MARITAL POWER: A THEORETICAL EXPLICATION AND EMPIRICAL EXPLORATION OF THREE PROCESS MODELS

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

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ABSTRACT

MARITAL POWER: A THEORETICAL EXPLICATION
AND EMPIRICAL EXPLORATION OF THREE
PROCESS MODELS

By

Elizabeth E. Benson

This report analyzes one major research program within family sociology, that focusing on the "Resource Theory" of marital power. Two implicit cognitive processes by which resource possession is assumed to be "translated" into marital power were identified, centering around the concepts of perceived competence and gratitude-and-respect. These models were contrasted with a third theoretical process suggested by critics of the Resource Theory, that of power-dependence theory.

A case was made that the Resource Theory research program has reached an impassé, where each additional study only increases the number of contradictory and inconsistent findings. On the hunch that this impassé is at least partially due to the underlying assumptions of the theoretical reasoning, the job of explicating and testing the assumptions in this line of reasoning was undertaken.

Hypotheses were tested on data from a sample of 90 upper-middle class, urban, newlywed Michigan couples ranging in age from 22 to 40 and including couples in both first and second marriages. Both wife and

husband were interviewed, with gender of interviewers matched with that of respondents. Couples were interviewed at two points in time, by telephone shortly after their wedding and in their homes several months thereafter.

One benefit of the longitudinal research design was that it allowed identification of the role preferences about task division with which respondents had begun the marriage. These preferences were compared with later reports about the actual division of tasks. The average degree to which a respondent's initial preferences were achieved was taken as the measure of marital power, using only those items on which husband and wife had begun marriage with different ideas.

When previously implicit parts of the theoretical line of reasoning were directly tested, the results were rather mixed. This calls into question some of the premises on which these theories are based and suggests that theoretical refinement should be the first order of future research.

Findings with respect to specific theoretical process-models indicated that each theory succeeded in describing marriages to some extent. In the perceived competence formulation, one's marital power is hypothesized to be directly related to one's competence. Gender differences were found in types of competence which were related to marital power. The competence of dependability was most consistently related to marital power. Husbands yielded to a "dependable" spouse only in areas they considered unimportant, while wives did so on important issues as well. Wives, but not husbands, are likely to comply with the wishes of a spouse who is considered to be "intelligent."

The gratitude formulation is the second model which was examined. Like perceived competence, it embodies a line of reasoning found in the Resource Theory work. Spouses who contribute greater "resources" to the marriage are hypothesized to earn power because of the gratitude and respect of their mates. Only an indirect test of this formulation was possible, for which more support was found for husbands than for wives.

Power-dependence theory was the final formulation tested. In this theory, the higher the dependence of a spouse upon the mate, the lower that spouse's power. Two related aspects of dependence are distinguished, "motivational investment" in goals mediated by the spouse and the presence of "alternatives" for obtaining valued goal-objects from a source other than the spouse. Relative marital power is posited to vary directly with level of alternatives and inversely with level of motivational investment.

The data trends were in the predicted direction for some indicators of potential alternatives-to-the-present marriage. Very little support was found for power-dependence hypotheses involving motivational investment.

An auxilliary set of hypotheses related to power-dependence was also tested. Based on the work of Dahlström, these hypotheses deal with the notion that the average amount of power exercised within a couple across multiple issues will increase as the interests of spouses become more divergent. That is, spouses will have an increased "incentive to comply" with the other's wishes if, in return, the other spouse will comply on another issue. Such "trade-offs" were thought

more likely to occur when spouses felt strongly about different issues, rather than about the same issues. Tests of this hypothesis were generally positive. However, the presence of trade-offs was not directly measured.

Finally, test situations were set up for which alternative theories would predict different results, as a technique for assessing the relative applicability of the several theories. In specific test-situations, the gratitude formulation described the findings better than the perceived competence formulation. Power-dependence theory "fit" the data better when the task area was one which had been traditionally assigned to the spouse's gender, while the competence/gratitude formulation provided a somewhat better "fit" for other task areas. In a different test-situation, power-dependence predictions were supported over those based on competence and gratitude formulations. Yet another test, contrasting only competence theory with power-dependence theory, indicated slightly more support for the latter.

The role of task importance, as a scope condition, was also explored. Power-dependence predictions held more strongly under high-importance conditions for wives and under low-importance conditions for husbands. Perceived competence predictions held more strongly for both genders when task importance was low.

These assessments of the relative adequacy of different theories must be viewed as very tentative, inasmuch as the sample size was not large and the indicators require refinement. However, in general, it appears that power-dependence theory provided the best description of marital power processes, of the three theories which were examined in this study.

MARITAL POWER: A THEORETICAL EXPLICATION AND EMPIRICAL EXPLORATION OF THREE PROCESS MODELS

By

Elizabeth E. Lauer Benson

A DISSERTATION

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Department of Sociology

1976

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Dedicated to

my father and mother

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Although it is strange to say, any successful completion of a dissertation depends upon whether or not people other than the author are willing to go out of their way. I was indeed fortunate in having many such people "on my side" in this undertaking.

For academic guidance and consistent support throughout the course of my graduate studies, I would like to extend appreciation to my guidance committee members, Drs. Bo Anderson, Frederick Waisanen, Beatrice Paolucci, and Barrie Thorne. Particular thanks are due to my chairman, Dr. Anderson, who combines the ability to see the crux of a complicated theoretical issue with the ability to strike a happy balance between guidance and letting a student explore his or her own interests and ideas.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In the present study, I take a critical look at the perhaps elusive and metaphorical concept of marital power. "Power" in the sense in which it is used in the study of community and national politics may be transferred to the analysis of families only in a metaphoric sense. That is, what we mean by marital power is somehow different from what we usually mean by power-in-politics.

Power of one spouse in a marriage, in my view, is evidenced by non-self-satisfying behavior on the part of the other spouse. But married couples are supposed to engage in non-self-satisfying behavior, to consider the welfare and desires of the other spouse. Does this mean that power is a meaningless term for analyzing families? I think not. The question of relative advantage still remains, i.e., do spouses engage in equal amounts of non-self-satisfying behavior or does one partner benefit more than the other one?

And, one might ask, in what areas of married life is the study of "relative advantage" useful and appropriate? For newly married couples like the respondents in my study, it seems that one critical area is the question of how the structuring of one's joint, everyday life patterns gets accomplished. Such patterns--including the establishing of routines for dividing up the daily tasks involved in joint living--may persist for years to come, once established. All couples must deal

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with these questions; hence there is some sense in which one may compare groups of couples. This has certain advantages over the study of more ideosyncratic--although doubtlessly important--"critical issues" between spouses (e.g., a critical power issue for one couple may be whether to raise a child as Protestant or Catholic, while in another couple a critical issue may revolve around whether the wife has a career; identification and comparability of such issues was not attempted in the present study).

In a marital context, the assumption that power is a "zero-sum game" seems to be inappropriate. Both spouses may gain from the exercise of power. The question is whether or not this gain is equal or unequal, i.e., whether one has a relative advantage. Because such relative advantages are being gained, the metaphor of "power" can still be useful for the study of marriages. One only must be careful not to assume that it's exercise is intentional, i.e., that one spouse deliberately tries to reduce the benefits of the other.

The present study begins with the examination of one tradition in the study of marital power, the research program which has focused upon the so-called "Resource Theory of Marital Power." This program, it seems to me, has reached an impassé, a point at which no further theoretical/explanatory progress is evident. It is unclear whether the confusion, e.g., about contradictory findings, is due to theoretical problems or to such methodological shortcomings as the predominant use of female respondents, the inability to identify critical differences in cultural contexts, or the failure to find culturally equivalent measures of power.

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I suggest that a good part of the problem is indeed one of theoretical unclarity, a failure to explicitly identify assumptions about intervening cognitive processes. Upon careful examination of the literature, several alternative and/or complementary theories of marital power processes are identified. These theories are then explicated, drawing upon related social psychological theories. The set of hypotheses which is developed in this exploratory study focuses upon marital power processes per se, as opposed to prematurely using theories as vehicles for explaining behavior in a particular sample of respondents.

Hypotheses are constructed with this purpose of theory testing in mind. Wherever possible, test situations are developed in which different theories would predict different results, in order to assess the relative explanatory power of several theories. Hypotheses are then submitted to preliminary testing, using data from 90 husband-and-wife pairs from a sample of upper-middle class Michigan newlyweds in their first and second marriages. Suggestions for future refinement of presently employed theories and for testing these theories with different population groups are incorporated during the presentation and interpretation of findings.

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CHAPTER II

THE RESOURCE THEORY OF MARITAL POWER: A LITERATURE REVIEW

The present study takes as its point of departure the most influential tradition in the study of marital power, that known as the "resource theory of marital power." This approach to the study of power differs from other traditions in the field in several ways.

The Resource-Theory Tradition in Context

The resource theorists view marital power as having its base primarily in quantifiable resources such as income and education, rather than in qualitative ways in which resource-combinations are used, e.g., as legitimate, expert, reward, coercive, or referent power-bases (Raven, Centers, and Rodrigues, 1975).

Family interaction is assumed to intervene between resource possession and marital power, but is neither given special emphasis nor directly studied. This contrasts with such works as Kenkel (1957), Caputo (1963), Leik (1965), Farina (1960), and Mishler and Waxler (1968) for whom interaction processes are not only directly studied but are seen as the "critical stage" (Turk, 1975) or dimension of power. That is, if marital power is seen as emerging through some choice-making process, the "interaction school" assumes that power can best be identified by measuring

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interaction[1] during the decision-making. The decision-outcomes are viewed as not "really" being power but only the results of power, i.e., results of power-in-interaction. In contrast, the resource-theory school defines the critical stage as occurring near the end of the choice-making process; power is measured in terms of the outcomes--who wins when spouses disagree or who is allocated power to make final decisions for the family as opposed to who decides who will decide or who decides who will win (Safilios-Rothschild, 1970).

The resource-theory writers are among those social scientists who view power as the ability to attain outcomes congruent with individual wants (although they generally assume rather than measure what individuals want, e.g., people are assumed to want the power to make family decisions). The major competing view in the field sees power as residing in the person who makes the critical contribution to choice process, e.g., in the person who participates most or who speaks first. Here the powerful person is the one who has an impact upon group choice-making and hence (presumably) upon the outcome of choice-making. However, one may be powerful in this sense without always having one's specific suggestions accepted by the group (Turk, 1975).

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[1]For example, power may be operationalized as total amount of participation during group decision-making discussions (Caputo, 1963), number of discussions in which individuals speak first and/or last (Farina, 1960), or who first suggests the idea which is finally adopted by the group (Blood and Hamblin, 1958: 347). Researchers who measure power-during-interaction do not share a common theoretical orientation, e.g., some take "resources" into account as an independent variable and others do not.

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Importance of the Resource Theory

The resource theory literature, although beset with its share of methodological and theoretical shortcomings, provides a useful starting point for the exploration of marital power. First, it interprets the nature of contemporary marital power from an ideological perspective which is widely accepted, namely that power is equally available to men and women, and that whichever spouse makes the greater tangible contribution to the family "earns" the greater power. Tests of this theory's validity would provide some guidance about whether sociologists are justified in continuing to offer this interpretation to their students and readers.

Second, the resource theory work is notable in the marital power field for its history of systematic theory development. Early studies were replicated with a variety of populations, the findings used to adapt and refine the theory, and the revised theory again subjected to empirical testing. (In contrast, the interaction-tradition does not share this history of continuing development. Seldom have two researchers even used similar measures of power inhibiting the accumulation of knowledge and the development of a theory.)

Development of the Resource Theory

A few major studies in this research program shall now be summarized. I have selected works most central in the evolution of the theory itself. The following discussion begins with the earliest work on the resource theory and follows the development of the theory over

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time. Special attention will be given to treatment of the central elements of this theory--resources and power--and to the hypothesized links between them. Empirical findings about the association of specific resources with marital power will then be summarized, with emphasis upon the contradictory findings which necessitated a reformulation of the theory. My critique of this work follows in Chapter III.

Blood & Wolfe (1960)

Blood and Wolfe offer resource-theory or marital power as a post-factum explanation for certain unanticipated findings from interviews with 909 wives, a random sample of all intact families in the greater Detroit area.

The researchers found that dyadic marital power was related to social class indicators. Their "resource theory of power" interprets such socio-economic variables as formal education, occupational status, income, and organizational participation as "resources," possession of which forms a base for possession of marital power. Power in the marital dyad ("internal system") has its base in resources obtained by spouses from the "external system" (Blood, 1963: 475). The larger the advantage of one spouse over the other with respect to such external-system resources, the larger his or her corresponding advantage in marital power.

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Resources in principle were not limited to factors like income and education but were thought to include "anything that one partner may make available to the other, helping the latter satisfy his needs or

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attain his goals" (Blood & Wolfe, 1960: 12). The finding that wives with preschool children had the lowest marital power, at a time when their investment of effort and other "internal" resources is high, was not taken to mean that the theory excludes such resources. Rather, the authors interpreted this as evidence of the greater explanatory power of external as compared with internal resources.[2] Because children constrain the wife from obtaining external resources, and because external resources are more "potent" than internal ones, the wife's power is low at this stage of the family life cycle.[3]

If resources are anything by which one spouse may help the other achieve goal-satisfaction, one might ask what goals are involved. Blood and Wolfe assumed that the primary personal goals which U.S. spouses seek in marriage are sexual fulfillment, emotional response,

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[2]In a later article, Blood (1963: 475, 476) modified this interpretation somewhat. He noted that relative participation of the husband and wife in the external system will determine the balance of marital power insofar as marital power is measured in terms of decisions governing transactions of the family with the external system. Blood and Wolfe's decision-making scale included two transactions with the occupational system (husband's job and wife's employment status), five purchases (car, insurance, housing, food, and medical services) and one decision about where to go on a vacation. All may be said to deal with the external system to some degree and--a point not noted by the authors--all directly or indirectly involve money.

[3]Blood & Wolfe did not specify why internal resources have less explanatory power than external ones. Such resources certainly contribute to need and goal satisfactions of the other spouse, just as do external resources. Such unanswered questions proved an impetus for later theory development (e.g., by Heer, 1963; see my discussion of power-dependence theory in Chapter VI).

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companionship, the new experience of parenthood, and some particular standard of living.[4] They also assumed that decision-making is a good indicator of power (although presumably recognizing that other dimensions and types of power do exist), since decisions allocate future material resources and hence affect outcomes and goal achievement (ibid.: 11).

Power

Power, for Blood & Wolfe, is defined as "the potential ability of one partner to influence the other's behavior" (ibid.: 11). Authority is a subset of power, namely that power held by one partner because both agree that it is proper for him or her to have it. (Authority is thus more than Weber's "legitimate power," in that Weber only specified that the less-powerful person must hold this view.) It seems that Blood & Wolfe would divide behavioral outcomes into the following types (see Figure 1 below). Note that potential but unused power (or authority) is excluded, since I am focusing on the explanation of observed behavior.

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[4]One would expect, therefore, that the husband's resources would be strongly associated with the wife's satisfaction in these areas. Some association was found between husband's education and income and certain goal-satisfactions of the wife, such as satisfaction with affection and with companionship received. Husbands' satisfaction and its relation to wives' resources was not studied because husbands were not interviewed.

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

Figure 1. Blood & Wolfe's conceptualization of power, as applied to the explanation of observed behavior.

How did Blood & Wolfe operationalize this concept of power? Their indicators were the following decisions (ibid.: 282), with unweighted scores for each combined into one index score.[5] The spouse with the higher index score, i.e., the one who made more decisions, was considered to be the more powerful of the two.

[5]The authors made no attempt to determine how important these decisions were, in the opinion of the wives they studied. Hence, there was no basis for assigning unequal "weights" to the several decisions which comprised their power index.

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In every family somebody has to decide such things as where the family will live and so on. Many couples talk such things over first, but the final decision often has to be made by the husband or the wife. For instance who usually makes the final decision about

a) what car to get?

b) whether or not to buy some life insurance?

c) what house or apartment to take?

d) what job your husband should take?

e) whether or not you should go to work or quit work?

f) how much money your family can afford to spend per week on food?

g) what doctor to have when someone is sick?

h) about where to go on a vacation?

(answer categories)

(5) Husband always
(4) Husband more than wife
(3) Husband and wife exactly the same
(2) Wife more than husband
(1) Wife always

Answers to these questions are assumed to represent power itself[6] (making decisions equals exercising power.) Almost by definition, one who decides must be exercising power over the other's behavior, because that person allocates resources which affect goal-satisfactions.

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[6]The decision-index of marital power also implies that a power is assumed to be zero sum in nature (if one spouse gains power, the other must lose power). In part, this is a methodological problem. Other such problems include criteria for determining which decisions to include in such an index and whether specific decisions can be assumed to indicate as much power as broader decisions. See Safilios-Rothschild (1963) for a discussion of these and other related problems.

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Blood & Wolfe further assume that, among contemporary United States couples, traditional patterns of authority no longer determine who acquires decision-making power.[7] Power must be "earned" by making resource contributions.

Their operational definition of power thus differs from the conceptual definition (see Figure 1). "Allocation of decision-making", rather than "ability to influence behavior of the other", is now the dependent variable or thing-to-be-explained.



Figure 2. Blood and Wolfe's operationalization of power.

If "power" is operationalized in terms of decisions made by individuals, the question now becomes one of accounting for patterns

[7] They did not measure authority directly. However, they compared marital power patterns of older, farm, Catholic, and immigrant couples (where one would expect traditional authority of the husband to be the highest) with other couples. Since mean husband-power did not differ significantly among these groups of couples, Blood & Wolfe concluded that "patriarchy as a cultural norm is either already gone or rapidly disappearing" (ibid.: 27).

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

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of decision-making. Blood and Wolfe saw only two possible bases of such decision-patterns, traditional norms and "pragmatic" considerations, i.e., resources. They eliminated tradition as a viable explanation (see footnote 7) and hence assumed marital power must be based on resources. However, they provided no way to empirically distinguish pragmatic from normatively based decision-power. Hence their decision-index measure of marital power would consider the person-who-decides to have power under all of the 24 situations outlined in Figure 3.

WHO SHOULD MAKE THE FINAL DECISION:

	(Not determined by norms)				(Is determined by norms)	
	Spouses disagree		Spouses agree		Spouses agree	
WHAT SHOULD THE DECISION BE:	A decides	B decides	A decides	B decides	A decides	B decides
Spouses agree	1	5	9	13	17	21
Spouses disagree						
A's ideas accepted	2	6	10	14	18	22
B's ideas accepted	3	7	11	15	19	23
Compromise	4	8	12	16	20	24

▨ A defined as having power

□ B defined as having power

Figure 3. Illustration of different meaning contexts in measuring power, as implied by Blood and Wolfe.

The operational measure of power, therefore, includes situations ranging from complete agreement of spouses (cells 9, 13, 17, and 21) to complete disagreement (cells 2, 6, 3, 7, 4, and 8).

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In addition, A is considered to be powerful whenever A makes final decisions, even in cases where A does not want to do so (cells 1, 2, 3, 4) or when A decides to do what B wanted (cells 3, 11, and 19).

In short, if power is equated with who usually makes decisions, A can be said to have power even when A does not influence B to act differently than B would have in the absence of A (cells 1, 3, 9, 11, 17, and 19). "Power" as operationally defined is thus both broader and narrower than the conceptual definition of power (broader because it includes cases where behavior cannot be said to be directly due to influence and narrower because it is limited to allocation of decision-making about the use of resources).

I will return to the problems of defining power later. At this point, it is sufficient to note that Blood and Wolfe do not treat power as the ability to influence another's behavior[8] but simply as the ability to have the final say about resource-use (and hence presumably the ability to affect goal-outcomes of both spouses).

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[8]They did include a second measure of marital power which is closer to their conceptual definition of power as the ability to influence the other's behavior. The question was: "When you and your husband differ about something, do you usually give in and do it your husband's way, or does he usually come around to your point of view?" (ibid.: 23). Unfortunately, we are not told whether husbands who win such contested decisions are also the ones who score high on the decision-index measure. Nor are we told whether resources would correlate with this second measure of marital power.

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The Link Between Resources and Power

Resources were thought to serve as bases of power in several ways. Such "resources" as education, occupational status, income, and organizational participation allow one to make a contribution to the family. One who makes such a contribution is, almost by definition, a resourceful and competent person, implying special skills in decision-making as such. Participation in the outside world, involved in obtaining external resources, may also yield specific knowledge about politics, cars, taxes, etc., as well as experience in taking responsibility and making decisions (ibid.: 13). External system resources are thus associated with competence--skill and knowledge--which are relevant to marital decisions about transactions with the external system. The competence of a high-resource spouse is assumed to be recognized by the other, who defers to his or her greater knowledge.

Community prestige standards can also influence domestic power. The wife presumably shares these standards and so a "successful" husband in the eyes of the community receives also great respect from his wife. Community prestige gives the husband self-confidence (ibid.: 30), which may further increase the wife's respect for him. Wives benefit by sharing the prestige of their husbands, as well as the material advantages he provides. Wives are "indebted" and "grateful" to such a high-resource husband and willingly defer to him on decisions.

Blood and Wolfe stress that coercion is not characteristic of marital power. Only once do they mention the possibility that a high-resource spouse might obtain power by withholding resources (ibid.: 13);

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and the occurrence of physical violence in families is ignored; in general, resourceful husbands[9] are assumed to earn the willing deference of their wives by their contributions to the family and to the wives' goal-satisfactions. Exactly how material resources and competence increase satisfaction of sexual, emotional, companionship, and the non-economic aspects of parenthood goals is not specified. Nor is it clear whether the same resources are expected to "work" the same way for both genders. Presumably, wives can also "earn" power by obtaining high resources.

Empirical Findings

Blood and Wolfe tested two types of empirical hypotheses dealing with the relation between external resources and relative[10] marital power. The first was of the type: the higher the income level of

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[9]High-resource wives, on the other hand, apparently earn their high power by another means. In view of the low marital satisfaction of "dominant wives", Blood and Wolfe assume that husbands defer to these wives less out of respect and gratitude than because they are so incompetent that wives have no choice but to take over decision responsibilities.

In general, Blood and Wolfe's wives appeared to accrue less to power from a given amount of resources than did husbands. This might be due to failure to measure all relevant resources or to lingering traditional authority (which Blood and Wolfe assume to be a thing of the past). At any rate, differences in the resource theory's ability to account for marital power of wives vs. husbands points to the need for theory improvement.

[10]The word "relative" indicates comparative positions of two spouses. If person A has more power than person B, A is said to have greater relative power. Likewise, A has greater relative resources if A has more resources than does B.

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husbands the higher the relative marital power of husbands. Second, and more in fit with their theory, were hypotheses in which resource levels of both spouses were considered, e.g., the greater the educational advantage of husbands over their wives, the higher the relative marital power of husbands.

Because their data was not gathered for the purpose of testing the resource theory, Blood and Wolfe apparently lacked complete information about wives' resources. At any rate, most of their hypothesis tests were of the first type, in particular those dealing with associations between husbands' resources and husbands' relative marital power. Most of these hypotheses received support.

The higher the husband's resource of occupational status (measured as high and low white collar and high and low blue collar), the higher their mean power[11] (ibid.: 30, 31). Wives' occupational prestige was not considered; however, employed wives had higher power than non-employed wives within each of the following categories: husband not employed, husband employed full-time, and husband employed more than full-time[12] (ibid.: 40). An additional indicator of work

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[11]There was one exception: high blue-collar husbands had lower mean power than did low blue-collar husbands. When this relationship was examined separately for couples having employed and non-employed wives, the same pattern was observed for the non-employed wife cases. Where the wife was employed, however, low blue-collar and high blue-collar husbands had equally high mean power scores.

[12]Apparently, no husbands were employed only part-time. There were 413 employed husbands with non-employed wives but only three employed wives whose husbands were not employed. Hence, one has little basis for deciding whether resource-advantages have the same effect for women as for men.

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participation, the number of years the wife had been employed since marriage, was directly related to wives' relative power (i.e., was inversely related to husbands' relative power) (ibid.: 41).

Husbands' income resources were directly related to husbands' mean relative power. This effect was especially pronounced in the lowest and highest income levels (ibid.: 31, 32). The effect of wives' income was only indirectly examined. When couples were divided into groups according to total family income, the mean relative power of husbands was lower than when couples were divided according to husband's income alone, at least for high-income couples[13] (ibid.: 32). Wives' education was related to marital power in a curvilinear fashion; wives with very low education and with very high education had higher relative power than did wives with intermediate levels of schooling. Husbands' education, in contrast, was directly related to husbands' mean power[14] (ibid.: 28).

Fortunately, Blood and Wolfe provide data about comparative education levels of spouses. Wives' relative power was related to their education relative to their husbands' education. As predicted, wives

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[13]Perhaps this occurred at all income levels. Blood and Wolfe did not present the specific findings but only mentioned drastic decreases in husbands' power at the two highest income levels.

[14]Husbands with less than six years and with 16 or more years of schooling deviated somewhat from the trend. High-education husbands, although they "lose" a little power, never approach the lower power level of low-education husbands. High-education wives, in contrast, have almost the same power scores as those with the lowest education.

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had the highest mean power when they had an education advantage (at least five years more schooling than their husbands), the lowest power when their husbands had an education advantage, and intermediate power scores when spouses had about the same education (ibid.: 37).

Table 1 allows an examination of the combined effects of comparative education and husband's occupational status upon marital power (ibid.: 38). In general, husbands' mean power increases with occupational status within each education-combination as predicted.

Table 1. Rank order of wife's relative marital power according to comparative education of spouses and husband's occupational status.[15]

	Comparative Education		
	Wife More	Equal	Husband more
Rank order of wife's mean marital power* by husband's occupational status			
High white-collar	6	7	9
Low white-collar	2	4	8
High blue-collar	1	3	5

*1 = highest wife power

The largest differences between adjacent cells in Table 1 (in terms of mean power-score differences) are marked with arrows. The "loss" of

[15]This table is adapted from Blood and Wolfe, 1960, Table 10, p. 38. I have omitted low blue-collar couples because of the small number of cases. This lowest-status group, however, produced some interesting deviations from the general trends. Husbands with an education advantage had less power than those with equal education. Also, equal-education husbands in this group had more, rather than less power than equal-education husbands in the next-highest occupational status group.

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In general, Blood and Wolfe found relative marital power to be directly associated with the following "resource" variables: relative work participation (husband--overtime, full-time, or not employed; wife--employed or not employed), relative education of spouses, number of years the wife had worked during the marriage, and husband's income. Husband's occupational status, husband's education, and relative participation of spouses in organizations were also directly related to marital power, as predicted, but to a lesser degree.

With minor modifications,[16] Blood and Wolfe's study has been replicated in several other countries. The studies of Michel (1967) in France, of Safilios-Rothschild (1967) in Greece, and of Burić and Zečević (1967) in Yugoslavia revealed that the relationship between certain resources and marital decision-power varied among cultures (see Figure 4 for a summary of differences). Rodman (1967) attempted to broaden the theory to account for these differences. His work, in turn, was subjected to empirical testing by Burr et al. (1973).

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[16] In particular, the specific decisions used to measure marital power in American couples were not always appropriate for other cultures. Michel, for example, used five of the original eight decision-items. She then added other decisions typical of French families, selecting those which seemed to provide the nearest cultural equivalents to the items used in the U.S. study. (The cultural grounds on which decision items were selected are discussed in Blood et al., 1970). For this reason, it is not valid to compare the absolute value of power-scores between countries. The comparison focuses, rather, upon whether resources and power show the same patterns of relationship to each other under different cultural conditions.

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As the remainder of this chapter will show, this research program has apparently reached an impassé. Revisions of the theory have not fully succeeded in accounting for differences in marital power patterns among cultures. In my opinion, the present state of confusion about the relation of resources to marital power--even in the United States, where the theory has received the most support (see Burr et al., 1973)--indicates that a new strategy of inquiry is called for; only then can we perhaps solve the complicated question of the nature and bases of marital power.

Michel (1967)

Michel interviewed 550 wives in a random sample of urban French families living in Paris and Bordeaux. Her findings were generally consistent with those of Blood and Wolfe, but relationships between resources and power were weaker and often not statistically significant. As in Detroit, marital power of wives was higher for employed women, and husbands' power was directly related to their amount of formal education and income. Occupational status exhibited the same general trend, although with some inconsistencies. For example, low white-collar workers had the same, rather than greater, mean power as high blue-collar workers, and white-collar workers--when divided into three levels instead of only two--exhibited some decrease in mean power between the middle and the highest levels. Comparative education of spouses (whether the wife has more, equal, or less education than the husband) corresponded to the U.S. pattern in its relation with

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marital power. Finally, Michel dealt with marital power and difference between income of spouses (which Blood and Wolfe had not done). Income advantage was directly related to possession of marital power, as expected. However, power of employed wives did not increase significantly until they had higher incomes than their husbands; power was not much different for wives with lower incomes and wives with equal incomes. Michel notes, however, that wives are rarely able to obtain the kind of income, education, and occupational superiority over their husbands that would yield them high marital power.

Safilios-Rothschild (1967)

Quite different relationship patterns between certain resources and decision-power were found in a 1964 sample of 133 Athenian wives. Employed wives still had higher mean power than unemployed ones, but only in the traditionally "feminine" household decisions. Husbands' education was inversely, rather than directly, related to husbands' marital power. Income of husbands showed a curvilinear relationship to their power scores; husbands' power was lowest in the middle income ranges and high at both extremes of income. Husbands' occupational status did not show a clear trend; however, unlike French families, the least powerful husbands were not the semi- and unskilled workers but rather the independent professionals and the group of lesser professionals and medium-level managers and administrators.

When education of both spouses was considered simultaneously, husbands' mean power showed no differences between couples where the husband or the wife had an education-advantage. Equal-education couples

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were the most husband-dominant of all, which was attributed to the very low amount of schooling of these couples. That is, husbands will exercise power if they are less-educated and adhere to traditional norms; at higher education levels, husbands were thought to have more exposure to liberal ideas.[17] Such "liberal" husbands may still be quite powerful by American standards, however; we only know that they have less decision-power than less-educated men in their own society--and then only in the traditional feminine domains.

In conclusion, Safilios-Rothschild noted that the resource theory was at least partially more applicable to Greek women than to Greek men; wives with high resources, i.e., those with an educational advantage or who were employed, "earned" more power than wives with equal education or who did not work outside the home. Husbands who had high resources, as measured by a composite social status index, including both income and education, had less power (relative to their wives) than husbands with low resources.[18]

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[17] These liberal ideas were not portrayed as new norms, but as a loosening of old norms which allowed resources and free choice to have a larger effect on decision-making.

[18] It is also interesting that Greek families differed from French and American ones in patterns of power over the stages of the family life cycle. American wives had the lowest power when there were preschool children. For French wives, the low point occurred somewhat later when the children were in school but not yet adolescents. Greek wives, on the other hand, appear to gain rather than lose power with the birth of the first child and steadily increase their power throughout life. Safilios-Rothschild suggested that motherhood does not increase dependence upon the husband in Greece, as it does in France and the U.S., because grandmothers are commonly "available" for child care. This also makes employment a more feasible option for Greek mothers. Greek mothers gained power only in child-related decisions; however, it is noteworthy that they did not lose power in other areas, as compared to newlywed couples without children. (Of course, the data in all these studies are cross-sectional rather than longitudinal; interpretations about "gaining" power over time must be viewed with caution.)

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Burić and Zečević (1967)

The Yugoslavian study of marital power was done with 117 families, randomly chosen from workers in a large car factory in a Serbian city. Findings were generally similar to the Greek, rather than to the French or American, studies. Employed wives had higher mean power than unemployed ones, as in all the countries. In this Serbian city, employed wives had more "say" than unemployed wives about three decisions: purchasing expensive household items, purchasing expensive women's clothing, and installment loan decisions. Family budgeting, family planning, and decisions about leisure time were little affected by wife's employment. As in Greece, husbands' authority was inversely related to amount of formal education. As Safilios-Rothschild had suspected in the Athenian study, Yugoslavian husbands[19] with lower education were found to subscribe more often to a traditional family ideology than were better educated husbands. Wives with little education also were more traditional in this respect. Wives had the highest power when both spouses were well educated. In addition, difference between spouses' education also affected power. As in the U.S. and France, the wife's education advantage was directly related to her power.

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[19] Husbands were also interviewed in Yugoslavia and Greece, although power scores reported are based on wives' responses in all countries. This was done to make the later studies comparable to the early Detroit research which had only female respondents.

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Unlike the highly industrialized France and United States, Yugoslavian husbands "lose" power (relative to their wives) as their occupational status rises. This trend also occurred in Greece but to a less pronounced degree. Husband's income was not directly related to his power; low-income husbands had the highest power, while there were little differences between power of medium and high-income husbands. Part of the traditionalism of low-salaried unskilled and skilled workers was attributed to their recent migration from rural areas. In Greece, but more strikingly in Yugoslavia, wives' power was directly related to length of their own urban experience and--to a lesser extent--to their husband's urbanization.

Summary of Cross-Cultural Findings

The most succinct way to summarize findings is to select those resource-variables for which data was collected in all four countries, and examine the relationship of these resources to mean marital power scores. Since the original decision-index had to be modified for use in other cultures, and since techniques for calculating power-means differed, it is not meaningful to compare absolute power socres between countries. One can, however, see whether a given resource had the same pattern of relationship with marital power. The direction of such relationships is illustrated in Figure 4 (adapted from tables 1 through 5 in Burić and Zečević, 1967).

Rodman (1967)

Rodman summarized and interpreted the four preceding studies. In general, he argued, husbands' power scores are directly related to husbands' education, occupational status, and income in the U.S. and France. In Greece and Yugoslavia, husbands' power is inversely related to these "resource" variables. To account for this, he proposed a "theory of resources in cultural context." He reasoned that education, income, and occupational status are "not merely resource variables in a power struggle, but are also positional variables in the social structure" (Rodman, 1967: 321). In relatively traditional societies, the likelihood of learning sentiments favorable toward equalitarian marital norms may increase with one's position in the society (particularly with educational level). In less traditional societies, where norms are generally equalitarian and more flexible to begin with, there is more opportunity for situational variables such as resources to come into play and influence behavior. How does this revised theory compare with the empirical data available? Safilios-Rothschild (1970: 547) notes that even Blood and Wolfe's (1960) original data revealed that occupational status and income are not consistently related to power in U.S. families. Low blue-collar men had more say than high blue-collar men, which may indicate that traditional norms still restrict the operation of "resources" in the lowest social classes. Similarly, Komarovsky (1967) found that--among working class families--husbands had more decision-power when they were lower in education, income, and occupational status, i.e., lower working class husbands were more powerful (in relation to their wives) than were higher working class husbands.


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

Figure 4. Relationship between selected "resources" and mean marital power of husbands in four countries.

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Puzzling results, however, have been found by other researchers. In Japan, income and education were directly related to marital power, while occupational status was inversely related (Blood, 1967). Although industrialized, Japan is still relatively traditional in many respects and one would have expected higher education to be associated with more equalitarian norms and hence with lower husband-power as in the Greek case. In Belgium, on the other hand, the resource theory received support (Leplee, 1968) while it did not in countries with more equalitarian ideologies; Kandel and Lesser (1972) and Trost (1969) report no association of marital power with education or occupational status in Denmark and Sweden, respectively.[20]

Burr, Ahern, and Knowles (1973)

Rodman's post-facto explanations were formalized into a series of hypotheses by Burr et al., and tested using 1,956 Brigham Young college students as informants about their parents.[21] Using relative income of spouses as the resource indicator, the following results were obtained:

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[20] Safilios-Rothschild (1970: 548) suggests that part of the confusion may be due to methodological problems, in particular the use of only wives' perceptions of power. Greek working wives think that they have more decision-making say than do housewives; according to husbands' reports, however, marital power did not differ by employment status of the wife. Thus it seems that the resource theory applies only to women's perceptions and not to men's.

[21] Results of these tests must be viewed with caution, because of the use of students as informants and because strongly equalitarian norms may not have been present in this sample of Mormons (90 per cent were members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints). Also, only four of the decisions included in the decision-power index corresponded with those in Blood and Wolfe's original index. Data analysis techniques also differed from earlier studies.

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Hypothesis 1. The greater the relative resources of a spouse, the greater is his/her relative marital power.

Supported when correlation techniques were used but not when multiple regression was employed. When controlled for type of norms and flexibility of norms, the relationship of income to power was curvilinear, very low in magnitude, and changed from a positive to a negative relationship as norms changed from patriarchal to equalitarian.

Hypothesis 2. The amount of power normatively prescribed for a role is directly related to the relative marital power of the incumbent of that role (e.g., the more patriarchal the normative beliefs, the higher the husband's marital power).

Strongly supported. This relationship remained strong even when resources (relative income) were controlled.

Hypothesis 3. Resources will be more strongly related to marital power when norms are equalitarian than when norms are patriarchal.

Not supported. In fact, there was a slight trend in the opposite direction; resources influenced power somewhat more under patriarchal norms than under equalitarian ones.

Hypothesis 4. The greater the flexibility of norms (range of tolerable behavior), the stronger the relationship between resources and marital power.

Supported when t-tests were used but not when multiple regression techniques were applied. Norm flexibility had the predicted effect only when norms were in the patriarchal range.

Hypothesis 5. The greater the flexibility of norms, the weaker the relationship between norms and marital power.

Not supported.

In short, norms had much more effect on power than did relative income resources in this Mormon population. Resources had the predicted effect

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only within the range of patriarchal norms and, if anything, had the opposite effect under more equalitarian norms.[22]

Burr et al. conclude with a new hypothesis, based upon their findings:

> The amount of power normatively prescribed for a role interacts with the relationship between resources and power in such a way that resources are positively related to power when norms are patriarchal and negatively related to power when norms are equalitarian (ibid.: 16).

It may be, then, that Detroit families were much more patriarchal in their beliefs than Blood and Wolfe assumed. This hypothesis does not, of course, fit all of the findings from the studies I have mentioned. For example, it cannot explain why resources show no relation to power (rather than a negative relation) in equalitarian-ideology Scandinavian countries. It also cannot explain why income and education but not occupational status "act as resources" in Japan. It does, however, fit reasonably well with the data about husbands' resources and ideologies in Greece and Yugoslavia.

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[22] Burr et al. (1973: 17) note the similarity of their results to those of Hoffman. Hoffman suggested that employed wives who are ambivalent about marital ideology--who had only partially rejected patriarchal norms--may actually become less dominant than before they worked, "in order to compensate for the threat offered by the sheer fact of her employment" (Hoffman, 1960: 34). Wives who accepted male dominance, she reasoned, might gain in power when employed for three reasons:

(1) These women are more likely to work out of economic necessity and might, therefore, consider their husbands to be failures.
(2) They may be more likely to feel that the economic role is the legitimate basis of power, since this is an idea present in male dominance ideology.
(3) Women who endorse male dominance ideology may have such an exaggerated ideal of masculinity that their husbands can't live up to these expectations.

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The research program on the resource theory of marital power appears to me to have reached something of an impasse. As a way out of the confusion of contradictory findings, it is time to critically analyze this body of research and to find new approaches to circumvent the shortcomings in both the methodology and in the formulation of the theory itself.

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CHAPTER III

ANALYSIS OF THE RESOURCE-THEORY WORK

Critique: Marital Power

None of these previous studies, in my opinion, has really tested the Resource Theory of Marital Power. A primary shortcoming is that they simply did not study marital power at all but, rather, something which might be called resource-control authority (deciding about the allocation of family resources)..

The one consistent finding is that a spouse's income is associated with the making of marital decisions about financial matters (see Hoffman and Nye, 1974, for a summary of findings according to decision-topic). It seems that earning money somehow gives one more "right" to have a say about money matters. Making income-related decisions involves control over family resources, implying influence over benefits of other family members. Without in any way discounting the importance of such resource-control, I would maintain that it is not (necessarily) identical with marital power. Of course, this raises the old question: What is power?

My distinction between resource-control and power evokes images of the endless literature devoted to "pinning down" the elusive concept of power. Attempts to conceptually distinguish marital power from dominance, authority, influence, and control have not proved very

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fruitful (Turk, 1975). Yet another definition and/or operationalization of power will serve no useful purpose unless it can avoid the shortcomings of previous efforts.

The Criterion of Empirical Fit

There are two aspects of what I call the "criterion of empirical fit." The first is that distinctions at the conceptual level are not very useful unless they refer to phenomena which can be distinguished from each other on the empirical level. A good case in point is that of French and Raven's (1960) typology of the bases of power (expert power, coercive power, reward power, legitimate power, and referent power). Their typology has been little used and of little use in research (however, see Ravens, Centers, and Rodrigues, 1975) because almost any "empirical" instance of power involves several power bases simultaneously. It is almost impossible to identify or measure the relative contributions of each power-base.

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The second aspect of the criterion of empirical fit is that empirically distinct phenomena should not be "lumped together" under one conceptual rubric. That is, one's concepts should allow one to distinguish among significantly different phenomena. This criterion is difficult to put into practice, because it involves judgments about what constitutes such a "significant difference."

The definition of marital power as "resource control" quite clearly fails in the latter respect, that is, it fails to distinguish among situations having a wide variety of "causes" and "consequences". Consider a group of married couples, all of whom report that the husband makes more money than the wife (i.e., the husband has higher resources) and that he usually has more say about money-related decisions. Within such a group of couples, one might find instances of all of the following situations:

a) Spouses agree about who should make financial decisions

1) Couples subscribing to the norm that this is the proper role of a husband, that it is his legitimate authority to make these decisions. Such couples would probably not change their decision-making patterns even if the wife were to start a high-paying job (gain more resources).

2) Couples subscribing to the norm that the earning of money entitles one to the major say about the use of that money. If the wife begins earning money, she automatically would be given the major say about the allocation of her own earnings.

3) Couples subscribing to neither of the above norms, where the husband happens to take on more of the financial responsibilities for reasons of preference or convenience. If a difference of opinion would arise about the use of money, the husband's ideas would not necessarily prevail.

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b) Spouses disagree about who should make financial decisions

4) Couples in which the husband makes financial decisions only because his wife refuses to do so. He feels overburdened with other responsibilities and/or dislikes making these decisions but cannot convince his wife to give him some assistance.

5) Couples who disagree about use of income, in which the husband's ideas prevail. At least the wife (and perhaps also the husband) does not subscribe to the norms of types (1) and (2) above. She feels that her contributions to the family, although not of a monetary nature, entitle her to a say about all kinds of family decisions (including financial ones). However, she does not succeed in convincing her husband to accept her opinions about how money should be used. (Note that in this case, the disagreement about who should make financial decisions is only a reflection of a disagreement about the outcome of the particular decisions in question, not a disagreement about basic marital role patterns).

Recall that in all couples under consideration, the husbands earn more money (have greater resources) and also make more financial decisions (have greater resource-control). This apparent "correlation" between resource possession and resource control, often taken as support of the Resource Theory, fails to make important distinctions:

I. The distinction between couples where the husband's resource-control would not change, even if his resources were lowered (types 1, 3, 4, and perhaps 5) and those in which a resource change would have an effect (type 2 and perhaps 5).

II. The distinction between resource control based on consensus (types 1, 2, and 3) versus that occurring in situations of disagreement (types 4 and 5).

The Criterion of Empirical Independence

Distinction (I) above is complicated by the difficulty of empirically isolating (or "partialling out") the effect of normative

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influences, in order to identify the actual strength of resources as an independent variable. There are two types of normative influences confounding the relationships observed, at least one of which could be eliminated by a better operational definition of marital power. There are norms about the content of marital roles (what is man's work and woman's work), and there are norms about the overall authority patterns of families (who should have the final say, where disagreements exist).

If marital power continues to be measured by the content of marital roles (who makes what decisions, for example), there is no hope of isolating the relative effects of resources and norms upon marital power. An indicator known to be strongly normatively patterned should, therefore, not be used to measure marital power, when one of the other major variables in the theory is that of norms.

This is not to deny the influence of norms upon marital power, but to plead for a procedure where the influence of norms could be separated from that of resources. The theoretically most interesting cases in this respect would be those in which norms and resource possession would predict different results. (In the past, relationships found between resources and marital power have been "over-determined"; that is, husbands were favored both by the norms and by the structural opportunities for obtaining resources. The "deviant" cases provide good test cases for getting around this problem, but only if we cease to measure power in terms of the content of marital roles but can find some indicator less affected by norms.)

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The second type of normative influence, that specifying general authority patterns, is more difficult to handle. That is, it is difficult to find a measure of marital power which is not confounded by this norm. The best we can do, perhaps, is to control this variable by means of (a) sample selection, i.e., choosing a sample likely to share similar norms for general marital authority and/or (b) attempt to measure this norm directly, using it as a control variable.

Defining and Measuring Marital Power: The Approach of the Present Study

As has been discussed, the definition of marital power as resource control is inadequate for purposes of testing the Resource Theory of Marital Power. As a dependent variable, it: (a) lacks conceptual independence from the independent variable of resource possession; (b) lacks empirical independence from the other major variable of norms; and (c) fails in general to differentiate among such vastly different situations as resource-control in a context of consensus versus conflict.

In the following discussion, I will present an operationalization of marital power which avoids most of these shortcomings. First, however, I will briefly discuss the conceptual definition of "power" used for my study.

The Concept of Power

My conceptual definition of power is somewhat different from that of Blood and Wolfe. I define power to be present in a relationship

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when there is (a) non-self-satisfying behavior[23] which (b) would not occur in the absence of the other party to the relationship. This eliminates behavior which is aimed at attaining the individual's needs and wants, since such behavior is self-generated rather than due to the influence of another. This definition cannot handle power which is exercised via socialization; if wives are socialized to want little decision-making responsibility and much housekeeping responsibility, and if their marriage corresponds to these desired patterns, they are not low in power by my definition.

Meeting the Criterion of Empirical Fit

My treatment of power differs considerably from that of Blood and Wolfe. I do not consider the making of marital decisions to indicate power unless (a) spouses differ in their preferences (wants) about who should decide,[24] and (b) the spouse who decides also wants that responsibility. Blood and Wolfe simply assumed that everyone wants to

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[23]This term is borrowed from Martin (1971). He uses it in a different context, however.

[24]I do not require that spouses communicate their differences of opinion or that overt resistance be present. The failure to openly disagree does not necessarily mean that one doesn't hold a strong opposing view; it may simply be a reaction to great powerlessness.

Also, I use preference measures obtained at an earlier time point than were the outcome-measures. Undoubtedly, preferences measured later would be more congruent with reports of the "actual" outcome. Such shifts in preferences over time may themselves be the result of influence and hence would camouflage the amount of power which was exercised.

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make decisions.[25] By narrowing the range of behaviors which are defined as reflecting power, I have reduced the number of empirically distinct phenomena which are grouped together under the conceptual rubric of "power".

Meeting the Criterion of Conceptual Independence

Possession of resources and resource-control power seem to me less than totally independent concepts. Rather than limiting my power-indicators to decisions about allocation of financial resources, I have focused upon allocation of such non-monetary resources as time and effort.

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[25]Their treatment of "resource control" as power altogether missed the kind of power described as type (4) on p. 35, namely refusal to take responsibility which can be a very potent sort of veto-power. This failure, I think, accounts for some serious misinterpretations of findings.

Take the example of Blood and Wolfe's (1960: 258) claim that "dominant wives" have low marital satisfaction. Yet they tell us elsewhere (p. 67) that these wives, although often employed full-time, do "far more household tasks than any other type of wife . . . This counters the common assumption that powerful spouses compel their partners to carry out their bidding, and is further evidence of the non-coercive nature of marital power." I would suggest that this provides evidence, not of the non-coercive nature of marital power, but of the lack of power of these wives. Can a woman who can't convince her husband to help a little really be "powerful"? The husbands, rather than being weak and incompetent as Blood and Wolfe assume, appear to exercise a great deal of "refusal power". I suspect that these wives really belong to the "husband dominant" category, a category also characterized by low-satisfaction wives. Combining these two types of couples would create a group homogenous with respect to wives' low marital satisfaction, including wives with both low and very high "resources", having in common a low level of marital power. Thus it may be that very low marital power (rather than low resources or low resource-control) accounts for low marital satisfaction.

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Meeting the Criterion of Empirical Independence

The problem of finding power measures which are independent of normative prescriptions is critical; otherwise, one cannot have confidence that power variations correlated with some independent variable are not actually due to normative influences. Questions about who makes what decisions clearly are strongly patterned by cultural norms and hence are not satisfactory. I also include decision-making questions but, by measuring power as the discrepancy between who makes a decision and who the spouse prefers to make that decision, I reduce the "contamination" of results by norms.

The influence of norms about general authority patterns (e.g., who should prevail if there is disagreement) has not been satisfactorily eliminated, although the elimination of working and lower class couples from my sample may have reduced variations in such norms. I did, however, reduce response bias from this source by the indirect nature of my questions about power; few respondents would guess that I would compare their preference-answers in the first interview with outcome questions asked months later.

The Indicator of Marital Power

The major indicator for marital power involved a series of eight responsibilities. The specific items included were selected according to the following criteria: (a) that both "male" and "female" responsibilities be included; (b) that the responsibilities have consequences for both spouses, i.e., that their performance affect the joint

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life of the couple; (c) that they be common to almost all married couples; and (d) that they be areas where spouses would be likely to have different preferences about who should take on the responsibility. In meeting the last criterion, I utilized several items which proved to have high "role discrepancy" scores in a previous study.[26] I cannot claim that these items reflect the total balance of power of a couple, of course.

The responsibility items were as follows:[27]

1) Grocery shopping
2) Repairing things around the house (furniture, toys, appliances)
3) Making complaints, if necessary, to salesmen or landlord
4) Keeping in touch with relatives
5) Deciding what people you will invite to the house
6) Taking care of the car
7) Preparing supper
8) Doing the supper dishes (or loading the dishwasher)

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[26]This study was done by Rogers (1972) with Michigan couples who were somewhat older than my respondents. She provided me with a breakdown of items according to mean role-discrepancy scores, and I selected those having the highest scores (Rogers, personal communication, 1973). A role-discrepancy is the difference between how a spouse prefers a responsibility to be divided and how it actually is divided. One may assume that preferences of spouses differ for role-discrepant items, although Rogers did not actually compare preferences of both husband and wife.

[27]Couples with children were asked about two additional responsibilities: getting up at night, if necessary, with the children; and helping the children with their homework.

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Respondents were asked in the earlier telephone interview about their preferences for these items:

> During the next few months, there will be many jobs which have to be done--everything from cooking to paying the bills. I'll mention a few of these jobs and ask how you would prefer to divide them up between the two of you--regardless of whether they probably will be divided that way or not.
>
> Who would you prefer to (name of item, e.g., "do the grocery shopping") in the next few months? Would you say:
>
> Husband almost always
> Husband more than wife
> Both about the same
> Wife more than husband
> Wife almost always
> Neither one

Some months later, during a personal interview in the couple's home, respondents were presented with a list of the same responsibilities and asked to check "Who usually does this?", indicating one of the above answer categories for each item.

First, I compared preferences of husband and wife. Items on which they agreed were eliminated; for the remaining items I calculated the discrepancy (absolute difference) between a spouse's Time 1 preference and Time 2 report of who does each responsibility. Then I compared the husband's with the wife's discrepancy scores; the spouse with the higher discrepancy of the two was considered to have the lesser relative power. Such relative power scores could vary from +4 to -4. In the illustration in Figure 5, the wife has the greater power because she came closer to achieving her wants than did her husband.



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

Figure 5. Illustration of power-score calculation for a single responsibility-item.

For some hypothesis tests, a power-index was constructed. This index was a simple average of all discrepancy scores of an individual spouse. Relative power was then determined by comparing the average discrepancies of husband and wife.

The use of unweighted power-indices has been criticized strongly in the past (see Safilios-Rothschild, 1970). For this reason, I also constructed an index in which items were weighted according to their perceived importance. I am assuming that achieving one's preferences in important areas reflects more power than the ability to achieve preferences in unimportant areas. In the second interview, I asked respondents to indicate the importance of each responsibility: "Regardless of who does it, do you think this is an <u>important</u> job or decision". Relative power scores for each responsibility were then weighted according to importance, as illustrated in Figure 6.

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FORMULA: Importance factor times relative power score = Weighted relative power score.

If importance was:		And the relative power score was -2:		Then the weighted relative power score was:
Very Important	.20 x	-2	=	-.40
Fairly important	.17 x	-2	=	-.34
Slightly important	.13 x	-2	=	-.26
Not at all important	.10 x	-2	=	-.20

Figure 6. Calculation of weighted relative power scores for individual responsibility items.

Such weighted relative power scores could vary from +.80 to -.80. A weighted power index was then constructed by averaging an individual spouse's weighted scores for responsibility items. Although the importance-weight coefficients were chosen arbitrarily, this weighted index still represents an improvement over an unweighted one.

Concluding Comments

In summary, I should like to identify several key issues dealing with the nature of "power" and indicate where I stand on these issues.

