its national organization--to work for insti- tutional change where equal opportunity did not exist. At first, school Officials refused to recognize the new slate of black representatives. Negotiations dragged on between school Officials and leaders of the black community regarding which set of black delegates was to serve as representatives of the black community on the Lincoln High Human Relations Commission. At a meeting of blacks, called to discuss the situation, black students upbraided their parents for not being more aggressive in their dealings with school Officials. They accused their ' One student leader parents of "selling out to the man.‘ in an_impassioned speech said "students are ready to go back to that_school and fight [and] die if conditions don't change."28 Other student speakers echoed these sentiments and received prolonged applause from the student segment of the audience. However, school administrative officials finally agreed to hold another election for black representatives 27D.J., November 29, 1970. 28D.J., December 4, 1970. 174 and an almost completely new slate of delegates, more activist in sentiment, was selected.29 Continuing BlackCriticism 3f_E3ucationa1 Policies That there was still much unhappiness about school policies was indicated in March when Richard Cranston of the "Citizens Coalition for Quality Education" asked State Representative Wilson Robertson to include Durant in his proposed investigation of urban education. Cranston noted that two studies, one by the League of Women Voters and one by the state Civil Rights Commission, had been critical of the Durant school system. But, said Cranston, "we want a legislative investigation because they (school officials) have laughed off the leaguer-they can say they're just a bunch of idle women; and people believe the CRC always favors blacks anyway. They won't be able to dismiss the legislature in the same way." Representative Robertson replied to the request by indicating that he was sym- pathetic to Durant's problems but felt that broadening the scope of his investigation would diminish its effec- tiveness.30 29D.J., February 1, 1971. 3°D.J., March 30, 1971. 175 With the election to the board in April 1971 of 31 who was a forthright critic of Mrs. Virginia Houston, the board and who had served as president of the League of WOmen Voters when its critical study had been under- taken, it appeared that blacks might be able to hope for more vocal representation, if not for more constructive action regarding educational problems of concern to the black community. Black Leaders View the Issue-Area of Education Black leaders when interviewed mentioned a number Of deficiencies in the school system which they felt affected the performance of black students. It was noted that simply hiring more black teachers for the system was not necessarily a progressive step if the black teachers had not received adequate training. A related complaint was that the school administration refused to provide in- formation on teacher's qualifications. It was said that the school programs were good in some areas--adult education--but deficient in other areas-- basic instructional program in the elementary grades. There were complaints that white teachers in predominently black schools made no attempt to know or understand the 31D.J., April 6, 1971. 176 black subculture and therefore had great difficulty relating to black students. Blacks believe that the Durant Board of Education represents the "white establishment." It was noted that the board arrives at decisions in closed meetings and then reaffirms these decisions in their public meetings. Blacks maintain that in order to secure "safe" candidates for the board, outgoing board members resign before their term expires and handpicked successors are appointed by the board to fill the unexpired term. The new appointee then runs for office at the next election as an experienced incumbent. Blacks also feel that elections for the school board are intentionally held at special elections that will attract little voter interest or concern. Blacks say that the black member of the board does not work aggressively enough to promote better education for black children. Some blacks feel his candidacy was promoted by the "white establishment" because he was expected to assume a com- placent role. Blacks are critical of the close ties be- tween the Board Of Education and the Hobbs' Foundation and some believe that the foundation is in effect running the educational program in Durant. As-an indication of the power of the school board, it was noted that no business concern would underwrite the report of the League of Women Voters that was critical of the school system although 177 such funding is frequently done in many communities as a public relations gesture. Blacks maintain that few black teachers are pro- moted to supervisory positions that carry real decision- making reSponsibility. They complain that white counselors tend to channel blacks away from college preparatory courses and into general courses that do not even prepare students for the apprenticeship programs in the skilled trades. Black leaders also complain about school discipline which they believe is enforced more vigorously against black students than against white students. Black leaders are critical of some black employees of the Board of Education for not being more militant in: protesting inadequacies that affect.blacks. However, not all blacks employed by the school system are apologists for the system. Although they tend to be less critical of the education system than many other blacks, they~recog- nize that there are deficiencies. Black apologists for the system believe that at least some of the black criti- cisms are unfair. They maintain that inadequately pre- pared teachers are being eliminated (in this regard they point out that school administrators are criticized by. black leaders for hiring inadequately prepared black teachers but that when these teachers are released the action may activate black protest organizations). Apolo- gists note that effective integration of the school system 178 is hampered by the constantly shifting character of the pOpulation in a number of the neighborhoods. To those who criticize the moderate attitude of the black member, of the school board, his rejoinder is that he believes he must establish his status as a responsible representa- tive of the entire community before he can serve as a successful pleader for black needs. The black community because of its major power resource--the black vote-~may_possess some power potential for affecting decision-making in this issue-area. It is entirely conceivable that in the future the black community in combination with other power loci—-perhaps the UAW, the Democraticharty, the Durant Federation of Teachers or the Durant churches--may be able to muster enough strength to effect the changes it desires. To do so would probably necessitate doing a more effective job in mobilizing the black voter to turn out for the special Board of Education elections. The voter turnout in support of Mrs. Virginia Houston--a.black critic of school board policies who re- ceived more votes in a recent election than any other candidate--indicates that such voter support can be acti- vated. Limited Success in Implementing BIack Goals However, the achievements of black leaders in the issue-area of education appear to have been limited. 179 Blacks have been unsuccessful in implementing many of their goals that relate to upgrading the instructional programs and improving the physical facilities that serve predomi- nently black schools. Nor does it appear that either the school board or the school administration is particularly receptive to suggestions for change that originate in the black community. While school administrative Officials point to the increasing percentage of black teachers in the system, there are still relatively few blacks holding responsible positions. In this issue-area, as in the issue-area of human relations, black leadership has been largely powerless to effect significant changes. Black leaders appear to lack the power that would provide access to importance centers Of decision-making. CHAPTER IX POLICE-BLACK COMMUNITY RELATIONS The area of police-black community relations is one that is of constant concern to the leaders of the black community in Durant. Black citizens feel that they are frequently subjected to rude and abusive behavior on the part of the police and that they are on occasion treated in a brutal fashion. They complain that they are harassed by police when police surveillance is not re- quired while they Often find it difficult to obtain police assistance when there is a real emergency. The black Com- munity maintains that it is virtually unrepresented on the police force. There are only a handful of black Officers on the force due to the fact, say black leaders, that black.officers find it virtually impossible to earn promotions. Earl History of BIacK Complaints Complaints of police brutality were fairly frequent during the late fifties and early sixties and the white commissioner of the predominently black third ward, 180 181 George Hamilton, noted that he had been protesting about these incidents since 1950 "but somehow the complaints get lost in the shuffle."1 In October,-l958, after a young girl had been brutally beaten by police, blacks began to picket the city hall.2 A committee was appointed by the Durant City Commission to investigate the matter but_exonerated the police department. Commissioner Hamilton proposed that a lay committee be established to hear citizen complaints but this proposal was voted down.3 In 1959 the third ward elected Roger Milton, the first black man to serve on the City Commission, as its representative. Milton a relatively mild-mannered man soon found himself making frequent complaints about the over- zealous activity of police Officers.4 Officers of the NAACP were also lodging frequent complaints about police brutality in the early sixties. Robert Terhune, president Of the NAACP, urged that Durant policemen receive training in human relations. He said that the police department has asked for "more cooperation from the Negro community" but noted that policemen "dis- play blatant discourtesy when answering complaints made by 1D.J., September 23, 1958. 2D.J., September 23, 1958. 3D.J., October 7, 21, 1958. 4D.J., December 29, 1959; January 5, 12, 1960. 182 Negroes." He said that he was not condemning the entire police force but the department "has evidently attracted some sick or ignorant types." He asked that the ”un- desireables" be "purged." Terhune said that if the in- fluential citizens were unable to stop police brutality it would be necessary to take corrective action. He said: "If . . . the citizenry of Durant wishes the stigma of open protests, demonstrations, picketing and boycotting in order that all its citizens may realize their constitu- tional rights, then this organization stands ready to spearhead them."5 Howard Hobart of the NAACP also lodged a complaint saying "as Negroes, we are beginning to wonder if we need protection from the people who are hired to protect us."6 Efforts to Improye Police- BIacE Community Relations During the middle sixties law enforcement officials, particularly County Prosecutor Larson, made attempts to improve relations between the police and the black com- munity. A meeting of black clergymen and law officials was held and Larson called for improved communications between the two groups. Larson noted the need to 5D.J., June 7, 1963. 6D.J., December 10, 1963. 183 investigate individual charges Of police brutality with- out delay so that resentment and ill will would not fester and grow.7 During this period, the Urban League was granted permission to Offer a program on human relations to Durant police officers and biracial conferences between black leaders and police officials were initiated. The director of the Urban League indicated that he felt that these positive steps might improve relations between the police and the black community.8 A new police chief, Lawrence Roberts, was appointed and seemed genuinely concerned about black rights. Blacks came to recognize that he had some sympathy for their problems but felt that he was constrained from taking af- firmative action by the prevalence of bigotry among his subordinates and among his superiors. Chief Roberts admitted that there was a need for more black policemen on the force and indicated that he would try to recruit black Officers. At one time, there had been twelve black patrolmen on the force but having encountered difficulty in achieving promotions, they ac- cepted positions as plant protection officers when Uni- versal Motors opened up this area to blacks.9 8D.J., January 3, 1965. 9D.J., April 8, 1965. 184 Although some whites in Durant during the middle sixties were becoming more sympathetic to black complaints 'about police harassment this did not appear to include Durant's first citizen, R. S. Hobbs. Mr. Hobbs, in an interview said that he felt allegations of police brutality were "a lot of baloney." He said "police have to arrest some tough actors who want to get into fights and Officers often risk their lives . . . Police don't go out to beat up somebody."lo Civil Disturbances In July 1967, a series of disorders broke out in the predominently black near north side of Durant. Gangs of black youths roamed the streets taunting whites, break- ing windows and looting stores. The Durant Fire Department answered forty fire alarms--fourteen of them in connection with fire bombing. During the course of the rioting, police arrested scores of young blacks. Black Mayor Roger Milton had been warned that there might be trouble and had scheduled a meeting with other black leaders. However, the disturbances broke out while the meeting was still in pro- gress.11 10D.J., February 15, 1966. llD.J., July 25, 1967. 185 Milton, along with other black leaders, went into the streets to assist the police in quelling the disturb- ances. Milton confronted some of the groups and was said to have taken part in several arrests and in a number of cases talked groups into dispersing. Shortly before dawn he asked the governor to declare a state of emergency in Durant.12 Milton later complimented the police for the able way in which they performed. He said that he felt the disturbances were the manifestation of petty lawlessness but were also a manifestation of the anger at the city's "power structure" and its lack of accomplishment in dealing with the problems of the city. In particular he noted the lack of recreational facilities, jobs for young people and decent housing.13 Bill Newton, president of the activist Lancer Club, was more critical of the police. Newton, who Often served as a kind of spokesman for ghetto youths, maintained that over-reaction by police to some youthful exuberance had probably precipitated the riot. Newton and the young men who were in his group also expressed anger at the leaders of black organizations and at the white community for failing to assist young blacks who were experiencing 12D.J., July 25, 1967. 13D.J., July 25, 1967. 