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ANGLO-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS UNDER
LORD SALISBURY, 1885-1892

by

Abdullah Nasir Al-Subaiy

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Department of History

1980

© 1980

ABDULLAH NASIR AL-SUBAIY

All Rights Reserved

Abstract

ANGLO-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS UNDER
LORD SALISBURY, 1885-1892

by
Abdullah Nasir Al-Subaiy

Lord Salisbury (1830-1903), one of the greatest modern
British politicians, dominated the political scene for almost
thirty-five years. He entered political life in 1868 as a
member of the House of Lords. In 1874 he joined Disraeli's
cabinet as Indian Secretary, then served as Foreign Secretary
in 1878. In 1885, he was selected as Prime Minister and occu-
pied this post until 1892, except for a few months in 1886.

In 1895, he was reappointed Prime Minister and held that of-
fice until he retired in 1902.

Between 1885 and 1892, Salisbury played a decisive
role in shaping British foreign policy. During this period
the imperialist movement, involving competition and the strug-
gle for colonies among the European powers, reached its height.
Under Salisbury's premiership, Britain strengthened its in-
terests in Africa and Asia. Salisbury also succeeded in

destroying the isolationist policy which had distinguished

Abdullah Nasir Al-Subaiy

British foreign relations before 1878. At the same time, he
was determined to keep Britain out of the System of European
alliance which was a principal feature of that area.

In dealing with the Eastern Question, which concerned
the Ottoman Empire and its dominions in Eastern Europe,
Salisbury was in close contact with the other Powers. Between
1876 and 1887, he was the British representative at the Con-
stantinople Conference, which was held to settle the Eastern
Crisis.

Through his work in Eastern and Indian affairs,
Salisbury gathered information about the Egyptian question.
This background enabled him to play a decisive role in shaping
Anglo-Egyptian relations. He realized the strategic value of
Egypt's location to the British empire and worked to preserve
and increase British influence there.

Although the British occupation of Egypt took place
under Gladstone's leadership, the foundations of their pres-
ence there were established by Salisbury's policy. He suc-
ceeded in easing international tensions among the great
European powers over Egypt. He also managed to calm the
Sudanese issue.

Chapter I describesthe historical background of the

European, mainly British and French, involvement in Egyptian

Abdullah Nasir Al-Subaiy

affairs, culminating in the British occupation. Chapter II
concentrates on Salisbury's diplomatic efforts to reduce
international tensions over the Egyptian question. Although
his diplomatic pronouncements suggested that Britain might
withdraw from Egypt under certain conditions, his intent was
that the British remain for an indefinite time. Chapter III
focuses on Salisbury's dealings with the European great powers.
By 1900, Salisbury had persuaded them that Britain should
dominate in Egypt, offering colonies and other concessions in
Africa as compensation. Chapter IV discusses British policy
in internal Egyptian affairs. Salisbury tried to keep do-
mestic conflict in Egypt from developing into international
crises which would threaten British interests there. He sought
to prevent any contact between the European powers, especially
France, and the Egyptian people, fearing the Europeans would
encourage the nationalist movement against Britain. Chapter

V deals with Salisbury's policy toward the Sudan. Anglo—
Egyptian relations were damaged by the British decision in
1885 to abandon the Sudan. Realizing the importance of that
territory to the Egyptian government and to the British pres-

ence in Egypt, Salisbury succeeded in calming the Sudanese

crisis.

Abdullah Nasir Al-Subaiy

Chapter VI summarizes the main arguments of the thesis.
Conclusions are offered concerning Salisbury's diplomatic at-
tempts to reach an agreement with the Ottomans regarding Egypt,
his success in blunting European opposition to the occupation,
his support of Baring's handling of Egyptian internal affairs.
Finally, Salisbury's attitude toward Egyptian internal affairs

is evaluated.

DEDICATION

To my sons Tarek and Husam,

and my wife, Anisa

ii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

It has been a great privilege for me to have
Dr. Donald N. Lammers as both my committee chairman and
major advisor. I wish to express my deepest gratitude and
appreciation for his help and guidance in writing this
dissertation which gave me a real learning experience in
research. Without his support and fine knowledge of my
subject I could not have completed this dissertation.

My thanks, and appreciation are also due to my
guidance committee, Dr. Alan W. Fisher, Dr. Paul A. Varg
and Dr. Paul R. Duggan, for their encouragement and pro-
fessional suggestions during the development of this study.

I wish to express my gratitude to Ms. Elizabeth
Johnston for her editing; to Mr. R. H. Harcourt Williams
for his aid in copying Lord Salisbury's private papers and
his friendship.

My great appreciation is owed my mother, whose
patience, encouragement and love gave me the ability to

finish my higher education.

iii

Finally my deepest gratitude goes to my wife, Anisa
and my sons, Tarek and Husam, who offered me their love,
encouragement and inspiration over the years of my study in

the United States.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABBREVIATIONS.

Chapter
I. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO 1885

II. SALISBURY'S DIPLOMATIC ATTEMPTS TO EASE
THE EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1885-1887.

Sir Drummond Wolff's First Mission
to Constantinople . . . . . . . .

Drummond Wolff's Second Mission to
Constantinople.

III. SALISBURY, THE GREAT POWERS, AND EGYPT:
1885-1892 . . . . . . . . .

Germany .
France.
Italy .
Russia.

IV. THE BRITISH OCCUPATION AND EGYPTIAN
INTERNAL AFFAIRS: 1885-1892

The British Influence on Egyptian
Government. . . . . . . . .

The Impact of the British Occupation
on Egyptian Life. .

The Egyptian Governmental System.

Education .

Economy . .
Social Life

Page

vii

36

36

45

66

67
76
86
92

97

97

119

120
125
127
131

TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont'd.)

Chapter Page
V. SALISBURY AND THE SUDAN QUESTION

1885-1892. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134

The Egyptian-Sudanese Connection . . . . . . . 134

The Dervish Threat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141

The Italian Threat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154

VI. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
Appendixes

A. CONVENTION BETWEEN HER MAJESTY AND HIS
IMPERIAL MAJESTY THE SULTAN OF TURKEY
RELATIVE TO EGYPTIAN AFFAIRS SIGNED AT

CONSTANTINOPLE, OCTOBER 24, 1885 . . . . . . . 171
B. THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY TO SIR H.

DRUMMOND WOLFF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
C. LORD SALISBURY TO SIR EDWARD MALET . . . . . . . 181
D. LORD SALISBURY TO SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF. . . . . 183
E. SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF TO THE MARQUIS OF

SALISBURY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
F. SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF TO THE MARQUIS OF

SALISBURY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
G. SIR EVELYN BARING T0 LORD SALISBURY. . . . . . . 195
H. SIR E. BARING TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY

BRITISH STATE PAPER, EGYPT NO. 2 . . . . . . . 200

ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
vi

F.O.
P.R.O.
S.P.
W.C.

{E

ABBREVIATIONS

British Foreign Office
British Public Record Office
Salisbury Papers

Wolff Correspondence

Pound Egyptian (L; os. 6d)

vii

Chapter I

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO 1885

Lord Salisbury played an important and often decisive
role in Anglo-Egyptian relations between 1878 and 1902. He
first became involved with the Egyptian question in 1878,
after Lord Derby's withdrawal from Disraeli's cabinet. As
foreign secretary, Salisbury worked well as he tried to find
a new and positive foreign policy which Britain could adopt
to strengthen its position.

One major problem Salisbury faced in his years in
office was the Eastern Question, which involved centrally the
power relations between Russia and the Ottoman Empire. -A
cornerstone of his policy was to prevent Russian control of
the Straits. Because the Treaty of San Stefano gave Russia
this control, Salisbury found it unacceptable. He made it
clear that if Russia insisted on the treaty, Britain would
have to stand behind the Ottoman Empire, even if this meant
war. Salisbury's new policy showed his great intelligence

and genuine willingness to use new methods in British foreign

 

 

policy to protect imperial interests in the Mediterranean
and the Near East. After he assumed control of the Foreign
Office, his policy was embodied in his famous "circular
dispatch of April 1878," which he sent to all British embas-
sies and laid before Parliament. This important dispatch
showed very clearly that a change in British policy had been
introduced.

Even earlier, Salisbury had carefully watched the
Eastern Crisis as Secretary of State for India and as an
active representative in the abortive conference held in
Constantinople in 1876-1877. The Conference was called to
resolve the Eastern Crisis, finally settled at Berlin in
1878.

As of 1875, the Ottoman Empire still dominated a huge
area encompassing Bulgaria, Albania, a substantial part of
modern Yugoslavia, northern Greece, and much of the Near East.
The Ottomans faced strong nationalistic opposition to their
rule, especially from their Christian subjects in the Balkans.
The Ottomans, of course, wished to hold the empire at any cost.
The other protagonists in the Eastern Question (Britain,
Russia, and Austria—Hungary) viewed the situation from their
own vantage points: Russia wanted a quick collapse of the

Ottoman Empire, in hopes of facilitating its own expansion

southward; Austria-Hungary, itself threatened by Slav nation—
alist movements, preferred the preservation of Ottoman rule;
Britain, fearing Russian intentions toward India, Persia, and
the Mediterranean, also shaped its policy to maintain the
integrity of the Ottoman Empire.

Salisbury's policy as Foreign Secretary in 1878 re-
flected Britain's desire to continue its traditional support
of the Ottomans. On several occasions, Salisbury showed the
other powers that Britain's intentions were clear and firm.
One example was the British rejection of Bismarck's proposal,
made at the Congress of Berlin in 1878, to dismember the
Ottoman Empire, give Tunis to France, and permit England to
annex Egypt.

The British attitude stemmed from the belief that
preservation of Ottoman rule, however weak, was in the best
interests of British involvement in the Mediterranean, Egypt,
and the Suez Canal. Salisbury thought that war might ensue
from the inability of the European powers to find a replace—
ment for Ottoman hegemony. Dismemberment of the empire would
possibly sever the trade routes essential to British survival.

Salisbury, by supporting the Ottomans in 1878, sought
to keep the Russians from acquiring the Straits and thus deny-

ing them to the British navy. He was troubled by another

rival, even more dangerous than Russia. France, with a navy
second only to Britain's, was able to challenge British in-
terests in the Mediterranean. Furthermore, the French had a
scheme to obtain new territories along the northern African
coast, which would seriously threaten Britain's route to India
through Alexandria and the Suez Canal.

Britain's position generally was isolationist, where-
as most of the other great powers had depended on a system of
alliances to protect their interests. The British refused to
enter into such arrangements, which could have involved them
in a power struggle on the Continent. Britain's major goals
were to maintain its commercial activities and naval facil-
ities throughout the world and to try to gain control over
certain strategic positions. Islands and ports such as
Gibraltar, the Cape of Good Hope, Cyprus, Malta, and Alexan—
dria were of great value to the far-flung British Empire.
Salisbury realized this need and succeeded in acquiring Cyprus
and Alexandria, which were the keystones of British policy in
the Mediterranean and the Near East. Cyprus would facilitate
British aid to the Ottoman Empire, and Alexandria would secure
the British route to India through the Suez Canal.

Salisbury believed that it was essential for Britain

to gain a predominant influence in Egypt. He hoped, through

the maintenance of Ottoman friendship, that the Porte would
allow British naval concessions in Egypt. He explained his
policy on July 15, 1879:

The only form of control we have is that which is

called moral influence, which in practice is a com-

bination of menace, abjurgation, and worry. In this

we are still supreme and have many modes of applying

it. We must devote ourselves to the perfecting of

this weapon.

Serious British political and strategic interests in

Egypt and the Near East developed in the second half of the
eighteenth century. When the French signed the Treaty of
Paris in 1763, their dream of an Indian empire was ended, but
they would refuse to withdraw from the area for a long time to
come. In 1798, Napoleon attacked Egypt with the ultimate aim
of depriving Britain of its crucial land and water route to
India. His expedition drew attention to Egypt, which became
a battlefield thereafter, especially between the French and
the British. Each wanted to control Egypt and use it as a
base to threaten the interests of the other in the area.
Ottoman and British efforts forced Napoleon to withdraw in
1801.

Mohammad Ali, an Albanian posted in Kavalla (now part

of.Greece), was sent by Sultan Selim III to defend Egypt

 

lSalisbury to Lyons, in Lord Newton, Lord Lyons
(London, 1913), Vol. II, p. 355.

 

against the French. Through his cleverness, bravery, and
diplomacy, Mohammed Ali succeeded in diminishing the Mameluks'
rule over Egypt and, after the defeat of the French, in bene-
fiting from the conflict between the Mameluks and the Sultan.
Mohammed Ali's dream was to establish his own empire, with
Egypt at the center. Sultan Selim III appointed him governor
of Egypt in 1805, and he began his ambitious task of creating
an independent state. Mohammed Ali tried to drive foreign
powers from Egypt. His most important and successful step
was the defeat of the British expenditionary force in 1807,
led by General Frazer. By 1835, Mohammed Ali had conquered
the Sudan and part of Arabia, which was to be the core of the
new empire. He also had reformed Egyptian governmental ad-
ministration and modernized Egypt by imitating the West. He
created such a strong state that it finally overshadowed the
Ottoman Empire. When the European powers realized the seri-
ousness of his intent, they decided that he must be stopped.
The first clash came when Mohammed Ali expanded into
Syria. The British saw a grave threat to their interests in
the Near East, through which the land route to India passed.
Britain, Prussia, Russia, and Austria supported Sultan Abdul
Mejid I against Mohammed Ali, who eventually was forced to

content himself with Egypt. The Treaty of London forced, on

both parties by the European powers in 1840, resulted in
Sultan Abdul Mejid I's Firman (imperial decree) of June 1,
1841, which ushered in a new phase of Ottoman-Egyptian rela-
tions.1 The Firman gave Mohammed Ali's family hereditary

rule in Egypt. The Egyptian army was to be limited to 18,000
soldiers in time of peace. Mohammed Ali was forbidden to
build new ships, and Egypt was to pay an annual tribute to

the Sultan. This turning point in modern Egyptian history
limited Mohammed Ali's ambitious dream and ushered in European
control over Egyptian affairs.

The policies of Mohammed Ali's successors promoted
European intervention in Egypt through creation of the Suez
Canal and growing indebtedness. European involvement in
Egypt's internal affairs can be directly traced to Khedive
Ismail (1863-1879), one of the most extravagant and flam-
boyant rulers in modern Egyptian history. His extraordinary
expenditures to westernize Egypt resulted in a debt of
fE. 90,000,000 to European financiers. Because Egyptian tax

revenues were very low, Ismail incurred further debts to meet

 

1Although Egypt remained a part of the Ottoman Empire,
the treaty entitled Mohammed Ali's family to rule Egypt di-
rectly. They had the right to initiate their own internal
policy. The Sultan's suzerainty limited Egyptian freedom of
action in the international field, particularly with regard
to the European powers.

his obligations to the Suez Canal Company (the canal was
opened in 1869) and to secure his conquests in Africa. In
1867, Ismail obtained the title of khedive (Viceroy) from
Sultan Abdul Aziz by paying additional tribute.1

Ismail's financial position worsened in 1875. In
that year the Ottoman Empire declared bankruptcy, and there
was a serious decline in the price for cotton, c6nsidered the
mainstay of the Egyptian economy. Ismail was forced to seek
more loans, at even higher interest rates. He finally was
obliged to sell his shares in the Suez Canal (176,602 shares,
or about 44 percent of the total) to Britain at a very low
price. The Ottomans were bankrupt, so could not buy them,
and the French refused to. The country's indebtedness, the
opening of the Suez Canal, and Ismail's sale of shares to
Britain marked a new and dangerous turn in Egyptian history.
These developments placed the country at the mercy of the
European powers, especially France and Britain, and increased

their influence over Egyptian administration.

 

1S.N. Fisher, in the Middle East, A History, dis-
cusses Ismail's financial troubles: "From the moment of his
accession in 1863 until his deposition in 1879, life at the
court in Egypt was sumptuous, and money flowed like the waters
of the Nile. Ismail showered munificent gifts upon all, and
his trips to Europe and Istanbul were lavish in every detail.
Presents to the Sultan on the order of £1,000,000 and a
diamond—encrusted, solid gold dinner service were not unusual.”

 

British interests and policies in Egypt changed after
the 18703 for two main reasons. The first was the weakness
of the Ottomans. Their failure to manage their affairs and
strengthen their position prompted the Europeans to consider
dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. The second was the open-
ing of the Suez Canal in 1869, which shortened the water route
from Europe to India by almost 5,000 miles. The creation of
the canal and its subsequent importance to British shipping
(89 percent of all traffic in 1878-1880 was British) caused
Britain to direct increasing attention toward Egypt and con—
sider maintenance of the canal essential to its imperial de-
fense. The British government, which originally opposed the
creation of the canal because it expected the French to domi-
nate, now looked for any opportunity to seize control. Lord
Palmerston, the British foreign minister, declared in April
1859: "It is not to our interest that there should be open
between the Mediterrean and the Indian Ocean a water-passage
at the command of other powers (France), and not at ours.”1

The British opportunity came in 1875, when Khedive
Ismail's financial trouble forced him to sell his canal

shares. .The British prime minister, Disraeli, saw the chance

 

1Suzann Evertt, "Disraeli and the Suez Canal,"
British History Illustrated 2 (June 1975): 57.

10

he was looking for, and believed it was vital for Britain to
assume supremacy over the canal. Disraeli purchased Ismail's
shares with financial support from the Rothschilds. By so
doing he secured the British route to India and the Far East
and prevented the French from dominating the canal.
Disraeli's pride in his purchase was clear in a letter he
wrote to Queen Victoria on November 24, 1875:

It is just settled; you have it Madam. The French

Government has been out-generaled. They tried too

much, offering loans at an usurious rate, and with

conditions which would have virtually given them the

government of Egypt. The Khedive, in despair and

disgust, offered your Majeity's Government to pur-

chase his shares outright.

The purchase of the Suez Canal shares was the first
serious step on the road to British occupation of Egypt in
1882. Writing on the day when the purchase was announced,
the Times declared:

It is impossible to separate in our thoughts the pur-
chase of the Suez Canal shares from the question of
England's future relations with Egypt, or the destinies
of Egypt from the shadows that darken the Turkish
Empire.
It was clear to the British that Egypt would strengthen

their empire and give them stratetic domination in the Medi-

terranean and Near East. In the event of dismemberment of the

 

1Ibid., p. 53.

2Theodore Rothstein, Egypt's Ruin (London: 1910, p. 8.

 

11

Ottoman Empire, as Disraeli stated in his message to the Queen
on November 18, 1875:

It is vital to your majesty's authority and power at
this critical moment, that the Canal should belong to
England, and I was so decided and absolute with Lord
Derby on this head, that he ultimately adopted my
views and brought the matter before the Cabinet yes-
terday. The Cabinet was unanimous in their decision
that the interest of the Khedive should, if ossible,
be obtained, and we telegraphed accordingly.

Speaking in Parliament on February 21, 1876, Disraeli declared:

I have never recommended and I do not now recommend

this purchase as a financial investment . . . . I

do not recommend it either as a commercial specula—

tion . . . . I have always and do now recommend it

to the country as a political transaction, and one

which I believe is calculated to strengthen the

Empire.2

The sale of the khedive's shares did not solve Egypt's

financial problems, which only grew worse. Creditors were
‘very disturbed by the country's inability to pay its debts.
The European nations saw a golden opportunity for turning the
issue from one of private investments into an international
question. France was the first to take this line and behave
as sheriff's officer for French bondholders, seeking to gain

maximum protection for their interests and to strengthen

French influence in Egypt.

 

1Evertt,op.cit., p. 61.

2William L. Langer, European Alliances and Align-
ments 1871e1890 (New York: 1950), p. 256.

 

 

 

12

Early in 1876, the French minister of foreign affairs,
the Due Decazes, approached Lord Lyons, the British ambassador
at Paris, with certain crude proposals for intervening in
Egypt. Decazes suggested cooperation in establishing an in—
ternational commission there, similar to the one that had

worked so well in Tunis. The British government rejected the

proposal because it was aware that the plan would enhance
France's position in Egypt, which would be contrary to British
imperial interests. At that time, Britain's general policy
vvas to support the Ottoman Empire and gain influence in Egypt
'through friendly relations with the sultan and the khedive.
The opportunity for European intervention was offered

13y Khedive Ismail, who appealed to them for experts to re—
cyrganize his finances and prepare materials for annual budget-
ing. He hoped to satisfy his creditors by demonstrating a
genuine desire to set his affairs in order and fulfill his
obligations. On May 2, 1876, Ismail accepted the French sug-

gestion which led to the establishment of the Caisse de la

 

Dette'Publique. This new institution included representatives
from France, Italy, Austria and, later, Britain. In addition,
two controllers, one French and one British, were appointed

to supervise Egypt's finances, hence the name Dual Control by

which the system became known.

13

This European intervention in Egyptian financial af-
fairs during 1876-1878 did not improve the situation, and
matters grew worse. In the meantime, British policy began to
change under the leadership of Salisbury, who had replaced
Lord Derby as foreign secretary. Salisbury seemed dissati-
fied with events in Egypt and advocated more active interfer-
ence. He was unhappy with the idea of cooperating with
France; as he wrote to Disraeli: "The state of affairs may
change and it may suit us at some future period to push ahead:
and then any obligatory engagement would be highly inconve-
'nient."1 Salisbury wished England to dominate: "We have no

‘vish to part company with France: still less do we mean that

2

iFrance should acquire in Egypt special ascendancy." For

Salisbury, even sharing the controller's office did not mesh
‘with British plans for adding Egypt to the empire in the near
future. Salisbury stated this clearly in a letter to Lord
Lyon: "But the controllers will hardly be enough, we want to
have some hold over the government of Egypt, though we do not

want to assume any overt responsibility."3 It was clear to
1Lady Gwendolyn Cecil, Life of Robert Cecil, Marquis
'of‘Salisbury (London: 1921), vol. II, p. 332.

 

2Salisbury to Lyons, April 10, 1879, Newton, opI cit.,
II, p. 175.

3Newton, op. cit., II, p. 187.

n\:b

ate
A|V

’A

P‘

r

14

Salisbury that England could not occupy Egypt at that time:
the international situation and the lack of a strong European
ally militated against it. Britain had no choice but to
share control with France. In Salisbury's words:
As to our policy--the defence of it lies in a nut-
shell, when you have got a faithful ally who is bent
on meddling in a country in which you are deeply in-
terested--you have three courses open to you. You
may renounce--or monopolize--or share. Renouncing
would have been to place the French across our road
to India. Monopolizing would have brought it very
near the risk of war. So we resolved to share.

Once the two governments agreed to work together, they
pressured Khedive Ismail into accepting an international board
of inquiry into his affairs in an attempt to find a solution
to the financial problem. The commission met on April 1, 1878,
and it eventually recommended that the entire Egyptian adminis—
tration be changed. It also stressed that the Khedive should
offer his estates as security and accept a form of constitu—
tional government with power vested in a ministry containing
two Europeans. After some hesitation, Ismail agreed. These
changes strengthened European influence over internal affairs.

The European coalition that was consolidated in 1878

and that purported to be the protector of European bondholders

was in fact using this pretext to intervene in Egypt.

 

lCecil, o . cit., II, p. 331 - 2.

15

Salisbury was frank: "I should be glad to be free of the com-
panionship of the bondholders."l European control of Egyptian
finances brought no improvement. In 1879, the controllers
decided there was no money in Egypt's treasury to pay the in-
terest due on its debts, and they recommended that Egypt make
no payment that year. It was clear that they wanted to de-
clare the country bankrupt, but Khedive Ismail resisted. He
rejected their recommendations and put forward his own pro-
posal to reduce the interest on the funded debt by one-half
percent and thus pay off the floating debt. Moreover, he de-
clared that he would undertake to pay off all obligations if
he was allowed to deal with the situation. The controllers
resigned in protest over the Khedive's rejection of their
recommendations.

Khedive Ismail, who was deeply grieved by foreign
intervention, took this opportunity to restore his prestige.
He demanded the dismissal of his prime minister, Nubar Pasha,
who had been appointed in 1878 under pressure from the Euro-
pean powers. The Khedive charged that Nubar Pasha had gone
too far in complying with the Europeans. Ismail also de—

manded a new government which would inspire his own and the

 

1Cecil, Op. cit., II, p. 352.

16

people's confidence. Neither Paris nor London opposed the
dismissal of Nubar Pasha, even though Sir Rivers Wilson,
Egyptian Minister of Finance, pressed upon the British govern-
ment the case for reinstatement. Salisbury's view of the
episode was stated thus:
Her Majesty's Government are of the opinion that the
position of Sir Rivers Wilson will be extremely dif-
ficult, if not impossible, to maintain, unless Nubar
Pasha is readmitted to the cabinet in some form or
other.1
But the British did not insist on the return of Nubar Pasha,
and Khedive Ismail formed a new cabinet under the premiership
of his son, Tawfik. The two European ministers were retained
and were made full members of the cabinet, with veto power.
The formation of a new cabinet did not produce any
significant change in Egyptian finances, and the country
seethed under its humiliation and exploitation by Europeans.
Most Egyptians felt European intervention in their affairs
should be stopped. Khedive Ismail was aware of this, and he
tried to show his people that he agreed. The Europeans pre-
vented him from performing his duty as a head of state when

they refused to permit him to assist in the deliberations of

his own council. Both foreign representatives in the Egyptian

 

1Lord Cromer, Modern Egypt (London: 1908), II, p. 88.

 

17

cabinet, Sir Rivers Wilson for the British, and M. de
BligniEres for the French, insisted on imposing their influ-
ence on ministerial decisions and on their right to veto ev-
ery measure which they jointly disapproved. To establish
their absolute authority over the Khedive, they proposed to
issue a decree postponing the upcoming debt payment (the
April Coupon of 1879). The Khedive refused to cooperate, for
he believed that Egypt was perfectly capable of paying. The
European controllers considered this refusal a grave challenge
to their authority and prestige; they threatened to advise
their governments to use whatever force was necessary to se—
cure bondholders' money if the Khedive did not sign their
proposal.

Khedive Ismail thereupon made one final attempt to re—
gain his lost authority. Certain that he would soon lose his
throne and become a puppet of the Europeans, he decided to
move quickly. On April 7, 1879, he summoned the European con-
sular agents and asked them to transmit to their governments a
project which expressed the wishes of the Egyptian people. He
stated that Egypt could meet all of its financial obligations,
and he demanded the formation of a native cabinet to be re-
sponsible to the Chamber of Delegates. The European ministers

were dismissed, and Sharif Pasha, the constitutionalist

18

leader, was appointed head of the new cabinet. These mea-
sures aroused the utmost indignation in European official
circles. This threat could by no means go unanswered.
Salisbury's reaction was swift. On April 9, 1879, he
wrote in a dispatch: "Admitting that the Khedive was not
bound to retain Mr. Wilson permanently in office [his action]
was precipitate and causeless."1 Salisbury suggested that
the khedive restore the European ministers. On May 11, the
German foreign minister, Count Munster, informed Salisbury
that his government considered the khedive's decree illegal
and invited England to join in a deliberate rejection. The
other powers instructed their agents and consuls-general to
follow suit. The Europeans made their position known on
April 22. Mr. Vivian, the British agent and consul general
in Egypt, informed Salisbury on June 8, 1879, that the protest
would be successful and that the decree would be modified or
withdrawn. On June 18, Salisbury sent instructions that the
khedive should be officially informed that he would be wise to
abdicate in favor of his son Tawfik. Salisbury also wrote a

dispatch based on the assumption that there

 

1W.H. Russell, "Why Did We Depose Ismail?" Contem—
porary Review, vol. 48 (1885): p. 317.

 

19

was public disorder . . . . the personal character
and rule of the Khedive and his past career unfitted
him to remain in power. The powers were bound to
arrest misgovernment before it results in the materi-
al ruin and almost incurable disorder to which it
must lead.1
The Europeans put great pressure on the Ottoman sul-
tan, Abdul Hamid II, Egypt's suzerain,2 to depose the Khedive,
and he complied on June 26, 1879. Ismail left Egypt four days
later to live in exile in Italy. He was succeeded by his
eldest son, Tawfik. Ismail's deposition marked another turn—
ing point in the Egyptian question. The country now faced an
uncertain future, and Salisbury correctly noted that "after
having a Khedive deposed the character of nonintervention is
not easy to retain.”3
Khedive Tawfik was very weak and could not continue
his father's attempts to oust the Europeans. On July 17,
1879, Tawfik dismissed Sharif Pasha's ministery and rejected
its reform proposals, which included some constitutional re-

forms. On November 15, 1879, he returned to the controller-

general system. He appointed Evelyn Baring (Lord Cromer) and

M. de BligniEres to the posts. The controllers were now

 

lIbid., p. 318.

2See note 1, P. 7

3Salisbury to Lyons, July 17, 1879, Newton, op. cit.,
II, p. 357.

20

muCh more secure, for they could not be dismissed without the
consent of their governments.