Individual versus relational power: The Weberian concept of power as the ability to achieve one's will despite resistance implies that power is an attribute of the individual. Emerson (1962) and, to some extent, Thibaut and Kelley (1960) view it as a relational concept. That is, an individual has power in the context of a particular relationship. He or she may have the power advantage in one relationship but not in another.

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Relational power seems to me to be the proper focus for a study of marriage. This does not mean, however, that the Weberian notion of resistance need be ignored.

Contested versus uncontested measures of power: Authority is an example of uncontested power. Because the less powerful party agrees that the other party should have power, power rests upon consensus. Blood and Wolfe's decision-index comes close to measuring authority in this sense. Power to achieve one's will despite resistance (the Weberian definition) is power within a contested situation. As I have said before, this is the aspect of power in which I have more interest.

My choice of "contested power" meant that the outcomes of decisions can be said to indicate power only when prior disagreement had been present. That is, one must somehow measure what the individual's "will" was--and ascertain that resistance was present to some degree (e.g., that the other party "willed" something different)--in order to measure power as the achievement of one's will despite resistance.

Zero-sum versus non-zero-sum power: Any measure of contested power in a relational context must come to grips with the question of whether that power is to be viewed as zero-sum in nature. A question which asks "who wins more often, you or your spouse" treats power as if it were zero-sum; the higher his power, the lower hers must be.

The unweighted version of my power indicators--discrepancy between preferred and attained division of responsibility--also implies a zero-sum assumption. One way to circumvent this questionable assumption

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is to use some weighted power-index, where the weighting factors of husband and wife need not be the same. I have already mentioned the use of "perceived importance" to create weighted power scores.

Another very similar way to get beyond a strict zero-sum notion of power is to take into account "motivational investment" levels. Take the basically zero-sum measure of "who wins" when preferences differ. There is a five-point scale, upon which his and her preferences are located. If the final solution corresponds with his preference, his power is higher. Operationally, the discrepancy between his preference and the outcome is much lower than hers, and her "loss" is directly proportional to his "gain":

Her Preference His Preference

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his discrepancy = 0
her discrepancy = 4

Suppose that we now introduce the notion of strength of preference. The person who feels more strongly about his/her preference would have more subjective "gain" from winning, while the person who cares little has little to gain or lose.

Suppose for the above example that her motivational investment (preference strength) is very high, while he is almost indifferent; he has very little at stake whether he wins or loses, while she would have more subjective "gain" from winning and more subjective "loss" from losing. He prevails in this example. She loses a great deal, but he does not really gain.

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Without the requirement that power be considered a zero-sum game, the implicit assumption that the powerful person is trying to gain something for him/herself is no longer necessary. The particular example discussed comes closer to Habermas' (1971: 254) definition of power as the ability to hinder other individuals or groups to pursue their interests (as contrasted to Weber's definition where the powerful individual is trying to attain his own will, i.e., to gain something for himself). Under a non-zero-sum assumption, then, it is not necessary to assume that power is motivated by hope of personal gain; it encompasses both situations where this occurs and those where this does not.

Identification of the critical element of power: As Turk (1975) pointed out, one's choice of a power measure reflects an assumption about where power "really" is located, i.e., the stage of choice-making where the exercise of influence is most consequential.

I will be using power-measures dealing with influence as reflected in outcomes of "decisions." In this respect my measures are similar to Blood and Wolfe's. I have no basis for assuming such outcome-power to be more consequential than interaction-power.[28] My choice to select this measure of power was made solely on the basis of data quality.

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[28]One could compare interaction and outcome measures of power and empirically determine which is the more crucial dimension, e.g., by examining which can better predict satisfaction with outcomes.

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The measurement of marital power is not the only area requiring improvement before the resource theory can be adequately tested. The treatment of "resources" is also open to question. Here the problem is more than one of definition and measurement; it involves the basic overall strategy of research to be employed.

Critique: Resources

Assuming for a moment that previous studies of the Resource Theory had adequately defined and measured marital power, would they then constitute adequate tests of that theory? For two reasons, I do not think so.

"Overdetermined" Relationships

Within a given culture or subculture, any statistical relationship between possession of particular resources and marital power (however the latter is defined and measured) constitutes a poor test of the resource theory because such relationships are "overdetermined." That is, many factors are operating in the same direction, and one cannot easily isolate the effect of resource possession from the effects of other variables.

It is not just that patterns of resource possession tend to coincide with normative patterns, although this is also true (for example, husbands are expected to--and usually do--have higher education and incomes than their wives). Structural opportunities to obtain resources are unequally distributed by gender as well (see Gillespie, 1971). Gender-role socialization patterns further strengthen the male

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advantage in resource possession by putting less pressure on women to strive for the resources which are potentially available to them.

All of this would present a less serious problem for theory testing if study samples included relatively sizeable numbers of couples in which the wife has a resource-advantage over the husband. Then one could begin to isolate the relative contribution of resources to marital power; e.g., when patterns of relative resource-possession and cultural norms "predict" different results, is resource-possession still strongly associated with marital power? However, finding sufficient numbers of such "deviant" couples for study has been (and still is) extremely difficult.

Multiple Resources and Testability

The researchers in Chapter II have focused on identifying which resources are associated with marital power in particular cultures. Although this approach has resulted in some interesting findings, the theory itself has never been put to a rigorous test.

This point deserves some elaboration. With the possible exception of a well-designed laboratory experiment, multiple resources are always present in any social situation. Any negative findings, therefore, can always be explained away as being due to some additional unmeasured resource (or, for that matter, to some assumed norm). Take Blood and Wolfe's (1960: 27, 42) finding that average power of husbands declines with age, despite the fact that husbands' incomes and occupational status tend to increase as they get older.

Proponents of the resource theory can always find some other resource which decreases with age,[29] whose influence can be claimed to partially cancel out the effect of income and status resources. In short, it is almost impossible to find conclusive negative evidence against the theory itself by correlating resources with marital power (although one can establish that a particular resource is not associated with marital power under particular circumstances).[30]

One criterion of an adequate theory is that it should be falsifiable. That is, it should be possible to identify potential situations which would constitute conclusive negative evidence against the theory. If no possibility of conclusive negative evidence can even be envisioned, then the theory is not really testable. Is the Resource Theory hopelessly unfalsifiable and hence not amenable to rigorous testing? Certainly the approach of examining relationships

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[29]Or, of course, they can point to some resource of the wives which tends to increase with age.

[30]This does not constitute negative evidence against the theory, since the theory does not pretend to predict which resources will lead to marital power under particular situations. Even existing explanations about why a certain resource "works" in some cultures and not in others have been largely of a post-hoc nature (e.g., Rodman, 1967). Any attempt to predict anything more than very gross differences between cultures would run head-on into the problem of multiple resources. An additional theory would be required which could predict power outcomes from particular combinations of resources of one spouse in relation to those of the other spouse. Judging by the difficulties posed when only two "resources" are studied in laboratory experiments, as in Berger and Fisek's study of "specific status characteristics" (1970), the simultaneous assessment of dozens of resources would seem to be a hopeless task.

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between resources and marital power does not provide this kind of stringent test. But perhaps another strategy can be used, one which can test the theory itself more or less independently from the question of which resources are important in a particular situation. To do this, I believe, the best strategy is to more directly identify and operationalize the elements in the hypothesized translation mechanism (i.e., the process by which any resource is thought to result in marital power). This is the task of the following chapters.

CHAPTER IV

STRATEGIES OF INQUIRY

A resource theory of power contains three basic elements, an "input," a "throughput," and an "output." The input, of course, refers to resources. The throughput phase refers to a postulated intervening process or mechanism by which resources are translated into power, a process in which mental processes such as perception are central.[31] The distribution of power (whether measured during interaction or in terms of outcomes of contested decisions) is the output, the last element in the series.

Depending upon one's research aim, i.e., upon what one wishes to describe or explain, any of the three elements may be taken as a "starting point" in the strategy of inquiry. I will briefly discuss several approaches which might be taken, concluding with the approach chosen for the present study.

Output as the Starting Point

Here the objective is to describe or explain how given distributions of power came to be. An appropriate strategy might be to hold power "constant," e.g., to select for study a group of couples having

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[31] An exception would be a theory meant to deal with cases of outright coercion, including the use of physical force. Most resource theories of marital power have not attempted to deal with coercion in any explicit way. The work on violence in families (e.g., Steinmetz and Straus, 1975) has not generally employed a resource formulation.

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similar power structures. Say that one is interested in those rare couples who are extremely equalitarian and one wants to discern how they manage to achieve equalitarianism. Working backwards in the input-throughput-output chain, one examines their resource situations and the processes by which they arrived at a power division. If explanation rather than description is the main goal, a control group of non-equalitarian couples who are otherwise demographically similar to the equalitarian couples would facilitate the identification of crucial prerequisites for equalitarianism.

In all of these examples, "output" is taken as the starting point or thing to be accounted for.

Resources as the Starting Point

Several approaches which begin inquiry with the input stage come to mind. One may want to account for the pattern of resource distribution, e.g., why husbands or wives in a particular society tend to have the advantage with respect to certain resources (e.g., Gillespie, 1971). One may ask <u>which</u> resources can best predict or account for power distributions; this is the major objective of many of the studies reviewed in Chapter II. Or one may begin with a particular resource and explore the conditions under which its distribution affects the distribution of power. The work on multiple resources (status characteristics and on relevance of resources [the conditions under which they are "activated" and affect power]) falls in this tradition (see, e.g., Berger and Fisek, 1970; Freese, 1969; Kruse, 1967).

Researchers interested in the interrelation between cultural norms and resources would also begin inquiry at the input stage. One could attempt to predict power-outcomes of particular resource situations according to type of culture (in contrast to Rodman's first post-hoc explanations in his 1967 article). This would require prior identification of theoretically significant cultural parameters.

Studies focusing upon resource-input might utilize a sample stratified according to resource levels. For example, one might want to compare couples where both spouses are high on a given set of resources with couples where both are low, where the husband is higher than the wife, and vice-versa. A variation of this strategy involves the elimination of "intermediate" situations in favor of more extreme differences in resource levels (very high or very low resources).

All of the above are strategies which take "input" as their point of departure.

Throughput as the Starting Point

Here the concern is with the process by which resources come to be related to marital power. One might compare equalitarian and non-equalitarian couples as suggested above ("output as the starting point") with the additional specification that both groups be similar in resources. Controlling in this way for resources, one focuses upon the role of process in accounting for differences in power-outcomes.

A similar strategy could be used with a sample stratified according to resources (both spouses high, both low, etc.). Here the role of throughput could be studied by examining the "deviant" cases, those which do not exhibit the power outcomes which would be expected from their resource situation. One could search for differences in cognitive processes or for conditions lacking in these couples' situations, the presence of which may be necessary for resources to be "activated." All of the above strategies, while potentially useful, require sampling criteria which are difficult to meet. For example, one can measure perceptions about relative overall contributions of spouses without having to identify which resources are involved. My strategy to increase testability also involves the comparing of alternative theoretical processes. The possibility of finding negative evidence is provided by specifying test situations where the alternative theories would predict different results.

The more direct operationalization of the theoretical process itself serves to minimize the sampling criteria problem discussed above. Unless one can avoid the need to deal with specific resources, it is necessary to find couples who are similar with respect to a large number of demographic and resource-related characteristics.[32] Such

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[32]My sample is relatively homogeneous with respect to general social class level, length of marriage, place of residence, age, country of birth, and race. It contains four subgroups according to previous marital experience (both spouses in their first marriage, both in second marriages, husband in first marriage/wife in second, and wife in first marriage/husband in second). But it was not possible to control for specific resources in a precise way or for such extraneous variables as religion.

controlling for extraneous variables by sample selection is a practical impossibility for a study of limited finances. The other option of obtaining an extremely large sample, large enough to allow simultaneous statistical controls for a number of variables, is also an expensive procedure.

My strategy does not entirely overcome the limitations of less-than-ideal sampling criteria. If I find that one theoretical process best accounts for power distributions in my data, I run the risk that this process may only operate under certain resource conditions (those most common in my upper-middle class Michigan couples). To the extent that I do not deal with specific resources, I cannot determine the resource-related scope conditions of a theoretical process. A second limitation is that I necessarily must rely on indirect information (self-reports) rather than upon more "objective" observational data.

With this introduction, I will now proceed to introduce the two process-theories which serve as the focal point of my study. I will discuss each in turn and specify the major hypotheses. Then I will identify the test situations I have devised for the assessment of their relative explanatory power, including the statement of alternative hypotheses.

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CHAPTER V

"EQUAL-INPUT" THEORIES OF MARITAL POWER

Introduction: Equal Input vs. Power-Dependence Theories

Two exchange-theoretical formulations seem appropriate and relevant for the present study. Both deal with the "throughput" process by which resources are translated into marital power. A major difference between the two is their assumption about the nature of marital power. The first type, which I call "equal-input" theory, assumes that marital power rests upon the willing compliance of the less-powerful spouse. This view is consistent with Blood and Wolfe's original resource theory. I have identified two specific versions of equal-input theories.

In the first, competence (derived from experiences associated with attaining such resources as income and education) is exchanged for compliance. When one spouse is perceived as having greater competence, the other spouse yields willingly to the other's greater ability. This is similar to French and Raven's (1960) "expert power." In the second version of the equal-input theory, resources are directly exchanged for compliance. If one spouse contributes more resources (especially those from which the other acquires benefits such as prestige in the community or a high standard of living), the other spouse has "respect and gratitude."

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In both the competence and gratitude versions, compliance (or deference) seems to become an exchange commodity in itself. It is as if there were some norm of equal exchange; when a spouse cannot equal the contributions of resources or competence of the other spouse, he or she feels obliged to repay the debt incurred with the only "coin" available: deference. Marital power is thus not coercive; it is not even mildly repressive, in that the less powerful partner views the other spouse's power as the legitimate return earned for greater contributions.

The second theory relevant for the present study is that of power-dependence. Here marital power may be, but is not necessarily, free of all repressive qualities. Power is based upon the dependence of the other spouse, rather than directly upon contributions of resources. Two couples with identical patterns of resource-contributions may differ in their marital power structures, if they differ in dependence. A housewife with a good education is less dependent upon the husband's resources than is one without such qualifications, even though neither woman is employed. The first woman could obtain financial resources from some source other than her husband. The second woman could not as easily because of her greater dependence upon the husband for resources; she is not as much in a position to insist on her own way if he feels strongly about something. She simply has more to lose, and may comply out of a conscious or unconscious fear of losing her husband.

Having introduced the theories with which I will deal, I will now proceed to discuss each in some detail and to identify central

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Chapter VI

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hypotheses to be tested. The present chapter examines two types of equal-input theories, while power-dependence theory is discussed in Chapter VI.

Perceived Competence

The competence version of the Resource Theory of Marital Power is suggested by Blood and Wolfe. White-collar husbands, they suggest, have higher power than blue-collar ones because their job-related experiences make them "extra-equipped with the knowledge and skills required for decision-making, and their wives correspondingly are inclined to recognize their husband's competence along these lines" (1960: 31). The lower power of black husbands is attributed to job discrimination and poor schooling, i.e., to low educational and occupational status resources, which undermine their morale and make them "undependable" (ibid., 35). Dependability can be seen as an aspect of competence to handle marital responsibilities.

Although Blood and Wolfe assume that high-power spouses have more actual competence,[33] I believe that this is not a necessary assumption. All that should be required is that such spouses be

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[33] They quite directly assume that possession of "resources" indicates that the possessor must be a resourceful person: "This discussion of the ways in which the husband's position in the community contributes to his power in the family may be concluded with a reminder that high-status husbands do not appear to be coercing their wives into submission. Such husbands have more to offer to their marriages because of their unusual competence and resourcefulness: it is this contributing to the marriage which brings with it greater freedom for the husband to participate in decision-making and greater willingness by the wife for him to do so" (italics added: Blood and Wolfe, 1960: 36).

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perceived as having more competence. When two people know each other well and know each other's strengths and weaknesses, actual and perceived competence may often coincide. Sometimes they will not,[34] however, and in these cases it would seem that the perceived situation forms the basis upon which people act.

Implicit in this formulation are the following assumptions: (a) Spouses agree in their evaluations of relative competence (if they do not, then the effect of perceived competence upon marital power is diminished accordingly); (b) The spouse perceived as the more-competent one likes and accepts that "label"; and (c) Any spouse views marital power as desirable, at least in those situations where he or she feels competent to exercise it well.[35]

This theory, in which resource-related competence forms the basis of marital power, coincides with some ideas developed by theoreticians in the status characteristics tradition (e.g., Berger et al.,

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[34]For example, a competent wife may have a husband who does not recognize her competence, and a less-competent husband may still succeed in convincing his wife that he is the more competent.

[35]One can think of situations where assumptions (b) and (c) would not be met. Blood and Wolfe's concept of marital power often involves accepting responsibility. If a spouse does not want a particular responsibility, that person may deny or underrate his or her competence in an effort to justify why the other spouse should take on the burden; her strategy of feigning incompetence to avoid housework could be extended to avoidance of decision-making responsibilities as well. Hence, incompetence can be a basis for power to avoid undesired decision (and other) responsibilities.

1966, 1972).[36] What Blood and Wolfe call "resources" (income, education, occupational status), Berger et al. term "status characteristics." Perceived "level of competence" becomes, for Berger, "performance expectations." Since the dependent variables in both formulations deal with the distribution of power, a remarkable similarity exists between Berger's work on Status Characteristics and Expectation States and the competence version of the Resource Theory of Marital Power.

The work on expectation states, being at a higher stage of development and theoretical refinement, may therefore be useful in explicating hypotheses for marital power. The close correspondence of the two formulations is illustrated in Figure 7 below, for a simple one-resource situation.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
BLOOD & WOLFE	(Perception of) Resources	(Perception of) Competence	Relative Marital Power
BERGER et al.	(Perception of)[37] Status Characteristics	Performance Expectations	Power & Prestige Order

Figure 7. Comparison of major variables contained in theories of Blood and Wolfe (1960) and Berger et al. (1966, 1972).

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[36] Neither Berger et al., nor Blood and Wolfe, it should be noted, attempt to deal explicitly with the creation of actual competence. Specific competences could be viewed as varying along two dimensions: how difficult and time-consuming they are to learn and how desirable the possession of a competence is (for a particular individual or for men or women in general). During marriage, the probability that one learns a new competence may be directly related to its perceived desirability and inversely related to the difficulty of learning. Competences, after all, can be learned--perhaps from a more experienced spouse. Thus differences in initial resource-related skills can be reduced over time (without the requirement that learning experiences be linked to changes in external resources).

[37] In research situations, perception of status characteristics is often controlled or manipulated by the experimenter. In effect, this manipulation is a substitute for the evaluation of status characteristics as this would occur in normal interaction situations.

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Once one goes into situations where multiple resources or status characteristics are involved, an additional step is required. This step would occur between stages (1) and (2) in Figure 7, and would involve an additional mental calculus on the part of participants. Berger et al. (1966: 32 ff) explicitly identify the need for this intervening step. Each participant evaluates the several resources (status characteristics) of both self and other, arriving at overall competence evaluations or "aggregated (general) expectation states" for both parties. In this calculation, resources or status characteristics presumably are weighted according to criteria such as their degree of relevance to the task at hand. The behavior of participants (e.g., whether or not they allow themselves to be influenced by others) is a function of their evaluations;[38] those that conclude Other to be higher than themselves in overall competence or aggregate expected performance ability will allow themselves to be influenced.

Background of the Berger Program[39]

Some discussion of the history of Expectation State Theory may be useful at this point, because it may show to what extent substantively diverse theoretical "strings" share very similar ideas analytically. It emerged, of course, not from the study of marriage or even of ongoing

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[38] Other influences, e.g., intimidation, are not encompassed within this model.

[39] I have drawn upon Freese (1969) for this historical introduction to the Berger Program of research and theory development.

social groups, but from the work of Bales and associates (e.g., Bales and Slater, 1955) on ad-hoc groups. Bales found that his task-oriented laboratory groups of apparent status-equals, initially strangers, exhibited a cluster of correlated inequalities. Inequalities in behavior (observed frequencies of initiation and receipt of activity) and in evaluation (member-ratings of "best ideas" and "productivity") emerged rather early and tended to persist over time. These components of group interaction are conceptualized by Berger and associates as constituting, collectively, the "observed power and prestige order" of the group.

So-called equal-status groups did not remain equals for long. Differential performance expectations were thought to arise from evaluations of early performance outputs. These expectations soon stabilize and proceed to determine the power and prestige order. Where group members are differentiated at the outset by some socially valued status characteristic ("resources"), positions of members in the observed power and prestige order tend to be ordered according to their positions with respect to the external status characteristic.[40]

The main generalization which can be made with respect to unequal-status groups is the following: If task groups are differentiated with respect to some status characteristic external to the task situation, the observed power and prestige order of the group tends to coincide with the distribution of the status characteristic--whether or not that characteristic is related to the group task.

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[40]This effect has been documented with respect to such status characteristics as occupation and sex (Strodtbeck, James and Hawkins, 1957), race (Katz and Benjamin, 1960), and organizational position (Torrance, 1954).

The line of research concerned with explaining this phenomenon in ad-hoc groups of initial status-unequals is that part of the Berger program which he labels "status characteristics and expectation states."

The 1966 Formulation

Berger, Cohen, and Zelditch (1966) proposed a theory dealing with diffuse status characteristics, i.e., those characteristics such as race and gender which are surrounded by many beliefs and stereotypes and which are associated with expectations of superior or inferior general performance ability. (I believe that Blood and Wolfe's "resources" of occupational status, education, and income would also be diffuse status characteristics.)

If one particular diffuse status characteristic were the only basis of discrimination between two actors in task-focused groups, and if actors were forced to decide who was right and wrong on an ambiguous task, then they would decide on the basis of who ranked high or low on the diffuse status characteristic. Lacking any other basis for their performance evaluations (and being unable to evaluate quality of performance directly due to the ambiguous nature of the task), actors will base evaluations on the diffuse status characteristic even if this has no direct relation to competence at the specific task. Empirical support for the 1966 formulation includes Moore's (1968) study of the diffuse status characteristic of prestige of school attended and Cohen, Berger, and Zelditch's forthcoming work on Air Force rank.

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Before relating this discussion to families, let me summarize the manner in which expectations are thought to affect the observable behavior of individuals--that is, the four components of the observed power and prestige order--based on my interpretation of Berger and Fisek (1970).

(1) Individuals either give or do not give action opportunities to others, and they either receive or do not receive action opportunities from others. An action opportunity such as being asked for an opinion is a chance to perform. Individuals expected by others to perform well will be given more action opportunities.

(2) Once given an action opportunity, an individual either does or does not take this chance to contribute a performance output to the group interaction. (I would also suppose that acceptance of an action opportunity is more likely if the person expects himself/herself to perform better than other members.)

(3) Given a performance output, others will evaluate that output either positively or negatively. Such evaluations appear to be colored by initial performance expectations (based on diffuse status characteristics, for instance); the same performance output by a high-status member would receive higher evaluations than if it came from a low-status member. Such evaluations are reflected in observable positive and negative reactions directed at the performer.

(4) During the interaction, differences of opinion become apparent. Sometimes an individual is influenced to change opinions and sometimes he or she is not. Again, an individual who expects that another has more competence will be more easily influenced to change his or her mind.[41]

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[41] I should note that the standardized experimental situation with which Berger tested his theory operationalizes only one component of the observed power and prestige order--that of influence--while experimentally controlling for the remaining three (initiation of activity, receipt of activity, and judgments of task ability.) In principle, any other component could be chosen instead of influence.

Of the four components of power and prestige orders, influence corresponds most closely to Blood and Wolfe's view of marital power, in

To the extent that either equal-status or unequal-status ad hoc groups can be compared to marital dyads, it appears to me that marital power and prestige orders should be shaped by both initially present diffuse status characteristics (resources) and by evaluations of performance outputs during early stages of the relationship. Initial performance expectations based upon diffuse status characteristics (including gender[42]) may be powerful in that they determine who gets an opportunity to perform a particular task. Once a spouse gets this opportunity, however, his/her performance may be so poor that initial expectations have to be revised. For marriages do not usually exhibit either the total uncertainty (about task-relevant competence) or the ambiguity (about whether a performance output is correct or incorrect) that are characteristic of Berger's experimental groups. Hence, status characteristics (external resources) should affect the distribution of marital power but not to the degree that this occurs in such special ad hoc groups.

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that influence and final-decision power both occur toward the end of an interaction process. The two views of power differ, however, in whether opposition must be overcome. My own study takes Berger's position that influence (power) can only be said to exist when some opposition has to be overcome.

[42]The "strength" of gender as a diffuse status characteristic in premarital or marital dyads could vary greatly. If it is not seen as a status characteristic at all, one would expect that:

(a) The relationship between other status characteristics (resources) and marital power will not differ between men and women. For example, a wife would gain as much power from a given income-advantage as does a husband.

(b) Power and prestige orders will be more affected by direct evaluations of early performance outputs (than in cases where gender is associated with preconceived performance expectations).

Development of Expectation
State Theory

In task-focused laboratory groups, composed of strangers who never see one another and know only how they rank on one diffuse status characteristic, the theory finds support; having no other basis for evaluating relative competence, the status characteristic distribution determines the distribution of influence. But this is an unusual situation, not at all like "real life". Would the theory also hold if subjects were differentiated on one status characteristic while being equal on another? Would it hold for specific as well as diffuse status characteristics (resources), some of which are inconsistently evaluated? Answers to these questions would move the theory closer to marital situations, where many specific and diffuse status characteristics exist in combination.

As would be expected, a discriminating diffuse status characteristic proved to be maximally "effective" in determing influence in laboratory situations when there was no other activated status characteristic on which the subjects were equal. "Activating" a status characteristic in a laboratory situation is done by the experimenter. When spouses are left to choose from multiple sources of status information, they might or might not "activate" diffuse status characteristics on which they are equal.[43]

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[43]Take the example of two couples in which the wife has more education and in which spouses are equal in income. Both must solve the same "task", that of deciding how much life insurance to buy. In

The question of whether specific status characteristics, i.e., specific performance abilities, also affect influence was dealt with by Berger, Fisek, and Freese (1970). They found that differentiation of subjects on one specific status characteristic had the expected effect on influence distribution even when the specific "ability" was unrelated to the task. However, if subjects believed that they were high on one irrelevant ability and low on another one, they "cancelled" each other out (Freese, 1969). If the specific characteristic is dissociated from (rather than merely being independent of) ability at the task, however, its distribution does not determine the distribution of influence (Kruse, 1967).

What about specific status characteristics which are relevant to the task? Berger and Fisek (1970) and Tress (1971) did experiments in which two specific status characteristics were "activated", each being equally relevant to the group task. In the condition where the two characteristics were inconsistent, resulting influence measures were intermediate between the conditions where both characteristics were high and where both were low. These and other findings suggest that subjects "combine" or "average" inconsistent status information.

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both couples, the husband and wife disagree on this. The first couple considers both education and income as relevant to the issue at hand. That is, both status characteristics are "activated"; competence at the task is assumed to increase with both education and income. The wife gains somewhat more influence than the husband. The second couple may act only on the basis of education and ignore income, giving the wife a great deal more influence.

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Generalizing the Theory

The 1966 Expectation States Theory was extended to encompass both diffuse and specific status characteristics and to include the simultaneous operation of multiple status characteristics in organizing behavior (Berger and Fisek, 1970). This moved the theory closer to a marital situation, although the scope conditions of the revised formulation still required that the only information subjects have about each other be about status characteristics, that task outcomes be defined in terms of either "success" or "failure", and that the task be a unitary and collective one in which members are motivated to succeed (they are not only engaged in the task but are task-oriented).

For purposes of the present study, the most important addition to the 1966 formulation was the assumption that actors will develop aggregated expectation states for self and other. They do this by "combining" multiple status characteristics. Performance expectations based on separate status characteristics are combined to form a general or overall judgment of competence level (performance expectation level). In addition, each component performance expectation (perceived ability) is weighted according to degree of relevance to the task. Unlike expectations accompanying single status characteristics, aggregated expectation states are not dichotomous but are continuous variables. The greater the aggregate expectation advantage of one partner over the other, the greater that person's power and prestige advantage. (More precisely, power and prestige position is

posited to vary as the square of the expectation advantage. Small expectation differences will have negligible effects but effects will accelerate with increasing expectation differences.[44]

Relevance of expectation state theory to marriage: In its present form, Berger's theory, of course, was not intended to apply to ongoing social groups. It is aimed at answering the general question: what do people do when they are in a situation of uncertainty? What kind of information do they use to define a situation--reducing some of the uncertainty--so that they have some basis for action? In the absence of any clear information (about competence, for example), they use information about status characteristics as clues. Families--even when faced with ambiguous tasks--should not need such status clues in order to "get by", since they know each other intimately. Indeed, Leik (1965) found that status characteristics lose their "effect" when group members know a great deal about each other. He compared three-person family groups with three-person pseudo-families (the

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[44]A mathematical equation based upon this notion was remarkably successful in fitting data from two studies (Berger and Fisek, 1970; Berger, Fisek, and Crosbie, 1970). These studies both dealt with two equally-weighted status characteristics in five combinations of high and low, consistent and inconsistent characteristics.

The Berger, Fisek and Freese study (1970) discussed earlier also provides some support for the assumption that expectations are weighted by degree of task-relevance of a status characteristic. Although specific status characteristics "determined" the influence distribution whether or not it was made relevant to the task, the effect upon influence was more marked in the "relevant" condition. However, the above mentioned mathematical equation did not "fit" their data as closely as in other studies.

latter including the same individuals as the former groups). While husbands in pseudo-family groups were more dominant, such differences disappeared in actual family groups.[45]

Yet the correlations between such diffuse status characteristics (resources) as income, education, and occupational prestige with marital decision-power cannot be so easily explained away. Under certain conditions, e.g., in the permanent aircraft crews studied by Torrance (1954), ongoing social groups do exhibit a direct relationship between status characteristics and influence. The question becomes: under what conditions will status characteristics affect influence or power in families?

In speculating about what these conditions might be, I will give separate consideration to the link between status characteristics (resources) and performance expectations and the link between performance expectations (perceived competence) and the distribution of power.

(a) Conditions under which status characteristics may determine performance expectations in families: Status characteristics ought to coincide with performance expectations when, as Blood

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[45]One could argue that this is the result of an "averaging out" of status characteristics as posited in the revised expectation states theory. I think that this explanation is highly unlikely. If all status characteristics of each family member were aggregated, the father would surely exceed the mother who would exceed the daughter in "aggregate status." Any selection (activation) of some subset of such characteristics would, more often than not, also tend to favor the father.

and Wolfe suggest, status characteristics are associated with experiences leading to actual competence (providing that this competence is recognized and is seen as a competence which has some bearing on the issue at hand.) This approach requires some way of assessing actual competence, which is not possible in the present study. In addition, it ignores the more interesting part of the theory--that status characteristics can shape performance expectations even when they have no bearing upon the task (when there is no reason to assume that they would be associated with competence at this particular task).

When spouses have access to more direct information about their relative competence (as they usually do), this information will sometimes be inconsistent with the distribution of status characteristics. Such an "inconsistent" situation is the most theoretically interesting, for purposes of testing Expectation State Theory in marital dyads. The major question is: Under what conditions will performance expectations be based upon status characteristics rather than upon evaluation of past performance outputs, when the two sources of "information" would predict different expectation patterns?

Status characteristics may override contradictory sources of information, I would suggest, under the following condition:

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When the task is "new", i.e., when there is no basis for assuming that past performance outputs (on other tasks) indicate ability relevant to this task. In other words, expectation state theory should apply to families when the scope condition of uncertainty about task-relevant competence of spouses is met.

In the present study, I do not have sufficient data to test this proposition. In addition, instances of high uncertainty about competence would seem to be relatively infrequent in marriages.

(b) Conditions under which performance expectations may determine the distribution of influence in families: This seems to me to be the more interesting area of inquiry: under what conditions do performance expectations (regardless of their base) pattern the distribution of power and prestige?

I can think of instances where perceptions of competence would not determine the distribution of power in marriages. A wife who believed herself to be more competent might willingly yield influence, knowing full well that the quality of task-performance would suffer as a result. This might be the result of strong norms that the husband "should" have the say in a particular area. (Note that this is not the same thing as saying that gender is a "powerful" status characteristic in shaping performance expectations. The case under consideration is one in which the wife's performance expectations are not consistent with her gender status).

The same wife might also yield influence, believing that the loss in task-performance quality would be made up of gains in non-task areas. For example, this may benefit the affective quality of their relationship by increasing the husband's satisfaction and sense of participation. Or she may view the task-performance as a learning situation for the husband in which making "mistakes" may even be a valuable part of the learning process.

In all of the above examples, "success" at the task is not the primary motivation: Berger's scope condition that the group must be strongly task-oriented is not met.

I would, therefore, hypothesize that performance expectations will be more strongly related to the distribution of marital power and prestige when doing the task well is perceived as important, i.e., when the consequences of poor task-performance are seen as serious. Even strongly held norms may be violated if there is enough at stake, enough to be gained by distributing influence according to perceived competence rather than in accordance with normative gender-role expectations.

The importance of the task thus becomes an additional variable. Expectation State Theory will most closely apply to family behavior when families are the most task-oriented, i.e., when they meet this scope condition of the theory.

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Hypotheses

My first hypothesis is that aggregated (overall) performance expectations will pattern the distribution of power and prestige. "Translated" into resource-theory terminology, this hypothesis is:

Hypothesis C:[46] The higher the perceived overall competence of a spouse, the greater his or her overall marital power.

Several conditions should be added to this hypothesis. The first concerns the fact that there are two parties to a marriage, whose perceptions about relative competence may or may not coincide.

Hypothesis C-1: The greater the agreement between spouses in perceptions of relative overall competence, the stronger the relations:

a. between the wife's perceptions of relative competence and her relative marital power;

b. between the husband's perceptions of relative competence and his relative marital power.

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[46] Hypotheses are labeled with "C" for competence, "G" for those relating to gratitude as a theoretical mechanism, and "D" for power-dependence theory.

Agreement about competence, of course, implies that resulting marital power patterns are also based upon consensus.[47] This is what Blood and Wolfe assume about the nature of marital power. They also assume that competence is seen as relevant to marital decision-making.

In the present study, it was not possible to measure relative "weights" of specific status characteristics (specific competences) or to determine which ones are "activated" in a given situation. I can, however, determine whether a particular power-outcome is perceived as resulting from considerations of competence (regardless of the source of that competence-evaluation).

Blood and Wolfe suggest that a spouse often complies or yields power because he or she recognizes the greater competence of the other. If that is the case, "competence" should be offered as a rationale for power outcomes at least as often by the less-powerful spouse as by the more-powerful one. If anything, the less-powerful persons should mention competence considerations more often.

Hypothesis C-2: The frequency with which "competence" is given as a rationale for specific power-outcomes either:

a. will not differ between spouses having high and low power in that specific area, or

b. will be higher for low-power than for high-power spouses.

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[47] An additional problem with "agreement about competence" is that such agreement may be the outcome rather than the "cause" of power. A powerful spouse may influence the other to change competence perceptions. Dissonance theory might predict that such shifting of competence perceptions by the weaker spouse might result (even in the absence of influence attempts) in order to decrease cognitive inconsistency. In this case, perceptions of competence would shift over time, with the less-powerful spouse shifting perceptions more than the other.

If high-power spouses mention competence more often, I would suggest that competence is not the "real" basis of the power exercised. Talk about competence may serve mainly as a justification for power arrangements, which actually have some base other than competence. Or such arguments may be a strategy[48] for obtaining compliance from the other spouse, e.g., by devaluing the other's competence in order to gain decision-making power or by feigning incompetence in order to avoid an unwanted responsibility. In either case, differences in competence are not the major basis of power. Strong support for this hypothesis would require the measurement of actual competence or, at least, measures of perceived competence prior to marriage (neither of which are available from the present data). Under these circumstances, I would not consider hypothesis C-2 to be either supported or not supported unless the findings are highly significant.

Let us now turn to expectation state theory. I suggested that perceived competence should be more strongly related to the distribution of marital power when successful task performance--doing the task well--is seen as important (i.e., when Berger's scope condition of task-focused groups is most nearly met).

Hypothesis C-3: The relationship between perceived competence and marital power will be stronger for "tasks"

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[48] With my data, I have no way to determine whether arguments about competence are deliberately used as a power strategy. Probably the use of power in marriages is usually not as "cold blooded" or consciously motivated as the word "strategy" would imply.

judged to be important than for those judged to be less important.

This hypothesis, in effect, would involve testing hypotheses C and C-1 separately for high-importance and low-importance tasks and then comparing the results.

What effect would the agreement or disagreement about task importance have? One would anticipate that each spouse rates his or her areas as especially important, for example. Hypothesis C-3 ought to receive the clearest and strongest support when both spouses agree on task importance.

Hypothesis C-4: The greater the agreement between spouses in judgments of relative importance of "tasks," the stronger the support for hypothesis C-3 will be.[49]

Spouses may choose to use what competence they have, more often for tasks which they view as being important. Blood and Wolfe suggest that high-status husbands take over more financial decisions because these decisions involve larger expenditures than in low-status families (1960: 33). The consequences of poor decisions are potentially greater, so the husband recognizes the importance of these decisions and takes an interest in their execution. Since high-status husbands are also assumed to be more competent at such things, both competence and importance of the decision (to the husband) operate in the same direction.

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[49] This hypothesis was not directly tested in the present research. For related hypotheses, see Chapter VII.

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It would not be inconsistent with this approach to hypothesize that task importance by itself should affect marital power, even when perceived competence is held constant. The spouse who "cares more" about a "task" will take more initiative and will presumably want more say.

Hypothesis C-5: When perceptions of relative competence are controlled: the greater the discrepancy between spouses in perceived importance of a "task," the greater the relative power in that task-area of the spouse with the higher importance evaluation.

This hypothesis is not central for the competence formulation itself, but it shares with that theory the assumption that most marital power is based upon consent. For example, husbands are thought likely to yield to wives' preferences when she cares more than he about the issue at hand, and vice-versa. Or it may be that one simply is more insistent about having a say when the issue is important. Either way, compliance is directed at allowing one's spouse to increase satisfaction in areas where he or she cares a great deal.

I have now presented six hypotheses, the most central of which is the first. All are consistent with resource-theory notions about competence and marital power, although I have taken additional ideas from expectation state theory (in particular, the hypotheses about task importance). The major change I have made is the substitution of perceived competence for "actual" competence, which again was suggested by the work on status characteristics and expectation states.

This concludes my discussion of perceived competence as a theoretical mechanism by which resources are translated into marital power. The second type of "equal-input" theory, in which gratitude is the central element, is closely related to the competence formulation. In many cases, it would predict the same power outcomes. Separate treatment is justified because it provides a clearer case of the "equal-input" assumption--an assumption which is in clear contradiction to power-dependence theory, as will be seen in Chapter VII.

Gratitude and Respect

Another explanation for the greater power of high-status husbands, as compared with low-status husbands, is that they earn their wives' "respect" by their success in the community (Blood and Wolfe, 1960: 30). This success, of course, benefits the wife by giving her a high standard of living. She also shares the community prestige which accompanies her husband's occupational status. She is grateful for these benefits he provides and feels indebted to him.[50]

The exchange here is one of socially-valued external resources in return for compliance (as contrasted with the competence formulation, where competence based upon external resources--rather than the resources themselves--is the exchange commodity). To the extent that competence

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[50]For example, the finding that suburban Detroit husbands exceed city husbands in average power receives this explanation: "Perhaps suburban wives feel indebted to their husbands for providing them with a place to live which is more attractive than the industrial city of Detroit" (italics added; Blood & Wolfe, 1960: 36).

is indeed rooted in experiences of external-resource procurement (or is perceived as such), the competence and gratitude hypotheses would predict identical distributions of marital power.[51]

The gratitude explanation implies, I think, the presence of some norm of equal exchange. Spouses feel obligated to contribute equal "inputs" or contributions. In a similar manner, Blau (1955) analyzed the exchange among office workers. Job-related assistance, when it could not be returned in kind, was repaid with "deference." Deference, which includes the yielding of power, becomes an exchange commodity in itself. The greater the gap between the "resource" contributions of two spouses, the more deference is required by the lower contributor to equalize the exchange.[52]

For example, take the finding that the balance of power shifts somewhat in the wife's direction, when wives are employed (Blood and Wolfe, 1960: 32). Presumably the "working" wife, by obtaining more resources of her own, has now narrowed the gap between what he and she have to offer in their exchange relationship. She needs to give less "deference" than the non-employed wife to fully repay her debt for resources received from the husband.

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[51] One may, of course, also be "grateful" for a spouse's contributions of competence, as well as for direct contributions of resources such as income or prestige. This interpretation of the competence formulation makes the "equal input" assumption more explicit.

[52] Note that the presumed norm specifies that it is "inputs," *not* (power) "outputs," which should be equal. In fact, one sacrifices outputs in order to equalize inputs, provided that one has no other means of equalizing them.

If "gratitude and respect" are presumed to be a major mechanism by which external resources (or, for that matter, contributions of competence) are translated into marital power, one would predict the following:

Hypothesis G: The greater the gratitude to a spouse, the lower is the marital power (of the grateful person).

More specifically, one could state that: the greater the inequality between spouses in their gratitude to the other, the greater the inequality of marital power (to the advantage of the less grateful spouse).

In the present study I cannot test this hypothesis directly, because I have no attitude measures of "gratitude." Indirect tests are possible, however. One deals with what I call the "Cinderella syndrome." Cinderella, once married to the prince, ought to be much more grateful for benefits received than would a princess married to the same prince. In like manner, wives who grew up in lower socio-economic homes ought to be more grateful to "successful" husbands than those who came from more advantaged backgrounds.

Hypothesis G-1: The greater the external-resource advantage of one's spouse over one's parents, the lower one's marital power.

This hypothesis, I should note, would also be consistent with power-dependence theory; the greater the "motivational investment" in goal-objects (valued resources) mediated by the spouse, the greater one's dependence upon that spouse, and the lower one's relative marital power. Motivational investment--the value placed upon the spouse's resources--is

arrived at by a social comparison process. In this case, the comparison is against one's family of origin. Power-dependence theory, however, would focus upon comparisons with current alternative sources of goal-objects, such as potential alternative spouses or employment.

The research of Pearlin (1975) on cross-class marriages is relevant to Hypothesis G-1. He found that class-of-origin operates as an exchange commodity in itself, i.e., that the effect of having a lower class-of-origin than one's spouse is not "cancelled out" by upward mobility (high present resources). Lower-origin spouses were apparently "grateful" to higher-origin partners, reporting higher levels of marital satisfaction than persons who had "married down." This effect, however, occurred only for persons with strong desires for success (in power-dependence terms, with high motivational investment in getting ahead). Among such social climbers, marital satisfaction was increased by having a higher-origin spouse and decreased by having a lower-origin spouse.

The "gratitude" formulation diverges from that of power-dependence theory in the role played by alternative sources of goal-objects. One cannot be "grateful" for resources which the other spouse potentially could acquire (but does not); yet in power-dependence theory, such potential resources are postulated to affect the balance of power. It is now appropriate to discuss power-dependence theory in some detail and, in the discussion of critical tests in Chapter VII, to return to the question of potential alternative sources of resources.

CHAPTER VI

A POWER-DEPENDENCE THEORY OF MARITAL POWER

David Heer (1963) suggested a theory which he thought could better account for empirical findings of marital power than did Blood and Wolfe's explanations. Blood and Wolfe, he said, could not explain why certain external resources such as income led to marital power, while internal resource contributions did not. For example, wives generally increase their contributions of time and labor upon the advent of a baby.[53] Yet this increased contribution, although it presumably benefits the husband, apparently wins her no "gratitude"; at least, it wins her no power. Her power sharply drops at this time (or appears to do so, judging by cross-sectional data). It certainly drops faster than she would exhibit any loss of "competence." Thus it would seem that neither competence[54] (knowledge or skill) nor gratitude can fully account for marital power distributions.

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[53] Power of wives also varies inversely with the number of children (Heer, 1958: 341-347; Blood & Wolfe, 1960: 134), although the mother of many children undoubtedly contributes more "internal" resources than the mother in smaller families.

[54] Heer admits that relative competence may indeed have some role in determining outcomes of uncontested decisions. He feels, as I do, that power is better measured by outcomes of contested decisions (that there must be some disagreement or "resistance" present before one can say that power is operating). When spouses disagree, Heer suggests that relative competence is probably an insufficient explanation of who prevails. Blood and Wolfe's decision-index of power did not distinguish between contested and uncontested decisions; most likely, the majority of the component decisions were of the uncontested variety.

Heer's "revised theory" has its roots in the work of Homans (1961: 55-56), Waller's principle of least interest[55] (Waller and Hill, 1951: 190-192), and--although not acknowledged--probably also in Thibaut and Kelley's (1960) concepts of power and dependence.

In Heer's words:

> . . . Here the focus is not on the value to each spouse of the resources contributed by the other but on the value placed on these resources outside the marriage. According to the revised theory, the greater the difference between the value to the wife of the resources contributed by the husband and the value to the wife of the resources which she might earn outside the existing marriage, the greater the power of her husband; and vice-versa. This theory explicitly states that each partner to the marriage conceives of the possibility of separation, divorce, and subsequent remarriage. (Heer, 1963: 138).

Thus, the mother of pre-school children has low power because her potential returns, outside the marriage, have lowered. Perhaps partly because she likely would have custody of the children, her "bargaining power in the remarriage market is probably not very high" (ibid.). Until the children are in school, working for pay is a problematic alternative. In short, the returns she might expect under some alternative to her present marriage are rather meager. Similarly, the woman married to a successful man realizes she has made a relatively good "catch", probably better than any other husband she might find. She is wary of contradicting him if he really feels strongly about something, for fear of jeopardizing the relationship.

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[55]This principle states: the partner with the least interest in the relationship is the one most apt to exploit the other. Waller, according to Heer, does not explain <u>why</u> this is so.

So the spouse with more to lose (should the marriage end) is at a disadvantage. Such a spouse is more dependent upon the partner than vice-versa, although the dependence need not be financial.[56] Dependence is thus the basis of marital power: the greater one's dependence upon the spouse, the lower one's relative marital power.

As Heer does not state explicit hypotheses, I have drawn upon the work of Thibaut and Kelley (1960), Emerson (especially his 1962 paper) and Dahlström (1966) to formulate hypotheses that may help to overcome the theoretical impassé referred to at the end of Chapter IV.

Thibaut and Kelley (1960)

Power, rather than being the ability to affect psychological and behavioral changes (e.g., compliance) in the recipient, is defined as the ability to affect the "outcomes" of another (in the sense of causing changes in Other's cost/benefit balance). Such outcome

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[56]Safilios-Rothschild (1970: 548f) suggests that emotional dependence operates in a similar way: if he loves her more than she loves him, then he is the more dependent. He has more to lose (not only in case of divorce, but, I would suppose, from temporary withdrawal of affection during disagreements).

The greater social isolation of suburban working-class housewives, as compared with those in older working-class neighborhoods in the city, is noted by Tallman (1969). It could be that Blood and Wolfe's suburban wives had lower power than city wives not, as they suggest, because they were "indebted" to their husbands for providing them with more pleasant living arrangements (see Blood & Wolfe, 1960: 36). Rather, they may have had fewer alternative sources of emotional support and assistance. The network of relatives and neighbors in stable working-class neighborhoods may make the wife less dependent upon her husband, increasing her marital power.

changes, of course, are assumed to affect behavior. Thibaut and Kelley's "power" is still defined as an ability of individuals (as in Weber's definition of power), but now both individuals (in a dyadic situation) must be considered. Power and also cost/benefit outcomes of both actors are treated, each actor from his or her own perceptual point of view.

A's power is the extent that Actor A, by varying his or her behavior, can affect the quality of B's outcomes. B's counter-power is the extent that B can affect the quality of A's outcomes. The key to "calculating" power lies in the calculation of outcomes.

Outcomes are subjective, based on a "scale" where the size of the increments appears to be determined by the value of the (experienced or imagined) outcome received. The "zero point" of the scale, which forms the comparison base, is that level of outcomes which the actor might attain in his or her best available alternative situation. This zero point is his or her Comparison Level in the next best alternative, or "CL_{alt}". Interacting persons affect each other's reward-cost position as measured on this scale and thereby can influence or control each other.

Furthermore, the average level of outcomes of a relationship cannot fall below the zero point of CL_{alt} for very long or else the relationship would be terminated in favor of the next best alternative.

The central process here is one of social comparison, somewhat similar to reference group theory. It is not enough for A to give B some output ("resource") which B values; in order to reap power, A must give B more of that output than he or she could receive elsewhere.

If B has no counterpower, A's power equals the distance between B's average outcome level and B's CL_{alt}. This is called "fate control". A's power in this case is exactly equal to B's dependence, dependence being defined also as B's average level of outcomes minus B's CL_{alt}. The degree of A's power, under fate control conditions, rests on his ability to supply high rewards at a low cost to himself. Supplying rewards and even "using" power can be costly to A. Potential power hence is greater than usable power.

Since marriages are seldom "fate control" situations, let us examine Thibaut and Kelley's "behavior control" case. B now has some control over the variations in his or her outcomes by adjusting behavior to "synchronize" with A's desired behavior alternatives. A's power depends upon A's ability to make it desirable for B to synchronize. By not synchronizing, B has some counterpower with which to decrease A's benefits and/or increase A's costs. Before A decides to use potential power, A must calculate not only the direct power costs of power use (see above) but also the indirect costs which are possible because of B's counterpower.

A and B usually have several behavior choices which are possible. Gains of each are a function of the interaction of the choices of each. Some of B's behavior choices will yield higher gains for A than others. A must make it sufficiently desirable for B to choose that coordinated behavior which leads to higher outcomes for A.

Power of A is no longer strictly equal to B's dependence upon A. Because of B's counterpower, A must increase the rewards available to B

(to induce B to select a behavior alternative which is beneficial for A). A does this at some cost to himself or herself, a cost which enters the "equation". A may increase power over B by increasing B's dependence, i.e., by raising B's outcome level (relative to B's CL_{alt}).

In marriage, there is seldom only one "desired object" such that one party must gain at the expense of the other. Often both can gain. If so, Thibaut and Kelley suggest that goals tend to be cooperative and the mutual rewards lead to identification. Identification, in turn, may make the act of delivering rewards to the other a source of satisfaction in itself. Outcomes increase even more[57], and norms may develop which stabilize the relationship. (Competitive relationships found in the win-loss pattern are less stable and may lead to a strategy of alternating who gets the good outcomes.) In short, high levels of interdependence--where each partner has high ability to increase the outcomes of the other--should lead to high satisfaction.[58]

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[57]Dahlström (1966: 246) calls attention to the underlying assumption in such arguments, namely that rewards are assumed to be stronger "reinforcers" than are punishments, and hence have more impact upon the learning process.

[58]Outcome levels are increased by deletion of costly conflicts and by the addition of new satisfactions. Satisfactions are increased by the convergence of values and attitudes of the parties over time. Thibaut and Kelley specify four mechanisms by which convergence occurs, based upon learning theory. Two are "associative processes". Aspects of A's behavior associated with B's rewards come to acquire reward value for B in themselves, increasing the reward value of A's behavior to B. B's own behaviors may come to have increased value to him or her in and of themselves, after being consistently rewarded by A.

"Motivational processes" include increases in output as a result of conflict avoidance. Such cost-reduction can occur during

Groups which are highly dependent on each other have been compared to slightly dependent groups by previous researchers. Back (1951) found that, regardless of the type of attractiveness upon which group cohesiveness (interdependence) was based, highly cohesive groups reached more agreement and also showed more overt resistance to others' suggestions. Although both power and counterpower are high, the development of high mutual outcomes over a long time is posited to reduce the likelihood of severe conflict (elimination of costly conflicts raises the outcome level, of course). Conflict-avoidance strategies under conditions of high counterpower include the defining of limited zones of conformity and allowing the slightly more powerful member to be more influential.

Perceptions are central for Thibaut and Kelley. Reward-cost outcomes are perceptual. Synchronization of behavior requires that B be aware that his or her outcomes could be improved by such synchronization, etc. So it is not surprising that most of the strategies cited for increasing power are also perceptual. A less-powerful husband (Actor B) can increase his power by five strategies:

(a) increasing the value of B's product to A (or reducing the value of A's product to himself);

(b) limiting opportunities for A to acquire new skills or inhibiting A's performance level;

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decision-making, when relative evaluation of alternatives are changed. After the decision, dissonance reduction can be attained by changing relative evaluations of objects of choice. The two associative mechanisms clearly lead to greater attitude and value consensus and the two motivational mechanisms may lead to greater consensus also, although this is less clear.

(c) delivering rewards which make A's counterpower less usable (because now she has more rewards to lose);

(d) raising his own CL_{alt} or lowering A's CL_{alt} (perhaps by manipulating alternatives available);

(e) secretly lengthening his time perspective, thus temporarily lowering his own CL_{alt}, which increases the value of rewards received from A.

