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I . ..t ..‘/,:4l.».J. /...vt...€ . .1...f.. , ‘ ~ L LI BRA R Y Michigan State it \llllllllllll“ll\llllllllllWW“M 3 1293 10137 2856 University 5*; This is to certify that the thesis entitled JAPAN'S SECURITY POLICY: A STUDY OF THE RELATIONSHIPS ., AMONG THE DECISION MAKERS' PERCEPTIONS, THE PRESS, AND PUBLIC OPINION DURING 19%: ': I 'l.‘ p «"— by a"; 'f. - a .‘ ‘31 Sung K m ‘4' "f 2' — g has been accepted tow_ards fulfillment of the requirements for .- ‘ l 6.- i - Ph'D' degree in Pn‘Ht-ieal Science _, i‘ ‘43 i ' 1 Major professor 1/ I 0 » ‘ ‘ fi . k. 0‘ - ’0 A ‘ 9 ' ‘ 0—7639 ‘ ' 1 . ‘ ' I 1 l 051119 MAR 08 2010 ABSTRACT JAPAN'S SECURITY POLICY: A STUDY OF THE RELATIONSHIPS AMONG THE DECISION MAKERS' PERCEPTIONS, THE PRESS, AND PUBLIC OPINION DURING 1952-1971 By Tai Sung Kim In this study an attempt is made to determine the degree of impact of the press and public opinion on Japanese foreign policy decision makers' perceptions concerning Japan's security policy. Among many issues which are related to Japan's security policy are the two major ones: a) the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty of 1951 and its revision of 1960; and b) the Japanese Self Defense Forces. The three central hypotheses that are developed and tested in this study are: a) The decision makers' perceptions concerning Japan's security issues are not strongly influenced by the opinions of the press toward the issues. b) The decision makers' perceptions concerning Japan's security issues are not influenced by the opinions of the mass public (hereinafter called the public) toward the issues. c) The opinions of the public toward Japan's security issues are strongly influenced by the opinions of the press toward the issues. Tai Sung Kim In order to test the above hypotheses the total of twelve sub-hypotheses are developed and tested by regression analysis. The decision makers' perception variables are the major themes related to the security issues that appeared in their admini- strative and policy speeches delivered in the Japanese Diet. These themes are measured by content analysis of the speeches. The press variables are also the major themes related to the issues that appeared in the editorials of Asahi Shinbun (Asahi Newspaper). These, too, are measured by content analysis of the editorials. The sources from which both the decision makers' perception and the press variables are drawn include all of the available speeches and editorials during the period from l952 to l97l, rather than samples. The public opinion variables are the percentages of the public (the samples) that responded to the specific positions related to the security issues in the national opinion surveys. Two polls, the Asahi and the Central Research Service, are selected as the main sources of the public opinion data. Some of the major findings are: a) The decision makers' perceptions have been consistently favorable to the continuation of the U.S.-Japanese alliance, and at the same time, in favor of increasing the Self Defense Forces. b) The press has been highly critical of some of the arrange— ments in the U.S.-Japanese alliance, although not in favor of the total abrogation of the security treaty, and has also been against the increase of the Self Defense Forces. C) Tai Sung Kim Nearly a majority of the public believes that the U.S.- Japanese Security Treaty protects Japan but a small minority thinks the treaty the best means to protect Japan's security. As for the Self Defense Forces, the majority of the public believes that the forces are needed, but is against the increase of the forces. The results of the regression analyses of the variables suggest that all three central hypotheses are generally supported, but with varying degrees of exceptions. The two most significant exceptions are: a) The opinions of the press that are critical of some of the arrangements in the U.S.-Japanese alliance appear to have significant impact on the decision makers' perception favoring the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty. This finding and other empirical evidence tend to suggest that the intensity, duration and scope of the controversies surrounding the issue are important factors which determine the degree of impact of the press on the decision makers' perception. The decision makers' perception favoring the increase of the Self Defense Forces is correlated with the opinion of the public not in favor of increasing the forces. This result and other evidence tend to suggest that the degree of awareness of the issue by the public is an important factor which determines the degree of impact Tai Sung Kim of the public on the decision makers' perception. Finally, it is noteworthy to point out that, although the degree of the impact of the press on the opinions of the public is strong, the duration of the impact tends to be relatively short. JAPAN'S SECURITY POLICY: A STUDY OF THE RELATIONSHIPS AMONG THE DECISION MAKERS' PERCEPTIONS, THE PRESS, AND PUBLIC OPINION DURING 1952—1971 By Tai Sung Kim A DISSERTATION Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Political Science 1974 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The author wishes to express his sincere gratitude to Dr. Bruce James Bueno de Mesquita, the Dissertation Chairman, for his enthusiastic encouragement and invaluable advice during every stage of this dissertation. Appreciation is extended to the other members of the Dissertation Committee, Dr. Robert Jackson and Dr. Jerry Weinberger. The author is indebted to Dr. Naokichi Tanaka of Hosei University in Tokyo and Dr. Michio Royama of the International House of Japan, Inc. for their assistance during the author's visit to Japan to collect data. The author is also indebted to Lansing Community College for a leave during the Spring Term of 1973 which relieved him from his teaching responsibilities to pursue this dissertation. Finally, my wholehearted appreciation goes to my beloved wife, ijin, and children, Brian and Dennis, for their understanding and patience during the many years of this work, without which this dissertation would not have been possible. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page LIST OF TABLES ....................... vi LIST OF GRAPHS ....................... x Chapter I. INTRODUCTION ..................... l The Problem Statement .............. l The Purpose of This Study ............. 5 The Plan For This Study ............. 7 II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE PEACE TREATY WITH JAPAN AND THE U.S.-JAPANESE ALLIANCE ......... 9 PEACE-MAKING WITH JAPAN .............. . 9 The Occupation Authorities for Japan ....... l0 The Preparation of Peace: l945-l948 ........ 16 The Preparation of Peace: l948-l951 ........ 28 The Conclusion of the Peace Treaty ........ 4l DEVELOPMENT OF THE U.S.-JAPANESE ALLIANCE ...... 45 The U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty of l95l ..... 46 The Revision of the U.S.—Japanese Security Treaty ................. 58 The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security of l960 (The Mutual Security Treaty) ................ 69 The Rearmament of Japan .............. 78 III. REVIEW OF THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND THE ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION AND THE PRESS IN FOREIGN POLICY MAKING ............... 89 The Theories of International Politics ........ 89 The Role of Public Opinion and The Press in Foreign Policy Making .......... ll4 IV. THEORETICAL MODEL FOR ANALYSIS AND HYPOTHESES TO BE TESTED ............... l3l Chapter THEORETICAL MODEL .................. Public Opinion ................ . Press . . ......... . ........ . Security Need ................... Economic Need. . ................ The Belief System of the Decision Makers . . . . . . ........... HYPOTHESES . . . . . . ............... The Decision Makers' Perception And The Press . ............ The Decision Makers' Perception And Public Opinion . . ............ Public Opinion And The Press ........... V. METHODOLOGY AND DATA PRESENTATION .......... . THE DECISION MAKERS' PERCEPTION VARIABLES ...... THE PRESS VARIABLES . . . . . ........... THE PUBLIC OPINION VARIABLES ........... CONCLUSION .................... VI. TESTING THE HYPOTHESES ............... THE DECISION MAKERS' PERCEPTIONS AND THE PRESS . . ....... Hypothesis l ........ . . . . ..... Hypothesis 2 ............ . . . . . Hypothesis 3 . . ............... Hypothesis 4 . . ............... SUMMARY ..................... THE DECISION MAKERS' PERCEPTIONS AND PUBLIC OPINION ................ Hypothesis l ................ . . Hypothesis 2 . ................. Hypothesis 3 . . . . .............. Hypothesis 4 .................. SUMMARY . . . ........ . . . . ...... THE PUBLIC OPINION AND THE PRESS ......... Hypothesis 1 . . . . . . ........ . . . Hypothesis 2 ................ . . Hypothesis 3 . ................. Hypothesis 4 .................. iv Chapter Page VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION ................. 226 The Major Findings From the Data ........... 227 Major Findings Among the Variables and Their Theoretical Implications ........... 232 Limitation of the Study ............ , . . 237 APPENDIX A ......................... 238 APPENDIX B ......................... 243 APPENDIX C . . ....................... 245 APPENDIX D ......................... 247 APPENDIX E ......................... 249 APPENDIX F ...................... . . . 252 APPENDIX G ......................... 253 APPENDIX H ......................... 255 BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................... 256 Table II. III. IV. VI. VII. VIII. IX. LIST OF TABLES Japanese Popular Reactions to A Separate Peace Treaty ......... Japanese Popular Reactions To The Stationing of U.S. Troops in Japan After The Peace Treaty ...... Authorized and Actual Personnel in Self Defense Forces, l954-l97O ..... Japan's Defense Expenditures, l962-l97l . The Impact of the Press on the Decision Makers' Perception: “Japan is a Leader of the World Community" ......... The Impact of the Press on the Decision Makers' Perception: I‘Japan Should Improve Her World Status" ........ The Impact of the Press on the Decision Makers' Perception: ”Japan Should Assume a Greater Responsibility for the Promotion of World Peace ............. The Impact of the Press on the Decision Makers' Perception: ”Japan Should Improve Her Relations With the Asian Nations" The Impact of the Press on the Decision Makers' Perception: "Japan Should Improve Her Relations With the Asian Nations" The Impact of the Decision Makers' Perception: “Japan Should Improve Her Relations With China” ........ vi Table XI. XII. XIII. XIV. XV. XVI. XVII. XVIII. XIX. XX. XXI. The Impact of the Press on the Decision Makers' Perception: "Japan Should Improve Her Relations With China'I . . . . The Impact of the Press on the Decision Makers' Perception: ”The U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty Protects Japan's Security” The Impact of the Press on the Decision Makers' Perception: l'The U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty Protects Japan's Security” The Impact of the Press on the Decision Makers' Perception: “Neutralism Will Not Protect Japan's Security" ...... The Impact of the Press on the Decision Makers' Perception: "Japan Should Increase Her Self-Defense Forces“ . . . The Impact of the Press on the Decision Makers' Perception: "Japan Should Pursue a Peace Diplomacy" . . ...... The Impact of the Press on the Decision Makers' Perception: "Japan Should Pursue a Peace Diplomacy" . . ...... The Impact of Public Opinion on the Decision Makers' Perception: “The U.S.- Japanese Security Treaty Protects Japan's Security" . . . The Impact of Public Opinion on the Decision Makers' Perception: "The U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty Protects Japan's Security" ....... The Impact of Public Opinion on the Decision Makers' Perception: "Neutralism Will Not Protect Japan's Security. . . .......... The Impact of Public Opinion on the Decision MaKers' Perception: "Japan Should Increase Her Self-Defense Forces . vii 000000 ...... 000000 Page 184 186 187 188 189 191 192 195 196 200 203 Table XXII. XXIII. XXIV. XXV. XXVI. XXVII. XXVIII. XXIX. XXX. XXXI. The Impact of Public Opinion on the Decision Makers' Perception: ”Japan Should Increase Her Self—Defense Forces ....... The Impact of Public Opinion on the Decision Makers' Perception: "Japan Should Increase Her Self-Defense Forces . ...... The Percentages of the Samples in the National Opinion Surveys That Responded to the Question: ”In Your Opinion, What Is The Most Important Task of the Self— Defense Forces?" . ......... Public Support for the Government . . . . The Impact of the Press on Public Opinion That is Favorable to the Increase of Self—Defense Forces . . The Impact of the Press on Public Opinion That is Unfavorable to the Increase of Self-Defense Forces . . The Impact of the Press on Public Opinion That is Favorable to the Necessity of the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty ........ The Impact of the Press on Public Opinion That is Unfavorable to the Necessity of the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty . .......... The Impact of the Press on Public Opinion in Support of the U.S.- Japanese Security Treaty as The Best Means to Protect Japan ..... The Impact of the Press on Public Opinion in Support of Neutralism as The Best Means to Protect Japan . . . viii 00000000 00000000 ..... Page 204 206 207 210 213 214 216 217 219 221 Table XXXII. XXXIII. Page The Impact of the Press on Public Opinion That is Favorable to the Rearmament of Japan ................. 222 The Impact of the Press on Public Opinion That is Unfavorable to the Rearmament of Japan ................. 223 LIST OF GRAPHS Graph Page 1 Annual Defense Budget Compared With The GNP And The Government Budget (1958-1972) ............... . . . . . . . . 84 2 The Percentages of The Samples in The National Opinion Surveys That Support The U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty or Neutralism as The Best Means to Protect Japan ....... . . . . . . . . . ..... 198 3 The Percentages of The Samples in The National Opinion Surveys That Claim Whether or Not The U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty Protects Japan . . ...... . . . . . 199 4 The Percentages of Those Who Are in Favor of And Not in Favor of The Increase of The Self-Defense Forces ........... 205 5 The Percentages of Those Who Claim That SDF is Needed and Those Who Are in Favor of the Increase of SDF ...... . . . . . . . . 208 6 The Percentages of The Samples in The National Opinion Surveys on The U.S.- Japanese Security Treaty ................ 220 7 The Percentages of The Samples in The National Opinion Surveys on The Necessity of Army and The Increase of SDF ....... . . . . . . . . ..... 224 8 The Percentages of The Samples in The National Opinion Surveys On The Attitudes Unfavorable To Army and The Increase of SDF . . . . . . . ...... . . . . 224 CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION The Problem Statement During the past quarter of a century since the end of World Warll, Japan has experienced unprecedented peace and economic pros- perity. For the first time in modern history, Japan has not been en- gmged'hiserious political and military conflicts with other nations fin~such a long time. The standard of living among the Japanese people has risen at an annual average of over nine percent: a rate which few Fmoples in the world have experienced.1 The per capita gross national income has multiplied many times, from $250 in 1950 to $1,658 in 1970,2 muiJapan now occupies the position of the third largest industrialized nation in the world. Also, Japan's prestige in the world has become weTlrecognized because of her economic power and technological accomp- lishments in many industries. At the same time, Japan's role in inter- national politics has gradually been strengthened. All of these accomplishments have been credited to many internal and external factors. Internally, the reorganizations of 1M. Statistical Yearbook, 1969, p. 551. 2Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1971, p. 805. political and economic structures and the extensive social reforms carried out by the U.S. Occupation authorities during the early years following the end of World War II established the solid foundations for a new Japan based upon the democratic political process and the economy of the free enterprise system. In addition, the long prevailing political stability and successful domestic and foreign policies of the ruling Liberal Demo- cratic Party (LDP) have made many other contributions. As far as the external factors are concerned, two wars in Asia—-the Korean and the Vietnamese wars—-brought about enormous demands for Japanese goods, largely through U.S. military procurements resulting from the wars in Asia. Moreover, the increasing demands by many peoples, in both Western and non—Western countries, for Japanese goods enabled Japan to expand foreign trade. This has contributed to Japanese economic growth. Despite these remarkable successes, Japan has been confronted with many major problems, one of which has been the development of a viable security policy: a policy which would provide for the best means to protect her security without hindering her economic growth and her relations with other nations. To accomplish this, the Japanese government has pursued two courses: first was the reliance on the United States for Japan's security and second was the gradual increase of her own defense capability, mainly the Self Defense Forces. Ever since Japan regained her sovereignty in 1952, the Japanese foreign policy orientation has been toward an alliance with the United States. The backbone of this alliance has been the U.S.