186 difficulty in finding jobs. One member of Newton's group said "these so-called leaders don't know whats going on. They never-come down here. Our people want jobs. My three brothers have looked everywhere for work but they, can't get a job."14 A young black reporter, who was the son of a community leader, also commented on the hostility that ghetto blacks exhibited during the crisis toward middle-class blacks. Attempts at Arbitration On the afternoon following the disturbances, a series of meetings were held. Attending the first meeting were city officials, community leaders and a large group of black youths. At this meeting it was prOposed that the city release the black youths who had been arrested as a result of the previous night's rioting. Prosecuting Attorney Larson, at first refused but after some thought decided to do so, provided the young men agreed to go back in the streets and advise other blacks to "cool it." Larson knew that the agreement was risky but his faith was justified when the one hundred and two young men who were released did as they had promised. They went to potential trouble spots and calmed people down; they traveled in sound trucks requesting everyone to "cool it;" and some l4D.J., July 26, 1967. 187 appeared with adults on radio and television programs and requested young people to COOperate with the authori- ties. The calculated risk Of releasing the prisoners worked because on subsequent evenings there was much less activity and although further arrests were made none of the original group Of prisoners were caught breaking the law. Larson said that he believed he could trust the integrity of the black youths if he gave them a chance. .However, he told them that it was a "one-shot deal." If they were caught violating the law again, they would be subjected to the full weight Of the law. Larson believed that.his decision not only saved the city from further violence but that it "built a bridge" across the gap be- tween the black community and the police. He said "we showed the Negro . . . that the law isn't only "Whitey's' law, but is everyone's law--and that it does have compas- sion."* Larson believed that the agreement solved more than the "immediate problem of protecting lives and property." "Through it we sought to establish something permanent in order that the Negro could trust us and have confidence in us so that when we say to him in the future that this is the way the law is, he knows it applies equally to him as well as to anyone else." They will know, Larson said, that the law is not only "Whitey's way of doing things."15 15D.J., August 1, 1967. 188 There was a good deal of criticism of Larson's decision to release the prisoners. "Issuing an invitation to engage in lawlessness" was the way-some described it.16 However after summarizing the pros and cons of the decision to release the prisoners the Durant Journal concluded 0 "there is no argument that Durant rests easier than it did last week, and Durant also rests easier than Detroit."17 Following the meeting between Larson and black youths a_second meeting Was held which included leaders of the black and white communities. John Marsh of the Urban League listed the problem areas that were irritating the city's black residents. He concluded by saying "we don't want to threaten but the time is growing short." He then asked for a commitment. to action from civic leaders. Much of the discussion centered on the lack of jobs for young blacks and a commitment.‘was Obtained from Universal Motors' executives and Hobbs Foundation executives to pro- vide additional jobs. Congressman Reigle who attended the meeting called on local business and industrial leaders to find additional jobs for black youths. Reigle said that Durant was "on the verge of an explosive situation" and 16D.J., July 27, 1967. l7D.J., August 1, 1967. 189 that it would be necessary to spend both time and money to correct abuses and "head off a worse situation."18 There soon was evidence that at least some com- munity leaders in Durant were sincere in their Offers to provide jobs for young blacks for approximately one hundred job Offers were received during the next few days.19 On the thirty-first of July, the governor cancelled the "State of Emergency" he had declared at the request of 20 The story of the Durant riot was closed. Mayor Milton. The community had been shocked into an awareness of the discontent felt by many of its blacks and there had been some attempts to alleviate some of the conditions. Un- fortunately, the concessions made by the white community were not fundamental enough to alleviate the basic problem. Continuin Black Criticism of the POIlce Department In 1968, representatives of the state Civil Rights Commission spent several hours with the youthful activists of the Lancer Club. Club members were critical of the "establishment" in Durant and indicated that they included black leaders in their indictment. The young men criti- cized almost every segment of the community including the 18D.J., July 26, 1967. 19D.J., July 29, 1967. 20D.J., July 31, 1967. 190 news media, clergy, established Negro groups and even Negro Mayor Roger Milton. The Durant Police Department received particular attention. Robert Parsons, club president, said that Police Chief Lawrence Roberts, is a good man and is really trying to do the right thing. But he hasn't been able to get the message across to the cop on the beat, and that can mean trouble. We don't intend to start any trouble and I don't think any other Negroes want to start any trouble. But if a single spark is set Off by overly-aggressive police action, trouble could come, and once it came it wouldn't end.21 In April 1968, stirred by the death of Martin Luther King, Albert Hilton president of the NAACP, backed by a number of leaders of civil rights organizations pre- sented a series Of demands at a press conference. Two of the demands related to police-black community relations. These were (1) "establishment of a civilian review board for the police department" or the "creation of the post of civilian commissioner of police," (2) "promotion of- Negroes in all phases of police work, including immediate appointment of Negroes as detectives." Hilton explained the demands by saying, "we are trying to direct grief into constructive channels rather than in sporadic mis- behavior in the streets."22 21D.J., March 17, 1968. 22D.J., April 6, 1968. 191 The Durant Police Department began to initiate some programs to promote greater-rapport with the black community but there were still complaints of police brutality and in June, 1968, the NAACP was given permission to station observers in police headquarters on weekends. The program was initiated by the NAACP but about twenty- five Durant clergymen later joined the program and the NAACP dropped out. The observers jotted down information as each prisoner arrived including the time of arrival, condition and conduct of prisoners and force used by the police. The effectiveness of the program was attested to by the fact that there was a marked decline during this period of complaints of police brutality.23 The Wallace Rally A rather unpleasant situation developed during the 1968 political campaign when presidential aspirant George Wallace visited Durant. The Wallace rally was picketed by blacks and a confrontation of sorts took place between the Durant police--a number of whom had shown some sympathy with Wallace's candidacy--and some black youngsters. Eight black youths were picked up by the police including Marvin Milton, the fifteen year old son of the mayor. Blacks claimed that police treated several of the youngsters in 23D.J., July 4; October 27, 1968. 192 brutal fashion and maintained that at least some of those who were arrested were not guilty of any illegal activity. The youths were not charged and were released in the custody of their.parents. Following the incident at the rally, the Greater Durant Committee on Freedom and Law Enforcementé-an.organization created to strengthen under- standing and rapport between law enforcement authorities and the black community--met with Police Chief Roberts and asked for an investigation of police conduct and that members of the committee be allowed to participate as Observers. Rev. Robinson, one of the committee, said: Chief Roberts was sympathetic to our request but said that it would have to be cleared with the City Manager. Klein (the City Manager) said he would consider the matter but informed us two days later that he would not permit an investigation of the type we requested. This refusal brought forth the resignations of seven of the committee including the heads of the Urban League, NAACP and the regional office of the state Civil Rights Commission leaving only law enforcement officials, the superintendent of schools and the executive director of the Human Relations Commission on the committee. Spokes- man for those who resigned said "we believe we have been put in the position of being used as patsies by the police department." Those resigning did not blame Chief Roberts. They noted that Roberts "is one of the best police chiefs in the county and is sympathetic to our view of the 193 problem. But he is a prisoner of the system and can't do things without clearing them with the city manager."24 Mrs. Kay Brenton, director of the Durant Office of the state Civil Rights Commission, said that the com- mittee had the potential to improve relations between law enforcement Officials and citizens of the community.’ "But to realize that potential it was essential that there be good faith on both sides of the table. Many of us do not believe we have always seen good faith from officials." She went on to say that there "must be effective machinery for Objective investigations of citizen complaints."25 An additional dimension to the controversy occurred when Mayor Milton, through his attorney, requested that the policeman who had arrested his son be required to take a lie detector test. However, City Manager Klein, rejected the request.26 Shortly after this, Milton revealed that he did not intend to run for a second term as mayor but would seek his sixth term as a city commissioner. The mayor conceded that the arrests at theWallace rally, including that of his son, had produced some Opposition to his candidacy. He 24D.J., October 10, 1968. 25D.J., October 11, 1968. 26D.J., October 11, 1968. 194 noted that some other candidates for public Office had 27 not to support him. "felt under pressure" The Durant Journal had been critical of what it termed the "protective parent" reaction of Milton but in an editorial the paper called on him to reconsider his decision not to run for the office of mayor again. The Journal noted that Milton "holding office through a period of civil disorder and racial strife without precedent in U.S. history . . .-was a conscious and noticeable force for rapprochement between the races," and that "he had won respect for his representation of his city."28 In this controversy, black leaders appeared to be able to muster little support for their position. The resignations of black leaders from the committee had little or no impact and the black mayor's position on the issue made him so politically vulnerable that he decided not to run for office-again. It was clear that blacks without support from other loci of power had in this situation only limited power resources. NAACP Dinner Shortly after this, Rev. James Groppi,.white, militant, civil rights priest spoke at the fiftieth anni- versary dinner of the Durant NAACP. Before beginning his 27Detroit Free Press, October 14, 1968. 28D.J., October 15, 1968. 195 speech, Father Groppi asked: "Is it true the intelligence department of the police is here?" Three men who were setting at a table in the center of the room said "yes." "Why are you here? Do you represent the police department?" Father GrOppi asked. One answered emphatically "no!" The Officer went on to say that they were interested in what Father Groppi had to say. Father GrOppi noted that the policemen had taken down the names of all those who had been introduced during the dinner and he asked the policemen to leave. When they didn't do so, he said "I refuse to continue_until the police department leaves." The three policemen got up and left.- The black audience stood up and applauded. Father GrOppi then went on to attack the courts, merchants who cheat blacks, the educa- tional system, the country's-power structure and the churches. At the end of his talk, Father GrOppi received 29 Black leaders maintain that a second standing ovation. the type of over-zealous police surveillance evidenced in this incident occurs frequently in Durant and they view its occurrence with great resentment. Continuing Black Complaints O PO 1ce Brutality Late in 1968, a meeting devoted to police-community relations was held in a Durant church. Lieutenant Brinton 29D.J., October 21, 1968. 196 of the Durant Police Department who was in charge of community relations said: "Of course there's some police brutality but basically we have a good police department." However, Albert Hilton of the NAACP described a number of instances of flagrant brutality and Brinton agreed that "it does.happen" and that it is often directed at black people.30 There was also evidence that, despite the good intentions of police administrators, incidents of police brutality were continuing to occur for there were frequent complaints including several from prominent people who had witnessed such incidents. Dick Malone, a special education teacher told the City Commission that he saw the police repeatedly strike a prisoner who was making no attempt to resist. Malone said that when he asked for the policeman's badge number from another officer, he was threatened with arrest and a beating. Malone said that it was almost im- possible to follow the procedures set up for lodging a complaint and when he insisted on action, the police furnished a report of the incident which was filled with half-truths. Regarding the report, he said, "it was so outrageous that I seriously wonder if the police can con- duct an internal investigation."31 30D.J., December 9, 1968. 31D.J., August 12, 1969. 197 In spite of the apparent goodwill of some police administrators it did appear that the procedures for registering complaints were unsatisfactory. Some blacks maintained that the chief of police was, in fact, a cap- tive of the system and was unable to initiate changes because of the intransigence of the City Commission and because of resistence within the police department itself. Selection of Vice Squad Head In August, 1969, Chief Roberts complained that he was not consulted when the new head of the vice squad was appointed. It was said that black commissioners had exerted pressure on the city manager to have a specific officer selected. There were protests from other commis- sioners and by the Durant Journal that these black com- missioners were interfering in administrative matters. Black Commissioner Tipton said that he had never ordered the city manager to accept his proposed candidate and would have dropped the matter if the manager had objected.. He added that he saw nothing wrong in discussing personnel with the city manager. Tipton who had been critical Of the police department's failure to crack down on prosti- tution in his ward noted with approval that since the new supervisor had been appointed there had been more frequent arrests for vice and not a single complaint of police 198 brutality.32 In this situation it appeared that black commissioners had been able to exert pressure on the administrative officers of the city. The democratic_ process had, in this case, provided blacks with the power to effect at least some minor changes in the police de- partment. Ombudsman Appointed A few days later, at a City Commission meeting, City Manager Klein proposed that the city provided an ombudsman. The black community had long been critical of the fact that there were no adequate procedures for filing complaints about police irregularities. Guide- lines for handling these types of complaints had been developed in 1968 but blacks complained that they were a well kept secret. Klein had at one time resisted the suggestion to create an ombudsman. He had admitted that "the reaction of the department to complaints could be improved" but felt "that a large number of complaints are not well founded."33 In order to reach an acceptable compromise be- tween civil rights groups and the police department it was decided that the ombudsman should be a black police 32%: April 15; August 12, 1969. 