

ABSTRACT

PROBLEMS IN ORGANIZATIONAL RENEWAL: A CASE STUDY OF ORGANIZATION CHANGE

By

Philip Shaw Hart

In the course of the past decade a number of social and physical programs came into existence through Federal legislation. One outcome of such legislative effort was the creation of a multitude of organizational forms designed to carry out specific purposes within the nation's cities. In many instances, private sector, or third sector, monies preceded or matched the public monies, thus many of the organizations which were created received financial input from more than one sector of the society.

The problem under study here is of one organization located in Boston which became a magnet for public and private monies during the late 1960's. The focus is on organizational renewal, organizational change, and organizational survival. At the macro-level, the concern is with general and specific social, economic, and political conditions which spawned organizations such as Alpha, Inc., and with the al-

teration in these macro-conditions which necessitated organizational renewal and change. At the micro-level, the concern is with a community analysis and an organizational analysis in order to better understand elements of causality at the local level.

The method is thus a case study of one organization (Alpha, Inc.) which was undergoing change during the one-year period of study reported here. An open system strategy was the research approach, in that the author's initial assumptions were grounded in an interdependence between the organization and its environment. Following Thompson (1967) and Dill (1958), the environment became defined as the 'task environment,' and included those 'elements relevant, or potentially relevant, to goal-setting and attainment.' The author adopted a strategy of sustained participation, or involved participation, which allowed him to employ a number of data-gathering methods.

The field study was conducted during the period of September, 1971 to September, 1972 in Boston. Alpha, Inc., was a Black organization as defined by its staff, Board, and client composition, and by its goal statements and organizational ethos. Concepts which were crucial elements of this case study and societal analysis included: renewal, change, survival, task environment, institutional sphere, goals and objectives, input, output, systems, con-

version processes, cooperative strategies, decision-making, communication, productivity, and administrative behavior. A series of propositions are posited in Chapter II which represent empirically grounded statements relative to the above concepts. In Chapter III three distinct hypotheses are formulated which relate to the organization and its environment. The initial hypothesis (H_1) relates to the institutional sphere. Hypothesis two (H_2) and hypothesis three (H_3) relate to the intra-organizational sphere, and differ to the extent that H_2 is directional, while H_3 is non-directional.

Specifically, H_1 states that renewal and change implies: an increase in task environment influence; a decrease in public concern; and an increase in cooperative strategies. The data gathered and analyzed relative to H_1 supported the hypothesis as initially formulated. Hypothesis two (H_2) states that renewal and change implies: a decrease in productivity; an increase in turnover rates; a decrease in communication; an increase in centralized decision-making; a change in clientele; a decrease in the tolerance for bureaucracy; and an increase in organizational rigidity. Each component of this hypothesis was supported by the data except for the prediction that renewal and change implies a decrease in productivity. The findings

were that productivity increased rather than decreased. This finding pointed up the fact that in non-profit organizations, a central technical problem for both the organizational researcher and the practitioner is the relation between input and output (or measures of organizational efficiency). That is, there is not necessarily a linear relationship between input and output in non-profit organizations, thus the level of predictability here remains low. Hypothesis three (H_3) is non-directional and states that renewal and change implies: structural change; a change in goals and objectives; and a change in administrative behavior. The data supported H_3 as initially formulated.

Renewal, change and survival were seen as interdependent phenomena within an organizational setting. The assumption guiding the organizational analysis was that if we can explain renewal and change then we should be able to predict survival in an organizational system. The organizational and societal analysis reported here serves to corroborate the validity of such a guiding assumption. The author recognizes the limitations of a case study in its explanatory and predictive value, yet also is aware that if sociologists, policy makers, and practitioners are to understand organizational change, more case studies and comparative studies must be carried out.

The organizational analysis reported here thus serves as a heuristic device to stimulate work in the area of organizational renewal and change. A further function of such research is to point up elements of causality between the macro-, and micro-, levels of society. For the organizational researcher to contribute to this model of causality, an open system strategy will have to be adopted.

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The organizational and societal analysis reported here represents a culmination of academic and experiential work carried out over a number of years. During this period of time I developed both personal and working relationships with a number of individuals who influenced my thinking either directly or indirectly as I pondered the question of organizational change.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Background

Over the past decade we have witnessed the growth and development of a multitude of organizations[1] addressing themselves to improving urban life in a number of functional areas and in a number of ways. In fact, during the recent course of history in the United States, there has been a massive infusion of public funds into programs generally labeled as social action, and certainly no small amount of private funds have been similarly committed. In recent years examples of such programs include: Ford Foundation's Grey Areas Projects, the President's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime, War on Poverty, and the Model Cities Program.[2] Out of such programs there developed particular organizational forms designed to carry out specific purposes.

The War on Poverty was initiated by the Democratic Party and was facilitated through the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO).[3] When the late President Lyndon B. Johnson 'declared' the War on Poverty, the mechanism for coordination and, hopefully, leadership at the local level

was to be the Community Action Agency (CAA); while at the federal level such coordination and leadership was to come from OEO. The Community Action Agencies were organized as private, non-profit agencies eligible to receive federal monies directly without necessarily passing through the city and State governmental levels. 'Widespread citizen participation' was a central concept in the efforts of CAA's to mobilize local resources in poverty communities, and this concept proved elusive in both its operational definition and implementation in the field.

Following close on the heels of War on Poverty legislation was legislation which called for the development of the Model Cities Program.[4] Management consultant Alan Madian[5] reminds us that,

> By 1967, three years after the War on Poverty was launched, President Johnson had shifted the principal coordinating responsibilities for urban poverty programs to Model Cities. The aim of Model Cities was to find a means of bringing together the physical rehabilitation provided by urban renewal and the social programs provided by the domestic cabinet departments and the OEO. (Madian, 1971, p. 10)

Madian notes that a major innovation of Model Cities was giving money directly to the cities rather than channeling it to the cities through the states. John Strange[6] notes other changes between the Community Action approach and the Model Cities program as far as participation is concerned. First, local governments rather than private, non-profit agencies were provided with ultimate

responsibility for the local administration and operation of the program. Second, participation of the poor (or neighborhood residents) was to be limited rather than maximized, and governmental and business participation was guaranteed.

Few pieces of domestic legislation have created as much controversy in recent years as has the mandate for 'maximum feasible participation' of the poor in the Community Action Programs of OEO and the attempts to insure 'widespread citizen participation' in the Demonstration Cities Program of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). It should be noted however that citizen participation is not new to the politics of the United States. In fact,

> Citizen participation and control of government has been a widely accepted objective of our government from its inception. (Strange, 1971, p. 1)

Attention to and support for citizen participation have been especially evident on the local level, and on both the state and local level the attempt to institutionalize participation has been one of the three major goals of governmental reformers. The pursuit of the objective of citizen participation has been an elusive goal which has varied in importance and in the intensity with which it has been pursued.

In more recent times we can assess the decline in intensity of the pursuit of this objective. After the rise

in prominence in 1964 and 1965 of OEO's call for 'maximum feasible participation,' legislative authors of the Model Cities legislation could not escape the necessity to pay obeisance to the tenet of participation. There was an attempt to limit the emphasis on participation by the poor and the Black by calling for the 'widespread' participation of the business and organizational elements in a community rather than the 'maximum feasible participation' of the poor.[7]

Numerous observers have attempted to classify the various results participation might have. Sherry Arnstein[8] describes participation as a ladder with eight rungs extending from manipulative participation (non-participation) to citizen control. Other rungs of the ladder include: (2) therapy (non-participation--a substitute for the planning and conduct of programs); (3) informing (citizens are informed, but play no role in decision-making); (4) consultation (citizens are heard but lack the power to insure that their views will be heeded); (5) placation (citizen is responded to in order to create the impression that he has influence); (6) partnership (negotiation and compromise between citizens and program bureaucrats); and (7) delegated power.

An emphasis was placed on decreasing citizen participation with the inauguration of President Nixon. This decreasing emphasis was manifest in OEO by a lack of

concern with the extent of participation prior to funding, denial of funds for organizational activities, transfer of OEO programs to other agencies having less stringent participation requirements, increasing emphasis on research and planning as opposed to action, general reductions in funding levels and a general discouragement of citizen participation.

Section 103 of the legislative act bringing Model Cities into existence in 1967 (see footnote 4) indicates that in order for a program to be eligible for assistance, there must be "widespread citizen participation in the program." This was only one of thirty (30) requirements necessary for the acceptance of an application. In May 1969, a Model Cities memorandum banned exclusive initiation of projects by citizens' groups and required all Model Cities agencies to assure HUD that in no case would "the city's ability to take responsibility for developing the plan" be impeded. The technical and financial assistance provided to citizens' groups by HUD was better planned and more thorough than that provided by OEO, however, citizens' groups still encountered major obstacles in their attempts to influence and/or control the Model Cities program.

> Advice giving, employment, organized support for the program, were all legitimate roles for citizens to play. But not control. That was to remain the province of the professionals and the elected politicians. (Strange, 1971, p. 21)

Another aspect of the Model Cities Program which decreased citizen participation was the emphasis on planning.[9] The emphasis on planning resulted in an increased importance of professional staff, thus reducing the potential impact of citizens.

In another vein, both Model Cities and Community Action Programs hired more Black and low income persons than had previous federal programs, especially in program or management positions. Secondly, more Black and low income persons held positions on decision-making boards than in any previous governmental program. Third,

> . . . of all the minority group members and persons with below average incomes, those persons who participated were more likely to have more education, a higher income, and generally higher status than those who did not participate. (Strange, 1971, p. 23)[10]

Strange goes on to note the likelihood that the emphasis on participation and the actual involvement of new groups of citizens in these programs stimulated a desire to participate and also increased hopes for more assistance from government and new social, political and economic benefits. Further, participants are also likely to have learned about governmental activities and operations from their participation.

Relative to changes in public policy, there is little evidence as to what impact has resulted from both the Community Action and Model Cities Programs.[11] From

his fieldwork, Strange suggests that it can be argued that the emphasis on citizen participation did alter policy discussion in one way: it forced policy makers to deal with the problems of race. In other words, no longer could policy be made without considering the reactions and desires of racial minorities. Following close on the heels of the War on Poverty was the Model Cities Program. For all intent and purpose, these programs have run their natural life cycle, and we now observe the Republican Party-led proposal for general revenue sharing.[12]



Figure I: Federal Program Progression Over Time

Alan Madian in his assessment of the above progression speaks of a federal strategy of substitution. Madian's point is that substitution is the federal strategy for dealing with organizational or program failure. This implies that the new organization is assigned the original

task of the first organization. Existing organizations are kept alive by those they are servicing, regardless of the effectiveness of that service.

However, such a federal strategy does not create conditions necessary and sufficient for the development of organizational competence. Perhaps such a strategy correlates closely with Piven and Cloward's (1971)[13] view of the actual function of these social/physical planning programs. The above authors' proposition is that OEO and Model Cities were merely partisan political attempts to harness a burgeoning Black/poor vote in an unstable urban environment. The social conditions in the urban areas throughout the nation in the middle and late sixties provided an atmosphere of racial polarization, instability of organizational life (both social and formal organizations), unemployment and discontent.[14] The colleges and universities of the country did not escape the influence of events in the cities and one outcome was the development on campuses of Black, urban and ethnic affairs centers and/or departments.[15]

The attempt to deal more directly with trouble in the cities was facilitated through measures intended to 'assimilate' the urban Black and low-income population.

> Some of the larger foundations, expecially those with national interests and perspectives, were the first to act on this view of the problem. In the late 1950's, for example, the Ford Foundation inaugurated a "Great Cities" program through which

> money was funneled to urban school systems for experimental programs designed to reverse the high rates of academic failure among black youth. Later, Ford funded "Grey Areas" projects in several cities to encourage local leaders to get together on plans for new approaches to "urban problems." (Piven and Cloward, 1971, p. 232)

In other words, foundation money was used in an attempt to activate local professional and political elites, and to induce them to be more responsive to the urban Black populace. Such private sector, or perhaps more accurately 'third sector,'[16] monies pre-dated the public sector involvement in such social programs.

In the cities, one outcome was a number of human service organizations funded by both private and public sector monies. Because of social, political and economic conditions, the urban areas and principally inner-city cores became magnets for both public and private sector monies.

The Organization Under Study

One such organization which developed in the inner-city core of Boston was a result of such 'money magnetism.' At a time when this particular section of Boston (known as Roxbury) experienced its urban rebellion, racial polarization was at a peak and the common correlates of social disorganization were present. Events in late 1967 provided for the development of the organization under study here. It was at that juncture that representatives from the Black

community and the university community[17] came together and began a series of sessions which culminated in the receipt of a four (4) year demonstration grant from a large private foundation. The monies were to provide for the development of a "new institutional form, an organization capable of acting as a broker between the university and the community." For analytical purposes here, we shall refer to this young, ambitious organizational form as Alpha, Inc.

Alpha, Inc.'s first year of operation was 1968. The organizational analysis in this study focuses on one year, spanning September 1971 to September 1972. Alpha, Inc. was moving into its fourth year of operation in September 1971 and had undergone a series of internal structural and administrative changes, perhaps reflecting the instability of its task environment.[18] The one-year time span under study here promised to be a period in which the even more intensive structural changes occurred as Alpha moved to adapt to environmental change and to adopt strategies appropriate for dealing with an altered task environment.

At a macro-sociological level, a set of social, political and economic conditions led to the development of structural reforms societal-wide, designed to socialize broader segments of the urban and rural populations. The concern here is primarily with micro-sociological analysis,

but with secondary concern for conditions and causality at a macro-level. David Rogers[19] suggests as his central research question: "What affects service delivery in inner cities?" The answer, he states, is in terms of 'macro' and 'micro' determinants. The macro aspects relate to characteristics of the city, of state-city, and federal-state-city relations; the micro aspects relate to characteristics of particular delivery systems in the city. The micro aspects, Rogers reminds us, are derivative phenomena, understood within a broader political context.

Rogers further asserts that:

> The state of the social sciences (in particular sociology, political science, economics) is so primitive on these questions that it is not easy to develop models or conceptual schemes. (Rogers, 1971, p. 148)

For future research, a conceptual scheme including four parameters, each broken down into sets of variables, was formulated by Rogers. They include: (1) the political setting or environment; (2) the organizational design (both planned and unplanned) of the delivery system; (3) the nature of the transactions (bargaining, negotiations) among the participants; and (4) the outputs.[20] Political setting characteristics seen as critical include: the extent of institutional and interest group differentiation; the extent to which any integrative structures exist (machines, parties, city-wide voluntary associations, city bureaucracies, political leadership) to link and

coordinate disparate interests; a strong or weak mayoralty system; reform or machine-style politics; the degree of stability or volatility of a city's politics; the extent of harmony or conflict in city-state and city-state-federal relations; and the extent of organization and power of the poor. The second parameter, organizational design of the delivery system,[21] denotes the nature of the relationship among participating agencies in any particular development programs. Variables here include: extent of lateral and vertical differentiation; extent of unit autonomy; and what integrative mechanisms exist to encourage collaborative problem-solving.

The third parameter refers to transactions within and across agencies.

> In the language of game theory, we view transactions as win-lose, lose-lose, or win-win. Our interest is in ascertaining the conditions under which the parties work together productively, in a win-win or joint payoff relation. (Rogers, 1971, p. 149)

The final parameter, outputs, includes conventional measures (e.g., reading scores, housing starts, training, placement, retention, and promotion rates); as well as more qualitative but equally important data on the extent of innovation in administration (use of new management techniques), and the extent of growth in the capacity of all agencies to coordinate.

The conceptual framework formulated by Rogers has proven useful as a heuristic device, both in his particular

concern with a comparative study of municipal government, municipal-state-federal relations, and the development of viable delivery systems; and in interorganizational studies carried out recently by the Center for Policy Research which address questions relative to interorganizational coordination, organizational stratification and the macro context within which such phenomena occur. Such a framework will be of great utility as we explore the case study of an inner city organization whose ascendance, development and attendant decline and need for change were predicated upon macro and micro aspects.

When Alpha, Inc. was founded in January 1968, it was described by its founders as the only existing coalition melding services, resources and interaction with surrounding white universities. Alpha has operated on the basis of two principles: that community action should be carried out by community residents; that such action should be supported by social science research. At the time of its founding, Alpha's goals were set and they remain: to help minority community organizations achieve cultural, psychological, political, economic and social control over the factors, internal and external, which affect and direct them.[22] Specifically, the organization's public goals[23] as a broker state its principles:

> The liberation of Black people.
>
> The building of a Black community which has

cultural, psychological, political, economic and social control over those factors, internal and external, which affect and direct its life expression and its destiny.

The development in the Black community of a value system based on unity, love and trust.[24]

In late 1970 and on into 1971, Alpha, Inc was confronted with a task environment which was directing less and less money into inner-city human service programs. The management of Alpha, Inc. was interested in strengthening the activities and programs and broadening the scope and involvement of Alpha in order to make it an economically self-sufficient and growing organization. This task was set to be achieved at a time when there existed a depressed demand for general community services as reflected in the economy in general and decreased funding for special research grants.[25]

Community groups were affiliated with Alpha for a period of two years for training and service. Some of the groups maintained an educational orientation, while others were self-help oriented. These agencies indicated to Alpha the kinds of training and support which were needed, and Alpha designed curriculum and created courses and experience to meet their demands. Such programs often took the form of leadership activities, community organizational efforts, support and direction in fund-raising and research activities. With the goals and objectives of the groups in mind, Alpha provided additional assistance

by defining educational priorities and long-range goals.[26]

By September of 1971, Alpha, Inc. found itself at a point of transition which was to require organizational renewal and change. The organizational research proposed here provides an empirical statement of one year in that process. Those factors impacting upon Alpha were as broad as societal-wide, and as focused as its local community. The concern here is with the theory of organizations, as distinct from organization theory in the sense suggested by Rapoport and Horvath.[27]

> The theory of organizations purports to be a social science. It puts real human organizations at the center of interest. It may study the social structure of organizations and so can be viewed as a branch of sociology; it can study the behavior of individuals or groups as members of organizations and so can be viewed as a part of social psychology; it can study power relations and principles or control in organizations and so fits into political science. (Rapoport and Horvath, 1968, p. 74)

The concern proposed here will principally be with the initial-mentioned focus, though the latter two will not escape attention. In that the method is social scientific, prediction and explanation of social phenomena will be of concern. And the sociological concern is with the organization's social structure as related to other internal variables, and to the external, or institutional sphere.

An interesting parallel to Alpha, Inc.'s organizational type was a short-lived organization which developed in Chicago in 1969 in the aftermath of Dr. Martin Luther

King's assassination. As Dan Rottenberg states,[28] Dr. King had been dead less than a year, and in cities across the nation there was a sense of urgency among civic leaders, a feeling that the nation's urban racial problems could not be put off. There formed a group of white executives (a new kind of corporate executive which developed almost overnight, the vice president for 'good works and community affairs') representing the stolid financial institutions in Chicago who began dialogue with Black leaders. The white executives were anxious to build parks, improve schools, and set up job training programs in the Black community. The Black leaders felt that the answer to urban race relations was not for whites to solve the problems of Blacks, but for whites to provide Blacks with the resources to solve their problems themselves.

In their own meetings, the Blacks had developed a possible direction to move: a Black self-help think tank, to be known as the Black Strategy Center. It was projected that such an entity would bring leadership and expertise in health, youth guidance, and economic development to a wide range of Black community organizations.

Despite the doubt of the white corporate investors, twenty-three major Chicago companies put together $642,000. to fund the operation of the Black Strategy Center for one year. Of the twenty-three companies that contributed to the project, fifteen gave $25,000. each. The leaders of

thirteen of those companies formed the steering committee of the center's white support group.

The Black Strategy Center was to have been a resource center[29] run by Blacks for Blacks, funded with white money but free of white control. The Center's board of directors had been limited to fifteen under the assumption that a larger board would be unwieldy, but this meant that more than half the fifty participating black organizations were not represented on the board. There was initial disagreement over the function and direction of the center once tax-exempt status was secured.[30] There were those who wanted the center to take on an activist stance and solve problems itself, and those who wanted it to be a resource center to be used by other community groups. The center staff was anxious to plot broad, long-range programs, but the supporting white businessmen wanted to see some concrete accomplishments as quickly as possible. It was eventually agreed not to require the center to produce a few specific programs, but to allow it simply to react to the needs of its constituent organizations in whatever way the center's staff desired.

> The white executives were learning to tolerate the ideas of people who had different value systems and different priorities, and to apply the concept of laissez faire to the black community in which they had invested a great deal of money. (Rottenberg, 1973, p. 79)

As summer of 1970 moved into fall, the whites commissioned

a management consulting firm to evaluate the center's projects.

> The report confirmed the whites' worst fears. It took into account the difficulties faced by the center but concluded that "progress to date must be considered disappointing. Failure to achieve stable, unified leadership is the most critical failing of the center's first year of operation. . . . Selection, planning and management of projects by the center have generally been haphazard. . . . Substantial changes are needed if the Black Strategy Center is to become a viable force in dealing with significant black issues during the next year." (Rottenberg, 1973, p. 80)

After much scrambling, re-assessing and meeting, the white principals decided that the Black Strategy Center as it then existed was not their cup of tea. They advised their fellow supporting businessmen that financial support of the center would cease as of December 31, 1970. "The support group will review steps taken by the Black Strategy Center at the end of March 1971 and will at that time determine whether the center merits further financial support," the form letter stated. However, the center had no other means of support; thus it folded as soon as the white businessmen's money ran out.

Where had the money been allocated and what was there to show from its expenditures? On one hand the contention was that the center did not have a strong board. Instead of spending $600,000. on a center and salaries and office equipment, just $300,000. could have been spent on the center and the remaining $300,000. could

have been divided into ten $30,000. demonstration grants for other Black organizations, and those organization representatives could have comprised the board.[31] Otherwise, those organizations could be expected to regard the center as competition for funds from the white community.[32]

The example cited above with the aborted Black Strategy Center points up a parallel within another context of the developmental problems of a resource center, think-tank type of organization within a Black, inner-city community. There was a similarity between the macro conditions which gave rise to both organizations. In the case of the Black Strategy Center, operating monies came from the private, business community. With Alpha, the initial monies were private, philanthropic foundation (or third sector) based, followed a year later by federal, research monies. It was approximately one year after the Black Strategy Center was informed that funding would cease that Alpha was advised that its third sector funding was being discontinued (December of 1971). The primary difference in these two instances is that the Black Strategy Center's dependence was concentrated in one place (i.e., the private, business community), while Alpha's dependence was more dispersed (i.e., the NIMH monies were to last until September of 1973 and Alpha had developed other revenue-generating projects). The Black Strategy Center was thus unable to survive, while Alpha

had the resources, despite having to make cutbacks, to chart in earnest the arduous path of organizational survival.

Defining Concepts

The problem or question under study here, deals with organizational renewal. That is, what are conditions internal and external to an organizational system which render renewal problematic? What conditions make organizational renewal a prerequisite for organizational survival? Further, in this context, what are the variables of concern relative to organizational renewal and change? Fundamentally, what do we mean by organizational renewal? And how do we define and operationalize change in organizational systems?

The twelve-month period spent in field research with Alpha, Inc. will aid in specifying and describing elements of organizational renewal and change. In addressing this problem, the concern will be with questions of: (1) task environment influence (in the social, political and economic sense); (ii) productivity; (iii) turnover rates; (iv) structural change; (v) organizational rigidity; (vi) communication; (vii) decision-making; (viii) board functions; (ix) changing publics (or clientele); (x) the role of a professional caucus; (xi) tolerance for bureaucracy by staff members; (xii) cooperative strategies;

(xiii) goals/objectives; (xiv) administrative behavior; and (xv) organizational survival. These variables will allow for the generation of empirical data which can provide a micro-analysis of organizational renewal and change. The mode of analysis is the case study method. The organization under study is Alpha, Inc., an entity undergoing rapid change in relation to an altered task environment.

That task environment consists of: (i) macro; and (ii) micro aspects which are themselves composed of general and specific elements. The broader context within which such conceptual elements occur, and are to be delineated herein, include the social, political and economic spheres. Thus, in the 1960's, a general, macro aspect within the social sphere was civil rights, urban unrest and attendant conditions which were perceived as indicating some level of political instability. This led to a specific response on the part of the private sector, the 'third sector'[33] and the public sector in the form of various types of programs and legislation designed to address the social, political and economic conditions.[34] In many instances, such a process gave rise to the development of organizations within urban areas which became dominated by a Black perspective which interpreted the condition of this population group as being analogous to a developing country. That is, the concern in working

within such an organizational context should address itself to political, social and economic development on the terms of this population segments' world view, not necessarily in accordance with city-state-federal funding guidelines and policies. Inherent in such a perspective, and attendant developmental process, are the concepts of renewal, change and survival within the organizational context.

Important within this context too, is the distinction Selznick makes in regard to the concepts 'organization' and 'institution.'[35] He states:

> The term "organization" thus suggests a certain bareness, a lean, no-nonsense system of consciously co-ordinated activities. It refers to an expendable tool, a rational instrument engineered to do a job. An "institution," on the other hand, is more nearly a natural product of social needs and pressures--a responsive, adaptive organism. (Selznick, 1957, p. 5)[36]

The world view of the need for social, political and economic development within a modernization context thus has as an important tenet, the need to 'institutionalize' various organizational[37] forms. The contradiction confronted by the Chinese in The Great Leap Forward thus poses a dilemma here and is a concern with which Black social theoreticians must grapple.

One of the basic differences between 'organization' and 'institution,' in Selznick's sense, relates to the definition of the environment. 'Organization' sees

the environment essentially one of change and challenge; 'institution' sees it as one of continuity and stability. The modern manager, like the military commander, sees danger around every corner; for him, change and not harmony is the natural order of things.

> In a basically harmonious world, man need not rely solely on the instruments of rationality. He can use all factors that enter into human relationships. But in a world defined as hostile, the insights and tools deriving from a rational approach to the world may be the only mechanisms of survival a man has. The turn from "institution" to "organization" demands a radical redefinition of the environment. (Schurmann, 1968, p. 235)

According to the usage of the concept 'task environment' adopted by James D. Thompson (1967) from William R. Dill (1958), to denote those parts of the environment which are "relevant or potentially relevant to goal setting and goal attainment," we can begin moving toward an understanding of renewal, change and survival in organizational systems; and also begin the re-definition needed if we are to comprehend 'organization' and 'institution' within a broader context. The task environment is defined by the dependence of the organization. Since dependence introduces constraints or contingencies;

> The problem for the organization is to avoid becoming subservient to elements of the task environment. . . . By scattering its dependence, it prevents the concentration of power over it. It need not concede power to a single element of the task environment. (Thompson, 1967, p. 32)

For any one organization which is in a dependence relation,

i.e., an element of the task environment has a concentration of power over the organization, the withdrawal of that particular relationship should initiate a process of renewal, leading to organizational change and hopefully, organizational survival.

By renewal is meant the process of self-examination, determination of purpose and the setting of a future direction.[38] With Alpha, Inc., as an organization operating under norms of rationality, such a renewal process included: (i) the commissioning of a management audit to cover four broad areas; (a) a money audit; (b) an operational audit; (c) the potential of a research and development arm; and (d) what is the potential of Alpha, Inc.,[39] as well as a (ii) two-day retreat to deal with 'intergroup problems' using "The Structured Group Interview."[40]

Following Griffiths (1970), change refers to an alteration in the organization structure, in any of its processes, or in its goals or purposes. Robert Mayer[41] reminds us that the notion of social-structural change is rooted in the elementary ideas of Emile Durkheim. One difficulty Durkheim had with this concept is the problem of reification, or the tendency to equate conceptual abstractions of reality with an actual piece of reality.[42] Another problem in the analysis of social-structural change is the determination of what constitutes change.

By social change is meant some alteration in a social system. Lewis A. Coser[43] made the attempt to distinguish changes of systems from changes within systems in order to resolve the problem of some part of the system remaining unchanged if the original objectives are to remain relevant.

> We propose to talk of a change of system when all major structural relations, its basic institutions, and its prevailing value system have been drastically altered. . . . Change of systems may be the result (or the sum total) of previous changes within the system. This does not, however, detract from the usefulness of the theoretical distinction. (Coser, 1967, p. 28)

Recognizing the distinction as an abstraction, Coser provides two criteria by which to judge system change: (i) the speed or the time over which change takes place; and (ii) the extent of the system affected by the given change. Using a model derived from Ernest Nagel's formulation,[44] Francesca Cancian[45] uses this model to differentiate between changes within a system and changes of a system.