— Japanese Security Treaty, which was signed wh§n the peace treaty was concluded in 1951.3 On the part of Japan, the treaty was designed primarily so that the United States would protect Japan's security. But it has also contributed to Japan's economic growth by facilitating trade with the United States while at the same time limiting defense expenditures to an average annual outlay of less than one percent of Japan's gross national product.4 As for the United States, the treaty served the interest of the U.S. defense policies in the Far East by providing a military base in Japan and by insuring Japan's continuing political support for U.S. policies. Despite the many benefits Japan has enjoyed from the alliance with the United States, the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty has been a focal point of controversies in Japanese foreign policy. Although a majority of the Japanese people believe that the treaty protects Japan's security, a great number of people are either search- ing for an alternative such as neutralism, or beginning to criticize the structures of the Japanese alliance with the United States. The strongest opposition to the treaty comes from the second largest political party, the Japan Socialist Party, which advocates the total abrogation of the treaty and the establishment of neutralism. Conse- quently, the controversies surrounding the treaty have been one of the 3The Security Treaty was once revised in 1960 and further extended in 1970. 4See Chapter II, p. 83. most seriously disputed foreign policy issues in all of the general elections since 1952. As far as the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) were concerned, their development was closely associated with the Japanese alliance with the United States. The SDF was fully equipped and trained by the United States under the Mutual Assistant Agreement of 1954.5 Furthermore, the Security Treaty stipulates that SDF will be placed under a joint command between the United States and Japan in time of war. This tends to preclude Japan's exclusive use of SDF against external threats inde- pendently from the United States. The establishment and, particularly, the increase of SDF have drawn many serious challenges from the people and press. The issues involving SDF generally include the question of its constitutionality, the real and anticipated financial burden to maintain it, the inadequacy of SDF as a viable defense force, and the adverse reactions from other Asian nations to Japan's effort to increase her military capability. In spite of the controversies surrounding the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty and SDF, the Japanese government has consistently pur- sued the policy of alliance with the United States while at the same time gradually increasing the SDF. 5Over the years, the equipment and training of the SDF have gradually been assumed by the Japanese government. A discussion of SDF will be presented in Chapter II. The Purpose of This Study This study measures, through correlation analysis, the degree of influence of the press and public opinion on the Japanese decision makers' perceptions of Japan's foreign policy orientation with respect to the alliance with the United States and related issues. The study also measures the degree of influence of the press on public opinion in order to determine whether or not the press influences the decision makers' perceptions indirectly through the mass public. The study does not, however, attempt to examine why the decision makers perceive the security issues as they do. The significance of this study is derived from the follow- ing theoretical propositions:6 l. The external behavior of a nation state is the outcome of the actions taken by the foreign policy decision maker as mediated by his perceptions of reality. Thus, the decision makers' perception is one of the essential variables in the study of foreign policy making. 2. The press, as an opinion maker, and public opinion, defined as the opinion of the masses, are important domestic policy influencers. Yet their influence on the foreign policy decision maker is limited even in an open political system. 6The extensive review of these theoretical propositions will be presented in Chapter III. The press tends to have substantial influence on the formation of public opinion. It is particularly true when the press is the primary source of informa- tion obtained by the people. Although this study deals with a limited number of issues in Japan's foreign policy, this researcher is convinced that the study of the influence of the press and public opinion on the decision makers' perceptions of the issues is highly relevant in terms of the theoretical propositions advanced by many scholars in the field. It is particularly so in the case of Japan for the following reasons: 1. The problems related to security policy have been the major issues in Japan's foreign policy making. The press in Japan is highly articulate in dealing with foreign policy issues, and at the same time, it is the primary source from which the Japanese people obtain information concerning foreign policy. The Japanese people are relatively well informed on foreign policy issues. Finally, it is hoped that the findings in this study furnish some theoretical propositions which can be examined in future studies. The Plan For This Study Chapter II offers a review of the development of the U.S.- Japanese alliance system. As far as the United States and Japan were concerned, the establishment of the alliance was closely tied with the development of the peace treaty signed in 1951. For this reason, Chapter II also reviews briefly the development of the peace treaty. The review of the developments of the peace treaty and the alliance is pertinent to this study because it portrays the nature of the problems and controversies in relation to the alliance. Chapter III reviews the literature on the theories of foreign policy making which are relevant to the development of the theoretical framework and model of analysis adopted in this study. Chapter IV presents a theoretical model for analysis which is developed from the mediated Stimulus-Response model. Chapter IV also presents the Hypotheses to be tested in this study, which are derived from the theoretical assumptions and propositions suggested in the literature reviewed in Chapter III. The rationales for the development of the hypotheses are also explained. Chapter V introduces the statistical methods used to analyze the chosen variables and the methods of selecting the variables. It also explains the limitations of the data. The hypotheses are tested in Chapter VI utilizing corre— lational techniques. The outcomes of the test are interpreted in descriptive forms. Chapter VII contains the conclusion of the study, and presents some theoretical propositions for future study. Also, the limitations of this study are explained. CHAPTER II DEVELOPMENT OF THE PEACE TREATY WITH JAPAN AND THE U.S.-JAPANESE ALLIANCE The purpose of this chapter is to review the backgrounds and nature of the U.S.-Japanese alliance system. Since this alliance was developed in conjunction with the development of the Japanese peace settlement, it is difficult to understand fully the nature of the alliance without having understood the background of the peace settle— ment. For this reason, the development of the peace settlement will be reviewed first. Then the development of the U.S.-Japanese alliance will be Considered. THE PEACE-MAKING WITH JAPAN The Japanese peace settlement was technically the decision of the Allied Powers but, in reality, it was the product of the U.S. effort, largely reflecting her own policies toward Japan and the Far East. The U.S. policies toward the post-World War II Japan fall into two distinctive periods. The first period, in which the U.S. effort had been primarily preoccupied by her attitude and policies formulated in the spirit of punishing and reforming the Japanese people, runs from 1945 to late 1948. Accordingly, during this period, many of the drafts of the peace 10 treaty worked out by the U.S. government were punitive in nature. They are designed for the purpose of preventing the resurgence of Japanese militarism in the future. The second period covers late 1948 to 1951, during which the United States took a drastically different approach to the settle- ment of peace with Japan: the approach aimed at the creation of a strong self-sufficient U.S. ally that would play a stabilizing role in Asia against Communist expansionist movements. The security arrangement between the United States and Japan was also worked out during this period. The Occupation Authorities for Japan Although the United States carried the major burden in fighting against Japan, the United States had regarded the war as one against the Axis. She therefore intended that the occupation of Japan should be an Allied responsibility.] On August 22, 1945, the United States invited three other major powers--the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and China—-to set up a ten-power advisory commission, 1James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York & London: Harper & Brothers Publications, 1947), p. 213. Although this appeared to be the original intention of the United States Government at the beginning of the occupation, the subsequent events indicated that the United States was determined to carry out her own policies with or without the consent of the Allies. See also, W. MacMahon Ball, Japan, Enemy or Ally? (New York: John Day Co., 1949), p. 9. 11 the Far Eastern Advisory Commission (FEAC) to carry out the purposes of the Potsdam Declaration and the surrender terms. The Soviet Union and China accepted the invitation but Great Britain objected, largely because the commission would have only advisory powers.2 In September 1945, when the Council of Foreign Ministers met in London to discuss the problems concerning Germany, the Soviet Union submitted a new proposal to create an Allied Control Council for Japan. The Council would be composed of the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China and would have much greater power than the FEAC proposed by the United States earlier in August. The intention of the Soviet Union was to obtain greater control over the Occupation authorities in Japan. The United States objected to the consideration of the Soviet proposal at the meeting, arguing that the purpose of the meeting was not to consider the Japanese questions. In the meantime, the U. S. Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, continued negotiations with British Foreign Minister Bevin on the matter of establishing the FEAC. Finally, the British Cabinet author- ized Mr. Bevin to accept the U. S. proposal. The United States, having obtained Britain's consent, hoped that the Soviet Union would withdraw her proposal and revert to her earlier approval of the U. S. proposal of August 22nd. But the Soviet Union refused to do so, claiming that 2Byrnes, op. cit., p. 213. See also F. C. Jones, et al., Survey of International Affairs, 1939-1946: The Far East, 1942-1946, (London: Oxford University Press, 1955), p. 338. the conditions had been changed. The United States decided to call a meeting of the FEAC any- way, and the first meeting was called on October 30, 1945, in Washing— ton.3 Nevertheless, the Commission was, from the very outset, unable to operate effectively. It was not only because the Soviet Union did not send a representative, but also because there was a considerable degree of dissatisfaction on the part of the United Kingdom and Australia for their purely advisory role.4 In December 1945, the Foreign Ministers' meeting5 was held in Moscow and an agreement was reached to establish a new commission, the Far Eastern Commission ( FEC), and the Allied Council for Japan. The FEC would be composed of eleven nations6 and set up in Washington. 3At the first meeting of the FEAC the U. S. representative, Major General Frank R. McCoy, was elected as chairman. It then adjourned for a week to give the Soviet Union another opportunity to send a representative, but the Soviet Union did not. 4Kazuo Kawai, Japan's American Interlude, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1960), p. 16. See also Edwin M. Martin, The Allied Occupation of Japan (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1948), pp. 8-9. 5The Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States met in Moscow from December 16 to 26. The agree— ment to establish the FEC headed by the United States was reached on December 27. 6The eleven member nations were: the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States, China, France, the Netherlands, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India, and the Philippine Commonwealth. 13 The Allied Council would be composed of four nations7 and set up in Tokyo. The FEC began functioning on February 26, 1946, with authority to formulate policies and to set forth the principles and standards for the obligations to be fulfilled by Japan under the terms of surrender. It had the right to review any directive and any action of the Supreme Commander involving policy decisions. The decisions of the FEC were put into directives issued to the Supreme Commander of Allied Powers for Japan by the United States government. It was also agreed that the Commission would act upon majority votes of the eleven members, including the votes of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and China. This provision, in effect, gave veto power to the four major powers.8 There was a further provision that in case of the failure of the FEC to act promptly enough to meet any particular exigency, the United States government could issue ”urgent unilateral interim directives" which would have the same force 7The member nations of the Allied Council for Japan were: the Soviet Union, the United States, China, and Australia who repre- sented the British Commonwealth nations. 8Byrnes, op. cit., p. 218. 14 as action by the Commission.9 This provision was a manifestation of the United States government's determination not to be substantially influenced by the others in carrying out her occupation policies.1O There were three questions, however, that were exempted from this authority of the United States. These three questions on which the Commission had to decide by a majority vote were: a. changes in the control system as set forth in surrender terms, b. fundamental changes in the Japanese constitutional structure, and c. changes in the government as a whole as distinguished from shifts involving individual officials. During the first three years of the Occupation the FEC worked without serious conflict with the MacArthur administration. But as the Occupation passed from its initial phase of reforming Japan to the subsequent phase of restoring her to normal status in the world 9President Truman expressed his determination in his memoirs saying, "We wanted Japan controlled by an American Commander, acting on behalf of the Allies...I was determined that the Japanese occupation should not follow in the footsteps of our German experience. I did not want divided control of separate zones. I did not want to give the Russians any opportunity to behave as they had in Germany and Austria.“ See Memoirs of Harry S. Truman: Year of Decision (New York: Doubleday, 1955), pp. 422-423. 10The U. S. Secretary of State, Byrnes, argued at the time of the establishment of the FEC that the authority of General MacArthur should not be obstructed by the inability of the Commission to agree on policy or of the Allied Council to agree on advice for carrying out the Occupation policy. See Kawai, op. cit., p. 16. HByrnes, op. cit., p. 218. 15 (:ommunity, differences between the United States and othe the FEC gradually increased. As the FEC became increasin ,tzyr disagreement, the United States began to resort more a 1:!163 "urgent unilateral interim directives” and ignored th Consequently, the FEC was able to exercise very i'r1‘f4uence on major policy decisions. The Commission, how cz‘i ssed an indirect restraining influence on the handling 0 tz'i (an problems by the United States and provided the major a: 'legal channel through which to express their opinions o c>‘f= the Occupation. As far as the Allied Council for Japan was conce effectiveness was far less inspiring than the FEC. The r this was that although the Council was created to exercis <>\/€2r~ the Occupation authority in Japan, it was provided w adV'i sory powers. It was also because General MacArthur, (3(3nnnnander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) invariably chose to (3(3l1r1cil's advice, disregarding the fact that he was suppo SUI t with the Council in advance of the issuance of his 0 TITGE 'meeting of the Allied Council for Japan remained peri a"<1 the Occupation policies were almost exclusively formu C‘~‘11"r~ied out by the United States and SCAP with little inf the others. For this practice of the United States, no 0 12Kawai, op. cit., pp. 16-17. 