On July 7. 1880, Khedive Tawfik tried to convince the
Europeans that a general settlement of Egyptian affairs
should be reached. He was unhappy with the way the Europeans
defined the Egyptian debt under the law of liquidation. Ac-
cording to this law, Egypt's annual revenue should be divided
into almost two equal parts. One portion, the Europeans in-
sisted, should go to the Caisse on behalf of the bondholders.
The other was to go to the Egyptian government on the condi-
tion that it must pay its tribute to the Porte and any deficits
which might accrue to the Caisse. Thus, Egypt was left with
about {E.2 million with which to run the government. The
Khedive, having failed in his negotiations, watched helplessly
as the Europeans took another step toward domination of Egypt.
On January 14, 1881, the controllers-general arranged for the
sale of Egypt's last stakes in the Suez Canal Company's pro-
fit. This showed the Egyptians that the Knedive was to be
only a token ruler and his native ministry a mere instrument
for executing the will of the Europeans.

In the meantime, the number of foreigners in Egypt in-
creased: "In the interest of greater efficiency numbers of

Europeans were brought in to act as officials, all of whom

21

enjoyed attractive salaries, while the native officials went
unpaid for a year or eighteen months."1 The Europeans held

a privileged position under the capitulatory system, which
aroused Egyptian hostility even more than did the controllers'
arrangement. Europeans were allowed special consideration in
many areas, including religious worship, laws, taxation,
trade, and tariffs. The system dated back to the sixteenth
century, when the sultan granted extra-territorial rights to
the Europeans residing in the Ottoman Empire. As Egypt was
juridically a part of that empire, the Europeans insisted on
these privileges for their subjects there. By granting them,
Egypt lost much of its autonomy.

The Egyptians, unable to bear their humiliation by
foreigners, began their struggle in the summer of 1881. At
this time, the nationalist movement consisted of three groups.
The constitutionalists were composed of the rich and those
mostly educated abroad. The second group was led by Muslim
intellectuals who believed in constitutional rule and in a
return to the pure foundations of Islam. The third group
consisted of native Egyptian army officers; they were led by

Ahmed Arabi, and their intent was to secure certain reforms

 

1Langer, op. cit., p. 260.

22

and free Egypt from foreign exploitation. Gladstone had
admitted that Arabi's movement was in "truth national as well
as military; it was anti-European, and above all, it was in
its objects anti—Turk."l

Arabi and his followers constituted a dangerous threat
to the puppet ruler of Egypt and to European control. Arabi
urged all Egyptians to fight to free their country from.both.
He began to acquire fame, and many Egyptians saw in him the
only potentially victorious leader. As his reputation spread,
he became a symbol of the nationalist movement.

Arabi and his followers in the army challenged the
Khedive's authority by military demonstrations and by press-
ing for genuine reform. They forced the Khedive to organize
a new cabinet under Sharif Pasha's premiership in September
1881. The French and British regarded the nationalists as a
threat to their aims in Egypt, and they decided to abort the
movement in its early stages. The European powers unsuccess-
fully urged Arabi to leave. According to Arabi: "Monsieur
Mange, the French consul, and another French gentleman did

their utmost to persuade me to leave the country and go to

 

1
Ibid., p. 263.

23

1 They then tried to

Paris in order to avoid all troubles."
persuade Sultan Abdul Hamid II to induce him to do so:
"Dervish Pasha invited me to go to Constantinople to live
with His Majesty the Sultan and with other friends."2 Arabi
resisted all these efforts, for his departure would mean
abandoning the struggle for legal rights and freedom from
foreign intervention.

On November 10, 1881, M. St. Hilaire, Prime Minister
of France, was succeeded by M. Gambetta. The latter had re-
cently returned from Tunis and Algeria, where he had experi-
enced serious difficulties. The native revolt against French
rule in both countries was beginning, and it was gaining
added vigor from the Pan-Islamic movement led by Sultan Abdul
Hamid II. Gambetta believed that Egyptian nationalism could
seriously affect the French situation in North Africa. Fur-
thermore, he was closely connected to the financial houses of
Paris, the Bourse, and the Rothschilds, and with other capi—
talists, all of whom had invested millions in Egyptian bonds.
Gambetta suggested to the British Liberal government, led by

Gladstone, a joint expedition against the Egyptians. However,

 

1Ahmed Arabi, "Instructions to My Counsel," The
Nineteenth Century (December 1882): 238.

2Ibid.

 

 

24

rivalry between the two countries prevented the British from
accepting the idea. Gambetta then proposed sending a joint
note to the Egyptians, and Gladstone's government accepted.
The note stated that the two powers would stand beside the
Khedive against nationalist pressure and would maintain order
in Egypt, by force if necessary.

The note, sent on January 12, 1882, was poorly re-
ceived, even among pro-Westerners, and support for the nation—
alists increased. In reaction, the Egyptian Assembly refused
to ratify the new budget, which created a serious clash be-
tween the government and the European controllers. Confronted
with the great upsurge in nationalist feeling, Sharif's cabi-
net resigned and was replaced by a nationalist government
headed by Mahmoud Sami Al-Baroudi. Ahmed Arabi became minis—
ter of war. The cabinet had the country's full support.

On January 30, 1882, M. Gambetta fell from power and
was succeeded by M. de Freycinet, who regarded joint action
against Egypt in a different way. He believed in sending war-
ships as a show of power to intimidate the Egyptians, but he
opposed the British idea of asking Sultan Abdul Hamid II to
send one of his generals with authority to try to settle the
issue. If such a mission were successful, the Europeans would

lose the opportunity to intervene.

25

On June 11, 1882, the situation reached dangerous
proportions. Riots in Alexandria created a critical moment
for both the Khedive and the nationalists. The consensus of
historians of modern Egypt is that neither the Khedive nor
Arabi was responsible. One eyewitness, W.S. Blunt, blamed
the European powers and the Ottoman Empire:

It was part of the plot I knew to have been designed

through Dervish Pasha (Ottoman agent in Egypt) and

the Foreign Office to entrap and betray Arabi.
Blunt added:

One point only in this sinister affair is still a

matter for me of much perplexity and that is to de-

ternune the exact amount of responsibility assign-

able in it to our agents at Cairo and Alexandria.

There are passages in Malet's dispatches which seem

to show that he was looking forward, about the time

when the disturbance was first contemplated, to

some violent solution of his diplomatic difficulties,

and there is no doubt that it had been, for some

time past, part of his argument against the nation-

alist Government that it was producing anarchy.1
The riots developed out of a quarrel between a Maltese and an
Egyptian donkey-boy, and the boy was killed. Fighting between
the Egyptians and the Europeans began on June 11, 1881, and
continued for some time.

The British government watched the situation carefully

but was unab1e_to reach a rapid conclusion about what was

 

1Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, Secret History of the English
Occupation of Egypt (New York: 1922), pp. 235-36.

 

 

26

happening. In London, opinion was divided as to what policy
to follow. Gladstone sympathized with the nationalists and
wanted to take a moderate line, but the majority of his cabi-
net did not share this feeling. Lord Granville, the Foreign
Secretary, insisted that the Egyptian situation required
military intervention, especially after the riots in Alexan-
dria, and he argued that Britain must squelch Arabi's move-
ment.
Granville was worried about the British interest in

the Suez Canal:

I am.ready to go to any length for reparation, and

I set great store about making the Canal safe. But

I own to dreadful alarm at occupying Egypt militar-

ily and politically with the French. I think the

majority (in the cabinet) would rather like to do

this . . . . it is a nasty business, and we have been

much out of luck.1

The split in the cabinet and the opposition created a

serious problem for the government. Lord Hartington, Secre—
tary of State for War, threatened to resign if direct action
were not taken. The British Foreign Office heard rumors that
France was willing to support Arabi and thus attempt to gain

control in Egypt. Britain and France were mutually suspici—

ous,.and each was.unwilling to let the other deal with Egypt

 

1Edmond Fitzmaurice, The Life of the Second Earl
Granville (London: 1905), II, p. 265.

 

 

27

alone. France rejected the British proposal of an Ottoman
expedition, even under Anglo—French auspices. The French
insisted, instead, on a European conference, which the Brit-
ish approved, but the Ottomans refused to participate, con-
sidering it interference in their internal affairs. Despite
the Ottoman refusal, the conference opened in Constantinople
on July 23, 1882, with representatives from Britain, France,
Russia, Austria, and Italy in attendance.

The conferees agreed on a French suggestion that the
powers should not seek any territorial gain or any further
concessions in Egypt. Lord Dufferin, the British ambassador
at Constantinople, expressed a reservation in his acceptance
of this agreement; he wanted to leave Britain free to act in

response to cases of force majeure. He believed the agreement

 

"would comprise not only danger to the Suez Canal, but any
other unexpected change in the political situation in Egypt
which might call for immediate action."1

The British cabinet, fearing that Arabi might block
the canal, ordered Beauchamp Seymour, Admiral of the Fleet at
Alexandria, to send an ultimatum to the Egyptian government.

The British thought the ultimatum and the appearance of the

 

1British state paper, Egypt, no. 17 (1882), p. 48.

28

fleet in Egyptian waters would bring an end to the situation.
But Seymour found that Alexandria was fortified and that
Arabi was taking all necessary measures to protect the city.
The British asked Sultan Abdul Hamid to order all work on
these fortifications stopped immediately. The sultan, who
was also worried about events in Egypt, so ordered. The for-
tifications were inadequate to prevent the British from cap-
turing the city, but the British wanted to create an issue.
Northbrook, First Lord of the Admiralty, in his report to
Gladstone, said:

If we want to bring on a fight we can instruct B.

Seymour to require the guns to be dismantled. My

advisers do not think they will do much harm.where

they are.1
Although the Egyptians had already ceased work on the forts
Seymour claimed that they had not, and on July 10, 1882, he
sent a new ultimatum demanding that the forts be surrendered
to him for dismantling. The Egyptian government was deeply
insulted by this order from someone with no legal authority,
and it was regarded as another attempt to diminish Egyptian

sovereignty. The entire cabinet and the Khedive rejected

the ultimatum.

 

1Paul Knaplund, Gladstone's Foreign Policy (New
York: 1935), p. 183.

29

The French, who were suspicious of British aims in
Egypt, were unwilling to become more involved. They ordered
their fleet to withdraw if the British attacked Alexandria
or took any further action. The British were quite pleased
with this decision, which ultimately gave them sole control
of Egypt and the Suez Canal. The French thought their re-
fusal to participate might dissuade the British from inter-
fering in Egypt. Even if this failed, by not joining with
the British, the French kept their policy options open.
Furthermore, the French did not want to antagonize the Egyp-
tians, among whom they enjoyed much influence. Finally,
mindful of its interests in Syria and Lebanon, France was re-
luctant to endanger its relations with the Ottoman Empire.

On July 11, 1882, the British fleet bombarded Alexan-
dria. On July 31, British marines landed. The Khedive put
himself under British protection and dismissed Arabi, who
proclaimed a state of war between Egypt and England. The
Egyptian nationalists decided to continue their struggle even
if the Khedive had sold himself to the Europeans. Arabi be-

lieved that he had an obligation toward his people to defend

the country against its enemies. He expected the Ottoman

Empire to offer support, but the Porte, itself very weak,

30

first hesitated and then abandoned Egypt. The Ottomans hoped
the other great powers would prevent British domination.

After a careful study of the international situation
and its complications, Britain decided to complete its occupa-
tion of Egypt. The Ottoman Empire could not challenge the
British forces; Bismarck had given Britain a green light in
and attempt to isolate France and weaken it; and Italy, Russia,
and Austria had no objections. On July 22, 1882, Parliament
agreed on a budget for a military campaign against Egypt with
the special aim of suppressing the nationalist movement. In
an attempt to conceal its main purpose, the British govern-
ment invited France and Italy to join them, certain that they
would refuse. Both did so. The French Prime Minister,
Freycinet, who favored participation in the expedition to pro-
tect French interests in the Suez Canal, resigned. Bismarck,
although he had no direct interest in Egypt, believed he
should put pressure on Britain in order to gain concessions.
He insisted on renewing the conference of Constantinople.
Meanwhile, on July 20, 1882, the Ottoman Empire had agreed to
participate in the conference. Then, on July 24, in an at-
tempt to regain its prestige as Egypt's suzerain, the Ottoman
Empire declared that it planned to send a military expedition

to Egypt. But since the Ottomans could not carry through,

31

due to their extremely weak condition, sultan Abdul Hamid, on
August 7, 1882, accepted the Identic Note of July 15.

In the Identic Note, the European powers had agreed
that, under certain conditions, they would allow the sultan
to intervene in Egypt.1 The note was adopted by the confer-
ence and sent to the European governments for ratification.
The British, believing the conference fruitless, had entered
into direct negotiations with the sultan in an attempt to gain
time. They discussed the propriety of sending Ottoman forces
to Egypt, while their own soldiers under General Wolseley,
were crushing the Egyptian nationalists at the battle of Tal-
al-Kabeer on September 13, 1882. This defeat ended nation-
alist resistance and inaugurated 72 years of British occupa-
tion. After Tal-al-Kabeer, Grandville asked Lord Dufferin to
cease negotiations with the Ottomans.

The motives behind the British occupation of Egypt
were complex, but there were three important and immediate
reasons. The first was Egypt's strategic location in rela-

tion to three continents. This factor was especially

 

1The Europeans could require the Sultant to accept
their terms because of their enormous economic and political
influence on him“ Furthermore, the Europeans much preferred
that the Ottomans intervene rather than any European power,
in order that none gain ascendancy.

32

important after the completion of the Suez Canal, the artery
between England, India, and the colonies of the Far East.
Bismarck was aware of this:
Egypt is of the utmost importance to England on ac-
count of the Suez Canal, the shortest line of commu-
nication between the Eastern and western halves of
the Empire. It is the spinal cord which connects
the backbone with the brain.1

Second, because of French fears of German power in
Europe, especially along the Rhine frontier, France was pre-
pared to allow Britain to intervene in Egyptian affairs, thus
ending their long period of rivalry. The British also be-
lieved the moment was ripe for occupation of Egypt; the inter-
national climate generally was suitable for such action.

Third, the British felt the nationalist rebellion
must be crushed, for it threatened to end European interven-
tion in Egyptian affairs.

The British judgment was correct, as there was no
serious military resistance to their intervention either from
the French or from the sultan. The British feared that the
sultan might send troops to support the Egyptians against
them, but no such action was taken.

After the military occupation, Britain had a diffi-

cult time justifying its actions to the other European powers

 

1M. Busch, Bismarck, vol. 11 (London, 1898) p. 322.

33

and to the Porte. The British first announced that they
would evacuate Egypt after restoring Khedive Tawfik's author-
ity. In the early stages, they also considered handling the
situation in a manner similar to the Belgian question. The
European powers would be asked to agree to Egypt's becoming
a neutral state; no European power would try to gain conces-
sions in Egypt or the canal zone. But Britain soon aban-
doned both ideas and.worked, instead, to strengthen its con-
trol. The Prince of Wales wrote to Wolseley: "After this
campaign we must forever keep a strong hold over Egypt, as
our interests are too great ever to be lost sight of again."1
In February 1883, Queen Victoria wrote to Lord Granville
along the same lines: "The Queen feels very anxious that
nothing should be said to fetter or hamper our action in
Egypt: we must have a firm hold on her once and for all."2
The British decided to establish a new governmental
system which would put Egypt under Britain's absolute domin-
ation. Action was swift. Forty—five days after the occupa—
tion, Lord Dufferin, British ambassador to Constantinople,

was sent to Egypt. Granville, in his instructions to Dufferin,

wrote :

 

1Langer,‘0p. cit., p. 281.
2Tbid.

 

34

Her Majesty's Government . . . feel bound not to
withdraw from the task thus imposed on them until

the administratidn of affairs has been reConstructed
on a basis which will afford satisfactory guarantees
for the miintenance of peace, order, and prosperity

in Egypt.

Dufferin was familiar with Egyptian affairs. From
his two important posts as ambassador to Russia (until 1879)
and to ConstantinOple (since 1881) he had watched develop-
ments and was able to strengthen the British presence in Egypt.
Dufferin arrived in Alexandria on November 7, 1882, and spent
six months in the country. On February 6, 1883, he sent his
final report to Granville. It is considered one of the most
important documents on the Egyptian question. In it, he laid
the foundation of British policy during the occupation.

Among his many recommendations, Lord Dufferin sug-
gested oranizing an Egyptian army of 6,000 under the command
of British officers; establishing consultative representative
councils consisting of a legislative council and a general
assembly; appointing an able British agent to guide the coun-
try; and maintaining British guidance for an indefinite

period, through the agent and British administrative officials.

Sir Evelyn Baring (later Lord Cromer) was chosen for the top

post.on.May 30, 1883, and he arrived in Egypt on September 11

 

1British State paper, Egypt. no. 2 (1883) p. 11.

35

of that year. Baring ruled Egypt for 23 years (1882-1907),
exercising virtually absolute power and authority.

With Baring's arrival, a new era of Anglo-Egyptian
relations began. Even though the country nominally remained
part of the Ottoman Empire, control had passed to the British.
The authority of the Khedive and his cabinet was greatly re-
duced. British officials were attached as advisers to the
more prominent officials. As Baring said, "we do not govern
Egypt, we only govern the governors of Egypt.”1 The cabinet
could make no decision without the British counsul-General's
consent. Granville instructed Baring:

The advice of Her Majesty's Government should be
followed, as long as provisional occupation con-
tinues. Ministers and governors must carry out
this advice or forfeit their offices.2

On January 18, 1883, Anglo-French control was abol-
ished. Britain was determined to rule Egypt alone, but tried
to conceal its interest and policy in Egypt from the other
European powers. On January 3, 1883, the British issued a
mild circular stating that they would be responsible for pre—
3

serving public tranquility and security in Egypt.

1Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid, Egypt and Cromer (London:
1968), p. 68.

 

 

2Cromer, op. cit., I. p. 382.

3British State Paper, Egypt, no. 2 (1883), p. 11.

Chapter II
SALISBURY'S DIPLOMATIC ATTEMPTS TO EASE
THE EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1885-1887

Sir Drummond Wolff's First
Mission to Constantinople

 

 

When Lord Salisbury's cabinet replaced Gladstone's
on June 11, 1885, one of its major problene was the Egyptian
question. Salisbury immediately sent Sir Drummond Wolff to
Constantinople to negotiate with the Ottomans. France and the
Porte were pressuring England to announce a definite evacua-
tion date. French influence in Egypt was still greater than
that of any other European power, and the French language and
culture were second only to the Arabic. France also had stra-
tegic and economic interests in the country which it was un—
willing to lose to the British.

The Wolff mission was born more of necessity than of a
genuine desire to withdraw from Egypt. Salisbury made it clear
that he would follow Gladstone's policy. As he told Baring:
"We are not in a position, as I ventured to explain to you, to

.originate now any policy diverging at a sharp angle from that

36

37

of our predecessors."l The mission had three aims: to gain
important concessions from the other European powers if
Britain evacuated Egypt; to bring Britain out of isolation;
and to weaken Egyptian opposition to the British occupation.
Salisbury wanted to establish good relations with Germany and
France, but he also wanted to dilute Bismarck's influence. He
wrote to Sir William White, Ambassador in Constantinople:

I do not wish to depend upon [Bismarck's] good will,

and therefore, shall keep friends with France as

far as we can do it without paying too dear for it.

The threat of making us uneasy in Egypt through the

action of France is the only weapon [Bismarck] has

against us and we are free of him in proportion as

we can blunt it.2

Wolff's mission was intended to conciliate France and

the Ottomens and to prevent Bismarck from using France against
Britain. Those aims were clear in Salisbury's instruction.
He wanted Wolff to point out that the British government would
recognize fully the rights of the sultan as sovereign of Egypt.
Salisbury knew that this would keep the sultan and the Muslim

world quiet for the moment. Also, he hoped such recognition

would prompt the sultan to send troops to subdue the Mahdi's

 

1Salisbury to Baring, private, September 15, 1885
no. 64, P.R.O. F.O. 633/7.

2F. H. Hinseley, "Bismarck, Salisbury and the Agree-
ment of 1887," Historical Journal (1958): 79.

38

rebellion in the Sudan, which threatened the British position
in Egypt. But Salisbury clearly intended that the Wolff mis-
sion should secure British dominance in Egypt and prevent
other European powers from maintaining any competitive in-
fluence there.

In the first instance, [your mission is] to secure

for this country the amount of influence which is

necessary for its own imperial interests, and sub—

ject to that condition, to provide a strong and

efficient Egyptian government, as free as possible

from foreign interference.

Salisbury saw Wolff's mission as an attempt to
strengthen the British occupation, not weaken it. He in-
structed Wolff to avoid any promise of British evacuation.

Our diplomatic task is twofold: to obtain the ar-
rangement necessary for our work in Egypt now,
secondly, in leaving it to secure the privileged
position which will pay us for blood and treasure
spent . . . . we must avoid any definite or con-
tingent promise of evacuation.

Abandoning Egypt was unthinkable unless the European
powers formally agreed to make great concessions to the
British in Africa and Asia.

For early evacuation will be the only price we shall

have to offer for this second object. If we can say
to Europe we are in possession: practically you can

 

1Salisbury to Wolff, August 7, 1885, no. 1. Corre-
spondence respecting Sir H. Drummond Wolff's special mission
to Constantinople, British State Papers, British Museum,
London, are henceforth referred to as W.C.

2Al-Sayyid, op. cit., p. 46.

39

not turn us out. What will you give us to go soon?

And if the state of European politics happens to be

favorable we may gain a great deal for England.1
But in 1885, such an arrangement seemed impossible. Thus,
the WOlff mission was essentially an attempt to gain time and
assess the reaction of the major European powers, especially
France, toward the British occupation. This intent was made
clear by Salisbury's refusal to give Wolff full powers to
negotiate with the Ottomans, a fact which aroused much sus-
picion in Constantinople.

Despite the Wolff mission, Salisbury had no specific
policy toward the Egyptian question in 1885. Because of
Egypt's strategic value and profound importance to Britain's
Mediterranean interests, the only thing upon which Salisbury
insisted was British supremacy in Egypt, either through con-
tinued occupation or through guarantees from the other powers
if Britain should withdraw. In a private letter dated August
18, 1885, Salisbury told Wolff:

My great objection to fixing a date for our evacu-
ation of Egypt is that relief from our hated pres-
ence is the one bribe we have to offer, the price

we have to pay for any little advantage we may de-
sire to secure. If we once part with that, we

 

lIbid.

 

4O

practically go into the market empty-handed, a

practice of which the late government were fond,

but which I never knew came to any good.1

Thus instructed, Sir Drummond Wolff, Ambassador Extra-

ordinary, arrived in Constantinople on August 22, 1885. In
his negotiations with the Ottomans, Wolff followed Salisbury's
directions and avoided any serious talks about British evac—
uation.2 In a private letter dated September 8, 1885,
Salisbury told Wolff that the Queen was strongly against any
promise to withdraw:

The Queen is dreadfully nervous of any promise of

a fixed time for evacuation. I have generally found

she represents a large body of conservative opinion

of the less obtrusive kind.3
Therefore, Wolff concentrated his efforts on gaining Ottoman
approval on three main points. First, the sultan should send

troops to subdue the Sudanese rebellion. This alternative to

sending British troops was favored because the sultan had a

 

1Salisbury to WOlff, private, August 18, 1885, no.
A 44/33. Salisbury Papers. The Salisbury Papers, Hatfield
House, Hatfield, Herts, are henceforth referred to as S.P.

2The Ottoman negotiators were: Assim Pasha, Minister
for Foreign Affairs, Kiamil Pasha, Minister of Evcaf, and
Naoum Effendi, who acted as pratocolist. After September 25.
1885, the new Grand Vizier, Kiamil Pasha, Aarifi Pasha, the
new president of the council of State and acting Minister of
Foreign Affairs, and Mohammed Said Pasha, the Foreign Minister.

38.?. Salisbury to Wolff, private, September 8, 1885,
no. A 44/35.

41

legitimate claim to the Sudan, and the Sudanese Muslims might
find it more difficult to fight Ottoman Muslims than the
troops of a Christian nation. Second, the sultan should ap-
point a commissioner to proceed to Egypt with Wolff or some
other British representative to settle the future organiza-
tion of the country. Third, any international engagements
contracted by Khedive Tawfik must be taken into consideration
in reaching the final settlement of the Egyptian question.

The Ottomans were inclined to accept the last two
stipulations, but they hesitated over the first. Sultan
Abdul Hamid II feared that sending troops would damage his
reputation as a Muslim leader and would create great diffi-
culties among his Muslim subjects.

During the negotiations, the sultan pressed the
British to fix a date for evacuation, but they refused. They
claimed that if they left, another European power would re-
place them. Furthermore, Wolff maintained that British troops
were the guardians of European interests in Egypt, which ob-
liged them to stay until they felt the country was able to
pay its debts.

Under instructions from Salisbury, Wolff did make one
conciliatory move to gain Ottoman approval of the British

position. He suggested that British troops might withdraw

42

gradually if the sultan allowed Khedive Tawfik to recruit
soldiers from the Ottoman Empire to replace the British units.
But he also made it clear that if such a proposal was agree-
able, the withdrawal of British forces required the consent
of both the British and Ottoman commissioners in Egypt as
well as of the Khedive, so that the satisfactory operation of
the government in Egypt would be secured.1

On October 24, 1885, a convention was signed between
England and the Ottoman Empire. There were six articles.
First, both governments agreed to send a high commissioner to
study the situation in Egypt. They would report their find-
ings to their governments and the best solution for the Egyp-
tian question would then be decided. Second, the Ottoman
high commissioner would consult with the Khedive to try and
find the best means of tranquilizing the Sudan by peaceful
measures. The Ottomans agreed to inform the English high
commissioner of the negotiations with the Sudanese and not to
reach any settlement without British consent. Third, both
high commissioners would diSCUSS‘With the Khedive the best

means of reorganizing all branches of the Egyptian

 

1W.C., Wolff to Salisbury, September 15, 1885, no.

22.

43

administration and would try to introduce any reforms which
might be considered necessary. Fourth, the sultan agreed to
respect the international engagements contracted by Khedive
Tawfik unless they were contrary to the privileges granted by
his Imperial Firmans. Fifth, both commissioners would examine
and study the internal affairs of Egypt. They would both help
the Egyptian government secure its southern frontiers and
maintain domestic stability and order. Once assured that
order prevailed, they would report to their governments, which
would then consider concluding a convention regulating the
withdrawal of the British troops in a convenient period.
Sixth, both governments agreed to ratify the convention, and
the exchange should take place at Constantinople within fif-
teen days or less, if possible.1

The convention was greatly to Britain's advantage.
The Porte acknowledged the occupation, and the sultan's in-
fluence in Egypt was thereby considerably diminished. In
particular, the appointment of English and Ottoman high com-

missioners meant, to the British, that the Porte officially

recognized and accepted the occupation, which weakened both

 

1W.C., Wolff to Salisbury, October 24, 1885, no. 65.

44

European opposition and Egyptian resistance. The agreement
was a great success for Salisbury.

In accord with the agreement, the two commissioners,
Drummond Wolff and Hukhtar Pasha Ghazi, went to Egypt to dis-
cuss with Khedive Tawfik the reorganization of his adminis-
tration and the army. Wolff was astonished by the Ottoman
attitude. He reported to Salisbury that he believed the
Ottomans expected the British to stay in Egypt for a long
period, for they had ceased pressing for an evacuation date.
Therefore, he advised his government to reach a final agree-
ment with the sultan which would give the British a legiti-
mate basis for staying on. But France consistently opposed
any such agreement if it did not include a specific evacua-
tion date.

After the agreement was signed, Salisbury was re-
placed by Gladstone, but the latter's government lasted only
six months. Gladstone, who was busy with the Irish Home Rule
question, did not have much time to devote to Egyptian mat-
ters. In June 1886, Salisbury returned to form a new minis-

try, this time with a secure governing majority.

Drummond Wolff's Second Mission
to Constantinople

 

 

When Salisbury returned to power in June 1886,

Britain had become diplomatically isolated, and the inter-

national situation was tense. He wrote to Baring:

We have a hard game to play, and a very full board.
Abroad we seem to shut up the alternative of two
wars either of which is likely to modify profoundly
the face of Europe . . . . in these circumstances
you must not be surprised if we find our hands a
good deal tied in many respects.1

The Egyptian question was one among many issues on

which Salisbury believed he should take immediate action.

The best course seemed to be resumption of diplomatic nego-

tiations with the Ottomans. This step was chosen to meet

possible pressure from the European powers to neutralize

Egypt. The idea of neutralization was unacceptable to

Salisbury unless England could maintain the right to secure

its own interests:

The object which the Powers of Europe have had in
view may be generally expressed by the phrase "the
neutralization of Egypt,” . . . . the British

 

no.

1Salisbury to Baring, private, February 13, 1887,
88, P.R.O. F.O. 633/7.

45

46

Government must retain the right to guard and up-
hold the condition of things which have been brought

about by the military action and large sacrificies
of this country.

