ABSTRACT

PROBLEMS IN ORGANIZATIONAL RENEWAL: A '

CASE STUDY OF ORGANIZATION CHANGE

By

Philip Shaw Hart

In the course of the past decade a number of social
and physical programs came into existence through Federal
legislation. One outcome of such legislative effort was the
creation of a multitude of organizational forms designed- to
carry out specific purposes within the nation's cities. In
many instances, private sector, or third sector, monies pre-
ceded or matched the public monies, thus many of the organi-
zations which were created received financial input from more
than one sector of the society.

The problem under study here is of one organization
located in Boston which became a magnet for public and pri-
vate monies during the late 1960's. The focus is on organi-
zational renewal, organizational change, and organizational
SurVival. At the macro-level, the concern is with general
and gpecific social, economic, and political conditions which

spawned organizations such as Alpha, Inc., and With the al-

Philip Shaw Hart

teration in these macro-conditions which necessitated or-
ganizational renewal and change. At the micro-level, the
concern is with a community analysis and an organizational
analysis in order to better understand elements of causality
at the local level.

The method is thus a case study of one organization
(Alpha, Inc.) which was undergoing change during the one-
year period of study reported here. An Open system strategy
was the research approach, in that the author's initial as-
sumptions were grounded in an interdependence between the
organization and its environment. Following Thompson (1967)
and Dill (1958), the environment became defined as the 'task
environment,‘ and included those 'elements relevant, or_'
potentially relevant, to goal-setting and attainment.' The
author adopted a strategy of sustained participation, or
involved participation, which allowed him to employ a
number of data-gathering methods.

The field study was conducted during_the period
of September, 1971 to September, 1972 in Boston. Alpha,
Inc., was a Black organization as defined by its staff,
Board, and client composition, and by its goal statements
and organizational ethos. Concepts which were crucial
elements of this case study and societal analysis included:
renewal, change, survival, task environment, institutional

sphere, goals and objectives, input, output, systems, con-

Philip Shaw Hart

version processes, COOperative strategies, decision-making,
communication, productivity, and administrative behavior.
.A series of propositions are posited in Chapter II which
represent empirically grounded statements relative to the
above concepts. In Chapter III three distinct hypotheses
are formulated which relate to the organization and its
environment. The initial hypothesis (H1) relates to the
institutional sphere. Hypothesis two (H2)and hypothesis
three (H3) relate to the intra-organizational Sphere, and
differ to the extent that H2 is directional, while H3 is
non-directional.

Specifically, H1 states that renewal and change.
implies: an increase in task environment influence; a.
decrease in public concern; and an increase in COOperative
strategies. The data gathered and analyzed relative to
H1 supported the hypothesis as initially formulated. Hy-
pOthesis two (H2) states that renewal and change implies:
a decrease in productivity; an increase in turnover rates;
a decrease in communication: an increase in centralized
decision-making; a change in clientele: a decrease in the
tolerance for bureaucracy; and an increase in organizational
rigidity. Each component of this hypothesis was supported
by the data except for the prediction that renewal and

change implies a decrease in productivity. The findings

Philip Shaw Hart

‘were that productivity increased rather than decreased.

 

This finding pointed up the fact that in non-profitlorgan-
izations, a central technical problem for both the Organi-
zational researcher and the practitioner is the relation
between input and output (or measures of organizational
(efficiency). That is, there is not necessarily a linear
relationship between input and output in non-profit organi-
zations, thus the level of predictability here remains low.
Hypothesis three (H3) is non-directional and states that'
renewal and change implies: structural change; a change in
goals and objectives; and a change in administrative be-
havior. The data supported H3 as initially formulated.
Renewal, change and survival were seen as inter-
dependent phenomena within an organizational setting. The
assumption guiding the organizational analysis was that
if we can explain renewal and change then we should be able
to predict survival in an Organizational system. The or- ‘
ganizational and societal analysis reported here serves to
corroborate the validity of such a guiding assumption. The
author recognizes the limitations of a case study in its.
explanatory and predictive value, yet also is aware that if
sociologists, policy makers, and practitioners are to under-
Stand organizational change, more case studies and compara-

tive studies must be carried out.

Philip Shaw Hart

The organizational analysis reported here thus
serves as a heuristic device to stimulate work in the area
of organizational renewal and change. A further function
of such research is to point up elements of causality be-
tween the macro-, and micro-, levels of society. For the
organizational researcher to contribute to this model of

causality, an Open system strategy will have to be adopted.

PROBLEMS IN ORGANIZATIONAL RENEWAL:

A CASE STUDY OF ORGANIZATION CHANGE

BY

Philip Shaw Hart

A THESIS

Submitted to

Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Sociology

1974

@ COPYright by

PHILIP SHAW HART
1974

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The organizational and societal analysis reported
here represents a culmination of academic and experiential
work carried out over a number of years. During this period
of time I developed both personal and working relationships
with a number of individuals who influenced my thinking
either directly or indirectly as I pondered the question
Of organizational change.

I would like to thank Charles Mitchner and Kenneth
Williams for the Opportunity to view the Urban League at
both the local and national levels in my earlier stages Of
pucblem formulation. Robert L. Green, Dean of Michigan
State's College of Urban Development, aided my thinking rela-
tive to the initiation and institutionalization of organiza-
tional change within a university context.. Various individ-
mfls played important roles through the prospectus and final
<haft stages of the work; included among these individuals
are: William Faunce, Vincent Salvo, Timothy Hennessey,
Donald Olmstead, Jay Artis, John Gullahorn, and most especially,
Qufistopher Sower. It is with special gratitude that I wish
1x>acknowledge Christopher Sower's contribution, which proved

‘Urbe both academically and strategically sound, and filled

ii

‘with compassion and interest in a struggling Black graduate
student.

Two other individuals from dissimilar pasts and
with dissimilar futures also deserve recognition for their
mutual influence during my data compilation stages in Boston;
Edgar Goff and Murray Horwitz played key roles in the organ-
ization under study and from my standpoint were good, com-
petent men. I would also like to thank Susan Middleton and
Nan Talbott for the fine job of typing they did on the
manuscript.

Finally I would like to thank my wife, Tanya, and

my daughter Ayanna, for bearing with me through all of this.

iii

CHAPTER I:

CHAPTER II:

CHAPTER I I I :

CHAPTER IV:

_CHAPTER V:

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . .

Background. . . . . . . . .
The Organization Under Study. . .
Defining Concepts . . . . . .

THE THEORY AND LITERATURE. . . .

The Literature . . . . . . .
A Statement of PrOpositions . . .

A STATEMENT OF HYPOTHESES. . . .

The Institutional Sphere . . . .
Internal Variables/Directional . .
Internal Variables/Non Directional
Summation . . . ‘. . . . . .

THE FIELD SETTING . . . . . .

Data Collection . . . .
Macro-Analysis . . . .
Micro-Analysis . . . .
Community Characteristics.
Community Resources. . .
Methods/Rationale . . .

DATA ANALYSIS/FINDINGS. . . . .

The Institutional Sphere . . . .

The Intra-Organizational Sphere. .

Measuring Organizational Change/
The Five-Step Model . . . . .

iv

Page

_29

32
39

71

71
71
84
93
99
104

109

109
129

152

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

Page

CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . 158

The Process of Dispersed

Dependence in Organizations. . . 158
Contribution . . . . . . . . 161
Toward a Paradigm of Social Change 163

Concluding Remarks . . . . . . 171

FOOTNOTES: Chapter I . . . . . . . . . 174
Chapter II . . . . . . . . . 181
Chapter III. . . . . . . . . 182
Chapter IV . . . . . . . . . 185
Chapter V . . . . . . . . . 188
Chapter VI . . . . . . . . . 192

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . 193

APPENDICES O O I O O O O O O O O O O 20 4
Appendix A: Black Faculty 8
Administrators Education

Caucus Questionnaire . . . . 204

Appendix B: Organizational Layout 213

Appendix C: Tolerance for Bureau-
cratic Structure: A Scale . . 216

LIST OF TABLES

Page

1.0 Macro-Specific Input by Year. . . . . . 83
1.1 Adjusted Macro-Specific Input by

Year Under Study. . . . . . . . . . 84

1.2 Alpha Task Environment by Level and Frequency 90
1.3 Roxbury/North Dorchester Incomes . . . . 96
1.4 Task Environment Input Over Time . . . . 112

1.5 TEI for Study Year and Year
Immediately Preceding, in Dollars .' . . . 112

1.6 organizational Death-Rate Among Alpha-
Affiliated Projects, as of September, 1972 118

1.7 Alpha Task Environment by Level
and Frequency (aggregated) . . . . . . 120

1.8 Productivity (Output) by Input, Year '
and Ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . 128

1.9 Comparative Turn-Over Rates . . .. . . . 131,132
1.10 Structured Group Interview Area Outcomes. . 133

1.11 Turnover Rates Comparing the Entire
Year with April-September. . . . . . . 140

1.12 Number of Products by Period
and Average Products per Month . . . . . 140

1.13 Number of Relationships by Division -. . . 145

vi

II.
III.

IV.

VI.
VII.
VIII.

IX.

XI.

XII.

XIII.

XIV.

LIST OF FIGURES

Federal Program Progression Over Time. .
Institutional Sphere Relationships. . .
Internal, Directional Relationships . .
Internal, Non-Directional Relationships .

Alpha Task Environment Interaction by
Source, Level and Amount/Input . . . .

Alpha Activities. . . . . . . . .
Map showing Roxbury area . . . .' . .
Methods of Data Collection by Hypothesis.
Methods of Obtaining Information ., . .

TEI from Macro-General Societal Level
to Micro-Specific Societal Level . . .

Alpha Organizational Chart
as of April 13, 1972 . . . . . . .

Alpha Organizational Chart
Pre-Transformation . . . . . . °, .

Input/Amount by Year . ; . . . . .
Organization Change Model. . . . . .

Organizational Layout . . . . . . .

vii

.Page

61
64
66

89
92
97
107
m.

111
146

147-
153
155
215

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Background

 

Over the past decade we have witnessed the growth
and develOpment of a multitude of organizations1 addressing
themselves to improving urban life in a number of functional
areas and in a number of ways. In fact, during the recent
course of history in the United States, there has been a
nmssive infusion of public funds into programs generally
labeled as social action, and certainly no small amount of
guivate funds have been similarly committed. In recent
years examples of such programs include: Ford Foundation's
(hey Areas Projects, the President's Committee on Juvenile
Delinquency and Youth Crime, War on Poverty, and the Model
Cuties Program.2 Out of such programs there develOped
Emrticular organizational forms designed to carry out
SPecific purposes.

The War on Poverty was initiated by the Democratic
Party and was facilitated through the Office of Economic
0Pportunity (OEO).3 When the late President Lyndon B.
JOhnson 'declared' the War on Poverty, the mechanism.for

c90rdination and, hopefully, leadership at the local level

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was to be the Community Action Agency (CAA); while at the
federal level such coordination and leadership was to come
from CEO. The Community Action Agencies were organized
as private, non-profit agencies eligible to receive
federal monies directly without necessarily passing through
the city and State governmental levels. 'Widespread
citizen participation' was a central concept in the efforts
ct CAAzs to mobilize local resources in poverty communi-
ties, and this concept proved elusive in both its opera-
tional definition and implementation in the field.

I Following close on the heels of War on Poverty
legislation was-legislation which called for the develop?-

ment of the Model Cities Program.4 Management consultant

5

Alan Madian reminds us that,

By 1967, three years after the War on Poverty
was launched, President Johnson had shifted the
principal coordinating reSponsibilities for urban
poverty programs to Model Cities. The aim of Model
Cities was to find a means of bringing together the
physical rehabilitation provided by urban renewal

and the social programs provided.by the domestic,
cabinet departments and the CEO. (Madian, 1971,
p. 10)

Madian notes that a major innovation of Model Cities was
giVing money directly to the cities rather than channeling
°it to the cities through the states. John Strange6 notes
Other changes between the Community Action approach and
the Model Cities program as far as participation is con-
cerned. .

First, local governments rather than private,

non-profit agencies were provided with ultimate

3

responsibility for the local administration and operation
of the program. Second, participation of the poor (or
neighborhood residents) was to be limited rather than
maximized, and governmental and business participation was
guaranteed.

Few pieces of domestic legislation have created as
nmch controversy in recent years as has the mandate for
'maximum feasible participation' of the poor in the
Cbmmunity Action Programs of CEO and the attempts to
insure 'widespread citizen participation' in the Demonstra-
tion Cities Program of the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD). It should be noted however that.citizen
participation is not new to the politics of the United

States. In fact,

Citizen participation and control of government
has been a widely accepted objective of our
government from its inception. (Strange, 1971, p. 1)

Attention to and support for citizen participation have
been especially evident on the local level, and on both
the state and local level the attempt to institutionalize
Participation has been one of the three major goals of
SOVernmental reformers. The pursuit of the objective of
Citizen participation has been an elusive goal which has
Varied in importance and in the intensity with which it
has been pursued.

In more recent times we can assess the decline in

intensity of the pursuit of this objective. After the rise

in prominence in 1964 and 1965 of OEO's call for 'maximum
feasible participation,‘ legislative authors of the Model
Cities legislation could not escape the necessity to pay
Obeisance to the tenet of participation. There was an
attempt to limit the emphasis on participation by the
poor and the Black by calling for the 'widespread'
participation of the business and organizational elements
in a community rather than the 'maximum feasible participa-
tion' of the poor.7

Numerous observers have attempted to classify the
various results participation might have. Sherry Arnstein8
describes participation as a ladder with eight rungs
extending from manipulative participation (non—participa-
tion) to citizen control. Other rungs of the ladder
include: (2) therapy (non-participation--a substitute for
the planning and conduct of programs); (3) informing
(citizens are informed, but play no role in decision-
making); (4) consultation (citizens are heard but lack the
Power to insure that their views will be heeded); (5) pla-
Cation (citizen is responded to in order to create the
impression that he has influence); (6) partnership
(negotiation and compromise between citizens and program
bureaucrats); and (7) delegated power.

An emphasis was placed on decreasing citizen
Participation with the inauguration of President Nixon.

This decreasing emphasis was manifest in CEO by a lack of

 

 

 

5

concern.with the extent of participation prior to funding,
denial of funds for organizational activities, transfer of
CEO programs to other agencies having less stringent
participation requirements, increasing emphasis on
research and planning as opposed to action, general
reductions in funding levels and a general discouragement
Of citizen participation.

Section 103 of the legislative act bringing Model
Cities into existence in 1967 (see footnote 4) indicates
that in order for a program to be eligible for assistance,
there must be "widespread citizen participation in the
puogram." This was only one of thirty (30) requirements
necessary for the acceptance of an application. In May
1969, a Model Cities memorandum banned exclusive initiation
Of projects by citizens' groups and required all Model
Cities agencies to assure HUD that in no case would "the
City's ability to take responsibility for developing the
Plan” be impeded. The technical and financial assistance
Provided to citizens' groups by HUD was better planned
and more thorough than that provided by CEO, however,
Citizens' groups still encountered major obstacles in
'their attempts to influence and/or control the Model Cities
Pregram.

Advice giving, employment, organized support

for the program, were all legitimate roles for
citizens to play. But not control. That was to

remain the province of the professionals and the
elected politicians. (Strange, 1971, p. 21)

6

Another aspect of the Model Cities Program which
decreased citizen participation was the emphasis on plan-
ning. The emphasis on planning resulted in an increased
importance of professional staff, thus reducing the .'
potential impact of citizens.

In another vein, both Model Cities and Community
Action Programs hired more Black and low income persons
than had previous federal programs, especially in program
<n“management positions. Secondly, more Black and low
income persons held positions on decision-making boards:
than in any previous governmental program. Third,

. . . of all the minority group members and
persons with below average incomes, those persons who
participated were more likely to have more education,
a higher income, and generally higher status than
those who did not participate. (Strange, 1971,

p. 23)10 '
Strange goes on to note the likelihood that the emphasis
on participation and the actual involvement of new groups
Of citizens in these programs stimulated a desire to
Participate and also increased hopes for more assistance
fromgovernment and new social, political and economic
benefits. Further, participants are also likely to have
learned about governmental activities and operations from
their participation.
' Relative to changes in public policy, there is
1ittle evidence as to what impact has resulted from both

11

the Community Action and Model Cities Programs. From

his fieldwork, Strange suggests that it can be argued that
the emphasis on citizen participation did alter policy
discussion in one way: it forced policy makers to deal
with the problems of race. In other words, no longer
could policy be made without considering the reactions

and desires of racial minorities. Following close on the
heels of the War on Poverty was the Model Cities Program.
For all intent and purpose, these programs have run their
natural life cycle, and we now observe the Republican

IMrty-led proposal for general revenue sharing.12

 

 

'Sharing (1972

 

General Revenue]
)

 

 

 

"Improve the Quality
of Urban Life"
Model Cities (HUD)
Widspread Citizen
Participation (1967)

 

 

 

 

 

"War on Poverty"
Office of Economic
Opportunity Maximum

Feasible Participation
l (1964)

 

 

 

 

Figure I: Federal Program Progression Over Time

Alan Madian in his assessment of the above progres-
Sixnxspeaks of a federal strategy of substitution.
Madian's point is that substitution is the federal strategy
fer dealing with organizational or program failure. This

infiflies that the new organization is assigned the original

 

task of the first organization. Existing organizations
are kept alive by those they are servicing, regardless of
the effectiveness of that service.

However, such a federal strategy does not create
conditions necessary and sufficient for the development of
organizational competence. Perhaps such a strategy corre—
lates closely with Piven and Cloward's (l971)13a view of
the actual function of these social/physical planning
{upgrams. The above authors' prOposition is that CEO and
Mbdel Cities were merely partisan political attempts to
harness a burgeoning Black/poor vote in an unstable urban
mndronment. The social conditions in the urban areas
throughout the nation in the middle and late sixties
pmcvided an atmosphere of racial polarization, instability
Of organizational life (both social and formal organiza-
tions), unemployment and discontent.14 The colleges and
universities of the country did not escape the influence
0f events in the cities and one outcdme was the development
on campuses of Black, urban and ethnic affairs centers
and/Or departments.15

The attempt to deal more directly with trouble in
the cities was facilitated through measures intended to
'aSSimilate' the urban Black and low-income population.

Some of the larger foundations, expecially
those with national interests and perspectives,
were the first to act on this view of the problem.

In the late 1950's, for example, the Ford Foundation
inaugurated a "Great Cities" program through which

 

 

money was funneled to urban school systems for
experimental programs designed to reverse the high
rates of academic failure among black youth. Later,
Ford funded "Grey Areas" projects in several cities
to encourage local leaders to get together on plans
for new approaches to "urban problems." (Piven and
Cloward, 1971, p. 232) - '

In other words, foundation money was used in an
attempt to activate local professional and political elites,
and to induce them to be more responsive to the urban
Black populace. Such private sector, or perhaps more
accurately 'third sector,‘16 monies pre-dated the public

sector involvement in such social programs.

 

In the cities, one outcome was a number of human
service organizations funded by both private and public
sector monies. Because of social,political and economic
conditions, the urban areas and principally inner-city.)

cores became magnets for both public and private sector

monies.

The Organization Under Study

One such organization which developed in the inner-
City core of Boston was a result of such 'money magnetism.‘
-At a.time when this particular section of Boston (known
as Roxbury) experienced its urban rebellion, racial polar-
iZation was at a peak and the common correlates of social
‘3iSOrganization were present. Events in late 1967 provided
f0'r'the development of the organization under study here.

It Was at that juncture that representatives from the Black

 

 

 

H

10

17

community and the university community came together and

began a series of sessions which culminated in the receipt
Of a four (4) year demonstration grant from a large
private foundation. The monies were to provide for the
development of a "new institutional form, an organization
capable of acting as a broker between the university and
the community.” For analytical purposes here, we shall
refer to this young, ambitious organizational form as
Alpha, Inc.

Alpha, Inc.'s first year of operation was 1968.
The organizational analysis in this study focuses on one
year, spanning-September 1971 to September 1972. Alpha,
Inc. was moving into its fourth year of operation in
September 1971 and had undergone a series of internal
‘Structural and administrative changes, perhaps reflecting
the instability of its task environment.18 The one-year
tixne span under study here promised to be a period in which
the even more intensive structural changes occurred as
AlPha moved to adapt to environmental change and to adopt
Stzrategies appropriate for dealing with an altered task
environment.

At a macro-sociological level, a set of social,
Political and economic conditions led to the development
<3f' structural reforms societal-wide, designed to socialize
broader segments of the urban and rural populations. The

COncern here is primarily with micro-sociological analysis,

 

 

 

 

 

4.

‘I

 

11

but with secondary concern for conditions and causality

19 suggests as his central

at a macro-level. David Rogers
research question: "What affects service delivery-in~
inner cities?" The answer, he states, is in terms of
'macro' and 'micro' determinants. The macro aspects

relate to characteristics of the city, of state-city, and
federal-state-city relations; the micro aspects relate to
characteristics of particular delivery systems in the city.
The micro aSpects, Rogers reminds us, are derivative
phenomena, understood within a broader political context.

Rogers further asserts that:

The state of the social sciences (in particular
sociology, political science, economics) is so
primitive on these questions that it is not easy
to develop models or conceptual schemes. (Rogers,
1971, p. 148)

FOr'future research, a conceptual scheme including four
Parameters, each broken down into sets of variables, was
formulated by Rogers. They include: (1) the pOlitical
Setting or environment; (2) the organizational design
(both planned and unplanned) of the delivery system;

(33) the nature of the transactions (bargaining, negotia-
tiJans) among the participants; and (4) the outputs.20
PCilitical setting characteristics seen as critical include:
the extent of institutional and interest group differen-
tiirtiOn; the extent to which any integrative structures

eMist (machines, parties, city-wide voluntary associations,

city bureaucracies, political leadership) to link and

 

 

12

coordinate disparate interests; a strong or weak mayoralty
system; reform or machine-style politics;.the degree of
stability or volatility of a city's politics; the extent
Of harmony or conflict in city-state and City-state-I
federal relations; and the extent of organization and
power of the poor. The second parameter, organizational
design of the delivery-system,21 denotes the nature of the
relationship among participating agencies in any particular
development programs. Variables here include: extent of
lateral and vertical differentiation; extent of unit
autonomy; and what integrative mechanisms exist to
encourage collaborative problem-solving.

The third parameter refers to transactions within

and across agencies.

In the language of game theory, we view trans-
actions as win-lose, lose-lose, or win-win. Our
interest is in ascertaining the conditions under
which the parties work together productively, in a
win-win or joint payoff relation. (Rogers, 1971,

p. 149)
The final parameter, outputs, includes conventional
measures (e.g., reading scores, housing starts, training,
PJJacement, retention, and promotion rates); as well as more
<Illalitative but equally important data on the extent of .
innovation in administration (use of new management
teczhniques) , and the extent of growth in the capacity of
all agencies to coordinate. a

The conceptual framework formulated by Rogers has

Proven useful as a heuristic device, both in his particular

 

 

13

concern with a comparative study of munici;.l government,
municipal-state-federal relations, and the development
of viable delivery systems; and in interorganizational
studies carried out recently by the Center for Policy
Research which address questions relative to interorgani-
zational coordination, organizational stratification and
the macro context within which such phenomena occur. Such
a framework will be of great utility as we explore the
case study of an inner city organization whose ascendance,
development and attendant decline and need for change were
predicated upon macro and micro aSpects.

When Alpha, Inc. was founded in January 1968, it
Was described by its founders as the only existing coali-
tion melding services, resources and interaction with
surrounding white universities. Alpha has operated on the

basis of two principles: that community action should be

Carried out by conmmnity residents; that such action should

be: supported by social science research. At the time of
its founding, Alpha's goals were set and they remain: to
help minority community organizations achieve cultural,
PSYchological, political, economic and social control
Over the factors, internal and,external, which affect and
dj-r:ect them.22 Specifically, the organization's public
90a1823 as a broker state its principles:

The liberation of Black people.

The building of a Black community which has

 

 

 

B!

8!

Il-

14

cultural, psychological, political, economic and
social control over those factors, internal and
external, which affect and direct its-life expres-
sion and its destiny.

The development in the Black community of a i
value system based on unity, love and trust.24l g

In late 1970 and on into 1971, Alpha, Inc was
confronted with a task enviromnent which was directing less
and less money into inner-city human service programs. The
management .of Alpha, Inc. was interested in strengthening
the activities and programs and broadening the scope and)
involvement of Alpha in order to make it an economically
self-sufficient and growing organization. This task was
Set to be achieved at a time when there existed a depressed
demand for general community ser.vices as reflected in the
economy in general and decreased funding for special

research grants . 25

Community groups were affiliated with Alpha for a
Period of two years for training and service. Some of the'
grnoups maintained an educational orientation, while others
Were self-help oriented. These agencies indicated to
Alpha the kinds of training and support which were needed,
and Alpha designed curriculum and created courses and
.experience to meet their demands. Such programs often '
tC>okthe form of leadership activities, community organi-
zational efforts, support and direction in fund-raising
axui research activities. With the goals and objectives

of the groups in mind, Alpha provided.additional assistance

 

 

15

by defining educational priorities and long-range goals.26

By September of 1971, Alpha, Inc. found itself at
a point of transition which was to require organizational
renewal and change. The organizational research proposed
here provides an empirical statement of one year in that
process. Those factors impacting upon Alpha were as
broad as societal~wide, and as focused as its local
cmmmunity. The concern here is with the theory of organi-
zations, as distinct from organization theory in the sense
suggested by Rapoport and Horvath.27
The theory of organizations purports to be a
social science. {It puts real human organizations at
the center of interest. It may study the social
structure of organizations and so can be viewed as
a branch of sociology; it can study the behavior of
individuals or groups as members of organizations
and so can be viewed as a part of social psychology;
it can study power relations and principles or control
in organizations and so fits into political science.
(Rapoport and Horvath, 1968, p. 74)
The concern proposed here will principally be with the '
initial-mentioned focus, though the latter two will not
esCape attention. In that the method is social scientific,
Prediction and explanation of social phenomena will be of
concern. And the sociological concern is with the
°r9anization's social structure as related to other
internal variables, and to the external, or institutional
sPhere.
An interesting parallel to Alpha, Inc.'s.organiza-

tiohal type was a short-lived organization which developed

in Chicago in 1969 in the aftermath of Dr. Martin Luther

.. \ .ng‘q
o

 

16

King's assassination. As Dan Rottenberg states,28 Dr.

King had been dead less than a year, and in cities across
the nation there was a sense of urgency among civic leaders,
a feeling that the nation's urban racial problems Could

not be put off. There formed a group of white executives
(a new kind of corporate executive which developed almost
overnight, the vice president for 'good works and community
affairs') representing the stolid financial institutions
in.Chicago who began dialogue with Black leaders. ‘The
white executives were anxious to build parks, improve
schools, and set up job training programs in the Black
community. The Black leaders felt that the answer to

urban race relations was not for whites to solve the
problems of Blacks, but for whites to provide Blacks with
the resources to solve their problems themselves. H

In their own meetings, the Blacks had developed a
Possible direction to move: a Black self-help think tank,-
to be known as the Black Strategy Center.‘ It was projected
that such an entity would bring leadership and expertise
in health, youth guidance, and economic development to a
Wide range of Black community organizations.

Despite the doubt of the white corporate investOrs,
twenty-three major Chicago companies put tOgether $642,000.
to fund the operation of the Black Strategy Center for one
Year, Of the twenty-three companies that contributed to

the Project, fifteen gave $25,000. each. The leaders of

l7

thirteen of those companies formed the steering committee
Of the center's white support group.

The Black Strategy Center was to have been a
resource center29 run by Blacks for Blacks, funded with
white money but free of white control. The Center's board
cm directors had been limited to fifteen under the assump-
tion that a larger board would be unwieldy, but this
meant that more than half the fifty participating black
(uganizations were not represented on the board. There
was initial disagreement over the function and direction

of the center once tax-exempt status was secured.30

There
were those who wanted the center to take on an activist
stance and solve problems itself, and those who wanted it
to be a resource center to be used by other community
groups. The center staff was anxious to plot broad, long-
range programs, but the supporting white businessmen
Wanted to see some concrete accomplishments as quickly as
Possible. It was eventually agreed not to require the
center to produce a few specific programs, but to allow it
SimPly to react to the needs of its constituent organiza-
tions in whatever way the center's staff desired.
The white executives were learning to tolerate

the ideas of people who had different value systems

and different priorities, and to apply the concept

Of laissez faire to the black community in which

they had invested a great deal of money. (Rotten-

berg, 1973, p. 79)

AS Summer of 1970 moved into fall, the whites commissioned

 

 

18

a management consulting firm to evaluate the center's
projects.

The report confirmed the whites' worst fears.
It took into account the difficulties faced by the
center but concluded that "progress to date must be
considered disappointing. Failure to achieve stable,
unified leadership is the most critical failing of
the center's first year of operation. . . . Selec-
tion, planning and management of projects by the
center have generally been haphazard. . . . Substan-
tial changes are needed if the Black Strategy Center
is to become a viable force in dealing with signif-
icant black issues during the next year." (Rotten-
.berg, 1973, p. 80)

After much scrambling, re-assessing and meeting, the white

 

:mincipals decided that the Black Strategy Center as it
then existed was not their cup of tea. They advised their
fellow supporting businessmen that financial support of
the center would cease as of December 31, 1970. "The
support group will review steps taken by the Black Stra-
tegy Center at the end of March 1971 and will at that time
determine whether the center merits further financial I
Support," the form letter stated. However, the center
had no other means of support; thus it folded as soOn as
the white businessmen's money ran out.

Where had the money been allocated and what was
,there to show from its expenditures? On one hand the
c°ntention was that the center did not have a strong
board. Instead of spending $600,000. on a center and
Salaries and office equipment, just $300,000. could have

been spent on the center and the remaining $300,000. could

19

have been divided into ten $30,000. demonstration grants

for other Black organizations, and those organization

representatives could have comprised the .board.31 Other-
wise, those organizations could be expected to regard the
center as competition for funds from the white community.32

The example cited above with the aborted Black

Strategy Center points up a parallel within another
context of the developmental problems of a resource

center, think-tank type of organization within a Black,

inner-city community. There was a similarity between the

macro conditions which, gave rise to both organizations.

In the case of the Black Strategy Center, operating monies

came from the private, business community. With Alpha,

the initial monies werevprivate, philanthropic foundatiOn
(or third sector) based, followed a year later by federal,

research monies. It was approximately one year after

the Black Strategy Center was informed that funding would
ceeSe that Alpha was advised that its third sector funding
Was being discontinued (December of 1971). The primary
difference in these two instances is that the Black
Strategy Center's dependence was concentrated in one
place (i.e., the private, business community) , while
Alpha's dependence was more dispersed (i.e., the NIMH
Inc’l'lies were to last until September of 1973 and Alpha had

de"’eloped other revenue-generating projects). The Black

Stl‘ategy Center was thus unable to survive, while Alpha

-\.V

 

 

c.‘

‘

20

had the resources, despite having to make cutbacks, to

chart in earnest the arduous path of organizational sur-

vival.

DefiniggyConcepts

The problem or question under study here,deals with

organizational renewal. That is, what are conditions

internal and external to an organizational system which
render renewal problematic? What conditions make organiza-
tional renewal a prerequisite for organizational survival?
Further, in this context, what are the variables of

concern relative to organizational renewal and change?
Fundamentally, what do we mean by organizational renewal?
And how do we define and operationalize change in organiza-
tiOnal systems?

The twelve-month period spent in field research
with Alpha, Inc. will aid in specifying and describing
elements of organizational renewal and change. In address-
in? this problem, the concern will be with-questions of:
C1) task environment influence (in the social, political
aJlél economic senseh (ii) productivity; (iii) turnover
irates; (iv) structural change; (v) organizational rigid-
j“t§?; (vi) communication; (vii) decision-making; (viii)
bQard functions; (ix) changing publics (or clientele);
(3") the role of a professional caucus; (xi) tolerance for

bureaucracy by staff members; (xii) cooperative strategies;

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

21

(xiii) goals/objectives; (xiv) administrative behavior;

and (xv) organizational survival. These variables will
allow for the generation of empirical data which can
provide a micro-analysis of organizational renewal and

change. The mode of analysis is the case study method.

The organization under study is Alpha, Inc., an entity

undergoing rapid change in relation to an altered task

environment .

