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A COMPARISON OF ARISTOTLE AND STRAWSON
ON THE CONCEPT OF A PERSON

By

Stephen Russell Dickerson

A DISSERTATION
Submitted to
. Michigan State University
In partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Philosophy
1980

 

ABSTRACT

A COMPARISON OF ARISTOTLE AND STRAWSON
ON THE CONCEPT OF A PERSON

BY

Stephen Russell Dickerson

I intend to achieve two main goals in this disserta-
tion. First, I intend to reconstruct Aristotle's theory
of a (human) person. Second, I intend to compareAmistotle's
theory of a person with P. F. Strawson's theory of a per-
son in an attempt to assess the strengths and weaknesses
of one theory as compared with the other.

I devote the first chapter to a consideration of two
questions: "What makes an individual thing to be a person?"
and "How can we decide when the concept of a human person
applies to an individual thing?" Relying heavily on
Aristotle's discussion of substance and essence in Meta-
physics VII, I arrive at the conclusion that the necessary
and sufficient condition for the existence of a person is
an ensouled body. I also arrive at the conclusion that
the necessary and sufficient condition for applying the
concept of a person to an individual is that the individual

have the essence of a person.

Stephen Russell Dickerson

Since a necessary condition for the existence of a
person is that it have a soul of a certain kind, I devote
Chapter II to an examination of Aristotle's theory of the
soul in the De Anima. I also give a critical analysis of
his doctrines of the active and passive minds, and I in-
vestigate the extent to which Aristotle was a materialist.

Since Aristotle relies on a certain theory of the

soul in the Nicomachean Ethics, I devote Chapter III to an

 

examination of this theory of the soul and to Aristotle's

discussion of reason in the Nicomachean Ethics. I also

 

argue that Aristotle uses a theory of the soul in the

Nicomachean Ethics that is different from the theory of

 

the soul that he develops in the De Anima.

Having explored Aristotle's theory of a person, I
devote Chapter IV to a critical analysis of P. F. Strawson's
theory of a person. The source of my account of Strawson's
theory of a person is Chapter III, titled "Persons," of

his book Individuals. My discussion of Strawson's theory

 

of a person touches on his views of descriptive metaphysics,
basic particulars, and P- and M-predication. I consider
criticisms that have been raised against various aspects of
Strawson's theory of a person by Joseph Margolis, Roland
Puccetti, Jerome A. Shaffer, and Bernard Williams.

Finally, I devote the last chapter to a comparison of
Aristotle's and Strawson's theories of a person. I conclude

that one advantage of Strawson's theory of a person is

 

 

 

Stephen Russell Dickerson

that it recognizes the need to explain how we have non-
observational knowledge of ourselves. An account of the
inner, personal aspect of the person is missing, for the
most part, from Aristotle's theory of a person. Neverthe-
less, I also conclude that Aristotle's account of a person
is more successful than Strawson's account of the person
in explaining the similarities and the differences between

persons and other animals.

To My Wife, Brenda

ii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am indebted to Professor George C. Kerner for ex-
tremely helpful suggestions that strengthened my discussion
of Strawson's theory of a person.

I am indebted to Professor Craig A. Staudenbaur for
suggestions that helped improve the style and translations
throughout my dissertation. I am also grateful to Professor
Staudenbaur for discussions that helped me work through
some difficult problems in Aristotle's text.

I wish to thank Professor Harold T. Walsh for his
constant encouragement throughout my work on this disser-
tation. I also wish to thank Professor Walsh for giving
me the confidence to trust my own reading of Aristotle, and
especially for spending many hours discussing Aristotle
with me.

Finally, to Professor Rhoda H. Kotzin, my advisor, I
am deeply grateful for the countless suggestions that have
tremendously improved the quality of this dissertation, and
especially for the guidance, encouragement, and friendship
that she has extended to me during the course of my graduate

study at Michigan State University.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I NT RODU CT I ON
Chapter
I. SUBSTANCE AND ESSENCE . . . . . . . .

A. Aristotle's Concept of Substance
B. Aristotle' 5 Concept of Essence .
1. A Paradox . . . .
2. Essence, Form, and Matter .
3. Essence in Individuals vs. Essence
in Species . . . . . . .
C. Definition
1. What a Definition Is . .
2. How to Arrive at a Definition .
D. The Nature and Concept of a Human
Being
1. Necessary and Sufficient Con-
ditions .
2. What is a Human Being?
3. How Do We Know That an Individual
Is a Human Being? . .
E. Summary and Conclusion

LII. THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE DE ANIMA .

A. The Nature of the Soul . .
B. Mind--The Thinking Faculty .
l. The Passive and Active Minds
2. The Importance of the Soul
C. The Importance of the Body . .
1. Necessary and Sufficient Con-
ditions
2. The Relation Between the Soul and
the Body . . . . . . .
3. Conclusion .
D. Concluding Remarks

iv

101

 

Chapter
III. THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS AND

 

THE POLITICS . . . . . . . . . . 106
A. The Soul . . 108

1. The Theory of the Soul in the
Nicomachean Ethics . 108

 

2. The Psychology of the Nicomachean
Ethics vs. the Psychology of the
De Anlma . . . . . . . 113

 

B. Reason . . . . . . . . . . . 131
1. Reason and the Human Being . . 131

2. A Critical Analysis of Cooper's
Position . . . 137
C. The Contribution of the Politics . . 146
1. Women . . . . . . . 149
2. Natural Slaves . . . . . . 152
D. Summaryxand Conclusion . . . . . . 159

‘\
1

N. P. FKSTRAWSONI’S THEORY OF THE PERSON . . . 162

a.’
. J

\Mai:~'>5-""‘
A. Descriptive and Revisionary Meta-
physics . . . . . . . 164
B. The Concept of a Person . . . . . 166
1. P- and M- Predication . 167
2. Criticisms of Strawson' s Doctrine
of P- and M- Predication . . 168
3 The Basis for Ascribing P-
Predicates . . 173
4. Strawson' s Criticism of the Con-.
cept of a Pure Egg . . . . 176
C. Criticisms of StraWSOn 5 Theory of a
Person . . . . . . . . 179
1. Introduction . . . . . . 179
2. Jerome A. Shaffer. . . . . . 181
3. Joseph Margolis . . . . . . 183
D. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . 189

V. A COMPARISON OF ARISTOTLE AND STRAWSON . . 191

A. Descriptive vs. Revisionary Meta-

physics . . . . . . . . . 192
B. Basic Particulars . . . . . . . 197
C. Persons . . . . . . . . . 203
D. P- and M- Predicates . . . . . . . 211
E. An Objection to Strawson . . . . . 216

 

 

Chapter

F. Do the Objections to Strawson Also Apply

to Aristotle? . . . . 220

G. Summary and Conclusion . . . . . . 223

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . 224
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227

vi

q

INTRODUCTION

There are two primary goals that I intend to achieve
in this dissertation. First, I intend to reconstruct
Aristotle's theory of a human being. (Throughout my dis-
cussion of Aristotle, I will use the terms 'human being'
and 'human person' interchangeably.) Second, I intend to
compare Aristotle's theory of a human being with P. F.
Strawson's theory of a person. While comparing these two
theories, I will examine the points upon which they agree
and disagree, and I will attempt to assess the advantages
and disadvantages of one theory as compared with the other.

Since Aristotle did not devote any single work solely
to a discussion of his views on the nature of a human
being, his views on this subject must be distilled from
his work in a wide variety of areas, including not only
metaphysics and biology, but also logic, ethics, and poli-
tics. Thus, in order to uncover Aristotle's theory of a
human being, I will devote Chapter I to his discussion of

substance and essence in Metaphysics VII. This is neces-

 

sary because a study of the essence of a human being will
tell us what it is to be a human being. Since Aristotle
holds that the essence of a human being is the soul as the

formal aspect of the body, and since it is in beingrational

1

that human beings are different from plants and other ani-
mals, I will devote Chapter II to a study of Aristotle's
discussion of the soul in the De Anima. I will be espec-
ially interested in his discussion of the mind in the De
Aging. In Chapter III, I will examine the theory of the

soul that Aristotle uses in the Nicomachean Ethics. I will

 

argue that the theory of the soul that Aristotle uses in

the Nicomachean Ethics is different from the theory of the

 

soul that he uses in the De Anima. In this chapter, I will
also examine the question whether Aristotle would regard
slaves, women, and children as human beings in his discus-
sion of slaves, women, and children in the Politics.

Having examined some of the most important aspects
of Aristotle's theory of a human being, I will devote
Chapter IV to a critical analysis of P. F. Strawson's theory
of a person. I will study Strawson's theory of a person
as he presents it in Chapter III, titled "Persons," of his

book Individuals. In examining Strawson's theory of a per-

 

son, it will be necessary to consider his doctrine of basic
particulars,and his doctrine of P- and M-predication. This
is neCessary because Strawson regards persons and material
bodies as the only two types of basic particulars, and be-
cause persons are different from material bodies in that
both P- and M-predicates are ascribable to persons.

After reconstructing Aristotle's theory of a human

being and critically examining Strawson's theory of a

’ 1

.I.

Own
5 v'

“I

v‘,

1w

i.
no.

u
."
ho‘

person, I will devote Chapter V to a comparison of these
two theories. Not only will I compare their concepts of
a person, but I will also examine the extent to which
.Aristotle is doing descriptive metaphysics and the extent
to which Aristotle could accept Strawson's concept of a
basic particular.

By reconstructing Aristotle's theory of a human
being, I hope to shed some light on his concept of a human
being in a way that has not been done before. Also, by
critically analyzing Strawson's concept of a person and
comparing Strawson's concept of a person with Aristotle's
concept of a human being, I h0pe to accent some issues that
one should consider when one is proposing a concept of a

person.

CHAPTER I

SUBSTANCE AND ESSENCE

My investigation of Aristotle is ultimately directed
toward the goal of offering an account of the nature of the
human being within the context of his philosophy. Conse-
quently, it will be the purpose of this chapter to examine
the concepts that Aristotle might have usedin.order to an-
swerthe questions "What makes an individual thing to be a
human being?" and "How can we decide when the concept of a
lunmnlbeing applies to a particular individual thing?" Some
contemporary philosophers would attempt to answerthese ques-
tions by trying to find necessary and sufficient conditions
that must hold in order for an individual to be a human be-
ing (in the case of the first question) or in order that we
might properly apply the concept of a human being (in the
case of the second question). However, Aristotle did not
use the term 'necessary and sufficient condition', and it
should not simply be assumed that he would see the task of
answering these questions as one of specifying the neces-
sary and sufficient conditions. My approach here, then,
will be to discuss first those concepts that would seem to

be especially important in an attempt to state the nature

of the human being and the appropriate use of the concept
of a human being from Aristotle's point of view. After
discussing those concepts, I will try to show how Aristotle
would use them to answer the two questions mentioned above.
Consequently, the following discussion will be divided into
four major parts. In the first part I will discuss briefly
Aristotle's concept of substance. This is important be-
cause he regards human beings as being primary substances
(§a£., Chap. 5). The second part will deal with his con-
cept of essence, which is important because Aristotle holds
that what a thing is by its nature is its essence (M33.
1029 b 13-16). And since the essence of a thing is ex-
pressed by its definition (Met. 1030 a 6), the third part
will be concerned with his concept of a definition and with
the method of arriving at a definition of a substance by
means of divisions. Finally, in the fourth part I will
explain how some contemporary philosophers would answer
these two questions by means of necessary and sufficient
conditions; and after showing how Aristotle would answer
these questions, I will discuss the similarities and the
differences between his approach and the contemporary

approach.

A. Aristotle's Concept of Substance

 

In the Categories Aristotle says that "a Substance—-

 

 

that which is called a substance most strictly, primarily,

and most of all--is that which is neither said of a

subject nor in a subject" (2 a 11-13, trans. Ackrill,
Ackrill's emphasis). Now, to say that 1 is "in a subject"

(en hypokeimenEi) means that 3 "cannot exist separately

 

from what it is in" (1 a 22-23, trans. Ackrill). An in-
stance of white is an example of something that is in_a
subject; an individual white cannot exist apart from any
particular object--it is always in some object or other.

Also, to say that K is "said of" X (kath' hypokeimenou

 

legetai) means that K is related to 1 as a genus to one of
its members, so that the genus "human being" is said of an
individual human being (1 b 10-15).1 Consequently, the
existence of an individual substance does not depend on its
being in something else, and it does not bear to anything
the relation that a genus bears to one of its members. In-
stead, he says that "all the other things are either said
of the primary substances as subjects or in them as sub-
jects. So if the primary substances did not exist it would
be impossible for any of the other things to exist" (2 b
4-6, trans. Ackrill).

I have been concerned so far with what Aristotle re-

fers to as primary substances (prEtai ousiai). But he also

 

holds that there are substances that are substances only

in a secondary sense (deuterai ousiai). These are the

 

 

1This is pointed out in Sir David Ross, Aristotle,
5th ed. (London: Methuen 8 Co., 1949), p. 23, and in J. L.
Ackrill, Aristotle's Cate cries and De Interpretatione,
translated with notes (Ox ord: Oxford University Press,
1963), pp. 75-76.

 

 

species and the genera to which the primary substances be-
long (2 a 13-18). To use Aristotle's example, the individ-
ual human being (a primary substance) belongs in the species

"human being" (en eidei hyparchei tEi anthrEpEi), and both

 

the individual human being and the species "human being"
belong to the genus "animal." Thus, in terms of the dis-
cussion above, the secondary substances are said of(1egetai)
the primary substances, and yet, he argues further, they

are not in any subject (3 a 6-21). Furthermore, the impor-
tance of the secondary substance is revealed when Aristotle
says that "only they, of things predicated, reveal the pri-
mary substance" (2 b 30-31, trans. Ackrill). In particular,
he says that if someone were to ask what the primary sub-

stance is, a more intelligible and proper (gnfirismfiteron

 

kai oikeioteron) answer would give the species instead of

 

the genus (2 b 7-10). This is because the species is
"nearer to the primary substance" (trans. Ackrill). A des-
cription of the species to which an individual belongs is

a more complete description and a description that more
effectively distinguishes the kind of individual that is

of interest than a description of the genus is. To des-
cribe an individual in terms of its genus would be to give
a description that would not distinguish the individual
from individuals of other species of the same genus. This
is because the genus consists in individuals that have cer-

tain attributes in common, and these attributes alone are

not sufficient to distinguish individuals of various kinds
into species. For example, describing a particular human
being in terms of the group of attributes that all and only
human beings have in common (i.e., the attributes that
characterize the species "human being") would yield a des-
cription that tells one more precisely what a human being
is than describing a human being in terms of the genus
"animal." The characteristics in virtue of which individ-
uals are animals are too general to distinguish among var—
ious kinds of animals. Of course, to specify that a human
being is an animal does give us some useful information;
it tells us, for example, that a human being is neither a
vegetable nor a mineral, and it tells us that human beings
are similar to other animals in certain respects. This
seems to be Aristotle's position, and it gives us some in-
sight into what he would consider to be an appropriate ac-
count of a human being, viz., an account that is based on
the species.

In Metaphysics VII Aristotle develops his concept of

 

substance more fully. In Chapter 1 he points out that sub-
stance is the primary sense of 'being', and in this sense
substance is what is referred to as "what a thing is" (ti
esti) or a "this" (tode ti) (1028 a 10-15). As in the

Categories, substance is still not said of (legetai) any

 

other subject, while everything else is said of substances

(1029 a 7-8, 1038 b 15). But in Metaphysics VII, 3

 

 

Aristotle considers the possibility that matter is the same
thing as substance, since matter also is that of which
everything else is said, while not itself being said of
anything else (1029 a 7-26). Nevertheless, he rejects
matter as a candidate for substance because of two features
that belong especially to substance but not to matter:

separability (to chariston) and individuality (tode ti)

 

(1029 a 27-29, 1017 b 25). The separability of primary
substances refers to their existing apart from some other
subject; this is to be contrasted with the particulars of
other categories, such as qualities or quantities, whose
existence is dependent on the existence of some subject of
which they are predicated (Phys. 185 a 28-32; M35. 1040 b
22-27, 1069 a 25). Individuality also belongs primarily
to substances (Cat. 3 b 10; M33. 1029 a 27-29, 1030 a 5),
and Aristotle distinguishes the individual from the uni-
versal by pointing out that the universal is predicated of
many subjects despite the fact that the individual is not

predicated of any (De Interp. 17 a 38-40). Hence his re-

 

mark in Metaphysics VII, 13 that a primary substance is a

 

"this," while a universal attribute is a "such" (1038 b
34-1039 a l, 1039 a 15-16).

It is also in Metaphysics VII that Aristotle develops
the relation between the concepts of a thing's substance
and its essence. This is of special importance because my

attempt to determine the characteristic features of a human

10

being is an attempt to discover the essence of a human being.
Furthermore, I think that an inquiry into the nature of a
thing from Aristotle's point of view is best directed at an
inquiry into its essence, because Aristotle holds that the
essence of a thing is precisely what it is to be that thing.
Concerning the relation between the essence and the substance
of a thing, Aristotle says that essence belongs to substance
"especially and primarily and simply" (1031 a 13); and in
addition, for substances, the formula of a thing's essence
is the definition of the thing (1031 a 12-14). In Chapter 6
Aristotle even argues that "each primary and self-subsistent
thing is one and the same as its essence" (1032 a 5-6, trans.
Ross).