Salisbury again sent Drummond Wolff to Constantinople,
in January 1887, in an attempt to convince the Ottomans to
reach a final agreement. Salisbury had little confidence in
the mission's success. He wrote to Baring:

Wolff's negotiations are not promising at present.
I do not think they will come to much unless there
is some change in the present distribution of
power in Europe. But they seem to keep the door
Open, and to give the French an excuse before
their own people for taking no steps.

Wolff's mission, in Salisbury's view, was merely an
attempt to gain time, not a serious search for a solution.
The stumbling blocks were Germany and France:

Bismarck is trying to force us into an attitude
more definitely antagonistic to the French. This
is natural, as he wishes to isolate them, and
would not be sorry to waste a portion of their
forces upon us. This of course is not our inter-
est, and the necessity of guarding against this
device adds to the difficulties of our negotia-
tion just now.

 

1Salisbury to Wolff, January 15, 1887, British State
Paper, no. 2.

2Salisbury to Baring, private, February 13, 1887, no.
88, P.R.O. F.O., 633/7.

3Salisbury to Baring, private, February 25, 1887, no.
89, P.R.O. F.O., 633/7.

47

Even though Bismarck could stir up considerable trou-
ble over Egypt, Salisbury viewed France as the main obstacle
to reaching an agreement with the Porte. By sending Wolff
to Constantinople for an unspecified time, he hoped that

eventually a political change in France would alter Official

attitudes:

Whether we shall get as much as this out of France
may very well be doubted and the negotiation may
take a long time. If the present strained condi-
tion of affairs in Europe should end in any result
to the detriment of France, she might become more
open to persuasion than she is now.1

Salisbury was in no hurry to reach an agreement with the
Ottomans unless he was sure that the French would allow it:
With a future so uncertain, we are not anxious for
an immediate close of the negotiation and therefore
these ideas are only put in the form of suggestions,
and must not be looked upon as having reached any
further stages of growth. In fact, it is evident

that a good deal of flesh must be put upon their

bones before they can come to maturity.
Lord Lyons, the British ambassador at Paris, was more Opti-
mistic than Salisbury. He believed that if the present

cabinet was changed, the new government would adopt a friend-

ly attitude toward England: "If there should be a new

 

1Salisbury to Baring, private, February 11, 1887, no.
87, P.R.0. F.0. 633/7,

Ibid.

48

nunistry it might possibly pursue a policy more friendly
toward England with regard to Egypt and other matters. The
Egyptian question would no doubt become less difficult."1
Therefore, Salisbury planned to use Wolff's mission to buy
time: "Our negotiations must be circumspect, slow, and a
little hazy and ambiguous."2

In February 1887, according to Salisbury's instruc-
tions, Wolff delivered to the Sublime Porte a memorandum
which outlined the framework that the negotiations should
follow. He concentrated on four main points. First, the
withdrawal of troops from Egypt should not take place before
England was sure that the Egyptians were able to handle their
own administration and that any agreement they had or might
have with the Khedive would be honored. Therefore, England
could not fix a date for the evacuation unless external and
internal peace for Egypt were assured. Second, the European
powers should give their consent to any agreements reached
between England and the Ottoman Empire. The British wanted

to be certain that no powers would seek to replace them in

Egypt._ Third, England would insist on retaining in a

 

lS.P., Lord Lyons to Salisbury, private, February 18,
1887, no. A56/1l.

2S.P., Salisbury to Malet, private, February 23, 1887,
no. A 64/3.

49

position of command a sufficient number of British Officers,
and only on that condition would Britain accept the responsi-
bility of evacuation. But England would not withdraw unless
it felt that the situation in Egypt were satisfactory.
Fourth, England was willing to agree with the European powers'
view that the best solution of the Egyptian question was to
neutralize that country. Each power should have the right to
make use of the land passage to proceed from one sea to the
other, but no foreign soldiers should be permitted to remain
on Egyptian soil. This condition must be restricted to peri-
ods of peace as far as England was concerned. If the

British agreed to evacuate Egypt, they must be allowed to re-
tain a treaty right of intervention if at any time internal
peace or external security should be threatened.

In a private instruction, Salisbury told Wolff to
concentrate on securing perpetual security for free transit
within Egypt and along the Suez Canal for the British. He
also insisted on the right of reentry into Egypt as the main
condition of any British evacuation:

I wish to obtain if it is possible some treaty right

of re-occupation, under proper conditions and limita-
tions, which would enable us to watch over Egypt

50

from Cyprus and Malta, withOut offending the
Mussulman population by floating the infidel flag
among them.1
Sultan Abdul Hamid II was reluctant to enter into new
negotiations. He believed the agreement of 1885 had paved
the way for British withdrawal, still not accomplished after
a year, and that further discussions should wait upon that
withdrawal. The British pointed out that Article VI had Stip-
ulated that further agreement should be discussed. Also, they
threatened to "take away from (the sultan) the Califate which
is derived from Egypt, and give it to one of the Egyptian
sheiks who are descended from the prophet."2
Given this attitude, the sultan agreed to begin talks
on February 6, 1887. There was great pressure from France
and Russia on the sultan to insist on a fixed date for the
British evacuation. They urged him to maintain his authority
over Egypt. The French position was clear, as Salisbury ex-
plained to Baring:

The French through Herbette to Malet tell us that
all our troubles are due to our refusal to fix a

 

1Salisbury to Baring, private, January 21, 1887, no.
85, P.R.O. F.O. 633/7.

2S.P. Wolff to Salisbury, Decypher, Private and
Secret, July 11, 1887, no. A51/133.

51

date for the evacuation . . . "only let us (the
French) have the credit of having induced you to
fix a date.“1 '

The Ottomans opened their talks with Wolff by demand-
ing that England should fix a date for evacuation within three
to six months and that the British officers in the Egyptian
army should be gradually replaced by Ottoman officers.2 They
wanted to resume responsibility for protecting Egypt in the
event of disorders, but should it prove inconvenient for the
Porte to send troops, then England should have the right of
re-entry. England rejected these suggestions on the ground
that they did not have any guarantee against the attempts of
other powers to obtain paramount influence in Egypt. The
British declared they could not withdraw for many months and
that British officers must remain in command of the Egyptian
army.

The Ottomans asked if it were possible to limit the
negotiations to matters which could be settled between

England and the Ottoman Empire alone. Salisbury replied that

the British government could not agree to a partial

 

1Salisbury to Baring, private, February 4, 1887, no.
86, P.R.O. F.O. 633/7.

2The Ottomans who conducted the negotiations were the
Grand Vizier Kiamil Pasha and the Minister of Foreign Affairs,
MOhammed Said Pasha.

52

arrangement which would leave the Egyptian question undecided
in the absence of an international understanding. Sultan
Abdul Hamid II personally was unhappy with the question of
neutralization. He preferred to substitute the French phrase,

"sarete'territoriale.' He asked in what respect a treaty of
neutralization would secure his right in Egypt. The Porte be-
lieved that the existing treaties guaranteeing the integrity
of the Ottoman Empire were sufficient; if they were not, how
would a treaty of neutralization prove more effective? The
Ottomans also asked whether the powers who would join in the
treaty would be responsible for resisting any possible viola-
tion of neutrality. Next, the Porte pointed out that if the
question of neutralization were so important, should it not
be arranged by separate treaty between the Ottoman Empire and
England. The Ottomans feared "neutralization" because of the
Belgian case, for they believed that the policy had caused
Belgium's separation from the kingdom of the Netherlands.

The neutralization of Egypt was not so vital an issue that
Salisbury was prepared to insist on it. He felt it was more

important to England to reach an agreement with the Ottomans

.than to pressure them into accepting neutralization. He told

 

1W.C., Wolff to Salisbury, March 11, 1887. no. 40.

53

the Ottomans, through Wolff, that "Her Majesty's Government
attach no importance to the word of "neutralization."l The
issue was dropped from the negotiations.

On April 16, the Ottomans submitted their first pro-
posal to Wolff. It consisted of four articles. First, they
wanted British troops to be withdrawn within eighteen months.
Second, they demanded the removal of British officers from
the Egyptian army within a year. Third, the Porte would give
England the right of re-entry, but it would be limited to
cases of external invasion and would hold for only a few
years after the British evacuation. Fourth, the Ottoman
Empire would re-establish the Egyptian administration in the
Sudan.2 Salisbury rejected the proposal, mainly objecting
to the third condition: "It will be impossible for us to
consent to limit our right of re-entry to a fixed number of
years."3

The Ottomans considered these points as necessary

preconditions for agreeing to the British right of re-entry

 

1W.C., Salisbury to Wolff, telegraphic, April 10,
1887. no. 58.

2W.C., Wolff to Salisbury, telegraphic, April 16,
1887. no. 61.

3S.P., Salisbury to Wolff, private, telegram, July
11, 1887. no. A 51/189.

54

into Egypt. They believed these were the only terms the
other powers would accept. If the Europeans refused to rati-
fy an agreement between the Ottomans and England, the British
occupation would continue indefinitely.

Salisbury asked WOlff to insist on three years as the
minimum period before British troops would be withdrawn. He
also insisted that British officers remain in command of the
Egyptian army even longer: "We are prepared to agree to the
term of three years. I think that the English officers
should be retained in the Egyptian army for a couple of years
longer."1

During the negotiations there were rumors that England
might agree to allow the sultan to send troops to Egypt. When
the French heard of this, they informed the sultan that they
would not accept such a plan. The French feared that the
British would gain control over the militarily weak Ottoman
sultan. Salisbury, with no European ally willing to support
his policy to hold Egypt, had no choice but to use the Wolff
mission to buy time: "We must keep it diplomatically in our

power4"2..Sa1isbury admitted that it was only because the

 

lW.C., Salisbury to Wolff, telegraphic, May 2, 1887.
no. 72.

2S.P., Salisbury to Wolff, private, February 23,
1887, no. A51/l49.

55

British occupied Egypt that the European powers were trying
to gain concessions in exchange for their support. He
thought that if the Gladstone government had tried to secure
British interests without direct military occupation, Britain
would be in a better position to resist European pressure.
We should "satisfy France on account of Bismarck's attitude.
His policy, in a humbler walk of life, would be called
chantage . . . . I heartily wish we had never gone to Egypt.
Had we not done so, we could snap our fingers at all the
world."1 However, since the occupation had taken place, he
believed that his task was to secure the British position.
The Egyptian question also created problems for
Salisbury at home. During the negotiations there were intim-
ations, leaked through the diplomatic circle at Constanti-
nople, that Salisbury might agree to leave Egypt. This
aroused considerable opposition among officials, the press,
and the public. Salisbury, who was annoyed by such rumors,
instructed Wolff to be more careful in his contact with
people there: "Choose your confidants carefully--reports

of your private conversations come home in odd sorts of

 

1Ibid.

56

ways, and the business of explaining away is sometimes per-
plexing."1

Among the officials who opposed evacuation was Baring.
He feared that such an agreement would destroy British in-
terests in Egypt and would raise Egyptian nationalist's hope
of getting rid of the British altogether:

Evacuation would mean retrogression . . . . On no
account agree to fixing unconditionally a date for
our departure. I think we must leave a door open
in case we should not think it wise to go

I am not in the least prepared to say with any
degree of certainty that at the end of say, five
years, we shall be able to go.2

Wolff supported Baring on the ground that such a move would
destroy the unpopular Khedive Tawfik and his puppet cabinet.
"Nubar [the Egyptian prime minister] feels his position and
that of the Khedive untenable without the British occupa-
tion."3 But Salisbury had no intention of withdrawing; he

assured critics that he did "not see any probability of our

leaving Egypt under six years from this date and our stay

 

1Ibid.

2Baring to Salisbury, private, April 1, 1887, no.
94., P.R.O. F.O. 633/6.

3Wolff to Salisbury, May 8, 1887, P.R.O. F.O. 78/2823.

57

may be much longer."1 He also reminded the public that it
was Gladstone's government which had entangled him in the
Egyptian occupation, and that he merely was trying to find a
proper solution: "We are bound hand and foot by the pledges
of retirement which our predecessor have given, and which we
impliedly confirmed."2
During the negotiations in 1887, Salisbury made it
clear that abandoning Egypt would be seen by the British as
a move to destroy their empire, especially because of Egypt's
strategic value. Salisbury, an avowed imperialist, also
viewed Egypt as the essential link between Britain and India
and the Far East. He was aware that "English opinion is not
prepared for an evacuation of Egypt. Still less for the
abandonment of it."3
The idea of the British leaving Egypt annoyed

Bismarck. His son, Count Bismarck, the German foreign minis—

ter, told Malet, the British ambassador at Berlin, that his

 

1Salisbury to Baring, private, February 11, 1887,
no. 55, P.R.O. F.O. 633/7.

2Salisbury to Baring, private, May 6, 1977, no. 92,
P.R.O. F.O. 633/7.

3S.P., Salisbury to Wolff, private, February 23,
1887, no. 51/149.

58

father disapproved and thought such an action might cause the

fall of Salisbury's cabinet:

He had reminded the Ambassador that the English inter-
vention in Egypt was the work of the liberal govern—
ment under Gladstone. It might happen that, were you
to make too great concessions, the unionists who still
called themselves liberals might unite on the (Egyptian)
question with Mr. Gladstone and so produce the fall of
the present government.1

Salisbury admitted that he could not agree to withdrawal from
Egypt, even with guarantees which would secure British in-
fluence there, since that would mean the end of his ministry
and the return of Gladstone. In a private letter to Wolff
dated March 23, 1887, he stated the matter clearly:

(It) is to a certain extent unfortunate for your nego-
tiations, because it is not easy to come to a con-
clusion on the question of guarantees. There is also
another difficulty. We do not even yet know our

exact Parliamentary footing . . . in other words, how
many people there are who are willing to see Glad-
stone back in office. Till we know this, I expect

my colleagues to be very nervous about guarantees,
lest they should give to Gladstone the weapon he

wants .

In April 1887, after several meetings with Sultan
Abdul Hamid II and the European representatives at Constan-

tinople, Wolff came to a conclusion that the best way to

 

1S. P., Malet to Salisbury, private, June 25, 1887,
no. A61/29.

2S.P., Salisbury to Wolff, private, March 23, 1877,
no. A51/155.

5.9

solve the issue was to place Egypt under international con-
trol. Salisbury.rejected the idea on the ground that it
would put England at the mercy of the Germans and the French:

Referring to your private letter, I do not see my

way to any acceptance of international control. It

means, to us, slavery to Germany. We must normally

be the rivals of France, and can never escape from

that position: and therefore we can never have an

international majority without the help of Germany.

And Germany will sell that help very dear.
Aside from the French and German challenge to British inter-
ests in Egypt, Salisbury also feared that the small powers
would find an opportunity to demand concessions from England
in return for their cooperation. He believed that if such a
plan were worked out, the United States, whose relations
with England were not good, would create trouble:

The setting up of any such council would be a matter

of extreme difficulty, because the smaller powers

would insist on their share. I do not see my way out

of this difficulty, specially on account of the

United States.2
In response to Ottoman and European pressure, and in an at-

tempt to gain time, Salisbury authorized Wolff to state that

British troops would withdraw from Cairo within three years

 

lS.P., Salisbury to Wolff, private, April 6, 1887,
no. A51/158.

2Ibid.

60

and from.Egypt within five, if order and security in the in—
terior were undisturbed. But the right to reOccupation was
essential in Salisbury's view:

The end to which I would like you to work is evac-

uation, but with certain privileges reserved for

England. I should like a treaty right to occupy

Alexandria when we p1eased.1
Agreement was reached on May 22, 1887, according to the
British terms, and the sultan was inclined to accept it. How-
ever, France and Russia opposed the convention because of the
reoccupation clause. They believed it gave England rights
equal to those of the Porte, which would mean that England
and the Ottomans were to be joint sovereigns of Egypt. The
French warned the sultan that if he ratified the convention
he would be handing over a part of his territories to England.
The British would be released, unlike the other powers, from
the obligations of the Treaty of Berlin, which maintained
the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. The French and Russians
also told the Porte that since the convention gave no advan-
tages to the Ottoman Empire, they considered it a treaty of
alliance; if it were ratified, they would no longer consider

the Ottoman Empire a neutral state. Furthermore, they warned

VSultan Abdul Hamid II that if he accepted the treaty, they

 

1Cecil,‘op.cit., III, p. 235.

61

would thereby assume the right to occupy other provinces of
the Ottoman Empire and to leave only after a similar conven-
tion had been concluded. Thus France might occupy Syria, and
Russia might move into Armenia.
Under such pressure, the sultan asked Salisbury to
delay ratification of the treaty by Queen Victoria. He first
wanted to submit the convention to the other powers. The
Ottomans suggested that the matter might better be discussed
in London or Paris, rather than Constantinople. Salisbury
firmly rejected these suggestions: "Her Majesty's government
cannot consent to postpone the ratification of the conven-
tion; still less can they discuss the convention with the
other powers before the exchange of ratification."1 He
threatened the sultan by adding that should
the Porte refuse to ratify on the appointed day, the
treaty will, of course, fall through, but the posi-
tion of this country will be entirely changed. Her
Majesty's government will be released from their
engagements with the Porte in regard to Egypt, and
Will remain free to take their own course.

Since it was clear to Salisbury that achieving an agreement

with the Ottomans would be better than nothing, he agreed to

give_the_sultan five days in which to reconsider ratification

 

lW.C., Salisbury to Wolff, Telegraph, June 4, 1887,

no. 8.

ZIbid.

62

Salisbury informed Bismarck, hoping the latter would urge
Sultan Abdul Hamid II to sign: "Count Bismarck told me that
your Lordship had accorded a prolongation of five days for
the ratification."1 The sultan, who feared the French and
Russians more than the British, refused to ratify, and
Wolff's mission ended in failure.

The French attitude enraged Salisbury: "They are the
most unreasonable people I have ever heard or dreamt of."2
He became more determined than ever to hold Egypt, and his
mistrust of France grew. But the French remained firm in
their resolve to thwart any agreement between England and the
Ottoman Empire which would strengthen the British and weaken
French interests in the Mediterranean. The French believed
they had little choice but to protect their empire in Indo—
China and North Africa, and they felt it imperative to pre-
vent Britain from gaining a strategic position in Egypt un—
less France received important concessions. They wanted some
African territories and British recognition of their interests
in Tripoli and Tunis. Those demands were unacceptable to

.Salisbury: "I would not allow him (the French foreign Minister)

 

lS.P., Malet to Salisbury, private, June 21, 1887,

no. A 61/28.

2Cecil, 0p. cit., IV, 34.

63

for a moment to believe that such a proposition will be lis-
tened to. We at least cannot go with a policy of exchange."1

In January 1888, the sultan approached Salisbury with
a new suggestion. In an attempt to overcome the Franco-
Russian opposition to the right of re-entry, the sultan told
the British that he would agree to allow them to keep their
troops and a naval base in Alexandria. Salisbury rejected
the proposal:

[Sir Henry Evelyn] Woods Pasha (the Commander in
Chief of the Egyptian army) came to me and pro-
posed-~or professed to propose--on behalf of the
Sultan that we should accept some hold upon
Alexandria . . . . I doubt this being more pala-
table to the French, and it would not give us an
equally effective leverage for protecting Egypt
from external and internal enemies.

The sultan, regretful that he had not ratified the
convention of 1887, tried to induce the British to renew ne-
gotiations in 1890. He authorized his Grand Vizier to ne-
gotiate on the basis that he would accept the right of re-
entry if the British would withdraw their troops within a

year. Once more, Salisbury refused on the ground that

England no longer believed it should fix a date for

 

lS.P., Salisbury to Lytton, private, September 1890,

no. 95.

2Salisbury to Baring, private, January 20, 1888, no.
97, P.R.O F.O. 633/7.

64

withdrawal: "The sultan has made new and wholly unacceptable
proposals with respect to evacuation. He must perfectly
well know they are unacceptable. I cannot make out what ob-
ject of policy he has in view in making them."1 Salisbury
suspected that the sultan had been encouraged by the European
powers, mainly France and Russia, to submit such a proposal.
Therefore, he believed it would be against British imperial
interests in Egypt and the Mediterranean ot accept.

One might ask whether Salisbury seriously intended
to end the British occupation. It could be argued that care—
ful study of Salisbury's private and official correspondence
reveals that he thought the occupation was to England's
disadvantage since the European great powers were opposed.
Salisbury believed that it was only the Egyptian issue which
caused the friction with France, the German pressure for con-
cessions,the hostility to Britain in the Muslim.world, and
the danger of reduced British influence on the sultan. But
it was obvious that Salisbury opposed ending the occupation

unless he received the great powers' consent that they would

 

1S.P., Salisbury to Baring, private, April 25, 1890,
no. 55/54.

2Iahumd Y. Zayid, Egypt's Struggle for Independence,
(Beirut: 1965) p. 47.

65

officially accept British supremacy in Egypt. This was quite
clear frOm his insistence on England's right of re-entry.

The failure of WOlff's negotiations upset Salisbury
and revealed to him how strong was the French and Russian
influence at Constantinople and how weak was that of the,
British. Moreover, Salisbury believed the failure of the
negotiations greatly affected the balance of power in Europe
and weakened British imperial interests. Therefore, he
decided to abandon his efforts to settle the Egyptian question
by direct dealings with the sultan. Instead, he concluded,
the best course for securing British interests in Egypt and
elsewhere was to seek closer relations with the central

powers. This policy will be discussed in the next chapter.

Chapter III
SALISBURY, THE GREAT POWERS,

AND EGYPT: 1885-1892

To understand Great Britain's relations with the
European powers and their effect on the Egyptian question, it
is necessary to review the European situation during the per-
iod 1885-1892. France faced difficult problems arising from
its loss of the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine to Germany
and its conflict with Britain over Egypt. Bismarck's plan
to isolate the French by forming an alliance with Austria-
Hungary and Italy also weakened France and prevented it from
taking any active role on the Continent. Although the alli—
ance system kept Britain isolated, the British were willing
to remain aloof from continental conflict. They did, how-
ever, make it clear that if war should break out in Europe,
they would intervene to maintain the balance of power and to

protect their own interests.

66

 

67

Germany

In 1885, Bismarck was, of course, aware of Salis-
bury's attempts to solve the Anglo-French conflict over Egypt
by sending the Drummond Wolff mission to Constantinople.
Bismarck appreciated Salisbury's dilemma and sought to bene—
fit from it. He knew that Salisbury needed German support
to ease the Egyptian situation. Salisbury remarked: "It is
only Egypt that puts us in this difficulty--for otherwise
Bismarck's wrath would be of little moment to us. It is
heartily to be wished we were delivered from this very in-
convenient and somewhat humiliating relation."1 Germany's
importance stemmed mainly from Bismarck's good relations with
Sultan Abdum Hamid II: "He [Bismarck] has obtained consider—
able hold over the sultan's mind."2 Furthermore, Germany had
a vote through its representative at the Caisse, which con-
trolled the financial administration of Egypt. Therefore,
German support was essential. AS Baring said, "Berlin and not

Cairo is the real center of gravity of Egyptian affairs."3

 

1S.P., Salisbury to Scott, private and confidential,
May 4, 1887, no. A64/10.

2Ibid.

 

3Marquis of Zetland, Lord Cromer (London: 1932), p. 128.

68

Realizing this, in 1885 Salisbury urged Malet to seek German
support for Wolff's first mission to Constantinople:

I have thought it better not to give you a personal

instruction to ask for his [Bismarck's] assistance

as it might draw down on us a snub. But if you

should see any opportunity of asking for assistance

at Constantinople and think it will be favourably

received, pray consider yourself instructed to ask

for it.1

MOre generally, Bismarck worked to bring Britain into

the orbit of the Central Powers. His efforts were rewarded
when Britain and Italy signed a secret convention on February
12, 1887, and reached an understanding which became known as
the Mediterranean Agreement. The two agreed to consult on
maintenance of the status quo in the Mediterranean, Aegean,
and Black Sea. Italy accepted the British position in Egypt,
and Britain agreed to support Italy in North Africa. A few
months later, on December 12, 1887, Austria-Hungary became
party to the understanding. The main aim of the agreement
was to prevent the Ottoman Empire from ceding any rights in
the Balkans or the Near East and to prevent Russia from gain-
ing any concession from the Ottomans. On November 30, 1887,

Salisbury stated in a letter to Bismarck:

I believe that the understanding into which England
and the other two powers are now prepared to enter

 

l
A 44/14.

S.P., Salisbury to Malet, September 1, 1885, no.

69

will be in complete accordance with her declared

policy, and will be loyally observed by her. The

_grouping of states which has been the work of the

last year will be an effective barrier against

any possible aggression of Russia, and the con—

struction of it will not be among the least ser-

vices which your Serene Highness has rendered to

the cause of European peace.1
According to the Mediterranean Agreement, Italy and Austria-
Hungary were given assurance that Britain would support them
diplomatically at the Straits and in the Mediterranean. But
since Britain was a parliamentary state, there was no guar—
antee that the British would offer military and naval assis-
tance to the two countries in case of war.

The main reasons for Britain's support of the Triple
Alliance were that it strengthened the British position in
the Mediterranean and Egypt and weakened French opposition
to the British occupation of the latter. The agreement was
intended to maintain the balance of power in the Mediter-
ranean and bring peace to the area. It was an attempt by
Salisbury to gain German support in the matter of the Egyp—
tian question. Furthermore, Salisbury feared Franco-Russian
relations might undercut his plan for a Mediterranean balance

of power. He also hoped to ease the tension existing be-

tween France and Germany at the beginning of 1887, which

 

1Cecil,‘op. cit., p. 77.

20

might lead to war, which in turn would adversely affect the
Near Eastern situation. Salisbury foresaw that such a war
would mean the downfall of the Ottoman Empire, which would
seriously affect the British position in Egypt.

The Mediterranean Agreement was a great success for
Bismarck, the result of his efforts in the late 18803 to
maintain friendly relations with Britain. In exchange, he
had acquired potential British support for Austria regarding
the Straits. As the British navy was the strongest in Europe
at that time, the British could decide the future of the
Straits.

But the agreement did not bring about a change in
Germany's attitude toward the British in Egypt during 1887—
1890. Salisbury's failure to gain German support there was
due mainly to Bismarck's continuing desire to take advantage
of the Egyptian question to separate Britain and France.
Salisbury was not ignorant of these intentions:

Bismarck's criticism of our Egyptian policy is
discouraging. He is hard to please--we have
willingly ranged ourselves with the Central
European Powers--but when he wants us-—as he
evidently does--to quarrel with France down-

right over Egypt, I think he is driving too
hard a bargain.

 

1S.P., Salisbury to Malet, private, February 23,
1887, no. A 64/3.

71

Even though Salisbury was aware of German policy and tried
to thwart it, he had few alternatives. Germany was the
strongest state in Europe, and the British needed its coop-
eration to maintain the balance of power there. Furthermore,
the German representative to the Caisse at Cairo was an in-
portant factor in Britain's Egyptian policy. When these Ger-
man agents tried to play a decisive role in Egypt, Salisbury
protested to Berlin:

It might be well to suggest to Hatzfeldt that the

two German representatives in Egypt, the Consul

General and the member of the Caisse, do not seem

to have realized that Berlin and London are at

present upon friendly terms.1

The Caisse de la Dette Publique had been established

in May 1876, when Egypt became bankrupt. From 1876 to 1885,
England, France, Austria-Hungary, and Italy were members.
After the occupation, British diplomatic pressure succeeded
in gaining full membership for Germany and Russia in 1885.
In 1887, Salisbury believed German support was needed in the
Caisse. He anticipated a possible change in government in
Paris which might draw Italy and Austria-Hungary closer to

France. Therefore, German support would enable the British

to rule Egypt smoothly.

 

1S.P., Salisbury to Malet, private, August 18, 1885,
no. A 44/12.

72

Salisbury soon grew tired of depending on German
_goodwill. He thought it would be in the British interest to
find a way to ease the European powers' pressure on Britain
regarding Egypt. Sir Drummond Wolff's missions to Constan-
tinople during 1885-1887 were deemed by Salisbury as the best
solution to relieve this pressure and gain time: "A little
further on in the history of Europe the condition may have
changed and we may be able to get some agreement arrived at
which will justify evacuation."1
In a final attempt to gain Bismarck's support for his
Egyptian policy and in order to overcome Franco-Russian op-
position to the Anglo-Turkish agreement signed in May 1887,
Salisbury sent a copy of the draft to Bismarck. Germany was
the only great power to receive one: "I send you a draft of
the convention which Wolff is negotiating at Constantinople.
I have allowed Hatzfeldt to see it: and Wolff has shown it
to Calice. But beyond those two powers we do not wish it to
be known at present."2 But Bismarck, who was benefiting from

the friction between England and France, was unwilling to

press the sultan to ratify the agreement.

 

1Salisbury to Lyons, July 20, 1887, Newton, 11, p. 409.

2S.P., Salisbury to Malet, private, April 13, 1887,
no. A 64/5.