33D.J., August 19, 1969. 199 Officer. Black City Commissioner Tipton complimented Klein on his plan and indicated that he felt it was "a step in the right direction." Klein, who was usually a rather-staunch defender Of the police department admitted that some Durant police Officers appeared to have "anti- social tendencies." Tipton went a step further saying "certain officers are trying their utmost to agitate other people into starting a riot."34 A black patrolman, Robert Darden, was appointed as ombudsman. However, the appointment greeted with approval by black leaders and the black community was largely unproductive. Although complaints were filed with the ombudsman and were investigated and processed by him, affirmative action was rarely undertaken.35 Renewed Com laints From The BIacE.Community' That police-black community relations was still a sensitive area was sustained in a report published in 1969 by the Urban Coalition, a group of important white and black leaders brought together to assist blacks in obtaining their social and constitutional rights. 'The coalition report, 34D.J.,.August 28, 1969. 35D.J., November 9, 1969. 200 dealing with problem areas, had police-black community relations at the top of its list of sensitive areas.36 In spite of the attempts by law enforcement Officials to improve the situation, black members of the Durant City Council and the Goodrich County Commission continued to voice complaints about police activity. In November, 1970, Councilman Milton noted that 75 percent of the complaints received from the black community were still related to police activity. Black Councilman Floyd Tipton said: "In Durant, the black and minority peOple are not protected we're policed. .8. . The only time we see police in the neighborhood is if there has been a complaint, or if they are looking for someone to arrest." Commissioner Milton felt that there definitely was a need for more black policemen but added that the in- crease in the number of black councilmen had helped to ease the situation. Police Chief Roberts responded to this criticism by saying "the lower-income blacks complain that there are too many policemen in their neighborhoods. Then you get calls from middle-income blacks who say they need more police protection." Roberts said that he was trying to recruit more blacks for the police force but added "what can you do if everyone in the community tells a kid not 36D.J., October 12, 1969. 201 to grow up and become one of those pigs." Roberts didn't feel that the black areas were over-policed but he said that they get their share of Officers because "we've gone overboard on community relations there."37 However, the Ombudsman Project of the Model Cities Program, in cooperation with the Urban Coalition of Durant, had kept records of policemen whom it found repeatedly "abuse, illegally arrest and harass" blacks. The ombudsman Project also held public hearings where minority groups could present their complaints regarding police brutality. An Ombudsman Project spokesman claimed that there were about one hundred pending cases of police brutality filed with the NAACP and seventy with the Durant office of the Civil Rights Commission. Don Filson, director Of the Ombudsman Project, was critical of the investigation procedures utilized in cases of police brutality. He said, ”the cases never get out of city hall," and said the reason was that the police department investigated itself. Filson was also critical of black officials saying they had not done much to ease the situation. As for law enforcement, he said "the police are just supposed to keep niggers in their place."38 37D.J., November 15, 1970. 38D.J., November 15, 1970. 202 The Institute of Community Studies Survey In February, 1971, the results of a survey of Durant community services conducted by the Institute of Community Studies of New York was published. One section of this study dealt with police-black community relations. It began "in Durant police routinely wear hard hats. This is an unusual procedure. In most cities hard helmets are used at times of civil disorder or riot. The hard hat has a symbolic meaning for the black man of Durant. It is a sign Of 'looking for trouble' and intimidation." The report noted that "blacks at all levels feel supressed by the police force" and believe that police are utilized by the white establishment to intimidate them. This feeling is especially prevalent, noted the survey, among moderate and low-income blacks. The report mentioned four factors that reinforce black attitudes regarding the police. These are: "(1) harassment, (2) verbal and physical abuse, (3) the continuous authoritarian display of power, (4) the poor employment experience of blacks on the police force." The report went on to note that blacks are often stopped and questioned by police particularly when travel- ing through white neighborhoods and that black-white group situations received undue police surveillance. The-report' also noted that seventy-seven citizen complaints had been made.against the police force and that only one had been 203 sustained. In that case the guilty Officer merely received a written reprimand and was reassigned. The investigators found that, the integrity of the police force . . . is seriously questioned by blacks and whites. The law enforcement activities have tended to focus on such crimes as social gambling, prostitution, etc., while more serious crimes were ignored. . . .1 Over a period of time some residents have begun to believe that a number of law enforcement officials are involved in payoffs. The report made a number of recommendations in- cluding: the elimination of abusive attitudes toward blacks; the elimination of unnecessary policing in the black community; the adoption of policies that would attract black recruits to the police force and would give promise of possible promotion of black patrolmen in the future; and development of a more comprehensive program Of community relations vis-éfvis the black community. A most important recommendation was one calling for a director of public safety who was to be responsible to the City Council, and a citizen complaint review board.39 Lewis Hobbs, son of R. B. Hobbs, but more liberal in social philOSOphy than his father was now president of the Hobbs' Foundation. Lewis was also chairman of the committee that provided the funding for the survey. In r 39Institute of Community Services, Community Services in Greater Durant, 1970, pp. 95-99. 204 discussing the report Hobbs admitted that "we need to make changes."40 Police Chief Roberts appeared to be angered by a number of the Observations and recommendations in the report. He-said: "I didn't need a study to tell me we need more black officers. . . . Basically we've done _ everything we can in the area of recruitment . . . Part "of the reason blacks haven't been recruited is that they don't want to be." Roberts went on to say "the unfair thing is that they say we don't promote people." He said "we have nothing to do with promotions" and went on to describe the civil service procedure. Turning to the changes of excessive patrolling in black neighborhoods, Roberts said: It depends on who you are talking to. We get complaints that we don't do enough."41 Black Police Officer Dissafisfaction That there was much dissatisfaction among black officers on the police force was apparent when seven black police officers in the summer of 1971 resigned from the Fraternal Order Of Police. The officers maintained that the policeman's lodge had failed to represent them in equal opportunity matters. They then formed a Durant chapter of 4oD.J., February 2, 1971. 41D.J., February 25, 1971. 205 the Society of Afro-American Police. Robert Darden, ombudsman with the Durant Police Department, who served as spokesman said that the group was formed to give black officers "more of a voice" in the department and to "help build our own morale."42 Black Leaders View the Issue-Areaigf POIlce-Black Community Relations In interviews, black leaders indicated that police- black community relations was one of the areas of greatest concern to them. They felt that the problem of police brutality needed immediate attention. Black leaders com- plained that the city manager and the chief of police were aware Of sadistic officers on the force but were unable to remove them because of opposition from some members of the City Council. It was reported that sadistic police officers have been told by their superiors to stay out of the black areas but that they frequently disobey orders. It is felt that the practice of recruiting policemen from small com- munities results in police officers who have had little or no contact with blacks, who fear blacks, and who, as one leader said in a voice trembling with emotion, treat blacks as "animals." Blacks had hoped that the appointment of an ombudsman charged with investigating allegations of police 42D.J.,August 25, 1971. 206 brutality would help, but they have been disappointed with the results. Complaints are filed with the ombudsman and he investigates and makes recommendations for action ' but nothing happens. Blacks maintain that attempts to improve the image of the policemen in the black community have had only limited success. A scooter patrol that brought policemen in closer contact with blacks did have some success. How-1 ever, an attempt to have black youths work as police cadets failed. It was said that the veiled hostility of white patrolmen was quite apparent to black youngsters in the program. The failure of black patrolmen to earn promotions is another frequently cited complaint. Black leaders feel that the white supervisor's evaluations of black patrolmen, which is part of the civil service rating, serves to aid whites in preventing blacks from receiving promotions. Blacks also feel that the content of police civil service exams is oriented toward white, middle-class life-styles and blacks have been pressing the city administration to provide alternative test forms. Blacks also feel that the policemen's organization, the Fraternal Order of Police, is committed to a policy of limiting black promotions. Only two black leaders felt that the complaints against the police department were largely unjustified. 207 One felt that blacks must be willing to compete on equal terms with whites and that to do so, black patrolmen need to work more diligently in upgrading their qualifications. The issue-area of police-black community relations is one that is fraught with problems and difficulties. However this might well be an area where blacks can exert some pressure through the political process by using "balance of power" techinques--that is, by offering to support other political factions in return for their assistance in this area. Our survey of this issue-area indicates that blacks have been able to effect some changes by using this technique. Black elected Officials have been able to exert some pressure on city officials to make some changes in the Durant Police Department. Specifically they were able to have a sympathetic police Official appointed to a sensitive post and they were able to secure the appointment of an ombudsman. It is also apparent that many police Officials have begun to act more circumspectly in their relationships with the black community. The political process, which has provided blacks with very limited power resources, appears in this issue-area to allow blacks to exert some pressure on governmental decision-making and by so doing to secure some limited benefits. 208 Black Leaders Possess Limited Resources with Which to Effect Change However, it is clear that blacks are still de- cidedly disadvantaged in the issue-area of police-black community relations. Although blacks constitute approxi- mately 30 percent of the population of Durant their repre- sentation on the police force is approximately 5 percent and no black occupies a supervisory position on the force. In addition, black citizens are frequently subjected to rude treatment and occasionally to brutal treatment by law enforcement officers. Although an ombudsman has been appointed, his reports tend to be ignored by his supervisors. As in the case of the previously examined issue-areas of human relations and education, it is clear that the ability of blacks to effect significant improvements in police- black community relations is severely constrained by the limited power resources of black leadership. CHAPTER X OPEN HOUSING A study prepared by the Council of Social Agencies of Durant shows that 71 percent of the city's non—white pOpulation was concentrated in seven census tracts. Of, the city's forty-one census tracts, twenty-four had less than 1 percent non-white population.l Karl and Alma Taeuber in their study Negroes in Cities2 indicated that Durant's segregation index is 94.4 on a scale of 0 to 100, reflecting the percentage of the black population in Durant that would need to be relocated to other neighbor- hoods tO effect a racially balanced residential pattern. The study indicated that Durant was the most segregated city in the northwest, north central and western regions of the United States. The rather rigidly segregated pattern Of housing in Durant is maintained in a variety of ways. Realtors lDurant Council of Social Agencies, Census Tract Project, Part I (Durant Council of Social Agencies, 1963), p. O 2Karl E. Taeuber and Alma Taeuber, Negroes in Cities (Chicago, Aldine Co., 1965), pp. 29-30. 209 210 are committed to maintaining the homogeneity of white areas and some blacks elect to remain in black areas either through fear or preference. When black families do move into white areas, they sometimes encounter hostile white neighbors who can and do use threats and intimida- tion. Attempts to Promote Open ccupancy In 1963 the NAACP started an active campaign to obtain a fair housing ordinance. A series of meetings under the auspices of the NAACP were held to rally support in the white community.3 Since the Durant Board of Educa- tion has always had social and economic elites serving on it, it is not surprising that the NAACP began exerting pressure on the board to support an open occupancy law. In_1964 and 1965, a member of the NAACP attended every meeting of the Board of Education and at each meet- ing would rise and request the board to support an Open occupancy ordinance. One evening, Charles Strong, board chairman angered by the NAACP tactics replied, "we are 4 This led here to educate children not to house them." toya spirited exchange between Strong and black board member, Dr. Alexander Waldron, with Waldron pointing out 3D.J., August 31, 1963. 4D.J., October 29, 1964. 211 the relationship between open housing and equal educational Opportunities. However, the board did not alter its position and prominent black attorney Riggs described the board's position as "hypocritical." In 1964, a new organization HOPE (Housing Oppor- tunities Provided Equally) was organized and began to play an active role in promoting integrated housing.