

METAPHOR: A STUDY OF
VARIOUS THEORIES AND THE PLACE
OF METAPHOR IN PHILOSOPHY

Dissertation for the Degree of Ph. D.
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ABSTRACT

METAPHOR: A STUDY OF VARIOUS THEORIES AND THE PLACE OF METAPHOR IN PHILOSOPHY

By

Harold Joe Rood

This paper is a detailed examination and criticism of several current theories of metaphor which purport to provide adequate explanations of metaphor. The major views considered are those of Philip Wheelwright, I. A. Richards, Max Black, Paul Henle, Monroe C. Beardsley, Colin Turbayne, and Nelson Goodman. The purpose of the consideration of these views is to determine how well each view deals with certain questions of philosophical importance. Those questions concern: (1) the possibility of correctly ascribing truth values to metaphor, (2) the relationship of metaphor to literal usage, and (3) the suitability of metaphor as an instrument in philosophical discourse. Since it is argued that no theory considered provided an adequate answer to these questions it became the additional purpose of this paper to formulate a discussion which does provide such answers.

To facilitate the characterization and examination of current theories, five types of theory of metaphor are recognized. The distinction between types of theories is based upon which of several rather obvious features a theory treats as predominant. The five types of theories are: (1) the Tension Theory, (2) The Comparison

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Theory, (3) The Relational Theory, (4) The Absurdity Theory, and (5) The Veridicality Theory. One Chapter is devoted to each of these types of theories. The nature of each type of theory is delineated and one or more representative theories is considered in each chapter. This consideration includes both an overall evaluation and a close analysis of the details of the theory for correctness and internal consistency.

This paper concludes that while each type of view offers suggestions which are helpful in understanding metaphor, no view considered is adequate as a general explanation of metaphor. They all fail to provide a general account since each construes metaphor too narrowly. This narrow construal is not the result of faulty definition since, generally speaking, definitions are not offered. These views base their explanations upon sets of closely related examples. As a result, several of the views seem plausible, provided that only their examples are considered. But none of these theories explain the full range of metaphors or even the examples proposed in other well-known discussions.

The final chapter presents an explanation of metaphor which avoids the difficulties found in previous explanations and which is based upon the arguments contained in the earlier chapters. Metaphor, it is argued, is the use of an expression, where 'use' is understood as 'the occurrence of a token within a particular context'. This paper establishes that metaphors are both meaningful and amenable to truth value assignment. The meaning or sense associated with a particular

metaphoric use is in part, but only in part, dependent upon convention. Its meaning is dependent as well upon a wide variety of relationships between objects, uses of language, feelings and opinions. The repeated metaphoric use of an expression may establish a new convention but the metaphors sense is not dependent upon a set of new conventions. The paper argues that since some metaphors are both meaningful and true, metaphor is an appropriate tool for philosophical investigation. Metaphor, however, suffers from a ubiquitous but nonsystematic ambiguity. One is therefor, cautioned to avoid metaphor in doing philosophy.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Metaphor has often been characterized as applying the name of one thing to something else. Aristotle says: "Metaphor consists in giving the thing a name that belongs to something else."¹ It has also been characterized as a comparison without the use of 'as' or 'like' and as a resemblance in difference. While each of these is a concise statement concerning the nature of metaphor, to be significant such statements must be supported by compelling argument. Whether such support is available is not clear. Arnold Isenberg says:

We do not have and perhaps never shall have an explicit understanding of metaphor. For no one has come up with anything² faintly recognizable as a sufficient condition of the term.

The task of determining whether any one has ever come up with an adequate theory of metaphor is a question which is too broad to deal with here. However, several contemporary views are promising. Our investigation is limited to works which are currently reputed by many to have dealt satisfactorily with the various aspects of metaphor. Our problem is to determine whether any of these is a sound theory of metaphor. That is, we wish to determine whether any currently accepted theories are sound.

The first question arising in a discussion of metaphor is 'what is metaphor'? An answer to this at the outset would seem appropriate.

But the question is ambiguous and its ambiguity often goes unnoticed. Two reasonable interpretations of this question are: (1) How is 'metaphor' to be used? and (2) What is the nature of metaphor? If one is clear with regard to the answer to (2) then (1) is an easy question; its answer is: 'Metaphor' is to be used to refer to metaphors. Such an answer has little value if the nature of metaphors is undetermined (inasmuch as an exhaustive list is not possible). Taking the questions in reverse order is similarly of little help. If one does not know the use of the term 'metaphor', what is to govern his investigation? A common solution to this sort of problem (very common indeed in the social sciences) is to stipulate a set of characteristics and use 'metaphor' to refer to that set of things which have all and only those characteristics. We would have a clearly defined problem and could commence at once with a clear understanding of our use of terms.

But here we are not much interested in that sort of agreement on terms. We are interested in discovering the nature of those utterances which are generally called metaphors. We want to know for example whether sentences containing metaphors can be correctly labelled 'true' or 'false' or whether it is an error to ascribe truth value to metaphors. We would like to know whether metaphor can be eliminated through paraphrase without loss of meaning and how metaphor accounts in part for the expansion of language. We want to know how we understand metaphor.

A precise definition could hasten our work in answering these questions. If that definition were sufficiently complete we might be able to answer the above mentioned questions by deduction alone.

However, this sort of procedure will prove ultimately to be uninformative with regard to the nature of metaphor. An example will clearly show the difficulty foreseen. Metaphor has been defined as a figure of speech having two arms which are to be compared. To this explanation, the following example was proposed as an objection: 'The chairman plowed through the meeting.' It was pointed out that this expression did not have two arms to be compared. In answer to the objection came this reply: 'your example is not metaphor since it does not have two arms.' While a definition would provide a convention by which to use the term, in adopting a convention we may fail utterly to understand both ordinary uses of 'metaphor' and the nature of metaphor.

Any proposed definition may not capture the various senses of 'metaphor' in the ordinary use or philosophical use of that term. By examining various discussions about metaphor and considering examples presented by others we gain an understanding of the ordinary uses of that term, even though we state no convention.

'Metaphor' as ordinarily used is not a precise term. Black offers the following caution:

'Metaphor' is a loose word, at best, and we must beware of attributing to it stricter rules of usage than are actually found in practice.³

Any attempt at definition at the outset could well prejudice our outcome. We would examine only those things which fell within the scope of our definition and conclude that our definition correctly characterized metaphor. Until we have concluded the investigation, the nature of metaphor must remain an open question. If it is insisted that some

indication of the nature of metaphor be provided, we will quote from the Oxford English Dictionary which defines metaphor as:

The figure of speech in which a name or descriptive term is transferred to some object different from, but analogous to, that to which it is properly applied.⁴

So long as the key terms in this definition are understood in a vague sense it is a reasonable definition. Some would quarrel with it since it fails to discriminate among metaphor, metonymy, and synecdoche; others may claim that it included other expressions which are not, strictly speaking metaphors. We would argue that it includes too little. It does, however, give an indication of the nature of that which we intended to investigate.

Method of Investigation

We shall proceed by a detailed examination of currently held theories of metaphor. Generally we will limit our consideration to theories held by persons recognized as philosophers and the theories upon which they comment. We shall divide the theories of metaphor into various types to allow some degree of efficiency in following out distinct themes of explanation. This classification will direct our attention to the common advantages and disadvantages of several theories at once. Such an organization will also allow us to keep in mind various types of claims and arguments.

In examining these theories we develop an understanding of the use of 'metaphor' by considering examples of metaphor which are presented in the explanation of those theories. Our critical analysis of the various

theories indicates the problems to be avoided by a correct theory. Equally valuable is the isolation of true claims with regard to metaphor presented by these theories.

Both Black and Beardsley consider alternatives to their views, either to show their view to be correct or to provide a contrast to their own view. Beardsley says:

The theory I shall propose ... will appear in its clearest light⁵ if we first contrast it with alternative theories of metaphor....

Both these motivations for the presentation of alternative views is sound. But neither Black nor Beardsley discuss theories which are seriously held by anyone. While the consideration of such theories as they present is of interest, these theories are either invented or so poorly characterized as to describe no particular theory. Since both Black and Beardsley are critical of the alternative views, we would like to examine the original work of persons whom these authors believe to hold the views described. We should like to determine whether Black and Beardsley understand the positions which they purport to criticize. But except for Black's discussion of the substitution view, no authors or works are cited as defenders of the specific views presented.

Beardsley says, in regard to his effort in this matter: "It is hard to find clearcut examples of writers who defend one or the other of these views ..."⁶ although he does claim that "The chief writers are sorted out somewhat."⁷ The criticisms offered by Black and Beardsley are not criticisms of seriously defended views but rather of bare outlines which generally contain no defense. Their theories are not shown to be superior to other currently held views since they do not consider such

views nor are their arguments addressed to such views.

Our investigation will proceed differently. The theories which we discuss will not in every case fit neatly in the general description of the types we propose. However, we will discuss the theories themselves rather than the types. This will allow us to take full advantage of the contributions and arguments of those theories and to address our objections to the genuine alternatives to the view we offer. This will provide a more accurate picture of existing philosophical positions on metaphor and the advantages of our position over competing explanations.

Types of Views of Metaphor

Generally, the bases of the theories which we discuss are correct in that such bases describe some aspect which a great many metaphors share. Often these theories can be made on the basis of the particular aspects emphasized by a theory. By discussing an example of metaphor we can illuminate some of these aspects. Consider:

Richard is a lion.⁸

This expression apparently implies a comparison between Richard and a lion. It would not be regarded as a literal statement since Richard is human and no lion is human. In some sense, 'Richard is a lion' is false. On the other hand, this sentence conveys information about the nature of Richard's character and seems therefore to be true in some sense. One may notice a tension here associating the referent of 'Richard' with the referent of 'lion' or between the obvious falsehood and truth of the expression.

The different characteristics we find in this metaphor are tension, falsehood, truth and comparison. The distinction between the types theories is a matter of which of these features of metaphor is emphasized, that is, which of these aspects is considered to be the basis of metaphor.

We call a theory which emphasizes tension a 'Tension Theory'. The advocates of these theories with whom we deal are Foss, Wheelwright, and Eastman. Wheelwright, who is taken as the chief spokesman for this view states: "The essence of the metaphor consists in a semantic tension which subsists among the heterogeneous elements brought together in some striking image or expression."⁹ No brief characterization of this view will do it justice, so we delay further characterization until we can fully present this view.

Two types of theory emphasize the comparative aspect of metaphor, one we call the 'Comparison Theory', the other the 'Relational Theory'. The comparison view treats metaphors as stating comparisons. Such a theory would claim that the above example is a comparison between Richards and lions. The comparison may be intended to point out the likenesses and differences between the objects mentioned. It may also be an attribution of certain applicable features of the one object to the other. On this view, the metaphor is valuable because the audience is able to draw out of the metaphor previously unobserved likenesses and relationships between the compared objects.

The relational view does not claim that the metaphor is a comparison. Rather, it holds that resemblance or some other significant

relationship among objects is our basis for understanding the metaphor. By being familiar with these relationships one can determine the meaning of the metaphor. In the example above, it would be our knowledge of the ways in which lions were like people that we would know what was being said about Richard. To use the language employed by Henle, the lion mentioned by 'lion' serves as an icon for a particular kind of person. The author of 'Richard is a lion' is saying that Richard is that sort of person; he is not comparing Richard to lions. As representatives of the comparison view, we treat Richards, Reiser and Black. Henle's work exemplifies the relational view.

The Absurdity Theory of metaphor centers its discussion upon the obvious inappropriateness of a literal interpretation of metaphor. We shall consider two fairly distinct variations of this theory. The first is that of Monroe Beardsley. On his view of metaphor, our understanding of metaphor is based upon the recognition of some absurdity in a literal interpretation. This recognition accounts for our attempt to find a meaningful alternative interpretation on the grounds that we think that people try to talk sense. Henle, also, provides a discussion of this issue and we are tempted to lump Henle and Beardsley together. But Henle considers the 'iconic' explanation as central to his discussion and this explanation is not shared by Beardsley.

The second variation of the absurdity view is the view of Turbayne. He views metaphor as a matter of sort-crossing and the misuse of metaphor as a matter of sort-trespassing. Turbayne's primary interest is explaining how people are misled by metaphor. The inappropriateness of

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metaphor is used by Beardsley to explain our understanding and by Turbayne to explain our misunderstanding.

The final type of theory which we consider focuses upon the truth of metaphors. We shall call such views veridicality theories. We shall consider the work of Goodman, Elliott, Mew, and Myers. We shall present only Goodman's view as a veridicality view. We consider the other works as following out themes suggested in our consideration of Goodman. At the outset, Goodman is most concerned with discussing the capacity for metaphors to be true. But he presents no single theme as do the other views. Instead, he treats several important topics which arise concerning the truth of metaphor. His discussion provides the basis for the development of some central considerations in our own view of metaphor.

A Note on These Classifications

It will be the case that some of the theories treated do not fit neatly into a single type. We do not consider this fact to be a problem. We do not argue, as it seems that Black and Beardsley do, that a particular type of view is in error and therefore any view of that type mistaken. Our criticisms are leveled against the specific claims of the individual theories. Therefore, the soundness of our argument will not depend on correct classifications. The classification is helpful in following out the various themes used to explain metaphor. But a disagreement with that classification would not entail a disagreement with our evaluations of the views classified.

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NOTES TO CHAPTER I

1. Aristotle, Poetics 145767, The Basic Works of Aristotle, Edit. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1966), p. 1476.
2. Arnold Isenberg, "On Defining Metaphor", The Journal of Philosophy, XXX (October 1963), p. 612.
3. Max Black, "Metaphor", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 55 (1954-1955), p. 276.
4. Oxford English Dictionary.
5. Monroe C. Beardsley, Aesthetics, Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1959), p. 134.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. We shall later criticize this as an example of a metaphor but it will serve here to point out characteristics which have been attributed to metaphor.
9. Phillip Wheelwright, The Burning Fountain (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1968), p. 102.

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CHAPTER II

TENSION THEORIES

Although a great many theories of metaphor mention energy or tension or perhaps semantic clash, only relatively few theories claim that this is the essential feature of metaphor. The theories which we call 'tension theories' take tension to be the essential feature of metaphor which separates it from other linguistic forms. Tension plays such an important role in these theories because, according to such theories, it accounts for the aesthetic value and the expressive power of metaphor.

Two of the three theories to which we give serious consideration in this chapter are classified by Beardsley as 'supervenience' theories. Before proceeding we shall consider our rationale for providing an alternative basis of classification.

Consider Beardsley's characterization of the supervenience theory.

The defense of this theory begins with the observation that poetic language, and metaphor in particular, is capable of conveying meanings that literal language cannot convey. Why else, indeed, would we have need of metaphor, unless it supplied a mode of speech for which there is no substitute? Proponents of the supervenience theory would generally, I think, brush aside examples like "sharp wind" as not "true" metaphors, or not the important sort: but in Plato's metaphor of the cave or Dostoyevsky's metaphor of the Underground, they would say the natural became capable of bearing a supernatural meaning. Only through metaphor ... is language freed from the restrictions of literal speech and permitted to range abroad at will. According to this theory, the meaning of a metaphor does not grow out of the literal meanings of its parts, but appears as something extraneous to, and independent of them. The literal meanings are overridden and lost; the metaphorical meaning is inexplicable in terms of them.¹

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We shall argue that the theories of Foss and Wheelwright do generally fit the description of a supervenience theory and we will be interested in examining the claims of such a theory. We will want to examine these claims, not because they are unique to these theories, but rather because they are the basis of claims to be made by many other theories and are therefore in part the basis for other theories. Our decision to classify these as tension theories is based on the fact that the emphasis given by these theories to semantic tension is much greater than that found in other theories. Many other theories emphasize the 'new meaning' of metaphor as much as do these theories. It is the place given to tension which makes these theories unique, not the claim that metaphor results in a new meaning.

Pazzaz Theory

Before we begin consideration of the serious theories, we shall consider a theory which, no one (we hope) holds. It is a strawman and a weak one at that. But its obvious weakness will alert us to possible difficulties of the tension theories of metaphor.

We shall call our theory the pazzaz theory. According to this theory, the essentially significant element of true metaphor is pazzaz. Linguistic expressions having pazzaz are metaphors; those lacking it are not. The greater the pazzaz of any given metaphor the greater will be the aesthetic pleasure one derives from it. One could examine various expressions and point out those which have pazzaz (These would, by coincidence turn out to be those pieces of literature already recognized

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as great works; those which have little or no pazzaz would not be so recognized.). It would be obvious that those expressions having pazzaz were more appealing thus establishing the aesthetic relevance of pazzaz. Pazzaz would therefore be shown to be of central importance to poetry and other literary forms.

This strawman has a major weakness and one which would make discussion of other aspects of the theory (if any were fully presented) a waste of effort. That weakness is that a technical term has been introduced without definition or explanation. An argument might be presented that an understanding of the term was to be gleaned from the examples which alternately contained or failed to contain the character indicated. (To save space we omitted the actual presentation of these examples.) But of course we did not know what we were to look for. Since those said to contain or embody pazzaz were examples of the best literature, we may have concluded that the pazzaz was the goodness of the literature. If one cannot explain generally what is meant by a term, examples will be of little help since one will not know what the examples are examples of. One will have, in effect, introduced a primitive term. To introduce a primitive term as the basis of one's explanation of metaphor will leave metaphor unexplained. One may well introduce 'Metaphory' as the name of the essential characteristic of metaphor; but perhaps the circularity would too easily be perceived.

Suppose we could clearly perceive some before unnoticed characteristic in the examples provided. An account such as that above would fail to justify the claim that all and only expressions which have that

characteristic are metaphors. It would seem at first consideration a wiser move to preserve the grammarians distinction and merely note that some similes as well as other expressions embody pazzaz and that some metaphors lack it.

The rather absurd pazzaz view of metaphor ought to alert us to two considerations that must be dealt with by the tension theories of metaphor. The first: some clear explanation of the meaning of 'tension' must be provided; the second: arguments must be offered to support tension as the distinguishing characteristic of metaphor and not just a coincidence in the cases noted.

Foss

Although it is Wheelwright who makes the most of the concept of tension, he refers to the view of Foss as presented in Symbol and Metaphor.² Tension does not play quite as significant a part in the theory of Foss as in that of Wheelwright. Nonetheless Foss states: "Metaphor is a process of tension and energy, manifested in the process of language, not in the single word,"³ and "The characterization of the metaphor as energy is excellent.... It is energy tension."⁴ We agree with Wheelwright's comment in the Swanee Review. "Foss's term 'energy tension' would help to explain the difference (between metaphor and non-metaphor), but I do not find his actual use of it very clear."⁵ We shall attempt to understand Foss's use of 'tension' since his use seems to have suggested a tension theory to Wheelwright. We shall also examine his claim that metaphor destroys the conventional meaning of its terms.

Even though Foss has suggested the tension theory to Wheelwright, one finds a difference in the use of 'tension' in reading Foss and Wheelwright. Wheelwright, as we indicate above, bases his explanation of metaphor on tension. Foss makes no such attempt. 'Tension' is more aptly a description of his explanation than a basis of that explanation. He speaks of metaphor as "blasting the symbols and shattering their customary meaning" and of "the dynamic process of the searching, striving, penetrating mind...." He says, "It is what Aristotle aims at when he calls the metaphor energy".⁶ Given the terminology with which Foss discusses metaphor we are not surprised that he goes on to label it a "process of tension and energy."

Foss's discussion of metaphor is tied to an epistemological theory in which he opposes symbolic process and metaphoric process. He says:

As the word symbol is generally used in connection with scientific knowledge, we must find another word to characterize the very different kind of knowledge we are concerned with in art, myth and religion. To this end the word metaphor will best serve our uses, for although it has heretofore been used in a narrower sense than it will be here....⁷

Since our interest here is linguistic theory rather than epistemology, we shall not pursue further Foss's epistemology. We do consider Foss's theory as a forerunner of Wheelwright and consider his central claim that somehow the conventional meanings of the terms of a metaphor are lost. Foss states:

The metaphoric process, however, is different: here the known symbols in their relation to each other are only material; they undergo a complete change in losing their familiar meaning in each other and give birth to an entirely new knowledge beyond their fixed and addible multitude ... the living creation is born out of a destruction of the old, it is not a summing up of the old parts, but their entire absorption in the creation.⁸

and

It is the unique generality of the intensional process to which the terms are sacrificed, and it is their mutual destruction in the process out of which a new and strange insight arises.⁹

The question we wish to answer is whether, in metaphor, terms retain their conventional meaning or whether as Foss suggests the conventional meanings are lost. Wheelwright objects to Foss's view as follows:

In the first place, while "sacrifice" is correctly introduced, destruction is surely too strong. If the conventional meanings of the terms drawn into the energy tension were really destroyed, would not the tension cease to exist.¹⁰

If one assumes, with Wheelwright and Foss that tension is an essential feature of metaphor and if one further assumes that tension is somehow the result of conventional meanings, then Wheelwright's objection is valid. The destruction of the conventional meanings would result in the elimination of the tension and therefore of the metaphor. The weakness of this objection is that it has premises which themselves are still open to question.

We are tempted to criticize Foss's use of 'destroyed' since it is not clear what would count as the destruction of a meaning. 'Destruction' is certainly used here metaphorically. We shall not pursue this criticism since there appears a reasonable interpretation of Foss's use of 'destruction of meaning.' We will assume that Foss means that the conventional meaning of the metaphorically used expression is no longer associated with nor considered in the understanding of the metaphor.

We are, however, able to offer an objection to Foss' view which does not depend on Wheelwright's premises. We will argue that if the

conventional meanings were destroyed, the metaphor would be meaningless. Suppose that Foss is correct, that the conventional meanings are destroyed in metaphor or perhaps that in their metaphoric use these words are divorced from their conventional interpretations. We now want to consider how it is that such metaphoric expressions are meaningful. We reject the possibility that the metaphors are iconic or stipulatively defined as a general explanation since generally metaphors fail to fall under either of these descriptions.¹¹ As a matter of fact, we are able to understand metaphor by making use of the meanings conventionally associated with its terms. Notice that given that metaphors are not icons (that is, the linguistic expressions do not resemble their referents) if they did not have conventional meaning, then every word would serve as well as any other in forming metaphors; it would not matter what words were combined to form the metaphor. But surely the words used determine in part at least whether the expression is a metaphor and if so which one. If there were no conventional meanings for the terms we would not be able to determine the sense of the metaphor. While it may be the case that the meaning of a word used metaphorically is new (i.e., novel and unconventional) and perhaps even goes beyond (in some sense) any combination of conventional meanings, it is not the case that conventional meanings are irrelevant, since it is through the conventional meaning that we understand a term's meaning as a metaphor.

While we may want to claim that a metaphor has a single meaning distinct from conventional meanings, we may not go so far as to deny that conventional meanings are still associated with its terms.

Wheelwright

Wheelwright's theory of metaphor is found in two recently published works, Metaphor and Reality¹² and The Burning Fountain.¹³ Both these works preserve the tension theory and the supervenience view, essentially as described by Beardsley. Although these themes overlap in Wheelwright's discussion we shall first consider his view in terms of a tension theory and then consider those aspects of his theory supporting the supervenience view.

In Metaphor and Reality, Wheelwright proposes to deal with metaphor by the introduction of two terms 'epiphor' and 'diaphor' as names of distinct features of metaphor. These features amount to the consideration of comparison and of unusual juxtaposition of linguistic expression, each of which is often found in metaphor. In a revised edition of The Burning Fountain, Wheelwrights approach rather than contrasting epiphor and diaphor, emphasizes a contrast between simile and plurisignation.

Both Metaphor and Reality and the revised edition of The Burning Fountain were published in 1968. It is reasonable to assume that Wheelwright believed these views to be compatible. And while he emphasizes different aspects in the detail of his explanation they both support the tension and supervenience views. Although bringing out these differences in detail we shall attempt to present his work as a single position.

Wheelwright initiates both his discussions by objecting to a view which treats 'metaphor' as a grammatical concept.¹⁴

In Metaphor and Reality¹⁵ he bases an argument to this effect upon the following line of Robert Burns:

O, my love is like a red, red rose.

According to the classical grammarians' distinction, the presence of the word 'like' would qualify this line as a simile. Wheelwright, however, claims that Burns' line has "more tensive life, more metaphoric vitality" than the following similar line:¹⁶

Love is a red rose.

While it may be the case that the former line has more tensive life (whatever that may be) we still have seen no argument for rejecting the grammarian's distinction. However, if we adopt as a premise a statement from The Burning Fountain we will produce an argument. That premise is "The essence of metaphor consists in a semantic tension which subsists among the heterogeneous elements brought together in some striking image or expression."¹⁷ If we accept this notion of semantic tension, then the above discussion perhaps shows that the distinction based on grammar alone is not sufficient to characterize metaphor.¹⁸ A similar argument is presented in The Burning Fountain:

"He fled from court like a man escaping naked from a fire." Cicero's simile rests on a plain logical analogy, and the pleasure which it gives, if any, is simply of intellectual recognition. The same may be said of many tropes which have the grammatical form of metaphor, as when Aeschylus calls a harbor the stepmother of ships. This minor piece of wit is not metaphor in the essential and semantic sense of the word, for it makes its connection by analysis and labored comparison rather than by "sudden perceptions of an objective relation." One might call it a tabloid simile. It lacks what Martin Foss calls the "energy tension" proper to real metaphor.¹⁹

At this point Wheelwright's theory bears a striking resemblance to the Pazzaz theory. We are as yet unclear about the meaning of 'metaphorical tension' as we are about 'pazzaz.' Wheelwright provides no adequate characterization of tension in either work. However, he does provide analyses of the various examples of metaphor. Attention to these analyses provides an indication of what he intends by 'tension.' We will discover, however, that no single clear-cut meaning is indicated. Rather his various examples indicate that the term is used in various ways in the various examples.

We may begin to gain some feeling for his use of 'tension' by examining his discussion of what he means by a live language.

Now what is it for language to be alive? In all organic life there is a ceaseless but varying struggle between opposite forces, and without such struggle the organism would go dead.... In man the basic organic strife shows itself in various tensions, of which he may be unconscious or at most only partly conscious--the tension between self and other persons, between self and physical environment.... As man gropes to express his complex nature and his sense of the complex world, he seeks or creates representational and expressive forms ... the problem becomes that of finding suitable word-combinations to represent some aspect or other of the pervasive living tension. This, when conscious, is the basis of poetry.²⁰

These comments do provide some indication of Wheelwright's use of 'tension.' But they are far from a definition of that term.

Further characterization of tension is found in Metaphor and Reality in Wheelwright's discussion of semantic motion.

What really matters in a metaphor is the psychic depth at which the things of the world, whether actual or fancied, are transmuted by the cool heat of the imagination. The transmutative process that is involved may be described as semantic motion.²¹

A review of his discussion of semantic motion together with close attention to his examples will provide possible interpretations of his use of the term 'tension.' The semantic motion of metaphor is explained in terms of two other motion words 'epiphor' and 'diaphor' "... the one standing for the outreach and extension of meaning through comparison, the other for the creation of new meaning by juxtaposition and synthesis."²²

Wheelwright attributes his use of 'epiphor' to Aristotle, recalling that he described metaphor as being the application of the name of one thing to another. Wheelwright's explanation of epiphor is:

Epiphoric metaphor starts by assuming a usual meaning for a word; it then applies this word to something else on the basis of, and in order to indicate, a comparison with what is familiar.²³

Wheelwright characterizes the movement as being from a more "graspable image 'over on to' what is vaguer, more problematic, or more strange."²³ The essential mark in epiphor, Wheelwright says, is a similarity between objects, one of which is more well-known. Similarity alone, however, is not sufficient to characterize metaphor. "An already obvious resemblance would not provide any energy-tension; a steno-statement of comparison is not an epiphor."²⁴ The energy-tension is achieved only where the comparison is between dissimilars and "comes as a shock which is yet a shock of recognition."²⁵ We may then consider this as our first explanation of tension. It is a reaction on the part of the reader (a shock) to the recognition of a ground of similarity between two dissimilar objects. The Burning Fountain provides support for this analysis.

There is more energy-tension, I would say, in the idea of a pancake moon than in the idea of a round moon, because there are more disparate groups of qualities huddled together and thus an element of paradox, of ambivalence, of tension between astronomical and breakfast-table associations, is introduced.²⁶

Though this example supports the 'shock-of-recognition'-interpretation, it invites consideration of a further question. That question is whether, as we suggested above, the tension is constituted by the shock (the response of the audience) or whether it is constituted by the difference in qualities of the objects compared. Wheelwright's examples suggest that tension is either a quality of the linguistic expression, its referents, or a quality of the audience. He does not indicate which of these he has in mind. But as we consider alternative characterizations of tension based on other examples we shall find that the audience reaction to the characteristic mentioned remains a reasonable interpretation of 'tension.' Wheelwright's discussion of diaphor does not present an explanation of tension nor does it seem reasonable to attempt to extract one. We shall postpone our analysis of that discussion until we consider this theory as a supervenience theory.

By attending to the discussion of plurisignation and simile in The Burning Fountain we shall encounter further explanation of tension. Wheelwright claims that energy-tension is achieved by a merging of these aspects of metaphor. He states:

The hypothesis which I should like to put forward is that metaphor at its best tends to achieve fullness of semantic energy-tension by a merging of two complementary elements--simile and plurisignation. In simile, two verbal expressions each conveying an individual image or idea, are joined; in plurisignation, a single verbal expression carries two or more meanings simultaneously.²⁸

Wheelwright attempts to support this hypothesis by considering a set of graded examples. Our interest is not so much whether he is successful but rather in the comments which he makes about tension.²⁹ In this consideration he notes that those tropes which involve only simile or only plurisignation lack metaphoric tension while the combination tends to produce tension and therefore metaphor. He states:

A simple simile without a plurisignative depth is usually not very interesting.... Such similes in each case depend on a single point of reference. They offer us no fresh apperception: only at best amiable surprise of a likeness before unnoticed.³⁰

It is evident from the explanation of his examples that at least a part of what he calls energy tension is an openness to alternative interpretation. Wheelwright considers two examples from Shakespeare.

(A) To thy fair flower add the rank smell of weeds. (Sonnet 69)

(B) Times thievish progress to eternity. (Sonnet 77)

I would judge (A) to be a suppressed or tabloid simile. Its expressiveness is limited by the implicit analogy: the beauty of youth likened to a fair flower, and his treachery likened to the rank smell of weeds. On reading (B) I think we feel at once the greater expressiveness of the figure, and I do not believe that this comes merely from the melodramatic evocations of the word "thievish" nor from the quasi-mystical and hyperbolic lift of the word "eternity." The greater interest of it depends more legitimately upon the way in which the word "thievish" functions in the sentence. As connected with "progress" it suggests the kind of progress a thief might be supposed to make.... But "thievish" also connotes the act of stealing.... The images are not suggested for their own sake, but because they refer to, and evoke a sentiment about, the concretely complex idea of the pang of the loss through time's passage.³¹

It is clear in this example that the difference between the lines is primarily a difference in the number of interpretations to which it is amenable. (A) is open to the single interpretation presented (or so his discussion goes) while (B) is subject to a great variety of reasonable interpretations. Tension is related in part to the number of alternative

interpretations. His mention of what we feel ("the greater expressiveness") raises the question whether it is these feelings which constitute the tension or whether 'feel' is here synonymous with 'perceive' in which case the tension would be a matter of multiple interpretation. Nonetheless as with the similarity among dissimilar explanations, it may be audience response which constitutes tension.

In a somewhat confusing discussion Wheelwright suggests "... a last approach to metaphoric tension from the side of simile ..." by considering the "... problem of poetic synaesthesia...."³² The Oxford English Dictionary provides a definition of 'synaesthesia' somewhat related to Wheelwright's use of this term it is: "Production, from a sense impression of one kind, of an associated mental image of a sense impression of another kind."³³ This sense of the term would label events such as having visual images of a particular color upon hearing certain sounds. To avoid confusion it is important to notice that Wheelwright differs in his use of the term. He explains 'synaesthesia' as "... the fusing of imagery drawn from two distant sense-channels. Dante's description of Hell as "there the sun is silent" (dove il sole tace) and the "Blind mouths!" of Milton's Lycidas stand among the great familiar classical examples. Each depends on intersensory analogy."³⁴ Wheelwright does not explain what characteristic it is that these examples have which qualifies them as examples of tension.

One characteristic may be that of a fusion of dissimilars. This would reaffirm that tension is the result of perceiving a similarity among dissimilars. In a discussion of the two examples above,

Wheelwright suggests that he may view tension as an emotive matter. He claims that a particular discussion of these examples is sufficient since they "account for the impact of these two great cases of synaesthesia upon a normally responsive reader...."³⁵ This discussion indicates that the greatness of these cases of synaesthesia lies in their impact upon the reader. Since these examples are presented as instructive with regard to tension, it is reasonable to assume that 'tension' may after all refer to the emotive response of the reader. While it is not clear which of these features, the resemblance in differences or emotive response, Wheelwright's comments certainly warrant consideration of 'tension' as an emotive prediction.

The view that tension refers to an emotive matter, according to Wheelwright, is also supported by his discussion of dead metaphor.

The last example is a reminder of the fate that eventually overtakes radical metaphors. They grow old and moribund losing the vital tension of opposed meanings, dramatic antithesis, paradox which was theirs at their inception. They become fossilized and enter into everyday speech as stenosymbols which have lost their one-time allusiveness and power to stir.³⁶

Here 'tension' as "power to stir" is an emotive term. But the discussion of "opposed meanings," "dramatic antitheses," and "paradox" indicates that perhaps the "power to stir" is a result of the tension which is the opposition of meanings, etc. This latter interpretation would indicate that tension is a semantic notion. It is similar to Henle's discussion of 'clash of meanings.'³⁷

There is then good support for a claim that the semantic tension of a work is constituted by the reaction of its audience (or perhaps the way its audience generally reacts). Such an interpretation would

contradict Wheelwright's statement that the test of essential metaphor is "the quality of semantic transformation that is brought about."³⁸ Since the essence of metaphor is to be semantic tension,³⁹ we ought to look for semantics as the basis of tension. We could do so and consider his reference to audience response as a discussion of the benefit of employing a figure possessing tension. In attempting to consider tension as a semantic matter, rather than pragmatic matter, we find three different uses of 'tension.' It is used as a label for (1) comparisons of dissimilar objects, (2) openness to alternative interpretation, and (3) opposition of literal meanings. All of these, which are labeled 'tension' are features which other theorists comment on and find valuable. Nothing seems to be gained by introducing the term 'tension': it only obscures the position. It obscures the position since it is often unclear which sense of 'tension' is being used and therefore unclear which point is being made. If it is claimed that 'tension' refers not just to those features but rather to all those special features of metaphor then the position becomes circular. If tension is something created by metaphor rather than a feature of metaphor, it is a matter of pragmatics rather than semantics as is indicated above. If tension is the response of the reader then Wheelwright is to be criticized for ignoring this aspect of metaphor, since while he mentions it, he makes no attempt to specify what sort of reaction is 'tension.' In discussing Max Eastman's view, we shall find an attempt to carry out an explanation of the audience reaction and a reaction which is one of tension in the conventional sense of 'tension.'

There is no basis in Wheelwright's work for adopting a notion of tension. His work in fact makes us suspicious that other discussions of semantic tension may be conflating several aspect of metaphor and producing a new term to handle.

Supervenience

In several arguments Wheelwright advocates the position that a new meaning is created by the use of metaphor. He does not, however, go so far as Foss in claiming that the conventional meaning of the terms of the metaphor is destroyed. He claims that the new meanings allow the poet to express that which had not before been expressed and provides for possible expansion of language. He argues from etymological evidence that language has in fact expanded through metaphor. Then by examining plurisignation and diaphor he discusses the inability of literal speech to capture the meaning of metaphor.

The importance of the expansion of language through metaphor is expressed in terms of language adjusting so as to be able to express new types of perceptions.

But language is also needed for dealing with the living flow of experience which is not yet formalized into definite concepts and which cannot be conceptualized without suffering distortion of character.... When we try by language to express presentative immediacy, seeking to express by words the phenomenological object rather than an object that has been largely fixed by conceptual definition, it follows that the language employed must have more flexibility in order to be relatively close to the fluctuating character of the experience in question.⁴⁰

Though not clearly stated, this discussion seems to include the problem of attempting to talk about a new perception; that is, a perception not

usually, or perhaps never before made. In such a case, no word in the present vocabulary would have a conventional meaning which would communicate our experience. Wheelwright is particularly concerned with this matter in poetry. As an example he considers the word 'horse.'