> Change within the system refers to change that does not alter the system's basic structure. In a functional system, this means changes in state coordinates for which compensation is possible. G and the relationship between state coordinates remain the same. Change of the system is any change that alters the system's basic structure. In a functional system, this includes disappearance of G, the appearance of new state coordinates or the disappearance of old ones, and change in the range of variation of state coordinates for which compensation is possible. (Cancian, 1964, p. 119)

In referring to the distinction made by Cancian, Peter M. Blau[46] uses the terms 'macrostructures' and 'microstructures.' Microstructures have as their constituent elements interacting individuals or actors in the Parsonian sense. While in the case of macrostructures, the constituent elements are other social structures, that is, a macrostructure is, by definition, a complex social structure.

> . . . macrostructures tend to have enduring institutions whereas microstructures are more transitory. (Mayer, 1972, p. 33)

It can be demonstrated that there are three distinct ways in which social change as structural change can occur: (i) by reallocating the existing combination of roles and statuses to a different set of individuals or memberships; (ii) by altering the combination of roles characteristic of a given structure; and (iii) by redistributing the rights and obligations inherent in the statuses of that structure. When the replacement of personnel in the roles of the social structure occurs rapidly, or in large doses, significant changes in role definition or performance can occur. Thus, given a group of actors in a social system, it is possible to change the structure by creating new roles or redefining existing ones.[47]

Mayer reminds us that within the traditional literature dealing with social systems, there has been a tendency to analyze change in terms of sources within the

system itself, called endogenous factors, rather than sources external to the system, called exogenous factors.

Robert Nisbet[48] has drawn attention to the limitations of such an analytic bias. More often than not, changes in social systems or social structures result from invasion from the outside, that is in contact with other systems. Technological innovation is the most potent of such exogenous factors. In contrast, functionalism tends to explain change by reference to endogenous factors. Endogenous factors may be useful and appropriate for explaining why systems persist, but they are not very adequate for explaining why they change. As Nisbet points out, functionalism is a good theory of stability but a bad theory of change.

> In operational terms, social-structural change reduces to two basic processes: (1) incorporating different people into the same structure, or (2) incorporating the same people into different structures. Thus, the operational definition of social-structural change implies simply an alteration in the composition of either the actors in the structure or the roles and/or statuses of the structure. (Mayer, 1972, p. 41)[49]

Structural change does not always have ramifications in related systems. The degree of independence of a given subsystem (or organization) is an important factor in determining the feasibility of a proposed structural change. Social structural change as defined by Mayer is applicable within a limited set of circumstances. These circumstances can be elaborated in three

respects: (i) the scale of change; (ii) the power to change; and (iii) the sanctions to change.

The overall objective of the organization under study is survival. Thus the concern will be with renewal and change in an organizational system as it attempts to adapt to its task environment and survive. By survival is meant an organization's capacity to gain input from its task environment and to produce an output which is consumed by that task environment. Survival also refers to the ability of an organization to disperse its task environment influence, thus damping the control that any single element has over it. This degree of independence in a given organization is crucial in determining the likelihood of a given structural change. If the organization is dependent, then the less feasible is a given structural change and the less likely is the organization to survive once that dependent relation ceases.[50] The concepts of renewal, change and survival are thus interdependent phenomena.

CHAPTER II

THE THEORY AND LITERATURE

The case study will deal with the theory of organizations. Related to this concern is a third line of development which has come to be viewed as the third cornerstone of organization theory. This is the theory of decisions, which provides an orientation much more relevant to the theory or organizations than to organization theory. As will be seen in the case of Alpha, Inc., a basic decision had to be made upon completion of the management audit contracted in September of 1971.

> The "decision," i.e., a choice based on examining a state of affairs and the range of possible outcomes is the fundamental event of decision theory. (Rapoport and Horvath, 1968, p. 75)

As stated in the "Findings and Conclusions" section of the management audit:

> One of the major issues facing [Alpha] at this time is whether to focus its efforts on research activities or consulting activities. While we recognize that the dividing line between consulting and research can be drawn arbitrarily, such a decision is most important when put in the context of business development. . . . We do not suggest this question as an exclusive program--"we will do research and research only," but only as a way of focusing your efforts and resources, and as a tool in formulating business plans. In addition, this decision will provide some direction to the

> organization's thinking of how it will formulate plans for pursuing business, how it will conduct its business activities, and what type of reporting and follow-up plans are required or expected. . . . Chief among our recommendations is that [Alpha] should focus its efforts on research activities. (p. 4)

Alpha, Inc. thus had a strategic decision[1] to make once the management audit report was submitted in March of 1972. As with any decision, the management of Alpha, Inc. was hoping to make a decision which would be effective and implementable both now, and on into the future. Peter Drucker[2] reminds us that every decision is a risk-taking judgment and that the decision-making process should involve six steps: (i) the classification of the problem; (ii) the definition of the problem; (iii) the boundary conditions; (iv) the decision as to what is right in order to meet the boundary conditions; (v) the building into the decision of the action to carry it out (i.e., what does the action commitment have to be and who has to know about it?); and (vi) the feedback which tests the validity and effectiveness of the decision against the actual course of events.

Harold Wilensky[3] notes what he refers to as an intelligence failure, which means the inability to muster the intelligence needed for successful pursuit of organizational goals. Intelligence denotes information relevant to policy.

> High quality intelligence designates information that is clear because it is understandable

> to those who must use it; timely because it gets to them when they need it; reliable because diverse observers using the same procedures see it in the same way; valid because it is cast in the form of concepts and measures that capture reality (the tests include logical consistency, successful prediction, congruence with established knowledge or independent sources); adequate because the account is full (the context of the act, event, or life of the person or group is described); and wide-ranging because the major policy alternatives promising a high probability of attaining organizational goals are posed or new goals suggested. (Wilensky, 1967, pp. viii-ix)

Wilensky goes on to note that the nature of an executive decision itself shapes the uses and quality of intelligence because it affects the number, kinds, and organization of experts called to serve. When the executive is overwhelmed by uncertainty, in order to reduce his huge burden of calculation, he relies not on the expert but on precedent[4] and on trial and error, the short-run reaction to short-run feedback. This situation generally holds except where the decisions are so clearly technical and the problems or programs so clearly new that precedent provides a poor guide and expert planning promises much. In the case of the basic decision to be made by Alpha, Inc., being of a strategic nature, precedent would be of little help to the decision makers. However, with the strategic decision, time permitted the collection and analysis of information whose consequences would be long term. Thus we can infer that the management of Alpha, Inc. was not overwhelmed by uncertainty and could rely on

the expert[5] rather than on precedent.

In the organizational analysis of Alpha, Inc., the concern will not be with statements concerning general characteristics of organizations. These statements constitute the 'upper' level of organizational theory. Comparative analysis of organizations yields 'middle-range' theories. The concern here will be with the case study of an organization, a detailed observation of a single case. Amitai Etzioni reminds us:

> Many case studies of organizations close with some universal statements about organizational variables 'based' on the study of one organization. Researchers are often lured into such overgeneralizations for lack of a middle-range theory which would allow the formulation of specific statements -- that is, statements concerning subcategories of organizations. (Etzioni, 1961, p. xiii).

The primary concern of an Alpha, Inc. case study will be with generating empirical data which can foster the development of comparative studies of this subcategory of organization.

The Literature

Meyer N. Zald (1970) provides an analytic case study of a pervasive American institution, the Young Men's

Christian Association (YMCA). Zald's framework is a political economic one which the author states is not a substitute for decision theory, the human relations approach, or the concept of organizational rationality. This framework does subsume the others for analysis of organizational change. This choice of method seems to have worked well in Zald's case study and is worth attention by those who study or administer organizations. Daniel E. Griffiths (1970) states that the observer of social organization is forced to the conclusion that organizations are not characterized by change. Organizations, as purposive social units, come into existence with a great deal of built-in stability. This stability is of such magnitude as to comprise a potent resistance to change. Change in organizational systems does occur. However, there are few empirical measures of the initiation of change in organizations. Griffiths goes on to note that the observer of change must reconcile himself to study of the infrequent, not the frequent in organizational life. By change, Griffiths means:

> [A]n alteration in the structure of the organization, in any of its processes, or in its goals or purposes. (Griffiths, 1970, p. 428)

The revision of a rule, the introduction of a new procedure, or the revision of the purposes or direction of the organization can all be subsumed under the concept

of change. Griffiths proceeds to identify conditions aiding change in the form of a series of propositions.

Sheldon L. Messinger (1955) provides a historical case study of the decline of the Townsend Movement.[6] This movement Messinger referred to as being a 'value-oriented social movement.'[7] The author identifies five (5) stages in the transformation of the organizational character. These include: (i) an ascendant phase; (ii) lack of public concern in the organizational mission; (iii) a drop in membership; (iv) a shift to organizational maintenance; and (v) transformation. A 'value-oriented social movement' refers to social movements fundamentally oriented toward rendering some change in the social structure and of sufficient force to develop organizations. In the ascendant phases, when social forces press for reconstruction and changes are still in the offing, the concern of leaders and members of social movements alike is with those things that must be done to translate discontent into effective and concerted action.

If and when these organizations go into ascendancy they go into a process of transformation. Initially there is a lack of public concern for the organizational mission, membership drops and the dominating orientation of leaders and remaining members shifts from the implementation of the values the organization is taken to represent to maintaining the organizational structure as such, even

at the loss of the organization's central mission. With this process, the locus of issue-selection will tend to move outside the organization. The last stage of such an ascendancy process is with the change from a value-implementing agency to a recreation facility. The organization character will stand transformed.

The concern in this study is with an open system model in that one area of focus is task environment influence. The closed system strategy (Taylor, 1911; Gulick and Urwick, 1937; Weber, 1947) involved the implicit assumption that the organizational problems of an enterprise can be analyzed and solved within the internal environment and that changes in the external environment could be accommodated within the existing organization. In support of this approach, the organization was considered a 'determinate' system in theory and a 'mechanistic' system in practice. Since most literature on organizations was a by-product of the search for improved efficiency or performance internally, and since this required that organizational variables (both internal and external) be fixed or at least predictable, the organization had to fit the researcher's world. The premise was that the organization was rational and stable in either a rational and stable world or in an irrational and unstable world that could be locked out.

The open system (Barnard, 1938; Selznick, 1949;

Clark, 1956) approach of this stream refutes much of the closed-system ideal, stressing that organizations are not autonomous entities. Further, the best-laid plans and the most astute controls do not eliminate unintended consequences of policy nor do they prepare and condition the organization to absorb and cope with environmental shocks. Herein is a shift in thinking--from the "search for certainty" to the "expectation of uncertainty" (Thompson, 1967). Thus, we assume that a system contains more variables than we can comprehend at one time or that some of the variables are subject to influences that we cannot fully control or predict.

Organizations are dependent on other organizations and social units for input and output, for the relative stability of these transactions and the assurance of their continuation into the future, and for the varied psychological and social benefits that the environment can offer the organization.

The 'natural system' approach to the organization is a variation on the open-system model. This approach assumes the system to be determined by nature, but it is our incomplete understanding which forces us to expect surprise or the intrusion of uncertainty (Roethlisberger and Dickson, 1939). It is admitted that there is considerable interdependence with the environment. However, the trait of homeostasis gives the organization the inherent

capability of maintaining a viable system in the face of disturbances in the environment. This internal and external stability is assisted by complicated networks of informal relations.

The former open system (Barnard, 1938; Selznick, 1949; Clark, 1956) model asserts that the interdependence of organization and environment is inevitable and natural, adaptive and functional. At the same time, specific strategies are needed to adjust to and utilize effectively the organizational milieu. A few years later, Katz and Kahn (1966) spoke of the phenomenon of negative entropy[8] as further support for open-system dependencies of the organization. In other words, by importing more energy from its environment than it expends, the organization can store energy and forestall the possibility of disorganization or chaos.

Selznick's (1949) carefully written description of a new institution's (TVA) adjustment to its environment paved the way for the development of types of environmental strategies, especially in the interorganizational area. The work of Selznick also influenced writers such as Clark, March, Cyert, Parsons and Simon to give due weight to environmental forces in their analyses of the organization. Given that attention, planned and organized strategies for environmental adaptation and influence began to appear. Thompson and McEwen (1958) made a

contribution through the study of organizational goals and environment. The authors postulate that goal-setting is purposive and not necessarily rational. They identify basically two strategies for dealing with the environment, (a) competition and (b) cooperation. These constitute procedures for gaining support from the organizational milieu. The selection of one of these is a strategic problem. Both strategies provide a measure of environmental control over organizations by providing for outsiders to enter into or limit the organizational decision process.

The setting of goals is essentially a problem of defining the desired relationships between an organization and its environment. As stated above, goal-setting is purposive, not necessarily rational. And the most calculated and careful determination of goals may be negated by developments outside the control of organization members.

As the goals call for increasingly intangible, difficult-to-measure products, society finds it more difficult to determine and reflect its acceptability of that product and the signals that indicate unacceptable goals are less effective and longer in coming. And efforts must produce something useful or acceptable to at least a part of the organization environment to win continued support.

As noted earlier, the authors enumerate two strategies for dealing with the environment, (a) competition and (b) cooperation. Competition is the process whereby the organization's choice of goals is partially controlled by the environment. This tends to prevent unilateral or arbitrary choice of organizational goals. Cooperation can either be in the form of (i) bargaining, (ii) co-optation, or (iii) coalition. There all constitute procedures for gaining support from the organization milieu. The selection of one or more of these is a strategic problem. It is here that the element of rationality becomes important.

The authors pre-date Bennis'[9] thinking in regard to the efficacy of temporary organizations. For they state that one of the requirements for survival appears to be the ability to learn about the milieu accurately enough and quickly enough to permit organizational adjustments in time to avoid extinction. Running tangentially to this need is that of estimating the position of other relevant organizations and their willingness to enter into or alter relationships. This necessitates a sounding-out process. The ambiguity of sounding-out has a further advantage to participants, that neither party alone is clearly responsible for initiating the change. This 'deliberate ambiguity' is a process and a strategy.

A Statement of Propositions

According to A Modern Dictionary of Sociology (1969)

a proposition is a "generalized statement of a relationship among facts." Most often in sociological usage the term refers to a hypothesis that has been affirmed by empirical research but is not sufficiently established to be considered a scientific law. By conflict, we shall refer to as "direct and conscious struggle between individuals or groups for the same goal, and unlike competition, opponents are primarily oriented toward each other rather than toward the object they seek." Also, conflict is intermittent rather than continuous. Conflict resolution refers to a negotiated settlement of the conscious struggle which renders the relationship a cooperative, or competitive one. At the macro-level, two models of social intervention entail conflict. One is the conflict-containment model, and the other is the conflict-intensification model. The latter model is appropriate to conflict theory and the writings of Hobbes, Hume, Marx, et al.

Rolf Dahrendorf (1958) sees the conflict model, which emphasizes change, conflict, and constraint, as a balance to the recent emphasis in sociology on the equilibrium or 'utopian' model, which emphasizes stability, harmony, and consensus in societal analysis.

Social action agencies seemingly overlap two of Etzioni's (1961) analytical classifications of organizations based upon their compliance structures. The

utilitarian and normative compliance structures prevail in most social action agencies, i.e., utilitarian in the sense that remuneration provides a major means of control over participants and normative in the sense that normative power provides a means of control. Organizations, such as social action agencies, which develop compliance structures in which two patterns occur with the same or similar frequency, Etzioni refers to as dual compliance structures. The organizational type which provides the closest approximation to the dual-utilitarian/normative compliance structure is the labor union. By inference then, we are saying that social action agencies approximate labor unions as organizational types.

Proposition 1.0: The effective elite hierarchy is one in which the structure of the elites and the hierarchy of goal (or goals and means) are congruent. (Etzioni, 1959)

Relationships between elites are also compared as to the form their interaction takes, in terms of the degree of cooperation or antagonism. Cooperation may be based on formal co-optation or informal collaboration; antagonism may be accompanied by overt or open conflict (see Thompson and McEwen, 1958; Marcus, 1960). Cooperation and/or conflicts are thus related to organizational effectiveness.

Proposition 1.1: Co-optation (following Selznick, 1948; 1953) tends to promote commitment to organizational activities.

Co-optation implies a congruence in goals, thus commitment to such goals makes conflict resolution more likely.

Proposition 1.2: Those most alienated from the organization tend to be inactive or drop-out. (Etzioni, 1961; Newcomb, 1943)

Implicit in this proposition is that alienation has as a by-product, conflict. The organizational participant may then exercise an 'exit option' or a 'voice option' (see Hawley, 1971). The voice option is manifest in the form of dissatisfaction, protest and conflict. As a result, management (or organizational elites) may engage in a search for causes and possible cures (conflict resolution).

Proposition 1.3: Upward expressive communication is limited in all organizations. (Etzioni, 1961; Schumpeter, 1950)

Criteria for decisions tend to be communicated downward, more often than upward. Consistent with this assumption is that change tends to be top-down. Providing a sense of participation in decision-making (Bass, 1965; Pelz, 1956) decreases the likelihood of conflict over decision outcomes, and forges a congruence between planners and doers.

Proposition 1.4: Utilitarian organizations emphasize vertical instrumental communication. (Read, 1959)

This organizational type is the most rational, and coordination, planning, and centralized decision-making are

emphasized here.

Proposition 1.5: Hierarchical cohesion tends to be directly related to lower participants' positive involvement in the organization. (Etzioni, 1961)

Positive involvement implies less probability for overt conflict to develop, and if it does develop, the former provides an atmosphere for conflict resolution.

Thompson (1967) talks about dominant coalitions and organizational control in relation to the potential for conflict.

Proposition 1.6: Potential for conflict within the dominant coalition increases with interdependence of the members.

Proposition 1.7: Potential for conflict within the dominant coalition increases as external forces require internal compromise on outcome preferences.

Proposition 1.8: Potential for conflict within the dominant coalition increases with the variety of professions incorporated.

Smith and Tannenbaum (1963) and Tannenbaum (1961) developed a control graph (a descriptive model) which is a conceptual-methodological tool designed to characterize the pattern of control in formal organizations. Control was defined in the broad sense to refer to any process in which a person (or group of persons or organization of persons) determines or intentionally affects what another person or organization will do. One proposition they

intended to explore was the relationship between aspects of control, measures of organizational effectiveness and member attitudes toward the organization ('index of member loyalty').

Proposition 1.9: Control by all levels in an organization provides the basis for effective coordination of organizational activity, as well as for the integration of goals of individual members and the organization, with this coordination and integration being conducive to high organizational effectiveness. (Likert, 1960)

This proposed relationship was found in the empirical studies noted above in voluntary associations, labor unions and delivery companies.

Control and conflict seem to be mutually interdependent phenomena; however, little is known about organizational control processes and their implications.

Classical organization theory assumed that subordinates are concerned only with their own needs, and not the goals of the organization. Classical theory assumed the subordinate resists change and is not a good decision-maker. Bass (1965) asserts that classical theory is actually a collection of hortatory rules based on nineteenth-century military formulas modified for the purpose of industry. These rules have been further modified for the purpose of non-industrial organizations. The pyramidal organization is generated by these formulas

and assumptions. Organizational search for new approaches to the changing environment is difficult, if not impossible. And conflict is resolved in a quasi-military manner. Phenomena associated with interactions between individuals are ignored, and individuals are treated as units. The classical rules were deduced from faulty assumptions about human motivation, learning and perception which have led to a conflict-generating climate within industrial and non-industrial organizations. The attempt to resolve conflict within the bounds of classical rules further exacerbates the organizational dilemma. Modern behavioral science offers:

> More effective organizations [which] are made about interested and able people; in small, freely communicating, face-to-face groups; under articulate and dedicated leadership; deeply committed to a clear and challenging objective and thoroughly involved in solving the problems which stand in the way of achieving the objective. (J. P. Jones, 1962)

This view is probably utopian, but it does represent efforts by modern behavioral scientists to render a synthesis of the modern and classical approaches.

Basically then, the classical approach recognized no conflict between man and organization. The structuralist school views some conflict and strain between man and organization as inevitable and by no means always undesirable.

Following Mack (1965):

Proposition 2.0: Dynamic or open systems are more likely to be productive of conflict than closed systems.

Proposition 2.1: The exercise of power generates opposition.

Proposition 2.2: Differentiation, stratification and constraint lead to the creation of subcultures.

Implicit in Proposition 2.2 is that the concept of ethnocentrism renders conflict more probable among subcultures (in organizations, subcultures, subgroups, informal groups).

Proposition 2.3: Conflict within a given group promotes the formation of subgroups.

Proposition 2.4: Conflict not only promotes group formation, it can destroy groups.

Proposition 2.5: Conflict defines and maintains group boundaries and contributes to social cohesion.

This list could be extended by calling upon the propositional inventories on conflict, such as those by Robin Williams, Lewis Cose, Rolf Dahrendorf, Raymond Mack, et al. These propositions offer good research leads in the areas of: (i) the number and nature of parties to conflict; (ii) the nature of issues; (iii) the stability of power relations; (iv) the mode of resolution; and (v) the suddenness and degree of structural change.

Following Blau and Scott (1966) in their study of welfare agencies, we can suggest that conflict in organizations which rigid bureaucratization is designed to

conceal and suppress, are an inevitable source of change, and that the resulting organizational developments can be conceptualized as dialectical processes.

In his interesting little book, The Limits of Organizational Change (1970), Herbert Kaufman suggests that because organizations change in an incremental fashion, their survival rate should be closely associated with the rate of change in their environment. If the environment changes swiftly or unexpectedly, we would anticipate a great slaughter of organizations. Those organizations unable to adapt would seemingly experience a high death rate.

Important in the understanding of organizational change is the concept of survival. The shift from strict attention to goal achievement (effectiveness) to survival is provided by the open-system strategy (Thompson, 1967). Such a strategy incorporates uncertainty by recognizing organizational interdependence with the environment. The determination of 'what is the environment' is crucial from the standpoint of setting organizational boundaries. For when the boundaries of an organization can no longer be distinguished, it is safe to assume that the bonds holding the organization together have dissolved. Such bonds, or 'magnetism' include: (i) emotional bonds; (ii) moral bonds; (iii) bonds of expediency; (iv) habitual bonds; and (v) physical bonds. The greater the number of bonds

holding an organization together, the harder it is to disintegrate it and the more likely it is to reassemble itself after having been dismantled (cf., Death of Health Council chapter in Community Involvement).[10] Most organizations are not united by such a variety of bonds. And, in fact, in modern societies bonds of expediency are probably the most widely used type. This is the reason that so much organization theory is addressed almost exclusively to the rational calculation of inducements to enter and contribute to an organization.

But as organizations learn what sorts of adaptations are required for survival, they may "theoretically" change themselves to satisfy those requirements. The question then becomes, "How many changes can an organization make before it is regarded as a totally new organization?"

For Parsons in "Suggestions for a Sociological Approach to the Theory of Organizations" (1956), an organization is seen as a system which 'produces' an identifiable something which can be utilized in some way by another system. Thus, the output of an organizational system is, for another system, an input. The boundary specification here refers to adjacent systems. Adjacent is used in the functional sense (to refer to organizations whose outputs become direct inputs of a given organization or whose inputs include the direct output of a given

organization) as well as in the spatial sense. Parsons' general model thus has three anchor points: (i) the systems from which an organization receives its inputs or resources; (ii) the values, structure and norms which compose the organization as a system; and (iii) those systems which use the output of the organization as an input. For a non-profit organization (as Alpha, Inc. was in 1971) the question of measurement of output becomes problematic. Effectiveness is measured by the extent to which outputs accomplish an organization's objectives, and efficiency is measured by the relationship between inputs and outputs. In most non-profit organizations, output is not measured in quantitative terms. There is therefore no one good way to estimate if any additional inputs (i.e., costs) will produce commensurate outputs. The inadequacy of output measures is the central technical problem.

Organizational boundaries thus relate to a system concept (i.e., inputs, conversion process and outputs); the functional and spatial sense of adjacency; and the concept of bonds. Change, in both the environment and in the organization, means an alteration in structure, processes, goals, or purposes. Accordingly, there are different degrees of change. Griffiths (1970) in discussing open systems states they have certain characteristics distinguishing them from closed systems (Hearn, 1958).

These include: (i) open systems with inputs and outputs; (ii) open systems tend to maintain steady states; (iii) open systems are self-regulating; (iv) open systems display 'equifinality,' i.e., identical results can be obtained from different initial conditions; (v) open systems function without persistent conflicts that can be neither resolved nor regulated; (vi) open systems maintain steady states through feedback processes; and (vii) open systems display progressive segregation, i.e., this process occurs when the system divides into a hierarchical order of subordinate systems which gain a certain independence of each other.

If we assume that an organization is an open system that maintains a definite boundary, then the systemic properties of the organization and its environment implies an order to the concepts of organizational change and organizational renewal. Such ordering is embodied under the tenets of general system theory. Thus, organizational renewal in my usage corresponds to the feedback processes. As defined in Chapter One, "by renewal is meant the process of self-examination, determination of purpose and the setting of a future direction." In general, feedback refers to that portion of the output of a system which is fed back to the input and affects succeeding outputs, and to the property of being able to adjust future conduct by reference to past performance.

Organizational change, though infrequent and incremental, does occur. At times the change is radical. Under what conditions might change be expected to occur:

Proposition 2.6: The major impetus for change in organizations is from the outside.

Proposition 2.7: The degree and duration of change is directly proportional to the intensity of the pressure from the adjacent (supra-) system.

Proposition 2.8: Systems respond to continuously increasing stress first by a lag in response, then by an over-compensatory response, and finally by collapse of the system (non-survival).

Proposition 2.9: The more hierarchical the structure of an organization, the less the possibility of change.

Proposition 3.0: When change in an organization does occur, it will tend to occur from the top down, not from the bottom up.

In order to assemble the interdependent phenomena of survival, change and renewal in organizational systems, we must identify and attempt to measure stress, or pressure from an outside system(s). Explicit here is the proposition that organizational change is more likely given such outside pressure. Such stress, or pressure, then activates the sometimes dormant renewal process, which allows the organization under stress to begin the adaptation process. The externally-induced change process, and the renewal process thus interact as independent variables allowing us to predict survival (as the dependent variable). The

renewal, or feedback, process is of utmost importance here. For with continuous outside pressure as an inducement for change, if there is a lag in initial response (i.e., the renewal/feedback process 'misfires') the renewal process, once initiated, tends toward overcompensation and then the likelihood of system non-survival is increased. This implies that once the external pressure, or stress, is identified as possessing the potential for fostering organizational change, the renewal process should begin concurrently. Such an interdependence in timing is important if the organizational system is to embark on a process of survival.

The three major hypotheses outlined in Chapter Three represent an attempt to reflect the change, renewal and survival concepts and process. It is the intent of the hypotheses to capture those elements internal, and external, to a particular organizational system which can explain change and renewal, and predict survival. The design thus is embedded in systems science with its dominant notion of homeostasis, or equilibrium. Important in such a perspective are those input elements, conversion process elements and output elements which capture traditional organizational measures (e.g., productivity, turnover rates, etc.) operating in an interdependent and uncertain environmental matrix.

Critical to the prediction of survival is the

capability of the organization to avoid becoming subservient to elements of the task environment. Thompson (1967) states this in the form of a proposition:

Proposition 3.1: Under norms of rationality, organizations seek to minimize the power of task-environment elements over them by maintaining alternatives.

Thus, by scattering its dependence, the organization prevents the concentration of power over it. It then need not concede power to any single element of the task environment. This further implies that continuous external pressure on the organization is dispersed, thus damping the change process. Dispersal of task environment power, thus implies less pressure for change and more of a likelihood of organizational survival.

The question of survival being decided by an outside force, which may have little relation to organizational outputs, is a crucial one, especially in relation to non-profit organizations. Essentially, the locus of decision-making as to survival, or not, has remained with the outside foundation or government agency. The interesting development in the case study of Alpha, Inc. is with how that locus of decision shifted from outside the organization to inside. Thus the outputs assumed even greater importance as the organization moved to disperse task environment power over it. The process, as it will

be discussed later, is somewhat unique for the setting Alpha, Inc was in, but not necessarily unique for industrial organizations which have steady government grants and contracts. What is problematic in both instances is the utilization of such input as a leverage to develop an entity which has diversified, and convertible outputs. Outputs which can provide for survival of the originally dependent organizational system.

The concern in the analysis here is thus with factors (i) internal and (ii) external to the organization. However, in the organizational research here, we are moving toward Thompson's (1967) synthesis of the open and closed system concepts. Thompson takes off from Simon's (1957) theory of decision-making[11] in that it holds that internal processes are significantly affected by the complexity of the organization's environment. But performance and deliberate decisions are also involved and they imply the closed system. Thompson refers to this synthesis as rational interdependence. Bass (1965) provides a meaningful accounting of decision-making under norms of rationality which also apply here.

