PERCEPTION, ATTITUDES AND IMAGES: A: STUDY OF JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOR Dissertation for the Degree of PIT I3 MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY . , _._._-:s KIYOKO KURUSU NITZ A. 1S: , 1973 jp’V‘ ' fi.-i“"“”" ’» 4 I I! III IIIIIIIIIIII I III III I, "III I 1:1 3 R A R Y . w- 7—— This is to certify that the thesis entitled PERCEPTION, ATTITUDES AND IMAGES: A STUDY OF JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICX BEHAVIOR presented by Kiyoko Kurusu Nitz has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for Ph.D. Political Science degree in .fl [/W ‘ s / ‘..T_‘(\ //;,7 /Z / L" ”7 If 1(1/ M or professor Date/LAILVZ/IT [3/ /77-.:77 .J I/ (/ 0-7639 ABSTRACT PERCEPTION, ATTITUDES AND IMAGES: A STUDY OF JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOR BY Kiyoko Kurusu Nitz Despite Japan‘s spectacular domestic prosperity and seemingly intense interest in economic assistance and polit— ical endeavors for peace in Asia, the Asians themselves seem to fear every Japanese step as an indication of a revival of pre-l945 Japanese imperialism and expansionism. It is widely assumed by Specialists in Japanese political behavior that the Japanese have become more "modern" and are ready to assume a greater political and economic leadership role in Asia. It is significant for the assessment of future Asian develOpment to empirically identify the structure of Japanese attitudes toward ASia. This thesis examined the components of Japanese decision makers' international image of Japan and its role in Asia and the relationships among these image components. The image components examined include expansionism, traditional- ism, self-confidence, perception of national capability and power, defensive and active policies, and nationalist and regionalist orientations. Fourteen foreign policy speeches made by foreign ministers in 1955, 1957, 1959, 1961, 1963, Kiyoko Kurusu Nitz 1965, and 1967 were translated into English and were com— puter content analyzed. The following changes in Japanese policy images over the period 1955 to 1967 were hypothesized: (1) Japanese policy makers expressed fewer expansionist and traditionalist attitudes; (2) Japanese perception of self-confidence and national power increased; (3) Perceptions of Japan's role in Asia changed from defensive policies to active policies and from a nationalist orientation to a regionalist orientation; and (4) The changes in Japanese perceptions of self—confidence and national power and capability occurred in conjunction with the change in role perceptions from defensive to active poli- cies and from nationalist to regionalist policies. The fre- quency distributions of concepts derived from these hypotheses were obtained using the New Asia Equivalence Table and the differences across time of bivariate co-occurrences of concepts were statistically tested. The findings of this study indicate that the Japanese decision makers' perception of Japan has indeed changed: The Japanese image is more self—confident and national power is more frequently identified in the later time segment. More active political and economic roles are identified in the foreign policy statements. Yet there exist in their perceptions both strong "aggressive" and "tradition— alist" traits and an absence of "expansionist" as well as "militarist" orientations. The Japanese seem to be making an effort to portray themselves as a more friendly and democratic Kiyoko Kurusu Nitz neighbor. However, their perceptions of themselves, their role, and the means for implementing their goals seem to remain traditional. At the same time the Japanese are becoming more pragmatic and practical, as evidenced by a decrease in idealistic themes. They are becoming less nationalist— oriented, but have not shown comparable increases in region— alist orientations. In summary, the Japanese do not seem to have established a clear self—identity concerning their approach to implementing foreign policy goals, despite a great interest in economic and political instruments and an increas— ing interest in Southeast Asia. PERCEPTION, ATTITUDES AND IMAGES: A STUDY OF JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOR BY Kiyoko Kurusu Nitz A DISSERTATION Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Political Science 1973 A dfiy I» ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This thesis is an outcome of my long—term interest in the Japanese society and its people and their relation- ships with other peOples in Asia. During my undergraduate studies at International Christian University in Tokyo I was fascinated with the study of Japanese political activity in Southeast Asia during the Second World War, particularly with the human factors underlying this behavior. After com- ing to the United States my interest has deepened and broad- ened but has continued to center around the issue of the relations of Japan and Asia in the future and the various problems involved in peaceful c00peration among these nations. As I became more aware of the significance of atti— tudinal and image factors in the study of foreign policy behaviors of decision makers, the possible utility of "value— ridden" documents, such as policy statements, as data for the scientific examination of complex international behaviors became apparent. Although I selected a computer content analysis strategy with the initial encouragement of my thesis committee, the road to implementing efficient, economic routines necessary for the present study proved to be long and costly in terms of time and highly technical effort. ii This thesis is an outgrowth of the kind advice and sincere efforts of many individuals with whom I became acquainted during the process of conducting the research. All of their names are too numerous to list, but the follow— ing are representative of persons who have served beyond the expectations of normal scholarly cordiality and reciprocity: Mrs. Cheryl Crawford of the Bendix Corporation, Ann Arbor, Michigan, for supervising the keypunching; Mr. William C. Mitchell of Fields, Grant and Co., Menlo Park, California, for the use of the computer content analysis programs he has writ- ten; Mr. Carles Wall of the Department of Information Science, University of Hawaii, for technical advice and for the use of his APL program for the statistical analysis; The Department of Economics of the University of California, Berkeley, and the University of Hawaii Computer Center for the use of facilities and the generous provision of computer time. This thesis would not have been possible without the patient and understanding advice of the thesis committee chairman, Dr. Baljit Singh, committee members Drs. Wesley Fishel, Iwao Ishino, and Ralph Smuckler. A special grati- tude is owed to Dr. Fishel, who initially arranged the Oppor— tunity for my graduate work at Michigan State University and has constantly inspired my interest in Asia. A warm thanks for my husband, Dr. Lawrence H. Nitz, who not only has given me various technical advice, but also has patiently provided me with moral support, and to my two iii young daughters, Noelani and Nicole, who have grown up with their mother's computer output and have made my work more meaningful. And finally to my mother, who resides in Japan and first Opened my eyes to political affairs in Japan, for her courage and support. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF TABLES O O O O C O O C O O O O O C O O C 0 LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chapter I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Historical DevelOpment of Japan's Asian Policies After the Second World War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Setting: The Japanese Foreign Policy Making Process in Post-Second World War Period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Statement of the Problem . . . . . . II. PERCEPTION, ATTITUDES, INTERNATIONAL IMAGES AND JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIORS: REVIEW OF LITERATURE . . . . . . . . . . Schematic of Japan's Expansionism . . . . The Selection of One Project: Incorporation of Asia as the Great East Asia Co—prosperity Sphere . . . . III. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY . . . . . . Presentation of Hypotheses . . . . . . . Data source 0 I O O O O C O O O O O O O . Data Source Characteristics and Systematic Errors . . . . . . . . . . . Preparation of Data on Attitudes and Images Using Computer Content Analysis Operationalization of Hypotheses (Designation of Indicants for Variables) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Analysis Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . IV. TESTING AND ANALYSIS OF HYPOTHESES . . . . Profile Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . Summary of Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . Analysis of Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . V Page vii ix 14 38 48 51 52 73 74 81 86 93 98 114 122 124 127 132 Page V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . 168 The Traits of Pre-1945 Expansionism- Militarism . C C O O O O O O O O C O O I 168 Nationalist, Regionalist, and Leadership Perception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . l72 Perception of the Sel and the Political and Cultural Orientations . . . . . . . . 174 BIBLIOGRAPHY O O C O O O O C O O O O O O O O O O O O l 8 3 APPENDICES I C O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 195 vi 1.7. 1.8. 3.7. 3.8. 3.9. 3.10. 3.11. LIST OF TABLES List of Prime Ministers in Office (1946-1967) 0 c o o o o o o o o o o o o 0 Votes Cast According to Political Parties . Distribution of Votes According to Political Parties and Type of Electoral District . . Academic Background and Party Support . . . Sponsorship of Legislation Introduced Into the Diet 0 C C C O O O C C O O O I O O O 0 Classification of LDP Diet Members by Occupational and Educational Backgrounds, November I 1965 I O O C O O O I O O O O O . Percentages of Former Public Servants and Local Politicians in LDP Cabinets, 1955-1965 0 o o o a c o o o o o o o o o o PARC Officials with Public Service Backgrounds and Those Who Were Formerly Local Politicians . . . . . . . . . . . . Further Explanations of Japanese Foreign Policy: A Simplified Model . . . . . . . . Summary of Image Changes . . . . . . . . . . Table of Foreign Policy Speeches . . . . . . Hypothesis I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Hypothesis II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Hypothesis III . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Hypothesis IV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Hypothesis V . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Hypothesis VI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Hypothesis VII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Hypothesis VIII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii Page 16 18 20 21 26 32 34 35 75 82 91 114 115 115 116 116 116 117 117 4.1. 4.2. 4.3. 4.4. 4.5. 4.6. 4.7. 4.8. 4.10. 4.11. 4.14. 4.15. Testing of Dimensions . . . . . . . . . Result of Hypothesis Testing . . . . . . Result of Hypothesis Testing-—Hypothesis Result of Hypothesis Testing: Hypothesis Result of Hypothesis Testing: Hypothesis Hypothesis Testing: Hypothesis III. . . Result of Hypothesis Testing: Hypothesis The Result of Hypothesis Hypothesis V . . . . . The Result of Hypothesis Hypothesis V . . . . . The Result of Hypothesis Hypothesis V . . . . . The Result of Hypothesis Hypothesis VI . . . . The Result of Hypothesis Hypothesis VI . . . . The Result of Hypothesis Hypothesis VI . . . . The Result of Hypothesis Hypothesis VI . . . . The Result of Hypothesis Hypothesis VI . . . . Testing: Testing: Testing: Testing: Testing: Testing: Testing: Testing: viii II III III Page 134 138 146 148 149 151 152 155 156 157 159 160 161 162 163 LIST OF F IGURES Figure Page 1.1. The General Election Results . . . . . . . . . 19 1.2. Labor Force According to Industries and Votes Won by the Conservatives and the Progressives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 1.3. The Informal Circuit of Foreign Policy Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 ix CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION Introduction The increasing disappearance of lines of demarca— tion between domestic and foreign policies has characterized post-Second World War international relations. Foreign policies of nations increasingly seem to be formulated in response to both the internal and external factors as well as in response to the systemic impacts. This has been par- ticularly true in the case of the foreign policies of post— Second World War Japan, which suddenly was reduced terrie torially to four small islands and suffered destruction of its national economy and of its political, social, and cultural life. In order to survive as a nation, Japan has found itself in need of taking into its calculation of national and foreign policies both systemic impacts and such external forces as the two Great Powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as the newly established Communist regime in China. Later, as the bipolarization of the international world loosened and the problem of the discrepancy between the wealthy deveIOped nations and the Poor developing nations was acknowledged, the scope and nature of Japan's economic role in Asia became a critical issue. It was apparent that the wealthy and highly l technically trained Japanese were likely to play some signifi— cant role in the developmental process of these nations. The question was the nature of leadership to be adopted by the Japanese. The nature of the role to be played by the Japanese, however, apparently is restricted in part by neighboring nations' colonial eXperiences and their previous relations with the Japanese, particularly during the Second World War. The increasing incidents of anti—Japanese behavior in South- east Asia in recent years seem to support this proposition. Above all, Japan's policies toward these nations are affected by Japanese attitudes toward other Asian nations and percep- tions of the nature of Japanese—Asian relations, the range of appropriate policy postures, and the prevailing Japanese image of the international environment. Japan since the Meiji Restoration has experienced several distinct periods in its foreign relations. During the Meiji Period, Japan successfully became an international power by adapting its policies to those of the major powers. The succeeding period of expansion of its power from Korea to China into Southeast Asia was based upon the ideology of a "Greater East-Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere," which concept grew from a purely economic ambition to including establish— ment of a self-defense sphere and "emancipation of the native Populations" from European domination. This expansion, however, abruptly ended in Japan's defeat in the war in the Pacific in 1945. The expansionist and crude, sometimes savage behavior before 1945 in China, Manchuria, and Korea, as well as in some parts of Southeast Asia by the culturally developed Japanese has been a bewildering issue. After 1945, Japan was stripped of all its conquered territories. In the 19505, iizre-entered the international scene under the protection of the United States. Out of the destruction of the Second World War and the ensuing Occupa- tion, Japan quickly regained a position of note in the international world. In the period of the loosening of bipolarization of Cold War in the 19603, Japan achieved an amazing economic recovery. The extravaganza of the Expo '70 as well as the Olympic Games in 1965 symbolized its resur— gence as an ever more visible actor in international rela— tions. Some scholars even attempt to draw a parallel between Japan's foreign activities in the 19603 and 19708 and those of the 18805 and 18905.1 Whether we accept this parallel-K ism or not, the 19503 and 19608 prepared the foundation in many aspects for contemporary Japan's activities in South- east Asia. It is the theme of this study that the manner in which the Japanese policy makers perceive the international environment of Japan as well as their nation's role in Asia and the world has global political implications; that Japan's Policies toward Southeast Asia have always been planned in light of past experiences in the area and of Japan's rela— tions with the United States; and that these international images held by the Japanese decision makers have changed in content and structure during the period analyzed (1955—1967). Specifically, I will examine several aspects of the inter— national images and attitudes of the Japanese foreign policy apparatus through a computer content analysis of foreign policy speeches of key Japanese decision makers. Those images related to Japanese policies toward Southeast Asia will be' analyzed on the basis of two sets of constructs: (l) the impact of the past attitudinal orientations, i.e., the symbolic effect of cultural traditionalism and expansionism upon the contemporary images; (2) intra—image relationships, particularly the relationship between the perception of national power, national capability, and self—confidence of the Japanese leaders, and the leadership role they perceive for Japan in Southeast Asia as well as their perception of international cooperation. The terms in which these theo— retical constructs may be given Operational meaning arise from the historical development of postwar Japan as well as the setting of the Japanese foreign policy-making process. I shall discuss these two subjects in the sections below. The Historical Development of Japan's Asian Policies After the Second World War During the Occupation, 1945-1952, Japan's policies were focused upon regaining independence at the earliest pos- sible date. Demilitarized and democratized, the new Japanese leaders' eyes were turned toward domestic reconstruction of Japan out of the total political collapse and social disintegration that had resulted from the humanization of the Emperor and corollary Occupation policies. Japan‘s "foreign relations" were conducted with the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP), and particularly with the United States. After 1952, with the conclusion of San Francisco Peace Treaty, Japan faced three major tasks: (1) the estab- lishment of a viable economy, (2) the resumption of diplo~ matic ties with nations in Southeast Asia, and (3) rebuild— ing "patriotism" (or national identity).2 The second and third problems have been linked also with the problem of changing the prewar and wartime images of Japan in the outside world. The major spur to economic recovery was started by outside initiative: the Occupation laid sound foundations for the process of "miracle development.“ During the Korean War, which broke out in June, 1950, the United States began to purchase Japanese supplies and services on a very large scale. This war thus marked the economic turning point for Japan.3 Despite some minor setbacks by the later 19508, the Japanese were witnessing a lasting economic boom. Living standards had not only reached prewar levels but were surging far ahead. By the mid-19608 per capita income, while still far behind that of countries like England or West Germany, ‘surpassed that of Southern EurOpean countries. And at the time of this writing Japan is rated third in economic power after the United States and the Soviet Union. This remarkable economic recovery and the rising domestic standard of living, however, were not accompanied by the building of an equally powerful military apparatus. Japan, since its return to the international scene, has con- centrated its efforts on economic activities, such as trade and commerce, while it has largely depended upon the United states for the provision of its international security. Japan's symbolic intercourse with other nations has been largely conducted through the United Nations and other vol— untary international cooperative endeavors. Since the 19508, Japan has eagerly sought the rein— statement of friendly relations with other Asian nations through the payment of reparations, loans, and trade. The San Francisco Peace Treaty (Article 14) obliged Japan to pay reparations in products and services.4 The reparations were to serve several other purposes in addition to showing repentance to the Southeast Asian countries. They were used for long—range economic development projects which were designed to raise the standard of living of the recipient nations, which in turn would provide broader markets for Japanese products. And the emphasis on capital products avoided the conflict with the traditionally popular Japanese exports of consumer goods.5 Reparations not only had the effect of softening the resentment against the Japanese invasion, but also had the effect of increasing the purchas— ing power of these nations. The foreign aid program, which is aimed particularly at Southeast Asia, is tied to purchases in Japan.6 As an organized program, it actually started in 1958 by the granting of a yen loan equivalent to 50 million dollars to the Govern- ment of India. "Economic Cooperation Activities" divisions were set up in the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). Japan joined the O.E.C.D. (the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) in 1963. In 1964, Japan's amount of foreign aid rated fifth in the O.E.C.D., following the United States, France, England, and West Germany. The technical assistance program, which includes .the training of specialists and the dispatch of Japanese technicians, has been conducted by bilateral arrangements since 1954. The program, originally aimed at the Columbo Plan member nations, now covers Latin America and Africa as well. The program was extended also to include the donation of machinery and instruments, establishment of technical training centers, etc. In 1965, "Nihon—Seinen Kaigai Kyoryoku Tai,"7 a Japanese version of the Peace Corps, was established and more than 50 young Japanese were sent to Southeast Asian nations. The budget for technical assistance expanded from 13,000,000 yen in 1954 to 2,077,000,000 yen in 1965.8 Between 1954 and 1965, 5,944 trainees from Afro—Asian nations received training in Japan, while 775 Japanese specialists were sent abroad.9 Aside from these programs under the Foreign Affairs Ministry, MITI and the Ministry of Educa— tion have their own programs. Most of these efforts achieved their desired goals. The establishment of the Asian Development Bank in 1967 marked the start of a new era. During these developments in Japan's relations with Asia, changes in the tone, i.e., emphasis, of her policy were observed. First the Japanese began to talk in terms of "moral responsibility" to deal with the North-South problem (i.e., the increasing gap between the developed and developing countries) in her relations with Asian nations. The key LDP (the Liberal Democratic Party) leaders discussed cooperation with the "Pacific Region" in increasingly favorable terms. Despite these rather promising developments, we can observe some serious drawbacks. First, Japan's spectacular development was achieved through its privileged position as an ally of the United States. Japan has been economically and militarily heavily dependent upon the U.S. At a time when most other coun- tries were discriminating against Japanese goods, the United States accepted them freely and became Japan's most impor- tant market. Roughly one quarter of Japanese exports go to the United States, almost seven times as much as go to any other country. On the other hand, approximately one third of Japan's imports come from the United States.10 Military dependence can be traced to the fact that the majority of Japan's foreign service officers were in liaison duty to SCAP during the Occupation. The postwar decision-making process in Japan was shaped under the strong impact of the United States. The new Constitution itself was drawn under its strong guidance. In fact, the basic decisions taken by the U.S. with respect to its programs for the demilitarization, democratization, and after 1947, the economic and international rehabilitation of Japan continue today to provide both context and cause for a surprising number of that country's most controversial political, economic, and social issues. During the seven years of Occupation, American policy underwent some drastic changes in its principle: a shift from punishment and reform to the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Japan.12 The emphasis of occupation pol— icy shifted from "demilitarization" to "democratization."l3 Between 1947 and early 1948 as a result of the beginning of the Cold War, Japan was in the process of becoming America's "most important ally in Asia,"14 and Japan was to be strength- ened economically and socially. Between 1950 and 1953, the U.S. was attempting to persuade Japan to rearm. The most drastic economic reform programs of the Occupation were deemphasized and SCAP was ready to gradually return authority over the reform programs to the Japanese Government, which subsequently halted many of these reforms. And the national police force, which eventually turned into the Self—Defense Force, was to be organized. By the time the peace treaty was signed with the United States in 1952, the new outlines of American policy had become clear. While wanting to terminate the Occupation, 10 Washington was not willing seriously to weaken its position in northeastern Asia and the North Pacific. Consequently, it insisted upon ratification by Japan of a security treaty at the time of conclusion of the peace treaty. This insured that the United States could continue to base its forces on Japan in the event of war with the Soviet Union or a contin— uation of war in Korea. Furthermore, the United States retained its control of the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands, con— tinuing to maintain strong base facilities on Okinawa. The conservative LDP has committed itself inten- sively to the Western cause and based its policies too firmly upon a close relationship with the U.S. to preserve for itself sufficient space for political maneuver to make decisions of international significance, independent of U.S. positions. It may not disregard the advice of the U.S. without chancing political or economic disadvantages which may arise as a result of such disregard. This also seems to have lessened the poSsibilities for formulating policies in cooperation with the non-conservative politicians in the area of foreign policy. As a result, in such areas as Japan‘s relations with communist countries we can observe two—headed foreign policies. The delegates from non-conservative political parties are received in these countries almost as the national delegates of Japan, while the formal representative of the Japanese Government did not even step into Asian communist territories until the recent visit to China by Prime Min— ister Tanaka (with the possible exception of the case of 11 of semi-formal economic delegations sent to the People's Republic of China.) Serious observers both within and outside Japan doubt Japan's capability to exercise complete freedom in her Asian policy against the wishes of the United States under the present circumstances. Secondly, recent Japanese foreign policies have raised the fear of her Asian neighbors that Japan may per— ceive herself the future Asian leader in the fashion of her pre-Second W0rld War image.15 This characteristic is best described by Elsbree. He argues that the Japanese failure to identify the interests of the Southeast Asians with their own was a result of mainly three factors: first, the cruelty to the native pOpulation; secondly, the privations resulting from the economic dislocations which accompanied the war; and thirdly, the Japanese failure to capture the loyalty of the nationalist movements with which they came in contact. He succinctly summarizes the last aspect in the following passages: It was the tragedy of Japan that she became her own most ardent admirer and thus ruined whatever chance she might have had to exert a lasting influence. Her own apparent success in synthesizing East and West was proof to her of her superiority; the other cultures of Asia had failed to find an answer and so must be inferior. The solution, obviously was to improve them by Japan- ization which would impart the magic formula. 