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SOVIET TRANSITIDN TOCOMMUNISM 1

 

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This is to certify that the

thesis entitled

THE RELEVANCE 0F MARX AND LENIN TO
THE SOVIET TRANSITION T0 COMMUNISM

presented by

James R. Ozinga

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for ‘

PhD degree in Political Science

(WWW

Major pay f ssor
Date 3 00 f 6/)

 

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ABSTRACT

THEREIEVANCEOFHARXAMJIMINTOTHE
SOVIEP TRANSITION TO COMIUNISM

by
J enes R. Ozinga

The Third Party Progran of the Columnist Party of the Soviet
Union was adopted in October of 1961. It purported to be a guide
for the future, a road-nap of sorts for the novenent of the Soviet
Union from socialise to cc-nunisl. If this chin, at least, was valid;
irrespective of whether it could be successful, then the Russians were
attelpting to reach the pinnacle of Marx's aspirations. It therefore
seened worthwhile to investigate correlations and differences between
the notion of the future society that was held by Mar: and later by
Lenin, put these alongside of the Ihird Party Program in an effort
to prove an lupothesis that the Program was not an outgrowth of
either Marx or Lenin's thought but rather a political document and
a colproaised political dccunent at that which reflected and emerged
out of a power struggle in Moscow and in the socialist states. In
other words it was conceded at the outset that there would be surface
similarities, for after all, the Marxist-Leninist ideology is the
language of politics in the Soviet Union.

Fro- a variety of sources therefore, Harx's vision of the future

 

 

 

m pulle:
been ob1
lentation

«thaw

 

altentio
that the
Printiple a
“Pecific
M for
struggle

lené’es tc

that eme:

2

was pulled together, and then Lenin's vision was added. But it soon
became obvious that although words remained the same the actual imple-
mentation of the Marxian theory necessitated substantial alterations
as the nth was applied to a peculiar and chaotic Russia. As these
alterations were reflections of actual conditions, so it became clear
that the W Party Program was also not a flowing out of ideological
principles in the fullness of tine but again a specific response to
specific conditions. Those conditions which propelled Khrushchev to
push for the drafting of a new Program were his own domestic power
struggle which had most definitely not been settled in 1957, and chal-
lenges to the supremacy of the Soviet model for international socialism
that emerged in April of 1958 from the Yugoslav Party Program and the
Chinese Great Leap Forward. Both denied and seemed to imply a denial
of the validity of the Soviet experience for their system' 3 development.
These challenges occurred at a time when Soviet planners were revising
the 6th Five Year Plan, debating the weights for heavy industry versus
consuner goods production, and thinking in fairly long-range economic
terms anyway.

The Third Party Program was therefore such a specific response.
By the time it was adopted, however, it was alreaw incidental to
Khrushchev; for so much compromise is visible in the document itself
that he almost ignored it in 1961, preferring the are direct approach
of attacking China through Albania at the Twenty-Second Party Congress.
There is some evidence that as Khrushchev approached 190+ that he would
seek a less compromised document, but this was, of course, prohibited

by his retirement. The flurry of publications in the Soviet Union by

 

 

 

 

 

Strumilin

l
character

I
This is L
equates t

with 600:.

the mum,

 

3
Strumilin and others retired with him, reflecting the very personal
character of the Program. The Program has not, however, been repudiated.
This is largely due to the fact that a very great deal of the Program
equates the development of the material and technical basis of communism

with economic growth and expansionna palatable goal no matter who leads

thC country e

THE RELEVANCE OF MARX AND LENIN TO THE

SOVIET TRANSITION TO COMMUNISM

by If

{I} w
James RJ Ozinga

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillmont of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Political Science

1968

 

 

<23 COPYRIGHT

James Richard Ozinga

1969

DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to aw father for his model of

perserverance, and to u wife, Susanne, q sine 335 22g.

111

 

 

 

 

 

‘5 l!
of Polit

late at

““8 of I
th. and
3mm I
Penna;

0’ the D.

ACKNOUIEDGHENTS

My principal debt is to Professor Alfred G. Meyer who continued
as my Chairman even though he left the University. The Department
of Political Science in permitting this unusual concession to a grad-
uate student deserves high praise.

Other members of the Political Science Department and Professor
Adams of the History Department also contributed time and effort to
the seemingly impossible task of making me a Doctor of Philosophy.
Special mention should be made of Professors Grimes and Greene of
Political Science for assistance; but also Professor Press, Chairman

of the Department, for his interest in me and his kindness.

iv

Introduc
Chapter
I The
II 11'“.
III Len
IV 1,,"1
V The
V1 An M
VII 0°“I

 

 

 

{BABE OF CONTENTS

IntrOduCtioneeeeeeeeeeeeeee

Chapter
I The Basis for Marx's Future Society.
II Marfiam's Future Society . . . . . .
III Lenin: The Basis. . . . . . . . . .
IV Lenin: The Future Society . . . . .
V The Third Program of the CPSU. . . .
VI An Explanation of the Program. . . .
VIIConclusion.............

. 1
. 3
. l7
. 32;
. 54
. 93
. 131
. 171

 

 

 

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INTRODUCTION

This study began as a project in 1965 to determine the success,
if any, that the Soviet Union was having in seating the various
targets set up for itself in the Third Party Program. It was then
five years after the document's adoption, and I felt that an analysis
of data sight reveal the success potential of their claim to be moving
towards mu comniss. But it soon became clear that even if hard
data were available in the Soviet Union hard conclusions based on
such data were as susceptible to contrary interpretations as though
such a study had never been sade. So what if their production of
coal had not reached the target—there could be so sany explanations
and interpretations of such a phenosencn that the stub it self would
be specious.

My interest in the Program was so strong, however, that I began
to wonder what purpose was served in adopting it in 1961. Did it
have anything to do with Marxian and Leninist predictions about
co-nnisn? Could it be said to be an ideological docusent even if
it was not such in the econosic-political area? I doubted it, but
did not know it. So I determined to lay Marxisn's predictions along
side of Lenin's and then add the Third Party Program in such a wq
that even a casual reader could see the differences. But after becoling
involved with the study I could not in good conscience demonstrate
what these predictions were without saying something about the nature

1

 

 

 

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their pr
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2
of the sen making them, some of the factors which heavily influenced
their projections, and also the manner in which the mth became denuded
of any real philosophical meaning as it went fro: the mind of Han
through Lenin to the contemporary Russian situation.

I perforce had to be selective in gathering the data-«this is
neither a complete stuchr of Marx, nor of Lenin, nor of the Soviet
political systen. The focus is on the Program. But I did decide,
early in the game, to take both Marx and Engels as though they spoke
with the sane voice and for each other. I did this because this is
the way the Soviet Union interprets then. It would have been inter-
esting to separate then as A. James Greggor does so well in his book
_A_ guy g_f_ Egg, but it would have been beyond the necessary scope
of this study.

When analysing the events which led up to the adoption of the
Program I was deeply indebted to the. "conflict" scholars, especially
Robert Conquest and Carl Linden. They were most suggestive, and will
be credited in the appropriate places in the study. The conclusions
that I have arrived at are, of course, w own; and I lust bear full
responsibility for then. I hope that those who read this will find

as such pleasure as the author did in writing it.

CHAPTER I
THE BASIS FOR MARX'S FUTURE SOCIETY

The vision of a future society cured of its ills shared by Marx
and Engels was the consequence of the union of a theory and a practice.
The theory was alleged to be scientific because it was thought to be
grounded in empirical reality. Instead of the high-flying philosophies
of many former thinkers, the Marxist system based itself on a material-
istic exposition of bread and butter issues in the productive process.
The entire social order was based in production and in the exchange
of products,1 and history was a record of movements reflecting altera-
tions in the mode of production and the resulting conflict of classes.
This concept can be called wthological in character,2 with some
justification; but the use of the term nth connotes only the idea-
ticnal character of the thought which, as always, was articulated in

the garb of empirical reality.

 

l'Frederich Engels, "Socialism, Utopian and Scientific," Marx, Engels,
Selected Works in Two Volumes, ed. V. Adoratslq, (Iondon: Martin Lawrence,
Ltd... nod. I, P. 1 50

chbert Tucker, Plano-om and mu in Karl Marx, (Cambridge:
University Press, 1 is the source for the thinking underlying this
statement. It will be noticed, however, that I have maintained consider-
able distance between u position and that of Mr. Tucker. I am using
the term wthologlcal to refer to concepts that are ideaticnal in origin;
that is, not derived from empirical experience. This not only includes
little pejorative connotation, but also is clearly distinguishable from
the use Mr. Tucker makes of the concept of the Marxian nth as reflecting
a schizophrenic dichotoaw within Marx himself that is projected onto the
real world as proletariat and capitalist. See p. 226, for example.

3

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I,

Marx and Engels developed their theory in a ten year period from
about 1837-18‘II7, beginning with Marx' 3 student years at the University
of Berlin and culminating in the joint authorship of the Columnist
Manifesto in 18’+8. The nth, or theory, was a transformed Hegelianism;
that is a detranscendentalized philosophy which traced in ”real" history
the pernicious development of devisive private property, and with it the
progressive alienation of the producers from their products, their
tools, their fellow men, and in the final analysis from themselves.
History revealed the consequences: alienation expressed as the division
of labor, and class warfare in response to periodic alteration and
progress in the mode of production.

Following the thought of Guisot and Thierry, as well as the study
by von Stein, Marx concluded that again in his own era the class structure
of society lent itself to the possibility of dichotomization so dear to
every maker of nth. The deprived were the proletariat and the depraved
were the bourgeoisie. Conflict between them was inevitable for history
progressed by this sort of resolution of dialectical confrontations.

The war between these modern classes would be, to pro-quote Wilson, a
war to end all wars. Mark was certain of this even though Go-unism
might not be the final form of social relations. As he wrote in 1814-4:

Gomism is the phase of the negation of the negation,

and is, consequently, for the next stage of historical

development, a _r:_e_a_l_ and necessary factor in the emanci-

pation and rehabilitation of man. Commism is the

necessary form and the active principle of the inediate

future but commis- is not it self the aim3of human devel-
opment or the final form of human society.

 

3Karl Marx, "Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844," user

1/3, p. ll“; in T. Bottomore and M. Rubel, Karl Marx: Selected Urit s
in Sociolog and Social Philosophy, (London: Watts and 00., 19%;,
Po 3.

 

 

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5
Engels implied the same thing when he wrote that " . . . a perfect

society, a perfect state, are things which can only exist in the

imagination. "1'

Nonetheless, warfare between classes would be at an end. This
notion was based on the assumptions that the whole society was being
rapidly proletarianized, that the previously undreamed of wealth in
the capitalistic productive process made the necessity of a deprived
class anachronistic, and that the socialization of the ownership of
the means of production proscribed the development of any future class.
Hence the eradication of private property has eschatological significance.

Bourgeois property was the private property to be destroyed by
the proletarian revolution, just as before the bourgeoisie had abol—
ished feudal property. Feudalistic remnants that remained, like
small peasant holdings and those of petty artisans, could be ignored
because they were feudalistic properties caught in capitalistic property
relations and therefore already doomed. But bourgeois property was yet
to be destroyed. And this was particularly capital, that is the sort
of property that exploited wage labor. "Property in its present form
is based on the antagonism of capital and wage labour,"5 he wrote in
1848. Notice that the relations of capitalistic production are the
basis of bourgeois property rather than the other way around. The
private property he condemned was a consequence of estranged labor.
Labor was external to the worker because it did not belong to man's

essential being, and hence denied man, mortified man, and ruined him.

 

I'Engels, "lardwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German
Philosophy,” Selected works, op. cit., p. #21.

5Marx and Engels, ”The Co-Iunist Manifesto," 1mm, p. 220.

an 'v w w H.._,_

 

 

 

 

 

'"Jhe worker
work f~;-els
and when he
fore volum
not the sat
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To whom dag;
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6

"The worker therefore only feels himself outside his work, and in his
work feels outside himself. He is at home when he is not working,
and when he is working he is not at home. His labour is not there-
fore voluntary, but coerced; it is £91333 _lah_gr;. It is therefore
not the satisfaction of a need; it is merely a may to satisfy
needs external to it."6 Thus the product of labor is alien and the
act of production is alien activity not belonging to man the worker.
To when does it then belong? The worker confers to a stranger the
activity which is not his own and in so doing produces the relation
to the product and act of production of the capitalist. "Private
property is thus the product , the result, the necessary consequence,
of alienated _lab__9£, of the external relation of the worker to nature
and to himself."7 Later the relationship becomes reciprocal.

The property that the proletarian revolution must abolish was
therefore a qmptom of the desperate alienation which afflicted
man, and it was this which was the target of their activities. In
this sense property was not considered as personal appropriation of
the products of labor useful for the maintenance and reproduction of
life, but as capital or the accumulation of alienated labor. The
abolishing of this property would mean that the social character of
this property would lose its class characteristics. In this sense
the theory of the communists, Marx wrote, may be srrmmed up by the

sentence Abolition of private property.8

 

6Karl Marx, "Estranged Labour," Economic and Philoso hie Mann-
scri ts of 18%, ed. Kirk Stmik, trans Martin Milligan, ENew York:
International Publishers, 1964) .

711m.

8
Marx and Engels, "The Communist Manifesto," Selected Works,
32.1.23" pp- 220-221.

7

Co-unism is the Reitive abolition of private m,

of human self-alienation, and thus, the real appropriation

of human nature, through and for man.9

The positive abolition of private property, as the

appropriation of human life, is thus 3133 msitive aboli-

tion of all alienation, and thus the return of man from

religion, the family, the State, etc., to his human, i.e.,

social life. Religious alienation only occurs in the

sphere of consciousness, in the inner life of man, but

economic alienation is that of real life, and its aboli-

tion therefore affects both aspects.

But how to accomplish this? As Marx wrote in 1845, abstract thought
was no longer sufficient. What was necessary was practical, sensuous
activity.n For a time Marx and Engels were associated with the
newly formed Communist Party, especially during the revolutionary
period 18l+8-50. Subsequent to this association Marx made great
efforts to lead the International Working Men's Association beginning
in 186‘!I and lasting until the Paris Commune of 1871. The rest of

the time they, but especially Marx, were active in writing, conversing,
‘ speaking, and communicating by letter; all oriented to assisting the
proletarian class to accomplish its historically inevitable mission
in both its negative and positive aspects.

The activity by the Party was that of leadership through educa-
tion and agitation in order to provide a theoretically correct focus
for proletarian activity. This would aid them in developing the
consciousness of their class position and the scientific reasons for
that position. Once that consciousness was fully developed the

revolution would be imminent .

 

9Marx, "Economic and Philosophical Mes,” in Bottomore and labor,
OEe Cite, PP. 243-24113

”rum, pp. 115 and 2M.

uMarx, "Theses on Feuerbach," Economic and PhilosOph_ical Mes,
Struik edition, op. cit.

 

 

 

 

The

identifi
Party va
national
rather t;

ter 51;
the goal
the pro;
conquest
held by -
“flierstg
Seneral r
to be cozl
sease th;
Person ti

”1° cone;

 

 

 

8

The leadership of the League or Party was, in the Manifesto,
identified with, and yet apart from the proletariat. The Communist
Party was distinguished from other working class parties by its inter-
national character and its representation of the movement as a whole
rather than sectarian interests,12 functions which the International
later subsumed as its own. The Communist Party had aims similar to
the goals of other working class parties, however. "Foruation of
the proletariat into a class, overthrow of the bourgeois supresacy,
conquest of political power by the proletariat.”]‘3 The advantage
held by the Party over the working class was that of " . . . clearly
understanding the line of. narch, the conditions and the ultimate
general results of the proletarian sovement."1h This knowledge was
to be conunicated to the workers, for the times were ripe in the
sense that modern large-scale industry had turned the worker from a
person tied to the land into a propertyless proletarian, creating the
sole condition for the overthrow of the capitalist system.

Only the proletariat created by modern large-scale industry,

liberated from all inherited fetters, including those

which chained it to the land, and driven in herds into

the big towns, is in a position to accomplish the great

social transforsation which will put an end to all

class exploitation and all class rule. The old rural

hand weavers with hearth and hose would never have

been able to do it, they would never have been able

to conceive sigh an idea, much less able to desire to
carry it out.

 

Rum and Engels, "Manifesto," Selected Works, op. cit., p. 216.
131b1ds’ p. 219s

“In“.
15‘Iin‘ngeiln, The new Question, (New York: International Publishers,

n.d.) p. 29.

Ir. rim _. ...._

 

 

These so

of a soc
conditio:
of produ
society.
for the .
once the
the pm‘“
social w

thin itta

 

9

These modern developments therefore were at the same time developments
of a social revolution because of the development of a class whose
conditions of life drove it to revolution and because of the blossoming
of productive relations that had outgrown the framework of capitalist
society. Hence the framework itself would burst and provide the means
for the abolition of all class differences once and for all.16 And
once the correct knowledge of the capitalist system was possessed by
the proletariat they would no longer ever be in any doubt as to which
social institutions it should be against, and in what manner its
main attacks should be directed.17

The creation of this attitude, this knowledge, in this class
was the goal of the Party, as it was later of the International.
The organisation functioned as a focus of the proletariat and Mar:
and Engels sought to speak for the organization. This was, naturally,
not accepted by all; witness their endless bickering with those who
differed in seemingly inconsequential details. Those who read through
the works of Marx and Engels cannot fail to note comparisons with the
in-fighting of theolog in which the correct ideological position
often seems more important than the conversion of the so-called
heathen. This claim was also less than altruistic on the part of
Harm at least-witness his letter to Engels in reference to the
International, written in 1867.

Things are moving. And in the next revolution which is

perhaps nearer than it appears, we (i.e., you and I)

will have this powerful engine in an; 93%. Compare

this with the results of Maminni's etc., operations
during the last thirty years! And without any financial

 

16111111., D. 88s

17Ib1de. Po 1380-

 

 

 

 

 

me
in
Cr
an
Th
in the
agent w.
because
Pate it:
represex
redeem j
m

politlc;

10

means, moreover. With the intrigues of the Proudhonist

in Paris, of Mancini in Italy, of the Jealous Odger,

Cremer, and Potter in London, with the Schulse-Delitzschi es

and Lassaleans in Germany! Us can be very well content!

This was quite understandable. Marx was devoting his life to what
in the grand Victorian manner was the emancipation of all mankind. The
agent was the class in radical chains possessing a universal character
because of its universal suffering. This proletariat could not emanci-
pate itself without emancipating all other spheres of society, for it
represented in itself the complete loss of mankind and could only
redeem itself by redeeming all mankind completely}9

This Isaiah-like prophecy was to be accomplished by a destructive

political act,20 the overturning of the master of society, the state21

which was only a machine for the oppression of one class by another.22
It had to be smashed.23 Coinciding with this activity, the means of
production would be seized and commodity production would be ended,
thereby terminating the domination of the product over the producer.
This was the 22.51; demanded of the proletarian forces by the

theoretioians. When it was to occur was a matter of some confusion.

 

18“.“. "Letter to kgels, September 11, 1867," Selected Horks,
OEe Cite, II, Do 614.

19am, "The Hegelian Philosophy of Right," Selected Es s, trans.
H. J. Stenning, (Iondon: Leonard Parsons, Ltd., 1925 p. 3?.

203m, "oh the King of Prussia and Social Reform,“ ghid” pp.
132-133.

alEngels, "Introduction to the can wu- in France," Selected
Work... 02. fits. II, p. “58.

22Ibid. , p. l+60.

aria-x, "Letter to Dr. Kugelmann on the Paris Camus, April 12,
1871,” Selected Works, ibid., p. 528.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

At times

expected
At other
the proph

the Mahif

ll

At times Marx and Engels sounded like the early Christians who daily
expected the resurrection of the body and the second coming of Christ.
At other times Marx and Engels make use of what can be compared to
the prophet's equivocal fullness of time. The latter attitude allowed
the Manifesto to summarily dismiss St. Simon, Fourier, and Owen.

The Founders of these systems, see, indeed, the class

antagonisms, as well as the action of the decomposing

elements in the prevailing form of society. But the

proletariat, as yet in its infancy, offers to them the

spectacle of a class without any historical initiative

or any independent political movement. Since the

development of class antagonisms keeps even pace with

the development of industry, the economic situation,

as they find it, does not as yet offer to them the

material conditions for the emancipation of the prole-

tariat. They therefore search after a new social

science, after new social laws, that are to create these

conditions. Historical action is to yield to their

personal inventive action, historically created condi-

tions of emancipation to phantastic ones; and the gradual,

spontaneous class organization of the proletariat to an

organisatiozg of society especially contrived by these

inventors.

Thus, when economic conditions were ripe class antagonisms would also
be. The theory was quite neat, but in actual practice the development
of class antagonisms proved quite ballq, for as economic conditions
improved the dialectical pauperisation that should have occurred was
replaced by modest advances for the working class, already occurring
in Marx's own day. But Marx could or would not see this.

Adding to this confusion of when the revolution g_a_§_ to begin was
uncertainty about under what conditions it 23593 to begin. Should it
be as a consequence of final proletarian misery or should it begin
earlier, even before economic conditions make it allegedly inevitable?

The latter notion which is related to the later concept of permanent

 

aharx and Engels, "Manifesto," Selected works, op. cit., I, p. 237.

 

 

12
revolution advanced by Trotslq was expressed by Marx in his Address
of March, 1850, when he and Rgels thought another revolution might
be isninent.as Here Marx discussed a temporary alliance with the
democrats (bourgeoisie) until the old regime was overthrown, but
also the simltaneous creation of a worker' s government independent
of the bourgeois one. This would nationalize the rural areas and
turn them into collectively owned labor colonies. Communications,
transportation, and industry would be nationalized without compensa-
tion to the former owners. Strong revolutionary radicalism should
be maintained for as long as possible after the initial victory.

Of course this reads like Justification for a J acobin style
permanent revolution, or in other words as doctrinal support for
Lenin's surprising April Theses in 1917. It also shows the continuing
dominance of the Blwquistic tradition in the League emanating from
its parent society the Parisian organized League of the Just in 1836.
Those who have an emotional need to disassociate Marx from conspira-
torial activities and J acobin-seizures of power can cite the fact that
Marx and Engels left the League shortly after the Address was drawn up
over the very issue of trying to hurry the revolution along.26 George
Lichtheim feels that Marx tacitly and Engels explicitly repudiated the
positions maintained in the Address.27 But no one denys that Marx
and Engels authored the document , forcing one to the conclusion that

at least for a short time they maintained this position.

 

25Marx, "Address of the Central Council to the Consist League,”
Selected worksI op. cit., II, pp. 154-168.

26km Mehring, Karl Marx: The Ste of His Life, (london: The
Bodley Head, 1936), pp. 20013:.

aGeorge Lichtheim, Marxism, (New York: Praeger, 1961). pp. 122:1.

 

 

 

"A new 1
is, how
Han ids

and vent

contrary

But
VNte to
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02 thfi rt

tn, m

13

Their later writings do not, moreover, provide solid clues that
their thinking has in fact definitely changed. Marx wrote around 1850,
"A new revolution is only possible in consequence of a new crisis. It
is, however, also just as certain as this."28 In a speech in 1856,
Marx identified the crisis as the giant contradiction between wealth
and want which was to prefigure the revolution29 and that it was
alreaw present: "In our days everything seems pregnant with its
contrary . . . ”30

But during the same month of the same year, April, 1856, he
wrote to Engels: "The whole thing in German will depend on the
possibility to back the proletarian revolution by some second edition
of the Peasant's war. Then the affair will be splendid."31

But a second edition of the peasant rebellion would preclude
the development of the giant contradiction which was to be the cause
of the revolution, for the simple reason that the peasants by this
time are expected to be off the land and working in the factories
of the modern industrial system, and that while the big peasant was
bourgeois, the small peasant remaining could expect salvation only

from the working class.32 Marx wrote in Capital that the expropriation

 

ZBMarx, "The Class Struggles in France 1816-50," Selected Works,
02. Cite. p. 299s

29Marx, "Speech at the Anniversary of the People's Paper," ibid. ,
pp. #27428.

3"void. , p. #28.

331mm, "Letter to Engels, April 16, 1836," Selected Works, op. cit.,
D. “'31s

M, "Prefatory Note to The Peasant War in German,” ibid.,
PP. 539‘5400

 

 

 

of the I
accumul
is ripe
tartaric.
proletaz
criticiz
"toiling
that the

indust ri.

lie

of the great mass of the people from the soil belonged to the primitive
accumulation period of capitaliml's growth.33 By the time revolution
is ripe one would think the vast majority of peasants would be prole-
tarians, supporting this motion with references to the concept of the
proletarianizing of the vast majority of the society; and Marx's
criticism of the Gotha Program of 1875 for including in the concept
"toiling people" more peasants than proletarians, and his contention
that their demands on the existing state for cooperative societies in
industrialized German proved that they were not ripe for ruling?“

This confusion provides a clue, unbacked by hard data, that Marx
and Engels had a feeling that somehow their theory did not relate to
practice, a feeling they usually managed to suppress. This feeling
was a near unconscious realization that revolutions of the sort that
they were hoping for only occur in countries with large and discon-
tented peasant populations meaning that proletarian coming to power
would be out of time in relation to the expectations of historical
materialism. Engels wrote in 1853 that the preliminaries of the
proletarian revolution in Germany, such as the demand for a unified
republic, were now taken for granted. Hence the Party could new
base itself on the Manifesto. Then:

All this, of course, concerns only theory; in

practice we shall, as always, be reduced to pressing

for resolute measures and absolute ruthlessness above

all. And that is the trouble. I have a presentiment

that, thanks to the perplexity and flabbiness of all

the others, our Party will one fine morning he forced

to assume power and finally to carry out the measures
that are of no direct interest to us, but are in the

 

33am, "Selections from ch ital," Selected Works, op. cit., 1,
p. 351.

3“ Marx, "Critique of the Gotha Programme," Selected Works, op. cit.,
no P0 5750

.- ‘~ ww‘

 

 

gfllfik‘bgfiz‘t‘EHB-m

15

general interests of the revolution and the specific
interests of the petty-bourgeoisie; on which occasion,
driven by the proletarian populace, bound by our own
printed declarations and plans-more or less falsely
interpreted, more or less passionately thrust to the
fore in the.Party struggle-awe shall be constrained to
undertake communist experiments and perform leaps the
untimeliness of which we know better than anyone else.
In so doing we lose our headsn-only physically speaking
let us hope-a reaction sets in, and until the world
is able to pass historical judgment on such events, we
are considered not only beasts, which would not matter,
but also betes which is much.worse.

I do not quite see how it can turn out otherwise.
In a backward country like Germany, which possesses an
advanced party, and is involved in an advanced revolution
with an advanced country like France, the advanced party
must get into power at the first serious conflict and
as soon as actual danger is present, and that is, in
any event, ahead of its normal time. All that does not
matter, however, and the best thing we can do is for
our Party to have established its historical rehabili-
tation in its literature ahead of time, should events
take such a turn.

The intrusion.of praxis, and with it empirical reality, into the
ideaticnally derived theory and vice-versa provided a confusion that
Sidney Hook sums up well when he wrote that Marxism was ”an ambiguous
legacy."36 Theoretically an.untimely leap was heretical, yet in
practice almost any kind of revolutionary activity in or out of time,
by a massive proletarian majority or by a toiling class which contained
elements out of temporal context seemed permissible, at least at one
time or another.

Somehow the agent class was expected to receive a message fromx
this. Small wonder that they did not, for the critique of utopian

socialism in the Manifesto was as apt for the Marxian program of action

¥

35Engels, "Letter to J. Meydemeyer, April 12, 1853," Selected
Corregggfigence, (Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, n.d.5,
PD. 9 e

36

Sidney Hook, Marx and the Marxists: The Ambgggus Legag,
(Princeton, Princeton ver y ress, .

 

 

as well
pnctic
it: arr
emyth
m 6hr:

themsel‘

16
as well as any other. In theory the revolution.was a means; in
practice it became both means and end because of the long delay in
its arrival, because of the confusion and changes of mind about
everything except the word, and because the end of that revolution
‘was shrouded in a.mist that Marx:and Engels, perhaps wisely, imposed

themselves. The next chapter seeks to penetrate that mist.

 

 

utOpia
their
societ;

5‘19in

CHAPTER II
HARXISM'S FUTURE SOCIETY

Both.Marx and Engels were concerned about being considered
utopians. Hence there seems to have been a deliberate effort on
their part not to communicate details about the post revolutionary
society. There was an equation made, at least by Engels, between
supplying details and utopianism.

These new social systems were from the outset
doomed to be utopias; the more their details were
elaborated, the more they necessarily receded into

pure phantasy.

In general, the question is not whether the
proletariat when it comes to power will simply seine
by force the tools of production, the raw materials
and means of subsistence, whether it will pay imme-
diate compensation for them, or whether it will re-
deem property therein by installments over a long
period. To attempt to answer such a question in
advance and for all cases would be utopiapmaking,
and I leave that to others.2

It is specious to dismiss this as cowardice or fear of ridicule
even though these factors may have contributed. Engels was correct;
but for reasons that he did not or could not understand. The vision
would only have been cheapened by articulation. The ideal of serving

mankind, for example, tastes flat when structured. Consider the

1Engels, Herr Eugen gaggigg's Revolution in Science SAnti-Qghgiggz,
(New York: International.Publishers, 1939 , p. 2 3.

23%.]... The Bong ngstion, OEe Cite, Pe 980

 

l7

 

 

 

 

 

 

debacl
there
m‘ticul
Engels
reality
idealie
the his
march o
maul
artific:
Of the z
"alt-«.1
of this
nature 0
the new
Writings
The
socializ

Vith the

l8
debacle of evil that accompanied the Crusaders of long ago. Normally
there is a deep gulf between the ideals that move men, and their
articulation or implementation. The new age conceived by Harx.and
Engels was a mental fiction based.cn.a subjective apperception of
reality mixed with a.heaty dose of idealistic wish. The humanistic
idealism in _Th_e_ Economic ;_en_d_ Philosophical Manuscripts 2; fl fit
the historical materialism of TppuggpgpplIdeologz and the funeral
march of capitalism in Capital to describe a mental construction whose
resemblance to real life and real history was‘g‘ppiggi forced and
artificial. The post-revolutionary society, considered the negation
of the negation,3 was philosophically strong while realistically
weakp-clearly revealing its parentage. To have articulated the details
of this vision in any systematic manner would.have made the mythological
nature of the concept apparent--in fact it would have been utopia,
making. Nonetheless, both leaders were unable to avoid referring to
the new society in a number of instances throughout their voluminous
writings.

The new communist society was based on the revolution's successful
socialization.of the means of production. This would be accomplished
with the aid of the power of the state, much.tc the dismay of Bakunin.

. . . the proletarian class will first have to possess

itself of the organized political force of the State and

with this aid stamp out the resistance of the Capitalist

class and re-organize society . . . (carrying out) . . .

that economic revolution of society without which the

whole victory must end in a defeat and in a,massapre of
the working class like that of the Paris Commune.

3am, Economic and Philosophical use of 18%, 1mm 1/3, p. 125, in
Bottomore and Rubel, p. .

“Engels, "Letter to Phillip Van Patten, April 18, 1883," Selected
Corre ndence, pp. #36-437.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

fre
the-
the:

 

the 336::

its “SefL

Vict
Side
ach
moms

a) 'JV ’5"
5;! 0:,

/. .

19
The use of state power after the revolution was one of the principal
differences between Marx and Baknnin in the International and was at
least partially responsible for the expulsion of the anarchists in
1872. But Marx felt that he avoided the anarchist criticism by seeing
this utilisation of state power for proletarian purposes as a temporary
expedient. The extermination of the anew and the economic revolution
were to be accompanied by a disappearance of the state as state.

At first the state " . . . can be nothing but t_h_g revolutiog
dictatorship g; 1h; pmletaria ."5 But it is, nonetheless, a tran-
sitional institution used to hold down the proletariat' s adversaries
by force,

. . . and as soon as it becomes possible to speak of

freedom the state as such ceases to exist. We would

therefore propose to replace the word ' state' every-

where by the word Gemeinwesen (community) . . .6

One could not speak of freedom and state together. This reflected
the anarchistic strain in Marx and Engel's thought. The state, for all
its useful purposes after the revolution was nonetheless an

. . . evil inherited by the proletariat after its

victorious struggle for class supremacy, whose worst

sides the proletariat, just like the Commune, cannot

avoid having to lop off at the earliest possible

moment . . .

It was a machine used for the oppression of one class by another class8
but since the socialization of the means of production precluded the

emergence of a new class there was only the old class of capitalists

 

514m, Criti e of the Goths Pro amme, g! II, p. 577.
6Engels, "Letter to August Bebel, March 18, 28, 1875," _S_C_, p. l‘fl.
7Engels, Introduction to The Civil war in France, §_U_ II, p. #60.

8Ilihiei.

 

 

to ‘
pom
que:
The
unti
coni
on ti
large
made

demon

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was th
the cl
£36915
f°rm f<

NPUtlj

20
to be concerned with--a finite task in other words. How long this
power of the state would be used in this fashion was left open to
question, for Engel's statement on this point was very ambiguous.
The dictatorship or class struggle would continue, he wrote, " . . .
until such time as a new generation, reared in new and free social
conditions, will be able to throw the entire lumber of the state
on the scrap heap."9 This optimistic environmentalism, derived
largely from Rousseau and the Enlightenment , often provided can
answers to very difficult questions; and later experience will
demonstrate just how meaningless an answer it was.

