ABSTRACT

A CASE STUDY IN PROGRAM EVALUATION

By

James L. Snook

This investigation is concerned with the lack of impact of evaluation and institutional research on academic programs in American higher education. From the perspective and literature of institutional research on the one hand, and sociology, on the other, the case study method is used in an effort to identify interpersonal, institutional, and research factors and dynamics which enhanced or inhibited impact of evaluation research efforts at Kalamazoo College during the three year period, 1966-69. The findings are largely supportive and illustrative of numerous conclusions in the literature which are noted.

Four summary conclusions regarding strategy for achieving evaluation impact are offered, with special relevance for small, private colleges. In revealing top level resistance to evaluation research findings and evidence of it being overcome, this case study contributes more broadly to filling a gap in the literature noted by Reginald Carter:

> There are few reports on how to overcome resistance at the top management level to the findings of social science research evaluations. A collection of case histories where management resistance was successfully overcome would be of great benefit to future researchers, and a study of organizational and interpersonal conditions would be an important initial step toward changing

the dominant latent function of evaluation research from mere ritualism to a rationale for change.[1]

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[1]Reginald E. Carter, "Clients' Resistance to Negative Findings and the Latent Conservative Function of Evaluation Studies," The American Sociologist, Vol. 6 (May, 1971), p. 123.

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A CASE STUDY IN PROGRAM EVALUATION

By

James L. Snook

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Administration and Higher Education

1972

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to express my appreciation to the following in recognition of their significant contribution to this endeavor:

To Paul L. Dressel for his counsel and guidance.

To Kalamazoo College, her faculty and staff, for the opportunity to share in the agony and ecstacy of higher education.

To my wife, Martha, and children for their loving patience and endurance.

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CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEM AND INTRODUCTION

Review of the Literature

The surge of growth and popularity of institutional research in American higher education in recent years is rather impressive (Rourke and Brooks, 1966; Cross, 1967; Boyer, 1967; Stecklein, 1970), with college and university offices of institutional research becoming a locus of evaluation efforts in higher education. Boyer states:

> One of the most prominent features on the American higher education landscape is the looming mass known as "Institutional Research." Besieged on all sides by demands for "excellence," hard pressed to justify the soaring costs of their activities, and tempted by the flowing cornucopia of foundation money, college administrators from Boston to Santa Barbara have given their blessing to a welter of research programs designed to evaluate past and present developments in their institutions and, hopefully, to cast some light on future trends.[1]

This surge in institutional research offices and evaluation research also is seen as emphasizing the managerial revolution of the last decade and a half,[2] institutional

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[1]Ernest L. Boyer, The Impact of Institutional Research on the Academic Program (Albany: Office of the Vice Chancellor for University-Wide Activities, State University of New York, 1967), p. 1.

[2]Francis E. Rourke and Glenn E. Brooks, "The Growth of Institutional Research," The Managerial Revolution in Higher Education (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1966).

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needs for self-knowledge,[3] and a felt need for more rational basis for decision making and action.[4]

While the response has produced great variety in purpose, organization, personnel, role, and activity of offices of institutional research (Birch, 1970; Lins, 1963; Rourke and Brooks, 1966; Stecklein, 1962, 1970; Stickler, 1968), Cross nevertheless observes:

> Typically, offices of institutional research have been concerned with the operational nuts-and-bolts problems involving the allocation of resources.[5]

Noting that "a strong link between [institutional] research and efforts of colleges to strengthen management and improve efficiency"[6] has been followed by evidence of a significant contribution by institutional research offices to better, more efficient non-academic management of their parent institutions, Boyer finds the academic side to be pale by comparison. He states:

> There is, however, no body of literature that addresses itself to the central question: "To what extent has institutional research actually helped

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[3]Paul L. Dressel and Sally B. Pratt, The World of Higher Education (San Francisco: Josey-Bass, 1971), p. 9.

[4]W. Hugh Stickler, "The Managerial Revolution in Higher Education: An Overview," Introductory Papers on Institutional Research, ed. E. F. Schietinger (Atlanta: Southern Regional Education Board, 1968).

[4]Reginald E. Carter, "Clients' Resistance to Negative Findings and the Latent Conservative Function of Evaluation Studies," The American Sociologist, Vol. 6 (May, 1971), pp. 118-124.

[5]Patricia K. Cross, When Will Research Improve Education? (Berkeley: Center for Research and Development in Higher Education, 1967), p. 2.

[6]Boyer, op. cit., p. 4.

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> improve collegiate life generally and the academic program in particular?"[7]

Boyer further concludes:

> While institutional research--organized both formally and informally--also has studied educational matters such as curriculum, teaching methods, and student development, this effort has had only minor impact on the heart of collegiate life--the academic program. This conclusion is supported by the paucity of relevant literature, the comments of informed observers, and the degree to which many academic tenets and methods remain essentially what they were generations ago.[8]

It is this problem of lack of, or at best limited, impact of evaluation research, especially on the academic program in higher education, to which this case study investigation is directed.

A number of factors seem destined to create substantial demand for more, better, and effective (having impact) evaluation of the academic program: the continuing financial crisis, student unrest and disenchantment, and public criticism;[9] increasing awareness of our rapidly changing society;[10] increasingly effective authoritative criticism (e.g., Jencks and Riesman, 1968; Chickering, 1969; Dressel, Johnson, and Marcus, 1970); and increasing possibilities for educational alternatives to compete with conventional

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[7] Ibid., Synopsis

[8] Ibid.

[9] Frederick W. Bolman, "University Reform and Institutional Research," The Journal of Higher Education, Vol. 41 (1971), pp. 86-97.

[10] Alvin Toffler, Future Shock (New York: Bantam Book by Random House, Inc., 1971).

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In addressing herself to the core question, "When will research improve education?" Cross concludes in agreement with H. S. Dyer[12] that most of what faculty and administrators "do as educators is in fact based on blind assumptions that could turn out to be wrong."[13] Dyer contends that one of the functions of institutional research is to keep reminding them of this fact. Cross also cautions in conjunction with T. R. McConnell[14] that educational innovation and development in the absence of evaluation "may easily become quackery."

Dressel has long cautioned that:

> Failure to engage systematically in evaluation in reaching the many decisions necessary in education means that decision by prejudice, by tradition, or by rationalization is paramount.[15]

In terms of higher education, existing or contemplated, Cross concludes:

> The weight of the evidence to date is that a careful program of research and development and evaluation is our most promising approach to improvements in

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[11]Ernest L. Boyer and George C. Keller, "The Big Move to Non-Campus Colleges," Saturday Review, (July 17, 1971), pp. 46-58.

[12]H. S. Dyer, "Can Institutional Research Lead to A Science of Institutions?," The Educational Record, (Fall, 1966), pp. 452-466.

[13]Cross, op. cit., p. 4.

[14]T. R. McConnell, "Research or Development: A Reconciliation," Phi Delta Kappa Monograph (Bloomington, Indiana: 1967).

[15]Paul L. Dressel and Associates (eds.), Evaluation in Higher Education (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1961), p.6.

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Furthermore, according to Boyer:

> While most institutional research has focused on management matters . . . a few investigations have probed aspects of college life more directly related to the academic program. In some instances these inquiries have emerged from within the milieu of institutional research itself, but more often they have been carried on by behavioral scientists--psychologists and sociologists--not directly identified with the fraternity.[17]

Dyer notes similarly the prevalence of two differing views of institutional research: one is concerned primarily with the operational problems of institutions in which the institutional researcher is "strictly a servant of the administrator"[18] and is generally attached to the office of the president; the other view is characterized by theoretically oriented, long term studies of students and the inner workings of institutions and is beholden to the social sciences.

Dyer acknowledges that "research of an operational variety is unquestionably important," but counters that "operational research, almost by definition pays little or no attention to the fundamental purposes of an institution or to the value systems that control it."[19]

Asking further, "What kind of research will help college-sponsored offices of institutional research contribute to the maximum development of their colleges?," Cross

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[16]Cross, op. cit., p. 4.

[17]Boyer, op. cit., p. 7.

[18]Dyer, op. cit., p. 454.

[19]Ibid.

invokes Dyer's caution that:

> Offices of institutional research would neglect operational problems at their peril, but he warns that "research that does not go beyond the instrumentalities of education is unlikely to make any fundamental difference in the impact of the institution on its constituents or on the community it hopes to serve. Operational research, uninformed by theory, goes nowhere . . . it may be concerned with ways of ensuring the solvency of the institution, but it does not ask what purposes are being served by keeping the institution solvent."[20]

Thus, Cross' question may beg a broader social science perspective than that typically encompassed by institutional research.

Dyer surmizes:

> If institutional research is to have a positive and enduring impact on institutional quality, if it is to become a science in any acceptable sense, it must somehow integrate both of these points of view [operational and theoretical] in a common attack on institutional problems.[21]

Discussing "social research and educational policy," Martin Trow has identified the following three broadly different kinds of research--each having somewhat different purposes, methods, strategies, and problems:[22]

> predictive - aims to tell us what will result from some specific educational practice or pattern and often involves establishing a close statistical connection between one or more characteristics of students and a predicted educational outcome.
>
> directive - aims to assimilate policy making to research, intervening directly into educational practice with statements of what ought to be done on the basis of its findings.

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[20]Cross, op. cit., p. 2. [21]Dyer, op. cit., p. 454.

[22]Martin A. Trow, "Social Research and Educational Policy," Research in Higher Education: Guide to Institutional Decisions (New York: College Entrance Examination Board, 1965), p. 53.

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> illuminative - aims to explore and illuminate the nature of educational institutions and processes--to show the connections among student characteristics, organizational patterns and policies, and educational consequences. It is concerned especially with the ways in which these and other components of educational systems interact with one another.

Sociologist Trow argues for illuminative research as the best kind of institutional research. He contends that

> this kind of research sidesteps the distinction between "pure" and "applied" research on the grounds that what may be most valuable to policy-makers is a fuller understanding of their own institutions and what goes on within them. . . . Thus, this mode of research assumes that nothing is necessarily outside its terms of reference and aims for clarification and understanding on the basis of which wiser and more effective policy decisions can be made.[23]

Dressel and Pratt note that institutional research with its focus generally being on studies specific to the problems of a particular institution or larger system of higher education has been typically predictive or directive in nature.

> In contrast to institutional research, research on higher education starts with the identification of issues and problems and undertakes to make a contribution to the understanding or the resolution of them.[24]

Hence, research on higher education, a broader concept than institutional research, is typically more illuminative in nature.

Yet, the question of impact of research on higher education is no less disquieting than the question of the impact of institutional research. Dressel and Pratt observe:

> Despite the volume of research, its impact on

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[23] Ibid.

[24] Dressel and Pratt, op. cit., p. 1.

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> institutions and on higher education generally may be rather limited. The problems of interpreting research and putting it into action are many. However, much of the research is illuminative and is not oriented to bring about action. The results of research in the same field are often contradictory because of the differences in assumptions or in the values of the researchers. A great deal of the research is simply inconclusive, and, to a considerable extent, final decisions, whether on a single campus or at a state or national level, are based on political maneuvering and on publicly stated values or secretly held prejudices, with research findings having limited impact. And, in many cases, it is difficult to trace the connection between the research and the actions taken.[25]

As is evident in the recent annotated guide to the major literature in higher education by Dressel and Pratt, numerous authors offer suggestions or principles for improving institutional and evaluation research which would seem to contribute to increased impact of evaluation. For example, Dressel and Pratt suggest that the institutional researchers' investigations take on new depth and significance, warrant greater confidence, and are more effective when their investigations evidence awareness of the large body of research on higher education. McConnell,[26] in noting what has paid off in other fields such as the natural sciences, sounds a prominent theme in the literature: agreeing with Dyer, he suggests that significant improvement in impact on education by institutional and other evaluation research requires that they focus on questions which have reference to theoretical-explanatory principles (such as learning and motivation[27]) on the one hand and relevance to

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[25] Ibid., p. 8. [26] McConnell, op. cit.

[27] L. J. Cronbach, "The Role of the University in Improving Education," Phi Delta Kappan, (June, 1966), pp. 539-545.

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Dyer suggests necessary conditions for institutional research to achieve positive and enduring impact:

> First, institutional research must be so organized that it deals with the real problems of particular institutions while at the same time endeavoring to fit these problems into some sort of evolving generalizations. Second, it must develop more dependable and believable measures to get at the many institutional variables that appear important as our observations become more refined. And third, it must acquire much more sophistication about how to conduct genuine experiments which recognize the restrictions while exploiting the possibilities in the data peculiar to its own domain and which lead to a body of interpretable, cumulative results.[28]

> Practically any question one can raise about the educational enterprise can be formulated as a testable hypothesis so as to get a reasonable indication of whether the opportunities we provide students make a measurable difference in the kinds of thinking they habitually do and the kinds of people they become.[29]

> These three conditions are difficult but probably not impossible to fulfill. In view of the central importance of institutions of higher learning to our kind of society in our kind of world, it goes without saying that the effort to meet them should be commensurate with the magnitude of the problem.[30]

Agreeing only in part with Lewis Mayhew that one of the principal reasons "that institutional research has not had more impact on the conduct of institutions . . . is the inadequacy of available instrumentation,"[31] Dyer nevertheless acknowledges the centrality of measurement to such impact. Asserting that it is the measurable things, no matter how subjectively or inaccurately measured, that tend

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[28]Dyer, op. cit., p. 466.

[29]Ibid., p. 465. [30]Ibid., p. 466.

[31]Ibid., p. 458.

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> three major classes of institutional problems in which measurement, if rightly conceived, is indispensable to any genuine solutions. They are the definition of institutional goals, the determination of how well the goals are being met, and the identification of the factors that facilitate or impede reaching the goals.[32]

Noting that most measurement in higher education has been devoted to measurement of inputs, Dyer believes the idea of judging quality education by relating output to input is beginning to take hold. Furthermore, he cautions that

> it is important also that the ultimate consumers of the research--that is, the administration, the faculty, and the governing body--have a hand in defining the variables before the computer starts grinding out the numbers. Otherwise, the numbers may be regarded as irrelevant, and if they are regarded as irrelevant by any of the interested parties, they are irrelevant for all intents and purposes.[33]

Cross' conclusion seems apt:

> In other words, improvement in education will take place when we study the right kinds of questions and when we learn how to apply research knowledge to the practice of education.[34]

It is evident that there are at least two major aspects to the problem of limited impact of institutional and evaluation research. The first, making such research more usable as a basis for improving education including the academic program, will apparently require more than the typical institutional or educational research approaches as noted above. Certainly, the organization, perceived role, resources, personnel, etc. of an institutional research

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[32]Dyer, op. cit., p. 459. [33]Ibid., pp. 458-459.

[34]Cross, op. cit., p. 1.

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office will have much to do with whether this is likely or even possible.

The second, getting such research into the thinking of those who make educational policy and program decisions, may be no less critical. Presumably, institutions which would bring such resources together so as to produce more useful institutional and evaluation research would in some-way be desirous of it.

Mayhew offers examples of institutional research and research on higher education that

> did have an impact on the practice of higher education. On the other hand, there have been both notable failures and an enormous number of situations in which research results were not utilized even though findings were reasonably clear.[35]

Examing the results of efforts to evaluate the degree of success or failure of social action, industrial, and educational innovations, Carter notes

> a number of case studies that indicate specific conditions where evaluation research findings have been selectively ignored. Thus, even if evaluation research is competently conducted, the fate of the results is often determined by another set of criteria.[36]

He reveals, for example, that clients may desire an image of actively supporting scientific evaluations and/or may never seriously consider the possibility that the results might be negative--i.e., not agreeing with the client's (and

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[35]Lewis B. Mayhew, "Educational Research, Its Capabilities and Limitations," Research in Higher Education: Guide to Institutional Decisions (New York: College Entrance Examination Board, 1965), p. 6.

[36]Carter, op. cit., p. 118.

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sometimes the researcher's) anticipated results. This latter point is suggested by sociologist Peter Rossi[37] as the main reason why negative results generally have so little impact.

Carter notes that there are a number of reasons why clients may choose not to accept the results of evaluation research in addition to the "resistance frequently encountered by social scientists when their findings do not positively reinforce the expectations and ideological value system of their client." These include:[38]

1) the psychological characteristics of clients and/or researchers
2) the quality of the research
3) the feasibility of implementing the recommendations
4) past negative experiences with social science research
5) inappropriateness of data and/or researcher to generate policy recommendations

Hence, in addition to producing higher quality, more meaningful research, Boyer points out that

> institutional research will never achieve its maximum potential impact until its results are transmitted more forcibly to the people who hold decision-making power. . . . Amid the welter of interested individuals and groups he [the researcher] must first and most emphatically address himself to the people who hold the power to make a firm decision on a given matter. To be effective, the institutional researcher must define his potential audience carefully and sensitively and plan his approach in terms of capturing the attention and interest of the persons who are prepared to take action on the issue at hand. In short, he must have a

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[37]Peter Rossi, Boobytraps and Pitfalls in the Evaluation of Social Action Programs, Proceedings of the Social Statistics Section of the Annual Meetings of the American Statistical Association (Washington, D. C.: American Statistical Association, 1966), pp. 127-137.

[38]Carter, op. cit., p. 118.

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Carter concludes that:

> There are few reports on how to overcome resistance at the top management level to the findings of social science research evaluations. A collection of case histories where management resistance was successfully overcome would be of great benefit to future researchers, and a study of organizational and interpersonal conditions would be an important initial step toward changing the dominant latent function of evaluation research from mere ritualism to a rationale for change.[40]

In sum then, it is to the situation noted by Boyer that this study is directed:

> A survey of the literature makes clear that the recent state of research activity has not been accompanied by a corresponding surge of influence. Research bibliographies multiply like fruit flies, yet we still know very little about what happens when a project has been completed, conclusions drawn, and statistical tables carefully filed away.[41]

Kalamazoo College

In 1961, Kalamazoo College in Kalamazoo, Michigan adopted an academic program which has come to be known as the "Kalamazoo Plan." This innovative plan has contributed substantially to an increased prominence of that institution among small private liberal arts colleges in America.

During the 1966-67 academic year, Kalamazoo College attempted a formal self-evaluation. An outgrowth of that self-evaluation effort was the establishment of a full-time Office of Institutional Research the following year. That office was terminated two years later.

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[39]Boyer, op. cit., p. 28. [40]Carter, op. cit., p. 123

[41]Boyer, op. cit., p. 2.

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The Case Study

This case study is an attempt to assess the impact or lack of impact of evaluation studies conducted at Kalamazoo College under the auspices of the formal self-study and the Office of Institutional Research from 1966-69. To the extent that lack of impact is identified, a major focus of this study is consideration of difficulties, if any, in getting evaluation research findings into the thinking of faculty and administration so as to be evidenced in the College operation and program.

It does not require excessive visibility into the functioning of higher education in America to recognize major claims of proprietorship and management of the college and its academic program by the administration on the one hand (also as representative of the governing board of trustees or regents) and by the faculty on the other. Hence, a study of management resistance and related organizational and interpersonal conditions as called for by Carter[42] is important to this case study and is included within its scope. Accordingly, an analysis of the development of Kalamazoo College and the Kalamazoo College Plan, of the governance of the College, and of the impact of the evaluation research noted above comprise Chapters III, IV, and V respectively.

In the concluding Chapter (VI) of this case study, an attempt is made to identify both (a) major weaknesses in

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[42]Carter, op. cit., p. 123.

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selected evaluation research under investigation and factors contributing to such weaknesses, and (b) major sources of resistance, if any, to the findings of that evaluation research, and circumstances by which such resistance was overcome--if indeed it existed and was overcome. In sum, this concluding chapter is an attempt to identify factors which enhanced or inhibited evaluation research and its impact at Kalamazoo College in light of the selected literature and to derive implications and recommendations for planning and carrying out such evaluation.

Comments

In addition to the salience of the problem under investigation and efforts at Kalamazoo College to attempt evaluation research, additional factors are favorable to this case study on Kalamazoo College at this time:

(1) A time lapse of two years has passed since the author of this case study was affiliated with Kalamazoo College, first as full-time consultant and technical assistant to the faculty director of the 1966-67 formal institutional self-study, and then as full-time Director of the Office of Institutional Research during its two year existence (1967-69), hopefully yielding a blend of first hand familiarity with the subject at hand with the subsequent objectivity of an "outside" point of view.

