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REGIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION

IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: 1945-1969
presented by

William T. Bucklin
has been accepted towards fulfillment

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ABSTRACT
REGIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: l9h5-l969
by William T. Bucklin

An economic union, The Association of South East Asian
Nations, was formed in 1967 with a membership composed of
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.
ASEAN is the latest of numerous attempts by Southeast Asians -
to c00perate on a regional basis, usually with little success.
This study utilizes attribute and behavioral data for ASEAN
members in a longitudinal study to ascertain if the amount of
participation in regional organizations is related to four
conditions believed by political and economic theorists to be
conducive to economic integration.

The extent and forms of regional c00peration in South-
east Asia since 1945 are reviewed and factors promoting and
hindering c00peration are noted. Transactional, functional,
and decisionmaking theories of integration are critically
reviewed and a new theory of economic integration is offered.
This theory posits that economic integration is a process that
may progress through five stages: (1) Readiness for Cooperation;
(2) Consolidation of the Union; (3) Maintenance and Expansion;
(4) Emergence of Community and; (5) Political Unification.
Progress within and between stages is Operationally measurable
and demarcated by definite thresholds; formal agreement, three-
year existence, broad social acceptance, and transfer of

governmental functions .

The four widely agreed upon conditions favoring inte-
grative success are; presence of economic growth, presence or
potential for significant mutual trade, amiable relations
between members and, willingness of major foreign policymakers
to engage in cooperation. These conditions are represented in
a statistical analysis by the variables, per capita income
index, percentage of regional/total trade, level of cOOper-
ation in official government interaction, and content analysis
of policymaker statements about the efficacy of regional 000p-
eration. Seven hypotheses are tested within the mediated
stimulus-response model(S-O-B) to find out if actual memberships
in regional groupings are related to the selected variables.

Findings include: (1) the presence of economic growth
is highly correlated to favorable perceptions of and partici-
pation in regional organizations; (2) favorable perceptions
and participation are negatively correlated with the level of
mutual trade, although causation is rejected; (3) a moderate
correlation exists between favorable perceptions and actual
participation; (h) the level of cooperative interaction is
weakly correlated with favorable perceptions and actual parti-
cipation. Five hypotheses are substantiated to varying degrees
and with reservations while the two relating to mutual trade
are fully rejected.

Indonesia is a persistent exception throughout the
Study, participating widely in regional organizations despite

stagnant per capita income, unfriendly relations with neighbors,

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and occasionally unfavorable statements toward cooperation
with other ASEAN members.

Among the conclusions arrived at are that regional
cooperation is increasing among ASEAN members and appears to
be based upon reasonably sound foundations. The variables
selected(mutual trade excepted) are useful indicators of
integrative progress within the first and second stages of
the theory. Other conclusions are tenuous due to the pauacity
of data available, a dearth of comparative empirical evidence

from other integrations, and the effects of other intervening

variables not analyzed in this study.

REGIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION
IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: 1945-1969

By
r. H
William Tblsuckiin

A THESIS
Submitted to
Michigan State University

in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Political Science

, a???
4%
(a

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author wishes to acknowledge his personal gratitude
to Edward E. Azar for his enthusiastic encouragement and
invaluable advice as Dissertation Committee Chairman. Members
of the Committee, John Collins and Baljit Singh, did much to
clarify the author‘s thought and provided continuous inepir-
ation at every stage of completion.

The author is also greatly indebted to the National
Science Foundation for a Fellowship and to Lansing Community
College for a sabbatical leave that allowed reapites from
teaching to collect data and prepare the final cOpy. Apprec-
iation is also extended to the Michigan State University Events
Data Bank and the University of North Carolina Conflict and
Peace Data Bank for granting generous access to stored data
and computerized information.

My wife, Margaret, and children, Loren, Brita, and
Heather were especially helpful and understanding when this
work interfered with activities or time rightfully that of
the family.

11

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
ACMIowLEMMENTS O 0 O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 1 1
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
LIST OF GRAPES o o o o o o a o o o o o o o o o o o 0 v1

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

LIST OF APPENDICES . . . . . . . . . . . .

Chapter
I.

INTRODUCTION 0 O O O O O O O O O O O

The Problem
The Region
Importance of Economic Union to
Southeast Asia
Importance of the Study to Political Science
Plan of Procedure for the Study

II. REGIONALISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA SINCE

VJ OBI-ID “AB I I O C O O O O O O . I O O C C O O . l 1

Introduction

Regionalism 19u5—1953

Regionalism 1954—1960

Regionalism 1961-1966

Regionalism 1967 to the Present

Summary of Regional COOperation 1945-1969
Obstacles to Cooperation

Aspirations for Expanded C00peration

III. REVIEW OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION LITERATURE . . . 65

Introduction

Transactional Models of Integration

Functional Models of Integration

Decisionmaking Models of Integration

Quantitative Methods for Integration
Analysis

111

Page

IV. A THEORY OF INTEGRATION, MODEL FOR

ANALYSIS, AND HYPOTHESES TO BE TESTED . . . 94

Introduction and Definitions

Theory of Economic Integration
Rationale for Selection of Variables
Model for Integration Analysis
Hypotheses to be Tested

V. METHODOLOGY AND DATA PRESENTATION . . . . . . 122

Introduction

Measurements of Economic Growth

Measurement of Mutual Trade

Measurement of Inter-Nation Interaction

Measurement of Foreign Policymaker
Perceptions

Participation in Regional Cooperation

Reservations on Data and Methodology

VI. TESTING THE HYPOTHESES . . . . . . . . . . . I”?

Introduction
Testing the Hypotheses
Summary

VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . 188

APPENDIX I

Introduction

Cooperative Interaction Foundations
and Behavior

Theoretical Linkages

Limitations of the Study

Conclusions of the Study

0 O O O O O C O O O O O O O O O O O O 0 Q 201

APPENDIX II o O O o o o o o o o o o o o O o O o O o 202

APPENDIX III C O O O O O O O O O O O C O O 0 0 . . . 203

BIBLIWBAPHY O O O O 0 O O O O O O O O O o 0 O O O O 204

iv

Table
I.

II.

III.

IV.

V.

VI.

VII.

VIII.

XI.

XII.

LIST OF TABLES

Page

Per Capita Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
Percentage of Total Trade Done with

ASEAN Members . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128

Events Resultants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136

Policymaker Perceptions Toward

Regional Cooperation(Favorable - Unfavorable . 140
IGO Memberships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
The Relationship Between Per Capita Income

and Foreign Policymaker Perceptions . . . . . 148
The Relationship Between ASEAN Trade and

Foreign Policymaker Perceptions . . . . . . . 153
The Relationship Between.Amiable Relations

and Foreign Policymaker Perceptions , . . . . 159
The Relationship Between Per Capita Income

and Regional Memberships . . . . . . . . . . . 16“
The Relationship Between.ASEAN Trade and

Memberships in Regional Organizations . . . . l7#
The Relationship Between Amiable Relations and

Memberships in Regional Organizations . . . . 175
The Relationship Between Foreign Policymaker

Perceptions and Memberships in

Regional Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . 185

Graph

II.

III.

IV.

VI.

VII.

VIII.

IX.

XI.

LIST OF GRAPHS
Page

Relationship Between Per Capita Income and
Foreign Policymaker Perceptions
for Indonesia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149

Relationship Between Per Capita Income and
Foreign Policymaker Perceptions
for Malaysia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150

Relationship Between Per Capita Income and
Foreign Policymaker Perceptions
for the Philippines . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151

Relationship Between Per Capita Income and
Foreign Policymaker Perceptions .
for Thailand 0 o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o 0152

Relationship Between ASEAN Trade and Foreign
Policymaker Perceptions for Indonesia . . . . 15h

Relationship Between ASEAN Trade and Foreign
Policymaker Perceptions for Malaysia . . . . 155

Relationship Between ASEAN Trade and Foreign
Policymaker Perceptions for Philippines . . . 156

Relationship Between ASEAN Trade and Foreign
Policymaker Perceptions for Thailand . . . . 157

Relationship Between Amiable Relations and
Foreign Policymaker Perceptions
for Indonesia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160

Relationship Between Amiable Relations and
Foreign Policymaker Perceptions
for Falays la 0 O O O O O O O O O O 0 0 O 0 O 16 1

Relationship Between Amiable Relations and

Foreign Policymaker Perceptions
for the Philippines . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162

vi

Graph Page

XII. Relationship Between Amiable Relations and
Foreign Policymaker Perceptions
for Thailand 0 O O O O I O O O C O O O O O O C 163

XIII. Relationship Between Per Capita Income and
Regional Memberships for Indonesia . . . . . . 165

XIV. Relationship Between Per Capita Income and
Regional Memberships for Malaysia . . . . . . 166

XV. Relationship Between Per Capita Income and '
Regional Memberships for the Philippines . . . 167

XVI. Relationship Between Per Capita Income and
Regional Memberships for Thailand . . . . . . 168

XVII. Relationship Between ASEAN Trade and
Memberships in Regional Organizations
for Indone 8 1a 0 o O o o O o o c o o o o o O 0 17 O

XVIII. Relationship Between ASEAN Trade and
Memberships in Regional Organizations
for Malaysia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171

XIX. Relationship Between ASEAN Trade and
Memberships in Regional Organizations
for the Philippines . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172

XX. Relationship Between ASEAN Trade and
Memberships in Regional Organizations
for Thailand. 0 O O O O O I O O O O I O O . 0 0 173

XXI. Relationship Between Amiable Relations and
Memberships in Regional Organizations
for Indonesia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176

XXII. Relationship Between Amiable Relations and
Memberships in Regional Organizations
for Malaysia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177

XXIII. Relationship Between Amiable Relations and
Memberships in Regional Organizations
fOI‘ the Philippines 0 o o o o o o o o o 0 0 0 178

‘XXIV. Relationship Between Amiable Relations and

Memberships in Regional Organizations
for Thailarld O 0 o O 0 O O 0 O o O 0 o o o o 0 l7 9

vii

Graph Page

XXV. Relationship Between Policymaker Perceptions
and Memberships in Regional Organizations
for Indonesia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181

XXVI. Relationship Between Policymaker Perceptions
and Memberships in Regional Organizations
for Malaysia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182

XXVII. Relationship Between Policymaker Perceptions
and Memberships in Regional Organizations
fOI‘ the Philippines 0 o o o o o o o o o O 0 0 0 183

XXVIII. Relationship Between Policymaker Perceptions

and Memberships in Regional Organizations
for trialland O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 0 O 0 181+

viii

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
Illustration Page

I. Stages and Thresholds of Regional
Economic Integration . . . . . . . . . . . . 96

II. mediatEd S-o-B MOdGl o o o o o o o o o o o o 116
III. MOdifled S-O-R MOdel o o o o o o o o o o o o 117

IV. Malaysia's Event Vectors and
8681.1th - 1965 o o o o o o o o o o o o o 135

ix

Appendix
I.
II.

III.

LIST OF APPENDICES

ASEAN Trade and Total Trade Per Year .

Number of Events Per Year and Mean
Level of C00peration Within ASEAN . .

Number of Favorable and Unfavorable
Perceptions by Foreign Policymakers .

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Problem

In August 1967, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Singapore, and Thailand formally agreed to create the Association
of South East Asian Nations(ASEAN) to promote regional economic
c00peration among its members. This nascent economic union is
the latest of several attempts by some Southeast Asian nations
since l9h5 to 000perate economically on a regional level.1
Earlier attempts were ineffectual because few nations were
interested or because they elicited only a narrow sc0pe of
c00peration. ASEAN presently encompasses the nations in the
region that are economically most developed and contain the
largest populations(Singapore population excepted), and it is a
broad but loose functional approach to cooperation anticipating
expansion of its membership and deepening of members' involve:
ment.

Of the other forms of regional economic cooperation that
have been attempted by Southeast Asians since World War II,
some have failed, others continue to exist but are relatively

unproductive and a few have produced limited benefits for their

 

1The term, "economic union," is used in.a general sense
to describe any multilateral agreement among nations that permits
some degree of coordination. upon specified economic matters.

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members. It is posited by this study that failure or success
in these ventures is related to these nations' capabilities to
cOOperate and these nations' readiness for COOperation of
various types is operationally measurable by indicators of
political and economic conditions within and among the five
nations.

For the purposes of this study it is assumed that the
formation of ASEAN constitutes an example of regional economic
cooperation that may involve economic integration and the
processes that led to its formation are those which have promoted
other economic integrations, past and present. It is suggested
that ASEAN is the second step in an economic integrative process
that may deepen by closer association along a continuum that
includes: (1) price stabilization agreement, (2) coordination
arrangement, (3) free trade area, (4) customs union, (5) common
market and, (6) unification.2

Successful integration ventures seem to depend upon the
existence of favorable social, economic, and political conditions

which have been identified by theoretical and empirical studies.3

2An expanded discussion of this continuum and integration
theory is found in Chapter IV of this dissertation.

3Kar1 Deutsch, et al., Political Community and the North
Atlantic Area, (Princeton, I95mmm
EurOpe, (Stanford, 1958); Philip E. Jacob and James—V. Toscano
63s., The Integration of Political Communities, (New York, 196$);
AmitaiEtZIoni,“POlitIcal Unification, (NBwIYOrk, 1965); Leon N.
Lindberg and Stuart A. SCHeingoId, Europe's Would-Be Polity,
(Englewood Cliffs, 1970); Bela Balassa,‘Theory of Economifi'
Integration, (Homewood, 1961); James Meade,‘ProbIems or Economic
Union, (Chicago, 1953); Tibor Scitovsky, Economic Theory and
West EurOpean Integration, (Stanford, 1958); R01? SannwaIE and
JECQues Stther,'ECOnomIc Integration, (Princeton, 1959).

 

 

 

 

This study attempts to partially assess these nations' capabil-
ities to cOOperate regionally by examining the extent to which
they fulfill some of the conditions believed conducive to
economic integration. The study asks: To what extent is coop-
eration among these five nations related to specific factors that
promote integration? Have these nations since 1950 experienced
growth in the factors that have accompanied other successful
integrations? If so, has growth in the relevant factors actually
been accompanied by increased participation in regional organ~
izations? Which of the examined factors accounts most for the
existing levels of c00peration among these nations during 1950
through 1969?

A few of the conditions believed by political integration
theorists and economists to be conducive to regional economic
integration include:

1. similar basic social and economic conditions;

2. similar political programs and favorable Opinions by

major foreign policymakers;

3. a multiplicity of friendly transactions and inter-

actions among member governments;

a. past association in previous cooperation with the

members.
Even a cursory knowledge of Southeast Asia leads one to conclude
that these nations do not possess many of these attributes. Nor
do they possess common and intersecting histories, common
religions or languages or political programs; their economies

are not diversified, nor are trading levels high.

4

This study selects four factors that are widely agreed
upon among political integration theorists and economists“ as
promoting integration: (1) increasing economic growth rates;

(2) substantial amount of mutual trade; (3) amiable interactions
between members, and; (a) favorable perceptions of c00peration
among major foreign policymakers. Measurable indices of these
four factors have been selected and deve10pment levels on these
indices are subjected to a correlational analysis with the
actual levels of participation in regional c00peration for each
of the five nations over the twenty-year period.5 An earlier
study by the author found these factors relevant for Southeast
Asia and suggested that motivations of major foreign policymakers
are probably the crucial element in determining "willingness"

to integrate.6 The present study is elaborative in that it
utilizes new and better sources of data, more saphisticated
methodology, and a twenty-year time span. Thus, the conclusions
should be more concrete and useful.

This study postulates that economic growth, trade
relations, internation contacts, and policymaker opinions of
regionalism are all related to the success of regional cooper-
ation among Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore,
and Thailand, but the existence of favorable perceptions of

major foreign policymakers is the most accurate indicator of

 

“See footnote 3.

5The indices and rationale for their selection are set
out in Chapter IV of this dissertation.

6"An Analysis of Southeast Asian Nations with Regard to
Their Possession of Some Pre-Conditions for Membership in an
Economic Union," unpublished Masters Thesis, Department of
Political Science, Michigan State University, 1962.

5
the actual amounts of regional cooperation between 1950 and 1969.

The Region

 

Geographic considerations are important in determining
the membership of a regional economic union? and there has been
some confusion among scholars and policymakers over boundary
definitions of Southeast Asia. The region has been variously
defined to include or exclude particular nations to suit the
purposes of the writers. Southeast Asia is generally understood
to be composed of Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia,
the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, North Vietnam, and South
Vietnam.8 Some scholars would also include Australia, New
Zealand, and Taiwan though geographical considerations would
hardly warrant this. In other definitions, all but the mainland
nations and Indonesia are excluded.9 Most conceptions of
memberships in economic associations have relied on geographic

prOpinquity10

even though Bruce Russett, when attempting to
identify the boundaries of world regions in Operational or

measurable terms, found that the geographic variable did not hold

 

7James Lawler and Jerome Laulicht, "International Inte-
gration in Developing Regions," Peace Research Reviews, 3(1969)31.

8Malaya became Malaysia in 1963 with the inclusion of the
British protectorates of Singapore, Sarawak, and Sabah; Singapore
seceeded from the Federation in 1965. Brunei remains a British
protectorate.

9For definitions of the region, see: Francis G. Carnell,
"Southeast Asia and the Modern World," India Quarterly, 13(April-
June l957)101-120; Charles A. Fisher, “Tfie Concept—othouth East
Asia,‘I Eastern World, 7(March 1953)12; Robert Fluker, "Region-
alism and Efie Modernization of Southeast Asia,“ Review of
Politics, 31(April 1969)189-209; Milton Meyer, "RegIOnaI COOp-
eration in Southeast Asia,” Journal of International Affairs,
3(Spring l9h9)68; Vu Van ThaI, "ARegIOnaISGIutIon f6r“Viet Nam,”
Foreign Affairs, 46(January 1968)3U7-36l. Vu Van Thai even
Heffnes'Indonesia outside the region while including the Phil-
ippines.

loLawler, above, p. 31.

 

 

 

 

up well and concluded, '. . . there is no sharply identifiable
Asian or Southeast Asian system either, even less than could
be found for other areas."11

Despite the lack of common agreement on the boundaries
of the region, Southeast Asians have some feelings of commonality;
they and others have sometimes acted as if the region were a
fact and this has affected policymaking within and between
nations. This study considers the region as a whole only in a
peripheral way and analyzes only the five members of ASEAN.
The choice of these nations is based upon: (1) their present
membership in an economic union; (2) their history of past
efforts to cOOperate together, and; (3) their comparatively high
level of economic develOpment within the region. The remaining
nations are excluded from the analysis because of: (1) their
peripheral geographic locations; (2) their small amount of
interaction with other nations in ASEAN; (3) the practical
difficulties of Obtaining data, and; (h) their indications that
they do not desire further regional economic cooperation at the

present time.12

Igportance of Economic Union to Southeast Asia

 

The formation of a viable economic union embracing most,
if not all, Of the nations in Southeast Asia could have several

beneficial consequences. An economic union would probably

 

11Bruce M. Russett, International Regions and the Inter-
national System, (Chicago, 1967), p. 181.

12Due to its brief existence, Singapore is not included
in all the correlational analyses; the limited data available
will be used for comparative and explanatory purposes.

contribute to better political and economic relations among
members as well as between members and other nations. In this
way it might strengthen the security of the region and be a
deterrent to wars, both world-wide and local, for nations with
economies intertwined would find it difficult to arm against
each other. A union could assist in further stabilization and
expansion of the members' economies by increasing inter and
intra-regional trade. More stable economies could improve the
ability of the members to attract private or public investment
and aid, thus making development programs in these nations more
secure. More trading could reduce members' dependence upon
imports and permit a reduction of balance of payments deficits.
And finally, it could be the beginning of broader functional
relationships among these nations and with their neighbors. For
example, the inclusion of a suggested common defense arrangement
among ASEAN members13 could alleviate subversive and aggressive
action within and toward the region. In view Of these impor-
tant possibilities, a study assessing the foundations of OOOp-
eration in.ASEAN is a tOpic worthy of attention.

Importance of the Study to Political Science

A major objective of this study is to amplify knowledge
about the integrative process in underdeveloped nations. Quite
Quite obviously the nations studied here do not fulfill many

of the conditions for integration posited by Deutsch, Haas,

 

13Asian Almanac, (5-8 August 1967)2271.

 

Lindberg and other scholars who have analyzed the process.1u

Yet these nations are undertaking a measure of regional inte-
gration by forming ASEAN. And this situation needs to be
explained. Since decisions to create formal intergovernmental
organizations for cOOperation are essentially political decisions,
economic regionalism is a valid and pertinent topic for poli-
tical inquiry. This study will have value for political science
on the theoretical, empirical, and policy levels.

The study has theoretical value because it utilizes
established theories of integration as a framework for collecting
information that will add to the growing body of knowledge
about integration. It relates several of the most agreed upon
findings in these theories to the actual level of participation
in cOOperative ventures by ASEAN members.

It is valuable empirically because data are organized and
analyzed in a systematic way to provide Objective measurement
of the selected variables. The quantitative methodology employed
also has potential for use in a broader study embracing more
nations and it is applicable to other world regions. The study
provides an Opportunity to examine the strengths and weaknesses
of this methodology for future studies of regional cooperation.

The study has value for policymaking because it assists
politicians in understanding the foundations of an existing
economic union that is expected by some Observers to endure,

grow, and affect Southeast Asian politics in a major way similar

 

1”See footnote 3.

to the effect of the EurOpean Economic Community on EurOpe.
SO future decisions of ASEAN, Southeast Asian, and other policy-
makers concerned with progress in integration may benefit from

the additional knowledge and conclusions evolving from this work.

Plan of Procedure for the Study

Chapter II offers a review of regional cOOperation in
Southeast Asia since l9h5 and evaluates some of the motivations
for undertaking these schemes as well as the underlying reasons
for success or failure. This review is pertinent to the study
because it portrays the types and amounts of actual cOOperation
to which the variables used in the study are compared.

Chapter III reviews the literature on regional integration
that is relevant to understanding the theoretical framework and
model of analysis adopted in this study. Distinctions are made
between theoretical approaches; critiques Of the theories are
offered; and, recent methodological refinements are summarized.

Chapter IV presents a new theory of integration and a
model for analysis. The theory draws upon the literature
reviewed, presenting a continuum of integration divisible into
five stages whose boundaries and dimensions are defined in
Operational terms. The mediated Stimulus-Observation-Response
model and the refinement of it used in this study are also
explained.

Chapter V explains the statistical methods used to
analyze the chosen variables and includes the data for each
index along with error computations and other reservations of

the data.

10
The hypotheses Of the study are tested in Chapter VI
utilizing statistical correlational techniques and descriptive
analysis. Conclusions and limitations of the study are contained

in Chapter VII.

CHAPTER II
REGIONALISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA SINCE WORLD WAR II

Introduction

Southeast Asians have engaged in various forms of region-
alism since 1945 and a review of these endeavors is important to
understanding the motivations behind them, the conditions under
which they were precipitated, and the success or failure of each
venture. Regionalism in Southeast Asia has varied over time
with respect to membership, types of contacts, levels Of agree-
ment, and motivations for attempting cOOperation. Some expres-
sions have been Pan-Asian, a few include only Southeast Asians,
and others have been sub-regional in membership. Regional
contacts have involved proposals, conferences, information
exchanges, consultations on a continuing basis, and creation of
ministerial level regional organizations. Levels of agreement
have ranged from simple agreements to consult on mutual problems
to attempts to harmonize national industry and resource devel-
Opment plans. Motivations have emerged from cultural, security,
political, or economic interests and have been externally as
well as internally inspired.

Prior to 1945 several conceptions of Southeast Asia gave
impetus to the sentiment that these nations constitute a region.

These included the Japanese concept of the Greater East Asia

11

12
CO-Prosperity Sphere, the Allies' designation of Southeast Asia
as a separate Command area, the existence Of price stabilization
agreements having Southeast Asian members, and a few prOposals
for cOOperation based on presumptions of cultural or ethnic
unity.

During World War II, the Japanese began uniting these
nations in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere that wOuld
have created a union somewhat analagous to an Asian common
market but, because of pressing war commitments, there was little
progress in cOOperative behavior.1 The Allies' Southeast Asian
Command area designation, though based on only geographical and
administrative convenience, contributed to sentiment inside and
outside the region that these nations comprise an identifiable
unit. Price stabilization boards are the oldest form of econ-
omic cOOperation involving some Of the nations within the region.
Rubber and tin agreements were concluded before World War 112
and agreements on wheat, tea, and sugar have also been in force
at various times. These agreements have not been very successful
in controlling prices of primary products,3 but they have added
to a sense of common interest on some economic matters. A few
proposals for cOOperation or unification were put forth even
before 1945, but they were mostly utopian schemes based on

ethnic or religious affinities and elicited little response

 

1Russell H. Fifield The Diplomacy of Southeast Asia:
l9u5-l958, (New York, 1958 , p. 27.

2Klaus E. Knorr, Tin Under Control, and World Rubber and
its Regulation, both pubIIshed at Stanford in 19u5.

3. Charles P. Kindleberger, Economic DevelOpment, (New
York, 1965), pp. 349-350.

 

 

13

from colonial governments.“

Southeast Asian manifestations of regionalism since 1945
can be separated, without much exactness, into four time periods
during each of which dominant themes spurred regional conscious-
ness. The periods are categorized as: 1945-1953 during which
cultural themes predominated; 1954-1960, dominated by security
considerations; 1961-1966; and 1967 to the present, both
exemplified by economic motives and demarcated by the formation
of ASEAN. These categories are especially arbitrary because
underlying motivations were seldom.unidimensional and because

dominant themes were not exclusively confined within each period.

Regionalism 1945-1953

The first period of regional consciousness was marked by
Asian and Southeast Asian conferences, prOposals for COOperation,
and promulgation of formal organizations. At the close of
World War II, the first real attempts were made to deal with
Southeast Asian problems on a regional level. At that time a
Special Commission was created by the British to deal with
critical food shortages in their colonial possessions.5 This
Commission formed a Liaison Conference that soon included most
of the nations and dependent territories of Southeast Asia and
held several Special conferences on food production and distri-

bution, nutrition, fisheries, and social welfare. NO votes were

 

“Milton W. Meyer, "Regional COOperation in Southeast Asia,"
Journal of International Affairs, 3(Spring 1949)68-77; K. M.
PanIEEEr,"RegiOna1 Organization for the Indian Ocean Area,"
Pacific Affairs, 18(September 1945)246-251;Amry Vangenbosch
and RIOHEFE BuEwell, The Chan ing Face of Southeast sia,
(lexington, 1966), pp. 359- SKI

5Meyer, pp. 74-77.

14
taken during these conferences and political issues were avoided
but, in 1949, the Commission was the most tangible form of
regionalism in Southeast Asia.6 Functions of the Liaison
Conference were gradually taken over by agencies of the United
Nations and Commission responsibilities were delegated to other
agencies.

The Asian Relations Conference held in 1947 was an
unofficial meeting of representatives from twenty-eight nations
promoted by India to publicize the plight of Asian nations and
their desires for independence. Of ASEAN members, only the
Philippines and Thailand were independent at the time, but
representatives of each of the other soon to be independent
Southeast Asian nations were present, including Malaysia and
Indonesia. During the 11-day meeting, roundtable groups dis-
cussed economic, cultural, racial, or labor topics as well as
national freedom movements; controversial topics were avoided.7
Agreement was reached regarding many common problems, but only
one resolution was passed and an attempt, supported by a few
delegates, to form a permanent Asian Union failed; plans to
hold another conference in 1949 did not materialize.8

The New Delhi Conference on Indonesia was convened by
Prime Minister Nehru in January 1949 to marshal support against
Dutch attacks on territory claimed by the Republic of Indonesia

forces.9 The Conference was official; only representatives of

¥

6Meyer, p. 74.
7Fifield, pp. 449-450.
8Fifie1d, p. 451.
9Fifield, p. 456.

15

recognized governments could participate. Burma and the Phil-
ippines sent delegates and unofficial observers were present
from Thailand, Indochina, and Indonesia. A11 delegates united
in condemning the Dutch actions and the Conference ultimately
influenced settlement of the problem,10 but another move to set
up regional machinery, particularly for promoting cooperation
in the United Nations, failed.11

Perhaps realizing that interests in all-Asian conferences
were too varied to allow consensus on solutions to common
problems, Southeast Asian leaders convened and attended confer-
ences of their own, the most notable of which was the Baguio
Conference in 1950.12 After several false starts, President
Quirino of the Philippines succeeded in holding the Conference
with Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines and four nations
from outside the region in attendance. Although originally
conceived by Quirino as a prelude to the conclusion of a security
pact, military matters were not discussed at the Conference.13
In fact, questions discussed were primarily economic ones. The
agenda followed a Philippine resolution stressing rationali-
zation of economic develOpment, increases of agricultural and
industrial production, expansion of trade among nations of the

region, and possibilities for a multilateral clearing arrange-

 

loFifield, p. 457.

11William Henderson, "The DevelOpment of Regionalism in
Southeast Asia," International Organization, 9(November 1955)467.

leenderson, pp. 454-458.

l3Henderson, p. 474; Werner Levi, "Union in Asia," Far
Eastern Survey, 19(August l950)l45.

l6

ment.lu Nevertheless, despite General Romulo's plea that
This task is too big for any single nation to accomplish
by itself. The need for consultation, understanding,
joint planning and action by the countries concerned is
imperative.1
the Conference ended with the Observation that
. . . internal economic develOpment is a matter of national
concern for each government; that each individual country
cannot brook interference from the outside, no matter how
well—meaning, with its develOpment plans and their execu-
tion.1
It was apparent that least the nations attending this Conference
were, in 1950, not yet envisioning any type of economic cooper-
ation that would bind their policymaking in any way.