The political form of what was to be smashed by the proletarian
state was bourgeois democracy. Marx wrote in 1875 that democracy
was the last state form of bourgeois society, and was one in which
the class struggle had to be fought out to a conclusion.1° But
Engels wrote in 1881* that the proletariat needed the democratic
form for the seizure of political power, for " . . . the democratic
republic always remains the last form of bourgeois rule, that in
which it goes to pieces."]'1

In any case our sole adversary on the day of the

crisis and on the day after the crisis will be
the whole of the reaction which will group around

pug; democra , and this, I think should not be
lost sight of. . .1?-

The new form that society would take was built on the old, not-

withstanding the negation of the negation. With the socialization of

 

9Ihiol.
loMarat, Criti ue of the Goths Pro sue, fl II, p. 579.
nEngels, "Letter to Edward Bernstein, March 2‘}, 1884," pp, p. “+5.

lzfingelm, "Letter to August Bebel, December 11, 1884," pp, p. 457,

 

 

omttz

21
the means of production the proletariat put an end to itself as prole-
tariat , as class. Hith the eradication of the capitalist class through
whatever violence was necessary the entire society would be characterized
by proletarianness-becoming-classlessness. Now the state would be the
representative of the whole society, and as such become superfluous.
The government of persons would no longer be necessary, merely the
administration of things and the direction of the processes of produc-

tion. The state was not to be abolished, it would naturally wither

”we13

The new social form was called an association or commity.

"The working class, in the course of its development,
will substitute for the old civil society an association
which will exclude classes and their antagonism, and there
will no longer be any political power, properly so-called,
since political power is precisely th official expression
of the antagonism in civil society.“-

Not only would there not be a state, but not even political power.
The substitute for this power would be the authority of all men, of
mankind, species man; who would again control material production and
the division of labor which was the source and consequence of man's
alienation. This was only possible in a community.

"Only in association with others had each indivi-
dual the means of cultivating his talents in all
directions. Only in a community therefore is personal
freedom possible. In the previous substitutes for
conunity, in the State, etc., personal freedom
existed only for those individuals who grew up in
the ruling class and only insofar as they are ushers
of this class. The illusory community in which, up
to the present , individuals have combined always
acquired an independent existence apart from them,
and since it was a union of one class against another

 

13Engels, Socialism Uto ian and Scientific, p! I, pp. 181-182.
1‘}

Marx, Poverty of Philosopp; (18%), user 1/6, pp. 227-228, in
Bottomore and Rubel, p. 7.

 

 

In otk
neat.
are go
social
in the
power c
device
in this
Individ;
control
31L;
its rep;
“faint

all POEM

“9 Pam

 

22

it represented for the dominated class not only a

completely illusory comunity but also a new shackle.

In a genuine cos-unity individuals ain their freedom

in and through their association."
In other words people could say of the couunity, they have no govern-
ment. This would mean that the people in the co-unity would say, :3
are government. Institutional independence of a previously functional
social arrangement meant fetish to Marx, and the fact that he tied it
in the above passage to class conflict obscured his point that political
power could not be disassociated from g the people without becoming a
device for domination which is 1:29; used as a class instrument. Freedom
in this new social formation is much closer to Rousseau than to Hegel.
Individuals within the new association would bring under their own
control the conditions for a free development and activity for themselves.1'6

Engels used terms like "shattering of the former state power and
its replacement by a really democratic state. . ., " or described as
infallible the two methods used by the Paris Commune; i.e., filling
all posts by elections with a universal suffrage and easy recall, and
the paying of all elected officials no more than that received by other
workers." Production was to be reorganized on the basis of the
" . . . free and equal association of producers . . .," and as a

result the state would be forced " . . . into the Museum of Antiquities

by the side of the spinning wheel and the bronz ax."‘1'8 Marx wrote of a

 

1511mm, German Ideolo , MEGA, I/S, pp. 63-6‘}, in Bottomore
and Rubel, p. 7.

15mm , pp. 610-67/2k9-50.
J”Engels, Introduction to The Civil War in France, S! II, p. #59.

J’afingels, QLigipn of the F‘s-:91, Private Propgrty and the State,
Ernest Untermann translator, (Chicago: Charles Kerr 8: Co., 190 pp. 211-212.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

twent;

when

the co
aspira
or uha‘
the we:
into ea
between
Potenti.
necessit

this so:

 

 

 

23
” . . . vast association of the whole nation . . ""19 in 1848; and
twenty-seven years later of a state which would be an organ completely
subordinate to society.»

Hence this society was called communism, or an exaggeration of
the community, which was the vehicle for the realization of Marx's
aspirations in 18%. It was the return of man to himself, as a 39313;,
or what meant the same thing to Marx, a M being; assimilating all
the wealth of the previous development of man. Comnism was a blending
into each other of humanism and naturalism because the antagoniu
between man and nature was resolved. Communism solved the conflict
potential of being and becoming; of object and subject; of freedom and
necesdty; and of individual and species. Communism was therefore
" . . . the nlution of the riddle of history and knows itself to be
this solution. ”21

Forty years later Engels eloquently described the social gates
of primitive man which he thought Lewis Morgan had discovered. How
wonderful, he said. No soldiers, police, nobility, kings, regents,
prefects, judges, prisons, lawsuits were found and still the affairs
ran smoothly. "What splendid men and women were produced by such a
society," even though man was almost " . . . completely dominated by
nature, a strange and incomprehensible riddle to him.”22

But now nature was not feared-nit was merged into man as alienation

was replaced by monistic union. Subject and object were now one. New

~_.

when and Engels, Manifesto, ._S_U_ I, p. 228.
20Marx, Criti of the Goths Pro me, in Bottomore and Rubel, p. 255.

auarx, m 18%, user, 1/3, p. 11!»; Ibid., p. at}.
ezfiingels, 03531 of the Egg, pp. 117-119.

I

 

man don:
point or
would m
this 50(
and natu
his eyes
Iiature t
reality.
Thi
the mean
V85 the
“eighted
0f the n:
“10m ti
Practice
solomn;

fGllow,

21+
man dominated the external conditions of his existence and from this
point on would fashion his own history in the realm of freedom.23 Man
would no longer merely propose—he would also dispose.2l' As man becomes
this social, human being he absorbs in himself the abstract citizen25
and nature becomes a bond for him with other men, " . . . the basis of
his existence for others and of their existence for him. Only then is
Nature the 25$ of his own m existence, and a vital part of human
reality."26 And man is free to be man.

This is, of course, a very heavy load for the act of socializing
the means of production and removing capitalists to bear. Yet the one
was the action or practice designed to bring about this philosophically
weighted future society. But the difficulty is that such descriptions
of the new community are deficient in the sort of operational termi-
nology that would create an understanding of the association in actual
practice. One has more of a feeling that he has read the Song of
Solomon rather than a blueprint which succeeding generations could
follow.

But this is to an extent due to the data so far considered. Both
Marx and Engels made many more specific statements which do permit
one to achieve a deeper understanding, providing answers to several
questions.

There would be authority, for example, in this future. The state

might be an evil that the proletariat inherited, but in a letter written

 

23333318, Anti-m5, Pe me
21+Ihid., Pe “Se

ashlar-x, On the Jewish gestion, German-French legumes, Feb. , 181m,
in Bottomore and Rubel, p. .

26km, KPH 1810-4, MEGA I/3, pp. 115-116; Ibid., pp. 245-6.

 

 

 

'7" i”"'§'9 {vej—um

H81”!

25
in 1872.Engels argued against the notion that authority and state
were inherently evil.
”(How these people propose to run a factory, work
a railway or steer a ship without having in the last
resort one deciding will, without a unified direction,
they do not indeed tell us). The authority of the
majority over the minority also ceases. Every indivi-
dual and community is autonomous, but as to how a
society, even of only two people is possible unless
each gives up some of his autonomy, Bakunin again
remains silent."

"Even if this authority is voluntgpily be owed
it must cease simply because it is authority.”

The anarchist notion of exaggerated individual autonomy clashed with
the communalism of Marx and Engels. Authority within that associational
framework.was not only permitted but seen as necessary. The juxtaposi-
tion of authority and the freedom of social man required the metaphysical
agility of Rousseau; yet the concept of the General Hill of the majority
is never explicitly promulgated. One is left with the feeling that
authority is not an evil in itself, that, indeed, many situations seem
to require it; that it probably would be the will of the majority making
universal autonomy impossible because there must be some voluntary
limitations of that autonomy. Authority would then rest on that
voluntary submission.

During that same year, 1872, Engels*wrote to C. Terzaghi:

“I believe the terms authority and centralization
are being greatly abused. I knew nothing more authori-
tarian than a revolution . . . It was the lack of cenp

tralization.and authority that cost the Paris Commune
its lire."28

 

627mm, "Letter to r. r. Cuno, January 24, 1872," g! II,
pp. 33-21.

Zgnngels, "Letter to C. Terzaghi, January 1%, 1872,"'§§, pp. 332-3.

 

awr-

 

Lenin vii.
here that
root stroz

authority.

36
Lenin will later use this, but that is to anticipate. The point is
here that Engels as well as Marx reacted to the anarchist Bakunin
most strongly during this period by stressing the necessity of
authority.

Harx wrote in 1875 that some of the functions analogous to those
29 In

now performed by the state must continue in the new society.
Capital he had written that these would be the regulation of working
hours, division of social work, accounting, etc.

" . . . all labours, in which many individuals cooperate,
necessarily require for the connection and unity of the
process one commanding will, and this performs a func-
tion which does not refer to fragmentary operations, but
to the combined labour of the workshop, in the same way
as does that of a director of an orchestra. This is

a kind of productive labour which must be performed in
every “2300f production requiring a combination of
labours.

Engels wrote in 187‘! that the bourgeois economic system tended to
replace isolated action by combined action.

"But whoever mentions combined action speaks of organi-
sation; now is it possible to have organisation without
authority?

" . . . it is absurd to speak of the principle of auth-
ority as being absolutely evil and the principle of
autonoq as being absolutely good. Authority and
autonow are relative things, whose spheres vary with
the various phases of the development of society. If
the autonomists confined themselves to saying that the
social organisation of the future would restrict auth-
ority solely to the limits within which the conditions
of production render it inevitable, we could under-
stand each other; but they are blind to all facts that
make the thing necessary and they passionately fight
the word. "31

 

29m, Criti ue of the Gotha Pro ., _s_u_v II, pp. 563-5.

30Marx, Ca ital, as quoted in Iring Fetscher, "Marx, Engels, and
the Future Society,” in Laqueur and Labedz, eds., The Future of the
Communist Societ , (New York: Praeger, 1962), pp. 102-105.

31supple, ."oh Authority," p311, p. 637.

 

2?

It is only with great difficulty that these words are used to
justify an authoritarian political system. The anarchistic denial of
the validity of any authority seemed to them to be nonsense, for how
can one run.a railway without a time schedule?. In other words this
authority was in essence labor discipline for the purposes of effi-
cient production, whether on a farm, a ship, or in a factory. Besides,
the context surrounding this discipline was thought to be radically
different. The means of production had been socialized; classes were
historical artifacts; divisive antagonisms had disappeared; and the
acquisitive drive in man had begun to yield to a social motive for
labor that resulted in.harmonious cooperation.

But as this authority would extend beyond the individual, forcing
a.necessary curtailment of autonomy, so also would it extend beyond
the individual factory or farm. The whole of society was seen.as an
enormous factory or orchestra; the work performed must be orchestrated
into one harmonious whole. There must be " . . . the planned utilisation
and extension.of the already existing enormous productive forces of all
members of society . . ."32 There must be " . . . conscious organisation
on a planned basis . . {"33 The anarchy of capitalist production.needed
to be replaced by socially planned production.regulations in conformity
with the needs of society as a whole and those of each individual.3~
The result would be " . . . the harmonious cooperation of its productive

forces on the basis of a single vast plan . . .,"35 determined in the

 

Bngels, Introduction to Marx w Labour and Ca ital, pg 1, p. 251.
33Engels, Socialim Uto ian and Scientific, g! I, p. 185.

3«thirds , p. 181e

”Easels. saws-as. p. 323-

Proper
mien
nodal

not be
an org;
the Int
by th.

“5°01:

“int

"1‘! 301

E”

8'
3 [HR / b
r If [[16- mw :rg I

 

 

 

 

__.- - , —-

28
last analysis by the useful effects of the various articles of con-
sumption, compared with each other, and with the quantity of labor
required for their production.36

Marx wrote in Capital that the apportionment of labor time
" . . . in accordance with a definite social plan maintains the proper
proportion between the different kinds of work to be done and the
various wants of the community")? In another passage he referred to
socialized mankind, the associated producers, regulating their inter-
change with nature on a rational basis to bring it under their control.38
Hence this authority was considered as system wide. It could
not be political authority in the old sense for society was to become
an organic unity, man became truly man by becoming social man. Thus
the authority that would be exerted would be similar to that exercised
by the rationality of a man over the various parts of his body. Authority
was coordination for maximal benefit. No longer the crisis-ridden
anarchy of production in the bourgeois system for the mode of production
had rebelled against the mode of exchange39 ‘ and the productive forces
were now unfettered. Engels wrote of an unbroken, progressive develop-
ment in industry, a " . . . practically limitless growth of production
. . .,”“° and an end to waste, senseless luxury and extravagancefa

These forces of production would be coordinated for the benefit of all

 

finide, p. 3380

”Marx, Capital I, vr I, p. an; as in Bottomore and Rubel, p. 251.
Salim, Capital III, VA III/2, pp. 873-874; ibid., pp. 2510-5.
39Engels, Socialism: Uto m and Scientific, ,5; I, p. 176.
A'OIbidu p. 185.

“111,14.

 

' -"‘~. .Hr" 'y'r
_¥J.":'r’.,!' ”-4 P

members

_-_

Ar.

that so

sacrifi

this re;
capabil;
motor 0:
even tilt

created

 

 

 

members of the society.

And as society itself was a unity, so also was the man within
that society. Formerly man's physical and mental faculties were
sacrificed to the development of a very narrow skill, and he kept
this for all of his stunted life. Instead of a world of productive
capabilities and instincts, man was a crippled monstrosity, an automatic
motor of a fractional operation.42 Everything human had been removed,
even the appearance of humanity“) The existing division of labor
created artificial distinctions between a philosopher and a porter“.
and this sort of fractionalization resulted in conditions which
fostered drunkenness, typhus, crime, vermin, the bailiff and other
social illsfs

In the communist society this would all change. No longer serf-
1ike labor, but " . . . associated labour plying its toil with a
willing hand, a ready mind and a Joyous heart.“6 Whereas accumulated
labor was formerly capital, beyond the reach of the worker; it was
now " . . . a means to widen, to enrich, ro promote the existence of

the labourer."w Organized production would ensure that

 

kzhgeh, W, p. 318. Part of the above is an hgel's
quotation from Capital I, p. 396, Kerr edition.

“3am, The Holy Fag, MESA I/3, p. 205, in Bottomore and Babel,
Fe 2320

M*Marx, Poverty of Philoeom, (New York: International, 1963),
p. 129.

“Engels, The Hous_i_ng Question, p. #9.
“614m, Address and Provisional Rules of the Hog-Ag Men's Intejr;
national Association, 57.! II, p. . . .

#7llarx and Engels, Manifesto, _S_U_ I, p. 221.

 

 

 

but the
Pathol- 1
”Chit“
both. i
name
for a p.
Prim.
Wild h

of 1.1.0

In 800
““1:- 1)

tin ‘

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30
" . . . no individual can put on to other persons
his share in productive labour, this natural con-
dition of human existence; and in which on the
other hand, productive labour, instead of being a
means to the subjection of men, will become a
means to their emancipation, by giving each indivi—
dual the opportunity to develop and exercise all his
faculties, physical and mental, in all directions,
in which, therefore, productive ukgbour will become
a pleasure instead of a burden.

Some distinctions of occupational specialization would remain,
but the narrow, confines of the division of labor would be removed.
Rather than one person being only a porter, and another being only an
architect, for example, in the new system one man could easily be
both. He would then be a person who " . . . for half an hour gives
instructions as an architect (and then he) will also push a barrow
for a period, until his activity as an architect is once again required.”li"9
Private housework would be transformed into a public industry?o Labor
would be so distributed so that all without exception would share;
eliminating a privileged class as well as reducing each man's share
of labor and increasing his share of leisure time.51

what was good for industry and for all of society therefore also
was good for agriculture. Farmers or peasants would be saved from
their present misery only when " . . . land itself is withdrawn from

the private ownership . . . transformed into social property and

 

kw]... Anti.M:Ee Po 3&.

”Ibid" pp. 221, 324. See also mg, VA I, pp. 512-116, as in
Bottomore and Rubel, pp. 252-3: " . . . the mere bearer of a particular
social function, will be replaced by the fully developed individual, for
whom the different social functions he performs are but so many alterna-
tive modes of activity."

“imm, "Letter to Gertrude Giullaume-Schak, July 5, 1885." §_C..
pe

”meals. est-sums. p. 201.

‘v‘I'L .

- v

 

 

cultix

of ego
latter
once;

the up

of bot

Pmduc
vould
cities
“or“
be Clo
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01‘ u d

5.

31
cultivated by cooperative associations of agricultural workers on a
canon account.”52
"Association, applied to the land, has the advan-

tages from an economic point of view of large-scale

ownership, and at the same time achieves the original

tendency of the division of land, namely equality.

Association further restores the intimate relationship

of man to the land, in a rational way instead of through

serfdom, overlordship and a foolish wstique of proper-

ty. The land ceases to be an object of sordid specula-

tion, and through freedom of work and enjoyment becomes

once again the real, personal property of men. "53

Like their counterparts in industry, agricultural laborers would
become both real men and real squires by participating in the same sort
of cooperative association in the socialized fural scene; and, as a
matter of fact, a part of the same planned association. The differ-
ences between city and country would in the main disappear because
the undesirable features of both would be eradicated. Only the best
of both would remain. The large cities were to be broken up and the
rural areas would lose their stuporous isolation. Industry would get
pure water and agriculture would benefit from nearby industry. The
productive techniques that functioned well in the industrial sector
would be applied to the land. Farms would be run as factories. The
cities would find a fertilization utilisation for the heaps of human
excrement daily disposed of at great cost previously. The air would
be cleaner, housing more spacious and abundant, and the population
would be evenly distributed over the land. Both cities and the
country would lose their distinctiveness. The uniform distribution

of industry, agriculture, and population would solve crowded urban

 

SZEngels, Prefatory Note to an; Peasant 1g 2 Ge , §§ II,
Pp. 53940e

53Marx, m 18%, m, 1/3, p. 78; in Bottomore and Rubel, p. 2&5.

 

I‘M: _ "'—...‘;

 

 

w’V— ~.,.—u «1‘

'4,

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32
conditions, the needs of industry, and the lag in agricultural
development?“
Obviously, there is another side to the flow in this coordinated
association, and that is distribution of the wealth that is produced.
In other, less philosophically grounded socialist systems it seemed as
though distribution were the central element.. Engels wrote that specu-
lation on the organization of food and dwelling distribution led
directly to utopian vision-making, as one might expect.55 Marx cemented
that it was an error to assume that socialism turned principally on
distribution. "The distribution of the means of consumption at any
time is only a consequence of the distribution of the conditions of
production themselves."56 Thus one should not consider distribution
independently of the mode of production. Under capitalism the means
of production were in the hands of non-workers, with the masses
possessing only their labor power. But under socialism the different
ownership of the means of production resulted in a different distribution
of the articles of consumption.”
What sorts of differences must be extrapolated from the outline
Marx gave in 1875? Here he divided the total social product, or what
we might call a gross national product, into what seemed necessary
categories from the economic point of view, which were taken off the

top. First society not replace the used-up portions of the means of

 

5“ Engels, W, pp. 323-4}; The Roam geestion, pp. 95-96,

55Engels, The Housing Question, p. 101.
56%, Criti ue of the Goths Pro amme, a II, p. 567.

57Ib1d.

 

 

 

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33
production such as raw materials and a depreciation allowance for
wear of machinery. Second, society must budget for production expan-
sion. Third, there must be a reserve fund against unforeseen contin-
gencies. What was left must still be divided into funds allocated for
non-producing, but associated costs of administration; social necessities
such as schools and public health, and unemployment compensation. The
remainder would be divided among the individual producers in the society.58

The manner of distribution of this remainder, i.e., how much to
whom, was to depend on which phase of communism society was enjoying.

The first stage emerging out of the dictatorship of the proletariat
was one in which traces of the old order remained. Man has not yet had
sufficient time to be remade by the totally new environment, and the
' implication is that to give this man something for nothing would be
counterproductive. Hence his share of the wealth distributed during
this period would be a remuneration for actual labor time.59 Nonetheless
this would be inherently unequal, for some workers were stronger and
could therefore work longer hours; some had larger families and needed
more; while still others were single and needed far less. "To avoid
all these defects, right instead of being equal would have to be
unequal."60 But this was not possible until the second stage of
commism, or full comrnism. Now the evils of alienated existence
were gone from the character of man. He was educated, cultured, and

socially motivated. Work for such a man was no longer a means to an

 

581b1de, pp. 561-2e

59Merx, Ca ital, VA I, p. at; in.Bottomore and Rubel, pp. 250-1.

6charm, Criti ue of the Gotha Pro rams, _S_! II, p. 565.

”.m!' Vim " '

 

 

 

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3“
end but an end in itself, a.necessity for his functioning as a human

because it allowed for the expression of his creativity and produc-

tivity. "Only then can the narrow horizon of bourgeois right be fully
left behind and society inscribe on its banners: from each according
to his ability, to each according to his needs."61

The distribution of the wealth of society would now be unequal and
satisfy the needs of man from the semen storehouse; needs which he
formerly spent his entire life acquiring, using up, and again gaining.
His mind and body would now be free from concern about his animal
needs and he could spend his time expressing his humanness.

There are two basic assumptions which underlay this prediction.
First, the productive process freed from the fetters of the private
extraction of profit would produce an abundance. Marx spoke of the
abundant flowing of the " . . . springs of cooperative wealth. "62
Engels wrote:

”The possibility of securing for every member of
society, through social production, an existence which

is not only fully sufficient from a material standpoint and

becoming richer from day to day, but also guarantees to

them the completely unrestricted development and exercise

of the physical and mental faculties—this pozibility now

exists for the first time, but it does exist. 3

The first assumption, that of material wealth, is easier to grant
than the second; that great benefits would accrue to the population
because of the social nature of society. The great wealth that would

be produced would not be for commodity circulation but for consumption.

 

 

slibide, Fe 5660
GZIbid.
53.2.3.1... W: p- 309-

 

 

35
The labor power of all the different individuals would be consciously

applied as the combined labor power of the commity. "All the charac-
teristics of Robinson Crusoe‘s labour are here repeated, but with this
difference, that they are social, instead of individually} There would
be no artificial barriers between production and consumption, and the
social usefulness of labor would never be in doubt.

Leisure time would be comes to all, " . . . so that what is really
worth preserving in historically inherited culture, science, art, human
relations-is not only preserved, but converted . . . into the common
property of the whole of society, and further developed."65 Man would
be freed from the enslaving fetishism of religion, because it would
wither along with the state when it no longer was required to serve
the pseudo function of pretended knowledge in areas where man had
previous felt he had no control.66 Bourgeois marriage for the purpose
of providing heirs would fade into a situation where both men and women
would feel free to marry only because of sex-love. No longer would man
have to buy, or want to buy, the surrender of woman; and woman would
surrender only for love.67

Men would be liberated from the confines of a narrow nationality
even though their struggle prior to the revolution may have begun as a

national one.68 But workingmen had no country even before the revolution;69

 

6"Marx, Ca ital, I, VA, p. 8‘}; Bottomore and Rubel, pp. 250-1.

65121119113, The 3.»qu ggestion, pp. 29-50.
66Engels, W, 1). $5.

67Engo1e. cm of the Fem—ill, pp. 91-100.
68Marx and Engels, Manifesto, St] I, p. 217.

691b1de, p. 225s

 

_____

.fil. u'fmw ,-

 

b.

36

so that, afterwards, as class.hoetility declines so also does cumin:
between nations. ” . . . a new society is springing up, whose Inter—
national rule will be Peace, because its national ruler will be every-
where the saIIIe--Lal'.~our."7° The struggle for man's emancipated future
there could not of course be any war. There would be no cause for

Material abundance and socialness-on these assumptions man is
to be free to become truly human. Nature, the world outside of man is
now the life element of his reality, the foundation of his existence;
and society is now a union of the essence of man and the essence of
nature., He has returned to his human, that is, social existence that
he left so long ago. Like the prodigal he has eaten of the bitter
hunks, but unlike his man returns to his social existence having subdued
and subsumed nature which.he formerly feared, and with an abundance of
material and nonpmaterial wealth.

"the bourgeois relations of production are the

last antagonistic form of the social process of pro-

ductionv-antagonistic not in the sense of individual

antagonism but one arising from the social conditions

of life of the individual; at the same time the pro-

ductive forces developing in the womb of bourgeois society

create the material conditions for the solution of that

antagonism. This social formation brings, therefore,

the prehistory of human society to a close."
One door was shutting, but the door to human history was opening.

So they believed.

 

70m, The Civil war in France, _S_U_ II, p. 466.
71Harx, Critigue of the Goths Programs, 5%; II, pp. 570-1.

7gnarx, Preface to a Contribution to a.Criti e of Political Eco ,
.5... It P0 3640

CHAPTER III
LENIN: THE BASIS

Lenin also believed, at least by 1894 when he moved from populism
to Marxism. But Lenin came to Harxism.when it was apparent in the
rest of Europe that time had not been kind to the Marxian predictions.
The revolutionary fervor of the proletariat had not matured; instead
capitalism had-developing out of the stage of primitive accumulation
into a period when the workers were increasingly sharing in the bene-
fits of an expanding national wealth. In addition, the beginnings of
labor unions and the extension of political suffrage to the working
class had given the proletariat more of a feeling of participation
in the existing political and economic systems rather than a desire
to overthrow them.

But Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov was Russian, and the environment was
much different. The economy was still backward but developing rapidly.
The peasantry constituted an illiterate, apathetic, and superstitious
90% of the population. The political system was reactionary, intensely
anachronistic; and it created an alienated intelligentsia which in-
creasingly sought a solution to Russia's problems through an apocalyptic
vision of revolution.

Lenin was a part of this. His brother, Alexander, had been

executed in 1887 for his participation in an abortive attempt to

3?

 

 

P

’1

tn

'd

,. .-<<*

38
assassinate the Tsar. Alexander had toyed.with Marxism, but his
younger brother went much further, studying it intensively, and
finding in it the theoretical framework for the revolutionary impatience
that possessed him. The historical materialism of Marx indicated that
the revolution that one could expect in Russia was the bourgeois revolu-
tion which would create the proletariat and in good time the proletarian

revolution.

4‘

_j;‘}:,x”KBut very early (1895) Lenin began to write of the necessity of

i .
e

/

p/

o' '

the proletariat participating in the bourgeois revolution, that without
the overthrow of autocracy nothing was possible for the working class.
But his insistence was on the proletariat winning for itself the
political rights which it needed for its later emancipation.l He was
already a revolutionary when he came to Marxism, and be seized on the
proletariat as the agent class for both the capitalist and worker
revolutions. This was a really revolutionary role for a proletariat
that was just beginning to develop, and was just emerging from the
peasant heritage it had so recently been a part of. It is quite likely
that this total revolutionary role would have been beyond the capacity
of the proletariat even if Marx:had been correct about the developing
revolutionary spirit or consciousness under full capitalism. But
Harx:had been in error, and this was beginning to be seen and openly
discussed in.Europe, especially after the death of Engels in 1895.
Because this revolutionary consciousness had not developed in the
proletariat, the revisionismrthat emerged denied that revolution.was

an applicable goal for the proletariat; at a time when Russian conditions,

 

J'Lenin, "Frederich Engels," Collected worke (Moscow: Foreign
Languages Publishing House, 1964), Volume 2. p. 27, (1895).

 

. ‘ _
v‘ v ‘5 ..
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VC

VF:

See

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39

without reference to historical materialism, had created powerful
revolutionary aspirations. A Russian coming to Marxism at this time
had, therefore, good reason to combat the revisionist denial of prole-
tarian consciousness, but because he possessed an impatient proletarian
doctrine with an underdeveloped working class he must take steps to
counteract this loss of or lack of consciousness which indicated that
he really believed the revisionist claim.2

Vhat was necessary was the creation of that consciousness. If
that failed he must substitute the doctrine for the proletariat, an
undesirable alternative. Lenin's solution was organization designed
to bring about that proletarian development for the reason that the
Party would be a carrier of proletarian consciousness through whose
organized activity the spontaneous struggles against local employers
would be turned into a political struggle culminating in socialin.3

Marx had taught that this consciousness which made revolution:
was the result of the contradictions of the material life of the
individual. But this kind of revolutionary activity so far in Russia
seemed useless, amateurish, and local. This could not be called a
struggle of Social Democracy, Lenin wrote, because " . . . it will not
be the organisation and leadership of the class struggle of the prole-

tariat.”5 In order for this to be true these local risings needed to

 

2Alfred G. Meyer, Leninism, (New York: Praeger, 1956), p. 3111.

3Lem, ”Our Immediate Tasks," g! I. (1899), p. 216.

A'llarx, Preface to a Contribution to a Criti ue of Political Econo ,

EL! I! P0 3630
sLenin, “Our Immediate Tanks,” 9! h (1899), p. 218.

e. .b s M.
a... v ‘. pp \U\.\

be

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1.0
be brought together, to be made aware of each other, to assist each
other, and to be brought together under the same theoretical frame-
work. To accomplish this a central newspaper was required. The one
he had in mind at this time was the Rabochnaya_§§zg§g*which the First
Congress of the RSDLP had decided was to be its central organ.6
This newspaper would bring socialist ideas to the working class move-
ment and connect those movements to the regular political struggle
for democracy as a means of achieving socialism.7 In so doing he
was, of course, teaching a totalist view of revolution that prefigured
his surprising Theses in April of 1917.

The newspaper was to be the organ, or the means of expression
of the Party which stood behind it.

"It is impossible to conduct a political struggle

if the Party as a.whole fails to make statements on all

questions of policy and to give'girection to the various

manifestations of the struggle.
The Party would define the interests of the working class, the activity
of the class-conscious workers in promoting the struggle in an enlightened
manner, and assist the proletariat to deepen its class awareness and
political activity.9

Obviously whatever makes this promotion.more efficient and rapid

deserved positive consideration. And here the whole tradition.of

 

ég!,h, Note 80, p. #43. This newspaper had been published in.Kiev
twice, but subsequent to the Congress in 1898 police seizure of the
presses prevented its publication. But the desire for a.central news-

paper continued. Hence the founding of Iskra outside of Russia to be
smuggled in.

7I-enin, "Our Immediate Tasks," 5:1 4, (1899), p. 217.

81b1de, p. 219.

9Lenin, "Draft and Explanation.of a.Progrsmme for the Social-
Democratic Party,” 1895, g»; 2, p. 112. Also 91. it, "An Urgent Question,"

1899. Pe 222.223e

1+1
elitism in Russian revolutionary thought from Pestel, Balcunin,
Nechqev, Tkachev, and the narodnik conspirators supported Lenin's
innovation in l902-the professional, secret, centrally controlled
Party organization manipulating the proletariat for its own good.
The motivation was impatience for that victory which would light a
revolutionary beacon for the down-trodden masses (populism?) and
ensure the complete overthrow of the gendarme of Europe which would
make possible the European revolutions which would then show Russia
the way to convert a few revolutionary years into an era of revolu-
tionary decades.10
)4 But by identifying the consciousness with the Party, Lenin
denied the proletarian character of such a revolution. Without
the Party organization the proletariat was nothingln' The workers'
level of consciousness was spontaneity and their focus was trade-
union level or economic struggle.12 The political consciousness was
possessed by the Party, and it was the only correct one;13 hostility
to which within the ranks of the proletariat showed them as having an
incorrect class position.“ But this meant that the discontent on
which the revolution would build did not have to be proletarian in

the usual sense of the word. All manner of discontent could be

 

1”Lenin, "Social-Democracy and the Provisional Government," C_H_ 8,

April, 1905’ pp. 287-2880

nLenin, "Party Discipline and the Fight Against the Pro-Cadet
Social Democrats," 9! 11, November 1906, p. 320.

12Lenin, "Apropos of the Profession De Poi," a it, 1899, p. 290.
Al”, "Uhat 13 to b9 mm," fl 5, 1902, Pe 375s
13Lenin, "Learn from the Enew,“ g! 10, November, 1905, p. 61.

l"’Ilaid.

 

 

#2

utilized by the Party from whatever source or class in order to promote
the ends dictated by the superior consciousness of that Party.l5
/x< And even within the Party one could not be sure of correct class-
consciousness. In 1905 Lenin wrote that it would be ridiculous to
think that everyone who Joined the Party was immediately the right
sort. These elements, he wrote, of instability, vacillation, and
wavering can be influenced; and they will submit to the influence of
the steadfast and solid core of Social-aDemocrats.16 The Party

" . . . must be composed of men and women who clearly

understand the tasks of the Social-Democratic working-

class movement and who have resolved to engage in a

determined struggle against the present political

system. It must combine within itself the socialist

knowledge and revolutionary experience acquired from many

decades of activity by the Russian revolutionary intelli-

gentsia with the knowledge of working class life and

conditions, and the ability to agitate among the masses

and lead them which is characteristic of the advanced

workers."
Neither philosophically nor realistically could the proletariat measure
up to the demands being made of it. The necessity of Party substitution
for proletariat was therefore clear from the outset. To call the demand
for total revolution unimpeachably orthodoxzharxism, as Lichtheim does18
is misleading, for in his arguments with the Economists Lenin went so
far to the political as to distort the Marxist argument in such a.way
that the 1843 period of Marx, when he was closest to the Jacobin-

BabouvistABlanquist heritage became the dominant one. ‘Lichtheim.would

 

15mm. , p. 412.