6 The idea of linking forces with the national move— ments was a sound one. . . . They fumbled it, and one basic cause was their own faulty conception of the national movements in Asia. . . . The idea of Japanese superiority was implicit in their estimates of the national movements, cited in the opening chapters, it was borned out in all their actions during the occupation. 12 The notion of guidance was always that of leading a little child by the hand, there was no inkling of a relationship in which mutual problems would be dis— cussed on equal terms. . . . They saw what a useful instrument nationalism could be in their plans for a Co-Prosperity Sphere, but they failed to draw all the necessary consequences from this realization, for if nationalism was a force strong enough to be of use to them, it would require more consideration than they were prepared to give. They tried to meet the problem with the arguments that national self-determination, in its traditional sense, was out moded in the modern world, that the only truly independent countries were those which pos- sessed all the elements of national power, and that the weak nations of the world could exist only under the protection of one of the giants. These fears are lxnnr out in a French observer's report of the comment made by a member of the Indian dele- gation that "we fear the ADB may become a tool of American economic imperialism or of Japanese economic expansionism."18 This is supported by McNelley's observation that "the neigh- bors still have lingering suspicion of what the Japanese are up to, fearing a possible revival of Nipponese imperialism and militarism."19 Thirdly, these foundations (namely, the historically oriented attitude which tries to settle all the foreign policy issues in the long—established framework, by assuming that 'the past 20 years' relationships between the United States, Taiwan, Korea, and Japan are permanent and unchangeablezo) upon which the Conservative Government has based its foreign policies during the past 20 some years have been increasingly questioned within Japan. The strong emphasis upon economic diplomacy was criticized for an opportunism which places 13 economic interest above principle, which as a result has deprived Japanese diplomacy of clear-cut expressions of her attitudes on major international issues.21 The Japanese public has started to review Japan's relations with her immediate neighbors as well as with the United States in a broad but calm and reasoned debate over the problem that Japan faces, not in terms of how Japan should react to American or Communist contentions, but in terms of Japan's own interests and goals. The increasing dissatisfactions among the public with the Japanese foreign policies is significant, but is only a part of the deeper problems the Japanese face in their national life. The foreign policy issues seem to represent the fear among the Japanese public of a return of an author— itarian political regime, as well as a question of public trust in their leaders which has been tested repeatedly in major political controversies in Japan since the surrender: the establishment of the Self—Defense Forces in 1952, the revision of the Security Treaty with the United States in 1960 and in 1970, the Subversive Activities Prevention Law of 1952, the revision of the Police Law in 1954 and an attempt to revise the Police Duties Execution Law in 1958, the Viet- namese War, and Japan's status (obligations) under the provisions of the U.S.—Japan Security Treaty, and, finally, the long—continuing movement for the revision of the 1947 Constitution. 14 These cleavages in political opinions are perceived by the public as one consequence of the fact that the party in power does not reflect the true Opinions of the public. In other words this perception that the LDP leaders do not reflect the pOpular voices and that they form an autonomous policy-making body raises the serious issue of the adequacy of the Japanese political process as a means whereby the popular policy inputs are effectively transformed into governmental policy outputs, without distortion by the leaders. The Setting: The Japanese Foreign Policy Making Process in Post— Second World War Period The Japanese foreign policy which has emerged since the postwar adoption of western style democracy is somewhat different from a typical western style democratic political system. The Japanese political system, according to the words Of the 1947 Constitution, is based upon the American type separation of powers among the Diet (the legislature), the Cabinet (the executive), and the Supreme Court (the judiciary) with the Emperor as the symbolic head of state. The formal specification of the process by which the conduct Of foreign policy is governed is simple: The Prime Minister, representing the Cabinet, submits bills, reports on general national affairs and foreign relations to the Diet, and exercises control and supervision over various administrative branches (Article 72): The Cabinet, in addition to other 15 general administrative functions, shall perform the follow— ing functions: (1) administer the law faithfully; (2) con— duct affairs Of state; (3) manage foreign affairs and conclude treaties. However, it shall obtain prior or, depending on circumstances, subsequent, approval of the Diet (Article 73, (l), (2), and (3)). In actual practice, however, because of the dominant position of the Liberal Democratic Party and the bureaucracy in the political process, as well as the intensive involves ment Of business groups, the Diet and broadly defined public opinion play minor roles. Foreign policy formulation in post-Second WOrld War Japan has been in the hands of the conservative elites. Since the foundation Of the Liberal Democratic Party in 1955, it has controlled the Cabinet, the body responsible for the foreign policy of Japan. (See Table 1.1.) The strong ideological commitment of the Socialists and the Communists and equally strong attachment Of the con- servatives to the West seems to have eroded any hope for the emergency Of nationally unified policies concerning the major international issues Japan faces.23 This picture has emerged due to several distinctive characteristics Of the Japanese political setting (culture): the unique experience of the Occupation, Japanese voting behavior and the political party system, the dominance of the executive branch in the policy formulation process, and the distinctively Japanese informal policy circulation system. 16 Table l.l.--List Of prime ministers in office (1946n1967). May, 1946 Yoshida Shigeru lst Liberal:Progressive Coalition May, 1947 Katayama Tesu Socialist:Democratic Nat. Coop. Coalition March, 1948 Ashida, Hitoshi Democratic:Socialist Nat. Coop. Coalition October, 1948 Yoshida Shigeru 2nd Liberal Democratic February, 1949 Yoshida Shigeru 3rd Liberal Democratic October, 1952 Yoshida Shigeru 4th Liberal May, 1953 Yoshida Shigeru 5th Liberal December, 1954 Hatoyama Ichiro lst Japan Democratic March, 1955 Hatoyama Ichiro 2nd Japan Democratic November, 1955 Hatoyama Ichiro 3rd Liberal Democratic December, 1956 Ishibashi Tanzan Liberal Democratic February, 1957 Kishi Nobusuke lst Liberal Democratic June, 1958 Kishi Nobusuke 2nd Liberal Democratic July, 1960 Ikeda Hayato lst Liberal Democratic December, 1960 Ikeda Hayato 2nd Liberal Democratic December, 1963 Ikeda Hayato 3rd Liberal Democratic November, 1964 Sato Eisaku lst Liberal Democratic January, 1967 SatO Eisaku 2nd LiberalDemocratic First, the Occupation not only established the founda- tion for a strong U.S.—Japan alliance which has been the key to postwar Japanese foreign policies, but also assisted the l7 conservative political elites in establishing their strong political basis. Secondly, the Conservatives, after launched an advantageous campaign during the short period of 1947n1947 despite the gradual increase.inthe progressive votes as seen in Table 1.2 and Figure 1.1. The tendency toward urbanization seems to be respon- sible for the general increase in the non—conservative votes as seen in the changing voting behaviors according to the electoral districts. There is also an almost paralleled decline:h1the conservative votes and the population engaged in the first sector of industry, i.e., agriculture and forestry.24 Another factor contributing to the higher progressive votes is the level of education. The higher a person's edu— cational level, the more he tends to vote for the non- conservative candidates. The persistent strength of the conservatives can be found in the survival of traditional Japanese value systems and two contradictory outcomes of Japan's economic prosperity. The erosion of traditional values in Japanese society owing to the increasing industrialization and urban— ization represents change in a comparative sense. Persistent traditional attitudes still exist among the Japanese particur larly in the rural areas and among the older generations. One author describes the Japanese "national character" 18 .mpnmm Hmuoan was huumm OHDMHOOEOQ smash mo HMDODIQSm .uo» OOEHOM Dos mmz ouonomo .umh coauom no: m83 mmao spasm Hones mam .ummq .pbmem awn mo Hmuouunsmo .06fimmo m.umumeeas meflnm >3 oonmfiansm xoonummw HMOflumflumum amme Q ca co>wm mmusmwm map Eonm Hogans OED an oonosuumsou "mmma.wmma .3 d teézaoo emeofiummm .AMSOsm mo m.om on“ 8H H0fl>mzmm1wswpo> one coeumNchQuD one sowumNHHmHHumsoch mxsmm ooom ONSOB Op meNmom mxflnmoa sumxo as wetnesshcmm mzonm .Ocflxo mu8£5mmw Eoym "mmmarmmma "mousomm mnm.mm www.mm moo.ooa moo.ooa woo.ooa woo.ooa Hmpoa em.m mm.m 88.8 mo.m sm.m mm.m muemeammmeaH Ho.o NN.o mH.o mm.o mn.o vm.a msoosmaaoomflz mm.m mm.e mo.q mm.m mm.m mo.m shame umeqsesoo .hb.oa mm.m m... o... O... O... oquOEOM hm.h ov.h mm.n mh.m o... o... umAHMHOOm owumuooamo 5H.HN mm.bm No.mm Hm.bm m>.mm Omm.om mpnmm pmfiamwoom mmo.n¢ mom.mv wmo.vm mmm.hm mah.hm tho.mm .m Oflpmuooaoa Hmucnfiq AoquV AumHmv Asuomv Anummv Anummv Aauhmv munmm mmma bmma moma omma mmma mmma coauooam c.mmfiuncm Hmowuaaom Op msaouooom ummo mmuo>uu.~.a manna l9 70 r The Conservatives 60 . 60.7 - 1 57 a 57.6\ 54.7 50 r 40 _ .4 39.2 (,«c 35.5 "53.1 30 I- 30.0 29.5 . The ProgreSSives 26.5 24.5 20 r 10 ~ r fi' I r T I f Y 0 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 3O (4.25.1947) (10.1.1952) (2.27.1955) (11.20.1960) (1.23.1949) (4.19.1953) (5.22.1958) (11.21.1963) Source: Okino, Yasuharu._ ShOwa Sanjfinendai ni Okeru Toshika Kogryoka to TOhyO Kodo Henka (The Trend in Voting Behaviors and Industrialization and Urbanization in the thirties of Showa. Restricted Copy, no publica— tion date, p. 31. Figure l.l.--The General Election Results. 20 .mmoo OmpOfiupmom .m>wmmoumoum u .moum uo>flum>ummsoo u .mcoo .@.g .Amzorm mo m.om map cmluomwmmmmanauo> was cowumNfismnHD 08m sOflumNfiHmwuuwsosHv mxcmm.ooox 05:09 on mxommom mxfigmoa snmxo as “mosmssflsmm 830:0 cw moans» Scum couosuumsou “MONO ¢.H magma Op ODOQDOOM mgp mom .mmmhu poauumflc Hmuouomam mo sowuwsflmmp on» mom Q "00 .50 .H mm «.0v 5.vm .m.mm 0.5m m.mm 0.5m «.mm N.m0 mmmumbfi Hmnoflumz 0H.0N ¢¢.vm 0¢.5N ¢m.mm NH.mN 00.05 mm.HN 55.H5 mmMHHH> Hm.mm mv.mm mH.0m m0.mm H0.Nm 50.0m 00.0N Hm.m0, mmMHHH>IMEmm 05.0m mm.mm 00.5m 00.0m m0.vm H0.mm 400.0m 00.00 HOHQOU GMQHD 5m.5m 00.Hv mm.mm 00.mv 50.50 mm.5v mw.vv 50.Hm make cwuwaomouumz .moum .msoo .monm .msoo .moum .msoo .moum nwmsoo uoauumao meme omma mmma mmma .8 . . use» coauooam MO Oahu can mmaunmm Hounduaaom Op maficnooom mmuo> MO coeusnanumaall.m. a magma m.uoauumfio Hunouomao 21 Table 1.4.--Academic background and party support.a Political Parties Education LDP JSP DSP JCP Komeito Others University 45.0% 31.7% 8.2% 0.9% 0.4% 13.6% High School 46.5 30.4 5.0 0.6 2.0 15.5 Junior High 48.1 25.6 3.2 0.6 2.7 19.8 Elementary School 49.1 16.6 1.6 0.6 2.1 29.9 Unknown 50.8 26.2 ... 1.6 1.6 19.7 aSource: Unidentified author, Op. cit., p. 61. Table 18. Survey by the Chuo-Chosa—sha, March, 1965. (Sample:15,863) as embracing: . . . substantial elements of the old order which emphasized the family and nation over the individual; discipline, duty, and obligation over freedom; distinc- tion in status over equality; and racial arrogance over egalitarianism. The younger generation and the better educated, however, are slowly moving toward individual- ism and commitment to "democracy," but the movement is uneven, with strong survivals of ethnocentric, hier- archical, and holistic attitudes.25 However, the emerging middle class is still essen- tially conservative within the context of the socio—economic system of Japan.26 In recent years also an increasing con- servative orientation has been observed among younger gen- eration Japanese.27 Authorities of Japanese political behavior Observe that in this extraordinary prosperity the masses are increasingly caught up in a cycle of very rapid socio-economic change. And their interests, anxieties, 22 % 250» 3rd Industry ’1‘” 200” ,«-“' and Industry Organized Labor "”’ . rogre881ve Votes 150” 100<+ I 4 .......... “- Conservative Votes lst Industry 50‘» 0 : ; 1946 0 1947 1948 19494. 1950.. 1952‘? 1953 1955i 1958.. 1959K 1960‘- 1962‘ 19630 1965 * Source: Unidentified Author. A study paper for the government personnels. p.28. Figure 9. This figure uses the ratio based on the 1946 census. Figure l.2.--Labor Force according to Industries and Votes won by the Conservatives and the Progressives. 23 commitments, and energies are increasingly bound up with the issues that stem from that change. (These are essen— tially domestic, practical, and highly personal issues.28 The Conservatives were quick to recognize the fact that the average Japanese gives political priorities to domestic economic issues.29 They increasingly took over many of the welfare policies proposed originally by the Socialists, even though they watered them down slightly.30 Backed by their record of postwar achievement of economic prosperity and regaining of independence, along with their close ties with the U.S. and the Western bloc, the Conservatives score better with the average Japanese who prefer to defend the status quO rather than to risk their moderate but prosperous life in voting for Socialists or Communists who openly take sides with the Communist bloc and defy these values. The Socialists, on the other hand, have ignored prosperity, emphasizing a pattern Of grievances drawn mainly from traditional ideological sources and spelling out the future either in Utopian or apocalyptic terms. They have frequently given foreign policy priority over domestic policy. As a result, they have generally been at a psycho- logical and political disadvantage. Although nationalism and foreign policy issues became matters of increasing importance to Japan after 1950, it cannot be said that these factors occupied the center of the stage.31 The picture which emerges after these observations is one Of a vicious circle, in which the Conservatives are 24 turning more and more to pragmatism, emphasizing welfare policies, while the Socialists are increasing their ideal— istic and pessimistic orientation. One party remains dominant and always in power. It knows only how to govern. The other is perennial minority, unable to command more than one third of the electorate. It knows only how to oppose, and at times seems positively afraid of power. . . . And both par- ties remain greatly separated from the Japanese "man- in-the-street." Thirdly, the major effects we can observe of the semi- permanent control of the majority by the Conservatives in the working Of two major policy making and executing organs Of Japan is the weak Diet as an organ for check and balance in the national political process and the omnipotence of the Cabinet supported by the huge bureaucracy and the business groups. it The basic functioning of the bicameral Diet (the House Of Representatives and the House of Councilors) depends upon the committee system.33 The Committee, however, although it may contribute to articulating the differences of view- points between the LDP and the opponents and the related issues and problems, does little to induce changes and modi- fications in the government policies. This fact and the absence Of crossing the bench add to the inactiveness of the Diet as a real organ for checking and taming the policies made by the Cabinet. The Cabinet under the Prime Minister, who is respon— sible to the Diet, does not merely execute and administer a program of legislative action determined by the Diet. It 25 plans legislation, initiates bills, organizes support in the Diet, and puts through a legislative program, which it then administers.34 One reason for this strong position of the Cabinet is that the Constitution itself appears to contran dict the principle of legislative supremacy by providing the executive with a variety of powers. It administers the affairs Of state through a vast bureaucracy, embracing some 1,852,000 employees (1963) in 53 primary ministries and agencies. Although the judiciary is independent, the Cabinet appoints judges and administers criminal justice. A11 pub— 1ic procurators (prosecutors) are civil service employees of the Ministry of Justice.35 I The Cabinet also has the right to initiate both legislation and amendments to the Constitution. Evidence (of the Cabinet's legislative leadership is found in the observation that the majority of the legislation has been proposed by the Cabinet, as seen in Table 1.5.36 In order to understand the working of the Cabinet and its relations with the Diet, we must now turn to the manner in which the LDP functions as a political party (that is, how it reaches policy decisions) as well as its relations with the bureaucracy, business groups, and the public. The Liberal Democratic Party came into existence in 1955 as a result of the merger of two conservative parties, the Democratic Party and the Liberal Party. The two 26 Table l.5.--Sponsorship Of legiséation introduced into the Diet._ Bills Sponsored by Dietman Bills Sponsored . Upper Lower by Cabinet House House 24th Regular Session 1955-1956 Bills introduced 173(1)b 26(13) 77(6) Bills passed 141 4 16 38th Regular Session 1960-1961 Bills introduced 211 35(1) 60(2) Bills passed 150 2 8 48th Regular Session 1964-1965 Bills introduced 139(6) 24(5) 64(19) Bills passed 125(1) 4 10 Slst Regular Session 1965-1966 Bills introduced 156 18 60 Bills passed 136 0 11 55th Special Session 1967 Bills introduced 152 13 43 Bills passed 131 0 6 aSource: Nathaniel B. Thayer, How the Conservatives Rule Japan (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1969), p. 220. Table 15. bFigures in parenthesis show number of bills brought forward from previous session. Table compiled from statistics of Shugiin Hoseikyoku—-House of Representatives). 27 constituent parties had enjoyed a long prewar heritage in their organization as well as in‘leadership. The LDP inherited most of these structural aspects while adding new organs such as the establishment of the vice—presidency and the institutionalization of the secretariat, as its opera— tions have become increasingly complex. (See Appendix 1.A. for the organizational chart of the LDP.) The Policy Affairs Research Council formulates party policies according to suggestions from the Dietmen, the bureaucracy, and the external groups, to be approved by the decision—making organs of the LDP, the Party Conference, the Assembly of the members of both houses of the Diet and the Executive Council. The Party Conference, convened once a year by the party President, although it is the supreme organ Of the party and elects the party officials and approves party budgets, is characterized by the absence of deliberation of policy. The Assembly is to examine and decide especially important questions concerning party man- agement and activities in the Diet and also to substitute for the party conference in matters requiring an urgent decision. These two organs are more or less nominal despite their significance on paper. The 30—member Executive Council, which consists Of 15 elected by ballot of all the House of Representative members and 15 from the House of Councilors, carries more de facto power. It appoints per— sonnel to the various party posts and approves the policies presented by the PARC (Policy Affairs Research Council). Of 28 course the Presidency of the party which holds the Prime Ministership, along with the Vice—Presidency and the post of the Secretary General, are powerful positions, and the occupants of these Offices exercise strong influence in the outcome of party policies. One characteristic we must note in the Japanese policy decision process which is particularly true in the LDP is that even when a majority vote is specified as procedural, most decisions are resolved by hanashiai, that is, talking it over in search of unanimous agreement, which characterizes most of the intra-party decision making. This hanashiai in the Executive Council is often furthered by the existence Of factions within the LDP as discussed below. The actual working of the above policy-making process in the LDP is summarized by Fukui,37 in an extensive study of that subject, as a "complex process of interaction between four factors: (1) membership; (2) party organization; (3) intraparty factions; and (4) connections with external groups." The LDP was initially formed essentially as a con- servative Diet members' group but has made efforts to extend its power as a "mass" party. However, the majority of the 1.9 million or so members are nominal and the size of the effective membership still remains at about 50,000. "The policy—making power is narrowly concentrated in the hands of slightly more than 400 Diet members who constitute the inner ring of the party membership and monOpolize all party 29 party offices at the headquarters.“38 400 Diet members 8,500 Local politicians 40,000 Ordinary members—-peripheral ring the rest A reserve array Of regular LDP voters In terms Of its membership and party organization, it is a typical parliamentary party. Non-parliamentary party mem— bers or the local branches exercise no significant influ— ences.39 For these reasons, the LDP is compelled to depend greatly upon various extra-party groups for the acquisition of political funds and votes. After the Occupation, the business groups seriously chose to become the main prOe. viders Of political funds for the LDP. The political donan tions are channeled through either the formal party organi— zation or the individual party members. There is a distinct trend in the nature of contributions, however. In 1957, 30% Of the donations came from 20 individual enterprises, while only 6% came from trade and professional associations. In 1962, only 10% of funds came from individual companies, while 25% came from trade and professional associations. In 1965, 90% Of the LDP income was channeled through the Kokumin Kuokai,4o while only 2% came directly from either the indi- vidual enterprises or trade and professional associations. (For the detailed picture, see Appendix 1.B.) The Kokumin Kyokai in 1966 was effectively coordi— nating practically all groups and organizations willing to make financial donations to the LDP. Nearly 40% of the 455 30 enterprises and associations which made donations to the LDP or its component parts in 1965 handed their money directly and exclusively to the Kokumin Kyokai. And it has become a powerful organization as a financial supporter as well as the propaganda arm of the LDP. Because of the divergent and conflicting interests within the business community, though, there is a definite limitation to the influence of the Kokumin Kyokai. The businessmen also provided assistance in nego- tiating actual foreign economic activities for the government. As discussed in the first chapter, reparations were Conceived as a means to increase Japanese trade with Southeast Asia. And it was the business community that first of all comprehended this relationship and took the initiative in negotiating Officially on behalf Of the government, and unofficially helped gather information and develop closer relations with foreign governments as well as in implementing the agreements as representatives of the corporations.41 This dependence upon political contributions as well as a kind of moral support the LDP seeks from the business groups has forced in another dimension a close dependence of the cabinet upon the bureaucracy, according to Fukui. This is explained by Fukui as : The technical needs of such policy—making activity on behalf of the providers of funds and votes require the assistance of the various ministries of the national public service. The acceptance of the latter's help in turn obliges the party to heed their misles and 31 inter-alia to undertake legislative actions designed to enlarge their powers and budgetary appropriations. 