METHODOLOGICAL INDIVIDUALISM: AN ALTERNATIVE PARADIGM FOR EDUCATIONAL INVESTIGATION

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ABSTRACT

METHODOLOGICAL INDIVIDUALISM:
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By

James Stephen Kaminsky

Despite huge investments of federal, state, and local governments and the most conscientious of efforts by educational practitioners, there is still apparent massive dissatisfaction with the conduct of the American educational establishment. This study attempts to understand the pervasive dissatisfaction with the educational establishment in terms of fundamental problems created by the function of the positivist paradigm adopted by American educators.

Using some of the tools of common language analysis as its basic methodology, this study examines the adequacy of the positivistic paradigm (Hempel's conception) for the explanation of intentional, purposive, human action and therein education--assuming that education is an intentional activity. The analysis indicates that the explanatory paradigm used by educators is inadequate for understanding educational events for the following reasons: (1) the

positivistic paradigm depends upon Irreducible Social Laws which are demonstrated to be either unnecessary or avoidable in the explanation of intentional events, (2) the positivistic paradigm's incorrect assumption of intentional terms among antecedent conditions, and (3) positivistic paradigm's dependence upon "mechanism" which assumes a contingently necessary and unexceptional connection between external events and human action--which cannot be demonstrated in the "real" world.

This study suggests Methodological Individualism as an alternative paradigm for the explanation of educational events. Methodological Individualism maintains: social events can be understood by reference to the intentional terms of individual agents and without reference to, or use of, Irreducible Social Laws. An explanation is offered to demonstrate how direct observation of intentional terms is possible. This is a fundamental prerequisite for Methodological Individualism if it is to attain status as a viable methodology. Further, it attempts to dissolve the commonly held claim of vacuity, which usually derives from a misunderstanding of the initial work on Methodological Individualism done by J.W.N. Watkins.

Finally some suggestions are developed for explanation which are apparently indicated by some of the procedures and postulates of Methodological Individualism.

This development focuses upon some considerations of language, ethics and ideology for Methodological Individualism as a qualitative methodology, and cites a protocol of the prerequisites for qualitative research which are apparent at this time.

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To my parents, Charles and Alice Kaminsky

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CHAPTER I

THE FELT CRISIS

The Reason:

Whoever is a teacher through and through takes all things seriously only in relation to his students--even himself.[1]

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[1]F. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, Modern Library, ed. by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1968), Section 4, para. 64, page 269.

The Problem:

> Involuntarily, parents turn children into something similar to themselves--they call that "education." Deep in her heart, no mother doubts that the child she has born is her property; no father contests his own right to subject it to his concepts and valuations. Indeed, formerly it seemed fair for fathers (among the ancient Germans, for example) to decide on the life or death of the new-born as they saw fit. And like the father, teachers, classes, priests, and princes still see, even today, in every new human being an unproblematic opportunity for another possession. So it follows--[2]

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[2]Nietzsche, para. 194, page 298.

The Crisis:

> (W)hen bridges do not stand, when aircraft do not fly, when machines do not work, when treatments do not cure, despite all conscientious efforts on the part of many persons to make them do so, one begins to question the basic assumptions, principles, theories and hypotheses that guide one's efforts.[3]

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[3]Arthur R. Jensen, "How Much Can We Boost I.Q. and Scholastic Achievement," Harvard Educational Review, XXXIX, No. 1 (Winter, 1969), 3.

Jensen was correct when he noted the discipline of education must call to question the basis upon which educational knowledge has been based since the late eighteen hundreds. Contemporary educational theories no longer serve to explain the "blooming buzzing mass" before our senses. Educators are faced with a world out of joint. When it is common knowledge that the school systems of major cities are failing their students, when minority students are beaten as a matter of course, when school systems successfully teach students how to fail at school and not much more, when schools serve as the prime instruments of repression for the upward aspirations of large segments of the poor, when schools psychologically defile their client while intellectually neglecting them, and socially casting them adrift to seek their own offices--it is time to examine the basic assumptions, principles, theories, and hypothesis that guide the educational process.

In the late 1800's academicians interested in the phenomenon of education adopted the positivist paradigm[4] as a fruitful matrix within which to explain, and arrive at an understanding, of the phenomenon of education.[5] The

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[4]Paradigm: Some implicit body of intertwined theoretical and methodological belief that permits selection, evaluation and criticism.

[Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2d ed.; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), pp. 16,17).]

[5]James R. Robarts, "Quest for a Science of Education in the 19th Century," History of Education Quarterly, VIII, No. 4 (Winter, 1968), 431-446.

adoption resulted in the rationalization of educational thought and praxis along the dimension of positive knowledge, transformed those persons of general interest in a phenomenon, in this case education, into a profession, promoted a specialized body of knowledge, and the codification of that knowledge in bulletins, journals and books.

The rigid definition and adoption of a paradigm has had other consequences. One such consequence was (is) the production of an elaborate professional language the most significant consequence was the production of a uniform field of paradigm engendered expectations which provides a constant matrix within which evaluations and criticism can be made--and anomalies detected. Against the background produced by the advanced articulation of the positivist paradigm to educational phenomenon, it has become apparent that educational phenomenon have not been consistent with paradigm engendered expectations, anomalies have become commonplace. The obvious reason for the adoption of the positivist paradigm was a desire to share in the prestige accruing to the fledgling natural sciences. There was never any question as to whether or not the model of the natural sciences was the model appropriate to the study of educational phenomenon. The quest for "scientific respectibility" and, therein, public approbation has focused the attention of educators upon positive research and methodological problems. The direct result of the decision to

adopt the paradigm was a shift from armchair theorizing to the verities of empirical research. The consequence for education has been the development of sophisticated research tools, usually of statistical character (carrying most of the logical and mathematical superstructure of the hypothetical deductive model) and the promotion of the survey (and the mathematical analysis and display thereof) as the mode of educational research.

The inability of the matrix provided by the positivist paradigm to achieve a rapid and economical penetration of educational phenomena indicates dysfunctionalisms within the positivist paradigm. As Mills notes:

> To become aware of the problems of structure, and of their explanatory significance for even individual behavior, requires a much broader style of empiricism. . . . (T)he very formulation of problems, becomes available only when our view is broadened to include comparative and historical structures. Yet, because of epistemological dogma, abstracted empiricists are systematically a-historical and non-comparative; they deal with small scale areas and they incline to psychologism. Neither in defining their problems nor in explaining their own microscopic findings do they make any real use of the basic idea of historical social structure.[6]

The analytic paradigm used for the penetration of educational phenomena is not adequate. The expected understandings of educational phenomena have failed to emerge, along with the promised science of education.

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[6]C. Wright Mills, The Sociological Imagination (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 68.

Deutscher correctly notes:

> The adoption of the scientific model in the social sciences has resulted in an uncommon concern for methodological problems centering on issues of reliability and to the concomitant neglect of the problem of validity. . . . We concentrate on consistency without much concern with what it is we are being consistent about or whether we are consistently right or wrong. As a consequence we may have been learning a great deal about how to pursue an incorrect course with great precision . . .[7]

The "Babylonian astronomy," Deutscher notes, bears implications for the problematic contemporary educational situation.

Evidence the phemonenon that:

> (T)he New York City school system has an annual expense budget of well over $1 billion and keeps producing more and more welfare clients makes the failure of the schools a significant public issue. Many of the city's taxpayers increasingly feel that they have a right to expect more for their money than the schools are giving them. Furthermore, city residents and institutions are often double and triple taxed for the school's failures, paying for welfare, correctional institutions, crime, delinquency, and narcotics addiction. Under increasing pressure from the government and civil rights groups to hire more Negroes and Puerto Ricans, big business in New York City, as elsewhere, has begun to hire "qualifiables" rather than "qualified" people. It takes the cripples from the public school system--for example, ghetto high school dropouts and graduates--and gives them the training the schools were unable to give. Indeed, a parallel school system is beginning to emerge in such training programs, but business strongly resents the

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[7]Irwin Deutscher, "Words and Deeds: Social Science and Social Policy," Social Problems, XIII, No. 3 (Winter, 1966), 241.

fact that the school's failures have forced it into these programs.[8]

The New York system has been flooded with demonstrations, experiments, and innovations and few if any have worked. The New York system continues to collapse despite massive transfusions of staff, money and material. Nor is New York an isolated problem, a paradox in a sea of well being; it is just the classic example, the exemplar, of problems which are endemic in American education. The problems are the same in Philadelphia, Houston, Birmingham, Pontiac and St. Paul. Perhaps there are differences of degree but not of kind.

In the 1969-70 school year the bill for public education reached 35 billion dollars, more than 2,000,000 teachers, administrators, librarians, and counselors worked with the nation's 45 million student youth.[9] Governmental units of America, federal and state, are involved in massive efforts in support of American education. Since 1945 the amount of money spent upon education per pupil has doubled.[10]

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[8]David Rogers, 110 Livingston Street: Politics and Bureaucracy in the New York City School System (New York: Random House, 1969), p. 6.

[9]Charles E. Silberman, Crisis in the Classroom: The Remaking of American Education (New York: Random House, 1970), p. 7.

[10]Silberman, p. 17.

Yet apparently in spite of massive assistance, huge staffs of instructional personnel, ever more sophisticated and expensive hard and software, the public and professional educators look upon public education with greater and greater despair. John Kenneth Galbraith argues that an emergency education system would perhaps be a key step in the war on poverty. H. Kohl, and Jonathan Kozol, argue with great cogency that a lack of respect for persons among educational staff, especially persons in the form of children, is one of the primary causal factors of psychological damage in children.

In his book Death at an Early Age, Jonathan Kozol graphically displays the lack of respect for persons which pervades the Boston schools.

> The Boston Teachers' Handbook also contains these rules: "Corporal punishment shall not be inflicted when it might aggravate an existing physical impairment or produce or threaten to produce permanent or lasting injury. . . . Violent shaking or other gross indignities are expressly forbidden. Cases of corporal punishment shall be reported by each teacher on the dates of their occurrence in writing. . . . These reports shall state the name of the pupil, the name of the witness, the amount of punishment, and the reason therefor. . . ."
>
> These stipulations are daydreams to anyone who knows certain of the Boston schools. Whippings were frequently given at my school without a witness present. Cards were commonly not filed, if for no other reason that this task alone would have taken some of the teachers several hours. Students were repeatedly grabbed, shaken and insulted. Parents were rarely notified. And at least one child in my school was whipped in such

> a way as to leave on his hand a physical impairment in the form of a large raised scar which may be with him all his life. I know this boy well, for he was a student in my room. His name is Frederick. When I first noticed the curious protrusion that rose up near the end of his finger, I asked him about it immediately and he explained it in these words:
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> "It happened in September before you were my teacher. I was talking and I was sent down to the cellar and when I got the stick I was scared and I must have pulled back my hand a little so I got it on the knuckle instead of on the finger part. I already had a bad infection. They said it was my fault for not keeping my hand still."[11]

Kenneth Clark portrays another pervasive problem in American education.

> Thousands of students drop out of school before graduation, thereby increasing the chances that they will end up unemployed or with a menial job. Harlem has far more than its share of such alienated teen agers. A survey by the New York State Division of Youth shows that in 1960-61, about 10 percent of Harlem's pupils attending high school in Manhattan left that year. Of the students from Harlem who entered academic high schools in 1959, 53 percent became dropouts; 61 percent who entered vocational schools that year left before graduating. Even though attendance at school is compulsory until sixteen, more than a fifth of the boys and more than half of the girls leaving junior high (during 1960-61, 3.8 percent of these pupils left school) were under sixteen. A number of these boys were sent to correctional institutions, a number of the girls were pregnant--but the schools do not mention reform schools in their records and far underestimate the number of pregnancies; they generally refer instead to "overage."* Nor do the schools mention discouragement over academic failure as a cause, though the dropouts themselves

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[11]Jonathan Kozol, Death at an Eaerly Age: The Destruction of the Hearts and Minds of Negro Children in the Boston Public Schools (New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1967), pp. 10-11.