1’6Lenin, "The Reorganisation of the Party,"‘g! 10, November, 1905,
Pe 32s

17Lenin, "Preface to the Pamphlet May Days in Kharkov," _O_d_ 1+,
November, 1900, p. 358.

18George Lichtheim, Marxism, (New York: Praeger, 1961,), p. 336.

s,

 

 

 

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EM

#3
be the first to deny that the Manifesto and the Address summed up
orthodox Marxism, whatever that may be.
X The point is not whether Lenin was or was not a Marxist in good
standing. That debate can have no fruitful conclusion.19 The point
is that in forcing the proletarian doctrine into a narrow political
frame of reference Lenin turned a beautiful failure into a tawdry
success. The Party was conceived of as the spirit incarnate of the
advanced, conscious proletariat which led the riff-raff and poor peasant
into the democratic revolution, with democratic goals. But it did not "
follow from this that the bourgeoisie was the motive force in the '
revolution. "Such a conclusion would be a vulgarization of Marxism,
would be the failure to understand the class struggle between the
proletariat and the bourgeoisie."‘20
The motive force was the proletariat for out of necessity to
protect its economic interests the bourgeoisie wavered between revolution

and reaction. "Only the proletariat is capable of oonsumating the ‘

 

19The point that is lost when this sort of discussion begins is
that neither Marx nor Lenin accepted the notion that Marxism was a
closed book. Lenin perceived it as a guide rather than a dogma. Even
though one might, as does Schapiro in The Origins g_f_ the Communist
Autocra , Praeger, 1965, p. 11+; say that Lenin's notion of a party
elite was " . . . close in spirit and temperament to Marx's outlook"
it was not really the outlook that was so similar as the conditions
giving rise to that frame of mind. In 1811-8449, Marx was quite willing
to apply the French model to Germany where it did not fit. Lenin' s
desire to do the same in re Russia rather than German is a reflection
of the similarity of conditions in 1848 Germany and 1900 Russia. But
to debate whether Lenin' s elitism is somehow derivable from the Marx
of this period is to ignore the rest of Marx; to debate whether Lenin
was a good Marxist is to raise the theological issue of the similarity
of St. Paul to Christ; or if Christ came again would he come as a Negro.
It 18 hopeless.

zoLenin, "The Fifth Congress of the RSDLP," g! 12, 1907, p. #57.

 

 

 

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ht,
revolution, that is, of achieving a complete victory."21 By 1911 he
was speaking of continual proletarian hegemom so as to purge undemo-
cratic elements from the democracy.22 His political orientation had
caused him to merge elements of the minimum with the maximm program.

He suned this up most clearly in 1916.

4/” "whoever expects a pure social revolution will

‘ never live to see it." "The socialist revolution in
Europe cannot b_e_ mthing other than an outburst of
mass struggle on the part of all and sundry oppressed
and discontented elements. "23

- ’Ms. /

hut the confusion was evident at least from 1905. In present day
Russia, he wrote, there are not just two contending forces, but two
were going on at the gang 3:133. One was the battle for democracy and
the other was the struggle for socialisma

Moreover, by 1916 Lenin had a theoretical framework which explained
how underdeveloped nations fit into the Marxian historical pattern in
such a way as to justify his allegations about Russia. The theory of
imperialism25 contended that the highest stage of capitalism had now
been reached in finance or monopoly capitalise. Monopolies of indus-
tries and banking institutions brought great wealth into a few hands.
In order for capitalism to expand it had to export capital to backward
or undeveloped areas. This made economic sense, but it also fostered
the very rapid development of capitalism in these areas, creating

tremendous strains, so that when revolution broke out in the more

 

alibi-deg Ppe #574580
ZZLenin, "Those who would Liquidate Us," 91, 17, 1911, p. 79.

231mm, "The Discussion on Self-Determination Summed Up," 91 22,
1916, p. 356.

3mm, "Socialin and the Peasantry," 9! 9, 1905, pp. 307-308.

p 1951.: nin, "Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism," 91 22, 1916,

 

 

advanc
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pp. 2

 

45

advanced countries (not including Russia) " . . . the undeveloped and
oppressed nations do not just wait, do not cease to exist, do not
disappear."26 Rather they ”take advantage of the great crisis“, and
along with the revolts in the advanced countries there will be a whole
series of democratic and revolutionary movements in the other coun-
tries, based on the uneven development of international capitalismezz

Here can be seen a phenomenon that will be visible again;
reality dictating to philosophical theory in that the theory is shaped
to the reality one perceives. The issue is not imperialisl as a theory
but its use to justify a Marxian revolution in a country that Lenin
himself called little developed and sparsely populated.28 This was
not only done through the instrument of the imperialism theory, but
also through the notion of revolutionary impurities mentioned above,
by a concept prefiguring Tito that nations would arrive at socialism
in different ways and each with its own contribution,29 and the claim
to peculiarities within the Russian situation. By January of 1917
Lenin had come to the point where he had analyzed the 1905 revolution
as bourgeois-democratic in its social content, but a proletarian one
in its methods. It sought democratic goals, but was also proletarian
for it was led by the workers as vanguard, and the weapons used,

strikes, were specifically proletarian.30 He might doubt that a

 

26Lenin, "A Caricature of Marxism,” g; 23, October, 1916, p. 59.

271bid.
2810011111. "Ilperialim," 2! 22, 1916’ p. 273.
29Lenin, "A Caricature of Marxism," 2! 23, 1916, pp. 69-70.

30Lenin, "Lecture on the 1905 Revolution," 91 23, January, 1917,
pp. 238-239.

 

 

 

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revolution would come soon in Russia,31 but whenever it did he was
ideologically ready for it.
Not only this confusion, but since 1905 he had written of the
possibility that Russia would act as a spark to set the European prole-
tariat in notion. Revolt in Russia would serve as a signal for the

world struggle.32

This may, of course, be explained as caused by
”ridding Europe of its policeman," but as Meyer suggests this idea
of a Russian gift to the more developed world is squarely in the
Rusdnn revolutionary tradition. When coupled with what Fainsod and
Meyer call the dialectics of backwardness which Lenin explicated after
the revolution it becomes yet another theoretical underpinning of a
proletarian revolution in Russia. When Lenin's critics pointed out
the underdeveloped nature of Russian capitalism and hence its prole-
tariat, he could easily respond that the European revolution with
which Russia's would be linked would take care of all that. The
Russian experience, aided by Europe would result in a socialist
Europe, including Russia. "The European workers will show us how to
do it, and then together with then we shall bring about the socialist
"33

revolution.

But-nit the revolution occurred in only one country it would

 

311nm. , p. 253.

32mm, "The Aggravation of the Situation in Russia,” 9! 9, 1905,
p. 412. See also ibid., "The First Victory of the Revolution," p. #34}.

”Lenin, "The Stages, the Trend, and the Prospects of the Revolu-
tion," 9! 10, 1905-6, pp. 90-92. Reference to Meyer's Leninisn, p. 259:
Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled, (New York: Randon House, 15373. p. 38.

.I'f"

‘fiy— —

v9... _ "
m ... A

 

 

 

 

 

47

immediately be crushed by the capitalist powers.3“ But this was
impossible. The Germans had already natured to the point of a tran-
sition to socialism because the state now controlled 66 million people
from one center which meant that they were very close to socialism.35
Besides revolutions were bound to follow the imperialist war in
Europe}6
X One case earlier. On March 11:- and 12a, 1917, Lenin was suddenly
and dranatically confronted with an actual revolutionary situation
in Russia which culminated without his help in the overthrow of the
Tsar of all the Bussias, Nicholas II. He reacted almost immediately.
The bourgeois revolution has been completed! This statement which
would have surprised a good.nany revolutionaries in Petersburg was
justified on the basis that by 1917 the bourgeoisie were so nearly
completely in power that a simple push brought the autocraqy to the
ground. The war had accelerated the course of backward Russia's
develop-est so that seemingly at one blow Russia.had caught up with
Italy, England, and almost with.Francel37

This was, however, no tine for the proletariat to rest. Applying
what he had said on.nany previous occasions he urged the workers not
to support the new Provisional Government, but the Soviet of workers
and Soldiers' Deputies. The workers must be armed before freedom and

the destruction of tsarisl can be assured. But he was not Just

 

3“Lenin, "The Principles Involved in the Var Issue,"§!_23,
December, 1916, p. 158.

35Lenin, "Theses for an Appeal to the International Socialist
Committee and.All Socialist Parties,"Ԥ!,23, January, 1917, p. 210.

36Lenin, "Speech at an International Meeting in Berne,"|§!,22,
February, 1916, p. 125.

”Lenin, "Letters from Afar," g! 23, March 20, 1917. p. 303-1}.

1+8

interested in making tsarism irrestorable. He referred repeatedly to
the March revolution as the first stage. The second stage involved
the proletariat's utilization of the peculiarities of the present tran-
sitional situation in order to proceed not only to the consolidation of
the democratic victory but to socialism.38

This incredible assertion.was not made by a power mad, frustrated
leader. Rather by a true believer in the adaptations of Marxism he
himself had created. The proletariat must be active, they cannot
wait; the Party is the embodiment of the proletarian consciousness
necessary to bring about that new dawn of humanity; and revolution
in.Europe following the war was inevitable, because capitalism in the
advanced countries was gasping its last breath before going down. The
fullness of time had come and he urged the embryonic workers' militia
to combine not only police but also general state functions, military
functions, and the control of social production and distribution.39
In his third letter from.Geneva.he was obviously frustrated because
he could not tell whether the second stage had already arrived."0 The
proletariat must organize and smash the state machine and phase the

police, army, and the bureaucracy into an armed populace.#1

This
universal militia.would restore absolute order and devotedly observe
comradely discipline; distribute grain and housing equally, with.the

rich last in line; and introduce universal civilian labor service.

 

381bide’ De ”8.
391bid., April 9, 1917, pp. 318-19.
l”11:14., March 24, 1917, p. 323.

h1Ibid., p. 325.

49
These measures would not constitute socialism but the transition to
it.42’ The chaos and anarchy then existing in Russia was not a refuta-
tion of his ideas but support for the notion of the revolution.was
continuing into the next stage.

He claimed he was not for introducing socialism but for preaching
it.‘+3 The majority of the population are peasants who must be proper
gandized or educated to see the progressive character of nationalising
the land and seizing control of the banks and syndicates.“4 These
measures need caution and gradualness in their adoption, but this is
the only direction in which to move. But this also meant taking control
of the Soviets as a.means to that end.

(/‘" . . . if the revolutionary proletariat should actually
win power, it will only be for the sake of going for-

) 'ward. And to go fbrward means to take definite steps to
get us out of the war-dwords alone won' do it. The com.
plete success of these steps is only possible by world

‘ revolution, if the revolution kills the war, if the

1‘ workers of the whole world support the revolution.

Taking power is, there ore, the only practical measure

and the only way out.’ 5
The taking of power, and the implementing of certain measures would not
constitute socialism, but what Lenin called ”one foot in socialism”.
The other foot was the peasant economic relationships.46 Nonetheless

he urged his program on his astonished Party, stating that the Russian

 

“2.32%., April 80 19179 PP. 329' 3309 3A1.

aghilenin, "The Seventh (April) All Russia Conference,” 1917,‘§! at,
p. 2e

““Lenin, "A.Proletarian.Militia,"‘2! 24, Hay, 1917, p. 181.

l'PsLenin, "The Seventh (April) All Russia Conference,"Ԥ!.24, 1917,
Po 2"}.

#SLenin, “Speech in.Favour of the Resolution on the Current Situation,"

.2! 21", Hay, 1917,. P. m.

50

revolution wam merely the first stage in a long line of proletarian
revolutionsgtfl but that because of Russian backwardness the Russian
proletariat (Party) could not aim at immediate socialist changes}?

Lenin seemed to be walking a tightrope to avoid devastating
criticism. The crux of his message was that nothing could be accom-
plished unless they took power. The whole issue of whether or not
socialism would be introduced in Russia, or whether Russia was ready
for the second stage of the revolution was reduced to empty talk.
Marxism was not a dogma, but a guide. There had never been a pure
revolution moving from capitalism to socialism. Russia had something
in between, something new and unprecedented.“ Forget the stages of
a rigid historical materialism, look at what the present Russian
situation offered. The road to Russian socialism lay through the
Soviets, and therefore the task of the day was to amplify and extend
Soviet hegemony. The prize was leading the workers of the world to
socialism.“9 For a short time the Russian proletariat had the great
honor to have been the first to start the revolution, even though it
was less organized, less prepared, and less class-conscious than the
proletariat of other countries. This honor was not due to special
qualities of the Russian workers, but to a special conjuncture of his-

torical circumstances making the Russian proletariat for a short

 

l”Lenin, "Resolution on the Current Situation," 91 21+, May, 1917,
Fe 3110

#8Lenin, ”Speech to the First All Russia Congress of Soviets,"
JW, 1917, a 25. PP. 19-x.

. gleam, "To our Comrades in HarnPrison Camps," 93 23, March, 1917,
Pa e

   

 

 

 

51

time the vanguard of the revolutionary proletariat of the whole

"0114050 In twenty-two remarkably consistent years he was within
sight of his goal. It was still revolution.

"Single-handed the Russian Proletariat cannot

is” bring the socialist revolution to a victorious conclu-

\‘ sion." But " . . . the objective circumstances of
the imperialist war make it certain that the revolution
I will not be limited to the first stage of the Russian

( revolution; that the revolution will go; be limited to

‘ Russia. _Thg German proletariat i_s_ E13. most trustwortq,
) the most reliable all: of the Russian and the world

proletarian revolution."

.
\.
\
‘v

"Comrade Rykov says that socialism must come from
other countries with a more developed industry. But
that is not so. Nobody can say who will begin it and
who will end it. That is not Marxism; it is a parody
Of MMMen53

"If we had said, No tsar, but a dictatorship of the
proletariat, well, this would have meant skipping over
the petty bourgeoisie. But what we are saving is help
the revolution through the Soviets. We must not lapse
into reformism. We are fighting to win, not to lose.

At the worst we can count on partial success."5"'

In so doing the Russians would be setting an example that would
certainly be followed by the workers of at least Germany and France.55
The Russian demand for a just peace, for instance, would be followed

by revolts against their governments by the workers of Germany and

 

501.com, "The Revolution in Russia and the Tasks of the Workers of
All Countries," 2! 23, March, 1917, p. 350. See also "A Farewell Letter
to the Swiss Workers," 2! 23, March-April, 1917, p. 571.

51mm.
5211M. . p. 373.

53Lenin, "Speech blinding Up the Debate on the Report on the Current
Situation," a 24, M83, 1917' De Zl‘ée

5“Ibid.

5655Lenin, "Is There a Way to a Just Peace,” _Cl 25, June-July, 1917,
P0 e

 

9‘.

 

52
France. If the bourgeoisie of England, Japan, and America resist,
the Russian workers along with other workers will successfully wage a
revolutionary war against them?6 It almost sounds as though Lenin
hoped that the capitalists would resist for this would, he said, bring
the revolution in Europe a hundred times nearer, and the new Russian
Arm with its elected commanders would willingly fight the war against
them}; This would awaken an "ardent response” from among the inter-
national proletariat masses.58
"Doubt is out of the question. We are on the

threshold of a world proletarian revolution. And

since of all the proletarian internationalists in

all countries only we Bolsheviks enjoy a measure of

freedom . . .," more is demanded of us.

‘ Thus the old populists were only partly wrong. Russia did after
all have a gift for the West. It was not peasant socialism; or was it?
It was a confused potpourri. Like a commander with vast forces, Lenin
saw a weak link in the snow chain of defense. It did not matter that
the proletarian forces were weak, the anew was so invitingly incapable
of defense that a vision of their vulnerability swept Lenin's mind,
and our impatient Marxist could not resist.

But he was under no illusions that this battle was the war. He

called his seizure of power on November 7i by a variety of expressions

 

56Ibid.

57Lenin, "Draft Resolution on the Present Political Situation,"
_C_U_ 25, September, 1917, p. 515.

58 Lenin, "The Russian Ravolution and Civil War," _cy_ 26, September,
1917, p. 38. Also, "The Meeting of the Petrograd Soviet of workers and
Soldiers' Deputies, October 25, 1917," _qw_ 26, pp. 239. 2%.

59Lenin, "The Crisis Has Matured," c_w_ 26, September, 1917, p. 77.

 

 

 

011

we

 

53
like armed rising, and insurrection. This was not a.gateway into
socialism but into the path leading to socialism.60 But at the same
time the insurrection or coup no longer was for the purpose of consoli-
dating a bourgeois victory. " . . . in taking power we are not at all
afraid of stepping beyond the bounds of the bourgeois system; on the
contrary, . . . we shall fearlessly march towards socialism, . . .
our road shall be through a Soviet Republic."61)< When Bukharin
wanted to drop the reference to the minimum program in the nemearty
Program revision, Lenin argued:
(r. "We must first carry out the measures of transition to
\. socialism, we must continue our revolution until the
‘world socialist revolution is victorious, and only
then, m from battle, may we discard the minimum
) program as of pp further Egg." We have " . . . not yet
i realised tggébasic prerequisites for a transition to

{ socialism.

This was the basis for the holding action.

a..- -, a~.~._“¢n‘ l~~:I.» ¢ ~-. ,.

 

 

6°Lenin, "Speech to the First All Russia Congress of Soviets," _C_V_ 25,

June, 1917, pp. 1742. Similar references are located in nearly all his
writings of this time period immediately surrounding the dates of the coup.

61Lenin, “Revision of the Party Programs," 2! 26, October, 1917,
p. 1700

622min. , p. 171.

 

 

fl!

 

CHAPTER IV
LENIN: THE FUTURE SOCIETY

The Bolsheviks seized power on November 7, 1917. Just two
months earlier Lenin had written his §pgpg Egg Revolution which was
a curious mixture of Marxism, anarchism and generalized.optimism.
Before the insurrection, he taught, the revolutionaries must concenp
trate on destroying, breaking up, annihilating the machinery of the
state.1 What this meant is not clear at all. The machinery or
apparatus he was writing about he considered to be a very simple
organization. The great majority of functions which it performed
had become so simplified and reduced that any literate person would

2 But if the functions of

have no difficulty in performing them.
the state machinery remain after the insurrection in.what manner
has it been destroyed? It obviously has not been destroyed.

Moreover, the transition from a state that must be annihilated
to one that must be preserved could be accomplished in one day.3
The chief tasks would be bookkeeping and control which could be

performed by anyone with a knowledge of basic arithmetic,“ and made

 

J'Lenin, State and Revolution, (New York: Vanguard Press, 1929), p. 138.
S;p;g., p. 149.

3%., p. 155.

l‘Ihiuu p. act-5.

55
easier by the fact that most of the old administrative staffs were
likely to stay on.for the new employers.5 This sounded very little
like a revolution and very much like a coup.

After the seizure of power the organizational principle applied
to the state would be the same one that worked so well for the Party,
namely a combination of democracy and centralism. Lenin called this
a voluntary centralism, a union of the various proletarian communes
which together would then get on with the business of destroying
capitalist supremacy.6 This concept of voluntary centralism had been
developed since 1915 particularly in reference to the national question,
and even more specifically in relation to the right of secession of a
nation. What is most interesting are the limitations that Lenin
introduced immediately.

"The rights of nations to self—determination (i.e.,

the constitutional guarantee of an absolutely free and

democratic method of deciding the question of secession)

must under no circumstances be confused with the expediency

of a given nation's secession. The Social Domocratic Party

must decide the latter question exclusively on the merits in

each particular case in conformity with the interests of

social development as a whole, and with the in crests of

the proletarian class struggle for socialism."

voluntarism‘was insured by this right to secede, but this right
did not preclude propaganda and agitation.against separation or the
exposure of such a desire as being bourgeois nationalism.8 A Marxist

Party must combat all forms of nationalism, even the most refined;

 

5lhid., p. 20#.
61bide, Ppe 159-600

7Lenin, "Resolutions of the 1913 Conference of the Central Committee,
RSDLP,“‘§!_19, September, 1915, p. 429.

8Lenin, "The National Programme of the RSDLP," g! 19, 1915, p. 5k4.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

56
because such a Party must advocate not only unity, but also the
amalgamation of the workers of all nationalities in the struggle against
reaction and bourgeois nationalism.
"Our task is not to segregate nations, but to unite

the workers of all nations. Our banner does not carry

the slogan 'national culture', but international culture,

which unites all the nations in a higher, socialist

unity . . ."9
As a matter of fact the desire to secede was a pre-revolutionary desire
created by bourgeois oppression. Once the freedom was granted, Lenin
thought, the desire to implement that freedom would decline.lo But it
was nonetheless necessary to implement it as a right subsequent to the
revolution because as a result of its being on the books, so to speak,
it would serve as a practical basis for the elimination of all friction
between nations, making their amalgamation that much more simple.11

He was not being wsterious or underhanded. When a person is
overwhelmingly convinced that he is right he has restricted his alter-
natives and ability to see differences in such a way as to make the
concept of freedom or voluntarism different. One's freedoms or rights
are that which cannot be used because their use demonstrates erroneous
thinking. Forcing people to be free did not originate with Lenin.nor
did it end with him. The voluntary association of communes must be

understood in this context.

 

5#89Lenin, "Once More on the Segregation of Schools,“ 9!,19, 1915,
p. e

loLenin, "Corrupting the Workers with Refined Nationalism," 91 20,
May, 1914, p. 289; "The Rights of Nations to Self-Determination," ___20,
May, l9l#, pp. 595~#5#; and "The Socialist Revolution and Self-Determination,"

9!,22, February, 1916, pp. 1k6-7.

11Lenin, "The Discussion on Self-Determination Summed Up,"'§! 22,
Jul?" 19169 P0 3250

57

This association went beyond Russia, of course. In‘§t§tg‘gng
Revolution he has international socialism in mind. He seems to have
seen himself as one of the major leaders since 191# when support for
the war became a divisive issue among socialists. This did not destroy
internationalism; rather the international movement required a new
direction. "The proletarian International has not gone under and
will not go under. Notwithstanding all obstacles, the masses of the
workers will create a new International."12

The new direction was the leadership position of the Bolshevik
insurrection, in the sense that they had been the first of the expected
postdwar revolutions. By 1918 this feeling of leadership had hardened
to the point where it was a leader-follower relationship that he had
in mind, and it was this notion that acted as the unfortunate back-
ground for the formation of the Third International.

"Bolshevism has become the world wide theory and

tactics of the international proletariat! (Applause)

It has accomplished a thorough-going revolution for all

the world to see. To be for or against the Bolsheviks

is actually the dividing line among socialists."13
This was unfortunate because it made the Third International a mere
extension of Bolshevism, a tool of Soviet domestic policy.

In.March of the same year, however, he had sounded much different;
reflecting the German military pressure and also the greater room for
frankness before the Party. He said: " . . . it is the absolute truth

that without a.German revolution we are doomed . . . " "At all events,

 

1ZLenin, "The War and Russian.Social-Democracy,"‘9! 21, October,
191%, p. 55. See also "Kamenev's Speech in the Central Executive Committee,"

.9! 25’ “gust 29’ 1917, PO 242.

13Lenin, "Report at a JOimt Session of the All-Russia CEO,"‘Q!,28,
October, 1918, p. llfi.

58

under all conceivable circumstances, if the German revolution does
not come, we are doomed."1“

This, though, was his nadir. He had been frustratingly moving
in this direction since the rising in Petrograd on November 71!. He
argued against those who said that the West was disgracefully silent
by saying that only the blind could fail to see the ferment among the
working masses in Germany and the West. "We believe in the revolution
in the west. we know that it is inevitable!"15 But he was also begin-
ning to give himself an escape route. Two days later he said that the
intemational revolution would seal the Russian victory}6 and two
months later after expressing the usual faith in the coming revolts
he wrote:

"It would be a mistake, however, to base the tactics of

the Russian socialist government on attempts to determine

whether or not the European, and especially the German,

3:12:19“ ggotgifinngdfifiplace in the next six months
Two months after this, at his lowest point, he added, "The revolution
will not come as quickly as we expected." " . . . the world socialist
revolution cannot begin so easily in the advanced countries as the
revolution began in Russia."18

The background to this surprising statement is the necessity of

 

1“Lenin, "Extraordinary Seventh Congress of the Russian Communist

Party (Bolshevik)," March 6-9, 1918, p. 98, 5g! 27.

”um, "Meeting of the All Russia CEO," 9! 26, November 17, 1917,
Do 2910

16Lenin, "To the Population," 2! 26, November 19, 1917, p. 298.

l7Lenin, ”Theses on the Question of a Separate Peace," _C_U_ 26,
January, 1918, pp. #454.

18Lenin, "Extraordinary Seventh Congress of the BOP (8)," _C! 27,
“8.13011, 1918, Pe 98o

59
explaining, already in March of 1918, why the European revolution
had not as yet commenced.

" . . . we do not forget the weakness of the Russian
working class compared to other contingents of the inter-
national proletariat. It was not our own will, but histor-
ical circumstances, the legacy of the tsarist regime, the
flabbiness of the Russian bourgeoisie, that caused this
contingent to march ahead of the other contingents of the
international proletariat; it was not because we desired
it, but because circumstances demanded it.

"He must remain at our post until the arrival of our
ally; the international proletariat, which will arrive and
will inevitably arrive, but which is approaching at an
immeasurably slower pace than we expected or wish. If we
see that as a result of objective conditions the interna-
tional proletariat moves too slowly, we must nevertheless
stick to our tactics of temporising and utilizing the
conflicts and contradictions between the imperialists, of
slowly accumulating strength; the tactics of preserving
this island of Soviet power in the stormy imperialist
sea, maintaining this island which now already attracts
the gaze of the working people of all countries."19

"The workers of the world are looking toward us.

He can hear their cry: Hold on a little longer! You

are surrounded by enemies, but we shall come to your

aid, and by our joint effort we shall finally hurl

the imperialist vultures over the precipice. we hear

this cry, and we swear we shall hold on . . . "20
This notion of maintaining the island, of holding on, pervaded his writing
of this period. There are however two qualifications to this attitude.
One was the growing feeling of pride at what they had accomplished the
longer they stayed in power. This was manifest in the allegation noted
above that Bolshevism was now the theory and tactics of the international
proletariat. But it is also visible in the many references Lenin made

to the spread of Bolshevism or Sovietism throughout the world, based on

 

19Lenin, "Report on Foreign Policy," 9! 27, Moor, 1918, p. 337. See
also "Speech to the Chairmen of Gubernia Soviets,"‘Q! 28, July, 1918,
p. 37.

aoLenin, "Speech at a Meeting in Sokolniki District," 9! 28, August,

1918: P0 530

 

ensue1

«11.2: V

 

 

60

such slender evidence as the translation of the word Soviet into
Italian.21 Not only could they defend themselves with the Red Army
but they could also secure the victory of the international revolu-
tion.22 Leadership has passed for a short time to the Russians.23
They had become the model. But when the other revolutions did take
place Russia would cease to be the model and become again a backward
country.24 But already in 1919 he undercut this by stating that the
workers of other countries hag'come to the aid of the Russians. The
sympathies of the international proletariat had prevented their
imperialist countries from more positively intervening during the
civil wars and hence made Soviet success possible.25

The other qualification to the holding action was that there was
no intention of maintaining their island in a passive sense. It was
the fundamental task of the Party, the vanguard of the class-conscious
proletariat to adopt

" . . . the most energetic, ruthlessly determined and

Draconian measures to improve the self-discipline and

discipline of the workers and peasants of Russia . . .

to create everywhere soundly co-ordinated mass organi-

sations held together by a single iron will."

A single iron will meant control and this meant the power of the state

 

ZlLenin, "Report at a Joint Session of the All Russia CEO," 9! 28,
October, 1918, pp. llfi-llS.

zz'Lenin, "Resolution of the Joint Session of the All Russia CEO,"
Q!_28, October, 1918, p. 130.

23mm, "The Third International and its Place in History,” 2! 29,
April. 1919, p. 310.

2“Lenin, "Leftdwing Communism, an Infantile Disorder,"‘§! 51, May,

1920’ pp. 21’22e

251nm, "Political Report of the Central Committee to the All Russia
Conference of the BOP (3),"Ԥ!_50, December, 1919, pp. 175-#.

26Lenin, "Resolution on War and Peace,"‘g! 27, March, 1918, p. 118.

 

_ r"- \.r_ fl} 'fi- ..

 

+
t

 

61
to coerce. No socialist, he said, had ever promised that the highest
phase of communism would in actuality arrive. The great socialists
had anticipations that it would come but in those anticipations did
not assume the current Russian productivity levels or the present
" . . . unthinking man in the street capable of spoiling, without
reflection the stores of social wealth and of demanding the impossible."27
As long as this highest phase has not arrived there must be very strict
control of labor and consumption by society and the state.

How the state could be both used and destroyed was confusing unless
one had the single-mindedness of Lenin. What was to be destroyed was the
bourgeois state, that instrument of class oppression directed against
the proletariat. But when the state becomes a proletarian state,

" . . . when it will be an instrument of violence exercised by the
proletariat against the bourgeoisie, we shall be fully and unreservedly
in farour of a strong state power and of centralism.?28

This state power, dignified by the adjective proletarian, was to
last until universal mass organizations were created, until the urban
proletariat had realized benefits from their concentration, education,
and unity; until real equality existed among the former exploited and
there were restrictions on the former exploiters; until there were
frequent elections, with recall powers for the masses; until the indus-
trial unit was the primary political nucleus; until an army was created

that would be connected with and a part of the people; and until a

 

27Lenin, State and Revolution, p. 201.

28Lenin, "Can the Bolsheviks Retain State Power?" 9! 26, October 1,

1917 ’ p. 116.

62

merging of the legislative and executive functions allowed for a
transcendence of parliamentarianism. The controls would have to last
until the old state bureaucracy was destroyed, until the workers were
taught their own and other jobs well; until all government positions
could be filled periodically by different people; and society had
altered to the point where a declaration of rights would be unnecessary
because actual participation in rights existed to such a great extent.29

He omitted items from this list that would be anti-police, or
descriptive of depressed salaries for officials or elective officers
in the armed forces. In May of 1917 he had suggested the replacement
of the army with an arming of the whole peOple30 but it was now March
of 1919 and circumstances were different. The German military threat
of 1918, the continually recurring outbursts of civil war, tremendous
domestic economic chaos and urban starvation, political dissension,
and the delay of international revolution made it imperative that he
alter some of his ideas. He had no difficulty doing this, for as he
himself said, "Our theory is a guide to action, not a dogma."31

Of course he was an opportunist. In noting this, however,
observers generally give the impression that Lenin took a "pure"
Marxism and twisted it into Bolshevism. Fainsod described it as

turning Marx.on his head.32 This has to be a.Marx that I never met.

 

29Lenin, "Draft Programme of the RCP (3)," 9! 29, March, 1919,
pp. 106-108.

3otenin, "Open Letter to the Delegates of All Russia Congress of
Peasant Deputies," QE'ZG, May, 1917, p. 575.

31Lenin, "From a Publicist's Diary,” _C_H_ 25, September, 1917, p. 281.

32Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled. (CambridSOa Emmi ”‘1'”‘1t’
Press, 1964), P0 38.

 

 

pro.

enc.
mad
was

thi

tho
of

Now
we:

bei

tie:

63

The Marx that I met changed his mind about the applicability of the
French revolutionary model to Germany, about the Communist Party;
about the Paris Commune in 1871, about England's place in historical
materialism; and even about the necessity of violence in the expected
proletarian revolution. All of these changes were dictated by experi-
ence. Had Marx been this involved in experience he may very well have
made more fundamental alterations in his program. Nonetheless Lenin
was an opportunist. The major item on his agenda was survival. For
this he had to have an army with military, i.e., non-democratic
discipline, and he had to utilize former tsarist army officers by the
thousands to command the inexperienced Red Army. Following the period
of civil wars and intervention his focus shifted from survival to revival.
Now the discipline was maintained and the former tsarist industrialists
were utilized to rebuild the economy. There was tremendous consistency-
before the revolution it was a compulsion to overthrow the tear, then
attain power. After November of 1917 it was a compulsion to stay in
power. All else was secondary, and all great men of history including
the gentle Jesus had this kind of singleminded dedication to their
destinies.33

What kind of revolution did Lenin think that the Bolsheviks had
accomplished?

"I have no illusions about our having only just

entered the period of transition to socialism, about
not yet having reached socialism. But if you say that

 

3:Hugh Schonfield, The Passover*Plot.

Obviously, in calling Jesus gentle, I am putting my tongue
in my cheek and referring to the mythological figure rather than to the
historical person who was not always gentle and did possess a.genius for
implementing the goals of his single-mindedness.

 

 

64

our state is a socialist Republic of Soviets, you will

be right. You will be as right as those who call many

western bourgeois republics democratic republics although

everybody knows that not one of even the mostaeemocratic

of these republics is completely democratic."

"We are far from having completed even the transi-

tional period from capitalism to socialism. We have

never cherished the hope that we could finish it without

the aid of the international proletariat. We never had

any illusions on that score, and we know how difficulgs

is the road that leads from capitalism to socialism."

