THE EFFECTS OF AGRARIAN REFORM IN SOUTHERN YUCATAN, MEXICO: A CASE STUDY OF A FEDERALLY ADMINISTERED MIXED FARMING COLLECTIVE EJIDO

Dissertation for the Degree of Ph. D.

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
JACOB JOSEPH CLIMO

1976



3 1293 10110 1347

LIBRARY
Michigan State
University

This is to certify that the

thesis entitled

THE EFFECTS OF AGRARIAN REFORM IN SOUTHERN YUCATAN, MEXICO: A CASE STUDY OF A FEDERALLY ADMINISTERED MIXED FARMING COLLECTIVE EJIDO

presented by

JACOB JOSEPH CLIMO

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

Ph.D. degree in Anthropology

Major professor

Date 6 May 1976

O-7639



61000-11

ABSTRACT

THE EFFECTS OF AGRARIAN REFORM IN SOUTHERN YUCATÁN, MEXICO: A CASE STUDY OF A FEDERALLY ADMINISTERED MIXED FARMING COLLECTIVE EJIDO

By

Jacob Joseph Climo

This thesis is concerned with the collective ejido as an institutional form in the context of Mexico's agrarian reform and development program. It compares the relative success of collective ejidos in two ecological zones in the state of Yucatán.

Initially, the high degree of cultural and historical continuity of the Yucatán region would tend to suggest a uniform setting for the adaptation of collective ejidos. Both the northern and southern zones share a common cultural and linguistic background, an hacienda and plantation history, and contemporary rural administrations which are characterized by federal agrarian reform agencies interacting with local collective ejido organizations.

Nevertheless, the adaptation of the collective ejido to these zones differs significantly in both economic and social dimensions. The collective ejidos in the northern zone are adapted to the agro-industrial production of commercial henequen in the context of a stagnating economy, while recent collective ejidos established in the southern zone are organized around cattle ranching and mechanized

cash-crop farming in an expanding economy. Differences in the adaptations of the collective ejidos in these zones are clearly related to: (1) varying local ecological potentialities for resource development, and (2) resulting federal administrative policies which either restrict or encourage local economic and social development. Moreover, corresponding differences are noted in the quality of relations between government extension agencies and local ejido organizations.

The data suggest that the economic, social, and political success of federally administered collective ejidos in Mexico ultimately depends upon the configuration of local and regional conditions which inhibit or encourage the development of particular collective ejidos in specific localities.

After a brief introductory chapter, Chapter Two delineates the place of the agrarian reform and ejido program within its larger context of Mexican society and culture. It then describes the basic ecological features and cultural history of the Yucatán region. The final section turns specifically to the effects of the collective ejido program in Yucatán's northern henequen-producing zone.

Chapter Three considers the ecological and cultural history of the southern ex-hacienda under investigation. The first section describes the setting of the village, including the location of the ex-hacienda along communication routes and its official political ties within the municipio of Tzucacab. It also considers certain key geographical features, village settlement patterns, acculturation, and population statistics. The second section reviews the pre-agrarian

reform history of this ex-hacienda, collective ejido community in two parts: the expansion of haciendas, 1823 to 1875, and the corporate sugar plantation, 1876 to 1935. The final section describes the two major policy changes in the agrarian reform following its initial impact in 1937: first, the state administration of the government-owned sugar plantation, 1936 to 1962; and second, the federal administration and the emergence of the collective ejido cattle and cash crop farm, beginning in 1964.

Chapter Four discusses the legal basis of the ejido and the changes in the local economy which resulted from the ejido mixed farming development project. The first section describes the formal organization of the local ejido society. The basis of membership and rights in the ejido are defined, followed by a delineation of the two major ejido organizations: the general assembly and the credit society. The section ends with a discussion of ejido land utilization and occupations. The second section deals with the relations of production on the ejido mixed farming development project, including: capital dependence and the costs of production, the management-labor structure, the credit society and employment, farming methods, and productivity and marketing. The third section elaborates the non-ejido occupations in this ex-hacienda village, including local businessmen, ranchers, free milperos, wage laborers, and subsidiary economic activities. The chapter ends with a review of socio-economic classes, past and present, and a brief description of the contemporary standard of living.

Chapter Five examines changes in the social organization of this ex-hacienda community resulting from the formation of the local

collective ejido. The first section focuses on occupational status groups in the lower class, including ejidatarios and non-ejidatarios. The second section examines selected aspects of family life, including household, the life cycle, nuclear family relations, extended and affinal relations, and ritual kin. The third section describes community-level relations and institutions, including leisure, religion, and public health and education, while the concluding section deals with relations between the community and the nation-state which have emerged as a result of the national agrarian reform.

Chapter Six presents an analysis of local ejido politics and the principal political changes resulting from the formation of the collective ejido. The first section deals with relations between the ejido and the federal agrarian reform administration. It begins by describing the impact of Mexico's revolutionary political ideology on the ejidatarios. This discussion is followed by an elaboration of the socio-political functions of the National Indigenous Institute, which administers the ejido mixed farming project. The section concludes with a discussion of the expanding ejido economy and the formation of new credit societies. The second section deals with internal ejido politics, including labor relations within the credit society, the role of credit society chief representative, factional conflict within the credit society, and cooperation, conflict, and alliance between credit societies. The final section of this chapter describes relations of cooperation and conflict between the ejido and the private sector.

The concluding chapter summarizes the findings of the ethnographic data concerning this ex-hacienda, collective ejido community, then compares and contrasts this southern mixed farming ejido and northern henequen ejidos with regard to ecology and potential for economic development, the effects of administrative policies since Cárdenas, and the local political economy of the collective ejido organizations. The thesis concludes with a consideration of the implications of this study for future policy and research.

THE EFFECTS OF AGRARIAN REFORM IN SOUTHERN YUCATÁN, MEXICO: A CASE STUDY OF A FEDERALLY ADMINISTERED MIXED FARMING COLLECTIVE EJIDO

By

Jacob Joseph Climo

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Anthropology

1976

© Copyright by

JACOB JOSEPH CLIMO

1976

TO MY PARENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Various institutions provided financial support for this project. I received two grants from the Latin American Studies Center of Michigan State University which supported the field research from June through August, 1970, and from January through March, 1971. I am grateful to Dr. John Hunter, director of the Center, for this support. From October through December, 1970, I received living expenses from the Yucatán government. During that period I gathered survey data in the village of Catmis to be utilized in a larger government project concerned with the socio-economic conditions of the henequen zone and surrounding area. I am grateful to Professor Fernando Câmara B., sub-director of the Institúto Nacionál de Antropología E História, for allowing me to participate in that project. During the last six months of the field research, from January through June, 1971, I received a research assistantship from the Department of Anthropology, Michigan State University. I am grateful to Dr. Iwao Ishino, then Department Chairman, for that support.

I am also indebted to my teachers. Dr. Bernard Gallin, Chairman of the Department of Anthropology, MSU, offered helpful discussions before the project was formulated and through much of the writing. Professor Fernando Câmara B., provided me with letters of introduction to the necessary agencies in Mexico, and helped me select Catmis as a village where changes brought by the national

agrarian reform could be investigated fruitfully. He also criticized various drafts of my research proposal and offered helpful discussions on problems associated with Yucatán's agrarian development. Dr. Scott Cook offered helpful advice and some theoretical suggestions during the field research. Dr. Arthur Rubel offered helpful comments on a paper I wrote and discussed Mexico's agrarian reform with me on a number of occasions in the light of his research in Oaxaca. Dr. Leonard Kasdan helped me through many theoretical and concrete problems as my teacher. Finally, Dr. Joseph Spielberg taught me much of what I know about Mexico and politics. He also served as chairman of my thesis committee and supervised the writing of the final draft. His patient and persistent criticism of my work has been very valuable to me.

I wish to express my appreciation to many people outside academia who helped in the intellectual development of this thesis. In Mexico, I visited many federal agencies in an effort to learn about different aspects of Yucatán's agrarian reform. I was received by many government officials who offered assistance. I am particularly grateful to Professora Celinda Gomez of the Institûto Nacionál de Antropología E História in Mérida, and to Prof. Efrén Caraveo C., then director of the Institûto Nacionál Indigenísta in Peto, Yucatán.

In addition, the people of Catmis are accustomed to strangers from other parts of Mexico, who reside in the village for varying lengths of time to perform educational, medical, or technical services for the community; the beneficial effects of these services are immediate and tangible. When I came to Catmis, the villagers

wanted to know how the anthropologist, yet another professional, would help them. While I believed my investigation would ultimately prove beneficial to them, I had nothing tangible which would help them in the immediate present, nor could I promise anything for the future. Under these tenuous circumstances, I am deeply grateful to Srs. Hipolito Carballo, Manuel Ix Ix, Jose J. Carrillo, Manuel Lizama, and Sra. Lupe Ortega V., all long-time residents of the village, who helped me by offering information freely and, I believe honestly, although they knew there were no immediate rewards available.

This thesis is dedicated to my parents, Leonard S. Climo and Adeline S. Climo, for their encouragement in the pursuit of my chosen career. I also received similar encouragement from my sister, Miriam C. Katz. Finally, I am grateful to my wife, Martha, for her moral and intellectual support during the preparation of the thesis.

Many individuals and institutions have helped make this thesis possible and share in the credit for any contribution it may make. However, the accuracy of the data and the substance of the opinions and conclusions remain entirely my own responsibility.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

LIST OF TABLES ix

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS xii

Chapter

ONE: INTRODUCTION 1

Objectives of the Study 1
Mexico: A Complex Society 2
Theoretical Issues and the Problem 7
Methodology and Field Research 13
Organization of the Chapters 19

TWO: COMPARATIVE HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK OF COLLECTIVE EJIDOS IN THE YUCATÁN REGION. 23

Introduction 23
The Ejido: A National Institution 23
The Yucatán Region: Ecological and Cultural History . 33
The Effects of Agrarian Reform in the Northern Henequen Zone 58
Summary 79

THREE: ECOLOGY AND HISTORY OF AN EX-HACIENDA IN THE SOUTHERN ZONE 82

Introduction 82
The Setting 82
Ex-Hacienda and Municipio 82
Geography 87
Settlement Patterns 88
Acculturation 91
Population 94
Pre-Agrarian Reform History 96
The Expansion of the Hacienda, 1824-1876 97
The Corporate Sugar Plantation, 1877-1937 99
The Agrarian Reform 106

Chapter		Page
	State Administration: The Government-Owned Sugar Plantation 1936-1962	108
	Federal Administration: The Collective Ejido Cattle and Cash Crop Farm, 1964-	120
	Summary	125
FOUR:	THE EJIDO AND THE LOCAL ECONOMY	131
	Introduction	131
	The Formal Organization of the Ejido	132
	Membership and Rights	132
	The General Assembly and the Credit Society	135
	Ejido Land Utilization and Occupations	140
	The Mixed Farming Project	147
	Capital Dependence and Production Costs	149
	The Management-Labor Structure	159
	The Credit Society and Employment	164
	Farming Methods	171
	Productivity and Marketing	178
	Non-Ejido Occupations	185
	Local Businesses	186
	Ranchers (Small Land Owners)	188
	Free Milperos	191
	Wage Laborers	195
	Subsidiary Economic Activities	196
	Socio-Economic Classes	198
	The Past and the Present	198
	The Standard of Living	204
	Summary	210
FIVE:	SOCIAL ORGANIZATION	220
	Introduction	220
	Occupational Status Groups in the Lower Class	221
	Ejidatarios	221
	Non-Ejidatarios	224
	The Family	236
	The Household	237
	The Life Cycle	243
	The Nuclear Family	251
	Extended and Affinal Relations	260
	Ritual Kin	262
	The Community	268
	Leisure	269
	Religion	273
	Public Health and Education	284
	The Community and the Nation-State	290
	Summary	295

Chapter Page

SIX: LOCAL EJIDO POLITICS 303

Introduction 303
The Ejido and the Federal Agrarian Reform Administration 305
The Impact of Mexico's Revolutionary Political Ideology 306
The National Indigenous Institute 311
Labor-Administration Relations on the Mixed Farming Project 317
The Expanding Ejido Economy and the Formation of Credit Societies 323
Internal Ejido Politics 331
Labor Relations Within the Credit Society 332
The Role of Credit Society Chief Representative . . 337
Factional Conflict Within the Credit Society 340
Cooperation, Conflict and Alliance Between Credit Societies 347
The Ejido and the Private Sector: Cooperation and Conflict 354
Summary 365

SEVEN: CONCLUSIONS 374

Introduction 374
Ecology and Administrative Policy as Causal Variables in Catmis and the Northern Henequen Zone . 375
Administrative Policies Since Cárdenas 376
Ecology and Potential for Economic Expansion 380
The Effects of Economic Potential on Administrative Policies 382
The Economic Development and Political Organization of the Collective Ejidos 384
Some Implications for Future Policy and Research . . . 397

APPENDICES

A. QUESTIONNAIRE FOR SOCIO-ECONOMIC STUDY OF CATMIS . . . 401

B. THE COSTS OF PRODUCTION (TABLES B1-B14) 404

BIBLIOGRAPHY 422

GLOSSARY 432

LIST OF TABLES

Table		Page
1.	Traditional and Modern Clothing in Catmis	92
2.	Population Statistics for Catmis: 1900-1970	94
3.	Adult Emigration From Catmis and Localities of Immigration	118
4.	Individual Milpa Production on Ejido Lands, 1970	146
5.	The Structure of the Mixed Farming Loans	152
6.	Yearly Expenditures for Goods and Services: 1968-1970	165
7.	Monthly Labor Expendtirues for the Mixed Farming Project	166
8.	Number of Weeks Worked by Credit Society Members: 1969 and 1970	168
9.	Credit Society and Non-Credit Ejidatario Earnings	170
10.	Earnings of Ejidatarios and Non-Ejidatarios Who Worked on the Credit Society Development Project	171
11.	Crop Cultivation on the Mixed Farming Project	173
12.	Age Distribution of Adult Male Ejidatarios and Non-Ejidatarios in Catmis	225
13.	Emigration of Conjugal Family Members From the Village	228
14.	Average Weekly Income and Expenditures of Ejido and Non-Ejido Families	231
15.	Material Wealth of Ejido and Non-Ejido Families	233
16.	Household Size and Composition	238
17.	Age of Male Household Heads: 1941, 1956, and 1971	239
18.	Distribution of Household Types: 1956 and 1971	240
19.	Types of Marriage by Age	247

Table		Page
20.	Type of Marriage by Occupational Status Groups	248
21.	Occupation of Godparents for Baptism	266
22.	Participation in Catholic Ritual by Occupational Status	275
23.	Participation in Catholic Ritual by Age	276
24.	Itemization of Fiesta Expenditures and Earnings	279
25.	Participation in Mayan Rituals by Age	281
26.	Participation in Mayan Rituals by Occupational Status	282
27.	Milpa Cultivation by Occupational Status	283
28.	Literacy by Sex	287
29.	Literacy by Occupational Status	288
30.	Literacy by Age	288
B1.	Investments for the Cattle Ranching Project	404
B2.	Amortization Schedule of the Basic and Supplementary Cattle Ranching Loans	405
B3.	Estimated Productivity of the Cattle Breeding Project	406
B4.	Estimated Earnings and Expenditures for the Breeding Project	407
B5.	Estimated Annual Expenditures and Profits for the Fattening Loan	409
B6.	Expenditures for the Basic Cultivation Loan	410
B7.	Amortization Table for the Basic and Supplementary Cultivation Loan	411
B8.	Selected Crops, Planting Seasons, and Total Project Costs	412
B9.	Costs of Production and Estimated Profits for One Hectare of Maize	413
B10.	Costs of Production and Estimated Profits for One Hectare of Sesame	414

Table		Page
B11.	Costs of Production and Estimated Profits for One Hectare of Soybean	415
B12.	Costs of Production and Estimated Profits for One Hectare of Grain Sorghum	416
B13.	Costs of Production and Estimated Profits for One Hectare of Fodder Sorghum	417
B14.	Total Actual Expenditures by Loan Category: March 1968-February 1971	418

ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure — Page

1. The Formal Management-Labor Structure of the Mixed Farming Project 160

2. Social Composition of Extended Family Households 242

Map

1. Yucatán State: The Northern and Southern Zones 35

2. The Municipio of Tzucacab and Area Surrounding the Village 83

3. The Village of Catmis 90

4. Land Utilization on the Catmis Ejido: 1970 141

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Objectives of the Study

One of the principal goals of Mexico's agrarian reform was to integrate the peasantry into the economic and political life of the nation-state. It its early phases the agrarian reform established the institutional means by which the peasantry could participate in the national culture. It strengthened the position of labor, emancipated the Indian, spread public education and health services, and improved communications. Even more importantly, it transformed Mexico's political economy by breaking up the large *haciendas* and by distributing land to the peasants through the *ejido* program.

Since 1940 the pace of social change and land distribution has slowed down. Nevertheless, the course has been set. Today, all new policies have as their expressed goals the material and cultural betterment of the peasantry and their economic, social, and political integration into the life of the nation-state.

This thesis illustrates some of the effects of Mexico's agrarian reform in the Yucatán region through an ethnographic case study of a federally administered cattle and cash-crop farming collective ejido in southern Yucatán state. The study has three main objectives: (1) to examine the economic and social changes in an ex-hacienda, collective ejido community which have resulted from

national agrarian reforms; (2) to describe and analyze the socio-political and economic relations between the collective ejido and government agencies representing national agrarian reform institutions; and (3) to compare and contrast the economic and social development of this southern mixed farming collective ejido with northern henequen-producing ejidos which have been studied by other anthropologists concerned with the impact of Mexico's agrarian reform in Yucatán state.

Prior to focusing on the ejido in question, however, some background information concerning the theoretical and conceptual framework of the study will be presented. This chapter, therefore, begins by defining the place of Mexico's agrarian reform and development within a larger theoretical context. Then, it outlines the specific theoretical problems considered and the methods utilized in the study.

Mexico: A Complex Society

Since the early community studies by Redfield and Villa (Redfield 1941, 1950; Villa 1945; Redfield and Villa 1934), anthropologists increasingly have begun to conceptualize Mexico as a complex society. While Redfield's original contribution was his concept of the community isolate, it was his folk-urban continuum theory that first implied a cultural relationship between the different community types existing contemporaneously in Mexico.

Mexican anthropologists early grasped the utility of his model for differentiating community types within the nation-state. Fernando Cámara (1952: 143) distinguished communities that are "traditional,

homogeneous, collectivistic, well-integrated" and have obligatory service in political and religious offices, i.e. centripetal organization, from communities that are "changing, heterogeneous, weakly integrated" and have voluntary service, i.e. centrifugal organization. Aguirre Beltran (1955) stressed the historical, economic, and cultural relationship between urban centers of diffusion and nearby rural communities which became their satellites.

Julian Steward (1950: 106-114; 1951) developed a general theory of "socio-cultural integration," signifying the social and cultural processes by which part-processes characteristic of a plurality of social and cultural units are coordinated into a social system. Steward emphasized three major levels of socio-cultural integration: the level of the nuclear family; the level of the multi-family socio-cultural system coordinated through a supra-family organization, referred to as the "community"; and the state level of integration, bringing several multi-family aggregates into functional dependence on one another within a still larger system.

Aguirre Beltran applied Steward's concept of socio-cultural integration to Middle America using the following levels: the nuclear family, kindred, barrio or ward, community, constellation of a regional capital with satellite towns (called states in Mexico and departments in Guatemala), and, finally, the state (Wolf 1967: 300).

Steward and his students (Steward et al. 1969) tested his theory in a comprehensive ethnological study of Puerto Rican society. In the study, they utilized the concept of "sub-culture" as a local unit of analysis to refer to various local social and cultural

segments within a larger national culture which, like Mexico, was characterized by complex social institutions and social classes.

In a well-known article, Wolf (1956: 1065) proposed the term "nation-oriented group to stand for Steward's idea of "horizontal socio-cultural segment." He then contrasted such groups with "community-oriented groups." Reviewing Mexico's history from the earliest period of Colonial rule, Wolf considered the ways in which these two kinds of social groups arranged and rearranged themselves in conflict and accommodation along the major economic and political axes of Mexican society. He claimed that each rearrangement produced a changed configuration in the relationship of community-oriented and nation-oriented groups:

> . . . During the first period of Post-Colombian Mexican history, political power was concentrated on the national level in the hands of royal officials. Royal officials and colonist entrepreneurs struggled with each other for control of the labor supply located in the Indian communities. In this struggle, the royal officials helped to organize the Indian peasantry into corporate communities which proved strongly resilient to outside change. During the second period, the colonist entrepreneurs--and especially the owners of haciendas--threw off royal control and established autonomous local enclaves, centered on their enterprises. With the fusion of political and economic power in the hands of these intermediate power holders, the national government was rendered impotent and the Indian peasant groups became satellites of the entrepreneurial complex. At the same time, their corporate communal organization was increasingly weakened by internal differentiation and the inroads of outsiders. During the third period, the entrepreneurial complexes standing between community and nation were swept away by the agrarian revolution and power again returned to a central government. Political means are once more applied to check the transformation of power-seekers from the local communities into independent entrepreneurs. Among the groups used in exercising such restraint are the agriculturalists, organized in ejidos which allow the government direct access to the people of the local communities (Wolf 1956: 1073).

Considering contemporary Mexico, Wolf justified his call to investigate Mexican society by analyzing the economic and political relations between nation-oriented groups on different levels of the larger society:

> Throughout this analysis, we have been concerned with the bonds which unite groups on different levels of the larger society, rather than with the internal organization of communities and national-level institutions. Such a shift in emphasis seems increasingly necessary as our traditional models of communities and national institutions become obsolete. Barring such a shift, anthropologists will have to abdicate their new-found interest in complex societies (Ibid.: 1074).

Consistent with this emerging theoretical orientation toward Mexico as a complex society, Adams (1962: 409) reaffirmed earlier criticisms of the Redfieldian community model as an obsolete unit of analysis on grounds that major bonds with the nation-state which were rapidly developing within the community could neither be understood nor analyzed using that traditional conceptual framework. As an alternative to the community isolate he proposed to study the processes involved in nationalization:

> . . . The most successful process to date has not been the incorporation of communities as such within the national system, but the incorporation (often coupled with their creation) of other organizations. Labor unions, agrarian reforms, and collectivization . . . [when used as devices to gain the loyalty of, and control over, a population] have not been used with communities as such but with relational systems that intersect and form parts of communities (Adams 1962: 409).

In his theoretical concept of "secondary development" Adams (1967) linked the increasing ties of nation- and community-oriented groups to the larger processes of industrialization and economic development. He distinguished two kinds of development patterns in the growth of human societies: the primary and the secondary.

Primary development produces technological inventions and discoveries and elaborates social and economic forms to handle the consequences, while in secondary development the basic technological devices and economic forms are already invented before they are introduced into an area. In secondary development,

> . . . industrialization . . . does not mean the process of laissez faire, trial and error, invention, discovery, and general innovation that permits a society to find a subsequent adjustment, but rather, the importation of the basic processes and the attempt to graft them onto a social structure already specifically organized to carry on a different kind of process (Adams 1967: 19).

According to Adams, Western Europe and North America experienced primary development with the coming of the industrial revolution. Technology was learned by the industrialized laborers, but only gradually did they develop social devices such as strikes, syndicates, and unions, to achieve better conditions of employment and to secure a greater portion of the increasing wealth (Ibid.: 18).

Unlike Western Europe and North America, however, industrial growth in Latin America began in the twentieth century, and it did so through secondary development:

> The Mexican Revolution serves as a historical marker for the beginning of Latin America's secondary adaptation, even though industrial technology preceded it. . . . What followed in . . . Mexico . . . was the emergence of the government as the only focal organization in the society that could attempt to restructure the society so that some of the benefits that had begun to spread through the population of the more industrialized world could be realized by the masses of the underdeveloped areas (Ibid.; 20).

Hence, one of the principal characteristics of secondary development is that the government exercises a position of power,

manipulating the factors of development to achieve a social reorganization that will not only permit but also hasten development.

> Secondary development, for better or worse, involves social engineering and, hopefully, orderly planning. In primary development, social engineering and planning have usually followed well after technological change; until the inventions are made, no one can plan what to do with them and with their consequences. In secondary development, however, a country finds the market full of available technology, and the question becomes one, first, of selecting that which will be more appropriate for the local scene, and, second, reorganizing the society so that the new devices may become operative (Ibid.: 21).

Adams' theory of "secondary development" explains how the major economic and technological changes in Latin American communities were imposed from above. The government then created local political and labor organizations which today interact with higher-level governmental agencies for the management and development of local resources.

Theoretical Issues and the Problem

For two main reasons, anthropologists have been reluctant or unable to fully adopt the theoretical orientation proposed by Adams. Firstly, accepting the theoretical perspective of secondary development would require certain fundamental changes in the models which underlie much anthropological research in Mexico and Latin America. Whether overtly or covertly, many anthropologists still cling to the traditional "community isolate" perspective. Consequently, even when they confront directly the problem of the local effects of government-sponsored development projects, they are ill-equipped to deal with it in the larger context of nationalization or secondary development.

Foster's (1967) well-known study of Tzintzuntzan provides a good example of the way anthropologists perpetuate the "community" concept even when the impetus for change is obviously planned development imposed upon the villagers by government. In his discussion of the effects of the community development program CREFAL (Céntro Regionál de Educación Fundamentál para la América Latína), Foster is clearly aware that the role of government administration must be understood. Nevertheless, he still holds fast to an implicit assumption of the community isolate and never perceives the project in its larger context of nationalization or secondary development:

> . . . Experience in CREFAL and elsewhere shows that much more than the cultural forms of the recipient group must be known if all is to go well. This is because in all programs of directed culture change at least two socio-cultural systems interact with each other: (1) the client group, the community, and (2) the innovating bureaucracy. For a community development organization, like any bureaucracy, can be looked upon as a society with specific cultural forms, much as a village community consists of a society with its culture (Foster 1967: 343).

In the perspective of secondary development, it is not so much that development projects represent one aspect or dimension to be studied side by side with other similar dimensions such as acculturation, assimilation, or the formation of classes, but rather, that actions which are initiated by the government in the context of development projects must be seen as the principal cultural process behind economic and socio-political change on the local level. As yet, this perspective has not taken hold in anthropological circles.

A second reason for the failure of "secondary development" to become a widely utilized concept in anthropological investigations of Latin America is that the theory itself has demonstrated

certain significant shortcomings. Any theory dealing with complex society should elaborate in unambiguous terms all of the possible factors which may influence the outcome of secondary development.

Adams, however, is content to present an incomplete model of secondary development. He explains the impact of secondary development only on the national level, not on the regional or local levels. Moreover, without the empirical basis provided by studies of specific regions and localities, Adams' view of secondary development appears static and unchanging. Certainly federal administrative policies do not emerge full blown and are not applied uniformly or with equal success throughout the country. A more appropriate view would be one that accounts for regional ecological variations as well as changes in administrative policies in response to the successes and failures in the implementation of specific development programs.

Naturally, such a model would be very complex, requiring a vast number of variables. Unfortunately, however, without such a model the theory of secondary development remains on a high level of abstraction without concrete links to field research.

In an effort to explore some of the more empirical although lesser-known aspects of this theory, the present thesis proposes to investigate some of the factors which influence the results of secondary development as observed in a government-sponsored agrarian development project in southern Yucatán state. The thesis presents a comprehensive study of this mixed farming collective ejido in the context of both regional/local and national agrarian reform and

development. The study focuses on the way local and regional ecological variables influence national administrative policies which, in turn, determine: (1) local and regional institutional variations and (2) the results of the project with respect to the expressed goals of the government. Before turning to the characteristic features of this particular farming project, however, it is necessary to clarify what each of these causal variables connotes and the relationships among them.

One important factor involves the history and evolution of administrative policies and the institutional forms which the government has established to implement secondary development. Such administrative policies constitute the major thrust of governmental efforts to achieve secondary development. Yet any particular policy must be understood as an historical process which emerged out of earlier processes and which dies only slowly as its specific goals and institutional forms are sooner or later achieved or subsumed under the goals and institutional forms of newer policies.

Superficially, one might suggest that such administrative policies emerge out of political expediency. However, Mexico's secondary development has demonstrated a measure of economic success during the last 35 or 40 years which required a high degree of rational planning and implementation, certainly implying that government planners have adapted their thinking more toward technological and production requirements than merely to the political or social exigencies of the moment.

As a process, the evolution of administrative policies in the agrarian sector has been altered by at least three factors. Firstly, even if certain key institutional forms have remained unchanged, the implementation of national agrarian reform laws has varied in different periods of the country's post-Revolutionary history. Secondly, the implementation of technology-related policies has varied corresponding to improvements in agricultural technology such as the rapid expansion of irrigation projects beginning in the late 1930s when the profitability of such projects was discovered or changes in the types of agricultural commodities produced and exported. Finally, international factors such as markets, fluctuating prices, and outstanding debts have influenced the process of evolving administrative policies (see, for example, J. Wilkie 1970). In each case, the chief consequence has been changing priorities and policies followed by corresponding alterations in institutional forms. Thus, any empirical investigation of secondary development must necessarily explain administrative policies and institutional forms in a temporal and changing light rather than in a static framework.

A second factor which influences the results of secondary development consists of the local and regional ecology. Here one must consider the role played by environmental variables in the success and failure of national institutional forms and policies. The same policy applied to different regions or even different ecological zones in the same region may bring very different results. Thus, a number of ecological variables can be considered causal to the effects

of development projects in any specific locality. Such variables might include the following: (1) the configuration of rural to urban settlements, (2) the degree of cultural heterogeneity of the people, (3) population densities, and (4) natural resources and potentialities for resource development. These variables, among others, would influence the outcome of secondary development by shaping and limiting local and regional institutional forms.

A final factor which influences the results of secondary development concerns the pre-existing institutions of a region or locality. The local economy as well as social and political institutions which existed before the imposition of secondary development from above must adapt to some extent to the new circumstances of development. Perhaps it is the local institutions which change the most as a result of secondary development. Nevertheless, a feedback effect takes place in which pre-existing local institutions also limit and may influence the local expression of national institutional forms as well as the outcome of national development policies and programs.

This thesis tests the hypothesis that ecological variations are causal to the effects of national agrarian reform policies which, in turn, determine the shape of local-level economic and socio-political institutions. To operationalize the hypothesis, it was proposed that: Although national agrarian reform administrative policies will demonstrate considerable uniformity, the effects of such policies on ex-hacienda collective ejidos in Yucatán's northern and southern zones will vary in certain fundamental respects as local

collective ejido organizations necessarily adapt to significant ecological/economic differences between the two zones.

Methodology and Field Research

The study was designed to contribute to both the ethnography and ethnology of collective ejido communities in an effort to identify causal variables in the economic and socio-political adaptations observed on the local level. Beginning with the ethnographic purpose, the study elaborated the ecology and economic potential, the history of administrative policies, and the resulting local economic, social, and political effects of the agrarian reform on an ex-hacienda collective ejido community in the southern zone. Such basic ethnographic data were required for the southern zone since no previous studies of southern haciendas in Yucatán had been made.

The particular southern ex-hacienda collective ejido community was selected for study for a number of reasons. First, prior to the Cárdenas reforms in 1937, this hacienda was the center of a large, corporately owned and administered sugar plantation of the "factory-in-the-field type" (Mintz 1969); the refining plant was located in the heart of the hacienda, while the surrounding lands were dedicated to commercial sugar cane production. The hacienda inhabitants were landless, wage laborers, held to the plantation through personal bonds with the owners based on paternalism. With the implementation of the national agrarian reforms in 1937, and subsequent modifications in the 1960s, the local economy as well as the social structure was radically transformed. Observation of this

ex-hacienda, therefore, permits analysis of the major economic, social, and political changes brought by the agrarian reform.

Secondly, the collective ejido farm is operated today as a modern agricultural experimental project which is subsidized and administered by national agrarian reform agencies in order to test the feasibility of other similar projects in the region and in other regions of the nation which possess similar potentialities for resource development. The expressed purpose of this development project is to raise the standard of living of the ejidatarios and thereby integrate them into the national economy and culture. The presence of this development project, therefore, offered the possibility of evaluating its success or failure with reference to its own stated goals, thus adding another dimension to understanding the impact of agrarian reform on this ex-hacienda, collective ejido community.

Thirdly, although the workers of this ex-hacienda were affected by significant agrarian reforms in the 1930s, particularly by the formation of a labor union and the nationalization of part of the sugar plantation, nevertheless, the local collective ejido is new. Having been established in 1964, it reflects an important national trend in which many new ejidos are formed in mountainous regions, tropical bush lands, and semi-desert plains--lands which are suitable mainly for cattle grazing (Chevalier 1965: 169-170). According to the 1950 federal census, more than 80 million hectares in Mexico were dedicated to cattle raising, forest, and grazing estates. About 20 million hectares of these lands were utilized

by 7,393 communal and public estates, while the remaining 60 million hectares were employed by private estates, several thousand of which are no doubt immense (Ibid.). With the advent of small, relatively inexpensive irrigation projects, Mexico's potential for creating intensive cattle-ranching and cash-cropping collective ejidos is tremendous. A few anthropologists have recognized the need for research on modern cattle-ranching estates (Wagley and Harris 1955: 52). However, no complete monograph of a cattle-ranching collective ejido has been written. The ejido in southern Yucatán was therefore selected for study in order to fill this gap in the literature.

The final reason for selecting this particular ejido community relates to the ethnological purpose of the study. In contrast to the restrictive ecology and lack of potential for economic development of the northern henequen zone, this southern ex-hacienda, collective ejido has a physical environment which is conducive to economic growth. A controlled intraregional comparison of this cattle and cash-cropping collective ejido with henequen ejidos in Yucatán's northern zone is valuable for at least two reasons: first, it identifies the broader similarities of the effect of agrarian reform policies on the entire Yucatán region; and second, it helps isolate the causal variables, i.e. the impact of local ecology on national administrative policies which are responsible for shaping the economic and social adaptation of local collective ejidos and the quality of relations between the ejidatarios and federal agents representing national agrarian reform institutions.

The data utilized in this study are based on ethnographic field research which was conducted in three phases from June, 1970, through April, 1971, in Yucatán, Mexico. During the first two months of the investigation, the author lived in Mérida where he participated in a project directed by Professor Fernando Cámara B. of the Institúto Nationál de Antropología É História and Professors Joseph Spielberg and Scott Cook of the Department of Anthropology, Michigan State University. As part of a research team, the author visited government agencies, collected official documents, and attended lectures and seminars concerned with the study of socio-economic change in the northern henequen zone.

In the second phase of the research an ex-hacienda, collective ejido community in the southern zone was selected for more intensive study of socio-economic change for comparison with the henequen zone. Remaining in Mérida for another month, the author visited government agencies and studied official documents pertinent to the investigation of economic and social change in Catmis. Many offices and government agencies cooperated by making documents and information available. The Secretaría de Recursos Hydraúlicos (Ministry of Public Works) and its various branch offices provided maps of the Catmis project, an orientation concerning the source of funding for small irrigation projects in southern Yucatán state, and some of the problems encountered by irrigation engineers in Yucatán. Later further assistance was received from field technicians in the village.

The Banco Agropucuario Del Sureste (Mixed Farming Bank of the Southeast) was also cooperative and furnished all of the pertinent data concerning the loans for the development project in Catmis, the project reports of expenditures, and its plans. The bank director, Ing. A. Conde Medina, and various bank officials allowed the author to interview them on different occasions over a 10-month period and helped orient him to the structure of the loans, projected goals, and the difficulties encountered in financing the project. In every case, documents were made available upon request.

The Departmento De Asuntos Agrarios (Department of Agrarian Affairs) provided data on the ejido in Catmis, particularly the size of the land grant, the original land expropriations which formed the ejido, and communications between the ejidatarios and the agency.

In the last phase of the research the author moved to the southern zone and stayed for a few weeks in Peto at the Céntro Coordinadór De La Región Maya, the regional center of the Instituto Nacionál Indigenísta (National Indigenous Institute). The director, Professor Efrén Caraveo C., and his staff issued a kind invitation to use their facilities, provided orientation concerning their general role in the socio-economic development of the southern zone and their specific role in the Catmis development project, and permitted observation of the interactions between agents from the Institute and the ejidatarios from Catmis. Since the Institute is located only 20 miles from Catmis, the author returned to the Institute from the village on various occasions to consult with staff from the Institute and Professor Caraveo.

From Peto, the author moved to the village itself to live and work for the remaining eight months of the field work. The ejidatarios provided a house in the village which was situated next to the main ejido complex of buildings. This location facilitated the investigation since it provided easy access to ejido as well as to village activities.

A number of standard anthropological field techniques were used to gather data in the village. These included a survey instrument, ejido accounting and labor records from the development project, informal interviews, and participant observation. A general questionnaire was administered by random sample to slightly more than one-half of the household heads (Appendix A), and a population census was taken of the entire village community. In addition, current records from the National Indigenous Institute in Peto, concerning the development project in Catmis, and past records from the sugar cane industry, which were found in an old warehouse, provided valuable information. Given some study and adaptation, these records revealed many important things about past and present agricultural operations in Catmis: profits and expenditures, the social composition of the credit society of the ejido, and the collective work organization utilized by the project. Informal interviews and discussions were held with the ejidatarios, many other residents of the village, and most of the government technocrats and bureaucrats, who had some connection with the local development project. Moreover, trips were taken to other parts of the area to observe the effects

of other similar projects on the smaller, more isolated villages which surround Catmis.

Finally, observation and participation in ejido and village affairs proved to be an important way of developing an understanding of both the village and the ejido community. The author observed the daily movement of people and machinery, the work assignments, the relations between ejidatarios, the activities of numerous technicians sent by different government agencies to assist the project, and the formal and informal meetings in which the collective ejidatarios made decisions concerning the labor and political problems which confronted them. Although there was a personal effort to keep an original status as an objective observer, in the face of political conflicts between the various ejido factions the ejidatarios eventually began to identify the author with one of the factions. Under the circumstances, however, this was unavoidable since the leaders of one faction proved to be more receptive and less demanding than those of the other faction. The author was also able to participate in many village events, including religious and secular ceremonies, community meetings, discussions, and parties.

Organization of the Chapters

The following chapters are arranged to test the proposed ethnological purpose of the study and to analyze the local ecological, historical, economic, social, and political changes brought to this ex-hacienda by the national agrarian reform.

Chapter Two delineates the place of the agrarian reform and ejido program within its larger context of Mexican society and

culture. It then describes the basic ecological features and cultural history of the Yucatán region. The final section turns specifically to the effects of the collective ejido program in Yucatán's northern henequen-producing zone.

Chapter Three considers the ecological and cultural history of the ex-hacienda. The first section describes the setting of the village, including the location of the ex-hacienda along communication routes and its official political ties within the municipality of Tzucacab. It also considers certain key geographical features, village settlement patterns, acculturation, and population statistics. The second section reviews the pre-agrarian reform history of this ex-hacienda, collective ejido community in two parts: the expansion of haciendas, 1823 to 1875, and the corporate sugar plantation, 1876 to 1935. The final section describes the two major policy changes in the agrarian reform following its initial impact in 1937: first, the state administration of the government-owned sugar plantation, 1936 to 1962; and second, the federal administration and the emergence of the collective ejido cattle and cash crop farm, beginning in 1964.

Chapter Four discusses the legal basis of the ejido and the changes in the local economy which resulted from the ejido mixed farming development project. The first section describes the formal organization of the local ejido society. The basis of membership and rights in the ejido are defined, followed by a delineation of the two major ejido organizations: the general assembly and the credit society. The section ends with a discussion of ejido land utilization

and occupations. The second section deals with the relations of production on the ejido mixed farming development project including: capital dependence and the costs of production, the management-labor structure, the credit society and employment, farming methods, and productivity and marketing. The third section elaborates the non-ejido occupations in this ex-hacienda village, including local businessmen, ranchers, free milperos, wage laborers, and subsidiary economic activities. The chapter concludes with a review of socio-economic classes, past and present, and a brief description of the contemporary standard of living.

Chapter Five examines changes in the social organization of this ex-hacienda community resulting from the formation of the local collective ejido. The first section focuses on occupational status groups in the lower class, including ejidatarios and non-ejidatarios. The second section examines selected aspects of family life, including household, the life cycle, nuclear family relations, extended and affinal relations, and ritual kin. The third section describes community-level relations and institutions, including leisure, religion, and public health and education, and the concluding section deals with relations between the community and the nation-state which have emerged as a result of the national agrarian reform.

Chapter Six presents an analysis of local ejido politics and the principal political changes resulting from the formation of the collective ejido. The first section deals with relations between the ejido and the federal agrarian reform administration. It begins by describing the impact of Mexico's revolutionary political ideology

on the ejidatarios. This discussion is followed by an elaboration of the socio-political functions of the National Indigenous Institute which administers the ejido mixed farming project, and labor-administration relations on the mixed farming project. The section concludes with a discussion of the expanding ejido economy and the formation of new credit societies. The second section deals with internal ejido politics, including labor relations within the credit society, the role of credit society chief representative, factional conflict within the credit society, and cooperation, conflict and alliance between credit societies. The final section of this chapter describes relations of cooperation and conflict between the ejido and the private sector.

The concluding chapter summarizes the findings of the ethnographic data concerning this ex-hacienda, collective ejido community, then compares and contrasts this southern mixed farming ejido and northern henequen ejidos with regard to ecology and potential for economic development, the effects of administrative policies since Cárdenas, and the local political economy of the respective collective ejido organizations. The thesis concludes with a consideration of the implications of this study for future policy and research.

CHAPTER TWO

COMPARATIVE HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK OF COLLECTIVE EJIDOS IN THE YUCATÁN REGION

Introduction

This chapter delineates a comparative historical framework of collective ejidos in the Yucatán region. The first section reviews the historical role of the ejido and its evolution as the chief institutional form in the context of Mexico's national agrarian reform and development program. The second section describes the basic ecological features and the cultural history of the Yucatán region, while the final section turns specifically to a discussion of the effects of the collective ejido program in Yucatán's northern henequen zone.

The Ejido: A National Institution

The ejido land grant is the most important national institution to develop out of Mexico's agrarian reform because it created thousands of local nation-oriented groups which are well-integrated into the polity of the nation-state. Yet, the concept of ejido is not new and its meaning has changed a number of times as it evolved from Colonial times to the present where it plays a crucial role in the context of Mexico's national agrarian reform and development.

During the Colonial period, the ejido was a unit of land designated by the Spanish crown for use by indigenous communities.

The Indians held the lands communally and assigned plots to individual villagers, who had usufruct rights to them. Spanish laws protected the ejidos from absorption by private landholders, by declaring them inalienable.

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, with improved communications and the importation of mechanized agriculture, private plantations began to expand. The estate owners needed labor, and the best means of securing it was to take the land away from the villages so that their inhabitants would be forced to work on the plantations. For the first time laws were made which treated Indian lands as a marketable commodity, and, as a result, the Indians rapidly lost possession of their properties. Not only were the traditional and fairly localized Indian "communities" absorbed in this way, but also the peasant enclaves between the large plantations.

From the perspective of revolutionary peasant leaders, particularly Emiliano Zapata, the Revolution of 1910 was fought specifically to recuperate the ejido lands which the expanding plantations had taken from the peasants only decades before. Zapata's Plan de Ayala, for example, demanded the return of land taken from the villages, the nationalization of estates of opponents of the plan, and the allocation of state land to those who were without (Gonzales Navarro 1965: 207). The crux of Zapata's position thus lay in the concept of "restitution" of local-level communally held lands. From his perspective, restitution would have enabled peasant villages to remain economically and to a certain extent politically autonomous from both the large private landholders and the government.

After the Revolution official acceptance of the concept of ejido was essential under pressure of popular and peasant opinion in the central and southern provinces which had been aroused by the Zapatista movement.

However, the newly revived concept of ejido which was worked into the constitution of 1917 differed significantly from Zapata's. Lands were distributed mainly to village and town communities, but the basic right of the private plantations to exist alongside these settlements went unchallenged. The early aim of land reform was not to break up the large land-holding units, but to provide land to agricultural workers who would supplement their income by working at nearby haciendas (Tannenbaum 1962: 184). Mexican government officials from Carranza to Calles therefore considered the principal aim of the agrarian revolution to be the establishment of individual holdings of small or average size as "inalienable family property," despite the communal agrarian movement begun by Zapata and his followers.

Thus, the ejido emerged as a local land resource which is controlled by a complex political system beginning on the highest level of government and reaching down to the local ejido communities. On the local level an ejido is a unit of land which the federal government has expropriated from a large private owner, then granted to a specified group of individuals to be held and worked in common. The individual members or ejidatarios hold usufruct rights to the land; they can will it to an heir, but cannot sell, lease, rent, mortgage, or fail to use the land for two consecutive years on pain of expulsion from the society. In contrast to the individual members,

who can be expelled, the ejido land grant itself is inalienable. An ejido grant may be revoked only by direct presidential resolution.

According to the national agrarian code which was first published in 1934, the internal structure of the ejido society consists of three elected officials--a president or comisario, two secretaries, and a Vigilance Committee. The president allocates ejido plots to the members, resolves internal conflicts, and calls meetings of the General Assembly of members at least once each month. He holds office for a three-year term. The Vigilance Committee, consisting of three members, acts as a formal check on presidential abuse of power.

During the administration of socialist president Lázaro Cárdenas, 1934-1940, a number of major changes were implemented in the ejido program which made the agrarian reform irreversible and final. For the first time it became clear that the ejido, rather than some other institution, would become the principal vehicle for political integration and economic development.

Strongly influenced by international socialism and by the communal agrarian movement which Zapata had begun some 20 years before, Cárdenas envisioned the ejido as a democratic agrarian community of rural workers or peasants who were to be integrated socially and culturally as well as economically (R. Wilkie 1971: 170). Full implementation of Cárdenas' program would have given control over the means of production to the ejidatarios as well as

reorganized the distribution of land. The reforms made during his administration reflect both his goals and his ideology.

In the political arena Cárdenas established the National Peasant Confederation (Confederacion Nacional Campesina) as a peasant trade union which, in 1938, was incorporated into the official government party, PRI (Partido Revolucionario Institucional). This measure provided the institutional means for the President and the party to control the mass of ejido electors.

Today, the inalienability of the ejido land grant and the viability of the local ejido organization are protected formally by the Department of Agrarian Affairs, a branch of the Ministry of Agriculture. The ejido sector is officially integrated into the structure of PRI by the National Peasant Confederation, although the extent and range of its influence on the PRI is clearly minimal.

The National Peasant Confederation is best visualized as an executive committee functioning at the head of a series of executive committees organized in a vertical-horizontal pattern reaching from the national level to the state level, and on down to the local ejido communities (Padgett 1966: 11). Every three years delegates from local ejidos select over 500 local committees which, in turn, elect 32 provincial committees. The latter select from among their members 14 members who represent the ejidos in the official government party and exert some influences on the central executive committee, such as the selection of the official presidential candidate of the official party.

Although the ejidatarios comprise more than one-third of the members of the National Peasant Confederation, small private landholders appear to have a greater influence on the higher levels of the association, whereas the ejidatarios have been more involved defending the interests of specific ejidos (Scott 1959: 171). It is evident that the government intervenes in the choice of the members of the Peasant Confederation, at least on the higher levels, but some small representation of the ejidatarios conceives of the office of President, to a certain extent, as being in sympathy with its own aspirations. The Peasant Confederation itself, then, represents the equivalent of the left wing of the PRI (Chevalier 1965: 189).

In addition to establishing the CNC, Cárdenas expanded the ejido program by distributing more hectares of ejido lands to more ejidatarios than the combined allocations of all seven post-revolutionary presidents who preceded him (J. Wilkie 1970: 188). His predecessors allocated 8,723 million hectares on a provisional basis and 6,666 million with definite deeds of ownership to 778,000 ejidatarios, while Cárdenas alone allocated 9,861 million subject to confirmation and 17,889 million definitively to 810,000 ejidatarios (Chevalier 1965: 168).

Considering the economic importance of ejido grants within the larger society, it should be noted that by 1940 they included more than 30 percent of the people in Mexican localities with a population below 10,000 (Whetten 1948: 186). The 1960 census listed close to 2,300,000 ejidatarios, but if the total population which derives some benefit from ejidos is calculated, it probably would be

more than 12,000,000 people (Chevalier 1965: 176). Ejidatarios in possession of land amount to about 25 percent of the total agricultural labor force and 53 percent of all heads of farm units. In 1960 their share of the net agricultural product was 33 percent (Stavenhagen 1970: 260).

In spite of the obvious advances made through the distribution of millions of hectares of land to the peasantry, most students of the agrarian reform are critical of the economic progress of the ejido program (Wolf 1956: 1072). Today, the ejidatarios still comprise one of the poorest segments of the population. Approximately 95 percent of the ejidos are worked individually by the members. The total land allotment of the ejido is divided into parcels which the individual members manage and cultivate for the most part on their own. Under this system most ejidatarios cultivate small plots of land using primitive tools which barely enable them to produce enough to feed their families. Among the many factors which have prevented these ejidatarios from participating fully in the national economy are: (1) poor quality soils and insufficient land parcels; (2) lack of technical facilities such as credit, machinery, irrigation, etc.; and (3) perhaps most important, a rapidly increasing population coupled with insufficient land to distribute to everyone who has rights to it under the law.

As a result of these and other basic economic problems, scholars have correctly judged that the principal effect of the agrarian reform has been political integration rather than economic development. Chevalier, for example, pointed to the large measure of

political stability Mexico has enjoyed since the Revolution and argued that, to some extent, the ejido system is responsible:

> It is probable that political stability in Mexico is linked to the absence of serious social tensions, and even with some possibilities of expression being available for the majority of the population which is concerned above all with preserving results already achieved (Chevalier 1965: 176).

Nevertheless, despite Senior's thesis (1958) which stressed the democratic aspects of the reform, such political integration has not resulted in a participatory democracy in which ejidatario interests would be represented corresponding to their numbers. Because the ejido is dependent upon and controlled by government, the integration of the ejido into national political organizations has contributed to the real political subordination of the ejidatarios to government interests, and has diminished the functional efficiency of ejido organizations as independent interest and pressure groups. In addition, direct contact between the State and the ejido has opened the possibility of future conflict between them, especially since the ejido sector has the most to gain from new "reforms" of the agrarian reform. Once the ejidatarios become aware of their mutual interests, however, they can make significant changes since the structure for their participation is already present (Stavenhagen 1970: 259-260).

Thus, the vast majority of ejidos today must be regarded mainly as political instruments rather than economic ones because, as Wolf claimed, the ejidos

> . . . have brought under government control large numbers of people who depend ultimately on the government for their livelihood. Agrarian reform has, however, produced social and

> political changes without concomitant changes in the technological order; the redistribution of land alone can neither change the technology nor supply needed credit (Wolf 1956: 1072).

The outstanding exception to this general failure to achieve adequate economic development is the collective ejido which constitutes Cárdenas' final reform of the ejido program and, for the present study, represents his most important reform.

In 1937 Cárdenas extended the ejido system to include lands held by the largest, most productive agricultural units, the industrialized plantations. For the first time workers (called acasillados) who lived on these plantations were given the right to request permission to form ejidos. Cárdenas then created about 800 collective ejidos in a number of regions where large-scale industrialized agriculture was already highly advanced or where the lands were fertile enough to transform them into highly productive commercial farms: the Laguna region in Durango and Cuahuila, northern Yucatán state, the Yaqui valley, Michoacan, and Los Mochis. By establishing collective ejidos in these regions, Cárdenas sought to maintain modern agricultural methods and to avoid the disadvantages of breaking up the large productive plantations in order to distribute very small parcels of land to rural workers who lacked both capital and technological skills (R. Wilkie 1971: xii).

The formal organization of the collective ejido is the same as that of the individual ejido. The chief differences between them are: (1) in the collective ejidos the ejidatarios pool their lands and farm them as one unit, including "the purchase of input and the

sale of output" (Eckstein 1970: 290); (2) in the collective ejidos the credit society often functions as a collective labor organization; and (3) in general, the collective ejidos are better integrated than the individual ejidos into the national economy since they are typically mechanized, highly capitalized, commercial farms which produce cash crops for sale in regional, national, and international markets. Eckstein (Ibid.) also distinguished a third type of internal labor organization, the "semi-collective," where part of the labor is done collectively, and part individually, output sold jointly, but, as a rule, each ejidatario accredited with the produce of his own parcel. For the present discussion semi-collective and collective ejidos are considered as a single type.

If Cárdenas' expectations for economic and political integration and development were high for the individual ejidos, they were even higher for the collective ejidos. According to Raymond Wilkie, the political functions of the collective ejidos during the Cárdenas administration were:

> . . . to support the administration's policies, which were generally more favorable to workers and peasants than those of any previous or later administration, to serve as a model for increased worker participation in the control of industry and agriculture, and to give the rural workers a larger share of the nation's total income by reducing the income and power of the large landowners (R. Wilkie 1971: 170).

In short, the collective ejidos represented Cárdenas' most ambitious attempt to achieve the economic and socio-political integration of the rural workers and the peasants through the ejido program of the agrarian reform.

The Yucatán Region: Ecological and Cultural History

The present thesis focuses on the economic and social effects of agrarian reform and the relative success of a collective ejido as a vehicle for integration in southern Yucatán state. To understand the place of this collective ejido within its larger regional context, however, some background information is presented concerning the ecological and cultural history of Yucatán, followed by a review of the findings of Raymond (1970) and Kirk (1975) concerning the principal economic and socio-political effects of collective ejidos in the northern zone of Yucatán state and the identification of the underlying causes of these changes.

The Yucatán Peninsula, which includes the states of Yucatán and Campeche and the Territory of Quintana Roo, is totally unlike any other Mexican region. Only a very small area in the north center exceeds 500 feet in height and in relief it is either lowland or undulating tableland, practically devoid of all surface drainage. Geologically, it is composed of a porous limestone shelf covered with shallow soils.

Yucatán's climate is uniform with the exception of rainfall. In general, it is warm and moist. All months of the year are characterized by high temperatures, but the highest occur from May through August. During the rainy season, from March through November, temperatures fluctuate between 90° and 100° F. In the dry season, from December through February, the temperatures are somewhat higher. Throughout the Peninsula there is marked seasonal contrast. Summers

are characterized by plentiful rainfall while winters offer little rainfall. Seasonal alternation is marked and regular.

The state of Yucatán occupies the northern and central portions of the Peninsula. For the present purpose, it may be divided into two main zones, the northern "henequen" zone and the southern "frontier" zone, corresponding to variations in geography, demography, and land utilization (see Map 1: Yucatán State: The Northern and Southern Zones).

With regard to rainfall, surface water, type of plant cover, and soil cover, there is an observable gradient from the northwest to the southeast. Rainfall varies from 500 to 600 mm. along the northwest coast and increases to more than 1200 mm. toward the interior. Northwestern Yucatán state is entirely without rivers or streams, and rainwater percolates quickly through the limestone. This rainfall gradient brings corresponding local differences in natural flora. As Redfield explained:

> . . . In the northwest, the long, dry winters, and scanty annual rainfall allow the development of only small bushes, chiefly xerophytic. As one travels inland and southeastward, the size of the trees increases; the scrubby jungle gives way to a taller, denser growth, and then--east of Valladolid and south of Peto--to a true tropical rain forest, where trees may be fifty or sixty feet high, and where many remain green all year (1941: 23).

The outstanding topographical feature characteristic of northern Yucatán and the essential source of water for many populations are the cenotes, or sink holes, which appear where the roof of a subterranean drainage channel has collapsed. The cenote is a deep, circular, walled hole in the limestone in which the groundwater

YUCATAN STATE: The Northern and Southern Zones*

MAP I



*Source: Dirección General de Estadística, Septimo Censo General de Población, 6 de junio de 1950: Estado de Yucatán, Cuadro 26.

stands from nine to 40 meters below the surface of the land. Most of the settlements in northern Yucatán are found near cenotes which appear to have been a strong factor in the distribution of Indian settlements in Pre-Colombian times. Cenotes are less common in the southern zone where today most of the water supply comes from wells with a relatively deep water table. The southern zone is considered to have far greater potential for agriculture than the northern zone because its soils are deeper and more fertile. For this reason the Yucatán government has recently initiated a number of small-scale irrigation projects to encourage the development of commercial agriculture in the southern zone (Inter-American Development Bank 1966).

Historically, the economic development of the state was greatly influenced by the railroad. Constructed in the early part of this century, it linked the northern and southern zones. However, since the development of a modern highway system which ties Yucatán to Mexico City, the railroad has become relatively unimportant, even within the state.

Yucatán maintains a number of urban centers, only 14 of which have populations greater than 5,000 inhabitants. Mérida, the largest city, approaches a population of 175,000. This northeastern city, whose importance pre-dates the Spanish conquest, is the economic and political center of Yucatán, and the only urban area which exhibits features that are usually attributed to a city (Goodman 1970: 25). Besides being the main industrial and cultural center, Mérida is the seat of a highly centralized state government. The three largest cities--Mérida, Motul, and Progresso--and most of the towns with

populations over 5,000 are located in the north, while only a handful of large towns are located in the south.

More than half of Yucatán's population live in rural settlements--villages, haciendas, and ranchos--which are disbursed throughout the countryside. Settlement patterns are similar in both zones except that in the southern zone a higher proportion of the population dwells in smaller settlements and an overwhelming portion of the settlements are rural and non-nucleated in character with houses spread out at greater distances from one another.

Differences in settlement patterns reflect variant demographic patterns. Although it covers only 30.64 percent of the total area of the state (about 11,000 Km^2), the great majority of Yucatán's population and the highest population densities are found in the northern zone of the state. This zone has 401,311 inhabitants and a density of 34 people per square kilometer, more than twice the density of the entire state. In contrast, the southern zone is sparsely settled. Comprising 69.36 percent of the total area of the state, it has only 210,906 inhabitants with a density of 7.2 people per square kilometer, one of the most sparsely settled areas of Mexico. The sparse population of the southern zone has contributed to its reputation as Yucatán's "frontier."

To a great extent the population distribution of the state reflects the development of Yucatán's export economy which began around the middle of the nineteenth century and culminated at the beginning of the twentieth with the near complete industrialization of agriculture in the northern zone. In the southern zone sugar

cane, cattle, chicle, and lumber emerged as the chief commercial exports. Most of the growth and prosperity of the state during the present century, however, is based on the cultivation and processing of henequen, a yucca which yields a coarse golden fiber. This is manufactured into binder twine, still a necessity for the mechanized harvesting equipment of the world's grain producers. Today, henequen represents 58 percent of the area harvested in Yucatán and 66 percent of the value of all agricultural production in the state, while henequen decortication and manufacturing represents 58 percent of all the industrial activity within the state (Goodman 1970: 73). For more than a century the village and hacienda inhabitants of the northern zone have been directly involved in the production of henequen and the processing of henequen fiber. Working in the henequen fields or in decorticating mills for wages has been their only means of support.

In the southern zone industrialized agriculture was limited to the southern municipalities of the state where deeper, more fertile soils and heavier rainfalls permitted the development of sugar cane production and processing "factory-in-the-field" type plantations (Mintz 1969). Aside from some sugar cane and a few other export commodities already mentioned, maize has been the chief crop of the southern frontier zone. Maize is produced in quantities which make it primarily a subsistence but also a money crop which helps feed the residents of the henequen zone (Redfield 1941; Chardon 1961: 65).

The fundamental difference between subsistence maize crop farming on the one hand and industrialized, commercial cash crop agriculture on the other has led to the development of two distinctive ecological adaptations in rural Yucatán state: the maize agricultural community and the hacienda, or agricultural estate. Each adaptation maintains its own set of economic activities and social correlates.

The populations of maize agricultural communities live in small villages and hamlets in the southern zone where they practice slash and burn agriculture with moderate efficiency. Whetten described this agricultural system as follows:

> . . . Toward the interior of Yucatan, corn is the chief crop, and the semi-nomadic type of agriculture tends to prevail. This is because of the shallowness of the soil and the rapidity with which its fertility is exhausted. In order to plant corn, a plot of land is cleared of bush by cutting it down and burning it. The land is then planted for two or at most three years consecutively. It is then abandoned for six or seven years and allowed to grow up to bush again so that it may accumulate humus and again become fertile. In the meantime the farmer moves on successively to the clearing and planting of other plots (1948: 18).

Animals are used for transport but not cultivation. Under favorable conditions peasants can raise more corn than is needed for consumption. It should be emphasized, however, that local rainfall fluctuates greatly and harvests may be lost entirely. In slash and burn agriculture a farmer spends more time clearing and preparing land for cultivation than in any other farming activity. After two or three years, the milpa, or maize plot, must be abandoned and allowed to lie fallow for about six to seven years until the natural scrub brush returns. As soils become depleted, village locations

must change. This accounts for continuous resettlement of the smaller communities in the frontier zone. The precariousness of semi-nomadic slash and burn agriculture in this zone explains its sparse population and low population density. In fact, unlike the northern henequen zone which suffers from overpopulation and land scarcity, the population densities in the south are so low that land is abundant.

The small, remote maize-producing villages are relatively new settlements located on government frontier lands which are unowned. The population size of such settlements ranges from three to 90 individuals. Often they are composed of one to 20 nuclear families with some patrilineally extended relations as the basis of their formation. Soil depletion causes a great deal of mobility of individual families or even entire communities (Villa 1948: 168). Consequently, every few years the village must change its location. New frontier areas are constantly opening up while the old are periodically abandoned or resettled.

The social organization of these maize agriculturalists was described in detail by Redfield (1941), in a series of field work projects conducted by Redfield, Hansen, and Villa Rojas in the 1930s. He characterized it as a "community isolate," in which social organization was:

> . . . marked by isolation; a high degree of genetic and cultural homogeneity; slow cultural change; preliteracy; small numbers; minimal division of labor; simple technology; . . . great functional coherence . . . social organization based on blood and fictive kinship; behavior which is traditional and uncritical; a tendency to view the inanimate and non-human world impersonally; the viewing of traditional objects and acts as sacred; the

> pervasive importance of magic and religion and, thus, resulting ritual behavior in all areas of life; the absence of economic motives which fail to fit with, and conform to, all other aspects of life (Mintz 1953).

This tendency toward cultural isolation also inhibited the acculturation of southern frontier communities relative to those of the north. According to the 1960 census, 44 percent of Yucatán's inhabitants were classified as Maya Indians. It is likely that well over half the population of Yucatán is bilingual, speaking both Spanish and Yucatec Maya. This is the highest percentage of use of an indigenous language in all Mexico, except for the neighboring Territory of Quintana Roo (Villa 1962: 234). The population of southern Yucatán state is generally considered even less acculturated than that of the north (Gomez 1965: 4). More than 70 percent of the inhabitants of this zone are classified as Indians, and almost all of them speak Maya more often than Spanish.

A number of anthropologists have documented the fundamental threat which the industrialization of agriculture poses to the perpetuation of peasant society (Wolf 1967: 12; Ramiro Guerra Y Sanchez 1964). Peasants are transformed into rural proletarians (Mintz 1953), who became dependent upon wages and consumer goods. In Yucatán subsistence maize patterns were eliminated completely in the northern zone by haciendas and plantations during the rapid spread of henequen production and manufacturing. Yet subsistence patterns survived in the southern zone for a number of reasons: (1) Yucatán's sugar cane industry occupied a rather focused area in the southern portion of the state; (2) in the southern zone the henequen industry never

spread much beyond the railroad lines and land was abundant; and (3) in contrast to the henequen industry, the sugar industry required only a seasonal labor force which permitted a number of "semi-peasants" to continue cultivating subsistence crops during the main part of the year, while those individuals who resided on the hacienda abandoned subsistence cultivation completely.

The second ecological adaptation, the hacienda or agricultural estate, represents the focus for the present discussion because its structure and function have undergone considerably more change than the maize-producing community as a result of Yucatán's cultural history. In Yucatán the hacienda and the plantation constitute the two basic types of agricultural estates. The hacienda is defined as

> an agricultural estate, operated by a dominant landowner and dependent labor force, organized to supply a small-scale market by means of scarce capital, in which the factors of production are employed not only for capital accumulation but also to support the status aspirations of the owner (Wolf and Mintz 1957: 380).

The plantation is defined as

> an agricultural estate, operated by dominant owners (usually organized into a corporation) and a dependent labour force, organized to supply a large-scale market by means of abundant capital in which the factors of production are employed primarily to further capital accumulation without reference to the status needs of the owners (Ibid.).

Some minor differences exist between ideal-typical haciendas and plantations. In Yucatán, however, these differences may be explained in quantitative terms since the plantation type succeeded the hacienda during a relatively short period of rapid industrialization. In contrast to the hacienda, the plantation is owned by a corporation rather than an individual, more highly capitalized, usually larger,

and organized to accumulate capital for reinvestment rather than to support the status aspirations of its owners.

In order to understand Yucatán's cultural history, and particularly the impact of the agrarian reform, it is necessary to understand the role which these capitalistic agricultural enterprises played in regional integration. Pointing to the general ecological-historical continuities in the Yucatan region, Strickon claimed that haciendas and plantations constituted a major economic and social force in both northern and southern zones which was causal to the development of Yucatán communities. He proposed that both types be viewed together as an "agricultural estate system":

> . . . The whole development of Yucatecan culture ever since the contact period has been tied to the agricultural estate system in one of its typological guises. . . . In the earlier periods of Yucatecan history, it was devoted to cattle, later to sugar, and still later, to henequen. Each of these stages, and the two major changes in crop were critical to the evolution of Yucatecan community types (Strickon 1965: 40-42).

In an important sense, the agrarian reform and ejido program did not change the presence of the agricultural estate system as an economic organization in agriculture. However, it did change the relations of production between labor and administration. Turning to Yucatán's cultural history and the impact of the agrarian reform, it is therefore necessary to stress the principal changes in structure and function of the agricultural estate system in both northern and southern zones.

In Pre-Conquest times the Yucatán region was the home of the Mayan Indians, probably the most advanced civilization that the Western hemisphere knew. From the eleventh to the thirteenth century

the three cities of Mayapan, Uxmal, and Chichen-Itza developed a political system which permitted great scientific achievements, particularly in astronomy. Its center before the fifth century was in the southern forested part and in adjacent Chiapas and Guatemala, but a carefully organized and staggered migration to the drier savanna country took place in the fifth and sixth centuries. It has been suggested that both the migration and the declining state in which it was discovered in the sixteenth century were due to soil exhaustion and overpopulation, both results of persistent shifting slash and burn agriculture which formed its economic base. Because Yucatân had no mineral wealth, and Spaniards waited until 1536 before conquering it. Even then the Maya presented no great military obstacle since their civilization had already declined to a condition of perpetual warfare among a series of tribal chiefdoms which occupied different parts of the Peninsula. The major difficulty was in consolidating Spanish rule over the entire region since, unlike the Aztec, the Maya had no controlling empire with functioning bureaucratic channels that could be utilized to coordinate the colonial government. The Spanish defeated the last pocket of resistance at Chetumal in 1542.

After the conquest the Spanish formulated a number of policies which regulated the relationships between Spaniard and Indian and which lay the foundation for Spanish control over land and labor. The encomienda involved rights to Indian labor and tribute. It was a grant made by the crown to a conquistador allowing him to receive tribute from Indians living in a prescribed number of towns. The

crown also set aside certain lands for ejidos to be held communally by the entire indigenous community and administered by the Mayan nobles (caciques) of each town.

By 1550 the death rate of the Indians from misuse of labor and disease had become so great that the crown decreed that encomenderos only had right to tribute and not to labor unless the Indians were remunerated daily with a specified amount of food. Although the encomienda lasted until 1785 when all tribute was transferred to the crown, the hacienda, with its utilization of indigenous labor, "emerged as a unit of production at a relatively early date and provided the basic underpinning to Yucatecan society until the twentieth century when it was dislodged abruptly by the enormous pressures of the revolution and the agrarian reform" (Raymond 1970: 82).

The early hacienda centered around a private holding of land and cattle with a set of buildings, a well, and a small work force. The owner was absent most of the year, but left a few cowboys and a boss to manage the operation (Camara Zavala 1947: 678). Production of the hacienda was oriented toward internal consumption and only a small surplus was produced for sale on regional markets. Southern haciendas were dedicated to a greater extent to produce cattle for the market.

