

PERCEPTION, ATTITUDES AND IMAGES: A STUDY
OF JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOR

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
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ABSTRACT

PERCEPTION, ATTITUDES AND IMAGES: A STUDY OF JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOR

By

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Despite Japan's spectacular domestic prosperity and seemingly intense interest in economic assistance and political endeavors for peace in Asia, the Asians themselves seem to fear every Japanese step as an indication of a revival of pre-1945 Japanese imperialism and expansionism. It is widely assumed by specialists in Japanese political behavior that the Japanese have become more "modern" and are ready to assume a greater political and economic leadership role in Asia. It is significant for the assessment of future Asian development to empirically identify the structure of Japanese attitudes toward Asia. This thesis examined the components of Japanese decision makers' international image of Japan and its role in Asia and the relationships among these image components. The image components examined include expansionism, traditionalism, self-confidence, perception of national capability and power, defensive and active policies, and nationalist and regionalist orientations. Fourteen foreign policy speeches made by foreign ministers in 1955, 1957, 1959, 1961, 1963,

1965, and 1967 were translated into English and were computer content analyzed.

The following changes in Japanese policy images over the period 1955 to 1967 were hypothesized: (1) Japanese policy makers expressed fewer expansionist and traditionalist attitudes; (2) Japanese perception of self-confidence and national power increased; (3) Perceptions of Japan's role in Asia changed from defensive policies to active policies and from a nationalist orientation to a regionalist orientation; and (4) The changes in Japanese perceptions of self-confidence and national power and capability occurred in conjunction with the change in role perceptions from defensive to active policies and from nationalist to regionalist policies. The frequency distributions of concepts derived from these hypotheses were obtained using the New Asia Equivalence Table and the differences across time of bivariate co-occurrences of concepts were statistically tested.

The findings of this study indicate that the Japanese decision makers' perception of Japan has indeed changed: The Japanese image is more self-confident and national power is more frequently identified in the later time segment. More active political and economic roles are identified in the foreign policy statements. Yet there exist in their perceptions both strong "aggressive" and "traditionalist" traits and an absence of "expansionist" as well as "militarist" orientations. The Japanese seem to be making an effort to portray themselves as a more friendly and democratic

neighbor. However, their perceptions of themselves, their role, and the means for implementing their goals seem to remain traditional. At the same time the Japanese are becoming more pragmatic and practical, as evidenced by a decrease in idealistic themes. They are becoming less nationalist-oriented, but have not shown comparable increases in regionalist orientations. In summary, the Japanese do not seem to have established a clear self-identity concerning their approach to implementing foreign policy goals, despite a great interest in economic and political instruments and an increasing interest in Southeast Asia.

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This thesis is an outcome of my long-term interest in the Japanese society and its people and their relationships with other peoples in Asia. During my undergraduate studies at International Christian University in Tokyo I was fascinated with the study of Japanese political activity in Southeast Asia during the Second World War, particularly with the human factors underlying this behavior. After coming to the United States my interest has deepened and broadened but has continued to center around the issue of the relations of Japan and Asia in the future and the various problems involved in peaceful cooperation among these nations.

As I became more aware of the significance of attitudinal and image factors in the study of foreign policy behaviors of decision makers, the possible utility of "value-ridden" documents, such as policy statements, as data for the scientific examination of complex international behaviors became apparent. Although I selected a computer content analysis strategy with the initial encouragement of my thesis committee, the road to implementing efficient, economic routines necessary for the present study proved to be long and costly in terms of time and highly technical effort.

This thesis is an outgrowth of the kind advice and sincere efforts of many individuals with whom I became acquainted during the process of conducting the research. All of their names are too numerous to list, but the following are representative of persons who have served beyond the expectations of normal scholarly cordiality and reciprocity: Mrs. Cheryl Crawford of the Bendix Corporation, Ann Arbor, Michigan, for supervising the keypunching; Mr. William C. Mitchell of Fields, Grant and Co., Menlo Park, California, for the use of the computer content analysis programs he has written; Mr. Charles Wall of the Department of Information Science, University of Hawaii, for technical advice and for the use of his APL program for the statistical analysis; The Department of Economics of the University of California, Berkeley, and the University of Hawaii Computer Center for the use of facilities and the generous provision of computer time.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Introduction

The increasing disappearance of lines of demarcation between domestic and foreign policies has characterized post-Second World War international relations. Foreign policies of nations increasingly seem to be formulated in response to both the internal and external factors as well as in response to the systemic impacts. This has been particularly true in the case of the foreign policies of post-Second World War Japan, which suddenly was reduced territorially to four small islands and suffered destruction of its national economy and of its political, social, and cultural life. In order to survive as a nation, Japan has found itself in need of taking into its calculation of national and foreign policies both systemic impacts and such external forces as the two Great Powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as the newly established Communist regime in China. Later, as the bipolarization of the international world loosened and the problem of the discrepancy between the wealthy developed nations and the poor developing nations was acknowledged, the scope and nature of Japan's economic role in Asia became a critical issue. It was apparent that the wealthy and highly

technically trained Japanese were likely to play some significant role in the developmental process of these nations. The question was the nature of leadership to be adopted by the Japanese.

The nature of the role to be played by the Japanese, however, apparently is restricted in part by neighboring nations' colonial experiences and their previous relations with the Japanese, particularly during the Second World War. The increasing incidents of anti-Japanese behavior in Southeast Asia in recent years seem to support this proposition. Above all, Japan's policies toward these nations are affected by Japanese attitudes toward other Asian nations and perceptions of the nature of Japanese-Asian relations, the range of appropriate policy postures, and the prevailing Japanese image of the international environment.

Japan since the Meiji Restoration has experienced several distinct periods in its foreign relations. During the Meiji Period, Japan successfully became an international power by adapting its policies to those of the major powers. The succeeding period of expansion of its power from Korea to China into Southeast Asia was based upon the ideology of a "Greater East-Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere," which concept grew from a purely economic ambition to including establishment of a self-defense sphere and "emancipation of the native populations" from European domination. This expansion, however, abruptly ended in Japan's defeat in the war in the Pacific in 1945. The expansionist and crude, sometimes savage

behavior before 1945 in China, Manchuria, and Korea, as well as in some parts of Southeast Asia by the culturally developed Japanese has been a bewildering issue.

After 1945, Japan was stripped of all its conquered territories. In the 1950s, it re-entered the international scene under the protection of the United States. Out of the destruction of the Second World War and the ensuing Occupation, Japan quickly regained a position of note in the international world. In the period of the loosening of bipolarization of Cold War in the 1960s, Japan achieved an amazing economic recovery. The extravaganza of the Expo '70 as well as the Olympic Games in 1965 symbolized its resurgence as an ever more visible actor in international relations. Some scholars even attempt to draw a parallel between Japan's foreign activities in the 1960s and 1970s and those of the 1880s and 1890s.¹ Whether we accept this parallelism or not, the 1950s and 1960s prepared the foundation in many aspects for contemporary Japan's activities in Southeast Asia.

It is the theme of this study that the manner in which the Japanese policy makers perceive the international environment of Japan as well as their nation's role in Asia and the world has global political implications; that Japan's policies toward Southeast Asia have always been planned in light of past experiences in the area and of Japan's relations with the United States; and that these international images held by the Japanese decision makers have changed in

content and structure during the period analyzed (1955-1967). Specifically, I will examine several aspects of the international images and attitudes of the Japanese foreign policy apparatus through a computer content analysis of foreign policy speeches of key Japanese decision makers. Those images related to Japanese policies toward Southeast Asia will be analyzed on the basis of two sets of constructs: (1) the impact of the past attitudinal orientations, i.e., the symbolic effect of cultural traditionalism and expansionism upon the contemporary images; (2) intra-image relationships, particularly the relationship between the perception of national power, national capability, and self-confidence of the Japanese leaders, and the leadership role they perceive for Japan in Southeast Asia as well as their perception of international cooperation. The terms in which these theoretical constructs may be given operational meaning arise from the historical development of postwar Japan as well as the setting of the Japanese foreign policy-making process. I shall discuss these two subjects in the sections below.

The Historical Development of Japan's
Asian Policies After the Second
World War

During the Occupation, 1945-1952, Japan's policies were focused upon regaining independence at the earliest possible date. Demilitarized and democratized, the new Japanese leaders' eyes were turned toward domestic reconstruction of Japan out of the total political collapse and social

disintegration that had resulted from the humanization of the Emperor and corollary Occupation policies. Japan's "foreign relations" were conducted with the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP), and particularly with the United States.

After 1952, with the conclusion of San Francisco Peace Treaty, Japan faced three major tasks: (1) the establishment of a viable economy, (2) the resumption of diplomatic ties with nations in Southeast Asia, and (3) rebuilding "patriotism" (or national identity).² The second and third problems have been linked also with the problem of changing the prewar and wartime images of Japan in the outside world.

The major spur to economic recovery was started by outside initiative: the Occupation laid sound foundations for the process of "miracle development." During the Korean War, which broke out in June, 1950, the United States began to purchase Japanese supplies and services on a very large scale. This war thus marked the economic turning point for Japan.³ Despite some minor setbacks by the later 1950s, the Japanese were witnessing a lasting economic boom. Living standards had not only reached prewar levels but were surging far ahead. By the mid-1960s per capita income, while still far behind that of countries like England or West Germany, surpassed that of Southern European countries. And at the time of this writing Japan is rated third in economic power after the United States and the Soviet Union.

This remarkable economic recovery and the rising domestic standard of living, however, were not accompanied by the building of an equally powerful military apparatus. Japan, since its return to the international scene, has concentrated its efforts on economic activities, such as trade and commerce, while it has largely depended upon the United States for the provision of its international security. Japan's symbolic intercourse with other nations has been largely conducted through the United Nations and other voluntary international cooperative endeavors.

Since the 1950s, Japan has eagerly sought the reinstatement of friendly relations with other Asian nations through the payment of reparations, loans, and trade. The San Francisco Peace Treaty (Article 14) obliged Japan to pay reparations in products and services.⁴ The reparations were to serve several other purposes in addition to showing repentance to the Southeast Asian countries. They were used for long-range economic development projects which were designed to raise the standard of living of the recipient nations, which in turn would provide broader markets for Japanese products. And the emphasis on capital products avoided the conflict with the traditionally popular Japanese exports of consumer goods.⁵ Reparations not only had the effect of softening the resentment against the Japanese invasion, but also had the effect of increasing the purchasing power of these nations.

The foreign aid program, which is aimed particularly at Southeast Asia, is tied to purchases in Japan.⁶ As an organized program, it actually started in 1958 by the granting of a yen loan equivalent to 50 million dollars to the Government of India. "Economic Cooperation Activities" divisions were set up in the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). Japan joined the O.E.C.D. (the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) in 1963. In 1964, Japan's amount of foreign aid rated fifth in the O.E.C.D., following the United States, France, England, and West Germany.

The technical assistance program, which includes the training of specialists and the dispatch of Japanese technicians, has been conducted by bilateral arrangements since 1954. The program, originally aimed at the Colombo Plan member nations, now covers Latin America and Africa as well. The program was extended also to include the donation of machinery and instruments, establishment of technical training centers, etc. In 1965, "Nihon-Seinen Kaigai Kyoryoku Tai,"⁷ a Japanese version of the Peace Corps, was established and more than 50 young Japanese were sent to Southeast Asian nations. The budget for technical assistance expanded from 13,000,000 yen in 1954 to 2,077,000,000 yen in 1965.⁸ Between 1954 and 1965, 5,944 trainees from Afro-Asian nations received training in Japan, while 775 Japanese specialists were sent abroad.⁹ Aside from these programs under the

Foreign Affairs Ministry, MITI and the Ministry of Education have their own programs.

Most of these efforts achieved their desired goals. The establishment of the Asian Development Bank in 1967 marked the start of a new era. During these developments in Japan's relations with Asia, changes in the tone, i.e., emphasis, of her policy were observed. First the Japanese began to talk in terms of "moral responsibility" to deal with the North-South problem (i.e., the increasing gap between the developed and developing countries) in her relations with Asian nations. The key LDP (the Liberal Democratic Party) leaders discussed cooperation with the "Pacific Region" in increasingly favorable terms.

Despite these rather promising developments, we can observe some serious drawbacks.

First, Japan's spectacular development was achieved through its privileged position as an ally of the United States. Japan has been economically and militarily heavily dependent upon the U.S. At a time when most other countries were discriminating against Japanese goods, the United States accepted them freely and became Japan's most important market. Roughly one quarter of Japanese exports go to the United States, almost seven times as much as go to any other country. On the other hand, approximately one third of Japan's imports come from the United States.¹⁰

Military dependence can be traced to the fact that the majority of Japan's foreign service officers were in

liaison duty to SCAP during the Occupation. The postwar decision-making process in Japan was shaped under the strong impact of the United States. The new Constitution itself was drawn under its strong guidance.

In fact, the basic decisions taken by the U.S. with respect to its programs for the demilitarization, democratization, and after 1947, the economic and international rehabilitation of Japan continue today to provide both context and cause for a surprising number of that country's most controversial political, economic, and social issues.¹¹

During the seven years of Occupation, American policy underwent some drastic changes in its principle: a shift from punishment and reform to the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Japan.¹² The emphasis of occupation policy shifted from "demilitarization" to "democratization."¹³ Between 1947 and early 1948 as a result of the beginning of the Cold War, Japan was in the process of becoming America's "most important ally in Asia,"¹⁴ and Japan was to be strengthened economically and socially. Between 1950 and 1953, the U.S. was attempting to persuade Japan to rearm. The most drastic economic reform programs of the Occupation were deemphasized and SCAP was ready to gradually return authority over the reform programs to the Japanese Government, which subsequently halted many of these reforms. And the national police force, which eventually turned into the Self-Defense Force, was to be organized.

By the time the peace treaty was signed with the United States in 1952, the new outlines of American policy had become clear. While wanting to terminate the Occupation,

Washington was not willing seriously to weaken its position in northeastern Asia and the North Pacific. Consequently, it insisted upon ratification by Japan of a security treaty at the time of conclusion of the peace treaty. This insured that the United States could continue to base its forces on Japan in the event of war with the Soviet Union or a continuation of war in Korea. Furthermore, the United States retained its control of the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands, continuing to maintain strong base facilities on Okinawa.

The conservative LDP has committed itself intensively to the Western cause and based its policies too firmly upon a close relationship with the U.S. to preserve for itself sufficient space for political maneuver to make decisions of international significance, independent of U.S. positions. It may not disregard the advice of the U.S. without chancing political or economic disadvantages which may arise as a result of such disregard. This also seems to have lessened the possibilities for formulating policies in cooperation with the non-conservative politicians in the area of foreign policy. As a result, in such areas as Japan's relations with communist countries we can observe two-headed foreign policies. The delegates from non-conservative political parties are received in these countries almost as the national delegates of Japan, while the formal representative of the Japanese Government did not even step into Asian communist territories until the recent visit to China by Prime Minister Tanaka (with the possible exception of the case of

of semi-formal economic delegations sent to the People's Republic of China.) Serious observers both within and outside Japan doubt Japan's capability to exercise complete freedom in her Asian policy against the wishes of the United States under the present circumstances.

Secondly, recent Japanese foreign policies have raised the fear of her Asian neighbors that Japan may perceive herself the future Asian leader in the fashion of her pre-Second World War image.¹⁵ This characteristic is best described by Elsbree. He argues that the Japanese failure to identify the interests of the Southeast Asians with their own was a result of mainly three factors: first, the cruelty to the native population; secondly, the privations resulting from the economic dislocations which accompanied the war; and thirdly, the Japanese failure to capture the loyalty of the nationalist movements with which they came in contact. He succinctly summarizes the last aspect in the following passages:

It was the tragedy of Japan that she became her own most ardent admirer and thus ruined whatever chance she might have had to exert a lasting influence. Her own apparent success in synthesizing East and West was proof to her of her superiority; the other cultures of Asia had failed to find an answer and so must be inferior. The solution, obviously was to improve them by Japanization which would impart the magic formula.¹⁶

The idea of linking forces with the national movements was a sound one. . . . They fumbled it, and one basic cause was their own faulty conception of the national movements in Asia. . . . The idea of Japanese superiority was implicit in their estimates of the national movements, cited in the opening chapters, it was borned out in all their actions during the occupation.

The notion of guidance was always that of leading a little child by the hand, there was no inkling of a relationship in which mutual problems would be discussed on equal terms. . . . They saw what a useful instrument nationalism could be in their plans for a Co-Prosperity Sphere, but they failed to draw all the necessary consequences from this realization, for if nationalism was a force strong enough to be of use to them, it would require more consideration than they were prepared to give.

They tried to meet the problem with the arguments that national self-determination, in its traditional sense, was out moded in the modern world, that the only truly independent countries were those which possessed all the elements of national power, and that the weak nations of the world could exist only under the protection of one of the giants.¹⁷

These fears are born out in a French observer's report of the comment made by a member of the Indian delegation that "we fear the ADB may become a tool of American economic imperialism or of Japanese economic expansionism."¹⁸ This is supported by McNelley's observation that "the neighbors still have lingering suspicion of what the Japanese are up to, fearing a possible revival of Nipponese imperialism and militarism."¹⁹

Thirdly, these foundations (namely, the historically oriented attitude which tries to settle all the foreign policy issues in the long-established framework, by assuming that 'the past 20 years' relationships between the United States, Taiwan, Korea, and Japan are permanent and unchangeable²⁰) upon which the Conservative Government has based its foreign policies during the past 20 some years have been increasingly questioned within Japan. The strong emphasis upon economic diplomacy was criticized for an opportunism which places

economic interest above principle, which as a result has deprived Japanese diplomacy of clear-cut expressions of her attitudes on major international issues.²¹ The Japanese public has started to review Japan's relations with her immediate neighbors as well as with the United States in a broad but calm and reasoned debate over the problem that Japan faces, not in terms of how Japan should react to American or Communist contentions, but in terms of Japan's own interests and goals.

The increasing dissatisfactions among the public with the Japanese foreign policies is significant, but is only a part of the deeper problems the Japanese face in their national life. The foreign policy issues seem to represent the fear among the Japanese public of a return of an authoritarian political regime, as well as a question of public trust in their leaders which has been tested repeatedly in major political controversies in Japan since the surrender: the establishment of the Self-Defense Forces in 1952, the revision of the Security Treaty with the United States in 1960 and in 1970, the Subversive Activities Prevention Law of 1952, the revision of the Police Law in 1954 and an attempt to revise the Police Duties Execution Law in 1958, the Vietnamese War, and Japan's status (obligations) under the provisions of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, and, finally, the long-continuing movement for the revision of the 1947 Constitution.

These cleavages in political opinions are perceived by the public as one consequence of the fact that the party in power does not reflect the true opinions of the public. In other words this perception that the LDP leaders do not reflect the popular voices and that they form an autonomous policy-making body raises the serious issue of the adequacy of the Japanese political process as a means whereby the popular policy inputs are effectively transformed into governmental policy outputs, without distortion by the leaders.

The Setting: The Japanese Foreign
Policy Making Process in Post-
Second World War Period

The Japanese foreign policy which has emerged since the postwar adoption of western style democracy is somewhat different from a typical western style democratic political system. The Japanese political system, according to the words of the 1947 Constitution, is based upon the American type separation of powers among the Diet (the legislature), the Cabinet (the executive), and the Supreme Court (the judiciary) with the Emperor as the symbolic head of state. The formal specification of the process by which the conduct of foreign policy is governed is simple: The Prime Minister, representing the Cabinet, submits bills, reports on general national affairs and foreign relations to the Diet, and exercises control and supervision over various administrative branches (Article 72): The Cabinet, in addition to other

general administrative functions, shall perform the following functions: (1) administer the law faithfully; (2) conduct affairs of state; (3) manage foreign affairs and conclude treaties. However, it shall obtain prior or, depending on circumstances, subsequent, approval of the Diet (Article 73, (1), (2), and (3)).

In actual practice, however, because of the dominant position of the Liberal Democratic Party and the bureaucracy in the political process, as well as the intensive involvement of business groups, the Diet and broadly defined public opinion play minor roles. Foreign policy formulation in post-Second World War Japan has been in the hands of the conservative elites. Since the foundation of the Liberal Democratic Party in 1955, it has controlled the Cabinet, the body responsible for the foreign policy of Japan. (See Table 1.1.)

The strong ideological commitment of the Socialists and the Communists and equally strong attachment of the conservatives to the West seems to have eroded any hope for the emergency of nationally unified policies concerning the major international issues Japan faces.²³ This picture has emerged due to several distinctive characteristics of the Japanese political setting (culture): the unique experience of the Occupation, Japanese voting behavior and the political party system, the dominance of the executive branch in the policy formulation process, and the distinctively Japanese informal policy circulation system.

Table 1.1.--List of prime ministers in office (1946-1967).

May, 1946	Yoshida Shigeru	1st	Liberal:Progressive Coalition
May, 1947	Katayama Tesu		Socialist:Democratic Nat. Coop. Coalition
March, 1948	Ashida, Hitoshi		Democratic:Socialist Nat. Coop. Coalition
October, 1948	Yoshida Shigeru	2nd	Liberal Democratic
February, 1949	Yoshida Shigeru	3rd	Liberal Democratic
October, 1952	Yoshida Shigeru	4th	Liberal
May, 1953	Yoshida Shigeru	5th	Liberal
December, 1954	Hatoyama Ichiro	1st	Japan Democratic
March, 1955	Hatoyama Ichiro	2nd	Japan Democratic
November, 1955	Hatoyama Ichiro	3rd	Liberal Democratic
December, 1956	Ishibashi Tanzan		Liberal Democratic
February, 1957	Kishi Nobusuke	1st	Liberal Democratic
June, 1958	Kishi Nobusuke	2nd	Liberal Democratic
July, 1960	Ikeda Hayato	1st	Liberal Democratic
December, 1960	Ikeda Hayato	2nd	Liberal Democratic
December, 1963	Ikeda Hayato	3rd	Liberal Democratic
November, 1964	Sato Eisaku	1st	Liberal Democratic
January, 1967	Sato Eisaku	2nd	Liberal Democratic

First, the Occupation not only established the foundation for a strong U.S.-Japan alliance which has been the key to postwar Japanese foreign policies, but also assisted the

conservative political elites in establishing their strong political basis.

Secondly, the Conservatives, after launched an advantageous campaign during the short period of 1947-1947 despite the gradual increase in the progressive votes as seen in Table 1.2 and Figure 1.1.

The tendency toward urbanization seems to be responsible for the general increase in the non-conservative votes as seen in the changing voting behaviors according to the electoral districts. There is also an almost paralleled decline in the conservative votes and the population engaged in the first sector of industry, i.e., agriculture and forestry.²⁴

Another factor contributing to the higher progressive votes is the level of education. The higher a person's educational level, the more he tends to vote for the non-conservative candidates.

The persistent strength of the conservatives can be found in the survival of traditional Japanese value systems and two contradictory outcomes of Japan's economic prosperity. The erosion of traditional values in Japanese society owing to the increasing industrialization and urbanization represents change in a comparative sense. Persistent traditional attitudes still exist among the Japanese particularly in the rural areas and among the older generations. One author describes the Japanese "national character"

Table 1.2.--Votes cast according to political parties.^a

Party	Election					
	1955 (27th)	1958 (28th)	1960 (29th)	1963 (30th)	1967 (31st)	1969 (32nd)
Liberal Democratic P.	63.07% ^b	57.71%	57.53%	54.65%	48.80%	47.06%
Socialist Party	30.28 ^c	32.75	27.51	29.02	27.88	21.17
Democratic Socialist	... ^d	... ^d	8.75	7.39	7.40	7.67
Komei-to	... ^e	... ^e	... ^e	... ^e	5.38	10.77
Communist Party	2.02	2.25	2.96	4.02	4.33	6.85
Miscellaneous	1.34	0.72	0.36	0.15	0.22	0.01
Independents	3.29	6.27	2.69	4.77	5.58	5.34
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	99.56%	98.87%

^aSource: 1955-1963: From Yasuhara Okino, Showa Sanjunendai ni Okeru Toshika Kogyoka to Tohyo Kodo Henka (Industrialization and Urbanization and Voting Behavior in the 30's of Showa). Restricted copy, n.d., p. 31.


1967, 1969: Constructed by the author from the figures given in Japan Statistical Yearbook published by Prime Minister's Office.

^bSub-total of Japan Democratic Party and Liberal Party.

^cSub-total of JSP Right, Left, and Labor Party

^dDSP was not formed yet.

^eKomeito was not formed yet.



Source: Okino, Yasuharu. Shōwa Sanjūnendai ni Okeru Toshika Kōgryōka to Tōhyō Kōdo Henka (The Trend in Voting Behaviors and Industrialization and Urbanization in the thirties of Showa). Restricted Copy, no publication date, p. 31.

Figure 1.1.--The General Election Results.

Table 1.3.--Distribution of votes according to political parties and type of electoral district.^a

District ^b	Election Year							
	1955		1958		1960		1963	
	Cons.	Prog.	Cons.	Prog.	Cons.	Prog.	Cons.	Prog.
Metropolitan Type	51.07	44.86	47.38	47.87	45.80	53.35	41.06	57.37
Urban Center	64.86	30.99	59.01	34.05	58.90	37.68	55.38	38.76
Semi-Village	65.51	29.68	58.87	32.81	59.63	36.15	59.45	35.31
Village	71.77	21.59	70.00	25.12	68.84	27.40	64.44	26.16
National Average	63.2	32.2	57.8	35.5	57.6	39.3	54.7	40.4

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^aSource: Constructed from tables in Showa Sanjunendai ni Okeru Toshika Kogyoka to Tohyo Kodo Henka (Industrialization and Urbanization and Voting Behavior in the 30's of Showa). Restricted copy, n.d.

^bFor the definition of electoral district types, see the footnote to Table 1.A.

^cKey: Cons. = Conservative; Prog. = Progressive.

Table 1.4.--Academic background and party support.^a


Education	Political Parties					
	LDP	JSP	DSP	JCP	Komeito	Others
University	45.0%	31.7%	8.2%	0.9%	0.4%	13.6%
High School	46.5	30.4	5.0	0.6	2.0	15.5
Junior High	48.1	25.6	3.2	0.6	2.7	19.8
Elementary School	49.1	16.6	1.6	0.6	2.1	29.9
Unknown	50.8	26.2	...	1.6	1.6	19.7

^aSource: Unidentified author, op. cit., p. 61.
 Table 18.
 Survey by the Chuo-Chosa-sha, March, 1965.
 (Sample:15,863)

as embracing:

. . . substantial elements of the old order which emphasized the family and nation over the individual; discipline, duty, and obligation over freedom; distinction in status over equality; and racial arrogance over egalitarianism. The younger generation and the better educated, however, are slowly moving toward individualism and commitment to "democracy," but the movement is uneven, with strong survivals of ethnocentric, hierarchical, and holistic attitudes.²⁵

However, the emerging middle class is still essentially conservative within the context of the socio-economic system of Japan.²⁶ In recent years also an increasing conservative orientation has been observed among younger generation Japanese.²⁷ Authorities of Japanese political behavior observe that in this extraordinary prosperity the masses are increasingly caught up in a cycle of very rapid socio-economic change. And their interests, anxieties,



Source: Unidentified Author. A study paper for the government personnels. p.28. Figure 9. This figure uses the ratio based on the 1946 census.

Figure 1.2.--Labor Force according to Industries and Votes won by the Conservatives and the Progressives.

commitments, and energies are increasingly bound up with the issues that stem from that change. These are essentially domestic, practical, and highly personal issues.²⁸

The Conservatives were quick to recognize the fact that the average Japanese gives political priorities to domestic economic issues.²⁹ They increasingly took over many of the welfare policies proposed originally by the Socialists, even though they watered them down slightly.³⁰ Backed by their record of postwar achievement of economic prosperity and regaining of independence, along with their close ties with the U.S. and the Western bloc, the Conservatives score better with the average Japanese who prefer to defend the status quo rather than to risk their moderate but prosperous life in voting for Socialists or Communists who openly take sides with the Communist bloc and defy these values.

The Socialists, on the other hand, have ignored prosperity, emphasizing a pattern of grievances drawn mainly from traditional ideological sources and spelling out the future either in Utopian or apocalyptic terms. They have frequently given foreign policy priority over domestic policy. As a result, they have generally been at a psychological and political disadvantage. Although nationalism and foreign policy issues became matters of increasing importance to Japan after 1950, it cannot be said that these factors occupied the center of the stage.³¹

The picture which emerges after these observations is one of a vicious circle, in which the Conservatives are

turning more and more to pragmatism, emphasizing welfare policies, while the Socialists are increasing their idealistic and pessimistic orientation.

One party remains dominant and always in power. It knows only how to govern. The other is perennial minority, unable to command more than one third of the electorate. It knows only how to oppose, and at times seems positively afraid of power. . . . And both parties remain greatly separated from the Japanese "man-in-the-street."³²

Thirdly, the major effects we can observe of the semi-permanent control of the majority by the Conservatives in the working of two major policy making and executing organs of Japan is the weak Diet as an organ for check and balance in the national political process and the omnipotence of the Cabinet supported by the huge bureaucracy and the business groups.

The basic functioning of the bicameral Diet (the House of Representatives and the House of Councilors) depends upon the committee system.³³ The Committee, however, although it may contribute to articulating the differences of viewpoints between the LDP and the opponents and the related issues and problems, does little to induce changes and modifications in the government policies. This fact and the absence of crossing the bench add to the inactiveness of the Diet as a real organ for checking and taming the policies made by the Cabinet.

The Cabinet under the Prime Minister, who is responsible to the Diet, does not merely execute and administer a program of legislative action determined by the Diet. It

plans legislation, initiates bills, organizes support in the Diet, and puts through a legislative program, which it then administers.³⁴ One reason for this strong position of the Cabinet is that the Constitution itself appears to contradict the principle of legislative supremacy by providing the executive with a variety of powers. It administers the affairs of state through a vast bureaucracy, embracing some 1,852,000 employees (1963) in 53 primary ministries and agencies. Although the judiciary is independent, the Cabinet appoints judges and administers criminal justice. All public procurators (prosecutors) are civil service employees of the Ministry of Justice.³⁵

The Cabinet also has the right to initiate both legislation and amendments to the Constitution. Evidence of the Cabinet's legislative leadership is found in the observation that the majority of the legislation has been proposed by the Cabinet, as seen in Table 1.5.³⁶

In order to understand the working of the Cabinet and its relations with the Diet, we must now turn to the manner in which the LDP functions as a political party (that is, how it reaches policy decisions) as well as its relations with the bureaucracy, business groups, and the public.

The Liberal Democratic Party came into existence in 1955 as a result of the merger of two conservative parties, the Democratic Party and the Liberal Party. The two

Table 1.5.--Sponsorship of legislation introduced into the Diet.^a

	Bills Sponsored by Cabinet	Bills Sponsored by Dietman	
		Upper House	Lower House
<u>24th Regular Session</u> 1955-1956			
Bills introduced	173 (1) ^b	26 (13)	77 (6)
Bills passed	141	4	16
<u>38th Regular Session</u> 1960-1961			
Bills introduced	211	35 (1)	60 (2)
Bills passed	150	2	8
<u>48th Regular Session</u> 1964-1965			
Bills introduced	139 (6)	24 (5)	64 (19)
Bills passed	125 (1)	4	10
<u>51st Regular Session</u> 1965-1966			
Bills introduced	156	18	60
Bills passed	136	0	11
<u>55th Special Session</u> 1967			
Bills introduced	152	13	43
Bills passed	131	0	6

^aSource: Nathaniel B. Thayer, How the Conservatives Rule Japan (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1969), p. 220. Table 15.