The first Southeast Asian integration prOposals were
primarily concerned with political union. In 1947, the French
suggested a Pan-Southeast Asian Union joining the Indochinese
states with Thailand. Thailand initially agreed to the Union
to promote cooperation in irrigation, fisheries, communication,
and other resources but the plan was abandoned following the
1948 Thai coup when Thailand insisted on complete independence
for the Indochinese states.17 During the same year, leftist
Thai leaders formed a Southeast Asia League composed of unofficial

representatives from several Asian nations. Enthusiasm for this

project quickly waned when it became apparent to other leaders

1“'Amando M. Dalisay, "Economic Aspects of the Baguio
Conference of 1950," a paper prepared for the 11th Conference
of the Institute or Pacific Relations, (Manila, 1950), p. 2.

15Dalisay, p. 1.
l6Dalisay, p. 5.

17Meyer, p. 70.

17

that the organization was a Communist front to assist Ho Chi
Minh in Vietnam.18 Various other prOposals, none of which
materialized, concerning Pan-Malay, Pan-Asian, and Southeast
Asian unions were made by national leaders including Thailand's
former Premier Thamrong Nawasawat, Indonesia's Socialist Party
President Soetan Sjahrir, Philippines President Quirino, and
Malaya's Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman.19

Two formal organizations for regional economic cooper-
ation, the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the
Far East and the Colombo Plan, were formed during this period.
These organizations did survive and attract new members, but
did not begin to have a significant effect on the region until
the second period and are discussed below.

In summary, initiatives for cOOperation during the first
period came primarily from Southeast Asians(and sometimes Asians);
they were anti-colonial and anti-Western in content, and most
were sponsored by leaders or groups having left-wing political
orientations.20 These initiatives served mainly to identify
common economic and social problems and reinforce sentiment for
cOOperation. They failed, however, in their intent when organ-
ization based on common spiritual feelings, economic needs, or
security problems was attempted. And the conditions examined
in this study do not appear conducive enough to support a

viable union during this period.

 

18Amry vandenbosch and Richard A. Butwell, Southeast Asia
Among the World Powers, (Lexington, 1957), p. 249.

l9Vandenbosch and Butwell, above, p. 250.

20Maruyama Shizuo, "Asian Regionalism," Japan iuarterly,
15(January-March l968)57.

 

 

18

Efforts of Asians and Southeast Asians failed, as Richard
Butwell sees it, because, '. . . none of the prOposals filled
any need of which most of the Southeast Asian countries were
aware."21 In the immediate post-war period everybody had their
own plan, but no one was for anyone else's; they were too

occupied with problems of independence and nationhood.22

Regionalism 1954-1960

During the second period, initiative shifted away from
indigenous prOposals toward Western-Sponsored organizations
concerned more with security and defense matters while Southeast
Asians struggled with irredentist movements and other impediments
to national unity. COOperative efforts initiated by Southeast
Asians generally failed although a few Western-sponsored organp
izations were successful in eliciting limited cooperation.

In April 1955, the Colombo Powers(Burma, Ceylon, India,
Indonesia, and Pakistan) attempted to capitalize on Asian
feelings of unity by Sponsoring the Asian-African Conference
that brought together leading statesmen from twenty-nine nations
in Bandung, Indonesia. Of ASEAN members, only Malaya, not yet
independent, was absent. A variety Of questions was discussed,
including economic and cultural cOOperation, human rights and
self-determination of peOples, colonialism, membership in the

United Nations, and disarmament.23 Although much agreement was

—__

21Richard Butwell, "The Patterns of Regional Relations
in Southeast Asia," Studies in Asia, (l963)l73.

22Vandenbosch and Butwell, 1966, p. 348.
23Henderson, p. 467.

 

l9

reached on problems confronting these nations, there was too
little mutuality of interests to undertake any solutions to
these problems. The final communique appeared to recognize a
need for regional cOOperation in stabilizing commodity prices,
increasing trade, establishing regional banks, sharing atomic
resources, and forming common economic policies, but the commun-
ique ended with the observation, "It is, however, not intended
to form a regional bloc.'24 Lasting cooperation within a
framework provided by Asian or Asian-African conferences was
impossible because of the heterogeneity Of interests involved
and the negative rationale-~opposition to colonialism-~under-
lying the meetings. In characterizing these broad conferences,
William Henderson perceives their main weakness in saying,
". . . they arose out of an ill-defined sense of Asian solidarity
springing from a shared colonial past and common resentment
against the west."25 And he continues, "In a sense, the most
significant thing about the three pan-Asian Conferences was the
fact that they were held."26

Security pacts Operating within the region include the
British‘Commonwealth, the Philippine Pact, and the Southeast
Asia Treaty Organization(SEATO). The Commonwealth's mutual
security aspects have declined in importance since World War II

and particularly so since the British withdrawal of forces east

 

24George McT. Kahin, The Asian-African Conference,
Bandung, Indonesia, April 1955: (Ithaca, I956ij’pp.‘104I2.

25I-Ienderson, p. 468.
26Henderson, p. 468.

 

20

of the Suez; protection from attack for many Commonwealth
members is assured by their coverage under other alliances
and the association exists primarily for consultation on econ-
omic matters.27 The Philippine Pact, signed with the United
States in 1951, includes no other Southeast Asian nations.

SEATO, the most comprehensive security grouping within
the region, includes only Thailand and the Philippines as full
members while Malaysia has been indirectly tied in through a
mutual assistance agreement with Britain, a SEATO signatory.28
The organization was originally conceived not only as a defense
alliance against aggression or internal subversion, but also
as an instrument '. . . to promote economic progress and social
well-being and to further the individual and collective efforts
of governments toward these ends.'29

Its value as a defensive alliance has been questioned
by many authorities because: (1) its strength depends upon
United States policy; (2) it represents only one-fifth of the
people it is designed to protect, and; (3) it is increasingly

resented by non-members in Asia.30 Although its creation was

 

27Susan Strange, "The Commonwealth and the Sterling Area,"
Yearbook of World Affairs, 18(1959)25; John D. B. Miller, The
Commonwealth in the WOrId, (London, 1958). pp. 80-81.

28Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam are "designated"
territories under the Treaty for which members assume responsi-
bility in the event of aggression or external subversion.
However, Cambodia consistently declared itself outside the
sc0pe of the Treaty and SEATO members agreed in 1962 to comply
with Laotian desires to be excluded from protection. Detroit
Free Press, (6 July 1962).

29Treaty, Article III and Pacific Charter of the Treaty,
in Collective Defence in South East Asia, (New York, 1956).
pp. 1704174.

30William Ball, "A Political Re-examination of SEATO,"
International 0r ization, 12(1958)7-25; Collective Defence,
abOve, pp.125-I§; and TOR-163.

 

 

 

 

 

21

partially an overreaction to Thailand's exaggerated feelings
of threat by Communist insurgents, even Thailand has found its
protective umbrella so undependable in time of crisis that
they concluded a separate agreement with the United States to
come to their aid deSpite the outcome of any vote on SEATO
action.31 SEATO's effectiveness as an organ to protect local
security is also impaired because it does not concern itself
with guerrilla activity or subversion; these are considered
political rather than security matters. This inability to
deal with internal affairs has led one critic to conclude:
Where errilla warfare is the threat, alliances in this
form EATQ7 merely give the guerrilla freedom to act with
impunity up until that stage where the ponderous interna-
tional machinery is activated into inescapable reflex
action; and this is a lot of freedom.32
SEATO's attempts to deal with economic matters have been
similarly disappointing. By 1956, it was decided to utilize
existing organs to promote general economic develOpment and
confine aid under the Treaty to compensation for military
expenses.33 Desires of Thailand, Pakistan, and the Philippines
to expand general economic aid under the Treaty were vetoed by
the non-Asian powers3“ and led William Ball to conclude in his
critical study that SEATO '. . . is not a suitable vehicle for

economic or technical aid.'35 Since 1959, SEATO economic

 

31George Modelski, SEATO: Six Studies, (Melbourne, 1962).

Po 83- Ronald C. Nairn, "SEATO: A Critique," Pacific Affairs,
41(Spring l968)l6.

32Nairn, p. 8.

33Collective Defence, p. 130.
34New York Times, (5 June 1960).
353a11, p. 25.

 

 

 

22

assistance has increased slightly due to continued pressures
from regional members and the organization now sponsors a
Graduate College of Engineering in Bangkok, a Cholera Research
Project in Dacca, some skilled labor projects, and Regional
Community DevelOpment Centers in northeast Thailand.36 SEATO,
in 1969, was still ineffective by any measurement,37 but it has
provided limited experience in regional COOperation for the two
ASEAN members.

The Colombo Plan, inaugurated by British Commonwealth
members in 1950, has grown to include all South and Southeast
Asian nations; it has been extended beyond the original six
years and is expected to continue indefinitely.38 The Plan is
actually not a plan at all but, through the Consultative Comm-
ittee composed of national Ministers meeting annually, members
are provided an Opportunity to talk over and coordinate national
develOpment. Members are subject to no formal rules and the
Committee has no direct control over national plans; even
efforts to form a permanent Secretariat have been unsuccessful.39
Nevertheless, the informal format has allowed frank discussion

of progress, problems, and future tasks.”0 The Plan offers

 

35La1ita Prasad Singh, The Politics of Economic Cooper-
ation in Asia, (Columbia, Missouri, I966). p. 2I4. MOEeIsEI,
pp. ISOSISS.

37Robert Fluker, ”Regionalism and the Modernization of
Southeast Asia," Review of Politics, 31(Apri1 l969)189-209;
P. Lyon, "SubstitifES‘TOF‘SEKTUVTV'International Journal,
24(Winter l968-1969)35-46.

38Creighton L. Burns, "The Colombo Plan,“ Yearbook of
World Affairs, l4(1960)198.

39Antonin Basch, "The Colombo Plan, A Case of Regional
Economic COOperation," International Organization, 9(1959)2-6.

“OEugene R. Black, Alternative in Southeast Asia, (New
York, 1969). p. 7-

 

 

 

 

 

 

23

development capital and technical assistance without discri-
mination and, though most aid is bilateral,l"1 it has increased

the amount of aid for smaller or less important nations.42

The
plan has also achieved some success in channeling technical and
economic aid to members and in coordinating their develOpment
programs, but to accomplish more would require a comprehensive
program with more central direction than members have been
willing to grant. The Plan, however, has usually been credited
with having eased international tensions between leaders of
Western and Asian nations and among Asians themselves.“3
During this period and the one following, Southeast Asian
nations have utilized both bilateral aid agreements and multi-
lateral development funds to provide capital for economic devel-
Opment. The International Bank of Reconstruction and DevelOpment
and the International Monetary Fund have provided capital for
specific projects(usually government Sponsored) but require

44 A cooperative

little or no COOperation between recipients.
economic develOpment fund to be administered by recipient Asian
nations was suggested by the United States in 1955. Twenty
million dollars was made available to Asian nations and the Simla
Conference was convened in May that year to decide how to admin-

ister and utilize the fund; only Burma in Southeast Asia was

 

“18ingh, p. 188.

quingh, p. 211.
“3Burns, p. 198; Lennox A. Mills, Southeast Asia:

Illusion and Realit in Politics and Economics, (MInneapolis,
I954). p. 333. NOE aII EensIon RES EIsappeared as is evident

from Pakistan's disassociation from the final communi us of the
1969 Consultative Committee meeting. New York Times, 22 May 1969).

““Fifield, p. 492.

 

 

24

absent from this meeting.“5 No agreement was reached on imple-
mentation of the fund, so the United States retracted the
offer.“5

A Special United Nations Fund for Economic DevelOpment
(SUNFED) was proposed in 1953(actually established at a later
date) and has been furnishing Southeast Asian and other nations
with limited develOpment funds. Full implementation of SUNFED,
tailored to meet the needs of lesser develOped nations better
than IMF or IBRD, was blocked by the United States and other
Western nations for policy reasons“? and its functions are now
being displaced by the Asian DevelOpment Bank, chartered in
1965.48

The period was also marked by an increasing number of
Southeast Asian ad hoc conferences involving various nations
who discussed Specific economic and social problems. These
included conferences on education, irrigation, industry, and
smuggling.“9 SOme of these interests are now formalized and
meet as yearly or periodic Ministerial conferences.5o

More concrete forms of cOOperation seem to have been
hampered during this period by sentiments toward neutralism(or
nonalignment), civil disorders, external aggressions, detri-
mental policies of outside powers, and inadequate develOpment

of similarity in the conditions promoting integration.

 

“5Henderson, p. 473.

45Henderson, p. 473.

47Fifield, p. 492.

“BSee following pages for a discussion of the Bank.

“9Fifield, pp. 461-462.
50Fluker, pp. 189-209.

25

Although, of the nations under study here, only Indo-
nesia formally adhered to a neutralist policy, Burma and Cam-
bodia pursued similar stances, thus limiting the number of
nations willing to COOperate in any form of regional organi-
zation.51 Malaysia was, until 1956, plagued with Communist
insurgents; the Philippines eXperienced disorder from the
Hukbalahaps;52 Thailand was troubled by Laotian rebels as well
as her relations with Cambodia;53 and Indonesia, under an
uneasy detente between the military and indigenous Communists,
experienced increasing fragmentation of national purpose.5u
Outside interference included insurgency promoted by mainland
China and the Soviet Union, preferential trade policies for
former colonies, exploitation by foreign investors, and unequal
granting of develOpment aid with strings attached. Even though
the United States in this period became committed to regional
develOpment, the nations concerned remained necessarily pre-
occupied and firmly committed to national develOpment.

An overview of regional cooperation during the second
period reveals that the period was marked by concerns with

national integration on the part of Southeast Asians, regional

 

51Robert A. Scalapino, "Neutralism in Asia," APSR,
48(March 1954)51; Hamilton Fish Armstron , "NeutraliEy: varying
Tunes," Foreign Affairs, 35(October 1956§6l; John S. Thomson,
"Burmese‘Neutralism,’I Political Science Quarterly,72(June 1957)279.

SZBichard Butwell, Southeast Asia Today--And Tomorrow,
(New York, 1961). pp. 99-10I.

53Fifield, pp. 257-260.

5uGuy J. Pauker, "The Soviet Challenge in Indonesia,"
Foreigg Affairs, 40(July 1962)612-626; Thomas P. Thornton,
e ng, oscow, and the Underdeveloped Areas," World Politics,
13(July 196l)491-504.

 

 

 

26
security on the part of Western nations, neutralism by leftist
interests, creation of a few successful Western-directed formal
organizations, and limited Southeast Asian cOOperation in confer-

ences on special economic and social problems.

Regionalism 1961-1966

During this period, the focus of regional activity
shifted dramatically, with the impetus for cooperation coming
from Southeast Asians and directed toward economic matters while
outside powers concerned themselves with Sponsoring conferences
on special economic problems. The period is also distinguished
by several tangible examples of economic cOOperation on a sub-
regional basis and by maturation of Asian associations for
cOOperation.

The United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the
Far East(ECAFE) has become a major instrument for investigating
regional economic cooperation and several COOperative projects--
Asian, regional, and sub-regional--have benefitted from the
efforts of this organization. ECAFE has been active in planning
reconstruction, attempting to raise the level of Asian economic
activity, and broadening of Asian economic relations. It
Sponsors investigations and studies as well as collects,
evaluates, and disseminates economic, technological, and stat-
istical information.55 The Commission, meeting in Conference,
is empowered to make non-binding recommendations by a majority

of members present and voting, but it cannot initiate action

 

55Fifield, p. 466.

2?

within a nation without that nation's consent.56

Although the Commission was established in 1947 and
Southeast Asian nations became members shortly after gaining
independence, ECAFE has become a motivating force for region-
alism only during the last ten years. Its initial lack of
influence was due to overcentralization of authority in United
Nations headquarters and to an aversion to dealing with political
problems, especially those suggesting integration. Until after
1958, ECAFE concentrated on promoting projects within individual
nations, eschewed even informal discussions on intra—regional
trade, and considered regional COOperation a taboo subject.57
In 1958, ECAFE adopted a Japanese proposal to promote intra—
regional trade and convened its first trade talks in January
1959. The talks uncovered a wealth of ignorance on the poten-
tialities of trade and were held annually after that, but in
the face of declining mutual trade, action was left to "inter-
ested.Asian countries."58 A prOposal by Dr. Lokanathan urging
regional economic cooperation in 1955 was not allowed to be
publicly discussed at that time since it was Opposed by too
many members and the report still remains confidential.59

A change of attitude became evident in ECAFE activities
following the Bangkok Resolution6o which allowed the Commission

to discuss all avenues of regional cOOperation. Since then,

 

56A. M. James, "The U.N. Economic Commission for Asia
and the Far East," Yearbook of World Affairs, l3(1959)l64.

57Singh, pp. 144-145.
SBSingh, pp. 120-124.
59Singh, pp. 144-145.
6oSingh, pp. 144-145.

28

several thoughtful studies have been produced that shifted

ECAFE emphasis toward promoting regional harmonization of

develOpment plans.61

In July 1966, ECAFE created a Working Group of Planning
Experts on Regional Harmonization of DevelOpment Plans and
charged it with:

(l) reviewing the present situation in regional economic
planning;

(2) discussing the precise SOOpe of harmonizing develOpment
plans;

(3) identifying and exploring preliminary ways that
regional planning could be advantageous;

(4) suggesting organization and procedures to carry on
study, consultation and action in the ECAFE region.62

The Working Group
. . . recognized that, if the scarce resources of the
countries could be pooled and the narrow domestic markets
combined, many of the obstacles impeding economic growth
would be overcome. As a way to deal with the problem of
economic growth, the Wgrking Group accepted the strategy
of plan harmonization. 3

The Group recommended that plan harmonization begin on a sub-

regional level with a limited number of countries and listed

several beneficial consequences that could be expected. It

suggested that harmonization could permit more efficient util-

ization of resources, higher division of labor, and effective

use of economies of scale through widened markets; it could

 

618cc especially, "Regional CO-Operation," Interim
Report by the Executive Secretary, ECAFE, (New Delhi, 31 January
1961; and the Economic Survey for Asia and the Far East, 1959,
1961, 1963, and 1967.

523conomic Bulletin for Asia and the Far East, ECAFE,
(New York,*l9o7). pp.*I-2.

63Economic Bulletin, 1967, p. 4.

 

 

 

29

eliminate duplication of investment and production efforts and
lead to new creative productive capacity and complementary
patterns.6u

Although “ECAFE's integrative output has been low'65 in
its own activities to data, it has sponsored the Mekong Project
and assisted with the Asian Development Bank, the Asian Highway,
and numerous conferences on economic COOperation.

The United Nations, through ECAFE, has been instrumental
in promoting the Lower Mekong River Basin Development Project
to plan and construct a series of multi-purpose projects to
control floods, provide irrigation and hydroelectric power, and
to improve navigation on the Lower Mekong river separating
Thailand, Cambodia, South Vietnam, and Iaos.

When a preliminary ECAFE report in 1955 noted the Mekong's
tremendous resources and suggested investigation, the United
States and the United Nations disapproved of having ECAFE assess
its potential.66 The United States wished to develop the Basin
itself and in 1956 sent in a Bureau of Reclamation team to begin
studies. ECAFE outflanked this Opposition and that of UN head-
quarters by creating an autonomous Committee for Coordination
of Investigation of the Lower Mekong Basin and this Committee,

strengthened in 1959 by an Executive Agent, has since conducted

 

64Economic Bulletin, 1967, p. 4.
6SSingh, pp. 144-145.
66Singh, pp. 127-129.

 

'1

I:

30

the Project.67 The United States agreed to pool its resources
with the Committee and, in 1958, allotted two million dollars

to initiate a team of international experts, led by Lt. General
Wheeler of the United States, to cooperate with representatives
of the four nations.68 This mission submitted a set of detailed
proposals in 1962.

In the beginning there was so little cOOperation by
these nations that, even after preliminary surveys and studies
had been completed, work could not begin. In 1961, although
cOOperation appeared on a more adequate foundation,69 civil
strife and political unrest prevented the start of construction.70
By 1962, however, political conditions seemed more favorable
and resources were sufficient enough to launch the data-coll-
ection programs, begin planning of ten multi-purpose projects,
and make a start on construction.71

In 1965, President Johnson strengthened the Project by
earmarking $500 million of a one billion dollar grant to Asia
for Mekong develOpment.72 And, by 1969, the Project had estab-
lished meteorological stations, flood warning stations, channel
markings for navigation, three dams well under way, two more
started on tributaries, began construction of three dams on the

mainstream, completed a power line from Thailand to Laos, built

 

67Singh, p. 133.
63New York Times, (7 March 1958)-

59willard A. Hanna, "The State of the States of Indo-
China," American Universities Field Staff Report, (New York,
1960). Part I, p. 50

7°Tran van Dinh, "Territorial Plannin and Equipping in
Asia," Asian Culture, 3(April-June l96l)l4-l .

710. Hart Schaaf and Russell H. Fifield, The Lower Mekong,
(Princeton, 1963). p. 121.

7ZChristian Science Monitor, (10 April 1965).

 

31

a bridge at Nongkhai and branched out its activities into trans-
portation planning, communication planning, and fisheries.73
Financing over the twenty-five years expected to finish the
Project is now coming from the four riparians plus twenty-six
other countries, eleven UN agencies, four foundations, and a
number of private companies.74

To date the Mekong Project is the most concrete and far
reaching example of economic cOOperation in Southeast Asia.
Although it includes only Thailand of the five nations studied
here, it gives evidence that Southeast Asians are politically
mature enough to cooperate despite great difficulties75 and
provides a continuing example Of the rewards that might be
expected by additional or other forms of cOOperation.

A major step toward regiOnal economic integration was
taken by Malaya, the Philippines, and Thailand in 1961 with the
creation of the Association of Southeast Asian States(ASA).

This Association was the fruition of a persistent campaign for
regional COOperation conducted by Prime Minister Tunku Abdul
Rahman of Malaya(now Malaysia). Since 1958 he has officially
advocated cOOperation among these nations in economic, cultural,

spiritual, technical, and artistic endeavors.76 In 1960,

 

73New York Times,(l7 January 1969); W. R. Derrick Sewell
and Gilbert“F. White,*The Lower Mekong: An Experiment in Inter-
national River DevelOpment," International Conciliation,
558(May l966)53; Christian Science Monitor,ITlo AprilI965).

74B1ack, p. 134; Singh, p. 138.

75Members continued to attend meetings and plan projects
despite breakdowns of diplomatic relations. See: Singh, p. 139.

75Letter to the Author from Manual A. Viray, First Sec-
retary, Embassy of the Philippines, Washington, D. C., dated
8 August 1961.

 

32

Prime Minister Rahman told the National Press Club in Washington,
D. C.:

We consider that there is so much affinity and identity
between the countries of the region that we must cOOperate
more closely in the common interest. What we have in mind,
and what is slowly beginning to emerge, is known in our
area as ASAS--The Association of Southeast Asian States.

I am convinced that the day must come when such an assoc-
iation develOps as a working arrangement on lines similar
to those which have emerged as regional economic associa-
tions in EurOpe and in this hemisphere.77

The heads of the member governments emphasized that ASA
would be non-political in character, independent of any power
blocs, and open to other nations of the region.78 The Decla-

ration Of Bangkok in July 1961 established the Association with
aims including the following:

1. To establish an effective machinery for friendly consul-
tations, collaboration, and mutual assistance in the
economic, social, cultural, scientific and administra-
tive fields;

2. To provide educational, professional, technical and
administrative training and research facilities in their
respective countries for nations and officials of the
associated countries; . . .

. . 5. To provide a machinery for fruitful collaboration in the
utilisation of their respective natural resources, the
develOpment of agriculture and industry, the expansion
of their trade, the improvement of their transport and
communication facilities, and generally rgising the
living standards of their peOples; . . .7

 

 

77Speech before the National Press Club, (27 October
1960), p. 6.

78Paper presented by the Permanent Representative of the
Federation of Malaya at an informal meeting of Pacific Area
Permanent Representatives to the United Nations on 13 March
1961; see also: Neg_York Times, (14 February 1961).

79Letter to the Author from Kok-Swee Choong, First Sec-
retary, Embassy of Malaya, Washington, D. C., 11 August 1961.

 

33

ASA provided for yearly Foreign Minister Conferences that
met in 1961, 1963, 1963, and 1966 and established a Standing
Committee, Joint Working Party, Expert Committees, and a National
Secretariat in each member government. Administrative organs
and records were headquartered in Thailand, no verbatim minutes
were kept, and records were kept to a minimum.80 Meetings of
ASA were suspended in 1964 with the onset of the Indonesia-

81 and held only once more in 1966 before

Malaysia confrontation
ASA was absorbed into ASEAN.

Despite its short existence, ASA succeeded in the minor
accomplishments of simplifying travel procedures and documents,
joint communications and transportation schedules and hookups,
and exchanges of cultural groups.82 Perhaps its greater benefits
were more general and included investigation of: (l) a larger
variety of subjects for joint ventures in cooperation; (2)
difficult areas for cOOperation so hard study could begin; and,
(3) fields where benefits may be achieved by future priority

planning.83 The prior existence Of ASA was a prime factor in

the ease of establishing ASEAN and Bernard Gordon concludes that

 

80Bernard Gordon, The Dimensiqns of Conflict in Southeast
§§$§,(Englewood Cliffs, 1966), pp, 168;169. ._.U

81For an excellent discussion of the confrontation, see:
Gordon, pp. 68-119; or, R. S. Milne, Government and Politics 1g
Malaysia, (Boston, 1967). pp. 185-196.

82Willard A. Hanna, "Lower Mekong COOperation," American
Universities Field Staff Report, (New York, 1963). p. 4.

83Gordon, p. 183.

 

 

 

c-

(.1!

st)

34

. . . the greatest impact of ASA's formal establishment
and the intensified communications it produced, has prob-
ably been in the new ways of thinking that were generated.

One area in particular has been notably affected: economic
cOOperation. 4

One effort was made during this period to capitalize on
feelings of ethnic solidarity and, by doing so, infuse security
issues into regional COOperation. In 1963, President Macapagal
of the Philippines prOposed a Pan Malayan Confederation to
include the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaya and the Borneo terri-
tories. The prOposal had grown out of a University of the
Philippines study and was rechristened Maphilindo by President
Soekarno of Indonesia.85

Maphilindo was formally established in July that year
following a consultative meeting in June to facilitate "a joint
approach to regional security," and common efforts to resist
I'subversion in any form or manifestation."86 Although the
organization had ”. . . no blueprint, no timetable, no agenda:"87
Macapagal Spoke of its future in glowing terms:

In Maphilindo and through Maphilindo, nourished constantly

by their vision and enterprise, the Malay peOples shall be

Eggheuepeg.gge true, the vast, the irresistible wave of
And further, ". . . it can mark the beginning of a new golden
age for the peOples of Malay stock."89

8“Gordon, p. 173.

85Hanna, 1963, p. 5; Gordon, pp. 26-28.

86Justus Van Der Kroef, "The New Malaysia and its Neigh-
bors," United Asia, 15(October l963)685.

87Hanna, 1963, p. 5.
88Gordon, p. 23.
89cordon, p. 23.

 

35

Maphilindo's vagueness Of purpose made it possible for
everyone to endorse it, but "on the basis of experience to date
with regional cooperation, it would seem that the better results
come from the more modest starts, and also that the big schemes
prejudice the little ones."90 Philippine motivation rested in
large part on pressing claims to Sabah, favored as early.as
1946 by Macapagal91 and rejected by the British in 1962.92
Soekarno favored it as a way of dismembering the Malaysia Feder-
ation and helping Southeast Asian attention to gravitate to the
larger and more populous Indonesia. Although the organization
died the following year because of the antagonisms engendered
by the Indonesia-Malaysia confrontation, Maphilindo did provide
the Philippines increased identification with and leadership
in Southeast Asia and also provided an impetus for Indonesia's
later participation in ASEAN.

Participation of ASEAN members in economic cOOperation
with non-regional nations also quickened during the last decade.
Several formal organizations not exclusively Southeast Asian
were established with either sponsorship or membership of
outside powers and these organs provided additional experience
in cOOperation for ASEAN members. These included the Asian
Productivity Organization, the Asian and Pacific Council, the
Asian DevelOpment Bank, several United Nations agencies, and

numerous ministerial conferences.

 

90Hanna, 1963, p. 2.
9lGordon, p. 18, footnote.

92Albert Ravenholt, "Maphilindo: Dream or Achievable
Reality2", American Universities Field Staff Report, (New York,
1964). p. 5. For a discussion of the Sabah claim, see: Gordon,
pp. 9-41.

all
'

:3.

Q I

"l

adv

sun.»

Ad

‘I

36

The Asian Productivity Organization met first in 1959
and was formally established in 1961 as a non-official organi-
zation with some government support. It seeks to promote intra-
regional cOOperation in improving productivity in non-Communist
Asian countries. It operates through yearly meetings and a
permanent secretariat; meetings are attended by private dele-
gations and official representatives of most Asian nations.