2 The bureaucrats provide their technical know-how to the LDP. In fact, "practically all the divisions of the policy affairs research council are carried piggyback by the bureaucracy through all the phases of policy making, from the supplying of basic research documents to the drafting bills." And the close contact with the LDP organs and LDP Dietmen is profitable for the bureaucrats themselves for various reasons. Because of the conservative domination of the Cabinet and the Diet committees, if any ministry hOpes to have its policies approved it must gain the approval of the party itself. These three groups, the conservative political leaders, the business leaders, and the bureaucrats, seem to form the "Establishment" in the Japanese society. The fact that they constitute a small, homogeneous group of men who occupy the tOp positions in government, business, industry, finance, education, and the mass media adds to their influ- ence. The large prOportion of the LDP Dietmen (as compared to the JSP Dietmen) graduate from the former imperial uni- versities, particularly Tokyo University, as seen in Table 1.6. The majority of the high-ranking bureaucrats are graduates of Tokyo University. In 1965, all of the Vice Ministers, 80% of the Bureau chiefs, 71% of the Division chiefs, 53% of the Section chiefs graduated from Tokyo University. Often the bureaucrats either enter business or politics after 32 5.5m m.om m.m5 m.0v m.mm m.m Hmuoe m.mm m.mm 0.0m m.mv m.v0 5.m moms 0.0m m.mv m.e5 5.0V H.0v m.H mmmz mommaaoo cam moapemno>wcs “capo m.mv 5.Hm 0.Hm m.mm m.m 0.0m Hmuoe H.0v m.vm ... H.mm ... H.00 mom: m.av m.em m.mN 0.0m m.aa m.5m mmmz Amy can 3: m.5 5.0 ... m.0a m.a m.0 Hence e.5 5.0a ... 0.0H ... 0.m mums m.5 0.5 ... H.0H m.m 0.5 mmmz Amy mmfluwmno>ess HMHHoQEH “mayo m.0m 0.mm 0.HN m.ma m.m m.mm Hmuoe 5.0v m.va ... m.mH ... m.om mum: m.vm 0.0m w.mm m.ma m.m v.mm mmmz w m w w w w lav suemum>eqo omxoe mamuoe msoosma mumflams smE msMAOHuHHom mvsm>nmm Iaoomflz [moon Immosflmsm Hmooq Osanom m.m0mH .Hmnsm>oz .mcssonmxomn Hmsoeumooco use Hmsoeummsooo mo muonsofi poem moq mo QOADMOHMAmmMHUII.m.H magma 33 - .Aommev sesame seem neemnen neurones name one «rammas serene neemneemsnm ammo romaumm .ae .Amoma ..>ozv .00 umam .smucwn wmxxox Eoum UODODHUmsOO .m magma .em .0 .m05ma .mmoum wasuomeamo mo muflmuo>fiss "moaoxuomv mcflxmz MOHHOA one mumnooaoaramumnfiq ommsMQMb one "Ho3om cw muumm .stsm onflnsumm "mousomm 0.¢ o.a 5.N o.v N.HH ... Hmuoe «OH .0. ooom HOq .0. 00. moms 0.m m.a ... m.v H.ma ... mmmz mHoocom auspsosmam N.va v.0a 5.m 5.ma 0.0m 0.0 Hmuoa m.mH v.am ... 0.0m o.mm ... moms 0.ma N.¢H 0.m m.ma m.mm m.H mmmz mommaaoo .mnocomou one .mHoosom HchHDmoo> .maoocom mecca: N.Hm «.mm mnvm v.m5 0.00 H.mm H8009 v.am v.05 0.0m m.V5 m.v0 m.mm mom: H.Hm o.¢m 0.5m 5.m5 v.mm ~.5m mmmz s ~ w m w m w m luv can Amt Amy mamuoe msoosma mundane sea msMAOwufiaom musm>uom tamomwz Inoob Immoswmsm Hmooq OHHnsm .emsqeueoouu.o.a manna their retirement. 34 A8 a result, not only is the LDP loaded with former bureaucrats as Dietmen (38% as compared to 1.8% of the JSP Dietmen), but the former bureaucrats occupy the large prOportion of the Cabinet posts and significant positions in the high decision-making organs of the LDP as seen in Tables 1.7 and 1.8. Table 1.7.--Percentages of former public servants and local politicians in LDP cabinets, 1955-1965.a Local Servants Politicians Cabinets No. % No. % 3rd Hatoyama (Nov. 1955—) 3 16.6 1 5.5 Ishibashi (Dec. 1956-) 33.3 3 16.6 lst Kishi (Feb. 1957-) 12 34.2 6 17.1 2nd Kishi (June 1958—) 33.3 2 11.1 lst Ikeda (July 1960-) 33.3 0 0.0 2nd Ikeda (Dec. 1960-) 23 46.0 5 10.0 3rd Ikeda (Dec. 1963-) 17 50.0 5 14.7 lst Sato (Nov. 1964-) 22 36.6 10 16.6 Total 104 41.4 32 12.7 aSource: Haruhiro Fukui, Party in Power: The Japanese Liberal-Democrats and PolicyyMaking (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), p. 66, Table 7. The checks and balances which are not effectively exercised by the existence of the Diet are exercised to a degree by the demands from the external groups; the business groups and the bureaucracy.4 To a greater degree, it is 35 .0 .m ..OmE0E .0mNsm0 MMI00 amummraa scarce 03030 "onwmfi 08x0monosEHom .ousnmc0sdm00 “mmma .umsmsm 0 use .mmma .mflsn oa .emma beee00>mv 000800000 ma one Amnenm>mv mass mm .mmma .nmnsm>oz mm .ennna «mmumma .em .lmmma .Hmnam>ozv 000 .ommow 5x0m0om Eonm vmposnumsou .0 m0nt .50 .m .A0500 .mmmnm M0s00000mo mo 000mno>0s0 "mmamxuomv 0stmz mmHHOm 08m mmmHOOEmQIHmqu0A mmmsmmm0 mga "H0300 80 00000 .05x50 ou0£summ ”monsomm 800mmwasoo 0.m 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.0 m 0.00 mm 0.0 a coeumnmneama 004m 00 mamasmz 8.0 m 0.0a H .. .. o.m H 8.0H m .. .. .. .. emaneenoumoee omen ms80o0u00om 08009 QOHmm0EEOU 0.00 00 0.05 00 0.00 00 .. .. 0.00 00 0.00 00 0.00 00 s00umanH0mo . . 004m 00 mumnemz 0.00 00 0.00 N 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 v 0.00 v 0.05 5 soEHHMSOImOH> 0000 musm>nmw 000350 0 .OZ 0 .OZ 0 .02 w .02 0 .OZ 0 .Oz 0 .02 00008 0000 0000 0000 0000 5000 0000 m.mcm00000000 0m000 mHHmEHOM 0003 0:3 mmosu 080 mwssoumxomn mO0>Hmm 000nsm £003 m000o0mmo Om Other Ministries) . M x i Other Government / Ministries Liberal Democratic §\\\\\\\\\\\\\\Party Faction Big Business Interests Source: Kinhide Mushakoji, Takoyokuki-jidai no Nippon Gaiko (Japanese Foreign Policy in the Multi-polarized World) (Tokyo: Tokyo Deagaku Shuppan-kai, 1971), p. 22. Figure l.3.—-The informal circuit of foreign policy process. Under this condition the role of the public opinion in Japan today can easily be exaggerated. Opposition of significant intensity generally is confined to urban cen- ters, especially in Tokyo. In summary, therefore, after reviewing the foreign policy making process of Japan, no notion seems to be more adequate than the one that "a nation- state as an actor in international politics is a group of 38 decision-makers, making decisions in the name of the state" for describing its characteristics. And here, the decision makers, although their faces have changed, have always been from the conservative elements of the LDP, except the short interlude between 1947-1948. The Statement of the Problem These observations lead to three major questions. The first question concerns the nature of Japan's security relations with the United States and the degree of influ- ence of the United States upon Japanese foreign policies. The second problem is the degree of persistence of attitudes and images which were prevalent in the pre—l945 Japan among the contemporary decision makers. The third question is con— cerned with the nature of Japanese perception of national identity and of her role in the international world, par- ticularly in Southeast Asia. The increasing "independence" from the United States is assumed as a natural consequence of Japan's recovery from the destruction of the Second World War. Olson argues that, ". . . as the country [Japan] became strong again economically, it was widely assumed that sooner or later it would adopt a more independent course in its foreign affairs, albeit within a general pro-Western framework,"47 and that "the urge to lead to gain prestige as somebody more than a client of the United States was evident in Japan's effort" to mediate the confrontation between Malaysia and Indonesia, 39 both of whose markets the Japanese desired, as well as in her cry for becoming a "bridge" between East and West.48 ward makes a confirming observation that “despite her dependence upon the United States, the secular trend of Official Japanese policy has been toward slow and piecemeal disengagement from the United States' position on a number of important international issues and increasing assertion of Japanese interests and vieWpoints."49 According to Ward, this trend follows predictably from the nation's search for a new international identity, role, and status after the end of the Occupation and return of power and responsibility to Japanese hands.50 Most Japan specialists in the United States seem to agree that Japan, with its high economic prosperity and literacy rate, and as the only highly developed country in the nonwestern setting, is destined to assume some leadership role. This point is summarized in Olson's statement that, The question is not whether Japan should play a larger role in Asia. Such a role is inevitable, in my view. The question is the manner and spirit of the role. This is where attitudes and policies come together in action and where the real meaning of Japanese modernism will reveal itself in events.51 In order to examine the subject from this perspec- tive, we must address a series of detailed analytic ques- tions.' The data specified by these questions are essential to any attempt to address these alternative propositions. The questions may be outlined as follows: 40 1. Did Japan's perception of itself and of the world change? I 2. Did Japan's perception of its role in Asia change? 3. If political leadership were foreseen (i.e., if Japan were to have any political plans in its relation- ship with Southeast Asia), does it inevitably follow that Japan will take the plunge into the “expansionist" and "militarist" footprints? Or will Japan be free from the ‘"old image" of itself? I 4. What distinctions may be found between recent Japanese Asian policies and pre-l945 policies? 5. If the new Asian policies were to be different from the old, what would characterize the perceptual basis of Japan's "new" Asian policies? 6.) Does Japan evidence any ambition to become an example of economic and political development to other Asian nations? 7. More specifically, Olson says that not until after 1964 did Japan have any idea that Japanese welfare 52 Is this true? is related to economic development in Asia. 8. As the only highly industrialized nation in Asia, is Japan willing and ready to expand her increasing involvement in Asian economic affairs and some day, to assume a positive political leadership? 9. To what extent can the expectation to extend political influence in Asia become the main stream of Japan's 41 foreign policy and economic diplomacy the subsidiary theme in the international image of Japanese decision makers? 10. What evidence is there of a Japanese desire to align politically with other Asian states? Is this I desire increasing? I I 11. If Japan were to be aspiring for a greater and independent leadership in Asia, could it successfully change its past image especially to its neighbors in Asia in order for it to effectively fulfill this new role? 12. Is it true that the "national power” of a nation determines the manner in which a nation-state behaves toward other nation-states in international relations? What other factors may assist in predicting a nation-state's behavior in a given situation? "Self—confidence"? "Economic development"? "Modernity"? In order to study the nature of Japan's future inter- national involvement (i.e., how Japan will behave in the international world) particularly in its relations with Southeast Asian countries, we must study the attitudinal basis of postwar Japan's foreign policies. Specifically, the international images held by the Japanese decision makers play a significant role in determining the nature of foreign policies selected by them. And the "past experi- ence" of Japan and of the Japanese leaders seems to exercise a strong influence upon the nature of the images held, that is, the manner in which the Japanese think about and look at the world around them. 42 In Chapter II, the relevant literature for the study of attitudes images of Japanese foreign policy makers is reviewed. Chapter III articulates the problems in hypothesis forms and presents a detailed explanation of methods and research design adopted in this inquiry. The process of computer content analysis of policy speeches will be discussed in detail. Chapter IV presents the data collected and discusses the findings of the analysis. Chapter V summarizes the theoretical and political impli- cations of the findings and discusses the possible future research for the further exploration of the problem. FOOTNOTES--Chapter I 1Kinhide Mushakoji, Takyokuka:jidai no Nippon Gaiko (Japanese Foreign Policy in the Multiepolarized WOrld) (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppan-kai, 1971). 2 Katsuo Okazaki, "Japan's Foreign Relations," The Annals, November, 1956, p. 158. 3Edwin O. Reischauer, The United States and Japan (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965), pp. 293-298. The cost of reparations to be paid in kind and services was as follows: Burma 200 million dollars Philippines 550 million dollars Indonesia 223.08 million dollars Vietnam 939 million dollars Total 1,012.08 million dollars Laos and Cambodia renounced the right to reparations and . instead have been receiving outright grants, totalling about three million dollars and four million dollars, respectively. Nationalist China and India also renounced their rights. 5Baisho-Mondai-Kenkyu-Kai, ed., The Present Situa- tion of Reparation.Program. (Tokyo: Gaiko-Jiho-sha, 1961), p. 48._ 6Theodore McNelley, "Japan's Role in South Asia," Current History, November, 1965, p. 289. ' From 1963, the young technician program was in progress. In 1963, 9, and in 1964, 14 were sent to South- east Asian countries. In Gaimusho, ed., Bluebook on Foreign Affairs (Waga Gaiko no Kinkyo), 1965, p. 160. 81bid., p. 158. 9Ibid. 11Ward in Passin, ed., Op. cit., pp. 29-30. 43 44 12McNelley, op. cit., p. 286. 13Ward, Op. cit., p. 30. l4Ibid. ' 15 Ivan Morris, Natignalism and the Ri ht Wing in Japan: A Study of Postwar Trends (New York: 0x ord UniVer- sity Press, 1960). - 16Willard H. Elsbree, Japan's Role in Southeast Asia NationalistiMovements 1940-1945 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953), p. 8. l7Ibid., pp. 164-65. 18M. P. Narayana Pillai, "Un-Asian Image," Far Eastern Review, April 25, 1968, p. 211. lgMCNelley’ OE. Cito'ppo 29E-93. zoflgditorial," Asahi Janaru, August 22: 1955- 21"Japan's Asia Policy: Panel Discussion," Keizai Orai, November, 1963, p. 70. 22Robert A. Scalapino, "The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan," in Foreign Policy in WOrld Politics, ed. by Roy C. MacRidis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967), _p. 300. 23Warren M. Tsuneishi, Japanese Political Style (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), pp. 200-201. 24Japanese electoral districts used to have 118 districts electing total of 467 MHR (member of House of Representatives). They were increased to 123 districts with 486 representatives in June, 1966. The distribution of districts according to the nature of industrial and urbanization indicators is shown in Table l.A on the follow- ing page. ' The increase in urban electoral districts is accompanied by increases in progressive votes in urban sectors as seen in Table 1.3. As mentioned above, there is an almost parallel decline between the population engaged in agriculture and the conservative votes and the population engaged in the second sector, i.e., industry,and the progressive votes. The remarkable increase in the number of people in the third industries (services) is not accompanied by the increase in votes of any political parties. The future political con- figuration may depend upon which bloc will win the votes of this group (Figure 1.2). 45 Table l.A.--Electoral districts.a Types of Before the Revision After the Revision Districts Number Position Number Position Metropolitan 19. 77 24 96 (ratio) % (16.1) (16.5) (19.5) (19.7) Urban Center 39 156 39 156 (ratio) % (33.1) (33.4) (31.7) (32.1) SemiAVillage 43 170 43 170 (ratio) % (36.4) (36.4) (35.0) (35.0) Village 17 64 17 64 (ratio) % (14.4) (13.7)' (13.8) (13.2) Total 1 118 467 123 486 (ratio) % (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) aSource: Okino, o . cit., p. 128. According to Okin _a__ o s classification, the four dis- tricts types are defined as follows: Metropolitan type: ratio of population engaged in the first . industriés (agriculture) to the total population of the district = 0.01-14.99% Urban Center type: above ratio = 15.00% - 39.99% Semi-Village type: above ratio = 40.00% - 54.99% Village district type: above ratio + 55.00% - 79.99% 25Tsuneishi, op. cit., p. 21. 26And age as well as income level seems to have a significant impact upon this trend. For example, in one study, although 39% of the white collar class supported the LDP, another 39%, the JSP, 5% the DSP, and 1%, JCP (no particular preference, 12%; don't knows, 4%; survey by Tomonori, Hayashi, Tokei-sui-Kenkyujo, March-April, 1961, sample, 2,295), there are significant differences in the distribution of these supports according to the age and income level. See for reference, Table 15. "The Preference of Political Parties Among White Collar WOrkers According to Age," unidentified author (government study paper), 02. Cite, pp. 53-54b 27Shigeki Nishihara, "Are Young People Becoming More Conservative?" Asahi Janaru, July 21, 1964, pp. 12-19. Also condensed and translated, in J. of Pol. and Social Ideas of Japan, I, 3 (Dec., 1964), 137-43. 46 28Robert A. Scalapino and Masumi Junnosuke, Parties and Politics in Contem rary Japan (Berkeley: University of CalIfornIa Press, 1962). 29 Ibid., p. 46. 3°Ibid. 31Ibid., p. 45. Also the Japanese are said to vote for a "person" not for a "party," which works in favor of the LDP candidates who often maintain an elaborate "Koenkai" (Supporters' Organization, or Club). 32Ibid., p. 53. 33There are 16 standing (permanent) committees. By Diet Law,-Committee memberships are allocated to various political parties in proportion to their numerical strength, which cuts down the power of minority Opposition even smaller. Moreover, control of all the committee chairmanships in the lower house is especially useful for the Government Party. All the bills are presented for examination to the relevant committee before they are placed on the floor. (A PM is to belong to at least one committee and not more than two com- mittees and he generally specializes in a particular field.) 34Tsuneishi, op. cit., p. 42. 351bid., p. 43. 36The major factor contributing to the Cabinet leader- ship is the increasing technical complexity of legislation and its execution. An average Diet member does not seem to possess the knowledge to prepare the ever complex legal docu- ments required for successful legislation. The existence of informal but omnipotent policy circulation system which will be explained below added to the picture. 37His research is repOrted if Haruhiro Fukui, Part in Power: The Japanese Liberal-Democrats and Policquaking (Berkeley: Univer81ty of California1 Press, . 1970) 381bid., p. 77. 391bid., p. 263. 40Ibid., p. 147. Kokumin Kyokai was organized on July 15, 1961. By October, 1964, 4,896 corporate members contributing 49, 225,920 yen/mo. and 48,222 individual members contributing 9, 218,111 yen/mo. By 1965, the membership rose respectively to 6,152 and 56, 686, and the amount of the con- tribution to 64, 770, 814 yen and 12, 286, 000 yen, respectively. 47 41For example, the key negotiator in the agreement , with Burma was Japan Trade Association President Fujiyama with Indonesia, Japan Development Bank President Kobayashi, and with South Vietnam, Federation of Economic Organizations Vice-President Uyemura. 42Fukui, 0p. cit., p. 264. 43One of the best studies in English will be found in the case studies by Prof. Fukui, Ibid. 44One interesting study of this aspect was presented by Michael Leiserson, “Factions and Coalitions in One-Party Japan: An Interpretation Based on the Theory of Games, " APSR, LXII, 3 (September, 1968), 770- 87. 45One observer argues that “it can be argued that - the council (PARC) is more important than the Diet because it is in the council where the real deliberations on policy take place. Quiet wars in its chambers are a daily occur- rence, as all the elements of the party fight to have their interests recognized. But once the council has reached a decision and obtained the formal approval of the Executive Council, the party members dutifully close ranks and support it." (Nathaniel B. Thayer, How the Conservatives Rule Japan (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1969], p. 235). And if no legislation is necessary, the Cabinet announces the decision as national policy. If legislation is neces- sary, a bill is presented to the Diet. But even the most heated debate in the Diet rarely changes the essence of the bill. 46Fukui, op. cit., p. 168. 47Lawrence Olson, "Japan and Asia,“ in American Assembly. The United States and Japan, ed. by Herbert Passin TEnglewoodCliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966): p. 82. 481bid., p. 87. 49Robert Ward, "The Legacy of the Occupation," in Passin, ed., op. cit., p. 54. 50 op. cit. 51Lawrence Olson, Japan in Postwar Asia (New York: 52 Ibid. A similar view is found in Tsuneishi, Ibid., p. 138. CHAPTER II PERCEPTION, ATTITUDES, INTERNATIONAL IMAGES AND JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIORS: REVIEW OF LITERATURE I will argue in this chapter that: (l) Attitudes or images which the decision-makers hold toward another country affect the manner in which they behave toward that country: (2) Japan's policies toward Southeast Asia during the period 1955-1967 can be considered as a series of efforts to increase the responsiveness of these countries to Japan; (3) These planned strategies to in- crease the responsiveness were affected by the images which the Japanese decision makers hold concerning Japan's national power and capability, Japan's relationship with the U. S. as well as its general international relations; and (4) There are reasons to assume that the components of these images varied during the period under inquiry. In the process of this discussion, special attention will be paid to the "stability" of images and the impact of the "past events and experiences" upon the international images. 48 49 Japan's Asian policies after 1952 can be considered to be a series of efforts to increase the "responsiveness" of Southeast Asian countries to Japan. "Responsiveness" is defined by Pruitt: An individual's level of responsiveness toward another nation is partially a function of past experi- ence with that nation and partially a function of other images. In this respect, responsiveness is similar to trust. Unlike trust, responsiveness is also frequently a matter of government policy, representing an element of strategic planning. Such policy may be adopted for the purpose of repaying debts, building good will, making to negotiate. The greater the other nation's effective fate-control, the more need will be seen for such a policy and the more responsiveness will be shown toward the other nation. Responsiveness based on positive fate- control is theoretically more stable than responsive- ness based on negative fate-control.l Since the changes in responsiveness are due to conscious policy decisions, the strategies for dealing with other nations will include: (1) building and maintain- ing good will (If we want the other nation's level of responsiveness (2) making the another nation people of that This may cause to increase, we should increase our own.); other nation more dependent (By helping in concrete ways, we demonstrate to the nation how helpful we can be in the future. them to feel more dependent on us and thereby increase our ability to command favors from them in the future.); and (3) signaling a willingness to nego- tiate.2 The nature of these planned strategies would de- pend upon the "objectives" of national foreign policies. 50 Foreign policy making in this context is best described by Snyder, §£_al. "the foreign policy decision- making can be summarized as a process which results in the selection from a socially defined, limited number of problematical alternative projects of one project intended to bring about the particular future state of affairs en- visaged by the decision makers."3‘ And "image of a future state of affairs, a set of conditions to be fulfilled or a set of specifications which, when met, areto be re- garded as the achievement of what was desired by the decision-makers in defined as "objective" of state be- haviors."4 Let us first interpret the Japanese pre-1945 ex- pansionism in the terms of this scheme. Crowley, in his study of prewar Japanese militarism, presents the original thesis that Japan's military and political leaders through- out the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, consistently .and consciously formulated state policies, domestic and foreign, in accordance with two normative standards; (1) the enhancement of national security; and (2) the enhance- ment of the ecOnomic well-being of the state (i.e., "Fukoku-Kyohei", a rich country and a strong army), and that the identification of national security and economic prosperity with a hegemonial position in East Asia became an article of faith for the Imperial Government that was not compromised until the end of the Pacific War. A restate- 51 ment of Crowley's proposition in the terms of the analyses developed above (p. 28-29) would be as follows: the Japanese leaders perceived that Japan was surrounded by two countries whom they perceived to be "powerful" and could overrun Japanese territory.‘ In order to become a "world power" Japan must acquire an ability to wage war against these two enemies. This ability was perceived to be possible only through the incorporation of other Asian countries. Schematic of Japan's Expansionism I. National Goal: To become a great power. II. Definition of Situation. 1. Perception A: Japan is weak with respect to the U.S. The U.S. is hostile” to Japan. Japan is weak with respect to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is hositle to Japan. 2. Perception B: Achievement of the above national goals means that Japan must be- come so strong as to be able to wage war against the U.S. and the Soviet Union. 3. Perception C: Need for a strong military and a higher economic standard of living. ‘ 4. Perception D: The Japanese islands are not large enough to realize their dream. 5. Perception E: China and Korea must be made Japanese territories or at least subject to the Japanese will. 6. Perception F: The China problem needs a new solution. 52 III. The perception Of Alternative Projects: a. Perception G: Advance to the North means possible conflict with the Soviet Union. b. Perception H: Advance to the South means possible conflict with the United States. IV. Misperceptions: l. Misperception A: The Japanese leaders did not think that the U.S. will Ob- ject militarily to Japan's advancement southward. 