^bFigures in parenthesis show number of bills brought forward from previous session. Table compiled from statistics of Shugin Hoseikyoku--House of Representatives).

constituent parties had enjoyed a long prewar heritage in their organization as well as in leadership. The LDP inherited most of these structural aspects while adding new organs such as the establishment of the vice-presidency and the institutionalization of the secretariat, as its operations have become increasingly complex. (See Appendix 1.A. for the organizational chart of the LDP.)

The Policy Affairs Research Council formulates party policies according to suggestions from the Dietmen, the bureaucracy, and the external groups, to be approved by the decision-making organs of the LDP, the Party Conference, the Assembly of the members of both houses of the Diet and the Executive Council. The Party Conference, convened once a year by the party President, although it is the supreme organ of the party and elects the party officials and approves party budgets, is characterized by the absence of deliberation of policy. The Assembly is to examine and decide especially important questions concerning party management and activities in the Diet and also to substitute for the party conference in matters requiring an urgent decision. These two organs are more or less nominal despite their significance on paper. The 30-member Executive Council, which consists of 15 elected by ballot of all the House of Representative members and 15 from the House of Councilors, carries more de facto power. It appoints personnel to the various party posts and approves the policies presented by the PARC (Policy Affairs Research Council). Of

course the Presidency of the party which holds the Prime Ministership, along with the Vice-Presidency and the post of the Secretary General, are powerful positions, and the occupants of these offices exercise strong influence in the outcome of party policies.

One characteristic we must note in the Japanese policy decision process which is particularly true in the LDP is that even when a majority vote is specified as procedural, most decisions are resolved by hanashiai, that is, talking it over in search of unanimous agreement, which characterizes most of the intra-party decision making. This hanashiai in the Executive Council is often furthered by the existence of factions within the LDP as discussed below.

The actual working of the above policy-making process in the LDP is summarized by Fukui,³⁷ in an extensive study of that subject, as a "complex process of interaction between four factors: (1) membership; (2) party organization; (3) intraparty factions; and (4) connections with external groups."

The LDP was initially formed essentially as a conservative Diet members' group but has made efforts to extend its power as a "mass" party. However, the majority of the 1.9 million or so members are nominal and the size of the effective membership still remains at about 50,000. "The policy-making power is narrowly concentrated in the hands of slightly more than 400 Diet members who constitute the inner ring of the party membership and monopolize all party

party offices at the headquarters."³⁸

400	Diet members
8,500	Local politicians
40,000	Ordinary members--peripheral ring
the rest	A reserve array of regular LDP voters

In terms of its membership and party organization, it is a typical parliamentary party. Non-parliamentary party members or the local branches exercise no significant influences.³⁹

For these reasons, the LDP is compelled to depend greatly upon various extra-party groups for the acquisition of political funds and votes. After the Occupation, the business groups seriously chose to become the main providers of political funds for the LDP. The political donations are channeled through either the formal party organization or the individual party members. There is a distinct trend in the nature of contributions, however. In 1957, 30% of the donations came from 20 individual enterprises, while only 6% came from trade and professional associations. In 1962, only 10% of funds came from individual companies, while 25% came from trade and professional associations. In 1965, 90% of the LDP income was channeled through the Kokumin Kuokai,⁴⁰ while only 2% came directly from either the individual enterprises or trade and professional associations. (For the detailed picture, see Appendix 1.B.)

The Kokumin Kyokai in 1966 was effectively coordinating practically all groups and organizations willing to make financial donations to the LDP. Nearly 40% of the 455

enterprises and associations which made donations to the LDP or its component parts in 1965 handed their money directly and exclusively to the Kokumin Kyokai. And it has become a powerful organization as a financial supporter as well as the propaganda arm of the LDP. Because of the divergent and conflicting interests within the business community, though, there is a definite limitation to the influence of the Kokumin Kyokai.

The businessmen also provided assistance in negotiating actual foreign economic activities for the government. As discussed in the first chapter, reparations were conceived as a means to increase Japanese trade with Southeast Asia. And it was the business community that first of all comprehended this relationship and took the initiative in negotiating officially on behalf of the government, and unofficially helped gather information and develop closer relations with foreign governments as well as in implementing the agreements as representatives of the corporations.⁴¹

This dependence upon political contributions as well as a kind of moral support the LDP seeks from the business groups has forced in another dimension a close dependence of the cabinet upon the bureaucracy, according to Fukui. This is explained by Fukui as :

The technical needs of such policy-making activity on behalf of the providers of funds and votes require the assistance of the various ministries of the national public service. The acceptance of the latter's help in turn obliges the party to heed their misles and

inter-alia to undertake legislative actions designed to enlarge their powers and budgetary appropriations.⁴²

The bureaucrats provide their technical know-how to the LDP. In fact, "practically all the divisions of the policy affairs research council are carried piggyback by the bureaucracy through all the phases of policy making, from the supplying of basic research documents to the drafting bills." And the close contact with the LDP organs and LDP Dietmen is profitable for the bureaucrats themselves for various reasons. Because of the conservative domination of the Cabinet and the Diet committees, if any ministry hopes to have its policies approved it must gain the approval of the party itself.

These three groups, the conservative political leaders, the business leaders, and the bureaucrats, seem to form the "Establishment" in the Japanese society. The fact that they constitute a small, homogeneous group of men who occupy the top positions in government, business, industry, finance, education, and the mass media adds to their influence. The large proportion of the LDP Dietmen (as compared to the JSP Dietmen) graduate from the former imperial universities, particularly Tokyo University, as seen in Table 1.6. The majority of the high-ranking bureaucrats are graduates of Tokyo University. In 1965, all of the Vice Ministers, 80% of the Bureau chiefs, 71% of the Division chiefs, 53% of the Section chiefs graduated from Tokyo University. Often the bureaucrats either enter business or politics after

Table 1.6.--Classification of LDP Diet members by occupational and educational backgrounds, November, 1965.^a

	Public Servants	Local Politicians	Business- men	Jour- nalists	Miscel- laneous	Totals
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Tokyo University (A)						
MHRs	89.4	8.8	12.9	22.8	26.9	34.2
MHCs	90.5	...	12.5	...	14.2	40.7
Total	89.9	6.5	12.5	21.6	23.0	36.2
Other imperial universities (B)						
MHRs	7.8	2.5	16.1	...	7.9	7.3
MHCs	5.6	...	16.6	...	10.7	7.4
Total	6.9	1.8	16.2	...	8.7	7.3
(A) and (B)						
MHRs	97.2	11.3	29.0	22.8	34.8	41.5
MHCs	96.1	...	29.1	...	24.9	48.1
Total	96.8	8.3	28.9	21.6	31.7	43.5
Other universities and colleges						
MHRs	1.3	48.1	46.7	74.2	49.2	39.6
MHCs	3.7	64.2	45.8	50.0	53.5	33.3
Total	2.3	52.3	46.5	72.9	50.5	37.7

Table 1.6.--Continued.

	Public Servants	Local Politicians	Business- men	Jour- nalists	Miscel- laneous	Totals
(A), (B), and (C)	%	%	%	%	%	%
MHRs	97.2	59.4	75.7	97.0	84.0	81.1
MHCs	99.8	64.2	74.9	50.0	78.4	81.4
Total	99.1	60.6	75.4	94.5	82.2	81.2
Middle schools, vocational schools, and teachers' colleges						
MHRs	1.3	25.3	19.3	2.0	14.2	13.6
MHCs	...	35.0	20.8	...	21.4	15.5
Total	0.8	28.0	19.7	2.7	16.4	14.2
Elementary schools						
MHRs	...	15.1	4.8	...	1.5	5.0
MHCs	4.1	50.0	...	1.4
Total	...	11.2	4.6	2.7	1.0	4.0

^aSource: Haruhiro Fukui, Party in Power: The Japanese Liberal-Democrats and Policy Making (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), p. 64, Table 5. Constructed from Kokkai binran, 31st ed. (Nov., 1965), pp. 99-150; GSS: Shugingiin meikan (1962); and GSS: Kizokuin sangiin giin meikan (1960).

their retirement. As a result, not only is the LDP loaded with former bureaucrats as Dietmen (38% as compared to 1.8% of the JSP Dietmen), but the former bureaucrats occupy the large proportion of the Cabinet posts and significant positions in the high decision-making organs of the LDP as seen in Tables 1.7 and 1.8.

Table 1.7.--Percentages of former public servants and local politicians in LDP cabinets, 1955-1965.^a

Cabinets	Servants		Local Politicians	
	No.	%	No.	%
3rd Hatoyama (Nov. 1955-)	3	16.6	1	5.5
Ishibashi (Dec. 1956-)	6	33.3	3	16.6
1st Kishi (Feb. 1957-)	12	34.2	6	17.1
2nd Kishi (June 1958-)	6	33.3	2	11.1
1st Ikeda (July 1960-)	6	33.3	0	0.0
2nd Ikeda (Dec. 1960-)	23	46.0	5	10.0
3rd Ikeda (Dec. 1963-)	17	50.0	5	14.7
1st Sato (Nov. 1964-)	22	36.6	10	16.6
Total	104	41.4	32	12.7

^aSource: Haruhiro Fukui, Party in Power: The Japanese Liberal-Democrats and Policy Making (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), p. 66, Table 7.

The checks and balances which are not effectively exercised by the existence of the Diet are exercised to a degree by the demands from the external groups; the business groups and the bureaucracy.⁴³ To a greater degree, it is

Table 1.8.--PARC officials with public service backgrounds and those who were formerly local politicians.^a

	1955	1957	1959	1961	1963	1965	Total
	No. %	No. %	No. %	No. %	No. %	No. %	No. %
<u>Public servants</u>							
PARC vice-chairmen	7 70.0	4 40.0	4 25.0	5 45.4	1 25.0	2 33.3	23 40.3
Members of PARC							
Deliberation	13 86.6	14 56.0	13 52.0	10 40.0	10 76.9	60 58.2
Commission							
<u>Local Politicians</u>							
PARC vice-chairmen	3 18.7	1 9.0	1 16.6	5 8.7
Members of PARC							
Deliberation	1 6.6	33 12.0	2 8.0	6 5.8
Commission							


^aSource: Haruhiro Fukui, Party in Power: The Japanese Liberal-Democrats and Policy Making (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), p. 67, Table 8. Constructed from Seisaku Geppo, 118 (November, 1965), pp. 156-58; Asahi, 22 November, 1955, 23 July (evening) and 19 September (evening) 1957, 10 July, 1959, and 6 August, 1963; Jiyuminshuto, Seimuchosakai meibo: Showa 40-nen 11-gatsu 10-ka genzai, mimeo., p. 1.

done by factions within the LDP. These intra-party factions have grown up as "the basic units for distribution of government and party offices, as well as of political funds."⁴⁴

Factions are rather recent phenomena developed between 1952-1955 and became a kind of permanent unit of association within the LDP since December, 1956. They have their own headquarters and fairly fixed and stable memberships. Intra-factional balance is deemed most significant in the appointment of Cabinet and party posts. The existence and strong influence of factions tend to weaken the effective leadership by the formal party organs. The leaders' meetings, a semi-official decision-making organ controlled by the dominant factions which supplements the formal Executive Council, was meant to counter-balance the above effect.⁴⁵

The relations between the interest groups (the business), the bureaucracy, and the LDP, the "reciprocal give-and-take system,"⁴⁶ is as yet to become weakened. The former two groups support the latter in order to obtain policy decisions favorable to them, while the latter depends on these groups for the acquisition of the basic forms of support "vital to its survival." The latter, on the other hand, seems to be more concerned with satisfying the former's demands than with its own independent policy making. The revised picture of policy-making process seems to present something like the following diagram presented

by Mushakoji. It is characterized by the informal process which is almost permanently institutionalized.



Source: Kinhide Mushakoji, Takoyokuki-jidai no Nippon Gaiko (Japanese Foreign Policy in the Multi-polarized World) (Tokyo: Tokyo Deagaku Shuppan-kai, 1971), p. 22.

Figure 1.3.--The informal circuit of foreign policy process.

Under this condition the role of the public opinion in Japan today can easily be exaggerated. Opposition of significant intensity generally is confined to urban centers, especially in Tokyo. In summary, therefore, after reviewing the foreign policy making process of Japan, no notion seems to be more adequate than the one that "a nation-state as an actor in international politics is a group of

decision-makers, making decisions in the name of the state" for describing its characteristics. And here, the decision makers, although their faces have changed, have always been from the conservative elements of the LDP, except the short interlude between 1947-1948.

The Statement of the Problem

These observations lead to three major questions. The first question concerns the nature of Japan's security relations with the United States and the degree of influence of the United States upon Japanese foreign policies. The second problem is the degree of persistence of attitudes and images which were prevalent in the pre-1945 Japan among the contemporary decision makers. The third question is concerned with the nature of Japanese perception of national identity and of her role in the international world, particularly in Southeast Asia.

The increasing "independence" from the United States is assumed as a natural consequence of Japan's recovery from the destruction of the Second World War. Olson argues that, ". . . as the country [Japan] became strong again economically, it was widely assumed that sooner or later it would adopt a more independent course in its foreign affairs, albeit within a general pro-Western framework,"⁴⁷ and that "the urge to lead to gain prestige as somebody more than a client of the United States was evident in Japan's effort" to mediate the confrontation between Malaysia and Indonesia,

both of whose markets the Japanese desired, as well as in her cry for becoming a "bridge" between East and West.⁴⁸ Ward makes a confirming observation that "despite her dependence upon the United States, the secular trend of official Japanese policy has been toward slow and piecemeal disengagement from the United States' position on a number of important international issues and increasing assertion of Japanese interests and viewpoints."⁴⁹ According to Ward, this trend follows predictably from the nation's search for a new international identity, role, and status after the end of the Occupation and return of power and responsibility to Japanese hands.⁵⁰

Most Japan specialists in the United States seem to agree that Japan, with its high economic prosperity and literacy rate, and as the only highly developed country in the nonwestern setting, is destined to assume some leadership role. This point is summarized in Olson's statement that,

The question is not whether Japan should play a larger role in Asia. Such a role is inevitable, in my view. The question is the manner and spirit of the role. This is where attitudes and policies come together in action and where the real meaning of Japanese modernism will reveal itself in events.⁵¹

In order to examine the subject from this perspective, we must address a series of detailed analytic questions. The data specified by these questions are essential to any attempt to address these alternative propositions. The questions may be outlined as follows:

1. Did Japan's perception of itself and of the world change?

2. Did Japan's perception of its role in Asia change?

3. If political leadership were foreseen (i.e., if Japan were to have any political plans in its relationship with Southeast Asia), does it inevitably follow that Japan will take the plunge into the "expansionist" and "militarist" footprints? Or will Japan be free from the "old image" of itself?

4. What distinctions may be found between recent Japanese Asian policies and pre-1945 policies?

5. If the new Asian policies were to be different from the old, what would characterize the perceptual basis of Japan's "new" Asian policies?

6. Does Japan evidence any ambition to become an example of economic and political development to other Asian nations?

7. More specifically, Olson says that not until after 1964 did Japan have any idea that Japanese welfare is related to economic development in Asia.⁵² Is this true?

8. As the only highly industrialized nation in Asia, is Japan willing and ready to expand her increasing involvement in Asian economic affairs and some day, to assume a positive political leadership?

9. To what extent can the expectation to extend political influence in Asia become the main stream of Japan's

foreign policy and economic diplomacy the subsidiary theme in the international image of Japanese decision makers?

10. What evidence is there of a Japanese desire to align politically with other Asian states? Is this desire increasing?

11. If Japan were to be aspiring for a greater and independent leadership in Asia, could it successfully change its past image especially to its neighbors in Asia in order for it to effectively fulfill this new role?

12. Is it true that the "national power" of a nation determines the manner in which a nation-state behaves toward other nation-states in international relations? What other factors may assist in predicting a nation-state's behavior in a given situation? "Self-confidence"? "Economic development"? "Modernity"?

In order to study the nature of Japan's future international involvement (i.e., how Japan will behave in the international world) particularly in its relations with Southeast Asian countries, we must study the attitudinal basis of postwar Japan's foreign policies. Specifically, the international images held by the Japanese decision makers play a significant role in determining the nature of foreign policies selected by them. And the "past experience" of Japan and of the Japanese leaders seems to exercise a strong influence upon the nature of the images held, that is, the manner in which the Japanese think about and look at the world around them.

In Chapter II, the relevant literature for the study of attitudes images of Japanese foreign policy makers is reviewed. Chapter III articulates the problems in hypothesis forms and presents a detailed explanation of methods and research design adopted in this inquiry. The process of computer content analysis of policy speeches will be discussed in detail. Chapter IV presents the data collected and discusses the findings of the analysis. Chapter V summarizes the theoretical and political implications of the findings and discusses the possible future research for the further exploration of the problem.

FOOTNOTES--Chapter I

¹Kinhide Mushakoji, Takyokuka-jidai no Nippon Gaiko (Japanese Foreign Policy in the Multi-polarized World) (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppan-kai, 1971).

²Katsuo Okazaki, "Japan's Foreign Relations," The Annals, November, 1956, p. 158.

³Edwin O. Reischauer, The United States and Japan (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965), pp. 293-298.

⁴The cost of reparations to be paid in kind and services was as follows:

Burma	200 million dollars
Philippines	550 million dollars
Indonesia	223.08 million dollars
Vietnam	39 million dollars

Total 1,012.08 million dollars

Laos and Cambodia renounced the right to reparations and instead have been receiving outright grants, totalling about three million dollars and four million dollars, respectively. Nationalist China and India also renounced their rights.

⁵Baisho-Mondai-Kenkyu-Kai, ed., The Present Situation of Reparation Program. (Tokyo: Gaiko-Jiho-sha, 1961), p. 48.

⁶Theodore McNelley, "Japan's Role in South Asia," Current History, November, 1965, p. 289.

⁷From 1963, the young technician program was in progress. In 1963, 9, and in 1964, 14 were sent to South-east Asian countries. In Gaimusho, ed., Bluebook on Foreign Affairs (Waga Gaiko no Kinkyō), 1965, p. 160.

⁸Ibid., p. 158.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Reischauer, op. cit., p. 298.

¹¹Ward in Passin, ed., op. cit., pp. 29-30.

¹²McNelley, op. cit., p. 286.

¹³Ward, op. cit., p. 30.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Ivan Morris, Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan: A Study of Postwar Trends (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960).

¹⁶Willard H. Elsbree, Japan's Role in Southeast Asia Nationalist Movements 1940-1945 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953), p. 8.

¹⁷Ibid., pp. 164-65.

¹⁸M. P. Narayana Pillai, "Un-Asian Image," Far Eastern Review, April 25, 1968, p. 211.

¹⁹McNelley, op. cit., pp. 292-93.

²⁰"Editorial," Asahi Janaru, August 22, 1965.

²¹"Japan's Asia Policy: Panel Discussion," Keizai Orui, November, 1963, p. 70.

²²Robert A. Scalapino, "The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan," in Foreign Policy in World Politics, ed. by Roy C. MacRididis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967), p. 300.

²³Warren M. Tsuneishi, Japanese Political Style (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), pp. 200-201.

²⁴Japanese electoral districts used to have 118 districts electing total of 467 MHR (member of House of Representatives). They were increased to 123 districts with 486 representatives in June, 1966. The distribution of districts according to the nature of industrial and urbanization indicators is shown in Table 1.A on the following page.

The increase in urban electoral districts is accompanied by increases in progressive votes in urban sectors as seen in Table 1.3.

As mentioned above, there is an almost parallel decline between the population engaged in agriculture and the conservative votes and the population engaged in the second sector, i.e., industry, and the progressive votes. The remarkable increase in the number of people in the third industries (services) is not accompanied by the increase in votes of any political parties. The future political configuration may depend upon which bloc will win the votes of this group (Figure 1.2).

Table 1.A.--Electoral districts.^a

Types of Districts	Before the Revision		After the Revision	
	Number	Position	Number	Position
Metropolitan (ratio) %	19 (16.1)	77 (16.5)	24 (19.5)	96 (19.7)
Urban Center (ratio) %	39 (33.1)	156 (33.4)	39 (31.7)	156 (32.1)
Semi-Village (ratio) %	43 (36.4)	170 (36.4)	43 (35.0)	170 (35.0)
Village (ratio) %	17 (14.4)	64 (13.7)	17 (13.8)	64 (13.2)
Total (ratio) %	118 (100.0)	467 (100.0)	123 (100.0)	486 (100.0)

^aSource: Okino, op. cit., p. 128.

According to Okino's classification, the four districts types are defined as follows:

Metropolitan type: ratio of population engaged in the first industries (agriculture) to the total population of the district = 0.01-14.99%

Urban Center type: above ratio = 15.00% - 39.99%

Semi-Village type: above ratio = 40.00% - 54.99%

Village district type: above ratio + 55.00% - 79.99%

²⁵Tsuneishi, op. cit., p. 21.

²⁶And age as well as income level seems to have a significant impact upon this trend. For example, in one study, although 39% of the white collar class supported the LDP, another 39%, the JSP, 5% the DSP, and 1%, JCP (no particular preference, 12%; don't know, 4%; survey by Tomonori, Hayashi, Tokei-sui-Kenkyujo, March-April, 1961, sample, 2,295), there are significant differences in the distribution of these supports according to the age and income level. See for reference, Table 15. "The Preference of Political Parties Among White Collar Workers According to Age," unidentified author (government study paper), op. cit., pp. 53-54.

²⁷Shigeki Nishihara, "Are Young People Becoming More Conservative?" Asahi Janaru, July 21, 1964, pp. 12-19. Also condensed and translated, in J. of Pol. and Social Ideas of Japan, I, 3 (Dec., 1964), 137-43.

²⁸Robert A. Scalapino and Masumi Junnosuke, Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962).

²⁹Ibid., p. 46.

³⁰Ibid.

³¹Ibid., p. 45. Also the Japanese are said to vote for a "person" not for a "party," which works in favor of the LDP candidates who often maintain an elaborate "Koenkai" (Supporters' Organization, or Club).

³²Ibid., p. 53.

³³There are 16 standing (permanent) committees. By Diet Law, Committee memberships are allocated to various political parties in proportion to their numerical strength, which cuts down the power of minority opposition even smaller. Moreover, control of all the committee chairmanships in the lower house is especially useful for the Government Party. All the bills are presented for examination to the relevant committee before they are placed on the floor. (A PM is to belong to at least one committee and not more than two committees and he generally specializes in a particular field.)

³⁴Tsuneishi, op. cit., p. 42.

³⁵Ibid., p. 43.

³⁶The major factor contributing to the Cabinet leadership is the increasing technical complexity of legislation and its execution. An average Diet member does not seem to possess the knowledge to prepare the ever complex legal documents required for successful legislation. The existence of informal but omnipotent policy circulation system which will be explained below added to the picture.

³⁷His research is reported in Haruhiro Fukui, Party in Power: The Japanese Liberal-Democrats and Policy Making (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970).

³⁸Ibid., p. 77.

³⁹Ibid., p. 263.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 147. Kokumin Kyokai was organized on July 15, 1961. By October, 1964, 4,896 corporate members contributing 49,225,920 yen/mo. and 48,222 individual members contributing 9,218,111 yen/mo. By 1965, the membership rose respectively to 6,152 and 56,686, and the amount of the contribution to 64,770,814 yen and 12,286,000 yen, respectively.

⁴¹For example, the key negotiator in the agreement with Burma was Japan Trade Association President Fujiyama with Indonesia, Japan Development Bank President Kobayashi, and with South Vietnam, Federation of Economic Organizations Vice-President Uyemura.

⁴²Fukui, op. cit., p. 264.

⁴³One of the best studies in English will be found in the case studies by Prof. Fukui, Ibid.

⁴⁴One interesting study of this aspect was presented by Michael Leiserson, "Factions and Coalitions in One-Party Japan: An Interpretation Based on the Theory of Games," APSR, LXII, 3 (September, 1968), 770-87.

⁴⁵One observer argues that "it can be argued that the council (PARC) is more important than the Diet because it is in the council where the real deliberations on policy take place. Quiet wars in its chambers are a daily occurrence, as all the elements of the party fight to have their interests recognized. But once the council has reached a decision and obtained the formal approval of the Executive Council, the party members dutifully close ranks and support it." (Nathaniel B. Thayer, How the Conservatives Rule Japan [Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1969], p. 235). And if no legislation is necessary, the Cabinet announces the decision as national policy. If legislation is necessary, a bill is presented to the Diet. But even the most heated debate in the Diet rarely changes the essence of the bill.

⁴⁶Fukui, op. cit., p. 168.

⁴⁷Lawrence Olson, "Japan and Asia," in American Assembly. The United States and Japan, ed. by Herbert Passin (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. 82.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 87.

⁴⁹Robert Ward, "The Legacy of the Occupation," in Passin, ed., op. cit., p. 54.

⁵⁰Ibid. A similar view is found in Tsuneishi, op. cit.

⁵¹Lawrence Olson, Japan in Postwar Asia (New York: Praeger, 1970), p. 235.

⁵²Ibid., p. 138.

CHAPTER II

PERCEPTION, ATTITUDES, INTERNATIONAL IMAGES AND JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIORS: REVIEW OF LITERATURE

I will argue in this chapter that: (1) Attitudes or images which the decision-makers hold toward another country affect the manner in which they behave toward that country; (2) Japan's policies toward Southeast Asia during the period 1955-1967 can be considered as a series of efforts to increase the responsiveness of these countries to Japan; (3) These planned strategies to increase the responsiveness were affected by the images which the Japanese decision makers hold concerning Japan's national power and capability, Japan's relationship with the U. S. as well as its general international relations; and (4) There are reasons to assume that the components of these images varied during the period under inquiry. In the process of this discussion, special attention will be paid to the "stability" of images and the impact of the "past events and experiences" upon the international images.

Japan's Asian policies after 1952 can be considered to be a series of efforts to increase the "responsiveness" of Southeast Asian countries to Japan. "Responsiveness" is defined by Pruitt:

An individual's level of responsiveness toward another nation is partially a function of past experience with that nation and partially a function of other images. In this respect, responsiveness is similar to trust. Unlike trust, responsiveness is also frequently a matter of government policy, representing an element of strategic planning. Such policy may be adopted for the purpose of repaying debts, building good will, making to negotiate. The greater the other nation's effective fate-control, the more need will be seen for such a policy and the more responsiveness will be shown toward the other nation. Responsiveness based on positive fate-control is theoretically more stable than responsiveness based on negative fate-control.¹

Since the changes in responsiveness are due to conscious policy decisions, the strategies for dealing with other nations will include: (1) building and maintaining good will (If we want the other nation's level of responsiveness to increase, we should increase our own.); (2) making the other nation more dependent (By helping another nation in concrete ways, we demonstrate to the people of that nation how helpful we can be in the future. This may cause them to feel more dependent on us and thereby increase our ability to command favors from them in the future.); and (3) signaling a willingness to negotiate.² The nature of these planned strategies would depend upon the "objectives" of national foreign policies.

Foreign policy making in this context is best described by Snyder, et al. "the foreign policy decision-making can be summarized as a process which results in the selection from a socially defined, limited number of problematical alternative projects of one project intended to bring about the particular future state of affairs envisaged by the decision makers."³ And "image of a future state of affairs, a set of conditions to be fulfilled or a set of specifications which, when met, are to be regarded as the achievement of what was desired by the decision-makers in defined as "objective" of state behaviors."⁴

Let us first interpret the Japanese pre-1945 expansionism in the terms of this scheme. Crowley, in his study of prewar Japanese militarism, presents the original thesis that Japan's military and political leaders throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, consistently and consciously formulated state policies, domestic and foreign, in accordance with two normative standards; (1) the enhancement of national security; and (2) the enhancement of the economic well-being of the state (i.e., "Fukoku-Kyohei", a rich country and a strong army), and that the identification of national security and economic prosperity with a hegemonial position in East Asia became an article of faith for the Imperial Government that was not compromised until the end of the Pacific War. A restate-

ment of Crowley's proposition in the terms of the analyses developed above (p. 28-29) would be as follows: the Japanese leaders perceived that Japan was surrounded by two countries whom they perceived to be "powerful" and could overrun Japanese territory. In order to become a "world power" Japan must acquire an ability to wage war against these two enemies. This ability was perceived to be possible only through the incorporation of other Asian countries.

Schematic of Japan's Expansionism

I. National Goal: To become a great power.

II. Definition of Situation.

1. Perception A: Japan is weak with respect to the U.S. The U.S. is hostile to Japan. Japan is weak with respect to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is hostile to Japan.
2. Perception B: Achievement of the above national goals means that Japan must become so strong as to be able to wage war against the U.S. and the Soviet Union.
3. Perception C: Need for a strong military and a higher economic standard of living.
4. Perception D: The Japanese islands are not large enough to realize their dream.
5. Perception E: China and Korea must be made Japanese territories or at least subject to the Japanese will.
6. Perception F: The China problem needs a new solution.

III. The perception of Alternative Projects:


- a. Perception G: Advance to the North means possible conflict with the Soviet Union.
- b. Perception H: Advance to the South means possible conflict with the United States.

IV. Misperceptions:

- 1. Misperception A: The Japanese leaders did not think that the U.S. will object militarily to Japan's advancement southward.
 - 2. Misperception B: The Japanese leaders considered that the Southeast Asian nationalist movements are manageable and expendible.
- V. Because of the above two misperceptions, Project (b) was taken up as a solution to the immediate problem, i.e., that settlement of increasing involvement in China.

THE SELECTION OF ONE PROJECT: INCORPORATION OF ASIA AS THE GREAT EAST ASIA CO-PROSPERITY SPHERE.

If Japan were to see herself playing a greater role in Asia and even to picture herself as a future world "super power" does it follow from this "natural goal" that Japan must inevitably go through stages II-V? Most reasonable persons would answer "NO". Then what factors may intervene in this process? What caused the misperception that the U.S. would not intervene in Japan's project of Southward advancement? How can this type of serious misperception happen? One mechanism which may explain such misperception is suggested in the causal diagram on the following page.



The role of communication as an intervening variable will not be discussed in this thesis. This factor has been discussed elsewhere. One of these intervening variables is images, perceptions, attitudes of decision makers. These will in turn, influenced by the psychological as well as sociological backgrounds of the decision makers. One of the foremost specialists on Japanese foreign policy behaviors, Prof. Mushakoji, notes three major sources of difference between the pre-Second World War period (i.e., the first "take-off" period for the Japanese foreign policy) and the post-independence period (i.e., the second "take-off" period) as follows: (1) the closeness to the international environment; (2) the structure of the international environment; and (3) the awareness of the outside world within Japan.⁶ The core of the problem is the manner in which the Japanese policy makers perceived these aspects of the international environment, that is, whether they correctly perceived the nature and extent of the above differences and whether they responded to these perceptions in a different manner than they did in the pre-Second World War period. The first problem is the focus of this study.