The general concept represented by the word "horse" results from one kind of such grouping (of here-nows of the experienceable world), based mainly upon publicly understood similarities.... But clearly other bases of association are possible. Any aesthetic experience is such an ali-dimensional grouping. An artist's characteristic attempt, in its semantic aspect, is to express and communicate an experience that involves a new grouping of experiential moments--that is, of perceived and imagined here-nows--for which there is no publicly acceptable word, formula, or other symbol already available.⁴¹

His particular concern with this aspect is expressed in his quote of Ezra Pound "The function of the artist is precisely the formulation of what has not found its way into language verbal, plastic or musical."⁴²

It is clear from this that Wheelwright believes that through metaphor one is able to create expressions which have meanings which are not expressed by conventional use of language. He states that an artist's characteristic attempt

... in its semantic aspect, is to express and communicate an experience comprising some grouping of perceived and imagined here-nows for which there is no publicly accepted word formula or other symbol already available.⁴³

Our interest in this position of Wheelwright is not limited to metaphor's effect in poetry. If he presents arguments to support his position, he will explain how the metaphor expresses this new meaning. We may in that case also have an explanation of metaphor in the non-artistic use of language. We may have an explanation of the ability of language to expand so as to express relationships which were previously unperceived.

Wheelwright argues that metaphor is capable of expanding language on the basis of supposed etymological fact. He states:

It has often been remarked that essential, or functional, or radical metaphor, is a chief contributor to the growth and enrichment of language.⁴⁴

In support of this claim about metaphor Wheelwright refers to the work of Friedrich Max Müller.⁴⁵

The Sanskrit word arka, from a root meaning 'to shine,' comes to signify both the sun and a hymn of praise. The splitting seems to have occurred not by deliberate comparison and transference, but through a mode of experience in which the visible shining and the bursting forth of joy from the heart appeared as two manifestations of one and the same effulgent reality.⁴⁶

Wheelwright suggests that skyscraper, bulldozer, arm of a chair, leaf of a book, are examples of English words which originated as metaphors.

He claims that these and

countless others have by now lost all trace of the semantic tension they must have had for their inventors and first users; consequently they are no longer living metaphors, but merely ex-metaphoric corpses, steno+terms, units of literal language.⁴⁷

Conventional language is expanded, according to Wheelwright, when metaphors through repeated use lose semantic tension and become conventional. The loss of semantic tension could be our growing accustomed to the new use of the word so that we experience none of those qualities we earlier contemplated as constituting tension.

If we accept this etymological argument, then we are convinced that the number of types of uses of a particular term can be increased; old terms can make reference where they failed to do so before. But this argument fails to demonstrate that other words, employed conventionally could not have been used synonymously. No evidence is provided that

there is available "no publicly accepted word formula or other symbol already available." Further, the etymological discussion fails to explain how the meaning of the metaphor is acquired or perceived in its first use.

Wheelwright's discussion of plurisignation suggests a basis for his claim that for at least some metaphors no literal use of language would be synonymous.

... the poetic symbol tends characteristically to be plurisignative, in that its intellectual meanings are likely to be more or less multiple, yet so fused as sometimes to defy any attempted analysis into monosignitive components, and always to produce an integral meaning that radically transcends the sum of the ingredient meanings.⁴⁸

This statement suggests that the particular combination of meanings of a metaphor could not be produced by any non-metaphoric expression and that the meaning of a metaphor would transcend any sum of meanings of literal usage. He explains further:

Frequently only a single meaning is denotative and capable of literal translation, while the remaining meanings are merely connotative--felt rather than thought--and, although controlled to a high degree by the context, do not have the kind of precision that would enable them to be satisfactorily expressed in analytical language.⁴⁹

It is evident from this last remark concerning meanings which are felt rather than thought that Wheelwright is claiming that no literal use of language would have the same emotive force as the metaphor even though it may have the same cognitive force. He provides an analysis of this situation.

"Pray you, undo this button;" the request is plain, the denotation single, but the connotative overtones generated by the context of King Lear's final tragic predicament and vision, have a strange power of suggesting more than can possibly be articulated--not

excluding, perhaps, a hushed arctypal reference to some undefined ceremony of preparing for the soul's release from the body.⁵⁰

Two issues are suggested. The first is that no literal expression could have the same power of suggestion. But Wheelwright presents no argument for such a position. The second issue suggested is a bit more subtle. We noticed that in the above example Wheelwright has made a literal use of speech to explain the meaning of the metaphor. Yet he claims that metaphors have no literal equivalents. Given his attempt at literal explanation of metaphor here and throughout both works, his position that there are no literal equivalents has an air of contradiction. He is either knowingly on a fool's errand when he attempts to explain metaphor in literal terms or does not believe his claims about literal equivalents.

In Metaphor and Reality, Wheelwright's discussion of diaphor suggests the manner in which metaphor creates new meaning. He explains his use of diaphor as follows:

The other and complementary kind of semantic motion that metaphor engages may be called diaphor. Here the movement (phora) is through (dia) certain particulars of experience (actual or imagined) in a fresh way producing new meaning by juxtaposition alone.⁵¹

Given the repeated reference to new meaning this last claim is of great importance. The words 'new meaning' suggest several different things and we would like to understand Wheelwright's use of these terms. Perhaps the consideration of his example and commentary will provide insight into his use of 'new meaning.'

My country 'tis of thee
Sweet land of liberty
Higgledy-piggledy my black hen.

Leaving aside questions of worth and taste, let us note that in this combination of elements, and by their combination alone, the writer manages to convey what is not expressed by either of the parts. His intention is evidently to make an antipatriotic utterance, but clearly there is nothing unpatriotic about either the first pair of lines taken by itself nor about the third line taken by itself. The antipatriotic sentiment is expressed solely by their combination.⁵²

This example is clear enough with regard to the meaning of 'diaphor.'

It is not very helpful with regard to the notion of a new meaning.

Wheelwright's observation that the lines taken together mean something more than any of the lines taken separately is an observation which

could be made with respect to most prose. Consider for example these

lines: 'He ran. He ran. He ran.' The three sentences together say something that none of them say alone. If this is all that Wheelwright

means by 'new meaning' then having a new meaning is not a special

characteristic of metaphor but is a feature of language in general.

The claim that metaphor results in a new meaning loses much of its import.

The new meanings were to provide the motivation for employing metaphor.

If the same result is attainable through literal usage, metaphor could

well be abandoned. The new meanings were, according to Wheelwright, of

great significance since they were meanings which were not expressable

in the literal use of speech. But if this is his claim, his conclusion

is premature. He says "The anti-patriotic sentiment is expressed solely

by their combination." His example may be in some ways a more interest-

ing expression of contempt for the views expressed in "My Country 'tis

of Thee," but there are many others; for example, 'I have great contempt

for the sentiments expressed in "My Country 'tis of Thee".' That the

diaphor would be more pleasing would be a ground for employing it, but

this in no way supports the claim that a new meaning is created.

To support his assertion that new meanings can arise from mere juxtaposition he makes reference to "... the broad ontological fact that new qualities and new meanings can emerge, simply come into being, out of some hitherto ungrouped combination of elements."⁵³ He invites the reader to consider a time at which Hydrogen and Oxygen had never combined later followed by the coming together of these elements to form water. Wheelwright claims that "Analogous novelties occur in the sphere of meanings as well."⁵⁴ While his analogy makes a pleasing image, it is hardly an argument which we find persuasive. It fails to provide a basis to suppose that linguistic expressions act as do chemical elements. Neither his example of diaphor nor his analogy provide a basis for holding that new meanings are created by diaphor.

It is clear that Wheelwright in part holds a supervenience theory as described by Beardsley. According to Wheelwright the aim of the poet is the expression of that which could not be expressed literally. He holds that metaphor allows us to express and communicate perceived or imagined here-nows for which there are no conventional signs. These new meanings, he claims, are the result in part of diaphor and plurisignation. We find, however, that many of these broad claims have no backing. In particular we find no support for his claim that the meanings of metaphor cannot be accurately communicated by the literal use of terms. The etymological facts which he represents only establishes that words may be used in ways which they had not been previously. This does not establish as a fact that no literal expression could have been synonymous.⁵⁵ Wheelwright's discussion of plurisignation made

reference to the emotive features of language; but still no argument was presented that no literal expression has that same emotive force.

Wheelwright, we find, is convinced of two things: (1) Metaphor creates new meanings and (2) tension is the most significant aspect of metaphor. The first of these claims is generally unsupported if by 'new meaning' Wheelwright means a meaning which cannot be expressed by literal expression. The second claim is unhelpful and the use of 'tension' tended to obscure rather than clear matters.

Eastman

We include the work of Max Eastman⁵⁶ as a tension theory, not because he employs 'tension' in his explanation but because his explanations turn upon a psychological phenomenon which might reasonably be called tension, and because it is significantly treated by Richards whose work we consider. Eastman's discussion of metaphor is a part of his discussion of and attempt to define poetry. He determines that poetry is an attempt to convey the quality of an experience.

And to make us clearly and intensely, or richly, or vividly conscious of this quality is the whole of his [the poet's] effort. It is an effort ... to heighten consciousness. Pure poetry is the pure effort to heighten consciousness.⁵⁷

Metaphor is an aspect of poetry to which Eastman attributes this consciousness-heightening ability. Although objecting in general to the grammarians use of terms he indicates that he takes metaphor to mean "... [calling an experience] by the name of some other experience that is similar."⁵⁸ He believes that metaphors could be "... described adequately as figures of comparison."⁵⁹

Given the characterizations of metaphor as a comparison and the aim of poetry as the heightening of consciousness, Eastman is presented with the question of the value of metaphor in poetry. What has comparing dissimilar objects to do with heightening consciousness? His answer is based on a psychological theory that interference with a task heightens awareness. Metaphor accomplishes this since metaphor, according to Eastman, tends to obscure meaning. He states "... those swift figures of metonymy and metaphor ... do not help explain like maps or illustrations, but rather obscure the meaning of the sentence in which they occur...."⁶⁰

Eastman argues that to have one's consciousness or awareness heightened one needs only to be presented with a problem. He uses as an example putting on a coat. Ordinarily he says this is done without much thought and one is not conscious of the motions through which he is going. However, should he be unable to get his arm into the sleeve he becomes aware of what is happening and what he is doing. He maintains this awareness until the problem is solved and then goes on as before not noticing what takes place.

I do not know how you could better define consciousness in that case, than to say it was the process of resolving the experience of a coat-with-an-impenetrable-sleeve into the experience of a coat-with-a-hole-in-the-lining. It was identifying an unfamiliar experience with a familiar one for the purposes of action. And as soon as this identification was accomplished and action resumed, the consciousness lapsed.⁶¹

From this example he generalizes that any situation which blocks our progress heightens consciousness. He states:

It seems that consciousness is, arises out of, or depends upon, two things--a blockage of action, and an identification of one experience with another so that action may be resumed.⁶²

According to Eastman's view, reading literature would be an action and metaphor would be a blocking of that action. The action would be blocked by the obscure meaning of metaphor which derives from impractical identifications.

What could a person do who desired to heighten consciousness or intensify, or preserve or prolong, or in any other way cultivate it for its own sake--what could he do--that would be more fundamental than to suggest impractical identifications? Poetic metaphor is the employment of words to suggest impractical identifications. You may choose this or that identification for any one of a thousand reasons, all of them very interesting but none general enough to enter into the definition of poetry. Any impractical identification that you can induce somebody to listen to is poetic, because it is the essence of an attentive consciousness. It is mind suspended on the brink of action.⁶³

It is this suspension at the brink of action which seems to us to fit the meaning of 'tension.' The tension created by the inability to proceed creates a heightened consciousness.

Eastman's discussion, if sound, would strengthen Wheelwright's claim that tension was the central factor in metaphor. And the situation Eastman describes fits well with Wheelwright's explanation of tension which results because of "... desperate groups of qualities huddled together."⁶⁴

Eastman's psychological theory seems plausible and some amount of experimentation might provide sufficient confirmation to induce us to adopt it. But his aesthetic theory is clearly inadequate. Consider "Pure poetry is the pure effort to heighten consciousness...." This is clearly not an adequate statement upon which to base a theory of metaphor. Such an explanation standing alone would make the man who turns the wheel on the rack a poet so long as his interest was restricted to

heightening consciousness. Bamboo shoots under the fingernails hardly seem to constitute a poem whatever the motivation. It may be that the value of poetry lies in heightening consciousness. But if that is so it must heighten it in some special way. The placement of impediments to one's action hardly seems to be the sort of heightening required. Such impediments rather than heighten consciousness with regard to the poem are often the reason poetry is not read. Some explanation is needed in regard to why one would undertake to read the work in the first place. One's consciousness is heightened only when there is interest in completing the task. It would be strange to say that people read poetry for the frustration they experience from it.

One point, which Eastman mentions but makes little of, may be salvaged. That point is that the identification of the perplexing situation as a familiar situation which allows one to go on often gives positive satisfaction. An important contribution to the aesthetic value of metaphor may indeed be in solving the riddle it poses (so long as the riddle does not so inhibit the reading that one loses track of the theme). This may be one aspect of metaphor which makes it pleasing, but it is the aspect which makes the solution to any puzzle enjoyable. While such solutions may enhance poetry they cannot be the entire basis of metaphor in poetry.

Eastman is correct about metaphor presenting obscure meanings and while this may cause the reader to experience a certain tension, it seems that it is not a tension that would be enjoyed. It is not a tension which would account for the importance which Wheelwright places of metaphor.

Conclusions Regarding the Tension Theories

In reading the work on metaphor of those whose interest is in literature one often finds reference to tension, energy, life, and similar qualities of literature, none of which appear to be the qualities of linguistic expressions. Predications such as tension, life, etc., were, at least in their first such uses, metaphors and a student in an introduction to literature class may very well experience the blockage of action about which Eastman speaks. The blockage is the result of attempting to understand literature and finding it discussed in terms which seem non-applicable to literature-ascribing properties which seem incommensurate with the other more obvious qualities of literature. Such a student wants to know what qualities a work has which entitles it to be called lively. The mere presentation of works which are lively is of little help in discovering the relevant qualities. In examining the tension theories we investigated the use made of 'tension' in an effort to discover those features of a metaphor to which 'tension' refers. In the work of Foss we found tension to be an apt description of the terms in which he explained metaphor. He used such phrases as "blasting the symbols and shattering their customary meaning." Such events would seem tense enough, if 'blasting' or 'shattering' were not also used metaphorically. But those words are used metaphorically. Nothing is blasted or shattered in the literal sense of those terms. His explanation would be clearer if he discussed symbols and meanings using literal speech. Such an explanation would claim that in its metaphoric use an expression: (1) has a sense which it did not conventionally

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have and (2) fails to have a sense with which it is conventionally associated. This sort of explanation clearly applies to linguistic expressions where blasting and shattering do not. While talk of blasting meanings may suggest tension, such talk seems only to confuse the issue and induce one to wonder whether the author's point has been correctly interpreted.

In Wheelwright's work we encountered a similar situation. The term 'tension,' still undefined, was used in connection with the description of several aspects of metaphor, but generally left open the question of whether these aspects were the tension or, whether these aspects of linguistic expression caused the reader to be tense. In either case, the use of 'tension' is in need either of further definition or, more probably, elimination since it is a metaphoric expression making reference to several different aspects of literature all of which are clearly expressible in more conventional English.

In Eastman's work we found an argument that causing tension (where 'tension' is roughly synonymous with 'frustration') may be aesthetically valuable in terms of heightening the reader's consciousness. The psychological theory that a blockage of action tends to heighten consciousness may be correct. But we found that the mere heightening of consciousness is not sufficient to constitute aesthetic value. We noticed a more plausible explanation, that the satisfaction one got from solving the blockage of action may account, in part, for people's interest in poetry. It would, if this were the only value of metaphor, put metaphor on a plane with solving puzzles of other sorts. But we

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recognize that the jigsaw and crossword are not poems and that a good deal more is required of a good poem than the presentation of puzzles. Generally our conclusions with regard to the tension theories are:

(a) The introduction of notions such as life, tension without stipulative definition are not helpful in understanding metaphor, even in its poetic use (although the mention of energy, tension and life may have greater aesthetic value).

(b) The claim that in metaphoric use terms lose their conventional meanings cannot be defended, since it is only with an awareness of the conventional meanings (perhaps among other things) that one is able to understand metaphor.

(c) The presentation of a riddle to be solved may be one aspect of the aesthetic value to metaphor.

(d) Several important features indicated by these views which warrant further attention in the consideration of other views are

(1) Metaphors are open to an indefinite variety of interpretation.

(2) The various interpretations need not be consistent.

(3) Metaphors involve some conflict between the meanings of their terms under conventional interpretation.

(4) Metaphor involves comparison.

While the tension theories bring out points which must be accounted for by a theory of metaphor they fail to provide a satisfactory explanation of metaphor.

NOTES TO CHAPTER II

1. Monroe C. Beardsley, Aesthetics (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1958), pp. 135-136.
2. Martin Foss, Symbol and Metaphor in Human Experience (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949).
3. Ibid., 61.
4. Ibid.
5. Philip Wheelwright, "Symbol, Metaphor, and Myth," The Sewanee Review, LVIII (1950), p. 687.
6. Foss, p. 60.
7. Ibid., 33.
8. Ibid., 61-62.
9. Ibid., 60.
10. Philip Wheelwright, Burning Fountain (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1968), pp. 107-108.
11. Even Henle, who claims all metaphor to involve icons would agree with us since he uses icon and iconic in an unusual way.
12. Philip Wheelwright, Metaphor and Reality (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1968).
13. Wheelwright, Burning Fountain.
14. We will see that according to his new 'metaphor' that metaphor is a matter of pragmatics, as opposed to a matter of grammar.
15. Wheelwright, Metaphor, p. 71.
16. Ibid.
17. Wheelwright, Burning Fountain, p. 102.
18. We say 'perhaps' since his argument is based on 'Love is a red rose' rather than the more similar line 'O, my love is a red, red rose.' Whatever 'tensive life' refers to, it seems that the comparison ought to have been made with the more similar line; our proposal may have more tensive life than Burn's line.

19. Ibid., 104.
20. Wheelwright, Metaphor, pp. 45-46.
21. Ibid., 71-72.
22. Ibid., 72.
23. Ibid., 72.
24. Ibid., 72-73.
25. Ibid., 74.
26. Ibid.
27. Wheelwright, Burning Fountain, pp. 121-122.
28. Ibid., 109.
29. In considering the graded examples we are somewhat at a loss. We were to consider them and to notice that those examples which had a mixture of plurisignation and simile were also those exhibiting tension. Our agreement that this were the case would essentially constitute an agreement with Wheelwright's hypothesis. But we are still unaware of what tension is and are forced to use his examples as examples of tension in an attempt to understand the term. Nothing in his examples (Wheelwright, Burning Fountain, pp. 109-118) brought to our attention anything resembling the "ceaseless but varying struggle between opposite forces ..." mentioned earlier (Wheelwright, Metaphor, p. 45).
30. Ibid., 109.
31. Ibid., 112-113.
32. Ibid., 113.
33. O. E. D.
34. Wheelwright, Burning Fountain, pp. 113-114.
35. Ibid., 114.
36. Ibid., 120.
37. This is treated in chapter II.
38. Wheelwright, Metaphor, p. 71.

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39. Wheelwright, Burning Fountain, p. 102.
40. Ibid., 79.
41. Ibid., 89-90.
42. Ibid., 90.
43. Ibid., 91.
44. Ibid., 119.
45. Friedrich Max Müller, "Metaphor," Lectures on the Science of Language, seventh edition (London, 1873), vol. I, Lecture VIII.
46. Wheelwright, Burning Fountain, p. 119.
47. Ibid., 120.
48. Ibid., 81.
49. Ibid., 117.
50. Ibid.
51. Wheelwright, Metaphor, p. 78.
52. Ibid., 78-79.
53. Ibid., 85.
54. Ibid., 86.
55. We wish here to forestall an argument based on the obvious growth of language. Obviously there were once fewer words than there are now and obviously too few to represent the complex perceptions of today's man. The fact that language has grown along with man's increased number and type of perceptions does not show that metaphor is responsible for that growth. The growth of language has included a significant increase in the number of words. Metaphor does not, however, create any new words. The bare fact of the growth of language will not establish that metaphor creates new meanings. A related point is that our interest is with current language. References to past periods when language was not sufficient to express certain perceptions will not establish that current languages in literal use cannot express every possible meaning. (Even though such expressions may be so cumbersome as to warrant the definition of new terms.)

56. Max Eastman, The Literary Mind (Charles Scribner's Sons, 1931).
We are not overlooking the fact that Eastman's work proceeded
Wheelwright's. It is strange that Wheelwright did not make use
of Eastman's arguments in support of his own position.
57. Ibid., 170.
58. Ibid., 184.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid., 183.
61. Ibid., 187-188.
62. Ibid., 188.
63. Ibid.
64. Wheelwright, Burning Fountain, p. 122.

CHAPTER III

COMPARISON THEORIES

When one asks his grammar teacher or consults a standard book of grammar, he is apt to find that metaphor is spoken of as implied comparison or comparison without the use of 'like' or 'as.' Such information may be followed by an example, as follows:

(1) 'Richard is a lion' metaphor (implied comparison).

(2) 'Richard is like a lion' simile (actual comparison).

And some mention will be made that the objects to be compared must be, to some significant degree, different, or at least it must be unusual to compare such objects. Now, without much familiarity with metaphor, this all seems safe enough. But it seems safe because we have considered only one sort of example. Between the sentences in the above example there is essentially only a grammatical difference. (1) could obviously be converted to (2) by inserting 'like' with no change in meaning. But, consider an example of a different sort.

(3) 'The lion of England leaped upon the infidels.'

It is not so easy to explain this example as a comparison. There is no place to insert 'like' or 'as.' An argument could still be presented that Richard is being compared to a lion. A suggested literal translation might be:

(4) 'Richard attacked the infidels as if he were a lion leaping upon its prey.'

But (3), in itself, provides no basis for assuming that Richard is the object to be compared to the lion. Richard is not mentioned. In (1) there is obviously in part at least a comparison; both items to be compared are mentioned and that mention is through the use of literal speech. But in (3), the explanation in terms of comparison must be more complex since only one of the compared items is mentioned. In order to maintain the comparison view, one must now explain our ability to recognize the other element of the comparison. A relatively simple answer to this challenge is that 'lion of England' refers to Richard, while at the same time containing the word 'lion' which refers to lion (or perhaps a lion). Realizing this dual reference, we compare the two objects. But this essentially pushes the problem back one step. Now we must explain how 'Lion of England' refers to Richard.¹ Such reference is often explained in terms of context. Were we to come upon (3) in isolation, we might very well find not a comparison, but rather a peculiar sentence. (Perhaps, in this case, peculiar only inasmuch as there are no English lions. If the phrase contained 'lion of Africa,' we would fully expect that a group of non-believers were about to be a meal for a member of the species Pelis leo.) But we do not find metaphor in isolation. The context, whether literary, physical, or other, may indicate the subject of the metaphor, or the metaphorical reference. The 'lion of England' will refer to Richard III, because he has previously been our subject. (Or perhaps, since lions are the Kings of beasts and people have been our subject, we know that it is a king who is the metaphorical subject.) We recognize 'lion's conventional extension.

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The comparison is between the referent of the term employed metaphorically (the subject as determined by context) and the referent as determined by conventional usage.

But this explanation in terms of context fails to hold up in many cases. While it is true that all metaphor will be in some context, it is not always the case that context alone will determine a subject (or referent of the metaphor). We may for example have found (3) in a context which would determine only that the subject is human. One however recognizes that the human king is subject since the lion is king of beasts. By recognizing the relationship involved one is able to determine the subject. It is by comparing 'person' with 'lion' that we recognize that the king is being spoken of. Notice here that the process is reversed. The comparison is the basis for determining the referent. It is only in understanding the comparison that we know what is compared, where in the previous example the recognition of two objects invited comparison. In the more recent example, it is recognizing the royalty of the beast and of the particular man that we know it is this man rather than that man to which 'lion' refers. Before we recognize this similarity we are unable to determine the referent of the metaphorical use of 'lion.' By trying out comparisons between the referent of the term in its literal use and various possibilities suggested by context, we determine the referent of the metaphoric use. Here knowledge of what is to be compared does not precede the comparison but is rather contemporaneous with the comparison. Understanding such a metaphor cannot be explained as a matter of comparing two objects since recognition of one of the objects to be compared depends on recognizing the comparison.

In considering the examples above we made use of two different types of explanation both of which involved the notion of comparison. In the first, the metaphor was construed to be a comparison. Understanding this metaphor amounted to understanding the comparison made, i.e., understanding the relationship between objects compared. The second example was not construed as stating a comparison. Rather it was explained that to understand the metaphor, in particular to become aware of its referent, one must make (as opposed to state) a comparison. It is through the ground of a comparison that one determines the referent. As one or the other of these functions of the metaphor is emphasized one obtains a different theory of metaphor.

To simplify our discussion of comparison theories, we will introduce the following notation: 'A' and 'B' will name the two sides of the comparison. 'R' will name the relationship, similarity, or ground of the comparison. Given this terminology one might conventionally express a comparison as 'A is like B in respect of R' or 'A is related to B by R.' We can distinguish two types of theories using this terminology and considering the above examples. The first type describes metaphor as the presentation² to the audience, of both A and B. In considering both of these the audience determines one or more appropriate R's. In making this determination an audience has interpreted and understood the metaphor (though perhaps not the utterer of the metaphor). We shall call this the comparison view. The second type of view describes metaphor as the presentation of A and R. In considering these the audience determines B. An object or event is mentioned by the expression interpreted literally and by some means the audience is made aware of the

ground of comparison. By knowing the ground of the comparison and the object mentioned under the literal interpretation, the audience is able to determine the referent of the metaphor. We call this the 'relational view.'

The primary difference between these views is what is to be explained. On the first view the theorist is generally most anxious to explain our comprehension of the new and various relationships which metaphor is capable of expressing. On the relational view, theorists are more interested in determining how we know what is being talked about, that is, how we understand that to which the metaphorical use of an expression refers.

We consider three examples of the comparison view in this chapter: Richards, Reiser, and Black. In presenting Richards' we will include treatment of his various discussions of important aspects of metaphor and sufficient description to characterize his position. We shall not cover every aspect of his work. Reiser will be considered as an interesting alternative interpretation of the comparison view. But we do not consider his work to be a major contribution. Black will be considered in somewhat greater detail. One basis for this detailed consideration is a wide reputation for having "taken care" of the subject. Our interest is to determine whether his arguments are sound, whether he has in fact successfully refuted the viable alternatives to his position and whether his position is sound.

In the chapter after this one we consider the relational theory of metaphor.

I. A. Richards

The Philosophy of Rhetoric contains Richards' most extensive discussion of metaphor. But it could be argued that he presents no theory of metaphor. In reading the Philosophy of Rhetoric one encounters several statements which could be construed as definitions. These all seem to be more appropriately treated as statements about metaphor. However, in considering the points he makes, it is clear that he holds a version of the comparison view. His interest in this discussion is directed toward explaining the R (similarity or relationship) involved in metaphor. One senses from his discussion, though it is not stated, that the B of the comparison is obvious from the context and that the A is mentioned by the metaphoric expression in its literal use. That Richards fails to explain our knowledge of B would be a serious criticism, if Richards had carefully laid out a theory. But as we mentioned above, there was no such laying out and we shall surmise that Richards would provide an argument that context would provide for our knowledge of B.

The central thrust of Richards' discussion is that metaphor is not some sort of mysterious phenomenon. He claims that previous views of metaphor have stifled creativity and he wants to show metaphor as part of our normal activity. He argues that the metaphors of language are a subset of a much larger set of metaphors, namely the set consisting of our thoughts. He claims that thought itself is metaphoric and that the metaphors of language are merely reports of metaphoric thought. His discussion dwells at some length on this point. All reasoning is described essentially as comparing. Throughout most of Philosophy of Rhetoric little attention is paid to linguistic expression. In the last

section he comes around to discussing metaphors as linguistic expressions. Since metaphor as it occurs in language is our prime interest, our discussion centers around remarks made there. We shall however attend to various other significant considerations which he presents earlier on in his work. The specific claims, in addition to his general position which we will examine are:

- (1) That metaphor constitutes a compounding of uses.
- (2) All language outside science is metaphoric.
- (3) That a distinction between tenor and vehicle is helpful in understanding metaphor.

We shall reject all three claims. This rejection is significant since if these claims were true they would play a central role in explaining metaphor.

The first of Richards claims is found in his explanation of his use of 'metaphor.' He uses that word

... to cover all cases where a word, in Johnson's phrase, 'gives us two ideas for one,' where we compound different uses of the word into one, and speak of one thing as though it were another. And I took it further still to include, as metaphoric, those processes in which we perceive or think of or feel about one thing in terms of another.... (Rhetoric 116)

We are concerned with so much of his commentary as applies to linguistic use. Here Richards talks about uses, and in particular compounding uses of a word. He suggests that a metaphor is the result of some union or mixture of uses. But metaphor generally involves only two uses: a single metaphoric use and a single literal use. The metaphoric use is derived from the literal use. There are not in general two or more uses which are compounded to produce a metaphoric use. Richards' analysis is

untenable. Obviously, he claims two things are being referred to by the metaphor: that which the phrase normally refers to, and that to which, under a metaphoric interpretation it refers. This is clear from his examples.⁴ But a metaphor cannot be the result of the compound of two such uses since its use to refer to one of the objects is the metaphoric use itself.⁵ In order for metaphor to result from a compounding of uses, those uses must be independent of the metaphor.

To speak of metaphor as the compounding of uses suggests that the two uses of the expression were prior to its use as a metaphor. But the metaphoric use of the expression is one of those uses and cannot be prior to itself. In terms of reference, the metaphoric use provides at most a second referent for the expression. There is no third referent which results from a compounding of uses. Although Richards describes metaphor as having ... 'two thoughts of different things active together'⁶ the thoughts of the different things cannot explain our understanding of metaphor since we understand one of the "things" to which the metaphor refers only after we understand the metaphoric use of the expression. Talk of compound uses seems only to mislead. This error is reflected in Richards' explanation of the meaning of metaphors. He says:

A modern theory would object, first, that in many of the most important uses of metaphor, the co-presence of the vehicle and tenor results in a meaning (to be clearly distinguished from the tenor) which is not attainable without their interaction. That the vehicle is not normally a mere embellishment of a tenor which is otherwise unchanged by it but that vehicle and tenor in co-operation give a meaning of more varied powers than can be ascribed to either.⁷

In our discussion of 'vehicle' and 'tenor' we claim these words to be

used ambiguously. Sometimes they appear to refer to meanings, at others to referents. If we consider 'tenor' and 'vehicle' first to refer to meanings, the resulting problem is precisely similar to the one above. The two meanings (tenor and vehicle) "give a meaning of more varied powers than can be ascribed to either." But such an interpretation entails three distinct meanings; the tenor and vehicle which cooperate and the meaning given by that cooperation. It is clear that a literal interpretation of the metaphoric expression will result in a meaning distinct from the meaning resulting from a metaphoric interpretation. But there is no third meaning which results. We will claim that the second meaning is in part a result of the first and that they are therefore related. But that relationship does not produce a third meaning.

Treating tenor and vehicle as referents fares no better since the referents of the terms are dependent upon their meanings. To suppose the referents cooperated to produce a new meaning is to suppose the pre-existence of two meanings which result in those referents.

In general, talk of interaction between *x* and *y* to produce some *z* requires the antecedent existence of *x* and *y*. If the meaning of a metaphor is some *z* which results from the interactions of two meanings *x* and *y*, then three and not two meanings need to be accounted for. They are the meaning of the expression under a literal interpretation, the meaning of that expression as metaphorically interpreted, and the third elusive meaning whose cooperation is required in producing the meaning under a metaphoric interpretation. No account is given by Richards of any such third meaning.

The second claim which we wish to consider is that "... most sentences in free and fluid discourse turn out to be metaphoric. Literal language is rare outside the central parts of the sciences."⁸ "The view that metaphor is omnipresent in speech can be recommended theoretically."⁹ This theoretical claim can be stated: the nature of language is such that except for the central areas of science a non-metaphoric language is not possible. We object to this claim on the basis that Richards either contradicts facts or is using 'metaphor' in a way other than that in which it is ordinarily understood. The fact which we say Richards contradicts, is that we do make distinctions between what is called the literal use of language and the metaphoric use of language when the nature of the speech is not at all scientific. Metaphor is seen as a great boon to the poet and often as a hindrance to the philosopher. We attempt to understand this distinction which is made so as to be able to encourage or discourage these uses of language as appropriate.

We find ourselves asking each other on occasion whether a sentence is being used literally or metaphorically. We ask each other on occasion to speak literally rather than metaphorically and are sometimes satisfied that this has been done. A theory which holds that there can be no literal speech except in science merely deprives us of the use, in the normal (or ordinary) sense, of that word. If we adopted Richards' position we would soon find ourselves making the same sorts of distinctions while employing a different terminology. This would likely be done in much the same way as Quine agrees to stop using the word 'exist' and uses

'is' in its place.¹⁰ Richards is not, as one might expect, arguing Müller's position, that most of the terms of our language originated as metaphors. (We presented this on page 29.) Rather, Richards has noticed that the meanings of terms fluctuate with use and context. While we agree with this observation, we still maintain our position that there is a distinction to be made between literal and metaphoric use throughout the normal range of language.

The third point we discuss is the distinction between tenor and vehicle. This distinction is often referred to and employed in the work of others and is generally positively commented upon. By introducing the terms 'tenor' and 'vehicle' Richards proposes to clear up certain confusions in regard to understanding the nature of metaphor. Specifically, he proposes to distinguish metaphor from other use of language based on this distinction.

Whether, therefore, a word is being used literally or metaphorically is not always, or indeed as a rule, an easy matter to settle. We may provisionally settle it by deciding whether, in the given instance the word gives us two ideas or one; whether, in the terms I suggested last time, it presents both a tenor and a vehicle which cooperate in an inclusive meaning. If we cannot distinguish tenor from vehicle then we may provisionally take the word to be literal; if we can distinguish at least two cooperating uses, then we have metaphor.¹¹

Richards speaks as though distinguishing the tenor from the vehicle were a fairly straightforward procedure (or at least that in many clear cases this can be done). But Richards is not clear in his explanation of the distinction between tenor and vehicle. He says:

A first step is to introduce two technical terms to assist us in distinguishing from one another what Dr. Johnson called the two ideas that any metaphor, at its simplest, gives us. Let me call them tenor and vehicle. One of the oddest of the many odd things about the whole topic is that we have not agreed upon distinguishing

terms for these two halves of a metaphor -- in spite of the immense convenience, almost the necessity, of such terms if we are to make any analysis without confusion.¹²

An even odder point here is that Richards provides two terms to make a distinction without explaining what is being distinguished. He states that at present we have only clumsy phrases such as 'the original idea' and 'the borrowed one,' 'what is really being said or thought of' and 'what it is compared to,' etc. But these clumsy expressions are as close as Richards comes to defining his 'technical' terms. His term 'vehicle' appears to refer to three distinct facets of the metaphor. They are: the term used, the referent which such a term would have if employed literally, and the sense which that term would have if employed literally. By tenor, he refers to the sense and to the reference of the term used metaphorically. Richards' explanation on page 96 in terms of the original idea and the borrowed one appear to be using tenor and vehicle as synonymous with the sense of the term used metaphorically and literally respectively. On page 118 he speaks of tenor and vehicle as though they were the referents. "A very broad division can be made between metaphors that work through some direct resemblance between the two things, the tenor and the vehicle and those which work through some common attitude which we take toward both." It appears that Richards simply overlooks the distinction between sense and reference.

But even if Richards had consistently used these terms to refer to the sense or the referent of the expressions used literally or metaphorically, these terms would be of little value in determining whether an expression is metaphoric. The adoption of these terms for that purpose

will instead expose a fault of the intended distinction. If we rephrase Richards' statement, substituting definitions for tenor and vehicle, we have the following: 'it presents both a sense when used metaphorically and a sense when used literally which cooperate in an inclusive meaning.' The fault exposed is circularity. Surely a sentence with a sense when used metaphorically is a metaphor. The vehicle-tenor distinction is of no help in recognizing metaphors. The problem with this distinction is that one must know that he is dealing with metaphor before he can make that distinction. That is, he must recognize the metaphoric sense in order to know that there is a tenor. Notice that it would be of no help to drop the words 'when used metaphorically' in order to avoid circularity, since to say only that the sentence had two senses or two referents would fail to distinguish metaphor from ambiguity. The reference to cooperation in an inclusive meaning may limit the sorts of uses of ambiguity but seems to describe the pun rather than metaphor.

The distinction which Richards desires to make, while not successful, does indicate his adoption of a comparison theory. At some points he speaks as though we were comparing objects with others as though the similarity between the objects accounted for our understanding of the metaphor. This latter view is expressed in his discussion of the example 'leg of a table.'