The Asian and Pacific Council(ASPAC) for COOperation was
a joint effort by South Korea and Thailand first convened in
Seoul during 1966 to explore avenues of cooperation, especially
"against Communist militarism and expansion."93 ASPAC includes
all ASEAN members except Indonesia and Singapore; it has shifted
its original intent toward economic matters, establishing a
technician training cooperation scheme and a cultural information
exchange center. It is presently studying the potential for food
and fertilizer banks, customs union, and a common market. Future
effectiveness of ASPAC is uncertain since disputes over security
and military matters marred the 1969 meeting and overshadowed
economic issues.91+ James Lawler feels that, due to the hetero-
geneity of its members, ". . . goodwill, some trade liberali-
zation and other forms of co-Operation are the most that can be

expected of the group.l95

 

93Werner Levi, The Challen e of World Politics in South
and Southeast Asia, (EngIewood CIIffs, 1968). p. 61.

94Asian Almanac, (20 August 1969), p. 9093.

95James Lawler and Jerome Laulicht, "International Inte-
gration in DevelOping Regions," Peace Research Reviews, 3(1969)63.

 

37

The United Nations has contributed to cooperation in
ways other than through ECAFE. The Conferences on Trade and
DevelOpment(UNCTAD) have explored extensively alternative ways
of increasing trade among Asians and, although the first UNCTAD
efforts were judged a failure,96 the 1968 Conference did agree
to establish a system of non-discriminatory tariffs which are
highly complex, controversial, and yet to be implemented. ECAFE
has cOOperated with the Economic Commission of Africa in
promoting the Asian Highway project to complete an all-weather
highway from Istanbul to Saigon. Completion of this route is
symbolically important and is expected to increase trade
throughout Asia.97 Although the Highway has ekaed much will-
ingness to cOOperate, few funds are as yet available for cons-
truction.98 The Asian Regional Council of the International
Labor Organization provides technical training and technical
cOOperation assistance to its members; other UN-sponsored
activities within the region include the Conference of Asian
Planners, Ministerial Conference on Asian Economic COOperation,
Asian Coconut Community, Committee for Coordination of PrOSpecting
for Mineral Resources in Asian Off-shore Areas, Meeting of Gov-

ernment Experts on Trade Expansion, and the Asian DevelOpment

Bank.99

 

96Andrew W. Green, Political Integration by JuriSprudence,
(Leyden, Netherlands, 1969). pp. 243-267.

97Christian Science Monitor, (10 April 1965).
9831ngh, pp. 124-126.
99Black, p. 95.

38
The idea of an Asian DevelOpment Bank(ADB) originated

100

in 1954 and was finally promulgated in 1965 with a pledged

capitalization of one billion dollars contributed by Western

and developed Asian nations.101

It includes eighteen Asian and
twelve non-Asian members and concentrates on providing capital
for projects neglected by private investment or too expensive
for public funds.102 It attempts to foster and stimulate reg-
ional COOperation, but also funds some national projects. ADB
has consistently been hampered by the problem of deciding
whether prOject funding or plan assistance is more valuable for
long-run develOpment.103

Japan is taking a larger role in regional economic affairs
and has convened a yearly Ministerial Conference for the Devel-
opment of Southeast Asia to discuss problems of develOpment and
the Japanese role in the region. Out of these conferences have
come the Southeast Asia Agricultural DevelOpment Fund and the
Southeast Asia Fisheries DevelOpment Center. A Japanese Central
Union of Agricultural COOperativeS also gives some assistance
in establishing cOOperatives throughout Asia. The pattern in
these organizations appears to be encouragement of individual

nation develOpment rather than inter-nation cooperation.

 

looBlack, p. 8.
101Christian Science Monitor, (10 April 1965).

102P. E. Stonham, "The Asian DevelOpment Bank and Economic
Cogperation in South-East Asia," Australian Quarterly, 39(March
19 7 79.

103Stonham, p. 83; Black, pp. 96-105; J. White, "The
Asian DevelOpment Bank: A Question of Style,“ International
Affairs, 44(October l968)677-690.

 

 

 

39

Regionalism 1967 to the Present

In 1967, the initiative for regional cooperation was

sparked by the creation of the Association of South East Asian

Nations(ASEAN). The aims and purposes as set out in the

charter signed in August that year are:

l.

2.

3.

5.

To accelerate the economic growth, social prOgress and
cultural develOpment in the region through Joint endea-
vors in the spirit of equality and partnership in order
to strengthen the foundation for a prOSperous and
peaceful community of Southeast Asian nations;

To promote regional peace and stability through abiding
reSpect for Justice and the rule of law in the relation-
ship among countries of the region and adherence to the
principles of the United Nations Charter;

To promote active collaboration and mutual assistance
on matters of common interest in the economic, social,
cultural, technical, scientific and administrative
fields;

To provide assistance to each other in the form of
training and research facilities in the educational,
professional, technical and administrative Spheres;

To collaborate more effectively for the greater util-
isation of their agriculture and industries, the
expansion of their trade, including the study of the
problems of international commodity trade, the improve-
ment of their transportation and communication facilities
and the raising of the living standards of their peOple;

To promote Southeast Asian studies;

To maintain close and beneficial cOOperation with existing
international and regional organisations with similar

aims and purposes, and explore all avefiues for even

closer cOOperation among themselves.10

To accomplish these ambitious tasks, ASEAN established an Annual

Meeting of Foreign Ministers, a Standing Committee, Permanent

and Ad Hoc Committees of specialists, and a National Secretariat

in each member country.105 Initial pronouncements that a

 

10“Asian Almanac, (5-8 August 1967)- P- 2259-

105Asian Almanac, (5-8 August 1967)- P. 22700

#0

defense arrangement and expansion of membership by five nations
that had indicated a desire to Join106 have not been realized.
It is now generally conceded that ASEAN would be an inadequate
vehicle for providing regional security and suspicions that
defense was an underlying motive for its formation have so far
limited its membership.107 Progress in cOOperation has not been
dramatic, and during 1968 there were no ASEAN meetings held.
Suspension of activity was caused by an atmOSphere of suspicion
and distrust between Malaysia and the Philippines resulting
from a rekindling of the diSpute over Sabah.108

By 1969, however, relations had improved and ASEAN
meetings began to reflect cautious progress. Permanent Commit-
tee were created for finance, commerce and industry, tourism,
and transportation and communication. The Conference established
an ASEAN Fund of approximately five million dollars, and ECAFE
appointed a team to carry out an economic study of possible
ASEAN projects.109 To date the brightest area of cooperation
has been in harmonizing civil aviation policies; lack of other
substantial gains led the Singapore Foreign Minister to remark
"that there was a lot of circus at the cost of less and less
bread,"110 because effort had been directed toward impressing

the world rather than toward real cooperation. Nevertheless,

106Asian Almanac, (5-8 August 1967)- P- 2271-

107D. E. Nuechterlein, "Pros ects for Regional Security
in Southeast Asia," Asian Survey, 8?September l968)806-816; P.
Lyon, pp. 35-46.

108Asian Almanac, (19 October 1968). pp. 297n-2980.
loggsian.Alman§g, (17 January 1970). pp. 3758—3760.
119AsianAlmanac, (24 January 1970)- Po 377°-

 

 

 

#1

cooperative discussions are continuing on specific matters:
Burma, Cambodia, and Laos have been invited to Join; South
Vietnam has indicated willingness if invited; invitation to

North Vietnam is under consideration;111

and some United States
industries are ready to participate in regional businesses.112

Southeast Asians have, during this period, buttressed
their cOOperation by establishing formal ministerial confer-
ences for discussing specific economic problems. They have
formed SEAMEC, SEAMIT, SEADEV, and a Central Bankers Group to
bring together the Southeast Asian government ministers of
education, transportation, develOpment, and finance for consul-
tation on common problems.113 Robert Fluker feels that these
types of cooperation are realistic in that they focus on
specific projects rather than upon broad charters and principles,
and the multiplicity of organizations is not harmful because
the organs are, for the most part, complementary rather than
competitive.11“

Summary of Regional Cooperation l9u5-l969

 

In reviewing attempts at cOOperation which might be
conducive to economic integration, it is evident that ASEAN
members have a long, impressive record of attending regional
conferences, maintaining memberships in regional and inter-
national organizations, and establishing formal associations

through which cOOperation could take place. They have discussed

 

lllAgian AlmanaC, (17 January 1970). Po 3757.
112Fluker, p. 206.

113Fluker, pp. 200-201; Black, pp. 105-117.
lluFluker, p. 205.

 

42

cooperation, studied its various forms, and planned COOperative
projects; but they have as yet accomplished very little in the
way of actual harmonization or integration in cultural,
security, political, or economic endeavors. ECAFE, ASA, ASEAN
and other organizations have all done extensive studies of
regional economic cOOperation, but have studiously avoided
addressing themselves to political problems or theoretical
analyses of factors promoting or hindering integration. These
nations have not yet faced the questions of permanent supra-
national institutions, of defense and security, of the prOper
government role in the economy, or of the linkages between nat-
ional and regional develOpment. Nor have they yet been willing
to take the initial sacrifice that is necessary for meaningful
COOperation to become a reality; that is, no organization has
succeeded in eliciting cOOperation to the point of jeOpardizing
any sovereignty of any nation.115 In speaking of Southeast
Asian policymakers, Bernard Gordon finds that "What often exists,
sometimes even in the statements and thoughts of the same
individual, is a striking ambivalence toward the whole subject."ll6
Resurgence of interest in regionalism since 1960 has been
due to such factors as external pressures, positive and negative,
including Western inducements, desires for national economic
stability, threats posed by Communist China, indigenous Comm-
unism, British military withdrawal, and United States statements

casting doubts about continued U.S. presence in the region.117

 

116Gordon, p. 17a.
117Levi, 1968, pp. 68—69; Singh, p- 165; Shizuo» P- 57'

“3

Still, some evolution in expressions of regionalism has
taken place since World War II. Interests have moved from
tenuous cultural affinities and impossible security alliances
to pointed consideration of regional resource and industry
develOpment plans, tariff reductions, and trade promotion focused
on a sub-regional rather than upon a Southeast Asia or Asia-wide

base.

Obstacles to Cooperation

Southeast Asian nations do not score high on those con-
ditions believed conducive to integration by theorists and, in
addition, these nations face other problems peculiar to under-
deveIOped nations that appear to inhibit more extensive manifes-
tations of regionalism. Southeast Asian regionalism has been
inhibited by a broad array of political, economic, and cultural
factors about which there is still so much controversy among
writers that accurate assessment of the effects of these factors
is difficult. Political factors include nationalism, competing
ideologies, conflicts and animosities, government instability,
and concerns for security.

Early feelings of unity within the region were based on
common attitudes toward newly granted independence and anti-
colonialism118 and these nations, rather than drawing closer
together, may have become increasingly differentiated and
separated, not only in their attitudes toward each other, but

also in their approaches to larger world problems.119 Asians

118John H. Kautsky, "Nationalism in Underdeveloped Counp
tries," in Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. ed., Politics and the
International System, (New York, 19693. p. 39.

119This is, at least, the position of Vandenbosch and
Butwell, 1957. p. 255.

 

 

44

found they mistook unity focused on a common enemy--imperialism—-
for a broad general feeling of brotherhood120 and, as Mills

notes:

Almost the only common interests of the peoples of South-

east Asia are that they live in the same part of the contin-

ent and that they all want to be independent. There are 121

more factors that make for disunity than for cooperation.
And Gordon echoes this statement, adding that

Regionalism has not taken root in Southeast Asia, first,

because of the many political conflicts among the nations

there, and second, because there is so little agreement,

even among its advocates, on what I'cOOperation" would mean

in practice.122
Even EurOpe's example of the feasibility of economic regionalism
has produced frustration by coming just when.Asian barriers to
regionalism were rising.123 And the concept of economic region-
alism, rather than suggesting common progress, ”. . . continues
to attract supporters because the concept, vaguely defined,
seems to promise different benefits to different national
leaders."124 Even the forms of nationalism and their diverse
foundations may serve to separate rather than support common
outlooks across the borders.125

Nationalism has given rise to conflicts and probably

hampered progress in cOOperation, but among the ASEAN leaders

(and others) there is, at the same time, a widespread attitude

 

12°Levi, 1968, p. 66.
121Mills, pp. 163-164.

122Bernard K. Gordon, "Regionalism and Instability in
Southeast Asia," Orbis, 10(Summer l966)h38.

123Levi, 1968, p. 51.
lzuGordon, Orbis, p. 438.
125See my Thesis, pp. 133-134.

45

favorable to regional cOOperation.126 Richard Butwell, writing
in 1963, stated tentatively,

. . . the evidence to date suggests that the character of

nationalism in at least some of the Southeast Asian coun-

3123 3:133: $232122 3? Efii‘éin‘iafié‘im” and “mm“
Today it is even more evident that parallel to the awakening
of nationalism there has grown up feelings favorable to regional
solidarity.128

Mutual suspicion and distrust exists among ASEAN members

as a result of differing political ideologies, personal rivalries
among leaders, and traditional or contemporary animosities.
Dominant political ideologies are certainly not so compatible
as were those in EurOpe when the EurOpean Coal and Steel Comm-
unity was formed or in Latin America when the free trade assoc-
iations were created.129 Ideologies range from that of the
right—wing military clique governing Thailand which has given
little attention to socio-economic planning or goals130 to that
of Indonesia, again under military dominance, but pursuing an
avowedly socialist policy attempting to provide some measure of
social welfare. Between these extremes fall the middle-of-

the—road policies of the Philippines and Malaysia under consti—

tutional democracies and those of Singapore, now emphasizing

 

126Bernard K. Gordon, "Problems of Regional COOperation
in Southeast Asia," World Politics, 16(January l96u)263; Asian
Almanac (14 September 1968}, pp. 2917-2920; (19 October 1968),
pp. 297 -2980; (24 January 1970). pp. 3770-3771.

127Butwell, 1963, p. 1820
128Vu Van Thai, p. 359.
129533 my Thesis, pp. 116-128.

l3OGunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty
of Nations, (New York, 19687. p. 394.

 

46

welfare policies to a greater degree under a socialist majority.
Cooperation has suffered from a lack of contact among
leaders,131 competition for leadership in regional groupings,132
and degrees of personalism in effecting foreign policymaking.133
In addition, changes in leadership by coups d' etat and elections
have disrupted policy continuity and personal relationships.
But it is also important to point out that leaders in these
nations, anxious to demonstrate their capabilities to run a
nation, may see regional cOOperation as a means of mutual
support strengthening their prestige and support among their
citizens.13u And, since the populations are not fully active
in the political process, leaders may have freedom to move closer
regionally without sacrificing popularity among their people.135
Finally, these nations are fortunate to have schemes of coop-
eration designed by experts who have been isolated from poli-
tical pressures up to this point.136
Animosities and conflicts among ASEAN members and other

Southeast Asian nations are also detrimental to cooperation.

Thailand has continuing border problems with Laos and Cambodia

 

13lSingh, p. 229.
132Gordon, 1964, p. 223; Levi, 1968, p. 59.

133Gordon, Dimensions of Conflict, pp. 135-140. See his
model of personality importance to policymaking in Southeast Asia.

13#Fisher, pp. 361-362. Levi, 1968, p. 51.
135Butwell, 1963,'p. 183.
136Gordon, Dimensions of Conflict, p. 165.

 

 

47

that have disrupted COOperation on the Mekong Project.137 The
Philippines claim to Sabah has damaged trust and willingness
to COOperate with Indonesia and Malaysia138 and the Indonesian
confrontation over Malaysia, though settled, may not have ended
the former's desires to dominate parts of Malaysia.139 Indone-
sians are still attracted toward Islamic brethren in the Phili-
ppine island of Mindinao and differences still exist between
Malaysia and Thailand over minorities in the border provinceslu'O
where neither nation has been able to maintain order. Cambodia,
under Prince Sihanouk, was particularly accusatory toward its
neighbors; besides arguments over disputed territories,141 there
are periodic problems involving border crossings, smuggling,
Oppression of minorities, complaints of trade obstruction, and
intrusion by foreign tr00ps.1”2 Although not all conflicts
mentioned are among ASEAN members, all are relevant because they
sap resources and energies that might otherwise be directed
toward expanding cooperation within.ASEAN.

It is possible, however, that the historical importance
of differences between these nations has been blown up out of
proportion and the disputes are employed only to serve immed-

iate ends in these nations. The existence of occasional

 

137Sewell, pp. 7-8.
13860rdon, Dimensions of Conflict, pp. 40-41.
139Gordon, Orbis, p. 4&5.
308 140Fifield, pp. 257-260; Vandenbosch and Butwell, 1957,
p. o
141The Prah Viharn Temple was awarded to Cambodia by the
World Court in 1962. '

142Hanna, 1960, pp. 6-7; Vandenbosch and Butwell, 1957,
pp. 232-237. These authors give informative accounts of these
quarrels among neighboring countries throughout their book.

 

48

conflicts, for example, may be less serious to regional coop-
eration than often supposed for these conflicts are not primarily
ancient and enduring ones, but few in number and of short
duration. Furthermore, Bruce Russett reminds us that it is not
the absence of conflict but the ability to work out conflict

with a minimum of violence that marks the condition of successful
integration.1l+3 He notes further that large flows of information
make it possible to reduce chances of blundering into these

conflicts.l“u

And in Southeast Asia, the level of violence
between nations has never been high even during the Indonesia-
Malaysia confrontation. Although there is an element of distrust
between leaders and within populations, extensive communications
do exist and have generally continued even during hostilities.lu5
Thailand and Cambodia continue cOOperating in the Mekong Project
even though they have no diplomatic relations.146 The Phili-
ppines reactivated ASA in 1966 following the confrontation and
a Joint Working Party held meetings even before diplomatic
relations were reestablished between the Philippines, Indonesia,
and Malaysia.lu7

Political instability and Cold War alignments have also
kept ASEAN members apart. Internal political instability is
evidenced by coups d' etat, irredentist movements, a shortage

of trained administrators, and widespread corruption within

some of these governments. Military coups have occurred in

—_

 

143International Regions and the International System,
(Chicago, I967I. p. 96. '

1U”Russett, p. 97.
145Gordon, Dimensions of Conflict, p. 141.
145F1uker, p. 199.

lWNareiso Ramos, "Association of Southeast Asia and the
Philippines," United Asia, 18(November-December l966)297.

 

 

 

49

Indonesia and Thailand and other ASEAN members have experienced
abortive revolts by dissident ethnic minorities, Communists, or
military factions.148 All ASEAN members suffer from a shortage
of trained administrators; those that are available cannot be
spared from existing administrative priorities to take on new
problems posed by any comprehensive regional agreement that
would require a great deal of information-gathering, research,
coordination, and administrative expense. In addition, corrup-
tion is often present and caused by “. . . the prevalence of
official misconduct among politicians and administrators, and
the concomitant spread of unlawful practices among businessmen
and the general public,"ll+9 and this affects the stability and
resources of these governments.

Cold War alignments or nonalignments with the resultant
tendering or withholding of economic and military assistance by
major powers have also divided ASEAN members. The Philippines,
Thailand, and Malaysia have been firmly in the Western camp
while other Southeast Asians have hovered from neutrality of

150 SEATO

sorts toward one camp or the other at various times.
has been consistently resented by all except its regional mem-
bers and South Vietnam; the presence of foreign military bases
in Malaysia and Singapore served to alienate Indonesia and Burma
just as the presence of U. S. bases in the Philippines, Thailand,

and South Vietnam has done.151 COOperation has also been

 

luaGordon Dimensions of Conflict, throughout; Vandenbosch
and Butwell, 1966, throughout.

11+9Myrdal, pp. 937-958, on the causes and effects of
official corruption.

ISOBlack, throughout.

151Asian Almanac, (17 January l970)3756-3760; (24 January
1970)3770-377I.

 

 

50

retarded somewhat by small nation fears of being dominated by
the larger or more powerful neighbors while larger nations fear
diminution of their power in accepting an equal relationship
with smaller powers.”2

But political concerns for national security may also
militate £25 greater cOOperation among at least some Southeast
Asians.153 Earlier writers in both Southeast Asia and the U.S.
saw regionalism as a way to fill the "power vacuum" left by the
departing colonial powers and as a counterforce to the rising
power of mainland China.15l+ And the regional concept is still
supported as a viable foundation for a system of collective
security to strengthen individual nations.155 Malaysia and
Thailand, of the ASEAN members, feel especially vulnerable
militarily. This is why they so badly want Indonesia with its
large pOpulation, natural resources, and large military estab-
lishment associated with them.156 The Philippines, too, feels
a need to buttress its security by closer Asian ties.”7 Fear
of a common enemy has served to unite much of the rest of the
world into regional blocs and may well assist in the task for

Southeast Asia, assuming that agreement on a common enemy is

 

152Levi, 1968, p. 59.
153Nuechter1ein, pp. 806-816.

1514'William Henderson, Southeast Asia: Problems of United
States Policy, (Cambridge, Massachusettsl. pp.‘25052' .

155Vu Van Thai, p. 355.
156Asian Almanac, (5 August l967)2268-2272. .
157Black, p. 64.

 

51
possible.”8 But so far, ASEAN is viewed by nonaligned and
Communist nations as a disguised SEATO and this stigma limits
its attractiveness to other Southeast Asians.159

Sustaining economic growth is another problem that
plagues these nations. Growth has been slowed by p0pulation
increases, income inequalities, inflation, and dependence upon
exports. POpulation increases resulting from high birth rates
and declining death rates have been consuming much of the
increase in output that occurs and this contributes to economic
stagnation or an extremely slow rise in standards of living.160

The existence of broad income inequalities with most of

the populations existing slightly above subsistence level also

hampers economic regionalism.161

Absence of monetization
(primarily in rural areas) results in small markets for most
goods and high risk for investors who, having capital, might
otherwise invest and stimulate development.162 Currency

instability with frequent or continuing inflation also inhibits

 

l58Barrera, Haas, and Schmitter note that in underdev-
elOped nations, ". . . shared fear of the industrial world“
might replace the positive expectations of Western elites in
promoting integration. Mario Barrera and Ernst B. Haas, "The
Operationalization of Some Variables Related to Re ional Inte-
gration," International Organization, 23(Winter 19 9)l50-160;
Philippe C. Schmitter,;‘Further Notes on Operationalizing Some
Variables Related to Regional Integration," International
Organization, 23(Spring l969)327-336. ____1 ‘*

159Lawler, p. 64.

160Mills, pp. 338-345, contains an excellent discussion
of the causes of pOpulation growth and its effects on the
economy; see also, Myrdal, pp. 621-644 on the theoretical aSpects
of population growth.

162Myrda1, p. 624; Lawler, p. 30; s. c. Taluqdar, "South-
East Asian Common Market," AICC Economic Review, 20 15 February
1969)12-13.

 

 

 

 

 

52

investment and generates insecurity and unrest throughout the
region.163 Rampant inflation robs these governments of needed
development funds. In addition, high and increasing adminis-
trative costs leave little of the government budgets for devel-
opment projects. Foreign aid has not been sufficient nor
reliable enougtho guarantee develOpment; the flow of economic
aid has been declining since the mid-1960's. Of necessity,
when funds are constricted by these factors, regional develOp-
ment projects normally receive much lower priorities than other
projects judged essential to national interests.

Underdeveloped nations usually have "thin" economies
dependent upon the production of one or two raw materials for
the bulk of their foreign exchangel6u and this affects both
internal economic growth and the potential benefits to be
realized from economic integration. All ASEAN members have
experienced a chronic deficit of payments as prices of these
raw materials fluctuate and decline and as their peOples'
demands for imports increase.l65 ASEAN members, being primarily
agricultural economies producing similar goods, have little
complementarity and actually do little intra-regional trading.
And the amount of mutual trade since 1952 has been declining

rather than increasing.166 These nations are still dependent

 

_

163Black,p. 47, notes that Indonesian inflation in 1966
was 639% and another 200% in 1967 and 1968.

164Myrda1, p. 586.

165Myrdal, pp. 600-602; Mills, Chapter 8; Economic Bul-
letin for Asia and the Far East, ECAFE, (New York, I967), p. 4.

166Economic Bulletin, 1963, 1965, 1967; C. L. Gheevala,
"Prospects of‘ReIonaI’COOperation in Asia," United Asia,
17(May-June 1965 166.

 

 

53

upon markets in developed nations for trade and these trade
ties are in some cases still reinforced by preferential tariff

policies of former colonial powers.167

Also, there still remains
a significant dearth of knowledge about each other's production
of goods available for potential exchange.

Artificial trade barriers further reduce the level of
intra-regional trade. These nations have relied on customs
duties for the bulk of government revenue168 and, although this
reliance is now decreasing, quotas on both imports and exports
are still imposed to regulate foreign exchange.169 In analyzing
the relationship between tariffs and trade, Cooper and Massell
find that rationalization of tariffs to increase trade has value
only under Special conditions which include: (1) regional trade
in proportion to total trade is relatively high, (2) the coun-
tries now competitive have potential complementarity, and (3)
the ratio of foreign to domestic commerce is low.170 And most
underdeveloped nations, ASEAN members included, do not qualify
under these conditions. Another economist finds few unions
suitable for underdeveloped nations; Kindleberger is of the
Opinion that regional planning is of little benefit except for

river utilization; price stabilization agreements are not

strictly regional in character; and technical cOOperation,

 

167Economic Bulletin for Asia and the Far East, ECAFE,
(New York, 1969}. pp. 63564.

168My Thesis, p. 8l; Economic Bulletin, 1969, pp. 60-66.

l69Gheevala, p. 167; Economic Bulletin, 1967, p. 4;
Bernard Gordon feels that thefibarriers to regional trade have
not been artificial government policies(tariffs) but the “pre-
sent stage of develOpment of Southeast Asia' s economies."
Dimensions of Conflict, p. 155.

l7°Richard Cooper and Benton Massell, "A New Look at
Customs Union Theory," Economic Journal, 75(December l965)46l-476o

 

 

 

54

though suitable, is not very important in the total economic

picture.171

Another economic problem to which these nations have not
addressed themselves is the apprOpriate role of the government
in their economies. Economic policies of ASEAN members range
from minimum interference in Singapore and the Philippines to a
major reliance on government direction in Indonesia. All of
these governments have accepted some responsibility for improving
social and economic welfare and this responsibility has been
translated into develOpment plans that, in order to be carried
out effectively, would require governmental control or super-
vision of most economic sectors. Yet, Myrdal describes these
governments as “soft states requiring extraordinarily little of
their citizens; there is little social discipline and even the
few existing obligations are inadequately enforced."172 Levi
agrees that regionalism in Asia is difficult because it requires
an extremely complex and high degree of coordination and subor-
dination of policies173 and the greater the state role in econ-
omic life, the larger the problem of integration would be.

Despite this bleak picture, there are some economic
conditions that may stimulate continued economic cooperation

if not integration. The commitment of all ASEAN members to

 

171Chapter 18; Russett agrees that underdeveloped nations'
similarity of economic needs and goals brings them into compe-
tition and close identification "seems remote."; see his:
Trends in World Politics, (New York, 1965). p. 162.

172Myrdal, pp. 895-896-

173Levi, 1968, p. 52.

55

economic development provides a common interest. All of these
nations now have a socio-economic plan and this brings about the
possibility of coordinating planning to increase trade and

174

regional complementarity. Since the stimulus of foreign

demand for the region's goods is diminishing as substitutes and
new competitive markets appear, impetus for develOpment must
become internally based and nurtured.l75 In fact, the decline
of world demand for primary commodities impels the smaller
nations dependent upon trade toward regionalism for economic
survival.176

Exchange of accumulated information from the several
economic and trade commodity studies done on the region has
pointed up numerous areas where complementarity is either present
or possible. Thailand and Malaysia already have a reSpectable
amount of complementarity, Singapore trades well with Indonesia,
and the Philippines and Malaysian economies could be comple-
mentary “. . . to a surprising degree.“177

Even existing artificial trade barriers can be overcome.
These nations have for some time been reducing their reliance
on customs duties178 and Myrdal found that the types of controls

in existence are mostly positive ones that encourage and stim-

.—

l74Ta1uqdar, pp. 10-11.
175Myrdal, pp. 582-583.

176Roger D. Hansen, "Regional Integration: Reflections
on6a Dgcade of Theoretical Efforts," World Politics,21(January
19 9)2 4.

177Ravenholt, p. 4; Donald B. Keesing, "Thailand and
Malaysia: A Case for a Common Market:", Malayan Economic Review,
10(October 1965)108-112.

173My Thesis, p. 87.

 

 

56

ulate production, investment, and consumption, usually in a

specific sector.”9 Negative controls such as rationing, admin-

istrative restrictions, denying exchange, and bullying are not

widespread, being employed primarily against minorities(espec-

ially Chinese) and foreigners.180
Gordon concluded in 1966 that the three necessary elements

for economic regionalism may now be present in Southeast Asia.

The most prosperous nations are committed to regionalism and

are members of ASA(now ASEAN); some of the uncommitted are

interested in participating; and the United States and Japan

have concretely demonstrated their backing for regionalism by

earmarking funds for cooperative develOpment. And in some ways

the region is better off than Africa or South Asia. ASEAN

nations have smaller pepulations, fewer boundary diSputes, fewer

poor, higher literacy, less malnutrition, and more plentiful

natural resources.182 It is also the case that when moderni-

zation is equated with industrialization in underdeveloped

nations, the latter becomes a goal that transcends cost-benefit

analysis so, when growth is not possible alone, these nations

are ”impelled" to attempt regional economic cOOperation schemes.183

All ASEAN nations are fragmented culturally due to
geography, pro-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial influences

 

179Myrdal, p. 903.

18°Myrda1, p. 922.

181Gordon, Dimensions of Conflict, p. 193.
182Myrdal, pp. 360-361-

133Hansen, p. 268.