2. Misperception B: The Japanese leaders con- sidered that the Southeast Asian nationalist movements are manageable and expendible. V. Because Of the above two misperceptions, Project (b) was taken up as a solution to the immediate problem, i.e., that settlement Of increasing involvement in China. THE SELECTION OF ONE PROJECT:' INCORPORATION OF ASIA As THE GREAT EAST ASIA CO-PROSPERITY SPHERE . If Japan were to see herself playing a greater role in Asia and even to picture herself as a future wold "super power" does it follow from this "natural goal" that Japan must inevitably go through stages II-V? Most reasonable persons would answer "NO". Then what factors may intervene in this process? What caused the misperception that the U.S. would not intervene in Japan's project Of Southward advancement? How can this type Of serious misperception happen? One mechanism which may explain such misperception is suggested in the causal diagram on the following page. 53 [ Foreign Policy Input + . ,Foreign.Policy.Output + Intervening.Variab1es The role Of communication as an intervening varia- ble will not be discussed in this thesis. This factor has been discussed elsewhere. One Of these intervening varia- bles is images, perceptions, attitudes Of decision makers. These will in turn, influenced by the psychological as well as sociological backgrounds of the decision makers. One Of the foremost specialists on Japanese foreign policy be- haviors, Prof. Mushakoji, notes three major sources of‘ difference between the pre-Second World War period (i.e., the first "take-Off" period for the Japanese foreign policy) and the post-independence period (i.e., the second "take- off" period) as follows: (1) the closeness to the interna- tional environment; (2) the structure of the international environment; and (3) the awareness Of the outside world within Japan.6 The core of the problem is the manner in which the Japanese policy makers perceived these aspects of the international environment, that is, whether they. correctly perceived the nature and extent Of the above differences and whether they responded to these perceptions in a different manner than they did in the pre-Second World War period. The first problem is the focus of this study. Contemporary research in social psychology and other branches Of the social sciences have found that an 54 actor's image, or his perception of the world and of himself, significantly influences his behavior. Research in political science has also increasingly found that the same perceptual dimensions of an actor's behavior make a significant contribution to the nature Of policy output. A belief system which is composed Of a number Of "images" of the past, present, and future can be defined. This belief system, in turn, governs the manner in which a person perceives his environment and his probable alterna- tive behaviors. It includes all the accumulated organized knowledge that the organism has about itself and the world.7 A belief syStem constantly interacts with new information. When a decision makers faces new information, the changes this new information may bring to him depends upon the de- gree to which the structure Of the belief system is "open" or "closed."8 Attitudes, which are "predispositions to respond in a particular way toward a specified class of Objects" consist of both cognitive (beliefs) and affective (feelings) components.9 However, these attitudes tend to be rather stable. New information that challenges the pre-existing balance between feelings and beliefs generates intrapersonal tension and a concommitant pressure to restore an internally consistent belief system by reducing the discrepancy, but not necessarily through a change in 10 attitude. For example, the source Of discrepant informa- tion may be discredited. The decision-maker may consciously 55 search for information that supports the pre-existing balance. Finally, the new and incongruent information may be accepted, leading one to modify or change his pre- existing attitudes so as tO establish a new, balanced atti- tude structure. The content and source Of the new informa- tion, the situation and the personality Of the recipient may decide this attitude change.11 Likewise, the content of an "international image" consists Of the "beliefs (i.e., the set Of cognitive attribute by which the person understands the Object in an intellectual way), the feelings (i.e., the affective component: a-liking or disliking for the focal Object), and the behavioral aspects (an action component, or set Of responses to the focal Object that the person decides ap- propriate in the light Of its perceived attributes). And both affect and cognitive components tend to be dependent upon each other. That is to say, there is a considerable evidence for a tendency toward correspondence among these image components. Favorable characteristics tend to be attributed to liked nations. Images essentially "serve as screens for the selective reception Of new messages and they Often control the perception and interpretation of these messages that are not completely ignored, rejected, or repressed."13 As in attitudes "a certain minimum level of interdependance among the most salient images is needed for a functioning 56 personality..."C1early the internal consistency both within and among images varies from one person to the next. The person who recognizes that his images are internally incon- sistent, finding his situation psychologically uncomfort- able, will not only 'try to reduce the dissonance and achieve consonance', but also, actively avoid situations and information which would likely increase the dissonance.14 And "many different specific images may be colored by common theme reflecting the person's general world—view, or perhaps more basic characteristics Of his personality."15 In this thesis, however, the latter aspect Of psychological corre- lates will not be dealt with. The psychological environment Of foreign policy decision making consists of both Of these attitudinal aspects as well as the international images Of the decision makers. And to the extent the decision maker can correctly perceive and assess his environment, a certain foreign policy is successful. The natural conclusion Of these Observations seem tO be that the way the decision maker perceives the situa- tion in which he must act has significant impact upon the outcome Of his decisions. Any study Of foreign policy will be incomplete, however, without including an analysis of the general environment which exists independently from the perception Of the decision makers. 57 A number Of smaller scale studies which do not claim the construction of general models, but attempt to test existing theories seem to have followed this direction. I will review the studies in political science in which "perception" Of the decision makers (or elites) are treated as an important variable. Significantly, all Of these studies use some type Of content analysis as a method Of data collection. This set of representative studies can be grouped into three types. The first category includes those which are mainly interested in the defining "image," or "perception" variables. Many Of the studies on percep- tion in political science fall into this category: The comparative study Of international images Of elites in the Soviet Union and the United States by Singer,l6 the comparative study of elite images according to the issue area covering eight nations and sixty four issues by Brecher, et al.,17 Graber's trend study of the perception Of the Middle East conflict in the United Nations.18 Choucri's study19 on the perceptual bases of nOn-alignment as well as study of John Foster Dulles by Holsti20 are good examples Of hypothesis testing exploratory studies. The study Of twenty Presidential nomination acceptance 21 and elite editorial speeches by Smith, Stone, and Glenn comment on the European and Atlantic Communities in four countries by Namenwirth and Brewer22 are good examples Of essentially exploratory studies. 58 The first three studies used hand content analysis method, while the last four studies dependend on computer content analysis method. These seven studies mainly ex- plored the content and structure Of elite perception. Al- though the findings in each study as well as the categories Of analysis are interesting, little or no effort has been directed to the exploration Of reasons underlying the foreign policy behaviors. The next type Of studies concerned with the rela- tions between the nature and content Of perception by decision makers and the actions of nations, mainly hostile behaviors. The most representative is the study by the Stanford group on the perception Of hostility and con- flict behaviors between the Axis and the Allies and the occurrence Of the First World War. They positively con— firmed the increasing reciprocal hostile perceptions.of the Opponents which eventually led to the War, mobilizing massive data.23 The results are presented in various papers. The study by Zinnes on the relations between the perception of hostility24 , the series of studies by Holsti25 followed similar orientation and identified positive relationship between the perception Of hostility Of the Opponents and the hostile actions by the perceiver. The third groups of studies is represented by Holsti gE_al., and the studies by Mogdis and Tidwell27 28 Mogdis examined the relationship between the perceptions 59 and a series of "hard" indices. Holsti gpppl, used the aforementioned 1914 data for perception data and the gold flow in and out Of London, as well as the stock market prices as economic variables. The perceptual data alone did not explain the development Of a local incident into a general war. But the relationship between perceptual data and actual events, particularly the fact that response to a stimulus was always more intense in hositlity than the stimulus itself provided a basic linkage between policy perception and action. In his study, however, the emphasis is upon the perception itself, rather than the combined explanatory power Of perception and hard indices for predicting to the future state behaviors. The papers by Mogdis and Tidwell and by Mogdis use the result of an extensive group study using both perceptual and aggregate data on the fifteen national attributes of each Of the Soviet Union and Communist China and thirty one interation variables between the two countries between 1950 and 1967. Mogdis and Tidwell examined the hypothesis concerning the relationship between the national attributes and changes in interaction between the two countries, based on the field theory Of Rummel.29 They also tested several hypotheses concerning the perception between two nations, independently Of the two groups of hard indices. Although they discovered a parallel development in the perception Of hositlity and some Of the interaction data they did not 60 establish the existence Of any causal relationship. A more significant aspect Of their study is the testing Of hypotheses concerning the perception Of hostility and specific interaction variables. Particularly, the changing differences in the nuclear/industrial gap between the Soviets and the Chinese predicted tO 96 percent Of their increasingly hostile interaction. Their data did not support, however, the relationship between the changing perceptions Of the United States by the Soviet Union and China and their perceptions Of each other. Mogdis later refined his previous analysis and tested the causal relationship among national attributes, behaviors, and perception. As in the previous paper, he develops his theoretical argument on the basis Of Newcomb's model Of cognitive balance, particularly in his examina- tion Of the relationship between the increasing hostile behaviors between the Soviet Union and the CPU, and the increasing difference in their perception Of the United States. The second theoretical basis is a departure from his previous paper and traces the causative relation between the "perception plus national attributes" and the "behav- ior" Of these two nations toward each other. As in the previous paper, he found "no significant relationship between Soviet and Chinese perceptions Of the United States and their increasingly hostile communications or behavior toward each other."30 He could prove from his data, however, 61 that the past behavior (t-l) explains 77% Of the total variance in the present behavior (t) [a test Of proposi- tions Of Charles McClelland's model; behavior+behavior]. He found the highest causative relations between the differences in attributes plus perception and the behavior of these two nations (which explains 89% of the variance in behaviors Of two nations to each other), while the perception of the opponent alone explained only 62% of the variance at the statistically significant level. How- ever, he did not test any hypotheses implying (Behaviort_1 + perception)+Behaviort~ in his study. Thus the national attributes themselves were found to be less effective indicator to predict foreign conflict behaviors of nations. On the other hand, the series Of studies reviewed indicated that the perception or the combination of perception and hard indices are effective measure of predicting foreign policies of a nation. What we need now seems to be a causal model of behavior of a nation-state (or nation states) which incorporates "percep- tion" factors. The Snyder, eE_al,3l model, or Modelski model32 are too broad to be a truly practical guide in this situation. As Rosenau notes they do not prescribe "causal" level relations between the variables they pre— sented and therefore fail to be a guide for a successful research on foreign policy behaviors. We must develop 62 some means by which to compare these prewar perception to the perception Of postwar Japanese leaders. The framework presented by Vital concerning the foreign policy behaviors Of small States is used as a guide- line for studying the relationship between the image variables. Although according to Vital's definition of small states, Japan at the lowest level of its economic prosperity immediately after the surrender does not fit to this category of small states because of the sizg_of the population (i.e., too big). However, the review Of his model seems to suggest that it generally describes the foreign policy behaviors of non-super powers fairly well, and can be used as a guideline in the discussion. One aspect of his model which distinguishes it from others 34 such as Snyder, et al.33 and Modelski is that he at- tempts to identify the relationship between variables in his model. Although Vital does not present the exact nature of the hypotheses (i.e., the direction Of the causal relationships between variables) he phrases his propositions in such a way that a researcher may utilize his frame of analysis to construct testable propositions. According to Vital, a state adopts; (1) active policies; (2) passive policies or (3) defensive policies toward State B, depending upon the relative "national power" of State A in comparison with that of State B. 63 In short, the choice of policy will depend as suggested, on Objective factors; firstly, on the exter- nal, international environment, and secondly, on the state's human and material resources, on the condition Of the state's administrative and military machinery at the particular point in time, and on the ability Of the leaders to marshall the national resources for political purposes. But it will depend, too, and per- haps more crucially, on the nature Of the society in question, on the character and ambitions of the national leaders, and on the predominent View of the value and importance to be attached to the state as such....and even on the attitude to the future that lies beyond the period that can be forseen with any clarity. What type of policy is adopted toward State B depends upon the assessment by State A of her "national power" in relation to that of State B. Not an absolute "national power" in the abstract map of world such as the table of the size of military itself, for each country, which exist in the world, but the "perceived" strength, or "capability" of one's own nation vis-a-vis the country to which a particular policy of State A is directed to achieve for foreign policy goals. When State A perceives its "national power" stronger than the "national power" of State B, it will adopt the active policies toward State B, and so on. And the national goal, set by the decision makers seem to be affected by this perception of "national power" or "capability" also. Therefore, the perception by State A's decision makers, i.e., the "assessment of national power and capa- bility of State A and State B will define the "national goals" of State A at a particular moment, which in turn will affect the selection of particular foreign policy by State A toward State B. 64 When State A's decision makers adopt a certain foreign policy, they cannot consider all the relevant factors which may affect the outcome of such a policy.... because there are too many factors to be taken into account. (See for example, the variables selected by Snyder, §E_al,, to affect the foreign policy Of a country.) But they do take into consideration those which are salient to them at that particular moment, for one reason or another. All the perceptions of input stimuli comprise the "international image." Each perception contributes to the international image to a varying degree, according to the intensity, and frequency Of the cognition of the Object or events or phenomena. A change in one of the images affects the rest Of the images less to the extent an actor is able to dis- sociate images. "Individuals dissociate some of their mental images more frequently with the broadening of their cognitive experience and the widening of their ranges of communication."37 Such broadening Often stems from geo- graphical and social mobility and formal intellectual training. Images, however, are characterized by their sta- bility. "Images and attitudes often persist with little or no substantial change despite spectacular change in the external world, or messages about such changes."38 And habits that actors have learned earlier may be in- corporated into their self—concept. The most that spec—. 65 tacular events or governmental efforts usually can accom- plish is to change some important aspects Of some import- ant images and some aspects Of their relations to . 39 surround1ngs cues and contexts. This stability Of images directs our attention to pre-war Japan's education which, according to Maruyama, embedded the basic foundation for the ultra-right national- ism among individual Japanese, which in turn nurtured the Japanese expansionism. The so-called ultra-nationalist or right wing societies and their movement merely expressed the all pervasive ideology Of right wing nationalism in a more blatent form. There is nothing surprising about this almost universal acceptance in Japan of the underlying tenets Of right wing nationalism...For when we examine these tenets one by one, we find that they are all closely related to the Official education Of "chukun aikoku" (i.e., "loyalty to the Emperor and love of country") which the power elite of Imperial Japan had systematically imposed on the people since the Meiji Period. In certain cases right-wing nationalist beliefs were from the onset part of the Government's programme Of indoctrination; in other cases they were naturally derived from the Official ideology.40 The stability Of images thus poses a serious question in the analysis Of Japanese foreign policies since "pre- vious experiences" as well as "international history" of a country (as an actor) along with its beliefs about its own domestic political system are hypothisized to be the major sources contributing to decision makers' concepts Of international relations Of other states and influence the 41 level Of their perceptual threshholds. The study of the 66 image Of Japan's role in Asia must be examined in close comparison Of Japan's past experiences. Although the "cool" generation which does not remember the Second World War is growing up in contemporary Japan, the majority of the Japanese leaders is still composed of a generation which holds Vivid memories of the Second World War and the poli- tics prior to it. Jervis suggests that past experience can act upon the present national policies in two manners. A state's previous unfortunate experience with a type of danger can sensitize it to other examples of that danger. While this sensitivity may lead it to avoid the mistake it committed in the past, it may also lead it to mistakenly believe that the present situation is like the past one. "Santay- ana's maxim could be turned around, "Those who remember the past are condemned to make the opposite mistakes."42 They also affect the responsiveness of the other nations to the nation at present. This hypothesis may explain the appearance of two contrasting observations by two dis- tinguished specialists of Japanese Political behaviors. I. Southeast Asia, preoccupied with achieving a degree of basic national unity, might be excused for distrusting Japan for its past record. They might naturally fear Japan's growing economic power or deplore the activities of individual "jute—buying generals." But if they truly believed that Japanese business in the 19508 represented the advance guard of a self-conscious national design to put the area under Japanese guardianship or ex— ploit it for Japan's purposes alone in the old manner, they lacked insight into the nature of 67 Japanese modernity, and the extent to which counter- vailing forces Operated within Japanese society. The Japanese were searching for a new national role in Asia; they may have been overcautious and niggardly, but nobody other than a few antiquarians wished to repeat the past. II. It is not hard to visualize a situation in which the extreme rightist elements, who have still not managed to recover from the effects of Japan's defeat in 1945 and the pre-war nationalist politicians who, for all their democratic facade, continue to embrace the Old spirit of Japanese imperialism, will slowly rise from their seats, their faces fixed in a mirth- less grin and, turning to the bewildered populace, will whisper into their ears, "Look at this now! We are all the same in the end, aren't we? Except that our country is more advanced....we got there first! There's no reason that we Japanese should repeat our past. The only trouble is that we didn't go about things cleverly enough last time." In conclusion, the discussion of this chapter may be summarized as follows: 1. Japan's pre-l945 expansionism is interpreted to be derived from (a) the ideology of "a rich country" and a strong army"; (b) the ideology of an "autonomous" national defense; (c) the traditionalist right-wing nationalist attitudes and (d) the misperception of the inter— national environment owing to the above factors. 2. The perceptions, images and attitudes of the decision makers play significant roles in determining the direction of a nation's foreign policies. 3. The perception of one's own nation's national power and capability seems to be one of the most signifi- cant aspects of images influencing the nature of foreign policy selected by the decision makers. 68 4. And, therefore, the role which Japan plans to play in Southeast Asia must hold some relationship to these international images. If the major causes for the prewar Japanese expan- sionist policies in the international environment themselves were largely dissolved during the postwar period, as Prof. Mushakojai reasons, what new attitudinal orientations can be found among the Japanese decision makers? Pacifism? Economism? Political Ambitions? Internationalism? FOOTNOTES—«Chapter II lDean G. Pruitt, "Definition of the Situation as a Determinant of International Action," in Kelman, ed., Op. cit., Chapter 11. 21bid., p. 417. 3Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Sapin Burton, eds., Foreign Policy Decision Making (New York: The Free Press, 1962), p. 90. 4Ibid., p. 82. 5Masao Maruyama, "Introduction," in Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan: A Study of Postwar Trends, ed. by I. I. Morris (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960). 6Mushakoji, op. cit., p. 25. 7George A. Miller, Eugene Galanter, and Karl H. Pribram, Plans and Structure of Behavior (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960). Kenneth Boulding presents a definition of "image" (The Image [Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1960]) which is slightly broader than most scholars' definitions. 8Milton Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind (New York: Basic Books, 1960). 9Milton J. Rosenberg, "Cognitive Structure and Attitudinal Affect," J. of Abnormal and Social Psychology,. LIII (1956), 367-72. lOOle R. Holsti, "Cognitive Structure and Attitudi- nal Affect," J. of International Affairs, XXI, l (1967), 19. 11For details of researches done on these subjects, see Kelman, co. ciE., particularly Chapter 6, ”Effects of Education and Persuasion on National and International Images," by Irving C. Janice and M. Brewster Smith. 12William A. Scott, "Psychological and Social Cor— relates of International Images," in Kelman, oo. ciE., .4. Chapter 3. 69 70 13K. W. Deutsch and Richard L. Merritt, "Effects of Events on National and International Images," in Kelman, CEO Cit.) p0 2340 14L. Festinger, A Theory of ngnitive Dissonance (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962), p. 3. 15Scott, Op. cit., p. 77. 16David J. Singer, "Soviet and American Foreign Policy Attitudes: Content Analysis of Elite Articulation," J. Of Conflict Resolution, VII. 7Michael Brecher, Blema Steinberg, and Janice Stein, "A Framework for Research on Foreign Policy Behavior," XIII, 13 (1969), 75—101. 18Doris Graber, "Perceptions Of the Middle East Conflict in the UN, 1953-1965," J. of Conflict Resolution, XIII (1969), 454-84. 19Nagli Choucri, "The Perceptual Base Of Nonalign- ment," Journal of Conflict Resolution, XIII (1969), 57-74. 20Ole R. Holsti, "The Belief System and National Images: A Case Study," J. Of Conflict Resolution, VI (1962), 242-252. 21Marshall S. Smith, J. Philipe Stone, and Evelyn N. Glenn, "A Content Analysis of Twenty Presidential Nomina- tion Acceptance Speeches," in Stone, et a1., Op. cit., pp. 359-400. 22J. Zvi Namenwirth and Thomas L. Brewer, "Elite Editorial Comment on the European and Atlantic Communities in Four Countries," in Stone, et a1., Op. cit., pp. 401-27. 23Robert C. North, et a1., Content Analysis (Evanston, 111.: Northwestern University Press, 1963). 24Dina A. Zinnes, "The Expression and Perception Of Hostility in Prewar Crisis: 1914," in Quantitative Inter- national Politics, ed. by David J. Singer (New York: The Free Press, 1968), 85-159. 25Ole R. Holsti, "Cognitive Dynamics and Images Of the Enemy," in Enemies in Politics, ed. by D. J. Finlay, O. R. Holsti, and R. F. Fagen (Chicago: Rand McNalley, 1967). 26Ole Holsti, Robert C. North, and Richard A. Brody, "Perception and Action in the 1914 Crisis," in Singer, ed., Op. cit., pp. 123-58. 71 27Franz J. Mogdis and Karen S. Tidwell, "A Quanti— tative Assessment Of Sino—Soviet Relations, 1950—1967," A paper delivered at the 1970 Annual Meeting Of the Inter— national Studies Association, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, April 2-4, 1970. 28Franz J. Mogdis, "The Verbal Dimension in Sino- Soviet Relations: A Time Series Analysis," Prepared for delivery at the 66th Annual Meeting Of the American Politi- cal Science Association, Los Angeles, California, 1970. 29Rudolph Rummel, "The DON Project: A Five Year Research Program," Honolulu: University Of Hawaii, Dimen- sionality of Nations Project (DON), Research Report NO. 9, particularly pp. 26-41 and by the same author, "Field and Attribute Theories of Nations Behavior: Some Mathematical Inter-relationships," DON Report, no. 31, August, 1969; cited in Ibid. 30 . . Mogdis, Op. c1t., p. 35. 