(2) It is now two to five years after the evaluation efforts under investigation, allowing time for impact to occur.

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(3) The Kalamazoo Plan is ten years old, yet nearly all personnel who have been involved in the development of the Kalamazoo Plan, subsequent governance of the College, and the evaluation studies under investigation are at Kalamazoo College at this time. However, two key people are retiring soon after this investigation is conducted: (a) President Weimer K. Hicks, in December, 1971, and (b) Professor Raymond Hightower, in September, 1971; a key figure in the development and passage of the Kalamazoo Plan by the faculty, and Dean under the new Kalamazoo Plan.

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CHAPTER II

METHODOLOGY

After discussing this tentative study with the Dean of Academic Affairs at Kalamazoo College, Douglas Peterson, early in March, 1971 the author sent a letter to Dean Peterson which at his request noted the purpose and tenor of the proposed study and what would be needed in terms of time and resources from Kalamazoo College and its personnel. The study received approval as formally noted in an April 7, 1971 letter from Dean Peterson.

Analyses

The intended analyses introduced in Chapter I are basic to the types and sources of evidence needed to carry them out. These analyses lie in five areas:

(1) development of Kalamazoo College and the Kalamazoo Plan: Chapter III

(2) governance of the College (including organizational and interpersonal conditions): Chapter IV

(3) impact of the evaluation research under investigation: Chapter V

(4) problems of getting evaluation research findings into the thinking of the faculty and administration,

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(5) implications and recommendations for planning and carrying out evaluation research so as to have impact, particularly in a small private college: Chapter VI

Sources of Supporting Evidence

Analyses in these five areas rest primarily on evidence from three sources: (1) the literature, (2) documents and records, and (3) interviews conducted by the author.

(1) The literature is that directly related to the history of Kalamazoo College and that noted in Chapter I pertaining to institutional and evaluation research from the point of view of institutional research in higher education and of sociology. It is noted throughout this case study where relevant, appearing most frequently in Chapters I, III, and VI.

(2) Documents and records noted or donated by the interviewees, or known to, or found by the author vary widely--from news releases and position papers to Educational Policy Committee minutes and evaluation research reports. The Office of Academic Affairs was very helpful in locating a number of relevant materials and records. Documents and records are most evident in Chapters III and V.

(3) Interviews with Kalamazoo College personnel were noted as a part of this case study in the March 16 letter to

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Dean Peterson. The primary topics of the proposed interviews and a tentative list of 22 persons to be interviewed were included. Dean Peterson's response of approval noted that he was sending a supporting note to those persons listed indicating the nature of the project and that they could expect to hear from the author in the near future.

Interviews were sought with members of Kalamazoo College faculty, administration, and board of trustees who (a) have played crucial roles in the conception and/or birth of the Kalamazoo Plan (see Chapter III), (b) have been "most influential" in the College during the ten years following the inception of the Kalamazoo Plan, (c) have held an administrative position with major responsibility related to the Kalamazoo Plan or program, (d) or have had direct involvement in the evaluation research under investigation.

The original list of 22 interviewees was drawn according to the above criteria as perceived by the author primarily from his prior Kalamazoo College experience, research, and knowledge. The first interviews were conducted with interviewees meeting criteria "c" and "d"; the list of interviewees was subsequently amended in terms of criteria "a" and "b" as trends in response to interview schedule item C (asking "who have been the most influential persons in the College?") emerged. In sum, the amended list of desired interviewees was comprised of 18 from the original list of 22 plus six additions. Of these 24, 22 were interviewed between June 3 and August 13, 1971, all interviews being arranged and conducted by the author. The

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remaining two were not interviewed: one having resigned his high ranking, influential administrative position and departed from Kalamazoo College in 1967; the other failing to keep two interview appointments without notice.

Of the 22 persons interviewed, eight met at least three of the four criteria; nine satisfied two of the criteria; the remaining five (four administrators and one faculty member) met only one criterion. Of these 22 interviewees, 13 have been members of the faculty and/or staff or board of trustees at Kalamazoo College since before the birth of the Kalamazoo Plan in 1960 (though several have been on leave for one to three years during this period) and six more became affiliated with Kalamazoo College within the next three years.

Clearly, the Chairman of the Board of Trustees and the President have been among the "most influential" throughout the life of the Kalamazoo Plan. In addition, of four current high ranking administrators who are widely recognized as having substantial though somewhat different spheres of influence within the College, two* have held the same position and been influential for an extended period of time. Of these four, three have previously been Kalamazoo College faculty members, and three* owe most of their present influence to the position they hold. Two* of the latter are widely thought to be influential primarily as extensions and representatives of the President's power and

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*One of these is one of the persons not interviewed as previously noted.

influence.

Five of these six, and six other administrators are among those interviewed. Of the remaining six administrators, only one is recognized as being very influential, and only in recent years, primarily in the informal role of advisor to the President in the area of student life and behavior which is increasingly beyond the realm of the President's traditional influence. Nevertheless, all six have met criterion "c" on a continuing basis, and thus have played some part in the governance of the College. Of these ten administrators (excluding Board Chairman, Light) four were previously full-time faculty members at Kalamazoo College, and one of these four plus three others also currently handle some part-time teaching responsibilities.

Interviewee comments noting the various spheres of faculty member influence can be summarized as follows: (a) being an opinion leader and listened to by other faculty members, (b) being willing and having the dedication to work for the betterment of the College or for a constituency of the whole or part of the faculty, (c) being influential with the President by virtue of one's personal and functional relationship to the President or one's persuasion, pressure, or expertise which is recognized by the President (more fully elaborated in Chapter IV).

Typically, in becoming influential with their colleagues, faculty members also hold important leadership positions in A.A.U.P., the Faculty Senate or formal committee structure, or as dean of academic affairs. It is from

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such positions that a few faculty members have been most influential during much of the life of the Kalamazoo Plan by combining the influence of the person and position and generally achieving some measure of effectiveness in all three spheres of influence noted above. These few "most influential" faculty members have typically held a variety of leadership positions rather than staying in one position for an extended period of time; their influence has generally varied somewhat in type and/or amount with the position held, the course of events during their tenure in each position--including their own apparent effectiveness, and their own personal priorities and interests.

Three current faculty members, two of whom have also been Kalamazoo's academic dean, were widely recognized by at least 70% of the interviewees as being among the most influential people in the College during the past decade. Three more faculty members were named as influentials by at least 40% of the interviewees. A number of faculty members were named by at least 15% of the interviewees: four of them were also directly involved in the evaluation research under investigation in this case study (see Chapter V). Another faculty member previously had responsibility for institutional research at Kalamazoo College and was also involved in some of the evaluation research under investigation. All eleven of these faculty members were among the interviewees.

The interviews provided much of the basis for Chapters III, IV, and V.

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The Interviews

Preceding each interview, an introductory letter and materials including an index of the institutional research studies conducted at Kalamazoo College during the period under investigation were sent to the prospective interviewee. Special arrangements were made in the cases of the President and Chairman of the Board of Trustees. All other interviews were arranged by the author in person or by telephone. After the experience of the first several interviews, interview lengths of one, one and a half, or two hours were requested depending on the extent to which each interviewee was judged to be knowledgable about the three major topics: inception of the Kalamazoo Plan, governance of the College, and fate of evaluation efforts. An interview schedule was used as a general guide in the interviews, but deviation from it was permitted and occurred where persons were willing and able to speak from special experience to points relevant to the three major topics. The average interview was approximately one hour and forty minutes in length, the range being from fifty minutes to approximately three hours. Only three interviews were terminated before the author (as interviewer) felt they had been fully completed--all due to prior commitment by the interviewees. And five interviewees were revisited to help fill gaps which emerged when all interviews and materials were pieced together.

Comments

In the judgement of the interviewer, those interviewed were very cooperative, helpful, and seemingly quite candid. This may have been due to several factors. All interviewees were assured of the confidentiality of comments they wished to be so treated: that particular comments would not be identified with the person making them was of some concern to virtually all interviewees except the President. In addition, with the impending retirement of the President, the interviewees seemed to sense that some reflection on or even rethinking of Kalamazoo College may be in order; this occasion was somewhat of an invitation and opportunity to do so.

In conclusion, the author bears responsibility for the final conclusions of this case study. This case study is subject to the weaknesses of the exploratory case study method even though objectivity and validity have been assiduously sought.

A final preliminary note: more specific information and the unpublished documents and materials pertaining to the conduct of this study and providing its supporting evidence are in the possession of the author. Inquiries may be directed to him.

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CHAPTER III

HISTORY

In the Centennial History of Kalamazoo College, Goodsell and Dunbar provide a detailed historical account of the persons and events which created Kalamazoo College and shaped its first 100 years. Receiving a charter for the "Michigan and Huron Institute" in 1833 from the Northwest Territorial Council, Rev. Thomas W. Merrill had won the legal beginning of the Baptist "literary and theological institution" he had inexhaustibly attempted to found for four years. It was to be three more years--in the year of statehood for Michigan--before his Baptist institution became a physical, living reality.

The charter was secured four years after the first permanent settler settled in what was later to become Kalamazoo, Michigan and at a time when "not more than 100 persons, exclusive of Indians, were living in the village."[1] Western Michigan was still virtually virgin wilderness. Most Michigan settlers were from New York and New England and possessed a common heritage in which the value of

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[1]Charles True Goodsell and Willis Frederick Dunbar, Centennial History of Kalamazoo College (Kalamazoo: Kalamazoo College, 1933), p. 11.

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[2]Ibid.,

education was firmly established. The westward movement reached throughout the Middle West, the emigration to Michigan apparently having been aided by the Erie Canal which opened in 1825.

The Great Revival which blossomed earlier in the century infused the westward movement with a missionary component which took aim at the "moral and spiritual salvation of the frontier."[2] The Methodist and Baptist sects flourished in the frontier, the Baptists being the second largest denomination in Michigan in 1833. Unswerving in his purpose, Merrill's charter was nevertheless granted only after reference to denominational control was deleted and only then after considerable struggle. Although not stipulated by charter, the first trustees--and most that followed--were predominantly prominent Baptist ministers and laymen from throughout Michigan.

The Michigan and Huron Institute, the name apparently referring to the area between Lakes Michigan and Huron, which was later to become Kalamazoo College was one of seven colleges established in the West and South between 1826 and 1836. These institutions were created "with the same spirit and purpose" as the six eastern Baptist colleges which had been established in the preceding decade: preparing young men for ministerial and missionary service. In offering combined theological and academic instruction, this fledgling institution not only prepared ministers but soon broadened

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[2]Ibid., p. 8.

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Since its inception, Kalamazoo College has been a coeducational liberal arts college although it was also at one point a branch of the University of Michigan and later of the University of Chicago. It also had a Female Division, Seminary, and a Preparatory Division. In 1892 the preparatory enrollment was three times the enrollment of college rank students.

Throughout its history, this institution, the "oldest institution in Michigan offering instruction of a college grade,"[3] has endured periods of uncertainty laced with the crises of attracting both financial support and students. The vitality, growth, and financial health of the College have varied with the times and its administrations. Overall, outstanding leadership is credited to three successive administrations stretching from 1892 to 1935--Dr. Arthur G. Stokum at the turn of the century (1892-1912), Dr. Herbert L. Stetson (1912-1922), Dr. Allen Hoben (1922-1935), and to the just completed administration of Dr. Weimer K. Hicks (1954-1971).

The College's guiding principles as enunciated by its centennial president, Hoben,[4] reflect an unswerving commitment to the liberal arts and to the constellation of

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[3]Arnold Mulder, The Kalamazoo College Story (Kalamazoo: Kalamazoo College, 1958), p. 10.

[4]Goodsell and Dunbar, op. cit., pp. 161-165.

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values incorporated in the Protestant Ethic[5] in aspiring to high Christian and academic standards worthy of an elite "fellowship in learning." They are evident in the leaders of the College from Thomas Merrill to the present time: as much in Dr. Weimer Hicks, the President of Kalamazoo College during the period in focus in this study as in his predecessors.

Arnold Mulder's history of Kalamazoo College from 1933 to 1958 leads up to the scene into which the episodes of evaluation research under investigation were injected. In 1952, Goodrich and Knapp's The Origins of American Scientists was published.[6] This comparative study of science education in American universities and colleges in terms of the advanced degree and accomplishments of science graduates educated between 1924 and 1934 ranked Kalamazoo College second in the production of scientists. This study identified several factors in the teaching and learning of science at Kalamazoo College which resulted in the exceptional achievement in science. These factors were: support and involvement by Kalamazoo industry, the personal qualities of the teaching staff, and the high intellectual ability and lower-middle-class, Protestant background of Kalamazoo's science students. This and similar studies published in

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[5]Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. Talcott Parsons (New York: Charles Scribner's Son, 1930).

[6]Robert H. Knapp and H. B. Goodrich, Origins of American Scientists (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1952).

several other sources ranked Kalamazoo among the most outstanding colleges in the nation and marked the beginning of a national reputation for the College.

Dr. John Scott Everton's four year administration ended in 1952 after two highly successful annual cultural and fund raising convocations under the general chairmanship of Dr. Richard Upjohn Light, a local neuro-surgeon and member of the Upjohn family, founders of the Kalamazoo based pharmaceutical firm of the same name. A three million dollar development program had been launched, but the overall financial position of the College continued to deteriorate in contrast to general recovery of the nation's economy, and Dr. Everton found the enrollment picture to be worsening. Student disruption and upheaval during the fall of 1952 discouraged the President and he sought a leave of absence which was followed by his resignation.

Dr. Light had been appointed to the Board of Trustees in 1951 and shortly thereafter retired from his medical practice. He and Harold Smith, the business manager, were asked by the trustees to assume temporary administrative leadership of the College with the titles "Executive Trustee" and "Administrative Head," respectively.

The situation was desperate, and collapse of the College was not inconceivable. The enrollment was less than 360 students and the College had just completed almost 18 consecutive years of deficit operation. The nearly two million dollar endowment had shrunk to less than $900,000.

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The faculty became demoralized and split by the turmoil. Although beginning teachers were attracted by the College's beginning salary of $3900, the highest paid faculty member received only $5500. This resulted in almost 50% turnover in the faculty annually.

Light and Smith immediately began to study each facet of the College in an attempt "to try to find out what had dragged this College down so far."[7] Starting with the Board of Trustees, about one third of its members were found to be at least 78 years old. In 1885 the Baptist Church, which in fact operated the College, turned it over on a 999 year lease to a self-perpetuating board of trustees which they did not control except that the president and a majority of the trustees had to be Baptists. One meeting of the trustees in 1953, apparently unable to convene because of lack of a quorum of Baptists, averted the dilemma by an on the spot temporary appointment to the board of a Baptist wife of a trustee.

In an effort to restructure the board of trustees, Light suggested to the Michigan Baptist Convention that they nominate several really productive persons to the board, two of whom would be selected with one serving on the executive committee. He also suggested that the American Baptist Convention in New York do the same with one to be selected for the board. Light urged revision of the requirement that the majority of the board of trustees and the

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[7]Interview with Dr. Richard Upjohn Light, Summer, 1971.

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president of the College be Baptists, an arrangement which clearly had not produced a healthy College. Instead he proposed that only one-third of the board be required to be Baptists including the three Baptist Convention Representatives noted above. With the consent of the Michigan and American Baptist Conventions, Light and Smith asked for a new charter legalizing these new membership requirements, arguing that with less than 5% of the people in the area being Baptists, too many able persons who were not Baptists had to be omitted from consideration for the board and the presidency. The new charter was granted and in addition a mandatory retirement age of 72 for the trustees was accepted by the trustees. The board was reorganized into working committees with substantial work cut out for them.

Light and Smith also studied the administration of the College. Everton's background was that of a scholar-teacher-chaplain. He had allowed considerable faculty participation in College matters. According to the faculty committee structure, faculty approval was required for the president's appointees to faculty committees that were responsible only to him. Light, who saw this as evidence of a leadership vacuum, abolished that committee structure. In essence, he directed the administration to administer and the faculty to teach. According to Light, he and Smith then

> cut down operating expenses enough for the College to come out in the black the next year. We postponed looking for a new president until we got some of these things straightened out. We also decided that we would

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have to place our bet on getting good faculty members.[8]

Concluding that attraction of students would be dependent on the College's reputation in general and its teaching in particular, Light surmised that a boot strap operation regarding the faculty was necessary. During the spring and summer of 1953 he found six people who were willing to give $10,000 each to supplement the salaries of six outstanding new faculty members by $2000 for each of the next five years. Light then went to the faculty and asked their permission to hire six such faculty members at salaries $2000 higher than the current faculty of the same rank. He explained that his plan in creating such inequities was to bring other salaries up to par with them in the coming years. He further stated that if the faculty did not want him to use that money for its intended purpose, he would return it to the donors. He received faculty approval and six "high quality" professors were added to the faculty as proposed. In retrospect, it is now evident that these six faculty additions and the three Baptist Convention additions to the board of trustees, all of whom have remained with the College to date (with the exception of one who is deceased), have played important roles in the life and revitalization of Kalamazoo College.

An important ingredient in Light's plan to increase all faculty salaries was suggested by an article in 1953 by Beardsley Ruml. Light visited Ruml to "find out just what

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[8]Interview with Dr. Richard Upjohn Light, Summer, 1971.

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he meant." In essence, Ruml was suggesting that colleges be run on four budgets: (1) An administrative budget financed by endowment, (2) auxiliary enterprises financed by special fees, (3) scholarships financed by gifts and grants, and (4) instruction financed by tuition.

A Ruml type budgeting plan was adopted by the board with all tuition income earmarked for the instructional budget. Hence, faculty salaries would be determined by the formula: tuition rate (number of student ÷ number of faculty members). With a student-faculty ratio of 16 to one, Light felt such an arrangement would encourage faculty responsibility and efficiency. Under this budgetary plan, they would receive higher salaries when they held down course proliferation and the number of faculty members, when they avoided under-enrollment in courses offered, and when they adopted more efficient and effective teaching and learning methods that produce more learning for more students per hour of faculty teaching time. Light further expected the higher salaries to attract better teachers. A policy of mandatory retirement at age 65 for the active staff of the College was recommended to and adopted by the board of trustees.

Light also secured an $85,000 grant from the Upjohn Company to be spent however needed. Clearly, the rebuilding of the College began during this one year interim Light-Smith administration.

A vacancy in the chairmanship of the board was readily resolved with Richard Light's appointment. Though

he was not an alumnus of the College, its emerging revitalization was in no small measure due to the energy, resources, and study he applied to the College's plight.

The selection of a president led to the appointment in September, 1953 of Dr. Weimer K. Hicks as the College's twelfth president. A description of how he decided to come to Kalamazoo College is revealing:

> He was asked to come to the College. He looked at it and it wasn't very inviting. He went to Grand Rapids, got a hotel room and stayed over night. The next morning he heard the minister of the Fountain Street Baptist Church preach a sermon emphasizing that sometimes you have to do the job you would rather not because of its importance to the will of God. He came out of there knowing what he had to do. That's the kind of religious commitment he brought to this Baptist College even though he was a Presbyterian.[9]

Born in Topeka, Kansas in 1909, Hicks' youth included considerable travel with his evangelist father. He attended and graduated from Peddie Preparatory School in New Jersey and Princeton University. He returned to Peddie in 1932 as an English teacher and admissions and public relations administrator. He received an M.S. degree from Cornell in school administration and in 1943 he became President of Wayland Academy, a Baptist sponsored preparatory school. He served Wayland as headmaster for ten years and was highly successful in attracting students and financial support to that institution: ingredients which would be essential to continued revitalization of Kalamazoo College.

Hicks was a proven salesman and fund raiser which he considered his primary profession. On the day he assumed

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[9]Interview: Name withheld, Summer, 1971.

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office, January 1, 1954, the College received a one million two hundred fifty thousand dollar bequest upon the death of a long-time supporter of the College. Hicks began working to interest or to revive interest of a number of wealthy families such as the Uptons, Olds, Dows. The skyrocketing of the value of stocks in a number of American corporations greatly aided Hicks' fund raising efforts. He attracted a number of highly successful corporate and other leaders to contribute their talents to the College as members of the board of trustees. With a limit of 54 members, the board has generally had a membership of 40-45 in recent years providing the College considerable trustee talent.