> do, and their records show the evidence: 88.1 percent of the boys and 68.5 percent of the girls leaving high school were inferior in reading; in mathematics, 89.5 percent of the boys and 84.6 percent of the girls were inferior. One cannot avoid the question whether it was the inability of these young people to learn or the failure of the schools to teach that led to this pattern of deterioration in learning skill, decline in I.Q., and eventual dropout.[12]

Failures are evident in other areas. For example, in some cases the educational situation is so desperate that random experimentation is replacing directed research. Dwight Allen's experiment in methodological trial and errorism in progress at the University of Massachusetts--often billed as the most innovative program in contemporary teacher education--typifies and demonstrates the level of confidence educators grant present understandings. An article in the Saturday Review notes about the Allen experiment:

> The planning committees cover most of the traditional areas, plus a few not frequently found at other institutions. Some groups appear to be working toward contradictory ends; for instance, one committee studying "student centered teaching" is "testing the assumption that effective learning occurs best in the context of a student exploring his own interests," while another is concentrating on means for evaluating teachers according to performance criteria. Both plans will probably be used next year since, one faculty member recently

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[12]Kenneth B. Clark, Dark Ghetto: Dilemmas of Social Power (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers Inc., 1967), pp. 124-125. [Italics mine.]

> explained, "We really don't know what works. That's what this place is all about."[13]

The potpourri of action engendered by this type of approach certainly creates an arena--but not much else. It should be apparent that when the rules define an unplayable game, the game cannot be salvaged by coloring the pieces instead of modifying the rules. Second, if it is true that no one knows the rules of the game, it is doubtful if a game can be discovered by trying random configurations without developing rules. Such efforts as the one at the University of Massachusetts are fundamentally mistaken. Shotgun efforts such as these are cul de sac expenditures; they start in confusion and end when federal funding is withdrawn, leaving conjuries of independent studies and projects behind, and few if any residual understandings. The level of confidence in present educational knowledge is so minimal that those hot for action are willing to grasp at the slightest straw. Even speculative psychology has been pressed to the task of educational reform. Such has happened to the writings of Carl Rogers. For example, Rogers writes:

> I see the facilitation of learning as the aim of education, the way in which we can learn to live as individuals in process. . . . We know . . . that the initiation of such learning rests

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[13]Harold C. Lyon, Jr., Learning to Feel--Feeling to Learn: Humanistic Education for the Whole Man (Columbus: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co., 1971), pp. 76-77.

> not upon the teaching skills of the leader, not upon his scholarly knowledge of the field, not upon his use of audiovisual aids, not upon the programmed learning he utilizes, not upon his lectures and presentations, not upon an abundance of books, though each of these might at one time or another be utilized as an important resource. No, the facilitation of significant learning rests upon certain attitudinal qualities which exist in the personal relationship between facilitator and the learner.[14]

It is not uncommon for contemporary educational practitioners to read such words and then immediately cast down their books and rush into the streets seeking to redress the problems of education by making themselves right in their hearts. A decent respect for persons is an important and functional part of educational praxis, but it does not provide the theoretical principles, hypotheses and theories which can be used to order the process of educational reform.

Perhaps the most ironic and interesting example of the lack of confidence exhibited by educators in the theories, principles and hypothesis, which direct their efforts is the augmentation of educational theory by magico-religious activity. This phenomena is not unusual in human affairs, but it is indicative of widespread frustration when instrumental rules are obviously ineffective in dealing with the "real world." As Malinowski writes:

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[14]Carl Rogers, quoted in Lyon, p. 65.

> Magic[15] is to be expected and generally to be found whenever man comes to an unbridgable gap, a hiatus in his knowledge or in his power of practical control and yet has to continue in his pursuit. Forsaken by his knowledge, baffled by the results of his experience, unable to apply any effective technical skill, he realizes his impotence.[16]

Given the realization that they must continue in their endeavors despite apparent impotence, educational practitioners have in many cases invoked magical ritual to bridge the gap in their understanding. Many in practice interpretations and applications of the Rosenthal Effect,[17] are for example, essentially institutionalized magico-religious supplications which are often invoked by educators when all known principles seem to fail. The use of magical principles is not confined to the activity of a few rural practitioners. It penetrates even the highest levels of the educational establishment. The penetration of magic is so replete that a Deputy Associate Commissioner of Education in the U.S. Office of Education can write with absolute sincerity:

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[15]Magic in the sense intended here means the abandonment of scientifically manipulative principles in favor of those which are (non-compulsive) supplicative in form; that is, invoking forces which are not understood and subject to compulsive controls.

[16]B. Malinowski, "Role of Magic and Religion," in Reader in Comparative Religion, ed. by William Lessa and Z. Vogt (2d ed.; New York: Harper & Row, Publisher, 1965), p. 108.

[17]Robert Rosenthal and Lenore F. Jacobson, "Teacher Expectations for the Disadvantaged," The Scientific American, CCXVIII, No. 4 (April, 1968), 19-23.

> Although Robert Thorndike has shown that the conclusions reached by Rosenthal's study are inadequately supported by data, there is little doubt that the theory being tested is a correct one.[18]

Such a statement is indicative of a religious faith which provides comfort and assurance in the face of contradictory and frustrating human experience. Such magico-religious rites provide functional integration and continuity where none in fact exists, rationalizes inexplicable happenings, dispels anxieties, and disciplines the educational organization in the face of anomalous experience.

Given the previous illustrations it would not be strange if one assumed that schools in general are staffed by unthinking and uncaring persons dedicated to the systematic "final solution" of the student problem, the bankruptcy of local government, and the destruction of civilized society. Attractive as this paranoid view may be, on occasion, the problem is certainly more fundamental. Such a view is naive, and an insult to a vast majority of dedicated, hardworking and concerned educational practitioners. Jensen's point was well made; when educational institutions fail despite all conscientious efforts on the part of numerous practitioners it is time to question the basic assumptions, principles and hypotheses which guide the educational endeavor, not the motives or sincerity of educational practitioners.

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[18] Lyon, p. 7.

Contemporary experience has forced professional educators to question the validity of their efforts. Despite the best effort on the part of many persons education remains inadequate and unsatisfactory for the needs of large segments of the population. Curriculums are meaningless to the students exhorted to master them, and serve poorly the communities which support them. The clients of education both private and public, political and civil, social and individual have become dissatisfied and cynical about the educational endeavor.

Dissatisfaction with the performance of institutionalized education has generated two major directions in educational reform. One major direction, "behavioral education," has found its impetus in the psychology of B. F. Skinner, Watson and other behavioral psychologists. The other major direction, a loosely conceptualized phenomenon, received its thrust from men as diverse as Abraham Maslow, Carl Rogers, Fredrick Perls. In the literature it is recognized under the rubric of "humanistic education."

At the present time the most bitter debate rages over the articles of faith espoused by each group. The resolution of the controversy which exists between these two "schools of thought" will probably chart the course of institutionalized education for the next decade. The tragedy lies in that, for the most part, it is irrelevant in whose favor the debate is resolved for it is a debate over Babylonian Astronomy--no more. Neither represents

a Copernican revolution. At best they represent differing conceptions of the Babylonian astronomy. The problem is: both directions in educational reformation are based upon the positivist paradigm and it (the paradigm) is inadequate to provide a satisfactory explanation of educational phenomena and processes. The problem is not to decide which is Copernican and which is Babylonian as it is assumed by many contemporary educators. The point is: that they are both Babylonian. In choosing between the two the only question is: which will cause the least harm in the practical affairs of men?

Both directions in contemporary educational reform are based upon an attempt to discover the rules and antecedent conditions (explanda) from which they can resolve the idosyncratic behavior of individual human beings (explandum). That is, both reforms depend upon "positive" laws of human action which experience has proven inadequate, and examples of which, in the social sciences have proven as illusive as unicorns. As Merton notes, despite libraries of sociological research, volumes of tabulation and mountains of studies, writer after writer may discuss positive laws in the social sciences without being able to cite a single empirical study which satisfies the criteria of the positivist paradigm.[19]

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[19]Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1957), pp. 85-99.

Both major movements aimed at educational reformation are not fundamentally different from the problematic system they would replace. Given the identity of conceptual foundations between behavioral, humanistic and traditional education there is little reason to assume that behavioral or humanistic reforms would be any less problematic than their traditional predecessor.

The reasons for the preceding claim are numerous--first, the apparent success of behavioral and humanistic reforms is a consequence of focusing upon simple (and sometimes trivial) problems, which are simple logical functions to which the positivist paradigm nicely applies. The functional result is to allow these reformational movements to concentrate upon simple operations with which they have a modicum of success; while ignoring serious problems which are not reducible to positive "puzzle form." Thus, many serious problems, such as "alienation," which are not reducible to "puzzle form," are "de-empiricized," and left to the devices of novelists or poets and thereby stricken from the group of serious problems.

Second, both "behavioral" and "humanistic" educational reforms are heavily committed to a metaphysical essentialism. The essences which behavioral and humanistic reformers hunt may be different but the practical consequences are the same. Beyond providing a group of

logical primitive terms necessary for the deducation of positivistic propositions, such terms provide the raw material for a barren social reductionism. The empirical regularities which serve as the brute phenomena of the positivist ontology are significant for theory only if the rationale for said regularities can be derived from a set of "other" terms. The development of a set of irreducible psychological facts which usually serve in the positivist paradigm as a set of primitive propositions from which behavior could be deduced, insulates analysis from important and meaningful references to dispositional propositions such as: belief, hope, desire, want, need, hate, etc. It might be worth questioning, given behavioral and humanistic use of the positivist paradigm, whether it might not be useful to conceive of man as a puppet awaiting the proper stimulus. The naive determinism which results from behavioral and humanistic essentialism cannot serve well or provide an adequate understanding of educational phenomena. The deempiricization of mediational states[20] commits educators to a naive determinism. The religious faith attributed to the Rosenthal Effect, positive reinforcement, or the "free school" movement (to note but a

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[20]A detailed explanation of mediations, their relation to ideology and their function will be discussed in Chapters II and III.

few) is indicative of the simplistic determinism to which this type of essentialism leads. Education cannot be understood or explained without reference to the mediational states which the positivist paradigm has so successfully exorcised.

Third, the combination in practice of the positivist paradigm and its corresponding metaphysical essentialism results in a rather odious social totalitarianism. An example of Maslow's combination of positivism and essentialism is evident in his writings.