The proposed organizational research undertaken here takes as its genesis the quotes of two authors, one a sociologist and the other a political scientist. As to the method, Alan Altshuler (1970) states:

> One of the more useful research efforts that might be undertaken in the next few years would

> be a series of case studies examining the record of Community Action, Model Neighborhood, and community control designers in forecasting even the very short-run consequences of their action. (Altshuler, 1970, p. 215)

As to the general research strategy, James D. Thompson suggests that:

> The open-system strategy shifts attention from goal achievement to survival, and incorporates uncertainty by recognizing organizational interdependence with environment. (Thompson, 1967, p. 13)

CHAPTER III

A STATEMENT OF HYPOTHESES

The hypotheses to be investigated in the organizational research reported here are working hypotheses. That is, hypotheses not yet subjected to empirical test. Scott (1965) follows the lead of Sellitz, et al. (1959) in noting three types of study design: exploratory, descriptive and hypothesis testing. The proposed study is exploratory in that we are trying to gain familiarity with a problem. Also, a number of working hypotheses can be posited, thus we are engaged in hypothesis-testing.

The working hypotheses under investigation here deal with phenomena or relationships about which there has been relatively little scientific research. Under these circumstances the hypotheses are necessarily tentative. In stating the hypotheses to be investigated herein, the concern will be with three levels: (i) the instituional sphere; (ii) internal variables/directional hypotheses; and (iii) internal variables/non-directional hypotheses.

The Institutional Sphere

As can be discerned from the three levels of hypothesis-testing, we will be viewing the organization under study as an 'open-system.' Thus the concern with the institutional sphere as an important interacting variable. The recognition of the importance of the institutional sphere is revealed in Parsons' (1956), Sower and Miller's (1964) suggestion that an organization dealing with public issues envisages the provision of some service or goods for other persons or groups. That is, an organization is seen as a system which 'produces' an identifiable something which can be utilized in some way by another system. Thus, the output of any one specific organizational system is for another adjacent system, an input. This adjacent system is thus a member of the organization's institutional sphere. Adjacency in the sense implied here begins to provide a sense of boundary specification. This usage of adjacent has both a functional and spatial reference.

As noted earlier, Parsons' general model[1] thus has three anchor points of legitimation: (i) the systems from which an organization receives its inputs or resources; (ii) the values, structure and norms which compose the organization as a system; and (iii) those systems which utilize the output of the organization as an input.

Organizational boundaries thus relate to a system

concept (i.e., inputs, conversion process and outputs); the functional and spatial sense of adjacency; and the concept of bonds. Change, in both the organization and its institutional sphere, implies an alteration in the structure, processes, goals or purposes. Assuming that an organization, both in practice and for analytical purposes, is an open system that maintains a specific boundary, the systemic properties of the organization and its institutional sphere imply an order to the concepts of organizational change and organizational renewal (the usage of the concept organizational renewal roughly corresponds to the notion of feedback[2] in general system theory).

According to Mervyn L. Cadwallader:[3]

> An open system, whether social or biological, in a changing environment either changes or perishes. In such a case the only avenue to survival is change. The capacity to persist through a change of structure and behavior has been called 'ultrastability.' If a complex social organization is to survive critical changes in its environment, it can do so only by changing its structure and behavior. (Cadwallader, 1968, p. 437)

This implies that any industrial corporation (such as IBM or General Electric) or any other organization type (such as the National Urban League or the League of Women Voters) that has survived the last fifty years of social change in the United States has done so through a process of self-transformation and not through the continuation of original organizational and operational patterns.

> Therefore, the concept of ultrastability will aid in distinguishing between systems that achieve

> stability under specific constant conditions and those that can learn or evolve new structures and behavior so as to remain stable under changing conditions. (Cadwallader, 1968, pp. 437-438)

In another vein, some classes of open systems adapt to a fluctuating environment through processes of learning and innovation. Any such system which is capable of purposeful problem-solving behavior and of learning from the past and innovating for the future is an ultrastable system. Further, any organization that is to change through learning and innovation, that is, to be ultrastable, must contain certain very specific feedback mechanisms, a certain variety of information, and certain kinds of input, channel, storage and decision-making facilities.

We may ask ourselves in examining an organization: Does the organization behave purposefully, does it solve problems, and does it forecast future events? If the answers are in the affirmative, then one must find in the organization certain kinds of communications, information and control mechanisms. For in order to innovate, the organizational system must be able to analyze information, that is, it must separate it into constituent parts. In a social system this is a consequence of particular explicit operating rules about what can and should be done, by whom, when and why. Innovation thus depends upon preventing a freezing of the behavior of the organizational system into old patterns. For as Cadwallader reminds us:

> . . . the state of ultrastability . . . for an open system, is the optimum road to survival. (Cadwallader, 1968, p. 439)

Organizational change, though infrequent and oftentimes incremental, does occur. At times such change may be radical. For a review of under what conditions change might be expected to occur, see propositions 2.6 to 3.0. These series of propositions imply that the exogenous impetus for organizational change activates the sometimes dormant renewal process which then begins the adaptation process. The externally induced change process, and the renewal process thus act as independent variables allowing us to predict survival, as the dependent variable. The renewal, or feedback, process is crucial here. For with continuous pressure from the institutional sphere as an inducement for change, if there is a lag in initial response then the renewal process, once initiated tends toward over-compensation. This then decreases the likelihood of the survival of the organizational system.

Relative to the institutional sphere then:

$$H_1 : (R/C) \Longrightarrow \uparrow TEI + \downarrow PC + \uparrow CS$$

where,

R/C	=	renewal and change
TEI	=	task environment influence
PC	=	public concern
CS	=	cooperative strategies
$\uparrow$	=	increasing
$\downarrow$	=	decreasing
$\Longrightarrow$	=	implies

In regard to working hypothesis one, the units of analysis include: (i) those general and specific components of the task environment; and (ii) the organization qua organization.

Those variables to be investigated in the case study relevant to the institutional sphere which can be termed exogenous include:

(1) Task environmental influence, where the concept task environment refers to those parts of the environment which are "relevant or potentially relevant to goal setting and goal attainment." (Thompson, 1967; Dill, 1958) Task environment has general (social, political and economic) and specific (Ford Foundation, NIMH, et al.) components.

(2) The role of the Board of Directors.

(3) Changing publics or clientele.

(4) The role of a professional caucus.

(5) Cooperative strategies.

The above are variables external to the organization, and are broken down as follows in relation to working hypothesis one.

(a) Variable	(b) Component(s)	(c) Relevant Propositions
TEI	(1)	2.5, 2.6, 2.7
PC	(2), (3), (4)	2.8
CS	(5)	3.1

Figure II: Institutional Sphere Relationships

Internal Variables/Directional

Those variables which can be termed internal, or endogenous, are the concern at the second level of hypothesis-testing. These variables are distinguished from those of hypothesis three in that they are directional. That is, we are predicting in hypothesis two (H_2) that renewal and change as related to variables comprising the organizational system's conversion process imply particular directional alterations. In this regard then, H_2 and H_1 are analogous, though their focus is different. It is at this point that our attention turns to renewal and change, and the conversion process as it relates to gaining and translating inputs from adjacent organizational systems into diversified and convertible outputs.

For working hypothesis two, the units of analysis are productivity rates, turnover rates, communication networks (including the organization's physical layout as that relates to a two-way flow of communication), patterns of decision-making, change in clientele (or publics), a bureaucratic scale and organizational rigidity. Symbolically, the second working hypothesis may be represented as:

$$H_2 : (R/C) \Longrightarrow \downarrow P + \uparrow TO + \downarrow C + \uparrow CDM + \sim CL + \downarrow TB + \uparrow OR$$

where,

P	=	productivity
TO	=	turnover rates
C	=	communication
CDM	=	centralized decision-making
$\sim$CL	=	changing clientele
TB	=	tolerance for bureaucracy
OR	=	organizational rigidity.

Whereas, H_1 is concerned with the organization qua organization, H_2 is somewhat reductionist in that it considers aspects of the internal structure which relate to renewal and change as influenced by the task environment.

Those variables to be investigated at this point relevant to the internal directional variables include:

(6) Productivity, including reports, monographs and representations.

(7) Turn-over rates.[4]

(8) Organizational rigidity, following Hawley (1971) refers to:

(i) centralized decision-making;

(ii) similarity in procedures and processes across organizational sub-units in accomplishment of goals;

(iii) standardized ways of relating to clients;

(iv) the above structural relations are persistent over time.

(9) Communication, following Blau and Scott (1962) differentiation, centralized direction and restricted communication are necessary for efficient coordination. Refers to documents such as memoranda, meetings and other organizational documents.

(10) Decision-making.

(11) Tolerance for bureaucracy,[5] a scale in which

bureaucracy as measured by an emphasis on discipline, rationality, technical knowledge and impersonal procedures is determined.

The above variables are internal to the organization, and are broken down as follows in relation to working hypothesis two.

(a) Variable	(b) Component(s)	(c) Relevant Propositions
P	(6)	1.9
TO	(7)	1.2
C	(9)	1.3, 1.4
CDM	(8)i, (10)	2.9, 3.0
CI	(8)iii	2.8
TB	(11)	1.5
OR	(8)i-iv	2.9, 3.0

Figure III: Internal, Directional Relationships

Internal Variables/Non-Directional

The second set of endogenous variables, which are non-directional, are expressed in hypothesis three (H_3). That is, in this statement of relations we are not predicting renewal and change relative to changes in magnitude. Rather, given the nature of the variables and their component parts, we are merely implying that an alteration in the organizational system relative to this set of endogenous variables will take place under conditions of

renewal and change.

Working hypothesis three is also somewhat reductionist in that it considers the internal structure of the organization. However, unlike H_1 and H_2, working hypothesis three is not directional. That is, given the nature of the variables, we cannot posit a directional alteration in their frequency. We can merely speculate that they are altered in relation to the process of renewal and change. Thus symbolically working hypothesis three can be stated thus:

$$H_3 : (R/C) \Longrightarrow SC + CG/O + AB$$

where, SC = structural change
CG/O = change in goals/objectives
AB = administrative behavior

Those variables to be examined which are relevant to the internal, non-directional variables include:

(12) Structural change.

(13) Goals/objectives.

(14) Administrative behavior.

The above variables are internal to the organization, and are broken down as follows in relation to working hypothesis three.

(a) Variable	(b) Component(s)	(c) Relevant Propositions
SC	(12)	2.0, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 3.0
CG/O	(13)	1.0, 1.1, 1.9
AB	(14)	1.6, 1.7, 1.8, 2.1, 3.1

Figure IV: Internal, Non-directional Relationships

Summation

Working hypothesis one will be tested using a combination of the open system approach[6] to organizations, and by assessing Alpha's process of cooperative strategy selection. According to Sower and Miller (1964) most organizations dealing with public issues envisage the provision of some service or goods for other persons or groups. Parsons' general model delineates "three anchor points of legitimation" for an organization: (1) the systems from which it receives it inputs of resources (the task environment); (2) the values, structure, and norms which compose the organization as a system (see H_2 and H_3); and (3) those systems which use the output of the organization as an input (the publics or clientele).

We will be looking at the task environment in regards to those components which input resources (money and human) into the organization and those factors which

affect such an allocation (social, political, economic). This will be expressed specifically in dollars and cents and generally in relation to the social, political and economic atmosphere prevailing in those specific input units. The analytical distinction between the general and specific components of the task environment is of importance here.

Public concern will be analyzed in relation to continuing board functions and participation, and the general atmosphere relative to the organization as revealed through official documents. Cooperative strategies will be analyzed in relation to their process of selection and their nature, i.e., competitive, co-optation, etc., by the organization during renewal and change.

Working hypothesis two will be tested by using a variety of methods, including: questionnaires, statistics derived from documents, memoranda, etc. For productivity as an example, we will be focusing on annual reports, which enumerate those 'products' in the form of reports, contracts, presentations, etc., which the organization 'produced.' The concern will be with measures of central tendency between phases of renewal and change, between different annual report years and with percentage increase/ decrease between phases/years.

Working hypothesis three will be tested by the use of organizational charts, documents/behavior relating to

alteration in goals/objectives and observation of administrative behavior over time.

The units of analysis are thus: (i) the task environment; (ii) the organization qua organization; and (iii) the internal structure of the organization. The measurement or statistical aspect will include the utilization of measures of central tendency, percentages, number of cases, information measures, which imply the use of scales up to the interval.[7] These scales attached to the above measures are possible because there are certain isomorphisms between aspects of objects and properties of numerical series.

Formats to be used in presenting the data include: (i) tables; (ii) graphs; (iii) charts; (iv) architectural drawings of physical plant (graphics); and other relevant diagrams.

The framework within which the renewal and change process will be discussed is the five-step model suggested by Messinger (1955). This model includes:

(1) An ascendant phase;

(2) Lack of public concern;

(3) Drop in membership;

(4) Shift to organization maintenance; and

(5) Transformation.

In the external, or institutional sphere, renewal and change implies increased task environment influence, a

decreasing public concern in the organization, and an increased need to develop and implement cooperative strategies.

In the internal, or intra-organizational sphere, renewal and change implies decreasing productivity, an increase in turnover rates, a decrease in communication within the organization, increasing centralization of decision-making, a changing clientele and a decreasing tolerance for bureaucracy and an increase in organization rigidity. On another analytical plane, renewal and change implies structural change, a change in goals and objectives and an alteration in administrative behavior.

The overriding objective for the organization under study is survival. Thus the concern will be with renewal and change in an organizational system as it attempts to adapt to its task environment and survive. By survival is meant an organization's capacity to gain input from its task environment and to produce an output which is consumed by that task environment. By renewal is meant the process of self-examination, determination of purpose and the setting of a future direction. Following Griffiths (1970), change refers to an alteration in the organization structure, in any of its processes, or in its goals or purposes. The concepts of survival, renewal and change are thus interdependent phenomena. These hypothese represent an attempt to capture those elements internal, and external,

to an organizational system which can explain renewal and change, and predict survival.[8]

CHAPTER IV

THE FIELD SETTING

Data Collection

The intent of this chapter will be to examine the field setting in which Alpha was operating in the September, 1971 - September, 1972 time period under study here. Our concern will be with macro- and micro-elements of the field setting in their political, economic and social context. In reviewing the above concerns, the focus will also be on general and specific elements of the macro- and micro-environment. From the above description and delineation we will move to a discussion of the methods and rationale in the collection of data pertinent to the macro- and micro-elements as this bears on hypothesis-testing. This process will then move us into Chapter V, in which the discussion will focus on data analysis, data presentation, and findings.

Macro-Analysis

In focusing our attention on the field setting and on strategies for gathering data from such a setting, it is important to bear in mind the points of consideration raised

by David Rogers,[1] Talcott Parsons,[2] and Sheldon Messinger.[3] Briefly summarizing the conceptual framworks posited by the above authors yields the following:

A. Rogers: (i) political setting or environment; (ii) organizational design of the delivery system; (iii) nature of the transactions among the participants; and (iv) outputs.

B. Parsons: (i) systems from which an organization receives its inputs or resources; (ii) values, structures and norms which compose the organization as a system; and (iii) those systems which use the output of the organization as an input.

C. Messinger: (i) ascendance; (ii) lack of public concern in the organizational mission; (iii) drop in membership; (iv) a shift to organizational maintenance; and (v) transformation.

Relative to the macro-analysis, the points in the above three conceptual schemes which have the most relevance are: A(i); B(i); C(i); C(ii); and C(iii).

As was discussed earlier, the development of Alpha was a function of the type of program funding initiated in the third sector and followed through by the public sector, particularly at the federal level. The rationale for such a category of funding was predicated on social, political and economic grounds. That is, given social unrest, political instability and economic recession in the nation's urban areas, there emerged the societal-wide effort to develop and implement programs which could address the above 'social problems.' Citizen participation was seen as a key variable in such

programs with its intended effects of large-scale institutional change and the reduction of social inequalities.[4]

Let us begin the discussion by focusing on the general, macro-economic conditions beginning in September of 1971. The facts were that productivity was low and wages and salaries were escalating, notably in the services (health, education, professional, transportation, federal, state and local governments). Prices were too rigid in many key industries, they were only flexing up. Union power to boost wages was unchecked and spreading into new areas, with government workers a prime example. Fiscal policy was stimulative and credit policy was expansive. Thus, inflationary pressures were continuing to build up as discussion began around the need for economic controls.[5] The objective of the Nixon Administration was rapid economic growth, with controls being viewed as a means to that end. The two-pronged program of controls to hold inflation and government stimulation of the economy was to lead to a booming economy with low unemployment. A gain of $100 billion in the Gross National Product (GNP) was projected in October of 1971 by leading economists for 1972 as a result of the two-pronged Administration economic policy. This would be nearly a 10% increase over the GNP for 1971. After allowing for higher prices, real growth was seen to be just under 7%. Unemployment was projected to slide to around 5%, with the growth in the economy seen to be sufficient to absorb new workers and cut the job-

lessness. It was also projected that inflation would be held to around 3 1/2%.

Relative to general, macro-political conditions beginning in September, 1971, was the fact that the parties were gearing up for the election year. In addition, the incumbent administration was moving to implement its economic policy of rapid growth through the political process of negotiation, bargaining, co-optation, with the requisite other political forces, e.g., business, labor, et.al. In attempting to implement its economic policy, the government was prepared to use force to get what it wanted. That is, the business community was told how much prices can go up. A limit was placed on wage increases, both union and non-union, and on salaries, bonuses, stock options, and other executive incentives. In addition, wages were going to be allowed to rise more than prices as a concession to the labor unions in order to elicit their cooperation on controls. This objective was also seen as a concession to those who were clamoring for a lid on profits.

There was also talk in Washington of the possibility of a black political party.[6] Despite such discussion, it was speculated that such a development probably would not materialize as a separate party. What was seen as likely was an effort by black leaders to have the Democrats select a '72 ticket that suited black people. The threat behind

such a move if the Democrats ignored the black demand was to stay home on election day. Any such action would hurt the Democrats in national elections, and at all levels where Republicans and Democrats are closely matched. Congressional districts that Democrats now hold could swing and governorships in big states could be seriously affected. Democrats thus became concerned because oftentimes the black voting populace is their winning margin.

Nixon's chances for re-election were assessed as being good with his stock rising among the voters. The issues which were seen as being crucial in the '72 election included: (1) the Vietnam War, which was fading as an issue; (2) inflation; (3) prosperity; (4) the farm business and the need to carry the farm states; (5) unemployment; (6) a black party; and (7) the candidacy of George Wallace, detracting from both parties. In addition, Nixon had in his favor the advantages accruing to an incumbent.

Revenue sharing with states and cities was seen as not passing in the fall of 1971, and in 1972 it was expected that only a bill putting strings on the money had much chance. It is important to consider that the 1972 elections tended to color everything that Congress[7] did and also what Nixon did. Thus, politics would largely determine what passes and what doesn't pass. Need or merit was thus to mostly get lip-service.

It was also expected that labor's power and influence

within the Democratic party would diminish in 1972, because delegates to the convention would be elected by a new method. Each state delegation had to be balanced according to the state's population, by color, nationality, sex, etc. This method was seen as potentially excluding hand-picked delegates chosen by the unions, or by the professional party men, mayors, governors, big contributors. Any delegation that was not 'balanced' would be subject to challenge by the younger and newer delegates and their slates would be seated as delegates to manage the convention. With internal party reform it could be expected that the Democrats would be weakened and unable to focus sharply on unseating the incumbent Nixon Administration.

The general, macro-social sphere included a conservatism which had the effect of winding down the social programs which grew out of the 1960's. This was a post-Civil Rights era in which the general sensitivity to the plight of the poor and black became lost in the perceived need to restructure social programs and to check the escalating salaries and wages in the service sectors. The women's liberation movement had essentially pre-empted civil rights as a social concern and voices began to be heard de-crying 'a second reconstruction.'[8] Unemployment was shifting to sectors of the economy which had normally not felt the social stigma of joblessness, e.g., aero-space engineers and other high-technology professions. The Nixon Administration was viewing

these unemployment shifts and contemplating ways to turn many domestic problems into opportunities. As an example, ways were being explored to use technological knowledge to solve such things as urban blight, inadequate transit, traffic jams, overloaded health care systems, etc. The objective would be to take the scientists/engineers who were available in space and other programs and put them to work on everyday problems. The intent would be for government to support practical projects undertaken by industry and universities, research and development started by government seed money. In the macro, general-social sphere, then, this thinking represented the attempt to shift the social programming focus of which citizen participation was a tenet to a technological base.[9]

As noted in the discussion on the task environment influence (see page 61), the environment also consists of specific elements. In relation to the macro-structure of Alpha, the specific task environment influences consist of the Ford Foundation[10] and the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH).[11] It was these two macro-structures which were the primary sources of input into Alpha in the year under study here.

The Ford Foundation grant was made available in 1968 in the wake of social unrest and racial polarization in urban areas generally, and in Roxbury specifically. The attractiveness of Alpha in such times of social, political and

economic duress was that it proposed to establish a collaborative model. It was seen as a model which would bring together white and black, university and community groups, in an attempt to strengthen the organizational life of the black community by making use of university resources. The money which was received by Alpha at the Roxbury community level was through National Urban League 'New Thrust' monies to aid its local affiliates in such areas as economic development, police-community relations, leadership development, and social services. The channel for the Ford Foundation money was thus through the National Urban League to its local affiliate in Boston, the New Urban League of Boston, and on to Alpha. Ford Foundation's grant was under the rubric of Community and Leadership Development. In the period of October, 1968 to September, 1972 the National Urban League received $8.08 million[12] in New Thrust monies from Ford Foundation. Of this amount, approximately $800,000.00 was to be channeled to Alpha, Inc., over the same span of time to conduct its work in the Roxbury community. Thus, around 10% of the New Thrust monies granted nationally was to be channeled to Alpha.

However, Alpha was not to receive the full amount of the 4-year grant, and one reason that the grant was cut short prematurely had to do with the Tax Reform Act of 1969. Let's initially turn our attention to the Tax Reform Act of 1969, and then go back to the amount of input from Ford (through

National's local Urban League affiliates), the percent this adjusted amount was of the 4-year New Thrust total, and the reasons Alpha was de-funded in December of 1971.

In general, Public Law 91-172, the Tax Reform Act of 1969, became effective on January 1, 1970, but certain sections (e.g., reporting requirements and minimum payout) are applicable only to taxable years beginning after December 31, 1969. Approximately one-third of P.L. 91-172 is devoted to the charitable area in general and more than one-half of that portion deals specifically with private foundations. The 46 pages concerned exclusively with foundations represent a complex pattern of regulation which is completely new to the foundation field.

The "private foundation" provisions of the Act fall into three broad categories:

(1) An annual 4% excise tax based on net investment income;

(2) A number of sanctions for prohibited actions or for failure to meet requirements, which sanctions are in the form of heavy (even confiscatory) excise taxes and penalties to be imposed on foundations, their managers, and their substantial contributors; and,

(3) Broader reporting requirements, including detailed information on a foundation's activities and the substantial contributions received by it. (Weithorn, 1970, p. 86).

"Private foundations" constitute an important new category of charitable organization under the Tax Reform Act. Private foundations are defined to include all Section

501(c)(3) organizations except:

(1) Organizations qualifying for deductions up to 50% (formerly 30%) of adjusted gross income (essentially, publicly-supported charities);

(2) Organizations normally supported
(a) not more than one-third from investment income and
(b) more than one-third from (i) gifts, grants, contributions, membership fees, and (ii) gross receipts from admission, merchandise sales, or the furnishing of services or facilities (other than in an unrelated business); excluding all receipts from "disqualified persons" and from Section 501(c)(3) organizations not described in (1) above, and excluding receipts described in (ii) above, from any person in excess of 1% of total support or $5,000 for each fiscal year, whichever is greater;

(3) Certain organizations auxiliary in function to organizations described in (1) and (2) above;

(4) Organizations testing for public safety.[13]

The amount of Ford Foundation program dollars which became a part of Alpha's operating budget thus totalled $650,000 in the period of October, 1968 to December, 1971. This total represented 8% of the total Ford program dollars for New Thrust activities in this four-year time span. What were reasons for Ford's decision to de-fund Alpha in December of 1971? Relative to the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Ford Foundation had to be wary of: (i) meeting requirements of grant-making, which if deemed unmet could result in excise taxes and penalties to be imposed on foundations, their managers, and their contributors; and (ii) broader reporting requirements, including detailed information on its activities.

Prior to the coming of Alpha's new Director in April of 1971, there had been inadequate information and fiscal controls on the program and expenditures under the Ford Foundation grant. In addition, insufficient monitoring of Alpha's activities was the situation with the New Urban League of Boston, the National Urban League and the Foundation itself. Thus the Foundation was, of course, unable to provide detailed information on the activities of Alpha in that Alpha had not during the life of the grant reported adequately, if at all, to Ford or to the other intermediaries in the chain. With the Tax Reform Act of 1969, there was generated enough pressure to move the Foundation to be accountable in ways it did not have to be previously. This pressure manifested itself within the Foundation all the way down to the local community in which Alpha was functioning. Despite a feverish pitch of activity within Alpha after April, 1971, and on up until December, 1971, to provide adequate reporting to Ford, the announcement came in the December Board Meeting that Ford would be de-funding Alpha. The pressure of the Act was more than the delinquent activity on the part of Alpha as an organization could overcome. The die had been cast and Alpha's Foundation Program Officer brought the bad news of de-funding in December, 1971.

Thus, instead of receiving a total of $800,000 in New Thrust monies from Ford, Alpha received $650,000, decreasing its percentage share of the 4-year program dollars from

10% to 8%. The impact of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 was thus felt within Alpha and in its surrounding community. It was this development also which heightened the renewal, change and survival process already initiated by Alpha.

The NIMH grant was to remain intact over a 4-year time span, despite the attendant problems with the Ford Foundation grant. This particular grant was received in October, 1969, and was to continue until September, 1973. Once Ford Foundation de-funded Alpha in December, 1971, the bulk of activities under this grant were terminated. This implied that personnel changes had to take place within Alpha while work under the NIMH grant continued. The total amount received under the NIMH grant was $727,393 over the 4-year life of the grant. During the time-span under study here, Alpha received $213,265 from NIMH and $50,000 from Ford. The total amount received from these two key macro-specific units was $263,265.[14]

Over the 4-year life of the Ford Foundation grant,[15] the average amount of input was $162,500. With the NIMH grant, the average amount of input was $181,848. There were only two funding years ('69-'70 and '70-'71) in which the full amount of Ford and NIMH were in place together. For these two funding years then, the average input from these two macro-specific sources totaled $345,000. The total amount of money received from Ford and NIMH over the cumulative 5-year grant period was $1,377,393.[16] The average input,then,

from Ford and NIMH as macro-specific elements of the task environment was $275,479 per year. Let's see how this average input compares with a year-by-year breakdown by macro-specific source.

Table 1.0

Macro-Specific Input by Year

Year	Source(s)	Amount	Total	$\bar{X}$	$\Delta(T-\bar{X})$
1968-69	Ford Foundation	$200,000	$200,000	$275,479	$ -75,479
1969-70	Ford Foundation NIMH	200,000 135,000	335,000	275,479	+59,521
1970-71	Ford Foundation NIMH	50,000 155,000	335,000	275,479	+79,521
1971-72	Ford Foundation NIMH	50,000 213,265	263,265	275,479	-12,214
1972-73	NIMH	224,128	224,128	275,479	-51,351

The year under study in this organization case study thus most closely matched the average dollar input per year by macro-specific source. However, if the Ford grant had remained intact during the 1971-72 period the figures would be as follows:

Table 1.1

Adjusted Macro-Specific Input by Year Under Study

Year	Source(s)	Amount	Total	$\bar{X}$	$(T-\bar{X})$
1971-72	Ford Foundation NIMH	$200,000 213,265	$413,265	$305,479	+$107,786

Thus Alpha experienced a reduction of 36% in its input from its two key macro-specific sources. If the Ford grant had remained intact, the percentage increase from 1970-71 to 1971-72 would have been 14% in the two key macro-specific elements. Rather, there was a 26% decrease in input from 1970-71 to 1971-72. This implied that rather than 1972-73 being the year of examination, setting of a new purpose, and implementing a program to attain this purpose, 1971-72 became the year of truth, by default.