They might be on the road that led to socialism but it was a difficult
path to follow. They had come into power out of time because it was
easier to do so in a backward country like Russia.36 But the holding
action was filled with crises, and strong measures of control were
necessary. What they had succeeded in loosening prior to the revolu-
tion they must new again contain.

This control included the Party. Lenin had never been happy with
dissension in the top ranks of the Party. It was tolerated and to
some extent institutionalized in the theory of democratic centralism.
But the closer one comes to the seizure of power and the subsequent
holding, the more was the opposition uncomfortable, then unnecessary
and specious, then dangerous, and finally forbidden. Ten days after
the insurrection he wrote that the victory of socialism in Russia
could only be insured by ending scepticism and wavering in the Party,

and by all members of the Party supporting their government.37

 

3“Lenin, "Third All Russia Congress of Soviets,"‘§! 26, January, 1918,
Ppe M5.

35Ibis.
filbide, p. “’71-'20

37Lenin, "Resolution of the Central Committee on the Opposition.within
the Central Committee,"|§! 26, November 17, 1917, p. 279.

65

Only a short time before he had spelled out what the responsi-
bilities of that government were. State-wide control and accounting.
Worker control of industry, i.e., state control was to be established.
State control would be worker control because it was a workers' state,
a dictatorship of the proletariat. Control of the banks, work books
to maintain labor discipline, redistribution of housing, and the use
of former capitalists were among the measures advocated. In justifying
the use of capitalists at high remunerations Lenin dramatically reversed
his pro-seizure optimism. "We are not utopian. We know that an un-
skilled labourer or a cook cannot immediately get on with the job of
state administration."38 Instead he demanded training by class-conscious
workers and soldiers be begun at once so that the working people would
be fit for those jobs. The fact that this was written only one month
after the §t§£gH§nQ_Revolution meant that Lenin had probably been
under heavy criticism for his statements in regard to the easy handling
of administrative duties. Governmental policies also included a
nationalization of the land, redistribution of food and clothing, and
a gradual expansion of the workers' militia into an all-people militia.
Some of these policies, as we have noted, had to be revised in the
light of later experience; and they indicated that the Bolsheviks came
into power for more reason than just power-lust alone; but they also
indicated that a firm measure of control over the population was required
to bring then about.

This control over the non class-conscious segments of the society

was alleged to be quite democratic. The overwhelming majority of the

 

38Lenin, "Can the Bolsheviks Retain State Power?" Q!_26, October 1,
191?. ps 113s See “so pps 105.1%.

 

 

66

working people support their vanguard, he wrote in 1919. But this
support does not come immediately, and it is not expressed through
elections. It is Egg after a long and arduous class struggle. But
even after the successful conquest of power the struggle must go
on for that support. But by October of 1919 Lenin could say
" . . . we pg!,have such sound sympathy, and from such an enormous
majority of the working people, that our state is the most democratic
state the world has ever seen."39

Also, like leaders of other countries, earlier and later, Lenin
was not being truthful. His words were designed for foreign consump-
tion. The dictatorship of the proletariat was not going that smoothly
at all. The arduous struggle for the support and sympathy of the
working class had already hit several snags. A.year and a half before
he had said "We can count on the politically conscious workers alone;
the remaining mass, the bourgeoisie and the petty proprietors are
against us; they do not believe in the new order and take advantage
of every opportunity to worsen the plight of the people."#0 Later
he quoted from a communication he had received from‘workers in
Petrograd.

"There were forty thousand of us at the Putilov

Works, the delegate from the Petrograd workers said to

so. But the majority of them were 'temporary' workers,

not proletarians, an unreliable, flabby lot. Now there

are fifteen thousand left, but thise are proletarians,
tried and steeled in the fight.

 

39Lenin, "To the Italian, French, and German Communists,” Q! 30,
October 10, 1919, p. 60.

“QLenin, ”Second Congress of the Commissars for Labour,"‘§! 27,

MW. 1918, D. ‘"02s

“11011111, "on th. Famine." a 27, m, 1918’ p. 395.

 

—' g—v‘v‘

 

 

 

 

 

 

67

The worker was referring to the mass exodus of workers from the cities
to the villages. In truth the Party was losing its proletariat during
this diaspora, and this made the substitution of the Party for. the
proletariat even more imperative. But among those that remained, Lenin
informs us, were many who were not the steeled fighters. During a
speech at a conference of trade-unions he told his audience that
all of them who worked in the factories knew very well that many of
the workers were not with the Party.“ In short, the vast majority
of the working class were as unorganized and unprepared after the
revolution as they were before it to lead mankind into the promised
hand.“3

As we have seen the problem extended into the Party as well. By
the end of 1918 it had begun to include many members who were not
considered really class-conscious or reliable. The first device to
control for this was propounded in December of 1918. The date of entry
into the Party was to be affixed to the membership card. Additionally
each member must note on his card which parties he belonged to or was
associated with over the past five years. All of this had to be certi-
fied by the chairman or secretary of his Party group.“ Even though
it was true, Lenin said, that a Party in power gives preference to its

members; we do not want people in the Party for that reason.“5 For all

 

“6:21am, "Fourth Conference of Trade Unions," C_U_ 27, June, 1918,
Po 0

u’Lenin, "Report at a Meeting of Bolshevik Delegates to the All .
Russia Conference of Soviets," April, 1917, p. #37, Q! 36.
“Lenin, "Draft Decision of the Central Connittee of the RCP (8),"
2U- 28’ Deflmbar, 1918. Do 3530

uSLenin, "Session of the Petrograd Soviet," _C! 29, March, 1919, p. 187.

 

 

 

68
of his genius, he had his blind spots. The Party was growing rapidly.

By mid 1919 Lenin was urging the use of the subbotnik concept as
a test of a new member's sincerity during a six month probationary period,
and by December he urged the closing of the membership lists so that
the Party could be narrow and tested, governing through the trade unions
and non Party conferences.“6 He seems to have considered a majority
of the Party members as unreliable}? It must be characterized by
loyalty and iron discipline, he wrote, possessing class-consciousness
and revolutionary devotion.

This sort of correct leadership, however, increasingly began to
coagulate at the top of the Party hierarchy as the isolation from the
very large Party deepened. And as the Red Arm won more and more
battles it was possible to refocus attention on the large number of
domestic problems. Within this new frame of reference Lenin became
very tired of opposition which seemed to him to be arguments over
theory at a time when energy ought to be devoted to the solution of
problems, a criticism he could have applied to himself on many occa-
sions. The opposition seemed to him to be involved with criticism for

49

its own cake, a concern over trifles. His repeated references to the

 

“6Lenin, "Political Report of the Central Comittee to the Eighth

All Russia Conference of the RC? (13)," g! 30, December, 1919, p. 187.

#7Compare his remarks in "A Great Beginning," 9! 29, July, 1919,
pp. #32433 with "Ninth Congress of the RC? (B)-speech Closing the
Congress." 9.! 30. April 5. 1920. pp. #85486.

1+8Lenin, "Left Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder," .C_V 31,
May, 1920, pp. alt-25.

”Lenin, "Our Foreign and Domestic Position and Party Tasks," gw_ 31,
November, 1920, p. #25.

 

 

 

 

69
opposition, however, pointed up its seriousness, whether it was advo-
cacy of trade-union supremacy or opposition to alleged concessions to
capitalism which he was making at the time.

The latter could be explained away more easily than the former.
Concessions were merely an expansion of his earlier decision to use
former bourgeois specialists in the econonnr, the administration, and
the arm; his insistence on keeping the bourgeois cooperatives along
with the proletarian ones; and his decision to allow the free trade of
grain in 1921. Common sense seemed sufficient to win the day. "How
canwe speed up the development of our economy whilst we are an economi-
cally weaker country? He can do that with the aid of bourgeois capital."
Concessions to not mean peace; they too are a kind of warfare, only in
another form, one that is to our advantage."50 The attractive part was
the strengthening of the internal foundations of the temporarily first
socialist state at the ironic expense of the snow.

On the issue of trade-union hegemony he had to pick his wav with
greater care. There was a far too simple connection between the worker's
state, worker control, and workers' unions. His own earlier words did
not help him at all. He had said in 1917:; "What we do suggest is
workers' control, which should develop into complete regulation of
production and distribution by the workers . . ."51 This was, of
course, one of the things the opposition group wanted. But in 1920

Lenin had changed his mind, and wrote some frank statements about the

 

soLenin, "Speech Delivered at a Meeting of Cells' Secretaries of
the Moscow Organisation of the BOP (B)," Q! 31, November, 1920,
pp. #314320 '

511nm, "Economic Dislocation and the Proletariat's Struggle,”
2!, 25: Jun. 19170 P0 “*0

 

 

Party dictatorship.
"What happens is that the Party, shall we say, absorbs
the vanguard of the proletariat, and this vanguard exercises
the dictatorship of the proletariat. The dictatorship can-
not be exercised or the functions of government performed
without a foundation such as the trade unions. These func-
tions, however, have to be performed through the medium of
special institutions which are also of a new type, namely
the Soviets."52
An organization.which embraces the whole of the proletarian class
cannot perform the role of leadership of the proletariat because both
here and elsewhere the proletariat is still so divided, degraded, and
corrupted in so many parts. ‘Leadership can only be exercised by
" . . . a vanguard that has absorbed the revolutionary energy of the
class."53 The whole, he said, is like an.arrangement of cogwheels
with transmission belts running from the vanguard to the mass of the
advanced class, and from.these to the mass of the working people.5k
Lenin was too busy to bother with theory, but nonetheless
theorized to justify his practice. Was he betraying the revolution?
Of course. And of course not. As Sorokins5 points out so eloquently
all revolutions work out of their chaos by reinstituting the very
structures which they had found so impossible to live with. Rebuilding
requires order. Lenin came very close to this when he wrote in late 1921:

"True revolutionaries have mostly come a cropper
when they begin to write 'revolution' with a capital R,

 

saLenin, "The Trade Unions, The Present Situation and Trotsky's
Mistakes,” 9!,32, December, 1920, p. 20.

531bide, Pe 2.1a
sthide

55pitri- A. Sorokin, The Sociolo of Revolution, (New York: Howard
Fertig, l967--originally 1925 .

 

 

?'—l mmwr‘miw 3-1::‘ V'eze‘zrww I‘FH't'S-Jl.‘ Fri-“~53”. '. " '-‘"'
l
.
.
.'
.
.
I 9 I
O ' I
0 I
.
I O
O
' r
¢ I a p r
v s e
C
. , .
e - P

 

71

to elevate 'revolution' so something almost divine, to

lose their heads, to lose the ability to reflect, weigh

and ascertain 5th the coolest and most dispassionate

manner e e e"
"To govern you need an any of steeled revolutionary Communists. We
have it, and it is called the Party."57 In the face of economic
chaos, enenw encirclement, internal enemies whose sabotage of Communist
efforts ranged from outright bourgeois opposition to proletarian
thefts from the state, and the rising of the Khronstadt garrison, the
governing Party needed factionalism like it needed Uinston Churchill
as Foreign Minister. Besides-

" . . . at the present time the proletarian policy of

the Party is not determined by the character of its

membership, but by the enormous undivided prestige en-

joyed by the small group which might be called the Old

Guard of the Party. A slight conflict within this

group will be enough, if not to destroy this prestige,

at all events to weaken the group to such a cslggree as

to rob it 03 its power to determine policy."
Hence stringent controls of the Party by the Party leaders was necessary
to promote unity; and criticism at the top levels was confined to
resmnsible dissent, within the framework of Party discipline. Failure
to observe these regulations could result in expulsion from the Party
even for a member of the Central Comittee if a two-thirds magicrity

for such action could be found.” The Party itself was now replaced

 

56Lenin, "The Importance of Gold," 2! 33, November 5, 1921, p. lll.

57Lenin, "The Second All Russia Congress of Miners," 9! 32, January,
1921’ p. 62.

58Lenin, "The Conditions for Admitting New Members to the Party,"
9! 33, March 24, 1922, p. 257.

59Lenin, "Tenth Congress of the RC? (B), Preliminary Draft Resolu-
tion of the Tenth Congress of the BC? on Party Unity," 91 32, March,
1921, p. 2101+. The appropriate paragraph is as follows:

72
by the few leaders at the pinnacles of power, and centralism finally
won its battle with democracy.

The concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat underwent a
similar change. In 1917 when Lenin himself viewed revolution with a
capital R, he wrote that the dictatorship of the proletariat was a

" . . . transformation of the proletariat into the

ruling class, able to crush the inevitable and des-

perate resistance of the bourgeoisie, and to organize,

for the new settlement of economic order, all the

toiling and exploited masses.

Even so the state would be a full democracy, a new democracy with
the abolition of the army and the transforming of all officials into
elective and revocable agents of the people. This would be a.trans-
formation of quantity and quality with no ferce being necessary because
the majority of the nation would be involved in the suppression of the

capitalists.61 The majority would suppress the minority and the bloodshed

 

"In order to ensure strict discipline within the
Party and in all Soviet work, and to secure the
maximum unanimity in eliminating all factionalism,
the Congress authorizes the Central Committee, in
cases of all Party penalties, including expulsion,
and in regard to members of the Central Committee,
reduction to the status of alternate members, and

as an extreme measure, expulsion from thetParty.
A.necessary condition for the application of such
extreme measure to members of the Central Committee,
alternate members of the Central Committee, and
members of the Control Commission is the convocation
of a Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee and all
members of the Control Commission shall be invited.
If such a general assembly of the most responsible
leaders of the Party deems it necessary by a two-
thirds majority to reduce a member of the Central
Committee to the status of alternate member, or to
expel him from the Party, this measure should be put
into effect immediately."

6oLenin, State and Revolution, p. 133.

élibideg Pe 1"‘90

 

 

73

would not last long. Neither would the bureaucracy for the end to
wage slavery meant an end to special functions performed by a special
class; for they would be performed by each in turn until they became
a habit to all.62

This early optimism was based on the apocalyptic notion of
Revolution, European revolutions, overestimation of the consistency
of the working class, and on a simplistic view of what this dictator-
ship involved. The purpose of the dictatorship was simply to break
the resistance of the capitalists, and the day or me after its beginning
ninety-nine per cent of the army would become enthusiastic supporters
as would the peasants.63 But very quickly the lessons of experience
overcame these judgments, and the necessity of maintaining civil order
took on a priority not previously accorded it. It was necessary to
suppress not only capitalistic resistance, but also civil disorder
such as crime, hooliganism, corruption, and profiteering. To put
these down.required "an iron.hand."6u Lenin discovered that itwwas
easier to gain.pcwer than to hold it. He justified the increases in
calls for discipline by referring to Marx‘s comment about the Paris

Commune not utilising its armed strength snfficiently.65 Only firmness

 

62Ibid., pp. 155, 156, and l9#.

63Lenin, "An.Epidemic of Credulity,"Ԥ!,25, July, 1917, p. 65; and
”One of the Fundamental Questions of Revolution," September, 1917, g! 25,
P0 3720

6“Lenin, "The Immediate Teaks of the Soviet Government,“‘§!,27,

March, April, 1918, p. 26‘}.

6SLenin, "Fear of the Collapse of the Old and Fight for the New,"
‘9! 26, January, 1918, p. #01.

m m 31?)» 1"? ", '

 

74

and ruthlessness can save us.66 By May of 1918 he was already saying
that a real dictatorship consisted in the pressure of this iron rule
being felt in all corners of the country, when

“ . . . not a single kulak, not a single rich man, not a

single opponent of the grain monopoly remains unpunished,

but is found and punished by the iron hand of the discip-

lined dictators of the6¥orking class, the proletarian

dictators. (Applause) "
By the time these "clenched fists" in the countryside were eradicated
the dictatorship had escalated into terrorism under the rule of the man
of steel. Observers began to speak of totalitarianism. All of this
developed visibly under Lenin's rule.

"If there ever existed a revolutionary who hoped that we

could pass to the socialist system without difficulties, such

a revolutionaryaéguch a socialist, would not be worth a

brass farthing.
Physical force must be used,

" . . . and we shall cast aside with contempt all who fail

to understand this, so as not to waste :ggds in talking

about the form of socialism. (Applause)

During the summer of 1918 the struggle for socialism became the
struggle for bread, and with the near successful assassination attempt
on Lenin the form of the struggle took.on a frightening dimension,

through the activities of Cheka, the secret police.

 

66Lenin, "Six.Theses on the Immediate Tasks,"Ԥ! 27, May, 1918,
p. 316; and "Theses on.the Present Political Situation,"‘9! 2?, May,

1918, Pe w}.
67Lenin, "Report on Foreign.Policy,"Ԥ!_27, May, 1918, p. 379.
68

Lenin, "Session.of the Central Executive Council, Moscow Soviet,
Red Army, and the Trade Unions," 9!,27, June, 1918, pp. 452-3.

691bideg p. 4350

 

W'—~' ,
. _' ‘

 

 

 

75

"The important thing for us is that Cheka is directly

exercising the dictatorship of the proletariat, and

in that respect its services are invaluable. There is

no way of emancipating the people except by forcibly

suppressing the exploiters. That is what Cheka is 70

doing, and therein lies its service to the proletariat.”

Aside from.this select band of guardians, the schools also had
functions in the dictatorship, for they must correctly socialize the
new generations for the tasks of constructing communism. There was an
emphasis on polytechnical education, teacher indoctrination, the
workers would be urged to become educated; and libraries, universities,

71 But the negative aspects

and adult classes were given priorities.

of the dictatorship were much more the focus of activity. The Menshevik

and Socialist Revolutionary newspapers were shut down. As Lenin put

it "He shall allow no opposition."72 If a person has not come to help

us, let him get out, go to Georgia, to Kolchak, or else he will be

put into prison.'73
Counter revolution was soon easily described as nearly anything

that obstructed the progress of the dictatorship as defined by the

leaders. Since the dictatorship was to last until the disappearance

of all classes it could only get more oppressive. The same sort of

discipline which had built up the Red Army into an efficient fighting

 

70Lenin, "Speech at a Rally and Concert for the m Russia Extra-
ordinary Commission Staff,"Ԥ! 28, November, 1918, p. 170.

Him, "Draft Program» of the TOP (13)," o_w 29, March, 1919,
Pe e

7gLenin, "Plenary Meeting of the Moscow Soviet,"'§!’29, April, 1919,
p. 264. See also "Plenum of the All Russia CCTU, Speech Closing the
Session,”I§! 29, April, 1919, p. 300; and."Foreword to 'Deception of the
People with.Slogans',"‘Q!.29, July, 1919, pp. 377-381.

73mm.

 

 

 

 

 

76

7" in order to

machine had to also be created on the front of labor,
eradicate inefficiency as well as subversion by obstruction. This
could be and was very narrowly interpreted. In a telegram to Stalin,
for example, Lenin wrote:

"Stalin . . . today I heard you and all the others very

clearly, every word. Threaten to shoot the incompetent

person in charge of communications who cannot give you

a good amplifier and ensure uninterrupted telephone

communication with me."75
The road to socialism at the point of a gun. Yet the goal at the end
of that road was alleged to be the end of exploitation of man. It
meant the end of the exploitation of labor’by capital and the abolishing
of the private ownership of the instruments of labor. All the factories
would then be handed over to the whole of society, and socialist production
wouldfibe conducted in common and be directed by the workers themselves.
The articles produced will satisfy the needs of the workers themselves,
and secure the full development of all their capabilities and equal
rights to enjoy all the achievements of science and art. This was not
Marxzbut Lenin in 1895-95.76 There would be public ownership, planned
production, equality of distribution, and the full development of man's
faculties. Horde like liberty and equality would be meaningful for a
context would be created for them by non-oppression, whether that be by

wealth, nation, religion or sex.77 Concern.about equality however was

 

7“Lenin, "Speech at a.Meeting of the Railwaymen of the Moscow

Junction,”‘Q!_30, February 1920, p. 3fl6.
75Lenin, "Telegram to J. v. Stalin," g! 30, February 1920, p. 363.

76Lenin, "Draft and Explanation.of the Programme of the Social
Democratic Party," _Q! 2, 1895-1896, p. 108.

77km, "Draft Election Address," 9! 11, November 1906, p. 301+.

 

 

77

more properly the concern of the bourgeois revolution rather than the
socialist one. The equality of the rural petty proprietor‘monld be the
last bourgeois illusion whose impotence people would soon realize.78
Nonetheless socialism would guarantee the well being of all the people.
The democratic community of the socialist society consisted of the
people armed, a high rate of culture, of people working without com-
pulsion in socialized workshops and taking a full role in all spheres
of political life.79

Equality, democracy, internationalism, and production organization
were the positive sides. The negative side to be abolished included
oppression, the military, illiteracy, a fragmented political life, and
war. But the year 191? with its peculiar Russian circumstances made
Lenin sound different as he came closer to the trees in the forest.
At first he was inclined to doubt the applicability of Marxian cone
cepts to the Russian situation. "The arguments are ridiculously
stupid, for what makes socialism objectively impossible is the small
scale economy which we by no means presume to expropriate, or even to
regulate or control.”

But after the insurrection it was different. "You will have
socialism if you take stock of every piece of iron and cloth."
"Socialism means keeping account of everything."81 This logical incon-

sistency was the result of Lenin's desire to implement as many socialist

 

78Lenin, "Strengths and Weaknesses of the Russian.Revolution,"‘2!,12,
April 1907. p. 356.

79Lenin, "The Discussion on Self-Determination Summed Up,".§! 22,
July 1916. pp- 324-325.

30mm, "Economic Dislocation and the Proletariat's Struggle,"
91 25, July 1917, p. 1+5.

811nm, “Speech at a Meeting of the Petrograd Soviet of workers'
and Soldiers' Deputies," gw_ 26, November 18, 1917, p. 29h.

“I.

 

 

lr‘.

 

 

78

measures as possible even while admitting that they were only at
the beginning of the road to socialism, that it was only possible
when all exploitation had been abolished,82 and that it was impossible
to implement in a single country.83

Therefore they were compelled to simultaneously work for the
building of socialism and at the same tiem work to bring about the
international revolution. But the delay in the latter, unforeseen,
created a revision of expectation fed by the pride of original accomp
plishment resulting in a.projection of the peculiar Russian experience
into a model of revolutionary development. Hence the building of
socialism in Russia alone was given international significance. ‘nThe
Russian revolution has charted the road to socialism for the whole

8“ Lenin.was able fer s abort time to use the Hungarian

world. . . "
experience and the Italian translation of the word Soviet increasingly
as,p£iggwfggi§ evidence of the growing international trend towards
Sovietism.85 Uith such a refocus reflecting a lessening dependence on
the international proletariat the internal building was shifted into
a more aggressive activity.

One important aspect of this activity was the desired inclusion.
of the mass of the pe0ple in the state apparatus. The courts and
government itself must be the work of the whole people, for " . . .

socialism cannot be implemented by a.minority, by the Party. It

 

8ZLenin, "Third All Russia Conference of Soviets,"Ԥ! 26,
January 1918, p. #66.

83mm. , p. 470.

841.com, "s eech at a Rally of Red Arm Men at Khodynka," g! 28,
August 1918, p. .

85Lenin, "Plenum of the 111 Russia corn—speech 01081118 “‘10 ““1“."
g! 29, April 1919, p. 298.

 

 

79

can be implemented only by tens of millions when they have learned

to do it themselves. "86 Socialism would be a reality when every

citizen would be a member of a single, nation-wide, state cooperative.87
But as we have seen the struggle for survival and even revival

increasingly sought solutions in more control, more discipline, more

dictatorship rather than in more freedoms. He felt compelled to call88

for self discipline and self sacrifice. Greater productivity of

labor was needed, and the former capitalists who were called in to

help were to be given large salaries, far in excess of the average

worker salary he had said would be the basis for all. He even went

so far as to wish to use what he considered scientific and progressive

in the Taylor system which he had roundly condemned early in his career

as an eMple of exploitation.89
The undesirable traditions of capitalism were now listed puritani-

cally as anarchy, laziness, disorder, and profiteering.90 Obviously

anything that enhanced Soviet power was good and progressive. In 1918

he felt that historical circumstances had given birth to two unconnected

halves of socialism, " . . . existing side by side like two future

chickens in the single shell of imperialism."91 Germany had the economic

 

861nm, "Extraordinary Seventh Congress of the RC? (3)," Q! 27,

87Lenin, "Version of the Article 'The Immediate Tasks',“ g! 27,
March-April 1918, p. 2‘1-8, 2+9.

881mm, "The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government," g! 27,
March-April 1918, p. 216.

89Ibid., pp. 257, 260.
901b1d., Pe $10

91Lenin, "Left Wing Childishness and the Petty-Bourgeois Mentality."
_C! 27, May 1918, p. 5‘10.

 

 

prerequisites and Russia the political. So until a German revolution
92

made it unnecessary, he intended to copy German state capitalism.
Those who disagreed with these were sorry revolutionaries, who
lacked the understanding and stamina for the

" . .1. stea advance of the iron battalions of the
proletariat." 3

"Only the development of state capitalism, only the

painstaking establishment of accounting and control,

only the strictest organisation and labour discipline,

will lead to socialism. Without this there is no

socialism."
But the basis of socialism was large-scale machine industry and even
the next generation would hardly achieve the full transition to
socialism?5 because Russia was so extremely backward and impoverished.96
Practice became much more important than theory now, or theory had to
change to fit the new conditions. Such was the price of power. He
sought to introduce socialism and could not help introduce state

Lenin came to see for himself that his exhortations about the
development of production were meaningless. The economy went so much

the wrong way in 1919 that he insisted that those who used the slogan

"develop production" ought to be included among those of a very large

92mm.

93min. , pp. 276-277.

9“Lenin, "Session of the All Russia CEO," 9; 27, April 1918, p. 297.

 

gslbide. pp. 298-”:lu

96Lenin, ”Extraordinary Sixth All Russia Congress of Soviets,"
g! 28, November 1918, p. 159.

 

 

81

group whom he characterized ad readers of books rather than practical
revolutionaries.97 "We must save the workers even if they are unable

to work. If we keep them alive for the next few years we shall save

the country, save society, and socialism."98 He exhorted them to educate
themselves in business and smart trading.99 Thus the NEP until Stalin re-
comended the building in 1928.

This meant, naturally, a deferral of socialism to the indefinite
future. But when that day did arrive society would be considerably
altered. The democracy-concept would be altered from wage-slavery
in freedom' 5 illusions to representative institutions without a
parliament—a fusion of executive and legislative functions in the
Soviets, where majority rule would prevail.loo While this form of
the state would also wither it would include Openly Conducted foreign
policy, active involvement of common people in state administration,
honest freedom {of the press by denying printing privileges to the
bourgeoisie, freedom of assembly, housing redistribution, direct

elections to local soviets, and indirect elections for others.101

 

97Lenin, "First All Russia Congress of Adult Education," 2! 29,
W 1919. P0 3590

981bide, p. 364s

99Lenin, ,"On Cooperation, 1," 2! 33, January 1923, p. 471.
looLenin, "Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautslq," 91 28,
October 1918, pp. 2‘16-248. See also "Speech at a Meeting of Poor Peasants'
Committees," 9! 28, November 1918, p. 1753 and "The Socialist Revolution
and Self-Determination,” _Cl 22, February 1916, p. 1%; State and Revolution,
p. 203e

lolLenin, "Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky," _C! 28,
October 1918, pp. 246-248.

.7? ._,m,

 

82
Because the proletariat would be fighting economic slavery it
would also fight that medieval mildew, religion. It would be contemp-
tuously cast aside for bigots and priests. But in this battle one must
realize that he is fighting a symptom and not the basis of the sickness.

He must be cautious therefore not to offend and cause resentment which

would perpetuate the religion.102

As long as there was a necessity of maintaining order the authority
of society must remain. The implication was strong that once socialism
was reached, the coercive one-man dictatorship would no longer be
necessary and be replaced by group control.lO3

The chaotic agricultural sector of the econony resisted the imple-
mentation of the socialist ideal of communal or associational farming.
Lenin had the idea that if only the peasants would be shown the communal
advantages they would follow of their own accord. There was, therefore,

a high emphasis on voluntary participation in the communal experimentalol'}

But associational farming could not be pushed too fast becuase of the

 

102Lenin, "Socialism and Religion," 2! 10, December 1905, pp. 85-87.
"Attitude of the Workers' Party to Religion," 9! 15, May 1909, pp. 402-13;
"Speech at the First All Russia Congress of Working Women,” CW 28, Novem-
ber 1918, p. 180; "Fourth Anniversary of the October Revolution,” 9! 33,
October 1921, p. 53; and "On the Significance of Militant Materialism," 9.!
33, March 1922, p. 229.. Also see CW 15, "Classes and Parties in their
Attitudes to Religion and Church," June 1909, pp. 4116-25.

1°3Lenin, State and Revolution, 1). 195. Also ”Explanation of the
Law on Fines," g! 2, 1895, p. ; "Kamenev's Speech in the CEO on the
Stockholm Conference," 2! 25, August 1917, p. 240; "Version of the Arti-
clg 'The Immediate Tasks' ,” g! 27, March-April 1918, pp. 212-17.

lo“Lenin, "Speech at a Meeting of Delegates from the Poor Peasants'
Committees of Central Gubernias," 91 28, November 1918, p. 1773 Cf Pp.
171-177. Also see "Plenary Meeting of the Moscow Soviet," gy- 29, April
1919, p. 266; and "What the Friends of the People are, and How They
Fight the Social Democrats," _C! l, 189‘}, p. 290..

 

   

83

already precarious state of the agricultural situation. As a result
communal farms were begun as models for the others to learn from; but
mostly the other farmerswould simply come and laugh, departing more
than ever convinced that the model was ridiculous.105 Lenin, nonetheless,
remained sure that associational farming was so much better that labor
productivity would'be trebled on such farms.106 Thus on the state farms,
where there were no small peasant proprietors to disturb, Lenin intro-
duced the communal concept meaning that no one was allowed to have his
own livestock, poultry, or garden plot.1o7

On the free trade of grain he remained obstinate until survival
very much.depended on it in 1920-21. He knew the peasants were weary
of the promissory notes, as well as the unlikely promises he had made to
them about providing agronomical, mechanical, and fertilizer assist-
ance. Therefore the kulaks whom he had said must be crushed were going
to be left alone again.108 Need had dictated to theory. But this
was a long way from saying that the ghglg essence of socialism lay in

demarcating the laboring peasant from the profiteering peasant.109

 

lo5Lenin, "First Congress of Agricultural Communes,"‘9!,30,
December 1919, pp. 200-201.

106Lenin, "First Congress of Land Departments,"Ԥ!_28, December,

19180 PP. 381.347.

lo7Lenin, "First Congress of Farm Labourers," g! 29, March 1919,
PP. 43-H4.

lo8Lenin, "Tenth Congress of the RC? (3)," g! 32, March 1921, pp.

186-7; "Achievements and.Difficulties,"‘Q! 29, March-April 1919, pp 76-77;
and "Eighth Congress of the BOP (B),"|§!_29, March-April 1919, p. 219.

logLenin, "Economics and Politics," gw_ 30, October 1919, p. 113.

 

"‘3' ‘*“"'"-"""" 15"” "' ,. "-45%!“- “'3” -_‘ 2: Inf 3 r .

 

e
C e
P
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v e ,
.
a v
I
P m

84
But since state capitalism was the last step before socialism, and
socialism was state capitalism in a monopoly made to serve the inter-
ests of the entire society, those things that were formerly capitalist
and therefore reprehensible, were now progressive adventures along
the road to socialislll.]']"o As in the fable, the scarecrow, the lion,
and the tin man were simply not the same as they had been before
Dorothy emerged on the yellow brick road leading to Oz.

But at issue was the survival of Russia, and in Lenin's mind
therefore 3192 of socialism. Whatever he did in the interests of
Russian survival were therefore theoretically correct even though
concessions and invitations to foreign capital, material incentives
in a non-equalitarian sense, and free trade of commodities were not
all that had to be done. The proletarian state must itself " . . .
become a cautious, assidious, and shrewd 'businessman', a punctilious
wholesale merchant-otherwise it will never succeed in putting this
small-peasant country economically on its feet."111 It could be no
other way. The masses of peasants were exhausted and the proletariat
was declassed, weak, scattered, and enfeebled.

With this much space between reality and the ideological goal

it is surprising that Lenin said as much as he did about the goal

 

mLenin, "Impending Catastrophe and Row to Combat It," 9! 25,

September 1917, p. 358.

nJ'Lenin, "Fourth Anniversary of the October Revolution," _qw_ 33,
October 1921, p. 59. See also "Speech Delivered at a Conference of
Factory Trade Union Committees of Moscow Enterprises of the Printing
and.Publishing Industry," 9! 31, November 1920, p. 429; and "Tenth
Congress of the RCP (3)," CW 52, March 1921, pp. 186-7, 191, 218-220,
2259 and 226’?O

llafienin, "New Times and Old Mistakes in a.New Guise," Q! 33.
August 1921, ppe 23.240

85
beyond socialism-communism. Once again there is a distinction between
his pre-seizure remarks and those that occur afterward as he saw the
trees as well as the forest. Before the insurrection the forest seemed
like the world and the trees very often looked like national equivalents
of that international dream.

"The whole of society will have become one office
and one factory with equal work and equal pay. But
this factory discipline, which the proletariat will
extend to the whole of society on the defeat of capi-
talism and the overthrow of the exploiters, is by no means
our ideal, and is far from our final aim. It is but a
foothold as we press on to the radicalcieansing of
society from all the brutality and foulness of capital-
ist exploitation; we shall leave it behind as we move
on. When all, or be it even only the greater part of
society, have learned how to govern the State, have
taken this business into their own hands, have estab-
lished a control over the gentry with capitalist lean-
ings, and workers thoroughly demoralized by capitalism
-from this moment the need for any government begins
to vanish."