> Observe that if these assumptions are proven true, they promise a scientific ethics, a natural value system, a court of ultimate appeal for the determination of good and bad, of right and wrong. The more we learn about man's natural tendencies, the easier it will be to tell him how to be good, how to be happy, how to be fruitful, how to respect himself, how to love, how to fulfill his highest potentials. . . .[21]

There is no reason to suppose that a man's nature is the ultimate court of appeal for the determination of right and wrong, good and bad. Such would give deontological status to man's present state of being. For that matter the ultimate court of right and wrong, good and bad, may be in man's greatest flights of fancy. That is, the court of right and wrong might better be found in man's

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[21]Abraham H. Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being (2d ed.; New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1968), p. 4. [Italics mine.]

most profound dreams as to what he might be; rather than what he is. The totalitarian determinism of biological nature can be as repressive and odious as the capricious whim of any dictator. As Herbert Marcuse so incisively writes:

> Under the rule of a repressive whole, liberty can be made into a powerful instrument of domination. The range of choice open to the individual is not the decisive factor in determining the degree of human freedom, but what can be chosen and what is chosen by the individual. The criterion for free choice can never be an absolute one, but neither is it entirely relative. Free election of masters does not abolish the masters or the slaves.[22]

Reform cannot liberate as long as the language of freedom is no different than the language of slavery. Happy slaves are nonetheless slaves. As Goodman notes:

> The most dangerous threat to humane letters (and in my opinion humanity) at the present, however, is . . . not the ugliness and commercialism of corporate capitalism, not the ignorance and alienation of the young, not the hypocrisy or censorship of power. It is the same dehumanization of modern times that I have been discussing through this book: Language is reduced to be a technology of social engineering, with a barren conception of science and technology and a collectivist's conception of community. This tendency has been reinforced by government grants and academic appointments, and it controls the pedagogy in primary schools [my parenthetical insert].[23]

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[22]Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), p. 9.

[23]Paul Goodman, New Reformation: Notes of a Neolithic Conservative (New York: Random House, 1970), p. 119.

The result of the combination of essentialism and positivism is a barren social totalitarianism, whose emphasis upon authority, expertise, control, passivity and obedience is a major factor in the instrumentalization of persons, a reduction of happiness to efficiency, and a translation of morality into the terms of passivity. The exclusive use of the positivist paradigm has proven inadequate for the economical and fruitful understanding of educational phenomena--and its by-product has been an untenable social totalitarianism.

An adequate understanding of education cannot be achieved without reference to mediational states. As Karl Mannheim notes:

> A human situation is characterizable only when one has also taken into account those conceptions which the participants have of it, how they experience their tensions in this situation and how they react to tensions so conceived. . . . If we wish to comprehend such a concrete phenomena as a situation or the normative content of a milieu, the purely mechanistic scheme of approach will never suffice. . . .[24]

Fundamental educational reformation will depend upon "extraordinary" research. Normal research cannot provide the answers necessary for the fundamental revision of education. Educational reformation will depend upon the demonstration of an alternative paradigm which allows for the effectual relation of the social nature of

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[24]Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1936), p. 44.

thought and knowledge. When confronted with pervasive anomalisms (paradigm collapse) it is necessary to move from the normal function of research (puzzle solving) to extraordinary research. Extraordinary research is an activity not unlike analytic philosophy; within which "primitive" fundamentals are questioned, problems made explicit, competing articulations tried out, and paradigm rules and assumptions brought to question. In this manner the paradigms are faced with the consequents of contemporary experience in a manner calculated to expose and isolate the specific formulations which are factors in existential anomolies. Therein "such and such," perceived originally only as a "puzzle" in need of more advanced and exact articulation, can be recognized as an anomaly, opening the way for the recognition of paradigms or paradigm factors in need of modification or replacement.

Educational reformation depends upon extraordinary not normal research. Normal research assumes the adequacy of the analytic paradigm, and surmises only the need of further articulation of phenomena to theory. Normal research in the realm of reformation is a cul se sac effort. Reformation cannot occur via normal research when the problem, as in education, rests in the paradigm not the articulation. Normal research focuses its attention upon the articulation not the paradigm, first principles are taken for granted, and these are exactly what may not be granted.

CHAPTER II

THE HYPOTHETICAL-DEDUCTIVE METHOD AND ITS PROBLEMS

If first principles are exactly what may not be granted, then, it is necessary to give reasons why those first principles may not be granted, and display the difficulties to which these principles lead.

This study does not fall into the obvious trap of attempting to maintain that hypothetical-deductive laws do not apply to human beings and behavior of humans. But, it does maintain there is a very important segment of human action not adequately explained by positivist rules. It would be ludicrous to attempt to maintain that hypothetical-deductive laws do not apply to the actions of persons. Hypothetical-deductive bio/physical laws are quite exact and fruitful. Hypothetical-deductive mechanical laws are applied with great familiarity by all manner of professionals; doctors, chemists, pharmacists, physiologists (to name the patently obvious). The question which addresses the educators, and the social scientist as well, is: can hypothetical-deductive rules be used to explain (predict and describe) purposive human action--as Skinner (to name one case) attempts.

As indicated in Chapter I, the general direction of educational research since the late 1800's has been to seek a methodological unity with the natural sciences. It has been the assumption of educators that human behavior is lawful and determinable and that social human action is a result of specifiable antecedent conditions.[1] The assumption has seen fruition in contemporary events and empirical implementation in performance contracting, state assessment programs, behavioral objectives and teacher accountability. It should be recognized that the first principles of the positivist model play a central role in educational policy. Given their role in the present state of affairs, they may not be lightly dismissed.

Criticism of the positivist paradigm must begin with the model. The classic explication of the hypothetical-deductive model by Hempel and Oppenheim stands as one of the best and clearest explanations of the positivist paradigm.[2] The explication represented by their work seems the correct place to begin. Hempel and Oppenheim maintain the following conditions of logical adequacy:

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[1]See B. F. Skinner, Science and Human Behavior (New York: The Macmillian Co., 1953).

[2]Carl G. Hempel and Paul Oppenheim, "Studies in the Logic of Explanation," Philosophy of Science, XV, No. 2 (April, 1948), 135-175.

I. Logical conditions of adequacy

(R 1) The explandum must be a logical consequence of the explanans; . . .

(R 2) The explanans must contain general laws, and these must be required for the derivation of the explandum . . .

(R 3) The explanans must have empirical content; i.e. it must be capable, at least in principle, of test by experiment or observation . . .



In the paradigm quoted above C_1, C_2 and C_k are simply statements of antecedent circumstances, which are necessary for the applications of a given law for the deduction of the explandum event. L_1, L_2 and L_r are general and unexceptional connections between specified event characteristics. The result (the explandum) is a "determined"[4] causal event. These events are to be distinguished from statistical events which merely assert an empirical regularity. It is also the position of Hempel and Oppenheim that the resulting deduction must have predictive ability if it is to qualify as an adequate explanation. They

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[3]Hempel and Oppenheim, pp. 137-138.

[4]Thus, a determined event is the necessary and unexceptional result of the relation of antecedent conditions and general laws, without use of purposes or intentions which are not contingently linked to their consequent and therefore unable to qualify as antecedent conditions in this model.

maintain quite emphatically that the utility and adequacy of any scientific explanation is its predictive ability.

It is the position of Hempel and Oppenheim that although the behaviors of humans or laboratory animals cannot as yet be subsumed under general laws of the covering law model[5] it is only a matter of time until an adequate articulation between theory and event is achieved and individual events will be applicable through laws of the causal type. Within such explanations there is no formal difference between dispositional predicates, motivational explanation, and statements of antecedent conditions in causal explanation. Therein the concept of purpose and like mediational terms can be satisfactorily eliminated as superfluous to empirical explanation.[6] At best such terms (mediational) serve as heuristic and metaphorical devices. But even in this function they often end up serving only as a rather facile ex post facto "explanatory" device, which lack, according to Hempel and Oppenheim, cognitive significance.

If the first principles of this type of explanation cannot be granted, in matters of conscious human action, then it must be shown (if it is to be judged defective) that either the model itself is in error in a

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[5]For purposes here I will use the terms covering law model, positivist paradigm, and hypothetical-deductive model interchangeable, although for other purposes there is good and proper reason for distinguishing between the three.

[6]See footnote on page 26 for explanation of this move within the hypothetical-deductive model.

generic sense or that the propositions which it relies upon for articulation are mistaken.

It seems useless to argue that the model itself is generically defective. The success of physical science has proven beyond a real doubt, in Wittgenstein's sense of real doubt, the correctness of the model at least for physical phenomena. The work of Skinner, Watson and other behaviorists in psychology and men such as Pasteur, Mendel, Harvey and numerous other physicians have proven that, at least in some aspects of biophysical/reflexive behavior, the covering law model is appropriate to persons.

The question that remains is: does the covering law model apply to dispositional events in the same manner it does to the refraction of light through the human cornea. Or more specifically, does the covering law model "really" subsume mediational states[7] adequately within the explanada term of antecedent conditions.

A place to begin, in criticism, is with the work of R. S. Peters and H. Tajfel.[8] They point out that the attempt to find a systematic deductive explanation for every human behavior has been pressed at least since the work of Thomas Hobbes. It was hoped that human behavior could be

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[7]Mediation, a cognitive term that has independent legislative force in human action and is non-contingently linked with antecedent stimulus and consequent behavior.

[8]R. S. Peters and H. Tajfel, "Hobbes and Hull--Metaphysicians of Behaviour," British Journal of Philosophy of Science, VIII, No. 29 (May, 1957), 30-44.

explained in the same mechanism as inanimate bodies. Such grand schemes can be found in the first chapters of Leviathan, or C. L. Hull's book Principles of Behavior, or B. F. Skinner's latest, Beyond Freedom and Dignity. Peters and Tajfel point out that however desirable such a deductive science might be it is probably little more than a pipe dream--especially given the "mechanics" upon which such a deductive system depends. The metaphysical article of faith that man is rational points out the logical truth that man's behavior is rule following and that adequate explanations cannot be given in terms of efficient conditions alone. Mechanistic explanations alone will not suffice. It may be quite easy to establish a contingent link between sensation and action, but at least in the case of conscious action, such a linkage may not be complete without certain mediations [habit structures or molar behavior (Skinner) or dispositional predicates (Winch)].[9] Consider, as Winch does in The Idea of a Social Science, the Pharisee and the Publican both of whom prayed to their God. Without the use of mediations we are faced with identical behavior--but behavior which is totally incommensurate. One is not reducible to the other without loss

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[9]See Skinner, Science and Human Behavior; and Peter Winch, The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy (New York: The Humanities Press, Inc., 1958). For example, a mediation such as "deprivation" is necessary before the link between stimulus and conditioned response can be established.

of meaning. Or on a slightly different tack, without mediations how does one distinguish the pill taken by the addict and the pill taken by the patient. Without mediations and dispositional predicates one is forced to reduce incommensurate behavior to a status of identity which is not observed.

The neurophysical mechanism, upon which systematic causal explanations depend, cannot show that all human action is due to external physical causes. If such uniform causal explanation were possible these laws would be non-purposive and of the following form.

> Whenever an organism of structure S is in neurophysical state q it will emit movement m.
>
> Organism O of structure S was in neurophysical state q.
>
> Therefore, O emitted m^2.[10]

As Malcolm notes the first proposition is a contingent[11] relation--given S in state q--m^2 will result. The contingent relation is dubious in cases in which S was in state q and still did not emit m^2. At this point (dispositional statements) behavioral explanations break down in as much as they do not conform to the covering law model.

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[10]Norman Malcolm, "The Conceivability of Mechanism," The Philosophical Review, LXXVII, No. 1 (January, 1968), 47.

[11]In this case a "certeris paribus" clause is necessary, in addition.

This is the case of the man for whom life is the most sweet--and then in apparent contradiction takes his life.

Malcolm maintains a more adequate, non-contingent explanation is purposive and non mechanistic. Such explanations would take the following form:

> Whenever an organism O has goal G
>
> and believes that behavior B is
>
> required to bring about G, O will
>
> emit B.
>
> O had G and believed B was required
>
> of G
>
> Therefore, O emitted B.[12]

According to Malcolm the universal premise of a purposive explanation is an a priori principle not a contingent law. Thus, these principles a priori assume a logico-meaningful mediation between stimulus and response which resists the reduction of dispositional and purposeful predicates to necessarily contingent relation between external physical causes and bodily movement; thus, rejecting the physical deterministic mechanism upon which the positivist paradigm depends.