31Snyder, et a1., Op. cit. 32George A. Modelski, Theory Of Foreign Policy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961). 33David Vital, The Inequality Of States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967). Vital states: "The present study is concerned with the latter class Of smaller states to the exclusion Of such middle powers. The dividing line between the two groups may be drawn by defining the rough upper limits Of the class Of small states as being: (a) A pOpulation Of 10-15 million in the case Of economically advanced countries; and (b) A population Of 20-30 million in the case Of underdeveloped countriesJ'(p. 8) Japan is in general treated as a "great power" at present, e.g., Brecher, et a1., Op. cit., p. 90. "There are four broad categories: superpowers, great powers, middle powers, and small powers. The place of any state in the power scale depends upon a combination Of four components . . . size, population, military capabil- ity, and economic capability, the last two especially at the point in time of status designation. . . . The great powers (UK, France, Germany, China and Japan) possess any three Of the four so as to give tO their foreign policy decisions a far-reaching but less than territorial impact. . . ." (p. 90) 34Modelski , Op . cit . 72 35Vital, op. cit., p. 122. 36Snyder, et a1., Op. cit. 37Deutsch and Merritt, Op. cit., p. 177. 381bid., p. 167. 39Ibid., p. 185. 40 . .. Maruyama, op. Cit., p. XVll. 41Robert Jervis, "Hypotheses on Misperception," in International Politics and Foreign Poligy, ed. by James N. Rosenau (New York: The Free Press, 1969), pp. 246—49. 421bid., p. 249. 43Olson, 1970, Op. cit., p. 45. 44 . . Maruyama, Op. C1t., p. xxv1. CHAPTER III RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY In order to answer the questions raised in the pre- vious chapters, we have to first (1) delineate the inter- national image held by the Japanese decision makers at a given time, (2) examine the relationship between various components of its image, and (3) determine whether there are changes in the content of the international image or in the relationship among various components of the inter- national image or in the relationship among various com- ponents of the international image over time. On the basis of such findings, we can determine whether there exist any relationships between the expansionist orientation, self— confidence, perception of national capability and of national power, Japan's role in Asia, and the regionalist orientation. The scope of this research is restricted in its methods of inquiry, determined by the availability of data, funds, and methods (techniques) as well as time. Restric- tions made primarily on these economic grounds will be made clear at the beginning of discussions of research design and method. The discussions in this chapter include: Presentation of Hypotheses; Computer Content Analysis; the 73 74 Mitchell Program; Operationalization of Hypotheses (i.e., Designation of Indicants); and Summary Of Analysis Design. Presentation of Hypptheses Identification of Image Structure and Changes in Image Structure Overtime An inquiry into the content of international image of the Japanese decision makers will be the first phase Of the research.1 In order to identify the content of inter- national image in the context of this research, interest of this study, we have to approach from two aspects; (a) identification Of characteristic traits similar to prewar expansionism; and (b) identification of the perceived role of Japan in Asia. From the examples given by Singer2 and Choucri3 and the review of Japanese Asian policies we can construct a hypothesized table of salient aspects Of the international image held by the Japanese decision makers. The classification of levels was derived from Snyder, et a1.4 and the definition of policies (defensive, active-economic, and active-political) follows Vital's model.5 Japanese expansionism, i.e., Japanese policies toward Asian countries during and before the Second World War seem to contain highly tutorial and paternal orienta- tions as elements.6 75 umaamsoamom uoaamsoo Hmsoflums IuousH EH maom Housepmz name OH mflzmuopmmq OHH03 umacoafiou map wo umsnumaol pauoz mmnm one CH ensue: UHHOB moum may SDHB woes mmoau usoEsoufl>sm oeu OCHOGM£U mo manmmmo .usmpamsoolmaomlonoz HamumBOm .THQEQMUIMHmm maocmHHmHEmummm HchHumsHousH muospsoo oEauumB How soaummmmom medaom =¢muflm muflmmmd OHuonoo= mumuaaaz mo amazon mmaoaaom commusoo:.m.b mofloaaom monouOOOIZD usoOHmsoolmaom Immoq tromz .mmoauozomlwaom o>HpmmozuEmum>m HmsoflumsnmusH Amosonommm mo mEmHm .msmam m0 usmEoumumuv coflumouflm Mum . sofluflcflwma Amoaumauouomumno Hmcapsufluumv eoflpmoouom "N Ho>mq msa>aq mo pumpsmum nonmflm soaumuflamfluumspsH mo comm swam muHHonosm w muo>ooom OHEosoom monopsommpsH Hmoaueaom mo mnm>oomm moauucoou amend SOHB mmae omoao mo psoenmflanmummlom How oomz coeuosuomsooom OHEosoom How oooz comma mo soaummfluMHOOEoQ oaumofiop w OHEopmmm Aucmesoua>smuv w GOHDMNflHmDHHHEoQ msoHuHesoo choumxomm mmauussou define new .m.D meme EH musoao>oz mosopcomoosH man spas maoanaamm Assamese aaomm so: once Haasanm meme CH mosmsamsH Hmz smmnom pomsH lumHssEEou msammonosH QHEmHmQEoE ZD UmflmamcopsH Hmz UHOU oocmpcomoosH "H Hm>mq Homo: moaaom o>auo¢ "hmma HOOD: moaaom m>amcmmmo "mmma Hm>oq .aoooz omaoaaoaam a "mowaom cmflmuom ommsmmmb mo msoaumcmamxm nosunamus.a.m manna 76 muoa>m£om msmoq w muwaw anosoom mo Dompsm oncomoo Homsmq d moasusoou smam< QDHB soHDmsmmom moaumflnouomnmso mflm< pmHGSEEOU £DH3 msoHpmHom OHEosoom magnumomoq Hmsouaoo muoa>m£om Hmouom msazu ammo xsmm DCOEQOHO>TQ smamfi umflcsanu EDAB seaboapomoz oz "usmuoo mamnmoum mocmumflmmd OHEocoom Hopmoum ummosm oncomoo HHmEm .m.D map SOHB hummus >pfluoomm .m.D map QDHB Swoosh muflusoom um Ho>oq Hmpoz moaaom m>fluo< "noma Hopoz moflaom o>flmsmmwo "mmma Ho>oq UoDCHDcOUII.H.m magma 77 As noted in Chapter 1, other Asian nation's fear ‘that the increasing interest and actual participatory activities Of the Japanese in Asia may be an indication Of a Japanese revival Of prewar and wartime imperialism and militarism. Whether such fears can be seen as justi- fied or totally unfounded on the basis of Japan's policy pronouncements depends upon the existence or absence Of certain traits Of militarism and imperialism and the tutorial and paternal approaches to her neighbors in Japan's expressed perception of her relations with Asia. The persistence Of these traits corresponding to prewar expansionism among the leaders in postwar Japan is widely recognized by the scholars as in Morris' state- ment: Political power in Japan, though far more widely spread than before the war, remains largely in the hands of an extremely conservative Establishment. This ruling group, whose influence has steadily increased since the resumption of independence, owes much of its strength to the prevalence of pre- modern conditions and traditions that we have noticed. For this reason and, also because its composition, the interests Of the ruling group are at many points contrary to those of modern democracy. Other scholars such as Reischauer, while recognizing the existence of typically Japanese behavioral characteristics, maintains the thesis that Japan has changed. Therefore, the first step in the analysis of foreign policy attitudes of Japanese leaders, must be also the examination of the 78 extent Of this traditionalism among the Japanese decision makers before examining Japanese perception Of her role in Asia. I discussed in Chapter 1 the co-existence of seem- ingly contradictory attitudes in contemporary Japan, e.g., the increasing progressive orienations owing to the in- dustrialization and urbanization yet the increasing con- servative attitudes among the middle class, and the existence Of an essentially pre-modern informal policy circulation process. My first hypothesis therefore, attempts to ex- amine whether we may be able to find the properties which correspond to the characteristics which may be called pre- war Japanese "expansionism—traditionalism." Hypothesis I: There is a trend away from the prewar ex- pansionism and traditionalism in the inter- national image held by the Japanese decision makers. The decrease in the expansionist and traditionalist attitudes among the decision makers will be reflected in their changing perception of Japan's relations with South- east Asian countries. More specifically from the defensive and passive policies to more active policies. The terms, "defensive", "passive", and "active" policies which were introduced in the previous chapters, will be defined in more detail in the operationalization section of this chapter. Hypothesis II: The nature of the perception of the role of Japan in Southest Asia has changed in emphasis from more defensive policies (such as redemption of the wartime be- 79 haviors, economic contributions) to more active policies (economic and political leadership). The question of what role Japan should play is inseparable from the question of the scope Of regional cooperation in Southeast Asia discussed in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2. Hypothesis III: The perceptions of the Japanese decision makers concerning regional cooperation increased over time during the period from 1955 to 1967. Intra-Image Structural Relationships If the Observations by students of Japan that the increase of Japan's economic independence (from the U.S.) would lead to independent foreign policy Of Japan, the perception of this "independent policy" must occur with the change in the perception Of her relations with the United States. This change in perception does not neces— sarily imply a change from friendliness to hostility, rather it must be a change from subordinate to equal status. If this interpretation is correct, then we can hypothesize that: Hypothesis IV: The change in the perception of the role Of Japan in Asia has occurred in conjunc- tion with the changes in the perception of her relations with the United States. The thesis that this increasing feeling of "inde- pendence" from the U.S. has been accompanied by the increas- ing "self-confidence" among the Japanese seems to be widely accepted. The public opinion survey indicated a gradual 80 increase in their pride in the Japanese culture and be- havioral codes in the 1960's. Several interpretations from this standpoint are consumated in Olson's proposi- tion that the changing Japanese perception of her role in Asia would be an inevitable result Of this self- confidence. Therefore two aspects Of Japan's perception Of her role will be analyzed: first, the policy perception, i.e., defensive active policy angle; and secondly, the nationalist-regionalist orientation angle. Hypothesis V: The increase in the self-confidence Of 5‘ I' ‘ ‘ Japan occurred in conjunction with the change in her perceived role in Asia from defensive policies to active policies. ‘Hypothesis VI: The increase in the self-confidence Of *5 T‘ Japan occurred in conjunction with the change from nationalist to regionalist orientation. As noted in Chapters 1 and 2, Vital argues that the small state which perceives itself to be stronger than its neighbors, will adopt active policies toward these neighbors, while when it perceives its power to be less than that Of its neighbors, it will adopt passive or defensive policies toward them. If we follow this argu- ment, Japan seemed to perceive that it was more powerful than China and other Asian countries when it adopted ex- pansionist policies. If so, at the time of the surrender, deprived Of all its economic and military power, it is most likely that Japan felt that she was equal in national power to other Asian countries, or less powerful and that 81 her altered perceptions Of her power and national capabil- ity vis-a-vis other Asian countries were accompanied by changed perceptions of her role in Asia. In another context, Terhune found that the percep- tion Of weak national power tend to be aSsociated with higher nationalism among the foreign students in the U.S.8 It would be meaningful first to relate this dimension of perception Of national power to the nationalist orienta- tion Of Japanese decision makers. Hypothesis VII: The change in the perception Of the role of Japan from defensive policies to active policies occurred in conjunction with the changes in her perception of Japan's "national power" or "capability" vis-a-vis other Asian countries. Next, the relationship between the perception of Japanese national power9 and her role in Asia by the decision makers that: Hypothesis VIII: The change in the perception Of its national power (from weak to strong) occurred in conjunction with changes in the nationalist orientation Of Japanese decision makers (from nationalist to regionalist). The general change in the international image of Japanese decision makers along the time dimension will be hypothesized in summary as shown on the following page. Data Source The data on attitudes and international image of Japanese decision makers are derived from computer content .momsmnu momEH mo humfifidmnl.m.m mabme umflHMQOHmmm mOAOEHom m>wuom moonum w magmmmo who: pompflchUIMHmm one: vacuum a manmmmo who: msonum w wanmmmu mmmq psooflmsoolmaom mmmq uswpflmsoonmaom who: m a m t . oaamnoommo amoanaaoa magnumpmmq anosoom pmaamsoauflomse mmmq mowOHHom m>fipod umfiHMGOAmom umwsoflmcmmxm mmmq umfiamsOauaomna , mmflOfiaom m>Hmsowoo unwamcoflumz umflcowmsmmxm H N m 83 analysis Of14 foreign policy speeches made by the Japanese Foreign Ministers in 1955, 1957, 1959, 1961, 1963: 1965, and 1967 at the House Of Representatives.10 Two speeches, one from the first half and another from the second half, were selected for every year. The importance of sampling in content analysis for the purpose Of inferring from a study Of international image by a study Of a sample Of statements to the inter- national image in policy attitudes held in general by the decision makers cannot be overemphasized. At the same time, sampling the foreign policy speeches presents several serious technical problems which will be discussed below. In a trend analysis, sample must be stratified according to certain time period. Here, because of the .nature Of Diet sessions in Japan, several problems arise. The annual meetings of both Houses of the Diet in ordinary session begin in December and continue for a period of 150 days. (The term may be prolonged by a concurrent reso- lution of both Houses.) When unfinished business remains from an ordinary session or when a natural or political emergency requires convocation, the extraordinary sessions are called. These sessions may be initiated either by the Cabinet or from the floor Of the Diet. Although a new ordinary session begins theoretically in December, the exact date of Opening is not specified in the regulation. Thus the date of closing varies, and therefore so do the 84 dates of Opening of new extraordinary sessions to debate the issues carried over from the ordinary sessions as well as the number Of extraordinary sessions held each year. | One solution is to cluster sample according to the "ordinary sessions" which is to be held once a year. This method will narrow down the foreign policy speeches to one per year. However, this clustering method will cause other problems. Since the ordinary sessions begin at the end Of December the policy speeches are given at the beginning of next year.. And since the length of the sessions is 150 days, the speeches always will cover the beginning Of the year and the latter portion of the year will be consistently omitted. Thus this sampling scheme would not be unbiased with respect to certain possible seasonal differences in perceptions. Size of sample was determined by the necessity of covering a seasonal effects as well as the minimum nec- essary size Of data (words) which were guessed from the previously undertaken content analysis researches. Stone, §E_§1., estimated that there Should be roughly 1,000 words for each tag tally when a researcher is using the Psycho- logical Dictionary Or some modification of it. The shortest foreign policy speech made between 1955 and 1967 85 was about five hundred words in English translation. Thus two speeches seem to meet this minimum requirement for researches using Harvard III Dictionary. In this context, an initial examination of a sample of texts suggested that only one policy statement would not be a good representation Of the image perceptions Of the Foreign Ministers. From this and in order to dis- , tribute the sample within a particular year, it was decided to select two speeches for every year from 1955 to 1967; one from the first half period and one from the second half period. The exact methOd used in the selection of speeches is as follows: 1. Using the index to the Kampo, all the names Of sessions at which any foreign policy speeches were given by Foreign Ministers were listed along the names of Foreign Minister and Prime Minister at that particular time. ‘2. The page numbers in the Special Edition (Gogai) Of the Kampg in which these speeches were reported were noted. 3. In the Kampo Special Edition, the date of ‘speech was checked. 4. On the basis of the above information, the figgp and the lagp speeches Of the selected year were marked. Xerox copies of these speeches selected were Obtained from the Diet Library. '86 1967 is a rather peculiar year in the sample. Because of the general election the first foreign policy speech Of the year was given at an extraordinary session and there was no foreign policy statement in the House of Representatives later in the year. Therefore, a speech to cover this deficiency was Obtained from Foreign Minister's speech at the UN. Although this latter speech covers Japan's fOreign policies in general, this peculiar nature of the sample taken in 1967 should be given attention at the time Of interpretation Of the results Of analysis. Data Source Characteristics and Systematic Errors There are certain possibilities of systematic errors because Of the nature of policy speeches itself and translations. These problems must be discussed first. 1. DO policy speeches reflect the personalities Of individual speakers rather than the general orienta- tion Of the government? As discussed in Chapter I, Japanese decision mak- ing takes a form similar to oligarchy, because of the great concerns for "unanimity" in reaching a decision. This is the same in the formulation of party policies. The party encourages each Diet member to follow party line closely 87 and discourages him from expressing an individual opinion on a particularly controversial issue if he does not agree with the position Of the party. An Official policy Speech made in the presence Of Opposition government policies already adopted or an attempt to influence the future policies by stating desirable policy goals. In this process it undoubtedly presents a “definition of the situation" as seen by the government. A statement may camouflage true intention behind the poli- cies suggested. However, in presenting certain policy goals, the speaker must discuss the issue in terms of desirability or undesirability Of certain "happenings" (policies, events, governments, etc.), and therefore, intentionally or unin- tentionally exhibiting his or his group's (for example, party, government) values, attitudes, policy goals as he perceived them. 2. Translation of Sample from Japanese to English The computer programs can process any language if they are written in an alphabet according to certain rules. In written Japanese, the use of Chinese character, the differences in accents in verbal Japanese as well as the context of the usage can determine the meaning of the homograph, i.e., words with different meaning but identical spelling. However, because Of the existence Of tOO many homographs when the Japanese is expressed in alphabets, i.e., Romaji, the use of Japanese at this stage 88 is rather difficult. There is an attempt being made to develop a set Of grammatical and contextual rules by which a computer can be programmed to make reliable decisions about the proper meaning for 1,000 homographs. A similar dictionary for Japanese, if it can be prepared, would certainly make the research in Romaji possible. However, at this stage, such an attempt will involve a linguist highly trained in computer programming and exten- sive funds to cover computer time. For this study, content analysis in Romaji seems infeasible. Therefore, after the sample of text was determined, the following step was taken for the purpose Of translating Japanese into English. First, the list Of speeches marked were compared to the list Of available speeches in English translation from the Japan Report. Those whose transla- tions were not available were translated into English by this author. In case of those whose translations appear in the available Japan Report, the speeches given in both sources were carefully compared tO each other in order to determine whether the whole statement was adequately trans- lated. A careful examination revealed that the main body Of the speeches were carefully presented, except that connecting statements such as the Opening remarks are in most cases dropped in the translated texts in the Japap Report. If any portions Of the main body were missing, which was rare, the translations Of these portions were added. 89 :Thus the sample represents a mixture Of semi- official translations presented in the Japan Report, and the translations by this author. The Japanese tend to use highly ambiguous expressions. Often I encountered a sentence which did not properly end or did not have regular "S + V..." forms at all. In these cases, a decis- ion had to be made from the context, since English syntax demands fairly precise definition of subject and verbs. It is assumed that this mixture of semiofficial translation and the translations by this author will cause no significant errors in the analysis. The reasoning underlying this assumption is as follows: If the absolute frequency count Of each word were used as the basis Of testing hypotheses, then there would be errors because of the use Of more than one translator. However, as discussed in detail in the methods section, an equivalence table, which is essentially a classification Of words into groups according to compound common attributes Of their definitions, is used to reduce the text for the analysis provides. If this classification of words is done without gross errors (i.e., a problem Of validity which will be discussed later), then words which describe the same or similar attitudes, policy, or events, will be set equivalent to the same con- cept. Consequently, if one translator used "economic instrument" and another used "economic means," either "in- strument" or "means" would be indistinguishable in the 90 frequency distribution based on the concepts Of the equiva- lence table. Similarly "aid" and "assistance" would be classified by the equivalence table into the same category. Thus, while there certainly exist systematic errors caused by the tendencies of each translator to use certain words describing certain phenomena, these differences will be insignificant for the analysis undertaken in this research. There may be another source of systematic error, though, because of the nature of policy speeches given publicly, exemplified by systematic avoidance of unfavor- able comments for the golf (such as the speaker's political party, his country, etc.). And these aspects should be given appropriate considerations at the time of interpre- tation of the results. The information on the sample thus Obtained is given in Table 3.3 on the following page. Since the perceptual data and the examination of internal relations of the data play a major and signifi- cant role in this research, most of the discussion in this section will be devoted to the process of content analysis; specifically, sampling and the construction of an "equivalence table." (An "equivalence table" will be defined later.) Definition of Content Analysis Content analysis is defined as "any technique for making inferences by objectively and systematically identi- 91 Table 3.3.--Table Of foreign policy speeches. Year Speech Session Date F.M. (P.M.) 1955b A 22nd (X)a 4.25 Shigemitsu (Hatoyama) 1955 B 23rd (Y) 12.2 Shigemitsu (Hatoyama) 1957 A 26th (X) 2.4 Kishi (Kishi) 1957 B 27th (Y) 11. Kishi (Kishi) 1959 A 3lst (X) 1.27 Fujiyama (Kishi) 1959 B 33rd (Y) 10.28 Fujiyama (Kishi) 1961 A 38th (X) 1.30 Kosaka (Ikeda) 1961 B 39th (Y) 9.28 Kosaka (Ikeda) 1963 A 43rd (X) 1.23 Ohira (Ikeda) 1963 B 44th (Y) 10.18 Ohira (Ikeda) 1965 A 48th (X) 1.25 Shiina (Sato) 1965 B 49th (Y) 7.30 Shiina (Sato) 1967 A 55th (Y) 3.14 Miki (SatO) 1967 B UN 9.22 Miki (Sato) aX: From the ordinary session; Y: From the extra- ordinary session. bThe original list would have included every year. Because Of the cost of keypunching, the sample used in this study include only alternate years. Remarks: There were twenty ordinary sessions and twenty seven extraordinary sessions, besides eight spe- cial sessions and two emergency meetings between 1947 and 1967. In the sample, six speeches are from the ordinary sessions, seven from the extra- ordinary sessions and the only one from the United Nations speech. The peculiar nature of the sample in 1967 is explained in the section on sampling. 92 fying specified characteristics of messages." It must be Objective and systematic. It must be undertaken for some theoretical reason if it is to be distinguished from infor- mation retrieval indexing or similar enterprises.11 Holsti states that “content analysis is likely to be especially appropriate for at least three general classes Of research problems which may occur in virtually all disciplines and areas of inquiry: 1. When data accessibility is a problem and the investigator's data are limited to documentary evidence. 2. When it is important to get repeated measures Of the subjects values, attitudes, and the like over a period Of time, and when a supplementary source of data is needed. 3. When, given certain theoretical components of data themselves the subjects' own language is crucial to the investigation. 