That task environment consists of: (i) macro;

and (ii) micro aspects which are themselves composed of

general and specific elements. The broader context

Within which such conceptual elements occur, and are to be

delineated herein, include the social, political and

economic spheres. Thus, in the 1960's, a general, macro

asPeot within the social sphere was civil rights, urban

“hr est and attendant conditions which were perceived as .

indicating some level of political instability. This led

to a. specific response on. the part of the private sector,

the 'third sector'33 and the public sector in the form of

v‘E‘Jl‘ious types of programs and legislation designed to
34

adcirress the social, political'and economic conditions.

In many instances, such a process gave rise to the develOp-

“lent of organizations within urban areas which became
doln:lnated by a Black perspective which interpreted the

condition of this population group as being analogous to

cieveloping country. That is, the concern in working

 

 

 

.«u

'a

22

within such an organizational context should address
itself to political, social and economic development on
the terms of this population segments'world view, not
necessarily in accordance with city-state-federal funding
guidelines and policies. Inherent in such a perspective,
and attendant developmental process, are the concepts of
renewal, change and survival within the organizational
context.

Important within this context too, is the dis-
tinction Selznick makes in regard to the concepts 'organi-
zation' and 'institution.'35 He states:

The term "organization" thus suggests a certain
bareness, a lean, no-nonsense system of consciously
co-ordinated activities. It refers to an expendable.
tool, a rational instrument engineered to do a job.
.An "institution," on the other hand, is more nearly

a natural product of social needs and pressures--a
res onsive, adaptive organism. (Selznick, 1957, p.

5)3

The world View of the need for social, political
anti economic development within a modernization context
th~‘~ls.has as an important tenet, the need to 'institution-
alize' various organizationa137 forms. The contradiction
(“3rlfronted by the Chinese in The Great Leap Forward thus

" pOSes a dilemma here and is a concern with which Black
Sc3<=ia1 theoreticians must grapple.

One of the basic differences between 'organiza-

‘tchan' and 'institution,‘ in Selznick's sense, relates to

‘tllee definition of the environment. 'Organization' sees

‘

 

 

 

,.

I
I"

|u

23

the environment essentially one of change and challenge;
'institution' sees it as one of continuity and stability.
The modern manager, like the military commander, sees
danger around every corner; for him, change and not

harmony is the natural order of things.

In a basically harmonious world, man need not
rely solely on the instruments of rationality.
He can use all factors that enter into human
relationships. But in a world defined as hostile,
the insights and tools deriving from a rational
approach to the world may be the only mechanisms
'Of survival a man has. The turn from "institution"
to "organization" demands a radical redefinition
of the environment. (Schurmann, 1968, p. 235)

According to the usage of the concept 'task
enVironment' adopted by James D. Thompson (1967) from
William.R. Dill (1958), to denote those parts of the
env'izronment which are "relevant or potentially relevant

\ .
to goal setting and goal attainment," we can begin moving
toWerd an understanding of renewal, change and survival. in
organizational systems; and also begin the re—definition
needed if we are to comprehend 'organization' and 'insti-
tutxion' within a broader context. The task environment
is defined by the dependence of the organization. Since
dependence introduces constraints or contingencies;

The problem for the organization is to avoid
becoming subservient to elements of the task
environment. . . . By scattering its dependence,
it prevents the concentration of power over it.
It need not concede power to a single element of

the task environment. (Thompson, 1967, p. 32)

F I I O 0 O I
()3? any one organization which 13 in a dependence relation,

 

 

24

i.e., an element of the task environment has a concentra-
tion of power over the organization, the withdrawal of
that particular relationship should initiate a process of

renewal, leading to organizational change and hopefully,

organizational survival.

By renewal is meant the process of self-examina-

tion, determination of purpose and the setting of a

future direction.38 With Alpha, Inc., as an organization

Operating under norms of rationality, such a renewal

process included: (i) the commissioning of a management

audit to cover four broad areas; (a) a money audit; (b) an

oPerational audit; (c) the potential of a research and

development arm; and (d) what is the potential of Alpha,

hie. ,39 as well as a (ii) two-day retreat to deal with

'intergroup problems' using "The Structured Group Inter-

View. In 40
Following Griffiths (1970), change refers to an

alteration in the organization structure, in any of its

precesses, or in its goals or purposes. Robert Mayer41

relKinds us that the notion of social-structural change is

rooted in the elementary ideas of Emile Durkheim. One

difficulty Durkheim had with this concept is the problem
of reification, or the tendency to equate conceptual

abstractions of reality with an actual piece of reality.42

N‘cher problem in the analysis of social-structural

Q11ange is the determination of what constitutes change.

‘!

v,

...-.A

 

25

By social change is meant some alteration in a social

43

system. Lewis A. Coser made the attempt to distinguish

changes of systems from changes within systems in Order

to resolve the problem of some part of the system remaining
unchanged if the original objectives are to remain rele-
vant.

We propose to talk of a change of system when
all major structural relations, its basic institu-
tions, and its prevailing value system have been
drastically altered. . . . Change of systems may be
the result (or the sum total) of previous changes
within the system. This does not, however, detract
from the usefulness of the theoretical distinction..
(Coser, 1967, p. 28)

Recognizing the distinction as an abstraction, Coser
Provides two criteria by which to judge system change:

(i) the speed or the time over which change takes place;\\
and (ii) the extent of the system affected by the given

chenge. Using a model derived from Ernest Nagel's formula-

45

tion,“4 Francesca Cancian uses this model to differen-

tiate between changes within a system and changes of a
System.

Change within the system refers to change that
does not alter the system's basic structure. In a
functional system, this means changes in state
coordinates for which compensation is possible. G
and the relationship between state coordinates
remain the same. Change of the system is any
change that alters the system's basic structure.
In a functional system, this includes disappearance
of G, the appearance of new state coordinates or
the disappearance of old ones, and change in the
range of variation of state coordinates for which
compensation is possible. (Cancian, 1964, p. 119)

 

~ch 3.
a 5!; - '-

 

26

In referring to the distinction made by,Cancian,

46 uses the terms 'macrostructures' and

Peter M. Blau
'microstructures.’ Microstructures have as their consti-
tuent elements interacting individuals or actors in the
Parsonian sense. While in the case of macrostructures,
the constituent elements are other social structures,

that is, a macrostructure is, by definition, a complex
social structure.

. . . macrostructures tend to have enduring
institutions whereas microstructures are more
transitory. (Mayer, 1972, p. 33)

It can be demonstrated that there are three distinct ways
1h! which social change as structural change can occur:
(1) Iby reallocating the existing combination of roles and
statuses to a different set of individuals or memberships;
(ii) by altering the combination of roles characteristic
015 a given structure; and (iii) by redistributing the
rights and obligations inherent in the statuses of that-
structure. -When the replacement of personnel in the roles
0f the social structure occurs rapidly, or in large '
doses, significant changes in role definition or per-
f‘DI‘I'nance can occur. Thus, given a group of actors in a
SOCial system, it is possible to change the structure by
Creating new roles or redefining existing ones."
Mayer reminds us that within the traditional

iliterature dealing with social systems, there has been a

'bendency to analyze change in terms of sources within the

 

 

27

system itself, called endogenous factors, rather than
sources external to the system, called exogenous factors.

Robert Nisbet48 has drawn attention to the limita-

tions of such an analytic bias. More often than not,
changes in social systems or social structures result

from invasion from the outside, that is in contact with
other systems. Technological innovation is the most
potent of such exogenous factors. In contrast, function-
alism tends to explain change by reference to endogenous
factors. Endogenous factors may be useful and appropriate
for explaining why systems persist, but they are not very
adequate for explaining why they change. As Nisbet points
out, functionalism is a good theory of stability but a
bad theory of change.

In operational terms, social-structural change
reduces to two basic processes: (1) incorporating
different people into the same structure, or (2)
incorporating the same people into different struc-
tures. Thus, the operational definition of social-
structural change implies simply an alteration in

the composition of either the actors in the struc-
ture or the roles and or statuses of the structure.

(Mayer, 1972, p. 41)4
Structural change does not always have ramifica-
tiOns in related systems. The degree of independence of
'a gimen subsystem (or organization) is an important
faC=tor in determining the feasibility of a proposed
structural change. Social structural change as defined
by Mayer is applicable within a limited set of circum-

‘itances. These circumstances can be elaborated in three

 

‘1

 

28

reSpects: (i) the scale of change; (ii) the power to
change; and (iii) the sanctions to change.

The overall objective of the organization under
study is survival. Thus the concern will be with renewal
and change in an organizational system as it attempts to
adapt to its task environment and survive. By survival
is meant an organization's capacity to gain input from
its task environment and to produce an output which is
consumed by that task environment. Survival also refers
to the ability of an organization to diSperse its task
environment influence, thus damping the control that any
single element has over it. This degree of independence
in a given organization is crucial in determining the
lilkelihood of a given structural change. If the organiza-
ticul is dependent, then the less feasible is a given
structural change and the less likely is the organization
“3 survive once that dependent relation ceases.50 The

concepts of renewal, change and survival'are thus inter-

dependent phenomena .

 

 

 

CHAPTER II
THE THEORY AND LITERATURE

The case study will deal with the theory of

organizations. Related to this concern is a third line

of development which has come to be viewed as the third

cornerstone of organization theory. This is the theory
of decisions, which provides an orientation much more
relevant to the theory or organizations than to organiza-
tion theory. As will be seen in the case of Alpha, Inc.,
a basic decision had to be made upon completion of the
management audit contracted in September of 1971.

The "decision," i.e., a choice based on
examining a state of affairs and the range of
possible outcomes is the fundamental event of
decision theory. (Rapoport and Horvath, 1968,
p. 75)

as stated in the "Findings and Conclusions" section of the

management' ' audit :

One of the major issues facing [Alpha] at this
time is whether to focus its efforts on research
activities or consulting activities. While we
~recognize that the dividing line between consulting
and research can be drawn arbitrarily, such a
decision is most important when put in the context
of business development. . . . We do not suggest
this question as an exclusive program--"we will do
research and research only," but only as a way of
focusing your efforts and resources, and as a tool
in formulating business plans. In addition, this
decision will provide some direction to the

29

 

 

 

 

 

30

organization's thinking of how it will formulate
plans for pursuing business, how it will conduct
its business activities, and what type of reporting
and follow-up plans are required or expected. . . .
Chief among our recommendations is that [Alpha]
should focus its efforts on research activities.

(p. 4)

Alpha, Inc. thus had a strategic decision1 to
make once the management audit report was submitted in
March of 1972. As with any decision, the management of
Alpha, Inc. was hoping to make a decision which would be
effective and implementable both now, and on into the
future. Peter Drucker2 reminds us that every decision is
a risk-taking judgment and that the decision-making process
Should inv01Ve six steps: (i) the classification of the
PrOblem; (ii) the definition of the problem; (iii) the
boundary conditions; (iv) the decision as to what is
rbght in order to meet the boundary conditions; (v) the
building into the decision of the action to carry it out
(ioe., what does the action commitment have to be and who
has to know about it?); and (vi) the feedback which tests
ting validity and effectiveness of the decision against the
a(Hamil course of events.

Harold Wilensky3 notes what he refers to as an
iJTtelligence failure, which means the inability to muster
the intelligence needed for successful pursuit of organi-

zfitdcnal goals. Intelligence denotes information relevant

‘0 poliCy .

High quality intelligence designates informa-
tion that is clear because it is understandable

 

 

 

31

to those who must use it; timely because it gets
to them when they need it; reliable because
diverse observers using the same procedures see
it in the same way; valid because it is cast in
the form of concepts and measures that capture
reality (the tests include logical consistency,
successful prediction, congruence with established
knowledge or independent sources); adeguate
because the account is full (the context of the
act, event, or life of the person or group is
described); and wide-ran in because the major
policy alternatives promiSing a high probability
of attaining organizational goals are posed or
new goals suggested. (Wilensky, 1967, PP. viii-
ix)

 

Wilensky goes on to note that the nature of an executive

decision itself shapes the uses and quality of intelli-

 

gence because it affects the number, kinds, and organiza-

tion of experts called to serve.\fWhen the executive is

V.

overwhelmed by uncertainty, in order to reduce his huge
burden of calculation, he relies not on the expert but
on Precedent4 and on trial and error, the short-run
reaction to short-run feedback. This situation generally
holds except where the decisions are so clearly technical
and the problems or programs so clearly new that precedent
-PrOVides a poor guide and expert planning promises much.
71” the case of the basic decision to be made by Alpha,
Inc., being of a strategic nature, precedent would be of
‘little help to the decision makers. However, with the
strategic decision, time permitted the collection and
analysis of information whose consequences would be long
telln. Thus we can infer that the management of Alpha,

I‘“=- was not overwhelmed by uncertainty and could rely on

 

 

 

“jI-oi-H- .- 7 - I

32

the expert5 rather than on precedent.

In the organizational analysis of Alpha, Inc.,
uneconcern will not be with statements concerning general
characteristics of organizations. These statements consti-

tute the 'upper' level of organizational theory. Compara-

tive analysis of organizations yields 'middle-range' W
theories. The concern here will be with the case study of

an organization, a detailed observation of a single case. ,
Amitai Etzioni reminds us: .. F‘

 

Many case.studies of organizations close with
some universal statements about organizational
variables 'based' on the study of one organiza-
tion. Researchers are often lured into such over-
generalizations for lack of a middle-range theory
which would allow the formulation of specific
statements -- that is, statements concerning sub-
categories of organizations. (Etzioni, 1961,

p. xiii).

The primary concern of an Alpha, Inc. case study
Will be with generating empirical data which can foster

the development of comparative studies of this subcategory-

°f Organization .

The Literature

 

Meyer N. Zald (1970) provides an analytic case

study of a pervasive American institution, the Young Men's

-, -' 1"”.I'i . “I i" II.

33

Christian Association (YMCA). Zald's framework is a
political economic one which the author states is not a
substitute for decision theory, the human relations
approach, or the concept of organizational rationality.
This framework does subsume the others for analysis of
organizational change. This choice of method seems to
have worked well in Zald's case study and is worth
attention by those who study or administer organizations.
Daniel E. Griffiths (1970) states that the observer of
social organization is forced to the conclusion that .
organizations are not characterized by change. Organiza-
tions, as purposive social units, come into existence
With a great deal of built-in stability. This stability
is of such magnitude as to comprise a potent resistance
to Change. Change in organizational systems does occur.
However, there are few empirical measures of the initia-
tiOn of change in organizations. Griffiths goes on to
n°te that the observer of change must reconcile himself
to Study of the infrequent, not the frequent in organiza-
tiOnal life. By change, Griffiths means:
[A]n alteration in the structure of the
‘organization, in any of its processes, or in

its goals or purposes. (Griffiths, 1970, p.
428)

The revision of a rule, the introduction of a new

procedure, or the revision of the purposes or direction

of the organization can all be subsumed under the concept

 

 

 

l)

34

of change. Griffiths proceeds to identify conditions
aiding change in the form of a series of propositions.

Sheldon L. Messinger (1955) provides a historical
case study of the decline of the Townsend'Movementfi. This
movement Messinger referred to as being a 'value-oriented
social movement.'7 The author identifies five (5) stages
in the transformation of the organizational character.
These include: (i) an ascendant phase; (ii) lack of
public concern in the organizational mission; (iii) a
drOp in membership; (iv) a shift to organizational main-:-
tenance; and (v) transformation. A 'value-oriented social
movement' refers to social movements fundamentally
oriented toward rendering some change in the social
Structure and of sufficient force to develop organizatiOns.
In the ascendant phases, when social forces press for
“Construction and changes are still in the offing, the
concern of leaders and members of social movements alike
is with those things that .must be done to translate
disC-Iontent into effective and concerted action.-

If and when these organizations go into ascendancy
they ‘go into a process of transformation. Initially
there is a lack of public concern for the organizational
miSSion, membership drops and the dominating orientation
Of leaders and remaining members shifts from the implemen-
tation of the values the organization is taken to represent

to maintaining the organizational structure as such, even

35

at the loss of the organization's central mission. With
this process, the locus of issue-selection will tend to
move outside the organization. The last stage of such an
ascendancy process is with the change from a value-
inmlementing agency to a recreation facility. The organ-
ization character will stand transformed.

The concern in this study is with an cpen system
model in that one area of focus is task environment
influence. The closed system strategy (Taylor, 1911:
Gulick and Urwick, 1937: Weber, 1947) involved the
implicit assumption that the organizational problems of
an enterprise can be analyzed and solved within the
internal environment and that changes in the external
environment could be accommodated within the exiSting
Organization. In support of this approach, the organiza-
tion was considered a 'determinate' system in theory and
a'mechanistic' system in practice. Since most literature
on Organizations was a by-product of the search for
i‘mpili‘oved efficiency or performance internally, and since
this required that organizational variables (both internal
and external) be fixed or at least predictable, the
°rgenization had to fit the researcher's world. The
Preudse was that the organization was rational and stable
in either a rational and stable world or in an irrational
and unstable world that could be locked out.

The open system (Barnard, 1938; Selznick, 1949;

36

Clark, 1956) approach of this stream refutes much of the
closed-system ideal, stressing that organizations are

not autonomous entities. Further, the best-laid plans and
the most astute controls do not eliminate unintended”
consequences of policy nor do they prepare and condition
the organization to absorb and cope with environmental
shocks. Herein is a shift in thinking--from the "search
for certainty" to the "expectation of uncertainty"
(Thompson, 1967). Thus, we assume that a system contains
more variables than we can comprehend at one time or that
some of the variables are subject to influences that we
cannot fully control or predict.

Organizations are dependent on other organizations
and social units for input and output, for the relative.
s‘tc'ibility of these transactions and the assurance of their
contzinuation into the future, and for the varied psycho-.
1°9:3.ca1 and social benefits that the environment can
offer the organization.

The 'natural system' approach to the organization
is a.variation on the open-system.model. This approach
assumes the system to be determined by nature, but it is
our incomplete understanding which forces us to expect '
surPrise or the intrusion of uncertainty (Roethlisberger
and Dickson, 1939). It is admitted that there is consid-
erable interdependence with the environment. However, the

trait of homeostasis gives the organization the inherent

37

capability of maintaining a viable system in the face
of disturbances in the environment. This internal and
external stability is assisted by complicated netwdrks
of informal relations. A .-

The former open system (Barnard, 1938; Selznick,
1949; Clark, 1956) model asserts that the interdependence
of organization and environment is inevitable and natural,
adaptive and functional. At the same time, specific
strategies are needed to adjust to and utilize effectively
the organizational milieu. A few years later, Katz and.
Kahn (1966) spoke of the phenomenon of negative entropy8
as further support for open-system dependencies of the
Organization. In other words, by importing more energy
from its environment than it expends, the organization. '
can store energy and forestall the possibility of dis-
organization or chaos.

Selznick's (1949) carefully written description
0f a new institution's (TVA) adjustment to its environment
Paved the way for the development of types of environmental
strategies, eSpecially in the interorganizational area.
The work of Selznick also influenced writers such as
clark, March, Cyert, Parsons and Simon to give due weight
t0 environmental forces in their analyses of the organiza-
tion. Given that attention, planned and organized
Strategies for environmental adaptation and influence

began to appear. Thompson and McEwen. (1958) made a

38

contribution through the study of organizational goals
and environment. The authors postulate that goal-setting
is purposive and not necessarily rational. They identify
basically two strategies for dealing with the environment,
(a) competition and (b) cooperation. These constitute
procedures for gaining support from the organizational
milieu. The selection of one of these is a strategic
problem- Both strategies provide a measure of environ-
mental control over organizations by providing for out-
siders to enter into or limit the organizational decision
process.

The setting of goals is essentially a problem of
dafining the desired relationships between an organiza-.
timbn and its environment. As stated above, goal-setting
is purposive, not necessarily rational. And the most
calculated and careful determination of goals may be
negated by developments outside the control of organization
members.

As the goals call for increasingly intangible,
djafficult-to-measure products, society finds it more
djdfficult to determine and reflect its acceptability of
titat product and the signals that indicate unacceptable
9C1als are less effective and longer in coming. And efforts
“ulst produce something useful or acceptable to at least a

\—

Part of the organization environment to win continued

Sl-lpport .

39

As noted earlier, the authors enumerate two strate-
gies for dealing with the environment, (a) competition and
(b) cooperation. Competition is the process whereby the
organization's choice of goals is partially controlled by the
environment. This tends to prevent unilateral or arbitrary
choice of organizational goals. COOperation can either be in
the form of (i) bargaining, (ii) co-optation, or (iii) coali-
tion. There all constitute procedures for gaining support
from the organization milieu. The selection of one or more
Of these is a strategic problem. It is here that the element
0f rationality becomes important.

The authors pre-date Bennis'9 thinking in regard to
the efficacy of temporary organizations. For they state that
one of the requirements for survival appears to be the ability
to Ilearn about the milieu accurately enough and quickly enough
to permit organizational adjustments in time to avoid extinc-
ticxn, Running tangentially to this need is that of estimating ‘
thee position of other relevant organizations and their willing-
ness to enter into or alter relationships. This necessitates
a sipunding—outgprocess. The ambiguity of sounding-out has a.
fultther advantage to participants, that neither party alone is
clearly responsible for initiating the change. This 'deliberate

arrIlbiguity' is a process and a strategy.

A Statement of Propositions

According to A Modern Dictionary of SOciology (1969)

40

a proposition is a "generalized statement of a relation-

 

ship among facts." Most often in sociological usage the

 

term refers to a hypothesis that has been affirmed'by~
empirical research but is not sufficiently established to
be considered a scientific law. By conflict, we shall
refer to as "direct and conscious struggle between
individuals or groups for the same goal, and unlike
competition, opponents are primarily oriented toward each
other rather than toward the object they seek." Also,
conflict is intermittent rather than continuous. Conflict

r_esolution refers to a negotiated settlement of the

 

conscious struggle which renders the relationship a
cooperative, or competitive one. At the macro-level, two
Hdeels of social intervention entail conflict. One is
thfi! conflict-containment model, and the other is the
Cornflict-intensification model. The latter model is
appropriate to conflict theory and the writings of Hobbes,
Hume, Marx, 9L9};- H

Rolf Dahrendorf (1958) sees the conflict model,
which emphasizes change, conflict, and constraint, as a
bfillance to the recent emphasis in sociology on the
equilibrium or 'utopian' model, which emphasizes stability,
harmony, and consensus in societal analysis.

Social action agencies seemingly overlap two of
Etzioni's (1961) analytical classifications of organiza-

tions based upon their compliance structures. The

41

utilitarian and normative compliance structures prevail

in most social action agencies, i.e., utilitarian in the
sense that remuneration provides a major means of control
over participants and normative in the sense that normative“
power provides a means of control. Organizations, such

as social action agencies, which develop compliance
structures in which two patterns occur with the same or
similar frequency, Etzioni refers to as dual compliance
structures. The organizational type which provides the
closest approximation to the dual-utilitarian/normative
conqfliance structure is the labor union. By inference
then, we are saying that social action agencies approxi-
Imite labor unions as organizational types.
mosition 1.0: The effective elite hierarchy is one in
‘v which the structure of the elites and
the hierarchy of goal (or goals and
means) are congruent. (Etzioni, 1959)
Reliationships between elites are also compared as to the
£2532 their interaction takes, in terms of the degree of
coOperation or antagonism. Cooperation may be based on
fOrmalco-optation or informal collaboration; antagonism
.may be accompanied by overt or Open conflict (see Thompson
and McEwen, 1958; Marcus, 1960). Cooperation and/or
conflicts are thus related to organizational effectiveness.
EEEEgsition 1.1: Co-optation (following Selznick, 1948;

1953) tends to promote commitment to
organizational activities.

42

Co-optation implies a congruence in goals, thus commitment

to such goals makes conflict resolution more likely.

Proposition 1.2: Those most alienated from the organiza-
tion tend to be inactive or drOp-out.

(Etzioni, 1961; Newcomb, 1943)

Implicit in this proposition is that alienation has as a

by—product, conflict. The organizational participant may

then exercise an 'exit option' or a 'voice option' (see

Hawley, 1971). The voice Option is manifest in the form

<xf dissatisfaction, protest and conflict. As a result,

management (or organizational elites) may engage in a

Search for causes and possible cures (conflict resolution).

Emposition 1.3: Upward expressive communication is .
limited in all organizations. (Etzioni,

1961; Schumpeter, 1950)

CIiiteria for decisions tend to be communicated downward,

I“Cure often than upward. Consistent with this assumption

is that change tends to be top-down. Providing a sense of
E>Elrticipation in decision-making (Bass, 1965; Pelz, 1956)
‘ieecreases the likelihood of conflict over decision out-

‘3C1mes, and forges a congruence between planners and doers.

ligggposition 1.4: Utilitarian organizations emphasize
vertical instrumental communication.

(Read, 1959)

Tulis organizational type is the most rational, and coordi-

niiltion, planning, and centralized decision-making are

43

emphasized here.

Proposition 1.5: Hierarchical cohesion tends to be
directly related to lower participants'
positive involvement in the organiza-
tion. (Etzioni, 1961) _ “

 

Positive invOlvement implies less probability for overt
conflict to develOp, and if it does develop, the former
provides an atmosphere for conflict resolution.

Thompson (1967) talks about dominant coalitions
and organizational control in relation to the potential
for conflict.
Egpposition 1.6: Potential for conflict within the dominant

coalition increases with interdependence
of the members.

 

Eroposition 1.7: Potential for conflict within the
dominant coalition increases as external
forces require internal compromise on
outcome preferences.

Proposition 1.8: Potential for conflict within the
dominant coalition increases with the
variety of professions incorporated.

 

Smith and Tannenbaum (1963) and Tannenbaum (1961)
developed a control graph (a descriptive model) which is
El conceptual-methodological tool designed to characterize
‘tlle pattern of control in formal organizations. Control
‘Viis defined in the broad sense to refer to any process in
‘Vllich a person (or group of persons or organization of
IPEErsons) determines or intentionally affects what another

IPearson or organization will do. One proposition they

44

intended to explore was the relationship between aspects
of control, measures of organizational effectiveness and

ummber attitudes toward the organization ('index of member
loyalty'). I

Control by all levels in an organization
provides the basis for effective coordi-
nation of organizational activity, as well
as for the integration of goals of indi-
vidual members and the organization, with
this coordination and integration being
conducive to high organizational effec-
tiveness. (Likert, 1960)

Proposition 1 . 9 :

This prOposed relationship was found in the empirical studies

noted above in voluntary associations, labor unions and

delivery companies.

Control and conflict seem to be mutually inter-
dependent phenomena; however, little is known about organi-
zational control processes and their implications.

Classical organization theory assumed that sub-

<erinates are concerned only with their own needs, and nOt'

the goals of the organization. Classical theory assumed

tame subordinate resists change and is not a good decision-

maker. Bass (1965) asserts that classical theory is

‘a<!tually a collection of hortatory rules based on nineteenth-

century military formulas modified for the purpose of

itldustry. These rules have been further modified for

title purpose of non-industrial organizations. The

I>3Iramlidal organization is generated by these formulas

45

and assumptions. Organizational search for new approaches
to the changing environment is difficult, if not impossible.
And conflict is resolved in a quasi-military manner.
Phenomena associated with interactions between individuals
are ignored, and individuals are treated as units. The
classical rules were deduced from faulty assumptions

about human motivation, learning and perception which

have led to a conflict-generating climate within indus-
trial and non-industrial organizations. The attempt to
resolve conflict within the bounds of classical rules
further exacerbates the organizational dilemma. Modern
behavioral science offers:

More effective organizations [which] are made
about interested and able people; in small, freely
communicating, face-to-face groups; under articulate
and dedicated leadership; deeply committed to a
clear and challenging objective and thoroughly
involved in solving the problems which stand in
the way of achieving the objective. (J. P. Jones,
1962) .

This view is probably utopian, but it does represent
(efforts by modern behavioral scientists to render a
SYnthesis of the modern and classical approaches.

Basically then, the clasSical approach recognized

I“: conflict between man and organization. The structuralist
School views some conflict and strain between man and
c)Iganization as inevitable and by no means always unde-

sirable.

Following Mack (1965):

46

Proposition 2.0: Dynamic or Open systems are more likely
to be productive of conflict than closed
systems.

 

ImOposition 2.1: The exercise of power generates opposition.

 

Imoposition 2.2: Differentiation, stratification and con-
straint lead to the creation of subcultures.

 

Implicit in Proposition 2.2 is that the concept of ethnocen-
trism renders conflict more probable among subcultures (in
organizations, subcultures, subgroups, informal groups).

Proposition 2.3: Conflict within a given group promotes
the formation of subgroups.

 

Proposition 2. 4. Conflict not only promotes group formation,
it can destroy groups.

PrOposition 2.5: Conflict defines and maintains group
boundaries and contributes to social co-
hesion.

This list could be extended by calling upon the
Eubpositional inventories on conflict, such as those by
Robin Williams, Lewis Cose, Rolf Dahrendorf, Raymond Mack,
$31. These prOpositions offer good research leads in
the areas of: (i) the number and nature of parties to con-
flict; (ii) the nature of issues; (iii) the stability of
Power relations; (iv) the mode of resolution; and (v) the
suddenness and degree of structural change.

Following Blau and Scott (1966) in their study
c"EVKilfare agencies, we can suggest that conflict in organ-

izations which rigid bureaucratization is designed to

47

conceal and suppress, are an inevitable source of change,
and that the resulting organizational developments can be
conceptualized as dialectical processes. _

In his interesting little book, The Limits of
Organizational Change (1970), Herbert Kaufman suggests
that because organizations change in an incremental fashion,
their survival rate should be closely associated with the
rate of change in their environment. If the environment
changes swiftly or unexpectedly, we would anticipate a
great slaughter of organizations. Those organizations
unable to adapt would seemingly experience a high death
rate,

Important in the understanding of organizational
Change is the concept of survival. The shift from strict
attention to goal achievement (effectiveness) to survival
is provided by the open-system strategy (Thompson, 1967).
Such a strategy incorporates uncertainty by recognizing
organizational interdependence with the environment. The
determination of 'what is the environment' is crucial from
the standpoint of setting organizational boundaries. For
when the boundaries of an organization can no longer be
distinguished, it is safe to assume that the bonds holding
the organization together have dissolved. 'Such bonds, or
Ymagnetism' include: (i) emotional bOnds; (ii) moral
bonds; (iii) bonds of expediency; (iv) habitual bonds;

and (v) physical bonds. The greater the number of bonds

48

holding an organization together, the harder it is to dis-
integrate it and the more likely it is to reassemble itself
after having been dismantled (cf., Death of Health Council
chapter in Community Involvement).10 Most organizations

are not united by such a variety of bonds. And,in fact, in
modern societies bonds of expediency are probably the most
widely used type. This is the reason that so much organi-
zation theory is addressed almost exclusively to the rational
calculation of inducements to enter and contribute to an
organization.

- But as organizations learn what sorts of adapta-
tions are required for survival, they may "theoretically"
Change themselves to satiSfy those requirements. The ques-
tion then becomes, "How many changes can an organization
HEfl<e before it is regarded as a totally new organization?"

‘ For Parsons in "Suggestions for a Sociological,
APproach to the Theory of Organizations“ (1956) , an organi-
zértion is seen as a system which 'produces' an identifiable
Something which can be utilized in some way by another sys-.
tern. Thus, the output of an organizational system is,
ff>r another system, an input. The boundary specifica—

'. ‘tion here refers to adjacent systems. Adjacent is used
ill the functional sense (to refer to organizations whose
<Jutputs become direct inputs of a given organization

-<3r whose inputs include the direct output of a given

49

organization) as well as in the spatial sense. Parsons'
general model thus has three anchor points: (i) the
systems from which an organization receives its inputs or
resources; (ii) the values, structure and norms which,
compose the organization as a system; and (iii) those
systems which use the output of the organization as an
input. For a non-profit organization (as Alpha, Inc. was
in 1971) the question of measurement of output becomes
prOblematic. Effectiveness is measured by the extent to
which outputs accomplish an organization's Objectives,

and efficiency is measured by the relationship between
inputs and outputs. In most non-profit organizations,.
output is not measured in quantitative terms. There is
therefore no one good way to estimate if any additional-
-inputs (i.e., costs) will produce commensurate outputsr
The inadequacy of output measures is the central technical
Enroblem. 9

Organizational boundaries thus relate to a system

c=<Dncept (i.e., inputs, conversion process and outputs); .
tile functional and spatial sense of adjacency; and the
C“oncept of bonds. Change, in both the environment and in
tile organization, means an alteration in structure,
Processes, goals, or purposes. Accordingly, there are
<1ifferent degrees of change. Griffiths (1970) in discuss-
iing open systems states they have certain characteristics

«distinguishing them from closed systems (Hearn, 1958).