Contemporary research in social psychology and other branches of the social sciences have found that an

actor's image, or his perception of the world and of himself, significantly influences his behavior. Research in political science has also increasingly found that the same perceptual dimensions of an actor's behavior make a significant contribution to the nature of policy output. A belief system which is composed of a number of "images" of the past, present, and future can be defined. This belief system, in turn, governs the manner in which a person perceives his environment and his probable alternative behaviors. It includes all the accumulated organized knowledge that the organism has about itself and the world.⁷ A belief system constantly interacts with new information. When a decision makers faces new information, the changes this new information may bring to him depends upon the degree to which the structure of the belief system is "open" or "closed."⁸ Attitudes, which are "predispositions to respond in a particular way toward a specified class of objects" consist of both cognitive (beliefs) and affective (feelings) components.⁹ However, these attitudes tend to be rather stable. New information that challenges the pre-existing balance between feelings and beliefs generates intrapersonal tension and a concomitant pressure to restore an internally consistent belief system by reducing the discrepancy, but not necessarily through a change in attitude.¹⁰ For example, the source of discrepant information may be discredited. The decision-maker may consciously

search for information that supports the pre-existing balance. Finally, the new and incongruent information may be accepted, leading one to modify or change his pre-existing attitudes so as to establish a new, balanced attitude structure. The content and source of the new information, the situation and the personality of the recipient may decide this attitude change.¹¹

Likewise, the content of an "international image" consists of the "beliefs (i.e., the set of cognitive attribute by which the person understands the object in an intellectual way), the feelings (i.e., the affective component: a liking or disliking for the focal object), and the behavioral aspects (an action component, or set of responses to the focal object that the person decides appropriate in the light of its perceived attributes). And both affect and cognitive components tend to be dependent upon each other. That is to say, there is a considerable evidence for a tendency toward correspondence among these image components. Favorable characteristics tend to be attributed to liked nations.

Images essentially "serve as screens for the selective reception of new messages and they often control the perception and interpretation of these messages that are not completely ignored, rejected, or repressed."¹³ As in attitudes "a certain minimum level of interdependence among the most salient images is needed for a functioning

personality..."Clearly the internal consistency both within and among images varies from one person to the next. The person who recognizes that his images are internally inconsistent, finding his situation psychologically uncomfortable, will not only 'try to reduce the dissonance and achieve consonance', but also, actively avoid situations and information which would likely increase the dissonance.¹⁴ And "many different specific images may be colored by common theme reflecting the person's general world-view, or perhaps more basic characteristics of his personality."¹⁵ In this thesis, however, the latter aspect of psychological correlates will not be dealt with.

The psychological environment of foreign policy decision making consists of both of these attitudinal aspects as well as the international images of the decision makers. And to the extent the decision maker can correctly perceive and assess his environment, a certain foreign policy is successful.

The natural conclusion of these observations seem to be that the way the decision maker perceives the situation in which he must act has significant impact upon the outcome of his decisions. Any study of foreign policy will be incomplete, however, without including an analysis of the general environment which exists independently from the perception of the decision makers.

A number of smaller scale studies which do not claim the construction of general models, but attempt to test existing theories seem to have followed this direction. I will review the studies in political science in which "perception" of the decision makers (or elites) are treated as an important variable. Significantly, all of these studies use some type of content analysis as a method of data collection. This set of representative studies can be grouped into three types. The first category includes those which are mainly interested in the defining "image," or "perception" variables. Many of the studies on perception in political science fall into this category: The comparative study of international images of elites in the Soviet Union and the United States by Singer,¹⁶ the comparative study of elite images according to the issue area covering eight nations and sixty four issues by Brecher, et al.,¹⁷ Graber's trend study of the perception of the Middle East conflict in the United Nations.¹⁸ Choucrist's study¹⁹ on the perceptual bases of non-alignment as well as study of John Foster Dulles by Holsti²⁰ are good examples of hypothesis testing exploratory studies. The study of twenty Presidential nomination acceptance speeches by Smith, Stone, and Glenn²¹ and elite editorial comment on the European and Atlantic Communities in four countries by Namenwirth and Brewer²² are good examples of essentially exploratory studies.

The first three studies used hand content analysis method, while the last four studies dependend on computer content analysis method. These seven studies mainly explored the content and structure of elite perception. Although the findings in each study as well as the categories of analysis are interesting, little or no effort has been directed to the exploration of reasons underlying the foreign policy behaviors.

The next type of studies concerned with the relations between the nature and content of perception by decision makers and the actions of nations, mainly hostile behaviors. The most representative is the study by the Stanford group on the perception of hostility and conflict behaviors between the Axis and the Allies and the occurrence of the First World War. They positively confirmed the increasing reciprocal hostile perceptions of the opponents which eventually led to the War, mobilizing massive data.²³ The results are presented in various papers. The study by Zinnes on the relations between the perception of hostility²⁴, the series of studies by Holsti²⁵ followed similar orientation and identified positive relationship between the perception of hostility of the opponents and the hostile actions by the perceiver.

The third groups of studies is represented by Holsti et al., and the studies by Mogdis and Tidwell²⁷ Mogdis²⁸ examined the relationship between the perceptions

and a series of "hard" indices. Holsti et al. used the aforementioned 1914 data for perception data and the gold flow in and out of London, as well as the stock market prices as economic variables. The perceptual data alone did not explain the development of a local incident into a general war. But the relationship between perceptual data and actual events, particularly the fact that response to a stimulus was always more intense in hostility than the stimulus itself provided a basic linkage between policy perception and action. In his study, however, the emphasis is upon the perception itself, rather than the combined explanatory power of perception and hard indices for predicting to the future state behaviors.

The papers by Mogdis and Tidwell and by Mogdis use the result of an extensive group study using both perceptual and aggregate data on the fifteen national attributes of each of the Soviet Union and Communist China and thirty one interaction variables between the two countries between 1950 and 1967. Mogdis and Tidwell examined the hypothesis concerning the relationship between the national attributes and changes in interaction between the two countries, based on the field theory of Rummel.²⁹ They also tested several hypotheses concerning the perception between two nations, independently of the two groups of hard indices. Although they discovered a parallel development in the perception of hostility and some of the interaction data they did not

establish the existence of any causal relationship. A more significant aspect of their study is the testing of hypotheses concerning the perception of hostility and specific interaction variables. Particularly, the changing differences in the nuclear/industrial gap between the Soviets and the Chinese predicted to 96 percent of their increasingly hostile interaction. Their data did not support, however, the relationship between the changing perceptions of the United States by the Soviet Union and China and their perceptions of each other.

Mogdis later refined his previous analysis and tested the causal relationship among national attributes, behaviors, and perception. As in the previous paper, he develops his theoretical argument on the basis of Newcomb's model of cognitive balance, particularly in his examination of the relationship between the increasing hostile behaviors between the Soviet Union and the CPU, and the increasing difference in their perception of the United States. The second theoretical basis is a departure from his previous paper and traces the causative relation between the "perception plus national attributes" and the "behavior" of these two nations toward each other. As in the previous paper, he found "no significant relationship between Soviet and Chinese perceptions of the United States and their increasingly hostile communications or behavior toward each other."³⁰ He could prove from his data, however,

that the past behavior ($t-1$) explains 77% of the total variance in the present behavior (t) [a test of propositions of Charles McClelland's model; behavior \rightarrow behavior]. He found the highest causative relations between the differences in attributes plus perception and the behavior of these two nations (which explains 89% of the variance in behaviors of two nations to each other), while the perception of the opponent alone explained only 62% of the variance at the statistically significant level. However, he did not test any hypotheses implying (Behavior $_{t-1}$ + perception) \rightarrow Behavior $_t$ in his study.

Thus the national attributes themselves were found to be less effective indicator to predict foreign conflict behaviors of nations. On the other hand, the series of studies reviewed indicated that the perception or the combination of perception and hard indices are effective measure of predicting foreign policies of a nation. What we need now seems to be a causal model of behavior of a nation-state (or nation states) which incorporates "perception" factors. The Snyder, et al.³¹ model, or Modelski model³² are too broad to be a truly practical guide in this situation. As Rosenau notes they do not prescribe "causal" level relations between the variables they presented and therefore fail to be a guide for a successful research on foreign policy behaviors. We must develop

some means by which to compare these prewar perception to the perception of postwar Japanese leaders.

The framework presented by Vital concerning the foreign policy behaviors of small states is used as a guideline for studying the relationship between the image variables. Although according to Vital's definition of small states, Japan at the lowest level of its economic prosperity immediately after the surrender does not fit to this category of small states because of the size of the population (i.e., too big). However, the review of his model seems to suggest that it generally describes the foreign policy behaviors of non-super powers fairly well, and can be used as a guideline in the discussion. One aspect of his model which distinguishes it from others such as Snyder, et al.³³ and Modelski³⁴ is that he attempts to identify the relationship between variables in his model. Although Vital does not present the exact nature of the hypotheses (i.e., the direction of the causal relationships between variables) he phrases his propositions in such a way that a researcher may utilize his frame of analysis to construct testable propositions.

According to Vital, a state adopts; (1) active policies; (2) passive policies or (3) defensive policies toward State B, depending upon the relative "national power" of State A in comparison with that of State B.

In short, the choice of policy will depend as suggested, on objective factors; firstly, on the external, international environment, and secondly, on the state's human and material resources, on the condition of the state's administrative and military machinery at the particular point in time, and on the ability of the leaders to marshall the national resources for political purposes. But it will depend, too, and perhaps more crucially, on the nature of the society in question, on the character and ambitions of the national leaders, and on the predominant view of the value and importance to be attached to the state as such....and even on the attitude to the future that lies beyond the period that can be forseen with any clarity.³⁵

What type of policy is adopted toward State B depends upon the assessment by State A of her "national power" in relation to that of State B. Not an absolute "national power" in the abstract map of world such as the table of the size of military itself, for each country, which exist in the world, but the "perceived" strength, or "capability" of one's own nation vis-a-vis the country to which a particular policy of State A is directed to achieve for foreign policy goals. When State A perceives its "national power" stronger than the "national power" of State B, it will adopt the active policies toward State B, and so on. And the national goal, set by the decision makers seem to be affected by this perception of "national power" or "capability" also.

Therefore, the perception by State A's decision makers, i.e., the "assessment of national power and capability of State A and State B will define the "national goals" of State A at a particular moment, which in turn will affect the selection of particular foreign policy by State A toward State B.

When State A's decision makers adopt a certain foreign policy, they cannot consider all the relevant factors which may affect the outcome of such a policy.... because there are too many factors to be taken into account. (See for example, the variables selected by Snyder, et al., to affect the foreign policy of a country.) But they do take into consideration those which are salient to them at that particular moment, for one reason or another. All the perceptions of input stimuli comprise the "international image." Each perception contributes to the international image to a varying degree, according to the intensity, and frequency of the cognition of the object or events or phenomena. A change in one of the images affects the rest of the images less to the extent an actor is able to dissociate images. "Individuals dissociate some of their mental images more frequently with the broadening of their cognitive experience and the widening of their ranges of communication."³⁷ Such broadening often stems from geographical and social mobility and formal intellectual training.

Images, however, are characterized by their stability. "Images and attitudes often persist with little or no substantial change despite spectacular change in the external world, or messages about such changes."³⁸ And habits that actors have learned earlier may be incorporated into their self-concept. The most that spec-

tacular events or governmental efforts usually can accomplish is to change some important aspects of some important images and some aspects of their relations to surroundings cues and contexts.³⁹

This stability of images directs our attention to pre-war Japan's education which, according to Maruyama, embedded the basic foundation for the ultra-right nationalism among individual Japanese, which in turn nurtured the Japanese expansionism.

The so-called ultra-nationalist or right wing societies and their movement merely expressed the all pervasive ideology of right wing nationalism in a more blatant form.

There is nothing surprising about this almost universal acceptance in Japan of the underlying tenets of right wing nationalism...For when we examine these tenets one by one, we find that they are all closely related to the official education of "chukun aikoku" (i.e., "loyalty to the Emperor and love of country") which the power elite of Imperial Japan had systematically imposed on the people since the Meiji Period. In certain cases right-wing nationalist beliefs were from the onset part of the Government's programme of indoctrination; in other cases they were naturally derived from the official ideology.⁴⁰

The stability of images thus poses a serious question in the analysis of Japanese foreign policies since "previous experiences" as well as "international history" of a country (as an actor) along with its beliefs about its own domestic political system are hypothesized to be the major sources contributing to decision makers' concepts of international relations of other states and influence the level of their perceptual thresholds.⁴¹ The study of the

image of Japan's role in Asia must be examined in close comparison of Japan's past experiences. Although the "cool" generation which does not remember the Second World War is growing up in contemporary Japan, the majority of the Japanese leaders is still composed of a generation which holds vivid memories of the Second World War and the politics prior to it.

Jervis suggests that past experience can act upon the present national policies in two manners. A state's previous unfortunate experience with a type of danger can sensitize it to other examples of that danger. While this sensitivity may lead it to avoid the mistake it committed in the past, it may also lead it to mistakenly believe that the present situation is like the past one. "Santayana's maxim could be turned around, "Those who remember the past are condemned to make the opposite mistakes."⁴² They also affect the responsiveness of the other nations to the nation at present. This hypothesis may explain the appearance of two contrasting observations by two distinguished specialists of Japanese Political behaviors.

I. Southeast Asia, preoccupied with achieving a degree of basic national unity, might be excused for distrusting Japan for its past record. They might naturally fear Japan's growing economic power or deplore the activities of individual "jute-buying generals." But if they truly believed that Japanese business in the 1950s represented the advance guard of a self-conscious national design to put the area under Japanese guardianship or exploit it for Japan's purposes alone in the old manner, they lacked insight into the nature of

Japanese modernity, and the extent to which counter-vailing forces operated within Japanese society. The Japanese were searching for a new national role in Asia; they may have been overcautious and niggardly, but nobody other than a few antiquarians wished to repeat the past.

II. It is not hard to visualize a situation in which the extreme rightist elements, who have still not managed to recover from the effects of Japan's defeat in 1945 and the pre-war nationalist politicians who, for all their democratic facade, continue to embrace the old spirit of Japanese imperialism, will slowly rise from their seats, their faces fixed in a mirthless grin and, turning to the bewildered populace, will whisper into their ears, "Look at this now! We are all the same in the end, aren't we? Except that our country is more advanced....we got there first! There's no reason that we Japanese should repeat our past. The only trouble is that we didn't go about things cleverly enough last time."⁴⁴

In conclusion, the discussion of this chapter may be summarized as follows:

1. Japan's pre-1945 expansionism is interpreted to be derived from (a) the ideology of "a rich country" and a strong army"; (b) the ideology of an "autonomous" national defense; (c) the traditionalist right-wing nationalist attitudes and (d) the misperception of the international environment owing to the above factors.
2. The perceptions, images and attitudes of the decision makers play significant roles in determining the direction of a nation's foreign policies.
3. The perception of one's own nation's national power and capability seems to be one of the most significant aspects of images influencing the nature of foreign policy selected by the decision makers.

4. And, therefore, the role which Japan plans to play in Southeast Asia must hold some relationship to these international images.

If the major causes for the prewar Japanese expansionist policies in the international environment themselves were largely dissolved during the postwar period, as Prof. Mushakojai reasons, what new attitudinal orientations can be found among the Japanese decision makers? Pacifism? Economism? Political Ambitions? Internationalism?

FOOTNOTES--Chapter II

¹Dean G. Pruitt, "Definition of the Situation as a Determinant of International Action," in Kelman, ed., op. cit., Chapter 11.

²Ibid., p. 417.

³Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Sapin Burton, eds., Foreign Policy Decision Making (New York: The Free Press, 1962), p. 90.

⁴Ibid., p. 82.

⁵Masao Maruyama, "Introduction," in Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan: A Study of Postwar Trends, ed. by I. I. Morris (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960).

⁶Mushakoji, op. cit., p. 25.

⁷George A. Miller, Eugene Galanter, and Karl H. Pribram, Plans and Structure of Behavior (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960). Kenneth Boulding presents a definition of "image" (The Image [Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1960]) which is slightly broader than most scholars' definitions.

⁸Milton Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind (New York: Basic Books, 1960).

⁹Milton J. Rosenberg, "Cognitive Structure and Attitudinal Affect," J. of Abnormal and Social Psychology, LIII (1956), 367-72.

¹⁰Ole R. Holsti, "Cognitive Structure and Attitudinal Affect," J. of International Affairs, XXI, 1 (1967), 19.

¹¹For details of researches done on these subjects, see Kelman, op. cit., particularly Chapter 6, "Effects of Education and Persuasion on National and International Images," by Irving C. Janice and M. Brewster Smith.

¹²William A. Scott, "Psychological and Social Correlates of International Images," in Kelman, op. cit., Chapter 3.

¹³K. W. Deutsch and Richard L. Merritt, "Effects of Events on National and International Images," in Kelman, op. cit., p. 234.

¹⁴L. Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962), p. 3.

¹⁵Scott, op. cit., p. 77.

¹⁶David J. Singer, "Soviet and American Foreign Policy Attitudes: Content Analysis of Elite Articulation," J. of Conflict Resolution, VII.

¹⁷Michael Brecher, Blema Steinberg, and Janice Stein, "A Framework for Research on Foreign Policy Behavior," XIII, 13 (1969), 75-101.

¹⁸Doris Graber, "Perceptions of the Middle East Conflict in the UN, 1953-1965," J. of Conflict Resolution, XIII (1969), 454-84.

¹⁹Nagli Choucri, "The Perceptual Base of Nonalignment," Journal of Conflict Resolution, XIII (1969), 57-74.

²⁰Ole R. Holsti, "The Belief System and National Images: A Case Study," J. of Conflict Resolution, VI (1962), 242-252.

²¹Marshall S. Smith, J. Philippe Stone, and Evelyn N. Glenn, "A Content Analysis of Twenty Presidential Nomination Acceptance Speeches," in Stone, et al., op. cit., pp. 359-400.

²²J. Zvi Namenwirth and Thomas L. Brewer, "Elite Editorial Comment on the European and Atlantic Communities in Four Countries," in Stone, et al., op. cit., pp. 401-27.

²³Robert C. North, et al., Content Analysis (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1963).

²⁴Dina A. Zinnes, "The Expression and Perception of Hostility in Prewar Crisis: 1914," in Quantitative International Politics, ed. by David J. Singer (New York: The Free Press, 1968), 85-159.

²⁵Ole R. Holsti, "Cognitive Dynamics and Images of the Enemy," in Enemies in Politics, ed. by D. J. Finlay, O. R. Holsti, and R. F. Fagen (Chicago: Rand McNalley, 1967).

²⁶Ole Holsti, Robert C. North, and Richard A. Brody, "Perception and Action in the 1914 Crisis," in Singer, ed., op. cit., pp. 123-58.

²⁷Franz J. Mogdis and Karen S. Tidwell, "A Quantitative Assessment of Sino-Soviet Relations, 1950-1967," A paper delivered at the 1970 Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, April 2-4, 1970.

²⁸Franz J. Mogdis, "The Verbal Dimension in Sino-Soviet Relations: A Time Series Analysis," Prepared for delivery at the 66th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Los Angeles, California, 1970.

²⁹Rudolph Rummel, "The DON Project: A Five Year Research Program," Honolulu: University of Hawaii, Dimensionality of Nations Project (DON), Research Report No. 9, particularly pp. 26-41 and by the same author, "Field and Attribute Theories of Nations Behavior: Some Mathematical Inter-relationships," DON Report, no. 31, August, 1969; cited in Ibid.

³⁰Mogdis, op. cit., p. 35.

³¹Snyder, et al., op. cit.

³²George A. Modelski, Theory of Foreign Policy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961).

³³David Vital, The Inequality of States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967). Vital states: "The present study is concerned with the latter class of smaller states to the exclusion of such middle powers. The dividing line between the two groups may be drawn by defining the rough upper limits of the class of small states as being:

- (a) A population of 10-15 million in the case of economically advanced countries; and
- (b) A population of 20-30 million in the case of underdeveloped countries." (p. 8)

Japan is in general treated as a "great power" at present, e.g., Brecher, et al., op. cit., p. 90.

"There are four broad categories: superpowers, great powers, middle powers, and small powers. The place of any state in the power scale depends upon a combination of four components . . . size, population, military capability, and economic capability, the last two especially at the point in time of status designation. . . . The great powers (UK, France, Germany, China and Japan) possess any three of the four so as to give to their foreign policy decisions a far-reaching but less than territorial impact. . . ." (p. 90)

³⁴Modelski, op. cit.

³⁵Vital, op. cit., p. 122.

³⁶Snyder, et al., op. cit.

³⁷Deutsch and Merritt, op. cit., p. 177.

³⁸Ibid., p. 167.

³⁹Ibid., p. 185.

⁴⁰Maruyama, op. cit., p. xvii.

⁴¹Robert Jervis, "Hypotheses on Misperception,"
in International Politics and Foreign Policy, ed. by
James N. Rosenau (New York: The Free Press, 1969), pp. 246-49.

⁴²Ibid., p. 249.

⁴³Olson, 1970, op. cit., p. 45.

⁴⁴Maruyama, op. cit., p. xxvi.

CHAPTER III

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

In order to answer the questions raised in the previous chapters, we have to first (1) delineate the international image held by the Japanese decision makers at a given time, (2) examine the relationship between various components of its image, and (3) determine whether there are changes in the content of the international image or in the relationship among various components of the international image or in the relationship among various components of the international image over time. On the basis of such findings, we can determine whether there exist any relationships between the expansionist orientation, self-confidence, perception of national capability and of national power, Japan's role in Asia, and the regionalist orientation.

The scope of this research is restricted in its methods of inquiry, determined by the availability of data, funds, and methods (techniques) as well as time. Restrictions made primarily on these economic grounds will be made clear at the beginning of discussions of research design and method. The discussions in this chapter include: Presentation of Hypotheses; Computer Content Analysis; the

Mitchell Program; Operationalization of Hypotheses (i.e., Designation of Indicants); and Summary of Analysis Design.

Presentation of Hypotheses

Identification of Image Structure and Changes in Image Structure Overtime

An inquiry into the content of international image of the Japanese decision makers will be the first phase of the research.¹ In order to identify the content of international image in the context of this research, interest of this study, we have to approach from two aspects; (a) identification of characteristic traits similar to prewar expansionism; and (b) identification of the perceived role of Japan in Asia. From the examples given by Singer² and Choucri³ and the review of Japanese Asian policies we can construct a hypothesized table of salient aspects of the international image held by the Japanese decision makers. The classification of levels was derived from Snyder, et al.⁴ and the definition of policies (defensive, active-economic, and active-political) follows Vital's model.⁵

Japanese expansionism, i.e., Japanese policies toward Asian countries during and before the Second World War seem to contain highly tutorial and paternal orientations as elements.⁶

Table 3.1.--Further Explanations of Japanese Foreign Policy: A Simplified Model.

Level	1955: Defensive Policy Model	1967: Active Policy Model
Level 1:	Independence UN Membership Korean War Cold War Began Independence Movements in Asia	Cold War Intensified Increasing Communist- Influence in Asia Friendly Relations with the U.S. and Asian Countries
<u>Input</u> <u>Stimuli</u>		
<u>Background</u> <u>Conditions</u> (=environment)	Demilitarization & Democratization of Japan Need for Economic Reconstruction Need for Re-establishment of Close Ties with Asian Countries Recovery of Political Independence	Economic Recovery & Prosperity High Rate of Industrialization Higher Standard of Living
systemic & domestic		
Level 2:	International System=Negative	International System=Friendly
<u>Perception</u>	Self-Powerless, Weak, Less- Self-Confident	Self-Capable, Powerful More-Self-Confident, Capable of Changing the Environment
(attitudinal characteristics)	UN-centered Policies U.S.-centered Policies Denial of Military "Domestic Affairs First" Policy Reparation for Wartime conducts	Close Ties with the Free World -Trust in the Free World -Distrust of the Communist World
<u>Definition</u> <u>Of</u>		
<u>Situation</u> (=Statement of Plans, Frame of Reference)		Leadership in Asia Mediator Role in Inter- national Conflict Regionalist

Table 3.1.--Continued

Level	1955: Defensive Policy Model	1967: Active Policy Model
Level 3:	Security Treaty with the U.S. Small Defense Budget	Security Treaty with the U.S. Broader Economic Assistance Programs
<u>Output:</u>	No Negotiation with Communist China	Asian Development Bank Open
Actual Behaviors	Cultural Leadership	Economic Relations with Communist Asia
Characteristics of Behaviors	Reparation with Asian Countries Economic Gifts & Loans	A Larger Defense Budget

As noted in Chapter 1, other Asian nation's fear that the increasing interest and actual participatory activities of the Japanese in Asia may be an indication of a Japanese revival of prewar and wartime imperialism and militarism. Whether such fears can be seen as justified or totally unfounded on the basis of Japan's policy pronouncements depends upon the existence or absence of certain traits of militarism and imperialism and the tutorial and paternal approaches to her neighbors in Japan's expressed perception of her relations with Asia.

The persistence of these traits corresponding to prewar expansionism among the leaders in postwar Japan is widely recognized by the scholars as in Morris' statement:

Political power in Japan, though far more widely spread than before the war, remains largely in the hands of an extremely conservative Establishment. This ruling group, whose influence has steadily increased since the resumption of independence, owes much of its strength to the prevalence of pre-modern conditions and traditions that we have noticed. For this reason and, also because its composition, the interests of the ruling group are at many points contrary to those of modern democracy.⁷

Other scholars such as Reischauer, while recognizing the existence of typically Japanese behavioral characteristics, maintains the thesis that Japan has changed. Therefore, the first step in the analysis of foreign policy attitudes of Japanese leaders, must be also the examination of the

extent of this traditionalism among the Japanese decision makers before examining Japanese perception of her role in Asia.

I discussed in Chapter 1 the co-existence of seemingly contradictory attitudes in contemporary Japan, e.g., the increasing progressive orientations owing to the industrialization and urbanization yet the increasing conservative attitudes among the middle class, and the existence of an essentially pre-modern informal policy circulation process. My first hypothesis therefore, attempts to examine whether we may be able to find the properties which correspond to the characteristics which may be called pre-war Japanese "expansionism-traditionalism."

Hypothesis I: There is a trend away from the prewar expansionism and traditionalism in the international image held by the Japanese decision makers.

The decrease in the expansionist and traditionalist attitudes among the decision makers will be reflected in their changing perception of Japan's relations with Southeast Asian countries. More specifically from the defensive and passive policies to more active policies. The terms, "defensive", "passive", and "active" policies which were introduced in the previous chapters, will be defined in more detail in the operationalization section of this chapter.

Hypothesis II: The nature of the perception of the role of Japan in Southeast Asia has changed in emphasis from more defensive policies (such as redemption of the wartime be-

haviors, economic contributions) to more active policies (economic and political leadership).

The question of what role Japan should play is inseparable from the question of the scope of regional cooperation in Southeast Asia discussed in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2.

Hypothesis III: The perceptions of the Japanese decision makers concerning regional cooperation increased over time during the period from 1955 to 1967.

Intra-Image Structural Relationships

If the observations by students of Japan that the increase of Japan's economic independence (from the U.S.) would lead to independent foreign policy of Japan, the perception of this "independent policy" must occur with the change in the perception of her relations with the United States. This change in perception does not necessarily imply a change from friendliness to hostility, rather it must be a change from subordinate to equal status. If this interpretation is correct, then we can hypothesize that:

Hypothesis IV: The change in the perception of the role of Japan in Asia has occurred in conjunction with the changes in the perception of her relations with the United States.

The thesis that this increasing feeling of "independence" from the U.S. has been accompanied by the increasing "self-confidence" among the Japanese seems to be widely accepted. The public opinion survey indicated a gradual

increase in their pride in the Japanese culture and behavioral codes in the 1960's. Several interpretations from this standpoint are consummated in Olson's proposition that the changing Japanese perception of her role in Asia would be an inevitable result of this self-confidence. Therefore two aspects of Japan's perception of her role will be analyzed: first, the policy perception, i.e., defensive active policy angle; and secondly, the nationalist-regionalist orientation angle.

Hypothesis V: The increase in the self-confidence of Japan occurred in conjunction with the change in her perceived role in Asia from defensive policies to active policies.

Hypothesis VI: The increase in the self-confidence of Japan occurred in conjunction with the change from nationalist to regionalist orientation.

As noted in Chapters 1 and 2, Vital argues that the small state which perceives itself to be stronger than its neighbors, will adopt active policies toward these neighbors, while when it perceives its power to be less than that of its neighbors, it will adopt passive or defensive policies toward them. If we follow this argument, Japan seemed to perceive that it was more powerful than China and other Asian countries when it adopted expansionist policies. If so, at the time of the surrender, deprived of all its economic and military power, it is most likely that Japan felt that she was equal in national power to other Asian countries, or less powerful and that

her altered perceptions of her power and national capability vis-a-vis other Asian countries were accompanied by changed perceptions of her role in Asia.

In another context, Terhune found that the perception of weak national power tend to be associated with higher nationalism among the foreign students in the U.S.⁸ It would be meaningful first to relate this dimension of perception of national power to the nationalist orientation of Japanese decision makers.

Hypothesis VII: The change in the perception of the role of Japan from defensive policies to active policies occurred in conjunction with the changes in her perception of Japan's "national power" or "capability" vis-a-vis other Asian countries.

Next, the relationship between the perception of Japanese national power⁹ and her role in Asia by the decision makers that:

Hypothesis VIII: The change in the perception of its national power (from weak to strong) occurred in conjunction with changes in the nationalist orientation of Japanese decision makers (from nationalist to regionalist).

The general change in the international image of Japanese decision makers along the time dimension will be hypothesized in summary as shown on the following page.

Data Source

The data on attitudes and international image of Japanese decision makers are derived from computer content




Table 3.2.--Summary of Image Changes.

analysis of¹⁴ foreign policy speeches made by the Japanese Foreign Ministers in 1955, 1957, 1959, 1961, 1963, 1965, and 1967 at the House of Representatives.¹⁰ Two speeches, one from the first half and another from the second half, were selected for every year.

The importance of sampling in content analysis for the purpose of inferring from a study of international image by a study of a sample of statements to the international image in policy attitudes held in general by the decision makers cannot be overemphasized. At the same time, sampling the foreign policy speeches presents several serious technical problems which will be discussed below.

In a trend analysis, sample must be stratified according to certain time period. Here, because of the nature of Diet sessions in Japan, several problems arise. The annual meetings of both Houses of the Diet in ordinary session begin in December and continue for a period of 150 days. (The term may be prolonged by a concurrent resolution of both Houses.) When unfinished business remains from an ordinary session or when a natural or political emergency requires convocation, the extraordinary sessions are called. These sessions may be initiated either by the Cabinet or from the floor of the Diet. Although a new ordinary session begins theoretically in December, the exact date of opening is not specified in the regulation. Thus the date of closing varies, and therefore so do the

dates of opening of new extraordinary sessions to debate the issues carried over from the ordinary sessions as well as the number of extraordinary sessions held each year.

One solution is to cluster sample according to the "ordinary sessions" which is to be held once a year. This method will narrow down the foreign policy speeches to one per year. However, this clustering method will cause other problems. Since the ordinary sessions begin at the end of December the policy speeches are given at the beginning of next year. And since the length of the sessions is 150 days, the speeches always will cover the beginning of the year and the latter portion of the year will be consistently omitted. Thus this sampling scheme would not be unbiased with respect to certain possible seasonal differences in perceptions.