Let me begin now with the simplest most familiar case of verbal metaphor--the leg of a table for example. We call it dead but it comes to life very readily. Now how does it differ from the plain or literal use of the word, in the leg of a horse, say? The obvious difference is that the leg of the table has only some of the characteristics of the leg of a horse. A table does not walk with its legs; they only hold it up and so on. In such a case we call the common characteristics the ground of the

metaphor. Here we can easily find the ground, but very often we cannot. A metaphor may work admirably without our being able with any confidence to say how it works or what is the ground of the shift.¹³

The common characteristics form the 'ground of the metaphor' and we see Richards' commitment to this ground as an aspect of every metaphor. He is not however committed to saying that the ground is always composed of common characteristics of the objects.

A very broad division can be made between metaphors that work through some direct resemblance between the two things, the tenor and vehicle, and those which work through some common attitude which we may (often through accidental and extraneous reasons) take up towards them both. The division is not final or irreducible, of course. That we like them both is in one sense, a common property that the two things share, though we may, at the same time, be willing to admit that they are utterly different.¹⁴

On Richards' view, we may be able to recognize that the two objects are of one sort but be unable to specify any particular characteristics which they share.¹⁵ While speaking of the ground of the shift which tends to indicate that the similarity was the basis of our understanding, it is the making of the comparison which remains for Richards the essential function of the linguistic metaphor.

Richards proposes three ways of interpreting the word "comparison" and notes that "As we mean by comparison these different things we get different conceptions of metaphor."¹⁶ While he does not indicate one interpretation as resulting in a correct theory of metaphor, he does reject two of the three interpretations. He says of a comparison

... it may be just a putting together of two things to let them work together; it may be a study of them both to see how they are alike and how unlike one another; or it may be a process of calling attention to their likenesses or a method of drawing attention to certain aspects of the one through the co-presence of the other.¹⁷

If comparison is interpreted as the 'calling attention to their likeness ...' then the explanation of metaphor as comparison fails, according to Richards.

The more carefully and attentively we go over the senses and implications ... the less shall we find the resemblances between vehicle and tenor counting and the more will the vehicle ... come to seem an excuse for saying about [the tenor] something which could not be said about the [vehicle].¹⁸

Richards says that we should not "... suppose that the interactions of tenor and vehicle are confined to their resemblances...."¹⁹ He observes that generally the differences between tenor and vehicle exceed their similarities and it is through these differences that the vehicle brings about the particular modification of the tenor.

The other form of the comparison theory to which Richards objects is one which he claims characterizes Eastman. It is the form which Richards describes as 'just a putting together of two things to let them work together.' Richards takes this sort of view to be an overreaction to the comparison view just criticized. While applying the label 'crude conception' to this view, Richards provides arguments which tend to support it. Richards' discussion is sounder than Eastman's; but given Richards' argument the view becomes less a tension theory and more akin to Richards' comparison view.

Richards argues that when two quite different things are put together ('an impractical identification' in Eastman's terminology) the most important happenings besides a general confusion are the mind's efforts to connect those quite different things. Richards says

The mind is a connecting organ, it works only by connecting and it can connect any two things in an indefinitely large number of ways. Which of these ways it chooses is settled by reference to

some larger whole or aim, though we may not discover its aim, the mind is never aimless. In all interpretation, we are filling in connections and for poetry, of course, our freedom to fill in--the absence of explicitly stated intermediate steps--is a main source of its powers.²⁰

Given this view of the mind's operation, our understanding of metaphor is in part explained. We attempt to make some sense of any linguistic expression and attempt to find connections in those expressions offered as comparisons. While this explanation puts Eastman's view in a better light, Richards rejects the appeal to tension alone as an adequate explanation of metaphor.

As the two things put together are more remote, the tension created is, of course, greater. That tension is the spring of the bow, the source of the energy of the shot, but we ought not to mistake the strength of the bow for the excellence of the shooting; or the strain for the aim.²¹

Richards continues his argument against Eastman by suggesting that in emphasizing tension Eastman may be overstating a single aspect of metaphor. The identifications Eastman claims as impractical, may when removed from context, be impractical, but given the proper context the impracticability diminishes. In argument Richards offers as an example the line from The Drummer Boy's Communion by Gerard Manley Hopkins. The line is offered in answer to a challenge that 'house' and 'bread' can hardly ever have the same reference (this we would construe as one of Eastman's impractical identifications).

Low-latched in leaf-light housel his too high godhead.

Richards claims that recognizing from the context that "... Hopkins is speaking of the wafer as the dwelling of the Divine Presence"²² one finds no strain in speaking of bread as a little house. Richards says:

But it is the rest of the poem that makes the connection easy and obvious, which witnesses to a general truth. The mind will always try to find connections and will be guided in its search by the rest of the utterance and its occasion.²³

Argument by example, unless constituting a counter-example is weak.

Nonetheless, the general explanation presented by Richards is more plausible than Eastman's discussion.²⁴ Rather than being an impractical identification which interferes with the reader's progress, the metaphor is the use of an expression to be interpreted in context so that the audience will draw out the various comparisons. Of truly impractical identifications, Richards says:

And bafflement is an experience of which we soon tire, and rightly so.²⁵

While one might, as Richards' characterization suggests, just put two things together to see how they work, the value of such a metaphor would lie not in any confusion which it would cause but rather in its potential comparisons. In the case of successful metaphor the author provides by context a setting in which the comparisons can be made.

Richards' discussion of the Eastman position supports our contention that he would argue that in the case of metaphors in which only one of the compared objects is mentioned by the metaphoric expression, the other will be indicated by context. It is by context that one knows that the 'house' of his example refers to the host at communion. In arguing against construing metaphor as impractical identification he argues that the ground or similarity may (and is in some cases) be provided by the context. The result is that a metaphor is a comparison in which one side of the comparison is mentioned, the other side and the basis of the comparison is given by context.

Richards fails to mention the third interpretation and since he rejected the other two, we suspect that this best characterizes his position. The view would be characterized by interpreting comparison as 'a study of them both to see how they are alike and how unlike.' His rejections of the other characterizations of comparison were alternatively based on noting that the first failed to take account of differences and that the second failed to recognize the part played by similarity. A study to see how things were alike and different would avoid both of these sorts of criticism. Our confidence that this interpretation of comparison is the basis of Richards' position also is supported by other comments which have induced us to classify his view as a comparison view. In particular, the view that the two objects (A and B) are presented and the audience is to determine their relationship (R) suggest that one is equally interested in similarities and differences.

Our major objection to Richards' theory of metaphor was mentioned in our initial paragraphs concerning Richards. It is that Richards has failed to carefully lay out a theory of metaphor. As a result, his discussion has several deficiencies. The first is that Richards explains metaphor as being a matter of comparison, yet does not explain how one gains his knowledge of what is to be compared. As we suggested, Richards would probably argue that this information would be provided by context. We should like to have seen such an argument sufficient to deal with metaphor in general, although it is clear that such an argument could be constructed to cover special cases. Second, Richards does not

present a sufficient characterization of metaphor. Although he characterizes metaphor as comparison, he provides no basis for distinguishing metaphor from other comparisons. There are many comparisons which are not metaphors. The statements he offers, which would tend to further define metaphor, are either circular, in the case of the tenor-vehicle distinction, or more accurately describe the pun, as in the compound of uses discussion. Third, in failing to precisely characterize metaphor, Richards also failed to explain our ability to recognize and appropriately interpret metaphor. While he mentioned a power of the mind to make connections, he failed to indicate a means of recognizing cases of metaphor and therefore cases where such connecting would be appropriate.

Our second major objection is one which will apply generally to comparison views. These views either assume or attempt to establish by argument that all metaphors make reference to things to be compared. Many metaphors however make no such reference. Black provides us with such an example, though he didn't propose it as one:

The chairman ploughed through the discussion.

One may indeed have to think about plowing in order to determine the chairman's actions at the meeting, but there is no interest in comparing these events. Such a statement conveys the manner in which the meeting was conducted; two things are not compared. One could produce a sentence of equivalent meaning in which no mention is made of plowing. Such a sentence is:

The chairman proceeded directly through the agenda, dealing summarily with objections, ruthlessly suppressing irrelevance and generally refusing to allow the discussion to stray from the central issue or be interrupted.²⁶

That this sentence says essentially the same thing as the metaphor is evidence that the intent of the original statement was not to compare the conduct of a discussion with plowing a field, but rather to specify how the discussion was conducted. Another example is provided by the following line from James Whitcomb Riley's "Out to Old Aunt Mary's."

While the waters gurgled and laughed and wept.

While such a line describes the sounds made by the waters, perhaps even how they appeared, no comparison is stated. No objects are mentioned in the line or the rest of the poem which would be compared. In fact in making a comparison between sounds one loses entirely the effect of the waters being alternatively happy and sad.

Our point is not that there are no metaphors which are intended as comparisons and which do compare objects. It is a claim that Richards' discussion of metaphor as comparison will not serve as a general account of metaphor.

The specific claims which we discussed and rejected were that (1) all language outside of science is metaphoric, (2) metaphor is a compound of uses, and (3) the tenor-vehicle distinction is valuable in understanding metaphor. Our objection to the tenor-vehicle distinction is not that more careful and precise terminology is needed but rather that Richards' terms were no better characterized than those which they were to replace. We argued that a compound of uses explanation presumes multiple uses prior to the metaphoric use; the metaphor however may be only a second use and that is generally derivative from a single other use. We rejected the notion that all language outside of science is in

theory metaphor since such a statement is of no help in understanding the distinction we do make. Such a position would only prompt us to seek a new word for our present use of 'metaphor.'

Richards' positive contributions lie mainly in his criticism of other views. He criticized two views of comparison. The first holding that the comparison involved in metaphor is a matter of noting similarities between objects. This view, which he claims to be the basis of 18th Century criticism, overlooked the fact that it is often the differences, more than the similarities, which account for the meaning of a particular metaphor. In criticizing Eastman, Richards demonstrated that understanding metaphor often involves attention to context. He showed that what might appear out of context as an impractical identification, may within context be completely sensible and provide no difficulty in interpretation.

A further contribution of Richards is the indication that talk about metaphor must employ a more precise terminology. In examining his discussion of 'tenor' and 'vehicle' we noticed that not only must one distinguish between literal and metaphoric interpretation, he must distinguish between a word, its referent, and its meaning as indicated by those interpretations.

Max Reiser

Max Reiser proposes an alternative basis for the ground of comparison.²⁷ While it could be questioned whether his view ought to be considered an example of the comparison view, it provides an interesting

contrast to Richards'. While Reiser emphasizes similarity, on Reiser's view, it is a similarity of emotive response to objects rather than a similarity of those objects themselves. We notice that Richards allows our feelings towards objects to be common properties.²⁸

Reiser's position could therefore be seen as contained within Richards' position. But Richards says little concerning the emotive aspect of metaphor. Reiser, on the other hand, stresses this aspect of metaphor in regard to poetry. Reiser is clear that he intends his discussion to be confined to the poetic use of metaphor.

In quotations we will find Reiser using 'simile' rather than 'metaphor.' Reiser considers the simile to be the basic figure of speech, with metaphors being "... transformations of the simile, derivations or abbreviations stemming from a common type of analogy most clearly evolved in the simile."²⁹ This claimed relationship between simile and metaphor is often disputed. But even if Reiser is not correct in this respect, we need not let this interfere with our consideration of his theory, since we may assume that his remarks were addressed toward metaphor directly.

Reiser's theory is that metaphor is not based upon any similarity between the literal and metaphorical referent but rather upon the emotions aroused by those objects. He speaks in terms of a distinction between scientific and poetic thinking. But this distinction in the end comes to the difference between comparing physical objects and comparing emotional responses.

The simile does not imply that process of association we are accustomed to in normal scientific thinking. Contrary to the ordinary

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association wherein we associate objects according to their real similarity, we shall see that the similarity of objects in the poetic simile is not real but fictitious when viewed from a realistic (scientific) point of view. These objects of the simile may seem similar if looked upon emotionally but there is no real resemblance at all.³⁰

The poet compares not the referent of the word or words but rather the impressions which these referents have left upon him.

Not the objects themselves but the impressions created in his "feeling" ... are similar, and that is why he connects these two objects. The link is not factual but emotional. Thus he does not compare two real objects in the outside world but two impressions within himself. In other words the emotional value is similar or identical not their real appearance.³¹

The ground of the metaphor is emotive. This is a significantly different claim than one would be making if he claimed that the value of the metaphor might lie in the feeling transferred from object to object as is suggested in Henle's discussion of induced content.³² Reiser claims that in poetic metaphor two objects producing a common emotive response are compared.

Reiser cautions us against a mistake which he would probably claim is made by both Henle and Richards insofar as their work is construed to concern poetic metaphor. He says that one can always discover similarities between objects and this is the case in regard to poetic metaphor. Such a discovery is apt to lead us to believe that the basis of these metaphors is a similarity between objects. But Reiser maintains that such similarities between objects are not sufficient to support a figure of speech.

In arguing for his position Reiser presents the following example:
the blood of grapes.

He claims that the comparison is based on an emotional response

The emotional value of the blood illustrating the emotional value of the wine creates a simile and appeals to everybody. Without this emotional value the simile would be "dead," cold, "meaningless" and this hidden meaning is the meaning of both objects for our sensibility.³³

Reiser argues that there must be an emotional relationship between objects if one is to become the symbol for the other.

For Reiser the understanding of a metaphor is a matter of intuition.

This intuition means simply that the emotional spheres surrounding the symbolized and symbolizing objects within the sensibility of the poet and his public are identical. Hence the "intuition."³⁴ It is a result of emotional conformity towards these objects.

It is clear from the title that Reiser is attempting an analysis of poetic simile. But a more accurate description might be 'an analysis of the aesthetic value of certain poetic similes.' It is obvious from his examples that some metaphors have emotion as their base. Often authors choose the terms of their comparisons in such a way that the emotional value of one of the objects will be transferred to the other. But in such cases where emotion does play a significant role, Reiser's explanation is incorrect. According to his explanation the metaphor is understood through a similarity in one's emotive responses to the two objects. But if there were such an emotional similarity then the comparison would lose its emotive value, i.e., the comparison would not be a transfer of emotive response from one object to the other since we already respond similarly. The emotive force of the figures which Reiser mentions, namely:

Thy eyes are like the stars

Mother Earth

The blood of grapes

lies in their ability to impute a certain emotion where one was once lacking. The relationship required for understanding the metaphor is often what Reiser calls a 'scientific' or 'real similarity.' Such a "real similarity" is necessary for the poet and the audience to consider one thing in terms of another so that the emotional transfer can take place. In his example concerning "the blood of grapes" he explains several similarities between human blood and wine. And he is correct that "If redness alone were to link these two objects, blood would make a very poor symbol indeed." The value of the figure may well be its emotive force. But he is incorrect in believing that there is an antecedent rather than induced emotional similarity between blood and wine. What the poet has attempted here to do is get us to have a similar emotional response to the wine that we would usually have towards blood by preying upon their non-emotional similarities.

While Reiser is correct in thinking that emotion plays a part in metaphor we find his account lacking in two respects. First, even for those examples he provides, it is the similarity of the objects involved, or the similarity of our conception of them, that provides the basis for our understanding of the metaphor. The emotive element is important in that the metaphor allows us to transfer our feelings from one object to the other. This has the result of a similarity of feeling towards both. That similarity is however a result of the metaphor rather than its basis. Second, his theory at best covers only the poetic use of metaphor and then only certain types of metaphor.

The main value of Reiser's view is the consideration of some basis other than similarity as the ground of comparison and to suggest another aspect of metaphor of which we must take account.

Max Black

Black, in his paper "Metaphor"³⁵ proposes what he calls an 'interaction' theory of metaphor. This theory, in which he claims to follow Richards, seems reasonably well to fit the definition of comparison to which Richards did not object. That definition was: "A study of them both to see how they are alike and unlike." We therefore classify his view as a comparison view. He presents for consideration and criticism two other views. He calls one the 'substitution' view; the other he calls the 'comparison view.' We shall notice that Black's interpretation of the comparison theory differs significantly from our description. In fact we shall claim that Black's theory differs significantly from theories which anyone else holds.³⁶ His arguments against these views appear as straw-man arguments while he fails to discuss positions similar to those which are held.

Black's own view is presented with some confusion, and is in many ways unsatisfactory. Black, however, makes three points of significance, which have been many times overlooked. They are (1) that metaphor involves essentially at least a sentence rather than a single word, (2) that a community's beliefs about things rather than facts govern the function of metaphor, and (3) that metaphor is a matter of meaning.

Black's initial discussion is based upon the first point, that a metaphor is a sentence rather than a single word. In support of this

point, he begins by distinguishing between that part of the sentence which is usually thought of as metaphoric and that part thought of as literal. Black invites consideration of the contrast between 'ploughed' and the rest of the sentence in the example:

'The chairman ploughed through the discussion.'

This would be commonly expressed by saying that 'ploughed' has here a metaphorical sense, while the other words have literal senses.³⁷ Although we point to the whole sentence as an instance (a "clear case") of metaphor, our attention quickly narrows to a single word, whose presence is the proximate reason for the attribution.

That part of the sentence which Black says has a metaphorical sense is called the 'focus' and the remaining part is called the frame. His argument that the whole sentence must be considered as the metaphor is that a change in either the focus or the frame will result in different metaphor, or perhaps no metaphor. The focus he notes will be considered metaphorical only within certain frames and that a change in the frame will result in a change in the metaphor. If the chairman was said to have ploughed his field there would be no metaphor; if a ship is said to have ploughed the ocean, then the metaphor is different.

Suppose somebody says, "I like to plough my memories regularly." Shall we say he is using the same metaphor as in the case already discussed or not? Our answer will depend on the degree of similarity we are prepared to affirm on comparing the two "frames" (for we have the same "focus" each time). Differences in the two frames will produce some differences in the interplay between focus and frame in the two cases. Whether we regard the differences as sufficiently striking to warrant calling the sentences two metaphors is a matter of arbitrary decision.³⁸

If Black expects us to take this question seriously, then he either thinks we have not attended to his previous discussion or has confused the focus of the metaphor with the metaphor. It is obvious that the

two sentences which he presents are different and that they have different senses; therefore, that the metaphors differ is obvious. What might be seriously questioned is whether the focus is being used in the same way or has the same sense. It would be reasonable to question whether the relationship between focus and frame in the particular instances was sufficiently different to claim that the sense of the focus differed. But given his claim that a metaphor consists of both a focus and a frame, a change in either will result in a change of metaphor.

So far we have not taken issue with Black's claim that metaphors are sentences or other expressions. This claim he expresses on page 275. However, he speaks concurrently of 'metaphorical use' of words which occur in such sentences. It appears that Black has not settled on whether he intends sentences (sign types) to be the metaphors or whether he intends uses of sentences (utterances of sign tokens for specific purposes) to be the metaphors. In discussing his examples it appears that he treats the sentences as the metaphors. But it is difficult to understand how uses of words could occur within sentences.³⁹ If Black is to maintain the position that metaphors are sentences then he will indeed have to distinguish metaphorical sense from literal sense and face the accompanying difficulties. By discussing metaphorical uses of sentences he could avoid such difficulties and preserve a single notion of sense. But rather than adopt one view and its advantages or disadvantages, Black wavers. On page 277, he states:

So far I have been treating "metaphor" as a predicate properly applicable to certain expressions, without attention to any occasions on which the expressions are used or to the thoughts, acts, feelings, and intentions of speakers on such occasions. And this is surely correct for some expressions.⁴⁰

But later on that same page he states:

When Churchill in a famous phrase called Mussolini "that utensil," the tone of voice, the verbal setting, the historical background helped to make clear what metaphor was being used.

And on 279 he writes: "On this view the meaning of M, in its metaphorical occurrence, is just the literal meaning of L." In proceeding with our discussion we shall insofar as possible overlook this wavering and suppose the most charitable view in each context.

Black is concerned to indicate that "to call a sentence an instance of metaphor is to say something about its meaning." While we agree that the syntax of a sentence does not serve to establish its status as a metaphor the argument which Black presents is less than satisfactory.

That argument is:

If the sentence about the chairman's behavior is translated word for word into any foreign language for which this is possible, we shall, of course, want to say that the translated sentence is a case of the very same metaphor. So, to call a sentence an instance of a metaphor is to say something about its meaning, not about its orthography, its phonetic pattern or its grammatical form. (To use a well-known distinction, "metaphor" must be classified as a term belonging to "semantics" and not to "syntax"--or to any physical inquiry about language.)⁴¹

It is by no means clear that a word for word translation of metaphor into a foreign language results in metaphor. Consider first the question of translating a metaphor into a foreign language. A word for word translation will often be regarded not as a metaphor but rather as confusion or perhaps a statement which is out of place. Consider, for example, 'No tiene pelos en la lengua.'⁴² A word for word translation of which is: 'He has no hair on his tongue.' Such a statement is true enough for most individuals to whom 'he' would refer, but quite a curious thing to

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say. This expression is not recognized as a metaphor in English. A brief glance into a bilingual dictionary will show such expressions to be idioms with special directions for translation. When these directions are not provided the word for word translations of such phrases are not recognized as metaphors.

Black does not provide any criteria of a correct word-for-word translation. Several possible criteria come to mind, none of which sustain his point. They are:

- (1) that the result of the translations have the same meaning as the original
- (2) that individual words be replaced by synonyms of the other language
- (3) that individual words be replaced by synonyms and adjustments be made to preserve grammatical form.

Given the point of Black's argument, it cannot be that the result of the translation have the same meaning as the original. If this were the criterion the non-metaphoric idiomatic translations of the bilingual dictionary would count as correct. In other words the translation would not be a metaphor but rather a literal expression with the same sense. Given this criterion, Black's argument fails since the translation will not be regarded as a metaphor, contrary to his claim.

We cannot believe that Black would invoke the criteria that each word be replaced by a synonym, since to do so would result in nonsense. Consider for example the sentence 'Il y a un maison blanc ici.' Word for word replacement yields 'It there has a house white here.' The grammar of language being different, mechanical substitution will not result in sentences. Even if some criterion of adjustments for grammar is

added, Black has no guarantee that he will have the same metaphor and further, no guarantee that the expression will not be literal. ('He has no hair on his tongue' is a literal statement.)

A third consideration weighs against Black's claims that 'to call a sentence an instance of metaphor is to say something about its meaning ...' and that "'metaphor' must be classified as a term belonging to 'semantics'...." It would seem that this position entails the further claim that it is in virtue of its meaning that a metaphor is a metaphor. However, every day, literary scholars discover the meaning of some metaphors and provide literal equivalents.⁴³ These literal equivalents have at least on some occasions the same meaning as the original metaphor. It may appear that we contradict ourselves talking of literal equivalents since we deny that every metaphor has a literal equivalent. But it is important to notice that one can deny the statement "all metaphors have literal equivalents" without claiming that no metaphors have literal equivalents. It is clear from our argument above that having the meaning that a metaphor has is not in itself a sufficient criterion of being a metaphor. Black, himself, agrees that there are some 'substitution metaphors'⁴⁴ which have literal equivalents which are not metaphors.

If this is the case, then some literal statements mean the same as some metaphoric statements. Therefore (since the metaphor and the literal expression may have the same meaning), the criteria by which we distinguish metaphor from literal speech must include other considerations besides meaning.

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Black, even though he argued for the position that meaning alone is sufficient to determine that an expression is metaphoric, appears unconvinced. He states:

We recognize that to call a man a "cesspool" is to use a metaphor without needing to know who uses the expression or on what occasions, or with what intention. The rules of our language determine that some expressions must count as metaphors; and a speaker can no more change this than he can legislate that "cow" shall mean the same as "sheep." But we must also realize that the established rules of language leave wide latitude for individual variation, initiative, and creation.⁴⁵

One wonders what sort of rules these are to which Black refers. In view of his earlier discussion they cannot be syntactical rules. He later calls them 'rules of usage.' Perhaps he has in mind some set of semantical rules. But Black fails to tell us what these rules are. In short, Black maintains that metaphor is a semantical rather than syntactical matter and that there are some rules which determine that certain grammatical constructions are metaphoric. Although he provides us with some clear examples of metaphor he does not provide us with the rules for recognizing them.⁴⁶ While we disagree with Black's arguments which tend to show that the having of a particular meaning is the determining factor in metaphor, we support the position that meaning is of central importance in explaining metaphor. In our discussion of Henle we criticize his work for failing to take account of the importance of meaning for metaphor.

Substitution Views

Black turns his attention to the consideration of three views of metaphor. The first such view is called by Black the "substitution view

of metaphor." He defines that view as follows:

Any view which holds that a metaphorical expression is used in place of some equivalent literal expression, I shall call a substitution view of metaphor. (I should like this label to cover also any analysis which views the entire sentence that is the locus of the metaphor as replacing some set of literal sentences.)⁴⁷

In spite of Black's examples of persons to whom Black attributes this view, it is not clear that anyone does hold it. Consider his first example.

... Whately defines a metaphor as "a word substituted for another on account of the Resemblance or Analogy between their significations."⁴⁸

While it is clear that Whately employed the word "substituted" it is not clear that he held the substitution view. An important aspect of the substitution view as described by Black is that the metaphor must replace some literal equivalent expression. It is certainly not clear from the passage presented that Whately held that for each metaphorical expression there is some literal equivalent. The substitution may very well be for the purpose of creating an expression having no literal equivalent.

Black's other example from the Oxford English Dictionary fares no better.

"Metaphor: The figure of speech in which a name or descriptive term is transferred to some object different from, but analogous to, that which it is properly applicable; an instance of this, a metaphorical expression."⁴⁹

Here again we find the name of one object being used for another and this might reasonably be construed as a case of substitution. Nonetheless the lexicographer is not committed by his definition to the further claim that there exists a literal equivalent for each metaphor. Thus even if

Black is successful in showing the "substitution view of metaphor" to be incorrect, it is not clear that anyone other than Black has seriously held such a view. In further describing this view, Black states:

"According to a substitution view, the focus of a metaphor, the word or expression having a distinctively metaphorical use within a literal frame, is used to communicate a meaning that might have been expressed literally. The author substitutes M for L;."⁵⁰

And in his note on terminology Black describes this view as follows:

For metaphors that fit a substitution or comparison view, the factors needing to be distinguished are: (i) some word or expression E, (ii) occurring in some verbal "frame" F, so that (iii) F(E) is the metaphorical statement in question; (iv) the meaning M' (E) which E has in F(E), (v) which is the same as the literal meaning, M(x) of some literal synonym, x. A sufficient technical vocabulary would be: "metaphorical expression" (for E) "metaphorical statement" (for F(E)), "metaphorical meaning" (for M') and "literal meaning" (for M).⁵¹

Notice the very strong claim with regard to synonymy. Not only must the entire metaphorical sentence have a literal equivalent but the focus of the metaphor must have one as well. According to such a view, the author could always avoid metaphor by using F(x) rather than F(E). The only effect of speaking metaphorically seems to be the creation of a puzzle for the audience.

In explaining why a "writer should set his reader the task of solving a puzzle"⁵² we find that Black describes two theories rather than one. The first reason he suggests is "there may, in fact, be no literal equivalent, L, available in the language in question."⁵³ But this explanation is inconsistent with the substitution view which Black had been describing. Black gives no indication that he recognizes this contradiction, which would in itself be a sufficient rebuttal of such a view. So that we may follow Black's discussion, we will divide these views.

The view originally stated will be substitution view 1; the view allowing the possibility that the metaphor has no literal equivalent will be substitution view 2. It is clear, however, that the second view is either absurd or misnamed. Claiming metaphor to be a matter of substitution when there is nothing for which the metaphoric expression is substituted is absurd. It would be better for Black to recognize that these are two distinct views. Since he redefines "catachresis" it would lead to less confusion to call substitution view 2 'the catachresis view' and not a substitution view at all. A strong additional reason for separately naming and separately treating this view is that it is a view which has been held, in part at least, by several literary theorists.⁵⁴ We shall therefore adopt the term 'catachresis view' as the name of the second substitution view.

Black explains that "Metaphor plugs the gaps in the literal vocabulary...."⁵⁵ He continues:

So viewed, metaphor is a species of catachresis, which I shall define as the use of a word in some new sense in order to remedy a gap in the vocabulary; catachresis is the putting of new senses into old words. But if a catachresis serves a genuine need it will quickly become part of the literal sense.

Black fails to present any analysis of this view. He raises no objections against it and from his later discussion of substitution metaphors it appears that he accepts this position as an explanation of at least some metaphors. If indeed metaphors do function in this manner they may serve as a vehicle for expansion of common understanding, of explaining how communication is not limited by our various languages. But after suggesting this view Black fails to consider arguments in support or

opposition and fails to explain how metaphor is able "to remedy a gap in the vocabulary." Rather than recognizing the importance of this theory, Black says only "... it is the fate of catachresis to disappear when it is successful."⁵⁵ Apparently the rapid change to literal or conventional use is sufficient ground for dispensing with further consideration of them. His treatment here is grossly incomplete and this implication of silence is that since metaphors of this sort are short-lived (as metaphors) they are not worthy of explanation. But it is just such a theory of metaphor which would account for much of the expansion and change in our language. If such a theory is correct, it is eminently worthy of evaluation. Further, since Black presents no objection to this theory, he presents no reason to prefer his own.

Substitution theory 1 is portrayed as holding that metaphor is a stylistic device. The purpose according to this theory of using metaphor is to increase the reader's enjoyment. Black says,

The principle behind these "explanations" seems to be: When in doubt about some peculiarity of language, attribute its existence to the pleasure it gives a reader. A principle that has the merit of working well in default of any evidence.⁵⁷

Such a scornful answer hardly shows the view to be incorrect. Such a remark would seem to indicate that a reader's pleasure is irrelevant in evaluating a figure of speech. But insofar as one is concerned with the occurrence of metaphor in works of art it is not at all clear that the reader's pleasure is irrelevant. Santayana, for example, says: "... the true test [of the real merit of a work of the imagination] is the degree and kind of satisfaction it can give to him who appreciates it most." Given this view of literature it would not be unusual to hold that a

poet's use of metaphor was designed to please. If indeed such theories of literature are correct, then establishing that metaphor affects feelings is a central issue; if it could be demonstrated that metaphor did not have this effect, it would be a strong argument against such theories of literature.

One can treat this discussion of Black's as an argument with a suppressed premise. That suppressed premise is that metaphors are cognitively valuable and play a significant role in philosophy. The inclusion of this statement as a premise results in the following reductio-ad-absurdum of the substitution 1 view:

1. According to the substitution view, the value of metaphor lies solely in the pleasure it gives the reader. ("the purpose of metaphor is to entertain and divert")
2. "If philosophers have something more important to do than give pleasure to their reader, metaphor can have no serious place in philosophical discussion."
3. Philosophers have something more important to do. (obvious)
4. Metaphor has a serious place in philosophical discussion.
(suppressed premise)
5. Therefore, the substitution 1 view is not correct.

Adding 4. as a premise results in a correct argument. However 4. or its negation is a statement we would like to see as the conclusion of an argument. It is probably the central question for a philosopher to be concerned with and not something to be assumed.

If substitution view 1 is correct, it may be that we ought to avoid metaphor except in literature since it can mislead us. If the catachresis view is correct then it is important to develop ability in the use of metaphor as a means of overcoming the restrictions of language in formulating new theories. But Black fails to satisfactorily deal with these questions.

Comparison Views

Black initiates his discussion of the comparison view by discussing figures of speech as functions. He uses the term function in much the same way as would a logician or mathematician. Figures are viewed as mappings of one meaning onto another. He uses irony as an example. Here the task the author performs is to say the opposite of what is intended.

On this function model Black describes metaphor:

What, then, is the characteristic transforming function involved in metaphor? To this the answer has been made: either analogy or similarity. M is either similar or analogous in meaning to its literal equivalent L. Once the reader has detected the ground of the intended analogy or simile (with the help of the frame, or clues drawn from the wider content) he can retrace the author's path and so reach the original literal meaning (the meaning of L).⁶¹

We recall that 'M' is the name of a metaphorical expression, not its meaning. 'L' is the name of a literal expression, not its meaning.

Here Black is in a muddle. As he presents the comparison theory, the analogy or similarity which ought to play a central role turns out to be without any function. He states that "M is either similar or analogous in meaning to its literal equivalent L." This statement is completely safe since he assumes that L is the literal equivalent of M, their meanings therefore must be identical; and things which are identical are

certainly similar. Talk about detecting grounds of similarity of meaning is superfluous since the meanings are identical they have every characteristic in common. One would not be 'retracing the author's steps' to reach an 'original literal meaning' since in being aware of the meaning of M, he is also aware of the meaning of L. At most, a reader would note that there was another expression which had the same meaning.

Black, in presenting this view, has perhaps lost sight of his own terminology. M is an expression whose meaning "... in its metaphorical occurrence, is just the literal meaning of L."⁶² Given this definition, if one understands the meaning of M, there would be no point in attempting to determine L and therefore no need of and discussion of analogy or similarity. A more appropriate explanation using Black's terms would claim that the meaning of M given a literal interpretation is analogous to the meaning of L given a literal interpretation. Since the meaning of M, interpreted literally, is for some reason inappropriate, one adopts the meaning of L as the correct meaning of M. Thus L is the literal equivalent of M. Here the analogy or similarity is between the meaning of M under a literal interpretation and the meaning of M under a metaphoric interpretation. The analogy or similarity serves to determine the correct meaning of M in the context.⁶³ Since one could determine the meaning of M, under a metaphoric interpretation, on the basis of similarities other than those between meanings, the L could be eliminated from the discussion. This is an important consideration since it is Black's requirement of L which separates his comparison view from views which are held by others.⁶⁴

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The significant question which Black fails to bring out and which is thought by some to be explained by the comparison view is the relationship between the meaning and/or referent of the term interpreted literally and its meaning and/or referent interpreted metaphorically. This relationship is, according to such views, analogy or similarity.

But neither the comparison view as explained by Black or the augmented view just discussed characterize Black's examples and explanations. Both those comparison views, in keeping with his demand for emphasis on meaning, described the analogy as being between meanings. Yet, in the light of what he goes on to say his understanding of the comparison view appears to be that the analogy is between the referents of the focus and the frame and that a metaphor may be correctly described as an elliptical simile. Consider Black's example:

When Schopenhauer called a geometrical proof a mousetrap, he was, according to such a view, saying (though not explicitly): "A geometrical proof is like a mousetrap, since both offer a delusive reward, entice their victims by degrees, lead to disagreeable surprise, etc."⁶⁵

Notice that the comparison is not between the statement (M) calling the proof a mousetrap and the statement (L) saying that the proof was like a mousetrap as would be indicated by his discussion. It is rather between geometrical proofs and mousetraps, neither of which are linguistic expressions. The comparison in the comparison view as described in this example is not between the metaphorical expression and some literal counterpart but rather between objects or between characteristics of those objects. Yet his definition above stated that the analogy was to be between the meanings of M and L.

Black offers the following definition of the comparison view which is divergent from his earlier discussion.

If a writer holds that a metaphor consists of the presentation of the underlying analogy or similarity, he will be taking what I shall call a comparison view of metaphor.... This is a view of metaphor as a condensed or elliptical simile. It will be noticed that a "comparison view" is a special case of the "substitution view." For it holds that the metaphorical statement might be replaced by an equivalent literal comparison.⁶⁶

Given this definition of the comparison view, metaphors would be comparisons. Black's earlier discussion held that the essential feature of metaphor is an analogy or similarity of meaning between M and L. While these explanations are not strictly speaking inconsistent neither follows from the other and once again, it appears that two views are to go by one name. This second comparison view still retains the requirement that the metaphor have a literal equivalent. His expression "It will be noticed ..." gives the impression that the requirement of a literal equivalent follows from other statements in that paragraph. This is not the case. The claim that metaphor may be regarded as a condensed simile does not entail the claim that the uncondensed simile will have an equivalent meaning. We emphasize this point since again it is the insistence upon a literal equivalent which distinguishes this view from widely held views and makes of his discussion a straw man argument.

While Black claims the comparison view to be a special case of the substitution view, he claims that they are, in one respect significantly different. The respect of their difference is, according to Black, the degree of the elaboration one would find in the paraphrase of metaphor. Black maintains that the "Richard is a lion." example is paraphrased,

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according to the substitution view of "Richard is brave." According to the comparison view it would be paraphrased as "Richard is like a lion (in being brave)." But Black fails to distinguish which of two possible claims that he could here be making. The first is: the comparison theorist and substitution theorist agree on how figures of speech are to be correctly paraphrased but do not agree on which figures are metaphor. The basis of their disagreement would be that the comparison theorist would insist that only those figures whose paraphrase contains 'like' or 'as' are metaphors while the substitution theorist would recognize a greater variety of metaphors. This would be an unlikely position for any comparison theorist to take since his theory would be by definition correct and therefore vacuous. The second of the two claims is that while the substitution theorist and comparison theorist agree with regard to which expressions are metaphors, they differ with regard to the correct paraphrase. That is, the comparison theorist is committed to an approach which the substitution theorist is not. The comparison theorist is committed to finding a comparison as the paraphrase of every metaphor. The substitution theorist is not committed to disagreeing with this procedure. He would in fact say that if the literal meaning of "Richard is a lion." is "Richard is like a lion (in being brave)" then that is the correct paraphrase; he would not insist, as Black seems to suggest, that the words 'like' or 'as' must be absent from the paraphrase. There is on this explanation no reason to believe that the comparison theorist would produce a more elaborate paraphrase.