50

These include: (i) open systems with inputs and outputs;
(ii) open systems tend to maintain steady states; (iii)
open systems are self-regulating; (iv) open systems
display 'equifinality,‘ i.e., identical results can be
obtained from different initial conditions; (v) Open
systems function without persistent conflicts that can be
neither resolved nor regulated; (vi) open systems maintain
steady states through feedback processes; and (vii) open
systems display progressive segregation, i.e., this
process occurs when the system divides into a hierarchical
order of subordinate systems which gain a certain inde-
Pendence of each other.

If we assume that an organization is an open
system that maintains a definite boundary, then the systemic
Properties of the organizationand its environment
implies an order to the concepts of organizational change
and organizational renewal. .Such ordering is embodied .
lhnder the tenets of general system theory. Thus,
Organizational renewal in my usage corresponds to the
Eteedback processes. As defined in Chapter One, "by
reenewal is meant the process of self-examination, deter-

; ,nmination of purpose and the setting of a future directionfl'
In general, feedback refers to that portion of the output
<>f a system which is fed back to the input and affects
=3ucceeding outputs, and to the property of being able to

(adjust future conduct by reference to past performance.

51

Organizational change, though infrequent and incre-

mental, does occur. At times the change is radical. Under

what conditions might change be expected to occur:

Proposition

2.6:

 

PrOposition

 

 

Proposition

PrOposition

P o osition

‘A

2.9:

3.0:

The major impetus for change in organi-
zations is from the outside.

The degree and duration of change is
directly proportional to the intensity
of the pressure from the adjacent
(supra-) system. “

Systems respond to continuously increas-
ing stress first by a lag in response,
then by an over-compensatory response,
and finally by collapse of the system
(non-survival).

The more hierarchical the structure of
an organization, the less the possibility
of change.

When change in an organization does
occur, it will tend to occur from the
tap down, not from the bottom up.

In order to assemble the interdependent phenomena

(XE survival, change and renewal in organizational systems,

We must identify and attempt to measure stress, or pressure

fiaom an outside system(s). Explicit here is the proposition.

*tllat organizational change is more likely given such out-

s 1 de pressure .

Such stress, or pressure, then activates

'tdae sometimes dormant renewal process, which allows the

(Drganization under stress to begin the adaptation process.

TPhe externally-induced change process, and the renewal

19rocess thus interact as independent variables allowing us

to predict survival (as the dependent variable). The

52

renewal, or feedback, process is of utmost importance here.
For with continuous outside pressure as an inducement

for change, if there is a lag in initial response (i.e.,
the renewal/feedback process 'misfires') the renewal
process, once initiated, tends toward overcompensation and
then the likelihood of system non-survival is increased.
This implies that once the external pressure, or stress,
is identified as possessing the potential for fostering
organizational change, the renewal process should begin

concurrently. Such an interdependence in timing is

important if the organizational system is to embark on a

Process of survival .

The three major hypotheses outlined in Chapter

Three represent an attempt to reflect the change, renewal

and survival concepts and process. It is the intent of

the hypotheses to capture those elements. internal, and .

e"iternal, to a particular organizational system which can

W change and renewal, and predict survival. The
deSign thus is embedded in systems science-with its
dominant notion of homeostasis, or equilibrium. Important
in such a perspective are those input elements, conversion

‘process elements and output elements which capture tradi-

tional organizational measures (e.g. , productivity,

turnover rates, etc.) operating in an interdependent and

uncertain environmental matrix.

Critical to the prediction of survival is the

53

Capability of the organization to avoid becoming subser-
vient to elements of the task environment. Thompson

(1967) states this in the form of a proposition:
Pioposition 3.1: Under norms of rationality, organizations
seek to minimize the power of task-
environment elements over them by
maintaining alternatives.

Thus, by scattering its dependence, the organization
Prevents the concentration of power over it. It then
neeci not concede power to any single element of the task
environment. This further implies that continuous external
Pressure on the organization is dispersed, thus damping
the change process. DiSpersal of task environment power,.
thus implies less pressure for change and more of a likeli-
hood of organizational survival.

The question of survival being decided by an
outside force, which may have little relation to organiza-
tiOnal outputs, is a crucial one, eSpecially in relation
‘t53 laon-profit organizations. Essentially, the locus of
decision-making as to survival, or not, has remained with
t1'le outside foundation or government agency. The interest-
_idlg'develOpment in the case study of Alpha, Inc. is with

how that locus of decision shifted from outside the
Organization to inside. Thus the outputs assumed even
greater importance as the organization moved to disperse

task environment power over it. The process, as it will

54

be discussed later, is somewhat unique for the setting

Alpha, Inc was in, but not necessarily unique for indus-
trial organizations which have steady government grants
and contracts. What is problematic in both instances is
fine utilization of such input as a leverage to develop an
entzity which has diversified, and convertible outputs.
Outgmats which can provide for survival of the originally
dependent organizational system.

The concern in the analysis here is thus with
faCtors (i) internal and (ii) external to the organiza-;
tion. However, in the organizational research here, we
are: Inoving toward Thompson's (1967) synthesis of the open
and closed system concepts. Thompson takes off from
Simon's (1957) theory of decision-making11 in that it
1“Dias that internal processes are significantly affected
by the complexity of the organization's environment. But
Performance and deliberate decisions are also involved
and they imply the closed system. Thompson refers to this
s‘ynthesis as rational interdependence. Bass (1965)
provides a meaningful accounting of decision-making under
htNtms of rationality which also apply here.

The proposed organizational research undertaken '
here takes as its genesis the quotes of two authors, one
a sociologist and the other a political scientist. As to
the method, Alan Altshuler (1970) states:

One of the more useful research efforts that
might be undertaken in the next few years would

fl“, ,_.\~ \\-—._——

 

 

”I

s.

V2.

55

be a series of case studies examining the record of
Community Action, Model Neighborhood, and community
control designers in forecasting even the very short-
run consequences of their action. (Altshuler, 1970,
p. 215)

As to the general research strategy, James D.
Thompson suggests that:
The open-system strategy shifts attention from
goal achievement to survival, and incorporates

lancertainty by recognizing organizational interde-
Ipendence with environment. (Thompson, 1967, p. 13)

CHAPTER III
A STATEMENT OF, HYPOTHESES

The hypotheses to be investigated in the organi-
zational research reported here are working hypotheses.
That is, hypotheses not yet subjected to empirical test.
Scott (1965) follows the lead of Sellitz, _e__t_§_l. (1959)
in noting'pthree types of study design: exploratory,
descriptive and hypothesis testing. The prOposed study is
exploratory in that we are trying to gain familiarity with
a Problem. Also, a number of working hypotheses can be
Posited, thus we are engaged in hypothesis-testing.

The working hypotheses under investigation here
deal with phenomena or relationships about which there has
been relatively little scientific research. Under these‘
circumstances the hypotheses are necessarily tentative.
In stating the hypotheses to be investigated herein, the
concern will be with .three levels: (i) the instituional
sPhere; (ii) internal variables/directional hypotheses;

and (iii) internal variables/non-directional hypotheses.

56

57
The Institutional Sphere

As can be discerned from the three levels of
hypothesis-testing, we will be viewing the organization
under study as an 'open-system.‘ Thus the concern with the
institutional sphere as an important interacting variable.
The: recognition of the importance of the institutional

Sphere is revealed in Parsons' (1956) , Sower and Miller's
(1964) suggestion that an organization dealing'with public
issues envisages the provision of some service or goods
for other persons or groups. That is, an organization is
58811 as a system which 'produces' an identifiable some-
thing which can. be utilized in some way by another system.
Thus, the output of any one specific organizational
System is for another adjacent system, an input. This
adjacent system is thus a member of the organization's
EEEEJEitutional sphere.‘ Adjacency in the sense implied
here begins to provide a sense of boundary specification.
This usage of adjacent has'both a functional and spatial
reference. .

As noted earlier, Parsons' general model1 thus
has three anchor points of legitimation: (i) the systems
- .‘from which an organization receives its inputs or re-
sources; (ii) the values, structure and norms which compose
the organization as a system; and (iii) those systems
which utilize the output of the organization as an input.

Organizational boundaries thus relate to a system

58

concept (i.e., inputs, conversion process and outputs); the

functional and Spatial sense of adjacency; and the concept

of bonds. Change, in both the organization and its insti-

tutional Sphere, implies an alteration in the structure,

processes, goals or purposes. Assuming that an organiza-

ticun, both in practice and for analytical purposes, is an
Open system that maintains a Specific boundary, the

3Y3 temic properties of the organization and its institu-
tional sphere imply an order to the concepts of organiza-
tional change and organizational renewal (the usage of 'the
concept organizational renewal roughly corresponds to the

2 in general system theory).

According to Mervyn L. Cadwallader:3

notion of feedback

An open system, whether social or biological, in
a changing environment either changes or perishes.
In such a case the only avenue to survival is change.
The capacity to persist through a change of structure
and behavior has been called 'ultrastability.‘ If
a complex social organization is to survive critical
changes in its environment, it can do so only by
changing its structure and behavior. (Cadwallader,

1968, p. 437)
This implies that any industrial corporation (such as IBM

or General Electric) or any other organization type (such

3“ the National Urban League or the League of Women Voters)
t1Iat has survived the last fifty years of social change
:in»the United States has done so through a process of
self-transformation and not through the continuation of

original organizational and operational patterns.

Therefore, the concept of ultrastability will
aid in distinguishing between systems that achieve

59

stability under Specific constant conditions and
those that can learn or evolve new structures and
behavior so as to remain stable under changing
conditions. (Cadwallader, 1968, pp. 437-438)
In another vein, some classes of open systems adapt to a
flucmuating environment through processes of learning and
inruovation. Any such system which is capable of purposeful
Prcflalemrsolving behavior and of learning from the past and
innovating for the future is an ultrastable system.
Further, any organization that is to change through
learning and innovation, that is, to be ultrastable, must
CQntain certain very specific feedback mechanisms, a
certain variety of information, and certain kinds of
jJ‘Put, channel,' storage and decision-making facilities.
We may ask ourselves in examining an organization:
Does the organization behave purposefully, does it solve
PIKDk>1ems, and does it forecast future events? If the
anSkiers are in the affirmative, then one must find in.
the organization certain kinds of communications, informa-
tion and control mechanisms. For in' orderto innovate,
,the organizational system must be able to analyze informa-
ti«on, that is, it must separate it into constituent parts.
.I11 a social system this is a consequence of particular
eXplicit operating rules about what can and should be
dOne, by whom, when and why. Innovation thus depends upon
Preventing a freezing of the behavior of the organizational

system into old patterns. For as Cadwallader reminds us:

60

. . . the state of ultrastability . . . for an
open system, is the optimum road to survival.
(Cadwallader, 1968, p. 439)

Organizational change, though infrequent and often-

times incremental, does occur. At times such change may

be radical. For a review of under what conditions change
might be expected to occur, see propositions 2.6 to 3.0.
These; series of propositions imply that the exogenous
imFetus for organizational change activates the sometimes
dormant renewal process which then begins the adaptation
PrOcess. The externally induced change process, and the
renewal process thus act as independent variables allowing
“3 to predict survival, as the dependent variable. The
renewal, or feedback, process is crucial here. For with
continuous pressure from the institutional sphere as an
inch1<':ement for change, if there is a lag in initial 1
response then the renewal process, once initiated tends
tward over-compensation. This then decreases the likelij
hood of the survival of the organizational system.

Relative to the institutional sphere then:

H1 : (R/C) =§+TEI :+ +pc + +cs

where, R/C renewal and change

TEI = task environment influence
PC = public concern

C8 = cooperative strategies

+ = increasing

+ = decreasing
===€> = implies

61

In regard to working hypothesis one, the units of
analysis include: (i) those general and specific compon-
ents of the task environment; and (ii) the organization
qua organization.

Those variables to be investigated in the case
study relevant to the institutional sphere which can be
termed exogenous include:

(1) Task environmental influence, where the concept

 

task environment refers to those parts of the environment
vflnich are "relevant or potentially relevant to goal set-
tidmg and goal attainment." (Thompson, 1967; Dill, 1958)
Task environment has general (social, political and econom-
i4:) and specific (Ford Foundation, NIMH, gt_al.) components.

(2) The role of the Board of Directors.

 

(3) Changing publics or clientele.

 

(4) The role of a professional caucus.

 

(5) Cooperative strategies.

 

{Dhtei above are variables external to the organization, and
are broken down as follows in relation to working hypothesis

One

(c)

 

(a) (b) Relevant
Variable Component(s) Propositions

TEI (1) 2.5, 2.6, 2.7

PC (2).(3),(4) 2.8

CS (5) 3.1

 

 

 

 

 

Figure II: Institutional Sphere Relationships

62
Internal Variables/Directional

Those variables which can be termed internal, or
endogenous, are the concern at the second level of hypothe-
sis-testing. These variables are distinguished from
those of hypothesis three in that they are directional.
That is, we are predicting in hypothesis two (H2) that
renewal and change as related to variables comprising the
organizational system's conversion process imply particular

<1irectional alterations. In this regard then, H2 and H1

are analogous, though their focus is different. It is at

tfllis point that our attention turns to renewal and change,
arm: the conversion process as it relates to gaining and
translating inputs from adjacent organizational systems
into diversified and convertible outputs.

For working hypothesis two, the units of analysis
are productivity rates, turnover rates, communication net-
Wor‘ks (including the organization's physical layout as that
relates to a two-way flow. of communication), patterns of
‘decision-making, change in clientele (or publics) , a
lbureaucratic scale and organizational rigidity. Symbolic-

a1 ly, the second working hypothesis may be represented as:

H2 : (R/C) ==>+P + +TO + +c + +CDM + «.CL + +TB + +OR
where, P productivity
TO. turnover rates
C communication

centralized decision-making

CDM
mCL changing clientele
TB tolerance for bureaucracy

OR organizational rigidity.

63

Whereas, H1 is concerned with the organization
qua organization, H2 is somewhat reductionist in that it
considers aspects of the internal structure which relate
to renewal and change as influenced by the task environ-
ment.

Those variables to be investigated at this point
relevant to the internal directional variables include:

(6) Productivity, including reports, monographs
and representations.

(7) Turn-over rates.4.

(8) Organizational rigidity, following Hawley

(1971) refers to: '
(i) centralized decision-making;
(ii) similarity in procedures and processes
across organizational sub-units in accomplish-
ment of goals;
(iii) standardized ways of relating to clients;
(iv) the above structural relations are
persistent over time.

(9) Communication, following Blau and Scott (1962)
differentiation, centralized direction and restricted
CCHHRMnication are necessary for efficient coordination.
Refers to documents such as memoranda, meetings and other
organizational documents.

(10) Decision-making.

(ll) Tolerance for bureaucracy,5 a scale in which

64

bureaucracy as measured by an emphasis on discipline,
rationality, technical knowledge and impersonal procedures
is determined.

The above variables are internal to the organiza-

tion, and are broken down as follows in relation to work-

ing hypothesis two.

(c)

 

(a) (b) Relevant
Variable Component(s) Propositions
P (6) 1.9

T0 (7) 1.2

C _ (9) 1.3, 1.4
CDM (8)i, (10) 2.9, 3.0
CI (8)iii ' 2.8

TB (11) 1.5

OR (8)i-iv 2.9, 3.0

 

 

 

 

 

Figure III: Internal, Directional Relationships

Internal Variables/Non-Directional

The second set of endogenous variables, which are
rIon-directional, are expressed in hypothesis three (H3).
That is, in this statement of relations we are not predict-
jJlgrenewal and change relative to changes in magnitude.
Ihither, given the nature of the variables and their
comPonent parts, we are merely implying that an alteration
in the organizational system relative to this set of

endogenous variables will take place Under conditions of

65

renewal and change.

Working hypothesis three is also somewhat reduc-
tionist in that it considers the internal structure of the
organization. However, unlike H1 and H2, working hypothe-
sis three is 295 directional. That is, given the nature
of the variables, we cannot posit a directional alteration
in their frequency. We can merely speculate that they are
altered in relation to the process of renewal and change.

Thus symbolically working hypothesis three can be stated

thus:

H3 : (R/C) :=)sc + mm + AB

where,° SC
CG/O
AB

structural change
change in goals/objectives
administrative behavior

Those variables to be examined which are relevant
t1) the internal, non-directional variables include:

(12) Structural change.

 

(13) GoalsZObjectives.

 

(14) Administrative behavior.

The above variables are internal to the organization, and

 

are broken down as follows in relation to working hypothe-

‘Sis three.

66

 

(c)
(a) (b) Relevant
Variable Component(s) Propositions
SC (12) 2.0,2.2,2.3,
2.4,3.0
CG/O (l3) l.0,1.1,l.9
AB (14) l.6,l.7,1.8,
2.1,3.l

 

 

 

 

 

Figure IV: Internal, Non-directional Relationships

Summation

Working hypothesis one will be tested using a
combination of the open system approach to organizations,

and by assessing Alpha's process of c00perative strategy

selection. According to Sower and Miller (1964) most

organizations dealing with public issues envisage the
Provision of some service or goods for other persons or

Parsons' general model delineates "three anchor

gZ‘Oups .
(l) the

POints of legitimation" for an organization:
sYstems from which it receives it inputs of resources (the
and norms

task environment): (2) thevalues, structure,

which compose the organization as a system (see H2 and H3);

.and (3) those systems which use the output of the organiza-

tixsn as an input (the publics or clientele).

We will be looking at the task environment in

'regards to those components which input resources (money

and human) into the organization and those factors which

67

affect such an allocation (social, political, economic).
This will be expressed specifically in dollars and cents
and generally in relation to the social, political and
economic atmosphere prevailing in those specific input
units. The analytical distinction between the general and
Specific components of the task environment is of
importance here.

Public concern will be analyzed in relation to
continuing board functions and participation, and the
general atmosphere relative to the organization as revealed
through official documents. Cooperative strategies will
be analyzed in relation to their process of selection
and their nature, i.e., competitive, co-optation, etc.,_
by'the organization during renewal and change.

WOrking hypothesis two will be tested by using a

Variety of methods, including: questionnaires, statistics
derived from documents, memoranda, etc. For productivity
as an example, we will be focusing on annual reports,
which enumerate those 'products' in the form of reports,
Contracts, presentations, etc., which the organization
'Exroduced.' The concern will be with measures of central
tendency between phases of renewal and change, between
different annual report years and with percentage increase/
decrease between phases/years.
Working hypothesis three will be tested by the use

Of organizational charts, documents/behavior relating to

68

alteration in goals/objectives and observation of adminis-
trative behavior over time.

The units of analysis are thus: '(i) the task:
environment; (ii) the organization qua organization; and
(iii) the internal structure of the organization. The
measurement or statistical aspect will include the utiliza-
tion of measures of central tendency, percentages, number
of cases, information measures, which imply the use of
scales up to the interval.7 These scales attached to

I
the above measures are possible because there are
certain isomorphisms between aspects of objects and
properties of numerical series.

Formats to be used in presenting the data include:
(i) tables; (ii) graphs; (iii) charts; (iv) architectural

(irawings of physical plant (graphics); and other relevant
diagrams.

The framework within which the renewal and change
Process will be discussed is the five-step model suggested
by Messinger (1955). This model includes: .

(1) An ascendant phase;

(2) Lack of public concern;

(3) Drop in membership;

(4) Shift to organization maintenance; and

(5) Transformation.

In the external, or institutional sphere, renewal

and change implies increased task environment influence, a

69

decreasing public concern in the organization, and an
increased need to develop and implement cooperative strat-
egies.

In the internal, or intra-organizational sphere,
renewal and change implies decreasing productivity, an
increase in turnover rates, a decrease in communication
within the organization, increasing centralization of
decision-making, a changing clientele and a decreasing
tolerance for bureaucracy and an increase in organization
rigidity. On another analytical plane, renewal and change
implies structural change, a change in goals and objectives
and an alteration in administrative behavior.

The overriding objective for the organization under
study is survival. Thus the concern will be with renewal

axui change in an organizational system as it attempts to
adapt to its task environment and survive. By survival
‘13 Ineant an organization's capacity to gain input from its‘
taSk environment and to produce an output' which is consumed
by that task environment. By renewal is 'meant the process
‘35 .self-examination, determination of purpose and the
setting of a future direction. Following Griffiths (1970) ,
cflit-Ange refers to an alteration in the organization struc-
t‘Jre, in any of its processes, or in its goals or purposes.
The concepts of survival, renewal and 'ichange are thus
interdependent phenomena. These hypothese represent an

attempt to capture those elements internal, and 9Xt9£22$1

70

to an organizational system which can explain renewal

and change, and predict survival.8

CHAPTER IV

THE FIELD SETTING

Data Collection

 

The intent of this chapter will be to examine the
field setting in which Alpha was operating in the September,
1971 - September, 1972 time period under study here. Our
concern will be with macro- and micro-elements of the field
setting in their political, economic and social context.’ In
reviewing the above concerns, the focus will also be on
general and specific elements of the macro; and micro-
environment. From the above description and delineation
we will move to a discussion of the methods and rationale in
the collection of data pertinent to the macro- and micro-
elements as this bears on hypothesis-testing. This process
will then move us into Chapter V, in which the discussion will

focus on data analysis, data presentation, and findings.

Macro-Analysis

 

In focusing our attention on the field setting and
on strategies for gathering data from such a setting, it is

important to bear in mind the points of consideration raised

71

72

by David Rogers,1 Talcott Parsons,2 and Sheldon Messinger.3
Briefly summarizing the conceptual framworks posited by the

above authors yields the following:

A. Rogers: (i) political setting or environment;
(ii) organizational design of the delivery
system; (iii) nature of the transactions among the
participants; and (iv) outputs.

B. Parsons: (i) systems from which an organization
receives its inputs or resources; (ii) values,
structures and norms which compose the organi-
zation as a system; and (iii) those systems
which use the output of the organization as
an input. '

C. Messinger: (i) ascendance; (ii) lack of public
concern in the organizational mission; (iii)
drop in membership; (iv) a shift to organiza-
tional maintenance; and (v) transformation.

 

Relative to the macro-analysis, the points in the above
three conceptual schemes which have the most relevance are:
A(i); B(i); C(i); C(ii); and C(iii).

As was discussed earlier, the development of Alpha
was a function of the type of program funding initiated in.
the third sector and followed through by the public sector,
particularly at the federal level. The rationale for such
a category of funding was predicated on social, political
and economic grounds. That is, given social unrest, political
instability and economic recession in the nation's urban areas,
there emerged the societal-wide effort to develop and imple-
nent programs which could address the above 'social problems.'

Citizen participation was seen as a key variable in such

73

programs with its intended effects of large-scale institu-
tional change and the reduction of social inequalities.4
Let us begin the discussion by focusing on the general,
macro-economic conditions beginning in September of 1971.
The facts were that productivity was low and wages and
salaries were escalating, notably in the services (health,
education, professional, transportation, federal, state and
local governments). Prices were too rigid in many key indus-
tries, they were only flexing up. Union power to boost wages
was unchecked and spreading into new areas, with government
workers a prime example. Fiscal policy was stimulative
and credit policy was expansive. Thus, inflationary pressures
were continuing to build up as discussion began around the
need for economic controls.5 The objective of the Nixon
Administration was rapid economic growth, with controls being
viewed as a means to that end. The two-pronged program of
controls to hold inflation and government stimulation of the
economy was to lead to a booming economy with low unemploy-
ment. A gain of $100 billion in the Gross National Product
(GNP) was projected in October of 1971 by leading economists
for 1972 as a result of the two-pronged Administration
'economic policy. This would be nearly a 10% increase over
‘ the GNP for 1971. After allowing for higher prices, real
growth was seen to be just under 7%. Unemployment was pro—
jected to slide to around 5%, with the growth in the economy

seen to be sufficient to absorb new workers and cut the job-

74

lessness. It was also projected that inflation would be
held to around 3 1/2%.

Relative to general, macro-political conditions be-
ginning in September, 1971, was the fact that the parties
were gearing up for the election year. In addition, the in-
cumbent administration was moving to implement its economic
policy of rapid growth through the political process of
negotiation, bargaining, co-optation, with the requisite
other political forces, e.g., business, labor, et.al. In
attempting to implement its economic policy, the government
was prepared to use force to get what it wanted. That is,
the business community was told how much prices can go up.

A limit was placed on wage increases, both union and non-j
union, and on salaries, bonuses, stock options, and other
executive incentives. In addition, wages were going to be
allowed to rise more than prices as a concession to the labor
unions in order to elicit their cooperation on controls.

This objective was also seen as a concession to those who
were clamoring for a lid on profits.

There was also talk in Washington of the possibility

6 Despite such discussion, it

Of a black political party.
{Was speculated that such a development probably would not
imaterialize as a separate party. What was seen as likely
‘was an effort by black leaders to have the Democrats select

a '72 ticket that suited black people. The threat behind

75

such a move if the Democrats ignored the black demand was to
stay home on election day. Any such action would hurt the
Democrats in national elections, and at all levels where
Republicans and Democrats are closely matched. Congressional
districts that Democrats now hold could swing and governor-
ships in big states could be seriously affected. Democrats
thus became concerned because oftentimes the black voting
populace is their winning margin.

Nixon's chances for re-election were assessed as
being good with his stock rising among the voters. The
iSsues which were seen as being crucial in the '72 election
included: (1) the Vietnam War, which was fading as an issue;
(2) inflation; (3) prOSperity; (4) the farm business and the
need to carry the farm states; (5) unemployment; (6) a black
party; and (7) the candidacy of George Wallace, detracting
from both parties. In addition, Nixon had in his favor the
advantages accruing to an incumbent.

Revenue sharing with states and cities was seen as
not passing in the fall of 1971, and in 1972 it was expected-
~that only a bill putting strings on the money had much chance.
It is important to consider that the 1972 elections tended to
'color everything that Congress7 did and also what Nixon did.
Thus, politics would largely determine what passes and what
doesn't pass. Need or merit was thus to mostly get lip-
service. '

It was also expected that labor's power and influence

76

within the Democratic party would diminish in 1972, because
delegates to the convention would be elected by a new method.
Each state delegation had to be balanced according to the
state's population, by color, nationality, sex,-etc. 'This
method was seen as potentially excluding hand-picked delegates
chosen by the unions, or by the professional party men, mayors,
governors, big contributors. Any delegation that was not
'balanced' would be subject to challenge by the younger

and newer delegates and their slates would be seated as
delegates to manage the convention. With internal party
reform it could be expected that the Democrats would be
weakened and unable to focus sharply on unseating the incum-
bent Nixon Administration.

The general, macro-social Sphere included a conServa-
tism which had the effect of winding down the social programs
which grew out of the 1960's. This was a post-Civil Rights
era in which the general sensitivity to the plight of the '
poor and black became lost in the perceived need to re-
structure social programs and to check the escalating salar-
ies and wages in the.service sectors. The women's liberation
movement had essentially pre-empted civil rights as a social
concern and voices began to be heard de-crying 'a second re-

'8 Unemployment was Shifting to sectors of the

construction.
economy which had normally not felt the social stigma of
joblessness, e.g., aero-space engineers and other high-

technology professions. The Nixon Administration was viewing

77

these unemployment shifts and contemplating ways to turn
many domestic problems into opportunities. As an example,
ways were being explored to use technological knowledge to
solve such things as urban blight, inadequate transit,_
traffic jams, overloaded health care systems, etc. The ob-
jective would be to take the scientists/engineers who were
available in space and other programs and put them to work
on everyday problems. The intent would be for government
to support practical projects undertaken by industry and
universities, research and development started by government
seed money. In the macro, general-social sphere, then, this
thinking represented the attempt to shift the social program-
ming focus of which citiZen participation was a tenet to a
technological base.9
As noted in the discusSion on the task environment
influence (see page 61), the environment also consists of
specific elements. In relation to the macro-structure of
4Aipha, the specific task environment influences consist of

10

'the Ford Foundation and the National Institute of Mental

11 It was these two macro-structures which

Iiealth (NIMH).
\Mere the primary sources of input into Alpha in the year
under study here.

The Ford Foundation grant was made available in 1968
in the wake of social unrest and racial polarization in urban

areas generally, and in Roxbury specifically. The attrac-

‘tiveness of Alpha in such times of social, political and

78

economic duress was that it prOposed to establish a collab-

orative model. It was seen as a model which would bring

together white and black, university and community groups,

in an attempt to strengthen the organizational life of the

black community by making use of university resources. The

money which was received by Alpha at the Roxbury community
level was through National Urban League 'New Thrust' monies
to aid its local affiliates in such areas as economic devel-

opment, police-community relations, leadership development,

and social services. The channel for the Ford Foundation

— money was thus through the National Urban League to its local
affiliate in Boston, the New Urban League of Boston, and On

to Alpha. Ford Foundation's grant was under the rubric

of Community and Leadership Development. In the period of

October, 1968 to September, 1972 the National Urban League

received $8.08 million12 in New Thrust monies from Ford

Foundation. Of this amount, approximately $800,000.00 was

to be channeled to Alpha, Inc., over the same span _of time
to conduct its work in the Roxbury community. Thus, around '

10% of the New Thrust monies granted nationally was to be-

Ch anne led to Alpha .

However, Alpha was not to receive the full amount of
the 4-year grant, and one reason that the grant was cut short
prematurely had to do with the Tax Reform Act of 1969. Let's
initially turn our attention to the Tax Reform Act of 1969:

and then go back to the amount of input from Ford (through

79

thational's local Urban League affiliates), the percent this
aéfiusted amount was of the 4-year New Thrust total, and the
:reasons Alpha was de-funded in December of 1971.

In general, Public Law 91-172, the Tax Reform Act
(Df 1969, became effective on January 1, 1970, but certain
sections (e.g., reporting requirements and minimum payout)
exre applicable only to taxable years beginning after Decem-
ber 31, 1969. Approximately one-third of P.L. 91-172 is
dravoted to the charitable area in general and more than one-
hiilf of that portion deals specifically with private founda-
txions. The 46 pages concerned exclusively with foundations
Iflepresent a complex pattern of regulation which is completely
new to the foundation field.

The "private foundation" provisions of the Act fall
ilrto three broad categories:

(1) An annual 4% excise tax based on net invest?
ment income;

(2) A number of sanctions for prohibited actions or
for failure to meet requirements, which sanctions
are in the form of heavy (even Confiscatory)
excise taxes and penalties to be imposed on
foundations, their managers, and their sub-
stantial contributors; and,

(3) Broader reporting requirements, including de-
tailed information on a foundation's activities

and the substantial contributions received by
it. (Weithorn, 1970, p. 86).

"Private foundations" constitute an important new
<3ategory of charitable organization under the Tax Reform Act.

3PIdNate foundations are defined to include all Section

80

501(c)(3) organizations except:

(1) Organizations qualifying for deductions up to
50% (formerly 30%) of adjusted gross income
(essentially, publicly-supported charitieS);

(2) Organizations normally supported

(a) not more than one-third from investment
income and

(b) more than one-third from (i) gifts,
grants, contributions, membership fees, and
(ii) gross receipts from admission, merchan-
dise sales, or the furnishing of services
or facilities (other than in an unrelated
business); excluding all receipts from
"disqualified persons" and from Section
501(c)(3) organizations not described in (1)
above, and excluding receipts described in
(ii) above, from any person in excess of
1% of total support or $5,000 for each
fiscal year, whichever is greater;

(3) Certain organizations auxiliary in function to
organizations described in (l) and (2) above;

(4) Organizations testing for public safety.13 _

The amount of Ford Foundation program dollars which
became a part of Alpha's operating budget thus totalled .
$650,000 in the period of October, 1968 to December, 1971..
33113 total represented 8% of the total Ford program dollars
for New Thrust activities in'this four-year time span. What
were reasons for Ford's decision“ to de-fund Alpha in Decem-
ber of 1971? Relative to the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Ford
Foundation had to be wary of: (i) meeting requirements of
Strant-making, which if deemed unmet could result in excise
ftaxes and penalties to be imposed on foundations, their mana-
Sgers, and their contributors; and (ii) broader reporting re-

(Inirements, including detailed information on its activities.

81

Prior to the coming of Alpha's new Director in April
of 1971, there had been inadequate information and fiscal
controls on the program and expenditures under the Ford
Foundation grant. In addition, insufficient monitoring of
.Alpha's activities was the situation with the New Urban League
of Boston, the National Urban League and the Foundation it-
self. Thus the Foundation was, of course, unable to provide
detailed information on the activities of Alpha in that Alpha
had not during the life of the grant reported adequately, if
at all, to Ford or to the other intermediaries in the chain.
‘With the Tax Reform Act of 1969, there was generated enough
pressure to moVe the Foundation to be accountable in ways it
did not have to be previously. This pressure manifested.
itself within the Foundation all the way down to the local
icommunity in which Alpha was functioning. Despite a feverish
pitch of activity within Alpha after April, 1971, and on up
until December, 1971, to provide adequate reporting to Ford,
“the announcement came in the December Board Meeting that
Ford would be de-funding Alpha. The pressure of the Act was
Imore than the delinquent activity on the part of Alpha as an
organization could overcome. The die had been cast and
'.A1pha's Foundation Program Officer brought the bad news of
de-funding in December, 1971.