73

Early in 1889, Bismarck tried to pull Britain into a
closer alliance with Germany, but Salisbury was not willing
to agree to formal ties. He viewed such an alliance as
damaging to the balance of power in Europe and as more advan-
tageous to Germany than to Britain. He believed that a thor-
ough but informal understanding would better serve British
interests.
Salisbury saw the necessity for colonial concessions
to Germany in exchange for its support. At the end of 1889,
he accepted Bismarck's proposal to transfer the East African
colonies of Uganda and Zanzibar to British rule in return
for German access to the Zambesi River and the granting of
Heligoland Island to Germany. Salisbury defended this ar-
rangement to the Queen, who did not approve:
Any indefinite postponement of a settlement in Africa
would render it very difficult to maintain terms of
amity with Germany, and would force us to change our
system of alliances in Europe. The alliance of
France instead of the alliance of Germany must neces-
sarily involve the early evacuation of Egypt under
very unfavorable conditions.1

Salisbury believed that an agreement with Germany would shape

the political future of a large part of Africa. The agree-

.ment would have given the British absolute domination over

 

15.P., Salisbury to Queen Victoria, cypher, June 10,
1890, no. A46/65.

74

the entire Nile Valley and would have secured their position
in Egypt. The sudden fall of Bismarck on March 20, 1890,
gave Salisbury a great opportunity to obtain what he wanted
from the new German government. Sir William.Ma1et,the Brit-
ish ambassador in Berlin, expressed his view about what
Britain could expect in a private letter to Salisbury:

I suspect that the German government are even more

anxious than we are to get all the African questions

in dispute between us definitely settled. It would

be a feather in the cap of the new government while

failure would be ascribed to the absence of the

master directing mind of Prince Bismarck.1

Salisbury and the Germans resumed negotiations in

Arpil 1890 and reached agreement on July 1. This Anglo-German
colonial agreement, which was known as the Heligoland Treaty,
stipulated that the Germans would abandon large claims in
East Africa and receive in return the Island of Heligoland
which Britain had obtained from Denmark in 1815. At the time,
the island was regarded as virtually useless to the British.
Britain was given supremacy in the Nile Valley. The treaty
was regarded as a striking demonstration of Emperor William
II's readiness to establish close friendship with England.

It was one of the most important achievements of Salisbury's

Nile Valley policy.

 

1
no. 63.

S.P., Malet to Salisbury, private, April 19. 1890.

75

The French received the news of the Heligoland
Treaty with consternation; they believed that it would ser-
iously weaken their position in Africa, especially in Egypt.

On July 4, 1891, William 11, Still courting British
friendship, visited London. He tried unsuccessfully to
associate Britain with the Triple Alliance. Nevertheless,
during 1892, Germany applied no pressure on Britain regard-
ing the Egyptian question, which might reflect William's con-
tinuing desire to cultivate the British.

These new developments in Anglo-German relations en-
abled Salisbury to devote more time to dealing with the
French. Their influence in the Ottoman Empire and Egypt was
still tremendous,1 and without French favor, British inter-
ests in Egypt and the Mediterranean would always be in some

danger.

 

1The Ottomans obtained most of their needed funds
from French financial houses. Trade with France was most
important for the Ottoman Empire, and French investments in
the empire were great. France supplied the sultan with many
advisors, who were attached to Ottoman government service.
Ottoman students were sent to France for their higher educa-
tion, and French teachers were taught at Ottoman schools;
therefore, the French language was widely spoken in official
circles and among the elite.

76

France

France was the first European power to develop an
interest in Egypt and the Near East, mainly in Syria and
Lebanon. The French became involved in Egypt in the second
half of the eighteenth century. France, which dreamed of es-
tablishing an empire with India as its core, decided to oc-
cupy Egypt, believing its strategic location would facilitate
such an empire. But the European powers forced the French
to abandon this plan and withdraw from the country in 1763.
The French, under Napoleon, again tried to occupy Egypt in
1798, but they met strong opposition from the sultan and the
European powers, who forced the French army to leave Egypt
forever.

Despite their formal evacuation, the French main-
tained great influence in Egypt during the reign of Mohammed
Ali and his successors. For more than fifty years, French
lawyers, engineers, military experts, and scholars imported
into Egypt most of what that country was to borrow from
European culture. Even after twenty years of British occu-
pation, French was second only to Arabic as the language
spoken in official and bureaucratic circles. Egyptian postage

stamps and street names were in Arabic and French. Egyptian

7?

law codes were based on French models. Some Egyptian news-
papers were published in French. Paris was the first choice
of Egyptian students and scholars who had a chance to go
abroad. Most of the credits and funds the Egyptian govern-
ment obtained came from French banks. Moreover, on November
30, 1854, Ferdinand de Lesseps, a French diplomat and pro-
moter, through his friendship with the Khedive Said, suc-
ceeded in obtaining the Suez Canal concession. This further
promoted French influence in Egypt. Britain was vigorously
opposed because of the supposed threat to its interests in
India. The canal was considered entirely a French enter-
prise; the board of directors and most of the employees were
French. France was aware of its influence and unwilling to
give it up. M. de Freycinet, the French Prime Minister, said:
From the time of Napoleon onward, France was never in-
different to the affairs of Egypt, not for a single
day. At times it even seemed to her that her prestige
in the world was to be measured by the role which she
played on the banks of the Nile.1
Wolff admitted the importance of Egypt to France: "Our per-

manence in Egypt would be a cause of offence to France as bit-

. 2
ter as Alsace-Lorraine."

 

1Joseph J. Mathews,‘Egypt and the Formation of the
AngloeFrench Entente of 1904, (London: 1939) p. 7.

2
A 51/80.

 

 

S.P., Wolff to Salisbury, private, May 3, 1887, no.

78

The creation of the Suez Canal focused Europen at-
tention-on Egypt, mainly that of Britain. Viewing the canal
as so vital to its empire, the British were determined to
have some control over it. They achieved that aim in 1875
by purchasing the Khedive Ismail's shares in the canal, and
Britain eventually became the largest single shareholder.
France did not oppose the sale, mainly because of its tense
relations with Germany and its desire to maintain good re—
lations with Britain.

The sale of the Khedive's shares initiated a new era
of Anglo-French cooperation in Egyptian affairs. Each real-
ized that since both had deep interests in Egypt, it was to
their mutual benefit to cooperate, since neither would allow
the other to dominate.

During the financial crisis in 1876, France and
Britain established the Caisse to manage the Egyptian debt.
On November 18, 1876, they established an Anglo-French con-
dominium to deal with Egyptian financial affairs. Further-
more, both countries insisted that the Nubar Pasha ministry,
formed on August 15, 1878, should have a minister from each
of their countries. Sir Rivers Wilson, a British official,
was appointed as minister of finance, and Andre de Blignieres,

a Frenchman, was appointed minister of public works.

 

7_9

Cooperation between France and Britain continued for
several years. When the Egyptian nationalist movement arose,
primarily directed against foreign control and influence,
both countries saw a serious threat to their interests. On
January 8, 1882, they issued a joint note intended to cow the
nationalists. On May 2, 1882, a French squadron accompanied
the British force to Alexandria in a demonstration of power
against the nationalists and as a Show of support for the
khedive.

The British occupation of Egypt in 1882 ended French
cooperation. Because the French were suspicious of British
intentions, they refused to join a military action, hoping
that their refusal would dissuade Britain from occupying
the country.

On November 9, 1883, Britain abolished the Anglo-
French condominium. The move was considered an indication
that the British meant to stay in Egypt and rule along. The
French, of course, were upset, and they regretted their
cooperation in establishing the condominium. In his memoirs,

Freycinet wrote:

80

From the French standpoint the condominium of
England and France was a mistake, and . . . . com-
plete freedom of action would have served French
interests more effectively.1 ' '

France firmly opposed the occupation and put great
pressure upon the sultan to insist on a British evacuation.
The French attitude created serious difficulty for the Brit-
ish. France constantly told Britain that it was ready to
maintain good relations if the British would fix a date for
their evacuation.

During Wolff's mission (1885-1887) to Constantinople,
France was the main European power which worked to thwart
any Anglo-Ottoman agreement unless it specifically Stated a
date for British troop withdrawal. France believed an Anglo-
Ottoman agreement would affect the balance of power in the
Mediterranean and would constitute a serious threat to French
interests in the area.

After the failure of Wolff's mission in 1887 and the
British decision to stay in Egypt, the French tried to chal-
lenge the British in an attempt to end their occupation.
Salisbury thought the French might even wage war:

[The French] already, I am told, look upon war

with England as the cheapest of the alternatives
.open to them. They are so unreasonable, and have

 

1Langer,’op. cit., p. 257.

81

so much incurable hatred of England, that I should
dread any very glaring exhibition of our sovereignty
in Egypt at this moment.

But instead of war, France concentrated on showing
its naval strength in the Mediterranean. This challenge to
British sea power forced Britain to reasses its navel forces,
which were found wanting. Salisbury's government determined
to strengthen the navy as a symbol of British power and
prestige. The government succeeded in passingthe Naval De-
fence Act in 1889, which sought to make the British fleet
equal to the combined force of the two next strongest fleets
in Europe. The naval race between Britian and France reached
tremendous proportions. France adopted the Gervais program,
which, in cooperation with Russia, was intended to establish
French naval superiority over the British by 1893.

In response to this situation, Salisbury believed it
was necessary to continue the policy that Britain had fol-
lowed since Palmerston's time, namely, to assure the integ-
rity of the Ottoman Empire and prevent Russia from reaching

Constantinople. Through maintaining good relations with the

sultan, the British could secure their interests in Egypt

 

1Salisbury to Baring, private, February 17, 1888,
no. 98, P.R.O. F.O. 633/7.

82

and prevent other European powers from obtaining concessions
from the Ottoman empire. Britain's best course now lay in
regarding Egypt as the keystone to its Mediterranean defense
plan, as well as its Indian empire.

Salisbury's Mediterranean policy and his approach to
the Triple Alliance bore its first fruits in June 1889, when
Spuller, the French foreign Minister, approached him with a
proposal for a withdrawal from Egypt. The French were will-
ing to accept the British right of re-entry, if the situa-
tion required it, a right they had denied in 1887. The
French ambassador expressly told Salisbury: "We should not
raise any insuperable objection to the re-entry of British
troops."1

To Salisbury this offer did not seem consistent with
the current international situation, especially in light of
the recent Franco-Russian understanding. A French guarantee
of British re-entry would not secure British interests and
supremacy in Egypt and the Suez Canal. Hence, Salisbury re-
jected the French proposal. He feared the Ottoman Empire
would collapse if Britain left Egypt, which would jeopardize

British interests in Egypt, the Mediterranean, and India.

 

1Robinson, Gallagher, and Denny, op. cit., p. 282.

83

To justify his rejection of their offer, he told the
French that he could not fix a definite time for British with-
drawal because of Egyptian internal affairs. If the British
left now, the khedive and the pro-British administration
would fall. On July 1, 1889, Salisbury told the French: "I
cannot see that there is anything more to be done for the
present."1 It was clear that he did not want to risk British
iterests by any further talk about the evacuation of Egypt.

Even though Salisbury had succeeded in reaching agree—
with Germany in April 1890, French influence in Constantinople
and Egypt was so enormous that without French favor the Egyp-
tian question would remain unresolved. France supported the
sultan in his demands for British evacuation in April and
June 1890. Salisbury sought some compromise with the French
to calm the situation. Salisbury and Ribot, the French for-
eign minister, opened negotiations in 1890 over the Zanzibar
issue, bearing in mind the Egyptian situation. The French
also wanted British recognition of their rights in Tunis.
Salisbury was willing to conciliate France if he had a guar-
antee that the Franco-Russian pressure over Egypt would be

.abandoned.

 

lIbid.

 

84

Salisbury was prepared to give France some compensa-
tion in-Africa, but not in Egypt. The French made their de-
mands clear on July 1, 1890:

They wanted recognition of their special position

in Tunisia, of a protectorate over Madagascar and

a delimitation of their sphere along the Niger and

in West Africa generally.
Salisbury was inclined to agree to these demands if the
French officially would recognize the British position in
Egypt, but this they could not do for fear of French public
opinion. Since France could not agree to the British condi-
tions, it sought another compromise, involving West Africa
alone. The issues of Egypt and Tunisia were left unresolved.
On August 5, 1890, both governments signed an agreement which
gave France Madagascar and huge parts of central and western
Sudan; in return, a British protectorate over Zanzibar and
Pemba was granted. The French gains seemed inconsequential
to Salisbury, since most of the area was desert. In his
speech in the House of Lords on August 11, 1890, he defended
his approval:

I will not dwell upon the respective advantage of

places which are utterly unknown not only to your

Lordships, but to the rest of the white human
race . . . . Anyone who looks at the map and mere—

ly measures the degrees will perhaps be of the

 

1Robinson, Gallagher, and Denny, op. cit. n. 302.

9 A

85

opinion that France has laid claim to a very con-

siderable stretch of country. But it is necessary

to judge land not merely by its extent but also by

its value. This land is what agriculturists would

call "very light land"; that is to say it is the

desert of Sahara.1
At that time, the agreement was viewed as a gain for Salis-
bury's African policy. It eased Anglo-French tension in
Egypt and the Mediterranean area, and it paved the way for
the Anglo-French Entente of 1904.

During 1891-1892, France continued to oppose the Brit-
ish presence in Egypt. The French tried to convince the sul-
tan that if he would continue to reject British pressure to
settle the Egyptian question, they were prepared to enter in-
to a close alliance with the Ottoman Empire and would assist
it in every way possible.

In summary, the most significant development in
French policy in the 18903 was the Franco-Russian alliance.
It was a serious threat to British interests in Egypt, the

Mediterranean, India, and the Far East, and it upset the

European balance of naval power.

 

1Hansard, 3rd series, CCCXLVIII, cols. 458-9.

8.6
'Italy

Although Italy was an official member of the Caisse
de la Dette Publique from its creation in 1876, it did not
play a decisive role in British policy in Egypt. But Italy,
as did the other European powers, tried to gain what advan-
tages it could from Britain in return for its support.

In February 1885, the British allowed the Italians to
occupy Massowah, which was part of the Ottoman Empire and was
ruled directly by the Egyptians, by ordering the Egyptian
garrison to withdraw. Britain wished to demonstrate to Italy
its goodwill, in return for which Italy might support the
British in Egypt. On December 22, 1884, Lord Granville had
said:

I have informed Count Nigra (the Italian Ambassador
in London) that Her Majesty's government were desir-
ous of showing their friendly feeling towards Italy
in all ways . . . . I was able to inform him that
Her Majesty's government had no objection to raise

against the Italian occupation of Zulla, Beilul or
Massowah.l

The Italians well aware of the British dilemma in
Egypt, were not satisfied with Massowah. In 1887, they

planned to extend their African empire to include the Red Sea

 

1Granville to Baring, December 22, 1884, P.R.O.
F.O. 78/3681.

87

coast and part of the Sudan. These new demands were un—
acceptable to Salisbury, who told Baring in a private letter
dated May 6, 1887: "The demand for the Red Sea coast which
the Italians have put forward is rather impudent."1
During Wolff's negotiations withthe Ottomans in

1887, Salisbury, seeking to ease international tension over
the Egyptian question, signed the Mediterranean Agreement
with Italy and Austria-Hungary. He thought this agreement
with Italy, a German ally, would result in German support of
the British right of re-entry, should the British agree to
evacuate. Salisbury expected the agreement to affect the
balance of power in the Mediterranean, which would have a
considerable impact on the French:

It [the Italian alliance] is valuable to us chiefly

because it is essential to Germany, and the friend-

ship of Germany is very important to us because she

keeps Russia and France in order.2
But it was obvious to Salisbury that the Italian alliance
would not bring much advantage to Britain, except as a means
of pleasing Germany:

[It] is not very advantageous, and has several draw-
backs, and one of them has the habit of quarreling

 

1Salisbury to Baring, private, April 1, 1887, P.R.O.
F.O. 633/7.

2S.P., Salisbury to Baring, private, August 31, 1890,
no. ASS/58.

88

with her neighbors, and asking us to back her. I
do not therefore put friendship of Italy so high

as some other objects of political desire . . . .
it is not worth a very great price, even in African
square miles.

After the collapse of Wolff's mission in 1887, Brit-
tain decided to make Cairo the center of its Mediterranean
strategy. The Italians threatened this policy when they ad-
vanced troops from the Red Sea Coast toward the eastern Sudan
in 1889. Furthermore, in May 1889, the Italian Prime Minis-
ter, Crispi, reached an agreement with Ethiopia which gave
the Italians great influence in the Blue Nile Basin. Also,
the Italians laid claim to Kassala, which would give them
firm control of the Nile. This was a serious threat to the
British, for from Kassala the Italians could reach Khartoum
by both the White and Blue Nile. More important, control of
the Nile waters, so essential to the Egyptian economy, by
another European could not be countenanced. As Baring told
Salisbury:

A civilized European power established in the Nile
Valley . . . . could so reduce the water supply as
to ruin the country [Egypt] . . . . whatever power

holds the upper Nile Valley must by the mere force
of its geographical situation, dominate Egypt.2

 

lIbid.

2Baring to Salisbury, Secrect, December 15, 1889,
F.O. 7814243.

89

Salisbury, although upset by these developments, was
unwilling to use force to stop the Italians. He preferred
diplomacy, for he needed Italian support of his Egyptian
policy. He also hoped this approach would please the Ger-
mans and weaken French opposition.

After the British signed the agreement with France
in August 1890, Salisbury turned to Italy to balance his
policy in Egypt and the Mediterranean. He believed it would
be easier to negotiate with Italy than with Germany and
France; as he told Baring: "We are negotiating on these
African matters with somewhat greater ease now than we have
agreed with Germany and France."1 Salisbury authorized
Baring to meet Crispi in Naples in September 1890 to discuss
Italy's position south of the Sudan and around the Red Sea.

Salisbury, who was in a strong position, wanted to
show clearly that Britain would gain a sphere of influence
in that area, at the expense of Italy if necessary. In his
instructions to Baring, he wrote:

We should insist on the command of all affluents of
the Nile, so far as Egypt formerly possessed them . . . .

we have no such well defined and imperative interests
to safeguard on the Red Sea slopes.

 

S. P. Salisbury to Baring, Private, August 31,
1890, No. A55158.

9.0

Salisbury added:

There is only one point that intereSts me in that
direction . . . namely that you shOuld not sanction
the tribal theory of dominion . . . . we shall
have to oppose it vigorously to the southwest of
Abyssinia . . . . It is possible that you may not
persuade the Italians to accept this principle; or
to keep their hands off the affluents of the Nile.~
In that case, we must be content to let the nego-
tiation be adjourned . . . . I do not think
England will lose by delay.1

Crispi refused to accept the British conditions,es-
pecially withdrawal from Kassala, and negotiations broke off
on October 10, 1890. This came as no surprise to Salisbury,
who had predicted that Britain might have a difficult time
with the Italian prime minister. AS he told Baring on
April 25, 1890:

I quite admit that there is one circumstance which
is apt to embitter all discussion with the Italians,
and that is that they are far less sincere than any
other nation we have to deal with. They seem to
look upon the tradition of Machiavelli as a sacred
heritage to which they must not be untrue.

Nevertheless, Salisbury was confident that an agree-
ment would be reached. He was aware of Italian financial

problems, which would prevent them from carrying out any vast

military action in Africa:

 

llbid.

2S.P., Salisbury to Baring, private, April 25, 1890,
no. A 55/54.

91

It must never be forgotten that their African en-

terprise, as it develops, must be very costly,

that it can bring them no return, and that their

finance is in that condition of eXtreme strain

that any tendency to increase its burdens may at

any moment produce grave political results.

Events in Italy proved Salisbury correct. After

Crispi fell in February 1891, his successor, Marquis Antonio
di Rudini, surrendered most of the Italian claims in the Val-

ley of the Nile by signing two agreements with Britain. In

effect, Salisbury was given a free hand in the Nile Valley.

 

lIbid.

 

92
Russia

Before Salisbury fell from power in 1892, Russia was
the only important state with which an agreement was not
achieved. The two nations had been enemies since 1820; they
had struggled over India, the Ottoman Empire, and Egypt.

In 1885, when the Mahdist movement in the Sudan
threatened the British presence in Egypt, Britain was unable
to send troops to the area. One important reason was a
Russian war scare arising from the Penjedh Incident. Un-
able to take military action against the Mahdists, the Brit—
ish decided to abandon the Sudan. They claimed that their
decision had been reached on strategic grounds; as Gladstone
said: "I am not prepared to go on [in the Sudan] upon any
terms, Russia, or no Russia."1

Salisbury believed Russia was the only power which
might threaten British interests in the Ottoman Empire and
Asia. He determined to use any means, even military force,
to stop it. In September 1886, he wrote to Lord Randolph
Churchill: "If Russia attacked Constantinople, and all the

other powers refused to intervene, I am rather disposed to

 

lRobinson, Gallagher, and Denny, op. cit., p. 155.

93

the idea that we should have to act in the Dardanelles."1

In Salisbury's view, the protection of Constantinople was
essential to securing British intereSts. Malet told the
Germans that Salisbury believed "if the Russians hold Con-
stantinople, we shall be quite unable to keep Egypt and .
India also."2

A major impetus behind the Mediterranean Agreement
with Italy and Austria-Hungary in 1887 was the British fear
of Russia. Salisbury believed close ties with the central
powers would dissuade the Russians from.taking any military
action. As he wrote to Bismarck on November 30, 1887:
"[The Triple Agreement was] an effective barrier against any
possible aggression of Russia."3

Russia was the only major European power to support
French attempts to thwart Wolff's mission to Constantinople
in 1887. The Russians warned the sultan that, should he

ratify an Anglo-Ottoman agreement, they would advance troops

into Asia Minor and toward Baghdad.4

 

1Salisbury to Churchill, September 1886, quoted in
R. Rhodes James, Lord Randolph Churchill (London: 1959), p. 555.

 

2Robinson, Gallagher, and Denny, op. cit., p. 263.

31bid., p. 267

4W.C., Wolff to Salisbury, Telegraphic, July 9, 1887,
no. 45.

94

Salisbury saw in the Franco-Russian agreement of 1890

a serious threat to British imperial interests in Egypt, the
Mediterranean, and the Far East. The agreement was a great
blow to the European balance of power, especially as far as
Britain was concerned. In response, the British Navy pre-
pared a study of British strength. The Admiralty believed
Constantinople and Egypt could be protected against a Russian
threat only if France stayed neutral. After reading the re-
port, Salisbury drew this conclusion:

If the opinions of the directors of naval and mili-

tary intelligence held good, the protection of Con-

stantinople from Russian conquest must cease to be

regarded as a aim of British policy, for we can not

defend it, and our policy is a policy of false pre-

tences.

As the French and the British had committed themselves
to a vast scheme of shipbuilding to strengthen their navies,
the Russians planned to follow suit. It was estimated that,
by 1893, the Franco-Russian sea forces would be larger than
the British.2 Such a change in the naval balance showed the
British that their Naval Defence Act of 1889 was incapable

of maintaining the security of British interests in Egypt and

the Mediterranean.

 

1Robinson, Gallagher, and Denny, op. cit., p. 313.

21bid.

 

95

Salisbury believed that Russian opposition to the
British occupation of Egypt was designed to gain concessions
in India, Afghanistan, Persia, China, and the Balkans. But
since Russia could not seriously challenge Britain in Egypt
or India without help from another European power, Salisbury

was in no great hurry to reach agreement.

Before his fall in 1892, Salisbury's diplomatic
achievements in EurOpe reflected his determination to keep
Britain in firm control of Egypt and to strengthen British
interests in the Mediterranean:

In the Anglo-German agreement he edged his most
immediate rival out of the Nile Valley. In the
Anglo-French agreement he set the seal on the
strategy of buying off French threats to Egypt and
the Mediterranean by agreeing to a huge French
empire in the western Sudan. In his negotiations
with the Italians he showed once more that Brit-
ain was determined to keep all comers out of the
eastern Sudan and the Nile Valley.1

Salisbury's success was due to the tension between France and

Germany and to Bismarck's system of alliances.

 

lIbid., p. 304.

96

During the period 1885-1892, Salisbury devoted most
of his time and energy to easing international tension sur-
rounding the Egyptian issue. He knew that his failure would
be a severe blow to British imperial interests and would_
adversely affect his political career. With skill and
determination, he maneuvered deftly to strengthen Britain's

position and prevent open conflict.

Chapter IV
THE BRITISH OCCUPATION AND EGYPTIAN
INTERNAL AFFAIRS: 1885-1892

British Influence on the Egyptian
Government

 

The British maintained their veiled protectorate over
Egypt through the power of the British army of occupation,
the British consul general, and British official advisers and
employees in the Egyptian government. The policy was to ap-
point Englishmen as advisers to important Egyptian ministries:
in the Ministry of War was Sir Evelyn Wood; in the Ministry
of Interior was Clifford Lloyd; in the Ministry of Finance
was Edgar Vincent; in the Ministry of Public Works was Colin
Scott-Moncrieff; and in the Ministry of Justice was Benson
Maxwell. These advisers played a decisive role in shaping
Egyptian internal policies. In many cases, their influence
was stronger than that of native ministers. Afaf al—Sayyid,
in Egypt and Cromer, mentions one example:

They [the British] took over the departments, and
inevitably the minister became a figurehead whose

97

98

decision could be overruled by the Adviser. An

anecdote aScribed to Ibrahim Pasha Fuad, a cabinet

minister, was a telling example of the power the

adviser wielded. Fuad's secretary had brought in

a sheaf of documents with a request that the min-

ister Sign them. The minister asked if the ad-

viser had seen them, and, when the secretary an—

swered in the affirmative, he waved a hand towards

the ministerial rubber stamp on his desk, and said:

"There is your minister."l
Englishmen also held high offices in Egypt: Mr. Caillard was
director of the customs department; Mr. Gibson, director of
the tourism bureau; Mr. Blunfield, director of Alexandria's
port; and Mr. Fitzgerald, general director of the account
department in the ministry of finance. Not only British
civilians but also British soldiers were placed in key posi-
tions. The commander-in-chief of the Egyptian Army was an
Englishman, Sir Evelyn Wood, and a majority of the superior
officers in the army were Englishmen.

The Egyptian government was obliged to follow the
suggestions of British officials. Lord Granville clarified
the British policy in these terms:

It should be made clear to the Egyptian ministers and
governors of provinces that the responsibility which

for the time rests on England obliges Her Majesty's
Government to insist on the adoption of the policy

 

1Al—Sayyid, op. cit., p. 80.

99

which they recommend, and that it will be necessary
that those ministers and governors who do not follow
thiS:Course shOuld cease to hold their offices.1
This policy, later known as the "Granville Doctrine," was
adopted and closely followed by successive British govern-
ments. Baring was to adhere firmly to this approach, which
was to create many problems in Anglo-Egyptian relations for
years to come.

The first major crisis between the two governments
centered on the Ministry of Interior. The British made
Clifford Lloyd under-Secretary of the Interior in 1884 in
Prime Minister Nubar Pasha's cabinet. Lloyd insisted that
police affairs be left to the British, and relations with
Nubar deteriorated as their differences over this issue and
over the role of provinical governors increased. By the end
of 1887, the British held police authority in the main cities.
As Baring told Salisbury: "Up to the present time the [police]
central department has been in the hands of Englishmen."2
The British insisted that each police division must be di—

rected by an English officer, with the title of deputy Inspec-

..tor general, who was to report directly to the British

 

11bid., p. 80.

2S. P., Baring to Salisbury, private, January 9,
1888, no. A 53/14.

Ioo

inspector general of police. The Egyptian government toler-
ated this domination in such major cities as Cairo and
Alexandria, but it could not agree to Lloyd's demand that
the provincial police be attached to the general police de-
partment. Lloyd ordered the local police commanders to re-
port directly to the inspector general in Cairo, which meant
sidestepping the authority of the provincial governors. The
Egyptian government believed that since the governor was re-
sponsible to the minister of interior for keeping order in
his area, the police commander must report to and take orders
from him. Nubar Pasha argued that bypassing the governor
would weaken his authority and prestige among his people and
would lead the populace to believe that the police commander
was more powerful thanthe governor. In a message to Salis-
bury, Baring agreed with the Egyptians:

It is alleged, and probably with some truth--they

go further and more or less usurp the function of

the Moudirs [Governors] . . . . The System creates

a division of responsibility, and that the authority

of the Moudirs is weakened by the control of the

English officers.
Moreover, Nubar Pasha opposed the appointment of British ad-

visers in the Ministry of Interior, which he believed Should

be left to the Egyptians. To Show his disapproval, Nubar

 

 

101

offered his resignation, but the British, knowing that Nubar
favored them, fired Lloyd instead and kept Nubar in his post.
Emboldened by his success, Nubar thought that he could

gain other concessions, and in 1887 he tried to ease Baring
out. Salisbury was startled whenthe Egyptian arrived in
London to discuss the issue, and Nubar returned home without
achieving his major aim. Nevertheless, he managed to con-
vince the khedive that the British would recall Baring and re-
place him with Sir Henry Wolff. According to G.H. Portal:

It is an open secret in "official circles" here that

Nubar while in England made a regular campaign against

Baring--in his letters to his friends here Nubar did

not attempt to conceal this, and even caused an im-

pression to gain ground that he had succeeded and that

Baring would in likelihood be replaced by Sir H.
Wolff.1

To persuade Salisbury's government to take action
against Baring, Nubar decided to send Tigrane Pasha, the Egyp-
tian Under—secretary of Foreign Affairs and Nubar's son-in-
1aw, to London in the summer of 1887. Tigrane complained
about Baring's policy, mainly concerning the police. The
mission upset Baring, who told Salisbury that these efforts

undermined his authority in internal affairs. Baring asked

 

1
S.P., G.H. Portal to Eric Barrington, private,

July 31, 1887, no. A52/61.