13H. S. Quigley and J. E. Turner, ThepNew Japan, and Politics (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 16 options were available to the other members of the Council. A result, General MacArthur was given authority to take any meas [1&2 deemed necessary for the implementation of the surrender do and the Potsdam Declaration.14 The Preparation of Peace: 1945-1948 The preparation of a peace treaty for Japan during th yea rs after the Japanese surrender was complicated by the fact there was no agency in the American government which was charg the ultimate responsibility for this task, and that there was sen sus among various agencies involved as to the time and the of" the peace treaty. It was further complicated by the fact 1: members of the Far Eastern Commission were deeply divided on c DY‘ObTems, such as the war reparations and control of the Japar ecIOnomy. The position of the United States was that the eleven men ts on the FEC should prepare the preliminary draft of the t J 14By the United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy Japan, General MacArthur was to exercise his authority througt aDanese governmental machinery and agencies and not attempt 1 Se Up a military government. This decision of the U.S. gover was based on the facts that the Japanese government, unlike tr Ue‘fmany, at the end of the war was still in operation and that “1 ted States was incapable of establishing a true military gc “19'“: simply because there were too few Americans who knew Japa "'3 language well enough to administer Japanese affairs. See: M- Maki, Governmentfiolitics in Japan: The Road_to Democracy ( York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 47; Edwih O. Reischauer, United States & Japan (New York: The Viking Press, 1965), p. 2 17 1:reaty for consideration by the peace conference.15 Secretar: éaicgued.that a twenty-five year treaty, later changed to a for“ treaty, should be proposed at the time of the peace conferenc: sstlrce the demilitarization of Japan. Under this arrangement a1 'tri c>n of the treaty should be reported to the Ambassadors or M' ()‘f’ the states that drafted the treaty, who would constitute a 55 ‘i on of Enforcement.16 The draft proposal was submitted to the FEC countrie: J une 21, 1946. But no definite results were attained in the l the proposal was shelved. This draft was written largely in ' sp‘i rit of severe punishment and long term control of Japan. Secretary Byrnes, supporting the draft, argued that: Both in the peace treaty and the demilitarization tr: we must look forward to a long period of involvement Japanese Affairs. The greatest progress we have mad. in the last two years can be lost if we do not make: that the chan es become a permanent part of the Japal way of life.19 M031; of the Allied Powers who would be directly involved in t mak‘ilrig process strongly supported the idea of controls, as ex ir' ‘tJne draft. It raised, however, serious doubts in the mind Off? cials in the American government as to the effectiveness . \ 15Byrnes, op. cit., p. 224. 16ijg, See also U. S. Department of State, Occupat QEEEEQ: Policy and Progress (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Governmen “‘9 Office fn.d.], pp. 85-88. 17 Byrnes, op. cit. 18 a long-term punitive treaty. Among those who were against a long-term occupation a 18 FJLunitive treaty was General MacArthur. As early as March 19 2111 interview granted to foreign press correspondents, Generall s a ‘id that: The time is now approaching when we must talk peace w Japan. Our occupation job here can be defined as fal roughly into three phases--military, political and ec The military purpose, which was to insure Japan will the ways of peace, and never again be a menace, has b think, accomplished . . . Psychologically, I believe success has been equally propitious. Japan understan thoroughly as any nation that war does not pay. Her spiritual revolution has been probably the greatest t world has ever known.19 Ma cArthur's suggestion for an early peace settlement with Japa based on his conviction that the prolonged occupation by the U States could cause adverse effects on the Japanese people in t o‘r"'ientation toward the United States. In other words, the Uni SS1lates might be seen by the Japanese people as imperialist. M ‘>\/Eev~, a prolonged occupation, in his view, would only cause ec \ 18Early termination of the Allied Occupation of Japan EXDY‘essed by General MacArthur in 1946 to the members of the F tastern Advisory Commission during their visit to Tokyo. He 5 he Occupation would not last more than three to five years, a grged the Commission to work on the terms of a peace treaty fo ee U. S. Department of State, The Far Eas_t_ern Cgflission, A S littfigrnational Cooperation, 1945 to 1952, Publication 5138, Far ifiY“ies 60 (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, ~ 21. 19Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Report of mehtSection, Political Reorientation of Japan: September 1945 §§Etember 1948, 2 vols., (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Office, 1959), p. 765. 19 strangulation and bring about an enormous economic burden to the United States to keep the Japanese alive. He accordingly advocated a quick peace settlement with Japan. As for the security of post independent Japan, General MacArthur had an optimistic view. He first favored the neutrality of Japan, saying that Japan should become "the Switzerland of the Pacific". He was against the rearmament of Japan and also against a peace treaty wh 'i ch included any security provisions. He claimed that the best way to defend Japan would be defense by the United Nations.20 He later changed his position and argued that Japan should be invited "to assure herself of security in the Communist-threatened Western Pacific by entering into a pact providing her with military defenses".2] General Ma cArthur's suggestion for an early treaty with Japan was not fully supported by other groups in the United States, mainly the War and Navy Departments and the State Department. The War and Navy Depart- men ts were against an early treaty, fearing that post-treaty Japan mi th not be able to defend herself. Both departments were in favor 0‘: Y‘earming Japan despite the new Japanese Constitution that renounced ZOIbid., p. 65. 21New York Times, November 5, 1949. the establishment of military forces 20 22 and of maintaining nea ;aearmanent U.S. bases in Japan proper. In order to have free the Japanese mandated islands and the Ryukus for military pur (162;)artments wanted them assigned to the U. S. as "strategic t s;l1 i ps", rather than as ordinary trusteeships which would be s to U.N.' supervision. 23 . On the other hand, in the State Department there was un "i ty of opinion regarding a peace treaty with Japan. In Mar El ciraft of the peace treaty for Japan was drawn up by a group tagyr Hugh Borton, Special Assistant to the Director of the Offi Ea s tern Affairs . Ja Panese 24 The draft called for all precautions agai military revival, which included no military forces 13f1£iri internal police and a coast guard; no research of a prim mi 1 itary nature; no manufacture or operation of either milita CT V‘l' '1 aircraft; and no stockpiling of strategic raw materials \ noUhcing 22Article IX of the Japanese Constitution of 1947, i the establishment of military forces, reads: Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based 0 justice and order, the Japanese people forever renou as.a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding para land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war pote will never be maintained. The right of belligerency state will not be recognized. 23Frederick Dunn, Peace Makinggand the Settlement Wi U’rinceton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 57. 24This draft was later revised in August 1947 and age January 1948. 21 eaxcess of normal requirements for current consumption. These restric- tzions were to remain in force twenty five years after the establishment ()1: peace unless the governments represented on the Commission of Inspection should otherwise decide. There was to be a Council of Ambassadors, representing the eleven nations at that time belonging 't:() the Far Eastern Commission. The Council was to enforce these re- strictive provisions. Furthermore, stringent reparations were to be ‘i’ mposed.25 There were no provisions for the post-treaty security of J apan, and no grants of bases or other military advantages to the U.S. Another group, the Policy Planning Staff, headed by George F:.. Kennan, which was created in April 1947, had different views. The members of the Planning Staff were not in favor of the attempts to hasten a treaty with Japan. They regarded Japan's social, economic, Eif1<:: F1 Events Policy toward Foreign Issues Policy Issues By-Passing Process Feed-back Process (Domestic) Feed-back Process (External) S: The external and domestic stimuli. The domestic stimuli include interests articulated by policy influencers, such as parties, groups, and public opinion, and also include domestic military and economic needs. B: The decision makers' belief system through which they per- ceive the reality. 0: The decision makers' perceptions of the foreign policy issues and their expression of their attitudes toward the issues. R: The actions taken by the decision makers. The modification from the S-O-R model includes the following: (a) an emphasis is placed on the domestic stimuli by introducing dom- estic feedback process; (b) the decision makers' belief system is added; and (c) the by-passing process of the belief system is indicated. The emphasis on the domestic stimuli does not imply that the external stimuli are insignificant. It merely stresses that the domestic stimuli may be more relevant than the external ones in the study of 136 foreign policy making in a particular nation. The decision makers' belief system is introduced in the model because many studies point out that, in the definition of the situations, the stimuli are per- ceived by the decision makers through their own view of the world.6 Thus, in this model the belief system is considered as an intervening variable. It is not, however, claimed that the decision makers' belief system is always a significant variable in relation to all the stimuli which are perceived by the decision makers. Thus, if the nature of the stimuli are "objectively" unambiguous, then it seems safe to assume that the belief system may make little variation on the perception of the decision makers.7 The by-passing process in the model indicates this aspect. An advantage of this model seems to be its capability to indicate not only how the decision makers perceive the stimuli but also why they do. Within the framework of this model, then, the question of why Japan has established and maintained the alliance with the United States as a core of her security policy can be answered by analyzing the relationships among the significant external and domestic stimuli, the nature of the decision makers' belief system, and the decision 6For a more detailed discussion of this subject, see Joseph H. de Rivers, The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co., 1968), pp. 19-32. 7Ole R. Holsti, "Individual Differences in 'definition of the Situation'", Journal of Conflict Resolution, XIV (September 1970) 309. 137 maker's perception toward the security policy. It is, therefore, possible to postulate at least four major propositions with respect to Japanese security policy: 1. The decision makers' perceptions in favor of the alliance may not be related to their own favorable attitudes or orientations toward the alliance, but exclusively related to the influence of domestic stimuli, such as pressure from public opinion, interest groups, and military and economic needs. 2. The decision makers' perceptions in favor of the alliance may be exclusively related to the influence of the external stimulus, such as political pressure from the United States. 3. The decision makers' perceptions in favor of the alliance may be exclusively related to their own attitudes and orientations (their belief system) which are favorable toward the United States and the alliance with her. 4. The decision makers' perceptions in favor of the alliance may be a complex interaction of the above three propositions. The empirical tests of the above propositions require the i ClGritification and measurement of a great number of external and domestic ‘37E3itTqui, and also need the analysis of the decision makers' belief $.YStem. In this study, however, no attempt is made to carry out such a Comprehensive task. The purpose of this study is limited to the examina- ~1'10“ of the relationships between two key domestic stimuli, public ‘DDlrrion and the press, and the decision makers' perceptions regarding the alliance with the United States. Accordingly, this study is too limited to provide any comprehensive answer to the question of why Japan pursues the alliance with the United States. The analytical model (the modified S-O—R model) for Japan's security policy which includes only major domestic stimuli is as follows: 138 THE MODIFIED S-O-R MODEL For The Analysis Of The Relationships Between Four Domestic Stimuli And The Decision Makers' Perceptions Toward The U.S.-Japanese Alliance § 12 .Q. B. Public Opinion Decision Decision The U.S.- Makers' Makers' Japanese The Press Image of Favorable Alliance The U.S. .Perceptions System Economic Needs Toward U.S.- Japanese Security Needs Alliance By-Passing Process Feed-back Process (Domestic) The inclusion of Japan's economic and security needs in the model is based upon this researcher's belief that they seem to be also key variables. Although only two domestic stimuli, public opinion and the press, are included in the analysis of this study, it is my intention to explain briefly the rationale for selecting all four of them as key domestic stimuli. Also, this study does not the analysis of the decision makers' belief system, not because it is insignificant but because it is assumed to be a constant factor. A brief discussion of the nature of their belief system will be presented later in this chapter. Public Opinion In order to see the relationships between the powerful domestic political forces and the decision makers' perceptions, public opinion 139 and press attitudes are selected for this study. There are, of course, other political forces that play powerful roles in the Japanese politi- cal process, namely organized interest groups and political parties. They are excluded from this study largely for the following reasons: First, on major foreign policy issues, the powerful organized interest groups are almost strict partisan in terms of their support for the party's positions on the issues:8 for instance, the most powerful business group, Keidanren, supports the Liberal Democratic Party; the most powerful labor organization, Shoyo, and the left-wing student organization, Zengakuren, support the Socialist Party; and the moderate right-wing labor organization, Zenro, which is the second largest labor organization, supports the Democratic Socialist 9 With the exception of Zengakuren, other groups generally Party. attempt to influence the decision makers through the political parties. Consequently, as far as Japanese foreign policies are con- cerned, both the major interest groups and political parties can be treated as the same unit rather than as separate entities. Second, the Japanese political parties are ideology-oriented parties rather than pragmatic and issue-oriented parties. As a conse- quence, it has been extremely difficult for the parties to compromise 8For the positions of these groups on the alliance, refer to Chapter II of this paper. 9For a detailed discussion of these relationships, see Robert A. Scalapino and Junnosuke Masumi, Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1962), especially Chapter IV. 140 their stands on major issues. Particularly, in the area of foreign policies, the positions of the political parties are clearly divided. Unlike the United States, bipartisan attitudes of the major parties to- ward foreign policies have never been developed in post-independent Japan.1O Over the past twenty-five years, the Japanese decision makers have been recruited consistently from the leadership groups in the I] To the decision makers, the claims of the Liberal Democratic Party. other political parties, especially on the issue of the alliance, are totally unacceptable. It is, therefore, safely assumed that the decision makers have not been greatly influenced by the other politi— cal parties on the issues of the alliance. For these reasons, both the interest groups and political parties are excluded from this study. In the Japanese political process, it is recognized that the mass public plays significant roles. The average Japanese is well 12 exposed to a substantial amount of political information. This is partly due to their high literacy level, over 98 percent of the popu- I3 lation, and their energetic reading habits. This is also due to the 10Tsuneish, op. cit., p. 200. 1]This does not mean that there is a unity among the members of the LDP on the foreign policy issues. The factional struggle within the LDP is, however, centered around the personalities of the leader- ship rather than the issues. See Scalapino, op. ci ., P- 253- 12Robert Ward, Japanese Political System (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967). p. 55. 130. N. Statistical Yearbook, 1969, p. 979. 141 fact that the Japanese mass media devote a considerable amount of space or time to the subjects directly or indirectly related to 14 The voting turn-out in the elections, as an indicator politics. of the public participation in the political process, appears impressive. In the 1967 general election, for instance, 73.99 percent of the quali- 15 fied voters cast their ballots. This was the third lowest turn-out for such an election since 1947. A comparable figure in the United States is an average of 65 percent.16 In the area of foreign policy, like the peoples in other countries, the Japanese seem to be somewhat less well informed than on domestic issues. Yet the size of the Japanese attentive public is larger than that of the United States. A survey conducted by Douglas Mendel in 1957 indicated that four out of ten Japanese expressed great interest in domestic and foreign policy news, and more than half of the respondents said that they discussed foreign policy issues with others occasionally or frequently.17 14Ward, op. cit., p. 38. 151bid. 16 Karl W. Deutsch, Politics and Government: How People Decide Their Fate (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1970), p. 26. 17Douglas Mendel, The Jppanese People and Foreign Policy (Berkeley and Los Angeles,TCalif.: University of California Press, 1961), pp. 25-41. I42 Mendel claims that Japanese public opinion has a profound I8 impact on foreign policy making. His claim is largely based on his surveys that indicated a high correlation between public support for the party, namely the LDP, and their positions on the foreign policy issues in the general elections. Mendel, thus, states that: ...as the Japanese people become more issue-conscious in their voting, they are more likely to support parties and candidates whose views on such bitter issues as rearmament and tge alliance with the United States coincide with their own. This assumption of Mendel might be correct. Nevertheless, a high correlation between the peoples' support for the party and their views on foreign policy as reflected in the election outcomes appears to be a weak basis for the claim that public opinion influences foreign policy making. People do not vote for the party or candidates only because of foreign policy issues. At the same time, public opinion might be influenced more readily by the decision makers than visa versa. It seems, however, evident that the Japanese government is interested in the trends in public opinion on the major issues, 20 domestic and foreign. In this study, nevertheless, it is 18Ibid., p. 38. 