Thus, instead of receiving a total of $800,000 in
New Thrust monies from’Ford, Alpha received $650,000, decreas-

ing its percentage share of the 4-year program dollars from

82

10% to 8%. The impact of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 was
thus felt within Alpha and in its surrounding community.
It was this development also which heightened the renewal,
change and survival process already initiated by Alpha.

The NIMH grant was to remain intact over a 4-year
time span, despite the attendant problems with the Ford
JFoundation grant. This particular grant was received in
()ctober, 1969, and was to continue until September, 1973.
()nce Ford Foundation de-funded Alpha in December, 1971, the-
laulk of activities under this grant were terminated. This .
:implied that personnel changes had to take place within Alpha
‘Jhile work under the NIMH grant continued. The total amount
.received under the NIMH grant was $727,393 over the 4-year
life of the grant. During the time-span under study here,
lAlpha received $213,265 from NIMH and $50,000 from Ford.
inhe total amount received from these two key macro-specific

‘units was $263'265.14

Over the 4-year life of the.Ford Foundation grant,15
‘the average amount of input was $162,500. With the NIMH
h‘grant, the average amount of input was $181,848. There were
only two funding years ('69-'70 and '70-'71) in which the
.‘full amount of Ford and NIMH were in place together. For these
two funding years then, the average input from these two
Imacro-specific sources totaled $345,000. The total amount
Of'money received from Ford and NIMH over the cumulative

16

5-year grant period was $1,377,393. The average input,then,.

83

from Ford and NIMH as macro-specific elements of the task
environment was $275,479 per year. Let's see how this
average input compares with a year-by-year breakdown by

macro-specific source .

Table 1.0

 

Macro-Specific Input by Year

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Year Source ( 5) Amount Total 3? A (T-i)
l .
11968-69 Ford Foundation $200,000 $200,000 $275,479 $ -75,479
1969-70 _ Ford Foundation ’ 200,000
NIMH 135,000::=’335'°°° 275,479 +59,521
31970-71 iFord Foundation 50,000
+
NIMH 155,000::=’335'°°° 275,479 79,521
1971-72 ‘ Ford Foundation 50,000
. - f2 2
iNIMH 213,265:::>263,265 275,479 1 , 14
(x
111972-73 NIMH 224,128 224,128 275,479 -51,351
\

 

 

 

 

 

The year under study in this organization case study
t1\us most closely matched the average dollar input per year by
Inhero-specific source. However, if the Ford grant had remained
intact during the 1971-72 period the figures would be as

fol lows :

84

Table 1.1

 

Adjusted Macro-Specific Input by Year Under Study

 

Year Source(s) Amount Total i (T-i)

 

1971-72 Ford Foundation $200,000

NIMH 213 2652>$4l3,265 $305,479 +$lO7,786
I

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Thus Alpha experienced a reduction of 36% in its
inpyut from its two key macro-specific sources. If the Ford
grtant had remained intact, the percentage increase from
19770-71 to 1971-72 would have been 14% in the two key macro—
sPecific elements. Rather, there was a 26% decrease in input
from 1970-71 to 1971—72. This implied that rather than 1972-
73 being the year of examination, setting of a nEW purpose,
ax"; implementing a program to attain this purpose, 1971-72

became the year of truth, by default.

.—

Micro-Analysis

 

Relative to micro-analysis, the points in the con—
ceptual schemes of Rogers, Parsons and Messinger which are
Particularly pertinent include: A(ii); A(iii); A(iv); B(ii) ;
E3(iii); C(iv); and C(v). In its "Application for Continuation

Grents," dated August 11, 1972, Alpha, Inc., states that:

85

For reasons spelled out in the progress report, below,
the grant projects have shifted from emphasis upon
research/action/training to major emphasis upon
research, relying more heavily than in the-past upon
the client groups to pursue the action/training
implications of the research. We have also broad-
ened our scope beyond research with local community

groups to include work with governmental and other
non-local agencies.

Further in the application's progress report, the aims of the
present research are reiterated while pointing up the institu-

tional bridging function of Alpha.

As an institution bridging two worlds, that of the
community and the universities, it (Alpha) must
continuously accomodate to the rapid changes in

both worlds.18

Using Alpha's August 11, 1972 Progress Report as our
primary source of reference, let's turn our attention to the
micro-general, and micro-specific elements. At the point of
Alpha's Progress Report of 1971, the organization contained
within its structure a variety of grass-roots groups. Work under
the NIMH grant was directed toward building an action-research
capability in each of six of these groups. The work was carried
forward by research assistants drawn from the community and
university, by faculty volunteers, Alpha training staff, and
community activists from the six groups. Besides NIMH grant
funds, financial support was provided by the Ford Foundation
and by several federal grants that Alpha had secured for the
Participating groups.

By early fall, 1971, it became apparent that both

a.

.-

 

86

the community and the university worlds had undergone marked
changes to which Alpha must rapidly accomodate. With the re-
trenchment of federal and foundation funding for inner—city
work, many community groups began to founder, their leadership
began to lose grass-roots support, with many leaders withdrawing
from community organizing into more secure jobs. Competition
for dwindling funds set in among community groups, and the
community began to experience increased governmental emphasis
on control of dissidents, rather than empowering them to remedy
grievances. .
Alpha felt all of these developments. With the termi-
nation of Ford Foundation support, the groups in Alpha were
unable to continue their previous level of participation. 'Of
the participants in the NIMH research, two sustained the goal
of developing an action-research component in their organiza-
tions. One organization directed itself toward healing internal
schisms that arose upon the temporary departure of its Executive
Director. One group broke up with its members returning to deal
with the survival issues of the five constituent community
schools. A Spanish—speaking group disintegrated under the
pressure of competition for scarce resources with its functions
assumed by a new organization that Alpha helped to found. Another
group found itself diverting most of its energies shortly after
entering the program to the defense of its Executive Director
in a widely-publicized parole violation case. The final organi-

zation reassigned its Alpha representative to tasks relevant to

87

setting up a Black People's Library.

The university world underwent rapid changes as
well. The example of Boston College, a main participating uni-
versity, applies with small variations to other schools as well.
Following a prolonged student tuition strike, the university
administrators on the Alpha Board of Directors became absorbed
in the financial crisis at the college. Losing the confidence
of former supporters among faculty and students, the community-
oriented administration became vulnerable to the attack of
those oriented toward internal survival and was forced to resign.
The academic departments, feeling the pressure for greater
"productivity," i.e., increased teaching loads, reduced their
emphasis on expensive graduate programs and restricted the.
amount of released time of faculty for community work. Faculty
themselves, apprehensive about the survival of the university,
felt less disposed to involve themselves in work that did not
directly benefit school finances.

In response, Alpha re-examined the inducements it
could offer faculty for their continued participation. Nego-
tiations ensued with individual faculty and departments. Among

the tradeoffs offered were:

stipends to graduate students;

- contracts with departments involving payment for'
released time of faculty;

- contracts with departments for overage consultant

payments to faculty;

- contracts with individual faculty for consulting fees;

88

- direct manpower support for research initiated by
faculty that was of interest to Alpha; and,
- direct hiring onto Alpha staff of persons at

faculty level.

Each of these courses of action costs money and re-
quired that Alpha attend to questions of income. As noted in
Chapter II (footnote 5), the research and consulting firm of
Arthur D. Little (ADL) was commissioned to examine the role
of Alpha vis-a-vis universities, local groups, governmental
agencies, etc., in relation to what services it could offer
and what remuneration it could expect. The recommendation of
ADL was that Alpha reduce its training emphasis, enlarge the
research aSpectS of its work, and reach out beyond local c0mmu-
nity groups to offer research services to other agencies in
need of program and organizational evaluation.

In the light of this recommendation, Alpha refocused
its year's work. Thus in Alpha's year-end Progress Report, the
activities are summarized under four general headings: (1)
activities initiated with local community groups, (2) with
governmental agencies, (3) with universities, and (4) those
initiated independently.

Let us now turn to examining the Alpha contacts
during the time span under study here, and also match these

sources by level of society/government.

89

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Source Level Amount/Input
Model Neighborhood National—HUD $ 18,979.00
Board (MNB) City - CDA . (
Local - MNB
Riverside- City 16,000.00
Cambridgeport Local
Corp. (RCC)
Ford Foundation National-National 50,000.00
Affairs; National
Urban League
Local-New Urban League
NIMH National - Center for 213,265.00-
.Metro. Studies
Springfield City-Housing Authority 4,200.00
BTPR, DPW State 4,014.00
Local-CIRCLE, Assoc. ‘
SFLC State - Title III pro bono
Local - SFLC '
SFLC Local - SFLC 8,500.00“
Harvard University University . 14,400.00
TOTAL: $325,344.00

 

 

Figure V: 19

 

If we subtract the amounts already discussed which

were Ford and NIMH input, then the total input/amount comes to.

Alpha task environment interaction by source,
level and amount/input.

 

90

$66,093, which represents the monies Alpha was able to derive
beyond Ford and NIMH. The total figure (see Figure IV) of
$325,344 still represents a 21% decrease from Alpha's projected
receipts had Ford 292 made the decision to de-fund. 1

Let's now aggregate the source and level information
to gain a sense of Alpha's predominant contacts through 1971-72

as it sought to adapt to change in its environment.

Table 1.2

 

 

Alpha Task Environment by Level & Frequency

 

 

Level '# % - ‘.
National 3 20
State 2 13
City - 3 20
University 1 " 7 ’ 7"
Local 6 40

Total: ‘ 15 100

 

 

 

As can be discerned from Table 1.2, Alpha in this
year of transition still had as its predominant level of con-
tact that of its local community with national and city contacts
being second in frequency. It is also noteworthy that the uni-
versity level contact was on the lower end of the frequency.
Also, from Table 1.2 we can see that by using Rogers' concep-
tion of macro being City-State-Federal (or National) that aggre-

gating these levels indicates that 53% of Alpha's task environ-

91

ment contact was at the macro-level.

In order to gain a further sense as to the changing
environment in which Alpha found itself, let's look at those
activities that Alpha had participated in as of May, 1972.
Particularly our focus should be on those organizations which
were affiliated with Alpha and to determine if such organiza-
tions were still in existence as of September, 1972. In con-
ducting this exercise we should bear in mind the points of
relationship that Kaufman makes relative to environmental
change and organizational death.20 Kaufman's point is:

Because organizations change only little by

little, their survival rate should be closely

associated with the rate of change in their

environment...If the environment changes swiftly

or unexpectedly, one would anticipate a fearful

slaughter of organizations. (Kaufman, 1971,
p. 96)

Further, we may expect a very high death rate among organiza-

tions solely from a failure to adapt.

As we have seen, the fragmentary evidence at our
disposal indicates that the organizational death
rate is indeed great, and that failure to adapt
is one of the plausible putative causes. The
pieces seem to fit together, empirically as well
as logically. (Kaufman, 1971, p. 96)

In order to try and get a sense of Kaufman's important points,
let's turn our attention to a bit of empiricism relative to

Alpha activities:

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93

As of September, 1972, of the twenty-three organiza-
tions included among Alpha activities twelve, or 52%, were
still in existence, while eleven, or 48%, were defunct. From
this data we can surmise that nearly one out of two organiza-
tions among Alpha's affiliations died out, which implies a rapid
change in the environment. Seemingly Kaufman's proposition
could go in two directions, thess being: (1) a rapid change in
the environment implies a Slaughter of organizations; and/or
(2) the slaughter of organizations implies a rapidly changing
environment. A question in relation to Alpha-affiliated .
organizations in Figure\U:and the nature of the total macro-
and micro- level environment is how representative are Alpha—
affiliated organizations of the community of organizations in
general? An additional question is, what percentage of organi-
zations in a given community of organizations must die before i
we state that the environment is changing rapidly? Should we
view 50% as a base-line figure? Seventy-five per cent? The
section reported above should be viewed as serving a heuristic

function in relation to answering the above queries.

Community Characteristics

 

Roxbury-North Dorchester is located in the southwest
section of Boston. (See map, Figure VII) The 1970 census data
(first count) on population by census tract indicates that

61,562 people reside in the Roxbury-North Dorchester community.

94

Of this total, 45,910 (or 74.57%) are Black. The census data
also indicates a decline in overall population from 83,520 in
1960 to the present 61,562, or a 26.3% decline in 1970. How-
ever, among the Black pOpulation in the community, the trend
is reversed. In 1960 the Black population (40,918) experienced
an increase of 15.2%. The remaining population in Roxbury-
North Dorchester is made up of a growing Spanish-speaking
American community and a declining white community.
The l700-acre Roxbury-North Dorchester area is part
of a city, Boston, that has absorbed successive waves of immi-
grants: Irish and Jewish around the turn of the century and
in the early 1900's, and, in the last 25 years, increasing
numbers of Blacks. It is predominately a residential area,
housing low- and middle-income families whose wage earners work‘
in Boston. Between 1950 and 1960 there was a population decline
of 26.3%, characterized by the withdrawal of whites and an in-
flux of non-whites. The 1960 census figures for the area Show
an evenly balanced racial composition. However, the populatibn
is clustered in pockets ranging from 99% white to 99% Black.
One still finds isolated areas of a few blocks in which an Irish
population lives, or a small segment of older Italian or Jewish
residents. However, the majority of the peOple now living in
the area are Black. This tendency has increased since the 1960
census, and some areas are rapidly becoming non-white ghettos.
Much of Boston's low-rent housing is concentrated

in this area. The area contains much less owner-occupied

95

housing than the rest of the city, although some few census
blocks have concentrations of owner occupancy.

There has been a consistent and thorough division
of Roxbury-North Dorchester into sub-neighborhoods. The
Roxbury neighborhoods are:

- Dudley Street East

- Dudley Street South

- Egleston Square

- Grove Hall West

- Lower Roxbury

- Mission Hill

- Warren Street

The North Dorchester neighborhoods are:
- Franklin Park
- Grove Hall East

- Uphams Corner

Historically, the Roxbury community has been mobile.
For each wave of immigrants it has been a place of "stop-over."
As a consequence, the people living there are younger than those
in the rest of the city, with a higher proportion of children
under five and a small percentage over 65. The non-white popu-
lation is younger than the white group, and therefore has a sub-
stantially larger proportion of school-age children. With few
exceptions, school buildings are old, crowded, and suffering
from the same deterioration that has affected the other property

in the area. Of the schools in the Roxbury-North Dorchester

96

section, 17 were listed as unsafe, overcrowded, and scheduled
for replacement, according to the Sargent Report on the Boston
Schools (1962).

The community has less educated and fewer skilled
workers, more families of five and six persons, and lower in-
comes than in the rest of the city. The following table, drawn
from the 1960 census information, lists incomes for the Roxbury-

North Dorchester GNRP area as compared with the city of Boston.

Table 1.3

 

Roxbury/North Dorchester Incomes

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ROXBURY/

—-N . DORCHESTER— —————BOSTON

No. of No. of
Family Income Families % Families %
Under 3,000 5,677 27.1% 27,359 16.7%
Under 5,000 11,346 54.0 63,946 39.0
3,000 - 5,999 8,234 39.2 60,893 37.1
6,000 - 9,000 5,482 26.1 53,649 32.7
Over 10,000 1,589 7.6 22,314 16.6

In 1960 only 20% of the pOpulation represented single-
person families, while almost 50% were families of three or
more. The number of pre-school children in low-income families
in 1967 was approximately 8,000.

It has been estimated that approximately 50% of the
total school-age population, or 7,132 persons, is one year
below grade norms. Approximately 14%, or 1,997 persons, is
two or more years below grade norms.

Approximately 11.159 (13.8%) of the total neighborhood

 

 

 

    

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98

population (according to the 1960 census) are considered func-
tionally illiterate.

The number of employed in low-paying occupations is
15,510 or 49.4% of total employed persons. Males 14 years or
older who are employed number 18,212. The unemployed in the
same category totals 1,407, or 7.2%.

The number of females 14 years and older who are
employed is 13,177, while unemployed females number 795, or
5.7% of the female working force.

In the past two years, approximately 1,500 families
have been relocated from substandard housing that has been taken
for demolition under the urban renewal program. Such relocation
intensifies many health and welfare problems. The need for
accessible and integrated social service is particularly pressing
to assist families before, during, and after relocation.

In summary, this area can be described as primarily
residential. While the Black population is steadily increasing,
the pattern of residency is that of a clustering of ethnic
nationality groups. Overcrowded housing, umemployment, poor
health, high crime, deliquency, and illegitimacy rates, and
dependency on public assistance mark this community. The resi-
dents show attitudes of defeatism, intergroup tension, and
powerlessness.21 By comparison with the rest of the city of
Boston, the Roxbury community's level of educational and voca-
tional skills are below the average. These limitations, plus
minority group status, contribute to a relative high rate of

unemployment in this area.22

Whitney M.

99

In a report on Roxbury prepared in 1961 by the late

Young, Jr., he stated:

While specific information has not been included
in the report on other indices of social dise
organization, it is universally recognized that
this part of Boston ranks high in crime, delin-
quency, broken homes, illegitimacy, dependence on
public assistance and unemployment. Roxbury-
North Dorchester, in short, is a district with
severe social problems.23

It would appear from the above quote that despite all

the monies and good intents that have been committed to Roxbury-

North Dorchester during the last ten years, major problems still

exist.

Community Resources

 

ABCD, Inc., of Boston conducted a program resources

survey of Boston's private, public, and anti-poverty social

services programs and the people and neighborhoods they serve.

They identified 191 agencies, including every voluntary, anti-

poverty, and public agency, as providing significant volumes

of social services to Boston residents in 1967. The following

types of agencies were queried:

- 153 agencies with a combined expenditure of
$153.5 million and a total of 571 programs;
- 49 affiliates of United Community Services and

Massachusetts Bay United Fund

100

- 73 voluntary agencies unaffiliated with any
major organization
- 12 anti-poverty organizations

- 16 agencies of Boston

It was found that these agencies typically performed
well-defined functions. In general, privately funded agencies
emphasized services for specific service groups throughout the
Metropolitan area, while state and city agencies provided mass-
produCed services to all able to take advantage of them. In
contrast, anti-poverty agencies generated a wide variety of de-
centralized services specifically intended for minority groups,
welfare recipients, and low-income residents of certain central-
city neigthrhoods.

Some specific findings were:

- Boston's social agencies spent approximately
$175 million in 1967: $58.8 million for direct
income maintenance by public welfare programs,
$31.7 million of the remainder consumed by over4
head or otherwise unaccounted for, and $63.0
million actually expended in providing service

programs.

- Public agencies accounted for 54% of all agency
expenditures, but only 29% Of the total of more
than 650,000 services to families and individuals.

The 132 voluntary agencies, on the other hand,

101

expended $30.9 million, less than one-third of
all services. ABCD and its area planning-action
councils, comprising the anti-poverty sector,
expended $12.7 million in the year studies, and
accounted for 13% of expenditures and a nearly
equal volume of services. The annual budget of
these anti-poverty agencies is now about $20

million.

Public and private agencies were highly centralized,
operating programs located primarily in the Back
Bay, Beacon Hill, and downtown Boston areas. A
group of 63 agencies operating in these areas
accounted for about two-thirds of all services

and expenditures. However, city residents were
only 45% of the service population of these agen-
cies. Anti-poverty agencies were the most decen-
tralized, with 68% of all expenditures accounted

for by facilities located in the areas served.

Less than one-third of all program expenditures,
or $19.8 million, was earmarked for specific
neighborhoods within the city. Three neighbor-
hoods - Roxbury/North Dorchester, Jamaica Plain,
and the South End - shared a third of these funds,
while outlying areas received a much smaller per-

centage.

102

4 Manpower programs received the highest priority,
accounting for nearly one-third of the $63 million
spent for direct service activities. Health and
general social services each accounted for approxi-
mately one-quarter of the total, while education
and recreation each accounted for one-tenth.

Only negligible amounts were spent for housing
and economic assistance other than welfare. How-
ever, social services and recreation were most

important in terms of volume of services provided.

- Most money and services benefited whites, although
racial and ethnic minorities received more assise
tance than their representation in the city's popu-
lation would indicate. Of the 650,000-plus services
provided by Boston agencies, 69% aided whites, 25%
Blacks, and 3% the Spanish-speaking. White program
participants benefited most from social service
funds, accounting for 63% of total allocation,
while Blacks received the benefit of 33$, and the
Spanish—speaking 3%. In contrast, whites comprised
79% of the city's population in 1968, Blacks 17%,

and the Spanish-speaking 2%.

- Anti-poverty agencies expended a greater prOportion
of their resourceS, 55%, for services to Blacks

than any other sector, and were the only agencies

103

to spend more on services to the Spanish-speaking
than their representation in the service population

would dictate.

- One-third of the recipients of services provided
by Boston social agencies also received some form
of welfare payment; 27% were members of "chronic
problem families;" 28% were below the poverty level,
earning less than $3,000 a year for a family of four.
Proportionately, expenditures for services to-low-
income families alone were twice their representa-
tion in the service population and over five times

their representation in the population as a whole.

- Programs accounting for 37% of all expenditures
were restricted to one or another special target
group, such as the handicapped, the elderly,
orphans, and the retarded. Programs for the physi-
cally handicapped alone accounted for the expendi-
ture of $15.2 million and, in combination with
services for other groups with physical or psycho-
logical limitations, absorbed 15% of all service

expenditures.24

With the comprehensive discussion of macro- and micro-
analysis, and community characteristics complete, let us now

turn to data collection, its methods and rationale.

104

Methods/Rationale

 

There are neither good nor bad methods, but
only methods that are more or less effective
under particular circumstances in reaching ob-
jectives on the way to a distant goal. (George
C. Homans, 1949, p. 330)

This type of field approach adOpted in this organi-
zational analysis is one of sustained participation. Although
there is an interest in formulating a set of working hypothe-
ses, because of the paucity of theoretical formulations in the
area of organizational renewal and change, the primary objective
is to gain familiarity with the problems of organizational re-

newal and change which can guide future research. Scott notes:

(T)he sustained researcher is in a better

position than the transitory one to utilize a

number of data-gathering methods: he can ob-

serve group activities, question group members
informally or by using a set of prepared questions,
and examine documents and products produced by

group effort. (Scott, 1965, p. 269)

She research interest is in the totality of a particu-
lar organizational situation, thus the strategy of utilizing
varied data-gathering methods. This total orientation has
been labeled by Goode and Hatt (1952) a "case study;" Katz
(1953) refers to it as a "field study." All the above

researchers agree, however, that what they are describing is

not a specific technique or set of techniques, but rather:

105

(a) way of organizing social data so as to
preserve the unitary character of the social
object being studied. (Goode and Hatt, 1952,
p. 331)
The data to be gathered in this caSe study of.a
social object will be gathered using administered question-

25 participant observation, documents and informant

naires,
reports. These methods of data-gathering are adequate to
the extent of their universality in eliciting a totality
of information. In concert with the multitude of data-
gathering methods, the sustained, open participation of
the researcher lent an faction" research perspective to
the investigation.26
The limitations to these methods of data-gathering
are nominal, in that the research is focusing on those modes
most appropriate for bringing data out of the field. One
advantage to the specification of these methods is that the
researcher built relationships with the subjects initially,.
rather than immediately focusing on data-gathering techniques
(J.P. Dean, 1954; Gardner and Whyte, 1946; Richardson, 19531.
A limitation in relation to participant observation techniques
is in regard to hypothesis—testing. Becker (1958) has argued
that it is feasible to test hypotheses by participant obser-
vation given certain analysis and data-gathering procedures,

and his medical school study (1961) demonstrates the applica—

tion of these procedures.

106

In many studies, investigators have made.use of
organizational records and documents (Dalton, 1959; Thompson,
1956; Selznick, 1949; Clark, 1958) in their research. A
limitation in using these kinds of materials is the problem

of documentation:

(i)t is difficult for the researcher to
reproduce for his reader all the evidence upon

which his conclusions are based. (Scott, 1965,

p. 285)

The use of informants is in the sense suggested by
Scott, with informants as experts. That is, information was
elicited from those members of the organizational system who
had insight as to the history and development of the system
and who had access to particular useful types of information.
Limitations here include the potential ethical dilemma and
the obvious factor of informant bias.

The methods of data collection are diverse, which is
appropriate to the research strategy and the role adopted by
the researcher. Thus their superiority to an approach which
would adopt one or two, but not all of the four methods to
be used here.

A From here we can categorize the types of data collec-
tion methods by hypothesis and evaluate the efficacy of the

particular strategy utilized using Zelditch's work27

as an
evaluation guide.

The methods to be utilized include the following:

(a) questionnaire
(b) participant observation

(c) documents

107

(d) informant reports

By hYpothesis, the methods are broken down in Figure

VII as follows:

 

 

 

 

 

 

Component Method(s)
H1: TEI b, 0
PC a, b, c, d
CS c, d
H2: P '0
TO b, c
C b, c, d
CDM b, c, d
C1 (b, c, d
TB a
OR b, c
H3: SC 0
CG c
AB 'b, c, d

 

 

Figure VIII: Methods of data collection by hypOthesis.

 

Across the three hypotheses then we can see from-

Figure VIEIthat the methods in component hypothesis-testing

break out as follows:

(1) 2 a's (questionnaire)

(2) 8 b's
(3)12 c's
(4) 6 d's

(participant observation)
(documents)
(informant reports)

108

How do the above methods compare in an evaluation

view with Zelditch's paradigm?

Information
Types

Frequency
Distribu-
tions

Incidents-
Histories

Institu-
tionalized
Norms &
Statuses

Figure IX:

 

Enumerations
& Samples

Methods of Obtaining Information

Participant
Observation

 

Interviewing
Informants

 

 

Prototype Usually In- Often inade-
& adequate quate
Best Form Inefficient Inefficient
Not adequate Prototype Adequate with
Not efficient & precautions
Best Form Efficient

 

Adequate
but
inefficient

 

 

Adequate but
inefficient
except for
unverbalized
norms

 

Most efficient
hence best
form

 

 

Methods of obtaining information.

Comparing Figure VIII with Figure IX seems to bode

well for the particular use of field methods utilized in the

Alpha case study, such that the range is from 'adequate, but

efficient' at the minimum, to 'prototype & best form' at the

maximum.

Let's now turn to Chapter V in order to see where

the choice of methods has taken us in relation to hypothesis-

testing and findings.

CHAPTER V

DATA ANALYSIS/FINDINGS

The Institutional Sphere

 

As noted in Chapter III1 the initial hypothesis
focuses on the institutional sphere with the components
of the hypothesis including: (1) task environment influence,
(2) the role of the Board of Directors, (3) changing publics,
(4) the role of.a professional caucus, and (5) cooperative,
strategies.

(1) In attempting to support the institutional
sphere hypothesis let's turn our attention initially to
the component of task environment influence (TEI). As noted
on page 61 (Chapter III), TEI refers to those parts of the
environment which are "relevant or potentially relevant to goal
setting and goal attainment." We have identiffed macro- and-
micro-elements of the task environment which are further
broken down into their general and Specific subparts. The
“macro—general TEI was one which had as an objective economic

growth with low unemployment, but with a decreasing emphasis

on governmental support for human service programs generally,

109

110

and for inner-city service programs specifically. The year
under study reported here was also a political year, so that
the question of program need or merit was subordinate to the
concerns of electoral politics. There was also a move afoot,
spearheaded by the Nixon Administration and generally sup-
ported by fiscal and political conservatives, to 'dis-mantle'
social programs conceptualized and implemented in the Kennedy-
Johnson Administrations. In the wake of such macro-general
develOpments was the concerted effort to spur private sec-
tor business activity and to promote revenue-sharing legis-
lation which would in effect channel human service program
dollars‘through State Houses dominated by Republican gover-
nors.{ The effect of these macro-general develOpments was
to be felt society-wide, and particularly in communities
such as Alpha's and in organizations like Alpha which had
their beginning in an ethos of participation and inner-city
community develOpment. We can safely surmise, then, that a
rapidly changing environment was becomming the norm at the
macro-general level, which was to have its effect at the .
macro-specific level..

Thus, in referring back to the conceptual schemes
of Rogers, Parsons, and Messinger, in relation to task en-
vironment elements, we can surmise that at the macro-general
level the political setting was changing, the level of input
into inner-city service programs was declining, and that

programs and organizations which were a function of the afore-

111

mentioned ethos of participation and community development
were no longer in ascendance; in fact, there was a lack of
public concern and a drOp in membership relative to such)
proqrams and organizations. Another outcome at the macro-
general level Which was to have ramifications at the macro-
specific and micro-specific levels was the passage of the Tax
Reform Act of 1969 (see discussion in Chapter IV). The effect
of the Act was specifically related to the behavior of private
foundations and was to have ramifications at the micro-general

and micro-specific levels.2

 

A. Macro-general

 

Congress

 

Tax Reform Act
of 1969

 

 

 

 

 

B. Macro-specific

Ford

 

Foundation

 

 

 

 

V

C. Micro-specific

 

FIGURE X: TEI from macro-general
societal level to
micro-specific Alpha, Inc.
societal level.

 

 

 

112

In relationship to what Figure )( represents rela-

tive to dollars and cents, let's turn to Table 1.4.

Table 1.4

 

Task Environment Input Over Time

 

 

 

 

 

 

Year Amount/Input t % % Total
_(a) 1968-69 $200,000 '- 15
(b) 1969-70 335,000 +68 24
(c) 1970-71 355,000 + 6 26
(d) 1971-72 263,265a -26 19
(e) 1972-73 224,128b -15 16
Total: $1,377,393 100%

 

 

 

(a) includes only Ford and NIMH
(b) includes only NIMH

Further focusing in on the 1970-71 and 1971-72 input
years and referring back to Figure V (see page 89) where we
see that in 1971-72 Alpha had additional input of $66,093,

which increased its total input to $325,344, we have:

Table 1.5

TEI fer Study Year & Year Immediately Preceding, in Dollars

 

 

 

Year Amount/Input I %
1970-71 . $355,000 + 6
1971—72 325,344 - 8

 

 

 

113

Thus, either using the figures in Table 1.4 or
Table 1.5 we can see that the input-amount was changing in
a monotonically decreasing fashion after 1970-71. 'However,
Alpha was exhibiting signs of adapting during 1971-72, in
that desPite the Ford de-funding decision, additional scattered
task environment input was being generated. In fact, the
$66,093 additional input generated represented 20% of Alpha's
total input-amount for 1971-72. The other 80% of input/
ambunt was represented by the macro-specific entities of Ford
and NIMH. We can thus infer that Alpha, as a rational entity,
was aware of changes in its taSk environment which were having
a direct effect upon its input/amount. As exhibited by the
fact that Alpha contracted for a management audit in Septem-
ber of 1971, we can infer that the continuous institutional
sphere pressure had activated the renewal process. For it
was with the commissioning of such an audit that Alpha began
in earnest the process of self-examination, determination of
purpose and the setting of a future direction.3 As a result
of task environment pressure and the activation of the renewal
process, Alpha set in motion an effort to alter its structure,
its processes, and its goals or purposes.

Seemingly, then, Alpha was moving toward a state of
'ultrastability.' For referring back to Cadwallader, we
are reminded that an open system either changes or perishes.

In such a case the single avenue to survival is change, and

this change process must be preceded and accompanied by a

114

renewal process. Inferentially, then, without renewal there
cannot be change, and in an open system in a changing en-
vironment there cannot be survival without renewal and
change. Further, the capacity to persist through a change
of structure and behavior is called 'ultrastability.' If

an organization is to survive critical changes in its envir-
onment, it can do so only by changing its structure and
behavior.

From the macro-general level on down to the micro-
Specific level, then, we can see that the TEI was increasing.
Relative to H1, then, renewal and change as observed in the
behavior of Alpha did imply that the TEI was increasing, for
the obverse4 would imply that such a process was not essen-
tial at that point-in-time. It is also critical to point
out that consistent with Propositions 2.6 and 2.7, the major
impetus for change in Alpha was from the outside, and that
the degree and duration of change were a function of the
intensity of the pressure from the adjacent system (or task

5 Further, Alpha was in a conflict-situation

environment).
with Ford Foundation as an element of the macro-specific task
environment around the events leading up to and coinciding
‘with the de-funding decision. This conflict-situation served
to define and maintain the Alpha qua. Alpha group boundaries
relative to Ford Foundation, and also contributed to the

social cohesion within Alpha as the organization initiated

the renewal/change/survival process.