- Since realtors would not normally assist whites who were willing to sell to blacks, HOPE attempted to act as an intermedi- ary by purchasing the homes from whites and selling to blacks. HOPE also began an active campaign in 1964 of picketing owners and realtors who were flagrant in their discriminatory policies.5 In 1965, urban renewal and a new freeway program began displacing large numbers of blacks. It was estimated that about thirty-three hundred units would be needed to house those who had been displaced--most of whom were blacks.- There was also concern that the replacement housing pro- jects were to be built in the predominently black areas of the city thus serving to perpetuate segregation. Several groups including the Urban League and HOPE appeared before the Durant Housing Commission asking for a more balanced distribution of project locations. A meeting between black leaders and the head of the Housing Commission led to a 5D.J., November 16, 1964. 212 heated exchange in which the director of the Housing Commission said that he objected to "peOple telling us to sit on our hands until we achieve the millennium." John Marsh of the Urban League responded by saying that he did not feel that public housing could be used to eliminate all the problems of segregation in the community but he did feel that care should be taken to see that the sites selected for housing projects did not serve to "pro- mote this problem." He said he objected to the idea of "doing something now and worrying about the problem later. Let's do something we can live with" in the future, he said, and added "we don't want a pattern that will per- petuate the problem of segregation."6 However, the Urban League reluctantly agreed to accept the site selected by the Housing Commission--in an area of Durant with the highest.concentration of blacks-- with the provision that additional units were to be built in areas where mixed occupancy was possible. Board of Education Support For Open Occupancy In 1966, the Durant Board Of Education passed a resolution calling for the adOption of an Open occupancy ordinance. The board stated that it "recognizes and supports the right of anybody to live anywhere in Durant." 6D.J., January 7, 1966. 213 .It "recognizes that segregation is not in the best interest 7 This of a truly quality education for all children." appeared to be a rather significant achievement for the black community. Lacking power resources, itself it was able to actuate the elite Board of Education to make a commitment to Open occupancy. The black community had long been.critical of the Durant Board of Realtors feeling the board members were the major obstacle to fair housing.~ Black leaders were un- doubtedly responsible for initiating a statement from the State Civil Rights Commission in July 1966 which criticized the campaign being conducted by Board of Realtors against Open housing. The commission accused the realtors of attacking "the legal and moral foundations Of . . . con- Istitutional law which forbids racial discrimination in housing" and it called the realtors campaign "dishonest" because it "distorts and twists provisions of the proposed bill."8 These criticisms were echoed by similar complaints made by John Marsh of the Urban League Of Durant.9 CRC Hearing In the fall, the State Civil Rights Commission be- gan conducting a public hearing on equal housing 7D.J., May 26, 1966. 8D.J., July 11, 1966. 9D.J., July 28, 1966. 214 Opportunities in Durant. Commission Co-chairman Bill Foster indicated that the reason for selecting Durant was that "despite considerable new home and apartment construction in the area, we have had complaints that Negroes are unable to buy or rent housing on the open market."10 During the course of the hearings, a number of witnesses appeared before the commission. An early witness was the superintendent of schools, who said that no more than six of the elementary schools in the city had enrollments whose racial composition approximated the total elementary school populatiOn. He said: "The degree of raCial imbalance that exists in some of the elementary schools in Durant is a result of long estab- lished patterns of housing segregation in the city of A number of black witnesses also appeared before the commission to testify that they had been subjected to discrimination when seeking housing in the Durant area. Two black employees of a federal agency described the dif- ficulties they encountered when they were transferred to, Durant. One said he was told by the broker that he would 10D.J., October 26, 1966. 11Civil Rights Commission, E ual Housin Opportuni- ties in Durant Public Hearing, Novemfier 29, 30; December 1, 9, I966, p. 2} 215 not assist him in obtaining an apartment in an all-white apartment building. The other described how vacancies dis- appeared between a phone inquiry and his arrival at the building. A black pharmacist related similar experiences. A member of the Durant Human Relations Commission described how two Negro teachers cancelled their contracts because they were unable to find adequate housing in Durant. The HRC representative attributed their difficulties to the "discriminatory.policies and practices of the Durant Board "12 This Opinion was corrobor- of Realtors and its members. ated by John Marsh the executive director of the Urban League, who maintained that the real estate interests were the primary perpetuators of the "ghetto" in Durant. The presi- dent of HOPE also indicted the Board of Realtors saying "their unwritten policy is not to sell homes to Negroes in white areas whether the owner wants to or not."» He supported his allegation with corroborative signed statements from seven individuals. He noted that realtors maintained that it was "against their national code of ethics to introduce a foreign element into a neighborhood." The president of HOPE added "in order for . . . Negro families to Obtain housing in . . . [white] areas it was necessary for a white person to purchase the house and then resell it to them Negro buyer."13 12lbid., p. 3. 13Ibid., pp. 3-4. 216 Negro realtors appeared before the commission and charged that they were discriminated against or knew of cases where others were discriminated against when attempting to gain membership in the Durant Board of Realtors. It was asserted that the denial of such member- ship handicapped the black broker. The black realtor did not have access to houses listed with the multiple listings exchange nor the Opportunity to have ready access to services available through the community's banks;’ No Officer or member of the Durant Board of Realtors appeared before the commission although the commission in- vited the president of the board and each broker-member against whom allegations of discrimination had been made to testify. Charges of discrimination were also leveled by several blacks against builders. Officers of the Home Builders Association were invited to appear at the hearing but all declined the invitation. One builder who did testify said that in most cases builders would not sell lots to Negroes in new subdivisions. Witnesses also testified that a great deal Of the housing in the ghetto areas was substandard. It was noted that the census tracts with the highest proportion of sub- standard housing also had the highest non-white population. A social caseworker testified that sixty-three of seventy of her client families were living in over-crowded or 217 substandard homes. A Catholic nun who did social work among low-income families complained that it was diffi- cult to get the authorities to enforce the city's housing code. A member of a Catholic social agency stated that he had surveyed twenty families living in substandard housing and found that none of the families were aware that a housing code existed. He said that slum landlords deliberately exploit the segregated housing market. He- related how one landlord told a white family that if they objected too vigorously about housing conditions, he would evict them and "put niggers in the house" because he "could get more money per week out of the house if he had niggers in it anyway, and the niggers wouldn't complain because they have no place to stay."14 Complaints were also lodged against other insti- tutions in the city. The NAACP and HOPE said that they had tried unsuccessfully to change the policies Of the Eureka Realty Division,.a subsidiary of Universal Motors. They reported that the policy of Eureka was to list homes that it controlled only with the Board of Realtors. "The company refused to consider the suggestions Of NAACP and HOPE that Eureka-held prOperties be listed also with Negro W 14Ibid., p. 10. 218 brokers and that Eureka include non-discrimination in- structions in listing agreements."15 The president of HOPE was critical of the role played by the Hobbs' Foundation in the area of human rights. He said that the foundation had "sidestepped the issue of Open occupancy in our community" and that when the foundation employs new black personnel the "only help they are given in securing housing is in the Negro areas that are already overcrowded."16 ' As the hearings were concluding Ralph Grimes, commission co-chairman, expressed disappointment that three of the most influential organizations in the com- munity--Universal Motors, the Hobbs' Foundation and the Durant Board of Realtors--had elected not to take part in‘ the hearings. Although Hobbs' Foundation executives had originally declined an invitation to appear at the hearing, they-changed their minds and testified at the final session which was set aside for rebuttal testimony. Representing the foundation were Richard B. Hobbs, founder and chairman of the board, and Howard R. Millington, executive director. It seemed very possible that their appearance was the result of an editorial in the Durant Journal which was headlined "Did 15Ibid., p. 10. 16Ibid., pp. ll-12. 219 Durant's Conscience Doze During the Hearing on Housing?" Mr. Hobbs made specific reference to the editorial when he said he didn't think the foundation had been dozing in any way. Hobbs also said he didn't think "any (public) statement of mine saying I oppose or favor Open occupancy housing would be of any benefit" to Durant's housing problem. He said whichever side he took, those who favor the other side "would feel badly toward me and the founda- tion." When a clergyman on the civil rights board pointed out that if the influential people in Durant didn't take an interest in the problem of segregated housing in the community, one could hardly expect the rank and file to do so, Mr. Hobbs replied rather inexplicably, "I have many friends in the Negro community and nobody is going to get me to take a position that these friends would take ex- ception to." The testimony became somewhat more acrimonious when a representative of the Civil Rights Housing Division described to Mr. Hobbs how Negro teachers had left the community becfuse-they cauld not fihd adequate housing and said "even yOHr mayor lives in the ghetto.: Hobbs replied with a smile, "if the mayor wants to move up in my neigh- borhood, he's welcome to." The-officials next comment, "I can't understand your unwillingness to offend some people (by taking a stand). You are without a doubt the most influential person in Durant and to be such you must 220 have offended some peOple" caused Hobbs to bristle and he replied angrily "thats too bad for you. I don't have to convince you."17 Mr. Howard Millington, executive director of the foundation, said "my personal position is like Mr. Hobbs'." He said that he felt Open occupancy was a political matter and "if we get into politics, our charter could be taken away from us.“ Millington indicated that "a massive attack" was needed to cope with Durant's housing problems. But regarding the question of securing adequate housing for blacks, he concluded rather weakly "if there were simply solutions, I would jump at them in a minute.» But the issues won't be solved until they are solved in the hearts of men."18 At the conclusion of the hearings, the Civil Rights Commission published it's report.- The report said: The City of Durantiand the larger metropolitan area are rigidly segregated, with nearly all of Goodrich County's non-white population con- centrated in contiguous census tracts in the inner core of the city. . . .- Segregated housing patterns appear to be controlled and maintained by builders and members Of the Durant Board of Realtors who refuse to show or sell properties in white areas to Negroes, whether so instructed by their clients or not, decline to service Open occupancy listings, and deny Negro real estate brokers membership l7D.J., December 10, 1966. 18D.J., December 10, 1966. 221 in the organization itself and its sub- sidiary shared listing system. The commission also concluded: The failure of financial, commercial, industrial and other private corporations and organizations to be represented at the hearing tends to show that that segment of the community is, at best, disinterested in the resolution of the problems of housing discrimination and segregation in the Durant area. In view of the strong economic, political, and educational force these groups have been for the improvement of the quality of community life in Durant, their silence on the question of equal housing opportunity serves to retard progress toward its achievement. The commission recommended that the city of Durant: Enact a comprehensive ordinance prohibiting dis- crimination in housing. . . .; appropriate suf- ficient funds for the Human Relations Commission . . . to enable it to deal more effectively and autonomously with problems of unequal housing and other areas of racial tension and discrimina- tion . . .; refrain from undertaking any renewal or related projects that would involve dis- location Of families until an adequate supply of . . . housing is available . . . and improve the effectiveness of its code enforcement program.2 The response of the various power loci in the com— munity, particularly the business-industrial loci, to the CRC hearings appeared to underscore the relative powerless- ness of black leaders to influence changes in housing policies. The hearings, supported and conducted by an Official state agency, were largely ignored by important organizations in the private sector which did not cooperate 19Civil Rights Commission,'pp;cit., pp. 14-15. 2°Ibid., pp. 15-16. 222 with the Civil Rights Commission. When Mr. Hobbs, probably the most important single individual in the community, did appear, he did not manifest any sympathy or support for the principles of open housing. Proposals for an Open Hou81ng Ordinance On July 24 and 25, 1967, a rather serious civil disturbance took place in the north-end of Durant in areas that were predominently black in composition. One result of the disturbance was renewed pressure by black leaders for concessions from the white community including the passage Of an Open occupancy ordinance. Rev. Robert Ralston, black leader, testified before the City Commission that housing was one of the black community's major problems. Disturbances during the past week he said, "have borne out the fact that we really need such an ordinance. I am beg- "21 ging you to pass it. A few days later the city attorney was directed by the City Commission's Legislative Committee to prepare an Open occupancy ordinance and shortly after this an ordinance was submitted to the commission for con- 22 sideration. However, much to the chargrin of its pro- ponents, the Open Occupancy Ordinance was turned down by the commission.23 21D.J., August 5, 1967. 22D.J., August 8, 11, 1967. 23D.J., August 15, 1967. 