

THE RELEVANCE OF MARX AND LENIN TO THE
SOVIET TRANSITION TO COMMUNISM

Thesis for the Degree of Ph. D.
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JAMES R. OZINGA
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
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THE RELEVANCE OF MARX AND LENIN TO
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presented by

James R. Ozinga

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ABSTRACT

THE RELEVANCE OF MARX AND LENIN TO THE SOVIET TRANSITION TO COMMUNISM

by

James R. Ozinga

The Third Party Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was adopted in October of 1961. It purported to be a guide for the future, a road-map of sorts for the movement of the Soviet Union from socialism to communism. If this claim, at least, was valid; irrespective of whether it could be successful, then the Russians were attempting to reach the pinnacle of Marx's aspirations. It therefore seemed worthwhile to investigate correlations and differences between the notion of the future society that was held by Marx and later by Lenin, put these alongside of the Third Party Program in an effort to prove an hypothesis that the Program was not an outgrowth of either Marx or Lenin's thought but rather a political document and a compromised political document at that which reflected and emerged out of a power struggle in Moscow and in the socialist states. In other words it was conceded at the outset that there would be surface similarities, for after all, the Marxist-Leninist ideology is the language of politics in the Soviet Union.

From a variety of sources therefore, Marx's vision of the future

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was pulled together, and then Lenin's vision was added. But it soon became obvious that although words remained the same the actual implementation of the Marxian theory necessitated substantial alterations as the myth was applied to a peculiar and chaotic Russia. As these alterations were reflections of actual conditions, so it became clear that the Third Party Program was also not a flowing out of ideological principles in the fullness of time but again a specific response to specific conditions. Those conditions which propelled Khrushchev to push for the drafting of a new Program were his own domestic power struggle which had most definitely not been settled in 1957, and challenges to the supremacy of the Soviet model for international socialism that emerged in April of 1958 from the Yugoslav Party Program and the Chinese Great Leap Forward. Both denied and seemed to imply a denial of the validity of the Soviet experience for their system's development. These challenges occurred at a time when Soviet planners were revising the 6th Five Year Plan, debating the weights for heavy industry versus consumer goods production, and thinking in fairly long-range economic terms anyway.

The Third Party Program was therefore such a specific response. By the time it was adopted, however, it was already incidental to Khrushchev; for so much compromise is visible in the document itself that he almost ignored it in 1961, preferring the more direct approach of attacking China through Albania at the Twenty-Second Party Congress. There is some evidence that as Khrushchev approached 1964 that he would seek a less compromised document, but this was, of course, prohibited by his retirement. The flurry of publications in the Soviet Union by

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Strumilin and others retired with him, reflecting the very personal character of the Program. The Program has not, however, been repudiated. This is largely due to the fact that a very great deal of the Program equates the development of the material and technical basis of communism with economic growth and expansion--a palatable goal no matter who leads the country.

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James Richard Ozinga

1969

DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to my father for his model of perserverance, and to my wife, Suzanne, my sine qua non.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

My principal debt is to Professor Alfred G. Meyer who continued as my Chairman even though he left the University. The Department of Political Science in permitting this unusual concession to a graduate student deserves high praise.

Other members of the Political Science Department and Professor Adams of the History Department also contributed time and effort to the seemingly impossible task of making me a Doctor of Philosophy. Special mention should be made of Professors Grimes and Greene of Political Science for assistance; but also Professor Press, Chairman of the Department, for his interest in me and his kindness.

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INTRODUCTION

This study began as a project in 1965 to determine the success, if any, that the Soviet Union was having in meeting the various targets set up for itself in the Third Party Program. It was then five years after the document's adoption, and I felt that an analysis of data might reveal the success potential of their claim to be moving towards full communism. But it soon became clear that even if hard data were available in the Soviet Union hard conclusions based on such data were as susceptible to contrary interpretations as though such a study had never been made. So what if their production of coal had not reached the target--there could be so many explanations and interpretations of such a phenomenon that the study itself would be specious.

My interest in the Program was so strong, however, that I began to wonder what purpose was served in adopting it in 1961. Did it have anything to do with Marxian and Leninist predictions about communism? Could it be said to be an ideological document even if it was not much in the economic-political area? I doubted it, but did not know it. So I determined to lay Marxism's predictions along side of Lenin's and then add the Third Party Program in such a way that even a casual reader could see the differences. But after becoming involved with the study I could not in good conscience demonstrate what those predictions were without saying something about the nature

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of the men making them, some of the factors which heavily influenced their projections, and also the manner in which the myth became demuded of any real philosophical meaning as it went from the mind of Marx through Lenin to the contemporary Russian situation.

I perforce had to be selective in gathering the data--this is neither a complete study of Marx, nor of Lenin, nor of the Soviet political system. The focus is on the Program. But I did decide, early in the game, to take both Marx and Engels as though they spoke with the same voice and for each other. I did this because this is the way the Soviet Union interprets them. It would have been interesting to separate them as A. James Gregor does so well in his book A Survey of Marxism, but it would have been beyond the necessary scope of this study.

When analyzing the events which led up to the adoption of the Program I was deeply indebted to the "conflict" scholars, especially Robert Conquest and Carl Linden. They were most suggestive, and will be credited in the appropriate places in the study. The conclusions that I have arrived at are, of course, my own; and I must bear full responsibility for them. I hope that those who read this will find as much pleasure as the author did in writing it.

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CHAPTER I

THE BASIS FOR MARX'S FUTURE SOCIETY

The vision of a future society cured of its ills shared by Marx and Engels was the consequence of the union of a theory and a practice. The theory was alleged to be scientific because it was thought to be grounded in empirical reality. Instead of the high-flying philosophies of many former thinkers, the Marxist system based itself on a materialistic exposition of bread and butter issues in the productive process. The entire social order was based in production and in the exchange of products,¹ and history was a record of movements reflecting alterations in the mode of production and the resulting conflict of classes. This concept can be called mythological in character,² with some justification; but the use of the term myth connotes only the ideational character of the thought which, as always, was articulated in the garb of empirical reality.

¹Frederich Engels, "Socialism, Utopian and Scientific," Marx, Engels, Selected Works in Two Volumes, ed. V. Adoratsky, (London: Martin Lawrence, Ltd., n.d.) I, p. 165.

²Robert Tucker, Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx, (Cambridge: University Press, 1964) is the source for the thinking underlying this statement. It will be noticed, however, that I have maintained considerable distance between my position and that of Mr. Tucker. I am using the term mythological to refer to concepts that are ideational in origin; that is, not derived from empirical experience. This not only includes little pejorative connotation, but also is clearly distinguishable from the use Mr. Tucker makes of the concept of the Marxian myth as reflecting a schizophrenic dichotomy within Marx himself that is projected onto the real world as proletariat and capitalist. See p. 226, for example.

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Marx and Engels developed their theory in a ten year period from about 1837-1847, beginning with Marx's student years at the University of Berlin and culminating in the joint authorship of the Communist Manifesto in 1848. The myth, or theory, was a transformed Hegelianism; that is a detranscendentalized philosophy which traced in "real" history the pernicious development of devious private property, and with it the progressive alienation of the producers from their products, their tools, their fellow men, and in the final analysis from themselves. History revealed the consequences: alienation expressed as the division of labor, and class warfare in response to periodic alteration and progress in the mode of production.

Following the thought of Guizot and Thierry, as well as the study by von Stein, Marx concluded that again in his own era the class structure of society lent itself to the possibility of dichotomization so dear to every maker of myth. The deprived were the proletariat and the depraved were the bourgeoisie. Conflict between them was inevitable for history progressed by this sort of resolution of dialectical confrontations. The war between these modern classes would be, to pre-quote Wilson, a war to end all wars. Marx was certain of this even though Communism might not be the final form of social relations. As he wrote in 1844:

Communism is the phase of the negation of the negation, and is, consequently, for the next stage of historical development, a real and necessary factor in the emancipation and rehabilitation of man. Communism is the necessary form and the active principle of the immediate future but communism is not itself the aim of human development or the final form of human society.³

³Karl Marx, "Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844," MEGA I/3, p. 114; in T. Bottomore and M. Rubel, Karl Marx: Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy, (London: Watts and Co., 1956), p. 243.

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Engels implied the same thing when he wrote that " . . . a perfect society, a perfect state, are things which can only exist in the imagination."⁴

Nonetheless, warfare between classes would be at an end. This notion was based on the assumptions that the whole society was being rapidly proletarianized, that the previously undreamed of wealth in the capitalistic productive process made the necessity of a deprived class anachronistic, and that the socialization of the ownership of the means of production proscribed the development of any future class. Hence the eradication of private property has eschatological significance.

Bourgeois property was the private property to be destroyed by the proletarian revolution, just as before the bourgeoisie had abolished feudal property. Feudalistic remnants that remained, like small peasant holdings and those of petty artisans, could be ignored because they were feudalistic properties caught in capitalistic property relations and therefore already doomed. But bourgeois property was yet to be destroyed. And this was particularly capital, that is the sort of property that exploited wage labor. "Property in its present form is based on the antagonism of capital and wage labour,"⁵ he wrote in 1848. Notice that the relations of capitalistic production are the basis of bourgeois property rather than the other way around. The private property he condemned was a consequence of estranged labor. Labor was external to the worker because it did not belong to man's essential being, and hence denied man, mortified man, and ruined him.

⁴Engels, "Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy," Selected Works, op. cit., p. 421.

⁵Marx and Engels, "The Communist Manifesto," ibid., p. 220.

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⁶ Karl
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⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Marx
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"The worker therefore only feels himself outside his work, and in his work feels outside himself. He is at home when he is not working, and when he is working he is not at home. His labour is not therefore voluntary, but coerced; it is forced labor. It is therefore not the satisfaction of a need; it is merely a means to satisfy needs external to it."⁶ Thus the product of labor is alien and the act of production is alien activity not belonging to man the worker. To whom does it then belong? The worker confers to a stranger the activity which is not his own and in so doing produces the relation to the product and act of production of the capitalist. "Private property is thus the product, the result, the necessary consequence, of alienated labor, of the external relation of the worker to nature and to himself."⁷ Later the relationship becomes reciprocal.

The property that the proletarian revolution must abolish was therefore a symptom of the desperate alienation which afflicted man, and it was this which was the target of their activities. In this sense property was not considered as personal appropriation of the products of labor useful for the maintenance and reproduction of life, but as capital or the accumulation of alienated labor. The abolishing of this property would mean that the social character of this property would lose its class characteristics. In this sense the theory of the communists, Marx wrote, may be summed up by the sentence Abolition of private property.⁸

⁶ Karl Marx, "Estranged Labour," Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, ed. Kirk Struik, trans Martin Milligan, (New York: International Publishers, 1964).

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Marx and Engels, "The Communist Manifesto," Selected Works, op. cit., pp. 220-221.

Communism is the positive abolition of private property, of human self-alienation, and thus, the real appropriation of human nature, through and for man.⁹

The positive abolition of private property, as the appropriation of human life, is thus the positive abolition of all alienation, and thus the return of man from religion, the family, the State, etc., to his human, i.e., social life. Religious alienation only occurs in the sphere of consciousness, in the inner life of man, but economic alienation is that of real life, and its abolition therefore affects both aspects.¹⁰

But how to accomplish this? As Marx wrote in 1845, abstract thought was no longer sufficient. What was necessary was practical, sensuous activity.¹¹ For a time Marx and Engels were associated with the newly formed Communist Party, especially during the revolutionary period 1848-50. Subsequent to this association Marx made great efforts to lead the International Working Men's Association beginning in 1864 and lasting until the Paris Commune of 1871. The rest of the time they, but especially Marx, were active in writing, conversing, speaking, and communicating by letter; all oriented to assisting the proletarian class to accomplish its historically inevitable mission in both its negative and positive aspects.

The activity by the Party was that of leadership through education and agitation in order to provide a theoretically correct focus for proletarian activity. This would aid them in developing the consciousness of their class position and the scientific reasons for that position. Once that consciousness was fully developed the revolution would be imminent.

⁹Marx, "Economic and Philosophical Mss," in Bottomore and Rubel, op. cit., pp. 243-244.

¹⁰Ibid., pp. 115 and 244.

¹¹Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach," Economic and Philosophical Mss, Struik edition, op. cit.

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13. Ib.

14. Ib.

15. Ib.

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The leadership of the League or Party was, in the Manifesto, identified with, and yet apart from the proletariat. The Communist Party was distinguished from other working class parties by its international character and its representation of the movement as a whole rather than sectarian interests,¹² functions which the International later subsumed as its own. The Communist Party had aims similar to the goals of other working class parties, however. "Formation of the proletariat into a class, overthrow of the bourgeois supremacy, conquest of political power by the proletariat."¹³ The advantage held by the Party over the working class was that of " . . . clearly understanding the line of march, the conditions and the ultimate general results of the proletarian movement."¹⁴ This knowledge was to be communicated to the workers, for the times were ripe in the sense that modern large-scale industry had turned the worker from a person tied to the land into a propertyless proletarian, creating the sole condition for the overthrow of the capitalist system.

Only the proletariat created by modern large-scale industry, liberated from all inherited fetters, including those which chained it to the land, and driven in herds into the big towns, is in a position to accomplish the great social transformation which will put an end to all class exploitation and all class rule. The old rural hand weavers with hearth and home would never have been able to do it, they would never have been able to conceive such an idea, much less able to desire to carry it out.¹⁵

¹² Marx and Engels, "Manifesto," Selected Works, op. cit., p. 216.

¹³ Ibid., p. 219.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Engels, The Housing Question, (New York: International Publishers, n.d.) p. 29.

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These modern developments therefore were at the same time developments of a social revolution because of the development of a class whose conditions of life drove it to revolution and because of the blossoming of productive relations that had outgrown the framework of capitalist society. Hence the framework itself would burst and provide the means for the abolition of all class differences once and for all.¹⁶ And once the correct knowledge of the capitalist system was possessed by the proletariat they would no longer ever be in any doubt as to which social institutions it should be against, and in what manner its main attacks should be directed.¹⁷

The creation of this attitude, this knowledge, in this class was the goal of the Party, as it was later of the International. The organization functioned as a focus of the proletariat and Marx and Engels sought to speak for the organization. This was, naturally, not accepted by all; witness their endless bickering with those who differed in seemingly inconsequential details. Those who read through the works of Marx and Engels cannot fail to note comparisons with the in-fighting of theology in which the correct ideological position often seems more important than the conversion of the so-called heathen. This claim was also less than altruistic on the part of Marx at least--witness his letter to Engels in reference to the International, written in 1867.

Things are moving. And in the next revolution which is perhaps nearer than it appears, we (i.e., you and I) will have this powerful engine in our hands. Compare this with the results of Mazzini's etc., operations during the last thirty years! And without any financial

¹⁶Ibid., p. 88.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 138.

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means, moreover. With the intrigues of the Proudhonist in Paris, of Mazzini in Italy, of the jealous Odger, Cremer, and Potter in London, with the Schulze-Delitzschites and Lassaleans in Germany! We can be very well content!¹⁸

This was quite understandable. Marx was devoting his life to what in the grand Victorian manner was the emancipation of all mankind. The agent was the class in radical chains possessing a universal character because of its universal suffering. This proletariat could not emancipate itself without emancipating all other spheres of society, for it represented in itself the complete loss of mankind and could only redeem itself by redeeming all mankind completely.¹⁹

This Isaiah-like prophecy was to be accomplished by a destructive political act,²⁰ the overturning of the master of society, the state²¹ which was only a machine for the oppression of one class by another.²² It had to be smashed.²³ Coinciding with this activity, the means of production would be seized and commodity production would be ended, thereby terminating the domination of the product over the producer.

This was the praxis demanded of the proletarian forces by the theoreticians. When it was to occur was a matter of some confusion.

¹⁸Marx, "Letter to Engels, September 11, 1867," Selected Works, op. cit., II, p. 614.

¹⁹Marx, "The Hegelian Philosophy of Right," Selected Essays, trans. H. J. Stenning, (London: Leonard Parsons, Ltd., 1926) p. 37.

²⁰Marx, "On the King of Prussia and Social Reform," ibid., pp. 132-133.

²¹Engels, "Introduction to the Civil War in France," Selected Works, op. cit., II, p. 458.

²²Ibid., p. 460.

²³Marx, "Letter to Dr. Kugelmann on the Paris Commune, April 12, 1871," Selected Works, ibid., p. 528.

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At times Marx and Engels sounded like the early Christians who daily expected the resurrection of the body and the second coming of Christ. At other times Marx and Engels make use of what can be compared to the prophet's equivocal fullness of time. The latter attitude allowed the Manifesto to summarily dismiss St. Simon, Fourier, and Owen.

The Founders of these systems, see, indeed, the class antagonisms, as well as the action of the decomposing elements in the prevailing form of society. But the proletariat, as yet in its infancy, offers to them the spectacle of a class without any historical initiative or any independent political movement. Since the development of class antagonisms keeps even pace with the development of industry, the economic situation, as they find it, does not as yet offer to them the material conditions for the emancipation of the proletariat. They therefore search after a new social science, after new social laws, that are to create these conditions. Historical action is to yield to their personal inventive action, historically created conditions of emancipation to phantastic ones; and the gradual, spontaneous class organization of the proletariat to an organization of society especially contrived by these inventors.²⁴

Thus, when economic conditions were ripe class antagonisms would also be. The theory was quite neat, but in actual practice the development of class antagonisms proved quite balky, for as economic conditions improved the dialectical pauperization that should have occurred was replaced by modest advances for the working class, already occurring in Marx's own day. But Marx could or would not see this.

Adding to this confusion of when the revolution was to begin was uncertainty about under what conditions it ought to begin. Should it be as a consequence of final proletarian misery or should it begin earlier, even before economic conditions make it allegedly inevitable? The latter notion which is related to the later concept of permanent

²⁴ Marx and Engels, "Manifesto," Selected Works, op. cit., I, p. 237.

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revolution advanced by Trotsky was expressed by Marx in his Address of March, 1850, when he and Engels thought another revolution might be imminent.²⁵ Here Marx discussed a temporary alliance with the democrats (bourgeoisie) until the old regime was overthrown, but also the simultaneous creation of a worker's government independent of the bourgeois one. This would nationalize the rural areas and turn them into collectively owned labor colonies. Communications, transportation, and industry would be nationalized without compensation to the former owners. Strong revolutionary radicalism should be maintained for as long as possible after the initial victory.

Of course this reads like justification for a Jacobin style permanent revolution, or in other words as doctrinal support for Lenin's surprising April Theses in 1917. It also shows the continuing dominance of the Blanquistic tradition in the League emanating from its parent society the Parisian organized League of the Just in 1836. Those who have an emotional need to disassociate Marx from conspiratorial activities and Jacobin-seizures of power can cite the fact that Marx and Engels left the League shortly after the Address was drawn up over the very issue of trying to hurry the revolution along.²⁶ George Lichtheim feels that Marx tacitly and Engels explicitly repudiated the positions maintained in the Address.²⁷ But no one denies that Marx and Engels authored the document, forcing one to the conclusion that at least for a short time they maintained this position.

²⁵ Marx, "Address of the Central Council to the Communist League," Selected Works, op. cit., II, pp. 154-168.

²⁶ Franz Mehring, Karl Marx: The Story of His Life, (London: The Bodley Head, 1936), pp. 200ff.

²⁷ George Lichtheim, Marxism, (New York: Praeger, 1961), pp. 122ff.

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Their later writings do not, moreover, provide solid clues that their thinking has in fact definitely changed. Marx wrote around 1850, "A new revolution is only possible in consequence of a new crisis. It is, however, also just as certain as this."²⁸ In a speech in 1856, Marx identified the crisis as the giant contradiction between wealth and want which was to prefigure the revolution²⁹ and that it was already present: "In our days everything seems pregnant with its contrary . . . "³⁰

But during the same month of the same year, April, 1856, he wrote to Engels: "The whole thing in Germany will depend on the possibility to back the proletarian revolution by some second edition of the Peasant's War. Then the affair will be splendid."³¹

But a second edition of the peasant rebellion would preclude the development of the giant contradiction which was to be the cause of the revolution, for the simple reason that the peasants by this time are expected to be off the land and working in the factories of the modern industrial system, and that while the big peasant was bourgeois, the small peasant remaining could expect salvation only from the working class.³² Marx wrote in Capital that the expropriation

²⁸ Marx, "The Class Struggles in France 1848-50," Selected Works, op. cit., p. 299.

²⁹ Marx, "Speech at the Anniversary of the People's Paper," ibid., pp. 427-428.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 428.

³¹ Marx, "Letter to Engels, April 16, 1856," Selected Works, op. cit., p. 431.

³² Engels, "Prefatory Note to The Peasant War in Germany," ibid., pp. 539-540.

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of the great mass of the people from the soil belonged to the primitive accumulation period of capitalism's growth.³³ By the time revolution is ripe one would think the vast majority of peasants would be proletarians, supporting this notion with references to the concept of the proletarianizing of the vast majority of the society; and Marx's criticism of the Gotha Program of 1875 for including in the concept "toiling people" more peasants than proletarians, and his contention that their demands on the existing state for cooperative societies in industrialized Germany proved that they were not ripe for ruling.³⁴

This confusion provides a clue, unbacked by hard data, that Marx and Engels had a feeling that somehow their theory did not relate to practice, a feeling they usually managed to suppress. This feeling was a near unconscious realization that revolutions of the sort that they were hoping for only occur in countries with large and discontented peasant populations meaning that proletarian coming to power would be out of time in relation to the expectations of historical materialism. Engels wrote in 1853 that the preliminaries of the proletarian revolution in Germany, such as the demand for a unified republic, were now taken for granted. Hence the Party could now base itself on the Manifesto. Then:

All this, of course, concerns only theory; in practice we shall, as always, be reduced to pressing for resolute measures and absolute ruthlessness above all. And that is the trouble. I have a presentiment that, thanks to the perplexity and flabbiness of all the others, our Party will one fine morning be forced to assume power and finally to carry out the measures that are of no direct interest to us, but are in the

³³Marx, "Selections from Capital," Selected Works, op. cit., I, p. 351.

³⁴Marx, "Critique of the Gotha Programme," Selected Works, op. cit., II, p. 575.

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general interests of the revolution and the specific interests of the petty-bourgeoisie; on which occasion, driven by the proletarian populace, bound by our own printed declarations and plans--more or less falsely interpreted, more or less passionately thrust to the fore in the Party struggle--we shall be constrained to undertake communist experiments and perform leaps the untimeliness of which we know better than anyone else. In so doing we lose our heads--only physically speaking let us hope--a reaction sets in, and until the world is able to pass historical judgment on such events, we are considered not only beasts, which would not matter, but also betes which is much worse.

I do not quite see how it can turn out otherwise. In a backward country like Germany, which possesses an advanced party, and is involved in an advanced revolution with an advanced country like France, the advanced party must get into power at the first serious conflict and as soon as actual danger is present, and that is, in any event, ahead of its normal time. All that does not matter, however, and the best thing we can do is for our Party to have established its historical rehabilitation in its literature ahead of time, should events take such a turn.³⁵

The intrusion of praxis, and with it empirical reality, into the ideationally derived theory and vice-versa provided a confusion that Sidney Hook sums up well when he wrote that Marxism was "an ambiguous legacy."³⁶ Theoretically an untimely leap was heretical, yet in practice almost any kind of revolutionary activity in or out of time, by a massive proletarian majority or by a toiling class which contained elements out of temporal context seemed permissible, at least at one time or another.

Somehow the agent class was expected to receive a message from this. Small wonder that they did not, for the critique of utopian socialism in the Manifesto was as apt for the Marxian program of action

³⁵ Engels, "Letter to J. Meydemeyer, April 12, 1853," Selected Correspondence, (Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, n.d.), pp. 93-94.

³⁶ Sidney Hook, Marx and the Marxists: The Ambiguous Legacy, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1955).

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as well as any other. In theory the revolution was a means; in practice it became both means and end because of the long delay in its arrival, because of the confusion and changes of mind about everything except the word, and because the end of that revolution was shrouded in a mist that Marx and Engels, perhaps wisely, imposed themselves. The next chapter seeks to penetrate that mist.

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CHAPTER II

MARXISM'S FUTURE SOCIETY

Both Marx and Engels were concerned about being considered utopians. Hence there seems to have been a deliberate effort on their part not to communicate details about the post revolutionary society. There was an equation made, at least by Engels, between supplying details and utopianism.

These new social systems were from the outset doomed to be utopias; the more their details were elaborated, the more they necessarily receded into pure phantasy.¹

In general, the question is not whether the proletariat when it comes to power will simply seize by force the tools of production, the raw materials and means of subsistence, whether it will pay immediate compensation for them, or whether it will redeem property therein by installments over a long period. To attempt to answer such a question in advance and for all cases would be utopia-making, and I leave that to others.²

It is specious to dismiss this as cowardice or fear of ridicule even though these factors may have contributed. Engels was correct; but for reasons that he did not or could not understand. The vision would only have been cheapened by articulation. The ideal of serving mankind, for example, tastes flat when structured. Consider the

¹Engels, Herr Eugen Duhring's Revolution in Science (Anti-Duhring), (New York: International Publishers, 1939), p. 283.

²Engels, The Housing Question, op. cit., p. 98.

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debacle of evil that accompanied the Crusaders of long ago. Normally there is a deep gulf between the ideals that move men, and their articulation or implementation. The new age conceived by Marx and Engels was a mental fiction based on a subjective apperception of reality mixed with a heavy dose of idealistic wish. The humanistic idealism in The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 fit the historical materialism of The German Ideology and the funeral march of capitalism in Capital to describe a mental construction whose resemblance to real life and real history was a priori forced and artificial. The post-revolutionary society, considered the negation of the negation,³ was philosophically strong while realistically weak--clearly revealing its parentage. To have articulated the details of this vision in any systematic manner would have made the mythological nature of the concept apparent--in fact it would have been utopia-making. Nonetheless, both leaders were unable to avoid referring to the new society in a number of instances throughout their voluminous writings.

The new communist society was based on the revolution's successful socialization of the means of production. This would be accomplished with the aid of the power of the state, much to the dismay of Bakunin.

. . . the proletarian class will first have to possess itself of the organized political force of the State and with this aid stamp out the resistance of the Capitalist class and re-organize society . . . (carrying out) . . . that economic revolution of society without which the whole victory must end in a defeat and in a massacre of the working class like that of the Paris Commune.⁴

³Marx, Economic and Philosophical Mss of 1844, MEGA I/3, p. 125, in Bottomore and Rubel, p. 246.

⁴Engels, "Letter to Phillip Van Patten, April 18, 1883," Selected Correspondence, pp. 436-437.

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The use of state power after the revolution was one of the principal differences between Marx and Bakunin in the International and was at least partially responsible for the expulsion of the anarchists in 1872. But Marx felt that he avoided the anarchist criticism by seeing this utilization of state power for proletarian purposes as a temporary expedient. The extermination of the enemy and the economic revolution were to be accompanied by a disappearance of the state as state.

At first the state " . . . can be nothing but the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat."⁵ But it is, nonetheless, a transitional institution used to hold down the proletariat's adversaries by force,

. . . and as soon as it becomes possible to speak of freedom the state as such ceases to exist. We would therefore propose to replace the word 'state' everywhere by the word Gemeinwesen (community) . . .⁶

One could not speak of freedom and state together. This reflected the anarchistic strain in Marx and Engel's thought. The state, for all its useful purposes after the revolution was nonetheless an

. . . evil inherited by the proletariat after its victorious struggle for class supremacy, whose worst sides the proletariat, just like the Commune, cannot avoid having to lop off at the earliest possible moment . . .⁷

It was a machine used for the oppression of one class by another class⁸ but since the socialization of the means of production precluded the emergence of a new class there was only the old class of capitalists

⁵ Marx, Critique of the Gotha Programme, SW II, p. 577.

⁶ Engels, "Letter to August Bebel, March 18, 28, 1875," SC, p. 147.

⁷ Engels, Introduction to The Civil War in France, SW II, p. 460.

⁸ Ibid.

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to be concerned with--a finite task in other words. How long this power of the state would be used in this fashion was left open to question, for Engel's statement on this point was very ambiguous. The dictatorship or class struggle would continue, he wrote, " . . . until such time as a new generation, reared in new and free social conditions, will be able to throw the entire lumber of the state on the scrap heap."⁹ This optimistic environmentalism, derived largely from Rousseau and the Enlightenment, often provided easy answers to very difficult questions; and later experience will demonstrate just how meaningless an answer it was.

The political form of what was to be smashed by the proletarian state was bourgeois democracy. Marx wrote in 1875 that democracy was the last state form of bourgeois society, and was one in which the class struggle had to be fought out to a conclusion.¹⁰ But Engels wrote in 1884 that the proletariat needed the democratic form for the seizure of political power, for " . . . the democratic republic always remains the last form of bourgeois rule, that in which it goes to pieces."¹¹

In any case our sole adversary on the day of the crisis and on the day after the crisis will be the whole of the reaction which will group around pure democracy, and this, I think should not be lost sight of. . .¹²

The new form that society would take was built on the old, notwithstanding the negation of the negation. With the socialization of

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Marx, Critique of the Gotha Programme, SW II, p. 579.

¹¹Engels, "Letter to Edward Bernstein, March 24, 1884," SC, p. 445.

¹²Engels, "Letter to August Bebel, December 11, 1884," SC, p. 457.

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the means of production the proletariat put an end to itself as proletariat, as class. With the eradication of the capitalist class through whatever violence was necessary the entire society would be characterized by proletarianness-becoming-classlessness. Now the state would be the representative of the whole society, and as such become superfluous. The government of persons would no longer be necessary, merely the administration of things and the direction of the processes of production. The state was not to be abolished, it would naturally wither away.¹³

The new social form was called an association or community.

"The working class, in the course of its development, will substitute for the old civil society an association which will exclude classes and their antagonism, and there will no longer be any political power, properly so-called, since political power is precisely the official expression of the antagonism in civil society."¹⁴

Not only would there not be a state, but not even political power. The substitute for this power would be the authority of all men, of mankind, species man; who would again control material production and the division of labor which was the source and consequence of man's alienation. This was only possible in a community.

"Only in association with others had each individual the means of cultivating his talents in all directions. Only in a community therefore is personal freedom possible. In the previous substitutes for community, in the State, etc., personal freedom existed only for those individuals who grew up in the ruling class and only insofar as they are members of this class. The illusory community in which, up to the present, individuals have combined always acquired an independent existence apart from them, and since it was a union of one class against another

¹³Engels, Socialism, Utopian and Scientific, SW I, pp. 181-182.

¹⁴Marx, Poverty of Philosophy (1847), MEGA I/6, pp. 227-228, in Bottomore and Rubel, p. 247.