Micro-Analysis

Relative to micro-analysis, the points in the conceptual schemes of Rogers, Parsons and Messinger which are particularly pertinent include: A(ii); A(iii); A(iv); B(ii); B(iii); C(iv); and C(v). In its "Application for Continuation Grants," dated August 11, 1972, Alpha, Inc., states that:

> For reasons spelled out in the progress report, below, the grant projects have shifted from emphasis upon research/action/training to major emphasis upon research, relying more heavily than in the past upon the client groups to pursue the action/training implications of the research. We have also broadened our scope beyond research with local community groups to include work with governmental and other non-local agencies.[17]

Further in the application's progress report, the aims of the present research are reiterated while pointing up the institutional bridging function of Alpha.

> As an institution bridging two worlds, that of the community and the universities, it (Alpha) must continuously accomodate to the rapid changes in both worlds.[18]

Using Alpha's August 11, 1972 Progress Report as our primary source of reference, let's turn our attention to the micro-general, and micro-specific elements. At the point of Alpha's Progress Report of 1971, the organization contained within its structure a variety of grass-roots groups. Work under the NIMH grant was directed toward building an action-research capability in each of six of these groups. The work was carried forward by research assistants drawn from the community and university, by faculty volunteers, Alpha training staff, and community activists from the six groups. Besides NIMH grant funds, financial support was provided by the Ford Foundation and by several federal grants that Alpha had secured for the participating groups.

By early fall, 1971, it became apparent that both

the community and the university worlds had undergone marked changes to which Alpha must rapidly accomodate. With the retrenchment of federal and foundation funding for inner-city work, many community groups began to founder, their leadership began to lose grass-roots support, with many leaders withdrawing from community organizing into more secure jobs. Competition for dwindling funds set in among community groups, and the community began to experience increased governmental emphasis on control of dissidents, rather than empowering them to remedy grievances.

Alpha felt all of these developments. With the termination of Ford Foundation support, the groups in Alpha were unable to continue their previous level of participation. Of the participants in the NIMH research, two sustained the goal of developing an action-research component in their organizations. One organization directed itself toward healing internal schisms that arose upon the temporary departure of its Executive Director. One group broke up with its members returning to deal with the survival issues of the five constituent community schools. A Spanish-speaking group disintegrated under the pressure of competition for scarce resources with its functions assumed by a new organization that Alpha helped to found. Another group found itself diverting most of its energies shortly after entering the program to the defense of its Executive Director in a widely-publicized parole violation case. The final organization reassigned its Alpha representative to tasks relevant to

setting up a Black People's Library.

The university world underwent rapid changes as well. The example of Boston College, a main participating university, applies with small variations to other schools as well. Following a prolonged student tuition strike, the university administrators on the Alpha Board of Directors became absorbed in the financial crisis at the college. Losing the confidence of former supporters among faculty and students, the community-oriented administration became vulnerable to the attack of those oriented toward internal survival and was forced to resign. The academic departments, feeling the pressure for greater "productivity," i.e., increased teaching loads, reduced their emphasis on expensive graduate programs and restricted the amount of released time of faculty for community work. Faculty themselves, apprehensive about the survival of the university, felt less disposed to involve themselves in work that did not directly benefit school finances.

In response, Alpha re-examined the inducements it could offer faculty for their continued participation. Negotiations ensued with individual faculty and departments. Among the tradeoffs offered were:

- stipends to graduate students;
- contracts with departments involving payment for released time of faculty;
- contracts with departments for overage consultant payments to faculty;
- contracts with individual faculty for consulting fees;

- direct manpower support for research initiated by faculty that was of interest to Alpha; and,
- direct hiring onto Alpha staff of persons at faculty level.

Each of these courses of action costs money and required that Alpha attend to questions of income. As noted in Chapter II (footnote 5), the research and consulting firm of Arthur D. Little (ADL) was commissioned to examine the role of Alpha vis-a-vis universities, local groups, governmental agencies, etc., in relation to what services it could offer and what remuneration it could expect. The recommendation of ADL was that Alpha reduce its training emphasis, enlarge the research aspects of its work, and reach out beyond local community groups to offer research services to other agencies in need of program and organizational evaluation.

In the light of this recommendation, Alpha refocused its year's work. Thus in Alpha's year-end Progress Report, the activities are summarized under four general headings: (1) activities initiated with local community groups, (2) with governmental agencies, (3) with universities, and (4) those initiated independently.

Let us now turn to examining the Alpha contacts during the time span under study here, and also match these sources by level of society/government.

Source	Level	Amount/Input
Model Neighborhood Board (MNB)	National-HUD City - CDA Local - MNB	$ 18,979.00
Riverside-Cambridgeport Corp. (RCC)	City Local	16,000.00
Ford Foundation	National-National Affairs; National Urban League Local-New Urban League	50,000.00
NIMH	National - Center for Metro. Studies	213,265.00
Springfield	City-Housing Authority	4,200.00
BTPR, DPW	State Local-CIRCLE, Assoc.	4,014.00
SFLC	State - Title III Local - SFLC	pro bono
SFLC	Local - SFLC	8,500.00
Harvard University	University	14,400.00
	TOTAL:	$325,344.00

Figure V:[19] Alpha task environment interaction by source, level and amount/input.

If we subtract the amounts already discussed which were Ford and NIMH input, then the total input/amount comes to

$66,093, which represents the monies Alpha was able to derive beyond Ford and NIMH. The total figure (see Figure IV) of $325,344 still represents a 21% decrease from Alpha's projected receipts had Ford not made the decision to de-fund.

Let's now aggregate the source and level information to gain a sense of Alpha's predominant contacts through 1971-72 as it sought to adapt to change in its environment.

Table 1.2

Alpha Task Environment by Level & Frequency

Level	#	%
National	3	20
State	2	13
City	3	20
University	1	7
Local	6	40
Total:	15	100

As can be discerned from Table 1.2, Alpha in this year of transition still had as its predominant level of contact that of its local community with national and city contacts being second in frequency. It is also noteworthy that the university level contact was on the lower end of the frequency. Also, from Table 1.2 we can see that by using Rogers' conception of macro being City-State-Federal (or National) that aggregating these levels indicates that 53% of Alpha's task environ-

ment contact was at the macro-level.

In order to gain a further sense as to the changing environment in which Alpha found itself, let's look at those activities that Alpha had participated in as of May, 1972. Particularly our focus should be on those organizations which were affiliated with Alpha and to determine if such organizations were still in existence as of September, 1972. In conducting this exercise we should bear in mind the points of relationship that Kaufman makes relative to environmental change and organizational death.[20] Kaufman's point is:

> Because organizations change only little by little, their survival rate should be closely associated with the rate of change in their environment...If the environment changes swiftly or unexpectedly, one would anticipate a fearful slaughter of organizations. (Kaufman, 1971, p. 96)

Further, we may expect a very high death rate among organizations solely from a failure to adapt.

> As we have seen, the fragmentary evidence at our disposal indicates that the organizational death rate is indeed great, and that failure to adapt is one of the plausible putative causes. The pieces seem to fit together, empirically as well as logically. (Kaufman, 1971, p. 96)

In order to try and get a sense of Kaufman's important points, let's turn our attention to a bit of empiricism relative to Alpha activities:

PROJECTS	Type of Project		EDUCATION					Health Drug	Org. Dev. Training	Communications	Crime & Adm. of Justice	Conf. Eval. & Dev.	Basic Res.
	Internal	Outside	Curr. & Prog.Dev.	Training	Day Care	Tech. Assistance	Housing						
Afro Audio Visual		X				X				X			
Civic Education Club		X	X			X							
House of Youth		X	X			X							
Malcolm X Foundation		X	X		X	X		X			X		
Male Role Model		X				X			X				
New School for Children		X	X		X	X							
Project Concern		X				X		X					
Foxbury Community School		X	X	X		X							
Storefront Learning Center		X	X	X	X	X							
South End Tenants Mgt.		X				X	X						
Urban Sisters		X		X		X			X				
Ujima	X	X				X			X				
Yours One		X				X		X					
Highland Park Free School		X	X			X			X				
FIRST (For Individuals Recovering Sound Thinking)		X				X	X		X				
TAB (Tenants Assoc. of Boston)		X	X			X			X				
CAUSE (Com. Assembly for a United South End)		X				X		X					
Peoples Black Library		X	X			X	X		X				
Poro Afro		X				X			X				
United Com. Constr. Workers		X				X						X	
Parent Participation Proj.		X	X			X			X	X			
Black Edu. Conference	X					X		X					
Com. Res. Review Committees		X				X				X			
CURE	X										X		
Public Relations Project	X											X	X
Correctional Assistance Prog.	X												X
Com. Univ. Relations Group	X												X
Univ. Impact on Adjacent Coms.													
School Desegration Project	X		X				X						X
Riverside Cambridge Port Corp.	X											X	
Boston Plan		X		X			X	X					X
Student National Medical Prog.		X					X						
Model Cities Conf. Eval.	X		X		X					X			
Real Estate Research Corp.	X												
Public Relations	X												

FIGURE VI: Alpha Activities

As of September, 1972, of the twenty-three organizations included among Alpha activities twelve, or 52%, were still in existence, while eleven, or 48%, were defunct. From this data we can surmise that nearly one out of two organizations among Alpha's affiliations died out, which implies a rapid change in the environment. Seemingly Kaufman's proposition could go in two directions, thess being: (1) a rapid change in the environment implies a slaughter of organizations; and/or (2) the slaughter of organizations implies a rapidly changing environment. A question in relation to Alpha-affiliated organizations in Figure VI and the nature of the total macro- and micro- level environment is how representative are Alpha-affiliated organizations of the community of organizations in general? An additional question is, what percentage of organizations in a given community of organizations must die before we state that the environment is changing rapidly? Should we view 50% as a base-line figure? Seventy-five per cent? The section reported above should be viewed as serving a heuristic function in relation to answering the above queries.

Community Characteristics

Roxbury-North Dorchester is located in the southwest section of Boston. (See map, Figure VII) The 1970 census data (first count) on population by census tract indicates that 61,562 people reside in the Roxbury-North Dorchester community.

Of this total, 45,910 (or 74.57%) are Black. The census data also indicates a decline in overall population from 83,520 in 1960 to the present 61,562, or a 26.3% decline in 1970. However, among the Black population in the community, the trend is reversed. In 1960 the Black population (40,918) experienced an increase of 15.2%. The remaining population in Roxbury-North Dorchester is made up of a growing Spanish-speaking American community and a declining white community.

The 1700-acre Roxbury-North Dorchester area is part of a city, Boston, that has absorbed successive waves of immigrants: Irish and Jewish around the turn of the century and in the early 1900's, and, in the last 25 years, increasing numbers of Blacks. It is predominately a residential area, housing low- and middle-income families whose wage earners work in Boston. Between 1950 and 1960 there was a population decline of 26.3%, characterized by the withdrawal of whites and an influx of non-whites. The 1960 census figures for the area show an evenly balanced racial composition. However, the population is clustered in pockets ranging from 99% white to 99% Black. One still finds isolated areas of a few blocks in which an Irish population lives, or a small segment of older Italian or Jewish residents. However, the majority of the people now living in the area are Black. This tendency has increased since the 1960 census, and some areas are rapidly becoming non-white ghettos.

Much of Boston's low-rent housing is concentrated in this area. The area contains much less owner-occupied

housing than the rest of the city, although some few census blocks have concentrations of owner occupancy.

There has been a consistent and thorough division of Roxbury-North Dorchester into sub-neighborhoods. The Roxbury neighborhoods are:

- Dudley Street East
- Dudley Street South
- Egleston Square
- Grove Hall West
- Lower Roxbury
- Mission Hill
- Warren Street

The North Dorchester neighborhoods are:

- Franklin Park
- Grove Hall East
- Uphams Corner

Historically, the Roxbury community has been mobile. For each wave of immigrants it has been a place of "stop-over." As a consequence, the people living there are younger than those in the rest of the city, with a higher proportion of children under five and a small percentage over 65. The non-white population is younger than the white group, and therefore has a substantially larger proportion of school-age children. With few exceptions, school buildings are old, crowded, and suffering from the same deterioration that has affected the other property in the area. Of the schools in the Roxbury-North Dorchester

section, 17 were listed as unsafe, overcrowded, and scheduled for replacement, according to the Sargent Report on the Boston Schools (1962).

The community has less educated and fewer skilled workers, more families of five and six persons, and lower incomes than in the rest of the city. The following table, drawn from the 1960 census information, lists incomes for the Roxbury-North Dorchester GNRP area as compared with the city of Boston.

Table 1.3

Roxbury/North Dorchester Incomes

	ROXBURY/ N. DORCHESTER		BOSTON	
Family Income	No. of Families	%	No. of Families	%
Under 3,000	5,677	27.1%	27,359	16.7%
Under 5,000	11,346	54.0	63,946	39.0
3,000 - 5,999	8,234	39.2	60,893	37.1
6,000 - 9,000	5,482	26.1	53,649	32.7
Over 10,000	1,589	7.6	22,314	16.6

In 1960 only 20% of the population represented single-person families, while almost 50% were families of three or more. The number of pre-school children in low-income families in 1967 was approximately 8,000.

It has been estimated that approximately 50% of the total school-age population, or 7,132 persons, is one year below grade norms. Approximately 14%, or 1,997 persons, is two or more years below grade norms.

Approximately 11,159 (13.8%) of the total neighborhood



FIGURE VII: Map showing Roxbury area.

population (according to the 1960 census) are considered functionally illiterate.

The number of employed in low-paying occupations is 15,510 or 49.4% of total employed persons. Males 14 years or older who are employed number 18,212. The unemployed in the same category totals 1,407, or 7.2%.

The number of females 14 years and older who are employed is 13,177, while unemployed females number 795, or 5.7% of the female working force.

In the past two years, approximately 1,500 families have been relocated from substandard housing that has been taken for demolition under the urban renewal program. Such relocation intensifies many health and welfare problems. The need for accessible and integrated social service is particularly pressing to assist families before, during, and after relocation.

In summary, this area can be described as primarily residential. While the Black population is steadily increasing, the pattern of residency is that of a clustering of ethnic nationality groups. Overcrowded housing, umemployment, poor health, high crime, deliquency, and illegitimacy rates, and dependency on public assistance mark this community. The residents show attitudes of defeatism, intergroup tension, and powerlessness.[21] By comparison with the rest of the city of Boston, the Roxbury community's level of educational and vocational skills are below the average. These limitations, plus minority group status, contribute to a relative high rate of unemployment in this area.[22]

In a report on Roxbury prepared in 1961 by the late Whitney M. Young, Jr., he stated:

> While specific information has not been included in the report on other indices of social disorganization, it is universally recognized that this part of Boston ranks high in crime, delinquency, broken homes, illegitimacy, dependence on public assistance and unemployment. Roxbury-North Dorchester, in short, is a district with severe social problems.[23]

It would appear from the above quote that despite all the monies and good intents that have been committed to Roxbury-North Dorchester during the last ten years, major problems still exist.

Community Resources

ABCD, Inc., of Boston conducted a program resources survey of Boston's private, public, and anti-poverty social services programs and the people and neighborhoods they serve. They identified 191 agencies, including every voluntary, anti-poverty, and public agency, as providing significant volumes of social services to Boston residents in 1967. The following types of agencies were queried:

- 153 agencies with a combined expenditure of $153.5 million and a total of 571 programs;
- 49 affiliates of United Community Services and Massachusetts Bay United Fund

- 73 voluntary agencies unaffiliated with any major organization
- 12 anti-poverty organizations
- 16 agencies of Boston

It was found that these agencies typically performed well-defined functions. In general, privately funded agencies emphasized services for specific service groups throughout the Metropolitan area, while state and city agencies provided mass-produced services to all able to take advantage of them. In contrast, anti-poverty agencies generated a wide variety of decentralized services specifically intended for minority groups, welfare recipients, and low-income residents of certain central-city neighborhoods.

Some specific findings were:

- Boston's social agencies spent approximately $175 million in 1967: $58.8 million for direct income maintenance by public welfare programs, $31.7 million of the remainder consumed by overhead or otherwise unaccounted for, and $63.0 million actually expended in providing service programs.

- Public agencies accounted for 54% of all agency expenditures, but only 29% of the total of more than 650,000 services to families and individuals. The 132 voluntary agencies, on the other hand,

expended $30.9 million, less than one-third of all services. ABCD and its area planning-action councils, comprising the anti-poverty sector, expended $12.7 million in the year studies, and accounted for 13% of expenditures and a nearly equal volume of services. The annual budget of these anti-poverty agencies is now about $20 million.

- Public and private agencies were highly centralized, operating programs located primarily in the Back Bay, Beacon Hill, and downtown Boston areas. A group of 63 agencies operating in these areas accounted for about two-thirds of all services and expenditures. However, city residents were only 45% of the service population of these agencies. Anti-poverty agencies were the most decentralized, with 68% of all expenditures accounted for by facilities located in the areas served.

- Less than one-third of all program expenditures, or $19.8 million, was earmarked for specific neighborhoods within the city. Three neighborhoods - Roxbury/North Dorchester, Jamaica Plain, and the South End - shared a third of these funds, while outlying areas received a much smaller percentage.

- Manpower programs received the highest priority, accounting for nearly one-third of the $63 million spent for direct service activities. Health and general social services each accounted for approximately one-quarter of the total, while education and recreation each accounted for one-tenth. Only negligible amounts were spent for housing and economic assistance other than welfare. However, social services and recreation were most important in terms of volume of services provided.

- Most money and services benefited whites, although racial and ethnic minorities received more assistance than their representation in the city's population would indicate. Of the 650,000-plus services provided by Boston agencies, 69% aided whites, 25% Blacks, and 3% the Spanish-speaking. White program participants benefited most from social service funds, accounting for 63% of total allocation, while Blacks received the benefit of 33$, and the Spanish-speaking 3%. In contrast, whites comprised 79% of the city's population in 1968, Blacks 17%, and the Spanish-speaking 2%.

- Anti-poverty agencies expended a greater proportion of their resources, 55%, for services to Blacks than any other sector, and were the only agencies

to spend more on services to the Spanish-speaking than their representation in the service population would dictate.

- One-third of the recipients of services provided by Boston social agencies also received some form of welfare payment; 27% were members of "chronic problem families;" 28% were below the poverty level, earning less than $3,000 a year for a family of four. Proportionately, expenditures for services to low-income families alone were twice their representation in the service population and over five times their representation in the population as a whole.

- Programs accounting for 37% of all expenditures were restricted to one or another special target group, such as the handicapped, the elderly, orphans, and the retarded. Programs for the physically handicapped alone accounted for the expenditure of $15.2 million and, in combination with services for other groups with physical or psychological limitations, absorbed 15% of all service expenditures.[24]

With the comprehensive discussion of macro- and micro-analysis, and community characteristics complete, let us now turn to data collection, its methods and rationale.

Methods/Rationale

> There are neither good nor bad methods, but only methods that are more or less effective under particular circumstances in reaching objectives on the way to a distant goal. (George C. Homans, 1949, p. 330)

This type of field approach adopted in this organizational analysis is one of sustained participation. Although there is an interest in formulating a set of working hypotheses, because of the paucity of theoretical formulations in the area of organizational renewal and change, the primary objective is to gain familiarity with the problems of organizational renewal and change which can guide future research. Scott notes:

> (T)he sustained researcher is in a better position than the transitory one to utilize a number of data-gathering methods: he can observe group activities, question group members informally or by using a set of prepared questions, and examine documents and products produced by group effort. (Scott, 1965, p. 269)

The research interest is in the totality of a particular organizational situation, thus the strategy of utilizing varied data-gathering methods. This total orientation has been labeled by Goode and Hatt (1952) a "case study;" Katz (1953) refers to it as a "field study." All the above researchers agree, however, that what they are describing is not a specific technique or set of techniques, but rather:

> (a) way of organizing social data so as to preserve the unitary character of the social object being studied. (Goode and Hatt, 1952, p. 331)

The data to be gathered in this case study of a social object will be gathered using administered questionnaires,[25] participant observation, documents and informant reports. These methods of data-gathering are adequate to the extent of their universality in eliciting a totality of information. In concert with the multitude of data-gathering methods, the sustained, open participation of the researcher lent an "action" research perspective to the investigation.[26]

The limitations to these methods of data-gathering are nominal, in that the research is focusing on those modes most appropriate for bringing data out of the field. One advantage to the specification of these methods is that the researcher built relationships with the subjects initially, rather than immediately focusing on data-gathering techniques (J.P. Dean, 1954; Gardner and Whyte, 1946; Richardson, 1953). A limitation in relation to participant observation techniques is in regard to hypothesis-testing. Becker (1958) has argued that it is feasible to test hypotheses by participant observation given certain analysis and data-gathering procedures, and his medical school study (1961) demonstrates the application of these procedures.

In many studies, investigators have made use of organizational records and documents (Dalton, 1959; Thompson, 1956; Selznick, 1949; Clark, 1958) in their research. A limitation in using these kinds of materials is the problem of documentation:

> (i)t is difficult for the researcher to reproduce for his reader all the evidence upon which his conclusions are based. (Scott, 1965, p. 285)

The use of informants is in the sense suggested by Scott, with informants as experts. That is, information was elicited from those members of the organizational system who had insight as to the history and development of the system and who had access to particular useful types of information. Limitations here include the potential ethical dilemma and the obvious factor of informant bias.

The methods of data collection are diverse, which is appropriate to the research strategy and the role adopted by the researcher. Thus their superiority to an approach which would adopt one or two, but not all of the four methods to be used here.

From here we can categorize the types of data collection methods by hypothesis and evaluate the efficacy of the particular strategy utilized using Zelditch's work[27] as an evaluation guide.

The methods to be utilized include the following:

(a) questionnaire

(b) participant observation

(c) documents

(d) informant reports

By hypothesis, the methods are broken down in Figure VII as follows:

	Component	Method(s)
H_1:	TEI	b, c
	PC	a, b, c, d
	CS	c, d
H_2:	P	c
	TO	b, c
	C	b, c, d
	CDM	b, c, d
	Cl	b, c, d
	TB	a
	OR	b, c
H_3:	SC	c
	CG	c
	AB	b, c, d

Figure VIII: Methods of data collection by hypothesis.

Across the three hypotheses then we can see from Figure VIII that the methods in component hypothesis-testing break out as follows:

(1) 2 a's (questionnaire)
(2) 8 b's (participant observation)
(3) 12 c's (documents)
(4) 6 d's (informant reports)

How do the above methods compare in an evaluation view with Zelditch's paradigm?

Information Types	Methods of Obtaining Information: Enumerations & Samples	Participant Observation	Interviewing Informants
Frequency Distributions	Prototype & Best Form	Usually Inadequate Inefficient	Often inadequate Inefficient
Incidents-Histories	Not adequate Not efficient	Prototype & Best Form	Adequate with precautions Efficient
Institutionalized Norms & Statuses	Adequate but inefficient	Adequate but inefficient except for unverbalized norms	Most efficient hence best form

Figure IX: Methods of obtaining information.

Comparing Figure VIII with Figure IX seems to bode well for the particular use of field methods utilized in the Alpha case study, such that the range is from 'adequate, but efficient' at the minimum, to 'prototype & best form' at the maximum. Let's now turn to Chapter V in order to see where the choice of methods has taken us in relation to hypothesis-testing and findings.

CHAPTER V

DATA ANALYSIS/FINDINGS

The Institutional Sphere

As noted in Chapter III[1] the initial hypothesis focuses on the institutional sphere with the components of the hypothesis including: (1) task environment influence, (2) the role of the Board of Directors, (3) changing publics, (4) the role of a professional caucus, and (5) cooperative strategies.

(1) In attempting to support the institutional sphere hypothesis let's turn our attention initially to the component of task environment influence (TEI). As noted on page 61 (Chapter III), TEI refers to those parts of the environment which are "relevant or potentially relevant to goal setting and goal attainment." We have identified macro- and micro-elements of the task environment which are further broken down into their general and specific subparts. The macro-general TEI was one which had as an objective economic growth with low unemployment, but with a decreasing emphasis on governmental support for human service programs generally,

and for inner-city service programs specifically. The year under study reported here was also a political year, so that the question of program need or merit was subordinate to the concerns of electoral politics. There was also a move afoot, spearheaded by the Nixon Administration and generally supported by fiscal and political conservatives, to 'dis-mantle' social programs conceptualized and implemented in the Kennedy-Johnson Administrations. In the wake of such macro-general developments was the concerted effort to spur private sector business activity and to promote revenue-sharing legislation which would in effect channel human service program dollars through State Houses dominated by Republican governors. The effect of these macro-general developments was to be felt society-wide, and particularly in communities such as Alpha's and in organizations like Alpha which had their beginning in an ethos of participation and inner-city community development. We can safely surmise, then, that a rapidly changing environment was becomming the norm at the macro-general level, which was to have its effect at the macro-specific level.

Thus, in referring back to the conceptual schemes of Rogers, Parsons, and Messinger, in relation to task environment elements, we can surmise that at the macro-general level the political setting was changing, the level of input into inner-city service programs was declining, and that programs and organizations which were a function of the afore-

mentioned ethos of participation and community development were no longer in ascendance; in fact, there was a lack of public concern and a drop in membership relative to such programs and organizations. Another outcome at the macro-general level which was to have ramifications at the macro-specific and micro-specific levels was the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 (see discussion in Chapter IV). The effect of the Act was specifically related to the behavior of private foundations and was to have ramifications at the micro-general and micro-specific levels.[2]



FIGURE X: TEI from macro-general societal level to micro-specific societal level.

In relationship to what Figure X represents relative to dollars and cents, let's turn to Table 1.4.

Table 1.4

Task Environment Input Over Time

Year	Amount/Input	± %	% Total
(a) 1968-69	$200,000	-	15
(b) 1969-70	335,000	+68	24
(c) 1970-71	355,000	+ 6	26
(d) 1971-72	263,265[a]	-26	19
(e) 1972-73	224,128[b]	-15	16
Total:	$1,377,393		100%

(a) includes only Ford and NIMH
(b) includes only NIMH

Further focusing in on the 1970-71 and 1971-72 input years and referring back to Figure V (see page 89) where we see that in 1971-72 Alpha had additional input of $66,093, which increased its total input to $325,344, we have:

Table 1.5

TEI for Study Year & Year Immediately Preceding, in Dollars

Year	Amount/Input	± %
1970-71	$355,000	+ 6
1971-72	325,344	- 8

Thus, either using the figures in Table 1.4 or Table 1.5 we can see that the input-amount was changing in a monotonically decreasing fashion after 1970-71. However, Alpha was exhibiting signs of adapting during 1971-72, in that despite the Ford de-funding decision, additional scattered task environment input was being generated. In fact, the $66,093 additional input generated represented 20% of Alpha's total input-amount for 1971-72. The other 80% of input/amount was represented by the macro-specific entities of Ford and NIMH. We can thus infer that Alpha, as a rational entity, was aware of changes in its task environment which were having a direct effect upon its input/amount. As exhibited by the fact that Alpha contracted for a management audit in September of 1971, we can infer that the continuous institutional sphere pressure had activated the renewal process. For it was with the commissioning of such an audit that Alpha began in earnest the process of self-examination, determination of purpose and the setting of a future direction.[3] As a result of task environment pressure and the activation of the renewal process, Alpha set in motion an effort to alter its structure, its processes, and its goals or purposes.

Seemingly, then, Alpha was moving toward a state of 'ultrastability.' For referring back to Cadwallader, we are reminded that an open system either changes or perishes. In such a case the single avenue to survival is change, and this change process must be preceded <u>and</u> accompanied by a

renewal process. Inferentially, then, without renewal there cannot be change, and in an open system in a changing environment there cannot be survival without renewal and change. Further, the capacity to persist through a change of structure and behavior is called 'ultrastability.' If an organization is to survive critical changes in its environment, it can do so only by changing its structure and behavior.

From the macro-general level on down to the micro-specific level, then, we can see that the TEI was increasing. Relative to H_1, then, renewal and change as observed in the behavior of Alpha did imply that the TEI was increasing, for the obverse[4] would imply that such a process was not essential at that point-in-time. It is also critical to point out that consistent with Propositions 2.6 and 2.7, the major impetus for change in Alpha was from the outside, and that the degree and duration of change were a function of the intensity of the pressure from the adjacent system (or task environment).[5] Further, Alpha was in a conflict-situation with Ford Foundation as an element of the macro-specific task environment around the events leading up to and coinciding with the de-funding decision. This conflict-situation served to define and maintain the Alpha qua. Alpha group boundaries relative to Ford Foundation, and also contributed to the social cohesion within Alpha as the organization initiated the renewal/change/survival process.