The second point on which Black is incorrect is the assumption that a paraphrase of a sentence which is an explicit comparison will be more

elaborate than other paraphrases. "Richard is a lion' could be paraphrased "Richard is extremely brave and makes bold frontal attacks upon his enemy causing them to flee and when not engaged in such an attack is quite serene since he is confident that no one dares challenge him.' This paraphrase obviously demonstrating that status as a comparison does not in itself guarantee the greatest elaboration.

In turning to Black's criticism of the comparison view, we find him saying "The main objection against the comparison view is that it suffers from a vagueness that borders on vacuity."⁶⁷ We are not surprised at this remark on Black's part since it reflects Black's presentation of comparison views. His discussion would have been stronger had he picked the views of one or two individuals and addressed his criticisms and remarks against a well worked out system.⁶⁸ Black's view is mistaken because he based his understanding of comparison views on a bad picture. His picture of metaphor was that of a one place function as was the case with irony. Irony can be considered a function which maps meaning onto meaning, in particular it maps meanings onto their opposites. Black looked therefore for a similar function in the case of metaphor. Continuing to think of mapping meanings onto meanings, he invented a comparison view where a meaning is mapped onto a similar meaning. What he should have found, if he wanted to talk about functions and the comparison theory, is that metaphor involves a much more complicated mapping. Such a function must take as arguments at least all of: the meaning of the metaphor under a literal interpretation, the conventional referent of the expression, pre-existing relationships

between meanings and between objects. An explanation of irony is vastly simpler than an explanation of metaphor. The result of using irony as a model is a rather confused explanation.

Interaction View

The theory of metaphor which Black proposes is called the interaction view of metaphor. He claims this view to be free of the main defects of the other views. Black provides no cryptic definition of this view, but begins with a statement borrowed from Richards:

In the simplest formulation, when we use a metaphor we have two thoughts of different things active together and supported by a single word, or phrase, whose meaning is a resultant of their interactions.⁶⁷

To distinguish his view from the comparison and substitution views, Black compares the interpretations which the three views would provide for the following example: 'The poor are the negroes of Europe.' The substitution theory, he claims, would interpret this example as saying something about the poor of Europe; the comparison theory would present some comparison between the poor and negroes. Black has Richards continue to speak for the interaction view: "In opposition to both, Richards says that our 'thoughts' about European poor and American negroes are 'active together' and 'interact' to produce a meaning that is a resultant of that interaction."⁷⁰ The focus of the metaphor is held to take on another meaning and this new meaning is distinct from any meaning which a literal substitution would have. At this juncture Black's own view greatly resembles the catachresis view. His attempt at distinction fails; he has presented another version of the catachresis view. But the adoption

in part at least of the catachresis view is not unique to Black.

Every theory we examine is a version of the catachresis view. The significant differences between those theories lie in the various explanations of the ability of some expression to acquire the new meaning.

Black's discussion of metaphor's ability to acquire new meaning presents some genuine innovations. He makes use of the following metaphor as an example in his explanation: "Man is a wolf." We may, says Black, say that there are two subjects, one principal (the man), the other subsidiary (the wolf). The metaphor conveys its intended meaning only to a reader with certain beliefs about these subjects.

What is needed is not so much that the reader shall know the standard dictionary meaning of "wolf"--or be able to use that word in literal senses--as that he shall know what I will call the system of associated commonplaces. Imagine some layman required to say, without taking special thought, those things he held to be true about wolves; the set of statements resulting would approximate to what I am here calling the system of commonplaces associated with the word wolf.⁷¹

The effect of the metaphor is the result of associating with the primary subject of a part of the system of commonplaces associated with the secondary subject. That is, a suitable hearer will construct a set of attributions to the principal subject based upon the commonplaces associated with the secondary subjects. The members of the set of commonplaces which are directly applicable to the primary subject are taken over as is; other members are applied metaphorically. "Each of these implied assertions has now to be made to fit the principle subject."⁷² For example, a man and wolf can both be seen as vicious, but these terms describe different sorts of behavior when applied to men than when applied to wolves. The attribution of viciousness to a man by

'Man is a wolf' extends only to the vicious characteristics usually found in men. Some commonplaces will not apply and are filtered out. The metaphor, on the interaction view, not only attributes characteristics of the secondary subject to the primary subject, it changes our view of the primary subject's own (or perhaps normal) characteristics. Those characteristics which are consistent with the make-up of subsidiary subject are accentuated while those which are inconsistent are ignored. Recalling the man-wolf metaphor, Black states: "Any human traits that can, without undue strain, be talked about in 'wolf-language' will be rendered prominent, and any that cannot will be pushed into the background. The wolf-metaphor suppresses some details, emphasizes others--in short, organizes our view of man."⁷³ Black claims: "If to call a man a wolf is to put him in a special light, we must not forget that the metaphor makes the wolf seem more human than he otherwise would." István Mészáros objects to this view. He says: "Black seems to have forgotten that more of nothing (otherwise would) is still nothing." He continues later, making reference to Black's example: 'the chairman ploughed through the discussion,' that the metaphor does not "affect in any way the subject" (not unless one wants to maintain that the chairman is put in some "special rural light," like the wolf in a "human light.")⁷⁴

Black includes in his interaction view of metaphor consideration not only of traits of subjects, but consideration of our attitudes towards those subjects. He says to call a man a wolf is, in part, to imply that he is hateful. Black therefore recognizes an important emotive aspect of metaphor. But he fails to mention an equally

important emotive function of metaphor. That function is the evoking of various attitudes and feelings of the reader. For example, in addition to expressing one's hatred by calling a man a wolf; one may arouse anxiety or a feeling of alarm in the reader. Since Black says nothing that would rule out this second emotive function, it seems that he would accept it as an addition, perhaps as a friendly amendment.

While Black calls his view an interaction view, his discussion indicates that his view is one species of the comparison view as we have described it. That is, according to his discussion, the metaphor presents the audience with two things and the audience considers their relationship. Black's explanation reflects one of Richard's definitions of comparison, namely: "a study of them both to see how they are alike and unlike one another."⁷⁵ Talk of "our ideas of two things active together" suggests a comparison of those things. One sees how they are alike and unlike as some traits are "rendered prominent" and others "pushed into the background." Black does not claim to hold a comparison view of metaphor, but his characterization of that view differs from ours. His explanation falls clearly within our definition of a comparison theory in that his explanation presumes that the audience is presented with two objects and determines the relationships between them.

In criticizing Black's interaction view of metaphor we will start by examining a criticism suggested by Black.

A fairly obvious objection to the foregoing sketch of "interaction view" is that it has to hold that some of the "associated common-places" themselves suffer metaphorical change of meaning in the process of transfer from the subsidiary to the principle subject. And these changes, if they occur, can hardly be explained by the account given.⁷⁶

We remember Black's discussion of the man-wolf example. The ferocity of a wolf is not the ferocity of a man. "Fierce" as used to describe wolves applies to man metaphorically. To explain, then, how "fierce" applies to a man will be to explain metaphor. According to Black, "the primary metaphor, it might be said, has been analyzed into a set of subordinate metaphors, so the account given is either circular or leads to an infinite regress." To this "fairly obvious objection" Black provides two answers, both of which are unsatisfactory. He suggests that the objection "might be met by denying that all changes of meaning in the 'associated commonplaces' must be counted as metaphorical shifts. Many of them are best described as extensions of meaning...."⁷⁸ But this suggestion errs in two ways. First denying that all changes are metaphoric will not explain those metaphors whose transfer of meaning involves metaphor. If Black could show that for every metaphor, a point is reached at which the change in meaning of the associated commonplaces is not metaphorical, then he would avoid one aspect of his objection. But he neither shows nor claims this and as his explanation stands he fails to avoid the possibility of infinite regress of metaphors explaining metaphors. The second error lies in Black's statement that the changes of meaning can be explained in terms of extension of meaning. While the extension of meaning has been associated with metaphor, the hope has been that a theory of metaphor would explain such extensions. If we, for example, consider the word 'green,' we can reconstruct the extension of its meaning. Many fruits have the color green before they are ripe. One naturally and literally uses 'green apples' as synonymous with 'unripened apples.' Green then was applied (metaphorically) to

other objects which were not ready or finished in some respect. A new farm hand might be said to be green. 'Green' is now used as a term meaning not-ripe and such use is literal, conventional. 'Green' has extended its meaning. And this extension is based upon metaphor. Since some extensions of meaning result from metaphor, Black fails to avoid his objection by appeal to change in meaning. Further, if Black were to maintain that his argument is adequate he would foreclose the possibility of explaining extension of meaning in terms of metaphor. Perhaps Black realizes some difficulty here since he says at this point. "I have not undertaken to explain how such extensions or shifts occur in general, and I do not think any simple account will fit all cases."⁷⁹

On another tack, Black presents an even more confusing explanation to avoid his suggested difficulty.

Secondly, I would not deny that a metaphor may involve a number of subordinate metaphors among its implications. But these subordinate metaphors are, I think, usually intended to be taken less "emphatically," i.e., with less stress upon their implications.... In any case, primary and subordinate metaphors will normally belong to the same field of discourse, so that they mutually reinforce one and the same systems of implications.⁸⁰

Apparently since these secondary metaphors are to be taken less emphatically, they need no explanation; or so Black would have us believe. But recalling the objection, without an explanation of the secondary metaphor one has no explanation of the primary metaphor. A simple wave of the hand will not do. The fairly obvious objection has not then been satisfactorily replied to by Black.

Two other objections come to light upon examination of the first three of seven commitments Black makes on behalf of his interaction theory. If his view is really committed as he indicates, then that view

is not adequate to characterize metaphor since it will not recognize obvious cases of metaphor as metaphors. The first and third commitments are:

- (1) A metaphorical statement has two distinct subjects--a "principal" subject and a "subsidiary" one.
- (3) The metaphor works by applying to the principal subject a system of "associated implications" characteristic of the subsidiary subject.

These two commitments are apparently based upon a single type of metaphor. Being so based, the theory is not descriptive of the full range of metaphors. The example which seems to have captured Black's attention is "Man is a wolf." This clearly has the form 'x is an m.' It is obvious that two things are mentioned, perhaps even compared. But many metaphors are not of this form because they either fail to have two subjects or because the subject or subjects which they have lie within the frame of the metaphor and undergo no change in meaning via associated implications. Black's earlier example is just such a metaphor: "The chairman ploughed through the discussion." This sentence has but one subject. It could be claimed that the sentence was about two things, the chairman and the discussion, but both these are contained in the frame of the metaphor, not its focus. In any case such a metaphor has one subject and a direct object rather than two subjects. Black's explanation will here fail since the focus of the metaphor is not a subject. While it is the case that there is a system of commonplaces which is associated with the act of ploughing, there is no primary subject to which the system of commonplaces is transferred. There are, in short, no two subjects which interact.

The second commitment of Black's view is further evidence that he has based his discussion on this single example. "(2) These subjects are often best regarded as "systems of things," rather than "things".⁸² Had he considered the "ploughed" example, he would not have expressed his theory in terms of things, since the word 'thing' connotes a substantive (though not material) entity as opposed to an action or set of actions. While one might very well want to compare ploughing with chairing a meeting it would be at least misleading to speak of comparing things. In general, explaining metaphor in terms of subjects and things at least suggests that the focus of the metaphor will always be either the subject or object of the expression as opposed to the verb or perhaps modifiers such as adverbs and adjectives.

We notice in the conclusion of Black's article a change in tone. This change amounts at least to a qualification of his view. There is a shift from talking about types of theories of metaphor to talk about types of metaphor. It had seemed that his discussion of the substitution and comparison views were essentially rejections of such views as a basis for his own superior view. But in his concluding remarks he speaks as though those theories correctly characterize some metaphors which his own theory does not.

Now it is in just such trivial cases that "substitution" and "comparison" views sometimes seem nearer the mark than the "interaction" views. The point might be met by classifying metaphors as instances of substitution, comparison, or interaction. Only the last kind are of importance in philosophy.⁸³

Given this change in tone, the three views are recognized as each being correct for some metaphors. Black's interaction view, rather than having application to metaphor in general is a description of a particular type

of metaphor, namely, the interaction metaphor. This is a serious retreat from what had appeared to be his aim, the explanation of metaphor in general. This position is further weakened since he provides no argument that the three views together characterize all types of metaphor. At most, it seems that Black concludes that there are at least three types of metaphor described by the substitution view, the comparison view and the interaction view and perhaps that there are some metaphors of each type.

Black offers advice regarding use of these various types of metaphor. He advises that we avoid use of the substitution and comparison metaphors. These sorts of metaphor can by definition be translated into literal speech (except for catachresis) and could be eliminated with no loss of meaning. Interaction metaphors are to be retained since they have no literal equivalents. They "are not expendable."⁸⁴ The interaction metaphor cannot be reduced to a series of literal statements since ... "the set of literal statements so obtained will not have the same power to inform and enlighten as the original."⁸⁵ The importance of the interaction metaphor finds its basis in this supposed untranslatability.

Black's argument for the untranslatability of interaction metaphors fails to establish that such metaphors cannot be translated. His argument is that any literal statement will be too precise.

For one thing, the implications previously left for a suitable reader to educe for himself, with a nice feeling for their relative priorities and degrees of importance, are now presented explicitly as having equal weight.⁸⁶

This argument involves two issues. The first is that metaphor enjoys a **degree** of either vagueness or ambiguity which provides the audience a

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variety of alternative interpretations in inferences. But Black's argument fails to establish that this same degree of ambiguity could not be found in the literal use of some expression. It is the case that generally, when one attempts to analyze metaphor, he attempts to resolve ambiguity much the same as he would attempt to resolve ambiguity in explaining a literal sentence. He is not seeking a literal equivalent. But this in no way rules out the possibility that there is a literal statement which has precisely the ambiguities contained in the metaphor. When the metaphor in question is ambiguous, no unambiguous literal statement will be equivalent to it. This is clear but Black's claim was much stronger.

The second issue is that of priorities. Black claims that the implications of any metaphor would, in their literal expressions, be necessarily of equal weight. But again there is no argument for this claim. It would seem that a literal expression could contain phrases such as 'this is the most significant implication,' 'this is about as significant as the last,' etc. Such a procedure would preserve any cognitive import of the relative priorities. Black has failed to show either that the ambiguity or the relative weight of the implications could not be captured by a literal statement.

In continuation of his argument for the untranslatability of **action** metaphors Black states:

The literal paraphrase inevitably says too much--and with the wrong emphasis. One of the points I most wish to stress is that the loss in such cases is a loss in cognitive content; the relevant weakness of the literal paraphrase is not that it may be tiresomely prolix or boringly explicit--or deficient in qualities of style; it fails to be a translation because it fails to give the insight that the metaphor did.⁸⁷

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This is a return to question begging. To claim that there is no literal equivalent on the basis that no literal expression says the same thing, is to say that there is no literal equivalent because no literal expression is equivalent. What is required to hold Black's position is a showing that no literal expression could mean the same as the metaphorical expression. We suggest that no proof is possible. In discussing the work of Müller in the previous chapter we noticed some metaphoric uses become literal uses without a change in meaning. Black recognized this in his discussion of catachresis. In such cases a literal expression would be synonymous with a previous metaphoric expression.

In short, Black has failed to show that the interaction metaphor has no literal equivalent. If he retreats to the position that interaction metaphors are defined as having no literal equivalent, then he has failed to show that there are any interaction metaphors.

But even if we allow that there are interaction metaphors and substitution metaphors, Black has provided us with no means of distinguishing them. He advises us to avoid those metaphors which have a literal equivalent. But he fails to answer the important question: "Which metaphors have a literal equivalent?" It is recommended that we employ only those metaphors which have no literal equivalent, but Black fails to show that there are any, and he fails to explain a process for distinguishing them.

In examining "Metaphor" we found that Black argues against two supposed positions and presents his own as an alternative. Such a move has little value since the views which he presents are not held by anyone

and are not held for good reasons. The basis of his objections to those views is a feature which similar views, which are defended, lack, namely, the requirement that the metaphor have a literal equivalent. Generally he ignores the treatment of what he calls the catachresis metaphor. It is this metaphor which is of greatest importance to philosophy. His charge that the comparison views suffer from vagueness seems to be a characterization of his discussion of those views. All of these criticisms of his work derive from the fact that he is jousting with straw men rather than seriously held theories.

His own theory describes metaphor as 'two thoughts of different things active together and supported by a single word or phrase, whose meaning is a resultant of their interactions.'⁸⁸ While this line is quite poetic it is hardly an explanation of metaphor. Black's view relies heavily on Richards and on the examples 'The poor are the negroes of Europe' and 'Man is a wolf.' Since Richards relies on that same type of example we are not surprised to see both Black and Richards holding a comparison view.

Two major objections to his view were at once evident to Black himself. He is not able to escape from them. Moreover by basing his theory on a single type of example, his explanation even if correct would be applicable to only metaphors of that one type. Black's interaction view proves to be no serious improvement upon Richards' effort.

Black makes two positive contributions in his discussions. The first is that metaphor is not constituted by a single word but is made up of two parts which he calls 'focus' and 'frame.' His examples indicate that the focus-frame compound generally includes a whole sentence.

His suggestion may be expanded to allow the frame to include a considerable amount of context. This is a point we further expand upon in speaking primarily of metaphoric uses of sentences rather than metaphoric sentences. Whether an utterance will be construed as metaphoric will depend on the situation of that utterance as well as the conventional meanings of its terms.

Black's second major contribution is the recognition that it is our opinion about objects rather than the truth about them which is significant in understanding metaphor. A community's beliefs about objects or events form a system of associated commonplaces. It is those commonplaces which stand out in people's minds that determine how a metaphor will be interpreted (or for that matter whether an utterance will be interpreted as metaphoric). These points must be incorporated in any correct theory of metaphor.

NOTES TO CHAPTER III

1. Since this is a dead metaphor, we recognize the dual reference as a matter of convention. For the purpose of this discussion we assume that this is not the case, that the metaphor is fresh.
2. We use 'presentation' and 'presented with' as neutral terms since in various formulations of these views, the method by which the audience is said to be made aware of A, B, and R varies.
3. I. A. Richards, The Philosophy of Rhetoric (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 116.
4. The examples presented as 'leg of a table' and calling people pigs and ducks. (ibid., 117). In addition he earlier states "... when we use metaphors we have two thoughts of different things active together and supported by a single word, or phrase, whose meaning is a resultant of their interaction" (ibid., 93).
5. Compounding two uses might describe a pun since a pun involves two uses both of which are independent of the expression.
6. Ibid., 93.
7. Ibid., 100.
8. Ibid., 120.
9. Ibid., 93.
10. W. V. Quine, "On What There Is," reprinted in From a Logical Point of View (New York: Harper and Row Publishers Inc., 1953), p. 3.
11. Richards, The Philosophy of Rhetoric, 119.
12. Ibid., 96.
13. Ibid., 117.
14. Ibid., 118.
15. The word 'sort' is for Richards a semi-technical term which he introduces in a sketch of an epistemological theory. It is that discussion upon which Richards bases his claim that all thought is metaphoric. In all thinking

"... we begin with the general abstract anything, split it, as the world makes us, into sorts and then arrive at the concrete particulars by the overlapping or common membership of these

sorts. This bit of paper here now in my hand is a concrete particular to us so far as we think of it as paperish, herish, nowish, and in my hand; it is more concrete as we take it as of more sorts, and the more specific as the sorts are narrower and more exclusive." (Rhetoric 31)

We choose not to examine Richards' epistemology since statements made in its presentation conflict with things he later says in regard to metaphor.

16. Ibid., 120.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid., 122.
19. Ibid., 127.
20. Ibid., 125. The statement that the mind works only by connecting things appears to be in contradiction with Richards' characterization of thought and perception as a matter of sorting.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid., 126.
23. Ibid.
24. We make use of Richards' discussion in our examination of Goodman. We shall argue that every grammatically correct sentence is meaningful and perhaps true if the proper context is provided. Such a claim might seem obvious but Bertrand Russell denies that 'Consanguinity drinks procrastination' is meaningful even though he recognizes it as grammatically correct. Goodman's position will result in the claim that no metaphoric interpretation of a statement is true; we shall argue that an appropriate context will result in an interpretation under which the sentence is true.
25. Ibid., 125.
26. This explanation is in part due to Black (Black 278).
27. Max Reiser, "Analysis of Poetic Simile," Journal of Philosophy, XXXVII (1940), pp. 209-217.
28. Richards, The Philosophy of Rhetoric, p. 118.
29. Reiser, "Poetic Simile," p. 210

30. Ibid.
31. Ibid., 210-211.
32. We deal with this issue in Chapter III.
33. Ibid., 213.
34. Ibid., 214.
35. Max Black, "Metaphor," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. 55 (1954-1955).
36. While Black cites two holders of the substitution view it will be argued on page 76 of this paper that neither in fact hold the view which Black described. We know of no one except Black who holds such views.
37. Ibid., 275. Since in our discussion of Goodman's treatment of metaphor we discuss at length the difficulties with distinguishing literal senses from metaphorical senses, we shall not here argue against the use of these terms here. Black in the second succeeding paragraph speaks of metaphorical uses and literal uses and they would serve as well for his present purposes.
38. Ibid., 276.
39. We argue this on page of this paper that it must indeed be uses of sentences rather than sentences which are the metaphors. The utterance of 'His heart is not in the right place' in an operating room would hardly be treated as a metaphor.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid., 276.
42. I owe this example to Mrs. Carmen Suter.
43. For example: "Fascism is a cancer.... Literally, fascism is a form of government; in the first sentence the writer asks the reader to tolerate the fact that "fascism" is not organic (that is, literally alive), in order that he, the writer, can attribute to a political system the connotation of abhorrence that most people have toward cancer." Owen Thomas, Metaphor and Related Subjects (New York: Random House, 1969), p. 24.
44. Ibid., 292.
45. Ibid., 277.

46. One rule which might be proposed is discussed in the following chapter. That rule is: when an expression makes no sense given a literal interpretation, try a figurative interpretation.
47. Ibid., 279.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid., 280.
51. Ibid., 294.
52. Ibid., 280.
53. Ibid.
54. For example: Henle, Richards, and Wheelwright.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid., 281.
57. Ibid.
58. George Santayana, The Sense of Beauty (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1955), p. 28.
59. Black, p. 282.
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid., 279.
63. Essentially the same explanation can be made using the note on terminology at the end of his article. Black's attention is focused on the relationship between $\underline{M}'(E)$ and $\underline{M}(X)$. If we take seriously Black's condition that $\underline{L}$ is the literal equivalent of $\underline{M}$, then the relationship between $\underline{M}'(E)$ and $\underline{M}(X)$ is identity. Given that this is the case, there is no need to invoke analogy or similarity. A distinction which Black fails to invoke is between the meaning of E in $F(E)$ under a literal interpretation ($\underline{M}(E)$) and $\underline{M}'(E)$. Employing this distinction one could characterize a comparison theory as follows: $\underline{M}(E)$ is either similar or analogous to $\underline{M}'(E)$. $\underline{M}(E)$ cannot be the correct interpretation of E in $F(E)$ and "Once the reader has detected the ground of the intended analogy or simile...." Ibid., 294.

64. His discussion of the comparison theory would be more significant if he could demonstrate that serious writers in this area actually hold the view he describes.
65. Ibid., 283.
66. Ibid.
67. Ibid., 284.
68. For example: Richards or Henle whose 'Metaphor' was available prior to the publication of Models and Metaphor.
69. Ibid., 285.
70. Ibid., 286.
71. Ibid., 287.
72. Ibid., 288.
73. Ibid.
74. István Mészáros, "Metaphor and Simile," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. N.S. 67 (1966-1967), p. 131.
75. Richards, The Philosophy of Rhetoric, p. 120.
76. Black, 289.
77. Ibid.
78. Ibid.
79. Ibid.
80. Ibid., 290.
81. Ibid., 291.
82. Ibid.
83. Ibid., 292.
84. Ibid., 293.
85. Ibid.
86. Ibid.
87. Ibid.
88. Ibid., 285.

CHAPTER IV

RELATIONAL THEORY

As we pointed out both Black and Richards hold comparison views. They both interpret metaphor as being a matter of comparing objects, perhaps a matter of examining two objects to determine their likenesses and differences. While Henle follows or parallels some of the points of Black and Richards, it is obvious at the outset that he holds a resemblance theory which is briefly characterized at the beginning of the previous chapter. The distinction between the comparison and resemblance theories being that in the comparison theory the metaphor states a comparison, while in the resemblance theory comparison or resemblance is employed to determine the referent of the metaphor. Henle's work fits this definition since he is most interested in explaining our understanding the referent of the metaphor based upon our recognition of similarity.

Paul Henle

Henle claims, in "Metaphor"¹, to follow Peirce. In so doing he attempts to use Peirce's terminology, 'icon' and 'symbol' in such a way as to establish a paradigm resemblance theory. We argue, however, that Henle does not follow Peirce, nor is his conception of the resemblance theory of much help in understanding metaphor. Rather, we argue that

his commitment to the resemblance view tends to interfere with his genuinely instructive suggestion.

Throughout his article Henle speaks in terms of figurative sense and literal sense. This suggests difficulties we find in Goodman's discussion² and our criticism of theories involving different types of meaning. Careful attention to Henle's definitions will show that his theory does not entail the sort of two-meaning theory to which we object. It will show that 'figurative sense' and 'literal sense' rather than names of radically different types of meaning are ways of avoiding circumlocutions for the sense of an expression as used literally or figuratively.

By the literal sense of a word we may mean the sense which a word has in other contexts and apart from such metaphoric uses. By figurative sense we may mean that special sense on which the metaphor hinges.³

'Literal sense' and 'figurative sense' both refer to meanings of terms. We shall want some way of referring to the relationship between a word and its various meanings. This may be accomplished by saying that a word is an immediate sign of its literal sense and a mediate sign of its figurative sense. These terms are appropriate since it is only through the literal sense that one arrives at the figurative.⁴

These definitions do not necessitate a dual meaning theory which entails different types of meaning. They are consistent with maintaining a single type of meaning and nothing Henle says hinges upon distinguishing types of meaning. We do, however, note that his definitions do not specifically rule out a two-meaning theory.

Iconic View

Henle attempts to base his explanation of metaphor upon Peirce's discussion of language. "... it is possible to explain metaphor as a

type of symbolism and to assimilate it to a more general theory of symbolism"⁵. Such an assimilation would be valuable in terms of describing metaphor as a regular feature of language rather than an exception to the general explanation. We find this effort to lack that value since he fails to complete the assimilation. He employs the terms 'symbol' and 'icon' of Peirce and on the surface, employs them much as does Peirce. Further investigation shows that Henle's use varies significantly from Peirce. Henle's definitions however square with those of Peirce.

A sign is a symbol insofar as it signifies according to an arbitrary rule, insofar as it is a conventional sign. A sign is an icon to the extent that it signifies in virtue of similarity.⁶

It is primarily upon Peirce's use of 'icon' that Henle's theory turns. And it is Henle's attempt to follow Peirce which results in his theory being a relational view. Peirce's discussion of icons is vital to our consideration and we therefore summarize it below:

An icon is a sign which refers to the object which it denotes merely by virtue of characters of its own and which it possesses just the same, whether such an item actually exists or not.... Anything whatever, be it quality, existent individual, or law, is an icon of anything insofar as it is like that thing and used as a sign of it.⁷

Henle makes use of Peirce's notion of symbol and icon in explaining metaphor as a two part relationship. The metaphor acts first as a symbol to refer to an object or event. The object or event, in turn, acts as an icon referring to the object or event under discussion. Henle describes this as follows:

Metaphor is analyzable into a double sort of semantic relationship. First using symbols in Peirce's sense, directions are given for finding an object or situation. Thus, use of language is quite

ordinary. Second it is implied that any object or situation fitting the direction may serve as an icon of what one wishes to describe.⁸

Henle introduces these two technical terms (symbol and icon), but to no serious advantage. His explanation amounts to no more than saying that the name of one thing is used in place of some other similar thing and because of the similarity, we can determine the intended referent. Not only do we not see an advantage to such an explanation, Henle's use of Peirce's term is genuinely misleading. Consider his explanation of the icon's role in metaphor.

We may say that we are given not the icon, but a description of what would be an icon. Alternatively, one might say that not the icon, but its essence is brought before the reader. Again to say approximately the same thing more safely, one may claim that what is presented is a formula for the construction of icons.⁹

Now consider the line from Keats' "To Hope" which Henle presents as an example of metaphor:

"When by my solitary hearth I sit,

and hateful thoughts enwrap my soul in gloom"

not only do we not find an icon here, no event is described by the word 'enwrap' although an event is referred to; the essence of enwrapping is not brought before the reader. (Consider having the appropriate essence brought before you in regard to the metaphor 'Richard is a lion'.) No formula for the construction of anything is presented. None of the events mentioned in Henle's explanation take place. The problem which Henle is trying to get around, by this talk of bringing essences and giving directions, is the fact that there is no icon involved in metaphor. And he recognizes this in saying "we may say that we are given not the icon...."

The icon is never actually present; rather, through the rule, one understands what it must be and, through this understanding, what it signifies.¹⁰

On this view, one is referred to an object or an event by the terms in the metaphor--the mysterious rule--and understanding of what the icon must be, is nothing more than understanding the conventional use of language and to what terms customarily refer.

We mentioned above that we found no icon. Metaphor simply is not iconic. The strongest claim that this view can successfully make is that there are objects and events which would function as iconic signs if they could in fact be presented. But, in fact, no such iconic signs are presented and it is genuinely misleading to speak as if they were. Further, it is a disservice to attribute such a theory to Peirce.

While we reject Henle's iconic theory, many of his observations concerning metaphor are correct. Such observations might be considered augmentations of his view, but talk of icons seems to obscure rather than help his position. A clearer position is attained by ignoring insofar as possible the notion of icon and concentrating on his observations. None of his positive points depends on the iconic theory and insofar as he attempts to relate his arguments to that theory, his efforts are confused. The first observation with which we deal is that similarity alone will not account for our ability to determine the referent of a metaphorical expression.¹¹ Henle explains:

While it may be that any two things are similar in some respect, this by itself is not sufficient to make one an icon of the other unless someone is led to consider one by its similarity to the other. The similarity must be noticed and used as a means of signifying. This would require at the very least that the similarity between an icon and what it signifies should not be shared by a great many other things as well.¹²

Other restrictions need to be placed on the similarity. Since even if there was but a single object which shared a particular quality with the icon, we may well not understand the metaphor since we may not consider that particular quality of the icon. Not only, as Henle noticed, is every object similar to every other object, there is a very large number of similarities which hold between objects. And generally speaking, the metaphor fails to state the nature of the similarity to be considered. In explaining how we are aware of the similarity or relationship to be considered, Henle avoids these difficulties and presents a view which is in line with our description of the relational view.

Henle explains that our knowledge of the ground of the comparison, that is, the relevant relationship, is derived from some feature of the literally named object or event. He agrees with Black's claim that a knowledge of a society's beliefs and habits is necessary for understanding metaphor. One must know '... minor facets of the general culture, such as what characteristics are uppermost in people's mind'.¹³ In less detail than Black, Henle expresses essentially the same position with regard to commonplaces. He provides an interesting example:

A popular song of some years ago praised a young lady by saying to her "You're the cream in my coffee." An entirely wrong impression would be obtained in a community which drank its coffee black.¹⁴

The minor facets and characteristics in people's minds indicate what sorts of grounds of similarity one ought to search to discover the similar object. While the R is not provided by the expression itself it is provided by context and those facets uppermost (hopefully) in the audience's mind. Henle, we notice, is careful not to explain too much.

Too much, in this case, would be our unfailing ability to understand metaphor. He states: "This is not to claim of course that everyone can understand every metaphor. Often of course metaphors are not understood."¹⁵ As suggested by Henle's 'cream in my coffee' example, if the facets foremost in the utterer's mind differ from those in the minds of the audience, confusion and misunderstanding will result. Comparisons will be made on grounds other than those intended or perhaps none will be made at all since none may seem appropriate given a different ground of comparison. Henle's explanation of metaphor is more interesting than many since he not only accounts for an ability to communicate via metaphor, he also accounts for those misunderstandings and frustrations in attempting to understand metaphor which actually occur.

Further insight into the nature of the R involved in metaphor can be gained from Henle's distinction between metaphor and other tropes. He claims that the basis for this distinction is the amenability of metaphor to multiple interpretation. We shall argue that a better basis for his distinction is in terms of the relationship (or similarity) upon which the trope is based. Henle observes that "The aptness of metaphor depends on the capability of elaborating it--of extending the parallel structure".¹⁶ He goes on to say: "It is this capability of extension which justifies the differentiations of metaphor from other tropes."¹⁷ The other tropes which he discusses are synecdoche and metonymy. In the case of synecdoche further elaboration is not, according to Henle, possible. By definition, the relationship involved in this figure is that of part to whole or whole to part. And according to Henle once

"... one apprehends the relationship, one gains a flavor of correctness, one perhaps attributes to the entire genus something of the feeling toward the species and that is all. No further development of synecdoche is possible."¹⁸ This lack of further development is of sufficient import to separate metaphor from synecdoche. We suppose that the same sort of reasoning is intended by Henle to apply to metonymy. But there is a more significant difference between metonymy and synecdoche, and metaphor than Henle's discussion emphasizes. It is more significant since it is the basis of the distinction which Henle notices and it lends further insight into the nature of metaphor. In synecdoche, a definite relation is specified and even in the case of the whole standing for the part there is a fairly limited number of parts and in considering them, elaboration comes to an end. The relationship involved in metonymy is not so precise. It is described as consisting of "... looser connections by way of some relation felt to be important...."¹⁹ Metonymy has a looser connection in two ways: (1) no definite relationship is specified and (2) there may be no definite number of objects to which the named object is related. However, the first sense of looseness is somewhat restricted. It appears that Henle intends to make reference by 'metonymy' to figures which will inhibit any tending to consider more remote relationships. Henle's example seems to illustrate just that sort of relationship: "... when one speaks of reading an author instead of his works...."²⁰ In the context of reading, it may be that the relation authorship is foremost and we consider no other. This suggests a basis for distinguishing between metonymy and metaphor.

That basis is the existence in the case of metonymy of a single obvious relationship. That relationship provides an interpretation so clearly correct that it effectively prohibits our consideration of alternative interpretations based on different relationships. Metaphor, which does not involve such a relationship, is open to alternative interpretations many of which are reasonably correct. It is the number of relationships which constitute reasonable alternatives that accounts for the number of alternative interpretations. Henle's talk of elaboration and extending parallel structure points to this basic difference between metaphor and other tropes. The distinction between metaphor and these other tropes is based on types of relationships which generate the figurative interpretation. We shall return to a consideration of these relationships as a part of Henle's explanation of our ability to understand metaphor.

In explaining our understanding of metaphor, Henle relies, in part, upon "... the sort of shock which it (metaphor) produces".²¹ He claims that "ordinarily one takes words in their literal sense and this is impossible in metaphor. This impossibility is in fact what drives one to seek a figurative sense."²² Henle points out two respects in which taking words in their literal sense may be impossible. The first respect is that the sentence itself may be absurd or meaningless when interpreted literally. The second respect is that although the sentence alone makes sense, in context it is absurd. "Whether taking all of the terms in their literal sense produces an absurdity or merely something incongruous, the clash of literal meanings must be felt".²³ It appears, though Henle does not mention it, that the clash of literal meanings is operative in

other figures as well as metaphor. As with metaphor, the clash provides the impetus for discovering a figurative interpretation. This effort to discover a figurative interpretation is based on "... the general principle that people try to talk sense and to make statements which are at least possibly true...."²⁴ Combining the recognition that a literal interpretation is not appropriate with the principle that people try to make sense, one attempts a reasonable interpretation of tropes. In this attempt, one tries various interpretations based upon the various relationships between objects and events mentioned under a literal interpretation and other objects or situations which if considered as the referents would make sense of the trope. In the case of synecdoche, the part-whole relationship is so fundamental or obvious that we gain a flavor of correctness and do not try out other possible interpretations. In metonymy some other single relationship is outstanding and we do not consider other interpretations; a single interpretation seems obviously the correct one. In the case of metaphor no single interpretation is uniquely correct. No single relationship stands out as a single parallel between the object mentioned in literal use and the object mentioned in figurative use.