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it represented for the dominated class not only a completely illusory community but also a new shackle. In a genuine community individuals gain their freedom in and through their association."¹⁵

In other words people could say of the community, they have no government. This would mean that the people in the community would say, we are government. Institutional independence of a previously functional social arrangement meant fetish to Marx, and the fact that he tied it in the above passage to class conflict obscured his point that political power could not be disassociated from all the people without becoming a device for domination which is then used as a class instrument. Freedom in this new social formation is much closer to Rousseau than to Hegel. Individuals within the new association would bring under their own control the conditions for a free development and activity for themselves.¹⁶

Engels used terms like "shattering of the former state power and its replacement by a really democratic state. . . , " or described as infallible the two methods used by the Paris Commune; i.e., filling all posts by elections with a universal suffrage and easy recall, and the paying of all elected officials no more than that received by other workers.¹⁷ Production was to be reorganized on the basis of the " . . . free and equal association of producers . . . , " and as a result the state would be forced " . . . into the Museum of Antiquities by the side of the spinning wheel and the bronze ax."¹⁸ Marx wrote of a

¹⁵ Marx, The German Ideology, MEGA, I/5, pp. 63-64, in Bottomore and Rubel, p. 247.

¹⁶ Ibid., pp. 64-67/249-50.

¹⁷ Engels, Introduction to The Civil War in France, SW II, p. 459.

¹⁸ Engels, Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State, Ernest Untermann translator, (Chicago: Charles Kerr & Co., 1902) pp. 211-212.

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" . . . vast association of the whole nation . . .,"¹⁹ in 1848; and twenty-seven years later of a state which would be an organ completely subordinate to society.²⁰

Hence this society was called communism, or an exaggeration of the community, which was the vehicle for the realization of Marx's aspirations in 1844. It was the return of man to himself, as a social, or what meant the same thing to Marx, a human being; assimilating all the wealth of the previous development of man. Communism was a blending into each other of humanism and naturalism because the antagonism between man and nature was resolved. Communism solved the conflict potential of being and becoming; of object and subject; of freedom and necessity; and of individual and species. Communism was therefore " . . . the solution of the riddle of history and knows itself to be this solution."²¹

Forty years later Engels eloquently described the social system of primitive man which he thought Lewis Morgan had discovered. How wonderful, he said. No soldiers, police, nobility, kings, regents, prefects, judges, prisons, lawsuits were found and still the affairs ran smoothly. "What splendid men and women were produced by such a society," even though man was almost " . . . completely dominated by nature, a strange and incomprehensible riddle to him."²²

But now nature was not feared--it was merged into man as alienation was replaced by monistic union. Subject and object were now one. Now

¹⁹Marx and Engels, Manifesto, SW I, p. 228.

²⁰Marx, Critique of the Gotha Programme, in Bottomore and Rubel, p. 255.

²¹Marx, EPM 1844, MEGA, I/3, p. 114; Ibid., p. 243.

²²Engels, Origins of the Family, pp. 117-119.

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man dominated the external conditions of his existence and from this point on would fashion his own history in the realm of freedom.²³ Man would no longer merely propose—he would also dispose.²⁴ As man becomes this social, human being he absorbs in himself the abstract citizen²⁵ and nature becomes a bond for him with other men, " . . . the basis of his existence for others and of their existence for him. Only then is Nature the basis of his own human existence, and a vital part of human reality."²⁶ And man is free to be man.

This is, of course, a very heavy load for the act of socializing the means of production and removing capitalists to bear. Yet the one was the action or practice designed to bring about this philosophically weighted future society. But the difficulty is that such descriptions of the new community are deficient in the sort of operational terminology that would create an understanding of the association in actual practice. One has more of a feeling that he has read the Song of Solomon rather than a blueprint which succeeding generations could follow.

But this is to an extent due to the data so far considered. Both Marx and Engels made many more specific statements which do permit one to achieve a deeper understanding, providing answers to several questions.

There would be authority, for example, in this future. The state might be an evil that the proletariat inherited, but in a letter written

²³ Engels, Anti-Duhring, p. 309.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 345.

²⁵ Marx, On the Jewish Question, German-French Yearbook, Feb., 1844, in Bottomore and Rubel, p. 236.

²⁶ Marx, EPM 1844, MEGA I/3, pp. 115-116; Ibid., pp. 245-6.

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in 1872 Engels argued against the notion that authority and state were inherently evil.

"(How these people propose to run a factory, work a railway or steer a ship without having in the last resort one deciding will, without a unified direction, they do not indeed tell us). The authority of the majority over the minority also ceases. Every individual and community is autonomous, but as to how a society, even of only two people is possible unless each gives up some of his autonomy, Bakunin again remains silent."

"Even if this authority is voluntarily bestowed it must cease simply because it is authority."²⁷

The anarchist notion of exaggerated individual autonomy clashed with the communalism of Marx and Engels. Authority within that associational framework was not only permitted but seen as necessary. The juxtaposition of authority and the freedom of social man required the metaphysical agility of Rousseau; yet the concept of the General Will of the majority is never explicitly promulgated. One is left with the feeling that authority is not an evil in itself, that, indeed, many situations seem to require it; that it probably would be the will of the majority making universal autonomy impossible because there must be some voluntary limitations of that autonomy. Authority would then rest on that voluntary submission.

During that same year, 1872, Engels wrote to C. Terzaghi:

"I believe the terms authority and centralization are being greatly abused. I know nothing more authoritarian than a revolution . . . It was the lack of centralization and authority that cost the Paris Commune its life."²⁸

²⁷ Engels, "Letter to T. F. Cuno, January 24, 1872," SW II, pp. 620-21.

²⁸ Engels, "Letter to C. Terzaghi, January 14, 1872," SC, pp. 332-3.

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Lenin will later use this, but that is to anticipate. The point is here that Engels as well as Marx reacted to the anarchist Bakunin most strongly during this period by stressing the necessity of authority.

Marx wrote in 1875 that some of the functions analogous to those now performed by the state must continue in the new society.²⁹ In Capital he had written that these would be the regulation of working hours, division of social work, accounting, etc.

" . . . all labours, in which many individuals cooperate, necessarily require for the connection and unity of the process one commanding will, and this performs a function which does not refer to fragmentary operations, but to the combined labour of the workshop, in the same way as does that of a director of an orchestra. This is a kind of productive labour which must be performed in every mode of production requiring a combination of labours."³⁰

Engels wrote in 1874 that the bourgeois economic system tended to replace isolated action by combined action.

"But whoever mentions combined action speaks of organization; now is it possible to have organisation without authority?

" . . . it is absurd to speak of the principle of authority as being absolutely evil and the principle of autonomy as being absolutely good. Authority and autonomy are relative things, whose spheres vary with the various phases of the development of society. If the autonomists confined themselves to saying that the social organisation of the future would restrict authority solely to the limits within which the conditions of production render it inevitable, we could understand each other; but they are blind to all facts that make the thing necessary and they passionately fight the word."³¹

²⁹ Marx, Critique of the Gotha Programme, SW II, pp. 563-5.

³⁰ Marx, Capital, as quoted in Iring Fetscher, "Marx, Engels, and the Future Society," in Laqueur and Labedz, eds., The Future of the Communist Society, (New York: Praeger, 1962), pp. 102-105.

³¹ Engels, "On Authority," SW I, p. 637.

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It is only with great difficulty that these words are used to justify an authoritarian political system. The anarchistic denial of the validity of any authority seemed to them to be nonsense, for how can one run a railway without a time schedule? In other words this authority was in essence labor discipline for the purposes of efficient production, whether on a farm, a ship, or in a factory. Besides, the context surrounding this discipline was thought to be radically different. The means of production had been socialized; classes were historical artifacts; divisive antagonisms had disappeared; and the acquisitive drive in man had begun to yield to a social motive for labor that resulted in harmonious cooperation.

But as this authority would extend beyond the individual, forcing a necessary curtailment of autonomy, so also would it extend beyond the individual factory or farm. The whole of society was seen as an enormous factory or orchestra; the work performed must be orchestrated into one harmonious whole. There must be " . . . the planned utilization and extension of the already existing enormous productive forces of all members of society . . ."³² There must be " . . . conscious organization on a planned basis . . ."³³ The anarchy of capitalist production needed to be replaced by socially planned production regulations in conformity with the needs of society as a whole and those of each individual.³⁴ The result would be " . . . the harmonious cooperation of its productive forces on the basis of a single vast plan . . .,"³⁵ determined in the

³²Engels, Introduction to Marx, Wage Labour and Capital, SW I, p. 251.

³³Engels, Socialism, Utopian and Scientific, SW I, p. 185.

³⁴Ibid., p. 181.

³⁵Engels, Anti-Duhring, p. 323.

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last analysis by the useful effects of the various articles of consumption, compared with each other, and with the quantity of labor required for their production.³⁶

Marx wrote in Capital that the apportionment of labor time " . . . in accordance with a definite social plan maintains the proper proportion between the different kinds of work to be done and the various wants of the community."³⁷ In another passage he referred to socialized mankind, the associated producers, regulating their interchange with nature on a rational basis to bring it under their control.³⁸

Hence this authority was considered as system wide. It could not be political authority in the old sense for society was to become an organic unity, man became truly man by becoming social man. Thus the authority that would be exerted would be similar to that exercised by the rationality of a man over the various parts of his body. Authority was coordination for maximal benefit. No longer the crisis-ridden anarchy of production in the bourgeois system for the mode of production had rebelled against the mode of exchange³⁹ and the productive forces were now unfettered. Engels wrote of an unbroken, progressive development in industry, a " . . . practically limitless growth of production . . . ,"⁴⁰ and an end to waste, senseless luxury and extravagance.⁴¹ These forces of production would be coordinated for the benefit of all

³⁶Ibid., p. 338.

³⁷Marx, Capital I, VA I, p. 84; as in Bottomore and Rubel, p. 251.

³⁸Marx, Capital III, VA III/2, pp. 873-874; ibid., pp. 254-5.

³⁹Engels, Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, SW I, p. 176.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 185.

⁴¹Ibid.

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And as society itself was a unity, so also was the man within that society. Formerly man's physical and mental faculties were sacrificed to the development of a very narrow skill, and he kept this for all of his stunted life. Instead of a world of productive capabilities and instincts, man was a crippled monstrosity, an automatic motor of a fractional operation.⁴² Everything human had been removed, even the appearance of humanity.⁴³ The existing division of labor created artificial distinctions between a philosopher and a porter⁴⁴ and this sort of fractionalization resulted in conditions which fostered drunkenness, typhus, crime, vermin, the bailiff and other social ills.⁴⁵

In the communist society this would all change. No longer serf-like labor, but " . . . associated labour plying its toil with a willing hand, a ready mind and a joyous heart."⁴⁶ Whereas accumulated labor was formerly capital, beyond the reach of the worker; it was now " . . . a means to widen, to enrich, to promote the existence of the labourer."⁴⁷ Organized production would ensure that

⁴²Engels, Anti-Duhring, p. 318. Part of the above is an Engel's quotation from Capital I, p. 396, Kerr edition.

⁴³Marx, The Holy Family, MEGA I/3, p. 205, in Bottomore and Rubel, p. 232.

⁴⁴Marx, Poverty of Philosophy, (New York: International, 1963), p. 129.

⁴⁵Engels, The Housing Question, p. 49.

⁴⁶Marx, Address and Provisional Rules of the Working Men's International Association, SW II, p. 440.

⁴⁷Marx and Engels, Manifesto, SW I, p. 221.

" . . . no individual can put on to other persons his share in productive labour, this natural condition of human existence; and in which on the other hand, productive labour, instead of being a means to the subjection of men, will become a means to their emancipation, by giving each individual the opportunity to develop and exercise all his faculties, physical and mental, in all directions, in which, therefore, productive labour will become a pleasure instead of a burden."⁴⁸

Some distinctions of occupational specialization would remain, but the narrow, confines of the division of labor would be removed. Rather than one person being only a porter, and another being only an architect, for example, in the new system one man could easily be both. He would then be a person who " . . . for half an hour gives instructions as an architect (and then he) will also push a barrow for a period, until his activity as an architect is once again required."⁴⁹ Private housework would be transformed into a public industry.⁵⁰ Labor would be so distributed so that all without exception would share; eliminating a privileged class as well as reducing each man's share of labor and increasing his share of leisure time.⁵¹

What was good for industry and for all of society therefore also was good for agriculture. Farmers or peasants would be saved from their present misery only when " . . . land itself is withdrawn from the private ownership . . . transformed into social property and

⁴⁸Engels, Anti-Duhring, p. 320.

⁴⁹Ibid., pp. 221, 324. See also Capital, VA I, pp. 512-14, as in Bottomore and Rubel, pp. 252-3: " . . . the mere bearer of a particular social function, will be replaced by the fully developed individual, for whom the different social functions he performs are but so many alternative modes of activity."

⁵⁰Engels, "Letter to Gertrude Guillaume-Schak, July 5, 1885," SC, p. 462.

⁵¹Engels, Anti-Duhring, p. 201.

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cultivated by cooperative associations of agricultural workers on a common account."⁵²

"Association, applied to the land, has the advantages from an economic point of view of large-scale ownership, and at the same time achieves the original tendency of the division of land, namely equality. Association further restores the intimate relationship of man to the land, in a rational way instead of through serfdom, overlordship and a foolish mystique of property. The land ceases to be an object of sordid speculation, and through freedom of work and enjoyment becomes once again the real, personal property of men."⁵³

Like their counterparts in industry, agricultural laborers would become both real men and real squires by participating in the same sort of cooperative association in the socialized rural scene; and, as a matter of fact, a part of the same planned association. The differences between city and country would in the main disappear because the undesirable features of both would be eradicated. Only the best of both would remain. The large cities were to be broken up and the rural areas would lose their stuporous isolation. Industry would get pure water and agriculture would benefit from nearby industry. The productive techniques that functioned well in the industrial sector would be applied to the land. Farms would be run as factories. The cities would find a fertilization utilization for the heaps of human excrement daily disposed of at great cost previously. The air would be cleaner, housing more spacious and abundant, and the population would be evenly distributed over the land. Both cities and the country would lose their distinctiveness. The uniform distribution of industry, agriculture, and population would solve crowded urban

⁵²Engels, Prefatory Note to The Peasant War in Germany, SW II, pp. 539-40.

⁵³Marx, EPM 1844, MEGA, I/3, p. 78; in Bottomore and Rubel, p. 245.

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conditions, the needs of industry, and the lag in agricultural development.⁵⁴

Obviously, there is another side to the flow in this coordinated association, and that is distribution of the wealth that is produced. In other, less philosophically grounded socialist systems it seemed as though distribution were the central element. Engels wrote that speculation on the organization of food and dwelling distribution led directly to utopian vision-making, as one might expect.⁵⁵ Marx commented that it was an error to assume that socialism turned principally on distribution. "The distribution of the means of consumption at any time is only a consequence of the distribution of the conditions of production themselves."⁵⁶ Thus one should not consider distribution independently of the mode of production. Under capitalism the means of production were in the hands of non-workers, with the masses possessing only their labor power. But under socialism the different ownership of the means of production resulted in a different distribution of the articles of consumption.⁵⁷

What sorts of differences must be extrapolated from the outline Marx gave in 1875? Here he divided the total social product, or what we might call a gross national product, into what seemed necessary categories from the economic point of view, which were taken off the top. First society must replace the used-up portions of the means of

⁵⁴Engels, Anti-Duhring, pp. 323-4; The Housing Question, pp. 95-96, and 36.

⁵⁵Engels, The Housing Question, p. 101.

⁵⁶Marx, Critique of the Gotha Programme, SW II, p. 567.

⁵⁷Ibid.

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production such as raw materials and a depreciation allowance for wear of machinery. Second, society must budget for production expansion. Third, there must be a reserve fund against unforeseen contingencies. What was left must still be divided into funds allocated for non-producing, but associated costs of administration; social necessities such as schools and public health, and unemployment compensation. The remainder would be divided among the individual producers in the society.⁵⁸

The manner of distribution of this remainder, i.e., how much to whom, was to depend on which phase of communism society was enjoying.

The first stage emerging out of the dictatorship of the proletariat was one in which traces of the old order remained. Man has not yet had sufficient time to be remade by the totally new environment, and the implication is that to give this man something for nothing would be counterproductive. Hence his share of the wealth distributed during this period would be a remuneration for actual labor time.⁵⁹ Nonetheless this would be inherently unequal, for some workers were stronger and could therefore work longer hours; some had larger families and needed more; while still others were single and needed far less. "To avoid all these defects, right instead of being equal would have to be unequal."⁶⁰ But this was not possible until the second stage of communism, or full communism. Now the evils of alienated existence were gone from the character of man. He was educated, cultured, and socially motivated. Work for such a man was no longer a means to an

⁵⁸ Ibid., pp. 561-2.

⁵⁹ Marx, Capital, VA I, p. 84; in Bottomore and Rubel, pp. 250-1.

⁶⁰ Marx, Critique of the Gotha Programme, SW II, p. 565.

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end but an end in itself, a necessity for his functioning as a human because it allowed for the expression of his creativity and productivity. "Only then can the narrow horizon of bourgeois right be fully left behind and society inscribe on its banners: from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs."⁶¹

The distribution of the wealth of society would now be unequal and satisfy the needs of man from the common storehouse; needs which he formerly spent his entire life acquiring, using up, and again gaining. His mind and body would now be free from concern about his animal needs and he could spend his time expressing his humanness.

There are two basic assumptions which underlay this prediction. First, the productive process freed from the fetters of the private extraction of profit would produce an abundance. Marx spoke of the abundant flowing of the " . . . springs of cooperative wealth."⁶²

Engels wrote:

"The possibility of securing for every member of society, through social production, an existence which is not only fully sufficient from a material standpoint and becoming richer from day to day, but also guarantees to them the completely unrestricted development and exercise of the physical and mental faculties--this possibility now exists for the first time, but it does exist."⁶³

The first assumption, that of material wealth, is easier to grant than the second; that great benefits would accrue to the population because of the social nature of society. The great wealth that would be produced would not be for commodity circulation but for consumption.

⁶¹Ibid., p. 566.

⁶²Ibid.

⁶³Engels, Anti-Duhring, p. 309.

The labor power of all the different individuals would be consciously applied as the combined labor power of the community. "All the characteristics of Robinson Crusoe's labour are here repeated, but with this difference, that they are social, instead of individual."⁶⁴ There would be no artificial barriers between production and consumption, and the social usefulness of labor would never be in doubt.

Leisure time would be common to all, " . . . so that what is really worth preserving in historically inherited culture, science, art, human relations--is not only preserved, but converted . . . into the common property of the whole of society, and further developed."⁶⁵ Man would be freed from the enslaving fetishism of religion, because it would wither along with the state when it no longer was required to serve the pseudo function of pretended knowledge in areas where man had previously felt he had no control.⁶⁶ Bourgeois marriage for the purpose of providing heirs would fade into a situation where both men and women would feel free to marry only because of sex-love. No longer would man have to buy, or want to buy, the surrender of woman; and woman would surrender only for love.⁶⁷

Men would be liberated from the confines of a narrow nationality even though their struggle prior to the revolution may have begun as a national one.⁶⁸ But workingmen had no country even before the revolution;⁶⁹

⁶⁴ Marx, Capital, I, VA, p. 84; Bottomore and Rubel, pp. 250-1.

⁶⁵ Engels, The Housing Question, pp. 29-30.

⁶⁶ Engels, Anti-Duhring, p. 345.

⁶⁷ Engels, Origin of the Family, pp. 91-100.

⁶⁸ Marx and Engels, Manifesto, SW I, p. 217.

⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 225.

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so that, afterwards, as class hostility declines so also does enmity between nations. " . . . a new society is springing up, whose International rule will be Peace, because its national ruler will be everywhere the same--Labour."⁷⁰ The struggle for man's emancipated future there could not of course be any war. There would be no cause for conflict.⁷¹

Material abundance and socialness--on these assumptions man is to be free to become truly human. Nature, the world outside of man is now the life element of his reality, the foundation of his existence; and society is now a union of the essence of man and the essence of nature. He has returned to his human, that is, social existence that he left so long ago. Like the prodigal he has eaten of the bitter husks, but unlike him man returns to his social existence having subdued and subsumed nature which he formerly feared, and with an abundance of material and non-material wealth.

"The bourgeois relations of production are the last antagonistic form of the social process of production--antagonistic not in the sense of individual antagonism but one arising from the social conditions of life of the individual; at the same time the productive forces developing in the womb of bourgeois society create the material conditions for the solution of that antagonism. This social formation brings, therefore, the prehistory of human society to a close."⁷²

One door was shutting, but the door to human history was opening.
So they believed.

⁷⁰Marx, The Civil War in France, SW II, p. 466.

⁷¹Marx, Critique of the Gotha Programme, SW II, pp. 570-1.

⁷²Marx, Preface to a Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy, SW I, p. 364.

CHAPTER III

LENIN: THE BASIS

Lenin also believed, at least by 1894 when he moved from populism to Marxism. But Lenin came to Marxism when it was apparent in the rest of Europe that time had not been kind to the Marxian predictions. The revolutionary fervor of the proletariat had not matured; instead capitalism had--developing out of the stage of primitive accumulation into a period when the workers were increasingly sharing in the benefits of an expanding national wealth. In addition, the beginnings of labor unions and the extension of political suffrage to the working class had given the proletariat more of a feeling of participation in the existing political and economic systems rather than a desire to overthrow them.

But Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov was Russian, and the environment was much different. The economy was still backward but developing rapidly. The peasantry constituted an illiterate, apathetic, and superstitious 90% of the population. The political system was reactionary, intensely anachronistic; and it created an alienated intelligentsia which increasingly sought a solution to Russia's problems through an apocalyptic vision of revolution.

Lenin was a part of this. His brother, Alexander, had been executed in 1887 for his participation in an abortive attempt to

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assassinate the Tsar. Alexander had toyed with Marxism, but his younger brother went much further, studying it intensively, and finding in it the theoretical framework for the revolutionary impatience that possessed him. The historical materialism of Marx indicated that the revolution that one could expect in Russia was the bourgeois revolution which would create the proletariat and in good time the proletarian revolution.

Revolution
But very early (1895) Lenin began to write of the necessity of the proletariat participating in the bourgeois revolution, that without the overthrow of autocracy nothing was possible for the working class. But his insistence was on the proletariat winning for itself the political rights which it needed for its later emancipation.¹ He was already a revolutionary when he came to Marxism, and he seized on the proletariat as the agent class for both the capitalist and worker revolutions. This was a really revolutionary role for a proletariat that was just beginning to develop, and was just emerging from the peasant heritage it had so recently been a part of. It is quite likely that this total revolutionary role would have been beyond the capacity of the proletariat even if Marx had been correct about the developing revolutionary spirit or consciousness under full capitalism. But Marx had been in error, and this was beginning to be seen and openly discussed in Europe, especially after the death of Engels in 1895. Because this revolutionary consciousness had not developed in the proletariat, the revisionism that emerged denied that revolution was an applicable goal for the proletariat; at a time when Russian conditions,

¹ Lenin, "Frederich Engels," Collected Works (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1964), Volume 2, p. 27, (1895).

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without reference to historical materialism, had created powerful revolutionary aspirations. A Russian coming to Marxism at this time had, therefore, good reason to combat the revisionist denial of proletarian consciousness, but because he possessed an impatient proletarian doctrine with an underdeveloped working class he must take steps to counteract this loss of or lack of consciousness which indicated that he really believed the revisionist claim.²

What was necessary was the creation of that consciousness. If that failed he must substitute the doctrine for the proletariat, an undesirable alternative. Lenin's solution was organization designed to bring about that proletarian development for the reason that the Party would be a carrier of proletarian consciousness through whose organized activity the spontaneous struggles against local employers would be turned into a political struggle culminating in socialism.³

Marx had taught that this consciousness which made revolutions⁴ was the result of the contradictions of the material life of the individual. But this kind of revolutionary activity so far in Russia seemed useless, amateurish, and local. This could not be called a struggle of Social Democracy, Lenin wrote, because " . . . it will not be the organisation and leadership of the class struggle of the proletariat."⁵ In order for this to be true these local risings needed to

²Alfred G. Meyer, Leninism, (New York: Praeger, 1956), p. 31n.

³Lenin, "Our Immediate Tasks," CW 4 (1899), p. 216.

⁴Marx, Preface to a Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy, SW I, p. 363.

⁵Lenin, "Our Immediate Tasks," CW 4 (1899), p. 218.

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be brought together, to be made aware of each other, to assist each other, and to be brought together under the same theoretical framework. To accomplish this a central newspaper was required. The one he had in mind at this time was the Rabochnaya Gazeta which the First Congress of the RSDLP had decided was to be its central organ.⁶

This newspaper would bring socialist ideas to the working class movement and connect those movements to the regular political struggle for democracy as a means of achieving socialism.⁷ In so doing he was, of course, teaching a totalist view of revolution that prefigured his surprising Theses in April of 1917.

The newspaper was to be the organ, or the means of expression of the Party which stood behind it.

{ "It is impossible to conduct a political struggle if the Party as a whole fails to make statements on all questions of policy and to give direction to the various manifestations of the struggle."⁸

The Party would define the interests of the working class, the activity of the class-conscious workers in promoting the struggle in an enlightened manner, and assist the proletariat to deepen its class awareness and political activity.⁹

Obviously whatever makes this promotion more efficient and rapid deserved positive consideration. And here the whole tradition of

⁶CW 4, Note 80, p. 443. This newspaper had been published in Kiev twice, but subsequent to the Congress in 1898 police seizure of the presses prevented its publication. But the desire for a central newspaper continued. Hence the founding of Iskra outside of Russia to be smuggled in.

⁷Lenin, "Our Immediate Tasks," CW 4, (1899), p. 217.

⁸Ibid., p. 219.

⁹Lenin, "Draft and Explanation of a Programme for the Social-Democratic Party," 1895, CW 2, p. 112. Also CW 4, "An Urgent Question," 1899, p. 222-223.

elitism in Russian revolutionary thought from Pestel, Bakunin, Nechayev, Tkachev, and the narodnik conspirators supported Lenin's innovation in 1902--the professional, secret, centrally controlled Party organization manipulating the proletariat for its own good. The motivation was impatience for that victory which would light a revolutionary beacon for the down-trodden masses (populism?) and ensure the complete overthrow of the gendarme of Europe which would make possible the European revolutions which would then show Russia the way to convert a few revolutionary years into an era of revolutionary decades.¹⁰

X But by identifying the consciousness with the Party, Lenin denied the proletarian character of such a revolution. Without the Party organization the proletariat was nothing!¹¹ The workers' level of consciousness was spontaneity and their focus was trade-union level or economic struggle.¹² The political consciousness was possessed by the Party, and it was the only correct one;¹³ hostility to which within the ranks of the proletariat showed them as having an incorrect class position.¹⁴ But this meant that the discontent on which the revolution would build did not have to be proletarian in the usual sense of the word. All manner of discontent could be

¹⁰ Lenin, "Social-Democracy and the Provisional Government," CW 8, April, 1905, pp. 287-288.

¹¹ Lenin, "Party Discipline and the Fight Against the Pro-Cadet Social Democrats," CW 11, November 1906, p. 320.

¹² Lenin, "Apropos of the Profession De Foi," CW 4, 1899, p. 290. Also, "What is to be Done," CW 5, 1902, p. 375.

¹³ Lenin, "Learn from the Enemy," CW 10, November, 1905, p. 61.

¹⁴ Ibid.

utilized by the Party from whatever source or class in order to promote the ends dictated by the superior consciousness of that Party.¹⁵

✕ And even within the Party one could not be sure of correct class-consciousness. In 1905 Lenin wrote that it would be ridiculous to think that everyone who joined the Party was immediately the right sort. These elements, he wrote, of instability, vacillation, and wavering can be influenced; and they will submit to the influence of the steadfast and solid core of Social-Democrats.¹⁶ The Party

" . . . must be composed of men and women who clearly understand the tasks of the Social-Democratic working-class movement and who have resolved to engage in a determined struggle against the present political system. It must combine within itself the socialist knowledge and revolutionary experience acquired from many decades of activity by the Russian revolutionary intelligentsia with the knowledge of working class life and conditions, and the ability to agitate among the masses and lead them which is characteristic of the advanced workers."¹⁷

Neither philosophically nor realistically could the proletariat measure up to the demands being made of it. The necessity of Party substitution for proletariat was therefore clear from the outset. To call the demand for total revolution unimpeachably orthodox Marxism, as Lichtheim does¹⁸ is misleading, for in his arguments with the Economists Lenin went so far to the political as to distort the Marxist argument in such a way that the 1848 period of Marx, when he was closest to the Jacobin-Babouvist-Blanquist heritage became the dominant one. Lichtheim would

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 412.

¹⁶ Lenin, "The Reorganisation of the Party," CW 10, November, 1905, p. 32.

¹⁷ Lenin, "Preface to the Pamphlet May Days in Kharkov," CW 4, November, 1900, p. 358.

¹⁸ George Lichtheim, Marxism, (New York: Praeger, 1961.), p. 336.

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be the first to deny that the Manifesto and the Address summed up orthodox Marxism, whatever that may be.

X The point is not whether Lenin was or was not a Marxist in good standing. That debate can have no fruitful conclusion.¹⁹ The point is that in forcing the proletarian doctrine into a narrow political frame of reference Lenin turned a beautiful failure into a tawdry success. The Party was conceived of as the spirit incarnate of the advanced, conscious proletariat which led the riff-raff and poor peasant into the democratic revolution, with democratic goals. But it did not follow from this that the bourgeoisie was the motive force in the revolution. "Such a conclusion would be a vulgarization of Marxism, would be the failure to understand the class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie."²⁰

The motive force was the proletariat for out of necessity to protect its economic interests the bourgeoisie wavered between revolution and reaction. "Only the proletariat is capable of consummating the

¹⁹ The point that is lost when this sort of discussion begins is that neither Marx nor Lenin accepted the notion that Marxism was a closed book. Lenin perceived it as a guide rather than a dogma. Even though one might, as does Schapiro in The Origins of the Communist Autocracy, Praeger, 1965, p. 14; say that Lenin's notion of a party elite was " . . . close in spirit and temperament to Marx's outlook" it was not really the outlook that was so similar as the conditions giving rise to that frame of mind. In 1848-49, Marx was quite willing to apply the French model to Germany where it did not fit. Lenin's desire to do the same in re Russia rather than Germany is a reflection of the similarity of conditions in 1848 Germany and 1900 Russia. But to debate whether Lenin's elitism is somehow derivable from the Marx of this period is to ignore the rest of Marx; to debate whether Lenin was a good Marxist is to raise the theological issue of the similarity of St. Paul to Christ; or if Christ came again would he come as a Negro. It is hopeless.

²⁰ Lenin, "The Fifth Congress of the RSDLP," CW 12, 1907, p. 457.

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revolution, that is, of achieving a complete victory."²¹ By 1911 he was speaking of continual proletarian hegemony so as to purge undemocratic elements from the democracy.²² His political orientation had caused him to merge elements of the minimum with the maximum program. He summed this up most clearly in 1916.

"Whoever expects a pure social revolution will never live to see it." "The socialist revolution in Europe cannot be anything other than an outburst of mass struggle on the part of all and sundry oppressed and discontented elements."²³

But the confusion was evident at least from 1905. In present day Russia, he wrote, there are not just two contending forces, but two wars going on at the same time. One was the battle for democracy and the other was the struggle for socialism.²⁴

Moreover, by 1916 Lenin had a theoretical framework which explained how underdeveloped nations fit into the Marxian historical pattern in such a way as to justify his allegations about Russia. The theory of imperialism²⁵ contended that the highest stage of capitalism had now been reached in finance or monopoly capitalism. Monopolies of industries and banking institutions brought great wealth into a few hands. In order for capitalism to expand it had to export capital to backward or undeveloped areas. This made economic sense, but it also fostered the very rapid development of capitalism in these areas, creating tremendous strains, so that when revolution broke out in the more

²¹Ibid., pp. 457-458.