57

that may not be conducive to integration.184

These nations
contain significant ethnic minorities, multiple Spoken languages,
and religious affiliations that illustrate the existence of many
value systems whose ideologies or goals do not always coincide;
the exclusiveness and tenacious adherence to these values may
constitute a barrier to both national and regional integration.

The single most important minority in the region is
composed of alien Chinese who make up at least ten percent of
the total Southeast Asian population. These Overseas Chinese,
distinct from other Southeast Asians ethnically, linguistically,
and in some cases by race and religion, have an importance within
the region far greater than their numbers would indicate.185
They control most of the merchandising in these nations; they
constitute a majority of the wholesalers and internal marketers;
and they are significant as regional traders.186 Chinese also
control much of the production of rubber, tin, and rice in the
region.

Their commercial dominance is usually resented by indi-
genous p0pulations who have attempted to deal with the problem
by assimilation policies, exclusion laws, and physical liqui-
dation. Thailand has relied on assimilation,187 the Phili-

 

1340harles A. Fisher “Southeast Asia: The Balkans of
the Orient?", Geoggaphy, 47(November l962)347 and 366.

185Mills, pp. 110-135. See also: 0. William Skinner,
"Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia," The Annals, 321(January
1959)136-147.

185Justus van Der Kroef, "Chinese in Southeast Asia,"
Current History, 33(December l957)367; My Thesis, p. 96.

187G. William Skinner, Chinese Society in Thailand,
(Ithaca, 1957). pp. 322-382.

 

 

 

58
ppines has passed laws forbidding Chinese to own businesses,188
while Indonesia has on at least two occasions engaged in violent
reprisals against Chinese businesses and residents.189 The
Chinese in Malaysia constitute nearly forty percent of the
pOpulation and are a special problem. It was Chinese leftism
in Singapore that led Prime Minister Rahman of Malaya to prOpose
federation with the more conservative colonies of Sarawak, Sabah,
and Brunei in 1961. The incompatibility of Malayans and Chinese
led to the breakup of the Federation as "Malaya aimed at inde-
pendence from Singapore‘s facilities and vice versa.'190

The Overseas Chinese do not, however, form a cohesive
community even within a nation but are fragmented linguistically,
by ancestral origin, and by political loyalties, national and
international.191 Nevertheless, because of their predominant
economic influence, their good will or neutral acquiescence in
the formation of an economic union is desirable.

Southeast Asians are also fragmented by the existence of
many exclusive languages. Some ASEAN nations have only recently
adOpted a national language and where these languages were not
those of an indigenous group, national integration has probably
been strengthened.192 Where, however, the language of a single
ethnic group was adOpted as in the Philippines and Malaysia,

assimilation of some minorities has been slowed. In any case,

 

188New York Times, (11 December 1959). Thailand also
requires citizenéhip,’but it is more freely given.

189Gordon, Orbis, pp. 438-444.
l9°Levi, 1968, p. 63.

191Richard J. Coughlin, Double Idgntity: The Chinese in
Modern Thailand, (Hong Kong, 1960). pp. 6-8; THIS, pp. 110-120.

192My Thesis, p. 100.

 

 

59

these newly adopted languages have not been assimilated by the
large majority of citizens and even when understood, they are
often not the media of spoken communication.193 Still, elites
in Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines communicate easily
in English while Indonesia and Malaysia have achieved rudimentary
coordination between their national languages with the ultimate
aim of fusing the two.194

Religions, because they often transcend minority divi-
sions, are a unifying force within ASEAN nations; but the same
cannot be claimed for the effect of religion on regional 000p-
eration. Buddhism is the state religion in Thailand, Islam
shares the same favor in Indonesia and Malaysia, while in the
Philippines, overwhelmingly Roman Catholic, church-state separ-
ation is maintained. With the exception of the Darul Islams in
Indonesia,195 religious have seldom been militant in any but

196

anti-foreign pronouncements, but no religion with strong

commitments to tradition can countenance regiona1 integration
if it would decrease political and economic influence now
enjoyed within a nation.

The above political, economic, and cultural obstacles,
though not prohibitive of regional cOOperation, certainly foment
controversy over what form cooperation should take. Disagree-
ment exists over whether COOperation should be on a regional or

sub-regional basis;197 Pan-Asianism is also a partially viable

193My Thesis, p. 100.
194Fifield, p. 156.
195Vandenbosch and Butwell, 1966, p. 362.

196George McT. Kahin, ed., Governments and Politics of
Southeast Asia, (Ithaca, 1956). pp.*348-3u9.

197Singh, p. 235.

 

6O

concept, and President Soekarno even had some success with
Afro-Asian sentiments. In summary, the diverse political
systems, inequalities in economic develOpment, and cultural
fragmentation do not augur well for creation of a common market
similar to that in EurOpe, but perhaps enough unifying factors

are present to support future regional cOOperation on some

specific economic matters.

Aspirations for Expanded Cooperation

DeSpite the many utOpian pronouncements about extensive
cOOperation that fly in the face of the many Obstacles tO
cOOperation, there is evidence suggesting that Southeast Asian
aSpirations for regional economic cOOperation are becoming more
realistic and hence attainable than at any time in the past.
Gordon feels that Southeast Asia now has the potential for
economic regionalism on a practical and pragmatic base because
the contributions of regionalism to rapid economic development
and growth have linked the idea to nationalist goals and

feelings.198

More specifically, he states:

For example, a regional or subregional association that
combined the dramatic nature Of Maphilindo with the con-
creteness Of ASA could bring major advantages--both for
the stability Of the region and for the internal well-
being Of Indonesia. Such a body. . . would include Indo-
nesia, She ASA members, and perhaps even Burma and Cam-'
bodia.1 9

The conclusions reached by Levi are more guarded; he feels that

only the most general kinds Of union can be discussed as Asians

k

19300rdon, Dimensions of Conflict, pp. 145-146.
l99Gordon, Dimensions Of Conflict, p. 191.

61

have not sufficiently developed the capability for coOperation
since it requires specific and political actions.200 Still. he
finds that motivations and international conversations about
potential Southeast Asian economic organizations are continuing,
. . . stimulated in part by the progress of many enter-
prises assisted from the outside, such as the Colombo Plan,
the Lower Mekong Basin develOpment project, the Asian
DevelOpment Bank, the Asian Productivity Organization, and
United Nations sponsored projects.201
Interest is also stimulated by an obvious and growing need for
cooperation and by Japan's increasing desire for economic invol-
vement in the area.202
Benefits anticipated from further cOOperation include
increased stability and security within the region and trade
expansion resulting from greater complementarity and elimination
of barriers. Prospects along these lines appear brightest for
a sub-regional grouping concentrating its efforts in the tasks.
of reducing customs duties and harmonizing national development
plans. Bela Balassa sees the greatest benefits coming from a
customs union as does Wionczek2°3 while Myrdal notes that
complementarity will be best promoted through coOperation on
develOpment planning.2°u Although prospects for trade in raw

materials are not bright and competition in manufactures is

—_¥

200Levi, 1968. P- 50-
201Levi, 1968. Po 610
2°2Levi, 1968, p. 61; Fluker, pp. 189-209.

203Theory of Economic Inte ration, (Homewood, 1961).
pp. 35-36;‘Eiguel S.PWIOnczék, 'HequIsIEes for Viable Economic
Inte ration," in J. S. Nye, International Regionalism, (Boston,
1968 . p. 296.

204Myrdal, p. 658.

 

 

62

high from develOped countries, regional development planning
can improve the situation by promoting increased processing of
raw materials, expansion of service occupations, and diversi-
fication of production.205

The UN Economic Commissions support this path and urge
that harmonization of national plans begin before nations set
the direction of national development that becomes harder to
change as time goes by.206 ECAFE urges that Planning Councils
be established at the sub-regional level and Ministerial Councils
be created at the regional level to reduce possibilities of
conflicts of interests between sub-regional plans. It also
recommends establishment of economic sectoral committees in
agriculture, industry, transportation, education, or other
sectors on the sub-regional level.207

A major roadblock to expansion of formal coOperation has
been the Indo-Chinese war. On the one hand, the two Vietnams
would be desirable partners in an economic union, but cannot be
included until an amiacable settlement is reached. On the other
hand, their membership within a COOperative organization could
be beneficial in bringing about a settlement of the conflict.208
Inclusion of Burma and Cambodia might also be desirable and

both nations have given some indications that they are interested.209

 

zosl‘lyrdal . p. 614's 0

2°6Albert O. Hirschman, Development Projects Observed,
(“8811111813015 DICO. 1967). p. 1.32.

207Economic Bulletin, 1967, pp. 7-11.

208Vu Van Thai describes this situation as a vicious
circle. pp. 350-358.

209Asian Almanac, (17 January 197o)3757—3760. Burma's Ne
Win visited Singapore and Malaysia in April, 1968 and discussed
regional cooperation. See: Levi, p. 181(footnote).

 

63

Some observers feel that the inclusion of additional nations
might not strengthen a union much and the effort might not be
worth the problems it would create.210

One might also take a more extremely negative view and
suggest that Southeast Asia may even now be expending more time,
money, and other resources on studies than the limited benefits
from cooperation would warrant if these expenditures could not
be recouped. The increasing amount of knowledge gained of each
other, if there are no prospects of additional benefits, does
not suffice to justify other than inquiries of an academic
nature unrelated to government programs and policymaking.
Perhaps these energies might better be applied to developing
new industrial and marketing techniques within each nation or
to strengthening already existing non-regional trade links.

This position, however, appears to be unrealistic when
considering the long-run welfare of the region caught up in a
world becoming more economically and politically interdependent.
To date, most of the financial and technical resources for
cOOperation have been provided by international organizations
and by western aid commitments so demands on Southeast Asian
national resources have not been excessive. And even if the
costs of coOperation were high, the costs of isolation might be
even higher. Even though economic benefits from regional econ-
omic integration may be slight for many years, the attendant

improvement in political stability that might come about could

 

210Keesing, p. 107. He even feels that only Thailand
and Malaysia are capable of cooperating without political
problems; the Philippines and others are either not suited or
not worth the trouble.

64

make the whole effort worthwhile.

In summarizing aspirations for future cOOperation, we
find that some of these nations are presently cooperating, moti-
vations for regionalism are high, and there are hopes for more
concrete COOperative ventures in the future. If these hopes
for future cOOperation are to be realized through viable forms
of cOOperation, decisions need to be based upon a realistic
appraisal of these nations capabilities to work together. It is
pertinent, then, to examine cooperative performance of ASEAN
members since World War II to assess past and present perfor-
mance with respect to some conditions believed by integration

theorists to be conducive to successful union.

CHAPTER III
REVIEW OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION LITERATURE

Introduction

Substantial variation in theoretical approaches, concept
definitions, and methods of analysis is evident in a review of
relevant regional integration literature. Some of these varia-
tions are being narrowed or resolved as knowledge about inte-
gration accumulates and as more sOphisticated methodology is
applied to the accumulated knowledge.

Variations of theoretical approach can be roughly cate-
gorized and titled according to the elements deemed most impor-
tant to integration analysis by various writers. The approaches
might be characterized as: (I) Transactional models; (2) Func-
tional models; and (3) Decisionmaking models. This classifi-
catory scheme is not intended to be either mutually inclusive
or exclusive since differences in approach are mostly a matter
of degree and are being modified in new writings of the major
prOponents of each model.

variation in the use of concepts and their definition is
also apparent. Disagreement exists, for example, on what con-
stitutes a political community and whether integration is a
state(condition) marking the existence of a political community

or whether integration is a process that deepens until a poli-

65

66

tical community is formed. There is also confusion over whether
or not some threshold exists beyond which regional cOOperation
becomes integration. Even the dimensions of integration are
hazy with some writers making no distinction between political
and economic integration and even assuming at times that social
integration and national or local integration patterns are
identical to international patterns. Broad disagreement over
the relevance of particular elements that promote or hinder
integration is also present--that is, which elements are conducive
to successful integration? Are these elements essential or
merely helpful and to what degree is each either? Does cOOper-
ation or integration in one economic or political task spill
over to impel or encourage a deepening of the integrative
relationship?

A final area of diversity in these studies regards the
most apprOpriate methods of analyzing integration. Are the
relevant elements only those that are relational among union
members or are domestic conditions also pertinent and, if so,
to what degree and in what manner? And once the relevant
elements are decided upon, how can they be operationally
measured? Then, too, if some variables do not lend themselves
to quantification, how can they be meaningfully related to
other elements that are quantifiable?

67

Transactional Models of Integration
Karl Deutsch and others, in a pioneering study, published
a useful analysis of ten historical integrations that occurred
in EurOpe between the Middle Ages and the early Twentieth
Century.1 These authors were concerned with identifying social,
economic, and political factors that contributed to the successful
formation of security-communities. They differentiate between
two types of integrated security-communities, amalgamated and
pluralistic. Amalgamation involved the merger of two or more
independent units and the creation of a supranational body while
pluralistic integration coordinated activities between members
continuously over a period of time, but retained the national
decision-making centers. The following conditions were identi-
fied in the study as being 'essential' in most amalgamated
integrations:
(l) mutual compatibility of main values; (2) a distinctive
way of life; (3) eXpectations of stronger economic ties or
gains; (h) a marked increase in political and administra-
tive capabilities of at least some participating units;
(5) superior economic growth on the part of at least some
participating units; ( ) unbroken links of social commun-
ication, both geographically and sociologically between
different social strata; (7) a broadening of the political
elite; (8) mobility of persons at least among the poli-
tically relevant strata; and, (9) a multiplicity or ranges
of communication and transaction.
Amalgamated integration probably required cooperation by members
in associations and organizations performing a fairly wide range
of different common functions and services. Helpful conditions
included "previous administrative and/or dynastic union; ethnic

or linguistic assimilation; strong economic ties; and foreign

 

lKarl Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North
Atlantic Area, (PrinceEon, 1957).

2Deutsch, 1957, p. 2.

 

68

military threats."3 Although this study was primarily concerned
with amalgamation, later studies by Deutsch have focused on
pluralistic integration”! and it is the latter that is most
pertinent for regional economic integration in Southeast Asia.
Conditions for achieving pluralistic integration were not clearly
specified in the original study, though Deutsch spelled them out
in a later study as being:
1. Compatibility of major political values
2. Capacity of the governments and politically relevant
strata of the participating countries to respond to one
another's messages, needs, and actions quickly, adequa-
tely, and without resort to violence
3. Mutual predictability of the relevant aSpects of one
another's political, economic, and social behavior<but
these relevant aspects are fewer in the case of a
pluralistic security community than they would be in its
much more tightly-knit amalgamated counterpart).5
The level of attainment on the essential and helpful variables
must be high enough in both types to result in a "sense of
community."6 Such a community is created by a condition of
integration reached by a process of fulfilling the pre-condi-
tions; a process completed by few amalgamations.7 Integration
has been achieved when the units no longer anticipate violence
to settle conflicts between each other.8 This is a relatively

low level of integration and the type of community created may

 

3Deutsch, 1957, p.hh and p. 54.

“'Integration and Arms Control in the EurOpean Political
iEnvironment: A Summary Report,” APSR, 60(June l966)354-365;
IQIPI Deutsch, Lewis J. Edinger, Hfiy'c. Macridis, and Richard L.
{Merritt, France, Germany and the Western Alliance, (New York,
196? ); Arms Control and the Atlantfc AlIiance, TNew York, 1967).

5The Analysis of International Relations, (Englewood
Cliffs, 1968). p. 1296.

6Deutsch, 1957, p. 5.

7Deutsch, 1957, p. 30.

8Deutsch, 1957, p. 31.

69

not be adequate enough to support a viable economic union.

Deutsch does not distinguish between social, economic,
or political integration and his interpretation of community
has been found

interesting'and suggestive, but it ignores too much that is
politically relevant. His is a theory of social or moral
community and not of political community as I would define
the term. Social community is, of course, relevant to the
development of a political community, but it is not the
same thing. The relationship must be Specified and this
Deutsch does not do.

Further, Deutsch's requirements for integration are not
fully Operational. After attempting to use Deutsch's methodology,
Peter Rohn concluded that the concepts are too general and
unObjective; reinterpretation and simplification are needed to
analyze other integration situations.lo Data are unavailable,
for example, to indicate fully the degree of social communi-
cation or the amount of interaction among selected elites.ll
Deutsch has by implication admitted that some of the conditions
are unwieldly and in later studies concentrates on measurable
transaction flows, public Opinion surveys, and elite attitude

interviews.12 William Fisher also criticizes Deutsch's works,

finding that Deutsch's major assumption that a process of social

assimilation leads to or causes a process of political develop-

9Leon N. Lindberg, "The European Community as a Political
SyStem: Notes Toward the Construction of a Model," Journal of
99mmon Market Studies, 5(June l967)3uh-387.

10”Testing Deutsch's Indices of Community," Political
lgesearch: Organization and Design, 2(September 1959I7-9.

1lRohn, p. 9.
12$ee footnote u of this chapter.

7O

ment to occur is a relationship not tested by empirical data.13
Fisher utilizes symbolic mathematical logic to test the assump
ption on which Deutsch rests his conclusion that since social
assimilation in Western Europe(by measuring transactions),
political develOpment or integration has stOpped.14 Fisher
finds the assumption logically untenable and rejects the socio-
causal paradigm as “probably of limited value in studying
political integration in any setting.'15 A study by Ronald
Inglehart also disputes Deutsch's conclusion on EurOpean inte-
grative progress; Inglehart surveys the attitudes of youth and
adults and finds that commitment to European.integration is
probably increasing.16

Philip Jacob and James Toscano edit a volume of inter-
disciplinary approaches addressed to the emergence of political
communities on local, national, and international levels.17
These authors utilize a sociological concept of community, do
not distinguish between political and other types of integra-
tion,18 and conclude:

On balance, it appears that the differences between rela—
tionships within communities and those among communities
are not so great as to indicate that political integratiog
is a different phenomenon in the two types of situation.

13'An Analysis of the Deutsch Sociocausal Paradigm of
5861:1081 Integration," International Organization, 23(Spring
9 257.

14Fisher, p. 257.
15Fisher, pp. 259-286.

16'An End to European Integration?", APSE, 61(March
l967)9l-105.

17The Integration of Political Communities, (New York,l96b).

18Claude Ake also follows this approach in his book,
§_Theory of Political Integration, (Homewood, 1967).

19Jacob and Toscano, p. 9.

71

Integration is perceived by these authors as a process which

is the function of both the level and the degree of cohesion

in the political community.20 And previous research indicates

ten factors that may exert integrative influence upon people.

These factors rely heavily on Deutsch's 1957 study and are:
(l) geographical proximity; (2) homogeneity; (3) trans-
actions, or interactions, among persons or groups; (n)
knowledge of each other; (5) shared functional interests;
(6) the "character“ or "motive" pattern of a group; (7)
the structural frame or system of power and decision-
making; (8) the sovereignty-dependency status of the
community; (9) governmengil effectiveness; (10) previous
integrative experiences.

The authors attempt to assess the relative importance
of each variable by prOposing a “costing model." In this
model, each of the variables could be evaluated and assigned a
weight in terms of costs or benefits represented by the degree
to which peOple are willing to expend effort to accomplish
integrative work.22 Weighting would certainly eliminate a major
criticism leveled at the Transactionalists; namely, that they
treat all variables as equally important to the integrative
process. However, the authors admit that '. . . we are asking
for data which at the moment it is impossible to supply with
any degree of assurance that it represents the real situation
in any political community."23 Two later studies have added
significantly to the utility of the costing model by eluci-

dating the kinds of costs that are both significant and

20Jacob and Toscano, p. 4-11.
21Jacob and Toscano, pp. ll-lz.
22Jacob and Toscano, p. 15.
23Jacob and Toscano, p. 16.

72

measurable.24

Amitai Etzioni, in Political Unification,25 also utilized
a sociological approach in evaluating the effects of elite
distributions and power compositions on four integration
attempts-~two that failed, one stable example, and a growing
union. He concluded that union is most likely to succeed if:
the elite units are few in number, initiating elites command
sufficient utilitarian power; political communication channels
are Open and responsive; and integrative effort is "mature" or
“overdue” rather than "premature.” The elites should also be
identifiable as committed to the union and capable of employing
a measured amount of coercion at prOpitious times.26

Etzioni distinguishes political integration from religious,
economic, or general integration, addresses himself to the
former, and maintains that a political community has been
formed only after passing the relatively high threshold of
unification. A political community: (a) has an effective
control over the use of the means of violence(though it may
”delegate" some of this control to member-units); (b) has a
center of decisionmaking that is able to affect significantly
the allocation of resources and rewards throughout the community;
and (c) is the dominant focus of political identification for

the large majority of politically aware citizens.27 He identifies

 

2“Edward E. Azar, ”Analysis of International Events,"
Peace Research Reviews, “(November 1970)76-105; Ralph M. Goldman,
1fAZTransactionaI Tfieory of Political Integration and Arms
Control,“ APSR, 63(September 1969)7l9-733.

25(New York, 1965).

26Etzioni, pp. 285-315.

27Etzioni, p. u.

73
three stages of the unification process-take—off, expansion,

and termination--during any one of which formation of a union
may fail28 and successful completion of which results in a
condition of integration. He agrees with the Functionalists
that a spill-over effect(he calls it secondary priming) may
Operate during the take-off period and, following W. W. Rostow,29
is necessary to impel the process into the expansion stage.3o
Although Etzioni's concept of political community is too
rigorous to fit the level of cooperation extant in Southeast
Asia, his criteria for union are instructive for delineating
parameters for successful cOOperation. The level of economic
cooperation among ASEAN members falls under Etzioni's concept
of harmonization wherein the "units maintain their autonomy
but work together."31 The members seek to bring about coordi-
nation through interaction between the power centers of the
member units. And this concept is very close to Deutsch's
pluralistic community. It is interesting that Etzioni's example
of both stable and growing unions(Nordic and EurOpean Economic
Community) have experienced successful harmonization but are
less than integrated, while integrative failures(West Indies
and the United Arab Republic) were once at the point of integration
but had not experienced long-term efforts to systematically

harmonize their conditions.

 

28Etzioni, pp. 51-62.
29Stages of Economic Growth, (Cambridge, England, 1960).

3°Etzioni, pp. 53-54.
31Etzioni, p. 300.

7A
As with Deutsch, Etzioni has difficulty Operationalizing

his concepts so that they might be directly measurable, comp-
arable, and replicable by others. It is particularly difficult

to obtain precise measures of threshold levels between stages
and of such concepts as 'secondary priming" or "measured amount

of coercion at propitious times." Political Unification,

 

though included here with the Transactionalists(partially based
on earlier studies by the author), perhaps strikes a reasonable

balance among the three types of models.

Functional Models of Integration
Functionalists postulate that when political units agree
to coordinate certain organizational tasks or functions(primarily
economic ones) and voluntarily create an organization to carry
out the task, the concern of each unit for the welfare of its
inhabitants will lead to an integrated community of interest
with respect to that function. And cOOperation in one or more
tasks will lead(automatically for some writers) to cOOperation
in other tasks.
Ernst Haas is a major proponent of the functional approach
and his writings on regionalism, although somewhat less
empirical than those of Deutsch or Etzioni and derived primarily
from recent EurOpean experience, have focused more on the
politically relevant variables than some other studies.32
The Uniting of Europe examined the attitudes and expectations
32The Unitin of Euro e, (Stanford, 1958); "Regionalism,
FunctionaIIEEC_Efid_fifiI?EF§§IEInternational Organization,“
World Politics, 8(January l956)238-263; “The Challenge of

Regionalism;*_1nternatiOnal Or ization 12(Autumn l958)qu-448;
Beyond the Nation-State, TStan or , .

 

 

 

75
of groups and elites before and after the European Coal and
Steel Community was founded and was especially concerned with
ECSC's importance as a "pilot project" leading, by a process
of "function spill-over," to the political integration of
EurOpe. Some conditions Haas found important to integration
were: similar cultural, legal, and economic backgrounds;
fragmentation of ideological and social Opinion; mutuality of
interests in selected elites; basically identical political
institutions and practices; similar political programs; and a
lack of controversial political issues between members.33
Acceptance of ECSC was also eased by a tradition among indus-
trial, political, and labor groups 'of mutual consultation and
rudimentary value sharing through past associations of members;'
another helpful condition was the existence of a real or
imagined external threat}!+

Haas subscribes to the tenet that there is need to form
a community and a community exists when members have formed an
organization with supranational powers in which to participate
voluntarily in matters of common interest.35 Where Deutsch
seemed to feel that a political community is a condition for
integration, Haas perceives the emergence of a community as a
consequence of integration. His concept of community is not so
comprehensive as that of Etzioni or of Deutsch's amalgamated

security-community, but requires more organizational formality

‘

33Uniting, p. 290.
34Uniting, p. xiii.

35Unitin , p. 5.

76
than a pluralistic one or harmonization. He envisions poli-
tical and economic integration as a single process that deepens
gradually by inclusion of new functions until unification in a
federal type of government occurs. According to Haas, successful
integration comes ”automatically" through the Spill-over process
as non-controversial areas are unionized. This spill-over effect

. . . proceeds most rapidly and drastically when it res-
ponds to socio-economic demands emanating from an indus-
trial-urban environment, when it is an adaptation to cries
for increasing welfare benefits agd security born by the
growth of a new type of society.3
Movement toward unification by taking cooperative
welfare-oriented action is most readily achieved by leaving
the work to experts and/or voluntary groups37 until later
'politicization" creates demands for further deepening of the
union. In Beyond the NationPStqte, Haas applies the concept
of spill-over to plead for international organizations that, in
a world of increasingly interdependent nations, would purposely
address themselves to social and economic welfare decisions
having spill—over effect, thereby promoting international
integration with a consequent reduction of violent conflict.38

Economists, most of whom accept the functionalist

approach and the validity of the spill-over effect,39 have also

 

36seyond the Nation-State, p. 105.
37Beyond the Nation-State, p. 48.
38Beyond the Nation-State, chapters one through five.

39Exceptions to this generality include: Gunner Myrdal,
Jisian Drama: An Inouir Into the Poverty of Nations, (New York,
~.: ; ' oer 0. ' rsc u: , Ieve Opmen 'ro ec s 'oserved,
(Washington, D. C., 1967); : s 0. c m , ap = ':r ets
land the Unification of EurOpe,' World Politics, 20(January
1968 )228-244.

 

 

77
contributed to the literature on economic integration.‘+0
Earlier works stressed the expected largess that could emanate
from cOOperation and freer trade, while more recent studies
have tended to be more analytical in recognizing the roadblocks
to union.“1 These writers have focused both on the conditions
desirable for nations attempting integration and on the benefits
expected from union, often seeing certainfactors as both con-
ditions for union and the result of union, thus introducing
a measure of circularity in their reasoning. Economic theorists
have generally failed to distinguish between an integrative
process and a state of integration and usually make no mention
of I'community" other than when referring to supranational insti-
tutions or organizations, i.e., EurOpean Economic Community.
Economists have also been guilty of ignoring the politics of
integration or, even when.recognizing that these decisions are
political, failing to ascribe sufficient weight to political
phenomena. Although economic factors such as similarity of
economic infrastructures, free movement of factors of production,
maintaining balance of payments, and other variables are more
amenable to measurement than some political variables, there
seems to have been no attempt by economists to determine what,
if any, operational threshold level is indicative of a viable

economic union c

 

“OBela Balassa, Theory of Economic Integration, (Homewood,
1961); James Meade, ProbIemsofIEconomicUnion, (Chicago, 1963);
Rolf Sannwald and Jacques StOhler, Economlc Integration,
(Princeton, 1959); Tibor ScitovSky,—EcOnomic Theory and West
EurOpean Integration, (Stanford, 19587.

41Myrdal, 1968;' Charles P. Kindleberger, Economic
DevelOpment, (New York, 1965).

 

 

 

 

 

78

Most criticism of the functionalist approach has been
directed at Ernst Haas whose writings have been attacked for
failing to operationalize the variables, for general inappli-
cability of the model to non-EurOpean environments, for ignoring
external influences on union formation, and for assuming the
Spill-over effect to be automatic.

Haas admits to the narrowness of his initial model,
saying, "I would hesitate to claim validity for it in the study
of regional political integration in Latin America, the Middle
East, or South-East Asia."“2 In.a later study following
research on Latin.American integration, Barrera and Haas modify
some of the conditions to be more applicable to underdevelOped
nations; they also add variables to account for external
influences and suggest quantitative indices to measure a few
of their conditions.”3 Philippe Schmitter, in a following
article, objects to some of these indices as being insufficient
to measure all dimensions of the broad conditions posited in
earlier studies. He suggests that: (1) additional fixed and
relative measures of power be used; (2) measures of pluralism
be more discriminating; and (3) change indicators also be
employed.””

The spill-over effect on integration has come in for

close scrutiny during the last few years due to its perceived

“ZUnitigg, xv-xvi .

43Mario Barrera and Ernst B. Haas, "The Operational-
ization of Some Variables Related to Regional Integration,"
Eaternational Organization, 23(Winter 1969)150-l60.

44"Further Notes on Operationalizing Some variables
Related to Regional Integration," International Organization,
23(Spring l969)327-336.