The other area of immediate concern to the new President was recruitment of students. He brought Stuart Simpson to Kalamazoo College from his admissions staff at Wayland to be admissions director. (Later, as one of Hicks' most trusted aides, Simpson was appointed business manager of the College, a position he still holds.) They immediately went to work on the recruitment of good students: "We waved that Origins of American Scientists around until we wore the copies out."[10] Hicks took charge of admissions and "he began admitting students left and right."[11] Not all faculty were in accord with the apparent softening of standards which seemed to accompany the increase in enrollment. But it was not until 1958 that the College finally

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[10]Interview with Weimer K. Hicks, Summer, 1971.

[11]Interview: Name withheld, Summer, 1971.

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Hicks was aware that President Everton had failed to gain faculty support which concerned Hicks as he pushed forward in rather authoritarian fashion in administration of the College (with the exception of the curriculum and teaching which he acknowledged to be the proper province of the faculty). Hicks had immediately acknowledged that he was not an educator. He did not talk the faculty's language and on occasion his pragmatism rubbed against their values of intellectual integrity. "Dr. Hicks was not a scholar, and we all had our doubts. But, he brought in students; brought our salaries up, increased library appropriations, and built buildings."[12] The enrollment grew in successive years from 360 in 1953-54 to 440 in 1954-55, 510 in 1955-56, 570 in 1956-57, and 630 in 1957-58. The College's leadership decided that 630 was to be the maximum enrollment based on such factors as physical plant and desired student-faculty ratio.

With this increase in number of students, under the Ruml budget faculty salaries increased dramatically.

> In 1955 when we [faculty] talked about salaries, someone said we ought to be bold and say a full professor should be paid $8,000 a year. Most of us said he was crazy. Yet, by 1958 some were being paid over $8,000 before even becoming full professors. In one year he increased salaries twice--some as much as $1,500. I had been very happy with my first raise of $900 that year.[13]

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[12]Interview: Name withheld, Summer, 1971.

[13]Interview: Name withheld, Summer, 1971.

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A 1957 Chicago Tribune survey ranked Kalamazoo College ninth among the nation's coeducational colleges. It gave the College a further boost in image and morale. Further pursuing a national image, Hicks appointed a New York based publicity director who in the following years was instrumental in the appearance of articles about the College in various publications such as Time, Saturday Review, and Wall Street Journal, and in nationwide television appearances by Hicks.

The events of 1955-65 amounted to the "glorious years" for private higher education in America according to Hicks. It was a decade of economic boom, of new interest in higher education precipitated by Sputnik, of private foundation support of higher education. Hicks noted: "Everytime you turned on your radio or T.V., someone was saying, 'Give to the college of your choice.'"[14] Whereas Everton had been faced with recruiting students at a time when the slump of the birth rate from the depression hit the college age population, the college age population had begun increasing with even more young people wanting to go to college. "The students were out there to take if you went out and got them."[15]

By 1968, the Ford Foundation was making substantial matching grants to private colleges. Kalamazoo College's first application for a Ford Foundation grant was turned

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[14]Interview with Weimer K. Hicks, Summer, 1971.

[15]Interview with Weimer K. Hicks, Summer, 1971.

down for various reasons: lack of sustained institutional stability and fund raising and insufficient planning for the future. Light then went out and raised four and one-half million dollars in less than a year, much of it being Upjohn family money including a sizable trust which Light wanted dedicated to the academic program. In this undertaking, Light provided still another impetus toward change:

> I and my family had gone abroad to study at the University of Grenoble in 1956 for six weeks, and just watching what happened to our boys at that time convinced me how much you could do with it. One boy just graduated from high school and entered Yale in the fall where they tested him and placed him in third year college French taught entirely in French. He had gotten two years of college French abroad in six to eight weeks. Concentrated study does quite a lot for those who are prepared for it.[16]

In 1957, Light asked the dean of the curriculum, Lawrence Barrett for suggestions about how a large fund for which he and his brother were trustees might be given to the College for academic purposes rather than for a swimming pool or other building which he suspected President Hicks might support. After receiving Hicks' approval for dedication of the fund to academic purposes, Barrett told Light of his concern about the provincialism of Kalamazoo students. Based on this observation and his family's experience abroad, Light was favorably inclined toward and suggested some form of foreign study for select students, an idea which Barrett strongly supported. The fund of one and a quarter million dollars was offered to the College--at first conditionally--to underwrite such a program. As a result, the College sent

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[16]Interview with Richard Light, Summer, 1971.

twenty-five students to France, Germany, and Spain in the summer of 1958. By 1961 the size of the group of Kalamazoo students going abroad to study in the summer was double that of the original group.

In addition, the 1957-58 Anniversary (125th) Fund drive which had a goal of over $1.5 million raised over $2 million. Demonstrating that the College could raise money, and feeling that its constituency had manifested trust and confidence in the College, Light and Hicks agreed that the College had a moral obligation to address itself to the growing educational needs of the nation and its growing population. During 1959-60, agreement was reached on a projection of gradual growth over the next decade to 1320 students and 72 full-time faculty members with top faculty total compensation of nearly $25,000. This plan was included in the second application for a Ford Foundation grant which resulted in a $2.2 million matching grant contingent upon the College's raising two and one-half times that amount. (The Ford grants matching formula was generally two to one.)

According to Light:

> In the late 1950's, we realized that just from population growth alone and the shift into higher education for high school graduates that the country was going to be faced with doubling its college and university facilities by 1970. I decided right there that probably the country would not double those facilities and still let all of the campuses be idle for four months of the year. The cost would be at least $10 billion and the country wouldn't pay the cost. And so in 1959 or '60, we decided to double our enrollment, to build according to a master plan up to 1300 students. At about the same time we looked around to see what was the best way to operate on a year-round basis. Larry Barrett was the academic dean at

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> the time and he was the moving force in this once we decided to operate year-round.[17]

Hicks notes: "We were searching for a way by which we could serve a large number of students because we felt this was our moral obligation."[18]

Grayson Kirk, President of Columbia University, had written an article noting the growing imperative for year-round education and suggesting that three years might be sufficient for the baccalarueate degree.[19] This article caught Light's attention; he ordered copies for all the trustees and also distributed it to the faculty. "In other words, he was pushing for more efficient education."[20]

The 1960's were to Kalamazoo College a decade of bricks and mortar and of a new departure in academic program. As of this writing, the College has a beautifully expanded, debt free physical plant valued at 18 to 20 million dollars which two to two and one half million dollars of federal funds helped build, and endowment of over 13 million dollars. In this respect, the results of Light's and Hicks' efforts to rebuild Kalamazoo College are a monument to their undeniable success.

In Hicks' view,

> the job of the president is to recognize what the

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[17]Interview with Richard Light, Summer, 1971.

[18]Interview with Weimer Hicks, Summer, 1971.

[19]Grayson Kirk, "College Shouldn't Take Four Years," Saturday Evening Post, (March 26, 1960), pp. 21-24.

[20]Interview with Weimer Hicks, Summer, 1971.

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> ingredients are that make a college. You have to have a faculty. You have to have students. You have to have a program, and then the overall world has to be made conscious of that program and of that institution.[21]

The only facet not yet rebuilt was the academic program. It is this remaining facet which is of special interest as evaluation of it is the primary focus of this investigation. It is at this point that Light's commitment to a year-round program, Hicks' interest in the public relations value of a more attractive academic program, and Lawrence Barrett's imaginative views of contemporary education merged and a new program emerged.

Lawrence Barrett had been one of the nation's first Woodrow Wilson Fellowship recipients and was the first of the six new faculty members appointed under the Light faculty salary supplement plan in 1953. In 1955, President Hicks created a new office, dean of the curriculum, and named Barrett to that position. In 1957,

> Barrett was named Dean of the Faculty and given additional duties in academic administration. The new offices were created for the purpose of studying the various disciplines to improve and strengthen the quality of teaching. The new Dean's job was described as that of coordinating the works of the various departments as they study the possible reorganization of their curricula.[22]

The most recent sweeping change in the curriculum had established four divisions and requirements for graduation in 1938 necessitating (1) taking a number of courses in these various divisions to assure general education

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[21]Interview with Weimer Hicks, Summer, 1971.

[22]Mulder, op. cit., p. 155.

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Dean Barrett began working on various possible patterns of academic program change in 1958. In the summer of 1959, several Kalamazoo faculty members attended a Danforth Foundation sponsored conference at Colorado Springs which focused on curriculum change. Barrett gave increasing attention to the Dartmouth Plan which called for quarters instead of semesters and a reduction in the number of courses students took per term. He worked out possible modified applications of it to Kalamazoo College, put his thoughts on paper, and distributed them to the administration and faculty. Barrett was aware of Light's increasing interest in year-round education and in finding a way to double the College's enrollment without doubling the on-campus enrollment. Barrett developed the idea of four quarters with a class (freshman, sophomore, junior, or senior) being off-campus each quarter. He presented this to President Hicks who "bought it."[23]

Meanwhile, Light told Hicks and Barrett that he wanted to ask the board of trustees to adopt year-round operation and institute a three year degree. They, in turn, presented Barrett's tentative curriculum pattern to Light. It included the possibility of foreign study for all students, Barrett's argument being that due to the provincialism of most Kalamazoo students, they all needed the experience of study abroad. Barrett insisted that while they

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[23]Interview with Lawrence Barrett, Summer, 1971.

could think in terms of a year-round college, they could not think in terms of each faculty member teaching all four quarters. Each faculty member would have to have one quarter off for professional and personal renewal. With general agreement reached among Light, Hicks, and Barrett, they asked the board of trustees for a commitment to a general plan comprised of these points. It was adopted by the board at their meeting in June, 1960. In addition, the board asked that a committee of the faculty be appointed to study the plan during the summer and develop a program of study by September which the committee could recommend to the College to go into effect a year later.

At commencement, President Hicks made a statement that part-time operation of the College, which was a heritage from rural days, could no longer be condoned. It was then clear to all that change was in the offing. Previous events--Light's distribution of Kirk's article advocating year-round operation, the Danforth Conference attended by leaders among the faculty, Barrett's distribution of suggestions for changes in the calendar and program--had led to some expectation and consideration of change. The President's statement signaled that the time was close at hand.

President Hicks consulted Barrett and Raymond Hightower, Chairman of the Educational Policies Committee, regarding how to proceed. They agreed that the Educational Policies Committee with the addition of several key faculty members and chaired by Hightower should be given the job of developing Barrett's general plan into a program of study

which it could recommend to the faculty in September. It was Hightower's job to attempt to engineer consensus within the short period of one summer.

At Barrett's suggestion, Dr. Light sent Dr. Hicks and his family abroad for the summer and Dr. Light also stayed away from the campus to avoid any charges that the outcome was the result of the administration forcing the program on the faculty. Barrett also persuaded the President to pay each of the committee members $250 for their efforts during the summer.

Before Hicks departed for Europe, Barrett told him that he had to have his backing on three points if a new program was to be workable. Although he harbored reservations, Hicks gave Barrett assurance of his backing and support on these points:

(1) each full-time faculty member was to have one quarter off from teaching and other College responsibilities although which quarter would depend on the scheduling needs of the College

(2) under a year-round program, number one above meant there could be no more one-man departments

(3) no teacher was to teach more than two courses per quarter.

As Barrett viewed it, rather than teaching 85 students in five courses three times a week, a faculty member would be teaching 45 students in two courses five time a week. This meant slightly fewer student class hour contacts per week per faculty member and slightly larger classes.

This would allow more opportunity to get to know those fewer students better plus fewer course preparations and presumably better teaching. This is the way Light and others expected it to work. The reduction of faculty teaching load from five to two courses per term would be very attractive to present and prospective faculty members. It would also provide better teaching at a "cost" of an only slightly reduced faculty work week in terms of faculty-student contact hours. Furthermore, the year-round schedule would get the faculty committed to the College year-round while only having to pay them for three quarters.

Barrett asked the President to add older influential faculty members to the Educational Policies Committee (EPC) for the summer; it had been comprised mostly of younger members of the faculty the previous year. Barrett and Hicks knew Hightower's position among the faculty. He had been EPC chairman a number of times and had established good rapport with even the most cantankerous of the older influential faculty members. As EPC chairman he had long demonstrated an ability to engineer agreement among them. Furthermore, the older faculty members had established what Barrett termed "Queensbury rules" regarding their own internal decision making. They were fair in their dealings, giving each person a chance to be heard rather than resorting to secret deals or working one against another. This would be important in gaining full faculty support for the new program.

In general, the older faculty members felt some

measure of confidence in President Hicks. They were especially appreciative for what he had already done for their salaries and were generally sympathetic to what he was doing for the College. Barrett indicated to the EPC that Light was putting on the pressure for a year-round program and if they did not devise one, the President would be held responsible.

President Hicks met with the EPC several times, assured Hightower that he would support EPC recommendations and then departed for Europe. After introducing his ideas to EPC, Barrett met with the Committee less frequently as advised by Hightower so as not to impede its working toward consensus.

The task before the Committee was one of "how to do it":[24] to figure out some arrangement whereby it was possible to have more students enrolled with the same facilities which were now to be used year-round. Desired ingredients were getting some students off-campus each term, foreign study which had already begun, and an optional three year degree program.

EPC met frequently that summer, generally in the cool basement of Mandell Library.

> Some didn't see merits of quarters or switching [students] off and on campus. If we got hung up on something we put a group to work studying it to come up with something. We met twice weekly at first and later once a week after we had broken down into subcommittees. We finally put it together.[25]

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[24]Interview with Wen Chao Chen, Summer, 1971.

[25]Interview with Raymond Lee Hightower, Summer, 1971.

Several members of the Committee made trips to examine examples of the quarter and trimester program at other institutions. In addition to a visit to Dartmouth, several Dartmouth alumni were interviewed to see how well they liked that program. The Dean at Dartmouth and the President of Associated Colleges of the Midwest were brought to campus to speak to the Committee. Several members of the Committee also felt that the Antioch College program should not be overlooked, that it might have something that could be borrowed and modified for Kalamazoo's purposes. A member of the Committee visited Antioch and several Committee members discussed Antioch's program with Antioch staff and faculty they knew personally.

As the Committee moved toward accepting the idea of a quarter system with some kind of on-off campus calendar, the question of how to accommodate foreign study loomed large. It was a prime consideration urged by Light, Hicks, and Barrett as well as already being in existence and well-funded. Committee members felt that study abroad should be more than a grand tour of Europe and Barrett was persuasive in urging its appropriateness for all Kalamazoo students. Some Committee members wanted study abroad in the summer, others in the sophomore year, still others in the junior year along the line of the already well known "junior year abroad" program. Alternatives were narrowed as difficulty getting foreign universities to take Kalamazoo students for the summer was indicated, and as contacts abroad advised that getting sophomores into foreign universities might also

be difficult. The question of adequate language preparation before the junior year further deflated alternatives other than the junior year. Finally, two quarters in the junior year emerged as most acceptable.

An aspect of the Antioch program seemed desirable and adaptable to Kalamazoo College: its work-study program.

> Most of our students had never had real work other than study. This was discussed as the experiential part of the program, an opportunity for the student to get some experience at work or service during their educational experience--preferably early, before they chose their major.[26]

There was also a general feeling that freshmen should spend their first year on-campus getting acclimated to college life and rigors.

> We were concerned about being able to set up work arrangements for one quarter especially other than summer quarter. We decided it would sound more respectable to call it "career and service" quarter and we thought we could get some help setting it up.[27]

The Committee agreed to a two course teaching load for the faculty and to a three course load for students. They concluded that this would improve the faculty's teaching and the students' use of the library.

> We expected the students to have more free time for study that they would use. We had some reports to the effect that at Dartmouth, for example, there had been greater use of the library under their three course per quarter plan. We had also told Ford [Foundation] that we were going to get just 1320 students--good students who could do independent work--something under their own initiative for one quarter while they're here. I'm not sure where this whole idea of an independent study quarter started, but someone was aware that when Dr. Hicks went to Princeton, students there sometimes wrote theses in the senior year. Other

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[26]Interview with Raymond Hightower, Summer, 1971.

[27]Interview with Raymond Hightower, Summer, 1971.

> schools had done it too. We expected to get not only good students but also to promote high level performance.[28]

As the Committee began formulating an independent study quarter for the senior year, expectations for the program were not clear as suggested by the following perceptions of two Committee members:

> We used the term thesis at first--a good senior thesis. Every student is capable of writing something that makes sense and if he does it he will be proud of it. It is the one thing that is his. It's for the student's goals, something he is going to be proud of. The whole direction of the program was toward increased independence. Anything that the student did as long as he did as well as he could was to be acceptable. It was the student's job, not for us [the faculty] to "nit pick" and it was up to him to complete it whenever he could.[29]

The independent study project was originally designed by the Committee

> as a junior Ph.D. thesis to show other prestigious institutions that our students were capable of doing outstanding work--their passport into good graduate schools.[30]

Largely because Light was insisting on it, the Committee attempted to work out a three year track. Ideas of accelerated education and advanced placement were popular nationally at that time and were incorporated in the Committee's ideas for a three year bachelor's degree program.

Barrett and the Committee labored to put the pieces together in an integrated program including a somewhat equal number of students off-campus each quarter to keep the

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[28]Interview with Raymond Hightower, Summer, 1971.

[29]Interview: Name withheld, Summer, 1971.

[30]Interview: Name withheld, Summer, 1971.

on-campus housing facilities as full as possible each quarter.

> We and Larry [Barrett] spent quite a bit of time balancing numbers to see how we could make it go. Having half of the seniors off-campus [doing independent study] in the fall and the other half in the winter was a further effort to balance things--determine who would fill the beds.[31]

Hightower had consulted as many faculty members as he could who were in Kalamazoo that summer regarding the work and progress of the Committee, especially those whose existing programs seemed threatened or hampered by the new program such as the biology department's summer work program and varsity athletics. Barrett negotiated with the chemistry department which extracted a concession regarding their own program for the senior independent project quarter which would allow their students to remain on-campus where they had laboratory facilities.

The Committee was able to put together a new program in outline form[32] in response to the tasks it had been given at the beginning of the summer. As for the numerous details which remained unsolved, Barrett assured the Committee that they could be worked out later.

When Hicks returned, he found the proposed program to be essentially what he and Barrett had discussed. He supported the Committee's product but privately concluded

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[31]Interview with Raymond Hightower, Summer, 1971.

[32]Prefatory Note on the Report and Report to the Faculty by the Educational Policies Committee, Kalamazoo College, September 8, 1960. (Mimeographed.)

that he had made a mistake on agreeing to a two course teaching load and tried to pursuade Barrett to change it. Barrett concluded he neither should, could, or would change it at that point.

> Then in the fall [1960] we went to Pretty Lake for a two day faculty orientation. Hightower presented the program and advocated it. That was really Ray's finest hour in the 21 years I have known him. He was masterful. He didn't disguise the fact that there were a number of loose ends yet to be worked out. Because of his seniority, the old die-hards couldn't laugh him off, and the young "Turks" couldn't buck him. And he satisfied most of us enough that it would help move the College forward that we went along with him. We insisted on a secret ballot so no one would be afraid of voting against it. The result was that only four voted against it.[33]

Three of the four votes were from persons who had not been in Kalamazoo that summer and thus had not been consulted.

According to Hightower,

> it was at the faculty retreat that the thing really came into being--out of the idea stage. When the faculty voted for this, they were committing themselves to it in principle; we were sure we were going to have it. We would begin there and make alterations as needed. We agreed to keep it continuously under study. Many other schools had made studies but made no changes. We made changes on the first round. I think, because we had enough in-feeling. I think that by that time the President felt secure enough that he didn't feel threatened by some innovations coming out of the faculty.[34]

Once the faculty approved the program in principle, Barrett proceeded to work out the details of the Kalamazoo Plan to the chagrin of some Committee members who thought they were to be involved in the formulation of these details. The new program began in 1961-62, a transition year, on a

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[33]Interview: Name withheld, Summer, 1971.

[34]Interview with Raymond Hightower, Summer, 1971.

three quarter basis.

