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MAI, év'u'm-u; "v- I-‘:!- ”00';‘ H Illminimum:Milli:Milli: ‘t This is to certify that the thesis entitled Migration, Settlement Pattern, and Social Organization: A Midwest Mexican-American Case Study presented by Jane Bushong Haney has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for Ph.D. degree in Anthropology Major professor 0-7 639 PLACE IN RETURN BOX to remove this checkout from your record. To AVOID FINES return on or before date due. MAY BE RECALLED with earlier due date if requested. DATE DUE_ DATE DUE DATE DUE 35 mu . ‘*.-‘ (‘1‘: Of‘gmufipe ' ‘7‘.» ' r .‘4.5' 1“! g ‘ Q‘s. M 6.1” m BY Jane B. Haney A DISSERTATION f Submitted to ' " fiqjlchigan State University firth fulfillment of the requirements - for the degree of h _ ' hithod 4 .4 - .. ' $315M. away- _ . .. , _- Wt 9i Anthrogology ””15375‘ * ' ‘ fies, 54%.“ ~ .7 “41.59 v~ , Huang: and! in am.- wax m "1: o - x .. . ‘ '-\‘~_ .'. 0-. 9 . . u. ‘ ‘~~\. ~ “s 0" . \“-. - ‘m. - v... ' ,“ \ '..’-u~. .. - o.,.. v c._ . , .. ~ . a. .\ o 0 . . - W . ..._.. . n t. ‘ u. 4; o u. x ‘ I u I n .. ‘v ‘ ‘-. v.‘ . n a." I. _ ‘. . -.~. ‘. e w,‘ u“ :‘u \ .._. J' b" . . o. '. H "o a l it. x.- .,, .' __._- v .. C. .I. ABSTRACT "Apron, SETTLEMENT PATTERN, AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION: * ‘ A nmwasr MEXICAN-AMERICAN CASE STUDY by ’ Jane B. Haney “‘8' ~attuicly is a‘comparative analysis of the growth and integra— 2 g .' l Chicano populations of Flint and Lansing, two Michigan Mfls‘ig'gest that three interrelated processes are crucial to . i - j‘E'Io'ml differences in urban minority populations in gen— - - l _ . :I‘cn, settlement pattern, and social organization. It 15 my ére'r'ural or small town people. It is .o .. u . .u ..- .. , t .l"' ,.. t .. ‘o _ ,... u. 0‘ ll. 0‘ ‘ I 5v-' .,. o.-. cu .- -—.-— ,.‘ s. a. ”‘- a ‘ 1 ~..,.. -. . . 'I... . v ' O ““ ‘I‘ w . .. '. “\_ .., A . . .._. s. . '0 .,‘. \‘ .'. O ._.t .. 'h u .‘w ~ . ., vs. ‘ u . . '0.‘ s \_ ‘. . .. - :.".. a .“w« is] 4 U. I ‘Q \ -: I ‘ ‘ ‘- u x K‘ ‘ .'n_ .__ _ . a I . on o 5. ~ ‘ “ Jane B. Haney .. tirthese differences in migrant selectivity are linked to 2"“.WOf Michigan industries which have fluctuated over 'imsfilint most Chicano household heads are factory workers . . -_ "lev‘range in income. or educational attainment; in Lansing there 'g’lutruesuthe clients and the professionals. The client cate- ifilming is concentrated in the barrio (Chicano neighborhood) Vittorprofessional category is not. When combined with differ— in region of origin, these current class divisions become an maintervening variable in the development of Chicano formal " -- mmizations. The agencies, all based in the barrio, are 7 ipalactors in local Chicano factionalism. Individual involve- “388111831 personalistically, as has been noted in other studies "1le organization. I suggest that Chicano personalism in ' animations in Lansing is not the primary reason that fac- ‘1' .ucontinues, however. It was found that the agencies are set tifil- to each other through competition for resources, parti- ' funding from public and private sources. The agencies were ‘Wtsmers and their internal form is often a major 3'9: Jane B. Haney Antagonism between the two is mitigated by the following factors. The leaders deliberately work together and try to prevent hostilities from reaching the notice of local powerholders; the black population is very large, segregated, and visible while theirs is not; and since Chicanos in Flint are not very different from the ”average" most do not want to be singled out for attention as an ethnic group. I conclude that Chicano intra-group political competition is encouraged in Lansing by the structure of funding sources available as a result of the city's role as capital of state government. Flint is a heavy one-industry city with a company town atmosphere. There Chicanos are only one of many waves of immigrants which has settled in and are far less visible than local blacks. In both cities, Chicano agencies are outside structures to which individuals adapted in tra- ditional ways. However, it was found that their overall effectiveness for Chicanos is tempered by the local power structures and the manner hiwhich Chicanos are integrated into these. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I wish to thank the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development for the predoctoral research grant which permitted me to A carry out the bulk of the research upon which this study is based. 'There are also many individuals to whom I owe thanks. To my major professor, Scott Whiteford, I am grateful for years of guidance and encouragement and for the fact that he diligently read and critiqued the rough draft while he himself was conducting a project outside the country. I also wish to thank the other members of my committee, from whom I learned a great deal about both theory and methods--Richard C. Hill, Arthur J. Rubel, and William Derman. My husband Joe I owe thanks for his patience, confidence, support, and research assistance. Of course, I owe the greatest debt of gratitude to the Chicanos of Lansing and Flint who allowed me into their homes, meetings, and places of employment; answered my questions; and to whom this study is dedicated. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii LIST OF FIGURES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM AND THE LITERATURE. . . . . 1 The Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Theoretical Framework. . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . Levels of Articulation. . . . . . . . . . . 5 Introduction . . . 5 The International Level'. Center and Periphery . . 6 The National Level: Center and Periphery . . . 8 The National Level: Class and Ethnicity . . . 12 The National Level: The Corporate and Public Sectors . . . . 18 The Regional and Local Levels: Political Economy . 20 The Local Level: Demography . . . 22 The Local Level: Resource Competition or the Struggle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Footnotes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 2. METHODS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Site Selection . . . . . . 31 LeVels of Articulation as Levels of Inquiry . . . . 33 Comparative Method. . . . . . . . 35 Research Strategies . . . . . . 36 Limitations of the Statistical Data Base . . . . . 38 -Footnotes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Q 4‘. ...q. '-.... "eo. .a..- . Chapter 3. THE DEVELOPMENT OF TWO DIVERSE URBAN POLITICAL ECONOMIES . Introduction . . . . . . . Lansing and Flint Before the Auto Age. . . . . . Lansing . Flint. The Beginning of the Auto Era Lansing . Flint. The Economic Sectors of Contemporary Lansing and Flint . Sociopolitical Milieus. Introduction Lansing . . . . Flint. Summary. . . Footnotes . 4. Migration. Intrdduction . Periods of Migration: The Migration Cohorts. Introduction Labor Recruitment and Periods of Immigration: The Evidence from Agriculture . . . . . . Introduction Early Depression Cohort (1923— 1931). Pre World War II Cohort (1932— 1941). . World War II and Early Postwar Cohort (1942— 1950) Early (1951—1955) and Late (1956- 1964) Bracero Cohorts . . . . War on Poverty Cohort (1965-1971) . Post Vietnam Recession Cohort (1972— 1976). Chicano Population Growth in Flint and Lansing. Lansing . . . . . . . . . . . . Flint. . . . . . . . . . Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Footnotes . . . . . . . . . .- . . . . . iv Page 43 43 45 45 47 49 49 52 56 63 63 63 69 72 74 76 76 77 77 115 115 121 126 128 \ .o' ,u— 0" / . . " . -- ,, . ... . - a -v— a... .. . r‘. .— Chapter 5. CLASS AND MIGRANT SELECTIVITY . Introduction . . Place of Origin of Migrants . General Comparison Analysis. Chicanos and the Opportunity Structures of the Cities Introduction Occupations of Chicanos and the Occupation Structures of the Two Cities . Education and Income of Chicanos in the Two Cities. Occupation Histories of Chicano Migrants . Social Characteristics of the Chicano Populations. Domestic Group, Family, and Kinship. Language. . . . . Religion. Summary.k . Footnotes . 6. SETTLEMENT PATTERN. Introduction . Studies on Population Distribution in Cities Introduction . Segregation Studies . Chicano Segregation and Centralization in Lansing and Flint and Relationship to the Black Population . Chicano Residential Distribution and Metropolitan Centralization . . . Chicano Residential Segregation . Housing and Physical Characteristics of Chicano and Non-Chicano Regions . . . . . . . . . .Chicanos and Neighborhood. Neighborhood Selection . . . . . Perceptions of Neighborhood Characteristics . . . . Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 'Footnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 130 130 131 131 139 143 143 144 149 154 158 158 162 164 165 169 171 171 172 172 173 175 175 183 195 210 210 213 219 221 Formal Organization Case Study 1: Factionalism in the Barrio . . . . . . . . . . . . . Introduction . Lansing Chicano Organizations in History. . Current Pattern of Chicano Organizations in Lansing . Agencies. Other Chicano Organizations Competition and Cooperation . Individual Involvement . Principles of Recruitment . Funding and Derivative Power Sources . . Health Care Provision for the Chicano Poor: A Political Issue Background of the Issue. . CSS and the Health Department. Chicano Cooperation . . The Barrio Clinic as a Chicano campaign Issue Summary. . Footnotes . . . Formal Organization Case Study 2: Factors Which Mitigate Against Factionalism . . . . . . . . . Introduction . History of Chicano Organizations in Flint Contemporary Flint Chicano Formal and Corporate Operating Units . . . Competition and Cooperation . Individual Involvement . Bases for Factionalism and Cooperation . Sources of Funding and Sources of Derivative Power. The Project: Negating Factionalism Among a DisPersed Population . . . . . . Introduction Competition within the Agency. Summary. . . Footnotes . . . . . . . . . . vi Page 223 223 224 232 232 236 237 237 239 245 253 253 254 258 260 264 266 268 268 269 275 279 279 282 288 291 291 293 303 305 . I ,5. M " ' .1» ' ~ 4" .--’ . o v, . .Io-"“ .\ . ,Nr' 4-. -.--- a.- .r ‘ . .. _. o u .. . .. 4.. -- -0. _ Page "Igmcmcwsrons. . . . . . . . . . . . 307 tion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 307 -' and Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . 307 Implications. . . . . . . . . . . . . 314 Research Suggestions . . . . . . . . . . 316 ..g 1%! gofi“, 'ilii; . Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . 334 ‘ F5.1.,-,ii ¥.;~;rpl Questionnaire. . . . . . . . . . . 334 \ «I. USe‘Survey. . . . . . . . . . . . . 339 '.‘ ipant Observation . . . . . . . . . . . 341 iJon History Questionnaire . . . . . . . . . 345 Innatu. ~fitf. _ees in Hay: 2111f ~31! lloa I: E. -‘. 2".»1: . . 11 , 5 .- . ‘ K ' -~ 1 - . 4.. .-‘ --‘v_ _ .~ LUCK-m f -¢-—. -—.- - ..‘ v- *~->.- - ' u .o . n...- .— ' ' .na .~..-.., ,p- .‘ ' t,, . -V 0 “fi . ' I '- 1 \' .‘ .. H— _‘ ‘ ‘7..- II C o. 1.. _, . ..._‘ v I 5— . ‘-.‘ 0 .‘. a 2'; _ .,. a . __ _ I .. .‘ . ‘o. . . ~..'_. .._ I., . o.‘ ‘ .‘.- . . O u , ' '~.‘ . I. . ‘ n. . ~ - , ‘ “st- 1.. . ‘p u 4 1 .. '._ .‘ » a ‘ o . LIST OF TABLES éi k Experience, Prior Midwest Experience, and 1 Born by Migration Cohort, Flint, Percentages " k Experience, Prior Midwest Experience, and : Born by Migration Cohort, Lansing, Percentages. C .r Beet workers in Mid-Michigan by Factory .7 kt, 1939 o o o o I o o -itqees in Harvest Productivity . . . . If.EgrAACre in Selected Crops . . . . . a ”of Mid-Michigan Beetworkers, 1941 . . Page 50 55 57 60 81 84 85 91 106 110 116 122 133 134 . a” \v.... ,...- ' .. 4. .U‘ . .. .. . ' a. '4»... -. - ....... .. ' O .. " >a. _‘ . . \ "... .,, - . —. .. 4 so. . ' . ‘. ‘. . . - ". [- ~. _'I ' o “—- ' u "uau. . Page {are Household Heads Born, Lansing . . . . . 137 A ‘EfiPloyod per Occupation, Flint and Lansing, 7................146 Reusehold Income and Percent Unemployed per , Tract for Selected Tracts, Flint and Lansing, -...............153 ='=~'-° Family Size in Flint and Lansing by Selected s Tracts, 1970 . . . . . 162 ~4-0 Population Range in Census Tracts, Flint and mg. 178 : cum ‘ ’3‘- i Deficit Measurement of Segregation for Chicanos ' 4m I‘Anglos, Flint, Michigan 1970.. . . . . . 184 *Deficit Measurement of Segregation for Chicanos Anglos, Lansing, Michigan 1970 . . . . . . . 185 ‘ ‘1‘: W Housing and Neighborhood Type by Population Size 201 i3 . ' U. -., sParish Size, Average Sunday Mass Attendance, . gCollections, 1962- 1972. . . . . . . 229 i a. 5 . Involvement by Occupational Strata in Lansing. . 238 9; ,. ”ailment by Occupational Strata in Flint . . 281 ~> . ‘- o u? . _ o . -- ~4 ..-v~ v ,- . 0-0-. _. . o.-. awcu.-.‘ u...- \_. '- ,, 7..., . .-, u... _ -- . -,. ... .., J - 4a. .,‘ . -, 17-,“ .g. x .. .. -o o.. ' r ’4 '§ ‘.b. -.. e. 4. 'D v .5. ~. 4 "l '\ a LIST OF FIGURES Figure Chapter 3 1. Flint and Lansing Sectorial Development, 1920-1970 . Chapter 5 1. Region of Origin of Flint Chicano Migrant Household Heads . . . . . . . . 2. Region of Origin of Lansing Chicano Migrant Household Heads . . . . . . . . . . . Chapter 6 1. Chicanos in Flint by Census Tract, 1970. 2. Chicanos in Lansing by Census Tract, 1970 . 3. Chicanos in Genesee County by Census Tract, 1970. 4. Chicanos in Ingham County by Census Tract, 1970 . S. Lorenz Curve of Chicano— —Anglo Segregation Index, Flint, Michigan 1970 . . . 6. Lorenz Curve of Chicano- -Anglo Segregation Index, Lansing, Michigan 1970.. 7. Blacks in Flint by Census Tract, 1970 ‘8. Blacks in Lansing by CenSus Tract, 1970. 9. Blacks in Genesee County by Census Tract, 1970 10. Blacks in Ingham County by Census Tract, 1970. 3. Education of Chicano Heads of Household Sampled, 1976 . Page 61 136 138 150 176 177 179 180 187 188 190 191 192 193 Page 1,193 of Recruitment and Cohesion for Lansing m- Forlnal and Corporate Operation Units . . . . 241 _ erg Sources for Lansing Chicano Formal and Corporate .a'tingUnits...... 246 1 ~_‘. . g-ipIes of Recruitment and Cohesion for Flint Formal and Corporate Operating Units . . . . 284 L'\. ‘ , Sources for Flint Chicano Formal and Corporate tingUnits.............. 289 i“ ‘ ‘ii‘r‘e‘POHer Sources for Flint Chicano Formal and ”at; Operating Units . . . . . . . . . . 289 . .11 1.11.. rials)? ' '4 him... Atus n: ‘- *3. ”hit -1 0‘ 1 . _- 119$ haze l"‘.' ' , hi . .q .0.- v a a ».. - 0.. -o 1 o .. .. ‘ r.,.. 'o ‘4 ‘-¢~. w. '- M‘. ‘ 0 ~. ' I s pn. .‘. .'z ' a I 'o '1‘. < ._ I ... a u a“ ' “ ‘4. CHAPTER 1 INTFKMNUCYTION: THE PROBLEM AND THE LITERATURE . '- I?" ‘ W {J ‘ 4 mm study is a comparative analysis of the growth and integra- ,‘: ' ; Chicano. populations of Flint and Lansing, two Michigan 3 in the following chapters I examine three processes that I u'fiflrb‘crucial to understanding local differences in urban " populations in general: migration, settlement pattern, and . ;~:Fignnization.2 I contend that these processes are interrelated 1 ”which operate dialectically; each influencing the course of o5soach acting as an independent variable in one situation and int variable in another. It is my hypothesis that one con- 1 11, however, is invariably independent and appears to V “tetanus of the three related variables noted above. This ital economy at the local and at several supralocal levels. I - ice the time of de Tocqueville (1835) it has been said Baasociations have the potential to wield considerable {Carin the United States. Social scientists who have ‘ ’epumunities have tended to note that Chicanos either lain or have fleeting, impermanent voluntary “nJ-l,explanatiOns have been tendered for this L '44: . -— 1... . - _ - - .- .0 ~' Y ’. , O o v. .po .p. . '.c- O .. 5‘. .- - . - ~o .7 I~s :- , .o"’ ,-o n H' .a-O _ .- - _,...,.- a . . . . ‘ .- ‘-u ‘ -' o . n..- u,. -.;. ‘v..‘.~: “' s‘ . \‘t ._ t. N“ \..“ .' Q J . ‘ r ' . "\\v._ ~ .,__ . ,‘ .._‘ . “‘U .‘ ‘ w .. '~._‘. I .U 1 'b.‘ .. u..- '. x . ‘ t .- o. a“ V- a. A4. \ ~— ‘ , .‘ . “a . 'I a “_ 'vl '- . n \ ‘. u. -. _ u.. . t. ‘ ‘u‘u .. - jig-(9‘8” Madsen 1964, who noted that individualism is a [1" Wit-“1‘31 ideal that impedes cooperative endeavors), or they 5 :'_- -,. to link lack of participation in voluntary associations to -caass StaIJJS (e.g., Lane 1968, who showed that lower class ' g‘did not participate in voluntary associations while middle ' Memos did, and that Chicano voluntary association leaders were ,1 111141110 class). In recent years Chicano social scientists have ‘ ”to take these viewpoints to task for failing to note, for example, ,h cry of (fliicano involvement in labor organizing (e.g., Leobardo . ABVS, Rosales and Simoni 1975, and Zamora 1975). The fact 1 however, that Chicano organizations do not appear in general ’4sachieved the position of political pressure groups. .-loth the culture and class explanations that have been tendered C.have some validity but both types explanation fail to deal 0. ' - ’91)! with a major aspect of Chicano formal organization. I argue a": I < ~ ‘KL‘ ' T'ihenselves, a reflection of the structures of politico- War? in which they must operate. Chicanos are in' general a w» , ation in the contemporary United States. In most parts ‘ fry they remain economically and socially underprivileged 911111;. pressure groups which could lobby on their own @1119 wrongs they have suffered.' When we find that not even cemprise a unified pressure group at the local level in most cities we are tempted to suggest that the explanation must lie within the Chicano population itself. I suggest that this type explanation fails to take into account a major point. That is that Chicanos are a national minority population, and minority status implies not only economic but politicoeconomic powerlessness. In general then, the reason that Chicanos have not yet been effectively politically organized lies outside their own population. This broad generalization pertains to local level developments as well. This study was designed to explore the manner in which power structures at various levels articulated with the Chicano populations of Flint and Lansing, Michigan to influence their migration into, integration in, and formal organization within these cities. Com- pariSOn was chosen as the major method of inquiry in order to delineate differences in the Chicano population itself that developed in response to particular politicoeconomic processes in local urbanization.4 I suggest, then, that the process of Chicano formal organization in a given city cannot be understood without reference to the growth and integration of Chicano population in that city and the way this growth reflects the historical development of the city within the national and international scene. Theoretical Framework , Introduction ' Certain assumptions are basic to understanding my analysis of .“Eflifl¢_and Lansing Chicano formal organization. It must be stated at ~p‘ ..—..- ; w J‘.‘ v C ,« .n . Os 5... . . o¢-- ... . n... ‘_ ~ Q m~.. ‘- ‘. ..‘ - '. ‘ . ‘o . ‘1 .. ~ ‘ ‘ a. \ ~- N, .~ “ ‘. . 0" u '. . 1‘ '- ‘. ’u 1 _‘ 0'. a. a u ’- ‘x ‘ - K. I u -I‘ .‘ ‘f ‘ -. codes, and beliefs but also as a process--a process of adaptation, recombination, and change. Culture includes the technoeconomic, social, and ideological realms and comprises the major adaptive . . . 5 mechanism for human soc1et1es: Culture is man's most important instrument of adaptation. A culture is made up of the energy systems, the objective and specific artifacts, the organizations of social relations, the modes of thought, the ideologies, and the total range of customary behavior that are transmitted from one generation to another by a social group and that enable it to maintain life in a particular habitat (Cohen 1968: 1). Since culture is in general an adaptive mechanism, change as well as maintenance is a major characteristic of culture. A conceptualization which I find useful due to its stress on process is that of Eric Wolf (1964: 61): The understanding of the process of cultural development, however, must involve not only a knowledge of aggregated forms, of styles, or of world view, but also a sense of the relation between environment and culture, of the struggle of social groups and their dynamic accommodation to one another, and implicitly of the emergence, distribution, and containment of power in a system( Basic to understanding any cultural phenomenon then, are the histori— cal dimension of the phenomenon and the context in which it has occurred or is occurring. Formal organization among Chicanos is one aspect of their total adaptation to Flint and Lansing. This cultural phenomenon had developed in a context that is similar at several supralocal levels but . divergent at the local level. The context of Chicano formal organi- zation in Flint and Lansing is complex but can, I think, be effectively viewed.as and analyzed from different levels of structural inequality. .u -- w ...,.r .- . .-. u .o .0. u . . - o h ‘ ' I ..... l- . . . _. . ._ \ 1‘ I ' a ~.. ..- ’ « ~ o. o.‘, ’ l .... .v .N. ‘ ‘ or I . -‘ (I M‘s. .4-- ""‘e r. h _"QD‘. . 7 “h“ . es... .. ‘ '0 s. ‘ ,.. c. “n. ‘ a. . . ‘1‘, a . s ..‘1-‘ ~§...5‘. ‘..‘ ' ‘\\.- a n ‘ I ‘.' T‘Vu. I ‘A -..‘ C . b "~.. 10‘ .h.‘ I. ..4 ._ ~" {‘ . \. i-..‘ ~u».l. —.‘ we.._‘ \ . . .I‘ . ‘ ‘ I‘ 'c. .- \. o v. \ ‘ . .\.: ‘;;‘ I.‘ -..‘-.S s‘ . ‘v. -. ‘ .‘- .."‘ C. ._. ‘ x, . ‘n. d‘ '-'. ‘ 1 '5 ‘~"‘. ‘.‘ ._-. - ‘ u. 'n“ -v“ I . .Aa ‘ L‘ _ . I‘.' 4‘ .4". \ ‘e “w .i, .. 4.. ‘ v-.. . .‘ , v‘ . A.. t.“ ”-irulation "h:ihtroduction.--There are different levels above the local at ~Eégiiticoeconomic power is unequally distributed which affect 4‘31, migration, settlement, and integration. These different "fs;itgwhich competing groups can cooperate or enter into conflict 'iihpen referred to as "levels of articulation" (Adams 1966, 1970). :zflnvels may be generally conceived of, working from the smallest jeihle to the largest unit, as "individual," "family,” "local," ' important to any analysis varies with the situation and the ;; I'lienon under consideration.6 i Leeds (1969) has pointed out that in general the amount or of causality of a phenomenon is linked to its level in this wt thical arrangement. Thus he notes that the primary or basic Eu 9 occurs at the national level, the secondary variables occur on .;$Qgional level, while the tertiary variables--dependent upon the i and secondary—-occur at the local level. In Leeds' case, the :1... under consideration was the occurrence and continuance of I“} ‘quuatter settlements. He suggested that the primary or basic ileading to squatments is the transformation of the national ;itgm mercantile to industrial capitalism, which results in un- '3‘urban growth. A secondary variable is the kind of industry nuin;the local labor market which marks its integration into ‘Applitical economy. At the tertiary level local variables 7;tion of the squatment Visea-vis the central business >‘J- Exactly the same sort of nested hierarchy of interrelated vari- ables is reSponSible for the pattern of Chicano migration and fomal organization in Flint and Lansing. The International Level: Center and Periphery.--Various authors have noted the inequality between nations since the beginning of the development of western industrial capitalism and its expansion into world hinterlands, and the terminology used to describe and explain this process include ideas of "dual economies" in developing nations, metrOPOIiS-satellite development, development-underdevelopment, and secondary development. Johan Galtung (1971: 81) refers to the phenomenon simply as imperialism: This theory takes as its point of departure two of the most glaring facts about this world: the tremendous inequality, within and between nations, in almost all aspects of human living conditions, including the power to decide over those living conditions: and the resistance of this inequality to change . These facts are a result of a world order in which: The world consists of Center and Periphery nations; and each nation, in turn, has its centers and periphery . . and between these, . . . imperialism is a system that splits up collectivities and relates some of the parts to each other in relations of harmony of interest, and, other parts in relations of disharmony of interest, or conflict of interest. ’The United States has been a Center nation in respect to Mexico for all of this century and most of the last, i.e., during that time a dependency relationship has existed between the two nations. Multiple examples of the relationship exist; one will suffice here. "Mexico is gen: foIn'th largest customer; it purchases about 63 percent of its I I D {Iv . . Q l .0- "' , a. .'.L .. . u— _|...‘ ' " ID- -_. ' . ...- ... ‘I .— .n h‘ -o.. u " ’ ' . .v 0. .’ 0...... -.. . ‘-. -.. ‘nvo. 1| .' - u ‘- .. ‘.. ‘s. ‘- . -;- ‘___ 'u‘.-.‘ ‘. ’h. ' ~. . b '-. A ‘0. 4 s a: 4‘ \ a u \e.‘ C’- A .0].- "J ‘. -. ~ ._ . ‘\- .5. k. .3 e..‘ ‘~ .. 4 . u - 'e - s 5-1‘ ‘ .r \‘ :‘_‘ “ . . ‘ .,~.‘; L' I \n o ‘ -, u ' h- ‘n‘ u 'c 1“, .~ * ’ :‘e~ . . ‘A d .‘k e I. ‘\ .'-- ‘ ’9. r h 'u L‘- . . -" ‘w' -. . w. a p a. . ~ ‘- ‘9 n e I . , ‘ u- ‘- . \ ‘- . 5“ 'J ‘3, ; .Qi’iho‘l'e‘rer, the trade balance is unfavorable. In 1976 Mexico's ll'Ithe' US showed a deficit of $1.4 billion" (U.S. Department of 3.31- The economy of the periphery is characterized by low wages 35:"? “ion to prices and profits, which brings about a dual labor . ‘ ~51th includes both employment (corporate and state) and under- :‘7‘5.2x on: (competitive) sectors. Thus, the streams of rural-urban 1 tend to be employed but in low-paying industries and services ‘ aprices remain high and profits are drained off by management and LnVopment of underdevelopment" in Mexico and Latin America has been auzfiomented-I- and will not be dealt with explicitly here. Under— : this relationship is important, however, for coming to grips M Mexico and the U.S. and continues today. 'x'; \' ' International labor migration from a Periphery nation to a ist development prevails. This pattern has been particularly 1: in 'the development of the modern agricultural industry t the world, and cases of international agricultural migration hédmnstrate the utility of "underdeveloped" areas as labor pool rm ‘ 33’ to the "developed" nations.8 The best-known case is that of ”t labor stream" are not so well-known. This is parti- .. "areas outside the five-state (Arizona, California, " co, and Texas) Southwest region where both former ”witch-intensive corporate industrial sector. The chronicle of the .‘ .v' '1 ’0‘ . ~ Ii.- . _.- u..- - ..a- ‘5‘. “.- . . ..p .o-a " a - .-§ ‘ "' ’ ._'.,-.¢¢-o' - I . -o-o ' - ‘ . »....-c . .-n '- o .F " ' ._.v~ a.» 0' e...- . .. . ,..o \ -\ ' u .1... ¢~.-¥- 't ¢-~— . - u. .n. >.. .. I ' ’.- ~ _., .3 J --‘ $.- - 0 § .-, - . I»... ‘. , §‘ \ ‘ '-.. ~v_~ . a I \ ‘ I‘ K c ' u.“. ‘.. 'I .3. I . . .. . . w. o- ...u . ~o "O... \‘i‘ ' t R u ' " \ 5“ '. U. .D- '0 \. . ‘ "5:. u. ‘.‘ 0“. D”. ‘; . a 'J \I _ . . “ .5 I ‘n .'.:,‘ c.‘ ..‘l‘ \o". . ‘~,,-':-.., '- .."t 1 Q 3‘. - '. . ‘. _ . a. ._ . . ".“. ‘Q .. . s ‘ -, ...: :-- J u‘ \ '.. '\ ‘ \ Datives whose ancestors were Southwest residents before 4 - n: ’ « §mgbecame part of the U.S. comprise a significant segment :3.- fumlation. {Ifi‘lehapt'er 4 of this study documents the way in which laborers ‘Horn were recruited into mid-Michigan agriculture through . .' ' ens-which waxed and waned from informal to corporate and back This aspect of the overall pattern of the migration of Chicanos 313m; and Lansing is a consequent of the center—periphery relation— Igbgtween Mexico and the U.S. whereby selected U.S. industries (both 35;le, ltural and manufacturing) are able to draw on the surplus labor 'gflhich is a result of the inability of Mexico to employ its masses ' " W.-—At the national level "i. 1.8;0 some important factors which have bearing on this case. First (Fir 1, unequal development within a nation or the presence of centers lgfiphery which has been amply documented for Latin America9 $93111 the U.S. as well. The Northeast and North Central regions ‘ .jIIQ ‘5‘ most highly economically developed regions in the country thgperiod of expansion of industrial capitalism (i. e., "The Revolution" of the nineteenth century). Most of the heaVy lice! . , ,I head “‘ggiy the country depended on different production mainstays, and «an r: health was determined by fluctuations in these industries. . Quarters located in the developed areas as well. Other in belt, a dairy region, and even tourist centers. . .IsI. érc , . 2 - or, the northeast and north central ("Midwest") . -‘_. -o ,u' \ __ . ' ”—u- _.‘ .vo .- ..' no“ "" , . ,w. . .-. - .. . \ . x ,g.... a in - a . - ~a Oa- 0“ o- a. i. o..’- IA'A . ~.-..-..' '5 ' \ - 'tuiblobillb- a... .,. . -‘ u ‘ "“-—.- v o “.‘Ovn .e.‘ ~~.... ‘ . - _ ‘e.."._.~ 1 ‘ ' t. .0“ v .rs. . N. ‘ .H ‘- “...I ‘ ‘.na ..N, ‘ ..I . ‘1'; '- "‘ ‘1: “V...“ J . “. ‘ . _~ .1. A $0,. .’ ‘ ., G“ ~. ~v”.. 3‘ ‘fi.. .— ‘q \u \- :‘~-._ n 05‘ u I .- - ~~."' ‘- a , . n“~ ‘.. 'l n -¢‘~‘E‘ \. \ "'- : e. “‘n .Q' .- " \. .. , 'In‘n‘ ~;. . ‘..‘_ o ‘i K‘" . . "‘e :- m- U. ‘JV‘ . '\ _. ._. \ ‘ - w. ‘1.‘1 ’ i ‘ Inst 0f the industry, controlled much of the wealth, and 1?- did the bulk of the decision-making for the country as a - 1 frhe Southeast suffered a "development of underdevelopment" with ‘ Ration of post-Civil War Reconstruction policies which drained "trials and skills. The economic depression of the Southeast and (33111 of the northern industrial center led to the migration of . ’, descendants of slaves from the earlier plantation economy, and poor whites. The arid Southwest always had a low population i.:fl:little‘to <>ffer to sustain a larger one except occasional mineral ,CaliforniaPS boom can be attributed to the growth of large- . flfiirrigation~agricu1ture, which occurred in southern Texas as well, lfiéeo~o€her climate—related industries including movies and television. '1151 ality and importance of the vagaries of climate in deter- ' uvthe health of Southwest industry combined with the pull of the Inped North to attract the Chicano. The situation was definitely .iyggdlays so benign, but labor recruitment and discrimination aside, fligiifhoor inequality in regional wealth is important in understanding Viskj u«' presence in the Midwest. . 1h recent years, attempts have been made to illustrate that i$§.;ldnprities.represent internal colonies within the "mother rTha two center-periphery relationships (international and ‘ zonal) which I have outlined were the mechanisms which resulted .A ‘gfflid be considered both Chicano "colonialism" and Chicano “colonialism" (cf. Acuna 1972; Blauner 1969). The Treaty of 5130 of 1848 had much the same result as imperialist 3 resulted in colonies abroad: although the local Yelicits of leaving, sacrificing loyalty to and “ av‘} '._. , fl.“ - ‘. ~. ov- ,‘ed - .o a, , o... v . . ""‘ ‘- .. o‘..-v - . .. f- o .o-so. G.‘ .‘ “ 00.- ‘-- ._-'.. .V -- -; "T .'; ~ "”'.'A. d c, u u . ;_¢ ~ . ‘ . \ ..._‘, § ~.. . ‘n I .‘ ... a ‘4 'i . “ .I . '. .“- - .0 .“ ., u .. L . _ .vl: V “» A \ 3“. ‘- \ .. 1 'v ‘n‘ ‘— 'l. c." ‘. .2 I" 1 o . a . \ .A“ 4 o 10 _pmotection from their own nation—state, they ultimately became politi- cally powerless in a new nation (and many had been powerless in Mexico). The waves of Mexican immigration prompted by the development of U.S. agribusiness and transportation, the influences of the Mexican Revolution, and two world wars brought powerless mobile rural prole— tariat into the very center of the Center, thus although recruited "voluntarily" they became an economically dependent colony within the "mother country." Since the Great Depression of the 19305 and particularly since World War II, however, the regional spread of wealth in the U.S. has been changing in accompaniment to the process of change from industrial to monopoly capitalism. Capitalist growth is now occurring through entrenchment or capital accumulation while in the past it occurred through expansion. For example, pre-World War II agriculture was labor-intensive but the war brought about not only the legislation which prompted considerable Chicano and Mexican migration as field hand labor but also hastened the mechanization or capital intensive expan- _sion of agricultural output. 'The economic bases and resultant local power structures of cities are having to change from industrial city form--characterized by the development of heavy manufacturing plants--to metropolitan city form--characterized by a growth of bureaucracy or service industry (see Thompson 1968). Now, what is more, manufacturing industries are fleeing the 61d industrialized regions to begin again in southern towns , where they are welcomed by favorable zoning, tax ordinances, and low :'“!Qndunionizedeages for workers. As a result of both developments, 3 -‘-.'._¢' > a: 11 firlworker is a part, remains at least temporarily in the old industri- alized centers. Many retain factory employment and a few are able to continue farmwork (the latter due largely to kin and patron ties), but as industries move southward and agriculture mechanizes unemployment and welfare rolls expand in the old industrial heartland. Therefore streams of Chicano labor migrants were encouraged to enter Michigan in the earlier decades of the twentieth century by economic opportunity and were even br0ught in deliberately by Michigan industry. Chicanos began to come to Flint and Lansing mainly in response to the labor needs of regional agriculture early in the century. Depending upon what figures are used, agriculture still ranks either second or third in importance in the Michigan economy following the auto industry, with tourism taking the other position. Events in Michigan agriculture are closely related to the development of the Chicano populations of the two cities as is detailed in chapters 4 and S. Chicanos soon became employed in the auto industry in Flint while maintaining agricultural employers in Lansing to a greater extent. Both industries needed large numbers of unskilled laborers in their early development before World War II, and the continued involvement of the U.S. in various wars beyond that time continued the employment opportunities for awhile. However, since World War II manufacturing and agriculture alike have been growing through technological improvements and real employ- lent opportunity for unskilled workers has been declining. In spite bisehls trend Chicanos have continued to migrate to Michigan in recent : genteel This is partly because in the 19705 Michigan remains a center ' 3.1.3} V ‘ I, I .peetnto southern Texas and partly because there is already a J___‘ I w 4“" U u' \ ‘ —l'» pi. .' ,.—u-"' . . ... . _- ‘.- ,_- ..e ..- .-... a .V-o --- s- -,.o..... - . .0, _. -_.__ Q o ‘ ~_ ' ..,‘ 5‘ ~. N- ‘. --. ' .e ‘- ~s, .._‘ - A . . c-‘- a 12 sizable number of Chicanos in Michigan which can act as brokers in various ways for the newcomer. Social aspects of chain migration are therefore intervening in the general pattern of migration. At the national level, then, the relative development of Michigan vis-a-vis the Southwest, especially southern Texas, and the change of urbanization from industrial to metropolitan city form that accompanied the post World War II centralization of capital have affected Chicano migration to Michigan. There is another set of variables at the national level that is pertinent to this study: class and ethnicity. The National Level: Class and Ethnicity.--One difficulty involved here is the need to distinguish between ethnic variables and variables which are related to class. As Pierre VanDenBerghe (1975: 72) has said, Ethnicity and class are interrelated but analvtically distinct phenomena. The fact that different social classes most commonly show subcultural differences and, conversely, that ethnic groups living under a common government are more 0 ften tha.n not ordered in a hierarchy of power, wealth, and status does not make class reducible to ethnicity, or ethnicity to class. This applies to Chicanos and other U.S. minorities. Much has been made of the U.S. as a ”melting pot" for various ethnicities as the population consists of many immigrants from various world areas. Common wisdom has always indicated that ethnic differences do not stratify us horizontally but rather vertical]y--i.e., the lines of ethnicity cut through American society but do not form any hierarchy. When awareness of racism as a process of institutionalized inequality reached national consciousness in the 19605 some began to equate gethhitity with horizontal strata, indicating that "white is right" ‘7.- ' . .. . -..--o~ ~o , s a” <........ l ...y.b..- .0 . . .- \ .u-‘Q'D'\Ifihb .. ,. ....... . . -........1... a ' I vas. \ r9 0 ~u. .. u ‘u. ‘.‘ .ll -“‘ n ., ‘ . -’ u.‘ _ t, . . u. “‘IA~-o. : u 0 u w‘" d. \‘~u . ~ UV.-- ‘I. . g _ ' ‘ \" g. k ”y...- 0. . .. u ..\ “at I.» ._. ~~ v' \ \. , .d .. q‘ \ . .. o‘. 13 l'fi.e., "white" or Anglo persons were at the top of the hierarchy) while blacks and other minorities were permanently locked into lower hier- - archical positions based on the ascribed characteristics of ethnicity. These characteristics have been considered by some to be causal vari- ables in Chicano organization inefficacy. V I submit that there is regional and local variation in Chicano cultural adaptations even though in general Chicanos share the common cultural traditions developed in rural mestizo Mexico. The vast majority of Chicanos are the descendants of poor rural migrants from Mexico or are themselves recent migrants and at best are many generations removed from elite positions. The bank of traditional cultural knowledge of social practices, norms, and values will therefore be similar in some broad general ways. However, Chicanos whose ancestors have lived in East Los Angeles for three generations will have developed their own distinctive ways of dealing with life that will be different from the adaptations of rural Texans because the contexts in which they have developed are different. Therefore similarities in the patterns of formal organization encountered between the two populations must be explained by something other than a common cultural adaptation unless there are in fact structural similarities in those contexts. Chicanos do not comprise a single undifferentiated class either, as Some have suggested, for example: ' The basic fact is that the Chicano is a working man, a laborer, a ,worker. Everybody, of course, knows this, but with a few notable - 'exceptions that I do not have to mention, few bother to say it, or x reflect on it, whether at Moratorium speeches or in the writing of 7 . grant proposals for Higher education. Whether male or female, Alhaubl‘l" collar or white collar, Chicanos stand in a relation of . ' ..¢dopendency to the ownership of the means of production. This 15 'r'k4‘ 55lfifibr the employed and the unemployed, for the children being " "“his minute and for the students at the University. No ‘ - n- I.’ o “‘ I “c .“v. ‘n .._.. . A _ p can ..t.:. I "'o W ~ «K- p.- “. ~l.’ buy... ‘ .‘« .V n‘ “a. a..“ I E" M A “O. u :A“‘~“ I ":4 .A- ‘ \M‘L. RUG: \-‘ -‘. . In. no. avg 14"- . .:‘3‘ q“ M b "’t...,‘ t .‘. .‘ l.‘ .'-,‘. lu- . a. b" :‘:.:“ ed‘.‘vl‘. ‘5 i's._ .’ ,A <.gl: ng‘fi‘. '~_. ‘ ‘- "J ‘ .‘: ‘35 . A vc‘Jv‘kl e... ‘ .i. - tit-:41 ,‘ A d. .h‘ .‘. - 14 Zihiiuiiifcih‘éffii‘f Efiiiaé‘hlififil‘fiifilt:5.i°.:§1f;:”i§i§?‘d§’£225f’ ences, are a people of Mexican descent (and in some cases, of Latin American descent). The ”Raza" is thus inseparable from its socio-economic role, and any analysis that overlooks this fact is bound to be unrealistic (Blanco 1971: 1). However, Chicanos do not have the same class position. They do tend to occupy positions in the less powerful classes, but some purchase the labor power of others through investments11 and only at the most general level can white collar workers who can make such investments and blue collar workers who do not have such interests be considered the same class category. Real class societies seldom contain only two classes, those who own the means of production and those who produce, although ".'. . the two fundamental classes of any social formation are those of the-dominant mode of production in that formation" (Poulantzas 1975: 22). There is an obvious class difference between a farm owner and a farmworker in the agriculture industry: the farmer does own the means of production and the relations of production clearly reflect that basic fact. However, classes may also consist of segments or fractions which do not have such a clear differentiation but may be of real importance for the formal organization of the members. For example, .Uithin the class of industrial workers in Flint there is a large segment employed at corporate sector high-wage factories which offer unioniza- tion but which also have strong central control; and another smaller segment consistent of the far less articulated employees of various scoopetitive sector low-wage factories. C I The problem in analysis comes about when the differentiation .\ D- -.‘ '\~ --- ._.._ e». .“ we u...‘ V . .“‘" . ‘u .- 5n. 1 ‘\\-1: v~.‘~" I.. ‘ "a ' 1 -~.: I' 1.. a". 1 ~« ~ '\ 2‘. n‘ . .> ‘g ’1 '. 7‘ ‘~ 'o 15 unchanged for over a generation. In such situations, the cultural adaptations made to the structural conditions which first could be viewed as temporary adaptive strategies become incorporated as cultural codes and blend with some and replace other cultural codes to which the new generation is enculturated. In cases where ethnicity and class do seem to meld, two major kinds of processes appear to be responsible: (l) discriminatory pressure from outside-—in which ethnic criteria are used to assign persons and groups to different structural categories or class positions; and (2) conditions of resource competition based on ethnicity where individuals or groups can exercise some choice in what ethnic identity they will maintain. Some examples should clarify these processes. As an example of the first, there really is no such ethnic group as "American Indian"--various indigenous native societies with quite distinctive linguistic and kinship structures and widely divergent technoeconomic adaptations are subsumed by the category. American Indians are, however, as a result of the historical expansion of Anglo settlement and resultant colonialism and even extermination of some cultural groups, a contemporary U.S. ethnic minority. They did not share a common cultural system but as a result of similar historical circumstances they occupy a particular structural position; due to shared history and legislation they also share more cultural similari- ties than their ancestors would have. In much the same manner Chicanos have become a national minority group, as detailed above. There is .less heterogeneity among the regionally distinct sectors of the Chicano population than is the case with American Indians due to their Mexican lfififiyfikground--albeit many generations ago in some cases—-shared by the A "~ ‘ a .0 —' - ..o~"- ~ _.- you- a“ . ’.-- ' u b A 0‘ O ‘ . q mo... I 0... -_ H. "O 1..- - n. " - hc_-._.‘ ;‘ ‘. J . t. .i , a '> ‘. ’ '5‘. I. . _ n ‘—4 '11 . ‘o. a" 16 vast majority of Chicanos. However, historical circumstances and overt discrimination have made of the diverse Chicano population a national minority. Perhaps the best-known example of the second kind of process is that studied by Abner Cohen, the Hausa in Yoruba Nigeria, which he considered a case of "retribalization.” His analysis ". . . discusses the processes by which, under certain structural circumstances, an ethnic group manipulates some values, norms, beliefs, symbols, and ceremonials from its traditional culture in order to develop an informal political organization which it uses as a weapon in its struggle for power with other groups, within the contemporary situation" (Cohen 1969: ix). Cohen's study detailed the ways in which the Hausa used their Hausa-mess to gain and maintain the control of the lucrative long- distance trade in cattle and kola. To some extent, ethnicity is ascriptive. An individual is enculturated within his family or domestic group, which is the primary unit responsible for imparting cultural tradition. Chain migration, in which one immigrant to a new area sends for other family members and more distant kin and friends after he has successfully adjusted to the new environment, accounts for the presence as well as the persistence of some ethnic groups and their cultural patterns. In this manner certain Chicano cultural traditions have been maintained in areas far apart geographically yet socially close such as Texas and Michigan. Likewise, institutional racism can meld diverse peoples into a single minority pepulation. Such processes are largely involuntary for the actors involved, who are not consciously developing their own ethni- 17 f'L'to what popular notions of ethnicity stress, ethnicity can ”-1YdaChieved." That is, ethnic symbols.and traditions can be fed in innovative ways both to cope with difficult new situations ito maintain distinctiveness in order to have exclusive claim to an ortant resource such as the case studied by Cohen. Other popular .examples are New York City's Irish policemen and Jewish merchants L imany other parts of the country. In some cases, people who have ‘ kittens identified as an ethnic minority through discrimination may then "g§ttempt to apply traditional cultural practices favorably to a new 3 fifltuation, and various kinds of social movements often attempt such It‘lu , gaggmbolic inversion (see e.g., Aberle 1966). 'cf .L'. 3"“ jgpr are they completely homogeneous in cultural background. However, I suggest that Chicanos are not all members of the same class general Chicanos have been forced to remain in the lower social "_s in the United States and their cultural adaptations have ' 7§mrgely been, although seasoned with regional flavor, adaptations to ' A“ *Seeioeconomic powerlessness. Chapter 5 discusses the differences in :” Aig- wvnal and class background and the contemporary class pattern of :canos in Flint and Lansing and suggests that these are in fact ‘ltsl of migrant selectivity by industry. In chapters 7 and 8 the I in which Chicano formal organization has been and continues to be egt.t0'constraints frOm outside are reviewed. In this study the Er‘.'l‘ ~ the stress in this study is as it is for Connell's study of 31L-7_ ‘ ruling class: 18 The streSs here is on the processes producing social groupings, rather than the categories they produce, and on the activity of people, not merely their location in social space (Connell 1977: 5). The National Level: The Corporate and Public Sectors.-—Chicanos are generally restricted to the less powerful classes, can be considered a colonized minority, and are presumably struggling, however success- fully, to improve their structural position. What, then, is the general profile of the power structure12 they confront? Some social scientists argue that the state organization itself in a state level society controls legitimate access to power and the use of force and is therefore the most powerful social form in the society (e.g., Service 1962: 1973-174). Others indicate that in modern monopoly capitalist states multinational corporations control power that transcends national boundaries (e.g., Hymer 1971). There is ample documentation that many multinational corporations control far greater resource bases than those harnessed by most nation-states (e.g., Barnet and Mfiller 1974). Such corporations are not only powerful but also extremely important to minority populations. The corporate sector offers the best—paid and frequently the most stable blue—collar employ- ment available (as compared to competitive sector industry) even though it is in general also responsible for maintaining a degree of unemploy- ment in order to have a ready reserve of labor at hand. Corporations also have a major investment in national and local government (see below). Industries in the corporate sector in general can be crucial causal factors in creating a supply of workers and in dominating local community organization. Kornblum (1974), for example, has demonstrated how the labor needs and relations of production of the major steel %Q:V _ .o . -\ a. '-' ,.. u a... -h.‘ . . 0‘ a.. ,_O V ~.. "" ‘9 ~.' 0. -‘\ K 0.- . x. A. , . .._ ~. v " —- .- ‘ .0. .. ~.-. ‘.,‘. .. '9 ~._ . a, . *...n 3‘.‘ 1'». _ -._ . '\ ‘5 19 mills of south Chicago have been responsible for the succession of various ethnic minorities in the area as a labor pool. Multinational corporations can be considered the ultimate operating units13 in monopoly capitalism. They compete and cooperate with each other at the highest possible point in any hierarchical power structure: the supra- national, and therefore are among the most powerful units any local operating unit can confront. However, the state apparatus or government in advanced capitalist countries is itself a social form with considerable influence on the less powerful. The public sector is a major employer of white—collar workers-~both elected and appointed—~and is a more realistic target for many desirous of upward mobility than private corporations due to greater visibility. Secondly, government generally serves the inter— ests of the powerful and therefore is a crystallization of dominance which exists outside the political sphere (see Poulantzas 1975: 24-28). Industry may be responsible for migrations, for example (as will be argued herein), but government is also an important locus of power which in many ways supports the needs of private industry. Gaining access to government has been a major focus of the mobilization of the lower classes in many areas (see e.g., Connell 1977) and is an important facet of Chicano formal organizations and their conversion into pressure groups. Government can prevent access to new resource bases as well, however, and entrench existing economic relationships thereby (see, e.g., Eckstein 1977). In general, then, the corporate sector and the public sector hold the most power in a capitalist state and tend to cooperate with each other. These are the real organizational loci of power, and the .0 0' 4. .b’ a... ." 0- l “‘1‘" U ‘ :‘Q; N u." 1 H 5‘ " he. 7: ; ‘;_.. ' "'¢Q .!‘ ~V .‘ _‘ _‘ \ ”' ‘c~.‘ — t Q" h A Q” 20 upper class consists of those who are in positions of control of the highest levels of these organizational loci. Less powerful operating units often become dependent on the power structure by deriving power from it, but regardless of the amount of power available or the amount of wealth generated the structure is not changed by such relationships. Capital accumulation, the production of surplus value, is the driving force of a capitalist society. By its very nature, capital accumulation necessitates expansion of the means of production, expansion of the size of the wage labor force, expansion of circulation activity as more products become commodities, and expansion of the realm of control of the capitalist class (Hill 1975: 3). Although the amount of "good things in life" available in the society at large may have increased over time, the structural relations tend not to. Thus in the United States the level of income and education have been rising with each decade, but the proportions controlled by the highest percentages versus the lowest percentages of the population ' have not changed (see respectively Hill 1973 and Sennett and Cobb 1973 for discussions of these developments). There are features which intervene at the regional and local levels which may either obscure this general power structure or may represent a crystallization of it and tend to mold the power structure faced most directly by Chicanos in their formal organization behavior. The Regional and Local Levels: Political Economy.--Among its various attributes aside from the obvious demographic ones (e.g., population size, heterogeneity, and density: Wirth 1938) the manner in ' which the city and its hinterland are integrated into the national economy has an important effect upon the_loca1 power structure and minority access to it. A city is a location for human habitation and‘ 21 interaction which exists and grows by virtue of its function as central place (Christaller 1966 [1933]) for production, consumption, communi- cation and redistribution, and administration. What is produced and administered will depend on variables at supralocal levels: the kind of state—level society in which it exists, the position of the city in the national urban hierarchy, international linkages, the natural and human raw materials available, and the energy sources available. Functions, like power, can be social and ideological as well as material; and the larger and more strategic a city is, the more numerous albeit interrelated are its functions apt to be. The political economy of the United States has been becoming increasingly centralized, as noted above. Urban growth in the post World War II U.S. reflects this change. The function of the industrial city was productive manufacturing, and Flint and Lansing both developed around the turn of the twentieth century as centers for the manufacture of a major durable good-~the automobile. However, the metropolitan city's economic base is not its manufacturing complex but rather is expressed by its services. Flint's development was intensely dependent upon the auto industry, while Lansing's was a product of a more diverse economic base which included agriculture and government. Chapter 3 reviews these divergent developments and demonstrates that Lansing's‘ mixed economy has different consequences for Chicano migration and integration than does Flint's industrial base. Another local power-holder which is, like industry, and govern- 'ment, linked to higher levels is the Roman Catholic Church. Most Chicanos are at least nominally Catholic, and the way the church has ,— l'. L.. .. ,. “A ~- . o I‘Ar u \‘ ‘. .K ‘. ‘ I 22 viewed them over time and actual church policies towards Chicanos have been important factors in local Chicano organization (see chapters 6—8). Local patterns of Chicano class and ethnicity will differ as adaptations to the conditions of migration and integration in that city. However, structured inequality at the national and international levels as discussed above act to influence the local power structures which are in fact articulated with the higher levels. The Local Level: Demography.—-Studies of localized Chicano populations in various parts of the country have found that they tend to reside segregated from other segments of the local population and that they form a distinct neighborhood which is located in an undesirable or deteriorating sector of the town or city. What is more, the Chicano populations which live in such circumstances are overwhelmingly found to be from the lower classes (see e.g., Achor 1974; Macklin 1963; Rubel 1966; Samora and Lamanna 1967; and Shannon and Shannon 1973). In an ‘ examination of the effects of local public policy on Chicano housing in West Fresno, California, Dagodag (1974) found that the residential concentration of Chicanos in that area was directly tied to the need for inexpensive housing generated by continued agricultural employment in the rural hinterland and the destruction of other substandard but needed housing in adjacent neighborhoods. It has been found in the case of black settlement concentration that the policies of loan and insurance agencies and local real estate boards are often responsible for their continued segregation (see e.g., Blauner 1969). Therefore discrimination and/or public policy may increase Chicano segregation which had begun as an outgrowth of poverty. I): o- 1 ... -' c. x 0. ~.. .,,.‘ 23 In the two cities selected for this study Chicanos had differ- ent patterns of residential concentration. It was hypothesized that these patterns were a reflection of differences in migrant selectivity by the different industrial labor markets in the two cities as well as a reflection of divergent public policy or "political milieu" regarding minorities in general and Chicanos in particular. It was also expected that the differences in settlement pattern would have had some influ- ence on Chicano formal organization behavior. Thus, one of the intervening variables of interest to this study is the impact of territory on formal organization. Considerable effort in the social sciences has been expended in efforts to link "community" to either territory (common land or common residence) or to society (social relations). Most community studies are predicated on the notion that a territorial base is a necessary precondition to a "community," just as it is for closed corporate peasant villages (Wolf 1957). On the other hand, Pilcher (1972) has studied an "occupational community" which had no territorial base but instead centered on a social institution. Boissevain has pointed out that where both social institutions and common territory overlap communities in both senses of the word exist: As soon as the number of activity fields involving the same people increases, as must occur in a bounded community in which people live, worship and work, the multiplexity and density ratios will also increase. In such communities we can also expect persons to have an excellent perception of the structure of the social networks of others (Boissevain 1974: 72). On the other hand, where territory and social relations do not overlap, such as occurs among most metropolitan urbanites, networks that are low in density and multiplexity--i.e., consisting of single-stranded -“5a.. ,. 4" ' \ ,.-- . .. . _.,_ o. .o — ”ov.‘ ,. , . I an. , .. .- o " o .. ‘- .. V ‘1 ~~.\ '. ‘u. a. ’ >4. 5.._ '0 o. ' a .'K ~. .. -. . ~ ‘4- ‘- v ‘ . .‘ . in- ‘C. Q g n w ‘c '1‘ III 24 ties to large numbers of people--will develop. Clearly both territory and social institutions can become organizing foci for the development of an interacting "community." Chapters 7 and 8 demonstrate the organi— zational loci for Flint and Lansing Chicanos. It will be suggested that where territoriality exists it will become important, and that when government policy declares that minority populations possess a distinctive territory that its lack can be problematic. The Local Level: Resource Competition or the Struggle.—-Chicanos are not Well represented among the "power elite" in the United States nor are they, as will be demonstrated in chapter 5, in Flint or Lansing. Are they then utilizing formal organizations in the struggle for more control? Voluntary associations and formal organizations in general are thought, as suggested above, to be among the major access routes to new power bases. Other researchers have indicated that minority popula— tions which lack such formal organizations are not necessarily dis— organized but rather organized along more informal lines. Liebow (1967), for example, found that black street-corner men were linked together into flexible networks rather than formal groups. Networks are based on a series of one-to—one ties and therefore resemble the ”dyadic contract" typical of Mexican mestizo peasantsz. The dyadic contract model postulates an informal structure in which the really significant ties within all institutions are largely achieved (hence selective) rather than ascribed (hence non- selective). . . . In other words, the formal institutions of society provide everyone with a panel of candidates with whom to interact; the individual, by means of the dyadic contract mechanism, selects (and is selected by) relatively few with whom significant working relationships are developed (Foster 1967: 214). the filexibility of a network permits contact with a range of organi— i-agfifions~and extends through many realms of interaction. For example, 5. ‘- A ' " 25 in Mexico and the United States both, kinship is bilaterally determined and so contains the element of choice and selectivity characteristic of networks.14 Perhaps the most important dyadic relationships for resource distribution are patron-client ties. Such ties link individuals in different social strata in ways which allow the less-powerful dyad member access to the derivative higher-level power of his patron while accruing prestige, a vote, deference, a link to a new region, or some other resource to the patron. A special kind of patron is the culture broker or mediator. The broker is a specialist in power relations that serves as a contact point between the essentially powerless and those with control at a higher level. It will be suggested in chapters 7 and 8 that many Chicanos do become involved in formal organizations through such informal networks and that leaders of certain organizations may act as brokers between their adherents and either the public or corporate sector. Kerri (1972: 44) defines a voluntary association as ”. . . any private group voluntarily and more or less formally organized, joined and maintained by members pursuing a common interest, usually by means of part-time, unpaid activities." He further indicates that the voluntary aspect of membership--non-mandatory and unpaid-—does not appear to be a defining feature of this type organization. Kerri also indicates that ethnic associations are different from voluntary associations but both involve common interest. Ethnic associations are organized'specifically for the purpose of promoting ethnic consider- ations (Kerri 1976: 24). What appears to me to be of greater impor- a ‘tlacc than the goals of the association as stated is the kind of power . .p- I 'v v u - nv—v 0' ”1.. O. .... -o‘ - ‘ .u.. -51 a .0 . v -..