4. When there are technical advantages because the volume of material to be examined exceeds the investi- gator's ability to undertake the research by himself.12 In this research, content analysis was selected as an analytical technique because Of the impossibility of interviewing in detail the Japanese political leader- ship. Also, when the study involves the change Over time, interviewing at one point in time can lead to more bias in the findings rather than assisting the research, unless 93 it is used as a purely supplementary method for an inter- pretation of findings. The major characteristic Of computer content analysis is summarized by Holsti's words: "The ability to analyze text reliably at almost unbelievable speed."13 The use Of computer for this purpose "impose[s] rigor and discipline on the formulation of research" and the data "are amenable to reanalysis as Often and, for as many purposes as desired."14 Preparation of Data on Attitudes and Images Using Computer Content Analysis After a careful comparison Of three major computer content analysis programs which are accessible in the United States, i.e., the General Inquirer Program, the General Inquirer II Program, and the Mitchell Program, from the perspectives Of cost, efficiency (i.e., speed), accessibility and reliability, a set of programs written by William C. Mitchell was selected.ls A research using the Mitchell Program unlike those using the General Inquirer Programs, demands a theory, an articulated hypothe- sis and clearly Operationalized indices for the variables to be studied before the program can be implemented. Each concept in a hypothesis defines a list Of words in such a way that there is no Overlap between the words defined by any two different concepts. Thus once the hypotheses have been selected, the concepts of the equivalence table 94 will be firmly defined. The entire text is then trans- lated into these concepts, and statistics on the frequency Of occurrence and patterns Of co—occurrence Of concepts are generated. This is in a sense a more "conservative" approach to content analysis research. The content validity of concepts used in the equivalence table is therefore one Of the most significant tests for the reli- able outcome Of the research. Then, in research undertaken via the Mitchell Program, if we accept the axioms Of a theory, the hypothe- sis derived from that theory, and the a priori definition indices for the variables to be tested, we will not be able to reject the results. If on the basis Of prelimin- ary analysis we accept the a priori definition Of the indicator concepts, and the theoretical hypothesis is rejected, then there can be only two causes: an error in the logic of the theory, or the non-existence of the postu- lated phenomenon. Procedure of Computer Content Analysis Now the process of computer content analysis used here will be discussed in detail. 1. The data were punched on the cards by a key- punch operator experienced in non-numerical documents. The statements were coded according to the specifications of the GI/II manual.16 The subject, verb, and indirect and direct Objects were identified by numerical number 95 followed by a slash, because the original intention was to use the GI/II program for the syntax analysis.17 The basic unit Of analysis is sentence, and the appearance Of certain concepts or cluster of concepts. 2. Then, the data was reduced into a smaller vocabulary using the equivalence table. This phase used the Mitchell Program and one of the most important phase in the research since the nature Of the equivalence table can determine the outcome Of the research to a greater extent. The equivalence table used in this research, "New Asia Equivalence Table," was derived from the Namenwirth Political Dictionary. This is a revisiOn Of the Harvard III Dictionary18 developed by Namenwirth for the analysis of elite paper editorials in Europe and the United States. The Namenwirth Political Dictionary was constructed by adding several tag categories to a list of 83 tags from the Harvard III Dictionary. The tag categories created include Soviet, American, British, French, German, European Atlantic, Nationalist, Unification and International Insti- tution. To these were added general categories which were thought to discriminate political behaviors such as Corrup- tion, Incompetence, Collective-Static, Individual-Static, Collective-Dynamic, Individual-Dynamic, Static and Dynamic. (Appendix 3.1) The latter group Of tags, however, did not differentiate among either papers or years in his 96 study.19 The tags which did not differentiate elite attitudes in Namenwirth Political Dictionary were deleted and other tags which become necessary to cover particular sets Of terms which appear frequently in the data were added. For example, the British, French, German and European Atlantic tags were immediately dropped. The Japan, Southeast Asia, Pacific Region, China tags were added. The resulting dictionary is tentatively called the New Asia Dictionary. In the Harvard III—based dictionaries, words ap- pear first followed by tag names. In general most nouns (objective names) were given a sociological definition and most verbs a psychological definition at the denota- tive level. The first order tags refer to the primary explicit meanings of words. The major shortcoming Of these dictionaries understandably stems from the Classification of words wholly according to psychological and sociOlogié cal concepts and the absence of many terms which are fre- quently used in the study of political behaviors. Another problem stems from the fact that each word is given two levels of definition, i.e., the first order and the second order definitions. The equivalence table, on the other hand, demands the classification of words according to concepts to be exclusive, i.e., one and only one concept name must be given to each word. By defining each word by only one concept we can eliminate the ambiguities in hypothesis testing. 97 This means defining a group of words which share a certain cluster of tags with a new tag (i.e., concept) as already discussed. First the words in the New Asia Dictionary were reordered into tag-word order, using a simple Fortran Program written for this purpose and sorted py_p§q_, Next, those words with more than one tag were isolated from those with only one tag. The latter group of words were left as they stand in the equivalence table. Groups of words with common multiple tags were given new concept names characterizing those combinations of tags. In the next step, after reducing the input data to concepts according to the equivalence table, the Mitch- ell Program produced a co-occurrence table which indicates the proportion with which each concept co-occurs with each other. These associations were taken within sentences, and summed over all sentences in the whole sample. Co- occurrences which are specified by the operational state- ments of hypotheses, but are not present in the sample must force the revision of the operational statement of the hypothesis. Those concepts which do not appear in the test are dropped from the equivalence table. Actual testing of the hypotheses of the study will be done with statistics from the co-occurrence tables specific to the time strata sampled. The equivalence table constructed from the New Asia Dictionary following the procedure introduced above 98 is called "New Asia Equivalence Table." The first version included 91 concepts. After studying the frequency dis- tribution over the period 1955 to 1967, the concepts To-Be, Tool, Weapon, Soviet Union, Latin American Small-Group, Nat-World were drOpped. Commodity was absorbed into "Econ- omic-Value," "Take" into "Get." The current version includes 81 concepts. The list of concepts is presented in Appendix 3.2. At this stage, it is necessary to specify in detail which concepts, or cluster of concepts, from this "New Asia Equivalence Table" may represent the variables in each hypothesis presented above. Operationalization of Hypotheses (Designation of Indicants for Variables) The basic hypotheses presented at the beginning Of this chapter postulate specific associations between elements Of policy images, images across time, or between images. In each case, the specific policy images are com- plex constructs, since it is implicitly assumed that the occurrence of a concept will identify a specific image only under certain conditions in the context of the docu- ment. Operational statements of the hypotheses in terms of unambiguous defining concepts derived from the New Asia Equivalence Table must make explicit those conditions under which behavior constructs are identified. Each Operational statement, therefore, will be formally expressed as the 99 consequence Of the union and intersection Of sub—sets Of the word-defining concepts in the equivalence table. Thus the datum for each hypothesis can be stated as the occur- rence Of some specific set of cells in a table Of aSsocia- tions within each time segment. The specific structure of such operational statements will be developed in the restatement of the hypotheses which follows: 1 ’Hypothesis I: There is a trend away from the prewar ex— pansionism in the international image held by the/Japanese decision makers. Japanese expansionism and therefore, the tutorial and paternal orientation in her Asian policies were sup- ported by the existence of the "old order" i.e., the "traditional" and "feudal" attitudes among the Japanese and their right-wing nationalism. The foremost authority on Japanese militarism, Professor Maruyama characterizes the right—wing nationalism with the following tendencies: l. Precedence of loyalty to the nation over every other form of loyalty. 2. Hostility towards any extension of democratic rights and towards international socialism. 3. Support of militarism and opposition to pacifist movements. 4. Glorification of national mission. 5. Appeal to protect national traditions and culture. 100 6. Emphasis on duties as opposed to freedom. 7. Stress on the individuals family and birth- place as the fundamental bonds of social cohesion. 8. Tendency towards the authoritarian regimenta- tion Of all human relationships. 9. Integration of the national spirit in support Of orthodox ideas. 10. Tendency to be especially vigilant and sus- picious in regard to intellectuals and members Of the free professions, on the grounds that they are apt to become the disseminators of "subversive thoughts."20 Similarly, the traditional attitudes are summarized by Tsuneishi as "ethnocentric, hierarchical, and holistic attitudes" whose characteristics are as follows: 1. An emphasis on the family and nation over the individual. 2. Emphasis on discipline, duty, and obligation over freedom. 3. Distinction in status over equality. 4. Racial arrogance over egalitarianism.21 These characteristics will be summarized as: l. Traditionalistic (status-conscious, discipline, etc.). 2. Nationalistic (ethnocentrism, distrust of outsiders, anti-intellectualism, included). 3. Expansionistic (external advancement). 101 4. Paternalistic-tutorial (toward the natives of other Asian countries). 5. Militaristic (use of arms as a major instru- ment of foreign policy implementation). Therefore, the following concepts were selected from the equivalence table to define the above orienta- tions. Dimension A: Dimension Dimension Dimension Dimension Traditionalism Community A Authority—theme Ideal-Value A Authority—theme Ideal—Value A Obligation Ideal—Value A Follow Nationalism Japan A Distress Nation A Ideal—Value Japan A Ideal—Value Japan A Nation Expansionism Japan A Strength Japan A Attack Japan A Advance Japan A Control Paternalism-tutorialism Southeast—Asia A Small Southeast-Asia A Community Japan A Authority—theme Japan A Guide Japan A Strength Militarism Japan A Distress Japan A Weapon 102 Hypothesis II: The nature Of the perception of the role Of Japan in Southeast Asia has changed in emphasis from more defensive to more active policies. During the Occupation, the immediate concern of the Japanese government was simply a survival as a unified people. The authority of the Occupation were simply ac— cepted. The foreign policy of Japan at this state is defined as an example Of passive policy according to Vital's definition. After the return to the international world, at the initial stages (1955 in Table 4.1), Japanese foreign policies are defined as defensive policies, which aimed at the maintenance of the status quo in Asia in order to preserve the economic recovery achieved during the Korean War, under the protection of the U.S. in the field of national security. Efforts were made to compen— sate for the destruction caused by Japan's wartime conduct and to win back the favor and friendship of Southeast Asian countries. Economic instruments were used essen— tially for the purpose of increasing internal increments (increasing the local standard of living, etc.). Exercise of political influence was either nonexistent or impossible. The use of military instruments naturally was out of ques— tion. Japan had limited amount of resources for diplo- matic and propaganda activities. What, if any, Japan could boast of concerning her superiority must be "cultural." 103 On the other hand, at the more recent extreme of time scale, Japan seems to be more outgoing and active in her foreign relations. Active policies of Japan seem to be based on the perception that Japan might play a desirable leadership role in Asia again. At the initial istage of the employment of active policies, the major goal was to make a greater contribution to the economic develop— ment of Southeast Asian countries: to provide a model for economic development. Economic development Of Southeast Asia was perceived to work favorably for the maintenance Of a prosperous Japanese economy, and to increase Japan's high standard of living. Soon, however, Japan began to speak of itself in terms of mediator in Malaysian conflict, playing the role of a bridge between the East and the West. The credibility of such a role, entailing the use Of both political and economic instruments remains ambiguous be- cause Japan still relies heavily on its alliance with the 'U.S. in the maintenance of the national security. The traits of defensive policy can be witnessed in the following statement concerning the role of repara- tion: To begin with, reparation is for the compensa- tion of the damage and the torments which our country incurred upon these nations during the War, and the exercise of reparation means the fulfillment of our responsibility. However, the role of reparation does not end simply with a passive fulfillment of responsibility. Now a mere recompensation of past damages and tormentations. It lays the foundation for the political and economic relations in the 104 future between Japan and the recipient countries. Moreover, the Objective Of reparation is to achieve the economic recovery Of the recipient nations, sand to make positive contribution to the economic development hereby turning the feeling Of the people Of recipient countries favorably to Japan, and based upon the correct understanding Of Japan, to contribute to the establishment of close econ- omic exchanges and Of friendly relations between both nations. The reparation, therefore, may be called a bridge which forms the basis Of coopera- tion between our country and the recipient country.22 On the other hand, the leadership role is per- ceived in terms Of "responsibility" and "mission" to con— tribute tO the reduction of tension and peaceful recon- struction in Asia. Our country [Japan] who has achieved high rate of economic growth under the free democratic politi- cal system, has presented a good example [model] to other Asian people who tend to lose confidence in the free democracy. In the future, deeply seriousness of our mission and responsibility to make the contribution to the reduction of tension and peaceful reconstruction of Asia. I would like to demand the right interest Of our country in the international community and at the same time to fulfill the responsibility appropriate for the rising international status of Japan.23 Defensive policies, therefore, will be explained by the expression of: l. Redemption of wartime behaviors. 2. Contribution to the economic recovery of Asian countries. 3. Desire to establish friendly relations with Asian countries. 4. Strengthening Japan's international status through peaceful means. 105 5.' Acceptance Of international status quo and dependence upon the U.S. 6. Trade, Economic exchanges, rather than econ- Omic aid and assistance are more important concerns. 7. Treatment of Southeast Asian countries as "equals." 8. Emphasis on the "legal" aspect of equality of sovereign nations and emphasis on the role Of the UN and other International Organizations and Japan's contri- butiOns through the UN. Summarizing these characteristics we can specify the indicants for Defensive Policy Perception as follows: Dimension A: Support of International Status Quo Japan A Maintain Japan A Urge DimenSion B: Perception of Non-Leadership Role Japan A Follow Japan A Avoid Japan A Cooperate Japan A Friendly Dimension C: Definition of International Rela- tions Political-Ideal A Obligation Ideal-Value A Obligation Ideal-Value A Cooperate Ideal-Value A Friendly On the other hand, the Active Policies Percgp: tion will be explained by the following indicants: Dimension A: Dimension B: Dimension C: Dimension D1: Dimension D2: 106 Concept Of Change in International Relations Japan A Advance Japan A Move Perception Of Leadership Role Japan A Authority-theme Japan A Guide Japan A Control Japan A Urge Japan A Promote Definition Of International Rela- tions, Power and Self Japan A Large Japan A Strength Economic Instrument. Southeast-Asia A Economic Ideal-Value A Economic Promote A Economic Advance A Economic Urge A Economic Political Roles Political—Ideal A Economic Political A Cooperate Political-Ideal A Cooperate Political A Promote Political-Ideal A Promote - Political A Advance Political-Ideal A Advance Political A Urge Political-Ideal A Urge The use of military threat and deterrence as an instrument Of foreign policy was not designated as an inde- pendent dimension here, since the preliminary analysis in- dicated that there was only minor frequency Of usage Of concept in the foreign policy statements. Dimension D1 and D2 may need further explanation. The existence of 107 . perception Of active policies, particularly that Of econ- omic leadership, or political leadership, for example, will be determined by the intersection Of Dimension A, B, C, and (Dimension D1 and D2).- Economic Leadership role essentially focuses on presenting Japan as a "model" of economic development Of Southeast Asian countries, and perceiving the "responsibility" and "mission" to contribute to the economic development of these countries. It tends to isolate "political" influence consequence Of Japan which will be brought about by such activities. The perception Of pglitical leadership role, on the other hand, involves the perception Of "mission" and "responsibility" to make contribution to the maintenance of peace in Asia, the idea Of playing "mediator" and "bridge“ role in the settlement of the international con- flict, particularly in Asia, and to assume a leading role in determining the fate in Asia. Hypothesis III: The perception of decison makers con- cerning the regional cooperation in— creased over time during the period from 1955 to 1967. For the study of these dimensions, I am using two above mentioned concepts Of Namenwirth which are derived from the integration theory Of Karl Deutsch, i.e., the nationalist and regionalist orientations. In the study of the North Atlantic area, Karl Deutsch substantiated that: 108 \ o By inte ration we mean the attainment, with— in a territory, Of "a sense Of community" and Of institutions and practices strong enough and wide spread enough to assure for "a long" time, depend- able expectations Of "peaceful change" among its population. By sense Of community, we mean a belief on the part of individuals that they have come to agreement on at least this one point; that common social problems must and can b2 resolved by pro- cesses Of "peaceful change." 2 This sense of community is a matter Of "mutual sympathy and loyalties," of "we feeling," trust and mutual consideration; Of partial identification in terms Of self- image and interests, of mutually successful predictions Of behavior and Of cooperative action in accordance with it."25 Nationalism or national self-consciousness, on the other hand, is "the attachment Of secondary symbols of nationality to primary items Of information moving through channels Of social communication, or through the mind Of an individual."26 From these concepts, Namenwirth selected attention to national and regional symbols as an index Of national and regional consciousness. "Thus increasing attention to regional symbols and at the same time declin— ing attention to national symbols indicate increasing regional integration; Opposite trends conversely imply de- "27 Therefore our concepts will be creasing integration. as follows: Dimension A: Nationalist Perception Japan A Nationalist Political A Nationalist 109 Dimension B: Regionalist Perception Japan A Community Political-Ideal A Community Southeast Asia A Community Southeast Asia A Japan Hypothesis IV: The change in the perception Of the role Of Japan in Asia has occurred in conjunc- tion with the changes in the perception of her relations with the United States. The indicants for the perception of the role of Japan in Asia have been discussed in the presentation Of Hypothesis II. Japan's relationship with the United States has also been discussed in length in the previous chapters. The perception Of Japan's relations with the U.S. are classified from "total dependence" to "equal-partnership." Total dependence will characterize such period as the occu- pation period when domestic as well as foreign policies of Japan was determined by the occupation authorities. The period Of ambivalence in an in-between period during which Japan had to determine which course to take and in what manner, whether to remain as a close ally or as an inde- pendent power. Dimension A: Total Dependence American A (Ideal—Value V Good V Strength V Large V Auth-Theme) Dimension B: Ambivalence American A (Strength V Large V Friendship V Fundamental) 110 Dimension C: Equal Partnership American A (Communicate v Coopera— tion V Friendship) Hypothesis V: The increase in the self-confidence Of Japan occurred in conjunction with her perceived role in Asia, a change from defensive role to active role. The indicants for the first variable was already specified in the discussion of Hypothesis II. "Self— Confidence" is defined as "a realistic and Objective con- fidence in one's own judgment, ability, power etc."28 This definition seems to cover the increasing pride among the Japanese in typically Japanese qualities and products over the years. The following concepts were selected as indi- cants. Dimension A: Less Self-Confident Japan A Bad Japan A Small Japan A Avoid Japan A Distress Japan A Follow Dimension B: More Self—Confident Japan A Good Japan A Urge Japan A Promote Japan A Potential Dimension C: Defensive Policies (Same as in Hypothesis III) Dimension D: Active Policies (Same as in Hypothesis III) 111 Hypothesis VI: The increase in the self-confidence Of Japan occurred in conjunction with the change from nationalist to regionalist orientation. The indicants for these variables were already discussed in Hypothesis II and Hypothesis III. Dimension A: Less Self-Confident (Same as in Hypothesis V) Dimension B: More Self-Confident (Same as in Hypothesis V) Dimension C: Nationalist Perception (Same as in Hypothesis III) Dimension D: Regionalist Perception (Same as in Hypothesis III) Hypothesis VII: The change in the perception Of the role Of Japan has occurred in conjunction with the changes in the perception of Japan's national capabilities and power vis-a-vis other Asian countries. The indicants for the role of variables were dis- cussed in Hypothesis II. The concept of power in inter- national relations has been a controversial topic. The concept Of power as presented in Vital's theory differs from the cognitively simple concept used in the theories of balance Of power (e.g., Morgenthau's presentation). A more viable interpretation seems to be summarized by Mo- Clelland. Although there are a few other attempts, I draw on his interpretation as a conceptual basis Of national 112 capability and power. According to McClelland, the re- lationship between capability and power is as follows: One Of the proposed solutions to the troublesome problem Of identifying power in terms of the elements at the source has been to employ the concept of capa- bilit as an additional and essential distinction. National capabilities suggest the potential to be powerful. This notion helps to separate that which could be mobilized and brought into play from the actual effort and effect. The effort and the effect can then be characterized as power. An advantage in the idea of separating capability and power lies in the need to identify the process Of converting potential power at the source into applied and effective power.29 The part of the analytic scheme presented by him which are particularly relevant here are as follows: 1. National capability is a complex Of elements, the particular combinations of which lie latent within a national society. 2. The varying situations of international politics require decision-makers to make estimates and judgments on what kinds, combinations, and amounts of the national capability will be needed for future use and, hence, will be mobilized. 3. The capabilities that are allocated for ulti- mate use as designated by the decision-makers are processed through the channels of relevant political, military, econ— omic and social organizations. Factors Of selection, con— trol, coordination, timing, and phasing are influences that bear on the effectiveness Of the conversion process and, therefore, on the production Of power....Another way 113 to express the idea Of the conversion process and, there- fore, on the production Of power....Another way to express the idea of the conversion Of capabilities into usable power is to say that power must be brought up through the subsystem Of a national system to the point of application and that the complex situations existing in the subsystems will have an effect on the mobilizing of power.30 In this context, the following concepts were selected. Dimension A: Perception of National Power as weak, less Powerful, and Capable. Japan A Bad Japan A Distress Japan A Avoid Japan A Small Dimension B: Perception of National Power as Strong, More Powerful and Capable. Japan A Strength Japan A Large Japan A Authority-theme Dimension C: Dimension A (defensive policies) Of Hypothesis II. Dimension D: Dimension B (active policies) of Hypothesis II. Hypothesis VIII. The change in the perception of Japan's national power (from weak to strong) occurred in conjunction with the change in the Nationalist orientation of Japanese decision makers (from nationa- list to regionalist). The indicants for the variables in this hypothesis are discussed already in the presentation of Hypothesis III 114 and Hypothesis VII. The dimensions used in the analysis will be accordingly as follows: Dimension A: Same as Dimension A Hypothesis VII. Dimension B: Same as Dimension B Hypothesis VII. Dimension C: Same as Dimension A Hypothesis III. Dimension D: Same as Dimension B Hypothesis III. Analysis Design in in in in The relationship among the various indicants discussed in the previous section is summarized in the following diagrams. I. Change of Image Over Time Table 3.4.