79
inability to explain the stagnating integrative process in
EurOpe and the relative absence of cooperative prOgress in
Latin America. The weight of the evidence now affirms that
spill-over is not automatic; it may or may not Operate, depen-
dent upon the presence or absence of several intervening
factors. Schmitt feels that Spill-over probably Operates
unless or until a prOposed measure theatens the sovereignty
of a member and causes it to insist “on the integrity of the
nation-state" and reject integration.“5 Stanley Hoffman lends
credence to this view in his distinction between low and high
politics, noting that welfare politics is low and agreement is
easier while high politics involves national security, an area
where the units do not want to be constricted.“6 Edward Azar,47
basing his position on the observations of Hirschman,“8 agrees
that some projects have spill-over side effects while others
do not and investment in those projects that do have Spill-over
effect is a conscious choice of the decisionmakers.’+9

Joseph Nye attacks the concept from another direction,
pointing out that external factors as well as internal ones

make for spill-over; outside forces are catalysts that either

 

usschmitt, p. 228.

“6Gulliver's Troubles, or the Setting of American Foreign
Policy, (new York, I968). pp.u03:n06.

47Hirschman, pp. 159-160.

1+8"International Political Integration: The Case of the
United Arab Republic,W Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Stanford
University, Stanford, California, 1969.

49Azar, above, chapter four.

8O
promote or inhibit increased integration.50 This view is
supported for underdevelOped regions where non-regional powers
and organizations have been instrumental influences upon
regionalism.51 Hansen observes that underdevelOped nations
have a real problem in regionalism of distributing costs and
benefits equally. Problems of cost and benefit distribution
led to breakups of regional organizations because they resulted
in pre-politicization of the issues involved and raised welfare

politics to "high" politics affecting national security.52

Decisionmaking Models of Integration

PrOponents of this approach have analyzed foreign affairs
as actions emanating from a governmental process or official,
resulting from external and internal influences upon decision-
makers, and designed to bring about a desired state of affairs
for the decisionmaking unit. The decisionmaking approach to
foreign policymaking follows roughly the paradigm set out by
Richard Snyder, et al.,53 and purports to examine the structural
factors, communication patterns, and motivational influences
underlying the roles and positions of international actors.

Most studies have been deductive in nature, confined to partial

5°International Regionalism, (Boston, 1968). pp. 333-349.

51James Lawler and Jerome Laulicht, "International
Inte ation in Developing Regions," Peace Research Reviews,
3(1969); Roger D. Hansen, "Regional Ififegration:Reflections
on a Decade of Theoretical Efforts,“ World Politics, 21(January
l969)242-2?1.

52Hansen, pp. 257-261.

SBRichard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burton M. Sapin,
eds., Foreign Policy DeciSion-making: An Approach to the Study
(Of InternationaI*Politics, (New’York, 1962.

81

tests by the case study method, and most often concerned with
conflict situations.54 The major advocate of this approach as
applied to regional economic integration has been Leon Lindberg.55
Lindberg examines the European Economic Community as a
political system to determine the extent to which policy outputs
reflect integration or commitment to common action within the
union. Integration is a process related to the inputs governing
decisions of national actors and its crucial dimension is:
How nations forego the desire and ability to conduct
foreign and key domestic policies independently of each
other, seeking instead to make oint decisions or to
delegate the decisionmaking process; and how, in response,
political actors in several distinct settings are per-
suaded to shift ggeir expectations and political activities
to a new center.
For Lindberg, there is no necessary relationship between
progress in economic integration and the formation of a poli-

tical community; and '. . . indeed, the success of economic

 

SuFor a representative sample of these studies, see:
Graham T. Allison, “Conceptual Models and the Cuban MiSsle
Crisis," in William D. COplin and Charles Kegley, eds., A Multi-
Mgthod Introduction to International Politics, (Chicago, I97I);
Herbert C. KeIman, ed.,“InEernaEIonaI Behavior, (New York,

1965); James N. Rosenau,‘NationaI‘LeaderShip and Forei
Polic , (Princeton, 1963); James N. Rosenau, PfiBIIc UfiInion and
F0 I

re Policy, (New York, 1965); J. David Singer, ed.,IQuanti-
§§Elve International Politics, (New York, 1968 .

55The Political Dynamics of Eurgpean Integration, (Stan-

ford, 19637; IDecision-Making and Integration In the EurOpean
Community," International Organization, 20(1965)56-80; "The
EurOpean Community as a‘POliticaI System," Journal of Common
Mnrket Studies, 5(June l967)344-388; "Integration as a‘Source
of"Stress on the EurOpean Community System," International
Organization, 20(Spring 1966); with Stuart A.’Scfi€Ingold,
_nr0pe s ould-Be Polity, (Englewood Cliffs, 1970). See also:
Bernard GordOn, DimensIOns of Conflict in Southeast Asia,
(Englewood Cliffs, 1966); George ModeIskI, SEATU: SIX Studies,
Vancouver, 1962).

56Lindberg, 1965, p. 202.

 

 

 

 

 

 

82

integration can be a cause of political disagreement"57 that
can thwart the formation of a community which is as yet not
present among the Six.58 He writes that commitment to EEC
has so far been to a pattern of negotiation and bargaining
over economic benefits by a network of interested groupsp
commitment has not been to its institutions, its rules, or its
policies when EEC activities are likely to spill over into
foreign and military fields.59 Another writer clarifies this
in noting that in EurOpe, integration.was a nnann of strength-
ening members so they could afford to act more autonomously6o
and the “uniting of Europe" was never accepted as an.§nn by
policymakers. Lindberg sees a community emerging only when
the participants develOp a commitment to common action at the
expense of national autonomy61 and integration will produce
continual stress as national decisionmakers weigh the economic
and political advantages of keeping the system intact against
any incentives they might have for bringing about its collapse
to free national policymaking.62

Criticisms of the decisionmaking model have been leveled
against the lack of Operationalization of the concepts, diffi-

culties of replication, and lack of explanatory power for

¥

57Lindberg, 1965, p. 80.

58Lindberg in Joseph S. Nye
Eggionalism, (Boston, 1968), p. 234.

59Lindberg, in Nye, pp. 234-235.

6oHansen, pp. 249-250.
61Lindberg, 1963, p. 218.
62Lindberg, in Nye, pp. 267-268.

Jr., ed., International

 

83
prediction. Confinement of studies under this model to post
noc explanations has been partially true, as Snyder has acknow-
ledged,63 but a systematic historical analysis can provide a
strong foundation for other predictive theories. Problems of
replication result from the complexity of concept combinations,
the lack of quantifiable indicators, and direction of most
studies to one-of-a-kind crisis situations--partially because
information is more readily available for crises. The model,
however, does have the distinct advantage of presenting a rich
conceptualization scheme offering fertile ground for numerous
hypotheses amenable to quantitative analysis.6“

An overview of the Transactionalist, Functionalist, and
Decisionmaking literature during the 1960's indicates that
there has been an increasing overlap or fusion of the three
approaches presented here. This eclecticism or flexibility in
approach is desirable and has been facilitated both by a broad
acceptance of systems theory in political science and by the
application of new quantitative methodology fitting most models

and useful in analyzing regional economic integration.

 

63Snyder, 1962, p. 2.

6”Michael Haas and Henry S. Kariel, Approaches togthe
Study of Political Science, (Scranton, 1970). pp. 455-456.

65Haas and Kariel, chapters seven and eight.

 

84

Quantitative Methods for Integration Analysis

Because attention in the numerous recent publications on
integration seems to have receded from attempts to construct
grand theories toward a more modest goal of uncovering and
validating specific variables that Operate in the integrative
milieu, methodology is treated independently of the above
distinctions between approaches. Quantitative research, in
fact, has proliferated to such an extent that only selected
examples of these methodologies can be presented here.

The use of aggregate social and economic indicators to
rank nations was stimulated by the works of Almond and Coleman,
Deutsch, Merritt and Rokkan, and Russett, among others.66
Whereas earlier studies utilized aggregate data mostly to rank
nations according to some criteria of develOpment and cate-
gorized the results into general typologies, more recent studies
concentrate on relationships between nations. The trends have
been to Operationalize more of the relevant variables, test the
validity of these variables as indicators of interaction, and
reduce the number of statistically reliable indicators. Some
of these studies have narrowed their focus from world-wide to
regional interactions and some have eschewed point-in-time
analyses for longitudinal studies portraying(and hOpefully

predicting) trends in relations. New variables have been

 

66Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., The
Politics of the DevelOping Areas, (Princeton, 1960); KarI W.
Deutsch,‘The‘Nerves of Government, (New York, 1963); Richard L.
Merritt and Stein‘Rbkkan, eds., Co rin Nations: Use 9:
Quantitative Data in Cross-NatiOnaI Researcfi, (New—Haven,
l966I;*Bruce‘Ml‘Russett, et’aI.,’WorId‘Handbook of Politicnl
and Social Indicators, (NEW—Haven, 19647.

 

 

 

85

introduced into the study of international relations and
scholars have combined several kinds of data(attribute, trans-
action, perception, inter-nation events) with scaling techniques
that permit comparison of qualitative data not previously
comparable.

Karl Deutsch, in recent works,67 draws upon his earlier
studies, but relies more on measurable transactions as indi-
cators of trends toward or away from an integrated condition.
In predicting what amount of integration in arms control would
be acceptable to EurOpeans in 1966, 1971, and 1976, Deutsch
employed five types of measures: interviews with elite leaders,
public opinion polls, a survey of arms control and disarmament
prOposals, content analysis of newspapers and periodicals, and
transaction data on inter-nation behavior.68 Transaction
indices employed were trade, travel, postal correspondence, and
exchange of students. He concludes that for the next decade
national political issues will predominate over supranational
ones in France and West Germany and not until after 1975 will
there be much possibility of progress toward EurOpean unifi-
cation.69

Bruce Russett compiled and correlated some 89 separate
indices for 130 nations in a comprehensive study of the patterns

of regionalism.70 He employed factor analysis to select 54 of

67Deutsch, 1966 and 1967.
58Deutsch, 1966.
69Deutsch, 1966, p. 365.

70Internationa1 Regions and the International System,
(Chicago, 1967).

86

these indices that were statistically significant enough to
measure the cohesiveness of world regions; the five indicators
of integrative tendencies that these indices measured include:
(1) social and cultural homogeneity, (2) similarity of political
attitudes or external behavior, (3) shared supranational member-
ships, (4) economic interdependence, and (5) geographical
proximity.71 His measures for the first four indicators turned
out to be excellent predictors of regional ties, but geographical
proximity did not explain much about affinities among nations.72
Russett concludes very tentatively that there is some progression
toward larger regional units, but little tendency toward more
integration is evident on either the regional or world-wide
levels.73

R. J. Rummel, utilizing factor analysis and separating
attribute indicators from behavioral indicators, correlated
nation-patterns and isolated those indices with the highest
validity.74 He also ran his variables against those of other
studies and found a highly significant level of congruence
among the studies. His most significant attribute indicators
were: energy consumption/population, pOpulation, bloc member-
ship, killed in foreign violence, Roman Catholics/pOpulation,

and population/area.75 The most significant behavioral pattern

 

71Russett, 1967, p. 11.
7ZRussett, 1967, pp. 212-214.

73Russett, 1967, p. 222.

7“"Indicators of Cross-National and International
Patterns," APSR, 63(March 1969)127-147.

75Rummel, APSR, p. 134.

37

indicators included: tourism, emigrants/pOpulation, weighted
UN voting distance, exchange of students, exports/GNP, and
76

intergovernmental memberships. In this study, Rummel also
contributes a valuable method of overcOming the problem of
missing data on statistical indices. He finds that other
indices of a variable can be utilized without significant
error if a coefficient of determination between basic indicators
has been computed and employed as a correction factor.77 The
study is part of an ongoing project to map the dimensions of
nations and their patterns of interaction. The project is now
collecting data and mapping the dyadic behavior of nations
along the dimensions of: salience, emigration and communication,
UN voting, exports, foreign students, international organiza-
tions, official conflict behavior, and diplomatic represen-
tation.78

A 1966 study by Steven J. Brams also utilized transaction
data in a factor analysis program to determine patterns of
relationships among nations.79 He correlated flows of diplo-
matic exchanges, trade, and shared memberships in intergovern-
mental organizations to illuminate nation subgroups in the

international system. Although this study could probably have

profited by using more reliable indicators, among the major

 

76summel, APSR, p. 142.
77Rummel, APSR, p. 145

78R. J. Rummel, "Some Empirical Findings on Nations and
Their Behavior," World Politics, 21(January 1969)226-24l.

79"Transaction Flows in the International System," APSR,
60(December l966)880-898.

 

 

88

conclusions reached were that geOgraphic proximity explained
most of the subgroup ties while trade data were most erratic
over time and, therefore, probably a better indicator of
changes or disturbances in relations than other indicators
employed.80

Attribute data and behavioral data have been combined
with data on the perceptions of significant elites to provide
increasingly sOphisticated analyses of inter-nation relation-
ships. Policymaker perceptions have been measured by content
analysis of documents, newspapers, memoirs, etc., and scaled
by Q-sort81 and other methods according to degrees of hostility,82
trust,83 or cognition?”+ And during the last five years, a
fourth dimension of analysis--inter-nation events data--has
come in for increasing attention. Events differ from perceptions
in that the former are official government actions taken rather
than affective statements made by policymakers. Interest in
perception and events analysis was stimulated by Robert North
and Charles McClelland of the Hoover Institute and has broadened

in an ever-widening circle of scholars emanating from the

 

80Brams, p. 898.

81Lincoln E. Moses, Richard A. Brody, Ole R. Holsti,
Joseph B. Kadane, and Jeffrey S. Milstein, "Scaling Data on
Lnter-Nation.Action," Science, 156(May 1967)1054-1059.

82Ole R. Holsti, Robert C. North, and Richard A. Brody,
“Perception and Action in the 1914 Crisis," in Singer, pp. 123-158.

83Azar, Dissertation, chapter six.

8”Murray Adelman, “Cognitive Balance and International
Crisis: An Application of Perception Scaling," Paper presented
at the Michigan State University Events Data Conference, (Feb-
ruary 1969).

89

Stanford group.85 These dimensions of analysis are especially
valuable because they allow quantitative measurement of the
qualitative meaning of communication rather than simply the
volume of communication among nations. Although earlier
studies used perception and events data primarily to study.
conflict situations and levels of violent interaction preceding
war, their use has now been extended to compare cOOperative
ventures such as alliances and integrative efforts.»

A major criticism of these studies has been their failure
to develOp and Operate from within a particular theoretical
framework. It seems clear that the bulk of effort has gone
toward data collection and methodology revinements86 within
one or more of the theoretical approaches described earlier.
And, as James Lawler notes:

In the search for precision, it is tempting to seize upon
figures which are readily available, and to accept models
which give prominence to readily quantifiable variables--
gsngéilgy the socio-causal paradigms of Deutsch and
Nevertheless, though much of the energy in this develOping

endeavor has been directed in this manner, the movement is not

devoid of theoretical foundations and recently some promising

 

85For a representative sample of these studies, see:
Singer, 1968; James N. Rosenau, ed. International Politics
and Foreign Polipy, (New York, 1969); MortonWKaplan, ed.,]flng
gpproaches to International Relations, (New York, 1968).

86Michael K. O'Leary, “Needs and Prospects in the
Analysis of International Events," Remarks at a roundtable of
the 1971 Michigan State University Events Data Conference,
(April, 1971). p. 10

87Lawler and Laulicht, p. 27.

 

 

9O

theoretical constructs have been offered.88

Another criticism leveled at studies using perception
and/or event data is the preoccupation with crisis situations,
and particularly those situations involving violence or war.
This fascination with conflict behavior is understandable since
the import of conflict in human interaction is well grounded in
theory and reality89 and since cOOperation often results from
prior conflict; also, the potential harm of unchecked conflict
is greater for humanity than the presence of consensus or
cOOperation. Paul Smoker notes that

. . . conflict research and revolution research have
considerable popularity both among those anxious to
understand the present international system or to improve
its Operation and amongst those who hOpe to overthrow
existing elites and transform present day political insti-
tutions into revolutionary government forms.

The pOpularity of conflict as a research tOpic leads to the
adoption of frameworks that will amplify knowledge about it and

. . . the acceptance of such frameworks continues to
self-fulfill the aggression, conflict, power political,
tooth and claw images of mankind and thereby assists in
solidifying conceptual foundations £81 future exploi-
tation, injustice, violence and war.

Furthermore, as Smoker concludes,

It should come as no surprise that an information envir-
onment steeped in conflict and violence is susceptible

to generation and support of so many conflicting conflict
theories and so few peace theories. It should also come
as no surprise that peace ig pOpularly defined as the
absence of war or conflict. 2

 

83Azar, Peace Research Reviews; Rosenau, 1969. .

89Lewis Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict, (Glen-
coe, 1956);.Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and CIass Conflict In Indus-
trial Society, (Stanford, 1959); EIton‘McNeil, ed.,'The Nature
'Ef:Human Conflict, (Englewood Cliffs, 1965). ‘I'

‘90"Anarchism, Peace and Control: Some Ideas for Future
Experiment," Paper presented at the Michigan State University
Events Data Conference, (April, 1971). p. 2.

918moker, p. 2.
92Smoker, p. 3.

 

91
The same bias, of course, is detectable in other theories and
models of international relations and, for that matter, in
much of the political science literature. Still, attention
to conflictual relations constitutes a definite bias and this
bias has been allowed to influence the orientations of the
analysts in the problems they select to study, the methodologies
they construct, and the conclusions that they find interesting.

Since conflict is the 'interesting“ phenomenon, it is
evidence of conflict that is sought after and finding it is
given the highest value. Absence of conflict and the reasons
for its absence or decline are frequently overlooked or under-
evaluated. Evidence of this bias toward conflict canbe found
in the subject matter of the studies, in the analytical proce-
dures employed, and in the data sources consulted.

A disprOportionate amount of research has been conducted
on the origins of World War I, World War II, Middle East
violence, the Korean Action, or the Cuban missile crisis while
precious few address themselves to such tOpics as Scandinavian
cOOperation, U.S.-Canadian Amiability, or duration of friendship
treaties.93

Labels on the scales or continuums established to rank
perceptions or inter-nation actions also give first position
to conflict over cOOperation, hostility over amiability, or
violence over non-violence. And the scales accord the highest

value(be it 9, 13, 30, or 7000) to all-out war while maximum

 

93See the agendas for the Events Data Conferences held
at Michigan State University in 1969, 1970, and 1971. One
might also cite as examples of this bias many studies conducted
by peace research organizations or those appearing in the
Journal of Conflict Resolution.

92

cOOperation is accorded a zero or a one.9u Then, too, most
studies have focused on the extreme peaks and troughs of

conflict or cOOperation,95 thus giving greater value to
untypical situations. Integration analysis, however, requires
expectations of long-term stability and peace represented

by measures of normalcy rather than abnormalcy. Dyadic treat-
ment of inter-nation behavior is also encouraged by orientation
to conflict whereas integrative behavior might be more profitably
represented by measures of mutuality of interests among all

unit members.

Data sources too are biased toward reporting conflictual
information and events data utilization is particularly subject
to this pitfall. Events are items in the flow of official acts
between governments and are roughly distinguishable from the
groww flow of transactions between nations by their "news-
worthiness."96 Newsworthy events are those important enough
to be reported in major newspapers, journals, or chronologies
of government activities and these tend to be events that are
disruptive of normalcy or the status quo. Violent events are

always disruptive and, hence, are reported and considered news-

 

94Moses, 1967; Azar, Dissertation; Azar, Peace Research
Reviews. Walter Corson rates cOOperation and conflict on separate
scaIes. See his, “Measuring Conflict and Cooperation Intensity
in International Relations,“ Abstract of a paper presented at
thg Michigan State University Events Data Conference, (February,
19 9 .

 

95An exception is Nazli Choucri(Field) who uses mean level
of violence in, "Measuring Behavioural Aspects of Policy: Afro-
Asian Nonalignment,” paper presented at the Michigan State Univ-
ersity Events Data Conference, (February, 1969). p. 12.

96Azar, Peace Research Reviews, p. 5; Charles McClelland,
"Some Effects on Theory from the‘International Event Analysis
Movement,“(University of Southern California, 1970), mimeo;
Charles Hermann, "What is a Foreign Policy Act? Problems and
Some Solutions on the Use of Multiple Events Sources," Pa er
presented at the MSU Events Data Conference, (April, 1970 .

 

93

worthy so long as they continue; cOOperation is not usually
perceived as threatening or disruptive so continued cOOper-
ation often goes unreported or underreported. Of course,
events data collection is dependent upon extant news sources
and the bias encountered is presently unavoidable.
What then should we study? The Opposite side of the coin
of conflict is cOOperation. This is not the same as
“conflict resolution," which, as social science has
proceeded so far, is simply that little bit of analysis
at the end which says that if the preceding conflicts are
avoided there will be resolution and harmony. Rather,
what is needed is an initial and pervasive focus upon
cOOperation itself.'97
Human beings clearly "get along“ with each other in
families, in communities, and in societies. But what are
the dynamics of this cOOperative process? To be sure we
have to know about the exceptions--namely, conflict--in
order to know about the norm. But we do know a great
deal abogt conflict; it is the norm that we have over-
looked.9
It is intended that this study will break away to a
small degree from the conflictual strictures that are so evident
in the literature by emphasizing cooperative patterns rather
than disruption of COOperation and by employing methodolOgical
constructs that will illuminate these patterns of cOOperation.
If successful, this study will go a little way toward stimu-
lating further development of models that represent COOper-
ation, agreement, integration, or peace in a more positive(and

hOpefully accurate) light.

 

97Anthony D' Amato, “The Politics of Ecosuicide," in Leslie
L. Roos, Jr., ed., The Politics of Ecosuicide, (New York, 1971).

p. 27.
93D' Amato, p. 28.

 

CHAPTER IV

A THEORY OF INTEGRATION, MODEL FOR ANALYSIS,
AND HYPOTHESES TO BE TESTED

Introduction and Definitions

Drawing on the literature reviewed, this study postulates
that integration is a process rather than a condition and this
process produces discernible patterns within and among cooper-
ating units. Integration occurs when two or more independent
units voluntarily coordinate certain functions(organizational
tasks) or delegate these functions to the supervision and
control of a decisionmaking body that is superior to the mem-
bers with respect to the delegated powers.l These units may
be individuals or collective organizations that are either
official or non-official in nature and the functions integrated
may be military, economic, political, religious, or cultural.

Integration is political integration when it involves
governmental decisionmaking and private integration when it
involves coordination or merger of non-governmental tasks.

The former concerns us here. Political integration may occur

on the local, national, or international level. International

1This definition is similar to that given by E. N. van
Kleffens, "The Case for EurOpean Integration: Political Con-
siderations," in C. Grove Haines, ed., European Integration,
(Baltimore, 1957). p. 80.

 

 

 

94

95

political integration is the basic pattern of governmental
decisionmaking undertaken to serve economic, military, reli-
gious, or cultural needs through cooperative arrangements with
other national decisionmaking units. International political
integration becomes regional integration when the membership

is confined to nations within the same general geographic area.
Since economic agreements between governments derive from
political decisions, then political integration is part of the
making of an economic union. Economic integration is used here
as a Specific term to describe voluntary political integration
for the primary(though not exclusive) purpose of increasing
economic well-being among regional members rather than for
defense, ethnic solidarity, territorial expansion, or other
purposes. This chapter offers a new theory of economic inte-
gration, an Operational model for analysis of integration
progress, and the hypotheses to be tested in this study. A

rationale for selection of the variables is also included.

Theory of Economic Integration

The ideal economic integration process might be portrayed
as moving along a continuum of increasing cOOperation divisible
into at least five stages and demarcated by distinct thres-
holds. Divisions of this integrative process into stages is
intended as an heuristic device derived more from other theories
of integration than from empirical evidence. That is, it is
suggested that the ideal integration process might follow this

pattern; not all past or present integrations have done so.

96

The stages are: (1) readiness for ooOperation; (2)
consolidation of the union; (3) maintenance and expansion; (4)
emergence of community; and (5) political unification. The
following diagram portrays the stages and thresholds of regional
economic integration. Integration for military, religious,
cultural, or other reasons could conceivably be represented
more accurately by different stages and be marked by other
thresholds. The thresholds separating the stages below are
Operationally measurable by available forms of data as are the
statuses of integrative progress within each stage.

ILLUSTRATION I

 

STAGES OF REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION

 

 

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Readiness Consolida- Maintenance Emergence Political

for tion of and of Unification
COOperation the Expansion Community
Union

 

A

 

 

 

 

 

 

Formal 3—Year Broad Social Transfer of
Agreement Period Acceptance Functions

k

 

A

 

 

 

 

THRESHOLDS OF REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION

k
k

 

Stage 1 - Readiness for COOperation. Readiness for COOp-
eration occurs prior to promulgation of an economic union
and may increase among potential members as environmental

conditions become more harmonious.2 During this period,

2Harmonization is not to be confused with Etzioni's use
Of the term for whom it means a conscious cOOperation following
formation of a union. Amitai Etzioni, Political Unification,
(New York, 1965). p. 300. Harmonization—here‘is similar—to his
Preunification state. See: Etzioni, pp. 16-37.

 

97

-the social, economic, and political conditions deemed

important by integration theorists become more conducive
to integration. Movement toward economic integration can
be indicated by comparing trends of develOpment in these
conditions among potential members.

For economic integration, measurements of inte-
grative progress within this stage and the one following
can be made using attribute, behavior, and perception
variables. variables used in this study to indicate
readiness are: (a) presence and continuance of economic
growth, (b) a significant level of existing or potential
mutual trade, (0) amiable relations among potential
members, and (d) favorable perceptions of regional cOOper-
ation by major foreign policymakers. The rationale for
adoption of these variables is set out later in this
chapter; measurable indices and data for ASEAN are found
in chapter five.

If a willingness to cOOperate exists on the part of the
policymakers, the readiness stage might include efforts to seek
cOOperation. The "seeking of unification" steps as set out by
Edward Azar are:

1)the statement of goals and selection of means to reach
the goal or goals; 2) the selection of a partner, or part-
ners, for carrying out the means; and 3) the proposal of
such to that party, and his response.3
It is expected that delaying the seeking of unification and

 

3Edward E. Azar, "Analysis of International Events,"
Peace Research Reviews, 4(November 1970)40-4l. Azar uses
unificatibn In a different way than it is used here.

 

98

extending the readiness period over longer periods of time to
allow greater harmonization will increase the possibilities
for success in economic integration.
Threshold One is marked by the signing of a formal
agreement between two or more independent nations to
create an economic union with some coordinating or
decisionmaking powers over the specific agreed upon
functions.’+ The nations studied here have crossed
this threshold in more than one instance, including
creation of ASA, Maphilindo, and ASEAN.
Stage 2 - Consolidation of the Union. This stage is marked
by the establishment of the union and its initial period
of existence when decisionmaking machinery is being esta-
blished, administrative routines are created, communi-
cation patterns develOped, and initial overall priorities
and goals are agreed upon. It also encompasses activities
undertaken to accomplish original purposes of the union;
these might be such activities as tariff reduction,
rationalization of currency exchange rates, or price stab-
ilizations.

Establishment of at least five types of economic
unions involving increasing complexity and integration is
possible--price stabilization agreement, coordination
arrangement, free trade area, customs union, and common

market.

 

“This threshold corresponds to Azar's "establishment of
unification" phase. See: Peace Research Reviews, pp. 41-42.

 

99

A price stabilization agreement is a cooperative
attempt by producing nations to end price fluctuations of
certain commodities through government control of stock-
piles, production, or investment. A coordination arrange-
ment may be confined to establishment of common policies
on such economic matters as weights and measures or trans-
portation and communication schedules or fares. Or it
might be so comprehensive as to involve a regional resource
and industry develOpment plan to develop existing and
planned industries utilizing those resources in which each
nation holds a comparative or absolute economic advantage
within the region. A free trade area involves mutual
abolition of tariffs(usua11y reduced gradually over a
number of years) on goods traded among members. Customs
unions include abolition of tariffs between members, but
also establish common tariffs for goods entering from
outside the union. A common market establishes common
internal and external tariffs but also provides for free
movement of all investment capital, labor, and goods across
national borders of members.

Stage 2 encompasses the time devoted to consol-
idating the union in accordance with its initial purpose.
Increasing capabilities to engage in a more complex union
can be measured by the variables employed in this study.
Movement from one type of union to another is evident in

the signing of the formal agreement and by noting the

lOO

emergence of official policies, committees, enforcing
agencies or other organs, and by noting the establishment
of industries or other economic establishments covered by
the union agreement.

Union memberships are not mutually exclusive and a nation
may be participating in one or more types of union at the same
time. In fact, a nation may be involved in several integrative
processes simultaneously, i.e., joined in a regional resource
and industry develOpment plan with eight of its neighbors while
at the same time enjoying a customs union with only three of
the eight, or with three others not of the eight. For example,
Thailand is COOperating regionally within ASEAN, the Mekong
Project, ECAFE, and other organizations having different
purposes as well as diverse memberships.

Threshold Two is passed at the end of a three-year
existence of the union beyond Threshold One. The
three-year period is, of course, an arbitrary sele-
ction, but has been adOpted because of the obser-
vation that integrative attempts which fail usually
do so within the initial three years while those
continuing beyond that period still cOntinue to
function. ASEAN, formed in 1967, has crossed this
threshold. It is the only sub-regional organization
containing these nations that has survived beyond
the initial three years.

101

Stage 3 - Maintenance and Enpansion. Following consoli-
dation of the union, the next task is to maintain it or

to expand its membership or functions. Effective main-
tenance exists when the original purposes are not const-
ricted or blocked by member units. For example, a customs
union member that counters tariff reductions by imposing
import quotas or excise taxes would be blocking the purpose
of the union. Mere survival of the association without
benefits to its members is not considered effective main-
tenance. Expansion is evident along three dimensions:

(1) depth, or number of functions involved; (2) scope, or
number of nations included, and (3) varying rates at
which new functions or members are incorporated into the
agreement. Expansion occurs when the union is broadened
or deepened, varying in rate from no change in union
status to a rapid inclusion of new members or functions.
ASEAN members are, for the most part, now satisfactorily
maintaining the union, but there is no appreciable
evidence of expansion.