115

(2) Let's turn our attention now to the second com-
ponent of H1, that of public concern (PC). The prediction
in the hypothesis is that renewal and change implies a de-

creasing public concern with the organization. By public

 

we shall be referring to those entities outside of Alpha's
organizational boundaries at the macro-general, macro-specific
and micro-general levels. Concern shall refer to a general-
ized interest in what happens to Alpha in a policy-making,
client/agency relationship and in a professional capacity.

The above concerns will be reflected in the hypothesis by

discussion of the role of the Board of Directors, changing

 

publics or clientele, and by the role of a professional

 

caucus.
(a) Let's begin our discussion with the role of the
Board of Directors by referring again to Ryan's "Analytical

and Descriptive Notes"6

for a perspective on the Board's
role in the 1969-70 period. In discussing the area of
"Administration and Organization," Ryan notes that the major
events are considered in relation to the functioning of the
Board and the development of the Project Leader's Council.
Going back to the spring and summer of 1969, we see a con-
siderable amount of Board activity centering around the re-
cruitment of a replacement for the Community Co-Director.7
Growing out of this we also see a clear change in the defi-

nition of Alpha, culminating in the official change in the

by-laws voted at the November 3, 1969 meeting, emphasizing

116

a shift from the idea of paired Co-Directors to-the idea of
a single (Community) Administrator with considerably expan-
ded official authority to operate Alpha.

This change was accompanied by the resignation from
the Board of one of the university founders of Alpha, and
a person who as Chairman of the Boston College Psychology
Department represented the university unit that had put the
greatest amount of emphasis on, and resources into, Alpha.
Ryan goes on to note that this important event passed with
little or no official public notice or interpretation.

At this point, however, the Board stopped meeting
at all regularly, did not convene again until April, and
then did not meet again until very late in the summer of
1970. There was thus only one meeting in a 9-month
period. It should also be noted that the empty university
seats remained unfilled during the entire year.

Meanwhile, the Project Leaders Council began making
demands to play a more clear and official role in the decision-
making of Alpha through membership on the Board. The change
in the by-laws and the low level of formal Board activity
seems to demonstrate a clear shift in the nature of the
community-university relationship. Although there was no
apparent protest on the part of university people to this
state of affairs -- they appeared to accept their subordina-
tion in the order of things '- it is noteworthy that univer-

sity participation at the Board level was very minimal during

117

this year.

Thus, in the absence of any clear redefinition of the
relationship, what seems to have happened was a process of
community dominance apparently accompanied by university
submissiveness. In that community in this instance refers
to Black community, and university invariably meant white
people, this shift can be interpreted as the predominance
of an emphasis on black institution-building which by defi-
nition was seen as not involving whites in policy-making
positions.8

The sequence of events described by Ryan in the
1969-70 period relative to Board inactivity parallels in
process, but not in content, the nature of Board activity
in the 1971-72 period under study here. For the reasons
mentioned above, and in Footnote 8, Board activity in the
1969-70 period diminished considerably. It was for entirely
different reasons that the Board was inactive during the
1971-72 year. Let's now turn our attention to Board activity
during 1971-72, reasons why Board activity decreased and
how these developments relate to institutional sphere in-
fluence.

During the lZ-month period under study here, the Board
of Alpha met formally only 4 times. These meetings were
in September, October, November and December.9 There were
small meetings of selected Alpha Board officers and staff

after December, but not within the context of a full Board

118

meeting.

After the by-law change in November, 1969, the
Project Leaders eventually became recognized officially as
a policy-making group on a Board which had 21'members.10
Once the Ford Foundation grant disappeared, Alpha was no

longer able to support projects with stipends.11

The pro-
jects, and Project Leader Council, thus fell away as interest
groups. Alpha could no longer provide projects with stipends,
nor provide the level of technical assistance and training
functions provided for under the Ford grant. In addition,
with the environment changing rapidly relative to inner-city
community groups, those former Alpha projects were forced to
attend to their own survival needs. For as we were able to
determine earlier in Chapter IV (see Fig. VI, Alpha Activi-

ties), the environment was changing rapidly and there was a

high organizational death rate (see Table 1.6, below).

Table 1.6

Organizational Death-Rate Among Alpha-
Affiliated Projects, as of September, 1972

 

 

# %
Still Existing: 12 52
Defunct: ll 43

N = 23 100%

 

 

 

119

In this instance, then, the entire Board withdrew
as a result of Ford's de-funding except for two of the offi-
cers who would irregularly provide policy input, advice,
and sign checks of amounts greater than $500. In essence,
then, the locus of policy-making shifted to the Alpha staff,
particularly to its senior staff members. Thus, as one seg-
ment of the chomponent of decreasing public concern, the

role of the Board of Directors12

decreased in scope and
function, thus by default shifting to Alpha's staff the
responsibility of policy-making agd_implementation.

(b) From here let's turn our attention to the second
element under public concern, that of changing publics or
clientele. In the years previous to 1971-72, Alpha's primary
public, or clientele, consisted of local community groups
and universities. As noted earlier, ADL was commissioned in
September, 1971, to examine the role of Alpha viz. univer-
sities, local groups, and governmental agencies. One specific
recommendation made by ADL was that Alpha reach out beyond
local community groups to offer reserach services to other
agencies in need of program and organizational evaluation.

To this end Alpha stated in its 1971-72 Progress Report to ‘
NIMH that it had broadened its scope. Alpha had thus examined
its assumptions relative to its publics, or clientele, and
made the conscious decision to alter its focus viz. institu-
tional sphere entities. Key considerations in this decision,
and course of action, were Alpha's need for viable public/

client input to survive in a changing environment, plus the

120

fact that local community groups and universities were not
in financial or organizational shpae to provide the type ~
and scope of input that Alpha desired and needed. Among the
local community groups there was withdrawal into their own
affairs of survival, and organizational death in extreme
instances. With the universities there was also withdrawal
from a community focus into a more inward, university-based
focus. Alpha responded to these stressful changes by a
promptness of response, which enabled the organization to not
overcompensate in its response, and thus avoid on eventual
collapse of the system (see Proposition 2.8, p.51).

However, it was a reality that Alpha's primary clien-
tele of local community groups and universities changed and
this is reflected in the figures derived from Table 1.2.

If we aggregate the National-State-City categories in

Table 1.2, we then see that the breakdown is as follows:

Table l .7

 

Alpha Task Environment
by Level 8 Frequency (aggregated)

 

 

Level # % %
National-State-City 3 53 53
University 1 7:>> 47
Local 5 40

 

Total: 15 100 100

 

 

 

121

So for the first time in its history, the aggregate of public/
client contact of local community groups and universities

with Alpha was less than the aggregate contact with other
sources. Further, as was noted in Chapter IV, the greater
percentage of Alpha's contacts relative to public/clientele
was at the macro-level. Thus, we can safely posit that in
form and fashion, and out of survival necessities, that Alpha
was moving away from its 'traditional' role and into a more
macro-level role.

(c) The next element of consideration in relation
to supporting H1 relative to public concern is the question
of the role of a professional caucus.

The Black Faculty/Administrators Education Caucus
(hereinafter referred to as "the Caucus") was initially.
organized in May, 1971. The scene of this initial meeting
was Alpha, Inc., located in Roxbury. It was the intent of
this organizing effort to bring together black faculty and'
administrators from colleges and universities in the New
England area in order to facilitate the develOpment of a
communication system among individuals and institutions.

It was under the direction of Alpha's Community-
University Relations Sector that the Caucus was reconvened
in October, 1971. The turnout for the initial two meetings
was encouraging from the standpoint of the number of partic-
ipants and the sc0pe of institutions represented. However,

after these initial two meetings the attendance faltered.

122

Alpha was wondering why people lost interest and if the devel-
opment of a group such as the Caucus was possible. To this
end Alpha formulated a questionnaire to gather information
relative to the Caucus specifically, and groups like the
Caucus in general. Once the results were in, Alpha considered
holding a meeting regarding interpretation of results and

how they impact upon strategies for developing and strength-
ening groups such as the Caucus.

Here, too, we can observe a declining level of
participation with Alpha on the part of the professional
caucus. Let's take a closer look at the results of the
questionnaire which was mailed out early in 1972.

The questionnaire was mailed out to a master listing
of 48 individual members of the Caucus. Of this number, 11
(or 23%) were filled out and mailed back to Alpha for tabu-
lation. Of those responding,13 9 were in administrative
positions while 5 were faculty. Relative to university/
agency currently employed with, 1 was with a community
agency, 7 were with universities and 3 were with 'Other. '14
Of those responding, 5 had been in their present position
less than one year, 2 had been in their present position
more than one year, and less than two and one-half years,
4 had been in their present position more than two and one-
half years and less than four years, and only 1 respondent
had been in his present POSition for more than four years.
Relative to former P0511310“: 7 were in administrative posi-

tions, 2 were in faculty positions, and 2 were in 'Other.'

123

Former employees previous to current positions found 3 in
community agencies, 3 in universities, and 4 in 'Other.'

Of those responding, 8 out of 11 had attended Caucus
meetings. Of this number attending Caucus meetings, 4 attended
four or more times, 3 attended three times and 1 attended
only once. All the respondents who attended Caucus meetings
thought they were worthwhile. Predominant reasons meetings
were seen as worthwhile include statements related to sharing
of information, skills and resources. Ways respondents
thought meetings could be improved included: focusing on
specific tasks, establishment of task groups, providing
adequate advance notice of meeting time, and Alpha providing
clearer objectives. The type of tasks respondents felt.
such a Caucus could be directed toward in priority order
included: methods of resource sharing, research projects,
advisory capacity to community groups, curriculum development
and proposal development, and writing position papers.

All the reSpondents felt that a group such as the
Caucus has a role to play in community development, with 8
of 11 feeling as if the Caucus should focus both on community
development and university development. Everyone among the
respondents thought that universities possess resources that
can be applied to community development. Obstacles identi-
fied seen as retarding a university role in community devel-
‘Opment included: departmentalization in universities, which

(iictates against a multi—disciplinary urban approach; broker

124

problems; financial; university has no commitment to contig-
uous communities; ignorance; and lack of focus. All those
responding thought that the community possesses resources
which can be applied to university development. Obstacles
seen as retarding the community role in university develop-
ment include: chauvanistic stance of university toward the
community and 'non-professional' persons; resistance to
.change; non-access and non-influence in university decision-
making and policy-formulation; and a lack of agreement on
mutual objectives. Of those resources which could be
applied to community development, the majority of respondents
stated that they had access to human resources, which a
unanimity felt could indeed be applied to community develop-
ment. The type of grouping that such an application could
take place was seen as a problem-specific task group:

Methods seen as most effective in community develop-
ment included: community development corporations; influence
activities (boycotts, disobedience, disruption); and grass-
roots organization and planning around specific institution-
building or development. Methods seen as most desirable for
the Roxbury community overlapped with the responses recorded,
above.

A majority of the respondents expressed an interest
to meet and discuss the questionnaire results, and a majority
stated that they would be able to attend future Caucus meet-

ings. Of those unable to attend future Caucus meetings, 100%

125

(4 out of 4) felt that the Caucus should continue to func-
tion. Relative to where the Caucus should meet, 6 of 11 (55%)
felt meetings should be in the community while 5 (45%) felt
the meetings should alternate between community and univer-
sity.

Despite the general feeling that what the Caucus
was doing was worthwhile, and that it should continue to
meet, the Caucus never did convene again. This was due
primarily to the press of events facing Alpha which rendered
the Caucus a low priority and also the resultant alienation
of Caucus members from Alpha once the organization had trans-
formed itself and emerged anew.

Thus, in relation to public concern the above dis-
cussion relative to the Board of Directors, changing publics/
clientele, and the professional caucus confirms that renewal

and change implies a decreasing public concern with Alpha.

 

(c) According to H1, renewal and change also implies
an increasing need to develop cooperative strategies with
elements of the institutional sphere. As was seen in Chap-
ter II (see pp.37-38), it was Selznick's work in describing
the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) which paved the way for
the development of types of environmental strategies, es-
pecially in the inter-organizational area. This paved the
:vay for work by Thompson and McEwen (1958) through which they
identified basically two strategies for dealing with the
curvironment, (a) competition and (b) cooperation. As we have

seen earlier, Alpha's two main input sources were Ford and

126

NIMH. With the Ford de-funding, Alpha was forced to enter
into relationships with its environment in order to gain
support. The selection of a strategy for gaining environ-
mental support is in itself a strategic problem, and it is
here that the element of rationality becomes important. As
stated in the "Background" section of the ADL Final Report
to Alpha:
(Alpha's) recent loss of Ford Foundation funding
made more imperative an assessment of (Alpha's)
strengths and weaknesses. Clearly, an institution
with drastically reduced funding quickly begins

to lose its ability to attract. (ADL Final Report,
April, 1972, p. 2)

Due to this loss of funding, Alpha by necessity had to in-_
crease its develOpment of cooperative strategies in order
to gain environmental support to make up for the funding
loss. In addition, as we see from PrOposition 3.1 (p. 53),
Alpha also was aiming to develop c00perative strategies with
a variety of task environment elements in order to minimize
the power of any one task environment element. Under norms
of rationality, Alpha did not want to repeat the Ford Founda-
tion experience, that is, of placing its dependence into one
or two (with NIMH) task environment elements. Alpha wanted
'to develop alternatives, thus scattering and minimizing its
dependence and the power of task environment elements over
the organization.

Thus, as Opposed to 1970-71 when Alpha's task environ-

ment elements were Ford and NIMH, which were the total input

127

into Alpha's Operating budget, in 1971-72 the number of task
environment elements had grown to nine. There, thus,
occurred more than a 4-fold increase in the number of task
environment elements. Alpha thus seems to have been moving
toward scattering its dependence through a heightened level
of developing cooperative strategies. Relative to coopera-
tive strategies, then, Alpha was increasing this process,
thus enabling the organization to gain support from its
environment.

To review H1, the above discussion and data presen-
tation has confirmed that renewal and change implies an in-
creasing task environment influence, a decreasing public
concern, and an increase in the development of COOperative

strategies.

The Intra-Organizational Sphere

 

(2) Let's initially turn our attention to the Inter-
nal Directional Variables (H2). The initial component of
this second hypothesis states that with renewal and change

there will be decreasing productivity. The assumption under-

 

. lying this prediction is rooted in Proposition 1.9 (p, )
‘which is based upon control by all levels in an organization
accompanied by coordination and integration of the organiza-
tion and individual members. Also Alpha had a reduced input
during 1971-72, which suggests that its output would also

decrease.

128

(a) In relation to productivity, renewal and change implies
that a process is underway which tends to detract from the
strict concentration on output. Renewal and change also im-
plies a state of flux which seemingly works against the coordi-
nation and integration of goals with this non-stable process
not being conducive to high organizational effectiveness.

As defined earlier,15 productivity shall refer to
those reports, presentations and monographs 'produced' by
Alpha and reported in its Annual Report. For the sake of
comparison, let's turn our attention to the report years
1970-71 and 1971-72. .Also, we will take a look at the input/
amount for these reSpective years, in order to derive a

measure of both effectiveness and efficiency.

Table 1.8

 

Productivity (Output) by Input, Year & Ratio

 

 

 

Year . . . . Input/Amount Output Ratio(i:o)
1971-72 263,265a 20 13,163
325,344b 16,267

 

 

aincludes only Ford & NIMH
bsee Fig. IV, Chapter IV

From Table 1.8, then, we can see that for the 1970-71
report year only two products were noted, while in 1971-72

20 products were noted. This was a lO-fold increase in pro-

129

ductivity despite at 8% decrease in funding (using the
$325,344 figure as the 1971-72 input). What these figures
also reveal is that for 1970-71 there was required an input
of $177,500 for each additional increment of productivity,
while for 1971-72 the required input figure for each addi-
tional increment of productivity dropped to $16,267. These
figures imply then that relative to 1970-71, 1971-72 was a
year of high organizational effectiveness and efficiency.
Thus, for the first component of H2, the outcome was the
reverse of the prediction. In fact, during the year under
study here there was an increase in productivity despite the
renewal and change process being underway and despite a

high turnover rate. Looking back at Proposition 1.9, what
does this finding infer? It seems.to mean that there was
(control at all levels of the organization which provides

the basis for effective coordination of organizational activity.
It also infers that individual and organizational goals were
integrated with this coordination and integration being con-
dusive to high organizational effectiveness.

It also implies that in a non-profit organization
it remains a problem to measure the output as a function of
the input. If we were to use the ratio between input and
output from 1970-71 for the 1971-72 input figures, then we
‘would have predicted that the output (or productivity) in
1971-72 would be 1.48 (using the $263,265 figure), or 1.83
(using the $325,344 figure). Conversely, using the 1971-72

, ratio and doing some retro-diction16 we would have predicted

130

the 1970-71 output figure as being 26.97 (using the $263,265
figure) or 21.82 (using the $325,344 figure). Further, using
the 1971-72 ratio and knowing that in 1972-73 Alpha was to

have an input of at least $224,128, we would predict the

 

1972-73 output as being 15 (only using the $325,344 figure).

For measurement and prediction problems noted in the
above discussion, then, the initial component of H2 relative
to production was get supported.

(b) The second component of H2 predicts that renewal
and change implies an increase in turnover rates. This
prediction has its roots in PrOposition 1.2 (p. 42) which
suggests that renewal and change engenders alienation and -
that alienation implies inactivity or dropping-out.

Let's look at the turnover rate figures in a compara-
tive vein. The basis of comparison will be figures derived

17

from a Boardroom Reports survey of turnover rates which

 

was published on August 17, 1972.

131

Table 1.9

 

Comparative Turn-Over Rates‘

 

Annual Turnover Rate
Male Employees
Female Employees

Male/Female

Boardroom Data

Alpha Dataa

 

% %
19 57
13 77
25 25

 

Length of Service at Termination

 

 

 

Under 1 year 41 64
1. year, but less than 5 42 36
5 years and over 17 -
Type of Business
Educational 15 57
Gov't Agency (any level) 14
Public Utility 13
Retail Sales &'Dist. 21
Service "25
For all Companies 26

 

 

132

Table 1.9 — Comparative Turn-Over Rates (cont‘d)

 

Size of Office

Boardroom Data Alpha Data
% %

1-25 Employees 22 57

 

Geographical Area

East 20 57

 

 

 

athe Alpha annual data is on a September-to-
September year basis.

Thus, from Table 1.9 we can see that in a relative
and absolute sense Alpha had a high, and increasing, turn-
over rate. The second component of H2 thus seems to be

s upported as predicted.

(c) The third component of H2 predicts that renewal
axnd change implies decreasing communication. Propositions
defined in Chapter II which relate to this component of

oonununication include 1.3 and 1.4 (see page 42). In this vein,

Critteria for decisions of an expressive nature tend to be com-

municated downward, thus implying that change tends to be tOp-

dOWTl. Further, in utilitarian organizations such as Alpha,

therxe is an emphasis on vertical instrumental communication.
ThUS4, from PrOpositions 1.3 and 1.4 we can infer that both

exprrassive and instrumental communication follow a verti-

133

cal pattern which tends to be top-down.

In order to confirm this hypothesis-component
reference will be made to outcomes from the "Structured
Group Interview" session held on July 21 and 22, 1972. This
session involved Alpha staff which at that time consisted
of 19 members.18 The "Structured Group Interview" is an
"action research" method for identifying and solving inter-
group social problems. A specific outcome of this two-day
session was a series of recommendations19 for decisive
planning. From a list of 40 items discussed during the
2-day session, four general areas were delineated. These
areas were: administrative, staff development, executive '
issues, and communication. There was some overlap of
items in these areas such that the delineation broke down

as follows:

Table 1.10

 

Structured Group Interview Area Outcomes

 

 

Area # Items %
Administrative 10 19
Staff Deve10pment 10 19
Executive Issues 17 33
Communication 15 29
Totala: 52 100%

 

 

 

athe total is greater than the original
list of forty (40), in that some items
fell into more than one area.

134

Thus among those areas of concern revealed as ex-
pressed by Alpha's staff in late July, 1972, communication
was the second most-important, trailing only executive issues.-
Among those areas Of concern which fell under the category
of communication were: security, trust model, organizational
mission, organizational strains, staff meetings, job
security, communication problems, black/white ethnic staff
problems, blackness at Alpha, roles of whites in the organ-
ization, staff problems, organization checks and balances,
project authority, checking with Director, and administra-
tive and job satisfaction.

In addition, there was very little communication by
memorandum from September until August. During that lZ-month
period there was probably a total of 150 memos circulated
throughout Alpha and the majority of them did not deal with
policy and/or implementation issues, but rather more with
administrative procedures. In fact, the highest level of '
Vmemo-sending' (as internal communication activity) came
éifter thetwo-day "Structured Group Interview" session. 80,
'from July 24, 1972 until late August, a total of 68 memos
were issued which represents approximately 45% of the total
issued during the entire lZ-month period. However, as we
Shall.see a little later, the organization had formally
(nuanged into a research and development operation with a
Hfixlimum of expressive and/or instrumental communication. We

<5“! infer then that communication was.top-down and that during

135

the renewal and change process communication was'decreased.20
(d) The next component in H2 is centralized decision-

making in which the prediction is that this will increase.

 

The critical parts of this component as revealed in Fig. III
(Chapter III) include the concept of centralized decision-
making under the organizational rigidity component and the
decision-making component. Relevant propositions in this
instance are 2.9 and 3.0.

As stated in the 'Findings and Conclusions' section
of the ADL report:

Three or four senior staff members are the heart

of the organization...Out of necessity two or

three senior staff members have shared in varying

degrees of responsibility for such key areas as

business develOpment, administration, and the

actual performance of research. The assignment

of principal responsibility for each of these func-

tions should be made with clear policies as to

accountability. More specifically, the Executive

Director must be willing to delegate authority to

form particular functions. Delegation to the

required extent is not likely to occur until the

Executive Director develOps confidence in the

skills and abilities of his staff. (ADL Final
Report, April, 1972, p. 26)

Let's spend some time here examining the process of
delegation as it relates to centralized decision-making. The
Process of delegation includes: assignment of duties to sub-
ordinates; granting of authority to use resources and take
other action necessary to perform duties; and creation of

Enicabligation (responsibility) on the part of the subordinate

to the executive for satisfactory performance of the duties.

136

Failure to delegate authority is also seen as a pitfall in'
organizational life.

Thus, ADL's observation in its report to Alpha
seems to have pointed up the hierarchical, centralized
decision-making situation which implies that organizational
change was from the top-down. This process is reinforced
through an analysis of the minutes of the "Structured Group

Interview" session, in which:

Some staff members expressed concern

that they have no input into the decisions

that are made at [Alpha]. Very often staff

meetings are called and obody knows what the

agenda will Consist of.29
Further, an area of concern which came out of the two-day
session on which there was an agreement that action needed
to be taken was in 'areas of decision-making process for
Executive vs. Total Group.‘

Thus in examining the above data and discussion, it
does indeed reveal a situation in which decision-making was
recognized as becoming increasingly centralized.

(e) The next component of H2 relates to a changing
Clientele viz. the internal organization. We have already
-examined the concept of changing clientele relative to the
institutional Sphere under the component of public concern.
3hl'that examination we determined that Alpha's institutional

Sphere publics/clientele were indeed changing, which indi-

catemi a declining public concern among those groups tradi-

137

tionally associated with Alpha.

Relative to the internal sphere, we have already
determined under turnover rates that Alpha's internal public,
or members, was increasingly changing. That is, Alpha's
internal members were tending to express an 'exit option'
through leaving or being forced out.

As further measurement of a changing, internal public/
clientele we shall refer to a notice for a meeting at Alpha
in February, 1972. At this time past and present members
of Alpha's internal community were invited to discuss the
circumstances surrounding Ford's de-funding decision, how
such a development impacted upon Alpha and its surrounding
community, to provide input as to what Alpha could become
and how such a future might relate to the interest of the
community and the university. Letters of invitation were
mailed out to approximately 100 individuals in January. Of
this number contacted, only around 11 or 12 persons came to
this important meeting. The turnout was only around 12%
aamd was at least 1/4 of what was expected. Seemingly then,
Alpha's internal public or clientele had lost interest and
was changing. If we look at this development in conjunction‘
With the turnover rates, then it can reasonably be inferred
that.this component of H2 is supported.

(f) The next component of H2 to be examined is

22

LUDlerance for bureaucracy.‘ Proposition 1.5 is relevant

to this component which suggests that if there is a decreasing

138

tolerance for bureaucracy, hierarchical cohesion is mini-
mized, which in turn "implies a lack of positive involvement
on the part of lower participants in the organizatiOn."

In a confidential memorandum23 dated March 8, 1972, the
findings of the questionnaire were discussed. The scale was
administered to 20 staff persons in late February, 1972.

The questionnaire results24 were mixed, but what was
revealed is a low tolerance for bureaucracy as measured by
the scale. In other words, Alpha staff does not respond to
'bureaucratization.’ It is a staff primarily confident in
setting their own directions, rules, hours of work, etc.,
who do not view those in leadership roles as leaders, per se.
It was noted in the discussion that it should be borne in
mind that the results are a function of (a) the scale cOn-
struction, (b) the situation internal to Alpha to that point,
and (c) staff's own perception of what should happen.
Essentially, Alpha at that time had no fixed structure, so‘
the predominant reactions may have been to that reality.

The staff of Alpha did indicate that they felt better
off’than most of their friends as far as current employment
was concerned. In other words, the majority of Alpha staff
was not bored by their jobs, felt happier in their jobs than
theirf’riends, and were not sorry that they took this job.
There seems to be a high level of selféactualization of Alpha
Staff in relation to their work. There, thus, exists a low

level of tolerance for bureaucracy and satisfaction may exist

139

because there are minimal bureaucratic trappings at Alpha.‘

In the research memorandum, the following questions were
raised. What would happen with an increase in the bureau-
cratization of Alpha? Would the level of satisfaction decline?
Would the level and scope of performance decline or increase?
What would be the additional turnover and absentee rate?

As revealed by the scale, within Alpha we had a
situation in which the tolerance for bureaucracy was low
and decreasing, yet there was satisfaction and positive in-
volvement in the organization. This anomaly from Proposi-
tion 1.5 seems to be.a function of the fluid hierarchy as
perceived by Alpha staff at the time of questionnaire admin-
istration. Unfortunately, no pre- and post-transformation
questionnaire administration was done, so we have no data
relative to the scale after the structural and behavioral
change in Alpha, Inc. The questions raised by Alpha in the
research memorandum would be pertinent relative to the post-
transformation period. '

We can attempt to deal with the questions raised in'
the absence of a post-transformation administration of the
bureaucratic scale questionnaire by examining available
(data on turnover rates and productivity. Crucial in such an
analysis is the fact that as of April 1, 1972, Alpha formally
announced its transformation into a research and development
organization and implemented structure and behavior approp-
riate to this organizational form. Thus, for the sake of the
data presented in Tables 1.11 and 1.12, the date of April 1

is the dividing point.

140

Table 1.11

 

Turnover Rates Comparing .
the Entire Year With April - September

 

 

 

 

 

Turnover

Time Period Rates, %
Male Sept Sept 77
Female Sept Sept 25
All Sept Sept 57
Male Apr. Sept 60
Female Apr. Sept 22
All Apr. Sept 21

Table 1.12

 

Number of Products
. by Period & Average Products per Month

 

 

 

# Products % #/month/§
Sept-April: 9' 45 1.29
Apr.-Sept. ll 55 2.20
Sept-Sept ' 20 100‘ 1.67

 

 

 

aA period of 7 months
bA period of 5 months

From the above data, we can infer that post-transforma-
tion there was a decrease in the turnover rate for male, female

and all employees and that the productivity rate was increasing

and was on the average 35% higher than in the pro-transforma-

141

tion period. Further, the post-transformation productivity
average per month was 24% greater than the full-year average
per month.

The post-transformation period thus seems to sub-
stantiate PrOp. 1.5 in that there existed a hierarchical
structure which could be perceived and related to.

Considering all that has gone before, we can state
that this particular component of H2 relative to renewal and
change implying a decreasing tolerance for bureaucracy has
been supported.

(9) The final component of H2 relative to renewal
and change is organizational rigidity. With renewal and
change, the prediction is that organizational rigidity is
increased. Organizational rigidity refers to: centralized
decision-making; similarity in procedures and processes
across organizational sub-units in the accomplishment of
goals; standardized ways of relating to clients; and that
the above structural relations are persistent over time.

The propositions particularly relevant to this component
include Prop. 2.9 and 3.0.

We have also confirmed one part of the organizational
rigidity component under (2)d, centralized decision—making.
Through the data and discussion presented earlier, we deter-
mined that there was an increase in centralized decision-
making. Relative to a similarity in procedures and processes

across organizational sub—units in the accomplishment of

142

goals we can Observe the following. The issuance of a per-
sonnel administrative manual in the Fall of 1971, which
covered administration policies and procedures and personnel
policies and procedures. This was a 74-page document replete
with forms, documents, report forms and other related materials
regarding procedures and processes for Alpha and its sub-units.
In April, 1972, an internal communication numbering and coding
system was implemented. Also in April, a central filing
system was set up and a contract was let to Tufts University
data processing to establish an information system for Alpha.
One part of ADL recommendations too was that Alpha needs to
establish a quality control mechanism in order to monitor
research plans and work products. A further recommendation
was that Alpha needed to implement a system to improve exter-
nal reporting and controls. However, the report did offer
a caveat:

Obviously, care should be taken not to pursue

the Opposite extreme of excessive control.

Control for control's sake is of dubious value

to a relatively small organization which is

highly dependent on creativity. Furthermore,

the process could prove very expensive.‘ (ADL
Final Report, April, 1972, p. 27)

Relative to standardized ways of relating to clients,
the personnel administrative manual spelled out policies re-
garding contracts, leases, consultants engaged on a contract
or specified fee basis, and the appropriate internal channels

Which should be followed upon entering into such agreements.

143

There also occurred general discussion about who should
assume responsibility for business develOpment and that
task fell mainly to senior staff. Once a client contact had
been made, a standardized Letter of Intent would be drafted
and forwarded to the potential client. In addition, there
was developed a standardized prOposal format relative to
seeking institutional sphere input.

The above structural relations began in September of
1971 and became even more 'institutionalized' once transfor-
mation took place. (Thus the relation did persist over the
course of this study, so in a relative sense we can safely
say that they persisted over time.

The above discussion thus confirms that there was
an increase in organizational rigidity with renewal and
change, and that such an increase was particularly evident
after April 1, 1972.

Thus in looking at renewal and change in relation to
H2, we can safely state that except in the case of non-
support of the productivity component that the hypothesis
was confirmed. The situation with the productivity predic-
tion indicates that measurement of efficiency and effective-
'ness in non-profit organizations remains a technical problem.
However, the work reported here in this area provides a quan-
titative base from which such a measurement and prediction

examination can proceed.

144

(3) Let's turn now to the second section of the intra-
organizational Sphere, that of the internal, non-directional
relationships.

(a) The first component states that renewal and change
implies structural change. This was indeed the situation
with Alpha for once the transformation took place as announced
in a memorandum from the Executive Director on April 20,

1972, the structure of the organization changed. The memor-

andUm in effect stated:

[Alpha] is officially a Research and Development
Organization effective as of April 1, 1972. In
essence, it means thatzghere is no longer a
"research department."
The breakdown under which Alpha would be operating henceforth
vvith personnel reporting to division heads was as follows:
admdnistration; quality control; health; education; community
(development and housing; and justice-administration. USing
‘the following formula we can compute the total number of

:relationships organization-wide and for each division within

.Alpha, the formula is:

n(2“‘l+(n-1))

(1.1) Number of Relationships

where n Number of employees

Under the Executive Director at the time of announced
transformation there were 18 employees (with the total
staffing consisting of 19 people). Thus the total number

of relationships possible for the Executive Director with sub-

145

ordinates, using formula (1.1) was 2,228,513. For each
division in the restructured organization, the total rela-

tionships were as follows:

 

 

 

Table 1.13
Number of Relationships by Division
# of

Division Relationships
Administration

Quality Control

Health 18
Education 490
Community Dev.& Housing 222
Justice-Administration 44

 

 

 

The new organization chart which became effective
April 13, 1972 was a line organization which was opposed to
‘the former line and staff structure. The new structure was

of the following form.

146

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

. Boar
AdVlsory d Of
_ Directors
CounCll
Executive
Director
Reporting
Editing -—————-~ ,
Quality - Administration
Control

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

[ l I- _ l J.