Finally, I should point out that Aristotle uses the
word 'substance"(gusia) in several different senses. In

the Categories he uses 'primary substance' (he prote ousia)

 

 

to refer to the individual existing things to which I have
been referring so far. These include individual human

beings, horses, and houses. In Metaphysics VII, however,

 

he uses 'primary substance' often to refer to the form

(eidos) and the essence of each thing (to ti an einai

 

hekastou) (1032 b 1), and the soul (h? psych?) (1037 a S,

 

28-29). He sometimes uses 'primary substance' in Metaphys-
ics VII to refer to the soul alone, in contrast with the

material body and the concrete individual (he synolos

 

'ousia) (1037 a 5-9, ZS-b 2). In this context the concrete

individual consists of a certain soul in a certain body;

11

that is, the concrete individual is the individual thing,
such as Socrates or Callias. But he also uses 'substance'
to refer to the essence of a thing (1017 b 22), the matter
of a thing (he hylE, 1042 a 32), and the form (1041 b 7-8).

Sometimes he says that the substratum (to hypokeimonon)

 

seems to be substance; this can be either the matter, the

shape (h? morphE),2 or that which is (a compound) of matter

 

and shape (to ek toutEn) (1029 a 1-5, 1042 a 26-31; De An.

 

412 a 6-10).

The preceding discussion has been an attempt to give
a brief account of Aristotle's theory of substance in order
to examine its relation to other concepts that will be of
use in determining what it is to be a human being from his
phi1050phica1 point of view. As a result, I have concen-

trated on his discussion of substance in the Categories and

 

in Metaphysics VII. In particular, I have established that

 

his concept of substance involves the views that primary
substance (as distinguished from secondary substance) is
neither lg nor said of any other subject; its characteris-
tic features are individuality and separability; and it is
one and the same as the essence of a thing. Since the es-

sence of an individual primary substance is such an

 

2Instead of shape (hE'morphE), Aristotle also says
"the outward appearance of the form" (to schema tes ideas,
1029 a 4), or the form (to eidos, 1029 a 6, 29; De An.

412 a 8), or the formula (Ho logos, 1042 a 28).

 

 

 

 

 

12

important part of what it is to be that individual, an
examination of Aristotle's concept of essence is invaluable
to our study of his concept of a human being. This will be

the subject of the next part.

B. Aristotle's Concept of Essence

 

l. A Paradox

In Metaphysics VII, 4 Aristotle says that the essence

 

of a thing is what it is said to be kath' hauto or by its

 

very nature (1029 b 13-16). Later, he says that the
essence is what some phis is (1030 a 2). But in Chapter 6,
he proposes the paradoxical view that "each primary and
self-subsistent thing is one and the same as its essence"
(1032 a 5-6, trans. Ross), and in the first few lines of
this chapter he suggests that this is true because "each
thing seems not to be different from its substance and the
essence is said to be the substance of each thing" (1031

a 15-18, trans. Ross). This is paradoxical because, as

3 the statement 'Socrates is a

M. J. Woods has pointed out,
man' becomes an identity statement. It is also paradoxical
because, since 'Callias is a man' is an identity statement
also, it would follow that Socrates and Callias were the

same in some way. Woods reconstructs the steps that could

have led Aristotle to this position as follows (p. 168):

 

3M. J. Woods, "Substance and Essence in Aristotle,"
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 75 (1974-75): 167.

 

13

l. Callias is identical with his essence. Woods points
out that, at Meta h sics 1022 a 24-27, when discussing
the meanings of 'Eath' hauto', Aristotle says that
'kath' hauto' "denotes the essence of each particular;
e.g., Callias is in virtue of himself Callias and the
essence of Callias" (trans. Tredennick).

 

 

2. The essence of Callias is what is expressed by the
definition of Callias. At Metaphysics 1031 a 12
Aristotle says that "definition’is the formula of the
essence" (trans. Ross).

 

3. The only definition of Callias will be the definition
of his species. In support of this, I would point
out that at Metaphysics 1039 b 27-1040 a 7 Aristotle
argues that there can be no definition of sensible
individual substances "because they have matter whose
nature is such that they are capable both of being
and of not being" (trans. Ross).

 

4. The essence of Callias is the essence of the species
"man." At 1030 a 11-13 Aristotle says that "nothing,
then, which is not a species of a genus will have an
essence--on1y species will have it" (trans. Ross;
Ross's emphasis).

Therefore,
5. 'Callias is a man' is an identity statement.

Woods argues later in his article that Aristotle was
motivated to identify an individual thing with its essence
because he recognized that the non-identity of "what a
predicate is said of, and that on the basis of which it is
so said" was partly responsible for the Third Man Argument
against Plato's theory of predication (pp. 169-70). Thus,
it is his attempt to avoid this difficulty that at least
partly explains why Aristotle raises this issue, according
to Woods. Later (pp. 22-24), I will offer an interpretation
of Aristotle's doctrine of an individual essence that will

help resolve this paradox.

14

The remainder of my examination of Aristotle's con-

cept of essence as it is discussed in Metaphysics VII will

 

deal with two major issues: (1) the relation between es-
sence, form, and matter, and (2) the difference between
essence as it belongs to an individual thing and essence

as it belongs to a species.

2. Essence, Form, and Matter

Regarding the first issue, Aristotle maintains that
the essence of a thing is the same as the thing's form,
which in turn is the same as its primary substance. At
1032 b 1-2 he says quite explicitly: "By form I mean the
essence of each thing and its primary substance" (trans.
Ross).4 In the case of a living thing, the soul is its
substance, form, and essence.5 In Chapter 17 Aristotle
explains in what sense the essence, form, and substance are
the same. In this chapter he proposes to consider anew
what substance is. When one asks "What is a man?" or "Why
is a man a man?," one might be understood to be asking "Why
is this material (flesh and bones) a man?" Aristotle says
that in such an inquiry "plainly we are seeking the cause.
And this is the essence (to speak abstractly), which in

some cases is the end . . . and in some cases is the first

 

4He says that the essence is the form or the substance
also at Met. 1017 b 22-23, 1035 b 32, 1037 a 32-1037 b 1.

5Met. 1035 b 14-16, 1037 a 5, 1037 a 27-30.

 

15

mover; for this also is a cause" (1041 a 27-30, trans. Ross).
Further on, Aristotle says:

Since we must have the existence of the thing as some-

thing given, clearly the question is why the matter is

some definite thing; e.g. why are these materials a

house? Because that which was the essence of a house

is present. And why is this individual thing, or this

body having this form, a man? Therefore what we seek

is the cause, i.e. the form, by reason of which the

matter is some definite thing; and this is the substance

of the thing. (1041 b 4-9, trans. Ross; Ross's emphasis)
Not only does this passage show that the essence, form, and
substance of a thing are the same, but it also shows that
it is this particular matter's having the essence or form
that it has that makes the individual thing to be the kind
of thing that it is by "giving" the matter a certain defi-
nite, coherent structure. As Aristotle explains in the re-
mainder of this chapter (1041 b 11-33), it is the cause of
the substance (or the essence) of a collection of elements
that makes the elements, taken together, something more
than just a disorganized heap--it makes them flesh (if they
are fire and earth) or a certain syllable (if they are 3
and h).

Concerning the nature of the cause, in the case of

artifacts (such as a bronze sphere) it is the efficient
cause (the artisan) who imparts a certain form to the mat-

ter. But in human beings and other organisms the soul is

the formal cause, final cause, and efficient cause.6 It

 

6Aristotle says that the soul is the form or formal
cause at Msp. 1035 b 14-16 and De An. II, 1; the final
cause at De Part. An. 645 b 14-19; and all three causes at
De An. 415 bIB-ll.

 

16

is the presence of soul in some flesh that makes a partic-
ular thing to be a human being and to do the kinds of
things that human beings do, probably the most significant

of which is thinking.7 In De Partibus Animalium Aristotle

 

points out that a human being without its soul is not really
a human being at all, but a dead body, a statue, or a sculp-
ture--all of which are "human beings" in name only (640 b
17-641 a 33). In living things, then, it is the soul (which
is the formal, final, and efficient causes) that is essen-
tial to the living thing if it is to exist as a genuine
living thing.

Concerning the relation between the essence and the
matter of a thing, it should be pointed out that it is not
possible for the essence to exist separately from any mat-
ter, just as it is impossible for matter to exist without
possessing some kind of form. As far as what actually ex-
ists is concerned, we will always encounter individuals
that are "enmattered" essences or "informed" matters (with
the exceptions of God and the intelligences that move the
heavenly bodies). (It is possible, however, to discuss
essence and matter in an abstract way as though they were
separable.) In fact, Aristotle points out that the essence
of a human being always appears in a certain kind of matter,

viz., flesh (1036 b 3-6). Nevertheless, he always insists

 

7Ross makes a similar point in Aristotle, p. 173.

 

17

that an account of the essence of a thing does not contain
a reference to its matter, or alternatively, the matter

is not part of the form or formula of a thing (1032 b 14,
1036 a 26-1036 b 6, 1037 a 25-1037 b 5). It is important
to keep this in mind, because when one is attempting to
understand the nature of a thing, one way of doing this is
to find its definition or an account of its essence, and
one should keep in mind that an account of its essence will
not involve its matter. Aristotle points out that this

is not always obvious, because, as I have just mentioned,
the form of a human being is always found in flesh, so one
might be tempted to include flesh in an account of the es-
sence of human beings (1036 a 26-1036 b 6). (I will return
to this issue in the last part of this chapter.) Before
proceeding further, it will be useful to consider briefly
why one can only understand a thing through its essence and

not its matter. Aristotle explains this in Metaphysics VII,

 

15, 1039 b 20-1040 a 7.
First, he assumes that there can be definition (horis-

mos), demonstration (apodeixis), or knowledge (epistemE)

 

only of things that can be neither generated nor destroyed
(1039 b 31-1040 3 5). Next, he states the two kinds of
substances that he is going to consider: the whole together

(to synolon) (i.e., matter and form together--individual

 

sensible substances) and the formula entirely (ho logos
holBS) (1039 b 20-21). (The formula here seems to be the

 

18

essence or the form, since it is "the being" of a thing.)
The formula itself is neither generated nor destroyed, and
hence would be something about which we could have know-

ledge. The manifestation of the formula ip_some matter,

 

however, is something that can be created or destroyed
(1039 b 25). Finally, he says that there can be no defini-
tion or knowledge of sensible substances, because they can
be created and destroyed. The reason for this is that they
have matter (hylé), and it is in virtue of having matter
that sensible substances can exist or not exist (1039 b
27-30). What Aristotle seems to be assuming here (without
stating it explicitly) is that having matter makes sensible
substances capable of being created or destroyed, and hence
undefinable and unknowable, because matter has the poten-
tial for having a certain form at one time and not having
it at another time. The matter itself is never generated
or destroyed, and the form (or formula) itself is never
generated or destroyed. But the sensible substance--pp
synolon--as the manifestation of a certain form in a cer-
tain matter, can come into being or cease to exist, and it
does this because of the matter's potential for coming to
have, and ceasing to have, a certain form. Consequently,
individual sensible substances cannot be defined; only the
essence can be known. As H. W. B. Joseph points out, "we
can only define then what is universal, or a concept.

But . . . concepts are the natures of things; and therefore

19

in defining concepts, we may define things, so far as they
8

 

are of a kind,sbut not as individuals."

 

The preceding explanation of why matter is not a
part of the essence of a thing was primarily concerned with
the epistemic advantage of disregarding a thing's matter
when giving an account of its essential nature. But I
think that reasons can be given from a slightly different
perspective for omitting matter from a description of a
thing's essence.9 An essential attribute of a thing is an
attribute that cannot fail to hold of the thing while the
thing persists as the kind of thing that it is (Post. An.
73 b 16-19). Thus, "having three linear sides" is an es-
sential attribute of triangle, or of‘a triangle, because
without this attribute there would be neither the concept
of the triangle nor a concrete individual triangle. A tri-
angle could not be made out of bronze unless three-sidedness
were imparted to the bronze. "Being made of bronze," how-
ever, is not an essential attribute of triangle, because a
triangle can exist in other kinds of matter. But an even
stronger claim is being made, namely, that "being made of
sgms kind of matter" is not an essential attribute, because

one can describe the nature of a triangle and work with the

 

8H. W. B. Joseph, An Introduction to Logic, 2nd ed.,
revised (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1916):*p. 82.

 

9This account is based on Edwin Hartman's discussion
in his "Aristotle on the Identity of Substance and Essence,"
The PhiloSOphical Review 85 (Oct. 1976): 553-57.

 

 

20

concept of a triangle without mentioning any matter. These
things could not be done if matter were an essential attri-

10 Furthermore, even though the essence

bute of triangle.
of triangle can be "enmattered" in a variety of different
kinds of matter, it may well be that the essence of some
things can only be "enmattered" in certain specific kinds
of matter. Edwin Hartman suggests (pp. 554, 556-57) that
an essence may place some constraints on the kind of matter
in which it can appear. This may be why the essence of a
human being, the soul, always appears in flesh and bones.
Aristotle may argue that animality and rationality are es-
sential attributes of human beings and that these attri-
butes can only be manifested in flesh and bones. The human
body is the kind of substance that is flexible, and yet it
holds its shape; and so human beings are capable of moving,
engaging in social activities, and trying to understand
things by interacting with other things in their environ-
ment. In short, since Aristotle sometimes regards essence
as involving the final cause, as well as the formal cause
(1041 a 28-29, 1044 a 36-b l), he might argue that a human
being could only attempt to realize his or her end if his
or her essence is in flesh and not in something as rigid

as wood, for example. Even a triangle cannot appear in

just any kind of matter; it could only appear in those kinds

 

loaf. Met. VII, 11.

21

of matter that were rigid enough to hold their triangular
shapes. A triangle could not be made of water, for
example.
3. Essence in Individuals vs.
Essence in Species

Having discussed the relation between essence, form,
and matter, I turn now to the second major issue, that of
the difference between essence as it belongs to individual
things and as it belongs to species. Much of Hartman's
discussion in Part III of his paper will be particularly

relevant here. Often in Metaphysics VII Aristotle suggests

 

that individual things have their own individual essences.
For example, in Chapter 6 he says: "Each thing itself,
then, and its essence are one and the same in no merely
accidental way . . . so that even by the exhibition of
instances it becomes clear that both must be one" (1031 b
18-22, trans. Ross), and "clearly, then, each primary and
self-subsistent thing is one and the same as its essence"
(1032 a 5-6, trans. Ross). Later, in Chapter 13, he says
that "the substance of each thing is that which is peculiar
to it, which does not belong to anything else . . . for
things whose substance is one and whose essence is one are
themselves also one" (1038 b 9-15, trans. Ross). Hartman
also points out that Aristotle's doctrine of the soul
"makes it clear that each person has his own soul" (p. 550).

As Hartman says, these cases suggest that Aristotleadmitted

22

individual essences, or essences that are unique to indi-
vidual things. In other places, however, Aristotle suggests
that there are not individual essences. For example, he
says that "nothing, then, which is not a species of a genus
will have an essence--only species will have it" (1030 a
11-13, trans. Ross; Ross's emphasis). One problem with
saying that only a species has an essence is that a species
is a secondary substance, while essence is the same as a
primary substance. So, it is not clear in what sense a
species has an essence. The problem that I will address

is how to explain these apparently different views of
essence.

Hartman says that "to say that your essence is dif-
ferent from mine is not to say that you and I have differ-
ent essential properties . . . that distinguish us each
from all others" (p. 552). And when Aristotle said at
1030 a 11 "that only species of genus have essence, he
means simply that it is the species . . . that determines
what the essence of something is" (p. 552). Furthermore,
Hartman explains that the essences of two individuals are
to be distinguished in the same way that the two individ-
uals are to be distinguished (since each individual is
identical with its essence), and that is in virtue of their
having numerically different portions of matter, which ex-
ist in different places. Hartman refers here to Aristotle's

claim that the individuals Callias and Socrates "are

 

23

different in virtue of their matter (for that is different),
but the same in form; for their form is indivisible" (1034
a 6-8, trans. Ross). This approach helps to resolve the
paradox I discussed earlier (pp. 12-13) of claiming that
Socrates and Callias are the same because they have the
same essence (viz., "man"), and because each individual is
the same as its essence. The paradox can be resolved be-
cause even though Socrates and Callias have the same form
or essence, the form or essence of each is actualized or
"enmattered" in portions of matter that exist in different
places.