223 Mayor Milton Resigns Mayor Milton who had played an important role in this issue-area was close to tears as he spoke to the commissioners and the three hundred spectators at the meeting. He said: I have been down here [the mayor lived in the black ghetto on the north side Of Durant] a long time, almost nine years now, and I have tried to do everything possible for everyone in this city, and I don't care what color or economic status. Last November, this City Commission saw fit to make me mayor and . . . I thought here at last we have a local government willing to accept people on the basis of their ability and not because of race, and I have lived with this and I have preached this to my community. Tonight, however, I've changed my mind. I'm not going4to sit here and live an equal-Opportunity lie. . Milton then told the commission he would resign. Many of those in the audience stood and applauded him. Reaction to the Mayor's Resignation Commenting on the actions of the evening the Reverend Alan Robinson executive director of the Durant Council of Churches, termed Milton's resignation "the most honest and most cleansing act of the evening. He \ stood ten feet tall above those who by their act robbed him and his followers of their rights and dignity."25 '1 24 D.J., August 15, 1967. 25 D.J., August 15, 1967. 224 The Durant Journal noted that while the City Commission had been meeting a group Of young black acti- vists were also meeting at the St. Charles Street Com- munity Center to discuss the ineffectiveness of Negro leaders in Durant. The ghetto audience was told that "Negro leaders weren't aware of our problems . . . It is time for us to represent ourselves, not to be led by false leaders. The middle class wants to emphasize open occupancy. That doesn't involve the grass roots." After the meeting adjourned, this group went up to city hall where they learned of Milton's resignation. Several em- braced him and said "we love you brother."26 News of Milton's resignation was followed quickly by other resignations.~ Three black members of the Human Relations Commission and one black member of the County Board of Supervisors resigned. Five additional members of the Board Of Supervisors announced their intention of resigning as did blacks on the boards of various other community agencies. I The Rev. Alan Robinson said that the failure of the commission to enact an Open occupancy ordinance was "evidence of just how sick our city is" and these senti— :ments were re-echoed by other influential citizens and 26D.J., August 15, 1967 27D.J., August 15, 16, 17, 1967. 225 institutions. The Durant Journal editorialized that Milton's resignation was "a demonstration of one man standing up for that in which he believes--and in which we all should believe." The executive director of the Urban League said in regard to the five commissioners who voted against Open occupancy "they believe in de- mocracy for everyone except the Negro." He said that the rejection of open occupancy caused all Negroes, moderate and militant to wonder about the democratic process in Durant. Two leaders of the Jewish community released a statement in which they said that it is "al- together shocking" that Open occupancy need be the object of legislation, but how much more shocking that_during these critical times an ordinance merely legislating those rights which have been previously granted should fail. . . . The shortsightedness and political ex- pediency evidenced by five of our city commissioners last night was a disgrace to our city and an insult to our fine mayor. It appeared that the defeat Of the Open Occupancy Ordinance and the resignation of Mayor Milton had nudged some of Durant's middle-class blacks into a more militant stance. A meeting was held the next evening at the Oak Avenue Christian Church pastored by Rev. Asher who had just resigned from the board of the Durant Human Relations 28D.J.,- August 15, 1967. 226 Commission. It was soon evident that Durant's blacks not_only were going to press for an Open occupancy ordi- nance but that they were also going to demand commitment to change in other areas. John Marsh, executive director of the Urban_League said that if Mayor Milton was willing. to withdraw his resignation there still would need to be some new "ground rules" that would involve commitments to find solutions to problems affecting blacks.29 4A». H. The Black Solidarity Rally The next day, Albert Hilton president of the NAACP 30 The announced plans for a Black Solidarity Rally. series of events that occurred in connection with this rally disturbed many in both the white and black communi- ties. On Friday, Hilton called City Manager Klein to secure permission for the rally that was to take place on Sunday. Permission was granted and rally sponsors began erecting a platform on Saturday morning. They were inter- rupted by police who took the platform down. Klein in- formed Hilton that he had given permission for a rally but not for a platform to be built. Klein said that it was illegal to erect such a platform without getting prior approval from the City Commission. 29D.J., August 16, 1967. 30D.J., August 17, 1967. 227 On Saturday afternoon, County Prosecutor Larson called a meeting of black leaders and City Manager Klein. Larson said that he believed it was unconstitutional to require a permit for a peaceful gathering on public prOperty. He said that he believed that it had been unnecessary to request permission in advance to hold the rally but per- mission had been given. He went on to say that when Klein granted permission to hold such a rally, it should have been assumed that the sponsors would build a platform. In an emotion packed session, an agreement was then concluded be- tween black leaders and white Officials. The agreement stipulated that blacks were to be permitted to erect a plat- form on the city hall property. Larson then issued a state- ment that was critical of city Officials. Larson said: Certain public Officials in attempting to deny the use of city hall grounds for a rally are putting law enforcement agencies of this city and county in the position of officially denying certain privileges granted under the U.S. Con- stitution. The are also making an issue of keeping off the grass a so-called "crisis" and are strengthening the claims of those who say that government and the police are against them. . . . There have been many instances where the city has permitted a platform to be built on the grounds to hear speakers. . _.. I think it is time we concentrated on enforcing serious laws and fighting serious crimes, rather than worry about someone stepping on the grass.3 By nightfall, it seemed that a satisfactory solution had been reached and the rally sponsors were preparing to 31D.J., August 20, 1967. 228 build their platform.» However, shortly before midnight, black leaders received a call from Police Chief Roberts asking them to come to headquarters. There they were told that the City Commission had informed the city manager that they would not be allowed to build their platform. The shocked president of the NAACP and the director of the Urban League immediately contacted a state representative who in turn contacted the governor. The governor got in touch with the attorney general who called Larson at 2 a.m. Larson petitioned for an injunction and the case was argued at 7 a.m. in the morning before two circuit court judges. At 9:15, the judges ordered the injunction and by 10 a.m. 32 Larson commented work had begun again on the platform. on his action in this way: ”I have an obligation to pro- tect the constitutional rights of every citizen. I thought there was a breach of the freedom of assembly, a breach of a previous commitment and the imminent possibility of a breach of the peace because of these harassments." He also added: "Based on the events of the last few weeks and especially the last couple of days, I'm beginning to wonder if some elected officials are not intentionally trying to provoke a confrontation between Negroes and whites."33 32D.J., August 21, 1967. 33D.J., August 21, 1967. 229 This type Of incident is not uncommon as far as the black community is concerned. They feel that indi- vidually or collectively they are subjected to this kind of harassment. Lacking the power to protect themselves, they must appeal to segments of the larger community for support. Here the sympathy Of a public official, the county prosecutor, stood them in good stead. The rally went Off as scheduled on Sunday, August 21, 1967 with about 4,000 in attendance. The most dramatic event of the day was the surprise appearance of the governor and attorney general at the rally. The governor in a whirl- wind visit landed at the airport, conferred with city officials, visited with Mayor Milton--who had been hospital- ized because of a stomach disorder and exhaustion--and had a conference with city commissioners who he urged to adopt an open occupancy ordinance. The governor then went to the rally and spoke in support of Open occupancy. He added that he admired "Roger Milton for not letting them keep "34 The "them" apparently referred using him as a stooge. to the commissioners who had voted against the Open Occu- pancy Ordinance. Successful Passage of the §pen Occupancy Ordinance At this time, the Hobbs' Foundation reversed its position on the issue. Lewis Hobbs, president of the 34D.J., August 21, 1967. 230 foundation sent a letter to each city commissioner urging them to vote for an Open occupancy ordinance.‘ Hobbs out- lined the goals of the foundation which he said included promoting Negro rights and opportunities. He went on to note that "recent events" have put the goals and achieve- ments of the Hobbs programs in jeopardy. He called on all citizens to join with the foundation in "a new effort toward racial justice and Opportunity." Hobbs' closed his appeal with a request to "Mayor Milton to reassume his office and give us his necessary leadership at this difficult time."35 This statement appeared to signal a change in the orientation of Durant's elites on the question of an Open occupancy ordinance. The power resources of the business, professional and industrial segments in the community now appeared to be available to those supporting this legisla- tion and this had important implications for the success- full resolution of the issue. However, as will be noted later, support of an open occupancy ordinance does not indicate support for changing the basic housing patterns in the community. The successful passage of such an ordi- nance Often has only a minimal effect on these patterns, as the leaders of the larger community probably recognized. 35D.J., August 20, 1967. 231 On August 28th, Roger Milton said that he was so encouraged by offers of support from individuals and organizations that he had decided to remain in office. Milton said: "In light of this massive declaration of support, I no longer feel that my continuation as mayor will be an unwitting obstacle to the fight for equal "36 opportunity. He requested all those who, out of sym— pathy for his position, had announced their intention of resigning to continue in office. Mayor Milton said he was declaring a moratorium on discussions of Open occu- pancy until September 5th in order to eaSe tensions. After some delay, the Open Occupancy Ordinance was adopted in October when one commissioner who had formerly Opposed the measure switched his vote and when a second commissioner who had been absent when the measure was originally defeated also cast an affirmative vote.37 The ordinance prohibited discrimination in the sale or rental of prOperty on the basis of race, color or national origin. Violations of the ordinance carried a maximum penalty of ninety days in jail and a three hundred dollar fine. 36D.J.,August 28, 1967. 37D.J., October 24, 1967. 232 Referendum on Fair Housing Harry Spicer who was active in the John Birch Society in Durant announced shortly after the_ordinance had passed that he was heading a "Committee to Repeal Forced Legislation" that would circulate petitions calling for a referendum election on the Open Housing Ordinance.38 After several weeks Of intensive work, the required number of signatures were Obtained. The question of Open occupancy was then one that would be decided by the electorate in the next election. A "Friends of Fair Housing Committee" was estab- lished to mobilize sentiment in support of the Open Occu- pancy Ordinance. Officers Of the organization included prominent black leaders and white friends of the black com- munity. In addition to the working officers, a number of honorary chairmen were named, including Lewis Hobbs, presi- dent of the Hobbs' Foundation; Robert Andrews, a prominent civic leader and former Universal Motors' executive; Mrs. Howard Evans, wife of the superintendent of schools; David Marden president of a chain of discount stores and an important member of the Jewish community; C. E. Patton regional director of the UAW; and Jack Hilton, civic leader 39 and prominent businessman. The makeup of the committee 38D.J., November 28, 1967. 39D.J., January 5, 23, 1968. 233 represented important loci of power and seemed to purport that the community was united in support of Open occupancy. As the weeks passed most major organizations in- cluding the Chamber of Commerce, UAW, Leagueof Women Voters, Federation of Teachers and the Durant Ministerial Association came out in favor of the ordinance.40 However, the two major parties were, at best, rather ambivalent in their support. The Republican Party indicated that it felt that the issue was not a partisan one and refused to take 41‘ Democrats did somewhat better but a stand on the issue. their stand was still rather equivocating. The only support they gave the issue was a statement by the Democratic County Chairman that "most Democrats are convinced open housing is desirable."42 The Durant Journal dispatched one of its reporters to visit four cities with Open housing ordinances to see how these were functioning. The journalist reported his Observations in a series of five stories. He summarized his findings in the following way: the most spectacular thing that happens after a city puts an Open housing ordinance into effect is that nothing happens. This sardonic comment . . . is a bit unfair and inaccurate. 4oD.J., December 24, 1967; January 9, 31, February 15, I9, 1968. 41D.J., January 19, 1968. 42D.J., February 16, 1968. 234 But it is close enough to the truth to give the lie to those who anticipate mas- sive Nigro migrations into white neighbor- hoods. Having thus reassured its' readers, the Durant Journal, which had formerly opposed this type of legislation, pub- lished several editorials in favor of open occupancy.44‘ When Dick Gregory appeared at Durant's Whitmore Auditorium, during the height of the campaign, he was asked to give his Opinion of Open occupancy. He probably drew shudders from prOponents of the measure when he said "fair housing is not important." Asked to explain his comment he said: "Fair housing can be a psychological victory but it is a small thing. Society makes such a big issue that once communities have such a law they feel they have dropped a little bit of God down on the community."45 The election was held on February 20, 1968 and the lead changed hands a number of times. Many supporters of the measure including Mayor Milton, went to bed with the feeling that the Open Occupancy Ordinance had been defeated for City Clerk Harding's count indicated that the measure had lost by fifty-seven votes. Milton, before going to bed had even read a statement in which he acknowledged the 43D.J., February 4, 1968. 44D.J., February ll, 16, 1968. 45D.J., February 17, 1968. 