 

Health Education Community Dev. Justice-Ad-
& Housing ministration

 

 

 

 

iFIGURE XI: Alpha Organizational chart as of April 13, 1972.

 

147

The organizational chart prior to the transformation

was as follows:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Board of
Directors
Executive
Director
Administrative Associate
Assistant Director
. Community-
JResearch Training University
Relations

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

EGURE XII: Alpha Organizational Chart Pre-TransformatiOn.

The structural change thus saw Alpha transform itself

from a research, training and resource center, characterized

by a line and staff structure, to a research and development

148

agency with a line structure. We can thus state that renewal
and change implies a structural change.

(b) The second component of H3 states that renewal
and change implies a change in the goals and objectives of
Alpha. As noted in Chapter I in the section on 'The Organi-
zation Under Study,‘ Alpha has operated on the basis of two
principles: that community action should be carried out by
community residents; that such action should be supported
by Social science reserach. Alpha was also established to
.be a broker between the community and university, with the
(expressed goals of helping minority community organizations
(achieve cultural, psychological, political, economic and social
<:ontrol over the factorS, internal and external, which affect
and direct them.

With its role as a broker diminishing due to environ-
xnental influences, Alpha was forced to re-examine its goals
(and purposes, to set a new direction and to organize itself
'to meet these new goals and objectives. Thus, as we have seen,
.Alpha began the renewal process by commissioning a management
audit. Chief among the recommendations in the audit was that
.Alpha re-structure itself to focus its efforts on research
activities. As was also suggested in the report, this was
not to say that Alpha should pursue research activities ex-
clusively; for superior research studies open numerous avenues
for meaningful and profitable consulting projects. The

following factors were listed in the ADL report to support

149

their rationale for a research focus:

(a) Alpha's experience as a resource center;

(b) The potential for market entry based upon
Alpha's capabilities;

(c) The uniqueness and capability of the
organization;

(d) The competitive picture;

(e) Research studies lend themselves to Alpha's
present staff arrangements;

(f) Financial stability

Upon completion of the management audit, Alpha had a
:fundamental strategic decision to make and the decision was
'to become a reserach and development organization. Further,
.Alpha moved to open an office in the Harvard Square area in
(Zambridge in order to heighten its contacts and credibility
in order to pursue its goal of pursuing research activities.
'Thus, by June of 1972 Alpha had offices in both Roxbury and
(Zambridge, supported by its NIMH grant and the input derived
from other task environment elements.

As stated in amemorandum26

of June 19, 1972, the growth
<3f Alpha is primarily directed toward providing leadership
xaithin communities for increasingly significant involvement
in local-national policies and programs. The organization

thus stands transformed in structure, goal-statement and

behavior. Alpha had also exhibited that it had the capacity

150

to persist through a change in structure and behavior, i.e;,
it was 'ultrastable.’ The second component of H3 thus stands
supported. Let's move now to the final component in H3, ad-
ministrative behavior.

(c) The prediction here is that renewal and change
implies a change in administrative behavior. We can see that
with organizational transformation there was a change in
structure. This change established a separate and distinct
admdnistration division which was headed up by an Operations
Director. The intent of this change was to centralize admin-
istration and take the burden of administration from the other
Senior staff members further freeing them up for business
development and/or research activities. ADL mentions in its
report the existence of a senior staff, and for our purposes
‘We will refer to this groupingas the dominant coalitiOn.
{This coalition was interdependent by function and structure,
thus following Prop. 1.6 (see page 43) there existed potential .
for conflict. Further, we have seen in some depth the pres-
Eiure exerted upon Alpha by external forces. Such pressure.
Inecessitated internal compromise on certain outcome prefer-
tences, thus further heightening the potential for conflict.
{The dominant coalition was composed of the following profes-
sions: architect; social scientist (2); and administration.
IFollowing Prop 1.8, potential for conflict within the domi-

nant coalition increases with the variety of professions in-

corporated. Fortunately for Alpha, there was not the extreme

151

exercise of power sufficient enough to generate opposition
(see PrOp. 2.1, page 46). With the overriding objective
of survival, there was enough administrative behavior directed-
toward scattering task environment influence that conflict

was kept to a minimum. However, the issue of tension among
the dominant coalition was raised and became an area of
concern at the two-day session built around the "Structured
Group Interview." It was categorized as "organizational
checks and balances" and was placed under the heading of
executive issues.

Administration was thus shifted structurally once
transformation took place and the prime function of this di-
viSiOn was to keep the Office running on a day-to-day basis
and to provide appropriate procedures and conditions necessary
to increase productivity (output) in order to continue to
gain support from the task environment. As noted earlier,
the administrative behavior which became the norm was a
strict accounting of personnel location, project status, etc.,
in such a fashion as to free other senior staff up for devel-
oping organizational.input. Thus behavior became divided
into input, conversion process and output, with the latter
two being the primary objective of the administration divi-
sion.

Thus, with renewal and change there occurred¢a change
in the structure and behavior of the administrative portion

of Alpha. This behavior manifested itself in a more rigid

152

and demanding fashion, but in a way which increased organié
zational output and further guaranteed survival.

We have thus concluded the discussion on data analysis
and findings. Two hypotheses (H1 and H3) have been supported,
while 6 out of 7 components of Hz were supported. The non-
confirmation of the productivity component was attributed to
a technical problem around the measurement of input/output
indices relative to organizational effectiveness and effic-
iency. This inability to predict output as a function of
input thus remains a technical problem in the study of O

_ effectiveness and efficiency in non-profit organizations.

Measuring Organizational Change/

 

The Five—Step_Model

 

In the concluding section of this chapter we will
'take a closer look at the S-step model adapted from Messinger's
vwork as it relates to the attempt to measure organizational
«thange. The explication of this model will allow us to de-
velop a sharper focus in relationship to the steps, or states,
within the 'transformation model. ' TO again review Messin-
gerfls five stages (which we here are referring to as a 5-step

model) 27 we have :

State 1: Ascendance
State 2: Lack of Public Concern

State 3: DrOp in Membership

153

State 4: Maintenance

State 5: Transformation

To derive a sense of these state conditions in relationship
to particular time periods we will be making reference to
Table 1.4 and Table 1.5 in the section under 'Institutional
Sphere.‘ From the figures in Table 1.4 we can formulate

the graph shown in Figure XIII.

 

 

 

400
,-----:. .
I I
300 3
. l
I t I
nPEE/gmoun : ' ' r__———1
(000) 200 y ; | I I
' I I I
I - I ' I I
100
: I ' I I
- l
I | i . '
I ' | i .
68 69 70 71 72 73
Years

 

 

FIGURE XIII: Input/Amount by Year.

Frcun Fig. XIIIwe can then correlate the years with the state

Cenditions in the following manner:

State 1: October, 1968 - September, 1971

154

State 2: October, 1971 - December, 1971
State 3: December, 1971 - January, 1972
State 4: February, 1972 - April, 1972

State 5: April, 1972 -

The typical model as explicated by those authors in footnote
27 would define States 1 and 5 as absorbing states. That is,
once entered they cannot be left. States 2, 3 and 4 would
be defined as transient states. That is, an organization28
in one of those states can either move to another transient
state or to an absorbing state. In a fully-developed 5-step
model based on numerOus studies of the process of organization
change, we should then be able to attach probabilities to.
the movement between states. For the definition of absorbing
states, once entered the probability would be 1.0 (or
certainty) that the organization would remain there. The
questions arise around deriving general probabilistic State-
ments for organizations moving between transient states, or
between a transient state and an abSorbing state. However,.
our knowledge about organization change is much too scanty
at this point in time to be able to derive such proabilities.
In the case of Alpha, Inc., we can see from Fig. XIII
and the state conditions that the organization was in State I
(ascendance) for approximately 3 years. What were defining
conditions and the resultant probability of Alpha then moving

into State 2 (lack of public concern)? From State 2, we can

155

posit the same question relative to the organization moving
into State 3, and so on until we approach the overriding
question of estimating the probability of an organization
moving into absorbing State 5, or organizational tranSfor-
mation. An attendant reality, too, is that once an organiza-
tion has left absorbing State 1, it may not be capable of
moving through the process model to absorbing State 5. It
is entirely conceivable that an organizatiOn will be arrested
somewhere within the transient states and become defunct
before it reaches the transformation absorbing state. Our
studies of organization change should be able to provide for
us an estimate of the probability of an organization moving
through the process model, transforming itself and surviving.
However, our current data and parameters are too limited to
begin addressing the very complex problem of estimation.

The five-step model proposed here as a heuristic

device would have the following form:

1.0 ‘ "1.0

.’

FIGURE XIV: Organization change model.

 

156

In such a model, too, we may be entirely-too restric-
tive in defining particular states as absorbing. We may
merely satisfy ourselves at this juncture by saying that
particular states are more or less transient than others,
rather than defining state conditions as being absorbing.
Aside from model-building, it is difficult to conceive an
organization occupying an absorbing state which cannot be
left. That is, is it at all possible to conceive that once
an organization has moved into the transformation state that
it cannot leave once the state is entered? Or perhaps the
process of organization change is continuous, such that once
the transformation state is reached the 9211 other state
which can be entered is State 1, ascendance thus setting in
motion the process model once again. Following this logic,
it then seems that the only states from which an organization
is certain of leaving, once entered, are States 1 and 5. The
basis of such logic is that no organization is either perma-
nently ascending or permanently in a transformed state.
Further, it is not at all a certainty that once an organiza-
tion leaves the ascendance state (State 1) and moves into
the 'lack of public concern state' (State 2), that it will
move through to State 3, State 4 and State 5. In the transi-
tion matrices derived as a result of Cohen, Coleman, Suppes,
Snell, et.a1., the probability of moving through all state
conditions, or in remaining in an absorbing state, equals 1.0.

However, with the case of an organization, it may die out

157

Brigg to reaching State 5. There is no guarantee in the real
world that an organization, once it leaves the ascendant
state, can survive and be transformed. Nor are there parame-
ters in the world of model-building which can portray with
certainty a movement from ascendance to transformation. If
we are to begin understanding and developing parameters which
can heighten our understanding Of the organization change and
survival process, perhaps a legitimate starting point is with
renewal and change and those components within these concepts
which allowed us to predict and explain.
Probably even before we devote too much time to

model-building though, we Should spend some time on more
case studies and more comparative studies of organization
change. We need more data before we can set realistic param-
eters for models of organization change. We need more come
parative studies of organization change in order to move to
the middle-range theory. Finally, we need to move to the
'upper' level of organization change theory which will allow
us to make statements concerning general characteristics of
organization change. It is at this point that we will be
ready for building models of organization change.

V This case study of Alpha, Inc. represented only a
beginning. Hopefully the data generated, the hypotheses test-
ed, the concepts derived, the terms defined, and the questions

raised will provide a step in the direction outlined above.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

The Process of Dispersed Dependence in Organizations

 

As we examine the process of organization change in
relation to an Open system strategy which incorporates the
task environment as a major variable, it is perhaps impor-
tant in a heuristic sense to consider the process of dis-
persed dependence in organizations. The heurism involved in
such an examination is particularly pertinent to Black social
theoreticians. Alpha, Inc., as a case study of organization
change, can serve as a benchmark in attempting to determine
and understand how a Black organization moves from a state
of dependence to a state of dispersed dependence. This
question is of particular importance to theoreticians and .
practitioners interested in understanding and moving Black
organizations from dependence to dispersed dependence.l Of
specific concern, too, is how the leverage afforded by input
from sources such as the private sector, the public sector
and/or the third sector, can be utilized in order to take an
organization through the change process such that it can

survive and grow in a state of dispersed dependence.

158

159

Let's take a closer look at what such a process may
look like and how the terms, or state conditions, could be
defined. It seems as if three (3) identifiable state con-
ditions would include the following:

State 1: Dependence

State 2: Inter-dependence

State 3: Dispersed dependence

Following Thompson's (1967) usage of task environment in-
fluence, the three states could be defined by the concentra-
tion of task environment control over the organization. This
would imply that we cOuld determine the state a particular
organization was occupying by the level and concentration.

2 In the instance

of control by task environment elements.
of Alpha, Inc. and the Black Strategy Center, task environ-
ment control was very concentrated. The concern of Black
theoreticians and practitioners is how to disperse task.
environment control and move the organizations to a state
of dispersed dependence. We saw that the Black Strategy
Center was unable to meet this challenge. We also observed
Alpha's movement along this continuum and for a variety of
_reasons enumerated earlier, have a sense that the organiza-
tion is enjoying some level of success in moving to a state
of dispersed dependence.

However, before we can move much further in developing

models which mirror the process of dispersed dependence, we

160

need more case studies and comparative studies of organiza-
tion change in Black organizations specifically, and in
organizations generally. We also need to gain a better
understanding of how Kaufman's concept of bonds relate to
defining organizational characteristics of survival or death.
That is, what type and combination of (l){emotional bonds,
(2) moral bonds, (3) expediency bonds, (4) habitual bonds,
and (5) physical bonds, are prerequisite to organization
survival and diSpersed dependence. For Black organizations,
which perhaps can be viewed within a modernization perspec-
tive, it could be hypothesized that all of the above five
combinations are in force, thus providing a foundation which
can lead to survival and dispersed dependence provided suf-
ficient and diversified inputs are acquired. A key factor
in looking at Alpha, Inc., was that it was a Black organiza-
tion with a mission rooted in a civil rights and moderniza-
tion ethos which made it attractive to more than those
interested in bonds of expediency.

The three-step 'dispersed dependence model' is thus
a heuristic suggestion which is in need of much more data and
theory-building before we could pretend to explicate it fully.
(However, the work done within this monograph points up the

need and efficacy in considering renewal, change, survival,

and dispersed dependence within an organizational context.

161

Contribution

 

The case study is based on a heuristic assumption.
That is, sociologists understand little about organizational
renewal and change. Further, sociologists, social legisla-
tors, policy analysts and policy makers understand probably
even less about the societal impact of various public and
private sector funded social programs. There is little
empirical evidence in sociological literature which speaks
to change, renewal and survival in the often transitory
organizational forms which develOp as a part of social pro-
gramming. Yet those Organizations exist within the bowels
of our urban areas and meet the requirements of organiza-.
tional life as does an automobile production facility, a
division within an electronics company, or a union local.
The literature in the field of social welfare (see Kramer
and Specht, 1969) and political science (see Wilson, 1968)
are more expository. This sociological case study has thus
served as a utilitarian device intended to aid in the dis-
covery of new facts and relationships.

We have seen that comparative analysis of organiza-
.tionS leads to the development of theories of the middle
range (Etzioni, 1961). Weick (1969) raises the question
concerning the validity of case studies to analyze organiza-
tions in a rapidly changing environment. However, organiza-
tion theory building is not a primary purpose here and, as
noted earlier, the concern is with the theory of organiza-

tions using the case study of Alpha, Inc. as a heuristic

162

device.

The Alpha case study is important as an analysis of
an organization which has developed competence in spite of
a substitution strategy which dictates against such a devel-
opment. This research can be an important contributor to
the study of community agencies, a ubiquitous organization
form about which our understanding is limited and segmented.
Another substantive importance of this research is in the
sociology and political science of organizations.

The procedures utilized here are not unique in the
study of organizations. What is important is the methodOl-
ogy employed in relation to an organization in transition.
The study of organizational change is an infrequent area.of
concern, principally because that type of information most
readily available to the researcher is not categorized within
a framework which makes change understandable.. Perhaps the
only universal constant is change, social scientists must
become cognizant of developing and refining methodological
assumptions appropriate to analyzing and understanding
change, and in this case organizational change.

A further important and contributing factor in the
proposed research is in relation to the concept of institu-
tion-building. Increasingly, the concern of Black organi-
zations funded by private and public sector monies is how
to use that financial foundation as a leverage to develop

an institution which lasts beyond the cessation of such

163

monies. Administratively and organizationally, this chal-
lenge has not often been met. Alpha, Inc. is an example of
an organization attempting to take that step. The work of
depicting the components of that process should be of impor-
tance to sociologists, political scientists and Black social

theoreticians in general.

Toward a Paradigm of Social Change

In The Sociological Tradition (1966), Robert Nisbet
asserts that Tocqueville and Marx played major roles. And
in fact, the sociological tradition may be seen as a kind
of magnetic field with Tocqueville and Marx as the two poles
of attraction. Nisbet goes on to state that in the long
run the influence of Tocqueville on the sociological tradi-
tion has been the greater:

Even before the nineteenth century had run its

course, the works of Tonnies, Weber, Durkheim

and Simmel -- the four men who, by common assent,

did the most to give systematic shape to modern

sociological theory -- reflected on the whole,

the trimuph of the Tocquevillian over the

Marxian image of society and its course of

develOpment. (Nisbet, 1966, p. viii)

Further, a parallel in significance to the contrast-4
ing roles of Tocqueville and Marx are the conflicting themes
of traditionalism and modernism. Of the contemporary social

sciences, sociology is perhaps the one in which tension be-

tween traditional and modern values is most evident in its

164

conceptual structure and its underlying assumptions. How-
ever, Nisbet states that to label Weber or Tonnies or Durkheim
or Simmel traditionalist (even more, politically conservative)
would be absurd.

Is sociology, as it has developed in the tradition

 

of Tocqueville, a conservative paradigm and discipline? That

 

is, defining 'conservative' to mean a 'disposition to preserve
existing conditions, institutions,'etc., or 'conservatism'

to mean 'an ideological orientation that opposes social.
change, especially change away from traditional cultural
values and mores.‘ This definition is seemingly not approp-
riate to the socialist paradigm which attempted to deal con-
ceptually with a 'classless' society, and other attendant
constructs, e.g., conflict, force, change, etc.

Can sociology be viewed as a 'value-free' paradigm

 

and discipline? Further, can sociology be viewed as a

 

liberating and radical paradigm in which sociologists become

 

advocates for persons and groups with limited resources?

 

In answering the above questions, we will begin by examining
paradigm and discipline. Then we will move to theoretical
and empirical studies in the area of organizational analysis
and theories of change. Implicit in the following discussion
will be: (1) the question of the ascendance and dominance

of a particular Weltanschauung (world view); and (2) three
models of social intervention.

The unit-ideas of an intellectual discipline should

165

be governed by the following criteria; they should be:

(a) general,
(b) continuous,
(c) distinctive, and
(d) possess perspective, framework, category (in
the Kantian sense), within which vision and fact

unite.

A paradigm (as a philosophy of society) is a systematic
statement of basic assumptions and propositions employed by
a particular discipline. The assumptions are widely shared
by those who feel most comfortable within the school of
thought and thereby assist in definition of critical prob-
lems, identification of data and observation of social phe-
nomena. A paradigm maps out the interrelations of central
concepts and thereby prevents the likelihood of missing
hidden assumptions while advancing theory and analysis.
Perhaps the most important feature of a paradigm is its
ability to organize value assumptions as well as organiza-
tional assumptions.

Inherent to the study of organizations in the socio-
logical tradition is the historic, religious and military
idea of a central point of authority. The sociological
world view which has come to dominate the study of organiza-
tions sees the organization as a pyramid. Thus problem def-

inition, data identification and Observation are grounded in

166

this initial assumption. Further, this assumption has been
buttressed by classical organization theory which assumes
that lower organizational participants muSt be persuaded,
rewarded, punished, controlled and directed. From these
assumptions have come many studies which now provide the
backbone of contemporary organization theory.

Inherent in both the theoretical and empirical studies
of organizations and change is reflected the ancient Greek
bias toward slow change. This preference, as reflected in
the paradigm and discipline of sociology, considers abrupt
change as being unnatural. Thus we have the ascendance of
Tocqueville's Weltanschauung, and Weber's response to Marxian

thought.‘ In fact, Julien Freund in The Sociology of Max Weber

 

(1968) feels that Weber was the first in practice to place
sociology on a strictly scientific basis. Weber was a pure
analyst, whereas other nineteenth century sociologists merely
utilized science for their own ends and that their (Comte,'

- Marx, and Spencer) primary objective was to change existing
society.

They were, in fact, closer to reform than to

science. (Freund, 1968, p. 10)

Nearly a century later, a similar controversy is
swelling within the discipline of sociology. And in fact,
the study of organizational change threatens to forge another
paradigm relative to organizational analysis and theories

of change. A full set of rules does not yet exist for this

167

emerging paradigm; however, Thomas Kuhn (1970) reminds us
that a paradigm need not even imply that any full set of
rules exists. Michael Polanyi (1958) voices a similar theme,
arguing that much of a scientist's success depends upOn
"tacit knowledge," i.e., upon knowledge that is acquired
through practice and that cannot be articulated explicitly.
The conceptualization of abrupt change (e.g., revo-
lution) does not dominate the sociological perspective.
Rather, the literature in both its theoretical and empiri-
cal aspects codifies incremental change with an equilibrium
model as its ballast. .Daniel Griffiths (1970) in his theo-
retical work notes an organization's builtrin stability as
a powerful resistance to change. Griffiths goes on to remind
us that there are few empirical measures of the initiatiOn
of change in organizations. He does mentiOn one measure
called 'Organizational Change' which was develOped as
an administrative-rperformance scoring procedure (Hemphill,
Griffiths and Frederiksen,.l962). The author uses a system
model to address the questions (1) under what conditions
does change occur? and (2) under what conditions is change
least apt to occur? Presthus (1962) also utilizes a system
model in analyzing the way in which forces prevent change
in organizations. Hawley (1971) states that one of the major
ways to induce change in organizations is the programmed
feedback of the results of research on the organization's

functioning. Argyris in "Organizations: Effectiveness,"

168

makes a similar point. The Fortune—Hutchinson (1971) model
for self-evaluation provides a method for generalizing feed-
back data which can begin the organizational change process.
Increasingly, the paradigm embodying organizational
analysis and change is opting for an open system conceptuali-
zation. Terreberry (1968) develops two hypotheses: (1) that
organizational change is increasingly externally induced,
and (2) that organizational adaptability is a function of
the ability to learn and to perform according to changes
in the environment. A review of recent literature appears
to support the idea of the decreasing autonomy and increasing
interdependence of organizations. Blau and Scott's (1966)
stricture that organizations must continually develop more
'symbiotic' relationships where extensive advantageous ex-
changes take place represents a structural awareness of
environment. Dill's (1958) stressing of the crucial nature
of the task environment adds a dimension. Thompson's (1962)
emphasis on 'transactional' dependencies lends further support.
The work of authors such as Bennis (1966) and Schein (1970
point up means of coping with change in organizational sys-
tems, e.g., through process consultation, organizational
and management development.
These theoretical and empirical studies of organiza-
tional analysis and change all fall within the sociological
tradition. They value incremental change, and the containment

ofIaorupt change. They focus on ways to improve the produc-

169

tivity, effectiveness and efficiency of organizational forms
as we know them. Essentially, these studies do not posit
change away from traditional values and mores. Thus the
problems posed and questions asked fall within a framework
apprOpriate to a discipline which has consciously inherited
the mantle of Tocqueville and Weber.

The values of this view of sociology are apparent.
These values are conservative, and the institutional arrange-
ments supportive of this perspective reinforce the conser-
vatism. Following Kaplan (1964), values must be given an
objective ground, for it is difficult to see how values could
be excluded.

The problem for methodology is not whether values

are involved in inquiry, but which, and above all,

how they are to be empirically grounded. (Kaplan,

1964, p. 387)
The objective ground of which Kaplan refers has not allowed
the conceptualization of abrupt change to gain ascendance
in the sociological perspective. In fact, such studies
have been considered beyond the pale in regard to funding
research in such areas. And it iS indeed difficult for a
paradigm to emerge and develOp if it has little, or no,
resource support.

Taking off from Plato's distinction between societies
based on (1) harmony, (2) factions, and (3) warfare, we can
generate three models of social intervention. The first is

(1) the social problems approach which takes the politics

170

out of the analysis, this model is analogous to the medical
model (i.e., look for pathologies in the individual, not the
society); (2) conflict-containment model;'and (3) cOnflict-
intensification model. The sociological paradigm wOuld fall

principally in (l), and possibly in (2). Sociology as a

 

radical paradigm would fall in (3), and in fact one reflec-

 

tion iS the Marxian view which has not gained ascendance,

as Nisbet suggests. The sociologist as advocate for persons
with limited resources would entail a value-choice, and the
use of model (3). This implies a rejection of the dominant
sociological paradigm and discipline. Thus, instead of
empirical studies and scales developed by Likert, Argyris,
Herzberg,-et.al., which provide management (organizational
elites) ways in which organizational productivity, efficiency
and effectiveness can be controlled, directed and enhanced,

the radical sociologist as advocate might develop means to

 

intensify the management/worker relationship. From the
standpoint of discipline, the radical queStion then becomes
the conjoining of fact and vision. Crucial concerns which
the sociologist as advocate would have to encounter include:
(1) the role of values in social science and EEEEE}

(2) whom does the advocate planner serve, in (a) a technician
role, and/or (b) an 'inside' role; and (3) the charge of
those in the Weberian tradition, that 'Sympathetic action

_is irrational.‘ Explicit in the advocacy position (either

as a research paradigm or in praxis) is the denial of the

171

existence of value—free social Science. We are thus forced
to address the question, "Can reform be Science?" Beyond
the reverberations attached to the above question, HOrOwitz'
(1970) concern is with 'social science as ideOlOgy.' - The

popular journal Social Policy has provided a forum to try

 

and deal with these same questions. In “Strategies for Radi-

cal Social Change,‘ such writers as Richard Flacks, Bennett

Berger, et.a1., have penned theoretical efforts to confront

organizational/institutional analysis and theories of change.
AS Kuhn notes, the acceptance of a paradigm marks

a qualitative change in the development of any science. The

sociological paradigm (and broadly, the social sciences)

remains in wait Of such a change.

Concluding Remarks

 

This organizational analysis provided a view of one
entity undergoing rapid change. Our understanding of such
an occurrence as more work is done in the area of organiza-
tional change stands to contribute to the development of a
paradigm of social change. Such a development seems to be
of importance in allowing us to understand more completely
the societal, institutional and organizational changes now
so prevalent in our increasingly interdependent world. In

examining change at the organizational level the following

172

steps seemed crucial if the organization was to survive:

(1) Recognition of the need for change;
(2) Renewal process;
(3) Implementation of change strategies;

(4) Dispersal of task environment dependence.

Relative to Hypothesis Two, which relates to intra-
organizational variables, future research should focus on
specifying and measuring more exactly the relation between
input and output. That is, we basically reinforced in our
findings the central technical problem in non-profit organi-.
zations of predicting levels of productivity as a function
of organizational input.* For both practitioners and re-
searchers there is a need to develOp a better understanding
of such a relationship. Further research around the varia-
bles in H2 should also focus on communications in regard to
number of messages sent, content of those messages, the level
of understanding of such messages, and the relationship be-
tween communications and change. Finally, in relation to
H2, further research should delineate the relationship between
variables more exactly and focus on formulating other inter-
.nal directional variables which relate to renewal and change.

Further research should continue in the area of
organizational change in order to indicate how a different

Operationalization of variables may lead to different results.

173

It is important to consider that this was a case study in
need of replication, in order for a more complete under-

standing of relationships to occur.

174

FOOTNOTES

Chapter I

 

Following Parsons (1960, p. 17) and Etzioni (1961,

p. xi) by organization is meant social units devoted

primarily to attainment of specific goals. Organiza-
tion Stands for 'complex bureaucratic organization.‘

For a useful, in-depth analysis of the above reforms,
see Dilemmas of Social Reform: Poverty and Communigy
Action in the United States, Peter Marris and Martin
Rein (Atherton Press, 1969).

 

Created as a federal agency under The Economic
Opportunity Act of 1964. Refer to Congressional
reference, "The War on Poverty, The Economic Opportun-
ity Act of 1964." A compilation of materials relevant
to 8.2642 prepared for the select subcommittee on
poverty (1964).

Created by the Demonstration City and Metropolitan
Development Act of 1966 and to be administered by the
Department of Housing and Urban Development.

Alan Madian, "Can Anyone Manage the Cities?" in
Innovation, No. 24 (September 1971).

 

John Strange, "The Impact of Citizen Participation on
Public Administration" (National Academy of Public
Administration, June 1971). (Mimeographed.)

In fact, "the White House (and CEO) was under pressures
from Congresswoman Edith Green and others to provide
local government, eSpecially the mayors, with an urban
program to assist the poor which the elected officials
could control," in Strange, "The Impact of Citizen
Participation . . . ," p. 7.

Formerly with the Organization for Social and Technical
Innovation (OSTI), Newton, Mass., and with CBC. MS.
Arnstein played a central role in outlining the

basis for citizen participation in Model Cities
programs.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

175

See the forum in Social Policy (May/June 1970),
entitled, "Whom Does the Advocate Planner Serve?"

 

Strange's findings are a summation of a multi-city
sample, thus there may be local contextual variables
which do not necessarily abide by this generalization.
Also see, J. D. Greenstone and Paul Peterson,.
"Reformers, Machines, and the War on Poverty," in
James Q. Wilson (ed.), City Politics and Public
Policy (New York: Wiley & Sons, 1968).

 

One continual problem with such reform programs
(sometimes referred to as social engineering) is that
of evaluating their impact. The continued inability
to develop useful evaluation models has limited
efforts to measure the impact of a program or partic-
ular program components. See F. Caro (ed.),

Readings in Evaluation Research (New York: Russell
Sage Foundation, 1971) and E. Suchman, Evaluative _
Research (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1967).
Relative to a systematic analysis of public policies,
see A. Etzioni, "Policy Research," in The American
Sociologist, Vol. 6 (supplementary issue), 8-12.
"Policy research is concerned with mapping alternative
approaches and with specifying potential differences
in the intention, effect, and cost of various pro-
grams." (p. 8) '

 

 

 

 

 

Q

Alan Madian, op. cit., "Can Anyone Manage the Cities?"
Innovation, No. 24 (Sept. 1971), p. 9, states that

if President Nixon has his way, the principal pro-
grams for rebuilding the cities will be absorbed

into general revenue-Sharing. This would eliminate
Community Action and Model Cities Programs and leave
State and local governments with the decision of how
much of their Federal revenue they wish to devote to‘
their poor.

 

Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, Regulating
the Poor: The Functions Of Public Welfare (New York:
Pantheon Books, l97l)i The authors trace the
relation between political unrest that accompanied.
the economic catastrophe of the Great Depression and
New Deal response up to unrest in the cities and
Great Society programs in the 19605. ‘

 

For a more in-depth discussion of causal links be-
tween social, political and economic conditions in the
nation's cities and urban unrest as an outcome, see
Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil
Disorders: U.S. Riot Commission Report (U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1968). °

 

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

- 21.

176

The year 1968 is perhaps the peak for the development
of such entities on the campuses. Based upon a
working paper principally drafted by The Institute

of the Black World, Atlanta, for the First Annual
National Association of Black, Urban and Ethnic
Directors (NABUED) Meetings in Atlanta, May 1972,

the author calculated a statistical correlation of
+.70 between the development of such entities on
campuses and the year 1968 (as the independent
variable).

See N. Fainstein and S. Fainstein, "Publicization:
The Transformation of Private Capital into Public
Goods--A Basis for an Analytic Typology of Founda-
tions," a Working Paper (New York: Center for Policy
Research, 1972).

More exactly, representatives from one discrete and
established social agency located in the Black
community and representatives of one discrete
behavioral science department at an established,
predominantly white university.

See James D. Thompson, Organizations In Action
(McGraw-Hill, 1967), for further explication of this
construct.

 

David Rogers, The Management of Big Cities (Beverly
Hills, Ca.: Sage Publications, 1971).

For recent efforts to employ the conceptual framework
suggested by Rogers, see Inter-organizational
Relationships and Consequences of the Health System
in an Urban Area (Grant No. l-ROI MH17159-01,02, and
03). Final Report to Public Health Service, NIMH,
DHEW, prepared by The Center for Policy Research, New .
York, October 1972; and Robert R. Alford, Interorgani-
zational Outputs (monograph prepared under a grant to
the Center for Policy Research from the National
Center for Health Research and Development, NIMH,
1971).

 

 

The delivery system for any development program tends
to mirror the wider power structure of the city. The
federal government's funding patterns play a signifi-
cant role in affecting inner city delivery of services,
mainly by increasing the pluralism of organizations
and decreasing the likelihood that they can be
effectively coordinated. Rogers, op. cit., p. 152.

 

22.

23.

24.

25.

26.

27.

28.

29.

177

Taken from "Director's Statement," May 1971, based
upon thirty-day observation of Alpha's objectives
and current activities by new director of Alpha, Inc.