I would propose the following explanation ofAJistotle's
position on the relation of the essence to the species and
to the individual. I would say that Aristotle can maintain
that essence belongs to species, on the one hand, when one
considers essence in the sense of an abstraction or a uni-
versal; and on the other hand, essence can be understood
to belong to an individual when it is considered as the
formal cause that is in the individual's matter. To ex-
plain this more clearly, consider first the claim that es-
sence belongs only to species. It should be pointed out
immediately that this cannot be understood as saying that
species have essences in the same sense in which individual
things have essences. For example, it would make sense to
say that the essence of a triangle includes its having

three sides, but it would not be proper to say that the

 

24

essence of the species "triangle" includes the species'
having three sides. If this were true, Aristotle would be
admitting the self-predication assumption that was partly
responsible for causing the Third Man difficulty in Plato's
theory of predication. However, when Aristotle says that
only species have an essence, I think he can be interpreted
as meaning that each member of the species has the same
essential attributes. Since essence is "the what it was

to be" some thing, a statement of "what it was to be an 3"
would be true for all E's. This is just to say that the
definition of §_applies to every N, since the "definition
is the formula of the essence" (1031 a 12, trans. Ross;
also Ipp. 101 b 38). For example, the attribute of having
three linear sides belongs to the essence of a triangle;
this attribute, as well as all of the other attributes

that are essential to a triangle, would truly hold for all
triangles in the species "triangle." If a thing did not
have three sides, it would not be a triangle and it would
not be included in the species "triangle." In short, to
say that only species have an essence is to emphasize that
all of the individuals of a certain kind have the same
essential characteristics, because an account of "what it
was to be" one of those individuals applies to all of those
individuals, and it is in virtue of "what it was to be"
such an individual that the particular individuals are

individuals of the same kind. The differences among the

 

 

25

individuals arise because their essential characteristics
occur in different portions of matter and because the indi-

11 Evidence

viduals have different accidental attributes.
that Aristotle would accept this explanation is provided

in the De Partibus Animalium when he says: "The individ-

 

uals comprised within a species, such as Socrates and
Coriscus, are the real existences; but inasmuch as these
individuals possess one common specific form, it will suf-
fice to state the universal attributes of the species, that
is, the attributes common to all its individuals" (644 a
24-27, trans. Ogle).

Having explained the sense in which a species has an
essence, let us consider the sense in which a living organ-
ism has an essence. In an individual organism the essence
is the form (Eiéfli’ 1032 b 1-2, 1035 b 32). As the formal
cause, the individual's essence consists in the individual's
shape and structure. The form is the essence also in the
sense that it constitutes what it is to be an individual of
such a kind. This is expressed in the definition of a
thing. The manifestation or realization of the essence in
a particular individual is characteristic of individuals of

its kind. In fact, the realization of the essences of

 

11Accidental attributes could be other than they are
for any individual, or they could cease to hold for any
individual without destroying what it is to be that indi-
vidual. (12p. 102 b 4-26)

 

26

various individuals in roughly the same way makes them in-

dividuals of the same kind, i.e., individuals of the same

 

species.

It should be pointed out, further, that even though
the essence of each of the individuals in a species is the
same, this does not mean that all of the individuals in
the Species will be qualitatively identical. The individ-
uals of a species may differ qualitatively because the
matter of an individual may affect the extent to which the
formal and final causes are developed in the individual.
Thus, the matter in which the form exists may prevent the
organism from achieving its end, and hence, the organism

may not develop fully (De Gen. An. 778 a 29-778 b 6).

 

Aristotle points out in Physics II, 8 that accidents occur
in nature when an organism fails to achieve its end of
being completely developed; this is because of the "cor-
ruption of the seed" from which the organism came to be or
because of some impediment to its development (199 a 39-199
b 25). For example, because of a genetic defect-~a defect
in the matter (or, specifically, the seed)--a thing may not
develop in the way in which things of that kind usually
deve10p; or because of some external impediment, such as a
lack of calcium in the food, a thing may not develop nor-
mally, but it could become deformed or its growth could be
retarded. These differences are differences in individuals

of a kind that are failures to develop normally. But there

 

27

may be differences among individuals that do develop nor-
mally, such as differences in eye, skin, or hair color,
for example.

Nevertheless, I think that Aristotle would say that
certain kinds of things can only differ in certain charac-
teristic ways, as well as resemble each other in certain
characteristic ways. Human beings, for example, may have
different eye colors, and their growth may be stunted or
abnormally increased, but humans usually do not develop
gills, sprout wings, grow horns, or crystallize (see 22
Gen. An. 770 b 9-17). I will return to this point in the
last part of this chapter.

I have pointed out that the essence, as the formal
cause of an organism, is manifest in an individual that
has a certain structure and performs certain functions that
are characteristic of individuals of its species. I also
hope to have shown the sense in which the essence belongs
to species and the sense in which it belongs to individ-
uals. These are not two completely different aspects of
essence, but closely related ones.

Throughout the preceding discussion, I have mentioned
that the definition of a thing is a formula of its essence
(1031 a 12). Since my goal is to determine the essence of
a human being, it will be especially useful to examine the
procedures that Aristotle outlines for arriving at a defi-
nition of a thing. This will be the subject of the next

part.

 

28

C. Definition

 

Before discussing one of the methods that Aristotle
proposes for arriving at definitions, it should be pointed
out that it is important to examine his theory of defini-
tion when one is trying to determine what his concept of a
human being, or anything else, is. This is because the
definition of something can tell us what it is to be the
kind of thing that is being defined.12 The definition tells
us this because it states the essence of the definiendum.13
Thus, Aristotle's view of what a definition is and how to
arrive at one should be of considerable help in an attempt
to determine what it is to be a human being in Aristotle's
view. The following discussion will involve first a brief
account of what a definition is for Aristotle, and then an

account of the method of arriving at a definition by

divisions.

1. What a Definition Is
A definition is a statement of the genus and the dif-
ferentiae of the definiendum (Igp. 103 b 16, 139 a 28, 153
b 14; Map. 1037 b 29). Aristotle says in the Topics that

"genus is that which is predicated in the [category of]

 

12Post. An. 93 b 29: horismos legetai einai logos
tou ti est1.

 

 

_ 13post. An. 91 a 1, 90 b 30: ho horismos ti esti
deloi._ Esp. 101_b 38; 154 a 31: esti d' horos men logos ho
to t1 en e1nai Semainon. Met. 1030 316: to ti 5n einai
estin hosonTho logos estin—HErismos.

 

 

 

 

 

 

29

essence [ti esti] of more and different things" (102 a 31).
Thus, a genus consists in individuals that are the same in
kind. For example, if we were to define a human being as
"an organism that has the capacity to reason," the genus
to which humans belong is the genus "organism."

H. W. B. Joseph defines the differentia (he diaphora)

 

as "that part of the essence of anything--or, as we may
say, of any species--which distinguishes it from other

14 For example, in our hypo-

species in the same genus."
thetical definition of a human being, "having the capacity
to reason" would be the differentia. This differentia dis-
tinguishes the species of human beings from all other
species in the genus "organism," because human beings have
this capacity, while the individuals of other species do
not have it. Another feature of differentiae is that they
belong to a subject necessarily, in the sense that "it is
impossible [for them] to belong to something and not to be-

long [to it)" (T p. 144 a 26). Thus, differentiae are not

accidental attributes (symbebEkos 102 b 4-5).

 

In An Introduction to Logic H. W. B. Joseph explains

 

that genus and differentiae together form a single concept
and constitute the essence of a thing (p. 82). They pro-
vide this unity, according to Joseph, because the genus is

"the general type or plan" and the differentia is "the

 

14Joseph, p. 74. The following discussion owes much

to pp. 82-88.

 

30

'specific' mode in which that [plan] is realized or devel-
Oped" (p. 83). He says that the differentia "carries out
as it were and completes the genus" (p. 86). Aristotle
indeed suggests at Map. 1038 a 5-7 that the genus does not
exist apart from the species and that the differentiae
stand to the genus as form to matter. He also says that
"the differentiae mags the species . . . out of it [the

genus]" (1038 a 7: hai diaphorai ta eidE . . . ek tautES

 

 

poiousin; my emphasis). Consequently, the picture that we
get of the relation between genus and differentia is that
together they form the species to which an individual be-

15 The genus "animal" is in one

longs and the essence.
sense the same for human beings and for other kinds of ani-

mals. But it is different in the case of any single kind

 

of animal (such as a human being), because it is "articu-
lated" in a unique way through the differentiae (such as
having a rational capacity) of that kind of animal. Con-
sequently, not only do the genus and differentiae form a

conceptual unity (as Joseph points out, pp. 82-83), which

 

is captured in a definition or a statement of a thing's
essence, but also, I would point out, they form an actual
unity in a particular individual, thus making the individ-

ual to be the kind of individual that it is.

 

ISJoseph, p. 74.

 

31

2. How to Arrive at a Definition
Aristotle explains the method of arriving at a defi-

nition by divisions in Posterior Analytics II, 13 and

 

Metaphysics VII, 12; I will consider each of these passages

 

in turn. In Posterior Analytics II, 13 he proposes to con-

 

sider "how to hunt for what is predicated in what a thing

is" (96 a 23: ta en tEi ti esti katEgoroumena). Before

 

explaining this method, he explains what we are looking
for. First, we are looking for attributes "which always

belong to each [subject]" (96 a 24: tBn hyparchontBn aei

 

hekastEi). Regarding these attributes, Aristotle says:
"One must take such things [attributes] up to the point
where, while so many are taken in the first place each of
which will belong to more [things], on the one hand, but
on the other hand, all [of them] together will not belong
to more [things]; for it is necessary that this be the
substance [ousian] of the thing" (96 a 31-34). That is,
we are looking for attributes, each of which belongs to
more than the subject being defined, but which, taken to-
gether, do not belong to more subjects than the one being
defined. Aristotle illustrates this with the example of
the triad, whose essential attributes are that it is a
number, odd, and prime in the sense of "not being measured
by number and not being composed of numbers." Taken sep-
arately, each of these attributes belongs to other numbers,

but all of them together belong only to a triad. Also,

 

32

together they constitute what it is to be a triad, and a
statement of them is the definition of a triad (96 a 36-b
14).

Having explained the character of the attributes
that are predicated in what a thing is, Aristotle turns to
the method of arriving at a definition by divisions accord-

ing to differentiae (96 b 25: hai diareseis hai kata tas

 

diaphoras). He first alludes to an earlier discussion
(Post. An. II, 5) in which he has argued that the defini-
tion that one arrives at through divisions is not an in-

ference (syllogismos) and hence does not prove anything

 

(96 b 25-26). Nevertheless, this method does insure that
the parts of the definition are stated in the right order
(96 b 31-35) and that nothing is omitted from the defini-
tion (96 b 36-97 a 5).

The rules that are to be followed are: (1) "to take

what is predicated in what the thing is" (en tEi ti esti),

 

(2) "to arrange these [predicates according to] what is
first or second," and (3) "[to be sure] that these are all
that there are" (97 a 22-25). The second rule is to be
followed by being sure that that which is ordered first

is that which follows all (hopESin akoluthei), but which

 

is not followed by all (97 a 28-33). The third rule is to

be followed by assuming

. of the first term in the division that every
animal is either this or this, and that this belongs
to it, and again [you take] the difference of this
whole, and [you assume] that there is no further

 

33

difference of the final whole--or that straightway

after the final difference this no longer differs in16

sort from the complex. (97 a 3S-b 1, trans. Barnes)

He then proposes a way of arriving at a definition

by means of successive generalizations (97 b 6-25). He
does not say whether this is part of what is involved in
defining by divisions or whether this is a different method
of arriving at a definition. Ross's view is that "in this
chapter Aristotle describes well, though his meaning is not
always easy to catch, the process of combined division and
generalisation which actually is the true method of attain-

17 The procedure is,

ing correct non-causal definitions."
first, to look at things that are "similar and undifferen-
tiated" (ta homoia kai adiaphora), and consider what they
have in common. Second, the same thing is done with other
species in the same genus. Finally, having considered

what is common to each species individually, we then con-
sider whether there is anything that is common to all of

the species. When we arrive at a single expression (lpgps),
"this will be the definition of the thing" (97 b 14).
Aristotle points out that if we arrive at more than one
expression, then more than one thing is being defined (97

b 14-25).

16Aristotle discusses in more detail the method of
arriving at a definition by divisions in Met. VII, 12. I
lVlll examine his discussion in Met. VII, 12 shortly.

17Ross, p. 53.

 

 

34

Aristotle says that "every definition is always of
the universal" (Post. An. 97 b 26; Met. 1036 a 28). Joseph
explains that

We can only define then what is universal, or a
concept. But we have already said that concepts are
the natures of things; and therefore in defining con-
cepts, we may define things, so far as they are of a
kind, but not as individuals.”(p. 82, Joseph's empha-
sis)

 

 

This is because a definition is a statement of the genus
and differentiae (i.e., the species--Ipp, 143 b 8-10),
which are not peculiar to only one individual, but common
to many individuals. And it is in virtue of having the
characteristics of the genus and differentiae in common
that we say that these individuals are of the same kind.

In Metaphysics VII, 12 Aristotle is more specific

 

about how the method of arriving at a definition by divi-
sions according to the differentiae is to work. He says
that we are to begin with what is called the first genus
(to prEton legomenon genos, 1037 b 30) and divide it into

a subgenus according to the differentia. The subgenus,
then, is divided according to the differentia of the dif-
ferentia, and so on. For example, the genus "animal" may
be divided into a subgenus by the differentia "having feet."
Next, the genus "animal having feet" must be divided into

a subgenus with respect to the differentia "having feet,"
such as "cloven-footed." Aristotle says that this division
is to be continued until one arrives at a species that con-

tains no further differences (1038 a 15: ta adiaphora).

 

 

35

At this point, "the last differentia will be the substance
of the thing and the definition" (1038 a 19; also 1038 a
26, 29-30).

»Joseph points out (p. 131) the possibility that a
certain genus might be divided by a differentia that is not
a further specification of the differentia that was used
just before. The genus "animal," for example, may be di-
vided into the species "human being" by the differentiae
"featherless" and "rational." In such cases, the species
is constituted by more than one differentia. Aristotle
says that dividing by a differentia that is app a differen-
tia of the preceding differentia is dividing kata to sym-

bebEkos, rather than kata ta orthon (Met. 1038 a 27-30).

 

Nevertheless, Joseph says that

The fullness and complexity of natural kinds constantly
leads to the introduction of fundamentally new dif-
ferentiae, especially where, as in the classificatory
sciences often happens, our differentiae are intended
as much to be diagnostic--i.e. features by which a
species can be identified--as to declare the essential
nature of a species. (p. 131)

 

Aristotle does not give a final definition of a human

being. In Metaphysics VII, 12 he suggests that a human be-

 

ing is to be defined as an animal having two feet, but in
the Topics he says that a human being is "by nature a civ-I
ilized animal" (19p. 128 b 17: to 230n hEmeron physei).

In other places he says that human beings have the proper-
ties of being "an animal receptive of knowledge" (Tpp. 132

a 20: szn epistgmgs dektikon), a political animal (Pol.

 

36

1253 a 2), and naturally imitative (Poet. 1448 b 8). Not
all of these properties belong to the essence; being "an
animal receptive of knowledge," for example, is not part
of the essence (and hence not part of the definition) of
a human being; it is a property (idion) that "at the same
time always belongs of necessity" to the human being (Top.
133 a 22: hama ex ananngs aei hyparchei kai to antheros).
It is difficult to decide what belongs to the essence
of a human being, or any other organism, and what does not.
Joseph addresses this problem, pointing out that "the prob-
lem of distinguishing between essence and property in re-
gard to organic kinds may be declared insoluble" (p. 102).
He explains that it is not possible to isolate a certain
core of characteristics that are the essential character-
istics of the individuals of a certain natural kind (p. 102).
The reason why this is the case, he explains, is:
The conformity of an individual to the type of a par-
ticular species depends on the fulfillment of an in-
f1n1ty of conditions, and implies the exhibition of an
1nf1n1ty of correlated peculiarities, structural and
funct1onal, many of which, so far as we can see . . .
have no connexion one with another. There may be devi-
atlon from the type, to a greater or less degree, in
endless d1rections; and we cannot fix by any hard-and-
fast rule the amount of deviation consistent with be-
1ng of the species, nor can we enumerate all the points,
of funct1on or structure, that in reality enter into
the determ1nation of a thing's kind. (p. 103)
The consequence of this for the definition of a human being

is that "the essence cannot be comprised in the compass of

a definition, or distinguished very sharply from the

 

37

properties of the subject. In these cases one must be
content to do the best he can" (p. 111).

Even though we may not be able to express exactly
and completely the essence of a human being in a defini-
tion, it is possible to identify at least some of the
characteristics that are part of what it is to be a human
being. I will attempt to do this in the next part.

D. The Nature and Concept
of a Human Beihg

 

 

In order to specify the nature of a thing (in the
sense of stating what it is to be that thing) and to state
the means of deciding whether a particular individual is
of a certain kind, a contemporary philosopher may try to
formulate necessary and sufficient conditions as criteria
for deciding which individuals belong to a certain kind
and which do not. In this part I would like to compare
Aristotle's approach with the approach of those who appeal
to necessary and sufficient conditions as means of answer-
ing the questions "What makes this individual thing to be
what it is?" and "How can we decide whether this individ-
ual thing belongs to this class or not?" Note that the
first question is a question about the nature of the indi-
vidual thing; answering it would involve stating only
those factors that are responsible for making it the glad
of thing it is, and it would not involve stating what makes

it to be this particular individual, which is different

i

 

 

38

from other individuals of the same kind. The second ques-

tion, however, is concerned with our knowledge about the

 

individual thing in question; answering it would involve
stating how we know that the individual thing is of a cer-
tain kind or deciding whether a certain concept applies to

a certain individual thing.