(2) Let's turn our attention now to the second component of H_1, that of public concern (PC). The prediction in the hypothesis is that renewal and change implies a decreasing public concern with the organization. By public we shall be referring to those entities outside of Alpha's organizational boundaries at the macro-general, macro-specific and micro-general levels. Concern shall refer to a generalized interest in what happens to Alpha in a policy-making, client/agency relationship and in a professional capacity. The above concerns will be reflected in the hypothesis by discussion of the role of the Board of Directors, changing publics or clientele, and by the role of a professional caucus.

(a) Let's begin our discussion with the role of the Board of Directors by referring again to Ryan's "Analytical and Descriptive Notes"[6] for a perspective on the Board's role in the 1969-70 period. In discussing the area of "Administration and Organization," Ryan notes that the major events are considered in relation to the functioning of the Board and the development of the Project Leader's Council. Going back to the spring and summer of 1969, we see a considerable amount of Board activity centering around the recruitment of a replacement for the Community Co-Director.[7] Growing out of this we also see a clear change in the definition of Alpha, culminating in the official change in the by-laws voted at the November 3, 1969 meeting, emphasizing

a shift from the idea of paired Co-Directors to the idea of a single (Community) Administrator with considerably expanded official authority to operate Alpha.

This change was accompanied by the resignation from the Board of one of the university founders of Alpha, and a person who as Chairman of the Boston College Psychology Department represented the university unit that had put the greatest amount of emphasis on, and resources into, Alpha. Ryan goes on to note that this important event passed with little or no official public notice or interpretation.

At this point, however, the Board stopped meeting at all regularly, did not convene again until April, and then did not meet again until very late in the summer of 1970. There was thus only one meeting in a 9-month period. It should also be noted that the empty university seats remained unfilled during the entire year.

Meanwhile, the Project Leaders Council began making demands to play a more clear and official role in the decision-making of Alpha through membership on the Board. The change in the by-laws and the low level of formal Board activity seems to demonstrate a clear shift in the nature of the community-university relationship. Although there was no apparent protest on the part of university people to this state of affairs -- they appeared to accept their subordination in the order of things -- it is noteworthy that university participation at the Board level was very minimal during

this year.

Thus, in the absence of any clear redefinition of the relationship, what seems to have happened was a process of community dominance apparently accompanied by university submissiveness. In that community in this instance refers to Black community, and university invariably meant white people, this shift can be interpreted as the predominance of an emphasis on black institution-building which by definition was seen as not involving whites in policy-making positions.[8]

The sequence of events described by Ryan in the 1969-70 period relative to Board inactivity parallels in process, but not in content, the nature of Board activity in the 1971-72 period under study here. For the reasons mentioned above, and in Footnote 8, Board activity in the 1969-70 period diminished considerably. It was for entirely different reasons that the Board was inactive during the 1971-72 year. Let's now turn our attention to Board activity during 1971-72, reasons why Board activity decreased and how these developments relate to institutional sphere influence.

During the 12-month period under study here, the Board of Alpha met formally only 4 times. These meetings were in September, October, November and December.[9] There were small meetings of selected Alpha Board officers and staff after December, but not within the context of a full Board

meeting.

After the by-law change in November, 1969, the Project Leaders eventually became recognized officially as a policy-making group on a Board which had 21 members.[10] Once the Ford Foundation grant disappeared, Alpha was no longer able to support projects with stipends.[11] The projects, and Project Leader Council, thus fell away as interest groups. Alpha could no longer provide projects with stipends, nor provide the level of technical assistance and training functions provided for under the Ford grant. In addition, with the environment changing rapidly relative to inner-city community groups, those former Alpha projects were forced to attend to their own survival needs. For as we were able to determine earlier in Chapter IV (see Fig. VI, Alpha Activities), the environment was changing rapidly and there was a high organizational death rate (see Table 1.6, below).

Table 1.6

Organizational Death-Rate Among Alpha-Affiliated Projects, as of September, 1972

	#	%
Still Existing:	12	52
Defunct:	11	48
N =	23	100%

In this instance, then, the entire Board withdrew as a result of Ford's de-funding except for two of the officers who would irregularly provide policy input, advice, and sign checks of amounts greater than $500. In essence, then, the locus of policy-making shifted to the Alpha staff, particularly to its senior staff members. Thus, as one segment of the H_1 component of decreasing public concern, the role of the Board of Directors[12] decreased in scope and function, thus by default shifting to Alpha's staff the responsibility of policy-making and implementation.

(b) From here let's turn our attention to the second element under public concern, that of changing publics or clientele. In the years previous to 1971-72, Alpha's primary public, or clientele, consisted of local community groups and universities. As noted earlier, ADL was commissioned in September, 1971, to examine the role of Alpha viz. universities, local groups, and governmental agencies. One specific recommendation made by ADL was that Alpha reach out beyond local community groups to offer reserach services to other agencies in need of program and organizational evaluation. To this end Alpha stated in its 1971-72 Progress Report to NIMH that it had broadened its scope. Alpha had thus examined its assumptions relative to its publics, or clientele, and made the conscious decision to alter its focus viz. institutional sphere entities. Key considerations in this decision, and course of action, were Alpha's need for viable public/client input to survive in a changing environment, plus the

fact that local community groups and universities were not in financial or organizational shpae to provide the type and scope of input that Alpha desired and needed. Among the local community groups there was withdrawal into their own affairs of survival, and organizational death in extreme instances. With the universities there was also withdrawal from a community focus into a more inward, university-based focus. Alpha responded to these stressful changes by a promptness of response, which enabled the organization to not overcompensate in its response, and thus avoid on eventual collapse of the system (see Proposition 2.8, p.51).

However, it was a reality that Alpha's primary clientele of local community groups and universities changed and this is reflected in the figures derived from Table 1.2. If we aggregate the National-State-City categories in Table 1.2, we then see that the breakdown is as follows:

Table 1.7

Alpha Task Environment
by Level & Frequency (aggregated)

Level	#	%	%
National-State-City	8	53	53
University	1	7	47
Local	6	40	
Total:	15	100	100

So for the first time in its history, the aggregate of public/client contact of local community groups and universities with Alpha was less than the aggregate contact with other sources. Further, as was noted in Chapter IV, the greater percentage of Alpha's contacts relative to public/clientele was at the macro-level. Thus, we can safely posit that in form and fashion, and out of survival necessities, that Alpha was moving away from its 'traditional' role and into a more macro-level role.

(c) The next element of consideration in relation to supporting H_1 relative to public concern is the question of the role of a professional caucus.

The Black Faculty/Administrators Education Caucus (hereinafter referred to as "the Caucus") was initially organized in May, 1971. The scene of this initial meeting was Alpha, Inc., located in Roxbury. It was the intent of this organizing effort to bring together black faculty and administrators from colleges and universities in the New England area in order to facilitate the development of a communication system among individuals and institutions.

It was under the direction of Alpha's Community-University Relations Sector that the Caucus was reconvened in October, 1971. The turnout for the initial two meetings was encouraging from the standpoint of the number of participants and the scope of institutions represented. However, after these initial two meetings the attendance faltered.

Alpha was wondering why people lost interest and if the development of a group such as the Caucus was possible. To this end Alpha formulated a questionnaire to gather information relative to the Caucus specifically, and groups like the Caucus in general. Once the results were in, Alpha considered holding a meeting regarding interpretation of results and how they impact upon strategies for developing and strengthening groups such as the Caucus.

Here, too, we can observe a declining level of participation with Alpha on the part of the professional caucus. Let's take a closer look at the results of the questionnaire which was mailed out early in 1972.

The questionnaire was mailed out to a master listing of 48 individual members of the Caucus. Of this number, 11 (or 23%) were filled out and mailed back to Alpha for tabulation. Of those responding,[13] 9 were in administrative positions while 5 were faculty. Relative to university/agency currently employed with, 1 was with a community agency, 7 were with universities and 3 were with 'Other.'[14] Of those responding, 5 had been in their present position less than one year, 2 had been in their present position more than one year, and less than two and one-half years, 4 had been in their present position more than two and one-half years and less than four years, and only 1 respondent had been in his present position for more than four years. Relative to former position, 7 were in administrative positions, 2 were in faculty positions, and 2 were in 'Other.'

Former employees previous to current positions found 3 in community agencies, 3 in universities, and 4 in 'Other.'

Of those responding, 8 out of 11 had attended Caucus meetings. Of this number attending Caucus meetings, 4 attended four or more times, 3 attended three times and 1 attended only once. All the respondents who attended Caucus meetings thought they were worthwhile. Predominant reasons meetings were seen as worthwhile include statements related to sharing of information, skills and resources. Ways respondents thought meetings could be improved included: focusing on specific tasks, establishment of task groups, providing adequate advance notice of meeting time, and Alpha providing clearer objectives. The type of tasks respondents felt such a Caucus could be directed toward in priority order included: methods of resource sharing, research projects, advisory capacity to community groups, curriculum development and proposal development, and writing position papers.

All the respondents felt that a group such as the Caucus has a role to play in community development, with 8 of 11 feeling as if the Caucus should focus both on community development and university development. Everyone among the respondents thought that universities possess resources that can be applied to community development. Obstacles identified seen as retarding a university role in community development included: departmentalization in universities, which dictates against a multi-disciplinary urban approach; broker

problems; financial; university has no commitment to contiguous communities; ignorance; and lack of focus. All those responding thought that the community possesses resources which can be applied to university development. Obstacles seen as retarding the community role in university development include: chauvanistic stance of university toward the community and 'non-professional' persons; resistance to change; non-access and non-influence in university decision-making and policy-formulation; and a lack of agreement on mutual objectives. Of those resources which could be applied to community development, the majority of respondents stated that they had access to human resources, which a unanimity felt could indeed be applied to community development. The type of grouping that such an application could take place was seen as a problem-specific task group.

Methods seen as most effective in community development included: community development corporations; influence activities (boycotts, disobedience, disruption); and grassroots organization and planning around specific institution-building or development. Methods seen as most desirable for the Roxbury community overlapped with the responses recorded above.

A majority of the respondents expressed an interest to meet and discuss the questionnaire results, and a majority stated that they would be able to attend future Caucus meetings. Of those unable to attend future Caucus meetings, 100%

(4 out of 4) felt that the Caucus should continue to function. Relative to where the Caucus should meet, 6 of 11 (55%) felt meetings should be in the community while 5 (45%) felt the meetings should alternate between community and university.

Despite the general feeling that what the Caucus was doing was worthwhile, and that it should continue to meet, the Caucus never did convene again. This was due primarily to the press of events facing Alpha which rendered the Caucus a low priority and also the resultant alienation of Caucus members from Alpha once the organization had transformed itself and emerged anew.

Thus, in relation to public concern the above discussion relative to the Board of Directors, changing publics/clientele, and the professional caucus confirms that renewal and change implies a <u>decreasing</u> public concern with Alpha.

(c) According to H_1, renewal and change also implies an increasing need to develop cooperative strategies with elements of the institutional sphere. As was seen in Chapter II (see pp. 37-38), it was Selznick's work in describing the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) which paved the way for the development of types of environmental strategies, especially in the inter-organizational area. This paved the way for work by Thompson and McEwen (1958) through which they identified basically two strategies for dealing with the environment, (a) competition and (b) cooperation. As we have seen earlier, Alpha's two main input sources were Ford and

NIMH. With the Ford de-funding, Alpha was forced to enter into relationships with its environment in order to gain support. The selection of a strategy for gaining environmental support is in itself a strategic problem, and it is here that the element of rationality becomes important. As stated in the "Background" section of the ADL Final Report to Alpha:

> (Alpha's) recent loss of Ford Foundation funding made more imperative an assessment of (Alpha's) strengths and weaknesses. Clearly, an institution with drastically reduced funding quickly begins to lose its ability to attract. (ADL Final Report, April, 1972, p. 2)

Due to this loss of funding, Alpha by necessity had to increase its development of cooperative strategies in order to gain environmental support to make up for the funding loss. In addition, as we see from Proposition 3.1 (p. 53), Alpha also was aiming to develop cooperative strategies with a variety of task environment elements in order to minimize the power of any one task environment element. Under norms of rationality, Alpha did not want to repeat the Ford Foundation experience, that is, of placing its dependence into one or two (with NIMH) task environment elements. Alpha wanted to develop alternatives, thus scattering and minimizing its dependence and the power of task environment elements over the organization.

Thus, as opposed to 1970-71 when Alpha's task environment elements were Ford and NIMH, which were the total input

into Alpha's operating budget, in 1971-72 the number of task environment elements had grown to nine. There, thus, occurred more than a 4-fold increase in the number of task environment elements. Alpha thus seems to have been moving toward scattering its dependence through a heightened level of developing cooperative strategies. Relative to cooperative strategies, then, Alpha was increasing this process, thus enabling the organization to gain support from its environment.

To review H_1, the above discussion and data presentation has confirmed that renewal and change implies an increasing task environment influence, a decreasing public concern, and an increase in the development of cooperative strategies.

The Intra-Organizational Sphere

(2) Let's initially turn our attention to the Internal Directional Variables (H_2). The initial component of this second hypothesis states that with renewal and change there will be decreasing productivity. The assumption underlying this prediction is rooted in Proposition 1.9 (p.) which is based upon control by all levels in an organization accompanied by coordination and integration of the organization and individual members. Also Alpha had a reduced input during 1971-72, which suggests that its output would also decrease.

(a) In relation to productivity, renewal and change implies that a process is underway which tends to detract from the strict concentration on output. Renewal and change also implies a state of flux which seemingly works against the coordination and integration of goals with this non-stable process not being conducive to high organizational effectiveness.

As defined earlier,[15] productivity shall refer to those reports, presentations and monographs 'produced' by Alpha and reported in its Annual Report. For the sake of comparison, let's turn our attention to the report years 1970-71 and 1971-72. Also, we will take a look at the input/amount for these respective years, in order to derive a measure of both effectiveness and efficiency.

Table 1.8

Productivity (Output) by Input, Year & Ratio

Year	Input/Amount	Output	Ratio(i:o)
1970-71	$355,000	2	$177,500
1971-72	263,265[a]	20	13,163
	325,344[b]		16,267

[a]includes only Ford & NIMH
[b]see Fig. IV, Chapter IV

From Table 1.8, then, we can see that for the 1970-71 report year only two products were noted, while in 1971-72 20 products were noted. This was a 10-fold increase in pro-

ductivity despite at 8% decrease in funding (using the $325,344 figure as the 1971-72 input). What these figures also reveal is that for 1970-71 there was required an input of $177,500 for each additional increment of productivity, while for 1971-72 the required input figure for each additional increment of productivity dropped to $16,267. These figures imply then that relative to 1970-71, 1971-72 was a year of high organizational effectiveness and efficiency. Thus, for the first component of H_2, the outcome was the reverse of the prediction. In fact, during the year under study here there was an increase in productivity despite the renewal and change process being underway and despite a high turnover rate. Looking back at Proposition 1.9, what does this finding infer? It seems to mean that there was control at all levels of the organization which provides the basis for effective coordination of organizational activity. It also infers that individual and organizational goals were integrated with this coordination and integration being conducive to high organizational effectiveness.

It also implies that in a non-profit organization it remains a problem to measure the output as a function of the input. If we were to use the ratio between input and output from 1970-71 for the 1971-72 input figures, then we would have predicted that the output (or productivity) in 1971-72 would be 1.48 (using the $263,265 figure), or 1.83 (using the $325,344 figure). Conversely, using the 1971-72 ratio and doing some retro-diction[16] we would have predicted

the 1970-71 output figure as being 26.97 (using the $263,265 figure) or 21.82 (using the $325,344 figure). Further, using the 1971-72 ratio and knowing that in 1972-73 Alpha was to have an input of at least $224,128, we would predict the 1972-73 output as being 15 (only using the $325,344 figure).

For measurement and prediction problems noted in the above discussion, then, the initial component of H_2 relative to production was not supported.

(b) The second component of H_2 predicts that renewal and change implies an increase in turnover rates. This prediction has its roots in Proposition 1.2 (p. 42) which suggests that renewal and change engenders alienation and that alienation implies inactivity or dropping-out.

Let's look at the turnover rate figures in a comparative vein. The basis of comparison will be figures derived from a Boardroom Reports[17] survey of turnover rates which was published on August 17, 1972.

Table 1.9

Comparative Turn-Over Rates

	Male/Female	
	Boardroom Data %	Alpha Data[a] %
Annual Turnover Rate	19	57
Male Employees	13	77
Female Employees	25	25
	Length of Service at Termination	
Under 1 year	41	64
1 year, but less than 5	42	36
5 years and over	17	-
	Type of Business	
Educational	15	57
Gov't Agency (any level)	14	
Public Utility	13	
Retail Sales & Dist.	21	
Service	25	
For all Companies	26	

Table 1.9 - Comparative Turn-Over Rates (cont'd)

	Size of Office	
	Boardroom Data %	Alpha Data %
1-25 Employees	22	57
	Geographical Area	
East	20	57

[a]the Alpha annual data is on a September-to-September year basis.

Thus, from Table 1.9 we can see that in a relative and absolute sense Alpha had a high, and increasing, turnover rate. The second component of H_2 thus seems to be supported as predicted.

(c) The third component of H_2 predicts that renewal and change implies decreasing communication. Propositions defined in Chapter II which relate to this component of communication include 1.3 and 1.4 (see page 42). In this vein, criteria for decisions of an expressive nature tend to be communicated downward, thus implying that change tends to be top-down. Further, in utilitarian organizations such as Alpha, there is an emphasis on vertical instrumental communication. Thus, from Propositions 1.3 and 1.4 we can infer that both expressive and instrumental communication follow a verti-

cal pattern which tends to be top-down.

In order to confirm this hypothesis-component reference will be made to outcomes from the "Structured Group Interview" session held on July 21 and 22, 1972. This session involved Alpha staff which at that time consisted of 19 members.[18] The "Structured Group Interview" is an "action research" method for identifying and solving inter-group social problems. A specific outcome of this two-day session was a series of recommendations[19] for decisive planning. From a list of 40 items discussed during the 2-day session, four general areas were delineated. These areas were: administrative, staff development, executive issues, and communication. There was some overlap of items in these areas such that the delineation broke down as follows:

Table 1.10

Structured Group Interview Area Outcomes

Area	# Items	%
Administrative	10	19
Staff Development	10	19
Executive Issues	17	33
Communication	15	29
Total[a]:	52	100%

[a]the total is greater than the original list of forty (40), in that some items fell into more than one area.

Thus among those areas of concern revealed as expressed by Alpha's staff in late July, 1972, communication was the second most-important, trailing only executive issues. Among those areas of concern which fell under the category of communication were: security, trust model, organizational mission, organizational strains, staff meetings, job security, communication problems, black/white ethnic staff problems, blackness at Alpha, roles of whites in the organization, staff problems, organization checks and balances, project authority, checking with Director, and administrative and job satisfaction.

In addition, there was very little communication by memorandum from September until August. During that 12-month period there was probably a total of 150 memos circulated throughout Alpha and the majority of them did not deal with policy and/or implementation issues, but rather more with administrative procedures. In fact, the highest level of 'memo-sending' (as internal communication activity) came after the two-day "Structured Group Interview" session. So, from July 24, 1972 until late August, a total of 68 memos were issued which represents approximately 45% of the total issued during the entire 12-month period. However, as we shall see a little later, the organization had formally changed into a research and development operation with a minimum of expressive and/or instrumental communication. We can infer then that communication was top-down and that during

the renewal and change process communication was decreased.[20]

(d) The next component in H_2 is centralized decision-making in which the prediction is that this will increase. The critical parts of this component as revealed in Fig. III (Chapter III) include the concept of centralized decision-making under the organizational rigidity component and the decision-making component. Relevant propositions in this instance are 2.9 and 3.0.

As stated in the 'Findings and Conclusions' section of the ADL report:

> Three or four senior staff members are the heart of the organization...Out of necessity two or three senior staff members have shared in varying degrees of responsibility for such key areas as business development, administration, and the actual performance of research. The assignment of principal responsibility for each of these functions should be made with clear policies as to accountability. More specifically, the Executive Director must be willing to delegate authority to form particular functions. Delegation to the required extent is not likely to occur until the Executive Director develops confidence in the skills and abilities of his staff. (ADL Final Report, April, 1972, p. 26)

Let's spend some time here examining the process of delegation as it relates to centralized decision-making. The process of delegation includes: assignment of duties to subordinates; granting of authority to use resources and take other action necessary to perform duties; and creation of an obligation (responsibility) on the part of the subordinate to the executive for satisfactory performance of the duties.

Failure to delegate authority is also seen as a pitfall in organizational life.

Thus, ADL's observation in its report to Alpha seems to have pointed up the hierarchical, centralized decision-making situation which implies that organizational change was from the top-down. This process is reinforced through an analysis of the minutes of the "Structured Group Interview" session, in which:

> Some staff members expressed concern that they have no input into the decisions that are made at [Alpha]. Very often staff meetings are called and nobody knows what the agenda will consist of.[21]

Further, an area of concern which came out of the two-day session on which there was an agreement that action needed to be taken was in 'areas of decision-making process for Executive vs. Total Group.'

Thus in examining the above data and discussion, it does indeed reveal a situation in which decision-making was recognized as becoming increasingly centralized.

(e) The next component of H_2 relates to a changing clientele viz. the internal organization. We have already examined the concept of changing clientele relative to the institutional sphere under the component of public concern. In that examination we determined that Alpha's institutional sphere publics/clientele were indeed changing, which indicated a declining public concern among those groups tradi-

tionally associated with Alpha.

Relative to the internal sphere, we have already determined under turnover rates that Alpha's internal public, or members, was increasingly changing. That is, Alpha's internal members were tending to express an 'exit option' through leaving or being forced out.

As further measurement of a changing, internal public/clientele we shall refer to a notice for a meeting at Alpha in February, 1972. At this time past and present members of Alpha's internal community were invited to discuss the circumstances surrounding Ford's de-funding decision, how such a development impacted upon Alpha and its surrounding community, to provide input as to what Alpha could become and how such a future might relate to the interest of the community and the university. Letters of invitation were mailed out to approximately 100 individuals in January. Of this number contacted, only around 11 or 12 persons came to this important meeting. The turnout was only around 12% and was at least 1/4 of what was expected. Seemingly then, Alpha's internal public or clientele had lost interest and was changing. If we look at this development in conjunction with the turnover rates, then it can reasonably be inferred that this component of H_2 is supported.

(f) The next component of H_2 to be examined is 'tolerance for bureaucracy.'[22] Proposition 1.5 is relevant to this component which suggests that if there is a decreasing

tolerance for bureaucracy, hierarchical cohesion is minimized, which in turn "implies a lack of positive involvement on the part of lower participants in the organization." In a confidential memorandum[23] dated March 8, 1972, the findings of the questionnaire were discussed. The scale was administered to 20 staff persons in late February, 1972.

The questionnaire results[24] were mixed, but what was revealed is a low tolerance for bureaucracy as measured by the scale. In other words, Alpha staff does not respond to 'bureaucratization.' It is a staff primarily confident in setting their own directions, rules, hours of work, etc., who do not view those in leadership roles as leaders, per se. It was noted in the discussion that it should be borne in mind that the results are a function of (a) the scale construction, (b) the situation internal to Alpha to that point, and (c) staff's own perception of what should happen. Essentially, Alpha at that time had no fixed structure, so the predominant reactions may have been to that reality.

The staff of Alpha did indicate that they felt better off than most of their friends as far as current employment was concerned. In other words, the majority of Alpha staff was not bored by their jobs, felt happier in their jobs than their friends, and were not sorry that they took this job. There seems to be a high level of self-actualization of Alpha staff in relation to their work. There, thus, exists a low level of tolerance for bureaucracy and satisfaction may exist

because there are minimal bureaucratic trappings at Alpha. In the research memorandum, the following questions were raised. What would happen with an increase in the bureaucratization of Alpha? Would the level of satisfaction decline? Would the level and scope of performance decline or increase? What would be the additional turnover and absentee rate?

As revealed by the scale, within Alpha we had a situation in which the tolerance for bureaucracy was low and decreasing, yet there was satisfaction and positive involvement in the organization. This anomaly from Proposition 1.5 seems to be a function of the fluid hierarchy as perceived by Alpha staff at the time of questionnaire administration. Unfortunately, no pre- and post-transformation questionnaire administration was done, so we have no data relative to the scale after the structural and behavioral change in Alpha, Inc. The questions raised by Alpha in the research memorandum would be pertinent relative to the post-transformation period.

We can attempt to deal with the questions raised in the absence of a post-transformation administration of the bureaucratic scale questionnaire by examining available data on turnover rates and productivity. Crucial in such an analysis is the fact that as of April 1, 1972, Alpha formally announced its transformation into a research and development organization and implemented structure and behavior appropriate to this organizational form. Thus, for the sake of the data presented in Tables 1.11 and 1.12, the date of April 1 is the dividing point.

Table 1.11

Turnover Rates Comparing
the Entire Year With April - September

	Time Period	Turnover Rates, %
Male	Sept - Sept	77
Female	Sept - Sept	25
All	Sept - Sept	57
Male	Apr. - Sept	60
Female	Apr. - Sept	22
All	Apr. - Sept	21

Table 1.12

Number of Products
by Period & Average Products per Month

	# Products	%	#/month/$\bar{X}$
Sept-April[a]	9	45	1.29
Apr.-Sept.[b]	11	55	2.20
Sept-Sept	20	100	1.67

[a]A period of 7 months

[b]A period of 5 months

From the above data, we can infer that post-transformation there was a decrease in the turnover rate for male, female and all employees and that the productivity rate was increasing and was on the average 35% higher than in the pre-transforma-

tion period. Further, the post-transformation productivity average per month was 24% greater than the full-year average per month.

The post-transformation period thus seems to substantiate Prop. 1.5 in that there existed a hierarchical structure which could be perceived and related to.

Considering all that has gone before, we can state that this particular component of H_2 relative to renewal and change implying a decreasing tolerance for bureaucracy has been supported.

(g) The final component of H_2 relative to renewal and change is organizational rigidity. With renewal and change, the prediction is that organizational rigidity is increased. Organizational rigidity refers to: centralized decision-making; similarity in procedures and processes across organizational sub-units in the accomplishment of goals; standardized ways of relating to clients; and that the above structural relations are persistent over time. The propositions particularly relevant to this component include Prop. 2.9 and 3.0.

We have also confirmed one part of the organizational rigidity component under (2)d, centralized decision-making. Through the data and discussion presented earlier, we determined that there was an increase in centralized decision-making. Relative to a similarity in procedures and processes across organizational sub-units in the accomplishment of

goals we can observe the following. The issuance of a personnel administrative manual in the Fall of 1971, which covered administration policies and procedures and personnel policies and procedures. This was a 74-page document replete with forms, documents, report forms and other related materials regarding procedures and processes for Alpha and its sub-units. In April, 1972, an internal communication numbering and coding system was implemented. Also in April, a central filing system was set up and a contract was let to Tufts University data processing to establish an information system for Alpha. One part of ADL recommendations too was that Alpha needs to establish a quality control mechanism in order to monitor research plans and work products. A further recommendation was that Alpha needed to implement a system to improve external reporting and controls. However, the report did offer a caveat:

> Obviously, care should be taken not to pursue the opposite extreme of excessive control. Control for control's sake is of dubious value to a relatively small organization which is highly dependent on creativity. Furthermore, the process could prove very expensive. (ADL Final Report, April, 1972, p. 27)

Relative to standardized ways of relating to clients, the personnel administrative manual spelled out policies regarding contracts, leases, consultants engaged on a contract or specified fee basis, and the appropriate internal channels which should be followed upon entering into such agreements.

There also occurred general discussion about who should assume responsibility for business development and that task fell mainly to senior staff. Once a client contact had been made, a standardized Letter of Intent would be drafted and forwarded to the potential client. In addition, there was developed a standardized proposal format relative to seeking institutional sphere input.

The above structural relations began in September of 1971 and became even more 'institutionalized' once transformation took place. Thus the relation did persist over the course of this study, so in a relative sense we can safely say that they persisted over time.

The above discussion thus confirms that there was an increase in organizational rigidity with renewal and change, and that such an increase was particularly evident after April 1, 1972.

Thus in looking at renewal and change in relation to H_2, we can safely state that except in the case of non-support of the productivity component that the hypothesis was confirmed. The situation with the productivity prediction indicates that measurement of efficiency and effectiveness in non-profit organizations remains a technical problem. However, the work reported here in this area provides a quantitative base from which such a measurement and prediction examination can proceed.

(3) Let's turn now to the second section of the intra-organizational sphere, that of the internal, non-directional relationships.