235 narrow margin of defeat and called the election "a moral victory, if nothing else." However, the count made by the staff of the Durant Journal did not tally with the city clerk's figures and in the morning two reporters went to the city clerk's Office to compare the returns. They discovered that there was a loo-vote error and that the Open Occupancy Ordinance had won by a margin of forty- three votes.* Milton who had gone to sleep at 3:15 a.m. thinking the measure had been defeated, learned in the morning of the victory. He said simply, "it's just wonder- ful. The people won."46 The fact that Durant was the first city to actually pass an Open occupancy ordinance by popular vote was not lost sight of by the rest of the country. Congratulatory messages poured in.47 The measure had passed in five of the nine wards in the city and of course could not have done so without substantial white support. However, the black community had given the ordinance unusually heavy support. In the predominently black third ward, the measure passed by a vote of 3,306 to 351. The turnout of registered black * The Durant Board of Canvassers certified the election victory margin as one of thirty-eight votes. In the recount in March, this margin was reduced to thirty votes. 46D.J., February 21, 1968. 47D.J., February 23, 1968. 236 voters was, in comparison with previous elections almost spectacular. The turnout in the third ward represented 58.4 percent Of the registered voters, 4 percent more than in any other ward and 7 percent higher than the city-wide average. It was also noted that of the fifteen precincts where more than 60 percent of the registered voters voted, eleven were in primarily black areas.48 It was felt that the churches and the community elites had played important roles in the victory. As Miss Helen Gordon secretary of the "Friends for Fair Housing” noted after the election: "we practically de- pended on the churches-~and on the power structure."49 The black community with support from important elite interests had won a victory although it would turn out to be only a token victory. It would appear that without support from the other loci of power, the black community would not have been successful in winning the referendum election. The makeup Of the committee "Friends for Fair Housing," was intended to convey the idea that all important segments in the community supported Open housing. Moreover, the inclusion of key influentials like Lewis Hobbs demoné strated that the issue had the support of the business 48D.J., February 24, 1968. 49D.J., February 24, 1968. 237 and industrial leaders of the community. The secretary, Miss Gordon, had noted the importance of the "power struc- ture" in achieving victory. Power loci involved in the victory included business and industry, the Board of Educa- tion, the churches, and labor--although in the latter case it was apparent that labor was hampered in utilizing all its power resources because of the rather widespread am- bivalence and even hostility of some of its' white member- ship toward Open occupancy. Both major political parties were also extremely cautious in Offering meaningful en- dorsements of open occupancy. Without the able assistance and support Of other loci, it would appear that the black community would have been defeated on this issue. For the black community lacked the resources to win such an election. Many white community residents were disturbed by the outcome of the referendum, feeling that it would result in radical changes in housing patterns. But, as the various community leaders who had supported the ordinance probably realized, only minor changes in housing patterns occurred. The victory in retrospect appears to be a rather hollow one and appears to validate the thesis of black.powerlessness. 238 6:23:52; Sit—9% The State Civil Rights Commission which had con- ducted the 1966 hearings devoted to housing problems in Durant had made certain recommendations regarding future action to be undertaken to alleviate some of the problems. A year after the recommendations had been made, the direc- tor of the Durant office, Mrs. Kay Brenton, made a progress report in which she noted that the only reason the housing problem had not become more acute for Durant's blacks was that a cut-back in federal funding had reduced Durant's urban renewal program. Mrs. Brenton reported continued difficulty in Obtaining funding for low-cost housing. She also reported only minor improvements in the negative attitudes of the Durant Board of Realtors.50 A few months later, at a public forum, Mrs. Brenton made some additional comments on the housing problem. She noted that the city's Open Occupancy Ordinance would have little effect on the segregated housing patterns in the city until there was an adequate supply of homes for low and moderate income blacks. She pointed out that three thousand people had been displaced by freeway construction and that many were still without housing in spite of the 50Durant Civil Rights Commission, Investi ator House Hearings Evaluations Report, February 23, I368, pp. 1, 2. 239 fact that one thousand units of public housing had been provided by the city. Mrs. Brenton went on to note that the segregated housing patterns in the city resulted in rather rigidly segregated schools. She pointed out that most of Durant's black students and black teachers were concentrated in eleven black schools.51 Ten months after the passage of the Open Occupancy Ordinance, Vice-chairman, Marvin Gridley told the Human Relations Commission that blacks were still being discrim- inated against in regard to housing and that those who were adversely affected didn't know how to file a complaint. Gridley noted that the city attorney had received only one complaint but indicated that he himself had received a number Of complaints from people who didn't know what to do.52 Shortly after this, John Marsh, executive director of the Urban League was invited to speak at a luncheon meeting of the Durant Board of Realtors. Marsh told the realtors that a lack of adequate housing was one of the major problems in Durant. He said the shortage could be attributed to the prevalence Of a "racist" assumption that black men should not own homes in white neighborhoods. Marsh blamed realtors for playing an important role in 51D.J., April 30, 1968. 52D.J., September 6, 1968. 240 perpetuating residential segregation in Durant. Marsh said that when racial intergration is progressing nicely in a neighborhood, many white realtors "set out to de- liberately destroy it." Marsh supported his contention by citing several local examples of "blockbusting." He said some realtors would not show a.home in an integrated neighborhood to a white family. This he said would eventually tip an integrated neighborhood into becoming an all black neighborhood. Marsh maintained that there were white realtors who "pressure white home owners.to sell and move out" the moment a neighborhood becomes in- tegrated. Marsh urged the realtors to help improve the housing situation for blacks in the community without having to be prompted by "outside pressure." For he noted, "if you fail to do so--the Urban League and other groups will increase efforts to require you to correct these in- "53 The mere fact that Marsh had been invited equities. to address the Durant Board of Realtors, an organization that had firmly opposed Open occupancy, might, Of course, be viewed as a favorable sign. However, an incident that occurred in the Spring of 1969 seemed to indicate that much remained to be achieved in the area of Open occupancy. In the middle Of May, a black mother, Mrs. Mary Lott and her six children S3D.J., October 23, 1968. 241 moved into a public housing unit in a white neighborhood. Six weeks later, after suffering much abuse, they moved out. The Durant Journal noted sardonically: "The Lotts didn't make any friends with neighbors during their one and a half month stay." For the entire month and a half the Lotts were constantly harassed. Eggs were thrown at the house, the lawn was torn up by a truck, the fuel line of their car was cut and the accelerator and carbureator damaged and a jar of kerosene was thrown at the house. When the two youngest children went to play in a vacant lot nearby, a white man brandishing a stick drove them out. The fifteen year Old daughter described to a reporter how six white boys blocked her path on the way to school and "reminded me what the white man's privileges were toward a nigger girl."54 Mrs. Lott reported that she remained in the house until her Oldest daughter, Irene, who was a member of a national honor society; had won an award for Americanism from the American Legion; and was preparing to attend Michigan State University on a scholarship became so emotionally disturbed that it was doubtful whether she could begin college. It was then that the Lotts decided to move. 54D.J., August 3, 1969. 242 The Lott family was replaced by a white family that were the next applicants on the public housing list. Rev. Alan Robinson, who was chairman of the Urban Renewal Relocation Subcommittee, noted: "It's unfortunate that they [Department of Community DevelOpment] moved a white family in. . . . This told the white community they had won. It showed them that_if they objected [to black fami- lies] only whites would be moved in." Robinson said that the community of Durant, including the city manager and the police, had failed the Lotts and he added "I certainly want to include the commissioner of the . . . ward [Melvin Howard] with those who failed.‘ I am not conscious Of any action on his part to make it so Mrs. Lott could live in peace."55 Commissioner Howard responded with sentiments that many blacks feel are fairly characteristic Of the larger community in Durant. He said, "I don't want to see this thing fanned by do-gooders and left-wingers into something that it isn't." He went on to say that if "there were all- black areas, then presumably there should be an all-white area and we are the only all-white ward in the city. I don't see how they (the Lotts) could be happy in an all- white neighborhood. No white person could be happy in an all-black neighborhood."56 55D.J., August 3, 1969. 56D.J., August 3, 1969. 243 Black Leaders View the Issue-Area of Housing In the interviews conducted with black leaders, complaints regarding the housing situation in Durant were voiced with some frequency and vehemence. Black leaders are very concerned about the fact that, despite the passage of an open occupancy ordinance, adequate housing for blacks is in short supply and housing is still rather rigidly segregated. A black leader who had been an important city official maintains that the conservative outlook of the business community hampers Durant in ob- taining additional federal urban renewal funds. Other black leaders complain about the misuse of the urban re- newal funds that have been allocated to the city. Blacks maintain that the areas selected for renewal are not the ones that are most in need of attention. Several expressed the belief that renewal sites are selected by the "power structure" for the future expansion of the "Education and Fine Arts Center" and the downtown business area. Some blacks suspect that one project is being implemented to provide future expansion space for a Universal Motors' plant. Black leaders also complain that the prices blacks receive for their homes in renewal areas are not adequate for the purchase of comparable structures in other areas of the city. They cite cases where displaced persons, 244 particularly retirees, have had to leave the city to find satisfactory housing. Black leaders do find that there have been some constructive attempts to locate public housing in mixed or in white neighborhoods. They also approve of recent attempts to erect single family units rather than large housing projects. They note, however, the frequent complaints about the quality of this housing and the fact that building codes are not vigorously en- forced. As compared to the Human Relations Commission issue, it might appear, at first glance, that the black community has achieved a number of important successes in its struggle for Open housing. It-has succeeded in getting the Durant City Council to pass a fair housing ordinance and when the ordinance was tested in a referendum election the black community emerged victorious. When the right of peaceful assembly had been denied blacks by the city government, they received strong support from the prosecuting attorney. The governor and the attorney general had visited the city to support black goals. Support for an Open housing ordinance had been received from community elites and the Durant Journal. These were positive ac- complishments but from a realistic point of view they must be viewed as token victories for the community of Durant is still rather rigidly segregated. 245 Inability of Blacks to Effect Changes in Segregated‘Housing Viewing the issue-area of housing in terms of social power it is possible to detect several power loci opposed to the black goals of securing adequate, safe and sanitary housing in non-segregated neighborhoods. The most important of these Opposing power loci are the Durant Board of Realtors and the City Council. The council supports token Open housing legislation but almost certainly would Oppose measures designed to achieve significant resi- dential integration. It would appear, in fact, that the segregated patterns are maintained with the approval of a majority of those in the white community. Because of this sentiment, labor unions, the local political parties and even the churches can lend only limited support to the principal of open housing.~ Without active support from important power loci, it would appear that the black com- munity with its limited power resources is going to find it extremely difficult to alter the existing segregated housing patterns in the near future. As in the case of the previously examined issue-areas of education, human relations and police-black community relations, it would appear that black leaders who have been attempting to effect changes in housing conditions have been relatively in- effective because they have been leaders with little power. CHAPTER XI SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION Investigations Of community leadership frequently conclude with a set of hypotheses or prOpositions that summarize the studies findings. Frequently these hypothe- ses are related to conclusions generated by other studies in an attempt to indicate their general validity. In this chapter, we have listed ten prOpositions that represent the conclusions growing out of our study of Durant. we_do not suggest that these propositions are grounded on irrefutable empirical evidence but we do feel the interview material and the printed materials relating to the four issue-areas tend to support the validity of these prOpositions. We have when possible tried to relate the propositions to findings produced by earlier studies to determine if there might also be some general validity for the propositions. The prOpositions, then, that have been generated by this study are: (l) The methodological approach used in this study--the employment of both the reputational 246 247 and the issue approach--appears to have general validity. The use of both approaches appears to be necessary to obtain a complete picture of community leadership. Prestus recommends this dual approach to community leadership1 and Ladd in his study of black leadership in Greenville and Winston-Salem has noted the need to supplement the reputa- tional approach with the issue approach. Ladd finds that "Negro leadership is issue leadership."2 (2) There is no single group of black leaders in Durant--no "power structure." The group of tOp black leaders, as revealed by the reputa- tional and issue approaches, would probably be consulted on an issue of significance to the black community. Yet it cannot be said that this group is in a position to make decisions for the black community or to speak for the black community. They are, in effect, leaders in the black community rather than; leaders of the black community. This finding 1Prestus, Men at the Top, p. 62. 