102

for support to counter the effect: "Tigrane's mission has
done harm for the moment, but I am sanguine that it eventu-
ally will clear the air and do a great deal of good if the
khedive and Nubar get frightened they will run straight.“1

Baring, who considered himself solely responsible
for Egyptian internal matters, was angered by Nubar's chal-
lenge to his authority. He thought that Nubar had received
some encouragement while in London: "Nubar is a changed man
since his visit to London and very difficult to manage."2
Salisbury, who had full confidence in Baring and never con-
sidered removing him, assured Baring that Nubar had received
no encouragement from.anyone connected with the Foreign

3

Office. Salisbury thought the sultan might be supporting

Nubar: "I suspect however that it is from Constantinople that
he gets any external stimulus to revolt that he may have re-

4

ceived." In an attempt to calm Nubar, Salisbury told him

that he would study the internal Egyptian situation and

 

1S.P., Baring to Salisbury, private, February 25,
1888, no. A53/28.

2S.P., Baring to Salisbury, private, January 30,
1888, no. A53/l4.

3Salisbury to Baring, private, February 17, 1888,
P.R.O. F.O. 633/7.

4Ibid.

 

103

would ask the British agent at Cairo to cooperate with the
Egyptian government.

Baring was unhappy that Salisbury had not backed him
completely. He strongly expressed his worries in a private
letter: "Would you mind telling me privately how far I can
count upon your support. I hope you will not consider me in
the matter. I should be perfectly ready to go if you thought
a change desirable in the public interest.”1 The friction
between Baring and the Egyptian officials annoyed the Queen,
who urged Salisbury to take measures to calm the situation.
In response, Salisbury told the Queen that he had "urged
Baring to avoid conflict. He must be supported and the
khedive made to feel that any disloyal conduct may cost him
his throne."2

Salisbury asked Baring to avoid a confrontation be-
cause of the challenge posed by the concentration of the
French fleet in the Mediterranean. He feared the creation of

a causus belli over Egypt:

 

Try and manage to postpone any breach with him [Nubar]
to a more convenient season. We are at this moment
.on the sharp ridge that separates the slopes towards

 

1S.P., Baring to Salisbury, private, February 15,
1888, no. A53/22.

2S.P., Salisbury to Queen Victoria, cypher, February
17, 1888, no. A46/38.

104

war and peace. It is a matter of great uncertainty
down which we shall slide; but a very slight push
either way may decide the issue, and the slide will
be a tremendous one if we go toward war. It is a
matter, therefore, of no common im ortance to avoid
any unnecessary cause of conflict.
Salisbury made it clear that his attitude toward the conflict
between Baring and Nubar was based on an evaluation of the in-
ternational situation. He told Baring that he did ”not wish
our administration in Egypt to be the cause to which the long
. . . . ,2
European war 18 to be ascribed by the future h13tor1ans.’
Salisbury wanted Baring to string Nubar along until the Brit—
ish could be rid of him: "When you advance on a dog he runs
away, when you walk away he does not wait till you are far
off, but begins barking at you that very moment you begin
to retreat--even so with Nubar.”3
Salisbury's decision to keep Nubar was based on po-
litical considerations, not disapproval of Baring's policy.
He assured Baring that when the right moment arrived he

would back him, even if he believed that Baring was mistaken

in his management of Egyptian affairs: "Of course, whenever

 

1Salisbury to Baring, private, February 17, 1888,
no. 98, P.R.O. F.O. 633/7.

2Ibid.

 

31bid.

 

105

the row comes, we shall support you heartily and thoroughly.
I believe you are right in this controversy. But if I
thought you wrong, I should still think it impossible to re-
treat before Nubar in the face of the whole East."1

At the end of 1887, Valentine Baker, head of the
police, died. Baring insisted on replacing him with an
Englishman, but Nubar wanted the post occupied by an Egyptian.
Under pressure from Baring, Nubar accepted the nomination of
Herbert Chermside, hoping he would cooperate with native
officers. But the conceited Chermside wanted full authority,
even over the minister of the interior. Baring reported
Chermside's demands to Salisbury: "If I am to be completely
subordinate to the native minister, the place is not good
for me. But if you want a strong man to guide and dominate
you, I am just the right man."2 Nubar,of course, refused to
appoint him.

Aware of the difficult British position after the
collapse of Wolff's mission to Constantinople in 1887, Nubar

thought pressing the police issue might induce Salisbury to

 

1Ibid.

 

2S.P.,Baring to Salisbury, private, February 19,
1888, no. A53/26.

1.0.6

remove Baring. The latter warned Salisbury about yielding
to Nubar: "European supervision is neceSsary or things will
go from bad to worse, and then we shOuld be obliged to
interfere once more and in a more objectionable manner."l
Baring urged Salisbury to tell Nubar that he must consult
him about any internal issue and must accept his views and
advise:

I am convinced that if Nubar is told in very plain

but not menacing language, that he must follow my

advice on this and other local matters, and if the

same language is used to Tigrane we shall pull

through without any ministerial change or other

serious upset."2

Nubar seriously overestimated his strength by chal-

lenging Baring, who was the real power in Egypt. When
Baring felt he could no longer be tolerated, he instructed
the khedive to fire Nubar Pasha. Otherwise, Baring warned,
Britain would allow the former Khedive Ismail to return to
Egypt:

Nubar could remain in power only so long as Baring

and/or the Khedive gave him their support. When

Baring withdrew this, the Khedive--realizing that
Nubar had almost brought him to the edge of a

 

1Baring to Salisbury, private, February 25, 1888,
P.R.O. F.O. 633/6.

2S.P., Baring to Salisbury, private, February 26,
1888, no. A53/29.

107

crisi3--also withdrew his support. It is signifi-

cant that he did so soon after the conversation be—

tween him and Baring had taken place. During the

conversation, Baring had suggested that Nubar should

go, and hinted that Ismail was ready to return to

Egypt at any time.1

On June 9, 1888, Riaz Pasha replaced Nubar as prime

minister, an appointment which revealed the strength of Brit-
ish influence in Egypt. In a private letter to Salisbury,
Baring described the new prime minister as "the most honest
man . . . . a stern disciplinarian, he does not intrigue.
Though not liked he is feared and respected."2
But he added in the same letter that Riaz Pasha was

stupid, obstinate and violent . . . . his manners

are barbarous . . . . he had not the most elemen—

tary ideas of government by law.3

The British felt free to interfere in the formation

of Riaz's cabinet. They wanted him to choose ministers who
would be willing to cooperate with the British and would not
create any problems. Baring wrote to Salisbury on the day

that Riaz announced his appointments, describing his role

in forming the new cabinet:

 

1Al-Sayyid, o . cit., p. 74.

2S.P., Baring to Salisbury, private, April 18, 1889,

no. A53/90.

3Ibid.

 

108

I can scarcely tell the Khedive that he is not to
name "a capable man" to be public minister. It
would not sound well in an official dispatch to be
laid before Parliament. Yeky? Zaki Pasha has
been named--a respectable quite old Turk--and
Moncrieff and his officers are now happy. Unfor-
tunately he [Riaz] put Omar Pasha Loutfi into the
War Office. So Grenfell and some of his officers
wished to resign. It would, however, have been
impossible to work the army with Omar Pasha Loutfi.
I let the Khedive and Riaz know this through a
third person. They behaved very well, although
since they had let the nomination become public
property, it was rather a bitter pill to swallow.
Mustapha Fehmey will take the War Office and
Zulfikar Pasha, who is quite harmless, Foreign Af—
fairs. On the whole the crisis has, I think, gone
off satisfactorily. I have interfered very little.
Indeed except about the war office, there has been
no occasion for my interference.1

British influence in and penetration of Egyptian af-
fairs continued. In November 1889, Alfred Milner was ap-
pointed general director of governmental accounts, and in
1890 he became under-secretary of the Ministry of Finance.
Sir Eldon Gorst was appointed in November 1890 to be general
inspector of budgetary affairs.2

In 1890 a new crisis occurred, centered on the minis-

try of justice. The British government, at the request of

 

1S.P. Baring to Salisbury, private, June 11, 1888,
no. A53/39.

2Abd-Al-Rahman, Al-Rafii, Miser wal Sudan (Egypt and
Sudan) (Cairo: 1948), p. 201.

109

Baring, brought judge John Scott from India to study and re-
form the ministry. He recommended many changes in the judi-
cial system, and he insisted on replacing Egyptian with
European inspectors and giving them power over judges. The
Minister of Justice, Fakhri Pasha, objected to Scott's re-
forms. Nonetheless, the British imposed the program by press-
ing the khedive to appoint Scott as judical adviser to the
Ministry of Justice. The khedive did so on February 15, 1891,
and Scott became the first British adviser to be attached to
this ministry since the occupation began in 1882. Riaz was
opposed, but he could not resist British pressure.

Since he could not prevent Scott's appointment, Riaz
decided to play a game with Baring by naming Herbert Kitchener
as head of the police. Riaz hoped the appointment might create
a conflict between Kitchener and Scott which would enable
him to get rid of both. Riaz repeated Nubar's mistake by
overestimating his power in challenging the British. Scott
and Kitchener worked well together and reported directly to
the khedive.

Relations between Riaz and Baring deteriorated rapidly.

Riaz regretted his approval of Scott's appointment, and he

 

lIbid., p. 202

110

tried to restore his authority, maintain himself in power,
and provide good government for Egypt. Baring, who wanted
absolute control, saw in Riaz Pasha's attitude a threat to
the British administration. Therefore, in the summer of
1890, he asked Salisbury to allow him to remove Riaz.
Salisbury feared that such an action, just before the French
election, would create problems for the British:

Your question about Riaz is a hard nut to crack. My

fear is lest it should bring our domination in Egypt

so forcibly before the minds of the ordinary French

elector that he will force his government to be

troublesome to us on the subject.1

Riaz Pasha's position was weakened by lack of support

from the khedive. Tawfik did not back his prime minister for
fear of British reprisals, and he had no objections to Riaz's
resignation. Baring told Salisbury:

The Khedive would want to govern more actively him-

self with the help of a retrograde and savage old

Turk as prime minister. I like bringing the Khedive

forward, but the combination would not work. It is

not desirable that the Khedive should be himself too

much pledged to one side in any of the numerous dis-

putes which arise here.2

Under British pressure, Riaz's cabinet resigned in May 1891.

 

1Salisbury to Baring, private, January 23, 1891,
no. 112, P.R.O. F.O. 633/7.

2S.P., Baring to Salisbury, private, April 18, 1889,
no. A53/96.

111

Mustafa Fahmi Pasha replaced Riaz. Fahmi was pro—

British and was willing to cooperate. Baring supported his
nomination:

The only other man is Mustafa Fahmi Pasha, and we

should probably have to insist on him. He is ex-

cellent but very weak. His nomination would mean

increased English interference in reality and the

appearance of still greater interference.
But because of his weakness and the British belief that they
could not depend on him, Fahmi almost lost his post only two
months after his appointment. Salisbury was worried about
such action and warned Baring:

Your position as "Maire du Palais" will be too plain-

ly revealed if Riaz follows Nubar at the distance of

two years, and Fahmi follows Riaz at the distance of

two months.
Therefore, Salisbury recommended continuing Fahmi in office
for the time being.

A turning point in Anglo-Egyptian relations occurred

when Khedive Tawfik died suddenly on January 7, 1892. The
new khedive, Abbas Hilmi, was born in 1874. He had left for

Europe while still very young, and he had been educated at

 

1S.P., Baring to Salisbury, private, April 18, 1889,
no. A53/96.

2Salisbury to Baring, private, January 23, 1891, no.
112, P.R.O. F.O. 633/7.

112

the Theresianum in Vienna. .He was eighteen years old when
he was named khedive. He arrived in Egypt full of stories

of the nationalist movement in Hungary, Bohemia, and Italy.
He wanted to rule Egypt, but he decided to wait and judge the
situation before taking any action. Baring described him

to Salisbury.

He resembles a very gentlemanlike and healthily-

minded boy fresh from Eton or Harrow . . . . not
at all devoid of intelligence, but a good bit
bored with el-Azher . . . . I really wish he

was not quite so civilized.1
Khedive Abbas, a young and ambitious ruler, thought he could
challenge British authority in Egypt and become the true
governor of his country. He believed that because Khedive
Tawfik had yielded, Baring had maintained his influence over
Egyptian internal affairs. Abbas was idealistic and more
given to theories than reality. He was not familiar with
British imperial policies, and he thought that as a khedive
of Egypt he should maintain and exercise full authority. He
believed Baring had no legal right to intervene in Egyptian
internal affairs. Furthermore, he thought that since the
British advisers were officially employed by his government,

.he had the_right to dismiss them. He imagined that, in theory,

 

lBaring to Salisbury, private, April 15, 1892, no. 177.
P.R.O. F.O. 633/6.

113

he could ask the British to withdraw their troops if the Eu-
ropean powers were willing to back him.

The young khedive was encouraged by several inci-
dents. The most important was Gladstone's speech at New-
castle on October 3, 1891. Gladstone said that the occupa-
tion of Egypt was a burden to Britain, and he hoped Salisbury
would end it before he left power. The speech had a great
effect on the British administration in Egypt and on Salis-
bury's government. The Queen, who was upset by the speech,
urged Salisbury to counter by announcing the official British
policy toward Egypt. She wrote Salisbury: "It is very im-
portant that the false rumours produced by the shameful
speech of Mr. Gladstone should be firmly contradicted."1
Baring also asked Salisbury to declare that British policy
in Egypt would continue unchanged: "If you could take some
public occasion to say the policy of the British government
about Egypt was unchanged, it would have an excellent effect
here. All the talk about evacuation is doing a good deal of

harm."2 Consequently, in a speech at the Guildhall,

 

1S.P., Queen Victoria to Salisbury, deciphered
telegraph, November 1, 1891, no. A45/107.

2S.P., Baring to Salisbury, decypher and private,
October 29, 1891, no. A54/75.

114

Salisbury declared that even if Gladstone were to come to
power, Salisbury believed that England would not relinquish
its occupation of Egypt. In a private letter to Baring in
December, Salisbury told him that the effect of Gladstone's
speech had diminished:

The trouble raised by the unfortunate utterances of

Gladstone and Morley about our occupation, has near-

ly subsided, both at Paris and at Constantinople:

and I am in hope we shall not hear much more of it.

But the situation is not as good as it was before.

Everybody is more jealous, and less certain of the

future. My Guildhall speech was a necessity under

the circumstances: but it has acted as an irritant

and I heartily wish the G.O.M. had spared me the

necessity of making it.1
Nevertheless, Khedive Abbas believed that if Gladstone were
in office, he would evacuate Egypt. Abbas also was aware
that several famous British political figures, such as Sir
Charles Dilke, John MOrley, and Randolph Churchill, favored
evacuation. Churchill visited Egypt from December 1890 to
January 1891. Baring reported to Salisbury that Churchill

"came [, however,] with the strong opinion that we should

clear out Egypt and thus get on good terms with the French."2

 

1S.P., Salisbury to Baring, private, December 4,
1891, no. ASS/71.

2S.P., Baring to Salisbury, private, January 19,
1891, no. A54/50.

115

Abbas was also encouraged by articles in the British
press which stated that he had the legal authority to con-
duct Egyptian affairs without any interference from British

agents at Cairo. One appeared in the Spectator on January

 

16, 1892. Abbas thought such articles would affect British
public opinion and policy. Baring was annoyed by the arti-
cles and urged Salisbury to use his unofficial influence with
the British press:
If you have any influence with friendly outsiders who
speak or write about Egypt, I hope you use it to make
them crack up the Khedive and keep me in the back-
ground. To compare small men and things to great, I

do pot want to pose as Bismarck to an Egyptian William
11.

Khedive Abbas, as were most Egyptians, was further
encouraged by French attitudes toward British rule in Egypt.
Particularly important were M. Deloncle, Eugene Etienne, and
various anti-British members of the Chamber of Deputies.
Among the French journalists, Mme. Juliette Adam and Pierre
Loti devoted most of their articles to urging the French
government and other European states to take action against
the British occupation. Abbas believed that the French would
back him in any attempt to lesson British control over his

authorityl

 

1S.P., Baring to Salisbury, private, January 16, 1892,
no. A54/87.

116

Finally, Abbas was emotionally impressed by his peo-
ple's welcome. He interpreted their fervor as the hope that
he would try to achieve Egyptian independence. Abbas felt
that if he could unite the country behind him, he could
loosen Britain's hold on Egyptian internal affairs.

Abbas's first action was to appoint his Austrian
tutor, Louis Rouiller, to the post of European secretary in
his cabinet. He hoped through Rouiller to establish a con-
nection with the French.

As Abbas attempted to free himself from Baring's
absolute authority, their relations began to deteriorate.
Baring told Salisbury that Abbas

has been foolish about a number of small things, but
he is so young and inexperienced that he ought not
be judged too harshly. I lectured him in plain but
friendly terms, and I do not anticipate that for the
time being I should have much difficulty with him.1

In the fall of 1892, Abbas announced his desire to
visit Constantinople. Salisbury was upset and thought that
the khedive might ask the sultan for Ottoman troops to oust

the British. Salisbury's first reaction was stated in a

private letter to Baring:

 

1Zetland, 0p. cit., p. 196.

117

It looks as if the poor young Khedive would have to
go to Constantinople. Would it be possible to send
him in the "Nile"? If the "Nile" once got into the
Bosphorous the Sultan's only thought would be to get
her out again.1

Salisbury did not agree with Baring that the khedive's visit
would not harm the British. His objection was stated clear-
ly in a private letter to Baring:

I gather from a recent letter that you are seriously
thinking of letting your young ruler go to Constan-
tinople. Has it ever occurred to you that when once
the Sultan has got him into his palace the young man
will be at the mercy of any moral engines of torture
the Sultan may care to apply, and that merely to get
away he may be persuaded into signing any paper which

is put before him . . . . or a statement that so
long as the English are in Egypt he is not a free
agent?

Salisbury decided to prevent the visit unless measures could
be taken beforehand to assure there would be no anti-British
results. He told Baring that if the khedive insisted on
visiting Constantinople, the British should think about two
possible cautionary measures:
I doubt whether even a fleet at Besika Bay would im-
press him [the Sultan], or perhaps a council of

Regency appointed to come into existence three weeks
after the Khedive's departure, if he did not return

 

1The "Nile" was a Britain warship. Salisbury to
Baring, private, February 5, 1892, no. 117, P.R.O. F.O.
633/7.

2Salisbury to Baring, private, March 4, 1892, no. 118.
P.R.O. F.O. 633/7.

118

and numbering you or Grenfell among its members,

might haVe a sufficiently deterring effect upon the

Sultan.1 '

As a result of Salisbury's objection, Abbas delayed

his plans, but Salisbury fell from office on August 12, 1892.
The khedive went to Constantinople in July 1893. His visit
proved that Salisbury was incorrect in his expectation.
Primarily because he was busy dealing with difficulties in
the Balkans, Sultan Abdul Hamid II did not, in fact, give
Abbas any encouragement which might upset the British. He
also thought that the new British government under the leader-

ship of Gladstone might try to find a solution to the Egyp-

tian question.

 

lIbid.

 

119

The Impact of the British Occupation
'on'Egyptian'Life

 

 

The British occupation of Egypt in 1882 had a pro-
found effect on Egyptian life. Britain's defeat of the
nationalist revolution, which had hoped to free the country
from foreign control, badly wounded Egyptian pride. To the
majority of Egyptians,1 who were Muslims, the control of
their country by non—Muslims meant the loss of dignity and
independence and a serious threat to their faith.

The British claimed that they had to come to restore
the authority of the khedive and to maintain stability and
order. When this was accomplished, they would leave. They
also indicated that they would introduce many beneficial re-
forms. During the early days of the occupation, most Egyp-
tians believed the British would introduce these reforms
and depart. Initially, the British did effect changes in
administration, justice, agriculture, and taxation. After a
decade, however, the Egyptians realized that the occupiers
had done nothing about the capitulations, which still func-

tioned, and that foreign domination of Egyptian financial

 

1The population included a sizeable Christian com-
munity and a smaller Jewish community. Their attitudes
toward the British occupation remain to be studied.

120

affairs was still effectively maintained through the Caisse.
The British had also neglected to make badly needed welfare

and social reforms.

The Egyptian Governmental System

 

British changes in the governmental system were the
most effective. Before 1882, Egypt was semi-independent and
had its own constitution. Under the British, it became a
subordinate state. The British dismissed the Egyptian army
and created a small force with British officers. The occu-
piers imposed their authority over the government by insist-
ing that Egyptian officials heed the British advisers at-
tached to every important branch of administration. The
Egyptian constitutional system, established in the period
between 1879 and 1882 as a result of Arabi's revolution, was
abolished. Moreover, the British insisted on using the same
social class, the pashas, to rule. This meant continuing in
office the khedive and Ottoman Circassian pashas, whom the
native Egyptians hated as aliens. The former cooperated
with the British in order to protect their privileges. They
recalled that the Egyptian nationalists had tried to oust

them, and they might have succeeded had the British not

121

intervened. Consequently, this class always sided with the
British, carried out their policies, collected the European
debts willingly, and abandoned the Sudan.

When Sir Evelyn Baring, who had colonial experience
in India, was chosen consul general, the Egyptians viewed
this as an indication that the British intended to govern
Egypt directly for an indefinite period. Baring, the iron
governor, ruled from 1883 to 1907. During 1885-1892, Baring
had the full support of Salisbury, which enabled him to
exercise absolute power over the Egyptian government. Some
what disingenously he remarked: "We do not govern Egypt, we
only govern the governor of Egypt."1

Baring, well aware that Britain was an alien
occupier, thought the only way to strengthen British rule
was to maintain a strong hold on the Egyptian administration.
Furthermore, as a true imperialist, Baring did not believe
the Egyptians were capable of running their own affairs. He
sought to restructure the Egyptian political community along
the lines of European values and Christian ethics. These
attitudes created many problems for the British in Egypt.

In the early days of the occupation, Britain had

adopted the policy of British heads and Egyptian hands, which

 

l
Al—Sayyid, op. cit., p. 68.

122

meant importing highly skilled and experienced men to serve
in important positions. When the Wolff mission collapsed
in 1887 and the British decided to stay in Egypt, this policy
was altered. Untrained and unskilled Englishmen were now
sent, one purpose being to provide career opportunities for
those unable to find jobs at home. The British claimed they
could not find capable Egyptians. It is far more probable
that they preferred to depend on their own people, rather
than train Egyptians who might be unwilling to cooperate
with the occupiers. The British were more dependent on peo-
ple than on institutions in ruling Egypt.
By 1890, the number of British subjects in Egypt was

336, earning a total annual salary of {150,317.1 Most of
these Englishmen knew nothing about their new jobs or local
customs. This was especially true of those working in such
sensitive areas as the Ministry of Interior, the police de-
partment, and the courts. Most of the British officials
lacked the experience and skills needed for the posts they
were recruited to fill:

The inspector for Agriculture of the Delta turned

out to be the geography teacher. Mr. Swift had not

gone home to England for the summer vacation, so he
was delegated to inspect the countryside. As he

 

lBaring to Salisbury, January 26, 1890. British
state paper. Egypt no. 2.

123

knew less than anything about agricultural condi-

tions in the Shargiyya province he accepted my word

that all was well and happily returned to Cairo,

so to report.1
Despite their inadequacies, the Egyptian government was ob-
liged to use these British officials and pay them high
salaries.

The Egyptians felt that Britain wanted to great their
country like other British colonies, to which Englishmen were
sent to obtain experience and achieve fame. A letter from
Salisbury to Baring confirms this policy:

We are sending to you Arthur Hardinge, who I think
you know. He is one of the cleverest men in the
service. He wants experience and that is one of
the considerations that have led me to send him to
so valuable a school as Cairo.2

A large gap developed between British officials and
the Egyptian people. The British behaved as masters of
Egypt and did not care about establishing friendly relations
with the population. Humphry Bowman, a British teacher in
an Egyptian high school, described those relations:

As soon as their work was over, the English masters
escaped on their bicycles to the sporting club at

Gezira . . . . they referred slightingly to their
pupils as the 'walads' [boys] and hardly less so

 

1Al-Sayyid, op. cit., p. 141.

2Salisbury to Baring, private, February 13, 1887,
no. 114, P.R.O. F.O. 633/7.

124

their Egyptian colleagues as the 'effendis'. They
even had separate common rooms.

During the years 1885-1892, the British depended on the
Ottoman-Circassian pashas and British subjects to run the
administration. The exclusion of native Egyptians from
high governmental posts upset the populace very much. In
April 1887, Wilfred Scawen Blunt wrote to Salisbury explain-
ing that the Egyptians were dissatisfied with the British
policy which prohibited Egyptian Arabs from being appointed
ministers. Salisbury sent Blunt's letter to Baring:

I have received--some time ago--a letter from Mr.

Wilfred Blunt. 1 do not quite know what to do

with it. Perhaps the best solution from my per-

plexity that can be suggested is to send it on to

you--of course quite unofficial.
In his reply, Baring admitted that not one Egyptian Arab had
been appointed minister or head of a department:

Under present conditions, however, I should regard

a proposal to make one of Blunt's friends ruler or

prime minister of Egypt as little less absurd than

the nomination of some savage Red Indian Chief to

be Governor General of Canada.

He added that the native Egyptians were ”corrupt and ignorant

biggots."3 Salisbury did not inquire into the issue any

 

1Al-Sayyid, op. cit., p. 140.
2Salisbury to Baring, private, April 22, 1887, no.
911, P.R.O., F.O. 633/7.

3S.P. Baring to Salisbury, private, May 8, 1887.

125

further, and Egyptian Arabs remained excluded from minis-
terial posts.

The impact of this policy upon the Egyptian politi-
cal structure was clear. Most Egyptian notables and educated
men avoided any attempt to revive the nationalist struggle.
This caution was necessary if they wished to hold jobs in
the administration, for the British insisted that no Egyp-
tian with nationalist sympathies be allowed to occupy any

official post.1

Education

 

Education in Egypt before the British occupation
was free to all.2 All subjects were taught in Arabic, ex-
cept at the law school, where French was the main language.

In 1884, the British abolished free education, charged fees

to all students, and replaced Arabic with English.3 The

 

1Al-Rafii, op. cit., p. 210.

2There are no reliable figures for the period, but
the few existing estimates indicate that, during Mohammed
Ali's time, not more than 5 percent of the children between
the ages six and twelve received any formal education. In
the course of the century, this percentage rose to about
17.5 in 1875 and a little less than 25 in 1913—1914.

3Al-Raffi, Op. cit., p. 216.

126

British also prohibited the teaching of Egyptian national-
ist history and political discussion of any kind in the
schools; the latter was considered a major crime and could
lead to imprisonment.1

Under the British, the budget for education was
severely reduced: in 1883 it was $99,549; in 1887, £68,452;
and in 1892, £90,848.2 As a result, many Egyptian schools
closed, and by 1892 no higher education institutions re-
mained open except the law, medical, engineering, and teacher
training schools. The curricula were altered to serve Brit-
ish interests by graduating officials to work for the
occupiers.3

Even though Egyptians continued to be sent abroad to
study, the British made an important change. During Ismail's
reign, 80 percent of these students went to France, and 96
percent of them studied technical subjects. During the

British occupation, 75 percent were sent to Britain, and they

took subjects related to the humanities and social sciences.

 

lZayid, op. cit., p. 55.

2Al-Rafii, op. cit., p. 217.

3Zayid, op. cit., p. 55.

4Nadav Safran, Egypt in Search of Political Community
(Cambridge, Mass.: 1961) pp. 55-6.

127

The British policy hindered educational progress and
had a deleterious effect on Egypt's cultural life. The Egyp-
tian dream, since MOhammed Ali's days, of making Egypt the

cultural center of the Arab world was seriously impeded.