‘.a o —¢I~.~.«-1 4 ~s~--.'u' u;.\ “p. "'\o. ' I I _‘ . I “'a! ‘ 4 ‘1 1. 'I .I ‘ . l‘.:‘ ‘t.,v‘ ‘ e . . . a ‘ 5"~ -: "~- — ,‘ "a. .. A u". J- “L‘. ' “ M'S hu‘ 0 .‘ .' a » . HQ», 'a . z» . "1' e_ A 26 base and access to vertical linkages that it controls and the way in which it articulates with other organizations. It will be suggested that individuals become involved in associations for different reasons but one factor emerges as important in the use of Chicano associations in the struggle for upward mobility through formal organization activity: the association is viewed as a source of power by those who participate in it. Wolf has suggested that there is an interstitial informal structure that parallels the formal framework of politicoeconomic power within the state and that many organizations within the parallel structure not only compete with each other but with the "sovereign power" of the state itself (Wolf 1966: l-2). This competition is a struggle for power, and the ”informal structures" Wolf describes are involved in the parallel non-mainstream structure of Chicano organi- zations described herein. These parallel structures can compete with each other, or as Wolf has noted, also compete with the state or at least attempt to gain formal recognition and public resources from it. When this is the focus of a formal organization, it may become a politi— cal pressure group or, on the other hand, it may become a parallel service organization dedicated to problems not directly the province of government itself. It is the latter type organization which has marked Chicano organization in the 19705 and is the focus of processual analysis in chapters 7 and 8. This study examines the formal organizations of the Chicano populations of Flint and Lansing. There are essentially two questions to answer regarding this cultural phenomenon. First of all, are .Qflhicano formal organizations in these cities principally instrumental 3’ -... \ .6.- .~‘- .... a. DC'V . 0.. ‘ I " .... . c‘,.v _ ..._‘- . V .. ‘ ‘. o.“ 27 units involved in a power struggle on behalf of the local Chicano population? Oliver Cox has suggested that resource competition always marks-ethnicity: This occurs because ethnic groups are sociocultural entities, which, while inhabiting the same state, country, or economic area, con- sider themselves biologically, culturally, linguistically, or socially distinct from each other and most often view their rela- tions in actual or potentially antagonistic terms (Cox 1970, as cited in Skinner 1975: 131). Secondly, what explains whether or not Chicano organizations are in fact involved in a power struggle? This question has been dealt with at length in the presentation of the hierarchy of variables above. Chapter 2 presents the methodologies and major research strategies employed in gathering the data on which this study is based. It also includes a discussion of some of the statistical sources utilized. Chapter 3 describes the historical development of Lansing and Flint and discusses their resultant divergent political economies. Chapter 4 explores the streams of Chicano migration to Flint and (Lansing over time and discusses the relationship between these changing migration patterns and national and local economic trends. Chapter 5 discusses current class and ethnic differentiation within the Chicano populations of Flint and Lansing and links these to the history of Chicano migration in as responses to different industrial bases. Chapter 6 describes the differences in Chicano settlement pattern between the two cities and links this to the different urban political economic climates. Then in chapter 7 historical and contemporary trends in Lansing Chicano formal organization are discussed and a case study of organization in prOgress is presented which demonstrates the crucial role for Chicano organization of different units in the local power 28 ". ;“ain describes the interplay of Chicano groups with the .mm’ie. The final chapter summarizes the research and ' L 2:81.116... ' 03 unit , *9 ad puln 5; ties‘ 4.. H5itp has be. .31 'el'-__.“c:: i, ‘ , Delhitz. ..I;.-:': , i. ‘ L'!‘:':'"m 9. Argentinr cnnc '1'. 14:26.“ .'-.; . ’;;:_r..‘."‘ ' secure (couom x’vtuy: "nan :‘fifiarians 1r. their mm : rmry (mun. ~ _\~ I! "s ‘5 5' e; Cornell!“ and Truebmoj 1197-1; 5": - a _ we - .;’1 .- q, ‘~ ‘ a. . K ‘ ‘5' a' ‘ . . ‘ . --: - 4 r ., - - ‘ 5“ . .. 29 Footnotes 1Throughout this study the terms "Chicano" and "Mexican— American" will be used interchangeably to refer to persons of Mexican ancestry in the U.S. Most of the persons of Mexican ancestry in Flint and Lansing refer to themselves as Mexican or mexicano and Chicano is generally a term used by the politically active. The term "Anglo" will be used in reference to English-speaking non-Chicanos, while Afro- Americans will be referred to as "black." 2I use social organization in the Firthian sense--i.e., as the process of forming social networks and groups, as opposed to social structure--the observable pattern of organization existing at one point in time at a particular place (Firth 1951). 31 discuss political economy as an unseparable system through— out this study. Politics may be power behavior and economics the mode and means of production; but power is ultimately economic as well as social and symbolic. 4Urbanization is ”. . . the movement from a simple highly localized unit to the complex territorially extended system of economic, social and political relationships predicated upon centers of settle- ment--cities" (Hill 1973: 11). 5Leslie White (1949) first delineated these major divisions. 6Other anthropologists have also noted the need to deal with different supralocal levels of social relations. Starr (1954) had noted in Vera Cruz that there were ever—wider levels of relationships which were important to her informants: the household group, the door- yard group, the village, the municipio, and the state. Wolf (1967) discussed the same kinds of ever-wider levels of social relations. Steward (1955) had about the same time as Starr delineated various kinds of social systems as themselves representing different levels of sociocultural integration. 7e.g., by Frank (1967) and Latin American Perspectives (1976). This relationship has been referred to by Adams (1967) as "secondary development" in Latin America. 8For example, Bolivians migrate to Argentina to harvest sugar- 'cane because the Argentine cane industry offers regular though seasonal employment, a more secure economic future than available to most Bolivian rural proletarians in their own country (Whiteford 1975, n.d.). . 9See, for example, Cornelius and Trueblood (1975) and Gonzalez CaSanova (1970). .. ' a. . . . ... c."‘. . . -.O O v .......v ,. ~— - u s -' b o ‘ I I . f . .. ..- ”ho‘I‘ :o--._ “ no). t u \- '.‘ .- .. a. ' \ ‘~-.... .._. c ‘ \ “—I l .I'Q. ‘. "1“. . V- .. .‘ 4... ,~; “'Ov n 'J;‘ ~o ~. : u q 1 U 'Q . \ ~. . ‘.a N...‘ . ~._‘ ‘I I “ - . . -. - «. “‘6 ~u .‘a .‘ 5 . . \ .‘a 3 _"§ -.. ”5. 10For purposes of this study, I will define ethnicity as the self-identification by individuals or their identification by others as pertaining to culturally-distinctive divisions of the general popula- tion that exist due to migration, isolation, history, and/or imperialism. Other anthropologists (e.g., Aronson 1975) consider ethnic groups self- identified units only. In contrast, I will define class as a position or category of people who share lifestyle and ideological similarities based on control of a shared means of production (see Marx, especially 1967 [1894]). Others (notably Kahl 1957) view classes as social groups possessed of class identity and awareness and, most importantly, marked ' by intraclass interaction. 11"They [David Rockefeller et. al] are not rich and powerful, in other words, because they themselves are producing goods or services at a faster rate than others, any more than was the feudal lord. They are where they are because they are able, through their ownership of vast means of production, to exploit staggering numbers of other human beings. This is what 'making investments' means: it means buying means of production and applying labor-power to it in the exploitative transaction outlined above . . ." (Newcomer 1977: 118). 2When one party in a power relationship has greater control over the environment (i.e., access to resources) of a second than the second has over the environment of the first, the two operate in a power domain (Adams 1966: 39). Although one party may clearly have power over another, the subordinate party always has some control over the environment of its dominator. The entire organization of such relations, particularly at the national level, is the power structure. "Power structure appeals as a network that is extensive, penetrating, salient, and definitive for the kinds of society under study, the nation-state" (Adams 1970: 7). 13”Operating unit" is a blanket term for the range of social forms from category through corporate group which each possess a power base and different degree of internal organizational complexity (Adams 1970; Whiteford and Adams 1973). Operating units which control quite different amounts of power cannot compete. In order for an operating unit to compete with a more powerful opponent it must augment its own resource base and a common method is to establish vertical ties to obtain derivative power from a higher level. 14Examples of relationships built out of interpersonal ties abound in the literature on Mexico and Latin America. Ritual kinship based on the Catholic ceremony of sponsorship for baptisms and other sacraments which are rites of passage stress the co-parent bond (Mintz and Wolf 1950). Peasants have established other means to assure horizontal stability such as the cargo cycle of ritual offices (Carrasco 1961; but cf. Cancian 1965) and to achieve vertical integration through patronage (Friedrich 1965; Wolf and Hansen 1967). 7"" «-. Wu.“ v.. n v 5n to. . - . ‘ O- ‘v- .I ‘ '5'. ~.. - a.‘ ' o .‘ a. a.“ .u ' .. v.‘ . '.‘ Y .o.“:’ 1 ". '.._ u a ‘ ‘ N ‘. “ ~ o,‘. \‘ ‘10... V. " “~ ‘ ..'I \..“ \H; ‘ ‘ . .‘~ k CHAPTER 2 METHODS Introduction The research design was a controlled comparison of the Chicano populations located in two different Michigan cities. Two character- istics mark the research methods that were necessary in this research situation: flexibility in data gathering techniques and historicity. In this chapter the selection of the research sites, the logic of the investigation, and specific techniques utilized are explained. Site Selection During thetwentieth century there has been a selective migra- tion of Chicanos mostly from Texas into the Midwest (the states of Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin), a region which by the 1970 census had the second-highest concentration of Chicanos in the nation. Most of these migrants had come as migratory seasonal farm- workers. Although the major industrial attraction for all labor migrants to Michigan has been the automobile and auto-related manu- facturing, Chicano immigrants to the state have been involved in the railroad, construction, and agricultural industries as they were in most other parts of the country. As a result of the growth in the auto industry and war-era expansion in agriculture, by 1970 there were over 31 32 150,000 Chicanos in Michigan, second in the Midwest only to Illinois; and almost 70 percent lived in urban areas of over 50,000 population (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1972). It was my intent to select two research sites in which I could hold regional variations in Chicano culture, total urban population size, and Chicano population size constant and yet have different urban political economies in order to examine whether Chicano formal organi- zation would indeed be constant. The research sites chosen were Flint (Genesee County) and Lansing (Ingham County), Michigan. These cities were selected for by the following criteria. First of all, they are medium-sized cities, a category which accounted for more Chicano rural- urban migration between 1950 and 1960 in the Southwest than did metro- politan cities (as defined by the census), and this size city also accounted for 70 percent of the urban Michigan pepulation. The total populations of the two cities are broadly similar: the 1970 total for Flint was 193,317 while that for Lansingefiast Lansingl was 179,169. Their Chicano populations are also similar: around 7,000 permanent residents in Flint and approximately 8,000 in Lansing.2 The major industry in both cities is auto manufacturing. _80th cities are located in central Michigan and are secondary industrial centers within the sphere of influence of metropolitan Detroit. Finally, the greatest percentage of Chicanos in both cities were in 1970 employed in the auto industry. There is a major difference between the two, however. In Lansing there is a physically-distinguishable neighborhood which both Chicanos and others consider Chicano territory and some smaller con- centrations. In Flint the Chicano population resides dispersed 33 throughout the city and indeed had been referred to in one study as an "invisible minority” (Choldin and Trout 1969).3 Basing my supposition on the segregation literature in sociology and geography (see chapter 6) I suspected that Flint Chicanos did not reside in a spatially distinct area while Lansing Chicanos did because of differences in the local power structures, in Chicano migration history to these cities, or both. In either case, the variables in question would be the type which I wished to examine. Levels of Articulation as Levels of Inquiry Although my focus of inquiry was at the local level, my theoretical orientation as outlined in the previous chapter required that I gather data about variables at supralocal levels that impinged upon the three processes-~migration, settlement pattern, and social organization--in question. At the international level, I relied on a variety of sources to elucidate the process of Mexico-U.S. migration. [It was not my intent to investigate the disparity between the U.S. and Mexican economies as a major part of my research but rather to demonstrate its importance for this international migration. I interviewed labor contractors and truckers who brought seasonal farmworkers to Michigan from both Mexico and Texas; collected the oral histories of Mexican residents in Michigan; included a number of questions on migration and related employment history in the general questionnaire I administered in both cities (see below and Appendices A and B); and reviewed documents from a number of sources, most useful of which were various government agencies. .. .v .\v 34 Many of the same sources were important in illuminating the process of internal migration at the national level. Furthermore, it was necessary to be cognizant of national events of importance to the process of development of class and ethnic awareness. Therefore, I also referred to newspaper archives, historical accounts, and the works of other social scientists. At the regional level, the development of the auto industry proved to be a major historical event. It was also necessary to pursue the differences in agricultural deveIOpment between Flint and Lansing. For information on these industries I referred to reports of particular companies, annual reports of local and state government agencies responsible for monitoring particular economic sectors, and pertinent U.S. census reports as well as Specialized histories of these industries. A wide variety of techniques was utilized to gather data at the local level. Many of the strategies outlined above were also useful for gathering information on certain local features: political systems, patterns of occupations, levels of employment over time, growth of local industries, kinds of social service programs available, and local social service funding sources. I spent a great deal of time in the traditional anthropological tool of participant observation. This technique was absolutely essential for understanding Chicano formal organization behavior both synchronically and diachronically. I was able to be involved over a period of time with organizations in both cities and do both processual and situational analyses of formal organization behavior.‘ I collected data on Chicano-Anglo intermarriage, Chicano arrests and sentencings, high crime areas in both cities, Chicano involvement in black organizations, and black spatial .. . . ‘,-.o~ ~ ._.~ov “on." v. n.. 0‘ ‘ ~ .ug . . ' a \.‘ 'h.‘. -I‘ . "-l“ :95- ., , . \ .1 d n; no. J._ a 35 distribution as well in order to illuminate the dynamics of Chicano relations with other ethnic groups. Furthermore, I went to government, school, and industry offices to gather information on mainstream per- ceptions of the local Chicano population. I also performed two surveys in each city--one to obtain a representative sample of Chicanos with which to compare the data obtained from informants, the other to dis- cover the kinds of neighborhoods in which Chicanos lived in comparison to all localities available in the two cities. Comparative Method Comparison was used in several different ways in this research. The most obvious, carefully controlled use of this method was the selection of two research sites for comparison. As explained above, I chose two cities in which other variables were held as nearly constant as possible in order to examine the causes for different settlement patterns. Throughout the investigation I was careful to gather information from the same kinds of sources in both cities about the same topic. In some cases this could not be done, but I compensated with data as nearly comparable as possible. I interviewed the same kinds of people, asked similar questions, and participated in similar Chicano social events. *I referred to data bases for statistics that had been gathered in the same manner in both cities--e.g., the U.S. census, and figures from the Michigan Employment Security Commission. The two surveys were conducted to ensure comparability of the data as well. I wanted to examine housing and neighborhood options in both cities in order to understand where Chicano housing fit within the .0 .oc' .o.... \ uh...» . u... "‘Q§;, -.. I u... - u 36 total possibilities. Census materials on Chicano housing by census tract were not available although data on housing value and condition by census tract for the total population was. I used this information to supplement the findings of my land use survey. Both this survey and the questionnaire were coded by census tract in order to ensure unit comparability with the 1970 U.S. census, which was the best body of statistical data available. The general questionnaire was designed principally to elucidate migration history, but included questions on settlement location decisions, familyand kinship, employment history, and Chicano organi- zations as well. It was essential to survey a random sample of the Chicano pOpulation in both cities since these populations included some 7,000 individuals per city and I could not hOpe to come to know them all personally. I waited to administer the survey instrument until I was sure it included questions on all the topics about which I needed to know, and pre-tested it twice to make sure the questions actually asked for the information I needed.4 Research Strategies A number of specific research strategies were utilized which will be enumerated here. These fit under three broad general headings: historiography, compilation of a statistical data base, and participant observation. Historiographic and ethnohistorical techniques included archival research, reviewing private document collections, searches of business and government records, and open-ended interviews with various selected informants in the manner which has come to be known as the collection of oral history. 37 Another strategy was the compilation of a statistical data base. This included gathering of data through the administration of my own surveys as well as use of sources detailed above. I collected school censuses, met with the directors of other surveys that I thought might be of use, and kept continuous files of statistical information which had bearing on my problem.5 The manner in which the surveys were administered is presented in detail in Appendix A. Both situational (holistic exposition of one time period) and processual (historical development) analyses of the variables in question were utilized. I indicated in the previous chapter that I consider culture dynamic and dialectical. Therefore holism and history are both elements in the ongoing process of culture. Participant observation was the major research strategy used to illuminate Chicano formal organization behavior in both research sites and to bind the various threads of data gathered in other manners together. The project required slightly over fifteen months to complete and participant observation in both cities continued even while other specific techniques were being utilized. It was through participant observation, for example, that I gathered most information on networks. This was supplemented with direct questioning of informants.6 Hortense Powdermaker (1966: 19) has indicated that in participant observation, "The anthropologist is a human instrument studying other human beings and their societies." I myself was a major research tool at the local level, as my observations of behavior and relationships, my friendships with Chicanos in both cities, my involvement in ongoing political issues centered at Chicano organizations in the two cities, and Chicanos' reactions to me were all data. Issues of establishing 38 rapport, reciprocity, and work with factions in a pepulation cognizant of anthr0pological research are explored in Appendix A. Limitations of the Statistical Data Base The three major sources of statistical data in Flint and Lansing utilized were the U.S. census collections, annual post—season farm labor reports of the Michigan Employment Security Commission (M.E.S.C.), and the migration history survey I conducted in 1976. (For a discussion of this survey see Appendix A.) Care was taken to gather a representative sample that was large enough to be valid in both cities, and an estimated 3 percent of the Chicano population was surveyed in each city. The major limitation with this research tool is that the population from which the samples were drawn tended to include the most stable, longest-term residents in both cities whose names appeared on public registers or were known to agencies which serve the population. Using this latter strategy was employed in attempt to add poor families to the population. However, the samples for both cities may well overestimate the socioeconomic position of the local Chicano population. Attempts were made to cross-check the data gathered in the survey by observation, interviews, and reference to other data bases such as state agency surveys and the 1976 sample appears, based on these controls, to be fairly representative. The annual farm-labor reports of the M.E.S.C. present the numbers of intrastate and interstate workers employed per month in state agriculture and for pertinent years gave monthly figures for all legally contracted Mexican workers and "Texans” (which undoubtedly included some illegal Mexican nationals as well since the term was 39 used categorically to refer to Texans of Mexican descent). I have not given total annual agricultural employment figures based on the sum of all months, however, because individuals may move from place to place within the state following the crops and may therefore be counted numerous times. Instead, the figures used throughout this study are either all workers, Mexican contracted workers, or Texas Chicanos by month of peak employment; that is, the number of whatever category is under consideration which was employed during the month of greatest overall employment. M.E.S.C. statisticans have indicated to me that even using these figures there may be an error of a few percent, particularly in comparing figures from the earliest years to the most recent years. No computations requiring an adjustment in the statistics have been made based on these figures, however; their use has been restricted to comparison. Although these figures again likely missed numbers of undocumented workers and those with the less stable employ- ment conditions, this data base demonstrates the relative differences in the use of field hand labor in the two areas under consideration and for different periods of time. Figures on Michigan Chicanos were available from the U.S. Bureau of the Census materials only for the 1970 census. Demographers are generally agreed that the figures on Spanish language population (see footnote 2, this chapter) are an undercount (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 1974). Again, as with the sample survey conducted in 1976, those undercounted were likely the poorest, most mobile, un- employed, and newcomer members of the p0pulation. Only the total number of Mexican-born residents of Flint and Lansing were available 40 from census materials before 1970 so historical data on Chicanos was limited to oral history and to other documents. Also, the historical comparison of the economic sectors of Flint and Lansing that appears in chapter 3 was based on census materials from 1920 to 1970. There is a margin of error of up to three percentage points between the primary sectors and tertiary sectors because professional-administrative level employees were not separated by industry except for manufacturing after the 1950 census. However, the comparative difference over time between the two cities does emerge clearly from the data. It is, I suggest, necessary in a complex research design to utilize the various strategies that make up the anthrOpological method-- participant observation, holism, and comparison.7 Holism, comparison, or participant observation may require the borrowing of some speCific research technique from another discipline. In this study a number of such techniques were used in order to carefully delineate the processes of Chicano migration, settlement pattern, and social organization in two Michigan cities. \ u-vo ~u. 41 Footnotes 1Although Lansing and East Lansing are separate formal politi- cal entities, they form a continuous city for all practical purposes. East Lansing is not a physically distinct suburb of Lansing as is Okemos, or as is Swartz Creek a suburb of Flint, in spite of its socioeconomic similarity to these suburbs. . 21970 was the first year the U.S. census of pepulation included a category for Spanish language population in the Midwest. For Flint this figure was 3,322, of which 119 were Puerto Rican and 122 Cuban; for Lansing the figure was 5,070 of which 25 were Puerto Rican and 198 Cuban. Chicano agencies indicated there were about 12,000 Chicanos in Lansing and at least 10,000 in Flint; but I estimate that the figures of the Michigan Civil Rights Commission (1973) census update probably accurately reflect the permanent pOpulation at that time. They showed 7,208 in Genesee County and 8,044 in Ingham County. These figures are much like those which I estimated based on my surveys (see chapter 5). 3After verifying the invisible nature of Flint's Chicano popula— tion, I searched for another city which was Comparable to Flint except for Chicano settlement pattern. 0f the other southern-peninsula medium- sized cities, Grand Rapids' Spanish language pOpulation although fairly concentrated included sizable numbers of Puerto Ricans and was not appreciably larger within the central city than the Spanish language population of the urban fringe; Saginaw's Chicano population was far too numerically significant vis-a-vis the total population; and the total populations of Ann Arbor, Bay City, Jackson, Kalamazoo, and Muskegon were too small to compare to Flint. 4English and Spanish versions of the questionnaire appear as Appendix B. 5I kept a log of apartments and houses available if the cost was listed and by broad geographic region of the city (N.S.E.W. and C80) and of jobs available by type, experience and educational creden- tials required for each Wednesday of a six-month period until February 1976. I found my work to have been of little utility for the following reasons. First of all, the majority of Chicanos in my surveys con- ducted later in both cities did not refer to newspaper listings to obtain housing-~15.4 percent in Lansing and 18.5 percent in Flint did, while over 20 percent in both cities relied on friends and over 30 per- cent used a realty agent. Secondly, the employment structure is not accurately represented by newspaper listings in either city. Rather, these listings tend to offer employment in peripheral areas such as temporary and part-time work that are used as strategies in a crisis or act as under-employment. . .o’ obi 42 6Collecting the complete network of any individual has proven to be an extremely time-consuming task and its utility has been questioned when some of the best network analysis used in a broad structural study such as mine has been based on more traditional ethnography (see Whitten and Wolfe 1973 for examples). 7See Eames and Goode 1977 for a review of studies of complex situations which failed to use these various strategies. L.’ n“- CHAPTER 3 THE DEVELOPMENT OF Two DIVERSE URBAN POLITICAL ECONOMIES Introduction Flint and Lansing, Michigan are both secondary cities within the sphere of influence of Detroit, the metropolitan heart of Michigan.1 The major industry of modern Michigan-—the automobile--had its start in Detroit. -It is still centered in that city administratively and functionally, but now the auto manufacturing realm includes other medium-sized cities in the Midwest, particularly in Michigan. Flint and Lansing are two of these. The importance of the auto industry in the economic structures of both cities is considerable, as reflected in overall employment figures (see below). Choldin and Trout (1969) noted that in both cities auto and auto parts manufacturing employed the most statistically significant proportion of the contemporary Chicano population as well. Although Flint and Lansing are now both predominantly industrial cities, there are differences between them that have developed over time which were of importance to the migration, settlement pattern, and formal organizations of the Chicano popula- tions in them. There has to date been little interest in delineating differ- ences that exist between such industrial cities. Sociologists have 43 44 mainly concentrated on similarities in social process or in spatial distribution (e.g., Hawley 1971) while some have been concerned with the inapplicability of the major models to pre-industrial or colonial cities (e.g., Sjoberg, 1955, 1960). Anthropologists have for some time been aware of the impact of features of the particular city on migrant populations (e.g., Leeds 1969), and urban anthropologists have come to refer to this phenomenon as ”urban context" (Rollwagen 1975). It is my contention that the major difference between Flint and Lansing which was of importance to Chicano migration and integration was local political economy. Both cities were industrial centers involved in the switch from industrial to monopoly capitalism, a change which places emphasis on the tertiary or service sector. I argue that this transformation had not occurred unilineally in both cities but was - instead much more highly deveIOped in Lansing, while Flint remained dependent on its industrial base. I suggest that the historical development of these different economic bases and the resultant politi- cal and social climates were the crucial "context" within which and to which the migrant Chicano populations were adapting.2 This chapter details the development of the divergent political economies of Flint and Lansing. It is my hypothesis that these developments form a basic independent variable in this study. I will indicate in succeeding chapters how the migration and integration of Chicanos into these cities occurred in response to the divergent development of the two local political economies. 4s Lansing and Flint Before the Auto Age Lansing3 Lansing, Michigan began as a land swindle. In the 18305 the largest settlement near what was to become the Lansing metropolitan region was Jackson, forty miles south, a busy trading center of a thousand inhabitants. In 1836 two brothers from New York state settled in Jackson, hired a surveyor, and drew up blueprints for a planned urban center which was to be built at the point where the Red Cedar and Grand Rivers join. The rivers form a rapids as they join, and these rapids became important later as a power source for the Lansing auto industry. Although actual building of the city was never begun, it was widely publicized and the brothers sold lots in ”Biddle City," as they named it, to buyers from New York and Illinois who came to farm. Another such scheme existed in eastern Ingham County at the same time. Through the 18405 settlers filtered into the area in hopes of estab- lishing themselves near these supposedly flourishing cities. What they found upon arrival were some homesteads standing in a forest clearing. Some stayed, however, and the settlement came to be known as Lansing, after a village in western New York from which a number of the new residents had come. Lansing might never have overtaken Jackson as the urban center of mid-Michigan except for one event: the state capital relocated from Detroit to the site. In 1847 Lansing was still a small pioneer settlement with less than a hundred inhabitants. That year there was a debate in the state legislature regarding selection of a new site for 46 location of the state capital. The state constitution of 1835 required that the capital be relocated in some central site although Detroit was then the only major settlement in the southern peninsula. Detroit had been made the capital when the state was admitted to the union in 1837 as it was the only incorporated city in the state. Due to its easy access to Lake Erie and the resultant water connection to the east, Detroit was always vulnerable to attack. Prior to statehood, for example during both the War of 1812 and the "Toledo War,"4 the city was sacked and burned. This stopped the regular sessions of the territorial legislature and destroyed some records. Except for legislators from Detroit itself, there was almost unanimous support for removal of the capital to some interior location. When the vote came for relocation no other city could gain a majority of the votes and a legislator who owned a large tract of land in the Lansing area offered to donate twenty acres for the capitol site. His half-humorous peacemaking gesture was successful and Lansing was named the new state capital. At the time there were no railroads for miles, only a small settlement, and few all-weather roads. By January of 1848 enough small temporary buildings had been erected that the legislature was able to open for its regular session at the new location. Lansing had not grown much by 1855 when another legislative act occurred which was of considerable importance to economic and political development of the area. That year Michigan Agricultural College was established under the provisions of the Morrill Land Grant Act. The college, located three miles east of the Capitol, was run by the Michigan State Board of Agriculture and actually opened in 1857. At 47 that time the state government was concerned with improving agri- cultural technology because it was presumed that farmland would remain the mainstay of the state's economy. Thus when Lansing was incorporated as a city in 1859 two economic interests were already of importance: agriculture and govern- ment. In 1860 there were just over 3,000 people in the newly incor- porated city, nearly three times as many as lived there a decade earlier. It was not until the introduction of railroads to the area in the late 18705, however, that any industrial activity not strictly related to farming came to be of importance. Even then the two early economic interests were not replaced entirely by industry. This will be demonstrated in a section to follow and is critical to understanding the different patterns of Chicano migration and integration which occurred in Lansing and Flint. 3.1.9.25 Flint had a somewhat earlier and more auspicious start than did Lansing. A fur trading post was estabished in 1819 on a wide, shallow spot in the Flint River where the Chippewa crossed on the Saginaw Trail. This was the route from the forests around Saginaw Bay to the City of Detroit. Soon a tavern, hotel, and ferry center were added to the trading post and travelers began to settle permanently. By the late 18305 Flint had a post office, bank, saw mill, two physicians and a lawyer, and had become seat of Genesee County. When Flint was officially incorporated in 1855 it had some two thousand permanent .residents. Even in those early days Flint was becoming an industrial center. From the 18605 to around 1880 the area around Saginaw Bay, 48 over three million acres of giant white pine forest, was the center of a major extractive lumber industry. Flint became a processing and transportation hub in the industry because the Flint River, on which the city was located, connected with a network of rivers which traversed the Saginaw country. The first industry in the city was the saw mill and during the Michigan lumber era mill after mill located in Flint. The first railroad in Flint was built during this period to provide transportation out for the products of the mills. There were nine such mills operating in 1870 with five hundred employees, but by 1880 the boom was over. The primary forests were devasted and re— forestation plans were years in the future. Only three mills were left in Flint that decade. Lumber had been responsible for considerable population growth as well as economic growth: by 1880 there were over eight thousand permanent residents in the city. These people did not become unem- ployed when the lumber era came to a close, however. In the late 18605 a carriage shop had opened and soon a wagon shop was established. There were also other wood-working industries making furniture, fence posts, and tool handles. It was the vehicle shops which were to become the mainstay of the Flint economy. By the 18805 the Durant-Dort Carriage Company, the Flint Wagon Works, and the Paterson Carriage Company were the major shops in Flint. Durant-Dort alone produced 50,000 carriages a year, and Flint became known throughout the country as "Vehicle City." Then in the 18905 and early 19005 the invention of gasoline- powered engines and their application to carriages transformed Flint's carriage industry to automobile production, and Flint continued its position as a leader in vehicle manufacture. Thus from quite early in 49 its development Flint's economy was oriented to and dominated by the vehicle industry. The Beginning of the Auto Era Lansing6 The auto industry in Lansing had its beginnings in the late 18005. Ransom E. Olds built the first steam-powered horseless carriage there in 1887. Olds's father, an Ohio blacksmith who moved his family to Lansing when Olds was in his teens, had developed a steam engine for which there was soon so much demand that he began producing the engines in his smithy. Olds found the steam engine heavy and bulky for appli— cation to a carriage so in 1896 he built a carriage powered by a lighter gasoline engine. The following year, 1897, the Olds Motor Vehicle Company was organized in Lansing under the general management of R. E. Olds. By that time there were over two hundred small manufacturing firms in Lansing, including the steam engine shop of Olds's father. The first car the Olds Motor Vehicle Company sold went to EurOpe and the result was favorable publicity. With the national stock market crash of 1893 nearly half the shOps were closed and some Lansing residents who depended on employment in those small industries emigrated (see Table 1). Money was a continual problem for the new Olds vehicle shop since it opened just as local businesses were recovering from the depression. Therefore in 1898 the Olds Motor Vehicle Company was reorganized with backing from a Detroit financier.‘ In 1900 a plant was opened in Detroit although production con- tinued in Lansing as well. By the following year the factory was 50 Table l.~-Lansing Population, 1860-1970. Year Total Population Year Total Population 1860 3,074 1920 57,327 1870 5,241 1930 78,397 1880 8,319 1940 78,753 1890 13,102 1950 92,129 1900 16,485 1960 107,807 1910 31,229 1970 131,629 Note: Based on figures from U.S. Bureau of the Census 1864, 1883, 1901, 1923, 1932, 1943, 1952, 1962b, and 1971b. turning out a simple, easily Operated low-cost motorized vehicle. The same year the Detroit factory suffered substantial damage due to fire. In 1903 Olds left the company. He wanted to continue producing small, low-cost cars but the financers were more interested in luxury vehicles. Then Henry Ford Opened a competitive shop in Detroit in 1904, and Olds returned to Lansing. As a result, Olds car production in both Detroit and Lansing declined. Olds soon established a new auto shop in the city and in 1906 the new company was named the Rec Motor Car Company, using Olds's initial R.E.O. since his surname was still in use in the Detroit plant. In 1908 Reo began making trucks as well as cars and by 1910 expanded into production of heavy—duty commercial vehicles. In 1908 Olds Motor Car Company became a division of the newly formed General Motors Corporation (see below). In 1909 Reo had an output of 6,600 cars while Olds in both cities produced only 1,750 and Buick in Flint manufactured 16,500 autos, second in car production only to Ford of Detroit (Crabb 1969: 250). This first decade of the twentieth century 51 marked the greatest population growth in Lansing history as peOple came in to work in the newly expanding vehicle industry. As the industry developed, secondary plants were established as spinoffs. In 1916 Duplex Truck moved to Lansing. In 1919 Fisher Body Company, which became a subsidiary of General Motors the same year, opened an auto body shop in Lansing to supply Olds. The following year two smaller companies merged into the Motor Wheel CorpOration to produce automobile wheels. Four drop forges were established in the city from 1906 to 1923 to produce various auto parts which were then assembled in the auto plants. These factories all developed to supply the auto plant originally established by Olds and his new factory. Then the depression struck and passenger car production was suspended at Reo in 1936. In 1940 the factory reopened as a manufacturer of trucks. In 1957 Reo became a division of White Motors of Cleveland, Ohio. The tOp truck production at Reo was reached in 1966, when 781 vehicles were produced (Wards 1968: 118). Production stOpped in 1974 and the factory was sold in 1975. Meanwhile, agriculture was undergoing important changes in the rural hinterlands. With World War II more foodstuffs were needed and the Lansing area became an important producer of truck crops. In the 19505 truck cr0ps continued in importance and the pickling cucumber came to dominate the industry. The location of rich mucklands north of Lansing led to the region becoming a major peppermint—farming area in the 19505 as well (O'Donnell, et al. 1960). All of these develop- ments in local agriculture required large numbers of hand laborers and large numbers of Chicanos came in response to this need (see Chapter 4). 52 Although Lansing pOpulation growth in the twentieth century was linked predominantly to the development of the auto industry, the growth pattern in the city has been one of steady increase over time (see Table 1). Factories Opened, closed, and consolidated and Lansing came to be a secondary production center of the General Motors Corpora- tion. By 1975 there were six major auto and auto parts plants in Lansing: five GM plants, of which three were Oldsmobile forge, parts and assembly factories; and a separate company which supplied GM parts. In addition, however, the four independent drop forges were still in Operation. Furthermore, as will be outlined in a succeeding section, both the primary and tertiary sectors continued to be important in industrial Lansing. The local pattern of auto industry development was the takeover of small Lansing industries by larger non—local firms with some small local plants still in Operation in the 19705. 5.1.1.227 The history of the auto age in Flint is the history Of General Motors Corporation. In the 18905 and first decade of the twentieth century when R.E. Olds was deve10ping his gasoline-driven car, parallel events were occurring in Flint. A judge built a horseless carriage at home in 1900. His is considered the first car made in Flint. The following year, 1901, the Flint Auto Company was established to build the immediately popular "Flint Roadster." This company went out of business as a result of legal problems after just two years' production of 52 cars. In 1901 David Buick also built his first automobile and by 1903 the Buick Motor Company was incorporated in Detroit. Late that year the Flint Wagon Works bought out the Buick 5hOp and moved 53 operations back to Flint. In late 1904 William Durant, a Flint native and son of the co-founder of Durant-Dort Carriage Company, was elected to the board of directors of Buick. Durant quickly foresaw that the auto would replace the carriage and became the major figure in the development of General Motors and in the evolution Of Flint as an auto manufacturing center. Durant-Dort's biggest production of carriages was 56,000 vehicles, achieved in 1906. The company was out Of business by 1917, pushed out by the popularity of the horseless carriage. Meanwhile, the auto industry in Flint was growing. In 1907 Buick car production was moved to Flint exclusively and the plant that had Opened two years earlier in Jackson closed. Weston-Mott, a factory from Utica, New York which manufactured axles for Buick cars, was moved to Flint in 1907 as well. Charles Stewart Mott, founder and Flint manager of Weston-Mott, was also the founder of the Mott Foundation. He was the director of General Motors for sixty-one years and served three terms as mayor of Flint. In 1908 General Motors Corporation was born in Flint. William Durant organized the consolidation of several independent companies under the control of Buick. These included Olds in Lansing and Buick and Weston-Mott in Flint. That year Buick had the greatest output of autos in the world with 8,820 cars turned out. The following year Buick production was up to 14,606 and in 1910 it was 30,525 (Gustin 1973: 87). In 1909 Durant had arranged for Albert Champion to move his company from Boston to Flint and the Champion Ignition Company was added to GM. Also in 1909 the Oakland Motor Car Company of Pontiac was added to GM. By 1910 Durant had secured controlling interest in Buick of Flint, Olds of S4 Lansing, Oakland of Pontiac, Cadillac of Detroit, Champion of Flint, and twenty-seven other auto assembly and parts plants in Michigan, New York, Ohio, and Ontario. This huge consolidation led to a bank takeover of the corporation in 1910 so Durant had to temporarily cease expansion of GM interests. The following year Chevrolet Motor Works was organized by Durant and Louis Chevrolet, a race-driver and mechanic, in Detroit. By 1914 Chevrolet and Durant had quarrelled and Durant moved the factory to Flint and began production. In 1915 Durant regained controlling inter- est of General Motors Corporation from the bankers through the purchase of GM stock by the Chevrolet company. By 1918 Durant and GM had gained control of all the individual companies which became the modern GM divisions: A-C (Champion), Buick, Cadillac, Chevrolet, Fisher Body, Oldsmobile, and Pontiac. Referring to Table 2, the biggest pOpulation boom in Flint history occurred from 1900 to 1920, particularly from 1910 to 1920. This was a result of the geometric growth of GM. In 1908 when GM was founded there were 4,499 blue-collar factor workers in Flint. In 1909 there were 10,265, and in 1910 over 15,000 (Gustin 1973: 911). The explosion of labor migrants to Flint during the first few years of the auto industry consolidation created an incredible housing shortage. Squatter settlements sprang up on vacant land throughout the city. The largest and best-known squatment, referred to as "Tent City," developed at Oak Park on the northern side of the city near the Buick plant. In 1909 the county health department ordered the park evacuated (Rodolf 1949: 500). However, the most famous photograph of "Tent City" was taken the following year. By 1919 the situation was so critical that GM 55 Table 2.--Flint Population, 1860-1970. Year Total Population Year Total Population 1860 2,930 1920 91,599 1870 5,386 1930 ~ 156,492 1880 8,409 1940 151,543 1890 9,803 1950 163,143 1900 13,103 1960' 196,940 1910 38,550 1970 193,317 Based on figures from U.S. Bureau of the Census 1864, 1883, 1901, 1923, 1932, 1943, 1952, 1962a, and 1971a. executives decided to take action. They established the Modern Housing Corporation division of GM, which built 950 new worker houses that year (Rodolf 1949: 503). As the post-World War I boom died down building was discontinued until 1923, but the second construction phase lasted until 1933. AltOgether over 3,000 houses were built (Rodolf 1949: 503). The houses were sold on contract to GM workers, who had no real alterna— tives. None were rented until after the Depression when many were vacated as a result of unemployment, and no more were built. The pattern of Flint's population growth and decline during the auto age reflects the nearly complete dependence of that city on the auto industry. This industry is very sensitive to cycles of boom and bust and the fluctuations in the Flint pOpulation mirror that sensiti- vity. During the 19305 Flint experienced its first population decrease as the lack of auto production drove out many unemployed workers (see Table 2). The second population decrease occurred between 1960 and 1970 and was a result not only of national and international economic trends but also of the increasing mechanization of the auto plants. 56 The development of Flint during the auto age, particularly the history of worker housing, also reflects the dominance of GM in the city in realms not purely industrial. This point will be dealt with in more detail below. Flint's introduction to the auto age was therefore quite different from that of Lansing. Flint is the home town of one of the nation's major multinational corporations and the migration and integration of Chicanos into Flint cannot be understood without taking that fact into account. The Economic Sectors of Contemporary Lansing and Flint Contemporary Flint and Lansing have divergent local political economies as a result of the factors described above. Lansing has an economy which is heavily influenced by government, education, services, and local agriculture as well as industry. Such interests in Flint, on the other hand, are clearly subordinate to industry. The various sectors of the Flint and Lansing economic structures are compared in this section. Table 3 presents the percentages of persons employed in both cities by occupational category by decade from 1920 to 1970, the period of Chicano migration and integration. Certain general differences can be noted between the two cities during this fifty year period. First, agriculture employed a relatively greater percentage of Lansingites than Flintites throughout the period. Although farm laborers and foremen comprised 3 percent or less of all the employed in either city during the time period in question, only during the enumerations of 1920, 1950, and 1960 were the percentages of farm laborers employed in the two cities equal. It was during these periods that Chicano immigration was 57 .5 new «HHQH we“ .5 use «NSQH .NmmH .mvaH .NmaH .mNQH msmcuu on» we saoasm .m.: co gowns .ommHuonH uom xuomoumo :xuumavcH o>Huoauuxoz...u.o co>Hu xuououau Hosuo Ho voumHH no: :oHuam:OOO+ .uno» peg» doumuoenco HOZa mnHmm momma ~om~v mommn mHomo ommmm NNva mommm uonv mmmwm onHom vmome noonaeu Hdsuum Hnuoh u- u: n m m H m H m m H H +Hozuo H Hv .. -u H H N H n N H H .conuow sham .muouoan sham mH NH HH m oH m m m 1- -n u- -u ouH>Hom cH H meH nH N OHMN. HH H oH N NH v NH v vH u- m -u m :u n .n pHozomso: oun>HHd v v -u u- -- u- -u -- m m m m mo>Hunpoao coHpauuoamcmnH cm v me m cm m we v mm m mm v mm m cm m av -n m .. Ho us on u- muouonaH mH om mH on HN mm ON Hm as -- o8 -- om -- mo -- mosauaaoao mH qH vH vH vH 0H vH oH u- -- u- -u wouvcHu .:oaosoa .cosmuwnku n o a n m n u: u -u an u- -- moHnm a 0. mm Hm?H mm om ommmH mm oH mH HH mm -1 wH . NH -u vH -u mm .. mH’wu HmuHHoHu n m n o m o m n n- s- -u «u- o>HumuuchHev< -Howmcnz mH NH NH HH MH 5 0H m w m m v HmoHccooh uHaconmououm uchcmH ucHHm mchcwH ucHHm mchcdH ucHHm mchcmH ucHHm mchcmq ucHHm mchcmH unHHm :oHpeQSUOO onoH oomH ommH oemH emmH cmmH .coHuuanuuo an noonmEu oceanom "ohmHuomaH uchcaH.vcm ucHHm .mousuuauum :oHuamsuOOI-.m oHpaP 58 greatest in Flint (see Chapter 4). At all other census enumerations from 1920 to 1970 one-third to one-half again as many persons were employed as farm laborers in Lansing as in Flint. These employment figures document the greater relative importance of agriculture to the Lansing economy over the fifty year period of Chicano immigration. During the decades of greatest Chicano immigration to the hinterlands of both cities as farm workers, the 19505 and 19605, the growth of employment in other economic sectors was greater. These sectOrs offered more stable, lucrative, or prestigious employment to Michigan natives, who began to leave farm employment. This helps to explain why Chicanos were recruited into mid-Michigan agriculture even though its importance was declining in the two urban areas in question.8 Likewise, professional-technical and managerial-administrative occupations consistently comprised a larger percentage of Lansing employment from 1920 to 1970 than was the case in Flint. One of the reasons for the difference in this category is that more individuals are employed in state government positions in Lansing than in Flint.9 The slightly higher proportion of Lansingites employed in professional, managerial, and service categories is likely due to the fact that Lansing is the state capital and state jobs are available. The greatest di5parities in these categories between the two cities occurred in 1950, immediately following the second World War. This disparity can be explained when these figures are compared with those on factory Operatives. In Lansing, only 1 percent more of the total were employed as Operatives from 1940 to 1950. In contrast, in Flint 7 percent more of the total were employed as factory operatives in that decade. It was during the war years that Flint factories attracted large numbers 59 of unskilled workers for employment in war materials production at the auto plants (see chapter 4). On the other hand, reference to the categories craftsmen, fore- men, Operatives, and laborers reveals that a far greater percentage of all employed Flintites worked in these occupations than was the case in Lansing throughout the fifty year period. The disparity in these blue- collar factory positions between the two cities was greatest in the years from 1940 to 1950 when the Flint factories were producing war materials. What the difference of an average of ten percentage points means in real numbers of persons employed is shown by Table 4. This table demonstrates not only that far greater numbers of persons were employed in the auto factories in Flint than in Lansing at all time periods but again reflects the fluctuations in Flint employment. Auto production was down in 1972 as a result of a minor recession and plummeted farther the following year with the onset of the energy crisis. Employment in Flint auto plants was down 2 percent in 1972. One additional Lansing factory, Reo, employed 5,877 workers in 1944 during the war but employment was down to only 81 in 1954. When the plant closed in 1974 there were about 900 employees. The relative importance of these different sectors of the Flint and Lansing economies over time is portrayed graphically in Figure 1. In both cities the importance of primary sector industries--agriculture, mining, forestry--has declined sharply since 1920. However, from 1930 to 1970 the decline has been steady and fairly gradual in Lansing while it drOpped suddenly in Flint from 1930 to 1940 when Flint experienced a decline in all industries due to the depression.10 In 1970, primary 'Table 4.—-Employment at GM Plants, Flint and Lansing, 1934-1973. Flint Auto Plants Lansing Auto Plants Year Actual Employees* % Increase Actual Employees+ % Increase 1934 -- —- 10,934 -- 1940 42,500 -- -— -- 1944 -- -- 20,470 98 1950 54,600 22 -- ~- 1954 -- -— 20,605 1 1963 59,500 8 -— -- 1964 -- —— 21,154 3 1972 58,100 -2 -- -- 1973 -- -- 28,159 33 *Figures from Beynon 1940 and Michigan Employment Security Commission document. +Figure5 from Lansing Regional Chamber of Commerce. sector industries accounted for some 3 percent of the Lansing economy and 2 percent of the Flint economy. A far greater disparity between the two cities is revealed in a comparison of the importance of secondary sector industries—-manufacturing --over time. This sector has declined in both cities over the period in question, but the decline in Lansing was sudden from 1920 to 1930, when local Lansing industries were purchased by larger firms, and steady until 1970. In contrast the secondary sector grew in Flint until 1950 and then experienced a rapid decline to 1970. The growth was largely due to the production of materials for both world wars and the rapid decline which appears on the graph marked a shift back to civilian manufacture. By 1970 almost half of the Flint economy was taken up by , secondary sector industries, which accounted for only slightly over a third of the Lansing economy. 61 Percent Employed 15 4 10 _ \ Percent Employed 6O O l l I 1 l 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 197056 40 Percent Employed TERTIARY SECTOR 6O ‘ ’ 55- ,/ ,’ 30 ' 1 50 ' /’ 45-4 ,,’ 40 ~ ,I 35.. 