Size of sample was determined by the necessity of covering a seasonal effects as well as the minimum necessary size of data (words) which were guessed from the previously undertaken content analysis researches. Stone, et al., estimated that there should be roughly 1,000 words for each tag tally when a researcher is using the Psychological Dictionary or some modification of it. The shortest foreign policy speech made between 1955 and 1967

was about five hundred words in English translation. Thus two speeches seem to meet this minimum requirement for researches using Harvard III Dictionary.

In this context, an initial examination of a sample of texts suggested that only one policy statement would not be a good representation of the image perceptions of the Foreign Ministers. From this and in order to distribute the sample within a particular year, it was decided to select two speeches for every year from 1955 to 1967; one from the first half period and one from the second half period. The exact method used in the selection of speeches is as follows:

1. Using the index to the Kampo, all the names of sessions at which any foreign policy speeches were given by Foreign Ministers were listed along the names of Foreign Minister and Prime Minister at that particular time.
2. The page numbers in the Special Edition (Gogai) of the Kampo in which these speeches were reported were noted.
3. In the Kampo Special Edition, the date of speech was checked.
4. On the basis of the above information, the first and the last speeches of the selected year were marked. Xerox copies of these speeches selected were obtained from the Diet Library.

1967 is a rather peculiar year in the sample. Because of the general election the first foreign policy speech of the year was given at an extraordinary session and there was no foreign policy statement in the House of Representatives later in the year. Therefore, a speech to cover this deficiency was obtained from Foreign Minister's speech at the UN. Although this latter speech covers Japan's foreign policies in general, this peculiar nature of the sample taken in 1967 should be given attention at the time of interpretation of the results of analysis.

Data Source Characteristics and Systematic Errors

There are certain possibilities of systematic errors because of the nature of policy speeches itself and translations. These problems must be discussed first.

1. Do policy speeches reflect the personalities of individual speakers rather than the general orientation of the government?

As discussed in Chapter I, Japanese decision making takes a form similar to oligarchy, because of the great concerns for "unanimity" in reaching a decision. This is the same in the formulation of party policies. The party encourages each Diet member to follow party line closely

and discourages him from expressing an individual opinion on a particularly controversial issue if he does not agree with the position of the party.

An official policy speech made in the presence of opposition government policies already adopted or an attempt to influence the future policies by stating desirable policy goals. In this process it undoubtedly presents a "definition of the situation" as seen by the government. A statement may camouflage true intention behind the policies suggested. However, in presenting certain policy goals, the speaker must discuss the issue in terms of desirability or undesirability of certain "happenings" (policies, events, governments, etc.), and therefore, intentionally or unintentionally exhibiting his or his group's (for example, party, government) values, attitudes, policy goals as he perceived them.

2. Translation of Sample from Japanese to English

The computer programs can process any language if they are written in an alphabet according to certain rules. In written Japanese, the use of Chinese character, the differences in accents in verbal Japanese as well as the context of the usage can determine the meaning of the homograph, i.e., words with different meaning but identical spelling. However, because of the existence of too many homographs when the Japanese is expressed in alphabets, i.e., Romaji, the use of Japanese at this stage

is rather difficult. There is an attempt being made to develop a set of grammatical and contextual rules by which a computer can be programmed to make reliable decisions about the proper meaning for 1,000 homographs. A similar dictionary for Japanese, if it can be prepared, would certainly make the research in Romaji possible. However, at this stage, such an attempt will involve a linguist highly trained in computer programming and extensive funds to cover computer time. For this study, content analysis in Romaji seems infeasible.

Therefore, after the sample of text was determined, the following step was taken for the purpose of translating Japanese into English. First, the list of speeches marked were compared to the list of available speeches in English translation from the Japan Report. Those whose translations were not available were translated into English by this author. In case of those whose translations appear in the available Japan Report, the speeches given in both sources were carefully compared to each other in order to determine whether the whole statement was adequately translated. A careful examination revealed that the main body of the speeches were carefully presented, except that connecting statements such as the opening remarks are in most cases dropped in the translated texts in the Japan Report. If any portions of the main body were missing, which was rare, the translations of these portions were added.

Thus the sample represents a mixture of semi-official translations presented in the Japan Report, and the translations by this author. The Japanese tend to use highly ambiguous expressions. Often I encountered a sentence which did not properly end or did not have regular "S + V..." forms at all. In these cases, a decision had to be made from the context, since English syntax demands fairly precise definition of subject and verbs.

It is assumed that this mixture of semiofficial translation and the translations by this author will cause no significant errors in the analysis. The reasoning underlying this assumption is as follows: If the absolute frequency count of each word were used as the basis of testing hypotheses, then there would be errors because of the use of more than one translator. However, as discussed in detail in the methods section, an equivalence table, which is essentially a classification of words into groups according to compound common attributes of their definitions, is used to reduce the text for the analysis provides. If this classification of words is done without gross errors (i.e., a problem of validity which will be discussed later), then words which describe the same or similar attitudes, policy, or events, will be set equivalent to the same concept. Consequently, if one translator used "economic instrument" and another used "economic means," either "instrument" or "means" would be indistinguishable in the

frequency distribution based on the concepts of the equivalence table. Similarly "aid" and "assistance" would be classified by the equivalence table into the same category. Thus, while there certainly exist systematic errors caused by the tendencies of each translator to use certain words describing certain phenomena, these differences will be insignificant for the analysis undertaken in this research.

There may be another source of systematic error, though, because of the nature of policy speeches given publicly, exemplified by systematic avoidance of unfavorable comments for the self (such as the speaker's political party, his country, etc.). And these aspects should be given appropriate considerations at the time of interpretation of the results. The information on the sample thus obtained is given in Table 3.3 on the following page.

Since the perceptual data and the examination of internal relations of the data play a major and significant role in this research, most of the discussion in this section will be devoted to the process of content analysis; specifically, sampling and the construction of an "equivalence table." (An "equivalence table" will be defined later.)

Definition of Content Analysis

Content analysis is defined as "any technique for making inferences by objectively and systematically identi-

Table 3.3.--Table of foreign policy speeches.

Year	Speech	Session	Date	F.M.	(P.M.)
1955 ^b	A	22nd (X) ^a	4.25	Shigemitsu	(Hatoyama)
1955	B	23rd (Y)	12.2	Shigemitsu	(Hatoyama)
1957	A	26th (X)	2.4	Kishi	(Kishi)
1957	B	27th (Y)	11.	Kishi	(Kishi)
1959	A	31st (X)	1.27	Fujiyama	(Kishi)
1959	B	33rd (Y)	10.28	Fujiyama	(Kishi)
1961	A	38th (X)	1.30	Kosaka	(Ikeda)
1961	B	39th (Y)	9.28	Kosaka	(Ikeda)
1963	A	43rd (X)	1.23	Ohira	(Ikeda)
1963	B	44th (Y)	10.18	Ohira	(Ikeda)
1965	A	48th (X)	1.25	Shiina	(Sato)
1965	B	49th (Y)	7.30	Shiina	(Sato)
1967	A	55th (Y)	3.14	Miki	(Sato)
1967	B	UN	9.22	Miki	(Sato)

^aX: From the ordinary session; Y: From the extraordinary session.

^bThe original list would have included every year. Because of the cost of keypunching, the sample used in this study include only alternate years.

Remarks: There were twenty ordinary sessions and twenty seven extraordinary sessions, besides eight special sessions and two emergency meetings between 1947 and 1967. In the sample, six speeches are from the ordinary sessions, seven from the extraordinary sessions and the only one from the United Nations speech. The peculiar nature of the sample in 1967 is explained in the section on sampling.

fyng specified characteristics of messages." It must be objective and systematic. It must be undertaken for some theoretical reason if it is to be distinguished from information retrieval indexing or similar enterprises.¹¹

Holsti states that "content analysis is likely to be especially appropriate for at least three general classes of research problems which may occur in virtually all disciplines and areas of inquiry:

1. When data accessibility is a problem and the investigator's data are limited to documentary evidence.

2. When it is important to get repeated measures of the subjects values, attitudes, and the like over a period of time, and when a supplementary source of data is needed.

3. When, given certain theoretical components of data themselves the subjects' own language is crucial to the investigation.

4. When there are technical advantages because the volume of material to be examined exceeds the investigator's ability to undertake the research by himself.¹²

In this research, content analysis was selected as an analytical technique because of the impossibility of interviewing in detail the Japanese political leadership. Also, when the study involves the change over time, interviewing at one point in time can lead to more bias in the findings rather than assisting the research, unless

it is used as a purely supplementary method for an interpretation of findings. The major characteristic of computer content analysis is summarized by Holsti's words: "The ability to analyze text reliably at almost unbelievable speed."¹³ The use of computer for this purpose "impose[s] rigor and discipline on the formulation of research" and the data "are amenable to reanalysis as often and, for as many purposes as desired."¹⁴

Preparation of Data on Attitudes and Images Using Computer Content Analysis

After a careful comparison of three major computer content analysis programs which are accessible in the United States, i.e., the General Inquirer Program, the General Inquirer II Program, and the Mitchell Program, from the perspectives of cost, efficiency (i.e., speed), accessibility and reliability, a set of programs written by William C. Mitchell was selected.¹⁵ A research using the Mitchell Program unlike those using the General Inquirer Programs, demands a theory, an articulated hypothesis and clearly operationalized indices for the variables to be studied before the program can be implemented. Each concept in a hypothesis defines a list of words in such a way that there is no overlap between the words defined by any two different concepts. Thus once the hypotheses have been selected, the concepts of the equivalence table

will be firmly defined. The entire text is then translated into these concepts, and statistics on the frequency of occurrence and patterns of co-occurrence of concepts are generated. This is in a sense a more "conservative" approach to content analysis research. The content validity of concepts used in the equivalence table is therefore one of the most significant tests for the reliable outcome of the research.

Then, in research undertaken via the Mitchell Program, if we accept the axioms of a theory, the hypothesis derived from that theory, and the a priori definition indices for the variables to be tested, we will not be able to reject the results. If on the basis of preliminary analysis we accept the a priori definition of the indicator concepts, and the theoretical hypothesis is rejected, then there can be only two causes: an error in the logic of the theory, or the non-existence of the postulated phenomenon.

Procedure of Computer Content Analysis

Now the process of computer content analysis used here will be discussed in detail.

1. The data were punched on the cards by a key-punch operator experienced in non-numerical documents. The statements were coded according to the specifications of the GI/II manual.¹⁶ The subject, verb, and indirect and direct objects were identified by numerical number

followed by a slash, because the original intention was to use the GI/II program for the syntax analysis.¹⁷ The basic unit of analysis is sentence, and the appearance of certain concepts or cluster of concepts.

2. Then, the data was reduced into a smaller vocabulary using the equivalence table. This phase used the Mitchell Program and one of the most important phase in the research since the nature of the equivalence table can determine the outcome of the research to a greater extent. The equivalence table used in this research, "New Asia Equivalence Table," was derived from the Namenwirth Political Dictionary. This is a revision of the Harvard III Dictionary¹⁸ developed by Namenwirth for the analysis of elite paper editorials in Europe and the United States.

The Namenwirth Political Dictionary was constructed by adding several tag categories to a list of 83 tags from the Harvard III Dictionary. The tag categories created include Soviet, American, British, French, German, European Atlantic, Nationalist, Unification and International Institution. To these were added general categories which were thought to discriminate political behaviors such as Corruption, Incompetence, Collective-Static, Individual-Static, Collective-Dynamic, Individual-Dynamic, Static and Dynamic. (Appendix 3.1) The latter group of tags, however, did not differentiate among either papers or years in his

study.¹⁹ The tags which did not differentiate elite attitudes in Namenwirth Political Dictionary were deleted and other tags which become necessary to cover particular sets of terms which appear frequently in the data were added. For example, the British, French, German and European Atlantic tags were immediately dropped. The Japan, Southeast Asia, Pacific Region, China tags were added. The resulting dictionary is tentatively called the New Asia Dictionary.

In the Harvard III-based dictionaries, words appear first followed by tag names. In general most nouns (objective names) were given a sociological definition and most verbs a psychological definition at the denotative level. The first order tags refer to the primary explicit meanings of words. The major shortcoming of these dictionaries understandably stems from the classification of words wholly according to psychological and sociological concepts and the absence of many terms which are frequently used in the study of political behaviors. Another problem stems from the fact that each word is given two levels of definition, i.e., the first order and the second order definitions.

The equivalence table, on the other hand, demands the classification of words according to concepts to be exclusive, i.e., one and only one concept name must be given to each word. By defining each word by only one concept we can eliminate the ambiguities in hypothesis testing.

This means defining a group of words which share a certain cluster of tags with a new tag (i.e., concept) as already discussed. First the words in the New Asia Dictionary were reordered into tag-word order, using a simple Fortran Program written for this purpose and sorted by tags. Next, those words with more than one tag were isolated from those with only one tag. The latter group of words were left as they stand in the equivalence table. Groups of words with common multiple tags were given new concept names characterizing those combinations of tags.

In the next step, after reducing the input data to concepts according to the equivalence table, the Mitchell Program produced a co-occurrence table which indicates the proportion with which each concept co-occurs with each other. These associations were taken within sentences, and summed over all sentences in the whole sample. Co-occurrences which are specified by the operational statements of hypotheses, but are not present in the sample must force the revision of the operational statement of the hypothesis. Those concepts which do not appear in the test are dropped from the equivalence table. Actual testing of the hypotheses of the study will be done with statistics from the co-occurrence tables specific to the time strata sampled.

The equivalence table constructed from the New Asia Dictionary following the procedure introduced above

is called "New Asia Equivalence Table." The first version included 91 concepts. After studying the frequency distribution over the period 1955 to 1967, the concepts To-Be, Tool, Weapon, Soviet Union, Latin American Small-Group, Nat-World were dropped. Commodity was absorbed into "Economic-Value," "Take" into "Get." The current version includes 81 concepts. The list of concepts is presented in Appendix 3.2. At this stage, it is necessary to specify in detail which concepts, or cluster of concepts, from this "New Asia Equivalence Table" may represent the variables in each hypothesis presented above.

Operationalization of Hypotheses
(Designation of Indicants
for Variables)

The basic hypotheses presented at the beginning of this chapter postulate specific associations between elements of policy images, images across time, or between images. In each case, the specific policy images are complex constructs, since it is implicitly assumed that the occurrence of a concept will identify a specific image only under certain conditions in the context of the document. Operational statements of the hypotheses in terms of unambiguous defining concepts derived from the New Asia Equivalence Table must make explicit those conditions under which behavior constructs are identified. Each operational statement, therefore, will be formally expressed as the

consequence of the union and intersection of sub-sets of the word-defining concepts in the equivalence table. Thus the datum for each hypothesis can be stated as the occurrence of some specific set of cells in a table of associations within each time segment. The specific structure of such operational statements will be developed in the restatement of the hypotheses which follows:

Hypothesis I: There is a trend away from the prewar expansionism in the international image held by the Japanese decision makers.

Japanese expansionism and therefore, the tutorial and paternal orientation in her Asian policies were supported by the existence of the "old order" i.e., the "traditional" and "feudal" attitudes among the Japanese and their right-wing nationalism.

The foremost authority on Japanese militarism, Professor Maruyama characterizes the right-wing nationalism with the following tendencies:

1. Precedence of loyalty to the nation over every other form of loyalty.
2. Hostility towards any extension of democratic rights and towards international socialism.
3. Support of militarism and opposition to pacifist movements.
4. Glorification of national mission.
5. Appeal to protect national traditions and culture.

6. Emphasis on duties as opposed to freedom.
7. Stress on the individuals family and birth-place as the fundamental bonds of social cohesion.
8. Tendency towards the authoritarian regimentation of all human relationships.
9. Integration of the national spirit in support of orthodox ideas.
10. Tendency to be especially vigilant and suspicious in regard to intellectuals and members of the free professions, on the grounds that they are apt to become the disseminators of "subversive thoughts."²⁰

Similarly, the traditional attitudes are summarized by Tsuneishi as "ethnocentric, hierarchical, and holistic attitudes" whose characteristics are as follows:

1. An emphasis on the family and nation over the individual.
2. Emphasis on discipline, duty, and obligation over freedom.
3. Distinction in status over equality.
4. Racial arrogance over egalitarianism.²¹

These characteristics will be summarized as:

1. Traditionalistic (status-conscious, discipline, etc.).
2. Nationalistic (ethnocentrism, distrust of outsiders, anti-intellectualism, included).
3. Expansionistic (external advancement).

4. Paternalistic-tutorial (toward the natives of other Asian countries).

5. Militaristic (use of arms as a major instrument of foreign policy implementation).

Therefore, the following concepts were selected from the equivalence table to define the above orientations.

Dimension A: Traditionalism

Community \wedge Authority-theme
Ideal-Value \wedge Authority-theme
Ideal-Value \wedge Obligation
Ideal-Value \wedge Follow

Dimension B: Nationalism

Japan \wedge Distress
Nation \wedge Ideal-Value
Japan \wedge Ideal-Value
Japan \wedge Nation

Dimension C: Expansionism

Japan \wedge Strength
Japan \wedge Attack
Japan \wedge Advance
Japan \wedge Control

Dimension D: Paternalism-tutorialism

Southeast-Asia \wedge Small
Southeast-Asia \wedge Community
Japan \wedge Authority-theme
Japan \wedge Guide
Japan \wedge Strength

Dimension E: Militarism

Japan \wedge Distress
Japan \wedge Weapon

Hypothesis II: The nature of the perception of the role of Japan in Southeast Asia has changed in emphasis from more defensive to more active policies.

During the Occupation, the immediate concern of the Japanese government was simply a survival as a unified people. The authority of the Occupation were simply accepted. The foreign policy of Japan at this state is defined as an example of passive policy according to Vital's definition. After the return to the international world, at the initial stages (1955 in Table 4.1), Japanese foreign policies are defined as defensive policies, which aimed at the maintenance of the status quo in Asia in order to preserve the economic recovery achieved during the Korean War, under the protection of the U.S. in the field of national security. Efforts were made to compensate for the destruction caused by Japan's wartime conduct and to win back the favor and friendship of Southeast Asian countries. Economic instruments were used essentially for the purpose of increasing internal increments (increasing the local standard of living, etc.). Exercise of political influence was either nonexistent or impossible. The use of military instruments naturally was out of question. Japan had limited amount of resources for diplomatic and propaganda activities. What, if any, Japan could boast of concerning her superiority must be "cultural."

On the other hand, at the more recent extreme of time scale, Japan seems to be more outgoing and active in her foreign relations. Active policies of Japan seem to be based on the perception that Japan might play a desirable leadership role in Asia again. At the initial stage of the employment of active policies, the major goal was to make a greater contribution to the economic development of Southeast Asian countries: to provide a model for economic development. Economic development of Southeast Asia was perceived to work favorably for the maintenance of a prosperous Japanese economy, and to increase Japan's high standard of living. Soon, however, Japan began to speak of itself in terms of mediator in Malaysian conflict, playing the role of a bridge between the East and the West. The credibility of such a role, entailing the use of both political and economic instruments remains ambiguous because Japan still relies heavily on its alliance with the U.S. in the maintenance of the national security.

The traits of defensive policy can be witnessed in the following statement concerning the role of reparation:

To begin with, reparation is for the compensation of the damage and the torments which our country incurred upon these nations during the War, and the exercise of reparation means the fulfillment of our responsibility. However, the role of reparation does not end simply with a passive fulfillment of responsibility. Now a mere recompensation of past damages and tormentations. It lays the foundation for the political and economic relations in the

future between Japan and the recipient countries. Moreover, the objective of reparation is to achieve the economic recovery of the recipient nations, and to make positive contribution to the economic development hereby turning the feeling of the people of recipient countries favorably to Japan, and based upon the correct understanding of Japan, to contribute to the establishment of close economic exchanges and of friendly relations between both nations. The reparation, therefore, may be called a bridge which forms the basis of cooperation between our country and the recipient country.²²

On the other hand, the leadership role is perceived in terms of "responsibility" and "mission" to contribute to the reduction of tension and peaceful reconstruction in Asia.

Our country [Japan] who has achieved high rate of economic growth under the free democratic political system, has presented a good example [model] to other Asian people who tend to lose confidence in the free democracy. In the future, deeply seriousness of our mission and responsibility to make the contribution to the reduction of tension and peaceful reconstruction of Asia. I would like to demand the right interest of our country in the international community and at the same time to fulfill the responsibility appropriate for the rising international status of Japan.²³

Defensive policies, therefore, will be explained by the expression of:

1. Redemption of wartime behaviors.
2. Contribution to the economic recovery of Asian countries.
3. Desire to establish friendly relations with Asian countries.
4. Strengthening Japan's international status through peaceful means.

5. Acceptance of international status quo and dependence upon the U.S.

6. Trade, Economic exchanges, rather than economic aid and assistance are more important concerns.

7. Treatment of Southeast Asian countries as "equals."

8. Emphasis on the "legal" aspect of equality of sovereign nations and emphasis on the role of the UN and other International Organizations and Japan's contributions through the UN.

Summarizing these characteristics we can specify the indicants for Defensive Policy Perception as follows:

Dimension A: Support of International Status Quo

Japan Δ Maintain
Japan Δ Urge

Dimension B: Perception of Non-Leadership Role

Japan Δ Follow
Japan Δ Avoid
Japan Δ Cooperate
Japan Δ Friendly

Dimension C: Definition of International Relations

Political-Ideal Δ Obligation
Ideal-Value Δ Obligation
Ideal-Value Δ Cooperate
Ideal-Value Δ Friendly

On the other hand, the Active Policies Perception will be explained by the following indicants:

Dimension A: Concept of Change in International Relations

Japan \wedge Advance
Japan \wedge Move

Dimension B: Perception of Leadership Role

Japan \wedge Authority-theme
Japan \wedge Guide
Japan \wedge Control
Japan \wedge Urge
Japan \wedge Promote

Dimension C: Definition of International Relations, Power and Self

Japan \wedge Large
Japan \wedge Strength

Dimension D1: Economic Instrument

Southeast-Asia \wedge Economic
Ideal-Value \wedge Economic
Promote \wedge Economic
Advance \wedge Economic
Urge \wedge Economic

Dimension D2: Political Roles

Political-Ideal \wedge Economic
Political \wedge Cooperate
Political-Ideal \wedge Cooperate
Political \wedge Promote
Political-Ideal \wedge Promote
Political \wedge Advance
Political-Ideal \wedge Advance
Political \wedge Urge
Political-Ideal \wedge Urge

The use of military threat and deterrence as an instrument of foreign policy was not designated as an independent dimension here, since the preliminary analysis indicated that there was only minor frequency of usage of concept in the foreign policy statements. Dimension D1 and D2 may need further explanation. The existence of

perception of active policies, particularly that of economic leadership, or political leadership, for example, will be determined by the intersection of Dimension A, B, C, and (Dimension D1 and D2). Economic Leadership role essentially focuses on presenting Japan as a "model" of economic development of Southeast Asian countries, and perceiving the "responsibility" and "mission" to contribute to the economic development of these countries. It tends to isolate "political" influence consequence of Japan which will be brought about by such activities.

The perception of political leadership role, on the other hand, involves the perception of "mission" and "responsibility" to make contribution to the maintenance of peace in Asia, the idea of playing "mediator" and "bridge" role in the settlement of the international conflict, particularly in Asia, and to assume a leading role in determining the fate in Asia.

Hypothesis III: The perception of decision makers concerning the regional cooperation increased over time during the period from 1955 to 1967.

For the study of these dimensions, I am using two above mentioned concepts of Namenwirth which are derived from the integration theory of Karl Deutsch, i.e., the nationalist and regionalist orientations. In the study of the North Atlantic area, Karl Deutsch substantiated that:

By integration we mean the attainment, within a territory, of "a sense of community" and of institutions and practices strong enough and wide spread enough to assure for "a long" time, dependable expectations of "peaceful change" among its population. By sense of community, we mean a belief on the part of individuals that they have come to agreement on at least this one point; that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of "peaceful change." ²⁴

This sense of community is a matter of "mutual sympathy and loyalties," of "we feeling," trust and mutual consideration; of partial identification in terms of self-image and interests, of mutually successful predictions of behavior and of cooperative action in accordance with it."²⁵ Nationalism or national self-consciousness, on the other hand, is "the attachment of secondary symbols of nationality to primary items of information moving through channels of social communication, or through the mind of an individual."²⁶ From these concepts, Namenwirth selected attention to national and regional symbols as an index of national and regional consciousness. "Thus increasing attention to regional symbols and at the same time declining attention to national symbols indicate increasing regional integration; opposite trends conversely imply decreasing integration."²⁷ Therefore our concepts will be as follows:

Dimension A: Nationalist Perception

Japan \wedge Nationalist
Political \wedge Nationalist

Dimension B: Regionalist Perception

Japan Λ Community
 Political-Ideal Λ Community
 Southeast Asia Λ Community
 Southeast Asia Λ Japan

Hypothesis IV: The change in the perception of the role of Japan in Asia has occurred in conjunction with the changes in the perception of her relations with the United States.

The indicants for the perception of the role of Japan in Asia have been discussed in the presentation of Hypothesis II. Japan's relationship with the United States has also been discussed in length in the previous chapters. The perception of Japan's relations with the U.S. are classified from "total dependence" to "equal-partnership." Total dependence will characterize such period as the occupation period when domestic as well as foreign policies of Japan was determined by the occupation authorities. The period of ambivalence in an in-between period during which Japan had to determine which course to take and in what manner, whether to remain as a close ally or as an independent power.

Dimension A: Total Dependence

American Λ (Ideal-Value \vee Good \vee
 Strength \vee Large \vee
 Auth-Theme)

Dimension B: Ambivalence

American Λ (Strength \vee Large \vee
 Friendship \vee Fundamental)

Dimension C: Equal Partnership

American Λ (Communicate v Cooperation v Friendship)

Hypothesis V: The increase in the self-confidence of Japan occurred in conjunction with her perceived role in Asia, a change from defensive role to active role.

The indicants for the first variable was already specified in the discussion of Hypothesis II. "Self-Confidence" is defined as "a realistic and objective confidence in one's own judgment, ability, power etc."²⁸ This definition seems to cover the increasing pride among the Japanese in typically Japanese qualities and products over the years. The following concepts were selected as indicants.

Dimension A: Less Self-Confident

Japan Λ Bad
 Japan Λ Small
 Japan Λ Avoid
 Japan Λ Distress
 Japan Λ Follow

Dimension B: More Self-Confident

Japan Λ Good
 Japan Λ Urge
 Japan Λ Promote
 Japan Λ Potential

Dimension C: Defensive Policies

(Same as in Hypothesis III)

Dimension D: Active Policies

(Same as in Hypothesis III)

Hypothesis VI: The increase in the self-confidence of Japan occurred in conjunction with the change from nationalist to regionalist orientation.

The indicants for these variables were already discussed in Hypothesis II and Hypothesis III.

Dimension A: Less Self-Confident

(Same as in Hypothesis V)

Dimension B: More Self-Confident

(Same as in Hypothesis V)

Dimension C: Nationalist Perception

(Same as in Hypothesis III)

Dimension D: Regionalist Perception

(Same as in Hypothesis III)

Hypothesis VII: The change in the perception of the role of Japan has occurred in conjunction with the changes in the perception of Japan's national capabilities and power vis-a-vis other Asian countries.

The indicants for the role of variables were discussed in Hypothesis II. The concept of power in international relations has been a controversial topic. The concept of power as presented in Vital's theory differs from the cognitively simple concept used in the theories of balance of power (e.g., Morgenthau's presentation). A more viable interpretation seems to be summarized by McClelland. Although there are a few other attempts, I draw on his interpretation as a conceptual basis of national

capability and power. According to McClelland, the relationship between capability and power is as follows:

One of the proposed solutions to the troublesome problem of identifying power in terms of the elements at the source has been to employ the concept of capability as an additional and essential distinction. National capabilities suggest the potential to be powerful. This notion helps to separate that which could be mobilized and brought into play from the actual effort and effect. The effort and the effect can then be characterized as power. An advantage in the idea of separating capability and power lies in the need to identify the process of converting potential power at the source into applied and effective power.²⁹

The part of the analytic scheme presented by him which are particularly relevant here are as follows:

1. National capability is a complex of elements, the particular combinations of which lie latent within a national society.
2. The varying situations of international politics require decision-makers to make estimates and judgments on what kinds, combinations, and amounts of the national capability will be needed for future use and, hence, will be mobilized.
3. The capabilities that are allocated for ultimate use as designated by the decision-makers are processed through the channels of relevant political, military, economic and social organizations. Factors of selection, control, coordination, timing, and phasing are influences that bear on the effectiveness of the conversion process and, therefore, on the production of power....Another way

to express the idea of the conversion process and, therefore, on the production of power....Another way to express the idea of the conversion of capabilities into usable power is to say that power must be brought up through the subsystem of a national system to the point of application and that the complex situations existing in the subsystems will have an effect on the mobilizing of power.³⁰

In this context, the following concepts were selected.

Dimension A: Perception of National Power as Weak, less Powerful, and Capable.

Japan \wedge Bad
 Japan \wedge Distress
 Japan \wedge Avoid
 Japan \wedge Small

Dimension B: Perception of National Power as Strong, More Powerful and Capable.

Japan \wedge Strength
 Japan \wedge Large
 Japan \wedge Authority-theme

Dimension C: Dimension A (defensive policies) of Hypothesis II.

Dimension D: Dimension B (active policies) of Hypothesis II.

Hypothesis VIII. The change in the perception of Japan's national power (from weak to strong) occurred in conjunction with the change in the Nationalist orientation of Japanese decision makers (from nationalist to regionalist).

The indicants for the variables in this hypothesis are discussed already in the presentation of Hypothesis III

and Hypothesis VII. The dimensions used in the analysis will be accordingly as follows:

Dimension A: Same as Dimension A in Hypothesis VII.

Dimension B: Same as Dimension B in Hypothesis VII.

Dimension C: Same as Dimension A in Hypothesis III.

Dimension D: Same as Dimension B in Hypothesis III.

Analysis Design

The relationship among the various indicants discussed in the previous section is summarized in the following diagrams.

I. Change of Image Over Time

Table 3.4.--Hypothesis I.

Expansionist Attitudes	Time		
	1955		1967
A	More	→	Less
B	More	→	Less
C	More	→	Less
D	More	→	Less

Table 3.5.--Hypothesis II.

Perception or Role of Japan in Southeast Asia	Time		
	1955	→	1967
<u>Defensive Policies</u>			
A	More	→	Less
B	More	→	Less
C	More	→	Less
<u>Active Policies</u>			
A	Less	→	More
B	Less	→	More
C	Less	→	More
D1 (economic)	Less	→	More
D2 (political)	Less	→	More
D3 (military)	Less	→	Less

Table 3.6.--Hypothesis III.

Perception of Regional Cooperation	Time		
	1955	→	1967
Nationalist	Strong	→	Weak
Regionalist	Weak	→	Strong

Table 3.7.--Hypothesis IV.

Perception of Japan's Relation with the United States	Time	
	1955	1967
Total Dependence	More	Less
Ambivalence		
Equal Partner	Less	More




Table 3.8.--Hypothesis V.

