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A CRITIQUE OF MODERNIZATION THEORY FROM DEPENDENCY
PERSPECTIVE

presented by
ALI-AKBAR MAHDI

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

M. A. degree in Sociology

Ruth S. Hamilton

Major professor

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A CRITIQUE OF MODERNIZATION THEORY FROM DEPENDENCY
PERSPECTIVE

By

Ali-Akbar Mahdi

A THESIS

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ABSTRACT

A CRITIQUE OF MODERNIZATION THEORY FROM DEPENDENCY
PERSPECTIVE

By

Ali-Akbar Mahdi

6/28/50

Modernization theorists have claimed that modernization is an historical phenomenon which is revolutionary, complex, systemic, global, lengthy, phased, homogenizing, irreversible and progressive. Economic development of the Third World countries is assumed to require certain socio-political institutions and values. These institutions and values are assumed to resemble those of Western society. Modernization, thus, is a change from a static and uniform traditional society to a dynamic and plural modern society of the Western type. This thesis contends that neither of these assumptions is historically true, nor are any of their claims scientifically valid. It is argued that the current "underdevelopment" of much of the world is the outcome of a larger historical process of global development.

This thesis attempts to outline some of the origins and characteristic features of modernization theory and the context in which the concept of modernization arose. This is followed by a schematic outline of the central concepts and conceptual procedures of modernization theory which are

Ali-Akbar Mahdi

then criticized from a dependency perspective on a number of accounts. Finally, a general discussion about the dependency model, as an alternative, and a short review of some of its central issues presented by four Latin American exponents are presented.

THE DEVELOPMENT SET

Excuse me, friends, I must catch my jet
I'm off to join the Development Set;
My bags are packed, and I've had all my shots
I have traveller's cheques and pills for the trots!
The Development Set is bright and noble;
Our thoughts are deep and our vision global;
Although we move with the better classes,
Our thoughts are always with the masses.
In Sheraton hotels in scattered nations
We damn multi-national corporations;
Injustice seems easy to protest
In such seething hotbeds of social rest.
We discuss malnutrition over steaks
And plan hunger talks during coffee breaks.
Whether Asian floods or African drought,
We face each issue with an open mouth.
We bring in consultants whose circumlocation
Raises difficulties for every solution -
Thus guaranteeing continued good eating
By showing the need for another meeting.
The language of the Development Set
Stretches the English alphabet;
We use swell words like 'epigenetic',
'Micro', 'Macro', and 'logarithmetic'.
It pleasures us to be esoteric -
It's so intellectually atmospheric!
And though establishments may be unmoved,
Our vocabularies are much improved.
When the talk gets deep and you're feeling dumb
You can keep your shame to a minimum:
To show that you, too, are intelligent
Smugly ask, "Is it really development?"
Or say, "That's fine in practice, but don't you see:
It doesn't work out in theory!"
A few may find this incomprehensible,
But most will admire you as deep and sensible.
Development Set homes are extremely chick,
Full of carvings, curious, and draped with batik.
Eye-level photographs subtly assure
That your host is at home with the great and the poor.
Enough of these verses - on with the mission!
Our task is as broad as the human condition!
Just pray God the biblical promise is true:
The poor ye shall always have with you.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
INTRODUCTION	1
PART I CONCEPTUALIZATION	
CHAPTER I. PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION	9
A. What Is Modernization?	9
Conceptual confusion	10
Variability of assumptions	13
Multidimensionality of the phenomenon	14
Conceptual levels	15
Major units of analysis: individual versus societal	17
B. Conceptual Differentiation	20
Modernization and development	20
Modernization and growth	24
Modernization and industrialization	27
Summary of chapter	29
CHAPTER II, COMPETING DEFINITIONS OF MODERNIZATION: A REVIEW OF LEADING THINKERS	31
Classification of studies of modernization	31
A. Structural/Technological Definition of Modernization	34
Marion Levy	37
Neil J. Smelser	39
Bert F. Hoselitz	45
Wilbert E. Moore	50
B. Social Psychological Definition of Modernization	57
Daniel Lerner	60
David C. McClelland	68

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd. . .)

	Page
Everett Hagen	71
Everett M. Rogers	74
Alex Inkeles and David Horton Smith	76
Robert Bellah	80
C. Stage Theories of Development:	
Rostowian Model	82
D. A Liberal View: Reinhard Bendix	88
Summary and conclusion of chapter	94
PART II	
CRITIQUE AND ANALYSIS	
CHAPTER III. CRITIQUE OF MODERNIZATION THEORIES	100
A. Critique of Structural/Technological Approach	100
Smelser	112
B. Critique of Social Psychological Approach	119
Rogers	131
C. Unidirectional Change and the Critique of Rostowian Model	137
D. Tradition and Modernity	147
Fictitious dichotomy	148
Model of modern	154
Tradition and traditionalism	158
Limitations of the model for the study of change	160
✓E. Ideological Foundation of Modernization Theory	163
Summary and conclusion of chapter	169
CHAPTER IV. SOURCES AND TYPES OF MODERNIZATION	174
Modernization from within or without	174
Modernization from above, middle, and below	175
Modernization and liberation	179
Acculturative modernization	184

TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONT'D. . .)

	Page
Lopsided modernization	186
Summary of chapter	189
CHAPTER V. MODERNIZATION, RATIONALIZATION, AND WESTERNIZATION	191
A. Modernization and Westernization	191
B. Modernization and Rationalization	198
C. Discontents of Modernization	205
D. Modernization: To Be or Not To Be	210
Summary of chapter	214
PART III WHICH WAY OUT?	
CHAPTER VI. TOWARD AN ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVE	217
A. Dependency Theory	217
B. Pablo Gonzalez Casanova	227
Structure of government	228
Internal colonialism	231
Democratization of national institutions	233
C. Andre Gunder Frank	235
Nature of underdevelopment	235
Metropolis-satellite relationships	236
D. Osvaldo Sunkel	239
National and international polarizations	239
Transnationalization process	241
E. Fernando Henrique Cardoso	244
The role of entrepreneurs	244
Dependent development	245
Relevance of dependency paradigm	247
Summary of chapter	248
CONCLUSION	250
BIBLIOGRAPHY	255
ADDITIONAL REFERENCES	277

INTRODUCTION

Historical concepts always tell us as much about the persons who use them as about the events they are supposed to describe. American social scientists use the concept "modernization" for reasons of convenience: it groups together all the complex transformations now going on in Africa, Asia, and Latin America and suggests comparisons with similar transformations presumed to have occurred at one time or another in Europe and North America. Modernization is thought to be a single, long-term historical process in which all humankind is destined to participate, but in which some people already have participated. It is claimed that traditional societies are moving toward a modern society with new values borrowed from the West. Such a process has been called the "modernization process." While the main concern of earlier modernization theorists was with transformations of Western European societies, since the 18th century, recent preoccupation has focused on what has been called "modernity and tradition" in the Third World countries. The dichotomy "tradition - modernity" has become identified with that of "underdevelopment - development" and has been employed to differentiate not only Western European societies in time, but also industrialized versus

nonindustrialized societies in space.

Around these polarities there has grown up a kind of conventional wisdom on what development in the larger social and cultural sense is all about. According to this perspective, underdeveloped societies are such because they have failed to accomplish three things:

- 1) to differentiate from the broader societal framework a formal economy around which to mobilize the motivations, discipline, and energies of the population in the service of universal market-rational production;
- 2) to overcome the communal norms that link the past, present, and future population to these societies social organizations and visions of the cosmos. Such ties abort the emergence of a complex, secular, pluralistic society integrated by the voluntary contracts between atomized individuals and groups characteristic of utilitarian societies;
- 3) to overcome attitudes accepting of traditional authority and of parochial motives in favor of the revolutionary, cosmopolitan, and future-oriented drive to be "modern."
(Stanley, 1972).

In contrast, it can be argued that the Western concept of development is a product of certain ethnocentric assumptions about the nature of the individual and society that are culture-bound and time-bound, specifically that it is a product of market assumptions about economic and political

rationality: The individual is seen essentially as a consumer and society as a series of marketable relations between individuals. Economic rationality then becomes the rationality of the market, and political rationality the maximization of the output-input ratio in a market-like model of a political society.

The objective of this thesis is to extricate some of the issues which arise in the sociology of development and modernization, and to question the underlying assumptions and implications of this particular mode of conceptualization based on the notions of modernity and modernization which have provided the characteristic theoretical framework of the sociology of development and modernization. It is an axiom of the sociology of knowledge that any intellectual enterprise is significantly influenced by the social context in which it occurs. On this basis, an attempt has been made to examine the motivations, cognitions, and purposes of modernization theory which historically gave it birth. Therefore a major task has been to outline some of the origins and characteristic features of this theory. Such a task finds its legacy in the past that modernization theory has been an ideology of development; and as we know, false knowledge and ideologies are, it is believed, important system maintaining forces. Any student of sociology coming from a periphery country should concern himself/herself with this fact and try to transcend these cognitive

barriers and develop ideas of his/her own to gain the consciousness for the transformations of her/his societal structure in the future. It is in this connection that we find formal ideology of growth and development in the present Third World countries, for example Iran, as "a smoke-screen for failure, a diversion to stave off despair, a mask to conceal reality rather than a portrait of it." (Geertz, 1964:70).

Modernization theory has been often used as one of the backbones for the argument with which the "dependency theory" is rejected, while in this study, the dependency paradigm will be used as a backbone of the argument, an argument in which modernization theory could be criticized; since the modernization theorists have not studied the political economy of the Third World countries. This thesis contends that understanding the Third World economy is dependent on the analysis of the political economies of those countries. As Frank puts it:

We cannot hope to formulate adequate development theory and policy for the majority of the world's population who suffer from underdevelopment without first learning how their past economic and social history gave rise to their present underdevelopment. (Frank, 1970b:4)

In this study, it will be argued that the modernization process is linked with the Euro-American economic and political controls around the world in the form of neo-colonialism. The years since World War II have seen a worldwide expansion of industrialization and commercialization.

In one sense, it could be argued that the modernization process began with the termination of overt political colonialism, but various forms of economic control and indirect political control replaced the formerly ubiquitous Euro-American colonial administrations. Therefore, modernization should be viewed as a continuation of the industrial expansion of advanced capitalist societies. Modernity as a consequence of Western structural transformations, it is argued, may have little to do with, or be in fact detrimental to, the causes of development in the Third World nations.

The concern with social classes, social collectivities, and social actors is one of the important factors in any study of development and underdevelopment. No adequate explanation of development or underdevelopment is believed to be possible without bringing into the analysis concrete actors. This work is concerned with the human dimension of development, with the costs and benefits to different social groups entailed in divergent developmental and allocative strategies, i.e. who gets what at the expense of which social groups. This approach, if seriously followed, is extremely exacting. Indeed, unlike functionalism, it demands a profound knowledge of historical developments in the societies to be studied. For instance, it is easy to point out and even to prove empirically without any serious acquaintance with Iranian history, that since the Constitutional Revolution Iran has become a more complex society,

that there has been increasing differentiation between kinship and economic roles, that universalistic norms have become increasingly dominant, etc.; it is equally easy to measure sociopsychological attitudes and to state that peasants tend to become more literate, less fatalistic, etc. But to study class relationships during the same period, to identify and trace the development of strategic groups in society and their policies vis a vis specific issues is a completely different exercise. It demands serious scholarship and years of hard work. Perhaps one of the reasons which explains why most works in the sociology of development and modernization are so ahistorical is that it is the easy way out. If one had to adopt an historical perspective, it would be impossible to write voluminous books based on short "tours" in underdeveloped countries where academics "explore" the country by conducting a few interviews and rushing back to their university to "process the data." The very example of such an approach is the study done by Daniel Lerner. Lerner's study (1966), which has come to be the dictionary of modernization theory, deals with the most critical period of history of Iran, 1951-1954. And the result is obviously an ahistorical understanding of the most important period of Iranian history. ~

The main problem with the political sociology of underdeveloped countries today is that it is all too commonly, as Worsley (1972:XII) puts it, "airport sociology" in

which distinguished academics fly from country to country, interviewing leaders in offices and hotels, and never come into contact with the life led in the villages. All they know about the Third World is an impression of that life, not life itself. Furthermore, as Keith Griffin has noted in this connection:

Most of the theorizing on economic development has been done by economists who live and were trained in the industrial west. Some economists, in fact, have written about the underdeveloped countries before they have seen them. . . . Almost all. . . are ignorant of much of the economic history of the countries about which they are theorizing. (Griffin, 1968:19)

Such a sociology, in terms of its own classical social science standards, when it encounters reality, becomes useless, i.e., underdeveloped sociology, as Frank put it.

The main rationale for the presentation of materials present in this thesis is that of identifying and critically evaluating dominant theoretical features of modernization theory. It has not been possible within the space of this short work to cover all relevant issues; nor has it been possible to review more than a small sample of literature on the topic. Although much of this work remains at a relatively macro-level of analysis, it does connect up at certain junctures with some of the more specific issues raised by modernization theory and the dependency model.

The thesis is divided into three parts. Part I deals with the problems of conceptualization in defining

modernization. The competing theoretical orientations are also offered and the leading thinkers in modernization theory are reviewed. The need for reconceptualization in terms of generalized types of social change is discussed. The next part, Part II, offers critique of different modernization approaches, and examines the merits and demerits of some of the arguments presented by modernization theorists. Some attempt is made to determine how useful modernization theory is for both the exploration of particular analytical problems and explanation of processes of change in the Third World countries. The final part of this work, Part III, presents an alternative perspective for the study of change in the Third World countries. A general discussion about the dependency model, as an alternative, and a short review of some of central issues presented by four Latin American exponents of dependency approach are the subject matter of the last chapter. Lastly, in addition to the list of the sources used in this work, a bibliography of the relevant references which were consulted, but not specifically cited in the text, is offered.

PART I
CONCEPTUALIZATION

CHAPTER I
PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION

A. What Is Modernization?

The term "modernization" has come into widespread usage after World War II. In spite of its relatively rapid rise to currency, there is a lack of consensus about its precise meaning. The proliferation of studies of modernization made by economists, sociologists, political scientists and social anthropologists, impressive as it is, has in fact added little to fundamental clarification of the notion of modernization in its fundamental sense.

The terms "modern", "modernizing" and "modernization" are being used in a bewildering number of ways. Two usages can be specified in ordinary speech: First, there is the equation of modern with recent or most recent. In this sense, "modernizing" means simply exchanging old ways with recent ones; and this contrast appears to underlie the oldest sense derived from the Latin "modernus" (Lewis & Short, 1879). At the other end of the scale we find the association of modern and modernizing with progress and

progressive. If the first usage of contemporaneity is purely relative, the second is dependent on the observer's value preferences. Neither use has much descriptive content or heuristic potential. These everyday usages do however, foreshadow the many meanings given to these terms in the sociological literature (Smith, 1973).

Conceptual confusion:

To find an accurate sociological definition for the term and to identify its characteristics are not easy. Heterogeneous meanings have been attached to the concept of modernization. The term has been defined in terms which are so open-ended that it is almost impossible to identify precisely the range of phenomena to which the concept is intended to apply.¹ It seems that Reishauer is right that the virtue of the word "modernization" is that it is "vague" and "unspecific" (Hall, 1965). In reading the enormous wealth of material by what the modernization theorists themselves are pleased to call "the worship company of modernization writers," (Weintraub, 1971-72) one is struck by the fact that scholars have not identified precisely the

¹One aspect of modernization theory which has not been seriously studied is the existence of a variety of theories which may appear to have general ideas in common, but which differ in content with regard to the authors' interpretation of modernization and the nature of research problems. Thus, the whole controversy over modernization may, in part, be confusing because of basic differences concerning the definition of terms.

basic dimensions or components of modernization, and have not placed them within one coherent conceptual framework.

Studies seldom give the same meaning or employ the same terms in dealing with their subject matter. On the one hand, similar social processes are variously denoted: One would thus be hard put to distinguish, for example, between Lerner's modernization (1966) and Srinivas' westernization (Srinivas, 1966), to tell apart precisely Coleman's political development (Coleman, 1965) and Eisenstadt's political modernization; or to see clearly the difference between what some economists call growth and what others call development. On the other hand, the same term often covers a multitude of meanings: For example, it might be difficult to identify development as used, let us say, by Coleman (Ibid) in a political context, with that employed by Braibanti and Spengler in an economic sense (Braibanti & Spengler, 1961) - who mean by it an increase in national income - with the "same" economic development of Sayigh (1965), who attributes to it also a social content, as for instance "some patterns of distribution of income." Relatedly, Ponsioen (1968) maintains that modernization by itself does not mean anything as long as one does not specify exactly what modern standards are. He shuns the use of the term "modernization" and instead persistently speaks about "development."

Furthermore, this lack of precision and uniformity manifests itself not only among writers, but also within

the writings of individual scholars who often use the concepts mentioned vaguely, interchangeably and inconsistently. Thus, for example, McClelland (1961) applies both the term growth and the term development to the same economic process. Holt and Turner (1966) alternate political modernization with political development, while Eisenstadt (1963a, 1963b, and 1964) sometimes equates development and modernization; on another occasion subsumes the one in the other, and elsewhere appears to identify modernization with nation-building in general.

For Lerner modernization is "the social process of which development is the economic component" (Lerner, 1967: 21); while Apter sees development, modernization and industrialization as terms of decreasing conceptual generality (Apter, 1965:67-8). Deutsch thinks of modernization more generally in terms of "social mobilization" or "the process in which major clusters of old social, economic and psychological commitments are eroded and broken and people become available for new patterns of socialization and behavior." (1961:494-5) Riggs defines modernization not as a process of development of a certain social, political, or economic type, but as a process of "catching up" with other countries (Riggs, 1966:388-89). Moore, to round off the list, juxtaposes economic development and modernization, but also equates both with industrialization, namely with a specific pattern.

All in all, such conceptual variations and ambiguities - and further examples could be quoted at length - occur generally; and their very ubiquity shows that they result largely from the fact that in the enormous and sometimes rushed flowering of new ideas very often little time is taken to consolidate the apparatus or the tools of thought.

Variety of assumptions:

Closely linked to problems of conceptualization is the presence of various assumptions which impose their own inner logic and imagery upon the reality studied, and which are often implicit rather than spelled out. Consequently the variety of current modernization theories, contrary claims notwithstanding, fail to describe the realities of the pattern of social change in the twentieth century. The primary reason for this situation is that the classic concern with the nature of modern society and with its historical dimensions has not been confronted seriously by contemporary modernization theorists, most of whom, consciously or unconsciously, have been motivated by the ethnocentric self-confidence of the Western achievement. Furthermore, a predominant tendency among contemporary theorists is that they try to elaborate even more complex conceptual distinctions without seriously confronting the problem of historical reality. This penchant for conceptual sophistication dissociated from history has led theorists to mistake concept

for fact. Philip Abrams concludes a similar plea with this admonition:

The academic and intellectual dissociation of history and sociology seems, then, to have had the effect of deterring both disciplines from attending seriously to the most important issues involved in the understanding of social transition (Abrams, 1972:32)

In order for these theories to be adequate they must be balanced by considerations of specific historical conditions. A social theory which neglects the latter severely limits its usefulness and applicability. What is needed is a dialectical relationship between the two, i.e. dialectics of history and science. The reason why current modernization theories are ahistorical and divorced from reality can be attributed largely to the breakdown of these dialectics.

Multidimensionality of the phenomenon:

Another reason for this definitional confusion is the multidimensionality of the modernization process, especially when these dimensions are not exhaustively identified, correlated along themselves or shown to be always present in a definite profile in a given case. This is best exemplified via the attempt by scholars to observe so-called disciplinary boundaries. Political scientists have been concerned with its disruptive features concerning the problems of nation-building and political change. They have focused on the ways to increase the capacity of the government

to innovate and to assimilate newly mobilized groups without suffering institutional breakdown. Economists look at this process in terms of man/woman's application of technologies to utilize the natural resources in order to bring about economic growth.

Psychologists try to find the effects of it, such as: rising tension, mental illnesses, violence, divorce, juvenile delinquency, and so forth. Sociologists pay attention to the differentiations occurring within social structure, types of societies which appear as the result of this process, race, ethnic and class conflict. Social anthropologists are concerned with the process of differentiation that distinguishes the modern societies from traditional ones. They are beginning to do a study of adjustments and interrelated priorities that modern groups and individuals establish in daily life. For them, the contents of modernization are hypothetically as susceptible to adjustments and selective pressures as are the contents of the traditional social-cultural order.

Conceptual levels:

Much confusion on the meaning of modernization stems from failure to specify the conceptual level at which discussion takes place and the lack of distinction between types of definitions. Broadly speaking, there can be distinction between three main approaches and, consequently three types of definitions: analytical, historical, policy-oriented.

As an analytic definition, modernization refers to fairly abstract qualities of social structure and process. Societies are termed "modern" to the extent that they exhibit these qualities. The neo-evolutionary functionalists are particularly prone to this approach. Modernization for them is a process of social change, or a set of such processes, which are theoretically universal in time and space.

As an historical definition, modernization refers to particular periods of time, marked off from their predecessors by new characteristics. The period in question may be distinguished by secularization and the rise of capitalism, dating in Europe as far back as the Renaissance and Reformation. This is not to say that the seeds of the novel attributes are not to be found in the past; that would be an ahistorical approach. But their flowering is bounded in time. The attributes of modernization demarcate a specific period, between two others.

In contrast to these approaches there is the view of modernization as a name for a set of policies pursued by the leaders or elites of developing countries. Modernization then is a conscious set of plans and policies for changing a particular society in the direction of contemporary societies which the leaders think are more "advanced" in certain respects (Smith, 1973).

In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, modernization referred primarily to the growth of rationality,

to secular ways of thinking and behaving, and to associated patterns of action that released people from the chains of superstition and the tyrannical bonds of despots. The really modern individual was a cool philosopher, a natural or physical scientist, or perhaps even a successful entrepreneur. His/her world was one of secular books, test tubes, experiments, and real-world observations; not one of superstitions, magic, and doctrinal explanations of the world and all it contained (Tullis, 1973).

In the "classical" or earliest modernizing countries -- Great Britain and other North Atlantic Nations -- the process of modernization was gradual, involving, among other things, a considerable degree of innovative behavior. The ideas and technologies relevant to modernization were diffused by degrees. But modernization and modernity today do not carry the same meanings as they did even as late as 1850. Modernization today is generally seen as a multifaceted process which involves changes in all areas of human thought and activity. Modernity is both a state of mind and a state of being. It deals as much with people's attitudes and values as with their physical and social world in which they live.

Major units of analysis: individual versus societal:

Modernization can be viewed as operating either on the societal or the individual level. Generally, modernization on the societal level has been the normal concern predominantly of economists, political scientists and

sociologists with a bent towards the "structural" approach. The conceptual interests of such an approach are the different institutional frameworks which serve as blockages or provide the opportunities or incentives to development (Weiner, 1966:10). This approach is also associated with macroprocesses that constitute the different dimensions of modernization: industrialization, urbanization, bureaucratization, democratization, and secularization. Some of the other commonly identified features of modernity on the societal level are the following: rationalized and expanded institutions pertaining to formal education, mass media, the development of a highly differentiated political structure and the extension of politics to all walks of life and political participation, market mechanisms and economic specialization, commercialized agriculture, rapid economic growth, science and technology, abundance of entrepreneurship, and opportunities for social mobility.

Modernization on the individual level has been the object of study of many social psychologists and anthropologists. The general assumption in this approach is that modernization of individuals is the ultimate key to the modernization of society. The specific objects of study in this approach are the motivations, attitudes, values, and beliefs of "modern man" as contrasted with those of non-modern man.² Among the more famous concepts described as a

²From a feminist point of view, it can be said that modernization theorists' language is a sexist language. They repeatedly use the word "man" denoting "human beings".

key motive in economic development is the one McClelland (1961) suggests to be the "need to achieve", which is a desire for excellence in order to attain a sense of personal accomplishment. Lerner put forward the other well-known, concept of "empathy as the inner mechanism which enables newly mobile persons to operate efficiently in a changing world" (1966:49) (emphasis original). Empathy as "the capacity to see oneself in the other fellow's situation" (Ibid:50) is a crucial variable, which, along with literacy and mass media, is chiefly instrumental in altering a traditional individual's lifestyle.

Some of the other individual characteristics generally associated with the modernization process are the following: functional literacy, cosmopolitaness, mass media exposure, innovativeness, political activism, secular orientation, self-reliance, a disposition to accept new ideas and try new methods, a readiness to express opinions, an interest in the present and future than in the past, a sense of punctuality, concern for planning, organization and efficiency, a tendency to see the world as calculable, a faith in science, and a belief in distributive justices (Weiner, 1966:4). This approach has been very close to cultural and normative definition of modernization among sociologists.

Culturally, modernity is portrayed as a consistent set of values and general orientations permeating a society

(Inkeles, 1969; Kahl, 1968). Its content is perhaps best described in terms of the Parsonsian pattern variables: a culture that is universalistic rather than particularistic, defines roles in specific rather than diffuse terms, and allocates rewards on the basis of achievement and not ascription (Parsons 1951; Hoselitz 1960). At the individual level, this set of values is reflected in a coherent syndrome of psychological orientations characterized intrinsically, by a certain mental flexibility in dealing with new situations and, extrinsically, by similarity to an ideal type of behavior proper to urban-industrial societies.

B. Conceptual Differentiation

Terms like development, modernization, industrialization, and economic growth are often used interchangeably, either because they are assumed to vary together, or are meant to refer to the same thing. It is beyond this work's scope to analyze the problem of such distinctions except as pertinent for our argument.

Modernization and development:

First, we need to make a distinction between modernization and development. Modernization consists of indices of growth in and by themselves, as for example urbanization, increase in literacy, health and nutrition, communications, participation, acculturation and so on. Modernization can

be satisfactorily expressed quantitatively, as in economic terms where it is termed as growth. But development, although it too can be explained quantitatively, should be expressed qualitatively, because it is essentially concerned with the acceptance of novel interrelationships of human beings among themselves and in interaction with their environment.³ While substantial rises in the indices of national products, per capita income, productivity, burgeoning urban construction, literacy, media consumption, communication and transportation, and technological progress, etc., are all necessary for development and modernization, they are neither sufficient for nor identical to development itself. Much of this type of change may occur without the introduction of any basic changes whatsoever in the social structure of the country. This does not mean that modernization does not involve structural change. In fact, it is also a process of structural change, but this change is not sufficient for self-sustained development. Indeed, the increase in these indices of modernization do not necessarily indicate that an integrated social, political and

³Schneider et al. (1972 and 1975) have distinguished modernization as a process whereby social change is imposed on regions and nations from without by already fully developed industrial centers, and development as the capacity of any national or regional elite to generate an economy in its own domain and mainly on its own terms. Their study shows that modernization may preclude development, and development may well inhibit or delay modernization.

economic development in the society has taken place because development requires a qualitative change in all the crucial focuses of the social order, i.e. a transformation in the socio-political system.

The concept of "development" should go beyond the economists' mechanical measures of growth (gross national product, per capita product and per capita income being the three major ones) to include such items as income distribution, employment, political and social participation, human freedom, and so forth. Development is a dialectical process which is not identical to technical achievements and ensuing growth rates. Development is deeply concerned with concerted efforts of developing man/woman towards an integrated and qualitative transformation of the social, economic, and political structures, as well as man/woman him/herself. It is a revolutionary leap from one epoch to another - from one type of relationship between men/women and their social, economic, political, and ideological products to another form of relationship.

The term "development" cannot be used for a situation in which the benefits of growth are limited to a small stratum, while an increasing proportion of the rest of the population is unemployed and hungry, and a police state keeps the resultant turmoil under terroristic control. To look at the case of Third World countries in this connection, it appears that the concept of "development", especially as used by North American social scientists, can be analyzed as

an "ideology"⁴ designed to mask the realities of imperialism, exploitation, and dependency. The real problem is not that of "development" and underdevelopment, but rather, in the words of Frank, of the "development of underdevelopment" (Frank 1970b) - that is, of the relationship between exploiter and exploited.

One should not leave this question of development without saying that, as mentioned earlier, "developmentalism" is based upon an implicit ideology and is not a necessary and value-free scientific position (Bodenheimer, 1971). This ideology is though originally American, by no means limited to the U.S. With considerable differences in detail, the official Soviet notions of development could also be quite aptly subsumed under the same general ideological category (Wilber, 1969), although they emphasize the importance of a revolutionary restructuring of traditional societies before the redemptive benefits of modernity can be fully savored (Berger et al., 1974).

Finally, it is worth remembering that one should not restrict analytically, the question of development purely to the contemporary world situation, as has been the tendency

⁴An ideology, as defined here, is a set of statements that are not open to disproof by empirical evidence and that are designed to shape social reality: change a given state of society, consolidate it, protect it against alternatives or deny its historical relativity.

in recent years under economic influence among modernization theorists. As Huntington has forcefully argued, the temporal restrictions recently placed upon the term "development" constitute a retrograde step in special-scientific analysis (Huntington, 1965). A clear example of such restriction can be seen in the development, as used by modernization theorists, which implies an unfolding toward some terminal state. The way the word development is used represents justifiable belief in the existence of social and cultural stages through which societies must move in order to arrive at some "modern" terminus whose nature is just as much problematic as are the stages themselves.

Modernization and growth:

Growth implies that an activity system is increasing the scale of its social structures and the quantitative level of its activities. Population, employment, income, etc., are dimensions commonly used to reflect these changes in level or scale. To be more specific, one can define "economic growth" as increase in aggregate product, either total or per capita, without referring to changes in the structure of the economy or in the social and cultural value systems. The problem in theories of development and modernization is that they equate economic growth generally with "development", and economic development particularly (Lerner, 1967). For numbers of reasons, it is important to

sort out and delineate the differences between these terms.

Development is broad-based realization of the potentiality of human personality and social conditions. Development involves changes in structure, while growth involves changes in scale. To achieve growth, one takes the structure of production as given and increases outputs basically by increasing inputs, while to achieve development one has to change the structure. Though growth provides the material for subsequent structural change, it is the structural change that permits viable growth to occur. Thus, growth is a quantitative phenomenon, while development is seen as a qualitative phenomenon. For instance, we take the per capita, which is one of the indices of economic growth: this useful and flexible device, however - is limited in its applicability for measuring modernization or development. Countries may improve their general level of living by the redistribution of income rather than by increasing it, or by the use of new antibiotic measures in the field of health while maintaining the same level of public expenditure as in the past. Conversely, per capita income may go up without this being accompanied by any substantial rise in the general level of living if, for example, there is an important expansion of production in a sector of the economy that absorbs little labor. Here one can consider and identify "growth without development" --

increases in the scale of production without changes in the structure of production (Clower et al., 1966).⁵ For instance such writers as Baran (1957), Frank (1970), and Furtado (1964) have shown quite convincingly that underdevelopment, measured in terms of severe and growing sectoral imbalances in the economy, is quite compatible with a relatively high rate of growth and the extensive "westernization" of attitudes and culture. The crucial point is not the change of attitudes, not even the rate of economic growth but rather the type of growth: Is it a growth which allows for the full and balanced utilization of all human and nonhuman resources in the country and which can gradually solve the problem of poverty and unemployment; or is the pattern of growth such that a small "modern" sector is developing in a spectacular way whereas the rest of the economy remains backward and stagnating -- leaving the vast majority of the population underemployed and impoverished?

In general, quantities have the merit of seeming to introduce both certainty and generality into the study, thus making facts more tangible and technical - less of a fantasy. But this is at the cost of leaving out of the analysis everything that is not readily quantifiable, and what is allowed to enter the analysis as a structuring device

⁵Clower characterizes Liberia as a dual-sector economy in which there is growth in a modern sector, but no development generally.

soon comes to be treated as if it were an end in itself. Quantities, initially defined by a random process, come to be treated as if they were ends in themselves.

Modernization and industrialization:

The relationship between modernization and industrialization also bears more scrutiny. Historically modernization and industrialization have been closely associated, but they are not equivalent terms. Industrialization is commonly determined, for example, by a nation's steel production, railroad cars per mile of tract and kilowatt hours of electricity generated. Modernization is a more inclusive term, because although it involves economic growth, it may or may not be based upon industrialization. As Apter (1965) has noted, we can have modernization without industrialization, but not vice versa.

In the West modernization proceeded by commercialization and industrialization, while in some non-Western areas modernization has proceeded by commercialization and bureaucracy. While industrialization in Europe gave birth to modernization, in Africa and Asia the present modernization processes may, though not in all cases, create favorable conditions for industrialization in the future. Third World countries may modernize without industrialization. If they are partially in pace with industrialization, it is a different kind than the one in eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe and America. African and Asian nations

usually begin the process of modernization with nation-building and the elevation of modern political systems. They aim at a transformation of their social structure, a spread of new norms and values. They disseminate education, while the local industry is developed only very slightly, and grows only later.

Modernization, according to Apter, should not be viewed in the tight technological sense that Levy (1966) and Rostow (1960) do. Rather, modernization is a more general phenomenon, and one way to get there, but not the only way, is through industrialization. Other means, in which new role structures, patterns of thinking, and integrating institutions which bind them all together, might also work. One practical problem here, of course, is that "alternative" routes to modernization other than industrialization, are not at all in vogue today. Moreover, if a country finds it impossible to modernize through industrialization, it is not certain that any alternative schemes will work any better for it. Therefore, we can conclude that

modernization can. . . be seen as something apart from industrialization - caused by it in the West but causing it in other areas. (Apter, 1965:43-44)

Finally, it is necessary to be aware of methodological consequences of equating these terms. According to Tipps, "to equate modernization with industrialization, for example, or with indicators typically associated with industrialization, adds nothing to the utility of the latter concept and renders the former redundant." (1973:205)

Summary of chapter:

In its conceptual content and scope, the term "modernization", as it is often used, smacks of substantial imprecision, ambiguity, and elasticity. In part the confusion derives from three factors:

- a) the historical change in the meaning;
- b) its cultural and political implications when it has been made synonymous with "westernization";
- c) the fact of its multidimensionality, especially when these dimensions are not exhaustively identified, correlated among themselves as shown to be always present in a definite profile in a given case.