30 ‘ l 1 1 J #4 251920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 Figure 1. SECONDARY SECTOR I l L 1 , 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 KEY: Flint ' "" Lansing Flint and Lansing Sectorial Development, 1920—1970. Based on figures from the U.S. Bureau of the Census 1923, 1932, 1952, 1962, and 1971a and b. 62 Finally, both cities have experienced a sharp increase in the tertiary sector--commerce and service (including government)--5ince 1920. This is a normal pattern in the contemporary U.S. The national political economy is now in the monopoly capitalism stage marked by metr0politan urbanism. It passed through industrial capitalism and concomitant industrial urban development with the end of World War II. The function of the industrial city was productive manufacturing, and Flint and Lansing both grew as centers for the manufacture of the auto- mobile. The metropolitan city's economic base is not its manufacturing complex, however, but rather is expressed by its services: ". . . in the creativity of its universities and research parks, the sophistication of its engineering firms and financial institutions, the persuasiveness of its public relations and advertising agencies, the flexibility of its transportation networks and utility systems, and all the dimensions of 'infrastructure' that facilitate the quick and orderly transfer from old dying bases to new growing ones" (Thompson 1968 as quoted in Hill 1975: 9-10). Lansing is making this transition better than Flint since it began as a center of government and has, as a result, always had a diversified economic base. Referring again to Figure 1, the tertiary sector has grown steadily in Lansing to comprise over two-thirds of the 1970 Lansing economy. Growth of the tertiary sector in Flint was fitful as this sector like the others was more adversely affected by World War 11 than its Lansing counterpart. The tertiary sector comprised just over 50 percent of the Flint economy of 1970. \ The contemporary Flint and Lansing economic structures reflect the differences that have existed between the two urban political economies since their inception. Although both are basically industrial 63 cities that are expanding their urban services as they become metro- politan, Lansing is making the transition more quickly. This is because Lansing has always had a more mixed economic base than Flint and was the seat of state government. The divergent economic structures of these two cities are the bases of the "contexts" of these urban areas to which migrants must adapt. Sociopolitical Milieus Introduction As a result of the development of divergent economic structures in Flint and Lansing the political ideology and social milieu of these cities is also different. The resultant "sociopolitical climate” or local ideological framework, to be outlined below, has had considerable impact on the integration of Chicanos in the two cities and upon their patterns of formal organization behavior. Lansing Lansing serves two major apparently conflicting political ideo- IOgies that have importance for the local Chicano population as a result of its economic base. One of these is conservative Republicanism--the principal political stance of both agribusiness and heavy manufacturing. In this capacity Lansing—-capital of a state which has been Republican since its founding (Dunbar 1970: Ch 18), service and administrative center of an important truck farming region (see chapter 4), site of a center for higher education which has innovated in agriculture, and major auto manufacturing center--serves to disseminate the traditional . . . . 1 political Views of these interests. 1 64 On the other hand, Lansing as capital of the state is also the center of every possible political pressure group in the state as all have to maintain some contact with the legislators and chief executive. The ready availability of an audience for any point of view which is created by the city's housing various interest groups andlobbies make Lansing appear to have a liberal, "open" political system. Individuals seem to have considerable upward mobility due to political patronage, which further "proves" that openness. This leads to an atmosphere of competition and free enterprise in the politicoeconomic realm. Lansing is also something of a showcase since it is the capital. Urban renewal was not an important influence as it was in Flint (see chapter 6) until implementation of funds from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban DeveIOpment in the mid 19705. Even the "blighted" neighborhoods in Lansing are far from the physically deteriorated areas characteristic of inner-city areas in major metropolitan centers.12 It is easy to understand that when Michiganders outside the city of Lansing say, ”We heard from Lansing," they mean that they have gotten word from the state government. Lansing is not only the locale or seat of Michigan state government, it is also the ideological embodiment of Michigan government. There was a Michigan state capital at Lansing in 1847 but there was not an incorporated city there until 1859. Until 1880, when economic functions of the city were still allied with serving the capital, local politics were intense and local leaders were also involved in state politics (Ray et a1. 1966). Lansing was really just a small town with business and commercial interests established to serve the local farmers and state legislators. 65 In the early part of the twentieth century Lansing industrializa- tion grew steadily as secondary industries began to locate innthe city to serve the needs of the growing auto factory which had come to the city in 1904. From 1920 until 1940 growth was largely accomplished through consolidation, non—local takeover, and enlargement of existing auto and auto-related plants. During that period the major industries, banks, and businesses shared interlocking boards of directors and what is more, these influentials were largely in control of city politics (Ray et a1. 1966). Then from the 19405 on overt control of city politics by business and industry ceased. Economic growth after that period came largely from the consolidated corporate industry sector (GM) with national and international interests and absentee directors. Local politics tended to continue to be run by persons who were administra- tors and lawyers from the major bloc or small businessmen directly involved in local politics. They were therefore less visible as spoke- men for the major companies although they continued to follow policies of the earlier influentials. At the time of my study, the city executive and councilmen with highest seniority were from local businesses (owners or managers) or were administrative staff in industry and all were staunch Republicans. The Republicans had not courted the Chicano vote in the past. This party has been identified nationally and locally with the interests of owners and managers, and Lansing Chicanos were not owners. Democrats, the party of labor in the U.S. two-party system, tended to vie for ward city council position5--those seats which are tied to a locality-~more often than at-large positions.13 Chicanos 66 had not run in city elections but in contrast there had been Chicano Democrat candidates in county elections where the barrio (Chicano neighborhood) was not split into several districts since 1970. Until 1976, several Chicanos would run in the Democratic primary for the same position and just "at the last minute" a gringo (Anglo) candidate would appear and take the election. The first successful Chicano candidate won his county seat as a Democrat just as I finished my fieldwork (see chapter 7). After 1950 the student population of Michigan State, the land- grant university, swelled as a result of the "baby boom" and relative postwar economic prosperity, and the study cited above (Ray et al. 1966) found that the economic impact of white-collar jobs at the university increased. These positions may have been even more influential than their economic contribution would indicate as they are stable in the face of economic recession compared to positions in durable goods manufacturing. The university also represented a direct link to the agriculture industry of the Lansing region as noted above. It was founded as a land-grant college for the purposes of studying agriculture and applied agricultural technology and still maintains strong agri- cultural interests. For example, the university complex includes several agriculture-related departments, an agriculture experiment station, and research farms. Furthermore, faculty from the university serve as consultants and board members in various community affairs. In this capacity they can exert considerable influence in events con— cerning Chicanos. For example, in chapter 4 reference is made to the fact that a professor suggested a flat-fee payment be paid to Michigan welfare recipients to entice them to "go home" in the 19705. Earlier, 67 Mexicans in Lansing had difficulty in establishing their own Catholic parish and one informant named two professors who had been influential in preventing that development. I found that these faculty members had served on the state farm labor commission. State government represents another link to local agriculture as legislators are not all urbanities and those from rural agricultural counties are often farm owners. Farm owners have tended to be uninter- ested in welfare, retraining, and health programs applied to Chicanos unless these are of benefit to agricultural interests as well. E.g., food stamps for temporarily unemployed farmworkers may tend to keep them on the farm between cultivation and harvest, helping the farmer as well as the worker. Farmers are not the only ones represented at the state level, however. There were at the time of the study several state-level organizations--commissions, fact-finding groups, task forces--which were concerned with migrant farmworkers and/or the Spanish-speaking which also had their headquarters in Lansing. Certain legislators (all but one were Democrats) espoused the Chicano cause and could be counted on to vote for, publicize, or draw up bills favorable to various concerns of interest to Chicanos. Furthermore, every other interest group-- conservative, liberal, local, nationa1--with a cause in Michigan is represented in the capital city. For example, in 1977 the PIRGIM (Public Interest Research Group in Michigan) advised news media that health lobbyists had among the strongest and best—funded organizations at the capital. The pOpulation of Lansing includes many southerners--Chicanos from Texas, blacks from the Southeast, whites from Appalachia and the 68 Southeast--the vast majority of whom came as workers. There have not been large numbers of diverse "white" ethnic groups important in Lansing history and blacks first began entering the city when it was just developing, largely from nearby northern states. Beginning with World War II more southern blacks migrated in and the natural increase of the population began to be important (Meyer 1970). By 1950 there was a "black ghetto" on the West side (which began dispersing by the late 19605), and the Chicano barrio was already solidifying then. In 1959 when Lansing celebrated its centennial as a city, there was an "ethnic festival" as part of the celebration. Chicanos who were in the city by that time recall that they and/or their parents, who participated in the festival through their Catholic parish organization, had the largest food booth and most impressive display of all the groups involved and that only the Italians rivalled their dance group displays. There was not another "ethnic festival" in Lansing until the national bicentennial in 1976, although there has been such an event annually in Flint for decades. Lansing's distinguishable ethnic groups are too distinguish- able--they live in different neighborhoods and appear to be different. Ethnicity is not something that one celebrates annually, but is rather a fact of daily life. As a result of the two political ideologies of Lansing—~that of capital city center of interest groups and that of center of state and local traditional political ideology--Chicanos and others seeking a vertical linkage to power are faced with the appearance of easy access Ito power. Yet business-industrial conservatism, white-collar ties to agricultural interests, and the conservative tradition of state 69 government combine to make politics less than receptive to urban proletariat and rural farmworker population concerns and highly com- petitive. 5129.2 Flint would appear to be more heterogenetic, using the Redfeld- Singer term, than Lansing because the city population consists of a blend of a large variety of cultural groups and does not represent any continuous historical link to Michigan political tradition. The establishment of an institute to facilitate assimilation and adjustment by various foreign-born workers at the beginning of the second decade of the twentieth century as well as the contemporary "invisibility" of the Chicano population would lend credence to the viewpoint that Flint had successfully adjusted to its heterogeneity. The blend of many nationalities is over—shadowed, however, by the fact that Flint is in many ways a company town. All the major industrial plants, where the vast majority of Flintites work, are subsidiaries of General Motors Corporation and even non—economic, "cultural" institutions are at root part of the company. The motor company maintains the GM Institute in Flint. It is an educational facility for engineers and technicians. Much of the housing in the city of Flint was built by General Motors (see above). Many projects for "minority group advancement," libraries and recreational services, school improvements, artistic endeavors, and even grants to private educational and artistic institutions owe their existence to the Mott Foundation. This is a private foundation named for its founder and three-term mayor of the city, one of the motor company pioneers. Even local union organizing exists by virtue 70 of the company's presence. The history of Flint's heterogeneous population growth is directly tied to the history of the motor com— pany's development, and local politics are related to both of these. As was noted above in reference to the Mott Foundation, ties between administration of the motor company and control of local politics have often been overt. The influence of the company's business orientation placing emphasis on efficiency and professionalism have also been felt in political decisions and voting behavior in the city. During the depression years, the Flint city charter was changed from a mayor-council government to a city manager—council government, with the city manager an appointed position. After forty-six years of city manager government the Flint city charter was revised again and in 1975 during my fieldwork there was a mayoral election. The contenders were the recently-retired police chief and the county register of deeds. The retired police chief, who won the election, had a history of work in an impressively automated, computerized, efficient police department that has been considered a national exemplar of the way modern police departments should run. This department typifies the way the business-industry ideology permeates the city. There are actually two quite different political ideOIOgies represented by various segments of the Flint population which might be called the labor view and the business view. The labor view is espoused by unions, political liberals, some minority group representatives, and some of the factory workers. This view stresses housing stock improve- ment, social welfare programs, full employment and the like. The business view is espoused by business and industrial management, by most civil servants, and by some of the factory workers. This view stresses 71 government efficiency and fiscal responsibility, progress in industrial growth in the city, encouraging high productivity and output in local business and industry, etc. In the section on Lansing politics above, it was noted that in that city these divergent political ideologies generally were in charge of separate branches of city government and that since the state government centered at Lansing as well as city administration has been historically most influenced by conservative interests, local politics remained largely in control of business- industry interests. In Flint, there has been considerably less ideo- logical split between branches of the city government at least partly because administration until recently was headed by an appointed pro- fessional. What is more, the welfare of even those who espouse the labor view is closely tied to the economic fitness of the motor company since the vast majority of the Flint employed work in auto or auto- related enterprises. Local politics merely reflect the character of industrial Flint which I referred to above as the company town. The company controls most employment Opportunities and local politics, but it is not pub- licly insensitive. Social improvements for the workers have been undertaken and conscious efforts have been made continuously to point out publicly how the disparate ethnic groups which make up the city may have different languages and culture but Flint is a successful "melting pot" (see e.g., Flint Journal 1976b). The tenor of public relations espoused by local media and politicans make the company appear paterna- listic yet predominantly a benefactor to the people of Flint, which is true inasmuchas many owe their employment to the company. However, the paternalism of leadership with company business views has made 72 successful collective bargaining and political protest difficult at best.14 A famous exception to that rule was the sit—down strike of 1936—1937, in which Flint auto workers laid the foundation for modern industrial unionism (see chapter 8). Both economically and politically Flint is an industrial city with a major stake in only one industry and its spinoffs. This industry is in durable goods, which is more readily influenced by economic recession than soft industries or services. The political ideology of the city reflects the vulnerable one-industry character of the local economy and the total dominance of the city by its major corporation. Many workers and even the poor, who might be at odds with local leader- ship over social services, are generally supportive of local industry- controlled government and the ideology of the melting pot as there are no viable alternatives for employment. As another researcher also found, in Flint the public at large thinks and says, "What happens to GM happens to me" (Fine 1969: 107). There is little competition in a com- pany town. Summary Lansing and Flint, Michigan are today both industrial cities which depend primarily on auto manufacture. However, Lansing has a mixed economy in which the primary and tertiary sectors, particularly agriculture and government, play important roles. Flint, on the other hand, is far more dependent on its auto industry and as a result is more sensitive to national and international economic cycles than is Lansing. 73 Flint is the home town of General Motors Corporation and GM administrators have always been the power holders in Flint. The history of Flint is, as a result, the history of GM. Lansing is also administered by pro—GM interests but the ties are more covert. The Lansing political arena reflects the diverse interests of Lansing's hinterland although the auto industry dominates local politics. It was demonstrated in this chapter that the trend toward these divergent political economies has existed since the founding of these cities. Lansing began as a farm settlement and soon had the fortune to become the capital of the state. Flint began as a lumbering center; lumber converted to carriage production; and the carriage industry transformed into horseless carriage manufacture. Since Lansing is the capital it is the center of diverse political interest groups, but local politics remain solidly aligned with the interests of local industry. Flint does not even have the appearance of political diver- sity that Lansing has and in many ways is a company town. Succeeding chapters will discuss the manner in which these important differences in political economy have influenced Chicano migration and integration in Lansing and Flint. 74 Footnotes 1In Michigan, Detroit is the "primate city," a term which has been applied to the capital cities in Latin American nation-states. Detroit serves as the center of an urban hierarchy which includes not only other Michigan cities but centers for the production of steel and rubber in other Midwest states as well. There is a massive urban proletariat resident with great service needs, located there as a result of its centrality in the auto realm. For a more complete develOpment of the regional role of Detroit in the auto industry, see Sinclair 1972. 2Smith (1975) describes two New England cities with different political economies in which Portuguese migration and integration was different. However, she discusses these processes as a result of the historical divergence in rates of immigration, structural and cultural "fit," and Portuguese visiblity. 3For more detail on this period in Lansing History see Darling 1950, Dunbar 1970, and Lansing history 1960. 4 . As a result of this argument the area around Toledo went to Ohio and the new state of Michigan was admitted with the inclusion of the upper peninsula as compensation. 5For more information on this period see Crow 1945, Dunbar 1970, and Flint Board of Education n.d. 6For further information on this era in Lansing see Crabb 1969 and Lansing History 1960. 7For more details on this period see Crabb 1969, Gustin 1973, and Rodolf 1949. 8See chapter 4 for more details of this development. 9During 1975 the classification section of the Michigan Depart- ment of Civil Service registered 13,188 persons in all job classifi- cations employed in state government in Ingham County (Lansing) while only 1,139 were employed in Genesee County (Flint). For more details on the develOpment of agriculture and its importance for the Chicano pOpulation, particularly in Lansing, see chapter 4. 11In this sense it may be said to have an orthOgenetic function to some extent--i.e., it serves to spread the traditional ideology of the founders (Redfield and Singer 1954). 75 12One section of the city which remains a thorn in the side of local politicians is the "sin strip" or redlight district which lines the major street entrance to the capitol building. 13One well-known Democrat former city employee and antagonist of the mayor was successful in his bid for an at-large council seat during my fieldwork. 14The following example is illustrative of the situation. A Chicano who has worked for GM for ten years has often served unoffi- cially as arbitration board member and as interpreter for Chicanos with grievances. For two years he has been president of the local chapter of the Latin American Labor Organization (pseudonym) which draws its membership from Chicano GM employees, automatically members of the official labor union, and acts essentially as a lobby both to GM and to the union. Although the organization has no legitimate power, it has served as a sounding board for complaints against the company. Company managers have acknowledged his informal spokesman role for their Chicano employees, but he was only recently approved a pay raise to which he felt he was entitled several years ago. CHAPTER 4 MIGRATION Introduction Migratory seasonal farmwork brought the majority of the Chicano pOpulation to Michigan. Whether or not they-were former migratory farmworkers, Chicanos in Flint and Lansing were largely migrants.1 What is more, most Chicanos in Flint and Lansing were labor migrants. They migrated into these cities in search of both seasonal and temporary employment. In this chapter I will delineate the patterns and time periods of Chicano migration to Flint and Lansing. It is my hypothesis that these migrations were responses to the fluctuations in labor needs of the agriculture and auto industries, components of the Lansing and Flint political economies. I suggest that these fluctua- tions were, furthermore, conditioned by national and international economic cycles. As such responses, these Chicano migrations can be considered the results of the interplay of structural inequality at different levels which were outlined in chapter 1. Understanding that the U.S. and Mexico as well as Michigan and Texas are in center-periphery relationships to each other is crucial for coming to grips with the patterns of migration which are described in this chapter. Both Mexican and Texas Chicanos2 have immigrated to Michigan since the 19205 and continue to do so in smaller numbers even now. It has been 76 77 argued that Chicano immigration from Mexico helped offset the Mexican trade deficit with the U.S. (see Hancock 1959) and also that the migrations created social problems in Mexico (Samora 1971). In addition, Texas Chicano migration permitted Michigan agriculture and industry to develop rapidly and permitted the continued dependence of Texas on primary industries. Since the Great Depression of the 19305 and particulary since World War 11, however, the regional spread of wealth in the U.S. has been changing in accompaniment to the process of change from industrial to monopoly capitalism. This period of transition coincides with the period of Chicano migration in question. Capitalist growth is now occurring through entrenchment or capital accumulation while in the past it occurred through expansion. This development is evident in Michigan not only in the growth of the auto industry but also in agri- culture. Pre World War II agriculture was labor-intensive. The war brought about not only the legislation which prompted considerable Chicano migration to Michigan as field hand labor but also hastened the mechanization or capital intensive growth of agricultural output, which was to slow down Chicano migration. In the following sections it will be demonstrated how Chicano migration has reflected these economic changes.3 Resultant features of migrant selectivity are detailed in chapter 5. Periods of Migration: The Migration Cohorts Introduction Generation of migration has been used to explain social change, particularly in the barrios of South Texas and California. For example, 78 it has been suggested (Alvarez 1973) that the immigrants of the first decade of the twentieth century were the Migrant Generation, born in Mexico. The first native U.S.-born generation included veterans of World War II who managed some upward social mobility and were the Mexican American Generation. Then there was social consciousness of the late 19605 among the young Chicano Generation, which largely con- sisted of the children of the Mexican American Generation (i.e., they were third generation immigrants). It has also been noted that sex and life cycle are important variables in the migration of Mexicans to the United States. Not only have Mexican immigrants in most periods been male--either single or without their families--and less skilled but also younger than most immigrants from other countries (Grebler et a1. 1970: 69). These factors tend to be correlated with lower incomes than those prevalent for immigrants from other countries. As a result, chain migration and continued importance of the extended although geographically dispersed family may be important adaptive strategies for individual and group survival. As will be discussed below and in chapters 5 and 6, Chicano newcomers in Lansing and Flint relied on a network of kin and friends to secure initial housing and employment. Similar adaptations have been recorded among newcomer urbanites in various world settings.4 In Flint and Lansing Chicano migration has not been a steady, cumulative process, as might be suggeSted by an exclusive consideration of selected features of the migrant pOpulation itself. International and intranational migration combine with natural increase of the mid- Michigan Chicano pOpulation. The result is a complex stratification of Chicanos into categories that include elders who were Mexican-born 79 and are Mexico-oriented, elders with similar ties to Texas hence the United States, long-time Michigan residents, young newcomer Mexican nationals, and English-speaking Michigan-born teenagers. These popula- tion segments are not homogeneous in their formal organization behavior or in their political ideology (see chapters 7 and 8). I suggest that the reason they differ in those areas is that they have been exposed to different sociopolitical climates in their divergent time periods and geographical areas. There are, then, two features of Chicano immigration which are related to periods of time. These are the cycles of migration to the target cities and the different strata which migrants from the divergent cycles represent. The use of migration cohorts can help sort out these facts. Cohort analysis was used extensively by Balan, Browning and Jelin in their study of social mobility in Monterrey: Cohorts may be defined as groups of people who are exposed to the same general environment at the same time. Most often cohorts are identified by time of birth, but other bases are possible, as for example our construction of cohorts by time of arrival in Monterrey. We define age cohorts as groups of men who were born within a given period of time, generally five- to ten-year intervals" (Balan et a1. 1973: 27). Using decades based on time of arrival in Flint and Lansing as the cohorts, some significant differences are discernible between the two cities. In all decades from 1920 through 1977 the average age at final immigration to the city for those heads of household surveyed in 1976 tended to be higher for the Flint sample than for the Lansing sample. The only exception was for the decade of the 19305; however the Lansing sample for that decade was too small to be reliable, as was the 19205 sample for Flint. In all decades except the 19705, Chicano migrants in Lansing showed higher percentages of chain migration--going 80 to Lansing because another kinsman was already there--then did the Flint sample. If those who went to the target city because a close friend or compadre (ritual kinsman) from the home town had preceded them are included as chain migrants (refer to the figures in parentheses) generally more Chicanos in Flint than in Lansing were chain migrants. From this comparison of age at immigration and percent chain migrant by decade of migration it emerges that Flint Chicanos tended to be slightly older at immigration and more migrated following friends there than did Lansing Chicanos. Another difference evident in the table is the per- centage of the total sample which settled in each city per decade. The Flint sample was not only older but also had a longer history in the city than did the Lansing sample. The Flint sample immigrated more evenly throughout the time period with a tapering off in the 19705, while the Lansing sample built pyramidically with the largest percent of migrants per decade occurring in the 19705. What factors can explain not only the differences in patterns of migration between the two cities but also the differences over time within each city? Within the time period from 1920-1976 several significant events occurred nationally and regionally which appear to closely correlate with those migrant characteristics which changed over time. Since a major thrust of this dissertation is just such locating of the target cities within a larger framework, migrant cohorts based on these events rather than decades have been devised to bridge the regions Texas- Mexico and Michigan during the period under investigation. There were seven cohorts so defined for Flint-Lansing, four of which were nine year intervals while the other three were five and seven year intervals. These cohorts were as follows: 81 .quo wouooHom egg ow wouwanEEH pm: mHonEoE xHHEmm segue poems memo 0:3 omega mm HHoz mm czouoeo: HHocu Eosw mpcmHum onHom ow mama on: mpcmpmHE omega pcomohmoh momocpcepmm :H moHSMHa« Ho.von.mm mm HH.moVo.ov mm "mwOHHom oEHu HHw u< HVNV HAN\NNV Hm.0v mev HmM\oNV Ha.wv mwchcmH\ucHHu :H among Hq.movo.om om mm\mH A.mm Ho.man.Ne mm em\om o.HH moamH Ha.NaVo.mo 4N os\m m.kN Hm.wa8m.sm mm wm.oH m.n~ moomH Ha.ooao.mm om mm\H m.NN HH.Hovm.wm mm He\o H.0N mommH m.me 4H AN\N A.w HH.emvk.mm NN we\4 m.om mosmH o.o mm m~\mm m.H oo.ooH mH mm\e m.m mommH -- -- -- o.o 0.0 m m\m m.~ monH ucmstz . new: omcmm onEmm ucmasz see: omcmm onEmm :Hm:u w :oHumeHEEH um om< w :ngu w :oHpmHmHEEH um om< w apnoea mnemems paHHa .memuoo sm «.ucmemHz cemcu Rogues: new coHpmemHz em ow<--.H oHnms 82 l. The Early Depression Cohort (1923-1931)S began with the earliest Flint permanent immigrants (although the earliest date en- cOuntered in the survey was 1927) and ended the year before the depression-era repatriations began. 2. The Pre World War II Cohort (1932-1941) began with the first year of the repatriations and ended the year before the War Emergency Farm Labor Program began. 3. The WW II and Early Postwar Cohort (1942-1950) began with the War Emergency Farm Labor PrOgram and ended the year before PL 78--the binational farm labor agreement known as the ”bracero program"--was enacted. 4a. The Early Bracero Cohort (1951-1955) began with PL 78 and ended with the final year of Operation Wetback, the prOgram of deportation which took place during 1954-1955. 4b. The Late Bracero Cohort (1956-1964) began with the year follow- ing Operation Wetback; it ended with the end of PL 78. 5. The War on Poverty Cohort (1965-1971) began with the year following the close of the bracero program; it ended with the last full year of the first Nixon term, thus including the last years of the domestic anti—poverty programs. The War on Poverty was declared by President Johnson in 1964. 6. The Post Vietnam Recession Cohort (1972-1976) began with the winding down of the Vietnam War; it ended with the year of my migration history survey. These cohorts closely parallel the chronology of Mexico-U.S. migration designed by Samora, Bustamante, Cardenas, and Samora (Samora 1971: Appendix B). Beginning with 1920, their chronology revolved 83 around the establishment of national quotas of EurOpean immigrants, the Great Depression, World War II, bracero legalizatiOn of illegal Mexican immigration, the Korean War, and the close of the bracero program. Although the migration cohorts designed in this manner are not even intervals, they are more closely correlated to the migration patterns than are decades. Referring to Tables 2 and 3, the percentages of the sample per city were somewhat different per migration cohort than they were per decade. In Flint it is clear that World War II was a strong impetus to immigration. It was during this period that the auto plants expanded production again after the Depression and began manufacture of materials for the war. One-third of the Flint sample migrated to that city during the bracero period, and although many came for farmwork most stayed for factory employment. An extremely small percentage of the Flint sample entered the city during the past few years, a time of auto production recession. In contrast, although over a third of the Lansing sample also entered the city among the two bracero cohorts, a full 26.3 percent had immigrated to that city within the past four years. During the latter period Lansing area agriculture, although rapidly becoming a capital-intensive industry, offered one of the few employment Opportunities remaining to the unskilled labor pool of the border region. 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In Flint 52.4 percent of the total sample had worked in the Flint area prior to settling in Flint or had come to the Flint area as farmworkers and another 7.7 percent of the sample were the children of such farm- workers. In Lansing 64.0 percent of the sample had been farmworkers in the Lansing area and another 16.0 percent had been children when their parents came to the Lansing area as farmworkers. In the following sections, cycles of employment in the agricultural industry therefore play a significant role in the analysis. Early Depression Cohort (1923-1931) Two point nine percent of the sample surveyed in Flint had migrated permanently (see footnote 1) to that city during the early depression period before 1923 (refer to Table 2)--those in the sample had entered the city from 1927 on. None of the Lansing sample came that early (see Table 3). The earliest permanent immigrants to Flint came prior to that, however. In 1923 a German fieldman from the Saginaw plant of Michigan Sugar Company contracted five families in San Antonio, Texas to work in fields in the northern part of Genesee County. All of these workers were natives of northern Mexico who had gone to Texas looking for work since northern Mexico was still economically unstable following activities of the Revolution. Three of the families stayed in Genesee County and were able to secure foundry work in Flint that 87 winter. The fieldman also married a Mexican girl who was one of these early immigrants and settled in the city. The associations which recruited Mexican workers into mid- Michigan agriculture evolved from informal into formal organizations and devolved again during the following decades. Mexicans were first recruited to work in sugar beets during the 19205. Sugar beets had become a profitable crop when the Tariff Act of 1890 established a cash bounty on beets to be paid directly to the growers and at the beginning of the twentieth century California and Michigan were the principal beet-producing states (Elac 1972: 57). The Michigan Sugar Company was the major processor of sugar beets in the area surrounding both Lansing and Flint, opening a refining plant in Lansing as well as one just out- side Saginaw and another in Owosso (between Lansing and Flint) during the first decade of the twentieth century (Ball 1960). During this period Michigan processing companies and growers sent to places such as Cincinnati, Chicago, and Cleveland and as far away as Lincoln, Nebraska for European immigrants to do the hand labor required. The immigration laws of 1917 (which prohibited those "likely to become public charges") through 1929--especially the act of 1924 (which set annual quotas by nationality)--specifically excluded Mexico'(Elac 1972: 32-29). From 1930 on Mexicans were the principal beet workers in Michigan, and according to the 1930 census Michigan was eighth of all U.S. states in population of Mexican birth. In the 19205 and early 19305 recruitment was informal and depended on the networks which individual sugar company fieldmen could establish. By 1939 there were thirteen "factory areas”-—multiply-county regions served by one beet refinery--in the state. Nearly three-fourths 88 of the twelve thousand beet farmers in the state lived in the counties where these beet factories were located. Only two or three per hundred farmers hired their own beet workers directly during these years. The task of obtaining the Chicano laborers needed for most farmers was the lot of the sugar company fieldmen. What the fieldmen did was to fulfill two primary functions: (1) they obtained contracts from the farmers to grow beets for their employer company and acted as crOp specialist and advisor to the growers; and (2) they obtained laborers for the farmers, assigned them beet acreages, arranged credit at local stores, and provided housing and transportation for the workers. The fieldman was responsible for the amount of money a worker could make: this depended on the number of acres he assigned. One fieldman interviewed in 1939 indicated that a family would have to be assigned seven acres per worker to meet their expenses (Thaden 1942: 12). A later estimate of labor needs indicated that each ten acres of beets required one worker for a six to eight week period from May through July to thin and hoe, and again from October to mid-November for the harvest (Davenport 1948: 3), yet acreages ranged from two to three acres per worker to as high as twenty-seven per worker (Thaden 1942: 13). Thus acreage assignments were in general insuffi- cient to provide the needs of the workers. In addition, there was little coordination of workers from farm to farm and factory area to factory area. Therefore there was little to keep them between the May- July thinning and the fall harvest. The average number of years service for the same company per fieldman in 1939 was ten (Thaden 1942: 11) and the fieldmen were skilled recruiters. Yet by fall many workers would have been forced to move on. 89 There was no work to do over the summer unless the farmer also had a few acres of snap beans or another vegetable crop. The reason that there was little coordination was that each fieldman simply recruited as many workers as he could at the beginning of the season. Fieldmen operated as individuals, not as nodes in a larger network. By the end of the time period covered in the Early Depression cohort, farmworkers were beginning to settle permanently into Flint and were obtaining employment at the local GM factories. The earliest Lansing settlers came in the following cohort. Pre World War II Cohort (1932—1941) The first permanent immigrants to settle in Lansing began migrating to the area in 1932 and 1933, but the families did not settle there until 1937. Three point seven percent of the Lansing sample came to that city in the period just prior to World War II and 5.8 percent of the Flint sample did (see Tables 2 and 3). By this time the recruit- ment patterns were beginning to diversify and included increasingly formal recruitment mechanisms. The first migrants to Lansing had originally been recruited by a sugar company fieldman in San Antonio (which was to become the center of Michigan farm labor recruiting activities) but had from then on taken it upon themselves to contact the farmer for whom they worked the first season to ascertain the time to travel to Michigan. One of the earliest families continued to work the beets and regularly came to the Lansing factory, stayed overnight in the company housing on the grounds, and was transported the following day to the field they had been assigned. Not all of the earliest Lansing settlers remained beetworkers. Another family found a farmer 90 in a county north of Lansing who grew mint and needed the labor of only one family so they became regular seasonal workers for him. Close patron-client ties were established between the farmer, the worker, and his family. Such early primary social ties that develOped in both cities led to the feeling among older residents that the 19705 migrants with ”radical” political phi1050phy were trying to undermine their lives' work with anti-Anglo rhetoric (see chapters 7 and 8). During the pre World War 11 period, growers' associations developed labor-procuring corporations which worked in conjunction with employment agencies in south central Texas. In 1938 the Michigan Sugar Company's growers formed the Beet Grower's Employment Committee to obtain and employ field workers. Growers contracted to other sugar com- panies also set up employment associations that year as in 1937 not enough Mexican workers had been available--perhaps as a reaction to the repatriation drive five years prior (see below). Local Works Project Authority and county direct relief clients had been hired as field laborers but they proved unsatisfactory to the farmers. Agreements were reached in 1938 between several employment agencies--all located in San Antonio, Texas--and the employment associations of the various Michigan sugar companies as follows. Michigan Sugar Company (of Lansing, Owosso, Carrolton, et al.) used the Frank Cortez employment agency. Great Lakes Sugar Beet Growers‘ Employment Committee (of Blissfield, southeastern Michigan) used the Simon Vasquez agency, Isabella Sugar (of Mt. Pleasant) used the S. P. Acosts employment agency, while Monitor Sugar (of Bay City) used the F. DeLaGarza agency (Thaden 1942: 19). Most of the workers so recruited were Chicanos although considerable 91 numbers of former EurOpean immigrants were still employed in the Saginaw-Bay City plants (see Table 4). Table 4.--Chicano Beet Workers in Mid-Michigan by Factory District, 1939. Percent Total Chicano* Chicano Company Factory District Workers Workers Workers Isabella Sugar Co. Mt. P1easant+ 1,366 1,032 76.0 Michigan Sugar Co. Alma 937 624 67.0 Caro 1,191 811 68.0 Carrolton (Saginaw) 1,035 527 51.0 Lansing 1,035 752 73.0 Monitor Sugar Co. Bay City 1,900 450 24.0 *Both Texas and Mexican born. +Mt. Pleasant and Alma are located due north of Lansing over an hour's drive from that city; Caro is located twenty miles east of Saginaw; and Bay City and Saginaw are slightly under an hour due north of Flint. Adapted from Thaden 1942: 14. The Texas side of the Mexican labor migration to Michigan during this period was presented in the article ”Mexicans to Michigan" (McWilliams 1941). At the time of that study, Frank Cortez (employed by Michigan Sugar) was the major labor recruiter in San Antonio.6 According to McWilliams, he had himself been a migrant laborer, as had most labor recruiters operating across state lines. Mr. Cortez would sign up workers, who had to undergo a physical examination and personal interview before signing the contract for the Michigan Beet Growers Employment Committee, the association of Michigan Sugar Company. Cortez received a $1 fee for each worker contracted (of which there were 92 an average 6,000 annually), while the workers had 25¢ each deducted from their pay for the health exam. A special kind of worker was recruited: "The companies are particular: they want rural Mexican families, not the urbanized proletariat" (McWilliams 1941: 6). Once contracted the workers remained in limbo in San AntOnio until the go— ahead signal to Cortez arrived from Michigan. Then they moved north- ward--by private car, by truck, or by train. The provision of train transportation in this period was a product of the increasing bureaucratization of labor recruitment. From this time until the termination of the bracero program in 1964 the recruitment mechanisms became increasingly more formal and the contact networks more complex. Examples of this began to appear as the employ- ment associations began their Operations. No longer would a worker get his check in the name of the farmer but rather in the name of either the company or the growers' employment association. In 1940 Michigan Sugar Company brought a trainload of Chicanos and Mexicans north to their factories at a rate of $15 per worker and in 1941 some 1,800 workers were brought by train (Thaden 1942: 25). Transportation had previously been provided by the workers themselves, paid for by advances; by truckers who charged $9-15 per worker; or even occasionally by the fieldmen. The company and association found that trains ensured the workers' arrival and prevented their premature departure. The workers brought by train came without their families, another change which was to continue as the pattern of recruitment became more formalized and workers became increasingly dependent upon a range of middlemen.7 Around 1940, earnings per beet worker ranged from $35 to around $400, with the average worker making $135 for the entire season; 93 approximately five months. This meant a monthly wage of $27, while the prevailing monthly wage for regular farm labor was $42 (Thaden 1942: 27). Fortunately for the beet workers, some beet growers at this time began to grow a few acres of truck crops, especially pickling cucumbers, which required hand labor and kept the workers busy in the summer period before beet harvest and prevented their having to lose money searching for work during the interim. This was to be of great importance for Chicano farmwork employment in future years. The earliest Chicano permanent residents of Lansing came to the city during this pre World War 11 period, while some Chicanos continued to migrate to Flint. The Flintites as in the earlier cohort secured urban employment, while Lansing Chicanos urbanites retained farm employment. World War II and Early Postwar Cohort (1942-1950) The war years provided the impetus for the greatest migration of Chicanos to Lansing and Flint, which occurred during the two periods which followed. In Lansing, agriculture remained of primary importance in this migration. At first, only sugarbeet growers for the mid-Michigan sugar companies tapped the Texas-Mexico labor source. By the 19405 the market for this labor pool had expanded to include truck farmers. 2 Growers of truck crops and sugarbeets in Midwest states temporarily worked together in larger associations-—e.g., the S.P. Acosta agency was employed by a temporary committee of representatives of various Michigan and Ohio growers as a group in 1941. By the early 19405, Nearly 12,000 Mexican workers came from Texas each year to work in Michigan sugar beets, cherries, snap beans, cucumbers, and tomatoes from May through November. Another 3,000 Texans work in the onion, celery, carrot, and mint fields (Love and Gaston 1947: 5). 94 Two new employment associations had been formed that became important during the war years: Michigan Field CrOps, Inc., organized by the processors of sugar beets, pickling cucumbers, tomatoes, sweet corn and snap beans, which was to place at least 10,000 workers annually; and Michigan Farm Labor Services, organized by the growers of bush, vine and tree fruits and muckland vegetable crOps (e.g., onions, celery), which was to employ 12,000 workers annually (Love and Gaston 1947: 10). By 1942 the national farm work force had been reduced by nearly one—third and Chicano workers were not readily available for farmwork. Some had entered the Mexican army when Mexico entered the war in 1942; the Mexican economy was temporarily improved by war export production; some Mexican immigrants were involved in the U.S. armed forces; and some had obtained urban factory work, especially in Flint (see chapter 5). In August of that year an executive agreement between the U.S. and Mexico was therefore ratified by the U.S. Congress which provided for government-regulated temporary farmworker recruitment. In the spring of the following year, the Emergency Farm Labor Supply Act became law (PL 45 of the 78th Congress). The Cooperative Extension Service of the War Food Administration, the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the Cooperative Extension Service of the state agricultural colleges were charged with the responsibility ". . . for assisting in providing an adequate supply of workers for the production and harvesting of agri— cultural commodities essential to the prosecution of the war" (U.S. Congress 1943: 70). The farm labor associations and Cooperative Extension Service did not work at cross purposes but rather cooperated to form an .p*' w- 5" Ab. 95 impressive network of labor contracting and regulating organizations linked directly to the national farm policy administration apparatus in control of international temporary labor migration. The processor- grower associations had the following functions: 1. Using and operating foreign labor camps, 2. Running placement and reception centers and moving workers from one crOp to the next, 3. Securing housing and transportation for the workers, and 4. Setting prevailing wages for the workers. The county agents of the extension service helped farmers obtain sufficient tires, gas and oil from the rationing boards to Operate their farms, inspected housing for the Mexican workers, assisted farmers with obtaining apprOpriations to build worker housing, recruited workers directly, and acted as middlemen between the workers and the farmer or association. In short, they performed much the same sort of mediator- facilitator services which the sugar company fieldmen had performed in the earlier decades. In the mid—Michigan area the extension service at Michigan State College performed these middleman services. One county agent summed up the personal ties which develOped between the agents and the workers: Because we had treated these peOple decently, each of the fieldmen had his own following of people. I have talked to crew leaders and had them ask me where I would be stationed and after I told them they informed me that they would follow me . . . because they believed that they would get a square deal wherever I was. It was the same with all the other liaison men. They had learned to know us and what we stood for (Davenport 1948: 21). In 1943 the county extension service recorded over 3,500 Texas Chicanos and 185 Mexicans working in Michigan fields while in 1944 there were over 5,700 Texans and over 3,000 Mexicans (Love and Gaston 96 1947: 19—21). Even more came in 1945: over 7,600 Texans and over 3,600 Mexicans. By 1947 only slightly over 1,600 Mexicans but over 13,000 Texas Chicanos worked in Michigan fields. At this time Michigan farmworkers were generally able to secure the minimum pay allowed by the federal government for the particular crop. For example, this level for sugar beets was $13 for thinning, $4.50 for the first hoeing, $3.00 for the second hoeing, or a total of $20.50 a spring work season per acre (Davenport 1948: 24). At an average of ten acres per worker that meant that a worker could earn $205.00 for the spring season or an average of $25.63 per week. In comparison, pecan-shellers in San Antonio, Texas in 1938 were only averaging $2.73 per week per worker (Shapiro 1973: 93). Therefore there was a possible nine-fold economic gain to be made by seasonal migration to the mid-Michigan fields. With the end of the war, the binational labor recruitment agree- ment between Mexico and the U.S. was temporarily allowed to expire and farm labor recruitment was returned to the various state employment agencies under the provisions of the Wagner-Peyser Act of 1933. In 1948 the Michigan Unemployment Compensation Commission (now Michigan Employment Security Commission) took over farm labor recruitment and management through its Farm Placement Section. This division continued to work in cooperation with Michigan Field CrOps, Inc. In 1948 the Unemployment Compensation Commission counted 12,000 Texas Chicanos and 952 Mexican contract laborers working in Michigan sugar beet, cucumber, snap bean, and tomato production although 35 percent-of the sugarbeets in the state were harvested mechanically that year (M.U.C.C. 1948). In 1949, there were no formally contracted Mexicans but some 16,000 Texans 97 (M.U.C.C. 1949). Doubtless some of these were actually Mexicans but were not formally contracted according to PL 45. In both years growers suffered a labor shortage in August when the cucumbers were ready for harvest as many international and interstate workers would leave after the slack period in June between beet thinning and blocking and the cucumber harvest beginning in July or August. In 1950 there were no contracted Mexicans in Michigan fields but again over 16,000 Texas Chicanos (M.E.S.C. 1950). Labor needs had not slackened noticeably yet the formal labor recruitment structure had again been returned to state government hands as there was no war emergency. Referring again to Tables 2 and 3, only 7.5 percent of the Lansing survey sample of Chicanos immigrated to that city during the war and early postwar period, yet 100.0 percent of these were either farm- workers when they migrated or were the children of such farmworkers. They included both Mexican and Texas born individuals. A full 20.3 per- cent of the Flint sample entered that city during this period yet only 57.1 percent of these were farmworkers or farmworkers' children at immigration, and much of the history of Flint Chicano immigration must -be explained by reference to the develOpment of the auto industry (see below). The World war II cohort included Lansing Chicanos who were recruited into the growing truck farming industry while Flint Chicanos in the cohort entered war materials production in the auto plants. Early (1951-1955) and Late (1956-1964) Bracero Cohorts The fourteen year period which marks the re-institution of the binational agreement begun as the war emergency farm labor supply program accounts for exactly one-third of the Flint survey sample of 98 Chicano migrants and slightly over that (33.7%) for the Lansing sample (refer to Tables 2 and 3). In 1951 there were 2,230 Mexican contract laborers and more Texans than in 1950 working in Michigan crops. The 1951 post season farm labor report broke down the placement of workers by crop area, indicating that for the twelve months of 1951 only 738 workers were reported to be employed in agriculture and food processing in the Flint area, while there were 6,767 reported employed during the year in the Lansing area (M.E.S.C. 1951). Clearly the immigrants were not predominantly Mexican braceros8 themselves as during the early years of the period only 18.2 percent of the Flint heads of household who migrated to that city and 30.8 percent of those in Lansing were born in Mexico. Only 16.7 percent in Flint and 21.4 percent in Lansing of those who migrated during the late bracero period were Mexican-born (see Tables 2 and 3). However, the trend noted for the years between the termination of the original Mexican contract labor program and the second--i.e., l948-1950--continued: Texas—born Chicanos far outnumbered Mexican-born contract laborers in Michigan fields. It is likely that this was because of the provisions of the agreement itself. PL 78 (1951-1964) provided that standard work contracts with certain stipulations would be signed between growers and workers before their admission. Among the provisions of the contracts were the following guarantees to the worker: I. A minimum period of employment, 2. At least three—fourths full-time work during that period, 3. No-cost housing, and 99 4. Both health insurance and workmen's compensation; the cost of the former to be deducted from his wages, the cost of the latter to be borne by the employer (U.S. Congress 1951). What is more, a farmer was required to demonstrate that local and domestic labor was unavailable for hire before braceros would be allotted to him. During this period, however, just as in previous periods, Mexican workers not formally contracted as braceros as well as Texas— born workers entered the Michigan labor force individually and in crews with truckers. McWilliams described what happened in an earlier period to those who were rejected by the associations: "These 'culls' usually go to the beet fields of other states or seek out a 'bootlegger' agent and arrange to go north with him" (McWilliams 1941: 7). It had become even easier by the bracero cohorts since growers of crOps other than sugarbeets made use of the Texas-Mexico labor pool. Also, some pro- spective migrants had a twenty-year knowledge of Michigan agriculture or exposure to others who did. By the early 19505 sugar beet production had begun to undergo mechanization. The sugar companies were finding that fewer refineries were more efficient as operations could be centralized and expanded through the use of machine energy. Liquidation was begun of the Lansing plant in 1952 and it closed by 1958 (Pioneer New 1956). The only refinery serving the two regions of interest to this study remained at Saginaw by the end of the decade (Ball 1960). Therefore, in 1952 there was less use of seasonal workers in sugar beets than in the past although sugar beet growers remained among the primary employers of seasonal farmworkers. More beet growers made use of new machinery 100 designed for planting and weeding the crOp. The largest acreages of pickling cucumbers in 1952 occurred in Manistee and Lansing, with snap beans which also required considerable field labor important in Lansing as well for the next two years (M.E.S.C. 1952, 1953). In 1954 Michigan employed 6,300 braceros and 19,000 Texans (M.E.S.C. 1954). That same year, however, in a program called "Operation Wetback" some 1,075,168 illegal Mexican immigrants were apprehended nationwide and sent to Mexico (Elac 1972: 27). Only 353 were reportedly deported through the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service center at Detroit (U.S. Department of Justice 1954: table 29), but considerable fear was in- stilled in witnesses of the alien roundups and families were disrupted by the deportations. Although there were "alien scares" throughout the country before Operation Wetback and the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service was active in Michigan as well as in other states with large numbers of Mexican residents and workers, the 19505 was not a period of forced emigrations of masses of Chicanos from the Lansing and Flint areas. Instead, the 19505 was a period of immigration. There were large numbers of braceros and other Chicanos in Michigan fields in 1954 and even more the following year and by 1956 nearly 10,000 braceros alone were employed statewide (M.E.S.C. 1955, 1956). In 1957 there was the highest demand for seasonal agricultural labor in the state's history, a record which was never broken. During the month of peak employment, there were 106,000 recorded workers employed including 14,600 braceros (M.E.S.C. 1957). These demands in agriculture came from the increased acreages in strawberries, cherries, blueberries, snap beans, and pickling cucumbers-that had been developing since-1948. 