Economy

The Egyptians were aware of British economic and
financial reforms, but most believed that these were insti-
tuted mainly to repay European debts and finance the occupa-
tion army. Most British officials, both at Cairo and Con-
stantinople, were aware of Egyptian feelings and their tax
burden. Sir H. Drummond Wolff felt that he should inform
Salisbury about the Egyptian financial situation. On June
14, 1887, he wrote:

I have the honour to call your Lordship's attention
generally to the abnormal condition of the financial
system of Egypt and the very great hardships it
inflicts on the people of the country.
In the same report, Wolff mentioned the main reason Egyptians
believed that British financial reforms were made merely to

justify and prolong the occupation. Egypt was obliged to cut

its budget by half in order to pay the European debts:

 

lw.c., Wolff to Salisbury, June 14, 1887, no. 96.

128

By taking the above figure (9,628,961 E.Lire) as

the expenditure of Egypt, it will be found that

more than half of it goes out of the country. The

Tribute of Egypt and the consolidated and uncon-

solidated debts amount this year to 5,043,976

Egyptian lire, the whole of which, though drawn

from the labour and property of the Egyptian

people is encased by foreigners and spent

abroad.1
The Egyptians also were deeply upset by the British govern—
ment's decision to collect the British share of dividends in
the Suez Canal Company directly from the Egyptian budget,
although in 1869 the former Khedive Ismail had sold these
dividends in advance to the company.

[The Egyptians] are now paying the interest on those

shares to Her Majesty's Government, instead of the

dividends which the ex-Khedive had in 1869 alienated

for 30,000 000 Fr., which sum was handed over to

the Canal.2

The British concentrated most of their efforts in

agriculture. They tried to convince the Egyptians that,
owing to the fertile soil around the Nile, this was the back-
bone of their economy. The British promoted cotton cultiva-
tion by improving the irrigation system and by opening many

canals. Other crops, such as sugar, rice, and corn, were

neglected, which convinced the Egyptians that the British

 

1Ibid.

 

2W.C., Wolff to Salisbury, June 17, 1887, no. 97.

129

were mainly interested in their country as a source of cotton
for the British textile factories in Lancashire and Yorkshire.
Furthermore, the British closed most of the Egyptian textile
mills, one being Al—Mahala Al—Kubara, which was opened in
Muhammed Ali's time.

The British opposed industrial development on the
ground that Egypt was an agricultural country, and they closed
many factories. It was obvious that the British began to use
Egypt as an open market for their products. European goods,
mainly British, began to flood the local market, and local
industry could not compete. Egyptian handicrafts began to
vanish, a3 Wolff told Salisbury:

It would be a blot on any permanent arrangement if

some attempts were not made to alleviate the heavy

burden entailed on the fellaheen by the debt which

crushes their industry and often deprives them of

their property and means of livelihood.1
There was a mass migration from the countryside to the main
cities, which increased unemployment and created housing
problems. Family income was severely reduced, and poverty
spread among the people.

In financial matters, Britain treated Egypt as one

of its colonies. British subjects were encouraged to invest

 

1W.C., Wolff to Salisbury, June 14, 1887, no. 96.

130

in Egypt. They established and directed interests in bank-
ing, real estate, agriculture, construction, transportation,
and hotels:

The railways, the telegraphs and the port of Alex-

andria are equally owned by the bondholders, and

thus, from a country consisting of 6,000,000 feddans,

or about 6,000,000 acres of cultivable land, and

with a population of about 6,800,000 including for-

eigners, an annual sum is extracted and exported of

5,043,976 Egyptian lire or 5,170,150L.1
In a report published by the Egyptian census bureau in 1913,
it was stated that during 1883-1904 the Europeans estab-
lished sixty companies.2 The report did not cover indivi-
dual European investments during the period. In staffing
these companies, only Europeans were used, the effect being
to prevent Egyptians from acquiring knowledge and exper-
ience.

Europeans, mainly the British, also invested in the
mortgage and loan business. In 1881, total Egyptian indi-
vidual debts were fE12,000,000; in early 1891 the sum was
fE20,000,000. According to Wolff's official report to
Salisbury dated July 14, 1887, more than 15 percent of

arable land was owned by the European creditors:

 

1Ibid.

2Al-Raffi, op. cit., p. 223.

 

131 ,

The cultivable land of Egypt amounts to about
6,000,000 feddans. Of these, I believe nearly one-
sixth, which were extorted from the people by very
doubtful means, are the property of foreign cred-
itors.
By 1891, 1,300,000 acres and 9,100 real estate properties
were mortgaged.2 Since most Egyptians were poor and could
not pay their debts, these accumulated. As a result, Egyp-

tians felt that they merely worked as servants for the Euro-

peans in order to meet these obligations.

Social Life

 

The British did not initiate social reforms in Egypt
except for the abolition of the Corvee. The British did not
allow the Egyptian government to allocate part of its budget
for social welfare. The Egyptians thus believed that since
the British controlled the government, they were responsible
for the mass misery.

The wealthy class associated itself with the occupa-
tion authority in an attempt to secure its position and
privileges. This class separated itself from the mass of

Egyptians and tried to imitate the European life-style,

 

1W.C., Wolff to Salisbury, June 14, 1887, no. 96.

2Al-Raffi, op. cit., p. 225.

132

giving lavish parties, and traveling abroad. The wealthy
turned their backs on the suffering of their fellow Egyptians
and on the nationalist movement.

The Egyptian lower class, which included most of the
population, suffered from disease and ignorance, unassisted
by social welfare programs. Low wages and unemployment were
seriously debilitating and helped alienate most Egyptians
from their traditions and beliefs. Family and interpersonal
relationships were weakened.

The British brought social disorders, too, in the
form of usury, liquor stores in cities and villages, and
night clubs in the main cities. These and other factors con-
tributed to a rapid change in people's morals and behavior.
The crime rate increased throughout the country. It seemed
to ordinary Egyptians that the British occupation was a pun—
ishment by the Almighty:

It was customary for fallah mothers to frighten
their children with the Injilzi "Englishman” as a
variant to the time-honoured bogey, the afrit. But
apart from such comment, the occupation, when
thought about at all, was regarded as an affliction

from the Almighty, similar to a flood, to punish
the faithful for their iniquity.l

 

1Al-Sayyid, op. cit., p. 145.

133

During 1885-1892, the British authority in Egypt,
which had the full support of Salisbury, deeply touched
every aspect of Egyptian life. The peOple, frustrated by
British policy, believed they had been deceived by promises
to introducegenuine reforms. In 1887, Wolff, who was con-
sidered a specialist in Egyptian affairs, warned Salisbury
about the consequences:

It is impossible to measure the political effect of
the state of things on a population thus mortgaged
to the foreign creditors of former bad masters. It
must always be the cause of a discontent not the

less deep from not being manifest, and it would al-
ways render the fellaheen anxious to join any popu-
lar leader who would promise them relief.

Wolff's predictions proved accurate. The suffering of the

people during this period undoubtedly contributed to the

rising of the second nationalist movement in the early 19003.

 

1W.C., Wolff to Salisbury, June 14, 1887, no. 96.

Chapter V
SALISBURY AND THE SUDAN QUESTION

1885-1892

The Egyptian-Sudanese Connection

From ancient times, Egypt has considered the Sudan,
source of the headwaters of the Nile, its lifeline. It has
regarded domination of the Sudan as vital, since the Nile
is Egypt's main water supply. As early as 2800 B.C., the
Egyptian's through military raids, maintained trading rights
with the northern Sudan. In about 2000 B.C., the Egyptians
occupied most of the Sudan and appointed their own governor
at Kerma.

This period of control ended with the Hyksos invasion
of Egypt in about 1700 B.C. The Sudanese enjoyed self-rule
until the Arabs conquered Egypt and extended their dominion

to the northern Sudan (Nubia) in 651 A.D.

 

lL.A. Fabunmi, The Sudan in Anglo-Egyptian Relations
(London: 1964), p. 22.

134

135

In the sixteenth century, the Ottomans occupied Egypt
and, nominally, the Sudan. In 1820, after Mohammed Ali had
become Viceroy of Egypt he sent troops into the area to rule
in the hame of the sultan. In 1840, the sultan recognized
Mohammed Ali as governor-general of the Sudan.

Khedive Ismail, seeking to imitate the Europeans,
claimed that Egypt should have its share in the partition of
Africa. In 1869, Ismail sent an Egyptian expedition under
the command of a British explorer, Sir Samuel Baker, into
the area on the pretext of ending the slave trade. Baker was
succeeded in 1874 by Colonel Charles Gordon, who was ap-
pointed Governor of the Equatorial Province by Ismail. In
1876, Gordon was promoted to Governor-General of the Sudan.

He remained in charge of the Egyptian administration there un-
til his resignation in 1881, in protest against the British
government's desposition of Khedive Ismail: "It pains me

the sufferings my poor Khedive Ismail has had to go through."1

The year 1881 was one of revolution in the Nile Val-
ley. In addition to Arabi's revolt in Egypt, there was a
Sudanese uprising. Mohammed Ahmad of Dongola, known as the

Mahdi, fought to free his country from foreign interference.

 

1Ibid., p. 31

136

The British saw the Mahdi's movement as a serious threat
to their presence in Egypt, and in 1883 they sent Egyptian
troops, under Colonel William Hicks, to subdue the revolt.
Hick's troops were defeated.
Sir Evelyn Baring's arrival in Egypt on September

11, 1883, was a turning point in Egyptian-Sudanese affairs.
Baring advised his government to halt military action against
the Mahdists because he believed British toops and huge
expenditures, which people at home would be unwilling to
pay, would be required to subdue the Mahdi. Gladstone, who
.shared Baring's belief, felt that any British involvement
in the Sudan would be opposed by the European powers, still
clamoring against the British occupation of Egypt. Britain's
attitude convinced the Egyptian government that past British
assistance had stemmed mostly from a desire to strengthen
British influence in the Nile Valley. This intention emerges
clearly in a remark by Samuel Baker:

My chief endeavour was to work for the interest of

Egypt, at the same time that I sustained and ad-

vanced the influence of England. General Gordon,

who succeeded me, was actuated by the desire and
died in the hope that England would reach Khartoun.“

 

1Ibid., p. 31.

137

In 1883, Gladstone's government decided to withdraw
Egyptian troops from the Sudan. Granville informed the
Egyptians that

Her Majesty's Government are in no way responsible

for the operations in Soudan which have been initi-

ated on the authority of the Egyptian Government.
Egypt viewed this decision as dangerous to its security, as
it deprived the country of a natural frontier and might open
it to the Mahdi's invasion. The Egyptian prime minister,
Sherif Pasha, resigned in protest on December 21, 1883. The
British administration in Egypt was thus faced with a minis-
terial crisis, as all Egyptian leaders refused to partici-
pate in a new cabinet. The British made it clear that their
policy must be executed; Britain would insist that only
Egyptian leaders who agreed to follow its policy would be
appointed to high office. Granville instructed Baring to
inform the Egyptians that

it is essential that in important questions affect-

ing the administration and safety of Egypt, and ad-

vice of the British Government should be followed

for as long as the present occupation continues.

Ministers and Governors must carry out the advice

or forfeit their posts. The appointment of British
ministers would be most objectionable, but it will

 

1Granville to Cartwright, May 7, 1883, P.R.O. F.O.
78/3550.

138

no doubt be possible to find Egyptians who will ex-

ecute the Khedive's orders under British advice.

The cabinet will support you.
Nubar Pasha, the only Egyptian leader of consequence, chose
to acquiesce. He formed a new cabinet pledged to the aban-
donment of the Sudan. Sultan Abdul Hamid II reminded the
khedive of the Firman of August 1879, which denied the
khedive the right to surrender any part of Egyptian terri-
tory, but the protest had no effect.

The British decision strengthened the Mahdi's move-
ment, which gained support and prestige among the Sudanese
masses.

In 1884, the British decided to evacuate the Sudan;
Gordon was chosen to conduct the operation because of his
knowledge of the country. Khedive Tawfik, under British
prompting, appointed Gordon Governor-General of the Sudan in
January 1884.2 He arrived in Khartoum the next month, and
instead of evacuating the area, he tried to restore Egyptian

rule. Gladstone's government insisted on evacuation.

Gordon thereupon complained:

 

1Granville to Baring, January 4, 1884, in correspon-
dence respecting the affairs of Egypt - Egypt no. 1 (1884).
p. 176.

2Fabunmi, op. cit., p. 35.

139

I must say I was surprised to see such a thing. A
Government like ours governed by men who dare not
call their own . . . . I have written letters to
the Foreign Office that would raise a corpse; it
is no good; I have threatened to go to the French
Government about the Soudan, it is no good.1

Gordon seriously misjudged the strength of the Mahdist
forces, with the result that he was beseiged at Khartoum and
cut off from both Egypt and the Red Sea. The British sent a
relief force, but it arrived too late. Gordon was killed on
January 25, 1885. There is some evidence that the Mahdi
wanted to save Gordon and exchange him for Ahmed Arabi, but
that the Mahdi's soldiers were unaware of their leader's
desire.

Gordon's death deeply affected the British people
and created a split among politicians about what action
should be taken to avenge him and to restore British pres-
tige. Leonard Courtney and John Morley demanded abandonment
of the Sudan. They believed that the Sudanese must be left

free to rule their own country. On February 5. 1885, in his

speech at Torpoint, Courtney said:

 

1Ibid., p. 36

2Ibid., p. 38

140

If I stood alone, I would protest against the notion

of war against the Mahdi . . . . simply for the pur-

pose of showing our might.1
Lord Randolph Churchill and the Lord Mayor of London were two
among many British politicians who urged action. Salisbury,
leader of the opposition in the House of Lords, called upon
the government to establish peace in the Sudan, which in his
view was essential to the security of Egypt. The Gladstone
government stood firm.

When the Mahdi died on June 21, 1885, the British
thought the crisis had passed. In her speech from the throne,
the Queen said:

The death of the Mahdi will probably enable me to
perform with less difficulty the duties toward the

ruler and people of Egypt which events have imposed
upon me.

 

1The Annual Register (London: 1885) pp. 22-3.

2Parliamentary Debates, vol. CCCI, August 14, 1885,
pp. 31—2.

141

The Dervish Threat

 

When Salisbury came to power on June 24, 1885, he
chose to follow Gladstone's Sudanese policy. He wanted to
ease the tensions surrounding the Egyptian question and con-
ciliate the sultan, who still nominally ruled the Sudan.
Also, Salisbury preferred to wait until conditions should
make occupation of the Sudan less difficult and more profit-
able. He hoped that the Mahdi's death might mean the end
of the movement.

In the event, the Mahdi's demise did not solve
Britain's problems. His successor was the Khalifa Abdullah—
al-Taashi, under whose leadership the Mahdi's followers,
the Dervishes, scored a triumph on July 30, 1885. They took
the key town of Kassala, which gave them control of the
Sudan except for the Red Sea fortresses. They then captured
and destroyed most of the Egyptian garrisons in the Sudan.

These victories alarmed Salisbury, to whom it now
seemed that the Dervishes were more powerful than he had
thought. The first action of Salisbury's government was to
order WOlsley, who had led the British expedition to aid
Gordon, to abandon Dongola and avoid any contact with the

Dervish forces. Salisbury was more concerned with

142

strengthening Britain's position in Egypt and with defending
Egypt from.the Dervish threat, than with restoring Egyptian

rule in the Sudan:

For the present, the view of Her Majesty's Govern-
ment is that the direct dominion of the Khedive
should not be carried further in the Valley of the
Nile thant:he region which may be conventiently
controlled from a military station at the furthest
terminus of the railways.

He hoped that the issue might be settled through cooperation
with the Porte.
Salisbury sent Henry Wolff to Constantinople in 1885

to try to find a solution for the Egyptian question as a
whole. He also hoped that the sultan could be persuaded to
take military action to maintain his authority in the Sudan.
Salisbury believed it would be a severe blow to the Dervishes
if they were to face Muslim troops. He wrote Wolff:

The co-operation of the Sultan will doubtless exer-

cise a marked influence on the minds of large bodies

of the inhabitants who profess the faith of Islam,

and will neutralize any evil effects arising from

any suspicion they may have entertained that it was

intended to subject them to the domination of

nations differing from themselves in faith.2

Salisbury instructed Wolff to tell the sultan that such

action would "add lustre to the prestige which the name of

 

1W.C., Salisbury to Wolff, August 7, 1885, no. 1.

2Ibid.

 

143

his government enjoys in the more distant provinces of his
Empire."l He assured the sultan that if the latter accepted
his suggeStion, England would do all it possible could to
assist. At the same time, Salisbury told Wolff to warn the
sultan that if he rejected his suggestion, Britain could

find help elsewhere:

It will not be open to his Government to complain
if the assistance of others is invoked. It will

be the duty, in such a case, of Her Majesty's Gov-
ernment to ascertain how far a native influence may
be available on which a settled form of government
can be built, or whether in any degree it is neces-
sary to recur to foreign assistance.

Sultan Abdul Hamid II refused to take military ac-
tion against the Sudan, fearing this would damage his pres-
tige throughout the Muslim world. As Wolff reported to

Salisbury:

The Plenipotentiaries then with some hesitation
entered into an explanation to the effect that
there was great disinclination on the part of
the Sultan to associate his troops with ours.
The result of the brilliant but fruitless oper-
ations of our forces having been the destruc-
tion of many thousands of Mussulmans make it
repugnant to the Sultan to be identified with
us as against races of his own faith.3

 

1Ibid.

 

2Ibid.

3

 

W.C., Wolff to Salisbury, September 4, 1885, no. 19.

144

Furthermore, the Egyptians did not favor any joint
action between the Ottoman Empire and England. After the
Hicks expedition in 1883, they preferred that they them-
selves or the Ottomans deal withtzhe Sudanese issue. Wolff
wrote Salisbury on September 4, 1885:

An Egyptian of high rank has informed me that the
dispatch of Mussulman troops under Hicks Pasha,
an Englishman, did more than anything else to
promote the power of the Mahdi.

The sultan countered the British plan with a pro-
posal to establish a civil commission to settle the Sudanese
issue. To make the arrangements more acceptable to the
Sudanese, the sultan insisted that negotiations should be
conducted by the khedive and the Ottoman commissioner; the
English commissioner should not take part but would be in-
formed at each step Salisbury authorized Wolff to accept:

I see no objection to Turkish proposal contained
in your telegram of yesterday if it understood
that nothing is settled without assent of English
commissioner.

On October 24, 1885, a convention was signed between

England and the Ottoman Empire. Article II stipulated that

Youssouf Pasha Shuhdi, chosen by Sultan Abdul Hamid II and

 

1Ibid.

 

2W.C., Salisbury to Wolff, October 2, 1885, no. 32.

145

the khedive, should conduct negotiations with the Sudanese.
Shuhdi's mission was successful in opening avenues of trade
between Egypt and the Sudan, but it failed to end the
Dervishes' threat to Egypt. On March 3, 1887, Wolff re-
ported to Salisbury:

With respect to this Article [Article II], I
stated, in answer to questions, that His High-
ness the Khedive and Ghazi Ahmed Moukhtar Pasha
had together selected Youssouf Pasha Shuhdi, and
dispatched him.to the frontier, from which he
sent reports home to the Khedive. Those reports
as well as the information furnished by our own
military authorities, showed that there had been
no attack in any force, that matters were quiet—
ing down, and that no aggression was apprehended be—
yond perhaps the marauding raids which were often
taking place in all uncivilized countries. The
Soudan, as far as Egypt was concerned, was now
quiet, so much so that trade was now being re-
opened with the Soudanese.1

This trade was more beneficial to the Sudan then to
Egypt because of the nature of the Sudanese economy. Since
the latter depended on primitive agricultural techniques
which did not meet the people's needs, the Sudanese viewed
the opening of the frontier as essential and to their ad-
vantage. They could import Egyptian goods and benefit from

Egypt's commercial connection with Europe.

 

1W.C., Wolff to Salisbury, March 3, 1887, no. 33.

146

Salisbury was unhappy with the results, particularly
since Egypt's pressure to restore its authority in the Sudan
continued. Therefore, on February 26, 1887, he asked Wolff
to press the sultan for direct military intervention. The
sultan resisted and told the British that the best solution
was to strengthen the Egyptian army sufficiently to enable
it to restore Egyptian hegemony in the Sudan: "His Highness
[told me] 14,000 [men] would be required if Dongola were
again annexed to Egypt."1 But Salisbury feared that a strong
Egyptian army might endanger the British position in Egypt.
He told the Ottomans through Wolff that England would not per-
mit the Egyptian army to number more than 10,000 men.

The failure of the 1887 negotiations left the
Sudanese issue unresolved. The Egyptian government was deep-
ly upset by the British refusal to take any action to allow
the Egyptians to restore authority themselves. Furthermore,
the British policy strengthened the Dervishes' forces and
prestige. In a private letter to Salisbury, dated March 10,

1888, Baring wrote:

 

1W.C., Wolff to Salisbury, March 26, 1887, no. 54.

2W.C., Salisbury to WOlff, telegraphic, March 30,
1887, no. 49.

147

I am rather concerned at the state of things up the
Nile. The Dervishes are beginning to trouble, and
some of the inhabitants of Assouan have found out
that they ought to pray six times a day instead of
five . . . . in fact that Kahlifa Abdullah is the

high priest of the prophet. I fear we shall have
some trouble.
The Dervishes, aware of Egyptian weakness, wanted

to seize the opportunity to free their country. In 1888,
they laid seige to Suakin, the only major town still under
Egyptian rule in the eastern Sudan. Riaz Pasha, the Egyptian
prime minister, urged the British to send troops to the town,
but Salisbury was against taking any action. His attitude
shocked the Egyptian and British military men in Egypt.
Baring wrote to Salisbury: "Kitchener is rather unhappy about
what you said in connection with Suakin."2 There were dif-
ferences of opinion among British officials in Egypt about
the value of Suakin to Egypt. As Baring told Salisbury:

Vincent and some others would like to get rid of

it at almost any price; the soldiers, on the other

hand, share Kitchener's opinion.3

Baring himself favored strengthening Suakin:

 

lBaring to Salisbury, private, March 10, 1888,
P.A.O. F.O. 633/6.

2Baring to Salisbury, private, April 12, 1888,
P.R.O. F.O. 633/6.

3Ibid.

 

148

It would never do to let Suakin fall into the

hands of Dervishes. Their presence at Suakin

would at once make itself seriously felt in the

Valley of the Nile. So far I think Kitchener

is right.1
After some hesitation, Salisbury yielded and authorized a
small British force to be sent from Cairo to Suakin, under
Sir Francis Grenfell, the commander-in-chief of the Egyptian
army. The expedition lifted the Dervish seige on December
20, 1888.

Since 1885, when the British had made patently clear
their intention to abandon the Sudan, the Egyptians had
tried to persuade them to change their policy. In late
1888, encouraged by success in The Suakin matter, Riaz Pasha
demanded the reconquest of Donogla in the northern Sudan.
Baring informed Salisbury:

If once I let them think that the Soudan is a pure-
ly Egyptian question and nothing else, and that they
can not expect much help even of a diplomatic kind,
in settling it, they would naturally reply, ”then
let us do what we like about it.

Salisbury did not favor partial operations such as the con-

quest of Dongola. He believed the Egyptians either should

 

1Ibid.

 

2Baring to Salisbury, private, May 2, 1890, no. 155,
P.R.O. F.O. 633/6.

149

defend what was left them or try and retake the entire Sudan.
But the latter alternative required an improvement in Egyp-
tian finances, which Salisbury thought were still far from
adequate. As he told Queen Victoria:

There had been a possibility of restoring the power

of the Khedive over the Nile but that depended on

Egypt footing the bill since the House of the

Commons would refuse to pay.1

In early 1889, there was optimism that the rising of

Abu Jummaiza in Darfur, in the western Sudan, against the
Khalifa Abdullah might weaken the Dervishes. Abu Jummaiza
was a follower of the Sanusi sect of Cyrenaica. His move-
ment was viewed by the British as a new challenge to the
khalifa, and if it succeeded, Egypt might retain its influ-
ence in the Sudan because of the good relations between
Egypt and the Sanusi. However, these hopes were much exag-
gerated,2 and in 1889 Abu Jummaiza was defeated and killed
by the Khalifa Abdullah.

After his victory, the Khalifa decided that the time

was ripe to invade Egypt. His troops, under the command of

 

1S.P., Salisbury to Queen Victoria, December 25,
1888, no. D186/510.

2Baring to Salisbury, May 12, 1889, P.R.O. F.O.
78/4240.

150

Amir Abd al-Rahman al-Nujumi, were sent to the frontier,
where Al-Nujumi engaged in quick raids on the Egyptian side.
To the amazement of the British, the Egyptian people sympa-
thized with the Dervishes:
However the raids and frontier disturbances which
take place from time to time have met with con-
siderable sympathy, if not assistance, from the
riverain population between Aswan and Wadi Halfa.
Many Egyptians believed that a Muslim movement was the only
way to oust the British. To meet the threat, the British
moved most of the Egyptian army to Wadi Halfa in an attempt
to stop al-Nujumi's troops. The Dervishes were defeated at
Taski on August 3, 1889, and this serious danger to Egypt
receded.

The Dervishes' defeat greatly affected their power
and prestige. The Egyptian government felt that the time
had now arrived to restore its authority in the Sudan.
Baring, who supported the Egyptian view, urged Salisbury
in the spring of 1890 to allow the Egyptians to advance on
Tokar. Baring argued that the capture of this strategic

location in the eastern Sudan would weaken the Dervishes

throughout the country. Although Baring assured Salisbury

 

1Baring to Salisbury, March 18, 1887, P.R.O. F.O.
78/4044.

151

that Tokar could be taken without difficulty, the idea was

rejected. Salisbury still insisted on maintaining a defen-
sive attitude. On March 28, 1890, Salisbury, in a private

letter to Baring, explained his position:

The argument against Tokar appears to me that the
operation must involve some money, and may involve
very much, and that the finances of Egypt, though
no longer in an embarrassed condition, are only con-
valescent and a very slight imprudence might throw
them back into the condition from which they have
been so painfully and laboriously drawn. Again when
once you have permitted a military advance, the ex-
tent of that military advance scarcely remains with-
in your own discretion. It is always open to the
military authorities to discover in the immediate
vicinity of the area to which your orders confine
them, some degree against which it is absolutely
necessary to guard, some strategic position whose
invaluable qualities will repay ten times any risk
or cost that its occupation may involve. You have
no means of arguing against them. They are upon
their own territory and can set down your opposi-
tion to civilian ignorance, and so step by step the
imperious exactions of military necessity will lead
you on into the desert.

Salisbury reminded Baring of Gordon's military defeat and
death in 1885. The disaster still lived in British minds,
a factor which must be considered in deciding any course in
the Sudan:
To these considerations, I must add that they will
appear infinitely magnified to the terrified minds

of people here at home. They were so deeply im-
pressed with the disasters of six years ago, and

 

1Salisbury to Baring, March 28, 1890, P.R.O. F.O.
633/7.

152

the apparently inexorable necessity which had
driven them into situations where those disasters
were inevitable, that they shrink instinctively
from any proposal to advance into the Egyptian
desert.
Salisbury did tell Baring that he might reconsider
if he had more evidence that such an action could be carried

out without difficulty and that it was necessary for the

defense of Egypt:
I do not say that this is a sufficient argument
to prevent such an advance, if there is a clear
balance of undoubted advantage in its favour,
but in the absence of any such evidence it must
be accepted as a strong presumption.2
Baring kept up his demands for military action

against Tokar. Salisbury was unprepared for the Queen's

support of Baring: "But to my great surprise the Queen ex-
pressed herself warmly in favour of the recapture of Tokar."3
Under this pressure, Salisbury telegraphed Baring on
February 7, 1891, that the government sanctioned the occu-
pation of Tokar.

The town was captured on February 19, 1891, thus

removing most of the eastern Sudan from the Dervishes'

 

lIbid.

 

2Ibid.

 

3Salisbury to Baring, private, February 13, 1891,
no. 114, P.R.O. F.O. 633/7.

153

control. Salisbury's reaction was stated in a private
letter to Baring dated February 27, 1891:
The Tokar business was very well done, but the
evils of Egyptian leakiness were well illus-
trated. If we had known the Osman Digha was
likely to be there with 4,000 men, we might
have hesitated to approve. But all is well
that ends well.

Before he left office in 1892, Salisbury was con-
fident that he had calmed the Sudanese question to the ex—
tent that international circumstances and Egyptian financial
capabilities allowed. He was satisfied with events: the
defeat of the Dervishes at Suakin in 1888, the defeat of al-
Nujumi's troops at Tuski in 1889, and the capture of Tokar
in 1891. It seemed to him that peace had been restored to

the southern border of Egypt and that the Dervishes would

not menace the country for the time being.

 

1Salisbury to Baring, private, February 27, 1891, no.
115, P.R.O. F.O. 633/7.