1. Necessary and Sufficient Conditions

Consider first the views of some contemporary philos-
Ophers on necessary and sufficient conditions. Brian
Skyrms says that A'is a necessary condition for B if, and
only if, whenever A is present, A is present. And A is a
sufficient condition for B if, and only if, whenever Apis
present, then B.is present.18 Similarly, Richard Taylor
says that A is a necessary condition ("essential") for B
if B cannot occur without A (although he points out that
it is logically possible for B to occur without A). And A
is a sufficient condition for ("ensures") B'if A cannot
exist without A existing also (and he points out again that
it is logically possible for A to occur without B).19 For
example, the presence of oxygen is a necessary condition

for combustion, because combustion cannot occur without

 

IgBrian Skyrms, Choice and Chance: An Introduction

to Inductive Lo ic, 2nd ed. (Encino, Calif.: DiCkenson
PuEI1sH1ng Co., I975), p. 85.

19Richard Taylor, Metaphysics (Englewood Cliffs,

 

IV.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 58.

 

39

oxygen; but oxygen is not a sufficient condition for com-
bustion, because oxygen can exist without combustion occur-
ring. To take another case, ingesting cyanide is a suf-
ficient condition for death, because ingesting cyanide
cannot exist without death occurring; but ingesting cyanide
is not a necessary condition for death, since death can
occur without ingesting cyanide. Consequently, if A, B,
and Q are singly necessary and jointly sufficient conditions
for D; then A, B, and g must all be present in order for D
to occur; and if A, B, and 9 do exist, then D must occur.
Necessary conditions and sufficient conditions are
often introduced in discussions of causation, where the
word 'cause' can be taken to refer to either the necessary
conditions, or the sufficient conditions, or both, of a

20 Taylor points out that, for most contem-

certain effect.
porary philosophers, to say that certain causal conditions

are necessary for the occurrence of an effect is not to say

 

that they are logically necessary for the effect, but that

if any of the conditions had not occurred, the effect would

not have occurred.21

 

20See Irving Copi, Introduction to Logic, 4th ed.
(New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1972), pp. 369-376;
Skyrms, pp. 85-88; and Richard Taylor, "Causation," in The
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 2, ed. Paul Edwards (NEW—
York: Macmillan PUblishifig Co., 1967), pp. 62-63.

 

21Taylor, "Causation," p. 62.

40

Consequently, I would say that an answer to the ques-
tion "What makes A to be what it is?" could be given by
stating the causally necessary and sufficient conditions
for A, that is, by stating the circumstances that must ex-
ist in order for A to exist and which are such that if they
exist, then A must exist. This, then, could be seen as a
way of stating the cause of A.

The question "How can one decide whether this indi-
vidual belongs to this kind?" or "How does one know whether
a certain individual is an A?" are different from the
question "What makes A to be what it is?" These first two
questions are not concerned with specifying the conditions
under which we can say that A exists, but instead they are
concerned with specifying the conditions under which we can
know that A is a certain kind of thing, or, one might say,
with specifying the conditions in which we can correctly
apply the concept of A.

This has been only a brief account of some contem-
porary views on necessary and sufficient conditions, but
it will serve to enable us to compare these views with
Aristotle's position on how one should answer the questions
"What makes an individual thing to be what it is?" and "How
can one decide whether a certain individual thing is an
individual of a certain kind?" In what follows, I will be
primarily concerned with these questions as they apply to

human beings in particular.

41

2. What is a Human Being?
(a) Necessity

In Metaphysics V, 5 Aristotle defines five senses of

 

the word 'necessity' (anangkaion). First, necessity is

 

that "without which, as a joint condition, it is impossible
to live" (1015 a 20-22). Second, necessity is that "with-
out which it is impossible for good either to be or to come
to be" (1015 a 22-26). Third, it is "the compulsory and

compulsion" (1015 a 26-33: to biaion kai h? bia). Fourth,

 

"that which it is impossible to be otherwise we say it is
necessary to be so" (1015 a 34-h 5). Aristotle explains
that "it is in relation to this sense of 'necessity' that
all of the other senses of 'necessity' are said in some
way" (1015 a 35). Finally, "demonstration is of things

that are necessary [hE apodeixis tan anangkaiBn], because

 

it is impossible to be otherwise, if [a thing] has been

proven absolutely [ei apodedeiktai haplESJ" (1015 b 6-8).

 

In De Partibus Animalium I, l and Physics 11, 9

 

Aristotle discusses the concept of hypothetical necessity

(ex hypotheseES), which will be especially useful to our

 

investigation of his views on the nature of a human being.
Hypothetical necessity is such that A: a certain object is
to be produced or a certain end is to be brought about,

phsp it is necessary that certain materials exist and cer-

tain motions occur in a certain order (De Part. An. 639 b

 

24-39; 642 a 1-13). For example, if a house is to be

 

42

produced, then it is necessary that bricks and wood exist
first, and then that the bricks and wood be put together

in certain ways by someone. Aristotle says that this same
kind of necessity holds for natural phenomena as it holds
for artifacts. In Physics 11, 9 he says that the thing
that is produced is not simply the outcome of a series of
natural events which just accidentally produced it. I also
wish to point out that the object which is produced is not

the necessary outcome of the matter qua matter. Aristotle's

 

view of hypothetical necessity is just that if a wall, for
example, is to exist, then there must be some matter of the
appropriate kind (i.e., the kind of material from which a
wall can be built) available to the builder. There is

nothing in the nature of the matter itself that makes it

 

necessary that a wall will exist--i.e., the stones may

22

never be used to build a wall. (Aristotle makes this

point at 200 a 25-27.) About a wall, Aristotle says:

Whereas, though the wall does not come to be without
these [i.e., the stones, earth, and wood of wfilch 1t
is made], it is not gas to these, except as its mate-
rial cause: it comes to be for the sake of sheltering
and guarding certain things. Similarly in all other
things which involve production for an end; the product
cannot come to be without things which have a neces-
sary nature, but it is not due to these (except as its
material); it comes to be for an end. (Ph 5. 200 a
S-10, trans. Hardie and Gaye; Hardie and aye's
emphasis)

 

22D. M. Balme discusses the distinction between ab-
solute necessity and hypothetical necessity in Aristotle's
work. See D. M. Balme, Aristotle's De Partibus Animalium
I and De Generatione Animalium I, translated with notes
(Oxford: Oxfbrd University Press, 1972), pp. 76-84.

 

 

43

It is clear from Aristotle's discussion in Physics
11, 9 that certain materials are necessary only with res-
pect to a purpose: "The necessary, then, is present only
on the basis of some assumption, it is not there as an end"
(200 a 14, trans. J. L. Creed). And there is further evi-

dence in De Partibus Animalium I, 1 that Aristotle was not

 

satisfied with a purely mechanistic explanation of how a
thing came into existence, whether that thing be a living
organism or an object made by an artisan (641 a 5-18).

More than just a mechanistic explanation of hpw a thing was
created, Aristotle asks for an explanation of why it was
created. Thus, a complete account of an object's origin
must include an account of its purpose.

It is also clear from his discussion in Physics II, 9
that his concept of hypothetical necessity is similar to
the contemporary philosopher's concept of a necessary con-
dition. The similarity is that, for Aristotle, an object
such as a house could not exist without the bricks and wood
that make up its matter (ghy_. 200 a 25-29); the existence
of some matter is a necessary condition for the existence
of the house. Furthermore, Aristotle's discussion in this
chapter suggests that the matter of a thing, while being
the necessary condition for its existence, is not a suf-
ficient condition for its existence. This is suggested
when Aristotle says, with respect to the example of the

wall mentioned earlier, "although the wall has not come

 

44

into being without these [i.e., the stones, earth, and

wood], it has not come into being because of them [dia

 

pappa]" (200 a 6, trans. Creed; my emphasis). He could be
interpreted as saying here that it is not the case that
whenever the appropriate matter is present, a wall is al-
ways present.23 This is to deny that the appropriate ma-
terial is a sufficient condition for the existence of a
house, since one contemporary definition of 'sufficient
condition' is that A is a sufficient condition for E if,
and only if, whenever A is present, g is present also.24
It should also be pointed out that Aristotle does not claim
that matter of a certain kind is necessary for the produc-
tion of a house (although, of course, only certain kinds

of matter will serve the purpose--houses cannot be made of

water, for example); I take him only to be claiming that

some kind of matter is necessary.

 

In Spite of the similarity between Aristotle's con-
cept of hypothetical necessity and the contemporary con-
cept of a necessary condition, Aristotle's concept differs
from the contemporary concept in the importance of the fi-
nal cause--the purpose for which the material is to be used.

For Aristotle the matter is necessary on the basis of a

 

23I made this point in a slightly different way at
the beginning of my discussion of Physics II, 9 on p. 42.

24Skyrms, p. 85.

 

45

certain assumption or hypothesis about the end that is to
be achieved (200 a 12-14). This purposive aspect is not
emphasized in contemporary accounts of necessary conditions.
However, I do not think that contemporary accounts of neces-
sary conditions preclude a mention of purposes. One could
say that the presence of oxygen, combustible material, and
the appropriate heat are necessary in order to burn some-
thing.

Even though the preceding discussion has dealt pri-
marily with objects that are made by human beings, such as
walls and houses, these remarks apply equally well to nat-

ural phenomena. In De Partibus Animalium Aristotle says

 

that because of what it is to be a human being, the human
body has certain parts and the body develops in a certain
way. Consequently, certain parts of the body and a cer-
tain pattern of development are necessary in order for
there to be a human being (640 a 33-b 4). Further, I
think that one can reasonably maintain that Aristotle re-
garded an ensouled body (or an embodied soul) as being
necessary in order for a human being to exist. Having an
ensouled body would be necessary in Aristotle's sense of
hypothetical necessity, since if there is to be a normal,
functioning human being, there must exist an ensouled
body. In addition, having an ensouled body would be a
necessary condition in the contemporary sense of that term,

since a human being cannot exist if either the soul or the

 

46

body is lacking. That Aristotle would regard the soul as
necessary for a human being to exist is evident in his dis-

cussion in De Partibus Animalium I, l, where he says that

 

a dead body has exactly the same configuration as a
living one; but for all that is not a man. So also no
hand of bronze or wood or constituted in any but the
appropriate way can possibly be a hand in more than
name. For . . . in spite of its name it will be unable
to do the office which that name implies. (640 b 35-
641 a 3, trans. Ogle)
This passage suggests that a human body or something look-
ing very much like a human body cannot be said to be a hu-
man being (except in name only), because it is unable to
function in the way that a human being normally functions.
The body must have a soul in order to do this. A few lines
later, he says, "as would seem to be the case, seeing at
any rate that when the soul departs, what is left is no
longer a living animal, and that none of the parts remain
what they were before, excepting in mere configuration,
like the animals that in the fable are turned into stone"
(641 a 19-21, trans. Ogle). This suggests that the soul
is necessary in order for a living thing to exist.

When Aristotle discusses hypothetical necessity in

both Physics and De Partibus Animalium, he concentrates on

 

the hypothetical necessity of certain kinds of matter for
bringing about the end of a certain artifact--a house, a
wall, or a saw. Nevertheless, he does say that "it is the

same with things that come to be naturally" (De Part. An.

 

639 b 30, trans. Balme), which suggests that his remarks

 

 

47

about hypothetical necessity apply to organisms also. In
addition, his general statement of what (hypothetical)
necessity is seems applicable to organisms: "Necessity
signifies sometimes that if there is to be phap for the
sake of which, phsss must necessarily be present" (642 a
32-33, trans. Balme; Balme's emphasis). In my preceding
discussion I have urged that an ensouled body is hypotheti-
cally necessary, because if there is to be a functioning
human being (an end), then the soul must necessarily be
present. But it should be kept in mind that the soul is
2212 than hypothetically necessary in order for a human be-
ing to exist. In the course of distinguishing between A's

not coming into being without B and A's coming into being

 

because of (dia) A, Aristotle says:

 

Similarly with all other things in which purpose is
present, they do not come into being without the things
that possess the necessary nature, but they do not come
into being because of them, except insofar as these
things are matter; they, rather, come into being for '
a purpose. (200 a 7-10, trans. J. L. Creed)

It seems that it is because of the soul that a human being,
25

 

or any other organism, exists. An organism exists because
3: the soul in the sense that the soul enables the organism
to perform its function. One way in which the soul does
this is by directing the development of the organism; that

is, by articulating the matter--giving it a certain form--

in such a way that the organism will develop into a

 

25The importance of the "because of" role of the soul
was suggested to me by Professor Rhoda H. Kotzin.

 

48

normally developed, normally functioning organism. It is

in this sense that the organism comes to be because of its

 

soul. Therefore, the soul is not merely hypothetically
necessary.

There is evidence in Aristotle's work to support this
interpretation. First, in Physics II, 9, as I have already
pointed out, he says that things in which there is a pur-

pose (to heneka) could not have come into being without

 

matter (hylE), but they came into being for a purpose (200
a 7-10). He also points out two further aspects of this
purpose: first, he says that "necessity is in the matter,
and that for the sake of which is in the formula" (200 a

15: enygar tEi hylEi to anangkaion, to d' hou heneka en

 

t6i logai); second, he says that "purpose is the cause of

the matter" (200 a 32: aition gar touto [hE heneka] tas

 

 

hylEs). What he says about the soul in other works sug-
gests that both of these aspects of the purpose are also

aspects of the soul. In Metaphysics VII, 10 he says that

 

"the soul of animals (for this is the substance of the liv-
ing thing) is the substance according to the formula and
the form and the essence of a body of such a kind" (1035 b
14-17).

Finally, in De Partibus Animalium I, l Aristotle

 

says that

nature as being . . . is also nature as moving cause
and as end. And such, in the animal, is either its
whole soul or some part of it. So in this way the

49

student of nature will actually have to speak more a-
bout the soul than about the matter, in proportion as
it is more due to soul that the matter is nature than
the other way round. (641 a 28-32, trans. Balme)
This passage suggests that the soul is the end (to telos)
in an animal, and that the soul, rather than the matter,
is primarily responsible for determining the nature of an
organism. With respect to the last sentence, Balme remarks
that "matter enables soul to exist, but does not determine
the animal's nature except accidentally. The matter can
be said to ha the animal only in the sense that it becomes
it when organized by soul."26
Consequently, I believe that it is an accurate inter-
pretation of Aristotle's position to say that an ensouled

body is hypothetically necessary for the existence of an

organism, and that it is also because of the soul that an

 

organism exists and functions as it does.
I would maintain that it is consistent with Aristotle's
position to say that the body is necessary for the existence

of a living thing, because the soul must exist in a body in

 

order for the body to develop in such a way that the living
thing will be able to perform its proper functions (among
which are nutrition, motion, and sensation in animals and
human beings, for example). Evidence that the body is
necessary can be found in Aristotle's discussion of hypo-

thetical necessity with respect to a saw in Physics II, 9.

 

269. M. Balme, pp. 90-91.

 

50

In this chapter he says that a saw cannot fulfill its pur-
pose unless it is made of iron, "for the necessity is in
the matter" (200 a 11-15). His discussion in this passage
also suggests, as I mentioned earlier, that the end or
purpose of the saw could not be realized unless some matter
of the appropriate kind (in this case, iron) were present
(see also 200 a 19-29). The same would apply to living
things, because Aristotle says that the soul qua final

cause constitutes the nature of an animal (De Part. An.

 

641 a 25-28), and this final cause could not be realized
unless it existed in the appropriate kind of matter.

So far, I have suggested, in part at least, how
Aristotle might attempt to answer the question "What makes
a thing to be what it is?" in terms of what is (hypotheti-
cally) necessary for the existence of a thing. I wish to
point out further that not just apy soul in ahy body will
result in a human being. I discussed this issue earlier,
when I pointed out that the soul of a human being could
enable a human being to perform its function only if the
soul existed in flesh, because only flesh has the kinds of
properties that make it possible for a living human being
to exist (p. 20). This issue has also been implicit in the
immediately preceding discussion. Consequently, I would
say that not only is an ensouled body necessary for the
existence of a living thing, but I would also say that a

certain kind of soul in a certain kind of body is necessary

 

51

for the existence of a certain kind of living thing.
Aristotle could say that a certain kind of soul is neces-
sary for the existence of a certain kind of thing because
the soul is the essence or the nature of what it is to be
that kind of thing (Ds_Ap. 412 b 10-15). And what it is
to be a human being would be significantly different from
what it is to be some other kind of living thing. The
souls of plants, for example, must have a nutritive facul-
ty; animals must have souls with nutritive and sensitive
faculties; and human beings must have souls with nutritive,
sensitive, and rational faculties (Qg_Ap. II, 3). Further-
more, Aristotle could say that a certain kind of body is
necessary for the existence of a certain kind of thing,
because each thing has an end, and it may be that its soul
can only enable the thing to achieve its end if the soul
exists in matter that has the appropriate properties. This
is suggested in the Physics by Aristotle's discussion of
the saw, which must be made of iron if its end (cutting)
is to be achieved (200 a 11-13). And in De Partibus Ani-
malium he says quite clearly that "just in the same way [as
the axe], I say, the body, if it is to do its work, must of
necessity be of such and such a character, and made of
such and such materials" (642 a 10-14, trans. Ogle).