Thibaut and Kelley's concept of power is only partly a property of individuals, for the ability to affect outcomes of the other depends upon the relative outcome position of A and B. The power of A and B are said to be conceptually independent of each other. In part, this appears to mean that power is not zero-sum in the sense that B's power must decrease as A's power increases. Both may have high power, as in the situation where both have low CL_{alt} levels. They do not distinguish positive from negative (e.g., "veto") power, nor is "resistance" as central a concept as it is for such power theorists as French and Raven (1960). "Power" and "dependence" are not conceptually independent, as both are defined in terms of CL_{alt}.

Part of the value of Thibaut and Kelley's work lies in the delineation of determinants of the exchange rate between A and B. Another contribution, incorporating some of French and Raven's ideas, is the linking of an interdependence level with the probability of attitude and value convergence.

Thibaut and Kelley assume that people are basically rational, in the sense that they will act so as to maximize outcomes. Blood and Wolfe, in contrast, seem to assume that people are rational in the sense that they will allocate decision-power to the person most qualified to make good decisions--that is, that couples will act so as to

maximize group (rather than individual) outcomes. Whether such "rational" models correspond with family behavior should be ascertained empirically, if only to find out the extent to which a rational calculus is, in fact, employed.

Emerson (1962)

Richard Emerson apparently explicated and simplified Thibaut and Kelley's ideas about power and dependence (although he does not acknowledge them). Noting that it is meaningless to state that A has power unless one also states "over whom", Emerson stressed the idea that power is the property of a social relation rather than an attribute of an actor. Social relations are said to be characterized by ties of mutual dependence. Power to control or influence the other "resides in control over the things he values . . .", which corresponds to Thibaut and Kelley's definition of power as the ability to affect the outcomes of another. Dependency is the basis of power. The dependence of A upon B is (1) directly proportional to A's motivational investment in goals mediated by B and (2) inversely proportional to the availability of these goals to A outside of the A-B relation.[59] This is similar to Thibaut and Kelley's (1) value of outcomes and (2) CL_{alt}.

[59] Emerson supplies an economic analogy for these terms: motivational investment = demand, and availability = supply. Supply-demand relations thus determine the exchange rate or "price". Thus baseball shortstops are less "valuable" than pitchers, not because they are less essential to the team but because good pitchers are harder to find. In the same manner, good housewives are less "valuable" than good breadwinners because good breadwinners are scarcer.

The power of A over B is defined as the amount of resistance on the part of B which can be potentially overcome by A. The stress on resistance is a point of difference from Thibaut and Kelley. In Emerson's formulation, there must be some resistance of B to A's demands before the change in B's conduct can be attributable to demands made by A.[60]

As with Thibaut and Kelley, "power" and "dependence" are not conceptually independent because, by definition, the power of A over B equals the dependence of B over A (and vice-versa). Also consistent with Thibaut and Kelley is Emerson's observation that the power of A and of B (over the other) need not be equal. If A's power and B's power are not equal, their relations are said to be imbalanced (one party has a power advantage, defined as $P_{AB} - P_{BA}$). The power of each party (P_{AB} and P_{BA}) is not viewed as neutralizing or cancelling out each other. For example, there can be balanced (equal-power) relations where both have high power or where both have low power.

Thibaut and Kelley's level of interdependence becomes, for Emerson, "cohesion". It may be crudely defined as the average of D_{AB}

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[60]This stress on resistance is also stronger than in my definition of power, as reflected in my operational measures. I do not limit "power" to situations where overt resistance occurs, but to situations where the other wishes for a different outcome than the one which occurs. This disagreement about preferred outcomes may be implicit; indeed, A need not even know that B disagrees. I use this broader definition because absence of overt resistance may itself be a reflection of the power situation; low-power spouses may not express disagreement because they have little chance of gaining anything that way (and perhaps because they have much to lose).

and D_{BA}, which Emerson thinks is superior to Festinger's (1950) definition of cohesion because it takes into account considerations of availability of alternative goal-sources, in addition to "motivational investment". Emerson does not elaborate on the role of cohesion or interdependence, however.

Thibaut and Kelley thought that highly interdependent groups experience convergence in attitudes and values over time, via associative and motivational processes (see footnote 58). One result is that the cost/benefit balance of each party is increased, both by increasing benefits and by reducing costs (e.g., by avoiding major conflicts). Emerson, in contrast, hypothesizes that imbalanced relations (regardless of level of cohesion or interdependence) will tend to change. They are unstable, for they encourage the use of power which, in turn, sets in motion processes of (a) cost reduction and (b) balancing operations (similar to Thibaut and Kelley's strategies).

Cost reduction[61] is a process involving value-change. Internalization during socialization and identification with the aggressor are given as examples. B lowers his amount of resistance and hence lowers his costs. However, unlike Thibaut and Kelley, cost reduction does not necessarily alter the fundamental imbalance of power. It

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[61] Unlike Homans (1961, Ch. 3-5; 1966), Emerson and Thibaut & Kelley do not consider values foregone to be "costs". Rather, foregone benefits are dealt with in the variables of "alternatives" (person) and "CL_{alt}" (Thibaut & Kelley). For these theorists, "costs" are restricted to the present exchange relationship between A and B.

y, however, function to deepen and stabilize social relations
ithin either imbalanced or balanced situations).

Balancing operations necessarily involve increasing or de-
easing dependence. Since dependence has components of motivational
vestment and availability, there are four logical possibilities for
creasing imbalance. If $D_{BA} < D_{AB}$, this imbalance may be decreased by:

1) B reduces motivational investment in goals mediated by A (in extreme form, this involves withdrawal of B);

2) B cultivates alternative sources for gratification of those goals (e.g., "network extension");

3) A increases motivational investment in goals mediated by B (exemplified by Emerson in a strategy of "status giving");

4) A is denied alternative sources for achieving goals (as by coalition formation of B with other goal-sources).

Two major differences exist between Emerson and Thibaut and
ley. First, Emerson's second strategy (above) requires that B
ually go to an alternative partner for some valued resources. In
baut and Kelley's formulation, the key factor is whether B could
so (whether B could implicitly or explicitly threaten to do so).
ential but "unused" alternatives thus can gain one power. I will
defining "alternatives" in the latter and broader sense in the
ent study.

Second, Emerson hypothesizes that imbalanced relations will
toward balance or increasing equality of power. Thibaut and
ey make no such claim. Emerson seems to assume that an imbalanced

ate necessarily creates "tensions" in participants, leading to
ange--a perhaps uncalled-for, overly restrictive assumption of
lance.

I will now summarize the major hypotheses I have drawn from
erson and Thibaut and Kelley, after which I will introduce refine-
nts and extensions of these hypotheses based upon the work of
dmund Dahlström (1966).

wer-Dependence Hypotheses:
rt I

For both Emerson (1962) and Thibaut and Kelley (1960), the
sis of A's power over B and of B's power over A is dependence.
pendence is the degree to which one's outcomes (benefit/cost ratio)
e controlled by the other.

Hypothesis D: The greater the dependence of one spouse upon the other, the lower that spouse's marital power.[62]

Dependence level, hence, is determined by an outcome-calculation
ocess. Outcomes available from the spouse are evaluated by comparing
em with a mental "scale", on which the zero-point (Thibaut and Kelley's
$_{lt}$) is the highest perceived outcome level available from a source
er than the spouse. A given outcome level available from the spouse
more subjective value as the zero-point declines. Although

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[62]One need not accept Emerson's assumption that the power of A equals dependence of B, in order to accept the above hypothesis. I will be g a definition of power which is conceptually independent of dependence.

easurement of precise CL_{alt} levels is not possible here, one can oughly distinguish between situations of greater and lesser alterna-ives.

Hypothesis D-1: The greater the value of goal-objects available or potentially available from a source other than the spouse, the higher will be the individual's marital power.

Within a dyadic context, this hypothesis becomes:

Hypothesis D-2: The greater the inequality between spouses in the value of goal-objects available or potentially available outside the marriage relation, the greater the inequality of marital power (to the advantage of the spouse with the higher alternatives).

Under conditions of equal motivational investment in goal-ojects differences in availability reflect differences in dependence. owever, motivational investment may also vary. The role of motiva-ional investment is to determine the increments on the outcome-evaluation cale. If one values a given exchange commodity highly (i.e., if one s high motivational investment in it), each "unit" received would ise the scale-value greatly. On the other hand, receiving a "unit" a less-valued commodity would result in little increase in one's sub-ctive value gained.

Hypothesis D-3: The greater the motivational investment in goal-objects mediated by the spouse, the lower the individual's marital power.

When both spouses are considered:

Hypothesis D-4: The greater the inequality between spouses in motivational investment in goal-objects mediated by the other, the greater the inequality of marital power (to the advantage of the spouse with the lesser motivational investment).

Note that alternatives and motivational investment operate together to determine dependence (and hence to determine power). Either an increase in alternatives (raising the zero-point) and/or a decrease in motivational investment (reducing the increments and hence the valuation of a given commodity received) can decrease dependence.

However, motivational investment is even more intertwined with the level of alternatives than indicated above. Subjective values of "commodities" are affected by previous experiences, i.e., by past exchanges with other people (some of whom may be perceived as present "alternatives" to the spouse). A "commodity" which has not been scarce or difficult to obtain in one's past experience would not have great value. For example, a "dependable" spouse is highly valued by someone whose experiences indicate that this is a rare 'phenomenon'. It takes on less value to someone who expects dependability as a matter of course.[63] The "Cinderella Syndrome" discussed under the gratitude hypothesis is another case in point. A wife should have greater motivational investment in financial resources contributed by "successful" husband if her past experiences indicate that such men re rare, than if she has known many such men.

To the extent that the past exchange relations which provide he basis of motivational investment level are similar to the present ternatives perceived to exist, the following hypothesis should hold:

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[63] On the other hand, if dependability were expected but not esent, such a person might reevaluate the importance of this trait. I n imagine a situation where the other spouse's dependability fell below e CL_{alt} level. Dependence upon such a spouse might be extremely low, potential alternative spouses would offer higher dependability and the ue of dependability is now seen as very high.

Hypothesis D-5: The greater the value of goal-objects available or potentially available from a source other than the spouse, the lower will be the motivational investment in goals mediated by the spouse.

Motivational investment and level of alternatives, hence, are not conceptually independent. For analytical purposes, however, they can be treated as separate variables.

Power-Dependence Hypotheses: Part II

Dahlström (1966) presents a much broader analysis of power. I will not attempt to summarize his lengthy and detailed analysis, but will draw upon certain relevant parts of it.

He makes the point that dependence upon another (for one's outcomes) is not conceptually equivalent to influence-power,[64] contrary to Emerson's assumption, because potential power-resources are

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[64]Nor, says Dahlström, is the degree to which preferences are realized the same as one's power. Achievement of preferences reflects power only when this is due to influencing others. I take this into account by operationalizing power as achievement of preferences under the condition of initial disagreement between spouses (i.e., they must have different preferences at Time 1).

I do not consider the relation of Time 2 preferences to decision-outcomes to be an adequate measure of power. Spouses who initially differed in preferences at Time 1 may often agree at Time 2; the relation between opinions or preferences before and after "decisions" can itself be regarded as a measure of attitude conformity, an outcome of power (see March, 1955: 431-451 and Hopkins, 1964: 79).

A third point relevant to the measurement of power is Harsanyi's (1962) assumption that power-negotiations center on the relative frequency with which B is to emit a particular compliant behavior. Hence spouses are concerned with how often the husband helps with the dishes over a given time period, rather than with whether or not he helps on a particular evening.

always used. The probability that A will use his/her power
ources depends upon the "utility"[65] A expects to gain from exer-
ing power over B, including the expected utility of B's compliance.
s is A's power incentive. The compliance incentive of B is the
lity B expects to gain[66] from A's power over B including the utility
yielding to A's influence. The act of compliance, in itself, may
costly from B's point of view. The exercise of power, in itself,
be a source of benefits to A (that is, power may be a goal-object
ch is intrinsically valued in itself, rather than only a means to
er ends). In short, power presupposes a "double incentive" (pp. 256-7)
ationship; both must expect some gain.

Hence I would hypothesize that dependence (motivational in-
tment and alternatives) will be more strongly related to power when
alues being a powerful person and will be less strongly related
n B values being a powerful person. The former increases A's in-
tive to use potential power (because A has more benefits to gain)
the latter decreases B's incentive to comply (because B's costs now
lude the loss of intrinsically-valued power).

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[65] "Utility" is an economic term used by Homans (1961). It
esponds to Thibaut and Kelley's outcomes, that is, to the cost/
fit ratio of an individual.

[66] If B is in a situation where he or she will get low utility
utcomes regardless of which behavior-choice is made, B has no in-
tive to comply with A's wishes. A must make it a little more worth-
e for B to choose a particular behavior in order to obtain compliance.

Hypothesis D-6: The relationship between dependence and marital power (in Hypotheses D-1 through D-4):

a) will be stronger when the less-dependent spouse considers power as intrinsically valuable, and;

b) will be weaker when the more-dependent spouse considers power as intrinsically valuable.[67]

For example, a husband who values being the "head of the house" as a goal-object in itself (beyond any benefits he may obtain from "winning" particular disagreements) has more to lose by complying than a husband who does not. (Whether or not this "ego-investment" in being a powerful person is due to normative prescriptions or to some other factor is not the point here. However, this may be one mechanism by which norms are translated into marital power.)

A major contribution of Dahlström is his consideration of multiple issues. Although his discussion of multiple issues deals with larger groups, it can appropriately be applied to dyads. Multiple issues increase the probable "exchange of power resources" (p. 259), which I interpret to include the probable use of power. Trade-offs are now possible. Person A, who ordinarily would not give in on one issue, may be willing to comply in return for B's compliance on another issue.

Hypothesis D-7: The greater the number of areas of disagreement between spouses, the greater the average amount of marital power exercised (by either spouse or by both spouses jointly).

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[67] This hypothesis is not tested in the present research.

reater exercise of power means, among other things, that trade-offs ill outnumber half-way compromises. Where compromises do not occur, rade-offs can be inferred from the fact that each spouse "wins" part the time.[68]

This effect ought to be the most apparent when the interests spouses vary, that is, when their motivational investment in a rticular area is different. If A and B feel strongly about the same sputed issue, trade-offs are less likely. But if A feels more rongly about issue 1 and B feels more strongly about issue 2, then ch has something to gain by a trade-off. A is allowed to prevail issue 1 and B in issue 2; each "wins" in an area which reaps high ojective benefits and each "gives in" in an area where the loss of efits is minimal.

Hypothesis D-8: *Within a couple's areas of disagreement, the greater the average difference between their motivational investment in the solution of the disagreement, the greater the average power exercised in these areas.*

solution of a disagreement is now considered, in Emerson's terms, oal in itself. To have a strong motivational investment in a solu- n means, in this case, to have strongly held preferences. Say that

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[68]In my study I may not have detected many existing trade-offs use I only measure a few specific issues. Trade-offs can exist out being consciously viewed as such. However, I did ask couples they arrived at a given allocation of responsibility, with one of 13 answer options dealing with an explicit trade-off agreement.

nd B differ in their preference about how to divide the responsi-
ities of keeping in touch with relatives and of deciding what
ple to invite to the house. A trade-off is most likely when the
e only has strong preferences about one issue and the husband only
strong preferences about the other issue. Each is allowed to
vail in the area where he/she cares the most. In Dahlström's
ns, the more the interest of each participant varies, the more
exchange of power.[69]

Finally, of course, there is the variable of how far apart
differing preferences of spouses are. Dahlström hypothesizes
the smaller the extent to which constituent parts of participants'
rests coincide in different issues, the greater the exchange of
r resources. Hypothesis D-7 deals with the number of issues where
rests of spouses differ. To that, I should add the following:

Hypothesis D-9: Within a couple's areas of disagreement, the greater the average discrepancy between their preferences, the greater the average power exercised in these areas.

hypothesis I find somewhat less plausible than the two preceding
It implies that compromises will occur more often when spouses
slightly differing preferences, and that trade-offs will occur
often when their preferences are widely discrepant. The hypothesis
ausible, perhaps, in larger groups or in situations where there is

[69]It should be noted that hypotheses D-7 and D-8 should not be
rued as a tautological undertaking. Rather, both the number of con-
d areas and the differential preference strength of both spouses in
areas are hypothesized to vary with average marital power.
Whether or not Dahlström's concept of power exchange corres-
to my usage of "power" will be discussed in Chapter IX. It may be
, for example, that more or less explicit trade-offs decrease or
"wipe out" each spouse's initial disagreement about how any parti-
issue should be handled. Thus, one defining characteristic of
would be "dissolved" by way of a trade-off.

e option of not resolving the difference. Here the lowest level of
ver-use is not the compromise but the stand-off. Such stalemates
ially are not an option in marriages, at least not for the issue
h which I am concerned. Someone has to do the grocery shopping;
isagreement about who this should be will inevitably get solved
t in the sense that both are happy with the solution, but in the
se that someone will end up doing the shopping).

Dahlström also deals with the relation of power resources
ilable and the costs incurred in the gain of influence. A person
ing much higher power resources, he argues, does not actually
e to "use up" his or her resources; vague promises and threats are
ctive without having to carry through on either (without having
ive the promised resources, thus reducing the costs of power use
, and without having to carry out threats, which might increase
costs so much that his/her incentive to comply goes down). The
er assumes that power can be "used up" if exercised too often;
outcomes may be so low that B even withdraws from the relationship.

Hence, I would suggest that the greater the dependence
erential between spouses, the more likely is A to use his/her
tial power.

Hypothesis D-10: The relationship between dependence and marital power (in hypotheses D-1 through D-4) will be weak under conditions of small dependence-differences between spouses and will become stronger at an increasing rate as dependence-differences widen.

This hypothesis posits some kind of exponential function in he relation of dependence to marital power. Unfortunately, the data ase in the present study does not allow testing of this hypothesis.

This concludes my discussion of the power-dependence theory f marital power. I will now proceed to the identification of test ituations, for the assessment of the relative adequacy of alternative heories.

CHAPTER VII

CRITICAL TESTS

In the event that each of the theories of marital power eceives some support, the assessment of their relative explanatory ower becomes interesting. I propose to compare the adequacy of ese theories by constructing test situations in which the different eories would predict different results. These test situations ex- icitly provide for the possibility of obtaining negative evidence; e can have greater confidence in findings which support a theory der such conditions.

Tests pertaining to theoretical processes or "translation chanisms" are presented first. These are followed by a few tests volving specific resource-variables, where a close connection of source possession with translation processes may be inferred.

Tests of Alternative Processes

petence Versus titude Theories

The competence and gratitude versions are closely related. one it is perceived competence (presumably obtained via experiences ociated with external resources such as income or education) which exchanged for compliance, while in the latter it is "resources" nselves which are directly exchanged for compliance. If spouses with resources are also perceived to be resourceful (i.e., competent) per-, then both theories predict identical patterns of marital power.

Although I do not have direct measures of "gratitude", it s still possible to identify situations in which different predictions would follow from these two theories. Income is a resource hich, at least in western cultures, has been shown to relate to arital power. This relationship presumably involves gratitude-for-ncome. If perceived competence does affect marital power, then is effect should be evident even when income (gratitude) is held nstant.

Test C-G 1: (Competence prediction) Controlling for relative income of spouses, the greater the perceived competence, the greater the marital power.

en both spouses are considered, this hypothesis predicts the follow-g rank-order, from highest to lowest marital power:

1) Spouses agree in perceptions: high-earning spouse seen as more competent.

2) Spouses differ in perceptions of who is more competent, or spouses agree that both are equally competent.

3) Spouses agree in perceptions: low-earning spouse seen as more competent.

this prediction is not supported, one would have negative evidence inst the competence theory. One would not, however, have strong itive evidence in favor of the gratitude theory, because a direct icator of gratitude is lacking.

A somewhat different strategy is to compare those couples re income and "competence" are inconsistent, i.e., where predictions ower based on resources differ from predictions based on perceived petence. This is Rosenberg's (1968) strategy for assessing relative

ffects of two variables. If resource-possession is more "potent" ıan "competence", marital power of high-income/low-competence spouses ıould exceed that of those with high-competence/low-income. The ›posite results would be expected, if competence is the more potent ıctor.

CONDITIONS	Competence assumption predicts A's power to be:	Gratitude assumption predicts A's power to be:
A > B in competence A < B in income	Higher	Lower
	↕ vs	↕ vs
A < B in competence A > B in income	Lower	Higher

Test C-G 2: (Competence prediction) Where resource-advantage and competence-advantage do not coincide, spouses having (1) higher competence and lower resources will have higher marital power than those with (2) lower competence and higher resources.

It may be, of course, that competence considerations are ımary when the task outcome is important (Hypothesis C-4) and that ratitude" mechanisms operate when task outcome is not so important. this is the case, one would expect:

Test C-G 3: Hypotheses C-G 1 and C-G 2 will be supported under conditions of high task-importance but not under conditions of low-task importance.

al-Input Theories Versus er-Dependence

The gratitude theory and, to some extent at least, the competence ›ry can be said to assume a norm of equal exchange (i.e., that spouses l obligated to contribute equal exchange "commodities," and that

xchange "debt" will be repaid in deference or compliance, if no
r coin is available). This exchange rule may be summarized as
ows:

Unequal resource inputs A > B	→ B raises inputs by giving more compliance	→ Equal total inputs Unequal output (power)	A = B A > B

Equal resource inputs
A = B ——————————————————→ Equal outputs (power)
A = B

In contrast, a power-dependence formulation need not assume a
of equal inputs (in the sense of equal contributions of exchange
dities). Neither unequal inputs nor, for that matter, outputs[70]
sarily must shift toward equality. Although norms of "fairness"
equality of exchange may exist, they are not presumed to override
ffect of relative dependence upon relative power. The exchange
for power-dependence theory deals not with inputs but with depend-
71

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[70]It is true that one power-dependence theorist, Emerson, adds an
onal proposition that imbalanced relations (where dependence is un-
will move over time toward a balanced state (where dependence is
and hence, for Emerson, where power-outputs must also be equal).

nequal dependence A > B	→ Balancing Operations	→ Equal dependence Equal outputs (power)	A = B A = B

s, he assumes that equal outputs will be the final result. He does
owever, assume that inputs will eventually become equal (see foot-
1).

[71]Equal dependence is not the same thing as equal inputs, since
input of exchange commodities by A may "yield" different amounts
endence from B, depending upon B's alternative sources of these
ties outside of the A-B relation.

F: Unequal dependence — Unequal power
A > B ⟶ A > B

F: Equal dependence — Equal power
A = B ⟶ A = B

Marital exchanges involve many different "commodities" of exchange, and it is almost impossible to determine what amount of commodity X "should" be exchanged for a given amount of commodity Y according to any exchange rule. I cannot, for example, empirically assess all of the exchanges of a couple and--weighting each commodity according to its perceived valuation by each spouse--measure whether that couple is engaged in equal exchange. But I can determine whether a spouse perceives the overall marital exchange of inputs to be equal.

Since relinquishing power serves to equalize spouses' total inputs, the equal-input theories would predict that situations of unequal-resource-input and a corresponding unequal-power-output would be viewed as fair by both spouses. Power-dependence theory would differ in its prediction; spouses will sometimes not view the exchange as equitable.

The indicator used for perception of exchange equality[72] does not explicitly tap inputs of external resources (such as income) or

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[72]The question used also appears to tap inputs other than compliance. I first asked respondents: "Some people think that married life is easier on women, while others say it is easier on men. In your experience, does it seem that married life is easier on men or women?" This was followed by asking: "What about your own marriage? (Would you say the same thing? Right now, who probably has it a little easier, you or your spouse?)".

ernal resources (of the competence variety); rather it seems to tap
its of internal resources such as amount of time and effort. Be-
e some exchange commodities are not included in this assessment
quality, there is no reason to predict that inequality of effort-
ts should result in corresponding inequalities of power. Extra
ts of effort, in fact, may serve to equalize an otherwise unequal
ange of inputs (in much the same manner that compliance is posited
qualize inputs in the equal-input theories):

ual inputs ——→ B contributes more effort ——→ Equal inputs
A > B A = B

Assuming that this also is consistent with the "norm of equal
nge" posited by equal-input theories, one would hypothesize that:

Test GC-D 1: (Equal-input assumption) Spouses perceiving that they contribute (a) more effort and (b) less effort than the other spouse, will not differ in perceptions of the <u>fairness</u> of exchange-outcomes.

pouse contributing more effort presumably does so in order to
the contributions of the other spouse in other resources, thus
lling the norm of equal exchange-inputs. Both should view this
uitable and "fair". The outcomes of the overall exchange (i.e.,
esulting power structure) should also be viewed as fair. Although
ot have measures of "fairness" <u>per se</u>, I do have data on satis-
n with power-outcomes; if these are seen as fair, they should
perceived as satisfactory.

In like manner, if power-outcomes emerge via a norm of equal
ge, there should be no difference in perceived fairness of

change results (satisfaction-with-outcomes) between more and less
werful spouses.

Test GC-D 2: (Equal-input assumption) There will be no difference in perceptions of the fairness of exchange-outcomes between high-power and low-power spouses.

wer-dependence theory, on the other hand, would not assume that all
uples act according to a norm of equal exchange. I would expect
at spouses who contribute more effort (Test D-GC 1) and who also
e low power (Test D-GC 2) would have lower satisfaction-with-power-
comes than other spouses. In addition, I would expect that high
er depresses satisfaction somewhat (as compared with equal-power
uses), but not as much as does low-power. This corresponds to
ans'' (1961) notion that inequality may bother both parties but it
l bother the disadvantaged party a great deal more. In like manner,
ould expect spouses who contribute less effort to be somewhat lower
n equal-effort spouses in satisfaction and spouses who contribute
e effort to be much lower. The alternative hypotheses may now be
ed explicitly:

Test D-GC 1: (Power-dependence assumption) Perceptions of the fairness of exchange outcomes will vary according to perceived contributions of effort of spouses, such that the following rank order will obtain (from highest to lowest satisfaction):

1) Equal effort
2) Self less effort than spouse
3) Self more effort than spouse

Test D-GC 2: (Power-dependence assumption) Perception of the fairness of exchange outcomes will vary according to perceived marital power, such that the following rank order will obtain (from highest to lowest satisfaction):

1) Equal power
2) Self more power than spouse
3) Self less power than spouse

:h of the above rest upon the (untested) assumption that satisfaction-
h-power-outcomes is a reflection of the perceived fairness or equity
those outcomes.

Another test between these alternatives theories, which does
require this assumption, deals with the notion of "alternatives"
:h is so central in power-dependence theory. In a gratitude or com-
ence explanation, only the actual (but not the potential, but not
l) resources should affect marital power. No one is "grateful" to
ouse for resources which could be but are not contributed, and no
se gains "competence" from the experience of foregoing resource-
inment efforts. In short, if the competence/gratitude theories
, I would expect:

Test GC-D 3: (Equal-input assumption) There will be no difference in marital power distributions between situations of equal and unequal potential alternative sources of resources.

Power-dependence theory, of course, would predict that the
se with higher alternatives will have higher power (controlling
lternative sources of resources which are currently being utilized).

Test D-GC 3: (Power-dependence assumption) The greater the inequality between spouses in potential alternatives, the greater the inequality in marital power (to the advantage of the spouse having higher potential alternatives).

tence Versus
-Dependence

If both the competence and power-dependence theories receive
support, an assessment of their relative adequacy would be in order.

st, one would want to control for one in order to see if the effect the other is reduced or eliminated.

Test C-D 1: (Competence assumption) When perceptions of relative competence are held constant, relative dependence will not be related to marital power.

Test D-C 1: (Power-dependence assumption) When relative dependence of spouses is held constant, relative competence perceptions will not be related to marital power.

above hypotheses are stated rather strongly. A reduction in the ation between dependence (or competence) and power, due to such rols, would also constitute some support for the hypothesis in tion.

A related strategy, particularly useful if both of the above theses receive some support, is the assessment of "relative effects" enberg, 1968: 169-182). Here the inconsistent cases are examined, e high competence and low dependence do not occur in combination. ompetence is the more "potent" independent variable, then one d expect:

Test C-D 2: (Competence assumption) Spouses with higher perceived competence combined with high relative dependence will have more marital power than spouses with lower competence combined with low relative dependence.

pendence is the stronger influence on marital power, the opposite ts would be expected (Test D-C 2).

Also interesting would be an examination of "task importance" variable. Hypothesis C-3 predicts that competence and marital should be most strongly related under conditions of high perceived

portance of the task (where it is important that the task be done

1). Power-dependence theory might be the better explanation under

ditions of low task-importance and competence theory under condi-

ns of high task-importance.

Test C-D 3: Perceived relative competence will be more strongly related to marital power under conditions of high perceived task-importance, and relative dependence will be more strongly related to marital power under conditions of low perceived task-importance.

A different prediction results, however, if task-importance

nterpreted as an aspect of motivational investment, with power-

ndence theory. From that point of view, power-dependence theory

ld hold even more strongly under high task importance than under

importance conditions (because in the former the power incentive

is increased, due to the greater benefits at stake).

Test D-C 4: (Power dependence assumption: task importance = motivational investment level) Relative dependence will be more strongly related to marital power under conditions of high task importance (than under conditions of low task-importance).[73]

are this hypothesis with Hypothesis C-3, previously presented.

Hypothesis C-3: (Competence assumption: task importance = rationale for subordinating individual goals in the interests of group goals) The relationship between perceived competence and marital power will be stronger for "tasks" judged to be important than for those judged to be less important.

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[73]"Dependence" here does not include the effect of task importance. (prior) dependence is presumably increased by the high motivational tment in the task.

There are reasons, then, for speculating that each theory ought to hold most strongly under the high-task-importance condition. This condition is also a critical test situation from another perspective: Safilios-Rothschild (1970) notes that "winning" in issues which are important to one reflects more power than "winning" on unimportant issues. Any theory which only accounts for power distributions within unimportant areas cannot be said to have high explanatory power. The theory which receives the strongest support under the high-importance condition could be said to have more explanatory power.

This brings up the question of underlying assumptions. Does high task-importance indicate that the individual has high individual goals at stake (as Safilios-Rothschild may assume and which is assumed in Test D-C 4) or that there are high group goals at stake (as the competence theory seems to assume; less competent B yields to A, sacrificing short-range individual gains for the sake of achieving group gains). Compare the predictions in Figure 8.

The power-dependence predictions in Figure 8 are based on an interpretation of task-importance judgments as motivational investment.[74]

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[74] One should ask whether my particular measure of task-importance tapped the importance of group-goals or individual-goals, since this gets to the heart of the underlying assumptions. If the power-dependence predictions in Figure 1 are not supported, this may be due to the importance-indicator measuring motivational investment in individual-goals (rather than in group-goals).

The hypothesis in question (D-4) was originally written with preference-strength (not task-importance) in mind as the measure of motivational investment. These two indicators may yield different results (e.g., a person may think a task is very important but not care

(individual goal-achievement assumed to be at stake)

	Relation between competence and power:	Relation between dependence and power:
Spouses agree:		
Task importance high	Increased → Hypothesis C-3	Increased → Test D-C 4
Task importance low	Decreased → Hypothesis C-3	No change or decreased → Test D-C 4
Spouses disagree:		
*A > B in importance	A's power raised → Prediction unclear; probably the low-importance spouse yields, since the other cares more (this increases quality of the relationship indirectly)	A's dependence is raised (and A's power is lowered) → Hypothesis D-4
B > A in importance	A's power lowered → Prediction unclear; probably the low-importance spouse yields, since the other cares more (this increases quality of the relationship indirectly)	B's dependence is raised (and A's power is raised) → Hypothesis D-4

*In competence version, A = more competent spouse.
In power-dependence version, A = less dependent spouse.

Figure 8. Task importance level and its predicted effect upon marital power.

The more that a spouse views an issue as important, the greater his or her motivational investment in a goal mediated by the other. This increases dependence (since more rewards are now mediated by the other spouse) and tends to decrease power.

Tests Involving Specific Resources

As discussed previously, one cannot hope to subject a theory of marital power to stringent testing by correlating specific resource-possession with marital power distribution. Still, there are a few specific "resources" which intuitively would seem to be "potent" (in their probable effect on power) and for which competing theories would predict distinctly different power-outcomes. Such tests necessarily involve additional assumptions, and so require more caution in the interpretation of findings, but they may provide fruitful clues for further theoretical development.

---

ch who does it, or a person may care very much who does a relatively important task). The consequences of poor task performance (at stake the task-performance questions) may differ from the consequences of ing tasks one dislikes or which "cost" much time and work (at stake the preference-strength question). Hence, where task-importance and eference-strength do not coincide:

High task-importance + low preference strength = group goal achievement is at stake

Low task-importance + high preference strength = individual goal achievement is at stake

pothesis D-4, if it holds anywhere, should hold under the latter condition. Non-support under this condition would constitute rather strong native evidence against power-dependence hypotheses about motivational vestment. This approach, however, has the disadvantage of eliminating h-importance tasks from the analysis.

ompetence and Gratitude ersus Power-Dependence

An employed wife should have greater marital power than a n-employed wife, according to either the competence or gratitude rmulations. The same would seem to be the case under power-dependence sumptions; after all, she has greater alternative sources of re- urces outside of her marriage. However, the second aspect of pendence--motivational investment--may actually be increased for me employed wives, cancelling out the marital power which otherwise uld be gained from working outside the home.

Hoffman's (1960) study of marital power of working wives icated that working was related to wives' marital power (a) if es had traditional marital ideologies or (b) if wives strongly re- ted traditional norms. However, if wives were more ambivalent in ir rejection of traditional norms, they garnered less power from ir working than in the other two cases. Hoffman suggests that y may try to reduce the "threat" of working to their husbands by ng extra-compliant. Another possibility is that, for some women, g able to work is a valued goal in itself. They have high moti- onal investment in being able to work. With the possible ption of couples having extremely equalitarian husbands, the wife's on of working is still a goal "mediated by the husband". That is, an effectively prevent his wife from working, either by forbidding r--in more "liberal" situations--by more subtle means such as ng her little assistance with home responsibilities, complaining

she has less free time to spend with him, or not being willing to
wer housecleaning standards now that she has less time for house-
rk. In short, he can making working such a "costly" option for
e wife that it is no longer worth the investment. He need not
ually do any of these things. Just the fact that he could prevent
from working makes her dependent upon him, if she has high moti-
ional investment in being able to work. Her high motivational
estment in working increases her dependence, and may override any
er she would otherwise obtain from the other "resources" she gains
n this alternative.

A working wife who does not value being able to work (or who
haps would rather not work) can always implicitly threaten to quit
, thereby reducing the family's income, unless her husband is
onably cooperative at home.[75]

Test D-CG 2: (Power-dependence assumption) Among couples where the wife is employed, the relationship between the wife's relative income and her marital power will be stronger when her motivational investment in working is high and weaker when her motivational investment is low.

A competence or gratitude formulation, on the other hand,
predict that such motivational investment would not affect the
ion of income to power (since motivational investment does not
the resource-contributions or her work-related competence nor
esources or competence of her husband).

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[75]This idea was suggested to me by Mel Katz, former statistical
ltant for the M.S.U. Department of Sociology.

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tant for the M.S.U. Department of Sociology.

The foregoing is a specific case of a more general type of situation, one in which motivational investment is not directly "attached" to resources.[76] Where motivation is invested in specific resources (e.g., of the other spouse), the several theories would predict the same results. In the gratitude or competence theories, the value of particular resources (e.g., income or some specific skill) is not taken as a given; although common cultural standards are often assumed, ideosyncratic differences in evaluation are not excluded in principle. "Motivational investment" in resources is simply another term for describing the fact that resources differ in value, and hence in their ability to affect marital power

Competence Versus Power-Dependence

In the competence explanation, high resources are associated with high competence because resource-procurement activities provide learning experiences. There are several particular resources which, it would seem, ought to be associated with the learning of knowledge

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[76] Another such case is motivational investment in power-as-an-end-in-itself (see Hypothesis D-6). Hoffman (1960) essentially tested a hypothesis similar to Test D-CG 2, substituting "traditionalism" for motivational investment. I suggest that her traditionalism ideology measure may actually tap intrinsic valuation of power. To make a strong case for this, of course, I would need a more direct measure of intrinsic valuation which is strongly associated with her traditionalism scale. I would speculate that wives' motivational investment in having a career (see Test D-CG 2 above) and both spouses' motivational investments in being a powerful person, in combination, could account for many of Hoffman's cases of high-resource, low-power wives.

and skills relevant to marriage. Persons possessing the "resources"[77] of greater age, previous marital experience, and having a child from a previous marriage should have greater average competence relevant to many marital situations (although having had children might only increase competence in dealing with child-specific problems). Therefore, such persons should have high average marital power.

These same "resources", from a power-dependence perspective, would be expected to decrease marital power by restricting "alternatives". Particularly for women, I would expect greater age to decrease their "market value" on the marriage market, reducing their potential alternatives to their present husbands. The label of "divorced" can also have the same effect, as can children requiring care and financial support. Such market-value considerations should be especially salient, I would think, for newly married couples such as those in my sample.

The contrasting predictions of competence theory and power-dependence theory for these specific resources are as follows:

Test C-D 4: (Competence assumption) Possession of resources of greater age, previous marital experience, and previous experience with children is directly related to marital power, such that the greater the spouses' inequality in experience, the greater their inequality of marital power (to the advantage of the more experienced spouse).

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[77] The use of the term "resources" seems awkward here. Berger's concept of "status characteristic" is less awkward, but is not entirely suitable in this particular case. Previous marital experience, for example, is a resource in that it supplies learning opportunities but often negatively evaluated, i.e., it is a negative rather than a positive status characteristic.

Test D-C 4: (Power-dependence assumption) Age, having been divorced, and having children from a previous marriage are inversely related to marital power, such that the greater the spouses' inequality, the greater their inequality of marital power (to the advantage of the spouse who is lower on these characteristics).

The power-outcome predictions of the above hypotheses may be ummarized as follows:



gure 9. Predicted marital power, according to competence and to power-dependence theory, for the resources of previous marital experience, age, and having children from a previous marriage.

this comparison, the crucial difference in predicted power occurs in unequal condition (one high, one low resource condition). Such a parison would provide support for one or the other theory, although dings could not be generalized beyond the particular resources ted.

This concludes my discussion of the hypotheses to be tested in present study. The purpose of this chapter was not merely to

develop a perhaps arbitrary set of hypotheses. It was a theoretical effort which, I hope, may contribute to the development of marital power theory.

The present impassé in one dominant tradition, the resource theory program of research, may prove to be due more to unclear theoretical assumptions than to problems of research methodology. I have focused on the cognitive processes which have been explicitly or implicitly assumed to be the link between resources of spouses and their marital power. My detailed examination of diverse and, at times, contrasting theoretical formulations may provide clues about fruitful directions for the future study of marital power.

Following a description of the research methods employed in this study, I will present the results of my hypothesis tests.

CHAPTER VIII

METHODOLOGY

Overview of the Study

e Panel Design

Data for testing the preceding hypotheses was obtained by terviewing a stratified sample of newlywed Michigan couples in eir first and second marriages.

Central to the design employed are two elements: (a) the terviewing of both spouses in each couple, (b) at two different ints in time during their early months of marriage. Couples were terviewed by telephone shortly after their weddings and, again, ur or five months later in their homes. Figure 10 summarizes the ming of the longitudinal design and the numbers of couples at each age for which complete data were obtained.

ME 0 - 1-2 mos. - →	TIME 1 - 4-5 mos. - →	TIME 2
plication marriage ense	1/2 hour TELEPHONE INTERVIEWS with each spouse	1-1/2 hour PERSONAL INTERVIEWS with both spouses (separately and together)
584 couples	N = 156 couples	N = 90 couples

ure 10. Overview of the Panel Design.

Findings reported are based upon data for the 90 couples (180 individuals) who participated in all phases of the research.[78]

Justification of the Design

The choice of this design was not made lightly, since it implied high research costs. That is, four individual-interviews were required per couple instead of the one needed for the more common procedure (e.g., that used by Blood and Wolfe, 1960) of interviewing one spouse at one point in time.

Inclusion of both spouses: Bernard (1972) and Safilios-Rothschild (1969), among others, have summarized the evidence that marriage may constitute a different reality for husbands and wives. For example, spouses often give different answers to the same questions. These differences are not random but patterned, e.g., in my own study, husbands reported doing more household tasks and wives reported making more decisions than their spouses gave them credit for.

Unlike Heer (1962) or Wilkening and Morrison (1963), I am not willing to assume that the reports of one gender are more reliable than the other. If individual's perceptions are assumed to affect behavior, then one should consider the perceptions of both spouses in trying to explain marital behavior.

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[78]Actually, 94 couples were involved in the entire study. Four were excluded from the analysis because the wives' personal interview questionnaires were lost in the mail.

The interviewing of both spouses complicates the analysis of data but offers possibilities otherwise not available. In the present study, for example, this made it possible for me to identify areas on which couples' role preferences were in agreement at the beginning of marriage, eliminating these areas from power-scores (since a role-division which is based upon consensus cannot be said to reflect power). In addition, having data from both spouses allowed me to submit theories of marital power to a much more rigorous test than would otherwise have been possible. Take the hypothesis from power-dependence theory that the spouse with the higher "market value" on the marriage market will have the higher marital power. Individuals who perceive themselves as having a low "market value", by this hypothesis, would not be predicted to have low power unless the other spouse had a high "market value." Use of both spouses' answers allows the separation of theoretically different situations, e.g., where both have a low market value (equal-power prediction).

The longitudinal dimension: The study of married couples at more than one point in time offers the possibility of observing couples over time. Even for a study in which the time-span covered is one of months rather than years, there are several advantages to such a longitudinal approach. Perhaps the primary advantages for the present report are methodological ones. A marital-power measure of the degree to which an individual's initial preferences are achieved some months later must include data about early preferences. Later recall of these

ferences are likely to be unreliable, both because of the difficulty remembering and because of the wish to convince oneself or the interwer that the marriage is satisfactory, e.g., that responsibilities divided according to one's preferences. Questions about why one ected a particular spouse or about one's "market value" are likely be more reliably answered shortly after marriage, while the memory fresh.

Sampling

teria for the pling Pool

The sampling pool consisted of all couples meeting four pling criteria who applied for marriage licenses between February 1 May 15, 1974, in seven urban counties in southern Michigan. These nties were Wayne, Oakland, and Macomb (the greater Detroit area), ham and Eaton (Lansing-East Lansing), Washtenaw (Ann Arbor) and (Grand Rapids).

All marriage license applications during this period were ined and 584 couples identified as apparently meeting the follow- eligibility criteria:

a) Both spouses between the ages of 22 and 40;

b) Husbands employed in an upper-middle or middle-middle status occupation;[79]

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[79] It did not prove feasible to simultaneously consider wives' pations as well. The requirement that wives also have high-status pations would have reduced the sample size drastically.

For purposes of sample selection, a simple technique of rmining occupational level was needed, one which allowed quick sort- f the thousands of license applications while sitting in the various

c) Both spouses either:
   1) entering a first marriage or,
   2) entering a second marriage preceded by divorce (rather than by widowhood);[80]

d) Both spouses born in the United States or Canada.

These eligibility criteria were chosen with two aims in mind. first was to increase the homogeneity of the sample, that is, to trol for variables extraneous to the theory which are known to ect the dependent variables. For example, marital power and ision-task arrangements vary among social classes (e.g., see Blood Wolfe, 1960) and among cultures (Michel, 1967; Safilios-Rothschild, 7; Burić and Zečević, 1967; Rodman, 1967). If one is to have con- ence that observed variations in marital power and decision-task

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nty Clerks' offices. The Revised Scale for Rating Occupation rner et al., 1949) was chosen because " . . . its seven-point occu- ion scale [is] probably the most sophisticated short classification ilable" (Robinson et al., 1969: 338). Couples were included in s study only if the husband's occupation fell in the top three of seven categories. However, occupation descriptions on marriage nses are sometimes vague, and a few persons with lower-middle level ipations were included in the sample as a result.

Husbands describing themselves as students or military per- el were also excluded, the former because a student situation was idered transitory and atypical, and the latter because no military allations existed within the region where it was financially feasible onduct interviews.

[80]A few of the 584 couples initially selected, it turned out, widowed and had to be disqualified. Michigan marriage license forms inguish between divorced and widowed persons only for women, by ask- for "Maiden name (if a widow)". One county refused to ask women if had been divorced, listing the maiden name of all previously married n, and several others had grossly inaccurate records on this item. he other hand, two counties on their own initiative collected divorce rmation from both men and women. In all counties it was necessary to upon answers given by the couple on the return-postcard (Appendix A).

structures are due to differences in the hypothesized independent variables, rather than in social class or cultural background, such controls are necessary. Therefore, persons born in other countries or working in lower-status occupations (the measure used for social class position) were not included in the study. It would have been desirable to control for several additional extraneous variables via sampling criteria, but this would have reduced the final sample size too much.

The selection of predominantly urban counties also served to increase sample homogeneity by eliminating most rural couples. The sample proved to be predominantly white, although race was not a sampling criterion because few non-white husbands met the occupational criterion and because refusal rates were higher than for white couples.[81]

One of the aims of this research was the study of marital communication (although the present report does not deal with this data). The second purpose of the sampling criteria was to increase the probability of finding explicit marital negotiation behavior, something thought to be quite infrequent in the general population. Testing of hypotheses is not possible without adequate variation in the

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[81] Refusal rates were particularly high for racially mixed marriages. Black couples were often willing to be interviewed by telephone but declined the offer for a personal interview, which may well have been due to the use of white telephone interviewers. Plans to employ a black interviewing team during the personal interviews were dropped because of the low number of black respondents.

independent variable, i.e., one cannot compare the effects of high versus low communication with a sample of low-communication couples. While the first purpose of the sampling criteria was to reduce variance with respect to extraneous variables, the second was to increase variance of the independent variables.

The very young and the less educated,[82] it was reasoned, are less likely to question traditional marital roles and hence to engage in the extensive communication often required to work out new roles. They were excluded from the sampling frame for this reason.

Special effort was made to include many previously divorced persons in the sample. The experience of one unsatisfactory former marriage[83] was believed likely to increase marital discussion about roles, in an effort to avoid past problems and mistakes. Also, previous marital experience may affect both "competence" and dependence", two central variables to be tested with reference to

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[82] It did not prove feasible to use education *per se* as a mpling criterion. Education is known to be highly intercorrelated th occupation status (Blau and Duncan, 1967), an indicator which s employed as a selection rule.

[83] The previously widowed were excluded because they presumably cked this experience. Within this age group, there proved to be very widows and widowers anyway.

Persons in their third marriage or more were excluded for sons of sample homogeneity.

the marital power theories. Since such second marriages were a fairly small proportion[84] of the sampling pool, simple random sampling was not appropriate.

Sample Stratification

The sampling pool was stratified into four marriage "types" as illustrated in Figure 11, with approximately equal numbers of couples selected from each category for interviewing.

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[84]Statistics for the state of Michigan (Michigan Department of Public Health, 1971: 324) indicate relatively high percentages of second marriages for persons between 22 and 40.

Second marriages as a per cent of all 1969 marriages in Michigan

Ages	Brides	Grooms
20-24	10.8%	5.1%
25-29	41.7	26.8
30-34	58.3	50.0
35-39	62.9	57.4
25-39	49.9	36.9
All ages (including the above)	18.6	19.0

ese figures, however, include many people not eligible for the present udy (e.g., married to someone under 22 or over 40 or to someone having re than one previous marriage). Most important, they include working ass as well as middle class persons. In sorting through thousands of rriage licenses, many more second marriages were encountered among ose with lower-status occupations for every one found among higher- atus levels. In fact, the infrequency of eligible second marriages cessitated the extension of the study to many more counties than uld otherwise have been included.

		WIFE: 1st marriage	WIFE: 2nd marriage
HUSBAND	1st marriage	a	b
	2nd marriage	c	d

igure 11. Sampling design.

The reason for including a high proportion of second marriages as already been discussed. The choice of a four-category sampling esign rather than a two-category one (first vs. second marriages) was ade on both methodological and theoretical grounds.

This design insures, first, equal numbers of individuals of ach gender who have been and have not been previously married. nother technique of achieving this goal of equal numbers, the in- usion of only both-first and both-second marriages[85] (cells a and d Figure 11) was rejected because the "mixed" cases (cells b and c) ovide the best tests of certain hypotheses and hence are the most eoretically interesting. For example, it is hypothesized that be- g divorced is a power-resource in marital exchange which tends to fect one's bargaining power. But it is relative resources which are othesized to affect relative power of spouses; no difference in ative power is predicted between both-first and both-second couples

[85]This design would not have been possible on practical grounds way, as both-second marriages are the least frequent and hardest to ain of all the four marriage types.

since resources are equal in both cases. Only where one spouse has a relative advantage is a different outcome expected. A clear rank-ordering of husband-dominance (or wife dominance) among the four cells can be predicted (e.g., in power-dependence theory, husband dominance should be the highest in cell b, medium in cells a and d, and lowest in cell c). This rank-order provides a more stringent test of the hypothesis (in the sense of being more clearly falsifiable) than does the prediction that both-first and both-second couples should not differ in relative dominance patterns (where the problem enters in of judging how much similarity it takes to conclude that there is no difference between groups).

Characteristics and Representativeness of the Sample

Although theory development rather than generalization of findings to a larger population was the primary objective of the study, a few comments should be made about the representativeness of the sample finally selected.

Effect of sampling procedures upon representativeness: The actual process of obtaining a sample of respondents involved four stages: the choice of counties, within those counties the collection of names of all couples meeting the sampling criteria, selection of couples for the first interviews and--from those interviewed--the choice of couples to be interviewed a second time.

The seven counties were chosen because they offered a large population base, encompassing four of Michigan's five most populous

Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (Detroit, Grand Rapids, Lansing, and Ann Arbor).[86] Flint and the smaller SMSA's of Saginaw, Kalamazoo, Muskegon-Muskegon Heights, Jackson, and Bay City were not included. No claim is made that study findings can be generalized to Michigan as a whole or to urban situations in other states.

The second stage of compiling the sampling frame required several months before sufficient names of eligible newlyweds could be accumulated. Given the requirement that couples be interviewed as soon as possible after the wedding, interviewing necessarily overlapped with the gathering of additional names. This had two consequences for sample representativeness. First, it was impossible to draw a random sample within each of the four marriage types because the total list of names was not available before interviewing began.[87] And second, since the couples married first were interviewed first,

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[86] The combined population of these four SMSA's was 5,351,682 persons in 1970 (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1971; 24-3), with Detroit being by far the largest with 4,199,931 persons in its three-county area. Lansing and Ann Arbor were chosen in preference to the more populous Flint area for practical reasons, Lansing because the study was headquartered there, and Ann Arbor because work could be coordinated with the bordering Detroit area.

The rural fringes contained in the SMSA's of Detroit and Ann Arbor were not included, partly because they fell outside of the toll-free Michigan State University telephone trunkline. The predominantly rural counties of Clinton (in the Lansing area) and Ottawa (in the Grand Rapids SMSA) were excluded entirely.

[87] In order to have a complete sampling frame prior to interviewing--when it is necessary to interview people soon after marriage--<u>much</u> larger population base would be needed.

interviewing quotas for the most frequently occurring marriage types were filled first. The result was that both-first marriage couples chosen had weddings in February and March, while second marriage weddings included April and early May dates in addition.[88] There is no reason to assume that couples marrying at different times of the year will vary in systematic, theoretically relevant ways,[89] however, so this should not be an important source of bias.

Couples chosen during the third and fourth stages of sampling (for the first and second interviews respectively) may be more representative of second marriages (than of both-first marriages). The lack of random sampling presents less of a problem, since nearly all possible second marriage couples were interviewed even when this required extensive efforts to locate and persuade them to participate. This was necessary in order to obtain sufficient cases, particularly of the rarer both-second and wife-second marriages. Both-first couples, on the other hand, were numerous, the sample interviewed contained a high proportion of self-selected couples (i.e., those that were most willing to participate).[90]

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[88]During the last visits to County Clerks, only the names of second-marriage couples were gathered.

[89]There are differences in number of couples who marry during different seasons, varying from a low point in January to a high in June. The "June bride" phenomenon is probably age-related, including a higher percentage of young couples; these couples most likely are not within the age group of this study--both spouses >22 and <40 years.

[90]This is more true of some counties than of others, however, depending upon the conscientiousness and persistence of the interviewers. The Kent County sample of first marriages is undoubtedly the best in this respect. In retrospect, it would have been advisable and possible to use random sampling of both-first couples for the second interviews.

Response rates: Of the initial list of 584 couples, 14 were
iscovered not to meet the eligibility criteria for the study (three
id not go through with their marriage plans, six had been widowed
ather than divorced, and five were disqualified for other reasons).
f the remaining couples, 47 were known to have moved out of the
rea and 20 had no forwarding address or telephone, leaving a total
f 503 couples as potential respondents. Response patterns of these
uples are summarized in Table 2.