It is possible for Stage 3 to begin prior to three years
after establishment and this stage might also last indefinitely
without progressing to the following stages. Stagnation of the
integrative process seems to be common in this stage, i.e., the
Scandinavian customs union, the Latin American free trade areas,
the EurOpean Free Trade Area, EEC, and NATO. It is also
important to emphasize that the integrative process may be

interrupted during any stage and dissolution may occur anytime

102

as a result of either internal or external pressures. Amitai
Etzioni's concepts of "premature," “mature," or "overdue"
unions5 seems useful to account for the variability in success
or failure during this stage. He says:
Integrating power needed to maintain a unification effort,
once it is initiated, tends to be greater for a premature
unification effort than for a mature one, and even smaller
for the maintenance of an overdue union, at least in the
initial stage.

It is also in Stage 3 and succeeding stages that the
spill-over process may operate and encourage broadening or
deepening of the union. If the spill-over process is consci-
ously encouraged by policymakers selecting those cOOperative
projects having spill-over effect, the union may expand and
move into succeeding stages. If decisions are made discouraging
further constrictions on national policymaking as spill-over
begins to affect crucial functions, the integrative process
may stagnate .

The remaining stages and thresholds are outside the
sc0pe of this study because they represent levels of integration
not present in Southeast Asia, but are included here to com-

plete the description of the integrative process.
Threshold Three is a relatively high one marking

 

the presence of extensive social interaction among
the pOpulations of the member units. At this point
the union is no longer one involving only elite

policymakers of participating members, but has

 

5Etzioni, pp. 80-82.
6Etzioni, p. 82.

103
penetrated into the business communities, educa-
tional systems, and social relationships among at
least the politically and economically influential
portions of the pOpulations. This threshold is
measurable by using transaction data on the extent
of tourism, exchange of students, migration, letters
exchanged, mutual trade, and other indices of inter-
action. Threshold values are not determined in this
study and would have to be established by empirical
evidence using past integrations as standards.

Stage 4 - Emergence of Community. A community has been
formed when the populations concerned consistently give
allegiance to the economic union rather than the national
government in matters related to the integrated functions.7
This sociological concept of community rests on evidence

of a broad consensus throughout the pOpulations regarding
the beneficial prOperties of the union as it touches their
lives. The existence of community can be measured by
increases in transaction levels coupled with attitude
surveys and Opinion polls that test respondents' commitment

to union effectiveness, symbols, institutions, and leaders.8

The community is considered to be deepening when new

 

7This definition follows that of Ernst Haas in The
Uniting of EurOpe, (Stanford, 1958). .5.

8Measurement of commitment can pbe accomplished in a
manner similar to that employed by Inglehart or Deutsch. See:
Ronald Inglehart, “An End to EurOpean Integration?, " APSR
61(March l967)91-105; Karl W. Deutsch, Lewis J. Edinger, Roy C.
Macridis, and Richard L. Merritt, France Germany and the
Western Alliance, £New York, 1967).

 

 

 

104

functions or members are absorbed while commitment to
the union remains stable or increases. A decline in
commitment marks a weakening or degeneration of the
community.

Threshold Four is crossed when: (1) control of

 

military units are formally transferred to the union,
giving the supranational body a monOpolization of
force, and (2) the union attains effective control
over the allocation of all basic resources and
services.9 A common army need not exist and some
authority may be delegated to national units, but
the union must have ultimate control over the allo-
cation of military resources and deployment of
tro0ps in time of crisis. Control of basic resources
also includes power to locate new industries, tax
pOpulations or governments, set wages and prices,
and harmonize social welfare programs.

Stage 5 - Political Unification. Achievement of political

 

unification occurs when these crucial political and econ-
omic functions have been transferred to the union without
any loss of community consensus. Commitment to the union
ought to remain stable or increase after these functions

are transferred. The transfer need not involve all poli-
tical and economic functions because unification does not

preclude leaving tasks that are internal to the member

 

9This threshold parallels Etzioni's criteria for the
existence of a political community. See: Etzioni, p. 4.

105
units under control of national governments. Unification
may deepen as the union tightens its control over more
functions and creates new, more centralized governing
organs; it may move from confederation, to federation,
and to a unitary form of government. Movement within
Stage 5 is measurable both by the appearance of new govern-
mental institutions and by the maintenance of community
consensus for each alteration of the union structure.

In any integrative process among nations, stages, and
particularly early ones, may be compressed or skipped alto-
gether. There is no compelling dialectic at work in this
theory. However, the empirical evidence available on integra-
tions suggests that when stages are compressed or skipped,
successful integration is less likely.10 Integrative failures
have most often been those that: (a) attempted union before
they achieved readiness, (b) moved directly from Threshold One
to Unification or, (c) attempted expansion before the union
had been internally consolidated. Successful integrations are
generally those that follow to some degree the process set out
here. In this sense, then, the theory or paradigm presented

here is to some extent both descriptive and prescriptive.

 

10On the UAR and the West Indies, see Etzioni, 1965;
on early EurOpe, see Karl Deutsch, et al., Political Communipy
in the North Atlantic Area, (PrincOEOfiT‘I957T; on EEC, see
LEon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold, EurOpe's Would-Be
Polit , (Englewood Cliffs, 1970); on the ArEB“COEEOE‘M§Fk§€T
see E. Kanovsky, "Arab Economic Unity," in Joseph S. Nye, Jr.,
ed., International Regionalism, (Boston, 1968). pp. 350—376;
on the'CentraI American Free Trade Area, see Miguel S. Wionczek,
l'Requisites for Viable Economic Integration," in Nye, pp.
287-303.

 

106

Integration analysis can profit by use of the construct, but
decisions of policymakers in integrating units might also
profit by following this pattern.

It goes almost without saying that the construct cannot
now be very predictive since few criteria were established for
measuring movement along the continuum and any inexorable
effect of the spill-over concept was rejected. The omission
of these criteria is necessary and intentional at this point
since too little is known now to set up measurements of inte-
grative progress based on nations' experiences. It is
expected that accumulation of experiential data in the future
will allow establishment of these criteria and at that time
prediction on empirical grounds will be possible within this
theory.

Rationale for the Selection of Variables

As mentioned earlier, this study is primarily concerned
with Stages 1 and 2 and the variables selected are those
pertinent to analyzing integrative progress in these stages.
The variables are economic growth, mutual trade, inter-nation
amiability, and favorable perceptions of regionalism by major
foreign policymakers. The choice of variables was parsimonious
in that one variable was selected to indicate progress on each
of four conditions that are conducive to integration. It was
judicious in that the validity of these variables has been
established in previous studies. It was economical to allow

handling of data for five nations in a longitudinal study

10?

extending over twenty years. The study does not attempt to
measure all conditions considered relevant to integration,

only four of those that appear to be adequate indicators of

develOpment levels.

Variable One - Economic Growth

The choice of economic growth as an attribute variable
was made because of: (a) the presence of economic growth in
other successful integrations; (b) concerns for economic
develOpment within ASEAN members' governments; (0) its value
in indicating capabilities for regional cooperation; and (d)
its presumed relationship to policymakers' willingness to
cOOperate.

Political theorists and economists find the presence of
economic growth conducive to successful integration.11 Deutsch
concludes that at least some of the members should be exper-
iencing growthl2 and both Haas and Etzioni find that growth
is a foundation for a "core area" providing sufficient
”utilitarian power" to assist in maintaining the union.13
And members ought to have similarly develOped economies}!4

There seems to be no requisite for economies to be highly

 

llKarl Deutsch, 1957; Haas, 1958; Etzioni, 1965; Lind-
berg and Scheingold, 1970; Philip E. Jacob and James V.
Toscano, eds., The Integration of Political Communities, (New
York, 1964); BeIa Balassa, Theory Of"Economlc IREEEFEEIOn,
(Homewood, 1961); James Mead, Problems Of Economic Union,
(Chicago, 1953); Tibor Scitovskyj7EconomIc Theory and West
European Integnation, (Stanford, 19587; Rolf Sannwald and—
Jacques StOhler,‘Economic Integration, (Princeton, 1959).

12Deutsch, 1957, p. 51.
13Haas, 1958, p. 290; Etzioni, pp. 38-43.
14Haas, 1958, p. 290; Wionczek, p. 292.

 

 

 

 

 

108
developed since historical political integrations have occurred
among units that were not highly developed. However, modern
economic integration may be a Special case in which growth is
essential to success. Even if it is not, high levels of
development are still important because policymakers believe
them to be important.

The economic growth variable has also been selected
because commitment to economic develOpment has been a prime
ingredient of national policymaking in all ASEAN nations.
DevelOpment is normally translated to mean industrialization
coupled with trade expansion and, although develOpment involves
social and political conditions as well, in nations such as
those comprising ASEAN:

. . . --1ow average labor productivity and low national
income per head--can, with a number of qualifications,

be taken as an approximate indication of all the others

[bonditions], that is, as an(imperfect) gndex of the
level of underdevelOpment in.a country.l

Another author stresses the importance of economic development
to modernization, saying
Of great importance also is the overall continuity of
economic develOpment and progress. The greater such
continuity the greater also is the positive adjustment 6
of various groups and strata to the new, modern settings.l
Since Southeast Asian nationalism is so infused with a drive
toward economic development, economic growth can provide a

common interest or principle on which to agree. And because

 

15Gunnar Myrdal, An Approach to the Asian Drama, (New
York, 1970). p. 225.

16S. N. Eisenstadt, Modernization: Protest and Change,
(Englewood Cliffs, 1966). p. 155.

109
there is some evidence that regionalism contributes to economic
growth, the idea of cooperation is linked to nationalist goals
and feelings.17 If, as Lindberg states, economic growth is
dependent upon either expanding markets or increased trade or
both as a result of more competition and economies of scale,18
these can be achieved either by internal development and trade
on an international scale or through economic union.19
Leaders of ASEAN nations are faced with a slow rate of internal
market expansion and with declining external trade; thus, they
may feel that commitment to growth necessitates greater coop-
eration and dependence upon regional develOpment. Hansen
points out that when modernization is equated in underdevelOped
nations with industrialization and independent growth is not
possible, these nations are impelled to attempt regional
schemes.20

Economic growth also increases a nation's capabilities
for participation in a union because nations with growing
economies can afford to expend resources to achieve cooperation
with others; they can afford to take risks with their resources
and risk-taking is attendant to the initiation of unions.

Nations with growing economies ought also to be more Open

 

l78ernard Gordon, The Dimensions of Conflict in South-
east Asia, (Englewood Cliffs, I965). pp. IKE-146.

18Lindberg, 1970, p. 8.
19Lindberg, 1970, pp. 8-9.

20Roger D. Hansen, "Regional Integration: Reflections
on a Decade of Theoretical Efforts," World Politics, 21(Jan-
uary 1969)268.

 

 

110

toward amiable relations with others since economic develOpment
correlates highly with "competitiveness.”1 Competitiveness
is a component of modernization and may indicate movement
toward a pluralist society which Barrera and Haas deem a
condition for successful union.22 One must be careful, however,
not to equate economic growth with increasing political stab-
ility since growth quite often contributes to social disinte-
gration and cultural change that is detrimental to political
stability.23

Finally, economic growth ought to be related to the
willingness of a nation to engage in economic cOOperation.
This is true because foreign policymakers want to be assoc-
iated with others from whom they can expect returns; these
policymakers should be attuned to a partner's index of economic
growth because it gives evidence that the potential for gain
is there. A condition of sustained and continuing growth
gives promise of future benefits corresponding to Deutsch's
essential condition that there must be expectations of joint
rewards through economic ties or gains envisioned for the
future.2“ It also indicates to policymakers that other nations
have the capabilities to administer a union. And so this
study examines growth rates among ASEAN members with respect

to their similarity to the most rapidly growing member.

 

21Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., The
Politics of the DevelOpinngreas, (Princeton, 1960). pp. 538-539.

22Mario Barrera and Ernst B. Haas, "The Operationali-
zation of Some Variables Related to Regional Integration,"
International Organization, 23(Winter l969)150-160.

23Eisenstadt, pp. 20-35.
2“Deutsch, 1957, p. 49.

111

Variable Two - Regional Trade

The use of trade data to indicate the behavior of
nations toward one another is common in the literature of
international relations.25 And there is widespread agreement
among political theorists and economists on the need for
significant mutual trade on a broad array of goods among
members of successful integrations.26 There is also widespread
feeling that underdeveloped nations do not have the diver-
sified economies that would make these complementary relation-
ships possible.27 However, much disagreement still exists
over whether mutual trade is a precondition for successful
union or a result of union and this is particularly important
for ASEAN members and other Southeast Asian nations hoping to
increase their economic complementarity by encouraging spec-
ialization of production through regional harmonization of
develOpment plans. The low level of trade among ASEAN members
in the past has been due as often to ignorance of each other's
products as to actual competitiveness so, as knowledge of each

other increases, trading levels may rise. And if trading

25Bruce M. Russett, International Regions and the
International System, (Chicago, 1967); H. J.‘Hfimmel, 1"Zlf'n'7dicators
'5? Cross-National and International Patterns," APSR, 63(March
1969)127-l47; Steven J. Brams "Transaction Flows In the
International System," APSR, 60(December l966)880-898; Bruce
M. Russett, et al., WorId'Handbook of Political and Social
Indicators, (New Haven, 19647;‘Richard7LJIMérrItt andIStein
ROkkan, eds., Comparing Nations: Use of Quantitative Data in
Cross-National‘Hesearéh, (New‘Haven,‘19667.

26Deutsch, 1957; Haas, 1958; Lindberg, 1970; Sannwald
and Stohler, 1959; Balassa, 1961; Scitovsky, 1958.

27Char1es P. Kindleberger, Economic DevelOpment, (New
York, 1965). pp. 346-349; Gunner Myrdal, Asian‘Drama; An
Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations, (New York, 1968); E. A.
CT ROBIfison,‘The’EconomIc Consequences of the Sizes of Nations,
(New York, 19607. pp. va i’a d 269-274.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

112

levels are rising, this will indicate increasing readiness

for cOOperation.

Variable Three - Amiable Relations

The existence of amiable relations among potential
members is also a pertinent criterion for successful inte-
gration.28 Past governmental interaction as well as existing
contacts among policymakers on a c00perative basis tend to
promote further cooperation29 while nations engaging in hostile
or violent behavior tend to elicit more hostile responses from
those they interact with in this manner.30 These interactions
are distinguishable from the vast bulk of ordinary transactions
taking place because they are official governmental acts
reported as discrete events in international conduct. Verbal
or physical actions of governments toward each other vary from
those indicative of a high level of cOOperation to those
denoting a high level of conflict; those nations engaging in
conflictual behavior are not likely to contemplate mutual
membership in an economic union. The character of nations'
salience to each other is indicated by the amount of inter-
action on either a COOperative or conflictual basis. It is
assumed that as nations become more salient to each other on a

280eutsch, 1957; Haas, 1958, p. 286; James Lawler and
Jerome Laulicht, "International Integration in DevelOping
Regions," Peace Research Reviews, 3(1969); Philip E. Jacob
and James VT‘Toscano, p. I2.

29Deutsch, 1957, p. 2; Ernst B. Haas, "The Challenge
of Regionalism," International Organization, 12(Autumn l958)456.

3001e R. Holsti, Robert C. North, and Richard A. Brody,
"Perception and Action in the 1914 Crisis," in J. David Singer,
Quantitative International Politics, (New York, 1968).
-158; AIan G. Newcomb, "InIEIEEIves and Responses in Foreign
Policy,“ Peace Research Reviews, 3(1969).

 

113

COOperative basis, their readiness for cOOperation increases
and this will be analyzed using inter-nation event data

compiled to portray the relationships among ASEAN governments.

Variable Four - Policymaker Perceptions

Since foreign policymakers determine(based on internal
and external factors) whether a nation will seek regional
COOperation or not, the feelings of these policymakers toward
the principle of cOOperation are expected to be related to the
amount of cOOperation undertaken by a nation. The positive
relationship between policymaker perceptions and that govern-
ment's behavior has been well established in the theoretical
decisionmaking 1iterature3l and corraborated by empirical
studies.32 Cleaning these perceptions from policymaker state-
ments in public documents by content analysis techniques
appears to have relatively high validity.33 It is acknowledged
that policymaker statements do not always reflect their true
Opinions but it is assumed that, for the most part, commun-
ications and actions exchanged are valid indicators of policy-

maker desires. This study assumes that readiness for cOOperation

31Richard C. Snyder, H. w. Bruck, and Burton M. Sapin,

eds., Forei Policy Decision-Makin An A roach to the Study
of InternatIonaI PoIIEIcs, (New YorE: I962); HerBerE C. KeIman,
InternatIOnaI BehavIOr,‘TNew York, 1965).

32Holsti, North and Brody; Richard A. Brody, "Cognition
and Behavior: A Model of Inter-State Relations," in O. J.

Haggey, ed.,Flexibility, Adaptability and CreativitgfiNew York,
19 )

33Robert C. North, et al., Content Analysis, (Chicago,
1963); Ole R. Holsti, Content Analysis fOr the Social Sciences
and Humanities, (Reading,:MESS.,'I9697; Alexander George,
quantitative and qualitative Approaches to Content Analysis, "
in Ithiel de Sola Pool, ed., Trends in Content Analysis,
(Urbana, 111,1959). pp. 732.

 

 

 

 

11#

increases as policymaker perceptions of potential members and
the principle of regional cooperation become more favorable.

It is suggested that increasing similarity on these four
indicators will sufficiently indicate any trends toward inte-
gration during Stages 1 and 2; potential members ought to have
similarly high levels of economic growth, mutual trade, 000p-
erative interaction, and favorable perceptions. This simi-
larity may exist among two, three, or more nations within the
region during various times of the period under study and those
nations that are most similar to each other are also most
ready for formal cOOperation on a regional level.

Foreign policymakers wishing to cooperate regionally
with other nations for economic reasons would seemingly be
attracted toward those nations that, among other things: (1)
are growing economically and have a potential for future
growth; (2) have significant mutual trade links or could expect
such as a result of the cOOperation and; (3) have sufficient
official interactions that have been friendly enough to give
some assurance that COOperation would continue on a long-
term basis. These factors, then, should be related to the way
foreign policymakers perceive regional economic cooperation,
favorably or unfavorably. And if regional economic cOOperation
is perceived favorably, a nation might be cooperating in
regional organizations with others toward whom they are
attracted, presumably as a consequence of the interplay of

these variables.

115

It has often been recognized, however, that policymakers
do not always act on the "objective reality" of a situation
but on their "image" of that situation3“ so there may not
necessarily be any relationship between these attribute and
behavioral indicators and policymaker perceptions of regional
economic COOperation or between perceptions and actual parti-
cipation; this possibility will also be investigated. The
purpose of this study is to examine these variables system—
atically to determine which, if any, have been related over
time to the amount of actual cooperation of ASEAN members in
regional organizations and how, if at all, the variables are

related.

Model for Integration Analysis

 

Foreign policymakers, as do other decisionmakers, act
in response to domestic and international stimuli but do so
only after evaluating these stimuli and choosing from among
available alternative actions. These internal and external
stimuli constitute inputs whose costs and benefits to the
decisionmaking unit are weighed before being translated into
outputs in the form of policies for governmental action or
inaction.

A model that has been offered to represent this sit-
uation(among individuals or collective entities) into which

one can fit attribute, behavioral, and perception variables

 

3401e R. Holsti, "The Belief System and National
Images: A Case Study," in william D. Coplin and Charles w.
Kegley, Jr., eds., A Multi-Method Introduction to Interna-
tional Politics, (Chibago, 1971). pp. BIABZ. ‘For an‘intro-
duction into the c0pious literature on this subject, see
Kelman, 1965.

 

 

116

is the mediated stimulus-reSponse mode1(S-o-R).35 This model
permits one to utilize environmental stimuli(attributes or
behaviors) as independent variables giving rise to perceptions
of policymakers as a response. It also allows one to utilize
perception stimuli as independent variables giving rise to a
response of actual participation.

The use of the S-O-B model in international relations
has given rise to several interpretations of the model.36
Studies have generally employed adaptations of the model to
study dyadic relations between two international actors-—
usually nation-states. And many of the studies have been
concerned with actions and perceptions that emanate from
conflict and escalate or reduce hostility between the two
actors. A generalized statement of the model as commonly used

appears as follows:37
ILLUSTRATION II

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Behavioral Output

, NATION A _ NATION B
Percept- Expressio Percept- Expressi§n
ion of as of A's of A's of B's
attitude attitude attitude attitude
and and Behavioral Outp t and and PB
behavior behavior B S behavior behavior _‘)
toward A toward B toward B toward A 1
E. S r s :
1 V =— = )

 

35Brody, 1966.
36Ole B. Holsti, et al., in Singer, pp. 123-158; Azar,

1970, pp. 77-78; James N. Rosenau, ed., International Politics
and Foreign Policy, (New York),l969.

37Holsti, in Rosenau, 1969, pp. 683-68U; Holsti, et al.,
in Singer, 1968, p. 133; Azar, 1970, pp. 77-78.

117

where: S: a stimulus from the environment which
may or may not be perceived by a
policymaker
R: an action of a policymaker, without
respect to his intent or how either he
or others may perceive it

r= corresponds to the "definition of the
situation" in decisionmaking literature

s= represents the policymakers expression
of his own intentions, plans, actions,
or attitudes. When carried out, "s"
becomes B.

This study employs another variation of the S-O-R model
utilizing ASEAN members' policymaker perceptions and actions
as affected by internal and external stimuli(S) as inputs that
lead to participation in regional organizations as outputs(R).
The model used in this study is as follows:

ILLUSTRATION III

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

REGIONAL
NATION A PARTICIPATION
O
indicators of: Policymaker Nation A's
Economic Growth Perceptions Memberships
‘ Autual Trade -9 of Efficacy ———¥ in Regional ~w

and of Regional Organizations
Amiable Relations Cooperation

with other
ASEAN members (r and s)

*
FEEDBACK

 

*Feedback is not analyzed in this study other than to
note that successful regional cooperation is generally
conducive to further cooperation on a regional basis.

where: S= economic growth, mutual trade, and inter-

nation events(and includes other environ-
mental stimuli left unexamined in this study)

0= subsumes the (r) and (s) of the S-O-B model
and consists of perceptions of cooperation
based on evaluations of the costs and
benefits anticipated

8: participation in regional cOOperation
measured by organizational memberships

118

The adOption of this model and the accompanying method-
ology is based on the assumption that the standard S-O-R model
is inadequate to deal with multilateral relationships and
contends that integration can better be analyzed by stressing
the mutuality in relationships or similarity of develOpment on
the variables chosen rather than by examining a series of dyadic
relationships among ASEAN members. A dyadic analysis of
Nation A's trade with Nation B and the policymaker perceptions
of that trade may disclose that there is or is not a strong
enough attraction to produce a trade agreement, but it would
distort the policymaker's willingness to associate in an
economic union with Nation B that also includes Nations C, D,
and E. Policymaker decisions are more likely to be based on
benefits derived from the total_association of all members
rather than on a series of dyadic evaluations. Policymakers
are concerned with what the union as a whole has to offer in
terms of existing or anticipated trade. And the same can be
said of amiability. They evaluate what level of amiability
could be expected of the collective membership working
together more than that amiability extant between any two
members. And so a nation might accede to multilateral relations
with another even if bilateral relatiOns have not been fruitful
when it perceives that other members' participation in a
union is valuable enough to offset the deficit.

A question often not answered by the integration

theorists is: Do nations fulfilling those conditions believed

ll9

conducive to regional cOOperation actually cOOperate regionally
on a level commensurate with their capabilities? If these
conditions are related to successful integration, can measure-
ments of the conditions be used as indicators of existing or
future integration? The four types of variables in this study
are examined to determine if there is covariance between one
or more variables and the actual amount of participation in
regional organizations over a twenty-year period. The study
asks which of the four types of variables are most closely
related to the actual amount of cOOperation in regional
organizations.

It is recognized that numerous factors not examined
here are involved in influencing decisions to cOOperate
regionally. So it is in no way implied that a relationship
found between the variables here examined and the level of
COOperation is in any way a cause of that cOOperation. The
study only attempts to ascertain if these variables are
actually valid indicators of cOOperation levels for Indonesia,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. If so,
then trends in the variables might be suitable predictors of
integrative progress in broadening or deepening ASEAN. The
variables are assumed to be valid indicators only in Stages
1 and 2 of the integration continuum; measurement of inte-
grative progress in Stages 3, 4, and 5 must necessarily rely

primarily on other variables.

120

Hypotheses to be Tested

The hypotheses are formulated so as to be testable
within the mediated S-O-R model as adapted above. The variables
to be examined are: economic growth, mutual trade, inter-nation
actions, policymaker perceptions, and regional memberships.
Economic growth, mutual trade, and inter-nation actions are
considered as independent variables related to the dependent
variables of policymaker perceptions and regional memberships.
Perceptions are an intervening variable used also as an inde-
pendent variable related to regional memberships. Although
hypotheses are stated here in a positive manner to emphasize
the expected relationships, implications of the null or unsub-

stantiated hypothesis are equally considered in the conclusions.

Hypothesis 1 Foreign policymakers in nations experiencing

 

economic growth will tend to have favorable
perceptions toward regional COOperation.

Hypothesis 2 - Foreign policymakers in nations enjoying high

 

levels of mutual trade will tend to have favor-
able perceptions toward regional cOOperation.

Hypothesis 3 - Foreign policymakers of nations engaging in

 

amiable relationships will tend to have favor-
able perceptions toward regional cOOperation.

Hypothesis 4 - Nations with high levels of economic growth

 

will tend to COOperate more in regional organ-

izations.

121

Hypothesis 5 - Nations with high levels of regional trade will
tend to COOperate more in regional organizations.

Hypothesis 6 - Nations with high levels of amiable interaction
will tend to cOOperate more in regional organ-
izations.

Hypothesis 7 - Nations whose foreign policymakers perceive
regional economic cOOperation favorably will
tend to be cOOperating more in regional organ-
izations.

Chapter V presents the data on these variables, explains
the methodology employed, and sets limitations on data and

methodology. The hypotheses are tested in Chapter VI.»

CHAPTER I

METHODOLOGY AND DATA PRESENTATION

Introduction

 

This chapter presents data for ASEAN members from 1950
through 1969 on the economic growth, trade, interaction,
perception, and regional membership variables. Indices chosen
to measure each variable are explained and a rationale for
their selection is offered. The indices were selected to
satisfy the criteria of: (a) validity as measurements of the
variables, (b) significance to theories of integration, (c)
relevance within the region and, (d) availability of infor-
mation for all five nations. Methods of analyzing the data
are explained and reservations regarding both data and method-

ology are recognized as limitations upon the conclusions.

Measurements of Economic Growth

 

The index chosen to represent economic growth in this
study is per capita domestic product at constant prices.
Numerous other indices are available with which to measure
levels of economic develOpment, some of which are more reliable

than others, depending on the purpose for which they are

intended. National income, gross national product, gross

122

123

domestic product, energy consumption, and even literacy rates
have been employed to rank nations according to absolute or
relative amounts of power or economic develOpment.l Usually
these indices are computed on a per capita basis to rank
relative power according to pOpulation size. Per capita gross
national product has been the most commonly used measure,
although a study by Rummel indicates that energy consumption/
pOpulation is a slightly more accurate indicator of development
than other indices.2 His study also found that, as an indi-
cator of power, GNP was only a little less reliable and could
be used without danger of significant error.3 Louis Guttman
finds GNP/capita somewhat less reliable than his general
indicator involving several indices.”

Changes in the level of national development can be
represented by percentage changes per year in any of the above

indices. This study uses yearly percentage changes in per

 

1Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., The
Politics of the DevelOping Areas, (Princeton, 1960); BFfiEe M.
Russett, et a1},‘W6rId;Handbook_of Political and Social Indi-
cators, (New Haven,“I9647; Hichard‘EiZNerritf and Stein
HBEEEE, eds., Comparing Nations: Use of Quantitative Data in
Cross-National Research, (NewPHaven,‘l966i;‘Efigene‘WIttkopf:
1Dontainment'Versus UnderdevelOpment in the Distribution of
United States Foreign Aid," in William D. Coplin and Charles N.
Kegley, Jr., eds., A Multi-Nethod Introduction to International
Politics, (New Iork,’197l);*H.IJ.‘HummeI, ifIndIcators of Cross-
NiEIonaI and International Patterns," APSR, 63(March 1969)127-
1 7. ‘-__-

 

2Rummel, p. 134.
3Bummel, pp. 135-137.

4"Social Problem Indicators," The Annals, 393(January
1971)1uo—1u6.

 

124

capita domestic product to measure economic growth.5 The
choice of this index was made primarily on the greater avail-
ability of this data over any other index data during the
twenty-year period. The per capita domestic product figures
are those given by the United Nations in the Statistical

 

Yearbook. Since these data have corrections already applied,

 

it is felt that they are more accurate than raw data for
national income or population. Data were taken from the

Statistical Yearbooks for 1953 through 1970 and interpolation

 

was employed to adjust early data to the 1963 base year.
Since data are computed differently by each nation, inter-
country comparisons would be misleading and are not attempted
in this study.