During the Colonial period there began a gradual transferrence of at least part of the population to the haciendas. In exchange for permission to live near the hacienda with water, wood, and milpa rights, a home and a yard, the Mayans were expected to work

one full day a week for the owner and to participate in labor for the community, the fagina, for two hours every Sunday (Raymond 1970: 84).

According to Chardon (1961: 19), it was relatively easy for an encomendero, if he also owned land, to transfer the population of a town to his hacienda. However, for those who managed to own land but had no encomienda rights, the problem of finding labor was more difficult. One of the ways of luring labor to an hacienda was to advance money to an individual so that he could pay his tax and tribute to his encomendero. Once in debt, he was bound by law to work for the hacendado in order to pay his obligation (Raymond 1970: 86).

By the end of the Colonial period Yucatan emerged as a society with a complex system of caste and class. The Creoles were Whites of Spanish descent, who were born in the New World. They controlled all levels of government, capital, and natural resources. The vehicle of their power was the Mestizo or Ladino class, a racially mixed group of Spanish and Indian descent. The Mestizos served as brokers between the Creoles and the Indians by managing hacienda affairs and controlling village politics. By the first half of the nineteenth century, the Maya could be divided broadly into four categories according to their relative degrees of acculturation: (1) the city Maya, who were high acculturated, and were, in fact, on the verge of becoming Mestizos; (2) the hacienda Maya, who lived in the Maya villages and served as part-time laborers on the estates; (3) the free Maya of the frontiers, who, like the hacienda Maya, depended for their subsistence upon the production of maize. They lived in

their own villages but they were not tied as laborers and debtors to the haciendas; and (4) the Huites, who were semi-sedentary Maya similar to the Lacandones. These lived on the far side of the frontier (Cline 1950: 79-80).

When Mexico declared its independence from Spain in 1824, Yucatán reluctantly joined the union. As a result, Yucatán was immediately confronted with insurmountable economic and political problems. In the economic arena, the markets which Yucatán had gradually come to depend on during the Colonial period disappeared overnight. Under Spanish control, Yucatán had exported beef and hides to Havanna, beeswax and cotton to Mexico, dyewood to Europe, and had imported sugar cane from Havanna. With the loss of Spanish protection, trade with Cuba ended and Yucatán could neither export beef nor import sugar cane. Beeswax and woven cotton, which were Maya tribute to the Crown, also came to a halt, and dyewood, which was the most valuable export, declined because of wasteful cutting and competition from Belize (N. Reed 1964: 7-8). Yucatán's economy was stranded somewhere between its Colonial past with Spanish support, and the independent period in which it was not yet tied to the economy of the new nation. With the traditional cash crops failing, the government was forced to encourage experimentation.

In the northern zone henequen developed as a source of rope for export. As an overseas market grew, hacendados gradually began to convert their estates to the new crop. This was done slowly, and it did not interfere with the customary raising of cattle. Moreover, the labor demands were extensive and caused no dislocation nor change

for the Maya workers, who grew milpa on the ejido lands when they were not working on the haciendas.

In general, the Colonial land tenure system was retained. However, the government was encouraging innovation, and private hacienda owners gradually absorbed communal or ejido lands, particularly near the major urban centers (Chardon 1961: 24). According to Cline (1948: 48), the 1,515 haciendas and estancias which were reported in Yucatán shortly before independence jumped to 2,413 in less than 10 years after independence. The expansion of private lands, particularly haciendas, also increased in the southern zone where vast areas of public lands had previously not been claimed.

Despite the growing importance of henequen, sugar cane emerged as the most important cash crop between 1825 and 1850. Encouraged by cheap land sales and low taxes, enterprising Ladinos moved eagerly into the forest areas of the southern zone where soils were deeper and better for sugar cane production. After only one year of planting and tending the crop, the second year's harvest would often yield a 700 percent profit (Reed 1964: 10).

Unlike the northern haciendas which required extensive labor for henequen, beef and hide production, southern haciendas required intensive labor for sugar cane production. The cane must be cut shortly after it ripens and the juice extracted by complex machinery. For the first time since the Colonial period began some 300 years before, the haciendas interfered with the traditional slash and burn agricultural activities of the Maya. The sugar cane harvest began almost at the same time as the maize harvest, but, more importantly,

the sugar harvest continued for three months after the corn needed to be planted, thus conflicting with the maize cycle. As external markets for sugar cane grew, the increasing need for labor on the sugar haciendas led the government to take oppressive measures against the frontier Maya. In the 1830s and 1840s, the government taxed the Indians on their land, sold public lands cheaply to hacendados, gave the hacendados control over local wells to ensure a local labor force, and, finally, passed legislation which impressed the labor force by making the debt peonage system explicit. Hacienda owners essentially had the right to round up the Indians and keep them on the haciendas, and the few Indians who were able to escape into the bush were forced into marginal areas (Strickon 1965: 51). The Maya of the southern zone were turned into slaves, in order to salvage Yucatán's ailing economy.

But if Yucatán's economy was ailing during the first decades of independence, her political situation was a calamity. Yucatán had joined the Mexican union when the Federalists were in power. This meant that each state government controlled its own internal affairs and the union functioned only as a military and economic alliance with a weak central government.

By the mid-1840s the political situation had changed. The Centralists, or those who advocated a strong central government, came to power and demanded the right to appoint state governors. This was clearly an affront to Yucatán's federalist position. Since Yucatán was an isolated region and since the federal government was preoccupied with the Mexican-American wars, Yucatán felt strong enough to

secede from the union. From 1843 to 1845 Yucatán defended herself against federal troops which came to enforce the power of the union. Most of Yucatán's assets were used for this war and the economy was in shambles.

To help the war effort, Yucatán armed the indigenous Maya and promised to lower taxes and repeal the oppressive labor laws against them. With the additional help of the Maya, the state managed to retain her independence from Mexico on the battlefield, but the economic and political aftermath was disastrous. Without money the state did not keep the promises it made to the Maya, and in 1844 the Indians, now armed, experienced in warfare, and extremely oppressed, rose up in revolt, initiating what is now known as the War of the Castes. By the time this Indian war ended in 1850, more than 28 percent of the population of the Peninsula had died in war, of starvation, or from disease, and the Yucatán government begged Mexico to take over and bring relief (Reed 1964: 10).

The sugar cane industry in the southern zone had been totally destroyed during the War of the Castes. From about 1850-1870, the years immediately following the war, the government sent troops to the south to maintain campaigns against renegade Indians. Because of Ladino fears and the continual presence of the military, the southern hacienda system lay dormant.

In the north the demand for henequen still exceeded the supply. A large portion of henequen hacendados entered into commercial henequen production between 1850 and 1880, and the expansion of the industry probably began between 1860 and 1870 (Chardon 1961: 30).

The transition from self-sufficient hacienda to commercial plantation agriculture continued slowly, however, and very few haciendas were purchased for the sole purpose of cultivating and processing henequen. Most haciendas, in varying degrees, retained the prevailing subsistence pattern based on livestock and maize, and made the transition by slowly increasing the land area used for henequen (Ibid.: 31). Other factors which limited the rapid transformation of henequen were the general labor shortage which followed the War of the Castes, the reluctance of Ladinos to abandon the security of the maize-cattle hacienda, and the small size of the capital investment.

In 1876 Porfirio Díaz came to power in Mexico. His regime may be characterized in his own words, "bread and the club," which meant "bread for the army, bread for the bureaucrats, bread for the foreigners, and even bread for the church and the club for the common people of Mexico and those who differed with him" (Simpson 1966: 288). For Yucatán, the Porfiriato period meant a strong central government which encouraged private enterprise, foreign investment, industrialization, and which maintained peace in the land. With expanded foreign demands, private plantations continued to grow and swallowed the remaining Indian lands. Capitalization of the henequen industry, especially from the United States, intensified, and production became strictly profit oriented; the subsistence modes which had been practiced simultaneously with henequen production were eliminated. Modern technology was used for processing both henequen and sugar cane. During this period the henequen industry reached the

peak of its production. Except for the masses of campesinos who labored on the plantations and lived in poverty, Yucatecans enjoyed an economic growth and a prosperity they had never known.

In 1896 Diaz decreed that all public lands and ejidos be given in individual title to those who were working them. The result was the distribution and later alienation of the ejido lands of the villages. Between 1878 and 1912 some 1,200 plots were distributed to Yucatecans, and virtually no ejido lands remained in the henequen zone by 1912 (Chardon 1961: 33). In addition, a growing international market and new inventions, especially the modern decorticating machinery, transformed the already expanding henequen industry into a modern plantation system: capital intensive, profit oriented, and dependent on an external market.

About the middle of the 1870s the sugar industry revived from the War of the Castes and plantations again began to spring up in the southern localities where they had once flourished. Sugar plantations were spread out from the municipalities of Oxkutzcab in the north to Tekax, Peto, and Tzucacab in the south, where they were more plentiful because of the deeper soils. Redfield claimed,

> There is little land in the state which is suitable for growing sugar cane, but . . . in Tekax in 1901 there was a large sugar factory, and most of the product was being converted into rum. I believe that sugar cane is still raised there. . . (Redfield in Shattuck 1933: 71).

Frederik Starr, who traveled widely in the southern Maya area during the early part of this century, maintained that by the turn of the century Tekax represented the southern limits of henequen production

and that distilleries for sugar cane were numerous and decentralized:

> The three great industries in Tekax are sugar, henequen, and liquor. Father Juan insisted that we should visit one of the local distilleries of which there are 14 in Tekax. Sugar, ground into thick syrup, is drawn off from the mill into great vats, where it is permitted to ferment; it is then taken to the still, where it is heated and vaporized, and the vapor carried up into high towers for condensation (Starr 1910: 315).

Starr also suggested that such plantations were usually owned by single hacendado entrepreneurs and that technological changes which improved production had already been installed:

> We found Santa Maria to be an extensive hacienda, and the sugar mill was a large structure, well supplied with modern machinery, and turning out a large amount of product. . . . (Ibid.: 30).

The haciendas in Tekax, Tzucacab, and Peto produced about 70 percent of the cane in Yucatán, and these southern municipalities enjoyed rapid economic growth along with the henequen industry. Construction of the railroad from Mérida to Peto was begun in 1885 and completed around 1910 (Cumberland 1968: 218-219). The railroad linked the southern zone directly to the north and further encouraged the growth of large commercial enterprises. Cattle, sugar cane, chickle, lumber, and maize were shipped to Mérida and the northern towns from southern towns, villages, ranches, haciendas, and plantations. A number of southern towns grew from frontier villages into large municipal towns which took on the normal distribution functions of Yucatecan urban centers.

In general, the southern zone continued to produce large quantities of maize on unclaimed government lands and remained marginal to the expansion of the henequen industry. Nevertheless, in

its sugar cane complex the southern zone developed economic and political structures and functions which were typical of the henequen haciendas and plantations in the northern zone. With the advent of a large foreign market for its produce in 1879, the Yucatecan hacienda completed its transformation from self-sufficient maize and cattle haciendas to commercial henequen and sugar cane plantations. Such plantations were devoted to cultivating and processing cash crops for sale on an external market. Their agricultural and industrial functions were highly centralized and integrated on an efficient basis. The hacienda lands were isolated from other adjoining haciendas, and the estate handled all the processes of production and performed the major social and political functions of a small rural village. Wages were low, and labor was still held to the plantation by the debt peonage system.

The estate consisted of a group of central buildings including the owner's house, the refining or rasping mill (depending on the crop), the supervisor's house, corrals, wells and cenotes, and adobe huts for the laborers. Surrounding the main area were forests where wood was gathered to run the steam engines of the factory. In 1916, when henequen production was at its peak, there were 1,100 haciendas exclusively devoted to henequen cultivation and production, and 850 had rasping and packing plants (Chardon 1961: 35). More than 500 had an average of 4,000 hectares of land each (Raymond 1970: 247), although the majority had 2,000-3,000 hectares. The average number of people living on the haciendas in 1921 was 100 or slightly more, while the larger haciendas had up to 600 people (Chardon 1961: 35).

Land ownership was concentrated in the hands of about 300 families in Mérida.

Most historians agree that the Mexican Revolution had no dramatic impact on the plantation system in Yucatán. Early federal agrarian reform legislation during the Revolution abolished the debt peonage system, and even more encompassing land and labor reform legislation was passed by 1917. In Yucatan, however, the hacendados united to oppose vigorously all reforms and, because of the initial difficulties in implementing the new laws, the hacendados managed to retain control over their plantations until 1936 when it became clear that they had lost the battle.

In 1915 the federal government passed agrarian reform legislation in order to break up Mexico's plantations and restore ejido grants to the towns. These early grants provided land for some Yucatecan towns, mostly outside the henequen zone in the south where lands were still abundant. However, the legislation did not affect the haciendas or ranches. Later, the Constitution of 1917 provided the basis for restoring land tenure by creating towns, recovering national lands which had been acquired against the public interest, and eliminating the large plantations by limiting the extent of private holdings (Chardon 1961). Because of hacendado opposition and organizational weakness in the central government, these laws were not implemented completely until 1936.

At the time of the Revolution the henequen industry was increasing production each year, but, because of monopolistic controls by U.S. financiers, prices were declining. In 1912 the state government

organized the first effective actions against foreign monopoly. Taking over the functions of the exporters, who previously had been agents of the U.S. banks and consumer interests, the government formed the Comision Reguladora del Mercado de Henequen. This organization helped producers by selling directly to American consumers and by regulating prices. Combined with increasing U.S. demands for henequen during World War I, this action helped the state back on its feet. The price of henequen had increased slightly by 1917, but when the world returned to a peace-time economy, the market fell again, and Yucatán never regained the position it had once held on the world market. From 1920 to 1945 henequen production and the amount of land used to cultivate henequen declined because of forced high prices, surplus production, and the entrance of foreign producers into the world market (Chardon 1961: 39-41).

A new organization, Henequeneros de Yucatán, was formed. Controlled by the hacendados, it functioned like the Comision Reguladora but its policies were not successful and the industry almost collapsed between 1926 and 1934. The federal government stepped in to assist the industry by declaring henequen a national utility; this brought with it the required enforcement of earlier agrarian reform laws, the establishment of ejidos, and the end of the old plantation system.

The government also set up a better system of agrarian credit for the ejidatarios which provided a financial base for the state government to improve the industry. For the first time the ejidatarios began to occupy and utilize the lands which had been granted to them.

Continuing their opposition, the hacendados refused to process ejidal henequen. In 1935 two laws were passed which declared the exploitation of henequen in Yucatán a national utility and forced the hacendados to rent their machinery to the ejidos.

In August, 1936, President Lazaro Cárdenas arrived in Mérida and announced the expropriation of what amounted to about 25 percent of the privately owned hacendado lands in the henequen zone. One year earlier, Cárdenas had personally supervised the creation of 296 collective ejidos for 35,000 ejidatarios in the Laguna region (Eckstein 1970: 277). The formation of collective ejidos in Yucatán's henequen zone was part of this larger national program. In Yucatán Cárdenas' implementation of the agrarian reform program called for the formation of collective ejidos for the resident workers of the henequen plantations, the transfer of control over the local means of henequen production to the ejidatarios, and the creation of the Banco Nacional de Credito Ejidal to subsidize local production.

In the southern sugar cane zone the sugar cane industry barely survived the years following the Revolution, and it did so at a fraction of its former size. From 1920 to 1930 active cut-throat competition throughout the country forced many plantations to close down. By the end of 1931 about half of the sugar mills in Mexico were either going through suits of bankruptcy or were being liquidated by their owners (Mosk 1950: 170).

Before the Revolution there were about 20 sugar plantations disbursed throughout Yucatán's southern zone,* and the industry was

*These estimates came from informants in Catmis.

still important within the region. However, Yucatán's sugar cane industry never achieved the importance of henequen within the national economy. Thus, when the sugar plantations began to fail in 1921, the government did not assist them. Some of the plantations which closed during that period were in Tabi in Oxkutzcab, Dzuiche in Peto, and Santa Maria, Polyuc, Tul, and Vakax in Tekax.

Only a handful of Yucatán's sugar plantations remained open long enough to benefit from the National Union of Sugar Producers (Union Nacional de Productores de Azucar), an organization which, like the Henequeneros de Yucatán in the north, was formed by Mexican sugar producers in 1931 to prevent further ruination of the industry. With the consent and sponsorship of the federal government, the organization was given substantial monopoly privileges. Its principal function was to regulate production by assigning quotas to individual sugar mills. In addition, it performed collateral functions such as distributing and marketing the output of the whole industry, regulating exports and imports on sugar, and extending credit to its members (Mosk 1950: 170). By 1935 only two sugar mills, one in Cakalna and another in Catmis, had survived in Yucatán to benefit from the subsidies of the Union de Productores and from the subsequent formation of the National Sugar Workers Union brought by the Cárdenas reforms in 1936.

The Effects of Agrarian Reform in the Northern Henequen Zone

In varying degrees most scholars have been critical of the overall effects of the agrarian reform in Yucatán's northern henequen

zone. In replacing the haciendas, the collective ejidos changed the legal status of most communities and introduced Mexico's revolutionary ideology which glorifies the role of the peasant and the worker in the context of national economic and social development. Nevertheless, apart from some improvements in the standard of living and limited labor and land rights in the ejido, and agrarian reform has made only minor changes in the economic and social life of the average henequen worker.

Today the collective ejidos in the henequen zone exhibit a number of features which seriously call into question their success as a planned institutional form. Because of low productivity, for example, one cultural geographer has declared them a failure and gone so far as to suggest the reinstatement of the pre-reform hacienda system (Chardon 1961: 218-219). Two anthropologists, Raymond (1970) and Kirk (1975), take a more positive position regarding the potential of the collective ejidos but do not hesitate to point out the lack of economic and social development as observed in low wages, underemployment, unemployment, a low standard of living, overpopulation, and a tremendous dependency of ejido communities on government agencies.

The general inability of the collective ejidos to flourish in northern Yucatán has been explained through a combination of two causal variables: (1) the objective ecological and economic limitations of the northern zone and (2) the policy of government administrations since the Cárdenas reforms. These two variables have determined the economic and socio-political conditions of local ejido communities and, thus, created a situation characterized by an overall

lack of development. It is necessary to review the main features of each of these variables before turning to the more specific features which have inhibited the economic and socio-political development of the collective ejidos in Yucatán's northern zone.

A brief glance at the northern henequen zone reveals immediately that it has a restrictive environment. Rainfall is generally inadequate for cash crop cultivation and rainfall fluctuations are highly variable from season to season. Moreover, the land is covered with a thin, shallow soil of poor quality even for maize production.

Since the late nineteenth century, henequen has been cultivated almost exclusively. Indigenous to Yucatán, henequen thrives almost anywhere on the Peninsula but is cultivated extensively in the semi-arid north primarily because very little else can be cultivated there.

The henequen plant takes seven years to reach maturity. Then, for approximately another 18 years, it produces leaves which yield a strong fiber. This cycle requires careful planning and tending of old and new fields in order to balance the proportion of plants in various stages of cultivation and production and thereby regulate production.

All of the cultivation processes are performed by unskilled, manual labor. The various tasks of cutting, planting, and weeding have traditionally been performed by individuals in non-cooperative work. There is nothing about the method which encourages any solidarity or cooperative labor organization.

Since the agrarian reform in the 1930s, the federal government has provided improved health care and medical facilities for the ejidatarios. As a result of decreased mortality, especially in the infant population, and increased longevity, the northern zone has experienced both regional and localized overpopulation. Overpopulation, coupled with a finite land base and henequen production which has not expanded beyond its apex which was reached in 1916, has resulted in finite land resources which may be observed on the local level in low wages and underemployment; the average ejidatario works only three to four days per week. Moreover, many sons of ejidatarios, who theoretically have rights to ejido land, must wait in the wings, so to speak, since they cannot be admitted into the ejido society until their fathers die.

In addition to these purely ecological constraints, the policies of government administrations since the Cárdenas reforms have caused ideological shifts, discontinuity in the labor organization of the local ejido societies, and changes in credit relationships with the government. Two major administrative changes and a number of minor labor reorganizations have been made since the Cárdenas reforms were implemented. The first phase involved a period of state administration under federal capital subsidy, while in the second phase, which is presently on-going, the collective ejidos are administered and subsidized directly by the federal government.

Cárdenas' declaration involving the henequen zone was oriented to the resident workers of the plantations. It included the following specifics:

(1) the amount of land for the formation of the ejidos would be based on four hectares per person; (2) once organized in terms of land, all ejidos would become cooperatives; (3) acasillados would receive land and form ejidos and cooperatives as was being done in the villages; (4) land remaining in the hands of the hacendados was not to exceed more than 150 hectares per person; (5) the decorticating plants would be purchased by the state and turned over to the cooperatives so that they could become complete productive units; (6) the Banco-Ejidal was to provide money to the cooperatives on a no-credit basis; (7) the Banco Agricola was to loan money to the small owners (Raymond 1970: 138).

Clearly, Cárdenas' agrarian reform in Yucatán attempted to implement his ideology as well as his goals for reforming the national ejido program. It called for the formation of collective ejidos and the transfer of the means of henequen production to the ejidatarios under a federal credit system which would have created a measure of economic autonomy for each local productive operation. Thus, the reform was oriented toward creating a strong rural working class in control of the local means of production and striving toward economic independence in a working relationship with the federal government. However, as the following pages explain, none of these goals was realized. Instead of pursuing Cárdenas' goals which would have placed increasing reliance on the ability of the ejidatarios to manage their own local affairs, the administration in the henequen zone immediately initiated policies which gave control over the means of production to federal or state administrative agencies and made the local collective ejido societies ever more dependent upon the government for capital subsidies and labor management.

Shortly after the formation process it became apparent that the land already planted in henequen had been unevenly distributed among the ejidos. According to the law, the ex-hacendados could

retain 150 hectares of land in cultivation. Since the ex-owners naturally chose to retain the most productive fields, the ejidatarios were left with unbalanced fields. Only 10 ejidos out of 276 had a proper balance of fields in exploitation in relation to fields in cultivation. In addition, unemployment and friction between federal and state authorities brought much unrest during this transition period (Raymond 1970: 139).

In an effort to resolve the problems of unequal distribution of henequen lands, Cárdenas agreed to the formation of a second Henequeneros de Yucatán, a federally subsidized but state-administered agency which was set up to handle the selling of fiber produced by the ejidos and the private planters (pequeños propietarios) and to organize and direct the production of all the credit societies.

Under this state-administered program each local ejido society had an administrator assigned by the state, who determined the amount and kind of work in conjunction with the ejido comisario. Each society was also assigned a nearby mill which rasped its fiber. Pay advances were made each week on the various tasks assigned to the members. At the beginning of the year the total value of the fiber produced the previous year was balanced against the amount advanced and any profit went to the ejidatarios as dividends (Raymond 1968: 142).

Although Henequeneros de Yucatán resolved the immediate problem of the imbalance of fields and even made some improvements, such as the construction of a central hospital in Mérida and some regional

clinics, nevertheless, the period is more appropriately characterized by poor work, low productivity, high costs, and corruption.

Because of the way it administered the credit societies, Henequeneros became known as "El Gran Ejido." In effect, the ejidos were treated as one massive labor pool which worked not only on lands assigned to their own ejidos, but also on all the lands in the general area (Kirk 1975: 104). Work was poorly done. Weedings which were supposed to last six months lasted three. Because of carelessness in planting, 80 percent of the young plants died. Overcutting of leaves reduced future productivity. Production of fiber from both ejido and private sectors dropped significantly because of the lack of initiative of the ejidatarios who had no control over the administration of production (Raymond 1970: 144). At the end of 17 years of Henequeneros de Yucatán, new and old fields still were not balanced for maximum utility.

Henequeneros was also very costly for the ejidatarios. As the largest administrative unit in the henequen zone, with 1,200 employees, it absorbed 42 percent of the total value of the fiber produced. Although the ejidos produced 72 percent of the fiber, they received only 20 percent of the total value. Private owners produced 20 percent but received 38 percent because they earned a profit for rasping the leaves of the ejidos, after the decorticating mills were returned to them in 1942 (Ibid.: 143).

Moreover, Henequeneros was replete with corruption on all levels, from the governor to the local administrators and ejido comisarios (Raymond 1970: 144). Good production figures do not exist

for the period (Kirk 1975: 105), indicating that corruption was widespread. In 1954 the federal government began to subsidize ejido earnings, suggesting that most societies were operating at a loss, and in 1955 Henequeneros de Yucatán was dissolved.

The federal government probably dissolved Henequeneros for a number of reasons: (1) a shift in ideology from the state collective to a more traditional view of the ejido in which each member of the collective would cultivate his own land, (2) too much graft throughout the system, and (3) not enough funds flowing to federal offices (Raymond 1970: 145).

In 1955 direct federal administration replaced Henequeneros de Yucatán. The ejidatarios were reorganized into the original 272 collective credit societies which had been formed in 1938, and the ejido once again was treated as an independent society of agricultural workers having usufruct rights to a specified area of land (Kirk 1975: 110).

Each society established independent relations with the Banco Ejidal which replaced Henequeneros de Yucatán. Pay advances were provided through a federal administrator and each society turned over its fiber to the bank for sale on the market. Theoretically, a society could now become independent and "autonomous" from the bank by liquidating its debts. By vote of its members, it could then establish credit from another source and market its own fiber, thereby taking profits when the market price was higher than the price the bank was paying. If the market price fell below the bank price, the society could vote again to reopen credit relations with the bank.

In practice, however, few societies were able to liquidate the debt. Between 1956 and 1963 most societies were accumulating new debts from large sums borrowed to replant the fields which had been exhausted during the administration of Henequeneros de Yucatán (Kirk 1975: 116-117). From 1956 to 1963 the bank was in debt every year (Raymond 1970: 148).

In 1960 the Banco Ejidal was changed to the Banco Agrario. The federal administrators were removed, and the credit society maintained independent relations directly with the bank through their elected officials, now called a social delegate (socio delegado) instead of comisario. The Banco Agrario initiated a new credit plan which functioned to break down the credit society into smaller productive units called "grupos solidarios," solidarity groups. Internally, the solidarity group has the same structure and rights as the credit societies regarding its autonomous or dependent relations to the bank. The main difference is that while only one credit society was permitted to form on a single ejido, many solidarity groups can form within a single ejido, provided that no individual member belongs to more than one group.

Credit societies were retained on the smaller ejidos where all members belonged to one collective and the ejido labor force was small. But the bank encouraged the larger ejidos to break into solidarity groups, each with its own elected officials, thereby splitting local control among a number of elected authorities. Where solidarity groups exist, there are two or more in the same ejido, and the ejido

is split up into a number of relatively small collectives which are more easily managed by the bank (Kirk 1975: 112; Raymond 1970: 151).

Theoretically, the solidarity group cultivates a portion of the total ejido land allotment which corresponds to the number of members in the group. In practice, the land allotment does not necessarily correlate with the size of a particular group, nor do the groups have their fields in the proper ratio of land in cultivation and land in exploitation (Raymond 1970: 174).

There is also an important ideological component to the solidarity group program. The bank considers the creation of such groups an intermediary step to the development of ejido henequen production by individuals called parcelarios, or heads of families who will receive about four hectares of ejido land to cultivate without any credit arrangements with the ejido community. In other words, the parcelario ejidatario, as envisioned by the bank, will enter into individual credit relations with the bank in order to keep his fields in balance (Raymond 1970: 151). The bank anticipates the complete breakdown of the collective ejido labor organization once the proportion of four hectares is balanced between lands in cultivation and lands in production for every parcel (Ibid.: 152).

Briefly summarizing, the various administrative policies in the henequen zone since Cárdenas have moved from one extreme form of labor organization to another. On the one hand, the state-administered "gran ejido," or state collective farm, organized the ejidatarios into a massive wage labor pool which showed no respect for the boundaries of individual ejido communities. On the other hand, the federal

administration since 1955 has systematically broken down the collective ejidos into smaller labor units, ideologically moving toward a goal of individual ejido cultivation without collective credit. Ironically, this most recent goal represents a recapitulation of the original role adopted for the ejido by the post-revolutionary presidents who preceded Cárdenas. It was from this individualistic definition of the ejido that Cárdenas tried to depart.

The administrative policies since Cárdenas reveal no consistency in credit relations, ideologies, nor labor organizations, beyond the periodic need to adjust the ejido laborers to the persistent imbalance of their henequen fields. Moreover, the administrations have shown a consistent lack of support for the collective societies as autonomous, cohesive, agrarian communities. In this short review of administrative policies the only consistent components are the dependency of the ejidos on the government and their lack of control over the local means of production.

The combination of the objective ecological limitations of the henequen zone and federal administrative policies since Cárdenas has led to a rather restrictive socio-economic environment which, in turn, appears to have fostered a number of specific constraints on the economic and social development of the collective ejido communities: (1) federal controls over the local means of henequen production through the use of capital has resulted in economic dependency and lack of initiative of the ejido societies; (2) corruption has lowered wages, contributed to underemployment, and jeopardized the social cohesion and ideology of the communities; (3) profit orientation

of the administration rather than social welfare has frustrated any efforts toward raising the standard of living through community development projects; and (4) ejido dependence on the private sector has indirectly inhibited the economic development of the ejido communities.

Federal capital subsidy has led to increasing dependence of the local ejido communities on the government. Because of their dependence on the state for capital subsidies, the ejidatarios have not controlled the local means of production as Cárdenas intended, except for a very brief period in 1936. The agrarian credit law of 1955 provides the most recent legal mechanism for control by the bank over the ejido labor force. Among the provisions in the law are the following: (1) the ejidos cannot borrow from any other source until debts to the government bank are paid; (2) since the ejido lands may not be mortgaged, debts are deferred in exchange for a share in the future produce of the soil; and (3) the bank can take possession of local ejido assets and manage the operation of the society until the debt is settled. In addition, interest charges, taxes, and administrators' salaries create further indebtedness of the societies.

The bank cannot change the ejido personnel since the individual ejido rights can only be revoked by the Department of Agrarian Affairs. Nevertheless, as explained in the previous discussion of policy changes, the bank does reorganize the ejido labor force periodically corresponding to work assignments associated with specific loans to put new fields into cultivation. Under the present system the bank makes "advanced payments" (anticipos) for work

performed by the ejidatarios. In theory the ejidatarios would derive economic benefits from higher production since, at the end of the year, the advanced payments are subtracted from the amount of fiber produced by the society and the remainder is distributed to the ejidatarios as profits. In practice, however, such "profits" are usually absorbed as payment on debts which were accumulated in the past (Kirk 1975: 86).

According to Kirk, this system of capital dependency along with indirect manipulation of the labor force has stifled both the individual and collective initiative of the ejidatarios. The ejidatarios regard the advanced payments as "salary" since they know that higher productivity will not bring them extra financial rewards. Moreover, as ejidatarios they retain their labor rights regardless of the quality of their work; hence, they do not work carefully. Seen from the perspective of capital dependency, it is not surprising that, as a productive unit, the collective ejidos are less efficient than the privately owned farms (see, for example, Chardon 1961: 218-219).

Through the extension of credit facilities the bank also regulates ejido production at a calculated level and maintains a state monopoly over marketing of henequen fiber. Ejido production has increased in recent years but at about only half the rate of private production (Raymond: 1970). Here again the rate of increase is determined by the amount of new lands prepared for henequen production and this, in turn, depends on the amount of capital disbursed by the bank, rather than on the initiative of the local societies.

Considering the prospects for the future, most observers project increasing capital dependency rather than autonomy. As Kirk claimed for one collective ejido:

> . . . In the long run, the ejido of San Antonio is not likely to reduce the total indebtedness but rather increase it if productivity and the exploitation of henequen is to be continued. . . . The percentage of ejido fields in production will decline from 80% in 1970 to about 50% in 1980, and to approximately 40% in 1981. . . . [It is] most likely that the remaining debt, and the compounding interest charges, will once again increase drastically for the ejidatarios, and the ejido, in the long run must be classified as a losing operation (1975: 125-127).

Corruption has further inhibited the economic and social development of the collective ejidos. Although it is impossible to evaluate its impact in quantitative terms, the evidence clearly indicates that, in addition to lowering salaries and increasing the debt to the bank, corruption jeopardizes the collective ideology and social cohesion of the collective ejido communities.

Corruption is prevalent on all levels of the henequen industry and must be regarded as part and parcel of the bureaucratic system of state controls. For example, both Raymond (1970: 157) and Kirk (1975) reported that individual ejidatarios illegally sell unrasped henequen leaves called "escaped leaves" to the private producers who own the decorticating mills. The owners include these leaves in their own production figures, thus inflating the official productivity of the private farms while, at the same time, deflating the official productivity of the ejidos. Such surreptitious sales help explain the low productivity of the ejidos in official aggregate statistics.

Theft by various officials in the credit society is also commonplace. Periodic accusations of theft are made against higher level officials in which case the officials are dismissed or forced to resign. However, when ejido officials are found guilty of theft, they go to jail. In addition to graft, "ghost payrolls," consisting of the names of non-existent people, frequently reduce by one-half what a member of a society should earn in a week, and the work week remains at only three or four days. Bank officials estimate that 10 to 15 percent of the payrolls consist of ghost names (Ramond 1970: 159).

A third constraint on ejido economic and social development stems from the fact that the bank has been profit oriented rather than oriented toward community development or social welfare. Since Cárdenas, dealings between the government administrations and the ejidatarios have focused on the economic goals of the henequen industry rather than on the social and cultural integration or betterment of the ejidatarios.

The bank does not encourage community projects and often frustrates any initiative the ejidatarios may have for improving their standard of living. None of the communities studied in Yucatán has active government price-controlled stores, CONASUPO, although the national program was specifically designed to assist ejido communities. Government-sponsored educational programs for adults are non-existent, although health clinics and schools are found throughout the region. None of the ejidos studied has cultural programs or communally owned televisions, though a few privately owned sets are found in most

communities. Food programs for children are not mentioned in either of the studies of northern Yucatecan communities, although such programs are found in many other parts of Mexico.

In addition, the living standards are low. The average family spends 90 percent or more of its weekly income on food. Housing is generally poor and without sanitary facilities. Loans are sometimes made to individual ejidos for home improvements. However, no systematic programs have been implemented on the regional level.

Communal utilization of ejido lands, which are not dedicated to henequen cultivation, is limited to wood gathering. Some ejidos have lands which were set aside in their original grants to be used as residential areas so that the ejidatarios theoretically anticipate moving their houses from the ex-hacienda site onto ejido lands. In one of the two communities studied these lands were unused by the societies, and the government failed to show any innovation in encouraging the productive utilization of such lands.

While the need for henequen is clearly on the decline (Raymond 1970: 17-18), diversification of agricultural production is regarded by government bureaucrats as practically impossible for two reasons: first, because of the ecological restrictions of the environment, i.e., the soil is too poor to grow cash crops other than henequen; and second, because crop diversification would conflict with the structure of control and the political-economic interests of those who control the industry (Raymond 1970: 17-18). Clearly, contradictory evidence concerning the environmental restrictions may be seen

in the private sector where many small farmers have successfully diversified their production. Private land owners raise pigs, sheep, goats, and cattle on their lands, and a number of private farmers have installed irrigation networks and proven that at least some soils in the northern zone are adequate for citrus production. Although no similar projects have been encouraged on the ejidos, it is obvious that such small-scale projects could easily be initiated by the ejidatarios with a minimum amount of capital subsidy.

Finally, the federal administration has not responded to the increasing population problem. No credit facilities or employment opportunities have been made available to sons of ejidatarios, and no new legislation has emerged to facilitate or reinterpret the succession of ejido rights. Of course, similar problems are found in many regions of the country, and only the federal government can amend the ejido laws. Nevertheless, in southern Yucatán state, where government-owned lands are still abundant, new ejido grants could be made to the sons of ejidatarios of the northern henequen zone. Despite the recommendations of anthropologists (Camara 1969), however, the government has not encouraged migration to the south.

In brief, because its profit orientation has precluded community development and social welfare projects from serious consideration, the federal administration of the henequen industry has not developed programs in response to the social and economic needs of the collective ejido communities.

The role played by the private sector constitutes a final, indirect aspect of the system of state controls which has inhibited

the development of the collective ejido societies in the northern henequen zone. Although it may be argued that the private sector does not directly inhibit the economic and social development of the collective ejidos since they are subsidized by the federal government, nevertheless it can be demonstrated that the presence of a large private sector in the henequen zone represents an indirect constraint on the collective ejido societies.

In the aftermath of Yucatán's agrarian reform the federal government clearly dominates the henequen industry. Nevertheless, especially on the local level, the private sector still wields disproportionate control over the means of henequen production when compared to the ejidos. According to the agrarian reform laws, small owners (pequeños propietarios), most of whom were hacendados before the agrarian reform, were permitted to retain 150 hectares of henequen lands in production and 150 hectares of fallow land, while the ejido allocations were four hectares per ejidatario. In practice, this means that, on the local level, the lands of each small owner, ex-hacendado produce as much as or more than the combined lands of 37 ejidatarios. Estimates on the number of private producers range from 450 to 500 (Raymond 1970: 119), while the ejidatarios number in the tens of thousands. Yet private owners account for almost a third of the total henequen produced.

In addition, an estimated 20 to 25 percent of the small producers own more than one small property; the additional property is often registered in the name of a family member. According to the 1960 ejidal census, 52 percent of all crop lands in Yucatán state

were owned privately, 27 percent were units comprised of 5,000 hectares or more and 42 percent of 1,000 hectares or more. Although such statistics include many holdings outside the henequen zone, they seem to indicate clearly that the restrictions on the size of individual property holdings, which are specified in the agrarian reform laws, have not been enforced rigorously by the government.

In recent years the private sector has increased productivity much more rapidly than the ejido sector. In part this is explained by the fact that increasingly more lands in the private sector have been turned over to henequen production. On the other hand, this does not necessarily mean that private production is much greater per land unit on the local level. As previously explained, the higher productivity of the private sector in part reflects the development of covert economic cooperation between the private owners and individual ejidatarios who sell stolen leaves to the owners.

Such economic cooperation must be understood as a local adaptation to the larger system of state controls. Since the bank pays the private producers more than the ejidatarios for what amounts to the same henequen fiber, private producers can still make a profit by purchasing henequen leaves from individual ejidatarios. However, the sale of "escaped leaves" is illegal and has a damaging effect on the collective society. Since it is done by individuals rather than by the collectivity of ejidatarios, it encourages corruption within the ejido. Furthermore, it lowers the official productivity of the ejido community and therein increases the debt to the bank, ultimately contributing to further indebtedness and continued capital dependency.

There are a number of other ways in which the ejidatarios are dependent on the private sector. The henequen decorticating mills, constituting an important productive resource, are owned mainly by the private ex-hacendados. In the original Cárdenas reforms the mills were expropriated and turned over to the ejidos. However, without management experience and capital for repairs, and in the absence of government assistance during the crucial transition period, the ejidatarios were unable to operate the decorticating plants successfully. In 1942, during the administration of Henequeneros de Yucatán, the plants were returned to the private owners.

Today, the bank fixes the rate which the ejidos pay to the owners for decorticating the henequen leaves of the society. The bank pays the owners from the ejido account, much like the advance salary payments to the ejido workers, and then subtracts the costs of decortication from the total value of processed ejido fiber. In effect, the ejidos are a captive client to the mill owners. Recently the bank has constructed a few new mills and purchased some of the mills which it then turned over to the ejido societies (Raymond 1970: 153). This is by no means a regional program, however, and the private owners still make large profits processing henequen leaves for the ejido societies.

Obviously, the ejido societies would have achieved a greater degree of economic success had the decorticating mills remained in their possession. Nevertheless, the ejido societies still derive some legitimate economic benefits from the private sector in that a number of private owners hire ejido laborers to work in their mills

and on their lands. There appears to be a good deal of local variation in such practices, however. On the large haciendas and in villages, where an ample supply of non-ejido labor is available, ex-hacendados do not hire collective ejidatarios to work on their lands because they claim the ejidatarios do poor work (Raymond 1970: 122). On the other hand, on smaller haciendas, where almost all the local residents are collective ejidatarios, and particularly where the ejidatarios and ex-hacienda owners maintain good relations, many of the ejidatarios may earn as much as half their cash income working for the private owner in his fields and in the decorticating mills (Kirk 1975: 338).

Such dependence on the private owner for wages further contributes to the lack of economic initiative of the collective societies. The productivity of the ejido lands is clearly insufficient to support the ejidatarios. Yet the presence of the private sector, by its offer of wages for labor, further inhibits the development of internal ejido initiatives which would lead to economic self-sufficiency for the collective ejido societies.

In brief, while the private sector may in fact benefit the individual ejidatario, it makes a negative contribution to the viability of the collective ejido organization. Some Mexican anthropologists have pointed to the basic incompatibility of a collective labor organization within a fundamentally capitalist system in which the private sector continues to exploit the collective ejidos. Stavenhagen's explanation, for example, applies very well to the situation of the collective ejidos in northern Yucatán even though

he proposed it as a more general reason for the lack of success of collective ejidos in Mexico:

> . . . En general la organizacion ejidal colective esta en franca decadencia, no porque haya demonstrado ser un fracaso, sino porque la incompatibilidad entre una forma de organización colectiva de trabajo y el regimen capitalista que impera en el pais ha sido demasiado grande. . . . El sabotaje de la organizacion colectiva desde las esfersas mas altas, desde hace casi treinta anos, refleja de hecho la contradiccion cade vez mas aguda entre los intereses privados y colectivos en el agro Mexicana. La principal tragedia de la reforma agraria mexicana ha sido que en su desarrollo ha tenido que reflejar necesariamente el caracter de la propia Revolucion Mexicana, realizada por los campesinos y usufructuada, en gran media por la nueva burgesia surgida en sus filas (Stavenhagen 1972: 40).

To the extent that the private sector controls the means of henequen production on the local level, the economic and social development of the collective ejidos in Yucatán will be inhibited.

Summary

This chapter began with an historical review of the concept of ejido as it evolved from Colonial times to the present in which it plays a crucial role in Mexico's national agrarian reform and development programs. The second section turned to a description of the ecological and cultural history of the Yucatán region. Although the region shows great continuity in its gross ecological features, nevertheless, the northern and southern zones were differentiated along a number of ecological dimensions. The discussion stressed the overall historical unity of the region as both a homogenous culture area and an area where the most significant economic and socio-political changes were caused by secondary development: first, the development of the hacienda and plantation system in the middle of the

nineteenth century; then, the transformations of this system due to the imposition of national agrarian reform laws and administrative policies following the Revolution of 1910.

The final section of the chapter focused on the effects of agrarian reform in the northern henequen-producing zone. Reviewing secondary sources, the discussion called attention to some of the specific limitations of the collective henequen ejido as an institutional form. Two main causal variables were isolated: (1) the ecological features of the northern zone which place severe limitations on its potential for resource development; and (2) the various administrative policies which have inhibited the development of cohesive and productive ejido communities on the local level because of frequent changes and inconsistencies in administrative goals, policies, and ideologies.

In the following chapters, the study turns to an analysis of the effects of the agrarian reform and collective ejido program in Yucatán's southern zone through a comprehensive examination of a mixed cattle ranching/mechanized crop farming collective ejido project. The thesis tests the hypothesis that: The local ejido ecology and particularly its potentiality for resource development is causal to the effects of national agrarian reform policies on local-level economic and socio-political institutions. To operationalize this hypothesis, it is proposed that: Although national agrarian reform policies will demonstrate considerable uniformity, the effects of such policies on ex-hacienda collective ejidos in Yucatán's northern and southern zones will vary in certain fundamental respects as both

regional administrating agencies and local collective ejido organizations necessarily adapt to significant ecological and economic differences between the zones.

CHAPTER THREE

ECOLOGY AND HISTORY OF AN EX-HACIENDA IN THE SOUTHERN ZONE

Introduction

This chapter considers the ecological and historical background of the ex-hacienda of Catmis. The first section presents a description of the physical and cultural setting of this ex-hacienda, including its location within the municipio, geographical features, settlement patterns, acculturation, and population. The second section reviews the pre-agrarian reform history of the ex-hacienda, including the expansion of sugar cane haciendas in the southern zone, 1823-1875, and the rise of the corporate sugar plantation, 1876-1935. The third section examines the impact of agrarian reform in Catmis corresponding to the two major administrative phases: state administration followed by federal administration.

The Setting

Ex-Hacienda and Municipio

Catmis, an ex-hacienda of about 900 permanent residents, is located 120 miles southeast of Mérida, near the border which separates the State of Yucatán from the Territory of Quintana Roo. The ex-hacienda lies at the southern tip of a triangle, with the towns of Tzucacab and Peto forming the northwestern and northeastern points, respectively (see Map 2: The Municipio of Tzucacab and Area Surrounding

THE MUNICIPIO OF TZUCACAB
AND AREA SURROUNDING
THE VILLAGE

Map 2



Source:
National Indigenous Institute,
Peto, Yucatan 1970

the Village). These two urban centers are both capitals of the municipalities which bear their names and are the only large towns in the area. The town of Tzucacab has slightly more than 4,000 inhabitants, while its municipality as a whole has about 6,000. Peto claims about 8,000 inhabitants, while its municipality numbers 11,000. Catmis is the second largest locality in the municipality of Tzucacab, and the only other locality in the area whose population even approaches 1,000 people. The remaining inhabitants of the municipality live scattered throughout the countryside on ranches, haciendas, and in small maize-producing hamlets.

The road system which links Catmis to Tzucacab and Peto is adequate, and villagers visit these towns frequently. To reach Tzucacab from Catmis, one travels 12 miles northwest along a dirt road. To reach Peto, one travels six miles east along the same dirt road until it bisects the modern Mérida-Chetumal highway at the hacienda of Santa Rosa. Peto is located on the highway about seven miles north of Santa Rosa.

In recent years public transportation has brought Catmis closer to Yucatán. Each day two buses enter the village: The first arrives at noon and departs from Mérida at 1:00 P.M.; the second arrives at 6:00 P.M. and remains in the village until 4:00 A.M. the following morning when it, too, departs for Mérida. Returning to Mérida, the bus travels first to Santa Rosa, then goes north along the highway to Peto. From Peto, it follows the highway west to Tzucacab and then north again to Tekax, Akil, Oxkutzbac, Ticul, Muna, Uman,

and Mérida. From Catmis, the bus takes 25 minutes to Peto, 45 minutes to Tzucacab, and four and a half hours to Mérida.

Many of the surrounding hamlets are essentially economic satellites of Catmis. The maize farmers who inhabit these settlements come to trade their harvests for consumer goods in Catmis' retail stores. In the same fashion, Catmis maintains a number of important administrative, legal, anc cultural relations with the municipal capital of Tzucacab. However, political and economic ties between Catmis and Tzucacab have always been relatively unimportant because Catmis' plantation economy was linked directly to larger regional and international markets, while its internal political organization was controlled by wealthy landowners who maintained personal ties to higher level government officials.

Because of its location and the adequate bus service, villagers have equal access to Tzucacab and Peto. Hence, Catmiseños maintain ties to both these municipal capitals for recreational purposes. However, for administrative, legal, and ceremonial functions, they are closer to Tzucacab. Births, marriages, divorces, and deaths are all registered in Tzucacab. In addition, priests are brought from Tzucacab and Peto to perform important religious ceremonies. Catmiseños depend on both Tzucacab and Peto for large fiestas and movies and for large retail daily markets which supply commodities not available in the village.

Today, the formal municipal government in Catmis consists of a single official, the comisario del pueblo, who is appointed by the municipal president of Tzucacab to resolve minor conflicts and crimes

in the village. His position is honorary, carrying no salary, and he performs functions similar to those of a justice of the peace. In one case, for example, a village girl brought paternity charges against a young man, claiming he should marry her. In his defense, the man claimed that the girl had sought him out in his bachelor house and, since this was a challenge to his masculinity, he had to sleep with her. Since the girl had given birth to another illegitimate child a few years earlier, her case was weak. Moreover, the man claimed that she had slept with others and he didn't believe the child was his. The comisario decided to wait until the child was born, at which time he would decide whether the defendant was the child's father by checking the child's physical features for likeness. Another case involved a stolen watch. The guilty man was sentenced to serve a number of days labor for the benefit of the village.

For more serious crimes, such as homicide, the comisario reports the case to the municipal president, and the police are brought in to handle the matter. There were no murder cases in Catmis in 1970-1971, but two were reported in the area: one from a remote settlement, and the second from the nearby development farm in Santa Rosa.

Most villagers know the municipal officials from Tzucacab. However, the local merchants participate in municipal affairs more than the average villager since they must pay bribes for unofficial government permission to sell goods which have been smuggled into Yucatán from Quintana Roo. Most food items, such as canned cheese and meats, are smuggled into Catmis without tax. Some goods,

particularly radios and liquor, are taxed heavily. In addition, the villagers must pay municipal officials for permission to hold local fiestas and sell liquor.

Finally, Catmiseños maintain personal ties to the municipio. Villagers have a better knowledge of the geography, history, people, and settlements of the municipality than the state or nation. Many men have worked in different parts of the municipality, and people have friends living in ranchos, haciendas, and hamlets as well as in the municipal capitals of Tzucacab and Peto. Kinship and marriage bonds within the municipality are strong, and many people now living in Catmis were born in other settlements in the municipality.

Geography

Catmis has a semi-tropical climate with summer rains and a dry winter. The mean annual temperature is 76° F., and the mean annual precipitation is 47 inches which falls from March through October. The days are generally warm to hot, while the nights are cool. Vegetation in the area is subtropical consisting of thick scrubs and savannah grasslands. The tallest foliage rarely grows more than 35 feet high. Soils in the village have a high clay content but, when irrigated, can support many different cash crops, horticulture, and some fruits. Because of the long dry season, only one crop can be grown each year without irrigation. Wild guinea grass (Panicum Maximum) covers the open lands around the village.

Securing a regular water supply presents a major seasonal problem for the villagers. From May to November it rains almost every day and water is plentiful. People collect rain water for

drinking in every conceivable kind of container, including large iron tanks, barrels, clay vessels, and aluminum buckets. Some people have built cement troughs in their yards for water storage, and one man even constructed a concave cement roof on his house which traps enough water to last through most of the dry season.

The dry season extends from December to April, and water is scarce. Those who cannot afford to buy water from the local vendors, who bring it from private wells outside the village, must haul it from one of five village wells. Hauling water is primarily women's work, but young boys often help with this daily chore. Sometimes an innertube is used to fill a barrel, but more often water is emptied from the well into two aluminum pails. For carrying, the pails are hung on the ends of a long wooden staff which is then balanced across the shoulders while walking. Women often fill a single bucket which they carry home on their heads.

Villagers complain that the wells are shallow and, consequently, the water has a high salt content and is brackish. Few villagers drink water from these wells, though everyone uses it for washing and cooking. A number of public water spickets are presently being constructed, and the people hope that hauling water from the wells soon will be unnecessary.

Settlement Patterns

The village settlement pattern indicates that Catmis developed as a factory village. The most imposing structure in the village is the factory itself which lies to the north of a large plaza area

(see Map 3: The Village of Catmis). In 1971 the remains of the defunct factory and machinery could still be seen, but the factory was being dismantled. The plaza area is covered with mud and high grass since it is chronically neglected. Once a year the villagers cut the grass and clean up the plaza for the November fiesta which honors Santa Catalina, the patron saint of the village.

The largest buildings in Catmis are located near or surrounding the plaza. These include: two cement school houses, one of which was built in 1971; two large general stores; a two-story building which originally was the residence of the factory owner, but recently was converted into a warehouse and offices of the ejido; a large cement dwelling which was built about 10 years ago to house managers of the factory; a large dormitory which was constructed to house seasonal factory workers but now lies vacant; and a meeting hall which was used for village assemblies. The only building situated on the plaza is a small Catholic church which was built about 10 years ago.

Other public and commercial buildings are located throughout the village. These buildings include: a Protestant church located in an adobe hut, a poolroom, five general stores, two grinding mills, three home-style restaurants, and a small post office.

The village contains 225 habitable dwellings, of which 78 percent (175) were occupied in 1971. The houses are separated from each other by low stone walls which enclose the yards and small maize plots or milpa. The dwellings are located on the north, east, and west sides of the plaza, but only a few houses are situated to the



Source:
Adapted from Merida Yuc,
1970–Alonso Avila

south of the factory site since, during the period of the sugar plantation, the sugar cane fields were located in this area. The smallest and most densely settled plots are near the plaza. Larger, less densely settled plots surround these houses, which suggests that the village has grown out from the plaza area.

Including the plaza, Catmis has 22 blocks and about 24 streets, none of which is paved. The shape of the village is roughly square, extending about half a mile in any direction. It is bounded to the south by the local Catmis ejido lands and two private cattle ranches, "Lara" and "Los Reyes," to the north by the ejido lands of the small hamlet "Macmay," and a private cattle ranch, "La Flecha," to the east by a government-sponsored farming project in Santa Rosa, and to the west by two private cattle ranches, "La Hermita" and "Tampich."

Acculturation

Located in the heart of the most indigenous area of Mexico, the population of Catmis is exceptional in that it is more acculturated than the people who live in the independent maize hamlets which are scattered throughout the southern zone. Fully 85 percent of the Catmiseños speak Spanish; 35 percent said they speak Spanish exclusively, while 50 percent said they were bilingual, speaking both Spanish and Yucatec Maya with equal facility. Only 15 percent of the villagers indicated that they speak Maya almost exclusively. In addition, there is no correlation between sex and language acculturation in Catmis, which suggests that men and women are acculturated at the same rate.

Another important indicator of acculturation in the Yucatec Mayan area is dress pattern. The term "mestizo" is used in Yucatan to refer to those who wear the traditional costume of the indigenous people, while "catrin" is used for those who wear European clothing. Traditional dress for the mestiza woman includes the huipil, a white cotton shift with embroidery along the neckline and hem, a gold necklace, hair placed in a bun or braided, and sandals. The "catrina" wears cotton printed dresses and uses shoes. The mestizo man wears white cotton pants, a white cotton shirt without a collar, and sandals, while men who are "catrin" wear European shirts, pants, and close shoes.

Table 1 describes the distribution of traditional and modern clothing in Catmis.

Table 1.--Traditional and modern clothing in Catmis.[a]

	Traditional (Mestizo)		Modern (Catrin)		Total Responses	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
n	30	40	45	60	75	100
nen	28	37	47	63	75	100
ldren	5	8	58	92	63	100
Total responses	63	30	150	70	213	100

[a]Data from village questionnaire, 1970-71.

Patterns of dress are mostly modern "catrin" for both men and women. About 60 percent of the men and 65 percent of the women wear modern clothing. In addition, about 92 percent of the Catmiseños claim that their children wear modern clothing. Again, with respect to clothes, Catmis is well-acculturated when compared to the maize-producing hamlets which surround it. It should be noted that the high degree of language and clothing acculturation in Catmis reflects its relatively heterogenous population which, in turn, results from frequent immigrations of people from other parts of Mexico who came to Catmis to work in the sugar industry.

Catmiseños identify with Yucatán's regional culture and history. Many of them have visited archaeological zones which are scattered throughout the state, and they express pride in their knowledge that Pre-Columbian Maya civilization was highly advanced. A number of villagers also collect old stone tools and pot shards which they find near the village. Most Catmiseños have seen Mérida and other northern towns, and a few have been as far as Mexico City. In addition, Catmiseños are fond of Yucatecan folk songs, and they lay claim to Yucatán's heroes. Villagers often speak of Guty Cárdenas, the Yucatecan song-writer of the 1920s, as if he were a long-time resident of the village or a personal friend. Moreover, the official name of the Catmis ejido is Felipe Carrillo Puerto, after Yucatán's famous socialist governor who was assassinated by reactionaries in the 1920s.

pulation

The population figures for Catmis clearly reflect many of the haracteristic features of plantation life. Table 2 shows the popu-tion statistics from 1900 to 1970.

ble 2.--Population statistics for Catmis: 1900-1970.[a]

ar	Total Population	Men		Women	
		N	%	N	%
00	417	226	54	191	46
20	303	162	53.5	141	46.5
30	483	261	54	222	46
40	690	372	54	328	46
50	907	476	52	431	48
60	302	159	53	143	47
6	995	513	51.5	482	48.5
0	874	443	51	431	49

[a]Data from 1900-1960 from VIII. Censo General de la Poblacion, ico, 1960; 1963, Mexico D.F.P. 61, Estado de Yucatán. Data from) were not available. Data from 1966 from Pozas (1966: 51). Data 1 1970 are from the author's own local village census.

nd the end of the hacienda period in 1930 the population of Catmis 483, or about the same as it was 30 years earlier in 1900. Fol-ng the agrarian reform and the implementation of the government-l sugar industry, however, the population almost doubled in 20 , from 483 inhabitants in 1930 to 907 in 1950.

The 1960 census, which lists only 302 inhabitants, was prob-
taken in the off-season and does not accurately reflect the
lation of the village. From 1966 to 1970 the population declined
endously as a result of a large emigration following the abrupt
ing of the sugar factory in 1965; at least 221 people emigrated
the village in search of work, and the population declined by
t 12 percent, from 995 in 1966 to 874 in 1970.

The population composition of the village also exhibits
acteristics of rural proletariat communities associated with
tations (Mintz 1953). In the first place, from 1900 to 1960 the
age demonstrated a high sex ratio: The male population ranged
4-8 percent higher than the female population, thus reflecting
mmunity which largely depends upon a male work force. Second,
opulation is highly mobile. Only 35 percent of the married
gers were born in Catmis. The remaining 65 percent originally
to the village from other parts of Yucatán and Mexico looking
ork in the sugar cane industry. When the factory was operating,
opulation was particularly mobile because of the seasonal nature
or requirements: Fully two-thirds of the villagers lived and
in Catmis during the harvest season, but had to leave the vil-
nd find work elsewhere during the "dead season" which lasted
x to eight months. Even today, one can observe a steady flow
le into and out of the village. Such mobility clearly indi-
hat tenuous conditions of wage employment still exist for many
s.

In both physical and demographic features, Catmis demon-
rates the basic characteristics of a typical plantation village in
ucatán. It differs from plantations in the northern zone in that
s organization centered around the cultivation of sugar cane
ather than henequen, and it is surrounded by abundant lands and
all maize-producing communities. On the other hand, Catmis is
ypical of many northern ex-haciendas with respect to its population
ize and its high degree of acculturation.

Pre-Agrarian Reform History

It is convenient to divide the pre-agrarian reform history
Catmis into two periods: (1) the expansion of the hacienda and
) the growth of the corporate sugar plantation.

Unlike many villages in northern Yucatán whose histories
e-date the Spanish conquest, most contemporary settlements in
uthern Yucatán have been inhabited for less than 100 years (Villa
45: 168). This relatively short period of occupation is due mainly
the traditional Mayan practice of slash and burn agriculture which
idly depletes the minerals in the soil. Even with plot rotation,
soils that lie within walking distance of the village become
usted after 50 or 100 years. This forces many individuals and
times whole communities to leave their villages in search of
h soils. Hence, the periodic abandonment and resettlement of
ges is a characteristic pattern in the southern zone.

Nothing factual is known about Catmis during the Pre-Colonial
olonial Periods, the latter of which lasted from 1546 to 1823.

Although no archaeological excavations have been conducted, pottery, stone tools, and large mounds have been found near the village, which suggests that Catmis was the site of a small hamlet which the frontier Maya periodically settled as a subsistence maize agricultural community.

The Expansion of the Hacienda, 1824-1876

When Mexico gained its independence from Spain in 1824, Yucatán's southern frontier opened up rapidly to Ladino settlers who sought to make a quick profit by operating small sugar cane haciendas. Most of the haciendas which sprang up throughout the region were located in the departments of Tekax and Peto (which then included Tzucacab), but ranged as far north as Oxkutzcab.

The earliest mention of Catmis, as X-Catmis (Cline 1950: 26), occurred in 1845 when it was described as an established sugar cane hacienda with relatively high costs in transporting cane to Peto. According to a local legend, the original Ladino hacendado, who bought Catmis, named it after his lovely wife, Catalina Mis. The Ladino settlers purchased lands cheaply from the government and dug wells to attract a small indigenous labor force. In exchange for water, the Ladinos demanded labor from the Indians on their plantations and gradually transformed the local Maya farmers into slaves.

It is likely that the frontier Maya destroyed the sugar cane hacienda in Catmis during the War of the Castes, 1848-1858, since the Indian rebels occupied Peto, Tzucacab, and even Tekax during the major portion of the war (Reed 1964). Following the war, Catmis was

evived as a garrison town with the responsibility of protecting Peto rom attacks by renegade Indians. In the 1860s the hacienda was gain purchased by a Ladino or Mestizo family and converted into a attle ranch and sugar cane hacienda.

Once again privately owned lands combined with refining mills prang up throughout the area. To name but a few, haciendas were pcated in Cakalna, Dzuiche, Vakas, Tul, Polyuc, Santa Maria (Tekax), nd Tabi. These mills were small, primitive, and highly decentral-zed in production. Characteristically, hacendados did not try to aise cane production above the capacity of their mills. Rather, ney maintained a stable production which required no additional capi-l investments. The markets for sugar cane in the region were found Peto and Tzucacab, but a large proportion of sugar cane was con-med locally as aguardiente.

During this period treatment of the Maya laborers was again llustrative of the most oppressive features of the hacienda system Latin America (Villa Rojas 1945: 168). Maya men were tied to the cienda through debt servitude and sons inherited the debts of their hers. Deviant behavior was punished with brutal beatings. One or favored workers were given the job of foreman (mayordomo). se men were entrusted to guard the machinery during the "off son," recruit and maintain a labor force, care for the sugar cane ntations, and manage the general store, In exchange for these vices, the hacienda owner furnished them with a small house near factory, a percentage of sugar cane, a small amount of cash, and all store containing tools and clothing from Mérida. Such

patron-client ties between the hacienda owner and his resident managers were often formalized through bonds of ritual kinship or compadrazgo.

During most of the year the owner was absent, but he would return to manage the hacienda during the harvest season when local maize farmers came from the surrounding hamlets to work in the cane fields. These seasonal laborers constituted the main force of factory labor. They received daily wages in perquisets which they used to make purchases in the general store. At the end of the harvest season the resident workers would also receive a measure of processed sugar.

Throughout this phase of the hacienda period the ethnic composition of Catmis was homogeneous, consisting primarily of the indigenous Maya Indians. All the villagers spoke Maya, except when communicating with the few Ladino owners or managers who spoke panish.

ne Corporate Sugar lantation, 1877-1937

The corporate sugar plantation began toward the end of the neteenth century. This phase was characterized by the rise of ntralization and industrialization of the hacienda which began ound 1877 and ended in 1937 with the implementation of Cárdenas' arian reforms. In relation to Yucatán's regional history, it responds to the period in which the henequen haciendas grew into ge plantations operated strictly for profit, with huge capital stments and the corresponding elimination of other subsistence vities such as slash and burn agriculture. In relation to Mexican

history, it spans the rule of Porfirio Diaz, the Revolution of 1910, and the Post-Revolutionary period.

Along with Mexico as a whole, Catmis experienced the strong influence of national trends during the Diaz rule. The hacienda ent through rapid commercialization, industrial development, and ncreased foreign investment. However, during the Revolution of 1910 nd the post-war years Catmis was isolated from national events. ntil 1937 the corporate plantation system continued to dominate the conomic and social life of Catmis, and the national agrarian reforms hich grew out of the Revolutionary period were not implemented.

Late in the nineteenth century a Cuban corporation purchased e Catmis factory as an investment. The new corporation had a number effects in the area which were both immediate and profound.

In contrast to the family-type hacienda which preceded it, the w land and factory combine was highly capitalized and completely ofit oriented. As the largest refining mill in the area, the Catmis rporation virtually controlled the regional market. None of the ily-type haciendas could compete with the corporate plantation. ce, in order to survive, the small owners developed into a planter ass" called colonos. Individual land owners contracted with the oration to grow sugar cane for the Catmis refining mill. Other l hacendados rented or sold their lands to the corporation. In heyday, then, the Catmis factory processed sugar cane which was n on a dozen or more smaller haciendas in the vicinity.

German machinery, which was imported from Cuba, greatly ased sugar cane production. Moreover, with the opening of the

ailroad from Tzucacab and Peto to Mérida, the factory in Catmis njoyed an expanding market. Previously, a large part of the product ad been converted into rum or aguardiente and consumed locally.

Increased demand for sugar cane also encouraged greater land cilization and this, in turn, created more work in the industry and rought more people to the village. When the factory was producing at p capacity, perhaps as many as 1,000 laborers worked three eight-hour ifts to harvest and process the cane. From January through May n harvested sugar cane in the fields and cut wood to keep the steam gines of the factory running. From June through December they pre- red lands for new plantings, weeded the fields which were in pro- ction, and cut lumber in anticipation of the next year's harvest. the labor force grew, the factory village evolved into a large ttlement which became the center of a growing rural proletariat ulation whose cultural and ethnic similarities to the inhabitants the outlying maize-producing villages diminished as they became reasingly dependent upon the factory for work. Particularly during after the Revolution of 1910 many rural migrants came to Catmis other parts of Mexico seeking refuge from the war and work in the r industry. From the time of the Revolution until 1965, when the ory closed permanently, the population of Catmis changed rapidly a heterogeneous resident labor force.

The relationship between workers and plantation owners was on the exchange of labor for a daily wage. The conditions of yment were determined by the hacienda administrators, who held ete economic power and political control in the village. The

Catmis sugar plantation was not a formal political unit; only one civil position was represented there, the comisario, who was appointed by the municipal president. The plantation owners together exercised control over the municipal government and often served as municipal officials.

Two classes were represented in Catmis: an upper class made up of the owners and administrators; and a lower class, made up of workers and the slightly more privileged foremen and richer shopkeepers. There were no marriages nor formal social activities between these classes, although sexual liaisons between owners and hacienda men were commonplace, and, today, the ex-hacienda owners will privately acknowledge many "unofficial" relatives in Catmis.

The labor force was stratified along a number of lines. First, resident laborers became associated with the machinery of the factory. They were the favored workers and were employed during the entire year. When the sugar harvest ended, they began repairs on the machinery, and when the repair period ended, they turned to weeding the cane fields and cutting lumber.

Resident workers in the corporate sugar plantation received daily wages as well as certain privileges, including a dwelling and land for milpa cultivation and a portion of sugar cane for each member of the family. Workers did not own subsistence plots, however, and were no longer attached to the hacienda by debt, largely because the tremendous seasonal fluctuations in labor needs of the sugar hacienda made it desirable that the workers be free to come and go; the plantation owners wanted to be responsible for as few permanent

workers as possible. Apart from the resident workers of the planta-
tion were the milperos, who constituted the major seasonal labor
force. These non-resident laborers lived with their families in the
small settlements surrounding the village. Their principal economic
base was in slash and burn agriculture, and the nuclear family was
their primary unit of production.

Another principle which stratified the labor force was the
distinction between skilled and unskilled workers. Even during the
family-type hacienda period, the diversity of skills which a man
possessed determined his importance to the industry. With the intro-
duction of modern processing machinery, however, the distinction
based on skill took on even greater importance. In the late 1920s
men who could repair machinery were in great demand. Consequently,
they commanded high wages and maintained high-status positions among
the workers.*

With the exception of maize, which was produced as a staple
in the surrounding hamlets, nearly all of the supplies of the plan-
tation were purchased outside the village. Barnyard animals and fowl
were raised within the hacienda to provide milk, meat, and eggs.
Apart from this, the workers bought food and clothes with their cash
wages, though the stores extended credit and collected, at times,
directly from the plantation.

Catmis had no church nor chapel, and most people rarely
attended church in Tzucacab. Baptism was the principal Catholic

---

*This was equally true for the henequen zone. Engineers who
ired the decorticating machinery were often brought over from
ny as part of the contract of sale for the factory purchase.

ritual practiced. The Catholic church exercised little influence in political or economic matters, and plantation owners made no attempt o encourage religion. Traditional Mayan rituals associated with the aize cycle were practiced primarily by milperos, and no conflict etween these beliefs and Catholicism was recognized by the villagers.

The plantation offered no education to the workers' children nd no modern medical facilities were available.

By the end of the Mexican Revolution, in about 1916, the tmis sugar plantation had developed into an agricultural industry ich was part of an industrial rural complex and dependent upon the le of a monocrop in regional and international markets. But the ban corporate plantation was dislodged during the aftermath of the xican Revolution. Three local mestizo families gained favor with e state government and, after a series of local political battles, naged to supplant the Cubans. Forming a new corporation, these ilies achieved control over the factories of Catmis and the small wn sugar factory in nearby Calkalna. From 1917 to 1937 they exer- ed complete control over the factory machinery and plantation ds. These mestizo men and their sons after them became the local es (caciques) of the village.