> When the program was first introduced, there was a lot of excitement. The students were excited; the faculty was excited. We were in a growth industry and in good shape.[35]

> We came up with a year-round, modern, relevant, existential type of education that people could buy, and people became excited about it.[36]

In general, the Kalamazoo Plan, see Figure 1, prospered in the decade of the 1960's except for the three year track. It simply did not materialize as very few students wanted an accelerated program. It was later phased out with only several graduates.

Career Service began in 1962-63 with the addition to the staff of two people who had experience in the two aspects of that program. The career or job experience part was set up by a former Antioch cooperative education program staff member who had contacts with the business world and who stayed at Kalamazoo for one year. The response to this program by business was beyond all expectations. The remuneration students received varied, but there were nevertheless more opportunities than the College could utilize.

The service aspect was set up by a former staff member of the American Baptist Convention who had provided leadership in their social concern and services area. The Career Service Program has had several directors and more recently an occupational emphasis.

The Foreign Study Program has been directed by

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[35]Interview with Wen Chao Chen, Summer, 1971.

[36]Interview with Weimer K. Hicks, Summer, 1971.



How The Kalamazoo Plan Operates

THE FOUR YEAR STUDENT will enter in the fall, spend a total of 10 quarters on campus and 4 or 5 off-campus and graduate in June after four years.

	FALL	WINTER	SPRING	SUMMER
FRESHMEN	campus	campus	campus	career service or vacation
SOPHOMORES	campus	campus	career service or vacation	campus
JUNIORS	study abroad	study abroad or career service or vacation	campus	campus
SENIORS	campus / off-campus study	off-campus study / campus	campus	XXXXXXXX

THE THREE YEAR STUDENT will enter college in June, immediately after high school graduation and will graduate from college three years later.

	FALL	WINTER	SPRING	SUMMER
FRESHMEN & SOPHOMORES	XXXXXXXX / campus	XXXXXXXX / campus	XXXXXXX / career service	campus / campus
JUNIORS	campus	study abroad	campus	campus
SENIORS	campus / off-campus study	off-campus study / campus	campus	XXXXXXXX

Figure 1.

Richard Stavig, formally a full-time faculty member, since its inception in 1958 and has expanded to 19 centers all over the world. Ninety percent of Kalamazoo's juniors spend one or two quarters studying abroad: generally fall and winter quarters according to the regular off-on-campus schedule. This off-campus program has been most enthusiastically endorsed by the students, but it has nevertheless been questioned by some faculty members because of the seeming lack of rigor of the study component abroad. The Light Trust which originally financed the summer study abroad program from 1958-1961 was doubled to approximately 2.5 million dollars which currently yields about $110 thousand of an annual budget for the foreign study program of over $400 thousand. Regular student fees are sufficient to finance the rest of the cost of the program.

For the first several years, the "Senior Independent Project" or SIP program as it was called, was whatever each department saw fit to make it. There was no overall coordinator of the program, and each independent project was generally undertaken off-campus and away from the student's SIP "advisor." Hightower noted: "One thing showed up early. By the time the student decided on an SIP project and had found a place to work on it, a good deal of the quarter was gone.[37] Seniors increasingly failed to get it done by graduation time although it was generally to have been done either fall or winter quarter. This was increasingly

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[37]Interview with Raymond Hightower, Summer, 1971.

embarrassing to the College and thus of concern to the President.

Having never really been defined, the SIP was generally assumed to be a part of the student's major. Furthermore, many faculty members saw and judged it more as a reflection on their own scholarship than on the student's. Hence, they often judged student SIP's in accordance with their own professional standards and requirements. In 1964, successful completion of the SIP was interpreted as a College graduation requirement. As originally hoped, there was a substantial increase in the use of the library during the first two years of the new Kalamazoo Plan in terms of the average number of books checked out per student.

The SIP Program has had several faculty or administrator "coordinators" since 1964, but they have had little authority over the program. It has generally been in the hands of the departments. Their impact has been restricted primarily to suggesting or establishing procedural guidelines. Some adjustments were made in the program in 1969 which shifted the emphasis (and the name) to "Senior Individualized Project" and made it a more flexible program providing more project options for a number of students. The only readily available alternative to the SIP has been student teaching experience for students seeking teacher certification.

Arriving at the same number of students on-campus each quarter has been a continual administrative financial concern in keeping the dorms filled to capacity. This has

been difficult due to variable factors such as class size (freshman, sophomore, etc.), sex ratio, deviation from the regular on-off-campus schedule by some students, and attrition. The SIP program has been used to provide the "adjustable" part of the otherwise tightly meshed on-off-campus program. Seniors have been assigned to a fall or winter quarter SIP by department, yearly adjustments being made by shifting departments which appear to fit the "best guess" on-campus enrollment needs. This has also been a perpetual administrative headache.

Light and Hicks continued to build the College during the first decade of the Kalamazoo Plan, but changes in the position of academic dean were frequent. Barrett had attempted to persuade Hicks to support him in changing the faculty's behavior to provide more extensive assistance to students on the SIP, which was not included in their two course teaching load, and to develop more meaningful teaching and learning contacts with students both inside and outside the classroom. Hicks contended that they should do that anyway and would not support Barrett further in what he felt was necessary to evoke and sustain such behavior from the faculty.

Barrett was succeeded by Hightower who then had the job of putting the Kalamazoo Plan into operation. After he also became mayor of the City of Kalamazoo in 1963, Hicks and Hightower concluded that his work as mayor was of greater importance for the College. Hightower also concurred with Hicks that Sherrill Cleland, professor of economics at

Kalamazoo College, would be a good successor. Cleland was dean from fall, 1964 until summer, 1967, when he took a leave of absence for a two year appointment as Ford Foundation Consultant to the American University of Beirut. Douglas Peterson, Chairman of the Education Department, succeeded him first as acting dean and then permanently with the President's blessing and the faculty's backing. Peterson took a one year leave of absence in 1968-69 during which Barrett filled in as acting dean. Peterson is currently Academic Dean.

Summary

After 120 years of existence, Kalamazoo College faced a very uncertain future. In 1953, as Executive Trustee, Richard U. Light was instrumental in a thorough reorganization of the College. In the subsequent 18 years under President Weimer Hicks with Richard Light as Chairman of the Board of Trustees, Kalamazoo College has been rebuilt. From a College which could not attract a sufficient number of students (enrollment of 360), keep its faculty (approximately 50% annual turnover), or achieve fiscal stability (17 out of the previous 19 years had resulted in deficits), the College's student body grew to a select 1400 with surplus applications and average SAT entrance scores of over 600, a relatively distinguished, well paid faculty with annual turnover of approximately 1.5%, and a greatly expanded modern physical plant with a nine-fold increased total value which is debt free, and an endowment which has

been increased nearly fourteen-fold.

With the additional contribution of Dean Lawrence Barrett as the "architect" and Raymond Hightower as the engineer of consent, in 1960 Kalamazoo College formulated and embarked upon an innovative year-round academic program. As has been revealed to be generally the case with major program innovations[38] this one was given its impetus from the top: in this case, Chairman of the Board of Trustees, Richard Light. Both before adopting the Kalamazoo Plan and then because of it, the College has attracted national attention and stature. An estimated 250 to 300 colleges have sent representatives to Kalamazoo College during the last decade to study the Kalamazoo Plan.

As a College which considers itself and is considered by some others to be among the elite of the nations private liberal arts colleges, its faculty has been strongly oriented toward teaching and sound scholarship. The faculty has generally measured its success and prided itself most in terms of the number of graduates going on to graduate school, especially reputable ones, and the number of Woodrow Wilson Fellowships and other scholastic honors accruing to its graduates. Hence, as a teaching institution, the College's major operational objective has been pre-professional training, prizing its students in terms of their scholarship and academic performance. Several faculty members and

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[38]JB Lon Hefferlin, Dynamics of Academic Reform (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1969).

administrators characterized this tendency as "faculty members perpetuating themselves."

Also notable among a minority of the faculty members--including some reputed to be among the best teachers at Kalamazoo--has been an objective of facilitating the personal and intellectual development and growth of the student. These faculty members have derived satisfaction from helping and watching students' potential blossom. Some of these faculty members define student potential broadly enough to include existential objectives and development such as flexibility, openness to change and challenge, etc. Many faculty members have evidenced from little or no commitment to opposition to such objectives, some having assumed any such objectives to be the responsibility of the College's off-campus programs, primarily foreign study.

A final major objective which had been generally although not exclusively attributed to President Hicks and the Board of Trustees is to instill religious values and time-honored standards of behavior and decorum. According to President Hicks,

> what we are trying to be right now is the best of two worlds. We're trying to be the best of the traditional college. I mean the college of Origins of American Scientists, the college of sound scholarship, pre-graduate study--all of these things; rules and regulations, everyone living on-campus. On the other hand, we are an activist, existential, on and off-campus which is progressively out in front. This is one of our problems.[39]

The College with its academic emphasis and its

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[39]Interview with Weimer Hicks, Summer, 1971.

existential-experiential off-campus programs has attracted highly independent students.[40] The Kalamazoo Plan was initially calculated, at least in part, to further increase student independence and lessen their provincialism. Some faculty members admit to increased appreciation of the off-campus programs on the basis of increased maturity which is apparent in some students after those experiences, especially career service and foreign study. Some faculty members have also heard about Kalamazoo students being highly rated as Woodrow Wilson awardees and graduate students increasingly for their apparent self-reliance, resourcefulness, adaptability, flexibility, and ability to assess and cope with new situations even though they have been less prepared academically than other students. (Because of the foreign study and SIP program in the junior and senior year, Kalamazoo students generally have only four quarters to devote to classroom study instead of the usual last two years.) Most faculty members and administrators view such outcomes, which are probably closer to Barrett's hopes than the faculty's or the President's, as a by-product of the Kalamazoo Plan. In comparison to the off-campus program, students are increasingly finding the on-campus life both in and out of the classroom to be dull, pedestrian, and confining. Corresponding major changes have not been made in teaching methods or course structure. Students must still live on campus or at home during all on-campus quarters. After living "on

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[40]"Danforth Study Final Report," (Kalamazoo College, 1966), p. III-37.

their own" during several off-campus programs, they view the slow acceptance of student self-determination in on-campus life by top level administrators with further disdain. Estrangement between the student subculture's and the President's views of on-campus student life has become increasingly apparent and bothersome, and in the minds of some, increasingly severe in the latter half of the 1960's.

It was onto this background and into this milieu in the last half of the 1960's that the evaluation efforts brought into focus in this case study were launched. The Kalamazoo Plan had been approved by the faculty with a commitment that continual evaluation of the new program would be undertaken. What evaluation was attempted? What impact did it have, if any? Why?

Before turning to these questions, another prior question is suggested by the near unanimity with which the interviewees believed President Hicks to be of critical importance to nearly any change within the institution as reflected in this comment: "President Hicks' position on almost any issue has been a critical factor. If he was opposed to something, he could usually find a way to scuttle it, and so people haven't tried things he was opposed to."[41] This prior question is basically one of institutional governance.

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[41]Interview: Name withheld, Summer, 1971.

CHAPTER IV

GOVERNANCE

When Richard Light, as Executive Trustee, began to reorganize Kalamazoo College in 1954, he almost immediately returned all administrative decision-making to the administration. Now, as Chairman of the Board of Trustees, Light asserts:

> Basically, faculty should teach, the administration ought to do all the administering, and the Trustees ought to keep out of their hair. The job of the Board is to establish broad policy and then tell the President to carry it out.[1]

Viewing the relationship similarly, Weimer Hicks has maintained this separation of responsibility between faculty and administration. He views the faculty's role as that of teaching and making the smaller academic policies. In recognizing and readily admitting that he is not an educator, he has considered the curriculum and teaching to be the responsibilities of the faculty. If they encroach upon his domain he reminds them that faculty committees dealing with the rest of the College exist because he permits them.

> The Board of Trustees owns the College and should make the larger policies, but the President needs to "spearhead and spark" the trustees and the faculty, and in

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[1]Interview with Richard Light, Summer, 1971.

> general lead, troubleshoot, provide a public image and coordinate the entire institutional effort.[2]

In coming to Kalamazoo College, Hicks viewed his own expertise to be in fund raising, student life, and public relations. His overriding concern has been public relations and "image" which attract both funds and students. Recognized as a very strong-willed and aggressive person and generally characterized as an authoritarian personality and "benevolent dictator" by the interviewees, Hicks' power is widely recognized and seldom challenged by those who know how internal decisions are made and power wielded.

> Like most small colleges, our President is held responsible by the Trustees for everything that goes on in the College. The question is how much of this responsibility is he going to delegate to his aides. He doesn't let anyone get sufficiently aggressive in any area to get away from his own support and point of view--which is what Everton had failed to accomplish; he hadn't had the campus under control. . . . The fact that this campus has had no major disruptions or destruction under Hicks demonstrates to the Trustees and others that he has a grip on things. He deserves and gets credit for that. He is an authoritarian personality. He has served the College well in many respects because of it, but it does create difficult problems today.[3]

> In the final analysis, on every issue, even the question of salary increments for secretaries, there is one power and that is the President. Every action that is considered will not be accepted if it is not discussed in advance with him and some understanding reached as to what will be approved before it goes to whatever group or committee will consider the issue. Our method of operation is not to evaluate or consider, but to see what is desired by the President and then set about bringing it to pass.[4]

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[2]Interview with Weimer Hicks, Summer, 1971.

[3]Interview: Name withheld, Summer, 1971.

[4]Interview: Name withheld, Summer, 1971.

In this respect, two persons who have long been non-competing, loyal, trusted allies to the President and have played important roles as useful extensions of the President's power are Stuart Simpson, Business Manager, and Wen Chao Chen, political science professor and more recently Librarian, Dean of Academic Services, and Vice President. Both men have frequently represented the President's view on various committees and in so doing, avoided a confrontation between the President and others whose views might differ with his. In President Hicks' own view,

> a president has to know how to make things happen. You become a professional in how to get others to reach a decision: a motivator, a manipulator. It may be with faculty. It may be with students. I would do it by talk, by persuasion, by "love," by encouragement, by "big stick," by toughness, by reward.[5]

He is thoroughtly true to his conception of human nature: that man's impulses need to be constrained or controlled. He embodies

> deeply held values and commitments to hard work, restrained social behavior--proper and decent, religious dedication and participation, courtesy and respect for elders, appreciation for one's opportunities.[6]

To him these are implicit in a good church related liberal arts college which thus must be paternalistic. He credits his own success to "more guts" and "hard work" and believes he sets that example for others to follow. His style of leadership is as demanding of others as it is of himself and is carried out as though he believes the strong--those

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[5]Interview with Weimer Hicks, Summer, 1971.

[6]Interview: Name withheld, Summer, 1971.

who can take it, who have the inner strength--should reign supreme: archtypical of David Riesman's "inner directed" man.[7]

Hicks' style of governance is to generally give hints to those who move toward the center of power in the decision making machinery to consult him before any decisions are made; he expects his prior approval to be sought. He expects this to be done by second level administrators and committee chairmen who are to seek out his views and engineer consent according to them. Several interviewees characterized his major technique for accomplishing this as pitting one against another and keeping each unsure of his own position, thereby solidifying their dependence upon his support and power. In this way, too, only he knows about everything that is going on in the institution. This situation is terribly frustrating to many, effectively stifles initiative (except his own) and produces a cautious staff and faculty. It nevertheless is very effective in allowing Hicks to guide the institution with seemingly little use of power. For this reason, Hicks' style of leadership is best known to those who work close to the center of power; his authority may appear to be benign, mysterious or enigmatic to those on the fringe of power and beyond.

Interviewees closest to the President's power suggested that Hicks typically wants to dominate others and

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[7]David Riesman, Nathan Glazer, and Reuel Denney, The Lonely Crowd, A Study in the Changing American Character (abr. ed. with new foreword; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961).

will do so completely if allowed. His method of testing people for weaknesses is often to see if they can withstand his temper tirade which is apt to follow if they only disagree with or challenge him. Most recipients are intimidated and quickly conclude that he is inflexible, and he is on some things. The prime and seemingly only method to successfully influence Hicks is to weather the tirade, drop the subject temporarily, but bring it up again.

Few people discover and enjoy this type of relationship with him, and only four persons in the College in the last ten years seem to have been able to meet him head on and thereby gain real power and the respect of the President. Three of these are Lawrence Barrett, Academic Dean from 1956 to 1962, Lloyd Averill, Dean of the Chapel and Vice President (left Kalamazoo College in 1967), and Sherrill Cleland, Academic Dean from 1964 to 1967. These men were all "very aggressive, hard working and bright."[8] As a "man of God," while projecting an attractive, eloquent, intellectual image for the College, Averill complemented Hicks' purposes well. Barrett and Cleland were adroitly political and clearly toiled long and hard to improve Kalamazoo College and its image. As an economics professor, Cleland's grasp of finances was of considerable use (and some suggest sometimes a threat) to Hicks. These men's relationship to the President is generally recognized as being productive for the College. But also, as may frequently happen between

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[8]Interview: Name withheld, Summer, 1971.

aggressive people, their relationship was often stormy and difficult, even abrasive.

The fourth person who has gained the President's confidence is Richard Stavig, Director of the Foreign Study Program. This is the lone area with which the President is little concerned. It has been ably administered by Stavig and has enjoyed the reputation of an attractive program which has received exceptional student acclaim.

With the lone exception of the Foreign Study Program, the President feels he knows what is going on throughout the College. As the only person able and willing to assume institution-wide perspective and responsibility (as he sees it), his estimation of his own views and judgement seemingly borders on the infallible. He is unwilling and unable to trust others with delegated responsibility. He prides himself on his ability to use people for his purposes and his authoritarianism has clearly served the College well in some respects. His own self-image is thought by some to require that he be recognized as the father figure, the seat of power, the successful patriarch of his flock and of the College which he rebuilt in his image.

The majority of second and third level administrators are quick to accept their subserviant role, are very loyal to the President, and find his authoritarianism fully appropriate and reassuring while enjoying the "borrowed" prestige of working for him.

Hicks is open in his relationships with others when he is confident and can afford to be open. He is closed

when he perceives a challenge to his views or less than ready acquiescence--where the disagreement mounts against him and the moves to head it off count. It is at this point that governance by tension and intimidation surfaces. Persons with divergent views who attempt to discharge their responsibilities in accordance with their own views or who seek change and innovation through the regular channels are enveloped in a wearying experience that most learn is not worth the resulting "hassle" with the President's power and the extensions of it. Several very influential interviewees suggested that he needs strong second level people if his influence is not to become smothering, but noted that he has not always had them. Even Hicks sometimes recognizes that changes must be made, but at the same time resists many of them because he sees many proposed changes as erosion of the values he holds and of what he believes traditional liberal arts education should be. The practical, pragmatic facet of the President is seen by some as being increasingly in conflict with his own deeply held values: by being the public relations man who is concerned about what will sell, he has helped build an institution that projects a public image of vitality which attracts students with and further exposes them to values that are an anathema to those he and some important board members and local patrons hold dear.

It is under such circumstances that he feels the need to have even more control to manipulate these increasingly contradictory images for the College's various publics

while finding it increasingly difficult to do so. Students increasingly represent a culture foreign to the President, which troubles him deeply. Some of the people caught between the President and the students lead harried lives at Kalamazoo College. Yet, in recognizing this increasing gulf, he has recently sought out several loyal faculty-staff members who are in non-threatening and non-competing positions but are also more effective with the students to help him understand the emerging student subculture. He even uses the language of such "aides" on occasion as he tries to provide leadership for the College in his public utterances.

It is this pragmatic ability to learn and assume new ideas and views that the other faculty and administrators uniformly count as one of the President's greatest strengths. The process is generally slow and painful for all concerned following the patterns noted above. When all his efforts to batter down opposition to his views fail--an exhausting process--he often takes on the new reality outwardly as his own. But increasingly, the rate and direction of change disturbs him and as his internal authority has yielded, he appears to feel less knowing and confident and even more authoritarian.

While the President's behavior sometimes appears to be unreasonable, irrational and inflexible, his resistance to change is acknowledged by some as helping to avoid commitment of the College to fads in education and to unreasonable student demands, helping to maintain the uniqueness of the

institution, and forcing people to examine and sell their views on compelling bases.