The term modernization has been used as an equivalent for industrialization, development, and economic growth, either because they are assumed to vary together, or are meant to refer to the same phenomenon. It was argued that each one of these terms refers to a different phenomenon. While both modernization and growth are quantitative phenomena, development is a qualitative phenomenon. Modernization can be satisfactorily expressed quantitatively, but development cannot be explained only in terms of economic indices. Development is a structural process which is not identical to technical achievements and ensuing growth rates. Growth involves changes in scale, while development is concerned with realization of the potentiality of human personality and social conditions.

Historically, modernization and industrialization have been closely related, but they are not identical terms. Modernization is a more inclusive term, because it may or may not be based upon industrialization. Modernization in Europe was caused by industrialization, while in the Third World countries the cause-effect relationship is different.

CHAPTER II

COMPETING DEFINITIONS OF MODERNIZATION: A REVIEW OF LEADING THINKERS

A major task in understanding modernization process is the definition and clarification of the fundamental conceptual tool. This necessitates an examination of the voluminous and varied literature that already exists concerning modernization. Rather than attempting to present a comprehensive review of all modernization theorists which would entail at least one volume in itself, this study will present a brief review and examination of the conceptualizations of some of the leading thinkers of the various schools of modernization. The aim in this selection is to be reasonably inclusive in reviewing the literature, but to focus above all on those modernization theorists who have enjoyed a wide professional influence, and have made important original statements.

Classification of studies of modernization:

To grasp the modernization process, it would be fruitful to look at different theories through the classification of their approaches. In so doing, it would be necessary first to classify different schools of thought and, then, review their approaches and definitions. The

classification used in present study is mainly based on Weiner's formulation of these different modes of thought and analyses (Weiner, 1966). This classification, of course, is different from Horowitz's or Nash's. Horowitz (1972) refers to two different trends of studies: the entrepreneurial and structural which correspond roughly to Weiner's categories of psychological and structural studies (Weiner, 1966). Manning Nash (1963) classifies modernization studies into three modes: (a) the index mode which contrasts poor economics ideal typically to the rich ones, (b) the acculturation view which considers the diffusion of knowledge, skills, values, and institutions from the rich to poor countries, and (c) the analytic mode which studies the process as it now occurs in less developed countries.

There is another classification which is used in the communication literature. In this school theories of development and modernization in relation to communication are subsumed under these categories: mechanical, organic, and cybernetic metaphors and models. The mechanical metaphors depict a close almost unvarying, connection between development in different parts of society; the similarity of "stages" of development in various societies; the explanation of differences between modernizing societies in terms of their passing through such respective stages as well as their "convergence" as the ultimate "end-result" of modernization. Probably, the most mechanical of all such

metaphors is Rostow's with his image of the economy as a jet taking off into self-sustaining growth. The second set of metaphors are termed organic. On a macro-level, this explains the development of societies as a process of increasing differentiation of structures and functions; an evolutionary process first described by Durkheim, and later by Parsons and Merton. Lastly, cybernetic metaphors conceive society as a complex, adaptive, information-bound multiple-feedback system.

Viewing the matter differently, the tentative classification utilized in present study can be explained in the following way: In general modernization studies use two approaches; these are indicative of two different levels of analysis: normative and structural. Normative approach considers values as object of study while structural approach deals with the institutional and organizational networks of society. Among those theorists who use normative approach two kinds of analyses can be distinguished: a) those who see individual as the unit of analysis such as McClelland, Hagen, Lerner, Rogers, Inkeles; b) those who consider social system as the unit of analysis, such as Weber, Bellah. Whereas the former stresses on the personal characteristic of individual such as social openness or achievement orientation, the later emphasizes the normative institutional areas of society such as religion or ideology. Structuralists also could be divided into two groups:

a) Those who use descriptive ideal types such as Parsons, Hoselitz, Nash, Eisenstadt. Among this group, there are few theorists who see modernization in a processual manner, such as Rostow, and Clark.

b) Those who use analytic explanations in a systematic manner, such as Moore, Smelser, Apter, Shils, Galbraith, Geertz, Keyfitz.

Most of structuralist's definitions of modernization is based on technological criteria. Therefore, they can be easily subsumed under structural/technological definition of modernization. The following is an attempt to review some of the main exponents of each one of these schools of thought. In addition to this, a review of Bendix's liberal theory of modernization and Rostow's stage theory of development will be offered.

A. Structural/Technological Definition of Modernization

Generally, societal modernization is taken to be associated with evolutionary social change, toward increasing differentiation of structure and increasing specialization of function (Smelser, 1964; Levy, 1966). These theories, while some claim to explain the processes whereby preindustrial societies become industrial, are content to paint a before and after picture, contrasting a set of characteristics associated with preindustrial societies with the corresponding set that evolves in those that are highly industrialized.

The theories are said to be diachronic, therefore, in that they attempt to infer process from a methodology of comparative statics. They are held to be unilinear in that all societies are held to undergo a parallel series of transformations during the process of industrialization that results in a highly homogeneous final product.

Modernization is thus held to be universal in impact and highly predictable with regard to end product:

We are confronted - whether for good or for bad - with a universal social solvent. The patterns of the relatively modernized societies, once developed, have shown a universal tendency to penetrate any social context whose participants have come in contact with them. . . . The patterns always penetrate; once the penetration has begun, the previous indigenous patterns always change; and they always change in the direction of some of the patterns of the relatively modernized societies (Levy, 1967:190).

Levy, and many other modernization theorists, define modernization in terms of use of inanimate sources of power. An illustration of this idea is the conceptualization of modernization in terms of energy use. That such use is an important feature of the modern society, and has implications for cultural development and patterns of social organization, is evidenced in the works of White, Ginsburg, Hall, McClelland, Johnston and Nielsen, and Weller and Sly (White, 1949; Ginsburg 1961; Hall 1965; McClelland 1966; Johnston and Nielsen, 1966; Weller and Sly, 1969).

Meadows, and others, similarly define "the process of economic development" as "in effect the process of

utilizing more energy to increase the productivity and efficiency of human labor." (Meadows et al., 1972:71)

These definitions are largely shared by Sahlins in defining general cultural evolution. He identifies various criteria for progress among the following: "As in life, thermodynamic achievement (or proficiency in converting inanimate energy into work) has its organization counterpart, higher levels of integration. [That is] cultures that transform more energy have more parts and subsystems, more specialization of parts, and more effective means of integration of the whole." (Sahlins and Service, 1960:35-36) The relation between energy consumption and social development has also been noted by Earl Cook, a geoscientist:

The success of an industrial society, the growth of its economy, the quality of the life of its people and its impact on other societies and on the total environment are determined in large part by the quantities and the kinds of energy resources it exploits and by the efficiency of its systems for converting potential energy into work and heat. . . . The more power we use, the more we shape our cities and mold our economic and social institutions to be dependent on the application of power and the consumption of energy. We could not now make any major move toward a lower per capita energy consumption without severe economic dislocation, and certainly the struggle of people in less developed regions toward somewhat similar energy consumption levels cannot be thwarted without prolonging mass human suffering. (Cook, 1971:134-44)

Energy consumption per capita is not the only measure of modernization, but is at the heart of most modernization indexes used by these researchers. Caplow and Finsterbusch (1964), have developed a modernization index consisting of

three elements: energy consumption per capita, telephones per thousand population and inhabitants per physician.

A definition of modernization which includes consumption of energy to multiply the efforts of the members of a society, that is, effective consumption of inanimate sources of power, is the most prominent among social scientists. To deal with that more than this seems to be beyond the scope of this work (see Sofranko, et al., 1971).

Marion Levy:

One of the early theorists, working in the Parsonsian tradition, is Marion Levy, Jr. Levy defines modernization directly in terms of technology: "I would consider any society the more modernized the greater the ratio of inanimate to animate power sources and the greater the extent to which human efforts are multiplied by the use of tools." (Levy, 1966:11-12) Inanimate sources of power he defines residually, as "any sources of power that are not produced from human or other animal energy." (Ibid)

Levy in his major work, Modernization and the Structure of Societies: A Study for International Affairs, provides us with a checklist of the correlates of modernization, though he declares himself unable to suggest exact criteria by which to measure the continuum of modernization. He does so on the basis of a binary distinction between "relatively" modernized societies (the United States, the Soviet Union, England, and France) and "relatively" non-modernized societies (Burma, India, Ceylon, and some Latin

American countries). "Modernized" is qualified to indicate that characteristics of each type are present in the other type; what is crucial is the degree to which a given set of characteristics is widely shared by the people in a given society. Levy holds that all relatively nonmodern societies are more alike than they are like relatively modern societies: the United States of the 18th century more closely resembles the Togo of today than it does the United States of today. Furthermore, the variation in societal types is reduced in modernization, as all societies increasingly come to resemble one another. This theme is also treated in W. Moore and A. Feldman:

Thus industrialization is viewed as a process that creates cultural homogeneity, in that certain patterns of belief and behavior are necessarily common to all industrial societies. Moreover, commonality is not limited to the single act or norm but applies as well to the configurations into which they are formed, for example, the interrelations among machine technology, division of labor, and authoritative coordination. (Moore et al., 1960:364)

Levy considers the implications of his distinctions in terms of problems of strains and control. He also delineates some of the advantages and disadvantages that accrue to being a latecomer to the modernization process. The advantages include the possibility of borrowing technologies, of skipping stages, of obtaining assistance, etc., while the disadvantages include problems of scale (competing with modernized societies), conversion (of resources from one use to another), and disappointment. Levy feels that

nonmodernized nations must, by and large, progress through the stages experienced by a relatively modern society during its period of industrialization. Although he does not discuss actual processes, he makes it clear that the patterns associated with modernized societies are always destructive of those associated with nonmodern systems. We can, from this perspective, conclude that modernization refers to the institutional and cultural concomitants of economic growth under the conditions of sophisticated technology.

Neil J. Smelser:

Smelser's work "Toward a Theory of Modernization," has its source in his study of the industrial revolution in England.⁶ This revolution is very thoroughly studied and an account of it is presented within the framework of Parsons' AGIL scheme.⁷ This theory is abstracted from its historical setting for a more general statement and for application to the developing countries.

Smelser begins with fact of economic development. He, applying the term modernization somewhat more generically than Levy, offers a definition in terms of the characteristics of social structure associated with the process

⁶Smelser, N.J., Social Change in the Industrial Revolution, London: Routledge, 1959.

⁷In the Parsonsian framework of social systems, each system is confronted with four basic problems which must be solved for continuation of the system. These functional requisites are adaptive (to the environment), goal-attaining, integration and pattern maintenance.

(Smelser, 1963). Modernization is said to be conceptually related to (but more comprehensive than) economic development. For him, "the term modernization - a conceptual cousin of the term 'economic development', but more comprehensive in scope - refers to the fact that technical, economic, and ecological changes have ramifications through the whole social and cultural fabric" (Smelser, 1966:111).

As a consequence, he expects these changes to occur in the spheres of politics, education, religion, family and stratification. He attempts to set out the main social structural concomitants of economic development. Under the latter he subsumes four distinct but interrelated processes: an increase in scientific technology, a progressive commercialization of agriculture, the changeover to mechanical factory production, and ecological arrangements. These four observations Smelser stresses are not empirical or historical generalizations, but ideal types - effective constructs that are useful in concrete analysis. Whether or not these four processes occur simultaneously in a given society, they nevertheless tend to affect the social structure in similar ways.

All four accompanying processes, Smelser believes, tend to generate similar types of structural changes. Again, in terms of ideal typical constructs, these are: (1) structural differentiation; (2) integration, and (3) social disturbances. These three major categories and the relationships between them constitute the core of Smelser's

theories of modernization. Hence, a more detailed elaboration, would be quite in order.

Smelser focuses more on process than does Levy, noting the interplay between structural differentiation and integration and the social disturbances caused by the lag between the two. The most important of these processes is differentiation. Differentiation, according to him, refers to several more specialized structures (1968:129). He defines it as a process whereby

one social role or organization. . . differentiate into two or more roles or organizations which function more effectively in the new historical circumstances. The new social units are structurally distinct from each other, but taken together are functionally equivalent to the original unit (Smelser, 1968:129)

Therefore, differentiation can be seen as "the establishment of more specialized and more autonomous units." This increasing specialization affects all areas of social life: the economy, the family, the polity, the value system, etc. Economic differentiation, for example, refers to reallocation of the production function from the family to specialized institutions. With regard to stratification differentiation means that other (achieved) evaluative standards intrude on ascribed membership and individual mobility increases. In this treatment, Smelser and Levy strongly resemble one another: When differentiation occurs in the economy of an underdeveloped country, for instance, the activities of production, consumption and exchange, which

were formerly lodged in the family or village units, now requires separate specialist organizations. A typical example is an analysis of how differentiation affects the family.

In underdeveloped countries, production is located in the kinship unit. Farming is usually of a subsistence nature and any other industries are of a supplementary nature, and are also attached to kin and village. As the economy develops several kinds of economic activities are removed from within the confines of the family complex. Agricultural wages, labor, and the factory system are factors contributing to this tendency. As these activities move out of the family, the family "loses some of its previous functions and thereby itself becomes a more specialized agency." (Ibid:139) It thus ceases to function as an economic unit. Here, Smelser goes beyond Levy in tracing the impact of such differentiation on the family which, stripped of its economic functions, becomes increasingly specialized in social-emotional gratification.

For Smelser, differentiation in all areas of social life alone is not enough for development. Following Durkheim he insists that one of the concomitants of differentiation "is an increase in the mechanism to coordinate and solidify the interaction among individuals with increasingly diversified interests." (Ibid:137) These mechanisms are the mechanisms of integration. Development is seen as a contrapuntal interplay between differentiation and integration. All of the structural differentiation that

occurs during the process of modernization raises the problem of reintegration. What needs integrating are the "increasingly diversified interests" brought about by differentiation. Thus the removal of economic activities from within the family creates many problems of an integrative nature: How is information about jobs to be conveyed to workers? How are family interests to be integrated with those of the firm? etc. It is in answer to integrative problems such as these, that organizations and institutions such as labor unions, labor recruitment agencies, welfare, cooperative societies, etc., have sprung up.

Finally, in Smelser's set of interrelated ideal types are the social disturbances. Social disturbances appear as the results of discontinuities in the processes of differentiation and integration because these two do not always keep apace with each other. This disturbance can be best defined as anomie and dissatisfaction bred by discontinuities and often crystallized in social movements of protest and rebellion. Smelser observes three responses to these discontinuities: anxiety, hostility, and fantasy. If these responses become collective, they usually give rise to a variety of social movements ranging from millenarianism through peaceful agitation to nationalism, revolution, and underground subversion (Ibid:127).

Smelser enumerates several sources of disturbance: (1) Structural change is uneven during modernization, producing anomie. For example, "in colonial societies. . . the

European powers frequently revolutionize the economic and political framework. . . but at the same time encouraged or imposed a conservatism in traditional religions, class, and family systems." (1966:199) The imbalance between industrial and agricultural development also falls into this category of disturbances. (2) New activities and norms often conflict with the old; new kinds of social and economic activities conflict with traditional activities. (3) The attempts of the central government to deal with modernization in general and unrest in particular may itself be a source of unrest, as traditional (often local) power sources resist encroachment from the center.

Comparisons can be made between Smelser and Levy in their perception of tension created by differentiation and integration, the latter having this tension in mind when he considered problems of modernization. Levy, therefore, discusses such problems as "change in fit" (e.g. "the teaching of new techniques undermining general family control," akin to Smelser's first source of disturbance), "fundamentalist reactions" (Smelser's second source of disturbance), and "the problem of adequate knowledge" (referring to the knowledge necessary for necessary centralized planning, which relates to Smelser's third source of disturbances - the inability of the government to exercise adequate central control.) Both Levy and Smelser are agreed on the need for increased central control during modernization.

Although their terminology is somewhat different, it is clear that Levy and Smelser both regard society as a mechanistic system. In this system, new structures are developed to perform the functions of those that are no longer performing adequately, and when this process of structural differentiation proceeds unevenly, tensions and imbalances are created for the system as a whole.

Having outlined this set of interrelated ideal types, Smelser continues to further fortify it with two methodological qualifications. First is that, despite the constant appearance of the forces of differentiation, integration, and social disturbances, the process of modernization is not everywhere the same. Factors making for variation are: (1) variations in pre-modern conditions, (2) variations in impetus to change, (3) variations in the path to modernization, (4) variations in the advanced stages of modernization, and (5) variations in the content and timing of dramatic events during modernization. Second and very important is the qualification that the set of ideal types though empirically linked, do not form a closed system. By insisting on this, he is giving recognition to the fact that differentiation, integration, and social disturbances may arise from sources other than economic development or from the effects of one on the other.

Bert F. Hoselitz:

Important among the earlier sociological explanations of modernization is the work of Bert Hoselitz. His work,

Sociological Aspects of Economic Growth, is based on Parsons' early formulation of European development. Hoselitz separates out certain elements of Parsons' theory and relocates them in a theoretical content that permits them to address the future-oriented demands of development in the new nations. The conclusion then seems vastly similar in content and implication to that of the social psychologists. The underdeveloped countries are counselled to eliminate the values and pattern variables of underdevelopment and adopt those of development if they aspire to modernity.

Hoselitz's theory of contemporary modernization is almost identical with that of Levy's, however, unlike Levy he does not focus on certain institution, but on total societies.⁸ Hoselitz's primary concern is with the generation of "theoretical models for different types of societies and different types of transitions or movements from 'traditional' to more 'modern' forms of economic organization." (Hoselitz, 1960:25) To do this required certain non-economic terms or criteria of which the various societies could be described or indexed, and variables for the explanation of the transition. It was in meeting the first

⁸Levy chose the institution of family in China for application of his theory. See Levy, M., The Family Revolution in Modern China, New York, 1963.

requirement that Hoselitz turned to Parsons' work, extracting from it his well-known pattern variables. By the use of these variables, Hoselitz hoped to characterize underdeveloped societies as they currently were, in contrast to the developed state to which they were aspiring.

In developing this contrast, Hoselitz found it necessary to employ only four of the five pattern variables: achievement vs. ascription, universalism vs. particularism, specificity vs. diffuseness, and self-orientation vs. collectivity orientation. From the application of these variables to the problem at hand, the conclusion was drawn that modern or "advanced" societies "exhibit" predominantly universalistic norms in determining the selection process for the attainment of economically relevant roles; that the roles themselves are functionally highly specific; that this predominant norms by which the selection process for those roles is regulated, are based on the principle of achievement or "performance"; and that the holders of positions in the power elite and even in other elites are expected to maintain collectivity oriented relations to social objects of economic significance. In an underdeveloped society, on the contrary, particularism, functional diffuseness and the principle of ascription predominate as regulators of social-structural relations especially in its economic dimension, and the orientation of actors in economically or politically influential roles is determined

predominantly by consideration of their ego." (Hoselitz, 1960:40)

These social-structural characteristics that make up either of the sides of this contrast must not be thought of as mere descriptive categories which are independent of each other. Rather they must be viewed as structural categories that are functionally interrelated. To illustrate, Hoselitz suggests that we make the assumption that economic development is associated with an increasing degree of division of labor. But this implies an increase in the number of highly specific tasks in society - tasks which can only be adequately performed by persons having the requisite skills. Consequently, competition open to all having these skills becomes the basis for filling these positions and not one's status in the society. Similarly, starting with the assumption of a low degree of division of labor in traditional societies, the case could be made for the functional relationship between diffuseness and particularism. A necessary implication of these arguments is that some combinations, e.g. specificity and particularism are disfunctional and are therefore, unlikely to occur in practice. Thus we may conclude that the two sets of special-structural variables given constitute functionally integrated and mutually exclusive wholes.

Having developed these two systems of variables for analyzing traditional and modern societies; Hoselitz's next

major problem is to explain the transition or movement from traditional to modern. Here, development is seen in no way related to indigenous sources of societal growth but is viewed exclusively in terms of externally induced change.

In Hoselitz's words,

The fundamental differences in developing a theory for past and for present economic growth is that the former process is an overall social process in which a priori no causal primacy can be assigned to anyone or anyone set of variables. As concerns present instances of development, it is quite proper to regard such factors as accumulation of capital. . . as the primary variables and to regard adjustments in the social structure as positive, negative or neutral responses to these "stimuli".
(Hoselitz, 1960:43)

Thus, the major impetus for the transition to modernity "is likely to come from the plans for economic advancement already drawn up and partially in the course of implementation" (Ibid:45). Planned development then itself becomes the change agent rather than internal societal processes of growth. However, for those plans to have effect, Hoselitz requires one other important social change: the coming to power of the equivalent of the European bourgeoisie in the country under consideration - a class, he believes, which would have formerly occupied a marginal position in the old society. Consequently, the implicit policy implications here are for government with the help of the local bourgeoisie to strive for the institutionalization of modern values (universalism, etc.) to support development plans in action or to be put in action.

Wilbert E. Moore:

To finish up with the structural/technological definition of modernization, which seems to be the most common kind, Moore's reflections on modernization is reviewed. What follows, then, is a general review and commentary on Moore's theory of modernization. Moore's major works in which his reflections on modernization can be found are: Social Change, The Conduct of Corporation, and The Impact of Industry. He has expressed his views in a number of articles in different anthologies on social change.

Moore defines modernization in terms of the transformation of a "traditional or pre-modern society" - as a correlate of (though not conterminous with) industrialization, which means "the extensive use of inanimate sources of power for economic production, and all that entails by way of organization, transportation, communication and so on." (Moore, 1963:92) Moore's definition is close to Levy's. He, somewhat more directly, defines modernization as involving the

. . . total transformation of a traditional or pre-modern society into the types of technology and associated social organization that characterize the "advanced", economically prosperous, and relatively politically stable nations of the Western World. . . . In fact, we may. . . speak of the process as industrialization. (1963:89-91)

Such a view is predicated on the assumption that one can describe the general features of both "traditional" and "advanced" or "modern" societies or thus treat development as the transformation of the one type into the other.

Like Smelser, Moore is critical of certain assumptions made of earlier theorists about the modernization process. Among these is the common defect of "treating industrialization as a given change and recording or ordering of the consequential changes that must then follow, by pursuing the functional model of an integrated social system, which has to achieve a new basis of integration owing to the introduction of a critically important alteration in a strategic sector of the society, the economy." (Moore, 1963:92) Moore is concerned about the assumption that the new structures that come with industrialization can be predicted on the basis of the functional requisites of already modernized societies. The problem is that even though theoretical knowledge of such sequences is desirable, he finds that "varying sequences of change are evident, and not all are equally effective in achieving professed goals" (Ibid:92)

Not only is Moore concerned about assumptions like these, but also about the problems of social engineering and of the applicability of social scientific principles to practical problems. These endeavors, Moore sees as being seriously limited by three factors: (1) The problem of values; (2) a serious lack of scientific principles; and (3) the fact that valuable information is "lost in the process of abstracting to achieve generalizations." (Hoselitz and Moore, 1963:366) This information, Moore suggests, has to be "added in" in the event of application.

Surrounded on all sides by doubts such as these, what Moore offers us is even less of a theory of modernization than Smelser's presentation. It amounts to no more than an organized guide and can be summarized as follows: Moore works out a synthesis of the structural similarities and persistent differences between social systems under the impact of industry. The emphasis on the similarity, according to him, implies that newly developing areas will move toward a common social model as they industrialize. He cites the supporting arguments, both empirical and theoretical, from a wide range of scholars including himself and Kerr and his colleagues. The underlying theory is phrased by Moore as the "theory of structural constraints." The essential idea is, according to him, that a commercial-industrial system imposes certain organizational and institutional requirements not only on the economy but also on many other aspects of society.

Moore then draws attention to an opposite view expressed particularly by Herbert Blumer, who asserts the independence from industrialization of "coincident" situations of intense social change. Moore evaluates this "disquieting" situation of differences of view as largely attributed to the problem of difference in levels of generalization:

Those who emphasize the commonalities of industrial societies will, for example, note the uniform use of administrative authority as a major way of coordinating highly specialized productive tasks. Thus, the situation of the

Russian factory manager is said to be very similar to that of his American counterpart. Others, dissatisfied with such generalization, dwell on details, not all of which can be readily dismissed as trivial. The ultimate political accountability of Soviet and American managers differs, as does the conduct of relations with labor unions having highly unequal legal positions (Moore, 1965:12-13).

Secondly, the problem is related to unequal scholarly attitudes toward probabilities:

The dedicated generalizer will identify a certain structural feature of industrial societies as "typical" and perhaps mistakenly imply that it is invariant, whereas his 'relativistic' critic will point to contrary cases, and perhaps mistakenly imply that they are common rather than exceptional. A closely parallel difference of view distinguishes the theorist, who seeks out the uniformities in time and space, and the technical adviser, who must take account of variable particulars in the operation situation, down to the level of personality characteristics of public bureaucrats or private managers. Each position tends to lead its tenants to impatience with the other (Ibid:13).

Thirdly, differences in the conceptions of social order and its future account for the difficulty of this problem:

The proponents of convergence generally subscribe to a high degree of structural interdependence and functional integration in societies. . . . Internal disharmonies and external variation are then viewed. . . as inconsistencies that will disappear. The proponents of divergence emphasize preindustrial differences among societies, differing rates and routes of change, and often, they hold a less deterministic view of the social order. . . . In short, they doubt that "eventual stability" will ever arrive (Ibid).

Moore suggests that the weight of evidence favors the divergence model. He searches for the implications of the crude and stubborn facts of variability for the

theoretical conception of social systems. He proposes to make a substantial modification of the very conception of society--a kind of equilibrium. He advocates that "dis-equilibrating variables" must be written in the analytical scheme to match with empirical reality.

Moore proposes the following three propositions for this purpose:

1. All societies are subject to and marked by internal sources of change. Although social phenomena are appropriately viewed in terms of systems, those systems are not to be conceived as precisely in equilibrium or their change processes as exclusively self-equilibrating. . . . Industrialization may provide partial solutions to existing tensions as well as setting up its own set of tension-producing demands on preindustrial social systems.
2. The antecedent structures, the character of the industrial impact and its processes of imposing change, and the precise characteristics of industrialized societies are all variable. This variability is not so great as to make any generalization impossible, but does limit the number and leverage of high-level generalization.
3. Industrializing and industrial societies exhibit, besides minimum structural congruences, a similarity in two characteristics of change: a high emphasis on deliberate change, and the consequences of continuous differentiation. Both of these require, for system viability, modes of tension management, but those modes are not likely to be alike, nor to become so. (Feldman and Moore, 1962:169).

The essence of these propositions is the view of society as a tension-management system: that is, "a society persists not only through orderly continuity but also through tension-management and change." Moore explains:

This conception of society has certain advantages in terms of the "fit" of the model to observed characteristics, even those of a persistent or recurrent quality, such as social deviation. It has overwhelming advantages in dealing with the phenomena of leads and lags in situations of rapid transformation. An outstanding way in which both industrializing and industrial societies differ in social structure is in the allocation of power and the political structure of the state. If societies differ in their characteristic tensions, because of varying historic legacies and the ways these intersect with current problems of achieving social goals, then it is readily understandable for tension-management as a whole, the state, will differ in its structure and forms of action. (Moore, 1965:17-18)

Essentially, Moore deals with the question of convergence, not merely among industrial societies but "among all societies" in the contest of "the growing interdependence of the modern world, which implies the extensive violation of the boundaries of formerly more or less independent systems, results from processes variously identified as industrialization, Westernization, or, the broader term, modernization. . . . In order to extend convergence theory to all contemporary societies and cultures, one needs a theory of modernization as such." (Moore, 1973:119) Why is there this need?

He explains:

Despite the extensive literature, to which I have contributed my share, on this subject, I think it proper to say that a succinct and comprehensive causal theory does not exist. Attention has been given to conditions, concomitants, and consequences, and they are clearly relevant to convergence. Indeed, convergence theory is the principal source of their derivation. But these alleged generalizations are commonly, if implicitly, in the classical ["If (modernization takes place) then. . . (certain other social changes must be met or later follow)"] form. The

likelihood that the if-clause will occur is not thereby directly examined (Ibid., emphasis original)

Admitting that it is impossible not to "formulate the necessary and sufficient conditions for modernization," which is to him the core of a comprehensive causal theory, "the theory of convergence among modernized societies serves as an informative basis for cross-societal (or cross-national) comparisons and generalizations" (Ibid:119-120). Moore seems to think that only in the above sense does convergence theory represent a major theoretical development with regard to modernization.

However, a major limitation on convergence theory is due to the fact that political stability as a requisite for economic modernization may be achieved in radically diverse forms. Moore's notion of society as a "tension-management system" was used precisely to explore "this persistent structural dissimilarity among industrial and also industrializing societies." (Ibid:126)

Moore's attempt to overcome the limitation of convergence theory by paying due attention to the divergent aspect of modernization seems, however, largely self-defeating because his consistent search for a general theory of modernization is a poor strategy by which to look into the historical reality of diverse material and ideal interests in this turbulent world.

His rather vague theoretical stance is expressed in the following concluding remarks:

One does not want to engage in arguments that are likely to be more ideological than objective over what is fundamental and what is superficial. Surely the ways of making a living, the size and type of place in which one lives, the relations between parents and children, and the degree of education can scarcely be dismissed as superficial and they are clearly headed for greater crossnational homogeneity. Beliefs, customs, language, and the way order is kept can also scarcely be dismissed as superficial, and they will certainly remain different for the foreseeable future (1973:130).

Moore is particularly vague on the question of ideology and objectivity. As one of the most sophisticated structural-functionalist theorists, Moore seems to be incapacitated by his consistent penchant to system building to come any closer to an adequate explanation of the reality of modernization. As in the case of Smelser, it is not at all clear that Moore has gotten around the problem of substituting a guide for a theory. The ever present possibility of the guide becoming a theory in the process of application, would suggest the contrary.

B. Social Psychological Definition of Modernization

The term "psychological" has a number of meanings today, and theories that deal with psychological aspects of development, therefore can take any one of several positions on these issues. Among the major varieties are those which emphasize particular internal characteristics or mental states (McClelland, 1961) or total personality (Hagen, 1962; Lauterbach, 1974) or the learning of behavior

(Kunkel, 1970) or particular values and attitudes (Inkeles and Smith, 1974; Kahl, 1968). Any psychological approach to development follows a general paradigm whose specific components vary with the psychological theory or school that is the source of the model of man/woman.

Those theorists who emphasize psychological factors in development, pay particular attention to the variables and linkages among them which in one way or another are the properties of individuals; to the specification of the conditions for and ways in which individuals change, and to the relationships between individuals and social processes. It is assumed that social action and change are hardly anything more than the totality of behavior of the individual who constitute society. Therefore, it is not the structural features of group domination, historical blockages, resource hoardings, control mechanisms and the like, which are considered to be crucial to the understanding of social change. Rather, it is individuals who figure most prominently as the unit of analysis.

Modernization from this perspective, is conceptualized as an array of specific processes in the minds of individuals, rather than as impersonal advances in social institutions (Lauterbach, 1974; Kunkel, 1976). It is seen to be essentially a process of physical and psychic mobility involving the dissociation of self from traditional systems and the association of self with social systems of a more modern orientation. These theories view the obstacles to

development in value and normative terms. The political, social, and economic problems engendered by development are the results of normative, and psychological characteristics and processes which today are common in all three worlds: "subculture of peasantry" (Rogers, 1969); "psychological barriers to change" (Foster, 1962); "Culture of poverty" (Oscar Lewis, 1961).

At the risk of oversimplification, it can be said that they, influenced by some aspect of Weber's work and by Parsonsian sociology, stress the incompatibility between the requirements of rapid economic growth and the dominant system of beliefs and values in most underdeveloped countries. Such values through their institutionalization into specific norms penetrate all social spheres and even shape the personality structure of the individuals involved. The problem of development then becomes predominantly a problem of communication, training, resocialization, a problem of cultural diffusion, i.e. of how to transfer the right attitudes and skills from the developed to the underdeveloped world. Within this perspective a certain optimism prevails. Although the process of "catching up" might be long, with the development of communications and the continuous spreading of Western science, technology and values, the economic agents in poor countries (entrepreneurs, workers or peasants), will acquire the right attitudes for growth. In the long term then, if present trends continue, all countries

will sooner or later make it (Hagen, 1969; Rostow 1960; McClelland, 1961).

Social psychologism, as this approach has been called (Inkeles, 1959), can be understood as a reaction against the theories of social determination. As such it reinforces the virtues of capitalistic ethic, free enterprise, and achievement motivation, and reposes slight faith in regulating mechanisms, planned development, and controlled growth. McClelland's case is a typical illustration of this approach (1961). Inkeles (1959), Lerner (1966), and Rogers (1969), among others, have contributed to this trend through their studies which focus on values, attitudes, communication, and diffusion of innovations.

Daniel Lerner:

Like Levy, Lerner's work grew out of the experience of witnessing the disintegrative effects of western society on a traditional society. In this case, however, it was not Confucian China, as was the case with Levy, but the Islamic Middle East. As in China (Levy, 1963), the Western invasion resulted in the disruption of many time-honored ways of doing things. "The area", Lerner tells us, "today are unified not by their common solutions but by their common problems: how to modernize traditional life ways that no longer 'work' to their own satisfaction." (1966:44) These processes of decay and the attempts at reconstruction that followed in their wake, no doubt had much in common with the experience of China. However, despite this, Lerner's

attempt to conceptually reproduce these processes, provides us with a theory of modernization quite different from that of Levy's.