To some extent, Catmis now experienced a revival of the pater- stic patron-client ties which had characterized the family hacienda d but which had disappeared during the time of the Cuban corpora- The mestizos played a greater role in local affairs, encouraged drazgo relationships between themselves and favored workers, and old the factory store to one of the workers.

The three mestizo families administered the corporation themselves, dividing control of local resources in order to manage the industry. Norberto Vasques was given control of the lands and machinery in Cakalna. The remaining two shareholders, Rafael Ken and Seribino Lara, divided the Catmis lands and machinery equally between them. They operated their lands individually, but they supervised the factory operation together.

Around 1935 both Ken and Lara died, and their corporate holdings were divided among their sons, who had helped them manage the corporation. Each man had three sons. On the death of Rafael Ken, his eldest son, Rafael, inherited some hotels, which his father had bought in Mexico City, and withdrew from the corporation. Another son, Felipe, inherited his father's half of the factory machinery in Catmis. The third son, Apolinar, inherited his father's sugar plantation lands. When Seribino Lara died a year or so later, Fernando inherited the largest portion of his father's lands. He converted the lands into a cattle ranch, "La Hermita," and also withdrew from the corporation. His was the first large ranch in the area, predating the recent upsurge in cattle ranching by about 30 years. The remaining lands and Seribino Lara's half of the Catmis machinery were divided by his other two sons: Ermilo inherited one-quarter share of the machinery and enough lands for a private sugar plantation; Raul also inherited one-quarter of the machinery and a large number of mules which he used as a mule train to pull carts of freshly cut cane from the fields to the factory.

By the middle of the 1930s the history of the corporately wned plantation in Catmis becomes somewhat obscure. It is clear hat the sons owned and managed the corporation for a few years fter their fathers died. This brief period of Catmis history is eplete with tales of political corruption, familial intrigues, ebauchery, and perhaps most important, a large accumulation of debts ich the shareholders began to pile on the corporation. One note- rthy incident involved Felipe Ken, who had inherited half the ctory machinery in Catmis. By 1937 it is said that his debts cumulated to more than two million pesos which he had borrowed om Fomento de Yucatán, then a major state banking agency for velopment of Yucatán's sugar industry.

The Agrarian Reform

In the middle of the 1930s a number of centralizing forces, h internal and external to the plantation, culminated in the ionalization of the sugar industry and the first implementation national agrarian reform laws in Catmis. Certainly, the state gained a foothold because of internal problems such as the failure pay taxes; increasing debts of the corporate owners, who put up ir shares in the industry as colateral for the loans; and an rall lack of cooperation and unity among the second generation of porate members. However, external pressures, which originated the national level and determined local events, were even more rtant to the final nationalization of the industry and the imple- tation of agrarian reform laws.

One significant external pressure was the partial nationalization of Mexico's sugar industry. Under the leadership of socialist President Lazaro Cárdenas, the federal government took direct measures to centralize the Mexican sugar industry in order to contain the detrimental effects of decentralized competition which had characterized the industry in the 1920s and early 1930s. For one thing, the government began to increase subsidies for the industry. From 1945 to 1950, federal subsidy rose from 9.2 percent (18.4 million pesos) of the federal budget to 26.3 percent (156 million pesos) (The Economic Development of Mexico 1953: 288-289). In addition, the government nationalized the lands and machinery of many sugar plantations, especially those which had gone into debt during the depression years when the Union de Productores had controlled the industry. As previously mentioned, only two factories, a small plant in Cakalna and the large plant in Catmis, were still operating in southern Yucatán.* In 1938 the factory machinery and about 3,000 hectares of factory lands were expropriated in Catmis to cover the debts of the private corporation. Nevertheless, a number of private planters managed to hold on to their lands, leaving about 60 percent of the productive sugar cane lands in private hands.

The final external pressure came with the establishment of the National Sugar Workers' Union (Syndicato Nacional de Trabajadores de Cana de Azucar). In 1937, also under Cárdenas, local chapters of the union were formed on many plantations throughout the country.

*According to national standards based on output, Catmis placed the third to largest category: Diario Oficial del Gobierno Constitucional De Los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 1943, No. 46, Part CXLI.

Cárdenas himself came to Catmis and warned the workers that "the owners of this industry can make a pact and close the factory" (Pozas 1967: 35). In the same year, through the initiative of some local leaders, Local #41 of Catmis was incorporated into the national union.

tate Administration: The Government-
wned Sugar Plantation 1936-1962

The federally owned, state-administered sugar plantation characterizes the first phase of the agrarian reform in Catmis. It began n 1937, the same year the Cárdenas reforms were finally implemented n Yucatán's northern henequen haciendas through the redistribution f lands and the formation of the collective ejidos.

It is important to note that, unlike the northern henequen ciendas, no ejido was established in Catmis. Although the actual asons for this are not known, it was probably felt that the ejido stem was not necessary in Catmis because of the unique arrangement its resources. In the context of the government-owned sugar plantion the labor union served a function similar to that of the ejido guaranteeing labor rights to the resident population. Moreover, ce Catmis is located in the heart of the southern frontier zone, re land is abundant and population sparse, anyone who really ted to extend the effort could walk a few kilometers from the ntation, find an unused plot of land, and cultivate maize or even ar cane on unclaimed government lands. Probably because of these cumstances the ejido was not introduced in 1937 as part of the arian reform.

Like the Henequeneros de Yucatán in the north, the formal administrative structure of Yucatán's government-owned sugar plantation had three main components: Azucares de Yucatán, the Colonos or Planters, and the labor force. Azucares de Yucatán was the state-level banking and administrative agency which handled federal funds for the industry. The state governor appointed its personnel to manage the factory and government-owned lands following the nationalization of the industry. The director of Azucares de Yucatán coordinated the operation of the refining mill with the cultivation activities of the planters. He also appointed administrators to manage the unionized labor force.

It is significant to note that the assistant to the director of the state bank was one of the ex-corporation owners of the Catmis factory. He held the position of assistant director for more than years and effectively managed the factory under the various directors, who changed every six years along with the governors who had appointed them. Throughout this period he also maintained a private sugar hacienda which he had inherited from his father. This man played a key role in labor-management relations during the period of the government-owned plantation. At various times he headed the Ejido Agrarian Commission and the Commission of Reconciliation, both organizations which dealt with grievances and arbitrated with the local labor union. As assistant director of the Catmis factory, he was the highest-ranking bureaucrat to reside in Catmis.

Below the assistant director came various bureaucrats and technocrats representing many different government agencies and the private landholders. Such positions are too numerous to elaborate, but among them were: a medical doctor in charge of the factory clinic, an accountant, a high-ranking mechanic responsible for repairing machinery, and a chemist who analyzed the quality of the sugar cane. These technicians were called on to handle specific problems of the operation. They did not usually reside in the village and did not become involved in village activities nor the political problems of the workers.

The private planters had been ex-hacienda owners before the government expropriated the factory lands and machinery. Since some private land ownership was permitted even after the nationalization of the industry, these individuals managed to hold on to a portion of their private lands. During the period of the nationalized sugar industry they emerged as small owners who sold their sugar cane to the government factory for processing. These private planters were not part of the formal administrative structure of the industry. However, like the ex-hacendados in the northern henequen zone, they continued to play a key role in the operation of industry, supplying where from 50 to 70 percent of the raw cane produced. Another group of planters, the public planters, were bureaucrats appointed by the state government to contract labor and grow cane on government-owned lands. Some ex-hacendados held a measure of economic and political control by staying on as government-employed managers of the factory machinery or as land contractors who were given cash

advances by the government to grow sugar cane on the plantation lands which they had previously owned.

The labor force was divided into two classes of workers: union and free workers. Free workers still depended heavily on individual maize cultivation on unclaimed public lands which were not used for sugar cane production. However, they also worked for the private sugar planters in order to supplement their income with cash. Union workers were associated with the National Sugar Workers' Union which provided them with a federally guaranteed labor contract specifying their rights and responsibilities as union workers (Diario Oficial 951, No. 5 Part CLXXXVII; and 1953, No. 24 Part CCI). They worked for the public planters, who were subsidized by the government.

The local union organized formally in 1938 with the election of an executive committee headed by a secretary general and nine secretarial posts. The executive committee was reviewed every two years by the members of the union and members could be reelected. In order to join the union, one had to give services to the industry of the production of sugar cane. Requests for entrance were made to the executive committee which informed the general assembly.

The laborers of the union were divided into permanent and temporary workers. Temporary laborers were employed during the six-month harvest season; during the remaining six months they grew maize or left the village in search of daily work. Permanent laborers were employed for the entire year. They resided in Catmis and controlled the union.

The political dynamics of the union lay in its unique dual potentiality: On the one hand, it could act as a progressive labor organization, while on the other, it could work closely with the state government agencies that administered the industry, thus representing a conservative force which helped sustain the structure of the state bureaucracy that controlled the government-owned plantations.

The local labor union, with its ties to the national union, represented the major political organization for the integration of the local proletariat. From the beginning the union fought for improved working conditions. In 1939 the factory began to grant medical services for the workers, better salaries and salary scales, and improved dwellings. Among the concessions won for the workers was pensioning. A pension of 500 pesos every 15 days was given to workers upon completion of 30 years of service and 60 years of age. The permanent workers' pensions were paid for the full year, while the temporary workers' pensions were paid for only half the year (Ozas 1967: 35).

Nevertheless, the union also functioned as a conservative, stabilizing force which operated within the structure of the state administration. Through the years there were a number of local strikes in the Catmis factory, but all were quietly resolved because of the skill with which local administrators handled the workers. Seldom were such strikes reported in the state newspapers because of their potential danger to the establishment.

It is difficult to isolate the variables which caused the shutdown of the Catmis factory in 1965. One explanation was offered by Ricardo Pozas, who directed a sociological study in Catmis shortly after the factory closed (Ibid.) Pozas claimed that the shutdown obviously came as an immediate response to the lack of sugar production in February 1965. In elaborating the underlying causes, however, he pointed to a number of interrelated technological, economic, and political variables.

Concerning the technical aspects of sugar cane production, Pozas noted that the quality of cane had deteriorated markedly during the last years of the operation. The variety of sugar cane produced has changed frequently with no apparent rise in production, and the ratio of the number of fields to their various growth cycles had not been coordinated for some time. Old fields were harvested past their most productive years, while new fields were not planted. During the heat of the political conflicts which characterized the last few years of production, no effort was made to deliver quality cane to the factory:

> . . . It is said that all the sugar cane producers, small and large, inserted much waste with the cane: burned cane, grass roots, and all, was paid as cane; that the raw weight of the milled cane was very high and the production of sugar very low. Moreover, there were other causes of low yield: The cane was burned in the field to facilitate the cutting, and then left there for eight days. As a result, the sucarel converted into dextrose and glucose, which is to say that at the end of the process little sugar cane, much uncrystallizable molasses, were collected. In addition, the month of November is the time to begin cutting the cane since that is the time when it yields the most sugar. But at times, the factory did not begin the harvest until March when they would lose much sugar. Accordingly, it is thought that this was the determining cause of the failure in the production of the factory (Ibid., my translation).

Pozas also noted other indications of the declining production of sugar cane. Most significant were the antiquated machinery of the factory and the rising costs of the operation. The factory machinery itself dated from 1906, and its old parts needed constant repair, yet they could not be replaced. Furthermore, the factory mill ran on steam power which required the accumulation of tons of lumber during the "dead season" to sustain the operation during the harvests. Forty years ago, when forests were accessible, lumber collection was cheap. But as the forests receded, these costs also rose.

Turning to political causes, Pozas emphasized two major federal- and state-level conflicts which contributed to the closing of the factory. In 1965 hacendado interests in Yucatan's sugar zone offered similar resistance to national centralizing pressures as those encountered in the 1920s in the northern henequen zone; that is, private ownership was slow to relinquish power and control over the means of production. With respect to sugar cane production in the southern zone, Pozas claimed that

> . . . Sr. Anicetto Macari, the owner of the factory La Joya (in Campeche) and member of the council of the Financiera Azucarera, had the intention of buying Catmis to dedicate the lands to cattle ranching. On the other hand the sugar from the factory of La Joya partially provides the State of Yucatan. For this reason, it is possible that the closing of the factory of Catmis would be a maneuver of the owner of that factory (La Joya) for the purpose of eliminating a competitor (Ibid.).

From this information, Pozas inferred:

> . . a very clear and definite aim of the larger sugar producers to cause the factory to fail; a purpose which appears in many other actions that they undoubtedly did in agreement with high functionaries of the factory (Ibid.).

The second state and national-level conflict was caused by the desire of the private landowners in the area to convert their haciendas from sugar cane production to cattle ranching. According to Pozas, not only were the local, private planters involved in this rapid economic transformation, but it was instigated in the highest echelons of the factory administration:

> . . . When Augustine Franco Aguilar was governor of the state, he named his brother-in-law, Joachin Reyes, director of Azucares de Yucatan. . . . It is said that Joachin Reyes build his ranch (Los Reyes) with money and materials from the factory (Ibid.).

Such acts of nepotism were closely linked to an important structural aspect of administrative inefficiency:

> . . . the failure of the factory is related to administrative changes. The administration of the factory was controlled by the state governor of Yucatan, who assigned one of his supporters as a means of making a rapid and easy fortune. Thus, administrators were changed every six years, [a practice] in which it would have been impossible to give the political administration continuity for productivity. . . (Ibid.).

Finally, Pozas stressed the conflict between the last federal ministration of the industry and the private and public planters. re than any single factor, this conflict, according to Pozas, was ponsible for the closing of the factory. The large private owners public planters who provided most of the cane for the factory eived large loans when the factory was controlled by the state ıcy, Azucares de Yucatán. One owner alone deposited 100,000 s in the bank and invested the remaining 150,000 pesos in the rs of the sugar cane. At the end of the harvest he would deliver valued at 100,000 pesos and the remainder of the bill was carried ucares de Yucatán (Pozas 1967). In the 1960s, when the adminis- on changed and became controlled directly by the Nacional

Financiera Azucarera, the federal banking institution, the new administration refused to give any more loans to the large private planters. When the factory stopped giving loans to Armando Medina Alonso, who produced 50 percent of the sugar cane which the factory received, all the large planters, in solidarity, withdrew their production, and the processing activities of the factory were terminated in short order.

A final cause which contributed to the closing of the factory was the local political situation in which the factory workers played a major role. Their political efforts during the last few years of the sugar industry were aimed primarily toward the establishment of a local ejido, and their goal was accomplished in 1964, only a few months before the factory shut down permanently. These events will be considered in the following section, which deals with the formation of the Catmis ejido. Before turning to that discussion, however, it is instructive to mention a few words about the economic depression which followed in the wake of the shutdown.

The adjustment to this technological change was clearly more difficult for the working class than for the individuals in the private sector. When the Catmis factory was closed abruptly in 1965, two alternatives became available to the local ex-factory workers: They could return to intensive milpa farming or emigrate from the village. It is interesting that these choices relfected the internal labor stratification of the sugar factory's proletariat population.

The group of workers which depended least upon the factory for its livelihood was composed of those who resided in the surrounding

hamlets, ranchos, and haciendas. Their primary economic activity was in milpa agriculture, and their involvement in the factory had been limited to the harvest season when they came to Catmis for the purpose of supplementing their subsistence economy with cash. Such "free workers" (libres) were not members of the union. They were employed by the private planters who never hired union workers. Their response to the factory shutdown was to intensify their milpa production in order to offset the seasonal cash supplement which was no longer available.

The group of workers which depended most upon the factory included those individuals who resided in Catmis. This group consisted mainly of permanent and temporary laborers, all of whom were members of the local union. Along with the bureaucrats, the majority of permanent workers emigrated completely after the shutdown. In addition, many skilled laborers were able to find work in factories in other parts of the Republic through personal ties with local factory administrators. Some of the older, permanent workers retired and moved to Mérida, while a handful of them remained in Catmis. From the time the factory closed in 1965, to 1970 (less than five years), a total of 213 adults emigrated from Catmis (see Table 7 Adult Emigration From Catmis). This group included 117 men (55 percent) and 96 women (45 percent).

For those who remained in Catmis the alternatives were not mutually exclusive. For example, seasonal emigration of the labor force combined with intensive milpa farming became commonplace. Many emigrated partially by working in a new government-owned vegetable

able 3.--Adult emigration from Catmis and localities of immigration.[a]

ocality of Immigration	Male	Female	Total
erida	18	20	38
ekax	12	14	26
icul	2	2	4
xkutzcab	4	2	6
kil	1	1	2
rogresso	2	2	4
zuiche	1	1	2
anta Rosa (Banco)	19	12	31
zucacab	7	6	13
eto	2	1	3
hetumal, Q.R.	25	24	49
psumel, Q.R.	1	1	2
arrillo Puerto, Q.R.	4	3	7
a Joya, Tabasco (Ingenio)	1	0	1
enosique, Tabasco (Ingenio)	6	0	6
n Pedro, Veracruz (Ingenio)	3	1	4
xico, D.F.	4	3	7
mpeche, Campeche	5	3	8
Total	117	96	213

[a]Data from village census, January 1971.

enterprise in the ex-sugar cane plantation of Santa Rosa, about seven miles from Catmis. During the harvest season men would stay in Santa Rosa but leave their families in Catmis. In the first years of the Santa Rosa project the government administrators hired many men from Catmis. However, after its fourth season the project declared bankruptcy and was leased by the government to a private company, Frutas Y Legumbres de Yucatán (Fruits and Vegetables of Yucatán). In recent years this company saved money by hiring unskilled women from Peto and Tzucacab for its labor force. Only about 10 or 12 men and about a dozen young girls from Catmis were working in Santa Rosa in 1970. In general, the villagers suffered a great deal in the years immediately following the shutdown. As one villager said, pointing to the remains of the defunct factory, "the cow we all depended on is dead, and we are hungry."

Not everyone suffered from the depression, however. The private ex-planters and a few others who could afford it rapidly transformed the private sector of Catmis and the municipality of Tzucacab from sugar cane production to cattle ranching. Most of the ex-planters still held control over much of their lands and converted them into private cattle ranches. Similarly, the government sold the Catmis factory machinery and about 2,000 hectares of the factory lands to a private company. The new company proceeded to dismantle the old machinery for sale as scrap metal, and anticipated converting the lands into a private cattle ranch.

By 1967 sugar cane production, which had dominated the life of Catmis for more than a century, was completely eliminated, and

cattle ranching had emerged as the product of the future. Tzucacab claimed 9,113 hectares of guinean grass and savannah pastures and no fewer than 25 large private cattle ranches had begun, many of which maintained several thousand head of cattle on several thousand hectares of land (Pozas 1967).

Federal Administration: The Collective Ejido Cattle and Cash Crop Farm, 1964-

The most recent phase of the agrarian reform in Catmis is characterized by changes which have resulted from the increased involvement of federal agrarian reform agencies. These agencies were instrumental in establishing and administering the local collective ejido and development project. Originally, the Santa Rosa project was set up to provide work for the depressed laborers of Catmis and the surrounding area. However, as previously mentioned, after only a few seasons it failed miserably in its purpose.

More importantly, however, the government also expropriated a sizable portion of land from the nearby cattle ranch, "La Hermita," and took some lands from the defunct factory which the government had owned to form the Catmis ejido. In so doing, the most recent change in the agrarian reform has helped transform a large number of landless and unemployed Catmiseños into ejido farmers.

The establishment of the Catmis ejido should not be misunderstood. It did not materialize by the unilateral action of a magnanimous federal government. It is true that the government sought to alleviate the suffering of the people. But it should also be remembered that the Catmis ejido was established in 1965--30 years

after Lazaro Cárdenas established collective ejidos in the northern henequen zone, 55 years after the Revolution. Rather than a magnanimous gift, then, the ejido was established as a result of much local pressure from a group of temporary factory workers who had suffered from unemployment for many long years, while the sugar industry died slowly. If one considers local political events, the villagers were very much involved in the organization and establishment of the local ejido.

Cognizant of the factory's declining production, about 15 temporary workers joined together in 1960 to form a collective sugar-cane-growing society. Their original motive was not to form an ejido, but to cultivate sugar cane for themselves on unowned government lands and then sell the cane back to the factory for processing. Naturally, their organization conflicted with the interests of the large private planters, who controlled most of the cultivation in the area. From the point of view of these large land owners and contractors, the collective sugar growers set a bad example for the other laborers, especially since, after three years of cooperative work, the sugar growers got better results and profits than when they had worked as laborers for the factory (Ibid.). To avoid this problem, the factory bureaucrats, in agreement with the large planters, stopped buying sugar cane from the collective growers.

In order to defend themselves, the collective sugar growers asked for help from a national organization of sugar cane planters, the Federación Nacionál Canera, which was seated in Mexico City.

They affiliated themselves with this body as the "Coalition of Sugar Growers #37" and demanded that the factory buy sugar cane from them (Ibid.).

This action aggravated the conflict between them and the large private planters who were supported by the factory bureaucrats, some of whom were also planters. Under pressure from the factory bureaucrats, the local labor union expelled the members of the Coalition of small growers on grounds that there was a conflict of interest between offering labor to the factory, with membership in the national union, and, at the same time, growing sugar cane independently, with membership in the Coalition of Sugar Growers #37.

In 1970 two of the founders of the Coalition of Sugar Growers #37 discussed the situation which existed when they were expelled from the labor union. The first statement below is from the founder-leader of the Sugar Growers' collective. He later became the president of the ejido and the chief representative of the ejido credit society:

> In 1956 when Victor Mena Palomo was governor he sent representatives to Catmis because sugar production was falling. In order to save the factory, he tried to encourage individual workers to grow cane as well as work in the factory. Our coalition was the only group that wanted to work like that. Then the local union began to place obstacles in our way. Along with the private planters they made it difficult for those who wanted to grow cane. Finally the Federacion Nacional Canera sent a representative to get the workers to change, but they didn't want to. The Syndicato Nacional de Trabajadores de Azucar also sent their representative. Then, when we joined the Canera, the local union expelled us. There were nine of us who joined as Coalition #37. At that time they told us we couldn't work the lands because they were government lands. We told them that we would have to request an ejido and with the help of the Federacion Nacional Canera we began negotiations in Mexico City. In 1962

we got the provisional grant. Then we began to grow cane on the ejido and the factory had to give us credit. We also did harvests of maize and other crops since while we were expelled from the labor union, we did not have anywhere to work. There were always about 15 of us who maintained the organization. After the final ejido land grant in 1965, we requested more credit to work the lands.

The second discussion of the sugar collective is by L.J., who became a field boss of the ejido credit society. He was instrumental in the formation of the ejido although he only worked for the factory periodically:

Ever since 1954 when we were still young boys working in the factory we wanted to find some way of advancing ourselves. S.E. and I organized a group of about nine others and we planted cane in lands outside the factory. When President Ruiz Cortinez came to Merida we prepared a letter asking for credit to buy a vehicle to transport the cane from the field to the factory. We sent the letter to Mexico City as we were then instructed but the answer said that another office would handle the matter. Since we received no response from the other office the matter dropped.

But things began to worsen in the factory. In 1955 they stopped planting new cane and the production also began falling off. We started planting sugar cane without credit. I was the foreman of the group. Each man paid me 2 pesos a day to do his share of the land, to prepare it for cane. There were 10 of us in the group at this time and since the others worked in the factory they couldn't do this work also. I was a baker in those days so I did the farming in the morning and I baked bread in the afternoons. After we did the burning of the fields we divided the land into plots and each of us had his 20 mecates. In all we worked about 200 mecates of lands outside those of the factory. In order to live we would plant maize in May and then in August when the maize was in the ground we would plant cane inside the maize plots. We started the entire organization without any credit. In 1956 when Victor Mena was governor we were helped somewhat since they gave us about 25-50 percent credit. The larger planters were getting much more. We had another problem also. The factory was against us since it had always represented the other, larger planters. When we delivered sugar cane to the factory they claimed that it was inferior in quality, impure, and they left it for the last. One year they left us with 180 tons of sugar cane, unpurchased, because they refused to buy it. The next year we asked for the intervention of the Federacion Canera, and we became affiliated with them as Coalition #37. After their intervention the large planters made an agreement with the Secretary General of the local union which forced us to choose

between being workers or planters. They told us we had to choose since we could not be affiliated with both organizations. We refused to relinquish our affiliation with the Federacion Canera since we claimed that without them we would have no security in growing and selling our cane. The local union expelled us from the syndicate and the men lost their jobs in the factory.

Shortly after that Franco Aguilar, who was then governor, called us to Merida following one of his visits to Catmis. We came to Merida and, upon arriving in his office, he told us that in the best interests of the factory, we should belong to the labor union and not to the Federacion Canera. He asked us to relinquish our affiliation to the Federacion Canera but we told him we couldn't do it because we needed the security. The governor told us that if we didn't renounce all our affiliations with the Canera we would lose all our rights in the factory; they would shut off our electricity, and even force us to leave our home. In other words all of the benefits to the workers of the factory would be cut off from us. We answered that if this were done we would be freed to request ejido lands. The governor said he couldn't give us ejido lands and he lied by saying that all the lands were privately owned.

With help from the Federacion Nacional Canera, the collective sugar growers contested their expulsion from the labor union and maintained their collective organization during the four years of litigation which followed. They lost the original case in the Yucatecan courts but won the case when it came before the federal appellate courts in Veracruz. While waiting for the reinstatement of their rights in the labor union, the group requested lands for the formation of a sugar-cane-growing ejido. In 1965, following a Presidential decree, the governor of Yucatán formalized the definitive ejido land grant to 167 members.

In 1968 federal government involvement increased even more when the Catmis ejidatarios were offered an opportunity to participate in an agrarian development project subsidized with loans from the Mixed Farming Bank of the Southeast, a regional-level agency endowed

with federal funds for agrarian development. According to the plan, the project would consist of a combination of livestock ranching and mechanized cultivation activities. The operation would be managed by the National Indigenous Institute (Instituto Nacional Indigenista), whose branch office, located in Peto, would provide technicians and experts in various agrarian development fields, while the ejido would provide the land and labor. In addition, the Ministry of Public Works (Secretaria de Recursos Hydraulicos) would subsidize and construct an irrigation project on the ejido lands.

Summary

The history of Catmis as an hacienda began with the rapid expansion of Yucatân's sugar industry in the southern zone following Mexico's independence from Spain in 1823. Catmis was settled by one of many enterprising Ladinos who purchased lands cheaply from the state and converted them into sugar cane and cattle ranching haciendas.

With the rapid spread of sugar haciendas, the traditional pattern of Maya slash and burn agriculture was disrupted. For the first time since the colonial period began some 300 years earlier, the Maya were needed to work intensively in sugar cultivation, and this conflicted with the agricultural cycle of maize cultivation. A system of slavery emerged in which the Maya were lured to the haciendas and forced to work under the debt peonage system.

The War of the Castes to a great extent was a Maya rebellion against the sugar haciendas. Along with other sugar haciendas in the southern zone, Catmis was destroyed by the Indians during the war but

reoccupied by Ladinos in 1870 as a garrison town with the responsibility of protecting Peto and Tzucacab from attacks by renegade Indians.

In the late 1870s the sugar hacienda was revived. Treatment of the Maya workers was probably similar to that which preceded the war, though by now the Indians were powerless and could no longer resist. The debt peonage system was encouraged as was the system of ritual kinship between the hacienda owner and the individual Maya worker. Under the Diaz administration (1876 to 1910) Catmis experienced growth. The railroad was built linking Tuzcacab and Peto to Mérida, and new machinery was imported from Cuba. Around the turn of the century the family-owned factory-in-the-field hacienda was replaced by a modern, industrialized, corporately owned plantation with about 300 resident workers and several hundred or even a thousand temporary workers who came to the hacienda to work during the six-month harvest season.

Before the implementation of agrarian reform laws in 1937, local resources and the means of production were controlled by a few corporate families whose power in the area was unchallenged. They owned large haciendas of sugar-producing lands and the refining mill in Catmis, and they permitted individual resident workers to cultivate maize plots on unclaimed government lands which were not used for sugar cane cultivation.

The workers were landless wage earners who depended on the corporation for employment. Basically, the owners classified the workers into two groups: favored and unfavored. Favored workers

were resident in the village and permanently employed, while unfavored workers were seasonally resident and seasonally employed. A handful of workers was placed in the confidence of the owners and given more responsibility and trust. They managed the village store or supervised the plant and field work. Their personal bonds with the corporate owners were frequently cemented through relations of ritual kinship. The workers had no organization to represent their interests, and they were tied to the plantation through bonds of debt servitude.

From 1870 to 1916 the technology and modes of production of the sugar industry grew from hacienda to plantation proportions. Modern processing equipment was brought to the village shortly before the Mexican Revolution, but the technology for sugar cane cultivation remained fairly primitive. The sugar cane fields were not irrigated. Processed sugar was transported from Catmis to Tzucacab on iron rails by mule train, and the crop was cultivated manually.

Private owners provided capital for the enterprise, and the corporate owners and private hacienda owners administered the local production process themselves. Their activities were sanctioned by state and municipal authorities, but neither they nor the workers maintained any signifcant ties to the federal government.

Following the Mexican Revolution, in about 1916, ejidos were established in many localities in the south. However, like the henequen plantations in the north, sugar plantations in the south were unaffected by the early land distribution laws. In Catmis control over the land and machinery remained in the hands of family and corporate plantation owners, and the sugar plantation was still financed with

private capital. The only important changes brought by the Revolution of 1910 were the replacement of the foreign-owned corporation by a Mexican corporation and the abolition of the debt peonage system. As a consequence of the latter, the village labor force became a free, landless, wage-earning population. At this time Catmis also experienced an influx of people from different parts of Mexico seeking refuge from the war.

Yucatán's sugar industry barely survived the decade of the 1920s because of the world depression and cutthroat price competition which put half of Mexico's sugar haciendas out of business. Catmis was one of the few haciendas which survived in Yucatán's southern zone, and by the early 1930s its corporate owners benefited from subsidies which the federal government provided the industry. By the mid-1930s, however, the owners had built up tremendous debts to the federal government. Thus, in 1938 they were powerless to stop Cárdenas when he instituted the labor union and expropriated 4,000 hectares of the best sugar-producing lands.

The national agrarian reform brought important changes to Catmis during the two major phases of its implementation: the initial impact of 1937 and the recent modifications of the 1960s. The initial implementation of national agrarian reform laws in 1937 created a public sector. The federal government nationalized 40 percent of the privately owned lands and all the machinery of the Catmis sugar-processing plant. No changes were made in the modes of production, however, and the continuing monocrop economy encouraged a situation of economic interdependence between the public and private sectors:

The remaining private landowners produced most of the raw sugar cane, while the government-owned factory processed it. Although the public sector was capitalized with federal funds, during the first phase following the Cárdenas reforms it was formally administered by a state government agency which, in turn, appointed the ex-corporation owners and private landowner planters to positions of local management. In addition, the agrarian reform created a local syndicate, part of the National Sugar Workers Union, to represent the laborers who worked in the public sector. To some extent, union laborers were protected by national union regulations. Standardized salary scales, retirement benefits, and health services were all provided in Catmis because of the national union contract. Nevertheless, union workers had little to say about the daily operation of the plantation. They did not share in profits (although they did receive a small portion of processed sugar at the end of the season), make decisions concerning labor needs, set production goals, nor deal in any way with the capital or marketing activities of the plantation.

Striking constituted the only formal sanction offered to the union. According to numerous documents from this phase, strikes were not uncommon, but they were rarely publicized and rapidly settled by various committees of reconciliation consisting of representatives appointed by the state governor, the national union and local union leaders, and factory administrators.

Modifications in the local agrarian reform program in the 960s brought major changes in the organization of the means of production. First, a diverse, mixed farming project was formed which

completely replaced the monocrop sugar plantation. Second, direct federal administration of the project operation with bureaucrats from other regions of the country replaced the former administration, which had been composed of local bureaucrats with private land and sugar-cane-planting interests in the area. Finally, the creation of the new ejido and the collective ejido labor/credit society provided new rights to the local residents, including: (1) a new form of land tenure, (2) rights to borrow capital as a collective credit society, and (3) labor rights similar to those formerly afforded to the sugar workers who belonged to the union.

As a result of these structural changes, the ejido and ejido credit society have achieved a higher level of economic and political integration than any of the local labor and political organizations which preceded them. On the other hand, the ejidatarios are basically still wage laborers with little decision-making power or control over the operation of the collective ejido farm. Having replaced the private hacendados, the federal government administration controls the farm.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE EJIDO AND THE LOCAL ECONOMY

Introduction

This chapter considers the economic changes which the recent formation of the collective ejido and mixed farming project brought to Catmis. The discussion deals generally with the major transformations experienced by the local economy, while it focuses more specifically on the relations of production between ejido organizations and the various federal agrarian reform agencies in the context of the mixed farming development project.

The first section describes the formal organization of the ejido according to national agrarian reform laws. It examines the legal basis of economic and political relations, both within the ejido and between the ejido and various federal agrarian reform agencies. It also describes the contemporary arrangement of the ejido's natural and human resources, illustrating the new occupations and economic opportunities which the ejido land grant and collective labor organization opened up for the ejidatario villagers.

The second section deals with the relations of production on the mixed farming project. With the establishment of the ejido and the collective ejido development project, the national agrarian reform radically changed the modes of production in Catmis from sugar cane production to modern cattle ranching and cash crop farming. Technicians

sent by
operati
labor.

in this
reform
tions w
income

ment of
effects
overall

ejido.
ejido ge
tion and

Members

ejido or
zation t
formally
official
acted ag
crats an

sent by a number of agrarian reform agencies administer the farm operation, while the collective ejidatarios provide the necessary labor.

The third section considers the role of non-ejido occupations in this ex-hacienda village. Any appraisal of the impact of agrarian reform on the local economy should include a description of occupations which have emerged in the private sector and the proportion of income derived from such activities.

The final section of the discussion deals with the development of socio-economic classes, past and present, with emphasis on the effects of the agrarian reform on the lower-class villagers. The overall standard of living of the lower-class villagers is described.

The Formal Organization of the Ejido

This section examines the formal organization of the Catmis ejido. It includes consideration of ejido membership and rights, the ejido general assembly and credit society, and ejido land utilization and occupations.

Membership and Rights

In retrospect, the labor union was the forerunner of the ejido organization in Catmis. However, the transition from one organization to the other did not go smoothly. Even after the ejido was formally established, strong animosities persisted between union officials and ejido leaders because the local union officials had acted against the ejidatarios in the interests of the state bureaucrats and private landowners when they expelled the ejido founders

from th

give th

ing to

bureauc

tried t

corrupt

factory

hypocri

union w

porary

loyalty

factory

size of

bers, th

workers,

vinced t

viduals

bers whi

to estab

1964. T

technica

20 hecta

parcel w

scrub an

from the local syndicate. In a sense, the ejido founders could forgive the landowners and state bureaucrats for their role in attempting to frustrate the ejido's formation; after all, the landowners and bureaucrats were capitalists who had vested interests which they had tried to protect. In contrast, the ejidatarios would not forgive the corrupt union officials who, they claimed, had been bought by the factory administration. The ejido founders regarded these men as hypocrites and traitors to their own working class.

As a consequence of these antagonisms, none of the permanent union workers ever joined the ejido. Furthermore, many of the temporary workers initially were reluctant to join the ejido out of loyalty to the factory administration or out of fear that, if the factory reopened, they would be expelled from the union. Since the size of the ejido land grant is determined by the number of its members, the ejido founders eventually tried to recruit the temporary workers, many of whom finally did join the ejido after they were convinced that the factory would never reopen. However, these individuals were not admitted into the inner circle of charter ejido members which was comprised of the men who had struggled many long years to establish the ejido.

The Catmis ejido was established by presidential decree in 964. The ejido land grant was composed of 3,777 hectares which were echnically, though not actually, assigned in parcels consisting of) hectares each to the 167 official ejido members. An additional rcel was assigned for a school and 370 hectares were allocated as rub and grazing lands for communal use by the ejidatarios.

has ini

heir, t

the lar

culture

indivic

the ejt

ically

from cu

may rul

and exp

to the

In cont

ejido s

land gr

from th

in the

died an

communi

none of

over the

ber of

tive yea

members

Affairs,

According to the national agrarian code, each ejidatario has inalienable rights to use the land. He can will his rights to an heir, but cannot sell, lease, rent, mortgage, nor personally alienate the lands in any way (Codigo Agrario 1970). The Ministry of Agriculture, through the Department of Agrarian Affairs, guarantees the individual rights of the ejidatarios by taking periodic censuses of the ejido community and by supervising ejido elections which theoretically take place every three years. If an ejidatario is found absent from cultivating his lands for two consecutive years, the Department may rule that he has abandoned them, and he may be disenfranchised and expelled from the society. His land rights would then be returned to the ejido community which, in turn, may allocate it to a new member. In contrast to the individual members, who can be expelled from the ejido society, the ejido land grant itself is inalienable. An ejido land grant may be revoked only through presidential resolution.

Five years after the establishment of the ejido, a census from the Department of Agrarian Affairs revealed a number of changes in the ejido's composition. First, four of the original members had died and their rights were inherited by their wives. Today, the ejido community cultivates these parcels for the support of the women since none of them has a mature son living in the village who could take over the responsibilities. A more significant change was in the number of individuals who were absent from their lands for two consecutive years. By 1970 fully 32 percent (55) of the original ejido members were disenfranchised officially by the Department of Agrarian Affairs, and their parcels had been returned to the ejido community.

narily

vidual

modern

factory

had not

and aba

nilpero

1970 th

those r

officia

The Gen
the Cre

the eji

bilitie

and vig

decision

cuss and

statemer

vention

or denia

communal

of Agric

elected

The high percentage of dropouts between 1965 and 1968 primarily reflects the extreme difficulty involved in exploiting individual ejido parcels without the benefit of capital, irrigation, or modern machinery. During these first years of the ejido the sugar factory had closed, but the government-sponsored mixed farming project had not yet begun. Many ejidatarios were forced to leave the village and abandon their plots because they could not survive as full-time milperos without some wage labor to supplement their income. In 1970 the ejido added 38 new members, 80 percent of whom were sons of those remaining. This reallocation of ejido parcels raised the total official membership to 140 individuals with 27 undistributed parcels.

The General Assembly and the Credit Society

According to the agrarian code (Codigo Agrario 1970: Art. 42), the ejido general assembly is charged with the following responsibilities: (1) to elect and remove members of an executive committee and vigilance committee; (2) to authorize, modify, or rectify the decisions of the executive committee whenever necessary; (3) to discuss and approve reports of the executive committee and post a visible statement of accounts in a central location; (4) to request the intervention of federal authorities on matters relating to the suspension or denial of rights of ejido members; and (5) to issue rulings on how communal lands should be used, subject to approval of the Ministry of Agriculture or the Ejido Bank.

The executive committee of the ejido is made up of three elected officials--a president (comisario ejidal), a secretary, and

a treas

who are

ejido.

assembl

officia

years.

reelect

the eji

treasur

tions o

failed

over th

ejido o

replace

the Dep

the eji

in orde

conside

ever, t

Institu

any dec

ejido ge
in other
state go
(R. Hans

a treasurer--and a vigilance committee, consisting of three members who are also elected, preferably from the minority faction of the ejido. The vigilance committee is charged to report to the general assembly any misconduct on the part of the ejido officers. The official term of office of the ejido executive committee is three years. Positions are honorary, unsalaried, and individuals may be reelected for a second term. Since the ejido was established in 1965, the ejido president has not been changed. The ejido secretary and treasurer were changed once, however, in 1968 as a result of accusations of fraud and internal political conflicts after the ejido failed to repay money which it had borrowed from a private bank.

The Department of Agrarian Affairs has a great deal of power over the ejido. It Catmis the Department does not directly appoint ejido officials as in some parts of Mexico,* but it can have them replaced by calling for new elections. The presence of agents from the Department of Agrarian Affairs acts as a stabilizing force in the ejido, and ejido officials try to cooperate with the Department in order to remain in power.

In theory, it appears that the general assembly would have considerable power over the means of production. In practice, however, the Department of Agrarian Affairs, the National Indigenous Institute, and the Mixed Farming Bank have been able to veto almost any decision and impose almost any policy on the assembly. On the

*In Catmis the original ejido officials were elected by the ejido general assembly as prescribed in the Agrarian Code. However, in other parts of Mexico the Department of Agrarian Affairs or the state governor, or both together, appoint the ejido officials (R. Hansen 1971: 115-116; and G. Fisher 1957: 95).

other
more c
genera
eral a
resider
prime r
the vil
civil g
and fe
of the
of the
30 perc
full pa

its exe
sentati
officia
land.
but it
nal org
represe
officia
positio
vote of
represe
the Ins

other hand, in matters which are removed from the ejido economy but more closely related to community life in the village, the ejido general assembly appears to have somewhat more influence. The general assembly and ejido leaders intervene in disputes between village residents and private landowners in the area. The ejido is also a prime mover in organizing the villagers into a labor force to clean up the village before fiestas. In addition, the ejido is the de facto civil government in Catmis. In important matters which concern state and federal government agencies, the ejido often represents the voice of the people. Finally, the ejido controls much of the social life of the village including the non-ejidatarios, who make up about 30 percent of the adult household heads but who are excluded from full participation because they do not belong to the ejido.

Paralleling the structure of the ejido general assembly and its executive committee is the ejido credit society and its representatives. The credit society is the local ejido organization which officially borrows the money from the bank to develop the ejido land. This credit/labor organization is comprised of ejido members, but it does not necessarily include all the ejido members. Its internal organization is composed of a chief representative, two auxiliary representatives, and a vigilance committee (all of whom are elected officials) and the credit society members. Officials keep their positions for two years but may be replaced at any time by majority vote of the credit society members. The main function of the chief representative is to act as the society's spokesman to the bank and the Institute, and to select ejido personnel to work on the mixed

farmin

on the

lance

charge

the re

as it

funds a

may for

the tot

number

group m

members

society.

members

to form

73 membe

remainin

join the

tion of

local e

societie

is permi

which ar

Mixed Fa

farming project. The auxiliary representatives work as field bosses on the cattle and cultivation projects, and the credit society vigilance committee, like that of the larger ejido organization, is charged to report to the credit society members any misconduct of the representatives.

The original size of the credit society, or "solidarity group"* as it is called, is determined by the bank according to the amount of funds available when the society forms. Technically, a credit society may form with a minimum of 20 members, but may include no more than the total number of ejido members. If the members of a credit society number less than 50 percent of the ejido general assembly, the credit group must obtain written consent of a majority of the total ejido members, including ejidatarios who are not members of the credit society, in order to form officially.** Even then, the number of members which the society is permitted to have, along with permission to form the society, is decided by the bank.

The original credit society in Catmis formed in 1968 with 73 members, and the group obtained signatures of approval from the remaining members of the ejido. The other 86 ejidatarios did not join the society, either because they were not told about the formation of the group or because they were not invited to join by the local ejido leaders who had formed the original ejido.

---

*Raymond (1970) clarifies the distinction between credit societies and solidarity groups, claiming that only one credit society is permitted to form on one ejido, whereas many solidarity groups which are labor units are permitted to form on a single ejido.

**National Indigenous Institute, 1968, Mérida, Yucatán. See also, Mixed Farming Bank of the Southeast, 1968, Mérida, Yucatán.

During the first three years of the development project the same individual occupied the positions of ejido president and chief representative of the credit society. As a result of this, there was no conflict nor competition for power between the two local organizations of the ejido. In 1970, however, new credit society officials were elected, while all of the officials of the general assembly were retained, thus bringing into relief the differences in power of the two executive committees. In accordance with the agrarian reform laws, the ejido president retained local power and authority regarding the distribution of individual ejido parcels and ejido land rights. Moreover, the president remained the principal figure in communications between the ejido and the Department of Agrarian Affairs. In terms of the distribution of the most important ejido resources, however, the credit society chief representative held more power than the ejido president: He earned a regular salary from the National Indigenous Institute, had specific controls over the collective ejido labor force, and had access to other ejido resources on the mixed farming development project, including the farming machinery.

The ejido general assembly and its executive committee were very important during the first years of the ejido when individual land allocations rather than collective land utilization prevailed. Since the development project began in 1968, however, the ejido credit society, which is the more exclusive body, has made all of the major economic and political decisions affecting the ejido members.

Ejido

credit
projec
ties wh
tion fr
About 2
project
of irri
vation
hectare
unshade
ejido l
the eji
portion

work fo
maize a
goats a
rest of

ejidata
ment pr
given to
credit s
the proj

Ejido Land Utilization and Occupations

The largest portion of ejido lands is used by the ejido credit society for the government-sponsored mixed farming development project. The ejidatarios use the remaining lands for farming activities which are independent of government loans. Ejido land utilization in 1970 is illustrated on Map 4 (Ejido Land Utilization in 1970). About 2,300 hectares of land are used for the government-sponsored project. On the map the heavily shaded area represents 800 hectares of irrigated agricultural lands which are used for mechanized cultivation of cash crops. The fenced-in area represents another 1,500 hectares which are employed for the mixed farming cattle ranch. The unshaded, unfenced area represents the remaining 1,200 hectares of ejido lands which are not utilized by the government project, but by the ejido members, either individually or collectively, to farm a portion of their legally designated parcels without government loans.

There are three main ejido occupations: wage laborers, who work for the mixed farming project; ejido parcelarios, who cultivate maize and other cash crops individually; and ejido ranchers, who raise oats and cattle on ejido plots which they have fenced off from the rest of the ejido lands. Such occupations are not mutually exclusive.

The primary source of income and the main occupation of most ejidatarios is working for daily wages on the mixed farming development project. Most of the work and the best jobs on the farm are given to about 65 ejidatarios who are actively involved with the credit society. Nevertheless, the majority of ejidatarios work on the project for wages at least part of the time. As a consequence,

LAND UTILIZATION ON THE CATMIS EJIDO: 1970* MAP 4.



*Source: Secretaría de Recursos Hydraulicos, Merida, Yucatan, 1970.

the d

of th

inform

On Mor

By 5:0

lage.

the ej

If he

drives

assign

buildi

They a

The fi

specif

He use

grown

cult.

gourd

food t

three

coffee,

field

formal

he has

the daily work routine of most Catmiseños is shaped by the operation of the ejido development farm.

On Saturdays the chief representative of the credit society informs the ejidatario of his job assignment for the coming week. On Monday morning the ejidatario wakes up at 4:30 A.M. before sunrise. By 5:00 A.M. he dresses and walks to the ejido buildings in the village. If he works as a cowboy, he rides one of the ejido horses to the ejido ranch outside the village to gather his lot of animals. If he drives a tractor, he enters the ejido yard in the village, drives his tractor to the fields, and begins the work which he was assigned. If he works as a field hand, he waits outside the ejido buildings for the field boss and the agronomist from the Institute. They arrive in a pickup truck and take the workers out to the fields. The field boss places each worker in the field and assigns him a specific task. The machete is the only tool of the unskilled worker. He uses it for weeding, planting, and harvesting the different crops grown on the farm.

By 8:00 A.M. the sun is hot and the work becomes more difficult. At 9:00 A.M. the workers stop for breakfast. Most carry a gourd of water and ground maize, but sometimes young children bring food to their fathers in the fields. Men come together in groups of three or four, build a fire in the fields, and prepare tortillas, coffee, and fruit. By 10:00 A.M. they have returned to work. Since field work is paid mainly by the task and amount accomplished, no formal time schedule is forced on the laborer. He may leave early if he has completed his self-imposed quota or if he must catch the

1 P.M
hands
accomp
work b
assess
villag
arounc
(fell

main m
beans,
may ea
daught

when h
may st
with o
end un
by 10:

comple
even o
from M
the ej
wages
chief

1 P.M. bus in Catmis for business outside the village. Most field hands end their work between 1 and 2 P.M., and the amount of work accomplished usually conforms to custom, depending on the type of work being performed. The field boss returns in the ejido truck to assess each man's work and sometimes takes the workers back to the village. More often, they walk. The ejidatario may linger a while around the adobe buildings of the ejido, chatting with his compañeros (fellow workers). From there, he goes home.

The afternoon meal is eaten between 2 and 4 P.M. It is the main meal of the day, normally consisting of tortillas, coffee, beans, chile, vegetables, fruit, and occasionally some meat. A man may eat with his older sons, but his younger children and his wife and daughters, who serve the meal, never eat at the same table.

Following the meal, the ejidatario sleeps till about 5 P.M., when he bathes using a bucketful of water. In the early evening he may stroll to his favorite store for a soft drink, stand and converse with other villagers, or attend a political meeting which may not end until 9 P.M. Usually, he will have a light meal and go to sleep by 10:00 P.M.

When important chores such as planting and harvesting must be completed, the ejidatarios work seven days a week and the tractors even operate at night. Normally, however, the ejido project functions from Monday morning through Saturday noon. On Saturday afternoon all the ejidatarios come together in the ejido building to collect their wages and learn the new work assignments for the coming week. The chief representative of the credit society brings cash from the

Natio

ejida

sign

rity.

allow

many

even

the f

a res

tions

mixed

occup

expli

the na

corpo

land

the de

(see

witho

perso

calle

the pr

member

National Indigenous Institute in Peto and distributes it to the ejidatarios. They are called up one by one to collect their pay and sign the payroll; those who cannot write make their thumb print.

The amount of money earned does not provide economic security. It barely suffices to cover minimum daily needs, let alone allow savings. Moreover, as the following section will elaborate, many ejidatarios, particularly the non-credit society members, but even those who belonged to the credit society, were underemployed by the farm during the first three years of the project operation. As a result, many ejidatarios are also involved in a number of occupations, both individual and collective, which are not related to the mixed farming project.

Individual maize cultivation is the most common supplementary occupation of the ejidatarios. The ejido development project is explicitly a collective farming operation. However, as expressed in the national agrarian code, the ejido's main function is that of a corporate landholding body which guarantees the right of individual land utilization to the ejido members. Hence, the lands unused by the development project, including about 1,200 hectares in 1970 (see Map 4), are distributed by the ejido president (comisario ejidal), without official parceling, to the individual ejidatarios for their personal use. Men who cultivate ejido parcels individually are called parcelários and, because of the abundance of lands unused by the project, both non-credit society members and credit society members take advantage of their parcelário privileges.

and t

locat

vated

socie

irrig

mixed

proje

for 1

earne

such

their

the la

higher

plots

roundi

for su

on the

which

(1.4 h

smalle

yields

in 197

per me

the ej

In 1970 42 ejido plots were cultivated by about 60 ejidatarios and their sons. None of the plots was parcelled off since plot location changes every season. About 30 of the plots were cultivated on lands located outside the area designated for the credit society development project. However, 12 plots were cultivated on irrigated parcels which lay within the land area designated for the mixed farming project. Theoretically, plots which lie within the project area may not be allocated for individual use until the debt for land development has been repaid to the bank with the money earned from the crops and cattle produced on the land. Nevertheless, such allocations were made by the local ejido authorities to a few of their close allies. These plots are particularly valuable because the lands are irrigated and, consequently, the yields are considerably higher.

Almost all of the ejido parcelário plots are smaller than the plots cultivated by free, non-ejidatario maize producers in the surrounding hamlets. This is because the ejidatarios do not grow milpa for subsistence but to supplement their wages from labor activities on the development project. Table 4 lists the 42 parcelário plots which were cultivated in 1970. The average size was 34 mecates (1.4 hectares); the largest single plot was 100 mecates; and the smallest plot was three mecates. An average plot of 34 mecates yields about 2,516 kilos of maize. At 65¢ per kilo (the market price in 1970), the average ejido parcelário earned about $1,635, or 48 pesos per mecate. This brought a monthly income of 136 pesos to supplement the ejidatario's wages on the development project.

Tabl

Wilg No
11
27
28
4
29
8
7
32
13
6
40
41
5
18
24
19
38
33
42
2
34
10
25
39
23
30
15
14
1
20
3
21
9
12
43
16
26
17
36
37
35
22
31

Sel

Table 4.--Individual milpa production on ejido lands, 1970.[a]

Milpero No.	No. Mecates Harvested	Kilos Estimated Per Mecate	Total Kilos	Cash Value at .65 Per Kilo[b]
11	100	126	12,600	$8,190.00
27	100	84	8,400	5,460.00
28	100	84	8,400	5,460.00
4	92	84	7,728	5,023.00
29	64	105	6,720	4,368.00
8	60	84	5,040	3,276.00
7	50	84	4,200	2,730.00
32	100	42	4,200	2,730.00
13	30	126	3,780	2,457.00
6	60	63	3,780	2,457.00
40	35	105	3,675	2,388.75
41	45	63	2,835	1,842.75
5	20	126	2,520	1,638.00
18	20	126	2,520	1,638.00
24	20	126	2,520	1,638.00
19	20	126	2,520	1,638.00
38	18	126	2,260	1,469.00
33	35	63	2,205	1,433.25
42	35	63	2,205	1,433.25
2	31	63	1,953	1,269.45
34	15	126	1,890	1,228.50
10	20	84	1,680	1,092.00
25	20	84	1,680	1,092.00
39	30	42	1,260	819.00
23	20	63	1,260	819.00
30	15	84	1,260	819.00
15	29	42	1,218	801.00
14	25	42	1,050	682.50
1	25	42	1,050	682.50
20	15	63	945	614.25
3	15	63	945	614.25
21	20	42	840	546.00
9	20	42	840	546.00
12	9	84	756	491.00
43	10	63	630	409.50
16	15	42	630	409.50
26	10	63	630	409.50
17	15	42	630	409.50
36	26	21	525	341.25
37	15	21	315	204.75
35	7	42	294	193.10
22	3	63	189	122.85
31	8	21	168	109.20
	1436 mecates (57 hectares)			

[a]From author's village census, 1971 (see Appendix A).

[b]The sale price of corn ranges from 85-90¢ during the year, but merchants seldom pay more than 65¢ per kilo to milperos.

ejida

in 19

of co

and h

who e

21 ki

almos

cate

ejida

the g

goat

mainl

dentj

and t

holdi

raise

to the

socie

They

80 hec

reform

Of course, there is a great range of possible earnings for ejidatarios who cultivate milpa. The parcelário who earned the most in 1970 claimed to have cultivated 100 mecates and harvested 126 kilos of corn per mecate. This brought him about 8,000 pesos that year, and he did not work at all for wages on the project. The parcelario who earned the least cultivated only eight mecates and harvested only 21 kilos per mecate, bringing a total of only 109 pesos. He relied almost completely on the project for wages. The data in Table 4 indicate that about 11 parcelários, or 25 percent, mainly non-credit ejidatarios, earned more than 2,000 pesos in milpa cultivation, while the great majority earned less.

The final ejido occupation to be discussed here is cattle and goat ranching, which is done by a few of the wealthier ejidatarios, mainly leaders and past leaders who operate their ranches independently of the government project. Four of the original ejido leaders and their sons have managed to build fences around individual ejido holdings ranging from 20 to 40 hectares in size. In each case they raise goats and some cattle which they own privately. In addition to these few private ejido ranchers, about 18 members of the credit society formed an independent collective cattle-ranching society. They claim to own 40 head of cattle cooperatively, which graze on 80 hectares of fenced-off ejido lands.

The Mixed Farming Project

With the termination of the sugar cane industry, agrarian reform agencies and the ejido development project dominate the economic

life

hecta

great

large

ized

ejida

of th

profi

body.

socie

wages

indiv

tribu

ejida

membe

invol

betwe

This

ing p

produ

(3) t

---

aroun
the o
10,00

life of Catmis. The lands which form the ejido constitute some 3,777 hectares, or close to 40 percent of the lands around Catmis.* The greatest portion of ejido lands, about 2,300 hectares, is used for a large profit-sharing agricultural-industrial farm dedicated to mechanized cash-crop cultivation and cattle-ranching activities. The ejidatarios earn daily wages on this development project, and members of the collective credit society of the ejido also share in the profits of the farm. All the ejidatarios own the lands as a corporate body. Nevertheless, not all the ejidatarios belong to the credit society. While all the ejidatarios may work on the project for wages, the elected officials of the credit society hire the specific individuals who comprise the labor force. These local officials distribute the low-paying and most difficult jobs to the non-credit ejidatarios, while they give the best jobs to the credit society members.

Large-scale production on the ejido development project involves a series of new arrangements of resources and relations between ejido organizations and federal agrarian reform agencies. This section examines the relations of production on the mixed farming project of the ejido, including: (1) capital dependence and production costs of the ejido, (2) the management-labor structure, (3) the credit society and employment, (4) modern agricultural

*Ricardo Pozas (1967) mentions a total of 6,067 hectares around the ex-hacienda. However, he does not include the lands of the outlying large ranches which would bring the total to at least 10,000 hectares.

techn

(5) p

Capit
Produ

capit

the e

proje

2,300

Hydra

while

proje

of ca

are o

and d

with

the s

manag

engin

who h

Works

import

separa

singl

technology for cattle ranching and cash crop cultivation, and (5) productivity and marketing.

Capital Dependence and Production Costs

Federal agrarian reform agencies supply large amounts of capital to finance the irrigation and mechanized farming projects on the ejido and to provide wages for the ejidatarios who work on the project. Two government agencies finance the development of about 2,300 hectares of lands on the Catmis ejido. The Ministry of Hydraulic Works provides the capital for a small irrigation project, while the Mixed Farming Bank of the Southeast provides capital for a project which includes both cattle ranching and mechanized cultivation of cash crops. Although the Mixed Farming and the Irrigation Projects are officially coordinated for the purpose of land transformations and development, nevertheless, the two agencies operate independently with respect to their capitalization programs.

The Ministry of Hydraulic Works provides most of the money for the small irrigation project on the ejido. It also administers and manages the local irrigation project with the help of its own engineers, field technicians, and about 15 of the Catmis ejidatarios who help lay pipes and work small pumps. The Ministry of Hydraulic Works is not a banking institution. However, because of its special importance to the modernization of agriculture in Mexico,* it is separately endowed by the federal government.

*Oscar Lewis (1960: 319) claims, ". . . more than any other single factor, irrigation has been transforming Mexican agriculture."

Inte

fund

in Y

orig

Mexi

of s

The

publ

wate

road

irri

tion

Allia

Finan

Bank

The M

devel

[1962

of lo

The fi

and e

table

about

per ca

also

the p

One of the major sources of capital for the Ministry is the Inter-American Development Bank. This bank is probably the source of funds for the Catmis project since similar small irrigation projects in Yucatan and other parts of Mexico are often constructed with funds originating there. In 1962, for example, the Nacional Financiera, Mexico's federal banking agency, borrowed US $2,500,000 for a series of small irrigation projects to improve land utilization in Yucatan. The loan was used to improve about 5,000 hectares (12,500 acres) of public lands in the southern zone of the state by tapping underground water deposits and installing local distribution networks and access roads.* It is with similar funding that the Ministry has provided irrigation for the Catmis development project.

The Mixed Farming Project is the most important economic operation in Catmis. It is financed with funds that originate from the Alliance for Progress, Fondo de Garantia Program. The Nacional Financiera passes these funds to a regional agency, the Mixed Farming Bank of the Southeast, whose central office is located in Veracruz. The Merida branch of this bank supervises the account for the Catmis development project.

---

*Considering this loan, the Inter-American Development Bank (1962: 36) claimed: "The project will directly benefit 700 families of low-income farmers, indirectly the population of the entire region. The farmers will receive parcels of land suitable in size to the social and economic conditions of the region and will plant fruits and vegetables on them. The net per capita income is expected to rise from about 900 to 3,300 Mexican Pesos which figure is higher than the 1960 per capita average for the entire country. The project will, of course, also influence the general productivity of the area and the diet of the population."

decis

bank

the a

the a

relea

and h

engin

new l

sists

categ

anize

milli

inter

these

natio

previ

the e

produ

proje

basic

ful o

tures

machi

The bank sends agents to the village only when important decisions must be made regarding the use of capital. For example, bank agronomists come to Catmis before each planting season to check the acreage of lands which have been prepared for planting. After the agronomist determines the number of prepared hectares, the bank releases the correct proportion of funds and the ejido purchases seed and hires labor for the cultivation and care of the crop. Bank engineers also visit Catmis to evaluate the commercial potential of new loans which have been requested by the ejidatarios.

The capitalization program of the Mixed Farming Project consists of two distinct farming activities and two corresponding loan categories. The farming activities include cattle ranching and mechanized cultivation. The loans involve the use of an estimated 10 million pesos to be disbursed over an 8- to 10-year period at low interest rates. The ejido lands may not be used as collateral for these loans since the integrity of the ejido land is protected by national agrarian reform law which forbids mortgaging. However, as previously mentioned, produce from the land may be mortgaged, and, at the end of the 10-year period, the bank may place a lien on future produce from the land in order to pay outstanding debts from the project.

The production costs for the Mixed Farming Project cover the basic services and equipment which must be purchased for the successful operation of the project. In the broadest sense these expenditures include accounting and supervision, land preparation, heavy machinery, jeeps and pick-up trucks, maintenance, and repair.

South
money
howev
into
pleme
used
prepa
for n
the s
alloc

Table

Farmi

Cattl
Culti

each
burse

In the official loan contract the Mixed Farming Bank of the Southeast lends the credit society of the ejido one large sum of money for the development project. For administrative purposes, however, the capital used to cover the costs of production is organized into Cattle and Cultivation Loans on the one hand, and Basic and Supplementary Loans on the other. The Basic, or Development, Loans are used for the initial purchase of machinery, equipment, and land preparation, while the Supplementary, or Operational, Loans are used for maintenance and repairs on a seasonal basis. Table 5 illustrates the structure of the Mixed Farming Loans and the initial capital allocated for the four major loans financed by the bank.

Table 5.--The structure of the Mixed Farming Loans.[a]

Farming Activity	Loan Category		Total
	Basic Loans	Supplementary Loans[b]	
Cattle loans:	1) $1,839,100	2) $654,914	$2,494,014
Cultivation loans:	3) $1,776,503	4) $661,290	$2,437,793
Total	$3,615,603	$1,316,204	$4,931,807[c]

[a]Source: National Indigenous Institute, Peto, Yucatán, 1968.

[b]The Supplementary Loans for cultivation are disbursed twice each year, while the Supplementary Loans for the cattle ranch are disbursed only once each year.

[3]In Mexican pesos.

ture,
proje
ejido
all t
proje
funds
there
order
years

used
stora
ment,
alloc
This
carri

purch
the c
farmi
renew
which

culat
load
catt]
quali

Each of the four loans carries its own categories of expenditure, and the amount allocated for each expenditure is based on the projected productivity for that particular farming activity. The ejido credit society pays the bank for each loan individually and for all the loans collectively. However, in the daily operation of the project, the expenditures for each farming activity are paid with funds that have been authorized for that particular loan. It is therefore necessary to describe the expenditures for each loan in order to evaluate the costs of production during the first three years of the project operation, from 1968 through 1970.

The Basic Loan for cattle ranching involves 1,839,100 pesos used for the purchase of fences, corrals, construction and services, storage equipment, mechanical farming equipment, transportation equipment, and cattle. The specific items purchased with the capital allocated for this loan are presented in Table B1 (Appendix B). This loan is subject to a 7 percent true annual interest rate, and carries a 10-year calendar of amortization (see Table B2, Appendix B).

The Supplementary Cattle Loans involve 654,914 pesos for the purchase of cattle and equipment and for financing the maintenance of the cattle ranch. This loan is used to subsidize two complementary farming activities: a breeding project, which includes a 10-year renewable annual loan of 157,074 pesos, and a fattening project, which is also renewable annually and involves 497,840 pesos.*

*The productivity of the breeding project is estimated by calculating the utilization of the pasture area in relation to the animal load (see Table B3, Appendix B). One of the limiting factors of any cattle ranch is the available pasture as well as the quantity and quality of the pasture. From a study of the ejido pasture (Banco

on 1,

anima

third

on th

This

showi

also

the f

for t

sales

of th

of th

proje

the t

Agrop
calcu
amoun
balan
The c
ratio
exist
to th
food,
from
0.2 u
of la
anima
that
plies
hecta
the 1

The Catmis project was set up to begin with 838 animal units on 1,500 hectares of ejido lands and grow to a maximum of 1,580 animal units by the ninth year of its operation. By the end of the third year, the project anticipated 1,212 animal units.

The estimated relationship between earnings and expenditures on the Cattle Breeding Project is illustrated in Table B4 (Appendix B). This table yields the estimated net income of the operation, thereby showing the economic possibilities for covering the loan. The table also estimates the productivity of the Cattle Breeding Project during the full 10-year period of the loan contract and serves as a guide for the replacement of adult cows by younger ones and the various sales which should take place annually, corresponding to the limitations of the pasture. The productivity analysis which appears on the bottom of the table suggests that by the end of the first three years the project should show: (1) a 7.76 percent capital gain in relation to the total project investment, (2) a 100 percent utilization of the

---

Agropecuario Del Sureste 1968), one obtains, by means of a simple calculus, the quantity of animal units of feed available for that amount of land. This factor serves as a basis for establishing a balance between the units of feed available and the units of animals. The calculus which generally serves for southern Yucatan suggests a ratio of one unit of cattle per hectare of land. Tables of equivalence exist which calculate the food requirements of the animals according to their age and sex. Thus, bulls and older cows count 1.3 units of food, steers and cows from 2-3 years count 1.0 units, steers and cows from 1-2 years count 0.6 units, and both male and female calves count 0.2 units of food. In this manner, the project estimates the quantity of land needed for the particular number and age/sex distribution of animals. If one head of cattle is supported by one hectare of land, that pasture supports 1.0 animal units. Consequently, if one multiplies the factor of animal units per hectare by the number of available hectares, the total number of animal units capable of production on the land is obtained.

ejid

anim

adul

ment

The

The

leav

an l

Henc

ing

SBO,

inte

Loan

used

tion

cost

Basi

annu

Tabl

peso

larg

tiva

ejido land designated for the cattle projects, (3) an 80 percent animal load capability on the land utilized, and (4) a 1 percent adult mortality rate which would be secured by insurance.

The estimated annual expenditures and profits for the Supplementary Cattle Fattening Loans are calculated in Table B5 (Appendix B). The loan authorizes $497,840 for the purchase of steers for fattening. The estimated gross profit following the sale of animals is $633,600, leaving 135,760 pesos estimated profit. The Fattening Loan carries an 11 percent interest charge, which amounts to 54,762 pesos per year. Hence, the estimated net profit for the ejido credit society, following the total payment of obligations to the bank ($552,602), is $80,997, or 14.65 percent of the investment.

The payment schedule for the Supplementary Cattle Loans is integrated into the 10-year amortization schedule of the Basic Cattle Loans (see Table B2, Appendix B).

The Basic Cultivation Loan includes 1,476,503 pesos to be used for land preparation, the purchase of equipment, and construction. The specific items purchased with this money and the estimated costs of each item are elaborated in Table B6 (Appendix B). This Basic Development Loan for cultivation is subject to a 7 percent true annual interest rate and an eight-year calendar of amortization (see Table B7, Appendix B). In addition, a smaller Basic Loan of 300,000 pesos became available early in 1968 to begin the project before the larger loan was appropriated. Thus, the total Basic Loan for cultivation is $1,776,503.

crop

the

The

sesa

hect

gate

proj

with

of p

(App

hect

hect

ties

fert

inse

Cult

sche

full

the

1 per

disb

the

descr

The Supplementary Loans for the cultivation of specified crops authorizes 661,290 pesos two times each year corresponding to the summer (non-irrigated) and winter (irrigated) production cycles. The crops grown include maize, soy beans, fodder, sorghum, and sesame seed. Table B8 (Appendix B) lists the projected number of hectares planted with each crop on a total of 550 hectares of irrigated ejido lands which have been designated for the cultivation project. The table anticipates the number of hectares to be planted with each crop, the costs of producing each crop, and the total costs of production for one complete year (two cycles). Tables B9-B13 (Appendix B) present an itemization of expenditures for producing one hectare of each of the cash crops and the anticipated profit per hectare after expenditures for interest and the various labor activities in cultivating each crop: plowing, scraping, seeding, planting, fertilization, irrigation (of the winter crops only), application of insecticides, cultivation, harvesting, and threshing.