--Hypothesis I. Time Expansionist Attitudes 1955 1967 A More + Less B More + Less C More + Less D More + Less 115 Table 3.5.—-Hypothesis II. Perception or Role Of Time Japan in Southeast Asia 1955 + 1967 Defensive Policies A More + Less B More + Less C More + Less Active Policies A Less + More B Less More C Less More D1 (economic) Less More D2 (political) Less More D3 (military) Less Less Table 3.6.-—Hypothesis III. Perception of Time Regional Cooperation 1955 + 1967 Nationalist Strong\\:;\$ Weak Regionalist Weak + Strong 116 Table 3.7.--Hypothesis IV. Perception Of Japan's Relation Time with the United States 1955 '+ 1967 Total Dependence More '+ Less Ambivalence Equal Partner Less '+ More Table 3.8.--Hypothesis V. perception of Role of Self-Confidence of Japan Japan in Asia Less-1955 '+ More-1967 Defensive Policies Active Policies Table 3.9.—~Hypothesis VI. Self-Confidence Less-1955 More-1967 Nationalist Orientation More Less Regionalist Orientation LESS More 117 Table 3.10.--Hypothesis VII. Perception of Japan's Perception Of Role Of National Power Japan in Asia .Weak-1955 Strong-1967 Defensive More Less Active Less More Table 3.11.--Hypothesis VIII. Perception Of Japan's National Power Weak-1955 Strong-1967 Nationalist Orientation More Less Regionalist Orientation Less More The answer to these questions must be determined from the preliminary analysis of the distribution and co-occurrence of tags (concepts) over the total population of sentences in the body of the data. I will present in the next chapter data analysis and discuss the results Of statistical tests. Interpretation of these results will follow in the final chapter. FOOTNOTES--Chapter III For examples Of somewhat similar studies, see Singer, 1964, Op. cit; Namenwirth and Brewer, in Stone, et a1., 1966, op. cit., pp. 401-27; Choucri, 1969, op. cit. 2 . . Singer, Op. c1t. 3Choucri, Op. cit. 4Snyder, et a1., op. cit. 5Vital, Op. cit. 6F. C. Jones, Japan's New Order in East Asia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954). Willard H. Elsbree, Japan's Role in Southeast Asia Nationalist Move- ment, 1940-1945 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953). 7 . . MorrIS, Op. Cit. 8Kenneth W. Terhune, "Nationalism Among Foreign and American Students: An Exploratory Study," J. of Conflict Resolution, VIII (1964). 91n the testing Of Hypotheses V, VI, VII and VIII, we must bear in mind the fact that Japan allocates a rather small prOportion Of her budget to national defense, to be called a big power in the conventional sense of the term. Therefore, from the VieWpoint Of national defense, Japan is dependent upon the U.S., and will be, at least in the immediate future. The effect Of her military dependence on the U.S. and the increase Of her economic power on the nature Of policy atti- tudes held by the Japanese decision makers must be taken into consideration in the analysis. 10The use Of public Opinion data, the analysis Of the prestige paper Opinions are among the pOpular alternatives. However, as explained in Section II the impact Of public Opinion remains in the containment or limiting, if any, Of the scope Of discretion available to the decision makers. The equation of the prestige paper Opinions to the policy elite Opinion is rather doubtful assumption in the case of Japan. The Japanese prestige papers are generally regarded to be more liberal and progressive Opinion leaders than the conservative policy elite's orientation. 118 119 llOle Holsti, Content Analysis for the Social Science and Humanities (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1969), p. 14. lzIbid., pp. 15-17. l3Ole Holsti, "Content Analysis," in The Handbook of Social Psychology, ed. by Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson, Vol. II (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1968), p. 636. l4Holsti, 1969, Op. cit., p. 145. Since the computer programs used in this research are new and in the develOpment stage, there are no handbooks such as those for the General Inquirer (GI) or General Inquirer II (GI/II) Programs. Therefore, it is necessary to follow the procedures Of analysis in detail. The content analysis method using the Mitchell Program differs from the GI and GI/II Programs which are more commonly available in the order and structure Of its steps. The representative characteristics Of both groups Of programs are as follows: First, the two sorts Of programs differ in technical aspects. The Mitchell Program processes the data at much higher speed than the GI programs do. The basic reason for this high speed is that the Mitchell Program stores the data and the dictionary (called an "equivalence table") in the core memory of the computer as Opposed to reading the definition for each word, one word at a time from the random-access file on disk storage. This speed makes it economically feasible for a researcher to repeat the hypothesis-testing or the construction Of the equivalence table if the concepts in the latter prove to be inadequate. Secondly, the dictionaries in the GI and GI/II pro- grams, as in most ordinary language dictionaries, words can be given more than one tag or definition. For example, as mentioned previously, most words in Harvard III Dictionary are given two tags, one psychological definition (first-order tag) and one sociological definition (second-order tag). In the equivalence table, words must be defined by only one concept. Typically, in my research, this concept will be a composition Of the words' first and second order tags in the Namenwirth Dictionary. Thirdly, because Of the second characteristics, in the researches using the GI and GI/II programs, a researcher has a choice between defining hypothesis from the beginning or posing no hypothesis at all. This does not mean, of course, that there need not be any theories for the research. As Holsti noted, the existence of a theory is significant part of any content analysis research. However, if no hypoth- eses are prOposed before beginning the analysis, a researcher can tag his data using a specific dictionary or dictionaries. He may then retrieve tags, generating co-occurrence or asso- Ciation tables, until he obtains satisfactory content dimen— sions Of images or speaker's perceptions. 120 16This phase was done at the Bendix Corporation, Ann Arbor, Michigan. Mrs. Cheryl Crawford kindly supervised this Operation. Originally, I planned to use the General Inquirer/ II Program. However, I was forced to alter this plan because Of the cost factor Of the external disk dictionary storage and access. l7Later, an independent Fortran program was written tO drOp all the unnecessary identification marks, such as this syntax identification, # sign for capitalization, and $ sign for the end Of document, as well as brackets for the identification Of document level (single bracket for the first level, double brackets for the second level, and so on). These syntax identifications can be used in later research. For example, when the researcher wishes to dis- tinguish which nation is giving economic aid to which nation, Japan or Southeast Asian countries, for example, these syntax identifications can prove an effective means to distinguish either situation. 18Many Of the studies which used the Harvard III Dictionary or its modifications are reported in Stone, et a1., 1966, Op. cit. Two Of the studies which belong to political science are: Marshall S. Smith, Philip J. Stone, and Evelyn N. Glenn, "A Content Analysis Of Twenty Presidential Nomination Acceptance Speeches"; and J. Zvi Namewirth and Thomas L. Brewer, "Elite Editorial Comment on the European and Atlantic Communities in Four Countries." Those which applied the Stanford Political Dictionary are numerous. Some of the examples are: Nagli Choucri, "Nonalignment in International Politics: An Analysis Of Attitudes and Behavior," (unpublished Doctoral dissertation, Stanford University, 1967); Nagli Choucri, "The Perceptual Base of Nonalignment," J. of Conflict Resolution, XIII (1969); Ole Holsti, "Cognitive Dynamics and Images of the Enemy," in Enemies in Politics, ed. by D. J. Finlay, O. R. Holsti, and R. F. Fagen (Chicago: Rand McNalley, 1967); Ole Holsti, Richard Brody and Robert North, "Measuring Affect and Action in International Reaction Models," Peace Research Society Papers, Vol. II (1965), 170-190; Ole Holsti, Richard Brody and Robert North, "Perception and Action in the 1914 Crisis," in Quantitative International Politics, ed. by J. David Singer (New York: Free Press, 1968). 19Namenwirth and Brewer, Op. cit., pp. 404-405. 0Masao Maruyama, "Introduction," in Morriss, Op. cit. lebid. 22Baishomondai-Kenkyu—Kai, op. cit., 1963, p. 204. Translated by Kiyoko K. Nitz. 121 23Speech Of Prime Minister SatO at the Diet, January 25, 1965. Translated by Kiyoko K. Nitz. 24Karl W. Deutsch, et a1., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton Univer- sity Press, 1959), p. 5. 25 51bido’ p. 360 261bid., p. 161. 27 . . Namenw1rth and Brewer, Op. c1t., p. 403. 28Jess Stein, ed., The Random House Dictionarygof the English Language (New York: Random House, 1966). 29Charles A. McClelland, Theory and the International System (New York: Macmillan, 1967), p. 70. 30Ibid., pp. 70-71. CHAPTER IV TESTING AND ANALYSIS OF HYPOTHESES The foreign policy speeches were first translated, sentence by sentence, into the set Of selected concepts. Then the frequency distribution of co—occurrence Of con— cepts was Obtained for each speech separately. A sample Of this co-occurrence table is given in the Appendix 4.1. Essentially, two types Of co-occurrence tables were Obtained. The first type counted the co—occurrence Of concepts only once per sentence. If the same concept appears more than once in a sentence, the sentence is counted as having only one occurrence Of the concept, and the concept co-occurs with each other concept in the sen— tence only once. The co-occurrence tabulation thus Obtained does not appear to represent adequately the strong appear- ance Of concepts since the use within a sentence Of several words representing one concept is counted in the same man- ner as a single use Of that concept. TO provide a measure Of intensity, therefore, each use Of a concept (thus, mul— tiple co-occurrences Of a pair Of concepts within a sentence) was counted in tabulating the co-occurrence tables used in this study. 122 123 The hypotheses to be tested are stated in terms Of the existence of specific trends in a certain image vari- able or between two or more image variables. Each variable is stated in terms Of one or more attitudinal, i.e., con— ceptual dimensions, each Of which in turn consists of one or more combinations Of concepts which is a group Of words. The testing Of hypotheses involves three sorts Of examinations: First, testing whether the concepts which comprise the theoretical dimensions are coherent: DO concept co-occurrences within dimensions change over speeches? Are these changes in the direction predicted by the assumptions Of the theoretical hypothesis? Secondly, testing whether the concepts which represent a given dimen- sion change in the same direction and whether the concepts Of a dimension, taken together, change significantly in the direction assumed by the hypothesis. Thirdly, testing whether the predicted theoretical changes in the variables and between variables exist and are statistically signifi— cant. The selection Of a statistical test to examine the theoretical hypotheses presented in Chapter IV posed sev- eral problems. First, since the hypotheses are historic- ally derived, and are expressed in terms Of specific image themes usages, the identification of dimensions represent— ing these themes cannot be a wholly empirical process. Thus the data-reduction capacities Of a method such as factor analysis are not appropriate to the premises of this 124 study. The composition Of the variables is determined a priori by the hypotheses. Common analytical techniques used with prespecin fied variables, such as single variable and multi—variable analysis Of variance, are also not appropriate to this study. Factorial analysis of variances assumes that the effects Of independent and dependent variables are additive. Multivariate analysis Of variance assumes also that the effects across multiple variables are additive. These hardly seem to be appropriate assumptions, since concepts selected cannot be assumed to be independent, and since no theoretical assumptions are made about the overall mean frequencies Of use for concept—pairs. This same problem Of non—independence Of theoretical concepts renders con— tingency or chi-square measures inappropriate for this analysis. Profile Analysis In order to meet the above requirements, the "profile analysis," a non-additive analysis Of variance type Of test across multiple dependent group means, was employed.1 Profile analysis enables us to test hypotheses concerning the group, or average profiles, in the two time periods used in this study. The data (pOpulation) are arbitrarily classified into two groups, according to the beginning half period and the latter half period during 1955—1967. Differences across speeches within the groups, then, provide 125 the "within groups" variance term for statistical testing. It assumes that “groups have been formed from criteria other than the profile themselves.“2 Essentially three types of questions can be tested by the profile analysis: 1. Are the population mean profiles similar in the sense that the line segments Of adjacent tests are arallel? 2. If the two pOpulation profiles are indeed par— allel, are they also at the same lgygl? 3. Again assuming parallelism, are the population means Of the tests different? Question 1 refers to the hypotheses Of no response by group interaction,3 while question 2 addresses itself to the hypotheses of group effects. Question 3 assesses the differential usage Of concepts or dimensions within groups. This measure is not used for the hypotheses here, since no hypotheses Of dimension comparability were pro- posed. In Morrison's development the variances Of the response variates need not be equal. Although "whatever inferences are made about the population profile structure must be accepted in the context of the scales chosen for the analysis."4 The tests are done in terms of the elements Of the mean vectors rather than through the mean squares ratios Of analysis Of variance. The mean vector xi = [ii 1,... x1 p] and §i = [f2 1,..., §2 p] and the pooled 126 covariance matrix S supply the information needed for the three tests. 1 k (sample within group S = ——————- Ah variance-covariance) where Ah is the matrix of sums Of squares and cross products 5 l +...+Nk. The statistic for testing the parallelism hypothesis within the hth group and N=N is Hotelling's T2 computed from N N 1 _ 2 l 2 __ l l __ T = (x -x ),C (CSC) C(Xl x2) N +N 1 2 l 2 We refer N1 + N2 - p 2 F= T 6 (Nl+N2-2) (p-l) to a table of F distribution with degree of freedom p - l and N1 + N2‘- p and reject the null hypothesis at the level if the Observed F exceeds the critical value F p-l, Nl+N2-p.7 C is the (p-l)p transformation matrix 1 -l 0 - - 0 0 O l -1 O 0 0 0 0 1 —l 8 Multiplication of any p element mean vector, y by C 127 essentially computes the p—l differences between successive elements Of y. If the parallelism hypothesis is tenable, we may go on and test the equal condition level hypothesis. This was tested by computing the two-sample t statistic from the sums Of the Observations on all responses in each sampling unit according to the statistic in matrix notion, j(§ - § ) t = 1 2 j'Sj (l/Nl + 1/N2) 9 (j' + [l,...,l] is the p-component vector with unity in each position; multiplication by j sums the elements Of the vector [ii- E21). If the null hypothesis is true, the statistic has the t distribution with N1 + N2 — 2 degrees of freedom.10 In order to calculate these t and F statistics, an APL computer program was written by Charles Wall of Univer- sity Of Hawaii, Information Science Department. The program calculates the mean co-occurrence/sentence scores for each speech and computes the F and T statistics with appropriate degrees of freedom. Summary Of Hypotheses Hypothesis I. There is a trend away from the prewar expan- sionism and traditionalism in the interna- tional image held by the Japanese decision- makers. Dimension A: Dimension B: Dimension C: Dimension D: Dimension E: 128 Traditionalism. Community A Authority-theme Ideal-Value A Authority-theme Ideal-Value A Obligation Ideal-Value A Follow Nationalism. Japan A Distress . Nation A Ideal—Value Japan A Ideal—Value Japan A Nation Expansionism. Japan A Strength Japan A Attack Japan A Advance Japan A Control Paternalism-tutorialism. Southeast-Asia A Small Southeast-Asia A Community Japan A Authority-theme Japan A guide Japan A Strength Militarism. Japan A Distress Japan A Weapon Hypothesis II. The nature of the perception Of the role of Japan in Southeast Asia has changed in empha- sis from more defensive policies to more active policies. Defensive Policies Dimension A: Dimension B: International Status Quo. Japan A Maintain Japan A Urge Perception of Non-Leadership Role. Japan A Follow Japan A Avoid Japan A Cooperate Japan A Friendly Dimension C: Active Policies Dimension A: Dimension Dimension Dimension Dimension D1: D2: 129 Definition of International Relations. Political-Ideal A Obligation Ideal-Value A Obligation Ideal-Value A Cooperate Ideal-Value A Friendly Concept Of Change in Inter- national Relations. Japan A Advance Japan A Move Perception Of Leadership Role. Japan A Authority-theme Japan A Guide Japan A Control Japan A Urge Japan A Promote Definition Of International Relations, Power and Self. Japan A Large Japan A Strength Economic Instrument. Southeast-Asia A Economic Ideal-Value A Economic Promote A Economic Advance A Economic Urge A Economic Political Roles. Political-Ideal A Economic COOperate A Political COOperate A Political-Ideal Promote A Political Promote A Political-Ideal Advance A Political Advance A Political-Ideal Urge A Political Urge A Political—Ideal 130 Hypothesis III. The perception of decision makers concerning regional COOperation increased over time ' during the period from 1955 to 1967. Dimension A: Dimension B: Dimension C: Nationalist Perception. Japan A Nationalist Political A Nationalist Regionalist Perception I. Japan A Community Political—Ideal A Community Southeast—Asia A Community Southeast—Asia A Japan ‘ RegiOnalist Perception II. Southeast-Asia A Near Southeast—Asia A Friendship Southeast-Asia A Cooperation Southeast-Asia A Approach Hypothesis IV. The change in the perception of the role Of Japan in Asia has occurred in conjunction with the changes in the perception of her relations with the United States. Dimension A: Dimension B: Dimension C: Total Dependence. American A Ideal-Value American A Good American A Strength American A Large American A Authority-theme Ambivalence. American A Strength American A Large American A Fundamental American A Friendship Equal Partnership. American A Communicate American A Friendship American A Cooperate 131 Hypothesis V. The increase in the self—confidence Of Japan occurred in conjunction with her perceived role in Asia from defensive policies to active policies. Dimension A: Less Self-Confident. Japan A Bad Japan A Small Japan A Avoid Japan A Distress Japan A Follow Dimension B: More Self-Confident. Japan A GOOd Japan A Urge Japan A Promote Japan A Potential Dimension C: Defensive Policies (same as in Hypothesis III). Dimension D: Active Policies (same as in Hypothesis III). Hypothesis VI. The increase in the self-confidence of Japan occurred in conjunction with the change from nationalist tO regionalist orientation. Dimension A: Less Self-Confident (same as in Hypothesis V). Dimension B: More Self—Confident (same as in Hypothesis V). Dimension C: Nationalist Perception (same as in Hypothesis III). Dimension D: Regionalist Perception I (same as in Hypothesis III). Dimension E: Regionalist Perception II (same as in Hypothesis III). Hypothesis VII. The change in the perception Of the role of Japan occurred in conjunction with the changes in her perception of Japan's "national power" or "capability" vis—a-vis other Asian coun- tries. Dimension A: . Dimension B: Dimension C: Dimension D: 132 Perceppion of National Power as Weak, Less Powerful and Capable. Japan A Bad Japan A Distress Japan A Avoid Japan A Small Perception Of National Power as Strong, More Powerful and Capable. Japan A Strength Japan A Large Japan A Authority Defensive Policies (same as in Hypothesis II). Active Policies (same as in Hypothesis II). Hypothesis VIII. The change in the perception Of Japan's national power (from weak to strong) occurred in conjunction with the change in the nation- alist orientation Of Japanese decision makers (from nationalist to regionalist). Dimension A: Dimension B: Dimension C: Dimension D: Perception Of National Power as Weak, Less Powerful and Capable (same as in Hypothesis VII). Perception Of National Power as Strong, More Powerful and Capable (same as in Hypothesis VII). Nationalist Orientation (same as in Hypothesis III). Regionalist Orientation (same as in Hypothesis III). Analysis Of Hypotheses A sample Of original data (speeches) is pro- vided in Appendix 4-2. The raw scores generated for the profile analysis by dividing co-occurrences Of each pair of concepts in a given speech by number Of sentences in the 133 speech are given in Appendix 4.3. The tables Of pooled co-variance are presented in Appendices 4.4 to 4.23. The results of tests are summarized in two tables below. Table 4.1 presents the result Of testing the adequacy of the combinations Of concepts representing certain constructs Of dimensions which in turn will portray the variables tested. The t scores in this Step 1 show the result of the concepts as originally conceptualized. Those in the Step 2 show the score Obtained using only those combinations Of concepts which are "pro-hypothesis" and strong enough to justify retaining them in the final hypothesis tests. The level Of probability as high as .l was retained because Of the conservative nature Of the profile tests, and the prelim- inary nature Of the Step 1 tests. The second table (Table 4.2) presents the hypothesis test results. A more detailed report of tests, covariance tables, mean vector scores, and the F and t scores are given with each dis— cussion. Hypothesis I Dimension A. Traditionalism. (Refer to Appendix 4.4). Observed frequencies were uniformly small and there were no significant differences over time in this dimension. This seems to indicate that the traditionalism interpreted by those scholars cited above is minimally represented in the data. 134 .moo.o omo.o rosewood p4uaamoHuamopH<:OHuoz + HNH.o Nam.o mmouumeonaoopH ovo.o oeo.o acanaonano ... ... m.oAd mmNN.o uammoH mao.o mao.o camcunnusd lamopH hmo.o moo.o wfimnuunusd <>ufic5EEou EmaamsoHquoue.¢ H >uaaa£pb0pd ouoom u Nuflaanmnoum ouoom u N muoom a ouoom mudoocou oEoz concmEHo memo I > N moum H moom nouoo> com: uouoo> one: soon 2 ANA n wpv .mCOamcwEap mo meaumoall.a.v Tahoe M 135 .. a . . u 000.0 000.0 anaconnmozaamamo as manage -asoa E ..nL HHCGUWCOU w 0» o O Howm O vmm.o hmm.o wocm>fldflu0d HH 000.0 000.0 saoamana 1H060H mna.o MNH.o coHumMOQOOU 0.0vov0.0 0005.0- <60H0>-H000H 000.0 000.0 ceauaoaano <05HM>IHQ®®H mCOHQMHQm 000.0 m0s.0 cohoaoasno Hoseanasnmpas <Hm . , . . 000.0 000.0 mono aaaao -000aoaspa -00060 0 0totm 0 mama 0 NNH.0 0HH.0 compas02a00o00 sacOHpmanoncH.< HH xuaaanmnOpm >uaaanm20ud ouoom u N mpoom H whoom wumoocoo oEmz COAmcoEHQ memo H Qwum HOuO®> Gmmz HOHUQ> C002 (EuOnUCn: .poocflusounn.a.0 wanes 1J36 .. 0mm.o “00.0 0060.10,”..Como0. . . . .- . n . _ . . 000.0 000.0 oao>4:00100 .n n 0 -- ammo . . .IIIII a 0 -0 0 0t . 0 0. 0 0 t- . 0 s0s.0 000.0 00000000.:0300 ...Iwiwoa . 000.0 000.0 000.: n00 000C“ 0x 0003.0 00> .- . . .0. ..0 0| - xrsuoon . 0m . . I . . ..Q. . 4. mom 0 FNN O Charm/«Hm... uflw . , 0 0 0 0 000 0 00 0 N 0 N00. 0 : N0N.0 N00.0 abscsesou _sandnbnoonusom .,. . .- - 00s.0 000.0 sneaasaoo.saaoo-.soa ... ..m . n - i--l . -0 0. .N0 0 0- 0 . 000.0 000.0 >pecsssouacoioo bhaaddOeuom.m ... ... m0.0.d.mo.0 mwmw.m 0N0.0 000.0 season 0o3U0|.Hom .. 000.0 000.0 cai00.00000000000 00a0000a002.0 000 000.0 mm0.0 HmopHu.00d owns . 000.0 000.0 saoaoasoa oats 000.0 000.0 Hmooen.aoaaooco>pe : Hom.0 000.0 0000b00004oocm>p< 000.0 000.0 HEOUHI.Hom:cDOEoLd . 000.0 000.0 Housmaaodaouosoud mma.0 NNN.0 HmopHn.00d mononomoou . HoN.0 000.0 HepauaaomcouoLOQoou 00.0 a No.0 00.N 0.0.1.0.0 00N0.0n 0N0.0 000.0 000601.00d 000m «Oasocoom HMOHDHHOQ.NQ 0N0.0 000.0 OHEocoomaomu: 000.0 mom.0 oaaocoou;ooco>c< ... ... .- 0.0 . a: . I 000.0 000.0 OesocoorqooosoLa A.bmpb~ 00 c 0 t0 0 H000 N 000.0 000.0 unaccoom menu «assasnsaoos 1.:. .I: -wwma 000.0 000.0 ostocoom boomsnnmsH O>H1Mm moamdubmsosusom Msuosoou.aa H0 moaaanononm onoon O nosirhdazsm cpoom b N Shana a spoon nbmoocou oon ceamcosaa memo N -73.”, 1- 1.. -1 o-w Labor...“ c732... EEOC... :13.“ 15.00;»: .ovschcou|u.0.0 canoe 1J3? .Aawma .HHHII3muUUZ “snow 3620 H .no> .naoooz Hoofiumfiumum nooch ob cofluospouucH c<.aafin>muo.m cw moanmu on» CD tenuouou one momma m use u ones . . . . . . + 000.0 000.0 mnosona< mmo.o 000.0 osocuucus< abaaanmbonm muoom u >u000nmnoum mnoom D N muoom a ouoom mumoocou mosmz soflmsosao memo nouow> cmoz nobow> one: Incomxm 0 spam 0 doom .omaaanaoo--.0.0 magma 1338 000 0.vmv0. 0000.0- 02 0000.vmv00.0 00.0 .0000.0 02 0 x u x 0 000 000 000.v0 0000.0- 02 000.v0v000.0 00.0 .0000.00 02 0 x 0 000 000 00.v0v00. 0000.0 0 000.v0v00.0 00.0 .0000. 0 u x 0 000 00000000 0>0000.u mm00000m m>0mc0000.m uchHmcoolwamm mmm0.< .> .cofluwc0emxm mgu 00m ©m>0mmno mum mmocwuunooo unm00m0cw0m oz .>0 mm» 02 000.vmv00.0 00.0 .0000.0 02 o x m x 0 000 000 0000000 00000 02 000.v0v000.0 00.0 .0000.0 02 o x 0 000 oz 0.vmv0. 0000.0 02 000.vmv00.v 00.0 .0000.0 02 0 x 0 000 00 00000000000.o 0 0000mc00mmm.m 0000000000z.¢ .000 may 02 0000.vmv00.0 00.0 .0000.0 02 m x 0 mmHUHHOA m>HuU<.m mmfloflaom m>0mcwwmo.< .HH Oz .mpCMUHGQH mnu 00w mucwEmuflswmn mnu mumwe m COHmcmE0Q haco .H GOHumEMHwCOU >0000anoum wuoom u pasmom whoom m Umuommxm mmHQmH0m> m0mm -nuommm 0000 0000000 00:00 umOB Em00maamuwm .wcflummu mHmmzuomhn mo uHSmmmII.N.v mHQMB 1039 Hwaamumm #02 u AZ Hmaamumm .0> 0000000000 00 m0 0500 m x 0 000 00 00000000000.o 0 00000zo0000.o 0000000000z.m 0003.0 .000> o x m 0 0 000 u x a 000 .> m0m®£uomxm :0 mm mEmm m x d 000 00000000 0>0000.o mm00000m m>0mcmwwo.m xmmz.¢ .HH> 0.00000000 mm» 00:00 0005000 0000. 0000;000 mz 000.v0v00.0 00.0 .0000.0 0z 0 x 0 x 0 000 00000000 000 00:00 0005000 0000.