"For when all have learned to manage, and really
do manage, socialized production, when all really do
keep account and control of the idlers, gentlefolk,
swindlers and such like guardians of the capitalist
traditions, the escape from such general registration
and control will inevitably become so increasingly
difficult, so much the exception; and will probably
be accompanied by such swift and severe punishment
(for the armed workers are very practical people,
not sentimental intellectuals and they will scarcely
allow anyone to trifle with them), that very soon the
necessity of observing the simple, fundamental rules
of any kind of social life will become a habit. The
door will then be wide open for the transition from
the first phase of communist society to its second
higher phase, and along with it to the complete wither-
ing away of the state."

With the transition the need for force and for the subjugation of one
man to another would vanish because " . . . people will grow accustomed

to observing the elementary conditions of social existence without

 

ll3Lenin, State and Revolution, pp. 205-6.

86

force and without subjection."llh This internalization of social
morality was a post-revolutionary development flowing inevitably out
of its capitalist foundations. This new morality, this new habit
would render unnecessary even the full freedom of a real democracy,
and it too, as a form of the state, would wither. The fuller the
democracy the more rapid the withering.ll5

Along*with democracy and force withering, would be the eradica-
tion of the distinction between manual and mental work. The erasure
of this difference would follow the gigantic development of the pro-
ductive forces of human society that would result from the removal of
the retarding influences of capitalism and by the utilization of
technology under socialism. The Ramsay method of extracting gas from
a coal mine so encouraged Lenin that he wrote in glowing terms of its
benefits to society, for it would release the labor of millions of
miners and shorten everyone's work day to perhaps seven hours.116
Even more advantages would accrue from the application of electrical
power to the productive process.

"The electrification of all factories and railways

will make working conditions more hygienic, will free

millions of workers from smoke, dust and dirt, and

accelerate the transformation of dirty, repulsive work-

shops into clean, bright laboratories worthy of human beings,

The electric lighting and heating of every home will re-

lieve millions of domestic slaves of the need to f§7nd

three-fourths of their lives in.smelly kitchens."

It sounds ridiculous to equate communism with fresh air and clean

 

ll“mid" p. 187.
ll5lbid., pp. 155, 189, 193, 194.
n51min, "A Great Technical Achievement,"I§!,l9, April 1913, p. 62.

1171bid.

_WVIV __._.._'_w.___.—__f_ _9

 

 

8?
clothing, but what Lenin felt would come was very simply a 323.!gng-
a world of free people-an international fresh start in which oppression,
poverty, privileges, and disunity were gone forever.118 Ridding the
kitchen of smells and the factory of dirt were a part of this transformation.
Because the means of production.were now the property of the whole
of society there would be a tremendous rise in labor productivity,
shorter working days, and a replacement of small and unorganized pro-
ductive units by collective and improved labor. There would be a
union of agriculture and industry based on science being applied,
collective labor, and a redistribution of the population which would
end both rural backwardness and urban concentration. The education of
every child would combine productive labor with instruction and gymnastics
resulting in more efficient social producers and more fully developed
human beings.119
There would be neither rich nor poor, with allthe people enjoying
all the fruits of everyone's labor. Because they now worked for
themselves, wealth would grow rapidly, accompanied by increased stan-
dards of living. This was not painting future prospects so much.as it
was an analysis of the present and building on the current trends of
development. When one added the socialist revolution to this analysis

one could speak of the emancipation.of the whole of oppressed humanity.120

 

118Lenin, "The Werking Class and the National Question," cw 19,
May 1913, p. 92.

119Lcnin,nxor1 Marx," cw 21, November 191k, pp.3Zl-72; and "To Our
Comrades in WarAPrison Camps:"_ 23, Mardh 1917, p. .

la°Lenin, "To the Rural Poor," cw 6, March 1903, pp. 366, 376, "What

the FrigndsP of the ;Rec 1e Are and How _Theg Fight the Social Democrats,"
9!,19 1 "Revision of the arty Programme," CW at, May

1917’ M94681)

88

In these pre-power statements Lenin did not carefully distinguish
between socialism and communism. Seeing the revolution as something
longed for, it assumed an eschatology similar in many respects to that
of a.young man aspiring to become twenty-one years old. Upon attaining
that age ambivalance creeps in as hope and reality intermingle. So
with Lenin. The easy optimism of the prOphet became a hope tempered by
the stark realities of the holding action. By March of 1918 the
Bolsheviks wanted a new Program, and evidently Bukharin wanted to in-
clude a description.of the communism to come. A.year before Lenin
would not have been so reluctant. But now he was.

"What, however, does Comrade Bukharin want?-That
we should give a description of socialist society in its
developed form, i.e., communism. Here he is inaccurate.
At present we certainly uphold the state and to say we
should give a description of socialism in its developed
form.where the state will cease to exist-qyou couldn't
do anything about that except say that when the principle
would be realized: from each according to his ability,
to each according to his needs. But this is still a.long
way off, and to say that means not saying anything except
that we have no firm ground to go on. We shall arrive
there in the long run if we reach socialism. It is
enough for us to set to work on what we have said. If
we were to do this it would be a tremendous historical
achievement.”

As a.matter of fact, he continued, we cannot even give a description
of socialism, let alone Communism. "The bricks of which socialism will
be composed have not yet been made."122 Besides, our labor productivity

is so low as to make a discussion of communism impossible.123

 

12:1'Lenin, "Extraordinary Seventh Congress of the BOP (3),"‘93 27,
March 1918, p. 147.

lzzlbid.

125mm, "Session of the All Russia can)," _c_w_ 27, April 1918,
PP. 303‘3040‘

89

But this did not mean that Lenin would not use the concept of
communism as a goad to greater effort, and also as a tranquilizer for
the seeming gutility Of it all. In 1919, hardly an encouraging year,
during the May Day celebrations held in Red Square he told the assembled
crowds that the majority Of those present who were about 30-35 years Of
age would live to see the full bloom Of communism even though it was
as yet remote. Our grandchildren will look at the documents and other
relics of the capitalist system and be amazed at how trade in articles
of primary necessity could remain in private hands, at how factories
could be privately owned, and how some men could exploit others and
not work themselves.

"Up to now the story Of what our children would see

in the future has sounded like a fairy-tale; but today,

comrades, you see clearly that the ediface Of socialist

society, Of which we have laid the foundations, is not

a utopia."12

The following year, when speaking to the young members Of the
Party, he said that the people now fifteen years old would see the
communist society and itself build that society. The time lapse was
necessary to permit the electrification Of the country, and in the
meantime he exhorted them to work as they had not ever worked before.125
In late 1921, while speaking in the context Of encouraging trade and
overcoming resistance to the NEP he said: "When we are victorious on
a world scale I think.we shall use gold for the purpose Of building

public lavatories in the streets of some of the largest cities in

 

1Z‘hLenin, "Three Speeches Delivered in Red Square,"'§!,29, May 1,

1919. P- 330.

1251mm, "The Tasks Of the Youth Leagues," 9: 31, October 1920,
PP- 298-299»

90

the world." In the meantime, however, buy cheap and sell dear.lz6
There was one development that gaveihig'optimism. It was based

on the activities of a few railway workers, who, desiring to overcome

the great lack of transportation equipment and facilities, began coming

to work on their own time on Saturday and laboring without pay. Lenin

seized on this subbotnik straw and built a castle on it in 1919. Communist

subbotniks were the actual beginnings of communism, for communism begins

" . . . when the‘rggk‘ggd.§ilg‘workers display an enthusiastic concern

that is undaunted by arduous toil to increase the productivity of

labour. e e"127

Encouraging this "shoot of communism" would mean among
other things the emancipation of women from the drudgery of petty
housework and the establishment of public catering places, nurseries,
and kindergartens, all of which would be imbued with this conscientious-
ness in.workirzg.l‘?'8

But this impatient Marxist could not leave the subbotnik. alone.
By November of 1919 he was already speaking of4§£ggggigg’volunteer
labor for the fuel crisis.129 ” . . . Communism . . . is voluntary
unpaid work for the common good that does not depend on individual
differences, that wipes out all memories of everyday prejudices, wipes
out stagnation, tradition, differences between branches of work,

differences in rates of payfbw'labour, etc."130 Since this was accepted

 

l2'6Lenin, "The Importance of Gold,"‘g!,33, November 1921, p. ll}.
127mm, "A Great Beginning," 9! 29, July 1919, p. #27.
1281mm, p. 429.

l29Lenin, "The Fight to Overcome the Fuel Crisis," §!.30, November
1919’ p. 141.

_ 130mm, "Political Report of the Central Committee," _cg 30,
December 1919, p. 186.

   

 

m...

91

as correct—suddenly the _s_i_n_e_ _g_u_§ no}; of a communist was subbotnikism;
organized from above volunteers. The Party now demanded this sort of
activity from each one of its members on pai of expulsion.131 It
should be introduced, he said, on the communes so that the other
peasants would learn how a real communist worked.132 It did not occur
to him that the other peasants might have laughed harder than before
at the sight of people working for nothing. But his equating EEEEEE?
gigigggwith communism kept him from such a realistic analysis.

Communism was still remote, a foretaste of later pleasures; but
this was a beginning. "If there is anything communist at all in the
prevailing system in Russia, it is only the subbotniks, and everything
else is nothing but the struggle against capitalism for the consolida-
tion of socialism, out of which, after the full victory of socialism,
there should grow that communism which we see at subbotniks, not with
the aid of a book, but in living reality."l33

But in the meantime Russia must build through organization and
technology. The organization was the Party and the technology was
electricity.

"Communism implies Soviet power as a political

organ, enabling the mass of the oppressed to run all

state affairs-dwithout that communism is unthinkable."

"This guarantees political success. Economic success,

however, can be assured only when the Russian prole-
tarian state effectively controls a huge industrial

 

131Lenin, "First Congress of the Agricultural Communes,"‘gg.30,
December 1919, p. 203.

132Iblcl.

133nm, "Report on Subbotniks," g! 30, December 1919, pp. 286-287.
See also "From.the Destruction of the Old Social System to the Creation
of the New," 92,30, April 1920, p. 517.

 

 

92

machine built on ugito-day technology; that means
electrification."1

This was the way out, the right direction, the task that the Party a
tiny minority of the population had set for themselves.
"This tiny nucleus has set itself the task of

remaking everything, and it will do so. We have

proved that this is no utopia, but a cause in which

people live by. "

"We must remake things in such a way that the

great majorityBgf the masses . . . will say . . .

'well done'."

Notwithstanding the bloodshed, economic dislocation, starvation,
and the loss of the class which they allegedly represented, the Party
pressed on with its holding action, with its focus now entirely on
itself--the island in the sea of capitalism. The stage was set for
the Stalinist construction of socialism. It was also set for the
Khrushchevian declaration at the Twenty-Second Congress much later
that the Party could now concern itself with the way in which full

communism could be built.

 

134Lenin, "Our Foreign.and Domestic Position and Party Tasks,”
23,31, Nevember 1920, p. #20.

usLenin, "Speech at a Plenary Session of the Moscow Soviet,"
‘9! 33, November 21, 1922, p. ##2.

CHAPTERV
THEEIRDPROGRAMOFTHECPSU

At the Twenty-Second Party Congress, on October 31, 1961, the
delegates unanimously adopted a program for the Columnist Party of
the Soviet Union. This program is primarily a political document,
and secondarily a general blueprint for the future development of the
country. As a political document it has not received the attention
which it deserves because most western observers have concentrated
on the second part of the program which provides the blueprint for
the future. Dan Jacobs wrote: "The first part of the document dealing
with the decay of capitalism, peaceful coexistence, and so forth is,
for the most part, an uninspired reworking of the usual tired and
outworn Communist cliches.”1 Both the Inqueur and Schapiro readers
concentrate on the second part of the program, as do most of the
journal articles which came out in a flurry after thepublication of
the progra'nun.2

I would not imply that this is incorrect; or that the scholarship
involved is necessarin superficial. But to take Khrushchev's

announcement of the program as charting the course to utopia at face

 

1'Dem Jacobs, The New Manifesto, (Evanston: Row Petersen and 00.,
1962). PO 217.

2See Halter Laqueur and Leopold Labeds (eds.), The Future of Co-unist
Society, (New Iork: Praeger, 1962), and Leonard Schapiro ed. , The USSR
and the Future, (New Iork: Praeger, 1963).

93

91,

value is unwise; because by doing so the attention is diverted from
the real meat of the program, which I think goes a long way towards
answering the question raised by Leopold Labeds as to win the Soviet's
ruling Party put itself on record as promising the golden age in the
near future.3

The new program is nearly five times longer than its predecessor,
the Second Party Program which dated from 1919. This old program
began with a statement about the international effect of the Bolshevik
Revolution reflecting the optimi- about other revolutions which still
prevailed at the time. It also stated that the Bolshevik Revolution
had begun to lay the foundations of communism which reflected the more
sober appraisal. This program also had its tired cliches about the
crisis development of capitalism, resulting in sufficient proletarian
discontent to throw off the capitalist yoke and institute the social
revolution through a dictatorship of the proletariat. Imperiali-
could not help the old order, it merely prolonged the inevitable
collapse and defeat of capitalia.

The old program characterized international organizations like
the League of Nations as groups which “ . . . by organizing the
systematic exploitation of all peoples on a world scale, direct all
their efforts to the i-ediate suppression of the revolutionary move-
ment of the proletariat of all countriesflfi Under such conditions,

slogans like pacifism, international disarmament, or courts of

 

3Leopold Labedz, "The New CPSU Programme,” Lawueur and Labeds (eds.).
The fixture of Comnist Society, p. 12.

1"Jan Triaka (ed.), Soviet Communism: Pro and Rules, (San Fran-

cisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1 2 , p. 133.

95
arbitration.were not only reactionary utopias but also a.means of
deceiving the working classes because what was meant was the disarming
of the proletariat and the diverting of the proletariat from its task
as the disarmer cf the exploiters.5

This was the voice of the unwanted outsider looking in and describ-
ing how undesirable that which.was denied him really was. Once the
country began achieving a measure of international legitimacy the
situation, of course, altered. The first signatory to the Kellogg-
Briand.Paet outlawing war was Soviet Russia. The League was joined
in the 1930‘s in an effort to contain fascism. During the decade of
the fifties ' Russia and the United States engaged in lengths and repeated
but mutually unconvincing discussions about general disarmament. In
1963 Russia signed the test ban treaty with that leader of international
capitalism, the United.States; against the oppositicm.cf one of its
principal proletarian."friends", China. In other words one must look.
at‘the tired cliches in order to see beneath.them for what they really
mean.

Also opposed in the second program.are the Social.Democratic‘and
socialist parties of other countries as being influenced by chauvinism,
cpportunism, and the desire to compromise. This case ofcalling the
kettle black will also be conveniently shelved during the popular and
united fronts when Soviet domestic necessities required it.

The rest of the old program was devoted to the aims of the GPSU
for Russia, and, like the introduction to the program, these aims were

also historically conditioned and alterable under changing circumstances.

 

5mg.

 

._ “.719- d"; .r.»,~- "

 

96

The claim was made, for instance, that local autonow was already
realized in 1919, giving ideological cover for the vast anarchic
confusion that was so prevalent during the period. Gontradicting this
notion of local autonomy was the Party aim to suppress all opposition
which would necessitate extending Party control over the whole country.
The suppression, of course, will end when exploitation of man by man
ceased; but that this has not occurred in fifty years of Soviet rule
should give someone something to think about. In such a context to
describe the rights and freedoms of the democratic, capitalist states
as being paper rights and those of the Soviet Union as being real
rights is strongly reminiscent of the fable "The Buperor's New Clothes,"
even if it is granted that western justice is far from ideal.

The problem of increasing bureaucratisation was recognized as
an evil which needed correction, but the Second Program saw it only
present in the Soviets, not in the Party. This complacency would
later be challenged by those outside of power. The army was justified
by the events preceding 1919 and Lenin's idea of abolishing the am
was quietly dropped. They wanted to stay in power. But in the old
Program even the notion of elective officers was relegated to the
past when the officers were supposedly representatives of the ruling
classes. They still were, for these same officers were utilised by
the new am, but now under the strict control of the working class,
according to the Program, for which one must substitute Party. The
use of bourgeois specialists in industry was urged by the old Program
which necessitated the scrapping of the old equal remuneration example

of the Paris Come.

97

Agriculture was to be treated cautiously. The document urged.not
that the differences between the towns and countryside be abolished,
but the ending of the cpposition.between them-reflecting the actual
conditions.of the time.

Jurisprudence was to have a social character. Education.was to
be available to all and.was to be the instrument of communist regenerae
tion of society. Distribution.was expected to be channelled through
networks of consumer communes based on the consumer cooperatives of
which some still exist today. The banks were expected to become giant
bookkeeping organs, although.without abolishing money and its substi-
tutes it made little sense to talk about destroying the financial
power of the banks. Housinngas to be improved, but then any attempt
to do something about housing would have constituted an improvement.

The work day was to be reduced to six hours as soon as produc-
tivity permitted, but with the proviso that the worker should then
spend the other two hours studying theories of trade and industry.
There were, finally, calls for free medical care and.medicine, sanitae
tion.measures, a curious reference to communal feeding, and for the
control of disease.

Trisha calls this Second Program visionary, wstical, revolu-
tionary, and romantic.6 This is misleading. It is true that in the
context of 1919 Russia all talk of social welfarism sounded.utopic.
But the point that needs remembering is that it could have been much
more visionary and unrelated to reality than it was. It could have

urged, for example, the immediate abandonment of commodity production

 

6Trisha, op. cit., p. 6.

98

or of money; pressed for complete worker control of industry, the
abolition of the am and the police; or installed com-on people in
leadership positions in the state administration. That it did not
go this far marks the Second Program as a practical coming to grips
with the reality of the time insofar as the ideological blinders
would permit. The document reveals a desire to stay in power and
still remain as much as possible consistent with their past revolu-
tionary aspirations. To have read the "left" out of the Party, so to
speak, would have openly marked the withering of those revolutionary
ideals and have brought the entire _r_'_ai__s_g_n_ $2.92. of the Bolshevik or
Soviet power into question. Hence the old document represented a viable
compromise between reality and wish, heavily influenced by the condi-
tions of the time-n-just as later the Third Party Program will appear.

This old Program was in effect for a long time—from 1919 until
1961, a period of forty-two years. Changing conditions which required
different responses, as we have noted, made the document anachronistic
and embarrassing, and it was removed from the shelves of libraries and
bookshops during the 1936-38 time period.7 Attempts to revise it were
begun as early as 1930 at the Sixteenth Party Congress; but all
attempts to revise the old Program failed until 1958 when it became
suddenly necessary for the First Secretary of the Party to put his
full weight behind the effort.8 This resulted in the draft program

published in July of 1961 and adopted later (hiring the same year.

 

7Wolfgang Leonhard, "Adoption of the New Program," Schapiro (ed.).
The USSR and the Future, op. cit., pp. ‘5-5.

81'.‘xplain:i.ng the background and reasons for this is the task of the
following chapter.

99

The new Program assumes that the construction of socialism has
alreacb been completed. What this means specifically is left to the
imagination of the reader. Presumably it means that the country had
been industrialised and agriculture socialized, but this is nowhere
spelled out. It is something to be believed, and it has the effect
of changing the goal to communism and making socialism that which is
to be built upon.

The opening sentence of the Program states that the Bolshevik
Revolution has ushered in a new era for mankind, that of the overthrow
of capitalism and the establishment of comnmnism. But it is clear that
such a victory is yet to come as the result of a struggle for supremacy
need by violent only “ . . . where the exploiting classes resort to
violence against the people."9 The new Program therefore is primarily
designed to sketch the non-violent manner in which Soviet state capi-
talism will triumph over private capitalism. The theoretical basis
for this triumph is. taken from the Marx and Lenin classics and adapted
to the current decade. The Program then sketches with a fair amount of
detail the actual manner of that march to victory, including unprece-
dented use of actual dates when certain stages are to be ccnsumated.

There are two parts to the Program. Part One is the section on
the theoretical foundations entitled “The Transition from Capitalism to
Communiml is the Road to Human Progress". Part Two is the sketch of
how to get to that goal entitled: "The Tasks of the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union in Building a Communist Society." A very brief intro-

duction states that the spectre of commism that Harx referred to in the

 

9%, OEe cite, p. as

 

' I 7,: _a. _——.

 

100

opening lines of the Manifesto was a dream which became a reality
through the genius of Lenin and the Party which successfully fulfilled (sic)
its first and second Programs, culminating in the successful construc-
tion of socialism in the Soviet Union. This tremendous effort inspired
others so arch that the authors of the Program become poetic. ”A mighty
purifying thunderstorm marldng the spring-time of mankind is raging
over the «:th What is referred to is the allegedly socialist
revolutions in Asia and Europe which resulted in the formation of a
world socialist system. And in the context of this expanding socialism
and shrinking capitalism, the Soviet Party decided to adopt its third
Program, " . . . 5 programme for the bung g; columnist societywu'
which will deliver man from evil into peace, labor, freedom, equality
and happiness. As if this were not enough, someone discovered that
the draft did not contain the word "brotherhood" in this list. It was
added.12

The theory begins with the now familiar analysis of capitali.
as the last exploitative system which, although developing its produc-
tive forces to a very great extent, has become an obstacle to further
progress. The assumption here, as with Marx, is that there is more
potential in the productive force of man than is possible to exhibit
in capitalism; that mature capitalism functions as a dam behind which

an entire sea of productivity lies awaiting the raising of the red flag

 

loTriska, op. cit., p. at.

111bid., p. 25.

Enemututmpmguwupmumudnammummteam“
News. #31 (55“), August 5, 1961 and the final form was published in
Isvestia, November 2, 1961.

101

of revolution. This potential is predisposed towards social conscious-
ness by the social nature of the capitalistic productive process. Thus
with the powerful potential channeled into social awareness one has
both the material conditions for the revolution as well as the desire
for this alteration of an exploiting society. And while the proletariat,
or industrial working class is the natural leader, the highest principle
of the dictatorship which follows is the alliance between the workers
and the working peasantry, who together throw off the bonds of imperial- I
ist capitalism, alreacb' decaying, and usher in the new era.

w The emphasis on the peasants reflects an unconscious awareness
that revolutions take place only in those countries which have large
peasant populations. As though aware of this the Program continues
with the Lenin notion that the uneven character of revolution resulted
from the uneven political and economic development in which Russia fit
as the weakest link in the imperialist astem. Originally this explained
how the revolution could occur in Russia and not in Germany and France,
but here it is used in a chronological setting, as cause and effect
transition from the theory of revolutions which overthrow capitalism
to the actuality of the Russian m in November of 1917.

The result of the Bolshevik efforts was the establishment of the
proletariat and the creation of a new kind of state. The draft Program
called this new state a soviet state. The final version called it a
soviet socialist state.l3 It is useless to quibble with their use of
this term to describe the immediate results of their efforts. The

term is so badly misused or overused, like democracy, that am kind

 

”Trisha, p. 29e

 

 

i

102
of semantic argument is out of the question.

Interestingly, initial credit for vast sweeping changes is not
given directly to the Party nor to the proletariat; but to the revolu-
tion as though it had the force of objective law that Marx and especially
Lenin granted it; that its eschatological significance was a fact per-
ceived in time and space. The revolution breached the imperialist
front, established the dictatorship of the proletariat, and created
the new state, a new democracy of worker and peasant power. The
revolution freed the people from foreign capital's enslavement, under-
mined exploitation and social injustice, smashed the chains of national
oppression, abolished the basis of exploitation, emancipated women,
and shook world capitalism to its foundations by leading the country
onto the road of socialism.

Credit for nationalizing industry, railways, banks, and the
land is given to Soviet power-—a synonym for Bolshevik power. The
young Soviet Republic was successful in fighting intervention, civil
war, blockage, disruption, and the inexperience of the working class
in state administration and socialist construction. These difficulties
were increased by the isolation of Russia as the sole standard bearer
for eccialism. Hence the innocent appearing sentence: "The class
struggle in the period of transition from capitalism to socialism was
therefore acute."1" Seldom has such a little word borne so much.

Notwithstanding these obstacles the Party proved equal to its
task of effecting the transition. Lenin is cited as having charted
the whole course, but only really granted credit for the NEP, the guide

lines of industrialisation, agricultural cooperation and a cultural

 

1"Ind. , p. 30.

 

 

10}
revolution. The transition to forced draft industrialization and
rural collectivisation is smothly made. No credit is given to
Stalin, for the notion is advanced that the whole of the Soviet people
and in particular the working class performed this tremendous feat in
a sort of subbotnik cataclysm, led of course by the Party. One might
think it significant that Stalin is not mentioned, but it should be
pointed out that no mention is made of Khrushchev either. The emission
of Stalin's name made it necessary to omit both. However, the device
of tying the whole "acute" period into Lenin's plan for socialist con-
struction is obvious distortion. As a matter of fact Lenin denounced
Trotslq's plan for rapid industrialization and his agricultural pro-
gram stressed voluntarism on the part of the peasantry.

But at any rate the Party proved equal to the task of industrialising,
solving the agricultural problem in a socialist manner, and-bringing
about a revolution, in :science and culture. The result—socialism.

No longer are there the antagonistic classes which result from the
private ownership of the means of production. Socialistic ownership

has ended the exploiting class; and thus is Soviet Russia there remain
only friendly classes-usomething Marx would have found incomprehensible.
The friendship, moreover, between the peasants and the working class

is called indestructible, and the new intelligentsia is allegedly devoted
to socialism. As a result of the Party effort, the Program states,

there is no more exploitation and this is the highest manifestation

of individual liberty and genuine social Justice, functioning in an
atmosphere of true democracy with guaranteed rights and duties, material
incentives which guarantee the congruence of personal and social interests,

and the will to successfully meet war and rehabilitation problems.

104

All of this proves that the Soviet experience counts for something
significant as a model for other countries wishing to build socialia,
even though there are bound to be some slight peculiarities due to
different national conditions. Social can be constructed, Soviet
experience teacher, only with the following factors firmly in mind.

1. A socialist revolution and a dictatorship of the proletariat
are essential.

2. Only socialism can end exploitation, production march,
and other capitalist ills; and provide planned, continuous and rapid
growth of both the econony and the standard of living of the people.

3. There must be a good alliance between the proletarians and
the non-proletarians such as the peasantry.

it. Only socialism ends all national oppression and creates a
climate for national cooperation within a single state.

5. The socialist state is the main instrument of change.

6. Socialism and peace are inseparable. Even peaceful coexistence
with states that have different social systems is possible and desirable.15

7. A coununist Party is essential, for about the same reasons as
given for the necessity of a socialist state.

8. Fidelity to the principles of Marxism-Leninism and of proletarian
internationalism are indispensible.

All of this is taught by the Soviet experience. But now the
Program can put it even more strongly.

"The world's greatest revolution and the socialist

 

15%. mention of different social systems was added to the draft
which had merely mentioned coexistence, undoubtedly a victory for
Khrushchev and the "revisionists" of which more in Chapter VI. Cf Triska,
p. 2“.

105

reorganisation of society, which has attained unprece-
dented heights in its development and prosperity, have

and have delivered a crushing blow to social-reformist
ideology. As a result of the devoted labour of the
Soviet people and the theoretical and practical activi-
ties of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, there

reality _a_n_d_ 5 science of; socialist construction 3133

has; _b_e_gn_ £99.32 3 practice. _T_h_e_ high—road 1:3 socialism

has p_e_e_r_1_ m. Many people are already marching along 16

it, and it will be taken sooner or later by all peoples."

Inexorably the reader has been led to the point where he is
informed in no uncertain terms that the Soviet experience is uniquely
applicable to other countries which began their socialist construction
much later than did the Soviet Union; and that the path to socialism
has already been well charted by the ruling elements in the Soviet
Union. The making of this point is one of the principal reasons for
thepromulgation of the Program, and it functions as a climax to the
theoretical portion of the Program. Once it has been made it colors
the large remainder of Part One and qualifies what is said in Part
She.

Let me illustrate. The words quoted above are the last sentence
preceding a section entitled "The World Socialist System.” The first
sentence of that new section reads: "The Soviet Union is not pursuing
the tasks of commnist construction alone but in fraternal community
with the other socialist countries.”17 This seems like a small about-
face from what had gone before. But almost immediately we learn that

the Russian victory over the German fascists and the Japanese militarists

 

1'6T1risk.a, pp. Bit-35.

17Ib1de, Pe 35o

 

 

106

created the favorable conditions for the emergence of the other
socialist countries after the war. Thus the position of M Later;
pge_s is constantly maintained.

The section on the socialist camp is noteworthy for the many
many appeals to unity and the benefits resulting therefrom; for the
chastisement given to the "revisionism" of Yugoslavia, and for the
apparently special significance given to the Chinese revolution}8
Albania is listed in first place alphabetically without comment.
Yugoslavia, Albania, and China in this sort of position represent a
compromise; but even though theChinese Peoples' Republic was granted
the apparent special treatment it does not last long. It is consider-
ably thawed by the many references to unity at a time when China was
not interested in unity, especially with Khrushchev. And, interestingly
enough, this is brought home even more by a muted attack on China in
the Program. After stressing unity the document states that no country
in the socialist camp can have, nor should have any special rights or
privileges. Then: "The line of socialist construction in isolation,
detached from the world community of fosiclist countries, is theoreti-
cally untenable because it conflicts with the objective laws governing
the development of socialist society. ”19 On the other hand unity

ensures the victory of socialism and communin. It is clear that the

 

18This position does not square at all with Khrushchev's blistering
attack on Albania in his speech to the Congress, thus revealing that the
Program's formulation was not his idea. See Khrushchev's Report of the
Central Committee to the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the

Soviet Union, delivered October 17, 1961, in The Go rose of the
CPSU, Vol I, (New York: Crosscurrents Press, 1931?, pp. 151 ff.

”Trisha, p. 36.

107

Program is referring to China because the words used to describe such
isolated construction are not revisionism and the like, but reactionary
and politically dugerous.

This is then followed by the refrain that the existence of the
Soviet Union greatly facilitates the tasks of socialist construction
in other countries. It is admitted that Lenin was right in that class
struggle does not disappear from the construction of socialism. One
could conclude from this that the class conflict, manifesting itself
especially in nationalistic chauvinism is a phenomenon inthepeoples'
democracies but not an longer-in the Soviet Union because it has passed
that economic stage. This is further evidence that the Russian Party
is the leader of the international movement, and it creates the addi-
tional return of considering any wavering from the path of the mother
hen ideologically, i.e., as evidence of class conflict, or imaturity;
and potentially of course this has the possibility of isolating the
proponents of such a separate path as nationalistic-bourgeoisie or
counter-revolutionary in the old Soviet context of the terns-permitting
suppression or exclusion.

Having made all of'its important points, the Program can new deal
with a safe subjectm-the crisis of capitaliu. It is safe in the
same sense that a good sermon on the wickedness of the world and its
eventual destruction is safe in an orthodox church. It is very much
against sin, while at the same time it makes everyone feel good by
comparison. "Imperialism has entered the period of decline and collapse.
An inexhorable process of decay has seized capitalism from top to

bottom . . ."20 But all sermons cannot be easily laughed away; and the

 

2°Ibid., p. 39.

108
same is true of this analysis. Growing bureaucratization, for example,
or militarism, agricultural restrictions contrasting with hungry world
populations, and the racist oppressions cannot simply be balanced by
pointing to the unclean skirts of the Program's authors.

But the mjaor thrust of the section portrays imperialist or
state-monopoly capitalism in its death throes which even the possession
of nuclear weapons will not prevent, for the capitalist system is out-
dated and must collapse. But the international revolutionary movement,
on the other hand, has a bright future. It is impressed with the
successes of the world socialist camp. Those revolutionary movements
not w impressed, it may be assumed, do not have this bright future.21
And this revolutionary selectivity is not new by any means. It dates
back at least from the formation of the Third International, and beyond
that to the endless conflicts of Lenin, Marx, and Engels had with their
ideological cousins. The trick, however, is in discussing the revolu-
tionary movements in the world as though only those which are approved
by the Soviet leaders exist; which is a manifest distortion. But by
using the device of calling them working-class movements or the growing
forces of democracy and socialism this distortion is covered up.

In discussing national revolutionary movements there seems to have
been considerable caution in dealing with the aggressive style of
Chinese dogmatism. One change between the draft and the final version
reveals that the Soviet leaders wanted to avoid offending China dnd
still maintain their own position. After describing, in now familiar

rhetoric, the advantages accruing to the revolutionary forces because

 

as» the recent attacks on Herbert Marcuse and the New Left in
P2383“, w w. 1968.