101 In the Lansing area, the increased acreage in pickling cucumbers would be the major impetus for Mexican and Chicano immigration through the 19705. From 1958 through 1964 braceros were used in Michigan predomi- nantly in pickling cucumbers and in blocking and thinning sugar beets. During those years, numbers of braceros per year ranged from around 9,000 in 1958 to 14,500 in 1960 with 13,225 employed in 1964 (M.E.S.C- 1958- 1964). Pickles and beets using contracted laborers were grown mostly in east and central Michigan, including the Lansing and Saginaw areas. Chi- canos were also used in those crops and they and a few braceros contracted directly from Mexico were also employed in snap beans and muck crOps such as lettuce, onions, mint, and celery, all of which were grown in the Lansing area. Throughout the bracero period, labor management was carried out by state employment agencies which were also responsible for placing braceros in their states to fulfill the pre-season orders they had placed with the immigration services. Chicano labor recruitment was not subject to the same formal organizational interest, however, and relied on several alternatives discussed above, which were in use before the war in the recruitment of Mexican citizens. Among these”. was a reliance on patron-client ties, where a "good" farmer and a trusted worker agreed the worker was to return with his spouse and children annually. The worker wrote or called the farmer to affirm the time he should arrive. Frequently the worker would do special chores for the farmer not really required by the job; the farmer would loan money to the worker, and sometimes would even loan his car. Also, there was dependence on other relationships of trust, such as those 102 which develOped between a crew leader or trucker and his crew. The trucker provided transportation; the crew leader provided middleman services between the work crew and the farmer.9 Trust would develOp between the crew leader and the farmer if the former had provided sufficient field "hands,” kept their problems solved, and provided transportation and supervisory services for the farmer who then re- quested that he return the following year. In such cases the neces- sarily lasting relationship was between the farmer and the crew leader. This personalistic, informal relationship was similar to that of the fieldmanand the worker which was so crucial to recruitment of the pre-World War II Chicano cohort. In both cases, the role of the field- man or crew leader was middleman between worker and employer. Another mechanism used was for the worker to directly contact the job placement agent at a farm labor association or at a processing plant. In the latter case, the placement agent would then contact farmers who had contracted with this employer processing factory or association to determine who needed the laborers most. The worker might have checked with the Texas state employment office in his home town before leaving to ascertain if there were any work orders in for particular growers or a given growers' association. Finally, a worker might just arrive in Michigan at what previous experience told him was the appr0priate time and apply at a branch or mobile unit of the M.E.S.C. Farm Placement Service. There a seasonal farm placement specialist could advise him what farmer had work in the area or might tell him there was no work to be had there and refer him to another part of the state where labor was needed. 103 The greatest percentage of the sample of Chicano household heads surveyed in Flint and Lansing were members of the bracero cohorts. That is, the milieu when they came to mid-Michigan included a formal structure for the planning and control of recruitment of Mexican nationals into agriculture. Other Chicanos, including illegal Mexican immigrants, doubtless came in even greater numbers following the same sorts of informal channels that were develOped earlier. Most of those that came to Flint during this period entered factory work shortly after arrival; more newcomers to Lansing retained farm employment. War on Poverty Cohort (1965—1971) In 1964 when the Governor's Commission on Migratory Labor was appointed they discussed the probable termination of Public Law 78, which was a subject of great concern to most Michigan growers that year (M.E.S.C. 1966: 8). They had always had difficulty with labor shortages even with bracero labor. At the same time that 13,225 unskilled Mexican contract laborers had been employed (M.E.S.C. 1965), however, a trend toward upgrading labor skills as a corollary to increased mechanization in certain agricultural specialties was developing. For example, a survey in the Muskegon area (western Michigan) concluded there were.) openings for 250 skilled year-round dairy hands--a statewide average of 1,250 was considered reasonable-~and at the same time twenty men were about to complete a 48-week course on farm machinery repair at Bay City (M.E.S.C. 1964: 7). During the last few years of the bracero program the crOps in which.hkxxican contract laborers were employed in Michigan were pickling lO . . cucumb6115: sugar beets, and truck crops--all crops important either 104 at present or historically in the Flint and Lansing regions. The final year of the bracero prOgram, pickles were the crop employing the third highest number of all seasonal workers in Michigan-—l6,309. Truck crOps that year were sixth, with 7,760; and sugar beets were seventh, with 5,760 (M.E.S.C. 1964). Following the end of Mexican contract labor importation many farmers found that local labor costs were so high that other means of production had to be substituted to continue the same profit margin: The major alternative to rising labor costs is said to be a con- tinuing substitution of capital for labor. Even the most effi- cient farms will find it necessary to improve their labor effi- ciency by 25 percent in the next 10 years (M.E.S.C. 1967: 9). As a result, the farm labor service estimated that there would be a 60 percent reduction in farm labor needs from 1960 to 1980 from 215,000 actual workers to 89,000 (M.E.S.C. 1967: 10). Most of this worker reduction was to be made possible through capital-intensive methods-- i.e., mechanization. The major problem facing Michigan farmers was how to replace the over 13,000 Mexican workers employed in the pickle and late vegetable crops. At first there was a largescale attempt to replace the braceros through other labor channels. The Farm Placement Section of the M.E.S.C. began a public relations-advertising campaign to entice local high school youth, housewives, the retired, and temporarily unemployed factory workers into summer farmwork. For example, the U.S. Department of Labor sent letters to all high schools about Athletes in Temporary Employment.as Agricultural Manpower (A-TEAM), suggesting that summer fan“ emplcnnnent was good preparation for fall sports. The M.E.S.C. also triexi'unsuccessfully to encourage temporary farm employment for 105 the large Chicano permanent pOpulation in Mt. Pleasant (M.E.S.C. 1966: 1). None of these attempts met with much success. Since 1964 Chicanos have continued to perform most seasonal farmwork in Michigan. For example, official records of the Michigan Employment Security Commission indicated that in 1965 some 80,000 interstate workers were employed throughout the state; and 52.5 percent or 42,000 were Chicanos.11 The pickling cucumber harvest in 1965 was down 32 percent from the previous year and there was an estimated 13,600 tons left on the vines unharvested at the end of the season principally because contract laborers were no longer available. Peak of season employment in pickles was down 29 percent from the previous year (M.E.S.C. 1965: 18-19). Peak employment in sugar beet cultivation was down 10.5 percent although the harvest was only 3.5 percent below the 1959-1963 average. Although production of truck crops was up 3 per- cent from 1964, the number of seasonal workers at the peak of harvest was down 5 percent (M.E.S.C. 1965: 22-23). The decline in seasonal labor use continued in 1966 with only 45,513 interstate workers of which 73.8 percent were Texans. In 1967 labor use was up again-~there was a 12 percent increase in the use of seasonal labor in the pickle harvest, an increase of 30 percent in sugar beet cultivation and harvest, and a 50 percent increase in truck crops from the previous year (M.E.S.C. 1967: 21-24). Then in 1968, labor use was down about 6.7 percent at peak, and from that year on the decline has continued. It is correlated to several factors, among these the increasing trend toward largescale farms. The U.S. Department of Agriculjnxre indicated there had been a 3.3 percent decrease in the rmmber oi?.farm5 in Michigan from 1967 to 1968, while the total land in 106 farms had only decreased 1.5 percent; and the average size per farm had also increased from 149 acres in 1967 to 152 acres in 1968 (M.E.S.C. 1968: 12). ' Another trend linked to the decline in labor use was mechanical and technological innovations in agriculture. In 1966 there were several mechanical once—over pickle harvesters in use in Michigan fields, and in 1967 Michigan State University developed a strain of pickle which could be planted closer together and bear a more even-sized fruit-- important characteristics for the increased use of mechanical harvesters. The relative productivity of mechanical harvesting versus manual har- vesting differs from crop to crop but is particularly important in the case of pickling cucumbers, the major employer of Chicanos in Michigan fields. Referring to Table 5, although mechanical harvesting of apples is only 3.8 times as productive in terms of actual quantity of fruit harvested than is hand picking, for pickling cucumbers the machine-man ratio is 50 to l--i.e., a machine can harvest fifty times the amount of a man. Table 5.--Differences in Harvest Productivity (Pounds per Manhour). CrOp Handpicked Machine Picked Machine/Man Ratio Apples 340 1,320 3.8/1 Cucumbers 100 5,000 50.0/1 Adapted from Hall 1969: 74. At the sanma‘time mechanical harvesters were used increasingly in the Cherry CITH) and as early as 1965 some 60 percent of the blueberry crop 107 was harvested by use of a hand-held vibrator and catching frame. Sugar beet thinning and harvesting had been reduced by developments in Special seeds, space planting, and herbicides. Improvements in productivity as a result of mechanization and technical developments combined with the tendency toward increasing consolidation of small farms to reduce the use of hand labor. In 1970 only 25,530 interstate workers were employed at the peak of the harvest and only 1,425 of these were in pickles. By 1971, there were only 977 workers employed at the peak of the pickle harvest although the pickle harvest was up from the previous year (M.E.S.C. 1971). In 1971 the Farm Placement Section of M.E.S.C. began to con- centrate on labor maximization and discouragement of labor migration. The placement specialists contacted employment services in southern states asking that they refer to Michigan only those migrants with solid work commitments; made sure farmers really did need workers who contacted them about work with a particular farmer; asked farmers who had hired migrants previously to write crew leaders and family heads advising them if they were not needed; and discouraged beet and pickle processors from advancing travel money to migrants working for their contracted growers (M.E.S.C. 1971: 15). However, 23.3 percent of the sample survey in Flint and 22.5 per— cent of the surveyed heads of household in Lansing migrated to those cities among the War on Poverty cohort (see Tables 2 and 3). Over 80 percent of these in Flint were Texas born yet over 50 percent in lensing were Mexican born, with less than 50 percent in Flint former flumworkers yet over 70 percent in Lansing former farmworkers. 108 Farmwork was still bringing migrants to Lansing in particular, but instead of remaining "in the migrant stream" they were settling into urban life. The reasons for that were multiple. The disparity between Michigan and Texas in economic base had not lessened and Texas Chicanos were still largely dependent on the seasonality inherent in agriculture-related industry. Other factors were important as well, however. Among these was the develOpment of social awareness that was part of-the War on Poverty and Civil Rights era. This awareness was first extended to seasonal migratory farmworkers during this period--a crucial time for them to become recognized as a special population since their way of life was rapidly being eradicated throughout the country. Church groups had long been interested in Michigan's migratory farmworkers --in 1940 the Home Missions Council of North America formed the Michigan State Migrant Committee to provide for some of the immediate physical needs of migrants and in the early 19505 the Catholic church had numer- ous Spanish-speaking priests and seminarians involved in mission pro- grams in the migrant camps.12 Yet it was not until the mid—19605 that certain important federal legislation took place that was to change the character of migratory farmwork for those still so employed in Michigan. The Migrant Health Act of 1962 provided that local health departments would offer health services to migrants, yet the first health care program especially for migrants in Michigan was arranged by a local health department in the southwestern part of the state in 1966. In 1965 the Lmiform Housing Standards Act provided for health department licensing of labor camps where five or more migratory laborers lived; the Michigan ‘k 109 licensing program began in 1966. In 1967 the Fair Labor Standards Act was extended to some agricultural laborers, making them subject to minimum wages and compensation. In 1967 the state-wide migrant services agency (MMA) was established to carry on the dual functions of providing for emergency needs of seasonal workers and retraining and placing them in non-agricultural industries. This manpower policy had the important consequence of increasing the Lansing Chicano population, as will be noted below. Post Vietnam Recession Cohort (1972-1976) The same trends noted for the War on Poverty cohort continued into the mid-19705. Manpower needs were getting smaller and smaller nationally in agriculture and Michigan remained consistent with the trend. For example, in several crOps important in mid-Michigan agri- culture the manhours required per acre production ranged from 36 to 70 for harvest and 50 to 126 for total cr0p production yet in 1975 the manhours for harvest ranged from 5 to 64 and total crop production required only 15 to 112 manhours (see Table 6). In the case of pickles, during the period 1964-68 it took an average of 70 manhours per acre including cultivation to get the pickles to market. By 1975 it took only 37 manhours per acre for harvest and 73 manhours per acre including cultivation to market the same amount of pickles. Labor recruitment was no longer a goal of farmworker organi- zations-—MMA was concerned with social services and retraining, MESC was concerned with maximization, and informal methods of labor recruit- ment prevailed in contrast to the highly structured methods of the bracero period. Smaller farmers still needed hand labor to compete 110 Table 6.--Manhours Per Acre in Selected CrOps. % Change in Manhours/Acre, 19605—1975 Manhours Per Acre Crop Harvest Total " 1964-68 1975 1964-68 1975 Harvest Total Apples 68 64 126 112 —6 -ll Cucumbers 7O 37 110 73 -47 -34 Onions 7O 41 120 86 -41 -28 Snap beans 36 5 50 15 -86 -7O Adapted from Davis 1969: Tables 7, 10. with capital-intensive agribusiness or to convert to largescale enter- prises. Contacts made with workers during the earlier period became important links in recruitment networks. The state employment agency was still officially in charge of farm labor recruitment andtmanagement, but a telephone call just prior to the harvest season from a worker to a grower for whom he had worked before became the surest method of securing farm labor and the best means of ensuring work for oneself and one's kin and friends. In this new stage informal mechanisms using kinship and friendship networks of the laborers themselves and the reliance on patron-client ties with farmers largely replaced the com- plex structures developed earlier. A small percentage (5.8) of the Flint survey sample entered the city among this cohort but the largest single percentage (26.3) of the Lansing sample did so (see Tables 2 and 3). This was a period of post- war recession and although opportunities were not great in Michigan they were somewhat better than available in Texas. Farmwork continued 111 to offer a bridge to Michigan from Texas and Mexico: a full 57.1 per- cent of permanent Lansing migrants came as farmworkers (see Table 3). The migration histories of two Chicano Lansingites among this cohort are exemplary of the pattern. One of these, Maria Estela Barrientoz, was a twenty—two-year- old mother of two. Maria had been born on "el otro lado" of Laredo (i.e., Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas) because her mother discovered at the time for her delivery that her husband had apparently abscounded with the doctor's fee she had been hiding in a jar in the kitchen. She went to Mexico to have a partera (midwife) deliver the infant, a much less expensive alternative. Maria was a pachuca (urban ”tough") when at home in Laredo and a migrant worker in the Midwest in the summertime. She quit school before finishing the seventh grade and married the first boy, Eduardo Barrientoz, who asked for her hand. They migrated to southeastern Michigan to work in the tomato and cucumber fields in the Blissfield area and secured cannery work there permanently following the floods in Texas in 1973. Maria became involved with the local migrant council, eventually becoming a member of the board of directors of Michigan Migrant Agency. This caused problems between Eduardo and Maria, and he returned to beating her daily, a practice he had dis-'V continued in Michigan. When Maria found that he and her closest girl- friend were having an affair, she packed the children and some clothes into the car of the padrino (godfather) of her eldest child and asked to go to Lansing. She had visited the city on migrant council business and therefore knew it had a large number of Chicanos. Maria and her children moved into the home of a friend from the migrant agency and she worked nights and went to a part—time school to get her high school 112 diploma. She had been in the city three weeks when we met. Maria's involvement with one of the federally-funded "migrant programs" which first began to develop during the War on Poverty was responsible for her ultimate settlement in Lansing. Her migration to Michigan had been in response to economic need, but her residence in Lansing was a result not only of continued need but also of her involvement with the migrant agency and informal primary-group relationships she had established through that involvement. Candelario Gutierrez, 42, was also born in Mexico but had lived on the border, maintaining at least a post office box on the Texas side, for years. He had had a little cantina in Nuevo Leon for awhile, but had been forced to become a migratory farmworker to support his wife and daughter when he was in his early thirties.13 At first he worked only in Texas, doing farmwork and hauling produce and people in his ancient pickup truck. Then a respected acquaintance in Weslaco, Don Pedro--a carpenter in the winter and crew leader in the summer--suggested that he consider coming along to Michigan to the pickle farm for the summer as the wages were pretty good. So in 1972 Candelario and his family drove to the Gilbert farm in Baton County to work with Don Pedro for the summer. The patron, Mr. Gilbert, was quite paternalistic and kept an eye on everything his "hands" did. Candelario's downfall was that he liked a beer now and then yet Mr. Gilbert allowed no drinking in his camp. Candelario went to the camp for a second season, but got in trouble with the patron over the beer. He successfully located another employer in the same county. This farmer, Mr. Oscar, owned several ranches and employed one or two Mexican families to take total care of each. Candelario moved into the smaller of two seasonal 113 houses on the farm, the larger being occupied by a trucker and his family who worked as an agent for Mr. Oscar to the pickle processing company in another town. When I met Candelario, he and his family had worked for Mr. Oscar two seasons. In 1975 Candelario's daughter, then 19, got a scholarship to attend the local community college through the assistance of the local migrant welfare worker. The winter of 1975—1976 he and his wife stayed in Lansing in the barrio, renting a room from friends they had met earlier while working at Gilbert camp who had since settled into the barrio. Candelario worked during the winter as a janitor on a special grant to a Chicano agency. Candelario was a "green carder" or "communter." He had a form I-lSl which allowed him to work in the U.S. while preparing for naturalization as a citizen. He had begun his international migrations as a "visitor" on a border-crossing card, form I-l86, however, and was not at all clear about what was required of him to maintain legal status in the U.S. He therefore travelled at least twice a year to the border and carried out business dealings that would be sure to establish his legal presence on the U.S. side of the border region although that was not required.14 When the spring of 1976 came, Candelario returned to Mr. Oscar's farm. In 1977 Candelario had moved into the larger migrant house at Mr. Oscar's, had bought himself a newer truck, and had brought another family up from Texas-~distant relatives of his wife--who then occupied the smaller house in which they used to live. Both Candelario and Maria represent one type of post-Vietnam War migrant to Lansing: the poor, unskilled, and undereducated type which was to join the "client" stratum in the Lansing Chicano population. 114 In Flint, a slightly different pattern was apparent. The farm- worker immigrant can be exemplified by Roberto and Maria Martinez, who had lived in that city since 1974. Roberto, 34, was born in San Antonio, graduated from high school there and served in the army in Vietnam. He was wounded in this service, returned to San Antonio and attended one year of college there on the GI bill. Then he and Maria were married. He moved with her to her hometown, a little town outside San Antonio, but found it difficult to support them as he could only get farmwork there and it was painful for him as he had schrapnel in his legs. They then moved to Flint, as her older sister lived there and invited them for a visit. Roberto got a job at a local GM plant through the aid of a veteran's officer, who also got him admitted to the nearest VA hospital for consultation and treatment. Maria spends the summers in Minnesota with another sister, and they work for a couple of months in the sugarbeet fields before she returns to Flint in the fall. She uses her summer earnings to buy clothing for the children and to buy "extras" for the house. Flint has not had a stream of professional-level Chicano migrants settling in during the 19705 as has Lansing. As will be dis- cussed in chapter 6, the demographic variables that make Flint Chicanos appear invisible also make them appear to be more problem-free than their Lansing counterparts. What is more, Flint Chicanos fit the mean of the local occupational and income structures better than do Lansing Chicanos (see chapter 5). So in relative terms fewer of them do suffer from economic problems generally served by social service agencies which employ the type of professionals that have come to Lansing. 115 The following sections present a historical overview of the growth of the Chicano populations of Flint and Lansing. Chicano Population Growth in Flint and Lansing Lansing Lansing officially became capital of the State of Michigan in 1847 but was not incorporated as a city until 1859. The local economic base combined agriculture and government from the inception of the city. These two economic sectors continued their importance in the local economy even with the twentieth century development of the auto industry (see chapter 3). By the bracero period of the 19505 a full century after urban incorporation, the area surrounding Lansing had become an important truck crop region with among the highest yields of pickling cucumbers in the country. Some Lansingites indicate that the first permanent Chicano settlers came to Lansing in the decade between 1910 and 1920 (e.g., Quinto Sol 1976). Chicanos who have lived in Lansing since the 19305 indicate that although a few families had come earlier to work on the farms near the city and some had come as workers on the railroads, the earliest permanent families came in the 19305. The census of 1910 did not include the category ”Mexican" or list Mexico as a possible place of birth in any tables for Flint or Lansing. In 1920 Mexico was listed as a possible choice for country of birth for foreign-born whites (refer to Table 7) but there were no Mexican-born persons recorded in Lansing city that year. In the Lansing tri—county area there were no Mexican-born persons in Clinton or Eaton Counties but two in Ingham County (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1923). These were probably migrants 116 Table 7.--Mexican-Born Population in Lansing and the Tri-County, 1920—1970. Total Mexican-born Mexican-born P0pulation, Population, Population, Year Lansing Lansing Tri-County 1920 57,327 0 2 1930 78,397 5 52 1940 78,753 7 72 1950 ' 92,129 68 100 1960 107,807 1,138 1,352* 1970 6, 131,629 1,426 2,079* *SMSA figure. Based on figures from the U.S. census, 1923-1971b. working in the onion fields in the southeastern part of the county as these fields have been important foci for Chicano labor most of this century. By 1930, the U.S. census showed five Mexican-born residents in Lansing city, twelve in Ingham County, another sixteen in Clinton, and twenty-four in Baton Counties. One of the "first five" heads of household in Lansing was born in Chihuahua, Mexico and came to the "winter garden area" of south- western Texas at age fourteen. This was during the beginning of the depression when work was scarse so his family began going north to Michigan to the sugar beet fields for a few summer months. They were contracted to enter the mid-Michigan area in 1933 and 1934 and he returned in 1937, got married, and stayed. He recalled that the Spring of 1936 in Crystal City, Texas there was an outbreak of tuberculosis, and only those Mexicans who were nationalized U.S. citizens were treated at hospitals. Other Mexicans who contracted the disease were 117 isolated in huts on their own property at their own expense. The threat of the loss of income if one became ill combined with the apparent uncaring attitude of the health authorities alarmed him. The next season he and several relatives and friends formed a small auto- mobile caravan and headed north to Michigan since they had previous satisfactory work experiences there. They settled in north Lansing near the beet refinery which employed them their first few seasons in Michigan. Other Chicano settlers in Lansing also lived near the sugar refinery. Later immigrants often moved into the same general area for social as well as economic reasons, so the north side where the sugar refinery was located became the center of Chicano population concentra- tion.15 During the depression years the sugar refinery in Lansing, which had opened during the first decade of the twentieth century, was closed (Pioneer News 1956). It was not in full operation again until near the end of the decade. With the Depression, a trend which had existed in Lansing in prior years became more evident. That was a tendency to view Chicano migrants as undesirable. In 1926 an elderly Chicano currently resident of Flint went to Lansing to visit, and offered the following description of the care other Chicanos seem to have taken to blend into the local scene: I was hungry when I arrived and I walked up and down the streets looking for a place that would sell me a cup of coffee and a doughnut (all he could say in English) and suddenly I heard some— one calling to me in Spanish . . . he took me inside and pulled the blinds before talking to me, he was so careful that nobody would hear him. He said his name was Roberto Tercero, but that he was married to an Anglo woman named Smith so he had changed his name to Robert Smith. During the period that production was down, there was no need for further immigration of workers into the area, and other crops and 118 industries could not employ the extra workers as they had similar difficulties. Some beet workers sought relief from the welfare depart- ment, and as a result there was considerable public opinion in favor of programs to return them "home." The Michigan State Welfare Department developed a program for their return, defining repatriation as appli- cable to ". . . the alien who by reason of his age or physical con- dition, is unable to become rehabilitated in the economic situation of today . . ." and further declared The prospective Repatriate is a person on relief in Michigan, still having citizenship in a foreign country. Chances for further immediate employment being very small, winter nearing, the alien relief client looks upon the immediate future with fear; perhaps in the native land, friends, relatives, or even property would insure a safer and easier road. Yet due to the lack of necessary funds the alien remains estranged from his world, with security just out of his reach (Michigan State Welfare Department n.d.). It is clear in the reference to ”winter nearing" and "chances for future immediate employment being very small" that repatriation was designed for unemployed seasonal workers, primarily farm workers, although rail- road workers in Flint were also repatriated as will be noted below. Since over half of the beet workers in Michigan by 1939 were of Mexican descent (not all of whom were native Texans although they may have come to Michigan from Texas) and probably a similar proportion of workers in other agricultural products requiring seasonal workers were also Mexican it is not surprising to find that Form R-103 of the Repatriation Service was designed specifically for the processing of Mexican repatriates during the depression. By 1940 there were seven persons of Mexican birth in Lansing (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1943), only two more than had been counted in the 1930 census, and only two out of eighty household heads I surveyed had moved to the city during the 119 19305. This was a reflection of the general lack of economic oppor- tunity as well as a fear of "repatriation” directed against Mexican nationals. Shortly before and during the war, however, another develOpment was taking place in Michigan agriculture which would have a long—range effect on Mexican immigration into the Lansing area. Regional speciali- zation and intensive farming develOped and expanded as cheap transporta— tion and refrigeration facilities became widely available. In 1950 Lansing had 68 Mexican-born residents (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1952) and my sample included seven household heads out of eighty who had moved to Lansing during the 19405. There were two Mexican restaurants established during the 19405 in Lansing as well, and one is still operating in the same location after thirty years. Despite centrali— zation and mechanization of sugar beet production, some workers were still needed for that crop as well as the other vegetable crops which were becoming increasingly important in the Lansing region. My sample included nineteen heads of household who moved to Lansing during the 19505. In 1951 Public Law 78, the bracero program, was enacted. As described above, most migrants to the area were not braceros but the labor needs of local agriculture were met by both the contracted workers and by other Chicanos. Twenty—one of the eighty heads of household in my sample settled in Lansing during the 19605, with the greatest number coming in 1966 shortly after the termination of Public Law 78. As a result of the recruitment of Chicanos into the fruit and vegetable industries, there were 1,138 persons of Mexican origin recorded in Lansing city in 1960, compared to only 68 the previous decade, with a total of 1,352 120 within the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1962b). Following the end of the contract labor era, Michigan farming began to mechanize and consolidate and the use of seasonal migratory laborers began a rapid decline (see above for details). In reSponse, the Michigan Farm Labor and Rural Manpower Service of the Michigan Employment Security Commission c00perated with nine other states in the Texas Migrant Experimental and Demonstration Project beginning with the 1969 crOp season (M.E.S.C. 1969). The prOgram was designed to assist migrant families in moving into other kinds of permanent employment, but the second year of the project found just a dozen families who wanted to "settle out of the migrant stream” in Michigan. Most had multiple reasons for not wanting to stay in Michigan, including perception by the migrants of a hostile attitude on the part of Michigan residents who considered the resettled migrants a burden on local social service rolls (M.E.S.C. 1970: 7). There is evidence that this perception may have been accurate. In 1974 approximately one thousand migratory farmworkers and their dependents received emergency services from the Lansing tri- county office of the migrant services agency due to low employment in agriculture in the area. In the 1970 census, the Mexican—born popula- tion of Lansing was 1,426 or just under 300 persons greater than in 1960 but the Spanish language pOpulation, largely Chicano, was 5,070. Twenty-eight heads of household in my survey had moved to Lansing during the 19705. In 1975 a consultant from Michigan State University to the director of the Michigan State Department of Social Services at Lansing suggested that welfare recipients in the state be paid a bonus of $5,000 to leave the state. It was suspected that many came to Michigan from other states just to receive welfare due to Michigan's relatively high welfare payments (Lansing State Journal 1975). F_1_2_n_t_ In contrast, Chicano migration to Flint is more a reflection of the development of the auto industry than of agriculture. The develop- ment of Flint as an important industrial center began with the esta- blishment of lumber mills during the logging boom years between 1870 and 1880. The presencé of lumber and sawmills and the function of the city as a transportation hub also encouraged development of wagon and carriage manufacture. During the next decade Flint became known as the "vehicle city" for its carriage manufacture. When the first car was built in the city in 1900 the stage was set for the automobile age. From 1900 to 1930 the pOpulation of the city increased well over 1000 percent due to the tremendous'growth of the auto industry (see chapter 3). Many of the workers recruited into this new industry were foreign-born. According to the U.S. census, there were no Mexican-born residents in Flint in 1910, but by 1920 there were 82, with 8 more in the tri-county area (Genesee, Lapeer, and Shiawassee Counties) and by 1930 there were 635 with 110 more in outlying areas (see Table 8). One of the heads of household in my survey, which included sixty-nine households in Flint, had come to the city during the 19205 and four had moved to the city during the 19305. The first Mexican families to come to Flint who still live there came in 1923. These were families contracted in San Antonio, Texas by an agent of the beet factory in Saginaw to hoe and thin sugar beets in the northern part of Genesee County. The heads of these 122 Table 8.--Mexican—Born Population in Flint and the Tri-County, 1920-1970. Total Mexican-Born Mexican-Born Population, Population, Population, Year Flint Flint Tri-County 1920 91,599 82 90 1930 156,492 635 759 1940 151,543 103 145 1950 163,143 128 152* 1960 196,940 687 1,055* 1970 _ 193,317 957 1,656* *SMSA figure. Based on figures from the U.S. Census, 1923-1971a. households are retired from the major auto factory following over thirty years' employment there. A single Chicano came to Flint in 1924 to do farmwork but soon got a job laying stones for intracity tracks with the railroad. Most Chicano residents of Flint were not farmworkers as early as 1939: in Genesee and Oakland Counties they worked in Flint and Pontiac foundries (Thaden 1942: 16). The depression years and the repatriations of the 19305 had more impact on the Flint Chicano population than they did in Lansing. This was partly because the population was already more sizable and partly because it was less mobile, due to greater reliance on industrial employment. Total Michigan auto and truck production in 1929 was 5,337,087 but by 1932 was down to 1,331,860 vehicles (Dunbar 1970: 567), representing a tremendous decrease in industrial employment potential for cities like Flint which were dependent on auto production. One young Lansing Chicano recalls hearing about the time his father, a ’ 123 railroad employee, was deported from Flint. He had only a temporary work permit which had long since expired, but had followed the track work north. He was put on a train headed south and taken to a town in ‘ southern Coahuila to find his own way home, which happened to be a border town on the Rio Grande just across from Texas. Many others, who had come during the boom years, found themselves either unwelcome or unable to find work and by 1940 the Mexican-born population of Flint was down to 103 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1943), a loss of 532 persons. Then production was shifted over to war materials as the second world war began. From 1939 to 1945, according to Dunbar (1970: 574), Michigan manufactured 39 percent of the aircraft and aircraft parts, 30 percent of the military vehicles and their parts, and 13 percent of the tanks produced in the country. The largest plant devoted to war material production in Flint was the Tank Arsenal, which had labor needs that could not be met by Flint residents. Many Flintites were in the armed forces so women, rural residents, and the first waves of southerners came to work in the factory. From 1940 to 1950 the census shows an increase of only 40 more persons of Mexican origin in Flint. Thirteen of the heads of household in my survey came to Flint during the 19405--a1most twice as many as the comparable Lansing figure for the same period out of a smaller total sample. This was likely due to the opportunities for employment in war industries. When the war was over, the auto plants again began producing civilian vehicles. Before the demand which resulted from the war backlog could be met, the United States entered into the Korean War, and from 1950 to 1955 production continued at all-time high levels. Between 1940 and 1955 Michigan had one of the highest rates of 124 population growth in the country, most of which came from immigration rather than natural increase. Flint was no exception. By 1960, the Flint population of Mexican-born persons had increased to 687 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1962a) and 20 out of 69 heads of household, the largest number in any decade counted in my sample, came to Flint during that period. Of these, the largest number moved to Flint in 1955. Once again there was a decline in the auto industry following the decline in war production as there had been after the world war. Defense contracts began to go to other states, foreign competition began,and in 1958 the worst economic recession since the 19305 occurred. Chicanos continued, like other southerners, to immigrate to Flint in hope of securing permanent stable employment, but the huge demands for labor would never again be the same, due not only to factors noted above but also to developments in the mechanization of auto production. During the 19605 another nineteen of the Chicano heads of household survyed immigrated to Flint, but these moved in evenly scattered throughout the years of the decade. During this period, some migrant camps were still in use in the county and some of the newcomers, as in previous decades, undoubtedly came for agricultural employment but remained due to industrial employment. By 1970 the Flint population of persons born in Mexico was 957 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1971a), an increase of 270 over 1960. Nineteen seventy was the first year the census bureau used a category for Spanish language population and that year there were 3,322 persons whose mother tongue was Spanish (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1971a), most of whom were Chicano. Part of the increase noted in foreign-born Mexican population may be due to an improvement in sampling. Recent 125 studies of the 1970 enumeration indicate a sampling error for Spanish- speaking people which may be as high as 30 percent for some cities due to problems such as language and mail-return surveys (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 1974). These sampling problems can be assumed to have been even greater in past years when no attempts were made to offset them, particularly since in Flint Chicanos have been an ”invisible" minority group. During the 19705, cycles of production in the auto industry continued to effect the Flint Chicano population as they had in the past. Due to the post-Vietnam recession, the energy crisis of 1973, »and the resultant changes in demand, unemployment in the auto industry has been higher than in the past decade. In 1975, for example, overall unemployment in Flint was 15.1 percent due to the fact that over one- third of all jobs in the city were in auto, truck, and auto-part factories (Verway 1976: 2). Only eight of sixty-five Chicano household heads in my sample had moved to Flint during the 19705, and these were relatives of long-time residents. Throughout the period of Chicano immigration to Flint there was no large settlement concentration. Early Chicano settlers indicate there were sections which served as entry points for newcomers, where slightly higher numbers of Chicanos resided but there was never a "Chicano neighborhood” such as existed in north Lansing. Flint Chicanos had come to the city during periods when large numbers of other immi- grants also came, and settled throughout the city as their numbers grew. As will be delineated in chapters 5 and 6 Chicanos who migrated to Flint were able to settle dispersed throughout the city because they were similar to many other labor migrants to that city. 126 Summary Chicanos have been settling in Flint since the 19205 and in Lansing since the 19305. The amount of migration to each city has fluctuated over time, however. It was argued in this chapter that the patterns of Chicano migration to Flint and Lansing were reSponses to a combination of economic disparity between Michigan and the border -region and actual recruitment of labor migrants by Michigan enterprises. The changes in migration streams over time were correlated to important national and international economic cycles as described above. More than half of all the Chicano permanent migrants to Flint and Lansing came as farmworkers or the children of farmworkers. Some of these were actually recruited into mid-Michigan agriculture while others entered Michigan in a less formal manner. Regardless of whether or not a particular Chicano came as a formally-recruited labor migrant, the majority of Michigan Chicanos were farmworkers. Both official and unofficial policies toward farmworkers therefore formed an important social element in the time period during which individual Chicanos were migrating. This social milieu was discussed in terms of migration cohorts. The earliest cohorts were marked by one-to-one personalistic labor recruitment into Michigan agriculture. Then came World War II and greater numbers of Chicanos sought economic advancement in Michigan industries that were keyed up for war production. During the 19505 and 19605 Chicano migration occurred in the context of formal, planned, controlled migration of Mexican nationals as field hand laborers. When the bracero program was terminated in 1964, development of social ser- vice programs and a national awareness of minority civil rights was 127 changing the context of Chicano migration. By the 1970s federal social service programs were a crucial feature in Chicano migration. These general patterns of migration context had somewhat different impact in Flint and Lansing due to the divergent political economies of these cities which were examined in chapter 3. In Lansing the impact of agriculture and its fluctuating labor needs continued in importance into the 19705. Chicanos were still employed in farmwork in the Lansing area in the 19705 when government programs were also having significant impact on Chicano migration and settlement. In Flint the vagaries of the auto industry had far greater influence on Chicano migration, which tended to coincide with auto industry boom and bust cycles as well as with overall develOpments in mid-Michigan agriculture. As a result of these local differences in migration in response to the divergent politicoeconomic bases of the two cities, Chicanos in Flint and Lansing have somewhat different internal class and status differ- entiations. These will be discussed in the ensuing chapter. 128 Footnotes 11 use the terms migrant and immigrant to refer to Chicanos who were resident in Flint and Lansing but were born elsewhere. The vast majority of Chicanos surveyed in both cities were born in Texas or northern Mexico (see text). It is not very useful to distinguish between "temporary" and "permanent" migrants to the research sites, as a number of the "permanent" Michigan residents I knew in 1975-1976 had returned to Texas in 1978. However, in both cities there were Chicano residents who had been in that city for at least twenty consecutive years. 2Official statistics distinguish between Mexican and Texas Chicanos and official policies differed for these segments of the Chicano pOpulation (see text). I therefore indicate which segment of the Chicano population is under discussion where pertinent. 3This chapter is based on a number of sources: oral histories of informants in both cities, interviews with persons at various government and non—profit organizations involved with migratory farmworkers, reports by pertinent individuals and agencies, and the migration history questionnaire I administered in both cities. 4A considerable literature exists on urbanite adaptations. See e.g., Mangin 1970 for a compilation of articles on regional associations, squatter settlements, formal organizations and rural-urban differences. Also MacDonald and MacDonald (1964) suggest that chain migration has a stronger influence on ethnic neighborhood formation than does discrimina- tion, and Stack (1974) demonstrates the reciprocity of kin networks in the city. 5This cohort is named for the latter part of the nine year interval it encompasses-~it was actually a "boom and bust" period. 6According to McWilliams (1941: 6) much of the use of Mexican labor in Michigan beet fields could be traced to the formation of a local Agricultural Workers Union among European immigrants at Blissfield which struck for higher wages in 1935. 7One Lansingite who settled there permanently in 1937 recalled going with a local church group to meet the trains during the early 19405 taking clothes, blankets, and coffee to the workers. Thus the pattern of settled Chicanos becoming an assistance pool for newcomers was established early. 8A bracero is a hand laborer, specificially a farm laborer, but has come to mean Mexican-born laborers recruited under the auspices of the bracero program. It is in the latter sense that I will use the term here. 129 9See Friedland and Nelkin 1971 for a more complete discussion of the trucker and crew leader positions. 10The "pickle belt" is a 60-mile stretch running diagonally across the state from Holland to Bad Axe and includes both Lansing and Flint. 11There have been three major migrant streams in the U.S. during the 19605 and 19705. This study is of a branch of the largest of these --the Central States stream. For an account of the migrant labor stream largely consistent of blacks which moves north and east from Florida annually see Friedland and Nelkin 1971. The third stream moves northward out of California (see Shenkin 1974: ch 3). 12Such migrant mission programs formed the basis for the Chicano Catholic parishes which exist to this day in both Flint and Lansing. 13Farmwork tends to be one of several options available to the Chicano labor migrant. For more detailed studies of the kinds of strategies employed by such migrants, see Bustamante 1971 and Galarza 1971. 14The border crossing card was originally meant for people to use within a 150 mile limit of the border for purposes of shepping and visiting and was restricted to four years. The regulations on visitors were changed in the early 19705 to an indefinite time limit but the geographic region was restricted to a 25 mile range from the border. The commuter card has no such restrictions. Samora suggests that the green card has been substituted for the bracero contract as an alien work permit (Samora 1971: 22). See Samora 1971 for more details on these regulations. 15This was in census tract 2. This tract currently has the second-highest Chicano population concentration but still serves as a major center for newcomer settlement. See chapter 6. CHAPTER 5 CLASS AND MIGRANT SELECTIVITY Introduction Most Chicanos in Flint and Lansing came to those cities seeking economic advancement in the form of improved employment conditions or wages. It has already been demonstrated in this study that they migrated in response to the shifting labor needs of different local industries. Chicanos in Flint and Lansing have a range of income, education, and occupation levels but each of these factors tends to display the same pattern in the same city. In addition, the regions of origin of Flint and Lansing Chicanos are somewhat different and these differences are related to the socioeconomic features discussed. Chicanos in Flint and Lansing are clearly not an undifferentiated ethnic group nor are they all a single class in both cities. Instead, distinctive patterns of stratification have emerged within each Chi- cano pOpulation. The two distinctive patterns within the Chicano populations of the two cities appear to be a result of the operation of migrant recruitment to satisfy local industrial labor needs1 and the operation of local structures into which these migrants had to fit. As noted in chapter 1, studies of Chicano formal organization have tended to indicate that the causal variable in ineffective Chicano organization is either their cultural background or their working-class 130 131 position. It is not my intention in this chapter to delineate internal stratification of the Chicano population in order to explain ineffectual formal organization thereby, but rather to demonstrate that this strati- fication is an intervening variable. I suggest that the Chicano class patterns discussed herein are a result of the larger processes of structural inequality that put into motion the differential Chicano migration to the two cities. Succeeding chapters discuss the ways in which the position of Chicanos in general vis—a-vis the local "power elites" and internal differentiation of the Chicano population act to influence Chicano organization behavior and success. Place of Origin of Migrants General Comparison There were at least 7,000 Chicanos in Flint and 8,000 in Lansing in 1970.2 The survey conducted in 1976 sampled approximately 3 percent of these populations (see Appendix A).3 Between those populations one of the most striking differences encountered in the survey was the place of origin (defined as the place of birth) of the household heads. A far greater number of Lansing household heads were Mexican-born than was the case in Flint. Referring again to Table 1 chapter 4, it can- be seen that 71.5 percent of Chicano migrants to Flint at all periods in the 1976 sample survey were Texas-born while 19.0 percent were Mexican-born with 9.5 percent born in other places. The earliest cohorts showed the highest percentages of Mexican-born migrants. In Lansing, Table 2 chapter 4 demonstrates that only 53.3 percent of Chicano migrants to that city at all periods were Texas-born and exactly one-third were Mexican-born. A full 13.4 percent were born in 132 other places, and most of them migrated to that city among the most recent cohort. What is more, these recent migrants were mostly pro- fessionals who came to serve the poorer Chicanos. The ratio of Mexicao- born to Texas—born was fairly constant in Lansing except during the War on Poverty period, at which time more migrants were Mexican-born. This period was marked by the first development of federal programs to aid seasonal farmworkers and was the first period following the termination of the bracero program. The Mexican-born migrants to Lansing during this period were mostly seasonal farmworkers who were offered social service assistance for the first time. In addition,many were doubt- less then illegal immigrants as most surveyed indicated that they had prior employment experience in the area but had had to return to Mexico.4 One of the most valuable services offered by Lansing Chicano social service agencies was and still is assistance in processing immigration papers. The regions of Texas and Mexico from which the migrants came were also different for the two cities and this difference was important for their integration into Flint and Lansing. Referring to Table l, the places of birth of Flint household heads were predominantly in Southeast central Texas. The San Antonio region accounted for 20.7 percent of all migrants, while the Corpus Christi and gulf coast region accounted for 11.5 percent with a total for the general region of 39.4 percent. The highest percentage of migrants from a single location came from San Antonio, with 10.2 percent, while Pleasanton (just south of San Antonio) accounted for 6.0 percent. The clustering of migrants to the same city from the same town of origin occurred through chain migration, but the selection of regions occurred not only due to chain 133 Table l.--Places Where Household Heads Born, Flint (Percentage of Sample, Rounded to Nearest Tenth). Michigan: 11.4 Flint 7.2 Chesaning 1.4 Pigeon 1.4 Detroit 1.4 Other States Besides Texas: 5.6 California 1.4 Colorado 1.4 Minnesota 1.4 Ohio 1.4 Mexico and Texas, Outside Major Regions: 8.8 Amarillo, TX 1.4 Mexico City, DF 6.0 Zacatecas, 2A 1.4 Southeast Central Texas:* 39.4 The Valley, South Texas, North Mexico: 33.8 Center 1.4 The Valley: 17.7 Austin 3.0 Valley (TX) 3.0 Valley (MX) 3.0 San Antonio region: 20.7 Brownsville 1.4 San Antonio 10.5 Mercedes 3.0 New Braunfels 1.4 Weslaco 4.5 Seguin 1.4 Mission 1.4 Pleasanton 6.0 La Villa 1.4 Floresville 1.4 ' Laredo 6.0 Cuero 1.4 Nuevo Laredo, TM 4.5 Ganado 1.4 Monterrey, NL 1.4 Corpus Christi region: 11.5 Sabinas Hidalgo, Corpus Christi 1.4 NL 1.4 Sinton 1.4 Goliad 1.4 Uvalde 1.4 Robstown 1.4 Crystal City 1.4 Alice 4.5 Benavides 1.4 *Unless otherwise indicated, all towns listed without a state abbreviation following are located in Texas. 134 migration but due to migrant selectivity by industry and time period as well. For example, the earliest immigrants to Flint were beet- workers, and a 1941 survey of the place of origin of beetworkers revealed the following information (see Table 2). Over 57 percent of all mid-Michigan beetworkers selected at that time were from San Antonio and altogether 64.24 percent of them came from the fairly urbanized south central Texas region around San Antonio. Table 2.--Place of Origin of Mid-Michigan Beetworkers, 1941. Town of Origin Number Percent San Antonio -- 57.50 (plus other Bexar County) 4,386 58.00 New Braunfels 140 1.84 Poteet 160 2.11 (Corpus Christi area) -- -— Robstown 174 2.29 (Winter Garden area) (1,221) (16.07) Laredo 200 2.63 Eagle Pass 220 2.90 Cotulla 308 4.05 Crystal City 493 64.9 (Others) (1,510) (19.69) Total 7,597 100.00 Based on Thaden 1942: 23. The earliest Flint immigrants who came as beetworkers were from just these areas, and they were followed by other kin and friends, accounting for the large numbers of Flintites from the San Antonio area. The second-highest percentage of Flint migrants in the sample were from a fairly large region including and surrounding the Rio Grande Valley: "The Valley," i.e., the lower Rio Grande valley from just east 135 of Laredo to Brownsville; a parallel strip on the other side of the Rio Grande—-Ve1 otro lado del Valle"; northern Mexico as far south as Monterrey, Nuevo Leon; and South Texas outside the valley. This latter region more specifically is the Southwest central Rio Grande valley and the Winter Garden area of Texas-~a strip which runs northwest from Laredo to at least Del Rio. These regions of origin are presented in Figure 1. Referring to Table 3, a different pattern of place of origin of Lansing heads of household sampled in the survey emerges. Southeast central Texas accounted for only 12.7 percent of Lansing migrants, while ”The Valley" and the other side of the valley supplied 20.5 percent, the Southwest central Rio Grande and Winter Garden areas 36.6 percent, and the town of Crystal City a full 10.0 percent of the sample. This dis- tribution is presented in Figure 2. Those Chicano immigrants to Lansing who were Mexican-born were mostly from small towns and cities in the immediate vicinity of the border. Unlike Mexican-born migrants in Flint, places of origin such as Monterrey and central Mexican states represented "other regions" rather than continuous extensions of migration regions in Texas. The state of Tamaulipas on the other side of the winter garden region accounted for the greatest number of Mexican-born migrants: Lansingites from the winter garden were apt to have relatives in the state of Tamaulipas and vice versa.5 It was demonstrated above that these differ- ences in region of origin were linked to the divergent economic bases of Flint and Lansing and their resultant labor markets (refer to chapter 3). 136 Amarillo Galveston M E x I C O 729§3&$&3§%§E'rownsville- .Zacatecas San Luis Pot ~si Mexico City 0 g 1: San Antonio region 20. 7° 11: The Valley 17.7%; 111: Corpus Christi area 11.5% E, Southeast Central Texas 39.4% South Texas-North Mexico 33.8% Figure 1. Region of Origin of Flint Chicano Migrant Household Heads (Percentage of Sample). 137 Table 3.