Payments on the principal and interest of the Supplementary Cultivation Loans are due six months after each planting. This schedule potentially allows enough time for each crop to reach its full growth so that it will be sold when it will yield a high price on the market. Interest on the Supplementary Cultivation Loans is percent per month, and these loans have an eight-year calendar of disbursement (see Table B7, Appendix B).

After this consideration of estimated costs of production for the Cattle Ranching and Cultivation Loans, it is now possible to describe the actual costs during the first three years of the project

oper

ture

Febr

the

firs

were

the

was

menta

fatt

auth

esse

catt

Only

labo

disc

thir

trat

2.2

tion

More

firs

the

unit

operation. Table B14 (Appendix B) lists the total actual expenditures of the project by loan category, from March, 1968, through February, 1971.

The data suggest three main stages of growth through which the project passed in the first years of its operation. During the first year about 2.4 million pesos were spent. These expenditures were mainly for construction, equipment, and land preparation for the cattle ranch. More than 95 percent of the Basic Cattle Loan was spent by the end of 1968. In the first three years the Supplementary Cattle Loans were used mainly to purchase cattle for the fattening project; however, only about 50 percent of the capital authorized for that purpose was utilized. The second year, 1969, was essentially a period of consolidation with far less construction on the cattle ranch and practically no development of the cultivation project. Only 378,990 pesos were spent during the entire year. Naturally, labor activities were severely curtailed, a situation which will be discussed further in the section dealing with employment. By the third year, 1970, the cattle ranch was completed, and the administration turned its attention to the Cultivation projects. About 2.2 million pesos were spent during this year, mainly for construction, equipment, and land preparation for the cultivation project. More than 95 percent of the Basic Cultivation Loans was spent by the first months of 1971. For the first time the project began to use the Supplementary Loans for specific crop cultivation on large land units. Bananas, maize, sorghum, fodder, sesame seed, and soy beans

were all cultivated, though on a somewhat smaller scale than the bank had anticipated because the designated lands had not been completely prepared.

By the end of its third year the capital from the Basic Loans had been spent on land preparation, equipment, and construction of the Cattle Project and the Cultivation Project, while the monies allocated each year for the Supplementary Loans had not been utilized fully until the third year when the operation achieved its projected scale of production.

In a summary of the importance of the costs of production, a major distinction must be made between financial as opposed to technological success and failure. From the standpoint of technological development, it is obvious that the land transformations on the ejido have created a productive commercial farm. However, the financial success or failure of the ejido project is not so easily observed. The technical managers of the project are employed by various government agencies which are committed to assist the ejidatarios in the project. The technocrats, who come from other parts of Mexico to work on the project for limited contract periods, make the major financial decisions for the ejido farm. In the formal rationale of the project, since the ejidatarios are uneducated, they must depend on the wisdom and good intentions of these technocrats. Negligence, or even honest errors, not to mention corruption on administrative levels, must ultimately be paid for by the collective ejido organization. At the end of the 10-year period, the bank may liquidate the ejido cattle, equipment, and tools to settle outstanding debts. Any

debts beyond the value of the project property will be paid for with future production from the ejido soils. As the present discussion has illustrated, the ejido credit society has been granted a certain amount of funds for its farming and ranching expenditures during the first 10 years. If the project fails financially at the end of this period, new funds might be made available, but clearly at a higher cost to the ejidatarios, whose bargaining strength for the new loan agreement might be severely curtailed because of the previous debts. Such new loans would reflect greater indebtedness and increased capital dependency on the government.

The Management-Labor Structure

Although the Mixed Farming Bank disburses the funds for the development project, it neither administers the funds nor manages the local labor force of the ejido. Both these tasks are carried out by a federal agrarian reform agency, the National Indigenous Institute, whose regional offices are located in Peto, 14 miles from Catmis.

Technocrats employed by the Institute administer the project funds and manage the collective ejido labor force by means of a formal management-labor structure (see Figure 1: The Formal Management-Labor Structure of the Mixed Farming Project). Apart from the director of the Institute, who is responsible for all of the projects sponsored by the Institute, the personnel from the Institute who are directly involved in the ejido development project include: (1) a technical director, who is a doctor of veterinary medicine; (2) an administrator, who acts as the accountant for the project; and (3) two field



Figure 1.--The formal management-labor structure of the mixed farming project.

tec

off

chi

rep

rep

res

Aff

col

for

by

rie

off

the

ran

far

Hyd

men

the

mem

At

lis

the

one

ran

technicians, including another veterinarian and an agronomist. The official personnel from the ejido credit society include: (1) the chief representative, who assigns work to the individual members and represents the credit society before the Institute; (2) two auxiliary representatives, who serve as work foremen and assist the chief representative as spokesmen before the bank and the Department of Agrarian Affairs; and (3) the members of the credit society, who work as a collective labor force on the development project.

The naming of personnel is conducted according to a specific formula. The technical director and the administrator are appointed by the director of the Institute, and the Institute pays their salaries. The three credit society representatives are the elected officials of the credit society. Their salaries are also paid by the Institute.

The technical director administers the farming and cattle-ranching operations with the accountant, markets the produce from the farm, coordinates the irrigation activities of the Ministry of Hydraulic Works with those of the Institute, manages loans and investments, changes or modifies the projected plans in consultation with the bank, and, finally, communicates directly with the credit society members concerning the operation and affairs of the development project. At the end of each week he presents the credit society foreman with a list of work that needs to be done the following week. To assist him, the technical director employs an agronomist and a veterinarian on one-year contracts. They help manage the cultivation and cattle-ranching activities by instructing the credit society foreman and

field bosses about how to tend the animals and crops and how to utilize the labor force in the everyday operation of the farm.

The chief representative of the credit society is the foreman of the Mixed Farming Project. Each week he allocates work assignments to the members of the society. He also supervises the activities of the other two representatives, who work closely with the two field technicians hired by the technical director. Each field boss supervises from 15 to 30 ejido laborers, who work on the tasks which the technical director has ordered for that week. One of the representatives is the field boss for the mechanized cultivation project and for the repairs and maintenance of the ejido lands. He places field hands in the various irrigated units for daily work on the farm or for construction and maintenance in the pasture and corral areas. He also makes sure that the tractors are operating correctly and working in the scheduled fields. The second representative is the head cowboy for the cattle project. He manages the storeroom of the cattle ranch and makes sure that each of the eight cowboys arrives early in the morning to take his lot of animals to the designated pasture area.

The credit society members comprise the formal collective labor organization, which performs all the activities advised by the technical director, the field technicians, the chief representative, and the field bosses of the respective work groups. The labor force that actually works on the project may be divided along two dimensions: skilled and unskilled, and credit society and non-credit society ejidatarios. The skilled workers include a mechanic,

wel

The

for

or

ing

The

rep

soc

a r

dri

tra

dri

The

but

lab

pro

on

bar

pro

All

the

nat

out

bas

well-keepers, carpenters and masons, tractor drivers, and cowboys. The unskilled workers, who make up the vast majority of the labor force, include men who repair corrals, work on minor construction jobs or maintenance, or as field hands in cultivation, harvesting, planting, preparation and maintenance of the soils and pasture.

Skilled labor is generally paid on a daily or weekly basis. The Institute pays 150 pesos per week to each of the credit society representatives. All other ejido labor is paid by the ejido credit society. The eight cowboys, for example, earn 20 pesos daily, work a regular six-day week, and are seldom replaced. About nine tractor drivers also work regularly and earn the highest salaries; usually tractor driving pays 25 pesos per day, but if the job is difficult, drivers are hired by piece work and may earn up to 50 pesos per day. The wages for artisan work, such as carpentry or masonry, are high, but the work is irregular and usually paid by the task. Unskilled laborers, who perform about 75 percent of all the work on the ejido project, earn daily wages that range from 14 to 20 pesos, depending on the difficulty of the chore or the amount of work performed.

Technically, the credit society has an agreement with the bank that only credit society members will be able to work on the project. The credit society, however, is not a tight-knit group. All the ejidatarios are allowed to work on the project. However, the chief representative, who allocates jobs each week to the workers, naturally favors the credit society members since they can vote him out of office at any time. He allocates regular work and preferred tasks to them, and, as a result, the credit society members earn more

than the non-credit ejidatarios. Such job discrimination is actually built into the administrative structure of the project, which originally limited the number of credit society members, thereby dividing the ejidatarios into two main groups--the credit society members and the non-credit ejidatarios. Chapter Five, which deals with local politics, will explain how such job discrimination has formed the basis of political conflict within the ejido labor and political organization.

The Credit Society and Employment

During the first three years of the project operation, restrictions on capital and other resources made working conditions highly irregular and insecure for the ejidatarios. Three major irregularities were observed.

In the first place, the absolute amount of money spent for labor fluctuated greatly by the year and by the month, causing corresponding fluctuations in the kinds of tasks performed by the ejidatarios and the size of their labor force. Such fluctuations are clearly illustrated in Table 6, which compares the expenditures for labor from 1968 through 1970 in four selected months of each year.

In 1968, of a total expenditure of 813,000 pesos, 128,000 (8 percent) pesos went for labor costs. In 1969 the total actual expenditure fell to 186,000 pesos, about 84 percent less, and the absolute amount spent for labor plummeted to 20,000 pesos (11 percent), or 108,000 pesos less than the previous year. In 1970 the total expenditures rose again to 954,000 pesos because of the input of

Table 6.--Yearly expenditures for goods and services: 1968-1970.[a]

Year	Month	Amount Spent in $1000s	Goods	Labor
1968	Feb.	72	29	48
	May	119	101	18
	Aug.	510	473	37
	Nov.	112	82	30
	Total	$813	$685 (82%)	$128 (18%)
1969	Feb.	136	131	5
	May	10	6	4
	Aug.	16	10	6
	Nov.	24	19	5
	Total	$186	$166 (89%)	$20 (11%)
1970	Feb.	27	5	22
	May	26	13	13
	Aug.	210	181	29
	Nov.	693	678	15
	Total	$929	$825 (91.5%)	$79 (8.5%)

[a]National Indigenous Institute, Peto, Yucatán, 1968-1970.

apital from the Basic Cultivation Loan. In that year 79,000 pesos
8 percent) went for labor costs. Such year-to-year fluctuations in
ne availability of capital reflect the various growth stages of the
roject, which were mentioned previously. Similar fluctuations may
observed in the monthly labor expenditures over a single year, as
lustrated in Table 7.

Tab

197

Mar
Apr
May
Jun
Jul
Aug
Sep
Oct
Nov
Dec
Jan
Feb

197

In
the
Tab
The
whi
197
of
pes
Nat
Job

Table 7.--Monthly labor expenditures for the Mixed Farming Project.[a]

1970-1971	Total Expenditures	Labor	Goods
March	$ 47,700	15,978	31,722
April	29,990	10,225	19,765
May	23,095	12,734	10,361
June	19,075	15,748	3,327
July	137,269	23,863	113,406
August	213,779	29,814	183,965
September	75,685	22,674	53,011
October	79,009	34,332	44,677
November	73,123	15,447	57,676
December	337,942	29,174	308,768
January	40,753	38,989	1,764
February	498,566	35,671	462,895
Total	$2,201,984	$284,651	$1,917,333

[a]Data from total work records March, 1970, through February, 1971, from the National Indigenous Institute, Peto, Yucatán.

In 1970-1971, for example, a total of 2,201,984 pesos were spent for the project, of which 284,651 (13 percent) pesos were spent for labor. The average monthly labor expenditure was 23,720 pesos. The highest monthly labor expenditure was 38,989 pesos in January, 1971, while the lowest monthly labor expenditure was 10,225 pesos in April, 1970. Less than 16,000 pesos were spent in each of the five months of March, April, May, June, and November, while more than 22,000 pesos were spent for labor in each of the remaining seven months. Naturally, such yearly and monthly fluctuations caused corresponding job competition and insecurities for the ejidatarios.

ear

the

wer

del

ori

stu

and

cre

wou

6,3

in

be

The

an

mat

It

196

pes

196

tio

exp

com

ear

An

The second important labor irregularity concerns the annual earnings of the credit society ejidatarios. In all three years of the project operation, from 1968 through 1970, the actual earnings were significantly below the projected earnings (Banco Agropecuario del Sureste 1968). The estimated annual earnings were presented originally in the bank's feasibility study of the project. This study estimated that enough money would be available from profits and anticipated loan expenditures to cover labor costs for all 73 credit society families. Some 507,000 pesos, the study claimed, would be available for salaries in 1968, providing an average of 6,347 pesos per family; 369,000 pesos would be available for salaries in 1969, averaging 5,055 pesos per family; and 416,000 pesos would be available in 1970, averaging 5,700 pesos per credit society family. The available data on the actual earnings in 1968, however, suggest an average of about 2,878 pesos per family, less than half the estimated amount. Unfortunately, the 1969 work records are incomplete. It is clear, however, that salaries in 1969 were even lower than in 1968 since the entire project expenditures in 1969 were only 353,394 pesos (see Table B14, Appendix B) compared to 2.4 million pesos in 1968. Consequently, it must be assumed that a significant proportion of that amount was not utilized for labor costs, but for other expenditures.

Fortunately, the data on salaries and earnings in 1970 are complete and accurate. In that year 67 credit society ejidatarios earned a total of 207,405 pesos in wages on the development project. An additional 23,911 pesos were distributed among them at the end of

the

bas

67

3,4

pes

pes

soc

ban

pat

pre

ins

Tab

the year for dividends since the farm operated on a profit-sharing basis. A total, then, of 231,315 pesos was distributed that year to 67 credit society ejidatarios, providing an average annual earning of 3,452 pesos. The total amount spent for labor was therefore 184,840 pesos less than the projected total amount for that year, and 1,248 pesos (40 percent) less than the estimated average amount per credit society family. This labor irregularity clearly suggests that the bank distributed far less capital for labor than it originally anticipated.

The final irregularity is chronic underemployment. The data presented in Table 8 suggest that many ejidatarios suffered from insufficient work during the first three years of the project operation.

Table 8.--Number of weeks worked by credit society members: 1969 and 1970.[a]

Number of Weeks Worked	Year			
	1969		1970	
	N	%	N	%
10-19	3	4	7	10
20-29	10	14	12	16.5
30-39	10	14	10	14
40 plus	10	14	4	5.5
Total ejidatarios	33	46	33	46

[a]Data from the National Indigenous Institute, Peto, Yucatán.

In
who
wee
ext
ban
Sur

sta
ing
thi
pro
the
an
onl
soc
ser
the
cre
cre
tha
fil
in
(as
tha
pes

In 1968 the average number of weeks worked by the 33 ejidatarios who worked the most was 31.5, while in 1970 the average number of weeks for this group actually fell to 28. This amount of work is extremely low when compared to the 50 work weeks per year which the bank study anticipated for the project (Banco Agropecuario del Sureste 1968).

In part, these work insufficiencies may be explained by the stages in the technological growth of the project and the corresponding labor fluctuations, both of which have been discussed earlier in this chapter. To some extent, all the ejidatarios suffered from the problem of limited resources. It must also be noted, however, that the ejidatarios who did not belong to the credit society experienced an additional problem of job discrimination. When the project began, only 73 of 140 active ejidatarios were permitted to join the credit society. Since the remaining non-credit ejidatarios were not represented politically within the credit society, they were subject to the whims of the credit society chief representative, who favored the credit society members in his hiring practices. As a result, the non-credit ejidatarios worked far fewer weeks and earned far less money than the credit society ejidatarios. This earning insufficiency is illustrated in Table 9. Of 67 credit society ejidatarios who worked in 1970, 45 (65 percent) earned more than 2,000 pesos, while only 22 (35 percent) earned less. Of 33 non-credit ejidatarios who worked that year, only one individual, a mechanic, earned more than 2,000 pesos, while the remaining 32 individuals earned less. The average

ann

to

Tab

Sal

$

200

400

600

wer
Cat
Yuc

sou

dat

soc

qua

ope

inc

day

the

197

the

annual earning for the non-credit ejidatarios was 851 pesos compared to 3,452 pesos averaged by the credit society members.

Table 9.--Credit society and non-credit ejidatario earnings.[a]

Salaries	Credit Society Members	Non-Credit Ejidatarios	Total
$ 0-1999	22	32	54 (%)
2000-3999	25	0	25 (%)
4000-5999	11	1	12 (%)
6000-7999	9	0	9 (%)
Total	67	33	100 (%)

[a]Complete salaries from March, 1970, through February, 1971, were taken for each worker from the records of expenditure from the Catmis Project Office of the National Indigenous Institute, Peto, Yucatán.

In general, the ejido credit society represented the principal source of employment for the majority of villagers. Although the data clearly indicate that only about 46 family heads, mainly credit society ejidatarios, earned enough to support their families adequately, nevertheless, during the first three years of the project operation the credit society often employed many other individuals, including the wives and children of ejidatarios and even non-ejidatario day laborers for task work in the fields. Table 10 presents data on the status and number of people who worked for the ejido project in 1970. According to the project records, 240 individuals worked for the ejido in 1970. In this manner many ejidatarios, and especially

those who earned lower wages, were able to supplement their incomes through the periodic labor inputs of other members of their families.

Table 10.--Earnings of ejidatarios and non-ejidatarios who worked on the credit society development project.[a]

Salary	Ejidatarios	Non-Ejidatarios	Total Workers
$ 0- 499	16	108	124 (52%)
500-1999	38	30	68 (28%)
2000-3999	25	1	26 (11%)
4000-5999	12	1	13 (5.5%)
6000-7999	9	0	9 (3%)
Total	100	140	240 (100%)

Farming Methods

The introduction of modern farming methods on the mixed farming project constitutes one of the major economic changes which the agrarian reform brought to Catmis. The ejido project depends upon the irrigation network operated by the Ministry of Hydraulic Works and on modern farming equipment and techniques for its cultivation and cattle-ranching activities.

The Ministry of Hydraulic Works determined that about one-third of the 3,777 hectares of the ejido lands was arable. Consequently, seven irrigated land units were constructed on 546 hectares of land. The other 767 hectares which could be irrigated were originally untouched because the Guinea Grass (Panicum Maximum) that grows wild on it could

be utilized as pasture by the cattle project. This area was designated for future agricultural improvements which would eventually include 11 more wells and corresponding irrigation ditches.

Each of the seven irrigated units in operation maintains pumping equipment for a deep well, moving parts for three-phased electric motors, nets of asbestos-cement piping, interrupted by hydrants every 76 meters, and an aluminum sprinkling system necessary to completely cover the area of its irrigation cycle. In addition, each unit of land is equipped with internal roadways between its different irrigation zones for the collection of the produce and main road uniting all the units with the population center of Catmis. Because of the high clay content of the soils where the irrigation units are located, drainage is inefficient, and, thus, each unit is also provided with a drainage system which impedes inundation of the worked areas. The land outside these parcelled, mechanized zones is quite variable in quality. Nevertheless, the Ministry designated about 1,500 hectares for cattle raising since these lands were inferior for cultivation.

Since 1968, when the development project began, the ejido has purchased five tractors, a thresher, a combine, a reaper, a sowing machine, and many other machines for modern commercial cultivation of cash crops (see Table B6, Appendix B). While much of the work is still done manually, these modern techniques permit the ejidatarios to cultivate irrigated land units which range in size from 150 to 250 hectares (see Map 4). A wide variety of cash crops, including maize, bananas, soy beans, sesame seed, fodder, and grain sorghum, is grown

simultaneously in different fields. Moreover, with the use of the sprinkling irrigation system and the rotating crop system, the land yields up to two crops each year. Table 11 lists the different crops cultivated for both summer and winter cycles, their locations on the irrigated land units according to well number, and the number of hectares of each crop planted.

Table 11.--Crop cultivation on the Mixed Farming Project.[a]

Well Number	Cycle I. Summer: July-December 1970		Cycle II. Winter: January-July 1971	
	Crop	No. of Hectares	Crop	No. of Hectares
1	Maize	70	Sesame seed	30
2	Maize	80	Grain sorghum	70
3	Grain sorghum Soy bean	48 10	Grain sorghum	48
5	Banana Sesame seed	19 25	Banana Grain sorghum	19 20
7	Fodder	70	Fodder	70
		322 hec.		254 hec.

[a]Data from accounting records of the National Indigenous Institute and conversations with agronomists working for the Institute.

The various tasks performed in the cultivation of each crop demonstrate that a combination of mechanical and manual labor is utilized, according to the particular requirements of the crop and the specific conditions of the soil. The overmechanization of the project reflects the financial interests of the bank, which lends the capital for the

pur

who

see

irr

Apr

was

was

pro

by

ope

bot

pro

can

tra

ass

ren

mat

har

con

and

mes

wor

med

purchase of machinery, rather than the interests of the ejidatarios, who would probably benefit more from sufficient employment and job security.

From April through December, 1970, 150 hectares of non-irrigated maize were cultivated at the first and second wells. In April the lands were cleared. Where the land was smooth, the tractor was used and all refuse brought together to be burned. Where the land was too thick with vegetation, mainly roots and trunks which are prevalent, the ejidatarios used machetes and the clearing was done by hand. In the middle of May, scraping was done, which consists of opening the land and lifting the soil, then leaving it higher on both sides than the center, where a small canal is formed. This process is done by tractor. The driver is paid 30 pesos daily and can complete two to three hectares in an eight-hour period. The tractor also breaks up the soil. For this activity each driver is assigned a helper who rides in back of the tractor and jumps out to remove pieces of wood and roots which may damage the machine.

Planting was begun in June and completed in July. It was mainly accomplished by machine, but about 30 hectares were planted by hand because it was raining and too muddy for the tractor. When the corn is planted by hand, the distance between the lines is one meter and between the plants it is 50 centimeters, or two plants to each meter. Three seeds are placed in the ground for each plant. Hand work pays three pesos per mecate, and a man can usually finish four mecates in a day. When the tractor is used, three seeds are planted

per meter instead of two, and the machine finishes three to four hectares per day.

Around the end of June the plants were thinned by hand when they reached a height of 30 to 40 centimeters. Then, in July, the earth was loosened around the plant. This was done half by hand, at a cost of three pesos per mecate, and half by machine. In August, after the rains had subsided, three to four men applied insecticide by hand. The insecticide is dust, not liquid, and it is applied early in the morning when no breeze will spread the dust where it is not wanted. Three men cover three hectares per day and are paid 15 pesos each per day.

At the beginning of September the plants are weeded. This was done by hand and, because there were many weeds after three months' growth, the ejido needed more laborers than those who came to work. Thus, during this period many non-ejidatarios and many women and children were hired to work in the corn fields. In November the ejido workers began to bend the corn stalks so the corn would dry. This was only done to about half the crop since the rains had passed and the remainder of the crop was no longer in danger of getting wet. The corn is bent by striking the stalk with the dull edge of a machete. This work was performed by hand, and the ejido was paid 2.5 pesos per mecate.

At the end of November and early in December the ejido began harvesting the crop. When the crop is harvested by hand, the ejido pays from 5 to 10 pesos for each sack of 40 to 45 kilos of corn. The higher price is usually paid when the stalks are located in hard-to-reach

ar

ha

tr

of

fo

28

va

fo

ha

in

on

ha

ve

ac

in

ti

fo

co

an

of

mo

te

Fo

ar

areas or when they are surrounded by prickers. Fifty hectares were harvested by hand and the remaining 100 hectares by machine. A tractor driver is paid 50 pesos per day and harvests about 25 tons of corn, which is equal to the work of 60 men. Six people can remove four tons of corn from the cob in a day, while the combine removes 28 tons a day, the work of about 42 people.

The other cash crops grown on the ejido were tended with varying degrees of manual and machine work. Fodder and grain sorghum, for example, need little hand work. They are planted, weeded, and harvested by machine. Moreover, they reseed themselves after the initial planting and may be continued for more than one season with only periodic rotation. Soy beans and sesame seed, on the other hand, need hand labor for weeding, applying insecticides, and harvesting, but machinery is utilized in planting and other cultivation activities. Bananas rely very heavily on manual labor, and, following the initial preparation of the soil, all the cultivation activities are done manually.

The cattle-ranching project also utilizes modern techniques for production. Initially, it was formed with the purchase of 600 cows and 24 bulls for breeding. This number was projected to increase and stabilize at 800 cows and 23 bulls. Steers in this original lot of animals were to be sold at 20 months of age, considered to be the most profitable time. In addition to the breeding project, the fattening project was started with the purchase of 400 thin steers. Four hundred hectares of land were divided into eight fenced-in areas to contain these animals.

su

mo

pr

ar

me

se

ke

of

fe

de

an

du

wa

ad

gr

oc

ty

la

gr

th

tr

pa

With regard to food requirements, the ejido lands contain sufficient meadows of Guinea Grass to maintain the cattle through most of the year. However, to insure an adequate food supply, the project included the mechanized cultivation of 70 hectares of fodder and the construction of four silos to preserve the fodder for supplementary feeding during March and April, the worst months of the dry season.

Since the project began, selection has been conducted to keep the best cattle on the project, thereby improving the basic lot of animals. Hence, cattle with the greatest body development, fecundity, and growth are not sold. In addition, vaccinations, deparasitation, and disinfectants are used to fight against disease, and dehorning and castration are practiced to encourage higher productivity.

Regarding the management of pastures, a modern rotation system was established in order to achieve maximum land utilization. In addition, the project encourages only a single species of pasture to grow inside each fence. This helps avoid losses through deaths that occur as a result of the preference cattle have for one or another type of pasture which may grow outside the fenced area. The pasture lands are weeded each year to insure the predominance of pasture grass, and pasture levels are maintained at a height which yields the greatest nutrients.

The corral system includes everything necessary for the proper treatment of cattle. This system consists of corrals with a principal alley of access and chutes, a straight chute with access to the

sc

ma

se

in

th

un

co

pr

Pr

fa

in

le

of

pe

co

pr

fi

ev

(2

ar

me

sc

be

ma

scale and deparasitation bath, ending the entire corral system at the main alleyway. It is noted that the chutes are constructed in a semi-circle which allows the animals to walk single-file and not be injured. Map 4 (Ejido Land Utilization) depicts the division of the cattle pastures on the project as well as the irrigated farming units. The key to the map identifies the open-air wells and fences, corrals, and dwelling units, all of which are utilized by the cattle project.

Productivity and Marketing

It is difficult to analyze the productivity of the mixed farming project for two reasons. First, the project only began operating in 1968. Consequently, it is hard to decide precisely what levels constitute adequate productivity. Second, the productivity of the collective ejido cannot be compared to that of an earlier period since cattle ranching and cash crop cultivation represent a completely new mode of production. Despite these methodological problems, however, some tentative evaluation of productivity during the first years of the operation may be made based on a combination of evidence derived from: (1) direct observation of the labor force, (2) interviews with ejidatarios and technicians from the Institute, and (3) data which compare the actual sale of produce and loan payments to the bank with estimated productivity rates and amortization schedules that were projected in a bank study before the project began.

The level of productivity on the Mixed Farming Project ultimately depends on two variables: first, modern farming techniques,

wh

pr

tr

ti

ni

an

pr

re

is

an

pr

co

pa

to

th

to

ne

pe

th

ma

br

Yu

on

which in this case are faily certain to permit large scale, high productivity; and second, the direction and competence of administrative decisions regarding the utilization of the factors of production. The available data suggest that, although modern farming techniques have encouraged high productivity on both the cattle ranch and the cultivation project, nevertheless, certain administrative problems regarding the use of land, labor, capital, and equipment reveal that the level of productivity, even after only three years, is not as high as it should be.

The present discussion reviews the productivity of the cattle and cultivation projects, then considers some of the administrative problems which inhibit productivity and their consequences for the collective ejido organization.

To analyze the cattle ranch, its actual productivity is compared to its estimated productivity. The Breeding Project planned to increase the general herd size to 1,212 animal units by the end of the third year (see Table B3, Appendix B), and, at the same time, earn total net profits of 533,021 pesos (see Table B4, Appendix B). The net profits for the Fattening Project were estimated at 135,760 pesos per year (see Table B5, Appendix B), or a total of 407,280 pesos for the three-year period, 1968-1970. Thus, the total net profit estimated for the first three years was 940,000 pesos.

The sale of 310 animals by the end of the first three years brought about 708,000 pesos (National Indigenous Institute, Peto, Yucatán), or 232,000 pesos less than the estimates. This deficit was only momentary, however, since the actual herd size increased to

1,370 animal units, or 158 more units than the estimated 1,212. When sold, these extra animal units would bring in another 221,200 pesos, or 11,000 pesos less than the three-year estimates. In general, the cattle project's actual productivity was about the same as the estimated productivity, indicating that the original estimates were accurate.

Although only one cultivation cycle had been completed by January, 1970, the cultivation project also appeared to be doing well. A consideration of the five different cash crops raised suggests that the project began slowly, with moderate gains, but that its expansion and success as a productive enterprise is imminent.

Maize was the most productive crop. From June through December, 1970, 150 hectares were cultivated successfully. Almost 220,000 kilograms of corn were sold for 188,321 pesos. Grain sorghum was also successful, yielding close to 90,000 pesos from the 45 hectares planted. The 70 hectares of fodder may also be considered successful, but the harvest was stored for animal feed in the silos built for that purpose, so none of it was sold. Sesame seed was planted on 25 hectares, but the yield was a mere 3,000 kilograms, which brought only 19,000 pesos on the market. Sesame did poorly for a number of reasons: The plants lacked water when they were planted; contrary to the advice of the agronomist, the ejidatarios failed to measure the land before they planted; the crop was harvested incorrectly; and the ejidatarios shook too much waste into the burlap bags along with the seed, thereby detracting from its market value. The sesame harvest yielded almost enough to cover expenses, but there

was no profit. Fortunately, only a small number of hectares were planted with soy beans because the crop was a total failure which cost the ejido about 15,000 pesos. The few beans harvested were sold to the ejidatarios in small quantities at wholesale prices. The banana crop was planted on 19 hectares in September, 1970. Since the crop would not be ready for harvest until the following September, 13 months after planting, there was no way to measure its productivity.

In general, the first cultivation cycle was successful. Toward the end of the harvest season, the project paid the bank 185,000 pesos of the 285,000 pesos which were borrowed for the Supplementary Crop Loans for that cycle, and the outstanding debt of 100,000 pesos could easily be paid by the end of the harvest when the remainder of the crops would be sold. In addition, both the fodder and grain sorghum were especially profitable since they reseeded themselves, thereby promising to yield another crop in the second cycle without additional expenditures for seed and other cultivation activities.

Briefly summarizing, by the end of the third year both the cultivation and the cattle-ranching projects appeared to have enjoyed a measure of success. Cattle production had achieved the estimates originally projected by the bank, and the cultivation project produced slightly less than anticipated, but only one of the five crops planted actually lost money. The produce of the project after three years enabled the ejidatarios to repay all of their debts to the bank as they fell due. Furthermore, at the end of the third year the Institute distributed a small dividend of 23,000 pesos to the

73 credit society members, implying that the project had earned some profit.

When one examines some of the administrative problems which were mentioned earlier, there are signs that the level of productivity of the project, even after only three years in operation, is not as high as it should be. In the first place, the lands have not been prepared for cultivation according to the projected schedule. In the third year of the project the bank estimated that 500 hectares of land would be in cultivation (Table B8, Appendix B). However, only 350 hectares were actually in cultivation, since the remaining lands had not yet been prepared. Although the failure to keep to the schedule of land preparation has no immediate effect on ejido productivity figures, nevertheless, the bank calculates the loans and amortization schedules according to these estimates. Thus, deferred payment of the basic loans because of lowered productivity simply indicates longer and greater indebtedness of the society to the bank.

A second sign of low productivity is land utilization. The project estimates that a number of different cash crops will be grown simultaneously on irrigated fields ranging in size from 100 to 250 hectares. In practice, irrigation field technicians constantly complained that perhaps as many as 20 different crops were being cultivated simultaneously on land units ranging in size from 2 to 10 hectares, with little organization or balance in the fields. The irrigation problems were immense. As one technician put it:

> . . . The irrigation pipes are portable so that each part of a large field can be irrigated sufficiently during the course of an eight hour day. The way these fields are planted, we must work 24 hours a day since some crops call for 2 hours of water, some three or four, and they are all on the same field.

Such cultivation practices are not conducive to high productivity.

Finally, the productivity of the Catmis project may be lowered by corruption within the ejido society. Some ejidatarios have accused the ejido leaders of stealing crops after they are harvested and selling them to local merchants, rather than turning them over to the bank. Theft may also take place in the cattle ranch, particularly theft of newborn calves before they are branded and marked. The one agronomist who attempted to calculate maize production on a particular field lost his job because of ejidatario pressures on the administration. This incident appears to indicate that accusations of theft have some foundation. Of course, it is impossible to measure the extent of losses through theft. However, the fact that the bank has been paid on time suggests that theft by the ejidatarios in Catmis thus far has not lowered production significantly, at least when actual production is compared to projected production figures issued by the bank. It may be concluded that while theft obviously has occurred, it is not rampant.

Despite the good performance of the ejido farm during its first three years, the productivity analysis seems to reveal a general picture of administrative policies which have fostered great capital dependency and encouraged indebtedness of the ejido society to the bank. The bank has overextended credit and overmechanized the society at the expense of job security and regular employment. Given this

financial an

ejidatarios

year project

principal of

preparation,

plementary o

crops). Sin

continue to

continue to

even high pr

to the ejida

go to repay

ejido credit

Mark

rather than

who the buye

are told at

this crop su

or poorly.

wholesale ma

Recently, th

in Catmis fo

ing stage.

The

within Yucat

States. Som

financial and administrative arrangement, it is likely that the ejidatarios will still be in debt to the bank at the end of the 10-year project period. The outstanding debts will clearly be on the principal of the initial Basic or Refraccionario Loans (for land preparation, irrigation, and mechanization), rather than on the Supplementary or Avio Loans (for seasonal production of cattle and crops). Since the lands are highly productive, the government will continue to support the project, and the credit society members will continue to work for wages and occasional dividends. In future years even high productivity on the project will probably not be returned to the ejidatarios in the form of profits; rather, such profits will go to repay the large long-term development loans incurred by the ejido credit society.

Marketing decisions are made by the Institute and the bank rather than the ejido and its leaders. Most ejidatarios do not know who the buyers are, how much was purchased, or at what price. They are told at the end of each season, or when the cattle are sold, that this crop succeeded or failed and that the credit society is doing well or poorly. Sometimes when a crop fails and cannot be sold on the wholesale market, it is sold at a low price to the ejido members. Recently, there was some discussion of establishing a wholesale store in Catmis for the ejido members, but this did not go beyond the talking stage.

The crops and cattle produced in Catmis are sold mainly within Yucatán, but also to other Mexican regions and to the United States. Some purchases are made by private companies directly through

the Institut
cattle and
its connect
diversified
enhanced.
thing it has

Alt
the most im
one. Occupa
in the loca
ing project
occupations
note that,
approach th
organizatio

The
businessmen
sionals, ra
men include
owner, 1 li
viduals wor
five laundr
artisans in
and 2 mason

the Institute, but the majority of sales, and especially the larger cattle and crop sales, are made through the Mixed Farming Bank and its connections. Because the project produces both cattle and diversified cash crops, its chances of successful marketing are enhanced. So far, the project has had no difficulty selling everything it has produced.

Non-Ejido Occupations

Although the Mixed Farming Project of the ejido represents the most important economic operation in Catmis, it is not the only one. Occupations in the private sector also play a significant role in the local economy. Especially since employment on the mixed farming project is insufficient, many ejidatarios also work in non-ejido occupations in order to support their families. It is important to note that, with few exceptions, such non-ejido occupations do not approach the scale of the capital investment, technology, nor labor organization which is utilized by the ejido development project.

The principal non-ejido occupations in 1970 included: businessmen, service occupations, employees and artisans, professionals, ranchers, free milperos, and wage laborers. The 25 businessmen included 14 merchants, 4 bar owners, 2 millers, 1 billiard room owner, 1 livery stable owner, and 3 restaurateurs. About 19 individuals worked in service occupations which included five seamstresses, five laundresses, six water deliverers, and three midwives. The 20 artisans included 2 carpenters, 2 butchers, 2 bakers, 12 blacksmiths, and 2 masons. Four employees worked as truck drivers for the merchants,

while the fo

About eight

free (non-e

employed by

machinery,

laborers, o

Ful

ejido occupi

7 of the 22

through the

laundress,

Local Busin

Cat

needs for f

portion of

as boxed ch

liquor, are

Chetumal, a

towns) wher

prices. In

local retai

The

with wholes

which they

other small

while the four professionals were all school teachers in the village. About eight ranchers lived in the village and a dozen or so men were free (non-ejido) milperos. Finally, some 30 day laborers were employed by the new land-owning company to dismantle the factory machinery, or by the Santa Rosa development farm to work as day laborers, or by nearby private ranches to work as ranch hands.

Fully 25 percent (23) of the 92 individuals engaged in non-ejido occupations were women. However, they were represented only in 7 of the 22 non-ejido occupations. In general, they earned money through the extension of domestic chores into occupations such as laundress, seamstress, restaurant owner, and midwife.

Local Businesses

Catmis neither manufactures consumer goods nor meets it own needs for food, but depends upon imported commodities. The largest portion of these goods is imported from Mérida, but some items, such as boxed cheese, canned and processed meats and fish, clothes, and liquor, are brought from British Honduras to the free Mexican port of Chetumal, and then smuggled to Catmis (as well as most other Yucatecan towns) where they are made available to the public at fairly cheap prices. In Catmis the vast majority of consumer goods is sold in local retail stores.

The three largest village stores combine their retail sales with wholesale corn businesses. The storekeepers own large trucks which they use to carry goods from Mérida to their Catmis stores and other smaller branch stores which they supply. These smaller stores

are located

producing h

these store

maize. Aft

sold on the

cash, but m

viduals, pa

their earni

Cat

two of the

owners slau

day which h

clothes, sh

are sold ye

from peddle

correspondi

villager ha

Bec

water is br

Rosa, or fr

two kilomet

delivery ha

engaged in

delivers wa

vidual home

delivers wa

are located along the Chetumal highway and in the more remote maize-producing hamlets of the Quintana Roo interior. During the year these stores provide goods to the maize producers in exchange for maize. After the harvest the corn is taken to Mérida where it is sold on the wholesale market. Most purchases in Catmis are made with cash, but merchants also extend up to 400 pesos credit to many individuals, particularly men who raise corn either as a supplement to their earnings on the ejido project, or as a full-time occupation.

Catmis also maintains two taverns and three grinding mills; two of the latter are owned by the corn merchants. Two of the store owners slaughter meat once each week, and one man bakes bread every day which he sells to the stores. None of the village stores sells clothes, shoes, or furniture, but these goods, especially clothes, are sold year around in Peto and Tzucacab. They may also be purchased from peddlers who come from Chetumal to Catmis once a year, at a time corresponding to the old sugar cane harvest season when the average villager had cash on hand.

Because the quality of water in the village wells is so poor, water is brought to the village from other, deeper wells in Santa Rosa, or from the ejido development project wells which are located two kilometers outside the village. An interesting system of water delivery has developed in the village involving about six men who are engaged in four distinct delivery businesses. One man hauls and delivers water by the bucketful from the village wells to individual homes. He has about 15 to 20 regular clients to whom he delivers water daily. His fee is 50 cents for delivery of two buckets

of water.

rain barrel

project wel

by the buck

dug his own

"vein" of w

He uses a g

canals and

drinking wa

must take t

bucket. Th

water tank.

from the go

water by th

individuals

Ranchers (S

Cat

enterprise.

similar to

prise an es

village. A

The only i

is an entr

refining m

This man o

lands. Al

of water. Two other individuals use horse and wagon to haul large rain barrels of drinking water which they bring from the ejido project wells. These men also pass from house to house selling water by the bucketful. Following the closing of the factory, another man dug his own well. Few people believed he would succeed in finding a "vein" of water, but he reached fresh water about 35 meters down. He uses a gasoline engine to pump the water into homemade irrigation canals and irrigates a vegetable garden in his yard. He also sells drinking water to the villagers. However, in this case individuals must take their own water from the well at a price of 20 cents per bucket. The final water seller owns a truck with a large removable water tank. In the dry season he imports fresh water to the village from the government agricultural project in Santa Rosa. He sells this water by the cubic liter to the store owners and the few private individuals who have large rain tanks or troughs for water storage.

Ranchers (Small Land Owners)

Cattle ranching constitutes another important form of private enterprise. About four large, private ranchers operate modern farms similar to those of the Catmis ejido project. These ranchlands comprise an estimated 4000-6000 hectares of lands which surround the village. All of them belong to absentee owners who live in Mérida. The only individual with large land holdings in the village itself is an entrepreneur from Mexico City, who purchased the sugar cane refining mill and ex-factory lands in Catmis from the government. This man owns about 2,000 hectares, or 35 percent of the village lands. Although he has not yet committed himself to any specific

project in
meat-packin
Until now,
machinery a
metal.

Abo
pendent ran
abandoned s
these famil
lands. The
squatters m
settled and
decision ha
fairly succ

The
60 hectares
utilized or
ranches, th
tribution,
tion, corra

Unl
average he
rancher own
largest own
and sex is
projects o

project in the village, many people believe he plans to construct a meat-packing plant and a cattle ranch on his newly acquired lands. Until now, his company has been occupied dismantling the factory machinery and shipping it to Mexico City where it is sold as scrap metal.

About four different families in Catmis began small, independent ranches on government-owned factory lands which had been abandoned shortly after the sugar industry closed in 1965. Recently, these families have asked the government for individual titles to the lands. They claim ownership under a federal law which holds that squatters may not be removed from public lands provided they have settled and worked the land for at least five years. By 1971 no decision had been made on their claims, but they were still operating fairly successful private ranches.

The smallest of these ranches is 30 hectares, two ranches are 60 hectares each, and the largest is 150 hectares. When the techniques utilized on these ranches are compared with those of the large modern ranches, they seem primitive with respect to herd size, animal distribution, labor organization, capitalization, animal load, irrigation, corral system, and medical facilities.

Unlike the modern ranches with thousands of animals, the average herd size on the small ranches is only 30 head. The smallest rancher owns 15 animals, two other ranchers own 30 each, and the largest owns 50. This means that the distribution of animals by age and sex is insufficient to permit specialized breeding and fattening projects of any size. The small ranches usually maintain one or two

bulls and a

and wheneve

lot of anim

land ratio

tially in c

ing the ani

season to e

graze the a

standard da

Alt

or ranchhar

do much of

grazing and

in and out

must be sh

this purpos

ship the a

Eac

wire fenci

cannot affo

animals ins

poses prob

pastures.

ment and t

techniques

tion, and

bulls and a few mature cows for breeding. Calves are highly prized and whenever possible are kept with the herd to increase the basic lot of animals. Due to a lack of investment capital, the animal/land ratio is low, permitting the animal load to increase substantially in order to maximize the land potential. In addition to breeding the animals, the small ranchers fatten steers during the wet season to earn cash. The rancher owns some of the steers, and he may graze the animals of other small and large owners on his land for a standard daily fee.

Although these small ranch owners frequently hire day laborers or ranchhands to help them in construction or repair projects, they do much of the daily work themselves. The main chores consist of grazing and watering the animals, and each day the cattle are moved in and out of the corrals. When animals are bought or sold, they must be shipped by truck. Two of the four ranches own trucks for this purpose. The other two ranches must rely on a second party to ship the animals for them.

Each ranch has at least one well with a gasoline pump and wire fencing around the circumference of the ranch. The small farmers cannot afford more than one corral, but one is essential to keep the animals inside at night. The lack of a more complicated corral system poses problems in food distribution and management of the available pastures. Finally, the small ranches also lack modern medical equipment and the know-how to facilitate the ranching operation. Modern techniques such as desticulation, dehorning, vaccinations, depariciation, and disinfectants are not utilized.

Onl

ranchers be

tion among

For example

of 75,000 p

pesos. If

(see Table

42,000 pesc

animals, a

are based

25 percent

servative

the averag

pesos and

would earn

17,500 pes

lower than

far more t

Free Milpe

Th

free milpe

and burn a

cultivate.

least accu

throughout

Only a rough estimate can be made of the earnings of the small ranchers because of a lack of concrete data and because of much variation among the ranchers with respect to the basic capital investment. For example, two of the four ranchers own trucks which cost a minimum of 75,000 pesos and all of them own at least one well, costing 5,000 pesos. If one considers that the average animal is worth 1,400 pesos (see Table B4, Appendix B), then the average rancher has invested 42,000 pesos in 30 animals, the largest rancher 70,000 pesos for 50 animals, and the smallest 21,000 pesos for 15 animals. If the estimates are based on the ejido fattening project (see Table B5, Appendix B), a 25 percent annual return on the basic investment would constitute a conservative estimate of the gross profit. According to this calculation, the average yearly income of the smallest ranchers is about 10,500 pesos and the average monthly income 891 pesos. The smallest rancher would earn only 5,250 pesos annually, while the largest would earn 17,500 pesos. It is fair to assume, however, that these estimates are lower than the actual earnings, since the overall investment includes far more than the cost of the animals.

Free Milperos

The remaining frontier lands around Catmis are utilized by free milperos, or private maize farmers, who practice rotating slash and burn agriculture, but who have no legal titles to the plots they cultivate. These milperos are typically the most indigenous and least acculturated people in the area. They live in small hamlets throughout the expanses of Yucatán's southern frontier zone and

especially

full-time

Ma

are freque

vegetables

average no

hectares),

no one who

to plant

Fo

declining

first plac

insecure,

ment of wa

consecutiv

lands must

runs for e

April, aft

chopping

consuming

between th

determines

shrubs to

burning,

preparing

walks thr

especially in the vast interior of Quintana Roo. Only about 15 full-time milperos reside in Catmis, however.

Maize is the main crop cultivated by the milpero, but beans are frequently planted alongside the corn stalks and some other vegetables, especially chile and squash, are commonly grown. The average non-ejidatario milpero cultivates about 100 mecates (four hectares), while a few individuals plant as many as 150 mecates; no one who depends on maize cultivation for subsistence can afford to plant less.

For a number of reasons, primitive milpa farming has been declining in importance in the immediate vicinity of Catmis. In the first place, the slash and burn method of farming is difficult and insecure, and the yields are often insufficient without the supplement of wage labor. A milpa plot may be planted for two or three consecutive seasons, but then the soil becomes exhausted and new lands must be prepared. The traditional, non-irrigated maize cycle runs for eight months, from April through November. Beginning in April, after the first rains, a plot of land is cleared of bush by chopping it down with a machete. This is the most difficult and time-consuming task of the year. The amount of land a farmer prepares between the previous harvest season and the new planting season determines the size of his crop. After waiting a few weeks for the shrubs to dry, the farmer burns the field. In May, following the burning, the fields are measured off and the land is scrapped, preparing it for seed. In June the fields are planted. The farmer walks through the plot with a sharp, pointed stick poking holes

between the
each hole.
and cultiva
November wh
over by hit
are allowed
the farmer
just before
women part
vested corn
or next to

Th
results fr
other natu
which is q
lagers onc
tion and n
average ye
kilos per
necate, or
the rate o
Catmis cor
earned abo
a monthly

Ic
food and c

between the burned shrubs and ashes. A few seeds are dropped into each hole. Beginning in July the farmer tends the fields by weeding and cultivating the soils. The harvest usually begins in late November when the maize is ripe. The corn stalks are first bent over by hitting them with the dull side of the machete. Then they are allowed to dry for about three to four weeks. During this period the farmer guards his milpa day and night, for theft is very common just before the harvest. After the maize has dried, both men and women participate in harvesting and threshing the corn. The harvested corn is often stored in a special wooden bin or tróje inside or next to the farmer's house.

There is considerable local variation in crop yield, which results from the quality of the soil and, of course, the rains and other natural events. Crop yield also depends upon the labor input, which is quite variable in Catmis considering that many of the villagers once labored in the sugar factory as their principal occupation and never depended on maize cultivation for subsistence. In an average year the harvest yields about 74 kilos per mecate, or 1,850 kilos per hectare. This figure may reach as high as 126 kilos per mecate, or as low as 21, when the crop is not completely lost. At the rate of 65 cents per kilo, which was the buying price of the Catmis corn merchants in 1970, the milpero who harvested 100 mecates earned about 4,810 pesos, or 48 pesos per mecate. This brought him a monthly income of about 400 pesos.

Ideally, the maize plots yield enough corn to satisfy the food and clothing requirements of the milperos' families. Part of the

maize is r
is sold to
to purchas
farming is
milperos r
must pay t
merchants.
merchants
the debt c
crop each

Wi
cides, the
year the f
sary cloth
can ruin h
for loans,

An
in Catmis
kilometers
exception
large priv
shareholdi
ranchers a
hand, the
lands beca
the other

maize is not consumed but saved as seed for the next season, and part is sold to the corn merchants for cash. The money, in turn, is used to purchase tools, clothes, and other necessities. In fact, milpa farming is not always secure. During the course of the year most milperos run up debts in the general stores. After the harvest they must pay these debts and, to do so, must sell most of the crop to the merchants. The few milperos in Catmis are mainly illiterate, and the merchants do not keep accurate records. They merely hold the idea of the debt over the milpero's head to insure that he will plant a large crop each season and then sell the harvest.

Without the benefit of irrigation, fertilization, or insecticides, the milpa plots yield only one crop per season. In a good year the farmer earns enough to feed his family and buy the necessary clothes and tools for the next season. However, one bad harvest can ruin him financially and cause him to turn to the corn merchants for loans, which puts him into debt for many seasons to come.

Another reason for the decline of primitive maize cultivation in Catmis is that the free milperos must now walk as many as six kilometers from the village to find unclaimed lands since, with the exception of the ejido, most of the nearby lands are used by the large private cattle ranches. While there are some long-standing shareholding relations, these are exceptional. In general, the ranchers and the milperos mutually distrust each other. On the one hand, the milperos are reluctant to grow milpa on the open ranchlands because cattle come and trample the crop or eat the corn. On the other hand, the ranchers discourage the milperos from using their

lands for

to form ne

ment their

surround C

credit soc

decline of

new land t

in Catmis

Wage Labor

Wa

If working

235 (78 pe

activities

marily in

At

businessme

in some ca

even more

which boug

are hired

shipped t

but the t

their empl

A

ranches w

lands for fear that the milperos will lay claim to the lands and try to form new ejidos. Recognizing the need for wage labor to supplement their milpa cultivation, many free milperos in the hamlets which surround Catmis have begun to request and form new ejidos and small credit societies modeled after those of the Catmis ejido. Hence, the decline of primitive milpa farming must be seen as a response to the new land tenure system and development project which was introduced in Catmis by the national agrarian reform.

Wage Laborers

Wage labor is the primary source of income for most Catmiseños. If working on the ejido collective farm is considered wage earning, 235 (78 percent) of 300 employed adults are occupied in wage-earning activities, while only 65 individuals (22 percent) are occupied primarily in non-wage labor activities.

About 35 non-ejidatarios work as day laborers for private businessmen in and around the village. Salaries are equivalent to and in some cases higher than those of the ejido project, but the work is even more sporadic and insecure. About 20 men work for the company which bought the sugar factory machinery from the government. They are hired to dismantle the machinery and place it on trucks to be shipped to Mexico City. The daily wage for this work is 25 pesos, but the turnover in personnel is tremendous, and the men believe that their employment will end when the machinery is gone.

Another nine individuals work as cowboys on the large private ranches which surround Catmis. Most of the employees live on the

ranch itse
where they
each day t
employed a
for tracto
between 13
in the pri
income for
developmer
only addit

Subsidiary

A
to hunt ra
found near
maize, and
the indiv
fences.
cooking a
seasonal,

A
kind of s
to one of
more impo
for their
maturity,

ranch itself, but these men commute each day on horseback from Catmis, where they maintain their houses and families. Six other men commute each day to the Santa Rosa vegetable enterprise, where they are employed as tractor operators and field hands. In 1970 the daily wage for tractor operators was about 20 pesos, while field hands earned between 13 and 16 pesos, depending on the specific task. Daily wages in the private sector frequently provide an alternative source of income for the ejidatario as well as other villagers when work on the development project farm is temporarily unavailable. It is not the only additional source of income, however.

Subsidiary Economic Activities

A number of villagers own 22 calibre rifles, which they use to hunt rabbits, wild ducks, and deer, all of which are commonly found near the village. In addition, many families raise vegetables, maize, and some fruit trees in the small yards around their houses; the individual yards are usually separated from each other by stone fences. Some families also grow herbs and spices which they use for cooking and traditional healing. Although these activities are seasonal, they provide some small supplement to the family income.

Almost every family raises chickens, turkeys, and pigs as a kind of savings. The chickens and turkeys are either eaten or sold to one of the general stores for quick petty cash. Pigs constitute a more important form of capital savings. Many families even buy feed for their pig to insure available capital when the need arises. At maturity, a large sow may be sold for several hundred or close to a

thousand pr
the general
pig when it
purchase of

Typ
place is in
benefit of
poor to ac
a number o
years many
The new co
sent manag
for many m
women to p
chores for

In
their fath
for wages.
agricultur
girls are
pick cucum
large truc
be seen al
Finally, a
Mérida as
know. In

thousand pesos. The capital is often used to repay loans extended by the general store. However, if a family is fortunate enough to sell a pig when it has no outstanding debts, the money is applied to the purchase of new clothes, a radio, or a sewing machine.

Typical of rural Mexicans, the villagers believe a woman's place is in the home. There she is supposed to labor for the direct benefit of her husband and children. In fact, many families are too poor to achieve this ideal. Hence, in addition to their normal chores, a number of village women commonly work for wages. All through the years many men have come from other parts of Mexico to work in Catmis. The new company and the Ministry of Hydraulic Works, for example, have sent managers, employees, and technicians who must live in the village for many months while performing their work. These men hire village women to prepare meals, wash clothes, and perform other domestic chores for them.

In addition, although it constitutes a great humiliation for their fathers, a significant number of unmarried village girls work for wages. Periodically, local girls from Catmis are hired to do agricultural work on the ejido collective farm. More often, however, girls are employed by the Santa Rosa vegetable farming project to pick cucumbers and pack them in crates. During the harvest season large trucks loaded with girls from Tzucacab, Peto, and Catmis may be seen along the highway carrying the girls to and from Santa Rosa. Finally, a number of girls from poor families in Catmis work in Mérida as domestic servants for well-to-do families whom the villagers know. In exchange for the girl's services, the family receives some

payment, a
in Mérida.
friendship
them is pr
fathers wi
on the det

Be
integratio
review of
that occur
change. T
emergence
perpetuati
national a

The Past a

Th
means of p
socio-econ
Catmis was
vate Ladin
The indige
formed in
through t

payment, and the girl is often given the opportunity to attend school in Mérida. In a few cases the two families are tied by bonds of friendship or ritual kinship, but more often the relationship between them is primarily economic. When asked about their daughters, village fathers will say they are in Mérida "studying" rather than elaborate on the details of this humiliating arrangement.

Socio-Economic Classes

Before a consideration of the contemporary levels of social integration in Catmis, it is necessary to provide a brief historical review of the various modifications of the village social structure that occurred during the principal periods of economic and social change. This section focuses on the history of social classes, the emergence of the contemporary working class, and then describes the perpetuation of a generally low standard of living following the national agrarian reform.

The Past and the Present

The ownership of capital and the administration of the local means of production have been instrumental in the development of socio-economic classes in Catmis. In the early nineteenth century Catmis was part of a community of sugar cane haciendas owned by private Ladinos who had acquired the land cheaply from the government. The indigenous Maya caste provided the labor force; they were transformed into wage-earning rural proletarians and tied to the hacienda through the debt peonage system.

To
cient comm
longer mee
The family
into a lan
plantation
peonage sy
into free
of people
in search
industry.

In
owned fact
the land-
landless,
union. A
village, a
ordinated
That the u
evidenced
mately 25
thermore,
Even more
were repla
resided in
on sugar-p

Toward the end of the nineteenth century larger, more efficient commercial plantations emerged, and family wealth could no longer meet the capital requirements to compete in the industry. The family-owned haciendas were forced to sell or were transformed into a landowner and planter class which sold sugar cane to corporate plantations for processing. Following the Revolution, the debt peonage system was abolished and the local laborers were transformed into free wage laborers. The village population grew with the influx of people from other parts of Yucatán and Mexico who came to Catmis in search of an isolated refuge from the war and work in the sugar industry.

In 1937 Mexico's national agrarian reform imposed the government-owned factory and plantation lands in Catmis, causing the decline of the land- and factory-owning class and the development of an official landless, wage-earning class which was represented by the local labor union. A working-class sub-culture began to predominate in the village, and ethnic differences between Maya and Ladino were subordinated to working-class goals in the context of union activities. That the union did not discriminate against the resident Maya is evidenced by the surnames of union roles from the 1940s; approximately 25 percent of the names are easily identified as Mayan. Furthermore, Mayan names appear frequently on the list of union officials. Even more important than these cultural changes, the former owners were replaced by government managers and technocrats, many of whom resided in the village, while the remaining private planters lived on sugar-producing haciendas surrounding the village.

As

from priva

administra

focus of t

several so

some maize

immigrants

Fo

local grou

developmer

retail goo

hamlets of

again in t

of a more

larly as t

remaining

Th

grant whi

but, at th

lagers wh

the modes

farming a

local pers

crop farm

Th

of the ec

As the administration of local production changed gradually from private, to corporate, to state, and finally to federal agrarian administrative agencies, the class of wage laborers, which is the main focus of this research, became larger. This class was drawn from several sources: former employees on haciendas and the corporation, some maize producers from the surrounding hamlets and towns, and many immigrants from other regions of the country.

Formerly, the principal changes in the differentiation of local groups had followed local population increases and the normal development of Yucatecan town functions, such as the distribution of retail goods from Mérida or the collection of maize from the remote hamlets of the interior. Recent agrarian reforms in the 1930s and again in the 1960s, however, have clearly opened up the possibility of a more complex local class structure in the near future, particularly as the ejidatarios take an intermediary position between the remaining private landowners and the non-ejidatario landless workers.

The most recent socio-economic change, then, is the ejido land grant which provided a new form of landownership for many villagers but, at the same time, differentiated them from the remaining villagers who are still landless. In addition, the dramatic change in the modes of production and technology--from sugar cane to mixed farming and ranching--brought corresponding changes in technical and local personnel as specialists and bureaucrats in cattle ranching and crop farming replaced former specialists in sugar cane cultivation.

This change influenced both the public and the private sectors of the economy. Thus, while much local wealth has remained in the same

families, t
planters ha
families wh
these chang
present tim
which emerg

Sir
reduced by
population,
middle clas
class, cons
agrarian ac
tion.

The
absentee la
they repres
village, fo
viously occ
the sugar i
village, an
earlier man
do not shar

Som
well-to-do
large merch
families wh

families, the recent expropriation of some lands from the sugar planters has encouraged the advancement of some local individuals and families who were previously poor. Despite the potential impact of these changes on the future class structure of the village, at the present time the class structure in Catmis is very similar to that which emerged at the time of the government-owned sugar plantation.

Since the class of large, corporate upper-class owners was reduced by the agrarian reform in 1937, the main segment of the local population, in terms of prestige and wealth, is actually an upper-middle class. However, the federal government, rather than this class, constitutes the principal source of capital and provides the agrarian administration which controls the local means of production.

The government technicians and managers and the one large absentee landowner are comparable to the former upper class in that they represent political and economic power. When they reside in the village, for varying lengths of time, they live in the houses previously occupied by the bureaucrats, managers, and technicians of the sugar industry. They are also the highest paid employees in the village, and they share many of the opportunities and privileges of earlier managers and owners. Unlike the ejidatarios, however, they do not share in the profits from the cattle ranch and the crop farm.

Some power and prestige is also held by about a dozen fairly well-to-do families in professions and private businesses such as the large merchants and retailers, the local teachers, and about six families who own cattle ranches of 30 to 150 hectares. In income and

prestige, t
Yucatecan t
the village
They are al
their chil
village sch
the villag
pate in vi
are native
were very
fluently a
through th
corn merch
ticularly
villagers
in contras
and the ma
lage, who
community.

N
which is
day. This
The lower
identifyi
the worke
rich in g

prestige, these families are comparable to the middle class of larger Yucatecan towns. They generally dress and eat better than most of the villagers, and they live in the larger, more comfortable houses. They are also better educated than most villagers, and they send their children to school in Mérida after the first few years in the village school. However, many of them are long-time residents of the village, they intermarry with other villagers, and they participate in village events and institutions. Some of the small ranchers are natives of other regions in Mexico who came to Catmis when they were very young. However, most of the corn merchants speak Maya fluently and identify with the milperos and other landless villagers through their common Mayan heritage. Some of them, particularly the corn merchants, accumulated their wealth slowly, while others, particularly the small ranchers, are newly rich. The working-class villagers refer to all these families as "the rich" (los ricos), but, in contrast to the new absentee landowner, the government technicians, and the managers, these families are permanent residents of the village, who play an active role in the cultural and social life of the community.

Ninety percent of the villagers belong to the lower class, which is made up of rural wage laborers who earn 15 to 25 pesos per day. This class constitutes the focus of the present investigation. The lower class expresses class consciousness and solidarity by identifying themselves as the poor (los pobres or los humildes) and the workers (los trabajadores). They distinguish themselves from the rich in general, from Yucatán's "ruling class" (la casta divina), and

particular

hectares o

houses and

enterprise

lower-clas

on many oc

issues of

of their m

Th

groups: t

The ejidat

agrarian r

village.

non-credit

members sh

ing wages

supplement

earning gr

they have

barely en

upon othe

In additi

no labor

governmen

particularly from the new absentee landowner who purchased 2,000 hectares of factory lands from the government and officially owns their houses and most of the buildings in the village. They refer to his enterprise as "the company" (la empresa). In village assemblies the lower-class workers address each other as "comrade" (el compañero), and on many occasions, such as the long struggle for the ejido and other issues of importance to the community, they stand together in defense of their mutual political and economic interests.

The lower class is composed of two occupational status groups: the ejidatarios and the non-ejidatarios, or landless laborers. The ejidatarios, those granted rights to communal lands through the agrarian reform, include about 70 percent of the wage earners in the village. They may be sub-divided into credit society members and non-credit ejidatarios. As previously mentioned, the credit society members share profits from the ejido project farm in addition to earning wages on the ejido project. Such profits provide a significant supplement to their income. The non-ejidatarios, or landless wage earning group, are the most stable segment of the lower class because they have the least chance for mobility. Most of the workers earn barely enough for their subsistence and therefore depend heavily upon other, secondary economic activities and frequent emigration. In addition, unlike the ejidatarios, the landless wage earners have no labor nor landholding organization to represent them to the government.

The Stand

T

improved

National

provide g

providing

enabled m

had dropp

The exter

not be ov

distincti

ing resou

hand, and

on the ot

wealth de

of living

salaries

average

ejidatar

becomes

conditio

they rec

other im

many fam

The Standard of Living

The national agrarian reform made some changes which clearly improved the standard of living in Catmis. The health clinic of the National Indigenous Institute and a new school building in Catmis provide good examples. Logically, it might also be argued that, by providing wages and profits, the ejido and development project enabled many ejidatarios to raise their standard of living, which had dropped markedly following the closing of the sugar cane factory. The extent to which the ejido has actually helped the villagers should not be overstated, however, since much evidence suggests that a clear distinction should be drawn between the economic growth and expanding resources brought by the ejido development project on the one hand, and the standard of living of the average lower-class villager on the other. In other words, the greatest portion of material wealth derived from the project has gone not to increase the standard of living of the average village family, but to pay the technicians' salaries and the bank loan. In general,the standard of living of the average lower-class family, including the ejidatarios and non-ejidatarios, is low. The overall poverty of the lower-class villagers becomes evident when the patterns of food consumption and housing conditions are observed.

Most of the villagers spend their wages a few hours after they receive them, for their earnings seldom cover more than food and other immediate needs. Especially during periods of low employment, many families often go without food, and temporary emigrations are

still comm

regular em

Mo

stores. (

record of

for 20 fa

The avera

the lowes

weekly ex

94 percen

chased it

sugar, sa

M

stores us

work, esp

harvests

most, onl

in cash.

portion

food. I

relative

not to h

Doña Lup

employee

which he

still commonplace for ex-factory workers who have neither found regular employment in the village nor joined the ejido.

Most food is purchased daily or weekly at the local retail stores. Groceries consume the greatest portion of the earnings. A record of earnings and expenditures for a one-week period was kept for 20 families, each of which was composed of five or six individuals. The average weekly income was 121 pesos; the highest was 350 pesos, the lowest 60 pesos, and the mean average 117 pesos. The average weekly expenditure for 27 common grocery items was 114 pesos, or 94 percent of the total average earnings. The most frequently purchased items included: maize, beans, water, rice, bread, coffee, sugar, salt, onions, meat, lard, soap, and kerosene.

Most villagers pay for their groceries with cash, but the stores usually extend credit for people who are temporarily out of work, especially if they cultivate milpa plots, in which case their harvests are used as collateral. Of the 10 families which earned the most, only one bought a few extra items on credit; the remainder paid in cash. Of the 10 families that earned the least, seven bought a portion of their groceries on credit. All too often a family has no food. It will manage to survive, however, because in such times relatives, neighbors, and ritual kin help out.

In such cases neighbors help each other in subtle ways so as not to humiliate the recipient. An example is illustrative here. Doña Lupe is a middle-aged woman who serves meals to some of the employees of the new company. Her income, plus 150 pesos a month which her husband receives from a nearby rancho where he sustained

an injury
tina, is
since her
plantatio
Augustina
daughter
is mainta

T
cement, a
only 10 p
attest to
managers
cultural
miles so
heavily
journeys
frequenc

houses a
cribed b
with pal
The floo
found.
wooden
window a
other,

an injury, enables her to feed her family. Her neighbor, Doña Augustina, is left with her two-year-old daughter and no means of support since her husband, a non-ejidatario, has gone to a distant sugar plantation to work for the season. Doña Lupe frequently asks Doña Augustina to help her wash laundry and serves Doña Augustina and her daughter meals while they work. In this way, Doña Augustina's pride is maintained.

There are three main types of houses in Catmis: adobe, cement, and wood. Together the cement and wood houses constitute only 10 percent of the total houses in the village. Cement houses attest to the relatively affluent life style of the past owners and managers of the ex-factory village, while wooden houses reflect a cultural influence from the nearby Territory of Quintana Roo; 10 miles southeast of Catmis, along the Mérida-Chetumal highway, a heavily wooded rainforest marks the border of the Territory. As one journeys into the Territory, wooden houses appear with increasing frequency.

About 90 percent of the houses in Catmis are adobe. These houses are typical of the Yucatec Maya Indian houses originally described by Robert Wauchaupe in 1938. Most of the roofs are thatched with palm leaves or sugar cane husks, but sometimes aluminum is used. The floors are mostly earth, but tiles and cement floors are also found. The houses consist of a main, apsidal-shaped room with a smaller wooden room attached. Usually the main room has an opening for a window and two doors. One door leads to the smaller room, while the other, which has a padlock, faces the street. The main room is used

for visit

small par

for bathi

dining ro

T

chairs, a

and an oc

board box

and pictu

machine a

curing gr

chickens

protectio

afford t

stones a

placed o

pots and

cooking

the open

facilit

consist

Despite

noon.

for visiting, sorting harvested maize, and sleeping. Sometimes a small part of the main room is partitioned off by a curtain and used for bathing. The smaller wooden room, utilized as a kitchen and dining room, faces the patio or courtyard of the house.

The average household contains few possessions. A few chairs, a table, cooking utensils, tools such as a machete and knives and an occasional rifle, some clothing and shoes, a trunk or cardboard box for storing clothes, a small altar with religious statues and pictures, a transistor radio, hammocks for sleeping, and a sewing machine are all commonly found. Herbs and spices for cooking and curing grow in the kitchen gardens of most courtyards, and pigs and chickens run freely about the yards. Some families own a dog for protection at night, but most families do not because they cannot afford to feed it.

Every kitchen has a hearth which consists of three large stones arranged in a triangle. An aluminum sheet or clay griddle is placed on the stones for cooking tortillas, and iron or aluminum pots and pans are placed directly on the fire between the stones for cooking other foods and boiling coffee. Wood, which is brought from the open lands around the village, is used for fuel.