The 156 couples where both spouses had been interviewed
nstituted the sampling pool for the second interviews. Perhaps
cause the experience of the first interview had been non-threaten-
g and/or interesting, over 70 per cent accepted the invitation for
ther interview before any follow-up calls were made. Many of
se were both-first couples, all of whom could not be interviewed
financial reasons.

Of the pool of 156 couples, four had moved out of the
a and one was already divorced. Response patterns of the remain-
151 couples are shown in Table 3.

Of these 151 couples, 85 per cent agreed to be interviewed
60 per cent actually were interviewed. Per cent of couples
erviewed varied considerably by marriage type: both first marriage,
per cent; husband second marriage, 61 per cent; wife second marriage,
per cent; and both second marriage, 76 per cent. The higher rates
the several second-marriage types were due to special follow-up
phone calls, necessary for obtaining sufficient respondents.

	Returned Postcard Voluntarily	Postcard Acceptance	Telephoned	Telephone Acceptance	Total Contacted	Total Acceptances	Both Spouses Interviewed	One Spouse Interviewed
Both 1st (N = 196 couples)	85	67	54	31	139	98	60	2
Husband 2nd (N = 101 couples)	34	29	33	16	67	45	37	4
Wife 2nd (N = 79 couples)	27	20	28	17	55	37	33	4
Both 2nd (N = 127 couples)	31	20	33	16	64	36	26	6
TOTAL (N = 503 couples)	177	136	148	80	325	216	156	16

ble 3. Response patterns by marriage type: Phase II personal interviews.

	Total Contacted	Total Acceptances	Total Refusals	Total Interviewed
ch 1st 55 ples)	48	46	2	26
band 2nd 36 ples)	35	33	2	22
e 2nd 35 ples)	35	28	7	23
h 2nd 25 ples)	25	22	3	19
AL 51 ples)	143	129	14	90

acteristics of Respondents

Characteristics of the 90 couples who participated in all es of the study are presented in Table 4. These are the couples provided the data used in the present report.

The majority of couples interviewed, especially in the nd-marriage groups, were from the populous Detroit area. The marriage types--not surprisingly--differed with respect to al characteristics. On the average, wives were youngest in first marriages, followed by husband-second and wife-second ages, with wives in both-second marriages being the oldest. The trend was true for age of husbands, except that husbands in

Table 4. Characteristics of Respondents by marriage type: Phase II Personal Interviews.

CHARACTERISTICS	Marriage Type of Couples: First or Second Marriage				
	Both 1st (N=26)	Husband 2nd, Wife 1st (N=22)	Wife 2nd, Husband 1st (N=23)	Both 2nd (N=19)	TOTAL (N=90)
COUNTY IN WHICH MARRIED					
Lansing area (N=8)	15 %	5 %	4 %	11 %	9 %
Ingham Co. (N=8)					
Eaton Co. (N=0)					
Detroit area (N=50)	35	81	48	53	56
Wayne Co. (N=28)					
Oakland Co. (N=16)					
Macomb Co. (N=6)					
Grand Rapids area (N=14)	19	5	17	21	16
Kent Co.					
Ann Arbor area (N=18)	31	9	30	5	20
Washtenaw Co.					
	100 %	100 %	99 %	100 %	101 %
AGE OF WIFE (at marriage)					
22 - 25 years (N=42)	73 %	55 %	30 %	21 %	47 %
26 - 29 years (N=34)	19	32	52	53	38
30 - 33 years (N=11)	8	14	13	16	12
34 - 40 years (N=2)	--	--	--	11	2
No information (N=1)	--	--	4	--	1
	100 %	101 %	99 %	101 %	100 %

34 - 40 years (N=13)	--	14	13	37	99 %
	101 %	100 %	99 %	100 %	

HUSBAND'S OCCUPATIONAL STATUS					
Professional, technical (N=51)	61 %	50 %	65 %	47 %	57 %
Managers, officials, proprietors (except farm) (N=23)	15	36	26	26	26
Clerical, Sales (N=13)	23	9	4	21	14
Other (N=3)	--	5	4	5	3
	99 %	100 %	99 %	99 %	100 %

WIFE'S OCCUPATIONAL STATUS					
Professional, technical (N=36)	46 %	36 %	22 %	58 %	40 %
Managers, officials, proprietors (except farm) (N=8)	12	5	13	5	9
Clerical, Sales (N=30)	23	36	48	26	33
Other occupation (N=4)	4	5	9	--	4
Student, field unknown (N=5)	12	5	4	--	6
Housewife (N=5)	--	14	4	5	6
	101 %	101 %	100 %	99 %	100 %

Table 4. Continued.

CHARACTERISTICS	Marriage Type of Couples: First or Second Marriage				
	Both 1st (N=26)	Husband 2nd, Wife 1st (N=22)	Wife 2nd, Husband 1st (N=23)	Both 2nd (N=19)	TOTAL (N=90)
WIFE: HOURS EMPLOYED					
Full time (N=70)	78 %	82 %	74 %	79 %	78 %
Part time (N=11)	8	9	17	16	12
None (N=9)	15	9	9	5	10
	101 %	100 %	100 %	100 %	100 %
HUSBAND: HOURS EMPLOYED					
Full time (N=86)	100 %	100 %	91 %	89 %	96 %
Part time (N=2)	--	--	5	5	2
None (N=2)	--	--	5	5	2
	100 %	100 %	101 %	99 %	100 %
WIFE: FORMAL EDUCATION					
Two or more years of college (N=56)	81 %	64 %	43 %	58 %	62 %
Less than two years of college (N=28	15	36	39	37	31
No information (N=6)	4	--	17	5	7
	100 %	100 %	99 %	100 %	100 %
HUSBAND: FORMAL EDUCATION					
Two or more years of college (N=77)	96 %	77 %	83 %	84 %	86 %

Both spouses "liberal"(N=38) (non-fundamental Protestant, non-Orthodox Jewish, "modern" Catholic, no religion)	31 %	45 %	48 %	47 %	42 %
Both spouses "conservative" (N=35) (Fundamental Protestant, Orthodox Jewish, "traditional" Catholic, other religion)	58	41	26	26	39
Mixed: one spouse liberal, one spouse conservative (N=13)	12	9	22	16	14
No information (N=2)	--	5	4	11	4
	101 %	100 %	100 %	100 %	99 %

RACE/ETHNICITY

Both White, not Spanish-American (N=85)	92 %	95 %	96 %	95 %	94 %
Both Black (N=1)	--	--	4	--	1
One White, one Black (N=2)	4	--	--	5	2
Both White; one Spanish-American (N=1)	4	--	--	--	1
One Oriental, one Black (N=1)	--	5	--	--	1
	100 %	100 %	100 %	100 %	99 %

CHARACTERISTICS	Marriage Type of Couples: First or Second Marriage				
	Both 1st (N=26)	Husband 2nd, Wife 1st (N=22)	Wife 2nd, Husband 1st (N=23)	Both 2nd (N=19)	TOTAL (N=90)
DO ANY CHILDREN LIVE WITH COUPLE?					
Yes (N=30)	-- %	23 %	48 %	74 %	33 %
No (N=60)	100	77	52	26	67
	100 %	100 %	100 %	100 %	
DOES WIFE HAVE A CHILD FROM A PREVIOUS MARRIAGE?					
Yes (N=28)	-- %	9 %	61 %	63 %	31 %
No (N=62)	100	91	39	37	69
	100 %	100 %	100 %	100 %	100 %
DOES HUSBAND HAVE A CHILD FROM A PREVIOUS MARRIAGE?					
Yes (N=25)	-- %	68 %	-- %	53 %	28 %
No (N=65)	100	32	100	47	72
	100 %	100 %	100 %	100 %	100 %

-second marriages were slightly younger than those in husband-
d marriages, in general.

Husbands who had not been married before (both first and second) were somewhat more likely to be in professional or ical occupations than previously divorced husbands. Both-second nds had the lowest average occupational status of the four s. In contrast, both-second wives had the highest average occu- nal status of all wives and were the only group in which wives ded husbands in per cent of professional/technical workers, the st status category. Surprisingly, both-first wives were more unemployed than were other groups of wives. There was little rence among marriage types in per cent of wives employed full 78 per cent of all women had full-time jobs. Almost all husbands mployed full time.

Over three-fourths of all husbands had two or more years of e, as did over one-half of the wives. Couples were about evenly d between those with "conservative" and "liberal" religious back- s. Both-first couples were more often from "conservative" ounds than other marriage groups; many of these couples are from nd Rapids area and are of "Dutch Reformed" background. Couples h one spouse comes from a conservative and one from a liberal und are the most common among wife-second and both-second couples. al sample included four Jewish couples, 17 Catholic and 33 ant couples. Five reported no religion and the remaining couples ixed" marriages (including six Catholic/Protestant combinations).

The vast majority of all respondents were white. One-third of the couples had one or more children living with them. Although husbands in the husband-second group most often had children, very few had children living with the couple. Both-second couples were the most likely to have children currently living with them; with very few exceptions, these children belong to the wife rather than the husband. Although about as many wife-second as both-second wives had children, wife-second couples were less likely to have children living with them. It may be that husbands who have not been married before are less willing to live with children than are previously married husbands.

In general, the respondents in the present study can be characterized as upper-middle class, predominantly white couples from urban areas. They are relatively well educated, and the majority are in their twenties. Perhaps because these couples have not been married long and because of the financial pressures of child-support payments, an unusually high proportion of the wives--90 per cent--are gainfully employed.

Preparation for Data Gathering

Questionnaire Construction

Questionnaires (see Appendices B through E) were informally pretested with colleagues and friends[91] during the early stages of

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[91]The author would particularly like to acknowledge the helpful suggestions of Dr. Frederick Waisanen and the detailed feedback of Tracy Huget, Werner von der Ohe, Michael Schneiderman, Charles and Kay Bauer, Sara and David Braden, Carolyn Thomas, and Carolyn Walker.

nstruction and the semi-final version pretested with 10 couples, ose names were obtained from the Ingham County marriage records and o met the sampling criteria.

Prior to formal pretesting, several hundred Michigan State iversity students in a junior-level social psychology class com- eted a questionnaire about characteristics they valued in a spouse future spouse. From the 40 characteristics which the students ed, eleven were included in the Phase I interview schedule. Nine these eleven items were selected by the following procedure. First, stionnaires from students under 20 years of age were discarded. remaining questionnaires were sorted into four groups: single es, single females, married females, and married males. For each up, mean "importance" ratings were calculated for each character- ic. The four characteristics which received very high ratings by groups were first identified. To these were added five character- cs which were highly rated only by married respondents or only by ondents of one gender. Two items with relatively low ratings, ing with household task performance and communication, were also uded in the final Phase I questionnaire (see the end of Appendix B).

Most Phase I pretest interviews were conducted by the author. use others not so familiar with the questionnaire were not in- ed in pretesting, some problems in layout and clarity of directions not detected. One result was a fair amount of missing data for decision questions" (pp. 2-5 of telephone questionnaire, Appendix B). II pretests involved additional interviewers, increasing the ease ministration of the final instrument.

nterviewer Recruitment,
raining, and Supervision

Criteria used for selecting interviewers included age, race, eneral social class background, and gender. That is, they were to e similar to the respondents--of roughly the same age group, white since almost all respondents were white), with some college education, d of the same gender as the particular respondent. In addition, of urse, interviewing experience, and ability to understand and use e questionnaires and to relate comfortably to respondents were also nsidered.

Recruitment: Initially an attempt was made to obtain tele- one interviewers living in the outlying counties, with the idea that e most reliable would be asked to continue during the better-paying rsonal interviews. Interviewers were solicited through contacts h sociology departments in six colleges, announcements in college -placement lists and in teachers' association newsletters, and ough individuals suggested by faculty members. Recruitment of com- ent, reliable interviewers was the most problematic for the greater roit area during both phases of the interviewing. Here the drop-out e[92] was sufficiently high that the use of out-of-town interviewers dropped in the latter part of telephone interviewing. Local

[92]This rate was probably no higher than in most studies using professional interviewers. Because each outlying area required a 2 to 2-1/2 hour drive to reach, every drop-out represented the loss onsiderable time and effort invested in training and supervision. etrospect, Lansing interviewers should have been used for all tele- e interviewing.

interviewers using toll-free university telephone trunklines were substituted, with many fewer problems of recruitment and supervision.

Recruitment of reliable interviewers was less problematic[93] for the Phase II personal interviews than for Phase I. Several things may account for this: higher pay, the continued participation of four excellent interviewers, and--perhaps most important--the fact that interviewers worked in teams, providing moral support for each other.[94]

The concept of research as a social exchange process can be applied to interviewers as well as to respondents. The "commodities" received by interviewers go far beyond money. The most reliable interviewers were those having motives in addition to pay (e.g., personal friendship, grades in a research course, spending time with an

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[93]This is not to say that there were no problems. The greater etroit area, including most of the second-marriage respondents, was ontracted to a professional interviewer who proved to be most unreliable. ese interviews were finally completed, but only by special arrangeents with Madonna College in Livonia. A special credit "Cooperative perience in Social Research" was organized by Mr. Dennis Bozyk, Chairn of the Division of Social Sciences. Class members were primarily ult night-school students and were hand-picked by Mr. Bozyk. They tended two three-hour sessions, conducted interviews, and wrote a term per. In addition to course credit, they were also paid for interviews ne. The exchange was mutually beneficial, as Madonna College students ve no other opportunity for coursework in research methods.

[94]Telephone interviewing is a solitary activity, easy to put until another day. Relatively inexperienced interviewers underimate the difficulty of finding respondents at home and become bored ng the same questionnaire over and over. Some find themselves lack- in the necessary courage. Regardless of the pay scale, few will ually complete more than 10 or 15 interviews.

attractive interviewer of the opposite sex, and the desire to establish a reputation for a newly established survey research center[95]). Status is also an important commodity in the exchange, both the status of the study itself and of the university connected with the study; if one wants to recruit reliable interviewers, I found one should avoid ever admitting that the research is "only" for a graduate student's dissertation and one should approach colleges of a lower status than one's own. The most fruitful sources of dependable out-of-town interviewers were small religious colleges of a conservative persuasion, either Catholic or fundamental Protestant, where the attractiveness of cooperating with a higher-status university is combined with a belief in the "work ethic."

Training and supervision: Out-of-town interviewers were interviewed and usually "trained" in their homes or places of business. The training sessions averaged 1-1/2 hours for the telephone questionaire and 2-1/2 hours for the personal-interview schedule, beginning with general principles of interviewing, proceeding to a detailed discussion of the questionnaire, and ending with a consideration of the practical problems of handling the interview situation. Phase II sessions included practice in rating a simulated couple interview

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[95] In fact, the decision to give the Kent County interviewing sponsibility to Ann Schroeder of the Calvin College Social Research nter resulted in my most pleasant experience with interviewers. She d her staff took entire responsibility for both telephone and personal terviewers, and were without exception reliable, thorough, and comcent. In exchange, a letter was circulated to all MSU sociology culty telling them of the availability and high quality of this new earch center.

see the end of Appendix C), for purposes of establishing common efinitions of concepts. Interviewers were paid for one or two practice interviews" done on their own, followed by another session or the clearing up of questions and problems.

Out-of-town interviewers were supervised by telephone and personal visits every couple of weeks, when completed questionnaires ere checked and picked up. The major task of supervision proved to keeping the time schedule implied in the research design (so that e time span between the first and second interviews was similar for l couples).[96]

The Data-Gathering Process

taining Access to rriage Records

The use of marriage license records as a source of names was sirable, because such records allow immediate identification of uples meeting the sampling criteria. This saves the expense of send- thousands of letters to persons who may not be eligible and also

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[96]Because of this design requirement, any problems with ependable interviewers were serious problems. The most difficult es involved people who ceased doing interviewing but would not admit when telephoned, thus delaying the assignment of new interviewers he area. In retrospect, this should have been handled by having leted questionnaires mailed in immediately. At the time, however, added cost of several dollars per couple for first-class postage judged to be prohibitive. Third-class mail was tried but proved e much too slow, often taking several weeks. Also, several tionnaires mailed third-class never arrived.

rovides some data about all couples, allowing comparison of
spondents and non-respondents to identify sampling biases.[97]

It proved necessary for practical (as well as theoretical)
asons to interview very recently married persons, since the
dresses on marriage licenses are soon out of date. It also proved
cessary to obtain recent records from the individual county clerks
ther than from the Vital Statistics Department of the Michigan
partment of Public Health, because filing deadlines are seldom
mptly met by the counties.

Although, by law, marriage licenses are public records in
higan, access, in practice, requires the permission of the County
rk. A telephone call explaining the purpose of the research
ficed in most cases. In one county, cooperation was attained only
requesting the intervention of Mr. van Hamburg of the Michigan
ic Health Service Vital Statistics Office. In general, the
ler and busier offices were initially less enthusiastic about the
usion of researchers into their work routine.

Each of the seven offices was visited several times, a total
9 trips in all, for the purpose of examining the most recent

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[97]The possibility of obtaining names from ministers of "liberal"
-middle class protestant churches was considered, with the hope that
would provide a sample homogeneous with respect to religion as well
cial class. Unlike more traditional churches, however, such churches
do not keep records of marriages performed.

rriage licenses.[98] After sorting out the eligible couples, the
rtinent information about each was copied (names, addresses, ages,
cupations, country of birth, license file number, county and date
license application and/or marriage). Letters were then addressed
sent to each couple as soon as possible, often before returning
Lansing in order to circumvent the two-day postal delay otherwise
ountered.

tial Contacts with Couples

The letter sent to all 584 couples explained the purpose of
study and asked their cooperation in completing ten questions on
stage-paid return card (see Appendix A), including their telephone
er if they were willing to be interviewed. Other questions in-
ed religion, education and immediate plans for having children
ended as a possible additional sampling criterion although not in
end used as such), whether each spouse had been married before--
f so--whether divorced or not (to supplement incomplete marriage
se data for sample stratification use), items for use in com-
g the characteristics of respondents and non-respondents (race,
t of time each spouse is employed, presence of children living

[98]Some offices only allowed us to use license applications,
others preferred us to use the licenses. The former is pre-
e because occupation descriptions are sometimes changed during
ping of final licenses (e.g., "executive secretary to president
st National Bank" may be changed to "secretary"). All informa-
ad to be copied by hand onto our own forms.

the couple, nature of the major job activity,[99] and whether the
nt occupation was a temporary job or the beginning of a long-term
r.[100]

If the return-card was not received within two or three weeks,
nd copy of the letter was sent.[101] Cards were finally received
78 couples in this manner. In addition, many couples were con-
by telephone when it was possible to obtain their telephone
s. This proved an effective technique of increasing the response
02 Answers to the "postcard questions" were obtained during the
part of the telephone calls, a technique which seemed to convince
of the legitimacy of the study and reassure them that we did not
to ask threatening questions. In all, 148 couples were tele-
in this manner.

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[99]"In your present occupation, which one activity takes the
me?" Respondents chose from categories adapted from Kohn (1969)--
and writing, working with your hands, or dealing with people--
d to provide additional information about the status-level of
ons. This question proved inappropriate for self-administration
ny respondents insisted upon checking more than one of the three
es.

[100]This question, as well as the question about major occupa-
ctivity, appeared to have some reliability problems. In several
couple was asked the questions by phone before their postcard
ived. The two sets of answers often differed, probably because
t spouses responded in each case.

[101]The first letters were addressed to "Mr. and Mrs..." and sent
sband's address. The second letters specified the maiden name
fe as well and were sent to the wife's address on the marriage
Wives appear to be more conscientious about providing the post
th forwarding addresses.

[102]A good deal of the success must be credited to Maureen Aquilina,
many evenings on the MSU telephone trunk lines telephoning

e I Telephone Interviews

Telephone interviewing began as soon as the first acceptances obtained from couples, in early March, and continued until mid-1974. Each couple was interviewed as soon as possible after wedding, which usually meant one to two months thereafter.[103]

Each spouse was interviewed separately for half-an-hour by terviewer of the same gender.[104] Couples were asked not to dis-he interview questions until both had been interviewed and, possible, both spouses were interviewed within the same week in to minimize inter-spouse discussion.

In all, 328 individuals were interviewed including 156 "com- couples.[105] Only these couples were eligible for the second of interviews.

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[103]By Michigan law a couple may apply for a marriage license 0 days prior to the wedding. In practice, the average is only six days beforehand. Given delays due to forwarding mail to resses and to honeymoon trips, etc., few couples received the until a week or two after their wedding. Nor did they (quite andably) answer it immediately but waited a week or two before ng the card.

[104]During pretesting, it became apparent that people tell ut things to male and female interviewers. Husbands, in parti- eemed less than frank about how they would prefer to divide d tasks when talking with a female interviewer. Hence it was to handle the differential effects of interviewer gender by cross-gender interviewing situations.

For telephone solicitation of interview participation, female callers seemed more successful with both husbands and

[105]If one spouse declined to participate, the other spouse was rviewed. Men were much more likely to refuse than their wives, tages of the interviewing.

ase II Personal Interviews

At the end of each telephone interview, the possibility of econd interview was mentioned and a tentative statement of interest ained. A letter verifying the plans for personal interviews was led to couples in late June, 1974, together with an answer form pendix A) and a stamped return-envelope. The response rate to s letter was sufficiently high (close to 70 per cent prior to any low-up efforts) that a second letter was not sent this time.[106] e telephone calls were made to second-marriage couples, since a ier percentage was needed in order to meet the requirements of the ling design without too large a sacrifice in sample size. Among more numerous first marriages, more couples volunteered than could nterviewed with the funds available. The objective was to obtain mple of 25 couples in each of the four marriage types or a total 0 couples (See Figure 11).

Each couple was assigned to an interviewing team of one man ne woman. Interviewers contacted the couple by telephone some eforehand to make a definite interview appointment. Interviews

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[106] This remarkably high response rate was apparently due to st interviews being non-threatening and of interest to respond- The success was such that it suggests the deliberate use of telephone interviews as a recruitment technique for future !-interview projects.

k place in the couple's home, usually on evenings and weekends, lasted for approximately 1-1/2 hours.[107]

The bulk of the personal interviews were done between July and September 31, 1974. In order to maintain equal time intervals veen the Phase I and Phase II interviews, an attempt was made to rview first those couples that had been interviewed first during telephone interviews. This meant that first marriages tended to ontacted before second marriages. However, summer vacations of les made this scheduling ideal more difficult to attain.

The interview format was as follows: the interviewing team ved at the couple's home and, after some initial small talk, soon into separate rooms (the wife and female interviewer in one room he husband and male interviewer in another). Separate interviews d an hour and a quarter, on the average. This was followed by minute joint interview of the couple by both interviewers, for es of obtaining behavioral measures of couple interaction (not ed in the analysis in the present report). The questionnaires cluded in Appendices C through E.

Ninety of the hoped-for 100 couples were actually interviewed. s contained in this report are based upon interviews with these .

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[107]Interviewers living in the interviewing area were usually minimize driving time. Even so, since couples were quite cattered within a given area, many hours were spent in driving. thanks are due to Mark and Claire Sandler and to Werner von der drove from Lansing to the Detroit area for the final "clean-up" rs.

Preparation and Analysis of Data

Data were first coded onto data coding forms, carefully
cked, and then sent to the Michigan State University card punch-
and verifying service.

In several cases, variables were constructed by combining
ormation from both spouses. Discrepancy scores (e.g., between
ises' preferences) were calculated by simple subtraction. For a
iled discussion of the calculation of item-specific power scores,
Chapter III. Where several questions were grouped together to
ide overall measures of marital power, simple averages were calcu-
d (the sum of scores of component measures divided by the number
tems). Averages rather than sums were used, since the number of
onent items varied from couple to couple, unlike most previous
indices, only items on which spouses had initially disagreed
included in overall power scores.

Data analysis was performed on the Telefunken computer at
eibniz-Rechenzentrum of the Bavarian Academy of Science, in
, West Germany. The SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social
es) program was employed. Use of this American program package
Telefunken computer required some modifications, which proved
source of some difficulty. The program was only recently
by Leibniz-Rechenzentrum and the manual describing Telefunken-
c control cards contained several errors.

In the following chapter, the results of this analysis and interpretation of the results will be presented. It goes without saying that the small sample size, the theoretically informed non-random sampling design, and the fact that the theories tested not highly refined, precluded the use of multivariate statistical ysis procedures. Therefore, fairly simple two-and three-variable s tabulations will be presented.

CHAPTER IX

TESTS OF THE "EQUAL-INPUT" THEORIES

In the following chapters, hypotheses are discussed in the
that they were first presented in the preceding chapters. Indi-
construction is dealt with in conjunction with the hypothesis
an indicator first appears.

Five of the eight "equal-input" hypotheses presented in Chap-
were tested for the present report. Four deal with the relation-
f perceived competence and marital power and one with gratitude
rital power. Omitted were Hypothesis G, because no direct measure
itude was available, and Hypotheses C-4 and C-5, dealing with
nces between spouses' judgments of task importance.

Hypothesis C-4, in which task importance is treated as a scope
n affecting the relation of competence to power, was not treated
arate hypothesis for purposes of this report. Instead, the
f task importance was included in the discussion of Hypotheses
. The strategy for dealing with task importance differed some-
that implied by Hypothesis C-4; instead of using importance
rol variable, the impact of importance was assessed by compar-
esults of hypothesis tests using the unweighted marital power
h results when power scores were weighted by perceived task
(see Chapter III). Because task importance was thought to
ble scope condition for power-dependence hypotheses as well

g., Test C-D 3), the use of importance-weighted power scores was limited to the competence tests. The majority of all hypothesis es in the present report include weighted as well as unweighted er measures.

Construction of Marital Power Indices

Since the two versions of my marital power index are employed he majority of all tables in this report, it is appropriate to uss their construction at the outset.

Unweighted Marital Power Index

One measure of overall relative marital power is an index , based on eight specific task areas, calculated by the following dure: (a) for each spouse, role-discrepancy scores (the absolute rence between Time 2 actual task division and Time 1 preferred division) were calculated for only those task items on which es' preferences differed; (b) for each spouse, these discrepancy were averaged; (c) the husband's and wife's average discrepancy were then compared; (d) if they were equal, both spouses received tive power score of 3. If they were unequal, the difference n their average discrepancy scores was figured. This difference ded to 3 for the more-discrepant spouse and subtracted from 3 for ss-discrepant spouse. Hence, lower numbers indicate higher rela- wer.

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Power Index Weighted
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second power index, weighted by perceived task importance,
tructed. This index had its base in the relative power
h contested-task (see Figure 5 in Chapter III) which were
l by the individual's importance-rating of the task in
Figure 6 in Chapter III for weighting coefficients). The
ghted relative power scores for the several specific tasks
raged for each respondent. As with the unweighted index,
which spouses' preferences had differed were included in

order that the weighted index be consistent with the un-
weighted-index scores were rescored so that lower (i.e.,
bers indicate higher marital power.

Interpretation of Tables

the tables which follow, results using weighted and un-
indices are placed side-by-side, wherever possible.
alues of these two indices are not comparable, e.g.,
3.00 for the unweighted index and 0.00[108] for the
The indices differ in another important way. For the

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or purposes of index construction, respondents having
power on a specific task were given a score of 0.1
0). (Other possible scores were 4, 3, 2, 1, -1, -2,
his slight change did not have much effect on the final
allowed equal-power scores to vary according to per-
ce. Otherwise, all equal-power scores would have been
s of importance (since 0.0 times any weight still equals

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ndex, marital power is "zero sum" in nature; if a wife has
.10 (10 points from equality), then her husband must have
.90. For the importance-weighted index, this is not true;
redict the husband's exact score from the wife's or vice-

l tables in Chapters IX and X are set up such that power
to be the lowest on the left-hand side and the highest on
nd side. To put it another way, a table which supports the
ill have the highest means on the left and the lowest mean
e right.

the right-hand side of each table are comments about
ot the data support the hypothesis. These comments describe
n of the trend but not the magnitude of the support or non-
e notation "curvilinear" is used for cases where the trend
ected direction between two adjacent "conditions" but in
direction for the third "condition." Some relationships
"curvilinear" may still provide some support for the
f the deviation-from-linearity is very slight.
h this introduction, let us proceed to the first set of
sts--those dealing with perceived competence and marital

Tests of Perceived Competence Hypotheses

General Competence → Overall Marital Power

rding to the competence formulation, the greater the
etence of a spouse, the greater that spouse's marital

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be (and the lower the power of the other spouse).
deals with general or overall competence, rather than with
c skills and abilities. Since the competence theory
role of competence perceptions in the yielding of power
competent spouse, it seemed appropriate to use the other
luation as an indicator. That is, one should be able to
power from A's perception of B's competence: the higher
f B's competence, the more often A should yield power to
fore--the lower A's power should be relative to that of B.
ar indicators of perceived overall competence dealt with
ence and dependability of the spouse. Intelligence comes
od and Wolfe's notion of overall ability to handle deci-
blems while dependability--although mentioned by Blood and
the explanation of the low power of black husbands--would
ly relevant to my task-based power measures.
question used to measure intelligence and dependability
as administered during the Time 1 interview. A number of
ding dependability and intelligence) were mentioned in the
e-selection criteria and the respondent was asked about
w important was this to you, in choosing him/her rather
lse?" Response categories varied from extremely important
important. Pretest trials had shown that respondents were
directly asked to "rate" their mate but would willingly
stion when it was posed in terms of mate-selection criteria.
etest respondents were asked both versions of the question;
ere very similar in all cases with respect to intelligence

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ndability. Hence there is some basis for assuming that people this question in terms of evaluating the mate, rather than in their own mate-selection criteria.

This test of hypothesis C is a P-centric test, i.e., compe- ications for only one spouse are used. A dyadic test of the thesis, employing competence perceptions of both spouses ously, will follow (see Hypothesis C-1).

Table 5 deals with the relation of P-centric competence evalu- overall marital power. According to Hypothesis C, one would pouse's overall relative marital power to be inversely related her evaluation of the other spouse's competence. That is, ld be lowest in condition (1) and highest in condition (3),

Using the unweighted power index (see left side of the table), wives are consistent with the hypothesis for both types of Support is stronger for wives' intelligence ratings than ependability ratings of the husband. When task importance to account (see right side of table), the hypothesis is nly for intelligence but not for dependability. Wives who husbands as relatively undependable (condition 3) apparently n way only in areas they consider to be unimportant.

sults for husbands show strong support for Hypothesis C to dependability, when the unweighted power index is used, ationship does not hold up when task importance is taken Husbands who view their wives as dependable apparently s' preferences, but only in areas that the husbands

HYPOTHESIS C: OVERALL RELATIVE MARITAL POWER BY PERCEPTION OF THE OTHER SPOUSE'S GENERAL COMPETENCE

UNWEIGHTED POWER MEASURE

Competence A: Dependability

Mean marital power* of:	Importance as a mate-selection criterion (1) Extremely Important	(2) Important	(3) Somewhat or Not at all Important	Is Trend in the Predicted Direction?
Husbands (N = 87)	3.07 (N=31)	2.71 (N=43)	2.57 (N=13)	Yes
Wives (N = 87)	3.18 (N=54)	3.11 (N=24)	3.10 (N=9)	Yes

Competence B: Intelligence

Mean marital power* of:	Importance as a mate-selection criterion (1) Extremely Important	(2) Important	(3) Somewhat or Not at all Important	Is Trend in the Predicted Direction?
Husbands (N = 86)	2.63 (N=31)	2.96 (N=45)	2.85 (N=10)	No (curvilinear)
Wives (N = 87)	3.30 (N=35)	3.09 (N=35)	2.94 (N=14)	Yes

*Lower numbers indicate higher power. Equal power = 3.00.

POWER MEASURE WITH IMPORTANCE WEIGHTING

Competence A: Dependability

Mean marital power* of:	Importance as a mate-selection criterion (1) Extremely Important	(2) Important	(3) Somewhat or Not at all Important	Is Trend in the Predicted Direction?
Husbands (N = 87)	-.13 (N=31)	-.04 (N=43)	-.08 (N=13)	No (curvilinear)
Wives (N = 87)	.03 (N=54)	.12 (N=24)	.02 (N=9)	No (curvilinear)

Competence B. Intelligence

Mean marital power* of:	Importance as a mate-selection criterion (1) Extremely Important	(2) Important	(3) Somewhat or Not at all Important	Is Trend in the Predicted Direction?
Husbands (N = 86)	-.18 (N=31)	-.01 (N=45)	-.06 (N=10)	No (curvilinear)
Wives (N = 87)	.11 (N=38)	.02 (N=35)	-.02 (N=14)	Yes

*Lower numbers indicate higher power. Equal power = .00.

r to be unimportant. The hypothesis was not supported for
gence ratings, with either the weighted or unweighted power
s.

In summary, Hypothesis C receives stronger support for wives
husbands. Both spouses yield power to a "dependable" spouse,
in relatively unimportant issues. Wives, but not husbands,
wer to an "intelligent" spouse. This may indicate that wives
the wishes of "competent" husbands but that husbands--when
ld--do so for reasons other than competence. Or it might indi-
t wives view "intelligence" as a competence that is relevant
rticular task areas in question, while husbands do not view
ks as requiring any particular intelligence.

s C-1: Dyadic General-Competence → Overall Marital Power

Hypothesis C-1 specifies that the relation between perceived
e and marital power should be stronger when spouses agree in
ceptions of relative competence. I cannot provide a direct
is hypothesis because each respondent rated only the other
not his or her own competence.

A related test, combining data from both spouses, however,
e with the data available. Essentially it is a dyadic version
sis C, with the independent variable consisting of combina-
usband's and wife's evaluations of each other's competence.
the specific dimensions of competence measured are dependa-
intelligence.

Empirical Hypothesis C-1: Overall relative marital power will be related to perceived competence, such that the following rank order will obtain (from highest to lowest power of spouse A):

1) A's rating of B's competence < B's rating of A

2) A's rating of B's competence = B's rating of A

3) A's rating of B's competence > B's rating of A

contains the results of this hypothesis test. Note that the
n group (1) are married to the husbands in group (3) and vice-
Because of the dyadic nature of the indicators involved, un-
l power scores (see left side of table) of husbands and wives
independent of each other. If the wives in group (1) have a
ove 3.00, then their husbands (in group 3) must have a score
00. In short, the trend for husbands and for wives must be

Hypothesis C-1 receives no support for the competence of
ence, in contrast to Hypothesis C for which wives--considered
ere likely to yield to husbands they considered as very intelli-
appears that such yielding wives fall disproportionately into
in Table 6; their husbands also rate them as very intelligent,
usbands apparently do not consider their wives' intelligence
unds for accepting their ideas about task division.

Results for dependability ratings are more in line with the
s. Spouses with a dependability-advantage have higher power
hen the unweighted index is employed. When task importance
nto account (see right side of table), wives but not husbands

HYPOTHESIS C-1: OVERALL RELATIVE MARITAL POWER BY PERCEIVED COMPETENCE RATINGS FOR BOTH SPOUSES

UNWEIGHTED POWER MEASURE

Competence A: Dependability

Mean marital power* of:	(1) Self Lower Rating Than Spouse	(2) Both Same Rating	(3) Self Higher Rating Than Spouse	Is Trend in Predicted Direction?
Wives (N = 84)	3.36 (N=33)	3.04 (N=37)	2.99 (N=14)	Yes
Husbands (N = 84)	2.93 (N=12)	2.93 (N=39)	2.60 (N=33)	Yes

Competence B: Intelligence

Mean marital power* of:	(1) Self Lower Rating Than Spouse	(2) Both Same Rating	(3) Self Higher Rating Than Spouse	Is Trend in Predicted Direction?
Wives (N = 85)	3.07 (N=24)	3.41 (N=38)	2.97 (N=23)	No (curvilinear)
Husbands (N = 86)	3.03 (N=23)	2.63 (N=39)	2.88 (N=24)	No (curvilinear)

*Lower numbers indicate higher power. Equal power = 3.00.

POWER MEASURE WEIGHTED BY IMPORTANCE

Competence A: Dependability

Mean marital power* of:	(1) Self Lower Rating Than Spouse	(2) Both Same Rating	(3) Self Higher Rating Than Spouse	Is Trend in Predicted Direction?
Wives (N = 84)	.05 (N=33)	.07 (N=37)	.01 (N=14)	No (curvilinear)
Husbands (N = 84)	-.02 (N=12)	-.12 (N=30)	-.05 (N=33)	No (curvilinear)

Competence B: Intelligence

Mean marital power* of:	(1) Self Lower Rating Than Spouse	(2) Both Same Rating	(3) Self Higher Rating Than Spouse	Is Trend in Predicted Direction?
Wives (N = 85)	.00 (N=24)	.12 (N=38)	-.01 (N=23)	No (curvilinear)
Husbands (N = 86)	.00 (N=23)	-.16 (N=39)	-.03 (N=24)	No (curvilinear)

*Lower numbers indicate higher power. Equal power = .00.

fit with the hypothesis. As the wives' dependability-advantage es, their power in important areas also increases (although the is not large in magnitude).

To summarize, Hypothesis C-1 receives support only for the nce of dependence but not for intelligence. This support is t stronger for wives than for husbands.

sis C-2: Task-specific Power → Use of "Competence" as a Rationale

Perhaps a more appropriate way to measure competence is to ask lirectly about task-relevant abilities. After reporting how bilities for eight specific tasks were allocated, respondents ed why they did it that way. Two of the thirteen possible hoices involved considerations of competence: "The person who's t this should do it" and "It's faster or more efficient this espondents who gave at least one of these responses, among their ree answers, were separated from the respondents who gave neither e response.

Task-specific relative marital power was calculated by: (a) ng each individual's role-discrepancy score on each "contested" (the absolute difference between the preferred and actual sion scores); (b) comparing the wife's and husband's role dis- for individual tasks. Equally discrepant spouses both task-power score of 4.00. Where spouses were unequal, the ifference between spouses' role-discrepancy scores was calcu- e more-discrepant spouse received a score of 4.00 plus the score, while the less-discrepant spouse was given a score

minus the difference score. This procedure is illustrated in 5 in Chapter III. The spouse who came the closer to achieving her preferences was considered to be the more powerful of the

Hypothesis C-2 specifies that lower-power spouses should mention competence considerations with equal or greater frequency than having greater power in that specific area. That is, according competence formulation, the less-competent spouse yields to the of the other because of recognition of the other's greater abil-

Results for Hypothesis C-2 can be found in Table 7. Two eas are eliminated from this analysis, "deciding what people to o the house" because few couples disagreed about allocation of m and "doing the supper dishes," because few respondents con- competence as relevant to this task.

Hypothesis C-2 is not supported in any of the twelve sub-tests 7. In slightly more than half of these, results are in the direction from that predicted, i.e., the more powerful a spouse task area, the more likely that he or she would give "compe- a rationale. This pattern occurs for both husbands and wives raditionally "masculine" and "feminine" task areas.[109]

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[109] Although not related to the hypothesis, the distribution by task area exhibits an interesting pattern. Examination of rs of high- and low-power husbands and wives within each task Table 7) reveals that husbands predominate in all of the ally "masculine" tasks (tasks 2, 3, and 6), as well as in one ally "feminine" task (task 4). For the remaining "feminine" nd 7), husbands and wives are equally represented in the high- p. In no task area do wives predominate more often than husbands.

) minus the difference score. This procedure is illustrated in
5 in Chapter III. The spouse who came the closer to achieving
her preferences was considered to be the more powerful of the

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mpetence considerations with equal or greater frequency than
having greater power in that specific area. That is, according
competence formulation, the less-competent spouse yields to the
of the other because of recognition of the other's greater abil-

Results for Hypothesis C-2 can be found in Table 7. Two
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m and "doing the supper dishes," because few respondents con-
competence as relevant to this task.

Hypothesis C-2 is not supported in any of the twelve sub-tests
7. In slightly more than half of these, results are in the
direction from that predicted, i.e., the more powerful a spouse
task area, the more likely that he or she would give "compe-
a rationale. This pattern occurs for both husbands and wives
raditionally "masculine" and "feminine" task areas.[109]

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by task area exhibits an interesting pattern. Examination of
rs of high- and low-power husbands and wives within each task
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ally "masculine" tasks (tasks 2, 3, and 6), as well as in one
ally "feminine" task (task 4). For the remaining "feminine"
nd 7), husbands and wives are equally represented in the high-
p. In no task area do wives predominate more often than husbands.

Table 7

HYPOTHESIS C-2: PER CENT OF HUSBANDS AND WIVES WITHIN EACH LEVEL OF TASK-SPECIFIC RELATIVE MARITAL POWER, WHO CITED COMPETENCE AS A RATIONALE FOR THE WAY CONTESTED-TASKS WERE DIVIDED

ence given as a rationale e division of:	Respondents' Task-Specific Marital Power* (1) Higher Than Spouse	(2) Equal	(3) Lower Than Spouse	Is Trend in Predicted Direction?
ocery shopping				
Husbands (N=43)	(N=15) 53%	(N=13) 54%	(N=15) 47%	No (opposite direction)
Wives (N=42)	(N=15) 67%	(N=13) 62%	(N=14) 43%	No (opposite direction)
airing things around the house				
Husbands (N=45)	(N=16) 75%	(N=21) 67%	(N=8) 63%	No (opposite direction)
Wives (N=45)	(N=8) 75%	(N=20) 65%	(N=17) 82%	No (curvilinear)
ing complaints to salesmen or dlord				
Husbands (N=52)	(N=25) 64%	(N=10) 50%	(N=17) 41%	No (opposite direction)
Wives (N=51)	(N=17) 77%	(N=10) 60%	(N=24) 58%	No (opposite direction)
oing in touch with relatives				
Husbands (N=53)	(N=23) 30%	(N=14) 43%	(N=16) 25%	No (curvilinear)
Wives (N=53)	(N=16) 31%	(N=14) 21%	(N=23) 22%	No (opposite direction)
ding who you will invite to house (omitted)	---	---	---	
ng care of the car				
Husbands (N=45)	(N=19) 63%	(N=16) 56%	(N=10) 60%	No (curvilinear)
Wives (N=43)	(N=9) 67%	(N=15) 47%	(N=19) 58%	No (curvilinear)
aring supper				
Husbands (N=40)	(N=14) 64%	(N=13) 69%	(N=13) 54%	No (curvilinear)
Wives (N=38)	(N=13) 46%	(N=13) 31%	(N=12) 33%	No (opposite direction)
the supper dishes (omitted)	---	---	---	

er measure is not weighted by importance. Percentage figures are based upon the number of nts within each power level. (The total number is indicated in parentheses above each per- If N=15 and the percentage is 53, then 53 per cent of the respondents cited competence as ale.)

who did not differ in preferences about who should do a given task are excluded, since no ore could be calculated for such persons.

It appears that Blood and Wolfe were wrong in their assumption lower-power spouses yield power because they recognize the greater tence of the other spouse, at least with respect to contested deci- about who should do what tasks. If the less-powerful spouses are the less-competent ones, they certainly do not appear to recognize The greater use of the "competence" rationale by more-powerful es could well reflect a rationalization for their own power, power apparently has some base other than competence.[110]

The position that competence rationales are used as justifi- s is bolstered when one examines the percentages of husbands and who give this rationale (regardless of their relative power).[111]

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[110] I also studied the association of the same two variables, ime using power as the dependent variable (not shown). Spouses ve a competence-rationale for the division of contested tasks gher mean power than spouses who did not give such a rationale, cases except for two: wives for the task of repairing things the house, and husbands for the task of car care. Interpreta- f such data is problematic, however, since the competence- ales given did not specify which spouse was thought to be the mpetent.

[111] Of the couples who had disagreed about who they would to do particular tasks, the following percentages of husbands es cited competence as a rationale for the actual task-division at:

EA:	Husbands: Per cent citing competence rationale	Husbands: Rank order	Wives: Per cent citing competence rationale	Wives: Rank order	Which gender mentions competence more often?
itionally le tasks"					
epairing (N=45 couples)	69 %	1	73 %	1	Wives
king complaints (N=52 couples)	54 %	4	65 %	2	Wives
r care (N=45 couples)	60 %	3	56 %	4	Husbands

ves cite competence reasons more frequently than do husbands for two the three "masculine" tasks, while husbands cite competence more ten than the wives for two of the three "feminine" tasks. Such fig- es suggest that husbands are resisting participation in "feminine" sks and wives are resisting participation in "masculine" tasks, and t both are justifying this by claiming that the other is better lified to do these jobs.

In summary, Hypothesis C-2 is definitely not supported. Since ts of the two previous competence hypotheses provided rather mixed ults, it appears that perceived competence has some effect upon mari- power but--at least as measured in the present study--such compe- ce considerations provide only a fairly small part of the explanation the distribution of marital power. Other theories, such as the itude formulation which will be discussed next, may prove to have explanatory power.

AREA:	Husbands: Per cent citing competence rationale	Husbands: Rank order	Wives: Per cent citing competence rationale	Wives: Rank order	Which gender mentions competence more often?
Traditionally "female tasks"					
Grocery shopping (N=43 couples)	51 %	5	57 %	3	Wives
Keeping in touch with relatives (N=53 couples)	32 %	6	25 %	6	Husbands
Preparing supper (N=40 couples)	63 %	2	37 %	5	Husbands

Test of a Gratitude Hypothesis

ypothesis G-1: Status Mobility → Overall Marital Power

The "gratitude" formulation cannot be directly tested because direct measures of gratitude or respect were available. One indirect st can be made, however. It seems reasonable to posit that gratitude one's spouse should be greater if one came from a lower-status family an the spouse and less if one's family of orientation was of higher tus than the spouse. This is the "Cinderella syndrome"; Cinderella uld be more grateful to the Prince than would be a princess married a prince. And, because of this greater gratitude, Cinderella should--ording to the gratitude hypothesis--have lower relative marital power n the princess. While none of my respondents were princes or prin-ses, it seems that the upwardly mobile--those who "married up" rela-e to their parents' status--should have lower marital power than se who were downwardly mobile.

In the present study, I divided respondents into three groups rding to status "resources": (a) those whose spouses had higher-us occupations[112] than their own fathers; (b) those whose spouses

---

[112]Occupations were assigned to one of the following cate-es, listed from highest to lowest status: (a) professional, techni- and kindred; (b) managers, officials and proprietors, except farm; clerical, sales, and kindred; (d) craftsmen, foremen, and kindred; operatives and kindred; (f) service workers, including private hold; (g) laborers, except farm and mine; (h) housewife, etc. rs were excluded from the analysis. Those few respondents not ntly employed were given an occupational rating based on marriage- se information about their usual occupation or their university (if a student) wherever possible.

ıd fathers had equal-status occupations, and (c) those whose own fathers
d higher-status occupations than their spouses. I expected marital
wer to be the highest for group (c)--who would have the least reason
be grateful to the spouse--and the lowest for group (a). Results of
is test are presented in Table 8.

This hypothesis is supported for husbands. Although the rela-
ınships for wives are not linear, the hypothesis receives some support
that the downwardly mobile wives (group 3) have higher mean power
ın the upwardly mobile wives (group 1). This is true for both types
power indices.

This support of Hypothesis G-1 must, of course, be interpreted
ı caution. Since the presumed intervening variable of gratitude is
measured, the findings are open to other interpretations.

I will return to the competence and gratitude formulations
hapter XI, dealing with tests between different theories. First,
ver, I will present the findings for my tests of power-dependence
ry.

Table 8

HYPOTHESIS G-1: OVERALL RELATIVE MARITAL POWER, BY OCCUPATIONAL STATUS OF SPOUSE RELATIVE TO THAT OF FATHER.

NWEIGHTED POWER MEASURE

	Relative Status of Respondent's Spouse and Respondent's Father			
ean marital power* of:	(1) Respondent's Spouse Higher	(2) Respondent's Spouse And Respondent's Father Equal	(3) Respondent's Father Higher	Is Trend in Predicted Direction?
Wives (N = 83)	3.31 (N=41)	2.89 (N=27)	3.03 (N=15)	No (curvilinear)
Husbands (N = 86)	3.00 (N=40)	2.76 (N=13)	2.62 (N=33)	Yes

ower numbers indicate higher power. Equal power = 3.00.

ER MEASURE WEIGHTED BY IMPORTANCE

n marital power* of:				
Wives (N = 83)	.04 (N=41)	.08 (N=27)	-.01 (N=15)	No (curvilinear)
Husbands (N = 86)	-.02 (N=40)	-.06 (N=13)	-.16 (N=33)	Yes

er numbers indicate higher power. Equal power = .00.

CHAPTER X

TESTS OF POWER-DEPENDENCE THEORY

Hypothesis tests relating to power-dependence theory will be esented in the order that hypotheses were first introduced in Chapter . The first "dimension" of dependence to be considered is that of tential alternatives-to-the-marriage, followed by the second aspect dependence, that of motivational investment in goals mediated by the use. Both of these are dealt with in Part I, below.

Part I. Alternatives and Motivational Investment

othesis D-1: Alternatives → Overall Marital Power

According to power-dependence theory, a spouse's marital power ld be directly related to his or her alternative sources of valued -objects outside of the marriage. Such "alternatives" may be either ntial or actually utilized. Currently utilized alternatives (e.g., vife having a job which provides income and prestige independent e husband) are subject to multiple interpretations. For example, ployed wives were found to have higher mean power than non-employed , one still would not know why this occurs. A gratitude or com- e explanation would be just as plausible as a power-dependence

Potential alternatives, however, are predicted to affect power in power-dependence theory but not in gratitude or

competence formulations (since a spouse cannot be grateful for resources not actually received and since one cannot gain competence from foregoing experiences of resource-attainment). Hence potential-but-unused "alternatives" are theoretically the more interesting for the present study.

Two indicators of potential alternatives were selected. Both relate to the explicit power-dependence assumption (see Heer, 1963: 138) that the possibility of divorce enters into people's "calculations." Spouses who believe themselves to have a good chance to find a suitable mate, should the present marriage dissolve, are less dependent upon the present spouse. Since dependence and marital power are hypothesized to be inversely related, such spouses should have higher power than those whose potential alternatives to the present marriage are less promising.

This assumption will be tested from both a P-centric and dyadic approach (the latter, which includes a broader range of indicators, is discussed under Hypothesis D-2). Indicators for the P-centric set were the following questions:

"Some people say that women have an easier time finding a good spouse and others say that men have it easier. In your own experience, does it seem that men or women have the easier time (finding a good spouse)?"

Following a question about number of people ever dated more than just casually: "Of these, about how many would you say were very close or serious relationships (including your present spouse)?"

These questions were judged to tap prospects of a person on the "marriage market." The first--although phrased in terms of men and women in general--was assumed to tap the respondent's perceptions of his or her personal situation. Since these couples were newlyweds, this memory

ould have been reasonably fresh. The second question about the story of serious dating relationships can be assumed to indicate arket value" as well, i.e., a person with much successful past expe- ence with the opposite sex probably would succeed in future encounters d would find it easy to remarry, if so desired.

Hypothesis D-1 predicts that a spouse's marital power should higher under high-alternative conditions (condition 3 in Table 9) an when potential alternatives-to-the-spouse are low (condition 1).

Support for Hypothesis D-1 is rather mixed. For Question A, es fit the predictions. However, the magnitude of the relation omes extremely small when task importance is taken into consideration e the lower portion of Table 8). Husbands' data do not support othesis D-1.

With respect to Question B, it is husbands rather than wives support the hypothesis. This support disappears, though, when task- rtance is used to weight the power scores. Apparently, husbands many serious dating experiences prevail only in task areas which consider to be relatively unimportant.

In summary, wives appear to gain some power when they perceive women have an easier time finding a good spouse than men and hus- appear to gain some power when they have extensive dating expe- e.[113] Wives with extensive dating experience, on the other hand, power--a reminder of the persistence of the double standard.

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[113] Question B, on dating experience, could also be interpreted experience which develops competence. The predicted trends for would be the same if a competence assumption were substituted.

Table 9

HYPOTHESIS D-1: OVERALL MARITAL POWER BY POTENTIAL ALTERNATIVES TO THE PRESENT MARRIAGE.

UNWEIGHTED POWER MEASURE

Question A: In your own experience, do men or women have the easier time finding a good spouse?

Mean marital power* of:	(1) Other Sex Easier	(2) Both Sexes The Same	(3) Own Sex Easier	Is Trend in Predicted Direction?
Wives (N = 81)	3.22 (N=32)	3.13 (N=36)	3.07 (N=13)	Yes
Husbands (N = 77)	2.66 (N=14)	2.88 (N=34)	2.77 (N=29)	No (curvilinear)

Question B: Number of very close or serious dating relationships in the past

Mean marital power* of:	(1) 1 or 2	(2) 3 or 4	(3) 5 or more	Is Trend in Predicted Direction?
Wives (N = 87)	2.90 (N=35)	3.29 (N=35)	3.42 (N=17)	No (opposite direction)
Husbands (N = 87)	2.99 (N=26)	2.78 (N=38)	2.69 (N=23)	Yes

*Lower numbers indicate higher power. Equal power = 3.00.

POWER MEASURE WEIGHTED BY IMPORTANCE

Question A: In your own experience, do men or women have the easier time finding a good spouse?