-—Places Where Household Heads Born, Lansing (Percentage of Sample, Rounded to Nearest Tenth). Michigan: 10.1 Mexico and Texas, Outside Major Regions: 11.5 Lansing 6.3 Albion 2.5 Ballinger, TX 1.3 Alma 1.3 College Station, TX 1.3 Other States Besides Texas: 9.1 Michoacan 2.5 Monterrey, NL 1.3 Arizona 1.3 Pecos, TX 1.3 California 1.3 San Luis Potosi 2.5 Illinois 1.3 Zacatecas 1.3 Montana 1.3 New Mexico 1.3 New York 1.3 Ohio 1.3 The Valley, South Texas,* Southeast Central Texas: 12.7 North Mexico: 57.1 San Antonio area: 4.6 The Valley: 2 San Antonio 2.5 Valley (TX) San Marcos 1.3 Weslaco Cuero 1.3 Rio Grande City La Villa . East Texas area: .6 (El Otro Lado del Val e Eagle Lake 1.3 Valley (MX) Galveston 1.3 Tamaulipas Altamirano, TM Corpus Christi area: 6.3 Comales, TM Alice 1.3 Ciudad Guerreo, TM Falfurrias 2.5 Ciudad Mier, TM Robstown 2.5 Agualeguas, NL SW Central Rio Grande val and Winter Garden area: 3 Laredo . Nuevo Laredo, TM Encinal e 04040400401001 040010“ (N mmwwoomvmmmoom Eagle Pass Piedras Negras, COA Zaragoza, COA Coahuila (border) Crystal City Carrizo Springs Del Rio Sonora H HHHOHHU‘IN HMO‘OHHNHHHMHHHHHWO .0. O O O O O. .0 *Unless otherwise indicated, all towns listed without a state abbreviation following are located in Texas. 138 Amarillo TEXAS C Pecos d.Acu 3‘ ' alveston Piedras 1- rgs' 5 Corpus Christi Laredo- Nuevo Lareda -fi},”Brownsville- . "L M E x l C o Monterrey 73" Matamoros _Zacatecas .San Luis Poto 1 .Mexico City WE Southwest central Rio Grande valley '7” and Winter Garden 36.6% Lower Rio Grande valley 20.5% Southeast Central Texas 12.2% Figure 2. Region of Origin of Lansing Chicano Migrant Household Heads (Percentage of Sample). 139 Analysis There are crucial differences in the backgrounds of Chicanos in Flint and Lansing which the major regions of origin provided, and there are important differences among the Chicanos of each city due to region of origin. In general terms, the major regions of origin of Flint and Lansing Chicano migrants are different: Flintites are from more urbanized Texas areas and Lansingites are from the small towns of the border area. "The Valley" and the "winter garden” have been studied by other social scientists, and studies in two communities, one per region, are important as background to this research. John Shockley (1974), a political scientist, did an analysis of the development of La Raza Unida in Crystal City while Arthur Rubel (1966) had earlier carried out an ethnography of the Mexican side of New Lots (pseudonym), Hidalgo County. Crystal City and New Lots had many similarities. Both were "new towns" which developed during the first decade of the twentieth century in response to the rise of irrigation agriculture following the Reclamation Act of 1902 (McWilliams 1968: 175). Until irrigation, livestock raising had been the primary economic concern in south Texas. With the rising importance of agriculture, a number of small towns ,. grew up in the area between the Rio Grande and Nueces Rivers, which had never been a heavily populated region. The "new towns" were comprised of two vastly different sectors. The Anglo sector consisted of resi- dences, businesses, and a full array of services largely catering to the Anglo landowners. The other sector was composed of the town's industries as well as the residences and small businesses of the Mexican population, most of which came to do Stoop labor in the fields. 140 Rubel referred to the Mexican section as that part of the town ”across the tracks." In the case of New Lots this was literally true and in other "new towns” such as Crystal City the situation was figuratively true. Both Crystal City, in the winter garden area, and New Lots, in "The Valley," were predominantly Chicano numerically, but the large landholdings were Anglo-owned. The social and political structures of the towns, i.e., the separate and distinct Angle and Chicano sectors, reflected the new economic mainstay of the towns. The labor—intensive nature of Anglo irrigation farming led to the importation of Mexican laborers. Although the Chicano sections of the two towns have experi- enced different recent political development, the early history and structural similarity of the towns provide an insight into the back— ground of many of the Lansing migrants. They came from an area where Chicanos and Anglos were separated socially, culturally, and institu- tionally and where separation was manifested in "dual towns." Further- more, the vast majority of Chicanos in these areas had come to them as mobile rural proletariat6 or the children of such mobile agricultural laborers, and had then moved into the Midwest engaged in the same endeavor. In contrast, San Antonio was an early outpost of the Spanish colonial government, first established as a mission and colony town in 1719; whereas the "new towns" were twentieth century phenomena. Although Mexicans have been the only "minority group" evident in San Antonio since the Anglo takeover of Texas in 1848 (Grebler et a1. 1970: 300), their longer history in the city and the position of Spanish-Mexicans as founders is a different milieu from the "new towns" of the Rio Grande region. Migrants to Flint were also 141 predominantly former farmworkers as were migrants to Lansing and they were not descended from old landed gentry either. However, they did not come from regions where "Mexican" was automatically equated with "farmworker." What is more, of those born outside Texas or Mexico, most Lansing Chianos were born in other farming regions while, except for the earliest cohorts, Flint Chicano immigrants came from Saginaw, Detroit, Toledo, Minneapolis and other urban areas. This difference is borne out by research based on the 1970 census materials as well: while only 37 percent of Lansing's immigrant Chicano population in 1970 had come from other parts of Michigan, 46.9 percent of those in Flint had lived elsewhere in Michigan prior to the move to Flint (Darden and Haney n.d.). Only the Post Vietnam Recession found many prior urbanites migrating to Lansing. Finally, a slightly higher percentage of Flint heads of household surveyed were born in that city than were born in Lansing (8.7 vs. 6.3), which correlates with the somewhat longer history Chicanos had in Flint. A greater number of Flint Chicano migrants were former urbanites from Texas and the Midwest and more were native-born Flintites than was the case with Lansing Chicanos. The latter were mainly rural-urban migrants and more of these were Mexican-born. The differences in region of origin and background of the migrants in turn had two impor- tant effects on their integration into Flint and Lansing. In Flint, Chicano migrants and natives were more homogeneous in background than apparent in a description of the diversity of their ages and places of birth. Most of them were accustomed to urban life and the vast majority were U.S. born, therefore they had no legal status problems. When combined with the socioeconomic variables detailed below, 142 Chicano migrants to Flint were much closer to the mainstream or "average" Flintite than was the case in Lansing. Chicano migrants to Lansing had become more diversified in recent years but included a larger number of Mexican-born unskilled laborers than did the Flint migrant population. When combined with the socioeconomic profile de- tailed below, it becomes clear that some Lansing Chicanos formed a "lumpen proletariat" or "problem" pOpulation in social work terms that was not as sizable in Flint.7 Region of origin played several roles in stratifying Chicanos within the target cities as well. These roles were more apparent in Lansing. First, the differentiation between Mexican-born and U.S.-born in Flint was to a considerable extent a function of generational differences. In contrast, Lansing included not only the "oldtimer" first-generation Mexican migrants but also considerable numbers of very recent Mexico-U.S. migrants. There were therefore more Oppor- tunities for disagreement on the benefits of assimilation, working "within the system," and political action in general than would be the case in a population with a more homogeneous origin and background socialization. Secondly, most of the recent Mexican migrants were poorly educated and unskilled. Thus the problems as well as the cultural heritage were being continuously renewed in the Lansing Chicano population.8 In recent years educated Chicanos had begun to migrate to Lansing to serve the needs of the very poor, particularly the newcomer Mexican migrant. Most of them were from Texas cities and young local Chicanos who had gone through the Lansing educational system and their parents who had sacrificed for their children's edu- cation often resented the intrusion of these professionals into 143 positions which they considered rightfully theirs. Finally, the fact that Lansing Chicano migration has continued from the border region for more than forty years means that migrants from the same town may become pitted against each other in Lansing as a result of historical developments in the border region. People in Lansing from the Crystal City of the 19305 and newcomers from the Crystal City of La Raza Unida daysg were particularly antipathetic towards each other since the former often assumed that the latter were "raving radicals" and the latter in turn often assumed the former were "tio tacos" (sell-outs). This stratifying role was also of importance in Flint and formed part of the basis of the two factions of local Chicanos. Chicanos and the Opportunity Structures of the Cities Introduction The framework of occupational, educational, and of course income improvements available in a given city can be considered the local Opportunity structure. There is an implicit assumption that a local opportunity structure is equally open to all residents——i.e., there is said to be equality of opportunity. Upward social mobility through the opportunity structure in the United States is generally an individual phenomenon which proceeds through occupational and edu- cational advancement. Groups move upward in the socioeconomic hierarchy through investment in the succeeding generation. Similarly, there is an implicit assumption that the opportunity structure of the United States is Open to all in general. However, the "good things in life" such as formal education and real income are distributed unequally 144 among groups in the United States and the inequality is not decreasing. In fact, Hill (1973) found that: . . . while the real income of families has risen since World War II, the degree of inequality in the distribution of income among families has remained roughly constant and the relative income gap between the richest and poorest segments of the white male labor force has increased (Hill 1973: 98). The way in which individuals and groups are integrated into a local opportunity structure depends on whether or not they are dis- criminated against in seeking those opportunities and upon their back- grounds, which may be a result of migrant selectivity. The way in which they are integrated may lead to greater disparity between the lowest and highest segments of the local population just as has occurred at the national level. Occupations of Chicanos and the Occupation Structures of the Two Cities The manner in which Chicanos fit into the occupation structures of the two cities was different, as has been suggested previously. Chi— canos did not fit into the "power elite," i.e., those with political and economic control, in either city but were internally differentiated by occupation in both. As will be demonstrated in succeeding chapters, these strata were important categories along which social cohesion and competition occurred. What is more, the pattern of Chicano occupational differentiation was markedly different in the two cities. In 1970, the census recorded 12 percent more (38%) of the Flint Chicano pOpulation employed as factory operatives than of the total city population (26%) while in Lansing 19 percent more Chicanos than the population as a whole worked as factory operatives (18% more for 145 Lansing-East Lansing: see Table 4). A smaller percentage of Chicanos were employed in service occupations than the city mean in Flint yet 7 percent more Chicanos in Lansing worked in service positions than the city mean. At the same time, Chicano professionals equalled the city mean in Flint and were 9 percent under-represented in Lansing. Fewer Chicanos in both cities were employed as laborers in Lansing and 2 percent more in Flint than the cities' means. In summary, in 1970 the Chicano occupation pattern in Flint more nearly approximated the pattern for all employed in the city than did the Lansing population, which was heavily over-represented in the low-skill, low-pay occupa- tional categories. In 1976 when I conducted the migration history survey I found that in Flint 45.6 percent of the household heads surveyed were employed in jobs at the auto or auto-parts factories. The next highest per- centage (8.8) was employed in supervision in those factories. Four point four percent were employed in construction, another 4.4 percent in unskilled service sector jobs and 4.4 percent were teachers or counselors. There were 2.9 percent employed as "service" professionals (mostly social workers) and a like percent was employed in administra- tion. Chicano service professionals were mainly employed by government or government-funded agencies. Most white-collar workers in Flint were therefore employed in traditional positions--teaching, business manage- ment, counselling, and health care. A further 4.4 percent were self-employed. Those who were self- employed had a range of small businesses, including tax and insurance accounting, construction, restaurants, repair stores, a small grocery, and a bar. Most self-employed who were involved in Chicano formal 146 .n.aHamH an.moamH msmcoo and mo smousm .m.= :0 woman. H o H H H H ooH>Hom eHoaomso: oue>HHd mH ON HH vH mH NH ooH>pom H H o H cano H swap H can» mo>Hpmuomo 59mm mmoH mmoH mmoH one mnouoan Sham oH HH 5 m w m muononmq m m w m w v mo>HumHomo :OHumpHommcmHH om am mm NH mH om Hsuopuamg mo>HuaHoao OH OH oH HH mH 4H HeoHpusupm Icou mowsHoch :oEoHomncoEmummHu OH HH a NN mm mH Hucoecao>ou mowsHoch HmoHpoHu m m N n n 0 monm H H o N n m ucoecue>ou use eosoHaam-HHom mowsHoch Rowena -chHEv ewmhe>m ow Hmcoflpflmceuu Eoww womcew :ecu uezoa .aeefio Eowm eewcmw NH NH omHiHm cacao xfiflemm echfim moema-momma msoaomam Hefluceeflmeu woze: omHm emfle eeczo xfifleew momno: eeczo He:0fiuflm:ewu eawcwm mecca esfie> ewepe>m 1. Hmwpcovfimep wofiueem xfiemcee imoemfl msofiemmm cusp Hosea .Hevflo N m comiHmH MW .mumm eEoocfl 30H eEom .eeczo kHflEww oaaeam.mmmmfi-memafi Oman Hefluceeamou H020: esflm> ewmue>m swap Oman Hezefi .eoucep .memso: xaflemw Hecofipflmsmeu woxfie xpo> eflafluflse w oflwcfim unuom xaume m H momiaom esz> ewmwe>m Hmfluceeflnew :mnp wezoa .memso: woczo xfipcwcfieoeepm .Hmcofluflmceap xaflemmioHucflm uzuom xapeo v H oomA mnemcmq peed; madman; pcflfim madman; ucflaa xhowepmu euflm coaumflsmom cake woocwonzmfiez mowumfiwepemwmzu wcflmso: muoewh a occofinu 1 .xwomeumu eNHm cofiumHzgoa xe omxk eooahonzwfiez new wcflmso: osmoflzoul.v vague !,I 202 these ranged from pre-1900 through the 19205. The tract included a small portion of the central business district. In tract 33, the 1970 housing census encountered more renters than owners and more housing units lacking some plumbing or kitchen facilities (7%) than the city mean (4%). What is more, 15 percent of all houses were valued at $10,000 or under compared to a city mean of 10 percent. There were five tracts in Lansing with similar-sized Chicano populations (tracts 1, 13, 20, 36.01, and 37). All had fairly poor internal access from one street to another and one was cut in half by a railroad which sometimes made access difficult. In two of the tracts this was not due to encroachment of factories and highways but rather due to the presence of parks and to street layout which included dead— ends and winding roads. Three consisted almost entirely of single- family houses, one consisted largely of apartment houses, and one was extremely mixed; housing in one tract was predominantly Type II; in another was Types I and II, but in two was mostly Type III; and the age of dwellings ranged from the 19205 through the 19605. These Lansing tracts represented two very different neighborhoods: three were located in transitional areas but two were located intthe newer residential region outside the immediate downtown area. It is important to note, however, that this newer residential region included the large flats of government—subsidized apartment houses built for low—income families. Those tracts in Flint which had the next—highest Chicano popula- tions (from 151 to 200) were five in number (tracts ll, 16, 22, 34, and 47) and ranged from extremely small and densely populated to very large and sparsely populated. They were all located outside downtown. Three of these were located at the edge of the city. The small, most densely 203 pOpulated tract was located in an older residential area of the city and consisted largely of single-family dwellings and older apartment houses; dwellings were Type III and IV, and were constructed in the early 19005. The larger tracts, however, were not in older deteriorating residential zones. They included one older working-class residential neighborhood with predominantly smaller single—family dwellings and a small business district, housing itself was generally Type II but there was little vacant land between buildings, there was good access, and most dwellings were built from 1920 through the 19405. Also included was a tract which had poor internal and external access due to a winding scenic road layout. The tract included a private golf club and lake; but other than the golf club land use was exclusively residential and consisted predominantly of spacious single-family dwellings most of which were constructed in the late 19505 through the late 19605. All of the larger tracts with 151-200 Chicanos in Flint were in well-kept residential areas with few physical problems. One tract did include the municipal airport--although there were noise and traffic diffi- culties the tracts offered modern single—family housing. In Lansing there were only two tracts with this size Chicano. population (4 and 36.02). One was located in the area outside down- town where two of the previous tracts including the one with low-income apartments noted above were located. It had almost no north-south access due to street layout; both segments consisted almost exclusively of single-family dwellings; the condition of housing in the tract was uniformly Type I built from the late 19405 to the present. This tract, like the larger ones in Flint with 151-200 Chicanos, was not located 204 in a transitional zone but rather in a suburban-style residential area. The other was an older, non-transitional residential area. There were twelve tracts in each city with from 51-150 Chicanos. In Flint, all but two of these were quite small, densely populated areas located just north of the central business district. The others were contiguous and located at the city's edge. Two of the most densely populated were located next to each other and had good to extremely poor access due to street layout and the location of services such as schools and hospitals in the center of the tract. One of these had very mixed land use with little housing while the other consisted largely of single family dwellings. The tract with mixed use had older dwellings constructed in the early part of the century while the other had houses built during the 19205 through 19405. The other small tract was located next to the two above-mentioned and had good access. It consisted of single family houses which were built from the first part of the twentieth century until the 19405. These tracts represented a transitional zone, where the tract with greatest proximity to down— town had extremely mixed land use and deteriorated existing housing while the others were older working-class residential areas. Two other tracts located north of downtown had good internal and external access, included large parks, consisted predominantly of single-family houses, the majority of which were constructed in the 19205. One tract con- tained many vacant houses. The two contiguous larger tracts had ex- tremely poor access due to street layout--both could be entered by only one street. One included a lake; there was considerable Open land and few buildings of any kind but some residential sectors; the age of housing ranged from the 19205 through the 19605 building date. 205 Both had major highways passing through them which had commercial and light industrial uses on either side. As can be seen, tracts with this level of Chicano population in Flint represented a range of residential types but generally were either transitional in land use or represented "blue collar" residential zones. The twelve tracts in Lansing with 51-150 Chicanos included four average-sized tracts located at the edges of the half circle around downtown formed by the Chicano BEIEEE: Three of these had good external accessibility and the fourth could be reached only by one street; all consisted largely of single—family houses but included a few retail stores, warehouses, light industry and services such as schools and churches; housing was Type II and III. The other tracts were fairly sparsely populated with large areas uninhabited. There was mixed land use in all three but there were residential zones separate from the commercial areas lining major highways. There were both single-family dwellings and apartment complexes, ranging in building period from the late 19405 through the present in the larger tracts. As can be seen, tracts in Lansing with Sl—lSO Chicanos also represented a broad range of residential options, and included some newer residential areas than comparable tracts in Flint. There were eighteen tracts in Flint with up to 50 Chicanos. They ranged in size from very small to moderately large. They were located throughout the city, but were mostly not located on the city's edge. They included all kinds of housing options, from older elegant single-family dwellings through the bungalow to the modern mobile home or trailer. Land use ranged from exclusively residential to mixed and heavy industry. Age of housing ranged from pre-19005 to the present. 206 In general, it can be said that the smaller tracts located closer to downtown were older and housing was in poorer condition with more mixed land use including industry; while those farther from the central business district were newer, housing was in better condition, and outlying business and shopping areas were close by. There were only twelve tracts in Lansing with up to 50 Chi- canos. These ranged in size from very small to the largest tracts in the city. The smallest were segments of larger tracts, as Lansing has numerous Split census tracts which lie partly inside the city limits and partly outside. One tract located near downtown was largely residential with single-family houses built during the 19205 through 19405 and included many office buildings; was easily accessible; and had the highest total black population in Lansing. The rest of the tracts were largely residential with some newer shOpping centers, parks, small industry and warehouses, Type III and IV housing of very mixed age. There were ten tracts in Flint with no Chicanos according to the 1970 census. My land use survey showed that these included one largely commercial downtown tract, one older mixed land use tract with fairly deteriorated housing, one largely residential older area, and several predominantly Anglo areas with Type I housino. One of the latter was the country-club district with some of the finer older single-family dwellings in the city. In Lansing there were six complete and five more partial tracts11 with no Chicanos. One of these included the state office complex and another included a major industry; both were located in the central business district. Two others were located on the city periphery and had few dwellings. Another had a major highway with commercial 207 establishments along both sides cutting through the center of the tract. The final tract included the country club with some of the most elegant single-family houses in the city. It is necessary to examine the city of East Lansing12 in order to understand the kinds of zones in which the Chicano population was not concentrated in the Lansing area. Most housing in the city of East Lansing is newer, constructed of durable materials, and in sound condition in comparison with Lansing because East Lansing is not only a suburb-like area but it is also a "college town.” East Lansing and Lansing are two separate incorporated municipalities; however, for most of the boundary there is no clear dividing line between the two. At one point an unincorporated sector lies between the two cities. According to records of the Catholic diocese this area contained a sizable number of Chicano families in the early 19605, but these have apparently moved as the concentration in this general area was, at the time of the 1970 census, inside the Lansing City limits in tract 12. As noted in the section on Chicano centralization above, there was another unincorporated area with an East Lansing address which had an extremely high number of Chicano families as well. In 1976 land use there was predominantly residential and dwellings were somewhat deteriorated; the streets were unpaved and tended to stand in water following a rain. Within the city limits of East Lansing five tracts had no Chicanos and five had up to fifty. All of these were pre- dominantly residential tracts but included schools and other services. The age of housing ranged from the 19405 through the late 19605 for the most part. Two tracts within the East Lansing City limits had Chicano populations from 51—100. These had somewhat more mixed land use and 208 housing was of varied age and of Types I and 11. These tracts included the major portion of the central business district of the city. There were only two tracts with Chicano populations over 100 in the City of East Lansing. These were situated on the university campus. One of these tracts consisted of the graduate dormitory while the other in- cluded apartments for married students. Both of these housing options included a number of residents from Latin America and other non- Chicano Spanish-speaking students. Most of these were only temporary residents of the tracts. Several decades ago, Burgess (1929) in his study of Chicago developed a model of five major concentric zones which he postulated existed in any northern industrial United States city. These ranged from the central business district out to the suburb. The zone just outside the central business district, the zone of transition, was said to include older residential areas deteriorating due to the encroachment of business and industry from the central business district and was expected to house first-generation immigrants in "colonies" as well as rooming-houses and ”homeless men" areas. The high-density Chicano population settlement in Lansing in 1970 was located in a zone just outside the central city which corresponded physically to Burgess' description of the transition zone. In the cast of Flint, the second most populous Chicano area was also in a transitional zone, but the tract with highest Chicano popula- tion and others with sizable Chicano populations did not include major industry. Although transitional in age and appearance, these tracts corresponded more closely to what Burgess called the "Zone of Inde- pendent Workingmen's Homes," and some to the "Zone of Better Residences.” 209 Second-generation immigrants were expected in the Burgess model to be found in the zone of "Workingmen's Homes” while middle class native- born were to be found in the "Better Residences" zones. As was dis— cussed above, Flint Chicanos have been in the city at least a decade longer than Lansing Chicanos and have been more fully integrated into the industrial economy of the city as well. Lansing Chicanos included many who had recently settled into the city after coming as seasonal farmworkers, while Flint had been the host to fewer such farmworkers in recent years. More Chicanos in Flint were born in that city as their parents have spent most of their adult years there, and many of these second-generation Chicanos have surpassed their parents in edu— cation and income and thus in settlement location possibilities. In Flint and Lansing, Chicano settlement seemed to correspond rather closely to the Burgess typology. What this typology assumed but did not explore, however, were the reasons why first-generation immigrants tended to concentrate in older, industrializing areas in any city: low incomes, language barriers, lack of saleable skills; and the need for kinship and friendship networks. Presumably, given equal opportunity and lack of discrimination in housing, education, and occupation succeeding generations would move out into other residential zones, hence second-generation immigrants would be found in working- class zones and natives born of native parents would be fully assimilated into the middle class. Chicano settlement in Flint and Lansing corre- sponded to the Burgess model for industrial cities, but the tenets which it assumed are the very processes which are being explored here. 210 Chicanos and Neighborhood Neighborhood Selection There was a group of questions in the migration history question- naire which dealt with neighborhood. Respondents were asked to indi- cate what they considered the boundaries of their neighborhood and if there were any problems in it; if the neighborhood had improved, gotten worse, or stayed the same during their residence; how long they had lived at that address and what the prior same-city address was if applicable; and why they chose that particular house or apartment in which to live. In Flint, 18.7 percent of respondents in 1976 were residing in the three census tracts with the highest Chicano pOpulations according to the 1970 census but only 4.3 percent of these resided in tract 12, the one with highest Chicano population per tract in Flint in 1970. In contrast, in Lansing, 39.0 percent of respondents to the question- naire resided in the three census tracts with the highest 1970 Chicano population with 15.0 percent residing in tract 8, where the largest Chicano population lived that year. In both cities, the largest per- cent of the sample per tract occurred in different tracts than those with highest Chicano populations in the 1970 census. It cannot be said with certainty whether these differences were a result of the fairly small sample size or a result of a change in settlement pattern. In the case of Flint, informants indicated the latter was probably true as there has been a movement out toward the suburbs particularly to the north of the city, which has always had some Chicano residents, and 13.0 percent of my respondents lived at the north central edge of the 211 city. No such movement appears to be occurring in Lansing, but 16.0 percent of my respondents lived in tract 2, which included a somewhat more mobile Chicano population segment than did tract 8. The average length of residence at the current address in Flint was eight years while in Lansing it was five years. I asked the prior address of Chicanos who had lived elsewhere in the same city and a full 39.4 percent of those who had in Flint had a prior address in a tract with a high Chicano population in the 1970 census. In Lansing, however, 31.3 percent had lived previously in tracts with low 1970 Chicano populations. These figures may indicate that not only did differential immigration to each city account for the initial spatial distribution of Chicanos in Flint and Lansing but also persons who have lived in those cities for a period of time may be moving within the city in a manner which intensifies the concentration in Lansing and the dispersion in Flint. The reason given for choosing the particular house or apartment in which the respondent was living was overwhelmingly stated to be price in Lansing (29.5%) while the second consideration was suitable size (23.1%), and a fairly large number (17.9%) indicated the dwelling was simply available when needed. Most respondents indicated there.' were multiple reasons for the selection in both cities, and price and size were the most commonly stated concerns. In Flint, size was the primary consideration (for 32.3%), price was secondary (15.4%) and location near work was rated equally (15.4%). In Flint a full third of the sample found their current housing through the assistance of a realtor while equal percentages-~30.0 percent each--found their housing in Lansing with the help of friends or family and through a realtor. 212 These differences reflect the fact that Flint Chicanos are owners while Lansing Chicanos are renters: while only 23.2 percent of the sample in Flint are renters, 57.5 percent in Lansing are. Yet according to the census in both cities as a whole, owners predominate over renters. This difference again reflects the greater poverty of some Lansing Chicanos. The fact that nearly a third of Lansing respondents found their housing through the assistance of friends or family reflects the social and cultural importance of the barrio. Many of those who found their housing through network ties lived in or peripheral to areas of Chicano concentration. The economic importance was noted above~-the barrio in Lansing had housing with lower values, therefore lower payments for owners who could get loans, and higher numbers of rental units than the city as a whole—-but many moved to the barrio to be near family and friends as well as through their assistance. What is more, one respondent in tract 8 said their house was ”. . . owned by another Mexican (known to the informant) who first rented then sold it to us." Another in tract 1 just north of tract 8 indicated that he thought his neighborhood was ". . . nice, especially for Mexicans." A young Chicana secretary who recently moved with her husband and small children into tract 8 said they had done so to be "near other Raga_(Chicanos)." If this process continues, segregation of Lansing Chicanos may increase rather than decrease. Most Chicanos did not conceive of their neighborhoods in terms of specific physical boundaries. They would give generalized geo- graphic locations such as "the north side,H but particularly in Lansing directions were seldom bounded. Even when asked specific directions to a place they were given not in terms of physical markers so much as in terms of personal referents. For example, one middle-aged Chicana whose daughter had just gotten an apartment in the city tried to tell us where it was located in the following terms: "Well, you go over by Lupe's house and then you drive past the university and you keep going until you get there——it's in back of Jaime's church there." Most often, people who lived in the barrio when probed for an answer to a question such as ”where do you live" or "where is your neighbor- hood” would respond, "§E_nuestro lado" (on our side), "Aqui en_el_ pueblo" (loosely, here in the Mexican part of town), or "Aqu£_§n_el barrio (or colonia)" (here in theneighborhood).l3 Some attempts have been made to capitalize on the symbolic significance of the barrio to Lansing Chicanos-~local Chicano radio programs often carried announce- ments for businesses located "right here in the barrio" and organizations frequently pointed to north Lansing as ”Chicano town" (see chapter 7 for more details). Perceptions of Neighborhood Characteristics Respondents were asked to indicate whether their neighborhood had improved, deteriorated, or remained the same during the time they had lived there. Overall, more people felt that their neighborhoods had remained the same than thought they had changed either for better or worse (43.5 percent in Flint and 46.2 percent in Lansing). In Lansing, more respondents in the five tracts with highest Chicano population indicated their neighborhood had remained the same than changed, and there was a fairly even split between those who felt the neighborhood had improved and those who thought it had deteriorated. 214 It is interesting to note that in the entire city, only one person living in 1976 in a census tract which had a low 1970 Chicano popula- tion expressed difficulty in obtaining a house loan yet most residents of tracts 8, 2, and 7 with high Chicano populations indicated that obtaining loans for purchase and repair of houses was difficult. One respondent in tract 2 indicated he was forced to get a co-signer in order to purchase his home while another indicated she went without homeowners' insurance for some time because several companies would not write a policy in her neighborhood. She nearly lost her home as a result. A respondent in tract 8 emphasized that her neighborhood was deteriorating ”each day" as stable peeple left and housing was allowed to deteriorate. North Lansing was one of the urban neighborhoods in the state in which charges of discriminatory practices in mortgage, home—repair loans, and homeowners' insurance were lodged which led to the establishe ment of the Governors' Task Force on Redlining in 1976. Their findings were revealing: The major factual finding_of the Task Force is that no standards exist governing mortgage lending decisions as they relate to the availability of credit, and, consequently, of housing Opportunity, in a geographic area. Laws exist to prohibit discrimination by race and sex, but not by geographic location. Lender decisions about location are based on perceptions of risk. However, in- ability to definitively measure risk in urban areas has given rise to charges of excessively subjective appraisals and lenders' self- fulfilling prophecies (Michigan Department of Commerce 1976: ii; emphasis theirs). Most of those who indicated that house loans were hard to obtain also indicated that schools and other public facilities were in poor con- dition, as is to be expected in physically deteriorating neighborhoods with eroding tax bases. 215 Equal numbers of respondents in the two census tracts (12 and 33) with highest Chicano populations in Flint said their neighborhood had improved as said it remained the same. A slightly higher number indicated the neighborhood had deteriorated yet one respondent when asked if there were any problems in his neighborhood said, ”No, like what?” and when the suggested possibilities were listed replied, "None of the above-~that's why I've stayed here twenty-two year!" Most of those respondents in the entire sample who listed numerous problems resided on the north central edge of the city or in the small densely- pOpulated tracts just north of the central business district. Two respondents living in predominantly Anglo census tracts on the southeast side of the city stated they had moved from homes in the north because there were "too many blacks." Although it appears there is a movement into the north central section, Chicanos were not very pleased with the location and it is likely it will be a transitional zone for them between the central city and northern suburbs and outlying small towns. One of the problems associated with living in physically deteriorating neighborhoods is a high incidence of crime. Much of the crime is economic in nature and is a result not of the physical deterioration but of the low incomes associated with deteriorating housing. I encountered a statistically and conceptually significant difference in reSponse to the question on "problems in the neighborhood" included in the migration history questionnaire. In Lansing, the major problems enumerated were related to the physical conditions in the neighborhoods: dangerous traffic, little for young people to do, and difficulty in obtaining a house loan. In Flint the major problem noted was a need for more police protection, with little for young peeple to 216 do a second concern. In both cities, at least a third of all respon- dents indicated there were no problems in their neighborhoods. There was considerable difference between the two populations on the question of police protection: only 7.5 percent in Lansing thought that there was a lack while in Flint 31.9 percent did. I felt that while this difference might reflect a higher crime rate in Flint than in Lansing, it might also reflect Chicanos' greater approximation to "the norm" in Flint, assuming that middle-class America does indeed feel a need for greater "law and order" as is often stated. I asked the police departments in both cities, therefore, for any statistics which they might have on crimes by area of the city which might be reflected in residents' attitudes toward the need for increased police protection. Such crimes as homicide and even assault are fairly uncommon statistically in these two medium-sized cities, but robberies and breaking and entering occur frequently and make a lasting impression, both law enforcement representatives indicated, on residents' per- ception of police protection in their neighborhoods. Both police departments divide their cities into "reporting areas,"14 geographically distinct sectors of the city. Figures obtained from the Flint police department show that in 1974 in reporting area #5, an area which contained 11.7 percent of the total population of the city (roughly census tracts 21 through 27) 16.2 percent of all the robberies and breaking and entering in the city occurred. Combined with area #1 (roughly tracts l and 2) and area #3 (tracts l9 and 20) these high-crime reporting districts accounted for 36.9 percent of all these crimes in the city for 1974 (there were 7,073 such crimes in Flint that year) but only 23 percent of the pOpulation, 217 a difference of 13.9 percentage points. This corridor corresponds very closely to the area not of Chicano population concentration but of black population concentration. It is extremely difficult to draw comparisons on the crime figures for both cities since the reporting areas were not drawn up in the same manner, but observations can be made. The reporting areas with highest individual percentages of the total robberies and breaking and enterings in Lansing for 1975 (of which there were 9,328) were area #17 (roughly tract 19 and the eastern halves of 15 and 18) with 7 per- cent, area #12 (roughly tract 14 and a little of 6) with 6 percent, and areas #15 and #3 (most of tracts l and 2) with 5 percent each, while area #19 reported 4 percent of those crimes for 1975. Areas #17 and #12 were the central business district and state capital complex and included the eastern portion of the only real black residential con- centration in the city but did not include all of it or did they include areas of high Chicano concentration. Area #15 was a shOpping center located outside the city limit. Area #3, however, included part of the Chicano barrio, particularly the area where the most transient portion of the population resided as well as some of the businesses (including bars) which catered to a Chicano clientele. Area #19 included that area of secondary Chicano concentration located just east of downtown. Therefore there seems to be no correlation between actual crime problems and Chicano perception of the need for increased neighborhood police protection but rather an inverse relationship exists. This may be at least partially explained by the fact that in areas of high Chicano population concentration police protection may not mean pro- tection of Chicanos but rather protection against them. The vast 218 majority of respondents in both cities said there was not too much police presence in their neighborhoods but two out of 69 in Flint and three out of 80 respondents in Lansing indicated there were too many police in their neighborhood. All five respondents lived in census tracts with high Chicano pOpulation concentrations. There were several publicized accounts of false arrest and police harassment which I heard about from the participants or their friends during my period of field- work in the Lansing barrio, and although I was told about similar incidents in Flint these had not occurred shortly before the narration as they had in Lansing. I had kept a file of the sentencings in cir- cuit court actions for both cities from March 1975 to May 1976 and during that period 1.98 percent of the total persons sentenced in Genesee County were Spanish—surnamed, while 1.4 percent of the county population according to the 1970 census was Chicano. The difference could be accounted for by the census undercourt of Spanish—speaking peeple in Flint or by Chicano population growth from 1970 to 1976 and likely does not indicate that Chicanos were being sentenced in any greater proportion than their proportion of the population. In Ingham County, on the other hand, 8.2 percent of sentences went to Spanish- surnamed individuals while only 2.7 percent of the population was Spanish language or Chicano. There appears to be a real problem with crime in the Chicano barrio of Lansing-~as one informant put it, "We have pure drugs and prostitutes in this neighborhood now, and it has gotten this way in the iast few years." But it may well be just as another informant stated, ”We have lots of police here but for all the wrong reasons." It appears that in Lansing Chicanos are a visable minority group with a Chicano section of town to be held up as a 219 "problem neighborhood” physically and socially. In Flint the presence of a large, equally visable black population combined with the dispersed settlement pattern of Chicanos seem to have contributed to their "in- visibility" and to the equation of "minority" to black, not Chicano. Summary Chicanos in Lansing were found to be more segregated from Anglos and more centralized in the city than were Flint Chicanos. The group of census tracts with high Chicano pOpulation and high Chicano segre— gation which were located in northeast Lansing formed the Chicano barrio which served both economic and social functions for the popula- tion. Flint Chicanos resided more dispersed throughout the city and were less segregated from Anglos than were Lansing Chicanos. Chicanos in both cities lived in different neighborhoods than did blacks, but in Flint my questionnaire showed a possible Chicano population movement into the near north side of the city since the 1970 census, an area which had a very high black population. In both cities, the census tracts with the largest Chicano populations were located in older, deteriorating residential areas. In Lansing, these tracts included industry and fit the "transitional zone" type of the Burgess model of urban land use while in Flint one of the tracts included businesses but no industry and the other was more nearly representative of the "work- ingmen's homes zone." In both cities, census tracts with high Chicano pOpulations included more houses with lower sales values than the mean in the city. In both cities, the tract with the second-highest Chicano population in the 1970 census had more renters than owners, but the tracts with highest Chicano population had more owners than renters. 220 In Lansing the tract with highest 1970 Chicano population was the nucleus of the barrio. It included long-time Chicano residents of the city, who were mostly homeowners, and some of the most recent arrivals in the city, who were renters. In Flint, the tract with highest 1970 Chicano population was almost exclusively a homeowners' neighborhood and was not a newcomers' settling-out location. Although the Lansing barrio began largely as a response to economic criteria and agricultural labor recruitment, it came to be significant in future settlement decisions by newcomers. As many Lansing Chicanos found housing through the help of friends as through more formal channels while the reverse was true for Flint. Some informants indicated they thought of their neighborhoods as Chicano neighborhoods and others said that they had moved there because of that. The settlement concentration of Chicanos into a barrio in Lansing worked as a feedback mechanism. In both cities, settlement pattern had an effect on organizational behavior, which will be examined in more detail in the two chapters which follow. Footnotes 1Whenever possible the term barrio will be substituted for the general north Lansing area of high Chicano pOpulation concentration. Some local Chicanos use the term in this manner; others refer to the area as "el pueblo" or "nuestro lado.” See the text below. 2The term "neighborhood" will be used to indicate the general locality surrounding a given informant's house. 3The other most important regions of origin for the Spanish language pOpulation of Michigan were Puerto Rico and Cuba. Of a total Spanish language population of 5,070 in Lansing in 1970 only 25 in the central city declared themselves Puerto Ricans and 198 Cubans; while of the 3,322 Spanish language persons in Flint 119 were Puerto Ricans and 122 Cubans (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1971a,b). They were not concentrated in the same census tracts as were those of Mexican origin but were scattered throughout the cities. They did not have a signifi- cant impact on the spatial distributions discussed here and their numbers were subtracted from the figures. The term ”Chicano" will henceforth be used in place of ”Spanish language population." 4Although some researchers indicate the minority undercount was likely as high as 10 percent, some demOgraphers estimate it to be as high as 30 percent for Chicanos in some areas (see U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 1974: 41—55). I suspect the undercount was higher in Flint than in Lansing due to the diSpersed settlement pattern and ”invisible" nature of the pOpulation. This seems to be borne out by 1973 estimates of the Michigan Civil Rights Commission (Michigan Civil Rights Commission 1973). 5The more concave the curve, the greater the segregation of the target population from the control population. 6For a more complete explanation of the computation of the index of dissimilarity as well as other indexes utilized here, see Taeuber and Taeuber 1965: Appendix A. 7Although the figures are open to question just as was the Chicano enumeration, the black undercount was likely not as great in Flint as the Chicano undercount as this population is more highly con- centrated and visible; has formal organizations concerned with accurate counts; and has been the target of other research. 81 used census tracts as the territorial units for the land use survey conducted in both cities so that the resultant data could be compared to the census figures used herein. 222 9Refer to Appendix A for a dicussion of the types. Type I and Type II were built of durable materials, in sound structural condition, and generally had more than the required space between houses. Types III and IV were generally the type known as ”working men's homes." 0The computer tapes for characteristics of housing for heads of household who were of Spanish language by census tract had all data suppressed in both cities and consultation with other users of this data and with the census bureau itself proved the data would be im- possible to obtain. However, the figures presented here (from U.S. Bureau of the Census 1971a,b) are illuminating, although for the general population, as tract boundaries are selected to make tracts reasonably homogeneous in their socioeconomic characteristics. 11Many tracts in Lansing are split between the city and the outlying county. On Figure 4, East Lansing's Chicano population was averaged at under 50 percent. 13Other anthropologists who have worked in Latin America have recounted similar experiences with Latin spatial orientations in conversation. 14In Flint these are 20 precincts. They are sectors of the city which can be patrolled by one car the boundaries of which are close enough together that the car can respond to an emergency at the opposite side within about five minutes. In Lansing an attempt has been made to draw up reporting areas based on population but they do not correspond to census tracts, also based on population. As a result, there are forty-four reporting areas in Lansing. CHAPTER 7 FORMAL ORGANIZATION CASE STUDY 1: FACTIONALISM IN THE BARRIO Introduction A remarkably similar description of formal organizational behavior of a political nature has been recorded for places as diverse as village Sicily (Blok 1974), Italy (Banfield 1958; Silverman 1975), Mexico (Foster 1967; Lewis 1951), and Vietnam (Hickey 1964); for Boston Italian-Americans (Gans 1962; Whyte 1943) and South Texas Chicanos (Madsen 1964; Rubel 1966) and even for a small town in Wales (Franken- berg 1957). These works describe a situation in which there is a con- stant power struggle within formal organizations and furthermore, organizations which do exist may be in conflict with each other over exactly the same goals or membership. Explanations for this type behavior include considering ineffective politics a part of working class culture (Gans 1962), a peasant world view in which all good is limited (Foster 1967), the view that these adaptations become part of the cultural tradition of the people which then impedes change (Madsen 1964), and the suggestion that such societies are structurally atomistic (Banfield 1958; Rubel 1966). I found a very similar situation which will be described in this chapter in the Lansing Chicano barrio. There was an abundance of operating units which ranged from clubs whose membership was linked by common interest or by kinship, to social service agencies. A number of these were involved in competitive Opposition to each other and individual members were aligned as factions.1 It is my hypothesis that this organization behavior was a response to the low structural position of Chicanos as a whole within the high resource availability of the capital city ”open society." It is my contention that this structural position was, as outlined in previous chapters, an out- growth of migration tempered by the labor needs of local agriculture. I also suggest that Chicano organization behavior was influenced by one intervening variable: the barrio settlement pattern of Lansing Chicanos--visible symbol of the Chicano presence in the city. In this chapter I will describe the range of Chicano formal organizations which existed in Lansing at the time of my study, the historical development of this pattern, and present an illustrative case study of political behavior in which I became directly involved as a participant observer. . . . . . . 2 Lansing Chicano Organizations in History When the first permanent Chicano settlers came to Lansing in the 19305 they were not entirely welcome as permanent residents. One early settler in the city recalled that some rooming houses and restaurants in the north side had signs posted indicating that Mexicans were not wanted. Chicanos banded together to form a Sociedad Mutualista (mutual aid society) early in 1946 as a response to hostility from such local businesses. The mutual aid society became utilized more when discrimination appeared on other fronts as well. For example, Jose Cruz, one of the founders of the mutual aid society, attempted to have an infant daughter baptized at the Catholic Church which he attended regularly, but the priest refused to perform the sacrament. His grounds were that this Chicano family belonged to a Texas parish, not to his. Mission activities were sporadic during these early years of Chicano settlement in Lansing so there was no alternative for Jose. In 1947 most of the members of the mutual aid society elected to expand their goals and change their name. They also took in new members at this time. The resultant organization, the ComisiOn de Mexicanidad (Mexican Commission), was directed to several related purposes. First of all, the major goal of the commission was to foster, preserve, and instill pride in the young for the Mexican cul- tural and linguistic heritage of their parents, the original founders of the group. The second purpose of the club was to demonstrate to the larger Anglo community the positive aspects of Mexican people and their culture. This was to be accomplished through the promotion of fiestas in celebration of Mexican national holidays (particularly the Battle of Puebla, May 5, and Mexican Independence Day, September 16). The Comisién de Mexicanidad still existed at the time of my study and was the oldest formal Operating unit3 among Lansing Chicanos. From its inception in 1947 it had become increasingly formalized and by some time in the late 19605 or early 19705 (informants did not recall the exact year) incorporation papers were requested from the state and the group became a non-profit corporation. Most of the officers were the original founders or members of their families. The president had 226 married into one of the founding families. There were few young members and individuals indicated privately that they were concerned the com- mission might die out within a few years because the young were no longer interested, as they put it, " . . . in preserving our patriotic heritage." There were certain factors which could account for the lack of interest on the part of the young, however. These factors included: (1) the "old guard” controlled the club, (2) membership was by invi- tation only, (3) the organization met infrequently and then only to promote fiestas around patriotic holidays, and (4) many Chicanos not involved in the commission felt that members were using the club to make a profit for themselves. There seemed to be evidence to support their suspicion. Whenever a fiesta was held money was made from the sale of tickets for the queen candidates,4 and sale of food and handi- craft items brought in money through booth rental paid to the com- mission. It was widely thought among other Chicanos that the members Of the commission pocketed the money. They had been in existence over thirty years and must have therefore amassed quite a fortune since, " . . . no one had ever seen anything that had come from the money." However, most of the club members were, if not actually poor and living on retirement income, simply factory workers. The individual with highest occupational status outside the commission was a frontline supervisor at one of the local auto factories. There was only a handful of members in the club by 1975, and most of the previous year's proceeds had to be spent on supplies for the gala occasions of that year. The early history of Chicano formal organization behavior in Lansing appears to parallel that developed in other areas of the world by various rural-urban migrants. The mutual aid society and the 227 ComisiOn de Mexicanidad, for example, served as solidarity groups in the face of strangers and hostility, and maintained traditional cul- ture much as did regional associations of immigrants to Lima, Peru (Doughty 1970). The Sociedad Mutualista served not only as a support group but also functioned irregularly as a "simple" rotating credit association (see Geertz 1962). About the time that the ComisiOn de Mexicanidad was developing, other clubs-—mostly for entertainment or recreation, were also started. The most long-lasting of these was an organization of young men who formed a baseball team around 1946 or 1947. These men played various other city teams for several years and then the organization died down. By the 19705 the club had been revived and the original members got tOgether a new ball team of "oldsters" to play other local city teams. A prerequisite for member- ship was purported to be that one had to have been a member of the original team, and yet a number of Chicano notables were also invited to join. In the 19505 various organizations devoted to Catholic reli- gious interests—-altar societies, special church-organized service clubs, religious study and self-improvement circles--were added to the Chicano recreational and support group Operating units. Most of these were outgrowths of the Catholic missionizing effort. These clubs met at the Catholic student center which served students of Michigan State University. In the late 19505 the student center moved from a small house into a larger building and the Chicano groups moved with it. It was in 1959 that the first ethnic festival was held in Lansing in connection with the Lansing Centennial celebration (see chapter 3), an event in which the Chicano clubs which met at the student center parti- cipated. Things remained much the same in the early 19605 but the Chicano population had swelled considerably and included many newcomers who had not been involved in either church activities or in other long-established clubs. In 1962 when it began to be clear that the bracero period was drawing to a close, the Chicano Catholics in Lansing had reached such numerous prOportion that they were able to get their own separate parish established and moved into a formerly Protestant church building outside the barrio. There was a succession of several priests, all of whom spoke Spanish and were highly popular with the Mexican parishioners (although only one was of Latin American origin). There was consider- able involvement by large numbers of Chicanos in celebrations, social work outreach for the church, and pastoral programs. Lansing Chicanos who knew this time describe it much in terms of "paradise lost." Movies taken of Mexican celebrations held at the church document pic- torially that which Chicanos who lived in the Lansing of the period describe wistfully. It is clear that a greater percentage of the Chicano population was involved in Chicano events in the mid-1960s than occurred in the mid-19705, although by the 19705 the population had again increased considerably. Table 1 further documents the post- parish decline in attendance in pastoral services. In 1965 the priest who was then pastor of the Mexican parish suggested to the bishop of the local diocese that the parish be replaced with a social service center and that the center be prepared to serve a multi-ethnic population. His rationale was that the 229 Table l.