Hume's statement in A Treatise of Human Nature can be made plain. Human behavior is governed by its own rules in the sense that: the behavior of how O will respond to X, depends upon what mediations impinge upon

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[12]Malcolm, p. 47.

the situation. That is, as Peters points out X's behavior will depend upon what rule O believes is required to bring about G (if O has good G) from the repertoire of rules available to X at that time P.

Prediction in the deductive sense is impossible. If an observer wants to predict how N will act at time Q he must ascertain what concepts (rules) N is using to view the situation. The direction of human activity does not necessarily depend upon the mechanics of external causes to bodily movement; the direction of decision depends upon the intentions disposition (governing rules) of actors which are not controlled by antecedent conditions. Thus an understanding of social events is incompatible with the activity of scientific prediction.

If Malcolm is correct, then some human actions are explicable by reference to dispositional predicates. To admit this much would be to acknowledge that any single-factor system which claims the ability to predict and explain human behavior without relying upon independent non-physiological variables is (ala Winch) self defeating.

Second the very idea of mechanism, upon which "scientific" explanation seems to depend seems incompatible with voluntaristic human action. That is, it is not modal behavior that is in need of explanation. It is not the general disposition that is in need of explanation. It is exceptional behavior that is interesting. The deviation

from the norm, the non-habitual, the non-characteristic decision--these are the interesting and important cases for social science and education. It was the refusal of Harlem's parents to accept the prevailing status quo that was of import for the future of public education. It was the refusal of the Black community to accept the doctrine of separate but equal, that was important and interesting. It was the decision of the students of American colleges in the late 60's, to reject their traditionally passive political position, which shattered a Democratic hegemony dating back to Franklin Delano Roosevelt, that was important and interesting. It is the non-characteristic action which is most in need of explanation, not the habitual or status quo.

On the other hand there is a serious objection raised to this type of position by Hempel.[13] Hempel argues, while rational (intentional) explanation gives good grounds for asserting the appropriate thing for A to do under circumstances B was X--it does not provide reasons for asserting that A did X, or that A must do the rational thing--X. To accommodate this problem Hempel argues the

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[13]Carl G. Hempel, "Reasons and Covering Laws in Historical Explanation," in Philosophy and History: A Symposium, ed. by Sidney Hook (New York: New York University Press, 1963).

explanans must be modified so as to look something like the following:

> Agent "A" was in situation C
>
> A was a rational agent at the time.
>
> Any rational agent when in situation of kind C, will invariably (or: with high probability) do X.[14]

Hempel argues that the above modification of the rational principle of explanation by a descriptive principle, necessitated by Winch's and Malcomb's assumption of rationality result in a covering law explanation. As such reasons, motives, and beliefs are categorized as antecedent conditions which are formally no different than causal explanating of the covering law form.

To put Hempel's objection simply, if one cannot derive the event (explandum) from the general laws and antecedent conditions (explanda) we are liable to be deluding ourselves as to the adequacy of our explanation or we are accepting an ex post facto explanation which is trivial--an explanation of the following type: aspirin will alleviate headache because of its pain removing quality.

Nevertheless if Winch and Malcolm are correct, the deductive linkages which Hempel demands are impossible. The resolution of the problem can be found in the

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[14]Hempel, p. 155.

realization that if the position of either Winch and Malcolm are adopted the step of adequacy which Hempel demands is not necessary. There is no need to posit a compulsive force (such as Skinner's reinforcement) to specify the necessary and sufficient conditions to explain and predict why "X" did "A." It would be necessary to point out that the paradigm as constructed by Hempel is in error. Hempel's account:

> Agent A was in situation C.
> A was a rational agent at the time
> Any rational agent, when in situation of kind C, will invariably (or: with high probability) do X, . . .[15]

Even if Hempel's adequacy move is granted and a rational premise is invoked--Hempel's position still cannot be salvaged. The error lies in the suppressed premises in the first line of Hempel's argument. When Hempel invoked the "first premise"

> Agent A was in situation of kind C[16]

here all the problems of mechanism are patched over in the assumption of the mechanistic argument in this premise. Expanded the above premise assumes the entire form of mechanism. That is,

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[15]Hempel, p. 155.

[16]Hempel, p. 155.

Whenever an organism of structure S
is in neurophysical state q it
will emit movement m.
Organism O of structure S was in a
neurophysical state q.
Therefore, O emitted m^2.[17]

The uniform mechanism rationality which Hempel's counter argument depends upon is mistaken. Uniform rationality is necessary to sustain the hidden metaphysics of the formalist--namely a logical model for the universe. It is the same intellectual move as that of Bishop Berkeley--a universal perceiver (to be is to be perceived). That is, the inclusion of a constant in a formal system. The uniform deductive rationality Hempel posits must give way to the non-uniform rationality of self reflective rules of Winch and Malcolm. There is no necessity, indeed no reason, to posit uniform rationality. In Winch's and Malcolm's models "neurophysical state q" is not a uniform electro/chemical state but an intentional mediation. Mediations are not uniform terms which are interchangeable. To return to the original example, the "prayer" of the Pharisee and the Publican though perhaps formally the same, they are empirically incommensurate, and one cannot be exchanged for the other without loss of meaning.

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[17]Malcolm, p. 47.

The fact of incommensurate behaviors point out that the reliance upon mediations, and therein nonuniform rationality, is not a reduction of the intentional explanation to the covering law model. Such would be the case if mediations were subsumable under the category of antecedent conditions. Empirically mediations govern the response to a given context and in that sense are rules not antecedent conditions. Empirically the work of Kendler and D'Amato on reversal and nonreversal shifts demonstrate that minded mediations are self governing rules which are characteristic of purposive behavior. Thus, it is the mediated rules which are a priori in conscious activity at any given moment in time.[18] Mediations have the status of rules not antecedent conditions. Mediations give rationality a nonuniform status (subjective if you will--in a special sense) which makes rationality the term irreducible in the covering law model.

This position does not commit the holder to posit a world of wildly erratic behavior, it merely points out that interpersonal consistency depends upon the shared similarity of the logico-meaningful mediations in the repertoire of contiguous individuals. As Wittgenstein

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[18]Howard Kendler and May F. D'Amato, "A Comparison of Reversal Shifts and Nonreversal Shifts in Human Concept Formation Behavior," Journal of Experimental Psychology, XLIX, No. 3 (1955), 165-174.

notes regarding the role of language in the consistency of knowledge and behavior,

> How do I know that this colour is red? -- It would be an answer to say: 'I have learnt English.'[19]

What does this mean in terms of explanation? First, it obviously means that the explanations of purposive human behaviors does not conform to the covering law model. That is not to say behavior cannot be explained but it does rule out the deductive type prediction which is necessary for hypothetical-deductive explanations.[20] Second, it means that understanding

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[19]Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. by G.E.M. Anscombe (3rd ed.; New York: The Macmillian Co., 1970), 381 para.

[20]It does not seem that the above mentioned position imputes an unnecessary rationalism to formalists such as Hempel--at least in relation to explanation. Empirical regularities are important for explanation, only if said regularity would be derived from a set of other propositions--invariably--a task Durkheim took up. That is, an explanation becomes informative when the propositions from which a brute event are functionally related, can be specified and thereafter used deductively. For example, in Suicide, Durkheim attempts to state the propositions of (1) social cohesion, (2) psychic support, (3) social stress, which are useful in deducing the social uniformity--suicide.

In other words, the apparent emphasis upon rationalism is a function of the role of deduction in formal systems of explanation. This emphasis certainly does not imply a denial of empirical evidences, behavioral evidence, consequents, brute fact as the starting place of explanation; it is the requirements of what counts as explanation that are at question.

is not interchangeable (in meaning) with the term prediction. To quote Winch,

> I want to insist that if a proffered interpretation is wrong, statistics, though they may suggest that that is so, are not the decisive and ultimate court of appeal for the validity of sociological interpretations the way Weber suggests. What is needed is a better interpretation, not something different in kind. The compatibility of an interpretation with statistics does not prove its validity. Someone who interprets a tribes magical rites as a form of misplaced scientific activity will not be corrected by statistics about what members of that tribe are likely to do on various kinds of occasion (though this might form part of the argument); what is ultimately required is a philosophical argument like, e.g., Collingwood's in The Principles of Art. (6:Book 1, Chapter IV.) For a mistaken interpretation of a form of social activity is closely akin to the type of mistake delt with in philosophy.[21]

It is not uncommon to be able to make predictions of great accuracy and still not understand what is being done or said. Grasping the meaning of an event is a realm far removed from predictive laws. Third it means that Hempel's inclusion of "mediations" among antecedent conditions is mistaken. Such would only be possible if "mediations" were dependent variables without legislative force, which were effects of external stimuli. Kendler's and D'Amato's work demonstrate that "mediations" once acquired are independent of external stimuli, and have independent legislative effect in purposive human action. Fourth, Kendler and D'Amato's work would indicate that the shape of the

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[21]Winch, pp. 113-114.

world is related to the "mediations" through which it is perceived. Fifth the work of these two psychologists would intimate that rationality is a non-uniform state of affairs (what is rational depends upon the configuration of mediations through which an individual "views" the situation); a state of affairs antithetical to the uniform universal rationality the hypothetical-deductive model demands and depends upon. In other words, the uniform rationality upon which the Hypothetical-deductive model logically depends--appears to be absent in the empirical world.

What then is the role of prediction in the social sciences in general and education in particular in regard to purposive human behavior? If "O" is to make a statement as to the future action of "B," he must familiarize himself with the "mediations," "B" is using in viewing situation "T." He must (ala Peters) understand the rules which B is following.

In this sense prediction is confined to "prediction of the short range." Prediction cannot be any more accurate than the specification of "mediations" which are governing a given situation. In relation to any significant sense, prediction of Historical Traditions is absurd. As Winch points out one significant independent variable in historical trends is the decisions, choices and goals

held by individuals in that moment in time. In illustration,

> It may help to recall Humphrey Lyttleton's rejoinder to someone who asked him where Jazz was going: If I knew where Jazz was going I'd be there already![22]

The point that has been missed is that education is a purposive activity. Education is an ideological (mediated, conceptual) expression of reality. It is when that ideology is no longer adequate in the context of contemporary experience that there is a "crisis in the classroom."

> A man's social relations with his fellows are permeated with his ideas about reality. Indeed, 'permeated' is hardly a strong enough word; social relations are expressions of ideas about reality.[23]

It has been the failure of professional educators to take into account the ideology (mediation) of education and the mediations' active role in the state of things. Such a myopic field of vision is a functional result of the exclusive search for the problems of education in the articulation of scientific theory to brute fact. It would seem that exclusion of ideological considerations is the reason why massive transfusions of money, technical improvements, and massive increases in expertise have not solved contemporary educational problems--the important problems of education are not technical--they are ideological.

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[22]Winch, pp. 93-94.

[23]Winch, p. 23.

The hypothetical-deductive model has its place in education. It is its exclusive use that has been problematic. It is the assumption that education functions exclusively within the necessary and unexceptional connections of Irreducible Social Laws and antecedent conditions which has precipitated the "crisis in the classroom." There can be no comprehensive solution to the problems of education until the ideological character and social context of education are taken into account. Until then--the bridges will not stand.

CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGICAL INDIVIDUALISM AND EXPLANATION

> A man's social relations with his fellows are permeated with his ideas about reality. Indeed, 'permeated' is hardly a strong enough word: social relations are expressions of ideas about reality.[1]

Winch's statement is the key to a demonstration of an alternative model of theory in education. (One warning should be entered before proceeding. Winch is not advocating a rather naive nominalism which fails to note the objective nature of the world. He is pointing out that we may never question the "total" nature of X. We may only question the adequacy of "X" as "such and such"; rather than, "X" as "this and that." To do more would simply bump the nose of language against the limits of the universe. Winch is emphasizing the active role mediations[2] plan in reality.) It should be plain then that "reality" is not equal to the bio/physical brute fact, but rather, is transactional with the province of meaning. In other words it is the configuration of meanings held by an individual

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[1] Winch, p. 23.

[2] I will in the future use the terms "mediation" and "language" interchangeably and as equivalent in meaning.

which constitute reality not the ontological structure of the object.[3] Second, it is the task of education to penetrate reality and therein arrive at an understanding of social phenomena through a recognition and understanding of the mediations which govern the context of a given situation. In other words the theoretical stance of Methodological Individualism is: purposive social events can be understood by reference to the avoidable mediations of individual agents without reference to Irreducible Social Laws.

There seems to be two obvious objections to Methodological Individualism: (1) how can we know which mediations an individual is using in a given situation (as Nagel points out Methodological Individualism is dependent upon whether or not direct observation of intentional terms is possible at least in principle. That is, as a paradigm Methodological Individualism depends upon whether or not we can know the rules which govern the action of X); and (2) even if we can know which mediations an individual is using in a given situation such a methodology is irretrivably empty. These objections will be considered in order.

First, if the hypothetical-deductive model is not an adequate theory of explanation, how is it possible to know the mediations or rules "B" is using in viewing

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[3]Alfred Schutz, "On Multiple Realities," in Collected Papers: The Problem of Social Reality, ed. by Maurice Natanson (The Hauge: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962).

situation "T" at time "E"? How is it possible to know, without having to resort to guessing pure and simple?

> (S)ince words and phrases for sensations belong to common natural language, their use "stands in need of a justification which everybody (who speaks the language) understands" (PI 261). Such a justification would be impossible if they were names of processes that are essentially incommunicable to others.[4]

The problem is the classical problem of private language. The classic example of the problem is Wittgenstein's beetle in the box.

> Now someone tells me that he knows what pain is only from his own case! -- Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a "beetle". No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle.--Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something constantly changing.--But suppose the word "beetle" had a use in these people's language?--If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a something: for the box might even be empty . . .[5]

Wittgenstein's example serves to point out the impossibility of knowledge if we are to posit knowledge on the model of subject and object. Such a model would appear to make knowledge of other minds impossible or at least force such claims into the realm of belief.

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[4]Alan Donagan, "Wittgenstein on Sensation," in Wittgenstein: The Philosophical Investigations, ed. by George Pitcher (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1966), p. 337.

[5]Wittgenstein, Investigations, 293. In all references to Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations and On Certainty, citations refer to paragraph numbers.

Yet in language we are able to predict, act and make inferences with success about mental events which appear to have utter privacy. Such certainly is an odd state of affairs, which leads to difficult and unsatisfactory puzzles. By implication

> It would be possible to imagine someone groaning out: "Someone is in pain--I don't know who!" . . . The proposition "I don't know whether I or someone else is in pain" would be a logical product, and one of its factors would be: "I don't know whether I am in pain or not" . . .[6]

If one understands pain only from his own case there can be no intersubjective agreement as to the use of the word (concept) "pain." This problem is one of many siblings born of a common philosophical assumption since Augustine. The assumption is (was) that all words mean as a great many nouns do. Augustine's influence has been pervasive. Among contemporary philosophers Augustine's influence can be seen in Russell's work on logical atomism. Russell had taken for granted that the universe consisted of a number of simples; independent entities which were directly understandable when encountered. That is, he believed that objects could be known independently of language--through ostensive definition. Here we find the idea that: "Every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands."[7] Knowledge is immediately given. The

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[6]Wittgenstein, Investigations, 407-408.

[7]Wittgenstein, Investigations, 1.

relation between the thing and the thing named is the relation of merely subject and object.

Only I, then, can know the dispositional terms of my mind because only I have direct access to it, or so the argument goes. No one can know if I am dizzy, in pain, or taste something. Each human then gives these words their meaning independently of others and of others use of them. Thus, he alone can understand what he fells. To this Wittgenstein responds:

> What reason have we for calling "S": the sign for a "sensation"? For "sensation" is a word of our common language, not of one intelligible to me alone. So the use of this word stands in need of a justification which everybody understands. . . . It might be said: if you have given yourself a private definition of a word, then you must inwardly undertake to use the word in such-and-such a way. And how do you undertake that? It is assumed that you invent the technique of using the word; or that you found it ready-made?[8]

Even in private perception then the naming process presupposes the creation of public rules for the use of the term. "Stage setting" to use Wittgenstein's term.

> When we speak of someone's having given a name to pain, what is presupposed is the existence of the grammar of the word "pain"; it shews the post where the new word is stationed.[9]

That is, even if persons existed in a philosophic sense, without bodies and behavior, the use of a concept would be predicated upon an intersubjective agreement upon the

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[8]Wittgenstein, Investigations, 261-262.

[9]Wittgenstein, Investigations, 257.

use of the word and the conditions which would justify the use of said word.

The previous discussion serves only to point out that correct and incorrect have no application to some supposed inner identification. There is no identity in a thing-in-itself. Without rules for that which would count for and that which would count against "S" assurance could never be given that a correct identification was being made. Perhaps he was mistaken every time![10]

> "A thing is identical with itself."--There is no finer example of a useless proposition, which yet is connected with a certain play of the imagination. It is as if in imagination we put a thing into its own shape and saw that it fitted.[11]

Malcolm gives a precise summary of the outcome of private language when he states:

> (I)f I obtain my conception of pain from pain that I experience, then it will be part of my conception of pain that I am the only being that can experience it. For me it will be a contradiction to speak of another's pain. This strict solopsism is the necessary outcome of the notion of private language.[12]

If the meaning of concepts cannot be acquired from private ostensive definitions, the mode in which they are acquired must be explicated.

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[10]Norman Malcolm, "Knowledge of Other Minds," in Wittgenstein: The Philosophical Investigations, ed. by George Pitcher (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1966), pp. 371-383.

[11]Wittgenstein, Investigations, 216.

[12]Norman Malcolm, "Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations," in Wittgenstein: The Philosophical Investigations, ed. by George Pitcher (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1966), p. 76.

The problem then is to account for the apparent success people exhibit in dealing with mental states; and explicate a methodology which would justify the use of words and phrases for sensations in the common natural language. In other words how can the concept of "pain" be an objective concept? D. W. Hamlyn writes that to understand the meaning of a concept

> one would have to start with an account of what it is to understand language, and end with the kinds of applications that the word has.[13]

The point of entrance to this problem then is an account of what it is to understand language. In this context a word may be thought of as an event-with-meaning. To the question of what it means to understand language Wittgenstein gives this answer,

> The grammar of the word "knows" is evidently closely related to that of "can", "is able to". But also related to that of understandings. ('Mastery' of a technique,)[14]

A minimal account of what it is to understand language is the ability to use a concept to discriminate and generalize; and justify that discrimination or generalization in intersubjective examination.

The second step is an examination of what Wittgenstein means by agreement in definition. Wittgenstein simply points out, relative to agreement in definition,

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[13]D. W. Hamlyn, The Theory of Knowledge (New York: Doubleday & Company Inc., 1970), p. 68.

[14]Wittgenstein, Investigations, 150.

that the evidential value of criteria is founded on definition. He notes

> The fluctuation in grammar between criteria and symptoms makes it look as if there were nothing at all but symptoms. We say, for example: "Experience teaches that there is rain when the barometer falls, but it also teaches that there is rain when we have certain sensations of wet and cold, or such-and-such visual impression." In defence of this one says that these sense-impressions can deceive us. But here one fails to reflect that the fact that the false appearance is preceisely one of rain is founded on a definition.[15]

What is agreement in judgment then? Where does this agreement come from. Agreement in judgment is taught.

> We do not learn the practice of making empirical judgements by learning rules: we are taught judgements and their connexion with other judgements. A totality of judgements is made plausible to us.[16]

Criteria then are taught by trial and error irrespective of formal logics, held fast not by truth values but by agreement of our environment.

> The child learns to believe a host of things. I.e. it learns to act according to these beliefs. Bit by bit there forms a system of what is believed, and in that system some things stand unshakeably fast and some are more or less liable to shift. What stands fast does so, not because it is intrinsically obvious or convincing; it is rather held fast by what lies around it.[17]

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[15]Wittgenstein, Investigations, 354.

[16]Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty, trans. by Dennis Paul and G.E.M. Anscombe (New York: J & J Harper Editions, 1969), 140.

[17]Wittgenstein, Certainty, 144.

The preceding view nevertheless is not to commit to a subjective or totally conventional view of the universe. What is wrong with idealism and nominalism which tend to emphasize the subjective or conceptual is that they fail to note the objective character of the world. We can raise the question only within a given agreed upon, arbitrary, conceptual scheme; but, you are reminded that we may not question the total nature of "X," we may only question its objectivity as a such-and-such.

That which is still missing is an account of the empirical connection between mental states such as pain, and said behavioral manifestations. The connection cannot be one of logical entailment--but it at least must be a logico-meaningful connection. For if the relation were merely contingent (say perhaps taught, or conditioned) pain behavior would at best be unreliable symptoms of mental (pain) states; further, there would be no justification in use of mental state words and phrases. Intersubjective examination would be impossible. It would not be difficult (under the conditions of a contingent relation) to imagine large segments of the population using mental state words and phrases in great variance from each other.

What then might be this essential connection between mental states and behavioral manifestations? Wittgenstein offers this suggestion:

> How do we refer to sensations. There doesn't seem to be any problem here; don't we talk about sensation everyday, and give them names? But how is the connection between names and the thing named set up? The question is the same as: how does a human learn the meaning of the names of sensation? -- of the word "pain" for example. Here is one possibility: words are connected with the primitive, the natural, expressions of sensation and used in their place . . . the verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it.[18]

What is the significance of Wittgenstein's suggestion?

> Wittgenstein's own solution, like the decisive movement of the conjuring trick itself, was so simple that it is elusive. It was to allow that the Cartesian grammatical facts are facts, that sensations are private non-dispositional accompaniments of the behavior by which they are naturally expressed but to refuse to recognize those accompaniments as processes that can be named and investigated independently of the circumstances that produce them, and the behavior by which they are naturally expressed. Sundered from their external circumstances, such private accompaniments cannot even be named in a common language; a fortiori, they cannot be investigated in any way at all. But, equally, should an investigation ignore such facts as that something accompanies a cry of pain, something which is important and frightful, then to describe it as an investigation of sensation would be preposterous.[19]

Thus the connection between a symbol and a mental state is no more exotic than the connection between a limp and an injured leg. Wittgenstein's suggestion has two other important results. One, it answers the question how does one know when one is in pain, or agony. And second, it

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[18]Wittgenstein, Investigations, 244.

[19]Donagan, p. 350.

provides an explanation of how the utterance of first person said by others can have meaning for us, roughly the same importance (meaning) as the natural behavior which functions as the criterion of psychological states of others. The essential connection between mental states and behavior therefore allow a criterion which is, by logical necessity, evidence for a mental state or process which is not itself observable. Thus, the criterion for the color of someone's mental image is what he says and does: I cannot observe the color of his image, but I can hear what he says and see what he does (see Wittgenstein, Investigations, Sect. 377).