The dominant faculty view of the President is one of ambivalence: grateful for what the President has done to rebuild the institution and their salaries, acknowledging his political astuteness, but disappointed (some, bitterly) in the one man rule which belies the College's motto--a fellowship in learning.

While the faculty has increased its influence in its committee selections and gained further influence through the College chapter of A.A.U.P., a succession of faculty leaders and proposals have brought little progress toward democracy. Presidential disapproval or lack of his endorsement alone may kill a proposal. But in addition, lack of "political savvy,"[9] of failure to consult informally with other influential faculty members, has led to frequent defeat of Educational Policies Committee proposals and others brought before the faculty.

President Hicks, as the on-campus locus of power, has seldom welcomed competing bases for decision-making. Institutional research is often viewed as providing a sounder basis for decision-making. What was its fate within this milieu? The astute observer would correctly anticipate difficulties.

Results regarding governance from the Institutional Functioning Inventory administered to administration, faculty

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[9]Interview: Name withheld, Summer, 1971

members, and students by the Kalamazoo College Office of Institutional Research in 1968[10] are generally supportive of the centralized governance pattern revealed by the interviews and this chapter.

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[10]"Institutional Functioning Inventory, Experimental," Prepared by the Educational Testing Service, Developed in collaboration with the Institute for Higher Education, Teachers College, Columbia University, under a grant from the Kettering Foundation, 1967.

CHAPTER V

EVALUATION RESEARCH AND ITS IMPACT

The stated focus of this case study is an assessment of the impact of efforts to evaluate the degree of success or failure of the educational program at Kalamazoo College during the three year period, 1966-69. From the "Preliminary Index of Institutional Research Studies" for 1966-69,[1] only one study, the 1967-68 evaluation of the SIP Program,[2] was widely recognized by the interviewees as having had significant impact. Another study which was a formal institutional commitment to evaluation, the "Danforth-Kalamazoo Institutional Self Study," (called Danforth Study),[3] was widely thought to have had from very little to no impact. These two studies comprise the attempts at comprehensive evaluation of the Kalamazoo College program or a major element of it during the three years under investigation. In

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[1]Preliminary Index of Institutional Research Studies: Kalamazoo College, 1963-69 Prepared by the Office of Institutional Research, Kalamazoo College, April, 1969.

[2]"SIP: Trick or Treat," An In-Depth Evaluation of the Kalamazoo College Senior Independent Project Program Prepared by the Coordinator of the SIP Program and Director of Institutional Research, Kalamazoo College, January, 1968.

[3]"Danforth Study: Final Report" (Kalamazoo College, 1966-67). (Mimeographed.)

addition, several studies had identifiable impact on a very limited scale and the several studies done at the request of the President reflect his interest in institutional research and evaluation. These studies and their impact and a brief history of institutional research and its problems at Kalamazoo College are the focal points of this chapter.

History of the Office of Institutional Research and Program Evaluation

The College had borrowed and adapted the career aspect of its Career-Service Quarter from Antioch College, and Walter Sikes of the Antioch program was selected to implement it. He brought with him Stanley Newman who was given the title Assistant Director of the Research Bureau. (The exact circumstances of his coming to Kalamazoo and of his title as Assistant Director of the Research Bureau were not clear in the minds of the interviewees as there was no Research Bureau per se other than Newman.) Sikes remained at Kalamazoo for one year before returning to Antioch. Newman remained for two years, 1962-64. According to Hightower who was Academic Dean at the time:

> He was under my jurisdiction. There never was a very clear idea of what he ought to be doing. The President felt he should be doing any little study job he wanted done or that I wanted done. Stan had a different idea and as Dean, I was in the middle and didn't agree with either one of them. The President would call me to ask Stan to do something but Stan was busy on other things and said he didn't have time to get to it for six weeks without some help; he did get some student help. A quick study to answer a question the President had in mind was almost impossible to get. The President always felt Newman should be ready to take anything of that sort. He did want to know various statistics such as how this years entering class compared to last years

> and other things that had especially public relations value. Stan's view was clear: unless given the latitude to study what he saw the need for, he was of no use to the College. The President would call me in and say, "What is Stan doing?" If I didn't know, he'd say, "It doesn't appear to me he's doing anything." My view was that we ought to be planning ahead, but Stan wanted to do his own thing. Some things he wasn't interested in and others he couldn't do. He was here two years primarily as a researcher; we let him teach too because he had his M.A. in anthropology and wanted to teach.[4]

Newman produced evaluations of three aspects of the College's program which are on record at the College but seemingly unread.[5] He was most remembered for having had several personality conflicts, most notably with the President. He was asked to make more definite plans for his future and left Kalamazoo after two years.

Sherrill Cleland became Academic Dean in 1964. An economist, Cleland had considerable background and experience in economic forecasting and utilization of data; he was data, future, and research oriented. The following year he asked psychology professor, Berne Jacobs to assume a one quarter time position as Director of Institutional Research. Jacobs conducted studies almost exclusively at the request of the Dean.[6]

Cleland arranged a College-wide self-evaluation with Danforth Foundation support for the following year, 1966-67 (see "Danforth Study" in this chapter), and sought a

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[4]Interview with Raymond Hightower, Summer, 1971.

[5]Preliminary Index of Institutional Research Studies, Kalamazoo College: 1963-64.

[6]Preliminary Index of Institutional Research Studies, Kalamazoo College: 1965-66.

full-time institutional research consultant. There had now been a graduated class under the Kalamazoo Plan and Cleland felt this was the earliest a thorough evaluation of the program could be attempted. He was also interested in addressing the College to some possible flaws or weaknesses he perceived, establishing ongoing institutional research to aid in evaluation and decision-making, and sharpening the objectives of the College.

Jacobs wanted to remain in teaching and James Snook was brought to Kalamazoo College from Michigan State University on a one year appointment as a person with institutional research training. Snook was directly responsible to the Academic Dean, but was advised of the President's dissatisfaction with institutional research under Newman.

Snook spent the first fall quarter learning about Kalamazoo College from the Danforth deliberations, advising and informing the Danforth participants in terms of research possibilities and requirements, and doing a study on class size for the President.[7] Winter, spring, and summer quarters were largely consumed for Snook by considerable time and effort devoted to the Danforth Study. During that year, Cleland asked Snook to attempt to write a self-job description[8] and on several occasions discussed possible projects

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[7]"Size of the Three Smallest Classes in Which Entering K College Freshmen are Enrolled for Fall Term 1966," Prepared by the Office of Institutional Research, Kalamazoo College, December 4, 1966.

[8]Responsibilities of the Office of Institutional Research, Kalamazoo College, November 10, 1966.

with Snook. Otherwise, he left Snook generally free to work directly with the Danforth Study director. In the fall of 1967, Cleland began a two-year leave of absence.

Before leaving, he expressed some regret to Snook that he had not provided him with more helpful direction during the preceding year. Cleland also indicated to Snook that he would be retained to follow up the Danforth Study and appointed him to the full-time position of Director of Institutional Research for the coming year, a position still responsible to the Academic Dean. Snook was also assigned to the Educational Policies Committee as an "ex officio" member to aid and assist that faculty committee in its work. Cleland further noted the President's doubt that the College needed a full-time institutional researcher and added that it might be wise for Snook to take on some administrative responsibility. At Cleland's request, Snook assumed responsibility for coordinating the Senior Independent Project (SIP) Program the following year.

In accordance with these primary responsibilities and his own job description,[9] Director of Institutional Research, Snook, endeavored to give on-going attention to research concerns of the Dean, the faculty, and the President as reflected in the studies completed during 1967-69.[10] Results from the Institutional Functioning Inventory

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[9]Responsibilities of the Director of Institutional Research, Kalamazoo College, November, 1967.

[10]Preliminary Index of Institutional Research Studies, Kalamazoo College: 1967-68 and 1968-69.

administered in 1968[11] suggest that the campus community had become widely aware of the Office of Institutional Research by that time.

Snook initiated his new combined role as the College coordinator of the SIP program and Director of Institutional Research by immediately launching a major evaluation effort in the fall of 1967: an evaluation of the SIP program (see "SIP Evaluation" in this chapter).

During the fall of 1967, the President requested an attrition study, but data collection from the various administrative offices soon bogged down under unanticipated difficulties (see "Attrition Study" in this chapter). Snook felt that he should not drop everything else which expediting the attrition study seemed to portend and concluded that if he did so, the basic data recording and retrieval problems encountered would essentially remain. He further concluded that something needed to be done to systematize and computerize data collection and retrieval if adequate, economical institutional research were to be possible at Kalamazoo College in the future. Furthermore, such a computerized data system could provide timely routine reporting of needed data for various administrative offices. In deciding not to drop everything in order to expedite the attrition study, Snook hoped the data definition, collection, and retrieval problems plaguing it would be more dramatically demonstrable to

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[11]"Institutional Functioning Inventory, Experimental," Prepared by the Educational Testing Service, Developed in collaboration with the Institute for Higher Education, Teachers College, Columbia University, under a grant from the Kettering Foundation, 1967.

and realized by the President and the Dean as a result.

Dean Peterson was frequently called upon during that year by the President to explain what Snook was doing and Snook was asked to keep the Dean informed of the activities of his office.

Four months after the President had requested the attrition study, Snook formally recommended that top priority be given the following year to systematizing the computerizing data collection, retrieval, and reporting. In Snook's reappointment letter several months later, with the attrition study still incomplete, Hicks' noted his dissatisfaction with the research effort of the Office of Institutional Research. Snook and William Jensen, Director of the College's Computer Center, were able to secure approval and support from the Dean and the President for their desire to give high priority in 1968-69 to systematizing and computerizing data collection, retrieval, and reporting.

During 1968 and 1969, EPC devoted serious consideration and deliberation to Snook's SIP evaluation and to formulation of a proposal for appropriate revision of the SIP program, but approval of the proposed changes appeared to meet major resistance from the President (see "SIP Evaluation" in this chapter). Snook increasingly felt that EPC's deliberations demonstrated sincere faculty dedication to improving the College's educational program in light of available evidence. He felt he was establishing an increasingly productive relationship with the faculty, but was also aware that in pushing for computer data systems he was at

least partially working himself out of a job.

In a conference with the President near the beginning of the 1968-69 academic year, Snook was told quite simply by the President that it was he (the President) that Snook had to convince with his research, not the faculty, for "they don't count."

Near the end of 1969, with Barrett having returned as interim dean for one year during Peterson's one year leave of absence, Snook was informed by the President that he would not be reappointed for the next year, 1969-70. An assistant dean with administration and institutional research training had been added to the administrative staff in 1968, and program evaluation was not a high priority in view of increasing pressures for economic belt tightening at Kalamazoo College at the end of the 1960's.

Thinking he had done his part in development of the data system, as the end of that year approached, it tragically came to no avail with the sudden and unexpected death of Jensen. Snook left Kalamazoo College shortly thereafter.

Although most Office of Institutional Research activities and recommendations have not been continued or implemented and the Assistant Dean of Academic Affairs has been given little priority for program evaluation, he has repeated two Office of Institutional Research efforts which have been found to be useful: the attrition study[12] and the College

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[12]Attrition Study - 1969-70 Prepared by the Academic Affairs Office, Kalamazoo College, March 9, 1971.

Student Questionnaire testing for freshmen.[13] Interviewee comments and other evidence also suggest that though program evaluation has lapsed in the ensuing years, events of those years are now sweeping questions of program evaluation to the fore at Kalamazoo College. Interviewee comments tended to suggest that the problems, personnel, and priorities of the College are becoming more favorable to sustained program evaluation and planning.

Danforth Study

From a conversation with representatives of the Danforth Foundation in the fall of 1965, President Hicks felt it was possible to obtain a grant from Danforth if the College would propose an institutional self-study and improvement plan. He asked Dr. Chen to draft a proposal; it was for a quarter of a million dollars. The Danforth reply indicated that they were not thinking in terms of nearly that much money and suggested that the project needed to reflect the advice and direction of someone like Paul Dressel, the Director of Institutional Research at Michigan State University.

Dean Cleland took over the project in December. He was seeking foundation funds through a variety of channels as had been encouraged by the President. Cleland's proposal included a full-time study director of national stature.

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[13]Kalamazoo College Freshmen: A Comparison of the Class of '70 and the Class of '73 Prepared by the Office of Academic Affairs, March 23, 1970.

Even though the proposal was for considerably less money, President Hicks was still interested in it:

> He will always go after a buck and that is why he allowed this. Public relations were his overriding concern. First, we could say we got the grant from Danforth; second, we could say we were studying the Kalamazoo Plan; third, we were going to get someone nationally prominent to direct it--all public relations. If we got something internally, fine.[14]

Refinement of the proposal[15] which made it acceptable to Danforth resulted in May in a grant of $25,000 to be matched by the College for the self-study. This was, however, a development which was much less attractive to Hicks:

> Originally, Danforth did not say anything about a matching grant. If they had, Hicks would have been much cooler to it. When they said, "We'll give you $25,000 if you find $25,000 more," he was saddled with it and couldn't get out of it. Then we didn't get the people we wanted such as Dressel. As it turned out, the Danforth study would be spending money to generate ideas that would cost more money. This bore no resemblance to the original idea.[16]

Being committed to utilizing outside advice and direction, but unable to obtain a study director or consultant of Dressel's stature, Cleland settled for a part-time internal director (from Kalamazoo College), a part-time external director-consultant, and an institutional researcher.

The faculty had not been informed of the self-study

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[14]Interview: Name withheld, Summer, 1971.

[15]A Request for Funds to Study the Operation of the Kalamazoo Year-Around Education Program, Kalamazoo College.

[16]Interview: Name withheld, Summer, 1971.

until the grant was approved, there having been nothing concrete to report until that time. A number of faculty members were unhappy that they had not been informed and several advised Cleland that adequate preparation could not be made by summer when the year-long study was scheduled to begin. Danforth Foundation representatives had suggested in December that attendance at a Danforth sponsored conference at the end of June might be helpful in the College's approach to evaluation. A Kalamazoo faculty and administration "team" was sent to that conference to develop a framework for the year-long self-evaluation.[17] They decided to give primary attention to an attempt to assess the extent to which the College's objectives were being fulfilled in terms of student outcomes, and then to consider possible changes in the program which would enhance achievement of these objectives.

Cleland hoped the Danforth Study would re-examine and sharpen the goals and objectives of the College, attend to some of the problems he perceived with the Kalamazoo Plan and bring about warranted changes, set up a continuing program of evaluation of performance of major tasks within the College, and establish institutional research within the decision-making processes of the College.

It is generally conceded that Cleland "hoped the Danforth Study would be a springboard for some changes,"[18]

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[17]Report to the Faculty on the Danforth Study of the Kalamazoo College Plan, Kalamazoo College.

[18]Interview: Name withheld, Summer, 1971.

but several interviewees also alleged Cleland's pursuit of the Danforth Study as a personal achievement. Given the opportunity to choose "his man" as internal director, Cleland asked Dr. Jean Calloway, Chairman of the Kalamazoo Mathematics Department to assume that role. Dr. John Hollenbach of Hope College was appointed as external director-consultant, and James Snook was obtained from Michigan State University as full-time technical consultant for the self-study.

The on-campus "insiders"--Hicks, Cleland, Chen, and Calloway had somewhat different hopes and expectations, purposes, and priorities regarding this self-study which affected its outcome: Hicks wanted public relations benefits from the self-study in the form of a positive endorsement of the Kalamazoo Plan and program, not changes that would cost money; without realizing "the depth of [Hicks'] feeling of parenthood perhaps to the Kalamazoo model,"[19] Cleland hoped to achieve some educational impact that might involve significant changes; Calloway wanted to see several specific changes made which he already felt were warranted. The latter had been a hard worker and frequent spokesman for the faculty and was clearly a popular and respected leader of the faculty. He was skeptical of the possibility of accomplishing much with such a study initially, but once he accepted the responsibility as Director, he put exceptional drive and effort into the self-study.

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[19]Interview: Name withheld, Summer, 1971.

Four faculty members were selected and given released time to head faculty "task forces" to study four major areas of the College: curriculum, off-campus programs, organized non-curricular activities, and student life. A fifth task force on management was added as a concession to the President. It had been expected that Chen, who had initiated the original proposal would be centrally involved in the self-study, but at that point was not. He was appointed chairman of this additional task force and understood his unannounced task as viewed by the President to be to perform a "watchdog" function, representing the President's concern about costs entailed in any recommendations emanating from the Danforth Study. Although Cleland's proposal had noted "use of the Kalamazoo Plan as a model for examing the efficiency of year-round education"[20] as one of the two specific purposes of the self-study, the only thing the "management" task force did consistently and accomplished overall under Chen's leadership was analyze the cost of Danforth proposals.

Early self-study deliberations by the various faculty, staff, and student participants in the fall generated less consensus than had been hoped for by some. A number of participants seemed to feel diverted from what they considered to be the more interesting and important endeavor--considering changes in the program--by first being asked to

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[20]A Request for Funds To Study the Operation of the Kalamazoo Year-Around Education Program, Kalamazoo College, p. 2.

to focus on the objectives of the College which had been suggested by the June Danforth Conference team: depth, breadth, personal development, and basic skills. Efforts to sharpen and agree on these objectives proved to be frustrating, and a serious challenge to the whole idea of evaluating the program in terms of student outcomes emerged. Snook wondered if it might not be necessary to shift to finding out what impact the College was having on its students followed by consideration of whether or not that was what it should be, sharpening objectives in that process rather than in the abstract.

In December, a "work weekend" attended by most people directly involved in the Danforth Study, and by the President, resulted in some workable bases of agreement and in additional momentum. It was perhaps the high point of the self-study in terms of participant enthusiasm. But, the President's comments signaled further caution. He noted that "whenever you dissect anything, you get an odor," and he cautioned that the study should not accentuate only the negative. There still remained concern, uncertainty, and confusion about what type and scope of proposed changes would be acceptable to the President.

The entire study had been behind the schedule suggested originally by Cleland and while momentum was high in December, very little concrete evidence of impact or lack of impact of the program had been collected, and it was subsequently given high priority. The necessity of waiting for at least some such evidence eroded some of the momentum,

but rather than let it all be lost, continued deliberations included somewhat premature consideration of possible changes. That the closely meshed nature of the Kalamazoo Plan would probably not allow major structural changes in one aspect of it without having ramifications in others became all too clear to some participants. Some possibly unwanted ramifications or lack of Presidential or faculty support could be suspected of virtually all specific proposed structural changes. Thus, proposed changes generally failed to gain widespread support. Most participant's pet concerns and solutions met with frustration.

As is evident in the "Danforth Study Final Report,"[21] the impact measurement and data collection aspect of the study relied primarily on questionnaires which somewhat systematically documented student and faculty characteristics and reactions to the program. Some pre- and post-testing was also utilized which provided evidence of the impact of some portions of the program. Much of the final analysis was completed by Snook during the summer after obtaining the assistance of a student computer programmer, and the final report was completed in August under the direction of study director, Calloway.

Impact

Test data suggested that the College's Foreign Study Program produced statistically significant increases in

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[21]"Danforth Study Final Report," loc. cit.

knowledge in the humanities as well as the expected increase in foreign language competence.[22] The Foreign Study Program had received considerable faculty criticism because its academic component was reported to be weak or at least undemanding by most students and observers. Several interviewees attributed possible impact to the Danforth Study in that for some of the critics, evidence of significant gains in knowledge in the humanities had seemingly helped legitimize the largely experiential education of the Foreign Study experience.

At the invitation of Foreign Study Director, Richard Stavig, Snook had substantially revised and expanded the existing questionnaire which was administered to Foreign Study returnees. This revised instrument further aided Stavig's continuing efforts to identify and confirm strengths and weaknesses of that program. Stavig has used the resulting information in making changes and adjustments in both the program and its personnel.

The only widely recognized change clearly attributable to the Danforth Study was the recommendation for and subsequent inclusion of students on faculty committees by formal faculty action. This action was not a result of student pressure but rather a result of faculty participants' perception of and appreciation for the student participants' contribution as members of four of the five Danforth task forces.

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[22] Ibid., p.IV-14 and IV-23.