109

of the presence of the Soviet camp, the authors made special efforts
to be specific about a sort of revolutionary gain which did not go
all the way to a full revolution. The Program notes the international
shift to the left, presumably Soviet, position, and then states that
in the new historical situation £925 capitalism the bourgeoisie can
be compelled to grant things that transcend ordinary reforms, that
" . . . are of vital importance to the working class and the progress
of its struggle for the victory of the revolution, for socialism, as
well as to the majority of the nation,"22 The phrase "the victory of
the revolution" was added to the draft Program and should be seen as
a concession to the dogmatists in Soviet circles as well as a cop to
the Chinese. It most clearly did not achieve its ob;iective,23 for
once having called for a constant revolutionary struggle and related
items, the Program "prefers” a peaceful transition to socialism in
the draft Program, and in the final version the ”attempt to achieve"
revolution by peaceful means.2u

Only when the ruling class resorts to violence should the non-
peaceful method be considered; but it is expected that the ' degree
of violence used against the revolutionary forces will be relative to
the strength of the capitalist or reactionary forces. This rather

leaves it up to the historical situation in a country at a particular

azTriska, :9. “8e

aaflote the Chinese response: "It is a programme which opposes revo-
lution on the art of the people still li under the imperialist and
capitalist sys em who comprise two thirds o the world's population, and
o poses the carrying of revolution through to completion on he part of
t a people alreach on the socialist road, who comprise one-third of the
world' s population. It is a revisionist programe for the preservation
or restoration of capitalise." The Polemic on The General Line of the

 

International Comnist Movement, (Pm: F'oreIE Wes Press, I965),
p. 92.
2‘:

Trim, p. m.

110
time. Even.the possibility of compensation to the dispossessed bourgeoisie
is considered possible, and the ideological quicksand is avoided by
lumping all these elements together as part of the struggle against
the enemy, and maintaining that whatever form of the struggle is se-
lected it can only come through revolution and be followed by what must
essentially be the dictatorship of the proletariat.

In.other*words the Program is walking a political tightrope. It
favors cooperation.with social democratic parties, but then severely
curtails the possibility of such.cooperation.by calling for the Commun-
ists to soundly criticize the ideological positions and opportunist
practice of the social democrats who have sided with the bourgeoisie-
a.very elastic designation, obviously. The Yugoslavs are chided for
their revisionism, and revisionism is listed as the chief danger within
the communist movement. But Khrushchev's attack on the dogmatismiof
Albania.in his report to this same congress revealed that he was more
concerned with dogmatism, and perhaps would have listed it as the
chief danger had he had his way. The watered-down.compromise in the
Program is threatened, however, by the obvious intent of the paragraph
on dogmatism which states that the dogmatists are counter to the creative
development of revolutionary theory leading to isolation of Communists
from the masses and to leftist adventurism.

But then.again, as though getting too close to saying something,
the Program swings back to its theme of unity by referring to the
statements of the fraternal parties in 1957 and 1960. This ignores
Khrushchev‘s attack on the Chinese in.Budapest in 1960 and uses the
ambiguous terminology of these declarations to pull the wool of unity

downsébut it could not succeed.

111

When discussing wars of liberation the Program similarly sidesteps
definitive positions and delicately steps between its fear of war, its
reluctance to harm relationships with already independent countries
which are not socialist; and its very evident desire to appear as an
orthodox international revolutionary Marxist which must breathe fire
and brimstone in order to do so. Revolution is necessary, of course.
But it may be one which is in concert with the national bourgeoisie,
imbued with nationalism now white-washed because it is anti-imperialist,
and contents itself with stating that the revolution so made must bring
about radical changes in the social and economic spheres and solve the
pressing problems of national rebirth?"5 But what is insured here is
independence, not socialism. In this context the choice is given the
new country as to what road of development will be taken, the low road
being capitalism leading downward, and the high road being socialism
leading upward. But this socialism refers specifically to developmental
socialism, the Stalin model if you will, the rapid expansion of a
command economy. No mention is made of civil war, purges, or the diets--
torehip of the proletariat. But even so the last two sentences of this
paragraph in the draft Program were deleted. They would have made the
position too clear:

"This road will require concessions from the bourgeoisie,

but those will be concessions in behalf of the nation.

All sections of the population can find application for

their energies, proviggd they follow the non-capitalist

road of development.“

The tone of the Program here is very much pro what it calls a national

 

find-deg Pe fie
2613111., pp. 57-58e

112
democracy and cites as mistaken the view that the communist parts of
such a movement should be persecuted. Such an activity would weaken
the liberation movement, impel-ii the gains to be made, and is counter
to the national interests of the people themselves. Surely this is a
new high for mildness.

The purpose behind this gentle tone is soon made clear. The
neutral nations play a large role in the prevention of war. The problem
of war is listed as the focal problem of the times which must be solved
in the interests of all peoples. The language is militaristic, e.g.,
force the imperialist aggressors to retreat, but the purpose is peace,
congruent with Khrushchev' 3 position since the Soviet explosion of the
hydrogen bomb.

The mildnems of the section dealing with the national-liberation
movement is countered immediately by one treating once again bourgeois
ideology and its decline, and the impotence of reformist ideology;
although the latter is not given nearly the same space as the former.

The reason for this section, containing some truth and some distortion,
seems to be as balance for the following section which deals with peaceful
coexistence and the struggle for world peace. Italicized is the sentence:
"The issue of war and peace is the principal issue of today" and "file
main thing is to ward off it thermonuclear war, to prevent it from breaking
out."27 This not only meant to the Soviet leaders a cooperation among

the socialist nations to compel if possible the renunciation of war as an
instrument of national policy, this also meant things that were not at

all acceptable to the dogmatists whether in China or in the Soviet

 

27Ibid., p. on.

 

 

113

Union. After having labeled the USA as the principal enemy, decaying,
moribund, hostile, anti-communist, imperialistic, militaristic, and
combined in aggressive blocs against the socialist camp; it is very
strange to read the Soviet peaceful coexistence

” . . . implies renunciations of war as a means of settling

international disputes, and their solution by negotiation;

equality, mutual understanding and trust between countries;

consideration for each other's interests; non-interference

in internal affairs; recognition of the right of every

people to solve all the problems of their country by them-

selves; strict respect for the sovereignty and territorial

integrity of all countries; promotion of economic and cul-

tural cooperation on the basis of complete equality and

mutual benefit."
The result of this profoundly status-quo approach would be competi-
tion rather than warfare. Diplomatic struggle would replace the more
violent forms. Even the Federal Republic of Germany is included in
this approach, and even wars between capitalist countries is opposed.

while this was a policy that any sane man could applaud, it was
nonetheless a direct slap to the aspirations of China. Yet Khrushchev
stated in his Report to the Congress: "The course adopted by our'Party
has been of tremendous significance in.otrengthening the unity of the
socialist countries . . ."29 But the concept of peaceful coexistence
he spelled out in that Report was hardly conducive to unity unless he
meant by unity following the lead of the USSR. Peaceful coexistence
meant the simultaneous existence of two opposed social systems which

have both renounced wars.)0 Placing this kind of coexistence on.a

 

28Ibid., pp. 65-66.
291Khrushchev's Re rt to the Co as, op. cit. p. 7.

mI‘bide, p. 46o

111+
programstic level could have only meant to the Chinese that they were
not going to receive Soviet assistance in their adventures even though
they were supposed to be ideological brothers.

It seems to me that I have demonstrated that to overlook this
first part of the Program is to ignore a great deal more than a repeti-
tion of tired words. That these words have great significance in the
political struggles of the 1958-60 time period is amply proven by the

Chinese reaction to them. The ”why" of the Program is buried right

. r ' "am

here in Part One, as we shall see in much more detail in the following
chapter.

The second half of the Program is more ideologically fresh, how-
ever, and for this reason perhaps has been granted western attention
in more of a comprehensive manner. Nonetheless the response of
western scholars has been one which can be best characterized as a
yawn. The blueprint for the future is called conservative, even
extremely consemtive by Dan Jacobs.31 Alfred G. Meyer, in his
recent general book on the Soviet system scarcely mentions the Program
at all. _ Nor does Carl Linden who did an excellent stuw of conflict
among the leaders of the country during the Khrushchev era}2 The
Schapiro and Laqueur readers do not differ significantly. In an
article Meyer saw the Program as another example of the Soviet's

forced program of industrialization. 33 George Lichtheim found the

 

3:I'Dan Jacobs, The New Communist Manifesto, op. cit., p. 21?.

32Alfred 3. Meyer, The Soviet gpliticsl sttem, (New York: Random
House, 1965) , and Carl Linden, Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadershi ,
lQZ-lfi, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1935.

8:3ili'red e, Ieyer, "hunty Years On," Laqueur and Labeds, op. cit.,
Po 1 O

 

 

 

115

major purpose of the document to be propaganda which by utilizing vul-
garized Marxist terminology states its faith in the authoritarian
brand of socialism imposed on.the masses by a technocratic ruling
elite.3h

This contrasts sharply with the Program's own view of itself.
Communism is listed as the bright future for all mankind and this
document reveals how to get there. Obviously such a.map cannot he
called conservative and yet scholars do so. It is not that they are
skeptical about Russia's meeting the various goals that are set up in
the Program so much as it is the feeling that even.were these opti-
mistic goals not it would still not make that much difference. One
might conclude that this feeling on the part of western observers
is a result of their cultural or educational ethnocentrism-they are
so used to thinking about communism as an unattainable never—never
land that when someone brings it down to earth it is equivalent to
telling Virginia that there is no Santa.Claus. But surely the question
is begged here. If the concept of communism is brought down.to earth
in such a way as to suggest that it is no more than the ability to
produce x:tons of steel or butter or electrical power then the concept
of communism loses whatever distinctiveness it formerly may have had,
whether rightly or wrongly.

But is this all? Steel, butter, etc.? No-there is more; but
what is said about this additional material does not inspire any more
confidence in its eventual realization.than.previous writings on the

subject; and raises as many questions as it purports to answer.

 

3“(Emerge Lichtheim, "The Programme and the MarxistnLeninist Tradi-
tion," in Schapiro, op. cit., pp. 33-3“.

 

 

116
Communism, states the Program, is a classless social system with
public ownership of the means of production and social equality for
all members of the society. Productive growth will dynamically provide
a geyser of wealth, so that distribution to the population will for the
first time by any country be on the basis of need rather than for work
performed. The concept of need is later qualified by such.words as
"reasonable", "sound", and the needs of perfectly developed persons.
This suggests that not all needs will be satisfied; or further, that
not all the needs will be even partially satisfied. All of this, of
course, raises the necessity of some individual or group deciding on
which needs are to be satisfied, and many other complications.

The basis for the alteration of the society, however, is to be
material, i.e., economic and technical. There are near constant
references in the document as well as in the contemporary Soviet Press
articles to the building of the material and technical basis of communism.
But the foundation for this construction program.is still the formula
made famous by Lenin’-Soviet power plus electrification of the whole
country. As we saw, this meant a maintenance of the present power
configurations plus a comprehensive technological development which
would industrialize the country on the most modern basis possible.

But since this is precisely what the Soviet planners have thought that
they were doing since 1928 or even before, one can understand those
western scholars who have insisted that there is really nothing new
about this Program.which so ought to be fresh and new.

Soviet power is a euphemism fer'Party control, and it has been

since 1917. The Program is a.Party document and shows a marked tendency

11?
to imply that the transition to communism, or the building of the
material and technical basis of communism, will not be possible without
the guidance of the Party. This second part of the document is sepa-
rated into the tasks of the Party in various fields of endeavor, such
as agriculture, or industry. There is no mention of a withering of
the Party therefore; rather the Program itself provides ideological
justification for a heightening of the role of the CPSU. Among the
leadership elite in 1961 or later there is no known advocate of such
a party withering along with the state, or even subsequent to the
state. And with the attempts of Khrushchev to replace the state by
the Party even references to the withering of the state are disappoint-
ing. Someone must administer the things rather than the men; and pre—
sumably there is no group better able to do this, in the minds of the
Party planners, than the Party itself.

Since to do a thing in stages has an aura of the experimental and
therefore scientific, the Party of scientific socialism had determined
that the transition to communism would also take place in stages, and
in mentioning this a slap could again be taken at the presumptuousness
of the CPC in alleging that their oomunes were a direct route of
comunism, skipping the stages of socialism. But the Soviet stages
aresosimple that theyhardlyqualifyasanimprovuemteverany
kind of crash program. They are simply decades; some goals are to be
reached in the first decade, and others in the second. After these
two stages or twenty years had passed, the foundation for communism
would have, in the main, been built, Full comni. was to have bloomed

sometime after this deadline of 1980, but within the lifetime of the

 

   

118
present generation in Russia.35
It is clear from a perusal of the goals of the two stages that
what is meant to happen is a rational and efficient improvement of the
Soviet economy in all of its aspects. The industrial goals and others

which follow reveal this strongly.

1. There is to be a.marked increase in the number of highly
skilled workers, with low-skilled work being done by machinery.

2. Rapid growth in productivity is to be balanced.with multi-
faceted training of the worker to do a variety of jobs, even special‘
ized ones. This maintains the specialization of labor which had made
possible so much industrial advance; while at the same time attempting
to circumvent Marx’s objections to the degrading aspects of such
specialization.

3. Systematic wage increases particularly to the lower levels
with the goal of eliminating the lower level, while at the same time
reducing the work week and work day significantly below the forty
hour week and the eight hour day.

4. Greatly increase the production of electrical energy, steel,
automobiles, and intensively develop automation, cybernetics, computer
technology, precision machinery, consumer goods production, the chemical
industry for fertilizers and plastics, and in general industry east of
the Urals.

5. A single power grid for the country will be constructed along
with atomic power stations in poorer areas. Transportation.will be

expanded and improved with more highways, faster public carrier travel,

 

35mm, p. 129.

 

 

 

119
and a system of deep water canals to link internal centers with
ocean ports.

6. Improvements are to be realized in capital investment; i.e.,
more profitable trends in capital construction are to be selected, em-
phasis is to be placed on maximum output per invested ruble, and a
reduction of time lag will be sought between investment and return.
This speaks volumes against interest-free lending by the state, and
interest charges are a part of the current economic reforms.

7. This will result in a passing of the United States in per
capita production, long a Khmshchevian goal. However theProgram care-
fully states that what the Soviets will do in twenty years is pass the

resent, i.e., 1960 levels of production sndlabor productivity in the
[1.5. This is considerably different from the general tone of the
Program's implication; that they would become the richest nation on
earth in terms ofproduction and consumption. The draft Program con-
tained the qualifier "contemporary" when referring to the U.S. level
which was to be surpassed in the first stage. The qualifier was dele-
ted in the final version.36 But the following sentence includes the
qualifier ”present” even in the final version when referring to the
volume of outputm-so that what the Program ends up stating is that
the present 0.5. volume of output in twenty years will be left far
behind by the Soviet Union—ambiguous enough to leave the impression
of richest and best unimpaired. I do not believe that the authors
felt that 0.8. growth rates would stagnate, for they elsewhere allow

such rates of growth even though they are smaller than those accorded

 

36Ibid., p. 73.

 

 

1m
to the economies of the socialist camp. This bit of realism corresponds
roughly to statistical projections by western scholars that the Soviet
Union is approximately that far behind the American levels.”

8. Besides allof this there is to be an improvement in working
conditions such as eliminating night work where feasible; and elimi-
nating dirty, degrading, and baskhresking labor. Benefits accruing
to the worker besides more wages and shorter working hours will include
longer vacations up to a month each year, and the extension of public
catering to provide meals at work, more rest homes, and country hotels
where the laborer can relax. I

In agriculture there is a similar desire to improve and expand
through what the Program calls intensification. Peasant incomes are
to grow rapidly until they match the worker income in the city and be
guaranteed by the state. W (bombination of urban-rural ele-
ments), long a Khrushchev dream, will become a reality with green
urban centers and rural centers to be model towns with agrarian indus-
trial associations and much greater development of conunity services,
public catering, nurseries and kindergartens. In addition labor produc-
tivity on the farms will rise greatly, and this greater productivity
aided by increased use of machinery, skilled training, fertilizers,
and general scientific agriculture will result in constant progress in
the aggregate output of agricultural products to levels far in excess
of those obtaining in 1960.

In short there is to be improvement everywhere. Real incomes

will slqrocket especially for those now in a low paving category.

37 See for example Solomon Schwartz, The Soviet Econo Since Stalin,
(New York: Lippincott 8: Co., 1965), p. 253.

 

 

 

 

 

 

121
Improvements will be seen in shepping facilities, and consumer coops.
The housing shortage will be overcome. Health care will be battered
by extending mother and child health institutes, maternity homes,
children's health centers, and hospitals. Women will further benefit
from the improvement of public catering to free them from the stove,
children's boarding schools to free them from child care, and domestic
appliance production to make their home life less of a burden. This
implies that the Soviet woman goes on working outside the home which
may or may not be what the woman herself wants.

Education will be improved by making more certain that it is
available to everyone within the country, and that the same high
standards of education prevail throughout. Especially important from
the point of view of the Program is the necessity of developing a
communistic attitude toward labor on the part of the younger generation.
Without such an attitude, obviously, this carefully constructed house
of cards will tumble down.

Public consumption funds will increase rapidly, even more so
than increases in wages; even though taxes will be abolished. From
this consumption fund will be provided a vast array of free and soon
to be free services to the population which would greatly supplement
their incomes. Children would be maintained at boarding schools for
nothing and those unable to work would receive a stipend, Education,
medical services and medicines, housing, communal services, transpor-
tation, public catering, and to some extent the use of holiday homes,
camps and sports facilities would be free. Stipends for unmarried

mothers and mothers of many children would also come out of this fund.

 

 

 

122

Another goal was the eradication of private farming plots as soon
as this was feasible, although this might take some doing. Although
they constitute only 3% of the cultivated land area, private plots in
196# accounted for 42%iof the milk and meat production, 73% of the
egg output, and 60% of the potato crop.38 Likewise, that school of
communism for the peasantry, the collective farm, will one day be
merged into the state farms into the property of the whole people.
Since this is an ideological statement rather than practical economics
it should be considered rather elastic.

Other fairly flexible goals include the notion of the withering
of the state by means of increasing mass participation in it, extending
the power and the scope of the local soviets, and providing frequent
election and recall privileges. The real test of the removal of the
state is, however, the removal of state ooercion.or subordination.

This the Program states will be gardually accomplished. But although
there is no longer a dictatorship of the proletariat, but a state of
the whole people, as long as there are criminals there must be coercive
punishment. Criminals are those who commit crimes dangerous to society,
violate the rules of the socialist community, and refust to live by
honest labor. When.these disappear, presumably in full communism, the
compulsion power of the state is also supposed to fade. That this is
mere lip service to the withering concept is obvious. But when that
day arrives there will be substituted for the state a communist public
self government, guided by the vanguard of the mass organisations, the

CPSU; and embracing the Soviets, trade-unions, cooperatives, and other

3aharshall Goldman, The Soviet Econo!%: gyth and Reality,
(Ehglewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 19 , p. 102.

 

 

 

 

 

-r

125 -- ,2;
mass organs of the pe0ple. "Communist society will be a highly organ-
ized community of working men. Universally recognized rules of the
communist way of life will be established whose observance will become
the organic need and habit with everyone."39 But all this must wait
the building of a developed communist society, and the consolidated
victory of socialism in the world arena; sufficiently vague time zones
to satisfy everyone and no one at the same time. The state will stay
for the foreseeable future.

All of these wondrous things would come to naught from an.ideo-
logical point of view if they do not result at the same time in the
making of work something substantively different than it was before.
In other words the quantitiative alterations must be accompanied by
qualitative changes. Work must become a primary need for man. Material
incentives will no longer be necessary because there will be a fusion
of individual and social motivations, and because the implementation.of
communist distribution removes the necessity of working for a living.
The Program is confident that this will create the potential for
labor to be freely creative and a source of joy to the laborer.

This is possible only if the man involved becomes what the Program
calls the perfectly developed man.

But what is this perfectly developed.man2 One having a.high
degree of communist consciousness, in tune with the subbotniks of
old. He will have industry, discipline, and devotion to the public
interest; he will be a participator in the management of public

affairs. His labor is a love, a need, and an end in itself. He will

 

39Triska, p. 10%.

 

 

 

Mix??? ”1" 2..“ 2 ‘ ,a. i " "V' ' "r-u -.‘;,'__ n a... ,_,_ r. _
I

 

 

 

.re _ _. C-rflth- .:__ fi,,

126
be a highly moral man living an exemplary life in his family which is
based on.mutual love and friendship. He will be a free man, freer than
any before him.

Thus when we leave the quantative and reach the qualitative the
Program becomes much less cautious and conservative sounding, for this
would require a fundamental transformation of man. He would have to
be the sort whose name the guardian of the gates of pearl would have
no difficulty in finding on the list. He is a result of the changed
behavior when the material and technical conditions are completed.

But the society in which this perfect individual will function
is to be a highly organized society, and presumably the high degree of
organization refers to the planning of the economy of the new society.
But other things must also be organized. All individuals are to enjoy
equal status because distinctions such as between rural and urban, or
status differentiations between men and women, or between mental and
physical labor are to be obliterated by bringint the lower up to the
level of the higher. Hence freedomxto either be poor or dumb is not
optional. Freedom.to be either generous‘or selfish seems to be ruled
out by the programmatic decision that relations will be harmonious
due to the complete identification of one's personal and social
interests. Progress in production will be uninterrupted, and pre-
sumably will occur at a.high rate since this is often cited as one of
the major differences between socialist and capitalist economies. The
low rates of development are cited as evidence of the decay of capital-
ism, and the high rates as proving the vitality and historical correct-

ness of the socialist system.

 

 

IV.‘ lilll ll! lull! III-Ill!“ . I

 

127

Moreover, this perfectly developed man's needs will be satisfied
from public sources. But this most assuredly-does not mean that he is
freed.from the necessity of working. He will not be permitted to live
a life of laziness, since every able-bodied man will participate in
socially useful labor. The ideological support for this is that when
the necessity of labor as means disappears, labor as and becomes the
prime and vital need because man's distinguishment from.the animal world
below him is his ability to create or to produce. Hence this freed man
will produce, will create, will work. Those that do not work are already
listed as criminals in the Program, and this should.not change with the
coming of communism. JPerhaps the most one could expect is that which
the Program.itself suggests, namely that the means of handling the problem
would change. Instead of execution.or prison, one might be sent to a
mental institution for corrective treatment. But besides this, social
pressure ought to be sufficient to keep the individual from exercising a
freedom.from.work.

But this raises the issue of what this new man is free from.
Certainly he is free from all sorts of inequality. He is going to be
equal insofar as status is concerned with regard to income, distribution,
job conditions, cultural advantages, education, and the like. He will
be free to be equal, but not free to have differentiated status. He

will still feel the necessity of working, and it would still be for a

117138 9"“ though thfl 30°1°ty thrusts itself in between the worker and
the recipient. "Communist production demands high standards or organisa-
tion, precision and discipline, which are ensured, not by compulsion, but

through an understanding of public duty, and are determined by the whole

128
pattern of life in communist society.”‘+o

While this might be sung to the tune of Onward Christian Soldiers
and be very stirring, it still seems to replace one type of compulsion
with another, and imply that the public duty style of Mpulsion is
preferable. This, of course, might be true for some people, but not
for others. Hence this freedom to be compelled in this instance by
social mores or whatever, would represent for some people a real cur-
tailment of their freedom. But since this group would be counterposing
themselves not only to the supposed will of the majority, but also to
the objective law of man's development, their voice of protest would be
lost in the wind. Nonetheless

"Communism represents the highest form of organization

of public life. All production units and self-governing

:lfixtfiflsafi2kmfiifi$§°$i 311‘?“ 1’1“"
Equal man is free to float with the stream, hopefully to swin with the
stream. And want to. But this picnic has ants.

But even so, how can this transformation of man possibly be seen
as a result of this kind of economic progress? From the Program's
point of view it is a transformation, a radical one. The primary
vehicle is not economic progress but education. The educational task
is a phenomenal one. The Party is exhorted to educate all working
people in the spirit of ideological integrity and devotion to coununiss;
to cultivate in them a communist attitude towards labor. But the molding
of the new man is brought about by his active participation in the

construction of communiss and the development of comunist principles

 

“Trim 9 PP e 60.70 s.

“Inn" p. 70..

129
in economic and social areas under the influence of the educational
work of the Party, the state, and other social organizations with
the help of the press, radio, movies, and television. The image
projected by the Program is one of mass mobilization of all resources
to educate, to turn the twig from bourgeois (they would say socialist)
to oomnist standards of living. It should also be clear that this
comes from the top down and not the reverse even though the Program
wants to have it both ways.
"As communist forms of social organisation are created,

comunist ideas will become more firmly rooted in life and

work and in human relations, and people will develop the

ability to enjoy the benefits of communism in a rational way.

Joint planned labour by the members of society, their daily

participation in the management of state and public affairs,

and the development of communist relations of comradely

co-operation and mutual support, recast the minds of maple

in a spirit of collectivism, industry, and humanism. 2
However, this contrasts with a later statement to the effect that
contrary to previous socio-economic formations connumim does not
develop spontaneously or sporadically, " . . . but as a result of
the conscious andpurposeful efforts of the masses led by the Marxist-
Leninist Party.“3 In other words without the Party there is no
comunian. But the Program must also say likewise that without the
peeple there can be no conunism, even though this is fairly meaning-

less. "The people are the decisive force in the building of

communism. _T_h_e_ Party exists 39;; the 22211.20 _sn_<_i_ it is _i_n aging the
1.1,

people that it sees the m gf_ it; activi I.” And this Party
existing for the people is invincible, with unshakable ideological

and organizational unity, even though it considers it a duty to consult

 

 

“21b1d., p. 110.“
431b1d.. p. 125.
“Hide, P0 1280

130
the people on major questions of home and foreign policy in its develop-
ment of socialist democracy.

That the Party exists for the people is a statement of belief based
on faith rather than reason, and it thus cannot be attacked. But
certainly the future society projected by the Party in this Program
is one that must be imposed from above through education, coercion,
social pressure, example, and mental rehabilitation. Its attractiveness,
nonetheless, to a great many people in the Soviet Union, manifested by
m many coversations with Russians in a variety of occupations can be
traced to those parts of the document which promise a richer and fuller
life, a life of comparative abundance.

The new society is a planned, highly organized society of equals,
socially motivated to produce in an atmosphere of abundance freely
shared; with all the component parts functioning with the rhythm of a
finely made watch; surrounded and embraced by the vanguard of the
people. Authority will be lodged within the Party as administrator,
for the state will have withered as state; with the functions of the
state taken over by the vanguard which exists for the people. Shortly
after, the other socialist nations will follow; and then, finally,
the imperialist nations will do likewise. The world of nations will
then function in harmony with a world communist econonw regulated by
the victorious working peeple according to one single plan. Socialism
in one country, turning into communism in one country, will have become

communism of the whole world.

CHAPTER VI
AN EXPLANATION OF THE PROGRAM

The Third.Party Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union.was adopted in 1961 for three reasons. One was China, the
second was Yugoslavia, and the third was a related conflict within
the leadership elite of the Soviet Party. I shall develop them as chron-
ologically as possible and hope to weave together an understandable
fabric into which the Soviet Program fits.

What must first be done is to dispense with the idea that Soviet
politics is a smooth stream, rarely rippled by dissent or conflict.
This rather simplistic ides sees in the person of the First or General
Secretary the one man who, having all the levers of power in his hands,
is able to dominate all his colleagues completely and impose his will
and his alone on the Russian populace. while this approach might be
comforting to those who wish to find a totalitarian syndrome operative
in the Soviet Union, it is not true. Debate on this issue surfaced in

the United States in 1963 and 1964-.1

 

lCarl. Linden, "Khmshchev and the Party Battle," Problems of

Communism, vol. 12, September-October, 1963, pp. 27-35; Thomas Righy,
"The Extents and Limits of Authority," ibid., pp. 36-kl; Robert Conquest,
"After'xhrushchev: A Conservative Restoration?," ibid., pp. #l-ko; Carl
Linden, "Facts in Search.of a Theory," Problems of Communism, vol 12,
November-December 1963, pp. 56-58; Robert Tucker, "The Conflict Model,"
ibid., pp. 59-61; Wolfgang Leonhard, "An Anti-Khrushchev Opposition," ‘
ibid., pp. 61-64; Michel Gordey, ”vanka' Vstanka," ibid., pp. 6h-6§,~
After Khrushchev's "resignation" see the spate of articles in the issues
of JanuaryeFebruary, Hay-June, and July-August, 1965, under the title

131

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

132

The main point of separation between these and other scholars
has been.not whether conflict exists in the leadership circles of
the ruling elite, but whether conflict is to be treated as a continuous
and crucial fact of Soviet political life. Once a leader was apparently
firmly in.power, the one group tended to underplay conflict. The
other school saw conflict not as a temporary phenomena on the way to
total power, but rather as an integral part of the dynamic and unstable
leadership politics; in other words as a permanent part of Soviet
politics. Robert Tucker puts it well.

"Probably the most important single failing of
Soviet studies in the West has been a general tendency
to take pretty much at face value the Communist preten-
sion to a 'monolithic' system of politics. In communist
theory or ideology, unity and harmony are the rule in
the Party and conflict is the exception, something that
regrettably occurs from time to time but remains an abnor-
mality; and this has been an underlying assumption of much
Western.thinking about Soviet politics. The truth seems
to be, however, that the unity and harmony in Soviet
politics are largely a matter of external show and pre-
tense, and that in Soviet politics as it is carried on
behind the scenes they are the exception and conflict
is thO rule."

In the new situation created by Stalin's death-
with no clear line of succession marked out, with old
animosities dividing the top leaders—~the conflict for
factional ascendancy not only continued but grew in
force and intensity, and on several occasions has erupted
onto the surface of Soviet public life in full view of a
startled worm."2

Hence every statement of policy, every indication of a new direction

should be seen as first of all a compromise, and secondly an indication

 

"The Coup and After," by Merle Fainsod, Richard Lowenthal, Robert Cone
quest, Uri Ralanan, Adam Ulam, Leon Smolinski, Seweryn Bailer, T. H.
Rigby, J. W. Cleary, and Carl Linden.

ZRobert Tucker, The Soviet Political Hind, (New York; Praeger,
1963)e Po 60

 

 

 

133

of the limit to which the currently dominant faction can push.

Then the successes and failures of both domestic and foreign policy
objectives either aid or harm that leading faction; resulting in slow
wave-like movement of progress and retrogression reflecting the under-
lying struggle for power.

But before getting involved in the events which led up to the
adoption of the Program it is well that certain vocabulary problems
be discussed. There are two broad groupings in which conflict is
played out in the Soviet Union since 1953—revisionism and dogmatism.
Revisionism means a favorable attitude towards rapprochement with
Yugoslavia, reformism in domestic politics, anti-Stalinim, less
terror as a motive for compliance, consumer goods over heavy industry,
more literary freedom or less fear of it, distrust of China, and a
greater desire to trust the West. Dogmatism, on the other hand,
means a pro-China line, conservatism in domestic politics, unwilling-
ness to de-Stalinize or a wish to go very slowly, literary repression,
heavy industry over consumer goods production, less innovation, a die--
like of Yugoslav revisionsim, and a distrust of the West. Each time
these terms are used all of the parts of the syndrome are not necessarily
meant; but the context in such a case usually shows why this is true.
Most of the time, however, the whole general syndrome will be conveyed
by the single word.

The first faction to emerge after the death of Stalin in 1953
was the Malenlaov-Beria coalition. Immediately after Stalin's funeral
these two began disassociating themselves from Stalin by urging a
lessening of reliance on terror internally, and a reconsideration of

Stalin's position on Yugoslavia externally. This does not necessarily

 

 

 

1%

mean that Malenkov with his internal economic liberalization policies
or that Beria with his more liberal policies towards the dependent
nationalities within the Soviet Union actually believed in these
things. That is not the point at all. They may have been sincere-
but they need not have been; for the primary purpose of adopting posi-
tions either on the side of revisionism or dagmatism or somewhere in
between was to consolidate or achieve power.

But Beria moved in mach a fashion as to alarm his opponents
in the Politburo by calling so many MUD units to Moscow, and giving
an excuse for fearing that a 2023 was intended. In July of 1953 he
was arrested and allegedly executed in December of that year. From
this point on he will be used as a scapegoat for Stalin, at times
when it was not politic to dondemm the former leader. The fact that
his arrest followed the uprising in the German Democratic Republic
so quickly suggests that his more liberal policies towards national
minorities and presumably the countries of Eastern Europe was also
being arrested and for the time shelved.

Besides the July rising in the GDR there was in the Soviet Union
a literary "thaw" which derived its name from the novel by Ilya
Ehrenburg. This period of greater freedom from controls coincided
with the August speech of Malenkov in which he announced the intention
of increasing consumer goods production so that the Soviet standard of
living could increase. Both distribution and agriculture were to be
improved. But the Five Year Plan (1951-1955) still reflected the
Stalinist or (new) dogmatist emphasis on monster projects in heavy

industry. Thus he would have uphill sledding until that emphasis was

   

135

altered. In addition Malenkov began stressing peaceful coexistence
with the Hoot.3 we have come to associate both of these attitudes
with Khrushchev, but during the Malenkov period Khrushchev' s rivavry
with him forced his muting of these policies; and Khrushchev chose to
stay with revising the agricultural situation-~something that could,
initially at least, be accomplished without a basic reorientation of
the heavy industry syndrome dear to the interests of the dogmatists.

It is not surprising that these careful plans resulted in
Khrushchev's being named First Secretary in September of 1953 with
Malenkov moving over to the governmental side as Premier. This may
have been satisfactory to Malenkov who probably felt he had no reason
to fear the Party organization he had controlled for so long under
Stalin; and his basic directives were more in keeping with the post
of Chairman of the Council of Ministers. But almost immediately
Khrushchev began to undercut any possible leadership by Malenkov es-
pecially in regard to agriculture. Khrushchev began holding Plenums
of the Central Committee on the agricultural question, and in several
speeches he carefully laid out £a__rtl tasks in regard to agriculture,
and rather carefully hedged on some of Malenkov's economic projections.“
The basic motive for this was to undercut Malenkov by making govern-
ment tasks Party tasks so that they would come under his jurisdiction.
Besides, by urging the Virgin land scheme on the Party and getting it
accepted Khrushchev made necessary vast alterations in machinery

supply and transportation requirements and was therefore in a lovely

 

:Pravda, August 19, 1953.