Mean marital power* of:	(1) Other Sex Easier	(2) Both Sexes The Same	(3) Own Sex Easier	Is Trend in Predicted Direction?
Wives (N = 81)	.03 (N=32)	.02 (N=36)	-.00 (N=13)	Yes
Husbands (N = 77)	-.08 (N=14)	-.13 (N=34)	-.04 (N=29)	No (curvilinear)

Question B: Number of very close or serious dating relationships in the past

Mean marital power* of:	(1) 1 or 2	(2) 3 or 4	(3) 5 or more	Is Trend in Predicted Direction?
Wives (N = 87)	-.01 (N=35)	.11 (N=35)	.06 (N=17)	No (curvilinear)
Husbands (N = 87)	-.03 (N=26)	-.13 (N=38)	-.05 (N=23)	No (curvilinear)

*Lower numbers indicate higher power. Equal power = .00.

efore examining the implications of these findings further, let us roceed to Hypothesis D-2. Here the same two indicators of "alterna- ives" (among other indicators) are considered, this time for the couple s a unit. Perhaps the pattern for relative alternatives of spouses ll provide a clearer picture.

pothesis D-2: Relative Alternatives → Overall Marital Power

Since "power" in power-dependence theory is an explicitly lational concept, it is relative dependence which "determines" rela- ve marital power. Alternatives, as one dimension of dependence, uld exhibit the clearest relationship to marital power when measured dically (e.g., differences between spouses in number of serious dat- relationships).

In addition to Questions A and B (see the previous hypothesis), other questions will be included in testing. The wording of these stions and the manner of scoring are as follows:

"People decide to get married in different ways. For yourself, when did it occur to you that you might like to (re)marry-- before you met the "right" man/woman, or didn't it even occur to you until after you met him/her?

Scoring: (1) Self before, spouse after
(2) Both before, or both after
(3) Self after, spouse before

During the last few years, did you ever seriously consider not arrying (again)--remaining single by choice?

Scoring: (1) Self no, spouse yes
(2) Both no, or both yes
(3) Self yes, spouse no

two questions relate to the alternative of not marrying. If being is an acceptable or perhaps even positively evaluated state, t provides a potential alternative to the present marriage. The

s attractive is the single state, the more dependent one is upon
spouse for maintaining the marriage status. However, if both
uses value the status of being married highly (i.e., strongly wanted
get married, as evidenced by deciding to marry even before a spouse
found and never seriously considering remaining single by choice),
n both are highly dependent. Dependence, when equal, should not
d to inequality of marital power. Only when dependence is unequal
uld a corresponding inequality of power be found.

Questions A and B, about potential remarriage chances, were
o rescored dyadically, as indicated below:

Do men or women have the easier time in finding a good spouse?

Scoring: (1) Both spouses agree that respondent's gender has a more difficult time
(2) Mixed answers, or both spouses agree that there is no difference between the genders
(3) Both spouses agree that respondent's gender has the easier time

Number of very serious dating relationships.

Scoring: (1) Self lesser number than spouse
(2) Self and spouse equal
(3) Self greater number than spouse

In Table 10 below, results for these four questions are pre-
ed. Predictions are for power to be lowest in condition (1) and
est in condition (3), i.e., for mean scores to decrease as one
s toward the right side of the table.

In discussing the test results, I will begin with Questions
i B (see the previous discussion of these indicators under Hypoth-
D-1). Both deal with relative potential alternatives for spouses
nd a suitable partner, in the event of divorce. Question A, when
d dyadically, receives moderately strong support with the unweighted

Table 10

HYPOTHESIS D-2: OVERALL RELATIVE MARITAL POWER BY RELATIVE POTENTIAL "ALTERNATIVES"

UNWEIGHTED POWER MEASURE

Part I. Potential for finding a suitable partner, in the event of divorce

QUESTION A: In own experience, do men or women have the easier time finding a good spouse?

Mean marital power* of:	(1) Spouses agree: Harder For Respondent's Gender	(2) Other Answers	(3) Spouses agree: Easier For Respondent's Gender	Is Trend in Predicted Direction?
Wives (N = 73)	3.41 (N=10)	3.11 (N=62)	--- (N=1)	Yes
Husbands (N = 73)	--- (N=1)	2.85 (N=62)	2.59 (N=10)	Yes

QUESTION B: Number of very serious or close dating relationships in the past

Mean marital power* of:	(1) Self Fewer Than Spouse	(2) Equal	(3) Self Greater Than Spouse	Is Trend in Predicted Direction?
Wives (N = 87)	3.22 (N=32)	2.92 (N=31)	3.38 (N=24)	No (curvilinear)
Husbands (N = 87)	2.53 (N=24)	3.02 (N=32)	2.76 (N=31)	No (curvilinear)

POWER MEASURE WEIGHTED BY IMPORTANCE

Part I. Potential for finding a suitable partner, in the event of divorce

QUESTION A: In own experience, do men or women have the easier time finding a good spouse?

Mean marital power* of:	(1) Spouses agree: Harder For Respondent's Gender	(2) Other Answers	(3) Spouses agree: Easier For Respondent's Gender	Is Trend in Direction Predicted?
Wives (N = 73)	.06 (N=10)	.02 (N=62)	--- (N=1)	Yes
Husbands (N = 73)	--- (N=1)	-.09 (N=62)	-.07 (N=10)	No (opposite direction)

QUESTION B: Number of very serious or close dating relationships in the past

Mean marital power* of:	(1) Self Fewer Than Spouse	(2) Equal	(3) Self Greater Than Spouse	Is Trend in Predicted Direction?
Wives N = 87)	.03 (N=32)	-.01 (N=31)	.16 (N=24)	No (curvilinear)
Husbands N = 87)	-.07 (N=24)	-.12 (N=32)	-.04 (N=31)	No (curvilinear)

PART II. Remaining single as a potential alternative to the present marriage

QUESTION C: When did it occur to you to (re)marry--before or after you met the "right" person?

Mean marital power* of:	(1) Self Earlier Than Spouse	(2) Both The Same Time	(3) Self Later Than Spouse	Is Trend in Predicted Direction?
Wives	3.46	3.12	2.76	Yes
(N = 85)	(N=23)	(N=46)	(N=16)	
Husbands	3.24	2.82	2.54	Yes
(N = 85)	(N=16)	(N=46)	(N=23)	

QUESTION D: Did you seriously consider remaining single by choice?

Mean marital power* of:	(1) Self no, Spouse yes	(2) Both The Same	(3) Self yes, Spouse no	Is Trend in Predicted Direction?
Wives	3.51	2.99	3.23	No (curvilinear)
(N = 87)	(N=17)	(N=46)	(N=24)	
Husbands	2.78	2.96	2.49	No (curvilinear)
(N = 87)	(N=24)	(N=46)	(N=17)	

*Lower numbers indicate higher power. Equal power = 3.00.

Part II. Remaining single as a potential alternative to the present marriage

QUESTION C: When did it occur to you to (re)marry--before or after you met the "right" person?

Mean marital power* of:	(1) Self Earlier Than Spouse	(2) Both The Same Time	(3) Self Later Than Spouse	Is Trend in Predicted Direction?
Wives	.06	.08	-.04	No (curvilinear)
(N = 85)	(N=23)	(N=46)	(N=16)	
Husband	.03	-.12	-.08	No (curvilinear)
(N = 85)	(N=16)	(N=46)	(N=23)	

QUESTION D: Did you seriously consider remaining single by choice?

Mean marital power* of:	(1) Self no, Spouse yes	(2) Both The Same	(3) Self yes, Spouse no	Is Trend in Predicted Direction?
Wives	.08	.05	.03	Yes
(N = 87)	(N=17)	(N=46)	(N=24)	
Husbands	-.18	-.01	-.10	No (curvilinear)
(N = 87)	(N=24)	(N=46)	(N=17)	

*Lower numbers indicate higher power. Equal power = .00.

ower measures. When task importance is taken into account, the elationship remains strong for wives but reverses for husbands. Question B, about relative dating experience, provides no support at all or the hypothesis. The persistence of the "double standard" is still mewhat in evidence, though; wives who exceed their husbands in dating perience have the lowest power of all wives. Another possible explanaon is that this group of wives contains disproportionate numbers of der women and women with children. Both age and having children from previous marriage may serve to reduce alternatives-to-the-present-rriage, cancelling out whatever power advantage would otherwise have crued from their dating experience. The effect of age and children l be examined in Test D-C 4, Chapter XI.

Part II of Table 10 deals with remaining single as a potenl alternative to the present marriage. Results for Question C ongly support Hypothesis D-2 when unweighted power measures are used. introduction of importance-weightings reduces the support, although ner-alternative spouses (condition 3) still have considerably more er than lower-alternative spouses (condition 1).

Question D, a more-direct question about whether singleness erceived as a viable potential alternative to marriage, provides limited support for the hypothesis. Although the equal-alternative ses (condition 2) do not fit the predicted trend, higher-alternative ses (condition 3) do have higher power than lower-alternative ses (condition 1), as predicted. When the weighted power index is cituted for the unweighted one, husbands provide no support at all

for the hypothesis. For wives, the trend is now totally consistent with the hypothesis.

In summary, the indicators used provide mixed support for Hypothesis D-2. The hypothesis is supported for one of the two questions about potential for finding a suitable alternative partner, in the event of divorce, that of relative ease of finding a good spouse (Question A). The support is stronger for wives than husbands, however, in that the relationship for husbands is reversed when the importance-weighted power index is used. Of the two indicators dealing with remaining single as a potential alternative to marriage, the hypothesis receives more support for Question C, about relative timing of the decision to marry. The data provide some support for the hypothesis even when the weighted power measures are used, although the trend is no longer linear; wives "gain" in power only when they have a relative advantage (condition 3), while husbands "gain" when they have either an equal or a relative advantage (conditions 2 or 3).

Hypothesis D-3: Motivational Investment → Overall and Task-specific Marital Power

Hypotheses D-3 and D-4 deal with that aspect of dependence which is termed motivational investment. The higher one's motivational investment in goal-objects mediated by the other spouse, the more dependent one is--according to power-dependence theory--the less power he will have, relative to the spouse. Hypothesis D-3 considers motivational investment levels of individual spouses, with relative motivational investment of couples to be treated in Hypothesis D-4 which follows.

Two types of indicators were used for motivational investment. The first are aimed at tapping overall motivational investment in the marriage, while the second are specific to the eight task areas.

I first asked respondents:

A) "Some people think that married life is easier on women, while others say it is easier on men. In your own experience, does it seem that married life is easier on men or women?"

This question was asked during the second interview, after the couple had been married for some months. That question was followed by another one:

B) "What about your own marriage? (Would you say the same thing? Right now, who probably has it a little easier, you or your spouse?)

Answer categories were the same for both questions:

(1) Easier on own gender
(2) Both the same
(3) Easier on other gender

Question A is assumed to measure the individual's CL level (Thibaut and Kelley, 1960), the comparison point against which they evaluated their own marriage. A wife who thinks that women in general usually have it easier in marriage, and who also thinks that she has it easier in her own marriage, presumably finds that her marriage is about the same as others in this respect. If, however, she thinks that women in general usually have it easier but--in her own marriage--she has it easier, then presumably her marriage is more beneficial than most. The latter wife could be said to have a higher motivational investment in her marriage than the former wife.

This point may be clarified by presenting the scoring rocedure which I used. I considered a respondent's answers to both uestions A and B, as illustrated below for male respondents.

Scoring of Questions A and B in combination:

(1) Husband has it easier than do "most husbands," e.g.:

{own marriage--husband easier
{most marriages--husband harder or both spouses the same

or

{own marriage--both spouses the same
{most marriages--husband easier

(2) Husband has it equally easy (or hard) as do "most husbands," e.g.:

{own marriage--husband has it easier
{most marriages--husband has it easier

or

{own marriage--both spouses the same
{other marriages--both spouses the same

(3) Husband has it harder than do "most husbands," e.g.:

{own marriage--husband harder
{most marriages--husband easier or both spouses the same

or

{own marriage--both spouses the same
{most marriages--husband has it harder

hort, a spouse (in this example, a husband) is assigned to category whenever his own marriage compares favorably to marriages in gene- as he sees them. Such husbands are assumed to value their marriages ly, i.e., to have a high motivational investment in preserving such dvantageous relationship. They therefore should be more dependent eir wives and lower in marital power, as compared to husbands in ory (3) who have less to lose, should the wife leave.

In addition to the indicator just described, Table 11 also
ludes responses to Question B alone.

As can be seen in Table 11, this hypothesis is not supported
either husbands' answers or for wives' answers. Without exception,
pondents who said that they had it easier than their spouses (group
have higher mean power scores than those who say they had it harder.
could be interpreted in two ways. First, it may be that the hypoth-
simply does not apply to marriage situations. Or it may be that
indicators used are not actually tapping motivational investment;
e these questions were asked after several months of marriage, I
d suggest that "having the easier time" in marriage may be a conse-
ce of having higher relative power. Because I believe that these
cators did not succeed in tapping motivational investment, I have
ded them from the following hypothesis about relative motivational
tment.

The findings in Table 11 may also be contrary to Blood and
's assumption that more-powerful spouses "earn" their power by
buting to satisfactions of the spouse. At least, the more-
ied spouses--e.g., those in group (1) who perceive that they are
more advantageous position--do not show any signs of yielding

The second type of motivational investment indicators were
c to the eight task-areas. A particular division of labor, I
d, could be a goal-object in itself. If a wife cares very much
ho does the dishes--e.g., has very strong preferences that this
shared equally--she has a strong motivational investment in

Table 11

HYPOTHESIS D-3: OVERALL RELATIVE MARITAL POWER BY LEVEL OF MOTIVATIONAL INVESTMENT IN THE MARRIAGE

UNWEIGHTED POWER MEASURE

Mean marital power* of:	QUESTION B: Is married life easier on you or your spouse? (1) Easier On Self	(2) Self And Spouse The Same	(3) Harder On Self	Is Trend in Predicted Direction?
Husbands (N = 87)	2.79 (N=39)	2.83 (N=36)	2.88 (N=12)	No (opposite direction)
Wives (N = 86)	3.05 (N=17)	3.20 (N=38)	3.18 (N=31)	No (opposite direction)

Mean marital power* of:	QUESTIONS A + B: Own marriage as compared with marriages in general (1) Self Easier Than Most Of Same Gender	(2) Self Same As Most	(3) Self Harder Than Most Of Same Gender	Is Trend in Predicted Direction:
Husbands (N = 83)	2.45 (N=15)	2.87 (N=62)	2.73 (N=6)	No (curvilinear)
Wives (N = 82)	3.11 (N=23)	3.19 (N=54)	3.26 (N=5)	No (opposite direction)

*Lower numbers indicate higher power. Equal power = 3.00.

POWER MEASURE WEIGHTED BY IMPORTANCE

Mean marital power* of:	QUESTION B: Is married life easier on you or your spouse? (1) Easier On Self	(2) Self And Spouse The Same	(3) Harder On Self	Is Trend in Predicted Direction?
Husbands (N = 87)	-.14 (N=39)	-.04 (N=36)	-.02 (N=12)	No (opposite direction)
Wives (N = 86)	.01 (N=17)	.10 (N=38)	.02 (N=31)	No (curvilinear)

Mean marital power* of:	QUESTIONS A + B: Own marriage as compared with marriages in general (1) Self Easier Than Most Of Same Gender	(2) Self Same As Most	(3) Self Harder Than Most Of Same Gender	Is Trend in Predicted Direction?
Husbands (N = 83)	-.10 (N=15)	-.08 (N=62)	-.07 (N=6)	No (opposite direction)
Wives (N = 82)	.02 (N=23)	.02 (N=54)	.03 (N=5)	No

*Lower numbers indicate higher power. Equal power = .00.

hat goal. Help with the dishes is of great value to her, and she is herefore quite dependent upon her husband; he determines whether or ot she achieve this valued objective. This interpretation leads o a prediction which differs from common-sense reasoning, namely that he greater one's motivational investment in a particular division of abor, the lower one's power is likely to be.

The measure of motivational investment for each task-area as a Phase I question about preference strength. After respondents ere asked how they would prefer to divide the eight tasks in their own rriage, they were then told:

> "People often feel more strongly about some jobs than about others. For example, a person might have very strong preferences or opinions about who should do the dishes but have no opinion at all about who should keep in touch with relatives."

e eight tasks were then repeated, and for each task the question was sed:

> "How strong are your preferences (opinions) about who should _____(task name)_____? Would you say Very Strong, Strong, Somewhat Strong, or Not at all Strong?"

For this hypothesis, task-specific measures of relative mari- power were used (rather than an overall power score). The unweighted cator was constructed by: (a) calculating for each spouse a dis- ancy score (the absolute difference between Time 1 preferred sion-of-labor and Time 2 report of actual division) and; (b) com- ng discrepancy scores of husband and wife for a given task. If es had equal discrepancies, each received a score of 4. If dis- ncies were unequal, the difference between discrepancies of spouses lculated; the more discrepant spouse received a score of [4 + the

ce-score], and the less discrepant spouse was given a score of
difference-score]. This scoring procedure is illustrated in
in Chapter III.[114]

Unweighted task-specific marital power, like unweighted over-
tal power, has two characteristics. If one spouse is high,
r spouse must be low. And the higher the score value, the
e marital power. In addition, no power score was calculated
les who agreed in their preferences. Hence numbers of respon-
Table 12 are lower than 90.

The weighted power measure was constructed as illustrated in
, Chapter III.[114] Respondents were first assigned a relative
ore for each task on which they had disagreed. Equal power
ue of 0.1. The highest possible relative power was -4 and
t possible power was +4. Power scores were then multiplied
hting factor based on the respondent's answer to the following

ardless of who does it, do you think this is an important
or decision?"

egories and the corresponding weighting factors were:

Very Important	.20
Fairly Important	.17
Slightly Important	.13
Not at all Important	.10

[114]However, the direction of scoring used is opposite that
pter III. I assigned lower scores to higher-power spouses,
make this indicator consistent with other power measures.

ect of this weighting was to increase a respondent's power
ge or disadvantage for "important" tasks and to decrease it for
hich were perceived as less important. The assumption behind
ocedure is that prevailing in important areas represents more
power than prevailing in unimportant areas.

Weighted task-specific power scores, like the weighted overall
dex which is based upon them, do not assume that one spouse
se" power in direct proportion to the other's power "gains."
d who prevails in an area which he considers to be important
credited with high power. His wife, if she considers the task
be unimportant, will "lose" much less power than her husband

Findings for both weighted and unweighted power are presented
12.

Results (see Table 12) are very mixed. Using the unweighted
sure, husbands' data support the hypothesis for tasks 1, 6,
1 of which are traditionally "female" tasks. Wives correspond
ictions for tasks 2 and 8; here, however, the only large power
e occurs between "somewhat strong" and "not at all strong"
es. Wives with very weak preference strength about who should
per dishes and repair things around the house are the most
achieve the kind of division of labor they prefer.
With both unweighted and weighted power measures, an inter-
tern emerges for several tasks.[115] Power is low when

[115] For unweighted power measures, the tasks which follow this
, for husbands, tasks 2, 3, and 4 and, for wives, tasks 3

12. HYPOTHESIS D-3: TASK-SPECIFIC RELATIVE MARITAL POWER BY LEVEL OF MOTIVATIONAL INVESTMENT IN TASK-DIVISION OUTCOME.

HTED POWER MEASURE

rital task-specific according to task:	Strength of Preferences About Who Does This Task (1) Strong or Very Strong	(2) Somewhat Strong	(3) Not At All Strong	Is Trend in Predicted Direction?
cery Shopping				
Husbands (N=43)	4.25 (N=8)	3.81 (N=16)	3.79 (N=19)	Yes
Wives (N=42)	4.00 (N=8)	4.06 (N=17)	4.12 (N=17)	No (opposite direction)
iring things around the house				
Husbands (N=44)	3.83 (N=23)	3.55 (N=11)	4.00 (N=10)	No (curvilinear)
Wives (N=46)	4.40 (N=15)	4.40 (N=15)	3.94 (N=16)	Yes
ng complaints, if necessary, to smen or landlord				
sbands (N=51)	3.69 (N=13)	3.04 (N=23)	4.27 (N=15)	No (curvilinear)
ives (N=52)	4.72 (N=18)	4.23 (N=22)	4.33 (N=12)	No (curvilinear)
ng in touch with relatives				
sbands (N=53)	4.22 (N=9)	3.60 (N=25)	3.79 (N=19)	No (curvilinear)
ves (N=53)	3.95 (N=19)	4.30 (N=20)	4.43 (N=14)	No (opposite direction)
ing who you will invite to use (omitted)	---	---	---	
care of the car				
bands (N=45)	3.81 (N=21)	3.47 (N=17)	3.43 (N=7)	Yes
es (N=44)	4.29 (N=14)	4.43 (N=21)	4.33 (N=9)	No (curvilinear)
ng supper				
ands (N=39)	3.86 (N=14)	4.18 (N=11)	3.57 (N=14)	No (curvilinear)
s (N=40)	4.33 (N=12)	3.77 (N=13)	4.27 (N=15)	No (curvilinear)
he supper dishes				
ands (N=48)	3.78 (N=9)	3.69 (N=16)	3.57 (N=23)	Yes
(N=48)	4.59 (N=17)	4.50 (N=10)	4.10 (N=21)	Yes

s indicate higher power. Equal power = 4.00.

Table 12. Continued.

'OWER MEASURE WEIGHTED BY IMPORTANCE

ean marital task-specific ower* according to task:	Strength of Preferences About Who Does This Task (1) Strong or Very Strong	(2) Somewhat Strong	(3) Not At All Strong	Is Trend in Predicted Direction?
) Grocery Shopping				
Husbands (N=43)	.02 (N=8)	-.03 (N=16)	-.08 (N=19)	Yes
Wives (N=42)	-.01 (N=8)	.00 (N=17)	.01 (N=17)	No (opposite direction)
Repairing things around the house				
Husbands (N=44)	-.03 (N=23)	-.07 (N=11)	-.01 (N=10)	No (curvilinear)
Wives (N=46)	.05 (N=15)	.07 (N=15)	-.02 (N=16)	No (curvilinear)
Making complaints, if necessary, to salesmen or landlord				
Husbands (N=51)	-.05 (N=13)	-.15 (N=23)	-1.17 (N=15)	Yes
Wives (N=52)	.10 (N=18)	.03 (N=22)	.05 (N=12)	No (curvilinear)
Keeping in touch with relatives				
Husbands (N=53)	.03 (N=9)	-.06 (N=25)	-.04 (N=19)	No (curvilinear)
Wives (N=53)	-.02 (N=19)	.05 (N=20)	.07 (N=14)	No (curvilinear)
Deciding who you will invite to the house (omitted)	---	---	---	
'aking care of the car				
Husbands (N=45)	-.04 (N=21)	-1.13 (N=17)	-.08 (N=7)	No (curvilinear)
Wives (N=44)	.04 (N=14)	.07 (N=21)	.06 (N=9)	No (curvilinear)
reparing supper				
Husbands (N=39)	-.04 (N=14)	.83 (N=11)	-.07 (N=14)	No (curvilinear)
Wives (N=40)	.05 (N=12)	-.04 (N=13)	.03 (N=15)	No (curvilinear)
ing the supper dishes				
Husbands (N=48)	-.02 (N=9)	-.05 (N=16)	-.06 (N=23)	Yes
Wives (N=48)	.10 (N=17)	.05 (N=10)	.24 (N=21)	No (curvilinear)

scores indicate higher power. Equal power = .00.

erences are strong and higher when preferences are somewhat strong, redicted. However, power decreases again in the weak-preference o. Thus it may be that very strong preferences do indicate a motional investment level which is sufficiently high to increase dence (lower power). But the effect of very weak preferences motivational investment) upon power is apparently offset by other rs; perhaps people with very weak preferences make no effort to ence their spouses or even to mention what their task-division rences are.

At any rate, it is difficult to identify any clear overall ns in the data on Table 12. Perhaps some of the confusion can rified when relative preference strengths of spouses are studied. ill be attempted under Hypothesis D-4 below.

esis D-4: Relative Motivational Investment → Overall and Task-specific Marital Power

Relative motivational investment should be inversely related tive marital power, according to Hypothesis D-4. That is, the having the higher motivational investment should have the lower power within the couple. As for Hypothesis D-3, in which

---

When weighted power scores are employed, the tasks are tasks d 6 for husbands and tasks 3, 7, and 8 for wives. I can find rn as to which tasks exhibit this trend and which do not. Such e about equally divided between traditionally "male" and jobs and between tasks about which more men than women have references and vice-versa.

ses were considered separately, the present hypothesis was tested
both general and task-specific indicators of motivational invest-

Two general indicators were used. The first dealt with a
ion about motivational investment in marriage itself (a goal which
viously mediated by the other spouse). The question was:

"In general, it is safe to say that married people get more
out of life than people who never get married."

ndents were asked to indicate whether they strongly agreed, agreed,
eed, or strongly disagreed with this statement. In order to
a measure of relative motivational investment, responses of hus-
nd wife were combined as indicated below.

Scoring: (1) Respondent agreed more strongly than spouse
(2) Respondent and spouse agreed (or disagreed) equally
(3) Respondent agreed less strongly than spouse

relative marital power is predicted to be the highest for group
the lowest for group (1). Results of this test are in Table 13.
e rates for this question are quite low. However, the available
early do not support the hypothesis. Motivational investment is
, rather than inversely, related to marital power.

A second general indicator of relative motivational invest-
a summary measure of discrepancy between spouses' task-specific
ce strengths. Discussion of this will be postponed until after
tion of preference-strength discrepancies for separate task

In the previous hypothesis, task-specific preference strengths
iduals was discussed. The rather mixed results suggested the

Table 13

HYPOTHESIS D-4: OVERALL RELATIVE MARITAL POWER BY RELATIVE MOTIVATIONAL INVESTMENT IN BEING MARRIED.

HTED POWER MEASURE

	Responses of both spouses to the statement: Married people get more out of life			
	(1) Self Agrees More Strongly Than Spouse	(2) Spouses Agree Equally	(3) Self Agrees Less Strongly Than Spouse	Is Trend in Predicted Direction?
rital power* of:				
Wives	3.07	3.14	3.24	No (opposite direction)
(N=67)	(N=15)	(N=29)	(N=23)	
Husbands	2.67	2.86	2.93	No (opposite direction)
(N=67)	(N=23)	(N=29)	(N=15)	

umbers indicate higher power. Equal power = 3.00.

ASURE WEIGHTED BY IMPORTANCE

ital power* of:				
ves	.01	.10	.04	No (curvilinear)
(N=68)	(N=15)	(N=29)	(N=23)	
sbands	-.06	-.03	-.04	No (curvilinear)
(N=67)	(N=23)	(N=29)	(N=15)	

mbers indicate higher power. Equal power = .00.

of dyadic measures. Relative task-specific preference strength
es were calculated by comparing husband with wife. Scoring was as
ows:

(1) Respondent stronger preference than spouse
(2) Respondent and spouse equal in preference strength
(3) Respondent weaker preference than spouse

all tables, the group predicted to have the highest power is the
with the highest number (group 3 in this case). See Table 14 for
indings about relative preference strength and task-specific power.

This table reveals no clear pattern for the unweighted power
res. Except for tasks 6 and 7, the data are not consistent with
ypothesis. In general, it appears that motivational investment
sk-division is not a power-disadvantage (except for car care and
ing supper, where the spouse who felt more strongly is less likely
ieve his or her preferred task-division). On the other hand, the
-sense alternative prediction that the spouse with stronger pref-
s will get his or her way is not supported either (except for
).

With the exception of wives on task 7, the importance-weighted
easures are not related to relative motivational investment in
dicted direction for any task. Nor is there any consistent
among the so-called "curvilinear" relationships, except that
s attain their highest power when preferences of spouses are
in tasks 3, 4, and 6).

In general, I can make no generalizations about Table 14
o say that the data do not fit the hypothesis. Several explana-
ght be offered for this. With respect to importance-weighted

ble 14. HYPOTHESIS D-4: TASK-SPECIFIC RELATIVE MARITAL POWER BY RELATIVE MOTIVATIONAL INVESTMENT OF SPOUSES IN TASK-DIVISION.

EIGHTED POWER MEASURE

n task-specific er* by task area:	Relative Strength of Preferences About Who Does Task (1) Self Stronger Preferences Than Spouse	(2) Both Equal	(3) Self Weaker Preferences Than Spouse	Is Trend in Predicted Direction?
Grocery Shopping				
Wives (N=42)	4.21 (N=14)	3.93 (N=15)	4.08 (N=13)	No (curvilinear)
Husbands (N=43)	4.08 (N=13)	4.07 (N=15)	3.92 (N=15)	No (curvilinear)
Repairing things around the house				
Wives (N=45)	4.08 (N=12)	4.20 (N=10)	4.26 (N=23)	No (opposite direction)
Husbands (N=45)	3.74 (N=23)	3.80 (N=10)	3.92 (N=12)	No (opposite direction)
aking complaints, if necessary, o salesmen or landlord				
Wives (N=52)	4.29 (N=21)	4.78 (N=18)	4.15 (N=13)	No (curvilinear)
Husbands (N=52)	3.85 (N=13)	3.22 (N=18)	3.71 (N=21)	No (curvilinear)
eping in touch with relatives				
Wives (N=53)	4.04 (N=23)	4.53 (N=15)	4.13 (N=15)	No (curvilinear)
Husbands (N=53)	3.87 (N=15)	3.47 (N=15)	3.91 (N=23)	No (curvilinear)
iding who you will invite to house (omitted)	---	---	---	
ing care of the car				
Wives (N=43)	4.55 (N=11)	4.56 (N=16)	4.13 (N=16)	Yes
Husbands (N=43)	3.88 (N=16)	3.44 (N=16)	3.45 (N=11)	Yes
aring supper				
Wives (N=39)	4.46 (N=13)	4.25 (N=8)	3.89 (N=18)	Yes
usbands (N=39)	4.11 (N=18)	3.75 (N=8)	3.54 (N=13)	Yes
g the supper dishes				
ives (N=48)	4.79 (N=19)	3.72 (N=18)	4.64 (N=11)	No (curvilinear)
sbands (N=48)	3.36 (N=11)	4.28 (N=18)	3.21 (N=19)	No (curvilinear)

ores indicate higher power. Equal power = 4.00.

Table 14. Continued.

POWER MEASURE WEIGHTED BY IMPORTANCE

Mean task-specific power* by task area:	Relative Strength of Preferences About Who Does Task (1) Self Stronger Preferences Than Spouse	(2) Both Equal	(3) Self Weaker Preferences Than Spouse	Is Trend in Predicted Direction?
1) Grocery Shopping				
Wives (N=42)	.02 (N=14)	-.02 (N=15)	.01 (N=13)	No (curvilinear)
Husbands (N=43)	-.02 (N=13)	.01 (N=15)	-.11 (N=15)	No (curvilinear)
2) Repairing things around the house				
Wives (N=45	.00 (N=12)	.01 (N=10)	.04 (N=23)	No (opposite direction)
Husbands (N=45)	-.05 (N=23)	-.03 (N=10)	-.02 (N=12)	No (opposite direction)
3) Making complaints, if necessary to salesmen or landlord				
Wives (N=52)	.03 (N=21)	.10 (N=18)	.03 (N=13)	No (curvilinear)
Husbands (N=52)	.02 (N=13)	-1.10 (N=18)	-.07 (N=21)	No (curvilinear)
4) Keeping in touch with relatives				
Wives (N=53)	-.00 (N=23)	.10 (N=15)	.02 (N=15)	No (curvilinear)
Husbands (N=53)	-.02 (N=15)	-.08 (N=15)	-.02 (N=23)	No (curvilinear)
5) Deciding who you will invite to the house (omitted)	---	---	---	
6) Taking care of the car				
Wives (N=43)	.07 (N=11)	.08 (N=16)	.04 (N=16)	No (curvilinear)
Husbands (N=43)	.03 (N=16)	-1.20 (N=16)	-.08 (N=11)	No (curvilinear)
7) Preparing supper				
Wives (N=39)	.07 (N=13)	.02 (N=8)	-.02 (N=18)	Yes
Husbands (N=39)	.00 (N=18)	1.06 (N=8)	-.07 (N=13)	No (curvilinear)
8) Doing the supper dishes				
Wives (N=48)	.12 (N=19)	.24 (N=18)	.07 (N=11)	No (curvilinear)
Husbands (N=48)	-.09 (N=11)	.03 (N=18)	-.10 (N=19)	No (curvilinear)

*Lower scores indicate higher power. Equal power = .00.

measures (in both Table 14 and in Table 11), it may be that
rence-strength and importance ratings are not independent of each
. Even though these two ratings were obtained during different
views, reducing the chance that respondents would strive to give
stent answers to the two questions, respondents may have inter-
these questions as having similar content. Before further
ch is done, the relationship between preference-strength and
ance should be checked.

This explanation does not account for the inconsistent find-
ith respect to the unweighted power measures, however. Nor do
ta for weighted measures indicate that spouses with strong pref-
consistently give high importance ratings; if that were the
ower scores should have been highest in condition (1).

Another possibility is that respondents are most likely to
high preference-strength for tasks about which they are the most
ent, i.e., for tasks where the spouse--even a month after the
--has exhibited strong determination not to give in or compromise.
this were the case for a large number of respondents, power
hould have been the lowest for condition (1). No such clear
is found.

In conclusion, Table 14 does not support the hypothesis.
have been the result of a combination of the above-mentioned
ions. Or it may be that preference-strength about task divi-
ot a sufficiently "powerful" kind of motivational investment,
t most spouses do not place high value upon attaining their

sired division of labor.[116] Finally, the explanation may simply be
at the hypothesis that motivational investment is inversely related
relative power does not hold for married couples.

The final table for Hypothesis D-4 utilizes average preference-
ength scores as the indicator for motivational investment. This
sure was constructed by comparing the two spouses' preference-strength
res on each task item. If identical, each spouse received a score
3 for the task. If preference-strength differed, the absolute dif-
nce between the wife and husband was computed. This difference was
d to 3 for the stronger-preference spouse and subtracted from 3 for
weaker-preference spouse. These relative task-specific preference-
ngth scores were then averaged for each respondent across all tasks
hich spouses had different role preferences. The resulting averages
then dichotomized for purposes of easier display in Table 15.

Although Hypothesis D-4 was not supported for separate task
, it does receive support when all task areas are considered
her. This support remains strong only for wives when the weighted
measure is used. When it comes to "important" task areas, hus-
apparently get their own way if they feel strongly enough about
ile wives get their own way only when they do not have strongly
preferences.

---

[116] Previously married women have higher average preference-
th scores than other women, while previously married men do not
t this pattern. It seems reasonable that these divorced wives,
y have had an unsatisfactory division of labor in the previous
ge, would begin a new marriage with clear and strongly held ideas
now tasks should be divided. However, the mean marital power of
usly married wives did not differ from that of other wives (see
27 in the following chapter).

Table 15

HYPOTHESIS D-4: OVERALL RELATIVE MARITAL POWER BY AVERAGE RELATIVE MOTIVATIONAL INVESTMENT OF SPOUSES IN TASK-DIVISION

NWEIGHTED POWER MEASURE

	Relative Strength of Spouses' Preferences About Who Should Do Contested Tasks		
	(1) Self Equal or Stronger Preferences	(2) Self Weaker Preferences	Is Trend in Predicted
ean marital power* of:	Than Spouse	Than Spouse	Direction?
Husbands	2.90	2.70	Yes
(N=86)	(N=51)	(N=35)	
Wives	3.23	2.99	Yes
(N=86)	(N=58)	(N=28)	

ower numbers indicate higher power. Equal power = 3.00

ER MEASURE WEIGHTED BY IMPORTANCE

n marital power* of:

Husbands	-.10	-.05	No (opposite direction)
(N=86)	(N=51)	(N=35)	
Wives	.07	.01	Yes
(N=86)	(N=58)	(N=28)	

er numbers indicate higher power. Equal power = .00

Considering the inconsistent findings with respect to specific
ask areas (Tables 12 and 14), any interpretation of such averages must
e made with caution. Speculatively, I would suggest that the same
eference-strength answer may have a different meaning for wives and
sbands. That is, a high preference-strength may represent higher
tivational investment for wives than it does for husbands. Although
nety per cent of these wives were employed, it is likely that satis-
ctory domestic arrangements were still more consequential to them
an to their husbands. Having more at stake, they are more dependent
on their husbands for achieving a satisfactory division of labor than
e-versa. If this is true, then the hypothesis is basically correct
there is a gender-related response bias in answers to the preference-
ength question.

This bias could probably be corrected (if it does exist) by
cing the task items within a larger group of items. This group
ld include issues of greater probable long-range consequence than
of the task items, e.g., such things as large financial and career
sions. These additional items would give a comparison point,
nst which a respondent could assess the task items. A larger num-
of answer categories should be provided to allow respondents to
distinctions among task items. If women really do have stronger
rences than do men about task division, then this should show up
the question format is changed in the way suggested.

To summarize the tests dealing with motivational investment,
neses D-3 and D-4 are generally not supported. The one supportive
ng just discussed must be interpreted with caution. Whether the

lack of support for these hypotheses is due to measurement problems is a question which requires further research.

Hypothesis D-5: Relative Alternatives → Relative Motivational Investment

Alternatives and motivational investment are not entirely independent concepts, as was discussed in Chapter VI. Present-time levels of motivational investment--how strongly one values something--are obviously influenced by one's past experiences about how scarce that "something" is. For example, a husband who has had many "acceptable" women from whom to choose a wife--who had many alternatives in the past--may value the rewards of marriage with a particular wife less than he would if she were the only close relationship in his experience. To the extent that the past exchange relations which provide the basis of motivational investment level are similar to the present alternatives perceived to exist, present alternatives and present motivational investment should be inversely related.

Whether particular types of alternatives are related to motivational investment in particular goal-objects in this manner, is an empirical question. Without knowing the historical development of a person's value system, one cannot predict which alternatives should be related to motivational investment in particular goal-objects. Such empirical tests are limited in scope and, of course, cannot provide strong support or non-support for the overall theoretical process by which motivational investment levels are postulated to arise. Still, it is of some interest to discover whether the measures of alternatives

and motivational investment level used in the present study are interrelated.

Part I of Table 16 displays the relationship of my measures of alternatives to motivational investment in the status of being married (a goal which is obviously mediated by the spouse). To make these cross-tabulations more readily understandable, the cell predicted to have the highest per cent in each row is marked with a "#" symbol.

For section (A) in Part I of Table 16, what support does exist for the hypothesis is not strong. The small N's in groups (a) and (c) prevent a stringent test of the hypothesis.

In sections (B) and (C), where the N's are more satisfactory, the hypothesis is not supported. Neither is it supported for Question 1 although there is some tendency for wives with lower relative alternatives (group c) to have higher motivational investment as predicted (see the bottom row).

In summary, Hypothesis D-5 is not supported when my measures of alternatives are related to motivational investment in the status of being married.

Part II of Table 16 deals with motivational investment in achieving a particular division of labor. The indicator used is that of average relative preference-strength. Higher numbers indicate that the respondent has stronger preferences than does the spouse (i.e., higher relative motivational investment). As mentioned under Hypothesis D-4, results for tests employing this indicator must be interpreted with caution.

Table 16

HYPOTHESIS D-5: RELATIVE MOTIVATIONAL INVESTMENT BY RELATIVE ALTERNATIVES

PART I. Motivational investment measured by responses of both spouses to the statement: Married people get more out of life than people who never get married.

ALTERNATIVES QUESTION A: In your own experience, do men or women have the easier time finding a good spouse?

Motivational investment question I: Married people get more out of life	(1) Spouses agree: Easier For Women	(2) Other Answer Combinations	(3) Spouses agree: Easier For Men	Is Trend in Predicted Direction?
Husband agrees more strongly	#	37%	50%	No (opposite direction)
Both agree equally		43%#	25%	Yes
Wife agrees more strongly	---	20%	25%#	Yes
	100% (N=1 couple)	100% (N=51 couples)	100% (N=8 couples)	

ALTERNATIVES QUESTION B: Number of very serious or close dating relationships in past

otivational investment estion I: Married ople get more out life	(1) Wife More	(2) Equal	(3) Husband More	Is Trend in Predicted Direction?
Husband agrees more strongly	36%#	31%	43%	No
Both agree equally	36%	50%#	38%	Yes
Wife agrees more strongly	27%	19%	19%#	No (opposite direction)
	99% (N=22 couples)	100% (N=26 couples	100% (N=21 couples)	

cell which is predicted to have the highest percentage, within the row.

ble 16. Continued.

ALTERNATIVES QUESTION C: When did it occur to you to (re)marry--before or after you met the "right" person?

tivational investment estion I: Married ople get more out life	(1) Husband Earlier	(2) Both The Same Time	(3) Wife Earlier	Is Trend in Predicted Direction?
Husband agrees more strongly	8%#	46%	39%	No
Both agree equally	39%	43%#	44%	No (no difference)
Wife agrees more strongly	54%	11%	17%#	No
	101% (N=13 couples)	100% (N=37 couples)	100% (N=18 couples)	

ALTERNATIVES QUESTION D: Did you seriously consider remaining single by choice?

ivational investment stion I: Married ple get more out life	(1) Wife, Yes Husband No	(2) Both Yes or Both No	(3) Husband Yes, Wife No	Is Trend in Predicted Direction?
Husband agrees more strongly	33%#	41%	25%	No
Both agree equally	44%	41%#	42%	No (no difference)
Wife agrees more strongly	22%	18%	33%#	No (curvilinear)
	99% (N=18 couples)	100% (N=39 couples)	100% (N=12 couples)	

:ell which is predicted to have the highest percentage, within the row.

Table 16. Continued.

PART II. Motivational investment measured by the average discrepancy between spouses' preference strength (how strong their preferences were about the division of specific task areas). The average scores included only tasks on which spouses role preferences differed.

ALTERNATIVES QUESTION A: In your own experience, do men or women have the easier time finding a good spouse?

Motivational investment measure II: Mean preference-strength discrepancy between spouses* for:	(1) Spouses agree: Harder For Respondent's Gender	(2) Other Answer Combinations	(3) Spouses agree: Easier For Respondent's Gender	Is Trend in Predicted Direction?
Wives (N=74)	2.66 (N=11)	3.04 (N=62)	--- (N=1)	No (opposite direction)
Husbands (N=74)	--- (N=1)	2.91 (N=62)	3.33 (N=11)	No (opposite direction)

ALTERNATIVES QUESTION B: Number of very serious or close dating relationships in past

Motivational investment measure II: Mean preference-strength discrepancy between spouses* for:	(1) Self Fewer Than Spouse	(2) Equal	(3) Self Greater Than Spouse	Is Trend in Predicted Direction?
Wives (N=88)	3.18 (N=33)	2.93 (N=31)	2.98 (N=24)	No (curvilinear)
Husbands (N=88)	3.02 (N=24)	3.05 (N=32)	2.83 (N=32)	No (curvilinear)

ALTERNATIVES QUESTION C: When did it occur to you to (re)marry--before or after you met the "right" person?

otivational investment easure II: Mean preference-rength discrepancy between ouses* for:	(1) Self Earlier Than Spouse	(2) Both The Same Time	(3) Self Later Than Spouse	Is Trend in Predicted Direction?
Wives (N=86)	2.88 (N=23)	3.13 (N=46)	2.89 (N=17)	No (curvilinear)
Husbands (N=86)	3.11 (N=17)	2.87 (N=46)	3.11 (N=23)	No (curvilinear)

ALTERNATIVES QUESTION D: Did you seriously consider remaining single by choice?

tivational investment sure II: Mean preference-engh discrepancy between uses* for:	(1) Self No, Spouse Yes	(2) Both Yes or Both No	(3) Self Yes, Spouse No	Is Trend in Predicted Direction?
Wives (N=88)	3.42 (N=17)	2.96 (N=46)	2.93 (N=25)	Yes
Husbands (N=88)	3.07 (N=25)	3.04 (N=46)	2.58 (N=17)	Yes

00 = spouses have equally strong preferences.
er 3.00 = respondent has stronger preferences than spouse (i.e., higher relative motivational investment).
der 3.00 = respondent has weaker preferences than spouse (i.e., lower relative motivational investment).

The hypothesis is not supported for alternatives Question A. Although the relationship for Question B is slightly curvilinear, it is generally consistent with predictions. The spouse with a relative advantage in previous dating relationships (group 3) does have lower relative motivational investment than a spouse with a relative disadvantage in dating experience (group 1). Differences between husbands and wives are also evident here. Wives have higher relative motivational investment only when they have less dating experience than their husbands, while husbands have higher motivational investment when their dating experience is either equal to or less than that of their wives. This may be due to disproportionate numbers of previously divorced men falling into the group (1). Because they have been married before, their dating experiences are likely to be more limited than their husbands'--at least when their husbands have not also been previously married. Wives in this marriage type had stronger relative preference strength than wives in other marriage groups.[117] Hence the findings

[117]This can be seen in the figures below:

	Relative Marital Experience		
	(1) More than spouse (self divorced, spouse not)	(2) Same as spouse	(3) Less than spouse (spouse divorced, self not)
preference-ength discrepancy een spouses for:			
Wives (N=88)	3.28 (N=22)	2.95 (N=43)	2.99 (N=23)
Husbands (N=88)	3.01 (N=23)	3.05 (N=43)	2.72 (N=22)

Question B may be due more to previous marital experience than to
ng experience; although these two types of experiences are similar
ome respects, previous marital experience seems more likely to
ct preference-strength about the division of household tasks.

Hypothesis D-5 is not supported for Question C but is supported
Question D. As for Question B, the data for Question D reveal
er differences. Wives have higher relative motivational investment
when their alternatives (with respect to singleness as an option)
lower than their spouses' (group 1). Husbands have higher relative
vational investment when their alternatives are either equal to or
than their wives (groups 1 and 2). Again, I suspect that pre-
sly married women are disproportionately represented in group (1);
many of these women not only have children but also have custody
eir children, the option of remaining single by choice is less
ble for them than for other women. Since these women seem to have
r relative preference-strength (see footnote 117), it is likely
previous marital experience is what raises the preference-strength
group (1)-women about task division. However, it is not implaus-
hat women who never would remain single by choice--who are highly
ge-oriented--would have stronger preferences about task division.
larger sample size, the relative effects upon preference-strength
ious marital experience and perception of singleness as an alter-
could be checked by introducing marital experience as a control
e.

In summary, Hypothesis D-5 received little support. Those
ns in which it is supported, I suspect, can be best explained

terms of previous marital experience. Relative marital experience, itself, may well be interpreted in terms of alternatives. Divorced rsons may have fewer potential alternatives to the present spouse nould they divorce again), i.e., they may be in a poorer "bargaining sition" than non-divorced persons. This speculation is not supported, wever, when relative marital experience is run against relative mari- power (see Table 27).

To conclude this section of power-dependence hypotheses, it pears that the support for the power-dependence theory is mixed. otheses dealing with alternatives (D-1 and D-2) receive more support n those dealing with motivational investment (D-3 and D-4).

Part II. Power Use Across Multiple Issues

The second set of power-dependence hypotheses is based upon work of Dahlström (1966). He suggested that the relation between r and dependence is conditioned by factors which influence the er incentive" of the more-powerful partner and the "compliance ntive" of the less-powerful one. For Dahlström (unlike Emerson, , power and dependence are conceptually independent concepts rather being defined in terms of each other. Although they are postulated inversely related, this relation is subject to predictable varia-

Of the five hypotheses in Part II of Chapter VI, three were in the present study. Hypothesis D-6, about the effect of intrin- luation of power for its own sake, and Hypothesis D-9, postulating

exponential function in the relation of dependence to power, were tested. The three hypotheses which were tested deal with the ect of multiple issues upon the amount of power used. For purposes this exploratory research, I have focused upon two-variable tests. ther research should be done to check whether the relationships with rage power use which were found would hold up when dependence is roduced as a third variable.

Before presenting tests of the hypotheses, the dependent able of "amount of power exercised" will be briefly described. nt of power exercised or "used" within a couple is different from all relative marital power. Here the concern is not with which se has more power but with how much power is exercised, regardless no has the "advantage." Other things being equal, for example, I ider power use to be lower in couples who make half-way compromises in couples who do not.

The indicator for amount of power exercised was constructed king the absolute difference between a respondent's overall rela- power score and 3.00. The resulting score is the same for husband ife and simply reflects how far they deviate from an equal-power ion.[118]

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[118] In future research, I plan to use a somewhat different cor which may prove to be more sensitive. It involves figuring riation-from-equality for task-specific power scores first, and lculating an average from these scores. The indicator I have this report probably underestimates the amount of power exer- n couples with equal relative marital power.

pothesis D-7: Number of Areas of
agreement → Amount of Power
ercised

When more than one area of disagreement is present, trade-offs
ween spouses are now possible. A spouse who would otherwise not
e in on one issue may be willing to do so in return for the other's
pliance on another issue. Hence, the average amount of power[119]
rcised is predicted to increase with the number of issues at stake.

In the present study, spouses could disagree about who
uld do all eight tasks. At the other extreme, they could agree
ut who should do all tasks (although only two couples did[120]).
majority of couples differed on anywhere from one to four task
as. For purposes of Table 17, these couples were placed in
up (1) and those who differed on more than half of the task areas
roup (2).

Table 17 (p. 220) reveals support for Hypothesis D-7. The
ter power use among couples who disagree on a large number of
areas may, as Dahlström would suggest, point to the existence of
-offs. This interpretation must remain tentative for the moment,
er, as no direct measure of number of trade-offs is included in
table. (I did ask couples how they arrived at their division of

---

[119] Preliminarily, "power" in this context should be taken to
hat A will get his or her way in a specific, joint task-area
e the fact that B disagrees with that particular way.

[120] No power scores could be computed for these couples or
other couple where the data about task division was not
e.

labor for each task, with one of the answer-options being "We decided that one of us would do it and that the other would do something else, in return". This "trade-off" option was chosen by very few respondents, however).

Another explanation for the findings in Table 17 is that couples who disagreed about many tasks were also the ones who, when they disagreed, had widely discrepant preferences. Such preferences would increase power-use scores, given the nature of the power index employed. This possibility will be discussed later, in conjunction with Hypothesis D-9.

In summary, Hypothesis D-7 was supported. The greater the number of areas of disagreement between wife and husband, the greater was the average power use within the couple. Whether or not this can be attributed to the presence of trade-offs, as suggested by Blöm, can not be determined without further research.

Hypothesis D-8: Average Discrepancy in Motivational Investment → Amount of Power Exercised

Trade-offs and the exchange of power resources, according to Blöm, ought to be most evident when the interests of spouses vary. If A and B feel strongly about the same disputed issue (have high motivational investment), a trade-off is unlikely. But if A feels more strongly about issue 1 and B feels more strongly about issue 2, then each has something to gain by a trade-off; the "compliance incentive" of each spouse is increased. Power use should, therefore,

increased, as motivational investments of spouses become more crepant.

One could argue, of course, that such an exchange of power ources is somehow different from "power", as the term has been d up to now. If spouses agree to take this exchange willingly, may actually change their initial preferences--reducing the gap een what they want and what they get, which is the way I have ured power. "Amount of power exercised", therefore, must be rpreted with this possibility in mind.

For the test of Hypothesis D-8, the measure of motivational stment discrepancy used was somewhat similar to the average rela- preference strength indicator (see Hypothesis D-4, Table 15). e the present interest is only with the degree to which spouses' ests (strength of preferences) vary, and not with who has the ger preferences, a different calculation procedure was used. ach item on which spouses had different task-division preferences, solute difference between their preference-strength scores was ed. These absolute difference scores were then averaged across sagreed-items. The resulting average was the same for husband fe and simply represented the degree to which the couple ed from a situation of equality.

Results for Hypothesis D-8 are contained in Table 18 (p. 220). othesis receives some support, to the extent that couples with erage motivational-investment discrepancies do exhibit higher se than couples with low discrepancies. However, the highest

el of power use is under condition (2) rather than under condition , as predicted. This unexpected result may be due to measurement blems or it may be due to disproportionate numbers of couples with ely differing task-division preferences falling into group (2), a nation which would inflate the power-use scores. At this point, it s appropriate to proceed directly to the consideration of such erence differences.

thesis D-9: Average Discrepancy in erences → Amount of Power Exercised

The final factor to be considered with respect to trade-offs multiple issues is the variable of how far apart the preferences e two spouses are. The smaller the extent to which the interests erred outcomes) of spouses coincide, the greater should be the nge of power resources (e.g., trade-offs). This implies that way compromises will occur more often when spouses have only ly different preferences than when preferences are far apart. pancy between spouses in preferences (Hypothesis D-9) and in the th with which these preferences are held (Hypothesis D-8) are mplementary aspects of the degree to which spouses' interests de. As with the previous hypotheses, the less the interests of coincide, the greater should be the chance of trade-offs, and her the total power use across multiple issues.