Two of the five Danforth recommendations referred to EPC for its attention[23] resulted in eventual changes: a) the problems of the last five quarters, particularly SIP and comprehensive exams (see "SIP Evaluation" in this chapter), and b) a fairly dull and unintegrated freshman-sophomore on-campus general education program structured around distribution requirements (see "Other Studies Having Identifiable Impact" in the chapter). The impact of the Danforth Study in these areas is at best supportive in nature, for it served more to focus, magnify and broaden awareness of them as problems deserving or even requiring attention than to uncover them as previously totally unrecognized problems.

> I think the major value was to focus on the College's problems for a whole year. The framework was not a bad one. I think we did focus on the problems and saw quite clearly what the strengths and weaknesses of the program were and are.[24]

> A lot of people put a lot of time in on it and I think the assessment part went well. We really did measure where we were and what we were about, and our people who weren't very familiar with some aspects of the program tended to become more familiar with them.[25]

Both long standing concerns and subsequent events have served further to keep alive all five of these problem areas (also includes teaching load, campus atmosphere and integration of on- and off-campus programs) referred to EPC by the Danforth Study.

Major formal changes regarding the SIP and

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[23]Educational Policies Committee Minutes for Meeting of October 10, 1967, Kalamazoo College.

[24]Interview: Name withheld, Summer, 1971.

[25]Interview: Name withheld, Summer, 1971.

comprehensives and the freshman academic program occurred two and three years, respectively, after the Danforth Study. These changes, following consideration of other alternatives during the intervening several years, were not conscious enactment of Danforth recommendations at that point and it is hazardous to conclude that such changes could not or would not have taken place without the Danforth Study. Hence, the relative impact attributable to the Danforth Study is extremely difficult to assess.

The numerous recommendations in the Danforth Study Final Report have seemingly had virtually no impact except as noted above. The individual recommendations and subsequent actions were reviewed by persons with primary responsibility in each of the four study areas (curriculum, off-campus programs, non-curricular activities, student life, and management) as a part of this investigation. With the above notable exceptions, only a few recommendations have been translated into even minor changes and those either appear very likely to have occurred without the Danforth Study or seem to have failed to accomplish whatever was hoped they would achieve.

One other type of impact of the Danforth Study--a personal one--is identifiable. As Director of the Danforth Study, Calloway encountered two early sources of difficulty that helped diminish his subsequent faculty leadership role. He failed to keep the President informed of the progress of the study, especially at the beginning since there was nothing concrete to report. Top level meetings among Hicks.

Cleland, and Chen soon excluded Calloway, and the President's relationship with him cooled. Calloway's rather uncompromising drive for specific changes regarding distribution requirements, the major change he hoped for in taking the responsibility for leadership of the self-study, alienated some of the other faculty members. While he was able to enlist considerable cooperation from faculty members throughout the study, the lack of results from the study in return for their fairly widespread cooperation and participation was painfully evident to almost everyone. Whereas Calloway would have almost certainly been selected as academic dean by acclaim of the faculty if Cleland had stepped down before the Danforth Study, he was clearly not wanted as dean by the faculty when Cleland left Kalamazoo after the Danforth Study; the interviewees were virtually unanimous on this point. Furthermore, in Calloway's subsequent relationship with the President, Hicks' coolness toward him has remained.

The Danforth Study is still occasionally referred to and quoted by both students and staff in various College deliberations. (One interviewee noted several instances in which the Danforth findings have been subsequently interpreted and invoked in quite "surprising" ways.) It seems evident that it is in the definition of issues which C. Wright Mills[26] contends to be essential in bringing many problems areas to the point of decision that such self-study

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[26]C. Wright Mills, The Sociological Imagination (New York, Oxford Press, 1969).

deliberations and data may make an intangible contribution.

Overall, the impact of the Danforth Study was expected to be and is apparently justifiably believed to have been very little. In view of the great amount of time, energy, and money it consumed, the perceived "pay off" has been dismal. Interestingly, the lack of impact is not atypical as the assessments of other college and university self-studies reveal.[27]

Senior Independent Project Program Evaluation

Snook was enthusiastic about the prospects of his newly acquired amorphous position of College Coordinator of the SIP Program. Problems of the senior year including the SIP had been brought into focus by the Danforth deliberations. Snook assumed the point of view that "if I'm going to coordinate the program, I'd better find out what needs to be coordinated." Feeling that the Foreign Study evaluation had been appreciated and productive, Snook suspected that the SIP program was another major off-campus program which could benefit from evaluation.

Snook began an evaluation of that program in the fall of 1967 on his own initiative. His evaluation dealt with objectives of the SIP Program, extent to which these goals were being achieved, and factors which were contributing to or impeding their achievement. His conclusions, which

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[27]Dwight R. Ladd, Change in Educational Policy, commentary by Katharine McBride (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1970).

identified weaknesses in the SIP Program and suggested remedies, were based on

> (a) a syntheses of observation which consistently emerged in serious faculty and student discussions of the SIP program during the 1966-67 Danforth Study, (b) the results of a questionnaire administered to 57% of the Class of 1967 in May, 1967, and (c) knowledge which research on learning has produced.[28]

Snook decided he could and should attempt to present his evaluative findings in an incisive, unequivocal manner. He gave copies of his report entitled "SIP: Trick or Treat"[29] to several deans for their reactions in January. They were quite supportive ("this is the kind of thing we need") but predicted that the President would explode when he saw the report. Snook was rather surprised by their prediction which was later confirmed. It was from some of the faculty that he expected resistance since his findings, which recommended SIP flexibility, seemed opposed to the penchant a number of the faculty members apparently had for a "thesis"-type SIP. He had actually expected an appreciative response from the President, for in the process of evaluating the SIP program, Snook had uncovered a number of sources which were seemingly supportive of both such an effort and his findings:

a) At the opening faculty meeting in September, 1965 the President announced review of the thesis quarter as one of the objectives for the year.

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[28]Summary of 1966-67 Evaluation of the Kalamazoo College Senior Independent Project Program, Kalamazoo College.

[29]"SIP: Trick or Treat," loc. cit., p. 1.

b) In November of 1965, Chen, then Coordinator of the SIP, completed a critical review of the SIP Program which revealed weaknesses in the program similar to the ones Snook found later. With perhaps less evidence and greater familiarity with the President's expectations, Chen arrived at fairly innocuous tentative conclusions but suggested that "basic changes in SIP may have to be made in the near future."[30]

c) Attention given to the thesis quarter by EPC that year was suggestive of a possible need for more flexibility, for it appeared that the existing SIP Program might be too inflexible to serve all students effectively. This tentative conclusion by EPC suggested the need for a more conscious plan by each department for bringing about increased independence and self-motivation during the last five quarters (after foreign study) including SIP. But a request by EPC for such plans by each department moved little beyond the discussion stage.

d) Another seemingly supportive factor was a trustee subcommittee report which was brought to Snook's attention after his SIP evaluation was submitted. A special trustee subcommittee had reviewed the College's program in 1965 in an effort to identify any serious defects in the program from interviews with College personnel and students. One of its immediate recommendations had been to "give the thesis quarter more flexibility and develop procedures to assure

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[30]A Report on the Operations of The Senior Independent Project Program, Kalamazoo College, Nov., 1965.

adequate supervision in the student's planning stage."[31]

e) The year 1966-67 was largely consumed by the Danforth Study which again urged SIP flexibility.

In the fall of 1967, EPC devoted its attention to the major problems which had been referred to it in the Danforth Report. One of the major problem areas was once again the last five quarters, especially the SIP and senior departmental exams (SDE). Danforth Study evidence had suggested that a number of students had viewed these two aspects of the senior year more as unintegrated roadblocks or hurdles than as meaningful learning experiences. It was again decided that an effort should be made to get departments to view and reconsider their academic program for the last five quarters as a consciously integrated program. This time, departments were asked to state the educational purposes and value of the SIP and SDE programs for their majors.

As an "ex officio" member of EPC, Snook offered his SIP evaluation report to the subcommittee focusing on SIP and SDE and it became a major focal point of the subcommittee's attention during winter quarter. Subcommittee Chairman, Professor John Peterson (History Department), seemed especially interested in Snook's report and invited Snook to participate in the subcommittee's deliberations. In April, after considerable subcommittee discussion, Peterson distributed Snook's SIP evaluation report to all members of EPC

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[31]Report of Special Trustee Study Committee, Kalamazoo College, Jan. 5, 1966, p. 1.

requesting that they read and digest it for discussion at the next EPC meeting. The April 29 and May 14 EPC meetings were devoted to Snook's report. Snook's findings, which illuminated why "independence" was failing and suggested the need for individualized projects were apparently taken seriously by the Committee as evidenced in the minutes of their deliberations.[32]

The subcommittee was then asked by EPC Chairman, Donald Flesche, to present a proposal for needed changes. Subcommittee Chairman Peterson was spurred on by organized protests by some seniors in several majors against the senior comprehensive exam (SDE) which if failed, could keep them from graduating at the last minute. He submitted a subcommittee proposal to EPC at the end of May while problems with SDE were very much on the minds of the faculty. That proposal credits the Snook report (SIP: Trick or Treat?) as one of the sources of its recommendation and calls for greater SIP flexibility, consideration of student interests and motivation, and active involvement by faculty SIP advisors. Since SIPs were being done "independently" for the most part, no tuition had been charged for the SIP quarter--a fact considered by the President to be a selling point to prospective students and parents. But Peterson's proposal recommended that both credit in terms of faculty teaching load and some tuition charge were warranted by the recommended increase in faculty supervision of SIPs.

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[32]Minutes for the Meeting of the Educational Policies Committee for April 29 and May 14, 1968, Kalamazoo College.

During the summer of 1968 EPC asked Snook to provide a brief written summary of his SIP evaluation report for the faculty;[33] debated if and when an informal faculty discussion could and should be scheduled; questioned the possibilities for changes in the SIP for the following fall; concluded that it needed more information about what could actually be done to provide the desired flexibility within the already existing formal structure of the College's academic program; and decided that an integrated post-Foreign Study Program required that they attempt to formulate a statement of purpose for the SIP which spelled out its place and function in the context of the whole educational process. All of the above were accomplished with general consensus.

In the fall of 1968, EPC Chairman Flesche attempted a synthesizing working paper[34] including a consensus statement of purpose and modification of subcommittee Chairman Peterson's SIP proposal from the preceding spring. After further slight modification by EPC, it became an active proposal in January, 1969. Several elements of the proposal seemed appropriately administrative matters: a proposed single fee for the SIP and increased faculty responsibility (load) for the SIP. Hence, Chairman Flesche suggested that EPC indicate only informal approval until after the Administrative Committee, comprised of the President and other

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[33]Summary of 1966-67 Evaluation of the Kalamazoo College Senior Independent Project Program, Kalamazoo College.

[34]Draft of Working Paper Prepared by EPC Chairman, Donald Flesche, Kalamazoo College, Nov. 30, 1968.

administrators acting as advisors to and implementors for the President, had an opportunity to consider it and respond.

As the Administrative Committee began discussing EPC's SIP proposal, the President reacted very negatively, listing a number of faults he found in it, some of which were negative judgements of its academic worth. Chairman Flesche felt obliged to try to respond to the President's criticism even though the President had freely admitted on numerous previous occasions that the formulation of the academic program lay outside his area of jurisdiction and expertise, and he generally stayed out of it. Flesche used the institutional research report, "SIP: Trick or Treat?" as "back up material" in support of the proposed changes but found that the President tended to dismiss that report as "overly negative . . . not objective."[35] As a potential impasse emerged, another member of the administration privately advised Flesche that

> the President doesn't take kindly to research that shows that a particular part of the program isn't working right and that maybe his mentioning some of Snook's studies was like waving a red flag in front of him.[36]

Flesche, who upon occasion had seen the President change his position, then attempted to show the President that not only was the SIP evaluation report probably accurate, but that it could be useful and positive in

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[35]Interview: Name withheld, Summer, 1971.

[36]Interview: Name withheld, Summer, 1971.

strengthening the College in terms which the President could appreciate. For example, he pointed out that the large number of students not graduating on time (which was known to be embarrassing to the President) was due mostly to their failure to complete the SIP, some of the major causes of which were revealed in the SIP evaluation report. He attempted to help the President see that Snook's report did not condemn the whole program: not only could the SIP be kept as a general requirement, but the liberal arts tradition and image of the College could be enhanced by a more flexible, individualized SIP program. Flesche's efforts, aided by some other members of the Administrative Committee, were successful in establishing that the SIP evaluation report could be dismissed only at some peril.

President Hicks visited Snook's office on February 24, 1969 asking for data showing that the SIP was so weak, noting that from his conversations with students over the years, the SIP seemed to rank almost as high as the very popular Foreign Study. Snook suggested that that evidence had been documented in his SIP evaluation report to which Hicks replied that the report was mostly ideas. Snook provided a summary of the data from that report as requested.

The Administrative Committee did approve the EPC SIP proposal with little revision[37] except for the matters of appropriate administrative concern noted above which remained unsettled.

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[37]Minutes of Educational Policies Committee Meeting for March 12, 1969, Kalamazoo College.

Readied for the faculty in April, following an informal faculty discussion of the proposal, Flesche submitted the proposal in summary form indicating specific motions for faculty action. This proposal received formal faculty approval without difficulty on May 5, 1969 except for the administrative portions noted above which were held in abeyance pending settlement by the Administrative Committee and the President.

Late that spring, black students presented demands to the College as had happened on other college campuses and the President's attention was diverted almost exclusively to that tense and potentially disruptive situation. When he was then faced with implementing the new SIP program which had been approved by the Administrative Committee and faculty, except for the administrative means for its implementation, he announced that there would be a "sliding" fee for the SIP: $100 for students doing their SIP in Kalamazoo and probably using the College's library and faculty time and probably living off-campus, and less for students as they lived farther away from Kalamazoo. He had not sought Administrative Committee support for this policy prior to his announcement, but did when students reacted very negatively to it. Receiving virtually no support from the Administrative Committee for his sliding fee and hearing of EPC's steadfastness to its proposed single fee, Hicks erupted in an Administrative Committee meeting with accusations of betrayal and of trapping him into approving the entire proposal. Flesche responded by reading memos which he

had that documented that EPC had withheld passage of its proposal until after it had been brought before the President and the Administrative Committee. Hicks then retreated; his sliding fee seemed unworkable to the Administrative Committee, for it is sometimes impossible to ascertain and define where a student is doing the SIP. Nothing was offered as a solution except the President rescinding his announced policy which he did. A uniform $25 SIP fee replaced it.

Hicks' idea for the sliding fee was generally attributed to his steadfast opposition to allowing Kalamazoo students to live off-campus where the College has less control over them as he feels it should in terms of their morality. His primary concern, however, was generally thought to be the public relations damage illicit student behavior can create with his public. The EPC proposal had included the provision of students doing SIPs in Kalamazoo, but living off-campus, and he feared that that was being advocated. Flesche apparently facilitated the President's final acceptance of the original EPC proposal by indicating his own opposition to students staying in Kalamazoo to do their SIP (for reasons different than Hicks') and that this was not being advocated as a general pattern.

Other concerns attributed to Hicks by some (but subject to some disagreement among the interviewees) were his concerns about the stability of the Kalamazoo Plan being jeopardized if students were allowed to live off-campus, anticipated faculty demands for more remuneration

commensurate with their increased responsibilities for individualized SIPs, his view that fees should be kept relatively low, and his concern that the SIP was being "watered down," becoming less demanding and less reputable for students and faculty.

Impact

It is evident that the SIP evaluation contributed significantly to both the formulation and enactment of changes in the SIP program as noted above. The SIP evaluation also illicited the President's resistance as well as helped overcome it. It contributed to overcoming that resistance by warranting the confidence of persons who were able to interpret it acceptably to the President as the primary decision-maker. Significant official changes in the SIP program were realized only as the result of a long, drawn out process. One interviewee characterized that process typically as

> a very tiring and frustrating one, especially if resistance is encountered from the top. And then, it is usually not worth trying unless you are convinced that it must be done and are willing to do the work and take the risks necessary to try to see it through.[38]

Interestingly, the effect of the change to an individualized SIP has been somewhat uneven. While more flexibility is recognizable now, departments vary considerably in the extent, manner, and speed with which they have implemented the approved SIP changes both in spirit and in fact.

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[38]Interview: Name withheld, Summer, 1971.

Studies Requested by the President

During 1966-67, President Hicks requested two studies from the Office of Institutional Research: one of the size of the freshmen's classes;[39] the other, an alumni study.[40] Both were completed in time to be useful to the President. However, a major study requested by the President the following year precipitated situations and decisions important to the fate of institutional research at Kalamazoo College:

Attrition Study

In October, 1967, the President requested that the Office of Institutional Research undertake a study to find out why students were dropping out of Kalamazoo College at a higher rate than anticipated. This study became a frustrating experience for both the President and Office of Institutional Research. The President was quite concerned and in search of an answer. For Snook, the task of obtaining attrition data became unexpectedly difficult. An initial request for such information at the Records Office met with a retort that that office already gave the President an attrition report. A quarterly summary prepared by that office did give the President attrition information, but in terms of gross numbers.

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[39]"Size of the Three Smallest Classes, etc.," loc. cit.

[40]Summary of Occupations of Kalamazoo College Graduates--Classes of 1957 and 1958 Prepared by Office of Institutional Research, Kalamazoo College, May, 1967.

Withdrawal dates calculated on different bases were found to be entered on College records by several administrative offices. In collecting data on who had withdrawn when, and working out definitions and categories of withdrawal, it was learned, for example, that the numerous students who did not complete the SIP by graduation time had been considered drop-outs in the Records Office reports even though they did not have to re-enroll to graduate.

It became necessary to identify those who were "actual" voluntary permanent drop-outs in preparing a questionnaire to be mailed to them in an attempt to identify some of the major reasons for their attrition. Such a questionnaire was obviously inappropriate for students who had withdrawn for such reasons as academic dismissal, disciplinary or health dismissal by the College, failure to complete the SIP, or who had subsequently re-enrolled. Identification of such ex-students required exhaustive records checks. Student transcripts often became essential aides in identifying these students with any certainty. But, for example, transcripts could be inspected only in the Records Office which at times was impossible due to space and time limitations of that office. Furthermore, it became evident that the several administrative offices involved did not understand or appear particularly sympathic to the types of data requested, and did not know, and in several instances did not volunteer, where the data could be most efficiently and reliably obtained.

This being highly frustrating to Office of

institutional Research Director, Snook, he found his part-time secretary to be invaluable. She had previously worked in several administrative offices, including occasional confidential work for the President, before leaving the U.S. for four years. Recently returned, she still knew the offices and personnel quite well, and was very effective in obtaining needed information from them. She spent much of her time during the following months hunting, collecting and confirming data for the attrition study.

Snook debated the wisdom of including an obvious and statistically significant finding which was likely to be disapproved by the President. He interpreted his own responsibilities to require that it be included:

> Among the male and "non-marriage" female questionnaire respondents, those who withdrew with overall GPA's of above 3.0 were significantly overrepresented (X^2: statistically significant at .01 level) in reporting their desire or need for "more personal freedom or a more permissive, diversified environment" to be one of the two most important reasons for their withdrawal.[41]

Detailed analysis of relevant data from the Danforth Study, of the results from a questionnaire constructed for and sent to the defined drop-out population and other relevan data in terms of reasons for student attrition were forwarded to the President in October, 1968, nearly one year after he had requested it.

Any impact of the study is seemingly limited to the President, for he apparently discussed it with no one; few

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[41] "A Look At Attrition," A Report by the Office of Institutional Research, Kalamazoo College, October, 1968.

interviewees, not even the Dean of Students, have even seen the report. No mention of it has ever been made to Snook by the President.

Interestingly, a subsequent study in 1971 by the Assistant Dean of Academic Affairs, using a slightly revised version of Snook's questionnaire, produced similar results. It noted that "the single factor most often stated as contributing to the student's decision to leave was 'I want more personal freedom and/or a more permissive environment.'"[42] Several interviewees commented similarly to one who said:

> It successfully concealed the real conclusions so as not to offend the President. You had to read between the lines. The President's attitudes about coed dorms, sex, dorm regulations, etc. were responsible for a good bit of attrition, but it couldn't say that because that isn't what the President wanted to hear.[43]

Respondent comments reported in both attrition studies evidence some of the conflict of cultures represented by the President and the student subculture: between the "best of the two worlds"[44] which the President noted the College to be trying to attain.