Thus,

> . . . there are certain criteria in a man's behaviour for the fact that he does not understand a word, that it means nothing to him; that he can do nothing with it. And criteria for his "thinking he understands", attaching some meaning to the word, but not the right one. And, lastly, criteria for his understanding the word right.[20]

In general "An 'inner process' stands in need of outward criteria."[21] But, it should be noted because a criterion is behavioral it does not follow its criterion is behavioral as well. For example, the criterion of pain is behavioral but pain is not. As Wittgenstein notes about pain:

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[20]Wittgenstein, Investigations, 269.

[21]Wittgenstein, Investigations, 580.

> "Yes, but there is something there all the same accompanying my cry of pain. And it is on account of that that I utter it. And this something is what is important--and frightful."[22]

In other words pain then is more than behavior. Wittgenstein's theory of criteria is able to avoid both the reductionism of the behaviorists and insoluble problems of Cartesian doctrines. Wittgenstein's interpretation of the relation between propositions and facts is not a behavioristic reduction of pain to a "disposition" to action, or a Cartesian analogy. Behavioral interpretations capitalize on Wittgenstein's criticism of Cartesian doctrines and ignore the fact he specifically states:

> The essential thing about private experience is really not that each person possess his own exemplar, but that nobody knows whether other people also have this or something else . . .[23]

Furthermore even if such a doctrine did exist it would be irrelevant for its existence would have no consequence.

> Imagine a person whose memory could not retain what the word "pain" meant--so that he constantly called different things by that name. . . . Here I should like to say: A wheel that can be turned though nothing else moves with it, is not part of the mechanism.[24]

Therefore, it is possible to establish mental states in the empirical realm and to have knowledge of

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[22]Wittgenstein, Investigations, 296.

[23]Wittgenstein, Investigations, 272.

[24]Wittgenstein, Investigations, 271.

them--knowledge as certain and justified as any empirical statement.

Now what does this mean for problems in ordinary language? It becomes apparent in Wittgenstein's analysis, knowledge of other minds does not depend upon having the "same feeling." For purposes of dissolving this problem the meaning of the terms "same" and "feeling" must be examined. The term "same" will be considered first. Wittgenstein writes,

> In so far as it makes sense to say that my pain is the same as his, it is also possible for us both to have the same pain. . . .[25]

That is he is pointing out that the grammar of possessives ought not serve to confuse us. Agreed it is impossible for person "D" to have the "same" pain as person "F" in the sense of the logical demands of a possessive. But it is possible that both have the "same" pain in that they answer to the same description. One would make the same type of mistake if one claimed that a son could not have the same build as his father! No meaning is attached to the fact that the pains of persons "D" and "F" were, or were not, numerically the same.

In this analysis the word "feeling" also loses its mystical significance. He points out that feelings are not meanings. That is, there is no instant and universal

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[25]Wittgenstein, Investigations, 253.

correlation between "inner experiences" and meaning. Agreed the "inner experience" is part of the meaning (as in the example of pain). As in the case of pain "An 'inner process' stands in need of outward criteria."[26] His point is "inner experiences" are not specified by themselves and nothing more.

Meaning is then fixed in the linguistic context of terms. The use of sensation words are fixed by criteria. Our knowledge of others then is fixed by our access (empirical) to the outward criteria of inner processes, and mastery of the techniques of language. Therefore, the function of meaning in language does not depend upon a parallel between a speaker's and hearer's sensation experiences. Berger and Luckman summarize it nicely in the following quotation:

> Human expressivity is capable of objectivation, that is, it manifests itself in products of human activity that are available both to their producers and to other men as elements of a common world. Such objectivations serve as more or less enduring indices of the subjective processes of their producers, allowing their availability to extend beyond the face-to-face situation in which they can be directly apprehended. For instance, a subjective attitude of anger is directly expressed in the face-to-face situation by a variety of bodily indices--facial mien, general stance of the body, specific movements of arms and feet, and so on. These indices are continuously available in the face to face

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[26]Wittgenstein, Investigations, 580.

> situation, which is precisely why it affords me the optimal situation for gaining access to another's subjectivity.[27]

The first objection to Methodological Individualism would seem to be mistaken. There are good reasons to believe that the term "know" may be used as surely, in reference to mediations, as to any other empirical phenomena. The previous section then would seem to provide the epistemological prerequisites for Methodological Individualism.

At this point the second objection must be considered. That is, even if we can "know" which mediations an individual is using in a given situation, such a methodology may be irretrivably empty.

Methodological Individualism can be saved from its apparent vacuity.[28] Krimerman argues that Methodological Individualism can be saved by a careful reformulation of the work of J.W.N. Watkins. Krimerman starts from the following two statements

(a) that there are no ISL's and

(b) that no social tendency exists which could not be altered if the individuals concerned both wanted to alter it and possessed the appropriate information.[29]

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[27] Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge (Garden City: Doubleday & Company Inc., 1966), p. 34.

[28] I owe most of this line of analysis to the brilliant essay by Leonard I. Krimerman, in his book The Nature and Scope of Social Science: A Critical Anthology (New York: Appleton-Century Crofts, 1969), pp. 587-602.

[29] Krimerman, p. 589.

Krimerman points out that this is much like claiming a man may engage in purposive activity if there are no forces mitigating against his goal and action toward the accomplishment of said goal. As should be noted this type of formulation of Methodological Individualism does not exclude of necessity that there are no Irreducible Social Laws. That is, (b) in this formulation is merely a truism. It can make no claim against the truth of the law claim in (a). In brief, in the formulation above, Methodological Individualism is too weak to reject a single Irreducible Social Law.

Nevertheless, Krimerman acts to save Methodological Individualism by making the following move. He retains statement (a) and reformulates (b). The two preformulated statements now take the following form:

(a) that there are no ISL's and

(b) will affirm that the occurrence of any social phenomenon or pattern can be explained by deducing it from true statements of four sorts: ascriptions of beliefs and desire to individuals; propositions asserting that little or no compulsion was introduced to prevent those individuals from acting on the beliefs and desires in question; conceptual analysis of those beliefs and desires and their combined implications; and claims to the effect that beliefs and desires under analysis are (were) avoidable, in the sense that there are (were) no social or legal obstacles preventing the individual agents involved from developing alternative beliefs and/or desires. (To abbreviate this, we can say that according to "b") any social event

> or regularity is deducible from the avoidable dispositions of individual agents.[30]

This move seems to solve various problems seen in the initial formulations of Methodological Individualism. First of all this formulation successfully deals with the problem of cultural conditioning--which seems to depend exclusively upon Irreducible Social Laws. Cultural conditioning assumes a social-social[31] conditioning process which is not avoidable. Such is to claim that no social phenomena exists which can be explained only by the premises available in (b). Clearly explanations can be arrived at without the use of irreducible social regularities, or social connections. Krimerman gives the following example:

1. Illiterates are persons who derive no pleasure from reading (studying, etc.) books and who can make little or no use of them.

2. Persons who do not desire and have little or no use for a given type of thing do not pursue (or purchase) it, unless compelled.

3. In country A, no one compels illiterates to purchase books.

4. In country A, illiterates can become literate and can purchase books; that is, no social or legal obstacles prevent them from so doing.

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5. Hence, in country A illiterates purchase few or no books.

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[30]Krimerman, p. 594.

[31]Social-social: A term used to designate social events which apparently do not include or depend upon the actions of individuals or the use of Irreducible Social Laws for their explanation.

[32]Krimerman, p. 593.

In the above example we have a case where the explanans do not appear to presuppose any Irreducible Social Law or social-social regularity. Nevertheless since the cited case applies only to cases in which Irreducible Social Laws are not necessary in explanation, a further development is required in cases where Irreducible Social Laws are apparently necessary. In this case, Methodological Individualism is not concerned with denying social facts (such as cultural conditioning) but rather, merely to point out that such conditioning is (was) avoidable. In this formulation of (b) Methodological Individualism can provide a coherent place for the process of cultural conditioning and the active role of other cultural objectifications such as language and institutions. That is, it may be quite legitimate, in some cases, to point out instances where phenomenon are impossible to analyze without reference to Irreducible Social Law. But, this does not entail that those Irreducible Social Laws are unavoidable, or such events are not at least in principle capable of explanation by the avoidable actions of particular agents.

Second, Methodological Individualism need not defend itself on the basis of an all or nothing "holism" or "individualism" dichotomy. As Krimerman points out if Methodological Individualism can be identified with the reformulated conjunction of (a) and (b) then Methodological Individualism is not a global rejection

of the effects of historical tendency or with a conception of social systems as organic wholes which explain the behavior of individuals that compose them. That is, one need not claim to be either an "individual" or "holist." Revised Methodological Individualism can abandon this distinction in favor of a more reasonable stand. In this form Methodological Individualism can attack what is common to all opponents of Methodological Individualism, that is, their affirmation of unavoidable Irreducible Social Laws.

Third, this formulation of Methodological Individualism also offers two modes of dealing with supposed Irreducible Social Laws. The first strategy Krimerman calls individualization. This move is simply the individual factorization of purported irreducible social uniformities. Even in the face of such pervasive uniformities as the "incest taboo" it is demonstrable that this socio-cultural variable did not prevent persons in courses of action in contradiction of the purported cultural uniformity; or, even in cases where no objective action in contradiction of the purported uniformity can be found, it may be demonstratable how men could have escaped this social uniformity. Thus, the regularity is granted, but its unavoidability is brought to question, the uniformity is not irreducible and therefore has no claim against Methodological Individualism. The second

strategy Krimerman calls de-empiricizing. This move is essentially a strategy for revealing purported irreducible uniformities which are merely analytic. For example, if a man is a professional murderer, he must at least have committed one socially non-sanctioned killing, and must have attempted killings when he has the opportunity. It simply makes no sense to call a man a murderer if he has not been engaged in socially non-sanctioned killings. Thus, the purported irreducible social uniformity is strictly conceptual.

> And this sense of "determine," as we have seen, does not imply that any state of affairs is unattainable by human effort. It does not serve to express a lawful and unavoidable connection between logically distinct classes of events, but merely announces an explication of meaning carried by the antecedent concept. As such, propositions expressing this sense of "determined" pose no threat to MI.[33]

The preceding explanation seems to save Methodological Individualism from vacuity. It also, I believe, offers a way to account for historical change, and individual undetermined action, without reliance upon the covering law model. It should be evident at this point that the covering law model is incapable of explaining purposive individual behavior (see Chapter II); and that Malcolm's formal demonstration of purposive human behavior is incompatible with causal (covering law) explanations of

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[33]Krimerman, p. 599.

behavior and is strong enough to reject such explanations at least in the case of purposive behavior. Second, it should be evident that Malcolm's demonstration of purposive human behavior is compatible with Methodological Individualism, and provides an empirical basis which at least parallels Krimerman's logical argument for Methodological Individualism.

In the light of the preceding analysis it would seem there are good reasons for assuming that both standard objections to Methodological Individualism have been dissolved, and it is appropriate to assume that Methodological Individualism is the most adequate theoretical stance for the social sciences--at least at the moment. Inasmuch as there seems no insuperable problems in knowing (mediations: concepts, beliefs, rules) which would epistemologically exclude Methodological Individualism as an acceptable paradigm candidate.

CHAPTER IV

EDUCATION, SCHOOLING AND METHODOLOGICAL INDIVIDUALISM

As Thomas Kuhn noted, the adoption of alternative paradigms is a revolutionary not a systematic process. In many cases the balance between argument and counter argument is small, and the balance, even in the area of crisis, will many times fall in favor of tradition--often convincingly so. If a new candidate paradigm is judged solely upon problem-solving ability, by hard headed men, very few paradigms would ever be replaced.