(a) The first component states that renewal and change implies structural change. This was indeed the situation with Alpha for once the transformation took place as announced in a memorandum from the Executive Director on April 20, 1972, the structure of the organization changed. The memorandum in effect stated:

> [Alpha] is officially a Research and Development Organization effective as of April 1, 1972. In essence, it means that there is no longer a "research department."[25]

The breakdown under which Alpha would be operating henceforth with personnel reporting to division heads was as follows: administration; quality control; health; education; community development and housing; and justice-administration. Using the following formula we can compute the total number of relationships organization-wide and for each division within Alpha, the formula is:

$$(1.1)\quad \text{Number of Relationships} = n(2^{n-1}+(n-1))$$

where n = Number of employees

Under the Executive Director at the time of announced transformation there were 18 employees (with the total staffing consisting of 19 people). Thus the total number of relationships possible for the Executive Director with sub-

ordinates, using formula (1.1) was 2,228,513. For each division in the restructured organization, the total relationships were as follows:

Table 1.13

Number of Relationships by Division

Division	# of Relationships
Administration	6
Quality Control	6
Health	18
Education	490
Community Dev.& Housing	222
Justice-Administration	44

The new organization chart which became effective April 13, 1972 was a line organization which was opposed to the former line and staff structure. The new structure was of the following form.



FIGURE XI: Alpha Organizational chart as of April 13, 1972.

The organizational chart prior to the transformation was as follows:



FIGURE XII: Alpha Organizational Chart Pre-Transformation.

The structural change thus saw Alpha transform itself from a research, training and resource center, characterized by a line and staff structure, to a research and development

agency with a line structure. We can thus state that renewal and change implies a structural change.

(b) The second component of H_3 states that renewal and change implies a change in the goals and objectives of Alpha. As noted in Chapter I in the section on 'The Organization Under Study,' Alpha has operated on the basis of two principles: that community action should be carried out by community residents; that such action should be supported by social science reserach. Alpha was also established to be a broker between the community and university, with the expressed goals of helping minority community organizations achieve cultural, psychological, political, economic and social control over the factors, internal and external, which affect and direct them.

With its role as a broker diminishing due to environmental influences, Alpha was forced to re-examine its goals and purposes, to set a new direction and to organize itself to meet these new goals and objectives. Thus, as we have seen, Alpha began the renewal process by commissioning a management audit. Chief among the recommendations in the audit was that Alpha re-structure itself to focus its efforts on research activities. As was also suggested in the report, this was not to say that Alpha should pursue research activities exclusively; for superior research studies open numerous avenues for meaningful and profitable consulting projects. The following factors were listed in the ADL report to support

their rationale for a research focus:

(a) Alpha's experience as a resource center;

(b) The potential for market entry based upon Alpha's capabilities;

(c) The uniqueness and capability of the organization;

(d) The competitive picture;

(e) Research studies lend themselves to Alpha's present staff arrangements;

(f) Financial stability

Upon completion of the management audit, Alpha had a fundamental strategic decision to make and the decision was to become a reserach and development organization. Further, Alpha moved to open an office in the Harvard Square area in Cambridge in order to heighten its contacts and credibility in order to pursue its goal of pursuing research activities. Thus, by June of 1972 Alpha had offices in both Roxbury and Cambridge, supported by its NIMH grant and the input derived from other task environment elements.

As stated in a memorandum[26] of June 19, 1972, the growth of Alpha is primarily directed toward providing leadership within communities for increasingly significant involvement in local-national policies and programs. The organization thus stands transformed in structure, goal-statement and behavior. Alpha had also exhibited that it had the capacity

to persist through a change in structure and behavior, i.e., it was 'ultrastable.' The second component of H_3 thus stands supported. Let's move now to the final component in H_3, administrative behavior.

(c) The prediction here is that renewal and change implies a change in administrative behavior. We can see that with organizational transformation there was a change in structure. This change established a separate and distinct administration division which was headed up by an Operations Director. The intent of this change was to centralize administration and take the burden of administration from the other senior staff members further freeing them up for business development and/or research activities. ADL mentions in its report the existence of a senior staff, and for our purposes we will refer to this grouping as the dominant coalition. This coalition was interdependent by function and structure, thus following Prop. 1.6 (see page 43) there existed potential for conflict. Further, we have seen in some depth the pressure exerted upon Alpha by external forces. Such pressure necessitated internal compromise on certain outcome preferences, thus further heightening the potential for conflict. The dominant coalition was composed of the following professions: architect; social scientist (2); and administration. Following Prop 1.8, potential for conflict within the dominant coalition increases with the variety of professions incorporated. Fortunately for Alpha, there was not the extreme

exercise of power sufficient enough to generate opposition (see Prop. 2.1, page 46). With the overriding objective of survival, there was enough administrative behavior directed toward scattering task environment influence that conflict was kept to a minimum. However, the issue of tension among the dominant coalition was raised and became an area of concern at the two-day session built around the "Structured Group Interview." It was categorized as "organizational checks and balances" and was placed under the heading of executive issues.

Administration was thus shifted structurally once transformation took place and the prime function of this division was to keep the office running on a day-to-day basis and to provide appropriate procedures and conditions necessary to increase productivity (output) in order to continue to gain support from the task environment. As noted earlier, the administrative behavior which became the norm was a strict accounting of personnel location, project status, etc., in such a fashion as to free other senior staff up for developing organizational input. Thus behavior became divided into input, conversion process and output, with the latter two being the primary objective of the administration division.

Thus, with renewal and change there occurred a change in the structure and behavior of the administrative portion of Alpha. This behavior manifested itself in a more rigid

and demanding fashion, but in a way which increased organizational output and further guaranteed survival.

We have thus concluded the discussion on data analysis and findings. Two hypotheses (H_1 and H_3) have been supported, while 6 out of 7 components of H_2 were supported. The non-confirmation of the productivity component was attributed to a technical problem around the measurement of input/output indices relative to organizational effectiveness and efficiency. This inability to predict output as a function of input thus remains a technical problem in the study of effectiveness and efficiency in non-profit organizations.

Measuring Organizational Change/ The Five-Step Model

In the concluding section of this chapter we will take a closer look at the 5-step model adapted from Messinger's work as it relates to the attempt to measure organizational change. The explication of this model will allow us to develop a sharper focus in relationship to the steps, or states, within the 'transformation model.' To again review Messinger's five stages (which we here are referring to as a 5-step model)[27] we have:

State 1: Ascendance

State 2: Lack of Public Concern

State 3: Drop in Membership

State 4: Maintenance

State 5: Transformation

To derive a sense of these state conditions in relationship to particular time periods we will be making reference to Table 1.4 and Table 1.5 in the section under 'Institutional Sphere.' From the figures in Table 1.4 we can formulate the graph shown in Figure XIII.



FIGURE XIII: Input/Amount by Year.

From Fig. XIII we can then correlate the years with the state conditions in the following manner:

State 1: October, 1968 - September, 1971

State 2: October, 1971 - December, 1971

State 3: December, 1971 - January, 1972

State 4: February, 1972 - April, 1972

State 5: April, 1972 -

The typical model as explicated by those authors in footnote 27 would define States 1 and 5 as absorbing states. That is, once entered they cannot be left. States 2, 3 and 4 would be defined as transient states. That is, an organization[28] in one of those states can either move to another transient state or to an absorbing state. In a fully-developed 5-step model based on numerous studies of the process of organization change, we should then be able to attach probabilities to the movement between states. For the definition of absorbing states, once entered the probability would be 1.0 (or certainty) that the organization would remain there. The questions arise around deriving general probabilistic statements for organizations moving between transient states, or between a transient state and an absorbing state. However, our knowledge about organization change is much too scanty at this point in time to be able to derive such proabilities.

In the case of Alpha, Inc., we can see from Fig. XIII and the state conditions that the organization was in State I (ascendance) for approximately 3 years. What were defining conditions and the resultant probability of Alpha then moving into State 2 (lack of public concern)? From State 2, we can

posit the same question relative to the organization moving into State 3, and so on until we approach the overriding question of estimating the probability of an organization moving into absorbing State 5, or organizational transformation. An attendant reality, too, is that once an organization has left absorbing State 1, it may not be capable of moving through the process model to absorbing State 5. It is entirely conceivable that an organization will be arrested somewhere within the transient states and become defunct before it reaches the transformation absorbing state. Our studies of organization change should be able to provide for us an estimate of the probability of an organization moving through the process model, transforming itself and surviving. However, our current data and parameters are too limited to begin addressing the very complex problem of estimation.

The five-step model proposed here as a heuristic device would have the following form:



FIGURE XIV: Organization change model.

In such a model, too, we may be entirely too restrictive in defining particular states as absorbing. We may merely satisfy ourselves at this juncture by saying that particular states are more or less transient than others, rather than defining state conditions as being absorbing. Aside from model-building, it is difficult to conceive an organization occupying an absorbing state which cannot be left. That is, is it at all possible to conceive that once an organization has moved into the transformation state that it cannot leave once the state is entered? Or perhaps the process of organization change is continuous, such that once the transformation state is reached the only other state which can be entered is State 1, ascendance thus setting in motion the process model once again. Following this logic, it then seems that the only states from which an organization is certain of leaving, once entered, are States 1 and 5. The basis of such logic is that no organization is either permanently ascending or permanently in a transformed state. Further, it is not at all a certainty that once an organization leaves the ascendance state (State 1) and moves into the 'lack of public concern state' (State 2), that it will move through to State 3, State 4 and State 5. In the transition matrices derived as a result of Cohen, Coleman, Suppes, Snell, et.al., the probability of moving through all state conditions, or in remaining in an absorbing state, equals 1.0. However, with the case of an organization, it may die out

prior to reaching State 5. There is no guarantee in the real world that an organization, once it leaves the ascendant state, can survive and be transformed. Nor are there parameters in the world of model-building which can portray with certainty a movement from ascendance to transformation. If we are to begin understanding and developing parameters which can heighten our understanding of the organization change and survival process, perhaps a legitimate starting point is with renewal and change and those components within these concepts which allowed us to predict and explain.

Probably even before we devote too much time to model-building though, we should spend some time on more case studies and more comparative studies of organization change. We need more data before we can set realistic parameters for models of organization change. We need more comparative studies of organization change in order to move to the middle-range theory. Finally, we need to move to the 'upper' level of organization change theory which will allow us to make statements concerning general characteristics of organization change. It is at this point that we will be ready for building models of organization change.

This case study of Alpha, Inc. represented only a beginning. Hopefully the data generated, the hypotheses tested, the concepts derived, the terms defined, and the questions raised will provide a step in the direction outlined above.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

The Process of Dispersed Dependence in Organizations

As we examine the process of organization change in relation to an open system strategy which incorporates the task environment as a major variable, it is perhaps important in a heuristic sense to consider the process of dispersed dependence in organizations. The heurism involved in such an examination is particularly pertinent to Black social theoreticians. Alpha, Inc., as a case study of organization change, can serve as a benchmark in attempting to determine and understand how a Black organization moves from a state of dependence to a state of dispersed dependence. This question is of particular importance to theoreticians and practitioners interested in understanding and moving Black organizations from dependence to dispersed dependence.[1] Of specific concern, too, is how the leverage afforded by input from sources such as the private sector, the public sector and/or the third sector, can be utilized in order to take an organization through the change process such that it can survive and grow in a state of dispersed dependence.

Let's take a closer look at what such a process may look like and how the terms, or state conditions, could be defined. It seems as if three (3) identifiable state conditions would include the following:

State 1: Dependence

State 2: Inter-dependence

State 3: Dispersed dependence

Following Thompson's (1967) usage of task environment influence, the three states could be defined by the concentration of task environment control over the organization. This would imply that we could determine the state a particular organization was occupying by the level and concentration of control by task environment elements.[2] In the instance of Alpha, Inc. and the Black Strategy Center, task environment control was very concentrated. The concern of Black theoreticians and practitioners is how to disperse task environment control and move the organizations to a state of dispersed dependence. We saw that the Black Strategy Center was unable to meet this challenge. We also observed Alpha's movement along this continuum and for a variety of reasons enumerated earlier, have a sense that the organization is enjoying some level of success in moving to a state of dispersed dependence.

However, before we can move much further in developing models which mirror the process of dispersed dependence, we

need more case studies and comparative studies of organization change in Black organizations specifically, and in organizations generally. We also need to gain a better understanding of how Kaufman's concept of bonds relate to defining organizational characteristics of survival or death. That is, what type and combination of (1) emotional bonds, (2) moral bonds, (3) expediency bonds, (4) habitual bonds, and (5) physical bonds, are prerequisite to organization survival and dispersed dependence. For Black organizations, which perhaps can be viewed within a modernization perspective, it could be hypothesized that all of the above five combinations are in force, thus providing a foundation which can lead to survival and dispersed dependence provided sufficient and diversified inputs are acquired. A key factor in looking at Alpha, Inc., was that it was a Black organization with a mission rooted in a civil rights and modernization ethos which made it attractive to more than those interested in bonds of expediency.

The three-step 'dispersed dependence model' is thus a heuristic suggestion which is in need of much more data and theory-building before we could pretend to explicate it fully. However, the work done within this monograph points up the need and efficacy in considering renewal, change, survival, and dispersed dependence within an organizational context.

Contribution

The case study is based on a heuristic assumption. That is, sociologists understand little about organizational renewal and change. Further, sociologists, social legislators, policy analysts and policy makers understand probably even less about the societal impact of various public and private sector funded social programs. There is little empirical evidence in sociological literature which speaks to change, renewal and survival in the often transitory organizational forms which develop as a part of social programming. Yet those organizations exist within the bowels of our urban areas and meet the requirements of organizational life as does an automobile production facility, a division within an electronics company, or a union local. The literature in the field of social welfare (see Kramer and Specht, 1969) and political science (see Wilson, 1968) are more expository. This sociological case study has thus served as a utilitarian device intended to aid in the discovery of new facts and relationships.

We have seen that comparative analysis of organizations leads to the development of theories of the middle range (Etzioni, 1961). Weick (1969) raises the question concerning the validity of case studies to analyze organizations in a rapidly changing environment. However, organization theory building is not a primary purpose here and, as noted earlier, the concern is with the theory of organizations using the case study of Alpha, Inc. as a heuristic

device.

The Alpha case study is important as an analysis of an organization which has developed competence in spite of a substitution strategy which dictates against such a development. This research can be an important contributor to the study of community agencies, a ubiquitous organization form about which our understanding is limited and segmented. Another substantive importance of this research is in the sociology and political science of organizations.

The procedures utilized here are not unique in the study of organizations. What is important is the methodology employed in relation to an organization in transition. The study of organizational change is an infrequent area of concern, principally because that type of information most readily available to the researcher is not categorized within a framework which makes change understandable. Perhaps the only universal constant is change, social scientists must become cognizant of developing and refining methodological assumptions appropriate to analyzing and understanding change, and in this case organizational change.

A further important and contributing factor in the proposed research is in relation to the concept of institution-building. Increasingly, the concern of Black organizations funded by private and public sector monies is how to use that financial foundation as a leverage to develop an institution which lasts beyond the cessation of such

monies. Administratively and organizationally, this challenge has not often been met. Alpha, Inc. is an example of an organization attempting to take that step. The work of depicting the components of that process should be of importance to sociologists, political scientists and Black social theoreticians in general.

Toward a Paradigm of Social Change

In The Sociological Tradition (1966), Robert Nisbet asserts that Tocqueville and Marx played major roles. And in fact, the sociological tradition may be seen as a kind of magnetic field with Tocqueville and Marx as the two poles of attraction. Nisbet goes on to state that in the long run the influence of Tocqueville on the sociological tradition has been the greater:

> Even before the nineteenth century had run its course, the works of Tonnies, Weber, Durkheim and Simmel -- the four men who, by common assent, did the most to give systematic shape to modern sociological theory -- reflected on the whole, the trimuph of the Tocquevillian over the Marxian image of society and its course of development. (Nisbet, 1966, p. viii)

Further, a parallel in significance to the contrasting roles of Tocqueville and Marx are the conflicting themes of traditionalism and modernism. Of the contemporary social sciences, sociology is perhaps the one in which tension between traditional and modern values is most evident in its

conceptual structure and its underlying assumptions. However, Nisbet states that to label Weber or Tonnies or Durkheim or Simmel traditionalist (even more, politically conservative) would be absurd.

Is sociology, as it has developed in the tradition of Tocqueville, a conservative paradigm and discipline? That is, defining 'conservative' to mean a 'disposition to preserve existing conditions, institutions,'etc., or 'conservatism' to mean 'an ideological orientation that opposes social change, especially change away from traditional cultural values and mores.' This definition is seemingly not appropriate to the socialist paradigm which attempted to deal conceptually with a 'classless' society, and other attendant constructs, e.g., conflict, force, change, etc.

Can sociology be viewed as a 'value-free' paradigm and discipline? Further, can sociology be viewed as a liberating and radical paradigm in which sociologists become advocates for persons and groups with limited resources? In answering the above questions, we will begin by examining paradigm and discipline. Then we will move to theoretical and empirical studies in the area of organizational analysis and theories of change. Implicit in the following discussion will be: (1) the question of the ascendance and dominance of a particular Weltanschauung (world view); and (2) three models of social intervention.

The unit-ideas of an intellectual discipline should

be governed by the following criteria; they should be:

(a) general,

(b) continuous,

(c) distinctive, and

(d) possess perspective, framework, category (in the Kantian sense), within which vision and fact unite.

A paradigm (as a philosophy of society) is a systematic statement of basic assumptions and propositions employed by a particular discipline. The assumptions are widely shared by those who feel most comfortable within the school of thought and thereby assist in definition of critical problems, identification of data and observation of social phenomena. A paradigm maps out the interrelations of central concepts and thereby prevents the likelihood of missing hidden assumptions while advancing theory and analysis. Perhaps the most important feature of a paradigm is its ability to organize value assumptions as well as organizational assumptions.

Inherent to the study of organizations in the sociological tradition is the historic, religious and military idea of a central point of authority. The sociological world view which has come to dominate the study of organizations sees the organization as a pyramid. Thus problem definition, data identification and observation are grounded in

this initial assumption. Further, this assumption has been buttressed by classical organization theory which assumes that lower organizational participants must be persuaded, rewarded, punished, controlled and directed. From these assumptions have come many studies which now provide the backbone of contemporary organization theory.

Inherent in both the theoretical and empirical studies of organizations and change is reflected the ancient Greek bias toward slow change. This preference, as reflected in the paradigm and discipline of sociology, considers abrupt change as being unnatural. Thus we have the ascendance of Tocqueville's Weltanschauung, and Weber's response to Marxian thought. In fact, Julien Freund in The Sociology of Max Weber (1968) feels that Weber was the first in practice to place sociology on a strictly scientific basis. Weber was a pure analyst, whereas other nineteenth century sociologists merely utilized science for their own ends and that their (Comte, Marx, and Spencer) primary objective was to change existing society.

> They were, in fact, closer to reform than to science. (Freund, 1968, p. 10)

Nearly a century later, a similar controversy is swelling within the discipline of sociology. And in fact, the study of organizational change threatens to forge another paradigm relative to organizational analysis and theories of change. A full set of rules does not yet exist for this

emerging paradigm; however, Thomas Kuhn (1970) reminds us that a paradigm need not even imply that any full set of rules exists. Michael Polanyi (1958) voices a similar theme, arguing that much of a scientist's success depends upon "tacit knowledge," i.e., upon knowledge that is acquired through practice and that cannot be articulated explicitly.

The conceptualization of abrupt change (e.g., revolution) does not dominate the sociological perspective. Rather, the literature in both its theoretical and empirical aspects codifies incremental change with an equilibrium model as its ballast. Daniel Griffiths (1970) in his theoretical work notes an organization's built-in stability as a powerful resistance to change. Griffiths goes on to remind us that there are few empirical measures of the initiation of change in organizations. He does mention one measure called 'Organizational Change' which was developed as an administrative-performance scoring procedure (Hemphill, Griffiths and Frederiksen, 1962). The author uses a system model to address the questions (1) under what conditions does change occur? and (2) under what conditions is change least apt to occur? Presthus (1962) also utilizes a system model in analyzing the way in which forces prevent change in organizations. Hawley (1971) states that one of the major ways to induce change in organizations is the programmed feedback of the results of research on the organization's functioning. Argyris in "Organizations: Effectiveness,"

makes a similar point. The Fortune-Hutchinson (1971) model for self-evaluation provides a method for generalizing feedback data which can begin the organizational change process.

Increasingly, the paradigm embodying organizational analysis and change is opting for an open system conceptualization. Terreberry (1968) develops two hypotheses: (1) that organizational change is increasingly externally induced, and (2) that organizational adaptability is a function of the ability to learn and to perform according to changes in the environment. A review of recent literature appears to support the idea of the decreasing autonomy and increasing interdependence of organizations. Blau and Scott's (1966) stricture that organizations must continually develop more 'symbiotic' relationships where extensive advantageous exchanges take place represents a structural awareness of environment. Dill's (1958) stressing of the crucial nature of the task environment adds a dimension. Thompson's (1962) emphasis on 'transactional' dependencies lends further support. The work of authors such as Bennis (1966) and Schein (1970 point up means of coping with change in organizational systems, e.g., through process consultation, organizational and management development.

These theoretical and empirical studies of organizational analysis and change all fall within the sociological tradition. They value incremental change, and the containment of abrupt change. They focus on ways to improve the produc-

tivity, effectiveness and efficiency of organizational forms as we know them. Essentially, these studies do not posit change away from traditional values and mores. Thus the problems posed and questions asked fall within a framework appropriate to a discipline which has consciously inherited the mantle of Tocqueville and Weber.

The values of this view of sociology are apparent. These values are conservative, and the institutional arrangements supportive of this perspective reinforce the conservatism. Following Kaplan (1964), values must be given an objective ground, for it is difficult to see how values could be excluded.

> The problem for methodology is not whether values are involved in inquiry, but which, and above all, how they are to be empirically grounded. (Kaplan, 1964, p. 387)

The objective ground of which Kaplan refers has not allowed the conceptualization of abrupt change to gain ascendance in the sociological perspective. In fact, such studies have been considered beyond the pale in regard to funding research in such areas. And it is indeed difficult for a paradigm to emerge and develop if it has little, or no, resource support.

Taking off from Plato's distinction between societies based on (1) harmony, (2) factions, and (3) warfare, we can generate three models of social intervention. The first is (1) the social problems approach which takes the politics

out of the analysis, this model is analogous to the medical model (i.e., look for pathologies in the individual, not the society); (2) conflict-containment model; and (3) conflict-intensification model. The sociological paradigm would fall principally in (1), and possibly in (2). Sociology as a radical paradigm would fall in (3), and in fact one reflection is the Marxian view which has not gained ascendance, as Nisbet suggests. The sociologist as advocate for persons with limited resources would entail a value-choice, and the use of model (3). This implies a rejection of the dominant sociological paradigm and discipline. Thus, instead of empirical studies and scales developed by Likert, Argyris, Herzberg, et.al., which provide management (organizational elites) ways in which organizational productivity, efficiency and effectiveness can be controlled, directed and enhanced, the radical sociologist as advocate might develop means to intensify the management/worker relationship. From the standpoint of discipline, the radical question then becomes the conjoining of fact and vision. Crucial concerns which the sociologist as advocate would have to encounter include: (1) the role of values in social science and truth; (2) whom does the advocate planner serve, in (a) a technician role, and/or (b) an 'inside' role; and (3) the charge of those in the Weberian tradition, that 'sympathetic action is irrational.' Explicit in the advocacy position (either as a research paradigm or in praxis) is the denial of the

existence of value-free social science. We are thus forced to address the question, "Can reform be science?" Beyond the reverberations attached to the above question, Horowitz' (1970) concern is with 'social science as ideology.' The popular journal Social Policy has provided a forum to try and deal with these same questions. In "Strategies for Radical Social Change,' such writers as Richard Flacks, Bennett Berger, et.al., have penned theoretical efforts to confront organizational/institutional analysis and theories of change.

As Kuhn notes, the acceptance of a paradigm marks a qualitative change in the development of any science. The sociological paradigm (and broadly, the social sciences) remains in wait of such a change.

Concluding Remarks

This organizational analysis provided a view of one entity undergoing rapid change. Our understanding of such an occurrence as more work is done in the area of organizational change stands to contribute to the development of a paradigm of social change. Such a development seems to be of importance in allowing us to understand more completely the societal, institutional and organizational changes now so prevalent in our increasingly interdependent world. In examining change at the organizational level the following

steps seemed crucial if the organization was to survive:

(1) Recognition of the need for change;

(2) Renewal process;

(3) Implementation of change strategies;

(4) Dispersal of task environment dependence.

Relative to Hypothesis Two, which relates to intra-organizational variables, future research should focus on specifying and measuring more exactly the relation between input and output. That is, we basically reinforced in our findings the central technical problem in non-profit organizations of predicting levels of productivity as a function of organizational input. For both practitioners and researchers there is a need to develop a better understanding of such a relationship. Further research around the variables in H_2 should also focus on communications in regard to number of messages sent, content of those messages, the level of understanding of such messages, and the relationship between communications and change. Finally, in relation to H_2, further research should delineate the relationship between variables more exactly and focus on formulating other internal directional variables which relate to renewal and change.

Further research should continue in the area of organizational change in order to indicate how a different operationalization of variables may lead to different results.

It is important to consider that this was a case study in need of replication, in order for a more complete understanding of relationships to occur.

FOOTNOTES

Chapter I

1. Following Parsons (1960, p. 17) and Etzioni (1961, p. xi) by organization is meant social units devoted primarily to attainment of specific goals. Organization stands for 'complex bureaucratic organization.'

2. For a useful, in-depth analysis of the above reforms, see Dilemmas of Social Reform: Poverty and Community Action in the United States, Peter Marris and Martin Rein (Atherton Press, 1969).

3. Created as a federal agency under The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964. Refer to Congressional reference, "The War on Poverty, The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964." A compilation of materials relevant to S.2642 prepared for the select subcommittee on poverty (1964).

4. Created by the Demonstration City and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966 and to be administered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development.

5. Alan Madian, "Can Anyone Manage the Cities?" in Innovation, No. 24 (September 1971).

6. John Strange, "The Impact of Citizen Participation on Public Administration" (National Academy of Public Administration, June 1971). (Mimeographed.)

7. In fact, "the White House (and OEO) was under pressures from Congresswoman Edith Green and others to provide local government, especially the mayors, with an urban program to assist the poor which the elected officials could control," in Strange, "The Impact of Citizen Participation . . . ," p. 7.

8. Formerly with the Organization for Social and Technical Innovation (OSTI), Newton, Mass., and with OEO. Ms. Arnstein played a central role in outlining the basis for citizen participation in Model Cities programs.

9. See the forum in Social Policy (May/June 1970), entitled, "Whom Does the Advocate Planner Serve?"

10. Strange's findings are a summation of a multi-city sample, thus there may be local contextual variables which do not necessarily abide by this generalization. Also see, J. D. Greenstone and Paul Peterson, "Reformers, Machines, and the War on Poverty," in James Q. Wilson (ed.), City Politics and Public Policy (New York: Wiley & Sons, 1968).

11. One continual problem with such reform programs (sometimes referred to as social engineering) is that of evaluating their impact. The continued inability to develop useful evaluation models has limited efforts to measure the impact of a program or particular program components. See F. Caro (ed.), Readings in Evaluation Research (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1971) and E. Suchman, Evaluative Research (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1967). Relative to a systematic analysis of public policies, see A. Etzioni, "Policy Research," in The American Sociologist, Vol. 6 (supplementary issue), 8-12. "Policy research is concerned with mapping alternative approaches and with specifying potential differences in the intention, effect, and cost of various programs." (p. 8)

12. Alan Madian, op. cit., "Can Anyone Manage the Cities?" Innovation, No. 24 (Sept. 1971), p. 9, states that if President Nixon has his way, the principal programs for rebuilding the cities will be absorbed into general revenue-sharing. This would eliminate Community Action and Model Cities Programs and leave State and local governments with the decision of how much of their Federal revenue they wish to devote to their poor.

13. Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare (New York: Pantheon Books, 1971). The authors trace the relation between political unrest that accompanied the economic catastrophe of the Great Depression and New Deal response up to unrest in the cities and Great Society programs in the 1960s.

14. For a more in-depth discussion of causal links between social, political and economic conditions in the nation's cities and urban unrest as an outcome, see Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders: U.S. Riot Commission Report (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968).

15. The year 1968 is perhaps the peak for the development of such entities on the campuses. Based upon a working paper principally drafted by The Institute of the Black World, Atlanta, for the First Annual National Association of Black, Urban and Ethnic Directors (NABUED) Meetings in Atlanta, May 1972, the author calculated a statistical correlation of +.70 between the development of such entities on campuses and the year 1968 (as the independent variable).