The fact that apparently impressed Lerner most, as he observed the break-up of villages and the movement to towns, etc., was that this was another instance of a universal process that had first occurred in Western Europe. "The Western model of modernization," Lerner asserts, "exhibits certain components and sequences whose relevance is global." (1966:46) He even goes further and makes the claim that "the sequence of current events in the Middle East can be understood, in some measure as a deliberate deformation of the western model." (Ibid)

. If indeed modernization everywhere exhibits "certain behavioral or institutional compulsions," (Ibid:47) then it follows that the experience of the West should be instructive for the Middle East. Working on this assumption, Lerner turns his attention next to a close scrutiny of the Western experience with the hope of isolating the factor or factors that were crucial in bringing it successfully to the state of modernity. Out of this search comes
 X Lerner's well-known factor of empathy, which is a faculty of what he calls the "mobile personality", a factor to be discussed at a later point.

In discussing the social aspects of modernization, Lerner defines it as "the process of social change whereby less developed societies acquire characteristics common to

more developed societies." (1968a, 10:386) It is a "secular trend unilateral in direction - from tradition to participant lifeways" (1966:89). This definition bears the notion of homogenization: that there is a process of changing toward some recognizable set of characteristics, of becoming more alike. Lerner goes on: "Modernization produces the societal environment in which rising output per head is effectively incorporated. For effective incorporation, the heads that produce (and consume) rising output must understand and accept the new rules of the game deeply enough to improve their society" (1968a,10:387). While Lerner does not specify the operations under which this requisite change in attitude and productive behaviors can be observed, he does delimit the subject with mentioning that modernization is not just increased output per head. In another place, he refers only to the similarity of the role modernization plays in development to that of earlier "Europeanization", "Americanization", and "Westernization", and notes that whatever its source, "modernization poses the same basic challenge - infusion of a rationalist and positivist spirit." (Lerner, 1966:45)

In the Passing of Traditional Society, Lerner offered what was to become a classic model of the modernization process. The "secular evolution of a participant society," according to Lerner, unfolds according to a regular

sequence of phases, beginning with urbanization,⁹ proceeding through literacy and mass communication, and extending to political participation. The growth of modern cities, he argues, is imperative for the evolution of modern industrial societies because only in cities have there developed the complex skills and resources that characterize the modern industrial economy as we know it today. Then, "within this urban matrix develop both of the attributes which distinguish the next two phases - literacy and media growth." (Lerner, 1966:60)¹⁰

⁹Lately, Lerner has made several changes in his model which are not taken into account in this review because they have not been available. In an interview (1977) he revealed a shift of his concern with "empathy" and "psychic mobility", as the key psychological requirements of modernization, to the notion of "ambivalence" - reflecting a worldwide "growth weariness" as well as signs of discontent in developing countries with some aspects of development policies. He no longer considers urbanization as the number one step. In fact he would start with literacy and media exposure and then move towards political participation. Furthermore, he no longer calls the whole process "modernization", but rather "change" or "propensity to change". (Lerner, 1977)

¹⁰It is interesting to know that one of the conditions for modernization, according to Marx, is the existence of an individually oriented urban "burgher" culture. It is not urbanization as such, but the creation of autonomous, self-governing corporations with their individualistic ethics which seems to Marx the necessary prerequisite for the emergence of "civil society" and thus of modernization. The absence of such urban "burgher" culture would thus vitiate modernization even under otherwise extremely favorable conditions. Marx uses Portugal as an example. He discusses that despite the fact that Portugal was the recipient of vast economic resources in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, modernization and industrialization did not occur there because there was no urban-based "civil society" (Avineri, 1969b).

Literacy, according to Lerner, provides reading skills and a consequent exposure to print mass media and the new ideas which the media carries. The literate peasant is able to store and retrieve technical and innovative information for delayed use. Literacy promotes growth of mental abilities helpful for modernization; manipulation of symbols, abstraction, empathizing with strange roles, and restructuring reality. In other words, literacy creates "psychic mobility". It contributes to mass media which in turn accelerates literacy. And out of the interaction of literacy and mass media develop institutions of participation which underlie the modern society. Such participation welds individual to the larger notion in terms of interest and psychological commitment.

Lerner uses a variety of variables both as indices and agents of modernization. Among these variables are: literacy, mass media exposure, urban contact, empathy, and political participation. He regards empathy as the crucial variable intervening between mass media exposure and modernization. Lerner considered it to be one of the most important hallmarks of human being's capacity to modernize. Empathy is a shorthand term for "introjection", the ability to attribute to self the desirable attributes of others, and "projection", the ability to assign to other objects the preferred attributes of self. Empathy "is the capacity to see oneself in the other fellow's situation". (Lerner, 1966:50)

For Lerner, high empathy characterizes modern society with its urbanization, industrialization, literacy, and participation. "In modern society, more individuals exhibit higher empathic capacity than in any previous society" (Ibid:51). Lerner's concept of empathy is an example of a social psychological approach to role proliferation (Friedland, 1969), which refers to the abilities of individuals to see themselves in the roles of others. It is, in a word, the capacity to "take the role of the other" or even conceive of the role of the other. From this perspective, traditional persons are unable to handle questions such as what they would do if they were the ruler of Turkey. Such questions are rejected out of hand by the traditionalists since they find such a role inconceivable. They are unable to project the possibility of occupying a role, let alone conceive of the behaviors implicit as the role.

Having reached this point, the question we must now ask ourselves is, why is empathy so important for Lerner? What crucial function does it fulfill? This important function becomes apparent when consideration is given to the fact that the primary defining characteristic of modern society for Lerner is that it is a participatory society: members participate in a consumer economy, in public forums and in a representative polity. These all require that the participants are able to understand and assess the various positions, i.e. have opinions about them and are able to make choices - abilities that all rest upon empathy.

Consequently, empathy becomes a crucial factor in the functioning of a modern participatory society.

The primary contributions of sociology towards a theory of modernization of Europe, for Lerner, turns on the increasing empathy brought about of mobility and exposure to mass media. However, it is when Lerner withdraws his theory from this historical context, in order to apply it to the new nations, that it takes on the narrower forms that have come to characterize theories of contemporary development and modernization. To see this in a purer form, one must go to Lerner's later work.

In his essay, "Towards a Communication Theory of Modernization" (1968b), Lerner's outlook is somehow less optimistic, reflecting the impact of some of the failures of the 50's and early 60's. Despite the many theoretical casualties of these years, Lerner thinks that he has weathered the storm. Thus the modernization process everywhere is still presented as starting with mobility and the production of the mobile personality. It continues with the emergence of the mass media, the stage that the developing countries have just reached. However, in these countries, the exposure to other ways of life which this stage has brought, very quickly raises the aspirations of the people to the point where it greatly outdistances their achievements. This in turn results in "the new revolution of rising frustrations." This imbalance (brought about by the mass media), Lerner sees as the major problem facing

the developing countries, and presents his theory as a solution.

Lerner asks, "What, in short, are the social institutions that affect the level of aspiration, the level of achievement and the ratio between them?" (1968a:139) He suggests that there are six: the economy, the police, the family, the community, the school, and the media. "About the first five," he suggests, "we can be very brief." (Ibid) The mass media, however, "are a major instrument of social change." (Ibid:140) Lerner insists that "modernization - conceived as the maximization of satisfaction - can succeed . . . if and only if, a clarifying communication theory and practice are activated." (Ibid)

As said earlier, the central problem is one reducing the imbalance between aspiration and achievement. For this, Lerner tells us, we are going to need more than disequilibria and balanced growth theories. Higher incomes, he observes, do not necessarily lead to commensurate increases in saving and investment. This coupling of higher income with both higher consumption and investment "is likely to occur only in a society where effort is associated with reward. . . ." (Ibid:151) This association of effort with reward, he believes, is a communication process. "People", he says, "must learn to make this association in their daily lives - linking what they see with what they hear, what they want with what they do, what they do with what they get." (Ibid)

The mass media then through their ability to restructure associations, are the crucial instruments for reducing this imbalance and opening once again the road to modernity.

To get the modernization process going, Lerner suggests that governments, or those in control, begin with "new public communications - the diffusion of new ideas and new information which will stimulate people to want to behave in new ways." (Ibid:152) This new socialization would bring with it new interests and new needs. These must be articulated and presented to government through recruitment from among the newly socialized. These articulated interests must then become concerns for public action which hopefully will address the expressed needs. Thus, it is their ability to initiate this process that gives the media their importance in Lerner's view of contemporary modernization. This has led one of Lerner's followers to the extreme suggestion, that "one of the cheapest ways to compel a country to strive for modernization would be to blanket it with subsidized cheap television sets and then to permit commercial telecasting." (Pool, 1963:288)

David C. McClelland:

The most vigorous and empirically founded viewpoint in effecting modernization theory is that of McClelland (1961). His study, The Achieving Society, traces its theoretical origins to Weber's theory of the Protestant

ethic, and its empirical base to the author's efforts to devise quantitative measures of human motives. McClelland's central thesis is that the relationship between the Calvinistic ethic and the spirit of capitalism is mediated by the achievement motive. His basic position is so well known that it only needs a brief summarization. Its essence is as follows: A psychological characteristic, technically called "need for achievement" (abbreviated nAch), is the predisposing factor which culminates in economic development whether modern or historical. Need for achievement is regarded by McClelland and by those in the tradition he has established by experimentation and dissemination, as "competition with a standard of excellence" (McClelland et al., 1953:78-9, 110-11), where the individual is personally involved with or emotionally oriented to excelling. He defines achievement motivation as "the desire to do well, not so much for the sake of social recognition or prestige, but to attain an inner feeling of accomplishment." (1966b:76)

McClelland's motivational theory is, indeed, a theory of entrepreneurship. He believes that the most important single causative factor in the rise of entrepreneurs which in turn leads to modernization of a country, is the prevalence among a people of a psychological drive which he called need for achievement. In his own words: "Civilization, at least in its economic aspects, is neither adaptation nor sublimation; it is a positive creation by a people made dynamic by a high level of

n-achievement." (1966c:100) Therefore, for him achievement motivation is the basic personality characteristic which sheds light on the rise and fall of nations. Economic development begins when people become achievement-oriented, as such people show their creative talents in business entrepreneurship. As he puts it: "a society with a generally high level of Achievement will produce more energetic entrepreneurs who, in turn, produce more rapid economic development." (196:205) It has been shown that these countries that had higher levels of achievement motivation, as measured in the current children's stories both in 1925 and 1950, showed a faster rate of economic development (this included both a capitalist country, U.S., and a socialist country, Poland) than the countries which had lower levels of achievement motivation. It has also been shown that in earlier societies, economic activities in nation increased level of achievement motivation, as reflected in literature, architecture, etc. (Ibid:Chap. 4) .

McClelland has devised a method of measuring n-achievement quantitatively by assigning scores to imaginative productions, along the same principles followed in the analysis of psychological needs through the thematic apperception technique. He has shown from his various investigations that quantitatively variations in this psychological drive are invariably associated with similar variations in the rates of economic growth of ancient civilization and modern or present-day societies.

From this perspective, individual modernity has been defined as a complex personality syndrome embracing a wide gamut of psychological orientations and ways of acting which are related to the functioning of the modern industrial society. "High-achieving mystics" are to be found among the business-oriented types, while "low-achieving traditionalists" are to be found in peasant sectors (McClelland, 1961). The traditional individual is supposed to rank low on the scale of achievement, she/he is short of ambition to rise and succeed. This contributes to his/her poverty as well as the backwardness of his/her society. Modernizing such an individual needs a "mental virus" of some sort existing in his/her mind.

Everett Hagen:

Along the same line, Hagen, as an economist, is another major advocate of the central role played by psychological factors. In his work, On the Theory of Social Change, Hagen begins by pointing out the inadequacies of classic economic explanations for lack of growth, such as low income and inadequate saving, inadequate markets, the need for big "lumps" of capital because steel mills do not come in all sizes, etc. Basically, he asks why such barriers did not prevent economic growth in the countries where it first occurred. For him, the problem is to explain what accounts for technological and entrepreneurial innovation in those cases. Why did some people surmount the

economic barriers which have always everywhere to some extent existed? The answer appears to lie in psychology--in the personality structure of the innovators.

He believes that modernization takes place as a result of the emergence of innovative personalities. He emphasizes a social event, "withdrawal of status respect," as the initial impetus for the eventual development of innovative persons who, when they appear, may channel their energies into either economic or non-economic arenas, such as religion or political ones, depending on the availability of models and permissive or facilitative social structural factors. However, it is a very complex inter-generational succession of psychological events that assertedly leads individuals whose forebears endured the loss of status respect to emerge as innovational, striving, achievement-oriented personalities.

The major causes of change are the social and psychological ones of perception of loss of status, weakening of the father's position and authority, expansive effects on the child of a warm, loving mother, and the influence of a role model. When womenfolk of a social strata which has fallen from its earlier high social status begin to rear their male children with love, understanding and ambitions, they help to nurture a new breed of innovative individuals who put their backward societies on the path of progress and prosperity. The absence of such individuals in an

underdeveloped country Hagen attributes to its child-rearing practices, which produce authoritarian personalities who then perpetuate a rigid social stratification system.

Hagen describes the "authoritarian" personality type to be more prevalent in peasant economies and the "creative outsider" found in advanced industrial economies.

For the "explanation" underlying these changes in personality and social structure, Hagen relies on a generally psychodynamic orientation, mainly derivative from Freud, turning on the production, repression, transformation and reduction of unconscious rage. Therefore, economic development is brought about by individuals who, belonging to the socially disadvantaged groups for generations, rebel against this lack or loss of social status and become the society's innovators. Hagen supports his thesis with many examples. In Colombia a high proportion of the indigenous businesses have been founded by individuals from one province - Antioquia. This province has few economic advantages though, as a coffee-producing area, the accumulation of capital was facilitated. Antioquians were, however, rated higher in need-achievement than other Colombians. Hagen suggests possible causes: the Basque origin of the people, the early importance of mining which resulted in the creation of non-family enterprises, and most significantly for him, the feeling of social rejection and status deprivation relative to the rest of the country.

Everett M. Rogers:

Rogers has offered his middle range theory of modernization, as he himself calls it, in his book called Modernization Among Peasants: The Impact of Communication. He conceptualizes the term modernization as "the process by which individuals change from a traditional way of life to a more complex, technologically advanced, rapidly changing style of life." (Rogers, 1969:14) Modernization here refers to a continuous process of change from one state of affairs to another, from a traditional way of life to a non-traditional and rapidly changing style of life which conforms to group patterns and expectations. Rogers further points out what he considers to be several of the misconceptions about modernization: (1) Modernization is not necessarily synonymous with "Europeanization" or "Westernization". Modernization is a synthesis of old and new ways and varies in different environments. (2) Modernization is not necessarily "good". It brings a mix of constructive and destructive effects depending on the situation and on the perspective of the observer. (3) "The process is not unidimensional and therefore, cannot be measured by a single criterion or index." Such variables as level of living, aspirations, literacy, education, political participation, cosmopolitaness, and more, are involved in the modernization process (Rogers, 1969:14-15).

Rogers views modernization basically in terms of communication. It is seen in terms of a transfer of modern

ideas and values from outside sources to the peasant community. He mentions that "modernization at the individual level corresponds to development at societal level." (Ibid) But as the approach is explicitly social psychological, the main focus of analysis is not the social rather the personality system; the main emphasis is not on society's institutionalized norms but on their internalization or simply their reflection in the attitudes of individual peasants.

Peasant communities are characterized by mutual distrust, suspicion, and evasiveness in interpersonal relations. Peasants tend to believe in the notion of limited good, i.e., that all desirables in life are in fixed supply. They think that one person's gain is another person's loss. Peasants are familistic and fatalistic. They subordinate their individual goals to those of the family. They are fatalistic in the sense that they perceive a lack of ability to control their future. They generally lack innovativeness and have unfavorable attitude towards change. They lack deferred gratification, the postponement of immediate satisfaction in anticipation of the future rewards. They are localistic in geographic mobility and in their exposure to mass media and have a limited time perspective. They relatively have low level of empathy (Rogers, 1969:40).

Rogers' work is really a variant of the functionalist perspective. Rogers employs nine independent variables in the study of modernization process among the Columbian

' peasants that describe a "subculture of peasantry" (1969: 24-38): literacy, mass media exposure, cosmopolitaness (the degree to which the individual is oriented outside his/her local community), empathy, achievement motivation, fatalism, innovativeness, political knowledge and educational aspirations (Ibid:49-56). Once these basic dimensions of the modernization process are identified, the main problem is to find out how they interrelate in the process of social change. This is mainly done through correlation analysis. For example, by processing the interview data, it was found out that in Columbia and India literacy was positively correlated with cosmopolitaness, political knowledge, innovativeness, empathy, etc. (1969:80-92). He summarizes the relation education bears to modernization (1969: 70ff). Literacy, he argues, provides reading skills and a consequent exposure to print mass media and the new ideas which the media carry.

Alex Inkeles and Dick Horton Smith:

Another approach with a strongly psychological emphasis is that of Inkeles and Smith. Smith and Inkeles suggest that modernization refers to two different objects:

As used to describe a society, "modern" generally means a nation state characterized by a complex of traits including urbanization, high level of education, industrialization, excessive mechanization, high rates of social mobility and the like. When applied to individuals, it refers to a set of attitudes, values, and ways of feeling and acting, presumably of the sort either generated by or required for effective participation in a modern society. (1966:353)

They have surveyed the literature on development, and composed a finite set of some 120 attitude items that they regard as representative of the analysts' view (Smith and Inkeles, 1966; Inkeles, 1966). They find that these items can be divided roughly into thirty-three content areas or themes, such as aspirations concerning occupation and education, perception and valuation of change, valuation of mass media, valuation of technical skills, efficacy of hard work, obligations to extended kin, and the like. These items taken all together provide an empirical definition of what they call "socio-psychological individual modernity."

Inkeles, writing with Holsinger,¹¹ conceives of individual modernity as "a complex set of interrelated activities, values, and behaviors fitting a theoretically derived model of the modern man, at least as he may appear among the common men in developing countries" (In Inkeles, 1973:163). Individual modernity, as is explained by Inkeles, is a configuration of values, attitudes, and behaviors characterized by individual autonomy and rational decision-making. Autonomy is the individual's perception of his/her ability to participate successfully in a variety of social

¹¹It should be noted that although Smith and Inkeles have collaborated frequently, each has some works written independently.

systems. Rational decision-making is typified by a purposive consideration of alternative solutions.

In a recent work, Becoming Modern: Individual Change in Six Developing Countries, Inkeles and Smith (1974) have presented the results of their study in six underdeveloped countries, which have appeared piecemeal in a series of papers over the last ten years or so. This study contains a full-length report of results from a very large study undertaken in Chile, Argentina, India, Bangladesh, Nigeria and Israel. They present an account of the construction of the various variants of the OM (Overall Modernity) scale, the central "instrument" of Inkeles and Smith's research project.

They deal with the influence of a related set of institutions on individual modernity. These institutions are: schools, mass media, factories, agricultural cooperative organizations, settings of nonindustrial employment in urban settings, and traditional rural institutions. They demonstrate a substantial association between OM Scale scores and such modernizing experiences as higher parental educational levels, more formal education, more mass media exposure, higher living standards, and more urban and industrial experience. Their measure of individual modernity, the OM Scale, yields strong or robust correlations with education in all those countries. Schools in each of six developing countries, flawed as they were, had a substantial

effect on the pupils exposed to their influence. Their students not only learned reading, writing and figuring, but also learned values, attitudes and ways of behaving highly relevant to their personal development and to the future of their countries. Those who had been in school longer were not only better informed and verbally more fluent, but also had a different sense of time, and a stronger sense of personal and social efficacy; participated more actively in communal affairs; were more open to new ideas, new experiences, and new people; interacted differently with others, and showed more concern for subordinates and minorities (Inkeles, 1973).

Inkeles believes that as industrialization occurs on a worldwide scale a kind of global melting-pot effect occurs and a common industrial man/woman emerges (Inkeles, 1960). Thus, individuals who live in industrial societies, having basically similar characteristics, are much the same wherever they live. The argument is much like Doob's (1960), i.e. similar environmental conditions produce "reasonably similar" people. Inkeles and Smith observe: "Attitudinal modernity may be defined as a set of attitudes, beliefs, behaviors, etc., especially characterizing persons in highly urbanized-highly industrialized, and highly educated social settings." (Smith & Inkeles, 1966:353) After further analysis of the relationships of the scales to criterion variables, Smith and Inkeles suggest the further conclusion that "men everywhere have the same structural mechanisms

underlying their psychic functioning, despite the enormous variability of the culture content which they embody (Ibid: 377). (Emphasis is mine)

Robert Bellah:

Operating somewhat on the systemic level other authors have arrived at conclusions congruent with the individualistic premise and emphasizing normative systems. Taking off on the Weberian thesis, Bellah (1957) has analyzed the long term effect of different value systems on the developmental process.

Bellah's writings furnish perhaps the most explicit example of the "maturation" approach. His major works on modernization include Religion and Progress in Modern Asia, and Tobugawa Religion. Bellah regards modernization as an increasing ability to "learn to learn" (1965). He accepts the provisional definition of modernization from Cyril Black as the "increase in capacity of a social system to process information from within and without it and respond appropriately." (Bellah, 1965:170) Bellah is insistent in the ethical neutrality of his concept of modernization. True, he equates it with "progress" but he is at pains to separate the analysis of specific conditions of continuous self-development from the purely ideological notion of a "better" future. On the contrary, he concedes that preservation of traditional values and structures is more adapted in many cases for the Asian countries whose "progress" he is considering. In other words, a modernizing leader or society

should aim to strike a balance between structural change and continuity, between maintenance of social identity and the capacity for growth (Bellah, 1957 and 1965).

Bellah contrasts the value systems of traditional and modern societies. Traditional values are predominantly other-worldly. Innovation for its own sake is viewed with horror and fear. The notion of continuous development is absent. There is no attempt to bring the goals of individuals under rational scrutiny, or arrange them in some sort of overall framework of calculation. In contrast, modern systems extol exploration and the Promethean outlook. Ends are subject to increasing rationalization, and the idea of ceaseless change and improvement becomes the keystone of every viable modern society. Modernizing a system means endowing it with a more comprehensive and efficient network of communications; and this in turn increases a system's capacity for "rational goal-setting". Communities can now choose their goals according to rational criteria, and not merely as before their means. In a modern society, men/women act and choose ~~consciously~~ from a vastly increased range of alternatives; in traditional-bound societies, not only were the choices severely limited, but glorification of the past and other worldliness deflected people from attempting to apply the lessons of their social experience to their communal arrangements (Smith, 1965). Modernization is principally a matter of change in accepted values. A traditional value system knows no such separation of

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values and norms. But in modern systems specific norms are determined by the short term exigencies of the situation, to allow the requisite flexibility in social, political and economic life, without affecting the vital role of fundamental principles of social action which are determined by religious values. Finally, as far as the sources of change are concerned, Bellah's analysis relegates these to the periphery of sociological concern. Bellah holds true to a central tenet of equilibrium theory in locating the origins of change in a system's response to changes in its environment. In this case, the changes are due to contact with an already transformed west. Such a change can be carried out by reformers. Reformers are the heralds of modernization; they embody an adaptive flexibility to external stimuli which assures their evolutionary superiority, whatever their particular chances in a given setting (Bellah, 1958).

C. Stage Theories of Development: Rostowian Model

One of the ways that the concept of development has become enlarged in the literature of economic development is through the presentation of the process of new capital formation as a series of stages. The simple initial-terminal state image yields to the image of a series of successive states.

The tendency here has been to turn to economic history to identify the stages characteristic of developing

nations. A number of scholars have wrestled with the problem of defining stages of industrial and economic development. Perhaps one of the best known efforts is The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto, that of Walt W. Rostow, who has identified five stages of economic growth (Rostow, 1960).¹² Clark is another example of stage theorists. Clark represents the historical progression to higher levels of productivity as an emergence through "primary, secondary, and tertiary" stages representing a movement from agriculture and other natural resource-oriented activities, through processing activities like manufacturing, to an emphasis upon human services (Clark, 1940).

Over against Marx's scheme of social development - feudalism, bourgeois capitalism, socialism and communism - Rostow sets his stages of economic growth: the traditional setting, preconditions for "take-off", the take-off itself, the thrust towards maturity, and the stage of high mass consumption. Basically, the Rostowian scheme is an extension of the traditional concepts of capital formation. He is concerned with the displacement of a traditional society to a level of modern mass consumption. However, he realizes

¹²Organski (1965), drawing from the work of Rostow, seeks to find the political prerequisites for the solution of the problems that occur at each of the economic stages of growth. He concludes essentially four stages: political unification, industrialization, national welfare, and abundance. Black (1966) also has a stage approach to modernization which mainly differs from the Rostowian framework.

that the transition from one to the other is the result of a set of sequences that must be specified for the capital formation model to prove useful to the planning process, hence his concern with outlining stages. In addition to the basic concepts of capital formation, he incorporates a number of other concepts including the Clarkian industrial stage sequences, the economic base multiplier, and a broader concept of psychological motivation. He introduces the notion that there are critical thresholds in the rate of capital accumulation.

Moreover, Rostow, undertaking to correct the "one-sided" Marxist approach to the theory of economic development, enumerates six basic factors of development operating independently of the social structure. These factors, in his view, consist of six fundamental propensities of the human being: the propensity (1) for developing the sciences; (2) for applying the sciences for economic purposes; (3) for the spread of technical innovations; (4) for material progress; (5) for consumption; (6) for procreation (Rostow, 1953:11).

Rostow's antithesis to Marx's dialectical materialism is that the behavior of societies is not uniquely determined by economic considerations but that the policy of nations and the total performance of societies represent acts of balance between cultural, social, and political forces which have their own authentic, independent impact on the performance of societies, including their economic

performance. He further elaborates on this:

On this view it matters greatly how societies go about making their choices and balances. Specifically, it follows that the central phenomenon of the world of post-traditional societies is not the economy - and whether it is capitalist or not - it is the total procedure by which choices are made. The stages-of-growth would reject as inaccurate Marx's powerful but over-simplified assumption that a society's decisions are simply a function of who owns property. (Rostow, 1960:150)

Rostow's stage theory is not only an attempt to introduce noneconomic factors into the analysis of economic development but it is also considered by Rostow himself to constitute "a more general, if still highly partial, theory about modern history as a whole." (Ibid:1)

The traditional setting is characterized by limited potential for productivity; science, technology, and attitudes that prevail in the society all function to put a ceiling on development. Furthermore, agriculture is predominant but not highly productive, little capital is available, few people have any savings, and illiteracy is common. In other words, the traditional stage is characterized by complete stagnation of productive forces.

In the second stage, conditions necessary for industrialization begin to take shape. The people become convinced that economic progress is possible and that it will bring them numerous desirable benefits. Certain changes in the economic structure begin, such as the formation of banks. The content of education shifts so as to

prepare people for the coming economic change and to equip them to participate in it. And most importantly, the polity takes the form of a centralized authority for the nation; it is difficult if not impossible, for the next stage to be attained without a strong government. In a nutshell, in this stage there appears in the society a realization of the need for economic progress and there arises a class of entrepreneurs in the purely capitalist sense of the word. In Rostow's opinion, Ethiopia, Kenya, Thailand, Cambodia, Afghanistan and Indonesia are at this stage now.¹³

In the third, or take-off stage, rapid growth is achieved through the application of modern industrial techniques in a limited number of sectors of the economy. Moreover, this growth becomes self-sustaining. One necessary condition for take-off to occur is the rise of the proportion of net investment to national income to something over 10 percent, "definitely outstripping the likely population pressure. . . and yielding a distinct rise in real output per capita" (Rostow, 1960:37). The noneconomic facets of take-off include the social and political triumph of those committed to modernization over those who tend either to cleave to traditionalism or to pursue other goals. Mexico,

¹³It should be noted that these examples are based on Rostow's views in 1960, a period when many of these countries were gaining their political independence.

Chile, India and the Philippines are at this stage.

The fourth stage, the drive to maturity, involves the application of modern technology over the whole range of the economy. In this way, new sectors may supplant older ones as the driving mechanism that sustains growth. In the United States, for example, railways, coal, iron, and heavy engineering dominated the economy and sustained its growth after the middle of the nineteenth century; then steel, ships, chemicals, electricity, and varied manufactured products served the same purpose. During this stage about 10 to 20 percent of national income is invested. As a rule of thumb, maturity is achieved somewhere around sixty years after take-off in the developed nations. "This is the stage", writes Rostow, "in which an economy demonstrates that it has the technological and entrepreneurial skills to produce, not everything but anything, that it chooses to produce." (1960:10) The Soviet Union, Japan, and certain other countries are at present at this stage.

And finally, there is the fifth stage, the age of high mass consumption, especially of durable goods, something resembling the celebrated "welfare state." Actually, once the stage of maturity has been reached and the commitment made to extend technology into all spheres of life, or number of directions are available. A society might focus on welfare for its people, or expand consumption, or strive for enhanced power in the international arena. The United

States, according to Rostow, opted for the second of the three in the 1920's. It was then that the movement to suburbia began, the automobile was made available to the masses of people, a proliferation of household gadgets appeared on the market, and a number of other consumptions - encouraging trends were started. At this stage are the countries of Western Europe, Australia, and New Zealand, Canada and the United States.

To finish the review of Rostow's work, it would be interesting to mention his remarks on imperialism. He explains the American imperialism of the turn of the century as the consequence of "a widespread mood"; he explains the imperialist trend to war as follows: "it has been a quite consistent feature of modern history for some groups to look beyond their borders for new worlds to conquer, as their societies approached technical maturity"; he explains the transition to the "age of high mass consumption" by saying: "the society as a whole becomes a little bored with the miracle of industrialization." (Rostow, 1960: 72-75)

D. A Liberal View: Reinhard Bendix

As a liberal social scientist and a critic of the neo-evolutionist-functional view, Bendix has offered an alternative approach in studying modernization. The following review is an attempt to depict his major postulate which

starts out with a somewhat different set of assumptions from neo-evolutionist approach.

Bendix points to the need for examining the developmental processes, and the processes of modernization and industrialization as well, from the viewpoint of factors of timing and sequence. Because of these factors, he says, these processes are unique in every case; modernization cannot occur twice in the same way. We cannot expect the present processes of modernization to be analogous to the past ones, nor can we expect that the industrialization which usually accompanies modernization will have the same effects in the countries now being modernized as it had in the countries that were already industrialized some time ago. (Bendix, 1970)

The history and diversity of social structures, according to Bendix, lead to different paths of development, even where technological change is identical. He cites Thorstein Veblen as an illustration of a convergence theorist. According to him, "Veblen modifies the Marxian contention that the industrially more-developed country shows the less developed country the image of its own future" (Bendix, 1964:6). Bendix further explains that in contrast to Marx, who used England as the classic ground of the capitalist mode of production, Veblen drew attention to the differences between England, Germany, and Japan. However, Veblen anticipates, in the long run, "the transformation in habits of

thought as an inevitable consequence of a people's adaptation to modern technology" (Ibid:7). Implicit in this approach, stresses Bendix, "is the belief that societies will resemble each other increasingly as they become fully industrialized." (Ibid:8)

Bendix states that these views have little merit and argues:

All countries other than England have been or are developing in the sense that they adopt from abroad an already developed technology and various political institutions while retaining their indigenous social structure. . . . Unless we assume that development once initiated must run its course, we must accept the possibility that the tensions of the social structure induced by a rapid adoption of foreign technology and institutions can be enduring rather than transitory features of a society. (Ibid:9)

In Bendix's opinion, a basic element in the definition of modernization is that it pertains to the kind of social changes which have occurred since the eighteenth century - changes which have led to political or economic "breakthroughs" in some pioneering societies and which have subsequently caused changes in follower societies. Thus Bendix tells us that in the process of modernization there are always "advanced model countries" and "follower countries". In his opinion, when we speak of modernization, we usually mean the processes of social change similar to those which originated during the industrial revolution in England (1760-1830), and the political revolution in France (1789-1794). These processes transformed England and France into "model" or "pace

setter" countries; they were the most highly developed economically, socially, and politically. Other countries strove to catch up with these two; using every "shortcut" they could think of, they were thus able to achieve the level of the model country in a much shorter time. Because of its industrial achievements, England served as a model country for France. Previously, Holland and Sweden, due to their highly developed cannon-making techniques, had served as models for England (Bendix, 1970). In all these cases, the follower country not only followed the experience of the model country, but also used "shortcuts" to catch up with it. Modernization has always consisted of internal changes in a country's economy and structure, but the internal changes have always been consequences of striving to attain the level of the model country.

‘ Bendix illustrates the interplay between modernity and tradition by his comparative case study of Japan and Germany. He initially discards the typical model of industrialization of the eighteenth century England and France. He postulates that this model is not useful for the understanding of other countries. According to him, this model is one of indigenous development which is incompatible with the experience of Germany, Russia, and Japan, where many ideas, technological innovations, and political institutions are either taken over from abroad or developed in conscious reference to changes that have taken place abroad. Bendix

characterizes this as "symbiosis of tradition and modernity." (1964:177) In his case study he identifies both similarities and differences of the two countries and then sets forth the peculiarities of Japanese and German development.