Findings for Hypothesis D-9 are presented in Table 19 (p. 220). ble reveals support for the hypothesis. Note that power use increase much between the low- and medium-discrepant groups. ly couples must be fairly discrepant in their task-division

Table 17

HYPOTHESIS D-7: OVERALL AMOUNT OF POWER EXERCISED, BY NUMBER OF AREAS ABOUT WHICH SPOUSES' PREFERENCES DIFFERED.

	Number of task-areas where spouses' preferences about task-division differed (out of eight areas)		
	(1) Low (1-4)	(2) High (5-8)	Is Trend in Predicted Direction?
Mean amount of power* exercised			
Couples (N=87)	.04 (N=56)	.36 (N=31)	Yes

*Higher numbers indicate higher power use.

Table 18

HYPOTHESIS D-8: OVERALL AMOUNT OF POWER EXERCISED, BY AVERAGE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SPOUSES IN STRENGTH OF TASK-DIVISION PREFERENCES.

	Average discrepancy in spouses' preference strength (across task-areas where preferences differed)			
	(1) Low (0,0-0,9)	(2) Medium (1,0-1,9)	(3) High (2,0-2,9)	Is Trend in Predicted Direction?
Mean amount of power* exercised				
Couples (N=87)	.08 (N=32)	.35 (N=46)	.18 (N=9)	No (curvilinear)

Higher numbers indicate higher power use.

Table 19

HYPOTHESIS D-9: OVERALL AMOUNT OF POWER EXERCISED, BY AVERAGE SIZE OF DISCREPANCY BETWEEN SPOUSES' TASK-DIVISION PREFERENCES.

	Average size of discrepancy between spouses' task-division preferences (average excludes task-areas where spouses' preferences agreed)			
	(1) Low (1,0-1,4)	(2) Medium (1,5-1,9)	(3) High (2,0-4,0)	Is Trend in Predicted Direction?
n amount of power* rcised				
Couples (N=87)	.14 (N=55)	.15 (N=20)	.33 (N=12)	Yes

her numbers indicate higher power use.

ferences before the predicted higher power use occurs. The
h-discrepant couples (group 3) are those who--on the average--are
least two points apart on the five-point preference scale. This
is, for example, that one spouse prefers to divide a task equally
e the other prefers to have one person do it all. These high-
repant couples may, as Dahlström would suggest, be engaging in
e-offs where he "wins" sometimes and she "wins" sometimes. It is
lly possible, however, that the more-powerful spouse is "winning"
of the time. Further work should be done to check out which is
ore common situation.

Hypotheses D-7, D-8, and D-9 deal with interrelated aspects
wer use among married couples. A fruitful avenue for further
rch would be to perform an analysis of variance, identifying the
r in which number of areas of disagreement, discrepancy in
rences, and discrepancy in the strength with which preferences
ld, operate together to affect the total amount of power exer-

To summarize Part II of the power-dependence hypotheses,
ount of power exercised within a couple was found to increase
e number of areas of disagreement and with the average discrep-
tween spouses' task-division preferences. Partial support was
und for the hypothesis that power use increases as the motiva-
investment levels of couples become more discrepant. In
, Dahlström's notion that power use will be low when the
s of spouses coincide and high when their interests vary,
support. Whether or not this increase in power use can be

ributed to the existence of trade-offs in multiple-issue situations

not be determined without further research.

CHAPTER XI

RESULTS OF CRITICAL TESTS BETWEEN THEORIES

The preceding two chapters have revealed rather mixed patterns
upport and non-support for the several theories of marital power.
urpose of this chapter is to attempt to determine whether one
y can be said to have greater explanatory power than another. A
r of test situations were devised, in which contradictory results
be predicted by different theories. The use of the term
ical tests" for such test situations is something of an over-
ment, given the exploratory nature of the study and the experi-
nature of the indicators. Still, it is a promising avenue in
uch test situations build in the possibility of finding negative
ce, i.e., of increasing the testability of theoretical formu-
s.

This chapter is organized in the same manner as Chapter VII.
f alternative theoretical processes will be presented first.
ond section deals with specific "resource" variables, for which
inks with theoretical processes can reasonably be inferred.

Alternative Processes

etence versus Gratitude Theories

G-C1: Relative Competence and
ive Income → Overall Marital

Of the three hypotheses presented in Chapter VII, two were
d in the present study. The sample size was deemed too small to
y the two control variables required for a direct test of hypo-
s C-G 3.

Test C-G 1 predicted that the effect of perceived competence
arital power would operate even when relative income is controlled.
and Wolfe assumed that higher-resource (higher-income) spouses
kely to be more competent. They also assumed that higher-income
s would receive more gratitude and respect from the other spouse.
both the gratitude and competence assumptions would predict
power for a higher-income spouse.

Obviously, there must be differences in perceived competence
eople within the same relative income levels. If the widely
ted relation between relative income and relative marital power
ple 25 for yet another example), is due totally to gratitude of
er-income spouse, then these within-group differences in per-
competence should have no effect upon marital power. The com-
formulation, on the other hand, would predict that perceived
ce would still be related to marital power when relative income
olled.

The gratitude formulation, then, predicts no difference among
e conditions in Table 20, while the competence formulation

cts that mean power will vary, being the lowest in condition (1)
ne highest in condition (3). This raises the problem of determin-
ow much difference in mean power is required to disprove the "no
rence" gratitude hypothesis. For this purpose, a statistical
of significance level was required. A two-tailed t-test for
ating the difference between two means was employed (degrees of
m = $N_1 + N_2 - 2$), with calculations performed on a small
ti-Underwood Programma 101 computer. The sample undoubtedly
t meet all the assumptions of this statistic. Given the present
or a simple and pragmatic way to differentiate between theories
loratory research, the t-test was chosen in preference over such
ime-consuming techniques as Tchebychev's inequality. Differences
mean power scores which were significant at the .10 level or
were taken as support for the competence formulation, and
hat failed to reach this significance level were considered to
the gratitude hypothesis. However, any statements that the
de hypothesis is "supported" must be interpreted conservatively,
as no direct measures of gratitude were available.

Results for Test C-G 1 are contained in Table 20. For the
ce of dependability, the trend is in the direction predicted
mpetence formulation. This is true for both levels of rela-
me, that in which the husband has a very large income-advantage
wife (i.e., makes at least twice as much annual income as she does)

TABLE 20

TEST C-G1: OVERALL RELATIVE MARITAL POWER, BY PERCEIVED COMPETENCE RATINGS OF BOTH SPOUSES, WHEN RELATIVE INCOME IS CONTROLLED.

EIGHTED POWER MEASURE

	COMPETENCE A. Dependability (1) Self Lower Rating Than Spouse	(2) Both Same Rating	(3) Self Higher Rating Than Spouse	Which Theory is Supported?
I HUSBAND MAKES A T DEAL MORE INCOME WIFE				
ean marital power* of:				
Wives (N=21)	3.45 (N=11)	3.19 (N=7)	--- (N=3)	
Husbands (N=21)	--- (N=3)	2.81 (N=7)	2.55 (N=11)	Gratitude
HUSBAND DOES NOT A GREAT DEAL MORE E THAN WIFE				
an marital power* of:				
Wives (N=59)	3.29 (N=19)	3.05 (N=29)	2.85 (N=11)	
Husbands (N=59)	3.08 (N=9)	2.92 (N=31)	2.71 (N=19)	Gratitude
	COMPETENCE B. Intelligence			
USBAND MAKES A DEAL MORE INCOME IFE				
n marital power* of:				
Wives (N=22)	3.10 (N=3)	3.61 (N=15)	2.63 (N=4)	
lusbands (N=22)	3.38 (N=4)	2.39 (N=15)	2.90 (N=3)	Neither one
SBAND DOES NOT GREAT DEAL MORE THAN WIFE				
marital power* of:				
ves (N=59)	2.99 (N=20)	3.30 (N=22)	3.13 (N=17)	
sbands (N=60)	2.87 (N=17)	2.78 (N=23)	2.95 (N=20)	Gratitude

mbers indicate higher power. Equal power = 3.00.

at in which the husband does not have such a large advantage.[121]
r, this trend does not approach statistical significance. The
ude hypothesis, therefore, cannot be rejected.

For the competence of perceived intelligence, no support is
for the competence hypothesis. This is not surprising, given
gative results for Hypothesis C-1 (see Table 6). As in Table 6,
is higher in condition (3) than in condition (1) as predicted--
y when the husband has a large relative-income advantage.
his relative income-condition, the trend comes closer to meet-
competence prediction than in Table 6 where income was not
led. However, the difference between the equal-competence and
gher groups is statistically significant at the .05 level, not
predicted direction. Hence, neither the competence nor the
ratitude) hypothesis can be said to be supported.

Under the second ralative- income condition, differences be-
ans are not statistically significant, and the gratitude hypo-
annot be rejected. This income group contains a diverse set
es, which may account for the inconsistent means. Subdividing
p might reveal some trends which are obscured by combining
re wives make more income with cases where incomes are equal
ly to the husband's advantage.

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[121]The latter group includes couples where the husband has a
come-advantage, where spouses have roughly equal income, and
les where the wife makes more money than the husband.

In summary, the gratitude hypothesis receives stronger support
loes the competence formulation. Trends are consistent with the
ence hypothesis for the competence of dependability, however.

-G 2: "Relative Effects"
petence and Income

A somewhat different strategy for assessing relative effects
independent variables (Rosenberg, 1968) requires that the
sistent" cells be compared. The competence assumption would
t that a more-competent, lower-income spouse would have higher
han a less-competent, higher-income spouse, while the gratitude
ion would make the opposite prediction. This exact comparison
be made, inasmuch as there were too few higher-income wives to
separate group. The following values, taken from Table 20,[122]
low an approximate test of Hypothesis C-G 1:

	(a)	(b)
Income advantage:	Husband > Wife	Wife > Husband (or Husband somewhat > Wife)
petence advantage:	Wive < Husband	Husband < Wife
ean marital power of wives:	2.50 (N=3)	3.29 (N=19)

---

he value for condition (a) above had been omitted from Table 20, f the small number of respondents. Means were used for only one ecause the dyadic nature of all indicators in this particular not allow the trend for husbands to differ from the trend for th sets of means were reported only for ease of interpretation 0 and other tables where this occurred.

The very small number of couples falling into condition (a) es any assessment of relative effects impossible. The figures ch are available are in the direction predicted by the gratitude thesis, however.

l-Input versus
r-Dependence Theories

The gratitude and competence formulation share, I submit, a on implicit assumption that marital power is "given up" in ex- ge for benefits received, and that this exchange operates accord- o a norm that exchange-inputs should be equal. That is, a spouse ontributes fewer "resources"--particularly fewer tangible urces"--to the marriage feels obliged to make up for this in- ity by giving greater deference and compliance. If this is true, low-power spouse should not perceive the exchange of benefits fair" (e.g., "it is only fair for John to make more of the ons, since he's making the money"). The gratitude and competence ations, then, would predict no differences in perceptions of ss among different power levels (Test GC-D 2). Nor would they differences in "fairness" among individuals who perceive the exchange as unequal with respect to some specific "input" such rt (Test GC-D 1) since such inequalities are "equalized out" in rall-picture by operation of this norm. The spouse who "has it e easier" in the marriage gives more in other ways.

Power-dependence theory would make no such predictions. It asonable to predict (following Homans, 1961) that inequities

power-outcomes or of effort-inputs, for example) are not necessarily
ceived as "fair"; specifically, I would predict that the more-advantaged
tner will perceive the exchange as fairer than will a less-advantaged
tner. In addition--since Homans suggests that inequity may "bother"
ore-advantaged exchange partner, albeit less than it bothers a
s-advantaged one--I also make the tentative prediction that the
l-exchange situation will be perceived as the fairest of all.

GC-D 1: Relative
rt → Task-Specific
sfaction

Direct questions about "fairness" proved awkward during the
est interviews, and respondents who did answer such questions were
illing to rate the division of labor for any task as unfair.
quently, questions about satisfaction were substituted. These
ions were administered during the final in-home interview by
of a paper-and-pencil check list which the respondent filled out
vacy. Following a question about how the eight task areas were
d between husband and wife, respondents indicated for each task
satisfaction with that division of labor. The question used was
atisfied are you with who does this?" Four answer categories were
ed, varying from extremely satisfied to not at all satisfied.
satisfaction answers were assigned higher scores.

The independent variable for Test GC-D 1 was a question which
n used previously in this report as an indirect measure of moti-
l investment (see Table 11). Following a question about whether

arried life is generally easier on men or women, respondents were
ked: "What about your own marriage? Would you say the same
ing? (Right now, who probably has it a little easier, you or your
ouse?)". As I have indicated earlier, the data in Table 11
ggested that this question did not tap motivational investment.
ther, it appears to tap perceptions of relative effort-inputs.
ch relative effort may be the outcome of the power balance; if so,
results of Table 21 which follow should be similar to Table 22,
which power is directly related to satisfaction.)

Results for Test GC-D 1 are presented in Table 21. The null
titude) hypothesis that satisfaction will not differ according to
eptions of relative effort should be considered to be rejected if
st scores are significant at the .10 level. Such tests, of course,
be viewed simply as pragmatic devices to assist in data inter-
ation. I consider the power-dependence hypothesis to be supported
ever satisfaction means are the lowest in condition (1) of all the
conditions and when the difference between condition (1) and
r condition (2) or (3) is statistically significant. That is, the
st satisfaction could either be in the "both the same effort"
tion (as Homans would suggest) or in the "self easier" situation.
which correspond completely to Homans' ideas are indicated, how-
by double asterisks in the right-hand column of Table 21.

Table 21 reveals striking gender differences. Wives fit power-
ence predictions for almost all tasks, including all of the
ionally "female" tasks. In the remaining two task areas, the trend

Table 21

TEST GC-D 1: PERCEIVED FAIRNESS OF TASK DIVISION (AS REFLECTED IN SATISFACTION), BY PERCEPTIONS OF *RELATIVE EFFORT* INVESTED IN THE MARRIAGE.

SFACTION WITH WHO TASKS:	Relative effort, as perceived by individual respondent: Who has it a little easier right now (in your marriage), you or your spouse? (1) Spouse Easier (N=12 husbands, N=31 wives)	(2) Both the Same (N=38 husbands, N=40 wives)	(3) Self Easier (N=39 husbands N=17 wives)	Which Theory Supported?
Grocery Shopping				
Mean satisfaction* of:				
Husbands (N=89)	3.58	3.45	3.41	Equal-input
Wives (N=88)	3.07	3.33	3.59	Power-dependence
epairing things around the house				
Mean satisfaction* of:				
Husbands (N=89)	3.17	3.61	3.36	Power-dependence**
Wives (N=88)	3.26	3.28	3.65	Power-dependence
king complaints to salesmen landlord				
Mean satisfaction* of:				
Husbands (N=89)	3.50	3.37	3.03	Neither one
Wives (N=88)	3.10	3.23	3.59	Power-dependence
eping in touch with relatives				
Mean satisfaction* of:				
Husbands (N=89)	3.00	3.18	2.97	Neither one
Wives (N=88)	2.94	3.03	3.47	Power-dependence
iding who you will invite che house				
lean satisfaction* of:				
Husbands (N=89)	3.25	3.45	3.24	Neither one
Wives (N=88)	3.37	3.38	3.47	Equal-input#
ng care of the car				
ean satisfaction* of:				
Husbands (N=89)	3.42	3.42	3.10	Neither one
Wives (N=88)	3.20	3.38	3.59	Equal-input#
ring supper				
an satisfaction* of:				
Husbands (N=89)	3.50	3.37	3.34	Equal-input
Wives (N=88)	3.00	3.37	3.34	Power-dependence**
the supper dishes				
n satisfaction* of:				
Husbans (N=89)	3.25	3.37	3.23	Equal-Input
Wives (N=88)	2.65	3.20	3.53	Power-dependence

mbers indicate higher satisfaction. Lowest possible satisfaction is 1.00 and highest possible
ion is 4.00.

d corresponds with Homans' predictions that equality (the middle column) should have the highest
tion of all.

not statistically significant, the trend is in the direction predicted by power-dependence theory.

esponds with power-dependence theory although it is not statistically
ificant. Husbands, in contrast, fit the power-dependence predictions
with respect to one traditionally "male" task, that of repairing
gs around the house. Could it be that husbands believe in the
of equal-inputs while their wives do not? These unexplained
erences suggest the usefulness of in-depth case studies. If such a
were pursued, I would suggest the inclusion of a larger proportion
uples with non-employed wives than was the case in the present
e. It may be, for instance, that only employed wives, but not
wives, fit the power-dependence predictions; those employed wives
lso do most of the household tasks may constitute the majority of
atisfaction wives in group (1) in Table 21.

In summary, the power-dependence formulation was consistently
ted for wives and the equal-input formulation was supported for
ds with respect to most traditionally "female" tasks; in other
reas, however, neither theory was supported for husband.

C-D 2: Task-Specific Marital
→ Task-Specific Satisfaction

The second test of equal-input versus power-dependence assumptions
ith relative power and level of satisfaction in specific task areas.
to the procedure followed for the previous hypothesis, the power-
nce hypothesis was considered to be supported whenever mean satis-
was the lowest in condition (1) of all the three conditions,
g that the difference between condition (1) and either conditions
3) were statistically significant.

The equal-input hypothesis that the perceived fairness of
hange (measured in terms of satisfaction) will not vary among equal-
er and unequal-power situations is supported for husbands in three
he four traditionally "female" task areas, as seen in Table 22.
traditionally "male" tasks, husbands are generally consistent
the power-dependence hypothesis (although the trend is statistic-
significant in only one of the three tasks). As in the previous
e, gender differences are apparent. Wives are consistent with
power-dependence hypothesis for all "female" tasks (although two
ie four are not statistically significant), and are consistent with
qual-input hypothesis for most traditionally "male" tasks.

There are some similarities between the patterns in Tables 21
2. In both, there is some tendency for each spouse to fit the
-dependence predictions with respect to tasks which were tradi-
ly assigned to that spouse, and to fit the equal-input predictions
her tasks. This trend is stronger in Table 22, however.

-GC 3: Relative Potential Alternatives
lative Current Alternatives → Overall
l Power

Spouses having sources of "resources" (other than from the
r) are said to have "alternatives." For example, an employed
s higher alternative sources of income (and other valued
es) than does an unemployed wife. A direct relationship between
e's income and her marital power, however, could be accounted
one or all of the marital power theories which I have discussed.
experience could have increased her competence in the eyes

Table 22

TEST GC-D 2: PERCEIVED FAIRNESS OF TASK DIVISION (AS REFLECTED IN SATISFACTION), BY LEVEL OF RELATIVE POWER IN SPECIFIC TASK AREAS.

ISFACTION WITH DOES TASKS:	Relative task-specific power (1) Self Less Power Than Spouse	(2) Self More Power Than Spouse	(3) Equal Power	Which Theory Supported?
Grocery Shopping				
Mean satisfaction* of:				
Wives (N=42)	2.86 (N=14)	3.53 (N=15)	3.31 (N=13)	Power-dependence
Husbands (N=43)	3.33 (N=15)	3.27 (N=15)	3.54 (N=13)	Equal-input
Repairing things around the house				
Mean satisfaction* of:				
Wives (N=46)	3.35 (N=17)	3.13 (N=8)	3.33 (N=21)	Equal-input
Husbands (N=45)	3.13 (N=8)	3.50 (N=16)	3.48 (N=21)	Equal-input#
Making complaints to salesmen and landlord				
Mean satisfaction* of:				
Wives (N=52)	2.80 (N=25)	3.47 (N=17)	3.60 (N=10)	Power-dependence**
Husbands (N=52)	3.12 (N=17)	3.48 (N=25)	3.10 (N=10)	Neither one
Keeping in touch with relatives				
Mean satisfaction* of:				
Wives (N=53)	3.09 (N=23)	3.88 (N=16)	3.43 (N=14)	Power-dependence
Husbands (N=53)	3.25 (N=16)	3.22 (N=23)	3.14 (N=14)	Equal-input
Deciding who you will invite to the house (omitted)				
Caring care of the car				
Mean satisfaction* of:				
Wives (N=44)	3.22 (N=18)	3.30 (N=10)	3.19 (N=16)	Equal-input
Husbands (N=45)	3.00 (N=10	3.16 (N=19)	3.25 (N=16)	Equal-input#
Preparing supper				
Mean satisfaction* of:				
Wives (N=39)	2.92 (N=13)	3.31 (N=13)	3.31 (N=13)	Equal-input#
Husbands (N=40)	3.31 (N=13)	3.21 (N=14)	3.08 (N=13)	Equal-input
Doing supper dishes				
Mean satisfaction* of:				
Wives (N=48)	2.84 (N=25)	3.13 (N=15)	3.38 (N=8)	Equal-input#
Husbands (N=48)	3.07 (N=15)	3.36 (N=25)	3.25 (N=8)	Power-dependence

mbers indicate higher satisfaction. Lowest possible satisfaction is 1.00 and the highest is 4.00. Satisfaction scores are reported only for those couples who differed in preferences k division.

d corresponds with Homans' predictions that equality (the middle column) should have the highest tion of all.

not statistically significant, the trend is in the direction predicted by power-dependence theory.

of her husband, her income could have increased his gratitude and respect for her, and/or the fact that she has an alternative source of income other than from her husband could have decreased her dependence upon him.

Potential (but currently not utilized) alternatives, on the other hand, are predicted to be related to marital power only in power-dependence theory. Some support was shown in Table 10 for Hypothesis 1-2, that such alternatives should be directly related to marital power. In itself, Table 10 did not provide a rigorous test, however, because of the possibility that the people with high potential alternatives are also the ones who have high currently-used alternatives. If potential alternatives are indeed directly related to marital power, then this relationship should persist even when the effect of present-time alternatives is controlled.

The indicator chosen for the "control variable"--present-time alternatives--was that of relative income. Within groups of couples having similar relative incomes, the power-dependence theory predicts that marital power is directly related to relative potential alternatives, and the competence and gratitude formulations predict no difference in power.

The null (competence/gratitude) hypothesis was considered to be supported if no two means were significantly different (at the .10 level). The power-dependence hypothesis was considered to hold if power was the lowest in condition (1) and highest in condition (3) and the difference between one pair of adjacent conditions was statistically significant.

Table 23

TEST D-GC 3: OVERALL RELATIVE MARITAL POWER, BY RELATIVE POTENTIAL ALTERNATIVES, WHEN RELATIVE INCOME OF SPOUSES IS CONTROLLED.

UNWEIGHTED POWER MEASURE

PART I. Potential for finding a suitable alternative partner

QUESTION A. Do men or women have the easier time finding a good spouse?

	(1) Spouses agree: Harder for Respondent's Gender	(2) Other Answer Combinations	(3) Spouses agree: Easier for Respondent's Gender	Which Theory Is Supported?
WHEN HUSBAND MAKES A GREAT DEAL MORE INCOME THAN WIFE				
Mean marital power* of:				
Husbands (N=19)	--- (N=0)	2.77 (N=17)	1.65 (N=2)	Power-dependence (but note the small number of respondents)
Wives (N=19)	4.35 (N=2)	3.23 (N=17)	--- (N=0)	
WHEN HUSBAND DOES NOT MAKE A GREAT DEAL MORE INCOME THAN WIFE				
Mean marital power* of:				
Husbands (N=51)	--- (N=1)	2.87 (N=42)	2.83 (N=8)	
Wives (N=51)	3.18 (N=8)	3.08 (N=42)	--- (N=1)	Equal-input#

QUESTION B. Number of very close or serious dating relationships in the past

	(1) Self Fewer	(2) Spouses Equal	(3) Self Greater	Which Theory Is Supported?
WHEN HUSBAND MAKES A GREAT DEAL MORE INCOME THAN WIFE				
Mean marital power* of:				
Husbands (N=22)	2.00 (N=5)	2.86 (N=7)	2.80 (N=10)	
Wives (N=22)	3.20 (N=10)	3.14 (N=7)	4.00 (N=5)	Neither one
WHEN HUSBAND DOES NOT MAKE A GREAT DEAL MORE INCOME THAN WIFE				
Mean marital power* of:				
Husbands (N=61)	2.71 (N=18)	3.07 (N=24)	2.79 (N=19)	
Wives (N=61)	3.19 (N=20)	2.85 (N=23)	3.29 (N=18)	Neither one

Table 23. Continued.

PART II. Remaining single as a potential alternative to the present marriage

QUESTION C. When did it occur to you to (re)marry--before or after you met the "right" person?

	(1) Self Earlier Than Spouse	(2) Both The Same	(3) Self Later Than Spouse	Which Theory Is Supported?
WHEN HUSBAND MAKES A GREAT DEAL MORE INCOME THAN WIFE				
Mean marital power* of:				
Husbands (N=22)	3.48 (N=6)	2.36 (N=10)	2.25 (N=6)	Power-dependence
Wives (N=22)	3.75 (N=6)	3.64 (N=10)	2.52 (N=6)	
WHEN HUSBAND DOES NOT MAKE A GREAT DEAL MORE INCOME THAN WIFE				
Mean marital power* of:				
Husbands (N=59)	3.10 (N=9)	2.99 (N=35)	2.50 (N=15)	Power-dependence
Wives (N=59)	3.50 (N=15)	2.95 (N=35)	2.90 (N=9)	

QUESTION D. Did you seriously consider remaining single by choice?

	(1) Self no, Spouse Yes	(2) Both Yes or Both No	(3) Self Yes, Spouse No	Which Theory Is Supported?
WHEN HUSBAND MAKES A GREAT DEAL MORE INCOME THAN WIFE				
Mean marital power* of:				
Husbands (N=22)	--- (N=3)	2.84 (N=12)	2.57 (N=7)	Power-dependence
Wives (N=22)	3.43 (N=7)	3.16 (N=12)	--- (N=3)	
WHEN HUSBAND DOES NOT MAKE A GREAT DEAL MORE INCOME THAN WIFE				
Mean marital power* of:				
Husbands (N=61)	2.95 (N=19)	2.97 (N=32)	2.44 (N=10)	Power-dependence
Wives (N=61)	3.56 (N=10)	2.97 (N=32)	3.05 (N=19)	

*Lower numbers indicate higher power. Equal power = 3.00.

#Trend is consistent with power-dependence predictions, but is not statistically significant.

As can be seen in Table 23, power-dependence theory receives consistent support for Questions C and D and some slight support for Question A. Question B provides support for neither theory, as the trend is statistically significant but not in the direction predicted by power-dependence theory.

A comparison of Table 23 with Table 10 suggests that controlling for the effects of relative income strengthens the relationship between potential alternatives and power for Questions A and D (the trend for the latter is not entirely consistent with predictions, which was not the case in Table 10). There is little change for Question B (which does not support the hypothesis on either table), and the relationships for Question C appear to be weakened.

To summarize the findings for Test GC-D 3, power-dependence theory was found to be supported over the competence and gratitude formulations.

Competence versus Power-Dependence Theories

So far, the two theories given the most attention have been the perceived competence and power-dependence formulations. Each, when considered separately, showed rather mixed results. The test situations which follow attempt to assess whether one theory can be said to have greater explanatory power than the other.

Test D-C 1: Relative Competence and Relative Dependence → Overall Marital Power

At this point, it is useful to ask whether relative dependence (i.e., motivational investment and alternatives) will each be related

to marital power, when the effects of relative perceived competence is controlled, and vice-versa. Table 24 contains data for all of the previously employed indicators of relative dependence, in combination with those for relative competence. The right-hand column of each subtable summarizes whether or not the trends are consistent with predictions. No attempt was made to assess statistical significance of these trends.

Since task-importance will be dealt with later, I will discuss only the results in which the unweighted power measure was employed at this point.

The competence of "intelligence" had not fit predictions (see Table 6) and--not surprisingly--does not have the predicted effect upon marital power when the relationship is controlled for dependence. Competence-formulation predictions for "dependability," which previously had been supported in Table 6, also receive some support in Table 24. In no case is the predicted trend found under all conditions of relative dependence, however.

The pattern of findings for relative dependence is somewhat clearer than for relative competence ratings. Alternatives indicators A and C and motivational investment indicator B, all of which had previously fit the power-dependence hypotheses (see Tables 10 and 14, respectively), continue to do so under most conditions of relative competence. In addition, alternatives indicator B--which previously had displayed a curvilinear relationship, somewhat in the direction opposite to the predicted (see Table 10)--now fits the power-dependence hypothesis for some conditions of relative competence.

Table 24

TEST D-C 1: OVERALL RELATIVE MARITAL POWER BY RELATIVE DEPENDENCE AND BY COMPETENCE RATINGS OF BOTH SPOUSES.

UNWEIGHTED POWER MEASURE

PART I. ALTERNATIVES-TO-THE-MARRIAGE AS MEASURES OF DEPENDENCE

ALTERNATIVES:	(1) Lower Than Spouse			(2) Equal			(3) Higher Than Spouse				Which Theory is Supported?	
COMPETENCE :	(a) Lower	(b) Equal	(c) Higher	(a) Lower	(b) Equal	(c) Higher	(a) Lower	(b) Equal	(c) Higher	Total N	Competence	Power-Dependence
Mean marital power* when:												
Alternatives measure is: / Competence measure is:												
A) Who has easier time finding good spouse? A) Dependability												
Wives	4.30 (N=2)	3.19 (N=8)	4.30 (N=2)	3.27 (N=27)	3.03 (N=20)	2.90 (N=12)	---- (N=0)	3.00 (N=1)	---- (N=0)	N=72	Only in condition 2	Yes
Husbands	---- (N=0)	3.00 (N=1)	---- (N=0)	3.02 (N=10)	2.93 (N=22)	2.73 (N=27)	---- (N=0)	2.81 (N=8)	1.70 (N=2)	N=72		Yes
B) Intelligence												
Wives	3.03 (N=3)	3.83 (N=4)	3.23 (N=3)	3.01 (N=16)	3.42 (N=26)	2.91 (N=19)	---- (N=0)	3.00 (N=1)	---- (N=0)	N=72	No	Wives - Yes
Husbands	---- (N=0)	3.00 (N=1)	---- (N=0)	3.09 (N=19)	2.63 (N=26)	2.92 (N=17)	2.77 (N=3)	2.18 (N=4)	2.97 (N=3)	N=72	No	Husbands - only in conditions a & b
B) No. of serious dating relations A) Dependability												
Wives	3.30 (N=14)	3.13 (N=15)	3.30 (N=3)	2.89 (N=9)	2.99 (N=14)	2.87 (N=7)	3.87 (N=10)	2.96 (N=8)	2.95 (N=4)	N=84	Wives only in condition 3	Wives - only in condition b
Husbands	3.05 (N=4)	3.04 (N=8)	2.13 (N=10)	2.93 (N=5)	2.96 (N=17)	3.11 (N=9)	2.70 (N=3)	2.84 (N=14)	2.70 (N=14)	N=84	Husbands - only in condition 1	Husbands - only in conditions a & b
B) Intelligence												
Wives	3.12 (N=11)	3.48 (N=13)	2.94 (N=8)	3.03 (N=8)	3.21 (N=13)	2.66 (N=9)	3.02 (N=5)	3.56 (N=12)	3.47 (N=6)	N=85	Wives - No	Wives - only in condition a
Husbands	2.53 (N=6)	2.44 (N=12)	2.98 (N=5)	3.33 (N=10)	2.90 (N=13)	2.84 (N=9)	3.04 (N=7)	2.55 (N=14)	2.87 (N=10)	N=85	Husbands - only in condition 2	Husbands - No

C) Decide to marry before or after met spouse?	A) Dependability														
	Wives	3.70 (N=7)	3.40 (N=10)	3.27 (N=6)	3.65 (N=14)	2.92 (N=21)	2.78 (N=8)	2.71 (N=10)	2.85 (N=6)	---- (N=0)	N=82	Wives - only in conditions 1 & 2	Yes		
	Husbands	---- (N=0)	3.15 (N=6)	3.29 (N=10)	2.94 (N=7)	3.08 (N=22)	2.34 (N=14)	2.92 (N=5)	2.52 (N=11)	2.30 (N=7)	N=82	Husbands - only in condition 3	Yes		
	B) Intelligence														
	Wives	3.26 (N=5)	3.97 (N=9)	3.14 (N=8)	3.10 (N=13)	3.32 (N=21)	3.04 (N=11)	2.80 (N=5)	2.92 (N=7)	2.43 (N=4)	N=83	Wives - No	Yes		
	Husbands	3.58 (N=4)	3.07 (N=7)	3.20 (N=5)	2.96 (N=11)	2.70 (N=22)	2.90 (N=13)	2.86 (N=8)	2.06 (N=8)	2.58 (N=6)	N=83	Husbands - No	Yes		
D) Seriously consider staying single by choice?	A) Dependability														
	Wives	3.45 (N=6)	3.60 (N=7)	3.37 (N=3)	3.21 (N=15)	2.90 (N=20)	2.87 (N=9)	3.51 (N=12)	2.94 (N=10)	2.95 (N=2)	N=84	Wives - only in conditions 2 & 3	No		
	Husbands	3.05 (N=2)	3.06 (N=10)	2.49 (N=12)	2.88 (N=8)	3.11 (N=21)	2.79 (N=15)	3.05 (N=2)	2.33 (N=8)	2.55 (N=6)	N=84	Husbands - only in condition 1	No		
	B) Intelligence														
	Wives	3.10 (N=5)	3.83 (N=11)	2.00 (N=1)	2.96 (N=11)	3.19 (N=19)	2.91 (N=15)	3.19 (N=8)	3.34 (N=8)	3.21 (N=7)	N=85	Wives - No	No		
	Husbands	2.79 (N=7)	2.63 (N=8)	2.81 (N=8)	3.09 (N=15)	2.84 (N=21)	3.04 (N=10)	4.00 (N=1)	2.21 (N=10)	2.72 (N=6)	N=85	Husbands - No	No		

*Lower numbers indicate higher power. Equal power = 3.00.

Table 24. Continued.

POWER MEASURE WEIGHTED BY IMPORTANCE

PART I. ALTERNATIVES-TO-THE-MARRIAGE AS MEASURES OF DEPENDENCE

Mean marital power* when:	(1) Lower Than Spouse (a) Lower	(b) Equal	(c) Higher	(2) Equal (a) Lower	(b) Equal	(c) Higher	(3) Higher Than Spouse (a) Lower	(b) Equal	(c) Higher	Total N	Which Theory is Supported? Competence	Power-Dependence
Alternatives measure is: / Competence measure is:												
A) Who has easier time finding good spouse? — A) Dependability												
Wives	.22 (N=2)	.02 (N=8)	---- (N=0)	.04 (N=27)	-.00 (N=20)	-.00 (N=12)	---- (N=0)	-.02 (N=1)	---- (N=0)	N=72	Wives - Yes	Wives - Yes
Husbands	---- (N=0)	-.02 (N=1)	---- (N=0)	-.01 (N=10)	-.19 (N=22)	-.04 (N=27)	---- (N=0)	-.03 (N=8)	-.23 (N=2)	N=72	Husbands - only in condition 3	Husbands - only in condition c
B) Intelligence												
Wives	.01 (N=3)	.13 (N=4)	.02 (N=3)	-.01 (N=16)	.06 (N=26)	-.02 (N=19)	---- (N=0)	-.02 (N=1)	---- (N=0)	N=72	Wives - No	Wives - Yes
Husbands	---- (N=0)	-.02 (N=1)	---- (N=0)	.01 (N=19)	-.21 (N=26)	-.03 (N=17)	-.03 (N=3)	-.15 (N=4)	-.01 (N=3)	N=72	Husbands - No	Husbands - only in condition a
B) No. of serious dating relations — A) Dependability												
Wives	.04 (N=14)	.01 (N=15)	.05 (N=3)	-.02 (N=9)	-.01 (N=14)	-.00 (N=7)	.12 (N=10)	.30 (N=8)	-.02 (N=4)	N=84	Wives - No	Wives - only in condition c
Husbands	-.00 (N=4)	-.02 (N=8)	-.12 (N=10)	-.01 (N=5)	-.23 (N=17)	.01 (N=9)	-.06 (N=3)	-.03 (N=14)	-.05 (N=14)	N=84	Husbands - only in condition 1	Husbands - only in condition a
B) Intelligence												
Wives	.01 (N=11)	.07 (N=13)	-.02 (N=8)	-.01 (N=8)	.02 (N=13)	-.05 (N=9)	.00 (N=5)	.30 (N=12)	.06 (N=6)	N=85	Wives - No	Wives - No
Husbands	-.08 (N=6)	-.10 (N=12)	-.01 (N=5)	.04 (N=10)	-.30 (N=13)	-.05 (N=9)	.01 (N=7)	-.08 (N=14)	-.02 (N=10)	N=85	Husbands - No	Husbands - No

C) Decide to marry before or after met spouse?	A) Dependability												
	Wives	.11 (N=7)	.06 (N=10)	.02 (N=6)	.09 (N=14)	.10 (N=21)	-.00 (N=8)	-.05 (N=10)	-.03 (N=6)	---- (N=10)	N=82	Wives - only in conditions 1 & 2	Wives - only in conditions a & c
	Husbands	---- (N=0)	.02 (N=6)	.05 (N=10)	-.02 (N=7)	-.17 (N=22)	-.10 (N=14)	-.02 (N=5)	-.09 (N=11)	-.11 (N=7)	N=82	Husbands - only in condition 3	Husbands - only in condition c
	B) Intelligence												
	Wives	.03 (N=5)	.14 (N=9)	.01 (N=8)	.01 (N=13)	.17 (N=21)	.01 (N=11)	-.03 (N=5)	-.02 (N=7)	-.10 (N=4)	N=83	Wives - only in condition 3	Only in conditions a and c
	Husbands	.10 (N=4)	.01 (N=7)	.02 (N=5)	-.02 (N=11)	-.22 (N=22)	-.03 (N=13)	-.03 (N=8)	-.17 (N=8)	-.06 (N=6)	N=83	Husbands - No	
D) Seriously consider staying single by choice?	A) Dependability												
	Wives	.06 (N=6)	.08 (N=7)	.04 (N=3)	.02 (N=15)	.10 (N=20)	.00 (N=9)	.08 (N=12)	-.01 (N=10)	-.03 (N=2)	N=84	Wives - only in condition 3	Wives - only in condition c
	Husbands	.01 (N=2)	-.34 (N=10)	-.08 (N=2)	-.03 (N=8)	.00 (N=21)	-.03 (N=15)	-.01 (N=2)	-.14 (N=8)	-.06 (N=6)	N=84	Husbands - No	Husbands - No
	B) Intelligence												
	Wives	.00 (N=5)	.14 (N=11)	-.20 (N=1)	-.01 (N=11)	.14 (N=19)	-.02 (N=15)	.02 (N=8)	.06 (N=8)	.02 (N=7)	N=85	Wives - No	Wives - only in condition b
	Husbands	-.03 (N=7)	-.51 (N=8)	-.03 (N=8)	.00 (N=15)	-.03 (N=21)	-.00 (N=10)	.20 (N=1)	-.15 (N=10)	-.08 (N=6)	N=85	Husbands - No	Husbands - No

* Lower numbers indicate higher power. Equal power = .00.

Table 24. Continued.

UNWEIGHTED POWER MEASURE

PART II. MOTIVATIONAL INVESTMENT AS MEASURES OF DEPENDENCE

MOTIVATIONAL INVESTMENT:	(1) Higher Than Spouse			(2) Equal			(3) Lower Than Spouse			Total	Which Theory is Supported?	
COMPETENCE:	(a) Lower	(b) Equal	(c) Higher	(a) Lower	(b) Equal	(c) Higher	(a) Lower	(b) Equal	(c) Higher	N	Competence	Power-Dependence
Mean marital power* when:												
Motivational investment measure is: / Competence measure is:												
A) Married people get more out of life — A) Dependability												
Wives	3.37 (N=7)	2.68 (N=7)	---- (N=0)	3.20 (N=9)	3.22 (N=13)	2.95 (N=6)	3.73 (N=8)	3.01 (N=9)	2.90 (N=5)	N=64	Wives - Yes	Wives - only in condition c
Husbands	2.58 (N=4)	3.01 (N=10)	2.28 (N=8)	3.30 (N=5)	2.71 (N=14)	2.80 (N=9)	---- (N=0)	3.31 (N=7)	2.63 (N=7)	N=64	Husbands - only in condition 3	Husbands - No
B) Intelligence												
Wives	2.86 (N=5)	2.99 (N=7)	3.60 (N=3)	2.74 (N=7)	3.51 (N=15)	2.76 (N=7)	3.18 (N=5)	3.83 (N=7)	3.11 (N=10)	N=66	Wives - No	Wives - No
Husbands	2.89 (N=10)	2.30 (N=8)	2.82 (N=5)	3.24 (N=7)	2.54 (N=14)	3.08 (N=8)	2.40 (N=3)	3.01 (N=7)	3.14 (N=5)	N=66		
B) Relative preference strength (average) — A) Dependability												
Wives	3.42 (N=25)	2.95 (N=22)	3.46 (N=9)				3.18 (N=8)	3.14 (N=14)	2.14 (N=5)	N=83	Wives - only in condition 1	Wives - only in conditions a & c
Husbands	3.02 (N=9)	2.87 (N=23)	2.88 (N=17)				2.67 (N=3)	3.05 (N=15)	2.38 (N=11)	N=83	Husbands - only in condition 1	Husbands - only in conditions a & c
B) Intelligence												
Wives	3.19 (N=15)	3.40 (N=27)	3.03 (N=15)				2.87 (N=9)	3.43 (N=10)	2.84 (N=8)	N=84	Wives - No	Wives - only in conditions a & c
Husbands	3.19 (N=14)	2.61 (N=22)	3.01 (N=14)				2.79 (N=9)	2.66 (N=16)	2.70 (N=10)	N=84	Husbands - No	Husbands - only in conditions a & c

*Lower numbers indicate higher power. Equal power = 3.00

POWER MEASURE WEIGHTED BY IMPORTANCE

A) Married people get more out of life	A) Dependability											
	Wives	.04 (N=7)	-.05 (N=7)	---- (N=0)	.03 (N=9)	.21 (N=13)	-.02 (N=6)	.11 (N=8)	-.01 (N=9)	.02 (N=5)	N=64	Wives - only in condition 1	Wives - No
	Husbands	-.06 (N=4)	-.01 (N=10)	-.11 (N=8)	.03 (N=5)	-.05 (N=14)	-.03 (N=9)	---- (N=0)	.00 (N=7)	-.04 (N=7)	N=64	Husbands - only in condition 3	Husbands - No
	B) Intelligence												
	Wives	-.02 (N=5)	.02 (N=7)	.06 (N=3)	-.05 (N=7)	.23 (N=15)	-.04 (N=7)	.02 (N=5)	.12 (N=7)	.01 (N=10)	N=66	Wives - No	Wives - No
	Husbands	-.03 (N=10)	-.11 (N=8)	-.03 (N=5)	.03 (N=7)	-.08 (N=14)	.02 (N=5)	.02 (N=3)	-.06 (N=7)	-.03 (N=9)	N=66	Husbands - No	Husbands - No
B) Relative preference strength (average)	A) Dependability												
	Wives	.06 (N=25)	.09 (N=22)	.06 (N=9)				.03 (N=8)	.02 (N=14)	-.08 (N=5)	N=83	Wives - only in condition 3	Wives - Yes
	Husbands	-.01 (N=9)	-.19 (N=23)	.02 (N=17)				-.05 (N=3)	-.00 (N=15)	-.09 (N=16)	N=83	Husbands - No	Husbands - only in conditions a & c
	B) Intelligence												
	Wives	.02 (N=15)	.14 (N=27)	-.00 (N=15)				-.02 (N=9)	.09 (N=10)	-.03 (N=8)	N=84	Wives - No	Wives - Yes
	Husbands	.02 (N=14)	-.24 (N=22)	-.02 (N=14)				-.04 (N=9)	-.06 (N=16)	-.04 (N=10)	N=84	Husbands - No	Husbands - only in conditions a & c

*Lower numbers indicate higher power. Equal power = .00

In general, it appears that the power-dependence theory eceives somewhat more support than does the competence theory in est D-C 1. Such tests, of course, require careful interpretation, ince the number of respondents in each cell is quite small.

est D-C 2: "Relative Effects" of mpetence and Dependence

In the one comparison in Table 24 for which both relative mpetence and relative dependence are largely consistent with predic- ons, it may prove interesting to assess the relative effects for e "inconsistent" conditions (following Rosenberg, 1968). That is, es a more-competent but more-dependent spouse have higher power an a less-competent but less-dependent one? The competence formula- on would predict the former and a power-dependence formulation the tter.

The appropriate values from Table 24, for the competence of endability and dependence (alternatives) indicator C (dealing with ther the decision to marry was made even before the "right" person found), are repeated below.

Relative alternatives:	Wife > Husband	Husband > Wife
Relative competence:	Husband > Wife	Wife > Husband
Mean marital power of:		
Wives	2.71 (N=10)	3.27 (N=6)

Wives' mean power is higher on the left-hand column above,-- lower numbers should be taken to "mean" higher power--indicating rt for power-dependence theory over the perceived competence

formulation. Of course, one could have much more confidence in such findings if the numbers of respondents were larger.

Test D-C 3: The Role of Task Importance

As discussed in Chapter VII, there are reasons for speculating that both the competence and power-dependence theories ought to hold most strongly under the "high importance" condition, i.e., when the issues at stake are perceived as important ones. Since I did not employ task-importance as a control variable, I will check out this hypothesis by comparing the results of the unweighted power measure with those obtained when the power measure was weighted according to perceived task importance. If a theory receives stronger support with the weighted than with the unweighted indicator, it is reasonable to conclude that it can predict marital power better for important than for unimportant tasks--since "important" task areas are given higher weights.

I will first review the effects which task importance have hen each theory is tested individually, and then assess the effects hen both competence and dependence are considered jointly in Table 24.

When competence perceptions of each spouse were considered eparately, "dependability" was related to marital power in the pre- cted direction (Table 4). This support disappeared, however, when e importance-weighted index was employed. Dependability ratings of th spouses, considered simultaneously, fit the competence formulation t, when importance was taken into account, the support was reduced. e only situation in which ratings of intelligence fit the hypothesis

was when wives' ratings of their husbands were considered separately (Table 4). This trend persisted when importance weightings were employed. In general, however, it appears that the competence hypothesis has greater explanatory power for low-importance task areas than for areas that are perceived as quite important by the spouses.

Measures of dependence (alternatives and motivational investment), when considered separately from competence, also show the same effect. When the perceptions of individual spouses about potential alternatives to the present marriage were related to marital power, two situations--one involving wives only and one involving husbands only--supported the power dependence hypothesis (see Table 9). The support for wives persisted when importance was taken into account but that for husbands was reduced although not entirely eliminated. When relative alternatives were related to power, the support which was found for the hypothesis disappeared entirely for one indicator (Question A in Table 10), and was greatly reduced for another (Question C). In a third (Question D), the hypothesis received stronger support under high-importance conditions for wives but not for husbands.

The only indicator of relative motivational investment which had been consistent with predictions was average relative preference strength of spouses about task-division. When importance was taken into consideration, the support for wives appeared to increase while that for husbands disappeared entirely (see Table 13).

In summary, it appears that power-dependence theory holds more strongly under high-importance conditions for wives and under low-importance conditions for husbands. This is consistent with

power-dependence findings in which the dependent variable was satisfaction rather than power (see Tables 21 and 22), where support was somewhat stronger for wives, especially in Table 21. Two explanations for this seem to be reasonable. First, it may be that variations in dependence among women are greater than among the men in my particular sample of couples. Or, perhaps--as suggested in Test D-C 4 in Chapter VII--women answered the task importance questions in terms of their own personal goals, while men interpreted them in terms of goals for the couple as a unit.

When Table 24 is considered, the difference between unweighted wer and power weighted by task importance can be compared by contrasting the support or non-support patterns summarized in the far right-hand lumn of the respective sub-tables. The pattern of support or non-pport for the competence hypothesis, with respect to the competence dependability, usually shows no change for husbands (in four of the tests) and decreases for wives in half of the tests. The shifts erved, in terms of gross changes from support to non-support, are marized below:

Number of tests in which support for the competence hypothesis is:	Wives	Husbands
Increased by importance weighting	1	-
Not changed	2	4
Decreased by importance-weighting	3	2
	6	6

›r the competence of perceived intelligence, there is little change
en importance weights are added; few test results are consistent
th the hypothesis in either case.

Similar comparisons for power-dependence theory, between
veighted and importance-weighted measures in Table 24, can also be
le. The patterns of gross shifts from support to non-support or
e-versa are as follows:

Number of tests in which support for the power-dependence hypothesis is:	Wives	Husbands
Increased by importance-weighting	4	-
Not changed	4	7
Decreased by importance-weighting	3	4
	11	11

In general, when dependence tests are controlled for relative
etence as in Table 24, the previously noted tendency for the predic-
s to receive increased support under high-importance conditions for
is found again. When competence tests are controlled for relative
dence, the tendency observed before, namely that support was
ed under high-importance conditions, is present to some extent.

In conclusion, the role of task importance as a scope condi-
for theories of marital power appears to be a significant one.
er, the effect of importance was not always in accordance with
xpected. The competence formulation, as adapted from the work
ger et al. on status characteristics and expectation states

966, 1972), had been expected to hold most strongly under conditions
high task importance. When such task importance was high, I
asoned, competence would become a factor because there would be more
rious consequences if task performance were done poorly; the group
ıld be more "task oriented" and thus somewhat similar to the task
:used laboratory groups used in previous research. There are at
st three problems with this line of reasoning. First, it may well
d if one were to use the type of power measures that Blood and
fe (1960) did, in which the person who actually takes more responsi-
ity is considered to have more power. Second, the kinds of task
ıs used for the present study may all be relatively unimportant to
: couples, relative to other joint concerns which they have.
lly, it appears that--at least for wives--the rating of a task as
ly important did not necessarily mean that they considered it
ly consequential for the couple as a group. The last reason may
account for the finding that power-dependence theory was supported
strongly for wives under high-importance conditions.

Tests Involving Specific Resources

My attempt to find a way to test the theoretical process of
al power separately from particular culturally-specific situa-
, was not entirely successful. Finding support for some indi-
; but not for others is a reminder, not only that my measurements
efining, but also that such theoretical process-concepts as
tional investment and competence cannot be measured in the
ct. There apparently are different norms for husbands and

ves with respect to what kinds of "competence" can earn one influence .g., wives yield to "intelligent" husbands but not vice-versa). To te another example, potential alternatives to the present marriage reduce dependence in societies where divorce is a possibility but ld not be expected to do so in other societies.

I was, however, successful in my attempt to test theories marital power in a manner which allows for potential falsifiability. approach of previous researchers in the "Resource Theory" tradi- n failed in this respect; the "resource theory" could never be ected, because any negative finding with respect to one "resource" d always be explained away as being due to some other "resource."

In spite of my desire to avoid the use of specific "resource" ables, there were a few cases where alternative theoretical formu- ons seemed to clearly predict different results from possession given resource. The presentation of these tests constitutes the nder of this chapter.

tence and Gratitude versus
-Dependence Theories

D-CG 2: Relative Income and Wives'
ational Investment in Having a
r → Wives' Overall Marital Power

Income is a "resource" which has been found to be consis- related to marital power in Western, industrialized societies. rment of wives has been found to increase their marital power in ndustrialized and less industrialized countries. (See Figure 3 summary of some relevant findings with regard to income and work participation.)

It appears that a good deal of the marital power of employed
is associated with their income. As was already mentioned under
-GC 3 above, the relation between wives' income (relative to
f their husbands) and wives' relative marital power, by itself,
ot support any one marital power theory. This income could earn
fe gratitude and respect from the husband (the gratitude theory).
perience of working could increase the wife's competence in areas
t to domestic matters and/or the husband's estimate of her com-
(the competence theory). Finally, having an outside source of
("alternatives") could decrease her dependence upon the husband
dependence theory). It may well be that all three processes
simultaneously to raise the marital power of employed wives
hat usually held by non-employed women.

Since my concern was to assess the relative explanatory power
al power theories, findings about the relation between income
r alone (see Table 25) are not helpful. I searched for a test
n in which different predictions would result from the different
eories. Although power-dependence theory would predict that
se in relative income should be associated with an increase in
power (because of better alternative sources of resources
he marriage), a contradictory prediction could result (if the
such "alternatives" were offset by high "motivational invest-
ne situation in question is one where the wife values having
for its own sake. Assuming that most U. S. husbands still
implicit "veto power" over the wife's decision to work,

wife's career is a goal which is "mediated" by her husband. She
ependent upon him for "permission" to pursue this career.

If that assumption still holds, power-dependence theory
d predict that wives with high "career investment" will "lose"
of the power which they would otherwise have gained from having
lternative source of income. The competence and gratitude theories
d predict that the relation between income and power remain unaf-
ed by such attitudes, since variations in motivational investment
ving a career should not cause changes in either the wife's per-
d competence or in her income contribution for which gratitude
e earned.

Test D-CG 2, in summary, hypothesizes that the relationship
en wives' relative income and their overall relative marital
will be reduced when controlled for wives' career investment.
mpetence and gratitude theories, in contrast, would predict that
investment have no effect upon the size of the relationship
n relative income and power.