The houses in Catmis have no running water or sanitary facilities of any kind. Toilets are not used and bathing facilities consist of a pail of water and a bar of soap made from animal fat. Despite the difficulties involved, most villagers bathe every afternoon.

T

although

few merch

though at

closed.

A

either br

sellers.

network c

village,

I

Many need

and dry m

People a

dry spots

to repai

a day, b

improvem

of the h

ex-facto

live in

Workers

he agree

workers

The average family uses candles or kerosene lamps for light, although a few of the stores use Coleman gas lamps, and recently, a few merchants purchased electricity which has become available again though at a high price after being removed in 1965 when the factory closed.

As previously mentioned, water for drinking and washing is either brought from the village wells or purchased from the water sellers. The new company in the village has begun construction on a network of water pipes and faucets in different localities of the village, but in 1971 it still was not completed.

In general, the houses in Catmis are kept in poor condition. Many need fresh whitewash. In the dry season the adobe walls crack, and dry mud falls to the floor. In the rainy season the roofs leak. People are constantly moving their hammocks and chairs to find the dry spots in the house. Yet, when the rains end, they do not begin to repair the roofs. Most women sweep out their houses at least once a day, but few villagers care to invest in more permanent home improvements. This lack of incentive is probably because 90 percent of the houses in Catmis are owned by the company that purchased the ex-factory lands from the government, rather than by the people who live in them.

Before dissolving its Catmis local union, the National Sugar Workers Union had negotiated with the owner of the new company, and he agreed to distribute the houses and yards to the ex-union factory workers as part of the compensation for losing their jobs. For a

number of

agreement

M

or had pe

company p

houses, w

now occup

worked fo

refused t

that he h

factory

Since on

only abo

periodic

Catmiseñ

lived in

quently

to their

ments on

which be

his titl

taking p

the roof

village)

number of reasons, however, the company's implementation of this agreement was unduly slow.

Many workers who emigrated from Catmis had sold their houses or had permitted friends and relatives to live in them before the company promised to distribute the official house titles. Other houses, which had been abandoned by emigrating ex-union workers, were now occupied by new residents of the village, most of whom had never worked for the factory. In response to these changes, the company refused to grant titles until it had evidence from each individual that he had occupied the household as a union laborer before the factory closed, or had purchased the house from a union member. Since only a few villagers could provide the required documentation, only about 15 house titles had been issued by 1971. In spite of periodic company threats of forceful removal, the vast majority of Catmiseños stubbornly refused to leave their homes. Many villagers lived in constant fear of eviction, and open conflicts arose frequently between villagers and resident company employees.

It is significant that the few villagers who received titles to their homes and yards immediately began to make noticeable improvements on them. One ex-factory worker, who had been living in a house which belonged to the ejido cattle ranch, returned to Catmis to claim his title and move back to his own house. Barely two weeks after taking possession of the house, he had invested in major repairs on the roof, built a wooden fence around his yard (the only one in the village), constructed a small chicken coop and goat corral in his

yard, and

the dry s

M

lagers wh

does not

moment.

houses:

area of t

cement ho

probably

them.

tion, th

project,

reforms

of land

workers'

assembly

all the

more exc

mally to

governme

Althoug

yard, and was buying cement to build a water trough for storage in the dry season.

Many houses in the village need repairs, but even the villagers who can afford it are reluctant to invest in a house which does not belong to them and from which they may be evicted at any moment. The ejidatarios have another reason for not repairing their houses: The ejido plans to move all its members out of Catmis to an area of the ejido designated as the "residential zone," where new cement houses will be constructed for them. Hence, the ejidatarios probably do not repair their houses because they intend to leave them.

Summary

This chapter examined the legal basis of the ejido organization, the operation of the collective ejido mixed farming development project, and the economic changes which the implementation of these reforms brought to the population of Catmis. By offering a new form of land tenure and labor organization, the ejido replaced the sugar workers' union as the major nation-oriented group in the village.

Two local ejido organizations were created: the ejido general assembly and the ejido credit society. The general assembly includes all the ejido members and officials, while the credit society is the more exclusive organization, comprised of 73 ejido members who formally took collective and individual responsibility to repay the large government loans which finance the ejido mixed farming project. Although these organizations actually have considerable power over

the commu

out in th

the gener

means of

zations a

which adm

T

the mixed

by the ej

tions hav

the ejida

of the c

addition

individu

some eji

earned a

hectares

collecti

mixed fa

industry

ments o

between

cies wh

project

finance

the community life of the villagers, their formal functions, as set out in the national agrarian code, are primarily economic. In theory, the general assembly maintains a good deal of power over the local means of ejido production. In practice, however, both ejido organizations are subordinate to the federal agrarian reform agencies which administer the mixed farming project.

Today, the greatest portion of ejido lands is utilized by the mixed farming project, although some of the lands are utilized by the ejidatarios apart from the project. A number of ejido occupations have emerged. First, by working in the collective labor force, the ejidatarios can earn daily wages on the project and the members of the credit society can share in the profits of the farm. In addition to the project, however, the ejidatarios use ejido lands as individual parcels, and a few ejidatarios have managed to parcel off some ejido land for private ranches. In 1970 the average ejidatario earned about 1,635 pesos by working an individual parcel of 1.4 hectares. One group of ejidatarios has even established a small collective ranching project, which operates independently from the mixed farming project.

Not only did the mixed farming project replace the sugar industry in Catmis, but it also created a whole series of new arrangements of the means of production and the relations of production between the ejido organization and the federal agrarian reform agencies which administer the project. Today, the ejido mixed farming project dominates the economic life of the village. The project is financed and administered by federal agrarian reform agencies.

Capital f
of the So
capitaliz
correspon
cash crop
loans and
credit sc
tered sep
its parti
project e
actual co
used to p
second ye
ranch was
great dea
land prep

major dis
or failur
uneducate
the key
technica
is highl
mately r
since it
At the e

Capital for the project is provided mainly by the Mixed Farming Bank of the Southeast, but also by the Ministry of Hydraulic Works. The capitalization program of the mixed farming project is administered corresponding to two distinct farming activities--cattle ranching and cash crop cultivation--and two loan categories--basic (development) loans and supplementary (operational) loans. Although the ejido credit society is responsible for all the loans, each loan is administered separately according to the estimated costs of production for its particular farming activity. During its first three years the project experienced three main stages of growth corresponding to its actual costs of production. In the first year the cattle loans were used to purchase cattle and construct the cattle ranch. In the second year much less money was spent, but the construction of the ranch was completed. In the third year the administration spent a great deal of money again, this time on construction, equipment, and land preparation for the cultivation project.

In a summary of the importance of the costs of production, a major distinction is drawn between financial and technological success or failure. By the rationale of the project the ejidatarios are uneducated so they must depend on government technicians, who make the key financial and technical decisions for the project. From a technical standpoint the project is obviously successful in that it is highly productive. However, the ejido credit society is ultimately responsible for errors in financial judgment or negligence since it must pay for the loans regardless of success or failure. At the end of the 10-year project period the ejido land cannot be

confiscat
able acco
from the
regard to
wisdom an
and make

the funds
tasks are
office is
collecti
consisti
tute, who
operatio
serve as
(3) the
on the p

restrict
highly i
irregula
for labo
causing
by the e
three ye
actual e

confiscated to pay for outstanding debts because the land is inalienable according to the agrarian code. Nevertheless, future produce from the ejido soils may be used to pay for past debts. Thus, in regard to capital, the ejido credit society is dependent upon the wisdom and fortuity of the federal agents who administer the project and make major technical and financial decisions for the project.

Although the bank disburses the capital, it neither administers the funds nor manages the ejido labor force on the farm. Both these tasks are carried out by the National Indigenous Institute, whose office is located in Peto. Technocrats from the Institute manage the collective labor force by means of a formal management-labor structure consisting of the following roles: (1) technocrats from the Institute, who determine the labor requirements and supervise the project operation; (2) the elected officials of the ejido credit society, who serve as work foremen and personnel managers on the project; and (3) the credit society members, who work as a collective labor force on the project and share in profits from the farm.

During the first three years of the project operation, restrictions on capital and other resources made working conditions highly irregular and insecure for the ejidatarios. Three major irregularities were observed: (1) the absolute amount of money spent for labor fluctuated greatly both by the year and by the month, causing corresponding fluctuations in the kinds of tasks performed by the ejidatarios and the size of their labor force; (2) in all three years of the project operation, from 1968 through 1970, the actual earnings of the ejidatarios were significantly below the

projecte
far less
(3) many
signific
the bank
non-cred
member.
jobs, the
ment for

N
represent
reform.
and moder
cattle-ra
ejido lan
was being
well. A
the culti
performed
nation of
also uses
available
the dry s
to fight a

Th
two main

projected earnings, suggesting that the bank actually distributed far less capital for labor than it originally anticipated; and (3) many ejidatarios suffered from underemployment, indicating that significantly less labor was employed than originally projected by the bank. As a result of such labor irregularities, the average non-credit ejidatario earned far less than the average credit society member. Despite the resulting competition and discrimination for jobs, the credit society represented the principal source of employment for the majority of villagers.

Modern farming methods which replaced the sugar plantation represent one of the major economic changes brought by the agrarian reform. The mixed farming project depends on irrigation networks and modern farming equipment and techniques for its cultivation and cattle-ranching activities. In 1970, 2,300 of the 3,777 hectares of ejido lands were utilized by the project, and the irrigation system was being constructed to include the remaining 1,200 hectares as well. A large amount of equipment and machinery was purchased for the cultivation of many different cash crops. The various tasks performed in the cultivation of each crop demonstrate that a combination of mechanical and manual labor is utilized. The cattle ranch also uses modern techniques of production, including maintenance of available pasture, cultivation of fodder for supplementary feeding in the dry season, pasture rotation, modern corrals, and modern methods to fight against infection and disease.

The productivity of the mixed farming project depends upon two main variables: (1) modern farming techniques which, in this

case, obv
of admini
second va
the proje
to the es
the cattl
expectati
vation pr
some crop
harvestin
has not b
hectares
only 350
land is r
single cr
vated on
ultimate
Finally,
Some acc
leaders,
payments

rather t
of proje
decision
other Me

case, obviously provide large-scale production; and (2) the wisdom of administrative decisions regarding capital and labor. While this second variable is difficult to assess after only three years of the project operation, the actual productivity was evaluated relative to the estimated productivity. The productivity analysis shows that the cattle ranch has expanded and produced according to project expectations and has met its payments to the bank, while the cultivation project has been only slightly less successful in spite of some crop failures and technical failures in land preparation and in harvesting. On the other hand, there are some signs that production has not been as high as it should be. The bank estimated that 550 hectares of land would be in cultivation by the third year. However, only 350 hectares were actually in cultivation. In addition, the land is not only utilized for large fields with many hectares of a single crop; rather, as many as 20 different crops are often cultivated on very small units of land, making irrigation difficult and ultimately lowering the productivity of the cultivation project. Finally, the productivity of the project may be lowered by corruption. Some accusations of theft have been made against the credit society leaders, but to date, since the society has managed to keep up its payments to the bank, it must be concluded that theft is not rampant.

Marketing decisions are made by the Institute and the bank rather than the ejido and its leaders. The ejidatarios are informed of project successes and failures but they do not make marketing decisions. Crops and cattle are sold mainly in Yucatán, but also to other Mexican regions and to the United States. The majority of

sales are

had no di

duced bot

market.

economic

pations

local ec

of consu

taverns

speciali

the majo

ranches

of head

Catmis b

small ra

anywhere

dents of

ranchers

and a fe

frontier

farmers,

have no

reasons

diate v

insecur

sales are made through the bank and its connections. The project has had no difficulty selling its produce, perhaps because it has produced both cattle and cash crops, thereby appealing to a diversified market.

Although the mixed farming project is the most important economic operation in Catmis, it is not the only one. Non-ejido occupations in the private sector also play a significant role in the local economy. Three large village stores combine their retail sales of consumer goods with wholesale corn businesses. There are also two taverns and three grinding mills, one baker, and a number of men who specialize in water sale and delivery. Cattle ranching constitutes the major form of private enterprise. About four large private ranches utilizing an estimated 6,000 hectares of land and thousands of head of cattle surround the village. Another four families in Catmis began small ranches after the sugar cane factory closed. These small ranches utilize from 30 to 150 hectares of land and maintain anywhere from 30 to 60 head of cattle. The small ranchers are residents of Catmis who manage their ranches by themselves, while the large ranchers are absentee owners who live in Mérida and hire day laborers and a few full-time employees to manage their ranches. The remaining frontier lands around Catmis are used by milperos, or private maize farmers, who practice rotating slash and burn agriculture but who have no legal titles to the plots they cultivate. For a number of reasons milpa farming has been declining in importance in the immediate vicinity of Catmis: Milpa cultivation is difficult and insecure, and yields are often insufficient without the supplement

of wage l
insectici
villagers
unclaimed
A
the villa
and smal
to those
than on
subsidia
pigs, an
nearby r
in Mérid

developm
of livin
tration
the deve
part of
controll
the end
tions en
the larg
class"
the rev

of wage labor; without the benefits of irrigation, fertilization, and insecticides, the milpa plots yield only one crop per season; and villagers must now walk up to six kilometers from the village to find unclaimed lands.

A few individuals work as day laborers for the businessmen in the village, and some men work as cowboys or field hands on the large and small ranches. Wages in the private sector are generally equal to those of the ejido project, but employment is even more insecure than on the ejido. Finally, most villagers practice a number of subsidiary economic activities such as hunting; raising chickens, pigs, and turkeys; or having their daughters work on the ejido or nearby ranches, or as servants in the homes of better-off families in Mérida.

The final section presented an historical review of the development of socio-economic classes and the contemporary standard of living in the village. The ownership of capital and the administration of the local means of production have been instrumental in the development of socio-economic classes in Catmis. In the first part of the hacienda period Catmis was owned by Ladino families who controlled the Mayan workers through the debt peonage system. Toward the end of the nineteenth century more efficient commercial plantations emerged, and the family hacienda owners were forced to sell to the large corporation owners or were transformed into a "planter class" (colonos). With the abolition of debt servitude following the revolution of 1910, the local workers became free wage laborers,

and the p

sugar inc

caused th

was repla

official

union. A

between M

the conta

the clas

middle-c

comparab

and poli

of the l

school t

Ninety p

which is

day. Th

the ejid

project,

Working-

distingu

in defen

the star

and the population grew with the influx of people seeking work in the sugar industry.

The initial implementation of the agrarian reform in 1937 caused the decline of the land- and corporation-owning class, which was replaced by government administrators and the development of an official landless, wage-earning class represented by the local labor union. A working-class sub-culture emerged, and ethnic differences between Mayan and Ladino were subordinated to working-class goals in the context of the union.

For the most part, the recent changes in the 1960s retained the class structure consisting of the working class and the upper-middle-class government administrators. The administrators are comparable to the former upper class in that they represent economic and political power in the village. There is also a small segment of the local population, namely the rich merchants, ranchers, and the school teachers, who hold some power and prestige in the village. Ninety percent of the villagers, however, belong to the lower class, which is made up of rural wage laborers who earn 15 to 25 pesos per day. This lower class is comprised of two occupational status groups: the ejidatarios, who hold communal rights to land and labor on the project, and the nonejidatarios, who are landless wage laborers. Working-class solidarity is expressed through some terminology which distinguishes them from other classes, and in periodic demonstrations in defense of their mutual economic and political interests.

In the consideration of the impact of the agrarian reform on the standard of living, a clear distinction is drawn between the

economic
the stan
The grea
to impro
the bank
some imp
spite of
project,
generall
conditio
earnings
over, th
are made
has no
reluctan
houses
governm
homes s
them in

economic growth brought by the ejido project on the one hand, and the standard of living of the average lower-class family on the other. The greatest portion of wealth from the ejido project has gone not to improve local conditions, but to pay technicians' salaries and the bank. Clearly the school and local health clinic have brought some improvement to the local standard of living. Nevertheless, in spite of the expanding local economy brought by the ejido development project, the standard of living of the lower-class villagers is generally low, as seen in patterns of food consumption and housing conditions. The average family still spends 94 percent of its weekly earnings for food, and most families buy some goods on credit. Moreover, the houses are kept in poor condition; about 90 percent of them are made of adobe. The average household contains few possessions and has no running water or sanitary facilities of any kind. People are reluctant to make home improvements, however, because most of the houses are owned by the company that purchased the factory from the government. Those few individuals who have received titles to their homes since the factory closed have made marked improvements and kept them in good condition.

reform o

extent o

differen

communit

state.

was impo

the high

between

change

seen in

ranking

ejidata

segment

status

by the

gratio

household

CHAPTER FIVE

SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

Introduction

This chapter and the next consider the effects of the agrarian reform on the social organization of Catmis. In order to show the extent of change in local social relations and institutions, three different levels of social integration are examined: the family, the community, and the relations between the community and the nation-state. The underlying hypothesis is that, since the agrarian reform was imposed on the village from above, more change has taken place on the higher levels of social integration, as seen in the relations between community organizations and the nation-state, while less change has taken place on the lower levels of social integration, as seen in the family and in community-level activities.

The first section considers the basis of occupational status ranking within the ejido and then between the ejidatarios and non-ejidatarios, the latter of which represent the landless, wage-earning segment of the lower class. The comparison of these two occupational status groups reveals some of the principal changes brought to Catmis by the agrarian reform.

The second section examines the lowest level of social integration, the family. The discussion begins with a consideration of the household and the life cycle. Turning to relations within the family,

the sect

tions, a

changes

institu

health

reform

This re

examine

Ejidata

by the

into fo

recogn

rankin

charac

influe

men, p

and al

additi

easily

differ

indice

the section describes the nuclear family, extended and affinal relations, and, finally, ritual kinship bonds with reference to the changes that have taken place as a result of the agrarian reform.

The third section deals with community-level activities and institutions, including leisure-time activities, religion, and public health and education.

The final section describes the changes brought by the agrarian reform in relations between the Catmis community and the nation-state. This relationship is elaborated upon in the following chapter, which examines the local ejido polity in detail.

Occupational Status Groups in the Lower Class Ejidatarios

Equal in every way under the law, the ejidatarios encountered by the author in the course of this study nevertheless fell clearly into four prestige groups. Although formally the ejidatarios do not recognize any status distinctions among them, there is a definite ranking process, which appears to be based primarily on personality characteristics, such as a reputation for honesty, the ability to influence other men, and the ability to cooperate with higher class men, particularly federal agrarian reform agents who control the use and allocation of ejido resources, either directly or indirectly. In addition to such personal characteristics, there are a number of more easily observed indices of status by which the ejidatarios could be differentiated. In order of their importance to the ejidatarios, these indices include: (1) official positions held in the ejido,

(2) lead
side the
worker.

All thes
to the p
them had
village
comisar
small b
their e

These m
ones.
the chu
outside
Below t
indivi
they ot
in orga
men in
income
boys by
Such o
consci
middle

(2) leadership in the village community, (3) business activities outside the ejido, and (4) occupational skill and reputation as a good worker.

The highest-ranking status group is composed of 14 ejidatarios. All these men once held the positions of ejido president, secretary to the president, or representative of the credit society. Most of them had been active in community affairs, ranging from sponsoring village fiestas and church affairs to holding the office of village comisario, and most also had some outside source of income such as a small business in the village or a small goat and cattle ranch on their ejido parcels.

The second highest status group is comprised of 24 ejidatarios. These men hold some minor offices in the ejido though not the highest ones. Many of them have been active in community affairs involving the church and the school, although only one of them has some small outside income through the private ownership of a small plot of land. Below this group are the majority of ejidatarios, including about 92 individuals. These men do not hold office in the ejido, and while they often participate in community affairs, they play no active role in organizing them and their participation is undistinguished. The men in this group are considered average workers with no outside income, and a number of them were trained as tractor drivers and cowboys by the National Indigenous Institute after the project began. Such occupational skills and a man's reputation for being a good, conscientious worker are important indicators of status within this middle group. None of the so-called "skilled" work requires more than

a month

tions ar

of these

Some are

village.

from the

working

jobs on

Election

outside

in them

individ

in a hi

term of

Thus, a

the eji

not nec

of a hi

drinks

seven r

famili

positi

a month or two of training, however, and most of these skilled positions are held by younger men.

The lowest status group includes about 30 ejidatarios. None of these men has ever held office or participated in community affairs. Some are old or sick and most of them have no close relatives in the village. They often live in the ex-hacienda dormitories left over from the sugar cane period, and they eke out a meagre living by working their own ejido parcels when they are able and by doing odd jobs on the ejido project for very low wages.

High-status positions in the ejido are achieved, not ascribed. Election to office, involvement as a leader in community affairs, and outside business dealings reflect personal characteristics and are not in themselves an a priori indication of status. For example, one individual, who had served as secretary to the ejido president, is not in a high-status position because he alienated many people during his term of office.

Membership in a particular family does not bring status either. Thus, although some families may have produced a number of leaders in the ejido and village community, other members of the same family do not necessarily enjoy nor achieve high status. In one case, the son of a high-ranking ejidatario is in the low-status group because he drinks heavily and does not participate in the ejido society. Of the seven men in high-status positions, only two are from outstanding families.

No single status index is sufficient to establish a man's position in the social hierarchy, though the most important index is

probably

status mo

cessful

status gr

in the do

their ej

status.

hard or

relative

Non-Ejid

in Catmi

ejido ar

the comm

present

with re

of the

Owner r

upward

the low

village

migrant

residen

workers

probably offices held in the ejido. Income, while clearly related to status mobility, is not the main criterion. Two ejidatarios are successful in businesses outside the ejido, but are not in the highest-status group in the ejido because they have not participated actively in the development project or because they have hired others to work their ejido parcels for them.

In general, age does not appear to be correlated with high status. Older men sometimes lose status when they can not work as hard or as well as the younger men. Most of the ejido officials are relatively young men, usually between 30 and 45 years of age.

Non-Ejidatarios

It is important to examine the status of the non-ejidatarios in Catmis. This group developed as a result of the formation of the ejido and represents an important change in the social structure of the community. The non-ejidatarios are of particular interest in the present context since a comparison of non-ejidatarios and ejidatarios with regard to various aspects of community life reveals many effects of the agrarian reform.

With the possible exception of a few businessmen, small landowner ranchers, and retired union workers, all of whom have experienced upward socio-economic mobility since the sugar factory closed, most of the lower-class ejidatarios do not enjoy high-status positions in the village. The lower-class non-ejidatarios are mainly comprised of migrant milperos and other seasonal "free" laborers, who established residence in Catmis after the factory closed, and temporary union workers, who did not join the ejido because they thought the factory

would re

these gr

opportun

differen

Table 12

Occupat

Ejidata
n=140 (

Non-eji
n=88 (3

anyone

Accordi

non-eji

is that

29 perc

by the

ejidat

tarios

tion o

would reopen. When the factory remained closed permanently, both these groups were effectively disenfranchised of seasonal employment opportunities in the sugar industry.

To a certain extent, the ejidatarios and non-ejidatarios are differentiated by age, as illustrated in Table 12.

Table 12.--Age distribution of adult male ejidatarios and non-ejidatarios in Catmis.[a]

Occupation	Age								Total	
	16-30		31-45		46-60		61+			
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Ejidatarios n=140 (62%)	41	29	43	31	37	26	19	14	140	100
Non-ejidatarios n=88 (38%)	47	53	15	17	15	17	11	13	88	100

[a]Data from village census, 1970. An adult male is defined as anyone over 15 years of age.

According to the table, 38 percent of the adult male population are non-ejidatarios. However, the most outstanding feature in the table is that fully 53 percent of the non-ejidatarios as opposed to only 29 percent of the ejidatarios are under 30 years of age.

The high percentage of young non-ejidatarios may be explained by the presence of 27 individuals in this age group who are sons of ejidatarios and who therefore have a good chance of becoming ejidatarios in the future, either through inheritance or through augmentation of the ejido membership. It should be recalled that since 1965,

when the

disenfra

viduals,

undistri

distribu

at some

with lit

appears

cent of

of becor

include

reducti

officia

groups

they ca

young n

non-eji

relativ

status,

non-eji

manent

live n

or fat

when the ejido was established, 55 individuals have been officially disenfranchised and their ejido rights reallocated to another 38 individuals, bringing the total number of ejidatarios to 140, with 27 undistributed parcels. It is likely that the general assembly will distribute these parcels to their remaining sons and close relatives at some future date. Thus, the number of youthful non-ejidatarios with little chance of attaining ejido rights is actually less than appears in the table.

The remaining 61 non-ejidatarios, representing about 27 percent of the adult male population of the village, have little chance of becoming ejidatarios short of forming a second ejido or being included in an augmentation of members of the first ejido based on a reduction of the amount of hectares held by each ejidatario in his official title.

Perhaps the smaller percentage of non-ejidatarios in the age groups between 30 and 60 reflects their individual recognition that they cannot achieve the same status as a young ejidatario or even a young non-ejidatario with ejidatario relatives. The low status of a non-ejidatario is ascribed, and, in the absence of a close ejido relative, a non-ejidatario over age 30 can not hope to attain ejido status, no matter how capable he may be. After marriage, most non-ejidatarios will be forced to leave the village in search of permanent work, but those who remain in Catmis have little choice but to live near their closest ejidatario relative, preferably their father or father-in-law, in hopes that this relative will help them enter the

ejido t

augmenta

ejidata

permane

with la

in the

Before

tion wa

outs fr

develop

tunity

been ch

industr

the ej

to emig

higher

Table

determ

table,

of the

40 per

villag

ejido through inheritance or by sponsoring their entrance during an augmentation of the membership.

Another demographic characteristic which differentiates non-ejidatarios and ejidatarios is geographic mobility, both seasonal and permanent. The ejido land grant provides the individual ejidatario with land rights that he can will to an heir. However, he must remain in the village to keep his work and his membership in the ejido. Before the development project began in 1968, even the ejido population was highly mobile, as evidenced by the high percentage of drop-outs from the ejido in the first years. With the introduction of the development project, however, the ejidatarios were offered an opportunity to work the entire year instead of only seasonally, which had been characteristic of the labor requirements of the former sugar industry.

Today, the ejido land rights plus a more regular income enable the ejidatarios to remain in Catmis, while many non-ejidatarios have to emigrate at least temporarily each year in search of work. The higher geographical mobility of the non-ejidatarios is illustrated in Table 13, which compares ejido and non-ejido conjugal families to determine the extent of emigration from the village. According to the table, fully 73 percent of the ejido households have all the members of their conjugal family living together in the village, while only 40 percent of the non-ejido families have all their members in the village.

Table 13

All conj
members

One or m
family m
outside

soon to

these c

nifican

ejido f

which a

ejidata

and soc

ejidata

First,

employm

second

than t

Catmis

area a

Table 13.--Emigration of conjugal family members from the village.[a]

	Ejido Families		Non-Ejido Families		Total
	N	%	N	%	
All conjugal family members in Catmis	38	73	10	40	48
One or more conjugal family members living outside Catmis	14	27	15	60	29
Total	52	100	25	100	77

[a]Village census, 1971.

Because the ejido was formed in the 1960s, it is still too soon to measure in detail or accurately the long-range effects of these changes. However, if such short-range effects prove to be significant, it would be reasonable to expect that the ejido and non-ejido family structures might also begin to alter in other features which are influenced by varying mobility patterns.

While important, such demographic differences between the ejidatarios and non-ejidatarios are not as basic as are the economic and social differences. From the economic standpoint, the non-ejidatarios have a lower status in the village for two main reasons: First, unlike the ejidatarios, they do not have regular rights to employment or land use in the ejido or in the private sector; and second, on the average, they have a slightly lower standard of living than the ejidatarios. In general, the non-ejidatario individual in Catmis is treated by both the ejido and by private employers in the area as part of a surplus labor force whose help is not essential.

in the

on the

tenuous

project

no regu

as desc

had eno

in ejid

labor f

tempora

private

dismant

the vi

hands

to live

retail

Rosa de

homes

ejidat

tries

absent

are di

the pr

mobili

The non-ejidatarios have no right to work in the ejido, either in the collective project or in individual parcels; the right to work on the ejido is granted to them by the ejidatarios. Hence, it is tenuous. Occasionally, a few non-ejidatarios are hired by the ejido project when no ejidatarios can be found for some task or other, but no regular employment arrangements develop for them on the ejido since, as described in the previous chapter, even the ejidatarios have not had enough work on the project during the first years of its operation.

In contrast to the ejidatarios, who earn most of their income in ejido activities, the non-ejidatarios represent an indispensable labor force for the private sector, serving both in permanent and temporary jobs, but always at the pleasure of a number of different private employers. The great majority work for daily wages in Catmis dismantling the sugar factory machinery for the largest landowner in the village. In addition, a number of non-ejidatarios work as field hands for the small and large ranchers in the area, and some continue to live in the traditional way as milperos in perpetual debt to the retail merchants. A few of the non-ejidatarios work on the Santa Rosa development project during the week, although their families and homes remain in Catmis. Finally, a number of the more mobile non-ejidatario villagers provide a source of cheap labor for the industries of Mérida, Chetumal, and even Campeche. Such individuals are absent from the village for most of the year. Thus, the non-ejidatarios are differentiated from the ejidatarios because of their dependence on the private sector, lack of employment rights, and high seasonal mobility.

because
non-eji
the fac
As a gr
suggest
respons
living.
with re
the sta
cating
directl
Table 1
and nor
on the
higher
additio
average
family
greates
of con
contril
enjoy
In the
income
is only

The non-ejidatarios are also differentiated economically because of their slightly lower standard of living. Some of the non-ejidatarios, particularly some skilled workers and retirees from the factory, are as well off financially as the high-earning ejidatarios. As a group, however, the non-ejidatarios generally earn less, which suggests that the establishment of the collective ejido project is responsible for some minor economic improvements in the standard of living. When ejidatario and non-ejidatario families are compared with respect to weekly income and expenditures and material wealth, the standard of living of the ejidatarios is slightly higher, indicating some signs of economic improvement which can be attributed directly to the recent formation of the collective ejido society. Table 14 compares the average weekly income and expenditures of ejido and non-ejido families by household type. The table indicates that, on the average, in the ejido families the weekly income is slightly higher and the expenditure lower than in the non-ejido families. In addition, the average ejido family lives within its means, earning an average of 17 pesos more than it spends, while the average non-ejido family spends an average of one peso more per week than it earns. The greatest difference in standard of living appears in the comparison of conjugal family households and nuclear families with children who contribute to the family's income. In such households the ejidatarios enjoy a significantly higher standard of living than the non-ejidatarios. In the conjugal family households, for example, the ejidatario weekly income is 152 pesos, almost double that of the non-ejidatarios, which is only 80 pesos, while the ejido family expenditures of 132 pesos are

Table

Househ
Type

1. Con

Ej
Non-Ej

2. Nuc
family
depend
childr

Ej
Non-Ej

3. Nuc
family
contri
childr

Ej
Non-Ej

4. Ext
family

Ej
Non-Ej

5. Tot
averag

Ej
Non-Ej

Table 14.--Average weekly income and expenditures of ejido and non-ejido families by household type.[a]

Household Type	Average Size of Consumption Unit	Average Weekly Income	Average Weekly Expenditure	Difference
1. Conjugal:				
Ejido--	2.0 (5)	$152	$132	$+20
Non-Ejido--	2.0 (1)	$ 80	$ 56	$+24
2. Nuclear family with dependent children:				
Ejido--	5.2 (17)	$138	$127	$+11
Non-Ejido--	4.2 (9)	$146	$147	$- 1
3. Nuclear family with contributing children:				
Ejido--	8.3 (12)	$215	$192	$+23
Non-Ejido--	7.2 (8)	$164	$179	$-15
4. Extended family:				
Ejido--	6.5 (2)	$110	$ 89	$+21
Non-Ejido--	7.5 (4)	$183	$160	$+23
5. Total average:				
Ejido--	5.8 (36)	$164	$147	$+17
Non-Ejido--	5.8 (22)	$151	$152	$- 1

[a]Data from village census, 1971.

more t
conjug
contri
week t
averag
as opp
family

childr
less f
averag
less a
the sa
incom
childr
exten
less
expla
to th
ranch
the f
the m
house
taric
demor
stand

more than double the 56 pesos spent by the average non-ejidatario conjugal family. In the nuclear family household with children who contribute, the ejido family earns an average of 50 pesos more per week than the non-ejidatario family. The ejidatario family spends an average of 13 pesos more and manages to save an average of 23 pesos, as opposed to a 15-peso deficit suffered by the average non-ejido family with contributing children.

On the other hand, in nuclear family households with dependent children and in extended family households the ejido families have less income and lower expenditures than the non-ejido families. The average ejido nuclear family with dependent children earns eight pesos less and spends 20 pesos less than the average non-ejido family. At the same time, the ejido family manages to retain 11 pesos of its income, while the average non-ejido nuclear family with dependent children has a deficit of one peso per week. In addition, the ejido extended family household earns 73 pesos less and spends 71 pesos less each week than the average non-ejido extended family. The best explanation for this rather significant difference probably relates to the fact that the non-ejido extended families own primarily small ranches or businesses which they manage as a family enterprise, while the few ejido extended family households have actually earned less on the mixed farming development project than any of the nuclear family household types. The fact that the economic advantage of the ejidatarios is not consistent throughout the different household types demonstrates that the ejidatarios maintain only a slightly higher standard of living, and that the economic benefits of the ejido credit

societ

the ej

ejidat

famili

A surv

goods

includ

animal

sewing

the fa

Table

Table

society development project are not distributed evenly throughout the ejido society.

One clear index of the improved standard of living of the ejidatarios may be demonstrated in material wealth. The ejido families have greater material wealth than the non-ejido families. A survey of 75 families placed a standard monetary value on various goods which the household heads claimed to own. The items appraised included: private land and milpa in cultivation, house and yard, animals, well and pump, tortilla press, radio and T.V., vehicles, and sewing machines. The value of each family's wealth was totaled, and the family heads were classified into ejido and non-ejido groups. Table 15 shows the results of the comparison.

Table 15.--Material wealth of ejido and non-ejido families.[a]

Material Wealth	Occupation			
	Ejido		Non-Ejido	
	N	%	N	%
$ 200-1,999	11	22	13	52
$2,000-3,999	26	52	5	20
$4,000+	13	26	7	28
Total	50	100	25	100

[a]Data from village census, 1970.

The t

the s

4,000

(7) o

52 pe

of th

while

cent

appra

emerg

stock

stand

heads

culti

the f

ejida

tages

cent

also

large

ejida

impor

of th

he co

had r

The table demonstrates that both ejido and non-ejido groups have nearly the same percentage of families whose material wealth is valued at 4,000 pesos or more: 26 percent (13) of the ejidatarios and 28 percent (7) of the non-ejidatarios. On the other hand, the material wealth of 52 percent (26) of the ejido families as opposed to only 20 percent (5) of the non-ejido families is valued between 2,000 and 3,999 pesos, while only 22 percent (11) of the ejido families as opposed to 52 percent (13) of the non-ejido families possess material wealth which is appraised between 200 and 1,999 pesos. The data clearly indicate the emergence of a higher standard of living of the average ejidatario.

The ownership of productive resources, such as land and livestock, provides some indirect evidence of this improvement in the standard of living of the ejidatarios. About 62 percent of the family heads in the village now hold rights to ejido lands. Many ejidatarios cultivate individual parcels, and a few of these plots are located on the fertile margins of the irrigation project, an indication that the ejidatarios understand and try to benefit from the economic advantages of mechanized cash crop cultivation. In addition, almost 40 percent of the ejidatarios own at least one head of cattle, and many also own sheep and goats. The animals graze side by side with the large herds of the ejido cattle-ranching project. For an average ejidatario to own and support cattle, even a single head, represents an important potential for improved standard of living. During the time of the sugar cane factory a poor man would not aspire to own cattle; he could never have afforded the initial capital investment, and he had no land on which to graze the animals.

altho

rapid

chang

than

dard

more

of ec

and r

commu

omic

unio

nity

have

ejid

vill

new

and

ejid

poli

smal

reti

gati

a se

Such improvements in the standard of living suggest that, although the ejidatarios have benefited in some minor ways from the rapidly expanding ejido economy, nevertheless, no major economic changes are evident, and the ejidatarios are only slightly better off than the non-ejidatarios. Thus, despite their slightly lower standard of living, it appears that the non-ejidatarios are handicapped more by their lack of social and political rights than by their lack of economic rights. Having no voice in the ejido general assembly and no formal labor or political organization through which they can communicate with the government, they play no part in the major economic and political decisions affecting the community.

A few of the well-off non-ejidatarios and some of the retired union workers participate in the school organization and other community and religious affairs. Nevertheless, most of the non-ejidatarios have no significant political influence in the community. The non-ejidatarios are not allowed to use the ejido medical services in the village. They had less protection than the ejidatarios against the new company when its employees tried to evict them from their homes, and in most community activities they have to take orders from the ejido officials, who are the de facto controllers of the social and political life of the village.

During the field research a group of about 20 men, including small landowners who had previously worked for the factory, and retired union workers, united to organize politically and sent a delegation to Mérida to request permission from the governor to establish a second ejido in the village. As retired workers and landholders,

these
villag
ejidat
attemp
mize t
belong
new co
state
ejido

occup
the i
integ
econo
opmen
them,
integ
patio
the
Catm
and
stat

leve

these men were clearly among the most affluent as well as the oldest villagers. Their group essentially excluded the poor majority of non-ejidatarios who worked for daily wages in the private sector. In attempting to establish a second ejido, some of them sought to legitimize their de facto claims to government lands which previously had belonged to the Catmis factory but which had not been purchased by the new company. Their efforts met with little success, however, and the state government initiated no motions toward establishing a second ejido.

After this consideration of the emergence of social classes and occupational status groups in Catmis, it is now possible to examine the impact of the agrarian reform on the different levels of social integration. Since the non-ejidatarios have not experienced the economic and socio-political advantages brought by the ejido and development project in the same way as the ejidatarios have experienced them, the effects of the agrarian reform on different levels of social integration may be observed clearly by comparing the relative participation of ejido and non-ejido groups. The following sections measure the impact of the agrarian reform on the local social organization of Catmis by focusing on familial relations, community-level activities, and the changes in relations between the community and the nation-state.

The Family

This section examines the effects of agrarian reform on two levels of the family: (1) the distribution over various time periods

of se
size
indiv
famil
tions
of ch
cable
as i
famil

refo
leve
must
soci
pone
comm
muni

The

vill
comp
inha
aver
ind

of selected demographic aspects of the family, including household size and composition, the age of household heads, the life cycle of individuals, and marriage types; and (2) the internal dynamics of the family, including nuclear family relations, extended and affinal relations, and ritual kin. The discussion focuses on significant aspects of change and stability in the family over time, and wherever applicable, the increasing differences between occupational status groups as illustrated through comparisons of ejido and non-ejido lower-class families.

A guiding hypothesis is that, in response to the agrarian reform, family structure has not changed very much relative to higher levels of social integration. Of course, proof of this hypothesis must include description and analysis of other, higher levels of socio-political integration. Hence, a discussion of the proof is postponed until the summary statement following the examination of community-level activities as well as the relations between the community and the nation-state.

The Household

In 1970 78 percent (175) of 225 habitable dwellings in the village were occupied; 149 households were occupied by family units composed of two or more people; the remaining 26 households were inhabited by single individuals, mostly older men and women. The average family was composed of 5.7 individuals, while the number of individuals per household ranged from 1 to 12.

The average family size in Catmis appears to have increased progressively since the agrarian reforms. Table 16 compares the size and composition of households for five different years spanning a 30-year period.

Table 16.--Household size and composition.[a]

Number of Members	Year				
	1941	1951	1956	1961	1971
2	47	11	35	0	17
3	75	7	32	6	25
4	63	10	34	8	15
5	32	11	30	2	22
6	14	1	33	4	21
7	1	3	23	2	12
8	2	3	8	2	11
9	0	2	7	4	9
10	0	2	3	1	9
11	0	0	2	0	8
12	0	0	0	0	1
Total Families	234	50	207	29	149
Average Family Size	3.6	4.5	4.8	5.7	5.7

[a]Data from 1941-1961 came from the files of an ex-hacienda owner in the village, while data from 1971 came from the author's own village census.

An examination of the table reveals that in 1941, only a short time after the labor union was established in Catmis, the average family size was 3.6. Twenty years later, in 1961, the average family size

rose to 5.7, where it has remained through 1971. This change is best understood as a result of improved health facilities for which the labor union fought. Such data also reflect trends in the nation as a whole with regard to declining infant mortality and increasing life expectancy.

Another significant demographic change in family structure, which resulted from the agrarian reform, is the age of male household heads. The available data clearly indicate a progressive trend for men to begin families when they are older and to remain at the head of their families longer than in the past. Table 17 compares the age of male household heads for three different years over a 30-year period.

Table 17.--Age of male household heads: 1941, 1956, and 1971.[a]

Age	Year					
	1941		1956		1971	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
21-30	92	40	56	27	27	19
31-40	73	31	59	28.5	41	30
41-50	45	19.5	43	21	25	17
51+	21	9.5	48	23.5	49	34
Total	231	100.0	206	100.0	142	100

[a]Data from 1941 and 1956 came from the files of an ex-hacienda owner in the village, while data from 1971 came from the author's village census.

The t
hold
were
hold
(49)
olde
nati
to r
more
prim
but

holc
appe
Tabl
ind

Tabl

Yea

195
197

The table indicates that in 1941, 40 percent (92) of the male household heads were less than 31 years old, while only 9.5 percent (21) were 51 years or older. By 1971 only 19 percent (27) of the household heads were less than 31 years old, while fully 34 percent (49) or more than three times as many household heads were 51 years or older. This change in family structure is best explained by a combination of factors: Improved health facilities have enabled more men to reach old age, while national labor laws have permitted men to work more years and have also protected them from being fired after their prime. Today, the average man establishes his family when he is older, but his household unit appears to last longer than in the past.

In spite of these demographic changes in the family and household structure, the distribution of household types in the village appears to have remained stable, at least over the last 15 years. Table 18 compares the frequency of nuclear, extended, and single or individual permanent households in 1956 and 1971.

Table 18.--Distribution of household types: 1956 and 1971.[a]

Year	Household Type						Total	
	Nuclear		Extended		Single			
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
1956	191	79	16	8	31	13	238	100
1971	133	76	16	11	26	13	175	100

[a]Data from the files of an ex-hacienda owner.

In bo
nucle
sing
hold
Amer
80 p
and
of s
wido
sibl

exte
hous
tial
coll
broa
more
of

ill
ten
hou
Com
mar
of
pat

In both years 75 to 80 percent of the households were comprised of nuclear families, 8 to 11 percent extended families, and 13 percent single individuals, an indication of stability in the ratio of household types. Typical of most wage-earning populations in rural Latin America, the nuclear family household predominates in Catmis. About 80 percent of the households are composed of a single married couple and their children. Another 10 percent of the households are composed of segments of the nuclear family: conjugal pairs without children, a widowed older parent living with his or her children, and, rarely, a sibling group.

Only about 10 percent (16) of the households are composed of extended families. For the present purpose, the extended family household denotes ". . . two or more nuclear families having residential unity regardless of the relationship binding them together--lineal, collateral, contractual" (Nutini 1967: 387). This definition was broadened to include "domiciliary groups in which there are two or more married pairs and their children or three or more generations of kinsmen" (Harris 1971: 634).

Though statistically infrequent, the extended family household illustrates the cultural preference for patrilocal residence and a tendency toward economic cooperation between agnates. Extended family households form for a variety of reasons (see Figure 2: The Social Composition of Extended Family Households). First, a few newly married couples live with the groom's parents until they find a home of their own (see No. 5 and 6). Characteristically, each conjugal pair has its own hearth and cooking utensils, an indication that this

Figure 2. The Social Composition of Extended Family Households

Figure 2. The Social Composition of Extended Family Households



KEY: / through a symbol = divorced
X through a symbol = dead
▲ = informant

arrang

howeve

numbe

have

proje

Anoth

ranch

house

dence

marr

(Nos

case

woma

live

The

vid

bef

ove

Par

nuc

bec

ar

mi

arrangement is usually temporary. In a few cases (Nos. 1,2,3,4,7), however, the extended family continues after the couple has had a number of children. In these families sons and fathers and/or brothers have prospered by working together in milpa cultivation, on the ejido project, or in a family enterprise such as a small cattle ranch. Another 10 families, however, whose members operate small cattle ranches or work milpa together, have not formed patrilineal extended households, even though they have maintained patrilocal village residence. Finally, an extended family may form due to the death of one marriage partner or divorce (Nos. 8-16). In three cases of divorce (Nos. 8-10) patrilineal extended families formed, while in five other cases (Nos. 12-16) matrilineal extended families formed when a widowed woman and her children came from her deceased husband's household to live with her own parents.

The Life Cycle

The family structure becomes operational in the lives of individuals. For this reason, it is important to consider the life cycle before turning to the specific relationships which have developed over time within the family.

In Catmis people consider it desirable to have children, and parents rarely express preference for a boy or girl. The average nuclear family has 4.5 children. This is thought to be too many because children are expensive to feed. However, most village women are not aware of or not interested in modern family planning. A few middle-aged women practice birth control methods in consultation with

gover
the h
planr

chil
where
woma
hous
afte

Most
fath
tize
chil

outs
not.
the
erra
with
more
moth

fam
Com

government medical personnel. However, they do it because they fear the hazards of pregnancy in their later years, rather than for family planning.

During pregnancy women are known to have certain cravings. In child delivery the woman is isolated from her home in a special hut where she is attended by a midwife and other female relatives. If the woman has no female relatives in the village, she may go to her mother's house. Usually, women return to their household chores a week or two after delivery.

The infant is dressed in clean rags and nursed when he cries. Most of the time he sleeps in a hammock. Occasionally, his mother and father play with him. During the first year the child may be baptized and the hezmék, an ancient Mayan ceremony, performed. Most children are given names after their first birthday.

After weaning, young children play on the floor at home or outside near the house. Little boys often run naked, but girls do not. Young children are often cared for by an older sibling. As the child grows older, he will go to school and run small shopping errands for his mother. At this age children are taught to cooperate with their mothers. Little boys are permitted to assert themselves more than girls. For example, a boy may demand certain foods and the mother will comply.

In early adolescence a boy may find his first work outside the family. Usually, he will work for a milpero for some small pay. Common interests in sexuality are expressed with age mates.

Occas
homos

danci
physi
ing a
in th
heter
or gi

shutd
frequ
home

encou
afte

marr
Phys
work
hair
men
Brit
pass
thou
and

Occasionally, incidents of sodomy and bestiality are reported, and homosexual experiences with older men are not uncommon.

The first real contact with the opposite sex takes place in dancing, which is important to courtship because it is the only physical contact between the sexes that is approved in public. During adolescence young men also travel to different towns and cities in the region for diversion. Adolescence is the stage of initial heterosexual encounters. Such encounters take place with prostitutes or girls whom boys meet at dances or movies.

Since the emigration of many people following the factory shutdown, many houses stand vacant in the village. Adolescent boys frequently move into these houses to live alone, though they return home for their meals.

More serious courtship begins in later adolescence. Sexual encounters in courtship take place at secret meetings after movies or after fiestas and dances, which normally last until the morning hours.

Girls usually marry between 15 and 20 years of age, while men marry from 18 to 25. Selecting a mate is based on free choice. Physical attraction and good looks are primary considerations, but good working habits are frequently cited as the basis of choice. Skin and hair color are closely linked to sexual drives and passion. Darker men and women (referred to as Beliceños after the Black population of British Honduras) are thought to have greater sexual drives and passion and to be poor workers, while light-skinned men and women are thought to be more delicate, their sexual appetites more restrained, and their work habits better. Economic motives play a greater role in

second and subsequent marriages. Men want women who cook and sew well and know how to manage money. Women want to marry men who will provide for them.

People usually select their spouses from nearby towns, villages, ranchos, and haciendas. Most couples meet by chance: at a market, a dance, on a bus, or through a mutual friend. Couples often decide to marry when the girl becomes pregnant. In most stories about marriage it is the girl who makes the suggestion to marry. If the couple has been courting for a while, the man is usually willing. Some men speak of their decision to marry as a conscious realization of readiness and need, followed by a quest for the proper mate.

In many cases, however, men marry in order to recognize their children socially. Hence, marriage is important because it functions to legitimize the status of children. There are a few individuals in the village whom the community considers illegitimate (hijo natural) because their mothers were not married to their fathers. In most cases the father is known. However, because of the father's failure to acknowledge the child publicly by marriage, the child's legal status is incomplete and he suffers for this. As a young child, he may be teased by the other children, and chances are good that he will also suffer in his adult life. Of two reported illegitimate adult men in Catmis, one never married and the second is severely criticized by many villagers for being the only bigamist in the village and having four illegitimate children of his own.

In some stories about marriage, especially if the bride is less than 15 years old, the bride's father asks the groom to wait for

an e

endu

enga

the

nigh

plac

ding

or f

riag

Tabl

Type
Marr

Civi

Chur

Free

The

free

16 a

marr

an engagement period before the wedding. Such engagements rarely endure more than a few months, and most couples marry without a formal engagement.

Weddings provide an important occasion for social display in the village. Celebrations may last for as many as three days and nights and often include a series of parties and dances which take place in a number of different houses. Fully two-thirds of the weddings in Catmis are held in church, while one-third are civil marriages or free unions. Table 19 elaborates upon the distribution of marriage types according to age.

Table 19.--Types of marriage by age.[a]

Type of Marriage	Age						Total	
	16-35		36-55		56-75			
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Civil	15	25	4	7	3	17	22	15
Church	31	50	54	83	13	72	98	68
Free union	16	25	7	10	2	11	25	17
Total	62	100	65	100	18	100	145	100

[a]Data from village questionnaire.

The table suggests that younger people claim to marry by civil law or free union more often than older people. Only half the people between 16 and 35 years of age were married in church, while the other half married by civil ceremony or free union. In contrast, 70 to 80

perc
unio
comm
youn
the
thei
who
riag

to t

Tabl

Occ

Eji

Non

The
by
is
bet
civ
nor

percent of those over 35 claimed to marry in church. Although free unions are frequently broken, they show considerable stability and the community accepts them as legitimate. About 25 percent (16) of the younger people form free unions, usually by eloping. After a while, the couple returns to the village, and their marriage is accepted by their families and the community. Informants noted that individuals who divorce their first partners in free union may strive in later marriages for greater legitimacy and security by church marriage.

Table 20 compares ejidatarios with non-ejidatarios with respect to the distribution of marriage types.

Table 20.--Type of marriage by occupational status groups.[a]

Occupation	Type of Marriage							
	Church		Civil		Free-Union		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Ejidatario	32	64	12	24.0	6	12.0	50	100
Non-ejidatario	19	79	2	8.5	3	12.5	24	100

[a]Data from village questionnaire.

The table illustrates that both status groups prefer church marriages by a large margin. Moreover, the percentage of free-union marriages is the same for both groups. On the other hand, a minor difference between the groups lies in the preference some ejidatarios have for civil instead of church marriages: While only 8.5 percent (2) of the non-ejidatarios had civil marriages, 24 percent (12) of the ejidatarios

had

to th

agen

are

inco

stat

hold

pare

and

loca

the

for

tair

ess

Nev

is

spo

cal

aro

cla

inc

tho

sup

had them. This preference for civil marriage may be indirectly related to the close ties Catmiseños have maintained with national government agencies through their labor organizations. Most federal agencies are strongly secular, if not overtly anti-clerical. The data are inconclusive, however, and no clear correlation can be drawn between status groups and marriage type.

After marriage, couples generally reside in a neolocal household, although a small percentage may live temporarily with the groom's parents, as previously mentioned. Newlyweds are often highly mobile, and the actual location of their residence depends primarily on the location of the husband's job rather than cultural preference. Once the residence has been established, however, the husband may leave for extended periods to find work, but the couple will try to maintain the neolocal household even under severe hardship.

Marriage is considered a natural state and sexual gratification essential. This is particularly true for men, but also for women. Nevertheless, the marriage bond is fragile, and divorce or separation is common. A number of older men and women have had at least two spouses. Unfortunately, apart from a few known cases, no statistical data are available on the frequency or distribution of divorce.

Women explain that marriages break up when the husband runs around with other women and does not come home at night, while men claim that marriages break up when wives are unfaithful, lazy, or incompetent in household chores. Occasional infidelity of the wife, though humiliating, is not sufficient cause for divorce. Men are supposed to desire sexual variety but not to avoid their wives. Sexual

jealousy, however, may play a significant part in divorce, especially when a man believes his wife has been promiscuous.

In the perception of both men and women, divorce results when the woman leaves her husband. In part, this perception may have developed from the highly mobile life of the rural wage earner: A man may be away for extended periods, yet the marriage is stable because it is the woman who goes to live with the husband in his home upon marriage. Consequently, when a man threatens his wife with divorce, he says he will kick her out. Similarly, when a divorce actually takes place, it is the woman who leaves the house.

Following divorce, young children live with their mother and her parents, while older children may remain with their mothers or fathers. Half brothers and sisters are fairly common in families, and men frequently accept financial responsibility for young children of their wife's earlier marriages. No one criticizes a man for not supporting children of his former marriages, but the villagers condemn a woman who does not raise her own children.

It is common for older people to work until they are physically unable. A number of older men and women occupy households as married couples or unmarried, widowed, or divorced singles. If they have children in the village, they usually eat with their children but sleep in a separate house. Catmis also is noted for a number of "gay" old bachelors, all of whom were socialized as adolescents into homosexuality by one of the previous factory owners. Most of these men, about a dozen in all, live alone, but there is one homosexual couple. Apparently, homosexuality was very much a part of the life and

repu

that

most

your

expr

bond

marr

chil

of

The

fam

tio

wiv

cle

of

sew

als

cor

han

Mer

tra

reputation of Catmis in the 1930s; these men seem to be survivors of that period.

Death is considered a natural event. When old people die, most villagers do not show great sorrow. However, when a parent of young children (especially a mother) dies, grief and pity are commonly expressed because the villagers believe that continuing nuclear family bonds are essential for the complete development of a child. When a marriage is broken through divorce, relationships between parents and children will continue, but when the nuclear family is broken because of death, it is considered tragic.

The Nuclear Family

The principal interpersonal relations within the nuclear family are those between spouses, parents and children, and siblings.

Relations between spouses are characterized by mutual cooperation, economic interdependence, and sexual union. Both husbands and wives contribute to the economic support of the household. There is a clear division of labor by sex. A wife's work centers around the care of the family and the home. Women are expected to clean, cook, wash, sew, iron, haul water, and tend to the needs of the children. Women also raise chickens and pigs, buy and sell on a small scale, take corn to the mill, and control the family's finances. On the other hand, husbands are expected to provide for the support of the family. Men work for wages in the fields, cultivate maize, manage the larger transactions of buying and selling, and provide firewood.

Ideally, the husband is the main authority in the home. He makes all the major decisions and commands the respect and obedience of his wife and children. The wife is expected to be faithful and submit to his wishes. Actually, however, the husband's work often carries him away from the house or even the village, and the wife plays the central role in managing the household and caring for the children. When the husband is away, a wife may traditionally claim at least half his salary from his employer. Thus, in most households the wife is the de facto manager of the family resources.

The husband has exclusive rights to his wife's sexual and domestic services. In return, he has a responsibility to provide for her and her children. Normally, as long as the wife provides him with the proper services at home and cares for the children, the husband will not interfere with her activities. On the other hand, particularly in the earlier years of marriage, the husband may go to great lengths to keep his wife from infidelity. Most men make their wives stay at home except for essential errands, such as minor shopping or taking corn to the nearest mill. However, since the husband is away most of the day, and often for extended periods, he cannot enforce his rules. His lack of control results in jealousy and suspicion. Many husbands live in fear that their wives have committed adultery, thus making cuckolds (cabrones) of them. These suspicions are at the root of many domestic quarrels.

As an emotional outlet, a husband may get drunk and beat his wife. This occurs infrequently, however, and most villagers interpret wife beating as a sign of the husband's weakness, not strength. Sullen,

intr

whic

wife

almo

beli

men.

and

repr

sexu

more

may

Most

thou

riag

Spon

One

In

Men

tal

introverted drunkenness is a more respected emotional outlet through which a man can alleviate his feelings of ineptness in handling his wife. Only a few men in the village are known to be drunks, but almost every man gets drunk once in a while.

In general, wives work very hard in the home. They are believed to have greater emotional endurance and consistency than men. Although it is considered in bad taste, women drink at fiestas, and older women occasionally get drunk. Yet, for a woman, drinking represents recreation without emotional overtones. Wives regard their sexuality similarly, though as previously noted, adultery is a far more serious offense. A woman who is frustrated with her routine may rebel temporarily by having a sexual liaison with another man. Most affairs are momentary, however, and have no serious consequences, though sometimes an affair is more serious and may disrupt the marriage.

There is generally a good deal of mutual respect in a marriage. Spouses learn the weaknesses of their partners and try to compensate. One man claimed he has been content for six years with his second wife. In contrasting her to his first wife, he said,

> . . . She helps where the other one never did. She sews very well and cares for the pigs. When we came to this house to live, she asked me for a radio and I bought it for her. She doesn't buy well in the market, but she isn't as bad as my first wife, who would buy stones if you were selling them. She has a tendency to buy a little of everything she sees, whether it is necessary or not. She especially indulges the children. For this reason, I buy most of the food and bring it to her on Saturdays, and she prepares it.

Men also claim that a good husband is obliged to listen to his wife talk at night. All day long, they say, she must obey her husband

and do what she is told. The only time she can tell him what she wants is at night, and a good husband will listen.

It Catmis the strongest and most enduring familial bonds are between parents and children. Parents take responsibility for their children's support, protection, education, and moral conduct. From an early age, children learn to help their mothers and respect their fathers. When parents become old, childrem, mainly sons but also daughters, often support them.

Children are brought up to obey and respect their parents, but emphasis is also placed on cooperation. Obedience in children is desirable. However, a considerable measure of self-expression is usually tolerated and even encouraged. For a young child, the mother is at the center of family life. It is she who deals directly with the children, deciding and supervising their activities. The father is a stricter authority figure. He may make decisions concerning the family, but the mother will enforce the rules through direct interaction.

Lack of cooperation with the parents and disobedience are the major offenses for which children are punished. Punishments vary according to the age and sex of the child, the severity of his offense, and his age rank in the family. Corporal punishment is fairly common, but rarely severe. In general, beatings are abhorred by the villagers since they are reminiscent of what the villagers call the "period of slavery" (la época de esclavitúd), which refers to the plantation and hacienda system before the Revolution of 1910. More often, children are controlled through shame, threats, and teasing. A mother's

comm

may

cons

trat

A mo

endu

they

and

Thes

Ther

chil

rega

home

quer

Mos

betw

feel

ofta

Gir

with

and

form

the

comment to a young child that he does not help his family or that she may give him away may result in a torrent of tears. Little boys are constantly teased about their genitals and often threatened with castration.

The mother-child relation is the strongest bond in the family. A mother's responsibility to her children is considered sacred, enduring, and totally emotional. She must nourish her children when they are young, supervise their moral conduct and religious training, and protect and defend them against a harsh, often cruel world. These responsibilities are considered to be instinctive in a mother. There were only two cases in the village of mothers who rejected their children, and the villagers considered these women crazy. Children regard their mothers as the source of nourishment and goodness. At home they learn to help her, and after marriage they visit her frequently.

Sons remain close to their mothers throughout their lives. Most men consider the mother-son bond to be far stronger than the bond between husband and wife. Married men thus maintain their principal feelings of loyalty to their mothers, and widowed mothers are most often supported by their sons.

The mother-daughter relationship is usually close, too. Girls learn domestic skills and responsibilities by working at home with their mothers. A daughter's attitudes toward work, children, men, and marriage are strongly influenced by her mother. Many women look forward to having daughters with whom they can share the burdens of the household. A mother is directly responsible for her daughter's

chastity and reputation. However, mothers are not unduly shocked (as fathers are) to learn that their daughters have a steady boyfriend or have become pregnant. Mother-daughter relations remain strong after a girl marries. If possible, girls like to live near their mothers. In her old age a mother may receive financial aid from her daughter, or may even live with her.

A father generally remains aloof from his children when they are young. He may intervene to discipline them for serious misconduct and take them shopping or occasionally to amusements at a fiesta. In addition, he will usually purchase their clothes and shoes. However, his posture toward them is consistently formal and authoritarian. Children must respect and obey their fathers and keep their distance. As a son matures, the father is likely to develop strong economic and political bonds with him. As a daughter matures, the father shows increasing concern in maintaining her chastity. A father is entitled to his daughter's domestic services as long as she remains in his home. Thus, fathers generally attempt to keep their daughters occupied with domestic chores just as they occupy their wives.

The father-daughter relationship is the weakest parent-child bond, probably because of its recognized potentialities for incest. A father may show physical affection for an infant daughter by holding her, but once she turns five or six years old, he will avoid physical contact with her. Sexual implications are particularly evident when a mature, unmarried step-daughter is living in the household. For this reason, daughters from a woman's first marriage often live with their maternal grandmothers or aunts when they reach

marriageable age. Father-daughter incest is actually very rare, but is known to occur in the village. Occasionally, when drunk, men will express incestuous fantasies about their daughters.

A daughter's sexual conduct reflects directly on her father's honor. Ideally, girls are supposed to be virgins when they marry, and a girl and her fiance are supposed to ask her father's permission to marry. Actually, few girls are virgins when they marry and permission to marry is seldom asked; when asked, it is seldom granted. Upon marriage, a girl moves from the protection and authority of her father to that of her husband. Emotional ties to her father may continue, but economic and social bonds weaken.

The bonds between father and son are often manifest in continuing economic and political ties. The extent of economic interdependence often fluctuates with the vagaries of economic life, but the political alliance between father and son almost always remains constant. Most men teach their sons to raise milpa, and the vast majority of milpa plots are cultivated by fathers and sons working cooperatively. When the father is engaged only in wage earning, he will try to find employment for his son to keep him in the village. If he cannot, the son may leave the village to find work. Nevertheless, the political alliance will endure. The son will return to the village for an official ejido census or to defend his father. Similarly, when work becomes available, the son may return to live. Many families do not achieve the cultural ideal of patrilocal village residence because of the resource limitations of the average family: the limited yields in practicing milpa agriculture without capital or modern technology and the fluctuations of local wage labor requirements. Nevertheless,

patrilocal residence has a high statistical frequency. About 60 percent of the married men interviewed claimed that their fathers lived and worked in the Catmis sugar plantation at least during the harvest, and in many cases throughout the year.

Formal relations based on authority and respect persist between father and son well into the son's adult life. Fathers and sons rarely drink together and never discuss women or sexuality. Most men will not smoke in their father's presence until they marry; some men claim they will never smoke in front of their fathers.

Despite considerable variation, relations between siblings are characterized by mutual cooperation and dependence, protectiveness, and sometimes rivalry. In general, older siblings are given more authority and responsibility in the family. Kinship terminology distinguishes siblings by age as well as sex.

As children, older siblings take care of younger ones and often develop a sense of responsibility for them. The oldest brother, being a male, has preferred status and may demand respect and obedience from younger siblings, although it is hard for him to impose his will on them.

The pattern of female dominance by men, which boys learn from watching their fathers, is first put into practice in their relationship with their sisters. An older brother begins to demand domestic services from his sister just as his father does from his mother. A brother is also concerned with his sister's reputation. In one incident a girl brought paternity charges against a young man in the village. Her brother told the village comisario, who had to resolve the

issue, that he would leave the village if the fellow didn't marry his sister. Apparently, the brother had been teased about his sister by everyone, and his shame was more than he could bear. In Catmis the typical response to shame or political defeat is personal withdrawal.

Siblings of the same sex tend to associate with each other and often form enduring bonds. Sisters may remain close friends throughout their lives, though they are separated when their husbands live in different villages. As they get older, they may retain their bonds by encouraging their children to visit or by sending token gifts through their children. In one case two sisters shared the responsibility of of supporting their old mother. The mother stayed for a few months with one sister in Catmis, then was sent to stay with the other sister in Tzucacab.

Younger brothers often work together in milpa cultivation. Even after marriage, they may cultivate a milpa plot jointly or select plots which are close together for their mutual protection against theft. On the ejido collective farming project brothers generally work together in the fields for wages. They also form important political alliances with their fathers at the head. After the father dies, the alliance often endures, but new dyadic bonds with their respective sons eventually become more important.

A number of factors weaken sibling bonds after marriage. Brothers and sisters set up independent households, frequently in different villages. Also, married women identify with their husbands' interests, and the bonds between them and their brothers weaken

correspondingly. As previously mentioned, bonds between brothers may weaken after their father dies and their own sons begin to mature.

There are some exceptions to the pattern of cooperation and solidarity among siblings. Occasionally, adult brothers become rivals, and the ejido or community may have to intervene to resolve their conflict. In one case two brothers were feuding over seven mecates of ejido land and the maize which one of them had harvested. The first brother had requested the ejido land in the name of the second. He worked the land, planted the corn, then left the village. The second brother cultivated the crop and harvested it without giving his brother anything. At a special meeting of ejido officials and village elders, a mediating committee proposed a compromise which was eventually accepted by both brothers. The incident seemed to damage relations between them, however, and after it they drifted apart. They became active in different political factions of the ejido. At the time they were the only brothers in the village without strong political ties between them.

Extended and Affinal Relations

A number of features which are characteristic of plantation life in Catmis have tended to limit the role of the extended family: the lack of familial control over productive resources, the predominance of the nuclear family household, dependency on wage earning as opposed to primary production, and the high geographical mobility of the population resulting from seasonal employment fluctuations. Nevertheless, relations between extended family members provide a

number of important supplemental needs. Extended family relatives are often called on for life crisis rites, emergencies, and temporary living quarters during residence changes.

Grandparents and grandchildren frequently form important bonds, particularly when they are living in the same household, but also when the live in separate households in the village. The closest relationship is with the grandmother, either maternal or paternal, who often acts as a mother surrogate. Particularly when a parent dies or parents divorce, young children may be reared by their grandmothers. With the notable exception of the maternal aunt, who also may act as a mother figure, most people do not form close bonds with collateral extended kin. Paternal cousins may be friendly or even political allies with their respective fathers, but these bonds break down easily after the fathers die.

It is probably correct to suggest that affinal relations are highly variable, depending on factors such as place of residence, age and sex, and type of marital union. For example, the relatively long period of child-producing years in the average woman means that a person is likely to find many of his or her spouse's brothers and sisters young enough to be his or her own children, old enough to be his or her parents, or of the same age group. When a spouse's siblings are close in age, personality factors also help shape the relationship.

Clearly, the most important affinal relations are with one's spouse's parents. Given the statistical frequency of patrilocal village residence, it is more often the wife who must learn to relate

to her husband's parents. However, the daughter-in-law is compensated somewhat by the predominance of the nuclear family household. A woman and her father-in-law normally maintain a relationship of formality and respect, often combined with unacknowledged avoidance. A woman's relations with her mother-in-law are strained. Villagers commonly blame the mother-in-law as the cause of divorce.

A man usually maintains formal respect relations with his wife's father. He may speak kindly of his mother-in-law, though most men are suspicious of their in-laws. Economic cooperation is rare, and though political alliances between affinal relatives occur, they are based mainly on other mutual interests which go beyond affinal ties, such as political cooperation within the ejido.

From a structural point of view, affinal relatives are even less important in free-union marriages, but this is also variable. The amount of aid given to affinal relatives probably depends more on the immediate availability of resources, physical proximity, and need than on the type of marriage.

Ritual Kin

Ritual kinship is important to the discussion of Catmis family relations for two main reasons: First, ritual kinship ties serve to strengthen pre-existing bonds with specific extended family members; and, second, they function to create significant new bonds of mutual aid and trust with non-relatives, thereby expanding the network of individuals who are considered part of the family.

Bonds of ritual kinship are formed through religious rituals, primarily baptism and marriage, but also first communion, confirmation,

and hezmek, an ancient Mayan ritual in which a newly born child is held on the hip of his sponsor to insure the normal development of his faculties (Redfield and Villa Rojas 1941).

The most common kind of ritual kinship is initiated at a child's baptism, which is performed before a child reaches his first birthday. The bonds of ritual kinship are formed when a couple asks a man and woman to stand as godparents at the baptism ceremony of their newly born child. The two couples become co-parents (compadres) to each other, and the child has godparents (padrinos), who, in turn, regard him as their godchild (ajihado). Thus, the ritual creates two distinct relationships: one between the godparents and godchild, the other between the co-parents.