I would summarize the results of my discussion of
necessity as follows. First, Aristotle's concept of hypo-

thetical necessity is such that a certain thing isnecessary

 

52

A: a certain end or purpose is to be achieved. In his ex-

planation of this in the Physics and De Partibus Animalium,

 

Aristotle uses examples in which certain kinds of matter
must be present A: there is to be a house, a wall, or a

saw. In the case of living things I think that Aristotle
would say that the body is the matter that must be present
(i.e., it is hypothetically necessary) A; a certain organism
is to exist. In this case the living, functioning organ-
ism is the end or purpose for which a certain kind of mat-
ter is necessary. For example, in Physics 11, 9, after
discussing the hypothetical necessity of certain matter

for artifacts, he says, "it is clear, then, that necessity

in natural things [en tois physikois] is that which is said

 

as matter and the motions of this" (200 a 31-32). And since
the final cause of an organism is the soul, then the exis-
tence of the body would be (hypothetically) necessary if

the soul is to exist. That this is Aristotle's view is

evident in De Partibus Animalium I, 5, when he says:

 

Since every instrument is for the sake of something,
and each bodily part is for the sake of something, and
what they are for the sake of is an activity, it is
plain that the body too as a whole is composed for the
sake of a full activity. For sawing has not come to be
for the sake of the saw, but the saw for the sawing;
for sawing is a kind of using. Consequently, the body
too is in a way for the sake of the soul, and the parts
are for the sake of the functions in relation to which
each has naturally grown. (645 b 14-20, trans. Balme)

Nevertheless, I would maintain that the soul, as the for-

mal cause, is also hypothetically necessary in the sense

 

53

that it must exist (in some matter, of course) if a living,
functioning organism is to exist. Hence, an ensouled body
must exist if an organism is to exist.

The second point that I have made is that even though
the soul is hypothetically necessary for the existence of
an organism, its role is still Apps than this. It is

because of the soul that an organism lives, develops, and

 

functions as it is supposed to.

The third, and final, point is that an ensouled body
seems to be a necessary condition for the existence of the
organism in the contemporary sense of "necessary condition."
Thus, whenever a living thing is present, the ensouled
body is present. Nevertheless, I have pointed out that the
contemporary concept of a necessary condition does not
capture all that is involved either in the hypothetical
necessity of the matter's presence in order that an end

can be achieved, or in the "because of" role of the soul.27

 

On the one hand, necessary conditions do not necessarily
involve a consideration of an end to be achieved; and on
the other hand, saying that the soul is a necessary con-
dition for the existence of an organism does not bring out
the role of the soul in making the organism a living, func-
tioning organism. That is, it does not take into account

the soul in its role as the final cause. But when Aristotle

 

27This point was suggested to me by Professor Kotzin.

 

54

talks of necessity in the sense of that "without which it

is impossible to live," he seems to have at least some-
thing like the contemporary sense of "necessary condition"
in mind. Having compared Aristotle's concepts of neces-
sity with the contemporary concept of a necessary condition,

let us turn to the concept of a sufficient condition.

(b) Sufficiency

In order to show that Aristotle recognized that there
were certain sufficient conditions that were satisfied when-
ever an animal existed, it would be required to show that
Aristotle recognized a set of conditions such that when-
ever those conditions were present, then an animal was
present (according to the contemporary concept of a suf-
ficient condition). However, in spite of the abundance
of information that Aristotle has given us on necessity,
there is very little clear information on what we would call
"sufficient conditions." Nevertheless, I think it is pos-
sible to say that what we might call the sufficient con-
dition for the existence of an animal is the ensouled body.
It must be kept in mind that this is imposing contemporary
terminology and concepts onto Aristotle's philosophy, and
one should be extremely wary of doing this, because one
runs the serious risk of misinterpreting him. Consequently,
I shall try not to assume too much about what Aristotle has
or has not said when I discuss sufficient conditions in the
context of his theory of cause and his views on the nature

of living things.

 

55

If the existence of an ensouled body is a sufficient
condition for the existence of a living thing, then when-
ever a certain soul exists in a certain body, a certain
living thing would exist. Now, if it is not the case that
an ensouled body is a sufficient condition for the exis-
tence of a living thing, then an appropriate counterexample
must be a case in which a soul exists in a body, but we
would not say that a living thing exists. However, there
seem to be no such counterexamples, because whenever some-
thing is an ensouled body, then it is a living thing. Two
final points should be noted. First, in saying that the
soul "exists in" a body, I am relying on Aristotle's view
that the soul is in the body at least in the way form is
in matter (as Aristotle suggests in De Anima II, 1); but
more than this, the soul consists in the proper functioning
of the body. I will discuss the nature of the soul and
its relation to the body more fully in the next chapter.
Second, I wish to argue here that an ensouled body is suf-
ficient (in contemporary terms) for the existence of a liv-
ing thing, inasmuch as the living thing is an individual

(primary) substance (i.e., from an ontological perspective).

 

But a living thing is also a biological organism that re-

 

quires more than just an ensouled body in order to exist
and in order to continue to exist. It needs, for example,
such things as food, water, air, the appropriate range of

temperature, and other environmental conditions.

 

 

56

So far, we have obtained the result that what some
contemporary philosophers might refer to as the necessary
and sufficient conditions for the existence of a certain
kind of living thing would be closely satisfied in
Aristotle's philosophy by a certain soul existing in the
appropriate kind of body.28

To sum up our results so far with respect to the
question "What makes a thing to be what it is?," I have
shown that some contemporary philosophers might answer it
by giving the necessary and sufficient conditions that must
be satisfied in order for the thing in question to exist.
These necessary and sufficient conditions might be taken
to be the causes of the thing's existence. Furthermore,

I have explained that Aristotle's concept of necessity is
similar in some respects to the contemporary concept of a
necessary condition. But I have also pointed out that
hypothetical necessity involves an end to be achieved and
that the presence of the soul involves more than can be
expressed in terms of the contemporary concept of a neces-
sary condition. I have also tried to give some reason to
believe that Aristotle could have accepted something like

the contemporary concept of a sufficient condition. From

 

28In his book Substance, Body, and Soul (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1977), Edwin Hartman argues
that the essence is the necessary condition for the exis-
tence of a particular substance (pp. 59-64) and that it is
also the sufficient condition for the existence of a par-
ticular substance (pp. 64-65).

 

57

Aristotle's standpoint the necessary and sufficient con-
ditions for the existence of a human being would be the
existence of a certain kind of body and a certain soul that
was capable of "directing" the development of the body
(barring any impediments to the proper functioning of the
soul) in a way that would bring about the end of a normally
developed and functioning individual. In his account, then,
the body is the material cause, and the soul is the ef-
ficient, formal, and final causes. Stating these causes
would provide an answer to the question "What makes a human
being to be a human being?"

3. How Do We Know That an Individual

Is a Human Being?

Next, I will attempt to explain how Aristotle could
answer the question "How can one decide (or how does one
know) whether an individual thing is an individual of a
certain kind?" As I indicated before (p. 40), this ques-
tion could be seen as asking when the concept of what it
is to be a certain kind of thing correctly applies. For
Aristotle this would involve determining the essence of a
particular individual. For example, if a certain individ-
ual is suspected of being a human being, then one would
attempt to decide whether it is in fact a human being by
checking to see if it has the essential characteristics of
a human being. Furthermore, since the definition of a

certain kind of thing is the statement of its essence (Met.

58

1031 a 12-13), then our attempt to determine whether the
essence of a human being is possessed by a certain individ-
ual is also an attempt to determine whether the definition
of a human being applies to this individual. So I would

say that Aristotle's answer to the question how one is to
decide whether a certain individual belongs to a certain
kind of thing would involve a consideration of the essence.
However, it should be pointed out that the essence of a hu-
man being (or any other organism) involves the soul as the
formal and final aspects of the body, and not the body (the
material cause) (Map. 1032 b 14, 1035 a 17-21, 1036 a 26-b
6, 1037 a 25-29). As a result, talking in terms of neces-
sary and sufficient conditions, the necessary and sufficient
condition that must exist in order for a certain kind of
individual to 951s; is the ensouled body. But the necessary
and sufficient condition that must be satisfied in order

for the concept of a certain kind of thing to apply to a
certain individual, or to say that a certain individual is

a certain kind of thing, is only the soul as the formal and

final aspects of the body, and not the body.

(a) Necessity

Let us consider in more detail the issue whether an
individual's having the essence of A is necessary and suf-
ficient for applying the concept of an A to the individual.
If the essence were not necessary, then it would be possible

to apply the concept of a human being, for example, to an

 

59

individual that does not have the essence of a human being.
But we would not apply the concept of a human being to an
individual that did not have the essence of a human being,
because it is in virtue of its essence that an organism is
the kind of organism that it is. (I pointed this out in
my discussion of essence, pp. 25-27.) It is in virtue of
having a certain essence that an individual has the struc-
ture and function that it has. Consequently, it is neces-
sary for an individual to have the essence of A.in order

for us to apply the concept of an A to that individual.

(b) Sufficiency

If an individual's having the essence of A were App
sufficient for applying the concept of an A, then there
could be an individual that has the essence of a human be-
ing, but which we would ESE say is a human being. A pos-
sible candidate might be a case in which the essence of a
human being seemed to be present in a non-human body (a
sophisticated machine, for example) or a body of a kind
that was radically different from a normal human body.

Aristotle's discussion in Metaphysics VII, 11 indicates

 

that such an individual would still be a human being, be-
cause the particular kind of matter in which the essence

is found is not part of the essence of the individual.
After explaining that it is evident that matter is not part
of the form of a circle, because a circle can exist in many

different kinds of matter, he says:

 

 

6O

Fpr example, the form of the human being [to tou
anthropou eidos] always appears in flesh and bones and
such parts; then are these parts of the form and the
formula [tou eidous kai tou logou]? Or are they not,
but matter [h 1E],Cbut because the form does not even
come to pass e i i nesthai] in other things, are we
unable to separate 1t. 1 36 b 3-6)

 

 

I would conclude, then, that Aristotle's view is that
an individual's having the essence of a human being is suf-
ficient for applying the concept of a human being to that
individual. So an individual's having a certain kind of
material body (viz., flesh and bone) is not a sufficient
condition for applying the concept of a human being to an
individual. Therefore, I think it is reasonable to say
that a thing's having the essence of A is necessary and

sufficient for applying the concept of an A to that thing.

(c) Application of These Results

At this point, it would be worthwhile to illustrate
how the position that I have reconstructed for Aristotle
could be used to decide whether the concept of a human be-
ing could be applied in two cases in which an entity does
not have a fully developed human body. The first case will
be that of a severely deformed human being, and the second
is that of a normal human infant. The answer to the ques-
tion how we can decide whether these are indeed human be-
ings could have important moral consequences.

In the case of a deformed human being, I think that
Aristotle would say that the individual is indeed a human

being. On his view, such "mistakes" occur in nature

 

 

61

sometimes, and he explains that what happens in such cases
is that there is a "failure to achieve a purpose" in the
organism (Bhys, 199 b 4, trans. Creed). That is, the end
result--an organism that is developed in a way that is nor-
mal for organisms of that species (human beings)--has not
been completely attained because of some impediment to the
organism's development (Ehys. 199 b 18). One explanation

that Aristotle gives of why "monstrosities" (ta terata) are

 

produced is that "the formal nature has not mastered the

material nature" (De Gen. An. 770 b 17, trans. Platt).

 

This suggests that the matter of the body was prevented,

for some reason, from becoming fully and normally "informedfl'
Aristotle also explains that even though monstrosities are
things that are contrary to nature, they still occur "al-

ways in a certain way and not at random" (De Gen. An. 770 b

 

13-15, trans. Platt). Thus, a human monstrosity may have
two heads, or it may appear to have the head of a ram, but
a human monstrosity never turns out to be actually a ram,

for example (see De Gen. An. 769 b 11-18).

 

Since the essence or form of a human being includes
its structure, its ability to function and develop in cer-
tain ways, and its rationality, then an individual that
did not have one of these characteristics would not be a
human being. As Aristotle says in De Anima II, 1, if the
essence of an eye (viz., sight) were removed, then the eye

would be an eye in name only (412 b 10-24). I believe

 

62

that the same view holds for the entire organism, because
Aristotle goes on to say that "we must now apply to the
whole living body that which applies to the part" and "just
as the pupil and sight make up an eye, so in this case the
soul and body make up an animal" (412 b 23-24, 413 a 2-3,
trans. Hamlyn). Now, I would point out that the essence
does not always appear in some individuals as "completely"
as it appears in others of the same kind. To illustrate
what I mean, some eyes do not have the power of sight to
the degree that other eyes have the power of sight. I
think that Aristotle would say that the reason why some
eyes are deficient is that there is a defect in their mat-
ter (as suggested in Rhys. 199 b 1-7). If the case of a
human being as a complete organism is analogous to the case
of an eye, then it would seem that the essence of a human
being could be present in some human beings less "com-
pletely" than in others. On my interpretation ofoistotle's
views, then, a monstrosity would be a human being in which
the essence of a human being did not exist as "completely"
as it exists in a normal human being. As in the case of
the matter of a defective eye, the matter of a monstrosity's
body is defective (or else there was some other impediment
preventing the normal development of the individual).
Nevertheless, I would say that as long as the eye had the
power of sight to some degree, it would still hs an eye

and not merely an eye in name only. Also, as long as an

 

63

organism had to some degree the structure, ability to func-
tion and develop in certain ways, and rationality that
constitute the essence of a human being, then it would hs
a human being and not merely a human being in name only.
For these reasons, I believe that we could apply our con-
cept of a human being at least to some monstrosities.
Consider, next, the case of a normal human infant,
who is far from being the completely developed, fully
functioning human adult, which I think Aristotle would
consider to be the end of a human being. I think that
Aristotle would say that an infant is a human being and
that part of what it is to be a human being is to be de-
veloping in the way that human beings normally develop.29
The necessary and sufficient conditions for applying the
concept of a human being need not be given in terms of
"static" conditions, such as having completely fulfilled
a certain purpose, unless there is some impediment (Ehys.
199 a 11, 199 b 8). Further, in terms of my previous dis-
cussion of when we can say that a certain kind of thing
exists, to say that having an embodied soul is a necessary
condition for the existence of a human being would involve
having the capacity to develop in a certain way, or, in a

less "static" sense, just to be developing in a certain

 

 

29Aristotle says at Ph sics 193 b 13-14: "We also
speak of a thing's nature as 5e1ng exhibited in the process
of growth by which its nature is attained" (trans. Hardie
and Gaye).

 

64

way, unless there is some impediment. An individual has
this capacity because of its form. Consequently, having

a certain form may be a necessary condition for applying
the concept of a human being, but this does not require
that the individual be completely developed in order to
apply the concept. It is only necessary that development
be proceeding in a manner that is usually the case for hu-
man beings.

Again, as in the case of a deformed human being, we
can apply the concept of a human being to an infant, be-
cause the formal cause is present. The value of consider-
ing the case of infants is that it emphasizes that one of
the necessary conditions for applying the concept of a hu-
man being (as well as a necessary condition for the exis-
tence of a human being) is that the individual in question
be developing in a way that humans usually develop. Thus,
the criterion is not based on a "static" condition, but on

a pattern of continuing development.

E. Summary and Conclusion

 

The purpose of this chapter was to discover how
Aristotle could answer the questions "What makes an entity
to be a human being?" and "How can we decide when the con-
cept of a human being applies to a particular entity?"
Before showing how these questions could be answered, how-

ever, it was necessary to discuss a number of the concepts

 

 

65

in Aristotle's philosophy that would be especially impor-
tant in the answers that could be given to these questions.

In the section titled "Aristotle's Concept of Sub-
stance," I outlined some of the major points of Aristotle's
theory of substance, concentrating on primary substance.
Two characteristic features of primary substance are its
separability, or the fact that its existence is not depen-
dent on the existence of another individual (as the exis-
tence of a color, for example, depends on the existence of
some object), and its individuality, which refers to the
fact that a primary substance is not predicated of many
individuals (i.e., it is not a universal, as a secondary
substance is). I also pointed out that Aristotle refers
to the primary substance sometimes as the essence of a

thing, especially in Metaphysics VII.

 

In the section titled "Aristotle's Concept of Essence,"
I examined the nature and importance of the essence of a
thing. Understanding the essence of a human being is the
key to understanding the nature of a human being, because
a human being could not be what it'is without its essen-

tial attributes. In Metaphysics VII Aristotle says that

 

the essence includes the form, but not the matter of a

thing. He also maintains that the essence holds of a spe-
cies, and I have explained that I take this to mean that a
description of what it is to be a human being, for example,

would apply to all individual human beings in the species

 

 

66

"human being." But at the same time, Aristotle argues in
Chapter 6 that each individual primary substance is the
same as its essence, and I have discussed this view in
terms of the existence of the essence in some particular
portion of matter.