Perception of Role of Japan in Asia	Self-Confidence of Japan	
	Less-1955	More-1967
Defensive Policies		
Active Policies		




Table 3.9.--Hypothesis VI.

	Self-Confidence	
	Less-1955	More-1967
<u>Nationalist Orientation</u>		
More		
Less		
<u>Regionalist Orientation</u>		
Less		
More		




Table 3.10.--Hypothesis VII.

Perception of Role of Japan in Asia	Perception of Japan's National Power	
	Weak-1955	Strong-1967
Defensive	More	Less
Active	Less	More

Table 3.11.--Hypothesis VIII.

	Perception of Japan's National Power	
	Weak-1955	Strong-1967
<u>Nationalist Orientation</u>		
More		
Less		
<u>Regionalist Orientation</u>		
Less		
More		

The answer to these questions must be determined from the preliminary analysis of the distribution and co-occurrence of tags (concepts) over the total population of sentences in the body of the data. I will present in the next chapter data analysis and discuss the results of statistical tests. Interpretation of these results will follow in the final chapter.

FOOTNOTES--Chapter III

¹For examples of somewhat similar studies, see Singer, 1964, op. cit.; Namenwirth and Brewer, in Stone, et al., 1966, op. cit., pp. 401-27; Choucri, 1969, op. cit.

²Singer, op. cit.

³Choucri, op. cit.

⁴Snyder, et al., op. cit.

⁵Vital, op. cit.

⁶F. C. Jones, Japan's New Order in East Asia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954). Willard H. Elsbree, Japan's Role in Southeast Asia Nationalist Movement, 1940-1945 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953).

⁷Morris, op. cit.

⁸Kenneth W. Terhune, "Nationalism Among Foreign and American Students: An Exploratory Study," J. of Conflict Resolution, VIII (1964).

⁹In the testing of Hypotheses V, VI, VII and VIII, we must bear in mind the fact that Japan allocates a rather small proportion of her budget to national defense, to be called a big power in the conventional sense of the term. Therefore, from the viewpoint of national defense, Japan is dependent upon the U.S., and will be, at least in the immediate future. The effect of her military dependence on the U.S. and the increase of her economic power on the nature of policy attitudes held by the Japanese decision makers must be taken into consideration in the analysis.

¹⁰The use of public opinion data, the analysis of the prestige paper opinions are among the popular alternatives. However, as explained in Section II the impact of public opinion remains in the containment or limiting, if any, of the scope of discretion available to the decision makers. The equation of the prestige paper opinions to the policy elite opinion is rather doubtful assumption in the case of Japan. The Japanese prestige papers are generally regarded to be more liberal and progressive opinion leaders than the conservative policy elite's orientation.

¹¹Ole Holsti, Content Analysis for the Social Science and Humanities (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1969), p. 14.

¹²Ibid., pp. 15-17.

¹³Ole Holsti, "Content Analysis," in The Handbook of Social Psychology, ed. by Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson, Vol. II (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1968), p. 636.

¹⁴Holsti, 1969, op. cit., p. 145.

¹⁵Since the computer programs used in this research are new and in the development stage, there are no handbooks such as those for the General Inquirer (GI) or General Inquirer II (GI/II) Programs. Therefore, it is necessary to follow the procedures of analysis in detail. The content analysis method using the Mitchell Program differs from the GI and GI/II Programs which are more commonly available in the order and structure of its steps. The representative characteristics of both groups of programs are as follows:

First, the two sorts of programs differ in technical aspects. The Mitchell Program processes the data at much higher speed than the GI programs do. The basic reason for this high speed is that the Mitchell Program stores the data and the dictionary (called an "equivalence table") in the core memory of the computer as opposed to reading the definition for each word, one word at a time from the random-access file on disk storage. This speed makes it economically feasible for a researcher to repeat the hypothesis-testing or the construction of the equivalence table if the concepts in the latter prove to be inadequate.

Secondly, the dictionaries in the GI and GI/II programs, as in most ordinary language dictionaries, words can be given more than one tag or definition. For example, as mentioned previously, most words in Harvard III Dictionary are given two tags, one psychological definition (first-order tag) and one sociological definition (second-order tag). In the equivalence table, words must be defined by only one concept. Typically, in my research, this concept will be a composition of the words' first and second order tags in the Namenwirth Dictionary.

Thirdly, because of the second characteristics, in the researches using the GI and GI/II programs, a researcher has a choice between defining hypothesis from the beginning or posing no hypothesis at all. This does not mean, of course, that there need not be any theories for the research. As Holsti noted, the existence of a theory is significant part of any content analysis research. However, if no hypotheses are proposed before beginning the analysis, a researcher can tag his data using a specific dictionary or dictionaries. He may then retrieve tags, generating co-occurrence or association tables, until he obtains satisfactory content dimensions of images or speaker's perceptions.

¹⁶This phase was done at the Bendix Corporation, Ann Arbor, Michigan. Mrs. Cheryl Crawford kindly supervised this operation. Originally, I planned to use the General Inquirer/II Program. However, I was forced to alter this plan because of the cost factor of the external disk dictionary storage and access.

¹⁷Later, an independent Fortran program was written to drop all the unnecessary identification marks, such as this syntax identification, # sign for capitalization, and \$ sign for the end of document, as well as brackets for the identification of document level (single bracket for the first level, double brackets for the second level, and so on). These syntax identifications can be used in later research. For example, when the researcher wishes to distinguish which nation is giving economic aid to which nation, Japan or Southeast Asian countries, for example, these syntax identifications can prove an effective means to distinguish either situation.

¹⁸Many of the studies which used the Harvard III Dictionary or its modifications are reported in Stone, et al., 1966, op. cit. Two of the studies which belong to political science are: Marshall S. Smith, Philip J. Stone, and Evelyn N. Glenn, "A Content Analysis of Twenty Presidential Nomination Acceptance Speeches"; and J. Zvi Namenwirth and Thomas L. Brewer, "Elite Editorial Comment on the European and Atlantic Communities in Four Countries."

Those which applied the Stanford Political Dictionary are numerous. Some of the examples are: Nagli Choucri, "Nonalignment in International Politics: An Analysis of Attitudes and Behavior," (unpublished Doctoral dissertation, Stanford University, 1967); Nagli Choucri, "The Perceptual Base of Nonalignment," J. of Conflict Resolution, XIII (1969); Ole Holsti, "Cognitive Dynamics and Images of the Enemy," in Enemies in Politics, ed. by D. J. Finlay, O. R. Holsti, and R. F. Fagen (Chicago: Rand McNalley, 1967); Ole Holsti, Richard Brody and Robert North, "Measuring Affect and Action in International Reaction Models," Peace Research Society Papers, Vol. II (1965), 170-190; Ole Holsti, Richard Brody and Robert North, "Perception and Action in the 1914 Crisis," in Quantitative International Politics, ed. by J. David Singer (New York: Free Press, 1968).

¹⁹Namenwirth and Brewer, op. cit., pp. 404-405.

²⁰Masao Maruyama, "Introduction," in Morriss, op. cit.

²¹Ibid.

²²Baishomondai-Kenkyu-Kai, op. cit., 1963, p. 204.
Translated by Kiyoko K. Nitz.

²³Speech of Prime Minister Sato at the Diet, January 25, 1965. Translated by Kiyoko K. Nitz.

²⁴Karl W. Deutsch, et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 5.

²⁵Ibid., p. 36.

²⁶Ibid., p. 161.

²⁷Namenwirth and Brewer, op. cit., p. 403.

²⁸Jess Stein, ed., The Random House Dictionary of the English Language (New York: Random House, 1966).

²⁹Charles A. McClelland, Theory and the International System (New York: Macmillan, 1967), p. 70.

³⁰Ibid., pp. 70-71.

CHAPTER IV

TESTING AND ANALYSIS OF HYPOTHESES

The foreign policy speeches were first translated, sentence by sentence, into the set of selected concepts. Then the frequency distribution of co-occurrence of concepts was obtained for each speech separately. A sample of this co-occurrence table is given in the Appendix 4.1. Essentially, two types of co-occurrence tables were obtained. The first type counted the co-occurrence of concepts only once per sentence. If the same concept appears more than once in a sentence, the sentence is counted as having only one occurrence of the concept, and the concept co-occurs with each other concept in the sentence only once. The co-occurrence tabulation thus obtained does not appear to represent adequately the strong appearance of concepts since the use within a sentence of several words representing one concept is counted in the same manner as a single use of that concept. To provide a measure of intensity, therefore, each use of a concept (thus, multiple co-occurrences of a pair of concepts within a sentence) was counted in tabulating the co-occurrence tables used in this study.

The hypotheses to be tested are stated in terms of the existence of specific trends in a certain image variable or between two or more image variables. Each variable is stated in terms of one or more attitudinal, i.e., conceptual dimensions, each of which in turn consists of one or more combinations of concepts which is a group of words. The testing of hypotheses involves three sorts of examinations: First, testing whether the concepts which comprise the theoretical dimensions are coherent: Do concept co-occurrences within dimensions change over speeches? Are these changes in the direction predicted by the assumptions of the theoretical hypothesis? Secondly, testing whether the concepts which represent a given dimension change in the same direction and whether the concepts of a dimension, taken together, change significantly in the direction assumed by the hypothesis. Thirdly, testing whether the predicted theoretical changes in the variables and between variables exist and are statistically significant.

The selection of a statistical test to examine the theoretical hypotheses presented in Chapter IV posed several problems. First, since the hypotheses are historically derived, and are expressed in terms of specific image themes usages, the identification of dimensions representing these themes cannot be a wholly empirical process. Thus the data-reduction capacities of a method such as factor analysis are not appropriate to the premises of this

study. The composition of the variables is determined a priori by the hypotheses.

Common analytical techniques used with prespecified variables, such as single variable and multi-variable analysis of variance, are also not appropriate to this study. Factorial analysis of variances assumes that the effects of independent and dependent variables are additive. Multivariate analysis of variance assumes also that the effects across multiple variables are additive. These hardly seem to be appropriate assumptions, since concepts selected cannot be assumed to be independent, and since no theoretical assumptions are made about the overall mean frequencies of use for concept-pairs. This same problem of non-independence of theoretical concepts renders contingency or chi-square measures inappropriate for this analysis.

Profile Analysis

In order to meet the above requirements, the "profile analysis," a non-additive analysis of variance type of test across multiple dependent group means, was employed.¹ Profile analysis enables us to test hypotheses concerning the group, or average profiles, in the two time periods used in this study. The data (population) are arbitrarily classified into two groups, according to the beginning half period and the latter half period during 1955-1967. Differences across speeches within the groups, then, provide

the "within groups" variance term for statistical testing. It assumes that "groups have been formed from criteria other than the profile themselves."² Essentially three types of questions can be tested by the profile analysis:

1. Are the population mean profiles similar in the sense that the line segments of adjacent tests are parallel?
2. If the two population profiles are indeed parallel, are they also at the same level?
3. Again assuming parallelism, are the population means of the tests different?

Question 1 refers to the hypotheses of no response by group interaction,³ while question 2 addresses itself to the hypotheses of group effects. Question 3 assesses the differential usage of concepts or dimensions within groups. This measure is not used for the hypotheses here, since no hypotheses of dimension comparability were proposed.

In Morrison's development the variances of the response variates need not be equal. Although "whatever inferences are made about the population profile structure must be accepted in the context of the scales chosen for the analysis."⁴ The tests are done in terms of the elements of the mean vectors rather than through the mean squares ratios of analysis of variance. The mean vector $\bar{x}'_1 = [\bar{x}_1 \ 1, \dots, x_1 \ p]$ and $\bar{x}'_2 = [\bar{x}_2 \ 1, \dots, \bar{x}_2 \ p]$ and the pooled

covariance matrix S supply the information needed for the three tests.

$$S = \frac{1}{N - k} \sum_{h=1}^k A_h \quad \text{(sample within group variance-covariance)}$$

where A_h is the matrix of sums of squares and cross products within the h th group and $N = N_1 + \dots + N_k$.⁵

The statistic for testing the parallelism hypothesis is Hotelling's T^2 computed from

$$T^2 = \frac{N_1 N_2}{N_1 + N_2} (\bar{x}_1 - \bar{x}_2)' C' (CSC')^{-1} C (\bar{x}_1 - \bar{x}_2)$$

We refer

$$F = \frac{N_1 + N_2 - p}{(N_1 + N_2 - 2)(p - 1)} T^2 \quad 6$$

to a table of F distribution with degree of freedom $p - 1$ and $N_1 + N_2 - p$ and reject the null hypothesis at the level if the observed F exceeds the critical value F_{p-1, N_1+N_2-p} .⁷ C is the $(p-1)p$ transformation matrix

$$\begin{bmatrix} 1 & -1 & 0 & - & - & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & -1 & & & 0 & 0 \\ - & - & - & - & - & - & - \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & & & 1 & -1 \end{bmatrix} \quad 8$$

Multiplication of any p element mean vector, \bar{y} by C

essentially computes the $p-1$ differences between successive elements of \bar{y} .

If the parallelism hypothesis is tenable, we may go on and test the equal condition level hypothesis. This was tested by computing the two-sample t statistic from the sums of the observations on all responses in each sampling unit according to the statistic in matrix notion,

$$t = \frac{j(\bar{x}_1 - \bar{x}_2)}{j'S_j (1/N_1 + 1/N_2)} \quad 9$$

$(j' + [1, \dots, 1])$ is the p -component vector with unity in each position; multiplication by j sums the elements of the vector $[\bar{x}_1 - \bar{x}_2]$. If the null hypothesis is true, the statistic has the t distribution with $N_1 + N_2 - 2$ degrees of freedom.¹⁰

In order to calculate these t and F statistics, an APL computer program was written by Charles Wall of University of Hawaii, Information Science Department. The program calculates the mean co-occurrence/sentence scores for each speech and computes the F and T statistics with appropriate degrees of freedom.

Summary of Hypotheses

Hypothesis I. There is a trend away from the prewar expansionism and traditionalism in the international image held by the Japanese decision-makers.

Dimension A: Traditionalism.

Community \wedge Authority-theme
 Ideal-Value \wedge Authority-theme
 Ideal-Value \wedge Obligation
 Ideal-Value \wedge Follow

Dimension B: Nationalism.

Japan \wedge Distress
 Nation \wedge Ideal-Value
 Japan \wedge Ideal-Value
 Japan \wedge Nation

Dimension C: Expansionism.

Japan \wedge Strength
 Japan \wedge Attack
 Japan \wedge Advance
 Japan \wedge Control

Dimension D: Paternalism-tutorialism.

Southeast-Asia \wedge Small
 Southeast-Asia \wedge Community
 Japan \wedge Authority-theme
 Japan \wedge Guide
 Japan \wedge Strength

Dimension E: Militarism.

Japan \wedge Distress
 Japan \wedge Weapon

Hypothesis II. The nature of the perception of the role of Japan in Southeast Asia has changed in emphasis from more defensive policies to more active policies.

Defensive PoliciesDimension A: International Status Quo.

Japan \wedge Maintain
 Japan \wedge Urge

Dimension B: Perception of Non-Leadership Role.

Japan \wedge Follow
 Japan \wedge Avoid
 Japan \wedge Cooperate
 Japan \wedge Friendly

Dimension C: Definition of International Relations.

Political-Ideal \wedge Obligation
 Ideal-Value \wedge Obligation
 Ideal-Value \wedge Cooperate
 Ideal-Value \wedge Friendly

Active Policies

Dimension A: Concept of Change in International Relations.

Japan \wedge Advance
 Japan \wedge Move

Dimension B: Perception of Leadership Role.

Japan \wedge Authority-theme
 Japan \wedge Guide
 Japan \wedge Control
 Japan \wedge Urge
 Japan \wedge Promote

Dimension C: Definition of International Relations, Power and Self.

Japan \wedge Large
 Japan \wedge Strength

Dimension D1: Economic Instrument.

Southeast-Asia \wedge Economic
 Ideal-Value \wedge Economic
 Promote \wedge Economic
 Advance \wedge Economic
 Urge \wedge Economic

Dimension D2: Political Roles.

Political-Ideal \wedge Economic
 Cooperate \wedge Political
 Cooperate \wedge Political-Ideal
 Promote \wedge Political
 Promote \wedge Political-Ideal
 Advance \wedge Political
 Advance \wedge Political-Ideal
 Urge \wedge Political
 Urge \wedge Political-Ideal

Hypothesis III. The perception of decision makers concerning regional cooperation increased over time during the period from 1955 to 1967.

Dimension A: Nationalist Perception.

Japan \wedge Nationalist
Political \wedge Nationalist

Dimension B: Regionalist Perception I.

Japan \wedge Community
Political-Ideal \wedge Community
Southeast-Asia \wedge Community
Southeast-Asia \wedge Japan

Dimension C: Regionalist Perception II.

Southeast-Asia \wedge Near
Southeast-Asia \wedge Friendship
Southeast-Asia \wedge Cooperation
Southeast-Asia \wedge Approach

Hypothesis IV. The change in the perception of the role of Japan in Asia has occurred in conjunction with the changes in the perception of her relations with the United States.

Dimension A: Total Dependence.

American \wedge Ideal-Value
American \wedge Good
American \wedge Strength
American \wedge Large
American \wedge Authority-theme

Dimension B: Ambivalence.

American \wedge Strength
American \wedge Large
American \wedge Fundamental
American \wedge Friendship

Dimension C: Equal Partnership.

American \wedge Communicate
American \wedge Friendship
American \wedge Cooperate

Hypothesis V. The increase in the self-confidence of Japan occurred in conjunction with her perceived role in Asia from defensive policies to active policies.

Dimension A: Less Self-Confident.

Japan \wedge Bad
 Japan \wedge Small
 Japan \wedge Avoid
 Japan \wedge Distress
 Japan \wedge Follow

Dimension B: More Self-Confident.

Japan \wedge Good
 Japan \wedge Urge
 Japan \wedge Promote
 Japan \wedge Potential

Dimension C: Defensive Policies (same as in Hypothesis III).

Dimension D: Active Policies (same as in Hypothesis III).

Hypothesis VI. The increase in the self-confidence of Japan occurred in conjunction with the change from nationalist to regionalist orientation.

Dimension A: Less Self-Confident (same as in Hypothesis V).

Dimension B: More Self-Confident (same as in Hypothesis V).

Dimension C: Nationalist Perception (same as in Hypothesis III).

Dimension D: Regionalist Perception I (same as in Hypothesis III).

Dimension E: Regionalist Perception II (same as in Hypothesis III).

Hypothesis VII. The change in the perception of the role of Japan occurred in conjunction with the changes in her perception of Japan's "national power" or "capability" vis-a-vis other Asian countries.

Dimension A: Perception of National Power as Weak, Less Powerful and Capable.

Japan \wedge Bad
 Japan \wedge Distress
 Japan \wedge Avoid
 Japan \wedge Small

Dimension B: Perception of National Power as Strong, More Powerful and Capable.

Japan \wedge Strength
 Japan \wedge Large
 Japan \wedge Authority

Dimension C: Defensive Policies (same as in Hypothesis II).

Dimension D: Active Policies (same as in Hypothesis II).

Hypothesis VIII. The change in the perception of Japan's national power (from weak to strong) occurred in conjunction with the change in the nationalist orientation of Japanese decision makers (from nationalist to regionalist).

Dimension A: Perception of National Power as Weak, Less Powerful and Capable (same as in Hypothesis VII).

Dimension B: Perception of National Power as Strong, More Powerful and Capable (same as in Hypothesis VII).

Dimension C: Nationalist Orientation (same as in Hypothesis III).

Dimension D: Regionalist Orientation (same as in Hypothesis III).

Analysis of Hypotheses

A sample of original data (speeches) is provided in Appendix 4-2. The raw scores generated for the profile analysis by dividing co-occurrences of each pair of concepts in a given speech by number of sentences in the

speech are given in Appendix 4.3. The tables of pooled co-variance are presented in Appendices 4.4 to 4.23. The results of tests are summarized in two tables below. Table 4.1 presents the result of testing the adequacy of the combinations of concepts representing certain constructs of dimensions which in turn will portray the variables tested. The t scores in this Step 1 show the result of the concepts as originally conceptualized. Those in the Step 2 show the score obtained using only those combinations of concepts which are "pro-hypothesis" and strong enough to justify retaining them in the final hypothesis tests. The level of probability as high as .1 was retained because of the conservative nature of the profile tests, and the preliminary nature of the Step 1 tests. The second table (Table 4.2) presents the hypothesis test results. A more detailed report of tests, covariance tables, mean vector scores, and the F and t scores are given with each discussion.

Hypothesis I

Dimension A. Traditionalism. (Refer to Appendix 4.4).

Observed frequencies were uniformly small and there were no significant differences over time in this dimension. This seems to indicate that the traditionalism interpreted by those scholars cited above is minimally represented in the data.

Table 4.1.1.--Testing of dimensions.^a (df = 12)

Hypothesis	Dimension Name	Concepts	Mean Vector		Step 1		Step 2	
			Score 1	Score 2	t score	probability	t score	probability
I	<u>A. Traditionalism</u>	Community^						
		Auth-theme						
		Ideal-Value^	0.043	0.037				
		Auth-theme	0.013	0.016				
		Ideal-Value^	0.040	0.046				
		Obligation	0.021	0.012				
		Ideal-Value^Follow			0.2259	p>0.8
	<u>B. Nationalism</u>	Japan^Distress	0.212	0.121 +				
		Nation^Ideal-Value	0.079	0.092				
		Japan^Ideal-Value	0.299	0.270				
		Japan^Nation	0.329	0.210 +	1.7775	0.1<p<0.2	1.74	0.1<p<0.2
	<u>C. Expansionism</u>	Japan^Strength	0.386	0.387 +				
		Japan^Attack	0.170	0.167				
		Japan^Advance	0.557	0.584 +				
		Japan^Control	0.079	0.076	-0.1283	p>0.8		constantly high
	<u>D. Paternalism</u> <u>Tutorialism</u>	Southeast-Asia^						
		Small	0.026	0.055 +				
		Southeast-Asia^						
		Community	0.102	0.123 +				
		Japan^Auth-theme	0.084	0.085				
		Japan^Guide	0.113	0.145 +				
		Japan^Strength	0.386	0.387				
					-0.8130	0.4<p<0.6	1.25	0.2<p<0.4
	<u>E. Militarism</u>	Japan^Distress	0.212	0.121				
		Japan^Weapon	0.071	0.014				
	<u>F. Unidentified</u>	Southeast-Asia^Near						
		Southeast-Asia^	0.124	0.340				
		Friendship	0.077	0.097				
		Southeast-Asia^	0.080	0.154				
		Cooperation						
		Southeast-Asia^			-1.5315	0.1<p<0.2		
		Approach	0.036	0.069				
					2.3345	0.02<p<0.05		

Table 4.1.--Continued.

Hypothesis	Dimension Name	Concepts	Mean Vector		Step 1		Step 2	
			Score 1	Score 2	t score	probability	t score	probability
II Active Poli- cies	A. International Relations- Status Quo	Japan^Maintain	0.118	0.122	0.9919	0.2<p<0.4
		Japan^Urge	0.526	0.394				
	B. Non-Leadership Role	Japan^Follow	0.053	0.048				
		Japan^Avoid	0.151	0.100 +				
		Japan^Cooperate	0.570	0.563 +	0.6462	0.4<p<0.6	1.69	0.1<p<0.2
		Japan^Friendly	0.436	0.366 +				
	C. Definition of International Relations	Pol.-Ideal^						
		Obligation	0.103	0.084				
		Ideal-Value^						
		Obligation	0.040	0.045				
		Ideal-Value^						
II Active Poli- cies	A. Concept of Change in IR	Cooperation	0.123	0.178 +	-0.7332	0.4<p<0.6	0.93	0.2<p<0.4
		Ideal-Value^						
		Friendly	0.067	0.090				
	B. Leadership Role	Japan^Advance	0.557	0.584				
		Japan^Move	0.252	0.267	-0.3601	0.6<p<0.8		constantly high
	C. Internat'l Relations	Japan^Auth-theme	0.084	0.085				
		Japan^Guide	0.113	0.145 +				
		Japan^Control	0.092	0.076				
II Active Poli- cies	A. Concept of Change in IR	Japan^Urge	0.526	0.394	0.7513	0.4<p<0.6	0.968	0.2<p<0.4
		Japan^Promote	0.214	0.200				
	B. Leadership Role	Japan^Large	0.314	0.362 +				
		Japan^Strength	0.386	0.387	-0.4619	0.6<p<0.8	0.925	0.2<p<0.4
	C. Internat'l Relations	Japan^Auth-theme	0.084	0.085				
		Japan^Guide	0.113	0.145 +				
		Japan^Control	0.092	0.076				
II Active Poli- cies	A. Concept of Change in IR	Japan^Urge	0.526	0.394	0.7513	0.4<p<0.6	0.968	0.2<p<0.4
		Japan^Promote	0.214	0.200				
	B. Leadership Role	Japan^Large	0.314	0.362 +				
		Japan^Strength	0.386	0.387	-0.4619	0.6<p<0.8	0.925	0.2<p<0.4
	C. Internat'l Relations	Japan^Auth-theme	0.084	0.085				
		Japan^Guide	0.113	0.145 +				
		Japan^Control	0.092	0.076				

Table 4.1.--Continued.

Hypothesis	Dimension Name	Concepts	Mean Vector		Step 1		Step 2	
			Score 1	Score 2	t score	probability	t score	probability
II D1. Economic Active Policies (cont.)	Southeast-Asian Economic Ideal-Value Economic		0.036	0.078				
			0.106	0.149	-2.0881	0.05 p 0.01
		Promote Economic	0.075	0.090				
		Advance Economic	0.205	0.464				
		Urge Economic	0.111	0.124				
	D2. Political Role	Economic						
		Pol.-Ideal	0.187	0.128	-0.3241	0.6 p 0.8	2.59	0.02 p 0.05
		Cooperate Political	0.163	0.261				
		Cooperate						
		Pol.-Ideal	0.222	0.135				
III A. Nationalist	Nationalist Japan Pol.-Ideal Nation	Promote Political	0.064	0.085				
		Promote Pol.-Ideal	0.101	0.054				
		Advance Political	0.186	0.371				
		Advance Pol.-Ideal	0.196	0.187				
		Urge Political	0.153	0.212				
	B. Regionalist	Urge Pol.-Ideal	0.155	0.119				
		Nationalist Japan	0.329	0.210				
		Pol.-Ideal Nation	0.309	0.121	2.4243	0.02 p 0.05
		Japan Community	0.564	0.461				
		Pol.-Ideal Community	0.245	0.105			2.50	0.02 p 0.05
VII A. Weak National Power	Southeast-Asian Community	Southeast-Asian	0.102	0.272				
		Community	0.227	0.272	1.1092	0.2 p 0.04	-0.398	0.6 p 0.8
		Japan Bad	0.045	0.037				
		Japan Distress	0.212	0.121				
		Japan Avoid	0.151	0.100	0.9856	0.2 p 0.4	2.04	0.05 p 0.1
	Japan Small	Japan Small	0.195	0.230				

Table 4.1.--Continued.

Hypothesis	Dimension Names	Concepts	Mean Vector		Step 1		Step 2	
			Score 1	Score 2	t score	probability	t score	probability
VII (cont.)	B.Strong National Power Perception	Japan^Strength	0.386	0.387				
		Japan^Large	0.314	0.362	-0.4293	0.6<p<0.8		constantly high
		Japan^Auth-theme	0.084	0.085				
V	A.Less Self-Confident	Japan^Bad	0.045	0.037 +				
		Japan^Small	0.195	0.230				
		Japan^Avoid	0.151	0.100 +	0.9874	0.6<p<0.8	1.95	0.05<p<0.1
	B.More Self-Confident	Japan^Distress	0.212	0.121 +				
		Japan^Follow	0.053	0.048 +				
		Japan^Good	none					
		Japan^Urge	0.526	0.386				
		Japan^Promote	0.172	0.200 +	1.200	0.6<p<0.8	0.886	0.2<p<0.4

^aThe t and F tests are referred to the tables in F. Graybill, An Introduction to Linear Statistical Models, Vol. I (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961).

Table 4.2.--Result of hypothesis testing.

Hypothesis	Variables	Parallelism Test		Equal Profile Test	
		Expected F score	Result t score	probability	Confirmation
I.	Only Dimension E meets the requirements for the indicants.				
II.	A. <u>Defensive Policies</u> B. <u>Active Policies</u>				
	A X B	NP 9.1447, 1,12 (.01<p<.025)	NP		YES
III.	A. <u>Nationalist</u> B. <u>Regionalist I</u> C. <u>Regionalist II</u>				
	(1) A X B	NP 3.5058, 1,12 (.05<p<.10)	NP	1.4893 .1<p<.2	NO
	(2) A X C	NP 5.9621, 1,12 (.025<p<.05)	NP	Equal Profile	YES
	(3) A X B X C	NP 3.1770, 2,11 (.10<p<.25)	NP		YES
IV.	No significant occurrences are observed for the examination.				
V.	A. <u>Less Self-Confident</u> B. <u>Defensive Policies</u> C. <u>Active Policies</u>				
	(1) A X C	P .0666, 1,12 (.75<p<.90)	P	2.1922 .02<p<.05	YES
	(2) A X D	NP 14.3204, 1,12 (.005<p<.01)	NP	-2.5384 p<.005	YES
	(3) A X C X D	NP 6.8905, 2,11 (.01<p<.025)	NP	-2.1732 .5<p<.1	YES

Table 4.2.--Continued.

Hypothesis	Variables	Parallelism Test		Equal Profile Test			
		Expected F score	Result	t score	probability Confirmation		
VI.	A. <u>Less Self-Confident</u>	P	1.6564, 1,12 (.10<p<.25)	NP	3.5803	p<.01	YES
	B. <u>Nationalist</u>						
	C. <u>Regionalist I</u>						
	D. <u>Regionalist II</u>						
	(1) <u>A X B</u>	P	1.6564, 1,12 (.10<p<.25)	NP	3.5803	p<.01	YES
	(2) <u>A X C</u>	NP	2.9146, 1,12 (.10<p<.25)	P (Ambiguous)			NO
	(3) <u>A X B X C</u>	NP	1.7239, 2,11 (.10<p<.25)	P (Ambiguous)			NO
	(4) <u>A X D</u>	NP	6.4931, 1,12 (.025<p<.05)	NP	-7106 (almost equal profile)		YES
	(5) <u>A X B X D</u>	NP	3.0961, 2,11 (.05<p<.10)	NP (almost)	.5783 (almost equal profile)		YES
	VII.	A. <u>Weak</u>					
B. <u>Defensive Policies</u>							
C. <u>Active Policies</u>							
(1) <u>A X B</u>		Same as in Hypothesis V.					
(2) <u>A X C</u>							
VIII.	(3) <u>A X B X C</u>						
	A. <u>Weak</u>						
	B. <u>Nationalist</u>						
	C. <u>Regionalist I</u>						
	D. <u>Regionalist II</u>						
	(1) <u>A X B</u>	Same as in Hypothesis VI.					

Key: P = Parallel NP = Not Parallel

Dimension B. Nationalism. (Refer to Appendix 4.5.)