Other Studies Having Identifiable Impact

Two other studies on teaching conducted during 1966-67 had very limited impact.

At the request of an English professor, Snook evaluated the relative success of his freshman English course in

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[42]"Attrition Study - 1969-70," loc. cit., p. 2.

[43]Interview: Name withheld, Summer, 1971.

[44]Interview with Weimer Hicks, Summer, 1971.

terms of both selected personal and traditional objectives, and as a result, identified its particular assests and limitations.[45] Comparative findings also revealed freshmen's reaction to other department's freshman courses with new confidence accruing, for example, to an instructor of the highest rated course.

Another study was essentially a student SIP: development and testing of a questionnaire for student evaluation of course effectiveness.[46] It was used on a voluntary basis by a number of professors and yielded some changes in their courses and teaching as a direct result of the questionnaire findings. The results have also been used in tenure and promotion decisions.

Two other evaluation studies beyond the defined scope of this study are nevertheless relevant to it, having impact in two areas referred to EPC for attention by the Danforth Study: general education and campus atmosphere.

After several years of considering various ways to strengthen a seemingly insipid freshman general education program, the faculty had still found no acceptable alternative. The English Department proposed and received faculty approval for freshman topical seminars to replace the traditional Freshman English Composition requirement. Faculty

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[45]Summary of Evaluation of Dr. Hilberry's English 1 Course, Fall, 1967, Prepared by the Office of Institutional Research, Kalamazoo College.

[46]Lynne Croxford, "Student Evaluation of Courses at Kalamazoo College" (unpublished Student Independent Project, Kalamazoo College, 1969).

approval, which was obtained only with difficulty, is reported to have been substantially influenced by English Department Chairman Waring's report of a recent evaluation of English composition in which he took part.[47] He was convinced and convincing in terms of that evaluation's evidence of the limited impact of Freshman English Composition courses on graduates' writing ability. While the Freshman Composition courses improved students' immediate writing ability, there was no difference in the writing ability at graduation of pre-matched pairs of students who had and had not taken Freshman English Composition.

Campus atmosphere had increasingly come under student scrutiny. In the face of increasing student pressure for coed dormitories on campus, the President agreed to a limited summer experimental coed dorm in 1970 with the stipulation that it be formally evaluated. The evaluation, conducted by an outside evaluator, suggested that "overt sexual behavior and drug use were less in the coed dorm, that the sexes related more naturally, and that there was no effect on student academic performance."[48] But reportedly, in revealing a general amount of sexual behavior and drug use on campus abhorrent to the President and some board members, they concluded that an unacceptable condition of

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[47]U.S., Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, The Effectiveness of College-Level Instruction in Freshman Composition, Office of Education, Bureau of Research, Dec., 1966.

[48]Interview: Name withheld, Summer, 1971.

illicit student behavior prevailed on campus. To them, this severely compromised student requests for self-governance, self-determination, and of course, coed dorms, and increased their resistance to such requests or pressure.

Several interviewees suspected that the President had learned that the time involvement and mixed findings or inconclusiveness typical of evaluation efforts serve well in the interest of "gradualism" which is "the preferred response of the power group to ideas which run counter to their philosophy."[49]

Summary

In sum, little impact is directly attributable to the College's announced effort at self-evaluation: the Danforth Study. Within a milieu of low motivation and support for evaluation and leaders working at cross purposes, it produced little in terms of actual changes in the program. With the absence of clearly indicated, easily implementable, widely supported recommendations for major change, and with the identification of some strengths of the program, the Danforth Study resulted somewhat in a confirmation of the status quo. Yet, it provided data which, for example, supported the value of the Foreign Study and was useful in making subsequent adjustments in that program. And, it may have brought some major concerns and problems, e.g., those referred to EPC, into clearer focus and broader recognition and awareness, for they have been the subject of repeated

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[49]Interview: Name withheld, Summer, 1971.

attention, proposals for change, and some subsequent changes. The Danforth Study also appears to have marked the beginning of direct student input into the problem defining and decision-making processes of the College.

Only the SIP evaluation had demonstrated impact in contributing directly and substantially to program change. Its impact seems attributable on the one hand to what one interviewee suggested was its compelling nature as the only truly comprehensive evaluation ever produced at Kalamazoo College. On the other hand, the proposed changes were realized only with the aid of persons who were willing and able to interpret its findings in terms acceptable to the President.

These two major attempts at evaluation and the attrition study revealed pertinent problems of conducting institutional research at Kalamazoo. Several evaluation efforts, e.g., SIP and coed dorm evaluation, seem to have identified and presented unwanted results which raised resistance to change when change otherwise appeared to be warranted by the evaluation findings.

Professor Waring's experience with outside evaluation demonstrated "spin-off" impact in the direction of substantial program change. And, the evaluation of the freshman English (Hilberry) and other courses and the utilization of Croxford's student course evaluation questionnaire indicate limited individual impact from evaluation of teaching activities.

CHAPTER VI

PROBLEMS IN PRODUCING AND USING EVALUATION RESEARCH: IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The previously stated purpose of this chapter is to

> attempt to identify both (a) major weaknesses in selected evaluation research under investigation and factors contributing to such weaknesses, and (b) major sources of resistance--if any--to the findings of that evaluation research, and circumstances by which such resistance was overcome, if indeed it existed and was overcome. In sum, this concluding chapter is an attempt to identify factors which enhanced or inhibited evaluation research and its impact at Kalamazoo College in light of selected literature . . . to derive implications and recommendations for planning and carrying out such evaluation[1]

in similar institutional settings.

Summary of Major Weaknesses, Contributing Factors, and Resistance, Existing and Overcome, Regarding the Two Major Evaluation Research Efforts: Danforth Study and SIP Evaluation*

Danforth Study Major Weaknesses:

(1) It produced limited evidence of impact or lack of impact of various aspects of the College program on which to base consideration of change. Most of the evidence regarding impact became available after the momentum of the evaluation effort waned. From such limited "illuminative"

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[1]cf. ante. pp. 14-15.

*Underlining in text indicates reference to Chapter I, Review of the Literature.

bases, it was only mildy directive: mostly in terms of suggestions and the need for continued study and evaluation.

(2) As with most social science research, it utilized imperfect and incomplete measurement methods and techniques which lacked credibility and invited skepticism.

(3) The final report was too technical and too long to be readily understandable by and useful to most decision-makers and most other members of the College community.

Danforth Study Major Factors Contributing to Such Weakness

(1) Lack of commitment, even hostility, to open objective evaluation within the dominant ideological, governance, and reward system of the College is evident. And, the dominant stance on Kalamazoo College education by the faculty and administration is that it is personalized, elitist, quality education which is more esoteric than tangible and hence, cannot be measured or evaluated quantitatively.

(2) The financial success, feeling of forward thrust, esteem, and self-satisfaction which the College has enjoyed in recent years also mitigated against evaluation and change. Enjoying low work load, high salaries, good students, and high prestige, the faculty saw little need and was under no pressure to examine what they were doing. A number of them comfortably believed the tensions and weaknesses of the institution were attributable to the President's policies which were not open to serious evaluation. Still having the institution overtly under control, the administration also

enjoyed the general aura of success. Predominant among both administration and faculty were vested interests in the status quo, with seemingly more to loose than gain from major changes in the tightly meshed Kalamazoo Plan. As one interviewee observed,

> at that point there was not strong faculty support for change. Actually, the change would have had more impact on the faculty than on others. And, there was enough of a sense of community and forward thrust as we continued to grow quantitatively to make the faculty feel that we had a goal that we were moving towards. And so the idea of changing the program was going to be more trouble than it was worth. . . . No one was committed to it, and the results of the study were not that dramatically demanding of change. As a matter of fact, it was pretty much the idea that--well, the status quo has some problems, but we're better off to hang in there and learn to adjust to the problems and try a little fine tuning. The report was somewhat confirmatory in showing some strengths of the program.[2]

(3) General suspicion that the Danforth Study was being pursued for the wrong reasons--for funds and public relations--supported by lack of adequate preparation, further launched it in a widespread atmosphere of low motivation and expectation.

(4) It is evident from the preceding chapter that the Danforth Study was frustrated by top decision-makers and evaluation leaders working at cross purposes. One interviewee noted:

> Hicks' attitude was that this was a faculty thing: "Your opportunity to study yourself. If nothing happens it will be your fault." His standoffishness didn't help from the outset.[3]

And from another:

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[2]Interview: Name withheld, Summer, 1971.

[3]Interview: Name withheld, Summer, 1971.

> As time went on during the study it became evident that the President's continuing attitude at best was disinterest and at worst was opposition.[4]

These factors were also resistance factors whereby neither the Danforth evaluation effort nor its findings were generally taken seriously. Its impact was predictably small. Furthermore, at the conclusion of the 1966-67 school year, four second level administrative positions changed hands for individual reasons: Vice President and Dean of the Chapel, Vice President for Development, Dean of Academic Affairs, and Dean of Students. This loss in administrative continuity resulted in even less administration priority and commitment to Danforth Study recommendations. With Cleland's departure, only one high level influential proponent of evaluation remained: Foreign Study Director, Richard Stavig. Stavig enjoyed the unique security of a seemingly highly successful program which he directed independently of the President's surveillance and governance but with his confidence. Left to his own standards and with the security to indulge in self-criticism, he sought and used evaluation research. Otherwise, it was the continuing troublesome and nagging dislocations in the operation of the overall program which eventuated in change.

The SIP evaluation

The SIP evaluation capitalized on one of those nagging dislocations, and provided the one instance in which resistance, the President's, to evaluation findings was

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[4]Interview: Name withheld, Summer, 1971.

overcome. It is unclear whether the polemic-directive style of the SIP evaluation report was more a weakness or strength. It was very likely both. Its weakness seems to be in the resistance it evoked from the President, failing to present the findings in a manner palatable to him. Its strength was suggested by the interviewees to be in its unusual integration of educational philosophy and theory with credible evidence and data in focusing on a problem of considerable interest and concern. In revealing a problem in terms which a number of faculty members had experienced and arriving at a coherent evaluative and directive judgement from these collective bases, it hit a responsive cord in a fairly broad audience and warranted their confidence. Being both "illuminative" and "directive," it seemingly provided a supportive and provocative basis for rethinking the SIP as part of a coherent educational program. This is illustrated by the following interviewee comments:

> The institutional research evaluation and reports were helpful back up material to the change that was being advocated. They were used as back up material to defend what we were trying to get. That was most helpful in getting final faculty passage, but with the Administrative Committee, use of the OIR information perhaps in some cases was as counter productive as it was productive because the fact that it was something coming out of institutional research automatically colored it as being either overly negative or at any rate, not objective was what was said. This was mostly the President. I think this illustrates the immediate reluctance to accept evaluation from the institutional research office.[5]

> I was surprised at the bold conclusions Snook came to in a way, because that isn't the way things are done

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[5]Interview: Name withheld, Summer, 1971.

here, but I wasn't surprised that he found them.[6]

Snook's report enumerated the shortcomings of the SIP and Hicks probably thought he was saying it was all wrong, period. Therefore, there was a problem of defense mechanisms. I think the way it was worded as a professional judgement was with detachment, but people were reading it with attachment and it sounded more critical.[7]

I think there was a lot of personality involved here. Somehow the President must have viewed Snook's SIP study and EPC's proposal as a criticism of the whole program.[8]

The IR evaluation of the SIP was the first time--the only time--we have ever had a coherent criticism of part of our program backed up by evidence and with thought of educational ideas--which I thought Snook had developed somewhat in conversation with some of us faculty members. It has helped. It was a real contribution in getting the revised SIP.[9]

I think one of the interesting things of the SIP study by Snook was that it had a point of view--it was polemical and forced some kind of decision compared to the Danforth thing which was too big. Evaluations are finding out what goes on, whether objectives or claims being made are being realized one way or another. I liked the fact that the researcher also had an educational philosophy and after he got into the evaluation, could judge whether he liked what he saw or not, could marshall his evidence and make a judicious decision and presentation on the basis of that. It pushed a thesis with evidence that could not be easily dismissed. There was considerable faculty feeling--dissatisfaction before the evaluation was started, and maybe that is a good sign of a fruitful area to work in. It's not shooting into the blue whereas with the Danforth thing, I don't know what kind of problem we thought we had--what kind of dissatisfaction there was at that time. The faculty work load study--in comparison--was kind of unmotivated. We were just going through the motions. The SIP study was effective because it articulated the feelings of a lot of people and gave us ammunition, not in a derogatory sense, and it did show in a fairly objective way

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[6]Interview: Name withheld, Summer, 1971.

[7]Interview: Name withheld, Summer, 1971.

[8]Interview: Name withheld, Summer, 1971.

[9]Interview: Name withheld, Summer, 1971.

that we weren't talking through our hats.[10]

> The IR SIP study had impact, I think, because it pointed out a problem, and pointed it out with sufficient data and sufficient background and research so that one simply couldn't ignore it, or would ignore it at some peril. And, I think that in the proposal when it was made by EPC, it could cite that study as a support for the proposal. I think it was thus rather effective in dealing with opposition to it. And, even though the SIP program revision dragged out for quite a while, it went through providing substantial changes. As I remember it, I think Snook's SIP study was a critical factor.[11]

The widespread confidence the SIP evaluation received (although the report had to be given further interpretive relevance for the President) seems illustrative of the literature. As suggested in the literature, impact of evaluation research will be increased when it evidences awareness of the large body of research on higher education[12] and has reference to theoretical-explanatory principles,[13] for it will then warrant greater confidence. And, as Dyer suggests, measurement in terms of three major classes of institutional problems may be indispensible to any genuine solutions. They are the definition of institutional goals, the determination of how well the goals are being met, and the identification of the factors that facilitate or impede reaching the goals.[14]

But, as Carter notes, even if evaluation research

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[10]Interview: Name withheld, Summer, 1971.

[11]Interview: Name withheld, Summer, 1971.

[12]cf. ante, p. 8.

[13]cf. ante, p. 8.

[14]cf. ante, p. 10.

is competently conducted, the fate of the results is often determined by another set of criteria.[15] In this instance, the second problem of getting such research into the thinking of those who make educational policy and program decisions[16] was no less critical in terms of the President. While the faculty's deliberations were reflected in and integrated into the SIP evaluation report, the Presidents concerns were not, highlighting the importance of Dyer's comment:

> It is important that the ultimate consumers of the research--that is, the administration, the faculty, and the governing body--have a hand in defining the variables before the computer starts grinding out the numbers. Otherwise, the numbers may be regarded as irrelevant, and if they are regarded as irrelevant by any of the interested parties, they are irrelevant for all intents and purposes.[17]

It was the efforts of EPC Chairman, Flesche and the Administrative Committee members who, backed by confidence in the evaluation, translated the findings carefully and sensitively[18] in positive terms for the President.

From previous experience with the President, Flesche and others knew how to couch the findings so as to be sympathetic and supportive of the President's priorities. This was something the evaluation author was ignorant of and failed to perceive, but without which the President's acceptance of the research findings was unlikely. Several

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[15] cf. ante, p. 11.

[16] cf. ante, p. 11.

[17] Dyer, op. cit., p. 459.

[18] cf. ante, p. 12

interviewees suggested that the general credibility of the SIP evaluation report, the faculty backed EPC recommendations for change, and the subsequent sympathetic interpretation of both to the President were all contributing factors in eliciting final approval of the proposed changes by the President. The sympathetic interpretation to the President was an important ingredient of the operational component which needed to be combined with the theoretical-explanatory (illuminative) component of the SIP evaluation, for as surmized by Dyer, institutional research must somehow integrate both of these points of view in a common attack on institutional problems[19] if it is to have positive impact.

Snook had prepared the SIP evaluation in such a way that it captured the attention and interest of the persons who were prepared to take action on the issue at hand[20] (the faculty), but failed to adequately perceive who held the decision-making power (the President). And, as a result, Boyer's prediction was born out: Institutional research will never achieve its maximum potential impact until its results are transmitted more forcibly to the people who hold decision-making power.[21]

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[19]cf. ante, p. 6.

[20]cf. ante, p. 12.

[21]cf. ante, p. 12.

Institutional Research: Organizational and Interpersonal Conditions*

In addition to calling for "case histories where management resistance was successfully overcome," Carter urged study of related "organizational and interpersonal conditions."[22] Clearly, the governance of the institution and its supporting ideology and resulting priorities define the brand and scope of evaluation research it will seek, support, utilize, and tolerate. In this case, as with a number of small private colleges, the dominant governance, ideological, and institutional priorities were closely tied to the President and his highly centralized power and control.

Having no previous experience in small colleges, the institutional researcher obtained to aid the Danforth evaluation expected that both university and college presidents exerted much of their leadership through persuasion in an environment of more diffused power. He also assumed that the institution's commitment to institutional research and evaluation via the Danforth Study signaled a basic desire for and appreciation of program evaluation and institutional research. As one interviewee noted, he expected the data he provided "would be received as objective information and obviously this was not the case."[23]

His ignorance of the history and nature of the College, its inner workings, established priorities, and

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*Underlining indicates reference to Ch. I, Review of the Literature.

[22]Carter, op. cit., p. 123.

[23]Interview: Name withheld, Summer, 1971.

requirements predisposed him toward behavior which did not win the trust and confidence of the President; nor was he particularly aware that he needed to do so. His allegiance and self-evaluation were much more strongly tied to what he perceived to be professional standards for his work, and as a consequence, he tended to produce more polished and thorough studies than were necessary or wanted. He wanted to establish confidence and objectivity in his products, but in so doing, long technical reports diminished their usefulness to some potential users and decision-makers. For example, the SIP evaluation report and especially the Danforth Study Final Report were so formidable that some users were unable to even decipher the findings that were of interest to them. And the length of time needed to conclude a study generally precluded the immediate usefulness of his institutional research for the exigencies which are the lot of most administrators. As one of the interviewees commented:

> Frankly, you [Snook] were invisible in your undertaking and what the President asked for and thought was important like the attrition study he never got, and everything he saw you produce was critical. The image was that.[24]

From the President's point of view his performance, especially in terms of the attrition study, was as unproductive as Newman's had been earlier. The outcome further supports Dyer's caution that offices of institutional research would neglect operational problems at their peril."[25]

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[24]Interview: Name withheld, Summer, 1971.

[25]cf. ante, p. 6.

Furthermore, Snook judged himself in terms of self-perceived effectiveness rather than apparent efficiency. As one interviewee commented:

> I think there is a difference between efficiency and effectiveness: that efficiency tends to measure behavior and habits like keeping a clean desk and answering memos right away, and effectiveness means that you achieve some objectives that have been set up. A person who may achieve objectives may appear to be relatively inefficient in the short run in his operational habits. And that's why if you don't have evaluation, you may end up rewarding the status quo seeker, the person who doesn't rock the boat, the person who is highly organized and structured but perhaps not open to the kinds of things students need when they came to a college and want to expand and grow.[26]

As another interviewee noted:

> Especially younger people sometimes fail to see the kind of subtle hints that come from powers that be, and then don't act in accordance with them. Hicks always wants people to consult with him ahead of time so he can tell them what he thinks and won't have to veto things. He indicates this by hints.[27]

Snook failed to understand such a hint from the President in the fall of 1967 when he suggested that Snook continue to meet with him regarding progress in institutional research. Snook asked if he wanted periodically scheduled meetings, to which the President indicated that would not be necessary. Not knowing what to make of the President's comment, Snook continued to report directly to the Academic Dean.

Furthermore,

> There is a gap of an administrative nature that he [Hicks] has never learned to handle. Third echelon

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[26]Interview: Name withheld, Summer, 1971.

[27]Interview: Name withheld, Summer, 1971.

> people such as yourself [Snook], when you talked to him, you showed deference not only to him but to other people who were over your head. So when you talked to him, you talked to him in a tentative, careful manner. To him that sometimes symbolized hesitation and weakness and he judged you accordingly.[28]

Increasingly Snook began to perceive a general condition within the College described by two interviewees:

> I haven't done much evaluating. It's actually not appreciated particularly. There has not been any particular encouragement to evaluate. Our method of operation is to come up with what has been predetermined to be the better way. We are oriented not toward self-evaluation of the College, but toward effecting preconceived notions as to how we should operate--those of a relatively small group here who make the decisions.[29]

and,

> There is a prevalent attitude toward evaluation around here. It is that people collect data when they want to convince you of something: not one of let's collect the data and see how we're doing and let the chips fall where they may.[30]

Especially after the President reacted negatively to the well intended SIP evaluation, Snook increasingly felt it unlikely that efforts at objective evaluation would be satisfactory to the President. He increasingly suspected not only that, as one interviewee put it, "the President doesn't understand research,"[31] but that his own ideological and philosophical view of education, which valued self-knowledge through evaluation research, was basically at odds with the President's. Snook concluded that the President

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[28]Interview: Name withheld, Summer, 1971.