154

The Italian Threat

 

In addition to the Dervishes' threat during the per-
iod 1885 to 1891, Italy created serious trouble for Anglo-
Egyptian interests in the Nile Valley. Italy was aware of
Britain's need for Italian support of its Egyptian policy,
primarily due to Italy's close ties with Germany. The
British had paid for this support in 1885 by allowing the
Italians to occupy Massowah, in the eastern Sudan, but this
proved insufficient. The Italians wanted to expand their
African empire to include most of the Sudanese coast along
the Red Sea. These demands were unacceptable to Salisbury.
In a private letter to Wolff, dated May 4, 1887, he wrote:

It is evident that blackmail is the order of the
day. Germany and Italy saw that the moment for
selling their services had come . . . . Italy
wants a long strip of Egyptian coast. It would
be very difficult to pay the price anyhow; for
the coast does not belong to us, but to Egypt--
and one thing on which the Egyptians are intract—
able is the cession of territory: as we found
when Lord Granville gave up the Soudan.1

During Wolff's negotiations with the Ottomans in
1887, the Italians made it clear that they would not support

the British in Egypt unless Britain yielded to their demands

in the Sudan. Wolff informed Salisbury:

 

1
A 51/170.

S.P. Salisbury to Wolff, private, May 4, 1887, no.

155

White and myself are of opinion from a multitude
of small indications that Germany, Austria and
Italy will delay an arrangement about Egypt so as
to force Her Majesty's Government to come to some
understanding with Italy, the nature of which we
have not discovered.

On May 2, 1889, the Italians and King Menelek of
Abyssinia signed the treaty of Occiali, which placed
Abyssinia under Italian protection, mainly in foreign af-
fairs. Italy believed it was now free to expand its empire
in the eastern Sudan. The Egyptians urged the British to
take immediate action to help Egypt maintain its security
and influence in the Sudan. The Egyptians believed that
this European threat was more serious than that of the
Dervishes. Although the latter had held the Sudan for
six years, they were unable to affect Egypt's water supply,
but a European power would have the ability to tamper with
the Nile's flow. The Egyptian prime minister, Riaz Pasha,
called Britain's attention to this new danger:

The Nile is the life of Egypt . . . . the Nile
means the Soudan . . . . if [any European power]

took possession of the banks of the Nile it would
be all over with Egypt . . . . the Government of

 

1S.P., Wolff to Salisbury, private and confidential,
May 3, 1887, no. A51/79.

156

His Highness the Khedive will never willingly
concent, not without co ulsion, to such an
attack on its existence.

Salisbury was worried about Italian intentions, and
he realized that Egypt was unable to respond because of its
financial difficulties. Nevertheless, he was not sure that
Italian finances would permit any large-scale plans. He
was inclined to view Italian pressure as a means to gain
more concessions, particularly since their maneuvers fol-
lowed so closely on the collapse of Wolff's mission to Con-
stantinople in 1887:

The Egyptian force is not strong enough to coerce
them, and England has no interest in Egypt suffi-
ciently definite or permanent to justify her in
quarrelling with the Italians upon the question of
the boundary. The Italians know that very well,
and will treat mere diplomatic pressure with much
disregard. They will not do anything flagrantly
unjust or in violation of distinct agreements or
evident, adverse title, for that might alienate

the sympathy of people in this country from them,
and I do not think they will do anything which will
lead to a great expenditure of money, for the state
of their finances is a great embarrassment to Crispi.

Salisbury did admit that developments in Africa, especially

the new Italian threat, forced him to devote most of his

 

1Riaz Memo, December 9, 1888, enclosed in Baring
letter to Foreign Office, January 15, 1889, C. 5668.

2Salisbury to Baring, private, May 2, 1890, no. 108,
P.R.O. F.O. 633/7.

157

time to African Affairs: "Africa is the subject which occu-
pies the Foreign Office more than any other."1
In 1890, the Italians laid claim to Kassala, an

important strategic point in the eastern Sudan, because
they believed it could enable them to occupy Khartoum. The
Italian claim again stirred fears about Egypt's water sup-
ply. The British viewed this demand as unfriendly and felt
it seriously affected their interests in Egypt and the Nile
Valley. They became convinced that they had been mistaken
to abandon the Sudan in 1885. Baring explained his views
in a private letter to Salisbury:

I have never denied nor do I now deny, that the

abandonment of the Soudan was very much to be re-

gretted, that the country naturally belongs to

Egypt and that the government which rules the

Delta of the Nile should also hold the banks of

the river, if not to its source, at all events

for a long way up its course.

The Italian challenge put the British in a difficult

situation. They considered themselves responsible for the
defense of Egypt as long as their occupation lasted. They

admitted that they had pressed the Egyptians to evacuate the

.Sudan, which they would not have done except under compulsion

 

1Cecil, op. cit., vol. IV, p. 254.

2Mekki Shibeika, British Policy in the Sudan 1882-
1902 (London: 1952), p. 322.

158

from Britain. The British felt that any reluctance to halt
Italy would damage their prestige in Egypt and elsewhere.

Furthermore, permitting Italy to establish an influence in
the Sudan might eventually jeopardize the British position

in Egypt. Baring called Salisbury's attention to this
possibility:

It will go down to history that the English govern-
ment found Egypt extending from Alexandria to the
sources of the Nile and left it shorn of half its
territory and dominated by an European power [Italy]
which, though now friendly, at some future time be
hostile, occupying the head water of the river on
which the whole life of the country depends. I con-
fess I can not look forward to the possibility of
any such consummation without the greatest regret.

In March 1890, Salisbury asked Baring what policy he

recommended. Baring replied:

It is most desirable to come to an early settlement
with the Italian government as to its territorial
limits; that the first essential basis of any such
arrangement is to exclude the possibility of the
Italians establishing themselves in the Nile Valley
or at Kasalah.2

Salisbury was convinced that Egypt could not afford to send
troops to the Sudan; the European powers which supervised

Egyptian finances would never permit such a step. Nor could

 

1Ibid.

 

2Ibid., Page 323.

159

Britain intervene militarily. He also rejected the sugges-
tion from the British military authority at Cairo that the
Ottomans be asked to send troops. Salisbury had little re-
gard for military advice:

I would not be too much impressed by what the sol-

diers tell you about the strategic importance of

these places, it is their way. If they were

allowed full scope, they would insist on the im-

portance of garrisoning the moon in order to pro-

tect us from Mars.1

Since force was out of the question, Salisbury

favored diplomacy as the means to keep the Italians out of
the Nile Valley. He entered into negotiations in Lodon
with the Italian ambasSador, Count Tarnielli, in an attempt
to settle the Sudanese question peacefully. Salisbury
accepted a draft of a demarcation of spheres of influence,
with Tokar on the Egyptian side. The draft was criticized
by the Egyptian government and Baring on the ground that it
gave Italy a strong hold on the Nile, which should belong
to Egypt. Baring told Salisbury:

I hope my telegram will have made it clear that

the main objection to the Italians' proposal is

that it involves no settlement at all on the

points which from an Egyptian point of view are
the most important.

 

1The Earl of Comer, Modern Egypt (London: 1908),
vol. 11, p. 75.

2Baring to Salisbury, private, May 2, 1890, no. 155,
P.R.O. F.O. 633/6.

 

160

Salisbury agreed that the draft would not satisfy

the Egyptians. Although pressed by the Germans to reach a
settlement, he decided to leave the negotiations to Baring,
who would arrive in London on leave in the summer of 1890:

Your dispatch on the subject of the Italian fron-

tier confirms me in the impression that the settle-

ment of it had better be delayed till you can

discuss it here in London yourself . . . . How-

ever, as the Egyptian government know that you are

in earnest on their side in this matter, I should

prefer that you conducted the negotiations your—

self.1
Salisbury's decision was based on his confidence in the man
on the spot:

It is probable that you will come to a better con-

clusion than I should do, with my imperfect con-

viction of the advantages which the possession of

the Sudan territory is likely to confer upon Egypt.

Instead of going to London, Baring went to Italy,

prefering to negotiate directly with Crispi. The Italian

prime minister was in Naples, away from the mass media and

the influence of the diplomatic circle in Rome.3

 

1Salisbury to Baring, private, May 2, 1890, P.R.O.
F.O. 633/7.

2Ibid.

 

3S.P., Baring to Barrington, private, August 26,
1890, no. A54/27.

161

In his instructions to Baring, Salisbury insisted
that all the affluents of the Nile that Egypt formerly had
possessed should be secured. He warned Baring that he might
find Crispi a hard bargainer, and he let Baring know that
he was free to halt negotiations:

I do not think England will lose by delay. Italy
is pursuing a policy which is financially im-
possible. Sooner or later she must recede from
it and then she will not be so particular about
frontiers. I dare say things will go on as they
do now as long as Crispi is at the head of af-
fairs. But he is 71.1

As Salisbury had predicted, Crispi rejected the Brit-
ish position that Italy must not tamper with any of Egypt's
former dominions in the Nile Valley.

In February 1891, Crispi fell from power and was
succeeded by Di Rudini, who expressed a desire to reach a
settlement with the British. On March 24, 1891, an Anglo-
Italian agreement was signed. Italy recognized Egyptian
claims in the Sudan, including Kassala, and agreed not to
interfere with the water supply of the Atbara River. Brit-

ain recognized the Italian protectorate over the whole of

Abyssiania to within 100 miles of the Nile.

 

1S.P., Salisbury to Baring, private, August 31, 1890,
no. A55/58.

162

The agreement was considered a great success for
Salisbury. It prevented the penetration of European influ-
ence into the Nile Valley, and it showed the Egyptians that
the British were willing to protect their interests in the

Sudan.

Chapter VI

CONCLUSION

The British occupation in Egypt in 1882 met with
European and Ottoman opposition from the outset, and this
pressure made the British position in Egypt vulnerable. In
response, British policy went through two phases. Failing
to obtain the European powers' consent to the occupation,
Britain declared that its primary aim in Egypt was to main-
tain the khedive's authority; it would evacuate its troops
as soon as this goal was achieved. Britain then claimed
its intention was to make Egypt financially solvent. Clear-
ly, the British could attain neither objective without the
cooperation of the great powers. In 1885, the task of
easing the international situation fell to Salisbury.

Salisbury's policy toward Egypt during the period
1885-1892 emerges from his formal correspondence and private
papers. Several observations and conclusions can be drawn.

Salisbury's policy evolved in two distinct stages.

The first began immediately after his appointment as prime

163

164

‘minister in 1885, when he inherited the Egyptian issue from
Gladstone's government. Salisbury sought a diplomatic solu-
tion to the Egyptian question, and to that end he sent Henry
Wolff to Constantinople in 1885. Salisbury felt direct
negotiations with the Ottomans might appease the European
powers, especially when he realized that Britain had depended
too heavily on Bismarck's good offices in dealing with the
major European powers over the evacuation of Egypt. This
diplomatic phase ended with the breakdown of Wolff's mission
in 1887; France and Russia persuaded the sultan to refuse to
ratify the agreement the Ottomans had reached with the Brit-
ish. The failure of negotiations convinced Salisbury that
the British policy of isolation should be abandoned.

In the second phase, emphasis shifted to an extended
occupation of Egypt. Salisbury decided to focus not on Con-
stantinople, but on Cairo, using it as a center for British
policy in the Mediterranean. To secure that end, Salisbury
believed Britain should seek closer relations with the Euro-
pean central powers in an attempt to counterbalance French
opposition to the British presence in Egypt. Nevertheless,
Salisbury opposed formal ties with the central powers or

any special alliance with Bismarck. He believed that such

165

affiliations would lead Britain to a direct involvement in
continental conflicts and would increase the tension between
Britain and France. Salisbury's main purpose was to obtain
Bismarck's full support for his Egyptian policy.

The conciliation of France was a cornerstone of
Salisbury's policy. He was convinced that Britain's diffi-
culties in Egypt stemmed mainly from France's attitude. He
acknowledged that France had interests and influence in
Egypt that it could not easily abandon. For that reason,
the French refused to join the British in crushing the Egypt-
ian nationalist movement in 1882, and they continued their
opposition to British control of Egypt until 1904, when both
countries signed the Anglo-French Entente. This agreement
ended French aspirations in the country and strengthened
British control over Egypt. The agreement could not have
been concluded had Salisbury not worked assiduously since
1885 to convince the French that Britain had a genuine desire
for good relations with France. As evidence of this, Brit-
ain was prepared to discuss possible colonial concessions if
France would recognize the British occupation of Egypt. To
leave the door open for such a possibility, Salisbury stead-

fastly resisted Bismarck's pressure to bring Britain into

166

his alliance system, which would have tied Britain formally
to the central powers. It was obvious to Salisbury that
Bismarck was trying to take advantage of the Anglo-French
disagreement over Egypt. By exacerbating the tension,
Bismarck hoped to isolate France and prevent it from chal-
lenging the German occupation of Alsace and Lorraine.

As his policy entered its second phase, Salisbury in-
structed Baring to concentrate his efforts on reforming the
Egyptian government and preparing for a long-term British
administration in Egypt. With this new focus in mind, in
1888 Salisbury reassessed British policy in the Nile Valley.
He began to think of the need for asserting British influence
in the Sudan as an added measure to secure Britain's presence
in Egypt. Salisbury came to see the importance of recaptur-
ing several strategic points in the Sudan that had been
Egyptian possessions until taken by the Mahdist forces in
1885. His decision was prompted by Italian interest in the
area, which became apparent in 1888.

The Italian threat alarmed Salisbury, for it was ob-
vious that Britain could not tolerate any European presence
in the Nile Valley. However, reconquest of the Sudan required

funding; the Egyptians were very weak financially, and British

167

taxpayers would never agree to bear the cost for such a
military operation. Salisbury's only recourse was diplomacy.
These peaceful methods bore fruit in 1891, when the Anglo-
Italian agreement was signed. Italy officially acknowl-
edged that the Sudan belonged to Egypt and abandoned any
claims in the area. Although relieved of the Italian threat,
Salisbury still was faced with the problem of reconquest of
the Sudan. This issue occupied his mind until his fall from
power on August 12, 1892.

The Sudan operation was a very important item on
Salisbury's agenda when he returned to office on June 29,
1895. On March 13, 1896, Salisbury informed Lord Cromer
that his cabinet had officially decided to conquer the Sudan.

In studying the Egyptian question, three important
observations can be made about Salisbury's policy during
1885-1892. First, he had full confidence in Baring. Although
Baring caused much trouble for Salisbury through his rough
handling of Egyptian officials, Salisbury believed that
Baring was the right man in the right place. Without any
hesitation he gave Baring his full support, even though he
admitted that Baring occasionally made mistakes.

The second observation concerns Salisbury's policy

toward the Ottoman Empire. Although the sultan was the

168

formal sovereign of Egypt, Salisbury believed he could not
be permitted to do anything to endanger the British presence
in Egypt. During 1885-1887, in an attempt to ease European
pressure, Salisbury tried to induce the sultan to reach a
settlement over Egypt. The failure of Wolff's mission, in
1887, convinced Salisbury that the sultan was very weak and
unable to take any action. At that time Salisbury decided
to abandon attempts to solve the Egyptian question through
direct dealings with the Ottomans.

The sultan was obviously unhappy about the British
occupation of Egypt. However, since he did not have the
power to oust the British, he could offer only verbal pro-
tests. The sultan had to rely on European pressure and on
British promises to maintain his position as sovereign of
Egypt. He was deceived by British declarations that they
would evacuate Egypt as soon as they could restore order.

He was forced to yield to the British presence in Egypt, and
this had a profound effect on the Ottomans, the Egyptians,
and the entire Muslim world. Events revealed the weakness
of the Ottoman Empire and the strength of the Europeans.

Fears were aroused in Syria, Iraq, Armenia, and else-

where that the sultan's policy might encourage other European

169

powers, mainly France and Russia, to take similar action

and occupy countries which they regarded as being in their
sphere of influence. French and Russian threats were offi-
cially expressed to the sultan in 1887. As a result, he
refused to ratify the agreement concluded between the Ottoman
Empire and England in 1887 regarding the Egyptian question.

From the point of view of this study, the Porte's
inability to act had its most profound effect in its impact
on Egypt. The Egyptians were deeply affected by the Ottoman
Empire's weakness and by the sultan's attitude toward the
British occupation. They felt Sultan Abdul Hamid II should
at least have applied diplomatic pressure, especially since
the major European powers opposed the British move. The
lack of Ottoman support was a major factor in preventing an
open Egyptian struggle against the British occupation.

The final observation that may be made about
Salisbury's policy involves Egyptian internal affairs. De-
spite Salisbury's success in 1891 in easing European pressure
on Britain, primarily by making concessions to Germany and

France, he failed to obtain Egyptian acceptance of the Brit-

ish presence. Salisbury's policy ignored Egyptian demands

for British evacuation, ignored their social, educational,

170

and medical needs, and ignored their desire for self-
government. Moreover, the Egyptians were deeply distressed
by Salisbury's decision in 1889 to rule the Sudan, formerly
an Egyptian dominion, directly. Salisbury's failure to re-
spond to Egyptian demands for improved living conditions
might be explained by his preoccupation with his responsi-
bilities, for he insisted on conducting foreign affairs him-
self. It seems impossible that Salisbury and other govern-
ment officials did not know about the situation in Egypt.
Over the years, they received several letters from the prom-
inent Englishmen describing socio-economic conditions. Al-
though some improvements were made, military expenditures
outweighed the monies spend on social betterment. It seems
clear that the British were far more interested in securing
their strategic interests in Egypt, and ultimately in India,
than in the welfare of the Egyptian people. This neglect
damaged Anglo-Egyptian relations for years to come. After
two revolutions at thirty-year intervals, the pattern

finally was broken in 1952.

APPENDIXES

Appendix A
CONVENTION BETWEEN HER MAJESTY AND HIS
IMPERIAL MAJESTY THE SULTAN OF TURKEY,
RELATIVE TO EGYPTIAN AFFAIRS SIGNED
AT CONSTANTINOPLE, OCTOBER 24, 1885.

w.c. NO. 65 (RATIFICATIONS EXCHANGED
NOVEMBER 24, 1885.)

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Ireland, Empress of India, and His Majesty the
Emperor of the Ottomans, having agreed to send Commissioners
Extraordinary to Egypt with a view to the settlement of
Egyptian affairs, have resolved to conclude a Convention,
and have named as their Plenipotentiaries for this purpose:

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Ireland, Empress of India, the Right Honourable
Sir Henry Drummond Wolff, a member of Her Britannic Majesty's
Privy Council, Knight Grand Cross of the Most Distinguished
Order of Saint Michael and Saint George, Knight Commander of
the MOst Honourable Order of the Bath, Member of Parliament,

and her Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to
His Imperial Majesty the Sultan on a Special Mission having

particular reference to the affairs of Egypt;

171

172

And His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of the Ottomans,
Mehemmed Said Pasha, his Minister for Foreign Affairs, deco-
rated with the Grand Cordon of the Osmanie in brilliants and
the Grand Cordon of the Medjidie;

Who, after having exchanged their full powers, found
to be in good and due form, have agreed upon the following
Articles, adopted upon the basis and.within the limits of
the Imperial Firmans now in force --

ARTICLE I

Her Britannic Majesty and His Imperial Majesty the

Sultan will respectively send a High Commissioner to Egypt.
ARTICLE II

The Ottoman High Commissioner will consult with His
Highness the Khedive, or with the functionary who shall be
designated for that purpose by His Highness, upon the best
means for tranquillizing the Soudan by pacific measures.

The Ottoman High Commissioner and His Highness the
Khedive will keep the English High Commissioner currently
informed of the negotiations, and as the measures to be
decided upon form part of the general settlement of Egyptian
affairs, they shall be adopted and placed in execution in

agreement with the English High Commissioner.

173

ARTICLE III
The two High Commissioners will reorganize, in con-
cert with His Highness the Khedive, the Egyptian army.
ARTICLE IV
The two High Commissioners, in concert with His High-
ness the Khedive, will examine all the branches of the
Egyptian Administration, and may introduce into them the
modifications which they may consider necessary, within the
limits of the Imperial Firmans.
ARTICLE V
The international engagements contracted by His High-
ness the Khedive will be approved by the Ottoman Government
in so far as they shall not be contrary to the privileges
granted by the Imperial Firmans.
ARTICLE VI
So soon as the two High Commissioners shall have es-
tablished that the security of the frontiers and the good
working and stability of the Egyptian Government are assured,
they shall present a Report to their respective Governments,
who will consult as to the conclusion of a Convention regu-
lating the withdrawal of the British troops from Egypt in a

convenient period.

174

ARTICLE VII
The present Convention shall be ratified and ratifi-

cations shall be exchanged at Constantinople within the

space of fifteen days, or sooner if possible.

In faith of Which the two Plenipotentiaries have af-

fixed their signatures to it and the seal of their arms.

Done at Constantinople,t:he twenty-fourth day of the

month of October, of the year eighteen hundred and eighty-

five.

(L.S.) H. Drummond WOlff.
(L.S.) Said.

 

In proceeding to the signature of the Convention dated
this day, the Plenipotentiaries of Great Britain and Turkey

declare that the French text shall be binding.

Done in duplicate, the 24th day of October, 1885.

(L.S.) (signed) H. Drummond Wolff.
(L.S.) (signed) Said.

Appendix B

THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY TO SIR H. DRUMMOND

WOLFF, F.O. JANUARY 15, 1887, W.C.I.

Sir:

In the opinion of H. M. Gov. its desirable that in
returning to your post at Cairo you should make some stay at
Constantinople, in order to ascertain the precise views of
His Imperial Majesty the Sultan with respect to the future
arrangements which are to be made for Egypt, and also to lay
before him the considerations by which the course of English
Gov. is guided.

It has become evident from the discussion of the last
few months, that the date at which the retirement of the
English army shall become possible will depend not only on
the progress we are able to make in pacifying the frontier
and strengthening the Egyptian administration, but also on
the nature of the arrangements by which the Khedive's Gov. is
to be sustained when British troops are no longer at Cairo.
Under the circumstances, we can't leave Egypt to the danger

of renewed anarchy, nor can we accept as an admissible

175

176

contingency that the void left by the retirement of our
troops should be filled by the forces of any other Power.

The Sultan is pressing the Gov. of G.B. to name a date for
the evacuation of Egypt and in that demand he is avowedly en-
couraged by one, or perhaps two, of the European Powers. H.M.
Gov. have every desire to give him satisfaction upon this
point, but they can't fix even a distant date for evacuation
until they are able to make provision for securing beyond
that date, the external and internal peace of Egypt.

In these negotiations, therefore, it seems to them
necessary, in the first place to investigate the nature of
the guarantee which it is possible, by agreement with His
Imperial Majesty the Sultan, to provide for the future secur-
ity of Egypt when the normal state of things has been re-
stored. It is to this task they desire that you should ad-
dress yourself at Constantinople. It is obvious that for a
considerable time the elements of such a danger as that
which they apprehend will be found in Egypt. The existence
of many foreign communities, guarded by extraterritorial
privileges, and withdrawn, therefore, practically from the
control of the Executive Gov., is in itself a fertile ele-
ment of disorder, and however genuine may be the desire of

the nations to which these communities belong to prevent

177

intrigue, past experience proves that their efforts to re-
press it will often meet withonly a limited success. The
existence of pretenders to the Throne, the foreign extrac-
tion and apparent unpopularity of the class from whom the
governing administration is mainly drawn, the weak character
of a large portion of the population, together with their
liability to those sudden accesses of religious-excitement to
which all Mahommedan population are subject,--all these cir—
cumstances taken together attach a peculiar weakness to the
Egyptian Gov. It is probable that very many years of undis-
turbed possession must pass away before it will have outgrown
the danger of internal convulsion similar to those by which
its existent has recently been put in peril. Such a calamity
would not only arrest the industry of the country, and shat-
ter its returning prosperity, but would imperil its external
security at the same time. Whatever England might do, other
nations would not permit the solvency of the Egyptian Gov. to
be destroyed by anarchy; and as soon as it became evident
that order could not be restored without foreign interven-
tion, from some quarter or other that foreign intervention
would arrive.

It is probable that some security against these dan-

gers may be found by retaining an adequate number of British

178

officers in positions of command in the Egyptian army. Such
a measure would be desirable both for the purpose of secur-
ing the efficiency and loyalty of the force, and also for
supressing any small commencements of disorder that may arise.
But it would be unwise to trust to this protection too im-
plicity. The presence of British officers in a military
force composed of members of a different race and religion
is not a guarantee against the occurrence of a mutiny. Any
disturbing force which was strong enough to place the Gov.
of the Khedive in peril would probably be strong enough to
shake off the influence which British officers might have
established over native troops. While, therefore, the pro-
vision that a certain number of British officers shall remain
connected with the Khedivial army would probably be one of
the conditions on which the British Gov. would insist before
accepting the responsibility of evacuation, it would be im—
possible for them to regard such a stipulation as an ade-
quate protection against the more serious dangers to which
I have drawn your attention.

The object which the Powers of Europe have had in
View, and which it is not less the desire of H.M. Gov. to
attain, may be generally expressed by the phrase ”the neu-

tralization of Egypt," but it must be neutralization with an

179

exception designed to maintain the security and permanence
of the whole arrangement. The British Gov. must retain the
rights to guard and uphold the condition of things which will
have been brought about by the military action and large
sacrifices of this country. So long as the Gov. of Egypt
maintains its position and no disorders arise to interfere
with the administration of Justice of the action of the exec-
utive power, it is highly desirable that no soldier belonging
to any foreign nation should remain upon the soil of Egypt,
except when it may be necessary to make use of the land pas-
age from.one sea to another. H.M. Gov. would willingly agree
that such a stipulation should, whenever the evacuation has
taken place, apply to English as much as to any other troops;
but it will be necessary to restrict the provision, as far
as England is concerned, to periods of tranquillity. England,
if she spontaneously and willinghly evacuates the country,
must retain a Treaty right of intervention if at any time
either internal peace or external security should be serious—
ly threatened. There is no danger that a privilege so costly
in its character will be used unless the circumstances im-
peratively demand it.

Provisions, strictly defining the conditions under

which intervention should take place, and placing it under

180

such limitations that the renewed presence of British troops
in Egypt shall not extend beyond the time which the exigency
demands, will probably be demanded by the Gov. of the Sultan,
and may very properly be the subject of consideration on the
part of H.M. Gov. They are very far from.intending to use
such a power, if it should be reserved to them by Treaty,
for the purpose of exercising any undue influence, or cre-
ating a Protectorate in disguise; still less for unnecessar—
ily renewing an occupation which has already imposed so many
sacrifices upon G.B. But it will be difficult to provide in
any other way for the security of Egypt, which they are
pledged to assure before they retire from the country.
Questions affecting the finances of Egypt, the posi—
tion of the Suez Canal and the modifications which seem nec-
essary in the capitulation at present in force, will prob-
ably be brought to your attention bythe Ottoman Government
and you will report to me any proposition which they may
submit to you. But before these can be satisfactorily dealt
with, some progress must be made in disposing of the para-
mount question to which the negotiation conducted by you

should in the first instance be directed.

Appendix C

LORD SALISBURY TO SIR EDWARD MALET

Private. Foreign Office, Feb. 23, 1887. S.P.

Your account of Bismarck's criticisms on our Egyptian
policy is discouraging. He is hard to please. Unless we
take the chestnuts out of the hottest part of the fire, he
thinks we are shirking our work. But we cannot go beyond a
certain point to please him--especially as his quid pro quo
is purely negative. We have willingly ranged ourselves with
the central European Powers that has always been our policy.
A distinct estrangement from France has followed, which has
cost us a pack of bothers in various parts of the world. But
when he wants us--as he evidently does--to quarrel with France
downright over Egypt, I think he is driving too hard a bar-
gain. It is not worth our while. Our policy is not, if we
can help it, to allow France either to force us out of Egypt
altogether, or to force us into quarrel over Egypt. There-
fore, our negotiations must be circumspect, slow, and a

little hazy and ambiguous. The Chancellor of course will

181

182

like clear statements, definite policies, and a breach as
soon as possbile. Our position in Egypt is one that the pub-
lic opinion here will not allow us to abandon altogether, but
it is a disastrous inheritance: for it enables the Chancellor
to demand rather unreasonable terms as the price, not of his
assistance, but of his refusal to join a coalition against us.

The point I understand him to be pressing now is that
during our absence from Egypt, when we have gone, an Arabi
movement may break out; and that before we get back again, a
great deal of valuable German property may be destroyed. Of
course, if this objection is pressed to the utmost it is un-
answerable; it is fatal to any project of evacuation. But
the danger is small. Our troops will be at Malta or Cyprus:
and the knowledge that we are there, and are likely to re-
turn, will prevent any very dangerous riot.

The Sultan of Zanzibar is being hardly treated. But
examples like that of Germany are contagious. I am afraid
he has been misled into thinking that by delimiting his ter-
ritory we engaged to guarantee it. But there is some incon-
venience in this development of annexation among the smaller
powers: as they are even less scrupulous than the Great

Powers.

Appendix D
LORD SALISBURY TO SIR H.

DRUMMOND WOLFF

Private. {ay 4, 1887, S.P. ASl/17O

It is evident that blackmail is the order of the day.
Germany and Italy saw that the moment for selling their ser-
vices had come. I have disposed of Germany. What they
wanted did not engage the future. But Italy wants a long
strip of Egyptian coast. It would be very difficult to pay
the price anyhow; for the coast does not belong to us, but to
Egypt--and the one thing on which Egyptians are intractable
is the cession of territory: as we found when Lord Granville
gave up the Soudan.