²²Lenin, "Those Who Would Liquidate Us," CW, 17, 1911, p. 79.

²³Lenin, "The Discussion on Self-Determination Summed Up," CW 22, 1916, p. 356.

²⁴Lenin, "Socialism and the Peasantry," CW 9, 1905, pp. 307-308.

²⁵Lenin, "Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism," CW 22, 1916, p. 195ff.

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advanced countries (not including Russia) " . . . the undeveloped and oppressed nations do not just wait, do not cease to exist, do not disappear."²⁶ Rather they "take advantage of the great crisis", and along with the revolts in the advanced countries there will be a whole series of democratic and revolutionary movements in the other countries, based on the uneven development of international capitalism.²⁷

Here can be seen a phenomenon that will be visible again; reality dictating to philosophical theory in that the theory is shaped to the reality one perceives. The issue is not imperialism as a theory but its use to justify a Marxian revolution in a country that Lenin himself called little developed and sparsely populated.²⁸ This was not only done through the instrument of the imperialism theory, but also through the notion of revolutionary impurities mentioned above, by a concept prefiguring Tito that nations would arrive at socialism in different ways and each with its own contribution,²⁹ and the claim to peculiarities within the Russian situation. By January of 1917 Lenin had come to the point where he had analyzed the 1905 revolution as bourgeois-democratic in its social content, but a proletarian one in its methods. It sought democratic goals, but was also proletarian for it was led by the workers as vanguard, and the weapons used, strikes, were specifically proletarian.³⁰ He might doubt that a

²⁶ Lenin, "A Caricature of Marxism," CW 23, October, 1916, p. 59.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Lenin, "Imperialism," CW 22, 1916, p. 273.

²⁹ Lenin, "A Caricature of Marxism," CW 23, 1916, pp. 69-70.

³⁰ Lenin, "Lecture on the 1905 Revolution," CW 23, January, 1917, pp. 238-239.

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revolution would come soon in Russia,³¹ but whenever it did he was ideologically ready for it.

Not only this confusion, but since 1905 he had written of the possibility that Russia would act as a spark to set the European proletariat in motion. Revolt in Russia would serve as a signal for the world struggle.³² This may, of course, be explained as caused by "ridding Europe of its policeman," but as Meyer suggests this idea of a Russian gift to the more developed world is squarely in the Russian revolutionary tradition. When coupled with what Fainsod and Meyer call the dialectics of backwardness which Lenin explicated after the revolution it becomes yet another theoretical underpinning of a proletarian revolution in Russia. When Lenin's critics pointed out the underdeveloped nature of Russian capitalism and hence its proletariat, he could easily respond that the European revolution with which Russia's would be linked would take care of all that. The Russian experience, aided by Europe would result in a socialist Europe, including Russia. "The European workers will show us how to do it, and then together with them we shall bring about the socialist revolution."³³

But--if the revolution occurred in only one country it would

³¹Ibid., p. 253.

³²Lenin, "The Aggravation of the Situation in Russia," CW 9, 1905, p. 412. See also ibid., "The First Victory of the Revolution," p. 434.

³³Lenin, "The Stages, the Trend, and the Prospects of the Revolution," CW 10, 1905-6, pp. 90-92. Reference to Meyer's Leninism, p. 259; Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled, (New York: Random House, 1964), p. 38.



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immediately be crushed by the capitalist powers.³⁴ But this was impossible. The Germans had already matured to the point of a transition to socialism because the state now controlled 66 million people from one center which meant that they were very close to socialism.³⁵ Besides revolutions were bound to follow the imperialist war in Europe.³⁶

X One came earlier. On March 11th and 12th, 1917, Lenin was suddenly and dramatically confronted with an actual revolutionary situation in Russia which culminated without his help in the overthrow of the Tsar of all the Russias, Nicholas II. He reacted almost immediately. The bourgeois revolution has been completed! This statement which would have surprised a good many revolutionaries in Petersburg was justified on the basis that by 1917 the bourgeoisie were so nearly completely in power that a simple push brought the autocracy to the ground. The war had accelerated the course of backward Russia's development so that seemingly at one blow Russia had caught up with Italy, England, and almost with France!³⁷

This was, however, no time for the proletariat to rest. Applying what he had said on many previous occasions he urged the workers not to support the new Provisional Government, but the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers' Deputies. The workers must be armed before freedom and the destruction of tsarism can be assured. But he was not just

³⁴ Lenin, "The Principles Involved in the War Issue," CW 23, December, 1916, p. 158.

³⁵ Lenin, "Theses for an Appeal to the International Socialist Committee and All Socialist Parties," CW 23, January, 1917, p. 210.

³⁶ Lenin, "Speech at an International Meeting in Berne," CW 22, February, 1916, p. 125.

³⁷ Lenin, "Letters from Afar," CW 23, March 20, 1917, p. 303-4.

interested in making tsarism irrestorable. He referred repeatedly to the March revolution as the first stage. The second stage involved the proletariat's utilization of the peculiarities of the present transitional situation in order to proceed not only to the consolidation of the democratic victory but to socialism.³⁸

This incredible assertion was not made by a power mad, frustrated leader. Rather by a true believer in the adaptations of Marxism he himself had created. The proletariat must be active, they cannot wait; the Party is the embodiment of the proletarian consciousness necessary to bring about that new dawn of humanity; and revolution in Europe following the war was inevitable, because capitalism in the advanced countries was gasping its last breath before going down. The fullness of time had come and he urged the embryonic workers' militia to combine not only police but also general state functions, military functions, and the control of social production and distribution.³⁹ In his third letter from Geneva he was obviously frustrated because he could not tell whether the second stage had already arrived.⁴⁰ The proletariat must organize and smash the state machine and phase the police, army, and the bureaucracy into an armed populace.⁴¹ This universal militia would restore absolute order and devotedly observe comradely discipline; distribute grain and housing equally, with the rich last in line; and introduce universal civilian labor service.

³⁸Ibid., p. 308.

³⁹Ibid., April 9, 1917, pp. 318-19.

⁴⁰Ibid., March 24, 1917, p. 323.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 325.

These measures would not constitute socialism but the transition to it.⁴² The chaos and anarchy then existing in Russia was not a refutation of his ideas but support for the notion of the revolution was continuing into the next stage.

He claimed he was not for introducing socialism but for preaching it.⁴³ The majority of the population are peasants who must be propagandized or educated to see the progressive character of nationalizing the land and seizing control of the banks and syndicates.⁴⁴ These measures need caution and gradualness in their adoption, but this is the only direction in which to move. But this also meant taking control of the Soviets as a means to that end.

" . . . if the revolutionary proletariat should actually win power, it will only be for the sake of going forward. And to go forward means to take definite steps to get us out of the war--words alone won' do it. The complete success of these steps is only possible by world revolution, if the revolution kills the war, if the workers of the whole world support the revolution. Taking power is, therefore, the only practical measure and the only way out."⁴⁵

The taking of power, and the implementing of certain measures would not constitute socialism, but what Lenin called "one foot in socialism". The other foot was the peasant economic relationships.⁴⁶ Nonetheless he urged his program on his astonished Party, stating that the Russian

⁴²Ibid., April 8, 1917, pp. 329, 330, 341.

⁴³Lenin, "The Seventh (April) All Russia Conference," 1917, CW 24, p. 242.

⁴⁴Lenin, "A Proletarian Militia," CW 24, May, 1917, p. 181.

⁴⁵Lenin, "The Seventh (April) All Russia Conference," CW 24, 1917, p. 243.

⁴⁶Lenin, "Speech in Favour of the Resolution on the Current Situation," CW 24, May, 1917, p. 307.

revolution was merely the first stage in a long line of proletarian revolutions;⁴⁷ but that because of Russian backwardness the Russian proletariat (Party) could not aim at immediate socialist changes.⁴⁷

Lenin seemed to be walking a tightrope to avoid devastating criticism. The crux of his message was that nothing could be accomplished unless they took power. The whole issue of whether or not socialism would be introduced in Russia, or whether Russia was ready for the second stage of the revolution was reduced to empty talk. Marxism was not a dogma, but a guide. There had never been a pure revolution moving from capitalism to socialism. Russia had something in between, something new and unprecedented.⁴⁸ Forget the stages of a rigid historical materialism, look at what the present Russian situation offered. The road to Russian socialism lay through the Soviets, and therefore the task of the day was to amplify and extend Soviet hegemony. The prize was leading the workers of the world to socialism.⁴⁹ For a short time the Russian proletariat had the great honor to have been the first to start the revolution, even though it was less organized, less prepared, and less class-conscious than the proletariat of other countries. This honor was not due to special qualities of the Russian workers, but to a special conjuncture of historical circumstances making the Russian proletariat for a short

⁴⁷ Lenin, "Resolution on the Current Situation," CW 24, May, 1917, p. 311.

⁴⁸ Lenin, "Speech to the First All Russia Congress of Soviets," June, 1917, CW 25, pp. 19-20.

⁴⁹ Lenin, "To our Comrades in War-Prison Camps," CW 23, March, 1917, p. 348.

time the vanguard of the revolutionary proletariat of the whole world.⁵⁰ In twenty-two remarkably consistent years he was within sight of his goal. It was still revolution.

"Single-handed the Russian Proletariat cannot bring the socialist revolution to a victorious conclusion."⁵¹ But " . . . the objective circumstances of the imperialist war make it certain that the revolution will not be limited to the first stage of the Russian revolution; that the revolution will not be limited to Russia. The German proletariat is the most trustworthy, the most reliable ally of the Russian and the world proletarian revolution."⁵²

"Comrade Rykov says that socialism must come from other countries with a more developed industry. But that is not so. Nobody can say who will begin it and who will end it. That is not Marxism; it is a parody of Marxism."⁵³

"If we had said, No tsar, but a dictatorship of the proletariat, well, this would have meant skipping over the petty bourgeoisie. But what we are saying is help the revolution through the Soviets. We must not lapse into reformism. We are fighting to win, not to lose. At the worst we can count on partial success."⁵⁴

In so doing the Russians would be setting an example that would certainly be followed by the workers of at least Germany and France.⁵⁵ The Russian demand for a just peace, for instance, would be followed by revolts against their governments by the workers of Germany and

⁵⁰ Lenin, "The Revolution in Russia and the Tasks of the Workers of All Countries," CW 23, March, 1917, p. 350. See also "A Farewell Letter to the Swiss Workers," CW 23, March-April, 1917, p. 371.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Ibid., p. 373.

⁵³ Lenin, "Speech Winding Up the Debate on the Report on the Current Situation," CW 24, May, 1917, p. 246.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Lenin, "Is There a Way to a Just Peace," CW 25, June-July, 1917, p. 56.

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France. If the bourgeoisie of England, Japan, and America resist, the Russian workers along with other workers will successfully wage a revolutionary war against them.⁵⁶ It almost sounds as though Lenin hoped that the capitalists would resist for this would, he said, bring the revolution in Europe a hundred times nearer, and the new Russian Army with its elected commanders would willingly fight the war against them.⁵⁷ This would awaken an "ardent response" from among the international proletariat masses.⁵⁸

"Doubt is out of the question. We are on the threshold of a world proletarian revolution. And since of all the proletarian internationalists in all countries only we Bolsheviks enjoy a measure of freedom . . .," more is demanded of us.⁵⁹

Thus the old populists were only partly wrong. Russia did after all have a gift for the West. It was not peasant socialism; or was it? It was a confused potpourri. Like a commander with vast forces, Lenin saw a weak link in the enemy chain of defense. It did not matter that the proletarian forces were weak, the enemy was so invitingly incapable of defense that a vision of their vulnerability swept Lenin's mind, and our impatient Marxist could not resist.

But he was under no illusions that this battle was the war. He called his seizure of power on November 7th by a variety of expressions

⁵⁶Ibid.

⁵⁷Lenin, "Draft Resolution on the Present Political Situation," CW 25, September, 1917, p. 315.

⁵⁸Lenin, "The Russian Revolution and Civil War," CW 26, September, 1917, p. 38. Also, "The Meeting of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers and Soldiers' Deputies, October 25, 1917," CW 26, pp. 239, 241.

⁵⁹Lenin, "The Crisis Has Matured," CW 26, September, 1917, p. 77.

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like armed rising, and insurrection. This was not a gateway into socialism but into the path leading to socialism.⁶⁰ But at the same time the insurrection or coup no longer was for the purpose of consolidating a bourgeois victory. " . . . in taking power we are not at all afraid of stepping beyond the bounds of the bourgeois system; on the contrary, . . . we shall fearlessly march towards socialism, . . . our road shall be through a Soviet Republic."⁶¹ When Bukharin wanted to drop the reference to the minimum program in the new Party Program revision, Lenin argued:


"We must first carry out the measures of transition to socialism, we must continue our revolution until the world socialist revolution is victorious, and only then, returning from battle, may we discard the minimum program as of no further use." We have " . . . not yet realised the basic prerequisites for a transition to socialism."⁶²

This was the basis for the holding action.

⁶⁰ Lenin, "Speech to the First All Russia Congress of Soviets," CW 25, June, 1917, pp. 17-42. Similar references are located in nearly all his writings of this time period immediately surrounding the dates of the coup.

⁶¹ Lenin, "Revision of the Party Programme," CW 26, October, 1917, p. 170.

⁶² Ibid., p. 171.



CHAPTER IV

LENIN: THE FUTURE SOCIETY

The Bolsheviks seized power on November 7, 1917. Just two months earlier Lenin had written his State and Revolution which was a curious mixture of Marxism, anarchism and generalized optimism. Before the insurrection, he taught, the revolutionaries must concentrate on destroying, breaking up, annihilating the machinery of the state.¹ What this meant is not clear at all. The machinery or apparatus he was writing about he considered to be a very simple organization. The great majority of functions which it performed had become so simplified and reduced that any literate person would have no difficulty in performing them.² But if the functions of the state machinery remain after the insurrection in what manner has it been destroyed? It obviously has not been destroyed.

Moreover, the transition from a state that must be annihilated to one that must be preserved could be accomplished in one day.³ The chief tasks would be bookkeeping and control which could be performed by anyone with a knowledge of basic arithmetic,⁴ and made

¹ Lenin, State and Revolution, (New York: Vanguard Press, 1929), p. 138.

² Ibid., p. 149.

³ Ibid., p. 155.

⁴ Ibid., p. 204-5.

easier by the fact that most of the old administrative staffs were likely to stay on for the new employers.⁵ This sounded very little like a revolution and very much like a coup.

After the seizure of power the organizational principle applied to the state would be the same one that worked so well for the Party, namely a combination of democracy and centralism. Lenin called this a voluntary centralism, a union of the various proletarian communes which together would then get on with the business of destroying capitalist supremacy.⁶ This concept of voluntary centralism had been developed since 1913 particularly in reference to the national question, and even more specifically in relation to the right of secession of a nation. What is most interesting are the limitations that Lenin introduced immediately.

"The rights of nations to self-determination (i.e., the constitutional guarantee of an absolutely free and democratic method of deciding the question of secession) must under no circumstances be confused with the expediency of a given nation's secession. The Social Democratic Party must decide the latter question exclusively on the merits in each particular case in conformity with the interests of social development as a whole, and with the interests of the proletarian class struggle for socialism."⁷

Voluntarism was insured by this right to secede, but this right did not preclude propaganda and agitation against separation or the exposure of such a desire as being bourgeois nationalism.⁸ A Marxist Party must combat all forms of nationalism, even the most refined;

⁵Ibid., p. 204.

⁶Ibid., pp. 159-60.

⁷Lenin, "Resolutions of the 1913 Conference of the Central Committee, RSDLP," CW 19, September, 1913, p. 429.

⁸Lenin, "The National Programme of the RSDLP," CW 19, 1913, p. 544.



because such a Party must advocate not only unity, but also the amalgamation of the workers of all nationalities in the struggle against reaction and bourgeois nationalism.

"Our task is not to segregate nations, but to unite the workers of all nations. Our banner does not carry the slogan 'national culture', but international culture, which unites all the nations in a higher, socialist unity . . ."9

As a matter of fact the desire to secede was a pre-revolutionary desire created by bourgeois oppression. Once the freedom was granted, Lenin thought, the desire to implement that freedom would decline.¹⁰ But it was nonetheless necessary to implement it as a right subsequent to the revolution because as a result of its being on the books, so to speak, it would serve as a practical basis for the elimination of all friction between nations, making their amalgamation that much more simple.¹¹

He was not being mysterious or underhanded. When a person is overwhelmingly convinced that he is right he has restricted his alternatives and ability to see differences in such a way as to make the concept of freedom or voluntarism different. One's freedoms or rights are that which cannot be used because their use demonstrates erroneous thinking. Forcing people to be free did not originate with Lenin nor did it end with him. The voluntary association of communes must be understood in this context.

⁹Lenin, "Once More on the Segregation of Schools," CW 19, 1913, p. 548.

¹⁰Lenin, "Corrupting the Workers with Refined Nationalism," CW 20, May, 1914, p. 289; "The Rights of Nations to Self-Determination," CW 20, May, 1914, pp. 395-454; and "The Socialist Revolution and Self-Determination," CW 22, February, 1916, pp. 146-7.

¹¹Lenin, "The Discussion on Self-Determination Summed Up," CW 22, July, 1916, p. 325.

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This association went beyond Russia, of course. In State and Revolution he has international socialism in mind. He seems to have seen himself as one of the major leaders since 1914 when support for the war became a divisive issue among socialists. This did not destroy internationalism; rather the international movement required a new direction. "The proletarian International has not gone under and will not go under. Notwithstanding all obstacles, the masses of the workers will create a new International."¹²

The new direction was the leadership position of the Bolshevik insurrection, in the sense that they had been the first of the expected post-war revolutions. By 1918 this feeling of leadership had hardened to the point where it was a leader-follower relationship that he had in mind, and it was this notion that acted as the unfortunate background for the formation of the Third International.

"Bolshevism has become the world wide theory and tactics of the international proletariat! (Applause)
It has accomplished a thorough-going revolution for all the world to see. To be for or against the Bolsheviks is actually the dividing line among socialists."¹³

This was unfortunate because it made the Third International a mere extension of Bolshevism, a tool of Soviet domestic policy.

In March of the same year, however, he had sounded much different; reflecting the German military pressure and also the greater room for frankness before the Party. He said: " . . . it is the absolute truth that without a German revolution we are doomed . . . " "At all events,

¹² Lenin, "The War and Russian Social-Democracy," CW 21, October, 1914, p. 33. See also "Kamenev's Speech in the Central Executive Committee," CW 25, August 29, 1917, p. 242.

¹³ Lenin, "Report at a Joint Session of the All-Russia CEC," CW 28, October, 1918, p. 114.

under all conceivable circumstances, if the German revolution does not come, we are doomed."¹⁴

This, though, was his nadir. He had been frustratingly moving in this direction since the rising in Petrograd on November 7th. He argued against those who said that the West was disgracefully silent by saying that only the blind could fail to see the ferment among the working masses in Germany and the West. "We believe in the revolution in the West. We know that it is inevitable!"¹⁵ But he was also beginning to give himself an escape route. Two days later he said that the international revolution would seal the Russian victory,¹⁶ and two months later after expressing the usual faith in the coming revolts he wrote:

"It would be a mistake, however, to base the tactics of the Russian socialist government on attempts to determine whether or not the European, and especially the German, socialist revolution will take place in the next six months (or some such brief period)."¹⁷

Two months after this, at his lowest point, he added, "The revolution will not come as quickly as we expected." " . . . the world socialist revolution cannot begin so easily in the advanced countries as the revolution began in Russia."¹⁸

The background to this surprising statement is the necessity of

¹⁴ Lenin, "Extraordinary Seventh Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)," March 6-9, 1918, p. 98, CW 27.

¹⁵ Lenin, "Meeting of the All Russia CEC," CW 26, November 17, 1917, p. 291.

¹⁶ Lenin, "To the Population," CW 26, November 19, 1917, p. 298.

¹⁷ Lenin, "Theses on the Question of a Separate Peace," CW 26, January, 1918, pp. 443-4.

¹⁸ Lenin, "Extraordinary Seventh Congress of the RCP (B)," CW 27, March, 1918, p. 98.

explaining, already in March of 1918, why the European revolution had not as yet commenced.

" . . . we do not forget the weakness of the Russian working class compared to other contingents of the international proletariat. It was not our own will, but historical circumstances, the legacy of the tsarist regime, the flabbiness of the Russian bourgeoisie, that caused this contingent to march ahead of the other contingents of the international proletariat; it was not because we desired it, but because circumstances demanded it.


"We must remain at our post until the arrival of our ally; the international proletariat, which will arrive and will inevitably arrive, but which is approaching at an immeasurably slower pace than we expected or wish. If we see that as a result of objective conditions the international proletariat moves too slowly, we must nevertheless stick to our tactics of temporising and utilizing the conflicts and contradictions between the imperialists, of slowly accumulating strength; the tactics of preserving this island of Soviet power in the stormy imperialist sea, maintaining this island which now already attracts the gaze of the working people of all countries."¹⁹

"The workers of the world are looking toward us. We can hear their cry: Hold on a little longer! You are surrounded by enemies, but we shall come to your aid, and by our joint effort we shall finally hurl the imperialist vultures over the precipice. We hear this cry, and we swear we shall hold on . . . "²⁰

This notion of maintaining the island, of holding on, pervaded his writing of this period. There are however two qualifications to this attitude. One was the growing feeling of pride at what they had accomplished the longer they stayed in power. This was manifest in the allegation noted above that Bolshevism was now the theory and tactics of the international proletariat. But it is also visible in the many references Lenin made to the spread of Bolshevism or Sovietism throughout the world, based on

¹⁹ Lenin, "Report on Foreign Policy," CW 27, May, 1918, p. 337. See also "Speech to the Chairmen of Gubernia Soviets," CW 28, July, 1918, p. 37.

²⁰ Lenin, "Speech at a Meeting in Sokolniki District," CW 28, August, 1918, p. 53.



such slender evidence as the translation of the word Soviet into Italian.²¹ Not only could they defend themselves with the Red Army but they could also ~~secure~~ the victory of the international revolution.²² Leadership has passed for a short time to the Russians.²³ They had become the model. But when the other revolutions did take place Russia would cease to be the model and become again a backward country.²⁴ But already in 1919 he undercut this by stating that the workers of other countries had come to the aid of the Russians. The sympathies of the international proletariat had prevented their imperialist countries from more positively intervening during the civil wars and hence ~~made~~ Soviet success possible.²⁵

The other qualification to the holding action was that there was no intention of maintaining their island in a passive sense. It was the fundamental task of the Party, the vanguard of the class-conscious proletariat to adopt

" . . . the most energetic, ruthlessly determined and Draconian measures to improve the self-discipline and discipline of the workers and peasants of Russia . . . to create everywhere soundly co-ordinated mass organizations held together by a single iron will."²⁶

A single iron will meant control and this meant the power of the state

²¹ Lenin, "Report at a Joint Session of the All Russia CEC," CW 28, October, 1918, pp. 114-115.

²² Lenin, "Resolution of the Joint Session of the All Russia CEC," CW 28, October, 1918, p. 130.

²³ Lenin, "The Third International and its Place in History," CW 29, April, 1919, p. 310.

²⁴ Lenin, "Left-wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder," CW 31, May, 1920, pp. 21-22.

²⁵ Lenin, "Political Report of the Central Committee to the All Russia Conference of the RCP (B)," CW 30, December, 1919, pp. 173-4.

²⁶ Lenin, "Resolution on War and Peace," CW 27, March, 1918, p. 118.

The first part of the document discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records of all transactions. It emphasizes that proper record-keeping is essential for the transparency and accountability of the organization. The document outlines the various methods used to collect and analyze data, ensuring that the information is reliable and valid.

The second part of the document focuses on the implementation of the proposed system. It details the steps involved in the rollout, from initial testing to full-scale deployment. The document also addresses potential challenges and provides strategies to overcome them, ensuring a smooth transition to the new system.

The third part of the document discusses the future of the organization. It outlines the long-term goals and the strategies to achieve them. The document also highlights the importance of continuous improvement and the need to adapt to changing circumstances.

The fourth part of the document discusses the financial aspects of the organization. It provides a detailed breakdown of the budget and the expected outcomes. The document also discusses the various sources of funding and the ways in which the funds will be used.

The fifth part of the document discusses the human resources of the organization. It outlines the various roles and responsibilities of the staff and the ways in which they will be trained and supported. The document also discusses the importance of maintaining a high level of morale and motivation among the staff.

The sixth part of the document discusses the legal aspects of the organization. It outlines the various laws and regulations that the organization must comply with and the ways in which it will ensure compliance. The document also discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records of all legal transactions.

The seventh part of the document discusses the environmental aspects of the organization. It outlines the various environmental issues that the organization must address and the ways in which it will ensure that it is operating in an environmentally responsible manner.

The eighth part of the document discusses the social aspects of the organization. It outlines the various social issues that the organization must address and the ways in which it will ensure that it is operating in a socially responsible manner.

The ninth part of the document discusses the overall impact of the organization. It outlines the various ways in which the organization is contributing to the community and the ways in which it is improving the lives of its stakeholders.

The tenth part of the document discusses the conclusion of the document. It summarizes the key findings and the recommendations of the document.

to coerce. No socialist, he said, had ever promised that the highest phase of communism would in actuality arrive. The great socialists had anticipations that it would come but in those anticipations did not assume the current Russian productivity levels or the present " . . . unthinking man in the street capable of spoiling, without reflection the stores of social wealth and of demanding the impossible."²⁷ As long as this highest phase has not arrived there must be very strict control of labor and consumption by society and the state.

How the state could be both used and destroyed was confusing unless one had the single-mindedness of Lenin. What was to be destroyed was the bourgeois state, that instrument of class oppression directed against the proletariat. But when the state becomes a proletarian state, " . . . when it will be an instrument of violence exercised by the proletariat against the bourgeoisie, we shall be fully and unreservedly in favour of a strong state power and of centralism."²⁸

This state power, dignified by the adjective proletarian, was to last until universal mass organizations were created, until the urban proletariat had realized benefits from their concentration, education, and unity; until real equality existed among the former exploited and there were restrictions on the former exploiters; until there were frequent elections, with recall powers for the masses; until the industrial unit was the primary political nucleus; until an army was created that would be connected with and a part of the people; and until a

²⁷ Lenin, State and Revolution, p. 201.

²⁸ Lenin, "Can the Bolsheviks Retain State Power?" CW 26, October 1, 1917, p. 116.

merging of the legislative and executive functions allowed for a transcendence of parliamentarianism. The controls would have to last until the old state bureaucracy was destroyed, until the workers were taught their own and other jobs well; until all government positions could be filled periodically by different people; and society had altered to the point where a declaration of rights would be unnecessary because actual participation in rights existed to such a great extent.²⁹

He omitted items from this list that would be anti-police, or descriptive of depressed salaries for officials or elective officers in the armed forces. In May of 1917 he had suggested the replacement of the army with an arming of the whole people³⁰ but it was now March of 1919 and circumstances were different. The German military threat of 1918, the continually recurring outbursts of civil war, tremendous domestic economic chaos and urban starvation, political dissension, and the delay of international revolution made it imperative that he alter some of his ideas. He had no difficulty doing this, for as he himself said, "Our theory is a guide to action, not a dogma."³¹

Of course he was an opportunist. In noting this, however, observers generally give the impression that Lenin took a "pure" Marxism and twisted it into Bolshevism. Fainsod described it as turning Marx on his head.³² This has to be a Marx that I never met.

²⁹Lenin, "Draft Programme of the RCP (B)," CW 29, March, 1919, pp. 106-108.

³⁰Lenin, "Open Letter to the Delegates of All Russia Congress of Peasant Deputies," CW 24, May, 1917, p. 373.

³¹Lenin, "From a Publicist's Diary," CW 25, September, 1917, p. 281.

³²Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled, (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1964), p. 38.

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The Marx that I met changed his mind about the applicability of the French revolutionary model to Germany, about the Communist Party; about the Paris Commune in 1871, about England's place in historical materialism; and even about the necessity of violence in the expected proletarian revolution. All of these changes were dictated by experience. Had Marx been this involved in experience he may very well have made more fundamental alterations in his program. Nonetheless Lenin was an opportunist. The major item on his agenda was survival. For this he had to have an army with military, i.e., non-democratic discipline, and he had to utilize former tsarist army officers by the thousands to command the inexperienced Red Army. Following the period of civil wars and intervention his focus shifted from survival to revival. Now the discipline was maintained and the former tsarist industrialists were utilized to rebuild the economy. There was tremendous consistency—before the revolution it was a compulsion to overthrow the tsar, then attain power. After November of 1917 it was a compulsion to stay in power. All else was secondary, and all great men of history including the gentle Jesus had this kind of singleminded dedication to their destinies.³³

What kind of revolution did Lenin think that the Bolsheviks had accomplished?

"I have no illusions about our having only just entered the period of transition to socialism, about not yet having reached socialism. But if you say that

³³ Hugh Schonfield, The Passover Plot.

Obviously, in calling Jesus gentle, I am putting my tongue in my cheek and referring to the mythological figure rather than to the historical person who was not always gentle and did possess a genius for implementing the goals of his single-mindedness.

our state is a socialist Republic of Soviets, you will be right. You will be as right as those who call many western bourgeois republics democratic republics although everybody knows that not one of even the most democratic of these republics is completely democratic."³⁴

"We are far from having completed even the transitional period from capitalism to socialism. We have never cherished the hope that we could finish it without the aid of the international proletariat. We never had any illusions on that score, and we know how difficult is the road that leads from capitalism to socialism."³⁵

They might be on the road that led to socialism but it was a difficult path to follow. They had come into power out of time because it was easier to do so in a backward country like Russia.³⁶ But the holding action was filled with crises, and strong measures of control were necessary. What they had succeeded in loosening prior to the revolution they must now again contain.

This control included the Party. Lenin had never been happy with dissension in the top ranks of the Party. It was tolerated and to some extent institutionalized in the theory of democratic centralism. But the closer one comes to the seizure of power and the subsequent holding, the more was the opposition uncomfortable, then unnecessary and specious, then dangerous, and finally forbidden. Ten days after the insurrection he wrote that the victory of socialism in Russia could only be insured by ending scepticism and wavering in the Party, and by all members of the Party supporting their government.³⁷

³⁴ Lenin, "Third All Russia Congress of Soviets," CW 26, January, 1918, pp. 464-465.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 471-2.

³⁷ Lenin, "Resolution of the Central Committee on the Opposition within the Central Committee," CW 26, November 17, 1917, p. 279.