The use of per capita measurements of economic growth

 

is highly important for ASEAN nations because, as in most
underdevelOped nations, high population growth rates tend to
eat up any real increase in national output.6 For example,
Gunnar Myrdal says:

Countries like the Federation of Malaya, the Philippines,
and Thailand perhaps have the potential for a more Spon-
taneous develOpment somewhat similar to the historical
Western type. But the rapid population increase can be
expected to bring even these less poverty-stricken
countries to the point at which large-scale planning
becomes necessary.

5There is no necessary relation between per capita
income and its distribution in society. National income/capita
or GNP/capita do not measure standards of living or conditions
under which peOple live. See; Jan Drewnowski, "The Practical
Signigtcance of Social Information," The Annals, 393(January
1971

6Lennox A. Mills, Southeast Asia: Illusion and Realit
in Politics and Economics, (MInneapoIis, 1964). pp. BBB-355;
Gm mr MyrdaI:_An Approach to the asian Drama, (New York,
1970). pp. 621-644.

7Myrdal, p. 184.

 

 

 

 

125

Per capita income data for each nation during the
twenty-year period are found in Table I; these figures are
used in the correlational analysis with other variables.
These data indicate that Indonesia's PCI has remained relatively
stagnant due to both mismanagement of the economy and high
population growth. The Philippines overcame a period of
economic downturn during the 1960's to experience a three
percent growth in 1968-1969 while in Malaysia and Thailand,
growth has been steady since 1960. Data for Singapore were

not available.

Measurement of Mutual Trade

 

Statistics on trade between nations have often been
used, either alone or in conjunction with other indices, as an
indicator of the level of inter-nation transactions. Trade is
without doubt the most agreed upon and most frequently used

indicator of the Transaction theorists.8

Although several
different indices are available to measure trade, this study
utilizes a measure of total trade(exports plus imports) of

each ASEAN member toward other members.

 

8Karl w. Deutsch, "Integration and Arms Control in the
European Political Environment: A Summary Report," APSR, 60
(June l966)354-365; Hayward Alker, Jr. and Donald Pfiafiala,
"Trends in Economic Partnership: The North Atlantic Area,
1928-1963," in J. David Singer, ed., Quantitative International
Politics, (New York, 1968), pp. 287-316? Steven J.‘Brams,
"Transaction Flows in the International System," APSR, 60
(December l966)880-898; R. J. Rummel, "Some EmpirIcaI Findings
on Nations and Their Behavior,“ World Politics, 21(January
1969)226-241.

 

TABLE I: PERCAEHM.IMHWE DEEX

126

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

' r 7' a. .' 1 F
50 51 52 53* I Sh ‘ SS 56 S7 58 1 59 J
- T
m 98 105 105 105 108 102 :105
mass g L a. #4
. mama 88 87 85 87
PHILIPPINES 68 69 7h 78 80 83 89 92 91 95
, smcmmb
THAIIAND 62 a1 63. 63 69 J 67 71' 71 81 79 85
4 i i 1 - } 1 A :1]
60 61 {62 )63*§6h 65‘ 66 67 68 {69
b». .111 A ,4
IND omsn 105 105 101; loo 102 103 103 101 101:. 101at
MAIAYSIA 93 96 98 100 102 106 109 110 112 115
_ a 8 8. 8.-
mmpmms 93 95 96 100 99 100 102 104 107 111‘!L
51mm
THAIIAND 91 92 9h 1100 103 109 ‘ 117 119 120 125
. ‘ lm___2a
*Base year

a - obtained by regression line

b - data not available

127

One advantage of trade figures is that they are available
over longer periods of time than are some other transaction
indicators, i.e., tourism, students exchanged, or migration.
Trade figures are also one of the more accurate types of infor-
mation available on transactions. This is true because, since
balance of payments and economic prOSperity are highly dependent
upon trade policies, it behooves governments to keep accurate
accounts of these transactions; control of goods flowing in and
out of nations from a few highly visible ports is easier to
monitor than the flow of goods and services or peOple within
national borders. Another advantage of trade data is that it
allows computation of a reporting error by cross-checking the
trade reported by Nation A to Nation B with that reported
received by Nation B from Nation A. It does not, however,
readily allow one to determine which nation is the source of
the error. Finally, trade flows appear to be a highly sensitive
indicator of official attitudes of nations toward each other.
Brams found that trade level fluctuations are highly corre-
lated with changes in governmental policies toward nations.9

The source of the raw trade data is the United Nations

publication, Direction of International Trade. Exports and

 

imports for each ASEAN member with all other nations were
totaled as was the trade that each ASEAN member did with the
other four ASEAN members. Trade with ASEAN members was
termed regional trade and computed as a percentage of trade

with all other nations. Data for levels of mutual trade are

 

9Brams, p. 887.

128

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

TABLE 11: mmms 09 TOTAL TRADE 00m: WITH ASEAN 13192.25
1 . a . . 1 “ $
50 51 52 53 ! 51. 55 56 57 so '1 59
INDONESIA 311.0. 322.7 27.2 26.6 28.7 30.6 29.7 32.1 113.9 1.2.0
.MAIAISIA“ 12.5 15.0 10.5 9.7,
mums 1.6 3.1 2.9 2.5 2.7 3.8 8.2 5.9 5.1 3.8
L 511mm
L
1 1111111110 1‘ 211.3 L27.7 29.8 39.111106 22.8 25.7 26.3 211.8 22.5
A I
60 6'1 62 63 6b, 65 66 67 68 69
INDONESIA 37.9 31.9 33.9 9.2 5.9 3.8 5.9 5.5 3.8 3.1
. 3.
“mm" 9.8 9.3 13.6 6.3 7.0 6.5 5.9 5.7 5.6 5.1
r..._.____----.. ,. e a
PHILIP 3.7 .2 .1 . . . . .
P114267 1. 3 2h 30 29 3h ho 11.2m 6.6&
511mm
THAIIAND 23.7 22.5 23.1719.6 20.0 111.81105 10317.0 14.».
l . ‘3 8' e ab

 

 

 

 

 

 

flIncludes Singapore trade
a. - obtained by regression line
b - highly questionable

 

129

contained in Table II. Raw trade figures are contained in
Appendix I.

A summary of regional trading during the twenty-year
period suggests that the Philippines has experienced the most
stable regional trade level, but at around three percent it
is evidence of very slight economic ties to other ASEAN
members. The Malaysia-Indonesia confrontation cut trade
between these nations by two-thirds and it has continued in
decline since 1963. Thailand's regional trade level is the
highest, but is now less than one-half what it was before
196“. With less than eight percent regional trade among ASEAN
members, existing trade could hardly provide a significant
motivation for economic union, although consideration of

future potential trade might alter the picture.

Measurement of Inter-Nation Interaction

The amount of official governmental interaction between
nations can be determined by counting the number of newsworthy
events that appear in public documents during any period.
These might be verbal statements made or physical actions
taken by'a government such as signing a trade agreement,
posting tr00ps on the borders, receiving a diplomatic visit,
or declaring an envoy persona non grate. And the content of
these events can be evaluated as being cooperative or con-
flictual in varying degrees. Types of events have been

categorized10 by some authors and various systems of measurement

 

10C. A. McClelland and G. D. Hoggard, “Conflict Patterns
in the Interactions Among Nations,“ in James N. Rosenau ed.,
International Politics and Foreign Poliqz,(New York, 1969).

130

have been develOped by others.11 This study measures the amount
of official inter-governmental interaction among ASEAN members
by collecting all events reported from 1950 to 1969 and scaling
these events according to the degree of COOperation or conflict
represented by the action. To utilize event data in this way
requires acceptance of two assumptions. First, it is assumed
that the situational context in which an event occurs is the
same for any nation in which it occurs; that is, Nation A's
firing across the borders of Nation B has the same meaning that
it would have to any other nation. This is a somewhat tenuous
assumption since the situational context does differ, i.e.,
firing across the border does mean.a different thing to

nations having generally friendly relations than it does to

two traditionally hostile nations.12 Nevertheless, the assum-
ption is a necessary one in the absence of some acceptable
method of defining the total situation. Second, it is assumed
that all events are discrete and earlier events have no
influence on later ones. This is again somewhat unrealistic
since some events are conditional upon earlier events; however,
there is no way of correcting for any autocorrelation effect

that might be present and the distortion which the assumption

 

11Walter H. Corson, “Measuring Conflict and COOperation
Intensity in International Belations,‘I Paper presented at the
MSU Events Data Conference, (February 1969); Edward E. Azar,
Stanley Cohen, Thomas Jukam, and James McCormick, "Method-
ological DevelOpments in the quantification of Events Data,“
Paper presented at the MSU Events Data Conference, (April 1970).

12Charles McClelland, I'Two Conceptual Issues in the
auantitative Analysis of International Event Data," Univer-
sity of Southern California, (March 1970). mimeo.

131
produces may not be serious.13
All events for the five ASEAN nations interacting with
any other nation were collected for the twenty-year period.
Domestic events were not collected. Sources for the event

data were: Asian Almanac, Asian Recorder, Facts on File, Far

 

Eastern Economic Review, New York Times, Keesing‘s Contemporary
Archives, and the Middle East Journal. These several sources
were found necessary both to avoid bias resulting from reliance
on particular sources14 and because coverage of Southeast Asian
events by news sources was Sparse, particularly during the
1950's. The total number of events generated by these sources
for all AsEAN members was 3423. Total events generated by

each source and the percentage of total events by each source

is listed below.

 

 

% of Total

Source Events Generated Events
Asian Almanac 528 15
Asian Recorder 7A1 22
Facts on File 163 5
Far Eastern Economic Review lush #2
New York Times 226 7
Keesing's Contemporary Archives 205 6
Middle East Journal 28 1
Miscellaneous 78 2

 

IBRichard A. Brody, “International Events: Problems of
Measurement and Analysis,“ Paper presented at the MSU Events
Data Conference, (April 1970). pp. 21.

luDiscussions of the problems resulting from consulting
biased sources can be found in: Robert Burrowes, Douglas
Muzzio, and Bert Spector, "Mirror, Mirror, on the Wall . . .:
A Source Comparison Study of Inter-Nation Event Data,“ Paper
presented at the MSU Events Data Conference, (April 1971);
McClelland and Hoggard, 1969; and Azar, Cohen, Jukam, and
McCormick, 1970.

132

These events were coded for computer analysis according
to the procedure set out by the Michigan State University
COOperation/Conflict Research Group.15 Only one coder was
utilized to code the complete data set so the problem of
checking reliability between coders was avoided. In accuracy
checks with other coders, this coder's results correlated at
0.98 in two previous studies.16

Events were scaled utilizing the MSU COOperation/Conflict V PM]
Research Group computer program that ranks events along a

13-point interval continuum from low to high violence. Once

 

again, the problem of determining scaler reliability was . j
avoided since the computer program reliability had been estab-

lished in earlier studies and stands at 0.98 as computed by

the Pearson product-moment correlation.l7 Following the

assigning of scale numbers by the computer program, the

l3-point scale was reversed so that, instead of coding low

violence(merger of two nation-states) as (l) and high violence

(waging all-out war) as (13), high cooperation(merger of two

nation-states) was accorded (13) and high conflict(all-out war)

was accorded a (l). The scale was then designated the coop-

eration scale.18 Since the l3-point scale is an equal interval

 

l5Edward E. Azar and Mark Rhodes, International Events:
A Manual for Coders, Department of Political Science, (MIChigan
State University,-TJune 1970).

15Personal communication with Edward Azar.

17Edward E. Azar, ”Knalysis of International Events,"
Peace Research Reviews, 4(November 1970)19-22.

lBRepresenting cooperation and conflict unidimensionally
on the same scale seems to be valid for this type of analysis.
See: Brody, 1970, pp. l6-l7.

 

 

 

 

133

scale, reversing the numerical values following scaling should
introduce no significant biases that would skew later
analysis.19

To accurately measure inter-nation interaction, one must
be concerned with not only the £122 of behavior, but the
amount of interaction. And, ideally, both factors ought to be
represented by a single numerical resultant so that total
behavior can be compared and correlated with other variables.
A method of doing this is found in the use of force vectors
which represent both intensity and direction by a single
resultant. To calculate the vectors, the type of event is
scaled up the y axis from one to thirteen and the number of
events per year is scaled along the x axis. The resultant
force and direction of this action for each nation toward the

other four ASEAN members is calculated using the formula:20

 

3 =le+vx2+ x3+ x“)2 + (yl+ y2+ y3+ ”'02

where: x": the number of events per year toward each
other nation

yn= the mean level of cOOperative behavior per
year with each other nation

thus: R =N/x2 + y2 gives a resultant for each year
of the study

 

19Azar tested the assumption that the scale is in fact
interval, comparing results of a paired comparison technique
test with a rank ordering test by judges and found the Pearson
product-moment correlation to be 0.98. Azar, Peace Research
Reviews, p. 22.

20The formula is the one commonly used in engineering
and physics for representing linear forces on a single plane
and can be found in numerous textbooks. See: George B.
Thomas, Jr., Calculus and Analytical Geometry, (Cambridge,
1953). pp. 458-459.

 

 

134
Event interaction of each nation toward other nations can be
represented by a vector on a graph(Illustration IV) and the
R obtained represents that nation's equated interaction with
all other ASEAN members for each year. On Illustration IV,
for example, Malaysia's interaction with Singapore is repre-
sented by vector A-eB, Malaysia's interaction with Indonesia
by vector A-9C, etc.

These vectors can be conceived as existing within a
behavioral Space and the behavioral space can be categorized
as reflecting: (1) high cooperation behavior; (2) indeter-
minate behavior and; (3) high conflict behavior. The lines
dividing these spaces on the illustration are determined
arbitrarily. The rationale for placement of the lines was that
nations engaging in only a few interactions should have to
demonstrate higher cOOperation(on the 13-point scale) than
those engaging in larger amounts of interaction. So too with
the high conflict Space; nations engaging in much interaction
of moderate conflict would be more likely to fall in this
category than nations engaging in little interaction, even if
it were more conflictual(lower on the l3-point scale). Nation
A's behavior toward all ASEAN members during the year is
represented by the R line on the graph. It is this R value
per year that is utilized in this study as a measure of each
nation's cOOperative behavior. The study, being primarily
concerned with testing the stated hypotheses, utilizes only

the yearly numerical resultants for each nation toward other

135

 

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TABLE III

EVENI‘S RESUIII‘ANTS

136

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137

ASEAN members and does not attempt to further explore the
fruitful ramifications of this construct. Besultants for
ASEAN members during the twenty-year period are contained in
Table III. For data on the number of events per year and the

mean level of cooperation, see Appendix II.

Measurements of Foreign Policymaker Perceptions

 

Measurement of perceptions is accomplished in this study
by content analyzing statements of major foreign policymakers
regarding the efficacy of regional cOOperation. Major foreign
policymakers include Heads of Governments(Prime Ministers,
Presidents) and Foreign Ministers. Statements analyzed are
those made in public and reported by selected news media.

Content analysis is a useful tool for analyzing docu-
mentary evidence and numerous techniques have been developed
to extract information from the various types of sources
available.21 The Stanford group has relied heavily on content
analysis to measure perceptions of national leaders in conflict
situations.22 Although their method is not without limita-
tions,23 it does allow one to infer, with satisfactory

reliability, the past perceptions on issues to which these

 

21This study eschews discussion of these techniques
and their applicability. See: Bernard Berelson, Content
Analysis in Communication Research, (New York, 193277—UIe B.
Holsti, ContenEAnaIysis_for the Social Sciences and Humanities,
(Beading, Mass.,‘1969); RObert C. North, of aII, Content
Analysis: A Handbook with Applications for—EHE—StfidyIEY—
International CrISis,(Evanston, 19637; Ithiel do SoIa Pool,
Trends in centent Analysis, (Urbana, 1959).

22North, above; J. David Singer, 1968.

ZBBobert Jervis offers a critique of the Stanford studies
in: "The Costs of the Quantitative Study of International Bel-
ations," in Klaux Knorr and James N. Rosenau, eds., Contendin
Approaches to International Politics, (Princeton, 1969). pp. I77-217.

 

 

 

 

138

leaders have spoken.24 The technique adopted here is simpler

than that of the Stanford group; it was chosen for convenience
necessitated by the summary reporting of policymaker views in

available sources and by the time available to the author.

The study examines issues of the New York Times from

 

January 1950 to December 1969 and the Asian Recorder from

 

January 1956 to December 1969 for favorable or unfavorable
comments by ASEAN policymakers on the theme of regional coop-
eration with one or more Southeast Asian nations. Regional
cOOperation is defined to include any statement about formal
agreements to cOOperate for military, economic, cultural or
other reasons with one or more nations within the region(not
only other ASEAN members). Theme words and phrases, in
addition to regional cOOperation, that are coded include:25
economic COOperation, integration, regionalism, multilateral
agreement(with neighbors), closer association, mutual benefit
or security, Southeast Asian unity, unification, and refer-
ences to specific organizations(ASA, Maphilindo, ASEAN, etc.).
The statements must have been made by clearly identified
policymakers, but summaries of their statements as well as
direct quotes are considered valid. Although some distortion
of views is possibly introduced by not confining the analysis
to direct quotes, summaries are allowed because sources do not

regularly report full texts of speeches or statements by South-

 

2”Robert North answers the Jervis critique in: "Research
Pluralism and the International Elephant," in Knorr and
Rosenau, pp. 218-2u2.

25This procedure follows that suggested by Alexander
George in, "Quantitative and qualitative Approaches to Content
Analysis," in Pool, pp. 7-32.

.Ai

 

139

east Asian leaders. The content unit is each separate article
or speech and the unit as a whole is coded favorable or unfav-
orable to regional cOOperation. Since a content unit may
contain both favorable and unfavorable statements about cOOp-
eration with specific nations or within particular organizations,
this coding technique requires interpretation of the unit's
overall meaning and this introduces possibilities for error.
However, it is the general perception of regional COOperation
that is valued here and coding every favorable or unfavorable
statement could be even more distorting than the method
adOpted.

The sample selected is every tenth issue of the Egg

York Times and every issue of the Asian Recorder. A test of

 

 

of duplication of events covered by the two sources indicated
that the congruence, as determined by a Pearson product-

moment correlation, was 0.12. Favorable perceptions are

coded (1) and unfavorable perceptions are coded (O). The

ratio of favorable/unfavorable perceptions per year is used

to represent perceptions of each nation in the correlational
analysis with other variables. Perception scores are contained

in Table IV; raw data are found in Appendix III.

Participation in Regional Cooperation
Participation of ASEAN members in regional cOOperation
is measured by the number of memberships each holds in official

governmental regional organizations. Memberships in regional

140

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

TABLE IV: POLICYmKER ERCEHIQIS TWARD 111010111.
COOPERATIQI (FAVCRABIE - UNFAVCBABIE) .
‘— ' 7 ' ' ‘ a A
50 51 52 5} Sb 55 56 57 58 S9
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L .
HIILIPPINES 2 0 0 O 1 1 -1 l 1 5
7 5111011132
“ THAIIAND 0 1 O 1 2 I 1 .0 1 1
.1 60 61 62 63 6h 65 66 67 68 69
INDQIESIA -2 -2 2 -1 3 3 10 8 h. 5
MAIAYSIA 3 2 6 7 -1 5 6 6 12 1:
mr 111313110? 7 3' 10- 7 h 2‘. 11 8 7 1,
SINGAPQYE 5 2 7 ‘6 2
1 1111mm) 1 2 h r 2 1 h 6 8 5 S
- 4i

 

 

141

organizations other than economic ones are counted because it
is assumed that all regional cooperation tends to contribute
to further cOOperation and all memberships constitute evidence
of willingness to cOOperate regionally.26 Non-governmental
organization memberships are not considered in this study
because they do not result from governmental decisions and are
indicators more of private integration than of political inte-

gration.

Data on memberships is taken from the Statesman's Year-

 

book, Yearbook of International Organizations, and information
supplied by the respective foreign ministries of ASEAN members.
The total number of regional memberships for each ASEAN nation
in each of the twenty years is contained in Table V and these

figures are used in the correlational analysis.

Reservations on Data and Methodology

A number of factors impose reservations on the data and
methodology in this study that may weaken the analysis and
require qualification of the conclusions. The economic growth
index may, to some degree, distort the picture of growth within
nations. Missing data on economic growth and trade as well as
inaccurate data on these indices increases chances for statis-
tical and other kinds of error(some of which cannot be

calculated). And these weaknesses impose restrictions upon

 

26Charles Kegley, Jr. and J. Martin Rochester see other
possibilities for the effect of regional contacts between
nations. See their: “Assessing the Impact of Trends on the
International System: The Growth of Intergovernmental Organi-
zations,“ in COplin and Kegley, 1971, pp. 005-008.

TABLE V:

100 MHBERSHIE

142

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

5. 51 52 53 .1 551 56 57' 58 59
110013511 16 16 16 16 17 17 17 19 19 19
L11111311 2 13 13 13 .
summons 13 13 13 13 15 15 16 18 18 19
, 511mm
THAIIAND H 13 13 13 13 13 b 111 17 _.18 19 19
P~ 6O 61 62 63 6h- 65 66 67 68 69
INDONESIA 20 21 21 22 22 10 18 32' 31 31
161111511 16 18 18 19 19 23 25 25 23 23
MUFFINES 19 23 23 26 27 29 31 n 28 28
_ SINGAPCFE 7 15 17 18 18
THAIIAND 19 20 21 ‘ 23 23 L21: 35 35 33 33

 

 

 

143

the methodology.

Per capita domestic product distorts the picture of
ASEAN economic growth in two ways. First, since much of the
rural area of these nations is unmonetized, some of the income
actually produced(eSpecially in the subsistence agricultural
sector) goes unreported in national accounts statistics.27
Second, gross domestic product does not include indirect bus-
iness taxes(i.e., sales taxes) and capital allowances which
might be considerable in nations where the government has a
role in directing the economy. Still, other indices, too,
have limitations and domestic product is closer to the “true"
income of a nation than gross national product; hence, it is
generally considered to be a 'cleaner' figure.28 In a few
cases, data on economic growth is missing. This is true for
Indonesia in 1950, 1951, and 1952 and for all members in 1968
and 1969. Since the amount of missing data is so small(1ess
than 1%) it has been deemed unnecessary to correct for it.
In Rummel's work on the Dimensionality of Nations Project, he
found that even a higher percentage of missing data had little
effect on the patterns that emerge in mapping and ranking
nations.29 This conclusion is substantiated in an earlier

study by Cattel.30 Trade data are also missing in a few

 

27wittkopf, p. 178.

28John S. Gambs and Jerome B. Komisar, Economics and
Man, (Homewood, 1964). pp. 139-1h1.

29APSR,1969, pp. 138-139.

3ORaymond B. Cattel, H. P. Hartman, and H. Breul, "An
Attempt at More Refined Definitions of the Cultural Dimension
of Syntality in Modern Nations,“ American Soc1010gica1 Review,
17(1952), cited in Rummel, above.

 

 

144

instances. Where economic growth and trade data are missing,
the figures are generated artificially(except for Singapore
prior to independence) using the regression line technique.
This technique was selected for convenience even though for
social indicators, it has been Judged to give slightly less
accurate results than the best-fitting curve technique.31
Some trade data, designated "derived data" by the

United Nations Direction of International Trade, are taken

 

from totals reported by the counterpart nation; this makes
error computations, particularly for 1950 through 1955,
exceedingly tenuous. Another source of error in trade data
that cannot be corrected for is the undetermined amount of
trade that takes place in the form of smuggling and goes
unreported in national accounts. Smuggling is substantial
enough throughout Southeast Asia to have been the topic of
numerous diplomatic talks and messages among leaders in these
nations.

Another problem overshadowing that of miSSing attribute
and transaction data is the frequent unreliability of these
figures. Per capita figures, for example, depend upon
extremely crude estimates of total populations and pOpulation
growth. Due to the sparsity and inaccuracy of census infor-
mation, pOpulation figures probably contain an inestimable

amount of error that affects per capita income, but which must

 

31Donald V. McGranahan, l'Analysis of Socio—Economic
DevelOpment Through a System of Indicators," The Annals,
393(January 197l)81.

 

1&5

go undetected. Data collected in these nations suffers
inaccuracy from the shortage of trained collectors, lack of
sufficient resources to collect complete sets, and a tendency
of leaders to report the most impressive figures rather than
the most accurate ones to increase their prestige or standing
in the world community.32

Changes in the manner in which data are reported also
affect the accuracy of economic growth and trade figures. This
is particularly true for Malaysia, which has changed its terri-
torial composition three times during the twenty-year period
and for Indonesia, which added West Irian to its national
accounts in 1961.

A major reservation on regional participation data
exists in the uneven amounts of activity represented by the
various memberships. A nation may be a member of several
relatively inactive organizations, but actually be engaging
in less regional cooperation than another nation holding
membership in only one or two highly active or integrated
organizations. An attempt, however, to measure participation
in other ways(i.e., meeting days per year) produced mostly
frustration and little accurate information. Finally, this
index does not measure exclusively the amount of ASEAN members'
cOOperation with each other, but with other nations as well,

including some outside Southeast Asia.

 

32Myrdal, 1968, pp. 479-480; Charles L. Taylor and
Michael C. Hudson, world Handbook of Political and Social
Indicators, (New Haven, 19707.’Introauction.

146

Summary

Despite these reservations, it is felt that there is
sufficient reliable data for four of the five ASEAN members
to permit a statistical analysis of the variables to test
the hypotheses set out in this study. The hypotheses are
tested in the following chapter and, with these reservations

in mind, judged to be substantiated or unsubstantiated.

CHAPTER VI

TESTING THE HYPOTHESES

Introduction

 

This chapter tests the hypotheses using statistical
correlation analysis of the data presented on the variables
in the preceeding chapter. Each hypothesis is considered and
analyzed separately for each nation by evaluating the relationp
ships between the variables. These relationships are offered
in graph form for each year of the twenty-year period and in
summary correlation tables containing the Pearsonian coefficients
of correlation, levels of significance, and standard estimates
of error. Hypotheses are also judged to be substantiated or
unsubstantiated for ASEAN as a whole. Instances where one or
more members do not fit the hypothesis are noted and reasons
appearing responsible are discussed. Conclusions about the
validity and importance of each hypotheses are included while
overall conclusions emerging from the study are reserved for

the final chapter.

Hypothesis 1
Hypothesis 1 states that foreign policymakers in.nations
experiencing economic growth will tend to have favorable per-

ceptions toward regional cOOperation. Graphic representations

147

148

of the relationships on these variables for each nations are
contained in Graphs I through IV. Designating per capita
income as the independent variable and perceptions as the
dependent variable, the following results are obtained for the
period between 1950 and 1969:

TABLE VI: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PER CAPITA

INCOME AND FOREIGN POLICYMAKER PERCEPTIONS

' ‘

 

Coeff- Stan- Level Number
icient dard of of
of Error Signi- Cases
Corre- of ficance
. lation Estimate .
Indonesia -0.28 3.04 --- 17
Malaysia 0.52 2.63 .1 1h
Philippines 0.6“ 2.68 .01 20
Singapore insufficient data available
. Thailand 0.82 1.25 .001 20 .

 

It is considered that hypothesis 1 is weakly substantiated
following consideration of the coefficients of correlation,
levels of significance, and acceptable amounts of error for
all nations analyzed. Thailand's relationship on this hypo-
thesis is very high while those of the Philippines and Malaysia
are acceptable; Malaysia's is lower probably as a result of
the fewer number of years analyzed. The important exception
is Indonesia which has exhibited increasingly favorable per-
ceptions toward cooperation despite persistent stagnation in
per capita income. It is thus concluded that favorable per-

ceptions are normally formed with regard for economic capabil-

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ities to cooperate, but that perceptions may be formulated

independently of this variable. Since Indonesia's perceptions
became favorable following the confrontation and revolt, it is
surmised that present Indonesian leaders perceive cOOperation

as a means to assist in overcoming economic stagnation.

Hypothesis 2

 

Hypothesis 2 states that foreign policymakers in nations
enjoying high levels of mutual trade will tend to have fav-
orable perceptions toward regional cooperation. Graphic rel-
ationships are contained in Graphs V through VIII. Designating
percentage of ASEAN trade as the independent variable and
perceptions as the dependent variable, the following results
are obtained:

TABLE VII: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ASEAN TRADE
AND FOREIGN POLICYMAKER PERCEPTIONS

 

 

Coeff- Stan! Level Number
icient dard of of
of Error Signi- Cases
Corre- of ficance
_‘ lation Estimate
Indonesia -O.67 2.31 --- 20
Malaysia -0.45 1.38 --- 14
Philippines -0.03 3.08 -—- 20
Singapore insufficient datq available
Thailand -O.71 1.54 --- 20

 

Hypothesis 2 must be rejected because there is a uni-

formly negative correlation for all nations analyzed. Although

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158

the relationships are inverse, the possibility of causation

is rejected because there is no known evidence in other studies
to substantiate that declining mutual trade causes increased
desires for cooperation. In Deutsch's studies of EEC, as

trade increased between 1950 and 1960, perceptions of cooper-
ation became more favorable; but despite further trade increases
since that time, perceptions have become less favorable.1 So
the null hypothesis appears most tenable; there is no depen-
dency of one variable on the other. Nonetheless, consideration
should be given to the possibility that declining trade contri-
butes to increased motivation for cOOperation in hOpe of
recouping exchange losses through mutual association. And
statements to this effect have been made by Southeast Asian

leaders.2

Hypothesis 3

Hypothesis 3 states that foreign policymakers in.nations
engaging in amiable relationships will tend to have favorable
perceptions toward regional cOOperation. Graphs of these
relationships appear in Graphs IX through XII. Designating
event resultants as the independent variable and perceptions
as the dependent variable gives the following results for the

period under study:

 

lKarl Deutsch, et al., Political Community and the
North Atlantic Area, (PrIncetofiT—I93VTT‘KErI‘Deutsch, Lewis
J.‘Edinger, Roy C. Macridis, and Richard L. Merritt, France,
Germany and the Western Alliance, (New York, 1967); KEFI
Deutsch, Arms Control and—the Atlantic Alliance, (New Iork, 1967).