We notice that in Henle's explanation the clash is not treated as merely an additional feature to heighten our enjoyment. It is required to perceive metaphor at all. If the clash is not felt

... one of two situations must obtain--either the passage is taken literally without encountering any difficulty and no suspicion of a metaphor arises, or else the figurative meaning is so usual that the reader goes to it immediately. In this case one has an idiom or a "dead metaphor" which, properly, is no metaphor at all.²⁵

In the latter case one will not be misunderstood although he is not likely to impress anyone with his authorship. The former case suggests that in employing metaphor one must insure that a conventional interpretation will be sufficiently out of place to insure that a figurative interpretation is attempted.

While we argue vigorously in opposition to Henle's presentation of an iconic theory, we find many of his other points to be insightful. By combining those other points with the iconic view, a reasonable theory might be produced. However, none of Henle's positive contributions depend on the iconic view. They are matters which are not usually associated with iconic language. We recall those points are: (1) the clash of literal meanings indicates that a figurative interpretation may be appropriate; (2) the principle that people usually attempt to talk sense encourages the figurative interpretation; (3) the characteristics uppermost in people's minds guide the attempted interpretation. The appeal to icons was to be of value in suggesting that similarity between objects or situations was to be the basis of the interpretation. This suggestion, however, is as misleading as it is helpful. While we agree that there must be some relationship upon which an understanding of the metaphor is based, that relationship need not be similarity, particularly not the sort of similarity which governs iconic reference.²⁶ Consider Henle's own example:

You're the cream in my coffee.

While a reasonable interpretation of this metaphor may be that the effect of the young lady on the life of the author was that of enrichment, there is no similarity except in the most strained sense between the

young lady and cream or between her actions and that of cream. But according to Henle, the cream in the man's coffee is an icon either of her or of her actions. While we admit that there may be a similarity between the effect of the cream on the coffee and the effect of the young lady on the man's life, the cream is not similar to anything relevant and is not an icon. For a further and more obvious example, consider H. G. Adams' line:

Hell is truth seen too late.

Here there is no similarity upon which this line turns. There are several relationships between truth and hell, depending on what kind of truth or hell one was discussing. Two interpretations based on such relationships are:

- (1) Hell (damnation) is the consequent of recognizing the truth about certain religious matters too late.
- (2) It is an extremely excruciating experience to learn the truth when it is too late to act upon it.

One could argue as to which of these is better or whether either is the best possible interpretation. Both seem reasonable interpretations, yet neither is based upon a similarity between two objects. (Hell may be an excruciating experience. But if this were claimed as the ground of similarity, then one would not talk of icons since icons are not icons of themselves.)

While it is important to maintain that there is some relationship between the literal sense of a term and the figurative sense of that term, it is not the case that, for every metaphor, the referent (if any) determined by the literal sense is similar to the referent (if any)

determined by the figurative sense. To this extent it seems that the discussion of icons tends to mislead one. While the similarity among objects may be the relationship in the case of some metaphors it can not serve as a general explanation of metaphor.

In discussing the significance of metaphor, Henle provides answers for a question proposed by Black.

If we now ask why, on this view, the writer should set his readers the task of solving a puzzle, we shall be offered two types of answer. The first is that there may, in fact, be no literal equivalent ... (and the second is) ... the pleasure it gives the reader.²⁷

These answers which Black finds unacceptable are just those given by Henle in his discussion of the cognitive and emotive function of metaphor.

With regard to the cognitive function of metaphor Henle states:

The function of metaphor in general is to extend language, to say what cannot be said in terms of literal meanings alone.²⁸

Black recognized this view of metaphor as the catachresis view and held the view to be correct in that it explained one type of metaphor. But as we observed, Black misjudged the importance of this view and dismissed serious consideration of it on the ground that such metaphors would be short-lived and readily adopted as a part of literal speech. Henle, by comparison, provides a more extensive discussion of the ability of metaphor to extend the usefulness of language. We find, however, that Henle's discussion is misdirected in that he attempts to explain this feature of metaphor wholly in terms of reference while failing to consider meaning. His focusing upon reference induces him to distinguish two "uses" of metaphor on the basis of the existence or nonexistence of an objective reference.

Henle describes the first use of metaphor, that involving objective reference as follows:

Metaphor may be used whenever something new is invented requiring a name or whenever it seems desirable to call attention to an undesignated aspect of something already known.²⁹

In this use of metaphor, according to Henle, the icon is sufficiently similar to the new object that one is able to recognize that to which reference is figuratively made. It can be seen that the use of metaphor here described could be eliminated from language or at least avoided and is only a matter of convenience (or perhaps a device to please the audience). One could use ostensive definitions and make reference with his newly defined term. Consider Henle's two examples: "Thus the lower shell of a turtle is called a plastron, which originally meant a breastplate, as in a suit of armor" and "hood of a car". In both, ostensive definitions could be made and the metaphoric use of terms could be avoided. In any event there are (or were) such metaphors in language and these metaphors will (or have) become part of the literal use of language.

Once the required part was recognized, however, the clash may be forgotten and the phrase might be considered a single unit, designating something whose appearance is known. Thus the metaphor would disappear and a new literal sense be born.³⁰

Henle finds more difficulty in discussing the other 'use' of metaphor. That use does not involve an objective relationship. Specifically, he finds difficulty in explaining the transition from metaphor to literal speech because there is no objective referent with which one becomes familiar. He says of the example 'cosmos':

... the term did not remain metaphorical, but engendered a literal meaning. The process used to explain earlier examples will not

serve here, however, since there can be no recognition or identification of a cosmos in the same sense that a hood of a car can be recognized. We know of no satisfactory theory as to how such terms became literal...."³¹

It seems to be Henle's focus on reference which leads him to conclude that he knows of no satisfactory theory.... But in examining his earlier remarks we find that the clash of meanings separated the literal from the metaphoric and not any considerations of reference. We recall that in discussing the clash of literal meaning, Henle explained that if no clash is felt the metaphor may be dead. He said that in such a case "... the figurative meaning is so usual that the reader goes to it immediately. In this case one has an idiom or a "dead metaphor" which, properly, is no metaphor at all."³² The basis for distinguishing metaphor from non-metaphor is whether or not the figurative meaning is usual. An explanation of the expansion of literal use through metaphor is suggested by these remarks. That suggestion is: as a linguistic community becomes accustomed to associating an expression with a meaning, that meaning is thought of without the special provocation of a clash of meaning. The becoming accustomed to meaning is essentially establishing a customary use of the word. Thus when a word's use is so usual that one thinks of it immediately it no longer causes a clash, that use will then be a conventional use and part of literal speech. If the further question is asked 'How do certain metaphoric uses become usual?' the answer is simple: by repeated use. What is significant is that a type of use, through repetition becomes one of several ambiguous literal uses. In such a case language has expanded. It is the immediate recognition of the sense in question which separates metaphor from literal

use. Objective reference needs to play no part in this explanation.

We see that the use of metaphors which do not involve an objective reference are of greater concern, since there is no easy device, such as ostensive definition, by which to avoid the metaphor or to fix so much of its meaning as is contained in reference. If we are to express the same meaning it may not be possible to do so by the literal use of any expression.

In cases of this sort, however, metaphor is even more important for extended language than in those considered before. After all, the underside of a turtle is simply there and can be pointed at if necessary to call attention to it. A world order may equally be there, but it certainly can not be pointed at in the same way. The only means of thinking about it may be the metaphor. Perhaps the new ideas is inconceivable apart from metaphor.³³

It is therefore of great importance to abandon the explanation in terms of reference and recognize that words are assimilated into literal language on the basis of repeated use and common understanding.

The final aspect of Henle's work which we now discuss is his notion of induced content. This induced content is particularly important when the metaphor is not concerned with objective reference. Consider the following metaphor:

The mind is the place where thinking occurs.

One might be tempted to search for the location of the mind since all places have location. Or perhaps the following may seem more familiar:

The mind is spiritual substance.

Here the word substance may induce one to attribute other qualities to the mind, such being subject to physical laws, which may not be intended by the expression. The induced content is particularly dangerous as the

metaphoric use of the expression becomes customary. Once the literal clash, to use Henle's expression, is no longer perceived, one is apt to forget metaphoric origin of the expression and attribute characteristics appropriate only to its former literal sense. One would not make such attribution while the metaphoric use of the term was new. People are careful about metaphor. To refer to our example, the mind becomes a place and a substance as that use becomes conventional. One may then forget that this is a different use of 'place' and 'substance'. Recognizing the difficulties which may be caused by induced content we look to Henle's discussion for help in avoiding such difficulties.

Our main interest is in the cognitive aspect of induced content. Henle's discussion centers around the emotive aspect. Nonetheless, he is careful in his explanation to allow for induced cognitive content. His remarks are addressed to poetry but the same effects result in non-poetic use.

The literary or poetic use of metaphor is also creative, but in a different way, bringing out a new aspect, or showing a new way of feeling concerning something already describable in the language.³⁴

Henle here notices a feature which Black overlooks. That feature is the conveying a new feeling (and not necessarily a pleasing feeling) concerning the topic of the metaphor. We agree with the position that philosophy has something more to do than give pleasure to its readers. Nonetheless, giving pleasure to the reader is often our intent when using language in other situations and is therefore often a reason to use metaphor. This feature of metaphor deserves a more detailed treatment than was provided by Black. According to Henle:

This nuance of feeling may well be the reason for the employment of the figure, for in many cases there does not seem to be any other way of conveying just the same impression.³⁵

Henle speaks of an antecedent similarity and an induced similarity. The antecedent similarity is that which constitutes the iconic relationship. It is the basis of the metaphor. Given such an antecedent similarity one can evoke by the use of metaphor an induced similarity. "... an induced similarity, such as the similarity of feeling which, as we have just noticed is transferred from symbolizing situation to situation symbolized."³⁶ It is unfortunate that Henle speaks of the similarity being transferred; it is not of course. The induced similarity is a similarity between our feeling (in the case just mentioned) towards one object and our feeling towards another object. What is induced is the feeling towards 'the situation symbolized', that feeling being similar to our feeling toward the 'symbolizing situation.' When the feeling has been induced the similarity is established. Henle states:

... the feeling accompanying the figurative sense is modified by and in fact caused by the feeling accompanying the literal sense. This modification of the way of thinking of what the metaphor symbolizes indirectly may be called the induced content of the metaphor.³⁷

Henle does not, however, discuss reasons for this induced content nor does he explain how the content is induced. Essentially his discussion is a notation that metaphor may involve induced content and that such content is of significant poetic value.

Henle's discussion involved only examples of induced emotive content. He points out that his definition of induced content does not restrict

such content to feeling. But due to Henle's view of poetry and his concentration on poetry he gives little consideration to cognitive content. He maintains: "such contents, if they exist, are of relatively minor importance in poetic use of metaphor and so have not been discussed here".³⁸ Henle does however indicate a grasp of the importance of induced content in regard to metaphor's use to extend language.

In some cases, we noticed that metaphor acquired literal meaning by the development of the ability to recognize what it designated; in other cases this explanation could not be given. Many philosophical terms are of this latter sort and it is difficult if not impossible to develop means of recognition for such terms as 'substance' or 'ego'. It may be in such cases that part of the meaning is given by an induced content.³⁹

Henle, however, does not pursue this explanation of the explanation further. His rather vague notion of induced content would make speculation tenuous at best.

Conclusions in Regard to Henle's View

Henle's reference to icons and the ensuing explanation provide a prime example of the relational view; that is he characterizes metaphor as referring to an object and providing the relationship between that object and the object which the author intended to discuss. Under a literal interpretation the sentence is construed as mentioning some object; the relationship is understood to be a matter of similarity; the audience recognizes the true referent of the metaphor. Two serious problems face the iconic theory. First, as it stands, it fails to explain our recognition that something is a metaphor and without that recognition we would not invoke the similarity as discussed. Second, it fails to explain what similarities we are to consider.

In correcting these deficiencies, Henle suggests the outline of a theory of metaphor which does not depend on the resemblance of objects. Neither does it depend on his explanation in terms of icons. It is rather an independent theory based upon the following criteria. Metaphor involves a clash when interpreted literally; this is our signal to attempt a figurative interpretation. We assume that there is a meaningful interpretation on the principle that people try to make sense. We attempt to find a relationship either between the words used in the metaphor and other words, between meanings associated with literal use and other meanings, or the referent associated with the literal use and some other referent. Our guide in attempting to discover such a relationship will be the characteristics uppermost in people's mind in regard to those words, meanings, or referents. When a relationship is determined, we then consider the referent associated with the related word, related meaning, or the related referent itself as the subject of the metaphor. When a meaningful interpretation is established, one understands the metaphor.

Notice that such an explanation does not depend upon finding a similarity or even a relationship between compared objects and events. We indicated above that Henle suggests such a theory since his concern with reference did not allow him to escape a dependence on comparisons of objects. Had he made good such an escape he could have provided a valuable theory.

In his discussion of metaphors' function in the expansion of language, Henle is once again hampered by his concern with reference.

This concern caused difficulty in explaining how metaphors without objective reference become literal uses. His difficulty is surprising since earlier in his article he explains this as being a matter of immediate recognition of meaning due to repeated use. But he overlooked the fact that it is the recognition of meaning which provides the general explanation, not familiarity with a particular referent.

While Henle's view, as he expressed it is a relational view, those aspects which make it so tend only to cause difficulty in explaining his positive points. By centering his attention on a sense rather than reference he could avoid these difficulties. And as we noted, by eliminating his dependence on reference and the iconic model one can establish a reasonable explanation of several aspects of metaphor.

Conclusions with Regard to Comparison and Relational Theories

The comparison, as a basis of explaining metaphor is particularly inviting. The words in their literal use do not mean the same as those same words in their metaphorical use. But there is a relationship between these meanings and often this relationship is a similarity between the referents which are associated with those meanings. There is no doubt that many metaphors are at least vague comparisons. But it is not clear that all metaphors are comparisons and not all metaphors involve the similarity between referents just mentioned. And even for those metaphors which are comparisons, the noting of the comparison does not explain our understanding of the metaphor. In fact we must often understand that the expression is a metaphor prior to recognizing that a comparison is

being made.

One is often tempted to show that every metaphor is after all a comparison by constructing as reasonable a paraphrase of each as he is able and then claiming that paraphrase to express the meaning of the metaphor. But as we discussed the line of James Whitcomb Riley from "Out to Old Aunt Mary's",

While the waters gurgled and laughed and wept."

we noticed that one would miss the point if he interpreted this line as a comparison (perhaps of sounds). The line makes sense in the poem only when one recognizes that the waters were weeping and laughing from happiness. A report of how the water sounded would be completely out of place. Isenberg sums up our point here.

And by introducing such words as 'like' into certain metaphoric expressions, as if misquoting: "All the world is like a stage," we obtain--whatever the impairment of the general effect--a simile. It is, no doubt, the possibility of such conversions that has led many rhetoricians to say that a metaphor is a condensed simile and a simile an expanded metaphor. Now this point I think is to be rejected; for there are metaphors, even simple ones, that cannot be thus converted without circumlocutions so devious as to make the result very distant in meaning and effect from their originals.⁴⁰

One might, if he were willing to sacrifice meaning and effect, construe all metaphor as comparison. But such a move would not be instructive with regard to metaphor since it could as well be made with any literal expression (given that one was willing to accept some sacrifice of meaning and effect). One could, for example rephrase

This house is a white house
to read

This house is like a white house.

Or perhaps one might similarly rephrase

The man moved swiftly
to read

The man moved as a swift man moves.

We agree that these restatements involve some change in meaning, but argue that converting the metaphor to simile involves a similar change. Therefore showing it is possible to produce reasonably correct paraphrases which are explicit comparisons is not to distinguish literal from metaphoric use. Further, since as Isenberg and our own example indicate that the result of paraphrase may be "very distant in meaning and effect from their originals", the claim that metaphors are comparisons is certainly misleading.

Comparisons and relational views tend to be misleading in another way as well. They argue that, or at least lead one to believe that, metaphors involve the comparison or relationship of objects. Discussions of the comparison and relational views are generally built around examples in which either the subject or the direct object of the sentence is being compared or in which the subject is compared to the direct object. For example, Richards compares the leg in 'leg of a table' with the leg of a horse. Black compares man and wolf in 'man is a wolf'. Not only the examples from Richards and Black lead to comparison and relational views, they concentrate attention on those grammatical elements which are in the nominative or objective case and the referents of those elements. This concentration results in an inattention to verbal and adjectival elements of the sentence as well as inattention to relationships other

than those holding between objects. Inattention to verbal and adjectival elements results in the failure to explain metaphors which have as their focus the predicate (a verb form). Such metaphors are not explained since the focus is not ordinarily construed as referring to an object or even to a type of object. An example of such a metaphor is provided by Black,

The chairman ploughed through the discussion.

In such cases there is no object which is related to another.

Concentration upon the relationships between objects results in difficulty in explaining those metaphors whose basis is a relationship between meanings and not a matter of comparisons at all. In particular, we here think of those metaphors with which we found difficulty in explaining their literalization.

The views of Black, Henle, and Richards all suffer to some degree from this difficulty. We do find that the promising suggestions of these theories can be stated without reference to comparisons.

NOTES TO CHAPTER IV

1. Paul Henle, 'Metaphor', Language, Thought, and Culture, ed. Paul Henle, University of Michigan Press, 1958.
2. This discussion takes place in Chapter VI of this paper.
3. Ibid., 174.
4. Ibid., 175.
5. Ibid., 177.
6. Ibid.
7. C. S. Peirce, Collected Papers, Hartshorne and Weiss, Eds., Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1932, Vol. II, p. 247.
8. Henle, 178.
9. Ibid., 179.
10. Ibid., 178.
11. This problem is discussed on page _____. Henle provides an interesting example of the difficulty by noting that "... the number seventeen is similar to an elephant in that they share the characteristics of being different from the moon." Ibid., 179.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid., 186.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid., 180.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid., 180-181.
19. Ibid., 175.
20. Ibid., 175-176.

21. Ibid., 182.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid., 183.
24. Ibid., 183-184.
25. Ibid., 183.
26. Richards also presents a criticism against too great a reliance on similarity. We consider this in Chapter II.
27. Black, 280-281.
28. Henle, 186.
29. Ibid., 186-187.
30. Ibid., 188. We recognize that talk of disappearing metaphors and birth of literal senses will raise questions as to what disappears and what is it for a sense to be born. We shall forego the tracking down of these loose ends since they could have been avoided by a more careful statement at the beginning.
31. Ibid., 188-189.
32. Ibid., 183.
33. Ibid., 189.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid., 191.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid., 192.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
40. Arnold Isenberg, "On Defining Metaphor", The Journal of Philosophy XXI (October 1963), pp. 609-622.

CHAPTER V

ABSURDITY VIEWS

One of the features of metaphor which we noticed in the introduction was the obvious absurdity which results from the literal interpretation of metaphor. That absurdity resulted either through some conflict of meanings within the expression itself or through a conflict between the expression and its context. We shall call those views whose explanation centers around the absurdity of literal interpretation 'absurdity views.' Both Beardsley¹ and Turbayne² hold such views. Both hold that recognition of a metaphor depends, in part at least, upon recognizing the inappropriateness of the literal interpretation. While the explanations of Beardsley and Turbayne are not in direct contradiction they do constitute rather divergent explanations. That divergence apparently stems from a difference in the aspect of metaphor which seems most significant. Beardsley is most interested in explaining how we understand metaphor while Turbayne is most concerned with the results of overlooking the absurdity of literal interpretation.

Beardsley's controversion (as he calls it) theory of metaphor is based upon the contention that one's ability to recognize and understand metaphor is based upon recognition of the absurdity of the literal expression. We recognize in the previous chapter that Henle considered this feature of metaphor. However, it did not constitute a central aspect of

the theory presented by Henle. We have chosen Henle's work as representative of the absurdity view, since the absurdity of literal interpretation is central to his view. In addition, Beardsley's discussion provides a basis for the discussion of various other significant questions. His criticism of types of views which he calls the Emotive, Supervenience, and Literalist theories treat in particular the claims:

- (1) Metaphors have no meaning.
- (2) The meaning of no metaphor is paraphraseable in literal terms.
- (3) Metaphors are literal statements.

While we find that Beardsley's controversion theory makes little improvement on certain observations of Henle and Black, his treatment of the above claims makes his effort well worth considering.

Turbayne appears less interested in our understanding of metaphors than in a particular sort of misunderstanding that arises from metaphor. His concern is with the result of failing to be aware of the absurdity of the literal interpretation after the expression has been accepted (as true) on the basis of a metaphorical interpretation. Turbayne uses terminology which leads one to suspect that he finds a moral significance to a blunder of this nature. He says:

Metaphors furnish a clear illustration of the "imposture" or the "delusion" or of the "cheat" of words. It is part of the nature of metaphor to appear wearing a disguise. This disguise is often so effective that not even automatic brains can penetrate it.³

Turbayne explains that metaphor is always in some sense inappropriate and that the use of metaphor involves make-believe. He says that one is cheated by or used by the metaphor when he fails to recognize the make-believe. It seems Turbayne's purpose is to warn us of these pitfalls which he explains.

While we find that Turbayne's warning is in order (the history of philosophy is replete with such errors), we find that his explanation is incorrect. It is incorrect since he claims that the use of metaphor involves pretending and make-believe and it is clear that using metaphor requires neither.

Both these examples of the absurdity are important since they deal in some depth with aspects ignored elsewhere. We shall first consider Beardsley's controversion theory.

Monroe C. Beardsley

Beardsley presents a discussion of what he terms a controversion theory of metaphor. The view is mainly an investigation of the point made by Henle: that the clash of literal meanings provides the basis for our search for a figurative sense. Beardsley goes into considerably greater detail in his attempt to deal with this aspect of metaphor. Prior to the introduction of his own view Beardsley proposes to discuss three other views, which he calls the emotive theory, the literalist theory and the supervenience theory. Beardsley indicates that it is hard to find any clear-cut defenders of these views.

These theories suffer somewhat from the same difficulty as those views commented upon by Black. That difficulty, which Beardsley recognizes, as mentioned above, is that these views are not associated specifically with any advocate. They suffer from skeleton presentation and skeleton argument. Further, there is no original source against which to check Beardsley's presentation and arguments. Each of the theories presented by Beardsley is based upon some aspect of metaphor. In each

case there are examples which tend to support the claims of that view. He discusses central issues of metaphor any one of which might be focused upon to establish a fully defended view of metaphor. We are interested, however, in the points discussed whether or not anyone desires to defend those theories and will consider Beardsley's analysis of each.

Emotive Theory

The central feature stressed in Beardsley's discussion of the emotive theory is the meaningfulness of metaphor. According to Beardsley, the central claim of the emotive theory is that metaphors have no meaning. Beardsley characterizes this theory as follows:

... according to the Emotive Theory, a word has meaning only if there is some way of confirming its applicability to a given situation--roughly, only if it has a clear designation. For example, the sharpness of a knife can be tested by various means, so that the phrase "sharp knife" is meaningful. We may suppose that sharp has some negative emotive import, deriving from our experience with sharp things. Now when we speak of a "sharp razor" or a "sharp drill" the emotive import is not active, because these phrases are meaningful. But when we speak of a "sharp wind," a "sharp dealer," or a "sharp tongue," the tests for sharpness cannot be applied, and therefore, though the individual words are meaningful, the combinations of them are not. In this way the emotive import of the adjective is released and intensified.⁴

Beardsley claims that such emotive theories are clearly wrong on two counts. They are wrong because they: (1) construe testability and therefore meaning too narrowly and (2) claim that all metaphors are emotive. In considering Beardsley's argument we become aware of the significance of the difficulty in his method of presentation which was discussed on the previous page. We should like to see an argument presented which would settle the question of the correctness of the emotive theory. Beardsley's argument is not, however, against any principle entailed by

the emotive theory but is rather against the example which he chooses to assist in the presentation of the theory. Even if his argument is conclusive against the example it does not defeat the emotive theory but only the choice of examples. These circumstances suggest that a person who chose to defend this view could have selected a more appropriate example. After considering Beardsley's argument we shall present an example which his line of reasoning will not defeat.

Beardsley's argument is:

... it is not correct to say that there is no test for sharp tongues. Anyone who often scolds and finds fault sarcastically can be said to have a sharp tongue; these are the tests. Of course, the tests for sharp tongues are not the same as the tests for sharp razors, but the tests for sharp razors are not the same as the tests for sharp drills either.⁵

In considering this argument we notice that Beardsley has chosen to attack the view presented on its home ground. That is, for the purposes of his argument he has accepted testability as the criterion of meaning. He might have rejected this view by insisting on and arguing for his own position with regard to meaning. He says, "For what the sentence means depends ... upon public conventions of usage that are tied up with habit patterns in the whole speaking community."⁶ This move would result in talk about conventions rather than talk about tests. For the extent of his discussion this will make no difference. The same arguments would require only minor restatement. We argue that the talk in terms of tests must reduce talk about conventions if the emotive argument is to succeed.

In returning to Beardsley's argument, we find a good point as well as an error common to many theories of metaphor. The good point lies in noticing that there are several different tests one might perform in

checking the applicability of a word. The test for sharp butcher knives is not the same as the test for sharp masonry drills. The fact that a particular test fails to apply does not show that a phrase is without meaning. 'Sharp masonry drills' is not meaningless because its tests for applicability differs from the test for the applicability of 'sharp knife.' On a testability theory of meaning the question of importance is whether any test is applicable.

The common error found in Beardsley's discussion is the use of a dead metaphor as the basis of the discussion. The expression 'sharp tongue' is recognized as employing 'sharp' in a literal manner; 'sharp' out of context is ambiguous. 'Sharp tongue' will have a test because it is a part of our literal vocabulary. Any reasonable defender of the emotive theory presented would claim that whatever its origin (perhaps it once was a metaphor), 'sharp tongue' is not metaphor. Perhaps the emotive theorist would reply, "Beardsley ought to consider 'sedulous quarter-staff;' here is a better example of metaphor; we have no tests for the sedulousness of quarter-staffs." But before a reply is made to this, we find that we must consider what is meant by 'test' or by 'confirming its applicability.'

The tests proposed by the emotivist must be tests 'in principle.' If one argues that the means to carry out the tests must be at hand, then a great many literal statements become meaningless which had never been considered meaningless before. A more important question is whether the relevant test must be known, generally or to anyone. If the test must be recognized generally within a linguistic community then the criterion of testability entails a conventional meaning. Given this explanation of

testability it is clear that some metaphors lack meaning since they are a departure from customary use and are not therefore associated with a generally recognized test. But to conclude from this explanation that such metaphors are without meaning is to conclude that the only meaning is conventional meaning. In dealing with metaphor such a conclusion is clearly mistaken. We offer two arguments to show that not all meaning is a matter of convention.

Our first argument is based on the consideration of the dead metaphor. As we noticed earlier, such metaphors have meaning. On the assumption that the metaphor was without meaning in its first utterance one is left with the awkward task of explaining when metaphors acquire their meaning. Various sorts of answers to this question arise. Among them are: 'after the phrase is used in a particular way for, say, 1000 times,' after that use is entered in the current edition of the Oxford English Dictionary. Any answer to the first sort is arbitrary. Answers of the second sort overlook the fact that lexicographers record uses, not prescribe them. Difficulties in explaining when a metaphor acquired its meaning can be avoided if one allows that at its first utterance within an appropriate context a metaphor has meaning. As such meanings are more widely recognized they are said to be more customary or customary among a larger group. As such meanings are recorded in standard lexicon they are said to be conventional. Therefore, conventional meaning is to be explained in terms of expanding use of a term with an associated meaning. If the term had no meaning there would be nothing to become conventional. Further if an expression were meaningless it would not be

repeated a sufficient number of times to become customary. We conclude therefore that while metaphor goes beyond customary meaning it is not meaningless.

Our second argument, in support of the view that metaphors are meaningful, has a more firm base. One fact about metaphor has been overlooked by Beardsley and our discussion to this point. Often the members within a linguistic community generally understand a metaphor in the same way. That is, they independently arrive upon a sense of the metaphor in which they are in agreement with one another. Further, this sense is not solely a matter of convention and the use of the expression in the given sort of context is unique. In these situations there is common understanding and communication. These are sufficient grounds for claiming that the metaphor has meaning, even though it lacks conventional meaning. Given that the metaphor has meaning, it can, as argued above, come to have a conventional meaning as its use becomes customary. The discussion of relevant tests is easily assimilated to this discussion by noting that as a linguistic community apprehends a common sense, its members are able to determine appropriate tests of the terms applicability.

We are now in position to deal with the proposed answer of the emotivist concerning 'sedulous quarter-staff.' As we argue in our discussion of Black and Henle, to constitute a metaphor this phrase must be accompanied by some context. Depending on context, it may indeed be meaningless. In those contexts in which the expression is meaningful to someone relevant tests could be described by that person. In those contexts where the expression is meaningful to no one, that use of the

expression is not metaphoric. The emotivist will be faced with either admitting that the phrase has appropriate tests or explaining how some nonsense expressions evoke emotive responses and others do not. It would seem that a meaningless expression would evoke only puzzlement.

Returning to Beardsley, we recall that his second objection to the emotive theory is that not all metaphors are emotive. This argument is supported by several theories which claim that at least on some occasions the value of metaphor lies in its use to communicate information where literal expression was lacking. We have no quarrel with this position.

We are in agreement with Beardsley's claim that the emotive position is incorrect due to a too narrow construal of testability. Our objection to Beardsley's argument was mainly that it only challenged an example and not the theory. The argument which defeats the emotive view is not all meanings or tests are conventional meanings or conventional tests. To claim otherwise is to claim that communication is possible, using meaningless expressions.

Supervenience Theory

The emotive theory as described by Beardsley is based on the claim that metaphors have no meaning. The supervenience theory admits that metaphors have meaning but claim that this meaning is not expressible in literal speech. Beardsley provides the following characterization:

The defense of this theory begins with the observation that poetic language, and metaphor in particular, is capable of conveying meanings that literal language cannot convey. Why else, indeed, would we have need of metaphor, unless it supplied a mode of speech for which there is no substitute? ... According to this theory, the meaning of a metaphor does not grow out of the literal meanings of its

parts, but appears as something extraneous to, and independent of them.... The Supervenience Theory regards a metaphor as a species of idiom ... it denies that metaphors can be explicated.⁷

Beardsley attacks this position by arguing against the claim that no literal paraphrase can convey the meaning of a metaphor. His first argument is that the theory conflicts with fact, namely that words which once were metaphors are now conventional and yet express the same meanings which they did as metaphors. He states:

... the Intuitionist [a person holding the supervenience view] also has some more specific reasons against the possibility of paraphrase. First, the resort to metaphor in ordinary language as well as poetry shows that we need it to express meanings that we have no literal language for, and therefore any metaphor outruns the resources of literal language. Now, as a generic account of metaphor, and also as a practical justification of it, this objection is undoubtedly sound. But it does not show that the cognitive content of the metaphor is such that no literal expression can ever designate it. And in fact we see all the time that, when metaphors are introduced to supplement existing literal language, especially in the history of science ("Nature abhors a vacuum," "natural selection," the Freudian "censor") where an important characteristic is singled out by the metaphor and for purposes of knowledge we want to refer to it again, literal language takes over. Either the metaphor is killed, or a technical neologism is invented and assigned that designation.⁸

We agree with Beardsley that the fact that some metaphoric expressions have become literal expressions without change in meaning shows that it is not impossible for a literal expression to have the same meaning as a metaphoric expression has had. Nonetheless, a reasonable rebuttal to this argument is available to the supervenience theorist. He might claim that his theory was to apply to the current situation of language. He could recognize that as languages change different syntactical groupings will be paraphrased differently and some not paraphrasable may become so. Similarly, some expressions which were once metaphors will cease to be

metaphors. But, he could maintain, it will never be the case that a metaphor can be translated accurately into literal speech even though some former metaphors are now a part of literal speech. This rebutting of Beardsley's argument would be successful.

The remainder of Beardsley's discussion of the supervenience theory consists of criticisms of arguments which tend to support that view. This first such criticism is directed against the argument that any accurate paraphrase of a metaphor must include a metaphor. The strategy of Beardsley is to introduce a metaphor and an accurate paraphrase which does not make use of metaphor. That is, he argues by counter example.

"Napoleon is a wolf" means, among other things, "Napoleon is cruel, and the cruelty of Napoleon is like the cruelty of a wolf ..."--here the word "wolf" is used literally, not metaphorically.⁹

This form of criticism suffers from an inherent difficulty; that is, showing that one's counter example is in fact a counter example. Beardsley has offered a purported counter example but fails to prove that it is one. Consider the following reply from a supposed intuitionist: "Beardsley fails to produce a complete paraphrase (as is indicated by the ellipses); further, should he attempt to complete his paraphrase he will still have either an incomplete paraphrase or will say too much." We of course see little value in this reply to Beardsley, but since Beardsley provides no argument for the completeness of his paraphrase he is reduced to begging the question, "Don't you agree that this is a counter example?".

Even if Beardsley's counter example argument holds, it at best defeats only the stronger of two supervenience views. The stronger of the two views is: No metaphor can be paraphrased without the use of further

metaphor. The weaker view: A great many metaphors cannot be paraphrased without the use of further metaphor. This weaker view is not rebuttable by a counter example of its opponent's choosing (in this case Beardsley's choosing). The only argument by counter example which would be significant would use an example which was claimed to be untranslatable in the manner prescribed. (Even with such examples, one's argument would be valid against the weaker claim only if every such example was translatable without metaphor.) The weaker version seems indeed to avoid Beardsley's argument and we find no reason to reject it. A second argument against paraphrase considered by Beardsley is:

... it must be admitted that there is an important difference between a predication that is merely suggested and one that is overtly stated, a difference that explains why we sometimes prefer to suggest rather than state, and it is lost in paraphrase. It is a difference in what I have called predicative weight, the difference between insisting and hinting, saying with force or just barely calling to someone's attention. An overt statement is bound to have more predicative weight than a suggestion, however obvious, and this may be misleading in the paraphrase.¹⁰

Beardsley responds to this argument by noting that one can include in the paraphrase, perhaps as parenthetical remarks, indications of the predicative weight to be understood while it is the case that paraphrases generally do not carry such indications nothing prohibits them from doing so.

The final argument for the supervenience view which Beardsley criticizes is the argument that the paraphrase of a poem would not be a poem. Beardsley correctly indicates that this argument fails to establish the point at issue, namely, that there is no synonymous literal paraphrase. It may be suggested that somehow the discovery of such a paraphrase in some way diminishes the value of the original poem. While it may be the

case that the paraphrase may lack some aesthetic values it may well help understand the sense of the original and increase one's appreciation of the original poem.

Beardsley offers the following summation with regard to the question of paraphrase and literal equivalents.

It does seem that there is no conclusive argument against the possibility, in principle, of paraphrase; but there are excellent reasons for supposing it to be usually impossible in practice. The most that we can even give is a partial paraphrase of a poem, and no matter how elaborate the paraphrase, we shall nearly always feel that something is left out, if the poem is complex. But we note that the reason for this feeling may often be that we are not sure that we have understood all the meaning of the poem, not that we have understood some meaning which we cannot make explicit.... But even if we can seldom in practice, paraphrase all of a poem, we can nevertheless paraphrase any of it we wish to paraphrase.¹¹

While this conclusion is comforting, if one accepts it, it is mistaken in two ways. First, it suggests that when we have doubts about a paraphrase, those doubts stem from a lack of understanding of the metaphor and not from an inability to make explicit some meaning which is understood. (While Beardsley says only this "may often" be the case, context indicates that he believes this to generally be the case.) Second, the passage states that we can paraphrase any of a poem that we wish to paraphrase.

The first mistake appears based upon a belief that one can paraphrase any expression which he understands. We should like to see an argument for this belief. In literal speech we often understand an expression but are unable to find other words which express the same meaning. There is no reason to assume that one can provide a paraphrase, in every case, when one cannot do so with literal speech even when he

understands the expression. Unless Beardsley resorts to circular reasoning by defining 'understand' so as to entail ability to paraphrase it is often the case that we understand linguistic expressions but are unable to explicitly paraphrase them. This is not a peculiarity of metaphor, but a situation of language in general. Beardsley's second error lies in the assumption that we only wish to paraphrase that which we can understand. But what we often wish to paraphrase is that which we do not understand. It is our lack of understanding which motivates our desire for the paraphrase. We want to eliminate the feeling that something is left out. Often it is the part of the metaphor's meaning which we fail to understand that we hope to elucidate by paraphrase.

What Beardsley ought to conclude from his arguments is that no aspect of metaphor as far as we can tell makes it unparaphrasable. It can be paraphrased as well as many vague and ambiguous terms in a literal use. None of the arguments of the supervenience theorist sustain the claim that every metaphor is not paraphrasable or even the weaker claim that some metaphors cannot be paraphrased.

A point at which to criticize the supervenience theory would be that no argument is presented to the effect that every metaphor is unparaphrasable.