Only a short time before he had spelled out what the responsibilities of that government were. State-wide control and accounting. Worker control of industry, i.e., state control was to be established. State control would be worker control because it was a workers' state, a dictatorship of the proletariat. Control of the banks, work books to maintain labor discipline, redistribution of housing, and the use of former capitalists were among the measures advocated. In justifying the use of capitalists at high remunerations Lenin dramatically reversed his pre-seizure optimism. "We are not utopian. We know that an unskilled labourer or a cook cannot immediately get on with the job of state administration."³⁸ Instead he demanded training by class-conscious workers and soldiers be begun at once so that the working people would be fit for those jobs. The fact that this was written only one month after the State and Revolution meant that Lenin had probably been under heavy criticism for his statements in regard to the easy handling of administrative duties. Governmental policies also included a nationalization of the land, redistribution of food and clothing, and a gradual expansion of the workers' militia into an all-people militia. Some of these policies, as we have noted, had to be revised in the light of later experience; and they indicated that the Bolsheviks came into power for more reason than just power-lust alone; but they also indicated that a firm measure of control over the population was required to bring them about.

This control over the non class-conscious segments of the society was alleged to be quite democratic. The overwhelming majority of the

³⁸ Lenin, "Can the Bolsheviks Retain State Power?" CW 26, October 1, 1917, p. 113. See also pp. 105-130.

working people support their vanguard, he wrote in 1919. But this support does not come immediately, and it is not expressed through elections. It is won after a long and arduous class struggle. But even after the successful conquest of power the struggle must go on for that support. But by October of 1919 Lenin could say " . . . we now have such sound sympathy, and from such an enormous majority of the working people, that our state is the most democratic state the world has ever seen."³⁹


Also, like leaders of other countries, earlier and later, Lenin was not being truthful. His words were designed for foreign consumption. The dictatorship of the proletariat was not going that smoothly at all. The arduous struggle for the support and sympathy of the working class had already hit several snags. A year and a half before he had said "We can count on the politically conscious workers alone; the remaining mass, the bourgeoisie and the petty proprietors are against us; they do not believe in the new order and take advantage of every opportunity to worsen the plight of the people."⁴⁰ Later he quoted from a communication he had received from workers in Petrograd.

"There were forty thousand of us at the Putilov Works, the delegate from the Petrograd workers said to me. But the majority of them were 'temporary' workers, not proletarians, an unreliable, flabby lot. Now there are fifteen thousand left, but these are proletarians, tried and steeled in the fight."⁴¹

³⁹Lenin, "To the Italian, French, and German Communists," CW 30, October 10, 1919, p. 60.

⁴⁰Lenin, "Second Congress of the Commissars for Labour," CW 27, May, 1918, p. 402.

⁴¹Lenin, "On the Famine," CW 27, May, 1918, p. 395.



The worker was referring to the mass exodus of workers from the cities to the villages. In truth the Party was losing its proletariat during this diaspora, and this made the substitution of the Party for the proletariat even more imperative. But among those that remained, Lenin informs us, were many who were not the steeled fighters. During a speech at a conference of trade-unions he told his audience that all of them who worked in the factories knew very well that many of the workers were not with the Party.⁴² In short, the vast majority of the working class were as unorganized and unprepared after the revolution as they were before it to lead mankind into the promised land.⁴³


As we have seen the problem extended into the Party as well. By the end of 1918 it had begun to include many members who were not considered really class-conscious or reliable. The first device to control for this was propounded in December of 1918. The date of entry into the Party was to be affixed to the membership card. Additionally each member must note on his card which parties he belonged to or was associated with over the past five years. All of this had to be certified by the chairman or secretary of his Party group.⁴⁴ Even though it was true, Lenin said, that a Party in power gives preference to its members; we do not want people in the Party for that reason.⁴⁵ For all

⁴² Lenin, "Fourth Conference of Trade Unions," CW 27, June, 1918, p. 466.

⁴³ Lenin, "Report at a Meeting of Bolshevik Delegates to the All Russia Conference of Soviets," April, 1917, p. 437, CW 36.

⁴⁴ Lenin, "Draft Decision of the Central Committee of the RCP (B)," CW 28, December, 1918, p. 353.

⁴⁵ Lenin, "Session of the Petrograd Soviet," CW 29, March, 1919, p. 187.



of his genius, he had his blind spots. The Party was growing rapidly.

By mid 1919 Lenin was urging the use of the subbotnik concept as a test of a new member's sincerity during a six month probationary period, and by December he urged the closing of the membership lists so that the Party could be narrow and tested, governing through the trade unions and non Party conferences.⁴⁶ He seems to have considered a majority of the Party members as unreliable.⁴⁷ It must be characterized by loyalty and iron discipline, he wrote, possessing class-consciousness and revolutionary devotion.⁴⁸


This sort of correct leadership, however, increasingly began to coagulate at the top of the Party hierarchy as the isolation from the very large Party deepened. And as the Red Army won more and more battles it was possible to refocus attention on the large number of domestic problems. Within this new frame of reference Lenin became very tired of opposition which seemed to him to be arguments over theory at a time when energy ought to be devoted to the solution of problems, a criticism he could have applied to himself on many occasions. The opposition seemed to him to be involved with criticism for its own sake, a concern over trifles.⁴⁹ His repeated references to the

⁴⁶ Lenin, "Political Report of the Central Committee to the Eighth All Russia Conference of the RCP (B)," CW 30, December, 1919, p. 187.

⁴⁷ Compare his remarks in "A Great Beginning," CW 29, July, 1919, pp. 432-433 with "Ninth Congress of the RCP (B)--Speech Closing the Congress," CW 30, April 5, 1920, pp. 485-486.

⁴⁸ Lenin, "Left Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder," CW 31, May, 1920, pp. 24-25.

⁴⁹ Lenin, "Our Foreign and Domestic Position and Party Tasks," CW 31, November, 1920, p. 425.



opposition, however, pointed up its seriousness, whether it was advocacy of trade-union supremacy or opposition to alleged concessions to capitalism which he was making at the time.

The latter could be explained away more easily than the former. Concessions were merely an expansion of his earlier decision to use former bourgeois specialists in the economy, the administration, and the army; his insistence on keeping the bourgeois cooperatives along with the proletarian ones; and his decision to allow the free trade of grain in 1921. Common sense seemed sufficient to win the day. "How can we speed up the development of our economy whilst we are an economically weaker country? We can do that with the aid of bourgeois capital." Concessions do not mean peace; they too are a kind of warfare, only in another form, one that is to our advantage."⁵⁰ The attractive part was the strengthening of the internal foundations of the temporarily first socialist state at the ironic expense of the enemy.

On the issue of trade-union hegemony he had to pick his way with greater care. There was a far too simple connection between the worker's state, worker control, and workers' unions. His own earlier words did not help him at all. He had said in 1917: "What we do suggest is workers' control, which should develop into complete regulation of production and distribution by the workers . . ."⁵¹ This was, of course, one of the things the opposition group wanted. But in 1920 Lenin had changed his mind, and wrote some frank statements about the

⁵⁰ Lenin, "Speech Delivered at a Meeting of Cells' Secretaries of the Moscow Organisation of the RCP (B)," CW 31, November, 1920, pp. 431-432.

⁵¹ Lenin, "Economic Dislocation and the Proletariat's Struggle," CW 25, July, 1917, p. 44.



Party dictatorship.

"What happens is that the Party, shall we say, absorbs the vanguard of the proletariat, and this vanguard exercises the dictatorship of the proletariat. The dictatorship cannot be exercised or the functions of government performed without a foundation such as the trade unions. These functions, however, have to be performed through the medium of special institutions which are also of a new type, namely the Soviets."⁵²

An organization which embraces the whole of the proletarian class cannot perform the role of leadership of the proletariat because both here and elsewhere the proletariat is still so divided, degraded, and corrupted in so many parts. Leadership can only be exercised by " . . . a vanguard that has absorbed the revolutionary energy of the class."⁵³ The whole, he said, is like an arrangement of cogwheels with transmission belts running from the vanguard to the mass of the advanced class, and from these to the mass of the working people.⁵⁴

Lenin was too busy to bother with theory, but nonetheless theorized to justify his practice. Was he betraying the revolution? Of course. And of course not. As Sorokin⁵⁵ points out so eloquently all revolutions work out of their chaos by reinstituting the very structures which they had found so impossible to live with. Rebuilding requires order. Lenin came very close to this when he wrote in late 1921:

"True revolutionaries have mostly come a cropper when they begin to write 'revolution' with a capital R,

⁵² Lenin, "The Trade Unions, The Present Situation and Trotsky's Mistakes," CW 32, December, 1920, p. 20.

⁵³ Ibid., p. 21.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Pitrim A. Sorokin, The Sociology of Revolution, (New York: Howard Fertig, 1967--originally 1925).



to elevate 'revolution' so something almost divine, to lose their heads, to lose the ability to reflect, weigh and ascertain in the coolest and most dispassionate manner . . ."56

"To govern you need an army of steeled revolutionary Communists. We have it, and it is called the Party."⁵⁷ In the face of economic chaos, enemy encirclement, internal enemies whose sabotage of Communist efforts ranged from outright bourgeois opposition to proletarian thefts from the state, and the rising of the Khronstadt garrison, the governing Party needed factionalism like it needed Winston Churchill as Foreign Minister. Besides--

" . . . at the present time the proletarian policy of the Party is not determined by the character of its membership, but by the enormous undivided prestige enjoyed by the small group which might be called the Old Guard of the Party. A slight conflict within this group will be enough, if not to destroy this prestige, at all events to weaken the group to such a degree as to rob it of its power to determine policy."⁵⁸

Hence stringent controls of the Party by the Party leaders was necessary to promote unity; and criticism at the top levels was confined to responsible dissent, within the framework of Party discipline. Failure to observe these regulations could result in expulsion from the Party even for a member of the Central Committee if a two-thirds majority for such action could be found.⁵⁹ The Party itself was now replaced

⁵⁶ Lenin, "The Importance of Gold," CW 33, November 5, 1921, p. 111.

⁵⁷ Lenin, "The Second All Russia Congress of Miners," CW 32, January, 1921, p. 62.

⁵⁸ Lenin, "The Conditions for Admitting New Members to the Party," CW 33, March 24, 1922, p. 257.

⁵⁹ Lenin, "Tenth Congress of the RCP (B), Preliminary Draft Resolution of the Tenth Congress of the RCP on Party Unity," CW 32, March, 1921, p. 244. The appropriate paragraph is as follows:

by the few leaders at the pinnacles of power, and centralism finally won its battle with democracy.

The concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat underwent a similar change. In 1917 when Lenin himself viewed revolution with a capital R, he wrote that the dictatorship of the proletariat was a

" . . . transformation of the proletariat into the ruling class, able to crush the inevitable and desperate resistance of the bourgeoisie, and to organize, for the new settlement of economic order, all the toiling and exploited masses."⁶⁰

Even so the state would be a full democracy, a new democracy with the abolition of the army and the transforming of all officials into elective and revocable agents of the people. This would be a transformation of quantity and quality with no force being necessary because the majority of the nation would be involved in the suppression of the capitalists.⁶¹ The majority would suppress the minority and the bloodshed

"In order to ensure strict discipline within the Party and in all Soviet work, and to secure the maximum unanimity in eliminating all factionalism, the Congress authorizes the Central Committee, in cases of all Party penalties, including expulsion, and in regard to members of the Central Committee, reduction to the status of alternate members, and as an extreme measure, expulsion from the Party. A necessary condition for the application of such extreme measure to members of the Central Committee, alternate members of the Central Committee, and members of the Control Commission is the convocation of a Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee and all members of the Control Commission shall be invited. If such a general assembly of the most responsible leaders of the Party deems it necessary by a two-thirds majority to reduce a member of the Central Committee to the status of alternate member, or to expel him from the Party, this measure should be put into effect immediately."

⁶⁰ Lenin, State and Revolution, p. 133.

⁶¹ Ibid., p. 149.



would not last long. Neither would the bureaucracy for the end to wage slavery meant an end to special functions performed by a special class; for they would be performed by each in turn until they became a habit to all.⁶²


This early optimism was based on the apocalyptic notion of Revolution, European revolutions, overestimation of the consistency of the working class, and on a simplistic view of what this dictatorship involved. The purpose of the dictatorship was simply to break the resistance of the capitalists, and the day or so after its beginning ninety-nine per cent of the army would become enthusiastic supporters as would the peasants.⁶³ But very quickly the lessons of experience overcame these judgments, and the necessity of maintaining civil order took on a priority not previously accorded it. It was necessary to suppress not only capitalistic resistance, but also civil disorder such as crime, hooliganism, corruption, and profiteering. To put these down required "an iron hand."⁶⁴ Lenin discovered that it was easier to gain power than to hold it. He justified the increases in calls for discipline by referring to Marx's comment about the Paris Commune not utilizing its armed strength sufficiently.⁶⁵ Only firmness

⁶²Ibid., pp. 155, 156, and 194.

⁶³ Lenin, "An Epidemic of Credulity," CW 25, July, 1917, p. 65; and "One of the Fundamental Questions of Revolution," September, 1917, CW 25, p. 372.

⁶⁴ Lenin, "The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government," CW 27, March, April, 1918, p. 264.

⁶⁵ Lenin, "Fear of the Collapse of the Old and Fight for the New," CW 26, January, 1918, p. 401.



and ruthlessness can save us.⁶⁶ By May of 1918 he was already saying that a real dictatorship consisted in the pressure of this iron rule being felt in all corners of the country, when

" . . . not a single kulak, not a single rich man, not a single opponent of the grain monopoly remains unpunished, but is found and punished by the iron hand of the disciplined dictators of the working class, the proletarian dictators. (Applause)"⁶⁷

By the time these "clenched fists" in the countryside were eradicated the dictatorship had escalated into terrorism under the rule of the man of steel. Observers began to speak of totalitarianism. All of this developed visibly under Lenin's rule.

"If there ever existed a revolutionary who hoped that we could pass to the socialist system without difficulties, such a revolutionary, such a socialist, would not be worth a brass farthing."⁶⁸

Physical force must be used,

" . . . and we shall cast aside with contempt all who fail to understand this, so as not to waste words in talking about the form of socialism. (Applause)"⁶⁹


During the summer of 1918 the struggle for socialism became the struggle for bread, and with the near successful assassination attempt on Lenin the form of the struggle took on a frightening dimension, through the activities of Cheka, the secret police.

⁶⁶ Lenin, "Six Theses on the Immediate Tasks," CW 27, May, 1918, p. 316; and "Theses on the Present Political Situation," CW 27, May, 1918, p. 364.

⁶⁷ Lenin, "Report on Foreign Policy," CW 27, May, 1918, p. 379.

⁶⁸ Lenin, "Session of the Central Executive Council, Moscow Soviet, Red Army, and the Trade Unions," CW 27, June, 1918, pp. 432-3.

⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 435.



"The important thing for us is that Cheka is directly exercising the dictatorship of the proletariat, and in that respect its services are invaluable. There is no way of emancipating the people except by forcibly suppressing the exploiters. That is what Cheka is doing, and therein lies its service to the proletariat."⁷⁰

Aside from this select band of guardians, the schools also had functions in the dictatorship, for they must correctly socialize the new generations for the tasks of constructing communism. There was an emphasis on polytechnical education, teacher indoctrination, the workers would be urged to become educated; and libraries, universities, and adult classes were given priorities.⁷¹ But the negative aspects of the dictatorship were much more the focus of activity. The Menshevik and Socialist Revolutionary newspapers were shut down. As Lenin put it "We shall allow no opposition."⁷² If a person has not come to help us, let him get out, go to Georgia, to Kolchak, or else he will be put into prison.⁷³

Counter revolution was soon easily described as nearly anything that obstructed the progress of the dictatorship as defined by the leaders. Since the dictatorship was to last until the disappearance of all classes it could only get more oppressive. The same sort of discipline which had built up the Red Army into an efficient fighting

⁷⁰ Lenin, "Speech at a Rally and Concert for the All Russia Extraordinary Commission Staff," CW 28, November, 1918, p. 170.

⁷¹ Lenin, "Draft Programme of the TCP (B)," CW 29, March, 1919, p. 111.

⁷² Lenin, "Plenary Meeting of the Moscow Soviet," CW 29, April, 1919, p. 264. See also "Plenum of the All Russia CCTU, Speech Closing the Session," CW 29, April, 1919, p. 300; and "Foreword to 'Deception of the People with Slogans'," CW 29, July, 1919, pp. 377-381.

⁷³ Ibid.

machine had to also be created on the front of labor,⁷⁴ in order to eradicate inefficiency as well as subversion by obstruction. This could be and was very narrowly interpreted. In a telegram to Stalin, for example, Lenin wrote:

"Stalin . . . today I heard you and all the others very clearly, every word. Threaten to shoot the incompetent person in charge of communications who cannot give you a good amplifier and ensure uninterrupted telephone communication with me."⁷⁵

The road to socialism at the point of a gun. Yet the goal at the end of that road was alleged to be the end of exploitation of man. It meant the end of the exploitation of labor by capital and the abolishing of the private ownership of the instruments of labor. All the factories would then be handed over to the whole of society, and socialist production would be conducted in common and be directed by the workers themselves. The articles produced will satisfy the needs of the workers themselves, and secure the full development of all their capabilities and equal rights to enjoy all the achievements of science and art. This was not Marx but Lenin in 1895-96.⁷⁶ There would be public ownership, planned production, equality of distribution, and the full development of man's faculties. Words like liberty and equality would be meaningful for a context would be created for them by non-oppression, whether that be by wealth, nation, religion or sex.⁷⁷ Concern about equality however was

⁷⁴ Lenin, "Speech at a Meeting of the Railwaymen of the Moscow Junction," CW 30, February 1920, p. 346.

⁷⁵ Lenin, "Telegram to J. V. Stalin," CW 30, February 1920, p. 363.

⁷⁶ Lenin, "Draft and Explanation of the Programme of the Social Democratic Party," CW 2, 1895-1896, p. 108.

⁷⁷ Lenin, "Draft Election Address," CW 11, November 1906, p. 304.

more properly the concern of the bourgeois revolution rather than the socialist one. The equality of the rural petty proprietor would be the last bourgeois illusion whose impotence people would soon realize.⁷⁸ Nonetheless socialism would guarantee the well being of all the people. The democratic community of the socialist society consisted of the people armed, a high rate of culture, of people working without compulsion in socialized workshops and taking a full role in all spheres of political life.⁷⁹

Equality, democracy, internationalism, and production organization were the positive sides. The negative side to be abolished included oppression, the military, illiteracy, a fragmented political life, and war. But the year 1917 with its peculiar Russian circumstances made Lenin sound different as he came closer to the trees in the forest. At first he was inclined to doubt the applicability of Marxian concepts to the Russian situation. "The arguments are ridiculously stupid, for what makes socialism objectively impossible is the small scale economy which we by no means presume to expropriate, or even to regulate or control."⁸⁰

But after the insurrection it was different. "You will have socialism if you take stock of every piece of iron and cloth." "Socialism means keeping account of everything."⁸¹ This logical inconsistency was the result of Lenin's desire to implement as many socialist

⁷⁸ Lenin, "Strengths and Weaknesses of the Russian Revolution," CW 12, April 1907, p. 356.

⁷⁹ Lenin, "The Discussion on Self-Determination Summed Up," CW 22, July 1916, pp. 324-325.

⁸⁰ Lenin, "Economic Dislocation and the Proletariat's Struggle," CW 25, July 1917, p. 45.

⁸¹ Lenin, "Speech at a Meeting of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies," CW 26, November 18, 1917, p. 294.



measures as possible even while admitting that they were only at the beginning of the road to socialism, that it was only possible when all exploitation had been abolished,⁸² and that it was impossible to implement in a single country.⁸³

Therefore they were compelled to simultaneously work for the building of socialism and at the same time work to bring about the international revolution. But the delay in the latter, unforeseen, created a revision of expectation fed by the pride of original accomplishment resulting in a projection of the peculiar Russian experience into a model of revolutionary development. Hence the building of socialism in Russia alone was given international significance. "The Russian revolution has charted the road to socialism for the whole world. . . ."⁸⁴ Lenin was able for a short time to use the Hungarian experience and the Italian translation of the word Soviet increasingly as prima facia evidence of the growing international trend towards Sovietism.⁸⁵ With such a refocus reflecting a lessening dependence on the international proletariat the internal building was shifted into a more aggressive activity.

One important aspect of this activity was the desired inclusion of the mass of the people in the state apparatus. The courts and government itself must be the work of the whole people, for " . . . socialism cannot be implemented by a minority, by the Party. It

⁸² Lenin, "Third All Russia Conference of Soviets," CW 26, January 1918, p. 466.

⁸³ Ibid., p. 470.

⁸⁴ Lenin, "Speech at a Rally of Red Army Men at Khodynka," CW 28, August 1918, p. 44.

⁸⁵ Lenin, "Plenum of the All Russia CCTU--Speech Closing the Session," CW 29, April 1919, p. 298.

can be implemented only by tens of millions when they have learned to do it themselves."⁸⁶ Socialism would be a reality when every citizen would be a member of a single, nation-wide, state cooperative.⁸⁷

But as we have seen the struggle for survival and even revival increasingly sought solutions in more control, more discipline, more dictatorship rather than in more freedoms. He felt compelled to call⁸⁸ for self discipline and self sacrifice. Greater productivity of labor was needed, and the former capitalists who were called in to help were to be given large salaries, far in excess of the average worker salary he had said would be the basis for all. He even went so far as to wish to use what he considered scientific and progressive in the Taylor system which he had roundly condemned early in his career as an example of exploitation.⁸⁹

The undesirable traditions of capitalism were now listed puritanically as anarchy, laziness, disorder, and profiteering.⁹⁰ Obviously anything that enhanced Soviet power was good and progressive. In 1918 he felt that historical circumstances had given birth to two unconnected halves of socialism, " . . . existing side by side like two future chickens in the single shell of imperialism."⁹¹ Germany had the economic

⁸⁶ Lenin, "Extraordinary Seventh Congress of the RCP (B)," CW 27, March 1918, p. 135.

⁸⁷ Lenin, "Version of the Article 'The Immediate Tasks'," CW 27, March-April 1918, p. 248, 249.

⁸⁸ Lenin, "The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government," CW 27, March-April 1918, p. 216.

⁸⁹ Ibid., pp. 257, 260.

⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 261.

⁹¹ Lenin, "Left Wing Childishness and the Petty-Bourgeois Mentality," CW 27, May 1918, p. 340.

prerequisites and Russia the political. So until a German revolution made it unnecessary, he intended to copy German state capitalism.⁹²

Those who disagreed with these were sorry revolutionaries, who lacked the understanding and stamina for the

" . . . steady advance of the iron battalions of the proletariat."⁹³

"Only the development of state capitalism, only the painstaking establishment of accounting and control, only the strictest organisation and labour discipline, will lead us to socialism. Without this there is no socialism."⁹⁴

But the basis of socialism was large-scale machine industry and even the next generation would hardly achieve the full transition to socialism⁹⁵ because Russia was so extremely backward and impoverished.⁹⁶ Practice became much more important than theory now, or theory had to change to fit the new conditions. Such was the price of power. He sought to introduce socialism and could not help introduce state capitalism.

Lenin came to see for himself that his exhortations about the development of production were meaningless. The economy went so much the wrong way in 1919 that he insisted that those who used the slogan "develop production" ought to be included among those of a very large

⁹²Ibid.

⁹³Ibid., pp. 276-277.

⁹⁴Lenin, "Session of the All Russia CEC," CW 27, April 1918, p. 297.

⁹⁵Ibid., pp. 298-301.

⁹⁶Lenin, "Extraordinary Sixth All Russia Congress of Soviets," CW 28, November 1918, p. 139.

group whom he characterized as readers of books rather than practical revolutionaries.⁹⁷ "We must save the workers even if they are unable to work. If we keep them alive for the next few years we shall save the country, save society, and socialism."⁹⁸ He exhorted them to educate themselves in business and smart trading.⁹⁹ Thus the NEP until Stalin recommended the building in 1928.

This meant, naturally, a deferral of socialism to the indefinite future. But when that day did arrive society would be considerably altered. The democracy-concept would be altered from wage-slavery in freedom's illusions to representative institutions without a parliament--a fusion of executive and legislative functions in the Soviets, where majority rule would prevail.¹⁰⁰ While this form of the state would also wither it would include openly conducted foreign policy, active involvement of common people in state administration, honest freedom of the press by denying printing privileges to the bourgeoisie, freedom of assembly, housing redistribution, direct elections to local soviets, and indirect elections for others.¹⁰¹

⁹⁷ Lenin, "First All Russia Congress of Adult Education," CW 29, May 1919, p. 359.

⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 364.

⁹⁹ Lenin, "On Cooperation, I," CW 33, January 1923, p. 471.

¹⁰⁰ Lenin, "Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky," CW 28, October 1918, pp. 246-248. See also "Speech at a Meeting of Poor Peasants' Committees," CW 28, November 1918, p. 175; and "The Socialist Revolution and Self-Determination," CW 22, February 1916, p. 144; State and Revolution, p. 203.

¹⁰¹ Lenin, "Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky," CW 28, October 1918, pp. 246-248.



Because the proletariat would be fighting economic slavery it would also fight that medieval mildew, religion. It would be contemptuously cast aside for bigots and priests. But in this battle one must realize that he is fighting a symptom and not the basis of the sickness. He must be cautious therefore not to offend and cause resentment which would perpetuate the religion.¹⁰²

As long as there was a necessity of maintaining order the authority of society must remain. The implication was strong that once socialism was reached, the coercive one-man dictatorship would no longer be necessary and be replaced by group control.¹⁰³

The chaotic agricultural sector of the economy resisted the implementation of the socialist ideal of communal or associational farming. Lenin had the idea that if only the peasants would be shown the communal advantages they would follow of their own accord. There was, therefore, a high emphasis on voluntary participation in the communal experiments.¹⁰⁴ But associational farming could not be pushed too fast because of the

¹⁰² Lenin, "Socialism and Religion," CW 10, December 1905, pp. 83-87. "Attitude of the Workers' Party to Religion," CW 15, May 1909, pp. 402-13; "Speech at the First All Russia Congress of Working Women," CW 28, November 1918, p. 180; "Fourth Anniversary of the October Revolution," CW 33, October 1921, p. 53; and "On the Significance of Militant Materialism," CW 33, March 1922, p. 229. Also see CW 15, "Classes and Parties in their Attitudes to Religion and Church," June 1909, pp. 414-23.

¹⁰³ Lenin, State and Revolution, p. 195. Also "Explanation of the Law on Fines," CW 2, 1895, p. 34; "Kamenev's Speech in the CEC on the Stockholm Conference," CW 25, August 1917, p. 240; "Version of the Article 'The Immediate Tasks'," CW 27, March-April 1918, pp. 212-17.

¹⁰⁴ Lenin, "Speech at a Meeting of Delegates from the Poor Peasants' Committees of Central Gubernias," CW 28, November 1918, p. 177; cf pp. 171-177. Also see "Plenary Meeting of the Moscow Soviet," CW 29, April 1919, p. 266; and "What the Friends of the People are, and How They Fight the Social Democrats," CW 1, 1894, p. 290.



already precarious state of the agricultural situation. As a result communal farms were begun as models for the others to learn from; but mostly the other farmers would simply come and laugh, departing more than ever convinced that the model was ridiculous.¹⁰⁵ Lenin, nonetheless, remained sure that associational farming was so much better that labor productivity would be trebled on such farms.¹⁰⁶ Thus on the state farms, where there were no small peasant proprietors to disturb, Lenin introduced the communal concept meaning that no one was allowed to have his own livestock, poultry, or garden plot.¹⁰⁷

On the free trade of grain he remained obstinate until survival very much depended on it in 1920-21. He knew the peasants were weary of the promissory notes, as well as the unlikely promises he had made to them about providing agronomical, mechanical, and fertilizer assistance. Therefore the kulaks whom he had said must be crushed were going to be left alone again.¹⁰⁸ Need had dictated to theory. But this was a long way from saying that the whole essence of socialism lay in demarcating the laboring peasant from the profiteering peasant.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁵ Lenin, "First Congress of Agricultural Communes," CW 30, December 1919, pp. 200-201.

¹⁰⁶ Lenin, "First Congress of Land Departments," CW 28, December, 1918, pp. 341-347.

¹⁰⁷ Lenin, "First Congress of Farm Labourers," CW 29, March 1919, pp. 43-44.

¹⁰⁸ Lenin, "Tenth Congress of the RCP (B)," CW 32, March 1921, pp. 186-7; "Achievements and Difficulties," CW 29, March-April 1919, pp 76-77; and "Eighth Congress of the RCP (B)," CW 29, March-April 1919, p. 219.

¹⁰⁹ Lenin, "Economics and Politics," CW 30, October 1919, p. 113.



But since state capitalism was the last step before socialism, and socialism was state capitalism in a monopoly made to serve the interests of the entire society, those things that were formerly capitalist and therefore reprehensible, were now progressive adventures along the road to socialism.¹¹⁰ As in the fable, the scarecrow, the lion, and the tin man were simply not the same as they had been before Dorothy emerged on the yellow brick road leading to Oz.

But at issue was the survival of Russia, and in Lenin's mind therefore also of socialism. Whatever he did in the interests of Russian survival were therefore theoretically correct even though concessions and invitations to foreign capital, material incentives in a non-equalitarian sense, and free trade of commodities were not all that had to be done. The proletarian state must itself " . . . become a cautious, assiduous, and shrewd 'businessman', a punctilious wholesale merchant--otherwise it will never succeed in putting this small-peasant country economically on its feet."¹¹¹ It could be no other way. The masses of peasants were exhausted and the proletariat was declassed, weak, scattered, and enfeebled.¹¹²

With this much space between reality and the ideological goal it is surprising that Lenin said as much as he did about the goal

¹¹⁰ Lenin, "Impending Catastrophe and How to Combat It," CW 25, September 1917, p. 358.

¹¹¹ Lenin, "Fourth Anniversary of the October Revolution," CW 33, October 1921, p. 59. See also "Speech Delivered at a Conference of Factory Trade Union Committees of Moscow Enterprises of the Printing and Publishing Industry," CW 31, November 1920, p. 429; and "Tenth Congress of the RCP (B)," CW 32, March 1921, pp. 186-7, 191, 218-220, 225, and 226-7.

¹¹² Lenin, "New Times and Old Mistakes in a New Guise," CW 33, August 1921, pp. 23-24.

beyond socialism--communism. Once again there is a distinction between his pre-seizure remarks and those that occur afterward as he saw the trees as well as the forest. Before the insurrection the forest seemed like the world and the trees very often looked like national equivalents of that international dream.

"The whole of society will have become one office and one factory with equal work and equal pay. But this factory discipline, which the proletariat will extend to the whole of society on the defeat of capitalism and the overthrow of the exploiters, is by no means our ideal, and is far from our final aim. It is but a foothold as we press on to the radical cleansing of society from all the brutality and foulness of capitalist exploitation; we shall leave it behind as we move on. When all, or be it even only the greater part of society, have learned how to govern the State, have taken this business into their own hands, have established a control over the gentry with capitalist leanings, and workers thoroughly demoralized by capitalism --from this moment the need for any government begins to vanish."