Japan and Germany are similar in the timing of rapid political changes, in sharing a preference for monarchical institutions, and in a tradition of bureaucratic government controlled by a ruling oligarchy. However, Bendix emphasizes, the dissimilarities are massive. Whereas Japanese medieval history had no adverse effect upon cultural homogeneity, Germany's exposure to outside forces throughout her history facilitated cultural heterogeneity. The two countries also differed in their initial political and economic posture. Japan started industrialization from the isolated political unity and agricultural economy, whereas Germany did from political division with industrial entrepreneurship and cultural exposure. Against this background, Bendix compares three aspects of Japanese and German modernization: social structure, political process, and the issue of consensus.

First, there was resistance to internal reforms in Germany as contrasted with the initiation of such reforms by the ruling groups in Japan. Secondly, Japan had greater ability of managing the country's political transition in the post-Meiji period than was the case in Germany after her unification under Prussian leadership. Thirdly, in Japan there was nationalist consensus uniting the people and their

leaders whereas in Germany consensus of a comparable degree was lacking.

The major focus in this comparison is on the political management of development as decision-making in social change. In all modernization processes, says Bendix, the government plays a particularly important role, since it initiates and stimulates modernization, obviously using different methods in different situations. Moreover, the greater the gap between the model and the follower country, the stronger, the role played by government in the process. The question is not of inevitability of change but of political ideas and solutions. Bendix suggests that functionalist thinking would interpret this differently. "It would consider the rather sudden introduction of modern technology as creating 'strains' or 'malintegration' in the established institutions of a society." (Ibid:208). Thus Bendix points out: "This assertion implies an earlier time when tensions were absent, which is false, or when society functioned 'more smoothly'; which is vague, as long as scholars cannot agree on a rank order of tensions or integration. The whole approach overlooks the precarious balance of decision-making and substitutes for it some concept of 'equilibrium' attributed to society as a 'system'" (Ibid:209).¹⁴

¹⁴Bendix is specifically criticizing the structural-functionalist formulation of industrialism. He does not deny the historical fact that modern technology created "'strains' and 'tensions' in the established institutions" both in Germany and Japan. However, his contention that this assertion implies a previous absence of tensions is hardly correct.

Bendix asserts that "once we recognize that a given admixture of tradition and modernity may be both enduring and affected by 'political management', we will give less weight to the 'malintegration' which impedes that strain of consistency and that we will also 'rely less exclusively on structural explanations of development" (Ibid:210). For "the most drastic social and political change of both countries (i.e., Germany and Japan) has not occurred as a result of that slow adaptation to the matter-of-fact outlook of modern technology which Veblen extrapolated from the English experience. In both countries, the mainstays of social and political tradition in the midst of modernity have been destroyed by conquest, military occupation, and partition." (Ibid)

It seems obvious that Bendix rejects the view that tends to see social change as a directed or linear movement from one form to another. The merit of his analysis largely lies in the fact that he demonstrated in depth the empirical inadequacy of the deterministic and evolutionary linear thinking characteristic of the social sciences in the 19th century tradition.

Summary and conclusion of chapter:

Modernization and development are terms that became rather popular after the second world war. This familiarity had a lot to do with the fact that they were being used to refer to processes that had become the major concerns of the

so-called new nations, nations which were then in the process of freeing themselves from colonialism or other forms of foreign domination. However, despite this current association with these new nations, the original referents of these terms were the profound changes in social organization and social praxis that accompanied the industrial revolution in Western Europe. The experience of these transformations came to be represented in modernization theory by a contrast, indexed in various ways, between tradition and modernity.

The modernization approach subsumes a wide range of types of analysis based on such ideas as structural differentiation, technological change, the traditional/modern dichotomy, the rural-urban continuum, the sequences of development, and the concepts of structural and cultural obstacles or prerequisites to development. The principal assumptions of modernization theory are (1) that modernization is a total social process associated with (or subsuming) economic development in terms of the preconditions, concomitants, and consequences of the later; (2) that this process constitutes a "universal pattern". Obviously among various writers there are differences of emphasis with respect to the meaning of modernization, partly due to its relationship with - or derivation from - that most contentious concept, "development."

Without doing undue violence to the differences between different modernization theorists, three common important factors for the sociology of modernization can be

observed in their works: The first is that, from each, concepts can be isolated that refer to what are generally called traditional and modern societies. The second is a tendency to assume an evolutionary movement from traditional to modern societies. The third is the search for, or the isolation of, an independent variable or variables that could be considered as crucial for the emergence of modern society.

The experience of Europe is considered by modernization theorists to be of universal significance. Therefore, most of the theories of European modernization are retained. First and most important is the retention of the dichotomy between tradition and modernity. In this setting, however, tradition and modernity exist side by side, giving rise to notions of dual or plural societies in which the primary goals are the transformation of traditional sectors into modern ones. Thus, what in the European case was conceptualized as two different phases in an evolutionary process, are here conceptualized as two simultaneous moments.

Second, with these two polar points, social scientists have continued their earlier search for independent variables which, when manipulated, may be crucial in getting a particular country moving from tradition to modernity. Here again many of the variables suggested have been the ones suggested by the classical sociologists or variables derived from the specification of more complex concepts in their works.

Third and finally, as mentioned above, there is the assumption of movement from tradition to modernity. In the case of the new nations, however, this movement is not something that has already occurred and has to be explained, but something that has to be brought about. Consequently, the new theories are oriented towards the future and not the past as in the European case.

For structural/technological theories of modernization the dynamics of modernization process consist of mechanisms such as the introduction of a market economy, monetization, urbanization, industrialization, the spread of mass communications and of literacy, and so on. These are subsumed and related at the theoretical level in the differentiation-integration model of social change.

Central among the characteristics of the social psychological approach of modernization have been its concern with the study of individuals rather than larger societal units, and an emphasis on understanding the psychological characteristics of individuals: attitudes, beliefs, predispositions, personality factors. These theorists argue that the Third World countries have certain character traits or social norms which prevent the pursuit of rapid development.

Another approach to the question of modernization and development is the theory of the stages of economic growth, suggested and applied by Walt W. Rostow. He distinguishes five basic stages of economic growth: the traditional

society, the situation establishing preconditions for the take-off, the take-off, the drive to maturity, and the age of high mass consumption. He discusses the conditions and characteristics of each of these stages and various cases of them.

As a liberal critic of the neo-evolutionist-functionalist view, Bendix argues that traditional societies differ in many ways from the older, western modern societies and they do not necessarily develop in the direction of these "older" societies. He looks at the question of modernization from the viewpoint of factors of timing and sequence. Modernization cannot occur twice in the same way. The history and diversity of social structures lead to different paths of development, even where technological change is identical. Bendix asserts that there is an ideological content to the concept of modernity. In this sense, "leader" nations set the stage for policies which "follower" nations attempt to replicate.

All of these approaches have depicted traditional society as a static one with little differentiation or specialization, with a low level of urbanization and of literacy. Modern society, on the other hand, is seen as a society with a very high level of differentiation, urbanization, literacy and exposure to mass media. In the political realm, traditional society has been depicted as based on a "traditional" elite ruling by virtue of some Mandate of Heaven, while

modern society is based on wide participation of the masses who do not accept any traditional legitimation of the rulers and who hold these rulers accountable in terms of secular values and efficiency. Above all, traditional society has been conceived as bound by the cultural horizons set by its tradition while modern society is culturally dynamic, oriented to change and modernization. The differences between modern and traditional societies are analyzed in terms of the "pattern variables", in which traditional societies are conceived as characterized by the predominance of particularistic, ascriptive, and diffuse orientations as against the universalism, specificity, and achievement orientations of modern society.

PART II
CRITIQUE AND ANALYSIS

CHAPTER III
CRITIQUE OF MODERNIZATION THEORIES

A. Critique of Structural/Technological Approach

The neo-evolutionist approach to modernization or structural functionalism is the application of Parsons' pattern variables and a diluted notion of Weberian rationalization to contemporary change. The functional neo-evolutionist approach remains committed to a graduated philosophy of change. It views social change from the standpoint of the consensus and equilibrium model. The sources of change are considered in terms of spontaneity and creativity rather than in terms of social conflicts, class divisions, and government planning and initiative. These latter would pose a threat to an equilibrated society and portend chaos, hence they are considered dysfunctional. The functional integration and mutual dependence of roles, institutions, and structures of the social whole are the outcome of a functional balance of social forces. Any massive planning for a rapid change may be an unwitting step towards chaos, hence towards retrogression (Moore, 1963).

Bellah, Parsons and others like Hoselitz, believe that one can analyze the evolution of societies from a "traditional" stage characterized by particularism, ascription and functional diffuseness to a "modern" one dominated by values of universalism, achievement and functional specificity. They also tacitly impose the Western sequence of value change into their analysis of non-Western evolution. In particular, they argue that all societies are subject to the pressures of maturation. Traditional societies, being unable to adapt flexibly to the environment, are sooner or later compelled to slough off their traditional aspects and exchange these for "rational" modes of relationship which permit the required adaptation. Modernization then becomes the process by which a transition from tradition to modernity takes place (Hoselitz, 1960; Hoselitz and Moore, 1963).

Unfortunately, it is here, at the central point of definition, that the maturation approach is flawed. When Weber distinguished "rational" from "traditional" modes of relationship and particularly authority, he was making a typological, not a chronological, distinction. True, he thought that recent changes tended to bring "rational" modes to the fore at the expense of traditional ones, but his feeling for the uniqueness of cultural traditions like the Western, prevented him from confusing classificatory with evolutionary devices. The two modes of relationship did not incorporate a causal explanation about how traditionalism was transformed into rationality and vice versa.

Such an explanation had to be derived from historical circumstances external to the assumptions behind the classification itself (Weber, 1947:115-118). Modernization does not constitute a "unilinear" demographic social, economic or political process which leads up, even if haltingly or intermittently, to some plateau whose basic contours - whatever the differences in detail - are everywhere the same.

Another problem is the vagueness surrounding the concepts of flexibility and rationality. In many cases, the "rational" is simply equated with the flexible or adaptable. But in other instances the West sets the pattern and determines the meaning of rationality. This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter V.

The functionalistic theories of modernization appear especially from the point of view of critical theory, as naturalistic and deterministic. They tend to see historical sequences and trends as necessary patterns and project them into the future. There is an alleged "logic of industrialization or modernization" that is seen as inevitable and as the result of natural forces seen as a result of choices, policies, strategies of concrete interest groups. In so far as values and norms are considered, they are seen in relation to specific actors. One does not talk in a Durkheimian manner about society's norms and values, but about the values or ideologies of the bourgeoisie, the peasantry, etc.

The concept of action and actor is not used in the restrictive and often reductionist way in which some symbolic interactionists use it. It refers not simply to "typical" actors (the intellectual, the worker, etc.) but to collectivities or groups (workers, intellectuals, peasants, etc.) in so far as they actually or potentially are capable of taking action, e.g. having goals, elaborating politics, etc. In other words, to talk about an organization, a group or any other collectivity as a whole in decision-making terms, is not considered to be a reification.

In contrast, in the functionalist-neo-evolutionist point of view actors disappear from the analysis, or at least they are peripherally mentioned.¹⁵ The central stage is here occupied by sets of institutionalized processes

¹⁵Modernization school smacks of elitist tendencies. It assumes that the process of modernization is, like so many other processes of development of new institutional structures, born or "pushed" not only by the development within a society of certain general structural characteristics, but also by the activities of special "charismatic elites". This is evident in the work of Shils (1962), Kerr (1960), Nettle and Robertson (1968), and others, although the full implications of this assumption have not always been made explicit by its upholders.

The term "modernizing elite" is a catchcall term generally used to describe those who have come to view themselves as the heirs of the colonial government. The modernizing elites are not a distinct, cohesive social class; they are criss-crossed by ethnic and regional affiliations, kinship, age groups, and patron-client relationships. Yet, in a sense, these elites do comprise a ruling class. The developmental mentality is said to obtain primarily among the elite high achievers (Kerr et al., 1960; Hagen 1962). Eisenstadt sees these elites as mediating the Western impact, and more generally as controlling the processes of differentiation and the resultant crises (1964c).

grouped together, not according to their relationship to specific actors, but with reference to society's systematic problems or functional requirements. (Parsons, 1951 and 1971; Eisenstadt, 1966; Bellah, 1957). Society in this view, is not made up of concrete interrelated groups, e.g. classes, but of roles and institutions. The process of development is seen in terms of roles or institutional differentiation. The question of who is behind such differentiation, who profits or loses from such developments is hardly posed. The problem is easily avoided by talking in an anthropomorphic manner about the "system" or "society" doing things, creating new ideas, solving rather than outcomes of human efforts and social movements. Indigenous processes of social change that had earlier brought about new developments in the society, are lost in the conceptualization process, while modernization itself becomes the primary change agent. Some of the developmental trends in the advanced countries are detrimental to global welfare but no considerations are given to their ethical and political controversiality. The latent ethical and political functions of functionalism is a legitimation of established power structures and welfare distributions on the global and the national level (Dahlstrom, 1976).

As classifications of change, neo-evolutionary categories like differentiation and reintegration automatically curtail the area of human agency to a marginal footnote.

The individuals' understanding of their situation, their evaluation of their dilemmas, becomes unidimensional, a mechanical reflection of situational imperative which overwhelms them. It is only when neo-evolutionists depart from their framework and formulae and analyze the range of responses to new situations that they concede a larger role for certain groups or individuals in realizing changes (Smith, A.D., 1976). The fundamental difference between dependency paradigm and functionalist approach to development is the place of collective actors or groups. In the dependency perspective, actors, groups and quasi-groups, i.e. social categories which, under certain conditions have the potentiality of becoming concrete groups, are at the center of the analysis. The social structure is basically seen in terms of group relationships (dominance, exploitation) and therefore development and underdevelopment, however described, is always problems, etc.

An excellent illustration of the functionalist approach is Smelser's seven stage model of structural-functional differentiation (Smelser, 1959). For instance in stage one "dissatisfactions" emerge with existing economic arrangements and in subsequent stages certain "ideas" appear which, eventually, if and when specified and implemented, resolve the dissatisfactions. During all this complex process one never knows who is dissatisfied, whose ideas emerge or are implemented, who profits from the solutions, etc. It is as if a Deus ex machina called

"society" creates problems and then generates processes which solve them (Mauzelis, 1972). What is particularly missing in this approach is the conception of national actors in international situations: Comparador and dependent national bourgeoisie. The actor in question is not the nth part of a total society, but refers primarily to those relating few actors in a particular society who in concert, are placed not only to make a judgment of modernity, but to reap the fruits of such a self-directed process as modernization.

The disappearance of action and actors is not necessarily wrong or a methodologically illegitimate exercise in sociological research (Smith, 1973). In certain ways, as Lockwood has shown (Lockwood, 1964), the attempt to look at a social system not from the point of view of actors but "impersonally", from the "outside" so to speak, is both useful and unavoidable. However, such an approach, on its own, can never give an adequate explanation of change. It can never explain why society develops. It can point out system contradictions or incompatibilities between institutions. But in so far as actors are kept out, one can never explain how such incompatibilities are resolved, changed or maintained. One is inevitably limited to the level of description (Mauzelis, 1972; Smith, 1973; Tipps, 1973).

The equation of modernity with the pattern variables of "achievement", "universalism" and "functional specificity" is also problematic. The distinction here is ideal typical,

and as we will show later in the case of modernization theorists it becomes ideological, and chronological. Many roles in so-called "modern" societies are ascriptive, especially as regards recruitment into the top and bottom positions. Conversely, there is considerable role achievement at all levels in underdeveloped countries, just as there are many universalist features in those societies and equally much particularism in the practice of modern or developed countries. For instance, particularism is widespread in the working class in both Europe and the United States (Frank, 1970). In this connection, it is necessary to distinguish between role "recruitment" and the "rewards" that follow. Frank substantiates this point by reference to the study of The Japanese Factory by Abegglen. Frank writes:

. . . role recruitment in Japan is very much based on achievement. . . . However, the assignment of reward within the role, as Abegglen argues, is highly ascriptive, being based on such factors as age, family obligations, etc. The important distinction between recruitment and reward (rarely made in discussions of achievement or ascription) and obvious differences between Japanese and American practices in this respect would seem to explain a large part of this disagreement on this matter. For example, Bellah and Levy, who emphasize Japan's achievement orientation as a cause of its development, refer to role recruitment. On the other hand, Abegglen, who emphasizes Japan's ascriptive pattern is apparently thinking of reward within roles. (Frank, 1970a:329)

As Frank has shown "much of what flies a universalist flag in the United States" and the Third World countries is little

more than the cover for morally offensive particularist private interests (Ibid).

Most of the African societies, in fact, can best be described as the colonial societies; and the defining characteristics of these societies are such that when they are compared with advanced ones, the outstanding contrast is not that of particularism and diffuseness on the one hand and universalism and specificity on the other. Rather, the distinctive contrast is to be seen in the different relations of domination that are characteristic of the two types of societies.

Universalism and particularism have existed side by side in colonial societies with the latter often in the service of the former. Totally colonized societies have been too long and too far incorporated into the metropolitan system for this classical contrast to be applicable. For instance, from the beginning of the Spanish Conquest, Latin America was incorporated into a world-wide mercantilist system. This was true not only of Mexico and Peru (which exported precious metals) but also of Brazil. Also, Furtado (1964;1965) indicates that from the 16th century onward the Brazilian economy was essentially capitalist, being based on specialization and the division of labor (sugar), reliance on foreign markets, and investments in slaves.

Functional oriented writings in modernization literature implicitly blame underdeveloped societies for their own

backwardness and point to a path of progress marked by co-operation with the developed West and incorporation of the population into a market economy and Western style democratic polity (Inkeles, 1969). While one has to assign blame for underdevelopment to domination and control by foreign capital interests, rather than to any intrinsic shortcoming of these societies. The path to development lay in liberation from exploitation by capitalist industrial societies not in cooperation with their directives. The goals of development should move increasingly away from imitation of advanced Western models and toward the generation of autochthonous solutions (Illich, 1969). The means to achieve such goals deemphasizes consensual integration, so is focused by functional approach, and focuses instead on the struggle with an "antinational" bourgeoisie and a structure of imperialist domination.

Generally, modernization theorists have either underestimated or ignored many important external sources of or influence upon social change. Their analyses lack any touch on the question of the colonial experience in the Third World countries. Societies are conceived by them as autonomous units which change according to internal forces. They only make a room for some intersocietal exchanges and consequent processes of diffusion. They totally fail to look for significant variables such as the impact of war, conquest, colonial domination, military invasion, economic dependency, capitalist penetration and so forth. It is not

that imperialism does not exist, it does or rather it did:

Indeed, until recent decades hardly any of the contacts between the members of the relatively modernized societies and the relatively non-modernized societies took any other form. (Levy, 1966:II:744)

Therefore imperialism existed but it need not have been the case. To focus on imperialism can only be a distraction, since the "morals of imperialists are essentially irrelevant to the problems faced by members of relatively nonmodernized societies in contact with modernization." (Ibid:I:125) The extraordinary argument which Levy and others propose is that what actually happened does not matter. Contact between the West and the rest of the world took the form of conquest, colonization, exploitation, massacre, and forced labor. This is irrelevant, the Modernizationists say, because even if contact had been entirely peaceful and egalitarian, the non-Western countries would have collapsed anyway:

I do, however, assert flatly that except in the sense that what is past and done is past and done, this need not have been the case. The invasion of the structures of relatively non-modernized societies by the structures of the relatively modernized societies via contact between the members of those societies would have taken place with or without the excesses of imperialism, that the structures of the relatively modernized societies would still have constituted the sort of general social solvent they constituted whether introduced by forceable or peaceful means and that, regrettably, an enormous amount of human dissatisfaction, unrest, and misery would have accompanied those invasions had they occurred under the most benign, well-intentioned of auspices. (Ibid,II:745)

And further he concludes:

Whatever one's judgment of how it was done, even if one takes into consideration only the point of view of the members of the relatively modernized societies, it was bound to be done. (Ibid)

Even Lerner (1966) who stresses the role of the Western impact in modernization process, ignores the structural mechanisms of the interactions between societies. He looks for this "impact" only in terms of its consequences for the diffusion of particular cultural attributes. For instance, he looks for the Iranian responses to newspapers and radio programs, for their capacity for empathy of their familiarity with city life, but he totally dismisses the foreign intervention in that country exactly at the time he was studying (1950-1953). Another example which can be mentioned is the study conducted by Hagen (1962). He has attributed economic growth to changing methods of toilet training.

As Huntington (1971) and a host of other critics have mentioned the functional paradigm is too general and abstract. It does not help to generate hypotheses about the sources of variation among concrete territorial system. It fails to direct its theoretical analysis to the past origins, the present transformations, or the future prospects of the existing social system as a system. As a result, what is needed is a theoretical perspective that systematically takes into account indigenous sources of change and the colonial forms of social organization and imperial domination characteristics of these societies. In

this thesis I have tried to show that dependency approach, despite of all its inadequacies, would provide us more relevant insight on the questions of modernization, in particular, and social change, in general.

A different variant of functionalist theory is the "differentiation-integration" theory of modernization, as Smith calls it (Smith, 1973:71). This approach which is best exemplified by Smelser deals with social growth over long time-spans, and can be traced back to Spencer's organic model and Durkheim's ideas about the effects of increasing specialization. The idea of structural differentiation owes much in its evolution to the economic concept of the division of labor in capitalist society. In fact, cultural boundedness in conceptualization and classical economic tendencies are both prominent features of the intellectual uses to which the structural differentiation concept has been put (Nettl and Robertson, 1968).

Smelser:

Smelser's theory lacks a clear description or definition of the explanandum. He starts by talking about social or structural changes accompanying economic development, but then goes on to ask about the various "paths to modernization" in terms of processes of economic development and industrialization. Similarly the attributes of the "advanced stages of modernization" oscillate between economic and social definitions. The relationship of

modernity thus defined to general economic development is not entirely clear. Smelser's concern for institutional regularities limits the utility of his model for dealing with internally-generated change, and for understanding the differential responses to external factors shown by different groups within the same institutional or cultural setting. Therefore, it is unlikely to be of much value for analyzing the internal dynamics for specific empirical situations, particularly if the changes are of recent origin. Although Smelser talks about varying paths and sources of modernization, his model in fact emphasizes the uniformity in the process and offers little analytical guidance to those interested in a detailed study of concomitant variations. Moreover, in common with other modernization approaches, his formulation is beset with various semantic difficulties which arise from his conceptualizing "modernization" as both "process" and a "product" or "end-state".

Smelser equates modernization with structural differentiation, integration and the like. This overworking of the concept of differentiation leaves important questions unanswered. Why, firstly, does differentiation figure as the prime determinant of change? Why, secondly, do only some structures have the capacity for self-differentiation? And how, thirdly, is this trend related to the processes and events which play so large a role in actual historical change? (Smith, A.D., 1976) Which categories of relationships and roles are to be selected as

crucial in one's analysis? This point has been well put by Frank (1970a) when he suggests that if one looked at the main centers of economic and political power in the United States one would find just as many undifferentiated relationships and roles as in the same elite groups in an underdeveloped country. Hence it is necessary to identify which institutional contexts and which levels of a structure one is referring to so that the phenomena under investigation are analytically comparable (Long, 1977).

Differentiation is neither a causal concept nor a process. It describes a state of affairs and its main use is for classifying societies or institutions. Therefore, it is not an aspect of concrete reality, but is solely a conceptual phenomenon. That is, when compared to the Western model of development, in which structural differentiation is a major variable, the undifferentiated nature of social structures in nations presently aspiring to development is greatly emphasized. Perhaps the clearest and most emphatic distinction between the commitment to modernization, as societal advance, and the particular Western notion of modernization, as structural differentiation, has been provided by the Chinese. In the course of the "cultural revolution" during 1965, the issue was clearly posed at the most authoritative levels: in so far as modernization necessarily implies professionalization and structural differentiation controlled by "mere" normative

integration, the Chinese openly rejected modernization altogether.

Under the pretext of 'regularization' and 'modernization' a handful of representatives of the bourgeois military line, making a complete carbon copy of foreign practice, vainly attempted to negate our army's historical experience and fine traditions and to lead our army on to the road followed by bourgeois armies. (Quoted in Nettl and Robertson, 1968:47)

With specific regard to the issue of the army as a developed structure, Mao Tse-tung condemned those who would build up the army on the "modernized" Western pattern. In Mao's vision,

The People's Liberation Army should be a great school. In this great school, our army men should learn politics, military affairs and culture. They can also engage in agricultural production and side occupations, run some medium-sized or small factories and manufacture a number of products to meet their own needs or for exchange with the state at equal values. They can also do mass work and take part in the socialist education movement in the factories and villages. After the socialist education movement is over, they can always find mass work with the masses. They should also participate in the struggles of the cultural revolution to criticize the bourgeoisie whenever they occur. In this way, the army can concurrently study, engage in agriculture, run factories and do mass work. Of course, these tasks should be properly coordinated, and a distinction should be made between the primary and secondary tasks. Each army unit should engage in one or two of the three fields of activity - agriculture, industry and mass work, but not in all three at the same time. In this way, our army of several million will be able to play a very great role indeed. (Ibid).

As we see, structural differentiation in even its crudest, organizationally distinct form, has here been challenged

and denounced. But it should be realized that Mao is not unique in taking this position. The emphasis on the mass of the people as against the bureaucracy and the specialist is a characteristic of political movements in several countries in Asia, and it has been so from the days of the anti-colonial struggles. This, however, does not mean that tasks or roles should not proliferate with the use of technology. What the mass line as applied to Asian, African, or Latin American countries really means, is that modernization need not necessarily be confined to the ideological and institutional framework prevalent in Western liberalism. To the extent that collectivities are used and stressed in this struggle for modernity, and the ideological foundations of modernization are different, the differentiation framework cannot be applied to the Third World countries. By collectivities it is meant primarily the weaker and underprivileged collectivities which must be mobilized for the achievement of the goals of modernization; and inasmuch as these goals run counter to the cultural, social and economic status quo, such mobilization must essentially be for the struggle against the status quo. The interdependence between these different factors guarantees that there will be no modernization, unless a simultaneous onslaught is launched against all of them (Chatterji, 1972).

The processes leading towards differentiation are for Smelser those of strain and disturbance and a sense of new values and opportunities. These truly initiate change,

not differentiation, which is merely a consequence. What really interests such a functional theory is how parts become dissimilar and how they can in these circumstances yet remain linked. It is the state of differentness, rather than any process of differentiation, that is its real explanandum; and such a theory amounts to the tautology that when parts become unlike, they must be relinked if the society is to survive and adapt to its changed environment.

Smelser tends to view society as a self equilibrating model in which chronic disequilibria are a special case. The problem with such a view is that it sees order, i.e., the existing system, as a normal state and disorder as a tension which should be overcome, while order itself is problematical rather than assumed.

Smelser's approach is a variant of Parsonsianism, which is characterized by the constant effort to consolidate the methodological ground of the social science as "science." The consequence of this approach is a lack of sensitivity to the intellectual and political issues involved in the ferment of modernizing societies in the present world. Because Smelser remains on the abstract level of the universal system characteristics, he leaves out the very dynamics of history from what his colleague Lipset called "the dynamic equilibrium model." (Lipset, 1963:8) His comparative and historical framework does not yield desirable illuminations on the problem of development and modernization in modernizing societies.

In short, the neo-evolutionist interpretation of modernization is a tautology of a peculiarly barren sort. It describes, it is true, an important set of processes, which may accompany "modernization" or other types of social change. But it can derive little insight from this description about modernization, or about the actual processes of social change. At most it circumscribes the limits within which further changes can take place. But because differentiation refers to a condition, a state of affairs, which is the product of other processes, it is logically and empirically precluded from illuminating change, that is, the forces which bring about new states over time spans.

Despite all of the qualifications which were presented by Smelser, one wonders if indeed he has gotten over the problem. One cannot help but observe that what were previously considered to be empirical or historical generalizations, Smelser is now giving the status of ideal types. The crucial test, however, is whether or not sociologists will be able to prevent ideal types from becoming generalizations in their concrete studies. The likelihood is almost nil. The examples which can be given are Parsons, Smelser, Blau and Scott. . . . This is a long recognized problem in the sociological theory. The real question is one of finding truths about concrete human affairs undergoing transformation, rather than making the application of general categories the sole purpose of historical inquiry,

as is the case of Smelser.

B. Critique of Social Psychological Approach

The main trouble is that the concept of modernity, taken in a psychological view of modernization, becomes a tautology. Therefore its value in any theoretical or empirical exploration is bound to be limited. Besides, such an approach also raises a number of conceptual and methodological issues, some of which are as follows:

a) What general assumptions such a conceptualization involves about the structure and functioning of the complex, industrial societies and its effects on the individual personality and; b) whether the assumed relationship between the selected variables and the complex, industrial society is universal, or is affected by the cultural and temporal factors and forces.

These issues have not been satisfactorily resolved in the current literature and research. Often the investigators make some general assumptions which they do not test. There have been unavoidable ethnocentric biases in the selection process; the variables selected have been basically those to be found in the countries of Western Europe and North America. One often suspects that sociologists have unconsciously attributed all the qualities associated with the "modern individual" to the people living in these countries. They have merely imposed a measure of modernism on the people under study, but have not allowed

the people to tell them whether modernism exists and what form it takes (Stephenson, 1968). This kind of analysis and identification of the traditional value orientations and attitudes has been quite unsatisfactory. Social psychologists have largely relied on the results of researches in anthropology for their image of the traditional people. This kind of analysis provides us at best with merely the highly abstract level of cross-cultural comparison limited to arbitrarily selected universal categories of value-orientations. In their concern for analyzing "what is", these theorists have ignored history, i.e., "what has been." This leads to an ahistorical view of society.

^ The psychological school of modernity defines the relationship between individual and structural processes in a simple one-to-one form. The complex dynamics at both levels are fused into an unilinear process: more modern individuals produce more national development. In Lerner's words:

The rate of social change everywhere is a function (probably a linear function) of the number of individuals accruing to the transitional stratum. The more persons who are 'going modern' in a single country, the higher its overall performance on the indices of modernity (Lerner, 1966:83).

Here, the emphasis on psychological modernity assigns priority to the potential causal additive effects of individuals in social change. While it is a simple fact that societies are not the simple "additive" sum of individual members.

To understand this one can go back to classical thinkers such as Marx and Durkheim. It is a simple axiom in sociological theory that individual and structural dynamics may follow distinct and even opposite courses. Ties between them are, more often than not, dialectic rather than additive. A simple sum of individual orientations cannot be automatically translated into congruent societal change. An active set of individuals, motivated by whatever psychological mechanism, must still cope with existing economic and political systems.

These sociologists and social psychologists have too readily assumed the relationship between people's values and attitudes and the social and economic development. Industrialization need not generate the same personality characteristics among the people all over the world. Not all the similarities in the attitudes, life style and general orientations of the people living in highly industrialized societies can be accounted by the process of economic development or modernization; one cannot overlook the fact that these nations share a common historical heritage and traditions. Modernization of attitudes presumably can occur with different content in differing contexts, such as socialist, communist, capitalist, "mixed", and many other cultural, transcultural, or ideological classifications. Openness to change, or to whatever is "new", may be a central theme of many types of societies, not restricted to characteristics usually referred to by Western capitalistically oriented analysts.

Weiner (1966) asks an appropriate question of this school - and offers his own response: Do some traditional societies have within them the mental seeds of modernity? (1966) While Weiner accepts some facets of the psychological approach, he clearly is not willing to concede that any specific psychological factor has a claim to "historical necessity". He prefers the concept of "substitutability", that is, the idea that among the great number of value systems that exist in the modernizing world of today it is possible that several, or even many, will be compatible with modernization. Indeed, in the contemporary world some value systems may actually encourage the process whereas a century ago they would have impeded it. All men/women of today, in other words, do not have to acquire the "Protestant Ethic" to file a claim on modernity. They may already have their own peculiar "virus" that simply needs to be activated.

Since Max Weber propounded his thesis on the Protestant ethic and the emergence of capitalism, and compared Christianity with the religions of Asia, it has become fashionable among some of modernization theorists to attribute people's poverty and backwardness in the Third World to their values and religious orientations. It is argued, on a logic similar to Weber, that a unique set of psychological orientations which, if present in sufficient numbers, will motivate major changes in the economic structure of a society. (McClelland, 1961; Lerner 1966) Unfortunately,

none of the recent theories pays enough attention to historical detail and systematic description of intervening mechanisms characterizing Weber's argument. In fact, the original thesis of Weber is often misconstrued by zealous admirers, while Weber himself was aware of the pitfalls of his thesis and often qualified it.¹⁶ Socio-psychological oriented sociologists and social scientists do not show such inhibitions. A number of studies like Tylor (1948), McClelland (1961), Nair Kusum (1964), and Myrdal (1968) have repeated the theme, often without sound empirical research data. A study conducted by Kumar (1972) challenges such simplistic assertions and hypotheses which are often taken to be granted as established truths. The findings of this study show that innovative behavior is not the function of values and attitudes associated with the subsistence farmers in India.

Thus, it is not possible to make any reasonable predictions about one's economic behavior on the basis of his/her psychological attributes and orientations. In other words, the effects of one's value orientations and personality traits on his/her economic behaviors should be looked at in the context of his/her total milieu, the

¹⁶This is most noticeably the case with the Protestant Ethic essay. Several writers, for example, have attributed to the Protestant sects a central causative role in the rise of Western capitalism, rather than see Weber's analysis in terms of the correlations between forms of religious belief and practical ethics which, indirectly, influence socio-economic behavior.

constraints of his/her situation and the real choices open to him/her. The effects of achievement motivations may be different in the case of two individuals in a social system or even the same person in two social situations. The drive for success may lead a well-to-do farmer to adopt modern innovations for increasing his total produce. However, the same drive is unlikely to make any difference in the condition of a landless laborer in Iran, it may even pose some problems for him in his community.