In Catmis godparents are expected to cover the expenses of the baptism ceremony, purchase a turkey for their godchild's family, and buy the child's first set of clothing. A child is expected to be respectful and courteous to his godparents. As he grows older, he may occasionally visit his godparents and help them in minor domestic chores. Godparents often give their godchild a few pennies for candy and show interest in their godchild's activities. In some cases the child may confide in his godparents as he grows older, and the godparents may give him advice.

There are two cases in Catmis of godparents raising orphaned godchildren. Beyond these bonds, godparents and godchildren have few clear-cut obligations. Far more important is the relationship between co-parents. This bond is formed between people of the same generation and within the same cultural situation. Co-parents treat each other

with respect and formality, and the relationship involves an understanding of mutual aid and cooperation. People usually become co-parents after a period of friendship. They form the relationship to make explicit their joint interest in helping one another.

Co-parents assist each other in many ways. Borrowing between co-parents is probably more frequent than between kin. A man can borrow his co-parent's tools or gun. Women will borrow or exchange food with their co-parents, and labor exchanges are common within and between the sexes. Co-parents often borrow money from one another and no interest is charged. In addition, a number of villagers claim that, after leaving the village when the sugar factory closed, their co-parents gave them permission to live in their houses. One woman said her co-parent actually gave her his house since he was moving away and had no more use for it. Often people rationalize their possession of valuable goods, normally the objects of envy, by explaining that they were gifts from a co-parent.

Finally, the co-parent relationship has a great deal of mutual trust associated with it. People often boast about how loyal their co-parents are to them. Ideally, co-parents should not compete with each other in business ventures, and a man should be able to trust his co-parent with his wife alone.

Like many cultural ideals in social life, co-parent relationships often fail to live up to the expectations people have for them. One man said his co-parent, formerly the Secretary General of the local sugar workers union, failed him by not providing him with a pension when he could have. Another man said scornfully that his co-parent

had destroyed their relationship by competing with him in business. Apparently, he had helped his co-parent get started in ranching by teaching him how to tend cattle, lending him a water pump, and spending many hours assisting him. His co-parent, whom he now sarcastically refers to as "el vecino" (the neighbor), sold cattle behind his back to his best client. Co-parent ties in Catmis are also known to break down when a man finds his co-parent in a compromising situation with his wife. Finally, villagers frequently complain that the high mobility of the population has had an adverse effect on their ritual kin relations. Co-parent ties that are not reinforced on a day-to-day basis tend to break down. In Catmis co-parents frequently are not able to help each other because they must leave the village, sometimes permanently, to find work.

Social, economic, and political factors often enter into the operation of the co-parent system. The more godchildren a man has, the more co-parents, and the wider network of persons on whom he can rely for favors. For this reason, anyone aspiring to a position of leadership must have many godchildren. In addition, poorer families probably look for well-to-do godparents for their children, though this must be reconciled with the strong desire most people have to find security and mutual aid on a day-to-day basis. A rich co-parent may be approached occasionally for fairly important favors, but he cannot be bothered daily for the many smaller favors people often need. Hence, it is not surprising to find that people often select co-parents who are better off, but not much better off than they.

The data on choices of individuals for ritual kinship bonds reveal two features which represent significant adpatations of the family structure to the broader economic and social changes brought by the agrarian reforms. First, a theme of security persists in the selection of co-parents. About 21 percent of all ritual kin are chosen from among specific extended family members--primarily grandparents, but frequently parents' sibilings. In such cases the ritual kinship bonds function to reinforce pre-existing family bonds by making them explicit so that they will become viable in everyday life. Second, over time, the choice of ritual kin from among non-relatives illustrates a pattern of increasing class solidarity. This pattern is illustrated clearly in Table 21, which considers the occupations of godparents for baptism.

Table 21.--Occupation of godparents for baptism.[a]

Age	Kin		Non-Kin			
			Same-Class Occupations		Higher-Class Occupations	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
50-80	5	26	3 laborer worker farmer	16	11 (2) office worker (2) soldier (2) factory owner telegraphist teacher rancher doctor businessman	57
20-34	2	15	10 (8) worker (2) farmer	77	1 businessman	7

[a]Data came from village questionnaire which was administered to half of the village households.

Before the Revolution of 1910 and immediately after, the choice of ritual kin tended to be vertical, or between classes. As previously mentioned in Chapter Two, favored hacienda and plantation workers commonly selected the hacienda owner or village businessmen to sponsor their children's baptisms. In so doing, they reinforced their favored position through vertical patron-client ties. However, since the establishment of the government-owned sugar industry in 1935, people have tended to select ritual kin horizontally, or from among people in their own class. As indicated by the table, for men over age 50, who were born before 1920, about 50 percent of their godparents for baptism were people who were employed in higher-class occupations than their own parents. However, the situation is reversed for men born after 1935, when the national agrarian reform brought the government-owned sugar factory and the labor union to the village. For men under age 34, born after 1935, close to 80 percent of their godparents were people who were employed in the same class occupations as their parents.

Since the factory closed and the workers' syndicate disbanded in 1965, ties of ritual kinship seem to be forming within the ejido, thus continuing the pattern of working-class solidarity which earlier emerged among the sugar workers. Thus, of five children born to ejidatarios since the ejido was established, four of their godparents were also ejidatarios, and the last was a non-ejidatario relative.

Finally, while ritual kinship relations through religious ceremonies are significant, their importance in Catmis should not be overemphasized. About half the villagers either were not baptized at

all or could not remember their godparents. Not everyone feels the need for this ceremony and some people, especially a small group of Protestants, deliberately ignore the individual ritual sponsorship in baptism because of its Catholic origins. Moreover, as previously mentioned, about a third of the married couples in Catmis were married by consensual union or civil law rather than by the church. In so doing, they eliminated a set of potential co-parents which they would have acquired through a religious marriage ceremony.

Beyond the formalized bonds of ritual kinship, most adult villagers have a number of voluntary co-parents, usually close friends or work associates who become co-parents by mutually declared intentions rather than through a religious ritual.

The Community

Moving beyond the level of the family, this section considers the community level of social integration. Catmiseños are tied to their community through a variety of activities, involving leisure time and religious events, and by village institutions, such as the public health clinic and the school. This discussion focuses on changes over time and differential participation of ejido and non-ejido groups in such community-level activities and institutions. Consistent with the basic argument in this chapter, it is hypothesized that the community level of integration demonstrates more change as a result of agrarian reforms than the family level, but less change than the level of local politics, which will be elaborated upon in the following chapter.

Leisure

In Catmis leisure-time activities are often indistinguishable from work. Villagers derive a certain enjoyment from interaction with their friends and neighbors. Women stop to talk and gossip while fetching water at the wells or waiting to grind their corn at the mills. Men do the same while working in the fields. People also enjoy visiting with one another in their homes or when they meet on the street. Oddly enough, the deaf-mute in Catmis is known as the village gossip. He moves from house to house telling the latest news and events in the village. He describes the villagers involved in these events using a combination of pantomime and sign language which most of the villagers understand. Everyone enjoys watching as Don Porfirio mimics the characteristic gestures and expressions of the individual villagers.

In addition to the recreational value people derive from daily interactions, the villagers participate in a number of leisure-time activities including sports, billiards, T.V. and movies, music, private fiestas and dances, drinking, and travel.

Today, boxing is very popular among the adolescent boys. Periodically, regional boxing matches are held in Peto, and the champions from Catmis go to Peto to represent the village. Recently, professional matches from Mexico City have been shown on Yucatán television. Practically everyone in the village attempts to see them. Only the younger men, however, actively engage in this sport.

Although Catmiseños also claim to have a great love for baseball, this sport does appear to be a thing of the past. Men often

recall the days of the government-owned sugar plantation with nostalgia; they would return home after work and go out to play baseball every day. Since the factory closed, however, no one has played, and the large baseball diamond in the center of the village lies dormant.

Other forms of entertainment in the village include billiards, T.V., and movies. One village merchant runs a billiard parlor which provides diversion for the young men. Recently, a villager purchased a T.V. set. On Saturday nights he converts his house into a theatre and charges 25 cents admission. In addition, a traveling movie company periodically shows Westerns or Tarzan movies on the wall of the old union assembly hall. On Saturday night people willingly pay one peso admission fee to sit on the wooden benches and watch the movie. Occasionally, the bottlers of Pepsi Cola or Coca Cola show a free movie to the entire village. One of the large landowners in the area used to operate a movie theatre in the village every Saturday night, but he closed the theatre when the factory closed.

Music is another important form of entertainment for the villagers. Men, women, and children sing informally and frequently. Groups of young people often come together in someone's house to sing. Usually they do not sing communally. One person sings the entire song or a number of verses and then another person sings. Their songs reflect three distinct cultural types: Carribbean-style love songs from Chetumal, very popular among the young people; Yucatecan folk songs, popular throughout the state despite their age; and rancheras, songs from the cattle country of northwestern Mexico, which have found their way to Catmis through movies and government

agents from the north. In addition to singing, a number of villagers play the guitar and some village youths have organized two bands, each of which has two guitars, a bass fiddle, and a drum.

Private house parties provide a very important kind of recreation for the villagers. They are attended by invitation and are often held to celebrate some specific event such as a baptism or wedding. Most celebrations on Christmas are held for family members or close circles of friends.

Frequently, house parties are given for the sole purpose of entertainment. Both men and women host such parties, and the format of the party varies with the sex of the principal host. When a man gives a house party, the guests are all men. The party begins in the late afternoon, includes a roasted lamb, heavy beer drinking, and lasts well into the morning of the following day. Such parties usually have a political as well as an entertainment motive. Ejido leaders provide beer for their followers and political strategies are discussed, or an arbitrator brings rival political leaders together at a party to negotiate a deal or form an alliance. At such parties men sit around a large table or form a circle, and two or three important leaders talk while the others mostly listen, only entering the conversation occasionally to offer a point of information or a comment. On other occasions the men are more disbursed. However, the leaders of rival political groups within the ejido will always sit at a single table when they attend the same party. Such parties are always sponsored by ejido leaders and their followers or by the smaller

private ranc
dom invited.

Wher
very little
cost is a fe
adolescent b
parties begi
held for the
nity for unm
socially app
in nearby T
Jarana, Yuc
has been in
popular dan
Mérida.

In
of secular
school teac
songs and
tain the p

In
and no wom
made from
beverages
to get dr

private ranchers. The large merchants and non-ejido milperos are seldom invited.

When a married woman sponsors a party, it usually involves very little expense since no refreshments are served and the only cost is a few pesos for the musicians. The guests include unmarried adolescent boys and girls as well as married men and women. Such parties begin around 9 P.M. and end around 1 A.M., and are expressly held for the purpose of entertainment. They offer the main opportunity for unmarried boys and girls to interact physically within a socially approved context, and they focus around dancing. At fiestas in nearby Tzucacab and Peto the people prefer ballroom dancing and the Jarana, Yucatán's traditional folk dance. In Catmis, however, dancing has been influenced by Carribbean music from Quintana Roo; the most popular dance is the cúmbia, which comes from Chetumal rather than Mérida.

In addition to house parties, the villagers celebrate a couple of secular fiestas. On Mexico's Independence Day, for example, the school teachers organize a celebration in which children perform songs and take part in a parade. Cowboys from the ejido often entertain the people by racing around the village square on horseback.

In Catmis both men and women drink, although only a few men and no women are known for chronic drunkenness. Aguardiente, which is made from sugar cane, and bottled beer are the most popular alcoholic beverages. The more traditional villagers, and those who drink alone to get drunk, prefer aguardiente, while beer is used more often for major social occasions. Men drink with their friends and work mates

in public

provide be

important

also compl

In

activity.

friends, t

Young men

with and m

or Chetuma

not availa

So

T.V., deve

relationsh

music, may

years, but

the agrari

national

improved

national

Religion

I

individua

Only a f

in public places and at home. Political leaders are obligated to provide beer for their followers. Social drinking is especially important on Sunday afternoons in the two village taverns. Drinking also complements all village fiestas and private house parties.

In general, Catmiseños enjoy traveling as a leisure-time activity. They often go to Tzucacab or Peto to visit relatives and friends, to shop, or to see a doctor at one of the public clinics. Young men travel to fiestas in northern villages and towns to dance with and meet young women. Occasionally, they travel as far as Mérida or Chetumal where they take advantage of urban diversions which are not available in the village.

Some of these leisure-time activities, such as movies and T.V., developed because of technological changes, with little direct relationship to the agrarian reforms. Others, such as fiestas and music, may have changed somewhat in style and format through the years, but they find their origins in the village, many years before the agrarian reform. Still other forms of diversion, such as national holidays, occupationally organized sports like baseball, and improved roads and bus service, grew up in direct response to the national agrarian reforms.

Religion

In general, religion seems to function more as an outlet for individual needs than as an expression of class or village solidarity. Only a few religious events in Catmis involve village-wide cooperation. Occupation status and age differences in religious practices

are minima
much by th
Th
and ritual
ditional M
for many g
ceive Maya
expressed
practicing
is relativ
at the tim
are devout
trast to t
Th
their actu
impact of
vidual, su
villagers
periodica
common fo
to a sain
activitie
marry by
communion
by occupa

are minimal, which suggests that religion has not been affected very much by the agrarian reforms.

The villagers subscribe to a variety of religious beliefs and rituals. It is probably correct to assume that Catholic and traditional Mayan religious beliefs and practices co-existed in Catmis for many generations before the agrarian reform. Most villagers perceive Mayan and Catholic rituals as complementary; practically no one expressed a conflict in professing Catholicism and simultaneously practicing traditional Mayan customs. On the other hand, Protestantism is relatively new in the village, having been introduced around 1940 at the time of the agrarian reforms. The few Protestants in Catmis are devout, and they propose their beliefs and rituals in direct contrast to both Catholic and Mayan rituals.

The vast majority of villagers are nominally Catholic, but their actual compliance with church regulations is lax. The major impact of the Catholic church is in the life-crisis rites of the individual, such as baptism, marriage, and funerals. In addition, most villagers place pictures and statues of saints in their houses and periodically light candles to their favorite saints. It is also common for villagers to make promises (promésas) to sacrifice something to a saint in exchange for a particular favor. In spite of these activities, Catmiseños do not attend church regularly, many do not marry by Catholic ceremony, and most do not go to confession and communion. Table 22 presents data on participation in Catholic rituals by occupational status groups.

Table 22.-

Ejido	
Non-ejido	
Total	

[a]

According
pate occas
pate or pa
participat
ence betwe
social sta
emerged as

A
concerning
about 60 t
sionally,
percent ar
rule is th
rituals mo
under age
participat

Table 22.--Participation in Catholic ritual by occupational status.[a]

	Regularly		Occasionally		Fiestas Only		Never		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Ejido	8	17	32	67	4	8.0	4	8.0	48	100
Non-ejido	6	25	14	58	3	12.5	1	4.5	24	100
Total	14	19	46	64	7	10.0	5	7.0	72	100

[a]Data from questionnaire of village.

According to the table, about 64 percent of the Catmisenos participate occasionally in Catholic rituals, while 20 percent never participate or participate only on fiestas, and another 20 percent claim to participate regularly. In addition, the table shows little difference between ejidatarios and non-ejidatarios, an indication that no social status differences in Catholic religious participation have emerged as a result of the agrarian reform.

A similar picture appears in Table 23, which presents data concerning participation in Catholic ritual by age. Here, again, about 60 to 70 percent of each age group claim to participate occasionally, while 20 percent are regular participants, and another 20 percent are poor participants. The chief exception to this general rule is the 20-39 year old group, which participates in Catholic rituals more than the other age groups: Fully 93 percent of those under age 40 as compared to 76 to 82 percent of those over 30 claim to participate regularly or occasionally in Catholic rituals.

Table 23.

Age Group
20-39
40-59
60+
Total

a

T

The main
regular r
chants th
time the
of the vi
children
vices, a
saint. F
services
the rosar
midnight

B

Society o
funds for
zation ha

Table 23.--Participation in Catholic ritual by age.[a]

Age Group	Regularly N	%	Occasionally N	%	Fiestas Only N	%	Never N	%	Total
20-39	6	21.5	20	71.5	2	7	0	0	28
40-59	8	18.0	19	58.0	4	12	4	12	33
60+	2	18.0	7	64.0	1	9	1	9	11
Total	14	19.5	46	62.5	8	11	5	7	72

[a]Data from questionnaire of village.

The number of devoted Catholics in Catmis is rather small. The main keepers of the church are married and unmarried women. No regular religious services are held, but one unmarried girl frequently chants the rosary by herself in the church on Friday nights. The only time the priest comes to the village is to offer communion on the fiesta of the village patron saint. Most women pray at home and teach their children to pray. In addition, one women's cult holds special services, a novena and rosarios to the Virgin of Guadalupe, their favorite saint. For each of nine consecutive nights, the women rotate the services among their houses. The service usually consists of chanting the rosary and congregation responses, followed by refreshments at midnight when the service ends.

Before the factory closed, there was also a village-wide Society of the Virgin whose sole function was to organize and collect funds for the annual fiesta to the village patron saint; this organization has no connection with church ritual or doctrine. Villagers

claim tha

because o

past few

and the d

T

include:

Christmas

are celeb

gambling,

sions, pr

T

three day

symbols o

recreatio

its main

A

sponsor a

of the s

becomes

be sponso

year. Th

much pre

outlay a

by villa

Jorge wa

claim that after the factory closed, the association fell apart because of apathy and the poverty of the community. However, in the past few years, due to the financial improvements brought by the ejido and the development project, an effort has been made to revive it.

The most important religious holidays which are celebrated include: the Days of Santa Catalina, patron saint of the village; Christmas (La Navidád); and Lent (Carnavál). These religious fiestas are celebrated with music and dancing, drinking, special foods, rodeos, gambling, rides and amusements (especially during Carnavál), processions, prayers and sacrifices, and mass.

The Days of Santa Catalina begin on November 23 and last for three days and nights. This is the only religious fiesta which includes symbols of village solidarity as well as individual religious and recreational activities. It is, therefore, of interest to describe its main features.

At the annual meeting of the Society of the Virgin, the fiesta sponsor and new secretary are selected by acclamation of the members of the society. The secretary of the previous year automatically becomes the sponsor for the present year. In Catmis the fiesta may be sponsored by a man or a woman. Usually this is rotated from year to year. The sponsor organizes and leads the fiesta, for which he gains much prestige in the eyes of the villagers. However, his capital outlay and time expenditure in planning the fiesta are extremely high by village standards.

In 1970, for example, Don Jorge Cocon was the sponsor. Don Jorge was 30 years old, unmarried, an ejidatario, and the brother-in-law

of the eji
sister, ar
developmer
fulfill a
which he
As he cla
T
the homes
Society o
but this
The commu
while Don
Anticipat
a pig fiv
brought
religious
in Table
earned th
also con
more tha

the enti
Tzucacab
generato
to sell
eight da

of the ejido president. He lived with his mother and an unmarried sister, and he worked as a highly paid skilled worker for the ejido development project. He volunteered to sponsor the fiesta in order to fulfill a promise he had made to the virgin, and to revive the fiesta, which he claimed had declined in importance since the factory closed. As he claimed, "I wanted to bring back some life to Catmis."

Two Sundays before the fiesta two or three people go out to the homes asking the villagers for contributions. In past times the Society of the Virgin would demand 20 pesos from each of its members, but this year the fiesta depended entirely on voluntary contributions. The community as a whole gave 400 pesos for the religious events, while Don Jorge put up another 1,000 pesos for the festivities. Anticipating this relatively large capital expense, he had purchased a pig five months in advance for 75 pesos. When the pig was sold, it brought 600 pesos, most of which went to cover the mass and other religious expenditures. The total costs of the fiesta are itemized in Table 24. Most of the expenditure was covered by the large profits earned through the sale of beer. As mentioned above, the community also contributed 400 pesos, but the fiesta actually cost 700 pesos more than it earned, and the loss was covered by Don Jorge.

In addition to the costs of the fiesta, Don Jorge had to plan the entire event himself. This consisted of countless trips to Tzucacab, Peto, and Tekax to make arrangements for musicians, the generator for electricity, permission from the municipal government to sell alcohol and to have the fiesta. He also spent a total of eight days flattening the dirt road in front of his house to make a

dance flo

a great d

Table 24

EXPE

120

Orch

Rent

Mass

Boar

Tran

Fire

Perm

Perm

Cost

EARN

Beer

Comm

Bulls w

were al

the ima

dance floor for the first night of the fiesta. In this he was helped a great deal by his ejido friends using ejido machinery.

Table 24.--Itemization of fiesta expenditures and earnings.[a]

EXPENDITURES	Price
120 cartons of beer @ $26	$3,120
Orchestra from Tekax	1,300
Rental of chairs @ $50 per night x 3	150
Mass and other religious expenditures	400
Board and room for musicians for three nights	200
Transportation and musicians' fees	250
Firecrackers	375
Permit from municipal government to sell alcohol	345
Permit from municipal government to have fiesta	330
Cost of generator (before electricity installed)	390
Total Expenditures.....	$6,860
EARNINGS	
Beer (sold @ $2 per bottle x 2,880 bottles)	$5,760
Community contributions	400
Total Earnings.....	$6,160
Net Loss	$ 700

[a]From an interview with Don Jorge Cocon.

The fiesta itself consisted of three dances and a rodeo. Bulls were donated by the ejido and the small private ranchers. There were also three religious processions, one each afternoon, in which the image of the virgin saint was paraded around the village and

brought i

brought t

following

free milp

T

which was

are mainl

is held d

mony to v

ritual, w

is essent

for the f

A

perform t

house. T

down. Mo

of specia

winds. T

various

are fill

cooked t

also pre

the gods

herbs an

crosses,

h-meng c

brought into the church. On the third afternoon, the virgin was brought to Doña Florentina's house, where it would remain until the following year when Doña Florentina Tzul, the wife of a respected free milpero, would be the patrona of the fiesta.

Traditional Mayan religious practices include the hezmek, which was mentioned previously, and a number of other rituals that are mainly associated with the maize cycle. The Cha'Chaak ceremony is held during the harvest season and represents a thanksgiving ceremony to various deities in the Mayan pantheon. The U'Hakil Kol ritual, which takes place in March or April before the first rains, is essentially a supplication for rain and protection from illness for the farmer and his family.

A Mayan ritual priest (h-meng) is brought from Tzucacab to perform the U'Hakil'Kol ceremony in the backyard of a milpero's house. The ritual begins early in the morning and lasts until sundown. Most of the ritual revolves around the supervised preparation of special ceremonial foods which are offered to the gods of the four winds. The h-meng builds an altar of wood and places on it gourds, various glass objects, and incense in strategic places. The gourds are filled with mixtures of the foods, including a chicken head, cooked turkey, corn meal, corn husks, and chile pepper. The priest also prepares a traditional drink which is thought to be enjoyed by the gods; it consists of bark from an acacia tree, cinnamon, and other herbs and spices. Branches are cut from a tree and tied to form small crosses, which are then fastened to the corners of the altar. The h-meng chants a long series of prayers in three intervals, ending the

last pray
ritual, r
foods. F
and the m
rain and

often as
milpa plo
rituals t
selves, a
Table 25

Table 25

Age
20-39
40-59
60+
Tot

About 55
rituals;
a slight

last prayer at dusk. Women, who are not permitted to attend this ritual, remain inside the house where they help prepare some of the foods. Following the ritual, friends and family partake of the foods, and the milpa farmer feels confident that the gods will bring adequate rain and protect him from illness.

Villagers claim that these rituals are not performed today as often as they were in the past because fewer people cultivate private milpa plots. Nevertheless, many adult men still practice such Mayan rituals themselves, and others, who do not sponsor the rituals themselves, attend or participate in ceremonies sponsored by others. Table 25 considers participation in Mayan rituals by age.

Table 25.--Participation in Mayan rituals by age.[a]

Age	Participation		No Participation		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
20-39	12	48	13	52.0	25	100
40-59	22	63	13	37.0	35	100
60+	6	50	6	50.0	12	100
Total	40	55	32	44.5	72	100

[a]Data from village questionnaire.

About 55 percent of the adult male villagers participate in these rituals; half the men under age 40 and over age 60 participate, while a slightly higher percentage of men between ages 40 and 59 participate.

T

occupatio

Table 26.

Occupatio Status	
Ejido	
Non-ej	
Tot	

Accordin

ejidatar

the ejid

producti

to the e

tivation

support

of the a

as many

tivate

a week

all age

are aff

Table 26 presents data on participation in Mayan rituals by occupational status.

Table 26.--Participation in Mayan rituals by occupational status.[a]

Occupational Status	Participation		No Participation		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Ejido	30	62.5	18	37.5	48	100
Non-ejido	10	42.0	14	58.0	24	100
Total	40	55.5	32	44.5	72	100

[a]Data from village questionnaire.

According to the table, about 20 percent more ejidatarios than non-ejidatarios participate in these Mayan rituals, which suggests that the ejidatarios may be developing a greater involvement in maize production and maize agriculture as a result of the security offered to the ejido parcelarios by the agrarian reform. Data on milpa cultivation by occupation, which are presented in Table 27, tend to support this suggestion. The table illustrates that about 40 percent of the adult male villagers cultivate milpa. However, more than twice as many ejidatarios (47 percent) as non-ejidatarios (22 percent) cultivate milpa.

The Protestants in Catmis hold religious services three times a week in an adobe house. About 15 to 20 individuals representing all ages and occupations attend regularly, and another dozen people are affiliated. Typically, the Protestants are fervent about religious

Table 27.

Occupatio Status	
Ejidatari	
Non-ejida	
Total	

doctrine
as "paga
are comm
of their
themselv
ing, dan
Catalina

to be it
solely b
inclinat
which yi
ters.
mitted
individ
particu

Table 27.--Milpa cultivation by occupational status.[a]

Occupational Status	Milpa		No Milpa		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Ejidatarios	24	47	27	53	51	100
Non-ejidatarios	5	22	18	78	23	100
Total	29	39	45	61	74	100

[a]Data from village questionnaire.

doctrine and highly critical of the Catholic church, which they regard as "pagan." They do not participate in any of the local rituals which are commonly associated with the Catholic church. Moreover, because of their demand for strict personal discipline, they also disqualify themselves from participating in many other local activities. Drinking, dancing, and the worship of "graven images," including Santa Catalina, are strictly forbidden.

The main appeal of the Protestant church to Catmiseños seems to be its basically democratic organization. The church is supported solely by contributions from the people it serves. Any man with the inclination and ability to speak may become a minister, a position which yields no material benefits; three of the adherents are ministers. In addition, young people, and women as well as men, are permitted to vote for church officials. Finally, the church encourages individual participation in religious hymns and prayers, which has particular attraction to some of the young people.

I

not opera

villagers

More than

rituals w

few relig

involve s

However,

taining c

status an

participa

village l

duction

been rel

Public H

health s

National

week. H

but in e

serious

Peto mai

without

region.

that off

In Catmis wealth, prestige, and social status differences do not operate in terms of religious affiliation. Although the richest villagers are Catholics, some of the upwardly mobile are Protestants. More than half of the villagers participate in traditional Mayan rituals without conflict with their nominal Catholic affiliation. A few religious fiestas, particularly the Days of Santa Catalina, involve some degree of cooperation and solidarity among the villagers. However, religion does not appear to play a significant role in maintaining class solidarity, and religious differences in occupational status are minimal. Finally, there is little variation in religious participation by age, which implies that religious activities in the village have remained fairly stable over time, except for the introduction of Protestantism in the early 1940s, the impact of which has been relatively unimportant.

Public Health and Education

The agrarian reform brought significant improvements in public health services and educational facilities to the village. Today, the National Indigenous Institute sends a nurse to Catmis one day each week. Her principal responsibility is to serve the ejido community, but in emergencies she will treat anyone who comes to the clinic. For serious medical needs that cannot wait, the Institute branch office in Peto maintains a clinic with a doctor and two nurses, which is used, without charge, by ejidatarios and their families throughout the region. There is also a clinic with hospital facilities in Tzucacab that offers medical care to the non-ejidatarios of the area and sells

medicine

monly go

villager

service,

has all

Indigeno

owned pi

However,

of birth

tice the

Some pe

more pr

remote

even Ca

of mode

it. Ab

modern

sonnel.

local m

in Tzuc

fee by

they u

medicine at cost. Villagers from Catmis who are not ejidatarios commonly go to this clinic for treatment.

In addition to medical treatment, the government offers the villagers a number of other health services. The malaria eradication service, El Servicio Para La Iradicacion del Pauluismo, for example, has all but eliminated malaria from the region, and the National Indigenous Institute sends technicians to innoculate the privately owned pigs and cows of the villagers.

As a rule these health services are welcomed by the villagers. However, some traditional folk practices persist. The vast majority of births still take place in the home, and many families still practice the traditional Mayan customs associated with child delivery. Some people in Catmis also use folk medicine, but such cures are far more prevalent among the traditional Maya villagers who live in the remote hamlets and find it difficult to travel to Peto, Tzucacab, or even Catmis for medical attention.

In general, the people of Catmis understand the significance of modern medical care and are willing to go out of their way to get it. About six women in their late thirties and early forties use modern methods of birth control in consultation with the medical personnel. Similarly, in emergency cases involving serious injury, one local merchant uses his truck to take the victim to the hopsital-clinic in Tzucacab. For this service he charges 50 pesos, an exorbitant fee by local standards, but the villagers pay it, an indication that they understand the importance of modern medical attention.

U

or educat

built whi

wishing t

which has

dary scho

second sc

this addi

to 181 pr

children

parents

The few

branch c

apathy,

claiming

half th

school.

only 7

lagers

they re

literac

village

the men

women

Until the agrarian reforms of the 1930s, Catmis had no school or educational facilities of any kind. In 1935 a schoolhouse was built which provided instruction through the fourth grade. Students wishing to continue beyond the fourth grade had to go to Tzucacab, which has a school through six grades, or to Peto, which has a secondary school. Recently, under pressure from the ejido community, a second school house was constructed by the new company owner. With this additional building, the village school now provides instruction to 181 pupils through grade six.

Most adult villagers only relate to the school through their children. Except for two teachers, who are natives of Catmis, the parents and the school teachers hardly know each other personally. The few villagers with higher income and prestige control the local branch of the Parent-Teachers Association. Teachers complain of parent apathy, while parents regularly criticize the teachers for laziness, claiming they use any minor excuse to dismiss classes.

Most villagers attend school for only a few years. More than half the adult population has completed less than three years of school. About 35 percent have completed less than six years, while only 7 percent have completed six years or more. Most of the villagers have learned basic reading and writing skills, however, which they regard as the purpose of the school. Table 28 presents data on literacy corresponding to sex. Approximately 73 percent of the adult villagers are literate, while 27 percent are illiterate. In general, the men (82 percent literacy) are slightly more literate than the women (63 percent literacy).

Table 28

Se
Mal
Fem

ate do n
ment, an
modern v
able to
write si
cated te
or the l
Catmiser
writing
has cons
defensiv
believed
ones."

literacy

Table 28.--Literacy by sex.[a]

Sex	Literate		Illiterate		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Male	133	82	29	18	162	100
Female	94	63	56	37	150	100
Total	227	73	85	27	312	100

[a]Data from village questionnaire.

It should be noted, however, that most of those who are literate do not read and write well. Very few villagers read for enjoyment, and the level of literacy does not correspond to the needs of modern village life, which increasingly demand that the villagers be able to communicate with the larger society. Most people can read and write simple notes and letters, but cannot comprehend more sophisticated technical documents, such as the ejido credit society accounting or the loan contract the ejido credit society has with the bank. Catmiseños recognize this deficiency and often speak of reading and writing as tools necessary for "self-defense" in a world they believe has consistently exploited them. Thus, education is regarded as a defensive weapon as well as a means of controlling others. It is believed that uninformed people are abused and deceived by the "clever ones."

Data presented in Table 29 indicate little difference in literacy between ejido and non-ejido groups.

Table 29

Occupati Statu	
Ejido	
Non-ej	

About 68
percent
equal op

agrarian
educati
remain
siders

Table 3

Age	
10-2	
30-4	
50-6	
70+	
	T

Table 29.--Literacy by occupational status.[a]

Occupational Status	Literate N	Literate %	Illiterate N	Illiterate %	Total N	Total %
Ejido	36	69	16	31	52	100
Non-ejido	19	79	4	21	24	100

[a]Data from village questionnaire.

About 68 percent of the ejidatarios are literate, compared to 79 percent of the non-ejidatarios, which implies that everyone has had an equal opportunity for education.

Due to improvements in educational facilities brought by the agrarian reform, there is a trend for the younger generation to value education more than their parents and to permit their children to remain in school longer than in previous generations. Table 30 considers literacy according to age.

Table 30.--Literacy by age.[a]

Age	Literate N	Literate %	Illiterate N	Illiterate %	Total N	Total %
10-29	143	81	33	19	176	100
30-49	55	65	30	35	85	100
50-69	27	63	16	37	43	100
70+	2	25	6	75	8	100
Total	227	73	85	27	312	100

[a]Data from village questionnaire.

Of the v
pared to
addition
sacrific
Such act
socio-ec
accompli
of the a

importan
entertai
battery-
news fr
strong
has als
working
ing to
of thei
the Yuc

Althoug
paper,
tion th

Of the villagers under age 30, only 19 percent are illiterate, compared to 38 percent who are illiterate of those over age 30. In addition, two or three of the villagers have managed at great personal sacrifice to send their sons to an agricultural school near Tekax. Such actions indicate a growing awareness of education as a vehicle for socio-economic mobility. Thus, while educational facilities have not accomplished what is needed, they clearly have improved as a result of the agrarian reform.

Aside from formal education, the radio has become extremely important in the diffusion of news and propaganda and in providing entertainment. About half of the households in the village now own battery-operated radios. People commonly listen to popular music and news from Mérida, Chetumal, and Havana, Cuba. The radio has had a strong influence in replacing folk music with popular music, and it has also been very important in shaping local political attitudes of working-class solidarity. In this regard it is particularly interesting to note that the collective ejidatarios have probably learned more of their ideological orientation from Radio Havana than from any of the Yucatecan or other Mexican radio stations.

Newspapers have less influence on the community than the radio. Although about a dozen villagers obtain copies of the Mérida daily paper, El Diario Yucatán, most villagers do not believe the information they obtain from the papers.

family a
highest
and the
chapter,
trate th

owners h
all of t
process
the hous

Worker-
left th
obligat
ties to
associa
were fi
explana
were pe
tempora
housed
owner c
rights,

The Community and the Nation-State

After the above consideration of social relations within the family and within the community, it is now possible to turn to the highest level of social integration, relations between the community and the nation-state. According to the guiding hypothesis of this chapter, it is this level of social integration which should illustrate the most change as a result of the national agrarian reform.

Before the agrarian reforms of 1937 corporate factory and land owners held complete power in the village. Not only did they control all of the local resources associated with sugar cane production and processing, but they also owned the wells, stores, school, and even the houses in which the workers lived.

The owners used their powers to control the local laborers. Worker-owner relations were based on paternalism, which in practice left the workers no recourse when the owner failed to fulfill his obligations. Individual workers maintained separate patron-client ties to the owner, and the workers were not permitted to form any associations to represent their collective interests. Wages and hours were fixed by the owner. A worker could be fired at any time without explanation and usually without compensation. Only favored workers were permitted to live and work permanently in the village, while temporary workers, who came to Catmis during the harvest season, were housed in dormitories. Any workers who came into conflict with the owner could be expelled from the village through denial of water rights, housing, and goods from the village stores.

pation i
status,
state au
villager
workers
the yea
privatel
politica
lage di
dents c
tax col
interes

Catmis
class o
under f
medical
bargain
than th
and the
factory
sented

"ingéni
or tour

The workers were also denied access to any effective participation in government. The owners, by virtue of their upper-class status, maintained ties to the municipal president and higher-level state authorities, and made all the political decisions affecting the villagers, including selection of the local comisario from among the workers to maintain order in the community. In addition, throughout the years Catmis was classified as a factory (ingénio)* which was privately owned. This meant that the village had no recognized political status within the state governmental structure. The village did not hold communal lands or buildings, and the local residents could not send a delegation to the state assembly and had no tax collector or municipal officials who could represent their interests as a community before state authorities.

The agrarian reforms of 1937 brought federal capital into the Catmis sugar industry and created the labor union. As a formal working-class organization, the union brought certain rights to the laborers under formal contract. Among other improvements, it guaranteed housing, medical care, and fixed hours and wages, and it sanctioned collective bargaining with the administration. Nevertheless, the state, rather than the federal government, administered the sugar industry in Catmis, and the former corporate owners and hacendados became the resident factory administrators. The directorship of the sugar industry represented a political spoil which newly elected governors awarded to one

*In all national censuses through 1960, Catmis is listed as "ingénio." Moreover, the village does not appear on many commercial or tourist maps for the same reason.

of thei
rally,
planter
represe
workers

local e
quish c
sent it
bypassi
action
growers
(inclu
who der
crats,
plante
the sh
establ
ment p

reform
replac
inclu
the ma
the e
lowing

of their key political supporters or relatives (Pozas 1967). Naturally, the resident bureaucrats, who were also private landowners and planters on lands which had not been expropriated by the government, represented their own upper-class interests above those of the workers.

In 1962, three years before the Catmis factory closed and the local ejido was established, the state government was forced to relinquish control over the local sugar industry when the federal government sent its own bureaucrats to administer the factory directly, thus bypassing the state. As previously discussed in Chapter Two, this action of the federal government was unacceptable to the large sugar growers and landowners in the area. More than any single factor (including the local pressures caused by a segment of factory workers who demanded an ejido), the ensuing conflict between federal bureaucrats, on the one hand, and state bureaucrats and local landowner-planters on the other, led to the closing of the factory. Following the shutdown of the sugar factory in 1965, the federal government established the ejido and initiated the ejido credit society development project in the village.

By far the most significant political change which the agrarian reform brought to Catmis is that federal administrative agencies have replaced private corporate controls over the means of production, including the source of capital, land ownership and land tenure, and the management of the local labor force. Contemporary relations between the ejidatarios and federal agents are discussed in detail in the following chapter, which deals with the local ejido polity.

Although somewhat less significant, a second result of the agrarian reform is that the local community has increasingly developed political ties with the state government. During the hacienda period the state government and the federal government were weak, and the villagers had no direct relations with government officials because the factory owners controlled all of the contact with higher-level authorities. During the period of the government-owned sugar industry the state governor became an important figure since he appointed the administrators in the sugar industry. In those days, however, the governor overtly represented the interests of the hacendado class. In 1956, for example, when a group of sugar cane workers from Catmis wanted to form a collective sugar planters association, they went directly to the state governor, who gave them little assistance. In fact, he did everything possible to discourage them. According to the villagers, the governor even lied by telling them that the lands around the factory were privately owned when many of the lands were really unclaimed government lands.

Today, the state governor is known to a number of villagers personally and is an important figure. Villagers fear his authority and power since he has control over law enforcement and may use the police force at his discretion. Nevertheless, Catmiseños feel that they have the right to confront him directly regarding important village matters, and they do not hesitate to send delegations to Mérida to speak directly with the governor. As previously mentioned, a small group of non-ejidatarios recently asked the governor to act toward the establishment of a second ejido. Moreover, as a result of the active

politick

and form

rights t

state,

The vil

recentl

old sou

to the

isolati

to a la

village

in Tzuc

of ass

power,

betwee

while

politi

For ex

Peto t

accoun

owners

Peto

tion

the s

politicking of the villagers, the governor of Yucatán came to Catmis and formally declared that it had become a "pueblo" with official rights to send a delegate to the state assembly in Mérida.

Despite such evidence of increasing political ties to the state, Catmis is generally unimportant in the state political process. The village is still situated relatively far from Mérida, and, until recently, transportation was poor. Moreover, Catmis is located in the old southern sugar zone, an area which is only marginally important to the henequen-dominated state economy. Continued geographical isolation and economic variance from the northern zone has contributed to a lack of active participation in politics beyond the level of the village. For example, the villagers are only peripherally involved in Tzucacab municipal politics. One corn merchant enjoys the title of assistant to the municipal president, but the position carries no power, only prestige.

Formal municipal elections reveal the continued conflict between the federal government and the private sector in the area, while the average villager has little to say in this because the political decision-making process takes place on a higher level. For example, in the 1970 elections in the neighboring municipality of Peto the National Indigenous Institute supported one candidate--the accountant for the Catmis mixed farming project; the large ranch owners supported a second candidate, and the population of the town of Peto supported a third candidate. Campaigning for the party nomination was rigorous and enthusiastic since obtaining the nomination is the same as getting the position. Although the state governor makes

the final
support as
nor nomina
reflectin

T
participa
all of th
and for o
Mexico's
the proce
in which
governmer
in these
past aff
present
involved

hypothes
the agr
. The hyp
was imp
integra
would c
seen i

the final decision, each candidate tries to rally as much popular support as possible. In this instance, as in former times, the governor nominated the candidate of the large private ranchers, thus reflecting their continued power in the area.

This lack of participation, however, does not exclude ritual participation. Like most Mexican peasants since the agrarian reform, all of the adult Catmiseños vote for state deputies and governors and for other high-ranking officials in state and national elections. Mexico's one-party system leaves little room for local involvement in the process of selecting candidates. Voting is essentially a ritual in which the villagers are expected to affirm the choice of the national government party, PRI. Nevertheless, Catmiseños vote with enthusiasm in these elections and are patriotic about voting because of their past affiliation with the National Sugar Workers' Union and their present ties to the federal government through agencies which are involved in the mixed farming project of the ejido.

Summary

It is necessary to summarize this chapter in light of the hypothesis which was proposed concerning the differential effects of the agrarian reform on three different levels of social integration. The hypothesis was stated as follows: that since the agrarian reform was imposed on the village from above, the higher levels of social integration as seen in the community's relations with the nation-state would demonstrate more change than the lower levels of integration as seen in the family and in community-level activities.

ejidata

descri

ranked

acteri

(1) of

lage c

(4) oc

explai

to sel

Most o

a good

member

betwee

that t

a your

differ

in th

non-e

regul

non-e

as ar

lower

emplo

The first section examined the ejidatarios and the non-ejidatarios as occupational status groups in the lower class. In a description of status positions within the ejido, the ejidatarios were ranked into four prestige groups based primarily on personality characteristics but also on a series of observable indices which included: (1) official positions held in the ejido, (2) leadership in the village community, (3) business activities outside the ejido, and (4) occupational skill and reputation as a good worker.

The generally low-status positions of the non-ejidatarios were explained by differentiating them from the ejidatarios with reference to selected demographic, economic, and socio-political characteristics. Most of the younger non-ejidatarios are related to ejidatarios and have a good chance of becoming ejidatarios in the next augmentation of ejido membership. In contrast, most of the non-ejidatarios in the age groups between 30 and 60 years old leave the village because they recognize that they cannot achieve the same status as a young ejidatario or even a young non-ejidatario with an ejidatario relative. This demographic difference between ejidatarios and non-ejidatarios is reflected further in the higher emigration rates, both seasonal and permanent, of the non-ejidatarios. The combination of ejido land rights and a more regular income enables the ejidatarios to remain in Catmis, while many non-ejidatarios have to emigrate in search of work.

While important, such demographic differences are not as basic as are the economic and social differences. The non-ejidatarios have lower status in Catmis because they do not have regular rights to employment or land use in the ejido and because, on the average, they

have a sl
in compar
material
standard
from the
ejidatari
the non-e
attribut

politica
allowed
less pro
who try
the none
the de f
lage.

of soci
which t
high de
ing wag
tively
graphic
in resp
include
the ave

have a slightly lower standard of living than the ejidatarios as seen in comparisons of income and expenditures and the accumulation of material wealth. Such material improvements in the ejidatarios' standard of living suggest that they have benefited in some minor ways from the rapidly expanding ejido economy. However, since the ejidatarios' standard of living is only slightly better than that of the non-ejidatarios, no major economic changes in lifestyle can be attributed to the agrarian reform.

Finally, the non-ejidatarios are handicapped by lack of political organization and influence in the community. They are not allowed to use the ejido medical services in the village and they have less protection than the ejidatarios against the new company employees who try to evict them from their homes. In most community activities the nonejidatarios have to take orders from ejido officials, who are the de facto controllers of the social and political life of the village.

The second section turned to a description of the lowest level of social integration--the family. In a social and economic setting which traditionally has been characterized by limited resources, a high degree of geographical mobility of the population, and fluctuating wage labor opportunities, the family in Catmis has remained relatively stable. As a result of the agrarian reforms, a number of demographic aspects of family life appear to have changed, particularly in response to improvements in public health services. Such changes include the following: The size of the average family has increased; the average male begins his family of procreation when he is older but

he liv

the re

not ap

slight

relati

acteri

econom

status

Extend

ever,

househ

relati

the ag

change

reform

parent

After

people

union,

have

the e

in th

agrar

agrar

he lives longer; and the average household lasts longer. Nevertheless, the relations which make up the internal dynamics of the family do not appear to have changed very much. Marriage types show some slight variation by age but very little by occupation. Nuclear family relations, which lie at the heart of the family structure, are characterized by bonds of loyalty and emotion, mutual dependence and economic cooperation. Such relations do not vary with occupational status. Indeed, they appear to be the most stable bonds in the society. Extended family relations provide supplementary security needs. However, the frequency of extended family households relative to other household types has not increased over time, nor has the quality of relations between extended family members been altered in response to the agrarian reform.

Finally, bonds of ritual kinship represent the only important change in familial relations which can be attributed to the agrarian reform. Before the Revolution of 1910 people frequently chose co-parents from among the hacienda owners and businessmen of the factory. After the implementation of agrarian reforms in the 1930s, however, people chose co-parents from among their fellow-workers in the labor union, and, following the recent agrarian reforms in the 1960s, people have begun to select co-parents from among their fellow workers within the ejido organization. The selection of ritual kin indicates a change in the direction of increasing working-class solidarity, and the agrarian reform clearly provided the impetus for this change.

The third section considered the changes brought by the national agrarian reforms to community-level activities and institutions.

Leisure-t
few of th
developed
tionship
as fiesta
the years
before th
the celeb
like bas
in direc

needs th
vast maj
pliance
Mayan ri
particip
performe
pants a
Santa C
religio
year, a
beer dr
traditi
althoug
partici
involve

Leisure-time activities and religion have remained fairly stable. A few of the newer leisure-time activities, such as movies and T.V., developed because of technological changes with little direct relationship to the agrarian reform. Other leisure-time activities, such as fiestas and music, may have changed in style and format through the years, but they find their origins in the village many years before the agrarian reform. Still other forms of diversion, such as the celebration of national holidays, occupationally organized sports like baseball, and improved roads and bus service for travel, grew up in direct response to the agrarian reforms.

Religion seems to function more as an outlet for individual needs than as an expression of class or village solidarity. The vast majority of villagers are nominally Catholic, though their compliance with church regulations is lax and they maintain traditional Mayan rituals without any personal religious conflict. An analysis of participation in Catholic rituals indicates that rituals are commonly performed and that no occupational or age differences in the participants are evident. The most important village fiesta, the Days of Santa Catalina, shows some village cooperation and solidarity in religious practice, but such holidays occur only two or three times a year, and the vast majority of the expenditures go for fiesta and beer drinking rather than for religious activities. Participation in traditional Mayan rituals also shows little difference by age, although there is a significant occupational difference: Ejidatarios participate more than non-ejidatarios because more ejidatarios are involved in milpa cultivation and the traditional Mayan rituals are

associa

duction

a few a

stable

are tho

have pr

since t

underst

get the

through

for on

teache

school

lagers

corres

litera

age re

age 30

illita

highe

and t

brief

commu

consi

associated with the maize agricultural cycle. Except for the introduction of Protestantism in the early 1940s, which has attracted only a few adherents, religious practices in Catmis seem to have remained stable since the agrarian reform.

The most significant changes in community-level institutions are those in public health and education. Various government agencies have provided medical care and other health services to the villagers since the agrarian reforms of the 1930s. As a rule the villagers understand and welcome such services and even go out of their way to get them. The agrarian reforms also brought improvements in education through the introduction of the school. Most villagers attend school for only a few years, however, and relations between parents and teachers are superficial. More than half the adult population attended school for less than three years. Seventy-three percent of the villagers are technically literate, but their level of literacy does not correspond to their needs. There are no significant variations in literacy according to occupation, although differences according to age reveal the impact of the agrarian reform: Of the villagers under age 30, only 19 percent are illiterate, compared to 38 percent who are illiterate of those over age 30.

The final section of this chapter reviewed the changes on the highest level of social integration--the relations between the community and the nation-state. The discussion in this chapter consisted of a brief consideration of the effect of these changes on the entire village community since the following chapter treats local ejido politics in considerable detail. According to the original hypothesis in this

chapte

the mo

tive a

of pro

create

popula

consti

agrari

but al

ties f

goverr

ment c

villag

the v

tics

They

they

econo

and h

which

taker

chapter, it is this level of social integration which illustrates the most change as a result of the national agrarian reforms.

By far the most important change is that federal administrative agencies have replaced private corporate controls over the means of production. In conjunction with such changes, the government has created formal labor organizations to represent the working-class population before federal agrarian reform agencies. Today, the ejido constitutes the most important of these organizations.

Although somewhat less important, a second result of the agrarian reform is that the local community, especially the ejidatarios but also the non-ejidatarios, has increasingly developed political ties to the state government. Villagers often confront the state governor directly on matters of local concern, such as the establishment of a second ejido in Catmis and the official recognition of the village as a "pueblo" with representation in the state assembly.

Despite such evidence of closer ties to the state, however, the villagers of Catmis show no interest in regional issues or politics beyond their immediate local economic and political concerns. They vote in state and federal elections as a matter of ritual, and they are uninvolved in municipal affairs, probably because they are economically independent from Tzucacab, the municipal capital.

This chapter has examined three levels of social integration and has proved the hypothesis that, as a result of the agrarian reform which was imposed on the village from above, more social change has taken place on the higher levels than on the lower levels of social

integrat

this st

and att

ejido o

elabora

evidenc

integration. In turning to a consideration of local ejido politics, this study will examine the highest level of integration in detail, and attention will now focus on the various relations which link the ejido organizations to higher-level political entities. Through an elaboration of these relationships, the following chapter offers further evidence in support of this hypothesis.

CHAPTER SIX

LOCAL EJIDO POLITICS

Introduction

This chapter considers the effects of agrarian reform on the highest level of social integration, the political relations of the local ejido organization. Consistent with the hypothesis proposed in the preceding chapter, the present discussion illustrates the most significant changes in local politics as a result of the national agrarian reform. Before the agrarian reform no formal labor or political organization existed to represent the interests of the local working-class population. In the early phase of the agrarian reform, however, Cárdenas established the National Sugar Workers' Union, which had a local chapter in Catmis. Then, during the recent phase of the agrarian reform, the ejido and collective ejido development project have been established to provide a new formal labor and political organization for the ejido population.

The data in this chapter describe political events and interactions with political significance which were observed during the course of the field research. In the discussion each example of political relations reflects a set of group interaction patterns which has emerged as a result of the agrarian reform. The principal patterns include cooperation, conflict, and alliance.

highest

local e

in the

signifi

agraria

politic

working

however

had a

agraria

have b

organi

action

course

politi

has em

inclu

CHAPTER SIX

LOCAL EJIDO POLITICS

Introduction

This chapter considers the effects of agrarian reform on the highest level of social integration, the political relations of the local ejido organization. Consistent with the hypothesis proposed in the preceding chapter, the present discussion illustrates the most significant changes in local politics as a result of the national agrarian reform. Before the agrarian reform no formal labor or political organization existed to represent the interests of the local working-class population. In the early phase of the agrarian reform, however, Cárdenas established the National Sugar Workers' Union, which had a local chapter in Catmis. Then, during the recent phase of the agrarian reform, the ejido and collective ejido development project have been established to provide a new formal labor and political organization for the ejido population.

The data in this chapter describe political events and interactions with political significance which were observed during the course of the field research. In the discussion each example of political relations reflects a set of group interaction patterns which has emerged as a result of the agrarian reform. The principal patterns include cooperation, conflict, and alliance.

which
into t
the ej
and in

organi
cant p
that f
means
and th
endowe
and th
ejida
federa
cies.
ejido
formi
sion

revol
cript
ous I
eral
broug
the f

To understand the changes in political structure and process which the agrarian reform brought to Catmis, the discussion is divided into three sections which examine the political relations both within the ejido and between ejido organizations and other political entities and interest groups.

The first section focuses on the relations between ejido organizations and federal agrarian reform agencies. The most significant political change which the agrarian reform brought to Catmis was that federal administration replaced private controls over the local means of production, including the source of capital, land ownership, and the management of the local labor force. Today, a federally endowed bank supplies the capital for the Catmis development project, and the Department of Agrarian Affairs protects the land rights of the ejidatarios. The National Indigenous Institute serves as the principal federal agency which coordinates the activities of these other agencies. The Institute also administers the mixed farming project of the ejido by managing the credit society collective labor force and by forming new credit societies corresponding to the technological expansion of the project.

The first part of the discussion reviews the impact of Mexico's revolutionary political ideology in Catmis, followed by a brief description of the theoretical concepts and goals of the National Indigenous Institute in the southern Maya region. Next, the control of federal agrarian reform agencies over the human resources of the ejido is brought to light by elaborating upon the expanding ejido economy and the formation of new credit societies. The section closes with a

descr

proje

ejido

capit

or he

polit

the c

chief

the p

tion.

flict

the p

and c

gener

tions

the f

facto

input

This

over

description of labor-administration relations on the mixed farming project.

The second section focuses on political relations within the ejido. Administrative controls over local resources combined with capital and job shortages on the development project have determined or heavily influenced practically every aspect of internal ejido politics. The section begins with a review of labor relations within the credit society organization. Next, the role of credit society chief representative is described, followed by a brief analysis of the process of factional conflict within the credit society organization. The section ends with a consideration of cooperation, conflict, and alliance between credit societies.

The final section deals with relations between the ejido and the private sector. In this discussion examples of both cooperation and conflict are presented to illustrate the local conditions which generate these group patterns of political interaction.

The Ejido and the Federal Agrarian Reform Administration

It is necessary to begin the discussion by examining the relations between the ejido and the federal agrarian reform agencies since the federal agrarian reform administration, more than any single factor, has shaped the local polity of the ejido by controlling capital inputs, the natural resources of the ejido, and the ejido labor force. This section considers the various dimensions of administrative control over the human resources of the ejido and the political relationships

which have emerged between ejido organizations and federal agrarian reform agencies.

The Impact of Mexico's
Revolutionary Political Ideology

Under Lazaro Cárdenas, Mexico established formal worker and peasant organizations and developed articulate economic and socio-political aspirations for the working class. As previously mentioned, the ejido land distribution program and the political structure which integrates the ejido into the federal government to a great extent are responsible for the political stability Mexico has enjoyed since the Revolution.

One major element in this political stability is the revolutionary political ideology which the federal government espouses. For the present purpose two facets of this ideology should be considered: first, the expression of faith in material progress; and second, the notion of peasant and government cooperation in a dynamic relationship whose principal purpose is to achieve economic and socio-cultural development. Indeed, the government praises the peasant and worker in the context of national economic development and pledges government assistance to them to raise their standard of living.

In Catmis this ideology translates directly into support for the development of local ejido resources as seen in the mixed farming development project and the ejido collective labor organization. The need for group spirit (conciencia), a persistent theme in ejido discussion, finds its origin in the administration's charge to the

ejida

who a

rheto

in th

requ

a por

plot

istic

ences

it ap

the e

were

growe

the v

mate

convi

purch

cials

found

charf

of th

in th

duced

ejidatarios to work without conflict, both with the government agents who are sent to help them and with each other.

In general, Catmiseños accept this national ideology and rhetoric, primarily because it has been accompanied by tangible results in the ejido. Nevertheless, a minority of ejidatarios object to the requirement to work collectively without being able to parcel at least a portion of the lands so that each ejidatario may also work his own plot independently. Hence, both collectivistic and more individualistic ideologies are represented in the ejido. Although such differences have not yet become the basis for political action, nevertheless, it appears that a fundamental ideological conflict has emerged within the ejido over this issue.

It should be remembered that the original Catmis ejidatarios were temporary factory workers who tried to form a collective sugar growers' society. At that time, literally every interest group in the village tried to frustrate their efforts. Among its more legitimate attempts to ruin the collective, the private landowners-planters convinced the state-appointed bureaucrats of the factory to refuse to purchase sugar cane from the collective. Even the local union officials acted against the incipient ejido movement by expelling its founders from the local Sugar Workers' Union. For a small group of charter members and founders the ejido symbolized the tangible result of their sugar growers' collective organization and their persistence in the face of opposition at every turn.

With the establishment of the ejido, these founders introduced an articulate ideology supporting collective labor activities

and, at the same time, condemning the prospect of individual initiative on the ejido. They believed that the Catmis ejidatarios had an obligation to continue working collectively, and they justified their collective ejido program with a number of ideological arguments that stressed the heroism of the collective labor movement in the past and its advantages for the present and the future of the village.

In the first place, they believed that collective labor represents the principal weapon of the working class against the private sector which for so long exploited the Catmis proletariat. During the hacienda period those who controlled the factory and the lands did not allow land rights to the laborers in the village. A man sold his labor and loyalty to a capitalist patrón, who exploited him. These men claimed that collective farming, in contrast to the plantation system, permits the peasants to determine their own fate and owe their loyalty to their work associates.

The second argument used by the original founders of the ejido was based on the fact that in Yucatán's southern zone modern farming methods are rapidly replacing traditional, primitive agriculture. One cannot make a living in the modern age without capital and machinery. The only way for the campesinos to gain access to these tools is through collective credit. Thus, they advocated learning and cooperating with the government agents who teach the necessary skills to run the farm and offer loans through the credit society. It is impossible, they argued, to divide land into individual parcels when the land is cultivated by machinery and irrigated. Without a collective labor organization, they claimed, they could not build a

new

all

trat

clai

farm

work

ment

a se

econ

lect

its

offe

core

coll

the

orga

the

year

decl

est

the

the

admi

new school, a dairy, a meat plant, or put electricity on the ejido--all projects which the collective group proposed for the ejido.

The final argument of this first credit society group illustrates the advantages of collective farming in the future. They claimed that those who shared in the collective farm would own the farm communally, would continue receiving credits, would have regular work and dividends from the profits, and would share in the development of the ejido lands. In the collective ejido, they said, there is a sense of unity and comaraderie with fellow members and clear economic goals for which to strive. A final advantage which the collective group emphasized was that the collective organization provides its members with direct ties to higher levels of government, thereby offering local participation in the political process.

In 1965, shortly before the mixed farming project began, the core group of ejido founders made their first effort to put their collective ideology into operation. They obtained private loans from the Banco Hydrogenadora de Yucatán, and established a collective labor organization consisting of 25 members. The ejido leaders administered the funds themselves and managed the labor activities. After one year the basic loans ran out and, because of poor management, the bank declared the project a failure. By 1970 the balance and unpaid interest on this debt came to about a million pesos.

Following the failure of the ejido-managed credit society, the core group of ejidatarios requested and received loans to begin the mixed farming project and form a new credit society under the administration of the National Indigenous Institute. In order to

swel

not

the

cred

shut

the

the

soci

diff

in i

tive

and

they

indi

coll

cred

achi

this

the

mana

his

form

the

vill

swell their ranks, the core group admitted many ejidatarios who were not involved in the sugar collective or in the earlier problems in the formation of the ejido. Rather, these individuals joined the credit society because they had no other employment after the factory shut down.

These new members developed an ideology which conflicted with the collective ideology of the original ejidatarios. Without denying the merits of collective farming or the obvious benefits of the credit society and the economic development of the ejido, their ideology differed in that it defined the ultimate goal of the collective ejido in individualistic terms. They agreed to the necessity of collective farming on pragmatic grounds: It was the only way to get capital and machinery to develop the lands. However, they claimed that, once they repaid the debt to the bank, they would prefer to take their individual portions of land and cattle and farm alone, without the collective credit society. In other words, for them the collective credit society represented a vehicle, a means by which they could achieve an ultimately individualistic end.

Through his personal life experience the chief proponent of this ideology exemplified the aspirations of many ejidatarios. Until the final shutdown of the sugar industry, his father remained a loyal manager for the largest private sugar planter in the region. He and his brother, however, had joined the ejido and had helped in the formation of the original credit society. His problem with some of the ejidatarios was that his family homestead was situated outside the village but on lands which had been granted to the ejido. After the

ejido was established, he and his brother obtained permission from the ejido society and fenced off about 30 hectares for his family's small cattle ranch. The original core group of the ejido later criticized him and his brother for working an individual fenced-off parcel, while at the same time participating in the collective credit society. Claiming that there was an ideological conflict involved, they accused him of hypocrisy. Still, other ejidatarios saw no such conflict since this family had achieved what many of them were striving for--a homestead with a few hectares of ejido land, some cattle, and the chance to earn regular cash wages working on the credit society project.

This ideology represented a return to the original post-revolutionary concept of ejido in which pre-Cárdenas administrations tried to establish small, individually worked family farms within the communal land system. Naturally, this goal is incompatible with the Cárdenas approach consisting of an agrarian reform administration which seeks to develop the land through intensive capital investment and modern technology, but which also requires a collective ejido labor organization and a single unit of production in order to be profitable.

The National Indigenous Institute

Structurally, the federal administration is a multifaceted bureaucracy. On the local level more than five semi-autonomous agencies perform specialized tasks, such as the construction and maintenance of the ejido irrigation system and the protection of ejido land rights. Ultimately, these agencies are integrated on a level of administration

above the region. However, because they are funded independently from each other, they operate with a good deal of autonomy on the local level with respect to their control over ejido resources.

This multifaceted bureaucratic structure provides a number of important advantages for the federal government. For example, the government gains security in its knowledge that no single agency or local ejido organization could gain control over all the productive resources of the ejido and begin to function independently from government decisions. For the ejido, however, this structure possesses a distinct potentiality for bureaucratic chaos; unless the activities of the various agencies are coordinated, no systematic production or economic development would be possible.

Probably because of this requirement for coordination, one key agency, the National Indigenous Institute, has been designated as the principal agency in the region which links the Catmis ejido to the federal government. Through its regional center the National Indigenous Institute accepted the responsibility of administering the capital and managing the ejido labor/credit society for the mixed farming project. In addition, because of its proximity to Catmis, the Institute in Peto coordinates many activities of the other federal agrarian reform agencies. For example, it coordinates the project operation with the Department of Agrarian Affairs and the Ministry of Public Works to insure cooperation regarding individual and collective ejido land rights, the legal utilization of ejido lands by the mixed farming project, and the use of water in irrigating the administered farm. Of course, the ejido organization has formal rights and

responsibilities with respect to each of these agencies. Nevertheless, since the Institute acts on a daily basis as an intermediary between the ejido and other agencies, the relations between the ejido and the Institute are clearly the most important.

Before elaborating upon the patterns of political relations between the ejido and the Institute, however, it is instructive to digress briefly and consider the background of this agency, including the theoretical concepts and concrete objectives which underlie its policies. Indeed, understanding the Institute's charter is important to the present investigation because this agency represents one of Mexico's most innovative and progressive anthropological approaches to directed change and cultural integration. In the opinion of some, "it is the most adequate approach to directed change in Meso-America" (Ewald 1967: 504).

Established in 1948, the chief concern of the National Indigenous Institute has been with the policy of "indigenism" as an aspect of social integration. The Institute emphasizes the regional scope of change, and the Coordinating Center constitutes the vehicle for regional integration. The theory behind the Coordinating Centers developed in response to the failure of earlier community-centered applied programs:

> Early attempts at social integration were handicapped by the existing state of knowledge of the cultural reality of Mexico. Most anthropological community studies conceived the community as an isolated, self-sufficient, static entity. These studies . . . failed to define the position of such communities within the social structure of the nation. It followed that programs of integration were atomized according to the multiplicity of existing communities in the country (Ibid.).

Further field research plus the concrete knowledge gained from applied projects led the Institute to adopt a perspective which contrasted sharply with the earlier approach. In the modern view Indian communities are seen as

> . . . satellites in a constellation, the nucleus in each case being an urban Mestizo community. Indian communities were interdependent parts of systematic wholes, with the actions of the parts inevitably affecting other parts, and the whole (Ibid.).

The earlier concerns with the definition of Indian and Indianness and the study of the folk-urban continuum ceased being important. The new emphasis was on analysis and change among communities comprising a regional system. Aguirre Beltran, present director of the Institute, explains the new perspective:

> . . . What became important was the integral development of the system, that is, of the cultural region that included Indians, Mestizos, and Ladinos, inasmuch as their mutual dependence connects them so inextricably that it is impossible to think of the improvement of one without being concerned with raising the level of the other (Ibid.).

Since the most isolated, self-sufficient communities are the least dependent, policy is directed toward creating and strengthening the ties between these communities and the larger system in order to break down isolation. This is achieved by promoting health facilities, economic growth, and communications, including roads and national language, to raise the level of acculturation. According to Aguirre Beltran,

> The basic objective is to achieve, within a discernible future, the constitution of a homogeneously integrated cultural region with a profile and character of its own, functioning smoothly with the aggregate of cultural regions which comprise the larger national society (Ibid.).

The bureaucratic structure of the Coordinating Centers has been described by Julio De la Fuente: "The Centers coordinate, in each area, the economic and technical resources of the Institute with those of the federal agencies functioning in that area, and other agencies representing Indians and non-Indians in that area" (Ibid.: 505). A social anthropologist heads each center, making policy decisions for the entire region which is influenced by that center. The center has an administrator, but he is subordinate to the anthropologist because his interests are somewhat different from the principal goals of the Institute. As Aguirre Beltran points out,

> Because the goal pursued is the integration and development of a region, it is assumed that the specialist in the social sciences is the person best fitted to handle the problems of daily living which arise through contact of human groups belonging to different cultures (Ibid.).

Under the director-anthropologist is a team of field technicians who work in the various projects managed by the center: doctors, nurses, public health trainees, educators, other anthropologists,* and agricultural engineers. A third level of technicians includes the promotores, bilingual Indians, who are natives of the region and have been trained for the purpose of introducing new ideas, techniques, and forms of organization into the community.

By 1970 regional Coordinating Centers had been established in six areas of Mexico which are inhabited heavily by indigenous peoples: the Tzeltal-Tzotzel, the Papaloapan (Mazatec), the Mixtec, the Tarahumara, Cora-Huichol, and the Yucatec Maya.

---

*In rural Mexico applied anthropologists perform functions similar to those of social workers in the United States.

The Centro Coordinadór de la Región Maya (CCRM) is the most recent of the Institute's centers. Established in Peto in 1965, this agency was charged with the task of integrating the relatively unacculturated Mayans of Yucatán's southern zone into the national culture and economy of Mexico. Since then, the regional coordinating agency has developed a number of programs in medical health, bilingual education, and economic development, and has contributed to the resolution of many local ejido problems.

The Institute's involvement in the Catmis project grew out of its general concern with the poor economic condition of the southern zone and its specific concern with the depression in Catmis caused by the closing of the sugar cane factory. Claiming that the annual earning of the average Catmis family ranged from 3,500 to 4,000 pesos, or about 10 to 12 pesos per day (US $1.00), the institute proposed to raise the standard of living, increase occupations and earnings, and expand the ejido economy through the mixed farming development project.

Yet the Institute does not have complete control over the project. Its primary administrative function is to implement policies and decisions which have been made on a higher level. The major decisions regarding the use of capital, for example, are made by the Mixed Farming Bank, not the Institute. Chapter Three illustrated how the bank determines the size of the Basic Development Loans and restricts the number of ejidatarios who can belong to the credit society. The bank also determines the amount of each Supplementary Loan according to the estimated production of crops or cattle in a

designated season, rather than according to an estimation of the costs of labor which would be needed for the same production. Tables B8-B12 (Appendix B) list the expenditures, for example, for the Supplementary Loan for the cultivation of specified crops. Each accounting category in the tables provides the amount to be spent on specified cultivation activities, but no category for labor expenditures is explicitly designated. In other words, capital is issued according to the technological requirements of the project, not the labor requirements of the ejidatarios.