The parallelism hypothesis for Dimension B failed to be rejected: The equal profile test yielded $.1 < p < .2$. This figure is not very definitely high or low either for rejecting or not rejecting the use of this dimension as an indicant for this study. However, a close examination of the mean vector scores reveals that three combinations of concepts, Japan-Distress(B1) and Japan-Nation (B2) decline in occurrence in the second period, while the other two combinations of concepts, Japan-Ideal-Value (B3) and Nation-Ideal-Value(B4) occur more frequently in the second period than in the first or show little change. Since Hypothesis I predicts the decline of nationalism dimension, the combination B1 and B2 are pro-hypothesis, while B3 and B4 are anti-hypothesis. Therefore, between groups differences of the former two combinations were tested. The result was that B1 and B2 differ between the time ordered groups ($p < .025$), and have essentially parallel profiles (See Appendix 4.7B).

Dimension C. Expansionism. (Refer to Appendix 4.6.)

The group profiles were uniformly parallel, but the value of t for the equal profile hypothesis was not significant ($p < .8$). These tests indicate that there are no significant changes over time in the components of this dimension. It is important to note, however, that these combinations of Japan-Strength and Japan-Advance consistently appear with high frequency.

Dimension D. Paternalism-tutorialism. (Refer to Appendix 4.7.)

The parallelism null hypothesis failed to be rejected and the value of t for the equal profile hypothesis was not significant. The mean vector scores indicate that the appearance of Japan-Authority-theme (D3) and Japan-Strength (D5) is almost constant over the two periods. Therefore, a t test is performed on Southeast Asia-Small (D1), Southeast-Asia-Community (D2) and Japan-Guide (D4) combinations. The t value shows that the differences over time are not sufficiently significant to indicate reliable change over time ($t=1.26$, $.2 < p < .4$). Moreover, these concepts increase in occurrence rather than decrease as specified by the hypothesis.

Dimension E. Militarism. (Refer to Appendix 4.8.)

The occurrence of both combinations of concepts Japan-Distress and Japan-Weapon decreases over time. The parallelism hypothesis test shows that usage profiles are parallel in both periods. The equal profile hypothesis test confirms that the decrease in occurrence is significant ($.02 < p < .05$).

These profile tests done so far were performed for the purpose of "cleaning up" the dimensions, that is, to eliminate the unnecessary combinations of concepts, as well as the combination of concepts which changes in contra-hypothesis direction. The profile tests for the five dimensions designed to measure the variable expansionism-traditionalism indicates, however, that only Dimensions B

and E are statistically significant and in accord with the assumption of Hypothesis I. Since the variable expansionism-traditionalism is conceptualized as the union of five dimensions, it is unreasonable to reduce the indicant of the variable to Dimensions A and E alone, even though Dimensions A and E change in the predicted direction. Therefore, it must be concluded that Hypothesis I, as theoretically defined, was not confirmed.

Hypothesis II

Defensive Policies. Dimension A. Support of International Status Quo. (Refer to Appendix 4.9.)

The value of F for the parallelism test is low and therefore the null hypothesis failed to be rejected (parallel). Although A2 (Japan-Urge) indicates fairly large change over the two time periods in the predicted direction, the A1 combination (Japan-Maintain) does not change significantly over time.

Defensive Policies. Dimension B. Perception of Non-Leadership Role. (Refer to Appendix 4.10.)

A parallelism hypothesis had failed to be rejected (parallel). And the test on the equal profile shows that the difference over time is not significant ($.4 < p < .6$). The mean vector score shows that the occurrence of Dimension B1 (Japan-Follow) and B3 (Japan-Cooperate) are almost constant over time. Accordingly, another set of profile tests was performed over Dimension B2 (Japan-Avoid) and Dimension

B4 (Japan-Friendly). The change was only comparatively significant ($.1 < p < .2$).

Defensive Policies. Dimension C. Definition of International Relations. (Refer to Appendix 4.11.)

Parallelism failed to be rejected, and the change in occurrences over time was not significant ($.4 < p < .6$). Since Dimension C3 (Ideal-Value-Cooperate) seems to increase over time greater than other combinations, an independent t test was computed. The change in C3, however, was still not significant ($.2 < p < .4$).

We can summarize by noting that the indicants for the defensive policies are not very powerful. Although the relatively effective combination of concepts A2, B2, B4 was used in hypothesis testing.

Active Policies. Dimension A. Concept of Change in International Relations. (Refer to Appendix 4.12.)

The change in elements of this dimension is parallel. The equal profile test reveals that the change is insignificant ($.6 < p < .4$). The occurrence of Dimension A is constantly high over time.

Active Policies. Dimension B. Perception of Leadership Role. (Refer to Appendix 4.13.)

The changes in Dimension B over two periods are parallel, but the change is not significant ($.4 < p < .6$). A closer look at the mean vector scores indicates that the occurrence of B1 (Japan-Authority-theme) is almost constant. The occurrence of B3 (Japan-Control), B4 (Japan-Urge), and

B5 (Japan-Promote) decreased over time, while the hypothesis predicts an increase in this dimension, thus cannot be included. The t test on B2 (Japan-Guide) shows that its predicted increase, too, is not significant ($.2 < p < .4$).

Active Policies. Dimension C. Definition of International Relations and Power and Self. (Refer to Appendix 4.14.)

The components are parallel over time, but the difference in levels of the profiles is not significant ($.6 < p < .8$). C2 (Japan-Strength) is almost constant in occurrence over time. A t test of C1 (Japan-Large) was computed but the difference across groups was not significant ($.2 < p < .4$).

Active Policies. Dimension D1. Economic Instrument. (Refer to Appendix 4.15.)

The profiles of the elements in this dimension are parallel over the two analysis periods and the change in level is significant ($.05 < p < .1$) in the direction required by the hypothesis.

Active Policies. Dimension D2. Political Instrument. (Refer to Appendix 4.16.)

The profiles of frequencies of occurrence are parallel over two periods. However, the change in frequencies is not significant ($.6 < p < .8$). A closer look at the mean vector scores over the two periods revealed that the occurrences of all those combinations which include the "political-ideal" concept decrease over time, while those which include "political" concept increase over time. This grouping in

itself is an interesting phenomenon which will be discussed in the next chapter. Since the latter group of combinations changes in the direction predicted by the hypothesis (the frequency of occurrence increases over time), the t tests were computed on the following combinations: Cooperate-Political (D2-2), Promote-Political (D2-4), Advance-Political (D2-6), and Urge-Political (D2-8). These tests show that the change in these combinations is very significant ($.02 < p < .05$).

Test of Hypothesis II (Table 4.3)

Hypothesis II was tested using the following dimensions: Defensive A2, B2 + B4 Active B2, C1, D1 (D2-2, D2-4, D2-6, D2-8). Since the indicants for the defensive policies are expected to decrease over time, while those for the active policies are expected to increase, non-parallelism is expected. As predicted, the profiles were not parallel at significant level ($.01 < p < .025$).

Hypothesis III

Dimension A. Nationalist. (Refer to Appendix 4.17.)

The result of test indicates that the dimension profiles are parallel and also that profile means differ very significantly ($.02 < p < .05$). Therefore, this Nationalist dimension is retained as it is.

Dimension B. Regionalist. (Refer to Appendix 4.18.)

The tests on the Regionalist dimension reveal that the change over time in these combinations is parallel;

Table 4.3.--Result of hypothesis testing--Hypothesis II.

 Defensive Policies Dimension A2, B2 + B4

Active Policies Dimension B2, C1, D1, D2-2, D2-4, D2-6, D2-8

THE POOLED COVARIANCE MATRIX IS:

0.07537	-0.01061
-0.01061	0.30160

MEAN VECTOR XBAR1

1.113	1.579
-------	-------

MEAN VECTOR XBAR2

0.860	2.347
-------	-------

PARALLELISM HYPOTHESIS

T-SQR = 9.145

F = 9.145

.01 < p < .025

EQUAL PROFILE HYPOTHESIS

T = -1.615

T WITH 12 DF

.10 < p < .20

EQUIVALENT PARAMETERS HYPOTHESIS

T-SQR = 33.514

F = 33.514

F WITH 1, 12 DF

however, that the change over time is not significant. An examination of the mean vector scores reveals that Southeast Asia-Community and Southeast Asia-Japan combinations increase in occurrence over time, which is pro-hypothesis. The t test over these two combinations indicates, however, that the

change is not significant ($.6 < p < .8$), suggesting that these two combinations are not very powerful indicators of the regionalist orientations. The combinations of concepts, Japan-Community and Political-Ideal-Community decrease in occurrence over time as opposed to the increase predicted by the hypothesis ($.02 < p < .05$). This finding may be interpreted that the unity within Japan or emphasis of togetherness within Japan is weakening. The implication of this phenomenon will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.

Dimension C. Regionalist II. (Refer to Appendix 4.19.)

After the co-occurrence table was obtained, the following combinations seemed to increase in frequency over two periods. They seem to the author to be closely related concepts: Southeast Asia-Near, Southeast Asia-Friendly, Southeast Asia-Cooperation, and Southeast Asia-Approach. The direction of change is consistent with the prediction for the regionalist dimension (increase over time). Tests indicate that the profiles for the two periods are parallel and that the increase in occurrence approaches significance ($.1 < p < .2$).

Test of Hypothesis III. (Refer to Table 4.4.)

Therefore, three types of hypothesis tests were tabulated: Dimension A and Dimension B; Dimension A and Dimension C; and Dimension A and (Dimension B and Dimension C). In the first hypothesis test, Dimension A and Dimension B3 and B4 are used. (The sum of B3 and B4 will be designated Regionalist I hereafter.) Notice that Dimension A is expected to decrease over time, while Dimension B is expected to increase over time, and

Table 4.4.--Result of hypothesis testing: Hypothesis III.

 Dimension A (Nationalist) X Dimension B (Regionalist I)

THE POOLED COVARIANCE MATRIX IS:

0.05681	-0.00987
-0.00987	0.09213

MEAN VECTOR XBAR1

0.680	0.329
-------	-------

MEAN VECTOR XBAR2

0.332	0.392
-------	-------

PARALLELISM HYPOTHESIS

T-SQR = 3.505

F = 3.505 .05<p<.10

F WITH 1 , 12

EQUAL PROFILE HYPOTHESIS

T = 1.489

T WITH 12 DF .10<p<.2

EQUIVALENT PARAMETERS HYPOTHESIS

T-SQR = 1.756

F = 1.756

F WITH 1, 12 DF

therefore that non-parallelism is expected. The parallelism test approaches significance, suggesting that the profiles are not parallel (.05<p<.10). However, the t test reveals that the predicted change in these combined dimensions over time is weak (.1<p<.2).

Dimension B X Dimension C (Refer to Table 4.5.)

Table 4.5.--Result of hypothesis testing: Hypothesis III.

 Dimension C (Regionalist II) X Dimension B (Regionalist I)

THE POOLED COVARIANCE MATRIX IS:

0.17379	0.10919
0.10919	0.09218

MEAN VECTOR XBAR1

0.318	0.329
-------	-------

MEAN VECTOR XBAR2

0.659	0.392
-------	-------

PARALLELISM HYPOTHESIS

T-SQR = 5.723

F = 5.723 .025 < p < .05

F WITH 1, 12

EQUAL PROFILE HYPOTHESIS

T = -1.085

T WITH 12 DF .2 < p < .4

EQUIVALENT PARAMETERS HYPOTHESIS

T-SQR = 4.823

F = 4.823

F WITH 1, 12 DF

The appropriateness of adding the components of Regionalist I Dimension and Dimension C (Regionalist II) was examined next. The tests show that the profiles over two time periods are not parallel, but the differences were in the

direction assumed by the theoretical hypothesis. Thus as observed in the mean vector scores, the magnitudes of predicted changes differ. From simple inspection of the mean vectors, Dimension C appears to be a better indicant than Dimension B because of the steep increase in frequency of occurrence over time. It may not be necessary to add Dimension B to the regionalist orientation, although the latter may add positively to the test.

Two sorts of relations were tested next.

Dimension A X Dimension C (Refer to Table 4.6.)

Since the Nationalist Dimension decreases over time, while Regionalist II Dimension increases over time, non-parallelism is expected. The test shows that the profiles of the groups are not parallel. The t test indicates that the overall between group levels do not differ significantly. These tests indicate that the Nationalist Dimension and Regionalist II Dimension change, as predicted, in the opposite direction. Hypothesis III is confirmed.

Dimension A X Dimension B X Dimension C (Refer to Table 4.7.)

Contrary to the above discussion, when both Dimension B and Dimension C are used as indicants of the regionalist orientation, the relationship predicted in Hypothesis III shows less intensely in the test. Because of the power of Dimension C, however, Hypothesis III is confirmed.

Table 4.6.--Hypothesis testing: Hypothesis III.

Dimension A (Nationalist) X Dimension C (Regionalist II)

THE POOLED COVARIANCE MATRIX IS:

0.05681	-0.02439
-0.02439	0.17379

MEAN VECTOR XBAR1

0.680	0.818
-------	-------

MEAN VECTOR XBAR2

0.332	0.659
-------	-------

PARALLELISM HYPOTHESIS

T-SQR = 5.962

F = 5.962 .025 < p < .05

F WITH 1 , 12

EQUAL PROFILE HYPOTHESIS

T = 0.032

T WITH 12 DF p < .8

EQUIVALENT PARAMETERS HYPOTHESIS

T-SQR = 0.015

F = 0.015

F WITH 1, 12 DF

Hypothesis IV

There are not enough occurrences of combinations of concepts paired with "American." Therefore, it was impossible to test the hypothesis. We must assume that either the particular sets of speeches are not an effective means to examine

the relations between Japan and the United States, or the current absence of multiple-word concept recognition procedures in the Mitchell program led to more severe under-tabulation of United States-related words than to other mentioned nations.

Table 4.7.--Result of hypothesis testing: Hypothesis III.

Dimension A (Nationalist) X Dimension B (Regionalist I) X
Dimension C (Regionalist II)

THE POOLED COVARIANCE MATRIX IS:

0.05681	-0.00987	-0.02439
-0.00987	0.09213	0.10919
-0.02439	0.10919	0.17379

MEAN VECTOR \bar{X} BAR1

0.680	0.329	0.318
-------	-------	-------

MEAN VECTOR \bar{X} BAR2

0.332	0.392	0.659
-------	-------	-------

PARALLELISM HYPOTHESIS

T-SQR = 6.931

F = 3.177

.10 < p < .25

F WITH 2 , 11

EQUAL PROFILE HYPOTHESIS

T = -0.149

T WITH 12 DF

p < .8

EQUIVALENT PARAMETERS HYPOTHESIS

T-SQR = 9.858

F = 4.518

F WITH 2, 11 DF

Hypothesis V

Testing of Hypothesis V involves the examination of fitness of Dimension A and B as indicants as well as testing of the dimensions which pass this test along with the dimensions concerning the perceptions which are already tested in Hypothesis II.

Dimension A. Less Self-Confident. (Refer to Appendix 4.20.)

The parallel profile hypothesis cannot be rejected. The difference in levels is not significant over time. The Japan-Small combination increases in occurrence from the first period to the second. The t test on the four decreasing combinations of concepts, Japan-Bad (A1), Japan-Avoid (A2), Japan-Distress (A3) indicate that the predicted decrease is significant ($.05 < p < .10$).

Dimension B. More Self-Confident. (Refer to Appendix 4.21.)

The parallelism test indicates that the profiles in the dimension are parallel over the two periods, but the mean test indicates that the differences in levels are not significant ($.2 < p < .4$). The only pro-hypothesis combination of concepts, Japan-Promote, does not change significantly by itself ($.2 < p < .4$). Therefore, Dimension B is dropped from the hypothesis testing.

The general test of the relationship between the "less-self-confident" dimension and "defensive" and "active policy" dimensions involves:

(1) Dimension A X Dimension C

- (a) a decrease in "less self-confident" dimension.
- (b) a decrease in "defensive policy" dimension over time.

Parallelism is expected.

(2) Dimension A X Dimension D

- (a) a decrease in "less self-confident" dimension.
- (b) an increase in "active policy" dimension.

Non-parallelism is expected.

(3) Dimension A X Dimension C X Dimension D

- (a) a decrease in "less self-confident" dimension and "defensive policy" dimension.
- (b) an increase in "active policy" dimension.

Non-parallelism is expected.

(1) Dimension A X Dimension C (Table 4.8.)

The parallelism test shows that the profiles are parallel over the two periods, where the test for goodness-of-fit is read from the high probability side of the appropriate F distribution ($.75 < p < .90$). The change in level is significant ($.02 < p < .05$) and in the direction predicted. Therefore, the hypothesis concerning the relationship between "less self-confident" dimension and "defensive policy" dimension is confirmed.

(2) Dimension A X Dimension D (Table 4.9.)

The parallelism test shows that the profiles of the two dimensions over time are not parallel ($.005 < p < .01$).

Table 4.8.--The result of hypothesis testing: Hypothesis V.

(Less Self-Confident) X (Defensive Policies)

THE POOLED COVARIANCE MATRIX IS:

0.01907	0.00284
0.00284	0.02831

MEAN VECTOR XBAR1

0.407	0.587
-------	-------

MEAN VECTOR XBAR2

0.258	0.466
-------	-------

PARALLELISM HYPOTHESIS

T-SQR = 0.055

F = 0.066 .75 < p < .90

F WITH 1 , 12

EQUAL PROFILE HYPOTHESIS

T = 2.192

T WITH 12 DF .02 < p < .05

EQUIVALENT PARAMETERS HYPOTHESIS

T-SQR = 12.625

F = 12.625

F WITH 1 , 12 DF

Moreover, the profile levels change significantly ($.02 < p < .05$). Therefore Hypothesis V's statement of the relationship between the variables "less self-confident" and "active policy" dimension is confirmed.

Table 4.9.--The result of hypothesis testing: Hypothesis V.

(Less Self-Confident) X (Active Policies)

THE POOLED COVARIANCE MATRIX IS:

0.01907	0.01481
0.01481	0.31535

MEAN VECTOR XBAR1

0.407	1.012
-------	-------

MEAN VECTOR XBAR2

0.258	1.979
-------	-------

PARALLELISM HYPOTHESIS

T-SQR = 14.320

F = 14.320 .01<p<.005

F WITH 1 , 12

EQUAL PROFILE HYPOTHESIS

T = -2.538

T WITH 12 DF .02<p<.05

EQUIVALENT PARAMETERS HYPOTHESIS

T-SQR = 62.139

F = 62.139

F WITH 1 , 12 DF

(3) Dimension A X Dimension C X Dimension D (Table 4.10.)

The parallelism test on the third relationship indicates that the profiles are not parallel (.025<p<.01) and the equal profile test shows that the change over the two periods is significant (.05<p<.1). This relationship is confirmed.

Thus Hypothesis V's statements concerning the "less self-confident" are confirmed.

Table 4.10.--The result of hypothesis testing: Hypothesis V.

(Less Self-Confident) X (Defensive Policies) X (Active Policies)

THE POOLED COVARIANCE MATRIX IS:

0.01907	0.00284	0.01481
0.00284	0.02831	-0.01860
0.01481	-0.01860	0.31535

MEAN VECTOR XBAR1

0.407	0.587	1.012
-------	-------	-------

MEAN VECTOR XBAR2

0.258	0.466	1.979
-------	-------	-------

PARALLELISM HYPOTHESIS

T-SQR = 15.033

F = 6.890

.025 < p < .01

F WITH 2 , 11

EQUAL PROFILE HYPOTHESIS

T = -2.173

T WITH 12 DF

.05 < p < .1

EQUIVALENT PARAMETERS HYPOTHESIS

T-SQR = 85.282

F = 39.087

F WITH 2 , 11 DF

Hypothesis VI

Since each dimension has been cleared in establishing appropriate indicants for the prior hypotheses, for the immediate purpose of testing the hypothesis, three types of tests are conceivable.

(1) Dimension A (Less Self-Confident) X Dimension B

(Nationalist)

(a) a decrease in "less self-confident" dimension.

(b) a decrease in nationalist dimension.

Parallelism is expected.

(2) Dimension A X Dimension C (Regionalist I)

(a) a decrease in "less self-confident" dimension.

(b) an increase in "regionalist" dimension.

Non-parallelism is expected.

(3) Dimension A X Dimension B X Dimension C

(a) a decrease in "less self-confident" and
"nationalist" dimensions.

(b) an increase in "regionalist" dimension.

Non-parallelism is expected.

(1) Dimension A X Dimension B (Table 4.11.)

The expected parallelism between two dimensions was not found ($.10 < p < .25$), but both variables change in the direction predicted. This change in level over the two periods is significant ($p < .01$).

(2) Dimension A X Dimension C (Table 4.12.)

The parallelism test concerning the second relations was similarly ambiguous ($.10 < p < .25$), although again inspection

Table 4.11.--The result of hypothesis testing: Hypothesis VI.

(Less Self-Confident) X (Nationalist)

THE POOLED COVARIANCE MATRIX IS:

0.01907	-0.00413
-0.00413	0.05681

MEAN VECTOR XBAR1

0.407	0.680
-------	-------

MEAN VECTOR XBAR2

0.258	0.332
-------	-------

PARALLELISM HYPOTHESIS

T-SQR = 1.656

F = 1.656 .10 < p < .25

F WITH 1 , 12

EQUAL PROFILE HYPOTHESIS

T = 3.580

T WITH 12 DF p < .01

EQUIVALENT PARAMETERS HYPOTHESIS

T-SQR = 5.020

F = 5.020

F WITH 1 , 12 DF

reveals that changes in the variables are opposite those predicted. Therefore, the predicted relations between the "less self-confident" dimension and the "Regionalist I" dimension were not confirmed.

Table 4.12.--The result of hypothesis testing: Hypothesis VI.

(Less Self-Confident) X (Regionalist I)

THE POOLED COVARIANCE MATRIX IS:

0.01907	0.02874
0.02874	0.09213

MEAN VECTOR XBAR1

0.407	0.329
-------	-------

MEAN VECTOR XBAR2

0.258	0.392
-------	-------

PARALLELISM HYPOTHESIS

T-SQR = 2.914

F = 2.914

.01 < p < .25

F WITH 1 , 12

EQUAL PROFILE HYPOTHESIS

T = 0.394

T WITH 12 DF

.6 < p < .8

EQUIVALENT PARAMETERS HYPOTHESIS

T-SQR = 0.208

F = 0.208

F WITH 1 , 12 DF

(3) Dimension A X Dimension B X Dimension C (Table 4.13.)

The test indicates that the change over time in these dimensions is not significant (.01 < p < .25), although consistent with the non-parallelism expected. Therefore, the hypothesis is not confirmed for these dimensions.

Table 4.13.--The result of hypothesis testing: Hypothesis VI.

(Less Self-Confident) X (Nationalist) X (Regionalist I)

THE POOLED COVARIANCE MATRIX IS:

0.01907	-0.00413	0.02874
-0.00413	0.05681	-0.00987
0.02874	-0.00987	0.09213

MEAN VECTOR XBAR1

0.407	0.680	0.329
-------	-------	-------

MEAN VECTOR XBAR2

0.258	0.332	0.392
-------	-------	-------

PARALLELISM HYPOTHESIS

T-SQR = 3.761

F = 1.723 .10 < p < .25

F WITH 2 , 11

EQUAL PROFILE HYPOTHESIS

T = 1.832

T WITH 12 DF .05 < p < .1

EQUIVALENT PARAMETERS HYPOTHESIS

T-SQR = 6.013

F = 2.756

F WITH 2 , 11 DF

Since the second relationship as well as the third relationship were not confirmed using the regionalist dimension, another set of profile tests was computed using the "Regionalist II" Dimension (Dimension D here). It was

already shown that the "Regionalist II" dimension is a stronger indicator than the "Regionalist I" dimension. The next set of tests, therefore, includes only this "Regionalist II" dimension.

(4) Dimension A X Dimension D (Non-parallelism expected)

(Table 4.14.)

Table 4.14.--The result of hypothesis testing: Hypothesis VI.

(Less Self-Confident) X (Regionalist II)

THE POOLED COVARIANCE MATRIX IS:

0.01907	0.03164
0.03164	0.17379

MEAN VECTOR XBAR1

0.407	0.818
-------	-------

MEAN VECTOR XBAR2

0.258	0.659
-------	-------

PARALLELISM HYPOTHESIS

T-SQR = 6.493

F = 6.493

.05 < p < .025

F WITH 1 , 12

EQUAL PROFILE HYPOTHESIS

T = -0.710

T WITH 12 DF

EQUIVALENT PARAMETERS HYPOTHESIS

T-SQR = 2.637

F = 2.637

F WITH 1 , 12 DF

The parallelism test indicates that the profiles are not parallel ($.05 < p < .025$). The equal profile test indicates that there is not a difference in overall level across time. These tests show the existence of a strong relationship as predicted by the hypothesis.

(5) Dimension A X Dimension B X Dimension D (Non-parallelism expected) (Table 4.15.)

Table 4.15.--The result of hypothesis testing: Hypothesis VI.

(Less Self-Confident) X (Nationalist) X (Regionalist II)

THE POOLED COVARIANCE MATRIX IS:

0.01807	0.03164	-0.00413
0.00164	0.17379	-0.02439
-0.00413	-0.02439	0.00581

MEAN VECTOR XBAR1

0.407	0.318	0.680
-------	-------	-------

MEAN VECTOR XBAR2

0.258	0.659	0.332
-------	-------	-------

PARALLELISM HYPOTHESIS

T-SQR = 6.755

F = 3.096 $.05 < p < .10$

F WITH 2 , 11

EQUAL PROFILE HYPOTHESIS

T = 0.578

T WITH 12 DF $.4 < p < .6$

EQUIVALENT PARAMETERS HYPOTHESIS

T-SQR = 11.036

F = 5.058

F WITH 2 , 11 DF

The parallelism test indicates that the profiles approach non-parallelism ($.05 < p < .10$). The equal profile test shows that profiles are similar.

These results can be interpreted to show the existence of a modest relationship among three variables. Therefore, Hypothesis VI is conditionally confirmed, when we use "Regionalist II" Dimension as an indicant of regionalist orientation.

Hypothesis VII

Testing of Hypothesis VII involves the examination of fitness of Dimension A and B as indicators as well as testing of the dimensions which pass this test along with the dimensions concerning the perceptions which are already tested in Hypothesis II.

Dimension A. Perception of National Power as Weak, Less Powerful and Capable. (Refer to Appendix 4.22.)

The parallelism test indicates that the profiles of this dimension are parallel over time, but levels do not change significantly over time ($.2 < p < .4$). The Japan-Small combination (A4) is anti-hypothesis while the remaining three combinations decrease in frequency over time as predicted. The t test over these three combinations reveals that the change is significant ($.05 < p < .1$) (Japan-Bad, Japan-Distress, and Japan-Avoid).

Dimension B. Perception of National Power as Strong, More Powerful and Capable. (Refer to Appendix 4.23.)

Although the profiles over time are parallel, it does not change significantly (.6 p .8) and was judged to be inadequate indicator.

The examination of the original co-occurrence table indicates that Weak-Strong type perception is closely related to less self-confident, more self-confident perceptions. Therefore, the same range of combinations of concepts is used in testing of both Hypothesis V and VI, and Hypothesis VII and VIII.

These profile tests indicate that only Dimension A is a reliable indicator but they also point to the fact that "weak national capability-power" concept and "less self-confident" concept were reduced to the same set of concepts. Since both constructs were constructed from different theoretical perspectives, one would expect them to be operationalized via independent concepts. Clearly, a better indicator for this type of perception is necessary. It may be reasonable to conclude that the reason for this lack of independence must be found mainly in the defining characteristic of the equivalence table. It is probable that the number of the entry concepts is too small to permit systematic discrimination between constructs. Conditional rather than exclusive equivalencing may improve discrimination of such related constructs.

In the next chapter I will discuss the meaning of these findings and their implications for the field of analysis of foreign policy behaviors.

FOOTNOTES--Chapter IV

¹Donald F. Morrison, Multivariate Statistical Methods (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), Chapter 4, "Tests of Hypothesis on Means."

²Ibid., p. 141.

³Ibid., p. 142.

⁴Ibid., pp. 142-43. Underline original.

⁵Ibid., p. 97.

⁶Ibid., p. 145.

⁷The F computed is essentially a conservative test, since the covariance between dimensions of the mean vectors, as well as variances within them form the error term for the T^2 test. The confidence interval for accepting the null hypothesis is effectively the maximum t^2 for any single element comparison in the vector $(\bar{x}_1 - \bar{x}_2)$. Morrison, p. 119.

⁸Ibid., p. 136.

⁹Ibid., p. 144.

¹⁰When the parallelism hypothesis is acceptable, for testing the hypothesis (question 3) of equal response means under two conditions (two time periods in this study),

$$F = \frac{N_1 + N_2 - p}{(N_1 + N_2 - 2)(p - 1)} T^2$$

$$(\text{when, } T^2 = (N + N_2) \bar{x}'C'(CSC')^{-1}C\bar{x})$$

with the F distribution with degrees of freedom $p-1$ and N_1+N_2-p .

We reject at the level the notion of equal response means if the observed F exceed the upper critical value F; $p-1$, $N_1 + N_2$. This last test is not necessary in this research. Ibid.,²p. 145.

CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The objective of this research is to scientifically delineate Japan's foreign policy by exploring the image structure of the decision makers. This exploration develops four types of questions: (1) Do traits of the pre-1945 expansionist-militarist orientations persist in the imates of the post independence Japanese decision makers? (2) Are the Japanese becoming less nationalist and more regionalist? (3) Are the Japanese images those of political and economic leadership? and (4) Are there any relationships within the images held between perceptions related to the self, such as the perceptions of national power, self-confidence, expansionist, nationalist, regionalist forms of political and cultural orientation.

The Traits of Pre-1945 Expansionism-Militarism

The Japanese interest in Southeast Asia has consistently increased (Dimension F in Hypothesis I). At the same time, Japanese perceptions are becoming less nationalistic (Dimension C in Hypothesis I, and Dimension A in Hypothesis III), and less militaristic (Dimension E in Hypothesis I). Japanese expansionism

exactly as witnessed in pre-1945 period does not exist as a strong trait in the decision makers' perception. It seems rather that policy spokesmen may be explicitly trying to avoid mention of any notions which may be reminders of the pre-1945 militarism. Therefore, the fears of Japan's Asian neighbors that her role will follow the pre-1945 model (p. 11, Chapter 1) are not justified on the basis of the sample data.

In spite of the above observations, we cannot conclude that the pre-1945 attitudinal orientations have completely disappeared from the scene. First, the Japanese leaders appear to take pride in the "self" and "nation." This is indicated in the high co-occurrence of concepts, such as, "Japan-Strength," "Japan-Authority-theme" and "Japan-Large." At the same time, however, the concept "Japan" is consistently associated with the concepts "follow," "friendly," "bad," and "maintain." And the frequency of perception of the concepts, "obligation," "nation" and "Japan" in association with "ideal-value" is consistent over time. The work of several scholars suggests this contradiction may be traced to the moral and sociological tenets of Japanese decision-makers. That is, there are persistent strong traits of respect for traditional values which emphasize the sort of harmony of the society Marshall observed in his study of the prewar Japanese business elite: "Spokesmen for the prewar Japanese

business elite, by contrast, accepted without apparent reservation the view that individual interests and private gain should be subordinated to the preservation of harmony within an organic society."¹ Reischauer observed the need for obedience to authority and sense of self-respect, that "Japan's shame ethic depends on the one hand on a strong sense of obedience to authority, but at the same time the maintenance of self-respect also calls for the exercise of will power."² If this is the case, then the seeming "modernity" in material achievement has not been accompanied by "modernity" in the attitudinal orientations of the Japanese leaders as Olson hypothesized.