Literalist Theory

The literalist theory as described by Beardsley is based on a claim nearly the opposite of the supervenience theory. The literalist theory claims that metaphors are literal expressions. They are elliptical

similes. While this claim is reminiscent of Black's characterization of the comparison view in that elliptical simile is mentioned, it differs significantly in that (1) it makes no claim that every metaphor has a literal equivalent and (2) it claims that metaphors are literal expressions. Metaphor is similar to other literal elliptical expression in that it is in need of no special interpretation.

... if nowadays people nearly always say, "She is the one I adore," it seems artificial to regard it as elliptical for "She is the one whom I adore"--they are not conscious of leaving out anything. But there are sentences where we could say with some confidence that certain words are implicit, though not uttered, because they are needed to complete the sense by ruling out other possibilities. "If he's going, I'm not" requires another "going" rather than "staying," to be understood after "not." The Literalist Theory, then holds that metaphors are elliptical similes. Since there is no fundamental difference they can be understood the way similes are, by the ordinary rules of language, and present no special problems for explication.¹²

This theory is dependent upon the assumptions of the comparison theory, namely, that all metaphors are comparisons or can be reduced to comparisons. Beardsley's objection to this theory makes use of a distinction between two kinds of similes:

(1) An open simile simply states that x is like y--the minutes are like the waves. (2) A closed simile states that x is like y in such and such a respect. In the lines

And custom lie upon thee with a weight,
Heavy as frost, and deep almost as life

(Wordsworth, "Ode: Intimations of Immortality from Recollections of Early Childhood") custom and frost are compared in "heavyness," custom and life in "depth."¹³

Based upon this explanation Beardsley states his criticism:

Closed similes work like metaphors, and can be restated fairly satisfactorily as metaphors. "Custom is frost heavy"--but not all metaphors, I think can be satisfactorily restated as closed similes--for example, in "The moon lies upon the straits," what is it that the moon looks like?

This is the conclusion of our argument against the comparison view, namely that not all metaphors are comparisons. But then Beardsley continues with an unusual claim.

But a metaphor cannot be reduced to an open simile, either, for they work very differently in poetic contexts. The open simile is empty and uncontrolled without a context: A is like B, but in what relevant respects the context has to inform us. The metaphor is full and rich, apart from any context; indeed, the function of the context is rather to eliminate possible meanings rather than to supply them. A metaphor is not an implied comparison.¹⁴

His statement¹⁵ that context eliminates meanings is correct but the statement that context fails to supply meanings is at least misleading. We argue in the final chapter that it is only through the context that some metaphors are meaningful. But here it will suffice to show that his remark is in conflict with his position five pages later.

It must be admitted that we cannot know with certainty that a given attribution is nonsensical, because someone may find a meaning in it that we have overlooked, perhaps by inventing a line of poetry in which the attribution works.

Thus for example, I once made up the expression "laminated government" in class, on the spur of the moment, as an example of nonsense. A student later pointed out to me a very similar expression in a book on government that gives it in context, a definite meaning.¹⁶

Beardsley is arguing that metaphor differs from nonsense in that it makes sense and often it is an appropriate context that produces that sense. This contradicts his position on 146 but is the better of the two positions. Beardsley's best argument against the literalist position is showing as he does that not all metaphors are comparisons.

Controversion Theory

Beardsley calls his own theory the controversion theory.

Its essential principle is that a speaker or writer utters a statement explicitly but in such a way as to show that he does not believe what he states, or is not primarily interested in what he states, and thereby calls attention to something else that he has not explicitly stated--"If he wins, I'll eat my hat." It is discourse that says more than it states, by cancelling out the primary meaning to make room for secondary meaning.¹⁷

The reader, according to Beardsley, sees that the statement made is absurd, yet something is presumably being asserted. "... he looks for a second level of meaning on which something is being said."¹⁸

A bare self-contradiction is just that; but when the modifier connotes some characteristic that can be meaningfully attributed to the subject, the reader jumps over the evident self-contradiction and construes it indirectly, on the principle that the writer knows that he is contradicting himself and wouldn't utter anything at all unless he had something sensible in mind. Then the expression becomes a significant self-contradiction.¹⁹

Beardsley's explanation is much like Henle's "general principle that people try to talk sense."²⁰ Beardsley's model for this explanation is what he calls an 'attribution.' This he defines as:

... a linguistic expression containing at least two words, one of which denotes a class and also characterizes it in some way, and the other of which qualifies or modifies the characterization.²¹

Examples of metaphor on this model are

The man is a fox

and

Metaphysical streets

In these examples 'man' and 'streets' are the subjects and 'fox' and 'metaphysical' are the modifiers. If these are metaphors, on Beardsley's view, then there must be connotations of the modifiers which apply to the subjects.

With this terminology Beardsley restates the controversion theory as follows:

a metaphor is a significant attribution that is either indirectly self-contradictory or obviously false in its context, and in which the modifier connotes characteristics that can be attributed truly or falsely, to the subject.²²

Beardsley characterizes the indirect self-contradiction as involving the attribution of a characteristic to an object when that object's definition excludes that characteristic. Given his examples and talk about connotations it is fair to assume that he would allow 'common knowledge' to replace 'definition' in such a discussion.

As the connotations of the modifiers are more difficult to work out, Beardsley claims, the metaphor is more obscure. But as long as there are connotations the expression is a metaphor. Our understanding of metaphor, on this theory, lies in working out the connotations or, better, discovering which connotations may be predicated meaningfully of the subject. The determination that an expression is a metaphor rather than nonsense depends upon our success in finding meanings:

... even if we put all English adjectives in one hat, and all nouns in the other, and drew them out at random we would find that the strangest combinations yield possible meanings upon reflection.... Moreover it must be admitted that we cannot know with certainty that a given attribution is nonsensical, because someone may find a meaning in it that we have overlooked, perhaps by inventing a line of poetry in which that attribution works.²³

As we discussed earlier, one's success in finding meanings will be dependent, in part at least on the context of the expression.

Our treatment of the contraversion theory is brief. We see very little improvement on the position extracted from Henle's work.²⁴

The position is essentially correct. Some restatement would be required to apply it to metaphors in which a subject term and attributive term are not as obvious. For example the line of Coleridge in "The Rime of

the Ancient Mariner":

And every tongue, through utter drought,
Was withered at the root;

Here it appears there is no single subject or modifier as is suggested by his discussion. If, however, the modifier is allowed to be more than a single word the theory will be sufficiently adaptable. Since Beardsley uses 'connotations' which seem to rule out nothing (except perhaps denotation) he avoids the difficulty of talking about features of objects, or features of meaning which have limited the application of other views to a limited type of metaphor.

Conclusions

The controversion theory stresses a feature of metaphor which had been discussed much before, namely that a literal interpretation leads to contradiction or absurdity. In terms of positive suggestion it offers no great improvement over the considerations of Black and Henle. However, Beardsley's discussion of opposing views illuminates significant questions about metaphor. Those questions are whether: (1) metaphors are meaningful, (2) whether their meaning is paraphrasable in literal terms, and (3) whether the meaning of metaphor is literal. In discussing the emotive theory of metaphor we concluded that metaphors have meaning (or are meaningful) but that such meaning is not customary or conventional. We noted that a metaphor is often meaningful in similar ways within a speaking community and that within a community a metaphor can be used to communicate. Based on this we claimed that metaphors are meaningful. We would agree with Beardsley that if an expression could not be

meaningfully interpreted it is not a metaphor but rather nonsense. We agree with Beardsley's claim that the fact that one test [or interpretation] fails to apply does not render an expression meaningless.

In discussing the supervenience theory we considered in some detail the question of literal equivalents. We noticed that the fact that some metaphoric uses become conventional does not serve as an argument for the possibility of literal equivalent. The claim that no literal use of language is synonymous with a metaphor may mean only that no literal equivalent is available at the time. However, the argument succeeds if the claim was that the meaning of a metaphor had some special characteristic which prohibits its expression by the literal use of speech. Combining these considerations we may claim that the meaning involved in metaphor is not of a different type than that of a literal expression even though the literal expression's meaning is determined by convention. That is, conventions alone may determine the sense of a literal expression.

We noticed that the proposal of examples for testing whether metaphor is translatable will settle nothing since in the end one must beg the question with regard to his literal translation. We agree with Beardsley that predicative weight can be assigned by the literal use of language. Further, we agree that the fact that a literal paraphrase may lack certain poetic qualities is not relevant to the question of whether such paraphrase exists. Indeed it seems that Beardsley is correct in saying that such paraphrase aids in the appreciation of the original.

We noted two important aspects of paraphrase concerning which we found Beardsley in error. We noted that it is not the case that we can

paraphrase every phrase which we understand, whether or not the phrase is a metaphor. Also we noted that it is the aspect of a metaphor's meaning which we fail to understand that often prompts our desire for paraphrase. We hope that the paraphrase will make that meaning clear. Such a paraphrase can, if we discover it, be offered as proof that we understand the metaphor.

Turbayne

Turbayne's discussion of metaphor is primarily concerned with describing how one is used by or taken in by a metaphor. In laying the foundation for such a discussion Turbayne presents a version of the absurdity view. While he more often speaks of the metaphor as inappropriate rather than absurd, he does indicate that a literal interpretation would be absurd and further his work is directed to the consideration of such absurd interpretations.

Turbayne begins his description of metaphor by introducing the notion of sort-crossing. He says:

However appropriate in one sense a good metaphor may be, in another sense there is something inappropriate about it. This inappropriateness results from the use of a sign in a sense different from the usual, which use I shall call "sort-crossing." Such sort-crossing is the first and defining feature of metaphor....²⁵

In producing what he considers a more adequate definition of metaphor, Turbayne makes use of Ryle's explanation of "category mistake." Turbayne presents what he calls the defining feature of metaphor as follows:

Metaphor consists in "the presentation of facts of one category in the idioms appropriate to another."²⁶

Though Turbayne does not claim that this definition of Ryle is to be adopted as the definition of sort-crossing, it is clear from his later remarks that he has made such an adoption. We notice that this will constitute a more narrow construal of 'sort-crossing' than is indicated by the earlier explanation; there, any unusual use of a sign would constitute metaphor. But it is clear that the unusual use must be of the particular kind described by Ryle. But, even with Ryle's help the notion of sort-crossing is none too clear (but we are none too clear about category mistakes either). While the examples given by both Ryle and Turbayne may suggest the sort of thing they have in mind, an example is hardly a definition. And, we would be hard pressed to give a precise explanation of either 'sort' or 'category.' The following discussion by Turbayne may indicate what he intends by 'sort.'

... in a sense some things come with their names on them. We "find" words already standing for things. We also "find" recurrent characteristics, connotations, things already numbered and sorted out, and necessary connections already threaded for us. They are out there a priori, but not a priori to all experience, merely to ours. These categories are as it were, built into our minds through a long tract of time from the moment we appear. They are part of our cultural, not natural, heritage.²⁷

Still we hesitate to attempt any definition of 'sort.' Were there no other ground to challenge Turbayne's view we would reject at least this presentation since the nature of sorts remains unclear. There is however a more solid and obvious criticism to be made of Turbayne's view. That more obvious criticism opposes Turbayne's claim that metaphor involves pretense.

For Turbayne, sort-crossing alone is not a sufficient criterion of metaphor. He holds that, in addition to sort-crossing, metaphor

involves pretense or make-believe. He states:

The use of metaphor involves the pretense that something is the case when it is not.²⁸

In elucidation of the pretense involved in metaphor Turbayne provides an analysis of the metaphor 'man is a wolf.'

... When I say that man is a wolf (metaphorically speaking I am actually giving him a name shared by all other wolves just as if I believe that he is another sort of wolf like the timber-wolf or the Tasmanian wolf, sharing with them all the defining properties of "wolf," or sharing with them inclusion in the denotation "wolf." But though I give him the same name I do not believe he is another sort of wolf. I only make believe he is. My words are not taken literally but only metaphorically. That is, I pretend that something is the case when it is not, and I implicitly ask my audience to do the same.²⁹

In further clarification of the pretense involved Turbayne indicates that there is no pretense about transferring names; that is, "man actually shares the name 'wolf.'"³⁰ One pretends, however, according to Turbayne, that man is a wolf. (We suppose that since Turbayne is a man, when he uses this metaphor, he gets down on all fours and howls at the moon. This is certainly how we would pretend to be wolves.) But according to Turbayne, more is involved here than pretense. He says:

"I do not merely pretend that man shares the properties of wolves; I intend.... Thus when I say that man is a wolf (metaphorically speaking) I intend that he shares some of the properties of wolves but not enough of them to be classified as an actual wolf...."³¹

We wonder at Turbayne's use of 'pretend.' It does not seem to be a conventional use of a term nor does it seem necessary to use the term at all. We notice a distinct difference (which Turbayne, by the way, alludes to) between man being a wolf and man sharing properties with a wolf. If, as is indicated by Turbayne's statement, the point of the metaphor is that man shares properties of wolves, no pretense is necessary. It is clear

that man shares many properties with wolves. To speak here of pretending and intending is unnecessary. One could more easily maintain that the sentence 'man is a wolf' indicates that Man has many of those properties which are shared by other creatures called wolves. When we say, to use another of Turbayne's examples, 'The timber wolf is a wolf,' we surely do not mean that the timber wolf shares all the characteristics of other wolves; if we did, we should be unable to distinguish it from the Tasmanian wolf. What would be crucial to explain is how one fails to mean that man shares a sufficient number of properties to be a wolf. What Turbayne needs to explain is how he manages to "intend that he shares some of the properties of wolves but not enough of them to be classified as an actual wolf...."³² This, he fails to do.

Talk of pretending is somehow out of place. Pretense indicates one makes a show of belief or perhaps attempts to deceive someone. But when one says, 'Man is a wolf' he certainly does not want people to think that he believes that men are wolves; neither does he attempt to deceive his audience. While he does speak as if he would if man were a wolf, neither he nor his audience acts as if man were a wolf. No one pretends. Turbayne might reply to these remarks by observing that we had been used by his metaphor. (Being used by a metaphor is a notion of Turbayne's which we consider later in this section.) But we have looked for the metaphor and found none. If he takes such a position then he must admit to being unclear and failing to present his view in an understandable manner.

Turbayne attempts to shed further light upon the nature of pretense involved by discussing various uses of terms. Returning again to the

'man is a wolf' example, he says:

But when I speak of the timber wolf and the man-wolf it is not a case of referring to two different sorts of wolves. This is so, because the word "wolf" is being used in two different senses even though it is as if it were being used in only one. The two different senses are called the literal and the metaphorical uses of 'wolf.'³³

Here it is unclear as to what would count as using a word as if it had only one sense as opposed to using it as if it were being used in two senses. In his example comparing the timber wolf with the man-wolf, each case was a case of using 'wolf' in one way. And the way 'wolf' was used differed with each case. And it was clear that the word was in each case being used differently from the other. But neither of his examples gives any clue to the feature of use which constitute being used as if there were only one sense (since he clearly does not intend that they be understood as synonymous). It is not at all clear for example, how these examples differ from simple ambiguity (in so far as 'as if' is concerned). This question is of particular import since it is the "as if" feature by which Tyrbayne distinguishes metaphor from ambiguity. In explaining that duality of meaning is not a sufficient criteria of metaphor, he states:

Awareness of duality of meaning, as we have seen is not enough to do it. Neither my awareness of my ability to see the point of a needle at the same time as I say that I can see the point of a joke.... In all these cases I am using words in one or another of these literal senses. I am representing the facts of one sort in words that may be equally appropriate to facts of another. What more is needed to make these expressions metaphorical? The answer lies in the as if or make believe feature already sketched and illustrated.³⁴

Still, Turbayne presents no adequate explanation of the "as if" feature nor any reason for us to agree that metaphor involves pretense or make believe. His talk of words 'being used in two different senses even

though it is as if it were being used in only one" is of no help since Turbayne fails to provide any criteria for such use.

In his explanation, Turbayne indicates that whether an expression is a metaphor is a relative matter; relative that is, to the person uttering or receiving the metaphor.

In considering, among others, the dead metaphors 'machine of nature' and 'kinetic energy,' Turbayne notices that there is usually no pretense since most people are not aware of the original literal meanings. He says:

Placed in their customary contexts these present to him nothing but the fact of literal truth. To the initiated, however, who are aware of the "gross original" senses as well as the now literal senses, they may become metaphors. There are no metaphors per se.³⁵

Thus, according to Turbayne, an expression is a metaphor "for an individual" if he recognizes both meanings and engages in make-believe.

The talk of make-believe or pretense becomes even more significant. We have above brought strong criticism against that feature as it was sketched and illustrated. 'Using two senses of a word as though there were only one' becomes no clearer with repetition; neither does 'pretending that two senses are one.'

While we find little value in Turbayne's explanation of metaphor, we are interested in his discussion of how people (especially philosophers) are misled by metaphor. Turbayne attempts to explain how the literal interpretation of a metaphor which is obviously false or absurd may be taken as true. As a background, Turbayne uses a discussion taken from Black. Turbayne states:

Black's meta-metaphors, however, are more illuminating. They accomodate the feature of attitude shift, and are, therefore,

harbingers of things to come in this book. An effective metaphor, he says, acts as a screen through which we look at the world; or it filters the facts, suppressing some and emphasizing others. It brings forward aspects that might not have been seen at all through another medium...." A good metaphor produces thereby "shifts in attitude."³⁶

Turbayne likens the repeated metaphor to advertising or propaganda in that through repetition it "comes to be believed more seriously."³⁷

As the phrase becomes conventional, the awareness of the duality of meaning is lost while the assumption of truth remains. Turbayne says:

The human characteristics that Aesop pretended were owned by animals have become literally part of their equipment. We no longer make believe that foxes are cunning and lambs gentle. They are. It will take another Aesop to make bulls cruel and lions murderous. When the pretense is dropped either by the original pretenders or their followers, what was before called a screen or filter is now more appropriately called a disguise or mask. There is a difference between using a metaphor and being used by it, between using a model and mistaking the model for the thing modeled. The one is to make believe that something is the case; the other is to believe it.³⁸

Turbayne's point is, it seems, that what begins as a means of explaining one thing in terms of another with an awareness that those other terms are not appropriate and therefore, require careful consideration, becomes an acceptance of that explanation without such awareness. The mind has, for example, become for some a place in which certain events occur.

To provide an explanation of this feature of metaphor, Turbayne introduces a term which parallels 'sort-crossing.' That term is 'sort-trespassing.' While giving the appearance of tying the explanations of use and misuse of metaphor together, the term 'sort-trespassing' suffers all the problems of 'sort-crossing.' The chief among those problems is a lack of explanation of what constitutes a sort. Turbayne explains sort-trespassing by distinguishing it from sort-crossing. Both involve

the presentation of facts of one sort in the idioms of another. This error provided that sort-crossing involves no error provided that one is aware of it. "On the other hand it is a mistake to present the facts of one sort in the idioms of another without awareness. For, to do this is not just to fuse³⁹ two different senses of a sign; it is to confuse them.⁴⁰

Not every case of sort-trespassing involves metaphor, according to Turbayne. One could be confused with regard to different literal meanings of a word. (As he would be if he wondered whether general contentment were a major general or a lieutenant general.) A case of sort-trespassing becomes a case of taking a metaphor literally "only when one of the two different senses confused is metaphorical and this is taken for literal."⁴¹ Returning to the man-wolf example Turbayne claims that one who recognizes the duality of meaning is using the metaphor and making believe. Someone who does not recognize the duality of meaning and believes (as opposed to make believe) that man is a wolf is "taken in" by the metaphor.

For him it is not a case merely of different sorts of values.
In which case for him the assertion that timber wolves and men
are wolves contains no absurdity.⁴²

At this point, the explanation of someone being taken in by a metaphor requires careful explanation. We recall that a metaphor is not a metaphor per se but only for someone. According to that discussion, an expression would not be a metaphor for someone who recognized only a single sense or who was not pretending. If this is the case, then a metaphor which has taken in someone turns out not to be a metaphor. In attempting

to avoid this problem, Turbayne says:

... it is better to say that sometimes the metaphor is not noticed; it is hidden. That is, if X is aware of the metaphor while Y is not, X says that Y is taken in by the metaphor, or being used by it, or taking it literally. But for Y it is not a case of taking the metaphor literally at all, because for him there is no metaphor. He is speaking literally or taking it literally.⁴³

But this discussion seems only to pile complication on complication.

A discussion of 'is aware of' and 'being taken in by' will bring this to light. Given Turbayne's other statements, X's being aware of a metaphor must be a matter of X's being aware that there is a duality of meaning and further that he or someone else is pretending that the expression had but a single meaning. Y, in Turbayne's example, would not be aware of both the duality and the pretense (though he might be aware of one of them). Now, according to the example, Y is said to have been taken in or to have been used by the metaphor. But ordinarily the phrases 'being used' and 'being taken in' indicate that someone was cheated or deceived. But nothing in the examples suggests cheating or deception. That Y was unaware of a duality of meaning or that someone else was pretending, entails no deception or cheating. Such a situation could certainly result in Y's failing to understand the person uttering the expression in question. When one fails to recognize that another is using language metaphorically he would think that the person was confused or uttering nonsense, or perhaps that a sign had been used inappropriately. He might go on to suggest that the speaker needs instruction with regard to certain facts or with regard to language usage. Y might be somewhat perplexed by what he has heard; but he won't be deceived or cheated. To misunderstand another's utterances is not to be deceived. Where communication is

important a user who understands the metaphor is no better off than the listener who does not understand; communication fails to take place.

While we disagree with the details of Turbayne's explanation, we find that it indicates and attempts to explain an important feature of some metaphors. There are cases where it appears that people have made errors through failing to recognize a metaphor. Nevertheless, we are not claiming that anyone has failed to recognize cases of pretense or make believe in regard to metaphor. Rather we claim that they have failed to recognize the fallacy of equivocation, that is, they have failed to notice a change in meaning. As we shall discuss in the next chapter, the metaphorical use of a sentence can express significant truth. When this occurs and the statement is recognized as true, one attempts, among other things, to determine what follows from that statement. One attempts to determine what is implied by this new truth (or perhaps old truth). One falls into error if in the process of his reasoning he attributes to this statement some meaning which is appropriate to its literal, not its metaphorical, use. One could indeed be misled if he accepts an expression as true given one interpretation and then bases his inferences from that expression some other interpretation. This is perhaps what Turbayne attempts to point out when he explains how we are taken in by a metaphor. He says "The long continual association of two ideas especially if the association has theoretical and practical benefit, tends to result in our confusing them."⁴⁴

While it is important to consider the errors which one can fall into when considering a metaphoric explanation, we find that Turbayne's explanation is generally unhelpful. His notion of sort is never explained:

therefore, sort-crossing and sort-trespassing remain a mystery. It is obvious that one is able to use metaphor without pretending or making believe. 'Being used by' or 'taken in by' metaphor similarly contain connotations which are at best misleading. As we have demonstrated above, it is possible to discuss these problems of metaphor without resorting to such misleading terminology.

Conclusions Regarding the Absurdity Theories

Both versions of the absurdity view which we considered indicate important aspects of metaphor. Unfortunately neither of these versions is particularly helpful in understanding metaphor. Beardsley adds little to the work done by Henle. From this, one suspects that Beardsley's basic contention is correct; namely, that the falseness or absurdity of the literal interpretation is our indication that a figurative interpretation is in order. But one also suspects that this observation in itself is not sufficient to explain metaphor. We conclude that Henle's and Beardsley's observations will play an important part in the correct view of metaphor, but more is required for a complete explanation.

Turbayne's explanation considers a problem that has tripped up philosophers in the past. But his introduction of terms such as 'sort-crossing,' 'sort-trespassing' fail to provide either a clear explanation of metaphor or of being misled by metaphor. We noticed that what Turbayne explained as being used by metaphor can be explained without resorting to Turbayne's special terminology. While his discussion does suggest our explanation in terms of the fallacy of equivocation, we find

his discussion raises more questions than it answers.

Both these versions of the absurdity indicate features of metaphor to be explained. Neither constitutes a satisfactory account of metaphor.

NOTES TO CHAPTER V

1. Monroe C. Beardsley, Aesthetics Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1958).
2. Colin Murray Turbayne, The Myth of Metaphor, revised edition (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1962).
3. Ibid., 95.
4. Beardsley, 134-135.
5. Ibid., 135.
6. Ibid., 25.
7. Ibid., 136.
8. Ibid., 434.
9. Ibid., 435.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid., 436.
12. Ibid., 137.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid., 137-138.
15. Ibid., 138.
16. Ibid., 143.
17. Ibid., 138.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid., 140-141.
20. Henle, 183.
21. Beardsley, 138-139.

22. Ibid., 142.
23. Ibid., 143.
24. We treated Henle's work separately since his emphasis was on an explanation of a relational view rather than a statement of a controversion view.
25. Turbayne, 11.
26. Ibid., 26. Turbayne cites: Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1949), p. 8.
27. Ibid., 79.
28. Ibid., 13.
29. Ibid., 14.
30. Ibid., 14-15.
31. Ibid., 15.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid., 17.
35. Ibid., 18.
36. Ibid., 21. Turbayne cites: Black, 287-288.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid., 22.
39. Turbayne's previous mention of fusing meanings is "Any trope can achieve full metaphorshood only but only for that user who fuses the two senses by making believe there is only one sense." Turbayne, 18.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid., 23.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid., 23-24.
44. Ibid., 26.

CHAPTER VI

VERIDICALITY THEORIES

The last feature of metaphor to which we made reference in our introduction was the truth of metaphor. From the point of view of philosophy in general, the most significant question is whether metaphors can be true in the same sense as other statements can be true. The possibility of using metaphor depends upon one's ability to speak truly when doing so. In this chapter we consider the work of philosophers who have treated this question, specifically Goodman,¹ Elliott,² Mew,³ and Myers.⁴ The result of our consideration is that some metaphors are indeed true.

In presenting Goodman's position a question may arise concerning his nominalist position. We do not, here, portray him as a nominalist since in The Languages of Art he does not speak as a nominalist. We take him at his word, rather than reinterpreting in nominalist terms because we believe that a nominalistic interpretation would be inconsistent with positions that he takes.

Goodman proceeds by arguing that some metaphors are true and then discussing the nature of what he calls 'metaphoric truth'. Elliott offers an argument that all metaphors, at least in poetry, are true. Mew's article is written in response to Elliott. While Mew's article is not a complete refutation of Elliott, it offers arguments which should

cause Elliott to weaken his position. Myer's position is that metaphors do not have truth value. Metaphors, he says, may be considered as useful or not useful, but should not be considered as either true or false. We will find Mew's argument unconvincing and maintain our position that at least some metaphors are true.

Goodman

Goodman's presentation treats three major issues: (1) the question of truth in metaphor, (2) an explanation of the nature of metaphor in terms of realm and schema, and (3) the understanding of metaphor.

Goodman's discussions of truth in metaphor relies heavily upon the introduction of the terms 'metaphoric possession' and 'metaphoric truth'. We argue that these terms do not help us understand the nature of truth in regard to metaphor. They only create new problems and tend to hide the central issues.

Goodman's proposal concerning metaphorical truth, we shall argue, is based upon an example which fails to represent many aspects of metaphor. It so fails because it is a dead metaphor. His example is 'This picture is sad'. Such a metaphor, if taken as an example of metaphor in general, gives the appearance that there is some rather obvious interpretation for each metaphor. It is this assumption which leads Goodman to believe that answer to the question of truth is quite straightforward. In failing to recognize the unlimited number of metaphorical uses of an expression, Goodman fails to provide criteria of truth for live metaphor.

Goodman's second concern is the explanation of metaphor in terms of realm and schema. A metaphor, he proposes, results when an old word is

applied to a new set of objects to make distinctions among them which bear some similarity to those made by the conventional use of the term. While we agree that this explanation does characterize some metaphors, we argue that it fails to characterize all metaphor. We find that even for that class of metaphors which is characterized above, the introduction of 'schema' and 'realm' does not facilitate the explanation of a change in meaning.

Goodman's third discussion treats the understanding of metaphor. His explanation is a return to the comparison theory in which he collapses the distinction between metaphor and simile and treats metaphor as elliptical simile. This analysis forms, for him, a basis for rejecting questions regarding the relationship between metaphoric and literal speech (the very question to which he addressed himself). The question is reduced to the question of why some objects have the properties they do, a question which Goodman leaves for the cosmologist. We shall argue that his reduction of this question, if it does indeed follow from his explanation of metaphor as elliptical simile, constitutes a *reductio-ad-absurdum* of his explanation.

We shall end our discussion of Goodman by noticing that it is for the most part based upon the analysis of his example 'This picture is sad'. Given the general theme of the book, it may be that this is the only metaphor (or only type of metaphor) which needed explaining. The presentation does however appear to be intended for all forms of metaphor. We shall note also that the technical terms introduced by Goodman are generally unenlightening and that insofar as the theory in

Languages of Art is correct, it merely reflects the work of Goodman's predecessors in this field, particularly Black and Richards, both of whom he credits.

Metaphoric Truth

Goodman is interested in showing that metaphor is not an alternative to truth; that is, to say that a statement is metaphoric is not to rule out the possibility of that statement's truth. People sometimes say, for example, "'x is p' is false but you can see what I meant." In so doing, they indicate an underlying assumption that a statement which is metaphoric is not true. Goodman argues that there is a sense in which metaphors may be true as well as false.

Goodman initiates his attack on the theory that metaphors cannot be true by considering the death of metaphor. As the novelty of a metaphor wanes, he says, the metaphor becomes more like literal truth. What is lost is the liveliness of metaphor, not its truth. In this discussion lies the following suppressed argument. Dead metaphors are in some cases obviously true. (For example: the statement 'Mary flew into a rage' would be true if Mary became very angry quite suddenly.) In some cases of dead metaphor, however, the only relevant feature to change since its inception is our becoming accustomed to it. These metaphors must, therefore, have been true while live. There are, therefore, true live metaphors. This argument is correct.

Having established that some metaphors are true, Goodman proceeds much as did Kant with his synthetic-a-priori, to show how metaphors can be true. In so doing, Goodman uses as a model the metaphor:

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The picture is literally gray but only metaphorically sad.
But is it literally or metaphorically cold in color?⁵

In attempting to say how it is possible that a painting could be sad, he states:

Metaphorical possession is indeed not literal possession; but possession is actual whether metaphorical or literal. The metaphorical and literal have to be distinguished within the actual.⁶

This statement which is reminiscent of Meinong leads one to wonder whether Goodman is introducing a new metaphysical theory. Although he discussed possession on earlier pages, Goodman fails to distinguish between literal and metaphoric possession and the terms 'metaphorical possession' and 'literal possession' enter the discussion without introduction or explanation. He provides no basis for determining whether a property is possessed literally or metaphorically. We find that we are left to attempt to make some clear sense of this notion of metaphorical possession. We shall now make such an attempt.

To understand metaphorical possession and how it accounts for metaphoric truth, let us consider two statements. The first is rather rare.

(1) 'Metaphorically speaking, this painting is sad'.

This statement is rare because outside a philosophical discussion one seldom labels his metaphors.⁷ But even though this statement is rare, it is easily understood. The phrase 'metaphorically speaking' is used to alert the imperceptive hearer that what follows is not to be interpreted literally. But now consider a statement employing Goodman's terminology which purports to elucidate (1).

(2) 'This painting metaphorically possesses sadness'.

It is this second statement which we need to explain, since if we can

properly use the term 'metaphorical possession' we may be able to see how this concept explains metaphorical truth. One could, of course, take the position that (2) is synonymous with (1). But this position would result in a circular argument since (2) is intended to explain (1), and (2) in turn is explained as meaning the same as (1). Expanded, the circle would be: 'the picture is sad, metaphorically speaking' is true if and only if the picture metaphorically possesses sadness; and by 'metaphorical possession of sadness' is meant 'is sad, metaphorically speaking'. Such an explanation of metaphoric possession will not suffice.

An alternative to this explanation was suggested previously. Statement (2) is straightforward (that is, not in need of any unpacking) and is based upon a new metaphysical theory. Such a theory would include the notion of objects possessing qualities and that such possession would be of two types, literal and metaphorical. But Goodman does not present such a metaphysical theory and we see no ground upon which to base such a theory.

It appears that to speak of metaphorical possession, without a complete explanation of that notion, is to invite problems rather than solve them. If metaphorical possession is to provide a basis for understanding metaphor, some explanation of that notion is required; The Languages of Art provides none.

The problems raised by the use of 'metaphorical possession' and which are in need of explanations can be avoided by rephrasing Goodman's discussion. Such a rephrasing would still make the same point.

The picture is gray (using 'gray' literally) and it is sad (using 'sad' metaphorically). But is the word 'cold' correctly applied to the picture when 'cold' is used metaphorically or literally?

Avoiding the use of 'metaphorical possession' one could go on to say 'the picture has a property which is ascribed to it by the sentence "this picture is sad" when that sentence is used metaphorically.' Further, the property ascribed by the metaphoric use may differ from the property which would be ascribed by the literal use of 'sad,' but nonetheless both properties are real (that is, not fictitious). Goodman could then point out that whether sad was being used literally or metaphorically would as he suggests, depend "upon some such feature as its novelty." Inasmuch as 'metaphorical possession' can be omitted from the discussion, it is preferable to do so and avoid the accompanying problems.

As Goodman pointed out novelty may be our guide with regard to determining metaphoric use. But novelty alone will not suffice. He correctly explains that the respect in which a word is novel is critical. Every application of a predicate to a new event is in some sense novel, yet not every application is a metaphor. The coining of a new word is not metaphor.

Metaphor, it seems, is a matter of teaching an old word new tricks--of applying an old label in a new way.... Briefly, a metaphor is an affair between a predicate with a past and an object that yields while protesting.⁹

In unpacking this metaphor, the following position can be constructed. Three distinct claims appear to be made. (1) "teaching an old word new tricks" indicates that metaphor involves terms which have conventional uses which are different from their use as metaphor; (2) the 'protesting object' indicates that metaphors when interpreted conventionally turn out to be false or at least an inappropriate use of language; (3) since the 'objects yield', one can with sufficient effort determine an interpretation

of the sentence which is fitting. Metaphor, Goodman says, involves an a-priori denial of the metaphoric predicate to the object. "Application of a term is metaphorical only if to some extent contra-indicated."¹⁰ Here Goodman is following Henle, Beardsley and Turbayne.

Goodman has claimed that there is a sense in which metaphors may be true and once again, he sets about explaining 'truth' as applied to metaphor. His first proposal turned on a distinction between metaphorical and literal possession of a property. The present explanation turns upon a distinction between literal and metaphorical truth. Goodman uses the 'sad picture' example to distinguish metaphor from mere falsehood and to introduce the notion of metaphorical truth.

To say that our picture is yellow is not metaphorical but merely false. To say that it is gay is false both literally and metaphorically. But to say that it is sad is metaphorically true even though literally false.¹¹

This distinction would make possible the denial of literal truth without having to reject the statement. A speaker could maintain that we ought to agree with his expression since it is metaphorically true.

Several problems are inherent in the proposed distinction between literal and metaphorical truth and in the explanation of this distinction. The first of these problems follows directly from Goodman's example. Notice that to claim, as he does in his example, that 'the picture is yellow' is not metaphorical but merely false is not to claim that some specific use of the predicate 'is yellow' fails to apply to the picture. It is rather to claim that there is no metaphoric use of the term yellow which applies to the picture either truly or falsely and this may be a hasty conclusion. If pictures can be described as sad they can also be

described as fearful. It may be that the painting is yellow after all, metaphorically speaking. Goodman fails to realize that every predicate has metaphoric uses applied to any object.¹² It may be that one has failed to recognize many such uses and would deny that a predicate has a metaphoric use in a given case. Such cases may require only insightful interpretation. Goodman's example demonstrates that the distinction between metaphoric truth and mere falsehood may not be as easy to make as he indicates. A second problem with Goodman's notion of metaphoric truth is that it apparently violates the law of the excluded middle. The statement that the picture is yellow is, according to Goodman, neither metaphorically true nor metaphorically false, "but merely false". Some sentences it appears are neither metaphorically true or metaphorically false.

A third problem with the notion of metaphorical truth is that the law of non-contradiction apparently fails to apply to metaphorical truth. One such violation of the law of non-contradiction is found in Goodman's statement that the picture is gay. Goodman says this statement is metaphorically false. But suppose that picture was a sad scene of people engaged in homosexual conduct. It would then be a gay picture and the sentence therefore would be metaphorically true. The same sentence would be both metaphorically true and metaphorically false.

The fourth problem with the proposal that we adopt a notion of metaphorical truth is that this notion is not sufficiently characterized. We are not, for example, appraised of the truth functional relationships between literal and metaphorical truth. (We do not know whether to count $(p > q)$ as true where p is literally true and q is metaphorically true but

literally false.) If we are to take this proposal seriously as an explanation of truth, then that explanation must conform to the requirements of standard logics or provide reasons for rejecting those requirements.

Each of the first three objections in itself provides a sufficient ground for rejecting metaphorical truth as an explanation of truth in metaphor. Even if these objections were rebutted, tremendous further work would be required, as indicated in the fourth objection, to make Goodman's proposal realistic and compatible without ordinary uses of 'true'.