“Pravda, September 15, 1953.

   

 

136
position to attack the various ministries of the USSR and the RFSFR
from an anti-red-tape point of view. These criticisms would, of
course, come to rest at the office of the new Premier.

Moreover the Melenkov desire to reorient the heavy industry
emphasis crashed on the rocks of the intransigent foreign policy of
the dogmatist Molotov, at the Berlin Conference from January to
February, 1954. While the Heat insisted on free election throughout
Germany, Molotov demanded an early treaty-making to which both German
governments would be invited to participate on an equal basis. The
result was not only stalemate, but also a freezing of hostilities
expressed by the inclusion of the Federal Republic in the Nate as a
fully armed member, and the formation of the Warsaw Pact to pull to-
gether the various bilateral treaties the Soviet Union had made earlier
with her dependent Eastern European states. This activity increased
tension, increasing the needs for armament production which is a part
of the heavy industry complex; and a dundamental reorientation was
impossible, making Malenkov's position untenable.

Also, during October of 1954, Khrushchev and Bulganin travelled
to Peking where commitments were made to a greater assistance program
for the Communist Party of China. This meant a building up of the
heavy industry of the Chinese, which necessitated a continued emphasis
on it at home, while further comitting the Soviet Union to maintaining
high levels of armaments production in the sense of protecting China.

This meant that Malenkov was outmaneuvered and it should have

come as no surprise that on February 8, 1955, Malenkov "resigned"

 

 

13?

his position as Premier and was replaced by Bulganin.5 Khrushchev
and Bulganin now constituted the dominant faction, but with Khrushchev
having more power. Conflict within the elite drew back again from
the public light and would not reappear until another upheaval had
been resolved in 195?. But the basic reason for Khrushchev's greater
power was not only that he was First Secretary, but also that through-
out his career he endeavored to make the Party a technically competent
vehicle for administering the complex Russian society. What this meant
among other things was a replacing of the governmental or ministerial
apparat with the Party apparatus, an encouraging of Party involvement
in decision making all along the line. This can be called revival of
a viable Party, but it was also Party interference in the affairs of
the State, which had the purpose of undermining the significance of
government positions of influence and of course raising his own.

But the Party he had inherited from Stalin was faction ridden.
He could not rule over it like Lenin, nor did he want if he could to
rule by terror. Hence he was reduced to political maneuveringin order
to stay on top, while actually striving to express the views of one of
the factions, the revisionists. Thus as long as Malenkov was a serious
rival for power Khrushchev seemed to be on the side of the other faction.
Pravda records him as saying in 1954;

”Only on the basis of further development of heavy
industry will we be able to successfully promote all

branches of the national scenery, and to raise steadily
the material well-being of the people and ensure the

 

5 There were other factors in his fall, of course. Especially dis-
crediting was the reopening of the "Leningrad case" at the Abakumov
trial in December of 1951! in which Malenkov was involved. See Robert
Conquest, Power and Polich the USSR, (New York: St. Martin's Press,
1962) , pp. 95-111 for details for the Leningrad affair.

138

inviolability of the frontiers of the Soviet Union.”6

But soon after Malenkov's political demise he began to shift ground.
Uhile Malcnkov's supporters were being purged quietly there could be
no change in domestic economic policy. Thus in March of 1955 m
published an article quoting Stalin's dictum on maintaining the heavy
industry orientation.7 In foreign policy however, he could begin to
move. He chose to reduce tensions in Europe, putting him on the side,
incompletely as yet, of the revisionists. The Austrian Peace Treaty
was promulgated on May, 15, 1955, followed by the Geneva Conference
of Heads of State in July. In September the Porkkala naval base was
returned to Finland, and with Bulganin he began travelling to India,
Burma, and Afghanistan; accompanying their trips with references to
the declining dangers of war. This line of thought was culminated by
the announcement of troop reduction in August. If he continued this
direction he would have problems with Molotov, with China, with Yugo-
slavia, and with the Soviet conservative economists. He did.

A very significant step that showed this direction most clearly
was the attempted rapprochement with Yugoslavia and with Tito in 1955.
But to do this was to conflict with the Foreign Minister, Molotov.
Therefore Khrushchev began to ignore Molotov in regard to the saw
foreign activities he was involved in, to undercut him as he had
Malenkov. Molotov handed him another knife when he wrote in an article

that socialism was not completely constructed in the USSR. The reason

 

6Pravda, December 28, 195k.

7Pravda, March 5, 1955.

 

 

 

139
for such a statement is likely that the de-stalinization debate was

probably going on at this time in the Presidium of the Party and by
saying what he did, Molotov could raise the issue of the intensifying
class struggle as the construction of socialism nears its end. He
overstepped because it had already been decided that socialism was
completely built by Stalin himself, and Khrushchev was able to make
Molotov recant in another article in September of 1955,8 to publically
humiliate himself over such a trivial point. This had the effect
of reducing his stature as an ideologist and gave the First Secretary
additional reasons for ignoring him.

The trade talks with Yugoslavia which had begun in 195‘} were
continued, and the tone of the Soviet press when discussing Yugoslavia
became more mild. But in March of 1955 a speech of Tito critical of

a speech by Molotov was printed in both Pravda and Izvestia. The

 

following day Pravda printed a reply but the defense of Molotov actually

 

put words in his mouth which were supportive of the changes in Yugo—
slavia since 1948, the very thing which had come to be known as Titoism
which, of course, Stalin had roundly condemned.9 Obviously Molotov
was an expendable pawn in Khrushchev's game.

When a delegation to Belgrade was announced Molotov was not included.
Khrushchev had the limelight, both in Belgrade and Sophia. The result

of the discussions was announced following a Central Conittee Plenum.m

 

8Kolnuniet, #14, September 1955, pp. 127-128.

9See Molotov's original speech Pravda February 9, 1955. Tito's
speech in Pravda and Izvestia March 10, 1955, and the rejoinder March 12,
1955 in Pravda.

loPravda, July 16. 1955.

 

. w «3;. z». ‘s'ns":~'.‘- ‘ ~ - - u ‘ "i.“ V 319-63-913ng ""I‘ass.:3,?_7.,‘.y$x-w, wwwmzir‘éw‘. turn-‘1" - g ’- ~ *‘l-

o

 

 

1‘40

The Soviet Union wanted rapprochement, not only, but admitted the
possibility of separate paths to socialism as well.

" . . . given unity in the chief fundamental matter of

ensuring the victory of socialism, various ways and means

may be employed in different countries, depending on his-

torical and national features, to solve the specific prob-

lems of socialist construction."

This revisionism would become stronger before it ebbed, for in
February of 1956 Khrushchev gave his famous "Secret Speech" at the
Twentieth Party Congress in which he began the denouncing of Stalin.
Why then? Because a disavowal of the past was necessary. And this
was required because of the direction that Khrushchev wanted to go,
namely in the direction of a higher and richer standard of living
for the Soviet people requiring a reorientation of the heavy industry
emphasis. In order to do this he had to weaken if not destroy the
conservative opposition which restrained his natural inclination to
leap into the change. Why at a Congress? Because this would give a
sense of permanency to the alteration. “by in 1956? Because his
power position was better than at any time in the past. Malenkov was
discredited but still in the power picture as the events of the follow-
ing year demonstrate. Molotov was in isolation theoretically and politi—
cally for Khrushchev had gotten his rapprochement with Tito at the July
1955 Plenum at the expense of Molotov.12

But most importantly it was extremely significant WHO did the de-

stalinizing; for obviously Khrushchev's skirts were not clean of the

11M.-

leee Kuusinen's references to this in his speech at the let Party
Congress, February 3, 1959.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

l#l
dirt that he would begin to distribute to others. Halenkov, Molotov,
Bulganin, and Kagonovich, if leading the movement, could conceivably
create irreparable damage to his power base in the Central Committee
and the Ukraine. But if he did the de-stalinizing himself, he could
direct it as he wished to serve his own.politica1 ends. As Robert
Conquest suggests, once the Beria cases were opened there was no way
of stopping the opening of other cases and other questions that were
not related directly to Beria, but to Yeshov, and of course to the
present members of the Presidium.13 So it was important who directed
the dismantling of the Stalinist heritage.

But on the related question of how far to go in debunking the
Stalin myth.some extremely interesting and surprising evidence is
revealed that no concrete decisiom.on this point seems to have been
made prior to the Congress. Ever since Stalin's death various refer-
ences had been made to the importance of the Loninist principle of
collective leadership, and to how wrong some things can go when.they
are decided by only one man. But positive references to Stalin had
continued. As late as December of 1955 his birthday was the cause
for an exuberant announcement in Izvestia;4 and the magazinelggtgggp
22.12%. m announced the forthcoming publication of Volume 14 of
his collectedworks,15 which did not come out as expected. This
suggests that the leadership was at least not clear as to how far to

go in breaking with the past, that a consensus would probably have

 

13Conquest, Power and Poligz in the USSR, 0 . cit., p. 273.

lulsvestia, December 21, 1955.

15Literatur a Gazeta, January 12, 1956.

 

 

 

11+2

merely continued.with.the past practice of attacking only the dis-
tortions caused by the personality cult. This is confirmed by
Khrushchev's testimony before the Twenty-Second.Party Congress in his
closing speech where he refers to the opposition in the leading groups
to his taking the issue of destalinization to the floor of the Congress
in the way that he did.16

It would seem.therefore that Khrushchev went much further in his
Secret Speech that had been agreed on, and that his impatience for a
consolidation of his position on the side of reform or revisionism
backed by a Congress of the Party caused him to overstep and thereby
to bring into question the legitimacy of the Soviet experience and
Soviet rule. This would lead directly to Hungary and Poland, and
grave political difficulties would now begin.to take shape; each having
its own impact on the Program to be adopted in 1961. The Secret Speech
was a weapon.in a factional political struggle that could.be and was
turned against the wielder. Khrushchev could have been sincere in his
condemnations of Stalin in 1956, but once again that is not the point.
He could have wanted to do good things for people but that is not the
point either. The Speech in its timing, its background, and reasoning
was a ploy in the political struggle. Thus the statement by Georg von
Ranch that the anti-stalin effort was " . . . done with reluctance
and in significant part with an effort at secrecy which unexpectedly

failed,"1? does not mesh.with the facts. Khrushchev showed no reluctance.

The secrecy was a farce from the beginning.

 

16Pravda, October 29, 1961.

17Georg von Ranch, A Histogy of Soviet Russia, (New York: Praeger,
1961+), P0 438.

 

 

 

fi—F...

1h}

Supporting this interpretation of the motivation of the speech
'was a.number of other elements in Khrushchev's Report to the Congress.
His veiled attack on Molotov and Malenkov leads one to the conclusion that
what he was really interested in.was the creation of a climate at the
Congress which would assist him in removing these two from the Presidium
and replacing them by someone whom he could handle easier. But his
many references to the importance of collective leadership backfired
on him; his goals were visibly against such a principle. Thus the
Congress did not react to his suggestions implied so carefully in
his Report, and less cautiously in the Secret Speech.

Except with words. The resolution adopted subsequent to the Speech
charged the Central Committee with ensuring the complete suppression
of the cult of the personality, " . . . and the liquidation of its
consequences in all branches of Party, state and ideological work, the
strict execution of the norms of Party life and the principles of
collective Party leadership which were worked out by the great Lenin."l8
This counted only as a verbal victory, because even though many new
faces were to be found in the new Central Committee; the Presidium
standing of Molotov, Vbroshilov, Kaganovich, and.flalenkov were still
unimpaired. Only Khrushchev and Suslov had dual membership with the
Secretariat. His victory was modest, indeed, even though the enlarged
Secretariat appeared to fewer him.

As a part of his general movement to revisionism, Khrushchev

appears to have wanted a.younger, more aggressively intellectual group

 

18

The CPSU in Resolutions and Decisionf of Con resses Conferences,
and Plenums of the Central Committee, Vol IV, 1955-1965, Moscow, p. 203.

 

 

 

 

l##
of individuals within.the Party who would attain expertise in.functional
areas of the economy. As an attempt to replace government functions we
have already noted. But it was also an attempt to replace the "pure"
Party people, the isolate apparachik.who would be threatened by any
significant change, and therefore resist it. And that changes were
in the offing was clear'from.his Report to the Congress in February of
1956.19 In June we won another victory, for Molotov lost his.Foreign
Affairs post, and Kagonovich his position as chairman of the committee
on labor and wages.20 Hence the momentum was building and undoubtedly
would have continued except for the tremendous retarding influence of
events outside the USSR and by the end of the year events inside
Russia.

Outside events could only hurt a revisionist, because Poland,
Hungary, Western military preoccupation.with the Middle East, parti-
cularly Suez; and the captive nations phraseology of the Eisenhower
platforms all aided the dogmatists in the xero-sum game. This was
exascerbated by increasing critical freedom of writers in Russia.

The momentum that was pushed somewhat in February of 1956 now turned
back upon.Khrushchev in a pattern.that will soon'become quite familiar.
He will be able to push the pendulum only so far, and then something
will occur, usually an international event; and the forces which he
sought to oppose will gather new strength and force him to create a
balance on their side of the fulcrum. This is what occurred in the
latter months of 1956. The delegation that went to Warsaw to debate

with Gumulka consisted of Kagonovich, Mikoyan, Molotov, and Khrushchev,

 

19252115. Jammy 15. 1956.

aoPravda, June 6, and June 9, 1956.

 

"z—m " J‘s-..‘ _-.. '. 7.- j

 

145

'listed.in just that order and without calling him a First Secretary.
This last was avoided by listing them as members of the Presidium,
and his non-alphabetical insertion at the end of the list clearly
presaged troubled water ahead.21

In addition the developing relations with Yugoslavia were tarnished
by the possible role the separate path to communism might have played
by Tito's public disagreement with.how the troops were used in.Hungary.
China fully supported the action. More critical relations with Tito
were the subject of an article in Pravda.November 23rd. 0n the other
hand relations with China improved through a speech by Khrushchev at
the Chinese Embassy in.Moscow which severely cut down his critique of
Stalin to a mess which the Chinese would find more palatable.22
Moreover the necessity of military intervention in.Hungary, and the
threatening West in the Mediterranean strengthened the bargaining
position of the Russian military meaning a slow-down.of the drive to
reorient the economy. The newly emergent literary freedom was restrained
by Khrushchev in a speech reported in November in which he urged the
crushing of "unhealthy attitudes,"23 which revealed hisebackpeddling.
Additional potential trouble emerged with the November 22nd announce-
ment that Molotov had been appointed the USSR Minister of State Control,
which, depending on circumstances, could or could not be a power posi-
tion.2h Anti-stalinism was further toned down by Pravda, December 23,

1956. At a meeting in Budapest in January 1957. the USSR.was represented

 

21Pravda, October 21, 1956.
ZgPravda, January 19, 1957.

23Pravda, November 10, 1956.

2“Pravda, November 22, 1956.

 

 

 

 

 

1%

by none other than Khrushchev and Malenkovlzs The heavy metal vs
light industry controversy could not be subject to this reversal because
the heavy industry syndrome was still being pushed by Khrushchev as
an anti-Malenkov device, as it would be until Malenkov was safely
out of the power picture.

Probably his nadir was the December'Plenum which created the
State Economic Commission able to powerfully interfere both with
Gosplan and Khrushchev's decentralization attempts. But the dogma-
tists, while maintaining positions on the Presidium if they had them,
again made the mistake of concentrating their power in the governmental
apparatus. Under the guise of improving Party control and reducing
agency red-tape Khrushchev could move against them with relative impunity.
This he did in 1957 with his well-known decentralization decrees which
broke up the dominant centralist position of many of his Opponents in
Moscow, and neatly dropped the necessity of directly combating the
powerful Gosekonomkoggigiya under an unfriendly Pervukhim. He received
sanction for his reorganization from the Supreme Soviet session of
May 7, 1957, and it might well be that others on the Party Presidium
who Opposed this plan did not speak because they had a‘gggp_in mind
that would fix everything. Their silence was striking, for in the
months that follow a great deal was made of Khrushchev in the press,
and there was no public criticism.of his slogan of surpassing the USA
in milk, meat, and butter production.26

The abortive gggp_in 1957 did not mean a complete victory for

Khrushchev but another compromise. He was in fact no better off than

 

2SPravda, January 6, 1957.

26See Conquest's data on this point, Power and Poli , P. 308.

____._,__ - ,

 

 

 

l'+?

before, because he could not completely rid himself of the ringleaders,
now called the anti-Party group, for despite repeated attempts right
up to the Twenty-Second Party Congress in 1961 he could not get them
expelled from the Party even though he got them branded as criminals.
Kaganovich, Molotov and Malenkov did lose their Presidium and Central
Committee standing, however, But because of their prestige, evidently,
Khrushchev felt continually threatened by them.”

But he was stronger than he had been, especially in the late
months of 1957. In a July speech in Leningrad he felt sevure enough
to move over once again, and stressed consumer goods production over
heavy industry.2& With Malenkov safely tucked away in Kazakhstan, he
felt able to take over the platform he had previously condemned, con-
firming the suspicion that in this area too he had all along been a

revisionist. However, Pravda reported a July 4th speech of Kenyan

 

to the effect that adopting the slogan or surpassing the USA in
agricultural products most definitely did not reduce the preponder-
ance of heavy industry. This gives an example of the sorts of
compromises Khrushchev was making, but also points out areas of
difference between the two men which will later come to more of a
head when Kosygin is head of Gosplan and Khrushchev tried to get
around the heavy industry emphasis by pushing the chemical industry.
So the Frist Secretary was definitely not a dictator, but with

the removal of the potention threat of Zhukov and the March 27, 1958

 

”This is the only explanation for his continued attempts to
reopen the case against them, and his repeated attempts to link them
with the crimes of Stalin.

28Pravda, July 7. 1957-

 

 

 

 

148

unanimous vote of the Supreme Soviet putting him into the.Premiermhip
as well as leaving him as First Secretary, he was very powerful
indeed. In addition, the fortieth anniversary of the Great October
Socialist Revolution had occurred in November of 1957 and with the
delegates from all the socialist countries except Yugoslavia present,
Soviet hegemony or Khrushchevian hegemony over international socialism
was seemingly assured. The 1957 Declaration of Unity, however, covered
up more than it declaredp-signs and portents of serious rifts to come.

The immediate motivation for the Third Party Program lay in the
events and struggles of 1958. The committee formed at the Twentieth
Congress to draft a new Program had notaas yet been heard from,
probably because like previous commissions on the same subject they
had done no work. But the drafting was now not long in coming;
propelled to some extent by the internal conflict, but also by events
that occurred in Yugoslavia and China.

The Program in many respects is unnecessary. Once the socialist
system was declared to be completed in the 1930's references to the
transition to communism had achieved ideological popularity. Stalin's
Economic Problems gg’Socialism had been written to make certain that
nothing changed very much in that precise time period. Even the
amalgamation of the HTS by the collectives was given the ideological
flacor of hastening the development of communism because this would
transform or assist in transforming the collective into something
more similar to state property.29 Thus the transition to communism

theme was a device to justify a practice that had validity on

 

29Pravda, March 14, 1958.

W
‘-

   

 

1&9

other grounds.

What was very necessary was a revision of the Sixth Five Year
Plan. The directives for this plan had come out of the Twentieth
Congress, but they had never been drawn up into a detailed plan,
both because of economic sluggishness and because the political events
of 1957 delayed future planning. At the fortieth anniversary Khrush-
chev promised grand and glorious things to the Soviet people in the

30

next twenty-five years, and unless he was completely insincere,
which later events disprove, he had a revision of the plan in mind.
Also, the effects of the economic decentralization of 1957 began to

be felt and the need for good planning became acute. The year 1958
was therefore justifiably very involved in economic planning, and
Khrushchev sought to answer this need by means of a Seven Year.Plam
which would take the economy up to 1965 and get the planning back

on the five year track. But this planning was propelled into a longer
range perspective by the Yugoslav and China challenge.

During the years 1958-1961 Khrushchev was involved in a struggle
for total power, not only in the Soviet Union but also in the inter-
national socialist world. The planning, the Twenty-First and Twenty-
Second Congresses, the Party Program, and everything else that he did
should be seen in this framework. It is the only tamework that makes
sense.

In.April of 1958 the Seventh Congress of the Yugoslav League of
Communists'wam held. Shortly before the Congress a draft program was

published which was a long range, twenty year plan which pulled together

 

BQPravda, November 12, 1957.

 

‘

 

149 CL-
the various strands of Yugoslav theory in a fairly decisive manner.
The immediate result of the publication of the draft was the cancella-
tion.of the Soviet plans to attend the Yugoslav Congress. It is too
easy to say that the Soviet decision was in reprisal for the Yugoslav
refusal to attend the meetings in Moscow in November of the year before.
In a speech before the Supreme Soviet Khrushchev said, a month after
the socialist summit, that there were some differences between Russia
and Tugoslavia on ideological and political matters, but he emphasized
that there were now fewer differences than in the past.31 But the
publication of the Program draft arounsed reactions in the Soviet elite
which he could not contain, and a breach in the developing rapproche-
ment was created.

It is easy to understand such an effect. The Yugoslav Program
stated that one form of socialism.was as good as any other, and that
Moscow's attempts to proclaim one path as the only correct one were
nothing more than dogma which obstructed the process of the socialist
transformation of the world. It maintained that there are contradic-
tions in socialism as well as in capitalism, that communist parties
should cooperate with social-democratic ones, and come out in opposition
to a division of the world into military blocs, stating that Nate was
the result of Stalinist aggression. Even though the final version of
the Program colored the Warsaw.Pact as primarily defensive, it still
urged the dissolution of both Nate and the Warsaw Pact, for those who
sought to keep them were reactionary whether they be in the capitalist
camp or the socialist one. The Program went on to say that the state

must begin to wither as soon as the initial transition period is

 

3J'Pravda, December 22, 1957.

 

150

Something of course that had occurred in Russia many years ago. Thus

the Program refers to the Soviet Union of pre-1956 as state capitalist
rather than socialist, but optimistically declared that certain features
of this system have been removed in Russia, leaving a loop-hole for an
optimistic appraisal of the future of Russia that must have enraged the
Soviet ideologues.

Evidence of such irritation appeared in Kommunist already in
April of 1958.32 It was very distressing to be informed that the
withering of the state which had not begun in.Russia was supposed to
have begun well before socialism was reached; and Russia was already
beyond this. But the statements dealing with the necessity of worker
control and its-condemnation of an accrual of surplus value by state
bureaucracies also was an indictment of the Soviet system. And what
was worse, they were not willing to let the Soviet leaders get away
with blaming Stalinism for past practice and instead insisted that the
Party itself must also wither as social antagonisms decline. Thus
the Yugoslav formulation was a direct challenge and critique of the
Soviet system all the more devastating because it came at a time of
official friendliness that was on the rise. .But the Program was a
clear challenge also in.that it presented an ideological foundation.
for an independent Marxist development which allied itself with the
more humanitarian side of Marx, therefore providing a.bssis for
socialist development which could avoid the authoritarian experience

of the Soviet model.33

 

SzKommunist, #6, April, 1958, pp. 16-19.

33For an English translation of the Yugoslav Program see Stoyan
Pribichevich, Yu slavim's‘U : The Pro am of the Le e of Communists
of Yuggslavia, (New York; All Nations Press, 19585.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

151

The Soviet response was set by the official Lenin birthday
speech.of P. N. Pospelov,3“ and by the lengthy article mentioned
above in Kommunist. The speech and the article are remarkable for
their similarity of wording. A number of points required alteration
in the Program, the authors pointed out in a comradely manner. The
first was the heretical evolutionary road to socialism. As we have
seen in the previous chapter this issue was straddled by the authors
of the Soviet Program by the use of the term revolutionary to apply
to even those instances where the transition to proletarian power was
basically peaceful. The point that upset the Russians here is that
the Yugoslav document strongly intimated that because of the increasing
state restrictions on private capitalism in the non-socialist countries
there were already vestiges of socialism in the developed capitalist
countries which the working class should encourage and vote for; and
thereby they would be bringing about the development of the founda-
tions of socialiss. Notwithstanding the Marxist support possible for
this position, the Soviet critics with China on their flank and their
own experience to worry about felt compelled to deny this. It ignores
the class nature of the state under capitalism, said the critics, it
ignores the necessity for a revolutionary mass political struggle to
establish political domination through a dictatorship of the proletariat,
it ignores the necessity of completely socializing the means of produc-
tion; and worst of all, it ignores the necessity of a correct political
party to lead all of this.

Another sin was a failure to sharply distinguish between the two

camps. The tendency, especially in the draft, to equate the two

 

3I‘LPravda, April 12, 1958.

 

 

 

 

_4.‘ n-.. .__

152
Military blocs ignores the fact that the dangers of war come from
the imperialist bloc alone; and it vitiates socialist unity by
ascribing the arms race, war dangers, and Soviet hegemonism to the
socialist camp. Yet another sore spot were the references to bureau-
cratic statism in the Soviet Union. The insistence on a premature
withering of the state ignored the need for a strong state right up
to the emergence of full communism to take care of otherwise certain
trouble from the enemies of socialism. Democratic centralism is not
contrary to socialism and the dictatorship of the proletariat is the
highest form of democracy which is also destined to wither away in
the future. The Yugoslav concepts reduced the Party to a mere ideo-
logical leadership, whereas the Party is indespensible as a leader
in all areas of society.

Besides this, the emphasis on independence, equality and mutual
respect in inter-nation relations implied that this was different
from the way it had always been; and ignored the need for unity and
cooperation. Instead of expressing words of support for the Soviet
Union and the Chinese People's Republic and other socialist countries
the Program plays down common experiences by stressing national
socialism resulting in separateness. And what is worse, the Program
rejects comradely criticism in advance by calling it dogmatism or an effort
to seek ideological monopoly; both of which are completely foreign to the
Soviet intentions. Moreover the draft stated that the correctness ef
ideology and progressiveness would be shown by practice and not by an
international forum. This was rejected on the grounds that history
does not provide any grounds for considering the decisions of the

Congresses of Communist Parties to be incorrect.

 

 

_

M

153
‘Basic to this whole critique was the smarting notion that Yugoslavia
was again rejecting the Soviet model for Socialist development. It
was so rejecting, and at its Seventh Congress in.April of 1958 Vice
President Karkelj publically criticized the Soviet Union for trying
to force its doctrines on Yugoslavia. Tremendous applause greeted the
words that the Yugoslav Communist Party did not need any certification
from Moscow as to its fidelity to Marxism-Leninism.35 The gauntlet
was thrown. Now if my analysis of Khrushchev's basic reformism is
correct he will try to cover this over with platitudes and try to ride
out the tempest. And that seems precisely what happened; even though
the conflict within the Presidum and Secretariat meant the Khrushchevian
drive would not appear in any neat way, but that there would be contra-
dictory approaches, starts and stops which.Richard Lowenthal mistakenly
saw as basic confusion in foreign policy while domestic policy was

36

under firm control. It seems to indicate rather than confusion an
inability to get a consistent and desirable foreign policy through the
Presidium past Suslov, Koslov, Voroshilov, Bulganin, Pervukhin, and
Saburev.

The very day that Kardelj spoke, Ye. A. Furtseva, ianarsaw and
hence perhaps not properly briefed, stressed the continuing friendly
relations with Yugoslavia and said that there was no reason to delay the

impending visit to Yugoslavia by voroshilov.37 This visit had been

 

35New York Times, April 25, 1958, p. 1.

36Richard Lowenthal, "Shifts and Rifts in the Russo-Chinese Alliance?
Problems of Communism, January-February, 1959.

37a” York Times, April 25, 1958, p. 1.

 

 

 

   

 

151*

announced just two days before the Pospelov article.38 On April 133::

2% announced its annual May Day slogans, and, as the year before,
Yugoslavia was listed alphabetically. Both China and Yugoslavia were
described as "building socialism" even though China had the additional
words which described her as a mighty bulwark of peace throughout the
world, ironic words for that year. On April 11m M announced the
publication of .a collection of Lenin's articles against revisionism,
no

but near the end of the article it eguated the dangers od dogmatism and 8
revisionism which was a fairly strong anti-Chinese statement. But the
whole thing got out of hand when Rankovic stated at the Yugoslav Congress
that the USSR was sharpening up the old rusty weapons of Stalinism and
trying to interfere with the internal affairs of Yugoslavia.39
The Soviet observers walked out.

In May the battle lines were drawn. On May 6!!! 23333; published
in full a Chinese attack on Yugoslavia entitled "Modern Revisionism
Must be Condemned." This and others that followed called the Yugoslav
Program anti-Marxist, anti-Leninist, thoroughly revisionist, and consi-
dered dogmatism justified under the dictatorship of the proletariat.
Khrushchev himself attacked the Yugoslavs in a speech in East Berlin,
even though he sent a birthday greeting to Titio in which he said that
he hoped for an early end to their disagreementsfo Lowenthal is correct

in writing that Khrushchev was pushed in a more conservative direction

by the Chinese; but it would be more exact to say that the propellant

 

38Pravda, April 10, 1958.
39m” York Times, April 21+, 1958, p. 1.

#ONew York Times, July 12, 1958, p. l.

1' ' urn-35‘ ‘- ‘

 

 

 

 

155

was not only China but the dogmatists in the Presidium as well. What

those individuals who see in Khrushchev such great power during this
period fail to remember is that his enemies allegedly routed the year
before were still on the Presidium for the most part. The developing
rapprochement with Yugoslavia begun by Khrushchev in 1955 had suffered
another setback, but so had his whole program of reform. As a result
he had to backtrack until the furor died down.

The cause and effect relationship between the Yugoslav Program
and the Soviet Program of 1961 cannot be established on the basis of
hard data. There is no Pravda article, for example, that said because
of that Program we want to write one. But thesuwhy should they admit
this? This twenty year projection of the Yugoslavs occurred when the
leadership of the Soviet Union was pre-occupied with planning, and
with maintaining the leadership position in the socialist world in the
wake of the dethronement of Stalin. No longer desiring to have recourse
to terror and death purges to control, the pressure was all the greater
to accomplish this by other means. One of the means was the paternalis-
tic attitude taken towards the Yugoslav program a.few years later.

"Yugoslavia likewise took the socialist path. But

the Yugoslav leaders by their revisionist policy contra-

posed Yugoslavia to the socialist camp and the internat-

ional Communist movement, thus threatening thi loss of the

revolutionary gains of the Yugoslav people.‘

"The revisionists deny the historical necessity of

the socialist revolution and of the dictatorship of the

proletariat. They deny the leading role of the Harmist-

Leninist Party, undermine the foundations of proletarian

internationalism, and drift to nationalism. The ideology

of revisionism is most fully embodied in the programme of
the League of Communists of Yugoslavia."u2

 

“12PM, D. 35s
“gram, pe 53s

 

 

 

156

.kmother means, of course, was to promulgate a correct programmatic

twenty-year plan to provide a star for the others to follow. The
connection between the two Programs is unmistakable.

But, also during 1958, another major socialist power moved into
the stage making similar noises. China. Once again, and very nearly
at the same time, a threat came--from the East this time in the shape ‘
of a general plan.of lengthy duration which purported to be a model
for socialist development that once again seemed to ignore the Soviet
experience. On the 2nd of.necember, 1957, Liu Shae-Chi announced that
the Chinese had decided to overtake Britain in gross heary industry
output by 1972.,+3 In February of 1958 during a meeting of the National
People's Congress the phrase "a great leap forward” was heard as a
characterization of the industrial development of the next three years.4#

This great leap period followed the abortive hundred flowers cam-
paign of 1957. The failure of that policy to indicate positive support
for the regime greatly abetted the dogmatic faction in the Chinese
leadership. Tightening of population controls was indicated at the
very time new economic plans were being discussed in China. Addition—
ally, the Soviet Union had agreed on October 15%, 1957, to help the
CPR to construct its own nuclear weapons even though Soviet economic
credits had largely ceased in 1957.45 Britain had proven that she
had hydrogen bomb potential in 1957 and in a matter of months France

would announce its decision to become a nuclear power. Hence the

 

hjflarold C. Hinton, Communist China in World Politics, (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin 00‘, 19657: p. 36.

480. Edmund Clubb, TWentieth Century China, (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1964), p. 555.

#5Hinton, op. cit., p. 56.

 

 

g

 

157
(firtnese catching up with Britain had more than one meaning.

But one of the first acts of Khrushchev after taking over the
premiership in early 1958 was to announce on March Blst a unilateral
cessation of nuclear testing with the express purpose of preventing
diffusion. Thus there was for China both the necessity of going it
alone without massive Soviet aid, and also the need for great haste
to gain great power status before the movement toward non-proliferation
which Khrushchev was pushing gathered any headway. All this would have
been exascerbated by growing Chinese hostility towards India, alarm
over events in Indonesia, and mounting tensions in the Taiwan.Straits.

The Russians had demonstrated by their launch of an ICBM and an
earth satellite in 1957 that they were very strong militarily; but
that this period of superiority over the United Stated would be short
seemed clear. Thus there was the need, in the Chinese mind, of
capitalizing on this socialist victory as quickly as possible.

All of these factors would encourage the Chinese to engage in
the great leap at home and aggressive activities abroad; and explains
the harshness of their attacks on Yugoslavia, for that country repre-
sented just the opposite from that expressed by the dominant dogmatic
faction in China. These factors also explain Chinese hostility to
Khrushchev's attempts to achieve friendly relations with the West during
this time.