2Ladd, Negro Political Leadership in the South, p. 4. ‘ 248 coincides with those of other studies. Thompson in his study of black leadership in New Orleans found that there were a number of black groups or classes and that "each of these segments or classes produces its own leadership."3 Scoble found the leadership structure fragmented in Los Angeles.4 A recent study by a black investigator in the midwest revealed similar findings.5 McKee after studying Grand Rapids concluded that "no one person, or even one group of persons, can speak for or legitimately represent the Negro community. In that sense, there are no leaders of the Negro community. But there are numerous leaders in the Negro community."6 (3) Using a typology with the labels conservative, moderate, liberal and militant, it was found that most of Durant's leaders were moderates or liberals and that no militants were included 3Thompson, Op. cit., p. 8. 4Scoble, Negro Politics in Los Angeles, pp. 35-36. 5Elijah Anderson, "Black Shadow Politics in Mid- westville," Sociological Inquiry, Vol. 42, NO. l (1972), p. 20. 6McKee, Negro Leadership in Grand Rapids, p. 2. (4) 249 on the list Of leaders. Burgess also em- ploys a fourfold typology and has described most of her black leaders as "liberal."7 When the "issue" approach was used to narrow our list of black leaders, we also found that we had a list of top black leaders that could be most accurately described by using our ideological label-~"liberal." we believe that the use of a fourfold classification permitted us to label our leaders with a greater degree of precision than would have been possible using one of the frequently employed threefold classifications. However, we recognize that it is not always possible to label individuals with complete accuracy in terms of the rather inelastic definitions of a typology. Therefore, we do see some validity in Ladd's approach to leadership typologies in which leadership styles are defined in relative rather than in absolute terms.8 It was found that the use of a conceptual framework which views race relations as power 7Burgess, pp,‘cit., pp. 177-178. Ladd, pp, cit., p. 150. 250 relations was helpful. It provided a clearer perspective of the power limitations Of the black community yigféfyig other loci of power.‘ For as Blalock has noted, "racial discrimination is ultimately based on power relationships between a dominant and a sub- ordinate group."8 Burgess finds this approach 10 while Schermer- to be analytically fruitful horn notes that "power relations set the basic frame within which acculturation, discrimina- tion, prejudice, etc., do or do not take 11 Himes has noted that since race place." relations appear to be power relations "re- search should be cast in terms of a 'conflict '"12 We did indeed find that the in- model. sights offered by "conflict theorists" enabled us to perceive more clearly power conflicts in the community. Conflict theory served as a kind of barometer indicating major problem areas. The insights offered by "conflict 9Blalock, "A Power Analysis of Racial Discrimination," p. 53. loBurgeSS, .920 Cite, pp. 3-40 llSchermerhorn, pp,cit., p. 55. 12Himes, "The Functions of Racial Conflict," p. 403. 251 theorists" were also useful in pointing to the positive functions of conflict in the race relations area. From this perspective, conflict is seen as having an integrating function.‘ Leaders of both the black and white communities become aware of problem areas and the need to seek solutions to race-related conflicts. White leaders become aware of the serious- ness of the problems facing black people while blacks become cognizant of the fact that the freedom of action Of white leaders is sometimes restricted by the prevailing sentiments of their constituents. Sociologists who have dealt with social power have indicated that legitimation is a key concept. Legitimation of power is normally conveyed by the use of symbols that serve to verify the fact that the individual or group does, indeed,.possess social power. Symbols of legitimation in the black community are rare because power resources are rare. Some symbols indicating power potential do exist, however. Negroes serving on the City Council and the School Board and as mayor, are by the simple process of filling these Offices, (5) 252 serving as symbols of some power potential in the black community. New educational programs devoted to black problems and the black experience, a black ombudsman, additional numbers of black teachers and black policemen-- all are symbols Of the fact that the black community has the potential for developing power resources. However, this power potential is still largely dormant. Blacks on elective and appointed boards are still not able to force major shifts in policies affecting the black community. There are no important black administrators in the police department or on the school administrative staff. Housing and elementary education are Still rather rigidly, segregated and police and the black community maintain a rather hostile attitude toward one another. Black leadership positions generally fall to those who have achieved occupational status within the black community. Leaders are normally city officials, agency leaders, union Officials, professional men or business leaders. McKee in his study of Grand Rapids also noted the increasing importance in the 253 black leadership structure of labor leaders and college educated professionals.13 How- ever, black occupational status alone does not guarantee leadership status in Durant. There are blacks filling important occupa- tional roles who are not community leaders. Leaders in the black community must possess personal qualities which for lack of a better descriptive term we shall characterize as "leadership style"--a kind of charisma, as it were. (6) There is a certain degree of ambivalence shown by the black community toward its' black leaders. Blacks frequently distrust the motives of their leaders. Myrdal, al- most thirty years ago, Observed that "the Negro hates the Negro role in American society, and the Negro leader, who acts out this role in public life becomes the symbol 14 15 of what the Negro hates" and Clark, 13McKee, Negro Leadership in Grand Rapids, pp. 5, 6, ll. 1'Myrdal, 2p. cit., p. 774. 15Clark, Dark Ghetto, p. 197. 254 16 17 Scoble and Silberman have noted this distrust or hatred of black leaders by the black masses. In Durant, the most ardent critics of black leadership are the young black radicals who accuse black leaders of reflecting white middle-class life-styles and a middle-class point of view on race-related issues. The criticism of these militants is somewhat blunted by the fact that they have limited constituencies. However, in spite of the ambivalence toward black leaders, these leaders do appear to be able to mobilize general community support when faced with a race-related crisis. (7) Durant's black community does not possess the old established black families that exist in other communities_and tend to provide leader- ship and stability, nor are there large black commercial enterprises that can provide business capital for black bussinessmen. 16Harry M. Scoble, "Effects of Riots on Negro Leadership,” in Louis H. Masotti and Dan R. Bowen ed., Riots and Rebellion (Beverly Hills, California: Sage ca ons, , p. 342. 17Charles E. Silberman, Crisis in Black and White (New York: Random House, 1964), pp. 2005201. 255 Watters and Cleghorn have noted that northern communities frequently lack this established black leadership and black capital.18 (8) White leaders in recent years appear to be taking a greater interest in assisting blacks but this assistance is constrained by the fact that the community, in general, does not appear to be too sympathetic toward race- advancement issues. This fact appears to have caused the local political parties to soft-pedal these issues. Jones, Wilson and Keech have all noted that the posture of white elected officials in regard to race- related issues is influenced by the value structures of their constituentslg' 20' 21 18Pat Watters and Reese Cleghorn, Climbin Jacob's Ladder: The Arriyal of Negroes in Southern POIitics (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Ward, 1967), p. 91. 19Mack H. Jones, "Black Officeholders in Local Government in the South: An Overview," Politics_l97l, No. 2 (March, 1971), p. 70. 20James Q. Wilson, "The Negro in American Politics: The Present," in John P. Davis, eds., The Amerigan Negro Reference Book (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice HaII, Inc., I966), p. 453. 21William R. Keech, The Impact of Negro Votin (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1968), pp. 107-I08. 256 and Howard,22 Boesel,23 Sindler,24 Lipsky, 26 27 28 25 Clark, Knowles and Strange all have concluded that the black community can expect to receive only limited gains through the political process. Even the UAW in Durant has been obliged to exercise some restraints in their traditional support for black rights. Economic elites, because they are sometimes less vulnerable to sanctions than politicians or agency leaders, occasionally appear to be in a better position to assist blacks. This elite support has been noted by Crain and 22John Howard, "Blacks without Power, in Steven E. Deutsch and John Howard ed., Where Its At: Radical Per- spectives in Sociology (New York: .Harpers andiRow, I970), PP- ' 23Boesel, 9p, cit., pp. 43—45. 24Allan P. Sindler, "Protest Against the Political Status Of the Negro," in Harry A. Bailey, Jr., Ne ro golitics in America (Columbus, Ohio: Merrill PEBIlshing 00y, pp. 323-225. ' 25Michael Lipsky, Protest in City Politics (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1970), p. 182. 26Kenneth B. Clark, "The Negro Elected Official in the Changing American Scene," The Black Politician, Vol. 1, NO. 1 (July, 1969), pp. lfiilz. 27Knowles and Prewitt, pp, cit., pp. 1551157. 28Strange, pp, cit., pp. 48-52. 257 Vanecko in their study of school de- segregation.29 (9) Some black leaders believe that effective action on race-advancement issues is dif- ficult to implement on the local level. They believe that the most effective imple- mentation takes place on the state or national level through legislation and litigation. Strange has commented on this problem. He says: "The prospects for local solutions to the racial crisis in the metropolis are dim. . . . The in- escapable conclusion is that solutions will have to come from Washington."30 (10) The black community in Durant can be charac- terized as relatively powerless to effect major changes in its condition. This power- lessness of black leaders has been documented in numerous studies. Hunter noted that "none of the leaders in the Negro community may operate in the same echelons of power as the 29Robert L. Crain and James J. Vanecko, "Elite Influence in School Desegregation,” in James Q. Wilson, Cit Politics and Public Poligy (New York: John Wiley and Sons,‘l968)p p. 148. 30Strange, pp. cit., pp. 51-52. 258 top leaders in the total community. . . ."31 Thompson found that "insofar as the formula- tion or execution of policies and practices governing the civic, political, economic, educational, professional and cultural life Of the community is concerned, Negroes are 32 powerless." Barth and Abu-Laban note that "Blacks hold positions of little importance in the community's institutional structures; their decisions have no serious ramifications "33 for the larger community. Many other studies have arrived at the same conclusion 34 35 36 Clark, 40 including those by McKee, Sloan, Strange,37 Baron,38 Drake,39 Marshall, 31Hunter, pp, cit., p. 139. 32Thompson, pp. cit., p. 165. 33Barth and Abu-Laban, pp, cit., p. 76. 34McKee, Negro Leadership in Grand Rapids, p. 2. 35Sloan, pp, cit., p. 228. 36Clark, Dark Ghetto, pp. 155-156. 37Strange, pp, cit., p. 49. 38Baron, pp. cit., p. 33. 39St. Clair Drake, "The Social and Economic Status of the Negro in the United States," Daedalus, Vol. 94, No. 4 (Fall, 1965): pp. 803-805. 40T. A. Marshall, "Reflections on Power," Sociology, V01. 3' NO. 2 (May, 1969), p0 1510 259 Tucker,41 Comer,42 Silberman,43 Pfautz,44 and Scoble.45 Black Powerlessness The central conclusion growing out of our study is\that the black community in Durant is relatively power- less to effect major changes in such important areas as housing, education, human relations and police-black community relations. In Durant, the black community lacks economic and social power. There are no black individuals or institutions in Durant with major financial resources. NO black leader could be considered a.community-wide leader. Black leaders have only limited access to important centers of decision-making. They can bring issues to the attention of the authorities but usually are unable to see that sig— nificant changes are effected. No black leader can be con- sidered a social leader. A number of blacks serve in appointive or elective offices yet they have not been able to effect any significant changes in political, social or 41Sterling Tucker, Black Reflections on White Power (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans Pfiblishing Co., 1969), p. 70. 42James P. Comer, "The Social Power of the Negro," Scientific American, Vol. 216, No. 4 (April, 1967), p. 27. 43Silberman, pp, cit., p. 194. 44Pfautz, pp. cit., p. 163. 45Scoble, Negro Politics in Los Angeles,.p. 2. 260 economic priorities that would provide major improvements in housing, education or police-black community relations. The greatest potential for power in the black community is the black vote. This appears to be true in Durant and in most communities with sizeable black populations. Yet social scientists have noted the difficulties involved in translating votes into social and economic benefits. A number of studies have pointed to this difficulty. Jones, in his study of local government in the South, reports: "Black Office holders . . . have not had significant success in reordering the priorities of the bodies on which they serve and they have enjoyed only limited success in in- creasing the black community's share of benefits and services «46 and Wilson notes that utilizing the political pro- cess "can only marginally affect the income, housing, oc- "47 Keech cupation or life changes of Negro electorates. has noted that black minorities should not expect that the vote will be of paramount importance in helping them achieve social justice. He finds that elected officials will only support race advancement measures when these do not conflict with their own values or with those of a majority of the voters. He says: "The prospects that votes will help eliminate basic inequalities in the life chances of Negroes 46Jones, pp. cit., p. 70. 47 Wilson, "The Negro in American Politics,‘ p. 456. 