Aristotle maintains that the definition of a thing
is the formula of its essence, and so it would be a useful
contribution to our study of the nature of the human be-
ing from an Aristotelian perspective if we can arrive at
a definition of a human being. Consequently, in the sec-
tion titled "Definition," I examined briefly his concept
of a definition and the method of arriving at definitions
by means of successively dividing a genus into mutually
exclusive and jointly exhaustive subgenera in order to en-
sure a complete and orderly definition of a thing.
Aristotle does not give a complete definition of a human
being, but on the basis of the examples he has suggested,
I have tried to show that, even though it is extremely
difficult to sort out exactly the features that belong to
the essence of a human being, rationality is one feature
that is part of the nature of a human being.

Finally, in the last section, titled "The Nature and
Concept of a Human Being," I compared and contrasted the
answers a contemporary philosopher and Aristotle would
give to the two questions I posed at the outset. Some

contemporary philosophers would attempt to answer these

 

67

questions in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions
that must be satisfied in order to say that a human being
exists and in order to apply the concept of a human being
to a particular individual thing. For Aristotle, I at-
tempted to show that what must be taken into account in
answering the question "What makes a human being to be a
human being?" is the nature of the ensouled body (or the
embodied soul). His answer to the question how we can
decide whether to apply the concept of a human being to a
certain individual thing involves determining whether the
essence of human beings applies to the individual in ques-
tion.

Having arrived at the conclusion that the essence
of a human being is the soul, and hence, that it is in vir-
tue of the soul that a human being is a human being, the
next step will be to examine carefully the nature of the
human soul and its rational faculty (the mind) in particular.

This will be the subject of the next chapter.

 

 

 

CHAPTER II
THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE DE ANIMA

Among the results of Chapter I were that (1) both the
body and the soul are the necessary and sufficient condi-
tions for the existence of a human being, (2) the soul is
the essence of a human being, and hence, necessary and suf-
ficient for the concept of a human being, and (3) the mind,
as a function of the soul, is an essential part of a human
being. Aristotle's work in the De Anima reinforces these
conclusions, and it is the purpose of this chapter to ex-
plore the contribution that the De Anima makes toward
Aristotle's concept of the human being. Thus, the first
part, "The Nature of the Soul," will give a brief discussion
of the nature of the soul in general; the second part,
"Mind--The Thinking Faculty," will contain a discussion of
the mind and an examination of the importance of the soul;
and the third part, "The Importance of the Body," will deal
with the importance of the body to the human being from the

point of view of the De Anima.

68

69

A. The Nature of the Soul

 

In Book 11, Chapter 1 of the De Anima Aristotle pro-

oses, as the "most common account" (koinotatos lo 05, 412
P S__.

 

a 5-6) of the soul, that the soul is "the first actuality
of a natural body which has organs" (412 b 5-6, trans.

Hamlyn: entelecheia hE'prEte sfimatos physikou organikou).

 

Broadly speaking, his discussion in this chapter shows that
he will be concerned with the nature of the soul in living
organisms. His discussion also shows that the soul is to
be defined in terms of the ability (dynamis) of the body

to perform not only its life-sustaining functions,1 but
also the kinds of functions that are characteristic of, and
essential to, the particular kind of organism to which the
soul belongs (this is suggested in 412 b 10-24). To define
the soul thus in terms of the disposition of the organism
to exercise its functions rather than the actual exercise
of those functions allows Aristotle to maintain that or-
ganisms that are asleep (or dormant) are still living or-
ganisms (412 a 24-27, 412 b 25-413 a 3). At the end of
this chapter, Aristotle says that the actualities of some
parts of the soul are the actualities of certain bodily
parts, so that these parts of the soul are inseparable from

the body in fact. Nevertheless, he does suggest that some

 

1This seems to be the emphasis of 412 a 12-b 5, in
which he says that "the soul must, then, be substance qua
form of a natural body which has life potentially" (412 a
20-21, trans. Hamlyn).

70

parts of the soul are separable since they are not the
actualities of any bodily parts (413 a 4-7). I will con-
sider the question of the separability of the soul later.

In the second chapter of Book II, Aristotle lists
the faculties whose origin is the soul; these are the fac-
ulties of nutrition, sensation, thinking, and movement (413
b 11-12). I will pass over the nutritive, sensitive, and
motive faculties of the soul and turn directly to the think-

ing faculty (to dianoEtikon), because, while plants and

 

animals have the nutritive faculty, and animals have the
sensitive faculty, only human beings ("and anything else
which is similar or superior to man" [414 b 20, trans.
Hamlyn]) possess the thinking faculty (II, 3). And further-

more, Aristotle maintains in the Nicomachean Ethics that

 

the function (ssgsh) peculiar to a human being is "an ac-
tivity of the soul according to reason" (1098 a 8). Con-
sequently, his remarks in the De Anima and elsewhere indi-
cate that he conceives of the thinking faculty as essential

to a human being.

B. Mind--The ThinkingFaculty

 

Since the ability to think is an essential part of
a human being for Aristotle, we should consider carefully
his remarks on the nature of the mind. In III, 5 (430 a
10-16) Aristotle says that there is an aspect of mind in
virtue of which it is potentially all of the objects of

thought, and there is an aspect of the mind in virtue of

71

which it makes all things. His discussion here suggests
that the first, passive aspect of the mind is analogous

to the matter of the sense organ, which has the capacity
to become like each of its objects; the second, active as-
pect of the mind is a condition of the mind that is anal-
ogous to the efficient cause, and it produces all that can
be known by actualizing the potentiality of the passive

mind. I will consider each of these aspects in turn.

1. The Passive and Active Minds

(a) The Passive Mind

At the beginning of III, 4 Aristotle proposes to
consider the distinguishing features of the mind and how
it thinks (429 a 10-12). He discusses the potential or
passive aspect of the mind in the rest of Chapter 4, and
the active aspect of the mind in Chapter 5. The potential
aspect of the mind is potential because it is nothing in
actuality before it thinks, and because it is capable of
receiving the intelligible forms of the objects of thought
(429 a 15-17, 24). Early in this chapter, Aristotle com-
pares thinking with perceiving, pointing out that the think-
ing part of the soul (to noein) and the sense organs are
similar inasmuch as they are capable of receiving the forms

of their objects without the matter,2 and they are similar

 

2That is, in thinking, the mind receives the intelli-
gible form of an object without the object's matter, and in
sensing, the sense organ receives the sensible form of an
object without the object's matter.

72

in that they are like their objects but not identical with

them (429 a 13-17: dektikon de ton eidous kai dynamei

 

toiouton alla m3 touto). In short, he says that "just as

 

that which is capable of perceiving is to perceivable things,
so the mind is to intelligible things" (429 a 17: hESper

to aisthEtikon pros ta aisthEta, hout3 ton noun prOs ta

 

noEta). Nevertheless, Aristotle says that one difference
between perception and thought is that the sense (he ais-
thgsis) is not able to perceive when an object of sensation
has been too intense, while the mind (ho nous) is better

able to think about inferior things (ta hypodeestOra) after

 

having thought of highly intelligible things (429 a 29-b
4). So Aristotle recognizes that the analogy between think-
ing and perceiving is not perfect. Furthermore, the passive
mind must be "unmixed" (shigg), because being blended with
the body or anything that is foreign to it would impair its
ability to receive the intelligible forms of the objects
of thought (429 a 18-29). Consequently, by nature the pas-
sive mind is potentially Aihs whatever is thinkable; how-
ever, it never becomes completely identical with the object
of thought, because the passive mind does not assimilate
the matter of the object (429 a l4-17)--it "receives" only
the intelligible form.

Aristotle points out later (429 b 5-9) that the pas-
sive mind can be a potentiality in two respects. In one

sense it is potential when it has never actually received

73

any intelligible forms. But in another sense the mind is
a potentiality when it is not now actually like certain
intelligible forms, but it is capable of becoming like
them (i.e., thinking of the objects) of its own accord be-
cause it had received those forms at some time in the past.
The difference between these two kinds of potentiality
would correspond to the difference between the state of
mind of one who has never learned a foreign language, and
the state of mind of one who knows a foreign language, but
who is not presently using it. D. W. Hamlyn points out in

his book, Aristotle's De Anima, Books II and III, that

 

Aristotle is distinguishing here between the intellect as
dynamis (the first sense of 'potential') and the intellect
as hééii (the second sense of 'potential') (p. 137, note
on 429 a 29-b 9).4

Aristotle's discussion of the passive mind does raise
a difficulty, nevertheless. Throughout this chapter he has
insisted that the mind is not mixed with the body and has

no bodily organ of its own (429 a 23-27, 429 b 4). Being

 

3A third sense of potentiality that Aristotle may a1-
so have in mind is potentiality in the sense in which the
mind has received intelligible forms of a certain kind, but
not of certain other kinds. This would be analogous to the
mind of one who has learned French, but not German. (I am
indebted to Professor Kotzin for calling to my attention
this third kind of potentiality.)

4D. w. Hamlyn, Aristotle's De Anima, Books II and III
(Oxford: Oxford UniverSity Press, 1968). All page refer-
ences to Hamlyn's book will be given in the text.

 

 

74

mixed with the body would interfere with the passive mind's
ability to receive the intelligible forms of thinkable ob-
jects. But the difficulty is that Aristotle does not ex-
plain BEE the passive mind receives the intelligible forms
of what can be known. As I pointed out earlier (pp. 70-72),
he says that as the faculty of sensation is to what is
sensible, the mind is to what is thinkable (429 a 17).
Nevertheless, sensation occurs when the sensible object
causes motion or change in a medium, which is "communica-
ted" by the medium to the sense organ (419 a 12-20, 25-31).
As a result of this, the sense organ becomes qualitatively
identical with the object of sense. Thinking could not
occur in this manner because the passive mind has no bodily
organ that could receive the form of the object of thought,
and because there is no medium through which the intelli-
gible form of the object could be "communicated" to the
passive mind. Thus, it is not clear exactly how the intel-
ligible form of the object of thought is "conveyed" to the
passive mind in order that the mind might become like the
intelligible object. (Hamlyn raises this problem briefly
at pp. 135-40.) Consequently, thinking and perceiving are
disanalogous in an important respect.

That the thinking faculty is closely related to the
sensitive faculty is evident when Aristotle says that "we
judge what it is to be flesh and flesh itself [to sarki

einai kai sarka] either by means of something different or

 

75

by the same thing differently disposed" (429 b 12-13, trans.
Hamlyn). He goes on to say that it is by means of the
sensitive faculty that we judge the constituents of flesh,
such as the hot and the cold, but it is by something else
that we judge the essence of flesh. This "something else"
is either different from the faculty of sensation or re-
lated to the faculty of sensation (429 b 13-17). Hamlyn
says that this "tends to suggest that the intellect by
which one judges essences . . . is not after all utterly
distinct from the senses" (p. 138, note to 429 b 10).
Nevertheless, Aristotle does not make it clear whether the
passive mind is a distinct faculty or a different function
of the sensitive faculty. It is clear, however, that he
sees thinking to be closely related to perceiving. At

431 a 16 he says that "the soul never thinks without an

image [phantasmatos]"; and at 432 a 6-8 he says that "unless

 

one perceived things one would not learn or understand any-
thing, and when one contemplates one must simultaneously
contemplate an image" (trans. Hamlyn). Consequently, think-
ing, imaging, and sensing are closely related because think-
ing does not occur without imaging, and images are move-
ments that result from sense perceptions (429 a l).
Aristotle does not explain, however, the nature of the re-
lation between thoughts and images, or why one never thinks

without an image.

76

(b) The Active Mind

The fullest account that Aristotle gives of the ac-
tive mind is in 111, 5. He begins this chapter with the
observation that in nature as a whole everything has two
aspects: matter (hyhs), which is potentially all of the
individuals of a certain kind; and a productive cause (Es

aition kai poiEtikon), which "makes" (poiein) each of the

 

individuals (430 a 10-13). He maintains that this same
dichotomy applies to the mind and that the passive mind
just discussed corresponds to the material aspect, which
has the potential for becoming each of the objects of
thought (430 a 14-15). Having discussed the passive mind,
let us turn to the active mind.

Aristotle says that the active mind is an activity
(energeia, 430 a 18) or a disposition (hshss, 430 a 15)
that makes what is potentially known by the passive mind
into what is actually known. He likens the active mind to
light. Light consists in a medium's being actually trans—
parent, and it is the presence of light that makes poten-
tially visible colors to be actually visible (II, 7).
Similarly, the active mind is an actuality that must be
present in order for what is potentially known by the pas-
sive nfind to become actually known. As D. W. Hamlyn points
out, "the activity of the active intellect is a necessary
condition of the actualization of the potentialities of the

soul, especially the thinking of objects" (pp. 140-41).

 

77

Without the active mind the potentiality of the passive
mind for becoming like its intelligible objects would not
be actualized. Hamlyn also points out that the active mind
is not a sufficient condition for actualizing the poten-
tialities of the soul (P. 141). There must also be the
passive mind, which is capable of receiving the intelligible
forms of thinkable objects.

Aristotle also says: "And this mind is separable and
unaffected and unmixed, being in substance activity" (430

a 17-18: kai houtos ho nous chEristos kai apathgs kai

 

am1ges tEi ousiai 5n eneggeiai). Not only is the active

 

mind separable (chEristos) from the body, but he says that

 

"this alone is immortal and eternal" (430 a 23: kai touto

 

monon athanaton kai aidion). Further, since it is "in

 

essence an activity," the active mind is always thinking
(430 a 22), and hence, it is identical with the objects of

thought.

(c) Some Difficulties

Having briefly explained Aristotle's account of the
passive and active minds, I will show how certain diffi-
culties arise from his account.5 First, I would say that

both the active mind and the passive mind seem to be

 

5The following discussion owes much to suggestions
that were made to me by Professor Rhoda H. Kotzin.

 

78

entities, because both are separable (chEristos, 430 a 17,

 

429 b 4) and both have an essence.6 The difficulties arise
as follows. At the beginning of III, 5, he says that in
the soul there is a difference between "something which is
matter to each kind of thing" (430 a 11) and "something
else which is their cause and is productive by producing
them a11--these being related as an art to its material"
(430 a 12-13, trans. Hamlyn). Thus, even though Aristotle
does not say so explicitly, it seems that thinking involves
the active mind acting on the passive mind. There are at
least three difficulties that arise here.

First, it is not clear hp! the active mind acts on
the passive mind. The analogy of the relation between an
art and its material is imperfect, because the art exists
in an artist who physically shapes the material. Neither
the active mind nor the passive mind is material, so there
could not be physical contact between them.

Second, it is not clear in what sense the passive
mind is passive. Even though the passive mind is "matter"
with respect to the active mind (the "efficient cause"),

it is not a material substrate that actually exists and

 

6He suggests that the active mind has an essence at
430 a 18, where he seems to use 'ousia' in the sense of
essence (has. 1017 b 22). He suggests that the passive
mind has an essence when he says that the passive mind "must
have no other nature [ h sin] than this, that it is poten-
tial" (429 a 22, trans. am yn). It is not clear whether
'physis' here is used in the sense of 'ousia' thatAristotle
p01nts out at Ass. 1014 b 35-1015 a 10.

 

79

can accept a variety of forms. In contrast with existing
matter, which always has sshs form or other, Aristotle
says that it is "in actuality none of the existing things
before it thinks" (429 a 24, 429 b 31). Since our under-
standing of passivity is primarily with respect to some
matter, it is not clear how we are to understand the pas-
sivity of the non-material passive mind.

Third, since the active mind always thinks (430 a 22),
it is not clear why the passive mind does not always think
also (i.e., it is not clear why the active mind does not
always act on the passive mind).

I will not discuss how Aristotle could resolve these
difficulties. I have only attempted to show how they arise
from his account of the active and passive minds.

(d) The Philosophical Importance

of the Active Mind

Having briefly considered Aristotle's rather sketchy
account of the active mind in III, 5, one might reasonably
ask what the philosophical importance of the active mind
is. In order to answer the question of its philosophical
importance, I will examine the role of the mind in Aristotle's
theory of knowledge, because this will help us understand
more clearly how the thinking faculty functions.

For Aristotle, Plato, and many others in the history
of philosophy, the one aspect of human beings that is in-

trinsically valuable and serves to distinguish human beings

80

from all other ("lower") organisms is the capacity to think
and reason. For Aristotle, acting according to reason is
the very function (to ergon) of a human being (AA 1098 a
3, 7, 13-14); it is part of the essence of a human being.
Consequently, having considered the nature of the mind
(hshs), I will consider the origin of knowledge.
Aristotle's explanation of the origin of knowledge
(epistemE) is as follows (Post. An. II, 13; Met. I, 1).
First, when one perceives an individual thing, "the first
universal is in the soul (for on the one hand one perceives

the individual [to kath' hekaston], but on the other hand

 

the perception is of the universal [tou katholou], for

 

example, of man, but not of the man Callias)" (Post. An.
100 a 15-b 1). Second, after repeated perceptions and mem-
ories of particulars of a certain kind, one arrives at a
more general concept of, say, an A, so that one can dis-
tinguish an A from a A. Third, as a result of higher de-
grees of generalization, one grasps the Species of a thing.7
When "the whole universal has come to rest in the soul"

(ek pantos EremESantos tou katholou en téi psychEi), there

 

is a principle of art and knowledge (technES arch? kai

 

epistEmES) (100 a 6-8). Further, Aristotle suggests at

 

De Anima 429 b 5-10 that when the whole universal is in the

 

7Post. An 100 b 2-4: palin en tautois hiStatai,

heES an ta amerE stEi kai ta katholou, hoion toiondi zaon,
heas onn' kai en toutEi hgsautas.