19Ibid., pp. 38-39. 20One of the indicators of its interest is that the Public Information Room in the Prime Minister's Office collects ten to fifteen opinion surveys annually. The surveys are collected through its con- tract with a major independent survey organization, The Central Research Service. See Douglas Mendel, Jr., "Japan Reviews Her American Alliance,” Public Opinion Quarterly, (Spring 1966), p. 2. I43 hypothesized that public opinion on the issues of the alliance has little influence on the decision makers. Public opinion on the alliance appears to be shaped largely on emotional and idealistic grounds. Furthermore, public opinion is widely divided among the various segments of the people. 1132.5. As far as the press is concerned, its influence on public opinion appears to be substantial. The newspapers provide the Japanese people with a broad coverage of both domestic and foreign news. The three national ”prestige papers,” Asahi, Mainichi, and Yomiuri, circu- late widely throughout the country, a combined circulation of over 24 million copies daily out of the total circulation of over 49 million 2] It is interesting to note that in 1968 the daily newspapers. Japanese were purchasing 492 daily newspapers per 1,000 population, the second highest in the world next to 518 in Sweden. The figure in the United States was 309.22 The prestige papers are privately owned and completely free from government control. Their journalists and editors are highly respected by the people and well recognized as opinion makers. The editorials of the three prestige papers tend to be non-partisan, and 21The total number of daily newspapers in 1968 was 171. See U.N. Statistical Yearbook, 1969, p. 749. Ibid. 144 by tradition, they are inclined to be more critical than supportive of government policies.23 The main hypotheses in this study are, therefore, that the press is likely to have a significant impact on public opinion, but on the other hand, it has little influence on the decision makers' perceptions with respect to Japan's security policy. Security Need It is generally recognized in the theories of alliances that the major determinants for a nation state to go into an alliance with other nations are: (a) to increase her capability to influence others, (b) to increase her capability to protect her security against external threats or domestic violences, and (c) to promote economic needs.24 It appears, however, that the most significant single factor for a nation state with weak military capacity to make an alliance is to (@394 increase her military power against an enemy, actual or anticipated. A military alliance may be formed for the offensive purposes designed 23It is known that the editorials of each newspaper appeal to different levels of people. Asahi editorials are aimed at the upper and upper-middle classes while Mainichi editorials are aimed at the middle class. Yomiuri editorials are more popularly written for average people. 24See K. J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice—Hall, Inc., 1972), pp. 112-13; Julian R. Friedman, "Alliance in International Politics" in Julian R. Friedman, et al., ed., Alliance in International Politics (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1970), pp. 4-5; Robert E. Osgood, Alliance and American Foreign Policy (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968), pp. 17-21. 145 for redistributing values or for the defensive purposes of maintaining the status quo. It is, of course, often difficult to distinguish an offensive alliance from a defensive one in actual practice. The U.S.-Japanese Security of 1951 was a defensive alliance aimed at the protection of the security of Japan and the Far East. In addition, it was designed to maintain Japanese public order against the internal disturbances incited by outside forces. The revised treaty of 1960 was also designed to protect Japanese security against external threats, to maintain the security of the Far East, and, in addition, to promote economic cooperation between the United States 25 Nevertheless, as far as Japan is concerned, the main- and Japan. tenance of the security of the Far East seems to be a secondary objective of the alliance, for Japan assumes no obligation under the treaty to engage in any active military participation outside of Japanese territory. In the case of a military alliance (such as the Japanese alliance with the United States) that is designed to increase the defense capability of a nation state against an external threat, it \flv . . . . N 18 poss1ble to postulate that there are at least two major determinants (I 86% {I for the formation of the alliance: first, the existence of an enemy, CK actual or anticipated; second, an inadequate defense capability of its own. In this respect, then, several important theoretical questions can be raised. What is an adequate defense capability of a nation 25Article II of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. 146 state, particularly in this nuclear era? Is it possible to measure the military capability objectively on the basis of the “hard” variables, such as the number of personnel in uniform, the amount of defense expenditure, the size and types of weapons, and so forth? Is an alliance an effective measure to protect the security of a nation 26 Although it is difficult to provide state in the nuclear era? accurate answers to these questions, satisfactory answers have to be made in relation to the degree of the threats from the adversaries. Yet, in peace time, rather than a war or crisis situation, it is also difficult to measure the degree of anticipated threats from the enemy. Consequently, the degree of external threats has to be measured in terms of the perceptions of the decision makers. In the case of Japan, an assumption is made that the Japanese decision makers perceived threats from the anticipated enemy under the alliance, namely China or the Soviet Union, is not an important factor in the definition of the situation. This assumption is based on the fact that Japan has never been threatened by China or the Soviet 27 Union physically or verbally since the end of World War II. Rather 26Morgenthau claims that the reliability of allies is smaller and the risks of alliances commensurably greater in the nuclear age. See Hans J. Morgenthau, “The Four Paradoxes of Nuclear Strategy,” IDS American Political Science Revigw, (March 1964), 33. Organski points out, nevertheless, that the empirical evidence in the past twenty years of the nuclear era indicates that the number of alliances has been in- creased rather than decreased. See A.F.K. Organski, World Politics, 2nd ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968), p. 332. 27Only in a short period, just before and after the outbreak of the Korean War, was there a serious concern over the Communist threats to Japan. 147 Japan has maintained amicable relations with China and the Soviet 28 1A, Union through personal travels and economic trade. Over the years, ___, Japanese relations with China and the Soviet Union have progressively // “I? improved while at the same time Japanese military capabilities have increased greatly.29 Thus, it is further assumed that the predominant concern of the Japanese decision makers in terms of Japan's security need is not really so much the existance of external threats as the perception W“ of insecurity stemming from Japan's inadequate defense capability. - tori Inn/ciao. 60'?“ “’ Economic Need As far as the economic gain from a military alliance is con- cerned, the alliance could provide economic benefits to the member nations through mainly three channels: first, direct economic aid from one party to the other; second, the promotion of trade among the member nations; third, the utilization of national resources for use other than defense. In the U.S.-Japanese alliance, Japan's economic benefit derives from the latter two channels, since the U.S. economic 28B. M. Russett states that the increasing volume of trade and travel are some of the indicators of developing favorable relations between the states. See Bruce M. Russett, Trend in World Politics, (N.Y.: The Macmillan Company, 1965), pp. 33-54. 290n1y in 1958, because of the so-called "the flag” incident in which the Japanese Government refused to have the flag of China raised at the trade fair held in Japan, has the trade between Japan and China been interrupted for a short period of time. 148 aid to Japan ceased in the early 1950's. It should also be pointed out that the alliance with the United States has had an adverse effect on Japan's trade with China and the Soviet Union largely due to the unfavorable reactions from both countries toward the Japanese alliance and, to some extent, to the pressure from the United States, such as embargo. It can be stated, \Ath States has been far greater than the expected gain from the trade with i/dlj/ \1Lb2.04jfl° US however, that Japan's economic gain from the trade with the United China and the Soviet Union. In 1966, for instance, the Japanese exports to the United States were valued at $2,969.5 million and imports valued at $2,657.7 million, that accounted for 30.37 percent of the value of all commodie ties exported and 27.91 percent of import value.30 To understand the magnitude of the trade with the United States, it seems noteworthy to see Japan's trade with her second largest trade partner both in export and import. In the same year, Japan's export to Hong Kong accounted for 3.78 percent of her total exports, and imports from Australia accounted for 7.14 percent of the total.31 It is further evident that Japan's economic gain from the limited spending on her defense has been substantial over the years. Japan has spent an average of less than 2 percent of her gross national 30Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statistical Survey_of Economy of Japan, 1967, pp. 46-49. Ib1d. 149 product for defense, which has been the lowest among the industrialized 32 nations in the world. Many economic theories of alliances postulate that the nation states in an alliance attempt to maximize their outputs (security guarantee) out of the smallest possible inputs (defense cost). In order to explain the degree of the amount of contributions in terms of the cost of defense a nation state is willing to make to the alliance, Olson and Zeckhouser developed a theoretical model based on 33 an economic theory of the indifference curve. The assumptions of their model are: 1. When a nation decides how large a military force to provide in alliance, it must consider the value it places upon collective defense and the other goods that must be sacrificed to obtain additional military forces. 3ZIn 1970, Japan ranked 13th in the world in terms of the total amount of military expenditures. In terms of per capita, the amount was $11, ranking 58th in the world. See U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures 1971, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 50. 33Mancur Olson, Jr. and Richard Zeckhouser, ”An Economic Theory of Alliances," Review of Economics and Statistics, (August 1966), pp. 266-79. Another interesting economic theory of alliance is the work of John G. Cross. His theory is based on the principle of profit maximization in economic behavior. His theory assumes that the nation states choose an alliance from many alternatives to maxi- mize the returns. This fundamental assumption seems to be very weak because in the realities of international politics, the nation states have little alternative alliances to choose from. See John G. Cross, "Some Theoretic Characteristics of Economic and Political Coalitions," Journal of Conflict Recolution, (June 1967), pp. 184-95. 150 2. In an alliance, the amount a nation spends on defense will be affected by the amount its allies provide. 3. When other things are equal, the larger a nation, the higher its valuation of the output of an alliance. They applied their model to the study of NATO, the U.N. and other internationally organized activities, such as economic aid to the underdeveloped countries. One of their findings in relation to the alliance is that the larger nations spend disproportionately larger amo unts for defense than the small nations. This is also true in the case of the U.S.-Japanese Alliance.34 It seems, therefore, evident that Japan's economic need is an 11h[Dortant variable in relation to her alliance with the United States. Tile Belief System of the 11%: ‘i’ sion Makers An important element of the decision makers' belief system in r61 ation to the alliance with the United States seems to be the image . 34Nevertheless, the model of Olson and Zeckhouser appears to be 1 Insufficient to explain the cost-security relationship of the members of the alliance, such as the U.S.-Japanese alliance, in which ‘th63 rnembers do not share the same degree of obligations and the amount 01: tlhe contribution to the alliance by each member is not spelled out. FM3V€3<3ver, as Olson and Zeckhouser did in their study, the use of total defense expenditures of each member state as the primary data for the anal ysis of a particular alliance, such as NATO, seems to be mis- leaaCi‘ing. Because, for instance, it cannot be assumed that the total defense expenditures of the United States is her contribution to any i3ai“tficular alliance to which she is a member. Also, this model, like other economic theories of alliances, is based on the rationality assumptions disregarding the perceptions of the decision makers. 151 of the United States possessed by the decision makers. They perceive the U.S. as a trustful nation.35 In making a military alliance, particularly a bilateral alliance, the image of the partner nation as a trustful or dependable nation may be one of the important considerations for a nation state going into an alliance. It also appears evident that in a military alliance, which is primarily designed to protect the security of the member nations, there are at least two factors that may have signifi- cant effects on the effectiveness of the alliance: (a) the adequacy of the combined defense capabilities of the member nations, vis-a-vis the enemy, actual or anticipated, and (b) the willingness of the member nations to devote their capability, explicitly or implicitly committed to the alliance, in an actual need. In many military alliances, with the exception of those which are formed during conflicts, the test of each member's willingness seldom arises until a serious confrontation takes place with the adversaries. Accordingly, it is argued that the willingness of a member state is measured partly on the basis of the trust between the member nations.36 35Trust is defined as the expectation by one nation that another nation will usually be helpful to her interests. For a similar defini- tion, see Dean G. Pruitt, "Definition of the Situation as a Determinant of International Action,“ in Herbert C. Kelman, ed., International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), p. 397. 36Pruitt states that mutual trust makes it easier for two nations to negotiate agreement because the citizens of each can anticipate that the citizens of the other will uphold their end of the bargain. See Ibid. 152 l . QXC o)“ In the case of the U.S.—Japanese alliance, the Japanese trust in the United States seems to be one important factor for the follow- ing reasons: 1. There is no explicit stipulation in the treaty about the amount of the U.S. capability committed to the alliance. 2. Japan has been almost totally dependent upon the United States for her security. 3. There has been no incident in which the willingness of the United States was tested in an actual confronta- tion with the adversaries. At the same time, a relatively high level of trust possessed by the Japanese decision makers in the United States stems from the empirical facts that the United States has carried out her committments in NATO, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War.37 Also, the earnest efforts of the United States to help Japan to regain her sovereignty and to re— cover her economy following the defeat in World War II should have contributed to such an image of the United States in the minds of the decision makers. In this study, as stated earlier, the decision makers' belief system is not included in the variables to be analyzed and is assumed to be a constant factor. The hypotheses in this study, which will be discussed in the following pages, will include the relationships 37Even in the case of the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War, which drew many serious criticisms against it among the Japanese people, the Japanese decision makers have consistently defended the U.S. involvement, arguing that the U.S. has been carrying out her committment to the South Vietnamese people. 