Both Goodman's presentation of metaphoric truth and our replies rest upon a fundamental error.¹³ That error lies in assuming that expressions or uses of expressions have truth value which is independent of their meaning. He says: "to say that our picture is yellow is not metaphorical but merely false". In saying this he makes no reference to what one might mean by such an utterance. Whether or not a painting were sad or yellow would depend upon what one means by 'sad' and 'yellow'. It is pointless to talk about the truth of a sentence until its meaning is resolved. And if the sentence is ambiguous, then it is entirely possible that differing truth values would be associated with the alternative interpretations. As Goodman's discussion indicates, 'This painting is sad' is ambiguous. We are not therefore surprised to find differing truth values accompanying the different interpretations. But we find no advantage in calling some of those values literal and others metaphoric.

At this point it is worth noting that the variety of metaphor upon which Goodman bases his explanation is severely limited. In examining

the metaphors recognized by Goodman in this section, we find that they all have a common feature. They are all dead. They have acquired by repetition a second usage and are more properly interpreted as ambiguities than metaphors. This is perhaps responsible for Goodman's willingness to talk about a sentence being metaphorically false, or a picture metaphorically possessing a property. Since the sense intended by the dead metaphor is generally recognized, it is easy to overlook the fact that when attempting to understand a live metaphor one lacks the guidelines provided by conventional use.

In Goodman's further explanation of metaphorical truth we find the assumption that Goodman views metaphor as having only a single (or at least a limited number) metaphorical use. He states:

Nothing can be both sad and not sad unless 'sad' has two different ranges of application. If the picture is (literally) not sad and yet is (metaphorically) sad, 'sad' is used first as a label for certain sentient things or events, and then for certain insentient ones. To ascribe the predicate to something within either range is to make a statement that is true either literally or metaphorically. To ascribe the predicate to something in neither range (I leave other ranges of metaphorical application out of account for the moment)¹⁴ is to make a statement that is false both literally and metaphorically.¹⁵

This explanation of metaphorical truth does appear reasonable. A statement is literally true if and only if the object falls within the literal extension of the predicate.¹⁶ A statement is metaphorically true if and only if the object falls within the metaphoric extension of the predicate. But such an explanation assumes that there are a limited number of metaphorical uses. The problem which arises with the realization that there is no such limit is illustrated by considering Goodman's use of 'ascribe a predicate'.

Goodman is not clear about his use of 'ascribe the predicate to something'. We do not know precisely what is to count as ascribing a predicate. Specifically it is not clear whether ascription is of a word token or of the extension of that token. This distinction may often be overlooked in the discussion of the literal use of speech. In such use the conventions of the language will determine the extension so that in discussing the ascription of a predicate (word token) one may assume the ascription of the word's extension as well. However, in the case of metaphorical use there is not a single extension, but many. Therefore, in ascribing a word token one fails to ascribe a single particular extension and it becomes important to specify whether one is ascribing a word or ascribing its extension.

If the ascription of a predicate is to be construed as the ascription of a word token, then the explanation of metaphorical truth must be revised. Such a revision might be "A statement is metaphorically true if and only if the object falls within one of the metaphoric extensions of the predicate." But such a revision would be subject to two objections. (1) In attempting to determine the truth value of a metaphor one will never have a guarantee that he has exhausted the possible extensions (or ranges) of any given predicate which is being used metaphorically. The determination that a particular metaphor is false would be, according to this theory, impossible to make. It would be impossible since one must show that the object does not fall within any of the ranges and there is no method of determining when one examined every metaphoric range. (2) Such a definition would be too restrictive. One may want to say of a metaphor that it is false, even though the object may fall within one

of the ranges of the metaphoric predicate.

Goodman, for example, wants to maintain that it is false that the painting is gay. And we would want to agree that the painting is not gay, in one sense of 'gay' but it may be gay in another.

Both these objections indicate a problem with treating the ascription of a predicate as a matter of ascribing a word token. Such an ascription in the case of metaphor fails to ascribe a single or even definite number of extensions or ranges. If truth is to be a matter of an object's being within a range, then there must be some procedure for specifying the intended range. These observations indicate that perhaps one ought to view ascribing a predicate as assigning a particular range or extension rather than a word token. It is clear that this is not Goodman's position since the predicates which he ascribes may have more than one range.¹⁷ Such a move even if permitted by Goodman, would not be of appreciable assistance in explaining metaphor. Although an explanation of truth would be provided, the theory will be uninteresting. If one claims that to ascribe a predicate is to ascribe an extension or range rather than a word, one avoids the problem of a great many extensions and will insure a unique truth value. But this amounts to saying that the provision of a specific meaning insures a unique truth value. Such a statement nicely avoids the above mentioned problems; it also avoids precisely that which needs to be explained about metaphor, namely:

(a) How does one determine the appropriate extension of a metaphor? (How does one choose the appropriate interpretation).

(b) Is there generally one interpretation that could be deemed the appropriate interpretation?

Talk about ranges or extensions is useful only if there is some method of determining the various ranges and which range is appropriate. We can agree with Goodman when he says, "Whereas falsity depends upon misassignment of a label, metaphorical truth depends upon reassignment."¹⁸ We can agree, that is, if Goodman will talk about truth rather than metaphorical truth. But in metaphor the possibilities for reassignment are limitless, both in variety and in number.

Goodman's talk about ranges does indicate a recognition that one of the problems to be faced in a discussion of truth is metaphor is ambiguity. But his discussion fails to account for the great variety of ranges. When one's model of metaphor is a dead metaphor then the number of ranges appears limited. It seems obvious in such a case that one has a question of literal truth and another question of metaphoric truth. But given the unlimited potential for interpretation there are an unlimited number of truths to consider. The real problem of how to determine an appropriate interpretation remains. If one can settle upon an interpretation, the question of truth in metaphor is the same as the question of truth in the literal use.

Realm and Schema

While we find that Goodman's talk about ranges has failed to substantiate his position with regard to truth, we are still interested in his discussion with regard to ranges. It is clear that any complete discussion of metaphor must, in some way, account for the great variety of uses of any particular expression when employed metaphorically.

Goodman's difficulty is after all not that he denied expressions had different uses, but rather that he failed to take account of the great variety of uses. We examine Goodman's discussion of the reassignment of range with the expectation that it will account for the shift in meaning which takes place in metaphoric use.

Goodman introduces the notion of "realms" as a means of explaining the reassignment of metaphor. He indicates that even within the scope of literal usage the sense of a term depends upon the general limits of the current discourse. What will count as red, for example, will depend upon whether one is distinguishing red from non-red over the entire universe of colored objects or whether one is distinguishing red from red-orange and red-violet. According to his discussion, the realm of a label is a universe of objects among which that label is selective. In the present example, the realm of 'red' would be the set of colored objects. Goodman, after providing this reasonably intuitive example, defines 'realm' as follows:

The aggregate of the ranges of extension of the labels in a schema may be called a realm. It consists of the objects sorted by the schema -- that is, of the objects denoted by at least one of the alternative labels.¹⁹

To understand this definition we find that we must determine the sense of the term 'schema'. This term is not defined by Goodman, but his use of it is sufficient to establish that (1) schemata sort objects, (2) labels function within schemata, (3) a label may belong to any number of schemata, and (4) schemata are constituted by labels. Goodman states:

The alternatives of a schema need not be mutually exclusive; for instance, a set of color terms with some of their ranges overlapping and some included in others will serve.²⁰

It would seem then that a schema is a set of predicates, not a sentence (or grammatical formula) and that a schema consists of the set of predicates which sort the members of a given range. However fitting this explanation may seem, we soon realize its circularity. The predicates which compose the schema are determined by the realm and the realm is constituted by the extension of the predicates which are members of the schema. Further, it does not appear possible to explain without circularity which predicates constitute any particular schema. One would like to say it is composed of those predicates which are alternatives to the label in question within the given realm. What the alternatives of the label are will be determined by the context and custom. The circularity of the explanation lies in the fact that 'realm' is defined as the aggregate of the ranges of the extensions of the predicates in the 'schema' and the schema is the set of predicates whose extensions form the realm. This circularity will not be fatal as long as further remarks are sufficient for us to understand the position and as long as we base no further conclusions upon the assumption that an explanation has been provided.

The alternative labels which together with the label under discussion are not generally specified, either in literal or metaphoric use. We understand from context, for example, that 'red' is functioning as an alternative to 'red-violet' or 'red-orange'. If we consider 'sad' we find it used in contexts as an alternative to 'happy', 'angry', 'joyous', etc. Generally, 'sad' with these alternatives would compose the 'schema', the realm being people or other sentient beings.

Goodman makes use of our understanding of 'realm' and 'range' to explain what transpires when metaphor is used. He states:

Metaphor typically involves a change not merely of range but also of realm. A label along with others constituting a schema is in effect detached from the home realm of that schema and applied for the sorting and organizing of an alien realm.²¹

In the 'sad picture' example, the new realm is that of works of art. Pictures are organized in terms of 'sad', 'happy', etc. The range of the term 'sad' now includes the members of the new realm, and it appears that change in realm would indicate that the new realm was not an expansion of the old realm to include pictures but that the metaphoric use of sad no longer applied to sentient beings. This claim about his theory seems justified by his willingness to separate metaphorical sadness from literal sadness.

Consider this explanation of metaphor as it would be applied to the following example:

The lion of England leaped upon the infidels.

We might say that 'lion' and its schema is detached from a home realm where it serves to separate one beast from another; other members of the schema might be 'cow', 'dog', 'dodo'. In its new realm, 'lion' sorts people, perhaps kings, from commoners or the courageous from cowards. But when we look for some justification of this analysis we can find none, given Goodman's theory. Specifically there is no justification for the choice of the home realm. In Goodman's theory, labels seldom operate in a unique realm. ("... even a label with a unique range seldom operates in a unique realm.")²² We have no basis upon which to pick one realm over another as the home realm. While it is true that the reference of

a metaphoric use of an expression is not that which we would expect from the literal use, talk about home and foreign realms is helpful only if we can establish what is to constitute the home realm.

Goodman's explanation of metaphor in terms of changing realms does not square with what speakers of a language do when they utter or interpret metaphor. There is no evidence that each time one speaks metaphorically that he has in mind some set of predicates (the schema) which he intends to transfer to a new realm. Even if it could be established that an author always had in mind a set of alternative predicates whose referents establish a home realm, since authors nearly always fail to announce those predicates, his audience would have no idea what they were.

Explanations in terms of realms are subject to both theoretical and practical criticism. Although it might seem rewarding to talk about transferring a schema from its home realm, it is not clear that a predicate has a home realm. It seems rather that predicates have many realms, none of which is home. From the practical side we find that talk about realms does not help in understanding what people do when they use or understand metaphor. Goodman has provided no evidence that authors have in mind sets of predicates when they use metaphor or that their audiences recognizes those sets of labels. Our argument here is not that words fail to have common or conventional uses or meanings. Nor is our argument that the metaphoric use of a term is dependent in part at least on the way it is used literally. Our argument is that Goodman's talk about schemata and realms is of no help in explaining the relationship between literal and metaphoric uses.

Talk of shifting schemata between realms may have some merit with regard to understanding particular metaphors. One can explain the significance of a Particular metaphor, in some cases, by showing that the word is used metaphorically to sort items in a way similar to that in which it is used to sort items when used literally.²³ Consider Goodman's discussion of the sad picture. It is the case that mentalistic terms generally (perhaps even now by convention) are applied to works of art in ways that suggest Goodman's analysis. That is, the opposites of mentalistic terms when applied literally (say to humans) remain their opposites when applied to art. For example, the opposite of a sad picture would be a happy picture. A non-sad picture might be angry. But this example is once again too narrow to form the basis of a theory of metaphor. Consider another example to which the above analysis is ludicrous. This example is the equally dead metaphor concerning King Richard.

'Richard is a lion.'

'Lion' is not used as the opposite of 'gorilla'. When Richard is called a lion it is not to distinguish him from a gorilla, or some other beast, but to indicate that he has some characteristics of the lion. If it were said that Richard was not a lion, we would not set out to determine whether he might not be a kangaroo in the way that we might attempt to determine whether a non-sad picture was angry. It would not be silly to attempt to determine whether a non-sad painting was happy. While 'sad' continues to function among its usual alternatives (or schema) in the metaphor examined, 'lion' does not.

Various metaphors may be explained in terms of realm and schema as is indicated by the 'sad picture' example.²⁴ But the adoption of such an explanation as a paradigm is unsuccessful and cannot be generalized to apply to all metaphors. It seems that this is the case with Goodman's discussion of realms.

Overlooking the technical considerations and attempting to examine the general position with regard to realms, we find Goodman's statement so obvious as to be trivial. It is no surprise that metaphor is a new use of a word, that it is applied to groups of objects to which words of that type were not thought to apply, that some metaphorical statements are true and others false, and that there is a change of extension when a word is used metaphorically. The important question of how one is able to understand the new extension of terms used metaphorically remains unanswered.

Understanding Metaphor

We have, in this chapter, pointed out that the most significant problem to be answered by a theory of metaphor is how one understands metaphor. We claimed that a discussion of the truth of metaphor which is independent of the discussion of its meaning leads to unreasonable difficulties. But, in answer to questions regarding the understanding of metaphor Goodman responds:

Presumably we are being asked, rather, for some general account of how metaphorical use of a label reflects its literal use.²⁵

Goodman proposes two answers to this question. The first, which he attributed to Cassier, is presented and dismissed. Metaphor, according

to that theory, is a matter of using a term, in an unconventional way, but in a way that it was used at an earlier period in one's linguistic development. Goodman provides the following example. An infant applies the term 'mama' to everyone, later narrowing its application until it is used to denote a single person. 'Mama' may later be used metaphorically as applying to all females. Goodman's reply to this proposal seems sufficient.

... however illuminating it may be, and however true for some cases, it obviously does not explain the metaphorical application of all or even most terms. Only rarely can the adult adventures of a label be thus traced back to childhood deprivations.²⁶

Goodman then considers the view that metaphor is essentially elliptical simile. Although he does not say that this is his view, he does not criticize it (intentionally). It seems, from the manner of presentation, to be an explanation with which he agreed. In any event, we are more interested in evaluating positions than attributing them. Goodman states:

Metaphor has often been construed as elliptical simile, and metaphorical truth as simply the literal truth of the expanded statement.²⁷

This is again essentially a statement of the comparison view and fails to overcome the objection that one of the objects being compared is not mentioned. This difficulty is particularly clear in Goodman's own example.

But the simile cannot amount merely to saying that the picture is like the person in some respect or other; anything is like anything else to that extent. What the simile says in effect is that person and picture are alike in being sad, the one literally, the other metaphorically. Instead of metaphor reducing to simile, simile reduces to metaphor; or rather the difference between simile and metaphor is negligible. Whether the locution be

"is like" or "is", the figure likens picture to person by picking out a certain common feature: That the predicate "sad" applies to both, albeit to the person initially and to the picture derivatively.²⁸

Goodman has here constructed for us the comparison which is to be the explanation of his example: 'sad picture'. While considering the metaphor as a comparison may explain some meaning, Goodman fails to explain how one knows that a person is that to which the picture is to be compared. In the original metaphor, no persons were mentioned. There is no evidence that the comparison need be between picture and person at all. Many other objects are at times sad, dogs, trees, buildings, chimpanzees, etc. The comparison theory of metaphor will explain our use and understanding of metaphor only if it includes an explanation of our knowledge of what is to be compared.

Goodman's own example gives rise to additional objections to the comparison view since it appears to be a counterexample. When we say of a painting that it is sad, we do not intend to ascribe to the painting those characteristics which would lead us to say that a person was sad. Goodman's explanation of the comparison turns upon a vacuous similarity. Goodman says, we recall, "What the simile says in effect is that person and picture are alike in being sad, the one literally and the other metaphorically."²⁹ We notice that what is alike is the fact that the same word is ascribed to both objects. But the fact that the same word is ascribed to distinct objects fails to establish any further similarity. Consider Goodman's line of argument applied to a different subject. A turn to starboard is similar to a morally acceptable action in that the word 'right' applied to both. We do not say that a starboard turn and a

good action are alike in being right, the one directionally, the other morally. The fact that the same sign type (or replicas of a sign) applied to two objects or events does not indicate that the objects are similar (that they have anything in common other than the application of a particular sign).³⁰ To explain the comparison involved in the comparison theory of metaphor one needs to do more than observe that a word is applied to different objects since such an application often indicates no comparison at all. Even, as in the case above, the fact that a word is correctly applied to two objects does not guarantee a comparison or a similarity between the objects. If, as a matter of fact, some metaphors are comparisons, more will be required to explain metaphor than the observation that the same word is applied to distinct objects.

Here, we need to carefully distinguish the explanation in Languages of Art from that offered by others who claim that similes are metaphors or vice versa. Wheelwright, for example, is concerned to show that the distinction between metaphor and simile is not a grammatical distinction. As noted in the introduction, one often hears "a metaphor is a comparison without the use of 'like' or 'as'." Such a statement would appear to distinguish metaphor on the basis of grammar. But Wheelwright argues that changing the grammatic structure of a metaphor so that it includes 'like' or 'as' will not change its meaning. The simile which results is not a comparison, but rather a metaphor. Wheelwright does not claim that there is no distinction between metaphor and simile, he claims rather that aesthetically important similes are in fact metaphoric and that some

apparent metaphors are only similes. That is, he distinguishes metaphor from comparison.

In examining Goodman's position, we find that he is not following Wheelwright in distinguishing metaphor from comparison, but is rather collapsing them and, in effect, treating metaphor as elliptical simile. Although the talk of literal and metaphorical application gives some appearance of rejecting that claim, we again recall that he stated:

... the difference between simile and metaphor is negligible. Whether a locution be 'is like' or 'is', the figure likens picture to person by picking out a certain common feature: that the predicate 'sad' applies to both, albeit to the person initially and to the picture derivatively.³¹

His claim that the difference between simile and metaphor is negligible is essentially a matter of reducing both to comparison. This treatment of metaphor as comparison provides the basis for Goodman's discussion of the relationship between metaphor and literal speech, which we now consider.

In explaining metaphor as elliptical simile, Goodman has made the following statements:

- (1) Metaphor is to be explained as comparison.
- (2) That explanation is based upon the observation that the same predicate is applied to two objects.

Holding this position one might quite naturally ask the question which Goodman asks; namely:

"... What sort of similarity must obtain between what a predicate applies to literally and what it applies to metaphorically."³²

(We recognize that Goodman presents this question here only to be rejected.) Such a question would be asked since there seems to be more than a fortuitous relationship between the metaphorical and literal

application of a term. But Goodman does not attempt to answer this question. Instead he argues that there is no good answer to this question. We cannot, for example, explain what objects must have in common to have a single predicate apply literally. They must, of course, have in common some property.

But what property? Obviously the property named by the predicate in question; that is, the predicate must apply to all things it must apply to. The question why predicates apply as they do metaphorically is much the same as the question why they apply as they do literally. And we have no good answer in either case, perhaps that is because there is no real question.³³

With this final argument we are to be satisfied as having an explanation of a metaphor. That there is no good answer is perhaps a sufficient basis for rejecting a question (assuming that the lack of an answer is not a matter of ignorance). But we are not satisfied.

When a rejected question is the reasonable result of a previous explanation, the rejection of the question is a strong argument for rejecting the explanation. We recall that what was to be explained was "... how metaphorical use of a label reflects its literal use".³⁴ In following Goodman's line of reasoning, we find that metaphor is essentially a comparison. (Goodman states: "the figure likens picture to person by picking out a certain common feature....")³⁵ The common feature he notes is the application of the same word to two objects (in his example 'sad' is applied to both the person and the picture). But this leaves unanswered the original question of how the metaphorical use reflects literal use. Given his adoption of the comparison view, Goodman interprets this question as being "what sort of similarity must obtain between what a predicate applies to literally and what it applies to

metaphorically."³⁶ And it is this question that Goodman rejects. Notice, however, that this unanswerable question arises only from the discussion of metaphor as comparison, comparison in terms of similarities, and similarities in terms of properties. The fact that the attempted explanation of how metaphorical use reflects literal use results in unanswerable questions should constitute a *reductio ad absurdum* of that explanation. Rather than a complete explanation with assurance that no further questions remain, Goodman's discussion serves better as an argument against viewing metaphor as comparison. When an explanation leads to an unanswerable question, it does no good to claim that 'there is no real question,' particularly if that question is the one which initiated the attempted explanation.³⁷ What is required is that one attempt some other explanation.

Goodman's argument, by way of error, does indicate an important aspect of metaphor. Goodman claims "The question why predicates apply as they do metaphorically is much the same as the question why they apply as they do literally".³⁸ It is, of course, the case that the questions are much the same (they differ only in the occurrence of one word). But from this, Goodman infers that the answers to those questions will be much the same.³⁹ It may be the case, as he suggests, that no general statement will explain what similarities things must have to be denoted by a single predicate. But there is, on a different level, an answer to the question of how in literal use, predicates apply to objects. That answer is that the literal use of predicates is a matter of convention. If we can speak a language, if we are familiar with its

conventions we can apply predicates (in literal use). Should we, however, encounter a word for which we did not know the conventions we would be unable to apply it. We could only guess at its meaning. This explanation is of course trivial. But this trivial explanation does not apply to metaphor. The reason a predicate in metaphorical use applies as it does is not explained entirely as a matter of convention. One of metaphor's key features is transcendence of convention in some respect. Nonetheless, one must be familiar with conventions to understand the new metaphoric use. But we do not need to learn a new set of conventions to understand metaphor. We are able to determine the new reference, that is, the reference of the term used metaphorically, based upon our knowledge of the reference of the literal use of that term. It is obvious that the application of a predicate in metaphoric use must be explained on some basis other than, or in addition to, familiarity with conventions. The fact that a trivial answer will satisfy one question (even if only at an elementary level) but will not satisfy another is an indication of a significant difference between these questions. Given that the same explanation will not suffice for metaphoric use, we are still left with the question of the relationship between the metaphorical and literal uses of language.

Goodman concludes his discussion of this issue on the following note of finality:

At any rate, the general explanation why things have the properties literal and metaphorical, that they do have ... why things are as they are ... is a task I am content to leave to the cosmologist.⁴⁰

But this comment surprises us since it seems that the question has been reversed. Our question began as one concerning the relationship of

literal and metaphoric use (and perhaps how the literal and metaphoric use of predicates makes reference to the properties which things have). We find that it has now been reversed. It is Goodman's analysis of this issue which leads from consideration of the use of language to the consideration of cosmology. We agree that such questions ought to be left to a cosmologist. But since Goodman's analysis has led to a dead end (one might have expected this since he examined only dead metaphors) we recommend that some other analysis be attempted which avoids cosmological questions.

Conclusions with Regard to Goodman's Theory

The conclusions resulting from Goodman's theory are essentially advice to avoid certain problems. First, we must take care in using the adjective 'metaphoric'. It is all too easy to avoid the serious questions and provide what appears to be an explanation by modifying the terminology employed in the philosophy of language with that adjective. One might, for example, be tempted, as was Goodman, to say that a metaphor is true if and only if the subject falls within the metaphoric extension of the predicate. But such a move only pushes the question back to the question, how does one know which of all the possible extensions of the predicate is indicated by a particular metaphoric use? Questions of metaphorical truth fare a similar result. What needs to be explained is how metaphors can be true where truth is construed to be one of two mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive truth values. Given this requirement, the introduction of 'metaphorical truth' will be either a circumlocution which could be eliminated, or it is the proposal

of another truth value. Neither of these will enlighten us with regard to the original question. In our discussion, we shall be careful to use 'metaphorical' to modify 'use' and attempt to explain how the metaphorical use of a sentence can be true.

Second, Goodman's work should also serve as a further caution against basing our efforts upon a model which does not fairly represent metaphor in general. We notice in particular that Goodman's example of metaphor lacks those qualities which the poet finds most important, particularly the limitlessness of possible interpretation. It is surprising that Goodman overlooks this since it is this characteristic which often makes metaphor the nemesis of Philosophy. Even if our objections to the theory in Languages of Art fail to hold, that work would fail to account for an important (perhaps the most important) aspect of metaphor. If examples are to be used as models, they must be chosen so as to reflect the great variety in metaphor. One must then adopt either a theory to explain them all or several theories to explain several distinct types of metaphor.

Elliott and Mew

While Elliott considers metaphor, he does not purport to offer a complete explanation of metaphor. His article is written as a response to Arnold Isenberg's, "The Problem of Belief".⁴¹ But in that response he considers the relationship between the interpretation of a metaphor and the truth of the metaphor. Of particular interest to us is his objection to Isenberg's contention that understanding is independent of truth. Elliott says of Isenberg:

He maintains that if we wish to affirm or deny something which is said to us, we must understand what is said before we can look for truth or falsity. This shows that it is possible to understand a poem without being concerned with its truth or falsity.⁴²

In reply to this argument, Elliott argues that in many cases of metaphor, one cannot understand the expression without determining its truth.

Of the various interpretations of a metaphor, some will result in truth, others falsehood or obscurity. According to Elliott, when we attempt to determine the meaning of a metaphor, we attempt to interpret it so that it is true. Elliott says:

We begin from a preliminary or initial grasping of meaning and proceed to establish the 'full' or exact meaning which is the meaning of the poetic sentence. It is as having that meaning that the poetic sentence is verified, but the process of verification is identical with the process by which the meaning is established.⁴³

In considering a particular metaphor we arrive at an interpretation because that interpretation results in a true statement. On Elliott's view, one assumes the truth of the metaphor and seeks an interpretation to support that assumption. Elliott says:

... verification of the poetic sentences is accomplished in the process of discovering their meaning. In all such cases, the verification movement is a necessary one.... In many cases the only alternatives are truth and obscurity. Where alternative interpretations are available, we normally prefer that which not only gives a poem meaning but enables it to mean truly.⁴⁴

The import of Elliott's position is that, if he is correct, asking for the truth value of an interpreted metaphor is unnecessary because in determining its meaning, we presupposed its truth. Elliott's remarks were all to be applied to poetry. But it seems reasonable to consider them as recommendations for understanding metaphor in general. We will do so with the recognition that some of the criticisms of his theory

would not be justified if we limited his theories application to poetry as he did.

There are several confusions in Elliott's work. The first is confusion of truth with belief. He fails to clearly distinguish truth from belief and speaks as though our opinion as to what is true were always correct. At best, one will be able to interpret the metaphor so that it appears to be true. A change in his explanation from statements about truth to statements about belief would save, for a time, his theory. His statement could then be revised from:

... we normally prefer that interpretation which not only gives a poem meaning but enables it to mean truly,⁴⁵

to

we normally prefer that interpretation which not only gives a poem meaning but enables it to mean something which we believe to be true.

On this revision, the interpretation will be based upon belief rather than truth.

Peter Mew, in his article "Metaphor and Truth",⁴⁶ criticizes yet another aspect of Elliott's theory. According to Elliott, we often determine the sense of metaphor by recognizing its truth. If, however, no true sense were perceived, we should be unable to determine its full meaning. Mew says:

One obvious and crucial defect in Elliott's view is that it can provide no explanation of how it is that certain false open metaphorical statements are not generally regarded as vague (rough, imprecise). Of the world, Hamlet says:

... tis an unweeded garden
That grows to seed; (Hamlet, Act I Scene 2)

And of life, Macbeth says:

... it is a tale
Told by an idiot, (Macbeth, Act 5, Scene 5)

Perhaps these statements are true, but I know many people who believe them false, yet who have never complained of their vagueness, imprecision or obscurity.⁴⁷

Elliott has failed to account for the fact, according to Mew, that some people understand the meaning of metaphors, yet nonetheless consider them to be false.

Mew, however, reminds us of a distinction that ultimately provides the basis for our objection to his argument. That distinction is between open metaphor and the closed metaphor. He explains this distinction, making use of a couplet by Pope:

So well-bred spaniels civilly delight
In mumbling of the game they dare not bite.

The Pope metaphor is an example of an open metaphorical statement in that nothing is done explicitly, or implicitly through the use of context, to specify the characteristics of civil behavior which are thought to satisfy the same description of the spaniel's behavior. An example of a closed metaphor would be:

(c) The heavyweight champion of the world is an elephant,
he's massive and trundles along clumsily wherever he goes.

In this second case, the specification of elephant characteristics is made.⁴⁸

The context of the closed metaphor determines which sense is intended. The truth value of such metaphors under various interpretations will have no bearing upon which interpretation is correct. Thus Elliott's position is refuted.

Elliott has available a reply to this criticism. He could apply Mew's distinction between the open and closed metaphor to support his own position. This could be done by broadening somewhat the notion of

context to include matters other than immediate literary context. Those examples from Shakespeare which were offered by Mew as counter-examples are in fact closed metaphor. They are closed by prior interpretation. The understanding of those who find them false is a borrowed understanding. The sense of these metaphors was discovered by persons who found them to be true. Had the people, mentioned by Mew, come upon these metaphors in isolation without the assistance of someone who perceived their truth, they would not have discovered the meaning. Having shown the counter-examples to be closed metaphor, Elliott then needs only to weaken his claim so that it applies solely to open metaphors.

While his explanation appears not to apply to the closed metaphor, Mew's discussion does not show that it fails to hold for open metaphors. That is, it may still hold for metaphors which are still in need of interpretation. But there is yet another objection to Elliott's theory. It appears to lead to paradox. Consider the following pair of open metaphors.

(22) 'Green ideas sleep furiously'

(23) 'It is not the case that green ideas sleep furiously'

(23) is the direct denial of (22). If the notions of true, false, and negation are to maintain their usual significance then (22) and (23) must have opposite values. But on Elliott's analysis, they are both to have true interpretations. Faced with the choice of abandoning Elliott's analysis or abandoning the convention use of 'true', 'false' or 'denial', we choose to abandon Elliott's analysis.

It seems that Elliott felt that our choices were between truth and obscurity as opposed to truth and falsity. It seems clear from the last example that our choice is between a meaningful interpretation (without regard for truth value) and obscurity. In short, we should choose an interpretation which makes sense. It seems that Elliott failed to realize that an interpretation which makes sense could be false.

The appeal of Elliott's suggestion that we select a true interpretation for the metaphor lies in our confidence in the poet. "When a poet makes a statement which is obviously false we normally assume that he did so intentionally and look for the point of the falsehood."⁴⁹ Our assumption is that the poet's statements must be true in some sense. We believe he has an understanding of some phenomenon and is attempting to communicate that understanding to us. But in spite of our confidence, the possibility that we or the poet are in error remains. It is possible that the author is misinformed about facts or has made some other mistake. It is clear that an author could be incorrect. A correct theory must therefore leave open the possibility of the falsehood of metaphor.

Even though Elliott presents an interesting argument, little is established concerning the truth value of metaphors. His discussion does lead us to realize that either from confidence in, or charity towards an author we attempt to interpret metaphor so that we believe it to be true. Failing at that, we attempt to interpret the metaphor so that it makes sense. Our argument on the previous page establishes that one has the choice between recognizing that metaphor may be either true or false, or giving up some basic considerations of logic.

Myers

Concern with truth often leads one to consider the logical relationships holding between metaphors and other statements. Earlier in this chapter, we criticized Goodman for failing to take such relationships into account. An article⁵⁰ by C. Mason Myers discusses the possible ascription of truth value to metaphor by investigating such logical relationships. The result of his consideration is the claim:

In philosophical discussions it will generally be a mistake to regard a statement that is only mediately informative about x (a metaphor) as true or false of x in the ordinary sense of the words. Rather we should speak of the usefulness or lack of usefulness of such a statement for the understanding of x .⁵¹

This claim advises against our earlier position that metaphors could be either true or false. Myers' claim purports to have a logical basis and invites consideration of the logical implications among statements and beliefs. Myers relies heavily on the work of Henle, and Myers' vocabulary of technical terms closely parallels that of Henle.

If S is (an immediately informative statement), it will imply a determinate set of statements about some object of thought x , the falsity of any one of which implies the falsity of S , but if S is (a metaphor) then a given interpreter I_1 can be guided by S to accept a certain set C_1 of statements about x and a second interpreter I_2 can be guided by S to accept a certain set of C_1 of statements about x such that C_1 can contain statements not in C_2 and vice versa, and where it is possible a member of C_1 is incompatible with a member of C_2 . If P is a statement in C_1 (or C_2), then the falsity of P does not necessarily imply that S is a false statement about x but only that I_1 (or I_2) has been misled by S .⁵²

One notices that Myers, in characterizing the relationships involved in literal speech, discusses implication; in discussion of metaphoric use he does not mention that which is implied but rather that which people will be guided to accept. What is not discussed is that which one will

be guided to accept by a literal statement. Consider the relationships in such a case. They will be essentially the same as in the case with metaphor. A literal statement would lead interpreter I_1 to accept a set of sentences C_1 and interpreter I_2 to accept a set C_2 . And the statements in C_1 need not be consistent with statements in C_2 . In fact, it may be that sets C_1 and C_2 are not themselves consistent (that is, a statement may lead one to believe (unwittingly) contradictory things). It would be the case that the falsity of a member of C_1 or C_2 would not imply the falsity of S . But this provides no basis for withholding the assignment of truth value to S . In short, that which people are led to believe has nothing to do with logical relationships among statements and can not form a basis for withholding the ascriptions of truth values from metaphor.

If we draw the parallel in the other direction, namely, consider those sentences implied by the metaphor, we still find no basis for the intended distinction. The problem with determining which sentences are implied by a metaphor is the result of the ambiguity (openness to alternative interpretation) of the metaphor. Prior to engaging in a discussion of the logical relationships of any ambiguous expression one attempts first to resolve the ambiguity, that is, settle upon a single interpretation. In Elementary Logic,⁵³ Quine suggests resolving ambiguity as follows:

[some words] have the effect, in these examples, of allowing the truth value of a sentence to vary with the speaker or scene or context. Words which have this effect must be supplanted by unambiguous words or phrases before we can accept a declarative sentence as a statement. It is only under such revision that a sentence may as a single sentence in its own right, be said to have

a truth value.... The methods of technical analysis will be fashioned in conformity with the understanding that a statement is a sentence which is uniformly true or uniformly false independent of context, speaker, time and place of utterance.⁵⁴

On reading Quine, we find the motivation for denying that sentences which are ambiguous have truth values. The methods of technical analysis are appropriate only to sentences which have "in their own right" a single truth value. In line with our terminology we would say that such a sentence would have the same truth value in any of its uses or contexts. Such a requirement would, however, deny truth values to a very large number of literal English sentences, which because of context were not considered ambiguous. Such a move in discussing English has the disadvantage of failing to correctly represent the facts of language and its use. This move we take Myers (but not Quine) to be making. Myers may be attempting to follow this move of formal logic, but has failed to notice that the logician is primarily interested in formal languages and techniques for their application; Myers is purporting to deal with natural languages. Quine's move is not to declare that ambiguous sentences of natural language have no truth value and are to be typed useful or not useful; he rather directs us to resolve the ambiguity prior to the attempt to apply the technical analysis. In this respect, metaphor differs little from simple ambiguity or amphibole. To return to the considerations of what sentences would be implied by metaphor, we note that implication is a technical term of logic appropriate to the methods mentioned by Quine. However such methods presuppose a resolution of the ambiguity of metaphor. That is, they presuppose the assignment of a single sense to the sentence and further a sense which will

determine a unique truth value. We find then that the discussion of implication, far from determining whether metaphors have truth value, presupposes that a unique truth value has been determined. The methods of formal analysis are applicable only after the question of unique truth value has been settled.

We find then that Myers argument against the ascription of truth value to metaphor fails. It fails because the formal methods which he attempts are applicable only on the assumption that the conclusion he reaches is false. We will argue with Quine that the uses or utterances of statements are the bearers of truth values. He states:

Strictly speaking, what admit of truth and falsity are not statements as repeatable patterns of utterance, but of individual events of statement utterance. For, utterances that sound alike can vary in meaning with the occasion of the utterance. This is due not only to careless ambiguities, but to systematic ambiguities which are essential to the nature of language.⁵⁵

and

Strictly speaking, as urged earlier, what admit to meaning and of truth and falsity are not the statements but the individual events of their utterances.⁵⁶

In terms of logical relationships, then, metaphor is on an equal footing with literal speech. The methods of classical formal logic are amenable only to those utterances of statements whose meaning guarantees a unique truth value.

Conclusions

In this chapter we have been primarily concerned with the question of truth. In considering Goodman's view, we found an argument showing that at least some metaphors are true. In summary, that argument is

(1) some dead metaphors are obviously true, (2) the only relevant facts to change since the metaphor was fresh is our becoming accustomed to it, (3) therefore, those metaphors were true when alive. Establishing that some metaphors are true is a first and necessary step in establishing a place in philosophy for the metaphor. But a second and equally important consideration is the establishment of criteria by which one can determine the truth of metaphor. We rejected Goodman's attempts in this regard. We recall that he distinguishes metaphoric truth from literal truth. We supposed that 'literal truth' was used synonymously with our ordinary use of 'truth'. Goodman's introduction of metaphoric truth provides no basis for determining whether metaphor is true. Besides, metaphoric truth seems to run afoul of various rules of logic. We should prefer any other explanation of the truth of metaphor over one which is incompatible with the assumptions of two valued logic.