The commune system also fits this pattern. High production plus
great population control. It also gave them propaganda potential which
they did not delay in using. They decided to claim for these communes
a more direct route to communism, bypassing the stage of socialism,

and therewith bypassing the experience of the Soviets. The first commune

 

 

 

158

was delightfully named Spudnik, and a description of the system was

published in the People's Qgily on.September #, 1958. The day before
this the paper had described the communes as a.new model, as enabling
one to visualize a transition to communism. On the he the regulations
for the commune stated that the commune was a basic unit of society

in which the working people united of their own free will under the
leadership of the Party and the government. Its task.was to manage

all industrial and agricultural production, trade, cultural and educa-

 

tional work, and political affairs within its borders. The intent
and purpose of the commune was to consolidate the social system and
energetically create the conditions for the gradual transition to
the communist system, which with effort could be achieved; along with
the eradication of all differences between town and country and between
manual and mental labor."6

"As the social products become abundant and the people

have high political consciousness, so will the transi-

tion from the principle of 'from each according to his

ability, to each according to his work' to the principle

of 'from each according to his abilicfivto each according

to his needs' be gradually effected.‘
In an earlier discussion of the commune system in China, Ch'en.Pe'ta,
in an article entitled "Under the Banner of Chairman.Mao," maintained
that the commune idea flowed out of Mao's creative following of the
Leninist injunction to develop the theory of Marx based on an analysis

of conditions peculiar to the countries of the East, conditions which

#GTheodore B. Chen, (ed.), The Chinese Communist Regime Documents
and Comment , (New York: Praeger, l9 , p. 2 .

47Ibid.

 

 

 

159

were unknown to the European countries.“8

There was therefore, an economic and ideological challenge to
Russian leadership both implicit and explicit in the great leap forward
and the establishment of communes. The Russian reaction was not warm,
but not actually hostile either. In a,midsyear article in Nggflgimgg
the whole matter is treated so lightly that sarcasm may be intended.
"The goal set by the Communist Party is to transform China, within
the next 15 or 20 years, into a great socialist power with modern
industries, a modern agriculture and a high standard of science and
culture."l"P9 The article does mention that there are some in China
who doubt the possibilities of success of the Leap, but this‘was the
closest it came to being critical. As a matter of fact grgygg, and
Izvestia, repeatedly stressed Sine-Soviet friendship during 1958 for
whatever that may be worth; mentioning the communes on September 11%,
and again on September 26“. The closest that these articles came to
a critique was in their stress on the primitive techniques in use on
the communes.

Gradually criticism began to gather steam. An article by Ts. A.
Stepanyan stated that the Asian countries building socialism would
fgllgg'the European ones into communism.50 Another article in November
of 1958 cited the earlier Russian experiments with agricultural communes
which had not been successful; and that, as a matter of fact, it was a

naive and romantic notion. Also the desire to leap forward across

 

“Extracts from the China Hainland Magazines, #138, August 11, 1958,
p. 13. The article is from Red Flag, July 16, 1958.

#9V. sikikhmenov, "China's Leap Forward," New Times, #25, June 1958,
pp 0 17.18.

50Ts. A. Stepahnyan, "The October Revolution and the Process of
Communist Formation," Voprogy Filosofii, #10, 1958.

 

 

 

160

unfinished stages of development was condemned because this caused
negative and painful reactions.51 This same line was repeated by
Khrushchev in July of 1959 in a speechin'Warsaw?2

This contrasted sharply with the claim.made in October of 1958
by the People's 2§il1_that "With the great leap forward in production
communism hasalready begun to push forth sprouts in our actual life."53
This Leninese must have infuriated the Russians. But the glowing success
for the industrial aspects of the Leap reported at the end of the year
could not be matched by any glories in the agricultural sector. As a
matter of fact the Wuhan Resolution of December 10, 1958, implied
difficult times still ahead in stating

"We should not declaire that people's communes will enter

communism immediately. . . . This distorts and vulgarizes

the great ideal of communism, strengthens the petit-bourgeois

trend toward egnalitarianism, and adversely affects socialist

construction."
This meant a serious retreat from communism to collectivism; for
the fact that the peasants were no longer to be supplied from centralized
distribution centers meant that the peasants were again on their own.
This does not seem to be a response to Soviet pressure so much as it is
a response to actual chaos in the Chinese countryside resulting from
too many slogans and not enough logic. The Party was not at fault-~it
was the cadres who had been dizzy with success.

During this year of 1958 China is most interesting and it is

 

51"The Main Link of the Transition to Communism," Problems of Peace
and Socialism, November 1958.

521m York Times, July 22, 1959, p. 1.
sgblubb, Twentieth Cent China, op. cit., p. 558.

5“113341., p. 363.

 

 

 

161

tempting to probe deeper. But the point of discussing China here

is, however, solely to point out the tremendous push this activity

in China gave to the Soviet desire to implement a.Program in the Soviet
Union, the desire to have a long range economic plan about which one
could make great claims.

But while both Yugoslavia and China play a role, it was comple-
mentary to the struggle for power within the Soviet Union. By the
end of 1958 Khrushchev was very preoccupied with unseating his oppo-
nents. The September Plenum of the Central Committee was called, it
is true, to issue the call for the extraordinary Twenty-First Party
Congress; but its real purpose was to remove Bulganin from the
Presidium. The November Plenum was used to link him securely with
the antianrty group, for his name was added to a list of the group
which appeared.in.Khrushchev's draft report on the Seven.Year’Plan.
He also confidently expressed his reformism by saying that the Party
" . . . is waging a determined struggle against all who cling to old
and obsolete forms and methods of work and who, infected by conserva-
tism, resist the implementation of the Leninist master line of the
Party."55 The pressure was raised at the December'Plenum at which
Bulganin, "confessed" and Khrushchev said in referring to Malenkov,
Molotov, and Kaganovich that "The tongue is not capable of referring
to such people as 'comrades', even though they have remained members
of the Party."56 ,Later in the same report he described them as
despicable, and alluded that there was a connection between them and
Beria who by now was the scapegoat for Stalinism. His use of the Plenums

for the purpose of consolidating his power probably reflects his

 

55Prayda, November 1k, 1958.
56Pravda, December 16, 1958.

 

 

 

 

.—-— —-_.——--a..—- ——.—-_.—k s.

 

162

inability to accomplish the same thing in the Presidium. He was

broadening the field of combat, pointing for the January Congress,
and going so far as to call the anti-Party group criminals who had
hindered the Central Committee's exercise of socialist legality?7

Along with this developing power struggle, was the claim to ideo-
logical leadership, which seemed to arouse as much opposition as his
desire to purge the group from the Party. Why else would he call six
Plenums in one year and another Congress so soon? On.November lhh
Eggzgg published the Theses Khrushchev had presented two days before
at one of the Plenums. Besides attacking the group, the Theses made
the following point.

"As a result of the victory of socialism, the USSR has

entered a new historical period of gradual passage from

socialism to communism. The long-term.p1an for the

development of the Soviet Union in the next 15 years

provides for the creation of the indispensable condie 58

tions for the completion of the transition to communism."

The implementation of the new Seven Year Plan was to have been a large
step in that direction. What he was accomplishing here, however, was

not just ideological supremacy for the Soviet Union but also for him-

self as author, and thus all of this is a part of the same cloth-the

drive for power. .

These events coincided with an ultimatum on Berlin which was
evidently staged for the purpose of getting another Summit meeting at
which he could represent the Soviet Union once again, but this time as
sole leader. This activity also made him appear more militant in regard

to the West in the light of his refusal to back the Chinese position in

 

 

57Pravda, December 26, 1958.

SaPravda, November 14, 1958.

 

 

 

 

163

regard.to Taiwan or the Middle East.

Therefore, the Twentquirst Congress which focused the drive for
a long-range economic plan does not represent some sort of sober and
scientific analysis resulting in a conclusion that a.new dawn was
approaching. It rather represented a power struggle both internationally
and domestically, in which the developing Third Party Program is little
more than a ploy. The Congress was ostensibly called for a ratification
of the new economic plan, but such a ratification was not necessary.
Serwyn Bailer considered the purposes for the Congress to be four—fold.
Propaganda which stresses the might of the USSR to both friend and foe
and its soon-to-be achieved economic superiority; an international
communist conference to give ideological support to Khrushchev on an
international scale; a demonstration of Khrushchev's personal authority;
and an internal mobilization attempt to spur the masses on to accomplish
the goals of the plan.59 Robert Conquest and Carl Linden saw it as
essentially a power struggle.60 Linden wrote:

"The calling of the 'extraordinary' congress, the first

of its kind in party history, provided him with a plat-

form for dramatizing his claim as a leader who would

conduct the Soviet party and the Communist world agl

well into a new 'stage' on the path to communism."

This is supported very clearly by O. V. Kuusinen's speech to the
Congress in which he stated that Khrushchev's many and brilliant prin-
ciples provided the foundation for completing the long-delayed new program

which ought to be made ready for the next Congress of the Party. As if

 

59S. Bailer, "The 21st Congress and Soviet Policy," Problems of
Communism, March-April 1959, p. 83.

60See Conquest, Power and.Poligz in the USSR, pp. 371—381; and Carl
Linden, Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership, p. 83.

61Linden, Pe 83e

 

 

 

 

16%

this were not enough he added: " . . . if the Central Committee will
work out the draft of the new progrelmon the basis of the principal
propositions of the report of Comrade Khrushchev at this congress,
then this will be a good program of the party."62 Since Lenin had
written both the first and second, with help, Khrushchev was both
skipping Stalin and aiming for a very exalted position for himself.

In his own speech at the Congress Khrushchev stressed goals dear
to the heart of the revisionist. The movement to Communism would not
be complete until the requirements of the people are satisfied with
complete abundance. He raised his agrogorod scheme of many years
standing as a device for reducing the differences between town and
country. He talked about the withering of the state apparatus in
favor of public organizations, because the class struggle was not
intensifying as Stalin had predicted, but actually declining. The role
of the Party would continue to grow. The threat of war was definitely
lower, capitalist encirclement was ended, and socialism in one country
was obsolete. He criticized the Chinese without mentioning them by
condemning sudden leaps into Communism, but then added that all of the
socialist countries would enter the stage of Communism more or less
at the same time, perhaps as an.olive branch to the Chinese.63

The drive to make himself an undisputed ideological leader'was

not a limitless success.6l+ Nor was his effort to totally unseat his

 

62Pravda, February 1%, 1959.

63Pravda, January 28, 1959-

6“For various opinions see Pravda, January 29, 1959, Izvestia,

January 25, Pravda, January 31, and July 2, 1959.

 

e-

 

165
Opponents. The congress made no real change in the status-quo arrangement
that to a good many people's minds evidently meant collective leadership
rather than personal one man rule. Those who while condemning the group
did so in such a way as to indicate that future action against them was
unnecessary seem to have won the day, for no further action was taken
against them. Khrushchev was left with allies on the Presidium and Secre-
tariat, but not with dependents; and these allies could be expected to
approve of some of his policies but not necessarily all of them. The
struggle would go on therefore, but once again after the Congress it
withdrew from public view. The policies Khrushchev had advocated he
continued to push. His visit to the United States at the end.of 1959
and his invitation to Eisenhower to visit the USSR in mid-1960 typified
the Camp David spirit that he wanted to develop. This, however, brought
him squarely up against China.

But before he could really do battle another external event brought
him up short--the May Day 0-2 spycraft. This evidence of international
espionage encouraged and aided the dogmatists, and endangered many of
the policies he had been advocating. It supported notions.of hostility to
the West, the necessity of high levels of armament production and there-
fore heavy industry, discouraged liberalization, and made it seem as
though the Chinese were correct all along. Khrushchev was thus faced
with another real test of his ability to maneuver. At the June 1960
meetings in Bucharest the time was ripe for a real Chinese attack on
Khrushchev personally. They were probably encouraged by his cancellation
of the Eisenhower visit and his extension of the invitation to Mao. But
whatever the Chinese intentions were, Khrushchev stole their thunder.

To have allowed a rapprochement with China to develop on their terms

 

 

 

166

'would.have meant undercutting all of his policies. So in a surprise
move he attacked them, completely scuttling any hopes anyone might
have had about getting together. In the following month he sealed
the fissure by calling back all the Soviet technicians in China and
getting them out in the space of one month. The effects of this on
the faltering great leap can well be imagined, and being made in the
name of the Soviet Party his actions shut off any possibility for
adopting a pro-Chinese line while he was in office.

Internally, Khrushchev lost some ground. Brezhnev was moved out
of the Secretariat to the post of President, a ceremonial position.
The secretariat was cut from ten to five, with the losers being those
who had supported Khrushchev most closely in 1957. Aristov, Ignatov,
and Furtseva were out. Pospelov, Kirichenko, and Belyaev were also
out. The result was to raise the prestige of Kozlov of the Leningrad
machine and Suslov who was identified with the conservative trend.
When Kozlov announced in a speech commemorating the Revolution that
everyone knew that steel production was the basic index to the country's
production and economic stature, it was a sign that Khrushchev was 6
again in the lower part of the wave.65

But by January of 1961 he responded, again at a Plenum, by saying
that the strength of a state is determined not only by the metal index,
but by also the amount of products a man receives and eats, and stated
contrary to Stalin that the production of consumer goods should outpace
demand for them.66 Between the January Plenum and the October Congress

he repeated his insistence that Russia overtake the U.S. in levels of

 

65Pravda, November 7, 1960.

66Pravda, January 21, 22, 1961.

 

 

 

 

167

consumption. Not to understand this, he said, was not being a real
leader, but a dogmatist and a conservative divorced from life, and
destined to be left behind by the progressive Party.67 But his remarks
at the British Trade Fair on May 20% about the equal rates of develop-
ment for the light-consumer goods sector of the economy were not even
printed in Russian papers.

He was also working on the concept of the dictatorship of the
proletariat, because it needed alteration so that it could no longer
be an excuse for heavy armaments and the apparatus of suppression.

The result of his efforts was a compromise--the state of the whole
people. This permitted the scrapping of the dictatorship but did not
include the withering of the state. The state of the whole people would
remain until the full victory of communism. This would be a sop to

the dogmatists, but the removal of the dictatorship aspects would be

a victory for the revisionists. By the time this notion got to the
Program it carried with it the statement that the class struggle does
not disappear in the building of communism and therefore there will be
the need of the state power.

Thus the Third Party Program is a crystalization of the general
direction he wanted to go, but somewhat watered down. It is not, most
definitely, a reflection of a conscious application of the ideology of
Marx and Lenin to a situation which seemed to callfor it, but rather
a device in a struggle for supremacy both international and internal.
The struggle continued after the Program was adopted-it was not even

a major tool for his purposes. It sought to rank him out and beyond

 

 

67.Pravda, February 19, 1961.

68New York Times, May 21, 1961.

 

168

Mac and Tito, and, of course, well above his fellows in the elite of
the Soviet Union. But how far does the Program rank above Yevtushenks's
"Stalin's Heirs" published in Pravda October 21, 1962; or Solzhenitsyn's
novel in 1963? These were much sharper tools for discrediting his
opponents than the Program, that bland compromised presentation of
ideological spice to make a long range economic plan palatable.

This is not to say that the Program was useless for his purposes.
The document gave him justification for his economics over politics
line for the Party that colminated in the 1962-6# split between the
industrial and agricultural sections of the Party. Ostensibly designed
to promote those with skills in technical and economic work, it more
than this was designed to overcome the influence of the‘gpparatchiki
and the regional Party bosses in the political-ideological arena.

But he still had his ups and downs after the Program was adopted.
The Cuban missile crisis caused a near eclipse of his reformism. But
he once again weathered the storm, this time aided by the Chinese who
made noises about boundaries with the Soviet Union, Kozlov's illness,
and a shake up of the Secretariat. This was climaxed by a_§£§!g§
referral to Khrushchev as the "head" of the Party Presidium.69 By
July of 1963 he is again promoting friendly relations with Tito,
7° And finally,

in February of 1964, Suslov announced the expulsion of Molotov and the
71

openly anti-Chinese, and pro-consumer welfare at home.

group from.the Party.

By the fall of 196h he again felt strong enough to push for all of

 

6agravda, June 22, 1965.
79bravda, July 20, 1963.

71Pravda, April 3, 1964.

 

 

169

lxis policies. He called for a virtual revolution in regime planning,
calling for a decisive shift in both the structure of the economy
and the future direction of its development, putting consumer produc-
tion in first place with consumer priority the basis of a.new long-term
plan. He told his colleagues that the main task of the new economic
plan qu to ensure the preferential development of consumer industries,
that heavy industry and defense had now been adequately developed, and
that the pace and focus of future development plans would be shifted
in the direction of consumer welfare and light industry.72

This kind of thinking on the part of Khrushchev gives rise to the
thought that had not this "invulnerable" leader been deposed the Party
might have been treated to the astonishing spectacle of unanimously
accepting a revised.Party Program at the 23rd Congress in 1966 only
five years after the adoption of the Third Program. That this did not
happen is history. The Brezhnethosygin coalition, much better at
maintaining a leadership which balances the factions have provided a
business as usual sort of leadershipthat moves very slowly if at all.

The point is, however, that the Program does not represent an
excessively reformist document that would need to be discarded by the
new leadership. It is a weakened version of what Khrushchev wanted,
and as such, more than likely represents the general goals of the
majority of the Politburo than any other document. References to a
transition to communism, and the necessity of building the material
and technical basis for communism continue to appear in the Soviet
Press because they are a threat to no one. The precise dates in the
Program can be very easily manipulated by the new leaders, for the

need will probably arise.

 

7ZPravda. September 22, and October 2, 1954-

170

Thus the ouster of Khrushchev does not mean a rejection of the
Program, but a rejection of an attempt to fundamentally alter the
traditionalist positions. The leadership simply was and is not ready
for a full swing to consumer orientation; thus the Khrushchev pain
that had been borne for so long could no longer be tolerated. His
ouster proves the continual existence of conflict in the Soviet elite,
and it was as a part of that struggle that the Third Party Program
must be understood. To treat it in isolation from that struggle is
to do it as serious an injustice as that performed by those who see in

it the hope for all mankind.

CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION

On the basis of what has already been learned, it would be simple
to say that the Third Party Program is not an ideological document.
But this sort of statement is nearly meaningless. What I might mean
in making such a judgment is that the teachings of Marx and Lenin do
not apply, are not the basis or motivation for the document. But as
we have seen it is not easy to say with any precision just what those
teachings actually were, even when the topics considered are selected
in advance.

I have shown that the origins of the Program lay in the events of
1958 when two simultaneous international socialist challenges to the
ideological supremacy of the Soviet model occurred in April of 1958,
coinciding with a drive for personal political power by Khrushchev in
a framework of long-range economic and social planning. He repeatedly
revealed during this time period that he much preferred the Central
Committee Plenums to the Presidium as an approval board for his
policies for reasons of political expediency. For the big policy
changes he used the Congresses of the Party. In 1956 he used it to
de-stalinize for his own political benefit. In 1959, as an attempt
to seal the fate of his opposition as well as approve the Seven Year

Plan; and in 1961 he used the congressional means for his attacks on

171

 

 

172
.Albania, further attempts to destroy his opposition, and almost inci-
dently to approve the Program.

In all of these activities he was with fair consistency a revi-
sionist or a reformer, more interested in a higher standard of living
for people than in how many tons of steel could be produced in a
single year. Certainly one can justifiably say that this too was a
political stance, but that is not the point. It makes no difference
whether Mr. Khrushchev was a nice man who liked people. Crankshaw is
trapped in these kinds of judgments in his biography of Khrushchev--
we need not be. The important element here is that Khrushchev, for
many reasons, placed himself in opposition to the conservative,
dogmatic tradition in the Soviet Union. His struggle with that powerful
element was symbolized by his struggle with that powerful old and dead
General Secretary. The Third Party Program emerged from the same Con-
gress that approved of the removal of Stalin's body from Lenin's
mausoleum.

But such a reburial did not mean an end of the conflict, nor
did the Program mean the beginning of a glorious future for the Soviet
people. Both of these actions were a compromised response to questions
Khrushchev had raised in the context of a political struggle. On the
other hand both actions were profoundly influenced by ideology, that
of dogmatism and revisionism. Both.of these contemporary ideologies
represent a stereo-typical set of responses to both domestic and foreign
stimuli. Each can be but need not be exclusive mutually. Both derive
their language and presumably their inspiration from Marx and Lenin, but
the initial motivation is more likely psychological than historico-

philo SOPhiCale

 

 

173

In this sense therefore the Program is quite ideological; but
in what way does this refer to either Marx or Lenin? The problem
is that the legacies of both men are ambiguous enough to function
as the background framework for both of the competing ideologies.
A document that in many ways is a compromise between them cannot
therefore be said to be unrelated to Marx and Lenin and at the same
time to say this is to say too much. Thus the hypotheses with which
we began can be said to be proven but most definitely not proven as
clearly as one would like. It can be justifiably said that the ideo-
logical explanation for Soviet phenomena should be the last one to be
considered; yet it is extremely difficult to rule it out of the
picture entirely. This is because Marxisqueninism, as Alfred G.
Meyer showed a few years back, is the language of Soviet political
Of course it is a language that Marx and Lenin might not identify
as their own were they to magically reappear on the stage of the human
drama; but because of this language connection there constantly seems
to be a surface or even pseudo-relationship between ideological
foundation and subsequent activity. One of the primary reasons for
this is the need for continual justifying reinforcement of the elite
themselves, as Meyer pointed out. But on the question of whether
this ideology were relevant to Soviet activity Meyer was compelled
to answer both.yes and no. J. C. Rees wrote recently in the same vein
about the relationship between Lenin and Harxzwith words that apply

equally well to Khrushchev.

1Alfred G. Meyer, ”The functions of Ideology in the Soviet

Political System," Soviet Studigg, VOl. l7, #3, January 1966, pp. 273-285.

 

 

174

Lenin's " . . . reasoning may not always convince us, and

we may protest that the very doctrines he invoked were a

modified or distorted form of the original Marxian theory."

"But we should not lightly dismiss his strong desire to

justify his actions in this manner, for his own sense of

what he was doing derived in major part from the concepts

and categories of thought through which the political sit-

nation was understood and assessed; and we in turn cannot

understand his conduct if we decide to exclude the role of

those ideas which supplied him with the goals and surveying

points of his activity."2
This says it very well. It is fallacious to assume that the ideology
plays no significant role simply because one cannot establish a strict
logical connection between principles and practice as cause and effect.
The role is less than an operational code (Nathan Leites) and more
than a post hoc rationalization of activity (Robert V. Daniels).
Soviet policy making is certainly not a simple application of Marxism-
Leninism, because, as Robert Tucker recently wrote, if ideology influ-
ences Soviet policy via the minds of the policy makers it is also
demonstrably true that policy influences ideology, that the official
interpretations of MarxisméLeninism develop and change in response to
policy needs, political interests, and changes in the policy mind which
reflect actual changes in the international and domestic environments.3

The neatness of the picture is further obscured by the fact that
other ideologies than those of Marx and of Lenin are important elements
of Russian tradition. The large peasant population and the populist
traditions which grew out of it, the effects of the Tartar occupation,

Stalin's rennovation of tsarist frames of reference, the long revolu-

tionary tradition of the intellegentsia, and different nationality

 

gJ. C. Rees, "Lenin and Marxism," in Leonard Schapiro and Peter

Reddaway (eds.), Lenin: The Man,_the Theorist, the Leader;,A Re raisal,
(New York: Praeger, 1967), p. 91.

3Robert 0. Tucker, The Soviet Political Mind, (New York: Praeger,
1963), De Xe

175
groups with separate heritages play a variety of roles in contribu-
tion to the mosaic of tradition that influences policy. Not the least
of these is the twentieth century phenomenon of rapid industrialization
which was grafted onto a functioning organism so recently that the
seam is still visible. Students of the Soviet Union do themselves an
injustice if when speaking about the Soviet ideology they only refer
to the traditions of Marx.and Lenin, even though it is true that the
small group which rules this massive country professes a greater identity
with this corpus than any other.

This profession of identity, however, occurs at a time when some
Western.scholars would insist that the country is becoming increasingly
irrelevant to that tradition. This is what Rostow meant when he spoke
of communism being applicable only to the supply side of the growth
equation,“ or that it was applicable only to the period of construction,
but not to the period of distribution. At first this seems a correct
analysis. Lenin's principal focus was a revolution which he colored,
and like many other frustrated intellectuals in a good many other
countries at different times, with apocalyptic hues. Once in power
the vision had to be ignored to avoid illustrating that inapplicability.
Buy cheap and sell dear has little or nothing to do with the fetishism
of commodity production and very much to do with the chaos which follows
revolutions. Marx's notions of a truly human existence had very little
to do with the process of electrifying the country, but his conviction
that proletarian power was different from all other kinds of power in.

the past could give Lenin the centralist power base that was applicable

 

“w. H. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth, (Cambridge: Univer-

sity Press, 1961), p. 133.

176

to the chaotic conditions of Russia, and lent justification to the
massive efforts of building that later took place. These construction
efforts could appear to be meaningful because the concepts of high
levels of industrial development and the economy of abundance were
not operationalized but relative to time and place in the minds of
Marx and Engels. The fact, therefore, of the revolution scouring
prior to the arrival of even the relative perceptions of high develop-
ment had the necessary result of creating forideology a principal
function of justifying the economic construction. The attainment of
rather high levels of production in Russia therefore led Rostow to
predict a withering of communism.on the demand side of the growth
equation.5

However, the Thirdearty Program demonstrates that the ideology
is still viable and adaptable but within the framework of construction
still-for the Program specifically calls for great efforts to continue
this construction well into the future. Will the leadership call for
and end to growth in 1980? Naturally not, for growth is open ended.
When "Communism is to be reached in all its fullness, not even the
Program can say. It does refer to the present generation having the
certainty of living under it, but even this statement is sufficiently
loose, as is the notion of the "beginnings of communism", to continue
to leave room for adaptability and maneuver at that time. The Program
therefore provides a snug justification.for a maintainance of the present
ideology of construction, as well as a theoretical base for maintaining
the existence and even the strengthening of that group which is to
lead and direct this construction effort-the Communist Party of the

SOdCt Union.

 

51bid.

177

But even though this is true, the Program points to adapta-
tions which will stretch the Marxism-Leninism tradition very thin
indeed. This ideology is not of very much help in running a sophis-
ticated economy and population. Continued growth can be insured only
if decisions are made in a.highly practical manner, that is nearly
without reference to any ideological consideration. Concepts must
be applied which have equal relevance to a capitalist country, con-
cepts implying rational rather than ideologically dogmatic allocations
of resources and values in the society. For example, the use of
interest rates as a "rent" figure on the Elma factor in capital loans
is most definitely going against the ideological grain in favor of
rationality in the production process. Similarly, rents paid on land
which have superior location or soil is an equalization.device long
in use in capitalist countries.

Thus severe adaptations are necessary if growth is to be main-
tained; and only high rates of growth can justify the Party's con-
tinued existence as leader, for only high rates of growth give the
illusion that a high plateau of whatever name can be at some not
too distant time successfully reached. But because no one knows or
perhaps even seems to care what that future society will really be
like, I suggest that the goal is growth "period", both because it is
necessary for survival and because the ideology can be used so easily
to justify it. And this goal is frozen into the Program.

But, significantly, this goal is so frozen at a time of movement
from the supply to the demand side, to use Rostow's phrase. The
Program justifies this goal at a time when it is increasingly apparent

that the continued expansion of capital goods production at the expense

178
of consumer durables production is dysfunctional to the maintainance
of growth. Hence the many references in the Program to the creation
of a happier and richer life for citizens of the USSR has realistic
rather than merely utopian potentials. The struggle for continuing
the Party has also become the struggle fggupggplg. Not because the
leadership is impregnated with humanitarianism so much as because both
social and economic systems are at a point where this is necessary.
And this could be the enduring aspects of the Third Party Program-
that this humanitarian impulse, easily justified by ideology and
hence difficult to avoid in this context might result in many major
benefits to the population in the realistic future rather than a possi-
bility that one's grand-children might or might not inherit.

Shorter, more pleasant, and more rewarding hours of work. Greater
amounts of leisure time. More equality of status and opportunity along
with the greater production of livestock, rather than having the
latter overshadow the former. These are, of course, relative terms;
but they must be, and this is encouraging; for it may mean that the
day of ideological or theological love for absolutes impossible to
fulfill is diminishing. The point is, nonetheless, that the Program
had made an expanding welfarism ideologically palatable and this is an
important contribution. If it is not ignored, the Program can be a
significant bridge between the utopian musings of a frustrated
philosopher and the greater happiness and satisfaction of over two
hundred million people. And without revolution.

The postéKhrushchev leaderShip has continued his policies by
other means. There is an abhorrance of the flamboyant adventurism

which made the Soviet Union interesting to the Western observer, but

179
which constantly endangered the more liberal policies of Khrushchev.
The periods of advance and recession have beengsmoothed out to a steady
but slower advance. The Program is seemingly being implemented by a
quieter leadership that has much greater potential for long-range
stability. Guaranteed incomes for collective farm workers unrelated
to the vagaries of climatic conditions, increasing automobile pro-
duction, a shorter work week and better pensions have been put into
effect. Educational reforsm interest charges on state loans, rents
on land, a movement away from total planning to a more rational economic
policy of local decision making at the enterprise level based on a
profitable utilization of resources emphasizing thrift and quality
are also past the beginning stages. Other steps include higher wages
and better housing attempts, a supermarket, deep water canals, more
quality and quantity of foodstuffs in the common stores, and even a
laundromat in.Roscow.

Internationally the new leadership has evidenced a strong inclina-
tion to work for peace or status quo which was highlighted in the Pro-
gram as being very crucial. The Tashkent settlement of the Indiae
Pakistani dispute, the Consular Treaty with the United States, and the
Noanroliferation Treaty are steps in this direction. On some matters,
however, they have revealed that they are not much mentally above some
leaders in the United States who see no danger in selling arms to smaller
countries with profound hatreds. Similarly, also, as the United States
went into an anti—French position after.France rejected NATO, so the
Soviet leadership is incapable of seeing in Czechoslovakia trends that
will ultimately work to their benefit.

But the Soviet elite has not moved closer to the Chinese. Instead

they seem intent on the calling of an international conference of

180

socialist states for the purpose of reading China out of the socialist
camp. As to Yugoslavia, relations seem distant but warm. One of the
more important policy decisions in the recent past was the purchase of
wheat abroad, from the West, rather than ask their population to
suffer after the crop failures. This is most encouraging, fot it
indicates a much healthier attitude on the part of both the West

and the Soviet Union.

Their score in regard to literary freedom is low. Leaders of a
country with such a long tradition of censorship, and who do not want
to rock the boat of progress as they see it, must find it very difficult
to imagine a freedom of expressionuparticularly when it touches on
the political system and its leaders. But the Sinyavsky and Daniel
trials as well as the Ginzburg affair later do reveal desires on the
part of the literary intellegentsia to be freer, and also indicate a
lessening of the fear of protesting what seem to them unjust decisions.
But freedom to dissent is most definitely not a part of the Program
as we have seen.

With limitations and qualifications, therefore, the new leadership
does seem to be implementing the Program. There even seems to be a
neo-NEP in progress in the granting of concessions to foreign capital.
Italian concerns will build a Fiat factory, the French an assembly
plant for Renaults, and England is building for the Russians a textile
factory--one of the well-known sources of Marx's examples in Capital.
There is growing involvement all over the world with oil production,
shipping, and selling; as well as with other commodities with socialist
and capitalist nations, with democracies or rightdwing dictatorships-

it does not make any difference. Peaceful coexistence with differing

181

social systems is being turned into a profitable relationship.

Would all of these developments have transpired without the adop-
tion of the Third Party Program? How can one answer? It is impossible
to categorically answer. What can be said is that the Program did not
represent in 1961 some sort of earth-shaking document that Khrushchev
rammed through, but a document that represented a compromise of positions
that reflected the consensus of opinion at that time. Thus one could
say that the Program made little difference. On the other hand the
challenges which made the Program necessary are also the motivation
for the improvements noted above; so that the Program in reflecting
the desires of the leadership to respond to these challenges in the
interests of their own survival did make a difference. The Program
was published in the Soviet press, and continuing references to the
trite phrase “building the material and technical basis of communism”
keep the formalized Program somewhat in mind; assuming that the readers
of the Soviet press are interested in doing so. The persons with whom
I discussed this in 1967 seemed very unwilling to be concrete about
the coming of any new age, and very interested in pointing out improve-
ments, specifically economic, in their own situation. In regard to
political matters apathy was very often quite noticeable. It is per-
haps summed up in the attitude of a former elementary schoolteacher
who when discussing ideology mentioned: "I was very lazy in those
subjects." My taxi driver in.Leningrad tried to make several business
deals with me, and merely shrugged when.I asked about being a capital-
ist in a socialist country. Another young man, a music teacher in
Moscow, possessed only a Hedonistic ideology. These things are

mentioned to suggest that to the Soviet people at large it is quite

182

probably immaterial to them whether the Program is fully implemented.

Thus, for the people the important aspects of the Program would
be those that bring greater economic and social satisfaction. For
the Party the important parts of the document are those which preserve
and guarantee the continuing power to the Party. Perhaps the two are
not incompatible after all. If growing bureaucracy does not smother
the developing alterations in the society the result might well be
considered to be in the spirit of Marx, and perhaps even of Lenin;
even though from the outside the Soviet Union would only be an advanced

industrial, welfare state.

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