 

 

81

soul, the mind is capable of thinking by itself, as the
person who actually knows (has epistEmEn legetai ho kat'

energeian) is able to exercise his capacity by himself.

 

Finally, Aristotle suggests in De Anima 429 b 10-21 that
it is with the mind, rather than the faculties of sense
perception that we distinguish (krinei) an A from what it
is to be an A. This activity of the mind seems to be dif-
ferent from its activity in any of the first three stages
that I mentioned, because it seems to presuppose that the
mind already grasps the essence of a thing in order that
the mind can distinguish between the essence and a per-
ceived individual which has the essence.8

To sum up, it is the sensing faculty that provides
images of particular things in the soul, but it is the mind
that discovers what is universal among the images, and this
is necessary in order for one to have genuine knowledge.
This capacity to "systematize" sense impressions of indi-
viduals and to recognize species and genera among the im-
ages that one can remember is possessed only by human be-
ings and by no other animal. Being able to do this enables
human beings to understand things and to engage in art
(technE); and perhaps more importantly, it enables us to

make the choices and judgments that are essential to moral

 

8My distinguishing the various stages by which the
mind arrives at the universal owes much to suggestions from
Professor Kotzin.

82

conduct. Indeed, Aristotle says that thinking does not
occur without images (431 a 14-16, 432 a 2-8), but this does
not require him to admit that thinking be confined to what-
ever image one happens to have. He points out in the 23

Memoria et Reminiscentia (449 b 30-450 a 9) that while the

 

image is of a particular individual, it may be taken to
stand for an entire species of things. In this way one can
engage in abstract thought and reason about the character-
istics that are held in common by all of the members of a
Species, while ignoring the characteristics that are pecul-
iar to the individual one is imagining.

One notorious difficulty of such an imagistic theory
of thought, however, is that it seems not to be able to
explain our ability to think and reason about things which
are not perceptible, such as the concepts of "democracy,"
"ambition," and "the future," for example.

An obvious contribution of the De Anima toward our
understanding of Aristotle's concept of the human being is
his discussion of the human mind. So far, I have explained
what I see to be some of the most important features of his
theory of the mind, and I have mentioned some problems in
his theory. I intend now to discuss the importance of the

soul in Aristotle's work.

 

83

2. The Importance of the Soul

It is necessary to understand the "importance" of the
soul in the De Anima in at least two senses. First, the
soul is important because of the high value that Aristotle
places on it. And second, the soul is important because
it is necessary for the existence of a human being. I will
consider each of these in turn.

The intrinsic value of the soul, and the intrinsic
value of the thinking faculty in particular, is prominent
in the work of both Plato and Aristotle. In the hays, for
example, Plato says that "every man's most precious pos-
session . . . is his soul" (73lc, trans. A. E. Taylor).

For Plato the soul is valuable because it is eternal, capa-
ble of reason, and the source of moral virtue. That
Aristotle places a high value on the soul is apparent from
the opening remarks of the De Anima, when he says that know-
ledge of the soul is especially worthwhile, partly because
it is knowledge about a superior and remarkable thing (402
a 1-4). Just as for Plato, the rational capacity of the
soul contributes to its value for Aristotle. The active
mind is separable from the body, immortal, and eternal (430
a 17, 23-24); it is where reason and the formation of con-
cepts occurs; and it is in virtue of this faculty that the
soul knows all things and can understand reality. The
rational soul is important to his ethical theory because

he believes that happiness is the greatest good (Ah I, 7),

84

and this consists in contemplative activity (Ah 1177 a

18-22). It is in the Nicomachean Ethics, furthermore,

 

where Aristotle says that it is an active life (praktikE)

of reason (1098 a 3) that distinguishes human beings from

the other animals, and that the function (to ergon) of a

human being is "an activity of soul in accordance with

reason [lpgss], or at least not without reason" (1098 a 7-8,

trans. Wardman). I will return to this in the next chapter.
Perhaps another reason why Aristotle regards the soul

as valuable can be found in De Anima 415 a 22-b 7, where

he says that plants and animals can only partake in the

eternal and divine (hina tou aei kai tou theiou metechfisin

 

hEi dynantai) by helping to continue the existence of their

 

species, not by the continuous existence of any individual
plant or animal. They do this by means of the reproduc-
tive function of the nutritive soul. Of course, human be-
ings also partake in the eternal and divine in this way,
but humans differ from plants and other animals in having
the active mind. The active mind itself is eternal and
immortal (430 a 24), and because of this it seems that each
human being itself shares in the eternal and divine.

The importance of the active mind for Aristotle is
also apparent in his discussion of God and divine thought

in Metaphysics XII. In Metaphysics XII, 7, for example,

 

 

Aristotle suggests the following argument, which I have re-

constructed from his discussion of thinking (1072 b 14-29):

85

1. "Mind and the object of thought are the same" (tauton
nous kai noetou, 1072 b 22, trans. Creed). Aris totIe
explains here that when mind (nous) is active (ener-
gas) it receives the objects of thought (tou noetou)
an the essences (tes ousias) of things (1072 5 23- 24).
Further, this activity of receiving the objects of
thought "seems to be the divine element possessed by
the mind" (dokei ho nous theion echein, 1072 b 24,
trans. Creed).

 

 

 

2. "Thought in itself is thought of what is best in it-
self, and what is fully thought is thought of what
is in the fullest sense best" (he de noesis he kath'

hauten tou kath' hauto aristou, kai he malista tou
malista, 1072 b 18-19, trans. Creed).

 

 

3. We are capable of being in the good state of contem-
plating what is most pleasant and best (to hediston
kai ariston, 1072 b 24- 25). (God is always in a state
that is even better than the good state we are in
sometimes [1072 b 24- 25, my emphasis]. )

 

 

 

Therefore,
4. The mind is what is the best in itself.

In Chapter 9 Aristotle explains that the supreme mind
thinks "of what is most divine and most valuable" (dElon

toinun hoti to theiotaton kai timiEtaton noei, 1074 b 26,

 

trans. Creed), which is itself, Since the supreme mind is

the best of things (esti to kratiston, 1074 b 33-34, trans.

 

Creed). The divine mind is in the best state "during the

whole of eternity," but the human mind (ho anthrEpinos nous)

 

"does not possess the good at this or that particular mo-
ment, but attains the best of things--which is something
other than itself--over a whole period" (1075 a 7-10, trans.
Creed).

Thus, I have Shown that the soul, and the human mind
in particular, are important for Aristotle because of the

high value he places on them.

86

The second respect in which the soul is important in
the De Anima is the sense in which the soul is necessary
for the existence of a human being and the essence of a hu-
man being. I explained in Chapter I in what way the soul
was necessary for the existence of a human being from the

point of view of Metaphysics VII and Physics II. Drawing

 

from Aristotle's discussion of the soul in De Anima II, 1
and 4, I will show that his views in the De Anima agree

with his views in the Metaphysics and the Physics. That

 

the soul is necessary for the existence of a human being
(both in the sense of a "necessary condition" and in
Aristotle's sense of "that without which it is not possible
to live" [M23- 1015 a 20]) is strongly suggested in hs
52122.11: 1, 412 b 10-413 a 3. In this passage the exam-
ples he uses are an axe and an eye, but he makes it clear
that his remarks are also intended to apply to the whole
living body (412 b 23-24). I Shall be concerned with hu-
man beings. Aristotle says here that it is the presence

of the soul in a certain kind of natural body (physikou
toiondi, 412 b 17) (viz., a natural body having organs [412
b 5]) that makes a living human being. Without the soul,

the body would be a human body in name only (homEnymES).

 

Aristotle says that being alive involves self-nutrition,
growth, and decay (412 a 14-16), so that without the soul
the material of the body would not become a living human

being. Both the nutritive and the sensitive faculties are

87

necessary for the proper functioning and survival of the
human being. But an even more important faculty of the
soul is the thinking faculty, which enables a human being
to perform its function, namely, contemplation and rational
activity. Consequently, without the soul, the human being
could not survive and function as a human being. Further,
Aristotle's discussion in 412 b 10-413 a 3 also strongly

suggests that it is because of the soul that a certain body

 

becomes a living human being. This is because the soul
"enables" the body to perform the nutritive, reproductive,
motive, sensitive, and rational activities that a normal
human being performs. At 415 b 13 he says that the soul,
as the substance, is the cause of the existence for every-

thing (to gar aition tou einai pasin hE ousia). I conclude,

 

then, that in the De Anima Aristotle's view of the soul as
necessary for the existence of a human being agrees with

this view of the soul in the Metaphysics and the Physics.

 

It is clear from the passage I have just discussed
that the soul is the essence of a living thing. At 412 b
10-12 he says: "It has been said, then, in general what
the soul is: substance according to the principle. In-
deed this is the essence of a body of such a kind."9

Further, he says later (415 b 8-27) that the soul is the

 

9katholou men oun eirEtai ti estin hE psychE' ousia
gar h? kata ton logon. touto de to ti en einai tSi toiEidi
samati.

 

 

88

cause (to aition) in each of three senses of 'cause':

 

(1) it is the substance of living things (h? ousia tan

 

empsycth samatfin) and the cause of their existence (to gar

 

aition tou einai pasin h? ousia); (2) it is the final cause,

 

or "that for the sake of which" (hou heneken), because "all

 

natural bodies . . . exist for the sake of the soul"; and
(3) it is the efficient cause, or "that from which motion
in respect of place is first derived" (trans. Hamlyn).
Therefore, I have shown that Aristotle's view of the soul
as the essence or form of a living thing is the same in the

De Anima as in the Metaphysics.

 

Consequently, the soul is an important part of a hu-
man being in Aristotle's work, not only because it is val-
uable, but also because it is necessary for the existence.
of a human being, and because it is the essence of a human

being.

C. The Importance of the Body

 

l. Necessary and Sufficient Conditions

So far, I have attempted to explain the importance
of the De Anima for understanding Aristotle's theory of the
human being because of the account of the soul and the mind
that it contains. In this part, I will examine what the
De Anima reveals about the role of the body in his theory
of the human being.

In the previous chapter, I concluded that the body was

a necessary condition for the existence of a human being,

89

both in the contemporary sense of "necessary condition" and
in Aristotle's sense of "necessity." I maintain that the
De Anima reaffirms this conclusion. In II, 1 Aristotle
says that every living natural body (such as a human being)
is a substance in the sense of a compound (synthetE) of
both matter and form (412 a 16). This means that the body

is the substrate (hypokeimenou, 412 a 19) in which the soul

 

exists as the actuality (entelecheia, 412 a 21) of the

 

body. Now, in I, l he raises the question whether any of
the functions or affections of the soul can exist indepen-
dently of the body (403 a 3-12). The answer to this ques-
tion will tell us the extent to which the body is necessary
for the existence of a human being. His immediate response
to this question is:
It appears that in most cases the soul is not affected
nor does it act apart from the body, e.g. in being an-
gry, being confident, wanting, and perceiving in gen-
eral; although thinking looks most like being peculiar
to the soul. But if this too is a form of imagination
or does not exist apart from imagination, it would not
be possible even for this to exist apart from the body.
(403 a 5-10, trans. Hamlyn)
Later, he says: "It seems that all the affections of the
soul involve the body . . . for at the same time as these
the body is affected in a certain way" (403 a 16-18, trans.
Hamlyn), and "it is clear that the affections of the soul
are principles [logoi] involving matter [enuloi]" (403 a

24, trans. Hamlyn). It is clear from these passages that

the soul and its "affections" (pathEmata) depend upon the

 

material body for their existence, inasmuch as they are

enmattered principles.

90

Therefore, since the soul could not exist unless it
were the actuality of a certain body, the body is also
necessary for the existence of a human being. The body
is necessary in the contemporary sense of a necessary con-
dition, because a human being could not exist without its
body. It is also necessary in Aristotle's sense of "that
without which it is not possible to live" (Ass. 1015 a 20).
Furthermore, though Aristotle does not explicitly address
the issue, his discussion in the De Anima seems to me to
support the view that both the soul and the body are suf-
ficient for the existence of a human being. If the soul
and body are present together, then a human being is pres-
ent--no third thing is needed.

Having shown that Aristotle's work in the De Anima
supports the conclusion in my Chapter I that the soul and
the body together are necessary and sufficient for the
existence of a human being, I will now examine in more
detail the relation between the soul and the body in the
De Anima. It is important that we understand the relation
between the soul and the body in order for us to understand
his theory of the human being. It is also important that
we address this issue in our discussion of the De Anima,
because, in the first place, the De Anima contains Aristotle's
fullest treatment of the soul. In the second place,
Aristotle sometimes seems to have a materialist theory of

the human being, as when he says that the soul is the

91

actuality of the body (I, 1; II, 1); and sometimes he seems
to have a dualist theory of the human being, as when he
says that the active mind is not mixed with the body and
separable from it (111, 5). For these reasons, then, I will
examine the relation between the soul and the body.
2. The Relation Between the
Soul and the Body

Aristotle recognizes that it is necessary to deal
with the question of the relation between the soul and the
body, and he also recognizes that this is not an easy ques-
tion (403 a 3-5). Nevertheless, it is necessary that he
raise and attempt to resolve the problem of the relation
between the soul and the body, because accounts of the na-
ture of the soul that had been proposed by earlier philoso-
phers had failed to resolve this question with any degree
of unanimity. In the first place, there was disagreement
among respectable and influential philosophers on the ques-
tion whether the soul was composed of matter or whether it
was incorporeal (404 b 30-405 b 20). Some phi1050phers,
whose first principles were material, regarded the soul as
material also (Empedocles, Democritus, and others); other
philosophers, who recognized incorporeal first principles,
regarded the soul as incorporeal (Heracleitus). In the
second place, Aristotle remarks with amazement that while
his predecessors were concerned with explaining the nature

of the soul and how it was the source of movement, they

92

did not specify exactly what its relation was to the body
(407 b 13-25). He says that the philosophers whose views
he has discussed are in error, because
Men associate the soul with and place it in the body,
without Specifying why this is so, and how the body is
conditioned; and yet this would seem to be essential
. But these thinkers only try to explain what is the
nature of the soul, without adding any details about
the body which is to receive it; as though it were
possible . . . for any soul to find its way into any
body. (407 b 14-17, 20-23, trans. Hett)
Consequently, it is the lack of agreement on the corpore-
ality or incorporeality of the soul and the lack of any
complete account of the relation between the soul and the
body that forces Aristotle to consider these issues in the
De Anima.

Some of Aristotle's remarks strongly suggest that
the soul (except the mind) is nothing more than, or iden-
tical with, certain movements in the body or in certain
parts of the body. His discussion of the affections of
the soul in I, 1 suggest this, and so does his remark that

"it is clear that the affections [of the soul] are enmat-

tered principles" (403 a 24: dEIOn hoti ta path? logoi

 

enuloi eisin). In 11, 1 his general definition of the soul,

 

as "the first actuality of a natural body which has organs"
(412 b 5), also suggests that the soul is identical with

a certain condition of a certain kind of body. Now
Aristotle does not say explicitly that the soul is nothing
more than, or identical with, a certain condition of the

body, but his discussion of the faculties of the soul in

93

the De Anima do suggest this view. If this were his view,
then Aristotle would have a materialist theory of the soul.
Nevertheless, I think that Aristotle does not have a strict-
ly materialist view of the soul, and it will be worthwhile
to examine the extent to which he is a materialist and the
extent to which he is not a materialist. This issue is
particularly interesting and relevant because not only were
some of Aristotle's predecessors materialists, but materi-
alism is also attractive to many contemporary philosophers.1'0
In his discussion of the question whether psychic
properties are all common to the body or not in I, l,
Aristotle talks mostly in terms of the emotions (403 a 7,
17, 25-b 19), but it is clear that he also includes per-
ceiving and thinking within the scope of this question
(403 a 7-10). In Short, he says: "If then there is shy
of the functions or affections of the soul which is pecul-
iar [19122] to it, it will be possible for it to be separ-
ated from the body. But if there is nothing peculiar to it,
it will not be separable" (403 a 10-12, trans. Hamlyn, my
emphasis). What Aristotle seems to mean here is that a
function of the soul that is not "with," or "associated

with," a certain body (meta SEmatos tinos, 403 a 16) is

 

itself separable from the body; and if the soul isalways

 

10The following discussion is influenced by Edwin
Hartman's Substance, Body, and Sou1: AriStotelian Inves-
tigations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977),
Chapter 4, "The Heart, the Soul, and Materialism."

 

 

94

11 It should

"with" the body, then it is not separable.
also be pointed out that 'separable from the body' need

not be understood as being opposed to 'identical with the
body', an identity materialist position; 'separable from

the body' could be understood (and I think this is the way
that Aristotle takes it) as being opposed to 'always pres-
ent in a body (while not identical with the body)‘. That
this latter position is Aristotle's will be brought out in
what follows.