> The man who embraces a new paradigm at an early stage must often do so in defiance of the evidence provided by problem-solving. He must, that is, have faith that the new paradigm will succeed with the many large problems that confront it, knowing only that the older paradigm has failed with a few. A decision of that kind can only be made on faith.
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> That is one of the reasons why prior crisis proves so important. Scientists who have not experienced it will seldom renounce the hard evidence of problem-solving to follow what may easily prove and will be widely regarded as a will-o'-the-wisp. But crisis alone is not enough. There must also be a basis, though if need be neither rational nor ultimately correct, for faith in the particular candidate chosen. Something must make at least a few scientists feel that the new proposal is on

> the right track, and sometimes it is only personal and inarticulate aesthetic considerations that can do that.[1]

As Kuhn stated there must be something that allows one to assume that the new proposal is on the right track (hopefully some of these considerations have been made evident in Chapters I, II, and III). But, on the other hand, Kuhn notes a conclusive proof of the new proposal in many cases cannot be provided. Such is still the case with Methodological Individualism. In other words Chapter I can only evidence the felt crisis in progress, Chapter II can only demonstrate problems with the covering-law model, and Chapter III can only point out that there are no insuperable logical or epistemological problems with Methodological Individualism as theory. The ultimate correctness of Methodological Individualism as theoretical system will and can only be resolved by further attempts to articulate Methodological Individualism to brute events. The issue of paradigm adoption can only be decided by the success of Methodological Individualism with the large problems that confront it.

Nevertheless, it is possible at this time to display the more important apparent implications (in the weak sense of implicate) of Methodological Individualism for educational theory--if not for practice per se. The

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[1]Kuhn, p. 158.

former is a "meta" consideration which is subject to the penetration of philosophical analysis. The latter is a matter of positive theory which is only subject to the empirical analysis upon the basis of consequents; which, obviously, there is no basis for here. That is, the consideration here concerns the implications of Methodological Individualism for the adequacy of educational explanation, not the production of substantive explanations of educational events. Considerations that follow pertain strictly to the implications for theory and adequacy of explanation.

The first implication of Methodological Individualism is in exposing the assumption made by contemporary educators that all explanation conforms to the covering law model. That is, their mistake was in assuming all important explanation has predictive ability. Scriven points out there are perfectly satisfactory explanations which have little or no predictive ability. Historical explanations, for example, are not subject to reasonable doubt and yet, historians cannot deduce general laws nor make predictive statements from their findings. Scriven points out another interesting case in that even in the physical sciences there are cases of highly validated covering law type explanations from which predictions cannot be generated at the present time. Covering law explanations about sun spots,

earthquakes, floods to name but a few do not allow specific prediction of their occurrence.[2] (This example seems a bit overstated in that at least in principle the Sun spots, etc. could be predicted. The point Scriven seems to be striving to make is that even in the physical sciences predictive ability is not the unique criterion of hypothesis acceptance.)

The educational significance of this obsessive concentration, by educators, upon a search for explanations with predictive ability has led to tunnel-vision understanding of educational phenomena.

The attempt to attain formal, non-intentional, predictive rules governing educational phenomenon, has ruled out, by definition, large areas of experimental practitioner "knowns." The covering law model purges as irrelevant many non-predictive yet valid explanations. In thus doing the experiential command, that comes with contextual knowledge; through acquisition by consequentially antecedent events, is largely denied cognitive significance through the use of various devices--usually the application of various epithets such as: subjective, N of 1, lacks predictive ability and the like to various experiential "knowns"--then operationally exorcising them.

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[2]Michael Scriven, "Truisms as the Grounds of Historical Explanations," in Theories of History, ed. by Patrick Gardener (New York: The Macmillian Company, 1969), pp. 443-471.

The implication of Methodological Individualism is to point out that it is precisely the experiential knowledge he or she as a teacher has gained (awareness of the important and often used mediations of "X") that allows the teacher to succeed in the process of schooling. It is here that the often invoked: "know your students," "know the community," "know where your students 'are at,'" "get a feel for the situation" and "be relevant" acquire significant, non-trivial meaning. At this point some sense can be made out of the demand of, "Black teachers for Black children." It is not a trivial demand. It would seem, within the perview of the Hypothetical-deductive model, that what is needed, is not teachers Black and White or Yellow, but <u>good teachers</u> i.e. professionals who know, and can put into practice the universal rules of schooling. The demand for Black or Yellow seems absurd. And in a racial sense it is absurd on one hand and disgusting on the other. But, in the sense that Black teachers are <u>language experts</u> in a language Whites have been historically and systematically excluded from [which is not conversely true for "educated" Blacks, who are carefully trained in the larger community's language (mediations)], such teachers are better equipped to "know" and therein motivate, be relevant and succeed with such populations.

This seems an adequate leaving point for a short aside. If Methodological Individualism is correct then many of the purported Hypothetical-deductive principles passed on in institutions of teacher education are fairly uselsss. Probably the most blatant example is the attempt of behavioral psychologists to develop universal principles of motivation. If Methodological Individualism is correct, motivation and its sister consideration, relevance, is dependent upon the mediational configuration held by the client. That is why Bach is relevant to one and the Moody Blues to another, that is why Op Art stimulates one and not another, that is why no one stimulus represents a positive or negative reward to all persons (an error of behaviorism). In other words, one of the implications of Methodological Individualism for education is the importance of particular knowings; that is the importance of knowing's individual students and individual classrooms and particular educational contexts--as a necessary though not sufficient condition for success in schooling. The previous material would seem to be significant reason for the expansion of Intern programs, and early implementation of classroom practice in teacher education. The concentration of contemporary teacher education programs on "schooling-in-general" would seem to be in error.

Second, if Methodological Individualism is a more adequate theoretical position for education, then it would

seem certain ethical (normative) considerations follow. Probably the most significant for education is the implicit justification of educational practice in the revelation of "how things are" inherent in covering law model explanations. As Methodological Individualism unfolds it becomes apparent that the self evident justification of "how things are" is closer to intimidation than justification. As Roszak notes about covering law type justification:

> If we probe the technocracy in search of the peculiar power it holds over us, we arrive at the myth of objective consciousness . . . cleansed of all subjective distortion, all personal involvement. What flows from this state of consciousness qualifies as knowledge, and nothing else does. This is the bedrock on which the natural sciences have built; and under their spell all fields of knowledge strive to become scientific. The study of man in his social, political, economic, psychological, historical aspects--all this, too, must become objective: rigorously, painstakingly objective. At every level of human experience, would-be scientists come forward to endorse the myth of objective consciousness, thus certifying themselves as experts. And because they know and we do not, we yield to their guidance.[3]

In more technical terms, if Methodological Individualism is the correct posture for education, the self evident justification of "how things are" cannot be maintained; that is, Nagel's distinction between 'characterizing' and 'appraising' value judgments[4] cannot be

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[3]Theodore Roszak, The Making of a Counter Culture: Reflections on the Technocratic Society and Its Youthful Opposition (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1969), pp. 208-209.

[4]Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science (New York: Harcourt Brace and World, Inc., 1961), pp. 485-502.

maintained as a mode of objective justification. Nagel claims 'characterizing' judgments may be dealt with somewhat in the same manner as critical synthetic definitions. That is the definition of "such and such" may in the first instance be an arbitrary judgment; nevertheless, Nagel maintains, factual judgments can be evaluated free from value/subjective/appraising terms subject only to the canons of objective verification based upon statistical and logical rules of inference. Therefore, although 'appraising' judgments exist in the human condition there is no need for them and their existence need not affect the possibility of an objective social science. For example, in the case of "idiot savant," the existence of this condition in an individual can be confirmed (or disconfirmed) on the basis of behavioral correspondence between a set of categories which identify the "idiot savant event" and the behavior of the subject, relative only to the canons of objective verification.

The distinction seems suspect. Nagel claims 'appraising' judgments are not necessary condition for making 'characterizing' judgments. Such seems highly unlikely. If Nagel's position were to hold, terms such as "idiot" and "savant" would have to be purely analytic--to eliminate appraising judgments as a necessary condition for making characterizing judgments. Immediately it should be recognized that terms such as "idiot" and

"savant" are synthetic. An inseparable and intrinsic part of the meaning of the terms "idiot" and "savant" are their normative components. Such terms are not merely normed they are commendatory, normative, in the sense of a recommendation of approval or disapproval is inherent in the brute meaning of each term. The term "idiot" for example is a classification of I.Q. at a statistically significant variance from human beings in "normal" condition. Normal is a quasi-primitive term which functions as an appraising term which is a necessary condition for making 'characterizing' judgments.

In other words the justification of "how things are" seems to depend on the prior goals and values of human purpose. It is important to recognize that the objective mode of justification is an empty form of a previous time, that will not serve ourselves or education well. Educational actions cannot be justified on the basis of "how things are" alone. They can be justified in relation to human purposes and goals.

Rationality then if Methodological Individualism is correct is the characteristic way humans deal with the world. Wilson notes:

> 'Why?'--questions about human action normally expect an answer of the second type: that is,

> some explanations or justification in terms of the agents' intentions, aims, purposes or reasons.[5]

In this sense there is an incipient morality in rationality. Dewey is quite correct when he notes:

> An individual usually acquires the morality as he inherits the speech of his social group.[6]

The symbolic universe is the level of justification. It represents a totality of meaning which encompasses the area of both "fact" and "value" and holds them both in a natural synthesis.

> (P)hilosophy has no private score of knowledge or methods for attaining truth, so it has no private access to good. As it accepts knowledge of facts and principles from those competent in inquiry and discovery, so it accepts the goods that are diffused in human experience. It has no Moasic nor Pauline authority of revolution entrusted to it. But it has the authority of intelligence, of criticism of these common and natural goals.[7]

Within this context men judge and make judgments.

> Judgments about values are judgments about conditions and the results of experienced objects; judgments about that which should regulate the formation of our desires, affections and enjoyments.[8]

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[5]John Wilson, Norman Williams, and Barry Sugarman, Introduction to Moral Education (Great Britain: C. Nichols & Company, Ltd., 1967), p. 49.

[6]John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct: An Introduction to Social Psychology (New York: Random House, Inc., 1922), p. 55.

[7]John Dewey, Experience and Nature (New York: Dover Publications Inc., 1958), p. 408.

[8]John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty: A Study of the Relation of Knowledge and Action (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1960), p. 265.

These judgments are not merely de facto but de jure in the sense of being the results of critical reflection upon the goods found in experience and in brute personal knowledge.

> Values (to sum up) may be connected inherently with liking, and yet not with every liking but only with those that judgment has approved, after examination of the relation upon which the object liked depends. A casual liking is one that happens without knowledge of how it occurs nor to what effect. The difference between it and one which is sought because of a judgment that it is worth having and is to be striven for, makes just the difference between enjoyments which are accidental and enjoyments that have value and hence a claim upon our attitude and conduct.[9]

The problem of value is one of finding authority for the regulation of educational conduct, the problem is to find an authorized principle stable enough to give direction to the process of education and flexible enough to meet the problems of education.

If Methodological Individualism is correct and human action is explicable in terms of the mediations held by individuals, then the concern of ethics is the examination of the mediations (reasons) which direct human behavior. In the sense that the phenomena of education are explicable in the action of persons--to that degree ethics must play the same role in it (education)

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[9]Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, p. 264.

as it does in individual action. And these are matters we must attend to!