153 among public opinion, the press, and the decision makers' perceptions only. HYPOTHESES This section presents the hypotheses to be tested and the rational for the development of each hypothesis. The variables selected for testing the hypotheses will be presented in the next chapter. Although the main subject area of this research is Japanese security policy, the hypotheses developed in this study includes the broader area of Japanese foreign policy. This is done because Japanese defense policy is made and carried out within the broad boundaries set by the basic principles of Japanese foreign policy. A total number of twelve hypotheses are formulated within three separate relationships: (a) the decision makers' perceptions and the press, (b) the decision makers' perceptions and public opinion, and (c) public opinion and the press. The independent variables are phrased only in general terms in stating the hypotheses since each hypothesis deals with more than one independent variable, which is described when the hypotheses are tested in the following chapter. The Decision Makers' Perception and The Press A basic theoretical assumption under which the hypotheses in this part are developed is that the press, as an opinion maker, has limited influence on the decision makers' perception in foreign policy making. In the case of Japanese foreign POIle making, It is further theorized that the press has very little impact on the 154 decision makers' perception. In this context, the following hypotheses are developed: 1. The decision makers' perceptions of Japan's world status and her international role are not correlated with the opinions of the press. 2. The decision makers' perceptions that are concerned with Japan's close relations with the Asian nations are not correlated with the opinions of the press. 3. The decision makers' perceptions that are concerned with Japan's peace diplomacy are not correlated with the opinions of the press. 4. The decision makers' perceptions of the means to protect Japan's security are not correlated with the opinions of the press. It is assumed that the decision makers' perceptions of the self-image of the nation and the self-role in the world tend to estab- lish a broad boundary of performance in formulating and conducting foreign policy. Hypothesis 1 is developed to test the impact of the press on the decision makers' perceptions in this aspect. Hypothesis 2 is related to Japan's relations with the Asian nations. Throughout modern Japanese history Japanese foreign policy has been oriented more to the Asian nations than any other nations in the world. Only after the end of World War II did the Japanese orientation shift to the United States for political and economic reasons. But, as the Japanese political and economic powers grew, \ ijbdtf” Y/fl/ .1. directed to the Asian nations. The Japanese government claims that “CAOSrJT «6., WWW «in w. a major stress in her foreign policy objectives has been once again ”Asia diplomacy" is one of the three basic principles of Japanese 155 foreign policy.38 The effort of the Japanese government to develop close relations with the Asian nations has been confronted with many problems. One of the problems is related to Japanese security policy. It is because China expressed her profound dissatisfaction with the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty, and also because many other Asian nations have felt a great deal of uneasiness toward the in- creasing military capabilities of Japan. Hypothesis 3 is also related to another basic principle of Japanese foreign policy--peace diplomacy--declared by the decision makers. The decision makers argue that Japan portrays itself as a true peace-loving nation since her Constitution renounces the estab- lishment of a military in Japan. It is from this vantage point, they argue, that Japan can best serve cooperation among all nations to promote world peace. But Japan's alliance with the United States and her effort to increase the Self-Defense Forces tend to discredit the decision makers' claim to some extent. 38The three basic principles of Japanese foreign policy, as declared by the government, include "Asia diplomacy," "peace diplomacy,‘ and "economic diplomacy." "Asia diplomacy" means that Japan as an Asian nation assumes moral responsibility to promote friendly relations among the Asian nations first. ”Peace diplomacy” is interpreted as the Japanese effort to promote world peace through peaceful means, mainly economic and technical cooperation among all the nations. "Economic diplomacy” is referred to as the Japanese effort to place the highest priority on her trade with other countries. See: Okazaki, Katsuo, "Japan's Foreign Relations,‘I The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, (November 1956), pp. 156-58; Naokichi Tanaka, Kakujitaj no Nihon no Anzenhosho (Japan's Security in Nuclear App) (Tokyo: Kajima Heiwa Kenkyusho, 1968), pp. 127-32. 156 Hypothesis 4 is concerned with the actual implementation of the Japanese security policy, which deals with the issues of the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty and SDF. The Decision Makers' Perception and Public Opinion In foreign policy making, it is generally recognized that 39 has public opinion, defined as the opinion of the mass public, little influence on the decision makers. In Japan the decision makers appear to enjoy a great deal of freedom from public pressures in deal- ing with defense policy despite the fact that the mass public is relatively well informed and articulate on the issue. This is partly because the government of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party from which the decision makers are recruited is not likely to be threatened in the general elections on the basis of its security policy. The consecutive victories of LDP in the past twenty years have been accredited to its successful domestic economic policies and to the unpopularity of the opposition parties.40 Under these theoretical assumptions the following hypotheses are formulated: l. The decision makers' perception concerning the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty as a means to pro- tect Japan's security is not correlated with public opinion. 39The concept of the opinion of the mass public is adopted here from Rosenau's definition which is reviewed in Chapter III. 40Scalapino and Masumi, op. cit., pp. 89-98. 157 2. The decision makers' perception concerning neutralism as a means to protect Japan's security is not corre- lated with the public opinions. 3. The decision makers' perception concerning the in- crease of Self-Defense Forces is not correlated with public opinion. 4. The decision makers' perceptions concerning the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty and the increase of Self-Defense Forces and neutralism are not corre- lated with public support for the government. Unlike the previously discussed hypotheses (”The Decision Makers' Perception and the Press," page 153), the variables covered by the above hypotheses are limited to issues on security policy. This is done because of the unavailability of public opinion data dealing with the broad aspect of Japanese foreign policy. As to the Japanese foreign policy orientation, mainly the U.S.-Japanese alliance system, public opinion is largely divided into three groups: (a) those who are in favor of the continuation of the treaty, (b) those who are against the treaty, and (c) those who are in favor of neutralism. Yet among the people who take any one of the above positions, there is no consensus as to the reasons for their opinions. Hypotheses l and 2 are developed to determine the impacts of public opinions, taking these various positions on the decision makers' per- ceptions into account. Hypothesis 3 is concerned with the decision makers' effort to make the Self-Defense Forces an effective military force. Public opinion on SDF is generally divided into two groups, one in favor and the other against the increase of SDF. It is intended to determine the impact of these public opinions on the decision makers' perception that 158 is in favor of the increase of SDF. Hypothesis 4 is formulated in order to see whether or not there is a correlation between the decision makers' perceptions of the defense policy and public support for the government. As pointed out earlier, it is hypothesized that there is no correlation. Public Opinion and the Press A theoretical assumption in dealing with the relationships between public opinion and the press is that the press, as an opinion maker, is able to manipulate the formulation of public opinion. This is particularly true when the press is the major source of information for the public. In the case of Japan, as discussed in the previous chapter, the press plays the dominant role in this report. In this context, the following hypotheses are developed: 1. Public opinion either favorable or unfavorable to the increase of the Self-Defense Forces is correlated with the opinion of the press. 2. Public opinion regarding the necessity of the U.S.- Japanese Security Treaty to protect Japan is corre- lated with the opinion of the press. 3. Public opinion favorable either to the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty or neutralism as the best means to protect Japan's security is correlated with the opinion of the press. 4. Public opinion either favorable or unfavo-able to rearmament of Japan is correlated with the opinion of the press. In developing the above hypotheses, public opinion is limited to the issues concerning the security policy. Hypothesis 1, 2, and 3 cover the same subject areas of public opinion as explained in ”The 159 Decision Makers' Perception and the Press,“ (page 153), covering the decision makers' perceptions and public opinion. Hypothesis 4 deals with the question of rearmament. CHAPTER V METHODOLOGY AND DATA PRESENTATION This chapter presents data for the decision makers' perceptions, the press, and the public opinion variables from 1952 through 1971 on the Japanese foreign policy orientation, mainly the security policy. Methods of collecting the data and the measurements of the variables are explained. The selection of the variables and their measurements are made to satisfy two major criteria: (a) relevance to the hypo- theses, and (b) availability of data. Some reservations and limitations regarding the methodology and data are recognized and discussed in the concluding part of this chapter. THE DECISION MAKERS' PERCEPTION VARIABLES Foreign policy decision makers who are selected for this study include all the prime ministers and foreign ministers during the period from 1952 through 1971. There are five prime ministers and nine foreign ministers. Under the Japanese Constitution, the Prime Minister as the head of the government assumes the ultimate leadership in conducting 160 161 foreign relations.1 Indeed, in practice, all the prime ministers have been extensively involved in the formulation and execution of foreign policies. At least two prime ministers, Yoshida and Kishi, assumed the positions of the premiership and foreign minister con- currently for some time. All the prime ministers, with the exception of one, travelled abroad to conduct personal diplomacy.2 Foreign ministers are officially in charge of the implementation of the policies, but they have been, in fact, largely the spokesmen of the prime ministers. The foreign ministers have invariably been recruited from businessmen and have had little prior experiences in foreign affairs. They have been, however, very active in articulating Japanese foreign policies at home and abroad. Perception data are collected and measured by content analysis of the speeches delivered by the decision makers. It is recognized that content analysis is a useful tool for analyzing documentary evidence, and numerous techniques have been developed 1Article 73 of the Japanese Constitution. Under the Japanese Cabinet system the powers of the Prime Minister are far greater than those of the British Prime Minister. The amount of powers he exer- cises by law and by custom falls somewhere in between those of the British Prime Minister and the President of the United States. See Robert E. Ward, Japan's Political System (N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), pp. 92-96. 2Prime Minister Tanzan Ishibashi is the exception who served the premiership only for two months from December 1956 to February 1957 and resigned for poor health. 162 to extract information from the various types of sources available.3 Several definitions of content analysis have been, however, advanced by social scientists. One dominant perspective in the area is represented in Berelson's definition: Content analysis is a research technique for the objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication.4 Berelson's definition, among other things, explicitly stresses the point that analysis of communication should be independent of the communicator's motives and the desired effects or actual interpreta- tions of the receivers. Holsti, on the other hand, disagrees with Berelson's limitation to the manifest content of communication, explicitly stating that the inferences are the raison d'etre of content analysis: Content analysis is any technique for making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages. 3See Bernard Berelson, Content Analysis in Communication Research, (New York: Free Press, 1952); Ole R. Holsti, Content Analysis for the Social Science and Humanities, (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1969); Robert C. North, et al., Content Analysis: A Handbook with Applications for the Study of International Crisis, (Evanston, Ill: Northwestern University Press, 1963); Ithiel de Sola Pool, Trends in Content Analysis, (Urbana, Ill: University of Illinois Press, 1959). Particularly, the Stanford group has relied heavily on content ana- lysis to measure perceptions of national leaders in conflict situations. Robert Jervis offers a critique of the Stanford studies in "The Costs of the Quantitative Study of International Relations," in Klaus Knorr and James N. Rosenau, eds., Contending Approaches to International Politics, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1969), pp. 177- 217. 4Berelson, p. cit., p. 18. 5Holsti, op. cit., p. 14. 163 The above two definitions, however, agree on the requirements of "objectivity" and "systematic." "Objectivity" means that the cate- gories used to analyze content must be defined so precisely that different researchers can analyze the same content employing these definitions and obtain the same results. ”Systematic“ means that the selection of content to be analyzed must be based on a formal, pre- determined, and unbiased plan.6 The technique adopted in this study is to ccnnit the appearance of the major themes related to the Japanese foreign policy orientation. The following themes, herein—after called the perception variables, are extracted from the speeches: 1. Japan is a leader of the world community. 2. Japan should improve her status in the world. 3. Japan should assume a greater responsibility for the promotion of world peace. 4. Japan should improve her relations with the Asian nations. 5. Japan should improve her relations with China. 6. The U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty protects Japan's security. 7. Neutralism will not protect Japan's security. 8. Japan should increase her Self-Defense Forces. 9. Japan should pursue a peace diplomacy. 6A requirement designed to prevent the analyst from choosing only those elements in the content which happen to fit his hypothesis and ignore others. 164 In counting the appearance of the above themes, the frequency of the appearance, rather than presence or absence of the themes, is recorded. This method is adopted because the frequency of the appear- ance of the themes tends to indicate the intensity of the themes exhibited by the decision makers. It is commonly recognized that frequency count is a measurement of "intensity of attitude“ or “amount of attention” devoted to a topic.7 In his review of content analytic research, Pool has concluded that specific types of inferences are quite reasonable: The assumption that the frequency of statements provides a good index of intensity of attitude is probably reason- able for a large class of cases. By "attitude” here, of course, we mean the attitude expressed in th§ body of the text, not the covert feelings of the author. In recording the frequency of the themes in the decision makers' speeches, only explicit themes are counted, and no effort is made to interpret the implications of the words in the speeches. The speeches from which the perception variables are collected are generally two kinds: first, the speeches delivered in the Japanese Diet, hereinafter called the Diet speeches,9 and second, the speeches 7See A. L. Baldwin, "Personal Structure Analysis: A Statistical Method for Investigating the Single Personality,“ Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 37, 1942, pp. 163-83; Ole R. Holsti, op. cit., pp. 5-6; I. L. Janis, "Meaning and the Study of Symbolic Behavior,‘ Psychiatry, 6, pp. 425-39. 8Pool, op. cit., p. 194. 9 speeches. All the Diet speeches are the administrative and policy 165 delivered outside of the Diet. The statements and testimonies given by the decision makers at the committee hearings in the Diet are ex- cluded because they are generally structured by the questions directed to the decision makers by others. The total number of Diet speeches available for this study is 65 during the period from 1955 through 1971. As for the other speeches, the press interviews and the decision makers' election campaign speeches are excluded since they are less reliable in terms of the decision makers' perception. The number of other speeches available for this study is 33. The decision makers' speeches combining the Diet speeches and other speeches are hereinafter called the overall speeches.1O THE PRESS VARIABLES The press variables selected for this study are the major themes related to the Japanese foreign policy orientation that are extracted from the editorials of the newspaper, Asahi Shinbun, during the period from 1952 through 1972. For two reasons, only one news- paper, Asahi Shinbun, is chosen for this study: First, Asahi Shinbun is the most prestigeous paper in Japan and has the largest daily circulation. It is also recognized that Asahi Shinbun has the most comprehensive coverage of domestic and foreign affairs, and its 10Total number of the overall speeches is 98. The data on the perception variables from the Diet and overall speeches are shown in Appendix B and C respectively. The sources of the speeches include The Japanese Diet Records, Japan Quarterly(documentary sections), and the Diet Yearbdok. 