"For when all have learned to manage, and really do manage, socialized production, when all really do keep account and control of the idlers, gentlefolk, swindlers and such like guardians of the capitalist traditions, the escape from such general registration and control will inevitably become so increasingly difficult, so much the exception; and will probably be accompanied by such swift and severe punishment (for the armed workers are very practical people, not sentimental intellectuals and they will scarcely allow anyone to trifle with them), that very soon the necessity of observing the simple, fundamental rules of any kind of social life will become a habit. The door will then be wide open for the transition from the first phase of communist society to its second higher phase, and along with it to the complete withering away of the state."¹¹³

With the transition the need for force and for the subjugation of one man to another would vanish because " . . . people will grow accustomed to observing the elementary conditions of social existence without

¹¹³ Lenin, State and Revolution, pp. 205-6.

force and without subjection."¹¹⁴ This internalization of social morality was a post-revolutionary development flowing inevitably out of its capitalist foundations. This new morality, this new habit would render unnecessary even the full freedom of a real democracy, and it too, as a form of the state, would wither. The fuller the democracy the more rapid the withering.¹¹⁵

Along with democracy and force withering, would be the eradication of the distinction between manual and mental work. The erasure of this difference would follow the gigantic development of the productive forces of human society that would result from the removal of the retarding influences of capitalism and by the utilization of technology under socialism. The Ramsay method of extracting gas from a coal mine so encouraged Lenin that he wrote in glowing terms of its benefits to society, for it would release the labor of millions of miners and shorten everyone's work day to perhaps seven hours.¹¹⁶ Even more advantages would accrue from the application of electrical power to the productive process.

"The electrification of all factories and railways will make working conditions more hygienic, will free millions of workers from smoke, dust and dirt, and accelerate the transformation of dirty, repulsive workshops into clean, bright laboratories worthy of human beings. The electric lighting and heating of every home will relieve millions of domestic slaves of the need to spend three-fourths of their lives in smelly kitchens."¹¹⁷

It sounds ridiculous to equate communism with fresh air and clean

¹¹⁴Ibid., p. 187.

¹¹⁵Ibid., pp. 155, 189, 193, 194.

¹¹⁶Lenin, "A Great Technical Achievement," CW 19, April 1913, p. 62.

¹¹⁷Ibid.



clothing, but what Lenin felt would come was very simply a new world-- a world of free people--an international fresh start in which oppression, poverty, privileges, and disunity were gone forever.¹¹⁸ Ridding the kitchen of smells and the factory of dirt were a part of this transformation.

Because the means of production were now the property of the whole of society there would be a tremendous rise in labor productivity, shorter working days, and a replacement of small and unorganized productive units by collective and improved labor. There would be a union of agriculture and industry based on science being applied, collective labor, and a redistribution of the population which would end both rural backwardness and urban concentration. The education of every child would combine productive labor with instruction and gymnastics resulting in more efficient social producers and more fully developed human beings.¹¹⁹

There would be neither rich nor poor, with all the people enjoying all the fruits of everyone's labor. Because they now worked for themselves, wealth would grow rapidly, accompanied by increased standards of living. This was not painting future prospects so much as it was an analysis of the present and building on the current trends of development. When one added the socialist revolution to this analysis one could speak of the emancipation of the whole of oppressed humanity.¹²⁰

¹¹⁸ Lenin, "The Working Class and the National Question," CW 19, May 1913, p. 92.

¹¹⁹ Lenin, "Karl Marx," CW 21, November 1914, pp. 71-72; and "To Our Comrades in War-Prison Camps," CW 23, March 1917, p. 348.

¹²⁰ Lenin, "To the Rural Poor," CW 6, March 1903, pp. 366, 376; "What the Friends of the People Are and How They Fight the Social Democrats," CW 1, 1894, p. 184; and "Revision of the Party Programme," CW 24, May 1917, p. 468.

In these pre-power statements Lenin did not carefully distinguish between socialism and communism. Seeing the revolution as something longed for, it assumed an eschatology similar in many respects to that of a young man aspiring to become twenty-one years old. Upon attaining that age ambivalence creeps in as hope and reality intermingle. So with Lenin. The easy optimism of the prophet became a hope tempered by the stark realities of the holding action. By March of 1918 the Bolsheviks wanted a new Program, and evidently Bukharin wanted to include a description of the communism to come. A year before Lenin would not have been so reluctant. But now he was.

"What, however, does Comrade Bukharin want?--That we should give a description of socialist society in its developed form, i.e., communism. Here he is inaccurate. At present we certainly uphold the state and to say we should give a description of socialism in its developed form where the state will cease to exist--you couldn't do anything about that except say that when the principle would be realized: from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs. But this is still a long way off, and to say that means not saying anything except that we have no firm ground to go on. We shall arrive there in the long run if we reach socialism. It is enough for us to set to work on what we have said. If we were to do this it would be a tremendous historical achievement."¹²¹

As a matter of fact, he continued, we cannot even give a description of socialism, let alone communism. "The bricks of which socialism will be composed have not yet been made."¹²² Besides, our labor productivity is so low as to make a discussion of communism impossible.¹²³

¹²¹ Lenin, "Extraordinary Seventh Congress of the RCP (B)," CW 27, March 1918, p. 147.

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ Lenin, "Session of the All Russia CEC," CW 27, April 1918, pp. 303-304.

But this did not mean that Lenin would not use the concept of communism as a goad to greater effort, and also as a tranquilizer for the seeming guttiness of it all. In 1919, hardly an encouraging year, during the May Day celebrations held in Red Square he told the assembled crowds that the majority of those present who were about 30-35 years of age would live to see the full bloom of communism even though it was as yet remote. Our grandchildren will look at the documents and other relics of the capitalist system and be amazed at how trade in articles of primary necessity could remain in private hands, at how factories could be privately owned, and how some men could exploit others and not work themselves.

"Up to now the story of what our children would see in the future has sounded like a fairy-tale; but today, comrades, you see clearly that the edifice of socialist society, of which we have laid the foundations, is not a utopia."¹²⁴

The following year, when speaking to the young members of the Party, he said that the people now fifteen years old would see the communist society and itself build that society. The time lapse was necessary to permit the electrification of the country, and in the meantime he exhorted them to work as they had not ever worked before.¹²⁵ In late 1921, while speaking in the context of encouraging trade and overcoming resistance to the NEP he said: "When we are victorious on a world scale I think we shall use gold for the purpose of building public lavatories in the streets of some of the largest cities in

¹²⁴ Lenin, "Three Speeches Delivered in Red Square," CW 29, May 1, 1919, p. 330.

¹²⁵ Lenin, "The Tasks of the Youth Leagues," CW 31, October 1920, pp. 298-299.

the world." In the meantime, however, buy cheap and sell dear.¹²⁶

There was one development that gave him optimism. It was based on the activities of a few railway workers, who, desiring to overcome the great lack of transportation equipment and facilities, began coming to work on their own time on Saturday and laboring without pay. Lenin seized on this subbotnik straw and built a castle on it in 1919. Communist subbotniks were the actual beginnings of communism, for communism begins " . . . when the rank and file workers display an enthusiastic concern that is undaunted by arduous toil to increase the productivity of labour. . . ."¹²⁷ Encouraging this "shoot of communism" would mean among other things the emancipation of women from the drudgery of petty housework and the establishment of public catering places, nurseries, and kindergartens, all of which would be imbued with this conscientiousness in working.¹²⁸

But this impatient Marxist could not leave the subbotniks alone. By November of 1919 he was already speaking of arranging volunteer labor for the fuel crisis.¹²⁹ " . . . Communism . . . is voluntary unpaid work for the common good that does not depend on individual differences, that wipes out all memories of everyday prejudices, wipes out stagnation, tradition, differences between branches of work, differences in rates of pay for labour, etc."¹³⁰ Since this was accepted


¹²⁶ Lenin, "The Importance of Gold," CW 33, November 1921, p. 113.

¹²⁷ Lenin, "A Great Beginning," CW 29, July 1919, p. 427.

¹²⁸ Ibid., p. 429.

¹²⁹ Lenin, "The Fight to Overcome the Fuel Crisis," CW 30, November 1919, p. 141.

¹³⁰ Lenin, "Political Report of the Central Committee," CW 30, December 1919, p. 186.



as correct--suddenly the sine qua non of a communist was subbotnikism; organized from above volunteers. The Party now demanded this sort of activity from each one of its members on pain of expulsion.¹³¹ It should be introduced, he said, on the communes so that the other peasants would learn how a real communist worked.¹³² It did not occur to him that the other peasants might have laughed harder than before at the sight of people working for nothing. But his equating subbotnikism with communism kept him from such a realistic analysis.

Communism was still remote, a foretaste of later pleasures; but this was a beginning. "If there is anything communist at all in the prevailing system in Russia, it is only the subbotniks, and everything else is nothing but the struggle against capitalism for the consolidation of socialism, out of which, after the full victory of socialism, there should grow that communism which we see at subbotniks, not with the aid of a book, but in living reality."¹³³

But in the meantime Russia must build through organization and technology. The organization was the Party and the technology was electricity.

"Communism implies Soviet power as a political organ, enabling the mass of the oppressed to run all state affairs--without that communism is unthinkable."
 "This guarantees political success. Economic success, however, can be assured only when the Russian proletarian state effectively controls a huge industrial

¹³¹ Lenin, "First Congress of the Agricultural Communes," CW 30, December 1919, p. 203.

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Lenin, "Report on Subbotniks," CW 30, December 1919, pp. 286-287. See also "From the Destruction of the Old Social System to the Creation of the New," CW 30, April 1920, p. 517.

machine built on up-to-day technology; that means electrification."¹³⁴

This was the way out, the right direction, the task that the Party a tiny minority of the population had set for themselves.


"This tiny nucleus has set itself the task of remaking everything, and it will do so. We have proved that this is no utopia, but a cause in which people live by."

"We must remake things in such a way that the great majority of the masses . . . will say . . . 'well done'."¹³⁵

Notwithstanding the bloodshed, economic dislocation, starvation, and the loss of the class which they allegedly represented, the Party pressed on with its holding action, with its focus now entirely on itself--the island in the sea of capitalism. The stage was set for the Stalinist construction of socialism. It was also set for the Khrushchevian declaration at the Twenty-Second Congress much later that the Party could now concern itself with the way in which full communism could be built.

¹³⁴ Lenin, "Our Foreign and Domestic Position and Party Tasks," CW 31, November 1920, p. 420.

¹³⁵ Lenin, "Speech at a Plenary Session of the Moscow Soviet," CW 33, November 21, 1922, p. 442.



CHAPTER V

THE THIRD PROGRAM OF THE CPSU

At the Twenty-Second Party Congress, on October 31, 1961, the delegates unanimously adopted a program for the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This program is primarily a political document, and secondarily a general blueprint for the future development of the country. As a political document it has not received the attention which it deserves because most western observers have concentrated on the second part of the program which provides the blueprint for the future. Dan Jacobs wrote: "The first part of the document dealing with the decay of capitalism, peaceful coexistence, and so forth is, for the most part, an uninspired reworking of the usual tired and outworn Communist cliches."¹ Both the Laqueur and Schapiro readers concentrate on the second part of the program, as do most of the journal articles which came out in a flurry after the publication of the program.²

I would not imply that this is incorrect; or that the scholarship involved is necessarily superficial. But to take Khrushchev's announcement of the program as charting the course to utopia at face

¹Dan Jacobs, The New Manifesto, (Evanston: Row Peterson and Co., 1962), p. 217.

²See Walter Laqueur and Leopold Labedz (eds.), The Future of Communist Society, (New York: Praeger, 1962), and Leonard Schapiro (ed.), The USSR and the Future, (New York: Praeger, 1963).

value is unwise; because by doing so the attention is diverted from the real meat of the program, which I think goes a long way towards answering the question raised by Leopold Labedz as to why the Soviet's ruling Party put itself on record as promising the golden age in the near future.³

The new program is nearly five times longer than its predecessor, the Second Party Program which dated from 1919. This old program began with a statement about the international effect of the Bolshevik Revolution reflecting the optimism about other revolutions which still prevailed at the time. It also stated that the Bolshevik Revolution had begun to lay the foundations of communism which reflected the more sober appraisal. This program also had its tired cliches about the crisis development of capitalism, resulting in sufficient proletarian discontent to throw off the capitalist yoke and institute the social revolution through a dictatorship of the proletariat. Imperialism could not help the old order, it merely prolonged the inevitable collapse and defeat of capitalism.

The old program characterized international organizations like the League of Nations as groups which " . . . by organizing the systematic exploitation of all peoples on a world scale, direct all their efforts to the immediate suppression of the revolutionary movement of the proletariat of all countries."⁴ Under such conditions, slogans like pacifism, international disarmament, or courts of

³ Leopold Labedz, "The New CPSU Programme," Lawneur and Labedz (eds.), The Future of Communist Society, p. 12.

⁴ Jan Triaka (ed.), Soviet Communism: Programs and Rules, (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1962), p. 133.

arbitration were not only reactionary utopias but also a means of deceiving the working classes because what was meant was the disarming of the proletariat and the diverting of the proletariat from its task as the disarmer of the exploiters.⁵

This was the voice of the unwanted outsider looking in and describing how undesirable that which was denied him really was. Once the country began achieving a measure of international legitimacy the situation, of course, altered. The first signatory to the Kellogg-Briand Pact outlawing war was Soviet Russia. The League was joined in the 1930's in an effort to contain fascism. During the decade of the fifties Russia and the United States engaged in lengthy and repeated but mutually unconvincing discussions about general disarmament. In 1963 Russia signed the test ban treaty with that leader of international capitalism, the United States; against the opposition of one of its principal proletarian "friends", China. In other words one must look at the tired cliches in order to see beneath them for what they really mean.

Also opposed in the second program are the Social Democratic and socialist parties of other countries as being influenced by chauvinism, opportunism, and the desire to compromise. This case of calling the kettle black will also be conveniently shelved during the popular and united fronts when Soviet domestic necessities required it.

The rest of the old program was devoted to the aims of the CPSU for Russia, and, like the introduction to the program, these aims were also historically conditioned and alterable under changing circumstances.

⁵Ibid.



The claim was made, for instance, that local autonomy was already realized in 1919, giving ideological cover for the vast anarchic confusion that was so prevalent during the period. Contradicting this notion of local autonomy was the Party aim to suppress all opposition which would necessitate extending Party control over the whole country. The suppression, of course, will end when exploitation of man by man ceased; but that this has not occurred in fifty years of Soviet rule should give someone something to think about. In such a context to describe the rights and freedoms of the democratic, capitalist states as being paper rights and those of the Soviet Union as being real rights is strongly reminiscent of the fable "The Emperor's New Clothes," even if it is granted that western justice is far from ideal.

The problem of increasing bureaucratization was recognized as an evil which needed correction, but the Second Program saw it only present in the Soviets, not in the Party. This complacency would later be challenged by those outside of power. The army was justified by the events preceding 1919 and Lenin's idea of abolishing the army was quietly dropped. They wanted to stay in power. But in the old Program even the notion of elective officers was relegated to the past when the officers were supposedly representatives of the ruling classes. They still were, for these same officers were utilized by the new army, but now under the strict control of the working class, according to the Program, for which one must substitute Party. The use of bourgeois specialists in industry was urged by the old Program which necessitated the scrapping of the old equal remuneration example of the Paris Commune.



Agriculture was to be treated cautiously. The document urged not that the differences between the towns and countryside be abolished, but the ending of the opposition between them--reflecting the actual conditions of the time.

Jurisprudence was to have a social character. Education was to be available to all and was to be the instrument of communist regeneration of society. Distribution was expected to be channelled through networks of consumer communes based on the consumer cooperatives of which some still exist today. The banks were expected to become giant bookkeeping organs, although without abolishing money and its substitutes it made little sense to talk about destroying the financial power of the banks. Housing was to be improved, but then any attempt to do something about housing would have constituted an improvement.

The work day was to be reduced to six hours as soon as productivity permitted, but with the proviso that the worker should then spend the other two hours studying theories of trade and industry. There were, finally, calls for free medical care and medicine, sanitation measures, a curious reference to communal feeding, and for the control of disease.

Triska calls this Second Program visionary, mystical, revolutionary, and romantic.⁶ This is misleading. It is true that in the context of 1919 Russia all talk of social welfarism sounded utopic. But the point that needs remembering is that it could have been much more visionary and unrelated to reality than it was. It could have urged, for example, the immediate abandonment of commodity production

⁶Triska, op. cit., p. 6.

or of money; pressed for complete worker control of industry, the abolition of the army and the police; or installed common people in leadership positions in the state administration. That it did not go this far marks the Second Program as a practical coming to grips with the reality of the time insofar as the ideological blinders would permit. The document reveals a desire to stay in power and still remain as much as possible consistent with their past revolutionary aspirations. To have read the "left" out of the Party, so to speak, would have openly marked the withering of those revolutionary ideals and have brought the entire raison d'etre of the Bolshevik or Soviet power into question. Hence the old document represented a viable compromise between reality and wish, heavily influenced by the conditions of the time--just as later the Third Party Program will appear.

This old Program was in effect for a long time--from 1919 until 1961, a period of forty-two years. Changing conditions which required different responses, as we have noted, made the document anachronistic and embarrassing, and it was removed from the shelves of libraries and bookshops during the 1936-38 time period.⁷ Attempts to revise it were begun as early as 1930 at the Sixteenth Party Congress; but all attempts to revise the old Program failed until 1958 when it became suddenly necessary for the First Secretary of the Party to put his full weight behind the effort.⁸ This resulted in the draft program published in July of 1961 and adopted later during the same year.

⁷Wolfgang Leonhard, "Adoption of the New Program," Schapiro (ed.), The USSR and the Future, op. cit., pp. 4-5.


⁸Explaining the background and reasons for this is the task of the following chapter.

The new Program assumes that the construction of socialism has already been completed. What this means specifically is left to the imagination of the reader. Presumably it means that the country had been industrialized and agriculture socialized, but this is nowhere spelled out. It is something to be believed, and it has the effect of changing the goal to communism and making socialism that which is to be built upon.

The opening sentence of the Program states that the Bolshevik Revolution has ushered in a new era for mankind, that of the overthrow of capitalism and the establishment of communism. But it is clear that such a victory is yet to come as the result of a struggle for supremacy need by violent only " . . . where the exploiting classes resort to violence against the people."⁹ The new Program therefore is primarily designed to sketch the non-violent manner in which Soviet state capitalism will triumph over private capitalism. The theoretical basis for this triumph is taken from the Marx and Lenin classics and adapted to the current decade. The Program then sketches with a fair amount of detail the actual manner of that march to victory, including unprecedented use of actual dates when certain stages are to be consummated.

There are two parts to the Program. Part One is the section on the theoretical foundations entitled "The Transition from Capitalism to Communism is the Road to Human Progress". Part Two is the sketch of how to get to that goal entitled: "The Tasks of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in Building a Communist Society." A very brief introduction states that the spectre of communism that Marx referred to in the

⁹Triska, op. cit., p. 51.



opening lines of the Manifesto was a dream which became a reality through the genius of Lenin and the Party which successfully fulfilled (sic) its first and second Programs, culminating in the successful construction of socialism in the Soviet Union. This tremendous effort inspired others so much that the authors of the Program become poetic. "A mighty purifying thunderstorm marking the spring-time of mankind is raging over the earth."¹⁰ What is referred to is the allegedly socialist revolutions in Asia and Europe which resulted in the formation of a world socialist system. And in the context of this expanding socialism and shrinking capitalism, the Soviet Party decided to adopt its third Program, " . . . a programme for the building of communist society"¹¹ which will deliver man from evil into peace, labor, freedom, equality and happiness. As if this were not enough, someone discovered that the draft did not contain the word "brotherhood" in this list. It was added.¹²

The theory begins with the now familiar analysis of capitalism as the last exploitative system which, although developing its productive forces to a very great extent, has become an obstacle to further progress. The assumption here, as with Marx, is that there is more potential in the productive force of man than is possible to exhibit in capitalism; that mature capitalism functions as a dam behind which an entire sea of productivity lies awaiting the raising of the red flag

¹⁰Triska, op. cit., p. 24.

¹¹Ibid., p. 25.

¹²The Draft of the Program was published in a supplement to Moscow News, #31 (554), August 5, 1961 and the final form was published in Izvestia, November 2, 1961.

of revolution. This potential is predisposed towards social consciousness by the social nature of the capitalistic productive process. Thus with the powerful potential channeled into social awareness one has both the material conditions for the revolution as well as the desire for this alteration of an exploiting society. And while the proletariat, or industrial working class is the natural leader, the highest principle of the dictatorship which follows is the alliance between the workers and the working peasantry, who together throw off the bonds of imperialist capitalism, already decaying, and usher in the new era.

The emphasis on the peasants reflects an unconscious awareness that revolutions take place only in those countries which have large peasant populations. As though aware of this the Program continues with the Lenin notion that the uneven character of revolution resulted from the uneven political and economic development in which Russia fit as the weakest link in the imperialist system. Originally this explained how the revolution could occur in Russia and not in Germany and France, but here it is used in a chronological setting, as cause and effect transition from the theory of revolutions which overthrow capitalism to the actuality of the Russian coup in November of 1917.

The result of the Bolshevik efforts was the establishment of the proletariat and the creation of a new kind of state. The draft Program called this new state a soviet state. The final version called it a soviet socialist state.¹³ It is useless to quibble with their use of this term to describe the immediate results of their efforts. The term is so badly misused or overused, like democracy, that any kind

¹³Triska, p. 29.

of semantic argument is out of the question.

Interestingly, initial credit for vast sweeping changes is not given directly to the Party nor to the proletariat; but to the revolution as though it had the force of objective law that Marx and especially Lenin granted it; that its eschatological significance was a fact perceived in time and space. The revolution breached the imperialist front, established the dictatorship of the proletariat, and created the new state, a new democracy of worker and peasant power. The revolution freed the people from foreign capital's enslavement, undermined exploitation and social injustice, smashed the chains of national oppression, abolished the basis of exploitation, emancipated women, and shook world capitalism to its foundations by leading the country onto the road of socialism.

Credit for nationalizing industry, railways, banks, and the land is given to Soviet power---a synonym for Bolshevik power. The young Soviet Republic was successful in fighting intervention, civil war, blockage, disruption, and the inexperience of the working class in state administration and socialist construction. These difficulties were increased by the isolation of Russia as the sole standard bearer for socialism. Hence the innocent appearing sentence: "The class struggle in the period of transition from capitalism to socialism was therefore acute."¹⁴ Seldom has such a little word borne so much.

Notwithstanding these obstacles the Party proved equal to its task of effecting the transition. Lenin is cited as having charted the whole course, but only really granted credit for the NEP, the guide lines of industrialization, agricultural cooperation and a cultural

¹⁴Ibid., p. 30.

revolution. The transition to forced draft industrialization and rural collectivization is smoothly made. No credit is given to Stalin, for the notion is advanced that the whole of the Soviet people and in particular the working class performed this tremendous feat in a sort of subbotnik cataclysm, led of course by the Party. One might think it significant that Stalin is not mentioned, but it should be pointed out that no mention is made of Khrushchev either. The omission of Stalin's name made it necessary to omit both. However, the device of tying the whole "acute" period into Lenin's plan for socialist construction is obvious distortion. As a matter of fact Lenin denounced Trotsky's plan for rapid industrialization and his agricultural program stressed voluntarism on the part of the peasantry.

But at any rate the Party proved equal to the task of industrializing, solving the agricultural problem in a socialist manner, and bringing about a revolution in science and culture. The result--socialism. No longer are there the antagonistic classes which result from the private ownership of the means of production. Socialistic ownership has ended the exploiting class; and thus in Soviet Russia there remain only friendly classes--something Marx would have found incomprehensible. The friendship, moreover, between the peasants and the working class is called indestructible, and the new intelligentsia is allegedly devoted to socialism. As a result of the Party effort, the Program states, there is no more exploitation and this is the highest manifestation of individual liberty and genuine social justice, functioning in an atmosphere of true democracy with guaranteed rights and duties, material incentives which guarantee the congruence of personal and social interests, and the will to successfully meet war and rehabilitation problems.

All of this proves that the Soviet experience counts for something significant as a model for other countries wishing to build socialism, even though there are bound to be some slight peculiarities due to different national conditions. Social can be constructed, Soviet experience teacher, only with the following factors firmly in mind.

1. A socialist revolution and a dictatorship of the proletariat are essential.
2. Only socialism can end exploitation, production anarchy, and other capitalist ills; and provide planned, continuous and rapid growth of both the economy and the standard of living of the people.
3. There must be a good alliance between the proletarians and the non-proletarians such as the peasantry.
4. Only socialism ends all national oppression and creates a climate for national cooperation within a single state.
5. The socialist state is the main instrument of change.
6. Socialism and peace are inseparable. Even peaceful coexistence with states that have different social systems is possible and desirable.¹⁵
7. A communist Party is essential, for about the same reasons as given for the necessity of a socialist state.
8. Fidelity to the principles of Marxism-Leninism and of proletarian internationalism are indispensable.

All of this is taught by the Soviet experience. But now the Program can put it even more strongly.

"The world's greatest revolution and the socialist

¹⁵The mention of different social systems was added to the draft which had merely mentioned coexistence, undoubtedly a victory for Khrushchev and the "revisionists" of which more in Chapter VI. Cf Triska, p. 24.


reorganisation of society, which has attained unprecedented heights in its development and prosperity, have confirmed in practice the historical truth of Leninism and have delivered a crushing blow to social-reformist ideology. As a result of the devoted labour of the Soviet people and the theoretical and practical activities of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, there exists in the world a socialist society that is a reality and a science of socialist construction that has been tested in practice. The highroad to socialism has been paved. Many people are already marching along it, and it will be taken sooner or later by all peoples."¹⁶

Inexorably the reader has been led to the point where he is informed in no uncertain terms that the Soviet experience is uniquely applicable to other countries which began their socialist construction much later than did the Soviet Union; and that the path to socialism has already been well charted by the ruling elements in the Soviet Union. The making of this point is one of the principal reasons for the promulgation of the Program, and it functions as a climax to the theoretical portion of the Program. Once it has been made it colors the large remainder of Part One and qualifies what is said in Part Two.

Let me illustrate. The words quoted above are the last sentence preceding a section entitled "The World Socialist System." The first sentence of that new section reads: "The Soviet Union is not pursuing the tasks of communist construction alone but in fraternal community with the other socialist countries."¹⁷ This seems like a small about-face from what had gone before. But almost immediately we learn that the Russian victory over the German fascists and the Japanese militarists

¹⁶Triska, pp. 34-35.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 35.



created the favorable conditions for the emergence of the other socialist countries after the war. Thus the position of primus inter pares is constantly maintained.

The section on the socialist camp is noteworthy for the many many appeals to unity and the benefits resulting therefrom; for the chastisement given to the "revisionism" of Yugoslavia, and for the apparently special significance given to the Chinese revolution.¹⁸ Albania is listed in first place alphabetically without comment. Yugoslavia, Albania, and China in this sort of position represent a compromise; but even though the Chinese Peoples' Republic was granted the apparent special treatment it does not last long. It is considerably thawed by the many references to unity at a time when China was not interested in unity, especially with Khrushchev. And, interestingly enough, this is brought home even more by a muted attack on China in the Program. After stressing unity the document states that no country in the socialist camp can have, nor should have any special rights or privileges. Then: "The line of socialist construction in isolation, detached from the world community of socialist countries, is theoretically untenable because it conflicts with the objective laws governing the development of socialist society."¹⁹ On the other hand unity ensures the victory of socialism and communism. It is clear that the

¹⁸This position does not square at all with Khrushchev's blistering attack on Albania in his speech to the Congress, thus revealing that the Program's formulation was not his idea. See Khrushchev's Report of the Central Committee to the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, delivered October 17, 1961, in The 22nd Congress of the CPSU, Vol I, (New York: Crosscurrents Press, 1961), pp. 151 ff.

¹⁹Triska, p. 36.

Program is referring to China because the words used to describe such isolated construction are not revisionism and the like, but reactionary and politically dangerous.

This is then followed by the refrain that the existence of the Soviet Union greatly facilitates the tasks of socialist construction in other countries. It is admitted that Lenin was right in that class struggle does not disappear from the construction of socialism. One could conclude from this that the class conflict, manifesting itself especially in nationalistic chauvinism is a phenomenon in the peoples' democracies but not any longer in the Soviet Union because it has passed that economic stage. This is further evidence that the Russian Party is the leader of the international movement, and it creates the additional return of considering any wavering from the path of the mother hen ideologically, i.e., as evidence of class conflict, or immaturity; and potentially of course this has the possibility of isolating the proponents of such a separate path as nationalistic-bourgeoisie or counter-revolutionary in the old Soviet context of the term--permitting suppression or exclusion.

Having made all of its important points, the Program can now deal with a safe subject--the crisis of capitalism. It is safe in the same sense that a good sermon on the wickedness of the world and its eventual destruction is safe in an orthodox church. It is very much against sin, while at the same time it makes everyone feel good by comparison. "Imperialism has entered the period of decline and collapse. An inexorable process of decay has seized capitalism from top to bottom . . ."²⁰ But all sermons cannot be easily laughed away; and the

²⁰Ibid., p. 39.

same is true of this analysis. Growing bureaucratization, for example, or militarism, agricultural restrictions contrasting with hungry world populations, and the racist oppressions cannot simply be balanced by pointing to the unclean skirts of the Program's authors.

But the major thrust of the section portrays imperialist or state-monopoly capitalism in its death throes which even the possession of nuclear weapons will not prevent, for the capitalist system is outdated and must collapse. But the international revolutionary movement, on the other hand, has a bright future. It is impressed with the successes of the world socialist camp. Those revolutionary movements not so impressed, it may be assumed, do not have this bright future.²¹ And this revolutionary selectivity is not new by any means. It dates back at least from the formation of the Third International, and beyond that to the endless conflicts of Lenin, Marx, and Engels had with their ideological cousins. The trick, however, is in discussing the revolutionary movements in the world as though only those which are approved by the Soviet leaders exist; which is a manifest distortion. But by using the device of calling them working-class movements or the growing forces of democracy and socialism this distortion is covered up.

In discussing national revolutionary movements there seems to have been considerable caution in dealing with the aggressive style of Chinese dogmatism. One change between the draft and the final version reveals that the Soviet leaders wanted to avoid offending China and still maintain their own position. After describing, in now familiar rhetoric, the advantages accruing to the revolutionary forces because

²¹See the recent attacks on Herbert Marcuse and the New Left in Pravda, May 30, 1968.

of the presence of the Soviet camp, the authors made special efforts to be specific about a sort of revolutionary gain which did not go all the way to a full revolution. The Program notes the international shift to the left, presumably Soviet, position, and then states that in the new historical situation under capitalism the bourgeoisie can be compelled to grant things that transcend ordinary reforms, that " . . . are of vital importance to the working class and the progress of its struggle for the victory of the revolution, for socialism, as well as to the majority of the nation."²² The phrase "the victory of the revolution" was added to the draft Program and should be seen as a concession to the dogmatists in Soviet circles as well as a sop to the Chinese. It most clearly did not achieve its objective,²³ for once having called for a constant revolutionary struggle and related items, the Program "prefers" a peaceful transition to socialism in the draft Program, and in the final version the "attempt to achieve" revolution by peaceful means.²⁴

Only when the ruling class resorts to violence should the non-peaceful method be considered; but it is expected that the degree of violence used against the revolutionary forces will be relative to the strength of the capitalist or reactionary forces. This rather leaves it up to the historical situation in a country at a particular

²²Triska, p. 48.