We found that talk of metaphoric possession of properties is of no help explaining metaphor. While it is true that some metaphors assert that certain objects have certain properties, we here use 'have' and 'possess' in the same sense as we would in describing literal speech. We do realize that under a metaphoric interpretation, the objects or qualities mentioned may differ from those mentioned, given a literal interpretation. Nonetheless, it is not the case that a different sort of possession is involved.

It becomes clear in considering Goodman's view that he failed to take into account, the wide variety of interpretation to which any given metaphor is open. While he does mention some difference in the ranges

of a predicate, his discussion treats the expression as though it had only two, a literal and a metaphoric range. Such a view would indeed suggest that the truth of metaphor could be explained by saying that a statement would be true if its subject were within one of the ranges of its predicate. But this move fails to explain how one is to determine the relevant range. That is, it fails to provide advice on how one knows what the metaphor says. And given various interpretations the metaphor will turn out alternatively true and false. We are increasingly aware as we study Goodman's view that the difficulty in determining the truth value of a metaphor is based upon a difficulty in determining its meaning. Elliott, however, gives us reason to reconsider a claim that the determinations of meaning must precede the determination of truth.

Elliott's article emphasized the interrelationship between interpretation and truth. While Elliott was not able to establish his point that metaphors ought generally be given interpretations under which they will be true, this advice may be sound in guiding our interpretation. In considering his arguments, we found that in the interpretation of metaphor one ought to seek an interpretation which has a truth value (assuming metaphor purports to be a declarative sentence).

Myers' arguments against ascribing truth value to metaphor failed. They failed because the methods he used presupposed that sentences have a unique truth value.

Our overall conclusion is that at least some metaphors are true and that they are true in the same sense of 'true' as are some literal

expressions. Similarly, some metaphors are false and false in the same sense of 'false' as are some literal expressions. But determining the truth or falsity of a metaphor depends in part on determining its meaning. We suspect that once one understands a metaphor, that is, once one has settled on one interpretation, that determining the truth value of a metaphor will be the same as determining the truth value of a literal expression.

NOTES TO CHAPTER VI

1. Nelson Goodman, Languages of Art (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc.), 1968.
2. R. K. Elliott, "Poetry and Truth", Analyses, January 1967, pp. 75-85.
3. Peter Mew, "Metaphorical Truth".
4. C. Mason Myers, "Metaphor and Mediatly Informative Expressions", Southern Journal of Philosophy, Fall, 1968.
5. Goodman, 68.
6. Ibid.
7. Here it is worth remembering that we want to understand the use of metaphor by people in general and are not especially interested in those problems to which only a philosopher's distinction can give rise.
8. Ibid., 69.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. This point was demonstrated by Beardsley in the previous chapter.
13. We presented those replies to defeat the position on its home ground as well as to emphasize the point to be made presently.
14. This parenthetical remark indicates some awareness of multiple metaphoric uses. But the fact that no further comment is made in this regard indicates that Goodman considers this to be of little significance. But since there is an unlimited number of ranges, one could never (with any degree of confidence) say as he does that a statement is metaphorically false.
15. Ibid.
16. Such a theory presumes that all names have been eliminated from the language and one is only concerned with predicates, variables and logical words.

17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid., 72.
20. Ibid., 73.
21. Ibid., 72.
22. Ibid.
23. Notice that such an explanation would be an elucidation of the sense of that particular metaphor rather than metaphor in general.
24. Assuming that one is clear about the use of 'realm' and 'schema'.
25. Ibid., 76.
26. Ibid., 77.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid., 77-78.
29. Ibid., 77.
30. We recognize that at least some metaphors are designed to reflect similarities, not create them.
31. Ibid., 78.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid., 76.
35. Ibid., 78.
36. Ibid.
37. We recall that it was a need to discuss the relationship between literal and metaphoric use which prompted the discussion in terms of comparison.
38. Ibid.

39. Given this line of reasoning, one would expect the following questions to have much the same answer: 'Why did Germany lose World War I?' and 'Why did Germany lose World War II'?
40. Ibid.
41. Arnold Isenberg, "The Problem of Belief."
42. Elliott, 77.
43. Ibid., 81.
44. Ibid., 83-84.
45. Ibid.
46. Mew.
47. Ibid., 193.
48. Ibid., 191-192.
49. Elliott, 79.
50. Myers.
51. Ibid., 166.
52. Ibid.
53. W. V. Quine, Elementary Logic (New York: Harper & Row, 1965).
54. Ibid., 6.
55. W. V. Quine, Methods of Logic (New York: Holt, Rinehart, Inc., 1959), p. xi.
56. Ibid., xvi.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

A definition of metaphor is not forthcoming. A great variety of figures of speech are referred to by people when they use 'metaphor'. A definition which would fit one metaphor likely will not fit another. C. Mason Myers provides an interesting comment on this point which could stand as a summary of our investigation of other views. Observing the great variety of metaphors, he goes on to say:

... Thus it is not surprising that advocates of a number of different theories of the nature of metaphor have no trouble finding examples which seem to fit only their particular theory. They are right about the special class of metaphors to which their examples belong, but wrong if they assume they have extracted an essence belonging to metaphors in general.¹

While we do not claim to have extracted the essence of metaphor (we are not certain what that would be), we can discuss several characteristics which all metaphors share. Metaphors are uses of expressions, by 'uses of expressions' we mean the occurrence of grammatically correct strings of symbols of language within a particular context. The words occurring in those expressions have meanings supported by convention and/or custom. Nonetheless, metaphor is a use which goes beyond those conventions. The meaning or sense which is associated with a particular metaphoric use is in part, but only in part, dependent on convention. It is dependent as well on a wide variety of relationships between objects, uses of language, feelings, and opinions. It is not dependent

on the recognition of any new set of conventions. An expression which is used metaphorically appears absurd, contradictory or inappropriate when interpreted literally. On the other hand, it is a use of words which is generally understood within a more or less limited linguistic community. Metaphors are therefore meaningful. Any use of words which fails to meet this last requirement will be nonsense and not a metaphor. While the foregoing is no definition, it is a correct and concise statement of our position. 'Metaphor' is, as we suggested in the initial chapter, an imprecise term and we must still guard against a definition which is at odds with ordinary use. Even though we provide no definition, conclusions from our investigation of other theories provide analysis of the key issues involved in metaphor. We consider those analyses in the remaining paragraphs.

Restriction of 'Metaphorical' to 'Use'

Since our analysis of other views is so negative in general, it is fitting that we begin negatively. It is tempting to use 'metaphoric' and 'metaphorical' quite widely. It is particularly tempting to use these words as modifiers of 'truth', 'referent', 'meaning', and other terms generally associated with language. In view of comments made in discussing Goodman's work we refrain from such use. Generally, 'metaphoric' and 'metaphorical' modify 'use' or 'interpretation'. 'Metaphoric expression' is best regarded as a device for avoiding the circumlocution 'an instance of an expression used metaphorically' or perhaps 'an expression whose uses are generally metaphoric'. We shall, on occasion, speak of metaphors when it is apparent that we are

referring to expressions rather than their uses. On such occasions, we shall be referring to expressions whose use would generally be recognized as metaphoric. We do not desire to depart from the ordinary use of language. Since 'metaphor' is often construed as referring to expressions, rather than their uses, we show how, in the light of our position, such a construal makes sense. We do not recognize two radically different kinds of sense sometimes spoken of by others as 'literal sense' and 'metaphoric sense'. The expression 'metaphoric sense' is best interpreted as 'the sense of an expression which is used or interpreted metaphorically'; it should not be interpreted to a separate kind of sense. We recognize that metaphor does not constitute a separate language resting on a unique type of meaning associated only with metaphors. It generally occurs within the context of literal speech and its meanings are interrelated with those of literal use. Some metaphors are meaningful and true; and when we so state, we intend the terms 'meaningful' and 'true' to have the same significance that they do for the literal use of language. A similar motivation is behind our decision with regard to meaning and reference. Although the interpretation of metaphor requires us to consider matters other than conventional meaning, we maintain that the metaphoric use of language is meaningful and that some metaphoric uses refer. We insist that metaphors can be truthful and sensible in the same sense as literal statements. Not only does this position help explain metaphor as a part of single language, it avoids the problems generated by a two truth or two meaning theory.²

No Examples as Paradigms

A second negative point suggested by our various analyses is that we avoid basing a theory of metaphor on a single example. An example will be even less likely to characterize metaphor than will a definition. As with examples in other areas, examples of metaphor will suggest simultaneously explanations which are too broad and too narrow. An explanation which provides a basis for understanding one metaphor may be totally inappropriate for another. We, therefore, take no examples of metaphor as paradigm.

Since the literature concerning metaphor is replete with hasty generalization we are careful not to generalize rashly from examples. Those points we do draw from examples will be points claimed true for only some metaphors. Arguments by example will generally be used as counter-examples to universal claims.

We notice that those theories taken primarily from examples tended to treat such metaphors as the only type of metaphor and attribute their characteristics to all metaphors. We are convinced that there are as many types of metaphor as of literal uses. Many of the views correctly explained some aspect or some type of metaphor. The comparison view, for example, is correct for some metaphors.

The claim that all metaphor is comparison may derive from the explanation of our understanding of comparison metaphors (that is, metaphors which state comparisons). Our explanation of the understanding of metaphor will not depend on comparison; however, comparison will still be available as an explanation of some metaphors.

Recognition of Metaphor

Metaphors do not generally have labels. This rather obvious fact is overlooked by several writers who proceed to explain how one handles metaphor without explaining how it is that one recognizes a metaphor. If, as in the model presently to be discussed, interpretation is construed as a relatively mechanical procedure, then an explanation of our ability to recognize metaphor is of great importance. One would not apply the procedure unless he thought that he was dealing with a metaphor. An explanation of our ability to understand metaphor must include an explanation of our ability to recognize metaphor. An explanation which misses this point is considered by Black in his discussion of the 'comparison view.' He provides directions to apply a formula to metaphors to determine their meaning. Such an application however presupposes that one is aware that the use of language under consideration is metaphoric. Any such explanation fails because recognition of metaphor often does not precede an understanding of it. That is, one often does not recognize that the use of an expression is metaphoric until he understands that use. And one may understand a metaphor without recognizing that it is one. (This would be most likely in the case of one who enjoyed literature but had escaped formal training in interpretation.) Two considerations show that one often recognizes cases of metaphor only after he understands the metaphors.³ First, consider Beardsley's point that the use of an expression is to be considered a metaphor only if it is not nonsense. The only assurance that an expression is not nonsense is that someone understands it. An intelligent individual is not likely to be assured that the use of an expression is not nonsense unless he

understands it, whether or not it must be explained to him. Therefore, in such cases, one must understand the use of an expression before he will recognize it as metaphor.

Second, it is only after understanding a figure of speech that we are able to distinguish metaphor from other figures such as hyperbole⁴ or irony.⁵ We are able to distinguish these figures from metaphor due to certain facts concerning their meanings.

Two essential factors are to be noticed. The first is that the recognition of metaphor is not a matter of syntax. There is not for example, a metaphor-mark as there is a question mark. While metaphorical and literal uses must be grammatically correct, no syntactical devices are generally employed to distinguish them from each other. A second factor is that our recognition of a use of language as metaphoric is in part a matter of our recognition of its sense. Any explanation of metaphor which attempts to deal with either recognition or interpretation independently will fail.

Recognition of Figurative Use

While there is no general test for metaphor prior to its understanding, there is a cue by which we are alerted to possible figurative use. That cue is described by Henle:

One ordinarily takes words in their literal sense and this is impossible in metaphor. This impossibility is in fact what drives one to seek a figurative sense.⁶

While 'impossible' is too strong a word, it is the inappropriateness of the literal interpretation which causes an abandonment of that interpretation and initiates a search for a figurative interpretation.

The inappropriateness of the literal interpretation may be due to a contradiction in that interpretation or a recognition that such an interpretation would result in absurdity in the given context. In either case the ineptness of a literal interpretation indicates that (in the absence of an apt literal interpretation) only a figurative interpretation will be suitable.

In considering the inappropriateness of the use of an expression we are reminded of Henle's point. He noticed that a wider context than the sentence itself must be taken into account in interpreting some metaphors. Since many such linguistic uses are recognized as metaphors in this wider context, we shall consider such context a part of the metaphor.

Context

'Context' has occurred in other views previously treated. Richards, for example, argues against Eastman's theory concerning impractical identifications and bases his argument on the observation that certain contexts make identifications less impractical than they might otherwise appear. Black's discussion of frame and focus is equally a discussion of context. Our own consideration of context will follow Black's lead in considering the metaphor to be composed of both focus and frame. We find, however, that Black construed the notions of focus and frame too narrowly. Because of this narrow construal, Black was unable to explain some of his own examples of metaphor.

Black considers a single word as the focus of the metaphor, the remainder of the sentence the frame. Black noted that "... the presence

of one frame can result in metaphorical use of the complementary word, while the presence of a different frame for the same word fails to result in metaphor."⁷ With this we agree. The status of an utterance depends on more than a single word within that utterance. Black's discussion of frame was, however, limited to the sentence in which the focus occurred and consideration of focus was limited to a single word. It seems that both these notions can be expanded and we expand them in the following way. Focus includes the expression which is used metaphorically while frame includes the context which makes that use metaphoric. We agree that in his example:

The chairman ploughed through the discussion.

the focus is 'ploughed' and the frame is the remainder of the sentence. But in the case of some metaphors the focus is not limited to a single word nor is the frame a single sentence. Consider the sentence:

His heart is not in the right place.

If this sentence were to occur in a novel about a cardiac patient, and further, occurred during the recounting of a heart transplant, then, while we may be concerned for the patient, we would find nothing metaphoric. If the novel concerned a wicked man who beat his children, we would recognize the metaphor here. The literary context in these hypothetical cases determines that one use of the sentence is metaphoric while another is not. Often the relevant context is not literary. It is rather the actual circumstances under which an expression is uttered. Considering the same example; if the phrase were actually uttered in the consideration of an E.C.G. report it would be interpreted differently than at a discussion concerning the United Fund and only one of these

would be considered metaphoric. Not only physical surroundings, but the "system of associated common places" of Black,⁸ or Henle's "minor facets of the general culture, such as what characteristics are uppermost in people's mind"⁹ must be considered as a part of the frame or context.

If we consider these factors as part of the frame of some metaphors we can discuss an example of which Black said "I shall have to neglect such complexities in this paper."¹⁰ Given a wider notion of frame and focus, the complexities of his example can be easily dealt with.

Black's example is:

Light is but the shadow of God (Sir Thomas Browne)
 Light is often associated with hope, joy, understanding and happiness. Since light is God's shadow the possession of these qualities by God must be incomparably great. Someone of course who understands light and relationship between light and shadow differently may interpret the line quite differently. Nonetheless, it is the frame or context, including general attitudes and beliefs which account for our understanding of this and other metaphors. All of these must be considered a part of the frame.

We invite the reader to notice that the inclusion of both the focus and frame as parts of metaphor is consistent with our explanation of metaphor as use. The use of an expression is in part determined by the context in which that sentence is uttered. So, even given our wider notion of frame a difference in frame will result in a difference in use and therefore a difference in what metaphor is used.

Confidence in the Speaker

While our examples indicate that the consideration of context will be a requirement for understanding metaphor, context alone explains neither our desire nor our ability to understand metaphor. Recall Black's question regarding one's motivation for providing his readers with a puzzle to solve. We now turn this question around to inquire about the reader's motivation for solving the puzzle. We noted that puzzle solving itself may be a rewarding experience. But metaphor often occurs when one is not at all interested in playing such games. Some other reason for our attempt to understand metaphor must be found.

Our willingness to attempt the interpretation of metaphor is based in part on our confidence that the speaker has something worthwhile to communicate. It will not matter whether that value is cognitive or emotive. We agree with Richards' argument against Eastman that we would soon grow tired of bafflement. Eastman perhaps believes that we are mountain climbers who accept the challenge because it's there. But just as the existence of mountains is not sufficient motivation for most of us to climb, the mere existence of figurative language is not sufficient to motivate interpretation. That motivation has as its base Henle's principle that people generally try to talk sense.

Relevance of Conventional Use

Desire to understand another may explain our motivation to cope with metaphor. It does not, however, explain our ability to understand metaphor. The major appeal of the relational theory as stated by Henle was an explanation of that ability. According to his view, one gains

understanding of a metaphor by the following procedure. He notices the customary referent for one of the terms of the expression and substitutes for it an object which is similar. Considering the new object results in a meaningful expression. Such an explanation, as we discussed earlier is at best suitable for a limited type of metaphor.

Some modification of the relational view will increase its range of applicability. Our major criticism of this view is that it depends upon relationships between objects, and the understanding of some metaphors does not depend upon such relationships. The obvious suggestion would be to drop the discussion of resembling objects. In so doing, we could say that when one encounters a metaphor, he picks a meaning which makes sense in the given context. But such an explanation fails. One could satisfy its requirements by deciding in advance to interpret every metaphor as synonymous with:

Excuse me, can you direct me to the restroom?

While such a remark would not make sense in every context, it would be a safe bet in many. This objection illuminates the fact that in our proposed explanation the meanings of the terms in their literal use is not taken into account and, as we argue in our discussion of Eastman, those meanings are relevant. We must at least modify our explanation by saying that one picks as a sense, something that makes sense, taking into account the conventional meanings as well as the context. This rather obvious remark would find opposition from Foss. We recall that he holds that in metaphor symbols lose their familiar meaning; their meanings are destroyed. But, as our argument against Foss established, if the individual terms of the expression had lost their conventional sense,

metaphors would not be meaningful. Our understanding of a metaphor is, in part, due to our understanding of the conventional uses of its terms. What we should like to say is just how conventional meaning is taken into account. In our criticism of the comparison views, we suggested several ways of taking conventional meanings into account other than comparison or similarity of their referents. Such other bases are our feelings towards the things mentioned, our beliefs about those things, and similarities between the meanings of the various terms. Yet this is not a complete list of possibilities. It seems that Henle, while less precise, may be more correct in explaining our basis of interpretation as 'characteristics uppermost in peoples' minds.' The factor most responsible for our interpretation of metaphor is what comes to mind when the conventional meaning of the terms in the metaphor are considered. Context is here relevant in providing a mental set which may direct our thoughts as well as providing a test of sensibleness of the interpretation. Why a linguistic community would be reminded of, or experience the feelings, objects or events they do could only be explained on a case to case basis. Nonetheless, the ability to communicate via metaphor is based upon such similarities among the audience and the speaker. Communication through metaphor will be successful only when the sorts of objects, events, feelings, etc., suggested to the author are similar to those suggested to the audience. Only in these cases will the metaphor be understood in the same way by author and audience. Notice that we have not spoken of determining the real or true meaning of a metaphor, nor has there been talk of correct interpretations. We find that while these notions may make some sense in the discussion of literal usage,

that sense is inappropriate in the consideration of metaphor. When one speaks of a true meaning or correct interpretation he is making reference to conventional usage. An interpretation is considered correct insofar as it is in accordance with such conventions. Metaphor is however, in part, a departure from convention. Therefore given the usual understanding of true meaning or correct interpretation, metaphor will have neither of these. We therefore make no attempt to explain them. The remaining question in this regard, "how is communication possible?" was answered above. When the set of associated commonplaces in the minds of the audience and speaker are sufficiently similar, they will interpret a metaphor similarly.

We recognize, too, that communication is not the only goal of metaphor. Often the value of the metaphor lies in the suggestion of a relationship which the audience must follow out and fill in. Its value in literature in this respect is that the same line in the same work need not have the same significance at each reading and to each audience. This is in part what accounts for the notion that a good metaphor is lively. In reading literature which contains such metaphors one is able to see different things with each reading.

It is in great part this feature of metaphor which, while creating great literature, causes metaphor to be abhorred by the philosopher. The philosopher, in his search for truth, demands a language of precise meanings and meanings which do not fluctuate with context. Further, he demands a use of language which is amenable to critical analysis and refutation. Metaphor will allow the slippery opponent to say 'that's not quite what I meant.' While we make room for this sort of liveliness

in our discussion, we are still most concerned with metaphor's usefulness in philosophy. We turn therefore to a more central issue, that of the truth of metaphor.

Truth of Metaphorical Statements

Explaining our ability to recognize metaphor as being, in part, a matter of recognizing absurdity leads us to question the possibility of ascribing truth values to metaphor. It is clear that that which is absurd is surely not true. However, man is able, by the use of metaphorical expression, to communicate useful information. But, if metaphors are false, it is paradoxical that they could be so communicative. Consider the following example:

(1) "His grandfather is a child when it comes to money."¹¹ It is not possible for anyone's grandfather to be a child; sentence (1) is false. But we know from this sentence that the grandfather does not keep good accounts of his money and that he does not spend it wisely. That some information is provided indicates that there is some sense in which (1) could be true. Our attempt to interpret metaphor is directed towards providing an interpretation under which it will be true. But it must also be possible for (1) to be false in the same sense. Consider the following example:

(2) Martha Mitchell has the mouth of Martha Rae.

This is a false statement, if literally interpreted. However, (2) does indicate something considered by some to be true, that Martha Mitchell's manner and topic of speech has caused embarrassment to those around her.¹² On the other hand

(3) 'Senator McGovern has the mouth of Martha Rae.' is false, both conventionally interpreted and metaphorically interpreted (at least in the sense in which (2) is true). Given that we make this distinction, a theoretical basis for it may be established.

We have been concerned with the distinction between literal and metaphorical language, and those problems unique to metaphor. The question of truth when applied to literal speech is problematic. There is, at least, no universally accepted theory of truth. Rather than considering theories of literal truth, or the general problem of truth, we will assume that some satisfactory explanation is available. Further, we shall assume that such an explanation would closely relate truth and meaning in such a way that given the state of the universe, a statement with a particular meaning would have a particular truth value. Given such an assumption, it seems that the special problem of truth of which a theory of metaphor must take account is the problem of determining the meaning of a particular utterance when such an utterance constitutes a metaphorical use. If we can show how to determine the meaning of a metaphor, we will assume that a similar relationship holds between meaning and truth, as holds in the case of literal speech.

Literal Equivalents and Truth

The question of literal equivalents is tied directly to the question of truth, on assumption that the problem of truth has been solved for literal statements. If every metaphor has a literal equivalent, even if cognitively and not emotively, then the answer to the question of truth becomes easy: the truth value of the metaphor is identical to the truth

value of its equivalent. However, in our discussion of Black we argued that no serious theorist held that every metaphor has a literal equivalent. Our intention here is not to support such a view. We hold neither the view that every metaphor has a literal equivalent nor the view that no metaphor has a literal equivalent. But our position in this matter is not the result of a lack of sufficient consideration. We hold neither of these views because we deny them both.

Both Wheelwright and Black set forth views that metaphor is indispensable without loss of expressive power since metaphors (in Black's case interaction metaphors) have no literal equivalent. But neither Wheelwright nor Black establishes his claim. Each, in fact, offers literal equivalents for various examples of metaphor.

We shall consider one further attempt to establish that metaphors have no literal equivalent. Abraham Kaplan, in "Referential Meaning in the Arts,"¹³ attempts to refute the view that metaphors have literal equivalents. He presents that view as follows:

... it [a view that all metaphors have literal equivalents] treats metaphor as having a type of cognitive meaning differing from non-metaphoric reference only in complexity. Metaphor is compound reference, referring to its tenor by way of its vehicle. The sense of the metaphor could be given directly, and it is this sense which is important. But the literal statement would not have the psychological effect of the metaphoric one. Poetry can be, and in critical practice should be paraphrased; the paraphrase will lack only the ornamental and emotional appeal of the original.¹⁴

In objecting to this view Kaplan offers essentially the same objection as does Black. Both, in recognizing the ambiguity of metaphor, claim that a paraphrase will fail to say precisely those things said by the metaphor. Kaplan states:

Of course to describe Richard of England as a "lion" is to say that he is brave and kingly. But it is to say a great deal else besides. And when enough paraphrases have been added to exhaust the content of the metaphor, all of them taken together now are likely to say too much--each phrase has its own senses not involved in the metaphor, in addition to those appropriate to it.¹⁵

But Kaplan, like Black, overlooks the possibility of various disjunctions of phrases combined with indications of how seriously each of them is to be taken. We still have no conclusive argument that some such device will not work. Further, we notice that Kaplan's conclusion is itself weak. He says, "we are now likely to say too much." This does not rule out the possibility that with a sufficient amount of study and attention an equivalent literal statement could be devised.

In considering Beardsley's work, we examined several arguments with regard to paraphrase, where paraphrase was interpreted as producing a literal equivalent.

Arguments on both sides were inconclusive. No sound argument had as its conclusion 'no metaphor can be paraphrased' nor was it established that every metaphor can be paraphrased. A similar question could be raised with regard to the literal use of language: namely can every literal expression be paraphrased? This question too, appears to be unresolved. Here we are tempted to ask: 'By whom and under what circumstances?' We, on occasion, find ourselves called upon to explain something which we have said by providing a paraphrase. And we find that we cannot construct a paraphrase of our expression even though we may offer some explanation of our meaning. In being unable to paraphrase we may find some difficulty in getting another to understand our original statement. We do not however, assume that one's inability to paraphrase is an indication that he is confused, does not know what he is talking about

or that his words are without sense or truth value. But this is often thought to be the case when considering metaphor. Stewart expresses clearly this position which may be at the heart of the philosopher's concern with paraphrase.

... given that the new meaning of the word cannot be stated or explained or exemplified in another expression it is likely that such a meaning does not exist.¹⁶

If, when dealing with literal usage, an explanation is provided which allows us to make sense of an utterance, even though no paraphrase is provided, we assume that it was not nonsense. Similarly, the absence of a literal expression with the same meaning as a metaphor is not a sufficient ground for declaring it to be meaningless. Paraphrase in language is based on an accidental, not necessary feature of language. That feature is the redundancy of many of its expressions. That a particular expression has an equivalent is a fortuitous matter and has no bearing on whether the expression is meaningful.

In light of these facts, one wonders about the concern over paraphrase of the metaphoric use of expressions. In claiming that a relation exists between literal equivalents and truth we are doing no more than claiming that two synonymous expressions have the same truth value. Even were it the case that no literal expression is equivalent to any metaphor it would not be established that such metaphors had no truth value. Many literal uses of language have no literal equivalents yet their truth value is clear. The appeal to literal equivalents to solve the question of truth in metaphor will fail since it cannot be established that every metaphor has a literal equivalent.

Paraphrase and Understanding

We indicated, in a criticism of Beardsley, that our interest in paraphrase of metaphor could well be that we do not fully (or perhaps even partially) understand some metaphors. We look to paraphrase for an explanation of a metaphor's meaning. We are also interested in literal paraphrase as a check on whether another is uttering nonsense. (In philosophy we often claim literal utterances to be nonsense.)

A key difference exists between attempting literal paraphrase of a literal use and a similar paraphrase of a metaphoric use. That difference is that in considering conventional use, our misunderstanding is likely to be due to our lack of familiarity with various conventions. In such cases the O.E.D. may be of great assistance. Perhaps a good thesaurus may be of help. These tools often provide information about conventions and synonymous expressions which are the basis of the construction of a meaningful paraphrase. Of course if one did not understand the original expression, one will not know if this paraphrase is precisely synonymous. One is satisfied with a paraphrase that makes sense and would have been appropriate in the context. In addition, the reference to standard lexicographic sources provides an argument for the correctness of the interpretation. Metaphor is different. We assume that one's difficulty in explaining a metaphor is not with the understanding of the conventions of language and therefore the O.E.D. and thesaurus will be of no help. While we recognize that the sense of a metaphoric use rests in part on convention, convention will not determine what the metaphor says. Therefore the tools based on these conventions will not generate paraphrase. Of course, the availability of the O.E.D.

does not guarantee our success in paraphrase of a literal expression nor does its disutility guarantee failure in the case of metaphoric expression. While the O.E.D. may suggest possible interpretations of literal expressions, it is the fittingness of one of them that governs our final choice. In the case of metaphor as in the case of literal use the fittingness of the paraphrase is our only guarantee of correct paraphrase.

A significant difference between literal and metaphoric use is metaphor's openness to alternative interpretation. This feature is not of course unique to the metaphoric use of language. But it is this feature which is one source of the life of the poetic metaphor and one of the reasons for its use. Metaphor is 'live' because it remains open to a great many interpretations. It remains interesting because one is able to find meaning in poetic metaphor which was overlooked earlier. This is the basis of the argument of Kaplan and perhaps the source of Beardsley's comments concerning that portion of the metaphor which is understood. Here the argument against paraphrase is an argument that no paraphrase will be open to precisely the same interpretations as will the original. And it may well be that we will have no guarantee that a paraphrase had included all the meanings which will ever be discovered in the original. Poetic metaphor is designed for this purpose. When a metaphor dies it becomes conventional. But in considering poetry the term 'dead' applies in quite the opposite way that 'live' was said to apply. The repeated use of a metaphor tends to center upon one of its possible senses, others cease to be considered and since the metaphor

becomes in this way a conventional word alternative interpretation is not invited. Consider:

Richard is a lion

We would not think that this could mean that Richard is cowardly, lazy (in letting his wife do the hunting and provide for the family) or bad smelling. But all these are qualities of lions which are easily attributed to humans. But 'lion' is a conventional term indicating that an individual is a very brave or strong person who may possess other kingly qualities. By custom this term no longer suggests the other possible interpretations, except perhaps as a joke.

Metaphor not occurring in poetry shares this openness to alternative interpretation. Rather than an advantage as in poetry, openness results in difficulties in philosophy and other studies where truth is of the essence. But in these cases we expect that the speaker has something specific to say. One of our interests in attempting to paraphrase is to find out which of several things a speaker said. If this question were asked of the poet he would probably answer, if at all, that he said all of them and more. But notice here that it will matter little whether our paraphrase is considered a literal or metaphorical use of language. Such paraphrase is of value, in the absence of the author in keeping straight the various possible interpretations for discussion with others and for decisions on our part.

Metaphor vs. Ambiguity

Talk about openness to alternative interpretation suggests that, in some respects, metaphor may parallel literal ambiguity. It will be

worthwhile to briefly consider ambiguity to determine how it differs from metaphor, since such a consideration may indicate a method of determining meaning in the case of metaphor. Ambiguity can be summarized as follows: an ambiguous word has more than one distinct use and it may not be evident which use is intended; an ambiguous word has more than one extension and it may not be evident which extension is intended. Ambiguity is governed by convention, and its various uses are generally few and well isolated. Since the uses are few and conventional, it is not generally difficult to determine, by the use of context, the intended meaning. Metaphor, on the other hand, goes beyond convention, and the possible senses of metaphor are not restricted. And in the case of poetic metaphor, even context may not determine a single correct interpretation. In the case of poetry this is an advantage. But outside of poetry we often desire a single sense to consider. In such a case, the departure from convention and the accompanying departure from the limitations of those conventions makes the task of selecting a single interpretation considerably more difficult. To exhibit this difficulty, we consider two examples; the first is an example of ambiguity, the second, an example of metaphor.

(4) 'Sam jones will run.'

We can reduce our number of possible interpretations to two. The statement either says:

(5) 'Sam Jones will be a candidate' or

(6) 'Sam Jones will, on foot, go faster than a brisk walk'

The context, whether one is talking about how fast Sam will move, will decide between (5) and (6). But if we consider

(7) 'Richard is a lion'

as it might have been as a live metaphor, there were an unlimited number of interpretations.

(8) Richard is a king.

(9) Richard is brave.

(10) Richard is yellow.

(11) Richard needs a haircut.

(12) Richard devours his neighbors.

(13) Richard has offensive body odor.

(14) Richard requires his wife to support the family.

(15) Richard is fierce.

(16) Richard roars.

(17) Richard goes about naked.

Context will be of assistance in eliminating some of these interpretations. Some interpretations may be inconsistent with others and context may isolate some interpretations as incorrect. But as in (8) and (9) above there may well be no basis to select one, the other or a conjunction of the two. This suggests another difference between ambiguity and metaphor. The selection in the case of ambiguity involves choosing only one of the meanings. In (4), for example, Sam Jones is running a 100-yard dash or he is running for office but he is not doing both. To intentionally confuse the meanings (that is, to see both meanings as being correct) is a joke, a pun. In the case of metaphor, many of the possible interpretations can be viewed as correct at the same time with no joke intended. Indeed, we recall that Henle says, 'Thus the aptness

of metaphor depends on the capability of elaborating it--of extending the parallel structure.¹⁷

Choosing an appropriate interpretation of metaphor bears some similarity to resolving literal ambiguity. In both, one considers the context of a statement and selects a meaning which makes sense. Metaphor may not so easily be resolved as ambiguity, since often a wider variety and greater number of interpretations make sense. However, the system of associated commonplaces is often effective in reducing the number of reasonable options. Nonetheless, the final determining factor in selecting an interpretation will be the sensibleness of the contemplated interpretation.

Final Note on Truth

To return to the question of truth, we find that although the specification of a literal equivalent would solve the problem, there may be no cases in which metaphors have such equivalents. This does not bear upon the wisdom of ascribing truth values to metaphor. We notice that with literal speech, understanding of the use of an expression is sufficient (together with the knowledge of several facts) to determine its truth value. There is no dependence upon literal equivalents. One does not attempt to paraphrase a sentence to determine whether it is true; the existence of another synonymous series of signs of the language is fortuitous and irrelevant. With literal speech we use paraphrase to get someone to understand a sentence or to agree with our interpretation and therefore, in view of a common understanding of the

relevant facts, share our ascription of truth value. In either of these situations, a literal equivalent is not required as a paraphrase. In this regard, metaphor is no different from literal usage. Once one understands the meaning or meanings of a metaphor he will be able to assign truth values appropriately (if he also is aware of certain facts). He needs make no recourse to literal equivalents. Such recourse, as is the case with literal speech may be helpful in inducing another to share that understanding or in an attempt to determine which of several things may have been intended. But equivalents are not required to guarantee that one's expressions are meaningful nor are they required for an expression to be truthful.

Metaphor in Philosophy

Our most important question is whether metaphor may be used in philosophy. Turbayne has emphasized the sorts of errors into which philosophers have fallen when employing metaphor. But we recognize that these errors stem from a misinterpretation of those metaphors. In particular, Turbayne points out the following sort of error. A philosophical position may include metaphor (perhaps because no literal expression seemed to convey the intended theory). In evaluating the position one errs by attempting to interpret the metaphor as though it were a literal use. Such an error would result in misunderstanding the position. One's arguments would not be, of course, in opposition to the view stated but probably against a straw man. This error would, as we suggested earlier, amount to a fallacy of equivocation. But this sort

of difficulty is at most a warning and is not a prohibition. The fallacy of equivocation is nothing new.

We sum up our position on this matter with the following analogy: Making a philosophical point with metaphor is comparable to driving a finishing nail with a large pipe wrench. It is possible to drive nails in this manner, but many will bend. If one had a hammer, he would be advised to use it. Similarly, we have argued that metaphors are meaningful and may have genuine truth value. They may therefore be effectively used in communication, including philosophic communication. But we have also likened the metaphor to literal ambiguity. While one may make a point, there will be question as to which point he is making. Parties may easily assent to the same metaphor while disagreeing over the matter at hand. We advise then, that one is wise to confine his effort to literal speech when his point can be made with literal speech. But since we reject the position that all metaphors have literal equivalents, we must admit that there may be occasions where only the metaphor will express the point. In such cases the metaphor is entirely appropriate.

NOTES TO CHAPTER VII

1. Myers.
2. These problems were discussed in our evaluation of Goodman's position in the previous chapter.
3. One may determine that a line must be metaphor due to the type of material he is reading or perhaps because some authority declared it to be metaphor.
4. Example of Hyperbole: 'Waves mountain high broke over the reef.'
5. Example of Irony: 'This is nice weather' uttered on a stormy day.
6. Henle, 182.
7. Black, 276.
8. Ibid., 287.
9. Henle, 186.
10. Black, 275.
11. Owen Thomas, Metaphor and Related Subjects (New York: Random House, 1969), p. 22.
12. We are not claiming that this is true of Martha Rae, but she, too, is noted for having a big mouth.
13. Abraham Kaplan, "Referential Meaning in the Arts," Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, XII (1954), pp. 457-74.
14. Ibid., 469, Kaplan uses the terms 'vehicle' and 'tenor' in much the same manner as does Richards.
15. Ibid.
16. Stewart, "Metaphor and Paraphrase", p. 113.
17. Henle, 180.
18. Wheelwright, 109.
19. Ibid.

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