2See Chapter II, throughout.

 

 

 

 

n:

(I)

'r

159

TABLE VIII: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AMIABLE
RELATIONS AND FOREIGN POLICYMAKER PERCEPTIONS

 

 

Coeff- Stan- Level Number
icient dard of of
of Error Signi- Cases
Corre- of ficance
=r lation Estimate ‘_

Indonesia 0.57 2.55 .02 19
Malaysia 0.50 3.05 --- 7
Philippines 0.69 2.60 .01 19
Sinypore 0.68 1.22 -"'- 5
Thailand 0.76 1.uo .001 19

_

 

This hypothesis is considered to be weakly substantiated.
Although the coefficients of correlation are not impressive,
the levels of significance and errors of estimates are well
within the acceptable range for Indonesia, the Philippines,
and Thailand. Missing data appears to account for Malaysia's
low correlation and lack of statistical significance. That is,
since Prime Minister Rahman has been a leading prOponent of
regionalism, a full set of event data would no doubt have
produced a higher correlation. Singapore results are suppor-
tive, but not statistically significant due to its short span
of independence. Indonesia's level of cOOperative interaction
seems to be closely related to leader perceptions toward
regionalism while the Philippines and Thailand perceive reg-
ionalism increasingly more favorably but continue behaving in

about the same way toward ASEAN members, especially since 1961.

160

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164

The importance of this hypothesis is weakened because events
data measure cooperative behavior among ASEAN members while
perception data relate to regional cOOperation in general,
including that with non-ASEAN members.

Hypothesis 4

 

Hypothesis 4 states that nations with high levels of
economic growth will tend to cOOperate more in regional organ-
izations. Trends of this relationship for each nation are
contained in Graphs XIII through XVI. Designating per capita

income as the independent variable and inter-governmental

 

memberships as the dependent variable, the following results E
are obtained:
TABLE IX: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PER CAPITA
INCOME AND REGIONAL MEMBERSHIPS

 

 

Coeff- Stan— Level Number
icient dard of of
of Error Signi- Cases
Corre- of ficance
_, lation Estimate ‘_

Indon381a “0033 5.32 """" 17
Malaysia 0.85 3.19 .001 14
Philippines 0.90 2.77 .001 20
Singapore insufficient data available
Thailand 0.95 2.32 .001 20

 

This hypothesis is considered to be highly substantiated
due to the high correlations and levels of significance for

three of the four nations analyzed. As economic conditions

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169
improve, nations can and do allocate more resources for
participation in 1008. But once again Indonesia is a deviant
case, participating widely in 1003 despite a stagnant economy.
This is interpreted as evidence of the high value which
Indonesian leaders place on regional participation; it is given
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memberships impose.

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-" fink-l9“ M. m-caau. “I

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are now sufficiently developed economically to permit full

 

participation in most relevant organizations. In the future,
total memberships will probably not increase much even though
;perceptions of cOOperation might become more favorable or

less so.

Eypothesis_5

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regional trade will tend to cOOperate more in regional organ-
izations. Graphs of these relationships follow in Graphs XVII
through XX. Designating trade with ASEAN members as the
1ntlependent variable and 1008 as the dependent variable, the

following results are obtained:

170

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IN REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS FOB THAILAND

173

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GRAPH XX: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ASEAN TRADE AND MEMBERSHIPS

  

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174

TABLE X: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ASEAN TRADE AND
MEMBERSHIPS IN REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

 

Coeff- Stan- Level Number
icient dard of of
of Error Signi- Cases
Corre- of ficance
_» lation Estimate
Indonesia -O.44 4.89 --- 20
Malaysia -0.7h “.07 --- in
Philippines 0.17 6.26 --- 20
Singapore insufficient data available
._ Thailand -0.88 3.52 --- 20 __

 

Due to the three negative correlations and that of
0.17 for the Philippines, this hypothesis is rejected; the
level of mutual trade is not related to the amount of regional
participation. The relationship between trade and partici-
pation is rather close during the early years of the study,
but breaks down in later years. The turning point seems to
be 1962 when Indonesian, Malaysian, and Thai trade drapped
dramatically and has remained low. This came Just as regional
organizations were emerging-~ASA and Maphilindo--and as
perceptions became markedly more favorable toward coOperation.
Philippine trade with ASEAN members has always been negligible
whereas Philippine desires for cooperation and mutual member-
ships have increased substantially since 1960.

As with hypothesis 2 involving declining mutual trade,

no causation can be implied or accepted in this relationship;

 

 

175

it is not conceivable that declining trade causes increases
in participation. One can only conclude that decisions to
Join IGOs evolve from other motivations. So, for these nations,
the null hypothesis is accepted as it was for hypothesis 2

and for the same reasons.

Hypothesis 6

 

Hypothesis 6 states that nations with high levels of
amiable interaction will tend to cOOperate more in regional
organizations. Graphs of these trends are presented in Graphs
XXI through XXIV. Designating cOOperative events resultants
as the independent variable and 100 memberships as the dependent
variable, the following results are obtained:

TABLE XI: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AMIABLE RELATIONS
AND MEMBERSHIPS IN REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

 

 

Coeff- Stan- Level Number
icient dard of of
of Error Signi- Cases
Corre- of ficance
_' lation Estimate _g
Indonesia 0.50 4.30 .05 19
Malaysia 0.76 1.79 .05 7
Philippines 0.53 5.34 .02 19
Singapore 0.28 “.15 --- 4
Thailand 0.85 3.73 .001 19

 

This hypothesis is moderately substantiated by the
acceptable correlations and levels of significance, even

though errors of estimate are relatively high. The results

D“

176

 

 

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180

of this analysis incorporate a one-year forward lag on 160

data on the belief that amiable interaction in one year would
not likely be reflected in formal association.until the
following year, if at all. Correlations obtained with the

lag analysis were higher than those without the lag, lending
credence to the assumption. Thailand and Malaysia corraborated
the hypothesis highly while Indonesia and the Philippines were
only mildly supportive. Singapore results, although included,
were inconclusive due to the inadequate number of cases
examined. All members except Indonesia have steadily increased
IGO memberships even during periods of hostility between some
of the members. Indonesia, however, reduced IGO participation
during the confrontation as President Soekarno withdrew from

participation in all United Nations activities.

Hypothesis 7

 

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makers perceive regional cOOperation favorably will tend to
be cooperating more in regional organizations. Graphs of
these trends are found in Graphs XXV through XXIX. Analysis
of perceptions as an independent variable and regional member-

ships as a dependent variable gives the following results:

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185

TABLE XII: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FOREIGN POLICYMAKER
PERCEPTIONS AND MEMBERSHIPS IN REGIONAL

 

 

ORGANIZATIONS
Coeff- Stan- Level Number
icient dard of of
of Error Signi- Cases
Corre- of ficance
_¥ lation Estimate ‘_

Indonesia 0.43 4.92 .1 20
Malaysia 0.50 5.0? .1 14
Philippines 0.72 4.41 .001 ”20
Singapore insufficient data available
Thailand A 0.88 3.53 .001 20

 

This hypothesis is considered to be moderately subs-
stantiated. Coefficients of correlation and levels of signi-
ficance for the Philippines and Thailand are high, but these
are offset by low correlations and levels of significance for
Indonesia and Malaysia as well as by.high errors of estimate
for all four members caused by the sparse data on these indices.
Correlations for Indonesia and Malaysia were lowered substan-
tially by behavior during the confrontation; the relationship
between perceptions and regional memberships for all four
nations has been much higher since 1965. A one-year forward
lag on memberships was attempted on the assumption that member-
ships might follow favorable perceptions but this did not_
raise the correlations. Apparently leaders were perceiving
existing cOOperation rather than eXpressing hOpe for future

cOOperation.

186

This hypothesis is less directly related to ASEAN
relationships since perception measurements are of regional
cOOperation in general and 100 data includes memberships com-
posed of non-regional as well as ASEAN members. The relation-
ship between leader perceptions and ICC participation is not
so close as expected and can probably be at least partially
attributed to the limited data available in the form of

direct quotes by foreign policymakers.

Summary
Hypotheses l, 3, 5, 6, and 7 are accepted with varying

degrees of substantiation and with varying exceptions.
Hypotheses 2 and 4 involving correlations of regional trade
with perceptions and with IGO participation are fully rejected.

Thailand exhibited uniformly high correlations on all
of the accepted hypotheses while those of the Philippines and
Malaysia were positive, but usually several points lower.
Singapore, with the limited data available, suggested support
for the relationships, but Indonesia proved to be a clearly
deviant case, producing negative correlations on two of the
accepted hypotheses(l and 4) and only .57, .50, and .43 on
hypotheses 3, 6, and 7(significant at the .02, .05, and
.1 levels).

Relationships on most variables for all nations tended
to be low until about 1961, diverse and conflicting during

the confrontation of l963-l965, and appreciably closer in the

187

final years of the study. Due to the fragility of the data,

no meaningful breakdown and analysis for each of the four
periods of the study can be offered as reliable. Economic
growth has been steady for all except Indonesia and has contri-
buted to favorable perceptions of and participation in regional
organizations. Trade, particularly since 1962, represents an
inverse relationship to the improving climate for cooperation
attested to by the other four variables. Perceptions and
memberships have been eSpecially closely related since the
period of the confrontation. Cooperative interaction has
improved slightly in the type of events occurring and greatly
in the amount of inter-nation.interaction. Still, the average
level of amiability of ASEAN members toward each other is not
appreciably higher than what each member exhibits toward all

other combined world actors.

CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Introduction

 

The study reviewed regional COOperation among Southeast
Asian nations since 19u5 and assessed the degrees of success
or failure of the several conferences, proposals, and organi-
zations since that time. Several theories of integration were
critically examined to attempt to link these cooperative
efforts to a meaningful framework for study. Shortcomings of
these theories led to the prOposal of a new theory of economic
integration drawing on the strengths of previous studies in an
effort to more accurately represent movement or change within
the economic integration process. A methodology was developed
to evaluate more accurately the cOOperative relationships among
integrating units than have other methodologies focusing on
dyadic conflict situations. Hypotheses were formulated to be
testable within this methodology and the variables selected
were those that have substantiated by other studies as having
validity for integration analysis. Results of testing the
hypotheses appear in the previous chapter and overall conclu-
sions emerging from the study are offered in this chapter
along with limitations of the study and implications for

188

189

theoretical develOpment as well as practical suggestions for

future regional economic cOOperation in.ASEAN.

Cooperative Interaction Foundations and Behavior

Definite trends are discernible in each of the variables

since 1950 and may be summarized as follows:

1. ASEAN members are still economically underdeveloped,

2.

but four of the five members are developing as evi-
denced by rising per capita incomes;

levels of mutual trade have declined drastically, but
will probably remain relatively steady at the present
levels and even increase somewhat in response to
direct efforts to promote trade within ASEAN;
cooperativeness of interaction is slightly above the
median on the lB-point scale and will not rise appre-
ciably, although the frequency of interaction will
continue increasing as a result of positive encour-
agement and economic capabilities for political,
economic, and cultural exchanges;

perceptions toward regional cooperation became
increasingly favorable through 1967, then experienced
a slight decline, but are expected to remain highly
supportive of regional involvement;

IGO memberships have peaked in number as ASEAN members
are now participating in nearly all of those organi-
zations offering benefits. Memberships will remain

I90
relatively constant, perhaps increasing by one or
two for each nation. Depth of involvement in selected
organizations can be expected.

Thailand, with respect to the variables examined,
appears to be acting most rationally toward regional cooper—
ation in general and with other ASEAN members. On each of the
five substantiated hypotheses(l, 3, 5, 6, and 7), Thailand has
the highest coefficients of correlation supported in every
instance at the .001 level of significance. It is concluded
that Thai leaders calculate their cooperative actions very
closely against those factors governing capability for COOp-
eration. Assuming validity for the indicators analyzed, Thai
cOOperation is on a very sound foundation-~leader perceptions
and 100 memberships are related to both increasing economic
capabilities and amiable relations with their neighbors.

The Philippines and Malaysia are also consistently
supportive of the five substantiated hypotheses although
correlations are not always high and levels of significance
stand at .1 or .01, reaching .001 in only three instances.

The overall picture for the twenty years was distorted for
these members because perceptions and events fluctuated widely
during the confrontation while PCI and 1003 increased rela-
tively steadily. Following the normalization of diplomatic
relations in 1965, perceptions and events have been more
closely related to PCI and 1608. Thailand's relative

uninvolvement in the confrontation helped strengthen variable

191

congruence throughout the twenty-year period.

For Singapore, on the two hypotheses for which limited
data were available, results were supportive on hypothesis
2 at .68 though not statistically significant, and were incon-
clusive on hypothesis 6. It is suggested that additional data
would find Singapore favoring economic regionalism since 160
memberships are numerous and increasing, PCI is adequate and
rising, and trade with other ASEAN members is substantial.
Trade was unrelated to cooperation for other ASEAN members,
but Singapore's dependence upon entrepot and regional trade
should provide a positive motivation for strengthening formal
ties with neighboring trading partners.

Indonesia, with respect to the variables examined,
appears to be behaving in the least rational manner. The
highest correlation is only 0.57 on the hypothesis involving
events and perceptions and is significant at the .02 level.
Other correlations are lower, inconclusive, or negative. An
interesting contrast is suggested between the behavior of
Indonesia and Malaysia. Indonesia has been generally favorable
toward regional cOOperation and leaders have frequently
extolled the virtues of association; however, there is little
evidence of real coOperation within Southeast Asia by Indo-
nesia until 1967. Malaysian leaders have been much quieter
in advocating cooperation, but genuine examples of concrete
efforts to COOperate within Southeast Asia are more numerous

for Malaysia than for Indonesia from 1960 to.the present.

192

The contrast might be attributed to important differences in
styles of leaders and systems, particularly during Soekarno's
years as President of Indonesia. Soekarno's statements were
often propagandistic messages intended to impress domestic
constituents and international news media while Prime Minister
Rahman's statements were less frequent and were addressed to
other Southeast Asian statesmen to convince these responsible
leaders that formal economic coOperation was truly in their
interests.

Any future analysis of policymaker perceptions, then,
should take account of these differences in style when relating
policymaker statements to other data. Controlling for this
phenomenon by selecting identical types of speeches, similarity
of audiences, or limitation of sources would be desirable, but
horrendously difficult and unproductive. Data accumulated by '
interviewing policymakers periodically over time would be an
ideal method of controlling this data; such was not possible
in this study.

Theoretical Linkages

 

Karl Deutsch noted that nations seeking association
wish to be associated with others having similar or higher
levels of economic develOpment.l Generalizing from this
observation to the level of economic development of ASEAN

members, Thailand, the Philippines, and Malaysia are similarly

 

lKarl Deutsch, et al., Political Community and the
North Atlantic Area, (PrInceton,1957I. p. 58.

 

 

193

develOped and developing along these lines and could well be
attracted to each other on this basis. Indonesia is lagging
significantly in economic growth and might be perceived by
some as a nation that could be excluded from association
without detrimental consequences to a union. This, however,
might be an erroneous conclusion. Although Indonesia's PCI
has been stagnant, a nation's contribution to a regional
grouping depends upon how much that nation is willing to
commit to the cause. And Indonesia appears willing to focus
its limited resources on regional cooperation to an extent not
significantly different than other ASEAN members. Even though
Indonesia's economic position is not strong, this commitment
to regionalism might warrant inclusion in an economic union,
especially if hope of future potential benefits and security
considerations, i.e., improvement in inter-nation relationships
is considered. Geography, cultural ties, security, and future
trade could well be more powerful motivating factors than
presence or absence of economic growth.

Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand may with good
reason be considered in the Maintenance and Expansion stage
(stage 2) of the theory as Judged by sufficient time, exper-
ience, and demonstration of commitment to the principle and
practice of economic cooperation through ASEAN and other
organizations. Indonesia, also within this stage by virtue
of ASEAN membership, might possibly be attempting integration

without adequate time or preparation in the Readiness for

19h

Cooperation stage; Singapore, too, exhibits somewhat shaky
foundations for solid integrative progress within Stage 2.
Progress in expanding ASEAN within Stage 2 has so far
been lacking. This can be partially attributed to lack of
readiness on the part of Indonesia and Singapore, but is also
due in no small part to the Jealous guarding of national
sovereignty by all ASEAN members. There is yet no evidence of
any willingness to submit to supranational control; many
conflicting external ties, suspicions of political ideologies,
religions, cold war stances, and possible revolutions engender
hesitation in moving beyond harmonization to integration. It
is expected that expansion of the union will continue to be
slow and might best proceed along the lines of harmonization
of national development plans. Industry and resource plan
harmonization has several advantages: (1) it has been studied
by ECAFE and concrete suggestions are already available; (2)
it requires less coordination than customs unions or common
markets and; (3) it does not disturb vested economic interests
already in existence to a very large degree. Finally, ASEAN
members having the most stable foundations for coOperation
might well move ahead in harmonization with the hOpe that
successes in doing so will provide positive encouragement to
other ASEAN members presently reluctant to undertake the risks
involved and to other Southeast Asian non-member nations

contemplating economic cOOperation.

195
Limitations of the Study

The study has limitations deriving from data collection,
selection of variables, and application of methodology. Rel-
iability of any conclusions offered is restricted and reduced
by these limitations.

Limitations on the data result both from their pauacity
and from the way they were collected. In several instances
not enough data were available to produce statistically signi-
ficant correlations. In unknown instances, data reported by
nations or sources were inaccurate, either by purposeful
distortion or misinterpretation. Often it was necessary to
overlook reservations on the data to produce figures that were
quantitatively comparable. Also, data collection, primarily
on leader perceptions, had to be oversimplified and limited in
amount by demands of time available to the author.

Explanatory power of the variables was limited by the
number and type of indices selected and by their completeness
as measures of phenomena. For example, per capita income does
not measure the whole picture of economic growth and additional
variables might have rounded out the picture. Rate of growth
in the industrial sector could be more important for consid-
erations of trade than overall growth rate; however, this index
was not available over the whole period in comparable form.
Trade data is also occasionally misleading. In several

instances when the percentage of regional trade declined, this

 

percentage actually represented a higher monetary value since

/74/197

total trade of a nation with the world had expanded monetarily
faster than ASEAN trade. IGO membership data suffer from
inaccuracy as a measure of actual regional cooperation because
memberships include non-ASEAN members and because membership
tells little about the extent or quality of participation.
Problems of methodology revolve primarily around the

use of statistical techniques that, even though correctly
chosen, oversolidify and obscure data fragility. The small
amount of data available on some indices tends to soften the
data base and correlational analysis gives results the appear-
ance of being more solid or hard than they are. Some of the
variability of results from insufficient data is observable
in the relatively wide errors of estimate obtained, but other
inadequacies are hidden. Several types of error affecting
the outcome of the study could not be calculated; these include
error in the reporting of trade data, errors in pOpulation
estimates, errors from biased reporting of sources, and
sampling error in the collection of perception data. More
sophisticated analytical tools would not have alleviated the
error problem since most errors are contained in the original
data as reported by the sources and could be revealed only
by more refined collection procedures, not by more refined
analytical techniques.

No satisfactory method exists to weigh the importance
of each variable in indicating capabilities for cooperation.

That is, are high correlations on PCI and IGO memberships

198

more revealing than high correlations on perceptions and 160
memberships of ability to cooperate? If a nation exhibits
low correlations on PCI and 160 memberships and high corre-
lations elsewhere, is it more or less capable of cooperating
than a nation with high correlations on the former, but lower

correlations on the latter measures?

Conclusions of the Study

Conclusions emerging from this study relate to data
accumulation, methodology and theory, and the future of
regional economic cOOperation in Southeast Asia.

Sufficient hard data are now available for most Southeast
Asian nations to permit conducting an ongoing longitudinal
study of the integration processes within the region. Data
collection procedures are improving in these nations and data
are available in old and new publications on enough indices
to allow broader and deeper analysis incorporating more
variables believed relevant to integration. Event data is
now being reported fairly accurately by several Journals and
chronologies; perception data, still insufficient in United
States English-language sources, should be available in South-
east Asian publications in quantity and quality adequate for
reliable content analysis. Further, waning of the rhetoric
used by policymakers to foster nationalism and internal unity
should produce perception data more related to actual behavior

and intent than was true earlier.

198

more revealing than high correlations on perceptions and ICC
memberships of ability to cooperate? If a nation exhibits
low correlations on PCI and IGO memberships and high corre-
lations elsewhere, is it more or less capable of cooperating
than a nation with high correlations on the former, but lower

correlations on the latter measures?

Conclusions of the Study

 

Conclusions emerging from this study relate to data
accumulation, methodology and theory, and the future of
regional economic coOperation in Southeast Asia.

Sufficient hard data are now available for most Southeast
Asian nations to permit conducting an ongoing longitudinal
study of the integration processes within the region. Data
collection procedures are improving in these nations and data
are available in old and new publications on enough indices
to allow broader and deeper analysis incorporating more
variables believed relevant to integration. Event data is
now being reported fairly accurately by several Journals and
chronologies; perception data, still insufficient in United
States English-language sources, should be available in South-
east Asian publications in quantity and quality adequate for
reliable content analysis. Further, waning of the rhetoric
used by policymakers to foster nationalism and internal unity
should produce perception data more related to actual behavior

and intent than was true earlier.

199
Data to support the theory set out in this study are

accumulating not only in ASEAN and throughout Southeast Asia,

but in other world regions as well from extant and defunct
integrative attempts. Utilization of this data in further
studies and by other scholars can lead to verification of the
stages and thresholds of economic integration encompassed in

the theory. If such demarcations are confirmed, then conceiving
of integration as a process rather than a condition is plausible;
the importance of conscious decisionmaking to deepen or broaden
a union can be readily accepted and, hopefully, pursued by
policymakers seeking successful integration.

Finally, this study finds that regional economic coop-
eration among Southeast Asians has accelerated, sepecially
since 1960. Experience gained in these varied cooperative
efforts, successful and unsuccessful, has allowed Southeast
Asians a more realistic appraisal of the benefits and costs
of economic cooperation, thus enabling current efforts to
assume more concrete forms than those of the past. Planning
today for cOOperation in the future is based solidly upon
attention to the lessons accumulated from past attempts. It
is concluded that ASEAN is a viable type of cooperation for
these nations and gives hope of significant future benefits
for present members as well as for others wishing to Join.
Termination of the Indo-China war and a reduction of internal

subversion in Southeast Asia can provide needed political

200

stability and allow cooperation to broaden and deepen. ASEAN,
having existed for five years, appears to be maintaining

itself well enough to take on limited new functions. It might
well begin by harmonizing economies through develOpment of
complementary industries, lowering customs barriers, negotiating
currency exchange agreements, curtailing smuggling, and
increasing intra-regional shipping in Southeast Asian bottoms.
It might also begin taking over some functions now being

performed by other regional and international organizations.

APPENDIX I

ASEAN TRADE AND TOTAL TRADE PER XEAR
(in millions of US dollars)

201

A

 

 

 

mafia? Wm.1M-...

Trade, Trade Trade Trade Trade_ Trade Trade Trade
1950 381.7 1123.4 461.6 2416.4 10.8 679.2 148.1 609.7
1951 665.8 2036.8 617.9 3538.9 27.6 890.0 198.1 718.8
1952 495.7 1825.3 505.3 2545.4 22.0 769.6 211.4 709.9
1953 426.8 1604.9 406.4 2453.6 20.4 825.7 255.0 651.6
1954 426.3 1485.2 389.5 1457.7 23.8 892.1 227.2 559.2
1955 482.6 1576.8 362.2 2906.9 36.3 948.3 151.3 663.2
1956 514.8 1735.1 377.7 3028.4 40.0 957.6 181.0 704.3
1957 567.0 1766.5 467.7 3116.6 61.8 1046.3 204.1 777.4
1958 556.9 1268.6 386.8 3697.9 53.4 1055.4 172.2 693.3
1959 560.0 1333.3 393.7 4038.9 39.3 1039.2 174.7 777.6
1960 535.2 1413.6 433.9 4429.8 40.6 1101.2 200.4 846.6
1961 504.4 1578.9 390.8 4222.7 45.6 1098.1 212.4 943.3
1962 566.4 1669.2 593.1 4354.1 34.9 1139.4 230.0 995.2
1963 96.5 1046.8 131.5 2101.9 33.4 1414.4 207.0 1055.1
1964 96.2 1224.4 168.2 2397.5 47.9 1608.5 254.1 1269.1
1965 49.4 1287.1 160.0 2464.3 48.3 1661.7 200.7 1354.0
1966 78.5 1321.6 157.4 2657.7 60.6 1798.5 196.9 1866.7
1967 77.4 1407.1 142.5 2661.6 90.1 1985.1 189.5 1743.5
1968 40.8 b 108.2 b 81.1 b 72.0 b
1969 b

 

 

Nations PublicatIEn,'1953 through 19701

 

aincludes Singapore trade

 

 

bmissing data derived by regression line technique
cSource: Direction of International Trade, United

 

202

APPENDIX II
NUMBER OF EVENTS PER YEAR AND MEAN
LEVEL OF COOPERATION WITHIN ASEAN

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

YEAR INDONESIA NALAISIA PHILIPPINES YSINGAPORE THAILAND
No. Mean"”TNo. Mean. No. Mean No.*Mean —“N32 Mean-
v/eroop /yr Coop /yr Cogp /yr C092; /yr Coop

1950 Q 1 9.0 2 6.2 g 2 7.7

1951 § 3 7.5 i 2 8.5 i 1 7.8

1952 i 1 6.6 0 6.4 e 0 7.8 e

1953 E 1 6.6 1 6.5 1 7.7

1954 i 1 9.0 1 6.5 1 9.0

1955 : 2 6.7 1 7.0 2 7.7

1956 g 4 6.7 1 10.0 1 7.0

1957 § 1 7.0 3 6.7 2 7.0

1958 4 6.2 2 6.2 5 7.7

1959 9 7.7 2 7.7 6 7.8

1960 ' 5 6.7 t 3 7.2 2 7.0

1961 E 4 8.5 3 15 8.2 7 7.2

1962 g 9 6.7 9 9 7.6 7 9.5

1963 €93 7.1 $30 5.3 75 7.4 1 5.0 10 7.0

1964 '61 7.1 {35 6.5 52 7.5 7 5.9 12 7.2

1965 26 6.9 32 6.7 14 7.6 18 6.8 7 7.5

1966 59 7.4 358 7.2 28 7.3 32 7.4 5 7.3

1967 52 7.4 g41 7.2 17 7.6 20 7.0 14 7.7

1968 §69 7.1 $53 8.5 27 7.2 35 8.1 12 7.5

1969 375 7.1 ‘57 7.8 27 7.3 {42 8.6 11 7.5

 

 

 

ef- data estimated by regression linEtechnique

APPENDIX III

203

NUMBER OF FAVORABLE AND UNFAVORABLE
PERCEPTIONS BI FOREIGN POLICYMAKERS

r

r

PHILIPPINES

T

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

INDONESIA ? MALAYSIA SINGAPORE THAILAND
IRAR‘FAVORIDNFAVIFAV081UNFAV FAVOR UNFAv FAVOR UNFAV FAVOR UNFAV
1950 1 2
1951 1 1
1952 2
1953 1 1
1954 l 2
1955, 2 1 1
1956 A 4 l l 1
1957; 1 l
1958' 3 1 1
1959 1 5 1 5 1
1960 I 1 3 4 1 7 1
1961 g 2 2 3 2
1962 i 2 8 2 11 1 6 2
1963 i 3 4 8 1 3 1
1964 i 3 1 4 2 1
1965 i 5 2 8 3 3 1 6 1 4
1966 § 10 lo 4 13 l 4 2 6
1967 g 10 2 l 7 1 8 7 9 1
1968 i 5 l a 12 l 7 6 6 I
1969 i 5 i 6 2 I, 4 3 1 6 1

4'

 

 

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General Reference Works

Statesman's Yearbook, (London, 1950-1969).

 

Yearbook of International Organizations, (Brussels, l950-l964).

Newspapers
Christian Science Monitor

 

Detroit Free Press

 

Manila Times

 

New York Times

 

217

United Nations Publications

 

Demographic Yearbook

Direction of International Trade

Economic Bulletin for Asia and the Far East
Economic Survey for Asia and the Far East
Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics

Statistical Yearbook

Letters to the Author

 

Chen Nan Fong, for the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Singapore, 30 October 1971.

Leticia Ramos Shahani, Officer-in-Charge of UN Affairs and
International Conferences, Republic of the Philippines,
21 October 1971.

Kok-Swee Choong, First Secretary of Information, Embassy of
Manila, Washington, D. C., 11 August 1961.

Manual A. Viray, First Secretary, Embassy of the Philippines,
Washington, D. C., 8 August 1961.

Chronologies

 

Asian.Almanac

 

Asian Recorder

 

Facts on File

 

Keesing‘s Contemporary Archives

 

Middle East Journal

 

Far Eastern Economic Review

 

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