Also, even when the defensive policies were emphasized, there were strong aggressive attitudes underlining the former attitudes, as indicated in the frequent association of "Japan" with concepts such as "attack," "advance," "move," "promote," and "control." This may in part be due to the fact that the period after 1955 is the period of Japan's increasing economic consolidation and prosperity. Or it may be that the Japanese are essentially more aggressive in their approaches to foreign relations. History suggests that the latter interpretation is more plausible, even though in personal relations the Japanese are seemingly more indirect and polite. A comparison of this period with the previous period (for example, 1946-1953) would be necessary to finalize this interpretation.

The failure to confirm Hypothesis I in the face of data supporting the strong existence of traditional traits, may be explained by Jervis' statement that "a state's previous unfortunate experience with a type of danger can sensitize it to other examples of that danger."³ Thus, the leaders may intentionally avoid any citation which would remind the observers of prewar Japan, and try to present Japan as more modern democratic and friendly. In this case, the recent increase in defense budgets on the other hand would belie the picture of friendly Japan the leaders try to portray. And, this, in turn, may support Jervis' observation that actors often do not realize that actions intended to project a given image may not have the desired effect because the actions themselves do not turn out as planned.⁴ These two possible interpretations, along with the above observation of persistent "traditional" outlook seems to support a proposition that a seeming "modernity" may not necessarily accompany the apparently completely "peaceful" Asian policies. These observations suggest that traditionalism modernity in Japan's foreign policy cannot be conceptualized as simple concepts associated with positive affect. The contradictory images identified suggest that the construct must be defined on the basis of relationships among ego-evaluative concepts and ideal-instrumental images. Thus a wholly new cognitive policy structure becoming open to future investigation.

Nationalist, Regionalist, and Leadership Perception

Between 1955 and 1967, the political perception of Japanese decision makers indicated a definite change. The emphasis on policy orientation changed from one of defensive policy to that of active policy. ($.01 < p < .025$).

When the focus is on the perception of economic and political instruments or approaches Japan may adopt, the Japanese decision makers seem to be very articulate. All those concepts, "Southeast Asia," "promote," "advance," "urge," are increasingly associated strongly with concept "economic."

Interestingly, the Japanese decision makers have paid increasing attention to "political" concepts (concepts describing political institutions, such as government, party, organization) as opposed to "political-ideals" (concepts representing values such as freedom, democracy, international, neutrality, liberation.) We may well interpret this phenomenon as an indication that the Japanese are becoming increasingly "pragmatic and practical" (political) than "idealistic" (political-ideal). While all those concepts "economic," "cooperate," "promote," "advance," "urge" are associated more strongly with "political-ideal" in the beginning half period than "political" in the earlier period, these are more frequently found in association with "political" in the latter half period ($.02 < p < .05$).

On the other hand, the Japanese foreign policy decision makers are not very articulate in defining the international environment. Their thought-patterns are Japan-oriented. They also seem to be more interested in what the Japanese think, plan to do, and so on, than in how they interpret and predict the moves of opponents, or neighbors. The citation of her relation with Southeast Asia have consistently increased. The absence of clear distinction between non-leadership-leadership perception is indicated by the consistent, frequent citation of Japan-Cooperate, Japan-Friendly (non-leadership role), and Japan-Urge, Japan-Promote (leadership role). The selection of concepts for these two dimensions might not have been adequate. All these highly frequent associations can very well belong to the "leadership role" perception. But the theoretical assumptions of the current literature from which these constructs were drawn suggest no more persuasive operationalization of national leadership style.

While increasing attention is paid to Southeast Asia (Dimension C) Southeast Asia is not particularly conceived in terms of "community." "Community" as political-idealistic concept is decreasing in occurrence in Japanese perception (Dimension B in Hypothesis III). The contemporary Japanese are distinctly less "nationalist" than they were earlier ($.02 < p < .05$). However, no significant increase in regionalist orientation is found, although

Southeast Asia is definitely becoming the center of attention (Dimension C). We may interpret this to say that the Japanese had not established a clear identity during the period 1955 to 1967 in terms of their relations with other Asian countries.

Along with the increasing interest in economic and political roles, this interpretation may have profound implications, since the question of whether Japan may remain an ally of the United States, become more friendly with the Communist powers, assume an independent internationalist position, or even emerge as a regional leader remains open. This finding contradicts those observers who seem to believe that the Japanese have already a definite political plan(s) in Southeast Asia.

Perception of the Self and the Political and Cultural Orientations

The above trend may indicate underlying psychological changes which the Japanese have been undergoing. As increasing economic strength and therefore self-confidence were internalized, the Japanese began to look for more practical solutions to their international problems, and rather than advocating desirable goals in terms of ideal political values they became more concerned with immediate and practical solutions to the problems. Also, when a country is more confident that it can exercise influence in

reality, it may think in more concrete and practical terms than simply "dreaming" of influencing other nations.

Vital proposed that the type of policy adopted toward State B by State A depends upon the assessment by State A of her "national power" in relation to that of State B, that is her perceived "strength" or "capability." The findings of this research generally support this statement. In order to present a stronger argument, however, it would be necessary to compare the results obtained here with the results of studies of the relationship of foreign policies to national attributes.

The series of new pragmatic traits in the image structure of the Japanese in turn seem to better reflect the concept "self-confidence." The new trend in the rise of the Japanese is indicated more by the "decreasing absence of pride in the nation [Japan], and a decrease in defensive policy perceptions than by an increase in "more self-confident" and "active" policy perceptions. This finding is significant for the observation of foreign policy behavior of nation-states. It must lead us to pay more attention to the absence or decrease and increase in negative perception of the self and the environment than to positive perception of the self and the world.

I can summarize these findings in terms of the answers to the set of questions raised in Chapter 1 as follows:

1. The Japanese perception of the self has changed greatly. Japan is more self-confident and feels less "weak."

2. Japan perceives more strong political and economic role in its foreign relations.

3. It is difficult to predict from the data whether the Japanese would embark on an expansionist and militarist path, or be more peaceful in their approach. Although we can say from the tests that they are less militaristic and nationalistic, there exist traits of "aggressive" perceptions as well as the tendency to value the traditional ethical values.

4. The new Japan seems to be making an effort to portray itself as a "more friendly, democratic" neighbor. Yet, Japan's perception of self and its role as well as the means to implement the goals seems to be colored with traditional social values, thus presenting a strange, contradictory picture of herself.

5. The Japanese are becoming more pragmatic and practical; they talk more in terms of concrete issues than of ideal political goals or values. Yet, the Japanese cannot be characterized in terms of "modernity" in their attitudinal orientations as Olson described. It seems that a more complex scheme than a traditional-modern dichotomy is necessary in assessing Japanese attitudes.

6. Most of all, the Japanese during the period studied do not seem to have a clear self-identity concerning what approaches they plan to pursue in implementing foreign policy goals, despite a great interest in economic and political instruments and increasing interest in Southeast Asia.

7. Thus, in view of the recent developments in American foreign policies as well as the Japanese defense policies, it would be difficult to predict the future direction of Japanese foreign policies in such an optimistic manner as Olson once stated "....as the country [Japan] became strong again economically, it was widely assumed that sooner or later it would adopt a more independent course in its foreign affairs [from that of the United States], albeit within a general pro-Western framework."⁵ [Underlining by the author.]

This research attempted to apply "a quasi-experimental design" in a rather unique manner in the study of the foreign policy images of Japanese decision makers. This is in sympathy with the increasing awareness within the discipline for theory, illustrated by Coplin's argument that:

...[T]he case study should differ because its prime purpose is to develop and test a set of concepts and propositions that can be used to analyze similar cases....Although the descriptive analysis provided in a case study may be interesting and important because of what it tells us about the particular case, the ideal goal of those performing case

studies is the development of concepts and propositions that are useful across a number of cases.⁶

In order to practice this, we must approach a case study with certain empirically replicable techniques. Blalock explains this approach thus: "the general strategy will be to conceive of confounding influences, measurement errors, and unmeasured variables in terms of specific causal models in which we include not only the measured variables of direct interest but also unknown or unmeasured variables which may be taken as a source of confounding effects of measurement error."⁷ And by necessity, a simplifying assumptions were made between variables, as Blalock states, "Clearly, a causal relationship between two variables cannot be evaluated empirically unless we can make certain simplifying assumptions about other variables (for example, no environmental forces or postulated properties operating in unknown ways)".⁸

Although there are a number of unexplained trends, several significant findings were made. The significance of "perceptual" or image data as opposed to national attribute data on the prediction of foreign policy behavior cannot be deemphasized, even in the study of non-conflict behaviors. In general, those studies which used aggregate data have been, although they were informative, less effective in estimating the foreign policy behaviors. Those which used, however, image or attitudinal data in combina-

tion with the perceptual variables were more promising. (See Chapter II for this discussion.) Also, while Rummel did not find significant relationship between direct indices of the national attributes and the conflict behaviors (although distance measures between attribute structures predicted to conflict behavior),⁹ psychological or motivational variables were later found by Firestone to be directly related to the conflict behaviors.¹⁰ These motivation variables, however, are based on the result of content analysis by McClelland.¹¹

Another finding, that the "perceived" national power or capability is a significant indicator of state's foreign behaviors demands further confirmation through re-analysis of the present data using additional data on both the national attributes such as used by Rummel and the exchange data used by Mogdis. For this purpose, a closer re-evaluation of these sorts of research efforts would be productive.

1. First, much of the journalistic account, although informative, is inadequate for estimating the foreign policy behaviors of a nation-state.

2. In spite of the generally accepted view that the formal policy statements are of little use in evaluating a nation's foreign policy behaviors, I found some significant relationships between certain image variables which estimate the direction of change in these behaviors.

3. Historical review yields inadequate indices for the seemingly interesting topics of expansionism, regionalism, etc. This may be due to a few methodological problems which have been articulated in the process of this research.

a. Conceptualization of the equivalence table:
Are the right words in the right category?

b. Designation of combination of concepts as indicants of certain variables: Are the right concepts chosen to represent a certain variable?

And last but most significantly

c. Theoretical foundation of the research: The theory of specific assumptions of relationships among variables selected to be tested must be meaningful a priori. Such formal hypotheses clearly lay the foundation for the form of content analysis used here.

d. Undiscussed but significant variables: This would demand further analysis of the co-occurrence tables obtained in this research using factor analysis, or clustering techniques.

e. The necessity of further refinement of content analysis techniques. Although Mitchell program is efficient, extension to permit multiple-word concept identification and third-order co-occurrence tables may be necessary.

f. Statistical problems in the analysis of co-occurrence data.

This last is a rather serious problem. Significant problems are involved in the weighing of the co-occurrences. Since concepts do not contain equal number of words in certain groups of concepts may appear consistently more frequent than other group of concepts.

"The field has an abundance of frameworks and approaches which cut across societies and conceptualize the end, means, capabilities, or sources of foreign policy, but no schemes which link up these components of external behavior in causal schemes."¹² Some efforts have been made toward theory-building in this respect, and my research is one of those attempts to indicate that a study exploring a causal relationship is possible and fruitful in the study of non-western foreign policy behaviors. Before we may be able to present a meaningful scheme of foreign policy analysis, however, many of those case studies advocated by Coplin will be required.

FOOTNOTES--Chapter V

- ¹Marshall, op. cit., p. 6.
- ²Reischauer, op. cit., p. 172.
- ³Jervis, op. cit., p. 2.
- ⁴Ibid., p. 251.
- ⁵Olson, op. cit.
- ⁶William D. Coplin, Introduction to International Politics (Chicago: Markham, 1971), p. 150.
- ⁷Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., Causal Inferences in Non-Experimental Research (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1961), p. 128.
- ⁸Ibid., p. 13.
- ⁹Rudolph J. Rummel, "The Relationship Between National Attributes and Foreign Conflict Behavior," in Quantitative International Politics, ed. by David J. Singer (New York: The Free Press, 1969), pp. 187-214.
- ¹⁰Joseph M. Firestone and Gary Oliva, "National Motives and National Attributes: A Cross-Time Analysis," Dimensionality of Nations Project, Research Report No. 25, May, 1969, Department of Political Science, University of Hawaii.
Joseph M. Firestone, "National Motives and Domestic Planned Violence: An Examination of Time-Lagged Correlational Trends in Cross-Time Regressions," The Dimensionality of Nations Project, Research Report No. 26, May, 1969, Department of Political Science, University of Hawaii.
- ¹¹David C. McClelland, The Achieving Society (Princeton, N.J.: Von Nostrand, 1961).
- ¹²Rosenau, in Farrell, ed., 1966, op. cit., p. 32.

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

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

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1.1. Organization of LDP Headquarters.

Source: Fukui, *op. cit.*, pp. 84-85.

Appendix 1.1. Organization of LDP Headquarters.

Source: Fukui, *op. cit.*, pp. 84-85.

Appendix 1.2.--Sources of LDP income by categories of donations.** (Unit: ¥1,000)

	1957	1960	1962	1965
Total income	226,945	1,890,285	1,558,677	3,382,465
Major donations (i.e. exceeding ¥100,000)	184,700	1,710,899	832,696	2,603,666
Major donations/Total income	81.3%	90.5%	53.4%	76.9%
Individual enterprises:				
Number of enterprises	21	42	121	20
Combined sum of donations	54,700 (29.6%)	191,799 (11.2%)	86,895 (10.4%)	43,300 (1.6%)
Trade and professional associations:				
Number of associations	3	24	38	13
Combined sum of donations	10,000 (5.4%)	154,000 (9.0%)	208,401 (25.0%)	174,500 (6.7%)
Political associations (excl. Keizai saiken Kondankai and Kokumin Kyokai)				
Number of associations	1	4	5	5
Combined sum of donations	11,000 (5.9)	53,800 (3.1%)	41,000 (4.9%)	21,000 (0.8%)
Keizai saiken Kondankai	109,000 (59.0%)	1,309,300 (76.5%)	495,000 (59.4%)	2,343,866 (90.0%)
Kokumin Kyokai				
Individuals				
Number of individual donors	..	4	2	3
Combined sum of donations	..	2,000 (0.1%)	1,400 (0.1%)	21,000 (0.8%)

*Percentages of the major donations, not of the total income.

Sources: Kambo, No. 9286 (4 December 1957), pp. 36-9; No. 9414 (14 May 1958), pp. 256-9; 'Gogai' No. 124 (24 December 1960), pp. 7-11; No. 10298 (19 April 1961), pp. 399-408; No. 10775 (15 November 1962), pp. 356-60; No. 10930 (27 May 1963), pp. 13-18; 'Gogai' No. 44 (20 April 1966), pp. 3-20; 'Gogai' No. 115 (22 September 1966), pp. 8-22.

**Source: Fukui, p. 147, Table 11: "Sources of LDP income by categories of donations."

Appendix 3.1. Namenwirth Political Dictionary Tags
(Alphabetical Order)

56 Academic	09 Large Group
24 Action Norm	61 Legal
29 Affection	70 Lower Status
87 American	04 Male Role
32 Anger	77 Male Theme
44 Approach	62 Medical
27 Arousal	25 Message Form
57 Artistic	63 Military
88 Atlantic	55 Move
48 Attack	90 Nationalist
50 Attempt	21 Natural World
49 Avoid	14 Natural Object
41 Bad	06 Neuter Role
86 British	18 Non Specific Object
38 Cause	37 Not
96 Collective-Dynamic	03 Other
95 Collective-Static	42 Ought
43 Communicate	71 Overstate
58 Community	69 Peer Status
46 Control	30 Pleasure
12 Corruption	64 Political
82 Danger Theme	52 Possess
83 Death Theme	19 Quantity Reference
39 Defense Mechanism	65 Recreational
31 Distress	66 Religious
99 Dynamic	01 Self
59 Economic	02 Selves
36 Equal	33 Sense
53 Expel	16 Sensory Reference
89 Europe	79 Sex Theme
60 Family	75 Sign Accept
05 Female Role	80 Sign Ascend
78 Female Theme	81 Sign Authority
47 Follow	76 Sign Reject
11 Food	73 Sign Strong
84 French	74 Sign Weak
85 German	08 Small Group
51 Get	20 Social Place
40 Good	91 Soviet
45 Guide	18 Spatial Reference
68 Higher Status	98 Static
22 Ideal Value	67 Technological
35 If	34 Think
23 Incompetence	26 Thought Form
97 Individual-Dynamic	17 Time Reference
95 Individual-Static	13 Tool
10 International Institution	92 Unification
93 Italy-Benelux	72 Understate
07 Job Role	28 Urge
	54 Work

Appendix 3.2. List of Concepts in the New Asia Equivalence Table (Second Version)^a

ADVANCE	IDEAL-VALUE	POLITICAL
APPROACH	IF	POL-ROLE
ATTACK	JOB-ROLE	POTENTIAL
ATTEMPT	LARGE	PRESENT
AUTH-THEME	MAINTAIN	PROCESS
AVOID	MESSAGE-FORM	REPAY
BAD	MOVE	RESTORE
COMMUNITY	NATIONALIST	RESUME
CAUSE	NATURAL-OBJ	SINCERITY
COMMUNICATE	NEAR	STRENGTH
CONTROL	NEUTER-ROLE	TIME-REF
CONFLICT	NOT	URGE
COOPERATION	OBLIGATION	WORK
DEFENSE-MECH	OTHERS	AFRICAN
DEVIATION	OVERSTATE	AMERICAN
DISTRESS	PLEASURE	EUROPEAN
DISTANT	POL-IDEAL	FAR-EAST
DISTRUST	PROMOTE	JAPANESE
DANGER-THEME	POSSESS	INTERNAT-INST
ECONOMIC	QUANT-REF	MIDDLE-EAST
ECON-VALUE	RESOLVE	PACIFIC
EXPEL	SENSE	SOUTH-ASIA
FOLLOW	SENSORY-REF	SOUTHEAST-ASIA
FRIENDSHIP	SMALL	
FUNDAMENTAL	SOCIAL-PLACE	
FUTURE	SPACE-REF	
GET	THINK	
GOOD	THOUGHT-FORM	
GUIDE	PAST	

^aIn the first version, 91 concepts were included. In the second version, COMMODITY was absorbed into ECONOMIC-VALUE, and TAKE into GET. TO-BE, TOOL, WEAPON, SOVIET-UNION, LATIN-AMERICAN, SMALL-GROUP, NAT-WRLD were dropped because of the low rate of occurrence.

Appendix 4.1. An Example of Table of Co-Occurrence of Concepts.

RESOLVE	4 TIMES,	COEFFICIENT = 0.26667
PAST	2 TIMES,	COEFFICIENT = 0.30769
PRESENT	11 TIMES,	COEFFICIENT = 0.46809
FUTURE	4 TIMES,	COEFFICIENT = 0.25806
TO-BE	49 TIMES,	COEFFICIENT = 1.15294
POTENTIA	15 TIMES,	COEFFICIENT = 0.58824
URGE	7 TIMES,	COEFFICIENT = 0.32558
WORK	2 TIMES,	COEFFICIENT = 0.11429
RESTORE	2 TIMES,	COEFFICIENT = 0.57143
REPAY	1 TIMES,	COEFFICIENT = 0.66667
SINCERIT	14 TIMES,	COEFFICIENT = 0.82353
LATIN-AM	1 TIMES,	COEFFICIENT = 0.66667
INTERNAT	1 TIMES,	COEFFICIENT = 0.50000
SOVIET-U	3 TIMES,	COEFFICIENT = 0.75000
FAR-EAST	2 TIMES,	COEFFICIENT = 0.15385

ADVANCE CO-OCCURS WITH:

DISTRESS	22 TIMES,	COEFFICIENT = 0.57895
JAPANESE	113 TIMES,	COEFFICIENT = 0.77663
OTHERS	38 TIMES,	COEFFICIENT = 0.69091
NATIONAL	53 TIMES,	COEFFICIENT = 0.94643
AUTH-THE	8 TIMES,	COEFFICIENT = 0.94118
SOUTHEAS	93 TIMES,	COEFFICIENT = 1.11377
APPROACH	51 TIMES,	COEFFICIENT = 0.90265
AVOID	11 TIMES,	COEFFICIENT = 0.46809
ADVANCE	74 TIMES,	COEFFICIENT = 0.58730
ATTACK	17 TIMES,	COEFFICIENT = 0.51515
BAD	10 TIMES,	COEFFICIENT = 0.90909
COMMUNIT	73 TIMES,	COEFFICIENT = 0.89024
CONTROL	29 TIMES,	COEFFICIENT = 1.03571
CAUSE	29 TIMES,	COEFFICIENT = 0.80556
COOPERAT	112 TIMES,	COEFFICIENT = 1.04186
EXPEL	8 TIMES,	COEFFICIENT = 0.88889
ECONOMIC	89 TIMES,	COEFFICIENT = 1.16340
EC	20 TIMES,	COEFFICIENT = 1.02564
FOLLOW	9 TIMES,	COEFFICIENT = 0.69231
FRIENDSH	85 TIMES,	COEFFICIENT = 0.82927
FUNDAMEN	17 TIMES,	COEFFICIENT = 0.82927
GOOD	23 TIMES,	COEFFICIENT = 0.71875
GUIDE	24 TIMES,	COEFFICIENT = 0.84211
MAINTAIN	10 TIMES,	COEFFICIENT = 0.58824
PROMOTE	35 TIMES,	COEFFICIENT = 1.00000
GET	9 TIMES,	COEFFICIENT = 0.69231
IF	883 TIMES,	COEFFICIENT = 1.66447

Appendix 4.2. An Example of Coded Original Data.

F THIS #GOVERNMENT.*<2>#THE RECENT INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS/1, SINCE #I/1 SPOKE/
3 AT THE PREVIOUS SESSION, HAVE?3 NOT SEEN/3 ANY IMPROVEMENTS/5. #THE TENSION/1
OF WORLD SITUATION HAS/3 NOT YET BEEN/3 RELIEVED/3. #IN #EUROPE, AFTER THE RAT
IFICATION OF THE #PARIS #AGREEMENTS, THE REARMAMENT/1 OF #WEST #GERMANY BEGAN
AND THE #WESTERN #ALLIANCE/1 WAS/3 FORMED/3. #HOWEVER, THE #SOVIET #UNION/1 HAS
/3 MOVED/3 ITS EMPHASIS/5 FROM LIGHT INDUSTRIES TO HEAVY INDUSTRIES AFTER THE CH
ANGE OF GOVERNMENT IN #FEBRUARY, + AND (THE #SOVIET #UNION/1) HAS/3 ADOPTED/3 PO
WER POLITICS/5, #I/1 CANNOT BUT HELP/3 JUDGING/3 THAT THE PEACE OFFENSIVE/1 OF
THE COMMUNIST BLOC HAS/3 CHANGED/3 ITS NATURE/5 AND OWING TO THIS, THE TENSION/1
IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS HAS/3 BEEN/3 INCREASING/3.*<3>#HOWEVER, WE/1 HAVE/3
TO PREVENT/3 THE #THIRD #WORLD #WAR/5 BY ALL MEANS FOR THE HUMAN KIND. #I/1 BE
LIEVE/3 THAT IT/1 IS/3 THE RESPONSIBILITY/5 OF #JAPAN/1 TO DO/3 ITS BEST/5 FOR I
NTERNATIONAL PEACE, JUDGING/3 FROM THE CURRENT STATUS OF #JAPAN. #IT/1 IS/3 NOT
HING BUT WITH THIS OBJECTIVE/5 IN MIND THAT #JAPAN/1 IS/3 ATTEMPTING/3 TO NORMAL
IZE/3 ITS DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE #SOVIET #UNION, TERMINATING/3 THE HOSTIL
E RELATIONS/5. #THE NEGOTIATION/1 IS/3 TO TAKE/5 PLACE IN #LONDON(CITY) IN THE
NEAREST FUTURE. #MOREOVER, THE DIVISION/1 OF #CHINA INTO TWO SIDES, AND THE CO
NFLECT/1 BETWEEN THE NATIONALIST #GOVERNMENT AND THE #COMMUNIST #GOVERNMENT/1 AC
CROSS THE #TAIWAN #STRAIT, IS/3 A MENACE/5 TO THE PEACE AND STABILITY OF #EAST #A
SIA, AND THE SITUATION/1 ALREADY HAS/3 BECOME/3 AN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT/5. #J
APAN/1 PRAYS/3 FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT, NOT BY ARMS, BUT BY TA
LKS, AT THE EARLIEST DATE AS POSSIBLE.*<4>#JAPAN/1 IS/3 PREPARED/3 TO PROMISE/3
PEACEFUL SOLUTION/5 OF CONFLICTS AS LONG AS THE OPPONENTS/1 DESIRE/3 SO. YES,
SHE (#JAPAN/1) BELIEVES/3 THAT TO ESTABLISH/3 FIRMLY THIS TYPE OF SETTLEMENT/5 A

Appendix 4.3. Table of Raw Scores (number of a particular combination of concepts in each speech/number of sentences in the speech).

Hypothesis I. Dimension A. Traditionalism.

RAW SCORES GROUP 1

0.154	0.015	0.015	0.046	Community \wedge Authority Theme
0.014	0.014	0.014	0.000	Ideal Value \wedge Authority Theme
0.042	0.028	0.014	0.028	Ideal Value \wedge Obligation
0.022	0.022	0.089	0.000	Ideal Value \wedge Follow
0.059	0.000	0.000	0.000	
0.012	0.012	0.071	0.035	
0.000	0.000	0.078	0.039	

RAW SCORES GROUP 2

0.090	0.000	0.051	0.013
0.049	0.000	0.020	0.010
0.010	0.000	0.042	0.021
0.083	0.042	0.021	0.031
0.000	0.039	0.078	0.000
0.010	0.010	0.039	0.000
0.015	0.022	0.074	0.007

Hypothesis I. Dimension B. Nationalism.

RAW SCORES GROUP 1

0.185	0.123	0.615	0.138	Japan \wedge Distress
0.123	0.027	0.233	0.164	Ideal Value \wedge Nation
0.278	0.139	0.111	0.819	Ideal Value \wedge Japan
0.356	0.089	0.333	0.311	Japan \wedge Nation
0.206	0.029	0.147	0.412	
0.165	0.094	0.318	0.329	
0.169	0.052	0.338	0.130	

RAW SCORES GROUP 2

0.077	0.141	0.295	0.385
0.039	0.098	0.275	0.304
0.042	0.031	0.208	0.104
0.083	0.031	0.302	0.135
0.235	0.118	0.412	0.196
0.137	0.118	0.265	0.098
0.235	0.110	0.132	0.250

Hypothesis I. Dimension C. Expansionism.

RAW SCORES GROUP 1

0.554	0.338	0.631	0.000	Japan Δ Strength
0.151	0.096	0.370	0.000	Japan Δ Attack
0.431	0.111	0.597	0.083	Japan Δ Advance
0.200	0.178	0.600	0.222	Japan Δ Control
0.500	0.265	0.559	0.000	
0.529	0.165	0.659	0.247	
0.338	0.039	0.481	0.000	

RAW SCORES GROUP 2

0.449	0.244	0.333	0.064
0.402	0.137	0.902	0.157
0.396	0.083	0.510	0.010
0.302	0.156	0.583	0.042
0.608	0.176	0.804	0.078
0.294	0.186	0.500	0.078
0.257	0.184	0.456	0.103

Hypothesis I. Dimension D. Paternalism-Tutorialism.

RAW SCORES GROUP 1

0.000	0.262	0.185	0.138	0.554	Southeast Asia Δ Small
0.055	0.110	0.096	0.164	0.151	
0.056	0.042	0.111	0.139	0.431	Southeast Asia Δ Community
0.044	0.244	0.111	0.044	0.200	
0.029	0.059	0.029	0.059	0.500	
0.000	0.000	0.059	0.153	0.529	Japan Δ Auth. Theme
					Japan Δ Guide
					Japan Δ Strength

RAW SCORES GROUP 2

0.000	0.038	0.077	0.256	0.449
0.020	0.000	0.147	0.137	0.402
0.010	0.010	0.031	0.125	0.396
0.073	0.094	0.208	0.188	0.302
0.176	0.216	0.059	0.020	0.608
0.010	0.333	0.049	0.108	0.294
0.096	0.169	0.022	0.184	0.257

Hypothesis I. Dimension E. Militarism.

RAW SCORES GROUP 1

0.185	0.323	Japan \wedge Distress
0.123	0.014	Japan \wedge Weapon
0.278	0.111	
0.356	0.000	
0.206	0.000	
0.165	0.047	
0.169	0.000	

RAW SCORES GROUP 2

0.077	0.000
0.039	0.000
0.042	0.042
0.083	0.000
0.235	0.000
0.137	0.000
0.235	0.059

Hypothesis I. Dimension F. Unidentified.