Thus, the management-labor structure of the Institute is charged to keep the project within the financial limits set by the Mixed Farming Bank. In order to accomplish this task, the Institute has two major administrative functions with respect to the credit society collective labor organization. First, it directs and manages the labor activities of the credit society in the daily operations of the farm. The effect of this administrative function in shaping ejido labor politics is discussed in detail in the following section. Second, the Institute supervises the formation of new credit societies with permission from the bank and the Department of Agrarian Affairs.

Labor-Administration Relations on the Mixed Farming Project

On the ejido mixed farming project labor relations between the credit society ejidatarios and the Institute agents are impersonal and characterized by formal rights and obligations of labor and administration. The management-labor bureaucracy which underlies this relationship was described in Chapter Three. (There is therefore no

need to repeat it in detail here.) Each week the technical director of the Institute determines the number of workers and the tasks to be performed by the ejidatarios on the project. The credit society chief representative functions as job distributor and chief foreman of the labor force. Technicians from the Institute, including an agronomist and a veterinarian, work closely with the auxiliary representatives of the credit society who manage the ejido work force. Consequently, neither the technical director nor the technicians from the Institute work directly in the field with the credit society members.

Formal relations between labor and administration take place in credit society meetings which are sometimes initiated by agents from the Institute through the credit society chief representative. Such meetings are usually characterized by an atmosphere of cooperation and congeniality, probably because most of the labor conflicts and grievances of the members have been expressed in credit society meetings which the Institute agents have not attended. In higher-level meetings between labor and administration the technical director and the accountant from the Institute inform the credit society members of the financial condition of the project. Reports are made concerning major financial decisions, including large purchases of equipment, alteration of investments, opening new loans, and marketing of produce from the farm. The Institute formally acts as the agent for the credit society to the bank. Although the society ultimately is responsible for repaying the loans, the Institute has signed as guarantor for a sizable

portion of the debt, and the credit society has formally agreed to permit the Institute to administer the funds.

Nevertheless, the credit society members must give their approval for major changes in the loans or alterations of investments. In one instance the technical director suggested a new plan which would decrease the cultivation and the cattle-breeding projects in favor of expanding the cattle-fattening operation. Since the plan called for significant changes in the loans, the technical director had to obtain permission from the credit society members.

In addition, the credit society bargains collectively with the administration through its chief representative. As agent for the society, the chief representative tries to convince the technical director to increase the capital for labor, thus providing more employment opportunities for the credit society members. It is not enough for the leader simply to request more workers each week. His request for more jobs must be based on solid reasoning. He must convince the director that a new machine shed is needed in the irrigated fields, that the fences in a certain pasture need repair, or that a warehouse is needed to store the harvest. To a certain extent, his effectiveness as a leader depends on his ability to get a few extra jobs each week. However, since the bank issues a fairly precise technical definition of the labor required for each activity associated with crop and cattle production, there are rather clear limits to the number of jobs needed to be performed each week. The technical director knows these limits, so the extent of bargaining is actually rather minimal. The chief representative also defends the credit

society's decision for higher wages in bargaining decisions with the technical director. The director may not agree, but usually will make some concessions on wages given continued pressure by the credit society representative. The wage scale for practically all tasks has risen gradually since the project began.

In interactions with the ejidatarios, technicians and the director from the Institute deliberately maintain impersonal relations instead of forming patron-client ties based on paternalism. The motto of the director of the Institute in Peto typified this approach: "Hay que ser amables con todos, amigos con nadien" (one should be friendly with everyone, but friends with no one). Understandably, a cultural tendency exists for patron-client ties to develop between labor and administrators; for almost a century such ties were characteristic of the relationships between large land owners and workers on the village plantation. Such bonds continued well into the agrarian reform period and were even present in the sugar industry until its demise in 1965. Even today, bureaucrats and technicians from the Institute frequently complain that some of the ejidatarios have not accepted the impersonality of the relationship they are supposed to maintain with agents from the Institute. Technicians claim that some ejidatarios plead poverty in the hope that the agents will take a personal interest in them. An ejidatario will say, for example, "I want to come to Peto to speak to the director, but I haven't got the bus fare."

Most government agents give free rides to the campesinos if they happen to be going in the same direction, but none of the agents

gives money for bus fare since this might imply encouragement to a certain political group. The agents from the Institute understand the importance of maintaining impersonal relationships, and very few patron-client ties have developed. The formation of patron-client ties between agents from the Institute and ejidatarios is further inhibited by the government practice of rotating regionally based bureaucrats as well as technocrats every few years.

Mutual agreement on the fundamental project goals and the ideology of the revolution further encourages cooperation between the ejido credit society and the Institute. The Institute hopes to construct and administer a smoothly running, productive, commercial farm with an efficient collective ejido labor force. It also hopes to pay back the debt to the bank. Any additional profits from the farm presumably will be distributed to the ejidatarios in the form of wages and dividends, thus enabling the ejidatarios to raise their standard of living. The Institute also wants to demonstrate Catmis' success to other, less-acculturated villagers in the southern zone so that they, too, will participate in similar projects involving collective credit societies administered by the Institute.

The ejidatarios agree with these goals. They desire continued capitalization of the project, development of the ejido lands, modern machinery, and, most important, continued or increased employment opportunities. They further support such goals because they are cognizant of their dependence on the Institute for technical expertise and political connections to higher levels of government. This accord is reinforced structurally through the intermediary position of chief

representative. On the one hand, he relieves the Institute of complaints from the laborers, while, on the other, he bargains with the technical director for higher wages and more employment for the credit society members.

Occasionally, however, conflicts do arise between the credit society members and the agents from the Institute. At such times decisions made by the administration are rejected by the credit society members, who may exercise a number of informal sanctions to demonstrate their dissatisfaction with the Institute.

Two cases of conflict between labor and the Institute administration were observed during the field research. In one incident the credit society members, led by their chief representative, refused to work with an agronomist from the Institute because the agronomist attempted to calculate the maize yield on a particular unit of project land. According to the formal contract between the ejido credit society and the Mixed Farming Bank, all of the crops cultivated on the irrigated land units belong to the project. After marketing, any profits must first be utilized to pay the bank. To some extent, the ejidatarios circumvent this agreement by planting private maize plots in the fertile margins of the irrigated project lands. When the crop is harvested, they remove their portions, which they sell privately. When the agronomist in question tried to calculate the maize yield, he would have revealed their activities, so the credit society turned against him. They complained to the technical director that the agronomist was "cold," and unresponsive to the needs of the Mayan

workers. They also refused to obey his instructions, and he was soon replaced.

A more serious conflict occurred during a transition period when the chief representative was not functioning in his normal role as a buffer between labor and administration. In this incident the ejido credit society elected new representatives, thereby replacing the founders of the original credit society. The election of a new credit society leader does not necessarily imply a conflict between the credit society and the Institute. However, in this case the new representatives were so distrustful of the previous leaders that they threatened to call for a federal audit of the accounting books. Moreover, for a number of weeks they refused to sign the purchases and payments made by the Institute's accountant. Of course, these actions directly implicated the technical director of the Institute as well as the accountant. After the new leaders counted all the cattle themselves, the Institute was able to persuade them that the accounts were clean, but the technical director, who had worked closely with the first credit society leader for three years, was replaced shortly thereafter. Such events clearly demonstrate the Institute's responsiveness to the political demands of the ejido credit society when conflicts arise which cannot be mediated by the credit society chief representative.

The Expanding Ejido Economy and the Formation of Credit Societies

Theoretically, the ejidatarios may form a credit society whenever a minimum of 20 ejidatarios can obtain credit from a private

or government bank. In compliance with varying stipulations of the loan agreement, they can pool their individual land allotments and work collectively, or work their individual plots, sharing machinery and marketing their produce cooperatively. In practice, however, the credit societies in Catmis have formed in conjunction with the technological growth and expanding capitalization of the development project, financed by the Mixed Farming Bank and administered by the Institute. The only exception to this practice was the privately financed credit society with about 24 members, which began and failed in 1967 before the present government project started.

In 1968, when the mixed farming project began, the Institute and the bank permitted the formation of only one credit society composed of 73 ejidatarios. The remaining 86 ejidatarios were not allowed to join. The bank was responsible for placing these original limits on the number of ejidatarios allowed to join that first society, while the final list of specific individuals comprising the society was compiled and submitted by the original ejido president, who also became the first credit society chief representative.

Thus, from the beginning of the development project the Institute delegated the choice of ejido personnel to the internal politics of the ejido. The ejido president, who did the choosing, claimed that every ejidatario was given an opportunity to join the credit society, but that many did not want to join. His opponents argued that many ejidatarios were not told about the formation of the credit society, and others, who wanted to join, were rejected by the ejido president on personal grounds.

Officially, the credit society members have an agreement with the bank that only they can work on the project. The credit society is not a tight-knit group, however, and many non-credit ejidatarios also work. Nevertheless, as previously elaborated upon in Chapter Four, working conditions were highly irregular and insecure during the first three years of the project. The overall situation of limited capital combined with an excessive labor force (even the credit society members were underemployed) did not allow much work for the non-credit ejidatarios.

In response to their more desperate circumstance, a group of about 60 dissatisfied non-credit ejidatarios joined together in an effort to form a second credit society. Although their leader held no formal position recognized by the government, he played a major role in organizing them. His experience in other ejido organizations prepared him to deal with the different government agencies as well as with the non-credit ejidatarios. He had been a representative of the original mixed farming credit society, but soon after the project began in 1968 he accused the chief representative of corruption, favoritism, and mismanagement of funds. A series of battles within the first credit society ensued, and he was expelled from the group. During the next two years he called informal meetings with the non-credit ejidatarios, visited them in their homes, and also had discussions with the director of the National Indigenous Institute and the technical director of the mixed farming project.

For two years the bureaucrats at the Institute held the non-credit ejidatarios at bay. Without directly denying the group

permission to form, they made the ejidatarios wait because funds for a second credit society were not available. In 1970, however, the Ministry of Public Works completed the last of 12 projected wells on the ejido, thereby opening up 1,200 more hectares of ejido land for irrigation and large-scale mechanized farming. In response to this technological growth, the Institute encouraged the non-credit ejidatarios to form a society and even requested further capital from the Mixed Farming Bank.

A considerable number of orientation meetings took place between bureaucrats and technicians from the Institute and the non-credit group. During this period of waiting the ejidatarios aspiring to belong to the new society expressed their desire to work for the project under the Institute's direction. The second credit group of the ejido was informed that it was expected to work hard to pay the loans back to the government. Potential members were told that they must perform whatever task was assigned to them, regardless of their personal work preferences. Agents from the Institute came to Catmis and made explicit the ideological norms expected to govern the behavior of the credit society members.

The following case materials were taken from field notes on January 18, 1971, at the last meeting before the formal establishment of the second credit society on the Catmis ejido. The Licenciado from the Institute arrived to present the final orientation to the ejidatarios who did not belong to the first credit society. The ejidatarios met in the old union meeting hall, which had not been torn down by the private company. The informal leaders of the group

went first to the hall. They began setting off sky-rocket firecrackers outside to notify the ejidatarios still in their fields that a meeting was about to take place. They also sent someone to ring the church bells, signifying the importance of this meeting. Between 5:30 and 6:00 P.M. the ejidatarios began arriving. They filled the wooden benches inside the hall, oil lamps were brought in to light the dusk-filled room, and the meeting began:

Informal Leader: Compañeros, the Licenciado is going to give an orientation for our organization.

Licenciado: First, let us take the list of those present who wish to be in the group. We must have your names since you cannot be in both credit societies. And, if you have not been censused you must do this when the representative from the Department of Agrarian Affairs comes next time. The group needs three representatives: one for the Mixed Farming Bank, one for DAAC, and one for the Institute.

Elder Ejidatario: I want you to know compañeros that a while ago we named Licenciado R.S. to help our group. Now we are arriving at its formation and we owe the Licenciado a great deal. Let us begin with an applause to show our appreciation. (Applause follows.)

Licenciado: Last week the national director of the Institute, GBC, came to visit us and also SCL, the national head of the Zootechnica was in Peto. I told them of your plans and asked how they might possibly help to obtain the loans necessary.

You know that on various occasions we have been speaking about the formation of this second group. Well, now, this will be the last informal discussion since next week a representative will come from the Mixed Farming Bank and one from the Department of Agrarian Affairs to deliver the final lists which the Department of Agrarian Affairs will try to make to solve the problems you have had over the last census which was taken in November.

BJ, the director of the Department of Agrarian Affairs in Merida, gave the order last week to form all the ejidos necessary to develop agricultural

and cattle ranching groups. Now let me explain what this will mean to you.

You will obtain a loan, exactly how much we don't know now, but basically this comes from the Alliance for Progress through the Fondos de Garantfa Program, and is administered by the Mixed Farming Bank of the Southwest for the development of the country.

Often times one hears it said that the money comes from the government so it isn't really important whether or not it is repayed. This is not true. The money is a loan; like any other loan it must be paid back. I wish to put this idea into your minds--that it must be paid back by you. But the only way you can do this is through your work, and for this work we ask for a unit of land and the Institute makes studies and evaluates the way in which you can get the loan. The possibility is that L.P.B. will be the technical director in charge of your project. Now many of you already know the way Dr. L.P.B. works; he is a meticulous person and demands perfect work. He doesn't permit poor work because you will only be able to obtain minimal credits that way and it will eventually be more difficult and costly for you to pay. The work must be good and in agreement with the requirements of the Institute. You can forget the idea that poor administration loses the money. This is over. What is going to happen is that you are going to work well and you're going to pay back the loan. Remember that the one who pays today what he owes can borrow again tomorrow. If you don't pay back the credit, I can assure you, you will get no more credit. Therefore, the only way to solve your economic problems is to work well. You should understand that with the loan your economic problems will be solved and you will have regular work all year long. The money not only will give you work but will also provide extra money.

I know many of you don't approve of the lower pay which the Institute gives, but the purpose of this is to protect the credit at all costs and make the balance lower. You know that last year we made a division of the profits to the first group, but this is, of course, according to the work done. There is no guarantee of this, and if there is no earnings, there will be no division of profits. I want to stress this fact; if you show profits, even in the first year, there will be a division of that profit, but this is not probable in the first year and so this cannot be promised. We do demand that you work in accord with our requirements. Another thing, if a

person cannot work, we replace him. Personal difficulties between two or three can harm the work of all the others. For those members who cannot work well, we must ask that you replace them.

You may feel that I am speaking to you in a very crude or gross way, but it is essential that this be understood from the beginning. Let us take, for example, the case of the ejido of Caxaytuk. Caxaytuk was slated to receive one million pesos in loans, but this will not work. Any why? Because Caxaytuk is an ejido where there is constant fighting; this program will not work in a house where there is constant fighting. So it is better from the beginning that those who cannot work with you and the Institute had better abstain from the society. It is understandable that some will not want to belong to the group, some simply are better off working alone. The reason I say this is that up till now the campesinos in this part of Yucatán always worked individually and that here and now, in the southern region of Yucatán, for the first time, the campesinos are working collectively.

If you want to work with us, o.k. But I'm telling you now that a very large loan is coming and everyone is responsible. I don't know exactly how much the first credit society owes but it will be paid in less than five years and the same will happen to this group. And now, thanks to the form in which the first credit society is working, the Mixed Farming Bank is making loans available to other groups that are working with the Institute. If these loans are not repaid, all the other campesinos in the region will also be denied credits. So you see how important success is here in relation to the repayment of credits. I now want to clarify any doubts you may have so please raise any questions now.

Leader: Whatever questions you may have, raise them now compañeros. . . .

Campesino: Whoever doesn't want to join now, let him have his land individually.

Campesino: How many individuals are needed to get the one million pesos for the cattle ranch?

Licenciado: That is a good question. The loans for farming and for cattle ranching are combined. This is why: Suppose the number of members is 30, but the cattle ranch of 1,500 head needs only 10 cowboys. That is

why we combined the project--so that the remaining 20 members will have regular work in the farming aspect of the project. All will have an income; the cattle usually earn more money--that's why they're called "ganado."

You must also pay the technicians with the earnings--like the Ministry of Hydraulic Resources, which is going to dig the wells, or the Mixed Farming Bank, which will send technicians who know which crops should be exploited on which lands, and so on. . . .

In case the lands aren't enough for your project, the first group has said that you may use any ejido lands which they are not exploiting or which have not been invested with wells. But the last word on this matter goes to the Mixed Farming Bank and the technical director of the project.

All of you are responsible for one debt. The way you divide the labor is up to you. For example, you may want 1,500 hectares of sesame, 1,000 of sorghum, but you will all work in this collectively. Now those who work as cowboys must also be divided according to interest and ability, but obviously in this, there is going to be greater specialization.

One problem is that everyone wants to work on the cattle ranch. But if there are 20 members and the cattle ranch needs only five cowboys, the other 15 must mind the farming. It must be done this way and in accord with the technicians. The main reason for such a project is so that you can have regular work and so that you can eat.

Are there any more questions compañeros? I am willing to spend until 6 A.M. tomorrow morning answering your questions and clarifying your doubts; it's better to get it out now than later, so don't keep this sort of thing inside you, ask it now.

Campesino: It isn't possible for everyone to work in one thing, even if we all want to. We simply all cannot work in the cattle ranch; O.K. five or 10 of us can, but the majority must work in farming--the same as grupo solidario #1. Before we thought we could only have the cattle ranch and leave the farming out completely, but now we realize that in order to have work for all of us, regularly, we need the farming too. I'm in agreement with what the Licenciado says.

Campesinos: We agree, agreed. . . .

Licenciado: Thursday I'm going to Mérida to speak with the Director of the Department of Agrarian Affairs and the manager of the Mixed Farming Bank to ask them if we can make a definitive and formal assembly with them present. We can do this the same day the group names its two representatives. These two representatives must be honest and hard workers, since they will represent the group officially. I will arrange a date for the coming week with compañero C.H.C. (the informal leader-organizer of the group). Those who are not here now should be informed. We want to form a group as good or better than the first group. I suppose that's all I have to say compañeros.

Leader: Those of you who just arrived and those who arrived late, please come up to the front so that the Licenciado can take your names. . . (the campesinos break up into small informal groups which begin discussing the meeting).

A few days following the final orientation meeting, a general ejido assembly met to approve the formation of the second credit society. Representatives from the Institute, the Mixed Farming Bank, and the Department of Agrarian Affairs were present for the meeting, which formally recognized the second credit society. The new society was organized with the same management-labor structure as the first society, and the coordination and administration of the two societies was assigned to the same technical director of the Institute.

Internal Ejido Politics

This section focuses on political relations within the ejido. As described in the previous discussion, the formal ejido political structure is shaped by agrarian reform agencies which control local ejido resources and the credit society labor organization. Wherever agrarian reform agencies exert direct controls over local organizations, ejido groups cooperate with each other to demonstrate their

acceptance of administrative policies. On the other hand, internal political relations which are independent from direct government control are frequently characterized by a high degree of competition and conflict among rival political factions whose leaders vie for official ejido positions and the corresponding power of such positions over the ejido labor force and the expanding resources of the ejido development project. The present discussion considers the internal political relations of the ejido by examining the patterns of interaction within the credit society and between the two credit societies.

Labor Relations Within the Credit Society

As a labor organization, the credit society makes policy decisions and holds formal discussions in two kinds of meetings: regularly scheduled assemblies which take place at the beginning of each month, and special sessions which are called for the purpose of immediate action on pressing matters. Both meetings are conducted in the same way except that the special sessions deal with specific problems and regular business is tabled. First, the roll call is taken and the secretary reads the minutes of the previous meeting. Next, various committee reports are heard. The committees are set up to deal with specific labor problems and matters of wage scale and hours. In one meeting, for example, the members raised the salary of the cowboys. They also voted to try to convince the Institute to permit construction of a machine shed in one of the irrigation fields so that the tractor drivers would not have to bring their tractors all the way back from the fields to the village, except for gasoline. The ejidatarios also

determine the salary for many field tasks, such as harvesting corn by hand which is calculated as piece work. All such matters are discussed thoroughly by the assembly, after which the meeting is thrown open to general discussion. The credit society chief representative usually brings up the first few items. Everyone has the right to speak as long and as often as he wants. No one's comments are censured. Debate usually continues until a consensus is reached. After general agreement has been reached, only one or two members will continue to express opposition by voting against the majority. Since much of the real decision making occurs in continuing informal discussions during work or leisure hours, the voting does not represent decision making so much as it does the granting of formal sanction by the group.

Despite its democratic format, the credit society assembly does not appear to qualify as a democratic community government since it excludes non-credit society ejidatarios, non-ejidatarios, and women. Moreover, the assembly does not have much power; it lacks civil authority beyond the boundaries of the mixed farming project, and its most important decisions concerning labor and wage policies are subject to approval by the Institute and the bank in higher-level meetings.

The only real power which the credit society members hold over their organization is that they can make personnel changes. Like other collective ejidos in Mexico (Whetten 1948), in Catmis the selection of leaders from within the collective labor force has created a problem in maintaining authority since very few of the credit society members have enough faith in their leaders to permit them freedom of action regarding selection of personnel for the labor force and

supervision of the daily farm operations. This lack of authority manifests itself in periodic conflicts which arise in the field between ejido workers and their elected representatives. Such conflicts are particularly evident when ejido leaders try to implement changes in the work schedule which throw off the routine of the regular skilled workers. An example of this kind of labor conflict may be seen in the following incident.

Florencio, a tractor driver, was irritated because during a very busy season Jose, the field boss, changed his work schedule from the day to the night shift. In the early evening Florencio returned to Catmis from Peto where he had been drinking during the day. He asked Jose's son for the keys to his tractor, but the son told him that he couldn't give them to him and that he would have to wait for Jose to return home. When Jose returned, Florencio asked him to let him keep the keys so that he could get to the tractor when he needed it. Jose refused, and Florencio began to argue with him, saying that if Jose had so little trust in him he should be there personally every time Florencio needed to use the tractor.

Jose also got angry and told Florencio that he was drunk and should go home and sleep it off. This made Florencio even more angry, and he continued arguing in a loud voice, making reference to the fixed salary Jose received as field boss: "You're out drinking two or three times a week, but you get your 25 pesos everyday whether or not you go out to the fields." The argument broke up after these exchanges, and both men went their separate ways without any clear resolution of the

conflict. It was understood that Florencio would be working the night shift for a while, and it was also clear that he did not like it.

Conflicts between the ejido laborers and their leaders also occur when newly elected credit society officials assert their authority over workers who had been privileged under the previous officials. In one incident, a group of four workers apparently did not want to tell the new officials whether they had been hired on a daily wage or on piece work. They had cut 2,000 poles which the new officials knew were far too thin to serve as fence posts. The officials decided to pay them daily wages rather than by the piece since most of the poles had to be discarded. On Saturdan afternoon, when the men came to collect their pay, they became angry when they found they had been paid daily wages instead of piece work. One of the older men involved in the group began to argue with the new chief representative, who was resolute about not paying for piece work. The argument lasted for 20 minutes and most of the workers were present since they had come to collect their weekly pay. The new representative did not yield in his insistence that the poles were inferior in quality and could not serve as fence posts. The worker finally left angrily, claiming he had been insulted and cheated since he had been hired on piece work, not on a daily wage.

The laborers of the collective credit society often use formal credit society meetings to express their grievances against the chief representative and the field bosses. There is always a movement to censure or remove some leader or other when the workers do not like him.

During the period of field research the bulk of criticism fell on the field boss of the cultivation project, but veiled accusations of corruption and mismanagement were also made against the chief representative. The field boss was often accused of incompetence, arrogance, and negligence. On one occasion a member claimed that the field boss remained on the truck with the agronomist from the Institute and never came into the fields to check the work. Another member claimed that the field boss frequently left the fields early and was drunk much of the time. Still others complained that the field boss did not know enough about agriculture and should be replaced. Both the chief representative and the field boss spoke to defend the official, but so many members had complained that the assembly placed the field boss on probation for the following month; if his work did not improve, the members would have the right to remove him.

Accusations against the chief representative were more indirect, but some members hinted that the chief representative was using the project for his personal gain. In his defense, the leader, who had already held office for three years, tried to convince the members by appealing to a higher authority. He claimed that the technical director of the Institute wanted him to remain in his position. Recognizing that his days in office were numbered, the chief representative attempted to demonstrate his own desire to give up the position by offering to train a replacement, whomever the members might select, over a six-month period. He claimed that the six-month training period was necessary--since he regarded his job as requiring a high degree of

skill--and thereby succeeded in discouraging many of the men from pursuing the position.

The Role of Credit Society Chief Representative

The credit society chief representative is the key political figure in the internal politics of the ejido as well as in labor relations with the Institute administration. It is therefore important to elaborate upon the major aspects of his role and the strategies he uses in dealing with his fellow workers. His position is delicate because he is responsible to both the Institute, which pays him a full salary to perform the functions of job distribution and chief foreman on the mixed farming project, and to the credit society members, who elect him to a two-year term of office.

Theoretically, an opposition group of members can remove the chief representative from office at any time by a simple majority vote of the credit society members. In fact, the chief representative can usually remain in office for the full two-year term, provided he cooperates with the technical director and thereby wins the support of the Institute.

Successful leaders cooperate with the Institute and the bank by accepting the responsibility of making personnel choices without complaining to the Institute about the insufficient funds for full employment. It is the chief representative, not the technical director of the Institute or agents from the bank, who bears the brunt of ejido dissatisfaction with chronic underemployment. As long as the chief representative distributes the jobs adequately and the work gets done,

the technical director will support him by resisting suggestions from other dissatisfied members to hold new elections. However, if the technical director or agents from the bank do not want to work with a particular individual, they can prevent him from attaining a leadership position or even remove him from office by encouraging an opposition leader within the society or by threatening to withdraw support for the project. Although the Institute and the bank do not appoint the credit society representatives, they do exercise a great deal of influence over the choice made by the credit society members.

The selection of chief representative for the second credit society constitutes a case in point. The informal leader, who organized the members of the second credit society over a three-year period, did not become one of its representatives because of direct intervention by a bank agent. During the official meeting for elections his name was called out unanimously by the new group for the office of chief representative. In response, the agent from the Mixed Farming Bank took the floor and declared to the ejido assembly that, since this individual had previously belonged to the first credit society, but had been expelled from that group, he could not be a representative of the second credit society. These were the bank's rules, he said, and the assembly would have to nominate another individual. In so doing the bank agent decapitated the organization. The agent probably took this action because this leader had caused a great deal of trouble for the Institute and the bank during his earlier conflict with the leaders of the first credit society. Moreover, the technical director of the Institute clearly did not want to work with him in the new

project. Regardless of motives, however, the incident illustrates that the credit society is permitted to choose its own representatives provided that they are acceptable to the government agencies in the project administration.

To be elected in the first place, however, the credit society representative must fulfill the leadership requirements of the credit society members. For one thing, better than average education and the ability to speak in public are important prerequisites for top political leadership in the ejido. Leaders are also expected to be able to cooperate with Institute and bank agents and represent the needs of the members effectively.

Most ejidatarios believe that their social and economic condition has resulted from lack of initiative, "irresponsibility," or a tendency to drink. They see themselves as helpless and in need of protection. To some extent this protection is furnished by the political leader. The services of the leader, though often motivated by political and economic interests, are interpreted as personal services furnished by the individual concerned. Hence, they involve the recipient in a bond of personal obligation. A "good" leader is one who is able to furnish desired ends by mediating between the federal administration and the individual credit society members, especially in getting jobs for the members.

The personal element is basic to ejido political life. There is little conception of "public" service to a "public" at large. Leaders may view their positions in personal terms, as rewards for services performed, and they may use their positions to meet family

obligations or to further family interests. Nepotism, a common form of patronage, may be defended in these terms.

The credit society representative, therefore, is expected to derive some personal economic and other benefits from his activities. The degree to which this is sanctioned, however, depends on the degree to which he meets the expectations of his constituents by distributing jobs and material wealth from the project, not to the whole credit society, but to particular individuals in it.

Factional Conflict Within the Credit Society

In a situation marked by limited capital and employment opportunities the ejidatarios rally around leaders who compete for the formal position of chief representative and the corresponding power to distribute jobs and other ejido resources in exchange for the political support of individual followers. Officially, the competition is decided in elections. In practice, however, elections often constitute a formal sanction of the leader whom the ejido majority, with the Institute's agreement, has chosen to support.

As a result of this competition, two factions have emerged within the credit society: the controlling faction, and what may be termed the "not-so-loyal opposition." Since the administration controls the ultimate fate of the credit society, both factions compete for political support from the Institute. The faction in power points out how efficiently and smoothly the project is operating, while their opponents point to the project's weaknesses and try to convince the technical director to intercede and make changes, at least in the

individual officials, but preferably by forming a new credit society with new loans to support their farming activities.

Toward this end the leader of the opposing faction encourages any discontent felt by the members who are not given regular employment. Sooner or later he hopes to muster enough support to petition the Institute and force the technical director to call for new elections. Although the opposition leader can offer nothing materially, his supporters will help him with an eye toward the future. At the same time, the opposition leader may try to win support from the Institute by speaking with the technical director and even the director of the Institute in Peto about the possibility of separating from the credit society in order to form a new credit society. However, the technical director is formally committed to working with the faction in power.

The chief representative, who heads the controlling faction, also controls the formal positions of leadership within the credit society. His powers are limited, however, since agents from the Institute control and circumscribe the use of most ejido resources. His main function on the project is to distribute jobs, and this forms the basis of his real political power in the credit society. It is important to recognize that the chief representative ultimately holds power by virtue of the support he gets from the Institute. No chief representative could remain in power very long if he had to depend upon the electoral process. Because of the chronic employment shortage, he could never succeed in distributing enough jobs to satisfy a majority of the credit society members.

In response to this inherent conflict in his position, the individual who held the position of chief representative during the field research for this study chose a job distribution strategy which furthered his personal economic and political aspirations. He funnelled as many jobs as possible to a small group of followers and relatives in exchange for their individual support. To fill his job list each week, the chief representative regularly distributed high-paying jobs to his political allies, while he allocated difficult and low-paying jobs or none at all to his enemies in the society.

The chief representative also encouraged informal transactions with his credit society followers in which he distributed other material goods and favors including money, forming compadrazgo relationships, and sponsored beer parties and fiestas in the village. He lent money to the credit society members who supported him and offered a measure of security to other followers by forming compadrazgo relationships with them. Nine men in the credit society, all of whom received regular work on the project, referred to the chief representative as "compadre," suggesting that he had more co-parents within the credit society than any other member. He also sponsored beer parties and fiestas. Each of two village taverns is patronized by a different faction of the credit society. Ejido followers drink with their leaders practically every Sunday afternoon. Bar meetings are the location of political discussions in which local enemies are openly derided and some political strategies related to hiring, firing, and bargaining with the Institute are suggested. In order to pay for the large amounts of beer his followers consume, the chief representative

adds the bar owner's name to the work list each week even though the owner never actually works on the project. Finally, the chief representative maintains his followers by sponsoring small fiestas and parties in private homes in the village. On these occasions a lamb is slaughtered and prepared, beer flows freely, and, in contrast to the tavern which is public, attendance at such parties is by invitation only.

In exchange for such favors credit society followers are expected to support the chief representative in political assemblies and actions, help perform whatever political assignments are given, and pass along information to the leader which may help him defeat or outmaneuver his enemies. As long as the credit society members cooperate with the chief representative, most of them receive high job evaluations and regular job assignments. However, those individuals who openly oppose the actions of the chief representative and his allies are accused of inferior work and an effort is made to replace them. It is usually an easy matter to dispose of a dissident unskilled day-laborer who opposes the chief representative. He is not given work for a few weeks, and, when he complains, he is told that others need the work more than he does. Since most of the time there are more workers than jobs, the chief representative's decision is easily defended. However, even those with specialized skills may find the political pressure very difficult to bear when they oppose the chief representative.

The following incident involving Alberto C., a tractor operator, illustrates this point. Alberto opposed the field boss at a credit

society meeting. Claiming that the field boss drank too much and didn't know enough about agriculture to supervise the field workers properly, Alberto recommended that the assembly replace the field boss. The following week Alberto complained that the leaders were trying to get rid of him by starting rumors that he broke his tractor purposely, and was trying to harm the society:

> First they gave me the hardest jobs, then, when something happened and the tractor broke, I was blamed and they started the rumor that I did it purposely and was a bad tractorista. They don't tell you when the tractor work is going to be difficult, so when someone breaks a tractor they can blame him for carelessness or make a hero out of him by saying that in spite of all possible actions the tractor broke.

Thus, through the distribution of jobs and other resources of the credit society project, the chief representative controls the ejido labor force.

The continuous flow of transactions between leaders and individual followers is an expensive enterprise--so expensive, in fact, that the chief representative must distribute considerably more local resources than he controls by virtue of the formal powers associated with his position. Forced by political necessity, the chief representative earns extra capital by utilizing all the local resources he can manipulate. One source of revenue is a one-peso tax which every worker pays to the society each day he works on the project. The revenue from this tax amounts to very little, however. More importantly, the chief representative rents project machinery to private corn growers in the area. Some ejidatarios claim that he even sells cattle and produce from the project without permission from the Institute or the bank. It is difficult to assess the amount of

capital which comes from these activities. The more important question, however, is how the revenue is utilized.

Clearly, credit society leaders try to accumulate wealth for their personal gain and economic mobility, but they do not succeed in any major way because of the distribution demands of their constituents. One former credit society representative owned a small goat ranch which he had built up during his term in office. A second leader admitted to a few head of cattle which he had acquired in the same way. After a term in office, then, the chief representative always demonstrates some upward economic mobility. Nevertheless, the chief's most profitable ventures, such as renting ejido lands to private ranchers or stealing crops and cattle from the mixed farming project, are flagrant violations of the agrarian code and the contract with the bank. Whenever a leader begins to accumulate a great deal of wealth through illegal means, the opposition faction of the society destroys his enterprise by making his activities public. This became clear in an incident involving the chief representative of the first credit society. His most lucrative enterprise was renting a large plot of ejido land on which he grazed cattle for a private rancher. For about a year vocal opposition was silenced through bribes, particularly to the leader of the opposition faction. A good portion of the representative's earnings from this venture did not remain in his possession. Rather he continually distributed wealth in the form of beer parties, fiestas, and monetary gifts in exchange for political support for his office. His enterprise was finally

terminated by the opposition faction leader, however, who revealed his activities publicly because no more bribes had been paid.

Although it is difficult to measure the precise amounts, it is probably safe to assume that a significant amount of wealth is distributed in this political process. Nevertheless, the wealth is distributed in the form of beer, parties, travel, etc., all activities of a luxury nature which reinforce the political competition rather than raise the standard of living in the community. Finally, because of the continued job shortage and the resulting labor competition within the credit society, this political process repeats itself. Following the incident in which the chief representative's enterprise was revealed, the opposition faction petitioned the Institute calling for new elections in the credit society. The original chief representative was removed from office and replaced by the leader of the opposition faction.

As leader of the new opposition faction, the ex-chief representative immediately began a political campaign to regain his position. His small group of followers refused to cooperate with the new representative since they were afraid, with some justification, that they would lose their jobs. At the same time the ex-leader began to visit the various government agencies, arguing with the directors that the changes in representatives had been harmful to the credit society. It is interesting that his letters to the various bureaucrats focused precisely on the special function which each agency performs on the mixed farming project. Hence, the letter to the Director of the National Indigenous Institute in Peto called attention

to the lack of harmony in the work routine of the credit society because "the new leaders insult the members and make poor job assignments." The letter to the director of the Mixed Farming Bank in Mérida stated that many of the credit society members wished to separate from the new leaders and form a new society. The letter to the bank director also called for an audit "because of the failure of the new representatives to report assets." And the letter to the director of the Department of Agrarian Affairs requested an ejido census on grounds that "many ejidatarios are not present and working their lands."

Such communications constitute a political request for the Institute to intervene and make changes which would further the political aspirations of the new opposition faction. However, in most instances the Institute intervenes to make adjustments in the labor organization, corresponding to the technological growth or capital expansion of the project, rather than to resolve internal factional conflicts. The Institute intervenes in such factional conflicts only when they are serious enough to affect adversely the quality of labor on the project. In the event of blatantly illegal activities of the labor leaders or work stoppages, new election or the formation of new credit societies is justified.

Cooperation, Conflict, and
Alliance Between Credit Societies

A second level of ejido political relations may be viewed in the interactions between the two credit societies. In 1970 cooperation between the two societies predominated because the formation of

the second credit society provided new employment opportunities for the ejidatarios who previously had been denied membership in the credit society. As a result, the principal source of tension between the two groups was removed, at least temporarily.

With the new society formed, however, a number of ejidatarios expressed the possibility of potential competition between the two societies over resources on the ejido development project, including land, machinery, labor, and continued capital and political support from the bank and the Institute. Although initiated by the Institute, the equitable division of ejido lands between the two societies, in consultation with the Department of Agrarian Affairs, represented a major area of cooperation and temporarily resolved any foreseeable land or water conflicts between the two groups. Nevertheless, the distribution of ejido lands unused by the project remains in the hands of the ejido president, who holds the formal power to allocate individual parcels to ejidatarios wishing to farm some lands apart from the development project. As a consequence, some ejidatarios feel that the two credit societies may come into conflict as each attempts to elect its own leader to the position of ejido president.

Second, unresolved conflicts over machinery and equipment could easily destroy both societies. For example, it would be wasteful for the Institute and the bank, in the name of the second credit society, to purchase new machinery since the machinery already purchased is adequate to cultivate and maintain the lands of both credit societies, provided they are shared. The proper use of tractors and other equipment calls for scheduling procedures which the ejidatarios

must learn to follow closely under the Institute's supervision. Political or labor problems between the two societies could easily destroy this technical coordination which is vital to the successful operation of the collective farm.

Third, it seems likely that the two credit societies will begin to compete for ejido members. The chief representatives of both societies will try to recruit other ejidatarios to lend greater legitimacy to their projects, particularly to increase the number of skilled workers in their groups. Ultimately, the Institute will have to determine how and under what circumstances an individual who is formally committed to one credit society can transfer his affiliation to the other.

A final area of potential conflict between the two societies relates to their continuing needs for capital, technical expertise, and political support from the Institute and the Mixed Farming Bank. At any moment these agencies can withdraw support, and the result would be the immediate liquidation of assets and the termination of the development project. Consequently, each credit society tries to cooperate with the Institute management by demonstrating that its collective labor organization is more efficient than the other society's. The Institute encourages this competitive atmosphere for two reasons: First, it provides a work incentive for the groups; and second, it formalizes the Institute's position as the authority which stands between the two credit societies of the ejido.

Of course, it is possible for such conflicts to arise between the two societies. However, in 1970 they maintained excellent relations

and the prospect of continuing them was good. Indeed, since each credit society functions as a separate labor organization, affected by capital limitations and work shortages stemming from its own loans, serious political conflicts are more likely to occur within each society than between societies.

Within the framework of the ejido development project, relations between the credit societies are shaped to a great extent by the demands of the federal agrarian reform agencies. Beyond the confines of the project, however, political relations between the two credit societies (or between factions of the different credit societies) are important to the broader ejido political process. It will be recalled that the entire ejido community controls the election of officials to the general assembly. The position of ejido president, who distributes ejido land parcels to individuals, is particularly important in this regard. Even a cursory examination of the relations between the credit societies, therefore, reveals the broader political processes of the ejido community.

Such processes are illustrated in the following case of a political alliance which formed between a minority faction of the first credit society and the second credit society. The two groups met together just after the second credit society was officially established. The atmosphere of the meeting was informal; soft drinks were served and the meeting took place in the home of the leader of the second credit group. The meeting was attended by leaders from both credit societies and a few followers from each group, including about 25 men in all. The first issue which the meeting considered was

an error in the document which all the ejidatarios signed approving the formation of the second credit society. One of the leaders of the first credit society was suspicious of the wording used by the Institute in the legal act which created the second group. He claimed that the document might be implying that the members of the first credit society were renouncing their membership in favor of joining the second credit society, instead of just approving the action of the second group. His suspicion was reinforced by the fact that the Licenciado who wrote the act did not distinguish the two credit society groups on the back of the document where the campesinos place their signatures or thumb prints. The campesinos from both groups agreed that the document was poorly worded, and the informal leader of the second group was entrusted with the task of speaking to the director of the Institute about the error and having it corrected. This was obviously the easiest issue to be settled in the meeting since all agreed that the distinction between the two groups should have been more clearly stated in the document.

The issues which the men considered afterward were more important for they represented the real purpose of the alliance. Both groups agreed to draft a letter to the Department of Agrarian Affairs, with a copy to the Institute. The letter would express the discontent in the ejido with the present leadership, remind the Department Director that it had been more than three years since the last ejido election, and request new elections. The combined signatures accompanying the letter would take the form of a petition and

include close to 75 percent of the ejidatarios, thus making it difficult for the Department to ignore or delay the elections.

The second stage in the alliance involved a more delicate matter since it required putting together a slate of individuals which both groups could support as the new officials of the ejido general assembly. Perhaps because of the potential conflict involved in this selection process, in their discussions the leaders of both groups called for consensus and agreement of those present and charged the men to express openly those issues where there was no agreement or where there was conflict.

A slate was agreed upon in which the designated president and secretary were from the first credit society, while the treasurer was from the second credit society. There was no discussion or opposition to the president or treasurer; the individuals designated to occupy these positions had obviously been selected in advance to represent their respective groups. However, the first individual considered for the position of secretary was from the second credit society, but since he was not present at the meeting, someone suggested that he was not interested in the position. Another man objected to this individual on grounds that he did not read and write well enough to be the secretary. The group finally settled on a younger man from the first credit society.

When the slate was agreed upon, the men decided to see the director of the Institute and ask him to notify the Department of Agrarian Affairs since the great majority of ejidatarios were anxious for an election. In a final comment one of the leaders of the minority

faction of the first credit society called for united action and trust among those who were present. He emphasized that it would be most unfortunate if, at the last minute, the other group changed and did not support the ticket and the program of action which had been outlined in the meeting; failure to abide by the decisions of the meeting, he said, would mean the end of the alliance and the trust between the two groups. One of the leaders of the second credit society responded by saying that the first credit society group could depend on the fact that they would support the action which they had agreed upon in the meeting.

The case of this alliance reveals two important features of the broader ejido political process. First, the alliance represented an attempt to weaken the power of the original leaders of the first credit society who held all the key positions in the ejido general assembly. Through such an alliance the minority faction of the first credit society also hoped to gain power within their credit society. Second, the alliance showed that the ejidatarios recognized the continuing importance of the general assembly of the ejido despite the fact that the assembly is overshadowed economically by the credit societies and the development project. After planning their strategy to achieve the removal of the present ejido leaders, the allied groups took great pains to select the proper individuals to fill the vacant positions with an equal representation from both credit societies, thus maintaining a balance of power and avoiding future conflicts by creating an atmosphere of accommodation between their groups.

The Ejido and the Private Sector: Cooperation and Conflict

Today, relations between the ejido and the private sector are characterized by both cooperation and conflict, although the latter is far more important since it more directly reflects the impact of the national agrarian reform on ejido politics. This section describes a brief case of cooperation and a second incident of conflict in an attempt to illustrate the local conditions which generate these political relations.

The incident of cooperation emerged when the ejido leaders convinced the Institute to release funds to purchase the old hacendado's residence in the village and the warehouse which stood next to it. The ejido leaders claimed that they needed these buildings for offices and storage space. For the deal to be made, however, many old animosities between the ejidatarios, particularly the ejido leaders, and the ex-plantation owner had to be mended. For example, according to the ejidatarios, during the great political conflict between the private landowners and the sugar growers' collective which later became the ejido this particular hacienda owner had actually threatened to shoot one of the ejido leaders unless he renounced his claim to the ejido lands. In order to bring the ex-hacienda owner to Catmis to negotiate, the ejidatarios asked a neutral party, one of the small private ranchers, to hold a party to which the ejidatarios and the ex-hacienda owner were invited. The ex-hacendado, who had resided in Mérida since the sugar cane factory closed in 1965, made a special trip by bus to attend. At the party the ex-hacendado acknowledged the

existence of the ejido for the first time and also offered some personal concessions, such as publicly recognizing one of the ejido leaders as his brother's illegitimate son; the ex-hacendado referred to the leader as "nephew" when the ejidatario leader called him "uncle." Thus, the ejidatarios and the ex-hacendado, who had previously been bitter enemies, sat down and negotiated the sale of the buildings to the ejido in a spirit of cooperation.

A more significant political incident wiich concerned the ejido community focused around an emerging conflict between the villagers and the new private landowner in the village. In this conflict the ejido has emerged as the most effective local political organization representing the entire community.

To understand the implications of this conflict some background to its development is required. As part of its agreement to purchase the factory machinery from the government, the private company bought an additional 2,000 hectares of land which previously had been owned by the federal government. Thus, in 1965 the workers' houses, the central buildings of the village, the wells, and all of the lands which contained the village became private property again after 30 years of federal government ownership.

Before disbanding in 1965, the National Sugar Workers' Union tried to compensate its ex-union workers for losing their source of livelihood. The union held negotiations with the new company, and the new owner agreed to make four concessions to improve the village as part of a general compensation to the unionized workers: (1) to finance and construct a new village school, (2) to build a network of

water faucets in different localities in the village and install electricity, (3) to distribute the house sites and yards to the ex-union workers of the factory, and (4) to allow a nurse from the National Indigenous Institute to set up a clinic for the ejidatarios in one of the central buildings of the village.

Once it disbanded, however, the union could no longer defend the agreement, and the villagers began to depend on the ejido which replaced the union as the only community organization capable of enforcing the agreement.

Because of the perseverance of the ejidatarios and other ex-union workers, who sent frequent delegations from the village to Mérida, the governor visited Catmis in 1970. In a speech he delighted the villagers by declaring that Catmis would soon be given the official political status of "pueblo" or village. The communal land grant of the village, called an "agrarian community," differs from that of the ejido, but represents a second aspect of land reform brought to many villages by the national agrarian reform (Stavenhagen 1970: 229). In the presence of the entire village, including the company owner, the governor announced that the owner of the private company had agreed to donate the necessary 400 hectares of land to form the necessary communal property of the village.

By 1971 few of the promises made by the company had been fulfilled completely. The new village government had not yet been constituted by the state legislature, and the 400 hectares of land had not been donated by the company, although the villagers were anxiously waiting for notification that Catmis had become a pueblo. The company

had completed construction of the new school, installed electricity for those who could afford it, and constructed part of the network of water faucets. However, as previously mentioned in Chapter Three, the company had distributed very few house sites, and many villagers complained that the resident manager of the company and his employees, all of whom were from outside the village, had tried to expel them from their homes. In general, the resident manager of the company was either unaware of the agreement or simply did not respect it, for many disputes and conflicts between the company and the villagers arose because of his actions.

In one rather dramatic incident the resident manager tried to remove the Institute nurse from the clinic, ostensibly to repair the building for use by the company. In response, practically the entire community of the village turned out en masse, refusing to let the nurse leave the building. In the ensuing argument the ejido leader spoke for the village and took the issue to the director of the National Indigenous Institute in Peto. The director contacted the governor, and the issue was quickly resolved in favor of the villagers. The original agreement between the sugar workers' union and the company was upheld because the entire village community, led by the ejidatarios, had demanded that the Institute nurse be permitted to remain in the clinic building to serve the people of the village.

Because this incident is particularly illustrative of the role of the ejido vis-à-vis the private sector with respect to community rights to use the central building for health services, it is presented as it was recorded from field notes:

About 8:30 A.M. Roberto, a cowboy, who was my roommate, came running into the room and called my attention to the Catmis church-bells. They were ringing louder than I had ever heard them.

"Listen to the bells," he said. "There is going to be a fight."

"What kind of fight?" I asked.

"They're trying to kick the nurse from the Institute out of the clinic," he answered.

"Who is?"

"Yesterday the company sent word to the Institute saying that the nurse had to leave the clinic today and would they please come and take her things. The company wants to kick out the nurse and use the building for a private dwelling. This morning the doctor from the Institute came and began to do it."

We arrived at the clinic in time to see about 50 women enter the building yelling at Felipe Camara, the manager of the company which had purchased the factory, who was supervising the removal of the factory machinery for shipment to Mexico City. Shortly after we arrived, E.S., the ejido president, and his archenemy, the leader of the opposition faction of the ejido, arrived in the same vehicle--an obvious display of ejido unity at a time of general crisis.

The comisario of the village also arrived and so did the policeman who had been placed in the village a few weeks earlier by order of the governor following an incident in which the new owners of the factory were accused by another local land-owner of taking old railroad tracks which had not belonged to them. The policeman was

supposed to watch the new company employees to make sure they didn't remove anything more than what they had actually bought in Catmis.

Finally, the doctor from the Institute arrived and prepared to remove the nurse. Camara, the company employee, stood in the middle of the room with his hands folded over his heavy frame. He was ready for trouble. The nurse continued to see patients throughout the incident, obviously demonstrating the vital importance of her presence in the village.

Arriving in the infirmary, I heard the last of the prelude which was the women yelling at Camara, "You're not going to take the nurse away. What will we do when our children are sick?" The women were shaking their fingers at Camara and were emotionally excited. Camara stood silently and didn't answer them.

The doctor and a few other technicians who accompanied him also waited silently. Finally, the ejido president entered and confronted Camara, "This is an infirmary," he said. "It belongs to the people here, not to a private individual."

As he spoke, he was removing the ladder and stool which had been placed inside the infirmary for the painters to work on the building. Camara's tactic, which didn't fool anyone, was to begin some repair work on the building, then claim that the building belonged to the company and remove the occupants--in this case the nurse from the Institute. This was regarded by all the people of Catmis as a direct denial of the promises which the company had made to the now defunct local union, i.e., that the public buildings would remain in the hands

of the villagers and that the new company would not attempt to use them for its own purposes.

The village was now represented in every political sphere as the leader of the ejido, his factional opponent, the doctor and nurse from the Institute, the policeman, the company manager, the comisario of the village, and a large number of villagers were all gathered to deal with the issue of the company trying to remove or, as they claimed, "move" the nurse from the clinic. There were about 50 people inside the building and another 100 outside watching through the windows and the door.

The policeman clearly was not mediating. He had his own position. He said, "You can't take the nurse from here, the people need her. You fellows have gone too far, walking into houses without knocking; as long as it has not been established legally who these buildings belong to, they don't belong to you. I heard the governor myself when he declared Catmis a pueblo. He said that the buildings belong to the people. Señor Raul, the owner of the company, agreed with the governor."

The company manager answered in his defense, "We want to repair the building and make a dispensary for children here and also, to some extent, use it for private purposes."

The doctor from the Institute spoke next. "We have been using the building for the clinic at the request of the people of Catmis."

"But you only serve a portion of the people, the ejidatarios," said the company manager.

The doctor answered, "We serve a large portion of the people. I can't defend the building, but as representative of the Institute let me say that we have been here for more than two years by agreement of those who bought the factory and the local syndicate which made the original arrangements."

At this point, the president of the ejido entered the discussion: "We ought to see the director of the Institute then, to get his opinion about this. I wouldn't be against going there even right now together and letting him solve the problem." And, turning to the manager, he said, "Would you be willing to come?"

The manager answered, "Yes, I'd be willing to come." Turning to the policeman he said, "We were only putting the artisans here to improve the building and change it into a dispensary for small children."

The ejidatarios, without the minority faction leader, got into their vehicle and left for the Institute in Peto. The women resumed yelling at the manager, who left the building and stood by his car, consulting with his employees, obviously deciding whether or not we would go to Peto to the Institute.

We arrived at about 12:30 at the Institute, and the director was still working. We waited for the doctor to arrive. We also waited for Camara and his men, who did not come. Naturally, Camara did not really want to talk to the director of the Institute, but he had to agree to come when he was challenged directly by the ejido president in front of all the villagers.

After a short wait, the director granted the ejidatarios an audience. Inside his spacious office are chairs and a feeling of airiness which one gets in all the Institute's buildings; they are open and fresh with many patios and porches, large open-air rooms, and tiled floors. The director rarely holds confidential meetings. Almost anyone can enter his office at any time and view the proceedings. Frequently, two or even three delegations of peasants will be waiting in the same room while the director is speaking with another group. The atmosphere is formal, but there is an openness which seems to tell the peasants that the director is seeking justice and fair solutions to their problems. The director has maintained a reputation among the peasants in the region as a fair and honest man, one who doesn't play favorites. As the peasants claim, "The one who is right has the director on his side."

The director invited us to pull up chairs, and the men made a circle of chairs in the center of the office. The director said, "What can I do for the people of Catmis?"

The ejido president was the first to speak: "Something happened this morning in Catmis which we want to ask your advice about. The new company tried to kick out the nurse, but the people showed up en masse and refused to let them. The manager of the company said that he wanted to repair the clinic but the people said he was going to kick out the nurse, and there was a large assembly which wouldn't let him do it."

The doctor from the Institute affirmed the ejido president's story: "I was there also, director, and it seems to me that the people clearly don't want the Institute to leave."

The director said, "Well, it seems to me that the people have every right to defend themselves against this sort of thing."

Next, the comisario of the village spoke, "Just to what extent is Catmis a pueblo? I know the governor came and officially declared it a pueblo, but the company keeps insisting that the houses and buildings belong to them. They are always coming by my house, asking me for the keys to houses. Then they enter them without knocking. For example, now they are trying to house the workers, who are completing the new school, and they are trying to make old residents leave their homes. Then, when the workers leave, the company says the houses are theirs and they refuse to return them to the people. On some occasions, I refused to give them the keys, but they come to my house acting with authority. They demand them. What should I do? Is it or isn't it a pueblo?"

The director answered, "No, Señor comisario, Catmis is a pueblo completely. The governor himself declared it so and there is no problem in this. In this case I think you did the right thing to defend the buildings. I'm going to communicate the incident to the governor. This is something he should know about."

The director's secretary tried to call the governor, but he was out so the director spoke with one of the Licenciados who serves the governor. The director said, "Sr. Licenciado, I'm calling because I would like to report to you a small incident which occurred this

morning in the pueblo of Catmis. It seems that the company that bought the factory tried to remove the Institute's nurse from the clinic where she has been working. The people objected and turned out en masse, refusing to let the company remove the nurse. The location of the incident was the clinic in which the Institute nurse has been working for the past two years at the request of the villagers. Apparently, the company claimed to have wanted to use the building for other purposes and to remove the nurse while they repaired the building. But the people would not permit it." The director listened to the answers, occasionally responding with some bit of information, and hung up.

Turning to the villagers, he said, "Well, gentlemen, the problem is solved. The people have every right to do what they did. The Licenciado said they did the right thing and the matter will be handled immediately." The peasants thanked the director and left the Institute to return to Catmis.

This incident clearly illustrates the resolute attitude which the villagers have developed with respect to their rights to public health facilities and their demand for "pueblo" or official village status within the state political apparatus. Like the labor union in past times, the ejido acts today as the principal local organization representing the village community, particularly in conflicts with private land owners in the area. It is also important to recognize the protection which the Institute gives to organized ejido demonstrations against the private sector. Such support is consistent with the ideology of the revolution.

Summary

Turning to the highest level of social integration, this chapter described and analyzed local ejido political relations which have emerged as a result of the national agrarian reform. The discussion considered various patterns of group interactions, including cooperation, conflict, and alliance, which characterize local ejido politics. The chapter was presented in three sections corresponding to different levels of ejido political relations: (1) relations between the ejido and the federal agrarian reform administration, (2) internal ejido politics, and (3) relations between the ejido and the private sector.

The first section examined the relations between ejido organizations and federal agrarian reform agencies which control capital inputs, natural resources, and the labor force on the ejido mixed farming project. Because of tangible economic developments on the ejido, the Catmisenos have generally accepted Mexico's national political ideology, which stresses faith in material progress and cooperation between the rural workers and government agents sent to help them. Nevertheless, some ideological conflict persists between those ejidatarios who advocate a strongly collectivistic ideology and those who view the collective ejido as a means of achieving an ultimately individualistic end.

In a consideration of the relations between the ejidatarios and the federal agrarian reform agencies, the federal administration is pictured as a multifaceted bureaucracy whose various agencies are funded independently. Consequently, they operate with a good deal

of autonomy on the local level with respect to their control over ejido resources. However, because of the need for bureaucratic coordination on the development project, the National Indigenous Institute has been designated as the principal agency in the region which links the ejidatarios to the federal government.

In addition to its broader functions of economic development and cultural integration of the localities in Yucatán's southern region, the Institute, in conjunction with the Mixed Farming Development Bank and the Department of Agrarian Affairs, performs two other functions which are more directly related to the development of the Catmis ejido: (1) the Institute administers the ejido labor force in the daily operation of the mixed farming development project, and (2) the Institute supervises the formation of new credit societies.

With regard to its first function, labor relations between the credit society ejidatarios and Institute agents are impersonal, characterized by formal rights and obligations of labor and administration. In formal meetings the Institute administration informs the credit society members of the financial condition of the project and requests approval from the members for major changes in the loans or for alterations of investments. The credit society members, through their chief representative, bargain collectively with the Institute administration for increased employment opportunities and higher salaries for the credit society members. Such interactions remain impersonal since agents from the Institute are careful not to develop patron-client ties with individual ejidatarios.

Mutual agreement on the project goals, combined with acceptance of Mexico's revolutionary political ideology and the ejidatarios' awareness that they are dependent on the Institute, encourages an atmosphere of cooperation between the credit society and the Institute. Occasionally, however, conflicts do arise and at such times the credit society members reject the Institute's decisions through a number of informal sanctions, including failing to cooperate with lower-level technicians, calling for the removal of certain technicians, failing to countersign purchases by the Institute's accountant, and threatening to demand a federal audit of the project's books. In most of the instances cited the Institute responded quickly to the legitimate demands of the credit society, and, in every case, the conflict stopped short of political confrontation.

The Institute's second function on the Catmis mixed farming project involves supervising the formation of new credit societies with permission from the bank. Theoretically, the ejidatarios may form a credit society whenever they wish, provided a minimum of 20 non-credit ejidatarios agree to assume the debt and the labor responsibilities collectively. In practice, however, new credit societies are formed with the consent of the bank and the bank also has restricted the number of members permitted to join a given society. The formation of new credit societies has followed the technological and economic expansion of ejido resources and the amount of investment capital made available by the bank. Nevertheless, the Institute supervises the actual formation of new credit societies through various orientation

meetings with the ejidatarios. In every instance the Institute has delegated the choice of personnel for the societies to the ejidatarios themselves.

Internal ejido politics involve relations within and between the credit societies. Wherever agrarian reform agencies exert direct controls over local ejido organizations, ejido groups cooperate with each other to demonstrate their acceptance of administrative policies. On the other hand, internal political relations, which are independent from direct government control, are characterized by a high degree of competition and conflict among rival political factions whose leaders vie for official ejido positions and corresponding power over the ejido labor force and the natural resources of the ejido development project.

Formal labor relations within the credit society take place in meetings which maintain a democratic format. Nevertheless, since much of the real decision making occurs in continuing informal discussions during work and leisure hours, the voting does not represent decision making so much as it does the granting of formal sanction by the group. Such formal meetings also lack power since the credit society must depend on approval from the Institute and the bank for legal implementation of its most important decisions.

The only real power which the credit society members hold over their organization is that they can make personnel changes. However, the power to select leaders from within the collective labor force has created a problem in maintaining authority since very few of the credit society members have enough faith in their leaders to permit

them freedom of action regarding selection of personnel for the labor force and supervision of the daily farm operations. This lack of authority of the elected ejido officials manifests itself in conflicts which arise in the field between ejido workers and their elected representatives. Such conflicts are particularly evident when there are changes in work schedules and when newly elected officials assert their authority over workers who have been privileged under the previous officials. In addition, the collective credit society members often use formal credit society meetings to express their grievances against the chief representative and the field boss. There is always a movement to censure or remove some leader or other when the workers do not like him.

The credit society representative is the key political figure in the internal politics of the ejido as well as in labor relations with the Institute. His position is delicate because he is responsible to both the Institute administration, which pays him a full salary to distribute jobs, and to the credit society members, who elect him. Although the administration does not select credit society leaders, it can prevent specific individuals from attaining office or remove them. A good credit society leader, from the perspective of the administration, is one who bears the brunt of complaints from the members about labor shortages and hires individuals who adequately perform the assigned tasks. Credit society members select as leaders men who have a better-than-average education, the ability to speak in public, and the capacity to represent labor interests effectively before the administration. The leader must also be someone who will represent the

personal interests of his constituents and distribute jobs to his political allies. Leader-follower ties are based on bonds of personal obligation, and leaders are expected to derive some personal economic and political benefit from their positions.

In a situation marked by expanding ejido resources but limited capital and employment opportunities, the ejidatarios rally around leaders who compete for the formal position of credit society representative and the corresponding power to distribute jobs and other resources in exchange for the political support of individual followers. Two factions emerge: the controlling group, which tries to remain in power, and the opposition group, which tries to call for new elections or break away to form a new credit society.

The job-distribution function of the chief representative forms the basis of his power in the credit society. He distributes jobs and other material goods, such as money, and pays for beer and parties in exchange for individual political support. The continuous flow of transactions between leader and follower requires that the leader distribute more resources than he controls by virtue of his formal powers. Forced by political necessity, then, the chief representative finds ways of manipulating ejido and project resources to gain wealth. He clearly accumulates some wealth for his personal advancement, but the greater the wealth he gains, the more he is required to distribute. This is especially true of illegal activities which may earn more profits but require even greater distribution of wealth to conceal the enterprises. It is difficult to measure the precise amount of wealth distributed in these political activities.

However, most of the wealth goes for luxuries such as beer and parties instead of for raising the standard of living in the village or for promoting upward mobility of the leaders. In 1970 such illegal activities were revealed by the opposition leader and, in new credit society elections, the chief representative subsequently was removed from office. In his new role as opposition faction leader the ex-chief representative and his loyal followers tried to sabotage the project by not cooperating with the new representatives and by campaigning for intervention by the Institute to resolve the political conflict by forming a new credit society. In most instances, however, the Institute and the bank intervene to create new credit societies corresponding to the technological growth or capital expansion of the project, rather than to resolve internal factional conflicts.

Political relations between credit societies were discussed with reference to incidents of cooperation, potential conflicts, and alliance. In 1970 cooperation between the two societies predominated because the formation of the second credit society provided new employment opportunities for the ejidatarios who previously had been denied membership in the credit society. Nevertheless, a number of ejidatarios expressed the possibility of future competition between the two societies over ejido resources, including land, machinery, labor, and continued capital and political support from the bank and the Institute.

Within the context of the ejido development project, relations between the credit societies are shaped to a great extent by the demands of the federal agrarian reform agencies. Beyond the confines of the project, however, political relations between the two credit societies

are important to the broader ejido political process. An example of alliance formation between a faction of the first credit society and the second credit society reveals two important facets of this broader political process within the ejido community: First, the ejidatarios recognize the continuing importance of the general assembly as a local economic-political organization, despite the fact that its actual economic significance has been overshadowed by the credit societies in the context of the mixed farming development project; and second, the ejidatarios from both credit societies have formed an alliance to provide equal representation of the two credit societies within the larger general assembly.

Relations between the ejido and the private sector are characterized by both cooperation and conflict, although the latter is far more important since it more directly reflects the impact of the national agrarian reform on ejido politics. The incident of cooperation between the ejido and the private sector illustrates how old animosities can be forgotten when the ejidatarios and private landowners stand to profit from economic transactions with each other. Nevertheless, the official position of the ejido toward the private sector reflects the ideology of the Mexican revolution, which seeks to restrict the power and holdings of the private sector; hence, underlying specific incidents of cooperation for mutual economic gain is a deeper hostility which is manifest in frequent conflicts between the ejidatarios and the new large landowner in the village.

As part of an overall compensation for the unionized workers when the sugar factory closed, the new landowner in the village agreed

to provide a number of improvements for the population, including building a new school, installing running water and electricity, distributing houses to the ex-union workers, and allowing the Institute nurse to set up a clinic in one of the central buildings of the village. By 1971, however, few of the promises made by the company had been fulfilled. In the example of conflict cited in the discussion the ejido organization emerged as the only local-level organization with enough power to fight for the enforcement of the conditions of the agreement and to defend individual villagers from harassment by the private company. Of course, the local ejido derives much of its support from the National Indigenous Institute, but the examples of conflict between the ejido and the private sector in Catmis clearly illustrate the resolute attitude of the ejidatarios in making certain that their rights as campesinos are respected.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSIONS

Introduction

This thesis has examined and analyzed the effects of agrarian reform on the ex-hacienda village of Catmis. The ethnographic discussion focused on two major aspects of change: first, changes in the local economic and socio-political organization of the ex-hacienda ejido community, and second, changes in the economic and political relations between local ejido organizations and federal agrarian reform agencies. In addition to examining these aspects of change within the ejido community, the thesis set out to disclose the causal variables in these larger regional transformations through a controlled intra-regional comparison of the Catmis ejido and ejidos in the northern henequen zone. This larger ethnological purpose was designed to isolate the causal variables--either administrative policies or ecological features--in the adaptation of local economic and socio-political institutions. This chapter is presented in two main sections.

The first section compares the Catmis ejido and collective henequen ejidos in the northern zone with respect to: (1) administrative policies since Cárdenas, (2) local ecology and potential for economic expansion, (3) the effects of economic potential on administrative policies, and (4) the resulting economic development and political organization of the collective ejidos. The final section

considers the implications of this study for future policy and research concerning collective ejidos in the context of Mexico's national agrarian reform.

Ecology and Administrative Policy as Causal Variables in Catmis and the Northern Henequen Zone

After the above summary of the ethnographic data concerning Catmis, it is now possible to compare the effects of agrarian reform in the northern henequen zone and in Catmis. By constructing a controlled intraregional comparison, this section reconsiders the hypothesis which was first presented in the Introduction: that ecological variations are causal to the impact of national agrarian reform policies on local-level economic and socio-political institutions. The hypothesis was operationalized to propose that: Although national agrarian reform policies will demonstrate considerable uniformity, the effects of such policies on ex-hacienda collective ejidos in Yucatán's northern and southern zones will vary in certain fundamental respects as local collective ejido organizations necessarily adapt to significant ecological/economic differences between these geographical zones.

In the present section the effects of agrarian reform in Catmis and the northern henequen zone are compared with respect to the following features: (1) administrative policies since Cárdenas, (2) ecology and potential for economic development, (3) the effects of economic potential on administrative policy, and (4) the economic development and political organization of the collective ejidos.

Administrative Policies
Since Cárdenas

Initially, the Cárdenas reforms were more conservative in Catmis than in the northern henequen zone. In 1938 the federal government expropriated a large amount of hacienda lands and the central sugar processing mill in Catmis. However, rather than form ejidos, the labor union was established and the government workers were unionized. The union was organized to accommodate the labor needs of the industry. Part of the union labor force was permanent, working under a 12-month contract, while the other part was temporary, working under a six-month contract during the sugar cane harvest. Like Henequeneros de Yucatán in the northern zone, a state government agency, Azucares de Yucatán, was created in the southern sugar zone and administered by the state governor and his appointees.

Similar to the northern henequen zone, many hacendados in the southern zone retained their lands and continued to grow sugar cane, which they delivered for processing to the Catmis factory. The private sector hired free laborers rather than unionized laborers. Improvements for unionized laborers included wage scales, health benefits, pensioning, and formalized collective bargaining.

Like the northern zone under the administration of Henequeneros de Yucatán, the private sector in the southern zone flourished under Azucares de Yucatán, while the public sector decayed, along with Cárdenas' ideals. Since there were no ejido societies in Catmis, the laborers did not go into great debt as did the henequen ejidatarios in the northern zone. However, the private sector provided the largest portion of the raw sugar cane. Private growers were advanced large

sums of capital, and the contribution of the federally owned lands was less than that of the private sector. Like Henequeneros de Yucatán, corruption was rampant under Azucares de Yucatán. The labor force was used to build ranches for the chief administrators and fields were not tended carefully. Nor was the balance maintained between sugar cane fields in production and those in cultivation.

In short, under the administration of Azucares de Yucatán, Catmis showed similar financial and technological problems as those experienced in the henequen zone under the administration of Henequeneros de Yucatán. The chief difference was in the division of controls over the factors of production: In Catmis the government expropriated some of the lands and the only processing factory in the area, permitting the largest portion of lands to remain in the hands of private sugar growers; in the northern henequen zone the largest portion of lands was expropriated and used to form ejidos, while the private owners held control over some lands and most of the decorticating machinery. In both zones wage scales and other benefits made some minor improvements in the life of the workers, but neither the unionized workers in Catmis nor the collective ejidatarios in the henequen zone held any effective control over the means of production.