Results of this test are found in Table 26. By comparing
fference between higher and lower relative income conditions in
26, with the difference between higher and lower relative income
e 25, one can determine which hypothesis is supported. The
nce between wives' mean power in higher and lower relative
conditions is .27, without the use of the control variable (see
5). If the corresponding mean differences are noticeably smaller

Table 25

OVERALL RELATIVE MARITAL POWER OF WIVES,
BY RELATIVE INCOME OF SPOUSES.

EIGHTED POWER MEASURE

	Relative income of spouses	
	(1) Husband makes much more income than does wife (at least twice as much)	(2) Other: Husband makes somewhat more income, equal incomes, and wife makes more income
marital ** of:		
ves (N=83)	3.36 (N=22)	3.09 (N=61)

r numbers indicate higher power. Equal power = 3.00.

TEST D-CG 2: OVERALL RELATIVE MARITAL POWER OF WIVES, BY RELATIVE INCOME OF SPOUSES WHEN WIVES' MOTIVATIONAL INVESTMENT IN HAVING A CAREER IS CONTROLLED.

UNWEIGHTED POWER MEASURE

CAREER INVESTMENT MEASURE A. Response of wives to: I would rather not have a job, providing that the extra money were not needed all that much.

CAREER INVESTMENT:	(1) High (Strongly Disagrees)		(2) Medium (Disagree)		(3) Low (Agree or Strongly Agree)		Is effect of career investment in the predicted direction?
RELATIVE INCOME:	(a) Husband much more income than wife	(b) Other	(a) Husband much more income than wife	(b) Other	(a) Husband much more income than wife	(b) Other	
Mean marital power* of:							
Wives (N=82)	3.30 (N=1)	2.97 (N=12)	3.35 (N=13)	3.14 (N=33)	3.40 (N=8)	3.11 (N=15)	No effect (compared with Table 25) Gratitude/Competence theory supported.

CAREER INVESTMENT MEASURE B. Difference between spouses' answers to: I would rather (that my wife) not have a job, providing that the extra money were not needed all that much.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SPOUSES:	(1) Wife disagrees more strongly than husband		(2) Spouses give identical answers		(3) Wife agrees more strongly than husband		Is effect of career investment in the predicted direction?
RELATIVE INCOME:	(a) Husband much more income than wife	(b) Other	(a) Husband much more income than wife	(b) Other	(a) Husband much more income than wife	(b) Other	
Mean marital power* of:							
Wives (N=80)	2.95 (N=8)	3.03 (N=13)	3.62 (N=12)	3.06 (N=34)	3.50 (N=2)	3.31 (N=11)	No (opposite effect compared with Table 25) Neither theory supported

to your own opinions about women working?

CAREER INVESTMENT:	(1) High (Women ought to have same opportunity as men)		(2) Low (Women ought to be able to work a bit or women ought not to work)		Is effect of career investment in the predicted direction?
RELATIVE INCOME:	(a) Husband much more income than wife	(b) Other	(a) Husband much more income than wife	(b) Other	
Mean marital power* of:					
Wives (N=82)	3.53 (N=14)	3.07 (N=49)	3.08 (N=8)	3.18 (N=11)	No (opposite direction, compared with Table 25) Neither theory supported.

CAREER INVESTMENT MEASURE D. Strength of endorsement of "Women ought to have same career opportunity as men" (asked only of wives who gave this answer to Question C above).

CAREER INVESTMENT:	(1) Very High (Strong endorsement)		(2) Moderately High (Medium or Weak endorsement)		Is effect of career investment in the predicted direction?
RELATIVE INCOME:	(a) Husband much more income than wife	(b) Other	(a) Husband much more income than wife	(b) Other	
Mean marital power* of:					
Wives (N=63)	3.63 (N=7)	3.04 (N=23)	3.43 (N=7)	3.09 (N=26)	No (compared with group 1 for Question C above) Neither theory supported.

CAREER INVESTMENT MEASURE E. Wives' answers to: Please characterize your level of career ambition over the long run.

CAREER INVESTMENT:	(1) High (High or very high ambition)		(2) Low (Medium or low ambition)		Is effect of career investment in the predicted direction?
	(a) Husband much more income than wife	(b) Other	(a) Husband much more income than wife	(b) Other	
Mean marital power* of:					
Wives (N=83)	3.76 (N=8)	3.10 (N=37)	3.14 (N=14)	3.08 (N=24)	No (opposite direction compared with Table 25) Neither theory supported.

*Lower numbers indicate higher power. Equal power = 3.00.

n .27 for wives having high career investment (condition 1 in
le 26) and noticeably larger for wives having lower career invest-
: levels, then the power-dependence hypothesis will be considered
e supported. In such cases, high career-investment wives "lose"
of the power associated with a favorable relative-income position
dition b); the amount of income they earn ceases to make much
erence in their power position vis-a-vis their husbands.

On the other hand, if controlling for career investment has
ffect--if the differences between higher and lower relative in-
remain about .27--then the competence/gratitude prediction holds.

The third possibility is that controlling for career invest-
will change the relationship between income and power but in the
tion opposite that predicted by power-dependence theory. Neither
y would be supported in such a case.

The technique of comparing the differences between one pair of
with the difference between another pair of means is useful in
g an approximate idea about the relative strength of relationships.
ks the precision of statistical tests of significance (e.g.,
whether two correlation coefficients are significantly different).
the data provide clear and unambiguous patterns, tests of
ical significance are not deemed necessary.

Question A (see Table 26) measures wives' motivational invest-
having a job, regardless of whether that job is considered a
Such motivational investment has no effect upon the relation
relative income and power, thereby supporting the competence and

tude theories. This result can be seen more easily when the
rence between means for higher and lower relative income groups
amined:

EASURE A. Wife's motivational investment in having a job

	(1) High	(2) Medium	(3) Low	Theory Supported
ence of power- between lower gher relative- groups:	.33	.21	.29	Competence/ Gratitude

the above values are greatly different from the difference of
nd when motivational investment is not controlled. Neither is
trend in the direction predicted by power-dependence theory
ich the values above should have been ordered from lowest to
).

The second motivational investment measure, Measure B in Table
a bit more complicated. Husbands and wives were both asked
A, about whether they would prefer that the wife not work.
ategories varied from strongly agree to strongly disagree.
who gave identical answers to this question are in group (2)
26. If the wife preferred to work more than her husband did,
le was placed in group (1). If the husband preferred her to
e than did she herself, the couple was placed in group (3). I
from power-dependence theory, that wives in group (1) would have
t mean differences. That is, they have some motivational in-
in having a job and their husbands are ambivalent or opposed
dea; assuming that husbands are in a position to enforce this

tion, such wives should be highly dependent on the husband's
sion. This dependence was expected to reduce any gains which
ise would accrue from having a more-favorable relative income
on (condition b in Table 26).

Examination of the mean differences (below) reveals that the dependence prediction does not hold. The relationship is clearly opposite direction; wives who want to work[123] but whose husbands completely agree "gain" more power from a favorable relative-position that do other wives.

ASURE B: Comparison of husband's and wife's preferences about whether the wife works

	(1) Wife prefers to work more than husband would prefer	(2) Spouses have identical preferences	(3) Wife prefers to work less than husband would prefer	Theory Supported
ce of ans be- ver and elative- roups:	.92	.56	.19	Neither one

values deviate strongly from the value of .27, obtained when
l variable is used. The implication of such a finding, support-
redictions of neither power-dependence nor the competence/
theories, will be explored after the remaining findings are

[123]Very few wives in this group indicated that they would prefer
k.

Similar findings are obtained with respect to the three re-
g measures of the wife's level of career investment. Measure C
able 26) deals with her opinions about the issue of women working
. There are three answer options. Wives who chose the strongest
ment ("women ought to have the same opportunity for an important
as men") were assumed to have high career investment (group 1
e 26). Wives who chose either the position that "women ought
work outside the home" (very few gave this answer) or the
n that "women ought to be able to work a bit, but not so as to
to interfere with home and family obligations" were considered
low career investment (group 2)

Measure D is closely related to Measure C. Respondents who
ed that women should have equal opportunity to have a career
ed an additional question, to determine whether they felt this
onally or simply endorsed this right for those other women who
exercise it. The "probe" used was: "What about your <u>own</u>
(Would you be disappointed if only the husband had a career?)"
-ended question was then categorized by coders, using the
instructions:

(1) Strong endorsement: wife wants to have a career and would be disappointed if she did not.
(2) Moderate endorsement: wife would like to have a career, but would not be personally disappointed if it doesn't work out that way.
(3) Weak endorsement: wife would like a career but only until there are children, etc.

then, simply makes finer distinctions within the high-investment
Question C. Women giving moderate and weak endorsements were
nto one group, due to the low number of weak endorsements.

Measures C and D are combined below, for the purpose of
ing the differences between power-means from Table 26.

ASURES C and D. Wife's opinion about women working outside the home.

F CAREER-TMENT:	(1) Women should have same opportunity as men for important career		(2) Women's work should not interfere with family responsibilities or women ought not to work	Theory Supported
	Very High	Moderately High	Low	
nce of eans be-wer and elative-roups:	.59	.34	-.10	Neither one
		.46		

There is a very clear and strong trend in the direction
that predicted by power-dependence theory. The higher the
otivational investment in having a career, the more power she
rom being in the more advantageous relative-income group
an in the less advantageous one. In the low-investment group
above), wives appear to "lose" power when they "increase" their
income position vis-a-vis their husbands.

The final indicator of level of career investment, Measure D,
tion about long-run career ambitions. "Regardless of whether
w employed, please characterize your level of career ambition
ong run." Respondents could check one of five options: very
, medium or average, pretty low--no particular long-run

ons, or I don't plan to work. Those answering "high" or "very
(group 1 in Table 26) were considered to have high career in-
nt, while the remaining women were considered to have low career
nent (group 2). As can be seen below, results clearly do not
: the power-dependence hypothesis.

SURE E. Level of wife's career ambition over long-run.

	(1) High or Very High	(2) Medium or Low	Theory Supported
nce of power- etween lower her relative- groups:	.66	.06	Neither one

In summary, there is a striking trend in favor of wives with
ivational investment in having a career; such women accrue
e marital power from a favorable relative-income position than
with little career investment. This is contrary to the
from such earlier studies as that of Hoffman (1960).
Such strong findings, I posit, would probably not disappear
st were refined (for example, by eliminating the few unemployed
m the sample, by making finer distinctions with respect to re-
come, or even by controlling for whether the wife worked full-
art-time).
My assumption that wives feel that their husband's "permission"
in order for them to have a career, simply may not hold for
r-middle class respondents. This possibility should be checked
research. Another possibility, of course, is that high moti-
nvestment in goals mediated by the other spouse does not

ıcrease dependence in a marital situation--or that this kind of
pendence does not lower marital power.

Although power-dependence theory has received some support
the present study for the hypothesis that "alternatives" should be
rectly related to marital power, it has received almost no support
r the hypothesis that "motivational investment" should be inversely
ated to power. Either the theory requires some change--at least a
cification of the conditions under which it does and does not hold--
I have failed to measure the kinds of "motivational investment"
ch are the strongest sources of marital dependence. This promises
be a fruitful avenue for further inquiry.

The final test-situation involving individual resource-variables
involves power-dependence theory, this time in specific contrast
the perceived competence formulation.

etence versus Power-Dependence Theories

C-D 4: Relative Age, Marital Experience, and Having Children → Overall Marital Power

The final three "critical" tests deal with three "resources"
ciated with certain kinds of past experiences, the experience
simply comes with having lived longer and the experiences associated
having raised children and having been previously married. All of
are potentially learning experiences, which should--more often
not--increase the competence of a person in a variety of areas.
ompetence theory would predict, then, that a spouse with more of a

Table 27

TEST C-D 4: OVERALL RELATIVE MARITAL POWER, BY RELATIVE AGE AND PREVIOUS MARITAL EXPERIENCE AND PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE WITH CHILDREN.

HTED POWER MEASURE

A. Relative Age

	(1) Younger Than Spouse	(2) Same Age As Spouse	(3) Older Than Spouse	Which Theory Is Supported?
arital power* of:				
sbands (N=86)	2.67 (N=11)	2.62 (N=26)	2.93 (N=49)	Power-dependence
es (N=86)	3.02 (N=49)	3.38 (N=26)	3.33 (N=11)	

B. Relative marital experience

	(1) Spouse Married Before, Self Not	(2) Both Spouses The Same	(3) Self Married Before, Spouse Not	Which Theory Is Supported?
rital power* of:				
ands (N=87)	2.79 (N=23)	2.84 (N=43)	2.82 (N=21)	Neither one
s (N=87)	3.18 (N=21)	3.12 (N=43)	3.21 (N=23)	

C. Relative experience with children

	(1) Spouse Has Children, Self Not	(2) Neither Has Children	(3) Self Has Children, Spouse Not	Which Theory Is Supported?
:al power* of:				
ıds (N=53)	2.73 (N=25)	2.84 (N=12)	2.83 (N=16)	Power-dependence
(N=53)	3.17 (N=16)	3.16 (N=12)	3.27 (N=25)	

mbers indicate lower power. Equal power = 3.00.

ular experience should be perceived as the more-competent
and, therefore, should have the greater relative power.

These three "resources" were selected because they may also
ative "status characteristics," i.e., traits which reduce one's
on the "marriage market" and hence reduce one's potential alterna-
to the present spouse. Power-dependence theory would predict
eing older, being divorced, and having children will all be
ted with lower marital power.

The test which follows relates the relative position of spouses
e three variables to their overall relative marital power. Com-
theory would predict that spouses with greater relative "experience"
ion 3 in Table 27) will have the highest power; power-dependence
reinterpreting the same variables, would predict that spouses
her relative "alternatives" (condition 1) will have the highest
In short, the two theories predict opposite trends.

Ages of spouses were obtained from the marriage license appli-
and were coded as follows: 22-23 years, 24-25, 26-27, 28-29,
2-33, 34-35, and 36-40. Codes for wife and husband were then

If they fell into the same age-category, they were considered
equal age (condition 2 in Table 27). Other respondents were
ther in the "older than spouse" group (condition 3) or the
than spouse" group (condition 1).

As Table 27 reveals, results are generally in accord with
endence predictions (although younger husbands have slightly
er than equal-age ones and older wives have slightly higher

r than equal-age wives). Husbands apparently "lose" power only hey are older, while wives "lose" if they are either the same age lder. The assessment of such gender differences could be improved ontrolling for age level; for example, the advantage of being ger than one's husband may decrease in older age brackets. Also, a larger sample it would be desirable to determine the effects all versus large age differences; the "older" wives in Table 27 sually only slightly older than their husbands, while some of the r" husbands are considerably older than their wives.

The second part of Table 27 deals with relative marital ience. All respondents in the present study were either beginning t marriage or else they had been married once before and then ed (or, in two cases, had an annulled marriage). A divorced married to another divorced person was considered to have an amount of previous marital experience. In about one-fourth of mple, the husband but not the wife had been married before and ther one-fourth, only the wife had been previously married. couples were placed into groups (1) and (3) in Table 27, depend- on whether the individual spouse had more or less marital nce.

Table 27 indicates that there are almost no differences in power among couples who vary in relative marital experience, so theory can be said to receive support. When the wife but not band has been married before, husbands have a very slight power ge relative to other husbands and wives have an equally small sadvantage relative to other wives.

The final test deals with whether or not spouses have ildren from a previous marriage. Couples in which neither had en married before are not included in the table for this parti- lar test. The couples in group (2), where neither has children, e similar to the couples in groups (1) and (3) in that at least e spouse has been married before. Also omitted from the table are couples in which both had children and one couple which has ldren born some time before the wedding.

The results with respect to children in Table 27 generally port the power-dependence hypothesis. As with relative age, rela- e experience with children exhibits differences according to gender. re the wife has children but the husband does not, husbands have er marital power than other husbands and wives have lower marital r than other wives. The reverse situation is a different matter, ver; if the husband but not the wife has children, power scores ot different from those of couples where neither spouse has dren. Part of this gender difference is undoubtedly due to the that only about one-third of the husbands but almost all of the [124] who had children, had their children living with them. Having dy of one's children, rather than simply having children, may turn be the real disadvantage with respect to one's alternatives on marriage market or--for that matter--for one's alternatives of

[124]Only one of the 27 wives who had children did not have her en living with her.

able to support oneself outside of marriage. This finding also
ponds with Blood and Wolfe's couples, where the average power of
was the lowest of all stages of the family life cycle for the
in which there were young children.

To summarize the results of Test C-D4, the data for relative
i relative experience with children generally correspond to
lependence predictions. Neither theory receives support with
: to relative marital experience of spouses.

CHAPTER XII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This report analyzes one major research program within family iology, that focusing on the "Resource Theory" of marital power. implicit cognitive processes by which resource possession is assumed e "translated" into marital power were identified, centering around concepts of perceived competence and gratitude-and-respect. These ls were contrasted with a third theoretical process suggested by ics of the Resource Theory, that of power-dependence theory.

A case was made that the Resource Theory research program has hed an impassé, where each additional study only increases the number ontradictory and inconsistent findings. On the hunch that this ssé is at least partially due to the underlying assumptions of the retical reasoning, the job of explicating and testing the assumptions is line of reasoning was undertaken.

These assumptions were then juxtaposed in an exploratory way st ideas from alternative theoretical traditions. I attempted to en the perspective beyond that of "classical" family sociology by ng upon seemingly unrelated strings of theory development (e.g., et al., 1966, and Dahlström, 1966). By so doing, I was able to p a set of hypotheses for each of the theoretical processes under eration.

Hypotheses were tested on data from a sample of 90 upper-
iddle class, urban, newlywed Michigan couples ranging in age from
2 to 40 and including couples in both first and second marriages.
oth wife and husband were interviewed, with gender of interviewers
atched with that of respondents. Couples were interviewed at two
oints in time, by telephone shortly after their wedding and in their
omes several months thereafter. In addition to the telephone and
ersonal interviews, data were also obtained by a return-postcard
nd during the many telephone calls made to solicit participation.
artly because of such efforts, response rates for the second inter-
iews were very high.

One benefit of the longitudinal research design was that it
lowed identification of the role preferences about task division
th which respondents had begun the marriage. These preferences
re compared with later reports about the actual division of tasks.
e average degree to which a respondent's initial preferences were
nieved was taken as the measure of marital power, using only those
ems on which husband and wife had begun marriage with different
eas (see Figure 12 below). This approach to the measurement of
ital power eliminates many of the shortcomings of the decision-
ing indices which have traditionally been used.

The 23 tables containing the results of hypothesis tests for
s sample of respondents do not lend themselves easily to a "quick"
nary. However, there are some central points which deserve mention.

UNWEIGHTED POWER MEASURE

Competence A: Dependability

Importance as a mate-selection criterion

Mean marital power* of:	(1) Extremely Important	(2) Important	(3) Somewhat or Not at all Important	Is Trend in the Predicted Direction?
Husbands (N = 87)	3.07 (N=31)	2.71 (N=43)	2.57 (N=13)	Yes
Wives (N = 87)	3.18 (N=54)	3.11 (N=24)	3.10 (N=9)	Yes

Competence B: Intelligence

Importance as a mate-selection criterion

Mean marital power* of:	(1) Extremely Important	(2) Important	(3) Somewhat or Not at all Important	Is Trend in the Predicted Direction?
Husbands (N = 86)	2.63 (N=31)	2.96 (N=45)	2.85 (N=10)	No (curvilinear)
Wives (N = 87)	3.30 (N=35)	3.09 (N=35)	2.94 (N=14)	Yes

*Lower numbers indicate higher power. Equal power = 3.00.

POWER MEASURE WITH IMPORTANCE WEIGHTING

Competence A: Dependability

Importance as a mate-selection criterion

Mean marital power* of:	(1) Extremely Important	(2) Important	(3) Somewhat or Not at all Important	Is Trend in the Predicted Direction?
Husbands (N = 87)	-.13 (N=31)	-.04 (N=43)	-.08 (N=13)	No (curvilinear)
Wives (N=87)	.03 (N=54)	.12 (N=24)	.02 (N=9)	No (curvilinear)

Competence B: Intelligence

Importance as a mate-selection criterion

Mean marital power* of:	(1) Extremely Important	(2) Important	(3) Somewhat or Not at all Important	Is Trend in the Predicted Direction?
Husbands (N = 86)	-.18 (N=31)	-.01 (N=45)	-.06 (N=10)	No (curvilinear)
Wives (N = 87)	.11 (N=38)	.02 (N=35)	-.02 (N=14)	Yes

*Lower numbers indicate higher power. Equal power = .00.

Figure 12. Illustration of the method used to measure relative marital power.

When previously implicit parts of the theoretical line of reasoning were directly tested, the results were rather mixed. This calls into question some of the premises on which these theories are based and suggests that theoretical refinement should be the first order of future research.

Findings with respect to specific theoretical process-models indicated that each theory succeeded in describing marriages to some extent. In the perceived competence formulation, one's marital power is hypothesized to be directly related to one's competence. Gender differences were found in the types of competence which were related to marital power. The competence of dependability was most consistently related to marital power. Husbands yielded to a "dependable" spouse ally in areas they considered unimportant, while wives did so on important issues as well. Wives, but not husbands, are likely to comply with the wishes of a spouse who is considered to be "intelligent."

The assumption that the lower-power spouse complies out of recognition of the other's greater ability was tested and rejected for of the eight task areas under study. In the majority of task areas, more-powerful spouse cited "competence" as the rationale for their vision of labor, more frequently than did the less-powerful spouse. is suggests that competence arguments may serve to justify the possession power, power which may well have some base other than competence.

The gratitude formulation is the second model which was examined. perceived competence, it embodies a line of reasoning found in the

esource Theory work. Spouses who contribute greater "resources"
o the marriage are hypothesized to earn power because of the gratitude
nd respect of their mates. Only an indirect test of this formulation
as possible, for which more support was found for husbands than for
ves.

Power-dependence theory was the final formulation tested. In
is theory, the higher the dependence of a spouse upon the mate, the
wer that spouse's power. Two related aspects of dependence are dis-
nguished, "motivational investment" in goals mediated by the spouse
d the presence of "alternatives" for obtaining valued goal-objects
om a source other than the spouse. Relative marital power is posited
vary directly with level of alternatives and inversely with level
motivational investment.

The data trends were in the predicted direction for some
icators of potential alternatives-to-the-present marriage. Very
le support was found for power-dependence hypotheses involving
vational investment. The only clear support was for average
tive preference strength of spouses (about task-division), an
cator of questionable validity. Here, the hypothesis was supported
strongly for wives than for husbands.

An auxilliary set of hypotheses related to power-dependence
lso tested. Based on the work of Dahlström, these hypotheses deal
the notion that the average amount of power exercised within a
e across multiple issues will increase as the interests of spouses
more divergent. That is, spouses will have an increased

centive to comply" with the other's wishes if, in return, the
er spouse will comply on another issue. Such "trade-offs" were
ught more likely to occur when spouses felt strongly about different
ues, rather than about the same issues. Tests of this hypothesis
generally positive. However, the presence of trade-offs was not
ctly measured.

Finally, test situations were set up for which alternative
ries would predict different results, as a technique for assessing
relative applicability of the several theories. In specific
-situations, the gratitude formulation described the findings
er than the perceived competence formulation. Power-dependence
y "fit" the data better when the task area was one which has
traditionally assigned to the spouse's gender, while the
tence/gratitude formulation provided a somewhat better "fit"
ther task areas. In a different test-situation, power-dependence
ctions were supported over those based on competence and gratitude
ations. Yet another test, contrasting only competence theory
ower-dependence theory, indicated slightly more support for the
.

The role of task importance, as a scope condition, was also
ed. Power-dependence predictions held more strongly under high-
nce conditions for wives and under low-importance conditions for
s. Perceived competence predictions held more strongly for both
when task importance was low.

These assessments of the relative adequacy of different theories must be viewed as very tentative, inasmuch as the sample size was not large and the indicators require refinement. However, in general, it appears that power-dependence theory provided the best description of marital power processes, of the three theories which were examined in this study.

A diagramatic summary of several major findings are contained in Figure 13. Those selected deal with overall relative power (rather than power within specific task areas). All independent variables are also of a relative nature, reflecting the position of one spouse as compared to the other.

In conclusion, I would like to make some comments about the future of marital power and marital power processes within families. It seems clear that none of the three process models can account for a great deal of the variance within families and that--in all likelihood--no cognitive model alone would do this. If the opportunity were available to directly observe the interaction of couples over an extended time, a broader picture of the complexities of power processes between husband and wife would be possible. One benefit of such an approach would be the chance to obtain more "objective" measures in addition to the subjective perceptual data used in the present study. Spouses whose preferences match their actual situation are considered as having high marital power, by my measurement techniques; some of these persons may, nevertheless, be the subject of a great deal of marital oppression, which an outside observer could only detect by watching marital interaction very closely.

PART I. SEPARATE TESTS OF MARITAL POWER THEORIES.



PREDICTED

ACTUAL

COMMENTS

POWER-DEPENDENCE

D-2) If higher — Relative alternatives; then higher — Relative marital power





A) Which gender has easier time finding good spouse. See table on page 184

C) Relative timing of decision that would like to marry. See table on page 185

D-3) If higher — Relative motivational investment; then higher — Relative marital power





See table on page 205

LEGEND:

_____ = husbands

- - - - - - - = wives

_ _ _ _ _ _ = couples (in last hypothesis set only)

. . . . . .



COMMENTS

See table on page 220

LEGEND:

_____ = husbands
- - - - - - - = wives
—— —— ——\ = couples (in last hypothesis set only)
. . . . . /

COMPETENCE VS. GRATITUDE

HYPOTHESIS

C-G1)

Relative competence

Relative marital power

WHEN: Relative tangible resources are controlled

FINDINGS

PREDICTED

COMPETENCE PREDICTION



GRATITUDE PREDICTION



ACTUAL



Condition 1) Husband makes at least twice as much income as wife.

Condition 2) Other.

COMMENTS

Findings consistent with Gratitude hypothesis (since trend is not statistically significant)

See table on page 226

LEGEND:

_____ = husbands

- - - - - - - - = wives

Only wives are included in findings for test D-GC3, for ease of interpretation.

Husbands exhibited the same general trends.

POWER-DEPENDENCE VS. COMPETENCE/GRATITUDE

HYPOTHESIS

D-GC3)

Relative alternatives

Relative marital power

WHEN: Relative tangible resources are controlled

PREDICTED

POWER-DEPENDENCE PREDICTION



COMPETENCE/GRATITUDE PREDICTION



ACTUAL



A) Which gender has easier time finding a good spouse.

See table on page 237

C) Relative timing of decision that would like to marry.

See table on page 238

Condition 1) Husband makes at least twice as much income as wife.

Condition 2) Other.

COMMENTS

Trends consistent with power-dependence prediction, except for A-2 (which is more consistent with competence/gratitude prediction)

LEGEND:

_____ = husbands

- - - - - - = wives

Only wives are included in findings for test D-GC3, for ease of interpretation.

Husbands exhibited the same general trends.

POWER-DEPENDENCE VS. COMPETENCE/GRATITUDE

HYPOTHESIS

Wife's career investment

D-CG2)

Wife's power accrued from favorable relative-income position

FINDINGS

PREDICTED

POWER-DEPENDENCE PREDICTION



COMPETENCE/GRATITUDE PREDICTION



ACTUAL



COMMENTS

Not consistent with either prediction.

C + D) Wife's opinion about women working outside the home.

See table on page 263

E) Wife's long-run career ambition.

See table on page 264

LEGEND:

———— = husbands

- - - - - - - = wives



Figure 13. Summary of Selected Findings.

It may be, too, that one theoretical model describes
milies better during the earlier stages of the family life cycle
ile another is more applicable at later stages. Since the exchange
mmitment between spouses is a long-term one, one may have to study
nger time periods than the several months encompassed by my study,
order to adequately evaluate the applicability of exchange-
oretical process models for describing families. Equitable trade-
s may occur, for example, in which a benefit received may be repaid
ths or years later, a reminder to methodologists that "longitudinal"
ot necessarily equal to just more than one point in time.

Finally, one promising strategy for further research would
he identification of those couples which best "fit" the power-
ndence and perceived competence models, respectively. If these
out to be different (non-overlapping) groups, an examination of
common characteristics within each group and of the characteristics
n differentiate the two groups might prove very useful. Such an
oration of the conditions under which each theory "operates"--in
of such things as stages of the family life cycle, normative
fs about the roles of men and women, career orientation of hus-
and wives, the larger context of social and economic circum-
es, etc--would constitute another step toward the goal of being
o describe and explain marital power processes within families.
a fairly clear idea of how to identify couples for whom power-
dence, perceived competence, or some other models are applicable,

further step would be possible: research aimed at assessing the
sitive and negative consequences of such processes, both in terms
the life-quality of the individuals involved and in terms of the
olications for the communities and societies in which these
nilies live.

ME QUESTIONS OF FACT..... Your confidential identification no. ____
Please check (✓) the one best answer to each question.

During your first three months of marriage:

a. Where will you be living? ☐ Wayne County; ☐ Oakland County; ☐ Macomb Co.; ☐ Washtenaw Co.; ☐ Ingham Co.; ☐ Eaton Co.; ☐ Kent Co. ☐ outside of southern Michigan ☐ other county in southern Michigan

b. How many hours will each of you be employed outside the home?
HUSBAND: ☐ full-time; ☐ part-time; ☐ none
WIFE: ☐ full-time; ☐ part-time; ☐ none

c. Will any children be living with you (including younger brothers & sisters)? ☐ yes ☐ no

Has either of you attended a college or university for two or more years?
HUSBAND: ☐ yes ☐ no
WIFE: ☐ yes ☐ no

Do you definitely plan to have a baby (or adopt a child) within the next 1-1/2 years? ☐ yes ☐ no

IF EITHER OF YOU IS EMPLOYED OUTSIDE THE HOME:

. Is your present occupation (as listed on the marriage license form) a job or the beginning of a long-term career?
HUSBAND: ☐ job ☐ career
WIFE: ☐ job ☐ career

. In your present occupation, which one activity takes the most time?

Reading & Writing (composing letters, programming, math calculations)	Working with your hands (typing, playing piano, keypunching)	Dealing with people (selling, teaching, etc.)
ID (check one):	☐	☐	☐
check one):	☐	☐	☐

this a first marriage for both of you? ☐ yes (go to #6 below); ☐ no

NO → Did the previous marriage end in divorce (rather than annulment or widowhood)?
HUSBAND: ☐ yes ☐ no
WIFE: ☐ yes ☐ no

Are there any children? . . . . . .
HUSBAND: ☐ yes ☐ no
WIFE: ☐ yes ☐ no

ional questions (if spouses differ, check 2 boxes):

Religious background: ☐ Jewish, Orthodox; ☐ Jewish, other ☐ Catholic, traditional; ☐ Catholic, 'modern'; ☐ Orthodox ☐ Protestant, fundamental; ☐ Protestant, other ☐ Other religion ☐ No religion

Race/ethnicity: ☐ Spanish-American ☐ other White ☐ Black ☐ Oriental ☐ Native American (Indian)

ou would like a report on the results of our study, where should we send it?
Address: _____

e can we call you for a simple telephone interview? Phone No. _____
are good times to call? (example: Mon., Tues., & Weds. from 7-10 PM; Sunday afternoon)

THANK YOU VERY MUCH ! !

First Class
Permit #359
E. Lansing,
Michigan

BUSINESS REPLY MAIL
No postage stamp necessary if mailed in the United States

Postage will be paid by:

E. BENSON
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
EAST LANSING, MICHIGAN 48824

MSU Acct. 11-3742

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

LETTERS SENT TO COUPLES

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY East Lansing, Michigan 48823

EPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY . BERKEY HALL

ear

re at Michigan State University, we're beginning a study about the early ages of marriage. You are among several hundred couples chosen from the blic marriage license records, and we're asking for a few minutes of your me. Won't you please take 5 minutes and fill out the enclosed postcard?

Y THE POSTCARD QUESTIONS? Although many studies have been done about teen- e marriages, much less is known about people who marry in their 20's and 's. For example, we lack very basic facts about the situations in which uples begin marriage. Yet these situations make a great deal of difference-- en the decisions which have to be made are different, depending upon whether e or both people are working, whether major career decisions have been tled yet, whether there will be children to plan for, and so forth.

RE IS ALSO A SECOND PART OF THE STUDY, involving 30-minute telephone erviews with each of you at your convenience. Of course, this is en- ely voluntary--if you are interested in being interviewed, please fill your phone number and preferred times at the bottom of the postcard. interview is both brief and interesting, mostly about decisions during early stages of marriage--how soon you expect certain types of decisions come up, which decisions you see as the really important ones in your own uation, and so forth. You would not be asked personal questions about income, intimate matters, or the like.

I do hope you'll take the time to return the postcard very soon-- by _____, if possible. Even if you are not interested in be- ing interviewed by phone, please fill out the rest of the card-- this information will help us find out which are the most and least common situations.

In return for this help, we'd very much like to send you a report about what we learned as a token of appreciation. Included will be some interesting comparisons of first and second marriages.

urse, all information you may give us is kept in the STRICTEST DENCE. Your answers will be placed together with those of many other es. Reports of the study will give information only about groups of es, in order that no individual or couples could ever be identified.

you please let us hear from you soon? We look forward to your reply!

Very truly yours,

Elizabeth E. Benson
Study Director
(517) 332-0924

IGAN STATE UNIVERSITY East Lansing, Michigan 48823

TMENT OF SOCIOLOGY . BERKEY HALL

you were telephoned this spring for the Michigan State University marriage
, both of you indicated interest in a second interview--if a convenient
could be arranged. That's why I'm writing--to ask you when it would be
ient and also to tell you more about our study. It promises to be an
sting study, involving couples from seven counties, and we hope you'll be
o participate again.

COND INTERVIEWS will be done this summer. Each couple who decides to parti-
will be personally visited in their home by a man and woman from our staff,
rearranged time. It will take no more than an hour. The questions deal
ome of the same subjects as the telephone interview--in particular, with
on-making during the first few months of marriage. I think you'll find our
iewers friendly and informal and the questions enjoyable, with more oppor-
for expressing your ideas than is possible in a telephone interview. As
we will not be asking questions of a very personal nature.

TRYING TO FIND ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS LIKE THESE:
at do couples find to be the most effective ways of making their more
difficult decisions? Which 'styles of decision-making' work best for
which kinds of people? (We hope to publish an article on this in a
widely read magazine, so that others may benefit from this knowledge.)
people with greater experience--either due to having lived more years
or having been married before--use different approaches to handling
decisions?
v do couples arrive at a way of dividing up everyday tasks and responsi-
ilities? What strategies do very busy couples use to cope with these
asks?
does the nature of one's employment, and the physical and mental fatigue
t creates, affect the handling of home responsibilities?

e, any information you give us will be kept in the strictest confidence.
utside of our small staff will ever see your answers, and you will never
ified or individually described in our written reports (of which you will
a copy). We will describe only groups of couples or groups of individuals
reports.

ETURN THE ENCLOSED SHEET NOW in the stamped envelope provided. This will
a general idea of when an interview would be convenient for you, so we
how many interviewers we need each week in various areas. About a week
d, when you have a better idea of your time plans, your interviewers will
and make a specific appointment. We thank you very much for your help
ring, and look forward to talking with you in the summer!

Sincerely yours,

Elizabeth E. Benson
Study Director (517) 332-0924

HIGAN MARRIAGE STUDY - 1974
artment of Sociology
nigan State University
t Lansing, Michigan 48823

LY RETURN AT YOUR EARLIEST CONVENIENCE:

1. We will be interviewing throughout July and August. Is there any particular week or part of the summer which you would especially prefer?

2. Are there any weeks which definitely would not be convenient for an interview?

. Which times of the week are usually the most convenient for both of you?

PLEASE CHECK SEVERAL CONVENIENT TIMES:

	Late Morning	Early Afternoon	Late Afternoon	Early Evening	Late Evening (around 9)
YS					
AY					

Please check your address & phone number below and correct any mistakes (to make sure our interviewers can locate you):

Thank you!

APPENDIX B

PHASE I. TELEPHONE INTERVIEW

IDENTIAL INFORMATION
974 Newlywed Study
epartment of Sociology
ichigan State University

Couple No. _____

1___Husb. 2___Wife

County _____

Marriage type:
1___wife 1st, husb. 1st
2___wife 2nd, husb. 2nd
3___wife 1st, husb. 2nd
4___wife 2nd, husb. 1st

PHASE I - TELEPHONE INTERVIEW SHORTLY AFTER MARRIAGE

_____

of Interview _____, 1974

tarting time ____:____ AM PM

nterviewed by _____

INFORMATION FOR INTERVIEWERS

Any children from previous marriage? ..... Yes No

Any children living with couple? ..... Yes No

Respondent plans to work? ..... Yes No

Occupation listed on marriage license: _____

LINE OF INTERVIEWER'S INTRODUCTORY SPEECH

a. This is _____ from Michigan State University.

b. We contacted you recently about a study of newlyweds.

c. Did I pick a convenient time to call?
(Could you spare half an hour to answer some questions about the decisions you two have made in the past and those you expect to be coming up in the future?)

NING THE INTERVIEW

. Let's begin by talking about some decisions which will probably come up, everything from buying a car to deciding about having children. We're mainly interested in the timing of decisions--what things come up even before people get married, how soon different decisions will probably be coming up in the future, and so on . . . .

(turn page ⟶)

INSTRUCTIONS FOR DECISION QUESTIONS (pp. 2-5)

You will repeat the questions in the large box 10 or 11 times, once for each subject.

1st subject - read every word of questions.
later subjects - read only underlined words

a) Has this subject come up so far? (IF NO/DK, GO TO b)

IF YES: About how many hours have you talked about it in the last six months? Would you say half-an-hour, an hour, 2 or 3 hrs., 4 or 5 hrs., 6 to 10 hrs., over 10 hours. . ?

How far have you gotten toward reaching a decision or understanding? Would you say you've: Just started, gotten a little of the way, gotten a good part of the way, or gotten all of the way (toward an understanding or decision)?

b) IF NO DECISION: Do you expect to be talking (more) about this in the future?

IF NO: Is that because there are no decisions to be made or because it's already understood how the decisions will be made? (IF NO DECISIONS, GO TO NEXT SUBJECT BELOW)

IF YES or maybe: About how soon? Within 3 mos., 6 mos., in a year, 2 or 3 yrs., 5 yrs., 10 yrs. . . ?

or

c) IF DECISION: Do you expect to be talking (more) about this in the future?

IF NO: Go to d

IF YES or maybe: About how soon? Within 3 mos., 6 mos., in a year, 2 or 3 yrs., 5 yrs., 10 years . . . ?)

d) How similar or different are your ideas when it comes to _____? Would you say: nearly identical, somewhat similar, somewhat different, or quite different?

	(20)	(21)	(22)
No	1	1	1
DK	1	1	1
1/2 hr.	2	2	2
1 hr.	3	3	3
2-3 hrs.	4	4	4
4-5 hrs.	5	5	5
6-10 hrs.	6	6	6
over 10	7	7	7
DK	8	8	8
	(30)	(31)	(32)
Just started	1	1	1
Little of way	2	2	2
Good part of way	3	3	3
All of way (decision)	4	4	4
No decisions to make (go to next subject)	0	0	0
Already understood	2	2	2
Other (specify in margin)	8	8	8
No	0	0	0
3 mos.	1	1	1
6 mos.	2	2	2
1 yr.	3	3	3
2-3 yrs.	4	4	4
5 yrs.	5	5	5
10 yrs.	6	6	6
over 10 yrs.	7	7	7
DK	8	8	8
	(40)	(41)	(42)
Nearly identical	1	1	1
S. similar	2	2	2
S. different	4	4	4
Q. different	5	5	5
DK	3	3	3

		(50)	(51)	(52)
e) How sure are you about your husband's/wife's ideas? --about where he/she stands on this subject? Are you very sure, somewhat sure, somewhat unsure, or very unsure?	Very sure	1	1	1
	S. sure	2	2	2
	S. unsure	4	4	4
	Very unsure	5	5	5
	DK	3	3	3
		(60)	(61)	(62)
f) (Probably every couple finds that some things are easier and more comfortable to talk about, than others) For yourself personally, is this a subject which might sometime be quite uncomfortable or touchy to bring up, maybe just a little uncomfortable, or is it not at all uncomfortable to bring up?	Q. uncomfortable	1	1	1
	A little uncomfortable	2	2	2
	Not at all uncomfortable	3	3	3

REPEAT PROCEDURE FOR THE FOLLOWING SUBJECTS:

(FOR LATER USE, PAGE 6)

		(70)	(71)	(72)
2) What about fixing up your house or apartment?	Extr. Important	1	1	1
	Important	2	2	2
	S. Important	3	3	3
3) What about dividing household responsibilities--how much each of you would do around the house, who does what, etc.?	Not particularly important	4	4	4
	DK	8	8	8

a) Has this subject come up so far? (IF NO/DK, GO TO b)

IF YES: About how many hours have you talked about it in the last six months? Would you say half-an-hour, an hour, 2 or 3 hrs., 4 or 5 hrs., 6 to 10 hrs., over 10 hours. . ?

How far have you gotten toward reaching a decision or understanding? Would you say you've: just started, gotten a little of the way, gotten a good part of the way, or gotten all of the way (toward an understanding or decision)?

or

b) IF NO DECISION: Do you expect to be talking (more) about this in the future?

IF NO: Is that because there are no decisions to be made or because it's already understood how the decisions will be made? (IF NO DECISIONS, GO TO NEXT SUBJECT BELOW)

IF YES or maybe: About how soon? Within 3 mos., 6 mos., in a year, 2 or 3 yrs., 5 yrs., 10 yrs. . . ?

c) IF DECISION: Do you expect to be talking (more) about this in the future?

IF NO: Go to d

IF YES or maybe: About how soon? Within 3 mos., 6 mos., in a year, 2 or 3 yrs., 5 yrs., 10 years . . . ?)

d) How similar or different are your ideas when it comes to _____? Would you say: nearly identical, somewhat similar, somewhat different, or quite different?

	Children	ous marriage	children
	(23)	(24)	(25)
No	1	1	1
DK	1	1	1
1/2 hr.	2	2	2
1 hr.	3	3	3
2-3 hrs.	4	4	4
4-5 hrs.	5	5	5
6-10 hrs.	6	6	6
over 10	7	7	7
DK	8	8	8
	(33)	(34)	(35)
Just started	1	1	1
Little of way	2	2	2
Good part of way	3	3	3
All of way (decision)	4	4	4
No decisions to make (go to next subject)	0	0	0
Already understood	2	2	2
Other (specify in margin)	8	8	8
No	0	0	0
3 mos.	1	1	1
6 mos.	2	2	2
1 yr.	3	3	3
2-3 yrs.	4	4	4
5 yrs.	5	5	5
10 yrs.	6	6	6
over 10 yrs.	7	7	7
DK	8	8	8
	(43)	(44)	(45)
Nearly identical	1	1	1
S. similar	2	2	2
S. different	4	4	4
Q. different	5	5	5
DK	3	3	3

e) How sure are you about your husband's/wife's ideas?--about where he/she stands on this subject? Are you very sure, somewhat sure, somewhat unsure, or very unsure?

	(53)	(54)	(55)
Very sure	1	1	1
S. sure	2	2	2
S. unsure	4	4	4
Very unsure	5	5	5
DK	3	3	3

f) (Probably every couple finds that some things are easier and more comfortable to talk about, than others)

For yourself personally, is this a subject which might sometime be quite uncomfortable or touchy to bring up, maybe just a little uncomfortable, or is it not at all uncomfortable to bring up?

	(63)	(64)	(65)
Q. uncomfortable	1	1	1
A little uncomfortable	2	2	2
Not at all uncomfortable	3	3	3

(FOR LATER USE, PAGE 6)

5) IF CHILDREN FROM PREVIOUS MARRIAGE, ASK:

I understand there are children from a previous marriage. What about arrangements for these children?

6) What about schooling or education for children?

	(73)	(74)	(75)
Extr. important	1	1	1
Important	2	2	2
S. important	3	3	3
Not particularly important	4	4	4
DK	8	8	8

...the question of how much the wife works or might work in the future?

a) Has this subject come up so far? (IF NO/DK, GO TO b)

IF YES:

About how many hours have you talked about it in the last six months? Would you say half-an-hour, an hour, 2 or 3 hrs., 4 or 5 hrs., 6 to 10 hrs., over 10 hours. . ?

How far have you gotten toward reaching a decision or understanding? Would you say you've: just started, gotten a little of the way, gotten a good part of the way, or gotten all of the way (toward an understanding or decision)?

or

b) IF NO DECISION: Do you expect to be talking (more) about this in the future?

IF NO: Is that because there are no decisions to be made or because it's already understood how the decisions will be made?

IF YES or maybe: About how soon? Within 3 mos., 6 mos., in a year, 2 or 3 yrs., 5 yrs., 10 yrs. . . ?

c) IF DECISION: Do you expect to be talking (more) about this in the future?

IF NO: Go to d

IF YES or maybe: About how soon? Within 3 mos., 6 mos., in a year, 2 or 3 yrs., 5 yrs., 10 years . . . ?)

d) How similar or different are your ideas when it comes to _____? Would you say: nearly identical, somewhat similar, somewhat different, or quite different?

	Wife works	Wife takes	Husband takes
	(26)	(27)	(28)
No	1	1	1
DK	1	1	1
1/2 hr.	2	2	2
1 hr.	3	3	3
2-3 hrs.	4	4	4
4-5 hrs.	5	5	5
6-10 hrs.	6	6	6
over 10	7	7	7
DK	8	8	8
	(36)	(37)	(38)
Just started	1	1	1
Little of way	2	2	2
Good part of way	3	3	3
All of way (decision)	4	4	4
No decisions to make (go to next subject)	0	0	0
Already understood	2	2	2
Other (specify in margin)	8	8	8
No	0	0	0
3 mos.	1	1	1
6 mos.	2	2	2
1 yr.	3	3	3
2-3 yrs.	4	4	4
5 yrs.	5	5	5
10 yrs.	6	6	6
over 10 years	7	7	7
DK	8	8	8
	(46)	(47)	(48)
Nearly identical	1	1	1
S. similar	2	2	2
S. different	4	4	4
Q. different	5	5	5
DK	3	3	3

e) How sure are you about your husband's/wife's ideas?--about where he/she stands on this subject? Are you very sure, somewhat sure, somewhat unsure, or very unsure?

	(56)	(57)	(58)
Very sure	1	1	1
S. sure	2	2	2
S. unsure	4	4	4
Very unsure	5	5	5
DK	3	3	3

f) (Probably every couple finds that some things are easier and more comfortable to talk about, than others)

For yourself personally, is this a subject which might sometime be quite uncomfortable or touchy to bring up, maybe just a little uncomfortable, or is it not at all uncomfortable to bring up?

	(66)	(67)	(68)
Q. uncomfortable	1	1	1
A little uncomfortable	2	2	2
Not at all uncomfortable	3	3	3

(FOR LATER USE, PAGE 6)

8) What about the type of job the wife takes or might take in the future?

9) What about the type of job the husband takes or might take in the future?

	(76)	(77)	(78)
Extr. important	1	1	1
Important	2	2	2
S. important	3	3	3
Not particularly important	4	4	4
DK	8	8	8

a) Has this subject come up so far? (IF NO/DK, GO TO b)

IF YES: About how many hours have you talked about it in the last six months? Would you say half-an-hour, an hour, 2 or 3 hrs., 4 or 5 hrs., 6 to 10 hrs., over 10 hours. . ?

How far have you gotten toward reaching a decision or understanding? Would you say you've: just started, gotten a little of the way, gotten a good part of the way, or gotten all of the way (toward an understanding or decision)?

or

b) IF NO DECISION: Do you expect to be talking (more) about this in the future?

IF NO: Is that because there are no decisions to be made or because it's already understood how the decisions will be made?

IF YES or maybe: About how soon? Within 3 mos., 6 mos., in a year, 2 or 3 yrs., 5 yrs., 10 yrs. . . ?

c) IF DECISION: Do you expect to be talking (more) about this in the future?

IF NO: Go to d

IF YES or maybe: About how soon? Within 3 mos., 6 mos., in a year, 2 or 3 yrs., 5 yrs., 10 years . . . ?)

d) How similar or different are your ideas when it comes to _____? Would you say: nearly identical, somewhat similar, somewhat different, or quite different?

No	1	1	1
DK	1	1	1
1/2 hr.	2	2	2
1 hr.	3	3	3
2-3 hrs.	4	4	4
4-5 hrs.	5	5	5
6-10 hrs.	6	6	6
over 10	7	7	7
DK	8	8	8
	(30)		
Just started	1	1	1
Little of way	2	2	2
Good part of way	3	4	3
All of way (decision)	4	4	4
No decisions to make (go to next subject)	0	0	0
Already understood	2	2	2
Other (specify in margin)	8	8	8
No	0	0	0
3 mos.	1	1	1
6 mos.	2	2	2
1 yr.	3	3	3
2-3 yrs.	4	4	4
5 yrs.	5	5	5
10 yrs.	6	6	6
over 10 years	7	7	7
DK	8	8	8
	(49)		
Nearly identical	1	1	1
S. similar	2	2	2
S. different	4	4	4
Q. different	5	5	5
DK	3	3	3

a) Has this subject come up so far? (IF NO/DK, GO TO b)

IF YES:

About how many hours have you talked about it in the last six months? Would you say half-an-hour, an hour, 2 or 3 hrs., 4 or 5 hrs., 6 to 10 hrs., over 10 hours. . ?

How far have you gotten toward reaching a decision or understanding? Would you say you've: just started, gotten a little of the way, gotten a good part of the way, or gotten all of the way (toward an understanding or decision)?

or

b) IF NO DECISION:
Do you expect to be talking (more) about this in the future?

IF NO: Is that because there are no decisions to be made or because it's already understood how the decisions will be made?

IF YES or maybe: About how soon? Within 3 mos., 6 mos., in a year, 2 or 3 yrs., 5 yrs., 10 yrs. . . ?

c) IF DECISION:
Do you expect to be talking (more) about this in the future?

IF NO: Go to d

IF YES or maybe: About how soon? Within 3 mos., 6 mos., in a year, 2 or 3 yrs., 5 yrs., 10 years . . . ?)

d) How similar or different are your ideas when it comes to _____? Would you say: nearly identical, somewhat similar, somewhat different, or quite different?

No	1	1	1
DK	1	1	1
1/2 hr.	2	2	2
1 hr.	3	3	3
2-3 hrs.	4	4	4
4-5 hrs.	5	5	5
6-10 hrs.	6	6	6
over 10	7	7	7
DK	8	8	8
	(30)		
Just started	1	1	1
Little of way	2	2	2
Good part of way	3	3	3
All of way (decision)	4	4	4
No decisions to make (go to next subject)	0	0	0
Already understood	2	2	2
Other (specify in margin)	8	8	8
No	0	0	0
3 mos.	1	1	1
6 mos.	2	2	2
1 yr.	3	3	3
2-3 yrs.	4	4	4
5 yrs.	5	5	5
10 yrs.	6	6	6
over 10 years	7	7	7
DK	8	8	8
	(49)		
Nearly identical	1	1	1
S. similar	2	2	2
S. different	4	4	4
Q. different	5	5	5
DK	3	3	3

e) How sure are you about your husband's/wife's ideas?--about where he/she stands on this subject? Are you very sure, somewhat sure, somewhat unsure, or very unsure?

(59)

Very sure	1	1	1
S. sure	2	2	2
S. unsure	4	4	4
Very unsure	5	5	5
DK	3	3	3

f) (Probably every couple finds that some things are easier and more comfortable to talk about, than others)

For yourself personally, is this a subject which might sometime be quite uncomfortable or touchy to bring up, maybe just a little uncomfortable, or is it not at all uncomfortable to bring up?

(69)

Q. uncomfortable	1	1	1
A little uncomfortable	2	2	2
Not at all uncomfortable	3	3	3

(FOR LATER USE, PAGE 6)

11) Are there other subjects or decisions which I've missed--things which have already come up or will come up soon? (Anything about education, buying a house, spending time with relatives, about children. . . . ?)

(WRITE IN) _____

_____

(79)

Extr. important	1	1	1
Important	2	2	2
S. important	3	3	3
Not particularly important	4	4	4
DK	8	8	8

me decisions will obviously be more important to you than others--
at is, the results will make more difference to you (than the
sults or outcome of other decisions). I'd like to quickly read
rough the list of decisions again and ask how important each is
you personally: extremely important, important, somewhat
portant, or not particularly important. Please just speak for
urself and not for both of you.

at about ___(buying large items)___ ? Are these decisions ex-
tremely important, important, somewhat important, or not
particularly important, to you personally?