²³Note the Chinese response: "It is a programme which opposes revolution on the part of the people still living under the imperialist and capitalist system, who comprise two thirds of the world's population, and opposes the carrying of revolution through to completion on the part of the people already on the socialist road, who comprise one-third of the world's population. It is a revisionist programme for the preservation or restoration of capitalism." The Polemic on The General Line of the International Communist Movement, (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), p. 92.

²⁴Triska, p. 50.

time. Even the possibility of compensation to the dispossessed bourgeoisie is considered possible, and the ideological quicksand is avoided by lumping all these elements together as part of the struggle against the enemy, and maintaining that whatever form of the struggle is selected it can only come through revolution and be followed by what must essentially be the dictatorship of the proletariat.

In other words the Program is walking a political tightrope. It favors cooperation with social democratic parties, but then severely curtails the possibility of such cooperation by calling for the Communists to soundly criticize the ideological positions and opportunist practice of the social democrats who have sided with the bourgeoisie--a very elastic designation, obviously. The Yugoslavs are chided for their revisionism, and revisionism is listed as the chief danger within the communist movement. But Khrushchev's attack on the dogmatism of Albania in his report to this same congress revealed that he was more concerned with dogmatism, and perhaps would have listed it as the chief danger had he had his way. The watered-down compromise in the Program is threatened, however, by the obvious intent of the paragraph on dogmatism which states that the dogmatists are counter to the creative development of revolutionary theory leading to isolation of Communists from the masses and to leftist adventurism.

But then again, as though getting too close to saying something, the Program swings back to its theme of unity by referring to the statements of the fraternal parties in 1957 and 1960. This ignores Khrushchev's attack on the Chinese in Budapest in 1960 and uses the ambiguous terminology of these declarations to pull the wool of unity down--but it could not succeed.

When discussing wars of liberation the Program similarly sidesteps definitive positions and delicately steps between its fear of war, its reluctance to harm relationships with already independent countries which are not socialist; and its very evident desire to appear as an orthodox international revolutionary Marxist which must breathe fire and brimstone in order to do so. Revolution is necessary, of course. But it may be one which is in concert with the national bourgeoisie, imbued with nationalism now white-washed because it is anti-imperialist, and contents itself with stating that the revolution so made must bring about radical changes in the social and economic spheres and solve the pressing problems of national rebirth.²⁵ But what is insured here is independence, not socialism. In this context the choice is given the new country as to what road of development will be taken, the low road being capitalism leading downward, and the high road being socialism leading upward. But this socialism refers specifically to developmental socialism, the Stalin model if you will, the rapid expansion of a command economy. No mention is made of civil war, purges, or the dictatorship of the proletariat. But even so the last two sentences of this paragraph in the draft Program were deleted. They would have made the position too clear:

"This road will require concessions from the bourgeoisie, but those will be concessions in behalf of the nation. All sections of the population can find application for their energies, provided they follow the non-capitalist road of development."²⁶

The tone of the Program here is very much pro what it calls a national

²⁵Ibid., p. 56.

²⁶Ibid., pp. 57-58.

democracy and cites as mistaken the view that the communist parts of such a movement should be persecuted. Such an activity would weaken the liberation movement, imperil the gains to be made, and is counter to the national interests of the people themselves. Surely this is a new high for mildness.

The purpose behind this gentle tone is soon made clear. The neutral nations play a large role in the prevention of war. The problem of war is listed as the focal problem of the times which must be solved in the interests of all peoples. The language is militaristic, e.g., force the imperialist aggressors to retreat, but the purpose is peace, congruent with Khrushchev's position since the Soviet explosion of the hydrogen bomb.

The mildness of the section dealing with the national-liberation movement is countered immediately by one treating once again bourgeois ideology and its decline, and the impotence of reformist ideology; although the latter is not given nearly the same space as the former. The reason for this section, containing some truth and some distortion, seems to be as balance for the following section which deals with peaceful coexistence and the struggle for world peace. Italicized is the sentence: "The issue of war and peace is the principal issue of today" and "The main thing is to ward off a thermonuclear war, to prevent it from breaking out."²⁷ This not only meant to the Soviet leaders a cooperation among the socialist nations to compel if possible the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy; this also meant things that were not at all acceptable to the dogmatists whether in China or in the Soviet

²⁷ Ibid., p. 64.



Union. After having labeled the USA as the principal enemy, decaying, moribund, hostile, anti-communist, imperialistic, militaristic, and combined in aggressive blocs against the socialist camp; it is very strange to read the Soviet peaceful coexistence

" . . . implies renunciations of war as a means of settling international disputes, and their solution by negotiation; equality, mutual understanding and trust between countries; consideration for each other's interests; non-interference in internal affairs; recognition of the right of every people to solve all the problems of their country by themselves; strict respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries; promotion of economic and cultural cooperation on the basis of complete equality and mutual benefit."²⁸

The result of this profoundly status-quo approach would be competition rather than warfare. Diplomatic struggle would replace the more violent forms. Even the Federal Republic of Germany is included in this approach, and even wars between capitalist countries is opposed.

While this was a policy that any sane man could applaud, it was nonetheless a direct slap to the aspirations of China. Yet Khrushchev stated in his Report to the Congress: "The course adopted by our Party has been of tremendous significance in strengthening the unity of the socialist countries . . ."²⁹ But the concept of peaceful coexistence he spelled out in that Report was hardly conducive to unity unless he meant by unity following the lead of the USSR. Peaceful coexistence meant the simultaneous existence of two opposed social systems which have both renounced wars.³⁰ Placing this kind of coexistence on a

²⁸Ibid., pp. 65-66.

²⁹Khrushchev's Report to the Congress, op. cit. p. 7.

³⁰Ibid., p. 46.

programmatic level could have only meant to the Chinese that they were not going to receive Soviet assistance in their adventures even though they were supposed to be ideological brothers.

It seems to me that I have demonstrated that to overlook this first part of the Program is to ignore a great deal more than a repetition of tired words. That these words have great significance in the political struggles of the 1958-60 time period is amply proven by the Chinese reaction to them. The "why" of the Program is buried right here in Part One, as we shall see in much more detail in the following chapter.

The second half of the Program is more ideologically fresh, however, and for this reason perhaps has been granted western attention in more of a comprehensive manner. Nonetheless the response of western scholars has been one which can be best characterized as a yawn. The blueprint for the future is called conservative, even extremely conservative by Dan Jacobs.³¹ Alfred G. Meyer, in his recent general book on the Soviet system scarcely mentions the Program at all. Nor does Carl Linden who did an excellent study of conflict among the leaders of the country during the Khrushchev era.³² The Schapiro and Laqueur readers do not differ significantly. In an article Meyer saw the Program as another example of the Soviet's forced program of industrialization.³³ George Lichtheim found the

³¹Dan Jacobs, The New Communist Manifesto, op. cit., p. 217.

³²Alfred G. Meyer, The Soviet Political System, (New York: Random House, 1965), and Carl Linden, Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership, 1957-1964, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1966).

³³Alfred G. Meyer, "Twenty Years On," Laqueur and Labedz, op. cit., p. 188.

major purpose of the document to be propaganda which by utilizing vulgarized Marxist terminology states its faith in the authoritarian brand of socialism imposed on the masses by a technocratic ruling elite.³⁴

This contrasts sharply with the Program's own view of itself. Communism is listed as the bright future for all mankind and this document reveals how to get there. Obviously such a map cannot be called conservative and yet scholars do so. It is not that they are skeptical about Russia's meeting the various goals that are set up in the Program so much as it is the feeling that even were these optimistic goals met it would still not make that much difference. One might conclude that this feeling on the part of western observers is a result of their cultural or educational ethnocentrism--they are so used to thinking about communism as an unattainable never-never land that when someone brings it down to earth it is equivalent to telling Virginia that there is no Santa Claus. But surely the question is begged here. If the concept of communism is brought down to earth in such a way as to suggest that it is no more than the ability to produce x tons of steel or butter or electrical power then the concept of communism loses whatever distinctiveness it formerly may have had, whether rightly or wrongly.

But is this all? Steel, butter, etc.? No--there is more; but what is said about this additional material does not inspire any more confidence in its eventual realization than previous writings on the subject; and raises as many questions as it purports to answer.

³⁴George Lichtheim, "The Programme and the Marxist-Leninist Tradition," in Schapiro, op. cit., pp. 33-34.



Communism, states the Program, is a classless social system with public ownership of the means of production and social equality for all members of the society. Productive growth will dynamically provide a geyser of wealth, so that distribution to the population will for the first time by any country be on the basis of need rather than for work performed. The concept of need is later qualified by such words as "reasonable", "sound", and the needs of perfectly developed persons. This suggests that not all needs will be satisfied; or further, that not all the needs will be even partially satisfied. All of this, of course, raises the necessity of some individual or group deciding on which needs are to be satisfied, and many other complications.

The basis for the alteration of the society, however, is to be material, i.e., economic and technical. There are near constant references in the document as well as in the contemporary Soviet Press articles to the building of the material and technical basis of communism. But the foundation for this construction program is still the formula made famous by Lenin--Soviet power plus electrification of the whole country. As we saw, this meant a maintenance of the present power configurations plus a comprehensive technological development which would industrialize the country on the most modern basis possible. But since this is precisely what the Soviet planners have thought that they were doing since 1928 or even before, one can understand those western scholars who have insisted that there is really nothing new about this Program which so ought to be fresh and new.

Soviet power is a euphemism for Party control, and it has been since 1917. The Program is a Party document and shows a marked tendency

to imply that the transition to communism, or the building of the material and technical basis of communism, will not be possible without the guidance of the Party. This second part of the document is separated into the tasks of the Party in various fields of endeavor, such as agriculture, or industry. There is no mention of a withering of the Party therefore; rather the Program itself provides ideological justification for a heightening of the role of the CPSU. Among the leadership elite in 1961 or later there is no known advocate of such a party withering along with the state, or even subsequent to the state. And with the attempts of Khrushchev to replace the state by the Party even references to the withering of the state are disappointing. Someone must administer the things rather than the men; and presumably there is no group better able to do this, in the minds of the Party planners, than the Party itself.

Since to do a thing in stages has an aura of the experimental and therefore scientific, the Party of scientific socialism had determined that the transition to communism would also take place in stages, and in mentioning this a slap could again be taken at the presumptuousness of the CPC in alleging that their communes were a direct route of communism, skipping the stages of socialism. But the Soviet stages are so simple that they hardly qualify as an improvement over any kind of crash program. They are simply decades; some goals are to be reached in the first decade, and others in the second. After these two stages or twenty years had passed, the foundation for communism would have, in the main, been built. Full communism was to have bloomed sometime after this deadline of 1980, but within the lifetime of the



present generation in Russia.³⁵

It is clear from a perusal of the goals of the two stages that what is meant to happen is a rational and efficient improvement of the Soviet economy in all of its aspects. The industrial goals and others which follow reveal this strongly.

1. There is to be a marked increase in the number of highly skilled workers, with low-skilled work being done by machinery.

2. Rapid growth in productivity is to be balanced with multifaceted training of the worker to do a variety of jobs, even specialized ones. This maintains the specialization of labor which had made possible so much industrial advance; while at the same time attempting to circumvent Marx's objections to the degrading aspects of such specialization.

3. Systematic wage increases particularly to the lower levels with the goal of eliminating the lower level, while at the same time reducing the work week and work day significantly below the forty hour week and the eight hour day.

4. Greatly increase the production of electrical energy, steel, automobiles, and intensively develop automation, cybernetics, computer technology, precision machinery, consumer goods production, the chemical industry for fertilizers and plastics, and in general industry east of the Urals.

5. A single power grid for the country will be constructed along with atomic power stations in poorer areas. Transportation will be expanded and improved with more highways, faster public carrier travel,


³⁵Triska, p. 129.

and a system of deep water canals to link internal centers with ocean ports.

6. Improvements are to be realized in capital investment; i.e., more profitable trends in capital construction are to be selected, emphasis is to be placed on maximum output per invested ruble, and a reduction of time lag will be sought between investment and return. This speaks volumes against interest-free lending by the state, and interest charges are a part of the current economic reforms.

7. This will result in a passing of the United States in per capita production, long a Khrushchevian goal. However the Program carefully states that what the Soviets will do in twenty years is pass the present, i.e., 1960 levels of production and labor productivity in the U.S. This is considerably different from the general tone of the Program's implication; that they would become the richest nation on earth in terms of production and consumption. The draft Program contained the qualifier "contemporary" when referring to the U.S. level which was to be surpassed in the first stage. The qualifier was deleted in the final version.³⁶ But the following sentence includes the qualifier "present" even in the final version when referring to the volume of output--so that what the Program ends up stating is that the present U.S. volume of output in twenty years will be left far behind by the Soviet Union--ambiguous enough to leave the impression of richest and best unimpaired. I do not believe that the authors felt that U.S. growth rates would stagnate, for they elsewhere allow such rates of growth even though they are smaller than those accorded

³⁶Ibid., p. 73.



to the economies of the socialist camp. This bit of realism corresponds roughly to statistical projections by western scholars that the Soviet Union is approximately that far behind the American levels.³⁷

8. Besides all of this there is to be an improvement in working conditions such as eliminating night work where feasible; and eliminating dirty, degrading, and backbreaking labor. Benefits accruing to the worker besides more wages and shorter working hours will include longer vacations up to a month each year, and the extension of public catering to provide meals at work, more rest homes, and country hotels where the laborer can relax.

In agriculture there is a similar desire to improve and expand through what the Program calls intensification. Peasant incomes are to grow rapidly until they match the worker income in the city and be guaranteed by the state. Agrogorods (combination of urban-rural elements), long a Khrushchev dream, will become a reality with green urban centers and rural centers to be model towns with agrarian industrial associations and much greater development of community services, public catering, nurseries and kindergartens. In addition labor productivity on the farms will rise greatly, and this greater productivity aided by increased use of machinery, skilled training, fertilizers, and general scientific agriculture will result in constant progress in the aggregate output of agricultural products to levels far in excess of those obtaining in 1960.

In short there is to be improvement everywhere. Real incomes will skyrocket especially for those now in a low paying category.

³⁷ See for example Solomon Schwartz, The Soviet Economy Since Stalin, (New York: Lippincott & Co., 1965), p. 238.



Improvements will be seen in shopping facilities, and consumer coops. The housing shortage will be overcome. Health care will be bettered by extending mother and child health institutes, maternity homes, children's health centers, and hospitals. Women will further benefit from the improvement of public catering to free them from the stove, children's boarding schools to free them from child care, and domestic appliance production to make their home life less of a burden. This implies that the Soviet woman goes on working outside the home which may or may not be what the woman herself wants.

Education will be improved by making more certain that it is available to everyone within the country, and that the same high standards of education prevail throughout. Especially important from the point of view of the Program is the necessity of developing a communistic attitude toward labor on the part of the younger generation. Without such an attitude, obviously, this carefully constructed house of cards will tumble down.

Public consumption funds will increase rapidly, even more so than increases in wages; even though taxes will be abolished. From this consumption fund will be provided a vast array of free and soon to be free services to the population which would greatly supplement their incomes. Children would be maintained at boarding schools for nothing and those unable to work would receive a stipend. Education, medical services and medicines, housing, communal services, transportation, public catering, and to some extent the use of holiday homes, camps and sports facilities would be free. Stipends for unmarried mothers and mothers of many children would also come out of this fund.

Another goal was the eradication of private farming plots as soon as this was feasible, although this might take some doing. Although they constitute only 3% of the cultivated land area, private plots in 1964 accounted for 42% of the milk and meat production, 73% of the egg output, and 60% of the potato crop.³⁸ Likewise, that school of communism for the peasantry, the collective farm, will one day be merged into the state farms into the property of the whole people. Since this is an ideological statement rather than practical economics it should be considered rather elastic.

Other fairly flexible goals include the notion of the withering of the state by means of increasing mass participation in it, extending the power and the scope of the local soviets, and providing frequent election and recall privileges. The real test of the removal of the state is, however, the removal of state coercion or subordination. This the Program states will be gradually accomplished. But although there is no longer a dictatorship of the proletariat, but a state of the whole people, as long as there are criminals there must be coercive punishment. Criminals are those who commit crimes dangerous to society, violate the rules of the socialist community, and refuse to live by honest labor. When these disappear, presumably in full communism, the compulsion power of the state is also supposed to fade. That this is mere lip service to the withering concept is obvious. But when that day arrives there will be substituted for the state a communist public self government, guided by the vanguard of the mass organizations, the CPSU; and embracing the Soviets, trade-unions, cooperatives, and other


³⁸Marshall Goldman, The Soviet Economy: Myth and Reality, (Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968), p. 102.

mass organs of the people. "Communist society will be a highly organized community of working men. Universally recognized rules of the communist way of life will be established whose observance will become the organic need and habit with everyone."³⁹ But all this must wait the building of a developed communist society, and the consolidated victory of socialism in the world arena; sufficiently vague time zones to satisfy everyone and no one at the same time. The state will stay for the foreseeable future.

All of these wondrous things would come to naught from an ideological point of view if they do not result at the same time in the making of work something substantively different than it was before. In other words the quantitative alterations must be accompanied by qualitative changes. Work must become a primary need for man. Material incentives will no longer be necessary because there will be a fusion of individual and social motivations, and because the implementation of communist distribution removes the necessity of working for a living. The Program is confident that this will create the potential for labor to be freely creative and a source of joy to the laborer. This is possible only if the man involved becomes what the Program calls the perfectly developed man.

But what is this perfectly developed man? One having a high degree of communist consciousness, in tune with the subbotniks of old. He will have industry, discipline, and devotion to the public interest; he will be a participator in the management of public affairs. His labor is a love, a need, and an end in itself. He will

³⁹Triska, p. 104.



be a highly moral man living an exemplary life in his family which is based on mutual love and friendship. He will be a free man, freer than any before him.

Thus when we leave the quantitative and reach the qualitative the Program becomes much less cautious and conservative sounding, for this would require a fundamental transformation of man. He would have to be the sort whose name the guardian of the gates of pearl would have no difficulty in finding on the list. He is a result of the changed behavior when the material and technical conditions are completed.

But the society in which this perfect individual will function is to be a highly organized society, and presumably the high degree of organization refers to the planning of the economy of the new society. But other things must also be organized. All individuals are to enjoy equal status because distinctions such as between rural and urban, or status differentiations between men and women, or between mental and physical labor are to be obliterated by bringing the lower up to the level of the higher. Hence freedom to either be poor or dumb is not optional. Freedom to be either generous or selfish seems to be ruled out by the programmatic decision that relations will be harmonious due to the complete identification of one's personal and social interests. Progress in production will be uninterrupted, and presumably will occur at a high rate since this is often cited as one of the major differences between socialist and capitalist economies. The low rates of development are cited as evidence of the decay of capitalism, and the high rates as proving the vitality and historical correctness of the socialist system.



Moreover, this perfectly developed man's needs will be satisfied from public sources. But this most assuredly does not mean that he is freed from the necessity of working. He will not be permitted to live a life of laziness, since every able-bodied man will participate in socially useful labor. The ideological support for this is that when the necessity of labor as means disappears, labor as end becomes the prime and vital need because man's distinguishment from the animal world below him is his ability to create or to produce. Hence this freed man will produce, will create, will work. Those that do not work are already listed as criminals in the Program, and this should not change with the coming of communism. Perhaps the most one could expect is that which the Program itself suggests, namely that the means of handling the problem would change. Instead of execution or prison, one might be sent to a mental institution for corrective treatment. But besides this, social pressure ought to be sufficient to keep the individual from exercising a freedom from work.

But this raises the issue of what this new man is free from. Certainly he is free from all sorts of inequality. He is going to be equal insofar as status is concerned with regard to income, distribution, job conditions, cultural advantages, education, and the like. He will be free to be equal, but not free to have differentiated status. He will still feel the necessity of working, and it would still be for a living even though the society thrusts itself in between the worker and the recipient. "Communist production demands high standards or organization, precision and discipline, which are ensured, not by compulsion, but through an understanding of public duty, and are determined by the whole

pattern of life in communist society."⁴⁰

While this might be sung to the tune of Onward Christian Soldiers and be very stirring, it still seems to replace one type of compulsion with another, and imply that the public duty style of compulsion is preferable. This, of course, might be true for some people, but not for others. Hence this freedom to be compelled in this instance by social mores or whatever, would represent for some people a real curtailment of their freedom. But since this group would be counterposing themselves not only to the supposed will of the majority, but also to the objective law of man's development, their voice of protest would be lost in the wind. Nonetheless

"Communism represents the highest form of organization of public life. All production units and self-governing associations will be harmoniously united in a common planned economy and a uniform rhythm of social labour."⁴¹

Equal man is free to float with the stream, hopefully to swim with the stream. And want to. But this picnic has ants.

But even so, how can this transformation of man possibly be seen as a result of this kind of economic progress? From the Program's point of view it is a transformation, a radical one. The primary vehicle is not economic progress but education. The educational task is a phenomenal one. The Party is exhorted to educate all working people in the spirit of ideological integrity and devotion to communism; to cultivate in them a communist attitude towards labor. But the molding of the new man is brought about by his active participation in the construction of communism and the development of communist principles

⁴⁰Triska, pp. 60-70.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 70.

in economic and social areas under the influence of the educational work of the Party, the state, and other social organizations with the help of the press, radio, movies, and television. The image projected by the Program is one of mass mobilization of all resources to educate, to turn the twig from bourgeois (they would say socialist) to communist standards of living. It should also be clear that this comes from the top down and not the reverse even though the Program wants to have it both ways.

"As communist forms of social organisation are created, communist ideas will become more firmly rooted in life and work and in human relations, and people will develop the ability to enjoy the benefits of communism in a rational way. Joint planned labour by the members of society, their daily participation in the management of state and public affairs, and the development of communist relations of comradely co-operation and mutual support, recast the minds of people in a spirit of collectivism, industry, and humanism."⁴²

However, this contrasts with a later statement to the effect that contrary to previous socio-economic formations communism does not develop spontaneously or sporadically, " . . . but as a result of the conscious and purposeful efforts of the masses led by the Marxist-Leninist Party."⁴³ In other words without the Party there is no communism. But the Program must also say likewise that without the people there can be no communism, even though this is fairly meaningless. "The people are the decisive force in the building of communism. The Party exists for the people, and it is in serving the people that it sees the purpose of its activity."⁴⁴ And this Party existing for the people is invincible, with unshakable ideological and organizational unity, even though it considers it a duty to consult

⁴²Ibid., p. 110.


⁴³Ibid., p. 125.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 128.

the people on major questions of home and foreign policy in its development of socialist democracy.

That the Party exists for the people is a statement of belief based on faith rather than reason, and it thus cannot be attacked. But certainly the future society projected by the Party in this Program is one that must be imposed from above through education, coercion, social pressure, example, and mental rehabilitation. Its attractiveness, nonetheless, to a great many people in the Soviet Union, manifested by my many conversations with Russians in a variety of occupations can be traced to those parts of the document which promise a richer and fuller life, a life of comparative abundance.

The new society is a planned, highly organized society of equals, socially motivated to produce in an atmosphere of abundance freely shared; with all the component parts functioning with the rhythm of a finely made watch; surrounded and embraced by the vanguard of the people. Authority will be lodged within the Party as administrator, for the state will have withered as state; with the functions of the state taken over by the vanguard which exists for the people. Shortly after, the other socialist nations will follow; and then, finally, the imperialist nations will do likewise. The world of nations will then function in harmony with a world communist economy regulated by the victorious working people according to one single plan. Socialism in one country, turning into communism in one country, will have become communism of the whole world.



CHAPTER VI

AN EXPLANATION OF THE PROGRAM

The Third Party Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was adopted in 1961 for three reasons. One was China, the second was Yugoslavia, and the third was a related conflict within the leadership elite of the Soviet Party. I shall develop them as chronologically as possible and hope to weave together an understandable fabric into which the Soviet Program fits.

What must first be done is to dispense with the idea that Soviet politics is a smooth stream, rarely rippled by dissent or conflict. This rather simplistic idea sees in the person of the First or General Secretary the one man who, having all the levers of power in his hands, is able to dominate all his colleagues completely and impose his will and his alone on the Russian populace. While this approach might be comforting to those who wish to find a totalitarian syndrome operative in the Soviet Union, it is not true. Debate on this issue surfaced in the United States in 1963 and 1964.¹

¹Carl Linden, "Khrushchev and the Party Battle," Problems of Communism, Vol. 12, September-October, 1963, pp. 27-35; Thomas Rigby, "The Extents and Limits of Authority," ibid., pp. 36-41; Robert Conquest, "After Khrushchev: A Conservative Restoration?," ibid., pp. 41-46; Carl Linden, "Facts in Search of a Theory," Problems of Communism, Vol 12, November-December 1963, pp. 56-58; Robert Tucker, "The Conflict Model," ibid., pp. 59-61; Wolfgang Leonhard, "An Anti-Khrushchev Opposition," ibid., pp. 61-64; Michel Gordey, "Vanka' Vstanka," ibid., pp. 64-65. After Khrushchev's "resignation" see the spate of articles in the issues of January-February, May-June, and July-August, 1965, under the title

The main point of separation between these and other scholars has been not whether conflict exists in the leadership circles of the ruling elite, but whether conflict is to be treated as a continuous and crucial fact of Soviet political life. Once a leader was apparently firmly in power, the one group tended to underplay conflict. The other school saw conflict not as a temporary phenomena on the way to total power, but rather as an integral part of the dynamic and unstable leadership politics; in other words as a permanent part of Soviet politics. Robert Tucker puts it well.

"Probably the most important single failing of Soviet studies in the West has been a general tendency to take pretty much at face value the Communist pretension to a 'monolithic' system of politics. In communist theory or ideology, unity and harmony are the rule in the Party and conflict is the exception, something that regrettably occurs from time to time but remains an abnormality; and this has been an underlying assumption of much Western thinking about Soviet politics. The truth seems to be, however, that the unity and harmony in Soviet politics are largely a matter of external show and pretense, and that in Soviet politics as it is carried on behind the scenes they are the exception and conflict is the rule."

In the new situation created by Stalin's death--with no clear line of succession marked out, with old animosities dividing the top leaders--the conflict for factional ascendancy not only continued but grew in force and intensity, and on several occasions has erupted onto the surface of Soviet public life in full view of a startled world."²

Hence every statement of policy, every indication of a new direction should be seen as first of all a compromise, and secondly an indication

"The Coup and After," by Merle Fainsod, Richard Lowenthal, Robert Conquest, Uri Ralanan, Adam Ulam, Leon Smolinski, Seweryn Bailer, T. H. Rigby, J. W. Cleary, and Carl Linden.


²Robert Tucker, The Soviet Political Mind, (New York; Praeger, 1963), p. 60

of the limit to which the currently dominant faction can push.

Then the successes and failures of both domestic and foreign policy objectives either aid or harm that leading faction; resulting in slow wave-like movement of progress and retrogression reflecting the underlying struggle for power.

But before getting involved in the events which led up to the adoption of the Program it is well that certain vocabulary problems be discussed. There are two broad groupings in which conflict is played out in the Soviet Union since 1953--revisionism and dogmatism. Revisionism means a favorable attitude towards rapprochement with Yugoslavia, reformism in domestic politics, anti-Stalinism, less terror as a motive for compliance, consumer goods over heavy industry, more literary freedom or less fear of it, distrust of China, and a greater desire to trust the West. Dogmatism, on the other hand, means a pro-China line, conservatism in domestic politics, unwillingness to de-Stalinize or a wish to go very slowly, literary repression, heavy industry over consumer goods production, less innovation, a dislike of Yugoslav revisionism, and a distrust of the West. Each time these terms are used all of the parts of the syndrome are not necessarily meant; but the context in such a case usually shows why this is true. Most of the time, however, the whole general syndrome will be conveyed by the single word.


The first faction to emerge after the death of Stalin in 1953 was the Malenkov-Beria coalition. Immediately after Stalin's funeral these two began disassociating themselves from Stalin by urging a lessening of reliance on terror internally, and a reconsideration of Stalin's position on Yugoslavia externally. This does not necessarily



mean that Malenkov with his internal economic liberalization policies or that Beria with his more liberal policies towards the dependent nationalities within the Soviet Union actually believed in these things. That is not the point at all. They may have been sincere-- but they need not have been; for the primary purpose of adopting positions either on the side of revisionism or dogmatism or somewhere in between was to consolidate or achieve power.

But Beria moved in such a fashion as to alarm his opponents in the Politburo by calling so many MVD units to Moscow, and giving an excuse for fearing that a coup was intended. In July of 1953 he was arrested and allegedly executed in December of that year. From this point on he will be used as a scapegoat for Stalin, at times when it was not politic to condemn the former leader. The fact that his arrest followed the uprising in the German Democratic Republic so quickly suggests that his more liberal policies towards national minorities and presumably the countries of Eastern Europe was also being arrested and for the time shelved.

Besides the July rising in the GDR there was in the Soviet Union a literary "thaw" which derived its name from the novel by Ilya Ehrenburg. This period of greater freedom from controls coincided with the August speech of Malenkov in which he announced the intention of increasing consumer goods production so that the Soviet standard of living could increase. Both distribution and agriculture were to be improved. But the Five Year Plan (1951-1955) still reflected the Stalinist or (now) dogmatist emphasis on monster projects in heavy industry. Thus he would have uphill sledding until that emphasis was



altered. In addition Malenkov began stressing peaceful coexistence with the West.³ We have come to associate both of these attitudes with Khrushchev, but during the Malenkov period Khrushchev's rivalry with him forced his muting of these policies; and Khrushchev chose to stay with revising the agricultural situation--something that could, initially at least, be accomplished without a basic reorientation of the heavy industry syndrome dear to the interests of the dogmatists.

It is not surprising that these careful plans resulted in Khrushchev's being named First Secretary in September of 1953 with Malenkov moving over to the governmental side as Premier. This may have been satisfactory to Malenkov who probably felt he had no reason to fear the Party organization he had controlled for so long under Stalin; and his basic directives were more in keeping with the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers. But almost immediately Khrushchev began to undercut any possible leadership by Malenkov especially in regard to agriculture. Khrushchev began holding Plenums of the Central Committee on the agricultural question, and in several speeches he carefully laid out Party tasks in regard to agriculture, and rather carefully hedged on some of Malenkov's economic projections.⁴ The basic motive for this was to undercut Malenkov by making government tasks Party tasks so that they would come under his jurisdiction. Besides, by urging the Virgin land scheme on the Party and getting it accepted Khrushchev made necessary vast alterations in machinery supply and transportation requirements and was therefore in a lovely

³Pravda, August 19, 1953.

⁴Pravda, September 15, 1953.

position to attack the various ministries of the USSR and the RFSFR from an anti-red-tape point of view. These criticisms would, of course, come to rest at the office of the new Premier.