Public goals, as different in fact from the organiza-
tion‘s real, or private goals. The organizational
researcher's objective is to define both goal struc-
tures. Such a definition will in turn dictate the
choice of the goal or system model (see A. Etzioni,
"Two Approaches to Organizational Effectiveness: A
critique and a suggestion," Administrative Science
Quarterly, Vol. 5 (1960b), 257-278.

 

 

AS expressed in initial founding documents. The
organizational research in this study will focus on
both public and private goals. As indicated in
Alpha's stated goals, the organization is Black in
orientation and focus. Defining characteristics of
a Black organization here include: (i) percentage
of staff and Board of Directors who are Black;

(ii) goal structure and organizational ethos.

Alpha, Inc. has received an $727,393 four-year grant
from NIMH in 1969. The organization's four-year
private foundation grant terminated early in Decem-
ber, 1971, for reasons to be discussed in more depth
at a later point. The four-year foundation grant was
in the amount of $800,000.

These Alpha-related services were largely made
possible through the private foundation grant.
Included was a stipend from Alpha, Inc. to each
affiliated organization of $6,000 for Year I and
$6,500 for Year II to be used in a manner set by each
individual organization in concert with Alpha. These
services were eliminated once that funding source
dried up.

Anatol Rapoport and W. J. Horvath, "Thoughts on
Organization Theory," in Walter Buckley (ed.),
Modern Systems Research for the Behavioral Scientist
(Aldine, 1968), PP. 71-75.

 

Dan Rottenberg, "The Healers," a reprint from The
Chicago Guide (January 1973), pp. 76-81.

 

Compare the normative intent of the Black Strategy
Center with the actual function of Alpha, Inc. From
the Arthur D. Little, Inc. management audit completed
in March 1972, "Since its founding in 1968, [Alpha,
Inc.) has assembled an organization which resembles

30.

31.

32.

33.

34.

35.

36.

178

that of a resource center. It has very successfully
combined the energies of community organizations
(generally action oriented) with clearly identified
expertise from the universities." (From the section,
"Findings and Conclusions," p. 4.)

It was not possible to release the funds until the

IRS granted tax-exempt status. The discretion of

IRS in matters of granting tax-exempt status serves

as a nullifying device for the development of a number
of non-profit organizations.

This was in effect the model employed by Alpha, Inc.
in relation to its third sector, Ford Foundation
monies. Alpha's board was to be composed of seven

(7) representatives from each of three interest groups:
those projects receiving stipends (see footnote 26);
the university community; and the Black community-at-
large. This twenty-one (21) member board often proved
unwieldy.

This phenomenon is Often referred to as co-optation,
and represents a useful tactic in mobilizing the

power of decision-making. See Philip Selznick, TVA
and the Grass Roots (Berkeley: University of Califor-
nia Press, 1953), for a description of how the
'agriculturalists' attempted to 'co-opt' the power of
decision-making within TVA. ‘ '

 

Wherever possible within the text, we will attempt to
make the analytic distinction between the private
sector and third sector, although this latter usage
is fairly new and can obfuscate the discussion if not-
borne in mind. See footnote 16.

For example, Greenstone and Peterson, op. cit.,
"Reformers, Machines and the War on Poverty," point
out that the 1965 Watts rebellion so disturbed OEO
officials that comparatively vast sums of money were
allocated to the city. Thus the per capita grant to
the City of Los Angeles increased after the outburst
almost three-fold.

 

Philip Selznick, Leadershipin Administration (Evan-‘
ston, Illinois, 1957), pp. Sff; and also Alvin
Gouldner, "Organizational Analysis," in Sociology
Today (New York, 1959), p. 406. ‘

 

 

Compare Selznick's definition with Samuel P. Hunting-
ton's discussion in his book, Political Order in Chang-
ing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1969), on the level of institutiOnalization of any

 

 

37.

38.

39.
40.
41.

'42.

179

organization relative to the four measurable criteria
of: adaptable, complex, autonomous and coherent
organization so crucial in the political modernization
process. Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization
in Communist China (Berkeley: University of Califor-
nia Press, 1968, New enlarged edition), Points up

the contradiction in 'organization' and 'institution'
in the Great Leap Forward. Schurmann's-point is that
the Chinese wanted human solidarity that would
produce action rather than inertia. They wanted
something that would function like 'organization,‘
but be like 'institution.‘ The lessons of the Great
Leap Forward indicate that this still is an irresolv—
able contradiction.

 

The role of organizations is obviously crucial, for
as Christopher Sower and Paul A. Miller note, the
literature of contemporary social science advances
two models for interpreting the exercise of social
power in issue resolution within American society.
Both of these models, the negative and the positive,
stress the importance of large-scale organizations.
See Sower_and Miller, "The Changing Power Structure
in Agriculture: An Analysis of Negative Versus
Positive Organization Power," in James H. Copp (ed.),
Our Changing Rural Society: Perspectives and Trends
(Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press, 1964).

See W. G. Bennis, K. D. Benne, and R. Chin (eds.),
The Planning of Change (New York: Holt, Rinehart &
Winston, 1961); Edgar Schein, Organizational Psychol-
ggy (2nd Edition; Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: PrentiCe-
Hall, 1970).

 

Source: Inter-office memorandum, dated April 1, 1971,
Arthur D. Little, Inc. ' . .

Source: Inter-office communication, memorandum No.
0023, to All Staff--Alpha, Inc., dated July 12, 1972.

R. Mayer, Social Planning and Social Change (Englewood
Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972).

See R. Chin, "The Utility of System Models and
Developmental Models," in Jason L. Finkle and Richard
W. Gable (eds.), Political Development and Social
Change (New York: Wiley & Sons, 1968), pp. 7-19, for
his distinction between an analytic model and a
concrete model. For Chin's purposes, an analytic
model is a constructed Simplification of some part

of reality that retains only those features regarded

 

43.

44.

45.

146.

47.

48.

49.

50.

180

as essential for relating similar processes whenever
and wherever they occur. A concrete model is based
on an analytic model, but uses more of the content
of actual cases, though it is still a simplification
designed to reveal the essential features of some
range of cases.

L. Coser, Continuities in the Study of Social Conflict
(New York: The Free Press, 1967).

 

E. Nagel, The Structure of Science (New York:
Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1961), in which the
author states, "In short, a Social system can be said
to change its structural form also only in the
relative sense of an alteration in some particular
kinds of relationships." (p. 529)

 

F. Cancian, "Functional Analysis of Change," in .
Amitai Etzioni and Eva Etzioni (eds.), Social Change
(New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1964), pp. 112-125.
Cancian notes that there are two types of variables
in a functional system: a state, G, a property of
the system which is maintained; and state coordinates,
factors or forces in the system which determine the
presence of state G.

 

P. M. Blau, "The Structure of Social Associations,"
in Walter L. Wallace (ed.), Sociological Theory
(Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1969), pp. 187-
200.

 

A vivid example pointed up by Mayer, op. cit., p. 35,
is the more aggressive role of students following
the introduction of significant numbers of non-
middle class Black students into college systems
(also see footnote 15)

 

R. A. Nisbet, Social Change and History (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1969).

 

The 'maximum feasible participation' of the poor in
the War on Poverty is an example of a change in role
composition. Mayer, op. cit., p. 45.

 

Cf. the situation of the Black Strategy Center in
Chicago and its concentrated dependence upon the
financial community.

181

Chapter II

 

We can broadly identify the four types of decisions
which must be made within an organizational context,
not necessarily decisnmnsmade by the same actors but
at differing points. These include: (i) Tactical
decisions, which represent the vast majority of
decisions an executive has to make that arise in
response to immediate demands of the present. Thus
there is seldom time to gather, or analyze, all the
information needed for the perfect decision.

(ii) Planning decisions, which represent a system of
actions designed to achieve an objective in the future.
Planning is a loose term commonly used for four
related but distinct activities: (a) working out and
evaluating a program in its future and overall con-

'text; (b) constructing a particular plan by creating
. and coordinating programs; (c) arraying a series of

alternative plans for evaluation and decisions; and
(d) making the decision to adopt a particular plan.
(iii) Policy decisions, which are the once and for
all internal decisions which deliberately sacrifice
the flexibility of tactical decisions for other aims.-
And (iv) strategic decisions, which concerns itself
with the allocation of resources (time, money,
manpower, materials) for the achievement of important
future aims. This type of decision has to take the
outside environment into account to a much greater
degree, not only as it is, but as it could be in the
future.

P. Drucker, "The Effective Decision," in The Effective
Executive (New York: Harper's Row, 1968).

 

H. Wilensky, Organizational Intelligence (New York:
Basic Books, 1967).

See Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary
Process (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1964),
p. 138.

In this specific instance in the form of Arthur D.
Little, Inc., Cambridge, Mass.

A movement to gain national pensions for the aged as
a mechanism for alleviating or preventing economic
dislocation.

10..

11.

182

Following Etzioni (1961), social movements are not
organizations in the strict sense, although social
movements have 'core' organizations which tend to
have normative compliance structures.

Entropy refers to system disorder, which in any
isolated system cannot decrease. Overload is a key
factor in fostering entropy in a system, and can
occur in both larger systems and individuals and
serves to impede rational decision-making. See N.
Weiner (1954) for further concept development and
explanation.

W. G. Bennis and P. Slater, Temporary Systems
(New York: Harper, 1968).

 

See C. Sower, J. Holland, K. Tiedke, and W. Freeman,
Community Involvement (New York: The Free Press,
1957), and the discovery in the Death of the Health
Council chapter. The authors were studying the
organization during the "final two years before its
death, and found that all of its available energy
during the last year went into purely maintenance
functions4-that is, just to keep its machinery
operating--meetings, etc. But here is the unique
finding. After the death of the formal health
council, a crisis of a TB threat arose in one school.
Almost immediately an informal group formed of people
who had been active in the health council. They
went right to work and obtained the doctors and

 

.nurses to do the necessary tests in the school. In

other words, an informal system was a residue of the
formal structure, and it performed one function of the
formal structure even after its death." (From per-
sonal communication with Christopher Sower via a
letter dated March 2, 1973). . I

In Simon's View, decision-making in organizations is

based on 'satisficing' criteria rather than maximiz-
ing.

Chapter III

 

For a lucid explication of 'model,‘ see R. B.
Braithwaite, Scientific Explanation (London: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1953). For an equally lucid
account of this and other uses of the term see May
Brodbeck, "Models, Meaning and Theories," L. Gross (ed)
Symposium on Sociological Theoryp (Evanston: Row,

 

 

183

Peterson & Co., 1959). According to Richard S.
Rudner, Philosophy of Social Science (Englewood
Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), ". . . the
point of employing a model belongs to the context of
discovery rather than to that of validation; for
models function as heuristic devices in science."
(p. 25)

 

See Kurt Lewin, "Feedbmfl<Problems of Social Diagnosis
and Action," in W. Buckley (ed.), Modern Systems
Research for the Behavior Scientist (Chicago:

Aldine Publishing Co., 1968). Reprinted from Kurt
Lewin, "Frontiers in Group Dynamics," Part II-B,

Human Relations, I (1947), 147-153. Lewin's point is
that some of the circular processes composing organized
social life correspond to what the physical engineer
calls feedback systems, that is, systems which show

 

 

'some kind of self-regulation. The feedback has to be

done so that a discrepancy between the desired and the
actual direction leads automatically to a correction
of actions or to a change in planning.

See M. L. Cadwallader, "The Cybernetic Analysis of
Change in Complex Social Organizations," in Modern
§ystems Research for the Behavioral Scientist, ed. W.
Buckley (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1968),

pp. 437-440. Reprinted from American Journal of
Sociology, Vol. 65 (1959), 154-157.

 

 

 

To include turnover rates by sex, length of service
at termination, type of business (comparative measure),
size of office and geographical area.

The questionnaire administered to Alpha's staff is
"Tolerance for Bureaucratic Structure: A Scale."

This instrument was developed in the course of a study
financed by the Manpower Administration of the U. S.
Department of Labor, under contract number 81-34-70-04.
Staff of the Center for Policy Research, New York
City, including A. Etzioni, S. T. Hillsman, R. Hansen
and M. Sontog, worked on developing this instrument
which is dated 1970. The questionnaire mailed to
members of Alpha's professional caucus was developed
in 1971.

See Walter Buckley (ed.), Modern Systems Research for
the Behavioral Scientist (Chicago: Aldine Publishing
Co., 1968); Talcott Parsons, "Suggestions for a
Sociological Approach to the Theory of Organizations,"
Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 1 (1956), 63-85,
225-239; James D. Thompson, Organizations in Action
(McGraw-Hill, 1967).

 

 

 

 

184

That is, the use of measures requiring nominal,
ordinal and interval scales.

"It is of some interest to note that the logical
Structure of a scientific eXplanation is identical
with that of a scientific prediction. . . . It follows
from these considerations that we have an explanation
for an event if, and only if, we could have predicted
it." See Rudner, op. cit., Philosophy of Social
Science, p. 60.

 

185

FOOTNOTES

Chapter IV

 

See Chapter I, pp. 11-13.
See Chapter II, pp. 48-49.
See Chapter II, p. 34.

With citizen participation being seen within the
paradigm of planning as promoting social-structural

~change society-wide by altering the composition

of either the actors in the structure or the roles
and/or statuses of the structure.

In fact, as reported in The Kiplinger Washington
Letter (September 10, 1971), the number one concern
in the world economy was inflation among the major
countries. Wages were rising faster than productivity,
just as was the case in the United States. The
governments of most of these major countries were
committed to high-level employment, fiscal stimula-
tion and ample-to-abundant credit. The drift was
toward controls, ways to hold down the inflation
without holding down employment and business
activity. Internal controhson prices and wages ,
(or so-called incomes policy) and external controls
on foreign investment and trade were the key consid-
erations.

As reported in The Kiplinger WaShington Letter
(October 1, 1971).

Congress was majority Democrat and in mid—October,
1971, it was expected that Congress would remain
Democratic.

A particularly vocal proponent of this theme of
a second re-construction was Vernon E. Jordan,
Executive Director of the National Urban League.

Revenue-sharing did represent a stronger push on

the part of the Nixon Administration than technological
programming, although considering both thrusts jointly
bodes ill for an expansive, social program-oriented
government apparatus. Relative to revenue-sharing

10.
11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

21.

186

also, was the fact that the majority of the governors
were Republican and the States were to be the funnels
for the 'New Federalism' program dollars.

A third sector national, macro-structure.
A public sector national, macro-structure.

Source: Ford Foundation Annual Reports, 1969,
1970, 1971 and 1972.

Source: Stanley S. Weithorn, "Summary of the Tax
Reform Act AS It Affects Foundations," in
Foundation News (published by the Foundation Center,
New York and Baltimore), May-June, 1970, pp. 86-89.

 

As we will see later, Alpha was able to develop
income (or input) sources from a variety of other
places. So the total from Ford and NIMH mentioned
was not the total income Alpha had to operate with
from September 1971 to September 1972.

We are counting the final year as a full-year,
deSpite the de-funding in December, 1971.

Bear in mind that the 1968-69 grant year was supported
solely by Ford Foundation money, while the 1972-73
grant year had as its foundation the NIMH grant.

SOurce: Application for Continuation Grant,
MH-17684-04, Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare, Public Health Service, August 11, 1972,
p. 5-2.

Source: Same as in footnote 1?, p. 5-3 (parentheses
are the author's).

For purposes of clarification, the acronyms included
in Figure IV are as follows: MNB - Model Neighborhood
Board; HUD - Department of Housing and Urban
Development; CDA - Cities Demonstration Agency;

RCC - Riverside-Cambridgeport Corporation; NIMH -
National Institute of Mental Health; BTPR - Boston
Transportation Planning Review; DPW - Department of
Public Works; SFLC - Storefront Learning Center.

See H. Kaufman, The Limits of Organizational Change
(The Univ. of Alabama Press, 1971), particularly
pp. 96-97.

 

Action for Boston Community Development, Inc.,
Characteristics of Target Area Residents, 1971.

 

22.

23.

24.

25.

26.

27.

187

Ibid.

Young, Whitney M., Jr., A Preliminary Exploration Of
Social Condition and Needs in Roxburerorth Dorchester -
GNRP, Task Force Report, 1961.

 

The bulk of the above discussion on 'Community
Characteristics,‘ and 'Community Resources,‘ was derived
from Final Report on a Study of the Feasibility of a
Merger or Consolidation of the Ecumenical Center of
Roxbury and the Roxbury Multi—Service Center,

A.L. Ne11um and Associates, 1972.

 

 

See footnote 5, Chapter III.

In the sense of the research being directed in part
toward solving the problems of the subject group. In
fact, the Alpha, Inc. staff will be one client of this
completed study.

Morris Zelditch, "Some Methodological Problems of
Field Studies," in the American Journal of Sociology,
Vol. 67, 1962, pp. 566-76.

 

188

FOOTNOTES

Chapter V

 

See Chapter III, pp. 57-62.

For a specific description in relationship to the
effect of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 and Alpha, see
William Ryan "[Alpha] Summer 1969 to Summer 1970:
Descriptive and Analytical Notes," (unpublished paper).
In the above notes in his discussion as to the rela-
tionship within Alpha between function and funding,
Ryan states: "Finally, the question arises as to the
relationship between function and funding. To what
extent is function to be determined by funding
opportunities and sources -- either external (e.g., NIMH)
or internal (e.g., Adult Education program). IS
[Alpha] and its constituency willing to accept the
necessary limitations on its activities and channeling
of its activities that this implies? Or, on the

other hand, is it the policy of [Alpha] to first
define its functions and priorities and then to seek
funding to carry out these functions?

 

"This is not an immediately pressing issue, since
the main funding sources (Ford and NIMH) seem to be
willing to be fairly flexible and permissive. Neverthe-
less, deadlines tend to arrive more rapidly than they
are anticipated and this is an issue that must
sooner or later be faced." p. 28.

See Chapter I, p. 24, in the section on "Defining
Concepts."

The obverse being that neutral, or decreasing, task
environment influence does not imply the need for
renewal and change.

As we shall see further on, the degree and duration of
change will be reflected in a 'transformed' Alpha in
structure and behavior. Such a transformation was
evident in August, 1972, or 7 months after the renewal
process was initiated concretely.

Op.Cit., Ryan.

10.

ll.

12.

189

Up until this time the staffing and structure of
Alpha totally reflected the community-university model
at all levels. Thus the administrative heads were
titled Community Co-Director and University Co-
Director.

The by-law change, the resultant non-participation by
university people in Alpha, and the lack of Board
activity in the time-span Ryan discusses seem to
possess a couple of attributes, these being: (1) a
reflection of social forces within black communities
generally, which emphasized institution-building and the
exclusion of white participation in decision-making
and policy-making; and/or (2) the felt need on the
part of Alpha to conceal what eventually surfaced

as the "mis-handling" of approximately $50,000 in
Ford Foundation grant money.

It was at the December meeting that.Ford FoundatiOn's
Program Officer to Alpha announced the de-funding
decision.

See footnote 31, Chapter I, for a further description
of the composition of Alpha's Board of Directors.

See footnote 26, Chapter I.

It is also important to note here that the Board was
being provided the opportunity to make and adopt

policy. As Ralph M. Kramer, "Ideology, Status, and
Power in Board-Executive Relationships," in R. Kramer
and H. Specht (eds) Readings in Community Organization
Practice, pp. 285-293, notes, "....many board meetings
characteristically consist of a series of reports that
serve to 'educate' the members, or from the perspective
of the executive, 'bring the board along' so that few '
real policy decisions are made. This process may be
described as 'non-decision-making,‘ in that conflict is
repressed through the executive's habit of introducing
only 'safe' issues for board consideration. (See J.L. Price,
"Governing Boards and Organizational Effectiveness,"
Adm. Science Quarterly, v.8, no. 3 (December 1963), P. 367.
See also P. Bachrach and M.S. Baratz, "Two Faces of
Power," American Political Science Review, v. 41, no.4,
(December 1962), pp. 947-952f7' This was no; the

case with Alpha in that there were no 'safe' issues,
thus the Board (or someone) had to make some policy
decisions. A cursory glance at the November 4, 1971
Board meeting agenda provides a view of issues presented
for Board consideration. These include: Status report
on Ford Foundation funds; Status report on NIMH funds;
Status of current contracts; Survival Fund issue;

 

 

 

 

190

Salary Review; Report on ADL Study; et.al.

13. In instances where N is greater than 11, respondents
were occupying more than one position within a
university/agency, or there was more than one
response possible on a question. In instances where
N is less than 11, some respondents did not answer
that Specific question.

14. Including the Boston Model Cities Agency, a regional
Office of Education Research Laboratory and a non-
profit Afro-American educational group.

15. See Chapter III, p. 63.

16. Concept meaning 'predicting the past.‘

17. See Boardroom Reports, August 17, 1972, p. 8.

 

18. Source: Inter-Office communication, memorandum
NO. 0023, to All Staff - Alpha, Inc., dated
July 12, 1972.

19. Source: Inter-office communication, memorandum
No. 0081, to Permanent Staff of Alpha, Inc., dated
August 15, 1972. .

20. See 'Appendix' for drawing of Alpha's physical lay-
out and how this effected communication patterns.

21. Source: Internal Memorandum, NO. 0078, to All Staff,
Alpha, Inc., dated August 9, 1972.

22. See footnote 5, Chapter III.

23. Source: Confidential Memorandum, to All [Alpha] Staff,
Alpha, Inc., dated March 8, 1972 (this memorandum
had no identifying number in that it was issued prior
to the introduction of the memorandum numbering and
coding system).

24. See 'Appendix' for results of the questionnaire.

25. Source: Inter-office memorandum, to [Alpha, Inc.]
from the Executive Director, dated April 20,1972.
For some unknown reason, this particular memorandum
did not contain the numbering and coding system.

26. Source: Inter-office communication, NO. 0007, to
University Research Project Principal Investigator,
dated June 19, 1972.

27.

28.

191

For work done in the area of social psychology relative
to model-building, see: Joseph Berger, B.P. Cohen,

J. Laurie Snell and Morris Zelditch, Jr. Types of
Formalization (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1962);
Bernard P. Cohen, Conflict and Conformity: A Probability
Model and Its Applications. (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press,
1963); James S. Coleman, Models Of Change and Response
Uncertainty (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall,
1964); Joan Crisswell, H. Solomon and Patrick Suppes (eds.)
Mathematical Methods in Small Group Processes (Stanford,
California: Stanford University Press, 1962); and

John G. Kemeny and J. Laurie Snell, Finite Markov Chains
(Toronto: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1962).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The social psychological concept of syntality is
important in that we are attributing particular
attributes of the individual to a group or organiza-
tion.

2.

192

FOOTNOTES

Chapter VI

 

It is a historical fact that perhaps the only institu-
tion, or organization, which is in a state of inde-
pendence within Black communities in the United States
is the church. The question for Black theoreticians
and practitioners is how other institutional, or
organizational, types attain a similar state.

A case-in-point is with the development of RAND, Inc.
This organization got its start wholly supported by
Department of Defense (more specifically, the Air

Force) contracts, and is now developing a variety

of contracts and grants from many diverse task environ-
ment sources and is highly regarded as a public policy
research institute. We can safely apply the dependence,
inter-dependence, independence model to RAND, Inc.,

and state that is it moving from a state of dependence
to a state of independence. For a more in-depth

report on RAND, Inc. and other public policy research
institutes, see Ronald S. Ritchie, An Institute for
Research on Public Policy (A Study Prepared for the
Government of Canada, 1969). A case which is geographi-
cally closer to home for Alpha, Inc. is the experience
of ABT Associates, Cambridge, Dr. Clark Abt,

president and founder, began with a DOD contract to

do some missile-model building and has taken ABT
Associates to a position of being diversified goo
independent.

 

 

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Olson, Jr., Mancur. The Logic of Collective Action. New
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Parsons, Talcott. "Suggestions for a Sociological Approach
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Structure and Process in Modern Societies.
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Piven, F.F. and Cloward, R.Q. Regulating the Poor. New
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Presthus, R. The Organizational Society. New York: KnOpf,
1962.

Rapoport, A. and Horvath, Wm. J. "Thoughts on Organization
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Read, W.H. "Upward Communication in Industrial Hierarchies,"
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Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders:
U.S. Riot Commission Report, U.S. Gov't. Printing
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Richardson, S.A. "A Framework for Reporting Field Relations
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200

"A Framework for'Reporting Field Relations
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Roethlisberger, F.J. and Dickson, W.J. Management and~
the Worker. Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1939. ' -

 

 

Rogers, David. The Management of Big Cities. Beverly
Hills, California: Sage, 1971.

 

Rogers, R. and McCreery-Spence, M. "The Dilemma of Change
and Future Organizations: An Exploratory Review,"
Sociological Focus, v. 6, no. 2, Spring 1973, pp.
42-60.

 

Rottenberg, Dan. "The Healers." Reprint from The Chicago
Guide, January 1973, pp. 76-81.

Rudner, Richard. Philosophy of Social Science. EnglewOod
‘Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966.

 

Ryan, William. "The Community—University Center, Summer
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Schein, Edgar. Organizational Psychology. Englewood
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Schurmann, Franz. Ideology and Organization in Communist
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Sellitz, C., Jahoda, M., Deutsch, M., and Cook. S.W.
Research Methods in Social Relations (Rev. ed.),
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Selznick, Philip. TVA and the Grass Roots. Berkeley:
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The Organizational Weopon. New York: McGraw-
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Leadership in Administration. Evanston, 111.:
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"Foundations of the Theory of Organization,"
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Simon, H.A. Administrative Behavior (2nd Ed.), New York:
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201

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Sower, Christopher. "Updating Outdated Organizations:,
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Holland J., Tiedke, K. and Freeman, W. Community
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and Bodary, John. "The State of Knowledge About
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Strange, John H. "The‘Impact of Citizen Participation on
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Taylor, F.W. Scientific Management. New York: Harper and
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Tannenbaum, A.S. Social Psychology of the Work Organization.
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and Smith, C.G. "Organizationaleontrol Structure:
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Terreberry, Shirley. "The Evolution of Organizational
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Theodorson, G.A. and Theodorson, A.G. A Modern Dictionary
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202

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and McEwen, Wm. J. "Organizational Goals and
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Organizations in Action. New York: McGraw-
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Tullock, Gordon. The Politics of Bureaucracy. Washington,
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Tyson, C.D. "The Control of Technology by Disadvantaged
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Wagenaar, T.C. "Dynamic vs. Static Organizations: An
Extension of the Basic Typology," Sociological
Focus, v. 6, n. 3, Summer 1973.

 

Weber, Max. The Theory of Social and Economic Organization,
A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (trans.), and '
Talcott Parsons (ed.). New York: The Free Press
of Glencoe, 1947.

 

Weick, K. The Social Psychology of Organizing. New York:
Addison-Wesley, 1969.

 

Weiner, N. The Human Use of Human Beings. New York:
Doubleday and Company, 1954.

 

Weithorn, 3.5. "Summary of the Tax Reform Act as It Effects
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Wildavsky, Aaron. The Politics of the Budgetary Process.
Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1964.

 

Wilensky, H.L. Organizational Intelligence. New York:
Basic Books, 1967.

 

Wilson, James Q. (ed.) City Politics and Public Policy.
New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1968.

 

Young, Whitney M., Jr. A Preliminary Exploration of Social
Condition and Needs in Roxbury-North Dorchester -
GNRP, Task Force Report, 1961.

 

 

203

Zald, Meyer N. Organizational Change. Chicago:' Univ. of
Chicago Press, 1970.

 

B.

C.

APPENDICES

Black Faculty and Administrators
Education Caucus Questionnaire

Organizational Layout

Tolerance for Bureaucratic Struc-
ture: A Scale-

' APPENDIX A:

-.-..—-_.__.__...._..- m.--~.

 

204

Project No.

 

Black Faculty and Administrators
Education Caucus

QUESTIONNAIRE

lastructions;_ We at the are attempting to both
assess the value of the Caucus' past activities and efforts,
and to determine possible future directions that the Caucus .
can pursue. Thus we would appreciate your thoughtful responses
to the following series of questions.

I.
1)

ii)
iii)

iv)

Name;
Position/Title

University/Agency

 

How’long in present position:
a. ( ) Less than one year

) More than one year and less than
ze'years

c. ( ) More than 2% years and less than

four years

d. ( ) More than four years..
What was your former position
and name of employer

immediately preceding your

present position.

II.’ Please mark the following with an (x) where appropriate.

1.

Did you attend any meetings of the Black Faculty and
Administrators Caucus?

a. ( ) Yes

b. ( ) No

205

Page Two
Questionnaire
Black Faculty and Administrators

'If your answer was No to question II (1) above, then
go to Q. 11.

2. Approximately how many meetings did you attend?

a. ( ) One

b. ( ) .Two

c. ( ) Three

d. ( ) Four or more

3. Do you think the meetings were worthwhile?

a. ( ) Yes
b. (' ) No (If no, then go to Q. 5).

4. If Yes, then please outline the reason(s) you think
the meetings were worthwhile.

 

 

 

 

5. If No, then please outline the reasonks) you think
the meetings were not worthwhile.

 

 

 

 

206

Page Three
Questionnaire
Black Faculty and Administrators

III.

'6.

In what way(s) do you think future meetings can be
improved?

a. ( ) MOre structured

b. ( ) Rotating chairmanship

c. ( ) More formal presentations
d. ( ) Other (specify) '
e. ( ) All of the above.

 

The initial working task of the Caucus focused on a

paper writteen by Calvin Hicks which spoke to the need for
redefining liberal arts education in relation to African-
descent students.

7.

8.

9.

Do you think the above task was a meaningful project
for the Caucus?

a. ( ) Yes
b. ‘( ) No (If No, then go to Q. 9).

If Yes, then why?

 

 

 

 

If No, then why not?

 

 

 

 

i *m—-- _ _ -..---.—.~..__fl--—

207

Page Four
Questionnaire ‘
Black Faculty and Administrators

IV.

11.

12.

13.

What type of task do you think such a Caucus could;
best be directed toward? (Rate these on a scale with
the most likely task being 1, the second most likely
being 2, etc.) '

a. ( ) Curriculum development

b. ( ) Methods of resource sharing

.c. ( ) Proposal development

d. ( ) Writing position papers

e. ( ) Advisory capacity to community groups

f. ( ) Other (specify) ' .

 

Briefly how WOUld you define university development.

 

 

 

 

Do you feel that a group such as the Caucus has a role
to play in community develOpment? (See definition on
final page).

a. ( ) Yes
b. ( ) No

Do you see the Caucus being most helpful to you by
focusing on community development or university develop-
ment?

8. ( ) University Development
b. ( ) Community DeVelopment.
C. (' ) Both (explain)

 

 

 

208

Page Five
Questionnaire
Black Faculty and Administrators

15.

16.

17.

Do you think universities possess resources that
can be applied to community develOpment?

a. ( ) Yes
b. ( ) No

What obstacles (institutional or otherwise) do you
think tend to retard the university role in community
develOpment?

 

 

 

 

Do you think the community possesses resources that
can be applied to university development?

a. ( .) Yes
b. ( ) No

What obstacles (institutional or otherwise) do you ‘
think tend to retard the community role in university
development?

 

 

 

 

 

209

Page Six
Questionnaire
Black Faculty and Administrators

l9.

' 20.

21.

‘Which university/agency resources are you able to
mobilize or direct?

 

 

 

 

Do you feel as if a portion of the above resources can
be applied to community develOpment?

a. ( ) Yes
b. ( ) No

Through what type of grouping do you think such an
application can take place?

a. ( ) Consortium of organizations

b. ( ) A specific community organization
c. ( ) Caucus attached to an organization
d. ( ) Other (specifcy)

 

What method(s) do you feel have been most effective
in community development?

 

 

 

 

Page Seven

210

Questionnaire
Black Faculty and Administrators

22.

VI ..
2.3.

24.

25.

26.

What method(s) do you feel are most desireable for
the Roxbury community? .

 

 

 

 

WOuld you like to attend a meeting to discuss the
results of this questionnaire?

a. ( ) Yes
b.. ( ) No

Will you be able to attend future Caucus meetings?-

a. ( ) Yes (If Yes, then go to Q.25).
b. ( ) No

If No, then do you feel the Caucus should continue
to function?

‘ a. ( ) Yes

b. ( ) No (If No, then you are finished with this
form. Thank you for your cooperation).

When do you think the Caucus should resume meeting?
(Please check (1 :) only one box).

a. (
b. (
c. (
d. (

Saturday, April 22
Saturday, May 6
Saturday, May 20
Other (specify)

vvvv

 

Page Eight
Questionnaire
Black Faculty and Administrators

VII .

27.

28.

29.

30.

 

211

‘Where do you feel Caucus meetings should be held?
(Please check (x) only one box).

a.
b.
c.
d.