--Mexican Parish Size, Average Sunday Mass Attendance, and Collections, 1962~1972. Member Mexican Actual Ave. at Annual Year Families Families Persons Sunday Mass Collections 1962 200 190 1200 350 $2700 1963 300 280 1800 400 8100 1964 570 550 3000 400 10900 1965 850 815 5000 -- 13100 1966 1000 990 5500 -- 9400 1972 200 190 550 (under 50)* 7900 * estimate based on later figures. Chicano population continued to be a "problem" population with social needs as well as spiritual ones, a freeway was about to pass through the Mexican church, so transformation to a social service center would be advisable when a move was forced. Documents do not indicate the reason for the stress on multi-ethnicity but it is probable that the priest and/or other church officials assumed that the Chicano pOpulation would cease growing with the end of the bracero period and would show more natural increase than immigration. If they reasoned in this manner, their decision was clearly an attempt to deal with the Chicano population in such a manner that they could be fully integrated into the Lansing social structure not as a separate and distinct ethnic group but as an assimilating immigrant group. As a result, the building which housed the Mexican Catholic community of faith was closed; the building was, as one informant puts it, ”buried”; and the money to (A O was used to purchase land in the barrig upon which the new center for social services would be erected. The late 19605 in the U.S. was a time for liberals. Consider- able strides had been made for civil rights in the early part of the decade. Black Americans were talking about ways to achieve "black power" and appeared to be making headway in the directions of educa- tional advancement, occupational Opportunity, desegregation, and poli- tical activity. Students across the country were protesting the war in Vietnam, and various oppressed groups were planning strategies to liberate themselves. In the Lansing Of the late 19605 to be a minority was suddenly "in"—-not necessarily acceptable, but a possible road toward more equal distribution of resources. Affirmative action guidelines to hire minorities began to be applied. Government funding opened up new jobs for minorities. Government grants were available for minority busi- nesses and minority—run service organizations. In this climate Lansing, the capital of Michigan, was center for a number of pilot programs for minority and "disadvantaged" pOpulations and a center for collection and redistribution of grants from various national and state-level departments of government. Michigan Migrant Agency (MMA) was founded during this period. At the close of the bracero program, the forerunner to MMA was develOped as a multiple church-sponsored outreach program to minister to the social and religious welfare of the presumed final migrant stream. In 1965 MMA was incorporated and Obtained a sizable grant from several anti-poverty programs. The organization was reorganized under a 231 new director with a much smaller budget and a new name in 1967, following a year in which the funding sources found fiscal management by MMA unsatisfactory. MMA was administered by non-Chicanos from its inception until the 19705. At about the same time Chicano Social Services (CSS), the Catholic social service agency, opened its doors in the barrio with combined social and religious functions which were to become proble- matic. Chicano priests were not available for the pastoral arm, but the services administration was early headed by Chicanos. MMA opened a Lansing branch office in the CSS building soon after its opening, as the MMA central offices had been moved to a location outside the capital city. Various news and entertainment segments in Spanish began to be developed by local Chicanos at this time on local radio stations. The most comprehensive and long-lasting commitment was to come from a small station outside the city. A newsletter was developed at CSS and at least one abortive attempt at a local Chicano newspaper was begun either at CSS or in the basement of a CSS employee. A local entrepre- neur began bringing Mexican moving pictures to town on a regular basis as well. This entrepreneur, the newspaper editor, several promoters. who engaged Texas bands to play for dances in the Lansing area, and one Mexican restaurant owner formed a businessmen's association in the early 19705. The organization was short-lived, however. Members had thought the organization could serve purposes similar to those of the Chamber of Commerce; but the association had few resources, no outside funds, and no staff and could not fulfill this desired function.S h.) (N N Current Pattern of Chicano Organizations in Lansing Agencies When I began my research in 1975 I encountered five Chicano organizations at the highest level of internal complexity. These were corporate Operating units6 which had a membership, a separate funding source or sources, and employed workers for the Operation of some sort of social and/or information service for the Chicano pOpulation of Lansing. All of these organizations, which I will henceforth refer to as agencies, had offices located in the heart of the barrio. Each of these agencies specialized in a particular aspect of information or social services for Chicanos; especially the poor, newcomer, and tran- sient barrio dweller. Chicano Social Services (CSS) provided religious and mental health counseling; cared for physical needs including emer- >gency food, clothing, and medical help; and served essential crisis intervention for both the newcomer and the chronically poor. Funds for these programs came from several sources, particularly the Catholic diocese and the Lansing united fund office. Michigan Migrant Agency had a branch office in Lansing administered by the central office located outside Lansing. Funds for MMA's operations came primarily from the U.S. Department of Labor, but several programs were funded locally. El Grito de Michigan (Grito) was principally concerned with publication of a bilingual newspaper of the same name as well as other materials concerned with either the Spanish-speaking or with migratory farmworkers. It was self-supporting but had originated with Model Cities funds, and by the end of my field work had obtained a local grant again. Finally, Aztlan del Norte (A del N) directed its efforts I' J (N 0*! toward drug and alcohol abuse among Chicanos while its parent agency, La Patria Aztlan (PA) operated a separate program for former prisoners returning to the city. All of these agencies Operated with total bud- gets that were much smaller than would actually be required to properly carry out their stated goals for the size pOpulation which was their target. What is more, there were several organizations which had member- ships and legal non-profit status which were competing with these agencies for funding from various public and private sources. These were clubs or formal operating units which had sought and obtained the legal status required to apply for funds which could provide them exclu- sive control of some aspect of services to Chicanos. These clubs included a women's group whose members were primarily administrative and professional Latinas,7 organized and legally incorporated during my fieldwork; and Chicano Association of Social Workers (CASW), whose members were graduate social work students at the university, also organized during my research. These two clubs Operated like sex- Specific branches of the same club, with involvement in many of the same activities. The Comisidn de Mexicanidad (CM) and the oldsters baseball team were both interested in setting up their own social centers and offering "something for the community” as well, but did not draw up prOposals to compete for funds, as did all the other units listed. At least one and possibly three of the existing agencies were actually splinters from already-established agencies which had ori- ginally been such clubs. The membership of one of the current clubs 234 included many prior board members of one of the already-established agencies, and may eventually become another agency itself. There was a tendency for every Chicano club of any size to draw up legal non-profit corporation papers in Lansing. The reasons for this were: (1) such legal status meant a club could apply in its own right for funds from private and public sector sources, and (2) models existed which indi- cated one successful pattern of evolution was from a club, through incorporation, to agency status. All of these Chicano organizations were parties in the nearly constant quarrelling, competition, charges, counter-charges, and poli- tical factionalism that formed the pattern of "agency envidia" in Lansing.8 Parties to the discord could see that their struggles were sometimes counterproductive, yet they would explain that the Chicano simply has a bellicose nature. The following parable was recounted to me several times to prove the point: Imagine a crowd of gringos [Anglos] stuck in a deep pit with steep sides. They would stand on each other's shoulders and form a human ladder, with the first one out pulling the next one up, who would help the following, and so on. Such is American ingenuity. Imagine a crowd of mexicanos stuck in the same deep pit, however. They would stand around arguing about who was going to get to be top of the ladder and never get out. That's the Mexican--so full of envidia he never gets anywhere. This was the emic explanation of the situation. As indicated in the first chapter, Chicanos did use formal organizations as though they consisted of multiple dyadic ties. To the leader, followers were attached in patron-client relationships; to other members there were other ties including primary ones such as kinship and pre-existing relationships based on shared region of origin. That is, as Rubel noted for New Lots, Texas Chicanos " . . . participate in secondary 235 associations as if they were of a primary nature" (Rubel 1966: 140), or as Macklin noted " . . . one votes with brothers and compadres, not according to issues” (Macklin 1963, as quoted in Rubel 1966: 140). What this kind of participation resulted in was a kind of factionalism in which there was constant competition over the scarse resource of public funding. Thus what Chicanos called agency envidia was generally carried out in the following ways: (1) attempts by an agency or club to "steal" a social service prOgram already funded or in the process of funding finalization from another agency by sub- mitting a proposal to the same funding source and applying pressure through the news media or pickets; (2) charging the administrator of some program or agency with lack of concern for Chicanos, corruption, or simple mismanagement; and (3) constant gossiping in the barrio along those lines of fracture that could be utilized by interested parties to form actual factions. The professionals and managers employed at the agencies in question juggled prOposals and programs, either they or outsider Chicano managers manipulated news events, while the un- and underemployed followers grumbled to all who would listen about the ineffective leadership of Fulano. The Chicano population of Lansing was by no means an inter- acting social community and yet the two spoken symbols most frequently called upon in these power struggles were "the Chicano barrio" and ”the Chicano community." It is not difficult to understand the importance of the first: the barrio was visible, large, and an economic resource because local programs administered with money from Community DeveIOp- ment were based on target neighborhoods, of which the barrio was one. 236 There appears to have been a tacit assumption between both Chicanos and interested Anglos, particularly Anglo funding sources, that the two were coterminous; i.e. that those Chicanos who had a stake in the agen- cies and their programs lived in the north side. Yet although most of the "client" category did indeed live in the barrio, less than half of the ”professional" category did. Many of the Chicanos involved in agency envidia did not have a stake in the struggle by virtue of resi- dence, property ownership, or propinquity to the barrio. Rather, their interest appears to have been due to the fact that Chicano agencies were a source of power. Barrio residents who were the clients of the agen- cies were well aware of the fact that their clientship was a route to upward mobility to the agency leaders. Some long-term residents were distressed as well that many of the professionals involved in the power struggle were ”outsiders" to Lansing as well as to the barrio--people recently arrived from Texas with college degrees and political contacts. Other Chicano Organizations There were also a number of clubs which were not usually involved in the competition. These included Chicano Veterans (Chi Vets), a full array of Protestant and Catholic religious clubs, and baseball and bowling teams--some of which were actually appendages to the agen- cies or clubs important in political maneuvers. In addition to this array of Chicano organizations, some Chi- canos did belong to other operating units. As is noted below, Chicano professionals and administrators were often involved in the governing boards of mainstream social service agencies and in the advisory boards of local funding sources. These were important vertical linkages 237 that could be mobilized in a power struggle (see the case study below). Lansing Chicanos were not involved in black associations or agencies although there was no antagonism between them. Finally, many Chicano factory workers were nominal members of labor unions. Plants in the corporate sector in Lansing were "closed shops" with obligatory union membership for employees which had passed the initial probation period. Chicanos did not tend to involve them- selves in "union politics," however. I only knew one Chicano with aspirations to a position in his union, and he became the steward for his section of the midnight shift at an auto parts plant. He was born in El Paso, had a more urban background than most Lansing Chicanos, and was married to an Anglo girl. Competition and Cooperation Individual Involvement Individual Chicanos became involved in the various Chicano agencies and clubs for a number of reasons. There were several impor- tant themes which did link individuals into networks and into the formal and corporate operating units involved in intra-barrio anta- gonism, although each individual would join those organizations which were most important to him for his own reasons. The role an individual might fill within any Chicano agency was closely linked to his occupational stratum. Referring to Table 2, the un- and underemployed service workers and seasonal farmworkers formed the clientele for both the Chicano agencies and for mainstream government agencies which dealt with the Chicano population. Factory 238 Table 2.--Agency Involvement by Occupational Strata in Lansing. Role in Agency Occupational Stratum Chicano Agency Other Agency Un- and Underemployed, Clients Clients Seasonal Farmworkers Factory Workers Not Involved, Not Involved Board Members Administrative, Employees, Board Members, Professional for Board Officers Not Involved Chicanos Administrative, Not Involved, Employees, Board Professional, Board Officers Members, Board Mainstream Officers workers tended to be uninvolved in either Chicano or mainstream agencies but might serve as board members for Chicano groups, and Comisi6n de Mexicanidad members were mostly factory workers. Chicano-employed pro- fessionals served as employees and board officers for the Chicano agen- cies and board members for government or mainstream agencies; while Anglo-employed professionals were employees, board members, or board officers of Anglo or government agencies and either officers for Chicano agencies or completely uninvolved in Chicano Operating units. Chicanos did not participate in agencies run predominantly by and for blacks except for youth recreational programs. This breakdown by class strata appears to generally agree with the findings of Lane (1968) and Barbosa-DaSilva (1968). Lane indicated that Chicanos in San Antonio participated in a wide range of voluntary associations, while leadership was confined to the upper classes of 239 Chicanos, whose incomes compared favorably with those of Anglos. Barbosa-DaSilva found that the highest rate of participation in such associations was by Chicanos with "high economic" and "low family” indexes-~no extended family demands and high incomes. What is more, Barbosa-DaSilva found that high educational levels were correlated to voluntary association participation. In Lansing, the less-educated, poorer Chicanos--including the seasonal farmworkers--tended to be unemployed or underemployed. Their involvement with Chicano organizations was limited to the corporate operating units, where they were clients. This occupational stratum consisted mainly of newcomers to town--especially those from Mexico who lacked documentation, language or job skills, and education, and older long-time residents who lived on fixed incomes and spoke little English. Neither male nor female factory workers were active in Chicano organizations as they spent most of their time at work or in shOpping and family activities. Unemployed wives of factory workers were, how- ever, Often active participants in both Catholic and Protestant reli- gious clubs. The well-educated more generously-paid managers and pro- fessionals, especially those employed outside the Chicano agencies themselves, formed the elite of Chicano organizations. Principles of Recruitment Beyond the simple occupational principle, however, individual recruitment to Chicano organizations followed different principles for each organization and formed the basis for cohesion within the operating unit. Formal Chicano organizations in Lansing tended to be semi- isolated units, each with its own familia of clients and followers. 240 Since the formal organizations were egocentric and the familias tended to consist of kin, clients, or friends of the central figure, they were organized similarly to factions. Referring to Figure 1, individual operating units tended not to share membership and to recruit partisans through different principles. For example, Chicanos involved in the Spanish-language Protestant churches and their club activities were not members of other Chicano organizations. Members of Chicano Veterans, which was a local branch of a national veterans group which was founded following World War 11, did from time to time participate in sports clubs, and several were board members of Chicano Social Services or La Patria Aztlan. Members of the ComisiOn de Mexi- canidad had been active in the Mexican Catholic parish but boycotted its successor, CSS, and were not formally involved with other groups. One member Of the commission had been a founder of Patria but was actively Opposed to its current direction and had recently been appointed to the board of Grito. The major principle of recruitment for the Protestant clubs, the Chicano Veterans' club, and the various sports clubs was common interest in the association.10 The sports clubs further drew members by generation--e.g. the "oldsters" were mostly men in their 40's and 50's who were first generation Mexico- Lansing migrants. The ComisiOn was devoted to promulgation of Mexi- canness and was only Open for recruitment to the "first five" Chicano families, their descendants, and affines or friends deliberately recruited by members. In its stress on ethnicity, this unit was closer in goals to the agencies than to the other clubs. oOmOchH mocHH coxoun HcHwHuo season m nocecm muHc: oz» OueuHecH mocHH vHHom . .muHc: ucHuekoao cumuoauou can Heeuom oceOHau mchcmH mom :onosou can uceepHsueoz mo moHaHocHua .H ownuHm eemHeUHz oe ouaau Hm a coupe oucoz Hoe cmHuu< u 2 How < cwHuu< ekuem m4 u uem HeHuom.O:noH:u n mmu azapeuo> Ocnonu u mue> qu mwmw aaeweeonu Hm esueaum HecoHueQSOOO Am :Huwuo Mo :onon AH umoaoucH :OEEOO Am :OHunuo:em.AH 1 4 oz eanofi 2 How < n Eu £9.35 ucnumouou; 242 Continuing with Figure l, the agencies had different recruit- 'ment principles. Chicano Social Services had a familia of supporters and clients who were tied to each other through real and fictive kin- ship, patronage, and friendship. The CSS staff included Hernando ("Harry”) Fuentes, his executive secretary, a caseworker, a social work supervisor (non-Chicano), a receptionist, and a janitor. There were students placed in part-time clerical work and clients of government "re-training” programs placed in part-time janitorial and grounds- keeper activities as well. Harry Fuentes was born in northern Mexico but moved directly to Lansing, where his older brothers were already established, when he was in elementary school. His secretary had lived in Lansing most of her life and she and her parents had been active members of the earlier Mexican parish. They were strong sup- porters Of the social services programs Offered at the ”new" CSS. She and Harry became compadres (co-parents) when she asked him and his wife to be baptismal godparents of her son, who was born shortly before she was employed at CS8. The caseworker was a Texas-born former sergeant in the U.S. army who had done clerical—administrative work in the service. He rejoined the army during my period of fieldwork and was replaced by a Mexican-born man who had been working with the migrant ministry in a nearby town who had gotten Harry's assistance in obtaining continued funding for that position. The receptionist had been employed by MMA when their offices were still at C85. The janitor was a former migrant who had moved to Lansing to assist a daughter whose husband had deserted her, leaving her with several small children to raise. The janitor was a few years short of retirement or social 243 security age, and was essentially unemployable in the regular labor market due not only to his age but also to the facts that he was uneducated, monolingual Spanish—speaking, and not a citizen. Several organizers and/or current staff members of La Patria Aztlfin and El Grito de Michigan had at one time been employed at CSS. In this manner CSS had served as the "parent" for numerous offshoot organizations and as a training ground for relatively unskilled Chicanos who moved from clerical and casework positions there up into city and state government positions at far higher salaries. By the time of my investigation the newer agencies were also performing these functions. Aztlan del Norte (A del N) split from Patria, and members of Chicano Association of Social Workers became board members there and at Grito. A former organizer of Patria became director of Michigan Migrant Agency and another executive from that office became a board member at CSS. Patria was originally founded by people from Crystal City, Texas, site of the birth of La Raza Unida party (See Shockley 1974). Newcomers to the organization tended to be friends of the organizers or at least former residents of Crystal City. At the very least they were former factory workers currently employed in entrepreneurial activities, as was the best—known of the founders. Michigan Migrant Agency's clients were rigidly defined according to U.S. Department of Labor Standards; the clients of the sister Aztlan agencies were "hard core”--prisoners or individuals with substance abuse problems. CASW's members were social workers, mostly students who had been recruited by the local university, who became avid workers in the programs of A del N and Grito. 244 Leaders of most of these newer Operating units (the sister Aztlan organizations, Grito, and CASW) espoused a cultural nationalist stance. They frequently made public disparaging references to "gabachos" (similar in intent to "honkies”) and "the gringo system" and several published poetry in which, for example, Chicanos with "white" wives were taken to task for being "traitors” to Chicanismo. Their rhetoric alienated many Lansing Chicanos as well as those Anglos who happened to hear it. Many long-time Chicano residents of the city had Anglo sons- or daughters-in law, and had spent many years trying to build a good public image for Chicanos. These peOple found the rhetoric threatening and even racist. They would say, "We know there is still much discrimination in Texas and Fulano just came here from there, but it's different here and we have worked hard to get along with our American [sic] neighbors.” The nature of individual involvement in formal and corporate operating units in Lansing was not remarkably different from that noted for similar organizations in Mexico. Both leaders and followers appeared to be integrated by the same principles with which functionally equivalent individuals in Mexico might have been. For example, leaders tended to be men who had a large enough network of real and fictive kin and friends to develop "strongman" positions from their footholds in their respective agencies and to organize formal higher- level ties. That is, leaders were men who could recruit a faction around them. This appears to be the same kind of phenomenon as cacique organization so important in pre—Revolutionary Mexico which survives, although restricted, today (Friedrich 1970; Genz 1975). 245 Furthermore, individuals from the client stratum often looked at agencies as giant patrons and referred to each agency by the name of its director (e.g., MMA was "La oficina de Raul"). When a client's request of the agency was not forthcoming, then, "Raul no le me quiso dar" ("Raul didn't want to give it to me"). Agency as patron there— fore maintained vertical integration between the client and professional Chicano strata. Dealing with the agencies in this highly personalistic manner was similar to the personalism encountered in formal organi- zational behavior in a South Texas town (Rubel 1966). A tendency for immigrants to adapt to the structures of their new social setting by adaptation of traditional means had been noted in many parts of the world and does not appear to be specific only to Chicanos (see, e.g., Gallin and Gallin 1977 for a study of the molding of fictive kin to new structures). In spite Of the multiplex ties which existed through shared board membership, recruitment principles, and shared origin these agencies became involved in struggles over programs, clientele, and funds on a regular basis. The major reason for this appears to be not simply that they were adapting in a traditional manner however; but that they were competing for many of the same resources for their continuance as well. Funding and Derivative Power Sources Referring to Figures 2 and 3, it should be clear that there was considerable overlap in funding sources between agencies in the Lansing barrio yet quite different derivate power sources were available to these diverse Operating units. For example, Patria Aztlan-Aztlan de Norte, 246 Funding Source Qperating Unit Membershi- -.___ Sports clubs “r-CM and Chi Vets Chicano populatio ‘ ' “\‘§5\_ _, Religious organizations, Larger city, area population Catholic G Protestant ’- . Private funding organization --‘Q; g 3,1:57r CSS City funds—4'" ;/ ‘ PA - A del N County funds N ' Grito State funds \‘ MMA Federal Funds ///////, CASW (none yet) Figure 2. Funding Sources for Lansing Chicano Formal and Corporate -_ Operating Units Agency Power Structure Operating Unit CSS - Private agency PA-A del N \ City officialfl MMA City agency ‘/ ‘County official/4. CM County agency 7;; Grito-CASW State officia/ State agency National official Figure 3. Derivative Power Sources for Lansing Chicano Formal and Corporate Operating Units Key: CM = Comisidn de Mexicanidad _-—' Chi Vets = Chicano Veterans CSS . = Chicano Social Services PA = La Patria Aztlan A del N = Aztlan del Norte Grito = E1 Grito de Michigan MMA = Michigan Migrant Agency CASW = Chicano Association of Social Workers 247 MMA, and CSS all had city and county funds and several had turned in competing proposals for exactly the same funds in the past. Yet CSS remained tied to its barrio base in local Lansing: its highest level funding sources were the county and local Catholic diocese. The other agencies, including Grito, received direct federal funds as well. The sports clubs, Comision de Mexicanidad, and religious clubs depended largely on member donations and all but the Sports club also regularly tapped the Chicano population and area people for funds through fiestas and other fundraisers. From time to time the agencies would also have dances or fiestas to raise money, which put them in direct competition with the less powerful clubs for the same resouces--a constant source of irritation to the clubs. The latter, however, did not think the agencies should be annoyed if they then competed with them for grant money. As a result of the differences in funding sources and of the personal network ties of the units' elite, the formal and corporate operating units in question had access to different sources of deriva- tive power. Patria-Adeln, MMA, Grito and CASW had ”friends" on the city council, at city agencies, on the county commission, in county agencies, in state legislature, at state governmental offices, and even in Washington. The Comision d§_Mexicanidad only had two city officials upon which to call for assistance, while CSS's sphere was restricted to local and county power sources. As is always the case with a power relationship, the donors of such derivative power had something to gain from the Chicano Operating units. A state official had obtained his office through initial success in a county election in which he carried the barrio vote in 248 spite of the opposition of two Chicano candidates in the primary. He was an important power source in his own right and broker to even more powerful persons and groups. He owed much of his success in the barrio to friends from the Patria-Adeln alliance, so he could be counted on for support of their causes. An even more important point to remember is that the agencies involved in this power struggle did not exist until the late 19605 even though sizable numbers of Chicanos had been in the city for over twenty years by that time. The agency type operating unit was not an "indigenous" social structure for Lansing Chicanos. It was a form imposed on them by the outside and run by outside rules. Rules for governing boards and client recruitment were not in the hands of Chi- canos but were made instead by government officials far removed from local circumstances. Even CSS was an outside product and clearly suffered ineffec- tiveness from its own internal structure. It could have been a powerful focus for Chicano activity fusing religious and socio-political inter- ests, but the pious considered the building hence its occupants sacriligeous and the ”radicals" considered its leadership papist, orthodox, and weak. It is not clear whether these two opposing sides among the potential supporters of the operating unit develOped accord- ing to the designs of the church architects of CSS or not, but their evolution kept the agency too involved in its own internal turmoil to pose any threat to real powerholders in Lansing. The imposition of this type corporate operating unit on Lansing Chicanos and their subsequent inability to c00perate for the same goals although all ostensibly were run by and for Chicanos was 249 similar to the situation found by Roberts (1973) in Guatemala City. These agencies appear to have been developed not to help Chicanos organize themselves into a viable political force or even to foster largescale social mobility. Rather, this level of organization was imposed by the outside as an attempt to provide a structure with which the more powerful could deal with the less powerful barrio. The structure was maintained in two ways: (1) each agency's budget was kept low while the service population remains high, continuing a certain degree of ineffectiveness; and (2) formal and corporate Operating units were encouraged to compete for the same resources in the public and private sectors alike by use of something of a quota system by which only X amount was set aside for Chicano programs. In this manner agencies were kept constantly in search of new funding sources; the amount of money to be spent by any one source on Chicano projects was kept finite and determined by that source; and one agency's success invariably meant another's failure. 2 Agency envidia was thus a response to the structural constraints on funding resources, just as Acheson (1972) found that the "image of limited good" held by some Mexican villagers was a rational expression of their limited good or resources. The image of limited good model as develOped by Foster (1965, 1967, and 1972) indicates that people who are relatively successful will expect aggressive behavior, even witch- craft, from their peers who they suspect will be envious of that relative success. It is precisely this sort of explanation which I have indicated was applied to operating units, not individuals, in Lansing. Operating units, however, tended to be the Special provinces of certain 250 individuals: these leaders who were centers of each and around whom the "familias" clustered. The "familias" of clients, on the other hand, gossiped about how the various leaders had betrayed them but did not indicate that they considered themselves part of the conflict. They did not, for example, make statements such as, "Oh, they (at X agency) are just envious of us (at Y agency) because we have a big grant and they don't." This kind of statement was, as noted above, commonly made by the leaders. The clients were more involved in obtaining services and favors-—the province of good patrons, the function fulfilled by the agencies--than in competing with other agencies. Because they responded to the agencies and certain clubs as though they were patrons, they were generally loyal to them. Only leaders and those who did not require services, i.e., board members and employees, were involved in more than one Operating unit. These cross memberships linked the leadership of certain agencies into at least temporary coalitions (e.g., the network of leaders and board members which was mobilized to get Epifanio Mata elected: see text below). In a review of the contrasting predictions made by Foster's image Of limited good model and the sociO-psychological model 0f the reference group theorists, Rubel (1977) indicates that an understanding of reference group theory may require a change in the limited good model. This is because an individual's membership group and his group of social referents may not be the same. Reference group analyses of U.S. minorities (e.g., Aberle 1906) indicate that in a modern industrial society with a generally high standard of living such as our own these with less material goods may have feelings of deprivation relative to some presumed mean, a situation not apt to occur in more isolated village settings. These feelings of deprivation lead not to fear on the part of the relatively wealthy but rather to desire for improvement of their conditions on the part of the relatively poor. I suggest that this explanation is applicable to most Lansing Chicanos, especially those who were not only relatively but also absolutely deprived: the clients of the agencies, those too poor to seek out patrons at all, and those employed in frequently emotionally and/or physically debilitating . competitive sector and service jobs. Both the clients and Lansing Chicanos uninvolved in Chicano formal organizations were on the whole less concerned with the efficacy of ethnic organizations than with their own chances at economic security and possible upward mobility. Lansing Chicanos on the whole were relatively deprived socioeconomically. In chapter 5 it was demonstrated that on the average their mean income and occupations were below the city norm while their family size was slightly higher. Most had as their primary concern either Obtaining or maintaining permanent employment, securing better wages, and making a major improvement in lifestyle. Not many perceived involvement in Chicano formal organizations as a route to such improvement, and many referred to such involvement by acquaintances in derogatory terms. 2 On the other hand, this full range of Chicano agencies which offered alternatives to the mainstream social services institutions, although it provided relatively little in services to the poor, did offer an Opportunity for the more fortunate to obtain experience in white-collar positions and mainstream politics. It also effectively diffused real protest through "co-optation" of leadership (see Berry 1971 for this argument). The greater the number of Chicano agencies 252 the greater the chance for employment, so leaders stood to gain from the factionalism since it often led to the development of a new agency. This factionalism appears, although explained in emic terms as envidia, to have been a response to the need of the mainstream, particularly the public sphere, to organize Lansing Chicanos into a workable system.11 This system masked the real problem: the fact that money for social service needs of the Chicano population was not deter- mined by their needs but by formulas of the funding sources themselves. That agency factionalism worked against Chicanos as a category while working for individual Chicanos in their quest for upward mobility should come as no surprise. The structure into which Lansing Chicanos fit was one of group powerlessness. Chicano migration into Lansing as a labor source for local industry had resulted in the selection mainly of the rural poor and powerless. In Lansing they largely continued to fit into the less powerful classes, and the most visible and potentially powerful of their formal organizations were actually outside structures. The barrio was the focus and location of the agencies and the segregation of poor Chicanos in a physically deteriorating neighborhood made them a "pro- blem" population to the various funding sources. In Lansing there was a lack of overt and clearcut local centralized control of power, although such power remained in fact largely in the hands of industry. There was an appearance of funding abundance due to the presence of many interest groups there due to the capital functions of the city, yet actual money available was quite limited. The "Open society" of the capital city where numerous interest groups were available as funding or derivative power sources for Chicano Operating units is 253 similar in outline to the structure of power described for Sicily (Blok 1974). In that case there was a weak central government which en- couraged local autonomy and strongman behavior as long as its own ultimate authority was not in jeopardy. In the following section I will demonstrate by situational analysis the manner in which the lines of Chicano cohesion and com- petition could be brought into play around a political issue. Health Care Provision for the Chicano Poor: A Political Issue Background of the Issue CSS--the Chicano organization most visible to outsiders--had been the site of a half-day per week adult health care clinic for two years when I began my research. When the adult clinic Opened, it operated directly under the auspices of the Ingham County Health Department—-becoming the first "neighborhood clinic" in the county-~and nursing staff was provided from the public health division of that department. In June of 1975, the physician who had been with the clinic since its inception discontinued practice at the CSS clinic and was replaced by another doctor. In July of 1975 the nursing staff of the clinic was replaced by personnel from the Community Health Services, formerly Model Cities Health Services, which had just become a branch of the Ingham County Health Department that same month. The staff was also reduced from five nurses, aides, and support people to three: a nurse, a nurse's aide, and a receptionist. The nurse's aide and receptionist were Chicanas who had originally been active in the Mexican parish but were related to the officers of the Comisién d3 Mexicanidad, 254 who considered Harry Fuentes (CSS director) personally reSponsible for its demise and the substitution of secular CSS. At the same time, a sliding-scale payment schedule was instituted in place of the strictly nO-pay system which had been in effect. By July 23, a third physician was treating clinic patients at the site. Although the day of the week that the clinic was held remained constant throughout the personnel and organizational changes, by mid-July the average number of patients seen per clinic had dropped drastically. From an average of 20.7 per clinic day for the first three months of 1975, the patient load had declined to a total of eight on July 16 and five on July 23. CSS and the Health Department The takeOver of the clinic by the Community Health Services (CHS) occurred when the director of CHS, Lorraine Smith, indicated to the county health board that her division could administer the CSS clinic more efficiently than could the public health division. Although there was logic to her contention because all except CSS and two other clinics for the poor in the entire metropolitan area were under her administration, it was also a political move. The city council was meeting at the time to consider whether to continue various model cities programs under their own auspices or to drop them altogether. "Model cities” ceased as a federal urban develOpment plan in 1975 and in June of that year all programs had to be taken over by local govern- ment under Community Development grants from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) or phased out. Adding the CSS clinic to her hegemoney would increase the CH5 target area thereby increasing the possible grant allocation from Community DeveIOpment. 255 Mrs. Smith's contention of greater efficiency therefore would aid her own division's continuance and add to its resources, but was not corre- lated to any real inefficiency at the CSS clinic. I interviewed members of 22 out of 33 families of different eth- -nicities which had used the CSS clinic four or more times during the past year and found that all of the fourteen Chicano frequent—user families had other ties to CSS. They attended mass or belonged to related religious clubs there, were relatives or compadres 0f CSS employees or board members, or received other important social services there such as immigration assistance. Four of these Chicano families who had also attended the clinic since the CH8 takeover noted they did not like all the paperwork since the clinic personnel had all changed, and one stated, "If it's a free clinic why do they want a check stub and all that?" Another noted that he did not like the girl with the adding machine to be the first person he had to see. Furthermore, fer most patients the physician and his staff represented the clinic itself. Many respondents asked, "Why did they let Dr. J go? He was such a good doctor and he knew my whole family." Others expressed bewilderment at the change and stated, "The nurses always met me at the door and said, 'Good morning, Mrs. LOpez' and made me feel right at home." Those who had been attending through June and July indicated that they were dis- tressed that there were two different physicians during that time, and would say, “Who knows who the doctor will be next week?" These patients were doubly distressed due to their personal ties to C88, and attributed this impersonal, bureaucratic attitude of the new clinic staff to the CSS board of directors staff, and ultimately to Harry Fuentes himself. In other words, they felt betrayed. This 256 was because they were quite unaware of the structure of CSS. This agency not only consisted of a social service administration arm and pastoral program but in addition contracted for a vast array of pro— grams funded and staffed by larger mainstream agencies. Although one- third of the CSS board members were Anglo influentials who belonged to both major political parties, most of whom knew Harry or other board members through their board involvements at Anglo agencies, two-thirds of the members were Chicanos. These were also personally tied to CSS through kinship, compadrazgo, religious participation, or patronage to Harry or long-standing members of his sphere of influence. For this reason, these board members were considered Harry's pawns when problems such as the clinic changes arose and they were unable to remedy the situation. There was a general feeling in the barrio that CSS was pro- fitting financially from the clinic, although that was not the case, and Anglos who were aware of the clinic controversy also shared this errone- ous assumption. For example, the new clinic staff indicated that there were important inadequacies in layout, plumbing, and ventilation in the CSS facilities, so Harry had a Chicano contractor rebuild that area of the building which housed the clinic. All the renovation was done at CSS expense, but the Chicana clinic aide said to me, "Now Harry can rent out the little rooms (closets) we don't use and make more money." Just before the first hearing on the clinic held by the health board (to be described below) a local politician asked Harry Fuentes, "Just how much rent does the health department pay you a month for the clinic?” and was incredulous when advised that the facility was provided free of charge. 257 Chicano Social Services was not blameless in the eyes of other observers. As noted, there was a general feeling that CSS was pro- fitting financially from the clinic. What is more, since Harry Fuentes was involved in the issue his reputation preceded him and caused some desire by the health department for mediators. At the same time that the clinic was a problem, another subcontractor at CSS was about to pull out because the youth program they had funded and staffed there had become a contact point in a local drug sales network. Harry did not consider himself responsible for the problem since the staff member in question was not on his payroll or under his supervision, but the subcontractor considered Harry responsible for all prOgrams held "under his roof" and because the staff member was Chicano; hence the pull-out threat. Harry's reSponse was to call the president of their board, a long-time friend and fellow member of another board, suggesting that they be sure to continue providing services in the Chicano barrio with a Chicano staff person-~even if not at the CSS location. The board president suggested that Harry put his thoughts on paper, so he did: he sent COpies to the board president, the welfare department, his local congressman, and the civil rights office. The presence of two Chicanas who disliked and distrusted Harry on the clinic staff also contributed to his reputation with their superiors at Community Health Services, some of whom came to refer to him privately as "Harry the horrible.” Several months after the original managerial changes, the Community Health Services began requiring a $2 payment per person for preparation of a chart above and beyond any charge that they might have as a result of the sliding scale fee. What is more, the Chicana 258 nurse's aide had to enter the hospital the following week, and she and the Chicana receptionist were replaced by one English-speaking-only black receptionist for several weeks. Furthermore, the clinic was closed for a holiday one week during the period although CSS was open that day, and there were no signs posted at the clinic explaining why it was closed nor had there been previous notice that it would be closed for the holiday. Chicano Cooperation Six months after the original changes occurred in the clinic, Lorraine called a meeting of the county health board to explain her recommendation to close the CSS clinic. Harry Fuentes had not been officially invited to the meeting, but Clive Johnson, the county com- missioner from the district which included the Chicano barrio, had called to advise him of the meeting. Clive was a Democrat who was purported to be strongly supportive of La_§ap§a}2 in general. He and the local state representative had been asked by Harry at the outset of the clinic issue to intervene with Dr. W., health department administrators, Lorraine Smith, and the Health board. They had both written letters to these individuals indicating that they sympathized with CSS in the matter. CSS was represented at the health board conference by Harry Fuentes; Jaime Dania, the vice-president of his board of directors; and the director of one of the subcontracted programs housed at CSS, who also happened to be a second-level leader of La Patria Aztlan. Community Health Services was represented by Lorraine Smith, her assistant, the director of a special clinic at Lorraine's headquarters, 259 a nurse from Dr. W's staff (who was to become the acting director of the health department when Dr. W left), and Dr. W himself. Clive Johnson and the health board members were also there. A It is important to understand certain network linkages between actors in this confrontation. The CSS board vice—president was a member of the Community Development advisory board which approved funds for all social prOgrams which had been part of Model Cities. Harry Fuentes was a member of the board for several private social agencies which were funded by the united fund and also sat on a special advisory board for the county. Clive Johnson was one of the powers behind the newly—developing faction in Lansing Chicano politics which was to get its candidate elected to local office at the end of my fieldwork. The CSS subcontractor, as noted above, was a figure in a competitive Operating unit in the barrio. All of these spoke on behalf of the needs of the people in the barrio for the clinic. Harry Fuentes demonstrated that the health department, through provision of the CSS clinic staff and physician salaries, had invested less in the clinic than CSS, which had donated the facility remodeling, rent-free use of space, phone, staff and janitorial services. The health board went on record unanimously opposed to closing the CSS clinic and reprimanded the health department for poor adminis- tration in letting the situation get so totally "out of control." Lorraine was quite distressed at the outcome-~she had been trying to expand the community development grant to CH8 through proving that even a small satellite clinic such as CSS worked a financial and personnel hardship on her division, cognizant of the fact that Harry would mobilize his extended network to prevent closure of the smaller "hostage” 260 clinic. The plan backfired because the health board was composed of various local politicians who were sensitive to particular pressure groups. Through Harry's ties to other agencies, county government, and linkages of his supporters to even more officials he was able to exert pressure on the board. The board then supported the CSS contention that the health department had deliberately or through mismanagement caused the confusion that led to faltering patient use of the clinic. All parties were to meet again in one month. Lorraine and Dr. W had not done the paperwork which the health board had requested by the next meeting and as a result the board began to question administration of other health department programs. In six weeks Dr. W left his position for a similar one in another state citing as his reason for leaving that he found it, ". . . difficult to be part of certain developments that I conscientiously object to," and the nurse who always strongly supported Lorraine Smith was named the temporary health department director. In the meantime, the clinic itself was finally left unchanged for several months, a Chicano medical student from the university began to volunteer time at the clinic, and CSS placed one of their part-time employees at the clinic to translate and to do "follow-up" of individual problems. With these events the number of patients increased to pre— change levels and some patients were even turned away because there was not enough time to see them. The Barrio Clinic as a Chicano Champaign Issue A full month after the final health board meeting, an article appeared in the local newspaper with the headline, "Client lack may end 261 clinic at Chicano Social Services." The article was written by a Chicano who was to become a strong supporter and public relations node in the coalition which was mobilized to elect the Chicano County Com- missioner. This Commissioner took the seat of Clive Johnson, who was the source of the newspaper article. In it, Clive said that ". . . both CSS and the health department mutually shared the responsibility for the clinic's deficiencies" although he had been at both meetings and knew that the health board decision had indicated the clinic was not to be closed and CSS was not to be held accountable for its low patient use. What is more, by the time the article appeared the "patient load" had returned to its pre-change level. The article infuriated Harry Fuentes and his supporters, as it made CSS appear to be at least as responsible for the problem as the health department, and the wording suggested that CSS might have been even more to blame than the health department. A few days after the article appeared in print Jaime Banda, the CSS board vice-president, announced his candidacy for the commission seat being vacated by Clive Johnson, who was entering the race for a higher position. At this press conference, Jaime brought up the clinic at CSS as a prime example of the sort of services needed in the north Lansing neighborhood and indicated that he had been involved in keeping the clinic open for some time and would continue to work with the health department on this and related matters. A few days before Jaime's announcement Pedro Martinez announced; then the following week Epifanio Mata announced his candidacy for the same position. Both of them cited the need for expanded health care services in north Lansing and the inability of existing agencies to provide them among the major 262 planks in their political platforms. Pedro Martinez was the right—hand man of the center of the Patria Aztlan organization. By the time of my fieldwork, Patria was splintering into other units and was no longer a powerful organization. The experienced Crystal City politico who had been its major founder had successfully organized a school walkout in Lansing in 1970 following an incident between a Chicano junior high school student and his gym teacher. Epifanio Mata, the successful candidate, had the support of the incumbent Clive Johnson, the local newspaper reporter, Grito-—the Chicano newspaper, Aztlan del Norte, some of the MMA contingent, and both CASW and most of the members of the Latinas' group. Thus both successful Anglos and successful Chicanos interested in cultural nationalism made up his coalition. These declarations of candidacy came at a time when CSS was having other problems besides the clinic. Not only was there the old drug sale scandal still hanging over the agency but also Harry's secretary had just quit to take a position with the state civil service at much higher pay. She was the unofficial assistant director, was well—liked, and a capable organizer. The day her resignation was formally announced the receptionist, who had been with the agency over five years as had the secretary, received a call about a job for which she had not even applied and was soon hired out of a field of twenty— seven applicants. The call came from a personnel officer of the agency where she was hired, who also was a member of the central core of the faction to which Pedro Martinez belonged. Harry was in negotitions at the time with one of his two major funding sources. He was having difficulty getting a small budget increase to offset inflation because the director of that funding source had been upset at a series of 263 newSpaper articles written the previous year by Clive Johnson and Epifanio Mata’s journalist friend in which a conflict between Harry and another executive who had been attached to CSS for many years had been outlined in intricate detail. The articles cast doubt on Harry's character as well as on his administrative abilities. Needless to say, Jaime Banda received the least votes. In July, a full year after the clinic issue began, another meeting was held at the health department with the new director Dr. G. The meeting went very poorly, covering all of the same points which had been covered many times in the past. The CSS clinic was put on in— definite probation but no standards were set by which to judge whether it had successfully met the conditions of parole.. Six months later-—a full year and a half past the initial change in clinic operations-~the clinic was reopened as a political issue because Epifanio Mata, the new county commissioner, was appointed to the health board and had just heard that there was "a lack of patient attendance" at the clinic. This issue not only illustrates the way in which the competition and cooperation actually operated among Lansing Chicano organizations. It also highlights two extremely important events which the literature on factionalized Chicano populations had led me to believe would not occur in Lansing. One of these was the manner in which Harry Fuentes was able to call in his network-~even peeple who were normally enemies --to pressure the health board into acquiescence, thus continuing health services to his agency's clients and proving his own strength. This is not political behavior of the powerless. Secondly, Epifanio Mata was able to develop a faction composed of members of all the most powerful units which operated in the barrio. He used this powerful 264 coalition not to become a traditional strongman in "the Chicano com— munity” but rather to successfully obtain a seat in mainstream local government which had already been demonstrated to be a route to upward mobility into national politics. In other words, in at least these two important cases Chicano factionalism may have been nothing more or less than good political behavior. Summary The first formal organizations which Lansing Chicanos developed were mutual benefit and ethnic associations designed to promote the positive aspects of their cultural heritage and to assist individual members with problems of discrimination. During the 19505 when large numbers of Chicanos and contracted Mexican laborers began to enter the Lansing area agricultural industry both Protestant and Catholic churches began missionizing activities with the population. With the advent of public national level consciousness of minority populations in the 19605 some federal legislation set the stage for the contemporary pattern of Chicano formal organizations in Lansing. In the late 19605 agencies began to develop whose goals were to alleviate Chicano social and economic inequality. By the mid 19%05 these corporate operating units or agencies had become the most notable form of formal organization among Lansing Chicanos. They had been proliferating through involve- ment in factionalism which led to splits and the formal incorporation of new agencies. Individual involvement was very personalistic: leaders tended to be individuals who could command a large personal following of family, clients, or friends and most of the followers were linked to the leader through patron-client ties. A familia of clients and 265 their leaders-~service professionals——formed the core of each agency. The agencies were then set in opposition to each other in spite of frequently shared board membership, recruitment mechanisms, and interest. It was suggested herein that the competition came not only from the alignment of individuals into factions because of the primary type ties which followers had to leaders, but also from the very nature of the mainstream power structure with which these agencies were articue alted. These agencies were really outside structures. They had been designed by outsiders and their internal form was often a major stumbling block to their effectiveness as political tools for the Chicano population as a whole. What is more, they were set in opposi— tion to each other both at the level of community dances and festivals and at the level of funding from public and private sources not only for growth and accrual of power but simply for their own survival. Individual Chicanos, however, were sometimes able to effectively manipulate these structures for their own benefit and some appeared to be becoming successful mainstream politicians- 266 Footnotes lA faction is a coalition of followers recruited personally but along diverse principles on behalf of a person in conflict with another person, with whom he was formerly united, over honor or the control of resources (Nicholas 1965: 27-29; Boissevain 1974: 192). 