Moreover the Malenkov desire to reorient the heavy industry emphasis crashed on the rocks of the intransigent foreign policy of the dogmatist Molotov, at the Berlin Conference from January to February, 1954. While the West insisted on free election throughout Germany, Molotov demanded an early treaty-making to which both German governments would be invited to participate on an equal basis. The result was not only stalemate, but also a freezing of hostilities expressed by the inclusion of the Federal Republic in the Nato as a fully armed member, and the formation of the Warsaw Pact to pull together the various bilateral treaties the Soviet Union had made earlier with her dependent Eastern European states. This activity increased tension, increasing the needs for armament production which is a part of the heavy industry complex; and a fundamental reorientation was impossible, making Malenkov's position untenable.

Also, during October of 1954, Khrushchev and Bulganin travelled to Peking where commitments were made to a greater assistance program for the Communist Party of China. This meant a building up of the heavy industry of the Chinese, which necessitated a continued emphasis on it at home, while further committing the Soviet Union to maintaining high levels of armaments production in the sense of protecting China.

This meant that Malenkov was outmaneuvered and it should have come as no surprise that on February 8, 1955, Malenkov "resigned"

his position as Premier and was replaced by Bulganin.⁵ Khrushchev and Bulganin now constituted the dominant faction, but with Khrushchev having more power. Conflict within the elite drew back again from the public light and would not reappear until another upheaval had been resolved in 1957. But the basic reason for Khrushchev's greater power was not only that he was First Secretary, but also that throughout his career he endeavored to make the Party a technically competent vehicle for administering the complex Russian society. What this meant among other things was a replacing of the governmental or ministerial apparatus with the Party apparatus, an encouraging of Party involvement in decision making all along the line. This can be called revival of a viable Party, but it was also Party interference in the affairs of the State, which had the purpose of undermining the significance of government positions of influence and of course raising his own.

But the Party he had inherited from Stalin was faction ridden. He could not rule over it like Lenin, nor did he want if he could to rule by terror. Hence he was reduced to political maneuvering in order to stay on top, while actually striving to express the views of one of the factions, the revisionists. Thus as long as Malenkov was a serious rival for power Khrushchev seemed to be on the side of the other faction. Pravda records him as saying in 1954:

"Only on the basis of further development of heavy industry will we be able to successfully promote all branches of the national economy, and to raise steadily the material well-being of the people and ensure the

⁵There were other factors in his fall, of course. Especially discrediting was the reopening of the "Leningrad case" at the Abakumov trial in December of 1954 in which Malenkov was involved. See Robert Conquest, Power and Policy in the USSR, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1962), pp. 95-111 for details for the Leningrad affair.

inviolability of the frontiers of the Soviet Union."⁶

But soon after Malenkov's political demise he began to shift ground. While Malenkov's supporters were being purged quietly there could be no change in domestic economic policy. Thus in March of 1955 Pravda published an article quoting Stalin's dictum on maintaining the heavy industry orientation.⁷ In foreign policy however, he could begin to move. He chose to reduce tensions in Europe, putting him on the side, incompletely as yet, of the revisionists. The Austrian Peace Treaty was promulgated on May 15, 1955, followed by the Geneva Conference of Heads of State in July. In September the Porkkala naval base was returned to Finland, and with Bulganin he began travelling to India, Burma, and Afghanistan; accompanying their trips with references to the declining dangers of war. This line of thought was culminated by the announcement of troop reduction in August. If he continued this direction he would have problems with Molotov, with China, with Yugoslavia, and with the Soviet conservative economists. He did.

A very significant step that showed this direction most clearly was the attempted rapprochement with Yugoslavia and with Tito in 1955. But to do this was to conflict with the Foreign Minister, Molotov. Therefore Khrushchev began to ignore Molotov in regard to the many foreign activities he was involved in, to undercut him as he had Malenkov. Molotov handed him another knife when he wrote in an article that socialism was not completely constructed in the USSR. The reason

⁶Pravda, December 28, 1954.

⁷Pravda, March 5, 1955.

for such a statement is likely that the de-stalinization debate was probably going on at this time in the Presidium of the Party and by saying what he did, Molotov could raise the issue of the intensifying class struggle as the construction of socialism nears its end. He overstepped because it had already been decided that socialism was completely built by Stalin himself, and Khrushchev was able to make Molotov recant in another article in September of 1955,⁸ to publically humiliate himself over such a trivial point. This had the effect of reducing his stature as an ideologist and gave the First Secretary additional reasons for ignoring him.


The trade talks with Yugoslavia which had begun in 1954 were continued, and the tone of the Soviet press when discussing Yugoslavia became more mild. But in March of 1955 a speech of Tito critical of a speech by Molotov was printed in both Pravda and Izvestia. The following day Pravda printed a reply but the defense of Molotov actually put words in his mouth which were supportive of the changes in Yugoslavia since 1948, the very thing which had come to be known as Titoism which, of course, Stalin had roundly condemned.⁹ Obviously Molotov was an expendable pawn in Khrushchev's game.

When a delegation to Belgrade was announced Molotov was not included. Khrushchev had the limelight, both in Belgrade and Sophia. The result of the discussions was announced following a Central Committee Plenum.¹⁰

⁸ Kommunist, #14, September 1955, pp. 127-128.

⁹ See Molotov's original speech Pravda February 9, 1955, Tito's speech in Pravda and Izvestia March 10, 1955, and the rejoinder March 12, 1955 in Pravda.

¹⁰ Pravda, July 16, 1955.



The Soviet Union wanted rapprochement, not only, but admitted the possibility of separate paths to socialism as well.

" . . . given unity in the chief fundamental matter of ensuring the victory of socialism, various ways and means may be employed in different countries, depending on historical and national features, to solve the specific problems of socialist construction."¹¹

This revisionism would become stronger before it ebbed, for in February of 1956 Khrushchev gave his famous "Secret Speech" at the Twentieth Party Congress in which he began the denouncing of Stalin. Why then? Because a disavowal of the past was necessary. And this was required because of the direction that Khrushchev wanted to go, namely in the direction of a higher and richer standard of living for the Soviet people requiring a reorientation of the heavy industry emphasis. In order to do this he had to weaken if not destroy the conservative opposition which restrained his natural inclination to leap into the change. Why at a Congress? Because this would give a sense of permanency to the alteration. Why in 1956? Because his power position was better than at any time in the past. Malenkov was discredited but still in the power picture as the events of the following year demonstrate. Molotov was in isolation theoretically and politically for Khrushchev had gotten his rapprochement with Tito at the July 1955 Plenum at the expense of Molotov.¹²

But most importantly it was extremely significant WHO did the de-stalinizing; for obviously Khrushchev's skirts were not clean of the

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² See Kuusinen's references to this in his speech at the 21st Party Congress, February 3, 1959.




dirt that he would begin to distribute to others. Malenkov, Molotov, Bulganin, and Kagonovich, if leading the movement, could conceivably create irreparable damage to his power base in the Central Committee and the Ukraine. But if he did the de-stalinizing himself, he could direct it as he wished to serve his own political ends. As Robert Conquest suggests, once the Beria cases were opened there was no way of stopping the opening of other cases and other questions that were not related directly to Beria, but to Yeshov, and of course to the present members of the Presidium.¹³ So it was important who directed the dismantling of the Stalinist heritage.

But on the related question of how far to go in debunking the Stalin myth some extremely interesting and surprising evidence is revealed that no concrete decision on this point seems to have been made prior to the Congress. Ever since Stalin's death various references had been made to the importance of the Leninist principle of collective leadership, and to how wrong some things can go when they are decided by only one man. But positive references to Stalin had continued. As late as December of 1955 his birthday was the cause for an exuberant announcement in Izvestia¹⁴ and the magazine Literaturaya Gazeta announced the forthcoming publication of Volume 14 of his collected works,¹⁵ which did not come out as expected. This suggests that the leadership was at least not clear as to how far to go in breaking with the past, that a consensus would probably have

¹³Conquest, Power and Policy in the USSR, op. cit., p. 273.

¹⁴Izvestia, December 21, 1955.

¹⁵Literaturaya Gazeta, January 12, 1956.




merely continued with the past practice of attacking only the distortions caused by the personality cult. This is confirmed by Khrushchev's testimony before the Twenty-Second Party Congress in his closing speech where he refers to the opposition in the leading groups to his taking the issue of destalinization to the floor of the Congress in the way that he did.¹⁶

It would seem therefore that Khrushchev went much further in his Secret Speech than had been agreed on, and that his impatience for a consolidation of his position on the side of reform or revisionism backed by a Congress of the Party caused him to overstep and thereby to bring into question the legitimacy of the Soviet experience and Soviet rule. This would lead directly to Hungary and Poland, and grave political difficulties would now begin to take shape; each having its own impact on the Program to be adopted in 1961. The Secret Speech was a weapon in a factional political struggle that could be and was turned against the wielder. Khrushchev could have been sincere in his condemnations of Stalin in 1956, but once again that is not the point. He could have wanted to do good things for people but that is not the point either. The Speech in its timing, its background, and reasoning was a ploy in the political struggle. Thus the statement by Georg von Rauch that the anti-stalin effort was " . . . done with reluctance and in significant part with an effort at secrecy which unexpectedly failed,"¹⁷ does not mesh with the facts. Khrushchev showed no reluctance. The secrecy was a farce from the beginning.

¹⁶Pravda, October 29, 1961.

¹⁷Georg von Rauch, A History of Soviet Russia, (New York: Praeger, 1964), p. 438.




Supporting this interpretation of the motivation of the speech was a number of other elements in Khrushchev's Report to the Congress. His veiled attack on Molotov and Malenkov leads one to the conclusion that what he was really interested in was the creation of a climate at the Congress which would assist him in removing these two from the Presidium and replacing them by someone whom he could handle easier. But his many references to the importance of collective leadership backfired on him; his goals were visibly against such a principle. Thus the Congress did not react to his suggestions implied so carefully in his Report, and less cautiously in the Secret Speech.

Except with words. The resolution adopted subsequent to the Speech charged the Central Committee with ensuring the complete suppression of the cult of the personality, " . . . and the liquidation of its consequences in all branches of Party, state and ideological work, the strict execution of the norms of Party life and the principles of collective Party leadership which were worked out by the great Lenin."¹⁸ This counted only as a verbal victory, because even though many new faces were to be found in the new Central Committee; the Presidium standing of Molotov, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, and Malenkov were still unimpaired. Only Khrushchev and Suslov had dual membership with the Secretariat. His victory was modest, indeed, even though the enlarged Secretariat appeared to favor him.

As a part of his general movement to revisionism, Khrushchev appears to have wanted a younger, more aggressively intellectual group

¹⁸The CPSU in Resolutions and Decisionf of Congresses, Conferences, and Plenums of the Central Committee, Vol IV, 1954-1960, Moscow, p. 208.



of individuals within the Party who would attain expertise in functional areas of the economy. As an attempt to replace government functions we have already noted. But it was also an attempt to replace the "pure" Party people, the isolate apparachik who would be threatened by any significant change, and therefore resist it. And that changes were in the offing was clear from his Report to the Congress in February of 1956.¹⁹ In June we won another victory, for Molotov lost his Foreign Affairs post, and Kagonovich his position as chairman of the committee on labor and wages.²⁰ Hence the momentum was building and undoubtedly would have continued except for the tremendous retarding influence of events outside the USSR and by the end of the year events inside Russia.

Outside events could only hurt a revisionist, because Poland, Hungary, Western military preoccupation with the Middle East, particularly Suez; and the captive nations phraseology of the Eisenhower platforms all aided the dogmatists in the zero-sum game. This was exasperated by increasing critical freedom of writers in Russia. The momentum that was pushed somewhat in February of 1956 now turned back upon Khrushchev in a pattern that will soon become quite familiar. He will be able to push the pendulum only so far, and then something will occur, usually an international event; and the forces which he sought to oppose will gather new strength and force him to create a balance on their side of the fulcrum. This is what occurred in the latter months of 1956. The delegation that went to Warsaw to debate with Gumulka consisted of Kagonovich, Mikoyan, Molotov, and Khrushchev,

¹⁹Pravda, January 15, 1956.

²⁰Pravda, June 6, and June 9, 1956.

listed in just that order and without calling him a First Secretary. This last was avoided by listing them as members of the Presidium, and his non-alphabetical insertion at the end of the list clearly presaged troubled water ahead.²¹

In addition the developing relations with Yugoslavia were tarnished by the possible role the separate path to communism might have played by Tito's public disagreement with how the troops were used in Hungary. China fully supported the action. More critical relations with Tito were the subject of an article in Pravda November 23rd. On the other hand relations with China improved through a speech by Khrushchev at the Chinese Embassy in Moscow which severely cut down his critique of Stalin to a mess which the Chinese would find more palatable.²² Moreover the necessity of military intervention in Hungary, and the threatening West in the Mediterranean strengthened the bargaining position of the Russian military meaning a slow-down of the drive to reorient the economy. The newly emergent literary freedom was restrained by Khrushchev in a speech reported in November in which he urged the crushing of "unhealthy attitudes,"²³ which revealed his backpeddling. Additional potential trouble emerged with the November 22nd announcement that Molotov had been appointed the USSR Minister of State Control, which, depending on circumstances, could or could not be a power position.²⁴ Anti-stalinism was further toned down by Pravda, December 23, 1956. At a meeting in Budapest in January 1957, the USSR was represented

²¹Pravda, October 21, 1956.

²²Pravda, January 19, 1957.

²³Pravda, November 10, 1956.

²⁴Pravda, November 22, 1956.


by none other than Khrushchev and Malenkov!²⁵ The heavy metal vs light industry controversy could not be subject to this reversal because the heavy industry syndrome was still being pushed by Khrushchev as an anti-Malenkov device, as it would be until Malenkov was safely out of the power picture.

Probably his nadir was the December Plenum which created the State Economic Commission able to powerfully interfere both with Gosplan and Khrushchev's decentralization attempts. But the dogmatists, while maintaining positions on the Presidium if they had them, again made the mistake of concentrating their power in the governmental apparatus. Under the guise of improving Party control and reducing agency red-tape Khrushchev could move against them with relative impunity. This he did in 1957 with his well-known decentralization decrees which broke up the dominant centralist position of many of his opponents in Moscow, and neatly dropped the necessity of directly combating the powerful Goskondkommissiya under an unfriendly Pervukhin. He received sanction for his reorganization from the Supreme Soviet session of May 7, 1957, and it might well be that others on the Party Presidium who opposed this plan did not speak because they had a coup in mind that would fix everything. Their silence was striking, for in the months that follow a great deal was made of Khrushchev in the press, and there was no public criticism of his slogan of surpassing the USA in milk, meat, and butter production.²⁶

The abortive coup in 1957 did not mean a complete victory for Khrushchev but another compromise. He was in fact no better off than

²⁵Pravda, January 6, 1957.

²⁶See Conquest's data on this point, Power and Policy, P. 308.



before, because he could not completely rid himself of the ringleaders, now called the anti-Party group, for despite repeated attempts right up to the Twenty-Second Party Congress in 1961 he could not get them expelled from the Party even though he got them branded as criminals. Kaganovich, Molotov and Malenkov did lose their Presidium and Central Committee standing, however. But because of their prestige, evidently, Khrushchev felt continually threatened by them.²⁷

But he was stronger than he had been, especially in the late months of 1957. In a July speech in Leningrad he felt severe enough to move over once again, and stressed consumer goods production over heavy industry.²⁸ With Malenkov safely tucked away in Kazakhstan, he felt able to take over the platform he had previously condemned, confirming the suspicion that in this area too he had all along been a revisionist. However, Pravda reported a July 4th speech of Kosygin to the effect that adopting the slogan of surpassing the USA in agricultural products most definitely did not reduce the preponderance of heavy industry. This gives an example of the sorts of compromises Khrushchev was making, but also points out areas of difference between the two men which will later come to more of a head when Kosygin is head of Gosplan and Khrushchev tried to get around the heavy industry emphasis by pushing the chemical industry.

So the First Secretary was definitely not a dictator, but with the removal of the potent threat of Zhukov and the March 27, 1958

²⁷This is the only explanation for his continued attempts to reopen the case against them, and his repeated attempts to link them with the crimes of Stalin.

²⁸Pravda, July 7, 1957.

unanimous vote of the Supreme Soviet putting him into the Premiership as well as leaving him as First Secretary, he was very powerful indeed. In addition, the fortieth anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution had occurred in November of 1957 and with the delegates from all the socialist countries except Yugoslavia present, Soviet hegemony or Khrushchevian hegemony over international socialism was seemingly assured. The 1957 Declaration of Unity, however, covered up more than it declared--signs and portents of serious rifts to come.

The immediate motivation for the Third Party Program lay in the events and struggles of 1958. The committee formed at the Twentieth Congress to draft a new Program had not as yet been heard from, probably because like previous commissions on the same subject they had done no work. But the drafting was now not long in coming; propelled to some extent by the internal conflict, but also by events that occurred in Yugoslavia and China.

The Program in many respects is unnecessary. Once the socialist system was declared to be completed in the 1930's references to the transition to communism had achieved ideological popularity. Stalin's Economic Problems of Socialism had been written to make certain that nothing changed very much in that precise time period. Even the amalgamation of the MTS by the collectives was given the ideological flaccor of hastening the development of communism because this would transform or assist in transforming the collective into something more similar to state property.²⁹ Thus the transition to communism theme was a device to justify a practice that had validity on

²⁹Pravda, March 14, 1958.


other grounds.

What was very necessary was a revision of the Sixth Five Year Plan. The directives for this plan had come out of the Twentieth Congress, but they had never been drawn up into a detailed plan, both because of economic sluggishness and because the political events of 1957 delayed future planning. At the fortieth anniversary Khrushchev promised grand and glorious things to the Soviet people in the next twenty-five years,³⁰ and unless he was completely insincere, which later events disprove, he had a revision of the plan in mind. Also, the effects of the economic decentralization of 1957 began to be felt and the need for good planning became acute. The year 1958 was therefore justifiably very involved in economic planning, and Khrushchev sought to answer this need by means of a Seven Year Plan which would take the economy up to 1965 and get the planning back on the five year track. But this planning was propelled into a longer range perspective by the Yugoslav and China challenge.

During the years 1958-1961 Khrushchev was involved in a struggle for total power, not only in the Soviet Union but also in the international socialist world. The planning, the Twenty-First and Twenty-Second Congresses, the Party Program, and everything else that he did should be seen in this framework. It is the only framework that makes sense.

In April of 1958 the Seventh Congress of the Yugoslav League of Communists was held. Shortly before the Congress a draft program was published which was a long range, twenty year plan which pulled together

³⁰ Pravda, November 12, 1957.



the various strands of Yugoslav theory in a fairly decisive manner. The immediate result of the publication of the draft was the cancellation of the Soviet plans to attend the Yugoslav Congress. It is too easy to say that the Soviet decision was in reprisal for the Yugoslav refusal to attend the meetings in Moscow in November of the year before. In a speech before the Supreme Soviet Khrushchev said, a month after the socialist summit, that there were some differences between Russia and Yugoslavia on ideological and political matters, but he emphasized that there were now fewer differences than in the past.³¹ But the publication of the Program draft aroused reactions in the Soviet elite which he could not contain, and a breach in the developing rapprochement was created.

It is easy to understand such an effect. The Yugoslav Program stated that one form of socialism was as good as any other, and that Moscow's attempts to proclaim one path as the only correct one were nothing more than dogma which obstructed the process of the socialist transformation of the world. It maintained that there are contradictions in socialism as well as in capitalism, that communist parties should cooperate with social-democratic ones, and come out in opposition to a division of the world into military blocs, stating that Nato was the result of Stalinist aggression. Even though the final version of the Program colored the Warsaw Pact as primarily defensive, it still urged the dissolution of both Nato and the Warsaw Pact, for those who sought to keep them were reactionary whether they be in the capitalist camp or the socialist one. The Program went on to say that the state must begin to wither as soon as the initial transition period is

³¹Pravda, December 22, 1957.

Something of course that had occurred in Russia many years ago. Thus the Program refers to the Soviet Union of pre-1956 as state capitalist rather than socialist, but optimistically declared that certain features of this system have been removed in Russia, leaving a loop-hole for an optimistic appraisal of the future of Russia that must have enraged the Soviet ideologues.

Evidence of such irritation appeared in Kommunist already in April of 1958.³² It was very distressing to be informed that the withering of the state which had not begun in Russia was supposed to have begun well before socialism was reached; and Russia was already beyond this. But the statements dealing with the necessity of worker control and its condemnation of an accrual of surplus value by state bureaucracies also was an indictment of the Soviet system. And what was worse, they were not willing to let the Soviet leaders get away with blaming Stalinism for past practice and instead insisted that the Party itself must also wither as social antagonisms decline. Thus the Yugoslav formulation was a direct challenge and critique of the Soviet system all the more devastating because it came at a time of official friendliness that was on the rise. But the Program was a clear challenge also in that it presented an ideological foundation for an independent Marxist development which allied itself with the more humanitarian side of Marx, therefore providing a basis for socialist development which could avoid the authoritarian experience of the Soviet model.³³

³²Kommunist, #6, April, 1958, pp. 16-19.

³³For an English translation of the Yugoslav Program see Stoyan Pribichevich, Yugoslavia's Way: The Program of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, (New York: All Nations Press, 1958).

The Soviet response was set by the official Lenin birthday speech of P. N. Pospelov,³⁴ and by the lengthy article mentioned above in Kommunist. The speech and the article are remarkable for their similarity of wording. A number of points required alteration in the Program, the authors pointed out in a comradely manner. The first was the heretical evolutionary road to socialism. As we have seen in the previous chapter this issue was straddled by the authors of the Soviet Program by the use of the term revolutionary to apply to even those instances where the transition to proletarian power was basically peaceful. The point that upset the Russians here is that the Yugoslav document strongly intimated that because of the increasing state restrictions on private capitalism in the non-socialist countries there were already vestiges of socialism in the developed capitalist countries which the working class should encourage and vote for; and thereby they would be bringing about the development of the foundations of socialism. Notwithstanding the Marxist support possible for this position, the Soviet critics with China on their flank and their own experience to worry about felt compelled to deny this. It ignores the class nature of the state under capitalism, said the critics, it ignores the necessity for a revolutionary mass political struggle to establish political domination through a dictatorship of the proletariat, it ignores the necessity of completely socializing the means of production; and worst of all, it ignores the necessity of a correct political party to lead all of this.

Another sin was a failure to sharply distinguish between the two camps. The tendency, especially in the draft, to equate the two

³⁴Pravda, April 12, 1958.

military blocs ignores the fact that the dangers of war come from the imperialist bloc alone; and it vitiates socialist unity by ascribing the arms race, war dangers, and Soviet hegemonism to the socialist camp. Yet another sore spot were the references to bureaucratic statism in the Soviet Union. The insistence on a premature withering of the state ignored the need for a strong state right up to the emergence of full communism to take care of otherwise certain trouble from the enemies of socialism. Democratic centralism is not contrary to socialism and the dictatorship of the proletariat is the highest form of democracy which is also destined to wither away in the future. The Yugoslav concepts reduced the Party to a mere ideological leadership, whereas the Party is indispensable as a leader in all areas of society.

Besides this, the emphasis on independence, equality and mutual respect in inter-nation relations implied that this was different from the way it had always been; and ignored the need for unity and cooperation. Instead of expressing words of support for the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic and other socialist countries the Program plays down common experiences by stressing national socialism resulting in separateness. And what is worse, the Program rejects comradely criticism in advance by calling it dogmatism or an effort to seek ideological monopoly; both of which are completely foreign to the Soviet intentions. Moreover the draft stated that the correctness of ideology and progressiveness would be shown by practice and not by an international forum. This was rejected on the grounds that history does not provide any grounds for considering the decisions of the Congresses of Communist Parties to be incorrect.

Basic to this whole critique was the smarting notion that Yugoslavia was again rejecting the Soviet model for Socialist development. It was so rejecting, and at its Seventh Congress in April of 1958 Vice President Kardelj publically criticized the Soviet Union for trying to force its doctrines on Yugoslavia. Tremendous applause greeted the words that the Yugoslav Communist Party did not need any certification from Moscow as to its fidelity to Marxism-Leninism.³⁵ The gauntlet was thrown. Now if my analysis of Khrushchev's basic reformism is correct he will try to cover this over with platitudes and try to ride out the tempest. And that seems precisely what happened; even though the conflict within the Presidium and Secretariat meant the Khrushchevian drive would not appear in any neat way, but that there would be contradictory approaches, starts and stops which Richard Lowenthal mistakenly saw as basic confusion in foreign policy while domestic policy was under firm control.³⁶ It seems to indicate rather than confusion an inability to get a consistent and desirable foreign policy through the Presidium past Suslov, Kozlov, Voroshilov, Bulganin, Pervukhin, and Saburov.

The very day that Kardelj spoke, Ye. A. Furtseva, in Warsaw and hence perhaps not properly briefed, stressed the continuing friendly relations with Yugoslavia and said that there was no reason to delay the impending visit to Yugoslavia by Voroshilov.³⁷ This visit had been

³⁵New York Times, April 25, 1958, p. 1.

³⁶Richard Lowenthal, "Shifts and Rifts in the Russo-Chinese Alliance", Problems of Communism, January-February, 1959.

³⁷New York Times, April 25, 1958, p. 1.

announced just two days before the Pospelov article.³⁸ On April 13th Pravda announced its annual May Day slogans, and, as the year before, Yugoslavia was listed alphabetically. Both China and Yugoslavia were described as "building socialism" even though China had the additional words which described her as a mighty bulwark of peace throughout the world, ironic words for that year. On April 14th Pravda announced the publication of a collection of Lenin's articles against revisionism, but near the end of the article it equated the dangers of dogmatism and revisionism which was a fairly strong anti-Chinese statement. But the whole thing got out of hand when Rankovic stated at the Yugoslav Congress that the USSR was sharpening up the old rusty weapons of Stalinism and trying to interfere with the internal affairs of Yugoslavia.³⁹ The Soviet observers walked out.

In May the battle lines were drawn. On May 6th Pravda published in full a Chinese attack on Yugoslavia entitled "Modern Revisionism Must be Condemned." This and others that followed called the Yugoslav Program anti-Marxist, anti-Leninist, thoroughly revisionist, and considered dogmatism justified under the dictatorship of the proletariat. Khrushchev himself attacked the Yugoslavs in a speech in East Berlin, even though he sent a birthday greeting to Titio in which he said that he hoped for an early end to their disagreements.⁴⁰ Lowenthal is correct in writing that Khrushchev was pushed in a more conservative direction by the Chinese; but it would be more exact to say that the propellant

³⁸ Pravda, April 10, 1958.

³⁹ New York Times, April 24, 1958, p. 1.

⁴⁰ New York Times, July 12, 1958, p. 1.



was not only China but the dogmatists in the Presidium as well. What those individuals who see in Khrushchev such great power during this period fail to remember is that his enemies allegedly routed the year before were still on the Presidium for the most part. The developing rapprochement with Yugoslavia begun by Khrushchev in 1955 had suffered another setback, but so had his whole program of reform. As a result he had to backtrack until the furor died down.

The cause and effect relationship between the Yugoslav Program and the Soviet Program of 1961 cannot be established on the basis of hard data. There is no Pravda article, for example, that said because of that Program we want to write one. But then why should they admit this? This twenty year projection of the Yugoslavs occurred when the leadership of the Soviet Union was pre-occupied with planning, and with maintaining the leadership position in the socialist world in the wake of the dethronement of Stalin. No longer desiring to have recourse to terror and death purges to control, the pressure was all the greater to accomplish this by other means. One of the means was the paternalistic attitude taken towards the Yugoslav program a few years later.

"Yugoslavia likewise took the socialist path. But the Yugoslav leaders by their revisionist policy contraposed Yugoslavia to the socialist camp and the international Communist movement, thus threatening the loss of the revolutionary gains of the Yugoslav people."⁴¹

"The revisionists deny the historical necessity of the socialist revolution and of the dictatorship of the proletariat. They deny the leading role of the Marxist-Leninist Party, undermine the foundations of proletarian internationalism, and drift to nationalism. The ideology of revisionism is most fully embodied in the programme of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia."⁴²

⁴¹Triska, p. 35.

⁴²Triska, p. 53.

Another means, of course, was to promulgate a correct programmatic twenty-year plan to provide a star for the others to follow. The connection between the two Programs is unmistakable.

But, also during 1958, another major socialist power moved into the stage making similar noises. China. Once again, and very nearly at the same time, a threat came--from the East this time in the shape of a general plan of lengthy duration which purported to be a model for socialist development that once again seemed to ignore the Soviet experience. On the 2nd of December, 1957, Liu Shao-Chi announced that the Chinese had decided to overtake Britain in gross heavy industry output by 1972.⁴³ In February of 1958 during a meeting of the National People's Congress the phrase "a great leap forward" was heard as a characterization of the industrial development of the next three years.⁴⁴

This great leap period followed the abortive hundred flowers campaign of 1957. The failure of that policy to indicate positive support for the regime greatly abetted the dogmatic faction in the Chinese leadership. Tightening of population controls was indicated at the very time new economic plans were being discussed in China. Additionally, the Soviet Union had agreed on October 15th, 1957, to help the CPR to construct its own nuclear weapons even though Soviet economic credits had largely ceased in 1957.⁴⁵ Britain had proven that she had hydrogen bomb potential in 1957 and in a matter of months France would announce its decision to become a nuclear power. Hence the

⁴³Harold C. Hinton, Communist China in World Politics, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1966), p. 36.

⁴⁴O. Edmund Clubb, Twentieth Century China, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), p. 355.

⁴⁵Hinton, op. cit., p. 36.

Chinese catching up with Britain had more than one meaning.

But one of the first acts of Khrushchev after taking over the premiership in early 1958 was to announce on March 31st a unilateral cessation of nuclear testing with the express purpose of preventing diffusion. Thus there was for China both the necessity of going it alone without massive Soviet aid, and also the need for great haste to gain great power status before the movement toward non-proliferation which Khrushchev was pushing gathered any headway. All this would have been exasperated by growing Chinese hostility towards India, alarm over events in Indonesia, and mounting tensions in the Taiwan Straits.

The Russians had demonstrated by their launch of an ICBM and an earth satellite in 1957 that they were very strong militarily; but that this period of superiority over the United States would be short seemed clear. Thus there was the need, in the Chinese mind, of capitalizing on this socialist victory as quickly as possible.

All of these factors would encourage the Chinese to engage in the great leap at home and aggressive activities abroad; and explains the harshness of their attacks on Yugoslavia, for that country represented just the opposite from that expressed by the dominant dogmatic faction in China. These factors also explain Chinese hostility to Khrushchev's attempts to achieve friendly relations with the West during this time.