166 editorials are known as having most intellectual appeal. Like Ip§_ New York Times in the United States, Asahi Shinbun is the one that most politicians and intellectuals in Japan read regularly. Second, it is intended to cover every editorial, rather than taking samples. Covering the twenty year period of the editorials from more than one newspaper would require enormous time and cost which are not available to this researcher. The major themes extracted from the press, hereinafter called the press variables, are: 1. Japan should improve her status in the world. 2. Japan should pursue a peace diplomacy through the United Nations. 3. Japan should pursue an independent foreign policy. 4. Japan should help underdeveloped countries. 5. Japan should improve her relations with the Asian nations. 6. Japan should improve her relations with China. 7. Japan should not increase her Self-Defense Forces. 8. Japan should not rearm. 9. The arrangements under the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty are not satisfactory. 10. Japan should pursue her security through the United Nations. 11. Japanese foreign and defense policies are not satisfactory. The method used in collecting the press variables is also content analysis of the editorials. The measurement adopted here is the counting of the.appearance of the themes. Unlike the perception I67 variables, however, the appearance of a theme in one editorial is counted only once, disregarding the frequency of its appearance in the same editorial. This method is utilized largely because it was found that in most cases the editorials rarely repeated the same theme more than once. This is true because the space allocated for the editorial is relatively small, an average of twelve short paragraphs; often an editorial is further divided into two different subject areas. As in the case of the perception variables, no attempt is made to interpret the implications of the words in the editorials, and only the explicit themes are counted. No summaries of the editorials are used as the sources of the press data, and only the original editorials are analyzed.H THE PUBLIC OPINION VARIABLES The public opinion variables, hereinafter called the opinion variables, are the percentages of the samples that are in agreement with the particular questions asked in the national opinion surveys.12 HThe total number of the editorials covering any aspect of the Japanese foreign policy and the world affairs is 472. However, editorials containing one or more of the above press variables is 272. The data on the press variables are shown in Appendix D. 12This method of using the percentage in public opinion surveys, which takes a particular stand as a variable, is also utilized by others. See John E. Mueller, ”Presidential Popularity from Truman to Johnson," APSR (March 1970), 18-34. 168 The questions in the surveys selected for this study are:13 l. The U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty is the best means to protect Japan's security. 2. Neutralism is the best means to protect Japan's security. 3. The U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty protects Japan. 4. The U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty does not protect Japan. 5. The Self-Defense Forces should be increased. 6. The Self-Defense Forces should not be increased. 7. The Self-Defense Forces are needed. 8. The Self-Defense Forces are not needed. 9. I support the Government. Collection of the opinion data proved to be a difficult task mainly for two reasons: first, no polling agency conducted the opinion surveys on the same subjects consistently during the twenty-year period; second, the wording of the questions on the same subjects in the same polls varied from time to time. In order to obtain the data as accurately and consistently as possible, this researcher adopted the following criteria in collecting the opinion variables. First, among numerous polls taken by the various agencies throughout the years, the two most extensive and prestigeous polls are 13The wording of the questions described here as the opinion variables are modified from the actual wording which appeared in the national surveys. The actual wording of the questions and the survey results are listed in Appendix E. 169 chosen for the primary sources of the data. These are the Asahi Polls and the polls of the Central Research Service. The Asahi Polls are associated with the Asahi Shinbun, that regularly polls opinions on the major domestic and foreign issues. The Central Research Service is a private polling agency that regularly conducts opinion surveys on behalf of the Prime Minister's Office under a government contract. Both polls utilize the same survey methods. The national samples are taken from the population over eighteen years old, and the interview method is used. The sizes of the Asahi polls are invariably around 3,000 and the polls of the Central Research Service are relatively large, normally around 16,000. On a very few occasions another poll, the Mainich Poll, which is associated with the second largest news- paper, the Mainich Shinbun, is chosen for a source of the opinion data when the data are not available from the above two sources. The survey methods and the sizes of the Mainich polls are almost the same as those of the Asahi polls. Second, the data are collected only from identical or nearly identical questions in the surveys, because it is proven that even a slight variation in the wording of the question tends to elicit l4 quite different responses in the opinion polls. Third, whenever more than one survey was taken by the 14John E. Mueller, "Trends in Popular Support for the Wars in Korea and Vietnam,” The American Political Science Review, June 1971, pp. 358-75. ' 170 above polls on the same subject matter during the six-month period (the unit period adopted for the analyses in this study) the average is calculated to determine the size of the percentage. In following the above criteria of collecting the opinion data, the sizes of the available data were diminished greatly. Never- theless, it is believed that the accuracy of the data is most important for this study.15 CONCLUSION A number of factors impose reservations on the data and methodology described in this chapter that may weaken the analysis which could require some qualifications in the conclusion of this study. First, the selection of the major themes, as the perception and press variables, are a result of subjective decisions on the part 01: this researcher. A question can be raised as to the relevancy of thee variables as the precise indicators of the decision makers' per- ceptions and the press on the Japanese foreign policy orientation. Nevertheless, in order to select most relevant themes in this respect, 11162 following efforts were made in the process of collecting the data. 1'1 the perception variables, a total number of twenty-eight major themes were extracted from the decision makers' speeches, and recorded bo'th in frequency and present—absent scales. Out of twenty-eight \ 15The public opinion data are shown in Appendix E. The source (VF the public opinion data are Asahi Yearbook, National Public Opinion §213591Yearbook, and Mainich Yearbook. 171 original themes, nine were chosen which appear to be most relevant to this study. The same procedure was used in collection of the press variables. The total number of twenty-nine major themes were extracted from the editorials and measured. Out of these twenty-nine, eleven themes were finally chosen for this study. Second, the use of only one newspaper as the source of the press data has limited scope. The collection of the data from other major newspaper or several papers might possibly bring about different results in testing the hypotheses. Third, concerning public opinion, it is fully recognized that the insufficient data available from the surveys previously conducted by others places severe limitations. With these reservations and limitations in mind, the hypotheses are tested in the following chapter. CHAPTER VI TESTING THE HYPOTHESES This chapter presents the results and interpretations of correlation analyses of the data on the variables selected for the test of the hypotheses. It is divided into three sections, each dealing with a set of the hypotheses in the three subject areas of the relationships: the decision makers' perceptions and the press, the decision makers' perceptions and the public opinion; and public opinion and the press. All hypotheses with the exception of one are tested by using regression analysis. The exception is Hypothesis 4 that deals with the relationship between the decision makers' perceptions and the [Dublic support for the government (page 209). This hypothesis is iaested by using the Pearson (Product Moment) Correlation Coefficient analysis.1 Regression analysis is mostly used in this study primarily because it offers two distinct advantages. First, it measures not (Drny'the level of correlation between the variables, but also the degree (ff impact of each independent variable on the dependent variable. 1Since Hypothesis 4 deals with a bi-variate correlational iinalysis, it is believed that Pearson (Product Moment) Correlation (3oefficient would be sufficient to yield a desired result. 172 173 Second, it allows for a correlation analysis dealing with multiple- variables. As for the decision makers' perception variables, the same variables from the Diet speeches and the overall speeches are separ- ately correlated with other variables. However, only the results of the analyses dealing with the perception variables from the Diet speeches are presented in this chapter unless the results using the perception variables from the overall speeches present substantially different outcomes. This is done because perception variables from the Diet speeches seem to be most significant for this research since all the Diet speeches used in this research are either administrative or policy speeches. In testing each hypothesis, the dependent variables are analyzed with and without a time lag of a six-month period. First, both dependent variables and independent variables with the time lag ()f six months are correlated with the independent variables from the [Jreceding period. The results of both analyses are presented in each tzable. The time lag is used in order to ascertain whether or not the ‘irfifiuence of the independent variables is immediate. In determining thesignificancelevel of the correlations, the lievels below .20 are termed acceptable, though they are larger than 'the levels which are normally accepted in most social science re— SSearches, which are below .05. The level .20 is adopted in this study 'For two reasons: (a) the variables, with the exception of the opinion Variables, are selected from the total population, not from the samples; 174 (b) since most hypotheses are stated to test the zero correlations, the significant level of .20 provides a much more rigid test than .05. In this chapter, no attempt is made to present the overall interpretations of the findings on the hypotheses. The major find- ings and their theoretical significances are discussed in the concluding chapter. THE DECISION MAKERS' PERCEPTIONS AND THE PRESS In testing the hypotheses in this section dealing with the relationships between the decision makers' perceptions and the press, the decision makers' perceptions are treated as dependent variables and the press variables are treated as independent variables. Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 1 states that the decision makers' perceptions of Japan's world status and her international role are not correlated with tnie opinions of the press. In order to test this hypothesis, three perception variables and four press variables are correlated. The perception variables are: 1. Japan is a leader of the world community. 2. Japan should improve her status in the world. 3. Japan should assume a greater responsibility for the promotion of world peace. 2The hypotheses dealing with the relationships between public 0Pinion and the press are stated to test p-sitive correlations. As ‘Will be shown in Tables XXVI through XXXIII, the significant level of .20 adopted in this study, however, made no difference because the Values of positive correlations are very high. 175 The first two variables are related to Japan's world status and the third one is related to Japan's international role for the promotion of world peace. The press variables are: 1. 2. 3. 4. Japan should improve her status in the world. Japan should pursue a peace diplomacy through the United Nations. Japan should pursue an independent foreign policy. Japan should help underdeveloped countries. This hypothesis is tested in two parts: first, Japan's world status; and second, Japan's international roles. The results of the regression analyses on the first part are contained in Table V and Table VI (p. 177) and on the second part are contained in Table VII (p. 178). TABLE V The Impact of the Press on the Decision Makers' Perception: ”Japan is a Leader of the World Community” Press 3 jfigriables N0 TIME LAG TIME LAG b partial Sig. b partial Sig. b b TIntercept .32 .24 Pursue a F’eace Diplomacy —.O7 -.13 .51 .04 .07 .71 Inmrove Japan's Idorld Status -.06 -.03 .85 -.17 .10 .59 R2=. N=31 Sig.R2=n.s. R2=.Ol N=31 Sig.R2=n.s. 3 In all the tables in this chapter, this column indicates Time Lag of six months is considered for the dependent variable. 176 The results shown in Table V suggest that the degree of the multiple correlation between the perception and the press variables is very low and insignificant. In other words, the decision makers' perception of Japan's world leadership is not influenced by the press. Among the two press variables, the press' assertion that Japan should improve her world status may be more relevant than the other in relation to the perception variable. Two partial correlations be- tween this particular press variable and the perception variable also suggest that there is no significant correlation between them. It should be pointed out, however, that the press' claim that Japan should improve her world status is the theme appearing least frequently in the editorials. As the data in Appendix D indi- cates, this theme appeared only twice in 1960. On the other hand, the decision makers perceived Japan's world leadership frequently throughout the years since 1962 at which time it first appeared. This is because Japan was not playing a significant leadership role in the world both in economic and political spheres until the 1960's. The results shown in Table VI also suggest that there is :10 significant correlation between the perception variable and the [Dress variables. It seems important to notice that although the [Dress variable claiming the improvement of Japan's world status is (exactly the identical theme as the perception variable, the partial correlation between this particular press variable and the perception variable is very low and insignificant. Among these press variables, the one that urges an independent foreign policy of Japan seems to 177 have a somewhat significant correlation with the perception variable. Throughout the years, one of the most serious and outspoken criticisms of the press on Japanese foreign and defense policies has been the assertion that Japan has pursued policies under the influence of the United States. It seems, therefore, that the decision makers are to some extent sensitive to this criticism of the press. Nevertheless, the sizes of the partial correlation and the regression coefficient suggest that the impact of this press variable on the perception vari- able is not substantially high. TABLE VI The Impact of the Press on the Decision Makers' Perception: "Japan Should Improve her World Status" Press yariables NO TIME LAG TIME LAG b partial Sig. b partial Sig. b b .Intercept .34 .68 Inmrove her bdorld Status .18 .08 .68 -.13 -.05 .78 F’ursue a Peace [Diplomacy -.02 -.03 .90 -.06 -.O8 .68 F’ursue an Independ- eant Foreign Policy .17 .28 .14 -.13 -.19 .32 R2=.O9 N=31 Sig.R2=n.s. R2=.O6 N=31 Sig.R2=n.s. Unlike the decision makers' perception that Japan is a leader 0f the world community which began to appear in their speeches in 1962, the theme urging the improvement of Japan's world status appeared in I78 their speeches from the early 1950's. This seems to indicate that the decision makers have been deeply concerned with the restoration of Japanese world prestige and power, although not necessarily its mili- tary power. TABLE VII The Impact of the Press on the Decision Makers' Perception: "Japan Should Assume a Greater Responsibility for the Promotion of World Peace” Press Variables NO TIME LAG. TIME LAG b partial Sig. b partial Sig. b b Intercept 3.08 2.79 Pursue a Peace Diplomacy .29 .16 .42 .47 .25 .20 Improve Japan's World Status 1.03 .17 .38 -l.09 -.18 .35 Japan Should I Help U.D. -.16 -.09 .66 .26 .13 .49 R2=.O9 N=31 Sig.R2=n.s. R2=.O9 N=31 Sig.R2=n.s. The results of the regression analyses on the second part of the hypothesis dealing with Japan's responsibility in the world are contained in Table VII. The results suggest no significant correlation between the perception and the press variables. It is particularly interesting to note that the press variable that asserts Japan's responsibility for providing technical and economic assistance to the underdeveloped countries has the least significant I79 impact on the decision makers despite the fact that this press variable suggests a method of implementing Japan's responsibility. It appears, however, that the decision makers have been deeply interested in assuming a greater responsibility for the promotion of world peace because, as the data in Appendix B show, this particular theme appears most frequently in the decision makers' speeches. From the observation of the low correlations, it is thus concluded that Hypothesis 1 is substantiated, suggesting that the press had no influence on the decision makers' perception. jiypothesis 2 Hypothesis 2 states that the decision makers' perceptions iiavorable to Japan's close relations with the Asian nations are not <2c>rrelated with the opinion of the press. In order to test this hypothesis, two perception variables Eir1cl four press variables are correlated. The perception variables are: 1. Japan should improve her relations with the Asian nations. 