- mz 000.vmv000.0 00.0 .0000.0 0z 0 x 0 000 oz 00000000500 0 000.vmv00.0 00.0 .0000.0 0z 0 x 0 x 0 000 oz 00000000500 0 000.v0v00.0 00.0 .0000.0 0z 0 x 0 000 000 00.v0 0000.0 02 000.v0v00.0 00.0 .0000.0 0 m x 0 000 HH umflamCOddwm.Q H um00©c00mwm.u 0000000000z.m mm» 00.v0 0000.0 mz 000.v0v00.0 00.0 .0000.0 0 000000000-0000 0000.0 .0> c00uME000cOU muflaflnmnoum muoom u uHSQO wuoom m Umuowaxm mm030000> mHmm -000000 umwB m00woum Hmswm ummB E000m00000m .vosc0ucooll.m.v @0908 140 Dimension B. Nationalism. (Refer to Appendix 4.5.) The parallelism hypothesis for Dimension B failed to be rejected: The equal profile test yielded .l with the F distribution with degrees of freedom p-l and N1+N2—p. We reject at the level the notion of equal response means if the observed F exceed the upper critical value F; p-l, N + N2. This last test is not necessary in this research. 1516., p. 145. 167 CHAPTER V DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION The objective of this research is to scientifi— cally delineate Japan's foreign policy by exploring the image structure of the decision makers. This explora— tion develops four types of questions: (1) Do traits of the pre-l945 expansionist-militarist orientations persist in the imates of the post independence Japanese decision makers? (2) Are the Japanese becoming less nationalist and more regionalist? (3) Are the Japanese images those of political and economic leadership? and (4) Are there any relationships within the images held between percep- tions related to the self, such as the perceptions of national power, self-confidence, expansionist, nationalist, regionalist forms of political and cultural orientation. The Traits of Pre-l945 Expansionism-Militarism The Japanese interest in Southeast Asia has con- sistently increased (Dimension F in Hypothesis I). At the same time, Japanese perceptions are becoming lggg nationalistic (Dimension C in Hypothesis I, and Dimen- sion A in Hypothesis III), and less militaristic (Dimension E in Hypothesis I). Japanese expansionism 168 169 exactly as witnessed in pre-l945 period does not exist as a strong trait in the decision makers'perception. It seems rather that policy spokesmen may be explicitly try— ing to avoid mention of any notions which may be reminders of the pre-1945 militarism. Therefore, the fears of Japan's Asian neighbors that her role will follow the pre-l945 model (p. 11, Chapter 1) are not justified on the basis of the sample data. In spite of the above observations, we cannot con- clude that the pre-l945 attitudinal orientations have com- pletely disappeared from the scene. First, the Japanese leaders appear to take pride in the "self" and "nation." This is indicated in the high co-occurrence of concepts, such as, "Japan-Strength," Japan-Authority—theme" and "Japan-Large." At the same time, however, the concept "Japan" is consistently associated with the concepts "follow," "friendly," "bad," and "maintain." And the frequency of perception of the concepts, "obligation," "nation" and "Japan" in association with "ideal-value" is consistent oVer time. The work of several scholars sug- gests this contradiction may be traced to the moral and sociological tenets of Japanese decision-makers. That is, there are persistent strong traits of respect for tradi- tional values which emphasize the sort of harmony of the society Marshall observed in his study of the prewar Japan- ese business elite: "Spokesmen for the prewar Japanese 170 business elite, by contrast, acCepted without apparent reservation the View that individual interests and private gain should be subordinated to the preservation of harmony within an organic society."l Reischauer observed the need for obedience to authority and sense of self-respect, that "Japan's shame ethic depends on the one hand on a strong sense of obedience to authority, but at the same time the maintenance of self-respect also calls for the exercise of will power."2 If this is the case, then the seeming "modernity" in material achievement has not been accompa- nied by "modernity" in the attitudinal orientations of the Japanese leaders as Olson hypothesized. Also, even when the defensive policies were em- phasized, there were strong aggressive attitudes under- lining the former attitudes, as indicated in the frequent association of "Japan" with concepts such as "attack," "advance," "move," "promote," and "control." This may in part be due to the fact that the period after l955 is the period of Japan's increasing economic consolidation and prosperity. Or it may be that the Japanese are essentially more aggressive in their approaches to foreign relations. History suggests that the latter interpretation is more plausible, even though in personal relations the Japanese are seemingly more indirect and polite. A comparison of this period with the previous period (for example, 1946- 1953) would be necessary to finalize this interpretation. 171 The failure to confirm Hypothesis I in the face of data supporting the strong existence of traditional traits, may be explained by Jervis' statement that "a state's previous unfortunate experience with a type of danger can sensitize it to other examples of that danger."3 Thus, the leaders may intentionally avoid any citation which would remind the observers of prewar Japan, and try to present Japan as more modern democratic and friendly. 'In this case, the recent increase in defense budgets on the other hand would belie the picture of friendly Japan the leaders try to portray. And, this, in turn, may support Jervis' observation that actors often do not realize that actions intended to project a given image may not have the desired effect because the actions themselves do not turn out as planned.4 These two possible interpretations, along with the above observation of persistent "traditional" outlook seems to support a proposition that a seeming "modernity" may not necessarily accompany the apparently completely "peaceful" Asian policies. These observations suggest that traditionalism modernity in Japan's foreign policy cannot be conceptualized as simple concepts associa-‘ ted with positive affect. The contradictory images identi- fied suggest that the construct must be defined on the‘ basis of relationships among ego-evaluative concepts and ideal—instrumental images. Thus a wholly new cognitive policy structure becoming open to future investigation. 172 Nationalist, Regionalist, and Leadership_Perception Between 1955 and 1967, the political perception of Japanese decision makers indicated a definite change. The emphasis on policy orientation changed from one of defensive policy to that of active policy. (.01 I [Election Policy Concittre I Assembly of the Menhers of AT the House of Representatives _ National Diet .‘—'.eIIIIs-:;r3 of I— — -- — — - - — — — — ’ O f the EdIKnion md Propaganda Bureau Information Bureau —— InIcrrurIonaI Department "II-IO RELATIONS COMMIT-TEE Publaunom Bureau Pan, Organ Bureau Cullunl Afltin Bureau PARC (Bureau) (Departments) r——— CcnnaI A (Ii-n p_cmnl n';"'"“'n" l1<‘I()’:\flI‘Jllon CIVII .UIJIH Agriculture GI Fornlry Orgamuuon—C 931;:g'gregfmtft'gdq Orgmnalron Hakim & Snull EnIrrprIsn Orrin'uanon ‘I—_c°mm"“ & “dun" :Cmnnmcc & Indunry OIsamuIIr-n NATIOX‘L I——— Induurul Lahou ORGANISATIOX b5." (.mnnmrnl .\ I’ubIIc \Vorhn mMSKlTTLE L—- .\Ird.um a. S-nail Lrucrproc Worker! w " PIIIIIII: lIuIIh - A'. SMIJI \VCIIJ“ L— Souil Secumy r—— You”! Your): L—-Suu$rru Worm“ J———Women‘r Orcaniulion ' L—Wmnm‘r Pom] F—Pubhc Speed“! L_£duurion & Turning Source: Fukui, 0p. c1t., pp. 84-85. I {Secretariatl ' I . . I I---{()rganisation Research Council] I I L- Central Academy of Politicgj I I I I I I _-_.____._..._.__} I I _____________.-._-I ‘See facing page. (Division!) CJIIIHCI Afhin —— L04 iI .\d'n.In-.Iulion P—NJlI-IV14111II"HL( JIIdIfIJi (\IIJH“ E Fort-tn Aflun Finanual — [II-IrJIInnJI Aflaifl F—-——-—S')(I1I«\I.'.nr1 ‘r—-—'— Labour Alina: ‘h—-—.\cnoz mHV muses .oz “mowummm .aa llamas asset mav mamas .0; loans .mn .Aomms poagooom was «NH .02 .Hmooo. “m-omm .mm .lmmms sq: was sass .oz “o-om .no tlsmma Mongoose so mmmm .ox .omgmi "moousom .oEoocH Hmuou ozu we uoc imcoflumcoo ponoE emu mo mommucmouoni Asm.ov ooo.am Ama.ov costs Awa.ov ooo.m .. maasuscas mo 23m iuCasgcu m N v .. quCOU Hwoompfldafl mo HQQLSZ minnofl>aozg fiwo.omv owmtmqmim Awq.mmv oooimmq Huxoxx Cflgoxoz Awm.wnv oomtmomia no.mmv ooo.moa memmocox cmmflwm HmNHcm Awm.ov ooo.am Awm.qo ooo.~v AwH.mV ocm.mm Am.mo ooo.aa mucouncoo wo aom oocflnaou m m d A mcofloofloommm wO OQAdH AHMHmOAwmsuap4dmom “its mecmocox cmgflmw Hmmaom .Hoxov mcofiuofloowmq anoflufldou Awm.mv oomtvna “wo.mmv How.mom Awo.mv ooo.wma Amw.mo ooo‘oa mcodumcoo mo 23m oocHQEOU ma mm vm m mcoflumHoOmmm Mo nonasz ”mcoHonHoOmmm Hocoflmmomoum was oomue Awm.av oom.mv Aww.oav www.mm Awm.aav mmn.ama “ww.mmv oontwm mcoHuzcoo mo Esm oocaneou om HNH NV am momflumuoucm mo umnEoz "mvmflumuoucw AmDUH>H®cH wm.om wv.mm wm.om mm.am oaoocfl Hooch \mcofluccoo nonmz oom.moo.m omo.mmm mmm.oan.a oontqma floooiooaw vcaooooxo .o.Hv mcoflumcoo nomoz mow.mmm.m uncommmia mmm.ommia mwmiwmm oaoocfl Hmuoe mmma Nmma coma nmma Aooo.aw uuflcav «*.mcoflumcoo uo mofluommumo >3 mEoocH mo; mo moousomul.m.a xaocmama 56 24 29 87 32 44 27 57 88 48 50 49 41 86 38 96 95 43 58 46 12 82 83 39 31 99 36 53 89 60 05 78 47 11 84 85 51 40 45 68 22 35 23 97 95 10 93 07 Appendix 3.1. Academic Action Norm Affection American Anger Approach Arousal Artistic Atlantic Attack Attempt Avoid Bad British Cause Collective-Dynamic Collective-Static Communicate Community Control Corruption Danger Theme Death Theme Defense Mechanism Distress Dynamic Economic Equal Expel Europe Family Female Role Female Theme Follow Food French German Get Good Guide Higher Status Ideal Value If Incompetence Individual-Dynamic Individual—Static International Institution Italy-Benelux Job Role 198 Namenwirth Political Dictionary Tags (Alphabetical Order) 09 61 70 O4 77 62 25 63 55 90 21 14 06 18 37 03 42 71 69 30 64 52 19 65 66 01 02 33 16 79 75 80 81 76 73 74 08 20 91 18 98 67 34 26 17 13 92 72 28 54 Large Group Legal Lower Status Male Role Male Theme Medical Message Form Military Move Nationalist Natural World Natural Object Neuter Role Non Specific Object Not Other Ought Overstate Peer Status Pleasure Political Possess Quantity Reference Recreational Religious Self Selves Sense Sensory Reference Sex Theme Sign Accept Sign Ascend Sign Authority Sign Reject Sign Strong Sign Weak Small Group Social Place Soviet Spatial Reference Static Technological Think Thought Form Time Reference Tool Unification Understate Urge Work lil‘lllv 1 199 Appendix 3.2. List of Concepts in the New Asia Equivalence Table (Second Version)a ADVANCE IDEAL-VALUE POLITICAL APPROACH IF POL-ROLE ATTACK JOB-ROLE POTENTIAL ATTEMPT LARGE PRESENT AUTH-THEME MAINTAIN PROCESS AVOID MESSAGE-FORM REPAY BAD MOVE RESTORE COMMUNITY NATIONALIST RESUME CAUSE NATURAL-OBJ SINCERITY COMMUNICATE NEAR STRENGTH CONTROL NEUTER-ROLE TIME-REF CONFLICT NOT URGE COOPERATION OBLIGATION WORK DEFENSE-MECH OTHERS AFRICAN DEVIATION OVERSTATE AMERICAN DISTRESS PLEASURE EUROPEAN DISTANT POL-IDEAL FAR-EAST DISTRUST PROMOTE JAPANESE DANGER-THEME POSSESS INTERNAT-INST ECONOMIC QUANT-REF MIDDLE-EAST ECON-VALUE RESOLVE PACIFIC EXPEL SENSE SOUTH-ASIA FOLLOW SENSORY-REF SOUTHEAST-ASIA FRIENDSHIP SMALL FUNDAMENTAL SOCIAL-PLACE FUTURE SPACE-REF GET THINK GOOD THOUGHT-FORM GUIDE PAST aIn the first Version, 91 concepts were included. In the second version, COMMODITY was absorbed into ECONOMIC- VALUE, and TAKE into GET. TO-BE, TOOL, WEAPON, SOVIET-UNION, LATIN-AMERICAN, SMALL-GROUP, NAT—WRLD were dropped because of the low rate of occurrence. Appendix 4.1. 200 An Example of Table of Co—Occurrence of Concepts. RESOLVE 4 TIMES, COEFFICIENT = 0.26667 PAST 2 TIMES, COEFFICIENT = 0.30769 PRESENT 11 TIMES, COEFFICIENT = 0.46809 FUTURE 4 TIMES, COEFFICIENT = 0.25806 TO-BE 49 TIMES, COEFFICIENT = 1.15294 POTENTIA 15 TIMES, COEFFICIENT = 0.58824 URGE 7 TIMES, COEFFICIENT = 0.32558 WORK 2 TIMES, COEFFICIENT = 0.11429 RESTORE 2 TIMES, COEFFICIENT = 0.57143 REPAY 1 TIMES, COEFFICIENT — 0.66667 SINCERIT 14 TIMES, COEFFICIENT = 0.82353 LATIN-AM 1 TIMES, COEFFICIENT = 0.66667 INTERNAT 1 TIMES, COEFFICIENT = 0.50000 SOVIET-U 3 TIMES, COEFFICIENT = 0.75000 FAR-EAST 2 TIMES, COEFFICIENT = 0.15385 ADVANCE CO-OCCURS WITH: DISTRESS 22 TIMES, COEFFICIENT = 0.57895 JAPANESE 113 TIMES, COEFFICIENT = 0.77663 OTHERS 38 TIMES, COEFFICIENT = 0.69091 NATIONAL 53 TIMES, COEFFICIENT = 0.94643 AUTH-THE 8 TIMES, COEFFICIENT = 0.94118 SOUTHEAS 93 TIMES, COEFFICIENT = 1.11377 APPROACH 51 TIMES, COEFFICIENT = 0.90265 AVOID 11 TIMES, COEFFICIENT = 0.46809 ADVANCE 74 TIMES, COEFFICIENT = 0.58730 ATTACK 17 TIMES, COEFFICIENT = 0.51515 BAD 10 TIMES, COEFFICIENT = 0.90909 COMMUNIT 73 TIMES, COEFFICIENT = 0.89024 CONTROL 29 TIMES, COEFFICIENT = 1.03571 CAUSE 29 TIMES, COEFFICIENT = 0.80556 COOPERAT 112 TIMES, COEFFICIENT = 1.04186 EXPEL 8 TIMES, COEFFICIENT = 0.88889 ECONOMIC 89 TIMES, COEFFICIENT = 1.16340 EC 20 TIMES, COEFFICIENT = 1.02564 FOLLOW 9 TIMES, COEFFICIENT = 0.69231 FRIENDSH 85 TIMES, COEFFICIENT = 0.82927 FUNDAMEN 17 TIMES, COEFFICIENT = 0.82927 GOOD 23 TIMES, COEFFICIENT = 0.71875 GUIDE 24 TIMES, COEFFICIENT = 0.84211 MAINTAIN 10 TIMES, COEFFICIENT = 0.58824 PROMOTE 35 TIMES, COEFFICIENT = 1.00000 GET 9 TIMES, COEFFICIENT = 0.69231 IF 883 TIMES, COEFFICIENT = 1.66447 201 a m\ezmsmqeemm mo mmwe mHme qumHm m\mqum«emm 09 same m\mm>qumm Aa\z«m«e#v mmm .mmw .Om m\mmHmma H\mezmzommo mme mm ozoq mm mequmzoo mo m\onquom gammommm m\mmHzomm oe m\ommoo# EmHzaszoo# mme azm ezmzzmm>oo# Bquaoneaz mme zmmsemm H\equmz oo mme oza .mmaHm 039 oezH «szo# mo H\onmH>Ho mme .mm>ommos# .mmseom emmmamz mme zH “weHoVZOQZOQA zH woman m\mmme oe m\mH H\oneom# mme meHz moneaqmm oHeazoqua meH m\mNH qasmoz oe m\ozHemzmee< m\mH H\zmm4e# ease osz 2H m\m>Heomemo mHme meHs esm osz eoz m\mH H\BH¢ .zammee mo moeaem ezmmmoo mme some m\ozHooae .moamm Aaonemzmmez H mom m\9mmm meH m\oo oe H\z¢man# mo m\equHmHmzommmm mme m\mH H\eH same m\m>qu mm H\H# .asz zazsm mme mom mzams one em mxmaze osmose omHme¢ mme m\ezm>mmm oe m\m>mm H\m3 .mm>m30m#Amv*.m\oszammozH m\zmmm m\m¢m moneaqmm gaonemzmmezH 2H H\onmzme mme .mHme oe oszo oza m\mmseHmzmmmo moamm mme ease m\ozHooDe m\mqmm eom eozzao H\H# .m\moHquom mm; om m\omemoo¢ m\m¢m Aa\onZD¢ emH>om# mmev oz¢ + .wmdmmmmm* zH ezmzzmm>oo mo mozm mo mme mmemm mmememoozH w>mmm oe.mmHmempozH emqu some m\mHm¢mmsm meH nwom>oz m\ was H\onZD# emH>0m# mme .mm>msom# .m\omsmom m\m¢3 H\mozquq¢# zmmemmze mme oza zaomm wzasmmow emmse mo H\ezmzasm¢mm mme .mezmsmmmo<¢ mHmam# mme mo oneaonH Ham mme mmemm .mmomom# zH# .m\om>qumm m\zmmm emu eoz m\m«m oneaDeHm memos mo H\onmzme mmee .m\mezmzm>ommsH ~24 m\zmmm eoz mmm>mmm mme as m \mmomm a\H¢ mosz .H\monemqmm qmoneazmmezH ezmomm mmeeAmv*.ezmzzmm>oo# mHme m .mnmo Hmcflmwuo cwcou mo mamamxm ad .N.v xficcmmmm Appendix 4.3. 202 Table of Raw Scores (number of a particular combination of concepts in each speech/number of sentences in the speech). Hypothesis I. Dimension A. Traditionalism. RAW SCORES GROUP 1 0.154 0.015 0.015 0.046 CommunityAhAuthority Theme 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.000 Ideal ValuellAuthority Theme 0.042 0.028 0.014 0.028 Ideal Value1\Ob1igation 0.022 0.022 0.089 0.000 Ideal Value/\Folow 0.059 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.012 0.071 0.035 0.000 0.000 0.078 0.039 RAW SCORES GROUP 0.090 0.000 0.051 0.013 0.049 0.000 0.020 0.010 0.010 0.000 0.042 0.021 0.083 0.042 0.021 0.031 0.000 0.039 0.078 0.000 0.010 0.010 0.039 0.000 0.015 0.022 0.074 0.007 Hypothesis I. Dimension B. Nationalism. RAW SCORES GROUP 1 0.185 0.123 0.615 0.138 Japan A Distress 0.123 0.027 0.233 0.164 Ideal Value A Nation 0.278 0.139 0.111 0.819 Ideal Value A Japan 0.356 0.089 0.333 0.311 Japan A Nation 0.206 0.029 0.147 0.412 0.165 0.094 0.318 0.329 0.169 0.052 0.338 0.130 RAW SCORES GROUP 0.077 0.141 0.295 0.385 0.039 0.098 0.275 0.304 0.042 0.031 0.208 0.104 0.083 0.031 0.302 0.135 0.235 0.118 0.412 0.196 0.137 0.118 0.265 0.098 0.235 0.110 0.132 0.250 203 Hypothesis I. Dimension C. Expansionism. RAW SCORES GROUP 1 0.554 0.338 0.631 0.000 Japan A Strength 0.151 0.096 0.370 0.000 Japan A Attack 0.431 0.111 0.597 0.083 Japan A Advance 0.200 0.178 0.600 0.222 Japan A Control 0.500 0.265 0.559 0.000 0.529 0.165 0.659 0.247 0.338 0.039 0.481 0.000 RAW SCORES GROUP 0.449 0.244 0.333 0.064 0.402 0.137 0.902 0.157 0.396 0.083 0.510 0.010 0.302 0.156 0.583 0.042 0.608 0.176 0.804 0.078 0.294 0.186 0.500 0.078 0.257 0.184 0.456 0.103 Hypothesis I. Dimension . Paternalism-Tutorialism. RAW SCORES GROUP 1 0.000 0.262 0.185 0.138 0.554 . 0.055 0.110 0.096 0.164 0.151 SOUtheasgmiiia A 0.056 0.042 0.111 0.139 0.431 0.044 0.244 0.111 0.044 0.200 Southeast Asia A 0.029 0.059 0.029 0.059 0.500 Community 0.000 0.000 0.059 0.153 0.529 Japan A Auth. Theme Japan A Guide RAW SCORES GROUP Japan A Strength 0.000. 0.038 0.077 0.256 0.449 0.020 0.000 0.147 0.137 0.402 0.010 0.010 0.031 0.125 0.396 0.073 0.094 0.208 0.188 0.302 0.176 0.216 0.059 0.020 0.608 0.010 0.333 0.049 0.108 0.294 0.096 0.169 0.022 0.184 0.257 204 Hypothesis I. Dimension E. Militarism. RAW SCORES GROUP 1 0.185 0.323 Japan A Distress 0.123 0.014 Japan A Weapon 0.278 0.111 0.356 0.000 0.206 0.000 0.165 0.047 0.169 0.000 RAW SCORES GROUP 0.077 0.000 0.039 0.000 0.042 0.042 0.083 0.000 0.235 0.000 0.137 0.000 0.235 0.059 Hypothesis I. Dimension F. Unidentified. RAW SCORES GROUP 1 0.215 0.262 0.169 0.185 Southeast Asia A Near 0.164 0.041 0.000 0.055 Southeast Asia A 0.139 0.028 0.111 0.014 Friendship 0.222 0.089 0.000 0.000 . 0.000 0.029 0.118 0.000 southeaSt éggaeflation 0.000 0.012 0.035 0.000 P 0.130 0.078 0.130 0.000 Southeast Asia A Approach RAW SCORES GROUP 0.167 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.029 0.049 0.059 0.010 0.167 0.052 0.031 0.000 0.313 0.177 0.094 0.042 0.745 0.157 0.353 0.157 0.686 0.088 0.402 0.196 0.272 0.140 0.125 0.066 205 Hypothesis II. Passive Policies. Dimension A. IR——Status Quo RAW SCORES GROUP 1 0.292 0.785 Japan A Maintain 0.055 0.247 Japan A Urge 0.097 0.472 0.022 1.089 0.000 0.441 0.259 0.247 0.104 0.403 RAW SCORES GROUP 0.141 0.436 0.098 0.569 0.260 0.313 0.083 0.510 0.078 0.314 0.127 0.186 0.066 0.434 Hypothesis II. Passive Policies. Dimension B. Perception of Non-Leadership Role RAW SCORES GROUP 1 0.077 0.200 0.646 0.677 Japan A Follow 0.014 0.260 0.493 0.260 Japan A Avoid 0.069 0.097 0.486 0.458 Japan A Cooperate 0.022 0.111 0.200 0.200 Japan A Friendly 0.059 0.088 1.118 0.618 0.118 0.247 0.682 0.435 0.013 0.052 0.364 0.403 RAW SCORES GROUP 0.026 0.038 0.346 0.359 0.108 0.118 0.824 0.275 0.021 0.031 0.490 0.240 0.021 0.135 0.427 0.521 0.000 0.098 1.039 0.275 0.059 0.108 0.294 0.402 0.103 0.169 0.522 0.493 0.015 0.055 0.139 0.111 0.088 0.141 0.169 RAW SCORES 0.051 0.039 0.104 0.115 0.196 0.010 0.074 RAW SCORES 0.631 0.370 0.597 0.600 0.559 0.659 0.481 RAW SCORES 0.333 0.902 0.510 0.583 0.804 0.500 0.456 Hypothesis II. RAW SCORES GROUP 1 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.089 0.000 0.071 0.078 GROUP 0.051 0.010 0.042 0.021 0.078 0.039 0.074 Hypothesis II. GROUP 1 0.262 0.370 0.194 0.111 0.382 0.365 0.078 GROUP 0.321 0.412 0.208 0.208 0.373 0.167 0.184 206 Passive Policies. 0.323 0.110 0.056 0.000 0.059 0.129 0.182 0.077 0.147 0.094 0.240 0.412 0.118 0.162 0.092 0.014 0.014 0.022 0.059 0.188 0.078 0.154 0.069 0.000 0.115 0.039 0.078 0.176 Active Policies. Dimension C. Definition of IR Pol—Ideal A Obligation I-T A Obligation I-T A Cooperate I-T A Friendly Dimension A. Concept of Change in IR Japan A Advance Japan A Move 0.185 0.096 0.111 0.111 0.029' 0.059 0.000 0.077 0.147 0.031 0.208 0.059 0.049 0.022 Hypothesis II. RAW SCORES 0.446 0.315 0.389 0.222 0.353 0.212 0.260 RAW SCORES 0.282 0.490 0.292 0.292 0.471 0.245 0.463 Hypothesis II. RAW SCORES GROUP 1 0.138 0.164 0.139 0.044 0.059 0.153 0.091 RAW SCORES GROUP 0.256 0.137 0.125 0.188 0.020 0.108 0.184 GROUP 1 0.554 0.151 0.431 0.200 0.500 0.529 0.338 GROUP 0.449 0.402 0.396 0.302 0.608 0.294 0.257 207 Active Policies. 0.092 0.000 0.083 0.222 0.000 0.247 0.000 0.064 0.157 0.010 0.042 0.078 0.078 0.103 0.785 0.247 0.472 1.089 0.441 0.247 0.403 0.436 0.569 0.313 0.510 0.314 0.186 0.434 Active Policies. Dimension B. 0.215 0.123 0.153 0.178 0.382 0.235 0.208 0.167 0.235 0.208 0.271 0.235 0.206 0.081 Perception of Leadership Role Japan Japan Japan Japan Japan Dimension C. 13 A Auth. Theme A Guide A Control A Urge A Promote Japan A Large Japan A Strength 208 Hypothesis II. Active Policies. 'Economic 'Instrument Dimension D1. RAW SCORES GROUP 1 0.092 0.169 0.123 0.231 0.077 Southeast Asia A 0.000 0.068 0.027 0.096 0.041 Economic 0.042 0.139 0.028 0.139 0.097 ' Ideal—Value A Economic 0.022 0.067 0.111 0.178 0.244 P 't A E . 0.059 0.059 0.088 0.059 0.059 Agomo e A ECOnomic 0.012 0.188 0.059 0.447 0.129 vanfie °°P°mlc 0.026 0.052 0.091 0.286 0.130 Urge Economic RAW SCORES GROUP 2 0.026 0.051 0.077 0.167 0.128 0.059 0.343 0.118 0.814 0.225 0.010 0.198 0.135. 0.594 0.104 0.031 0.094 0.052 0.188 0.115 0.059 0.196 0.059 0.745 0.235 0.265 0.098 0.147 0.343 0.029 0.096 0.066 0.044 0.397 0.029 Hypothesis II. Active Policies. Dimension D2. Political Role RAW SCORES GROUP 1 0.338 0.138 0.323 0.015 0.169 0.092 0.292 0.138 0.277 0.110 0.068 0.192 0.014 0.055 0.082 0.151 0.055 0.082 0.264 0.111 0.319 0.028 0.250 0.250 0.278 0.153 ~0.083 0.156 0.067 0.044 0.067 0.067 0.178 0.089 0.178 0.244 0.029 0.088 0.206 0.088 0.029 0.235 0.147 0.147 0.059 0.282 0.412 0.224 0.129 0.082 0.188 0.153 0.165 0.118 0.130 0.260 0.247 0.104 0.052 0.273 0.260 0.234 0.211 RAW SCORES GROUP 2 0.115 0.090 0.026 0.013 0.038 0.141 0.115 0.103 0.077 0.324 0.167 0.059 0.059 0.010 0.118 0.069 0.069 0.010 0.125 0.302 0.073 0.063 0.010 0.385 0.073 0.198 0.083 0.052 0.354 0.229 0.219 0.135 0.531 0.313 0.406 0.188 0.196 0.510 0.353 0.098 0.118 0.863 0.490 0.353 0.275 0.020 0.196 '0.029 0.098 0.029 0.333 0.108 0.127 0.069 0.066 0.206 0.176 0.044 0.037 0.228 0.140 0.228 0.132 Advance A Pol.- Ideal Urge A Political Urge A Pol-Ideal Promote A Political Promote A Pol.-Idea1 Advance A Political Pol.—Ideal A Economic COOperate A Political Cooperate A Pol.-Idea1 209 Hypothesis III. Dimension A. Nationalist Perception. RAW SCORES GROUP 1 Hypothesis III. Dimension B. 0.138 0.354 Nation A Japan 0.164 0.178 Pol.—Ideal A Nation 0.819 0.361 0.311 0.489 0.412 0.118 0.329 0.106 0.130 0.558 RAW SCORES GROUP 0.385 0.128 0.304 0.049 0.104 0.063 0.135 0.458 0.196 0.078 0.098 0.000 0.250 0.074 Regionalist Perception. RAW SCORES GROUP 0.415 0.277 0.262 0.477 Japan A Community 0.329 0.301 0.110 0.178 Pol.-Idea1 A Community 0.792 0.319 0.042 0.139 Southeast Asia A Community 0.556 0.044 0.244 0.444 Southeast Asia A Japan 0.618 0.176 0.059 0.147 0.800 0.271 0.000 0.035 0.442 0.325 0.000 0.169 RAW SCORES GROUP 0.603 0.077 0.038 0.115 0.608 0.039 0.000 0.069 0.349 0.093 0.000 0.128 0.458 0.188 0.094 0.344 0.510 0.216 0.216 0.784 0.333 0.039 0.333 0.275 0.368 0.081 0.169 0.191 210 Hypothesis V. Dimension A. Less Self—Confident. RAW SCORES GROUP 1 0.046 0.292 0.200 0.185 0.077 Japan A Bad 0.027 0.164 0.260 0.123 0.014 Japan A Small 0.028 0.278 0.097' 0.278 0.069 Japan A Avoid 0.089 0.289 0.111 0.356 0.022 Japan A Distress 0.000 0.088 0.088 0.206 0.059 Japan A Follow 0.082 0.212 0.247 0.165 0.118 0.039 0.039 0.052 0.169 0.013 RAW SCORES GROUP 0.000 0.128 0.038 0.077 0.026 0.020 0.333 0.118 0.039 0.108 0.000 0.229 0.031 0.042 0.021 0.010 0.313 0.135 0.083 0.021 0.196 0.353 0.098 0.235 0.000 0.010 0.029 0.108 0.137 0.059 0.022 0.228 0.169 0.235 0.103 Hypothesis V. Dimension B. More Self-Confident. RAW SCORES GROUP 1 0.785 0.215 0.338 Japan A Good 0.247 0.123 0.137 Japan A Urge 0.472 0.153 0.278 Japan A Promote 1.089 0.178 0.289 Japan A Potential 0.441 0.088 0.176 0.247 0.235 0.282 0.403 0.208 0.260 RAW SCORES GROUP 0.436 0.167 0.115 0.569 0.235 0.147 0.313 0.208 0.188 0.510 0.271 0.198 0.314 0.235 0.196 0.186 0.206 0.333 0.375 0.081 0.206 Ill] I'll 0.046 0.027 0.028 0.089 0.000 0.082 0.039 RAW SCORES 0.000 0.020 0.000 0.010 0.196 0.010 0.022 RAW SCORES 0.554 0.151 0.431 0.200 0.500 0.529 0.338 RAW SCORES 0.449 0.402 0.396 0.302 0.608 0.294 0.257 Hypothesis VII. RAW SCORES GROUP 1 0.185 0.123 0.278 0.356 0.206 0.165 0.169 GROUP 0.077 0.039 0.042 0.083 0.235 0.137 0.235 Hypothesis VII. GROUP 0.446 0.315 0.389 0.222 0.353 0.212 0.260 GROUP 0.282 0.490 0.292 0.292 0.471 0.245 0.463 Dimension A. 0.200 0.260 0.097 0.111 0.088 0.247 0.052 0.038 0.118 0.031 0.135 0.098 0.108 0.169 Dimension B. 0.185 0.096 0.111 0.111 0.029 0.059 0.000 0.077 0.147 0.031 0.208 0.059 0.049 0.022 211 Perception‘of 'Less Powerful 0.292 0.164 0.278 0.289 0.088 0.212 0.039 0.128 0.333 0.229 0.313 0.353 0.029 0.228 Japan Japan Japan Japan Nat'l Power as Weak, and'Capable. A Bad A Distress A Avoid A Small Perception of Nat'l Power as Strong, More Powerful and Capable Japan A Strength Japan A Large Japan A Auth.-Theme 212 Appendix 4.4. Hypothesis I. Dimension A. Community A Authority-Theme Ideal-Value A Authority-Theme Ideal-Value A Obligation Ideal-Value A Follow THE POOLED COVARIANCE MATRIX IS: 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 MEAN VECTOR XBARl 0.043 0.013 0.040 0.021 MEAN VECTOR XBAR2 0.037 0.016 0.046 0.012 PARALLELISM HYPOTHESIS T-SQR = 1.548736357 F = 0.4302045435 F WITH 3 , 10 EQUAL PROFILE HYPOTHESIS T = 0.2258803192 T WITH 12 DF EQUIVALENT PARAMETERS HYPOTHESIS T-SQR = 33.04291836 F = 9.178588433 F WITH 3 , 10 DF Traditionalism 213 Appendix 4.5. Hypothesis I. Dimension B. Nationalism. Japan A Distress Nation A Ideal-Value Japan A Ideal-Value Japan A Nation THE POOLED COVARIANCE MATRIX IS: 0.00670 0.00161 -0.00077 0.00455 0.00161 0.00193 0.00144 0.00401 -0.00077 0.00144 0.01754 -0.01337 0.00455 0.00401 -0.01337 0.03510 MEAN VECTOR XBARl 0.212 0.079 0.299 0.329 MEAN VECTOR XBAR2 0.121 0.092 0.270 0.210 PARALLELISM HYPOTHESIS T-SQR = 20.19283326 F = 5.609120349 F WITH 3 , 10 EQUAL PROFILE HYPOTHESIS T = 1.777510234 T WITH 12 DF .1c0 .mHOm HMOflUflaom .mo coflmcmafla mo 0 . 0 me0z 0 m0m0mm000.m u m m0000omm.00 u momma mHmmmBOmwm mmmfimzdmdm BzmQ¢>HDOm 006000060 0 mocs>0s HUOUHtam000000m < muofionm amoeuflaom < muoEoum .m00000om m>fluod 0.vdv0. mo 00 0903 e m000000000.0u u e mHmmmeomwm 0000000 qspom 00000000 0 . 0 0503 0 00000000m.0 u 0 m0000000.00 n momue 000mmeomwm 20000000000 000.0 000.0 000.0 000.0 000.0 000.0 000.0 mmsmx moeom> 2002 + + 0 + e 0 0 000.0 000.0 000.0 000.0 000.0 000.0 000.0 0m 2402 00000.0 m0~00.0 0m0oo.o 00000.0 0mmoo.o 00000.0 00000.0 00000.0 00000.0 00000.0 00000.0 00000.0- 00000.0 00000.0 00000.0 00000.0 00000.0 00000.0 00000.0 00000.0 00000.0 00000.0 00000.0 00000.0- 00moo.o 00000.0 00000.0 00000.0 o0m00.o 00m00.0 00000.0 00000.0 00000.0 00000.0 00000.0 00000.0: 00000.0 00000.0 00000.0 00000.0 00000.0 00000.0 00000.0 00000.0 00000.0 00000.0 00000.0 00000.0 00000.0: 00000.0 00000.0: 00000.0 00000.0 00000.0 “00 x00e02 mo200ms>oo cmqoom mme HOOCHI.00m < mpmummooo 0000000om < mumnmmooo .00 0000300000 UHEocoom < HMOUHI0OA .mH.0 xflvcmmmfi 225 Appendix 4.17. Hypothesis III. Dimension A. Nationalist A Japan Pol.-Idea1 A National THE POOLED COVARIANCE MATRIX IS: 0.03510 -0.00354 -0.00354 0.02796 MEAN VECTOR XBARl 0.329 0.309 MEAN VECTOR XBAR2 0.210 0.121 PARALLELISM HYPOTHESIS T-SQR = 0.2352936756 F = 0.2362936756 F WITH 1 , 12 EQUAL PROFILE HYPOTHESIS T = 2.42432839 T WITH 12 DF .02