In the community

In the university

Alternate between community and university.
Other (specify)

AAA“

 

WOuld the development of a Caucus newsletter
coordinated by - assist you in your present
activities?

a.
b.

to

( ) Yes
()No

In what ways(s) could you or your office contribute

such a newsletter?

 

 

 

 

If

there are any other comments you want to make

please make them here:

 

 

 

 

Page Nine
Questionnaire
Faculty and Administrators

Community Development - "a process of social action in
which the people of a community organize themselves
for planning and action; define their common and
individual needs and problems; make group and in-
dividual plans to meet their needs and solve their
problems; execute these plans with a maximum of
reliance upon community resources; and supplement
these resources when necessary with services and
material from governmental and nongovernmental agencies

- outside the community."

APPENDIX B:

213

COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS
AND

THE PHYSICAL LAYOUT

The spatial characteristics of the social structure

within which the communication channels are embedded have been

shown to be of importance. G.A. Miller pointed out:

When a large number of people belong to the
group, it is reasonable to assume that the
likelihood of messages passing from one perf
son to another is inversely proportional to
the distance between them. The greater the
distance, the lower the traffic density.
(Miller, 1951, p. 262). .

Barnlund and Harland (1963) reviewed empirical studies which

support Miller's reasoning. The empirical studies reviewed in-

clude:

Blake, et a1., 1956; Caplow and Forman, 1950; Festinger,

Schachter & Back, 1963; Lundberg, Hertzler, & Dickson, 1949;

Merton,

1948; Powell, 1952. Barnlund and Harland summarized:'

An inverse relationship has been found be-
tween the physical distance separating per-
sons and the likelihood of communication'
between them, with interaction increasing
as distance decreases, unless there are
physical barriers that intervene such as
filing cases, walls or desks. (Barnlund &
Harland, 1963, p. 468.)

For example in an organizational setting, Gullahorn found that

...distance was the most important factor

in determining the rate of interaction be-
tween any two employees (Gullahorn, 1952,

p. 134).

214

in an office of 37 workers in a large eastern corporation.

We have seen that during the year under study within
Alpha there was a decrease in communications, and an increase
in centralized decision-making. In Figure XV, the spatial lay-
out of Alpha indicates the office placement of the dominant
coalition. Those offices occupied by dominant coalition mem-
bers were A, B, E and F. The dominant coalition members in
closest proximity were A to B, and E to F. Separating A and
B was a wall with a single entrance, and the same held for
the physical barriers between E and F with slight modification
in that the adjoining wall did not have an entrance; The
greatest physical distance was that between A, B and E, F.
Relative to the dominant coalition too, among this sub-group?
ing there was the centralization of decision-making and a
decreasing flow of communications, such that A, B controlled
the flow of financial, technical and operational decision-mak—
ing. We can safely posit here that distance did seemingly'
play a role in the rate of interaction between dominant coali-

tion members.

 

 

 

            

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APPENDIX C:

216

TOLERANCE FOR BUREAUCRATIC STRUCTURE:

A SCALE

by

Marvin Sontag
Senior Research Associate, Center for Policy Research
(Teachers College, Columbia University)

Richard A. Hansen
Research Associate, Center for Policy Research
(College of the City of New York)

Sally T. Hillsman
Research Associate, Center for Policy Research
(Columbia University)

Amitai Etzioni -
Senior Research Associate, Center for Policy Research
(Columbia University)

1970

This instrument was developed in the course of a study
financed by the Manpower Administration of the U.S.
Department of Labor, under contract number 81-34—70-04.

CENTER FOR POLICY RESEARCH
423 West 118th Street
New York, N.Y. 10027

217
I. INTRODUCTION

 

The Tolerance for Bureaucratic Structure Instrument is de-
signed to measure the extent to which an individual indicates
a preference for working in jobs characterized by the particular
type of work setting considered typical in large scale, bureau-
cratic organizations. Such organizational contexts tend to be
relatively highly "structured, ".that is they require workers, in
their day-to- day activities, to exercise considerable d1sc1p11neiuvr
to regulations, related to imposed and distant goals ratherz' “
than permitting '..orkers to relate at least some of their immediate
behavior to goals of their_own choosing. IIt is suggested that
there is a dimension of personality which has direct impact on
individuals' ability and deSire to work in and gain satisfaction
from jobs varying in their degree of structure. We have called
this dimension of personal orientation to work "Tolerance for
Bureaucratic Structure."

The instrument to measure Tolerance for Bureaucratic Struc-
ture (TBS) is a self-report, Likert scaled questionnaire de-
signed to tap individuals responses to various aspects of work'
characteristic of structured, bureaucratic settings. It is a
forty-three item instrument written in simple English (about
third to fourth grade reading level) which asks respondents to‘
report preferences for a series of job attributes. The instru-
ment provides a single total score representing the degree to
which the individual has expressed a preference for working

within structured environments.

218

II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND OF THE INSTRUMENT

 

There is considerable theoretical and empirical evidence
that modern complex work organizations have difficulty achieving
both the coordination of individual actions presumed necessary
to attain their objectives and, at the same time, satisfying‘
the needs of individuals working in them. One of the reasons
for this is that bureaucratic organizations tend to exert exten-
sive control over the day—to—day,,moment-to-moment behavior
of their employees in an attempt to assure prediCtability'of:
performance. Writers as diverse as Marx (1964), Freud (1957),

. Merton (1957), Parsons (l951a,b), Bell (1956), and writers on.
industrial relations (Argyris, 1957) have concerned themselves
with the issue of the compatibility between individual needs.

and the increasing social need for discipline.

A fundamental question raised by many such writers, from
Weber on, has been what personality elements enable individuals
to perform comfortably in the relatively structured (and some-
times even restrictive) work environment characteristic of
bureaucratic organizations. The structure and operation of
bureaucracies clearly demand a considerable amount of discipline
from those who work within them. In Merton's discussion of
bureaucratic structures and personality (1957, p. 198), he em-‘
haSizes that bureaucracy's need for reliable performance requires
"an unusual degree of conformity with prescribed patterns of
action. Hence, the fundamental importance of discipline...",

Merton goes on to note that "discipline can be effective only

if the ideal patterns are buttressed by strong sentiments which

' ' 219 ’
entail devotion to one's duties, a keen sense of the limitation
of one's authority and competence, and methodical performance
of routine activities."

There is considerable evidence that individuals exhibit a
wide variety of responses to the attempts of organizations to
exercise control over their work activity. Theoretically one
may assume that the kinds of orientations and/or personality
attributes of individuals will influence how they react to the

r'demands of different jobs. EThe notion posed here is that a
dimension 3f personality which has direct impact on ah individual's‘ '
- ability to work in and gain.satisfaction from jobs in highly -,"
pf'xifstructured or "bureaucratic“'situations can be identified and ;‘
” measured;n We have labeledthis dimension "Tolerance for Bureau?-
.cratic.Structureh (TBS): H .h ° '“ I . I
..i'fAlthODdh the tradition of intellectual'concern with the
particular personality requirements for working in a bureaucracy
is relatively extensive, the empirical work in this area is
quite limited. Certainly there is an extensive literature
relating various personality traits, such as authoritarianism,
to specific, limited aspects of an individualis work behavior
and attitudes, particularly the relationship between supervisory
styles and the psychological characteristics of workers. (Vroom,
1960 and 1964; Likert, 1961, Herzberg, 1959 and 1966; Wilensky,
1964; Blauner, 1969; among many others.) However, jobs are
complex social roles composed of many different elements to which
.1 the worker must react simultaneously, supervisory relations

being only one of these. Little has been done to examine the

interactions of the workers' personality and the structure of

-!. -. . .. . .0. .: . . .. 0" . .-.. . ..O o. . .. .0 . a . . c‘;;:' . n

220

the.total work role as the worker experiences it day in and day
out. Naturally, not every aspect of the job and its setting'
is expected to have the same weight in terms of worker reactions.-
However, certain key analytic dimensions of jobs as work roles
may be hypothesized as critical variables for the understanding
of an individual' 5 response to his job.

. As suggested above, there is a long and substantial tra-
dition of thought to support the contention that there is a
."bureaucratic?_dimension of jobs which is reflected in all as+
..pects of the work role (supervisory relations, job content,

rules of conduct, interactions, etc.) and which critically in-

;fluences the reSponses _of workers to their jobs., It is suggestedEQ; s.

‘c‘ o :..o:'

”Ethat a correspond .ing general dimenSion of personality exists

1.“.which influences how an individual Will respond to jobs that

' . . . I
' l - ' ' I ‘ ' n on c
' s ' . ' ‘ . _ , o'. ' . ' ,U' - _ I
.g,: ‘. .' . z . ‘I. . ..1;-': o. : 05-0_ . '4 .. ' ' . '-:.°:' ... .o .11.. 4.. -~. _ . . '.,-"' o; . ‘ I .
‘ u - ~ . . . . o

,are more or less affected by the various types of discipline. ~;.--

demanded by work organizations.

The literature contains a number of references to attempts
to relate personality to bureaucratic work roles. Leonard-
Gordon (1970), for example, has developed an instrument to
measure an individual's preference for different work environ-
ments, particularly bureaucratic ones, drawing his baseline
concept entirely from the Weberian ideal type of bureaucratic
organization. Regis Walther (1964) has also developed an ex-
perimental instrument designed to measure thirty-seven personal
qualities of workers which influence job performance. Several
of these may be described as broadly related to bureaucratic
job requirements. Borgatta and Bohrnstedt (1971) have also
develOped a measure of work attitudes, contrasting risk orien-

tation and hygiene or maintenance orientations (similar to

221

"bureaucratic" orientations) as a test for use in establishing

"an individual' 5 management potential". However, all of these
scales were designed for use with middle class workers who
have no difficulty responding to rather complex and abstract
language. In contrast, the attempt here was to construct an
instrument for use with a wide range of workers and potential

' workers, including those with very limited formal education.

I

In additiox, the conceptual base of the bureaucratic per- .

SJ;IfSOQality dimension present here:(TBS).has a somewhat differenbggufx};~'

-§Lfocus from those of other'researchersfiv It has already beenkfeehxt?fiébr'

.5noted above that bureaucratic organizations are characterized

by a considerable need to regulate and structure their members.;}:;{,=

' c .
‘I. o I . . .0 C ' ‘. I‘ w , : o .' o- . u... . .I I‘ = ’3‘“.

behavior so that organizational goals are attained. . Hence, on '“

~-vthe-most general'level, the basic demand of bureaucratic orgahi- “"
'mzations is that their members discipline their expression of

personal and immediate needs, and respond to the more distant

and externally imposed demands of the organization. Although

in modern society this particular demand is made more frequently.

than in other historical settings, Parsons suggests that it

reflects one choice in a universal dilemma. When human action

is considered on the most abstract level, all actors are seen

as faced with the necessity to define the meaning of all

situations in terms of five different dilemmas (Parsons' "pattern

variables"). One of these is the necessity for the actor to

determine whether he will respond to the situation in an "affective"

or "affectively neutral" manner, that is, whether he will use

the activities and relationships with which he is confronted

222

for immediate psychological gratification or to further a more

distant goal. Since social situations (such as work role) .

provide the actor with normative prescriptions which define how
he is expected to resolve this dilemma, the individual is faced
with deciding whether to conform. Assuming that, as a personality.
system, an individual cannot or will not easily adjust to ful-
fill any and all action requirements, individuals are seen as

faced with psychological limitations to their desire'and capaCity

a. c "' .1. . .a
-. .’ ...- -'- '...-.-_
w 'sfuxw-«~Jn£»«.»u.

to conform. “ . xvi-51‘s
Given the behavioral requirements imposed by the Structuré‘“‘

of bureaucratic organizations, "neutrality" may be. characterized

as the normatively expected résébnhsé.': Conceptually, therefore, fifiji~

we may tie this abstract notion to that of a bureaucratic per-

. . .' ‘ - . . o "I 1.. . ‘ _. .I.-‘ 0' y a.“

sonality dimension or the tolerance for bureaucratic s1tuations:.
.As a normative prescr1pt1on for behavior in bureaucraC1es,
"neutrality" refers to the requirement that individuals evaluate
their behavior in terms of the specific consequences of the
situation for the organization rather than act in whatever way
brings them the most immediate gratification without regard for
evaluation. It is a question of whose interests are to be given
most consideration. On the psychological level, it is the
distinction between permissiveness and discipline, with the
former referring to immediate gratification in the psychological
sense (Parsons 1951b, pp. 80-84).

It is this ability to accept or tolerate discipline, to,

choose to evaluate personal behavior in terms of distant goals

which are relevant mainly to the organization, that is being

223

measured as a component of workers' orientations toward their
jobs. If one turns once again to organizational theories of
bureaucracy, particularly the Weberian tradition, one finds that
it is necessary to consider an individual's orientation (neutral
or affective) toward three aspects of the bureaucratic setting:
the rules and regulations inherent in bureaucratic structure,
hierarchical or authority relationships, and task activities.

It is likely that individuals who exhibit the willingness to

..-, .;._“ a-;. uu.;‘ .. 1.i .. ..~.fi-. ,‘ . ' . '
exerC1se self—restra1nt 1n these three spec1f1c areas of work

behavior are thoSe who can most easily tolerate the demands

of'a structured or bureaucratic work situation.

. - u . a . '. ,l
.- . o ' ’ ” o o . .‘o .
’. ‘. o0! . .'.- ' .~. . ' ~ 2. .- ‘ 3. l.- . I O... . 0" . . O -' . '.'¢. ' . . -

o o. . . 9 O ' , . o g . .
. . o a ,’I . ~‘ ,2. .. to. . j n I
'4 o o . .‘ a ‘ . ' . o

 

IiI.r IN§TRUHENT DESCRIbTIow
'rlblerance for bureaucratic Structure involves four related
areas, namely: attitudes toward rules and regulations; attitudes
towards authority; attitudes toward tasks; and orientation toward .
-the delay of gratification.

Attitudes towards rules and regulations are conceived of
as a continuum. At the "neutral" or bureaucratic end are lo-
cated those individuals predisposed toward willingly following
many rules and regulations on the job. At the Opposite ex-
treme are individuals expressing discomfort at having work be-
havior governed by such rules and regulations. Implied in this
construct is the assumption that the individual predisposed
toward following rules does so without feelings of anxiety or

hostility.

” acharacteristics..Vu-fl-" ‘5?‘”?7’“37“'4“53"‘r ”

224

Attitudes toward authority is a related construct involving
an individual's predisposition to accept the legitimacy of the
hierarchical structure of work, hence the legitimacy of super-
vision. Workers high in this area are characterized by an easy
acceptance of any degree of supervision and direction on the
job. At the opposite end of the continuum are those who reject
supervision of any type. . -

“ Attitudes toward task is a construct concerned with res;
(ponses toward the routine performance of activities which are.
limited in scOpe, highly. defined,.and perhaps repetitous. Those
who perform such tasks without reporting discomfort are placed
.at .the bureaucratic end of this. cont1nuum.. On the other end-

..-‘-' .:"' " ' . - .- 1 (4.3'

are 1nd1V1duals who dislike it when their work tasks have these
..pThe fourth area included in the scale is the individual‘s:-1
orientation toward delaying personal gratification. This
'differs somewhat from the areas described'above since they
relate to concrete aspects of work roles. This last area taps
a more general set of orientations which conceptually underlies
the personality construct. The theoretical notion of neutrality
suggests that all individuals are faced with the choice of
delaying their own gratifications as required by the needs of
the work organization, or not doing so, thus failing to live up
to the expectations of their job. Therefore questions designed
to measure this dimension of persenality are included as well
as questions relating to the specific context of work.
The construction of the instrument began with the writing

of several hundred potential items. On the basis of item

225

analyses of preliminary versions of the instrument, a final 43
question form on the basis of item analysis data as well as on

a prior judgment as to the degree to which the items were repre—
sentative of the construct. Included are questions relating to
the four areas described above. They are distributed as
follows: fifteen, rules and regulations; eleven, authority;

seven, task; ten, delav cf gratification. The prOportion of

items in each area was roughly parallel to an a priori decision 3'5341f

concerning the importance of each area to the total construct)"
Figure III-l pr gents, by area, the items in the final form.
Individuals respond to the instrument ngalfeveCPOintzfjxf
scale ranging from "strongly disagree" to " strongly agree .
A low bureaucratic response is coded zero and the highest
possible bureaucratic response four. If the question is omitted
or the answer is,a score of two is assigned to the item. The
items do not allow a neutral or indifferent response. In order
to minimize the effects of response setithe items are worked
in such a way that in about half of the items a strongly agree
is coded as highly bureaucratic while in about half of the

items a strongly disagree is coded as highly bureaucratic.

IV. INSTRUCTIONS FOR ADMINISTRATION AND SCORING

A. Administration:

 

For purposes of administration, the Tolerance for Bureaucratic
Structure instrument is entitled "Job Opinion Questionnaire."

This title was assigned in order to encourage the respondent to

fj5as the respondents read it to themselves.

226

provide personally valid replies to the questions rather than:
normative responses. Since it is designed particularly for
workers with a relatively low level of formal education, the
questionnaire is chort (43 items, tak1ng about 20 minutes to
answer) and requires only that the respondent circle his choice

on the answer sheet.l Since it is an'attitude measure, respondents
'should be allowed as much time as possible to complete their

'answers.
It is important that the people taking the test understand

I ‘ ...‘
3 .. ‘. , - .¢.'£~;" .n"

what they are to do. The test administrator should read the

directions printed on the first page of the instrument aloud

.

.. ’6’. ..l'tl. ‘\.’ J“ . I o "7' ~...... I. .0 : :I- . .. _ .. --'I. ....-’.... ..'...

After reading the instruction aloud the test adm1n1strator."jh

I

should ask if there are any quest1ons. Finally the administrator

Q U’ ' ‘. | O

sheuld emphasize again that there are no r1ght or wrong answers
to any of the questions and that their opinions are being
sought.

If the respondents have any difficulty understanding the
meaning of any question, the test administrator may help the
respondent understand the question without indicating a pre-
ferred answer. Each respondent Should have sufficient time to

answer each of the questions.

B. Scoring Instructions for the Job Opinion Questionnaire

 

The Job Opinion Questionnaire consists of 43 items with
which the respondent is to indicate agreement or disagreement.
The Quesions are worded in such a way that in about half of the

cases agreement is scored high while disagreement is scored low.
I

‘ - . ‘ . . ' a ' a ' ' ' ' - - ‘ ’ ' o . o
I Q o - '. - o ' ' . ' . ' C . ' ' 'c l ‘ .‘ .'- . ' ' J -' ‘5 . ' ' .‘- -' -' vn. ‘ -' . -
F I. ‘C . I .p ' - :".' . .9 'l’ . I .' '0! ""0 o ' '. l. . ..- "g 0 O . " '. . " z ..0 . . ' I ' ‘ ". . a .g.

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Disagree . “ ‘3 =
”OmiE"#-r1»u‘-~.~-~rm'é'

‘Agrééki 'u-J"fl".yf:3 é-u

227

The scoring key follows:

Strongly Disagree _ = 0;

Disagree = l

'. " ‘9 ' - ... . . ". ' ’3‘ ‘ ‘ . n "O’. ..’°1 ‘. 9o... O a ‘ "‘
0‘ _ .‘ ...‘. .1. . V ...I.. ‘\' h .“_ ' "'- l . , . _. . "g' a. '
- .0 ‘ . ‘ o — ' c
Olnlt - — 2 ‘
. .

Agree _.., .. ‘. .%- 3.

Strongly Agree. 3' _ ‘= 4 .

Questions w here the scoring is reversed are indicated by a R .

.. ...l . o . J;-

follOW1ng the space fWor th.e response.1

Ireversed (R) items is:

o ha 51 La-f

ll

Strongly Agree

unjf'Strongly,Disagree -h;:¢;,;4g$;.3n;g,'

The scoring key for.

Items where the individual has not responded or where his res-

ponse is unclear are scored as 2.

omitted the score should be disregarded.

16
R - 17

18

19
R 20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

W

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WW

WW W WW

If more than 5 questions are

31

32:
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43

WW W

 

WWWWW W

' I
The score for the 1nd1V1dual is. theflsum of the scores for the .

u ..
o ' '-
‘ .'

{J.Il. .1. '.

' I
.5-1 |
I

" I.

228

v. Tm: NORMATIVE GROUP

The normative group for the instrument consists of 2,592

individuals either employed in a variety of jobs or enrolled in .

'3 tra1n1ng programs for part1cular jobs. Most respondents were'.
locateAin.eastern states and live in urban areas.’ Data were
-gathered from a total of-lS distinct groups. _The groupSwere:'

selected because t21cy represent a variety of blue and white

1 . ‘ -. . J ." 'u'o.'...~:‘.'-:;I. :«iJu “3'2...T_"_..::i't‘j;
“d“chlar jobs, and typical federally sponsored job tra1n1ng programs.

4

Table 1 presents a listing of the groups and the number of indi-i"°

I
'.-'--’ 3 .--.- .C-‘a ‘ : .. _ -'£;'-.3u'o-,’-~

viduals obtained in each group.

The demograph1c character1st1cs -of the normative group are

, n
0" . O.

', Dr esented in Table 2. 17"- -: . . D :._3 3. . .. m }

. . . ' . ... I ' I .'o'.:~.. . 0' . ‘.l. “I ;. '. 0:0 ' 0.
3;. ."° 9‘ ‘- ...' 7.5-. r ’ .g. .'..‘,: . '.‘ o .-...0‘..' o ' _( '."~

..01‘

It should be noted that the normative data provided by ..
these groups should be taken only as suggest1ve.2 Thedsample I; ....F
obtained is not representative of the work population as a
whole nor any general segment of the working population.

Consequently the norm tables provide only a rough estimate
of the range of actual scores and of the level of a particular

group. It is strongly suggested that persons attempting to

use this scale develOp their own normative data.

229

\

Table 1

Sites in Which Data were Obtained on the
...... .un ”nu Tolerance for Bureaucratic Structure-u ..u ”nu “H“
. . . I. a. n I. a. 1 1 1 . . Instr Ont . . I . - . - 1 ...... .1 .

 

.0
q

 

--fih"3.*VSite-a-. ahungumb r 333'
l. Garment FaCtorY “Zorkers o o o o o o o o o o o o o o 0.0 o o o o o o .0 00 o o o 0.0 o o o o 162'
. . 2 I .. Nurses ' Ai C1125 o o o o o. o o o o o .0 o o o. o o o .0 o. o o o o o o o o o o o... f.‘.o:-.. o o. o 00.0V-o:.0'.o $19 5.5:. .

° 3 '”Collegiate fiursing Students...:................;}.}..;.g.l73.O

.4. 4,.,Office Temporary Workers,,.1..3......}......1......:.....348_,,
\l. 1:... r -. Jug-y 1 1 . . _ . .. . ”3:: . .3 :;. ,".'- '.'._;..4‘._..'.-.;‘~:". 1; 31".: 12;... ’1. o... .- 7?}: 3,31...- 1::.° ..--_'_.‘:f‘ '_ .r‘ .. v°?;*..;: ’4 ':.|'..'.. ...‘o 1.21.1253: :. : -.

"h51glbnemployed Workers;c,5.5.a.;..f..,fi.1.......{.§...h...11..73

.. a ' .3 ........

6 bii'scellalleous Clérks...... O...O...O...0......OOOOOIO:OO..OOOO0.0.1.23...

..J1Q1Taxi Drivers...

,,3...,,,£,.........,.................;;.3321

.. o . . . _ . _.‘
C . C -" . ' . ' I l
.g." ,.. . ' . .n.. ..‘n‘. ‘-‘.. ':;\- .0, O... a .‘ ’o- .:.-‘ _. . ' O“. ..o‘

. . . s ‘
u‘:“'- . I. "o u“ ' .1 "'o {I .. ..' 'l' .. ”'. ' U
. . _‘ .- .c ‘ .’ '. .‘ . ' ' ' . . ' ' a' '
n 1 1

8. ' ' Clerk Trainees; 0.. o 3.1.”... 0‘ q o o .‘..O..-. 0'. o o 0.0 .03 o 0.9.0.0-0 o 0'0 0'. 0 1"1'. 0. 01.]..7.3 . I .

c _ ._ a .

- 0 '. I... . o -_ n .
f .’. . '. . . ._. ' ’..’ -’ . . . .1. ' . o . 'lfl . .
. u ' - 1 o

"9 ""' .Bank Clerks 0 o .0: o. -_o .0. o. o _o .0. 9.21.. o 2. 011'9'1'0" :1 o q. 0.20.1.~ 0......“ o h o... f"... ..1- v...- "'1. 2. 9.;0205fi '

.h.l05_Bank.ClerkrTrainees.,.1.$..,:....1..,..:...,.1...f.......l26.o'
ll Worker Incentive krbgram (WINl'rraineesl.................112;
l2. Concentrated Employment Program (CPE) Trainees...........279.
13 Electronic Assembly Workers.............................. 30

14 University Secretaries...................................168

15 Textile printing Factory................................; 47

 

:.'IQ' . n .

230

Table 2

i
.nn eremographic Characteristics of the
............... Normative Group

 

‘11. . .I'Aéié". .. _ 5.0%
‘Female 50%

Age: . i : ';;.., ..23’ 1 .Mean 33.55
‘-« - -- ' ' " ‘ Standard Deviation 14.26

=*E;”'Yéars“of'Vfiih7”**iyi*4§fifitéVMean ‘ 12.62
M__Schooling;h ”.Standard Deviation 6.70

1 ° 0 c
. .

~ .

a

'Religious . - x .. Protestant 39%
reference 4 ... 2_Catholic . 35%

.;1Wh'ité.. :, 5'7 . °
Black 1 31 '
Other ‘_ 12"

I}.-Race.;-..

 

231

VI. NORMS

As was described in the previous section describing the
_Znorming sample, the norms presented here can best be thought of as
..suggestive rather than definitive. Table 3 presents the con- 1”
version of the raw scores on the instrument to t and z scores

as well as percentile scores. It should be noted that the perfi'

centile scores were obtained by normalizing the diStribution

'.~.1"~" ”‘3 .--. .
.z-‘= ' if} -‘ v3 -'.'-‘: ?.-."'. ..

and then computing percentile scores.‘ The norms presented 1h.
Table 3 use all the groups described . ” “’I h.
Because th1ie is a relationship between the kinds of work
at which an individual is employed and the scores on the TBS,.;
separate tables of norms are presented for various categorieS'

‘ '0

of jobs. Those in the sample who were actually employed aty

the time of testing were d1vided 1nto four categories based on ”v
a division of jobs into blue-collar and white-collar, structured
jobs and unstructured 3obs. The structured white-collar group
includes nurses' aides and bank clerks. The unstructured white-
collar jobs include college secretaries and Office temporary.
workers. The structured blue-collar jobs include electronic
assemblers, garment workers, and chemical printing operators.'

The only unstructured blue-collar job is taxi driver. Tables

4 through 7 present norms for these groups.

" '.-,’ -11.”: ‘ ..... .-.-~'-'..: 1- ..
._. .._ a 0'. ‘.'.. O '

JOB OPINION QUESTIONNAIRE

Name I Date

 

Mstructions: Below are a group of items that represent different
(minions about jobs. We all have different ideas about the best
Hnds of jobs for us, and these items will give you the chance to
express your opinions. There are no right or wrong answers to these
questions. Whatever you believe is right for you. Answer each item
by circling one of the following statements below each item. -

 

Strongly Disagree Agree Strongly

Disagree Agree
Fer example - if you agree strongly with a statement you would circle
swpon 1y Agree below the statement. If you should happen to disagree
with It you would circle Disagree below the statement. Do not spend
too much time on any one item. Remember there are no right or wrong

answers. Work quickly but carefully. Make sure you circle one
choice for every question. '

l. The best jobs for me are ones with set hours, like from 9 AM to
5 PM.
Strongly Disagree Agree Strongly
Disagree Agree

2. Often, the only thing wrong with breaking a rule is getting caught.

Strongly Disagree I Agree Strongly-1
Disagree Agree

3. It makes me angry to see other people wasting time on the job.
Strongly Disagree Agree Strongly
Disagree ' - Agree

h. It is often good to wait and think things over before deciding.
Strongly Disagree 'Agree Strongly.
Disagree Agree

5. I would like to have a job where I could set the hours.
Strongly Disagree Agree ' Strongly
Disagree Agree

6. The best job for me would be one where you knew exactly what you

had to do even if you did not know why you had to do it.

Strongly Disagree Agree Strongly
Disagree Agree

10.

ll.

l2.

13.

I4.

15.

233

When I apply for a job I get very mad if they make me wait to
find out if I got the job.

Strongly Disagree Agree Strongly
Disagree Agree

I think most bosses know what they are doing.

Strongly Disagree Agree Strongly
Disagree Agree

I usually do what the boss says even if I do not agree with him.
Strongly Disagree Agree Strongly
Disagree Agree

The worst part about working is having to take orders.

Strongly Disagree Agree Strongly
Disagree . Agree

It seems to me that most rules on the job are not really needed.

Strongly Disagree Agree Strongly
Disagree Agree.
Sometimes I wish I could change jobs every few months.
Strongly Disagree Agree Strongly.
Disagree Agree

I would hate a job where you could not see the finished product.
Strongly Disagree Agree Strongly
Disagree ' Agree

If everybody obeyed the rules at work, there would be fewer

aCcidents.
Strongly Disagree Agree Strongly
Disagree Agree

I like people telling me how to do things.

Strongly Disagree Agree Strongly
Disagree Agree

l6.

I7.

l8.

20.

'21.

22.

23.

2k.

234

It is important to save a regular part of your salary each Week.

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Strongly
Agree

Agree

A boss should eXpect you to take a sick day for personal business

when you need it.
Strongly Disagree Agree Strongly
Disagree Agree

Work is the most important thing in life.
Strongly Disagree Agree Strongly
Disagree Agree

I would like a job where I had more control over the way I work.
Strongly Disagree Agree Strongly
Disagree Agree

I like the responsibility of working without a boss.
Strongly Disagree Agree Strongly
Disagree Agree

When I am working I like my boss to tell me how he thinks I am

doing.
Strongly Disagree Agree Strongly
Disagree Agree

I like to work at a steady speed.
Strongly Disagree Agree Strongly
Disagree. ' Agree

I like to spend money as soon as I get it.
Strongly Disagree Agree Strongly
Disagree Agree

If a boss gives you a bad job he

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

ought to be told off.

Strongly
Agree

Agree

25.

26.

27.

28.

29.

30.

BI.

32.

33.

235

If a person is late for work, he should not be paid for the-time.

Strongly Disagree Agree Strongly
Disagree Agree

If I won a lot of money, I would first take a vacation.
Strongly Disagree Agree Strongly
Disagree Agree

What happens to you in life depends on hard work.

Strongly Disagree Agree Strongly
Disagree Agree

It is better to be your own boss than to work for someone else.
Strongly Disagree Agree Strongly-

Disagree ' Agree

Jobs where you have to sit in the same place all day would drive

me crazy. ' '
Strongly Disagree Agree Strongly.
Disagree Agree

I think a boss has the right to tell you exactly what to do.
Strongly Disagree. Agree Strongly

Disagree Agree

It is smart to take a chance once in a while.

Strongly Disagree . Agree Strongly
Disagree . Agree
Even if I don't like a rule I usually obey it.
Strongly . Disagree Agree - Strongly
Disagree , Agree
I often get mad when I am told what to do.
Strongly Disagree Agree 'Strongly

Disagree . Agree

3h.

35.

36.

37.

38.

39.

#0.

Al.

#2.

“3.

LJU

I would like a job that takes you to different places.
Strongly Disagree Agree Strongly
Disagree Agree

A company has the right to tell you what to wear to work.

Strongly Disagree Agree Strongly
Disagree Agree

I like to set my own pace when working.

Strongly Disagree Agree Strongly
Disagree Agree

Foremen should fire peeple they catch sleeping on the job.

Strongly Disagree Agree Strongly
Disagree Agree

People who refuse to obey orders on the job are often right.
Strongly Disagree Agree Strongly

Disagree Agree

It is hard for me to keep from blowing my tOp when someone gets
me very angry. '

Strongly Disagree ‘ Agree Strongly
Disagree ' Agree
Workers often know more than bosses.
Strongly Disagree Agree Strongly
Disagree ‘ . Agree
I dislike waiting.
Strongly Disagree Agree Strongly
Disagree Agree
Most foremen are too bossy.
Strongly Disagree Agree Strongly
Disagree Agree
I enjoyed filling out this form.
Strongly Disagree Agree Strongly

Disagree Agree

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