RAW SCORES GROUP 1

0.215	0.262	0.169	0.185	Southeast Asia \wedge Near
0.164	0.041	0.000	0.055	Southeast Asia \wedge
0.139	0.028	0.111	0.014	Friendship
0.222	0.089	0.000	0.000	
0.000	0.029	0.118	0.000	Southeast Asia \wedge
0.000	0.012	0.035	0.000	Cooperation
0.130	0.078	0.130	0.000	Southeast Asia \wedge
				Approach

RAW SCORES GROUP 2

0.167	0.013	0.013	0.013
0.029	0.049	0.059	0.010
0.167	0.052	0.031	0.000
0.313	0.177	0.094	0.042
0.745	0.157	0.353	0.157
0.686	0.088	0.402	0.196
0.272	0.140	0.125	0.066

Hypothesis II. Passive Policies. Dimension A. IR--Status Quo

RAW SCORES GROUP 1

0.292	0.785	Japan \wedge Maintain
0.055	0.247	Japan \wedge Urge
0.097	0.472	
0.022	1.089	
0.000	0.441	
0.259	0.247	
0.104	0.403	

RAW SCORES GROUP 2

0.141	0.436
0.098	0.569
0.260	0.313
0.083	0.510
0.078	0.314
0.127	0.186
0.066	0.434

Hypothesis II. Passive Policies. Dimension B. Perception of Non-Leadership Role

RAW SCORES GROUP 1

0.077	0.200	0.646	0.677	Japan \wedge Follow
0.014	0.260	0.493	0.260	Japan \wedge Avoid
0.069	0.097	0.486	0.458	Japan \wedge Cooperate
0.022	0.111	0.200	0.200	Japan \wedge Friendly
0.059	0.088	1.118	0.618	
0.118	0.247	0.682	0.435	
0.013	0.052	0.364	0.403	

RAW SCORES GROUP 2

0.026	0.038	0.346	0.359
0.108	0.118	0.824	0.275
0.021	0.031	0.490	0.240
0.021	0.135	0.427	0.521
0.000	0.098	1.039	0.275
0.059	0.108	0.294	0.402
0.103	0.169	0.522	0.493

Hypothesis II. Passive Policies. Dimension C. Definition of IR

RAW SCORES GROUP 1

0.015	0.015	0.323	0.092	Pol-Ideal \wedge Obligation
0.055	0.014	0.110	0.014	I-T \wedge Obligation
0.139	0.014	0.056	0.014	I-T \wedge Cooperate
0.111	0.089	0.000	0.022	I-T \wedge Friendly
0.088	0.000	0.059	0.059	
0.141	0.071	0.129	0.188	
0.169	0.078	0.182	0.078	

RAW SCORES GROUP 2

0.051	0.051	0.077	0.154
0.039	0.010	0.147	0.069
0.104	0.042	0.094	0.000
0.115	0.021	0.240	0.115
0.196	0.078	0.412	0.039
0.010	0.039	0.118	0.078
0.074	0.074	0.162	0.176

Hypothesis II. Active Policies. Dimension A. Concept of Change in IR

RAW SCORES GROUP 1

0.631	0.262	Japan \wedge Advance
0.370	0.370	Japan \wedge Move
0.597	0.194	
0.600	0.111	
0.559	0.382	
0.659	0.365	
0.481	0.078	

RAW SCORES GROUP 2

0.333	0.321
0.902	0.412
0.510	0.208
0.583	0.208
0.804	0.373
0.500	0.167
0.456	0.184

Hypothesis II. Active Policies. Dimension B. Perception of Leadership Role

RAW SCORES GROUP 1

0.185	0.138	0.092	0.785	0.215	Japan \wedge Auth. Theme
0.096	0.164	0.000	0.247	0.123	Japan \wedge Guide
0.111	0.139	0.083	0.472	0.153	Japan \wedge Control
0.111	0.044	0.222	1.089	0.178	Japan \wedge Urge
0.029	0.059	0.000	0.441	0.382	Japan \wedge Promote
0.059	0.153	0.247	0.247	0.235	
0.000	0.091	0.000	0.403	0.208	

RAW SCORES GROUP 2

0.077	0.256	0.064	0.436	0.167
0.147	0.137	0.157	0.569	0.235
0.031	0.125	0.010	0.313	0.208
0.208	0.188	0.042	0.510	0.271
0.059	0.020	0.078	0.314	0.235
0.049	0.108	0.078	0.186	0.206
0.022	0.184	0.103	0.434	0.081

Hypothesis II. Active Policies. Dimension C. IR

RAW SCORES GROUP 1

0.446	0.554	Japan \wedge Large
0.315	0.151	Japan \wedge Strength
0.389	0.431	
0.222	0.200	
0.353	0.500	
0.212	0.529	
0.260	0.338	

RAW SCORES GROUP 2

0.282	0.449
0.490	0.402
0.292	0.396
0.292	0.302
0.471	0.608
0.245	0.294
0.463	0.257

Hypothesis II. Active Policies. Dimension D1. Economic Instrument

RAW SCORES GROUP 1

0.092	0.169	0.123	0.231	0.077	Southeast Asia Λ
0.000	0.068	0.027	0.096	0.041	Economic
0.042	0.139	0.028	0.139	0.097	Ideal-Value Λ Economic
0.022	0.067	0.111	0.178	0.244	Promote Λ Economic
0.059	0.059	0.088	0.059	0.059	Advance Λ Economic
0.012	0.188	0.059	0.447	0.129	Urge Λ Economic
0.026	0.052	0.091	0.286	0.130	

RAW SCORES GROUP 2

0.026	0.051	0.077	0.167	0.128
0.059	0.343	0.118	0.814	0.225
0.010	0.198	0.135	0.594	0.104
0.031	0.094	0.052	0.188	0.115
0.059	0.196	0.059	0.745	0.235
0.265	0.098	0.147	0.343	0.029
0.096	0.066	0.044	0.397	0.029

Hypothesis II. Active Policies. Dimension D2. Political Role

RAW SCORES GROUP 1

0.338	0.138	0.323	0.015	0.169	0.092	0.292	0.138	0.277
0.110	0.068	0.192	0.014	0.055	0.082	0.151	0.055	0.082
0.264	0.111	0.319	0.028	0.250	0.250	0.278	0.153	0.083
0.156	0.067	0.044	0.067	0.067	0.178	0.089	0.178	0.244
0.029	0.088	0.206	0.088	0.029	0.235	0.147	0.147	0.059
0.282	0.412	0.224	0.129	0.082	0.188	0.153	0.165	0.118
0.130	0.260	0.247	0.104	0.052	0.273	0.260	0.234	0.211

RAW SCORES GROUP 2

0.115	0.090	0.026	0.013	0.038	0.141	0.115	0.103	0.077
0.324	0.167	0.059	0.059	0.010	0.118	0.069	0.069	0.010
0.125	0.302	0.073	0.063	0.010	0.385	0.073	0.198	0.083
0.052	0.354	0.229	0.219	0.135	0.531	0.313	0.406	0.188
0.196	0.510	0.353	0.098	0.118	0.863	0.490	0.353	0.275
0.020	0.196	0.029	0.098	0.029	0.333	0.108	0.127	0.069
0.066	0.206	0.176	0.044	0.037	0.228	0.140	0.228	0.132

Pol.-Ideal Λ Economic
Cooperate Λ Political
Cooperate Λ Pol.-Ideal

Promote Λ Political
Promote Λ Pol.-Ideal
Advance Λ Political

Advance Λ Pol.-
Ideal
Urge Λ Political
Urge Λ Pol-Ideal

Hypothesis III. Dimension A. Nationalist Perception.

RAW SCORES GROUP 1

0.138	0.354	Nation \wedge Japan
0.164	0.178	Pol.-Ideal \wedge Nation
0.819	0.361	
0.311	0.489	
0.412	0.118	
0.329	0.106	
0.130	0.558	

RAW SCORES GROUP 2

0.385	0.128
0.304	0.049
0.104	0.063
0.135	0.458
0.196	0.078
0.098	0.000
0.250	0.074

Hypothesis III. Dimension B. Regionalist Perception.

RAW SCORES GROUP 1

0.415	0.277	0.262	0.477	Japan \wedge Community
0.329	0.301	0.110	0.178	Pol.-Ideal \wedge Community
0.792	0.319	0.042	0.139	Southeast Asia \wedge Community
0.556	0.044	0.244	0.444	Southeast Asia \wedge Japan
0.618	0.176	0.059	0.147	
0.800	0.271	0.000	0.035	
0.442	0.325	0.000	0.169	

RAW SCORES GROUP 2

0.603	0.077	0.038	0.115
0.608	0.039	0.000	0.069
0.349	0.093	0.000	0.128
0.458	0.188	0.094	0.344
0.510	0.216	0.216	0.784
0.333	0.039	0.333	0.275
0.368	0.081	0.169	0.191

Hypothesis V. Dimension A. Less Self-Confident.

RAW SCORES GROUP 1

0.046	0.292	0.200	0.185	0.077	Japan \wedge Bad
0.027	0.164	0.260	0.123	0.014	Japan \wedge Small
0.028	0.278	0.097	0.278	0.069	Japan \wedge Avoid
0.089	0.289	0.111	0.356	0.022	Japan \wedge Distress
0.000	0.088	0.088	0.206	0.059	Japan \wedge Follow
0.082	0.212	0.247	0.165	0.118	
0.039	0.039	0.052	0.169	0.013	

RAW SCORES GROUP 2

0.000	0.128	0.038	0.077	0.026
0.020	0.333	0.118	0.039	0.108
0.000	0.229	0.031	0.042	0.021
0.010	0.313	0.135	0.083	0.021
0.196	0.353	0.098	0.235	0.000
0.010	0.029	0.108	0.137	0.059
0.022	0.228	0.169	0.235	0.103

Hypothesis V. Dimension B. More Self-Confident.

RAW SCORES GROUP 1

0.785	0.215	0.338	Japan \wedge Good
0.247	0.123	0.137	Japan \wedge Urge
0.472	0.153	0.278	Japan \wedge Promote
1.089	0.178	0.289	Japan \wedge Potential
0.441	0.088	0.176	
0.247	0.235	0.282	
0.403	0.208	0.260	

RAW SCORES GROUP 2

0.436	0.167	0.115
0.569	0.235	0.147
0.313	0.208	0.188
0.510	0.271	0.198
0.314	0.235	0.196
0.186	0.206	0.333
0.375	0.081	0.206

Hypothesis VII. Dimension A. Perception of Nat'l Power as Weak,
Less Powerful and Capable.

RAW SCORES GROUP 1

0.046	0.185	0.200	0.292	Japan \wedge Bad
0.027	0.123	0.260	0.164	Japan \wedge Distress
0.028	0.278	0.097	0.278	Japan \wedge Avoid
0.089	0.356	0.111	0.289	Japan \wedge Small
0.000	0.206	0.088	0.088	
0.082	0.165	0.247	0.212	
0.039	0.169	0.052	0.039	

RAW SCORES GROUP 2

0.000	0.077	0.038	0.128
0.020	0.039	0.118	0.333
0.000	0.042	0.031	0.229
0.010	0.083	0.135	0.313
0.196	0.235	0.098	0.353
0.010	0.137	0.108	0.029
0.022	0.235	0.169	0.228

Hypothesis VII. Dimension B. Perception of Nat'l Power as
Strong, More Powerful and Capable

RAW SCORES GROUP 1

0.554	0.446	0.185	Japan \wedge Strength
0.151	0.315	0.096	Japan \wedge Large
0.431	0.389	0.111	Japan \wedge Auth.-Theme
0.200	0.222	0.111	
0.500	0.353	0.029	
0.529	0.212	0.059	
0.338	0.260	0.000	

RAW SCORES GROUP 2

0.449	0.282	0.077
0.402	0.490	0.147
0.396	0.292	0.031
0.302	0.292	0.208
0.608	0.471	0.059
0.294	0.245	0.049
0.257	0.463	0.022

Appendix 4.4. Hypothesis I. Dimension A. Traditionalism

Community \wedge Authority-Theme
 Ideal-Value \wedge Authority-Theme
 Ideal-Value \wedge Obligation
 Ideal-Value \wedge Follow

THE POOLED COVARIANCE MATRIX IS:

0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

MEAN VECTOR XBAR1

0.043	0.013	0.040	0.021
-------	-------	-------	-------

MEAN VECTOR XBAR2

0.037	0.016	0.046	0.012
-------	-------	-------	-------

PARALLELISM HYPOTHESIS

T-SQR = 1.548736357

F = 0.4302045435

F WITH 3 , 10

EQUAL PROFILE HYPOTHESIS

T = 0.2258803192

T WITH 12 DF

EQUIVALENT PARAMETERS HYPOTHESIS

T-SQR = 33.04291836

F = 9.178588433

F WITH 3 , 10 DF

Appendix 4.5. Hypothesis I. Dimension B. Nationalism.

Japan \wedge Distress
 Nation \wedge Ideal-Value
 Japan \wedge Ideal-Value
 Japan \wedge Nation

THE POOLED COVARIANCE MATRIX IS:

0.00670	0.00161	-0.00077	0.00455
0.00161	0.00193	0.00144	0.00401
-0.00077	0.00144	0.01754	-0.01337
0.00455	0.00401	-0.01337	0.03510

MEAN VECTOR XBAR1

0.212	0.079	0.299	0.329
-------	-------	-------	-------

MEAN VECTOR XBAR2

0.121	0.092	0.270	0.210
-------	-------	-------	-------

PARALLELISM HYPOTHESIS

T-SQR = 20.19283326

F = 5.609120349

F WITH 3 , 10

EQUAL PROFILE HYPOTHESIS

T = 1.777510234

T WITH 12 DF

.1 < P < .2

EQUIVALENT PARAMETERS HYPOTHESIS

T-SQR = 262.8098552

F = 73.00273756

F WITH 3 , 10 DF

Appendix 4.6. Hypothesis I. Dimension C. Expansionism.

Japan \wedge Strength
 Japan \wedge Attack
 Japan \wedge Advance
 Japan \wedge Control

THE POOLED COVARIANCE MATRIX IS:

0.02013	0.00505	0.01087	-0.00021
0.00505	0.00651	0.00081	-0.00013
0.01087	0.00081	0.02511	0.00573
-0.00021	-0.00013	0.00573	0.00722

MEAN VECTOR XBAR1

0.386	0.170	0.557	0.079
-------	-------	-------	-------

MEAN VECTOR XBAR2

0.387	0.167	0.584	0.076
-------	-------	-------	-------

PARALLELISM HYPOTHESIS

T-SQR = 0.1986301496

F = 0.05517504154

Parallel

F WITH 3 , 10

EQUAL PROFILE HYPOTHESIS

T = -0.1282870534

T WITH 12 DF

p<.8

EQUIVALENT PARAMETERS HYPOTHESIS

T-SQR = 164.295022

F = 45.6375061

F WITH 3 , 10 DF

NORMAL END OF JOB

No significant changes over time.

Appendix 4.7. Hypothesis I. Dimension D. Paternalism-
Tutorialism

Southeast Asia \wedge Small
 Southeast Asia \wedge Community
 Japan \wedge Auth-Theme
 Japan \wedge Guide
 Japan \wedge Strength

THE POOLED COVARIANCE MATRIX IS:

0.00243	0.00160	0.00004	-0.00138	0.00038
0.00160	0.01357	0.00120	-0.00262	-0.00245
0.00004	0.00120	0.00420	0.00108	-0.00003
0.00138	-0.00262	0.00108	0.00391	-0.00163
0.00038	-0.00245	-0.00003	-0.00163	0.02013

MEAN VECTOR XBAR1

0.026	0.102	0.084	0.113	0.386
-------	-------	-------	-------	-------

MEAN VECTOR XBAR2

0.055	0.123	0.085	0.145	0.387
-------	-------	-------	-------	-------

PARALLELISM HYPOTHESIS

T-SQR = 0.907613324

F = 0.1701774983

F WITH 4 , 9

EQUAL PROFILE HYPOTHESIS

T = -0.8130018105

T WITH 12 DF

.4 < p < .6

EQUIVALENT PARAMETERS HYPOTHESIS

T-SQR = 100.6931903

F = 18.87997317

F WITH 4 , 9 DF

Appendix 4.8. Hypothesis I. Dimension E. Militarism.

Japan \wedge Distress
 Japan \wedge Weapon

THE POOLED COVARIANCE MATRIX IS:

0.00670 -0.00011
 -0.00011 0.00732

MEAN VECTOR XBAR1

0.212 0.071

MEAN VECTOR XBAR2

0.121 0.014

PARALLELISM HYPOTHESIS

T-SQR = 0.2820404705

F = 0.2820404705

F WITH 1 , 12

Parallel

EQUAL PROFILE HYPOTHESIS

T = 2.334515063

T WITH 12 DF

Significant

.02 < p < .05

EQUIVALENT PARAMETERS HYPOTHESIS

T-SQR = 15.07347274

F = 15.07347274

F WITH 1 , 12 DF

Appendix 4.9. Hypothesis II. Defense Policies. Dimension A.
IR--Status-Quo

Japan Δ Maintain
 Japan Δ Urge

THE POOLED COVARIANCE MATRIX IS:

0.00871 -0.00305
 -0.00305 0.05571

MEAN VECTOR XBAR 1

0.118 0.526

MEAN VECTOR XBAR2

0.122 0.394

PARALLELISM HYPOTHESIS

T-SQR = 0.9091584887 Parallel
 F = 0.9091584887
 F WITH 1 , 12

EQUAL PROFILE HYPOTHESIS

T = 0.9918512721 Not significant
 T WITH 12 DF .2 < p < .4

EQUIVALENT PARAMETERS HYPOTHESIS

T-SQR = 22.94899516
 F = 22.94899516
 F WITH 1 , 12 DF

Appendix 4.10. Hypothesis II. Defense Policies.
 Dimension B. Perception of Non-Leadership Role.

Japan \wedge Follow
 Japan \wedge Avoid
 Japan \wedge Cooperate
 Japan \wedge Friendly

THE POOLED COVARIANCE MATRIX IS:

0.00168	0.00120	0.00264	0.00236
0.00120	0.00473	0.00198	0.00124
0.00264	0.00198	0.07919	0.01092
0.00236	0.00124	0.01092	0.02111

MEAN VECTOR XBAR1

0.053	0.151	0.570	0.436
-------	-------	-------	-------

MEAN VECTOR XBAR2

0.048	0.100	0.563	0.366
-------	-------	-------	-------

PARALLELISM HYPOTHESIS

T-SQR = 2.904285227

Parallel

F = 0.8067458964

F WITH 3 , 10

EQUAL PROFILE HYPOTHESIS

T = 0.6462385893

.4 < p < .6

T WITH 12 DF

EQUIVALENT PARAMETERS HYPOTHESIS

T-SQR = 147.5945238

F = 40.99847884

F WITH 3 , 10 DF

Appendix 4.11. Hypothesis II. Defense Policies.
 Dimension C. Definition of IR.

Pol-Ideal \wedge Obligation
 Ideal-Value \wedge Obligation
 Ideal-Value \wedge Cooperation
 Ideal-Value \wedge Friendly

THE POOLED COVARIANCE MATRIX IS:

0.00333	0.00097	0.00171	-0.00037
0.00097	0.00102	0.00026	0.00051
0.00171	0.00026	0.01234	0.00063
-0.00037	0.00051	0.00063	0.00388

MEAN VECTOR XBAR1

0.103	0.040	0.123	0.067
-------	-------	-------	-------

MEAN VECTOR XBAR2

0.084	0.045	0.178	0.090
-------	-------	-------	-------

PARALLELISM HYPOTHESIS

T-SQR = 2.061639151

F = 0.572677542

F WITH 3 , 10

EQUAL PROFILE HYPOTHESIS

T = -0.7332034824

T WITH 12 DF

.4 < p < .6

EQUIVALENT PARAMETERS HYPOTHESIS

T-SQR = 29.90285618

F = 8.306348938

F WITH 3 , 10 DF

Appendix 4.12. Hypothesis II. Active Policies.
 Dimension A. Concept of Change in IR.

Japan \wedge Advance
 Japan \wedge Move

THE POOLED COVARIANCE MATRIX IS:

0.02511	0.00621
0.00621	0.01300

MEAN VECTOR \bar{X} BAR1

0.557	0.252
-------	-------

MEAN VECTOR \bar{X} BAR2

0.584	0.267
-------	-------

PARALLELISM HYPOTHESIS

T-SQR = 0.01906061974

F = 0.01906061974

Parallel

F WITH 1, 12

EQUAL PROFILE HYPOTHESIS

T = -0.3600749015

T WITH 12 DF

.6 < p < .8

EQUIVALENT PARAMETERS HYPOTHESIS

T-SQR = 52.65475134

F = 52.65475134

F WITH 1, 12 DF

Appendix 4.13. Hypothesis II. Active Policies.
 Dimension B. Perception of Leadership Role

Japan \wedge Auth-Theme
 Japan \wedge Guide
 Japan \wedge Control
 Japan \wedge Urge
 Japan \wedge Promote

THE POOLED COVARIANCE MATRIX IS:

0.00424	0.00108	0.00114	0.00790	0.00036
0.00108	0.00391	-0.00018	-0.00186	-0.00186
0.00114	-0.00018	0.00661	0.00757	-0.00086
0.00790	-0.00186	0.00757	0.05571	-0.00061
0.00036	-0.00186	-0.00086	-0.00061	0.00542

MEAN VECTOR \bar{X} BAR1

0.084	0.113	0.092	0.526	0.214
-------	-------	-------	-------	-------

MEAN VECTOR \bar{X} BAR2

0.085	0.145	0.076	0.394	0.200
-------	-------	-------	-------	-------

PARALLELISM HYPOTHESIS

T-SQR = 1.842204134

F = 0.3454132751

Parallel

F WITH 4 , 9

EQUAL PROFILE HYPOTHESIS

T = 0.7512738881

T WITH 12 DF

.4 < p < .6

EQUIVALENT PARAMETERS HYPOTHESIS

T-SQR = 138.8852504

F = 26.04098446

F WITH 4 , 9 DF

Appendix 4.14. Hypothesis II. Active Policies.
 Dimension C. IR.

Japan \wedge Large
 Japan \wedge Strength

THE POOLED COVARIANCE MATRIX IS:

0.00957	0.00490
0.00490	0.02013

MEAN VECTOR XBAR1

0.314	0.386
-------	-------

MEAN VECTOR XBAR2

0.362	0.387
-------	-------

PARALLELISM HYPOTHESIS

T-SQR = 0.3955470682

F = 0.3955470682

Parallel

F WITH 1 , 12

EQUAL PROFILE HYPOTHESIS

T = -0.4618957472

T WITH 12 DF

.6 < p < .8

EQUIVALENT PARAMETERS HYPOTHESIS

T-SQR = 1.653703338

F = 1.653703338

F WITH 1 , 12 DF

Appendix 4.15. Hypothesis II. Active Policies.
 Dimension D1. Economic Instrument.

Southeast Asia \wedge Economic
 Ideal-Value \wedge Economic
 Advance \wedge Economic

Promote \wedge Economic
 Urge \wedge Economic

THE POOLED COVARIANCE MATRIX IS:

0.00427	-0.00067	0.00112	-0.00173	-0.00208
-0.00067	0.00702	0.00079	0.01421	0.00287
0.00112	0.00079	0.00163	0.00178	0.00035
-0.00173	0.01421	0.00178	0.04219	0.00841
-0.00208	0.00287	0.00035	0.00841	0.00571

MEAN VECTOR XBAR1

0.036 0.106 0.075 0.205 0.111

MEAN VECTOR XBAR2

0.078 0.149 0.090 0.464 0.124

PARALLELISM HYPOTHESIS

T-SQR = 11.052216

F = 2.0722905

Parallel

F WITH 4 , 9

EQUAL PROFILE HYPOTHESIS

T = -2.088071244

T WITH 12 DF

.05 < p < .1

EQUIVALENT PARAMETERS HYPOTHESIS

T-SQR = 29.82521491

F = 5.592227796

F WITH 4 , 9 DF

Appendix 4.16. Hypothesis II. Active Policies. Dimension D2. Political Role.

Pol-Ideal Λ Economic	Promote Λ Political	Advance Λ Pol.-Ideal
Cooperate Λ Political	Promote Λ Political-Ideal	Urge Λ Political
Cooperate Λ Pol.-Ideal	Advance Λ Political	Urge Λ Pol.-Ideal

THE POOLED COVARIANCE MATRIX IS:

0.01145	0.00304	0.00294	-0.00154	0.00269	-0.00216	0.00237	-0.00180	0.00108
0.00304	0.01801	0.00894	0.00474	0.00210	0.01886	0.01006	0.00899	0.00558
0.00294	0.00894	0.01199	0.00141	0.00500	0.01388	0.01238	0.00680	0.00468
-0.00154	0.00474	0.00141	0.00325	0.00033	0.00570	0.00211	0.00397	0.00126
0.00269	0.00210	0.00500	0.00033	0.00448	0.00519	0.00577	0.00285	0.00215
-0.00216	0.01886	0.01388	0.00570	0.00519	0.03669	0.01905	0.01506	0.00966
0.00237	0.01006	0.01238	0.00211	0.00577	0.01905	0.01551	0.00873	0.00743
-0.00180	0.00899	0.00680	0.00397	0.00285	0.01506	0.00873	0.00957	0.00613
0.00108	0.00558	0.00468	0.00126	0.00215	0.00966	0.00743	0.00613	0.00790

MEAN VECTOR XBAR1

0.187	0.163	0.222	0.064	0.101	0.186	0.196	0.153	0.155
↑	↑	↑	↑	↑	↑	↑	↑	↑

MEAN VECTOR XBAR2

0.128	0.261	0.135	0.085	0.054	0.371	0.187	0.212	0.119
-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------

PARALLELISM HYPOTHESIS

T-SQR = 30.67949695

F = 1.597890466

F WITH 8 , 5 Parallel

t = 2.59
0.02 < p < 0.05
On 2,4,6,8

EQUAL PROFILE HYPOTHESIS

T = -0.3240686012

T WITH 12 DF

.6 < p < .8

EQUIVALENT PARAMETERS HYPOTHESIS

T-SQR = 99.68047193

F = 5.191691246

F WITH 8 , 5 DF

Appendix 4.17. Hypothesis III. Dimension A. Nationalist Perception.

Nationalist \wedge Japan
 Pol.-Ideal \wedge National

THE POOLED COVARIANCE MATRIX IS:

0.03510	-0.00354
-0.00354	0.02796

MEAN VECTOR XBAR1

0.329	0.309
-------	-------

MEAN VECTOR XBAR2

0.210	0.121
-------	-------

PARALLELISM HYPOTHESIS

T-SQR = 0.2352936756

F = 0.2362936756

F WITH 1 , 12

EQUAL PROFILE HYPOTHESIS

T = 2.42432839

T WITH 12 DF .02<p<.05

EQUIVALENT PARAMETERS HYPOTHESIS

T-SQR = 0.5925631787

F = 0.5925631787

F WITH 1 , 12 DF

Appendix 4.18. Hypothesis III. Dimension B. Regionalist I Perception

Japan \wedge Community
 Pol.-Ideal \wedge Community
 Southeast Asia \wedge Community
 Southeast Asia \wedge Japan

THE POOLED COVARIANCE MATRIX IS:

0.02371	-0.00027	-0.00809	-0.00781
-0.00027	0.00757	-0.00254	0.00291
-0.00809	-0.00254	0.01378	0.01691
-0.00781	0.00291	0.01691	0.04394

MEAN VECTOR XBAR1

0.564	0.245	0.102	0.227
-------	-------	-------	-------

MEAN VECTOR XBAR2

0.461	0.105	0.121	0.272
-------	-------	-------	-------

PARALLELISM HYPOTHESIS

T-SQR = 3.71456398

F = 1.031823328

F WITH 3 , 10

EQUAL PROFILE HYPOTHESIS

T = 1.109165874

T WITH 12 DF .2 < p < .4

EQUIVALENT PARAMETERS HYPOTHESIS

T-SQR = 75.52999833

F = 20.98055509

F WITH 3 , 10 DF

Appendix 4.19. Hypothesis III. Dimension C. Regionalist II.

Southeast Asia \wedge Near
 Southeast Asia \wedge Friendship
 Southeast Asia \wedge Cooperation
 Southeast Asia \wedge Approach

THE POOLED COVARIANCE MATRIX IS:

0.04138	0.00694	0.02034	0.01165
0.00694	0.00564	0.00364	0.00366
0.02034	0.00364	0.01477	0.00710
0.01165	0.00366	0.00710	0.00535

MEAN VECTOR XBAR1

0.124	0.077	0.080	0.036
-------	-------	-------	-------

MEAN VECTOR XBAR2

0.340	0.097	0.154	0.069
-------	-------	-------	-------

PARALLELISM HYPOTHESIS

T-SQR = 5.206874149

F = 1.44635393

Parallel

F WITH 3 , 10

EQUAL PROFILE HYPOTHESIS

T = -1.531473957

T WITH 12 DF

.1 < p < .2

EQUIVALENT PARAMETERS HYPOTHESIS

T-SQR = 36.04596377

F = 10.01276771

F WITH 3 , 10 DF

Appendix 4.20. Hypothesis V. Dimension A. Less Self-Confident

Japan \wedge Bad
 Japan \wedge Small
 Japan \wedge Avoid
 Japan \wedge Distress
 Japan \wedge Follow

THE POOLED COVARIANCE MATRIX IS:

0.00300	0.00288	0.00053	0.00237	-0.00048
0.00288	0.01211	0.00218	0.00243	0.00056
0.00053	0.00218	0.00473	-0.00058	0.00120
0.00237	0.00243	-0.00058	0.00670	-0.00014
-0.00048	0.00056	0.00120	-0.00014	0.00168

MEAN VECTOR XBAR1

0.045 0.195 0.151 0.212 0.053

MEAN VECTOR XBAR2

0.037 0.230 0.100 0.121 0.048

PARALLELISM HYPOTHESIS

T-SQR = 11.11799857

F = 2.084624732

F WITH 4 , 9

EQUAL PROFILE HYPOTHESIS

T = 0.9873598877

.6 < p < .8

T WITH 12 DF

EQUIVALENT PARAMETERS HYPOTHESIS

T-SQR = 126.0776541

F = 23.63956014

F WITH 4 , 9 DF

Appendix 4.21. Hypothesis V. Dimension B. More Self-Confident

Japan Λ Urge
 Japan Λ Good
 Japan Λ Potential

THE POOLED COVARIANCE MATRIX IS:

0.05557	0.00206	0.00260
0.00206	0.00332	0.00152
0.00260	0.00152	0.00478

MEAN VECTOR XBAR1

0.526	0.172	0.252
-------	-------	-------

MEAN VECTOR XBAR2

0.394	0.200	0.198
-------	-------	-------

PARALLELISM HYPOTHESIS

T-SQR = 5.865570818

F = 2.688386625

F WITH 2 , 11

Parallel

EQUAL PROFILE HYPOTHESIS

T = 1.120008724

T WITH 12 DF

.2 < p < .4

EQUIVALENT PARAMETERS HYPOTHESIS

T-SQR = 20.71162971

F = 9.492830284

F WITH 2 , 11 DF

Appendix 4.22. Hypothesis VII. Dimension A.
Perception of Nat'l Power as Weak, Less
Powerful and Capable

Japan \wedge Bad
 Japan \wedge Distress
 Japan \wedge Avoid
 Japan \wedge Small \rightarrow anti-hyp.

THE POOLED COVARIANCE MATRIX IS:

0.00300	0.00237	0.00053	0.00288
0.00237	0.00670	-0.00058	0.00243
0.00053	-0.00058	0.00473	0.00218
0.00288	0.00243	0.00218	0.01211

MEAN VECTOR XBAR1

0.045	0.212	0.151	0.195
-------	-------	-------	-------

MEAN VECTOR XBAR2

0.037	0.121	0.100	0.230
-------	-------	-------	-------

PARALLELISM HYPOTHESIS

T-SQR = 7.658976083

F = 2.127493356

Parallel

Japan \wedge Bad
 Japan \wedge Distress
 Japan \wedge Avoid

F WITH 3 , 10

EQUAL PROFILE HYPOTHESIS

T = 0.9855741386

T WITH 12 DF

.2 < p < .4

t = 2.04

.05 < p < .1

EQUIVALENT PARAMETERS HYPOTHESIS

T-SQR = 96.09063412

F = 26.69184281

F WITH 3 , 10 DF

Appendix 4.23. Hypothesis VII. Dimension B. Perception of Nat'l Power as Strong, More Powerful and Capable.

Japan \wedge Strength
 Japan \wedge Large
 Japan \wedge Auth-Theme

THE POOLED COVARIANCE MATRIX IS:

0.02013	0.00490	-0.00003
0.00490	0.00957	0.00138
-0.00003	0.00138	0.00420

MEAN VECTOR XBAR1

0.386	0.314	0.084
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MEAN VECTOR XBAR2

0.387	0.362	0.085
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PARALLELISM HYPOTHESIS

T-SQR = 0.9332565584

F = 0.4277425892

Parallel

F WITH 2 , 11

EQUAL PROFILE HYPOTHESIS

T = -0.4292573437

T WITH 12 DF

.6 < p < .8

EQUIVALENT PARAMETERS HYPOTHESIS

T-SQR = 92.94056907

F = 42.59776082

F WITH 2 , 11 DF

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