2. Japan should improve her relations with China. The press variables are: 1. Japan should improve her relations with the Asian nations. 2. Japan should improve her relations with China. 3. Japan should not rearm. 4. Japan should not increase her Self-Defense Forces. 180 The first two press variables are exactly the same themes as those of the perception variables. The remaining two press variables are chosen for this analysis because it is generally recognized by many that the Japanese effort to increase her Self-Defense Forces or to rearm has been unwelcomed by most Asian nations. Such an effort, therefore, would bring about an adverse effect on Japan's relations with the Asian countries. Both perception and press variables involv- ing China are selected for this analysis primarily because she is the single most frequently mentioned Asian nation. Since her independence in 1952, Japan had been profoundly (:oncerned with her future relations with China. This is evident t)eacause throughout the years, all the prime ministers, although they c:c>nsidered it premature and politically unwise to establish formal cj'igalomatic relations, encouraged Japanese people to expand trade and 4 Also, a great number of politicians, cultural exchanges with China. i riczl uding the leaders of the major political parties and the members (D'f’ tzhe Diet, were allowed to visit China. Tables VIII and IX contain the results of the regression Eina'l‘yses that indicates the impact of the press variables on the de(:‘ision makers' perception that is favorable to the development of C1 Ose relations with the Asian nations. \ 'F’ 4For the statements made by the successive prime ministers in AaYOY‘ of trade with China, see Yoshida, Shigeru, "Japan and Crisis in F513," Foreign Affairs (January 1951), 179; Scalapino, Robert A., "The porefign Policy of Modern Japan," in Roy C. Macridis, ed., Foreign .4214153y in World Politics, 2nd ed., (N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1962), 13° 2€50;and Documentary News of the Month (Tokyo: 1964), p. 67. 181 TABLE VIII The Impact of the Press on the Decision Makers' Perception: "Japan Should Improve her Relations with the Asian Nations" Press Variables N0 TIME LAG TIME LAG b partial Sig. b partial Sig. b b Intercept 1.66 2.37 Improve Relations w/Asian Nations .26 .22 .25 -.16 -.14 .47 Improve Relations With China -.02 -.02 .91 -.25 -.25 .18 R2=.05 N=31 Sig.R2=n.s. R2=.O9 N=31 Sig.R2=n.s. The results in Table VIII indicate that there is no signifi- cant correlation between the perception and press variables. Although both the decision makers and the press are in agreement that Japan has to improve her relations with the Asian nations, the impact of the press on the decision makers' perception is minimal. The low corre- lation seems to be partly due to the fact that the decision makers had been confronted with many complicated problems in developing close relations with the the Asian nations, particularly two of its closest neighbors, China and South Korea. The early development of diplomatic relations with China has been seriously hampered by the U.S. defense policies in Asia.5 This problem became acute after the U.S. 5See Oliver, Lee, "Communist China and Western Europe," Current History (September 1964), 146. 182 involvement in Vietnam war and China's nuclear explosion. With South Korea, no diplomatic relation had been established until 1955, primarily owing to the decade-old animosities between the two peoples.6 Even though the press had been in favor of an early establishment of diplomatic relations between the two nations, many Japanese people, particularly the left wing socialists and their sympathizers, had been against it. TABLE IX The Impact of the Press on the Decision Makers' Perception: "Japan Should Improve her Relations with the Asian Nations” Press Variables NO TIME LAG TIME LAG b partial Sig. b partial Sig. b b Intercept 1.87 2.25 Against Increase of SDF .05 .03 .88 -.53 -.32 .09 Against Rearmament .05 .01 .94 .03 .01 .94 R2=.OOI N=31 Sig.R2=n.s. R2=.10 N=31 Sig.R2=n.s. Table IX above contains the results of the analyses which indicate the impact of the press' assertions which are unfavorable to the increase of SDF and rearmament on the decision makers' perception. 6Many opinion surveys in Japan indicated for a long time that Koreans had been the second most hated people, next to the Russians, by the Japanese people. 183 On the whole, the results suggest that the press has no significant impact on the decision makers' perception. Yet when the time lag of six months is considered, the press' claim, which is unfavorable to the increase of SDF, has a significant correlation with the perception variable. The degree of the impact of the press is, however, not very strong. Furthermore, it is important to note that the signs of both partial correlation and regression coefficient are negative. This finding indicates a tendency that the more the press asserts its objection to the increase of SDF, the less frequently the decision makers stress Japan's closer relations with the Asian nations. TABLE X The Impact of the Press on the Decision Makers' Perception: ”Japan Should Improve her Relations with China" Press Variables NO TIME LAG TIME LAG b partial Sig. b partial Sig. b b Intercept .88 1.40 Improve Rel. With China .10 .13 .49 -.14 -.18 .34 Improve Rel. With Asia .10 .10 .58 -.13 -.15 .44 R2=.03 N=31 Sig.R2=n.s. R2=.O6 N=31 Sig.R2=n.s. Nevertheless, this finding seems insufficient to claim that the press has a significant impact on the decision makers' perception that is favorable to close relations with the Asian nations for the following three reasons: First, the decision makers' perception is 184 not correlated with the press variable that is unfavorable to rearma- ment of Japan, notwithstanding that the issues concerning SDF and rearmament are nearly identical in the eyes of the press. Second, although not shown in the table, the results of the regression analyses involving exactly the same perception variable but extracted from the decision makers' overall speeches indicate no correlations with the press variable. Third, as shown in the following Table XI, the decision makers' perception that is favorable to a close relation with China is not correlated to the press variable. TABLE XI The Impact of the Press on the Decision Makers' Perception: ”Japan Should Improve her Relations with China'l Press Variables NO TIME LAG TIME LAG b partial Sig. b partial Sig. b b Intercept .75 1.42 Improve Rel. With China .10 .12 .54 -.13 -.18 .37 Improve Rel. w/ Asian Nat. .12 .13 .50 -.l4 -.16 .42 Against Increase of SDF .12 .09 .64 -.07 —.06 .77 Against Rearma— ment .39 .15 .44 .23 .12 .55 R2=.O6 N=31 Sig.R2=n.s. R2=.08 N=31 Sig.R2=n.s. Table X and XI contain the results of the regression analyses to determine the impacts of the press variables on the decision makers' I85 perception that is favorable to close relations with China. The results indicate that both multiple and partial correla- tions are very low and insignificant and all the sizes of the regression coefficients are extremely low, suggesting that all the press variables in the tables have little impact on the decision makers' perception. It is thus concluded that Hypothesis 2 is also substantiated: the decision makers' perception that is favorable to close relations with the Asian nations is not correlated with the opinions of the press. Hypothesis 3 Hypothesis 3 states that the decision makers' perceptions of the means to protect Japan's security are not correlated with the opinion of the press. In order to test this hypothesis, three per- ception variables as dependent variables and four press variables as independent variables are correlated. The perception variables are: l. The U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty protects Japan's security. 2. Neutralism will not protect Japan's security. 3. Japan should increase her defense forces. The press variables are: l. The arrangements under the U.S.-Japanese Security treaty are not satisfactory. 2. Japan should pursue her security through the United Nations. 3. Japan should not increase her Self-Defense Forces. 4. Japan should not rearm. 186 In this test, three sets of the regression analyses are con- ducted dealing with each one of the perception variables and the combinations of the press variables. The results of the analyses to determine the impact of the press on the decision makers' perception favorable to the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty are contained in Tables XII and XIII (pp. 186 - 187). Both tables contain exactly the same perception and press variables, but the perception variable in Table XIII is extracted from the decision makers' overall speeches. Table XIII is presented here because the results show a significant difference from the results in Table XII. TABLE XII The Impact of the Press on the Decision Makers' Perception: ”The U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty Protects Japan's Security" Press Variables NO TIME LAG TIME LAG b partial Sig. b partial Sig. b b Intercept 1.15 .99 Protect Security through U.N. .95 .20 .30 .56 .12 .51 Not satisfied w/ US-Jap. Sec. Tr. .16 .19 .30 .31 .38 .04 R2=.12 N=31 Sig.R2=.12 R2=.22 N=31 Sig.R2=.O3 The results in the above table suggest that there is a signi- ficant correlation. Particularly, the perception variable is highly I87 correlated with the press' dissatisfaction with the arrangements under the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty. As shown in the following Table XIII, the level of the significance of the correlation increases when the per- ception variable is extracted from the overall speeches. TABLE XIII The Impact of the Press on the Decision Makers' Perception: ”The U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty Protects Japan's Security“ Press Variables NO TIME LAG TIME LAG b partial Sig. b partial Sig. b b Intercept 1.10 .79 Protect Security through U.N. 3.93 .61 .00 .33 .06 .75 Not satisfied w/ US-Jap. Sec. Tr. .17 .20 .26 .59 .52 .00 R2=.48 N=34 Sig.R2=.OO R2=.33 N=33 Sig.R2=.OO The results in Table XIII further suggest that the press' claim that Japanese security should be protected through the U.N. has a very strong impact on the decision makers' perception. Despite this indica- tion, the significance of the impact of this particular press variable on the perception variable may have to be discounted somewhat since the press has been ambivalent in taking such position. As the data indicate, this press variable appeared only twice in 1959 during the height of the controversies surrounding the revision of the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty. Yet this was certainly an indication of the press' dissatisfaction with the treaty. 188 At any rate, it seems evident that the decision makers' per- ception is influenced by the press, since the other variable, which explicitly states its dissatisfaction with the treaty arrangements, is highly correlated with the perception variable. It should be pointed out, however, that the press has never advocated the total abrogation of the treaty throughout the years. The major objections to the treaty by the press have been confined to some of the specific treaty arrange- ments, such as the use of U.S. bases in Japan and the ambiguities of Japanese obligations under the treaty. Table XIV contains the results of the analyses dealing with the impact of the press on the decision makers' perception that is un- favorable to neutralism in Japan. TABLE XIV The Impace of the Press on the Decision Makers' Perception: ”Neutralism Will Not Protect Japan's Security" Press Variables NO TIME LAG VTIME LAG b partial Sig. b partial Sig. b b Intercept -.05 -.003 Not Happy With U.S.-Jap. Sec. Tr. .10 .55 .OO .11 .54 .00 Japan Should Not Rearm .39 .41 .02 .02 -.03 .87 R =.37 N=31 Sig.R =.oo R2=.3O N=31 Sig.R =.01 189 The results suggest that there is a significant correlation. The perception variable, particularly, is strongly correlated with the press' dissatisfaction with the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty. It should be pointed out, however, that both press variables that are unfavorable to the treaty and the rearmament of Japan should not be interpreted as favorable to neutralism. The press, unlike the opinion of the mass public, has never supported neutralism as a viable foreign policy orientation of Japan. But because the abrogation of the treaty, not necessarily total disarmament, is a prerequisite for the estab- lishment of neutralism, the decision makers' perception seems to be reacting strongly to any claim which is unfavorable to the treaty. TABLE XV The Impact of the Press on the Decision Makers' Perception: "Japan Should Increase her Self-Defense Forces” Press Variables NO TIME LAG TIME LAG b partial Sig. b partial Sig. b b Intercept .15 .14 SDF Should Not be Increased .03 .08 .69 .03 .07 .73 Japan Should Not Rearm -.ll -.12 .54 .03 .04 .85 R2=.02 N=31 Sig.R2=n.s. R2=.Ol N=31 Sig.R2=n.s. Table XV contains the results of the analyses that indicate the impact of the press on the decision makers' perception that is favorable to the increase of SDF. 190 The results suggest that the decision makers' perception is not influenced by the press' objection to the increase of SDF. One of the explanations for this tendency appears to be that the decision makers and the press do not perceive the question of increasing SDF in the same direction. For the decision makers, the increase of SDF is necessary for Japan's independent military capability to defend herself while at the same time enhancing the sovereignty of Japan by not relying heavily on the U.S. On the other hand, the press objection to the increase of SDF is chiefly due to the expected economic burdens and the adverse reactions from the Asian nations, mainly from China. It seems, therefore, that the decision makers are not reacting to the press. From the observations of the results in the above three sets of analyses, it has to be concluded that Hypothesis 3 is not substan- tiated. Hypothesis 4 Hypothesis 4 states that the decision makers' perception favorable to Japan's peace diplomacy is not correlated with the opinions of the press. For the test of this hypothesis, one perception variable and four press variables are correlated. The perception variable is: 1. Japan should pursue a peace diplomacy. The press variables are: 1. Japan should pursue a peace diplomacy. 2. Japan should help underdeveloped countries. 191 3. Japan's foreign and defense policies are not satisfactory. 4. Japan should pursue an independent foreign policy. In testing this hypothesis, two sets of the press variables are correlated with the perception variable separately. The cate- gorization of the two sets of the press variables are based on the fact that the first two press variables are largely the suggestions made by the press on Japan's foreign policy, whereas the last two press variables are the expression of dissatisfaction of the press on the conduct of Japanese foreign and defense policies. The results of the regression analyses to determine the impact of the press' suggestions on the decision makers' perception are con- tained in Table XVI. TABLE XVI The Impact of the Press on the Decision Makers' Perception: ”Japan Should Pursue a Peace Diplomacy" Press Variables NO TIME LAG TIME LAG b partial Sig. b partial Sig. b b Intercept .60 .67 Pursue a Peace Diplomacy .32 .33 .08 .53 .51 .003 Japan Should Help U.D. 034 .32 .08 -.08 -.08 .07 R2=.20 N=31 Sig.R2=.05 R2=.27 N=31 Sig.R2=.Ol The results in the above table suggest that there is a reason- ably significant correlation. Although the level of significance of the I92 multiple correlation is extremely high, the size of the multiple correlation is somewhat small. It is evident, however, that the press variable that asserts Japan's peace diplomacy, which is exactly the same variable as that of the decision makers' perception, has a very significant correlation with the perception variable. TABLE XVII The Impact of the Press on the Decision Makers' Perception: "Japan Should Pursue a Peace Diplomacy" Press Variables NO TIME LAG. TIME LAG. b partial Sig. b partial Sig. b b Intercept 1.13 1.07 Not Happy With Foreign Policy —.04 -.06 .74 -.05 -.O7 .70 Pursue Independent Foreign Policy .04 .05 .80 .14 .14 .47 R2=.Ol N=31 Sig.R2=n.s. R2=.02 N=31 Sig.R2=n.s. The results in Table XVII, which suggest the impact of the press' criticisms of the conduct of Japanese foreign and defense policies on the perception variable, show no significant correlation. In other words, the decision makers' perception is not influenced by the negative atti- tudes of the press toward the conduct of Japanese foreign and defense policies. It is, therefore, concluded that Hypothesis 4 is partially substantiated. I93 SUMMARY Among the four hypotheses tested, Hypothesis 1 and 2 are substantiated whereas Hypothesis 4 is partially substantiated and Hypothesis 3 is fully rejected. The overall results, therefore, suggest that the press has some degree of influence on the decision makers' perceptions. This finding is in line with the basic theoretical assumption outlined earlier. The decision makers' perceptions of Japan's world status, her international role and her relations with the Asian nations, are not correlated with the opinions of the press. A high correlation between the press and the decision makers' perception, on the other hand, is found in relation to the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty. The decision makers' favorable perceptions toward the treaty are highly correlated with the press' unfavorable opinions toward the arrangements under the treaty. This finding, however, should not be interpreted to mean that the decision makers' perceptions of the Japanese security policy as a whole is influenced by the press, because the press' opposition to the increase of SDF proved to have had no impact on the decision makers' favorable perception to the increase of SDF. On this particular issue of SDF, as indicated in the following section, the decision maker's perception is highly correlated with public opinion. It is also found that the press' criticism of the conduct of Japanese foreign policy has no impact on the decision makers' favorable perception of Japan's peace diplomacy. Yet the press' support of the peace diplomacy in principle, not in actual conduct, tends to have some 194 influence on the decision makers' perception that is favorable to the peace diplomacy. This tendency indicates that the decision makers are either insensitive or immune to the criticism of the press on the implementation of the peace diplomacy. In conclusion, it should be stated that although the press exerts some influence on the decision makers' perceptions on the parti- cular issues, the degree of impact is not substantially strong. THE DECISION MAKERS' PERCEPTIONS AND PUBLIC OPINION In testing the hypotheses in this section, the perception variables are treated as dependent variables and the public opinion variables are treated as independent variables. Each perception variable is correlated with a set of opinion variables in testing each hypothesis. A set of opinion variables is constructed not only to select the most relevant ones to the perception variables but also to yield the largest number of cases in the regression analyses. Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 1 states that the decision makers' perception favorable to the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty as a means to protect Japanese security is not correlated with public opinion. In order to test this hypothesis, one perception variable and four opinion variables are correlated. The perception variable is: 1. The U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty protects Japan's security. 195 The opinion variables are: l. The U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty is the best means to protect Japan's security. 2. Neutralism is the best means to protect Japan's security. 3. The U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty protects Japan. 4. The U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty does not protect Japan. Table XVIII contains the results of the regression analyses which indicate the impact of public opinion, supporting either the treaty or neutralism as the best means of protecting Japan, on the decision makers' perception. TABLE XVIII The Impact of Public Opinion on the Decision Makers' Perception: ”The U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty Protects Japan's Security" Opinion Variables N0 TIME LAG TIME LAG b partial Sig. b partial Sig. b b Intercept .93 2.08 U.S.-Japanese Sec. is the Best Way -.02 -.14 .65 -.07 -.39 .19 Neutralism is the Best Way .03 .34 .26 .04 .36 .23 R2=.13 N=14 Sig.R2=n.s. R2=.23 N=14 Sig.R2=n.s. 196 Table XIX contains the results of the analyses on the impact of public opinion, which considers whether or not the treaty protects Japan, on the decision makers' perception. TABLE XIX The Impact of Public Opinion on the Decision Makers' Perception: "The U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty Protects Japan's Security" Opinion 7 Variables NO TIME LAG TIME LAG b partial Sig. b partial Sig. b b Intercept 6.17 1.56 U.S.-Japan. Sec. Treaty Protects Japan. -.03 -.22 .54 -.01 -.O4 .91 U.S.-Bapan. Sec. Treaty Does Not Protect Japan -.17 .53 .12 .02 .04 .91 R2=.28 N=11 Sig.R2=n.s. R2=.OO N=ll Sig.R2=n.s. As a whole, the results in the above two tables suggest that there are no significant correlations. Yet in Table XIX, the result indicates that the public opinion variable claiming that the treaty 7Although these two opinion variables are mutually exclusive in their contents, there is no significant correlation between them when the values of both variables from the opinion data are correlated. The correlation coefficient is -O.lO. 197 does not protect Japan has a reasonably significant correlation with the perception variable when no time lag is considered. Nevertheless, the size of the regression coefficient shows that the degree of influence is very small. Although it is insufficient to draw an inference from the above results in both tables, it appears that the decision makers' perception is somewhat more closely correlated with the negative public opinion than with the positive one toward the role of the treaty. The lack of significant level of correlations in these analyses may be due to the fact that the decision makers' perception is not responding to the widely fluctuating public opinions. As Graphs 2 and 3 demonstrate, the ranges of the fluctuations in the public opinions are relatively wide, with the exception of one opinion variable which claims that the treaty does not protect Japan. Also, the absence of the consensus among the people who are taking the same stance may be a contributing factor for the lack of correlations. For instance, although a substantial portion of the Japanese people claim that neutralism is the best way to protect Japan, there is no consensus as to the type of neutralism desired by them. Some, mainly the left wing socialists and the communists, support a neutralism with total disarma- ment, while others, largely the right wing socialists and the ultra conservatives, advocate a neutralism with a strong military establishment. The only common interest among those who advocate neutralism is the abro- gation of the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty. % 50 40 30 20 10 198 GRAPH 2 The Percentages of the Samples in the National Opinion Surveys that Support the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty or Neutralism as the Best Means to Protect Japan. r \\\‘\\\Y\\\\\\\\\\\\\Y\J 0' Year 1: 1st half 2: 2nd half 1 1 J L 4 l l l r T T71 1 \ \\ x“ \\:\V\ x\1 41 ' .:4 98 \\\\\\v\\\\\r\\i\\y\\X\1 L0 59 5960 6164 65 65 66 666768 1212 21212 21 _| N _, \l m : The U.S.—Japanese Security Treaty is the best means to protect Japan. [::::] : Neutralism is the best means to protect Japan. The graph shows: 1. Widely fluctuating attitudes of the people. 2. Sentiment favorable to neutralism was very strong, particularly in the late 50's, early 60's and late 60's. They seem to be associated with the intensity of controversies of the security treaty. 199 GRAPH 3 - The Percentages of the Samples in the National Opinion Surveys That Claim Whether or Not the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty Protects Japan. % = 707 _’ 60;; _ E I 9 ./ c _ / / ‘F A 7 / ; 50f* j a / j / 5 d ” z /. o / ./ / .9 / .. A A / / / / _, A / / / 40:' _ / ,. /, g: / I- 2 / / / / / j s / x j a” j ./ / ~+ / fi . a . / . 30" / / / / i” 3: / j: j / é / j / / .. r p / /' / ./ ,. / 2o~~ / p A WP / é " / / / / v’ ””1 / " / / W1 VF) / / / / / I; / / 4» / / / / / / / 10‘- j / j / / M / .. 5 fi / j j § § _ d'; . V I 1 fl /- 59 61 63 65 66 67 68 68 69 69 70 Year 2 1 I 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1: lst half 2: 2nd half 122252 : The Treaty protects Japan. I::::] : The Treaty does not protect Japan. The graph shows: 1. No inverse relationship between the two groups. 2. The attitude against the treaty is relatively stable. The decision makers' perception is at least weakly correlated with the most stable opinion variable, which considers that the treaty does not protect Japan. Yet the level of significance is not high enough to claim that the perception variable is influenced by the opinion variable. It is, therefore, concluded that Hypothesis 1 is substantiated. 200 Hypothesis 2 Hypothesis 2 states that the decision makers' perception un- favorable to neutralism as a means to protect Japan's security is not correlated with the public opinion favorable to the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty and neutralism. For the test of this hypothesis, one perception variable as a dependent variable and two opinion variables as the independent variables are correlated. The perception variable is: 1. Neutralism will not protect Japan's security. The opinion variables are: l. The U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty is the best means to protect Japan's security. 2. Neutralism is the best means to protect Japan's security. TABLE XX The Impact of Public Opinion on the Decision Makers' Perception: ”Neutralism Will Not Protect Japan's Security“ Opinion Variables NO TIME LAG TIME LAG b partial Sig. b partial Sig. b b Intercept .30 .18 U.S.-Japan. Sec. Treaty is Best -.10 -.31 .30 -.01 —.ll .71 Neutralism is Best Way .00 .05 .87 —.OO .14 .65 R2=.10 N=14 Sig.R2=n.s. R2=.O3 N=14 Sig.R2=n.s. Table XX contains the results of the regression analyses of the above variables. 201 The table shows that the multiple correlations are very low and insignificant. Particularly, both the sizes of the partial corre- lations and regression coefficients between the perception variable and the public support for neutralism are extremely low and insigni- ficant. A major reason for the lack of reaction by the decision makers, in addition to the one already described in relation to the different claims of neutralism, seems to be the decision makers' belief that neutralism will never be a viable foreign policy orientation of Japan in the near future but an expression of the mood against war widely shared among many Japanese people. This inference is drawn from the fact that the decision makers rarely expressed their objec- tion to neutralism explicitly in their policy and administrative speeches in the Diet and other speeches selected for this study. They seemed to be inclined to ignore the issue of neutralism. As the data in Appendix B and C show, this perception variable appeared only four times in the Diet speeches, the lowest frequency of appearance among all the variables extracted for this study, and eleven times in the overall speeches. Instead, the decision makers' strong and frequent criticism of neutralism appeared in their political campaign speeches and press interviews because the question of neutralism has been one of the major foreign policy issues during the elections. Ever since 1952, a platform of the largest opposition party, the Japan Socialist Party, has always included the abrogation of the U.S.-Japanese Security 202 Treaty and the establishment of neutralism.8 The result of the analyses suggest that Hypothesis 2 is also substantiated. Hypothesis 3 Hypothesis 3 states that the decision makers' perception favorable to the increase of the Self-Defense Forces is not correlated with public opinion. In order to test this hypothesis one perception variable and four opinion variables are correlated. The perception variable is: 1. Japan should increase her Self-Defense Forces. The opinion variables are: l. The Self-Defense Forces should be increased. 2. The Self-Defense Forces should not be increased. 3. The Self-Defense Forces are needed. 4. The Self-Defense Forces are not needed. In testing this hypothesis, only the perception variables with the time lag of six months is correlated with the opinion variable be- cause no variance of the perception variable is found due to the insufficient data when the perception variable with no time lag is correlated. The results of the regression analyses which indicate the impact of public opinion that is either favorable or unfavorable to 8See Chapter 11 (pp. 39-40). 203 the increase of SDF on the decision makers' perception are contained in Table XXI, and Table XXII (p. 204). The perception variable and the opinion variables in both Table XXI and Table XXII are exactly identical, but the perception variable in Table XXII is extracted from the decision makers' overall speeches. TABLE XXI The Impact of Public Opinion on the Decision Makers' Perception: "Japan Should Increase Her Self-Defense Forces” Opinion Variables TIME LAG9 b partial Sig. R2 N Sig.R2 . b Intercept 1.76 .32 14 .12 Should Increase SDF -.OO -.04 .89 Should Not Increase SDF -.03 -.54 .06 Yet the degree of impact, as indicated by the size of the re- gression coefficient, is not very strong. The result in Table XXII does not show any improvement in terms of the size of the multiple correlation but, unlike the result in Table XXI, the partial corre- lation of both opinion variables are substantially strong. From the observation of the results in both tables, it is reasonably safe to 9Time Lag of six months is considered for the dependent variable. 204 state that the decision makers' perception is strongly correlated with the opinion variable that is against the increase of SDF. TABLE XXII The Impact of Public Opinion on the Decision Makers' Perception: ”Japan Should Increase Her Self-Defense Forces” Opinion 10 Variables TIME LAG b partial Sig. R2 N Sig.R2 b Intercept 2.20 .30 15 .11 Should Increase SDF -.O3 -.54 .05 Should Not Increase SDF -.03 -.51 .07 Moreover, it is interesting to note that the direction of the partial correlation is negative. This suggests that the stronger the public opposition to the increase of SDF, the less stronger the decision makers' perception in favor of the increase of SDF. One of the major factors that has contributed to this tendency seems to be that nearly a majority of the Japanese people has con- sistently opposed the increase of SDF throughout the years. As Graph 4 (p. 205) demonstrates, since 1956 a much larger percentage of the people have been against the increase of SDF than those who are in favor of it. lO variable. Time Lag of six months is considered for the dependent .quocm 03p mg» cmmzpwn aegmcowmemc mmcm>cw cm we moose .N .mcocem me new co mmmmcocw on» pmcwmmm muzpwppm as» ._ ”maccm semen och .uom co mmmmsucw esp meWmmw muspwpp< ” flHHHHH ...5m 66 33.8.: mi 68 L33 5 $3.52 ” §§ me; oCNuN w—m: pmpnp N F N F N F N P N N N N F N N F F — Lwo> mm mm mm mm mm mm mm mm No E om mm mm mm mm em mm Nm 205 & mouse; mmcmcmoicme one co mmmmcocH one co co>mu cw poz uc< we Lo>me cw mc< on: mmogh co mommpcmocma one v Im— ...____-___..__._ Dec. 10, 1954 — 30' 20' OS 00-5—4000 _..l hUJKONKDNUTCW-J-HCD-JN—JKON-Jmmwmmmm—' —.l ‘61—: O N N —a6» N A __l N —J APPENDIX G THE PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE CABINET APPENDIX G THE PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE CABINET Question in the National Opinion Surveys: ”Do You Support the Prime Minister's Cabinet?” Support Oppose U) U) 0) 44 (U .,_ q) a) ...— U > C U S— 4—3 °r- -r- -r- ‘I— Q) (U r— Cl. D. -1-> E .Q r— 0. .C C O D (n (U ~r- (‘U 0 C3 +9 'r- o. ..J "3 c :I: c.) o. .4 O E .D S. -.- rd +-> +-> a) a) +< a) cu cu m +4 4: I L) S- S— x +4 U) x .2 x x S— U) .C O O 'I— r— S- r— 'r- 'l— 'I- 'I— 0 >5 3- I— S— +3 (1) OJ 0. D. r— < (D (O r— I—- r— l— o. +3 (D (U (U C x x Q. Q. U) .C +9 U) U) U) (I) D. S— ..C +9 (D O ‘l— 'l— 3 D '1— O +3 O 'r- w— 'l— ‘r- :3 (U 44 O >- Z _l _J (I) U‘) Q Z O I— D C) D C.:) (I) D. O 1— PRIME MINISTER HATOYAMA; 1956 8 6% -- -- —— -- 23% -— 29% 16% -— 14% -— 4% 7% 41% PRIME MINISTER KISHI: ' 1957 7 10 —- 8 —- 3 -— 19 4O 2 -- 6 —- 3 3 14 1957 11 7 -- 9 -- 4 —- 16 36 3 -- 6 -- l 9 19 1958 9 6 -- 8 2 3 -— 15 34 3 -- 13 -- 1 6 23 1959 2 3 -— 4 1 6 -- 14 28 8 5 10 -- l 10 34 1960 1 2 -- 7 1 1 16 33 4 11 ~- 1 14 32 1960 5 3 -- 1 1 -— 4 8 17 10 2 6 -- l 29 48 PRIME MINISTER IKEDA: 1960 8 8 6 -- 3 l -- 25 43 3 -- -- 2 —- 7 12 1961 3 6 —- 4 2 2 -- 13 27 2 -— 1 -- 27 32 1961 8 2 13 3 —- ~— -- 1 29 2 8 3 -- -- 14 27 1964 6 4 3 2 3 1 5 20 38 3 -- 3 20 3O NOTE: *Include ”no reason.“ --No choice is given in the survey. Source: Asahi poll. 253 254 Appendix G. The Public Support For The Cabinet. Continued. Question in the National Opinion Surveys: "Do You Support the Prime Minister's Cabinet?" Support Oppose m U) G) +3 (D 'l— 0) Q) 'l" U > C U S- 4-3 'r- '1— 'l- 'r- 0) cu .— a. o. 4-> E .o .—- a. .c C O D (f) M ‘F‘ (U 0 C3 +3 'r- O. _J "D C I U Q. ._I O E .0 S. -r- (U +3 +3 Q) Q) '1‘ Q) Q) Q) G) 44 -)< I c.) S- S- x +3 m x x .x x S- u) _C O O n- l'" S- r— 'r- w— 'l— ‘l- 0 >3 3- l—" L -H w m o. o. r— - Z ...J ...l (I) (I) D Z O 1— D O D D U) D. O 1'— PRIME MINISTER SATO: 1964 11 9 3 4 7 -- 6 18 47 3 3 2 3 -- 3 14 1966 4 3 4 2 5 2 2 12 30 2 4 3 3 -- 14 26 1966 11 3 2 1 3 2 4 1O 25 6 12 -- 3 -- 17 38 1967 9 4 4 3 5 2 4 16 38 2 4 3 4 -- 14 27 1968 8 4 2 4 5 3 7 16 41 8 3 4 3 -- 19 37 1968 10 5 3 4 4 1 5 16 38 6 5 3 -- -- 25 39 1968 12 10 2 5 3 1 4 18 43 6 4 4 -- -- 27 41 1969 10 4 I 5 5 4 4 19 42 8 6 5 3 -- 19 41 1970 6 8 2 8 4 2 3 18 45 5 5 7 2 -- 7 26 1970 10 8 2 7 4 2 3 15 41 3 4 3 4 -- 5 19 1970 12 11 3 5 3 1 3 20 46 8 5 6 2 —- 5 26 1971 5 7 2 5 3 1 4 13 35 9 6 6 3 -- 22 46 1971 8 7 3 3 3 1 2 13 32 11 7 7 4 -- 20 49 NOTE: *Include ”no reason.“ --No choice is given in the survey. Source: Asahi poll. APPENDIX H JAPAN'S DEVELOPMENT AID TO THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1966-1969) APPENDIX H JAPAN'S DEVELOPMENT AID TO THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1966-1969) 1.66 1967 19 8 969 Total Governmental Aids $516.2 mil. $644.7 mi1.$678.3 mil. $811.4 mil. 1. Grants-in aid 104.7 138.4 117.0 123.4 2. Direct Invest- ment Loans 130.0 202.2 190.5 216.2 3. International Organizations 50.6 44.7 48.8 95.6 4. Credit Loans 202.3 223.7 290.3 309.9 5. Direct Loans 28.6 35.7 31.8 55.9 6. Finance for International Organizations -— —- -— 10.0 Total Private Base 152.8 210.6 371.0 451.7 7. Credit Loans 84.7 161.7 280.2 299.6 8. Direct Invest- ment Loans 68.5 48.8 90.8 144.1 9. Finance for International Organizations 0.4 0.1 -— 8.0 Total Development Aids ' 669.0 855.3 1,049.3 1,263.1 Source: Boeki Nenkan, 1971, p. 185. 255 BIBLIOGRAPHY BIBLIOGRAPHY Books Alexis, Marcus and Wilson, Charles Z., eds. Organizational Decision Making (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967). Almond, Gabriel A. The American People and Foreign Policy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960). Almond, Gabriel A. and Verba, Sidney. The Civic Culture (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1965). Asahi Shinbun Anzen Hosho Mondai Chosaksi (Asahi Security Problems Research Institute). 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