I had a little talk with wadington to-day about your
negotiations. I admitted you had asked for 5 years: he in-
formed me his Government would be prepared to support 3
years: from which I inferred that 4 years was the right thing.
I told him that people here would cry out terribly about 3

years--but I impressed upon him that the re-entry was the

183

184

point on which we most insisted and that we had no inten—
tion of leaving Egypt until that was conceded. He replied
that in our conversations of last autumn that had been con-
ceded in principle and that all that was required to be
settled were the conditions under which the right was to be
exercised. I replied that this was one of the cases where
the principle was easily cut away by unfavorable conditions.
I think we may have less difficulty with the French than we
anticipate--if we can agree with Turkey. I do not think the
mass of politicians here will object to our leaving Egypt in
3 years--but I anticipate some considerable storm in our own
party. There are a certain number of Jingoes who on all
questions between foreign countries and us or our colonies
take the most extravagant view as a matter of course: and of
late years they have gained greatly in strength and they may
give us an evil quarter of an hour.

Vincent has been to Paris and settled the Corvee
question; apparently with little difficulty. He has a scheme
for a guaranteed conversion of the privileged debt, based on
the increased worth of our Suez Canal shares.

Do not resume any negotiations about Zeilah. India

which is hard up declines to find the money and to us of

185

course it has little interest-~50 we must for the present

maintain the status quo.

Appendix E
SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF TO THE MARQUIS

0F SALISBURY. - THERAPIA, JUNE 14,
1887. w.c. No. 96.

My Lord,

In connection with the signature of the Convention
and the Protocols annexed, I have the honour to call your
Lordship's attention generally to the abnormal condition of
the financial system of Egypt and the very great hardship it
inflicts on the people of the country.

It would be a blot on any permanent arrangement if
some attempt were not made to alleviate the heavy burden en-
tailed on the fellaheen by the debt which crushes their in-
dustry and often deprives them of their property and means of
livelihood.

In the schemes which have at different times been put
forward for the readjustment of the finances of Egypt, this
important point has been constantly overlooked. Attempts
have been made to establish an equilibrium of Egyptian finance

in which the amount payable for the debt was an almost

186

187

inevitable basis, and even when the sinking funds have been

suspended, this course has been taken rather to sustain the

external credit of the country than to better the lot of the
people.

One glaring instance of the hardship inflicted on the
people is to be found in the sums allotted to the military
defense of the country, in which out of a total expenditure
of 9,628,961 Egyptian lire,t:he cost of the army, including
that of the occupying force, is limited to a total of 325,000
Egyptian lire.

But taking the above figure as the expenditure of
Egypt, it will be found that more than half of it goes out of
the country. The Tribute of Egypt and the consolidated and
Unconsolidated Debts amount this year to 5,043,976 Egyptian
lire, the whole of which, though drawn from the labour and
property of the Egyptian people, is encashed by foreigners
and spent abroad. It may be said that a portion of this debt
is paid by lands and the railways and telegraphs and port of
Alexandria, but this is a comparatively small sum, the item
above mentioned including 200,0001. deficit on the Domains
Loan, and 200,0001. deficit on the Daira, and the amounts
actually paid for the interests of those loans not being

apparently included in the Budget. But the public works in

188

question were paid for by the money of the people. The cul-
tivable land of Egypt amounts to abut 6,000,000 feddans. Of
these, I believe nearly one-sixth, which were extorted from
the people by very doubtful means, are the property of for-
eign creditors. The railways, the telegraphs, and the port
of Alexandria are equally owned by the bondholders, and thus,
from a country consisting of 6,000,000 feddans, or about
6,600,000 acres of cultivable land, and with a population of
about 6,800,000 including foreigners, an annual sum is ex-
tracted and exported of 5,043,976 Egyptian lire, or 5,170,0501.
If the debt had been run up by wars, or extravagance
sanctioned by the people, it might be right to continue sad-
dling them with this intolerable load. But they had no voice
in the matter, and were passive instruments, almost beasts of
burden, in the hands of the rulers, whose vices, ambition, and
waste had accumulated this mass of debt. This evil has been
recognized more than once, but no attempt has been made to
diminish it, except on one occasion, when Lord Northbrook
recommended the diminution of the land tax by the sum of
450,0001, annually. This measure has only been partially
carried out by the abolition of the corvee at the cost of

250,0001. This sum, however, is still paid bythe people.

189

It is impossible to measure the political effect of
this state of things on a population thus mortgaged to the
foreign creditors of former bad masters. It must always be
the cause of a discontent not the less deep from not being
manifest, and it would always render the fellaheen anxious
to join any popular leader who would promise them relief.
Such a condition does not exist, and would not be tolerated
elsewhere, and in a settlement which it is hoped may promote
tranquillity throughout the country, the present fiscal sys-

tem is a danger which cannot be overlooked.

Appendix F

SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF TO THE NARQUIS
OF SALISBURY. - THERAPIA, JUNE 17,
1887. W.C. NO. 97.

My Lord,

With reference to my despatch of the 14th instant, I
have the honour to bring before your Lordship certain figures
showing the drain on the resources of the Egyptians caused by
the payment of the interest of the debts principally held
abroad.

The following are the annual payments:

 

{E
Tribute ---------------- 678,397
Guaranteed Loan ------------ 307,125
Privileged -------------- 1,086,969
Unified ---------------- 2,183,627
Domains ---------------- 352,000
Daira Sanieh ------------- 336.720
Interest on Suez Canal shares paid
to England ------------- 193,858
5,138,696

(0r, 5,267,1631.)
Against this the assets, other than the taxation of

the people, may be taken as follows:

190

191

 

Domains, after payment of £25.
administration expenses ------- 152,000
Daira ----------------- 136,720
Railways, &c. ------------- 835,000
1,123,720

(Or, 1,151,7631.)

Deducting this sum from the gross amount of debt as
above stated, the amount annually drawn from the Egyptian
taxes to be exported abroad is 4,115,4001,, while the re-
mainder, though not taken from the taxes, is abstracted from
the circulation of the country.

As an illustration of the extent to which Egyptian
stock is held in Europe, the following statement is interest-
ing. This stock having only recently been admitted to a quo-
tation at Berlin, the following have been the payments made
at that capital this year by Messrs. Bleichroder on the cou-
pons of the Privileged Debt due on the 15th April, and for

the Unified payable on the lst May:

;

Privileged 95,000

Unified 329,000
445,000*

This represents a capital of 3,800,0001. invested in
the Privileged stock and of 17,500,0001. in Unified bonds,
making a total of Egyptian stock held in Germany alone of

21,300,0001., or more than one-fifth of the whole debt.

*
This is a half-yearly payment and implies 890,000 L.
per annum.

192

I have tried to ascertain as nearly as possible the
amount of bonds held in Egypt; but the fluctuations in the
number of coupons cashed in Egypt are so great that it is
impossible to form even an approximate estimate. The reason
for this is that coupons are made use of by capitalists in
London and Paris and elsewhere for exchange operations. Thus
the greater portion of the coupons cashed in Egypt are cut
off from bonds held in Europe, and are given in payment for
goods exported from the country.

There is a further hardship inflicted on the Egyptian
people in connection with the Suez Canal.

Your Lordship is aware that the price of 4,000,000;
paid for the shares of the ex-Khedive by Her Majesty's Govern-
ment was originally expended by him out of the money collected
from the people. In lieu of any profit accruing to the
Egyptians under this head, they are now paying the interest
on those chares to Her Majesty's Government, instead of the
dividends which the ex-Khedive had in 1869 alienated for
30,000,000 fr., which sum.was handed over to the Canal.

Ioreover, the ex-Khedive had in 1864, paid under the
arbitral decision of the Emperor of the French a sum of
84,000,000 fr. to the Canal Company. The sums thus contri-

buted towards the Canal by the Egyptian people, though not

193

ear-marked, no doubt form a part of the present debt. Their

amount is as follows:

 

i
Shares -------------- 4,000,000
Arbitral Sentence -------- 3,360,000
Dividends sold in advance - - - - 1,200,000
8,560,000

for which expenditure the fellaheen are now paying a further
200,0001. annually. Under the original concession 15 percent
of the net profits of the Canal were to go to the Egyptian
Government. This percentage amounted in 1885 to 204,1721.
But this revenue was pledged by the ex-Khedive, and subse-
quently sold, thus depriving the Egyptian people of their
last chance of obtaining any return for the sums expended out
of their toil.

I have in my present and former despatch brought these
matters before the knowledge of your Lordship, in the hope
that some means may be found in the general arrangement, which
I hope is imminent, to elleviate in a certain degree the very
hard lot of the Egyptian people. This object, I believe,
could be effected without inflicting any injury on the credi-
tors of Egypt.

I should add that in aid of the administrative por-

tion of the Budget there are cetain sources of revenue,

194

derived from the sale of salt and natron and from Government

properties, amounting altogether to about 235,000;. a-year.

Appendix G
SIR EVELYN BARING T0 LORD SALISBURY

APRIL 18, 1889, S.P. A53/96

Private, Cairo

It is some long while since I wrote you anything
about the general position of affairs here. I think that I
had perhaps better do so now.

On the whole we are going on very satisfactorily.
Looking to the administrative and political detail I see no
subject that, so far as can be at present judged, is likely
to give rise to any serious difficulties. I understand that
your wish, looking at the matter from the broad political

and diplomatic point of view, is to maintain the status quo.

 

The general arguments in favor of this policy are obvious.
Fortunately, local interests and necessities point in the
same direction.

My only present anxiety is caused from the apprehen-
sion that at any moment some local mine may be sprung upon me
which will render the maintenance of the status quo extremely

difficult.
195

196

Whether this will happen or not depends mainly on
Riaz Pasha. I think I had better tell you briefly what I
think of him.

He is full of good intentions. He is the most honest
man here. He is a stern disciplinarian, which is much wanted.
He does not intrigue. He inspires confidence generally with
the Musulman population. Though not liked, he is feared and
respected. He is an immense improvement on Nubar.

These are good qualities--so good that I think it
very desirable, in the absence of any competent man to take
his place, that he should remain in power.

His defects are that he is stupid, obstinate, violent,
and--which matters 1ess--very vain. His manners are barbarous.
He has not the faintest conception of how to conduct a diplo-
matic negotiation. It was only with considerable difficulty
that the other day I prevented a serious quarrel between him
and d'Aubiguy about a trumpery question as to the pay of the
French member of the Railway Board, all merely due to unskill-
ful negotiation. Similarly a dispute with the Caisse about a
Railway Extension project has given me a lot of bother, though

I have now settled it. The inconvenient part of the whole

thing is that I am generally not brought into these quarrels,

197

until, by sheer muddle, both sides have lashed themselves into
a state of rage.

He has not the most elementary ideas of Government by
law. For instance, I was rather horrified the other day at
finding out that certain "commissions of Brigandage", which
are really tantamount to Courts-Martial, had been freely ex-
tracting evidence by torture, and that Riaz himself had been
ordering people to be imprisoned without any sort of legal
formality whatsoever.

It is wise not to be utopian so I shut my eyes to a
good deal but there is, of course, a limit to this process.

I shall be able to get the particular points to which I have
alluded above put right without any serious trouble, but with
a man of Riaz's character and tendencies towards the extreme
of partiarchal government I never can feel certain that he
will not some day commit some enormity, which would be exag-
gerated by the press, and which would make it very difficult
to keep him in office.

My principal fear, however, is not that I should fall
out with Riaz (I do not think this is probable) but that he
should quarrel with the Khedive.

The Khedive does not like him. He is too overbearing.

He would greatly like to get rid of him and I feel certain

198

that he would take an early opportunity of doing so if he
had the least inkling that such a step would be pleasant to
me. Hence I have to be very cautious not to give the small-
est hint in that direction.

If Riaz was turned out it would put us into consider-
able difficulties--much greater difficulties than at the time
of Nubar's resignation and that is mainly why I want to keep
him.

We should have to choose between two alternatives,
neither of which are pleasant in themselves.

The Khedive would want to govern more actively him-
self, with the help of a retrograde and savage old Turk as 3
Prime Minister. I like bringing the Khedive forward, but the
combination could not work. It is not desirable that the
Khedive should behimself too much pledged to one side in any
of the numerous diSputes which arise here with Consuls-
General, Commissioners of the Debt, etc.--and his old Turk
(I believe he wishes to name his Private Secretary) would be
quite impossible.

The only other man is Mustapha Pasha Fehmy, and we
should probably have to insist on him. He is an excellent
but very weak man. His nomination would mean increased Eng-

lish interference in reality and the appearance of still

199

greater interference. The French would not like it. Yet if
Riaz goes it seems the only possible solution.

I tell you all this, not beCause I have any immediate
reason to fear an upset, but because it is as well to be alive
to the possible complications which the future may have in

store for us.

Appendix H
SIR E. BARING TO THE MARQUIS 0F SALISBURY

BRITISH STATE PAPER, EGYPT NO. 2
CAIRO, JANUARY 26, 1890

My Lord,

Many exaggerated statements have often been made
about the non—English official in the service of the Egyptian
Gov. I beg therefore herewith a list showing the appoint-
ments at present held by Englishmen in the country.

It will be seen that the total number of Englishmen

employed is 336, annual salary of {£150,317.

List of Appointments held by
English Baring Officials

Appointment Number Salaries Number of Salaries
Subordinate
Appointment

 

Financial Dgpartment

 

{E {I

Financial Advisor 1 2,000 2 770
Director-General

of Accounts 1 1,500 2 900

200

201

Appointment Number Salaries Number of
Subordinate
Appointment

Salaries

 

‘Customs

Director-General of fE

Customs 2,000 12
Assistant ditto 1 1,600
Inspector-in-

Chief, Coastguard l 800 21

H

Post Office

 

Deputy Postmaster
General 1 660 6

Khedivieh Postal
Steamers

 

Director General 1 900 36*

Lighthouse

 

Controller-General
of lighhouse and
ports

Assistant ditto

Engineer ditto

1,500 20
1,000
780

PJHH‘

Educational Department

 

Inspectors of
Schoolmasters 9

Police Department

 

Chief of Public
Security Division
Deputy ditto

1,300
1,000

FHA

*Chiefly engineers

{E
3,522

3,420

960

9,100

4,397

2,460

202

 

 

Appointment Number Salaries Number of Salaries
Subordinate
Appointment
Police Department (cont.) {E fL
Inspectors in-chief 2 2,000
Divisional inspec—
tors 4 2,800
Officers and con-
stable 19 3,596
Clerks 5 696

Public Works Dept.

 

Under-Secretary

 

 

 

of State 1 2,000
Inspector-General
of Irrigation 1 1,600
Inspector of
Irrigation 4 4,700
Assistant ditto 3 1,600
Director of Works -- 1 1,600
-- 8 2,016
Prison Department
Inspector General 1 1,000
Native Courts of
Justice
Judges 3 2,886
Sanitary Department
Director 1 1,200 )
Sanitary Inspector 2 1,200 )
Doctors 3 774 ) - - - 3 600
Sanitary Engineers 1 480 )
Veterinary Inspector l 420 )

Total 39 37,700 144 34,037

203

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Appointment Number Salaries Number of Salaries
Subordinate
Appointment

Egyptian Army {E if
Officers 69 43,980 —- --
Non-commissioned

officers -- -- 33 5,408
Total 69 43,980 33 5,408
Mixed Administration
Public Debt Office
Commissioner 1 2,000
Domains Administration
Administrator 1 2,000 2 804
Daira Sanieh
Controller 1 2,000 )_ _ _
Engineer 1 1,000 ) 5 1’956
Mixed Tribunals
Judges 3 4,616 l 192
Quarantine Board
President 1 1,200 l 204
Railway Administration
President 1 1,950 )
Locomotive Super. 1 1,000 )
Deputy Chief Eng. 1 720 ) — — - 30 8,700
Inspector-General

of Telegraphs 1 850
Total 11 15,336 39 11,856

204

 

Number Salaries
{E
Superior Appointment 120 99,016
Subordinate Appoint—
ments 216 52,301
Grand Total 336 150,317

ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Unpublished Sources

 

Private Papers

 

This thesis is mainly based on official and private
correspondence between Lord Salisbury and the British embas-
sies and legations in Europe, Turkey and Egypt. Salisbury's
private papers are a good record of British foreign policy
during 1885-1902. These have more value than his official
correspondence. It is clear that Salisbury preferred to
state his opinion more fully in private, and he usually ex-
pressed his attitudes and opinions with greater frankness in
these papers. Therefore, the Salisbury papers, which are
located at Hatfield House, Hatfield, Herts, are the major
source for this study.

In addition to Salisbury's papers, other private
papers contribute valuable materials to the study of Anglo-
Egyptian relations during 1885-1892.

The Cromer Papers, 1882-1908, at the Public Record

Office, are very important because Cromer was the British

205

206

consul-general in Egypt during 1883-1907. Cromer wrote exten-
sively about Egypt's internal affairs. He also gave many
Opinions about the Egyptian question in general.

The Harry Boyle Papers, 1885-1907, St. Anthony's Col-

 

lege, Oxford, contain good materials about the British policy

 

toward Egypt during the period under study. Harry Boyle was
Cromer's oriental secretary. His papers were personal letters
to his mother.

Gladstone's Private Papers, in the British Museum,
London, are useful source for any study of Anglo-Egyptian rela-
tions, especially during 1882-1885. These contributed little
in this case, however, because of the emphasis on Salisbury.

The Granville Papers, 1882-1885, the Public Record 0f-

fice, London, are valuable to the study of British policy toward

 

Egypt, especially during his occupation of the Foreign Office
during 1882-1885.

Papers Concerning Ahmed Arabi Revolt 1881-1882i the
Egyptian Government Archives, the Citadel, Cairo, are useful
source for the Egyptian nationalist movement and Arabi's role.
They also gave valuable information about the British attitude

toward Arabi's movement.

207

Unpublished Official Sources
a) In the Public Records Offigg
British Foreign Office, Official Correspondence
between the Office and the British representa-
tives in Europe, Turkey, and Egypt during 1882-
1892, offers invaluable insights into diplo-
matic operations. The most important documents
are:
F.O. 78 Series (Turkey). Diplomatic cor—
respondence between Foreign Office and

British Agency in Cairo: 1877-1892.

F.O. 141 Series (Egypt). Telegrams and
other Correspondence between Foreign Office
and British Agency in Cairo: 1887-1892.
War Office Correspondence with the British
Authority at Cairo and the Sudan, gives details
about British military actions in those coun-
tries. The papers which were consulted are:
W.R. 32, 133-4 Miscellaneous information

on the Sudan and the reconquest, 1886-1901.

W.R. 106-13 Egypt and the Sudan, defenses

and operations, 1883-1901.

b)

208

In the British Museum

Correspondence Respecting Sir H. Drummond

Wolff's Special Missions to Constantinople in

 

1885 and 1887.

 

wolff was chosen by Salisbury in 1885
and 1887 to be the British envoy to try to reach
an agreement with the Turks regarding the Egyp-
tian question. Wolff spent several months at
Constantinople and Cairo trying to find a solu-
tion for the Egyptian issue. Therefore, this
correspondence is a good source of information
about Salisbury's diplomatic efforts to ease
the tension surrounding Egyptian question.
Wolff did not limit his writing to his diplo-
matic mission. He wrote extensively about
Egyptian internal affairs and gave his opinion
about the effect of British administration on
Egyptian life. In fact, this proved most use-

ful to this study.

209

Parliamentary Papers

 

Accounts and Papers, 1882-1892, these contain good materials

 

for this study.

Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, 1881-1885.

 

Parliamentary Debates, House of CommonsJ IV Series, 1882—1908.

 

Published Documents

 

Dugdale, E.T.S., Ed., German Diplomatic Documents, 1871—

1914. London and New York: Harper & Bros., 1928.

Hurewitz, J.C., Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, A

Documentary Record: 1535-1914, Vol. 1. Princeton: D. Van

 

Nostrand Co., Inc., 1956.

Knaplund, Paul, Gladstone-Gordon Correspondence: l851-l§9§,
Selections from the Private Correspondence of B.P.M. and a

Colonial Governor. 2 vols. Oxford: University Press, 1961.

Ramm, Agatha, ed., The Political Correspondence of Mr.
Gladstone and Lord Granville: 1876-1886. Oxford: Clarendon

Press, 1962.

210

Temperley, Harold and Penson, L.M., A Centurypof Diplomatic

Blue Books: 1814-1914. Cambridge (England): The University

 

Press, 1939.

Newspapers and Periodicals

 

The Annual Register, the British society for international

 

understanding, London.

Al-Misri, An Egyptian paper, in 1951 published the memoirs

of the Khedive Abbas. These are good materials showing the
relationship between Abbas and the British agents in Cairo

and his efforts to gain greater authority in ruling his

country

British History Illustrated.

 

Contemporapy Review.

 

Historical Journal.

Spectator, this paper had many articles dealing with the

 

Egyptian question, especially the Sudanese issue.

211

The Times, this paper, through its correSpondents in Cairo,

 

such as Mr. Moberly Bell, published many articles which kept

the British public informed about Egyptian affairs.

Biographies and Memoirs

 

Blunt, Wilfrid Scawen, Mnyiaries, Being a Personal Narratiyg

 

of Events: 1888-1914. 2 vols., London: M. Secker, 1919.

 

, Secret History_of the English Occupation of Egypt,

 

Being a Personal Narrative of Events. New York: A.A. Knopf,

 

1922.

Blunt's writings are very important in regard to the
Egyptian nationalist movement mainly because of his close
contact with the leaders of that movement. Blunt, who was a
Victorian liberal, usually criticized the British policy
toward Egypt and managed to have several meetings with Glad-
stone and Salisbury to defend the right of the Egyptians to

be left to rule themselves without European intervention.

Boyle, Clara, A Servant of the Empirei A Memoir of Harry

 

Boyle. London: Titus Wilson & Son Ltd., 1938.

212

Harry Boyle was Cromer's oriental secretary. This
book provides useful information about the British policy

toward Egyptian internal affairs.

Broadley, A.M., How We Defended Arabi and His Friends.

 

London: Chapman & Hall Ltd., 1884.
A useful source of Arabi's movement and the trial of

the leaders of the Egyptian nationalist movement.

Busch, M., Bismarck, vol. II. London: MacMillan, 1896.

One of the best early biographies of Bismarck, it
contains a full treatment of Bismarck's foreign policy. It
provides a good source of information about Bismarck's atti-

tude toward the British occupation of Egypt.

Cecil, Lady Gwendolyn, Life of Robert Cecil, Marquis of

 

Salisbury. 4 volumes, London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1921.

 

This book, which was written by Salisbury's daughter,
was based upon Salisbury's private papers. It is one of the

best prime sources of Salisbury's policy during 1885-1902.

Crispi, Francesco, Memoirs, collected and edited by T.
Palamenghi-Crispi. 3 vols., London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1914.
These memoirs of the Italian Prime Minister (1887-

1891) are very important records of Italian foreign policy

213

during that period. They provide a good source of Anglo-
Italian relations, especially in regard to Anglo-Italian ten-
sion over the Sudan. But these memoirs must be used with

caution.

Fitzmaurice, Lord Edmond, The Life of Granville George

Leveson Cower, Second Earl of Granvillg. 2 vols., London:

 

Longmans, Green, 1905.

This book contains many of the letters of the for-
eign minister in the Gladstone cabinet. It provides a valu—
able materials for the study of the British policy toward

Egypt during 1880-1885.

Lord Cromer, Abbas II. London: Macmillan, 1915.

 

__, Modern Egypt. 2 vols., London: Macmillan, 1908.

 

 

Cromer was the British resident and consul-general
in Egypt during 1883-1907. His writings were based on the
British documents, but they reflect his role of dealing with

the Egyptian internal affairs.

Gladstone, W.E., The Gladstone Diaries. Edited by M.R.D.
Foot. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968.

It provides good information of Gladstone's attitude

toward the Egyptian question.

214

James, Rhodes, Rosebury. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1963.

 

Lord Rosebury was the British Prime Minister, March
5, 1894 to June 21, 1895, but since he had a short time in
office, Rosebury did not play any important role which might
affect the Anglo-Egyptian relations. Iowever, this book
gives information regarding Rosebury's attitude toward the

Egyptian question.

Kennedy, A.L., Salisbury: 1830-1922, London: J. Murray, 1953.
One of the best biographies of Salisbury. It pro—

vides a good coverage of Salisbury's foreign policy.

Newton, Lord, Lord Lyons--A Record of British Diplomagy.
London: E. Arnold, 1913.

This book contains Lord Lyon's papers. Lord Lyons
was the British Ambassador at Paris during 1867-1887. Lyon's
writings to the Foreign Office reflected the French attitude
toward the British position in Egypt. It is a good record of
the Anglo-French relations regarding the Egyptian question

which related to this study.

Smith, Colin L., The Embassy of Sir William White at Con-

stantinople 1886-1891. Oxford: the University Press, 1957.

 

215

Sir William White was the British Ambassador in
Turkey during 1886-1891. He played an important role in
Anglo-Turkish relations during that period which effect the

Egyptian question.

Wolff, Sir Henry Drummond, Rambling Recollection. 2 vols.,

 

London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1908.
This book contains useful materials on the author's

mission to Turkey as a British envoy during 1885-1887.

Zetland, Lowrence John Lemlely Dundan, Second Marquis of,

Lord Cromer, London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1932.

 

This book is one of the best biographies of Lord
Cromer. It provides full treatment of Cromer's role in

Egyptian affairs.

31%

A1 Rafii, Abd al-Rahman, Miser wal Sudan, "Egypt and the

 

Sudan," Cairo: The Renaissance Bookstore, 1948.
Mr. Al-Rafii was one of the Egyptian historians who
lived under the British occupation. He wrote several books

about that period. This book, which was based on Egyptian

216

and British prime sources, gives useful details about the

effect of the British occupation on Egyptian life.

Fabunmi, L.A., The Sudan in Anglo-Egyptian Relations, A Case

 

Study in Power Politics: 1800-1956. London: Longmans, 1964.

 

This book was based on the author's Ph.D. thesis,
University of London. It contains valuable materials related
to this study regarding the Sudan question in Anglo-Egyptian

relations during 1885-1892.

Langer, William L., European Alliances and Alignments: 187l-

 

1890. New York: Alfred A. Knoff, 1950.

Professor Langer's book was based on unpublished
materials from the European archives. It provides a full
details about the European alliances system and the conflict

among the great powers. It has a chapter dealing with the

Egyptian question.

Lufti al-Sayyid, Afaf, Egypt and Cromer, A Study in Anglo-

 

Egyptian Relations. London: Murray, 1968.

 

Professor al—Sayyid is an Egyptian and teaches now
at the University of California at Los Angeles. This book was
based on her Ph.D. thesis from Oxford University and based

on unpublished documents from England and Egypt. It provides

217

excellent materials about British policy toward Egypt in-
ternal affairs. It also contains good information about the

Egyptian reaction toward the British rule of Egypt.

Mathews, Joseph J., Egypt and the Formation of the Anglo-

 

French Entente of 1904. Philadelphia: University of

 

Pennsylvania Press, 1939.

This book shows the significance of the Egyptian
question in Anglo-French relations. It provides information
about French influence in Egypt before and after the British
occupation. It was based on the author's Ph.D. thesis, the

University of Philadelphia.

Robinson, R. Gallagher, J., and Denny, A., Africa and the

 

Victorians. New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday & Co., Ltd.,

 

1961.

This is an excellent study of British imperialist
aims in Africa during the Victorian era. It based mostly on
unpublished British documents. It gives a full treatment of

the British policy toward Egypt.

Rothstein, Theodore, Egypt's Ruin. London: A.C. Fifiled,

1910.

218

An excellent study of the Europeans, mainly the
British, policy toward the Egyptian financial situation. It
refutes Cromer and Milner writings that the British had re-

formed and improved Egyptian financial positions.

Safran, Nadav, Egypt in Search of Political Community, An

 

Analysis of the Intellectual and Political Evolution of Egypt:

 

'1804-1952. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1961.

 

Nadav Safran was born in Egypt and received his high
school diploma in Egypt. After he finished his higher educa-
tion, he was appointed as a professor in the Department of
Government, Harvard University. In his study, Professor
Safran mentioned some serious problems encountered by Egypt
in an attempt to carve for itself a place in the modern world.
His study gives information about Egyptian economic, social

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Shibeike, Mekki, British Policy in the Sudan: 1882-1902.

 

London: Oxford University Press, 1952.

Professor Sibeike is a Sudanese, his book was based
on his Ph.D. thesis, University of London. It uses unpub-
lished documents and private papers of statesmen in England,
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the Sudan in the Anglo-Egyptian relations.

219

Zayid, Mahmud Y., Egypt's Struggle for Independence. Beirut:
Khayats, 1965.

Dr. Zayid is a professor of history at the American
University of Beirut. His book was based on his Ph.D. thesis,
Yale University. It cites quantities of Arabic sources which

are relevant to this study.

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220

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