Acceptance of certain variables as the basis of generalization is not scientific. For instance, if we take n-Ach, what will be the social manifestations as outlets for it? Need for achievement can serve many ends, or values. Thus, there is no guarantee that high need achievers will not be deviants from the dominant culture. They may be gangsters instead of entrepreneurs. Moreover, the social structure - including both its opportunities and its constraints is largely determinative, on a broad scale, of the direction of efforts to achieve. Minimally, then, n-Ach in underdeveloped countries is necessarily coupled with an unspecified but important "moral" pattern of the individual, determining whether he is ambitious in a socially useful, albeit personally advantageous, way as in a socially noncontributive way (McClelland, 1966, 35ff). What is regarded as socially useful or the reverse varies widely from culture to culture. Consider, for example, what

"high achievement" consisted of among the German National Socialists, the Japanese militarists and, with a very different content - among the followers of Muhatma Gandhi (Macklin, 1969). In a study conducted by Barrett, it is shown that among the Hausa, a Nigerian society, political office is the focus of aspiration. Obedience to the political elite is prevalent, but is not indicative of a lack of achievement orientation. Instead, the Hausa realize their ambitions of means of obedience (Barrett, 1969). Also, anthropologists, such as Smith, (1966) and Goldschmidt (1951) have identified an emphasis upon achievement in African and California Indian tribes.

The applicability of nAch to countries of the Third World where much behavior is collectively rather than individualistically oriented is problematic. Under such circumstances, it becomes a matter of particular import perhaps, whether the Western form of achievement motivation, being more individualistically centered, is readily capable of being grafted onto social and cultural networks that do not revere this orientation. Indeed, high nAch may sometimes be a symptom or derivative of the extent to which pattern of modernization has already occurred, rather than being a cause.

The social psychological school of modernization lacks an understanding of social dynamics which works behind these values. There is very little to demonstrate how

a nation moves from one modernization phase to the next, or why an urban person more frequently than not becomes literate, listens to radio, and develops a coherent pattern of modern values and attitudes. Socio-psychological modernizationists do not deal directly with the processes by means of which new behavioral ideas come into existence and become embodied in actual behaviors through social reorganization. They do not come to grips with the fundamental character of economic development - social learning.

The values that modernization theorists are talking about as "modern values" are only consumption-oriented values which benefits multinational corporations. Looking at the question from this angle, making people modern means making them empathic with Western style life standards, instilling new aspirations, and teaching organizational skills for reaching them. These values broaden the markets of import for the benefit of multinational enterprises. What is involved here is a taste transfer role of trade or a redefinition of basic needs as desires for particular branded goods, i.e., "the transition of thirst into the need for a Coke", as Illich (1969) put it. This product taste-transfer represents a severe blockage in the development of local industry, and can generate decline among those entrepreneurs that remain locally rather than, as Sunkel (1973) would put it, transnationally oriented. Therefore, the new "possibilities" that these values bring about, bear no relationship to local conditions of the underdeveloped countries.

Such modern values cannot be considered as the values of development. Modernity - as participatory demand making - can effectively stagnate an underdeveloped economy by restricting the field of action of development-oriented agencies. It only emphasizes individual consumption and hinders the success of developmental ideology. Such a kind of modernization serves to reinforce the existing social structure at a national level by showing how it is possible for a small section of the population to share in the goods of the scientific-technological world, without altering the forms of human relations or the character of social production (Horowitz, 1972).

The U.S. has often fostered this sort of modernism as a way of curbing the marked propensity of the Third World countries to seek industrial identity through economic autonomy. Many sections of the Third World have become veritable cornucopias of up-to-date goods. Such sectors satisfy the craving for modernity and function as a solution to overproduction within the U.S. Hence, the international division of labor continues to work to the disadvantage of the Third World countries. It probably satisfies the desire for modernization for a while, but does not bring about any real social structural change.

In the Third World countries today a modernizing psychology does not surface, unless large structural events involving significant portions of the society are in progress or have already occurred. Attitudinal changes should

be considered as a by-product of the "great lumbering social processes" that already have an engine of change somehow built into them. Therefore, psychological modernity in underdeveloped countries does not promote structural development, rather it leads to emigration of the modernized individual to the city slums, as we witness today. The psychological processes of modernization are dependent variables which can be only explained by larger institutional and structural processes occurring in the society as a whole.

Social actors, in this school, becomes a marginal measure, which does not account for all of these changes. The question of social classes does not appear in any discussion of modernization values. While the important question to ask is who is behind certain values and institutions, who tries to maintain them and who tries to change them.¹⁷ Thus, if traditional values and norms favor dominant interest groups in society, such groups might resist cultural change or only allow such changes which do not threaten the status quo. Thus, the "correct attitudes" cannot bring,

¹⁷By referring to who, I do not mean certain individuals isolated from society, in the sense that socio-psychological school of modernization deals with individuals. I see individuals who are members of certain socio-economic groups and should be seen in the mode of their interpersonal contact and as the manifestations of social forces. They are individuals insofar as they are the personifications of socio-economic structure and embodiments of particular class-relations and class-interests. Because the motives of individuals are more the expression than the cause of social reality.

say, political modernization, if the political elites actively suppress any changes which might give rise to a more modern political system. That is why in despite of all "modern attitudes" which Iranian elites acquired during their study in Western countries, political system is not still modernized. Equally important, in regard to social class, is that individual modernity in most of Third World countries has been limited primarily to those who are privileged due to circumstances of social class, urban residence and exposure to Western modernization.

Each individual's ability, magnified by the value of achievement, is actually a function of the prevailing opportunities for education and work that a society controlled by a propertied minority permits a person to enjoy. Then, from this point of view, what prevents some poor countries from fully utilizing their human and natural resources is not a lack of skills and "modern" attitudes, but a restrictive and antiquated system of production imposed and maintained by those who greatly profit from the status quo at the expense of the majority. For instance, in the case of most of African and Latin American societies, it could be easily said that their underdevelopment in part stemmed not from the organization of the society around traditional or other worldly values and practices, but from their colonization and subsequent incorporation into metropolitan socio-economic systems. Colonial and imperialist forces may be responsible

in part, not only for the government structures which take form, but for the type of mentality found in emerging societies. Feelings of dependence are likely to inhibit growth and the desire for political development (Fanon, 1963 & 1967). The longer a country has been declared legally independent, the more likely citizens and political leaders will rid themselves of this colonial mentality and take an active stand toward achieving greater freedom, equality, and social well-being (Horowitz, 1972; Cockcroft et al. 1970). Therefore, historical forces, such as colonial domination, affect not only the development of institutions but the particular attitude and mentality of societal members as well (Beckford's psychological dependency). Hence, we can conclude that the solution to the problems of underdevelopment cannot be simply a technical problem in communications or training but a political problem: the overthrow of certain elites, the transfer of power from those who are against effective economic growth to those who are for it (Frank, 1969; Baran, 1957; Furtado, 1964).

To see the very example of the fact that the question is not technical; but political, one can look at South Africa: In South Africa, the highest technology is used in mining. People are replaced from their homeland and families into the mines. Individuals are torn out of the familiar protective structures of their own life, in most cases physically separated from their families - becoming so-called industrial bachelors and thrown into an amorphous

and often chaotic mass of individuals organized rather remotely by plant management for purposes of labor. In such a situation the structure of modernity, in terms of institutions, patterns of everyday life, cognitive and normative themes and anything else one may wish to name, to the individuals is as an alien, coercive force that degrades and destroys his/her life.

Lastly, the social psychological school of thought in modernization studies has an inherent tendency to develop into the fallacy of normative determinism which tends to underplay the historical reality of the dynamics between material and ideal interests, tradition and modernity, political dominance and false consciousness - those classic concerns with the plight of individual in modern society swayed by its trends of rationalization and alienation.

In order to acquire a critical and more indepth assessment of the social psychological school of modernization, one can look at one of the theories reviewed previously. For that purpose the framework advanced by Rogers has been selected. Throughout the discussion, however, reference will be made to critical problems and issues which surface in other works.

Rogers:

The main focus of analysis in Rogers' study is not the social but the personality systems, though the approach is explicitly socio-psychological. The main emphasis is not on

society's institutionalized norms but on their internalization or simply their reflection in the attitudes of individual peasants. He characterizes peasant society primarily in terms of its subculture, while ignoring the possible range of variation in the types of peasant economy which he is considering. Since he believes he is simply summarizing accepted knowledge on the subject, he does not make any attempt to justify the central role cultural factors play in his analysis (Hutton and Cohen, 1975).

Rogers' examination of the changing values of Columbian peasants through an elaborate measurement of their attitudes, is done in a social vacuum. There is no serious attempt to link such values to the social context in which they are embedded. One has no idea, for instance, of how specific groups in the village deal with specific issues or make collective choices on the basis of such values. He does not show how peasants' features arose, nor how they might be related to the economy. The features of peasant society are seen as interdependent parts of a particular kind of social system, they are established by comparative observations and treated as persisting through time.

In Rogers' study (1969) peasants as actors disappear and we are left with a series of variables whose interconnection gives us nothing but trivia on the subject matter. One cannot simply extract variables from their imaginable cases. To repeat, generalizations which are

supposed to apply to all peasants the world over, are bound to be either obvious or inconclusive. For instance, literacy, as Rogers shows, is positively correlated to "innovativeness" (Ibid:86). This is not a trivial but an inconclusive generalization, as it is easy to think of cases which disprove it. For instance, if the power structure in the countryside is such that innovations only profit the landlord, the peasant has no interest in accepting new ideas despite increasing literacy (Stavenhagen, 1970:583). Moreover, as Hunter shows, subsistence peasants are extremely reluctant to accept new ideas and to move into cash economy, not as a consequence of illiteracy or prejudice but because quite objectively, the passage involves considerable risks for them (Hunter, 1969:82-91). Thus Rogers' generalization about literacy and innovativeness would have been meaningful if he could show under what conditions it holds true and under what conditions it does not.

Rogers characterizes his approach as middle range theory (1969:42-67), as an attempt to bridge the gap between Grand Theory and raw empiricism. But despite Rogers' self definition as middle range theorist, it would not be exaggerated to say that there is no serious theory whatsoever behind his approach. For instance, one has no idea of why these nine variables rather than some others, have been chosen; or how they are logically linked with each other and with the larger and growing body of theory on peasants

and development. Presumably what Rogers sees as "theory" is the end result of the statistical manipulation of variables and the eventual establishment of "universal laws" in the natural science tradition. In fact underlying the whole work is a crude positivism aiming at the establishment of generalizations which would show how two or more variables are linked together universally, i.e. irrespective of the social and historical context in which they are embedded. Thus the social structure of the village and of the larger Columbian society, which the peasants interviewed were living in, were nowhere taken into consideration; one learns next to nothing about interest groups or about Columbian economic, political, educational institutions on the village or national level. The same criticism can be applied to Inkeles and Smith's work.

The "theory" that underlies the research enterprise of Inkeles and Smith is not really a theory, and certainly not a "thoroughly elaborated" one as they have said:

Our conception of modernity rests on thoroughly elaborated theory as to the qualities which modern settings are likely to generate, as well as considerations of personal attributes which are likely to best adapt a man to life in such institutional settings. (Smith and Inkeles, 1966: 359)

Actually, Inkeles and Smith started with a set of concerns and hunches about what might constitute a syndrome of modernity. These concerns and hunches have been presented and to some extent developed in the sociological literature, at least from the times of Weber, Durkheim, Simmel, and Sombart.

In the last few decades a proliferation of more or less related ideas have been stated by theorists and researchers; what Inkeles and Smith have done is to pull together many of those notions in order to make use of them. (Anderson, 1975)

* It seems that Rogers and Inkeles ignore the fact that literacy and fatalism might have totally different significance in different countries of Third World, due to their different historical experiences and cultures. For instance, nowhere in Rogers' work we get a hint that the peasants interviewed were Colombian, rather than Chinese or Bulgarians. Presumably all these "contextual" considerations are quite irrelevant to what Rogers is doing. He could have applied the same tools and asked exactly the same questions in any underdeveloped country; no need to bother at all learning something about the society in which the interviews are administered. Indeed, according to Rogers, scientific progress in this field will come about by the repetition of similar exercises over and over again in as many cases as possible.

The need now is to know less about more; that is, what are needed are less intensive studies of greater number of villages in countries throughout the world (Rogers, 1969:41)

This should go on until eventually "a set of principles or perhaps even laws of human behavior may be realized." (Ibid: 47)

The trouble, of course, with such "laws of human behavior" or their approximations, is that they are either trivial or inconclusive (i.e., they are only true under certain conditions, which are not specified). To say for instance, that the more literate peasants become the more they are exposed to mass media (Ibid:81), the more they are oriented to the outside community ("cosmopolitaness") (Ibid:87); and the more aware they are of the larger political system ("political knowledge") (Ibid:88), is hardly revealing. One does not need to bother at all going to Columbia or learning sociology in order to come to this type of conclusion. Of course, Rogers' generalizations take a more sophisticated form: we thus learn that the simple zero-order correlation between literacy and political knowledge in the five villages, is .446 and that it comes down to .282 if the effect of the intervening "mass media exposure" variable is removed (Ibid:113). But this statistical precision hardly reduces the triviality of the statement. One knows as little about the problem of literacy or political awareness in Columbia after the statistical computations as one knew before them. In fact such generalizations provide a typical example of elephantine statistical yielding mouse-sized results.

Thus, one comes to conclusion that one should not "know less about more"; one should learn more about less, i.e. one should try to find out something about the social context in which the variables examined are embedded

(Mouzelis, 1972). A final indication of how misleading Rogers' "contextless" approach can be, is his essentially reductionist thesis that "modernization parallels at the individual level what development represents at the national level" - development being defined as a "type of social change in which new ideas are introduced into a social system in order to produce higher per capita incomes and levels of living through more modern production methods and improved social organization" (Ibid:18). The implication of such statements is the naive assumption that the more individuals in general and the peasants in particular adopt "modern" attitudes and values the more economically developed a country becomes. Rogers does not seem to be aware that one of the most striking characteristics of most underdeveloped countries today is that they experience superficial "westernization", or in the social psychological sense that Rogers uses the term "modernization", without effective economic development: "modern" styles of life and attitudes are widely adopted but within a context of a stagnating or "misdeveloped" economy - a situation which seriously aggravates the twin problems of poverty and unemployment (Mauzelis, 1972).

C. Unidirectional Change and the Critique of Rostowian Model

Some of the first sociologists set forth theories of social evolution that posited a uniform end, and, in

some cases, a uniform path to that end, for all societies. Comte, for example, described social evolution in terms of an ineluctable sequence which was leading to a predestined end. Some contemporary thinkers have continued to propagate this notion, while others have admitted to diverse pathways - though still to a predestined end. And in any case, the end is the same - a modern industrial society that has an obvious Western appearance. This myth of unidirectionality - the idea that all societies are ultimately heading towards one particular end - is something called the "theory of convergence" and sometimes the contradiction between tradition and modernity (Lauer, 1973). It is basically a form of technological determinism with an ethnocentric accent. Certain societal patterns similar to those of the West are seen inevitable for industrialization of any society. Industrialization of society, everywhere, is possible, it is argued only by acceptance of Western technology (Theodorson, 1953). The most noted exponents of this position are Kerr (1960) and Rostow (1960).

The idea that all societies are ultimately becoming very similar easily slips over into the myth of Utopia apprehended, which is the argument or assumption that a modern, industrial society represents the ultimate in human achievement. The solution for world problems, then, lies in helping the developing nations to modernize (where modernization is equivalent to Westernization) as quickly as possible.

The sooner they become like the West, it is believed, the sooner will mankind enjoy peace and fulfillment. Utopia has already been apprehended cognitively, it only becomes a matter of time and will until it is apprehended in reality throughout the world. The inherent flaws in modern society are thereby ignored; the modern social structure is held to require only refinement, not radical change.

The myths of unidirectionality and Utopia apprehended seem contradicted by a substantial amount of evidence (Nash, 1968; Berrien, 1966; Laur, 1973; Bondurat, 1963; Geertz, 1963a). Social scientists already are sensitive to the fact that change does not occur in identical lockstep stages in every country. The sequences which India or Japan experience when passing from traditional to modern societies are different from those experienced by Britain or France. The variations are due to both the historical timing of a society's own "take-off" and the distinctive character of its traditional culture. India took off from a Hindu rather than a Christian culture. It also became self-consciously committed to modernization in an era of nuclear power and mass franchise rather than in an era of the cotton gin and limited vote. Therefore, neither is it possible to justify the assumption that industrialization demands particular forms, nor is it possible to justify the idea of a singular path to that end.

The study of two Indonesian towns which were in the pre-takeoff period of economic development concluded that the path towards economic takeoff may involve considerable diversity in terms of cultural patterns of social structures. One town was characterized by a highly individualistic, modernized Moslem, economically motivated setting; the other was group-centered, orthodox Hindu, and politically motivated (Geertz, 1963a). Thus, changes which arise in social development occur neither simultaneously nor in any universal sequential pattern. As Horowitz (1972) has put it, "sectors develop rather than societies." And the order of their precedence in change varies from society to society.

But the myth of unidirectionality has one more implication which can be shown. Instructive in this connection is Rostow's much-discussed theory. Rostow's work was produced as a weapon against the Marxist theory of economic development. He even goes further and regards his manifesto as an alternative to Marxism. At this point, I am not concerned with his misunderstanding and misinterpretation of the basic character of Marxism (see Gustafsson, 1961).¹⁸

¹⁸To justify such an assertion, one can look at one example which easily shows that Rostow never really succeeds in giving an adequate picture of what Marx's views on the question of development and modernization are. He first makes Marx hold that the ancient-feudal-capitalist sequence is universally applicable, and then remarks that "Marx's concept of feudalism is too restrictive to cover all the traditional societies" (1960:146). He then goes on to maintain that Marx had no interest in the discussion of modernization in Asia

Nor shall I go into the metaphysical basic concept underlying Rostow's idea of development.

All the way through, Rostow's theory is not based on analysis of the internal dynamics of economic growth, but often seizes on fortuitous or superficial phenomena which often accompany economic growth. His theory contains a clearly stated quantitative connection between the take-off and the drive to maturity. But the basis of division changes abruptly between the latter stage and the age of high mass consumption. Whereas previously he described industrial development in various countries, he now shifts to the result of industrial development, more specifically the high mass consumption among certain strata of the population in North American society. The theory does not indicate anything like a connection in this development process. Accordingly, the process does not appear as a connected whole. Even high mass consumption naturally presupposes a background of industrial development, which qualitatively is not differentiated from the prior stage. As Rostow presents economic development, it does not contain any necessary internal dynamics.

For another thing there are no clear qualitative criteria for the stages of development. This is linked with

(Ibid:157). Rostow is, however, wrong on both points insofar as they claim to be an adequate representation of Marx's views on the subject: Marx never claimed that there was anything like "feudalism" in Asia, and his discussions on modernization in Asia, though ambivalent, are expressed in dozens of articles (see Avineri, 1969a).

the fact that Rostow is chiefly concerned with the sequential content of economic development, not its concrete form. But a process in stages presupposes not only continuing connection - permanence - but also qualitative changes. Without qualitative changes one cannot speak of stages at all. Thus, for example, according to Rostow the central point in the transition to the take-off is for the share of investment in the national income to rise from five to ten percent. But in and of itself, such a quantitative change does not alter the economic structure so that one can speak of a new stage. That depends entirely on how the investments are applied, which in turn depends on the social and political structure. In other words, if we wish to distinguish qualitatively different stages in a process, we must adduce something qualitative, i.e. some difference in kind. Rostow is aware of this to a certain extent. The qualitative criterion he chooses as an index for the age of high mass consumption is a specific consumption good, namely the automobile. This brings out very clearly the limitations of Rostow's theory. He selects an outstanding North American consumption good as the index of economic development in general, regardless of the type of society or other concrete conditions. The Mongols began to fly before they saw an automobile; the Chinese prefer, among other things, to build theaters before automobiles! Therefore, the process of economic growth need not end in mass consumption, while increased leisure may be an ethically dubious goal in

the face of pressing social needs. This clearly shows the ethnocentric aspect of this view.

Rostow's five stages are at once too general and too specific. His traditional society comprises all societies before capitalist or socialist industrialization. We get, all in the same pot; the ancient Roman Empire, the European Middle Ages, India and China of the 1940's and large portions of present-day Africa. According to Ramond Aron,

One may ask to what extent problems and stages are the same in countries which created industrialized society and in those which imported industrialization or imitated it. How far, for instance, can the 1960 take-off of Brazil, carried out with the help of modern techniques and by a population that is increasing at the rate of more than 3 percent per annum, be compared to the rate of France in 1830, when antibiotics, refrigerators, and motorcars were unknown. Advances in hygiene increase population pressures, and mass production of consumer goods encourages consumption. The problems may have some points in common, but at the same time they are remarkably unlike. (1967:31-32)

Such a method entails cutting oneself off from any actual understanding of economic development. It conceals more than it reveals. Thus, for instance, the actual course of development has shown that it was precisely the imperialistic expansion of the highly industrialized countries from the 1870's on that broke up and stopped short the incipient industrialization in the colonial world, and that the colonial countries could only begin industrialization and economic development after they had won national

independence (Gustafsson, 1961). This basic fact in the economic development of the world is not mentioned in Rostow's theory.

As Frank (1970) has argued, Rostow's theory is inadequate in explaining the present and the past of the Third World countries. His stages of development do not correspond to both past and present of these societies. His tacit assumption that underdevelopment is an original stage of traditional societies and that "there were no stages prior to the present stage of underdevelopment" (Ibid: 346) is primarily incorrect. Underdevelopment of these countries has been produced by the development of mercantilism and later, industrial capitalism. To equate the history of these countries with Western Europe is a mistake. The "new nations" of today are in a fundamentally different position from the "new nations" of Western Europe during the nineteenth century. They cannot be viewed within compartmental structures of stage development because impetus and continuity of their economic failures or successes must be juxtaposed with the impact and power of inputs and outputs of controlling nations.

Rostow's criteria for economic development in its various stages are, on the whole, not as general as he claims. Instead of concrete analysis and clear distinctions, he has been content in his theory basically to describe certain aspects of economic development in certain parts of the world. It is not made clear how one stage

terminates only to give rise to a successor stage, or why the sources of change shift from sector to sector as they do.

Appelbaum (1970) questions the empirical adequacy of Rostow's argument. He supports Kuznet's assertion that no empirical distinction exists between the take-off stages and the immediately preceding and succeeding stages, and that specific characteristics of individual countries such as historical heritage, time of entry into growth, process, or degree of backwardness are not given adequate consideration. He feels that to the degree Rostow specifies conditions, he is not supported by the data. His indicators frequently behave differently than his model argues (Spengler, 1965).

A more crucial issue is: Is Rostow successful in his presentation of "a Non-Communist Manifesto" as he subtitles his book? Despite his claim to the contrary, Rostow fails to provide an alternative to the Marxist formulation of the inherent conflict both within and among nations. He simply ignores the important issue raised by Marx about the relation between economic and social structure, probably more important for the questions it raises than the answers it provides. Instead he assumes the teleology of economic growth as one manifestation of a much wider process of modernization. He chooses to focus on "the consequence of the progressive, efficient absorption into the economy of

new technologies" as basic to economic growth and takes it as "a factor both basic and relatively uniform." (Rostow, 1970:179-180)

Nisbet, in discussing the relevance and irrelevance of the reliance on the "metaphor" of the evolutionary tradition, criticizes Rostow as one of a few illustrations of the abuses of the metaphor of evolutionary development. His point is that, whereas Marx's metaphor is relevant to his essential subject of the laws of evolution of mankind, Rostow's approach of taking essentially similar premises of Marxism and seeking "to apply these, not to abstract social systems, but to those very concrete, historically formed aggregates that are the nations of modern Europe." (Nisbet, 1969:255)

In their application to the problem of the underdeveloped countries two general methodological principles of Rostow's "theoretical work" have social significance. In the first place, Rostow, like the majority of modernization theorists, regards the capitalist system as eternal and immutable, and basically not only acceptable but essential for the underdeveloped countries. He denies any connection between rates of development and the character of productive relationships in a society. Exploitation and degradation of the working class, the destitution of the peasantry, monopolies and competition, anarchy in production - to all these factors in the capitalist mode of production he shuts his eyes. He thinks that colonialism is

"virtually" dead and communism is a "disease of the transition". In the second place, his theory of stages implies that in accordance with the objective course of historical development (as he sees it), the economically backward countries will not reach the stage of mass consumption for 100-150 years. The economy of the underdeveloped countries cannot even reach a state of maturity in less than 60 years after take-off begins (Rostow, 1960:9).

D. Tradition and Modernity

As mentioned earlier the dichotomy tradition-modernity has become identified with that of underdevelopment - development and employed to differentiate not only Western European societies in time, but also industrialized versus nonindustrialized societies in space (Bendix, 1970; Horowitz, 1970).

The common approach to the study of modernization has been the analysis of social change from static and uniform traditional society to a dynamic and plural modern society of the Western type through linear progression. Development is seen proceeding from something (tradition) through something (transitional society) to something (modernity). (See Kebschill, 1968) In this manner, the process is conceptualized whereby traditional societies acquire the attributes of modernity. Modernization, seen in this way, becomes an either/or matter. A society is

totally modernized or else it is traditional. Entire civilizations, complex processes of national evolution are grouped under the blanket term "tradition". The theory makes universal history a tabula rasa, reducing it to the dichotomy of civilizations that have crossed a particular threshold and those that have not (Porter, 1973).

Fictitious dichotomy:

This dichotomous approach creates certain problems which call for more attention and reflection: to believe that social transformations occur in the passage from underdevelopment (backwardness, undifferentiation, ruralism, etc.) toward modernization (industrialism, social complexity, urbanization, etc.) is a critical issue. There is no existing nation in the Third World which can be labeled "traditional" in the sense that modernization theorists posit. Social structures of the most diverse kinds cannot be seen altogether in the same category, sharing little more than the label "traditional". Tradition and modernity are not necessarily in conflict, nor are they mutually exclusive systems. As Rudolph and Rudolph have pointed out:

The assumption that modernity and tradition are radically contradictory rests on a misdiagnosis of tradition as it is found in traditional societies, a misapprehension of the relationship between them (Rudolph and Rudolph, 1967:3)

In fact, no society can be identified with extreme polarity. There exists many traditional values and institutions in

supposedly modern industrial societies as the case of England, the first industrial nation testifies. Not only do modern societies incorporate many traditional elements, but traditional societies often have many universalistic, achievement-oriented, bureaucratic characteristics which are normally thought of as modern. For instance, in Western industrial society, there are traits of ascription in the practice of closed-shop by certain unions and particularism in terms of "Ivy League" and "Public School" ties, and hierarchical relations in the Army and business corporation (Ye-Lin Cheng, 1975).

To think of tradition and modernity as mutually exclusive concepts, is to impose, as Rudolph and Rudolph (1967) have put it, an imperialism of categories and historical possibilities by artificially constructing an "analytic gap" which denies the possibility of innovation, mutual adaptation, and synthesis. The new patterns of behavior and attitudes may in some cases be fused; in others, they may comfortably coexist, one alongside the other, despite the apparent incongruity of it all. The old is not necessarily replaced by the new. The acceptance of a new product, a new religion, a new mode of decision-making does not necessarily lead to the disappearance of the older form. New forms may only increase the range of alternatives. Both magic and medicine can exist side by side, used alternatively by the same people. When an encounter takes place between two forces like tradition and modernity, it is very

unlikely that either of them will be totally eliminated in the encounter. Such an encounter is more likely to result in a dialectical interaction, as a result of which both will undergo some change.

In addition, it can be argued that not only co-existence is possible, but modernization itself may strengthen tradition. As Eisenstadt says, "in many countries modernization has been successfully undertaken under the aegis of traditional symbols and by traditional elites." (1973:2) It may give new life to important elements of the preexisting culture, such as religion. For instance, in Iran one can easily see the villagers and peasants who are carrying the tape recorders which are used for religious preaches and lamentations. No society can live without traditions; and the challenge of modernization is to build and develop traditions of modernity both through an interaction with older traditions of secular life and by modifying the latter to suit the demands of a new age. On the other hand, we have many instances in which traditional institutions and values have facilitated rather than impeded the social change: the extended family may become the entrepreneurial unit responsible for economic growth and so forth.

Even the clash between modernity and tradition sometimes does not delay the process of modernization, but leads to its full realization. To get an empirical sense

of these assertions, one can look at many studies which will easily support this thesis: Rudolph (1965) has shown that some lower castes in India have been able to rise to equality with higher castes through the effort of caste associations. Bennett (1968) has shown that the communal structure in Japan has continued to exist and has facilitated the process of modernization. George Devos (1965) showed that the traditional Japanese family was a powerful source of achievement motivation for the individual. Huntington (1966) showed that America inherited its political institutions from traditional Tudor England with constitutional government and diffusion of power in the hands of the President (Tudor King), the Senate and House of Representatives (Parliament), and the Court (Judicial Magistrates) in contrast to Europe's modern central political institution; and that America's political participation has been far more developed than that of European countries.

One of the other weaknesses in the study of modernization has been the fact that the typologies of tradition and modernity are supposed to be ideal types but have frequently been used as equivalents to actual societies in existence. The confusion has led to the assertion that the traditional societies are static and uniform and that they will develop to dynamic and plural modern societies of the Western type. The view that tradition and innovation are necessarily in conflict has begun to seem overly abstract and unreal. It is fallacious to assume that a traditional

society has always existed in its present form or that the recent past presents an unchanged situation.

All societies, either traditional or modern, are in a continuous stage of change, and, using Gurwitsch's terminology, reveal to varying degrees a continuous process of "destructuring" and "restructuring". Traditional society is often itself a product of change. This has been shown in the case of India by Gusfield (1967). Levine (1968) also has shown that the traditional Amharic culture in Ethiopia is neither static nor uniform. Moreover, change is not solely a characteristic of modern industrial societies. The contrast between tradition and modernity is presumed upon the similarities of traditional societies, while structurally these societies are heterogeneous and their values are diverse.

The idea of generalization of ideal types is rightly criticized by Bendix (1970) when he says that "ideal types are not generalizations" and cannot be found in social realities. For instance, one will be hard put to find an actual society characterized by hundred percent ascription and particularism with no aspects of achievement and universalism. Therefore, it is more accurate to postulate that traditional societies have differential degrees and types of "modernness" within their social structures and value systems and that there will be some carryover of traditional elements in modern societies (see Bendix, 1970 and Weiner, 1966).

In this way, one would be able to take into account the element of continuity which is often neglected in analysis of modernization.

Now the more sophisticated assertion of the eventual development from traditional to modern society in its ideal-typical form commits essentially the same mistake, since it is not likely for any society to develop into an ideal-type modern society. Existing societies are usually mixed in various degrees. It is stated by Feldman and Moore (1962) in their article on the question of convergence or differentiation in the development of industrializing societies, that there are variabilities in the character of pre-industrial societies, the trajectory of industrialization and the structures of industrializing societies; and that the solution of existing tensions and problems creates tensions and problems. When modernization is viewed as a transition from traditional to modern societies, the timing and sequence of modernity are often neglected. Historical and comparative evidence reveals clearly that modernization cannot occur twice in the same way (Bendix, 1970). Variation in timing and sequence may be influenced, for instance, by government initiative and planning, by emulation and imitation, by nationalism, and by cultural and ideological diffusion (Ibid).

The transition model often implies incorrectly that changes once initiated must follow the lines indicated by

some preexisting, usually "Western" model and that in the transition to modernity all aspects of social structure change in a more or less simultaneous and integrated fashion (Goldscheider, 1971). All these variabilities make it unlikely that there will ever be convergence of industrializing societies. Levine (1968) has suggested that certain kinds of change in traditional culture involve a shifting of relations among the existing elements or a shifting of the relative primacy of cultural complexes which have existed in all other cultures rather than the creation or adoption of new cultural elements. One of the main reasons that variation is not emphasized in the modernization process is that the dramatic and dynamic transformations associated with modernization have not been viewed in the context of "process" but in the context of "transition" from wholly traditional to wholly modern. This by itself is also due to modernization theorists' ahistorical view of modern and traditional societies. New states are not just momentarily in mid-passage between the states of "traditional" and "modern", but rather they represent a special class of societies unique unto themselves.

Model of modern:

Another problem in modernization theory one is faced with is that of defining what is modern and what is traditional, compounded by the difficulty of finding anything like an empirically pure type of either (Huntington, 1971). One cannot assume that modernity is an objectively

defined, universally applicable concept, nor that it has exactly the same meaning everywhere. Modernity, like tradition, is socially constructed and is a product of interaction (Brumer, 1976). As Huntington (Ibid) has noted modernity and tradition are essentially asymmetrical concepts. The modern ideal is set forth by these theorists, and then everything which does not fall into its interval, is assumed as traditional. Hence, the concept of "tradition" seems to be a hypothetical antithesis to "modernity", not the one which is based on the observed facts. The fictional character of the initial stage of the process is due to the fact that it is not based on observation of actual societies but on reflection on the features of the "terminal" stage. Furthermore, modernity can be defined affirmatively, but tradition remains largely a residual concept. Dichotomies which combine "positive" concepts and residual ones, however, are highly dangerous analytically. In point of fact, they are not properly dichotomies at all. Tradition is simply too heterogenous to be of much use as an analytical concept. The characteristics which are ascribed to traditional societies are the opposites of those ascribed to modern societies.