2All Chicano organizations and individuals discussed in this chapter have been given pseudonyms. 3A formal operating unit has a delegated administrative spe- cialist or council and controls a greater resource base than the com- bined resources of the individual members (Adams 1970: 52), such as the funds derived from annual fiestas for the Chicano pOpulation. 4The way that a local girl could become queen of a patriotic fiesta was to be nominated by a sponsor who put up a donation of money. She would then sell tickets on her winning ability to anyone in the city willing to buy one. The girl who brought in the most money won. 5Other members charged that one of the founders was using the association for his own betterment. This member was also widely suspected among Lansing Chicanos of using his legal business as a "front" for an illicit import operation and was spoken about with both fear and envy. 6A corporate operating unit is a social unit which has a dele- gated administrative specialist or council, controls a greater resource base than the combined resources of its individual members, including the exclusive control of some strategic resource which thereby harnesses even greater power (Adams 1970: 53). I consider the agencies listed here corporate in that each had exclusive control of a particular ser- vice from a specific funding source for the Chicano population. 7I.e., the members were not exclusively Chicanas but were from several Latin American countries as well. Several informants from different operating units used the term envidia, which loosely translates to envy and distrust, in refer- ence to the inter—agency discord. E.g., an important figure at CSS brushed off criticism of a program at that agency by a leader at PA with the comment, "Oh, he's just suffering from envidia of my agency." 9This story brings out the Chicano's presumed inability to work together, while another parable (Rubel 1966: preface) demonstrates the chip-on-the-shoulder individualism attributed to Chicano character by Chicanos themselves. Both are aspects of envidia. 10As noted in chapter 1, Kerri (1972: 44, 1976: 24) has defined a voluntary association as a private group joined voluntarily and maintained by members pursuing a common interest by means of part- time, unpaid activities. He distinguishes these from ethnic associ- ations, which are groups formed solely for the purpose of promoting ethnic considerations (Kerri 1976: 24). The Comisi6n de Mexicanidad would be classified as an ethnic association. —- 11Jorgensen (1972: 146-173) documents a similar case in which the Utes' tribal organization was elected and maintained by the BIA and Business Committee, which also successfully maintained intra- tribal factionalism similar to the agency factionalism I observed. 12Chicanos in both Lansing and Flint used this term to refer to the generalized struggle of Chicanos to attain equality. For someone to support L3_Causa, then, was for someone to take the Chicano side. CHAPTER 8 FORMAL ORGANIZATION CASE STUDY II: FACTORS WHICH MITIGATE AGAINST FACTIONALISM Introduction Most studies of Midwest Chicano urbanites have dealt with segre— gated populations living in barrios (e.g. Salas and Salas 1971; Sanora and Lamanna 1967; Shannon and Shannon 1973). Among such porulations it appears that high visibility, maintenance of cultural distinctiveness, discrimination, and a larger percentage population with low socio- economic indicators than the norm are part of the structural conditions of which formal organizational behavior is a reflection. The Flint Chicano pOpulation is not segregated and due to migrant selectivity by local industry more closely approximates the mainstream of that city than most Chicano pOpulations studied. It therefore represents a unique test case of my proposition that the political economy of the host city into which the Chicano pOpulation must fit will condition their formal organization behavior. The historical development of Chicano formal organizations, the contemporary pattern of such organizations, and factors which divide the pOpulation as well as principles of cohesion will be described in this chapter. Also included is situational analysis of formal organi— zation behavior through description of the develOpment of a social 268 269 -work outreach program at a Chicano agency in which I was a partici- pant observer. History of Chicano Organizations in Flint1 In the late 19205 Flint Chicanos had formed a Sociedad Mutualista (mutual aid society) with a separate women's branch. In 1927 these clubs sponsored the first annual celebration of the six- teenth of September, Mexican Independence Day. Ironically, in 1975 the Mexican flag was raised near city hall to celebrate the first annual observation of Mexican Independence Day. Another informant indicated that September 16 was observed in this manner off and on during this almost fifty year period, and one leader of a religious club recalled that the first celebration of the holiday was in 1939. The Sociedad Mutualista did not survive beyond the initial years of Chicano settle- ment in Flint. There were also attempts during the early years to develop youth recreation like the Club Recreativo (recreation club) but it, too, was unsuccessful. In 1920 an International Institute had been established near the northeast area of Flint which was then known as "Little EurOpe" due to the various EurOpean nationalities which lived there. When Mexicans began to immigrate to Flint they also settled near "Little EurOpe" and went to the International Institute for English language lessons and citizenship assistance. Flint Chicanos were also involved with workers of various other ethnicities in the sit-down strike against the General Motors plants of the city during 1936-1937. The strike began on December 30, 1936 and ended forty-four days later. One plant takeover known as 270 the "Battle of the Running Bulls" on January 11 ended with thirteen of fourteen hospitalized strikers suffering from gunshot wounds and a dozen police injured by thrown objects (Flint Journal 1976a). Men who would become famous national union leaders used the strike as proof of union strength-~the Reuthers and John L. Lewis. The benefits won by the strikers--improvements in wages, fringe benefits, and grievance procedures--were to set precedents in auto factories and for collective bargaining nationally. Estimates by city officials and strikers involved indicate that probably only about a thousand workers were actually strikers, but Chicanos were among them.2 One Chicana recalled her deceased father telling about the strike when she was a child like some men tell war stories. There was pride among the children of strikers for their parents' involvement, and Chicanos who had not taken part in the strike did not discuss it. Many workers, including some Chicanos, were not strikers, but most Chicanos were at least sympathetic to the cause. All Flintites were not, of course, sympathetic to the strike, and a vigilante patrol consistent of almost as many men as the striking workers was organized. The earliest Chicano organization which became permanent was the parish for Mexican Catholics. The first Spanish-speaking priest to minister to them came in 1929, offering the mass in whatever church was available. This priest was a Spaniard and was well received by the dozen or so northern Mexican families in Flint. Several of these are still resident Flintites. The third Spanish-speaking priest in Flint was the first at the Church of the Mexican Madonna (which I will refer to as the Mexican Catholic Church or MCC). The women of the altar 271 society had visited the bishop in 1953 attempting to convince him there was a need for a Mexican church. When a devastating tornado touched down in northern Flint in the Summer of 1953, the Chicano community of faith was able to obtain a church building that was vacated as a result. The Mexican parish was eventually founded in this building and by 1957 was formally Operating. That year the men's religious group, Knights of St. Joseph, was founded. It remained the largest Chicano men's voluntary organization in 1976. The priest who was first assigned to MCC was a missionary who went out to the migrant camps at the extreme northern edge of Genesee County. By 1966 the Flint Mexican Catholics had their fifth Spanish- speaking priest. He also went out to the migrant camps for the several years they remained in operation, but was not a missionary. He was assigned to the Mexican parish exclusively. This priest, a Latin American refugee, remained in Flint and was extremely influential in molding Chicano opinion over the following decade. It was under his leadership that Flint Chicano Catholics achieved the near impossible: they built and autonomously_maintain their own church. They raised money to build a new modern church building, pay daily expenses through tithes and contributions, and did not seek funds from the diocese. Some 400 member families were able to raise just over $100,000 at one time which paid better than one—third of the building costs. They financed the rest and pay the loan through a combination of annual fundraisers and tithes. The new building, which included a stained glass window and a cloth hanging of the Virgin of Guadalupe (patroness and symbol of Mexican Catholicism)--0pened in 1973. It was 272 the Opinion of the priest that the Opening of the new church building marked the turning point in Flint Chicano ethnic pride. From the 19205 to the 19705 the Catholic Church and its repre- sentatives to the Flint Chicano population played a crucial role in their formal organizing. The Knights of St. Joseph still had over sixty members in 1976. Another club devoted to other aspects of the Catholic faith was fifteen years old at the time of my study and had twenty active members, while the women's altar society was similar in age and membership. There were also several smaller clubs which met to serve charitable needs of both Catholic and non-Catholic Chicano Flintites. The longstanding and continued importance of the Mexican Catholic community of faith is reflected in selected stanzas from a poem authored by a Mexican seasonal migratory farmworker who was employed in the area in the early 19605: . The barracks where we live Doesn't know sadness, Because here we came to know The purity of the Church. . Therefore when we learned About the Mexican Virgin We headed to Flint To see her . . That her benediction spreads And inflames the hearts Of all the destitute In the United States Is the wish of a bracero Who came seeking money And, not finding it, 3 Made peace with God (my translation). 273 Also during the early 19505 the first Spanish language radio programs began to be aired regularly on a local educational channel. Mexican movies were never screened on a weekly basis as they came to be in both Lansing and Saginaw, and Flint Chicanos had been driving to both of those cities to view them for many years. Dances with local Chicano musical groups and occasional big-name attractions from Texas were held fairly often, sponsored by different clubs in the city. During the 19605 several non-church organizations were developed. These included a local chapter of Chicano Veterans and a ladies' auxiliary composed of wives or relatives of members. These were the only clubs which survived into the 19705. Then in the 19705 the Latin American Labor Organization was established at one of the GM plants, and a small number of Flintites formed a Latin American Citizens' League. Both were local chapters of national organizations, and both were devoted to improving the position of Chicanos in the larger society with the understanding that this would be beneficial to the city as well as to Chicanos. In 1969, another significant event occurred in Flint Chicano organization. A group of eighteen Chicanos met with an interested local sociologist late in the year to form a board of directors for a proposed social service agency for Chicanos. A grant was obtained from Model Cities and the Raza Services and Referral Group (Razas) opened its doors the following year. The first executive director of Razas was a young man who was interested only in youth—oriented pro- grams, had the staff members outfitted in brown berets (symbol of Chicano Power movements), and kept large posters of Che Guevarra on 274 the wall. He was investigated by the board following complaints from Older Flint Chicanos who were disturbed by the image the agency was giving to all Chicanos in the city. As a result of the investigation he was fired. The second director was a Peruvian woman with a Ph.D. who reputedly took advice from no one, but did not speak enough English to write proposals or deal with local politicians or funding sources. She was replaced after only three months by a middle—aged activist born in the lower Rio Grande Valley who had lived in Flint for over twenty years. He became quite anticlerical as he heard the priest had told his parishioners that those born to poverty were meant by God to remain poor, and the director could not abide this fatalism. His board of directors consisted mainly of Chicano factory workers who saw board membership as a powerful position from which to direct the activities of others, instead of taking orders as they had to do on the job. They were, however, also loyal Catholics and soon hamstrung the director by refusing him permission to leave the premises. When he resigned, the current director was hired. Following establishment of Razas, several other organizations were formed. A woman employee of Razas organized several parents to form a cooperative nursery for the use of working parents, but its continuance was largely a function of her own personal influence. In 1973 Parents and Teachers for Education (PTE) was formed to raise money for Chicano scholarships, and although few Chicanos were ever involved, members were recruited from the various Chicanos club and agencies in the city. The ComisiOn de Mexicanidad, active intermittently for ten to fifteen years, was re-organized to include delegates from all the 275 other formal and corporate Chicano Operating units about the same time. Finally, Chicanos for Youth DeveIOpment (CHYDE) was organized as a separate agency with the same board of directors as Razas the year before my fieldwork began. The agency was to assist youth in "finding a place in society" and the original grant was oriented toward drug use rehabilitation. The agency was constantly in a funding bind, as was its parent unit. Contemporary Flint Chicano Formal and Corporate Operating Units During the period of my fieldwork, the corporate operating units actually consisted of an agency bloc headed by Razas as delineated above. By this time Razas had a twenty-member board of directors which included both at-large board-appointed individuals and elected repre- sentatives from Chicano clubs. All the board members were Chicano and few had expertise in urban planning, social services, grantsmanship, or administration. The staff consisted of seventeen full-time employees, but only four of these were over 30 years of age and most had recently graduated from high school and had no prior work experience. Pepe Vasquez, fourth and current director of Razas, a native of a small town near San Antonio, Texas, had lived in Flint for eleven years but had no prior agency experience. He had been a salesman before he was hired at Razas. The inexperienced board and staff were expected to fulfill the agency's philosophy of general community action for Chicanos--i.e. alleviating immediate social problems, developing Chicano civil rights, and even gaining access to the policy-making process in government. Razas was located on the major North-South artery in the city but was in a deteriorated commercial district with a high incidence of 276 robberies and breakins.S Furthermore, most residents in the surrounding area were black. A number of Chicanos confided to me that they would never visit the agency because they were_afraid of the neighborhood. However, Razas was the major contact point with Chicanos for non- Chicanos in Flint just as CSS was in Lansing. Razas was originally funded through the Model Cities program, but in 1975 Model Cities was phased out. Social programs were evaluated for continuation under Community Development grants of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. At that time, Razas was temporarily continued as a city program under one of these grants. The agency had difficulty with its funding source because Chicanos in Flint lived dispersed throughout the city and even into the outlying county while Community Development grants hinge on pOpulations located in "target areas," i.e. concentrated pOpulations. The remainder of the agency bloc consisted of CHYDE, which was located in a separate building in what used to be "Little Europe" although it shared the Razas board of directors; Parents and Teachers for Education (PTE); and the COOperative nursery, which expected to serve about twenty children in 1976. In short, the agency bloc con- sisted of Razas-CHYDE. CHYDE not only had separate facilities but was also begun with a distinct grant from local funds earmarked for drug abuse programs, which came ultimately from the same source. CHYDE, like its parent agency, was constantly in jeopardy of closing, however. A large scale fundraiser was inaugurated one month prior to expiration of the grant in the spring of 1976, and the agency remained Open a few months by virtue of this effort. 277 There were also several Chicano formal Operating units. The Latin American Labor Organization and the Latin American Citizens League both met irregularly according to the wishes of members. There was a Chicano students' club at Mott Community College and another at University of Michigan-Flint (although the two institutions shared the same physical campus) and there was in addition a Mexican folkloric dance group at the latter. There were also several Sports clubs, particularly bowling and basketball teams, among Flint Chicanos. Chicano Veterans (Chi Vets) was one of the largest and strongest of the non religious Flint Chicano clubs. There were some seventy active members altogether in its men's and women's branches. The formal goal was to eliminate discrimination against Chicano veterans and to ensure that they received the rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. These goals had been established by the national organization of which the Flint clubs were chapters. Mostly, however, the organization served sociability functions. One of the major activities annually was admini- stration of a queen contest which was ostensibly held to raise money for a scholarship competition. The scholarship had never been large enough to defray more than partial college tuition costs for the first year for a given student. The queen contest terminated with a fiesta day which was generally held in conjunction with the Battle of Puebla (May S) celebration. It was a major Chicano social event. The day was capped by a dance at which the queen was crowned, held at the Chi Vets hall. This hall was rented year-round and was the only facility other than the church and the buildings that housed Razas-CHYDE that was used exclusively by Chicano Operating units in Flint. 278 The Knights of St. Joseph, the ladies' altar society, and several other clubs related to the Mexican Catholic Church were strong and viable formal operating units during my fieldwork. In fact, the church served as an institutional focus for Chicano traditional culture in Flint much as the barrio did in Lansing. Not only were the longest- standing formal organizations church affiliated. There were also dinners following Sunday mass. Couples who attended other churches were married at MCC. Different age groups came together regularly and the young were thereby immersed in the language and customs of their parents and grandparents. The senior Citizens' hot meal program was held there. Close organization ties were maintained between the church and a number of associations and programs with which it was not con- nected. For example, the announcers on the Chicano radio programs kept the audience informed of church activities, and one of the three announcers had been operating a booth for the church at the annual ethnic festival held by the International Institute for years. Pepe Vasquez from Razas and the priest had a cordial working relationship: Pepe sought support and sometimes advice from the priest, who in turn appreciated Pepe's publicly pro-Church stance. Despite the strength of the church in Chicano organization and maintenance of cultural traditions, pentecostalism was making small inroads among Flint Chicanos. There were two predominantly Chicano congregations of a few dozen faithful followers each. The attraction of these religions appeared to be in the personal contact with the divine which they offered in contrast to mediation by a priest. Faith healing and miracles during prayer were attested to by pentecostal informants. 279 Some Chicanos were also involved in an entire category of operating units in which Chicanos had no interest in Lansing: black organizations. A few Chicanos were members of black social service agency boards. Also, the first Chicano policeman, hired in 1974, appalled Anglo policemen when he joined the black police officers' asso- ciation. They considered him "white," and could not understand why a white man would join a club for black men. He explained that in Texas he had not been considered white and simply assumed that black officers would have more in common with him than white ones. His action caused a number of policemen, who had hitherto considered Chicanos just another white ethnic group like the local Poles, to re-consider what Chicanos might be.6 As a result, he was sent personally to investigate any complaints filed by persons with obviously Spanish surnames. Competition and COOperation Individual Involvement Factory workers comprised the majority of the Flint Chicano population and were far more significant participants in Chicano formal and corporate operating units in that city than in Lansing. They were members of the religious clubs, sports clubs, Chicano Veterans, PTE, and were both clients and board members or officers for Razas-CHYDE. Some factory workers were not involved in Chicano organizations at all and some of them were members of other organizations. These latter included mainstream agencies and groups and black organizations. Factory workers were also members of Latin American Labor Organization, which served arbitration functions, albeit informally, normally fulfilled by 280 a labor union. The un- and underemployed, which included no part-time farmworkers as it did in Lansing, were either clients of some of the agency bloc, clients of mainstream agencies, or uninvolved in agencies at all. Fewer numbers were clients than in Lansing because there were fewer un- and underemployed Chicanos in the city. Many of the individuals in Flint in this category were elderly. The smaller number of underemployed was due to the fact that fewer young immigrants were drifting in and out in search of work, attracted by local farmwork, and the decline in the auto industry in recent years, which had slowed labor immigration. Figures of the department of social services for September 1975 indicated that 414 Chicano families received Aid to Dependent Children (ADC); 62, Aid to the Disabled; 41, Aid to the Aged; and ano- ther family received Aid to the Blind in Ingham County (Lansing). That same month in Genesee County only 150 families received ADC; 16, Aid to the Disabled; and 7, Aid to the Aged.7 Since the Chicano agencies in Flint were not in competition with each other, clients of one were generally clients of the other or members of a family who used its services. Chicano professionals and administrators played similar roles in Flint agencies to-those played by their Lansing counterparts (see Table 1). There were fewer professionals and administrators employed in Chicano agencies in Flint than in Lansing but some of these parti- cipated in mainstream and black agency boards of directors. There were also fewer Chicano professionals employed in state offices in Flint than in Lansing since the latter is the state capital. Those professionals in mainstream positions in Flint were generally employed 281 Table l.--Agency Involvement by Occupational Strata in Flint. —--.‘ Occupational Stratum Role in Agency Chicano Agency Other Agency Un- and Underemployed Factory Workers Administrative, Professional for Chicanos Administrative, Professional, Mainstream Clients, Not Involved Clients, Board Members, Board Officers, Not Involved Employees, Board Officers Not Involved, Board Members Clients, Not Involved Board Members, Board Officers, Not Involved Board Members, Board Officers, Not Involved Employees, Board Members, Board Officers by private industry or by city or county educational institutions, government, or in independent professions. The fact that fewer Chicanos from the upper occupational stratum were involved in Chicano organizations directly or through state government was undoubtedly an important factor in the Chicano political picture in Flint. Chicano leaders or strongmen rooted in an agency with a familia of followers were scarse. There were actually only two leaders in the city--at Razas and MCC—-which could have played the role used by the Lansing 'agency leaders to advance their own interests, and one of these was the priest. Chicano businessmen in Flint did not constitute an important category of actors in Chicano formal organizations. Most Chicano businesses owned by Chicano organization participants were part-time affairs run by individuals who were employed by factories or government during the day. Those that were full-time operations were usually not prosperous and remained open due to reliance on family employment and continued patronage of Chicano friends. Most Chicano businessmen, including the full-time self-employed, were at least nominal members of the Mexican Catholic Church, and some were active members of the religious clubs there. The only full-time Chicano businessman who was an active Chicano agency board member was a construction contractor. Although the role played by an individual and the probability of playing a role at all within these units depended to some extent upon the occupational stratum of that individual in Flint just as it did in Lansing, the pattern of participation was different. This was in large part due to the greater statistical prevalence and economic impact of the factory worker in Flint. There was not a dichotomy between the professional Chicanos and their clients, each intent upon involvement in the Chicano agencies for their own ends. Instead, most Chicanos--like other Flintites--were factory workers concerned with making a living and pursuing recreation and consumer activities in their leisure time. Bases for Factionalism and Cooperation There was no proliferation of Chicano agencies in Flint. When new clubs formed they did not immediately seek private non-profit status as did clubs in Lansing. The only operating units which could have formed the bases of factions or could have entered into invidious competition with each other were the two agencies, one of which was the planned offspring of the other, and the Mexican Catholic Church. 283 Although there was tension between the agencies and the parish, it was largely confined to two spheres: (1) competition for support from the "whole community," and (2) conflict over ideals. The parish and the agencies alike not only desired but also needed support--emotional and financial--from the total Chicano population. Both were keenly aware that most of the time they were taken for granted, but a larger number claimed them in a crisis. The priest indicated that he was frequently called to the hospital to minister to Chicanos who were not his regular parishioners. Likewise, Chicanos who had been heard to inveigh bitterly against Razas would apply there for housing assistance later "with no shame." Both the agencies and the parish appealed to the Chicano pOpulation which was normally uninvolved in their affairs at fiesta time for support. Referring to Figure l, the pattern of recruitment and Cohesion among the various Flint Chicano formal and corporate operating units was quite different from that in Lansing. The agencies, Razas and CHYDE, obtained their employees through kinship and friendship. Since CHYDE was the offspring of Razas, some former clients of Razas had gotten employment there as well. The board of directors was the same for both agencies, and members were mostly friends or relatives of Razas or CHYDE employees. An effort was being made to expand the board to include outsider professionals because the majority of the current board members were poorly equipped for the position. Much valuable time was lost in needless arguments. This situation closely paralleled the case of the state-level board for Michigan Migrant Agency. rmuch mcHuauoao ouwwompou van Hwfiuom ocMOqu ucme pow conoxou ace useEuHsuoom mo moHuHocth .H OHSMHH .LmeHonfioE ponczm oumochw mocHH noxoun HcHuHLO :oeaco a wouusm muHc: ox“ oumoHch mocHH pHHow « coHumuchmLo monnH cmOHaofi< cHumH ”04¢H mcuu0uo> ocmonu “muo> qu HHm Eoum HHm cchcnuonr 0v anercu “no muoneoe Eoum muoproe nousxu OHHoxuau :nono: “um: coHueusvH HOH muozuuok vac museum; ”we; .I . . - EU d.\u\ HFQ uccnaoHc>oo Lune» now mecccqu "ucwzu .\\ \1v\ \\ anon. can- )/ and m-ua>po) mun. n;.:. xvi ; \uv \ o a L: .. .. . u a if; \\\ \//\\\\\ \ \ _ _ :me \\ \ \ ca / \ \ _ _ \\. \\\ \\. \\\ (\ \P, _ _ no \\ \\ \AV \uV\ . \\ emacouanu mm 2 \\ .\ \\\\ \ a .1. . ... _ \ x \ \ 218.7: 7 \\. \\.\dv\ \\\ \\\\\ \\ aHsmcwx mH _ \\ \ \ \\\ \ \ \ — \ \ \\-\ \ \ \ \ / . . \ \\ \ \\ \ \ \ l 2.55 \\ \\ \\ \ \ \ \ lull ‘4 III. _ \ \\ \v \ \ \ \.\\ /. _ _ \V \ \ \ \\\ \l \l \\ \\ / . \ II“ II‘ \\ Coilfioofil \-\\n.\ \ ullalll|\ul\|.:|.ll..||..ll.lu.kl.||“ P \k‘lxl‘l ll. 'IIII'! \ II.‘ III. C / _ “mououcH can oo Hm Enuawum amoroucH :oHuauouc; Hm _ coHpncecou HH anoHummzooo AH conrcu AH amonoucH coagou HH umoaoucH cacaoo AH mHzmv:0HaH Hm _ 922$ 2 _ mi _ mnaHu :upsxu mpaHu muH .lllll .33.; _ I 83 _ 33 Eu 2338.: e5. 8; .l I l .I I I I l. I. |_ 22sz ll. Fifi. . — — 'iIiII‘III-lllll'llllli lll'llnlllllllllll'lll 285 The parallel was not an accident. In both cases, the outside funding source under which the agency had been established had required a certain type composition for the board. In the case of MMA over fifty percent of board members had to meet criteria as seasonal migratory farmworkers; the board of Razas was to consist of Chicanos from the Flint area who had a wide range of social service needs as well as representatives from Chicano "interest groups.” Both boards were to act as "advisors" or informants regarding the problems of the target population but were also to propose and monitor programs. The board was then caught between two conflicting roles: that of advisor and that of policy-maker. Board members spent much of their meeting time dis- cussing personality conflicts and perceived slights by personnel, be- lieving this to be their proper function as "advisors." Initiation and monitoring of programs was largely left to staff. In the case of Razas that was doubly problematic since all but the supervisory staff were young and inexperienced. Parents and Teachers for Education was tied to Razas-CHYDE through common membership and origin. PTE also had members from all the other Chicano formal operating units in Flint. The president of PTE was very concerned that it would not last, however, because most of the members were such in name only. The other organization which drew its membership from all the Chicano clubs and agencies was the ComisiOn de Mexicanidad. Unlike its counterpart in Lansing, this club was not old and members were not suspected of using it to get rich. It was developed through recent COOperation between the church and agency with the express purpose of promoting pride in the Mexican heritage of Flint Chicanos through fiestas celebrating the sixteenth of September and the fifth of May. The club acted as organizer for the festivities but did not collect large sums of money. Most Chicano factory workers in Flint were employed in corporate sector plants. These plants, particularly the all-important auto factories, were ”closed shops" just as were their Lansing counterparts. Chicano employees were therefore at least nominal labor union members. Although they were involved in organizing activities right from the inception of unionizing in Flint, in the 19705 most Chicano informants indicated that they considered union officials "pro-management" or even ”out for themselves." The local chapter of Latin American Labor Orga- nization had not been organized as an alternative union, since its members were members of a recognized bargaining unit, but rather served as a support group and as a pressure group both to the union and to management. Latin American Labor Organization had no formal status with either.union or management (see Chapter 3) but was recognized informally since nearly one third of the Chicano factory workers were affiliated with it. There were also a number of sports clubs whose members joined because of common interest in the games they promoted or due to their similarity in age. These included various youth teams centered at CHYDE. There were also clubs related to religious develOpment, per- sonal introspection, and social service at the Chicano Protestant churches. Membership was drawn from their congregations. Neither the sports clubs (except for those at CHYDE) nor the Protestant clubs were closely interrelated with either major camp of the Flint Chicano organizations. Chicano Veterans, however, the large and visible club,8 was linked by board membership and friendship to Razas. Although members of Chicano Veterans were also members of the Mexican Catholic Church, many members of the latter considered them automatic "devils" or heathens because they had their own clubhouse where they held dances and sold alcoholic beverages. There was a network of strong clubs centered at the church. Members of the various pro-integrationist Chicano clubs were involved at the church as well. Total membership in these clubs was comparable to the numbers involved at Razas-CHYDE, but when backed by the entire parish membership (some 400 families) the impact of the church-affi- liated clubs could be great. As indicated above, there were two broad camps or networks of Operating units within the Flint Chicano pOpulation. These two camps were acknowledged by all my informants, one of whom called them "193 cristianos y los diablos" (the Christians and the devils). The parish and Razas were respective centers of these networks. These networks of operating units were potential political factions, but had not cry— stallized into that pattern. Although hostility was always present, there was relatively little actual internecine warfare between the two camps. The calm was due to (1) strong leadership, particularly by the priest; (2) overlap in membership among most of the Flint Chicano formal operating units involved in both camps; and (3) demographic variables. The demographic variables included the balance in numbers 288 between regularly involved members of both camps, and Chicanos' rela- tive unimportance numerically and situationally in Flint. The latter factor led to Chicano leaders' attempts to establish broker ties to higher levels of articulation—-particularly such brokers as local Anglo politicians. It also encouraged some Chicanos to align them- selves with the black organizations, and as will be demonstrated below, for some leaders to attempt to compete with them. Sources of Funding and Sources of Derivative Power Referring to Figure 2 it becomes evident that Flint Chicano operating units were almost totally dependent on local sources of funds while, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, a number of Lansing Chicano organizations received funds from mOre powerful governmental levels. Not only were sports, religious, and veterans' clubs——common interest associations--dependent on membership dues, contributions, and fundraisers among the larger Chicano and city pOpulations but so were the agencies. This resource competition may have bolstered existing antagonisms along the cleavage lines outlined above. As will be noted below, however, leaders of both camps attempted to understate their differences when it became clear that resources might be withheld from one of the Operating units by an outside funding source. Thus conflict was limited both by circumstances and by design to squabbles between the two camps of which outsiders would not be aware. This was in direct contrast to the Lansing situation, where new organizations would incor- porate overnight in order to vie for a grant for which another unit had already applied and where the ”dirty laundry" of established Chicano operating units was aired in the mainstream communications media. 289 Funding Source Operating Unit Membership Sports clubs, LALO V Chicano populationva x a Chi Vets 8 CM ‘V '— Larger city, area popu\lati\ A Private funding organization Religious org'ns, Catholic (MCC) Religious org'ns, Protestant City funds RAZAS, etc. County fundsHr—~"T'fl'"”fifla"'fir’wgflflflafflpfi— State funds Federal funds Figure 2. Funding Sources for Flint Chicano Formal and Corporate Operating Units. Operating Unit Power Source Operating Unit RAZA-CHYDE, Private agency=:H———————MCC and its clubs dependents \\\“~H\~‘\\\‘\Clty official c:\\\\:T\\\\T\\\\City agency \\\\\\‘*Chi Vets County official \County agency \State official \\ State agency ‘Federal official Figure 3. Derivative Power Sources for Flint Chicano Formal and Corporate Operating Units KEV; LALO: Latin American Labor Organization Chi Vets: Chicano Veterans CM: ComisiOn de Mexicanidad MCC: Mexican Catholic Church RAZAS: Raza Services and Referral Group CHYDE: Chicanos for Youth Development 290 Derivative power sources, like funding sources, were largely local. Although the agency bloc9 had state and federal level power sources, these were individuals, not departments. Since they were mostly elected officials they were able to command very loose coali- tions at their respective levels. In contrast, some Lansing organiza- tions had contacts with administrators in state and federal bureau- cracies which could place the power of their own organizations behind their Chicano dependents. The sources of derivative power for the agency and church- centered camps were different: with the exception of Chicano Veterans, the agency-centered operating unit network had allies at supralocal levels in the public sector. The church—centered network was limited to the hierarchy within the Church itself. Those contacts were some— what circumscribed since the Mexican Catholic Church was not funded by the diocese, and was therefore not completely within its control. Several factors impinged on Chicano organization development in Flint which stemmed from the primary dependence of Chicano operating units on local funding and power sources. First of all, demography was even more crucial for Flint Chicano organizations than for Lansing ones. Their dispersed settlement pattern meant that programs funded through local administration of Community DeveIOpment money tied to target neighborhoods were difficult to obtain. Their numerical minority vis-a—vis blacks meant that organizations of the latter were far more visible as pressure groups. Their statistical similarity to the Anglo mean in income and occupation made any demand for more Chicano-run or Chicano—staffed social service units--a major minority organization building block at this time-~appear unrealistic. Another important factor stemming from the locality of Flint Chicanos' power base was the need to work within the local system--i.e. to operate prOperly in a company town. _Flint was not the center for divergent interest groups as was Lansing. Chicanos in Flint found it necessary to adapt to the town's interests, because city officials were not apt to accommodate theirs if radically different. Also related to the local nature of Chicano power bases was the importance of main- taining a good image in the mainstream communications media. Bickering, charges and counter—charges aired in the local press might have had a truly disastrous impact in Flint. Finally, it is likely that the local nature of the power bases was not only an independent variable--causing stress on numbers and working within the system--but also a dependent one. That is, Chicano operating units were predominantly able to effect vertical ties to the least powerful local and regional levels of the public sector. This in turn was due to the variables noted as depen— dent above--demography and the company town ideology. In the following section the manner in which these variables came into play with the implementation of a social services outreach project for Chicanos will be described. The Prgject: Negating Factionalism Among A Dispersed Population Introduction Proyecto Outreach was a program designed to locate potential clients of Razas who were as yet unaware of services available there. The purposes of the project were (1) to locate Flint city residents with pressing physical or social needs, (2) to service those needs as I.) '0 N soon as possible through the Razas social workers, and (3) to refer more fortunate Chicano Flintites to other agencies for provision of less-than-immediate needs. Proyecto Outreach was funded separately from Razas by a grant from the Genesee County Community Action Agency and was headed by its own director, Ann Rios. Unlike subcontracted programs at CSS in Lansing, however, staff of Proyecto Outreach were under the supervision of the Razas director and were accountable not only to Community Action Agency but also to him. From the outset, there were problems between the funding agency and the staffing agency. Pepe Vasquez, Razas' director, had sought funding from Community Action Agency because it administered Genesee County programs for "minorities," but in fact dealt almost exclusively with blacks. Razas wanted Flint Chicanos located, because staff experiences had told them that city resident Chicanos had more social and economic problems than did Chi- canos who lived outside the city limits but within the county. Commu- nity Action Agency wanted "out—county" Chicanos located because the county commission, the political body to which they were accountable, had recently taken them to task for servicing the county unequally, devoting more time and expending more funds on central city clients than on out-county ones. Since, on the other hand, Razas was funded by a city program the referrals of Proyecto Outreach brought in clients with needs to be met who did not "count" as far as in—city "target areas" were concerned but demanded time and fiscal expenditures none- theless. A total of one hundred families were to be located during the nine—month project period. The initial contacts were made through referrals. For example, the affines of Proyecto Outreach's caseworker knew of several families 293 who were fellow Mexican Catholic parishioners who did not receive assistance of any sort from Razas. From the beginning, the project remained a few interviews behind schedule. It often took numerous telephone calls to locate potential reSpondents, who were not always at home once the interviewer arrived for an appointment. Simply appearing at the door was never done, as the questionnaires took an hour to administer briefly. Back in the office, an impressive amount of paperwork had to be done just for one respondent even if he had required no referrals. After the first two months Marie Mufiiz, a young woman active in the church who was due to have her first child soon, was hired as a clerk. She was asked to arrange interviews by telephone so that the caseworker, director and volunteer outreach workers could administer the questionnaires, do the referrals, data compilation, and reports. Unfortunately, Maria disliked telephoning, was a poor typist, and could not file. Ann Rios spent the rest of the six month program period trying to get her other staff members to do last-minute secre- tarial chores which Maria had not done. Maria was not fired, however, because all of the staff members of Proyecto Outreach-~from Ann down-- were hired by Pepe Vasquez. As Ann said, "Maria has lived here all her life, is a good church member, and Pepe can't just fire someone because he has to face them outside the center too." Competition Within the Agency Because of his realization that he was accountable to Chicanos outside his agency Pepe worked well with the parish-centered network, which might be considered "traditional” in comparison to Razas. He [\J k0 is even called the presidents of various clubs to advise them when he was making a statement to a government agency or the press. However, in spite of his deliberate intergroup solidarity, there was friction between him and his supporters within Razas and one of his board mem- bers and her considerable familial and affiliative connections within the "traditional" sector outside Razas. This board member, Celia Trask, considered Pepe a "dangerous radical" with "communist leanings," a possible carryover of the agency's founding image, who was using Razas to better his own finances and political aspirations. She con- sistently sabotaged intra-agency unanimity and successfully encouraged a split in the board and staff into Pepe supporters and anti-Pepeists which endured for several months. This split encouraged Pepe's hesi- tancy in the Maria case, and the split lasted until further funding crises eliminated a large number of staff members. Within Razas, the lines of loyalty stressed kinship, ritual kinship, and patronage ties. Pepe was the center of the Razas liberals--interested in social service programs, government assistance, minority rights, inter—ethnic programs in the schools, bilingual edu- cation, and the like. They were not opposed to confrontation with city officials or to publicity regarding various kinds of injustices to Chicanos found in Flint. Pepe's supporters included the Dominguez family (his office manager, secretary, and the director of Proyecto Outreach) to whom he was linked by a combination of friendship and patronage; the board president, an educated Puerto Rican raised with Flint Chicanos, and his several well-educated-friends on the board; several board members who were long-time members of other organizations 295 like Chicano Veterans, related through baptiSmal and marriage compadrazgo ties to either Pepe or the Dominguezes; and several employees who had no ties other than employment to any of the other Vasquez supporters. The Razas "cristiano" conservatives centered on Celia Trask, and included all Razas staff and board members who had similar ties with her and her husband, a construction contractor, or her brothers, who were GM employees. This faction professed similar goals for Razas to those of the liberals but held a different political action philosophy. They thought that persons affiliated with Razas in any way should pursue those goals while "keeping a low profile” in the city. When Celia's attempt to get the board to ask for Pepe Vasquez's resignation--spurred on by employees not aligned to Pepe and resentful of the nepotism they saw--failed, Pepe's life was threatened at a dance the following week by one of her brothers. Even the anti-Pepeists were somewhat alarmed at this serious escalation of the conflict, and I heard comments such as, "We're getting to be as bad as Saginaw."10 In spite of the escalation, however, blacks and Anglos uninvolved with Chicano operating units remained unaware of the struggle. About this time, Pepe was pressing Ann to do more interviews of city residents as her reports were not showing the kinds of needs that Razas workers served. Then he received a call from Jan Lacrosse, director of Community Action Agency, indicating that Proyecto Outreach was three interviews behind schedule and that there should be no more interviews done on in—city residents for the duration of the project. Ann dissented as she agreed with Pepe that the needier Chicanos lived inside the city whereas those better off economically became part of the pattern of "white flight” to the suburbs. At this time, slightly over one half of the one hundred interviews had been completed, Proyecto Outreach and Razas itself were evaluated by their respective funding sources the end of November, and as a result of positive evaluations Razas expanded physically the first of the month into a new facility which gave Proyecto Outreach more office space. By this time, Maria Mufiiz was in the final months of pregnancy and spent all her time making arrangements for the baby's arrival. She could not be counted on to maintain a regular schedule in the office. What is more, Ann Rios had been invited to join in an honorary asso- ciation of young business and service executives, and this association promptly made use of her talents in administering questionnaires to minority businesses. Ann was also a member of the advisory boards of a number of mainstream organizations and maintained other organiza- tional ties through a black social service agency where she had been employed before she was hired at Razas. Her many commitments were time—consuming and caused her to delay things that should have been done much earlier and to draft other peOple to do various tasks for her. She was, however, interested in maintaining good relationships both with potential clients through careful empathic interviews, and with other groups and potential factions within the Chicano population. Ann supported Pepe within the agency due largely to friendship between the two families but she herself was a member of the more conservative cristianos outside and was known to have maintained a close long- lasting friendship with the priest. 297 The week following the move to the new offices, a notice that the city program evaluation team found that Razas made "no significant effect on the environment” appeared in the Flint newspaper. Razas' board of directors interpreted the notice as a warning that Razas' funding was again in peril although they had just been favorably eval- uated and moved to improved facilities. This interpretation was bol- stered by the fact that they had also just received notice that six employees on city-level CETA (Comprehensive Employment Training Act) funds were secure of their positions for only one month. The notice was the result of an "environmental analysis" of selected city-funded social service programs which was ordered by the newly-elected mayor. Pepe immediately began calling the presidents of Chicano reli- gious, sports, and social clubs to advise them of the situation. When Razas funding had been in doubt the year before, he had called all of these club presidents and the priest. The latter told his parishioners that the services that Razas provided to poor Chicanos were important and that whether or not a given individual had need of them, the agency was important. As a result of the advertising by club presi- dents and the priest's homily, the mayor and city council were shocked to find their chambers flooded with Chicanos the night of the vote on Razas funding. Needless to say, the strategy was effective in a city where Anglo officials would say, "We have a few Spanish families here, but not many.” The department manager of the city's program evaluation depart- ment indicated that the Razas administration should not interpret the notice as a threat to their funding. His findings did not mention the 398 social effects of the agency, which were considerable, but only indi- cated that Razas was not a program of housing rehabilitation or other physical improvement. Pepe was not convinced, but said, ”Well, at least we're safe for awhile.” At the last moment, the six employees were extended another two months, and Razas and Outreach both proceeded smoothly over the winter months. In March, five months after inception of the program, Ann received a call from Jan Lacrosse directing her to prepare a report and exhibit on Proyecto Outreach for the county commission meeting the following day at 5:00 P.M. The major points of her report were as follow. First, the Chicano population of Flint and Genesee County had been underserved because federal and local monies allocated for programs to the poor distributed funds on the basis of population per- centage so the Chicano undercount in the federal census had been sig- nificant for services provision. Second, Proyecto Outreach had been designed as a needs assessment survey and provision of actual services to individuals had been difficult so only real emergencies had been dealt with. Finally, the report indicated that some sort of ongoing system needed to be implemented for dealing with out-county Chicanos because the Proyecto Outreach staff could not serve their general needs. Jan Lacrosses was not pleased with Ann's report. She con- sidered Proyecto Outreach itself an important service to the Chicano population of Genesee County. Pepe had read the report and had it delivered to the county commissioners as he did not trust Jan to do so. They had little to say about the report or about the project, 299 but voted to consider refunding once the original contract period expired the following month. Ann was asked about this time to become involved in prepara- tions for Chicano Day, which was to be held at Mott Community College. Anglo politicians, leaders of important black organizations, Chicano and Anglo educators, and Pepe Vasquez were asked to speak. Ann and other Razas staff prepared a slide presentation and poem narration of Flint Chicano history. Letters of invitation were sent to the parents of all Chicano students in the public and parochial school systems, invitations were sent to the clients and mailing lists of the agency bloc and to leaders of all Chicano clubs, open invitations were extended in the college paper, and announcements were posted at businesses and public places throughout the city. The speeches were well prepared, Mexican food was catered by a local restaurant at lunchtime, and students from both colleges presented Chicano theater in the afternoon. Throughout the day, however, fewer than a dozen people other than the speakers themselves attended the sessions. The Chicano population of Flint was in general uninterested in self-identification as "different," which participation in activi- ties such as Chicano Day would have been. They called themselves Americans; few of their children spoke much Spanish; and Mexican-mess was mostly reserved for traditional holidays, church activities, and dances. Even parties often included a blend of Anglo and Chicano. For example, local Chicano groups which played at parties and dances had a repertoir from "Chicano sounds”--a combination of border and rock music--to 19503 "golden oldies." Furthermore, Flint Chicanos were mainly conservative politically. A Chicana teacher from Detroit had been befriended by a couple who were active in the Socialist Workers' Party, and some Chicano parents threatened to petition her dismissal as a "communist." It was known that activities such as Chicano Day usually included some radical rhetoric, and few Chicanos were interested. The end of June marked the termination of the extended Proyecto Outreach contract and the end of employment for the six CETA employees who had been getting extensions for some months. One of these employees included Pepe's secretary, one of the Dominguezes. Proyecto Outreach remained in limbo for the month of July but in August Ann was back at work, designing ways in which various social services' could be offered to Genesee County Chicanos to meet the needs uncovered by the survey. In November, several more Razas employees were terminated from county CETA employment, and in December the agency evaluation was again positive but tentative. At the time of this writing, Razas finances remain as tenuous as ever but Proyecto Outreach has become incorporated into the social services department of the agency. Razas personnel's development of Proyecto Outreach exemplifies a very different kind of adaptation to agency structure than that encountered in Lansing. In Flint, the agency structure was also imposed by the outside. This structure was responsible for difficul- ties an inexperienced board and staff had with program administration and for dissention within the agency. Funding source requirements also led to considerable tension as a result of fiscal insecurity and prevented the hiring of more experienced workers. However, the Flint Chicano agency bloc was fighting a battle on two fronts simul- taneously. Not only were they fighting external constraints but they were also trying to undo several decades of acculturation. Not only were Chicanos in Flint far more Anglicized in language, kinship, interests, and even identification than their Lansing counterparts. They were also better integrated: socially--through intermarriage, economically-—as fellow factory workers, and politically—~as "good citizens." Even several of the Chicano operating units claimed as their major goals ngt_the maintenance of Chicano culture or pride in Mexican heritage but rather an equitable share of the American lifestyle. Even the operating unit that was most indigenousll--the parish-~was laboring to create ethnicity. The priest thought Chicano ethnicity as a category worthy of pride, not discrimination, developed coterminously with the building of the new church facility. He indi- cated that parishioners who had heard all their lives that they were good for nothing but work in the fields or "on the line” at a factory could now say, "We're good for building our own church." Both the construction of the new church and the development of the agency bloc-—occasions for creating Chicanismo-occurred during the 19705 following nearly fifty years of Chicano settlement in Flint. Chicanos had been accepted as similar to European immigrants-—confined to the worker strata at the factories, but no lower than other workers. During the Depression some of them had been deported, but others participated in a sit-down strike at the auto plants that had long-lasting national consequences for labor organization. The 302 Spanish-speaking Catholic missionary had always been a focus for maintaining cultural tradition, and establishment of the distinct Chicano parish in the 19505 may have been the single most important event in Chicano history in Flint. Without that center, Chicanos in Flint would likely have remained a dispersed population with no insti- tutional focus for their cultural distinctiveness into the 19705. The agency bloc, with its unstable funding, would probably have folded without the support of the church members. With the advent of the Civil Rights and southwestern Chicano Power movements in the late 19605 and 19705, the resultant heightened awareness of Chicano distinctiveness led to development of an agency, which further crystallized Chicano ethnicity. This newfound Chicano- ness is different from the Chicano-ness developed decades ago as part of "Little Europe" and the "melting pot," however. The new Chicano ethnicity can be bewildering or threatening to others, as the Chicano policeman proved. The new Chicano pride—~different from a sort of class fraction pride that came with the strike of 1936-1937-- is just as unsettling. The company town atmosphere stressing equality was a facade designed to ensure satisfaction with the life of a factory worker. Any development of radical ethnicity or class identificatiOn would undoubtedly be damaging to the smooth Operation of the industry. Since most Flintites identify their own interests with those of the company, it is not surprising that many Chicanos are unwilling to ally themselves with such a movement. This new Chicano pride developing in Flint is like the status cleavages between the various ethnic populations of the mill-worker neighborhoods of South Chicago studied by Kornblum (1974). Kornblum, 303 like Blauner (1969) indicates that competition between the different ethnic populations prevents the development of class unity among the workers, yet the involvement by members of all the ethnic populations in South Chicago steel mill workers' unions is a source of prestige. Flint Chicanos seem to be confronting the same problem. Alignment with the new ”radical" ethnic wave may improve one's individual chances at advancement or it may cause trouble at the factory. On the other hand, negation of one's ethnicity and a conscious alignment with working-class organizations may leave one Open to criticism at church and at other ethnic activities. Flint Chicanos appear to be deve10ping one novel idea, however: the "new ethnicity" is in some cases establishing ties with the larger and somewhat more effectively organized black pOpulation. Whether they become a coalition of "peOple of color" opposed to all things white or whether they will become aligned with white workers to form some larger class organiza- tion remains to be seen. It is also possible that neither will take place and instead the budding organization may wither. Summary Chicano organization activity in Flint began in the 19205 with a mutual aid society. There was a Spanish-speaking Catholic missionary from the first decade on, and in the 19505 a Mexican Catholic parish was established that was to become the institutional focus for maintaining Chicano traditional culture in the city. A number of Chicano clubs were affiliated with the church, including one begun in 1957--the oldest Chicano formal operating unit in the city. Chicano factory workers, most numerous occupational stratum in Flint, participated in the entire range of Operating units. The church and church-affiliated clubs formed one camp in potential factionalism in the city. The other camp consisted of a large social service agency for Chicanos and a subordinate but separate smaller agency. The leaders of these two camps worked together to prevent antagonisms from reaching Anglo recognition and also supported each other at crises in their respective camps. Chicanos were early integrated into the city as just another ethnic group. They were involved in the Depression era sit-down strike at GM. Then in the 19705 a new kind of Chicano-ness began to develop with the construction of a modern building for the Mexican Catholic church and the develop- ment of the agency camp. It is suggested that this new Chicano pride, just as the earlier strike, represents a potential threat to the smooth Operation of the company town. 305 Footnotes 1As in the previous chapter, all individuals and Chicano Operating units have been given pseudonyms. 