In the southern sugar zone the state administration of Azucares de Yucatán was dissolved in 1962, seven years after Henequeneros de Yucatán was terminated in the northern zone. During the following three years the sugar industry in Catmis was run under direct federal administration. However, conflicts between the local landowner-planters, who wanted to perpetuate the system of advanced

credits they had enjoyed under Azucares de Yucatân, and the federal administrators, who wanted the industry to yield profits for the government, proved to be too costly for the industry. In 1964 the sugar cane industry in Catmis was formally terminated, and the federal government encouraged the ejido movement which had emerged some time earlier within the local working population. In 1964 the Catmis ejido received a definitive land grant from the government, and in 1968 the government initiated the mixed farming project and the collective ejido credit society.

Today, many of the administrative policies in Catmis are similar to those of the henequen zone, particularly in their tendency to foster capital and labor dependency of the collective ejidatarios on federal agencies rather than develop an economically autonomous ejido community. For example, the cattle and cash crop farming project in Catmis is subsidized by the Mixed Farming Bank of the Southeast. The 1955 agrarian credit laws have formalized capital dependency of the collective ejido society on the bank. Such laws stipulate that: (1) the ejido cannot borrow from any other source until debts to the government are completely paid; (2) since the ejido lands may not be mortgaged, debts may be deferred in exchange for a share in the future produce of the soil; (3) the bank can take possession of local ejido assets and manage the operation of the society until the debt is cancelled.

Like the henequen zone, the bank issues advanced payments to cover salaries for the Catmis ejidatarios. Such payments correspond to crop and cattle ranching loans and both long-term development

loans and short-term seasonal loans. During the first three years of the project priority was given to bringing the farm to the highest level of productivity in the shortest possible period of time. Consequently, millions of pesos were invested in irrigation, land preparation, machinery and equipment, and salaries for administrators. The greatest portion of these funds was appropriated from the long-term development loans, thus promising to keep the Catmis ejidatarios paying on the interest and the principal at least into the second decade of the project operation. The pattern is clearly the same as that in the northern henequen zone.

The internal organization of the Catmis collective credit society consists of a chief representative, two auxiliary representatives, a vigilance committee, and the ejido credit society members. Although the leaders hold different titles in the henequen zone, the credit societies maintain fundamentally the same internal organization. On agreeing to the contract of credit, the ejidatarios in Catmis also agreed to work collectively under the administration of the National Indigenous Institute, whose branch office is located in Peto. The Institute agents control the ejido labor force by designating the work to be performed each week by the credit society members.

Despite the input of millions of pesos, the administration in Catmis, like that in the henequen zone, pursues a number of policies which have resulted in job insecurity, low wages, and underemployment. First, since the rapid growth of the project has taken precedence over creating job security for the ejidatarios, the administration has permitted the capital expenditure for labor to fluctuate greatly by the

month and by the year according to the technological development of the project. Second, the bank deliberately permitted the number of credit society members to be too large for the actual capital outlay for labor expenditures, thus consciously overpopulating the work force in order to insure the required labor. Finally, wages for work on the project were lower than for comparable work in the private sector, ostensibly to save money for future dividends. The resulting low wages, job insecurity, and underemployment closely parallel the situation in the northern henequen zone, although the cause of underemployment and low wages in Catmis is clearly attributed to administrative policy rather than to overpopulation as has been suggested for the henequen zone (Kirk 1975; Raymond 1970). Finally, corrupt practices within Catmis' collective credit society aggravate the problem further. Ghost payrolls and other manipulatory practices regularly found in the henequen zone are also common in Catmis, where they function to lower the capital base which is paid out for wages. Thus, with respect to control over capital and labor, many administrative policies in Catmis are similar to those of the northern henequen zone.

Ecology and Potential for Economic Expansion

These fundamental uniformities in administrative policy reflect the national character of Mexico's agrarian reform laws. Their implementation is similar, regardless of ecological variations between regions. Still, such regularities in administrative policies are all the more striking because of the obvious differences between the ecology and potential for economic development in the northern and

southern zones. In every way the ecological features of the Catmis ejido are conducive to economic growth and expansion as opposed to the restrictive ecology and lack of potential for economic growth found in the henequen zone.

Soils in Catmis are relatively fertile and deep. Rainfall is almost twice that of the northern zone. With the input of modern farming equipment and irrigation, the Catmis project has great potential for high productivity. Moreover, the diversity of agricultural production in Catmis means that in contrast to the northern zone, which is completely dependent on henequen, the Catmis ejido can be free of the whims of monocrop markets.

In contrast to the northern henequen zone, Catmis is sparsely populated. Only 75 percent of the houses are occupied. The village population declined tremendously when the sugar factory closed in 1965, and, while the population has been increasing, it has not yet returned to its previous levels.

The crops cultivated and cattle raised in Catmis show less complexity in their cycles than henequen. With the possible exception of bananas (which were grown on only 20 hectares in 1970), the crops are all cultivated seasonally and are capable of being rotated on a yearly basis.

Unlike the henequen zone, in Catmis the fields in cultivation do not need to be balanced in the same complex way as the henequen fields since many different crops are cultivated. In addition, unlike the henequen zone, many farming activities in both the cultivation

project and the cattle-ranching project are mechanized, and labor is organized collectively for many tasks.

As new wells are dug and new fields prepared for cultivation, the resources for the project are also expanding, which suggests that more individuals will be admitted to work on the project and possibly the ejido membership will increase in the near future. The cattle ranch also shows potential for further growth. New grasses are being grown to increase the number of animal units capable of being fed for each hectare of land utilized. Thus, in contrast to the restrictive environment of the henequen zone, the physical environment in Catmis is expanding and shows much potential for further growth, given the investment of capital and the input of modern farming methods and irrigation techniques.

The Effects of Economic Potential on Administrative Policies

As previously described, many of the same restrictive administrative policies are present in Catmis as in the northern henequen zone. Nevertheless, in recognition of the economic potential of the natural resources of the Catmis ejido, the agrarian reform administration has implemented a number of unique policies which encourage economic development through the expansion of ejido resources.

The following policies of the Institute administration stand in sharp contrast to those of the henequen zone. In the first place, new ejido land grants have been made in the southern zone, thereby increasing local resources utilized by the agrarian reform program. In the northern henequen zone, however, no new ejido land grants have

been made since the 1940s. And the finite land base of northern towns, villages, and ex-haciendas places restrictions on the local economy since henequen production can be maintained at present levels, but cannot be increased. This finite land base, combined with an increasing labor supply and fairly stable quotas for regional production, has resulted in a situation of less work and lower wages for everyone.

Second, the development loans in Catmis were made for the preparation of new lands for irrigation and modern industrial farming. In brief, a complete land transformation has taken place from the sugar cane era to the present mixed farming project in order to expand production. In the northern henequen zone, on the other hand, loans are made available to the local credit societies to perpetuate their accepted level of production, but not to make basic land transformations nor to increase the value of local productivity through irrigation or the diversification of crops. The technology used to cultivate and process henequen has remained fundamentally unchanged for at least 80 years, and no new modes of production or irrigation techniques have been introduced (Raymond 1970).

Finally, in Catmis agricultural experts sent by the government are working in direct contact with the ejidatarios toward the goal of increasing ejido productivity. Their principal function is to assist in expanding local production. In contrast, the agrarian administration of the henequen zone is oriented to regulate or even restrict the production of local collective ejidos, rather than help them increase their productivity. This difference stems from the

economic reality in which the quota of local ejido henequen production is predetermined by a specialized, external, monocrop market. When demand goes up, local production is permitted to increase. But when demand is low, the federal government continues to subsidize the industry through its regulatory agencies.

The Economic Development and Political Organization of the Collective Ejidos

These progressive administrative policies, combined with the expansion of ejido resources, have encouraged the development of concrete economic opportunities for the Catmis ejidatarios. Such opportunities are not available to the ejidatarios in the northern henequen zone.

First, unlike the collective ejidos in the henequen zone where the vast portion of ejido land is utilized for bank-subsidized henequen production, the ejido lands in Catmis are still capable of further exploitation by individual parcelarios. As a result, a number of different ejido occupations have emerged in Catmis as supplements to wage labor on the ejido mixed farming project. Today, more than half the active ejidatarios in Catmis are engaged in some form of ejido land utilization outside the project. Only a handful of ejidatarios have managed to build fences around their plots to raise cattle and goats, though none of these ejido plots has been formally parcelled by the government. Another 30 ejidatarios, plus many of their sons, work individual ejido parcels on lands outside the area designated for the mixed farming project. Another 10 individuals cultivate ejido parcels which lie within the irrigated lands designated

for the project. Theoretically, land plots which lie within the project area may not be allocated for individual cultivation until the debt has been repaid to the bank. Nevertheless, such allocations are made seasonally by the local ejido authorities. In addition, about 18 credit society members have fenced off 80 hectares of ejido lands in which they graze their own 40 head of cattle collectively. In Catmis the official size of individual ejido land grants is 20 hectares as opposed to only four hectares in the henequen zone. Such large land units ensure the possibility of continued individual cultivation on small plots in combination with the development project. Large land units also suggest the possibility of increasing the ejido membership in the future--something which cannot be done with the limited land resources in the henequen zone.

Second, unlike the henequen zone, the presence of the private sector in Catmis has not inhibited ejido productivity. In Catmis the private sector is not involved in the production or processing of any of the products from the mixed farming project. Hence, unlike the henequen zone, ejido production in Catmis is not inhibited by the expansion of private production through unfair competition in which the bank provides incentives to the private sector by paying higher prices for henequen or by encouraging the expansion of private land use for henequen cultivation. In the southern zone the Mixed Farming Bank also lends money to private ranchers, but private production is not linked to ejido production of cattle or crops in the same way that production and processing of the henequen ejidos is tied to the private sector.

A few ejidatarios work exclusively in the private sector for wages, primarily ejidatarios who have been alienated from the ejido credit society through the local political process. However, unlike many ejidatarios in the northern henequen zone, who receive up to half their cash income in wages from the private sector, most active ejidatarios in Catmis earn only a small supplement to their cash income through wages earned in the private sector.

Third, the productivity of the Catmis ejido is difficult to analyze since the project only began in 1968. Nevertheless, some tentative assessment of productivity was made by comparing the actual sale of produce to the estimated productivity which was projected by the bank. Generally speaking, the production of both cattle and cash crops has achieved the estimates, and the ejido has made its payments to the bank on time. Some signs of possible lowered productivity, as seen in excessive crop diversification cultivated on miniscule land plots, insufficient land under cultivation, and theft, indicate problems in management rather than in technological development. The rapid economic growth of the mixed farming project, however, should be understood to stand in sharp contrast with the relative stagnation of henequen production on the northern ejidos.

Finally, considerable evidence indicates that the ejidatarios have learned to use ejido resources and project equipment for their own economic gain. Such practices include renting ejido grazing lands to private ranchers, using project tractors to cultivate private plots, renting ejido machinery to private cultivators, and allocating parcels

on the irrigated lands which have been designated for the mixed farming project.

Some of these practices, such as renting project machinery to individual parcelarios, may be within the law, while others, such as grazing cattle for private ranchers on ejido lands or allocating project lands to individuals, are blatantly illegal. The illegal practices, particularly theft, are worth examining briefly because of the increasing economic opportunities such practices have provided.

The Catmis ejidatarios, like their counterparts in the henequen zone, sell some stolen goods to local merchants. Nevertheless, unlike the henequen zone, where individual ejidatarios steal and sell stolen henequen leaves to the private producers, in Catmis ejido leaders who steal project goods are forced to share their profits with their political allies and even with the opposition faction leader to keep him quiet. Thus, in Catmis more than a few ejidatarios derive economic benefits from such illegal sales. Theoretically, such sales harm the collective society since the product does not go to repay the debt to the bank, and the losses lower the ejido's official productivity. Nevertheless, theft is not rampant since it has not lowered productivity figures. At the same time, it seems obvious that the Catmis ejidatarios may develop a high incentive to increase ejido productivity since theft from the mixed farming project can be far more lucrative than theft on the henequen plantations. In contrast to henequen, a monocrop with limited local utility, cattle and many cash crops can easily be converted into wealth or consumed in the village.

Small amounts of henequen can be sold to private producers for badly needed cash, but this comes to very little compared to the large sums of money which can be obtained from the local sale of cattle, maize, and other cash crops. All such practices, both legal and illegal, have emerged in Catmis as a result of the expanding resources of the ejido and have helped develop a variety of economic opportunities for the Catmis ejidatarios.

Although it is still too soon to observe any dramatic changes, the expanding ejido economy may be expected to raise the standard of living of the Catmis ejidatarios. They already show greater material wealth and income when compared to lower-class non-ejidatarios, and an increasing number of ejidatarios now own cattle and other productive resources. Nevertheless, the process of economic improvement of the ejidatarios has been slow, partly because of continued political conflict within the ejido regarding access to ejido and development project resources, and partly because of restrictive administrative policies which control capital inputs and labor by encouraging more workers than the mixed farming project can support.

It is appropriate to conclude this comparison with a consideration of the collective ejido political organization. Like the ejidatarios in the northern henequen zone, the Catmis ejidatarios have been placed in a subordinate political position in which government bureaucracies control capital inputs and the local means of production and make the principal decisions which affect the ejidatarios' lives. As previously described, many of the administrative policies regarding ejido labor in Catmis are similar to those in the henequen

zone. Nevertheless, variations in local ejido political organization again reflect the differences between expanding and stagnating economies. Such variations are apparent with respect to both external and internal ejido political relations.

To begin with a consideration of the external relations, differences in the degree of political integration can be seen in the relations between credit society labor organizations and the federal administrations which control the production process on the henequen plantations and on the mixed farming project.

One of the basic indices of political integration is the degree of acceptance of the national agrarian reform ideology. Unlike many ejidatarios in the northern henequen zone, who are skeptical of national rhetoric because they recognize that their economy is stagnating rather than developing (Kirk 1975), the ejidatarios in Catmis accept the national ideology of progress and development because they can see tangible results in their expanding ejido economy. The most obvious evidence of economic development lies in the growing number of credit society members; after the first three years of the project operation, a second credit society was formed and the original ejido credit society also augmented its membership, thereby giving more ejidatarios the opportunity to earn wages as the development project expanded production.

In the northern henequen zone many ejidatarios feel frustration, animosity, and suspicion toward the bank agents (Raymond 1970: 162), and the national ideology of the revolution clashes with their own perceived political and economic reality (Kirk 1975: 366-367). In

contrast, none of the Catmis ejidatarios questions the sincere intentions of the government, and only a few of them openly doubt the motives of federal agents.

An even more important index of political integration is the degree and kind of cooperation between the bank administration and the credit society labor organization. Here, too, the collective ejido organizations in the northern and southern zones differ significantly. In the northern henequen zone a number of factors have combined to inhibit the development of close cooperation between the credit society and the bank. First, because of the nature of henequen cultivation and processing, the ejidatarios do not need technical assistance from the government. As a consequence, they do not work in close association with federal agents. Furthermore, the agents who do deal with the ejidatarios are not identified in any concrete way with the goal of increasing ejido henequen production.

Second, in the henequen zone the ejidatarios and the ex-hacienda owners, to some extent, have perpetuated paternalistic economic and social relations which were typical of the plantation period preceding Mexico's agrarian reform. Despite the fact that the agrarian reform administration replaced hacendado controls over the local communities, in the henequen zone the ex-hacendado remains an important authority figure for most ejidatarios. Of course, today, his powers are more subtle since he can no longer rely on the government to enforce his authority. Nevertheless, on many ex-haciendas in the henequen zone the ex-owner still exercises considerable control over the means of henequen production, thus wielding economic power on the

local level. The ex-hacendado typically owns the henequen decorticating factory and hires ejidatarios to work in the factory and on his remaining private fields. He may also help the ejidatarios by providing loans and donations for community projects, such as the installation of electricity, and by helping individual ejidatarios through private loans, sponsorship of life crisis rites, mediation of disputes with the community, or advice given to the ejidatario officials in their dealings with government agents (Wolf 1967). The trend in the henequen zone has been toward the development of more impersonal, business-like relations between the ejidatarios and the ex-hacendados. Nevertheless, the ex-hacienda owners still hold economic and political power over the ejidatarios, and the ejidatarios cooperate with them in many ways to retain their support.

In contrast to the northern henequen zone, in Catmis a number of factors have combined to encourage close cooperation between the credit society and the bank. First, the expansion of the ejido economy requires that the ejidatarios depend on government agencies for technological as well as for economic and political support. In Catmis the ejidatarios are placed in a situation where they must deal directly with federal agents. The spirit of cooperation is reinforced in daily contacts between the ejidatarios and federal agents who are actively engaged in increasing the productivity of the project farm. Meetings between labor and administration are held frequently, the ejidatarios are encouraged to express grievances, and the administration answers questions and deals with problems as they arise. Moreover, when the Catmis ejidatarios go to Peto to see the Institute

director about ejido matters, the director is open and responsive to them. He receives them informally, but always with courtesy and respect. He listens attentively to their requests and expresses genuine concern and responsibility for their problems. In contrast, bank officials in the henequen zone have been known to treat ejido delegations as if they were a troublesome nuisance (Kirk 1975).

Second, in contrast to the henequen zone, the absence of significant economic ties between the ejido and the private sector further encourages close cooperation between the ejido and federal agrarian reform agencies. Because of their desire to maintain close contacts with the government (or, perhaps, due to their fear of losing government support), the Catmis ejidatarios openly express the national ideology of the revolution, particularly that aspect of the national ideology which, on the one hand, condemns the exploitation of the workers by private enterprise, while, on the other, praises the notion of strong cooperation between the collective ejido labor force and the federal administration.

Even more important than this ideological basis, however, is the fact that in Catmis the agrarian reform completely eliminated private controls over the local means of ejido production, including the cultivation and processing of all ejido products as well as controls over the ejido labor force. Because of their relative independence from the private sector and the continued efforts of the new hacienda owner to take advantage of the community by not fulfilling his pledges, the Catmis ejidatarios outwardly manifest much hostility and animosity toward the private sector and particularly toward the private

owner of the new hacienda in Catmis. Ejido animosity is demonstrated in periodic protests against the new landowning company. In such demonstrations the ejidatarios demand that the company fulfill its obligations and pledges to the ex-union workers of the village.

Beneath this formal position of antagonism and conflict, however, the Catmis ejidatarios cooperate with nearby landowners in a number of ways, such as the negotiated sale of the ex-hacienda residence to the ejido, the sale of stolen project goods to local merchants, and the rental of ejido lands and machinery to private ranchers and farmers. Although such transactions parallel those of the henequen zone, the absence of the private sector from all formal controls over ejido production clearly minimizes the influence of the private sector in the internal ejido political economy and in its relations with the administration.

Finally, by comparing the manner in which conflicts between credit societies and administrations are resolved, the differences in the degree of political integration emerge most clearly. In both zones conflict between labor and administration arises for the same or similar reasons: The ejidatarios call for the removal of a particular administrator or protest alleged corruption in the administration or in the ejido leadership. In the henequen zone such conflicts periodically lead to work stoppages and confrontations or "tumultos" (Raymond 1970; Goodman 1970) with the bank. Unlike the henequen zone, however, in Catmis such conflicts have never led to confrontations with the bank or the Institute.

This difference, which suggests a higher degree of political integration of the Catmis ejidatarios, is clearly attributed to the important mediating function of the National Indigenous Institute. Standing midway between the bank and the ejido, in times of crisis the Institute acts as a buffer between them. The relative lack of stress in the ejido's political relations with the Institute may be attributed to two features of the Catmis mixed farming project which are absent in the northern henequen zone. First, because of the expanding ejido resources and large capital investments, funds are more often released by the Institute for specific ejido projects which have been initiated by the ejidatarios. During the course of the field research for the present study the Institute allocated funds for a number of such projects, including the purchase of the ex-hacendado's residence and warehouse. In Raymond's (1970) study of a northern henequen ejido no such projects took place, and in Kirk's (1975) study the ejidatarios managed to obtain a small amount of funds for their own minor project, but only after a long period of complicated political maneuvering.

Second, the close working relationship and high degree of communication between the Catmis ejidatarios and the Institute minimizes the severity of conflicts when they do arise. Under the Institute administration, the accounting and financial records of the mixed farming project are available for open inspection by the ejido leaders, while in the henequen zone the bank systematically denies the ejidatarios access to such records (Kirk 1975; Raymond 1970). In addition, in Catmis the ejidatarios are encouraged to express their

grievances with the project in daily work contacts with agents from the Institute. The closeness of administration-labor relations in Catmis stands in clear contrast to the distant administration-labor relations in the henequen zone. Such intraregional variations clearly explain the observed differences in the degree of political integration of the respective collective credit societies.

The internal political process of the ejidos constitutes the final difference in local political organizations which has developed as a result of differences between expanding and stagnating local economies. In the henequen zone political factions emerge within the credit society, and many local conflicts go unresolved since the ejido has great difficulty achieving clear-cut leadership (Wolf 1967: 312). Moreover, to a minimal extent leaders practice job discrimination in hiring, and there are significant variations in income among the members.

Nevertheless, the ejido labor and political organizations in the henequen zone appear to have adapted to their environmental situation of limited and finite resources along with perpetual job scarcities. In general, the available jobs are distributed fairly evenly among the credit society members. All of the members are underemployed, but no one is forced to leave the village permanently because of lack of work. Kirk (1975: 79) explains that practically none of the ejidatarios in the henequen zone emigrate from their villages as a result of unemployment since leaving the ejido means giving up a fixed and ascribed status; there may be only a little work available,

but since the ejidatario cannot be denied his right to work, he will remain in the village with the little job security he has.

In sharp contrast to the situation of relative internal political stability of the henequen ejidos, the expanding ejido resources in Catmis have encouraged a situation of relatively intense internal political conflict. In Catmis ejido factions compete for a multitude of local resources and formal positions which given their leaders access to resources. They compete to get their own leaders elected to the ejido presidency, for example, which is more important in Catmis than in the henequen zone since ejido lands unused by the mixed farming project are still available for distribution to individual parcelarios. Ejido factions in Catmis also compete for the political and economic support of the bank and the Institute, without which no faction could remain in power.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, ejido internal politics in Catmis are characterized by internal factional competition for the position of credit society chief representative and the corresponding power to distribute jobs and other project resources. The minority faction in the credit society tries to uncover corruption among the ejido officials in power, thereby initiating new elections, while the governing faction tries to eliminate the minority by denying them jobs, thereby forcing them to leave the ejido and the village. Blatant job discrimination in hiring practices has created a unique situation in which less than half the members of the credit society are given regular work on the project. As a result, a large number of

ejidatarios, many of whom are members of the credit society, are forced to emigrate from the village, thus abandoning their ejido rights.

From 1964, when the definitive ejido community was established, until 1970, almost 35 percent of the original ejido members gave up residence in the village. Hence, the price of high political integration of the Catmis credit society and ejido has been intense internal political conflict which has resulted in a rather paradoxical situation: The absolute number of ejidatarios in the credit society labor force as well as the number of credit societies has been increasing corresponding to the expansion of ejido resources, while the actual personnel on the project and in the ejido have been unstable corresponding to the high labor mobility caused by the ejido's competitive internal political process.

Some Implications for Future Policy and Research

It is instructive to conclude with a consideration of some of the implications of this thesis for future policy and research on collective ejidos in the context of Mexico's agrarian reform. In attempting to analyze the impact of the agrarian reform on the public sector, previous studies frequently have criticized the collective ejido as an institutional form after comparing their various economic and sociopolitical adaptations to those of the private sector. The most common comparison has been in levels of productivity in which the ejido sector has generally shown itself to be inferior according to aggregate productivity figures.

The fallacious assumption underlying such comparisons is that the set of incentives and constraints which the federal government offers on the one hand to rural workers and peasants within the public (ejido) sector and on the other hand to entrepreneurs within the private sector are identical, when in fact they are completely different.

If the present thesis has contributed anything to the enquiry into the adaptation of collective ejidos in Mexico, it has been to demonstrate that such comparisons at the very least are misleading if not blatantly incorrect. This investigation suggests that the kind of adaptation, success, or failure of particular collective ejidos must be judged on their own terms, i.e., by comparing the ecological/economic and socio-political conditions which encourage and inhibit their development. The comparison of the Catmis ejido mixed farming project and its collective ejido organization to henequen-producing ejidos in the northern zone reveals a series of conditions which lead to greater or lesser success, depending on local ecological/economic circumstances and the ways in which these conditions have been combined by agrarian reform agencies and ejido organizations.

In general, the conditions which appear to encourage the successful adaptation of collective ejidos, as seen in the Catmis mixed farming project, are the following: (1) when there are local resources for an expanding economy, (2) when government agencies insure capital for industrial development and increased production, (3) when government agents work closely with ejidatarios on the local level to increase local production, and (4) when ejido organizations

are completely independent or at least isolated in their production processes from the private sector. In general, the conditions which tend to inhibit the successful adaptation of collective ejidos, as seen in the northern henequen zone, would be the following: (1) when local resources are insufficient to expand the local economy through agrarian development projects; (2) when government agencies perform regulatory or restrictive functions, rather than insure capital for development and increased production; (3) when government agents are distant from the ejidatarios and not identified with the goal of increasing local productivity; and (4) when the private sector is interwoven with the ejido sector, thus having significant economic and political influence on local-level ejido organizations.

It is the combination of these conditions on the local level that determines the kind of adaptation and the success or failure of any particular collective ejido organization. Rather than judging the collective ejido on the basis of ideology or, out of context, by comparing the levels of ejido production with private production, anthropologists should instead begin to investigate the conditions which encourage and inhibit successful adaptations to the economic and socio-political realities of rural Mexico.

It is evident for the first time since the sugar episode in the nineteenth century, that southern Yucatán is emerging as an important region for industrialized agricultural production within the larger Yucatán and Mexican economies. In Yucatán's southern zone and in Quintana Roo the federal government has a unique opportunity to bring out some of the most effective components of the national

agrarian reform through a program of economic expansion combined with collective ejido farming in this region which represents the final frontier of the country. It would be most unfortunate and ultimately very costly were the government to inhibit the formation of new ejidos and development projects on these lands, or were it instead to sell large expanses of land to private ranchers and farmers who would prevent internal migrations to the southern zone, exploit local working populations, and effectively recreate an economic and socio-political environment similar to that which existed on industrialized plantations before the Revolution of 1910 and the Cárdenas reforms of the 1930s.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR SOCIO-ECONOMIC STUDY OF CATMIS

APPENDIX A

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR SOCIO-ECONOMIC STUDY OF CATMIS

1. Informant's name (male household head)

2. Household members:
   a. name
   b. age
   c. sex
   d. kinship with household head
   e. do they read and write
   f. grade of schooling each member completed
   g. civil status
   h. place of birth
   i. language spoken most fluently; second language

3. Present occupations of those who work:
   a. principle occupations and salaries
   b. secondary occupations and salaries

4. Previous occupations of those who work:
   a. principal occupations and salaries
   b. secondary occupations and salaries

5. Present occupation of head's father

6. Previous occupation of head's father

7. Present occupation of head's grandfather

8. Previous occupation of head's grandfather

9. Data on children living away from Catmis
   a. name
   b. sex
   c. age
   d. occupation
   e. destination of immigration

10. Are you accustomed to working communally in faenas?

11. If yes, how many days have you worked communally during the last year?

12. Individual and family ownership of the following:
    a. land
    b. a house site
    c. cattle
    d. horses
    e. pigs
    f. poultry
    g. a well in your yard
    h. an orchard
    i. cooking herbs
    j. curing herbs
    k. machine press for tortillas
    l. hand mill
    m. radio
    n. sewing machine
    o. bicycle
    p. motorcycle
    q. others

13. The dwelling unit
    a. composition of the walls
    b. composition of the ceiling
    c. composition of the floor
    d. number of rooms
    e. is the kitchen apart from the main dwelling

14. Who are your padrinos (for hetzmek, baptism, confirmation, first communion, marriage, others)?
    a. name
    b. kinship
    c. principal occupation
    d. place of residence

15. What language to you speak at home?

16. Are you a member of any religious or voluntary associations?

17. What positions have you held in these organizations or in the community?

18. Are you an ejidatario?

19. If yes, what positions have you held or are you presently holding in the organization?

20. On what occasions do the men (women and children) in your family wear modern or traditional clothing?
    a. daily
    b. fiestas
    c. school
    d. outside the village

21. How many members of your family have been to Mérida?

22. How many members of your family have been to Mexico City?

23. Which villages and towns do the members of your family (and you) most commonly visit? For what purposes?

24. How are you most often informed about events in Yucatán, in Mexico, and in other parts of the world?
    a. conversations with other members of the family
    b. discussions with friends
    c. communications with authorities
    d. listening to the radio
    e. reading newspapers

APPENDIX B

THE COSTS OF PRODUCTION

(TABLES B1-B14)

Table B1.--Investments for the cattle-ranching project.

A.	Fences	
	1. 52 kilometers of inside fences, 3 strands of wire, and with chutes at $2,500 per kilometer	$ 130,000
	2. 43 kilometers of outside fences, 2 strands of wire, posts, at $2,000 per kilometer	86,000
	3. Construction of 3 wells, open-air drinking trough, at $25,000 each	75,000
	4. Construction of a drinking trough with a motor for the well	20,000
	5. Repairing the drinking trough of the well	20,000
	6. 15 exist for proportioning food at $300 each	4,500
B.	Corrals	
	7. Corral w/chute, parasite bath, embaradero, scale and door	55,000
	8. Three auxiliary corrals for management @ $5,000	15,000
	9. Store room, milking room	13,000
C.	Construction and Services	
	10. Warehouse, office	15,000
	11. Foreman's house	3,500
	12. 10 houses for workmen and cowboys at $2,500 each	25,000
	13. Installing electricity on the main compound	78,600
D.	Storage Equipment	
	14. Hammer mill for grinding grain	11,000
	15. Chopping block for fodder	8,000
	16. Small motor mill for grinding sugar cane	25,000
	17. Storage tank for molasses	10,000
E.	Mechanical Farming Equipment	
	18. John Deere tractor 41 RP	40,000
	19. Plow	10,500
	20. Field tow	12,000
	21. Tools (miscellaneous)	2,000
F.	Transportation Equipment	
	22. Pick-up truck--Chevrolet	40,000
G.	Cattle	
	23. 600 cows of breed Cebu, at $1,600 each	960,000
	24. 23 bulls at $5,000 each	115,000
	25. Transporting cattle	50,000
	26. 10 horses with cowboy gear at $1,000 each	10,000
	27. Instruments for veterinary use	5,000
	Total	$1,839,100

Table B2.--Amortization schedule of the basic and supplementary cattle ranching loans.

Year	Balance on Basic Cattle Loan	Interest on Basic Cattle Loan	Balance of Supplementary Loan[a]	Interest on Supplementary Loan	Payment on Principle Basic	Payment Principle Supplement	Total Int. B. and S. Loans	Total Payment Obligation
I	$1,839,100	73,564[b]	654,914	72,040	--	497,840[c]	145,604	643,444[d]
II	1,839,100	110,346	823,050	90,533	--	823,050	200,881	1,033,931
III	1,839,100	110,346	673,657	74,102	139,100	673,657	184,448	997,203
IV	1,700,000	102,000	691,700	76,037	100,000	691,700	178,087	969,787
V	1,600,000	96,000	708,887	77,977	200,000	708,887	173,977	1,082,864
VI	1,400,000	84,000	717,709	78,948	200,000	717,709	162,948	1,080,657
VII	1,200,000	72,000	739,032	81,293	300,000	739,032	153,293	1,192,323
VIII	900,000	54,000	719,419	79,136	300,000	719,419	133,136	1,152,553
IX	600,000	35,000	720,757	79,284	300,000	720,767	115,284	1,136,051
X	300,000	18,000	720,767	79,284	300,000	720,767	97,284	1,118,051
Totals		736,256		788,688	1,839,100	7,012,828	1,544,944	10,396,074

[a]The Supplementary Cattle Loan includes the financing of cattle maintenance as well as the Fattening Project.

[b]Only 4 percent interest was calculated here since the largest proportion of the loan was not available until five months following the beginning of the contract.

[c]During the first year only the Fattening Project was financed with the supplementary loan. For this reason maintenance of the breeding operation of the first year defers its payment date until the second year.

[d]The deficits for covering payments are considered under Agricultural Loans.

Table B3.--Estimated productivity of the cattle breeding project.

	At Time of Loan	After Initial Invest-ment	Years									
			I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	IX	X
Animal units	28	838	930	1100	1212	1302	1382	1461	1542	1566	1580	1580
Bulls	1	24	24	24	24	24	25	26	28	28	28	28
Pregnant cows				6 -0 6	214 - 2 212 -20 192	193 - 2 191 -31 160	176 - 2 174 -34 140	208 - 2 206 -36 170	221 - 2 219 -79 140	228 - 2 226 -86 140	242 - 2 240 -100 140	242 - 2 240 -100 140
Yearling calves fem.			6 -0 6	216 - 2 214	195 - 2 193	178 - 2 176	210 - 2 208	224 - 3 221	231 - 3 228	245 - 3 242	245 - 3 242	245 - 3 242
Heifers 1-2 yrs. fem.	6	6	216	195	178	210	224	231	245	245	245	245
Breeding cows 2-3 yrs. fem.	19	619	619 - 6 -55 558	558 - 5 -50 503	509 - 5 -96 408	600 - 6 -114 480	640 - 6 -114 520	660 - 7 -123 530	700 - 7 -133 560	700 - 7 -133 560	700 - 7 -133 560	700 - 7 -133 560
Young bulls 1-2 yrs.	6	6	216	195	178	210	224	231	245	245	245	245
Yearling calves masc.			6 -0 6	216 - 2 214	195 - 2 193	178 - 2 176	210 - 2 208	224 - 3 221	231 - 3 228	245 - 3 242	245 - 3 242	245 - 3 242
Steers 2-3 yrs. masc.												
Increases:												
Pregnant cows	600			6	192	160	140	170	140	140	140	140
Bulls	23					1	1	2				
Sales:												
Steers 1-2 yrs.			6	214	193	176	208	221	228	242	242	242
Surplus cows			55	50	96	114	114	123	133	133	133	133
Surplus bulls												
Pregnant cows					20	31	34	36	79	86	100	100
Cows through insurance			6	5	5	6	6	7	7	7	7	7

Table B4.--Estimated earnings and expenditures for the breeding project (first 10 years).

	Year			
	I	II	III	IV
EARNINGS:				
1. Surplus cows @ $1300	$ 71,500	$ 65,000	$124,000	$148,200
2. Steers (1-2 yrs. old) @ $1400	8,400	299,600	270,200	246,400
3. Damaged cows (insurance) @ $1500	9,000	7,500	7,500	9,000
4. Pregnant cows @ $1700	--	--	34,000	52,000
TOTAL EARNINGS	$ 88,900	$372,100	$436,500	$456,300
EXPENDITURES:				
1. Purchasing bulls @ $10,000	--	--	--	--
2. Complementary feed $25.20 per animal unit	23,436	27,720	30,542	32,810
3. Vaccinations	3,246	4,230	4,479	4,779
4. Internal deparasitation	3,370	4,653	4,927	5,237
5. External deparasitation	5,377	6,599	7,272	7,811
6. Cattle insurance (cows @ $1500; bulls @ $5000 172.5)	35,490	29,659	27,009	35,490
7. Transportation & thresher (maint. costs)	15,000	15,000	15,000	15,000
8. Repair and construction of equipment	10,000	10,000	10,000	10,000
9. Maintenance of pasture lands at $50 per hectare	46,475	54,990	60,605	63,090
10. Cattle management (INI does accounting)	--	--	--	--
11. Unexpected costs (10% of aforementioned)	14,280	15,285	15,983	17,623
TOTAL EXPENDITURES	$157,074	$168,136	$175,817	$193,360
Earnings:	88,900	372,100	436,500	456,300
Expenditures:	157,074	168,136	175,817	193,860
Net profit:	-68,374	203,964	260,683	262,440
PRODUCTIVITY ANALYSIS:				
a. Percentage gain in respect to total project investment	--	6.98	7.76	7.81
b. Degree of land utilization	100%	100%	100%	100%
c. Animal loan on land utilization	0.66	0.74	0.80	0.85
d. Ptg. offspring weaned	70%	70%	70%	70%
e. Ptg. adult mortality	1%	1%	1%	1%

Table B4.--Continued.

	Year					
	V	VI	VII	VIII	IX	X
EARNINGS:						
1.	$148,200	$159,500	$172,900	$172,900	$172,900	$172,900
2.	291,200	309,400	3192,00	338,800	338,800	338,800
3.	9,000	10,500	10,500	10,500	10,500	10,500
4.	57,800	61,200	134,300	146,200	170,000	170,000
TOTAL EARNINGS:	$506,200	$541,000	$636,900	$668,400	$692,200	$692,200
EXPENDITURES:						
1.	--	--	--	--	--	--
2.	10,000	10,000	20,000	--	--	--
3.	34,826	38,817	38,858	39,463	39,815	39,816
4.	5,127	5,412	5,703	5,808	5,850	5,850
5.	5,640	5,953	6,273	6,389	6,435	6,435
6.	8,232	8,766	9,234	9,398	9,482	9,482
7.	33,872	34,933	37,038	37,038	37,038	37,038
8.	15,000	15,000	15,000	15,000	15,000	15,000
9.	10,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	10,000
10.	69,105	73,000	77,120	78,320	79,020	79,020
11.	19,186	19,988	21,926	20,143	20,266	20,266
TOTAL EXPEND.	$211,047	$219,869	$241,192	$221,579	$222,927	$222,927
EARNINGS:	$536,200	$541,000	$636,900	$668,400	$692,200	$692,200
EXPEND.:	$211,047	$219,869	$241,192	$221,579	$222,927	$222,927
NET PROFITS:	$325,153	$321,131	$395,708	$446,821	$469,273	$469,273
PRODUCTIVITY ANALYSIS:						
a.	8.78	9.56	11.78	13.30	13.96	13.96
b.	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
c.	0.89	0.93	0.97	0.98	0.99	0.99
d.	70%	70%	70%	70%	70%	70%
e.	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%

Table B5.--Estimated annual expenditures and profits for fattening loan.

Estimated Profits:

396 steers (1 percent subtracted from original 400 because of death), fattened to 400 kilograms average weight, at $4.00 per kilogram.

Estimated Gross Profit: $633,600.00

Estimated Annual Expenditures:

	Category	Annual Cost
1.	Vaccinations	$ 800.00
2.	Internal deparasitation	1,200.00
3.	External deparasitation	2,400.00
4.	Supplementary feed	6,000.00
5.	Preserving production (silos)	14,000.00
6.	Clearing and weeding land ($50 per hectare)	20,000.00
7.	Management (includes cost of cowboys, $20 per animal)	8,000.00
8.	Unanticipated (10% additional)	5,050.00
9.	Buying steers	440,000.00
	TOTAL EXPENDITURES	$497,840.00

Gross profits:	$633,600.00
Expenditures:	497,840.00
Net profit of fattening operation	$135,760.00

Table B6.--Expenditures for the basic cultivation loan.

Expenditure	Authorized Amount
1. Clearing, leveling, and derooting (550 hectares)	$ 550,000
2. Tractors	403,990
3. Ploughs	29,080
4. Reaping machine	46,470
5. Hand tools	10,596
6. Plough beams	8,106
7. Scraper	8,265
8. Sowing machine	37,656
9. Combine	179,850
10. Supplementary tools for maize harvest	46,370
11. Thresher	5,900
12. Feed harvest	25,220
13. One warehouse with tin roofing	40,000
14. Three shelters for machinery ($15,000 each)	45,000
15. One storage bin for combustibles	10,000
16. One warehouse for fodder	30,000
TOTAL	$1,476,503

Table B7.--Amortization table for the basic and supplementary cultivation loans.

Year	Loan	Interest	Payment	Total Obligation	Funds Available for Two Production Cycles (Supplementary Loans)	
1971	$1,476,503	$103,355	$ --[a]	$ 103,355	$ 722,330	$ 618,975
1972	1,476,503	103,355	200,000	303,355	722,330	418,975
1973	1,276,503	89,355	200,000	289,355	722,330	432,975
1974	1,076,503	75,355	210,000	285,355	722,330	436,975
1975	866,503	60,655	220,000	280,655	722,330	441,675
1976	646,503	45,255	220,000	265,255	722,330	457,075
1977	426,503	29,855	220,000	249,855	722,330	472,475
1978	206,503	14,640	206,503	220,958	722,330	501,372
Totals:	--	$521,640	$1,476,503	$1,998,143	$5,778,640	$3,780,497

[a]This first year is a grace period to offer the project some security.

Table B8.--Selected crops, planting seasons' total project costs.

Crop	Cost Per Hectare	Estimated Number of Hectares	Price
Summer Season:			
Maize	$1,078.00	320	$344,960.00
Soy bean	1,498.00	160	239,680.00
Fodder	1,095.00	70	76,650.00
TOTAL INVESTMENT:		550	$661,290.00
Winter Season:			
Sorghum	$1,433.00	320	$458,560.00
Sesame	1,188.00	160	190,080.00
TOTAL INVESTMENT:		480	$648,640.00

Table B9.--Costs of production and estimated profits for one hectare of maize.

Months	Concept	Costs Per Hectare
May	Plowing of fallow land	$ 100.00
May	Scraping	60.00
May	Seeding	72.00
June	Planting	60.00
June	Fertilization	320.00
June	Insurance and contracting	46.00
June	Irrigation	55.00
July	Application of insecticide	75.00
July	Irrigation	40.00
August	Application of insecticide	75.00
August	Cultivation	40.00
August	Irrigation	55.00
October	Harvest	40.00
October	Freight and threshing	40.00
	Sub-total	$1,078.00
Finance Charge:		
12% annually for six months		65.00
Estimated Production:		
$2,000 kilo per hectare each		
$ .85 kilo		
Resume:	Gross Earnings per Hectare	$1,700.00
	Costs	1,143.00
	Estimated Profits	$ 557.00

Table B10.--Costs of production and estimated profits for one hectare of sesame.

Months	Concept	Costs Per Hectare
November	Plowing of fallow land	$ 100.00
November	Scraping	60.00
November	Seeding	30.00
November	Irrigation before seeding	55.00
December	Seeding	60.00
December	Insurance and contracting	58.00
December	Fertilization(80-80-80)	320.00
December	Irrigation	55.00
January	Cultivation	40.00
January	Irrigation	55.00
March	Irrigation	55.00
April	Harvesting (cutting, stacking and threshing)	165.00
April	Carting	40.00
	Sub-total	$1,188.00
Finance Charge:		
12% annually for six months		71.00
Total cost:		$1,259.00
Calculated Production:		
900 kilo per hectare @ $2.70		
Resume: Gross Earning per Hectare		$2,430.00
Costs		1,259.00
Estimated Profit		$1,171.00

Table B11.--Costs of production and estimated profits for one hectare of soybean.

Months	Concept	Costs Per Hectare
May	Plowing of fallow land	$ 100.00
May	Scraping	60.00
May	Seeding	240.00
June	Injecting of seeds	20.00
June	Planting	60.00
June	Insurance and contracting	58.00
June	Fertilization	370.00
June	Auxiliary irrigation	55.00
July	Cultivation	40.00
July	Application of insecticide	80.00
July	Weeding	75.00
August	Auxiliary irrigation	55.00
August	Application of insecticide	80.00
October	Harvesting (cutting and threshing)	165.00
October	Freight	40.00
	Sub-total	$1,498.00
Finance Charge:		
12% annually for six months		90.00
Total cost:		$1,588.00
Estimated production 1,500 kilo @ $1.50		
Resume: Gross Earnings per Hectare		$2,250.00
Costs		1,588.00
Estimated Profit		$ 662.00

Table B12.--Costs of production and estimated profits for one hectare of grain sorghum.

Months	Concept	Costs per Hectare
November	Plowing of fallow land	$ 100.00
November	Scraping	60.00
November	Seeding	60.00
December	Irrigation before planting	55.00
December	Planting	60.00
December	Fertilization	320.00
December	Insurance and contracting	63.00
January	Cultivation	40.00
January	Irrigation	55.00
January	Application of insecticide	65.00
January	Irrigation	55.00
February	Cultivation	40.00
February	Irrigation	55.00
March	Irrigation	45.00
April	Irrigation	55.00
April	Inspection	45.00
May	Harvesting (cutting and threshing)	105.00
May	Freight	50.00
	Sub-total	$1,433.00
Finance Charge:		
12% annually for six months		86.00
Total cost:		$1,519.00
Estimated production 3,000 kilo @ $.70		
Resume: Gross Earnings per Hectare		$2,100.00
Costs		1,519.00
Estimated Profit		$ 581.00

Table B13.--Costs of production and estimated profits for one hectare of fodder sorghum.

Months	Concept	Costs per Hectare
April	Plowing of fallow land	$ 100.00
April	Scraping	60.00
May	Seeding	75.00
May	Fertilization	320.00
June	Planting and fertilization	60.00
July	Cultivation	40.00
August	Cutting	180.00
August	Freight	60.00
September	Cultivation	40.00
October	Cutting	120.00
October	Freight	40.00
	Sub-total	$1,095.00
Finance Charge:		
12% annually for seven months		77.00
Total cost:		$1,172.00
Estimated Production 60 tons @ $45		
Resume: Gross Earnings per Hectare		$2,100.00
Costs		1,172.00
Estimated Profit		$ 928.00

Table B14.--Total actual expenditures by loan category: March 1968-February 1971.

		Basic	Supplementary	Total
CATTLE	1968:	$1,705,214	$ 461,109	$2,166,323
	1969:	28,464	324,930	353,394
	1970:	23,500	248,017	271,517
	Total:	$1,757,178	$1,035,056	$2,792,234
CULTIVATION	1968:	$ 174,267	$ 57,942	$ 231,209
	1969:	96	25,500	25,596
	1970:	$1,388,516	540,951	1,929,467
	Total:	$1,562,516	$ 624,393	$2,187,272

TOTALS FOR EACH YEAR AND GRAND TOTAL:

1968:	$2,397,532
1969:	378,990
1970:	2,200,984
	$4,977,506

Table B14.--Continued.

Year	Basic Cattle	Supplementary Cattle	Feeding Project	Basic Cultivation	Supplementary Cultivation	Total
1968						
March	$ 213,500	--	--	--	--	$ 213,500
April	53,714	--	--	--	--	53,714
May	120,303	351	--	10,400	5,476 (Maize)	136,529
June	97,144	433	20,000	115,425	13,822 (Maize)	246,824
July	241,906	4,075	53,258	32,284	5,869 (Maize)	347,392
Aug.	465,391	28,772	490	13,319	3,228 (Sesame)	511,200
Sept.	266,425	38,172	392	1,090	4,203 (Sesame)	310,282
Oct.	23,351	10,506	17,154	90	6,223 (Soy Bean)	57,324
Nov.	94,484	9,625	3,887	959	3,237 (Soy Bean)	112,192
Dec.	93,105	4,570	476	700	8,975 (Sesame Seed)	107,826
Jan.	29,081	13,065	115,481	--	6,744	164,371
Feb.	6,811	5,921	124,481	--	105	137,378
TOTAL	$1,705,214	115,490	345,619	174,267	57,882	$2,398,532

Table B14.--Continued.

Year	Basic Cattle	Supplementary Cattle	Feeding Project	Basic Cultivation	Supplementary Cultivation	Total
1969						
March	$ 4,444	1,233	1,551	--	349	$ 7,577
April	3,787	--	810	--	588	5,185
May	7,165	--	1,176	--	2,466 (Sorghum)	10,807
June	1,903	3,511	470	--	9,293 (Sorghum)	15,177
July	1,089	3,392	3,798	--	448 (Sorghum)	8,727
Aug.	3,554	10,327	1,490	--	12,040 (Sesame)	27,411
Sept.	2,394	2,180	14,105	96	316	19,091
Oct.	4,128	37,572	17,141	--	--	58,841
Nov.	--	5,837	19,454	--	--	25,291
Dec.	--	4,861	133,234	--	--	138,095
Jan.	--	17,485	17,391	--	--	34,871
Feb.	--	23,453	4,459	--	--	27,912
TOTAL	$28,464	109,851	215,079	96	25,500	$378,990

Table B14.--Continued.

Year	Basic Cattle	Supple. Cattle	Feeding Project	Basic Cultiv.	Banana	Sesame	Soy Bean	Maize	Sorghum	Fodder	Total
1970											
March	$23,500	20,200	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	$ 43,700
April	--	8,847	21,143	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	29,990
May	--	1,162	21,933	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	23,095
June	--	--	19,074	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	19,074
July	--	--	25,423	26,716	--	--	--	85,130	--	--	137,269
Aug.	--	--	--	103,415	7,391	2,168	10,791	44,056	28,755	17,203	213,779
Sept.	--	--	--	40,990	13,745	5,363	687	7,097	6,993	810	75,685
Oct.	--	--	--	29,516	15,469	2,791	6,257	14,104	2,615	8,256	79,009
Nov.	--	--	--	562,116	12,940	19,008	9,186	36,802	51,416	11,655	703,123
Dec.	--	78,382	--	241,200	3,122	1,135	1,917	11,406	780	--	337,942
Jan.	--	12,087	--	9,905	4,892	8,997	1,951	524	2,397	--	40,753
Feb.	--	40,766	--	374,658	8,428	--	--	6,099	68,615	--	498,566
TOTAL	$23,500	161,444	87,573	1,388,516	65,987	39,462	30,789	205,218	161,571	37,924	$2,201,984

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

Adams, Richard Newbold
1967 The second sowing: Power and secondary development in Latin America. California, Chandler Publishing Co.

Baily, F. G.
1969 Strategems and spoils: A social anthropology of politics. Oxford, Basic Blackwell.

Banfield, Edward
1958 The moral basis of a backward society. Glencoe, Ill., Free Press.

Camara, Fernando Barbachano
1958 Colonizacion interna de Yucatán. Mexico, Instituto Yucateco De Antropologia E Historia, Instituto Nacional De Antropologia E Historia.

1968 Religious and political organization. In Heritage of conquest, Tax S., New York, Cooper Square Publishers.

Camara Zavala, Gonzalo
1946 Historia de la industria henequenera. Enciclopedia Yucatanense 3: 657-725.

Chevalier, Francois
1967 The ejido and political stability in Mexico. In The politics of conformity in Latin America, Claudio Veliz, ed. London, Oxford University Press.

Cumberland, Charles
1968 Mexico: The struggle for modernity. London and New York, Oxford University Press.

Eckstein, Sholomo
1970 Collective farming in Mexico. In Agrarian problems and peasant movements in Latin America, Rodolfo Stavenhagen, ed. Garden City, New York, Anchor Books, Doubleday and Company, Inc.

1966 El ejido collectivo en Mexico. Mexico-Buenos Aires, Fondo De Cultura Económica.

Edelmann, Alexandar
1965 Latin American government and politics: The dynamics of a revolutionary society. Homewood, Ill., The Dorsey Press.

Edmonson, M. S.
1953 Synoptic studies of Mexican culture. New Orleans, Tulane University, Middle American Research Institute, Pub.

Ewald, Robert
1967 Directed change. In Handbook of Middle American Indians, 6, Manning Nash, ed. Austin, University of Texas Press.

Fisher, Glen
1957 Directed culture change in Nayarit, Mexico. In Synoptic studies of Mexican culture, Robert Wauchope, ed. New Orleans, Tulane University, Middle American Research Institute.

Foster, George
1967 Tzintzuntzan: Mexican peasants in a changing world. Boston, Little Brown and Company.

Friedrick, Paul
1968 The legitimacy of a cacique. In Local-level politics, Marc Swarz, ed. Chicago, Aldine Publishing Company.

Fromm, Eric and Maccoby, Michael
1970 Social character in a Mexican village. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, Inc.

Glade, William Jr. and Anderson, Charles
1963 The political economy of Mexico. Madison, Wisconsin, University of Wisconsin Press.

Gonzalez, Moises Navarro
1965 Mexico: The lop-sided revolution. In Obstacles to change in Latin America, Claudio Veliz, ed. New York, Oxford University Press.

Hansen, Roger D.
1971 The politics of Mexican development. Baltimore and London, The Johns Hopkins Press.

Harris, Marvin
1971 Culture, man, and nature. New York, Cowell Publishing Company.

Lewis, Oscar
1960 Mexico since Cárdenas. In Social change in Latin America today, Richard N. Adams et al., eds. New York, Vintage Books.

MacWilliams, Carey
1939 Factories in the field. Boston, Little Brown Co.

Mintz, Sidney
1971 Canamelar, the contemporary culture of a rural Puerto Rican proletariat. In The people of Puerto Rico: A study in social anthropology, Julian H. Steward, ed. Urbana, University of Illinois Press.

Mosk, Sanford A.
1950 Industrial revolution in Mexico. Berkeley, University of California Press.

Padgett, L. Vincent
1966 The Mexican political system. Boston, Houghton-Mifflin Company.

Padilla, Elena Seda
1969 Nocora: The subculture of workers on a government-owned sugar plantation. In The people of Puerto Rico, Julian Steward, ed. Urbana, University of Illinois Press.

Ravicz, Robert
1970 Compadrinazgo. In Handbook of Middle American Indians, 6, Manning Nash, ed. Austin, University of Texas Press.

Redfield, Robert
1941 The folk culture of Yucatán. Chicago and London, The University of Chicago Press.

1950 A village that chose progress: Chan Kom revisited. Chicago, University of Chicago.

Reed, Nelson
1964 The caste war of Yucatán. Stanford, Stanford University Press.

Sanchez, Ramiro Guerra Y.
1964 Sugar and society in the Caribbean: An economic history of Cuban agriculture. New Haven, Yale University Press.

Scott, Robert
1959 Mexican government in transition. Urbana, University of Illinois Press.

Simpson, Lesley Byrd
1966 Many Mexicos. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press.

Spiro, Melford
1968 Factionalism and politics in village Burma. In Local-level politics, Marc Swartz, ed. Chicago, Aldine Publishing Company.

Stavenhagen, Rodolfo, ed.
1970 Agrarian problems and peasant movements in Latin America. New York, Doubleday and Company.

Stavenhagen, Rodolfo et al.
1972 Neolatifundismmo y explotacion de Emiliano Zapata a Anderson Clayton and Co. Mexico, Editorial Nuestro Tiempo.

Steward, Julian H.
1955 Theory of culture change: The methodology of multilineal evolution. Urbana, The University of Illinois Press.

Steward, Julian H. et al.
1969 The people of Puerto Rico, a study in social anthropology. Urbana, University of Illinois Press.

Tannenbaum, Frank
1953 Personal government in Mexico. In Latin American social organization and institutions, Olen E. Leonard and Charles P. Loomis, eds. East Lansing, Michigan State University.

1962 Mexico: The struggle for peace and bread. New York, Alfred Knopf.

Turner, John K.
1910 Barbarous Mexico: An indictment of a cruel and corrupt system. London, Cassell Co., Ltd.

Wagley, Charles and Harris, Marvin
1965 A typology of Latin American subcultures. In Contemporary cultures and societies of Latin America, D. B. Heath and R. N. Adams, eds. New York, Random House, Inc.

West, Robert and Angelli, John P.
1966 Middle America: Its lands and its peoples. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, Inc.

Whetten, Nathan
1948 Rural Mexico. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.

Wilkie, James W.
1970 The Mexican Revolution: Federal expenditure and social change since 1910. Berkeley, University of California Press.

Wilkie, Raymond
1971 San Miguel: A Mexican collective ejido. Stanford, Stanford University Press.

Wolf, Eric
1967 Levels of communal relations. In Handbook of Middle American Indians, 6. Austin, University of Texas Press.

Publications of the United States and Mexican Governments, Learned Societies, and Other Organizations

Banco Agropecuario del Sureste, S.A.
1968 Study of the feasibility of an agropecuarian project in Catmis, Yucatán. Mérida, Yucatán.

Banco De Mexico
n.d. Recursos naturales y humanos de las zonas caneras mas importantes de Mexico. Mexico D.F., Departmento de Investigaciones Industriales.

Censuses
1905 Censo y división territorial del estado de Yucatán verificados en 1900. Mexico, Oficina Tipográfica de la Secretaría de Fomento.

1918 Tercer censo de población de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos verificados el 27 de Octubre de 1910, I. Mexico, Secretaría de Hacienda, Departamento de Fomento.

1928 Censo general de habitantes, 30 de Noviembre de 1921, estado de Yucatán. Mexico, Talleres Gráficos de la Nacion.

1934 Quinto censo de población, 15 de Mayo de 1930, estado de Yucatán. Mexico, Secretaría de la Economía Nacional, Dirección General de Estadística.

1943 Seis censo de población, 1940, Yucatán. Mexico, Secretaría de la Economía Nacional, Dirección General de Estadística.

1952 Séptimo censo general de población 1950, estado de Yucatán. Mexico, Secretaria de Economia, Dirección de Estadística.

1963 Octavo censo general de población--1960, 8 de Junio de 1960, estado de Yucatán. Mexico, Secretaría de Industria y Comercio, Dirección General de Estadística.

1965 Cuarto censos agrícola-ganadero y ejidal, 1960 resumen general. Mexico, Secretaría de Industria y Comercio, Dirección General de Estadística.

Chardon, Roland Emanuel Paul
1961 Geographic aspects of plantation agriculture in Yucatan. Washington, D.C., National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council.

Codigo Agrario Y Leyes Complimentarias
1970 Vigesima Edicion, Mexico D.F.

Diario oficial organo del gobierno de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos,
1943 No. 46 (December), Part CXLI. Mexico D.F.

Diario oficial organo del gobierno constitucional de los Estados
1951 Unidos Mexicanos, No. 5 (July), Part CLXXXVII. Mexico D.F.

Diario oficial organo del gobierno constitucional de Los Estados
1953 Unidos Mexicanos, No. 24 (Nov., Part CCI. Mexico D.F.

Diario oficial organo del gobierno constitucional de Los Estados
1965 Unidos Mexicanos, (Feb). Mexico, D.F.

Economic Development of Mexico (The)
1953 Report of the Combined Mexican Working Party, published for the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press.

Instituto Nacional Indigenista
1968 Bases fundamentales para la formacion de un grupo Ganadero en el sur del estado de Yucatán. Peto, Yucatán.

Inter-American Development Bank
1962 Social progress trust fund report.

Mintz, Sidney
1953 The folk-urban continuum and the rural proletarian community. Bobbs-Merrill Reprint A-162. Chicago, University of Chicago.

Redfield, Robert and R. Alfonso R. Villa
1935 Chan Kom, a Maya village. Washington, D.C., Carnegie Institute of Washington, Publication No. 488.

Shattuck, George
1933 The peninsula of Yucatán. Washington, D.C., Carnegie Institute of Washington, Publication No. 431.

Starr, Fredrik
1910 In Indian Mexico. Proceedings of the Davenport Academy of Natural Science, 9. Davenport, Indiana.

Steward, Julian, ed.
1957 Perspectives on plantations. In Plantation systems in the new world. Washington, D.C., Pan American Union.

Steward, Julian H.
1950 Area research: Theory and Practice. Social Science Research Council Bulletin No. 63.

Thompson, Edgar T., ed.
1957 The plantation: A bibliography. Washington, D.C., Pan American Union. Social Science Monographs IV.

Villa, Alfonso Rojas
1945 The Maya of East Central Quintana Roo. Washington, D.C., Carnegie Institution of Washington, Publication No. 559.

Wauchaupe, Robert
1938 Modern Maya houses. Washington, D.C., Carnegie Institution of Washington, Publication No. 502.

Periodicals

Adams, Richard Newbold
1962 The community in Latin America: A changing myth. The Centennial Review 6.

Aguirre, Gonzalo Beltran
1955 A theory of regional integration: The coordinating centers. America Indigena 15.

Caso, Alfonso and De La Fuente, Julio
1958 National Indigenous Institute of Mexico: A report, ideals of an action program and results of an action program. Human Organization 17.

Cline, Howard F.
1948 The sugar episode in Yucatán, 1825-1850. Inter-American Economic Affairs 1.

Deshon, Shirley K.
1963 Compadrazgo on a henequen hacienda: A structural reevaluation. American Anthropologist 65.

Eggan, Fred
1965 Social anthropology and the method of controlled comparison. American Anthropologist 56.

Foster, George
1953 Cofradia and compadrazgo in Spain and Spanish America. Southwestern Journal of Anthropology 9: 1-28.

Landsberger, Henry A.
1972 Book review of Wilkie's San Miguel: A Mexican collective ejido. American Anthropologist 74: 1428-1430.

Mintz, Sidney and Wolf, Eric
1950 An analysis of ritual co-parenthood (compadrazgo). Southwestern Journal of Anthropology 6.

Nutini, Hugo G.
1967 A synoptic comparison of Mesoamerican marriage and family structure. Southwestern Journal of Anthropology 23.

Pozas, Ricardo (coordinator)
1967 Estudio de los problemas sociales del Ingenio Azucarero de Catmis, Yucatán. Acta Sociologica, Centro de Estudios de Desarrollo Serie: Promocion Social I, Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico, Mexico D.F.

Raymond, Nathaniel C.
1968 Land reform and the structure of production in Yucatán. Ethnology 7.

Steward, Julian H.
1951 Levels of socioculture integration: An operational concept. Southwest Journal of Anthropology 7: 374-390.

Strickon, Arnold
1965 Hacienda and plantation in Yucatán, Mexico. America Indigena 25.

Thompson, Richard A.
1970 Stochastics and structure: Cultural change and social mobility in a Yucatec town. Southwestern Journal of Anthropology 26.

Villa, Alfonso Rojas
1962 Notas sobre la distribucion y estado actual de la poblacion indigena de la Peninsula de Yucatán, Mexico. Mexico, America Indigena 22.

Wolf, Eric
1956 Aspects of group relations in a complex society: Mexico. American Anthropologist 58.

Wolf, Eric R. and Mintz, Sidney W.
1957 Haciendas and plantations in Middle America and the Antilles. Social and Economic Studies, University College of West Indies, 6: 380-412.

Unpublished Materials

Cline, Howard F.
1950 Regionalism and society in Yucatán, 1825-1847: A study of "progressivism" and the origins of the caste war. Chicago, University of Chicago Library, Microfilm Collection of Manuscripts on Middle American Cultural Anthropology, No. 32.

Gomez, Anna
1965 Economic study of the state of Yucatán. Washington, D.C., U.S. Department of State, unpublished manuscript.

Goodman, Margaret Ann
1972 The effectiveness of the Mexican revolution as an agent of change in the state of Yucatán, Mexico. Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University. Ann Arbor, University Microfilms.

Kirk, Rodney
1975 San Antonio, Yucatán: From henequen hacienda to plantation ejido. Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University.

Raymond, Nathaniel
1970 The impact of land reform in the monocrop region of Yucatán, Mexico. Ph.D. dissertation, Brandeis University. Ann Arbor, University Microfilms.

GLOSSARY

GLOSSARY

Acasillado--Resident laborers on a hacienda or plantation.

Aguardienta--An alcoholic beverage made from sugar cane.

Ahijado--A god-child.

Anticípo--A wage advanced for work performed which the bank subtracts from profits after the sale of the product.

Avío--Operational or supplementary short-term loan associated with semi-annual or annual production cycle of crops and cattle.

Cabrón--A cuckhold.

Cacíque--Refers to the local "boss" or dictator of a community or even a region. Originally, the term was used to refer to Maya nobles used by the Spanish Crown to govern localities.

Campesinos--Rural wage laborers and peasant farmers.

Carnavál--Lent.

Casta divina--A derogatory term used by the working class to refer to Yucatán's ruling class.

Catrín--Refers to people who wear modern clothing and speak Spanish more frequently than Yucatec Maya.

Cenote--A deep, walled hole containing groundwater which provides the main source of drinking water for the rural inhabitants in Yucatan's northern zone.

Cha'Chaak--Mayan ritual which takes place during the harvest season and represents a thanksgiving ceremony to the various deities in the Mayan pantheon.

Colono--A sugar cane planter who either owned a large expanse of land privately or contracted union labor to plant sugar cane on government-owned lands.

Comisário del Pueblo--Official representative of the municipal government in charge of civil administration and the adjudication of minor civil and criminal offenses. In an official "pueblo" the position is attained through election, but it is attained by appointment of the municipal president in an ex-hacienda.

Comisário ejidal--Elected ejido president whose duties, according to the agrarian code, are associated with the administration of the ejido lands.

Compadrazgo--A ritual relationship involving the co-parenthood of a child.

Compadre--Refers to the relationship of co-parenthood between the real parents and the god-parents of a child.

Compañero--A term of address used by the working class to refer to a comrad or work associate.

Conciencia--A concept of group spirit of the collective ejido society.

Creoles--During the colonial period referred to whites of Spanish descent who were born in Yucatan.

Cúmbia--Caribbean dance music from Chetumal which is popular in Catmis.

Ejidatario--An official member of the ejido society.

Ejido--A communal land grant from the government and the local land-holding society associated with it.

Empresa--A term used by the working class to refer to the new land-owning company in the village.

Encomienda--A trust granted by the Spanish crown to a conquistador who received the right of tribute from an Indian community.

Epoca de esclavitúd--Villagers refer to the plantation period before the Mexican Revolution of 1910 as the period of slavery.

Estancia(s)--A grant of land equal to one square league.

Eventual--Seasonal laborer on a hacienda or plantation.

Fágina--Work performed for the hacendado one day each week by those who lived in nearby villages and for which they received no payment of any kind.

Grupo solidario--A credit organization within the ejido which agrees to work collectively in order to obtain loans for economic development.

Hacendado--An owner of a large landed estate with a resident labor population.

Hacienda--An agricultural estate operated by a dominant landowner and subordinate labor force which is dependent on the estate.

Hectária--A unit of land which equals 2.417 acres.

Hezmék--A Mayan ritual in which a child during his first year of life is held on the hip of his sponsor in a ceremony which insures the normal development of his faculties.

Híjo natural--An illegitimate child.

H-meng--A traditional Mayan priest.

Huipíl--A traditional costume of the Mestiza woman consisting of a white cotton dress with embroidery along the neckline and hem.

Ingénio--A factory.

Jarana--Yucatán's traditional folk dance.

Kilogram--A unit of weight which equals 2.2046 pounds.

Ladino--After 1823, when Mexico gained its independence from Spain, this term replaced the term Creol.

Lambiscón--A spy for a political faction.

Líbre--A non-ejidatario or non-union day laborer.

Mayordomo--The foreman of an hacienda.

Mecate--A unit of land measuring 20 meters by 20 meters; 25 mecates equal one hectare.

Mestizo--In Yucatán, as opposed to Mexico in general, refers to people who wear traditional clothing and speak Yucatec Maya more frequently than Spanish.

Milpa--A plot of land devoted to the cultivation of maize by means of the slash and burn technique.

Milpero--One who cultivates a milpa.

Navidád--Christmas.

Novena--A series of prayers held by a religious cult in honor of a particular saint over a period of nine consecutive evenings.

Padrino--Godparent.

Parcelário--An ejidatario who cultivates a plot of ejido land individually.

Patrón--Refers to the sponsor of an individual or of a village fiesta.

Pequeño propiedad--A "small private landholding" unit presumably limited in size to the specifications of the national agrarian code.

Pequeño propietario--A small landowner.

Pobres--A term by which the working-class poor people refer to themselves.

Promésa--A vow to sacrifice something to a saint in exchange for a particular favor.

Promotores--Bilingual natives of a region who have been trained by the National Indigenous Institute to introduce new ideas and the Spanish language into indigenous communities.

Rancheras--Folk songs from Mexico's northern cattle complex.

Rancho--A privately owned cattle ranch.

Ricos--A general term used by the working class to refer to the upper-class rich people.

Socio delegado--Refers to the elected official of an ejido credit society or grupo solidario in the northern henequen zone. In Catmís the equivalent office is called chief representative or "primer representante."

Trabajadores--A term used by the lower class to refer to themselves as workers.

Tróje--A wooden bin for storing maize located within or next to a milpero's house.

U'Hakil'Kol--A Mayan ritual which takes place in March or April before the first rains as a supplication for rain and protection atainst illness for the farmer and his family.

31293101101347