The commune system also fits this pattern. High production plus great population control. It also gave them propaganda potential which they did not delay in using. They decided to claim for these communes a more direct route to communism, bypassing the stage of socialism, and therewith bypassing the experience of the Soviets. The first commune

was delightfully named Spudnik, and a description of the system was published in the People's Daily on September 4, 1958. The day before this the paper had described the communes as a new model, as enabling one to visualize a transition to communism. On the 4th the regulations for the commune stated that the commune was a basic unit of society in which the working people united of their own free will under the leadership of the Party and the government. Its task was to manage all industrial and agricultural production, trade, cultural and educational work, and political affairs within its borders. The intent and purpose of the commune was to consolidate the social system and energetically create the conditions for the gradual transition to the communist system, which with effort could be achieved; along with the eradication of all differences between town and country and between manual and mental labor.⁴⁶

"As the social products become abundant and the people have high political consciousness, so will the transition from the principle of 'from each according to his ability, to each according to his work' to the principle of 'from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs' be gradually effected."⁴⁷

In an earlier discussion of the commune system in China, Ch'en Pe'ta, in an article entitled "Under the Banner of Chairman Mao," maintained that the commune idea flowed out of Mao's creative following of the Leninist injunction to develop the theory of Marx based on an analysis of conditions peculiar to the countries of the East, conditions which

⁴⁶Theodore H. Chen, (ed.), The Chinese Communist Regime Documents and Commentary, (New York: Praeger, 1964), p. 240.

⁴⁷Ibid.

were unknown to the European countries.⁴⁸

There was therefore, an economic and ideological challenge to Russian leadership both implicit and explicit in the great leap forward and the establishment of communes. The Russian reaction was not warm, but not actually hostile either. In a mid-year article in New Times the whole matter is treated so lightly that sarcasm may be intended. "The goal set by the Communist Party is to transform China, within the next 15 or 20 years, into a great socialist power with modern industries, a modern agriculture and a high standard of science and culture."⁴⁹ The article does mention that there are some in China who doubt the possibilities of success of the Leap, but this was the closest it came to being critical. As a matter of fact Pravda, and Izvestia, repeatedly stressed Sino-Soviet friendship during 1958 for whatever that may be worth; mentioning the communes on September 11th, and again on September 26th. The closest that these articles came to a critique was in their stress on the primitive techniques in use on the communes.

Gradually criticism began to gather steam. An article by Ts. A. Stepanyan stated that the Asian countries building socialism would follow the European ones into communism.⁵⁰ Another article in November of 1958 cited the earlier Russian experiments with agricultural communes which had not been successful; and that, as a matter of fact, it was a naive and romantic notion. Also the desire to leap forward across

⁴⁸ Extracts from the China Mainland Magazines, #138, August 11, 1958, p. 13. The article is from Red Flag, July 16, 1958.

⁴⁹ V. Gikikhmenov, "China's Leap Forward," New Times, #25, June 1958, pp. 17-18.

⁵⁰ Ts. A. Stepanyan, "The October Revolution and the Process of Communist Formation," Voprosy Filosofii, #10, 1958.

unfinished stages of development was condemned because this caused negative and painful reactions.⁵¹ This same line was repeated by Khrushchev in July of 1959 in a speech in Warsaw.⁵²

This contrasted sharply with the claim made in October of 1958 by the People's Daily that "With the great leap forward in production communism has already begun to push forth sprouts in our actual life."⁵³ This Leninese must have infuriated the Russians. But the glowing success for the industrial aspects of the Leap reported at the end of the year could not be matched by any glories in the agricultural sector. As a matter of fact the Wuhan Resolution of December 10, 1958, implied difficult times still ahead in stating

"We should not declare that people's communes will enter communism immediately. . . . This distorts and vulgarizes the great ideal of communism, strengthens the petit-bourgeois trend toward equalitarianism, and adversely affects socialist construction."⁵⁴

This meant a serious retreat from communism to collectivism; for the fact that the peasants were no longer to be supplied from centralized distribution centers meant that the peasants were again on their own. This does not seem to be a response to Soviet pressure so much as it is a response to actual chaos in the Chinese countryside resulting from too many slogans and not enough logic. The Party was not at fault--it was the cadres who had been dizzy with success.

During this year of 1958 China is most interesting and it is

⁵¹"The Main Link of the Transition to Communism," Problems of Peace and Socialism, November 1958.

⁵²New York Times, July 22, 1959, p. 1.

⁵³Clubb, Twentieth Century China, op. cit., p. 358.

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 363.

tempting to probe deeper. But the point of discussing China here is, however, solely to point out the tremendous push this activity in China gave to the Soviet desire to implement a Program in the Soviet Union, the desire to have a long range economic plan about which one could make great claims.

But while both Yugoslavia and China play a role, it was complementary to the struggle for power within the Soviet Union. By the end of 1958 Khrushchev was very preoccupied with unseating his opponents. The September Plenum of the Central Committee was called, it is true, to issue the call for the extraordinary Twenty-First Party Congress; but its real purpose was to remove Bulganin from the Presidium. The November Plenum was used to link him securely with the anti-Party group, for his name was added to a list of the group which appeared in Khrushchev's draft report on the Seven Year Plan. He also confidently expressed his reformism by saying that the Party " . . . is waging a determined struggle against all who cling to old and obsolete forms and methods of work and who, infected by conservatism, resist the implementation of the Leninist master line of the Party."⁵⁵ The pressure was raised at the December Plenum at which Bulganin, "confessed" and Khrushchev said in referring to Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich that "The tongue is not capable of referring to such people as 'comrades', even though they have remained members of the Party."⁵⁶ Later in the same report he described them as despicable, and alluded that there was a connection between them and Beria who by now was the scapegoat for Stalinism. His use of the Plenums for the purpose of consolidating his power probably reflects his

⁵⁵Pravda, November 14, 1958.

⁵⁶Pravda, December 16, 1958.

inability to accomplish the same thing in the Presidium. He was broadening the field of combat, pointing for the January Congress, and going so far as to call the anti-Party group criminals who had hindered the Central Committee's exercise of socialist legality.⁵⁷

Along with this developing power struggle, was the claim to ideological leadership, which seemed to arouse as much opposition as his desire to purge the group from the Party. Why else would he call six Plenums in one year and another Congress so soon? On November 14th Pravda published the Theses Khrushchev had presented two days before at one of the Plenums. Besides attacking the group, the Theses made the following point.

"As a result of the victory of socialism, the USSR has entered a new historical period of gradual passage from socialism to communism. The long-term plan for the development of the Soviet Union in the next 15 years provides for the creation of the indispensable conditions for the completion of the transition to communism."⁵⁸

The implementation of the new Seven Year Plan was to have been a large step in that direction. What he was accomplishing here, however, was not just ideological supremacy for the Soviet Union but also for himself as author, and thus all of this is a part of the same cloth--the drive for power.

These events coincided with an ultimatum on Berlin which was evidently staged for the purpose of getting another Summit meeting at which he could represent the Soviet Union once again, but this time as sole leader. This activity also made him appear more militant in regard to the West in the light of his refusal to back the Chinese position in

⁵⁷Pravda, December 26, 1958.

⁵⁸Pravda, November 14, 1958.



regard to Taiwan or the Middle East.

Therefore, the Twenty-First Congress which focused the drive for a long-range economic plan does not represent some sort of sober and scientific analysis resulting in a conclusion that a new dawn was approaching. It rather represented a power struggle both internationally and domestically, in which the developing Third Party Program is little more than a ploy. The Congress was ostensibly called for a ratification of the new economic plan, but such a ratification was not necessary. Serwyn Bailer considered the purposes for the Congress to be four-fold. Propaganda which stresses the might of the USSR to both friend and foe and its soon-to-be achieved economic superiority; an international communist conference to give ideological support to Khrushchev on an international scale; a demonstration of Khrushchev's personal authority; and an internal mobilization attempt to spur the masses on to accomplish the goals of the plan.⁵⁹ Robert Conquest and Carl Linden saw it as essentially a power struggle.⁶⁰ Linden wrote:

"The calling of the 'extraordinary' congress, the first of its kind in party history, provided him with a platform for dramatizing his claim as a leader who would conduct the Soviet party and the Communist world as well into a new 'stage' on the path to communism."⁶¹

This is supported very clearly by O. V. Kuusinen's speech to the Congress in which he stated that Khrushchev's many and brilliant principles provided the foundation for completing the long-delayed new program which ought to be made ready for the next Congress of the Party. As if

⁵⁹S. Bailer, "The 21st Congress and Soviet Policy," Problems of Communism, March-April 1959, p. 83.

⁶⁰See Conquest, Power and Policy in the USSR, pp. 371-381; and Carl Linden, Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership, p. 83.

⁶¹Linden, p. 83.

this were not enough he added: " . . . if the Central Committee will work out the draft of the new program on the basis of the principal propositions of the report of Comrade Khrushchev at this congress, then this will be a good program of the party."⁶² Since Lenin had written both the first and second, with help, Khrushchev was both skipping Stalin and aiming for a very exalted position for himself.

In his own speech at the Congress Khrushchev stressed goals dear to the heart of the revisionist. The movement to Communism would not be complete until the requirements of the people are satisfied with complete abundance. He raised his agrogorod scheme of many years standing as a device for reducing the differences between town and country. He talked about the withering of the state apparatus in favor of public organizations, because the class struggle was not intensifying as Stalin had predicted, but actually declining. The role of the Party would continue to grow. The threat of war was definitely lower, capitalist encirclement was ended, and socialism in one country was obsolete. He criticized the Chinese without mentioning them by condemning sudden leaps into Communism, but then added that all of the socialist countries would enter the stage of Communism more or less at the same time, perhaps as an olive branch to the Chinese.⁶³

The drive to make himself an undisputed ideological leader was not a limitless success.⁶⁴ Nor was his effort to totally unseat his

⁶²Pravda, February 14, 1959.

⁶³Pravda, January 28, 1959.

⁶⁴For various opinions see Pravda, January 29, 1959, Izvestia, January 25, Pravda, January 31, and July 2, 1959.

opponents. The congress made no real change in the status-quo arrangement that to a good many people's minds evidently meant collective leadership rather than personal one man rule. Those who while condemning the group did so in such a way as to indicate that future action against them was unnecessary seem to have won the day, for no further action was taken against them. Khrushchev was left with allies on the Presidium and Secretariat, but not with dependents; and these allies could be expected to approve of some of his policies but not necessarily all of them. The struggle would go on therefore, but once again after the Congress it withdrew from public view. The policies Khrushchev had advocated he continued to push. His visit to the United States at the end of 1959 and his invitation to Eisenhower to visit the USSR in mid-1960 typified the Camp David spirit that he wanted to develop. This, however, brought him squarely up against China.

But before he could really do battle another external event brought him up short--the May Day U-2 spy craft. This evidence of international espionage encouraged and aided the dogmatists, and endangered many of the policies he had been advocating. It supported notions of hostility to the West, the necessity of high levels of armament production and therefore heavy industry, discouraged liberalization, and made it seem as though the Chinese were correct all along. Khrushchev was thus faced with another real test of his ability to maneuver. At the June 1960 meetings in Bucharest the time was ripe for a real Chinese attack on Khrushchev personally. They were probably encouraged by his cancellation of the Eisenhower visit and his extension of the invitation to Mao. But whatever the Chinese intentions were, Khrushchev stole their thunder. To have allowed a rapprochement with China to develop on their terms

would have meant undercutting all of his policies. So in a surprise move he attacked them, completely scuttling any hopes anyone might have had about getting together. In the following month he sealed the fissure by calling back all the Soviet technicians in China and getting them out in the space of one month. The effects of this on the faltering great leap can well be imagined, and being made in the name of the Soviet Party his actions shut off any possibility for adopting a pro-Chinese line while he was in office.

Internally, Khrushchev lost some ground. Brezhnev was moved out of the Secretariat to the post of President, a ceremonial position. The secretariat was cut from ten to five, with the losers being those who had supported Khrushchev most closely in 1957. Aristov, Ignatov, and Furtseva were out. Pospelov, Kirichenko, and Belyaev were also out. The result was to raise the prestige of Kozlov of the Leningrad machine and Suslov who was identified with the conservative trend. When Kozlov announced in a speech commemorating the Revolution that everyone knew that steel production was the basic index to the country's production and economic stature, it was a sign that Khrushchev was again in the lower part of the wave.⁶⁵

But by January of 1961 he responded, again at a Plenum, by saying that the strength of a state is determined not only by the metal index, but by also the amount of products a man receives and eats, and stated contrary to Stalin that the production of consumer goods should outpace demand for them.⁶⁶ Between the January Plenum and the October Congress he repeated his insistence that Russia overtake the U.S. in levels of

⁶⁵Pravda, November 7, 1960.

⁶⁶Pravda, January 21, 22, 1961.

consumption. Not to understand this, he said, was not being a real leader, but a dogmatist and a conservative divorced from life, and destined to be left behind by the progressive Party.⁶⁷ But his remarks at the British Trade Fair on May 20th about the equal rates of development for the light-consumer goods sector of the economy were not even printed in Russian papers.⁶⁸

He was also working on the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat, because it needed alteration so that it could no longer be an excuse for heavy armaments and the apparatus of suppression. The result of his efforts was a compromise--the state of the whole people. This permitted the scrapping of the dictatorship but did not include the withering of the state. The state of the whole people would remain until the full victory of communism. This would be a sop to the dogmatists, but the removal of the dictatorship aspects would be a victory for the revisionists. By the time this notion got to the Program it carried with it the statement that the class struggle does not disappear in the building of communism and therefore there will be the need of the state power.

Thus the Third Party Program is a crystalization of the general direction he wanted to go, but somewhat watered down. It is not, most definitely, a reflection of a conscious application of the ideology of Marx and Lenin to a situation which seemed to call for it, but rather a device in a struggle for supremacy both international and internal. The struggle continued after the Program was adopted--it was not even a major tool for his purposes. It sought to rank him out and beyond

⁶⁷Pravda, February 19, 1961.

⁶⁸New York Times, May 21, 1961.

Mao and Tito, and, of course, well above his fellows in the elite of the Soviet Union. But how far does the Program rank above Yevtushenko's "Stalin's Heirs" published in Pravda October 21, 1962; or Solzhenitsyn's novel in 1963? These were much sharper tools for discrediting his opponents than the Program, that bland compromised presentation of ideological spice to make a long range economic plan palatable.

This is not to say that the Program was useless for his purposes. The document gave him justification for his economics over politics line for the Party that culminated in the 1962-64 split between the industrial and agricultural sections of the Party. Ostensibly designed to promote those with skills in technical and economic work, it more than this was designed to overcome the influence of the apparatchiki and the regional Party bosses in the political-ideological arena.

But he still had his ups and downs after the Program was adopted. The Cuban missile crisis caused a near eclipse of his reformism. But he once again weathered the storm, this time aided by the Chinese who made noises about boundaries with the Soviet Union, Kozlov's illness, and a shake up of the Secretariat. This was climaxed by a Pravda referral to Khrushchev as the "head" of the Party Presidium.⁶⁹ By July of 1963 he is again promoting friendly relations with Tito, openly anti-Chinese, and pro-consumer welfare at home.⁷⁰ And finally, in February of 1964, Suslov announced the expulsion of Molotov and the group from the Party.⁷¹

By the fall of 1964 he again felt strong enough to push for all of

⁶⁹Pravda, June 22, 1963.

⁷⁰Pravda, July 20, 1963.

⁷¹Pravda, April 3, 1964.

his policies. He called for a virtual revolution in regime planning, calling for a decisive shift in both the structure of the economy and the future direction of its development, putting consumer production in first place with consumer priority the basis of a new long-term plan. He told his colleagues that the main task of the new economic plan was to ensure the preferential development of consumer industries, that heavy industry and defense had now been adequately developed, and that the pace and focus of future development plans would be shifted in the direction of consumer welfare and light industry.⁷²

This kind of thinking on the part of Khrushchev gives rise to the thought that had not this "invulnerable" leader been deposed the Party might have been treated to the astonishing spectacle of unanimously accepting a revised Party Program at the 23rd Congress in 1966 only five years after the adoption of the Third Program. That this did not happen is history. The Brezhnev-Kosygin coalition, much better at maintaining a leadership which balances the factions have provided a business as usual sort of leadership that moves very slowly if at all.

The point is, however, that the Program does not represent an excessively reformist document that would need to be discarded by the new leadership. It is a weakened version of what Khrushchev wanted, and as such, more than likely represents the general goals of the majority of the Politburo than any other document. References to a transition to communism, and the necessity of building the material and technical basis for communism continue to appear in the Soviet Press because they are a threat to no one. The precise dates in the Program can be very easily manipulated by the new leaders, for the need will probably arise.

⁷²Pravda, September 22, and October 2, 1964.

Thus the ouster of Khrushchev does not mean a rejection of the Program, but a rejection of an attempt to fundamentally alter the traditionalist positions. The leadership simply was and is not ready for a full swing to consumer orientation; thus the Khrushchev pain that had been borne for so long could no longer be tolerated. His ouster proves the continual existence of conflict in the Soviet elite, and it was as a part of that struggle that the Third Party Program must be understood. To treat it in isolation from that struggle is to do it as serious an injustice as that performed by those who see in it the hope for all mankind.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION


On the basis of what has already been learned, it would be simple to say that the Third Party Program is not an ideological document. But this sort of statement is nearly meaningless. What I might mean in making such a judgment is that the teachings of Marx and Lenin do not apply, are not the basis or motivation for the document. But as we have seen it is not easy to say with any precision just what those teachings actually were, even when the topics considered are selected in advance.

I have shown that the origins of the Program lay in the events of 1958 when two simultaneous international socialist challenges to the ideological supremacy of the Soviet model occurred in April of 1958, coinciding with a drive for personal political power by Khrushchev in a framework of long-range economic and social planning. He repeatedly revealed during this time period that he much preferred the Central Committee Plenums to the Presidium as an approval board for his policies for reasons of political expediency. For the big policy changes he used the Congresses of the Party. In 1956 he used it to de-stalinize for his own political benefit. In 1959, as an attempt to seal the fate of his opposition as well as approve the Seven Year Plan; and in 1961 he used the congressional means for his attacks on

Albania, further attempts to destroy his opposition, and almost incidentally to approve the Program.

In all of these activities he was with fair consistency a revisionist or a reformer, more interested in a higher standard of living for people than in how many tons of steel could be produced in a single year. Certainly one can justifiably say that this too was a political stance, but that is not the point. It makes no difference whether Mr. Khrushchev was a nice man who liked people. Crankshaw is trapped in these kinds of judgments in his biography of Khrushchev--we need not be. The important element here is that Khrushchev, for many reasons, placed himself in opposition to the conservative, dogmatic tradition in the Soviet Union. His struggle with that powerful element was symbolized by his struggle with that powerful old and dead General Secretary. The Third Party Program emerged from the same Congress that approved of the removal of Stalin's body from Lenin's mausoleum.

But such a reburial did not mean an end of the conflict, nor did the Program mean the beginning of a glorious future for the Soviet people. Both of these actions were a compromised response to questions Khrushchev had raised in the context of a political struggle. On the other hand both actions were profoundly influenced by ideology, that of dogmatism and revisionism. Both of these contemporary ideologies represent a stereo-typical set of responses to both domestic and foreign stimuli. Each can be but need not be exclusive mutually. Both derive their language and presumably their inspiration from Marx and Lenin, but the initial motivation is more likely psychological than historico-philosophical.



In this sense therefore the Program is quite ideological; but in what way does this refer to either Marx or Lenin? The problem is that the legacies of both men are ambiguous enough to function as the background framework for both of the competing ideologies. A document that in many ways is a compromise between them cannot therefore be said to be unrelated to Marx and Lenin and at the same time to say this is to say too much. Thus the hypotheses with which we began can be said to be proven but most definitely not proven as clearly as one would like. It can be justifiably said that the ideological explanation for Soviet phenomena should be the last one to be considered; yet it is extremely difficult to rule it out of the picture entirely. This is because Marxism-Leninism, as Alfred G. Meyer showed a few years back, is the language of Soviet politics.¹ Of course it is a language that Marx and Lenin might not identify as their own were they to magically reappear on the stage of the human drama; but because of this language connection there constantly seems to be a surface or even pseudo-relationship between ideological foundation and subsequent activity. One of the primary reasons for this is the need for continual justifying reinforcement of the elite themselves, as Meyer pointed out. But on the question of whether this ideology were relevant to Soviet activity Meyer was compelled to answer both yes and no. J. C. Rees wrote recently in the same vein about the relationship between Lenin and Marx with words that apply equally well to Khrushchev.

¹Alfred G. Meyer, "The Functions of Ideology in the Soviet Political System," Soviet Studies, Vol. 17, #3, January 1966, pp. 273-285.



Lenin's " . . . reasoning may not always convince us, and we may protest that the very doctrines he invoked were a modified or distorted form of the original Marxian theory." "But we should not lightly dismiss his strong desire to justify his actions in this manner, for his own sense of what he was doing derived in major part from the concepts and categories of thought through which the political situation was understood and assessed; and we in turn cannot understand his conduct if we decide to exclude the role of those ideas which supplied him with the goals and surveying points of his activity."²

This says it very well. It is fallacious to assume that the ideology plays no significant role simply because one cannot establish a strict logical connection between principles and practice as cause and effect. The role is less than an operational code (Nathan Leites) and more than a post hoc rationalization of activity (Robert V. Daniels). Soviet policy making is certainly not a simple application of Marxism-Leninism, because, as Robert Tucker recently wrote, if ideology influences Soviet policy via the minds of the policy makers it is also demonstrably true that policy influences ideology, that the official interpretations of Marxism-Leninism develop and change in response to policy needs, political interests, and changes in the policy mind which reflect actual changes in the international and domestic environments.³

The neatness of the picture is further obscured by the fact that other ideologies than those of Marx and of Lenin are important elements of Russian tradition. The large peasant population and the populist traditions which grew out of it, the effects of the Tartar occupation, Stalin's renovation of tsarist frames of reference, the long revolutionary tradition of the intellegentsia, and different nationality

²J. C. Rees, "Lenin and Marxism," in Leonard Schapiro and Peter Reddaway (eds.), Lenin: The Man, the Theorist, the Leader; A Reappraisal, (New York: Praeger, 1967), p. 91.

³Robert C. Tucker, The Soviet Political Mind, (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. x.

groups with separate heritages play a variety of roles in contribution to the mosaic of tradition that influences policy. Not the least of these is the twentieth century phenomenon of rapid industrialization which was grafted onto a functioning organism so recently that the seam is still visible. Students of the Soviet Union do themselves an injustice if when speaking about the Soviet ideology they only refer to the traditions of Marx and Lenin, even though it is true that the small group which rules this massive country professes a greater identity with this corpus than any other.

This profession of identity, however, occurs at a time when some Western scholars would insist that the country is becoming increasingly irrelevant to that tradition. This is what Rostow meant when he spoke of communism being applicable only to the supply side of the growth equation,⁴ or that it was applicable only to the period of construction, but not to the period of distribution. At first this seems a correct analysis. Lenin's principal focus was a revolution which he colored, and like many other frustrated intellectuals in a good many other countries at different times, with apocalyptic hues. Once in power the vision had to be ignored to avoid illustrating that inapplicability. Buy cheap and sell dear has little or nothing to do with the fetishism of commodity production and very much to do with the chaos which follows revolutions. Marx's notions of a truly human existence had very little to do with the process of electrifying the country, but his conviction that proletarian power was different from all other kinds of power in the past could give Lenin the centralist power base that was applicable

⁴W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth, (Cambridge: University Press, 1961), p. 133.

to the chaotic conditions of Russia, and lent justification to the massive efforts of building that later took place. These construction efforts could appear to be meaningful because the concepts of high levels of industrial development and the economy of abundance were not operationalized but relative to time and place in the minds of Marx and Engels. The fact, therefore, of the revolution occurring prior to the arrival of even the relative perceptions of high development had the necessary result of creating for ideology a principal function of justifying the economic construction. The attainment of rather high levels of production in Russia therefore led Rostow to predict a withering of communism on the demand side of the growth equation.⁵

However, the Third Party Program demonstrates that the ideology is still viable and adaptable but within the framework of construction still--for the Program specifically calls for great efforts to continue this construction well into the future. Will the leadership call for an end to growth in 1980? Naturally not, for growth is open ended. When "Communism is to be reached in all its fullness, not even the Program can say. It does refer to the present generation having the certainty of living under it, but even this statement is sufficiently loose, as is the notion of the "beginnings of communism", to continue to leave room for adaptability and maneuver at that time. The Program therefore provides a snug justification for a maintenance of the present ideology of construction, as well as a theoretical base for maintaining the existence and even the strengthening of that group which is to lead and direct this construction effort--the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

⁵Ibid.

But even though this is true, the Program points to adaptations which will stretch the Marxism-Leninism tradition very thin indeed. This ideology is not of very much help in running a sophisticated economy and population. Continued growth can be insured only if decisions are made in a highly practical manner, that is nearly without reference to any ideological consideration. Concepts must be applied which have equal relevance to a capitalist country, concepts implying rational rather than ideologically dogmatic allocations of resources and values in the society. For example, the use of interest rates as a "rent" figure on the time factor in capital loans is most definitely going against the ideological grain in favor of rationality in the production process. Similarly, rents paid on land which have superior location or soil is an equalization device long in use in capitalist countries.

Thus severe adaptations are necessary if growth is to be maintained; and only high rates of growth can justify the Party's continued existence as leader, for only high rates of growth give the illusion that a high plateau of whatever name can be at some not too distant time successfully reached. But because no one knows or perhaps even seems to care what that future society will really be like, I suggest that the goal is growth "period", both because it is necessary for survival and because the ideology can be used so easily to justify it. And this goal is frozen into the Program.

But, significantly, this goal is so frozen at a time of movement from the supply to the demand side, to use Rostow's phrase. The Program justifies this goal at a time when it is increasingly apparent that the continued expansion of capital goods production at the expense

of consumer durables production is dysfunctional to the maintainance of growth. Hence the many references in the Program to the creation of a happier and richer life for citizens of the USSR has realistic rather than merely utopian potentials. The struggle for continuing the Party has also become the struggle for people. Not because the leadership is impregnated with humanitarianism so much as because both social and economic systems are at a point where this is necessary. And this could be the enduring aspects of the Third Party Program-- that this humanitarian impulse, easily justified by ideology and hence difficult to avoid in this context might result in many major benefits to the population in the realistic future rather than a possibility that one's grand-children might or might not inherit.

Shorter, more pleasant, and more rewarding hours of work. Greater amounts of leisure time. More equality of status and opportunity along with the greater production of livestock, rather than having the latter overshadow the former. These are, of course, relative terms; but they must be, and this is encouraging; for it may mean that the day of ideological or theological love for absolutes impossible to fulfill is diminishing. The point is, nonetheless, that the Program had made an expanding welfarism ideologically palatable and this is an important contribution. If it is not ignored, the Program can be a significant bridge between the utopian musings of a frustrated philosopher and the greater happiness and satisfaction of over two hundred million people. And without revolution.

The post-Khrushchev leadership has continued his policies by other means. There is an abhorrance of the flamboyant adventurism which made the Soviet Union interesting to the Western observer, but

which constantly endangered the more liberal policies of Khrushchev. The periods of advance and recession have been smoothed out to a steady but slower advance. The Program is seemingly being implemented by a quieter leadership that has much greater potential for long-range stability. Guaranteed incomes for collective farm workers unrelated to the vagaries of climatic conditions, increasing automobile production, a shorter work week and better pensions have been put into effect. Educational reforms interest charges on state loans, rents on land, a movement away from total planning to a more rational economic policy of local decision making at the enterprise level based on a profitable utilization of resources emphasizing thrift and quality are also past the beginning stages. Other steps include higher wages and better housing attempts, a supermarket, deep water canals, more quality and quantity of foodstuffs in the common stores, and even a laundromat in Moscow.

Internationally the new leadership has evidenced a strong inclination to work for peace or status quo which was highlighted in the Program as being very crucial. The Tashkent settlement of the India-Pakistani dispute, the Consular Treaty with the United States, and the Non-Proliferation Treaty are steps in this direction. On some matters, however, they have revealed that they are not much mentally above some leaders in the United States who see no danger in selling arms to smaller countries with profound hatreds. Similarly, also, as the United States went into an anti-French position after France rejected NATO, so the Soviet leadership is incapable of seeing in Czechoslovakia trends that will ultimately work to their benefit.

But the Soviet elite has not moved closer to the Chinese. Instead they seem intent on the calling of an international conference of

socialist states for the purpose of reading China out of the socialist camp. As to Yugoslavia, relations seem distant but warm. One of the more important policy decisions in the recent past was the purchase of wheat abroad, from the West, rather than ask their population to suffer after the crop failures. This is most encouraging, for it indicates a much healthier attitude on the part of both the West and the Soviet Union.

Their score in regard to literary freedom is low. Leaders of a country with such a long tradition of censorship, and who do not want to rock the boat of progress as they see it, must find it very difficult to imagine a freedom of expression--particularly when it touches on the political system and its leaders. But the Sinyavsky and Daniel trials as well as the Ginzburg affair later do reveal desires on the part of the literary intelligentsia to be freer, and also indicate a lessening of the fear of protesting what seem to them unjust decisions. But freedom to dissent is most definitely not a part of the Program as we have seen.

With limitations and qualifications, therefore, the new leadership does seem to be implementing the Program. There even seems to be a neo-NEP in progress in the granting of concessions to foreign capital. Italian concerns will build a Fiat factory, the French an assembly plant for Renaults, and England is building for the Russians a textile factory--one of the well-known sources of Marx's examples in Capital. There is growing involvement all over the world with oil production, shipping, and selling; as well as with other commodities with socialist and capitalist nations, with democracies or right-wing dictatorships--it does not make any difference. Peaceful coexistence with differing

social systems is being turned into a profitable relationship.

Would all of these developments have transpired without the adoption of the Third Party Program? How can one answer? It is impossible to categorically answer. What can be said is that the Program did not represent in 1961 some sort of earth-shaking document that Khrushchev rammed through, but a document that represented a compromise of positions that reflected the consensus of opinion at that time. Thus one could say that the Program made little difference. On the other hand the challenges which made the Program necessary are also the motivation for the improvements noted above; so that the Program in reflecting the desires of the leadership to respond to these challenges in the interests of their own survival did make a difference. The Program was published in the Soviet press, and continuing references to the trite phrase "building the material and technical basis of communism" keep the formalized Program somewhat in mind; assuming that the readers of the Soviet press are interested in doing so. The persons with whom I discussed this in 1967 seemed very unwilling to be concrete about the coming of any new age, and very interested in pointing out improvements, specifically economic, in their own situation. In regard to political matters apathy was very often quite noticeable. It is perhaps summed up in the attitude of a former elementary schoolteacher who when discussing ideology mentioned: "I was very lazy in those subjects." My taxi driver in Leningrad tried to make several business deals with me, and merely shrugged when I asked about being a capitalist in a socialist country. Another young man, a music teacher in Moscow, possessed only a Hedonistic ideology. These things are mentioned to suggest that to the Soviet people at large it is quite

probably immaterial to them whether the Program is fully implemented.

Thus, for the people the important aspects of the Program would be those that bring greater economic and social satisfaction. For the Party the important parts of the document are those which preserve and guarantee the continuing power to the Party. Perhaps the two are not incompatible after all. If growing bureaucracy does not smother the developing alterations in the society the result might well be considered to be in the spirit of Marx, and perhaps even of Lenin; even though from the outside the Soviet Union would only be an advanced industrial, welfare state.


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