> Why employ language, cultivate literature, acquire and develop science, sustain industry, and submit to the refinement of art? To ask these questions is equivalent to asking: Why live? And the only answer is that if one is going to live one must live a life of which these things form the substance. The only question having sense which can be asked is how we are going to use and be used by these things, not whether we are going to use them. Reason, moral principles, cannot in any case be shoved behind these affairs, for reason and morality grow out of them. But they have grown into them as well as out of them. They are there as part of them. No one can escape them if he wants to. He cannot escape the problem of how to engage in life, since in the case he must engage in it in some way or other--or else quit and get out. In short the choice is not between a moral authority outside custom and one within it. It is between adopting more or less intelligent and significant customs.[10]

To be perfectly clear, lest the position advanced here be constructed as the flaming conservatism of a Cadillac liberal, it is not being said that the condition of those judged inferior is a matter merely of the mediations they hold i.e., it is their choice to be poor, dirty, etc. Such would be the grossest naiveté. Methodological Individualism does not deny cultural forces (see Chapter III). In certain cases men may be swept under despite their best personal efforts to avoid the given situation. The thrust of Methodological Individualism is to point out that such culture forces are not

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[10]Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 75.

Irreducible Social Law, are not the inevitable warp and woof of the universe but the avoidable results of the action in the world of men. Methodological Individualism as a theoretical system is certainly not so naive as to fail to recognize that some situations take more than the strength and resources of one man to rectify. The question Methodological Individualism puts to the institution of education (perceived as the concerted purposive action of men) is in what sense does participation in the schooling process, in concrete ways, facilitate the ability of each participant to intelligently alter the conditions of his existence and how can it contribute to the alteration of blocking conditions that one man cannot alter.

Methodological Individualism has many other interesting implications, one of those implications being for schooling. The implication for schooling begins with Methodological Individualism's overwhelming concern with language, and the use of language in directing life, and human behavior in particular. If Methodological Individualism is correct in that social action can be understood in terms of the purposeful (mediated conceptually directed via linguistic terms) then it would seem correct to conceptualize schooling as an introduction to the language games available to communities of persons. In other words in a non-trivial sense <u>schooling is: an introduction to the language</u>. This certainly does not imply anything as trivial as

reducing education to the study of grammar on one hand, and the study of classical English literature on the other. That is, schooling is an introduction to the several language games available to the adult community, in the sense that language (mediations) are the phenomenon, which for each individual as he develops a command of it, orders the "blooming, buzzing, mass" before his senses and provides the basis for his or her action in the world. It is the recognition that the language of chess is one game, the language of ethics another, the language of engineering another and the language of football etc. are differing language games the introduction to which substantially, significantly and non-trivially alters the reality of the initiate. It is the qualitative mastery of a particular language which distinguishes the Master from the novice. Each term of the language has an ontological effect or affect. It is this differing command of individual languages along the axis of quantitative and qualitative extension which discriminates between the schooled and unschooled. Language has a conceptual component and an objectified status in the world which may be separable for purposes of discussion but is inseparable in terms of meaning. In this sense Wittgenstein is quite correct when he noted:

> The grammar of the word "knows" is evidently closely related to that of "can", "is able to". But also closely related to that of "understands". ('Mastery' of a technique,)[11]

The significance of this concept of language is (1) the implied desirability of the mastery of many languages, i.e., the expansion of the schooling curriculum to the broadest possible state, and (2) this concept of language should point out the importance of "doing" (the mastery of both conceptual and praxis-execution axes) as a prerequisite for mastery. The contemporary emphasis upon book learning outside of praxis fares poorly within this concept of language.

The remaining important consideration of Methodological Individualism is its account of educational change without the use of Irreducible Social Laws--and the implications of that account. Methodological Individualism conceptualizes education as an objectified language game. Nevertheless, no language is without problems--the language of education being no exception.

> The symbolic universe is conceived of as a matrix of all socially objectivated and subjectively real meanings; the entire historic society and the entire biography of the individual are seen as events taking place within this universe. . . .[12]

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[11]Wittgenstein, Investigations, 50.

[12]Berger and Luckman, p. 96.

But,

> Because of the inevitable tensions of the institutionalization, and by the very fact that all social phenomena are constructions produced historically through human activity, no society is totally taken for granted and so a fortiori, is no symbolic universe. Every symbolic universe is incipiently problematic. . . . This intrinsic problem becomes accentuated if deviant versions of the symbolic universe come to be shared by groups of "inhabitants". In that case, for reasons evident in the nature of objectivation, the deviant version congeals into a reality in its own right, which, by its existence within the society, challenges the reality status of the symbolic universe as originally constituted. The group that has objectivated this deviant reality becomes a carrier of an alternative definition of reality.[13]

The important problems that educators are facing are a result of the perhaps unconscious attempt to close the universe of educational discourse through the discovery of scientific (hypothetical-deductive) truths beyond which there can be no appeal. The functional result was a myopic concentration upon the search for Irreducible Social Laws to the exclusion of other realities, and has ignored the contradictions between ideological systems, until they (the educators) were squarely faced with what Marcuse calls the "Great Refusal" and Roszak finds in the "Invasion of Centaurs," objectiviations such as these will not yield to behavioral objectives, liberal dress codes, long playing records, paperback books,

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[13]Berger and Luckman, pp. 106-107.

and the abolishment of teacher brutality. These problems of education stand as a rejection of the "end of ideology." Educational problems are a rejection of a one dimensional technological scientific mode of thought and behavior:

> in which ideas, aspirations, and objectives that, by their content, transcend the established universe of discourse and action are either repelled or reduced to the terms of this universe. They are redefined by the rationality of the given system and of its qualitative extension.[14]

Karl Mannheim notes in agreement:

> If the problem of the nature of reality were a mere speculative product of the imagination, we could easily ignore it. But as we proceed, it becomes more and more evident that it is precisely the multiplicity of the concepts of reality which produces the multiplicity of our modes of thought, and that every ontological judgment that we make leads inevitably to far-reaching consequences. If we examine the many types of ontological judgments with which different groups confront us, we begin to suspect that each group seems to move in a separate and distinct world of ideas and that these different systems of thought, which are often in conflict with one another, may in the last analysis be reduced to different modes of experiencing the "same" reality.[15]

It should be recognized at this point that Education as an entity does not exist as an Irreducible Social Fact. It exists, but it exists in many distinct worlds of ideas, held by individuals and groups of persons; often

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[14]Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), p. 12.

[15]Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World Inc., 1936), pp. 98-99.

in conflict with one another. That is, it exists as purposeful activity of human beings (a Methodologically Individual function). It may be necessary to speak of "education" as an Irreducible Social Fact--but it should be recognized this manner of speaking is a heuristic device. We must not be confused by the similarities of surface grammar between descriptive statements such as, "This is a room," and "That is an education." We must be careful and recognize the differences in the language game.

As an intentional activity education is ideological. It (education) is subject to the distortions, of subjective meaning structures--mediations, concepts--held by individuals. Participants in the educational process, both practitioner and client, have pre-selected and pre-interpreted this world (of education) they experience as reality, through the common sense meaning structures (mediations) constructed by men living their daily lives.

To quote Mannheim:

> It may well be that our intellectualism will repeatedly stimulate in us the longing for a point of view beyond time and history--for a "consciousness as such" out of which there arise insights independent of particular perspectives, and capable of formulation into general laws which are eternally valid. But this objective cannot be attained without doing violence to the subject matter. If we seek a science of that which is in process of

> becoming, of practice and for practice, we can realize it only by discovering a new framework in which this kind of knowledge can find adequate expression.[16]

As long as human action is explicable in terms of purpose and goals and it is recognized that reality is filtered through mediational glasses--education will inevitably be steeped in ideology. The possibility of finding a politically neutral understanding of education is clearly impossible. It has been the closing of the two dimensional universe that has led to problems in educational understanding; the liquidation of two-dimensional educational thought through the mechanisms of scientific objectification, has served to blind educators by covering significant differences with the blanket of objectivity, validity and universalism, until the educational situation is out of hand as in New York.

> (T)he New York City Board of Education is a prime example of the short-range oriented, reactive, fire-fighting organization, and this acts to preclude the central board and superintendent from playing an effective role in managing future changes. The board's reactive, non-planning posture is illustrated by a number of delaying and temporizing strategies, including: lengthy public hearings, often held before shaping a public position; studies and committees that sometimes simply hash over old studies, or often see any innovative plans diluted or discarded; hiring outside "experts" and "consultants" who develop innovative plans that are not used; insulation behind a wall of "technical" arguments as to why innovations are not feasible; trying a few local experiments when political pressures for innovation mount, rather than the

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[16]Mannheim, p. 171.

> city wide innovations that are needed; diffusing authority for formulating and monitoring the implementation of new programs across so many units within the institution that it is impossible to pinpoint responsibility for success or failure.[17]

It is only through the recognition of the two dimensional ideological nature of thought that education can be brought under control. This is not a return to ideology, it is not an end of ideology (ala Daniel Bell)--it is a recognition of the ideological function of positivistic educational thought, a recognition of its political function and a negation of the human reduction which is the functional result of the positivist language game.

The study of education:

> With the aid of a consistently elaborated analysis of the perspective, particularization acquires a guiding instrument and a set of criteria for treating problems of imputation. The range and degree of comprehension of each of these several points of view becomes measurable and delimitable through their categorical apparatus and the variety of meanings which each presents. The orientation towards certain meanings and values which inheres in a given social position (the outlook and attitude conditioned by the collective purposes of the group), and the concrete reasons for the different perspectives which the same situation presents to the different positions in it thus become even more determinable, intelligible, and subject to methodological study. . . .[18]

What would be desirable at this point would be an agenda for future research. But such would represent

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[17]Rogers, pp. 396-397.

[18]Mannheim, pp. 284-285.

little more than an exercise in futility. It may well be that it would be desirable to know "the" categories of relevant knowledge which would illuminate the process of education and which would be eternally valid. This objective could not, and cannot be achieved without doing violence to history. That which will be important for the illumination of education cannot be beyond time and history, and independent of particular perspectives.

All that can be specified at this moment are the requirements for future research, which are: (1) the abandonment of Irreducible Social Laws in the explanation of purposive human action, and (2) the adoption of explanation within the perspective given by the context of a particular culture through direct participant observation.

In essence then, Methodological Individualism as a qualitative methodology enjoins social scientists, and in this case educators in particular, to construct expalnations which reflect and respect the integrity of the real world and the perspective of the subjects under investigation. Methodological Individualism as

> Qualitative methodology refers to those research strategies such as participant observation, in-depth interviewing, total participation in the activity being investigated, field work, etc., which allow the researcher to obtain firsthand knowledge about the empirical social world in question. Qualitative methodology allows the researcher to "get close to the data," thereby developing the analytical, conceptual, and categorical components of explanation from the data

> itself--rather than from the preconceived, ridigly structured, and highly quantified techniques that pigeonhole the empirical social world into the operational definitions that the researcher has constructed.
>
> The direct examination of the empirical social world embodies a comprehensive analytical, descriptive, and in-depth analysis of the data. The fabricated models of human behavior employing the lock-step research design of data collection, which are pervasive and deeply entrenched among sociologists, prevent such in-depth analysis. Validity becomes a serious problem in scientific research when a priori assumptions and artificial schemes of explanation are imposed upon social reality.[19]

Methodological Individualism as a system of investigation would allow for consideration of the complex matrix of purposive human behavior that has been ignored on the grounds of scientific objectivity; thus, allowing for the possibility of closing the gap between present theoretical structures and the apparent truculent refusal of persons to fit within the expectations engendered by contemporary social theory.

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[19]William J. Filstead, Qualitative Methodology: Firsthand Involvement with the Social World (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1970), p. 6.

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