REPEAT FOR EACH SUBJECT LISTED ON PAGES 2-5.
MARK ANSWERS AT BOTTOM OF APPROPRIATE COLUMN ON THESE PAGES.
OMIT SUBJECTS WHICH ARE IRRELEVANT (Where lower portion
of column is blank)

(a) And you will work as a _____?
(SEE COVER PAGE)

(b) IF JOB DESCRIPTION IS NOT CLEAR, PROBE:
What kind of work is that? (What does it involve? What level do you teach? Do you employ other people in your business? etc.)

_____
_____
_____

2 3 4 Not work 5

What will you be doing? (keeping house, going to school. . .)?

_____
_____
_____

(go to Q. 14)

(25)

(26-27)
Occ. Code

(c) How many hours a week will you probably work? [ ] hrs/ week

(d) Will you have other jobs in addition to this one, during the next 3 months?
____Yes ____Probably yes 1. ____No (go to Q. 14) 1. ___DK (go to Q. 14)

IF YES OR PROB. YES:

Altogether, how many jobs will you have? _____(no.)
What about your other job(s)? What kind of work is that? How many hours a week?

2nd job: _____
_____
_____ [ ] hrs/ week

3rd job: _____
_____
_____ [ ] hrs/ week

(go to Q. 14

(28)
Total hours worked week

1___yes, full-time student 2___yes, part-time student 3___no (go to Q. 15) (29)

8___DK (go to Q. 15)

What school is that (PROBE: What type of school is that?)

name: _____

1___College 2___Jr. College 3___Technical School (30)

15) Will the two of you be separated--living apart from each other--for any period of time during the next 3 months?

IF YES: For more than one month (out of the next 3 months)?

___No ___Yes, 1 month or less separation ___Yes, over 1 month separation

___DK

16) Will you be living in a place of your own, rather than with relatives or friends (for the next 3 months)?

___Yes ___No ___DK

PROBE: Would you say husband almost always, husband more than wife, both about the same, wife more than husband, wife almost always--or neither one?

REPEAT FOR EACH ITEM BELOW — CIRCLE ONE:

	Husb. almost always	Husb. more	Both about same	Wife more	Wife almost always	Neither one	DK	
1. Do the grocery shopping?	1	2	3	4	5	7	8	(31)
2. Repair things (appliances, furniture, toys) around the house?	1	2	3	4	5	7	8	(32)
3. Make complaints, if necessary, to salesmen, or landlord?	1	2	3	4	5	7	8	(33)
4. Keep in touch with relatives?	1	2	3	4	5	7	8	(34)
5. Decide what people you will invite to the house?	1	2	3	4	5	7	8	(35)
6. Take care of the car?	1	2	3	4	5	7	8	(36)
7. Prepare supper?	1	2	3	4	5	7	8	(37)
8. Do the supper dishes (or load the dishwasher?)	1	2	3	4	5	7	8	(38)
IF CHILDREN LIVING WITH ASK 9 and 10:								
9. Get up at night, if necessary, with the children?	1	2	3	4	5	7	8	(39)
10. Help the children with their homework?	1	2	3	4	5	7	8	(40)
IF NOT OLD ENOUGH FOR SCHOOL, CHECK ☐								

(go to Q. 18)

PROBE: Would you say Very Strong, Strong, Somewhat Strong, or Not at all Strong?

	REPEAT FOR EACH ITEM BELOW	CIRCLE ONE:			
	Very Strong	Strong	Somewhat Strong	Not at all Strong	DK
1. Do the grocery shopping?	5	4	3	2	1
2. Repair things (appliances, furniture, toys) around the house?	5	4	3	2	1
3. Make complaints, if necessary, to salesmen, or landlord?	5	4	3	2	1
4. Keep in touch with relatives?	5	4	3	2	1
5. Decide what people you will invite to the house?	5	4	3	2	1
6. Take care of the car?	5	4	3	2	1
7. Prepare supper?	5	4	3	2	1
8. Do the supper dishes (or load the dishwasher?)	5	4	3	2	1
IF CHILDREN LIVING WITH ASK 9 and 10:					
9. Get up at night, if necessary, with the children?	5	4	3	2	1
10. Help the children with their homework?	5	4	3	2	1

IF NOT OLD ENOUGH FOR SCHOOL, CHECK ☐

and the dishes and so forth?

(PROBE: Or did it depend on whose apartment it was?)

Now, a few questions about the future:

20) Are you thinking about [going into a different line of work / going to work] at some point?

CHECK ONE:

___yes ___maybe ___DK (go to Q. 21) ___no (go to Q. 21)

What do you have in mind?

(a) What kind of work/job? _____

(b) Full-time?

___full ___part-time ___in addition to present job

___other situation, describe:

(c) About how soon? _____

No. children presently living with them (44)

age of youngest

(b) Is the youngest child living with you (that child) of preschool age, in grade school, middle school, or high school?

1___preschool 2___grade (K-6) 3___middle (7-9) 4___high (10-12) 5___out of high school (45)

(c) IF MORE THAN ONE CHILD LIVING WITH THEM: What about the oldest (older) child (living with you)?

1___preschool 2___grade (K-6) 3___middle (7-9) 4___high (10-12) 5___out of high school (46)

22) What about the future? Are you planning to have or adopt (more) children? (Probably or definitely?)

CHECK ONE: 1___Def. Yes 2___Prob. Yes 3___Maybe 8___DK, (go to Q. 23) no idea 4___Prob. No (go to Q. 23) 5___Def. No (go to Q. 23) (47)

(If you were to have children) about how many (more) would you yourself like?

No. children in future (48)

MEN----------SKIP TO Q. 25, NEXT PAGE

or

(go to Q. 24)

(b) IF ARE CHILDREN (IN PRESENT OR FUTURE):

NOTE: IF CHILDREN ONLY IN PRESENT START WITH AGE OF YOUNGEST CHILD (SKIPPING EARLIER AGES).

OTHERWISE, START AT THE BEGINNING.



How much would you probably work:

If there were/while the youngest child is:

	Full-time	Part-time	None	DK
1) A baby?	3	2	1	8
2) A preschooler but not a baby	3	2	1	8
3) A child in grade school	3	2	1	8
4) A child in middle or high school?	3	2	1	8
if/when:				
5) All the children are grown and away				

(go to Q. 24)

think of yourself as a career woman?

1___yes 2___maybe 3___no 8___DK

(b) Why is that?

(50)

(skip to Q. 26)

25) MEN ONLY:

Would you probably work less than full-time in the forseeable future?

___yes ___no (go to Q. 26) ___DK (go to Q. 26)

When is that? For what reason?

		CIRCLE ONE:				
a)	In marriage, the person who earns more money should have more to "say" about how it is spent.	SA 4	A 3	DK 8	D 2	SD 1	(51)
b)	When both people work, it is best to use the husband's money for necessities and set aside the wife's money for special things.	SA 4	A 3	DK 8	D 2	SD 1	(52)
c)	If a wife wants to work, her husband has no right to stand in her way.	SA 1	A 2	DK 8	D 3	SD 4	(53)
d)	I would rather (that my wife) not have a job, providing that the extra money were not needed all that much.	SA 4	A 3	DK 8	D 2	SD 1	(54)
e)	If the man is working to support the family, his wife has no right to expect him to work when he's at home.	SA 4	A 3	DK 8	D 2	SD 1	(55)
f)	Except in special cases, the wife should do the cooking and house cleaning and the husband should provide the family with money.	SA 4	A 3	DK 8	D 2	SD 1	(56)
g)	Raising children is more a mother's job than a father's.	SA 4	A 3	DK 8	D 2	SD 1	(57)
h)	A man who helps around the kitchen is doing more than should be expected.	SA 4	A 3	DK 8	D 2	SD 1	(58)
i)	A man ought to feel free to relax when he gets home from work.	SA 4	A 3	DK 8	D 2	SD 1	(59)
j)	In general, it is safe to say that married people get more out of life (are happier) than people who never get married.	SA 1	A 2	DK 8	D 3	SD 4	(60)

One is the decision to get married (again). People decide to get married in different ways. For yourself, when did it occur to you that you might like to (re)marry---before you met the "right" man/woman, or didn't it even occur to you until after you met him/her?

1___before 2___after 8___DK (63)

28) During the last few years, did you ever seriously consider not marrying (again)--- remaining unmarried by choice?

1___yes 2___no 8___DK (64)

29) Some people say that women have an easier time finding a good spouse and others say that men have it easier. In your own experience, does it seem that men or women have the easier time (finding a good spouse)?

___men have it easier ___women have it easier (65)

2___neither has it easier/ both the same. 9___DK

51) What about his/her dependability? How important was this to you, in choosing him/her rather than someone else? Was it Extremely important, Important, Somewhat important, or Not At All important (to you)?

REPEAT FOR EACH ITEM BELOW: CIRCLE ONE:

What about his/her:	How important was this to you. . .? Extremely important	Important	Somewhat important	Not at all important	DK	
1. Dependability	1	2	3	4	8	(66)
2. Ability to express affection	1	2	3	4	8	(67)
3. Physical appearance	1	2	3	4	8	(68)
4. Listening to what you say	1	2	3	4	8	(69)
5. Intelligence	1	2	3	4	8	(70)
6. Ability to be a good father/mother	1	2	3	4	8	(71)
7. Ability to be romantic at times	1	2	3	4	8	(72)
8. Attitudes about doing household tasks	1	2	3	4	8	(73)
9. Consideration of other people	1	2	3	4	8	(74)
10. Ability to earn an adequate income	1	2	3	4	8	(75)
11. Saying exactly what's on his/her mind	1	2	3	4	8	(76)
IF DIFFERENT FROM THE ABOVE ITEMS, ASK ALSO ABOUT THE FOLLOWING:						
1_____	1	2	3	4	8	
2_____	1	2	3	4	8	
3_____	1	2	3	4	8	

(b) And your mother's? (What was your mother's usual occupation while you were in high school?) (If no mother, ask about female guardian)

_____

IF HOUSEWIFE: After you were born, did she ever have a job outside the home for any period of time?

___No ___DK ___Yes

What kind of work did she do?

_____

How old were you at that time?

_____

33) How many years of education or schooling have you completed?

CIRCLE HIGHEST LEVEL COMPLETED:

High school	9	10	11	12		
College	13	14	15	16		
Post-grad	17	18	19	20	21+	PROBE: What degrees do you have?
Technical/ business school	13	14	15	16	17+	PROBE: What kind of school was that?

_____

IF NURSING, ETC.: Did you receive any degree or certification? (What kind? _____

(77-78)

PROBE: Was that traditional Catholic or modern Catholic?

0___Traditional 1___Modern

___Jewish ⟶ PROBE: Was that Reformed, Conservative, or Orthodox?

2___Reformed 3___Conservative 4___Orthodox

___Protestant⟶ PROBE: What denomination was that? ____(WRITE IN): _____

_____

5___fundamentalist 6___non-fundamentalist

7___no religion

8___other religion ⟶ PROBE: What religion was that? _____

_____

35) Do you still consider yourself _____(to be Missouri Synod Lutheran)

___yes ___DK ___no PROBE: What religion, if any, do you consider yourself to be?

_____

36) During the last year how often did you attend organized religious services? Never, once or twice, occasionally, once a month, once a week, or more than once a week?

1___never 2___1 or 2 3___occasionally 4___once a month 5___once a week

6___more than once a week 8___DK/no idea

37) Finally, can you tell me the date of your wedding, please: _____, 1974

a) We'll be sending you a progress report on this part of the survey in about 3 months.

b) Will you be at the same address then (in June or early July)?

___yes → IF NO ADDRESS ON POSTCARD (Q. 7), ASK:
I'm not sure we have your correct address. Where are you living?
ADDRESS: _____

___no
___DK → If your address has changed, how might we go about getting in touch with you? (PROBE: What city will you be living in? Is there someone who would have your address?)
_____

c) Of course, this kind of telephone interview has its limitations.

d) We're considering the idea of adding a second part to our study, where we could talk face-to-face with people who've just gone through the first few months of marriage--about the decisions they've come up against so far.

e) If this works out, do you think that you might be interested (in a face-to-face personal interview)?

___yes
___maybe
___no

COMMENTS (IF ANY): _____

f) I want to thank you very much.

g) It's been a pleasure talking with you. We really appreciate all your help!

1) If possible, we'd like to interview your husband/wife, too.

2) Could I ask that you not talk about the specific questions with him/her beforehand? We wanted to get both of your individual ideas, personally.

3) Is he/she there, so I could ask when would be a good time for someone to call him/her?

IF NOT THERE: When would be a good time to try?

Time to call other spouse

i) Again, thank you.....
Goodbye.

END OF INTERVIEW

INTERVIEWER: Fill out next page immediately after hanging up. →

VIEWER EVALUATIONS & IMPRESSIONS

MAKE AN "X" ON EACH LINE:

Respondent's attitude toward interview:

Extremely cooperative interested, eager | + ——— - | suspicious, hostile

Respondent's frankness/honesty:

Extremely frank | + ——— - | Did not give the impression of frankness

Respondent's fluency (ease of expressing ideas in words):

Very fluent | + ——— - | Not fluent/would be impossible to interview later

Respondent apparently was: ___alone ___with spouse
___with children ___with others

Did respondent indicate that couple had cohabited before marriage (e.g., already had a routine of handling tasks, etc.)?

___Definitely cohabited (said so) ___Definitely did not cohabit (said so)

___Not entirely sure: Describe any clues or comments in full. See especially Q. 19.

_____

_____

TOTAL LENGTH OF INTERVIEW: _____minutes

ANY OTHER COMMENTS ABOUT THE PERSON INTERVIEWED OR THE SITUATION:

_____

_____

_____

DENTIAL INFORMATION
74 Newlywed Study
partment of Sociology
chigan State University
st Lansing, Michigan 48823

COUPLE NUMBER: _____

Husband Wife

PHASE II - PERSONAL INTERVIEW, SEVERAL MONTHS AFTER MARRIAGE

Part A - INDIVIDUAL INTERVIEW

Part C - JOINT (COUPLE) INTERVIEW

(Place address label here)

interview _____, 1974

ing time _____:_____ AM PM

viewed by: _____

In your telephone interview, we spent a lot of time talking about these decisions. HAND LIST #1 TO R, ALONG WITH FELT PEN. We won't go through all of these again, but I would like to ask about a couple of them.

1a. Before I do that, would you please cross out the ones which don't apply to your situation. PAUSE. Now would you also cross out the ones which you consider to be fairly unimportant.

1b. Of the ones which are left, please tell me the one subject where you and your spouse's ideas are the most different. (PROBE: If you had to choose one, what would you say?) (GO TO Q. 1c).

NAME OF
No. ____ MOST DIFF. SUBJECT: _____

1c. From the ones which are not crossed out, would you also pick one where your ideas are somewhat different--about halfway between the ones where you have the most similar and the most different ideas. (PROBE: If you had to choose one, what would you say?)

NAME OF
No. ___ SOMEWHAT DIFF. SUBJECT: _____

1d. Let's talk a little about (name of "most different" subject):

1. Since your telephone interview, has this subject come up at all?	No 1 DK 1
1a. IF YES: Since then, have you talked about it just a little, a fair amount, or a great deal?	YES: Little 2 Fair 3 Great 4 DK 8
2. How far are you toward reaching a decision or understanding? Would you say you've just started, gotten a little of the way, gotten a good part of the way, or gotten all of the way (toward an understanding or decision)?	Just started 1 Little 2 Good part 3 All of way 4 DK 8
3. How sure are you about your spouse's ideas--about where he/she stands on this subject? Are you very sure, somewhat sure, somewhat unsure, or very unsure?	Very sure 1 S. sure 2 S. unsure 4 Very unsure 5 DK 3
4. For yourself personally, is this a subject which might sometime be just a little uncomfortable or touchy to bring up?	No 3 DK 8 YES:
4a. IF YES: Quite uncomfortable or just a little uncomfortable?	Quite 1 A Little uncomf'l. 2

e. What about ("SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT" SUBJECT) ?

1. Since your telephone interview has this subject come up at all?	No 1 DK 1
1a. IF YES: Since then, have you talked about it just a little, a fair amount, or a great deal?	YES: Little 2 Fair 3 Great 4 DK 8
2. How far are you toward reaching a decision or understanding? Would you say you've just started, gotten a little of the way, gotten a good part of the way, or gotten all of the way (toward an understanding or decision)?	Just started 1 Little 2 Good part 3 All of way 4 DK 8
3. How sure are you about your spouse's ideas--about where he/she stands on this subject? Are you very sure, somewhat sure, somewhat unsure, or very unsure?	Very sure 1 S. sure 2 S. unsure 4 Very unsure 5 DK 3
4. For yourself personally, is this a subject which might sometime be just a little uncomfortable or touchy to bring up?	No 3 DK 8
4a. IF YES: Quite uncomfortable or just a little uncomfortable	YES: Quite uncomf'l. 1 A Little uncomf'l. 2

1) Let's start with "how the money is handled." Is this at all different from what you had expected? Would you say it's a great deal different, some different, just a little different, or not at all different--or didn't you know what to expect?

2) What about "your relationship with your in-laws?" How much different is this from what you expected?

REPEAT FOR ALL ITEMS.

What about:	(a) How much different is this from what you expected? (CIRCLE ONE) Great deal	Some	Just a little	Not at all	DK	No expectation
1. How the money is handled COMMENTS (IF ANY):	4	3	2	1	8	0
2. Your relationship with your in-laws (COMMENTS (IF ANY):	4	3	2	1	8	0
3. Your standard of living--the house, clothes, car and so forth COMMENTS (IF ANY):	4	3	2	1	8	0
4. How disputes get settled COMMENTS (IF ANY):	4	3	2	1	8	0
5. How much each of you does around the house COMMENTS (IF ANY):	4	3	2	1	8	0

8.	Your spouse's expression of love and affection for you COMMENTS (IF ANY):	4	3	2	1	8	0
9.	How much time you spend working <u>together</u> on tasks around the house, etc. COMMENTS (IF ANY):	4	3	2	1	8	0
10.	How much "work" responsibility there is in marriage (in general) COMMENTS (IF ANY):	4	3	2	1	8	0
11.	How much "fun" and enjoyment there is in marriage (in general) COMMENTS (IF ANY):	4	3	2	1	8	0
	IF CHILDREN LIVING WITH:						
12.	How the children and the "new" step-parent get along COMMENTS (IF ANY):	4	3	2	1	8	0
	IF CHILDREN LIVING WITH:						
13.	In general, how well the children are doing COMMENTS (IF ANY):	4	3	2	1	8	0

somewhat satisfied, or not very satisfied?

2) What about "your relationship with your in-laws?" How satisfied are you with the way things turned out so far?

REPEAT FOR ALL ITEMS.

(b)

How satisfied are you with the way things turned out so far?

(CIRCLE ONE)

What about:	Perfectly	Pretty	Somewhat	Not very	DK
1. How the money is handled COMMENTS (IF ANY):	4	3	2	1	8
2. Your relationship with your in-laws (COMMENTS (IF ANY):	4	3	2	1	8
3. Your standard of living--the house, clothes, car and so forth COMMENTS (IF ANY):	4	3	2	1	8
4. How disputes get settled COMMENTS (IF ANY):	4	3	2	1	8
5. How much each of you does around the house COMMENTS (IF ANY):	4	3	2	1	8
6. The leisure time you spend with your spouse COMMENTS (IF ANY):	4	3	2	1	8

		4	3	2	1	8
9.	How much time you spend working <u>together</u> on tasks around the house, etc. COMMENTS (IF ANY):	4	3	2	1	8
10.	How much "work" responsibility there is in marriage (in general) COMMENTS (IF ANY):	4	3	2	1	8
11.	How much "fun" and enjoyment there is in marriage (in general) COMMENTS (IF ANY):	4	3	2	1	8
	IF CHILDREN LIVING WITH:					
12.	How the children and the "new" step-parent get along COMMENTS (IF ANY):	4	3	2	1	8
	IF CHILDREN LIVING WITH:					
13.	In general, how well the children are doing COMMENTS (IF ANY):	4	3	2	1	8

PROCEED TO OTHER ITEMS BELOW

(c)

How important is this, in making a marriage "work"?

(CIRCLE ONE)

What about:	Extremely important	Pretty important	Somewhat	Not very important	DK
1. How the money is handled COMMENTS (IF ANY):	4	3	2	1	8
2. Your relationship with your in-laws COMMENTS (IF ANY):	4	3	2	1	8
3. Your standard of living--the house, clothes, car, and so forth COMMENTS (IF ANY):	4	3	2	1	8
4. How disputes get settled COMMENTS (IF ANY):	4	3	2	1	8
5. How much each of you does around the house COMMENTS (IF ANY):	4	3	2	1	8
6. The leisure time you spend with your spouse COMMENTS (IF ANY):	4	3	2	1	8

11. How much time you spend working together on tasks around the house, etc. COMMENTS (IF ANY):	4	3	2	1	8

IF CHILDREN LIVING WITH:

12. How the children and the "new" step-parent get along COMMENTS (IF ANY):	4	3	2	1	8

IF CHILDREN LIVING WITH:

13. In general, how well the children are doing COMMENTS (IF ANY):	4	3	2	1	8

hen something doesn't suit you, are you the kind of person who ust comes out and says so, who drops a hint, or do you usually ot say anything at all?

1___come out 2___hint 3___not say anything

uppose you wanted your spouse to start taking more responsi- ility for doing something--such as getting the car serviced or oing the dishes. What would you probably do?

_____

_____

_____

hat are the chances that your spouse would go along with your ishes, after you did that? Very good, fairly good, so-so about 50%), fairly poor, or very poor?

1___very good 2___fairly good 3___so-so

4___fairly poor 5___very poor 8___DK

COMMENTS (IF ANY): _____

_____

_____

f that didn't work and it was important to you, what would you robably do next?

_____

_____

_____

general, when you have a spat or quarrel, which of you
ually brings up the subject:

1___husband 2___wife 3___both same

8___DK 7___never quarrel (go to Q. 6)

iat usually happens then? _____

_____

_____

io usually comes around to the other's point of view?

1___husband 2___wife 3___both same 8___DK

7___OTHER ANSWER, DESCRIBE

n general, is your spouse an easy or hard person to
lk to? Why?

_____ 1__easy

_____ 2__hard

_____

you think it is generally hard for a woman to under-
and a man and for a man to understand a woman?

_____

_____

_____

Now would you please tell me who usually does the following things--husband almost always, husband more than wife, both about the same, wife more than husband, or wife almost always.

(CIRCLE ONE ON EACH LINE)

Who usually:	Husb. almost always	Husb. more than wife	Both about the same	Wife more than husb.	Wife almost always	DK	NEITHER DOES THIS
a. Buys gifts	1	2	3	4	5	8	7
b. Makes appointments with doctors, tax lawyers, teachers, and so forth	1	2	3	4	5	8	7
c. Decides what to do on a weekend night	1	2	3	4	5	8	7
d. Mows the lawn	1	2	3	4	5	8	7
e. Does the laundry (or sends it out)	1	2	3	4	5	8	7
f. Keeps income tax records	1	2	3	4	5	8	7
g. Gets the husband's breakfast on work days	1	2	3	4	5	8	7
h. Does the vacuuming	1	2	3	4	5	8	7
i. Takes the initiative to make up, when there's been a disagreement	1	2	3	4	5	8	7
j. Takes out the trash or garbage	1	2	3	4	5	8	7
k. Straightens up the living room, when company is coming	1	2	3	4	5	8	7
l. Puts clean laundry back where it belongs	1	2	3	4	5	8	7
m. Decides how much spending money each of you should have	1	2	3	4	5	8	7
n. IF CHILDREN LIVING WITH: Decides about discipline for children	1	2	3	4	5	8	7
o. Decides about how to vote in elections	1	2	3	4	5	8	7
p. Has more to say about whether or not to use birth control	1	2	3	4	5	8	7
q. Has more to say about what kind of birth control to use, if any	1	2	3	4	5	8	7
r. Takes the initiative in expressing mutual affection (sexual)	1	2	3	4	5	8	7

Who does (or probably would) make the final decision about the following:

s. What house or apartment to take	1	2	3	4	5	8	7
t. What car to get	1	2	3	4	5	8	7
u. Whether to buy some life insurance and how much	1	2	3	4	5	8	7
v. Whether the husband changes his job or not	1	2	3	4	5	8	7
w. Whether or not the wife should go to work or quit working	1	2	3	4	5	8	7
x. How much money you can afford to spend per week on food	1	2	3	4	5	8	7
y. Whether or not a doctor is called when someone is ill	1	2	3	4	5	8	7
z. Where to go on a vacation	1	2	3	4	5	8	7

At what age did you begin to date regularly?

_____ years old

About how many people have you dated more than just casually--where you were real friends as well as dating partners? Would you say around 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, or more than 9?

1.___1 or 2
2.___3 or 4
3.___5 or 6
4.___7 or 8
5.___9
6.___more than 9

Of these, about how many would you say were very close or serious relationships? (PROBE: including your present spouse)

1.___1 or 2
2.___3 or 4
3.___5 or 6
4.___7 or 8
5.___9
6.___more than 9

THIS PAGE ONLY FOR PREVIOUSLY MARRIED PERSONS:

11. Think for a moment about your social life after you were divorced. In terms of dating the opposite sex, was it something of a disadvantage if people knew you were divorced? (IF YES: Did you consider it to be a fairly big disadvantage or just a small one?)

1__yes, fairly big 2__yes, small 3__no 8__DK 7__OTHER ANSWER, DESCRIBE:

COMMENTS (IF ANY): _____

12. After your divorce, did you have children living with you?

1__yes 2__no (go to Q. 13)

12a. IF YES: Was this a disadvantage, in terms of dating? (IF YES: a fairly big disadvantage or just a small one?)

1__yes, fairly big 2__yes, small 3__no 8__DK
7__OTHER ANSWER, DESCRIBE:

COMMENTS (IF ANY): _____

13. As you know, we're interested in some of the ways that people's second marriages differ from their first. HAND LIST #2 to R.

a. Please tell me which of these are quite different now, than they were in your first marriage. Just tell me the numbers...

WRITE NUMBERS BELOW, IN LEFT-HAND COLUMN.

b. What about number __(1st number)? Is this different now because you made a special effort to be sure it would be different, or did it just happen to work out that way?

IF SPECIAL EFFORT: A special effort to find a different kind of person or a special effort to make sure that an understanding could be worked out?

(a) WRITE IN NOs.	(b) CIRCLE ONE:			
		Special effort to:		
DIFFERENCES:	Just happened	Find diff. person	Work out understanding	DK
1) #	1	2	3	8
2) #	1	2	3	8
3) #	1	2	3	8
4) #	1	2	3	8
5) #	1	2	3	8
6) #	1	2	3	8

c. How old were you, when you got married the first time?

_____ years old

d. And how long did you and your first spouse live together after you got married?

_____ years

Some people think that married life is easier on women, while others say it is easier on men. In your own experience, does it seem that married life is easier on men or women?

1___own sex 3___other sex 2___neither (both the same)
8___DK

COMMENTS (IF ANY): _____

_____

What about your own marriage? (Would you say the same thing? Right now, who probably has it a little easier, you or your spouse?)

1___I do 3___spouse 3___neither (both the same) 8___DK

15a. Why do you say that? _____

_____

Everything considered, is your life very different than it was before your wedding, somewhat different, or not at all different?

1___very different
2___somewhat different
3___not at all different
8___DK

Does that mean that you did (didn't) live together before you were married?

1___lived together
2___not live together (go to Q. 18)
9___no response to question (go to Q. 18)

IF LIVED TOGETHER:

How long did you live together (before your marriage?

1___less than 1 month 6___1-1/2 years
2___1-3 months 7___2 years
3___4-6 months 8___3 years
4___7-10 months 9___4 years or more
5___a year

COMMENTS (IF ANY): _____

_____

Since you were 18, about how many years have you worked full-time?

_____ years

Since you were 18, were there years when you only worked part-time?

____Yes ____No (Go to Q. 20)

↓

19a. IF YES: About how many?

_____ years

At the present time, do you work either full-time or part-fime for pay, outside your home? (PROBE: IF YES: full-time or part-time?)

1____Yes, full-time 2____Yes, part-time 3____No (Go to Q. 31)

IF A TEACHER, ETC., WHO USUALLY WORKS BUT HAS THE SUMMER OFF, CHECK HERE ☐ AND GO TO Q. 21.

Does your spouse work the same hours you do, work different hours, (or is your spouse not employed)?

0____not employed 1____same hours 2____different hours

COMMENTS (IF ANY): _____

_____

About how often do you bring work home, to do after work hours? Never, once in a while, about half the time, or very often?

1____never 2____once in a while 3____about 1/2 the time
4____very often 7____OTHER, DESCRIBE:

_____

When you get home from work, are you usually just exhausted, fairly tired, just a little tired, or not at all tired?

1___exhausted 2___fairly 3___little 4___not at all 8___DK

What do you usually do for the first hour or so, after you get home from work?

_____

_____

Can you forget about your work once you get home, or is it still on your mind?

1____still on mind 2____forget (GO TO Q. 26)

25a. IF STILL ON MIND: What helps you get your mind off your work?

_____

How much do you talk about your work at home? Very little, a fair amount, or a great deal?

1___very little 2___fair amount 3___great deal

Do you tell your spouse only if something really interesting happened, or do you tell about all the little things that happened too?

1___only if really interesting 2___little things too (GO TO Q. 28)

↓

27a. IF ONLY TELL INTERESTING THINGS: Why is that? _____

Many people tell us that their work makes it hard to find enough time to do all the things they want to do. Do you find it difficult to find enough time to spend with your spouse?
(IF YES: Quite difficult or just a little?)

SPOUSE: 1___No 2___Yes, little 3___Yes, quite difficult

28a. What about finding enough time for the household tasks?
(PROBE: Is that difficult?)

TASKS: 1___No 2___Yes, little 3___Yes, quite difficult

28b. IF CHILDREN LIVING WITH: What about time to spend with the children?

CHILDREN: 1___No 2___Yes, little 3___Yes, quite difficult

28c. What about finding time to just be by yourself?

SELF: 1___No 2___Yes, little 3___Yes, quite difficult

28d. IF "QUITE DIFFICULT" TO ANY OF THE ABOVE: How do you manage to find the time, when it's quite difficult to do so? (PROBE: What ways do you have of finding time for your spouse/children/yourself/household tasks?)

_____

_____

Do you tell your spouse about the more complicated or technical things you do at work?

1___No 2___Yes

Do you sometimes wish you could talk to your spouse more, about your work?

1___No 2___Yes

30a. Why is that? _____

. ASK NON-WORKING R's: How much do you talk to your spouse, about what your day has been like? Very little, or a fair amount, or a great deal?

1___very little 2___fair amt. 3___great deal

31a. Do you tell your spouse only if something really interesting happened, or do you tell about all the little things that happened too?

1___only interesting 2___little things too (GO TO Q. 32)

31b. IF ONLY TELL INTERESTING THINGS: Why is that? _____

_____

_____ (GO TO Q. 32)

K EVERYONE:

. How much does your spouse tell you, about his/her day? Very little, or a fair amount, or a great deal?

1___very little 2___fair amount 3___great deal

. Do you sometimes wish that your spouse would tell you more or less, about his/her day?

1___no 2___yes, prefer more 3___yes, prefer less 8___DK

COMMENTS (IF ANY): _____

Does your spouse help you with <u>your</u> work at all, either directly or indirectly? (PROBE: In what ways?)

_____

_____

_____

Do you help your spouse? (PROBE: In what ways?)

_____

_____

_____

How often do you wish that your spouse could spend more time with you? Never, once in a while, fairly often, or very often?

1___never 2___once in a while 3___fairly often 4___very often
8___DK

36a. IF FAIRLY OR VERY OFTEN:

Have you talked about this at all? Do you think there's a chance to change the situation (so you can spend more time together?)

_____

_____

ASK EVERYONE IN COUPLES WHERE WIFE WORKS

Do you consider that your own field of work and your spouse's work are very close and similar to one another, overlapping to some extent, but with major areas of difference, or quite distinct from one another?

1___very similar 2___some overlap
3___quite distinct, different

Which of the following comes closest to your opinions about women working: HAND LIST #3 TO R.

____1 Women ought to be able to work a bit but not so as to allow it to interfere with home and family obligations (SKIP TO Q. 39)

____2 Women ought not to work outside the home (SKIP TO Q. 39)

____3 Women ought to have the same opportunity to pursue an important career as men

____8 DK (SKIP TO Q. 39)

N":

People can believe that women should have the same career opportunities as men without necessarily wanting that in their own marriage. How do you feel about that, personally? (PROBE: Would you be disappointed if only the husband has a career?)

_____

_____

Why is that? _____

_____

39. From the list, what do you think your spouse's opinion is (about women working)?

WRITE IN NUMBER: _____

COMMENTS (IF ANY): _____

_____

TAKE BACK LIST FROM R

40. Here is a list of annual incomes. They are numbered from 1 to 8. HAND LIST #4 to R. Which number represents the amount of income which you, yourself, earn in a year?

WRITE IN NUMBER: _____ (TAKE BACK LIST)

41. You probably know some couples where the wife earns more money than the husband. If you were in their situation, do you think it would bother you at all?

1___yes 2___no (GO TO Q. 42) 3___OTHER ANSWER, DESCRIBE:

41a. IF YES OR OTHER: Why is that? _____

_____

42. Do you think it would bother your spouse at all (to have the wife earning more than the husband)?

1___yes 2___no 3___OTHER ANSWER, DESCRIBE:

COMMENTS (IF ANY): _____

_____

43. What about your own situation? Who earns more right now, you or your spouse?

1___husband more 2___both same 3___wife more 8___DK

COMMENTS (IF ANY): _____

_____

. Couples have different ways of handling their money. Do you have two separate checking accounts, a joint checking account, or what?

1___2 separate 2___joint 3___joint and each has separate

4___joint and husb. has separate 5___joint and wife has separate

6___husband has separate account, wife has none

8___NO CHECKING ACCOUNT 7___OTHER ANSWER, DESCRIBE:

44a. As you recall, who suggested doing it that way?

1___husb. 2___wife 3___just kept on with way we did it before marriage

8___DK 7___OTHER ANSWER, DESCRIBE:

. People differ in what gives them their greatest satisfaction. HAND LIST #5 TO R. Please tell me the number of the thing which gives you the greatest satisfaction.

WRITE IN NUMBER: _____

a. Which gives you the second most satisfaction?

WRITE IN NUMBER: _____

b. And the third most satisfaction?

WRITE IN NUMBER: _____

KE BACK LIST FROM R.

RODUCTION OF PART B, SELF-ADMINISTERED QUESTIONNAIRE

TERVIEWER: MAKE SURE CODE NUMBER AND SEX (husband or wife) ARE MARKED BEFORE PART B TO RESPONDENT.)

there are some questions I'll ask you to answer yourself, by mark- the answers on this questionnaire. HAND PART B QUESTIONNAIRE AND CIL TO R. I'll be checking the other questionnaire, to make sure t my handwriting can be read, but feel free to ask me whenever you e any questions at all.

INTERVIEWER: NEXT PAGE TO BE ASKED AFTER SELF-ADMINISTERED QUESTIONS DONE.

AFTER R FILLS OUT PAPER & PENCIL QUESTIONS, ASK:

46. Let's take a minute to talk about this last question you answered about who does what. We're interested in a little about how you happened to work out things the way you did, and why.

a. Let's start with "who does the grocery shopping."

First, let's talk about how you happened to work this out this way. To give you an idea of what I mean, read through the top part of this sheet and see if some of these come close. HAND LIST #6 TO R, AND WAIT FOR R TO READ.

Do any of these statements seem to describe how you and your spouse arrived at this arrangement? Can you tell me the numbers? Are there other answers which also apply? WRITE IN ALL NUMBERS MENTIONED.

b. What about "repairing things around the house"? How did you arrive at who should do this? AFTER 1st ANSWER, PROBE: Anything else?

(REPEAT FOR REMAINING ITEMS)

ITEM What about:	How did you arrive at who should do this? WRITE IN ALL NUMBERS MENTIONED
1. Grocery shopping	
2. Repairing things around the house (furniture, toys, appliances)	
3. Making complaints, if necessary, to salesmen or landlord	
4. Keeping in touch with relatives	
5. Deciding what people you will invite to the house	
6. Taking care of the car	
7. Preparing supper	
8. Doing the supper dishes (or loading the dishwasher)	
IF THERE ARE CHILDREN: 9. Getting up at night, if necessary, with the children	
10. Helping the children with their homework	

c. Next why do you do the grocery shopping the way you do? The bottom part of the sheet gives some possible answers. Take a minute to read through them. WAIT FOR R TO READ.

Do any of these seem to describe why you do things this way? Can you tell me the numbers? Are there other answers which also apply?

d. What about "repairing things around the house"? Why do you do it (divide it up) the way you do?

PROBE FOR ADDITIONAL ANSWERS

(REPEAT FOR REMAINING ITEMS)

ITEM What about:	Why do you do it this way? WRITE IN ALL NUMBERS MENTIONED
1. Grocery shopping	
2. Repairing things around the house (furniture, toys, appliances)	
3. Making complaints, if necessary, to salesmen or landlord	
4. Keeping in touch with relatives	
5. Deciding what people you will invite to the house	
6. Taking care of the car	
7. Preparing supper	
8. Doing the supper dishes (or loading the dishwasher)	
IF THERE ARE CHILDREN: 9. Getting up at night, if necessary, with the children	
10. Helping the children with their homework	

TAKE BACK LIST FROM R

PART C - JOINT INTERVIEW

INSTRUCTIONS TO INTERVIEWERS:

1. List "H" for husband and "W" for wife before each comment recorded.
2. Whenever a difference appears, push gently for a joint statement: "What do you both feel about this?" "What is your opinion as a couple?"
3. Rating will be easier if comments are recorded in the order that they were made, as verbatim as possible. GOOD NOTES ARE VERY IMPORTANT.
4. Direct your comments to both spouses so that you will not influence which spouse answers.
5. Interviewers should take turns asking questions, the man asking all "M" questions and the woman all "F" questions.
6. Work out your own system for writing down answers. In some cases, one person is better at this or has more legible handwriting and will do all the recording. Or you may want to take turns, each taking one entire question.

F 1. To start with, I wonder if you would tell us a little about yourselves. For instance, how did you happen to meet and get together?

M 2. How long did you go together before you got married?

F 3. Whose idea was it to get married? PROBE: Who was the first to get serious? Who first hinted at or suggested the idea of getting married?)

RECORD EXACT WORDS:

M 4. We are interested in your opinions as a couple about several issues: For instance, do you feel that a husband and wife should each have their own circle of friends?
RECORD EXACT WORDS:

NOTE TO INTERVIEWERS: IF ONE SPOUSE PERSISTENTLY ANSWERS ALL QUESTIONS, BE SURE TO REMIND COUPLE TACTFULLY THAT JOINT ANSWERS ARE CALLED FOR.

F 5. Who should be responsible for dealing with such outside people as the landlord, the banker, real estate people, and so forth?
RECORD EXACT WORDS:

M 6. What kind of relationship should you maintain with your in-laws?
RECORD EXACT WORDS:

F 7. You know that we're interested in decision-making. I wonder if you could take one decision you made lately, or are in the process of making now, and tell us a little about it. (PROBE: Is there a fairly big decision you've made lately? Who first brought up the subject? What happened then? Where do things stand now?
RECORD EXACT WORDS:

M 8. All couples disagree sometimes. When this happens, what do you usually do? (PROBE: But sometimes talking is not enough. Sometimes one person just has to "give in." In cases like that, what usually happens?)
RECORD EXACT WORDS:

F 9. IF CHILDREN LIVING WITH THEM: I know you have children. What is one of the more important adjustments this has required for you?
RECORD EXACT WORDS:

M 10. IF EITHER SPOUSE PREVIOUSLY MARRIED: What kind of relationship do you think should be maintained with a former spouse? (PROBE: In terms of time spent, financial responsibility, etc.)
RECORD EXACT WORDS:

F 11. There's a lot of talk these days about "women's liberation" and, lately, about "men's liberation." What is your opinion on such things? (PROBE: Do women or men need "liberating"? In what way?)

M 12. Finally, what would you say is one of the best things about your marriage--something that gives you the most pleasure or sets your marriage apart from many others?
RECORD EXACT WORDS:

CLOSING SPEECH (USE YOUR OWN WORDS): We'd like to thank you very much for all of your help. It's been a pleasure talking with both of you. You'll be receiving a report about the study in late fall. Do you have any questions before we go?

INTERVIEWER'S RATING SHEET

TO BE FILLED OUT IMMEDIATELY AFTER LEAVING THE HOUSE

INSTRUCTIONS:
1. Drive around the corner, etc., before filling out.
2. Each interviewer fills this out separately, without discussion. THIS IS VERY IMPORTANT.
3. You are rating the joint interview, where the couple was interviewed together.
4. Do not use "both the same" any more than absolutely necessary. We are looking for differences between spouses, even fairly small differences.

INTERVIEWER JUDGMENT OF:	(CIRCLE ONE NUMBER) Husb. much more	Husb. more	Both the same	Wife more	Wife much more	Neither one does this	??
a. Who talks more?	1	2	3	4	5	9	8
b. Who has more "say" in joint decisions?	1	2	3	4	5	9	8
c. Who contributes more ideas?	1	2	3	4	5	9	8
d. Who shows more initiative (is less passive)?	1	2	3	4	5	9	8
e. Who does more to smooth over differences?	1	2	3	4	5	9	8
f. Who uses "we" more?	1	2	3	4	5	9	8
g. Who directs more questions to the other, such as "what do you think?"	1	2	3	4	5	9	8
h. Who points out more differences between spouses?	1	2	3	4	5	9	8
i. Who interrupts the other more?	1	2	3	4	5	9	8

j. IF INTERRUPTIONS, CHECK ONE:
1___interruptions seemed to facilitate conversation
2___interruptions blocked the expression of ideas

k. IS THEIR CONVERSATION:
1___parallel, each going own way almost independently of the other
2___coordinated, each picking up where the other left off
3___OTHER, DESCRIBE:

l. FROM THE DISCUSSION, does the marriage seem more one of "companionship" or more "traditional" (segregated roles)?
1___companionship
2___segregated/traditional

m. CONFLICT (CHECK ONE): 1___open conflict frequent
2___occasional conflict
3___suppressed conflict
4___no conflict

n. AGREEMENT (CHECK ONE): 1___agreement after discussion
2___agreement without discussion

o. CONSENSUS (similarity of spouses' ideas to start with):
1___high consensus
2___medium
3___low

p. Were gestures of hostility or affection made? CHECK ALL OBSERVED:

Husband: ☐ hostility ☐ affection ☐ ignored wife

Wife : ☐ hostility ☐ affection ☐ ignored husband

q. Do they seem happy together, as far as you can tell? 1___yes
2___no

r. Compared to other interview couples, do they seem:
1___happier than most
2___about average
3___less happy than most
8___?

s. IF CHILDREN LIVING WITH THEM:
1. Who "checked on" children? 1___husb. 2___wife 3___both
4___neither

2. Who did children come to or ask questions of? 1___husb. 2___wife 3___both
4___neither 5___children didn't come in

3. Who was irritated by children's noise? 1___husb. 2___wife 3___both
4___neither 5___no noise

t. Who answered the telephone/doorbell? 1___husb. 2___wife
3___both 4___neither 5___no calls or visitors

u. THUMBNAIL SKETCH: Briefly characterize the couple, with special attention to aspects of the husband-wife relationship which are not captured by the above ratings.

_____

_____

_____

_____

INTERVIEWER EVALUATIONS/IMPRESSIONS ABOUT
THE INDIVIDUAL (SEPARATE) INTERVIEW

v. Respondent's attitude toward interview: (PLACE AN "X" SOMEWHERE ON THE LINE)

extremely cooperative, interested, eager | + _____ - | suspicious, hostile

w. Respondent's frankness/honesty:

extremely open, frank | + _____ - | did not give the impression of frankness

x. Is the wife pregnant now? 1___yes 2___seems to be 3___apparently not

IF YES: Was she pregnant before the wedding? _____

_____

y. ANY OTHER COMMENTS ABOUT THE INDIVIDUAL INTERVIEWED OR THE INTERVIEW SITUATION:

APPENDIX D

LISTS ACCOMPANYING PHASE II QUESTIONNAIRE

#1

1. Buying large items (like a car or furniture or dishwasher)
2. Fixing up your house or apartment
3. Dividing household responsibilities
4. Having or adopting children in the future
5. Arrangements for children from a previous marriage (if appropriate)
6. Schooling or education for children
7. How much the wife works
8. The type of job the wife takes (or might take in the future)
9. The type of job the husband takes (or might take in the future)
10. Moving someplace else

#2

1. How the money was handled
2. How easy it was to talk over problems
3. Similarity in goals, values
4. How disputes were settled
5. Maturity of both people
6. How well you knew each other before marriage
7. How much the husband did around the house
8. How much you talked over practical things before marriage
9. Who took more of the responsibility for making decisions
10. How much time you could have to yourself
11. How much the wife worked, outside the home
12. How well you could understand each other's work
13. How "practical" or "romantic" your approach to marriage was
14. Relationships with in-laws
15. How heavy the pressure of financial problems was

#3

1. Women ought to be able to work a bit but not so as to allow it to interfere with home and family obligations.

2. Women ought not to work outside the home.

3. Women ought to have the same opportunity to pursue an important career as men.

#4

Annual Income

1. Under $3,500
2. $ 3,500 - $ 6,999
3. $ 7,000 - $ 9,999
4. $10,000 - $14,999
5. $15,000 - $19,999
6. $20,000 - $24,999
7. $25,000 - $29,999
8. $30,000 and over

#5

1. Your career or occupation
2. Your relationship with your spouse
3. Religious beliefs or activities
4. Leisure-time recreational activities
5. Participation as a citizen in the affairs of your community
6. Participation in activities directed toward national or international betterment
7. Running a home
8. (If appropriate) being a parent
9. Something else

#6

HOW DID YOU ARRIVE AT THIS ARRANGEMENT? (SEVERAL ANSWERS MAY APPLY)

1. I didn't give it any particular thought--this way just seemed natural
2. We talked about it once or twice
3. We talked about this quite a bit
4. When I'm unhappy about this, I've let my spouse know
5. When my spouse is unhappy about this, he (or she) lets me know
6. We had a good quarrel about this
7. I had to do a fair amount of "convincing"
8. My spouse had to do a fair amount of "convincing"
9. I just "put my foot down"
10. My spouse just "put his/her foot down"
11. We decided that one of us would do it and that the other would do something else, in return
12. I've given it some thought, but it wouldn't do any good to try to change things
13. I thought I'd wait until later for a better time to bring this subject up
14. Some other way (what?)

WHY DO YOU DO IT THIS WAY? (SEVERAL ANSWERS MAY APPLY)

1. This is a "man's job" or a "woman's job"
2. It's the only practical way, under the circumstances
3. The person who's better at this should do it
4. The person who likes it more should do it
5. It's more fun this way

#6 (continued)

6. It's easier than trying to change my spouse
7. It's faster or more efficient this way
8. This seems like the only fair way to do things
9. The person with more time should do this
10. The person who's more unhappy if it's not done (or done well) should do it
11. This is only a temporary thing--it will be different later
12. I refuse to do it any other way
13. My spouse refuses to do it any other way
14. Some other reason (what?)

APPENDIX E

PHASE II. PERSONAL INTERVIEW, PART B

CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION
1974 Newlywed Study - Phase 2
Department of Sociology
Michigan State University

CODE:_____

Husband Wife

PART B - PENCIL-AND-PAPER QUESTIONNAIRE

TO BEGIN WITH, TWO QUESTIONS ABOUT EMPLOYMENT:

1. Whether or not you are employed right now, please characterize your level of career ambition over the long run:

CHECK ONE:
1___Very high ambition
2___High
3___Medium or average
4___Pretty low; no particular long-run ambitions
5___I don't plan to work

2. IF YOU HAVE A JOB NOW: In general, how do you feel about your present work situation? (CHECK BELOW)

IF YOU ARE A HOUSEWIFE: In general, how do you feel about your present situation (being a full-time homemaker)?

CHECK ONE:
1___Extremely satisfied
2___Very satisfied
3___Fairly satisfied
4___Not very satisfied
5___Not at all satisfied

AND A QUESTION ABOUT COMMUNITY SIZE:

3a. How large was the place in which you spent most of your high school years? (If you lived in more than one place, please check the one where you spent the most time.)

CHECK ONE:
1___large metropolitan city (500,000 or more)
2___Suburb of large metropolitan city
3___Small metropolitan city (100,000 - 499,999)
4___Suburb of small metropolitan city
5___City (25,000 - 99,999)
6___Town (under 25,000)
7___On a farm
8___In the country but my family did not farm

3b. How large is the place you're living in now?

WRITE IN NUMBER (SEE ABOVE): _____

4. Some questions about communication:

PLEASE CHECK ONE ANSWER ON EACH LINE:

	Very Often	Often	Occasionally	Seldom	Never
1. How often do you and your spouse talk over pleasant things that happen during the day?					
2. Do you and your spouse talk about things in which you are both interested?					
3. Do you and your spouse avoid talking about certain subjects?					
4. Can your spouse tell what kind of day you have had without asking?					
5. Do you and your spouse use words which have a special meaning not understood by outsiders?					
6. Can you and your spouse discuss your most sacred beliefs without feelings of restraint or embarrassment?					
7. You and your spouse are visiting friends. Something is said by the friends which causes you to glance at each other. Would you understand each other?					
8. How often do you and your spouse talk with each other about personal problems?					
9. Do you feel that in most matters your spouse knows what you are trying to say?					
10. In general, have you and your spouse talked most things over together during marriage?					

5. Looking at your circle of friends as a whole, how would you characterize some of their main values or interests?

CHECK ONE ON EACH LINE:

	Dominant value or characteristic	Secondary characteristic	Not a characteristic
a. "Home-oriented"-emphasis on home, kids, garden, casual recreation at home, etc.			
b. "Experimental"-emphasis on new life styles			
c. "Sophisticated"-emphasis on cultural activities, more formal entertaining			
d. "Community-oriented" -community and civic activities			
e. "Religious"-emphasis on spiritual values, religious activities			
f. "Intellectual" or academic			

6. Among your circle of friends, how do most of them feel about women working?

CHECK ONE:

1___Women ought to be able to work a bit but not so as to allow it to interfere with home and family obligations.

2___Women ought not to work outside the home.

3___Women ought to have the same opportunity to pursue an important career as men.

4___I can't really say, since some friends have one opinion and others have another opinion.

7. Husbands and wives are usually different from each other in many ways. For example, even if both people are quite talkative, one is usually a little more talkative than the other.

How do you and your spouse differ on the following? PLEASE CHECK ONE ANSWER ON EACH LINE

WHICH ONE OF YOU USUALLY:	HUSBAND MORE	EXACTLY THE SAME	WIFE MORE
1. talks more?			
2. has the quickest temper?			
3. expresses appreciation for the other more often?			
4. has more "ups and downs" in moods?			
5. is more likely to be "on time?"			
6. is more likely to give in, when there is a disagreement?			
7. has more energy (tires less easily)?			
8. dislikes arguments more?			
9. tends to take the lead, in making decisions concerning both of you?			
10. is more likely to say something, if unhappy with something the other one does?			
11. shows more initiative?			
12. does more to smooth over differences?			
13. is more outgoing around strangers?			
14. is more level-headed in a "crisis" situation?			
15. has stricter standards for "tidiness" around the house?			

	8. WHO USUALLY DOES THIS? (CHECK ONE)						9. HOW SATISFIED ARE YOU WITH WHO DOES THIS? (CHECK ONE)			
	Husband almost always	Husband more than wife	Both about the same	Wife more than husband	Wife almost always	Neither one	Extremely Satisfied	Satisfied	Somewhat Satisfied	Not at all Satisfied
1. Grocery shopping										
2. Repairing things around the house (furniture, toys, appliances)										
3. Making complaints, if necessary, to salesmen or landlord										
4. Keeping in touch with relatives										
5. Deciding what people you will invite to the house										
6. Taking care of the car										
7. Preparing supper										
8. Doing the supper dishes (or loading the dishwasher)										
IF THERE ARE CHILDREN:										
9. Getting up at night, if necessary, with the children										
10. Helping the children with their homework										

	10. WHO WOULD YOU PREFER TO DO THIS? (CHECK ONE)						11. REGARDLESS OF WHO DOES IT, DO YOU THINK THIS IS AN IMPORTANT JOB OR DECISION? (CHECK ONE)			
	Husband almost always	Husband more than wife	Both about the same	Wife more than husband	Wife almost always	Neither one	Very Important	Fairly Important	Slightly Important	Not at all Important
1. Grocery shopping										
2. Repairing things around the house (furniture, toys, appliances)										
3. Making complaints, if necessary, to salesmen or landlord										
4. Keeping in touch with relatives										
5. Deciding what people you will invite to the house										
6. Taking care of the car										
7. Preparing supper										
8. Doing the supper dishes (or loading the dishwasher)										
IF THERE ARE CHILDREN:										
9. Getting up at night, if necessary, with the children										
10. Helping the children with their homework										

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


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