Another difficulty with the tradition/modernity concept is that by their very structure polar concepts tend to make us expect that an increase on one side involves a decrease on the other. Huxter (1963) has pointed out that

this view seems to presume something like a law of conservation of historical or social energy. He shows how it has led historians of the sixteenth century to assume that an increase in secular activity meant an automatic decrease in religious activity, whereas the evidence clearly indicates an increase in the intensity of activity of both kinds. It is this balance scale that has caused the critics of the tradition/modernity concept to speak paradoxically of the "traditionalization of modernity" (Kothari, 1968) and the "modernity of tradition" (Rudolph & Rudolph, 1967; Shiner, 1973).

Tradition and traditionalism:

Modernization theorists have viewed the Third World countries as traditional societies. Furthermore, the traditional societies have been considered as traditionalist. Here, problem is that tradition and traditionalist are taken as identical, while we have to distinguish between "tradition" and "traditionalism". Tradition refers to the beliefs and practices handed down from the past, as we reinterpret our past, our traditions alter (Shils, 1971). In contrast, traditionalism glorifies past beliefs and practices as immutable. Traditionalism, by virtue of its hostility to innovation, is clearly antithetical to the development of modernization. Traditions, which are constantly subject to reinterpretation and modifications, constitute no such barriers. To view tradition as simply the

dead hand of the past and hence the arch-enemy of modernization is unjustified. Edward Shils has made this point when he writes:

Tradition is not the dead hand of the past but rather the hand of the gardener, which nourishes and elicits tendencies of judgment which would otherwise not be strong enough to emerge on their own. In this respect tradition is an encouragement to recipient individuality rather than its enemy. It is a stimulant to moral judgment and self-discipline rather than an opiate. It establishes contact between the recipient and the sacred values of his life in society. (Shils, 1958:156)

Tradition is not a given, nor can it be inferred from study of the old culture. Rather, tradition is created anew in contemporary situations; as the situations change, the socially constructed conception of group tradition may also change.

The positions taken by defenders of native tradition should not be viewed in terms of their historical accuracy, for that is really of secondary importance. More to the point is that statements of group tradition create an identity that is currently meaningful to the participants and to those with whom they interact. Tradition is plucked-created, and shaped to present needs and aspirations in a given historical situation.

People refer to aspects of the past as tradition in grounding their present actions in some legitimating principle. In this fashion, tradition becomes a program of action in which it functions as a good or as a justificatory base. By emphasizing tradition people select and bring out

those aspects of it which are in line with the demand of the present and the future, thus giving new meaning to the past. Therefore, the struggle for a new culture in non-western lands means grappling with and reinterpreting the inner being and values of the traditional culture from within in the light of their relevance to modernization. In India, Nehru emphasized that the struggle for modernization required not cultural imitation but cultural creativity. In his own experience it meant a journey for the discovery of India in a new way, in which he looked in the Indian tradition for the germs of a humanism on which he could build a new cultural ethos embodying the spirit of modernity (Thomas, 1972).

Needless to say, the content of tradition, that is, of culture, varies according to time, context, and audience. Tradition can become a nexus around which change is rationalized and integrated. The legitimization of the new and innovational elements depends precisely on the dynamism of the old and established forms of behavior. The whole process of modernization is therefore to be viewed from a perspective of institution building which in its essentials is the building of traditions. It all depends upon just what the tradition is and how it is assessed in the innovative context.

Traditionalism as the cult of the past is indeed a barrier to all change. Traditions as the ways of the past which have been found good may be neutral or of positive

value in regard to modernization and change (Ryan, 1969: 409). Japanese ideology during the Meiji period furnished perhaps the best known instance of the uses of tradition for development. Buddhism, for example, may well prove to be a positive force for modernization in South Asia rather than the reverse.

Another study conducted by Milton Singer (1972) supports this hypothesis. Singer addresses himself to the key point first raised in a formal sense by Weber, and most recently argued by Myrdal: that is, Hinduism with its most important institution - the caste system - is incompatible with large-scale industrialization. The major reasons for this incompatibility are the supposed other worldly and passive character of Hindu theology, which creates a similar character in the Hindus, and the occupational rigidity of the caste structure, which prevents mobility.

Singer treats Weber's conclusion as a hypothesis for his study of the behavior of a group of the larger Hindu industrialists in Madras. He examines by interview and observation how these Hindu industrialists, who are clearly successful in their business activities, combine their business practices with their religion. In this analysis he finds first that Hindu social customs, which are supposedly a handicap to industrial development, in fact serve to either support the process or have no harmful consequences and second, that religion in fact morally supports the

efforts of the industrialists. (Singer, 1972) Therefore he cast doubts on the assumption that modernization is governed by the "inner logic" of an internal law of development according to which a correlated set of traditional institutions is transformed into a set of "modern" instructions (Singer, 1971).

Singer in another work alludes to Weber's thesis (ideal typical relations of the Hindu "ethic" to economic development) and its possible "distortions" under the hypothetico-deductive method in studying social change in India. Especially, if applied "as a basis for quick diagnosis of the ideological and structural factors impeding or facilitating economic development. . . ." (Singer, 1966:498), or when applied to a general analysis of the social and cultural "transformations" involved in modernization.

Limitations of the model for the study of change:

The conceptualization of the tradition-modernity contrast under the predominant assumption of the functionally interdependent system of traditional and modern society, respectively, contributes to the empirical limitations which in turn reflect the ideological distortions of modernization theory. For all the attention it has received, the conceptual apparatus of modernization theory has done remarkably little to advance our understanding of the many transformations which have been experienced by human societies.

In studying the processes of change in Third World countries, modernization theorists have traced the trivial changes in the form of social systems, rather than the changes in the structure. They have focused mostly upon variables relating to indigenous aspects of social structure and culture. By doing this, they have either underestimated or ignored many important external sources of or influence upon social change. They ignore the structural mechanisms of interventions between societies. They correctly look for Western impact in the modernization process, but they do this only in terms of its consequences for the diffusion of particular cultural attributes. They totally fail to look for significant variables such as the impact of war, conquest, colonial domination, military invasion, economic dependency, capitalist penetration and so forth.

To modernizationists what actually happened in the Third World countries does not matter. What is important to them is that most of Iranian villagers, for instance, have a transistor radio in their houses; while they ignore the question that why the villagers have them and how this happened or the processes which brought this about. The historical situation in which such changes have occurred is totally forgotten and only a superficial profile of facts has been taken. For modernizationists it is irrelevant that contact between the West and the rest of the world took the form of conquest, colonization, exploitation, massacre, and

forced labor. What is relevant to them is that as the result of such a contact, say, Iranians are having jeans and the like instead of old long garments.

★ Methodologically speaking, modernization theory has been unable to provide a satisfactory basis for systematic comparative research into the causes and consequences of patterns of variability and convergence in the formation and transformation of national societies. In general, it has been much more successful in delineating the characteristics of modern and traditional societies than it has been in depicting the process by which movement occurs from one state to the other. It focuses more on the direction of change, from "this" to "that", than on the scope, timing, methods, rate, and the most important one, nature of change.

If we assume for a moment that all its explanations are accurate, then we can assert that such descriptions are not the alpha and omega of scientific inquiry into the problem, but the beginning. The question is why these transformations occur in some societies and not others, why they appear at different rates and in different forms? One can also ask under which circumstances such processes are paralyzed or even reversed. These typologies do not provide any theoretical guidance for inquiring into determinants and constraints of modernization processes. What is needed now with some urgency is a sustained critical

evaluation of those dichotomies that condition our thinking about our world and that of underdeveloped countries.

E. Ideological Foundation of Modernization Theory

In arguing the methodological foundation of bourgeoisie economic science, Lenin wrote:

Not one professor of political economy, capable of producing the most valuable works in the field of factual, specialized investigations, can be trusted in a single word once he turns to the general theory of political economy. For this is just as much a party science in contemporary society as epistemology. (Quoted in Smelser, 1964) (*emphasis mine*).

The approach of modernization theorists to the problem of development and underdevelopment is determined primarily by their class interests as defenders of the imperialist system. Both the values and the cognitions embodied in this theory have been highly reflective of the social and historical conditions under which they have been developed.

Modernization theory was created as a response of American political intellectuals and elites to the international situation in the post-World War II period. Therefore, it can be safe to say that the idea of modernization is basically an American idea. Particularly speaking, at the time of emergence of independent Third World countries as a new party in the international political scene and in the wake of the breakdown of the European colonial empires,

European and American social scientists channeled their substantial intellectual interest and resources beyond the boundaries of their societies, into the study of the Third World societies (Schwartz, 1972; Shils, 1963; Nisbet, 1969). There were also other reasons, more directly concerned with the exercise of United States power, as Almond recognized in 1960:

Even in the absence of compelling scientific justification for broadening the scope of comparative politics, practical policy motives have forced the modern political scientist to concern himself with the whole scope of political systems which exist in the modern world. (Almond and Coleman, 1960:10)

As a by-product of this concern, the rapid expansion of research by social scientists on Third World societies emerged. This was characterized by considerable money and support of American government and private agencies that encouraged the social scientists and their graduate students to study the problems of economic development, political stability, and social and cultural change in these societies. The major focus of interest of these concerns was how to bring about changes in the underdeveloped societies, how to "develop" them. Far from being a theoretical model designed to facilitate objective investigation, the theory was an aid to the planning and legitimation of a massive intervention in the newly independent nations of the Third World (Lummis, 1976-7). Then, when it comes down to cases, modernization is not a fact, but a task:

. . . the task of nation-building in the new states is of such urgent priority for free men that we are anxious to combine scholarly analysis with a concern for programs and policy. (Pye, 1963:229)

The nature of the new modernization theory, hence seems to reflect a particular phase in the development of a single society, that of the U.S. A student of the sociology of knowledge might note that these tendencies had become prominent among American scholars in an era in which their country experienced unprecedented affluence, though uneven, at home and had taken unprecedented commitments to the status quo abroad (for purposes of expansion and remittance of profit).

In conceptualization of these theories much attention was paid to the elaboration of conceptual schemes by which the adaptation and adjustment of these societies to Western paradigms become possible. The way they approached the ~~question~~ of development and modernization was the way familiar to the intellectual traditions of Western thinking about the nature of social change (Nisbet, 1969). Although their terminology was new, their approach to study non-Western societies was deeply rooted in the conventional wisdom of Western social science. These studies were closely linked with some of the more sophisticated analytical tools and methods of research - for instance, post-Keynesian and econometric studies in economics - and with survey research, demographic and ecological researches, and analysis in sociology and political science. Above all they became

connected with some of the major theoretical developments in sociology and political science, especially with the "systemic" approach to social and political life, i.e. with the view of societies or politics as social or political systems in general, and in particular with the structural-functional approach developed by Parsons in sociology, and then taken up and further differentiated in political science by Almond (1960), Easton (1953) and others. Therefore, evolutionary theory lasted from the social Darwinism of the Nineteenth Century, and functionalism in particular was very influential in the shaping of modernization theory (Mazrui, 1968). This influence can be seen in many features of this new theory, such as: dichotomous conceptualization,¹⁹ focus on social differentiation and social

¹⁹This approach has a long-standing historical connection with a tradition that goes back to social Darwinism and beyond. This is an evolutionary tradition which conceptualizes the transformation of societies in terms of a transition between polar types. This great dichotomy of tradition and modernity had itself, of course, received its most influential original formulation in Spencer's distinctions between military and industrial society, in Maine's 1861 differentiation between status and contract, in Durkheim's mechanical (segmented) and organic (organized) societies, in Tonnies contrast between *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* in 1887, in Morgan's *Societas* and *civitas*, in Levi-Bruhl's pre-logical and logical, Cooley's primary and secondary groups, in Sorokin and Zimmerman's Rural and Urban areas, in Becker's Sacred and Secular, in Redfield's Folk and Urban Society, and in Weber's discussion of traditional and rational source of authority. The influence of these dichotomies can be seen in the neo-evolutionary and structural-functionalist theories of the mid-20th century, to which such leading theorists as Lerner, Levy, and Eisenstadt made leading contributions (Tipps, 1973:201). Giddens (1976) extensively describes the philosophical history and theoretical assumptions of these kinds of modernization theories and calls their conceptual relations the theory of industrial society.

system, emphasis upon the adaptation and adjustment processes, regarding stability as the most important aspect of the social system, directional process of change towards the Western model, value orientation.

The most striking fact in these theories is their ethnocentric world view. In this regard, the theory represents a more or less subtle return to the Western ethnocentrism characterizing early descriptions of social evolution. Lerner offers this view with the greatest candor:

What America is - to condense a rule more powerful than its numerous exceptions - the modernizing Middle East seeks to become. The meaning of public power and wealth for private comfort and fun is being learned. Those who regard this as ethnocentrism should try an exercise in self-analysis: Compare your own life with that of any Middle Easterner you ever knew. . . no advocate of Middle Eastern felicity can properly oppose the quest for things they lack because, in his opinion, Americans have too much of these same things for their own good (Lerner, 1966:79).

As Mazrui has mentioned, it was not clear that where the biological Darwinism ended and social Darwinism began during the heyday of racial theories (Ibid). But in the modern theories of modernization, one clearly see that Darwinism had been debiologized. To explain stages of development, the ethnocentric cultural pride is invoked, instead of racial bigotry (Tipps, 1973). The blatant ethnocentric trends of the European historians caused them to call the underdeveloped people of Africa and Asia "barbar", "uncivilized", "savage", "primitive. . .". To respond to the rise of new consciousness in the people of the Third World

they have tried to change their terminology. Therefore, to neutralize their language, they speak of "modernity" rather than "civilization", "tradition" instead of "barbarism". They continue to evaluate the progress of the Third World societies in a way that their forebears did in the 19th century. The only criteria in this evaluation is Western, in particular Anglo-American, societies. As Nisbet writes:

The comparative method, as we find it in the nineteenth century social evolutionists, and to a considerable degree at the present time, is hardly more than a shoring-up of the idea of progressive development generally and, more particularly, of the belief that the recent history of the West could be taken as evidence of the direction which mankind as a whole would move, following from this, should move. (Nisbet, 1969:190-1)

According to Nisbet, the approach of contemporary sociological theories is heavily dominated by the conventional Western thought from which views history as something closed and determined and risk reifying such ideas as stages of growth and development or classifications of phenomena. This perspective is rooted in what he calls "the organismic metaphor" which causes theories to confuse logical necessity with historical causality. Nisbet demonstrates the purely "Procrustean effects" of this metaphor operating in the functionalist works such as those of Parsons, Smelser, and Levy.

The theoretical constructions of modernization theorists in the Western World have a double purpose. On

the one hand, modernizationists' prescriptions for development are more acceptable when delivered in such an "envelope" to the economists, policy-makers, and rulers of the young sovereign states, many of whom were brought up on bourgeoisie economic science, than are assertions that the division of the world into oppressing and oppressed nations will endure forever. On the other hand, their method of approaching the problem provides great opportunities for propogating the ideas that the capitalist system is permanent and that it is essential for the underdeveloped countries to take the private capitalist path of development. Marx said of bourgeois political economy that "it regards the capitalist system not as a historically transient stage of development, but on the contrary, as the absolute and final form of social production. . ." (quoted in Smelser, 1964).

Summary of chapter:

The structural/technological theories of modernization are naturalistic and deterministic. They misuse the typological distinction Weber made between "traditional" and "rational". Weber never intended to make a chronological distinction. The concept of rational is used very vaguely. The question of "actors" does not appear in any analyses of this school. Society in this view is not made up of concrete groups, e.g., social classes, but of roles and institutions. The process of development, thus, becomes a

matter of proliferation of roles and institutional differentiation. Therefore, the question of who profits or loses from development is lost. Societies are conceived as autonomous units which change according to internal forces.

The external sources of or influence upon social change is entirely ignored. These theories fail to account for significant variables such as the impact of war, conquest, colonial domination, economic dependency and so forth.

Generally, a fundamental weakness of this approach lies in its isolation and segmentation of socio-historical variables resulting in a failure to comprehend the totality of the process of development.

Social psychological theory of modernization is subject to the logical criticism of reductionism. Focusing on individuals rather than structures or on the total system and its linkages with other systems, introduces a psychological reductionism. To the extent that there is dependence on certain kinds of psychological data, the overriding importance of institutionalized political-economic relations and the exercise of power over the appropriations, allocation and distribution of resources is overlooked. This group of theorists have too readily assumed the relationship between people's values and attitudes and the social and economic development. It is not possible to make any logical predictions about one's economic action on the basis of one's psychological characteristics. In the Third World nations today a modernizing psychology does not surface unless large

structural events are in progress or have already occurred. This school of thought has an inherent tendency to develop into the fallacy of normative determinism which tends to underplay the historical reality of the phenomenon of underdevelopment.

Stage theory of economic development is basically a form of technological determinism with an ethnocentric accent. The theory is not based on analysis of the internal dynamics of economic growth, but often seizes on contingent or superficial events which usually go along with economic growth. It does not concern itself with qualitative criteria for social change. The stages proposed are at once too general and too specific. The theory proves to be little more than an exercise in "comparative statics".

The dichotomy "tradition-modernity" has been identified with that of "underdevelopment-development" and has been employed to differentiate not only Western European societies in time, but also industrialized versus non-industrialized societies in space. This chapter has been concerned itself with this conceptual status of the substantive component of modernization theory, i.e., the ideal-typical dichotomization of tradition and modernity. The essential point is simply that what are in fact empirical generalizations or concepts of limited applicability ("historical individuals" in Weber's word) have assumed the status of generalizing ideal-types, with certain consequences

both for the characterization of "destination" and for the analysis of types of social change, or lack of change, in the underdeveloped countries which fail to conform to the model.

Modernization theory, in its concern for what is, has found it difficult to make systematic use of what has been, i.e., with history. Actual content of almost all the studies of modernization theorists is ahistorical in character. The nature of the relationships between the developed and underdeveloped countries has been ignored in these studies. Modernization theory has utterly failed to grapple with the outstanding feature of the past, i.e., the emergence of a world system of social relations. The alternative outlined in this work confronts modernization theory with the question of the historical context in which the impact of a modernizing force on indigenous so-called "traditional" societies is first located and this is in large measure the context of colonialism. The current "underdevelopment" of much of the world today is the outcome of a long historical process of global development.

Finally, it was argued that development - as aspiration, ideology, and field of study - became an issue of urgent priority for American social scientists following the end of the Second World War in the context of internal events in the colonial countries and the economic and political realities of a changing international situation. Far from

being a theoretical model, the theory was an aid to the planning and legitimation of massive intervention in the newly independent countries of the Third World.

CHAPTER IV

SOURCES AND TYPES OF MODERNIZATION

Modernization from within or without:

For analytical purposes, it is useful to distinguish different kinds of historically based modernization processes. First, a distinction can be made based on whether modernization is developed from within the society through the operation of forces native to it or whether modernization comes to a society from without (Kautsky, 1972). Needless to say, many cases of modernization will contain elements of both of these processes, but one is likely to preponderate over the other. In fact, there are few, if any, societies in whose modernization foreign influence was wholly absent and, on the other hand, few, if any, where some impulse for modernization did not originate with native sources.

Drawing an ideally sharp distinction, one can say that "modernization from within" a society grows gradually and, in a sense, organically and is brought about by natives of the society. This is sometimes called "managerial modernization". Modernization from within is the result of a purposeful, planned governmental activity, which aims

at uplifting the economy and the culture to the level considered to be modern. "Modernization from without", on the other hand, involves a rather sudden break with the hitherto traditional past and can be brought to a society either by foreigners or by some of its own natives or by both. Modernization from without could occur either as a consequence of the industrialization of a country or as the consequence of a confrontation between two societies. To use the modernizationists' language, this confrontation is between the more developed or somewhat developed societies and cultures and the less developed ones. Modernization which is based on confrontation of two cultures, sometimes takes the form of "acculturative modernization" (Chodak, 1973), to be discussed later. The ideas, processes, and material elements that initiate modernization are of native origins in the case of modernization from within and of foreign origins in the case of modernization from without (Kautsky, 1972).

Modernization from above, middle, and below:

By looking at modernization processes in this way, what we are really doing is looking at history horizontally. But we should make our analysis more dialectical by looking at the phenomena at hand, at the same time, vertically. We could have another profile of history and see the carriers and barriers of modernization. Modernization could be carried by different social groups and classes in

society. Therefore, we would have modernization from above, middle, and below. This division of the forms of modernization is based on logical differentiation. In practice, the elements of all kinds of modernizations either from within or without, or from below, middle, and above, dialectically intermingle and sometimes even stem from one another. What is posed here is not a definitive and all inclusive model which can be applied in any specific case. This hypothetical model is mainly based on the experience of some of the Third World countries such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, Egypt, and so forth. The usefulness of the model is in its ability to specify the sources of social change. It mainly shows that whether change is coming from above or below. Specification of the content and quality of each one of these levels is a matter of empirical investigation and analysis in every specific case. For instance, the experience of class-based socio-political movements of Iran in the past half century, and the current revolutionary ideologies expounded by the Iranian intellectual left, in addition to the experiences of other underdeveloped societies make it possible to construct the hypothetical routes for ascertaining the historically feasible paths toward modernization of the Iranian society. In case of Iran, modernization from above can be possible under the three forces: a) patrimonialism and imperialism, b) dominant class leadership, c) military leadership. Therefore the application of this model calls for a specification

of each level and its categories in specific case under the study.

"Modernization from above" is a kind that is internally set up by the ruling class or in some cases the kings or emperors, or externally by the foreign governments or their influenced and dependent bourgeois classes. Modernization of such a kind can be found in most of the Third World countries, such as Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, South Korea, Thailand, Brazil, Chile, Puerto Rico, and so on. This kind of modernization is usually taken as equivalent for "place revolution".

In many Third World nations modernization is sometimes a response to the external pressures of imperialism and challenges, of internal forces. For instance, in Iran modernization from above has been a response of patrimonial authority to the pressures of United States and challenges of people and opposite forces from within the country.

Modernization from above is only successful in promoting an uneven growth in different parts of society and economy. It stresses non-human resources and the importance of technical innovation in developmental strategy. However, it may bring greater technical efficiency and raise production, it will not reduce, but probably enhance, the economic, political and social resources of the few who own the means of production at the expense of the many who work with their arms and do not own the means of

their work.²⁰ The economic growth and social mobilization do not necessarily lead to development. The very example of this can be seen in modernization of Iran which is a modernization from above and can be called "petroleum modernization". This is why, despite all material gains and the rapid economic growth, an integrated social, political and economic development has yet to be achieved in Iran.

"Modernization from middle" is initiated mainly by the national bourgeoisie and middle classes. Historically, modernization of European countries have been of this sort. "Modernization from below" is a grassroot modernization which is originated from the masses in the lower classes in the bottom of the pyramid of society. Historically, this kind of modernization is known as the "proletarian revolution."²¹ Modernization from below is usually characterized as the "modernization from without". This is the truest kind of modernization which leads to the liberation of the masses and transcendence of culture of society and rise of industry

²⁰For instance in the case of agriculture, increased mechanization of agriculture eliminates the need for manual labor and, consequently decreases jobs in the rural sector, resulting in the redundancy of the rural laborer. Given the very limited absorption ability of the industrialization process, the rural unemployed usually become the penny vendors and slum dwellers who increasingly are found in and around all the major metropolitan areas of Asia.

²¹I have equated the term "revolution" with "modernization". By doing this, I have been pointing to the loose and sketchy use of these terms in modernization literature. I do not think that the two are identical phenomena.

thoroughly. Modernization of China and Soviet Union can be seen as the example of this sort of modernization.

Modernization and liberation:

In the light of the previous discussion, it might be said that the process of modernization culminates in the struggle for national liberation, which the African nations use as a means to broaden and deepen it. The struggle for independence was, on the one hand, one of the new, worldwide-overlapping revolutions; on the other hand, it was an era of transition to a wide new period of modernization organized by the African governments themselves. The removal of social relations of domination created more social and political space, new opportunities, increased options, and more power for the masses of the people - all of which together should constitute the social and political bases for modernization and development. Modernization to these people meant a struggle for emancipation, a struggle for land, and the continuing struggle for economic and political independence. This spontaneous drive to fight against misery and economic backwardness and for independence was born during colonial rule. In other words, colonialists sowed the seeds of their own destruction (Peshkin & Cohen, 1967). As Marx put it in case of India ". . . whatever may have been the crimes of England, she was the unconscious tool of history in bringing about the

revolution" (Marx, 1953).²² This drive is now being transformed in the independent states into a conscious and planned effort toward growth and development (Chodak, 1973). In the colonial situation the condition of domination, by the violence with which it initially immobilized the colonized, set in motion processes of change which tend to bring about its own demise: "that violence," says Fanon, "which has ruled over the ordering of the colonial world, which has ceaselessly drummed the rhythm for the destruction of native social forms and broken up without reserve the systems of reference of the economy, the customs of dress and external life, that same violence will be claimed and taken over by

²²In the terms of the current literature on modernization Marx credits England in India for bringing about what Geertz (1963b):105-157) would call "the integrative revolution" and what Organski (1965) calls the first and second stages of political development.

It is also important to mention here that according to Marx, non-European societies; if left to themselves, do not have the means - or the institutional urge - to change and modernize. Since Marx's vision of a socialist order of society is predicted upon a prior universalization of capitalism (Marx & Engels, 1965:75-76), the phenomenon of European colonial expansion assumes a further dimension in Marx's thought: while European overseas expansion is caused by the intrinsic necessities of capitalist market economy striving towards universalization, it also becomes a precondition for the achievement of a socialist transformation of society. Like capitalism, colonialism is a dialectical necessity which has to be overcome. Thus Marx welcomes European penetration of Asian society in direct ratio to its intensity, though he naturally criticizes the venality of its motives. Similarly, Engels welcomes the French conquest of Algeria and American expansion at Mexican expense (Avineri, 1969b). Some Marxist writers have viewed such judgments as "a setback from which Marxism has not yet fully recovered." (Horace, 1965)

the native at the moment when, deciding to embody history in his own person, he surges into forbidden quarters".

(Fanon, 1963:40) In its crude state, it takes the form of a compelling need to replace "a certain species of men by another species of men," which inhabits the consciousness and lives of the men and women who have been colonized. This need was urgent and compelling, and marked by the violence of colonization. Consequently, whether it took the form of slave rebellions, independence movements, or struggles for national liberation, decolonization as a process of modernization and liberation was always a violent process. As Fanon says:

It is the meeting of two forces, opposed to each other by their very nature, which in fact owe their originality to that sort of substantification which results from and is nourished by the situation in the colonies. . . . Decolonization never takes place unnoticed, for it influences individuals and modifies them fundamentally. It transforms spectators crushed with their inessentiality into privileged actors with the grandiose glare of history's floodlights upon them. It brings a natural rhythm into existence, introduced by new men, and with it a new language and a new humanity. Decolonization is the veritable creation of new men. But this creation owes nothing of its legitimacy to any supernatural power; the 'thing' which has been colonized becomes man during the same process by which it frees itself. (Ibid:36-37)

By including Africa in their spheres of influence and commercial activity, the colonial powers infected Africa with the germ of European modernization. The colonial powers themselves sowed the seeds of modernizing in Africa, Asia and the Middle East by transferring to those

areas all the structural paraphernalia of a modernization commercial city. At the same time, however, the colonial system and all the implications which resulted from it precluded the possibility of modernizing Africa in a comprehensive and thorough way. In order to rule Africa, the colonialists and the colonial administrations had to change her. The way this was done could be heard from Marx:

The introduction of railroads into India - an experiment which was going on successfully, and which, contrary to expectation, was eagerly availed of by the Hindus population - would, it was suggested, afford facilities for the establishment of such colonies and means of communication between them hitherto unknown. Nor would they be of benefit merely from a military point of view. These colonies would naturally become the sites of churches, schools, and libraries, whence the knowledge of the English language and the ideas of European civilization might be diffused among the nations. (Marx, 1958)

It was in colonialists' interest, however, to see to it that modernization affected only a small part of the population, and only superficially at that. Western education for instance, was not a humanitarian gift. The colonial powers knew that the introduction of western education was vital to the exploitation of Africa and Africans. Without this education there certainly would not have been clerks and technicians to execute those essential tasks in the government and commerce, particularly those the white people could not carry out themselves. Colonialism was dependent on modernization, but too much modernization was considered dangerous and undesirable. A certain amount of

technical training was essential to provide cheap semi-skilled labor, but it could not be allowed to continue beyond a given standard or the African would soon be competing with whites. The educational system introduced to Africa, was not designed to give African people confidence and pride of their culture, but one which sought to instill a sense of deference towards all that was European and capitalist. It was a system to inject Africans with fear, inferiority complexes, trepidation, servility, despair, and abasement. As Fanon emphasizes, the brainwash and mental disorders are the most inauspicious things which the colonists left in their colonies (Fanon, 1963). This is why Fanon says that African people have recently come to know themselves, i.e. they had lost their cultural identification during colonial periods (Fanon, 1967).

Different colonial authorities adopted different policies in the pursuit of their objectives. The French colonial policy was based on three fundamental goals: assimilation, association, and paternalism. The Portuguese colonial policy was similar. So was the British colonial policy, although it was based on a system of indirect rule, such as the case of Iran. To respond to the needs of Third World countries, which were under one form of colonial rule or another, for independence, colonial powers changed their position of domination in form. The new form of domination, though in essence with the same old concept, was neo-colonialism. In the new form of relationships,

neocolonialism, African countries were given formal independence. In some of these countries at the present time, a structural dynamism of industrialization is being carried out which brings about the question of "dependent development," as Cardoso phrased it (Cardoso, 1972).

Acculturative modernization:

The question of "truncated modernization," or "dependent development" at another level, brings us to the question of "acculturative modernization" which develops as a process of selective transplanting of particular elements from other cultures into the Third World countries and subsequently incorporating them into the traditional, homogenous cultural setting. Such a modernization emerges from a confrontation between two diametrically different cultures. This process does not lead to the replacement of the old institutions or produce of the new ones; occasionally the process enriches the traditional culture with new, heterogenous elements, but very often it leads to its impoverishment, deformation, and in some instances, to all kinds of cultural and social abnormalities. The superimposition of the foreign culture on the traditional culture creates a new quiescent-developmental, buffer culture, belonging neither to the traditional native culture nor to the foreign culture alone. It promotes a duality of norms, patterns of behavior, attitudes, and structural affiliations. In a nutshell, it creates "Westism", in the words

of Al Ahmad.* A whole world of syncretic phenomena is generated by the buffer culture: new language, religions, and social and cultural institutions appear within it (Chodak, 1973). Iran can serve as a good example of this phenomenon at present time.

This type of modernization began by colonial systems, and is carried out at the present time. It is more a seduction than an introduction to modernization. In such a process of modernization native people are in the fringe of it, and they contribute to it with their blood and sweat. Natives become a superior inferior people, between cultures. Actually, acculturative modernization is a process of alienation. The African, or Asian and Latin American is alienated from his/her society and transformed into a superior inferior. He/she is told, and is being told,

*This word is an idiomatic word coined about 25 years ago in Iran, referring to blind and wholehearted imitation of Western behaviors, morals, values, beliefs, etc. There is a great deal of literature about this concept which was started by the late Jalal Al Ahmad, one of the best contemporary social critics in Iran. Westism, according to Al Ahmad, is a kind of disease which was caused by the West through the process of westernization. It is like a termite which undermines the indigenous culture in order to destroy it for the benefit of the West. Westism has been an assimilation process by which West penetrated into all aspects of the life of people of underdeveloped countries in order to prepare their people, epistemologically, for a "take-off" towards neo-colonialism or a new kind of "slavery" (using the word in an unconventional sense).

Al Ahmad with his book, Westism, started an influential intellectual wave of anti-Westism. Needless to say, anti-Westism is not a negation of technology and modernization. It is comprehension of the indigenous culture and its promotion. If the West should be a model, its application needs more reflection, i.e., it should not be accepted wholeheartedly.

that since he/she has acquired some Western habits he/she has become superior; at the same time, however, the Western colonizer treats him/her as an inferior. In the case of Africans, Fanon has called these people men/women with a black skin and white mask (Fanon, 1967).

Lopsided modernization:

Various research efforts have examined systemic interaction among societal sectors during modernization process (Simpson, 1964; Lerner, 1964). Apparently, while modernization can be viewed as comprising a set of related changes among institutional sectors and the sectors can be viewed as interconnected and mutually dependent, the relationships do not pattern consistently or in a rigid one-to-one manner. Nor do intercorrelations found among sector's development force the conclusion that modernization occurs evenly throughout society. Research seems to suggest that, because of various institutional sensitivities, degrees of primary and autonomy, forces of resistance, and planning exigencies not all societal sectors modernize at similar rate, at the same time, or in the same sequence. The "lags" and "gaps" thus are created in different institutional spheres. Current speculation is that numerous, and often severe, imbalances occur and that unevenness is closely related to the problems of societal order and disorder. (Sofranko and Bealer, 1973)

The process of modernization in European societies on the whole has been more or less comprehensive, although

it did not advance evenly in all spheres of life. In the Third World countries, and especially in Africa, modernization is not comprehensive. It very strongly affects some spheres of life, some institutions and geographical areas, while other areas undergo modernization very slowly. Uneven modernization has been documented extensively.

Hunter indicates that in many underdeveloped countries, Africa in particular, present levels of development have been achieved mainly in the educational and social sectors (Hunter, 1962). Smelser on the other hand, acknowledges uneven political development, "Many African societies. . . have moved much faster into the modern age in the political sphere (with universal suffrage, parliaments and administrative bureaucracies), than in the economic sphere."