16. See N. Fainstein and S. Fainstein, "Publicization: The Transformation of Private Capital into Public Goods--A Basis for an Analytic Typology of Foundations," a Working Paper (New York: Center for Policy Research, 1972).

17. More exactly, representatives from one discrete and established social agency located in the Black community and representatives of one discrete behavioral science department at an established, predominantly white university.

18. See James D. Thompson, Organizations In Action (McGraw-Hill, 1967), for further explication of this construct.

19. David Rogers, The Management of Big Cities (Beverly Hills, Ca.: Sage Publications, 1971).

20. For recent efforts to employ the conceptual framework suggested by Rogers, see Inter-organizational Relationships and Consequences of the Health System in an Urban Area (Grant No. 1-ROI MH17159-01, 02, and 03). Final Report to Public Health Service, NIMH, DHEW, prepared by The Center for Policy Research, New York, October 1972; and Robert R. Alford, Interorganizational Outputs (monograph prepared under a grant to the Center for Policy Research from the National Center for Health Research and Development, NIMH, 1971).

21. The delivery system for any development program tends to mirror the wider power structure of the city. The federal government's funding patterns play a significant role in affecting inner city delivery of services, mainly by increasing the pluralism of organizations and decreasing the likelihood that they can be effectively coordinated. Rogers, op. cit., p. 152.

22. Taken from "Director's Statement," May 1971, based upon thirty-day observation of Alpha's objectives and current activities by new director of Alpha, Inc.

23. Public goals, as different in fact from the organization's real, or private goals. The organizational researcher's objective is to define both goal structures. Such a definition will in turn dictate the choice of the goal or system model (see A. Etzioni, "Two Approaches to Organizational Effectiveness: A critique and a suggestion," Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 5 (1960b), 257-278.

24. As expressed in initial founding documents. The organizational research in this study will focus on both public and private goals. As indicated in Alpha's stated goals, the organization is Black in orientation and focus. Defining characteristics of a Black organization here include: (i) percentage of staff and Board of Directors who are Black; (ii) goal structure and organizational ethos.

25. Alpha, Inc. has received an $727,393 four-year grant from NIMH in 1969. The organization's four-year private foundation grant terminated early in December, 1971, for reasons to be discussed in more depth at a later point. The four-year foundation grant was in the amount of $800,000.

26. These Alpha-related services were largely made possible through the private foundation grant. Included was a stipend from Alpha, Inc. to each affiliated organization of $6,000 for Year I and $6,500 for Year II to be used in a manner set by each individual organization in concert with Alpha. These services were eliminated once that funding source dried up.

27. Anatol Rapoport and W. J. Horvath, "Thoughts on Organization Theory," in Walter Buckley (ed.), Modern Systems Research for the Behavioral Scientist (Aldine, 1968), pp. 71-75.

28. Dan Rottenberg, "The Healers," a reprint from The Chicago Guide (January 1973), pp. 76-81.

29. Compare the normative intent of the Black Strategy Center with the actual function of Alpha, Inc. From the Arthur D. Little, Inc. management audit completed in March 1972, "Since its founding in 1968, [Alpha, Inc.] has assembled an organization which resembles

that of a resource center. It has very successfully combined the energies of community organizations (generally action oriented) with clearly identified expertise from the universities." (From the section, "Findings and Conclusions," p. 4.)

30. It was not possible to release the funds until the IRS granted tax-exempt status. The discretion of IRS in matters of granting tax-exempt status serves as a nullifying device for the development of a number of non-profit organizations.

31. This was in effect the model employed by Alpha, Inc. in relation to its third sector, Ford Foundation monies. Alpha's board was to be composed of seven (7) representatives from each of three interest groups: those projects receiving stipends (see footnote 26); the university community; and the Black community-at-large. This twenty-one (21) member board often proved unwieldy.

32. This phenomenon is often referred to as co-optation, and represents a useful tactic in mobilizing the power of decision-making. See Philip Selznick, TVA and the Grass Roots (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1953), for a description of how the 'agriculturalists' attempted to 'co-opt' the power of decision-making within TVA.

33. Wherever possible within the text, we will attempt to make the analytic distinction between the private sector and third sector, although this latter usage is fairly new and can obfuscate the discussion if not borne in mind. See footnote 16.

34. For example, Greenstone and Peterson, op. cit., "Reformers, Machines and the War on Poverty," point out that the 1965 Watts rebellion so disturbed OEO officials that comparatively vast sums of money were allocated to the city. Thus the per capita grant to the City of Los Angeles increased after the outburst almost three-fold.

35. Philip Selznick, Leadership in Administration (Evanston, Illinois, 1957), pp. 5ff; and also Alvin Gouldner, "Organizational Analysis," in Sociology Today (New York, 1959), p. 406.

36. Compare Selznick's definition with Samuel P. Huntington's discussion in his book, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969), on the level of institutionalization of any

organization relative to the four measurable criteria of: adaptable, complex, autonomous and coherent organization so crucial in the political modernization process. Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968, New enlarged edition), points up the contradiction in 'organization' and 'institution' in the Great Leap Forward. Schurmann's point is that the Chinese wanted human solidarity that would produce action rather than inertia. They wanted something that would function like 'organization,' but be like 'institution.' The lessons of the Great Leap Forward indicate that this still is an irresolvable contradiction.

37. The role of organizations is obviously crucial, for as Christopher Sower and Paul A. Miller note, the literature of contemporary social science advances two models for interpreting the exercise of social power in issue resolution within American society. Both of these models, the negative and the positive, stress the importance of large-scale organizations. See Sower and Miller, "The Changing Power Structure in Agriculture: An Analysis of Negative Versus Positive Organization Power," in James H. Copp (ed.), Our Changing Rural Society: Perspectives and Trends (Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press, 1964).

38. See W. G. Bennis, K. D. Benne, and R. Chin (eds.), The Planning of Change (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1961); Edgar Schein, Organizational Psychology (2nd Edition; Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970).

39. Source: Inter-office memorandum, dated April 1, 1971, Arthur D. Little, Inc.

40. Source: Inter-office communication, memorandum No. 0023, to All Staff--Alpha, Inc., dated July 12, 1972.

41. R. Mayer, Social Planning and Social Change (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972).

42. See R. Chin, "The Utility of System Models and Developmental Models," in Jason L. Finkle and Richard W. Gable (eds.), Political Development and Social Change (New York: Wiley & Sons, 1968), pp. 7-19, for his distinction between an analytic model and a concrete model. For Chin's purposes, an analytic model is a constructed simplification of some part of reality that retains only those features regarded

as essential for relating similar processes whenever and wherever they occur. A concrete model is based on an analytic model, but uses more of the content of actual cases, though it is still a simplification designed to reveal the essential features of some range of cases.

43. L. Coser, Continuities in the Study of Social Conflict (New York: The Free Press, 1967).

44. E. Nagel, The Structure of Science (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1961), in which the author states, "In short, a social system can be said to change its structural form also only in the relative sense of an alteration in some particular kinds of relationships." (p. 529)

45. F. Cancian, "Functional Analysis of Change," in Amitai Etzioni and Eva Etzioni (eds.), Social Change (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1964), pp. 112-125. Cancian notes that there are two types of variables in a functional system: a state, G, a property of the system which is maintained; and state coordinates, factors or forces in the system which determine the presence of state G.

46. P. M. Blau, "The Structure of Social Associations," in Walter L. Wallace (ed.), Sociological Theory (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1969), pp. 187-200.

47. A vivid example pointed up by Mayer, op. cit., p. 35, is the more aggressive role of students following the introduction of significant numbers of non-middle class Black students into college systems (also see footnote 15).

48. R. A. Nisbet, Social Change and History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969).

49. The 'maximum feasible participation' of the poor in the War on Poverty is an example of a change in role composition. Mayer, op. cit., p. 45.

50. Cf. the situation of the Black Strategy Center in Chicago and its concentrated dependence upon the financial community.

Chapter II

1. We can broadly identify the four types of decisions which must be made within an organizational context, not necessarily decisions made by the same actors but at differing points. These include: (i) Tactical decisions, which represent the vast majority of decisions an executive has to make that arise in response to immediate demands of the present. Thus there is seldom time to gather, or analyze, all the information needed for the perfect decision. (ii) Planning decisions, which represent a system of actions designed to achieve an objective in the future. Planning is a loose term commonly used for four related but distinct activities: (a) working out and evaluating a program in its future and overall context; (b) constructing a particular plan by creating and coordinating programs; (c) arraying a series of alternative plans for evaluation and decisions; and (d) making the decision to adopt a particular plan. (iii) Policy decisions, which are the once and for all internal decisions which deliberately sacrifice the flexibility of tactical decisions for other aims. And (iv) strategic decisions, which concerns itself with the allocation of resources (time, money, manpower, materials) for the achievement of important future aims. This type of decision has to take the outside environment into account to a much greater degree, not only as it is, but as it could be in the future.

2. P. Drucker, "The Effective Decision," in The Effective Executive (New York: Harper's Row, 1968).

3. H. Wilensky, Organizational Intelligence (New York: Basic Books, 1967).

4. See Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1964), p. 138.

5. In this specific instance in the form of Arthur D. Little, Inc., Cambridge, Mass.

6. A movement to gain national pensions for the aged as a mechanism for alleviating or preventing economic dislocation.

7. Following Etzioni (1961), social movements are not organizations in the strict sense, although social movements have 'core' organizations which tend to have normative compliance structures.

8. Entropy refers to system disorder, which in any isolated system cannot decrease. Overload is a key factor in fostering entropy in a system, and can occur in both larger systems and individuals and serves to impede rational decision-making. See N. Weiner (1954) for further concept development and explanation.

9. W. G. Bennis and P. Slater, Temporary Systems (New York: Harper, 1968).

10. See C. Sower, J. Holland, K. Tiedke, and W. Freeman, Community Involvement (New York: The Free Press, 1957), and the discovery in the Death of the Health Council chapter. The authors were studying the organization during the "final two years before its death, and found that all of its available energy during the last year went into purely maintenance functions--that is, just to keep its machinery operating--meetings, etc. But here is the unique finding. After the death of the formal health council, a crisis of a TB threat arose in one school. Almost immediately an informal group formed of people who had been active in the health council. They went right to work and obtained the doctors and nurses to do the necessary tests in the school. In other words, an informal system was a residue of the formal structure, and it performed one function of the formal structure even after its death." (From personal communication with Christopher Sower via a letter dated March 2, 1973).

11. In Simon's view, decision-making in organizations is based on 'satisficing' criteria rather than maximizing.

Chapter III

1. For a lucid explication of 'model,' see R. B. Braithwaite, Scientific Explanation (London: Cambridge University Press, 1953). For an equally lucid account of this and other uses of the term see May Brodbeck, "Models, Meaning and Theories," L. Gross (ed) Symposium on Sociological Theory (Evanston: Row,

Peterson & Co., 1959). According to Richard S. Rudner, Philosophy of Social Science (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), ". . . the point of employing a model belongs to the context of discovery rather than to that of validation; for models function as heuristic devices in science." (p. 25)

2. See Kurt Lewin, "Feedback Problems of Social Diagnosis and Action," in W. Buckley (ed.), Modern Systems Research for the Behavior Scientist (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1968). Reprinted from Kurt Lewin, "Frontiers in Group Dynamics," Part II-B, Human Relations, I (1947), 147-153. Lewin's point is that some of the circular processes composing organized social life correspond to what the physical engineer calls feedback systems, that is, systems which show some kind of self-regulation. The feedback has to be done so that a discrepancy between the desired and the actual direction leads automatically to a correction of actions or to a change in planning.

3. See M. L. Cadwallader, "The Cybernetic Analysis of Change in Complex Social Organizations," in Modern Systems Research for the Behavioral Scientist, ed. W. Buckley (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1968), pp. 437-440. Reprinted from American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 65 (1959), 154-157.

4. To include turnover rates by sex, length of service at termination, type of business (comparative measure), size of office and geographical area.

5. The questionnaire administered to Alpha's staff is "Tolerance for Bureaucratic Structure: A Scale." This instrument was developed in the course of a study financed by the Manpower Administration of the U. S. Department of Labor, under contract number 81-34-70-04. Staff of the Center for Policy Research, New York City, including A. Etzioni, S. T. Hillsman, R. Hansen and M. Sontog, worked on developing this instrument which is dated 1970. The questionnaire mailed to members of Alpha's professional caucus was developed in 1971.

6. See Walter Buckley (ed.), Modern Systems Research for the Behavioral Scientist (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1968); Talcott Parsons, "Suggestions for a Sociological Approach to the Theory of Organizations," Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 1 (1956), 63-85, 225-239; James D. Thompson, Organizations in Action (McGraw-Hill, 1967).

7. That is, the use of measures requiring nominal, ordinal and interval scales.

8. "It is of some interest to note that the logical structure of a scientific explanation is identical with that of a scientific prediction. . . . It follows from these considerations that we have an explanation for an event if, and only if, we could have predicted it." See Rudner, op. cit., Philosophy of Social Science, p. 60.

FOOTNOTES

Chapter IV

1. See Chapter I, pp. 11-13.

2. See Chapter II, pp. 48-49.

3. See Chapter II, p. 34.

4. With citizen participation being seen within the paradigm of planning as promoting social-structural change society-wide by altering the composition of either the actors in the structure or the roles and/or statuses of the structure.

5. In fact, as reported in The Kiplinger Washington Letter (September 10, 1971), the number one concern in the world economy was inflation among the major countries. Wages were rising faster than productivity, just as was the case in the United States. The governments of most of these major countries were committed to high-level employment, fiscal stimulation and ample-to-abundant credit. The drift was toward controls, ways to hold down the inflation without holding down employment and business activity. Internal controls on prices and wages (or so-called incomes policy) and external controls on foreign investment and trade were the key considerations.

6. As reported in The Kiplinger Washington Letter (October 1, 1971).

7. Congress was majority Democrat and in mid-October, 1971, it was expected that Congress would remain Democratic.

8. A particularly vocal proponent of this theme of a second re-construction was Vernon E. Jordan, Executive Director of the National Urban League.

9. Revenue-sharing did represent a stronger push on the part of the Nixon Administration than technological programming, although considering both thrusts jointly bodes ill for an expansive, social program-oriented government apparatus. Relative to revenue-sharing

also, was the fact that the majority of the governors were Republican and the States were to be the funnels for the 'New Federalism' program dollars.

10. A third sector national, macro-structure.

11. A public sector national, macro-structure.

12. Source: Ford Foundation Annual Reports, 1969, 1970, 1971 and 1972.

13. Source: Stanley S. Weithorn, "Summary of the Tax Reform Act As It Affects Foundations," in Foundation News (published by the Foundation Center, New York and Baltimore), May-June, 1970, pp. 86-89.

14. As we will see later, Alpha was able to develop income (or input) sources from a variety of other places. So the total from Ford and NIMH mentioned was not the total income Alpha had to operate with from September 1971 to September 1972.

15. We are counting the final year as a full-year, despite the de-funding in December, 1971.

16. Bear in mind that the 1968-69 grant year was supported solely by Ford Foundation money, while the 1972-73 grant year had as its foundation the NIMH grant.

17. Source: Application for Continuation Grant, MH-17684-04, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Public Health Service, August 11, 1972, p. 5-2.

18. Source: Same as in footnote 17, p. 5-3 (parentheses are the author's).

19. For purposes of clarification, the acronyms included in Figure IV are as follows: MNB - Model Neighborhood Board; HUD - Department of Housing and Urban Development; CDA - Cities Demonstration Agency; RCC - Riverside-Cambridgeport Corporation; NIMH - National Institute of Mental Health; BTPR - Boston Transportation Planning Review; DPW - Department of Public Works; SFLC - Storefront Learning Center.

20. See H. Kaufman, The Limits of Organizational Change (The Univ. of Alabama Press, 1971), particularly pp. 96-97.

21. Action for Boston Community Development, Inc., Characteristics of Target Area Residents, 1971.

22. Ibid.

23. Young, Whitney M., Jr., A Preliminary Exploration of Social Condition and Needs in Roxbury-North Dorchester - GNRP, Task Force Report, 1961.

24. The bulk of the above discussion on 'Community Characteristics,' and 'Community Resources,' was derived from Final Report on a Study of the Feasibility of a Merger or Consolidation of the Ecumenical Center of Roxbury and the Roxbury Multi-Service Center, A.L. Nellum and Associates, 1972.

25. See footnote 5, Chapter III.

26. In the sense of the research being directed in part toward solving the problems of the subject group. In fact, the Alpha, Inc. staff will be one client of this completed study.

27. Morris Zelditch, "Some Methodological Problems of Field Studies," in the American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 67, 1962, pp. 566-76.

FOOTNOTES

Chapter V

1. See Chapter III, pp. 57-62.

2. For a specific description in relationship to the effect of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 and Alpha, see William Ryan "[Alpha] Summer 1969 to Summer 1970: Descriptive and Analytical Notes," (unpublished paper). In the above notes in his discussion as to the relationship within Alpha between function and funding, Ryan states: "Finally, the question arises as to the relationship between function and funding. To what extent is function to be determined by funding opportunities and sources -- either external (e.g., NIMH) or internal (e.g., Adult Education program). Is [Alpha] and its constituency willing to accept the necessary limitations on its activities and channeling of its activities that this implies? Or, on the other hand, is it the policy of [Alpha] to first define its functions and priorities and then to seek funding to carry out these functions?

   "This is not an immediately pressing issue, since the main funding sources (Ford and NIMH) seem to be willing to be fairly flexible and permissive. Nevertheless, deadlines tend to arrive more rapidly than they are anticipated and this is an issue that must sooner or later be faced." p. 28.

3. See Chapter I, p. 24, in the section on "Defining Concepts."

4. The obverse being that neutral, or decreasing, task environment influence does not imply the need for renewal and change.

5. As we shall see further on, the degree and duration of change will be reflected in a 'transformed' Alpha in structure and behavior. Such a transformation was evident in August, 1972, or 7 months after the renewal process was initiated concretely.

6. Op.Cit., Ryan.

7. Up until this time the staffing and structure of Alpha totally reflected the community-university model at all levels. Thus the administrative heads were titled Community Co-Director and University Co-Director.

8. The by-law change, the resultant non-participation by university people in Alpha, and the lack of Board activity in the time-span Ryan discusses seem to possess a couple of attributes, these being: (1) a reflection of social forces within black communities generally, which emphasized institution-building and the exclusion of white participation in decision-making and policy-making; and/or (2) the felt need on the part of Alpha to conceal what eventually surfaced as the "mis-handling" of approximately $50,000 in Ford Foundation grant money.

9. It was at the December meeting that Ford Foundation's Program Officer to Alpha announced the de-funding decision.

10. See footnote 31, Chapter I, for a further description of the composition of Alpha's Board of Directors.

11. See footnote 26, Chapter I.

12. It is also important to note here that the Board was being provided the opportunity to make and adopt policy. As Ralph M. Kramer, "Ideology, Status, and Power in Board-Executive Relationships," in R. Kramer and H. Specht (eds) Readings in Community Organization Practice, pp. 285-293, notes, "....many board meetings characteristically consist of a series of reports that serve to 'educate' the members, or from the perspective of the executive, 'bring the board along' so that few real policy decisions are made. This process may be described as 'non-decision-making,' in that conflict is repressed through the executive's habit of introducing only 'safe' issues for board consideration. (See J.L. Price, "Governing Boards and Organizational Effectiveness," Adm. Science Quarterly, v.8, no. 3 (December 1963), p. 367. See also P. Bachrach and M.S. Baratz, "Two Faces of Power," American Political Science Review, v. 41, no.4, (December 1962), pp. 947-952.) This was not the case with Alpha in that there were no 'safe' issues, thus the Board (or someone) had to make some policy decisions. A cursory glance at the November 4, 1971 Board meeting agenda provides a view of issues presented for Board consideration. These include: Status report on Ford Foundation funds; Status report on NIMH funds; Status of current contracts; Survival Fund issue;

Salary Review; Report on ADL Study; et.al.

13. In instances where N is greater than 11, respondents were occupying more than one position within a university/agency, or there was more than one response possible on a question. In instances where N is less than 11, some respondents did not answer that specific question.

14. Including the Boston Model Cities Agency, a regional Office of Education Research Laboratory and a non-profit Afro-American educational group.

15. See Chapter III, p. 63.

16. Concept meaning 'predicting the past.'

17. See Boardroom Reports, August 17, 1972, p. 8.

18. Source: Inter-office communication, memorandum No. 0023, to All Staff - Alpha, Inc., dated July 12, 1972.

19. Source: Inter-office communication, memorandum No. 0081, to Permanent Staff of Alpha, Inc., dated August 15, 1972.

20. See 'Appendix' for drawing of Alpha's physical lay-out and how this effected communication patterns.

21. Source: Internal Memorandum, No. 0078, to All Staff, Alpha, Inc., dated August 9, 1972.

22. See footnote 5, Chapter III.

23. Source: Confidential Memorandum, to All [Alpha] Staff, Alpha, Inc., dated March 8, 1972 (this memorandum had no identifying number in that it was issued prior to the introduction of the memorandum numbering and coding system).

24. See 'Appendix' for results of the questionnaire.

25. Source: Inter-office memorandum, to [Alpha, Inc.] from the Executive Director, dated April 20,1972. For some unknown reason, this particular memorandum did not contain the numbering and coding system.

26. Source: Inter-office communication, No. 0007, to University Research Project Principal Investigator, dated June 19, 1972.

27. For work done in the area of social psychology relative to model-building, see: Joseph Berger, B.P. Cohen, J. Laurie Snell and Morris Zelditch, Jr. Types of Formalization (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1962); Bernard P. Cohen, Conflict and Conformity: A Probability Model and Its Applications. (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1963); James S. Coleman, Models of Change and Response Uncertainty (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1964); Joan Crisswell, H. Solomon and Patrick Suppes (eds.) Mathematical Methods in Small Group Processes (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1962); and John G. Kemeny and J. Laurie Snell, Finite Markov Chains (Toronto: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1962).

28. The social psychological concept of syntality is important in that we are attributing particular attributes of the individual to a group or organization.

FOOTNOTES

Chapter VI

1. It is a historical fact that perhaps the only institution, or organization, which is in a state of independence within Black communities in the United States is the church. The question for Black theoreticians and practitioners is how other institutional, or organizational, types attain a similar state.

2. A case-in-point is with the development of RAND, Inc. This organization got its start wholly supported by Department of Defense (more specifically, the Air Force) contracts, and is now developing a variety of contracts and grants from many diverse task environment sources and is highly regarded as a public policy research institute. We can safely apply the dependence, inter-dependence, independence model to RAND, Inc., and state that is it moving from a state of dependence to a state of independence. For a more in-depth report on RAND, Inc. and other public policy research institutes, see Ronald S. Ritchie, An Institute for Research on Public Policy (A Study Prepared for the Government of Canada, 1969). A case which is geographically closer to home for Alpha, Inc. is the experience of ABT Associates, Cambridge, Dr. Clark Abt, president and founder, began with a DOD contract to do some missile-model building and has taken ABT Associates to a position of being diversified and independent.

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APPENDICES

A. Black Faculty and Administrators Education Caucus Questionnaire

B. Organizational Layout

C. Tolerance for Bureaucratic Structure: A Scale

APPENDIX A:

Project No._____

Black Faculty and Administrators
Education Caucus

QUESTIONNAIRE

Instructions: We at the are attempting to both assess the value of the Caucus' past activities and efforts, and to determine possible future directions that the Caucus can pursue. Thus we would appreciate your thoughtful responses to the following series of questions.

I.

i) Name_____

ii) Position/Title_____

iii) University/Agency_____

_____

iv) How long in present position:

a. ( ) Less than one year
b. ( ) More than one year and less than 2½ years
c. ( ) More than 2½ years and less than four years

d. ( ) More than four years.

v) What was your former position_____

_____and name of employer_____

_____immediately preceding your present position.

II. Please mark the following with an (x) where appropriate.

1. Did you attend any meetings of the Black Faculty and Administrators Caucus?

a. ( ) Yes
b. ( ) No

Page Two
Questionnaire
Black Faculty and Administrators

If your answer was No to question II (1) above, then go to Q. 11.

2. Approximately how many meetings did you attend?

   a. ( ) One
   b. ( ) Two
   c. ( ) Three
   d. ( ) Four or more

3. Do you think the meetings were worthwhile?

   a. ( ) Yes
   b. ( ) No (If no, then go to Q.5).

4. If Yes, then please outline the reason(s) you think the meetings were worthwhile.

_____

_____

_____

_____

5. If No, then please outline the reason(s) you think the meetings were not worthwhile.

_____

_____

_____

_____

Page Three
Questionnaire
Black Faculty and Administrators

---

6. In what way(s) do you think future meetings can be improved?

   a. ( ) More structured
   b. ( ) Rotating chairmanship
   c. ( ) More formal presentations
   d. ( ) Other (specify)_____
   e. ( ) All of the above.

III. The initial working task of the Caucus focused on a paper writteen by Calvin Hicks which spoke to the need for redefining liberal arts education in relation to African-descent students.

7. Do you think the above task was a meaningful project for the Caucus?

   a. ( ) Yes
   b. ( ) No (If No, then go to Q.9).

8. If Yes, then why?

_____

_____

_____

_____

9. If No, then why not?

_____

_____

_____

_____

Page Four
Questionnaire
Black Faculty and Administrators

---

10. What type of task do you think such a Caucus could best be directed toward? (Rate these on a scale with the most likely task being 1, the second most likely being 2, etc.)

a. ( ) Curriculum development
b. ( ) Methods of resource sharing
c. ( ) Proposal development
d. ( ) Writing position papers
e. ( ) Advisory capacity to community groups
f. ( ) Other (specify)_____.

IV.

11. Briefly how would you define university development.

_____

_____

_____

_____

12. Do you feel that a group such as the Caucus has a role to play in community development? (See definition on final page).

a. ( ) Yes
b. ( ) No

13. Do you see the Caucus being most helpful to you by focusing on community development or university development?

a. ( ) University Development
b. ( ) Community Development
c. ( ) Both (explain)_____

_____

_____

Page Five
Questionnaire
Black Faculty and Administrators

---

14. Do you think universities possess resources that can be applied to community development?

a. ( ) Yes
b. ( ) No

15. What obstacles (institutional or otherwise) do you think tend to retard the university role in community development?

_____

_____

_____

_____

16. Do you think the community possesses resources that can be applied to university development?

a. ( ) Yes
b. ( ) No

17. What obstacles (institutional or otherwise) do you think tend to retard the community role in university development?

_____

_____

_____

_____

18. Which university/agency resources are you able to mobilize or direct?

_____

_____

_____

_____

19. Do you feel as if a portion of the above resources can be applied to community development?

a. ( ) Yes
b. ( ) No

20. Through what type of grouping do you think such an application can take place?

a. ( ) Consortium of organizations
b. ( ) A specific community organization
c. ( ) Caucus attached to an organization
d. ( ) Other (specifcy)_____

V.

21. What mathod(s) do you feel have been most effective in community development?

_____

_____

_____

_____

22. What method(s) do you feel are most desireable for the Roxbury community?

_____

_____

_____

_____

VI.

23. Would you like to attend a meeting to discuss the results of this questionnaire?

a. ( ) Yes
b. ( ) No

24. Will you be able to attend future Caucus meetings?

a. ( ) Yes (If Yes, then go to Q.25).
b. ( ) No

25. If No, then do you feel the Caucus should continue to function?

a. ( ) Yes
b. ( ) No (If No, then you are finished with this form. Thank you for your cooperation).

26. When do you think the Caucus should resume meeting? (Please check (x) only one box).

a. ( ) Saturday, April 22
b. ( ) Saturday, May 6
c. ( ) Saturday, May 20
d. ( ) Other (specify)_____

Page Eight
Questionnaire
Black Faculty and Administrators

---

27. Where do you feel Caucus meetings should be held? (Please check (x) only one box).

a. ( ) In the community
b. ( ) In the university
c. ( ) Alternate between community and university.
d. ( ) Other (specify) _____

VII.

28. Would the development of a Caucus newsletter coordinated by assist you in your present activities?

a. ( ) Yes
b. ( ) No

29. In what ways(s) could you or your office contribute to such a newsletter?

_____

_____

_____

_____

30. If there are any other comments you want to make please make them here:

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

Page Nine
Questionnaire
Faculty and Administrators

Community Development - "a process of social action in which the people of a community organize themselves for planning and action; define their common and individual needs and problems; make group and individual plans to meet their needs and solve their problems; execute these plans with a maximum of reliance upon community resources; and supplement these resources when necessary with services and material from governmental and nongovernmental agencies outside the community."