261 ”are contingent on the degree to which appropriate programs fit within the value structure of elites [elected Officials] and voting majorities."48 ' ' Keech seems to have touched on the crux of the problem involved in translating votes into solutions. In Order for black voters to be effective, they must coordi- nate their efforts with one or more loci of power within the larger community.9 However most other loci of power including political parties, labor unions, business, - school boards and religious communities seem constrained 'from making additional concessions to the black community by widespread resistence from the larger community. ‘ Study Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research It was felt that the limitations of this study are the limitations inherent in any one-man study of Community leadership. Certainly a survey team would have been able; . toundertakeattitudinal surveys that would have-provided much additional valuable information regarding the black cOmmunity and its relationship to black leaders. ' "As the study of the issue-areas prOgressed it was clear that there was one impOrtant problem area--unemploy-‘ ment--that has not developed into a public issue-area. 48Keech, pp. cit.,pp. 107-108.‘ 262 Bachrach and Baratz have indicated that leaders sometimes are able to prevent problems from developing into public 49 However, there did not appear to be any "con- issues. spiracy" on the part of black leaders to deliberately ignore this problem area. Rather it appeared that un- employment has not emerged as an important issue-area be- cause it has been clear to black leaders that it is one that can not be dealt with effectively at the local level. It is also important to point out that although we have painted what might be regarded as a uniformly bleak picture Of race relations in Durant during the past decade, the period should not be viewed as one-uniformly lacking in hope and achievement. During the late fifties and early sixties signs of racial progress were limited. However, themiddle sixties was a period in which there was a great deal of protest activity and considerable optimism amOng black leaders in Durant regarding the possi- bility of modifying their situation. It was also a period when white leaders, recognizing that blacks had legitimate grievances, tried to make some concessions to the black 'community. In recent years, however, Durant's black leaders again appear to be more pessimistic regarding the possibility Of achieving important goals for the black community. 49Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, pp, cit. 263 There are many similarities among the conclusions emerging from this study and those growing out of other studies of black leadership, but there are also some im- portant differences. This would lead one to suggest that there is a need for additional studies of black leadership in a variety of community settings with differing economic, social and political environments in order to determine the effect Of these factors on leadership styles and goals. Durant's_Black Leaders and the Future Most of the black leaders dealt with in this study are attempting to arrive at solutions by working within the on-going social system. However, many black leaders in Durant appear to be somewhat confused about Objectives in the immediate future. Blacks appeared at one time to feel that federal and state legislation and litigation would solve many Of their problems. However, they have learned that even where legislation provides access to the larger society, the white community utilizes other methods of preventing blacks from achieving the rights of full citizenship. In Durant, this has been particularly true in the area of housing where it would appear that private interests still prevent blacks from exercising their legal rights. Even where full access is available, blacks find that the negative attitudes of the white community serve 264 as a kind of psychological barrier to full participation. In Durant, this appears to have occurred in the public schools. Blacks feel that many white administrators, counselors, teachers and students maintain an attitude of covert hostility toward them. This hostility Of the larger community to full integration has caused some national black spokesmen to re-evaluate their traditional support for an integrated society and to question whether the full develOpment of black people might not be most readily achieved in a separate black society. However, black leaders in Durant do not yet appear ready to abandon their historic commitment to an integrated society. BIBLIOGRAPHY BIBLIOGRAPHY Anderson, Elijah. "Black Shadow Politics in Midwestville." Sociological Inguiry 42 (1972): 19-27.» Angell, Robert C. "The Sociology of Human Conflict." In The Nature of Human Conflict, edited by Elton B.» McNeil. ‘Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice- Hall, 1965. Bachrach, Peter and Baratz, Morton S. "Two Faces of Power." American Political Science Review 56 (December 1962): 947-52. Bailey, Harry A., Jr. "Negro Interest Group Strategies." Urban Affairs Quarterly 4 (September 1968): 27-38. . Ne ro Politics in America. Columbus, Ohio: MerrilI PuBIIShing Company, 1967. Barron, Harold B. "Black Powerlessness in Chicago." Trans- Action 6 (November 1968): 27-33. Barth, Ernest A. T. and Abu-Laban, Baha. "Power Structure and the Negro Sub-Community." American Sociological Review 24 (February 1959): 69-76. Bernard, Jessie. "Where is the Modern Sociology of Con- flict?" American Journal of Sociology 56 (July 1950): 11-16. Bierstedt, Robert. "An Analysis of Social Power." American Sociological Review 15 (December 1950): 730-38. ' Blalock, Hubert M., Jr. "A Power Analysis of Racial Dis- crimination." Social Forces 39 (October 1960): 53-59. . Toward a Theory of Minority-Group Relations. New York: Capricorn BOOks, 1970. 265 266 Boulding, Kenneth E. Conflict and Defense. New York: Harper and Row, 1963, Bowman, Lewis. "Racial Discrimination and Negro Leader- ship Problems: The Case of 'Northern Community.'" Social Forces 44 (December 1965): 173-186. Brody, Catherine. Cash Item. New York: Longmans Green and Company, 1933. ' . Nobody Starves. New York: Longmans Green and Company, 1932. Burgess, M. Elaine. Negro Leadership in a Southern City. Chapel Hill, N.C.: UniverSity of North CarOlina Press, 1960. Clark, Kenneth B. Dark Ghetto: Dilemmas of Social Power. New York: Harper and Row, 1965. . "The Negro and the Urban Crisis." In A enda épr the Nation, edited by Gordon Kermit. Washlngton, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1968. . "The Negro Elected Official in the Changing American Scene." Black Politician 1 (July 1969): 8-12. Comer, James P. "The Social Power of the Negro." Scientific American 216 (April 1967): 21—27. Cooley, Charles H. Social Process. New York: Scribners, 1918. Coser, Lewis A. The Functions of Social Conflict. Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1956. Cothran, Tilman and Phillips, William, Jr. "Negro Leader- ship in a Crisis Situation." Phylon 22 (Summer 1961): 107-118. ‘ Crain, Robert L. and Vanecko, James J. "Elite Influence in School Desegregation." In Citprolitics and Public Policy, New York: John WiIey and Sons, I968. Dahl, Robert. Who Governs? New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1961. 267 Dahrendorf, Ralf. Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Societ . Stanford, California: StanfOrd University Press, 1959. . "Toward a Theory of Social Conflict." Journal of Conflict Resolution 2 (June 1958): 170-I83. Dewey, John. Human Nature and Conduct. New York: The Modern Library,7I930. Drake, St. Clair. "The Social and Economic Status of the Negro in the United States." Daedalus 94 (Fall 1965): 771-814. Durkheim, Emile. The Division of Labor in Society, New York: The Free Press, 1960. Easton, David. "The New Revolution in Political Science." American Political Science Review 63 (December 1969i: 1051-1061. Fine, Sidney. Sit Down . . . Ann Arbor, Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 1969. Galbraith, John K. American Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing Power. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1956. Gamson, William A. Power and Discontent. Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1968. Gerth, Hans and Mills, C. Wright, eds. From Max Weber . . . New York: Oxford University Press, 1946. ‘ Gosnell, Harold F. Negro Politicians. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1935. Himes, Joseph S. "The Functions of Racial Conflict." In Race, Class and Power, edited by Raymond W. Mack. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., 1968.‘ Horowitz, Irving L. "Consensus, Conflict and Cooperation: A Sociological Inventory." Social Forces 41 (December 1962): 177-188. Howard, John. "Blacks Without Power." In Where It's At: Radical Perspectives in Sociology, edited by Sieven E. DéutSCh and JOhn Howard. New York: Harper and Row, 1970. 268 Hughes, Everett C. "Race Relations and the Sociological Imagination." American Sociological Review 28 (December 1963): 879-890. Hunter, Floyd. Community Power Structure. Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1953. International Sociological Association. The Nature of Conflict. Paris: UNESCO, 1957. Jones, Mack H. "Black Officeholders in Local Governments of the South: An Overview." Politics 1971 (March 1971): 49-72. Keech, William R. The Impact of Negro Voting. Chicago, Illinois: Rand McNally, 1968} Killian, Lewis M. "Community Structure and the Role of the Negro Leader-Agent." Sociological Inquiry 35 (Winter 1965): 69-79. , and Grigg: Charles M. Racial Crisis in America . . . Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hail, 1964. Knowles, Louis L. and Prewitt, Kenneth. Institutional Racism in America. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1969. Ladd, Everett C., Jr. Negro Political Leadership in the South. Ithaca, New York: Cornell UniversiEy Press, 1966. Lasswell, Harold D. The Analysis of Political Behaviour. London: Routledge and Kegan, 1948. Laue, James H. "The Changing Character of Negro Protest." The Annals Of the American Academy 357 (January 1965): 119-126. Lipsky, Michael. Protest in City Politics. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1970. Lynd, Robert S. and Lynd, Helen M. Middletown . .‘. New York: Harcourt Brace, 1929. MacIver, Robert. The Web of Government. New York: Macmillan,‘1947. 269 Mack, Raymond W., and Snyder, Richard C. "The Analysis of Social Conflict--Toward an Overview and Synthesis." Journal of Conflict Resolution 1 (June 1957): '212-248. Marshall, T. A. "Reflections on Power." Sociology 3 (May 1969): 141-155. McKee,.James B. "The Ideology of Moderation: Some. Assumptions About Conflict in American Society." An address delivered in the Provost's Lecture Series, Michigan State University, February 26, 1964 (mimeographed). . Introduction to Sociology. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969. . Negro Leadership in Gtand Rapids. East Lansing: Institute fOr’COmmunity DeveIOpment, Michigan State University, 1962. . "Organized Labor and Community Decision-Making." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1953. Mills, C. Wright. 293 Power Elite. New York: Oxford University Press, 1956. Myrdal, Gunnar. An American Dilemma. New York: Harper, 1944. Nelson, Harold A. "Leadership and Change in an Evolu- tionary Movement . . ." Social Forces 49 (March 1971): 353-371. Olsen, Marvin. Power in Societies. New York: Macmillan, 1970. Palley, Marian L. et a1. "Subcommunity Leadership in a Black Ghetto: A Study of Newark, New Jersey." Urban Affairsvguarterlyrs (March 1970): 291-312. Park, Robert E. "The Social Function Of War." American Journal of Sociology 46 (January 1941): 55I-578. , and Burgess, Ernest W. Introduction to the Science pf Society. Chicago: UniVersity of Chicago Press,’192l. 270 Pfautz, Harold W.~ "The Power Structure of the Negro Sub- Community . . .- Phylon 23 (Summer 1962): 156-166. Pinkney, Alphonso. piack Americans. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1969. Press, Charles. Main Street Politics: Pplicy-Making at the Local LeveI. East Lansing: Institute for Community DeveIopment, Michigan State University, 1962. Presthus, Robert. Men at the Tpp, New York: Oxford University Press, I964. Ross, Edward A. Social Control. New York: Macmillan, 1916. Rossi, Peter H. Ghetto Revolts. Chicago: Aldine, 1970. Schermerhorn, R. A. "Power as a Primary Concept in the Study of Minorities." Social Forces 35 (October 1956): 53-56. Scoble, Harry M. "Effects of Riots on Negro Leadership." In Riots and Rebellion, edited by Louis H. Masotti and Don R. Bowden. BEverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1968. . Negro Politics in Los An eles. Los Angeles: Institute of’Government and PEEIic Affairs, University of California at Los Angeles, 1967. Silberman, Charles E. Crisis in Black and White. New York: Random House, 1964. Sindler, Allan P. "Protest Against the Political Status of the Negro."' Annals of the Amertcan Academy of Political and Social Science 357 (January 1965i: 48-54. ‘ Sloan, Lee. "Negro Community Leadership in a Northern City." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, 1967. Strange, John H. "Racial Segregation in the Metropolis." In Metropolitan Politics, edited by Michael N. DanieIson. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966. Taeuber, Karl E. and Taeuber, Alma F. Ne roes in Cities. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., I965 ' 271 Thompson, Daniel C. The Negro Leadership Class. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1963. Tocqueville, Alexis de. Democracy in America. New York: Vintage Books, 1954. Truman, David B. The Governmental Process. New York: Knopf, 1953. Tucker, Sterling. Black Reflections on White Power. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 1969: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. County Business Patterns, 1970. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Negro Pqulation in the United States: 1790-1950. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Negroes in the United States: 1920-1932. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. 1970 Census of Housing, General HousingtCharacteristics. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. 1970 Census of Population. Advance Report. GeneraI POpulation Characteristics. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. 1970 Census of Population and Housipg, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. 1970 Census of Population. Number of Inhabitants. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. U.S. Census of POpulation: 1960, 1950, 1940, 1938. U.S. Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. Growth and Pros-. erit in Five Midwestern Cities. Chicago: FederaI Reserve Bank, 1955. Useem, John. "The Sociology of Power." Paper presented at the 45th meeting of the American Sociological Society, Denver, Colorado, September 6-9, 1950. Van Doorn, J. A. A. "Conflict in Formal Organizations." In Conflict in Societ , edited by Anthony Reuck and JuIie Knight. London: Churchill, 1966. 272 . "Protest and Negotiation: A Case Study of Negro Leadership in Atlanta, Georgia." Midwest Journal Of Political Science 7 (May 1963): 99-124. Wallace, Michael. "The Uses of Violence in American History." American Scholar 40 (Winter 1970-71): 81-102. Watters, Pat and Cleghorn, Reese. ClimbinngacOb's Ladder: The ArrivalJof Negrogp in Southern—Politics. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Ward} 1967. Wilson, James Q. "The Negro in American Politics: The ' Present." In The Americap_Negro Refptence Book, edited by John P. Davis. EngIewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1966. . Ne ro Politics . . . New York: The Free Press, 1960. 7 . "The Strategy of Protest: Problems of Negro Civic Action." Journal of Conflict Resolution 5 (September 1961): 291-303. Young, Richard. "The Impact of Protest Leadership on Negro Politicians in SaanranciscO." Western Political gtarterty_22 (March 1969): 94-III. IES "ITilliiijfliiifliiii‘l