(Lipset and Smelser, 1966) Horowitz notes the imbalances between political and economic development in Latin America where "coalescences of political maturity and economic development are unusual," (Horowitz, 1972:357), and where educational levels have risen without concomitant development of the economic sector. Similarly, Heilbroner and Lerner both document instances of "lopsided development" and anomalous surpluses of trained manpower (Heilbroner, 1963; Lerner, 1966). This is one of the sources of problems of developing countries in improving their political or educational sector. A good example of this problem is education. Undoubtedly, a literate population is an integral part of development. But some developing nations

have expanded their educational systems too rapidly, while the other sectors of their society are still lagging behind. This results in a double problem. On the one hand, they are forced to support an expansive system at a time when capital is desperately needed for economic expansion. And on the other hand, the populace is achieving an education, for which there is little use; the economic opportunities do not match the available educated population.

Another example of this problem can be seen in political sphere. Uneven process of modernization, as undertaken for instance in Iran and Saudi Arabia, are politically destabilizing, two important explanations of which are termed "relative deprivation" and "lead-lag." The former explanation maintains that uneven modernization causes people's expectations to rise, usually relatively more than can be fulfilled by actual achievement. This gap, between expectations and achievements, is perceived by the people as a state of relative deprivation, which leads to discontent and to political instability. The later explanation holds that the modernization of political institutions lags behind that of social and economic institutions, which results in a political system which is unable to respond adequately to new demands placed upon it by its people, demands spawned by the process of modernization. It is this lag which is then politically destabilizing.

Summary of chapter:

Looking at history horizontally, two kinds of modernization can be distinguished: a) from within the society through the operation of forces native to it and, b) from without. Hypothetically, by looking at history vertically, we can distinguish three sources of change and modernization: a) Modernization from above which is set up by the ruling classes (Iran), b) from middle which is carried by the national bourgeoisie and middle classes (European societies), c) from below which is originated from and initiated by the masses in the lower classes of a society (China). Needless to say, all these forms are dialectically interrelated and they should not be looked at in isolation from the dynamism of the whole.

The process of modernization may lead to the struggle for national liberation, which the African nations use as a means to broaden and deepen it. Modernization to these people meant a struggle for emancipation, economic and political independence. Such a drive was born during colonial rule, since colonialism was dependent on a truncated modernization which provided them with cheap semi-skilled labor. "Truncated modernization" and "dependent development" are consequences of "acculturative modernization" which develops as a process of selective transplanting of particular elements from other cultures into the Third World countries. Such a process leads the traditional society to

its impoverishment, deformation, and other kinds of cultural and social abnormalities. Thus, it is really a process of alienation, not modernization.

Modernization as an institutional process does not occur throughout society in an even manner. Because of various institutional sensitivities, degrees of primary and autonomy, forces of resistance, and planning exigencies not all societal sectors modernize at a similar rate, at the same time, or in the same sequence. This kind of modernization is called "lopsided modernization" which is sometimes one of the sources of the problem of institutional imbalances in underdeveloped countries.

CHAPTER V

MODERNIZATION, RATIONALIZATION, AND WESTERNIZATION

A. "Modernization" and "Westernization"

The relation of modernization to "Westernization" is one of the most important questions which bears more scrutiny. "Westernization" or "Europeanization" are the other equivalent for the modernization used by the Western biased theorists of modernization. It was within the past generation that modernity had come to be rather widely employed to describe the characteristics common to countries that are technologically more advanced. Defining the term with a Western bias, Eisenstadt writes:

Historically, modernization is the process of change towards those types of social, economic, and political systems that have developed in Western Europe and North America from the seventeenth century to the nineteenth and have then spread to other European countries and in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to the South America, Asia, and African continents. (Eisenstadt, 1966:1)

To see the practical implication of this theoretical tendency, we can look back to the colonial situation. In the words of Myron Weiner:

Until recently, French colonialists in West Africa have used the term évolué to describe the native who had proceeded from "savagery"

to "civilization". The French spoke of the "subjects" as children, who must move through stages of social development until they could become citoyen. The origins, the stages of development and the end-product were precise. To be an évolué, one had to be literate, speak French, dress in European fashion, and in general behave in the manner prescribed by French culture. The test of having achieved modern civilization was thus a particular style of life. And to be modern was, by definition, to be French. (Weiner, 1965:102) (Emphasis mine)

It is a facile fallacy that "modernization" and "westernization" are taken to be the same. As far as the Third World countries are concerned, such a modernization is a disease for them, not modernity in terms of progress. This kind of modernization, if practiced eventuates in practical recipes of imitation. This kind of "modernity" is the export of colonialist to the Third World countries. It was the worldwide expansion of capitalist influence that diffused this "modernity" to other cultures to undermine them. If we see that modernization in much of the world today presents itself as a process of westernization, it is not because what is "western" is "modern". It is so because it is a process of not only social change, but of cultural, political and economical imposition. Western culture, like a western location, does not make a society necessarily modernized from within.

How can we say that "modern" means "western?" The one thing which modernization theorists have not produced is a model of Western society which could be compared with, or even contrasted with, the model of modern society. Implicitly, the two are assumed to be virtually identical.

Modern society has been Western society writ abstractly and polysyllabically. Historically, such an identification leads one to assume the age-old technical superiority of Western civilization, an assumption belied by the fact that as recently as the late 16th century the economy, political organization, science and technology of China and Islamdon were just as highly developed as those of Western Europe (Levine, 1968).

A Western sociologist going to a Third World country is quite liable to be struck most forcibly by those things that he does not find there. "Modern" to such a person is which he is familiar at home, i.e. "western." What he sees, even if they are new and modern for the native people there, do not match with his western pattern. Hence, modernization is no longer seen as a process of internal societal growth, as part of, and the result of, historical processes of social change, but is itself the change agent. In other words, among other things, modernization in these nations is not conceptualized as growing out of contradictions or strains internal to their societies, but as externally induced activities to relieve poverty and to bring about institutional change. Modernization is not an external force. As Marx warns, one has to be careful about historical and socioeconomic analysis of every particular society and not metamorphose the "historical sketch of the growth of capitalism in Western Europe into an historico-philosophical

theory of the general path every people are fated to tread, whatever the historical circumstances in which it finds itself." (Quoted in Avineri, 1969b:173) In a letter to the editorial board of Otechestvenniye Zapiski (Nov. 1877), discussing the chances for modernization in Russia, he writes:

Thus events strikingly analogous but taking place in different historical circumstances lead to totally different results. By studying each of these forms of evolution separately and then comparing them one can easily find the clue to this phenomenon. But one will never arrive there by using as one's master a general historico-philosophical theory, the supreme virtue of which consists in being super-historical. (Ibid)²³

Thus, modernization is a force which can be and should be created from within each society. Every society experiences modernization in terms of its own unique history and culture, and the range of parameters of choice varies from society to society. Many of the Third World countries do have such a modernizing force within their own social structure, which do produce new forms of social institutions and structures. But those forms are of different kinds which do not have to necessarily be Western.

It does not occur to modernizationists that the "goal" of development may not be "modernity" (as modernization

²³Consequently Marx saw capitalism as the possible, yet by no means necessary, next step in Russian historical development. It should be noted that Marx's position on the question of modernization of non-European societies is ambivalent.

theorists have provided) but rather an "open" society in which individuals may choose their own developmental patterns. These societies can modernize themselves continuously without borrowing from the West. This is exactly the question of values. Whose values are to be adopted? Myrdal, Rostow, Eisenstadt et al., would answer West. This exactly shows their ethnocentric bent. Such a view presupposes that the highest of modern institutions should inevitably be those that have devised in the West. Edward Shils seems to have been expressing as much his own view of the matter as that of some members of the Afro-Asian elite, when he writes: "Modern means being Western without the onus of dependence on the West." (Shils, 1965:10) (The same thing was echoed during the Mashroteh period by Taghi Zadeh, one of the intellectuals of the time in Iran). Such an attempt to universalize historically specific values and institutions deriving from Western societies not only is not scientific, but also leads to distortion of social and historical facts.²⁴

Third World countries should not just copy the West in their transformations, and cannot even find the meaning of content of modernization by simply inquiring from the

²⁴Ryan puts this very neatly when he writes: The salesman of the United States model seem frequently to cling to the ethnocentric view that "What is good for Uncle Sam is good for you"--a proposition widely disputed both as a basis for political alignment and for economic growth as well. (Ryan, 1969:414)

West. They will have to design their own conceptions of development and to base their development planning on self-reliance rather than on dependence on foreign assistance. They should follow the goals of development in the sense of economic growth and an equitable distribution of its benefits, in terms of better health, better housing, better education and so forth. At the same time, they should reject the notion that these development goals necessitate the modernization of the entire society in the sense of adopting Western-derived institutions. Both development and modernization are to be subject to controls based on deliberately chosen values in each country. I do not mean that there is nothing to learn from the West - that would be absurd. What I mean is that they should find for themselves, instead of the alien and initiative Western basis, some ideological *raison d'etre* and dynamic, attuned to the culture and aspirations of their own populace. Furthermore if most of Third World nations reject "Westernization," it is a rejection of dependency, not a rejection of the material achievements attainable through emulation of the West.²⁵

²⁵However, it is misleading to speak of the West as if it were a homogeneous model upon which the new nations might plan their own transitions. It is true that all modern nations have a great deal in common, but there are notable divergences among them, especially in the routes and methods toward achieving modernity (Ryan, 1969).

Modernity is not something to adopt, but something to participate in; not to have, but to do and to be. And not even to be, but to keep becoming - a process, a dynamic. To be modern does not mean to live in one particular kind of environment rather than another. It means to live in the environment that one's society has deliberately chosen to construct; and to do so rationally and self consciously. Furthermore, it lies not in what one chooses but in the fact of being able to choose. The question is "that of the parameters of choice, that is, to determine when modernity can be manipulated and when it cannot, and thus what chances may be assigned to specific alternatives". (Berger et al., 1973:20) (emphasis original).

The process of modernization in Third World countries, is that process by which these countries become conscious of themselves and of their processes, and of the kind of country that it is possible for them to become, and by which they find or construct the technical means for executing such choices as they consciously make. If there is one fundamental truth regarding the Third World countries beginning their thrust toward modernization, it is that with few exceptions they do not wish to become Westernized. As Ralph Turner pointed out, "the Chinese intend to remain Chinese, the Indians, Indian, and the Moslems, Moslem." (Quoted in Ryan, 1969:413). And it is in this connection, for instance, that in Iran Majid Rahnema is interested to

promote indigenous development stemming from the traditions of rural areas, not imported from without; and Seyyed Hossein Nasr and Ehsan Naraghi stress the need for cultural authenticity and want to protect Iranian culture in all its forms from the onslaught of Charlie's Angels, the omnipotence of technology represented by the Six Million Dollar Man, as well as Western patterns of consumption.

B. Modernization and Rationalization

The concept of rationalization in this work is understood as proposed by Max Weber (1958b) who utilized it as a methodological tool to plot the dominant theme of modern social history, patterns of thought, culture, and art in the West. This "rationalization," as Weber saw it, has been an historical process in Western society. When Weber pointed to the uniqueness of Western culture, he believed the cause to be in the influence of its unique rationality with a number of absolutely distinctive traits such as science, the rational state, rationalized music, a rational economy, and its progressive intellectualization of life in the disenchanted world. Weber showed that rational action within a system of rational legal authority is at the heart of the modern rationalized economy, that is, of the capitalist system. By "rationalization" Weber meant the process by which explicit, abstract, intellectually calculable rules and procedures are increasingly substituted for sentiment,

tradition, and rule of thumb in all spheres of activity. Rationalization leads to the displacement of religion by specialized science as the major source of intellectual authority; the substitution of the trained expert for the cultivated man/woman of letters, the ousting of the skilled handworker by machine technology; the replacement of traditional judicial wisdom by abstract, systematic, statutory codes. Rationalization demystifies and instrumentalizes life. "It means that. . . there are no mysterious incalculable forces that come into play, but rather that one can in principle, master all things by calculation. 'This means that the world is disenchanted'".(Weber, 1958b:139)

But we have to remember, Weber was far from attempting "to make Western rationality the basis of a world view." (Freund, 1969:145) He never intended to postulate the process of rationalization as "an almost universal process" as was done for instance, by Barrett Berger (1971). He saw in rationalization a unique historical process of Western society and looked for its universal significance and value. In understanding this crucial fact in Weber, Parsons made this mistake which was followed by modernization theorists. This unique rationality was taken as a "universal law." (Parsons 1937:752; B. Berger 1971; Myrdal, 1970) In the search for "functional equivalents," contemporary modernization theorists turned Weber's historically specific question into a general issue of development.

To Myrdal, it is a fact that the modernization ideals are relatively much more fully realized in the Western developed countries than in the underdeveloped countries. Then, if the purpose is development, the modernization ideals which should be chosen as value premises are Western, because they are rational. He writes:

That they (modernization ideals as value premises) are more fully realized in the Western countries corresponds to the fact that those countries are also more developed. When the underdeveloped countries have actually chosen these ideals as development goals for themselves, they have done it because they are seen to be rational for development, not because they are Western. (Myrdal, 1970:240) (Emphasis original)

On the contrary, for Weber the phenomenon was one which he was content to note as a fact of history and which occasioned his surprise; but he was careful to avoid giving it any prophetic significance whatsoever. He saw it as a factor of progressive differentiation, without equating progressiveness with improvement. In other words, he did not regard it as progress in the axiological sense of the term. He saw the Western rationality as a fact, but he did not seek to legitimize it or to justify it as an advantage.

The kind of rationality which is proposed here as the key element of modernization, is defined by Weber in one place, as "the methodical attainment of a definitely given and practical end by means of an increasingly precise calculation of adequate means." (1958b:293) To draw upon this, as Schwartz does, we can define modernization, in one

sense, in terms of the expansion of man/woman's rational control over his/her physical and social environment.

(Schwartz, 1972:76) In this sense the process of modernization is a progressive increase of the width, scope, and extent of the areas of conscious, rational behavior.

Modernization theorists in their use of the term rationality develop the concept of "functional rationality" rather than that of "substantial rationality." Functional refers to the operation of the best possible means for the attainment of specified goals. This is often characterized by the elimination of traditional norms in favor of strictly scientific criteria, by the division of functions and roles, and by their specialized development. Substantial rationality, on the other hand, suggests the rational development of the total human person and the total human society in terms of the totality of their needs, rational and nonrational. It is true that modernization as happened in the Western hemisphere, imposed functional rationality on ever-increasing sectors of social life. Historically, such a rationalization in the West can be identified as the development of the capitalist system. Weber himself was ambivalent in his attitudes towards the major trends he discerned at his time (Weber, 1958b:128) He witnessed that the technique and social structures created by and originally expressing man/woman's rationality and mastery of his/her environment become self-maintaining processes no longer dependent on the rationality that created them but actually

stunting and constricting the rational capacities of the people they dominate. As Karl Mannheim later put it, the "functional rationality" of the capitalist system expropriated the "substantive rationality" of the individual. Science and technology have provided rationalization for the submission of man/woman to the technical apparatus and have legitimized a form of bureaucratic domination. Functional rationality, in the sense of a social system founded on purposive-rational action and scientification of politics is part of political domination including repression and unfreedom that demonstrate to the people the technical impossibility of determining their own life. Therefore, functional rationality is not a sufficient condition for substantial rationality including emancipation.

But whatever may be the mythically grounded legitimations of such a faith as rationality of Western society, why do the modernization theorists impose such a rationality on the Third World nations? Why do they want to impose the values of such a decadent civilization, which is locked up into its own "iron cage" (Weber, 1958a:182), and is incapable of solving the problems it has created for itself (Cesaire, 1972:9), on the people who have their own rationality? How can Western people who are not totally rational beings in their economic and social behavior, even in their own environment and cultural setting, validly ascribe rationality or nonrationality to the thinking and behavior of others when they themselves are culture bound? How do

they define the Western values rational and nonWestern as irrational?

Perhaps, the answer to these questions should be found in the expansionist nature of the capitalist system and ethnocentric knowledge enterprise, in which Western European standards of rationality and reason have been invoked to judge the thinking and behavior of people in other cultural contexts. It is in this framework that an assertion of Bellah seems important. He suggests that the pathologies that have been associated with modernization have been the result of "an increased effectiveness in goal-attainment with no increase in the rationalization of the goal-setting process" (Bellah, 1965:195). In other words, modernization theorists have been concerned with functional rationalization in the modernization process rather than substantial rationality. One of the reasons for such an emphasis is reversion of neo-evolutionists to Spencerian ethnocentrism. And it is from this approach that modernization theorists draw their assumptions.

Because of the historical fact that it was in certain Atlantic seaboard states that people first learned to apply inanimate sources of energy to production and thus to maximize control over their environment, so the main features of those states and their cultural and social organization have become normative, not just for classifying other societies in terms of approximation to the West, but

for supplying the main elements of an explanation of the emergence of the peculiar complex of modernity. This ethnocentrism appears, for example, in Parsons (1964) and Hoselitz (1960). In Parsons' discussions of Weber we see that there is the suggestion that the rationalization process should be described as a law (1937:752). Hence, because for example, legal codes and institutions occupy a vital position in modern Western societies, and because they exemplify vividly the functional rationality of procedure which Weber noted, they became for Parsons the main area in which differentiation of culture from society generates the transition to modernity, both in the West and outside (Parsons, 1971). Then, modernization theorists, taken this as their point of departure, assume that rationalization, in the Western sense, is both a precondition for and a central feature of modernity (Smith, 1976).

Parsons sees law as a cybernetic control system for regulating the higher energy yields of modern society. Similarly, Bellah locates the source and channel of modernization in the rise of flexible capacity to learn from experience, which is the result of increasing differentiation of organizations and roles (Bellah, 1958, 1965). And yet, when he goes on to examine Asian responses to the Western impact, he becomes aware that a variety of responses like nationalism, cultural reform or neotraditionalism may, and have, served to induce maturation and modernization (1965).

C. Discontents of Modernization

On this dirty patch
 a tree once stood
 shedding incense on the infant corn:
 its boughs stretched across a heaven
 brightened by the last fires of a tribe.
 They sent surveyors and builders
 who cut that tree
 planting in its place
 a huge senseless cathedral of doom.

Kofi Awoonor

People all around the world are coming to feel the strains of modernity. Discontents of modernity are growing in number day by day. In the Third World this theme is part of the urge to be liberated from structures of exploitation and misery. In the advanced industrial societies, it comes out of the protest against the increasing domination of wide areas of life by the technological and bureaucratic institutions. More and more writers discuss the problems of modernization under the heading of "Is it worth it?"

Modernity, if taken as what is going on in the West, far from releasing human energies for creative acts, reproduces the anomie and alienation so typical of so-called advanced nations. It has neither brought happiness nor reduced tensions, that on the contrary, it intensified them in many instances. Why enter the rat race if the prize is illusory? Is it worth it, they ask, to strive intensively, to struggle for the right to live in the iron cages of bureaucratic orders in polluted, crime-ridden societies? They believe that the most important question facing anyone

responsible for "development" is, how much human suffering is acceptable to achieve certain economic goals? (Berger et al., 1974)

Many discontents of modern industrial societies have pointed out the illogicality of the argument that what is modern is good. Such an assumption is unduly glib. Nothing is more modern, it is argued, than nuclear weapons, or the horrendous possibility that human race can in a flash, commit global suicide, or at least, level civilizations to the ground. Bacteriological warfare is so unthinkable in its loathsomeness, that we simply do not think about it, even though it is perhaps more awful even than the atomic menace; yet it is superbly a modern threat. If democracy is a result of modernization in Western World, even more modern is fascism created in this world. The efficiency of its wickedness, and the scale of its oppression, are historically unprecedented. Urbanization is taken as one of the indicators of modernity. One example of irrelevance of such a notion is the phenomenon of industrial slum as a facet of the sprawling urbanization process that marks the characteristically modern societies. Industrial urban slums, the historian notes, are a relatively modern development. Not only is it recent in the straightforward sense of being historically unprecedented, but also it is modern in that it rests squarely on the whole substance and apparatus of modernity in the capitalist world: on medicine and scientific hygiene, on technological communication systems

and efficient social institutions, on welfare-state structures and ideology. (Smith, W.C., 1965)

The strand of such a belief that what is modern is good, historically, has focused more exclusively on Western society. Its opponents tended to argue that Western society had earlier been integrated and conducive to human self-fulfillment. At some point in the past, however, a fundamental change had set in and Western history had begun a downward course. The breakup of human community, the attenuation of religious values, the drift into alienation and anomie, the terrifying emergence of a mass society: these were the products of secularization, industrialization, urbanization, and democratization. Karl Mannheim and Hannah Arendt warned of the totalitarian tendencies toward mass society. In other words, historically the modernization theory of the 1950s and 1960s contrasts starkly with the secular pessimism of the 1920s and 1930s. The processes which the 1950s viewed benevolently as modernization, the 1930s viewed with alarm as disintegration. Modernization, from this point of view, is seen as a replacement of one form of superstition with another. The displacement of conventional myths, mores, and mysteries with modern science and technology only creates a higher form of mythology, but it by no means eliminates the gap between the haves and have-nots.

The essential ordeal of modernization, it is argued, is the collective and individual loss of integrative

meanings (Berger, 1976). It operates like a gigantic steel hammer, smashing both traditional institutions and traditional structures of meaning. It deprives the individual of the security which, however, harsh they may have been, traditional institutions provided for him. It also tends to deprive him of the cosmological security provided by traditional religious world views. Modern technological production brings about an anonymity in the area of social relations. This anonymity carries with it a constant threat of anomie. The individual is threatened not only by meaninglessness in the world of his/her work, but also by the loss of meaning in wide sectors of his/her relations with other people. The very complexity and pervasiveness of the technologized economy makes more and more social relations opaque to the individual. People have become "alienated" from the polity and its symbols from their "selves" and others, from community and so forth. Alienation, the depersonalization of labor, the tendency to work for monetary gain rather than out of a joy and pride in craftsmanship, the loss of a fusion of a sense of moral responsibility and ultimate personal significance with the mundane task at hand, and so forth they are all the content of modernization pack. All the major public institutions of modern society have become "abstract" (Zijderveld, 1970). That is, these institutions are experienced as formal and remote entities with little or no meaning that can be concretized

in the living experience of the individual.

The contents of modernity, apart from the more brutal sufferings that modernization often brings with it, are rooted deeply in the transformations of human life brought about by growth of industrialization in the capitalist countries. There is not really any opposition to modernization and industrialization per se; it is not industrialization or modernization in itself that creates all of these problems, but it is the kind of industrialization and modernization created by capitalism. This is capitalism that should be blamed as the mother cause of the present anomie, alienation and so forth. Capitalism is a major fragmenting, "alienating" and ultimately dehumanizing force which pits individuals against each other in a merciless competitive conflict. The rationality of capitalist society, which is intrinsic to modern technology, imposes itself upon both the activity and the consciousness of the individual as control, limitation, and by the same token, frustration. Such a modernization is a threat. It degrades, to talk in Marx's language, human beings, turns men/women into commodities, and transforms human relations into a cash nexus. What I am really getting at is not a Rousseauian nostalgia; I am showing the irrationality of one of the most vexing aspects of advanced industrial civilization: the rational character of its irrationality. (Marcuse, 1964:9) Here, modernization is the imposition of

"infrastructures" of domination and exploitation. It seems instead of saying: "civilization gave birth to barbarism," one should say: "Imperialism gave birth to barbarism."

D. Modernization To Be or Not To Be

If one wishes to retain the concept and study of modernization, one should focus on the study of the larger societal forces and relations. Individual and technological/structural definitions of modernization are not defensible for the reasons which were discussed. In contrast to those trends, it appears that a holistic definition of modernization which is social (in the sense that individual behaviors are accounted for as a part of the social structure in which they appear) seems to be more realistic. Social structural processes of modernization - differentiation of roles and organizations, social mobilization, and reintegration of differentiated structures - are linked and combined with personal and cultural dimensions.

To view the matter in this way, the substance of modernization would be lifted out of its individualized base and viewed in the context of group relationships which are the decisive factors affecting the modernization process. This is the failure of social psychological approaches in modernization theory which cannot deal with the dialectical problem of individual/society by the reductionist formula of matching societal type and personality type (Bernstein,

1971). As Marx, in his preface to the first edition of Capital, warns us, individuals should be dealt with only in so far as they are the personifications of socio-economic structures, embodiment of particular class-relations and class-interests.

The key conceptual element in the modernization process is the element of "rationality." Rationality implies conscious, deliberate selection of appropriate means to attain consciously and deliberately chosen goals. It is important to stress that social arrangements which generate and absorb change towards greater rationality are at the heart of modernizing societies. This change would not only consider ever better means to accomplish societal goals, but it would also imply social mechanisms that constantly subject social and humanitarian goals to rational analysis, control, and choice. Such an incorporation of functional and substantial rationality into the production system of a society, its economy, and consequently into its social structures - for example, by the differentiation and professionalization of social life - would be considered to be the proper study of modernization. Such a rational and modernized society can be defined by human social relations, where man/woman is given a more creative role, where people have more control of their social conditions, where citizens join in collective ownership, democratic institutions and central planning, where segmentation and specialization,

one of the main problems of western modernization, is reduced or abolished, where wealth is distributed according to need.

This socio-historical approach would demand a structural analysis which would stress socio-ecological factors which promote or retard the incorporation of rationality as described above. These factors would include the following: an historical analysis that discovers the roots and processes that have generated institutional arrangements conducive to foster or impede the modernization process; the internal dynamics of the social unit as expressed in its stratification system, monopoly structures, population composition and growth, communication networks, investment patterns, resource exploitation, institutional stability, etc.; the social unit's extra-systemic linkages, particularly its relations with super or world powers which are in a position to control its economy and political decisions through the mechanisms of self-serving aid, investment, and trade arrangements. This holistic viewpoint which analyzes the structural features of the social unit would be the most fruitful both in terms of understanding the meaning of the modernization process, as well as in terms of predicting its pace and success.

Attitudes and beliefs should not constitute the prime focus of this approach. Any social psychological questions raised would not deal with behavioral dispositions

as the prime independent variables in the modernization process. Rather attitudes would be taken in their dialectical relationships, with the behavioral and structural needs. They would be viewed in the contexts within which they emerge and function to attain meaning and significance. A more worthwhile issue than the conduciveness or nonconduciveness of attitudes to modernization is the role of beliefs and ideologies as mechanisms of stability, protest, legitimacy, group pressure, and aspirations, all of which are factors related to the modernization effort involving coercion, deferment of consumerism, political viability, charismatic leadership, etc. (Tellis-Nayak, 1973)

In a nutshell, modernization theory, if it is to become a useful tool of inquiry, should view the process as individual's increasing rational control over his/her natural and social environment, through a total transformation of all aspects of human existence, ranging from individual personality to international relations.²⁶

²⁶A number of theorists have defined modernization in terms of man/woman's increased knowledge and mastery of his/her environment. Black, for example, defines it as the "totality of influence of unprecedented increase in man's knowledge of and control over his environment in recent centuries." (1966:7) (Emphasis mine). The difference this definition has from that offered here is that by "environment" Black does not mean the same thing that is considered in this argument. Eisenstadt (1966) also characterizes modernization as the capacity of a social system both to generate change and to absorb the change it produces through rational understanding. But his emphasis is more on the cultural and moral aspects of modernization. Barratt Breger (1971) also uses Weber's concept of rationalization as her theoretical framework to distinguish the major historical forces of modernization. But with her liberal approach she plants this element into a functional model which, I think, makes it questionable.

Therefore, for an African, or Asian, or Latin American, modernization is not only acquiring education, but also a pursuit of bread and freedom rather than Americanization or Westernization.

Summary of chapter:

Modernization and Westernization are taken to be the same thing by the western biased modernization theorists. It was argued that to equate these two is a mystification. Modern cannot mean Western. Modernization theorists have not specified what they mean by modern or what the model of Western is. Every society experiences modernization in terms of its own unique history and culture, and the range of parameters of choice varies from society to society. To become modern, every society should design its own conceptions of development and to base its development planning on self-reliance rather than on dependence on foreign assistance. Modernity is something to participate in. It is a process of becoming. It lies not in what one chooses, but in the fact of being able to choose.

Max Weber saw the process of "rationalization" as a unique historical process in Western society. Although he looked for its universal significance and value, he was far from attempting to make this the basis of a world view, i.e., as a universal process. But modernization theorists misunderstood Weber and took this rationality as a universal law. They developed the concept of "functional rationality"

and applied it in their researches on the Third World countries. They totally ignored the "substantial rationality" developed by Weber. They saw Western values as rational and non-Western values as non-rational or irrational. This exactly shows the expansionist nature of the capitalist system and ethnocentricity of modernization theory, in which Western European standards of rationality and reason have been involved to judge the thinking and behavior of people in other cultural contexts.

Modernity, if taken as what is going on in the West, far from releasing human energies for creative acts, reproduces the anomie and alienation so typical of so-called advanced nations. People all around the world are coming to feel the strains of modernity. In the Third World this theme is part of the urge to be liberated from structures of exploitation and misery, and in the advanced industrial societies, it is evident in the protest against the increasing domination of wide areas of life by technological and bureaucratic institutions. The argument that what is modern is good, not only is not logical, but is also an unduly glib assumption. Such a modernization has become a threat to human life. It is the imposition of "infrastructures of domination" and exploitation.

Regarding all of these, should one discard the concept of modernization? The answer is that if one wishes to retain the concept and study of modernization, one should focus on the study of larger societal forces and relations.

The substance of modernization should be lifted out of its individualized base and viewed in the context of group relationships. Adoption of an historical method is another thing for which modernization theory should look. The process of modernization should be regarded as individual's increasing rational control over his/her natural and social environment, through a total transformation of all aspects of human existence, ranging from individual personality to international relations.

PART III

WHICH WAY OUT?

CHAPTER VI

TOWARD AN ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVE

A. Dependency Theory

It has been the contention of this thesis that modernization theory is not an adequate formula for explaining the ongoing processes of change in the Third World countries, and it has been its assertion that dependency perspective provides us with more adequate, if not the most and best, explanation and understanding of these changes. Dependency approach as a peripheral perspective, as opposed to modernization theory as a center perspective, is a useful device to employ in order to understand historical situation of present and past in those countries. One advantage of dependency framework is that it allows us to analyze the modernization process from a broader theoretical perspective. This perspective, developed in the work of certain political economists, can serve as the basis of a sociological approach which would prove more fruitful both in understanding the nature of underdevelopment itself, and

in assessing the range of possibilities of development in the Third World, than that generally employed in the sociology of development and modernization. By drawing on dependency paradigm, the discontinuity of development and continuity of underdevelopment in Third World societies can be better understood as phenomena associated with core nation's interests and politico-economic activities which may account for uneven distributions of modernity. It should not be assumed, however, that this paradigm is an all inclusive explanatory model. To come to grips with this assertion, I think it is necessary to strive for more understanding of this perspective. The following remarks and review is an attempt to reach this aim.

The search for acceptable theories of modernization and development during the post war period occurred not only in the developed societies, but in the underdeveloped ones also. Wherever these theories have sprung up in the latter countries, they show a concern for indigenous sources of change and for the colonial order of underdeveloped societies not found in the modernization theories reviewed earlier. This emphasis is accompanied by a corresponding decline in the importance placed upon the development plans as major agents of change.

It is very rare indeed that major transformations in social thinking take place without some equally fundamental change or set of changes having taken place in the

society. The event that initiated the search for new theories of development in Third World countries was the collapse of the international capitalist economy precipitated by the crash in the United States in 1929. In most of these countries this collapse resulted in a severe contraction in demand, production, and prices of primary commodities upon which the economies of these countries depended. For instance, in Latin America this contraction succeeded in setting the stage for the decline of governments committed to laissez-faire policies and for the rise of governments favoring state intervention in the economy for the purpose of maintaining certain levels of income and employment, and for the promotion of economic growth and development.

Out of many attempts to come to grips with these new developments came the new theories that were to transform the social thinking of these countries. This paradigm is called "dependency theory." As Dos Santos has pointed out (1976), the ideas associated with dependency grew out of and were defined by the experience of Latin American radical and revolutionary movements. Specifically they seem to have grown out of the radicalizing nationalist movements in the late 1950s and early 1960s which were striving for national liberation and the extension of democracy to the whole society, but were not at first primarily socialist. In fact, we can say that dependency approach is a "peripheral perspective," i.e., it is a way of looking at the

question of development and modernization from the periphery. Dependency theory in its various forms has been advanced as a revolutionary alternative to the dominant bourgeois accounts of Third World countries' backwardness.

When the term "dependency theory" is used today, reference is being made to the work of such men as Pablo Gonzalez Casanova (1965;1970), Theotonio Dos Santos (1970; 1976), Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1966;1972a;1972b;1973), Enzo Felleto, Paul A. Baran (1957), Samir Amin (1976), Andre Gunder Frank (1969;1970a;1970b), Osvaldo Sunkel (1972; 1973), Clive Y. Thomas (1974), George Beckford (1972), Emmanuel Wallerstein (1974;1976), Celso Furtado (1964;1965; 1973), Rodolfo Stavenhagen (1970;1975) and so on. Mention should be made that there is no such thing as a single unified body of thought called dependency theory. This was the case with modernization theory too. Any common ground between those who share the terminology of dependency tends to dissolve as the importance of the differences between them become greater. In fact, the dependency perspective in the sociology of development has in recent years been racked by several competing theoretical paradigms.