2 . ' . . NO figures are available on the actual number Of Chicanos who were strikers. I was able to locate several strikers or their children to interview. 3The original reads as follows: La barraca en que vivimos Que su bendicion derrame NO conoce la tristeza En los Estados Unidos Porque en ella conocimos Y que a1 corazon inflame De la Iglesia su pureza. De todos los desvalidos. Por eso cuando supimos Es el deseo de un bracero, De la Virgen Mexicana, Que vino, de los dolares en pos, Hacia Flint nos dirigimos Y no conseguira dinero A ver la Guadalupana. Pero se reconcilio con Dios. (Tomas Napoles Ponce, written about 1962, unpublished.) 4As indicated in footnotes 3 and 5, chapter 6, corporate and formal operating units have a delegated administration and greater resource bases than the sum of the individual members. Corporate operating units also have exclusive control of some resource (Adams 1970: 52—53). 5Someone entered the building during lunchtime and stole portable valuables while I was working with the agency. 6The results may eventually be negative for the Chicano popu- lation. One officer told me that just recently the local police have begun to notice that Chicanos appeared to be becoming involved in the heroin traffic in Flint. He suggested that policemen who were aware of the Chicano Officer's "rejection" of whites appeared to be more apt to investigate Chicanos allegedly involved in such traffic than others. 7 'These figures are problematic. Whether or not a family was listed as Chicano depended on the caseworker's observation of a Spanish surname or "Mexican” physical characteristics. The figures probably reflect the pattern Of assistance to Chicanos accurately, even if the actual figures are questionable. 8Thirty-one point nine percent of the sampled household heads in Flint were veterans while only 16.2 percent of the Lansing heads of household I sampled were. ~ 9LALO was a ”dependent” of the agency bloc, which could be counted on to contact a powerful friend to make known a LALO grievance if necessary. This had only happened once, however. 10The Chicano barrio of Saginaw, Michigan was racked by killing and counter—killing in the mid-19705. Law enforcement Officials attri- buted it to conflict over a brisk trade in Mexican heroin. Chicanos in Flint and Lansing, while cognizant of the drug angle, attributed the violence to heightened conflict between groups normally in conflict. They said, "There it's always been family against family." 11I.e. indigenous in the sense of "traditional Chicano culture." CHAPTER 9 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS Introduction This study was a controlled comparison of the develOpment and integration of the Chicano populations of two Michigan cities—-Flint and Lansing. It was my hypothesis that three dialectically inter- related processes important in that development--migration, settlement pattern, and social organization--were dependent upon the power struc- tures of the target city and several supralocal levels. Summary and Conclusions Flint was found to be a company town dependent upon manufacture of one durable good—-the automobiles-and its spinoffs. In contrast, Lansing, also an auto manufacturing center, was also found to be the center of an important truck farming region and, as capital of the state, was also the center for government Officials and grants. Chicanos in Lansing and Flint were mainly migrants to those cities, and over half of them in both cities were migratory farmworkers or the children of farmworkers at immigration. However, the auto industry in Flint became the major Chicano employer as soon as Chicanos settled into the city. In contrast, some Lansing Chicanos retained agricultural employment even after permanent settlement in the city although a statistically greater number did become factory workers. 307 I conclude that the patterns of Chicano migration to Flint and Lansing occurred in response to the changing labor needs of the auto and agriculture industries. The labor needs of these industries fluctuated with changing regional, national, and international economic cycles. Therefore, Chicanos began to migrate to both cities by the 19305 to perform hand labor in sugarbeet cultivation and harvest as the immigration laws of the 19205 made Mexicans an available labor pool. Likewise, Chicanos migrated to Flint along with thousands of other workers during the 19405 to work in the auto plants, which were turning out huge orders of war materials. Following World War II both Flint and Lansing were faced with the need to diversify as city growth in the country was being channelled along metropolitan lines. Flint was not as successful as Lansing and the poor economic health of the city during the energy crisis of 1973 reflected its dependence on the auto industry. Lansing was more fortunate mainly because its capital city functions ameliorated its industrial dependence. Following the general trend, agriculture in the Lansing area was maintaining its economic health by becoming increasingly capital-intensive. Although the history of Chicano settlement in Flint and Lansing dates to the early decades of the twentieth century, the contemporary population configuration in both cities began to develop during the 19505. During this era Mexicans were imported as contract laborers through a complex network of formal organizations carrying out inter- national recruitment of workers. There was also a recession at the end of the 19505 and Chicanos from less—develOped Texas came in greater and greater numbers to work in mid-Michigan fields and factories. During the 19605, however, the mechanization of Michigan agriculture escalated and by the end of the decade the demand for hand labor was reduced to a fraction of its earlier level. The pattern of Chicano migration between under-developed southern Texas and northern Mexico and developed Michigan had been set, however. Through contacts with kin, friends, and former employers Chicanos continued to migrate to the state. Relatively few Chicanos except relatives of permanent residents entered Flint in the 19705, but many Texans and Mexicans were still migrating to Lansing attempting to join the local labor force through the strategy of temporarv agricultural employment. Establishment of settlement pattern was largely dependent upon migration. The auto and agriculture industries selected different Chicano migrants: those in Flint were mostly native-born and a number were veterans of the U.S. armed forces, while those in Lansing included Mexican nationals and many unskilled, uneducated workers. Early farm- workers settled near their employment in Lansing. Early farmworkers in Flint were contracted by a fieldman from another city. More Flint Chicanos had had prior urban experience, and may have been more suited to spatial integration by this and other factors of migrant selectivity (cf. Frielich 1970, who suggests Mohawk warriors are predisposed to skyscraper construction due to their training in fearlessness). Once established, the Chicano settlement concentration in Lansing mushroomed as the negatively selected migrants settled near others with similar background and language. Outsiders came to hold negative images of the barrio as demonstrated by the higher number of Chicano arrests than their proportion of the population. Discrimination may have also 310 contributed to further settlement by newcomer Chicanos who wished to avoid conflict with Anglos. One of the variables which appears to determine the local evaluation of a given ethnic population is the visibility of the minority pOpulation and, related to this, its size. Lansing Chicanos were segregated, culturally distinct, and visible. Blacks in Lansing did not comprise a much larger percentage of the total population than Chicanos. In Flint, over one fourth of the total population was black, and blacks were quite segregated and cen- tralized. Chicanos, dispersed and less significant numerically, were invisible in comparison. Economic and social features of the popula- tion that resulted from differential industrial selectivity of Chicano migrants exacerbated the trends in the two cities. Chicanos in both cities had developed mutual aid societies, support groups to confront discrimination, and ties to local Catholic parishes oriented to their population early in their adaptations. In Lansing, the Mexican Catholic parish was pulled out from under its parishioners in the early 19605 and was replaced by a social service agency. Feelings against the move were still strong, and some Chicanos suggested that factionalism among city Chicanos dated to that event. In Flint, financing of the Mexican Catholic parish was removed from“ diocesan control in the early 19705 by successful fundraising to build a modern church facility. In this manner Flint Chicanos gained a measure of control over their church. However, the priest kept tight reins on his flock and the political as well as moral impact of his leadership was immense. The church in Flint served as a conservative focus to formal organization activity. In Lansing, the 311 Catholic church hierarchy had effectively destroyed a similar center of organization. Chicano ethnic identity in Lansing was found to be predominantly ascribed while in Flint it was achieved. In Lansing, Chicano-ness was maintained by continued visiting with Texas and Mexican relatives, the influx of new Texas and Mexican immigrants, and the presence of the barrio which served as a symbol of cultural distinctivness. These factors continued Chicano visibility but also performed supportive functions for the overwhelming majority of poor, uneducated, Mexican- born, and underemployed negatively-selected Lansing migrants. Chicanos were the objects of discrimination, which fUrther heightened their dis- tinctivenss, but they did qualify for various kinds of government assistance programs due to the recognition of their minority status by local officials. Quite the opposite was true in Flint, where Chicanos were a somewhat older immigrant group and resided dispersed throughout the city. Recent attempts to prove the need for Special services to Chicanos had largely fallen on deaf ears. In both cities, the structure Of Chicano corporate Operating units--agencies--was imposed from above. In Lansing the poorer, more recently arrived, least acculturated Chicanos adapted to these agencies by using traditional personalistic mechanisms common to their Mexican heritage. They would establish vertical linkages to a patron at an agency, become a loyal member of his "family" Of clients, and react to the agency as though it were an individual. They gained visible improvements in their resource control in this manner, as the agencies--though Operating on severely limited budgets--did provide 312 various direct gifts of goods and services to their clients. These clients were able to maintain life in the barrio through reciprocal relations with kin, friends, and compadres and the addition of an agency patron to help out in emergencies. Thus, they appeared to be preadapted to the role of "agency client." The professionals—administrators in Lansing were interested in the Chicano corporate operating units because these could be used as a base for support, services, and clients. As was demonstrated, one professional had attained a local mainstream public office through his manipulation of his network of agency supporters. Similar mechanisms of adaptation and manipulation of ethnicity have been noted in other world areas (e.g. Grillo 1974). It has been suggested that the incor- poration of some members of an oppressed group into the "ruling circles" of the system (i.e. into the center of the Center) in this manner is akin to the policy of "indirect rule” which was maintained, for example, in the British colonies in Africa. Caulfield (1973: 190) gives the example of the Cherokee "Chieftain" in Oklahoma who is also an executive in Phillips' Petroleum Company, who makes decisions for the tribe which are more in the interests of the "white upper class" than the Cherokee nation. The Chicano professionals serving the client stratum at the agencies were largely fulfilling this function. Chicanos in Flint had adapted to the imposed agency structure through kinship and patronage as well. Leaders were constrained to manipulate the agency differently, however, because of the differences in local political economy, particularly local political ideology. In Lansing, there was factionalism among the corporate operating units 313 which was encouraged and maintained by the following. The very structures of the agencies themselves required inclusion of ineffec- tive policy makers on governing boards who were more interested in personal conflicts than in administration. There was an appearance of an ”Open society" in which any pressure group could get funding for its program, when in actuality funds for any given project for Chicanos were limited. In Flint, factionalism was mitigated by coop- erative leadership and comparative invisibility which required cooper- ation for the survival of operating units at all. Flint agencies did suffer from internal structural difficulties, but since the agencies were few in number and interlinked this did not lead to competition among them but rather within them. Both the agency bloc and the church supporters in Flint appeared to be building culture (Blauner 1969: 422). Flint Chicanos had been through fifty years of "melting pot" but were structurally integrated-~integrated into the local political economy, as opposed to integration by language or identifi- cation--at the lower levels. They were developing an awareness of their Chicano-ness and stressed local aspects of the Chicano experience-~such as participation in the sit-down strike of the 19305-- in their ethnic pride, which had strong overtones of working-class fraction identification. The majority of Chicanos in both cities lacked an awareness of the operation of systems of power, particularly government and government-funded institutions. They would relate to these formal organizations like they adapted to the migration experience in general--through manipulation of their own personal network. Since Chicanos tended to relate in network terms, much of the competition for resources took the form of power struggles between leaders of different "families" of followers. However, a greater range of derivative power sources was available in Lansing and as a result a number of Chicano agencies were maintained there. The major benefits of these agencies were the provision of white-collar positions and minimal though impor— tant social services. Although these agencies did provide services to their clients they were hampered from real effectiveness by the constant competition for resources in which they were engaged. There was just enough power available to Chicanos through their access to local derivative power sources to keep one major agency open in Flint. The agency was forced to present a united front with the church sup- porters tO local power holders if it was to survive. The overall effectiveness of these outside agency structures for Chicanos in general was therefore tempered by the local power structures and the manner in which Chicanos were integrated into these. At all levels and in all the processes involved in Chicano population development and integration in Flint and Lansing, however, there were power relationships operating over which Chicanos had little control. As a result, in Lansing Chicanos were a recognized minority group out of which some individuals were becoming integrated to the mainstream through manipulation of the agencies. In Flint, Chicanos were creating ethnicity to achieve mobility. Policy Implications A cursory reading of this study might indicate that the most effective way to eliminate factionalism, discrimination, and poverty 315 among the Chicano population of Lansing would be to relocate Chicanos from the barrio into all the census tracts in the city. I suggest that this would be rash, however. The barrio serves as a mechanism through which a Chicano newcomer with poor English language skills, little employment potential, and few friends can secure housing, emergency aid, and often temporary employment until he has a chance to learn some of the requirements for life in the urban mainstream. Therefore it would be more advisable to assist the newcomer with achieving those requirements--language, employment training, and formal education--than to relocate him, although relocation might be a desirable long-term individual goal. It would be helpful to mount an education campaign in the city stressing the positive aspects of Chicano-mess, but it is doubtful that local government would be open to such a movement unless it were in the form Of an annual festival such as the "patriotic" fiestas which already take place. In Flint, there are Chicanos who desire the services of an agency and are willing to use the existing agency bloc. These are constantly in funding peril due to the Community Development require- ment that target neighborhoods be served. Chicanos in Flint are a target but dispersed population. Furthermore, in both cities the agencies do offer a way for Chicanos to gain employment experience and move out into the mainstream. They therefore perform a valuable service not only for Chicanos but also for the city. as these individ- uals tend to lose their identification as part of a "problem” population. Future Research Suggestions There are a number of areas for future research to which this study points. One area for research is in donor locales. Considerable research in Mexico has suggested the impact of migration to the U.S. on rural Mexican villages (e.g. Lewis 1951; Shadow 1977) and Texas towns (e.g. Rubel 1966). We are beginning to understand specific linkages—-kinship, economic necessity--that enable an individual to make the international migration and what prevents others in the same village from doing so, but more work is needed. It would be useful to examine Chicano formal organization in settings radically different from the Southwest. Such an examination might be done, for example, in a city in Arkansas-~a state with Southeastern culture but located just north of Texas. Blacks have historically been "the minority" in the Southeast just as they have been in Flint. It would be worthwhile to determine if Chicanos in Arkansas have been integrated into the mainstream but at the lower levels, as they were in Flint. I suspect examination would show that they were. Another area for study is Chicano elites. Studies of the descendants of Mexican elites in the United States have dealt with. the now landless heirs to the New Mexico land grants (e.g. Leonard 1970), but most Chicano studies have been with labor migrants. We do not know if all Chicanos in California and New Mexico, for example, who have attained political positions or business interests are the children of labor migrants. We do know that many local elites in the Mexican northwest lost most of their land following failure to implement provisions of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (see Acuna 1972). 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The questions were completely open-ended and often required explanation. I revised the most difficult questions and changed the format, adding possible responses to be used as ”prompters." Following these revisions a second pre-test was conducted with the Chicano employees of a migrant services agency in Mt. Pleasant, Michigan. Seven questionnaires were completed and no further difficulties were encountered with the survey instrument. 335 The Instrument* The questionnaire was designed to gather the following data on a random sample of the Chicano populations of both cities: 1) Migration history When they came and why Employment history, current employment How they knew about the city 2) Demographics and economics Sex, age of household head Number in household .Education Number in household employed Income Stability 3) Spatial considerations How found housing Why selected particular housing Cost of housing Perceptions of neighborhood 4) Social organization Religion Visiting Hopes to return to Texas/Mexico Club membership 5) Stratifying variables Where born, length of residence Language Occupation, occupational history, education Neighborhood Sample Design A sampling specialist at the University of Michigan Institute for Social Research (ISR) was contacted regarding the implementation of the plan to sample by block saturation. It was pointed out that in * See Appendix B for the questionnaire. 336 census tracts where Chicanos reside dispersed time would be lost in trying to locate potential interviewees. This specialist had been a consultant to Choldin and Trout (1969) on their state-wide Chicano survey and suggested that I use the method which they had employed. That method was to devise a list of households from known sources such as agencies, public directories, welfare Offices, churches, and such. The major limitation to such a survey design is that the population from which the sample is selected shares the biases of its sources. A list of names was drawn up for each city utilizing various sources including city and telephone directories and those organizations which served the target pOpulation which were able to provide mailing or client lists. The names and addresses of individuals with Spanish surnames were taken from publicly available directories, cross- checking with several lists of Spanish surnames. Those names obtained from organizations were not cross-checked. Care was taken not to duplicate households. Persons with the same surname and the same address were listed only once. Residences known to be outside the city limits were excluded. Each name was recorded on a separate card, filed in alphabetical order, and the cards were then numbered consecutively. For Flint the resultant census included 1182 cards and for Lansing there were 1624. Multiplying these numbers by 4.0, the mean number of persons per household for households of Mexican origin in urban Michigan (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1973), the total census so derived was 4728 persons for Flint and 6496 persons for Lansing. Attempts to add recent immigrants to the list were made with the assistance of individuals who work with new arrivals in the city. 337 However, it is assumed that these figures were undercounts and that they probably represented the more stable, better-Off persons in both cities. The Survey A random sample of 90 numbers was derived by computer from all possible numbers on the cards which comprised the census of households for each city. Three assistants were hired to administer the survey in each city. Each interviewer was given a list of 30 names and addresses. It was anticipated that it would be possible to complete a questionnaire at 20-25 of each 30 addresses. Questionnaires were completed for each household on the list which was Chicano rather than using the lists as guides to individuals. In Flint the refusal rate was slight. There was considerable mobility encountered, but in fewer than five of any list of thirty had the houses so enumerated ceased to house Chicanos. Two non-Chicano Latinos were encountered in the sample. A total of 69 usable interviews were completed, for a total of 290 persons, or slightly more than a 5 percent sample of my population (4728 persons) and more than a 3 percent sample of the estimated Genesee county population (Michigan Civil Rights Commission 1973). In Lansing the refusal rate was slight in areas outside the Chicano barrio but interviewers encountered vacant houses, broken appointments, and outright refusals in almost 50 percent of the house- holds listed in the random sample in the barrio. At first I doubted the interviewers, but I then tried the sample myself with similar results. Even when I had a referral from a trusted acquaintance of 338 the potential interviewee I was sometimes refused entry. I was reminded by neighborhood residents that the area is sample by peOple from the university "all the time." This complaint can be readily verified by examination of theses and dissertations in the fields of education, sociology, and social work. Furthermore, a major survey had just been completed the previous summer by the state of Michigan on manpower and employment of selected minorities (see Wu 1976). The Lansing barrio had been selected as the site representative of Michigan Chicanos and a total of 628 households were interviewed between July 16 and August 31, 1974 in the barrio (Wu 1976: i). The survey instrument was lengthy and included numerous questions on past periods of employ- ment, salary, and unemployment. Similar questions on my survey instru- ment were often met with fear or reluctance to answer in both cities.* Armed with this information, I returned to the block saturation method. I hired a woman who lived in the barrio as an assistant and she and I sampled all the dwelling units in a four-block area in the heart of the barrio at which there was a respondent willing to answer the questions. Her prior acquaintance with many of the residents gained entree for her which would not have been possible for others. The number of questionnaires completed in this manner closely approxi- mated those not obtained through the list sampling attempted earlier. Only three non-Chicano Latinos were encountered on the lists in Lansing. The final sample of usable questionnaires totalled 80 * I encountered several good reasons for fear--a family which had failed to report a small outside income to the welfare office, undocumented Mexican nationals, and a man with two wives and two house- holds. Those persons volunteered the reasons for their fears, but others would ask, "Who wants to know and why?" even though the purpose of the study had been explained at the outset. 339 households including 318 persons. This total is 7 persons short of a 5 percent sample of my Chicano census, but is well above a 3 percent sample of the estimated Ingham County pOpulation (Michigan Civil Rights Commission 1973). The Land Use Survey A traverse was drawn diagonally across the longest extension of each census tract in each city and those structures which appeared on that traverse were the sample. In order to simplify the procedure, street blocks which most closely approximated the traverse were selected for the sample units. For each block sampled in a given census tract the following data was recorded: 1) land use, 2) housing condition, 3) housing age, 4) relative size of the census tract and density of housing units based on observation, 5) accessibility of residential streets to each other and to major through streets, 6) notable physical features, if any. This strategy was pursued as I had originally suspected that differences in housing and employment could account for the different Chicano residential distribution. I expected to find that if Chicanos were considered a minority as in Lansing.they would live in less desirable housing, while in Flint where they were "invisible" they would reside in housing that approximated the mean for the city. Cen- sus tracts were chosen for the units of comparison as they are designed to include areas of housing which is similar as well as to include 340 populations with similar socioeconomic characteristics. 1 found that this was generally the case unless major renovation had taken place since the last census. The city assessor's office was consulted in both cities to - ascertain the average age of houses in various sectors of the city and to view photographs of dwellings of representative age. I also referred to Andrews 1967 for architectural style changes since 1900. Land use per census tract was listed as residential, commercial, industrial, or mixed based on the block surveys. Dwellings were designated Type I, II, III, or IV based on current condition and original construction. The typology was designed for single-family dwellings since these predominate in both cities. Dwellings were designated type I if they were constructed of durable materials; were sizable and situated on more land than a regulation city lot; tended to include landscaping; and were in good repair, lacking maintenance problems such as peelingvor missing paint, and were structurally sound to cursory inspection. Type II were like type I but smaller or located on smaller lots. Dwellings were classed type IV if they were constructed of materials such as "insulbrick" (asbestos siding) which must be replaced and has been used historically on the homes of the working poor; were situated on regulation city lots, which allow for very little vacant Space between houses; and were restricted in size to the small "bungalow" style (although very old larger houses were classed as type IV if they were structurally unsound or Otherwise in poor condition); and had structural defects such as falling porches, missing or broken 341 doors and windows, roofs broken through, other parts of the house sagging or skewed, or had not been painted for such a long period that the wood was weathered. Type III were intermediate--they were like type IV but appeared to have only maintenance problems, or were like type II but in similar condition to type IV. The typology was sub- jective and meant to indicate the range of dwellings available. Participant Observation I already had friends at the universities and in broadcasting in East Lansing and Flint so I began expanding my own network of Chicano friends by following linkages out to the new potential members. I had difficulty at the outset overcoming resistance due, depending on the organization or individual, to my researcher role, my ethnicity, or both. These issues will be addressed below. I would have had serious difficulty entering into the social life of Flint and Lansing Chicanos at all without the prior experience with migrant farmworkers that I had had in the area. Through that research experience I had made some invaluable contacts in the Lansing Chicano barrio and had proven through an applied or directed research project and the resultant report (Ferguson, Haney, and Ready 1974) that I was concerned not only with my own academic advancement but also with the people I had studied. The final report provided me with as sure a reference to certain Chicano groups in both cities as did a letter of introduction from my chairman to some mainstream agencies. The use of these credentials and contacts were important in several instances. 342 Contacts with local Chicano influentials I met through the migrant study were important instant references to new associations. For example, early in the research I attempted to make an appointment with Lansing's Chicano Social Services' director. His secretary told me, "I couldn't fit you in his schedule," although I did not press for an immediate appointment. I contacted the social work supervisor at the migrant agency, who told me to use her name as a reference and to call her counterpart at Chicano Social Services, who advised me to come the very next morning. When I arrived I found that the director himself was waiting for me as the social work supervisor had told him about my interest. Further investigation proved that the gatekeeper function of his secretary, and of secretaries at other agencies, discouraged some from trying to make the contact and was effective in limiting outsider access. The written report of the migrant project was even more important as a reference. I provided copies to the directors of various programs and associations in both cities, particularly those who were hesitant to discuss their programs. For example, I met an educator in Flint who was quite hostile to "do-good white liberals" and would not discuss her program. She told me that she thought the white liberal in charge of Native American studies at the college where she was employed was a nice person but that his curriculum was incredibly poor as well as heavily pro-white biased (which it was, if her description was even fairly accurate). Her conclusion was that whites should not teach Native American or Chicano courses as they could not possibly "know what it is like to be a Chicano." Although 343 I came with a recommendation from a colleague of hers, she was hostile and reluctant to answer questions. I asked for a second interview at "a time of greater convenience" to her, and promised to mail a copy of the migrant study report before the second interview. She planned to take a folk dance group out to some migrant camps and was interested in the camp descriptions. The second interview had a totally different ambience. She was, although not warm and friendly, helpful and COOper- ative and provided numerous references to local Chicanos whom I might interview. At the end of the interview she remarked, "The only reason I saw you was because you sent the report like you said you would, and besides, it was pretty good." Another problem of accessibility developed as my involvement with the Chicano population of the two cities deepened. Once I met the director of Chicano Social Services I became enlisted as an "official volunteer" of CSS through performing a needs and use assess- ment of the health clinic there. I was accorded immediate acceptance in those Chicano organizations that were part of or peripheral to Chicano Social Services' sphere of influence and those members of the vast, uncommitted majority who at one time or another became CSS clients. I also became identified rather quickly with CSS even though I had prior experience with and had made friends in rival Lansing agencies. This was always a problem throughout my research particularly in that city. With time my utter refusal to be put in the position of taking sides with one Chicano organization against another coupled with my willingness to assist any Chicano organization against any non-Chicano outsider gained me at least minimal acceptance 344 with most of the various social sectors of the Chicano population. It also likely set me off as an obvious stranger, despite my under- standing of the language and culture, as no Chicano would have been permitted to remain inside yet outside so many competing operating units. 1 was often told parables whose point was not lost on me, such as the story about the man who wore so many hats he was never sure which one he had on; the puppy who ran from dog to dog looking for one he could follow; the poor cook who had a spoon in every pot; and the child who could not find his mother. APPENDIX B MIGRATION HISTORY QUESTIONNAIRE Name of house census tract APPENDIX B MIGRATION HISTORY QUESTIONNAIRE h) Number MIGRATION HISTORY QUESICXNAIRE hold head on back) street address respondent: date interviewer language of interview __ Spanish _ English phone oral consent obtained household head __p spouse other 34E; developed by hmeB.Hmmy 1976 HUD contract H-2367G 346 MIGRATION SISTORY QUESTIONN IRE 1976 Jane B. Haney CONSENT FORM (Interviewer will first identify him/herself). Employment, good wages, friends and relatives, and schools and churches all encourage people to settle in a particular city. I an administering a questionnaire that deals with these factors. (Provide business card). Mrs. Haney is writing a report on the settlement of Mexican- Anericans in this city, and an important part of this study is a history of which factors were more influential in encouraging people of Mexican descent to settle in Lansing/Flint. Is this family of Mexican descent? Would you be willing to assist us by answering the questions on this questionnaire? In :rder to insure your privacy, only the name of the household hes will be fathered so that if Hrs. Haney wishes to discuss a particular question with you she may. The infor- mation you give will be put together with the answers given by all other people who answer to fern a general picture of the history of settlement and employment in the city, and your answers will not be provided to anyone else. You are free to check this form over when we finish to make sure I have your answers.noted correctly, and you may decide not to continue if you wish. 2547 (1)Eow long have you lived at this address? weeks months 'ears all life 0 (2) ___household head get job here ___pther family member got job here .___came to attend school ___came as heard schools good 1 ‘___came as heard social services give much aid ZIDid you live at another address in this city before moving here? yes no If yes, what was that address? ‘___moved here to be near other family members here ___moved to be near friends from there who had come here ___didn't have enough money to leave hgard there are better opportunities __'otner (Comments: (31Wha: factors were most important in your decision to move to your present address? price location near family location near friends from home state location near friends from this city house/apt was available location near work ‘___size of house/apt other ,Comments: I LT 7 (If moved due to better opportunity) How did you know 'ansinz/Plint was the place to go for this? ___yisited friends from home who live here ___yisited other family members who live here ___heard from friends who live here ___heard from other family who live here ___heard from people who have been here before ___yorked in or near city before ___heard from employment agent (4}when did you move to Lansing/Flint? ___weeks ago ___;Onths ago ___years ago lived here all life Comments: heard from guidance counsellor other (Comments: - '- ‘Tl. (8)How did you locate this howso/apt? friends family newspaper (S)Where did you live before moving to Lansing/Flint? born in Lansing/Flint other place in Michigan other Midwest state Texas other SW state Mexico other social service agency realtor drove by other (9)Do you ' own rent ? (6)Why did you move to Lansing/Flint? 2548 (10)Hhen do you think this house/buil- ding was built? (11)Do you think the appearance of the neighborhood where you live has ___improved ___remained same ___deteriorated during the time you have lived here? I (3) poor school J ' (12)If someone asked you where your neighborhood was, what would you say? ___fiorth side ___3ast side ___§outh side ___yest side ___just this block ___§everal blocks around F l___other too much hard to other Comments: (13)In your neighborhood do you have problems with any of the followinr? ___too little police protection too danrerous to walk at police little for young people to do dangerous traffic get house loan ___too many people in neighborhood night (14)Sow many people live in this house? + Please list each as follows: Relationship to head Age Where born of household Primary language Education(yrs) \OWQO‘UIJ-KNNH 349 (4) (1S)Pcr persons who live here who are presently employed or who have worked during the past year, please list the following: Relationship to head Occupation Employer How long employed of household Weeks Months Years (16)Have any of these persons had any other jobs this year? yes ___no If yes, indicate below: Relationship to head Occupation Employer How long employed of household Weeks Months Years (17)Did anyone currently employed have difficulty getting his/her job? ___yes ___no If yes, what was the reason? education requirement old employer recommendation experience requirement other personal recommendation (18)Do you have children, brothers or sisters, or parents who do not live with you? yes no (19)}ibout how often are you able to visit with them? Relationship to head Where they live Frequency of visits of household Per day'Per wk. Per mo. Per yr. Other 350 ( 5) (ZOlWhere were you born” ___hichigsn __Texas ___pther 31 state ___2-'.exico other FT>YJWhere were your parents born? ____I:ichi 332:1 ___Iexas ___other SN state ___Iiexico ___pther “22 (if other than household head is respon- dent Jhere was the head of the household born? ___flichigan ___Iexas ___other 57 state ___yexico other 1HT33 Stnere were his/her parents born? Ziichi :an ____Texas other 5% state hezico other (34}15 the head of the household a veteran? Could you tell me about the kinds of Jobs he7she has had during his/her wc rkinc years? I would like to know what each job was that you can remember, about how long he had it, and if there was a big increase or decrease in pay that was important for any. Occupation and Location Length of Time Notable change in P3V° weeks Months 'Years Increase Decrease 3551 (6)? (25)Yhich of the followirr act vities How often? have you participated in during the i wkl ' moly less past year? How often? wkly bi :l'l moly less clini “kl? couns _ __ __ __ healt. dances,3".anish __ __ __ __ emerg.rocm church activities ____ ____ ____ :food stamps ___po:mun'ty -local :overnmcnt organizations meetings PTA mo"ios, Spanish III III III II II II ,M.‘ . - :other school ,_0_ 3 any of'tne io Ml vrin; reasons prevent prorrams your farticipc ti on in such activities? welfqre ___}ack of time .;-bthcr lick of interest II III III ' » v ' r- “a '.‘lsr lacs of money I? C Does o-r family bolo.. to a . rticu ‘”'5-be- church? ves no If yes, is i Catholic of -rotestant . :n v- '27'Hove vou participated in any of the the a i ? . . i A "y e 'r “i 1‘ the past year? Few often? Ves no bi w‘ ly mol" less VJ "1 1r 1 . d [3133ther than yO'Ir rfamily members who live here with you, with whom do you spend more time? fail", “ot in same house neirhoors reopl e from work club/or:eni:ation members church members other I (32}90 you have any plans to move from Lansing Flint? fives no If yes, where dofl you plan to move? other fiidwest city farm near here "eras other SN state hexico IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII I Other IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII IIIIIIIIII‘IIIIIIII IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII Other If yes, when do you plan to :0'2' " I n \ u i8;3o you rcouiarly use any of the follow- in: services in Spanish? radio this year next year within the next five years when the children are rrown when retired other a or other T! in ojanish ____'?lint) newsletter 0thcr El I (393”hich of the following community services I~ H337 ha'c you participated in durins the past " ' year? yo on rent "our rhousc,do "cu have a lease, or just pay per month? lease nor month How much per month? 3&52 flow often? “5)" I (?53Hhich of the following activities wEinkly moly less have you participated in during the o clinics I past year. counselling or co::un.mental How often? -__health bi wkly moly less wkly s:org.roon ___food stamps local government --mee n 63 movies,Spanish dances,3panish I I _’# ~—’— ——— II IIIIII II IIIIII church activities PTA community other school organizations programs welfare other (26)Do any of the following reasons prevent your participation in such activities? ___lack of time ~ lack of interest [30)Does your family belong to a particular church? yes no If yes, is it __. ___patholie lack of money Protestant Aether Other Does it offer services in Spanish? yes no (27}Snve you participated in any of the following community organizations during the past year? (31)0ther than your family members who live here with you, with whom do you How often? spend more time? bi wkly wkly H ‘33 m ___fanily,not in same house ___neighbers people from work ___club/or§anization members ___phurch members ___pther (32)Do you have any plans to move from Lansing Flint? as no If yes, where do you plan to move? L III IIIII III IIIIIIII III IIIIIIIII other hidvest city farm near here Texas other SW state Mexico Other If yes, when do plan to move? h IIIII III IIIIIIII: IIIII III IIIIIIII (28)Do you regularly use any of the follow- ing services in Spanish? ____radi o ____ or other TV in Spanish this year next year within the next five years when the children are grown jFlint‘ when retired newsletter other other _ (29)Hhich of the following community services have you participated in during the past year? (33)If you rent your house, do you hive I ' a lease, or just pay per nonth? lease oer month How much per month? 3Ei5 (34)(If you rent)Did you have to pay a deposit? ___yes ___po Was 1t _less than ___pame as ___pore than one month’s rent? (3572f you are buying your house, how did you arranjo your monthly paymevts? ___paii full price ___financed thru bank ___have land contract(pay landlord directly) ___yeterans loan ___?HA loan ___pther How much is the monthly fayment? (36)Approximately what was your family income during the gast year? ___pnder 32999 ___;3000-4999 ___;5000-6999 ___;7000-?999 ___310,000-14.999 ___315,OOO-24,099 ‘___pver 325,000 -* A—LA A...‘_ __ _‘.‘ ‘32:}; thl (1) iumber KIGRATIOU HISTORY QUESTIONNAIRE ’naze of household head on back) date census tract interviewer street address language of interview Spanish English phone oral consent obtained respondent: household head m f spouse other developed by Jane B. Haney 1976 HUD contract H-2367G 355 MIGRATION HISTORY QUESTICflflAIRB 1976 Jane B. Haney FCRNA DE CCXSEJTIHIBITO (Interviewer will first identify him/herself). Empleo, buen sueldo, amigos y parientes, y escuelas son factoree que motivan gente establecerse en una Ciudad singular. Estoy administrando un cuestionario que trata de estos factorea. (Provide business card). La Sra. Haney esta escribiendo un reporte del eatablicimiento de la comunidad Hexicanoamericana en esta Ciudad, i una gran parte de este estudio sera'una historia de cuales factores tuvieron mas influencia en el establecimiento de esta comunidad en Lansing/Flint.;EBs esta familia de descendencia mexicana? Estarfa Ud. dispuesto ayudarnos por contestar las preguntas en este cuestionario? Para asegurar su anonimidad, pondré'nomas el nombre del jefe de familia en esta forma para que la Sra. Haney podrfa hablarle tocante una reepuesta ai quere. La informacion que Ud. provee y las resouestas de todas las otras familias eetarén unidas para former una repre- sentacion general de la historia de empleo y establecimiento del Mexicanoamericano en esta Ciudad, y ninguna de sus respuestas se darén a nadie mas. Ud. tiene e1 derecho examinar esta forma cuando terminamos para aeegurar que he notado sus respuestas correctamente, y Ud. tiene el derecho decidir terminar la entrevista si quere. 3£56 (13}Por cuento tiempo han vivido Uds. en “esta casa/apartamento? seeanas meses afibs toda la Vida (2) 383% do familia encontrd trabajo _i;ptro miembro de familia encontrd trabajo aquf ___}legaron para asistir esouela ___}legaron porque se dice las escuelas son buenas ___l1egaron porous se dice que hay (ZTEPuvieron Uds. otra direcci6n en esta Ciudad antes de que se mndaron aquf? I 81 no {Fara "s’")l§ue fue? mucha ayuda de los servicios sociales ___l1egaron para estar cerca de otro miembro de familia aquf ___l1egaron para estar cerca de otro amigo de allf’que ya llego no tuvo suficiente de dinero para irse (3,é935398 rGZODeS fueron los mas importan- tes en 31 deteminacio’n de moverse a su direccion presente? ___precio ___pbicaci5h cerca de familia __;ubicaci5n cerca de amigos de su estado natal ‘___pbicacion cercs de amigos de esta Ciudad ___pasa/apartamentoeSt3b8 desocupado ___pbicacion cerca de trabajo .___tamafio ___otro ( omentario: se dice que hay nejor oportunidad soul otro _ (Comentario: _*Y L (7)(Si se mndaron para mejor oportunidcd) lpémo supieron que Lansing/Flint tuvo esta oportunidad? ___visitaron amigos de allf'que viven aquf ___yisitaron otro miembro de familia que vive aquf' . ___amigo que vive aquf'lo dijo ___ptro miembro de familia que "ive \ aquf lo dijo ' trabajo en 0 cerca de aouf agents de empleos lo dijo (4) Lfiuando llegaron a Lansing/Flint? ___p:nse3ero de una escuela lo dijo o ro hace semanas . hace meses (Eomentario: hace afibs ~——Y ha vivido aquf toda su "ida iCcnentario: I; (8)¢Como encontraron esta case/apert.? (Sllbonde vivieron antes de mudarse a Iansing/ Flint? naci6 aqui otro luear en Michigan otro estado en el nideeste Texas otro estado en el Suroeste México otro ___amigos __familia __perio’di.co ___agencia de servicio social ___agente de venta de cases ___}a pasamos a vuelta ___ptro (9X£Son Uds. (GléPorque se movieron a Lansing/Flint? duefiba renteros aqui? 1557 I O ’ ’ o (10) En an opinionLcuando fue construido I o I esta case.edific10? (11) Durante el tiempo que Uds. han vivido en esta vecindad,‘Lcree Ud. que en vista {faica ha mejorado durado sin cambiar deteriorado? pregunto donde esta'su (12) Si alguien 1e lo dirfa? vecindad, A oue’ la area del a area del la area del a area del oeste la area del oeste este bloque(o eallel rarios bloques (o calles)oercanos otro norte esta sur (13) En su vecindad,itienen al7unos ie 103 siguientes problemas? ___escuela mala ___;alta de proteccion policial ___denaciado peligro para ander en la noche ___demaciado policia .___fa1ta de recreo para los jovenns ___tr5fico pelicroso diffcil obtener prestamo dn casa demaCiado gents en la vocznsad -otro Comentario: 441 (14)lCuanta gents vive en esta casa? Note el siruiente para cada una: Farentesco al Edad Bonds naci5 jefe de familia 1 WM O‘OCnQChU'Ib- —. -. N-‘d‘ddu—‘d‘ OQCDQChU'IbuN Lengua principal Educacidn(lhaste d6nde llego?) £558 1 (4) (ISTPara las personas que viven aquf que tienan trabajo ahora o que han tenido empleo durante el ano pasado, note el siguiente por favor:, Parentesco al Ocupacidh Patron ‘ Por cuanto tiempo trabajo alli? Jefe de familia 1 Semanas Moses Ado: 2 3 4 5 I —i (103mm tenido unas de estas personas otro empleo este ago? __3{ __no (Para "si")Indique: Parentesco a1 Ocupacion Patron :LPor cuanto tiempo trabajo alli? jefe de familia Semanas {eses Anbs (17)'Tuvc alguien que tiene enpleo ahorrita dificultad en obtener este empleo? ___s{'___po (Para "sf“)lQue fue el notivo? ” requisite do eduoacion recommendacidh de otro patr6r renvisito do orperinncia otro . I recommendaCion personal (18)2Tienen_Uds. hijos, hermanos y hermanas, o padres que no viven con Uds.? si no (19‘3Con que frecuencia los visitan, mas o menoe? Parentesco a1 Donde viva La frecuencia de visitas Jefe de familia Por dfa For semana Por mes por aha Otro 1559 (5} (:o\\n6nde nacio Ud.? " Xichiban Texas otro estado en Suroeste Xéxico ___ __ otro (?1,235nde nacieron sus padres? Xichigan Texns otro estaio en Suroeste flexico otro (22)(Si otro querjefe de familia esta con- testando)iDonde nacio el jefe de familia? Kichigan Texas otro estado en Suroeste Merico ___ __ otro (.3 3' ads nacieron sus padres? U u\ H {ichigan Texas otro estado en Suroeste u’ uGXiCO otro (2.0323 e1 jefe do familia veterano? __sf ___no 'Podrfa Ud. decirme alga tocante los tipos de empleo que el jefe de familia ha tenido durante sus anos de trabajo? He gustarfa saber cada trabajo que Ud. so aoncrda,mns o menos cuanto tiempo lo duro] y si uno represento gran aumento o diminucion de page en comparaci6n con otros. ' CcupaciSn y Ubicaci6h Durncidh iCambio notable do page? I somanas Hesea Afibs Aument6 Diminuo O 6() (ZSEEn c'nles de las actividades siguien- tea han participado durante e1 ano pisado? Con que frocuencia? masque seman- mens- men- sesan. almen. ual. os ___pelQulcs, en espanol __ _ _ __ _bai‘os,esp. _ __ ___actividndes do la icletia __ __ __ _ _orgsnizaciones de la comunidad (6)? (29)'En cuales de los servicios para la comu idnd han participado duranto ol ano pasado? Con one ’recuencia? L masque seman- mens- soman. almen. sual. men- as _clfnicas _consejos o clfnica de salud mental ___cuarto de emer- concia ___pstampillas de alimento __ ___Juntas del gobierno local {26§i;on ants do 105 siguientes :revienen su participicion ectividadcs? ___falta de tiempo .__;fal ta de interes ___falta do dinero C.I‘O motivos que en tal ___PTA ___otra actividad escolar ___yelfare '___ptro .J esia? _sf 'J. r} (30zlfe “.tenecen’pds. a una (27);?an partim rode on unas de las si mientes crjanizaciones de la comunidad durante el ano ___no {Para ”51"-Bs ella .__pat§1ica Protestants tra_ frece la misa7servicio en sepanol? no l)" O '00 I (31) Con la excepcion do 103 mieabros de su familia cue viven con Uds.,écon quien pasan mas tiempo? ___familia. no _vecinos rwants do on trabajo _miembros de un club/organizacion ___miombros de su iglesia ___ptro en esta casa psszdo? Con que frecuencia? masque seman- mens— men— seman. almen. sual. os Ctro (28) Crdinariamento usan uno o todos do 103 serricios espafibles siguientes? radio 4’ ___. o otro programs espanol (Flint) periodico Otro (32X;Tienen algunos planes fijados para moverso de lensing/Flint?_ s ___po Si la respuesta fue positiva,1a don- do piensan moverse? otro ciudad en el Nidoeste rancho cercano Texas otro estado on Suroeste Mexico otro LY cuando piensan moverse? este ano e1 ano que entra dentro do cinco anos (cont'd) 3651 (25)é3n cualos de las actividades siguientes han participado duranto ol ago pasado? ACon que frocuencia? mas que aeman- :ens- men- seman. almen. ual. oo ___;elfculas. en espanol ___bailes,eop. ___nctividades do la iglosia___ ___orcanizac iones de la comunidad ____ (% fléSon unos do 103 siguientes motivos que provienen su participacion on tal actividades? _falta do tiompo :falta de interes ___;alta do dinero ___ptro (6)L (29); En cuales de los servicios para la co unidad hon participado durante 91 an? pasado? ACon que frecuencia? agenda 3 non- n-rs- ren- gem; a Son. nil. os _élinicss :consejos o clinica do salud mental ___puarto do emer- gencia [___estampillas de alimentc ____ ___Juntas del gobierno local ___PTA . ___ptra aotividad escolar __wolfaro otro (27 )IEan participado on unas do las siguientes organizaciones de la comunidad duranto el gab pasado? Con que frecuencia? mas que seman- mens- me:- alnen. ual. ,Lcc .MSU O I II II II H l l I | HI. Mill Hill lllll lllll ___Dtro “ (30)'[Pertene econ Uds. a una islesia?___sf “___po (Para "31") Es ella ___patolica ___?rotestanto ___ptra ° lpfrece la miss/servicio on esp~.rcl? 3 no (31) Con la excepcion de los mic. bros do on familia que vivon cor Ud. .écon quien pasan mas tiempo? fanilia,no en esta casa vecinos canto do on trabajo miembros do un club/or-anizacion miembros de su iglesia otro Ill \ ' . . (28/é0rdinariamento usan uno o todos de los aervicios espafibles sicuientes? radio 0 otro prejrama eapafiol ___fPlint) poriodico Otro (32)&Tienen algunos planes fijndos para moverse do lensing/Flint?_ 31_ _rn 81 la respuesta fuo positifl" .23 don- de riensan moverse ? otra ciudad en o1 Midoeste ___rancho cercano _Texas :otro estado en Suroesto :hoxico ”otro ZY cuando piensan moverso ? este an ‘V cl ano que ontra dontro do cinco afios (cont'dl I362 _ A. I cuando los ninos esten grandee cuando jubilado otro (7) (33) Si ostén rentando,2tienen un contrato o pagan por mos? contrato por mos XCuanto pagan por mes? (34) 31 satin rentando'Tuvicror que pagar on enganche? __sz ___ro 'éFue menos que igual mas que la rcnta de un mes? -x... ' (33,9; ostan comprando,écomo arreglaron sus pagos? pagaron el precio completo Urostamo del banco tienen contrato con el duefio(pagan e1 duenb directamentc) prestamo do veterano pre’stamo do FHA otro ACuanto pagan por mes? (36)ég proximadamente cuanto fue_ol ingreso e an familia durante e1 ano pasado? menos que $2999 33000-4999 35000-6999 37000-9999 310,0CO-14,999 315,000-24.999 mas que 325,000 "Il'l'illllll'lflllllllT