APPENDIX B:

COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS AND THE PHYSICAL LAYOUT

The spatial characteristics of the social structure within which the communication channels are embedded have been shown to be of importance. G.A. Miller pointed out:

> When a large number of people belong to the group, it is reasonable to assume that the likelihood of messages passing from one person to another is inversely proportional to the distance between them. The greater the distance, the lower the traffic density. (Miller, 1951, p. 262).

Barnlund and Harland (1963) reviewed empirical studies which support Miller's reasoning. The empirical studies reviewed include: Blake, et al., 1956; Caplow and Forman, 1950; Festinger, Schachter & Back, 1963; Lundberg, Hertzler, & Dickson, 1949; Merton, 1948; Powell, 1952. Barnlund and Harland summarized:

> An inverse relationship has been found between the physical distance separating persons and the likelihood of communication between them, with interaction increasing as distance decreases, unless there are physical barriers that intervene such as filing cases, walls or desks. (Barnlund & Harland, 1963, p. 468.)

For example in an organizational setting, Gullahorn found that

> ...distance was the most important factor in determining the rate of interaction between any two employees (Gullahorn, 1952, p. 134).

in an office of 37 workers in a large eastern corporation.

We have seen that during the year under study within Alpha there was a decrease in communications, and an increase in centralized decision-making. In Figure XV, the spatial lay-out of Alpha indicates the office placement of the dominant coalition. Those offices occupied by dominant coalition members were A, B, E and F. The dominant coalition members in closest proximity were A to B, and E to F. Separating A and B was a wall with a single entrance, and the same held for the physical barriers between E and F with slight modification in that the adjoining wall did not have an entrance. The greatest physical distance was that between A, B and E, F. Relative to the dominant coalition too, among this sub-grouping there was the centralization of decision-making and a decreasing flow of communications, such that A, B controlled the flow of financial, technical and operational decision-making. We can safely posit here that distance did seemingly play a role in the rate of interaction between dominant coalition members.



Figure XV: Organizational Layout

APPENDIX C:

TOLERANCE FOR BUREAUCRATIC STRUCTURE: A SCALE

by

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1970

This instrument was developed in the course of a study financed by the Manpower Administration of the U.S. Department of Labor, under contract number 81-34-70-04.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The Tolerance for Bureaucratic Structure Instrument is designed to measure the extent to which an individual indicates a preference for working in jobs characterized by the particular type of work setting considered typical in large scale, bureaucratic organizations. Such organizational contexts tend to be relatively highly "structured," that is, they require workers, in their day-to-day activities, to exercise considerable discipline to regulations, related to imposed and distant goals rather than permitting workers to relate at least some of their immediate behavior to goals of their own choosing. It is suggested that there is a dimension of personality which has direct impact on individuals' ability and desire to work in and gain satisfaction from jobs varying in their degree of structure. We have called this dimension of personal orientation to work "Tolerance for Bureaucratic Structure."

The instrument to measure Tolerance for Bureaucratic Structure (TBS) is a self-report, Likert scaled questionnaire designed to tap individuals responses to various aspects of work characteristic of structured, bureaucratic settings. It is a forty-three item instrument written in simple English (about third to fourth grade reading level) which asks respondents to report preferences for a series of job attributes. The instrument provides a single total score representing the degree to which the individual has expressed a preference for working within structured environments.

II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND OF THE INSTRUMENT

There is considerable theoretical and empirical evidence that modern complex work organizations have difficulty achieving both the coordination of individual actions presumed necessary to attain their objectives and, at the same time, satisfying the needs of individuals working in them. One of the reasons for this is that bureaucratic organizations tend to exert extensive control over the day-to-day, moment-to-moment behavior of their employees in an attempt to assure predictability of performance. Writers as diverse as Marx (1964), Freud (1957), Merton (1957), Parsons (1951a,b), Bell (1956), and writers on industrial relations (Argyris, 1957) have concerned themselves with the issue of the compatibility between individual needs and the increasing social need for discipline.

A fundamental question raised by many such writers, from Weber on, has been what personality elements enable individuals to perform comfortably in the relatively structured (and sometimes even restrictive) work environment characteristic of bureaucratic organizations. The structure and operation of bureaucracies clearly demand a considerable amount of discipline from those who work within them. In Merton's discussion of bureaucratic structures and personality (1957, p. 198), he emhasizes that bureaucracy's need for reliable performance requires "an unusual degree of conformity with prescribed patterns of action. Hence, the fundamental importance of discipline..." Merton goes on to note that "discipline can be effective only if the ideal patterns are buttressed by strong sentiments which

entail devotion to one's duties, a keen sense of the limitation of one's authority and competence, and methodical performance of routine activities."

There is considerable evidence that individuals exhibit a wide variety of responses to the attempts of organizations to exercise control over their work activity. Theoretically one may assume that the kinds of orientations and/or personality attributes of individuals will influence how they react to the demands of different jobs. The notion posed here is that a dimension of personality which has direct impact on an individual's ability to work in and gain satisfaction from jobs in highly structured or "bureaucratic" situations can be identified and measured. We have labeled this dimension "Tolerance for Bureaucratic Structure" (TBS).

Although the tradition of intellectual concern with the particular personality requirements for working in a bureaucracy is relatively extensive, the empirical work in this area is quite limited. Certainly there is an extensive literature relating various personality traits, such as authoritarianism, to specific, limited aspects of an individual's work behavior and attitudes, particularly the relationship between supervisory styles and the psychological characteristics of workers. (Vroom, 1960 and 1964; Likert, 1961, Herzberg, 1959 and 1966; Wilensky, 1964; Blauner, 1969; among many others.) However, jobs are complex social roles composed of many different elements to which the worker must react simultaneously, supervisory relations being only one of these. Little has been done to examine the interactions of the workers' personality and the structure of

the total work role as the worker experiences it day in and day out. Naturally, not every aspect of the job and its setting is expected to have the same weight in terms of worker reactions. However, certain key analytic dimensions of jobs as work roles may be hypothesized as critical variables for the understanding of an individual's response to his job.

As suggested above, there is a long and substantial tradition of thought to support the contention that there is a "bureaucratic" dimension of jobs which is reflected in all aspects of the work role (supervisory relations, job content, rules of conduct, interactions, etc.) and which critically influences the responses of workers to their jobs. It is suggested that a corresponding general dimension of personality exists which influences how an individual will respond to jobs that are more or less affected by the various types of discipline demanded by work organizations.

The literature contains a number of references to attempts to relate personality to bureaucratic work roles. Leonard Gordon (1970), for example, has developed an instrument to measure an individual's preference for different work environments, particularly bureaucratic ones, drawing his baseline concept entirely from the Weberian ideal type of bureaucratic organization. Regis Walther (1964) has also developed an experimental instrument designed to measure thirty-seven personal qualities of workers which influence job performance. Several of these may be described as broadly related to bureaucratic job requirements. Borgatta and Bohrnstedt (1971) have also developed a measure of work attitudes, contrasting risk orientation and hygiene or maintenance orientations (similar to

"bureaucratic" orientations) as a test for use in establishing "an individual's management potential". However, all of these scales were designed for use with middle class workers who have no difficulty responding to rather complex and abstract language. In contrast, the attempt here was to construct an instrument for use with a wide range of workers and potential workers, including those with very limited formal education.

In addition, the conceptual base of the bureaucratic personality dimension present here (TBS) has a somewhat different focus from those of other researchers. It has already been noted above that bureaucratic organizations are characterized by a considerable need to regulate and structure their members' behavior so that organizational goals are attained. Hence, on the most general level, the basic demand of bureaucratic organizations is that their members discipline their expression of personal and immediate needs, and respond to the more distant and externally imposed demands of the organization. Although in modern society this particular demand is made more frequently than in other historical settings, Parsons suggests that it reflects one choice in a universal dilemma. When human action is considered on the most abstract level, all actors are seen as faced with the necessity to define the meaning of all situations in terms of five different dilemmas (Parsons' "pattern variables"). One of these is the necessity for the actor to determine whether he will respond to the situation in an "affective" or "affectively neutral" manner, that is, whether he will use the activities and relationships with which he is confronted

for immediate psychological gratification or to further a more distant goal. Since social situations (such as work role) provide the actor with normative prescriptions which define how he is expected to resolve this dilemma, the individual is faced with deciding whether to conform. Assuming that, as a personality system, an individual cannot or will not easily adjust to fulfill any and all action requirements, individuals are seen as faced with psychological limitations to their desire and capacity to conform.

Given the behavioral requirements imposed by the structure of bureaucratic organizations, "neutrality" may be characterized as the normatively expected response. Conceptually, therefore, we may tie this abstract notion to that of a bureaucratic personality dimension or the tolerance for bureaucratic situations. As a normative prescription for behavior in bureaucracies, "neutrality" refers to the requirement that individuals evaluate their behavior in terms of the specific consequences of the situation for the organization rather than act in whatever way brings them the most immediate gratification without regard for evaluation. It is a question of whose interests are to be given most consideration. On the psychological level, it is the distinction between permissiveness and discipline, with the former referring to immediate gratification in the psychological sense (Parsons 1951b, pp. 80-84).

It is this ability to accept or tolerate discipline, to choose to evaluate personal behavior in terms of distant goals which are relevant mainly to the organization, that is being

measured as a component of workers' orientations toward their jobs. If one turns once again to organizational theories of bureaucracy, particularly the Weberian tradition, one finds that it is necessary to consider an individual's orientation (neutral or affective) toward three aspects of the bureaucratic setting: the rules and regulations inherent in bureaucratic structure, hierarchical or authority relationships, and task activities. It is likely that individuals who exhibit the willingness to exercise self-restraint in these three specific areas of work behavior are those who can most easily tolerate the demands of a structured or bureaucratic work situation.

III. INSTRUMENT DESCRIPTION

Tolerance for Bureaucratic Structure involves four related areas, namely: attitudes toward rules and regulations; attitudes towards authority; attitudes toward tasks; and orientation toward the delay of gratification.

Attitudes towards rules and regulations are conceived of as a continuum. At the "neutral" or bureaucratic end are located those individuals predisposed toward willingly following many rules and regulations on the job. At the opposite extreme are individuals expressing discomfort at having work behavior governed by such rules and regulations. Implied in this construct is the assumption that the individual predisposed toward following rules does so without feelings of anxiety or hostility.

Attitudes toward authority is a related construct involving an individual's predisposition to accept the legitimacy of the hierarchical structure of work, hence the legitimacy of supervision. Workers high in this area are characterized by an easy acceptance of any degree of supervision and direction on the job. At the opposite end of the continuum are those who reject supervision of any type.

Attitudes toward task is a construct concerned with responses toward the routine performance of activities which are limited in scope, highly defined, and perhaps repetitous. Those who perform such tasks without reporting discomfort are placed at the bureaucratic end of this continuum. On the other end are individuals who dislike it when their work tasks have these characteristics.

The fourth area included in the scale is the individual's orientation toward delaying personal gratification. This differs somewhat from the areas described above since they relate to concrete aspects of work roles. This last area taps a more general set of orientations which conceptually underlies the personality construct. The theoretical notion of neutrality suggests that all individuals are faced with the choice of delaying their own gratifications as required by the needs of the work organization, or not doing so, thus failing to live up to the expectations of their job. Therefore questions designed to measure this dimension of personality are included as well as questions relating to the specific context of work.

The construction of the instrument began with the writing of several hundred potential items. On the basis of item

analyses of preliminary versions of the instrument, a final 43 question form on the basis of item analysis data as well as on a prior judgment as to the degree to which the items were representative of the construct. Included are questions relating to the four areas described above. They are distributed as follows: fifteen, rules and regulations; eleven, authority; seven, task; ten, delay of gratification. The proportion of items in each area was roughly parallel to an a priori decision concerning the importance of each area to the total construct. Figure III-1 presents, by area, the items in the final form.

Individuals respond to the instrument on a five point scale ranging from "strongly disagree" to " strongly agree." A low bureaucratic response is coded zero and the highest possible bureaucratic response four. If the question is omitted or the answer is, a score of two is assigned to the item. The items do not allow a neutral or indifferent response. In order to minimize the effects of response set, the items are worked in such a way that in about half of the items a strongly agree is coded as highly bureaucratic while in about half of the items a strongly disagree is coded as highly bureaucratic.

IV. INSTRUCTIONS FOR ADMINISTRATION AND SCORING

A. Administration:

For purposes of administration, the Tolerance for Bureaucratic Structure instrument is entitled "Job Opinion Questionnaire." This title was assigned in order to encourage the respondent to

provide personally valid replies to the questions rather than normative responses. Since it is designed particularly for workers with a relatively low level of formal education, the questionnaire is short (43 items, taking about 20 minutes to answer) and requires only that the respondent circle his choice on the answer sheet. Since it is an attitude measure, respondents should be allowed as much time as possible to complete their answers.

It is important that the people taking the test understand what they are to do. The test administrator should read the directions printed on the first page of the instrument aloud as the respondents read it to themselves.

After reading the instruction aloud, the test administrator should ask if there are any questions. Finally the administrator should emphasize again that there are no right or wrong answers to any of the questions and that their opinions are being sought.

If the respondents have any difficulty understanding the meaning of any question, the test administrator may help the respondent understand the question without indicating a preferred answer. Each respondent should have sufficient time to answer each of the questions.

B. Scoring Instructions for the Job Opinion Questionnaire

The Job Opinion Questionnaire consists of 43 items with which the respondent is to indicate agreement or disagreement. The Quesions are worded in such a way that in about half of the cases agreement is scored high while disagreement is scored low.

The scoring key follows:

Strongly Disagree = 0

Disagree = 1

Omit = 2

Agree = 3

Strongly Agree = 4

Questions where the scoring is reversed are indicated by a R following the space for the response. The scoring key for reversed (R) items is:

Strongly Disagree = 4

Disagree = 3

Omit = 2

Agree = 1

Strongly Agree = 0

Items where the individual has not responded or where his response is unclear are scored as 2. If more than 5 questions are omitted the score should be disregarded.

1_____
2_____R
3_____
4_____
5_____R
6_____
7_____R
8_____
9_____
10_____R
11_____R
12_____R
13_____R
14_____
15_____

16_____
17_____R
18_____
19_____R
20_____R
21_____
22_____
23_____R
24_____R
25_____
26_____R
27_____
28_____R
29_____R
30_____

31_____R
32_____
33_____R
34_____R
35_____
36_____R
37_____
38_____R
39_____R
40_____R
41_____R
42_____R
43_____

The score for the individual is the sum of the scores for the individual items

V. THE NORMATIVE GROUP

The normative group for the instrument consists of 2,592 individuals either employed in a variety of jobs or enrolled in training programs for particular jobs. Most respondents were located in eastern states and live in urban areas. Data were gathered from a total of 15 distinct groups. The groups were selected because they represent a variety of blue and white collar jobs, and typical federally-sponsored job training programs. Table 1 presents a listing of the groups and the number of individuals obtained in each group.

The demographic characteristics of the normative group are presented in Table 2.

It should be noted that the normative data provided by these groups should be taken only as suggestive. The sample obtained is not representative of the work population as a whole nor any general segment of the working population. Consequently the norm tables provide only a rough estimate of the range of actual scores and of the level of a particular group. It is strongly suggested that persons attempting to use this scale develop their own normative data.

Table 1

Sites in Which Data were Obtained on the Tolerance for Bureaucratic Structure Instrument

	Site	Number
1	Garment Factory Workers	162
2	Nurses' Aides	195
3	Collegiate Nursing Students	173
4	Office Temporary Workers	348
5	Unemployed Workers	73
6	Miscellaneous Clerks	123
7	Taxi Drivers	332
8	Clerk Trainees	173
9	Bank Clerks	205
10	Bank Clerk Trainees	126
11	Worker Incentive Program (WIN) Trainees	118
12	Concentrated Employment Program (CPE) Trainees	279
13	Electronic Assembly Workers	30
14	University Secretaries	168
15	Textile Printing Factory	47

Table 2

Demographic Characteristics of the Normative Group

Sex:	Male	50%	
	Female	50%	
Age:	Mean	33.55	
	Standard Deviation		14.26
Years of Schooling	Mean	12.62	
	Standard Deviation		6.70
Religious Preference	Protestant	39%	
	Catholic	35%	
	Jewish	17%	
Race	White	57	
	Black	31	
	Other	12	

VI. NORMS

As was described in the previous section describing the norming sample, the norms presented here can best be thought of as suggestive rather than definitive. Table 3 presents the conversion of the raw scores on the instrument to t and z scores as well as percentile scores. It should be noted that the percentile scores were obtained by normalizing the distribution and then computing percentile scores. The norms presented in Table 3 use all the groups described.

Because there is a relationship between the kinds of work at which an individual is employed and the scores on the TBS, separate tables of norms are presented for various categories of jobs. Those in the sample who were actually employed at the time of testing were divided into four categories based on a division of jobs into blue-collar and white-collar, structured jobs and unstructured jobs. The structured white-collar group includes nurses' aides and bank clerks. The unstructured white-collar jobs include college secretaries and office temporary workers. The structured blue-collar jobs include electronic assemblers, garment workers, and chemical printing operators. The only unstructured blue-collar job is taxi driver. Tables 4 through 7 present norms for these groups.

JOB OPINION QUESTIONNAIRE

Name_____ Date_____

Instructions: Below are a group of items that represent different opinions about jobs. We all have different ideas about the best kinds of jobs for us, and these items will give you the chance to express your opinions. There are no right or wrong answers to these questions. Whatever you believe is right for you. Answer each item by circling one of the following statements below each item.

Strongly Disagree *Disagree* *Agree* *Strongly Agree*

For example - if you agree strongly with a statement you would circle *Strongly Agree* below the statement. If you should happen to disagree with it you would circle *Disagree* below the statement. Do not spend too much time on any one item. Remember there are no right or wrong answers. Work quickly but carefully. Make sure you circle one choice for every question.

1. The best jobs for me are ones with set hours, like from 9 AM to 5 PM.

Strongly Disagree *Disagree* *Agree* *Strongly Agree*

2. Often, the only thing wrong with breaking a rule is getting caught.

Strongly Disagree *Disagree* *Agree* *Strongly Agree*

3. It makes me angry to see other people wasting time on the job.

Strongly Disagree *Disagree* *Agree* *Strongly Agree*

4. It is often good to wait and think things over before deciding.

Strongly Disagree *Disagree* *Agree* *Strongly Agree*

5. I would like to have a job where I could set the hours.

Strongly Disagree *Disagree* *Agree* *Strongly Agree*

6. The best job for me would be one where you knew exactly what you had to do even if you did not know why you had to do it.

Strongly Disagree *Disagree* *Agree* *Strongly Agree*

7. When I apply for a job I get very mad if they make me wait to find out if I got the job.

Strongly Disagree *Disagree* *Agree* *Strongly Agree*

8. I think most bosses know what they are doing.

Strongly Disagree *Disagree* *Agree* *Strongly Agree*

9. I usually do what the boss says even if I do not agree with him.

Strongly Disagree *Disagree* *Agree* *Strongly Agree*

10. The worst part about working is having to take orders.

Strongly Disagree *Disagree* *Agree* *Strongly Agree*

11. It seems to me that most rules on the job are not really needed.

Strongly Disagree *Disagree* *Agree* *Strongly Agree*

12. Sometimes I wish I could change jobs every few months.

Strongly Disagree *Disagree* *Agree* *Strongly Agree*

13. I would hate a job where you could not see the finished product.

Strongly Disagree *Disagree* *Agree* *Strongly Agree*

14. If everybody obeyed the rules at work, there would be fewer accidents.

Strongly Disagree *Disagree* *Agree* *Strongly Agree*

15. I like people telling me how to do things.

Strongly Disagree *Disagree* *Agree* *Strongly Agree*

16. It is important to save a regular part of your salary each week.

Strongly Disagree *Disagree* *Agree* *Strongly Agree*

17. A boss should expect you to take a sick day for personal business when you need it.

Strongly Disagree *Disagree* *Agree* *Strongly Agree*

18. Work is the most important thing in life.

Strongly Disagree *Disagree* *Agree* *Strongly Agree*

19. I would like a job where I had more control over the way I work.

Strongly Disagree *Disagree* *Agree* *Strongly Agree*

20. I like the responsibility of working without a boss.

Strongly Disagree *Disagree* *Agree* *Strongly Agree*

21. When I am working I like my boss to tell me how he thinks I am doing.

Strongly Disagree *Disagree* *Agree* *Strongly Agree*

22. I like to work at a steady speed.

Strongly Disagree *Disagree* *Agree* *Strongly Agree*

23. I like to spend money as soon as I get it.

Strongly Disagree *Disagree* *Agree* *Strongly Agree*

24. If a boss gives you a bad job he ought to be told off.

Strongly Disagree *Disagree* *Agree* *Strongly Agree*

25. If a person is late for work, he should not be paid for the time.

Strongly Disagree *Disagree* *Agree* *Strongly Agree*

26. If I won a lot of money, I would first take a vacation.

Strongly Disagree *Disagree* *Agree* *Strongly Agree*

27. What happens to you in life depends on hard work.

Strongly Disagree *Disagree* *Agree* *Strongly Agree*

28. It is better to be your own boss than to work for someone else.

Strongly Disagree *Disagree* *Agree* *Strongly Agree*

29. Jobs where you have to sit in the same place all day would drive me crazy.

Strongly Disagree *Disagree* *Agree* *Strongly Agree*

30. I think a boss has the right to tell you exactly what to do.

Strongly Disagree *Disagree* *Agree* *Strongly Agree*

31. It is smart to take a chance once in a while.

Strongly Disagree *Disagree* *Agree* *Strongly Agree*

32. Even if I don't like a rule I usually obey it.

Strongly Disagree *Disagree* *Agree* *Strongly Agree*

33. I often get mad when I am told what to do.

Strongly Disagree *Disagree* *Agree* *Strongly Agree*

34. I would like a job that takes you to different places.

Strongly Disagree *Disagree* *Agree* *Strongly Agree*

35. A company has the right to tell you what to wear to work.

Strongly Disagree *Disagree* *Agree* *Strongly Agree*

36. I like to set my own pace when working.

Strongly Disagree *Disagree* *Agree* *Strongly Agree*

37. Foremen should fire people they catch sleeping on the job.

Strongly Disagree *Disagree* *Agree* *Strongly Agree*

38. People who refuse to obey orders on the job are often right.

Strongly Disagree *Disagree* *Agree* *Strongly Agree*

39. It is hard for me to keep from blowing my top when someone gets me very angry.

Strongly Disagree *Disagree* *Agree* *Strongly Agree*

40. Workers often know more than bosses.

Strongly Disagree *Disagree* *Agree* *Strongly Agree*

41. I dislike waiting.

Strongly Disagree *Disagree* *Agree* *Strongly Agree*

42. Most foremen are too bossy.

Strongly Disagree *Disagree* *Agree* *Strongly Agree*

43. I enjoyed filling out this form.

Strongly Disagree *Disagree* *Agree* *Strongly Agree*

QUESTION	# STRONGLY DISAGREE	# DISAGREE	# AGREE	# STRONGLY AGREE	N/R(#)*
1. The best jobs for me are ones with set hours, like from 9 AM to 5 PM.	8	9	3	0	—
2. Often the only thing wrong with breaking a rule is getting caught.	2	7	6	3	2
3. It makes me angry to see other people wasting time on the job.	0	8	6	6	—
4. It is often good to wait and think things over before deciding.	0	0	14	6	—
5. I would like to have a job where I could set the hours.	0	6	6	8	—
6. The best job for me would be one where you knew exactly what you had to do even if you did not know why you had to do it.	8	7	5	0	-
7. When I apply for a job I get very mad if they make me wait to find out if I got the job.	0	9	10	0	1
8. I think most bosses know what they are doing.	5	9	6	0	—
9. I usually do what the boss says even if I do not agree with him.	3	5	10	0	2

N = 20
* = No Response

QUESTION	# STRONGLY DISAGREE	# DISAGREE	# AGREE	# AGREE	N/R(#)
10. The worst part about working is having to take orders.	3	5	10	0	2
11. It seems to me that most rules on the job are not really needed.	2	12	5	0	1
12. Sometimes I wish I could change jobs every few months.	1	12	6	0	1
13. Would hate a job where you could not see the finished product.	0	2	7	10	1
14. If everybody obeyed the rules at work, there would be fewer accidents.	1	4	12	2	1
15. I like people telling me how to do things.	3	13	3	0	1
16. It is important to save a regular part of your salary each week.	0	3	12	4	1
17. A boss should expect you to take a sick day for personal business when you need it.	0	6	10	4	—
18. Work is the most important thing in life.	5	11	1	2	1
19. Would like a job where I had more control over the way I work.	0	1	13	6	—

QUESTION	STRONGLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	AGREE	STRONGLY AGREE	D/K (NR)
20. I like responsibility of working without a boss.	0	5	10	5	—

QUESTION	# STRONGLY DISAGREE	# DISAGREE	# AGREE	# STRONGLY AGREE	N/R (#)
20. I like responsibility of working without a boss.	0	5	10	5	–
21. When I am working I like my boss to tell me how he thinks I am doing.	0	3	10	6	1
22. I like my work to be at a steady pace.	0	2	16	1	1
23. I like to spend money as soon as I get it.	3	12	5	0	–
24. If a boss gives you a bad job he ought to be told off.	0	14	5	0	1
25. If a person is late for work, he should not be paid for the time.	2	10	5	1	2
26. If I won a lot of money, I would first take a vacation.	2	12	5	1	–
27. What happens to you in life depends on hard work.	2	12	5	1	–
28. It is better to be your own boss than to work for someone else.	0	10	7	1	–
29. Jobs where you have to sit in the same place all day would drive me crazy.	0	6	6	8	–

QUESTION	# STRONGLY DISAGREE	# DISAGREE	# AGREE	# STRONGLY AGREE	N/R (#)
30. I think a boss has the right to tell you exactly what to do.	1	10	8	0	1
31. It is smart to take a chance once in a while.	0	2	14	3	1
32. Even if I don't like a rule I usually obey it.	2	5	13	0	–
33. I often get mad when I am told what to do.	1	16	2	0	1
34. I would like a job that takes you to different places.	0	1	12	7	–
35. A company has the right to tell you what to wear to work.	3	12	5	0	–
36. I like to set my own pace when working.	0	0	16	3	1
37. Foremen should fire people they catch sleeping on the job.	1	15	3	0	1
38. People who refuse to obey orders on the job are often right.	5	12	3	0	1
39. It is hard for me to keep from blowing my top when someone gets me very angry.	6	7	6	1	–
40. Workers often know more than bosses.	0	12	8	0	–

QUESTION	# STRONGLY DISAGREE	# DISAGREE	# AGREE	# STRONGLY AGREE	N/R(#)
41. I dislike waiting.	1	1	14	3	1
42. Most foremen are too bossy.	1	12	6	0	1
43. I enjoyed filling out this form.	3	6	8	2	1

PART I-A

Do you have a job right now? 18 Yes 2 No

If you had the chance to start your working life over again, would you choose the kind of work you did on that (last) job?

7 Yes 7 No 6 No Response

PART II

QUESTION	# STRONGLY DISAGREE	# DISAGREE	# AGREE	STRONGLY AGREE	N/R (#)
A. My job is like a hobby to me.	2	12	5	1	–
B. My job is usually interesting enough to keep me from getting bored.	1	2	9	7	1
C. It seems that my friends are more interested in their jobs.	2	15	1	1	1
D. I consider my job rather unpleasant.	5	11	4	0	–
E. I enjoy my work more than my leisure time.	1	12	5	2	–
F. I am often bored with my job.	3	9	7	0	1
G. I feel fairly well satisfied with my present job.	1	9	8	1	1
H. Most of the time I have to force myself to go to work.	3	12	3	2	–
I. I am satisfied with my job for the time being.	3	12	3	2	–
J. I feel that my job is no more interesting than others I could get.	3	8	7	1	1

QUESTION	STRONGLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	AGREE	STRONGLY AGREE	N/R (#)
K. I definitely dislike my work.	9	10	0	0	1
L. I feel that I am happier in my work than most other people.	1	3	12	3	1
M. Most days I am enthusiastic about my work.	0	6	12	2	1
N. Each day of work seems like it will never end.	2	12	5	1	–
O. I like my job better than the average worker does.	0	3	14	2	1
P. My job is pretty uninteresting.	7	8	5	0	–
Q. I find real enjoyment in my work.	1	3	9	6	1
R. I am disappointed that I ever took this job.	9	9	1	0	1