In essence, the term "dependency theory" does not refer to a particular theory or a theory in the positivist sense of that term, i.e., a consistent set of interrelated propositions which are capable of being empirically tested, but rather it is a frame of reference. It is not a causal

category but a matrix of relations of a general condition. Thus it offers no specific empirical references, but rather a new perspective. It represents a framework of reference within which various heterogeneous phenomena are analyzed to see how they link and interact with each other to form a total system. In brief, it is an attempt to establish a new paradigm.²⁷ (Cf. Kahn, 1970) It directs the attention of the analyst to certain aspects of an historical situation - the selection between the internal economies and political forces and the external powers that dominate the world economy - but it does not tell the analyst just what those relations will be. In other words, it tells one how to study history, but does not tell him/her specifically what he/she will find as he/she does so. (Kahl, 1976) It refers to a perspective on development and underdevelopment within which several approaches to underdevelopment have emerged. These different theoretical formulations seem to be the

²⁷ The reason why we are too much obsessed with "paradigms," such as dependency or modernization paradigm, is that not only paradigms are desirable but also they are inescapable tools of thought. We all operate under their spell. Some researchers make them explicit, others may prefer to leave them implicit. Obviously, there is a need for explicit paradigms, as purposes, as images of goals, that serve not only as guides to explore reality, but also to change it, and ultimately as theoretical constructs that have to be refuted and refined against empirical tests. They cannot be value-free and never have been. This means we need measures not only of the outcomes, the "products" of development, but also of the processes themselves; which includes not only the relations between institutions in the social structure, but also of relations between individuals in everyday settings. Indices of modernization have told us how much, but now how well, or even just how.

results of the different interests, levels of analysis, political positions, etc. that form integral parts of the works of the various theories. That is the reason why dependency paradigm is said to be eclectic in nature. (Chilcote, 1974:7)

The main concern in this approach is with imperialist relations between developed and underdeveloped societies, and the role of various local groups - predominantly the middle and bourgeois groups - in this system of social relations. The type of analysis employed here is different from those used in modernization theory. The unit of analysis, here is "global," rather than "national." The "nation state" as an economic and political unit of reference becomes superfluous. "World System" becomes the unit of study and not "state" or the "nation" or the "people." Most specifically, there is a shift from a concern with the attributive characteristics of states, which concerns the most of modernization theorists, to concern with the relational characteristics of states (Wallerstein, 1976). Social relationships of these individual countries are seen in an "international" context, rather than national and geographical.

As Wallerstein (1974) has mentioned, this formulation runs counter to a large body of literature concerning the underdeveloped countries that was produced in the period 1950-70, a literature which sought the factors that explained "development" within non-systems such as "states"

or "cultures" and, once having presumably discovered these factors, urged their reproduction in underdeveloped areas as the road to salvation.

From this global perspective, countries are divided into center and periphery in terms of power relationships. Even, the internal economy is viewed as a "center-periphery" system. Galtung (1971) provides good theoretical clarification in this case. The terms express a relationship of power. Center implies "decisions made here." Periphery implies "decisions made elsewhere." As used here, Center applies to the industrially advanced capitalist nations of Western Europe and the United States. Periphery applies to the non-Communist, less industrially advanced nations.²⁸

In historical perspective, Wallerstein (1976) argues that the development of the Center/Periphery was integral to the process of European industrialization. Rather than viewing industrialization as a process which began in Britain and gradually spread through the world, he argues that industrial advance in some areas required the development of others into peripheral areas for the supply of foodstuffs, raw materials, and labor. As Western Europe developed industrially, Eastern Europe and the overseas

²⁸ Communist nations are omitted from this study due to their relative lack of economic ties with non-Communist states.

colonies developed along non-industrial lines to complement the new Center.

Implicit in this conceptualization is the idea of "dependence." This notion of dependence runs like a thread through the works of the various dependency theorists, each incorporating it into a different conceptual scheme. Dependency theory holds that the nature of social formations in Third World countries is dependent on how they are integrated with the world capitalist system. Therefore, it is impossible to comprehend the processes and problems of development in the Third World without treating this within the wider sociohistorical context of the expansion of Western European mercantile and industrial capitalism and the colonization of the Third World by these advanced economies. Thus Griffin writes:

Underdeveloped countries as we observe them today are a product of historical forces, especially those released by European expansion and world ascendancy. . . . Europe did not discover the underdeveloped countries; on the contrary, she created them. (Griffin, 1968:38)

The notion of dependence occupies a central place in the literature of dependency. The term "dependence" refers to the ever changing structure of institutions, classes and power arrangements that define the interchange between developed and underdeveloped societies. In more concrete terms, it refers to

. . . a situation in which the economy of certain countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy to which the former

is subjected. The relation of inter-dependence between two or more economies, and between those and world trade, assumes the form of dependence when some countries (the dominant one) can expand and can be self-sustaining, while other countries (the dependent ones) can do this only as a reflection of that expansion, which can have either a positive or a negative effect on their immediate development. (Dos Santos, 1970:231)

Johnson defines it as "the situation that the history of colonialism has left and that contemporary imperialism creates in underdeveloped countries." (1972:71)

From this perspective, the dependent situation is seen as one in which some countries have their economic development conditioned by developments in another economy to which they have been subjugated by colonialism or some other form of imperial domination. That is, the relationship between the countries are such that the dominant one can expand and develop on its own, while the dependent one can only develop as a reaction to the expansion in the dominant country. This dependence is - as Frank stresses (1970) - not only a consequence of purely external relationships, but also an "internal" condition. Thus, we have to consider two levels of dependence:

1) dependence as it has consolidated itself in the social structure of underdeveloped countries, particularly in the position of a ruling class whose interests coincide in nearly all important aspects with the interest of metropolitan capitalists to appropriate a part of the surplus produced in peripheral societies, and who, through the pursuit of their own political and economic interests, guarantee

the integration of their society into the existing global division of labor. This kind of dependent relationship creates an "infrastructure of dependency." (Bodenhaemer, 1971:38)

2) Dependence as manifested in the current relations of underdeveloped countries, which could be defined in the broadest possible way, including changes in the price of a country's export goods on the international market as well as foreign investment in domestic industrial projects. Besides being itself the most visible level of dependence, external relations are constantly reproducing a social structure in underdeveloped countries that fits into the dynamics of the international division of labor. (Hein and Stenzel, 1973)

As noted earlier, the institutions, classes, and power arrangements that define the situation of dependence change over time. Thus, it was the institution of the plantation with its now infamous planter class and a colonial administration, for instance, that linked the Caribbean to Europe in a dependent manner. Today, more and more it seems to be the multi-national corporations, aided by local governments and local entrepreneurs, that are linking the region to the United States in a similar fashion. (Beckford, 1972)

Therefore, the poverty of deprived nations, as Peter Townsend argues, is comprehensible only if we attribute it substantially to the existence of a system of international social stratification, a hierarchy of societies

with vastly different resources in which the wealth of some is linked historically and contemporaneously to the poverty of others. This system operated crudely in the era of colonial domination and continues to operate today, though more subtly, through systems of trade, education, political relations, military alliances, and industrial corporations.

However, despite these changing historical forms, the basic feature of the dependency situation still remains: the inability of the dependent country to develop without the impulse coming from outside. This results in the persistence of such well-known characteristics of dependent underdevelopment as deteriorating terms of trade, chronic deficits in the balance of payments, progressive decapitalization, progressive denationalization in industry, high unemployment, high inequality, and increasing technological and political dependence. In the following, I will attempt to review the major works of four Latin American theorists in dependency approach.

B. Pablo Gonzalez Casanova

One of the important bodies of theoretical work in which the notion of dependence plays a crucial role, is that of the Mexican social scientist, Pablo Gonzalez Casanova. In his work he is primarily concerned with the political conditions that foster or hinder the process of economic development. Thus, it is within a framework that

links together concepts such as a structure of government, external domination, internal colonialism, and democratization of institutions that the notion of dependence is incorporated. This theoretical scheme, though explicitly formulated in later works, can be seen in applied form in his celebrated work, Democracy in Mexico.

Structure of government:

In this work, Gonzalez Casanova begins with an analysis of the Mexican state, laying bare its structure and the gap that exists between it and its own liberal self-image. Next, the state is set in relation to other power groups in the society and the power that derives from imperial domination. The upshot of this multi-faceted analysis is a picture of the Mexican state which shows it to be a regime that emphasizes the notion of unlimited presidential power. In this presidential regime, as Gonzalez Casanova calls it, the system of checks and balances does not work; rather, there is a concentration of power in the presidency. As a result, Congress is controlled by the president and so also are the states, the municipalities, and even the working class movement.

However, the power of the president is not unlimited. It is limited on two fronts. First, it is limited by the local groups that the state must take into account when making decisions. These, Gonzalez Casanova has identified as the modern forms of caudillas and caciques, the army, the

clergy, and the entrepreneurs. On the second, it is limited by the various international groups that the state must take into consideration before acting on its decisions. These foreign groups are primarily American corporations and the United States government. This then is the picture of the Mexican state. Presidentialist in orientation, its powers are not limited by a system of checks and balances but by local and international power groups.

To this type of political organization, Gonzales Casanova has an ambivalent response. He defends it up to a point, arguing for its functional significance in Mexican society:

The entrepreneurial state and the concentration of power in a presidentialist regime function in several ways to promote stability and development. For instance, they make possible the concentration of scarce resources for rational utilization within a free-enterprise or capitalist framework. They increase the political stability of a nation threatened by intervention of large enterprises and great powers. They give Mexico the scope to move in the international field and to exert pressure in order to increase its capacity for negotiation and gradually to break down the external forces against equality that are typically felt by underdeveloped countries. (Casanova, 1970:68)

All of these qualities, Gonzalez Casanova believes, demonstrate that it would have been to the disadvantage of Mexico if the country had taken literally the classical ideas of democracy. "Respect for the balances of power," he argues, "would have been respect for the conspiracies of a semi-feudal society. Respect for political parties would have been respect for the caciques and military parties.

. . . To maintain unrestricted rights of ownership would have meant to maintain semi-feudal and foreign ownership and a status quo that could not allow for the creation of an internal market and national capitalization." (Ibid:68-69) Consequently, it is Gonzalez Casanova's belief that the present form of the Mexican state has made possible certain very real advances in terms of development that would not have been possible had the state taken on a more liberal form. It is this that constitutes his grounds for its defense.

However, beyond this point, Gonzalez Casanova becomes critical for he argues that, in addition to being an effective instrument in dealing with local and foreign power groups, etc. the state as presently organized has been a participant in the continuing domination of an ever-increasing number of Mexicans. Consequently, for Gonzalez Casanova, "the real problem that the economy is facing is not that it has violated the classical theory of economics and democracy, but that it has as yet been unable to break the external and more important, the internal dynamics of inequality." (Ibid:69-70) This failure to break the dynamics of inequality has made the state an unwilling partner in the continuing domination of Mexicans which began with colonialism. It was this paradoxical turn of events that came to be Gonzalez Casanova's primary concern. To understand them, he turned to an analysis of the relations between political structure and social structure. This he

approached from three different angles: (1) through the notion of "internal colonialism," (2) through an analysis of the possibilities for popular protest, and (3) through an analysis of stratification and mobility in Mexican society. Here I shall be looking at only one of these approaches to the problem -- that of internal colonialism.

Internal colonialism:

For many years now, the published statistics on Mexico have stressed the progress that has been made since the revolution. As a result, figures indicating reductions in illiteracy and in the number of children not attending school, have been quite plentiful. However, in spite of these figures, Gonzalez Casanova is ever drawing our attention to the fact that the marginal population has increased in absolute numbers. By describing a segment of the population as marginal, Gonzalez Casanova is referring to the fact that these people do not share or participate in the development that the state has made possible. Rather they continue to live on the margins of that more developed world, alienated from the income, culture, information, power and other social benefits generated in that world. This persistent condition of marginality Gonzalez Casanova believes can only be properly understood when viewed as a form of colonialism - that is, internal colonialism.

Colonialism, he argues, "does not, as is commonly believed pertain only to relationships between nations. It

also pertains to relationships within a nation in so far as a nation is ethnically heterogeneous and certain ethnic groups become the dominant groups and classes and others become the dominated." (Ibid:70-71) This form of colonialism manifests itself in three different but interrelated sets of social relations. The first set can be found in situations where a local metropolis "exercises a monopoly over Indian commerce and credit, with relationships of exchange unfavorable to Indian communities." (Ibid:85) This monopoly results in the permanent decapitalization of these communities, isolates them from any other center or market, thus "promoting monoculture and dependence." (Ibid:86)

The second set of social relations defining the condition of internal colonialism, are the ones under which the Indian population has been exploited by different classes of the Ladino population." This exploitation, as is the case in all colonies of modern history, is a combination of feudalism, capitalism, slavery, forced and salaried labor, share farming and peonage, and demand for free services." (Ibid)

Finally, internal colonialism manifests itself in the differences in the ways of life between Indian and Ladino communities, and the discriminatory and differential relations that exist between the two. Indian communities are marginal communities exhibiting such features as: predominantly subsistence economy, poor quality land, high incidence of infant mortality, etc. Along with these go

Ladino stereotypes of the Indians as "lazy", "robbers", "liars", and "good-for-nothings," typifying very much the situation under conditions of international colonialism.

However, Mexican society is not just a plural society with some ethnic groups dominating others. But, as in other colonial societies, the power of the state has been appropriated by some groups and is being used in their efforts to subjugate other groups. Thus, Gonzalez Casanova shows through an analysis of voting and newspaper circulation that the colonized population is systematically excluded from the political process and cut off from the information necessary to participate intelligently in that process. But even more important than their alienation from the political process, is their exclusion from positions of leadership which results in their being ruled by Ladinos. Thus, Indian communities display the same lack of political self-determination so typical of colonies.

Democratization of national institutions:

The upshot of this analysis of marginality is that Gonzalez Casanova sees Mexico as being faced with a problem of persistent underdevelopment that is not just economic in nature. He even takes time out to suggest why past attempts at purely economic solutions have failed. In addition to these economic measures there must be some political ones also. These, Gonzales Casanova sums up under the heading of "the democratization of national institutions." In this

call for further democratization, it should be clear that Gonzalez Casanova is not calling for the creation of a liberal state or even a two party system. Rather, the call is for the state not only to extricate itself from its involvement in the colonization of the Indians, but to include them in the social world it has created and to defend their rights against encroachments from other ethnic groups. Thus, in this instance, democratization becomes a process of decolonization, representing a further extension of the process of development made possible by the presidentialist state. It is only this further extension of the democratization process together with economic measures that Gonzalez Casanova sees as being able to deal with the problem of persistent and increasing marginality.

But what are the prospects that Mexico will move towards greater democracy? In answering this question, Gonzalez Casanova attempts a political diagnosis of the current Mexican situation from two standpoints. The first of these is a Marxian one; and the second, that of contemporary sociology. The result of the analyses from both these traditions, Gonzalez Casanova believes, points in the same direction: that the objective conditions for a major revolution do not exist and that continued economic development depends upon further political democratization. This would provide the state with increased decision making power to deal with the persistent inequality arising both from internal

colonialism and foreign domination.

C. Andre Gunder Frank

In the work of our next theorist, Andrew Gunder Frank, we have a formulation of dependency theory that is pitched at a higher level of generality and is somewhat more polemical in nature. Unlike Gonzalez Casanova, Frank's primary concern is not a particular institution, but the nature of the state of underdevelopment and how Latin America in particular arrived at that state.

Nature of underdevelopment:

Underdevelopment for Frank is not an "original" or "traditional" state that all the now developed countries have passed through, and that the underdeveloped countries are now going through. On the contrary, it is argued "that neither the past nor the present of the underdeveloped countries resembles in any important respect the past of the now developed countries." (Frank, 1970:3) The latter, Frank asserts, may have been undeveloped but never underdeveloped.

The basis for this assertion is that underdevelopment is seen as a product of certain social and historical forces which the now developed countries have either never been subjected to or were able to resist before their effects took root. In Frank's words, "contemporary underdevelopment is in large part the historical product of past and continuing

economic and other relations between satellite underdevelopment and the now developed metropolitan countries. (Ibid) Thus, it is in the set of social relations that define the interchange between a satellite and its metropolitan power(s), that we find the key to underdevelopment.

Metropolis-Satellite relationships:

But it is important to Frank's formulation to note from the start that metropolis-satellite relationships occur not only at the international level but are also to be found in the remotest parts of Latin America, there giving shape and form to social, economic and political life. This idea parallels that of Gonzalez Casanova's notion of internal colonialism, highlighting the fact that local groups dominate others in a manner similar to that of imperial domination. However, in Frank's formulation, the factor of ethnicity loses its importance: "Just as the colonial and national capital becomes the satellite of the Iberian (and later of other) metropolises of the world economic system, this satellite immediately becomes a colonial and then a national metropolis with respect to the productive sectors and the population of the interior. Furthermore, the provincial capitals, which thus are themselves satellites of the national metropolis--and through the latter of the world metropolis--are in turn provincial centers around which their own local satellites orbit. Thus, a whole chain of constellations of metropolises and satellites relates all

parts of the whole system from its metropolitan center in Europe or the United States to farthest outposts in the Latin American countryside. (Ibid:6)

Between these various metropoli and their satellites, there exists relations of economic, social and political domination. Frank's emphasis is on the economic aspect of this domination, the particular set of social relations that defines the economic interchange between metropolis and satellite, Frank believes, are instruments that serve to siphon economic surplus away from the satellites to the world metropoli "of which all are satellites." Consequently a system of metropoli and satellites, both at the international and national levels, linked together by relations that make possible the siphoning of capital away from the satellites and towards the metropoli, becomes the basic structural outline of the state of underdevelopment. Frank's approach to the study of underdevelopment calls for the documenting of the rise of these metropolis-satellite relations in particular countries and their persistence, though in changed forms, over the centuries. This Frank has done for both Chile and Brazil.

From these attempts to concretize the notions of metropolis-satellite and the relations between them, Frank has been able to generate five hypotheses that are important to his formulation of dependency theory at this point. The first of these is implicit in what has already been said.

This hypothesis is that "in contrast to the development of the world metropolis which is no one's satellite, the development of the national and other subordinate metropolises is limited by their satellite status." (Ibid:9)

The second is that "the satellites experience their greatest economic development and especially their most classically capitalist industrial development if and when their ties to their metropolises are weakest." (Ibid:10)

This hypothesis Frank thinks is supported by developments that occurred in Latin America during the depression of the 17th century, the Napoleonic Wars, the First World War, the depression of the 1930's, and the Second World War--all being times when the ties with the metropolises were weak.

The third hypothesis is that "the regions which are the most underdeveloped and feudal-seeming today are the ones which had the closest ties to the metropolises in the past." (Ibid:13) These were the countries that were the largest exporters of primary products to various metropolises and were later abandoned when business fell off. Examples given are those of the sugar-producing West Indies, Northeastern Brazil and the ex-mining districts of Brazil, Peru, Bolivia, and Mexico. The remaining two hypotheses are corollaries of the third and need not be mentioned in this brief summary.

This, then, is Frank's view of underdevelopment. He sees the phenomenon as an integral part of the development of capitalism as a global system, which simultaneously

produces both developed and underdeveloped societies. Consequently, if Latin America is to end its underdevelopment, it must sever its present relations with the world capitalist system and seek a socialist path to development. As long as these countries are caught up in this international network of trade and distribution, they can only stagnate. The cure is autarchy through revolution, an attempt to develop in isolation from the international trade network, as China and Russia have done. A precondition of this self-development, certainly in Latin America, is revolution.

D. Osvaldo Sunkel

In Sunkel's work, the primary goal is also a clear conceptualization of the state of underdevelopment. Like Frank, Sunkel sees underdevelopment as "part and parcel of the historical process of global development of the international (capitalist) system, and therefore, that underdevelopment and development are simply the two faces of a single universal process." (Sunkel, 1973:136)

National and international polarizations:

The evolution of this global system of underdevelopment-development, Sunkel believes, has given rise to two great polarizations. The first is an international polarization between developed, industrialized, central countries on the one hand, and underdeveloped, poor, dependent peripheral

countries on the other. The second is a national polarization which occurs between modern groups and regions and marginal, dependent groups and regions within a particular country.

Thus, the concept of "dependencia" links the postwar evolution of capitalism internationally to the discriminatory nature of the local process of development, as we know it. Access to the means and benefits of development is selective, rather than spreading them, the process tends to ensure a self-reinforcing accumulation of privilege for special groups as well as the continued existence of a marginal class (Sunkel, 1972:519)

The international polarization, Sunkel sees as arising from the penetration of the underdeveloped countries by the developed ones. This penetration is in fact an extension of the national economic system of the advanced country into the underdeveloped one. The resulting interchange between industrial and primary producing economies is one in which "the former tends to benefit more than the latter," which results in "cumulatively divergent trends in the development of the two groups of countries." (Ibid:137)

The second polarization, as already noted is a national one and occurs between modern regions and marginal ones. The former acquire their modern outlook and way of life from their close connections with the local extension of the metropolitan economy. This second polarization parallels very closely the notions of internal colonialism and local satellites that we encountered in the works of Gonzalez Casanova and Frank.

However, what is unique about Sunkel is his focus upon the relationship between the two polarizations. The key to this relationship is the fact that the penetration of the underdeveloped societies by the developed ones always gives rise in the former to complexes of activities, social groups, and regions which are tied to and are identified with the life style of the developed society. As a result, Sunkel is able to isolate an international community consisting of the large majority of the population of the developed countries and small segments of the underdeveloped countries. The members of this community, Sunkel believes, have similar patterns of consumption, income, and similar life styles. It is in studying the effects of this community on underdevelopment and marginality that Sunkel's model is uniquely useful.

Transnationalization Process:

In his paper, "Transnational Capitalism and National Disintegration in Latin America," Sunkel develops the concepts of transnational capitalism and national disintegration. A more accurate account of this thesis can be found in his joint paper with Fuenzalida. (Sunkel and Fuenzalida, 1974). The transnationalization thesis can be summarized as follows.

The capitalist system has changed recently from an international system, i.e., with nations as its most important units, to a transnational system, i.e., with increased importance as components for institutions, such as multinational

corporations and international organizations, and individuals transcending national boundaries. It has eliminated elements that were not part of it - "congeries" as Sunkel and Fuenzalida call them - remnants of earlier socio-cultural systems, and has integrated the remaining elements into a whole having a remarkable consistency. At the same time, it has acquired a number of new and powerful vehicles for giving substance to its meanings and diffusing them, such as new means of transportation, mass media, and new techniques of organization, of processing, storage, retrieval and analysis of information, and of marketing and advertising. This process is associated with and symbolized by the increase in the number and size of the multinational corporations and in their role in import - substituting industrialization. Indeed, "transnationalization basically means the participation of some locals in the process of production of material and non-material goods traditionally produced in the center of the capitalist system." Therefore, it has socio-cultural as well as economic and socio-political dimensions.

As a consequence of transnationalization, national societies in the capitalist sphere, both "underdeveloped" and "developed," have suffered deep changes in their social structure. In the first place, a process of disintegration, or falling apart, has set in. This is most obvious in its effect on the economy - setting off a process of internal polarization involving the expropriation of local entrepreneurial groups, the disruption of indigenous economic

activities, and the concentration of property and income. But disintegration is also discernible in other activities such as scientific research, architecture, sculpture and painting, and at a cultural personal level.

At the same time, national societies have generated counter-processes of reintegration, with a reassertion of national values and meanings, which sometimes finds political expression in an attempt "to bring the nation back to the sources of its existence as a separate entity, at all levels, social, cultural and personal."

As a consequence of all these processes distinct communities have emerged within national societies, one of which constitutes a transnational community "integrated at a worldwide level, in spite of the fact that its members live in geographically separate territories." The other communities, incarnating different national and local socio-cultural configurations, cannot become globally integrated in this way.

Sunkel's thesis of transnational integration and national disintegration offers a more subtle concept of dependency emphasizing dependency's impact on the internal structuring of the periphery political economy rather than simply on the periphery's asymmetrical links with a metropolis.

E. Fernando Henrique Cardoso

Cardoso has produced a significant number of works in the eight-year period since the publication of his major work with Enzo Faletto in 1967. Within these works, many of which are unavailable to the English-reading public, Cardoso has presented his position in a manner which is more explicit and more developed than one finds in his earlier work (Myer, 1975).

The role of entrepreneurs:

If the value of Sunkel's model is the theoretical access it provides to the international community described above, then the value of Cardoso's formulation is the access it provides to the role of the entrepreneur in the development process (Cardoso, 1966). In this particular variant of dependency theory, Cardoso is able to incorporate certain insights from an approach to development that goes all the way back to Sombart, Weber, and Shumpeter. This approach places great emphasis on the role of the entrepreneur as an agent of change. However, Cardoso is critical of the socio-political vacuum in which the earlier theorists placed the creative entrepreneur. He sees the need to place the entrepreneur in a specific society at a particular point in time. He attempts to describe a historical structural process of dependency in terms of class relations, tying the economy and international politics to corresponding local

factors which in turn generate internal contradictions and political struggle. By doing this, Cardoso is able to include in his model real limits placed upon a particular set of entrepreneurs.

In contemporary Latin American society, Cardoso believes that these limits are set by the conditions of imperial domination (Cardoso, 1972b). However, within this framework of domination, there are a range of possible responses open to the entrepreneur. They depend upon the entrepreneur's ability to form internal political alliances, to make use of or not to succumb to past historical developments, to be innovative, etc. These various responses, Cardoso believes, cannot be known a priori, but only from a knowledge of current historical trends and power arrangements. Thus, we can describe Cardoso's focus more precisely as the internal responses open to entrepreneurs under conditions of external dependence. This orientation can be seen in Cardoso's work on the role of entrepreneurs in Latin American development with Enzo Faletto (Cardoso, 1966).

Dependent development:

Cardoso believes that capitalist development could be possible within dependent situations. Dependent development, whose principal characteristics are fixed by Third World's external dependency, produces large increases in production and productivity in certain sectors and at the same time leads to marginalization and pauperization of the

growing rural and urban masses. He argues that modern capitalism and imperialism differs from Lenin's earlier conceptions. According to him, "from the theoretical Leninist point of view. . . imperialism should tend to restrict the economic growth of backward countries to mineral agricultural sectors. . . ." (1973:29) Capital accumulation, for instance, is more the consequence of corporate rather than financial control. Foreign investment by multinational corporations in Latin America is moving away from raw materials and agriculture to industry. More often than not these corporations comprise "local and state capital, private national capital, and monopoly international investment (but in the last analysis under foreign control)" (Cardoso, 1973:11). Therefore, monopoly capitalism and development are not contradictory terms; and dependent capitalist development has become a new form of monopolistic expansion in the underdeveloped countries. This development is directed to a limited and upper class-oriented type of market and society. At the same time, the amount of net foreign capital in dependent economies is decreasing. New foreign capital is not needed in some areas where there are local savings and reinvestment of profits in local markets. Moreover, dependent economies during periods of monopolistic imperialistic expansion are exporting capital to the dominant economies.

Relevance of dependency paradigm:

Cardoso believes that dependency perspective is more useful for Latin America than the structural-functionalism that has been the predominating sociological approach until recent years. The latter assumes a natural equilibrating of forces; it suggests that when a new economic group, such as the local industrialists, begins to operate and expand, it will automatically gain sufficient political power to protect its interests. It assumes that political mobilization will move apace with the emergence of the new urban masses, and that the polity will provide adequate mechanisms to absorb them into decision-making. In general, it assumes that economic changes are gradual and steady and that they, in turn, produce gradual and steady modernization of the social and political institutions. It assumes that small "dysfunctions" created by change will produce tensions leading to adjustments and new equilibria. Most of all, it assumes that the key "variables" interact in standard ways regardless of the historical context. These assumptions are reflected by methodological techniques that intercorrelate many indices of aspects of modernization to discover the "normal" patterns of congruence, placing countries of diverse background into the same matrix.

But the structural-functional perspective has not been matched by real events. Old economic sectors retain political power long after their days of productive glory.

New political groups emerge and occasionally, as in Cuba, seize power in order to drastically restructure the economy. The "deviant" instances are often better clues to real situations than the presumably "normal" or standard patterns that emerge from the computer (Kahl, 1976).

Summary and conclusion of chapter:

A major challenge to modernization theory has emerged in recent years among various branches of social science. This is called "dependency theory". This perspective, developed in the work of certain political economists, can serve as the basis of a sociological approach which would prove more fruitful in understanding the nature of underdevelopment in the Third World, than that generally employed in the sociology of development and modernization at present.

* The basic hypothesis of the dependency paradigm is that development and underdevelopment are partial, interdependent structures of one global system. It takes as its underlying assumption that it is not possible to apprehend the processes and problems of development in the Third World without considering them within the wider socio-historical context of the expansion of Western European mercantile and industrial capitalism and the colonization of the Third World by these advanced economies. Viewed in this way, underdeveloped nations are and have for some time been dominated economically, as well as politically, by external centers of power and thereupon function as their satellites. Likewise,

just as these countries are linked by dependency relationships to the outside and are not able to exercise much influence on the mechanism of world markets or in the terrain of international politics, so within a country there exist mechanisms of internal domination and salient inequalities between different sectors of the economy, and in the social structure generally.

This approach does not assume a uniformity among non-capitalist, so-called "Traditional" societies, and allows for the incorporation of dissimilar social structures. Such an approach substitutes for the largely atheoretical discussion of social and cultural obstacles to development, an analysis of the social consequences of capitalist development and imperialist expansion, and of the ways in which new exploitative structures are established which themselves act to impede socio-economic development.

Dependency theorist's analyses have quite different emphasis than modernization theorists'. Their focus of study is: international system relationships involving the outflow of internally-generated surplus, or capital, through profit remissions, dividends, license fees and internal costs between branches of multinational enterprise; the terms of trade favoring the industrial nations; foreign domination of crucial sectors of underdeveloped nations' economies; national specialized dependence on one or a few raw material or agricultural exports; and the increasing burden placed on national budgets merely to service the external debt.

CONCLUSION

This thesis began with a review of the sociological literature on modernization and development. In the course of that review, it was argued that most of theories of development and modernization, as antidotes to Marxism, were antihistorical in substituting the empty progress from "traditional" to "modern" for what happens to real societies. Their interpretations of changes were oversimplified accounts of what was occurring. This oversimplification, we argued, stemmed from the failure of these theories to systematically include contradictions and strains in these new societies as major factors pushing for modernization. On the contrary, this drive for modernization was viewed primarily as a desire to emulate the West and so could be consciously initiated by force of development programs and schemes. As a result, the weight of the colonial order of these societies, the dependent nature of their institutions were not seen as crucial factors making for change. Rather the focus was on the fact that these countries had not undergone a scientific and industrial revolution but desired the material abundance that supposedly came along with such a revolution. It is this desire for Western abundance that has been viewed as the drive behind the process of modernization; and, to satisfy it what was needed was the transfer of western science, technology, and institutions to the new nations.

As it was showed, modernization theorists often construct their models on the basis of an understanding of the social concomitants of Western economic development. Such models are probably largely irrelevant to comprehending the kinds of processes occurring in present-day Third World countries whose socio-historical and contemporary circumstances are so different. In my review and critique of those theories, I have argued that the processes of change occurring in these nations are much more complex; that while they have been concerned with securing Western technology, etc., they have also been consistently concerned with the removal of certain sets of social relations of domination, that have systematically followed from Western infiltration. It was discussed that on the international level, capitalist relations of dependence and exploitation explains both the continuous development of the already rich and the increasing underdevelopment of the poor countries; and on the national level, the dominant classes, being the clients of powerful interests abroad, ensure the maintenance of the status-quo or encourage changes which lead to superficial modernization.

The attempt has been here to illustrate the differences between two sociological approaches and to show how modernization theory can be stood on its head by a mode of analysis which approaches the study of development with an historical method, and is informed by questions more relevant to the pressing needs of the present situation than

those on which modernization theory is predicated, which is to say questions that do not disassociate the common concern with poverty, illiteracy and unemployment from the structural analysis of power and exploitation in their various forms.

As a result, it was argued for a conceptualization of development and modernization that took into account these factors too. One which attempts, through historically-specific, precisely-located comparative studies of modernization and development, to develop a "global" model that avoids any deterministic, westernized bias and do take account of all the levels of social structure and their interaction while allowing for different "development" outcomes. A theory of modernization and development must do more than describe and measure, if it is to yield scientific understanding. There are more complex inquiries than the measurement of, for example, economic growth or literacy or bureaucratization. They are inquiries into punitive causal factors rather than measurement of results: they require some historical insight as well as empirical research techniques. Achieving an historical perspective on underdevelopment is one very important way of understanding its nature.

One problem of which we should not lose sight is how to ensure that our concern with research techniques should not anaesthetize our historical understanding. The crucial issue is one of historical relevance. To what extent can

the social sciences help map the historical routes that the peoples of the world have taken or are taking, leading to the economic and political "modernization" of their societies? What are the historical forces operating in this modernizing ferment on the global scale? How can social sciences contribute to the discovery of general truths in historically unique situations? Most importantly, how can one as a social scientist stay neutral to this historical phenomenon of "modernization," which is a highly ethnocentric value, to many people in "modern" civilization? It is on this connection that an urgent need for a serious confrontation with the issue of historical relevance of the sociological theory of modernization is felt. The central issue in this argument regarding the inadequacy of modernization theory is whether the undergoing strategy of conceptualization involved is useful or not. I think that the tautological characteristic of modernization theory undermines its usefulness. The study of modernization, in order to be successful, has eventually to proceed at both microanalytic and macroanalytic levels, and in a language that permits one to move freely between the two poles: Modernization theory does not achieve this goal, nor modernization theorists attempt it, but they do provide examples of approaches at several different levels; some at macroanalytic, some at microanalytic and others falling at various intermediate points. It is on this basis that a historical-comparative

approach to the analysis of long-range, macrostructural patterns, of social change and development and modernization should enlarge their views and conceptual scheme in order to grasp the full dimension of these processes of change. It was asserted that this can be found more in the attempts of so-called dependency approach to development and modernization.

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