[29]Interview: Name withheld, Summer, 1971.

[30]Interview: Name withheld, Summer, 1971.

[31]Interview: Name withheld, Summer, 1971.

actually resisted most of his research findings and did not welcome any other bases for decision-making that might compete effectively with his own preconceived notions and opinions. As one interviewee stated, "the President has preconceived notions about the solutions to problems, what the problems are, and why they exist."[32]

According to the President:

> I'm very much a pragmatist. I'm more so than most people, and most presidents have to be more than most people. Consequently, I am not the type of individual that sits down and really delves deeply into any particular pattern. I play more by ear, by horse sense and by superficial knowledge and others do the work for me. I am not a good President in these points. These are my weaknesses. Consequently, basically we failed as much as you [Snook] or maybe more than you. In other words, we closed out a research office under your leadership really for two reasons: my pragmatism didn't show we were making money on it. The other reason, you have to realize we brought in an Assistant Dean who was needed and who picked up the research. You have to add to that the fact that I'm just not the type of President that operates on research material. I'm telling you that over my 28 years as President, I have operated without enough factual knowledge. This is one of my weaknesses. I've gotten away with it.[33]

And, in short, Snook failed to first perceive and later to appreciate and to speak effectively to the President's priorities which he increasingly emotionally and ideologically rejected. Snook's false expectations and naivete gave way to increased alienation from the President. Snook failed to perceive and respond to whatever opportunity existed to contribute to the President's use, understanding, and appreciation of institutional research: a necessity for

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[32]Interview: Name withheld, Summer, 1971.

[33]Interview with Weimer Hicks, Summer, 1971.

any institutional commitment to it during Hicks' administration.

Dyer's caution about the peril of institutional research which ignores operational problems is again pertinent: "When foundation money runs out, the research program is likely to be liquidated by . . . impatient people--administrators . . . ."[34] especially if the powers that be value it only operationally and judge it in terms of operational criteria with the "primary goal of finding out how 'to save money that can be used to better advantage.'"[35]

In the view of an interviewee:

> I think you have to work with the givens. I've found that the President can on occasion be educated. He has blind spots in which he is irrational and won't listen to reason, and he admits that in meetings with us. His immediate response is often times very explosive and has the effect of scaring people off so they don't come back. But if you have sound information, he can sometimes be educated and he can be convinced of a particular position. . . . There are some areas in which he is openly seeking to be educated. You don't know which those are. You have to feel those out and it takes awhile. You learn those by experience.[36]

This may be an all but impossible task for persons who do not have sufficient rank, visibility, and experience in the institution to know that.

Hicks suggested:

> Well, you need a dean who is research minded. I don't think as an institution we've had administrators who were research oriented. They may claim they were. But you see, in your [Snook's] year with Sherrill Cleland,

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[34]Dyer, op. cit., p. 455.

[35]Ibid., p. 454.

[36]Interview: Name withheld, Summer, 1971.

> he never made you indispensable in your research work. He never used your facts or made you come up with facts that showed why we should follow one road or another road.[37]

From Cleland's point of view, having hoped to establish institutional research as a part of the College's decision-making process,

> looking back, I'm not sure I understood at that point how to effectively utilize it [institutional research]. In terms of other pressures on me, I think I probably gave it less of a priority.[38]

Clearly, Snook did not comprehend the situation adequately to provide direction here either, and each of the following two years brought a different Academic Dean with different priorities of his own, different amounts and types of influence with the President, and different understanding of and commitments to evaluation and institutional research.

Understandably, the President kept financial and other confidential areas under the wings of trusted aides, notably Mr. Simpson and Dr. Chen who were responsible for whatever institutional research was done in those areas.

One interviewee commented:

> Evaluation really needs to be done on two levels: overall and instructional. Your [Snook's] concept of institutional research is the second one. I would say in terms of the effectiveness of our instructional program, we're sadly lacking. We really have not done very much. But in terms of the overall evaluation which I am assuming can be evaluated only in terms of tangible signs such as endowment, resources, enrollment, sustaining power, and reputation, then I think obviously the program has been successful. In these terms the program is evaluated by accountants. Visible tangible things.

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[37]Interview with Weimer Hicks, Summer, 1971.

[38]Interview with Sherrill Cleland, Summer, 1971.

> Interms of teaching program, we don't know. Is lecture better than audio visual? We don't know.[39]

This comment from a high ranking administrator reveals cognizance of the basic realities of operational inputs and outputs for institutional viability and survival (sustaining power). And, survival is the major task (goal) facing the College according to Board Chairman, Light and President Hicks. But what of educational inputs and outputs? Some are easily measured. Some of these, such as SAT measured ability level of incoming freshmen and awards won by graduates, are also readily translatable into operational inputs and outputs such as institutional status. Such status, an operational output resulting from conscious institutional effort in turn provides an operation input in attracting good students and financial support. Hence, such inputs and outputs are prominently displayed. The uniqueness and status undergirding Kalamazoo College's sustaining power and such "operational" measurement of it will remain paramount as long as survival is a pressing problem and these same operationally oriented inputs and outputs adequately maintain and reflect its sustaining power.

But numerous interviewee comments suggested that some events of the past several years have eroded confidence in the sustaining power of the College's traditional academic elitism: increased student criticism of the academic program; difficulty graduates have had getting jobs, fewer students interested in attending graduate school, increased

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[39]Interview: Name withheld, Summer, 1971.

uncertainty about how to educate students for the future in a rapidly changing society, all of which have weakened the institution's academic elitism as an answer to the increasing questions about what a student gets for the relatively high tuition he pays at such a private liberal arts college. Other realities have had similar effect: the increased prospects for applications for admission and subsequent enrollment to decline; evidence and conclusions such as Chickering's[40] that select, exceptional students may be learning in spite of selective colleges' inputs rather than because of them.

Part of the answer to Cross' question, "When will research improve education?" may thus be found in conditions which favor status and sustaining power (survival) and definition of them in terms of student outcomes based on evaluation of an institution's contribution to such output. Beyond the scope of this case study, however, some such forces appear to be taking shape in contemporary American society. Dyer notes:

> The typical approach to institutional evaluation is to focus on faculty and facilities, not to attempt to see what happens to students as a consequence of having been exposed to them. The regional accrediting associations, for instance, continue to put the main emphasis on the number of Ph.D.'s on the faculty, the range of course offerings, library and laboratory facilities, and the like, and have backed off from suggestions that measures of input and output involving tests might enter into the appraisal. Some of the reluctance to use such measures may spring from the realization that they assess only a part of what may be important in student learning,

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[40]Arthur W. Chickering, Education and Identity (San Francisco: Josey-Bass, 1969).

> and even that part with a good deal less than absolute precision. Some of the reluctance may be rooted in the legitimate fear that such measures tend to be misused and overinterpreted, as so often they are. . . . On the other hand, some institutions may be unwilling to submit to measurement by testing because they have too much confidence in test results, and that leads to the fear that any assessment based on such results may be too true to be good. All these doubts, however, seem to be dissipating a little, and the logic of trying to estimate the educational quality of an institution by conceiving of it as a function of measured input and output appears to be taking hold.[41]

Another possible impact of the institutional research under study here may be in that it afforded Kalamazoo College some experience with relating educational outcomes to inputs.

Another part of the answer to Cross' question is found at another level. From the one successful example of resistance to evaluation research findings being overcome in this case study, not only is research which warrants confidence clearly indicated, but so is strategy for getting results.[42] This is not to suggest that getting results is the lone responsibility of institutional researchers and evaluators, but that such a strategy will necessarily be a primary concern for anyone with responsibility for or interest in increasing the impact of evaluation research in improving education.

Further Illustration of the Literature*

This case study is even further illustrative of the literature reviewed in Chapter I. Several of the reported

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[41] Dyer, op. cit., p. 463.

[42] cf. ante, p. 13.

factors behind the national surge in institutional research offices are in evidence: the President's desire to tap the tempting cornucopia of foundation funds available for evaluation[43] via the Danforth Foundation and the dean's desire to utilize institutional research as a more rational basis for decision-making and action.[44] On the other hand, not only was the latter at variance with the President's style by his own admission, institutional research which revealed shortcomings of the College was viewed by him as detracting from rather than enhancing an image of excellence and the justifiability of higher costs.[45] He was, nevertheless, desirous of an image of actively supporting scientific evaluation[46] when so doing afforded positive public relations value.

Several interviewees in addition to Deans Cleland and Stavig also hoped for an institutional research contribution to a felt need for institutional self-knowledge.[47] Although the payoff from the Danforth Study was small, institutional self-knowledge was furthered by that effort with some notable results (e.g., foreign study impact, perceived problems referred to EPC with broader faculty knowledge of them, and greater recognition of a need for ongoing collection of evaluation data).

Cross and Dyer concluded that educational innovation

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[43]cf. ante, p. 1.

[44]cf. ante, p. 2.

[45]cf. ante, p. 1.

[46]cf. ante, p. 11

[47]cf. ante, p. 2.

in the absence of evaluation could be based on assumptions that could turn out to be wrong.[48] This might be especially true since, as several interviewees noted, the Kalamazoo Plan was primarily a managerial and operational innovation rather than an educational one.

The SIP evaluation contributed directly to institutional self-knowledge in revealing that some of the assumptions about it were indeed not being born out.

Self-knowledge, based on institutional research and evaluation data, when made available can seemingly have impact by being known by people who can make changes. Examples of such impact are found in the Danforth Study (foreign study), SIP evaluation, the evaluation of the coed dorm experiment, the student course evaluation survey, and Waring's experience with the outside English composition study. The above cases contributed to awareness of what happens to students under given circumstances (outcomes), and as such invited judgements as to how and how well people and programs were contributing to such outcomes. Evidence is offered in Chapter V of change resulting in each case as a result; in the case of the SIP and coed dorm studies, the change included at least temporary additional resistance to change on the basis of institutional self-knowledge.

Utilization of these studies reflect differential impact of familiarity with evaluation findings on various persons. The impact seemingly varied according to the

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[48] cf. ante, p. 4.

extent that the findings confirmed or challenged one's self-expectations and aspirations, one's expectations for the performance of the institution, and in terms of the rewards or withholding of rewards one expected from the "significant others" related to personal and institutional tasks. To the extent that one felt more threatened than challenged by revealed shortcomings and to the extent that the right or important processes, outcomes, or variables were felt to be ignored by the research or simply could not be measured, the findings seem to have been resisted. For example, a number of faculty members reportedly ignored or opposed the student course evaluation for such reasons, and several studies (Danforth, SIP, and coed dorms) which threatened the image of the institution as the President understood it were resisted by him.

That many decisions at Kalamazoo College being based on preconceived notions might be in conflict in engaging systematically in evaluation for reaching decisions is hinted by Dressel:

> To a considerable extent, final decisions, whether on a single campus or at a state or national level, are based on political maneuvering and on publicly stated values or secretly held prejudices, with research findings having limited impact.[49]

Why Snook's SIP evaluation was seen as negative and was resisted by the President is suggested by Rossi and Carter. Rossi notes that the client not expecting negative results preconditions him to resist them if they occur.[50]

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[49]cf. ante, p. 8. [50]cf. ante, p. 11-12.

Hicks, delegating little authority to others, generally required and rewarded a modus operandi whereby he was not to be presented with or confronted by what he considered to be negative reflections of the institution. This resistance was certainly of the variety encountered by social scientists when their findings do not positively reenforce the expectations and ideological value system of their client.[51]

All five of the factors Carter suggest for resistance to evaluation findings seem to be involved.[52] The authoritarian psychological characteristics of the President and his criteria for efficiency were counter to Snook's criterion of openness to evaluation findings in terms of educational effectiveness. The quality of the research was judged by the President according to public relations criteria which he could understand and use rather than by research criteria which he did not understand. Hence, it was generally overly negative, destructive, and troublesome from the President's point of view. He had had past negative experiences with social science research done by Stanley Newman who also failed to give what the President viewed as due priority to his concerns. And, in delegating little authority to others he clearly did not intend to delegate authority to data and/or research to generate policy recommendations. Since his ideological value system was not generally preserved or even served by the findings as he perceived them, for him the recommendations of the SIP

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[51]cf. ante, p. 12.

[52]cf. ante, p. 12.

evaluation, for example, lacked not only credibility but operational feasibility. Allowing many seniors to live off-campus while doing the SIP in Kalamazoo may have been viewed by the President as undermining the stability of the Kalamazoo Plan--a problem of feasibility--as suggested by several interviewees. For, if other students paying full fees were also allowed to live off-campus, the financial structure of the Kalamazoo Plan might be threatened in that Kalamazoo students are undercharged for tuition and overcharged for on-campus room and board (an undefensible but all too common practice). That the President's concerns were basically ideologically founded and public relations oriented is underscored by his own effort to institute an SIP fee policy which was later dropped at the insistance of others because it was not administratively feasible. Yet "feasibility" in terms of what the President would accept and in terms of suspected unwanted ramifications resulting from any major changes in the tightly knit Kalamazoo Program were probably both real and imagined deterants to major changes via the Danforth Study.

Faculty resistance to evaluation of teaching invokes more of the same factors, e.g., the ideological system of viewing teaching and learning as a process imbued with esoteric qualities which research cannot measure and which would be an invasion of academic freedom anyway. Again as with the President, feasibility may also be a question of uncomfortable or unfamiliar changes for the implementor and

thus something he may not understand or want and hence, will resist.

Summary and Conclusions*

The fate of institutional research and its lack of impact at Kalamazoo College within the preview of this study reflects Hefferlin's conclusions regarding the broader topic of dynamics of academic reform:

> In short, the first key to academic reform is that of resources: an existing program will continue as long as it can find support. A new program will be tolerated if it costs no money or brings its own support. It will be resisted if the new funds it requires could be used for the expansion of existing programs. And it will be actively opposed and accepted only under duress if existing resources must be divided to include it.[53]

> The evidence to date from historians, observers of academic life, and the reformers themselves point to three dominant sources of change in higher education: (1) the resources available for it, (2) the advocates interested in it, and (3) the openness of the system to them. In every case of academic change, these factors together appear to determine its outcome.[54]

The evaluation efforts brought into focus in this case study were largely attempts to be "illuminative." As such they had some identifiable impact which individuals translated into changes of magnitude ranging from individual teaching behavior to major program revision. Both the Danforth Study and the SIP evaluation were attempts to also be "directive," but only the SIP evaluation was compellingly

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*Underlining indicates major conclusions regarding "strategy for getting results." cf. ante, p. 13.

[53]Hefferlin, op. cit., p. 39.

[54]Hefferlin, op. cit., p. 49.

so, largely for reasons suggested in the literature.

This case study has yielded evidence, much of it supportive of the reviewed literature, regarding impact of evaluation and institutional research, including both the importance of and dynamics among factors contributing to research which attracts interest, gains confidence, and gets results from or via institutional decision-makers.

In addition, several conclusions regarding "strategy for getting results" seem warranted from and suggested by this case study:

(1) Evaluation and institutional research are more likely to attract interest if they speak to or identify areas of recognizable concern. Hence, both timing and topics should be carefully selected as part of a strategy for getting results. As one interviewee noted, "if institutional research could only come in on problems and anticipate them when the data is needed."[55] In order to apply the "wisdom, foresight, power, and resources to know what will be needed"[56] as suggested by an interviewee, persons with visibility into and influence or power in the institution will need to be involved and be sensitized to the potential and problems of utilizing institutional and evaluation research.

Dissemination of readable data and evidence to decision-makers which suggest or identify problem areas and

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[55]Interview: Name withheld, Summer, 1971.

[56]Interview: Name withheld, Summer, 1971.

related factors may have impact simply as a result of being read by them and entering their thinking.

(2) Establishing confidence in research and program evaluation findings and recommendations contributes to getting results. Several factors seem important: reasonable objectivity, not being identified as an effort by some groups to advance its own narrow self-interests; relevance to felt needs or revealing needs that are felt; relating findings to and supporting them with integrated theory and other relevant research; being "illuminative" and "directive" in terms of implications, possible alternatives, and likely outcomes which speak effectively to the various needs and priorities of the institution's decision-makers. Presentation of findings and recommendations in lucid non-technical summations is likely to be helpful.

Use of supporting theory and research can be important to establishing credibility of the evaluation criteria, whether the criteria are new or familiar, as well as strengthening the credibility of the findings, whether illuminative or directive. Use of informal methods of evaluation which invite people to involve their concerns and perceptions in evaluation can also reduce the threat of negative results and the stark sterility of only statistical results and help people be interested in and understand the results; the possibility of also taking into account and dealing positively with conceptions and perceptions which run counter to and in support of major findings is enhanced.

(3) Getting results is enhanced by relevant, confidence-inspiring research, but to be utilized by influentials and implemented by decision-makers may require that the findings be translated meaningfully in terms of their priorities and concerns. Three components of this dimension--realizing impact--deserve attention:

a) Evaluation and institutional researchers and supporters need to be cognizant of the way decisions are made and results obtained and of the decision-makers, their expectations, priorities, and requirements and ways in which they can be educated.

b) Assessment of institutional factors and conditions which will inhibit getting results should be taken into account.

c) An evaluation and institutional researcher needs to be an influential person or be aided and supported by influentials and/or decision-makers who have a commitment to the three points above and an understanding of the two foregoing components. This deserves the attention of all parties to evaluation and institutional research for the commitment to be genuine, and probably for the research to be productive. Perhaps only then is a solid strategy for effectively producing and presenting evaluation and institutional research results likely.

In this case, the primary researcher could have conducted an early informal institutional survey regarding these components which may have equipped him with at least

more realistic expectations, a better understanding of the tasks and obstacles before him, and perhaps the possibilities for and necessity of strategy for getting results.

Institutional research and program evaluation can be utilized in applying pressure for change (threat) or by challenge and reward (enhanced self and institutional concept). When and how these are most effectively applied in relationship to research and institutional variables may be a fruitful area for further investigation.

(4) Typical small college governance, ethos, financial structure, and possibly, future suggest factors important to evaluation and institutional research and its impact at such institutions. Several identifiable factors are generally less favorable to evaluation and institutional research than at larger institutions: governance is typically more authoritarian or patriarchal; the objectives may be more esoteric and traditional; the college community, more homogeneous. The typically heralded uniqueness in informal, caring relationships throughout the college community is antithetical to impersonal, objective, formal decision-making or evaluation of one another. And, few such institutions are affluent. The institutional commitment to and priority for institutional research may be low. These factors add special requirements for effective evaluation and institutional research and the interpersonal relationships through which they can be carried out. Typically lacking the commitment and funds for a full-time evaluation

and institutional research office, such institutions may nevertheless be facing changing circumstances which will invite or require such research.

The interviewees evidenced general consensus that effective evaluation and institutional research requires a competent, at least semi-independent agent who has understanding of that type of college and education. While this will generally be a part-time responsibility of an administrator or faculty member as has been the case for most GLCA Colleges,[57] several interviewees pondered the possibility of university, foundation, or consortia sponsored institutional research agencies emerging in the future which would serve small colleges.

From an interview:

> Maybe the problem of institutional research implementation is political. The institutional researcher is the employee of people he evaluates. Perhaps someone should go to Ford or Danforth [foundation] and point out that institutional research is bought by institutions subject to being swept under the table or the researcher being fired if he doesn't please the employer. Maybe what we need is an effective center of institutional research and evaluation divorced from any institution, but open to institutions for a small fee. Maybe the fee should be inversely related to how much of the evaluation is heeded.[58]

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[57]Summary of the Responses to the 1968 G.L.C.A. Institutional Research Questionnaire Prepared by the Office of Institutional Research, Kalamazoo College, 1969, p. 5.

[58]Interview: Name withheld, Summer, 1971.

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