In evidence of the fact that Aristotle does not iden-
tify psychic states with bodily states, I would point out
that he usually does not explicitly say that psychic states
are identical with, or the same as, certain bodily states.
Instead, he says that "it seems that all the affections
of the soul are with [2223: in accompaniment with] a body

. for at the same time as these the body is affected
in a certain way" (403 a 16-18, my emphasis), which suggests
a relation between the soul and the body that is not as
strong as identity. In addition, consider Aristotle's dis-
cussion of some "definitions" of anger (403 a ZS-b 19).
The physicist's (physikos) definition is: "being angry is

a particular movement of a body of such and such a kind, or

 

11This is Hamlyn's interpretation also (pp. 78-79).
Also, it is not clear what it means to say that the soul is
meta sOmatos tinos. Perhaps Aristotle means that the soul
is "with a certain body" in the sense that "it is not af-
fected nor does it act apart from the body" (403 a 6, trans.
Hamlyn).

 

95

a part of potentiality of it, as a result of this thing

and for the sake of that" (403 a 25-27, trans. Hamlyn).

This definition includes a reference to the material cause
(i.e., a certain kind of movement in a certain kind of body),
but it also includes references to the efficient and final
causes as well. In the passage immediately following this
one, Aristotle points out that what counts as an acceptable
definition depends on what one's interests are. In answer

to the question "What is anger?," a doctor would prefer a
definition that was given strictly in terms of the matter

or the body, but the student of nature (ho physikos) would

 

prefer a definition that mentioned not only the body, as
the material cause, but the formal, efficient, and final
causes also (403 a 29-b 17). The importance of this dis-
cussion of the definition of anger is that it indicates
that anger is something over and above the movements in
the body; it is "associated with" certain movements of the
body, but it involves more than just those movements. This
is not an "identity theory" of materialism.

Martha Craven Nussbaum supports this interpretation

in her study of De Motu Animalium. When Aristotle says

 

that anger "is" the boiling of blood around the heart,
Nussbaum says that "the 'is' used in statements about the
material cause is not the 'is' of identity, since we must
leave open the possibility that these functions can be real-

ized in other kinds of matter, or material processes"

96

(p. 147). (She has in mind Met. VII, 11.)12

Instead, she
says, Aristotle is using "the 'is' of realization or con-
stitution" (p. 147), which means that this psychic function
is usually realized in a certain bodily process. She con-
cludes that "in this way Aristotle can consistently both
make what appear to be general identity claims and also say,
more loosely, that psychic processes are 'not without body'
(2A 403 a 5-7), or 'always with some body' (a 15), that
'together with these the body undergoes some affection'
(a 18-19)" (p. 148). She explains further that the point
of these claims of Aristotle is not that there are two
separate processes that are merely correlated, but that a
psychic process is always realized in sphs bodily process,
though not necessarily always in the sahs bodily process
(p. 148, my emphasis).

There are at least three sources of evidence in the
De Anima that Aristotle did not hold the view that the soul
was nothing more than some matter. First, in I, 4 and 5
he explicitly rejects the views of those of his predecessors
who identified the soul with parts of the body or with some
kind of matter. This shows that Aristotle was aware of the
view that the soul is just a certain kind of matter and

that he rejected this view.

 

12Martha Craven Nussbaum, Aristotle's De Motu Animalium
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978). All page
references to Nussbaum's book will be given in the text.

 

97

Second, there are passages in which Aristotle says
explicitly that the soul is not the body, matter, or sub-
strate (422 a 19-22, 414 a 13-14). For example, at 414 a
19-22 he says that the soul is not itself a body, but it
"belongs in a body, and in a body of a certain kind" (sh
SEmati hyparchei, kai en samati toioutEi). And even though
the parts of the soul other than the mind (ho nous) are

not separable, they are different in definition (tEi logEi

 

hetera, 413 b 26-29).

Third, Aristotle maintains that not only are body and
soul different in definition, but also in "being" (to einai
heteron). For example, at 424 a 24-28 he says:

The primary sense-organ is that in which such a poten-
tiality [for receiving the sensible form without the
matter] resides. These are then the same, although
what it is for them to be such is not the same. For
that which perceives must be a particular extended
magnitude, while what it is to be able to perceive and
the sense are surely not magnitudes, but rather a cer-
tain principle [10 os] and potentiality of that thing.
(trans. Hamlyn. ee also 425 b 26-27)

I conclude, then, that it seems to be Aristotle's
position that even though the faculties of the soul (other
than the mind) always exist in some part of the body in

fact, the faculties of the soul are not the same thihgs as

 

the parts of the body in which they exist. Instead, the
soul is the form, essence, or actuality of the body, and
as such, it is distinguishable from the body in definition
and description, as well as in being. Consequently,

Aristotle is not a materialist in the sense that he believes

98

that certain psychic states are identical with, or nothing
more than, certain bodily states. But he is a materialist
in the sense that the parts of the soul (except the mind)
always exist in some matter and cannot exist without the
appropriate kind of matter.13
The preceding discussion arose from what I charac-
terized as the need for Aristotle to respond to the prob-
lems of the corporeality or incorporeality of the soul and
of its relation to the body, which had not been satisfac-
torily solved, as far as Aristotle was concerned, by his
predecessors. By explaining the soul as the actuality of
a certain kind of body, Aristotle has attempted to explain
the relation between the soul and the body more adequately
than his predecessors did. In II, 1-2 Aristotle explains
what the soulis, why it is in a body, what kind of body has
a soul, and why there is not a haphazard combination of
souls and bodies. These are questions that Aristotle at-
tempts to answer more successfully than his predecessors
did (407 b 13-25). I will not discuss Aristotle's answers

to these questions here, but it should be pointed out that

 

13In "Concepts of Consciousness in Aristotle"'CMind
85 [July 1976]: 388-411) W. F. R. Hardie briefly surveys
the views of those who believe that the soul is nothing
more than the way the body functions or that Aristotle was
not (or could not have been) aware of the mind-body problem.
Hardie argues against both of these views, claiming that
there is a sense in which there is a mind-body distinction
in Aristotle's work and that there is evidence thatAJistotle
was aware of body-mind and mind-body causation (pp. 410-11).

99

his answers to them depend on a concept of a soul that is
neither Strictly materialistic (in the sense that certain
psychic states are identical to certain bodily states) nor
extremely dualistic (in the sense that soul and body are

two different kinds of entities that exist together).

3. Conclusion

What do these results tell us about Aristotle's con-
cept of the human being? For Aristotle, a human being, as
well as every other living organism (except God and the
substances that move the stars), consists of an ensouled
body. And for most of the faculties and affections of the
soul--whether they be nutrition, sensation, or emotion--
there is always some concomitant bodily organ, state, or
process, the actuality of which is the soul. To this ex-
tent, human beings are not much different from the other
animals. But human beings 212 different from the other ani-
mals because humans possess a thinking faculty. AS I
pointed out earlier, though, the thinking faculty is Sig-
nificantly different from the other faculties of the soul,
because it is separable from the body and never mixed with
the body, and because one part of it, the active mind, is

in essence actuality.

 

Another clue to Aristotle's concept of the human be-
ing appears in I, 4, 408 b 5-17, in which he says that "it

is surely better not to say that the soul pities, learns,

100

or thinks, but that the man does these with his soul" (trans.
Hamlyn).14 Aristotle's discussion in this passage reaffirms
the close relationship between the soul and the body, and
suggests the point that the human being is not to be iden-
tified with either the soul or the body alone. |Nussbaum
points out that "the precise way of Speaking of soul and
body . . . is to say that there are various life-activities

of the creature, which we can characterize now functionally,

 

now by specifying the usual material constituents" (p. 148).
She interprets Aristotle as saying that the best way of
describing what a human being does is to speak of the func-
tioning organism, which is a complex of soul and body,
rather than to speak solely in terms of either the soul or
the body. D. W. Hamlyn points out, however, that Aristotle
himself does not always follow this advice, because he of-
ten speaks of the senses (418 a 14) or of the soul (427 a
20) judging, instead of the person judging (p. 81, note to
408 b 5).

The intent of this part was to explore the importance
of the body to Aristotle's theory of a human being in the
De Anima. As a result of this discussion, we have seen that
the body is important because it is the material substratum
without which the essence, or the soul, of a human being

could not exist.

 

14beltion gar 1565 me lagein'ten psychEn eleein e

manthanein 3 dianoeisthai, alla tonanthrapon tEi psychEi.

 

 

101

D. ‘Concluding Remarks

 

In this chapter I discussed the contributions that
the De Anima makes to our understanding of Aristotle's
theory of the human being. These contributions include an
analysis of the mind, an assessment of the importance and
the role of the body in the theory of the human being, and
an extensive discussion of the soul, which is the essence
of the human being.

Throughout my discussion in this chapter, I have
constantly referred to "Aristotle's theory of a human be-
ing," but D. W. Hamlyn points out that "the concept of a
person or subject is generally missing from Aristotle's
discussions of the problems in the philosophy of mind"

(p. 81); that is, Aristotle "gives little attention to the
role of the concepts of a person, the subject of conscious-
ness and personal identity" (p. xiii; also pp. xiii-xv,
122). Indeed, in 408 b 13-15 Aristotle says that "perhaps
it is better not to say that the soul pities or learns or
thinks, but that the man does these things with his soul,"
but, as I mentioned earlier (p. 100), Aristotle does not
often speak in the preferred manner himself. In the 2s
Ahiha Aristotle seems to be primarily concerned with the
"physical" nature of perception, i.e., with the natures of
the objects of perception, the media, the sense organs, and
the various changes which these things suffer. His study
of the mind is devoted to the nature of the thinking part

of the soul and the process by which thinking occurs; his

102

discussion here, as always, is in terms of actuality, poten-
tiality, form, and matter. Now, I would agree that all of
these things are undeniably essential parts of a human be-
ing, and that a complete account of what a human being is
could not afford to ignore them. Furthermore, it certainly
cannot be said that Aristotle has concentrated only on the
various "pieces" of the human being--the mind, the eye, the
soul, the body--to the exclusion of the whole organism of
which they are parts. He has not forgotten the importance
of the integrated, functioning, living organism, and it is
a mark of the excellence of his work in the De Anima and
elsewhere that he takes seriously the importance of the
total organism and its relationship to its environment.
Nevertheless, what is lacking in the De Anima is an acknowl-
edgment of the inner, personal, or immediate quality of

our psychic experiences. This aspect of our experience is
what is important to the concepts of self-consciousness

and the person. Occasionally, Aristotle seems to see the
need for this, as in III, 2, in which he considers the
question of how we are aware that we are sensing. Here,

at 425 b 12-25 and 426 b 8-427 a 15, he studies the nature
of the inner faculty that discriminates between the sensing

15

of color and the sensing of sound, for example. But in

spite of his discussion of some of the properties of this

 

15See also Nicomachean'Ethics, 1170 a 29-b 8.

 

103

faculty, he does not give a very complete account of it,
and he does not seem to recognize how important a part of
the person this faculty is. Consequently, even though
Aristotle has given an admirable account of the human be-
ing, he has not given an adequate theory of the person.

It may be, however, that Aristotle did not discuss
the nature of self-consciousness, because he did not see
it to be a problem that should be addressed in the 2s

Anima.16

The De Anima is, after all, primarily concerned
with the biological aspect of the soul, and not with "psy-
chology" in our sense of the word. It may also be that
Aristotle did not think that the nature of self-conscious-
ness was a problem that needed to be addressed at all.17
I do not intend to explore the complexities involved in
these views; I intend only to note that they offer possible
explanations of why Aristotle did not discuss self-conscious-
ness.

In addition, as Hamlyn suggests in the quote above
(from p. xiii), Aristotle's account of the various aspects

of the human being does not include a theory of personal

identity. Aristotle can be contrasted with Plato in this

 

16The points raised in this paragraph were suggested
to me by Professor Harold T. Walsh.

17It has also been suggested that Aristotle simply did
not have a concept of constiousness. W. F. R. Hardie dis-
cusses this view in his "Concepts of Consciousness in Aris-
totle." Hardie, himself, argues that Aristotle gsg_have a
concept of consciousness.

104

respect. Aristotle and Plato agree that the mind is sepa-
rable from the body, immortal, and capable of knowing all
things, but they seem to have different views of what hap-
pens to the soul after death. Plato's discussions of the
soul's experiences after death suggest that each person's
soul retains its own identity and individuality; each per-
son's soul would remember the experiences of its embodied
life, and the same soul could be reincarnated in another
body, while retaining its knowledge (though unactualized)
of the reality it had experienced while it was separated
from its body. Nevertheless, Aristotle does not describe
the post-mortem existence of the active mind,'and it is not
clear whether each person's active mind retains its iden-
tity and individuality after death. Since the active mind
is essentially activity, it would know all things, and
hence, be actually identical with the objects of thought
(431 b 18). But if every active mind were identical with
all knowable things, then there would seem to be no way of
individuating minds or of reidentifying any mind.
Aristotle points out (404 b 30-405 b 12) that his
predecessors saw the soul as having a nature that was
similar to the nature of their first principles (archai).
He proposes his own theory of the soul in a similar vein,
because he defines the soul and specifies the relation be-
tween the soul and the body in terms of concepts that are

primary to his metaphysics, such concepts as the four

105

causes, especially form and matter, and the concepts of
actuality and potentiality. These fundamental concepts
not only help him explain the existence of, and the pro-
cesses involved in the functioning of, the various facul-
ties of the soul, but they also permit him to explain that
the diverse activities of an organism (assimilating food,
reproducing, sensing, thinking) are the various aspects
of an integrated whole. To explain thus these diverse and
complex activities, and to be able to explain them in a
way that emphasizes their interrelationships, as well as
their relation to the organism as a totality, is a major
accomplishment.

Consequently, in spite of some inadequacies, the hs
Afliflfl is important because it contains a detailed and care-
fully articulated theory of the soul. This is why the 2s
Ahiha is so important for understanding his concept of the
human being.

Finally, one of Aristotle's primary objectives in the

Nicomachean Ethics is to determine what constitutes happi-

 

ness, since happiness is the end at which human actions
ultimately aim. In order to establish what human happiness
consists in, it is necessary for Aristotle to discuss the
nature of the human soul, and the rational faculty espe-
cially. Thus, in the next chapter, I will examine the con-

tribution of the Nicomachean Ethics to our understanding of

 

Aristotle's theory of the human being.

CHAPTER III

THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE NICOMACHEAN

 

.ETHICS AND THE POLITICS

In Chapter II I examined the contribution that the
De Anima makes to Aristotle's theory of the human being.
My discussion of the De Anima was primarily directed to the
nature of the mind, and to the importance of both the mind
and the body to his theory of the human being.

In this chapter I will investigate the contribution

that Aristotle's work in the Nicomachean Ethics (hereafter,

 

"Ah") and the Politics makes toward his theory of the hu-
man being. One would expect the Ah to provide some infor-
mation on his theory of the human being, because Aristotle
is primarily concerned with virtue and happiness, and with
the means of bringing about these conditions in human be-
ings. Since virtue and happiness depend essentially on
certain conditions of the soul, Aristotle explains those
parts of the soul which must be understood if one is to
understand the nature of virtue. It will be useful to com-
pare this explanation with his discussion of the soul in
the De Anima. In addition, Aristotle's work in the Politics

will be of interest, because in this work he discusses the

106

107

differences in the souls of free men, women, children, and

slaves. Thus, both the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics

 

will shed valuable light on his theory of the human being.

The first part of this chapter will contain my exami-
nation of the theory of the soul that emerges in the Ah.

I will also look at the similarities and the differences
between the theory of the soul that appears in the Ah and
the theory that appears in the De Anima. By comparing the
theories of the soul in the Ah and the De Anima, I hope to
determine whether the two accounts are consistent with each
other, and whether they are in fact the same theory of the
soul.

In the second part of this chapter, I will investi-
gate the role of reason in Aristotle's theory of the human
being in the Ah, I will also investigate and attempt to
explain Aristotle's claims in Ah IX, 8 and X, 7 that reason
seems to be the man.

After discussing Aristotle's account of reason in
the Ah, I will spend the third part of this chapter exam-
ining the respects in which children, women, and slaves are
different from free men. Aristotle discusses this issue in
Politics 1. It is essential that we consider carefully
what Aristotle says about children, women, and Slaves in our
attempt to uncover his theory of a human being, because
Aristotle is sometimes understood as maintaining that, for

various reasons, the rational part of the souls of children,

108

women, and slaves is inferior to the rational part of the
souls of free men. If the rational parts of children, wom-
en, and slaves are indeed inferior, then they would not be
fully human on Aristotle's view, since the rational part

is necessary for being human. This consequence is impor-
tant, because ES certainly believe that children, women,
and slaves are human beings in the same sense in which free
men are human beings. If Aristotle does hold that chil-
dren, women, and slaves are not fully human, then we should
try to discover what led him to this view, which conflicts
with our own perspective. Consequently, in this third

part I will attempt to determine whether Aristotle did in
fact hold this view, and if so, I will evaluate the strength

of his position.

A. The Soul

1. The Theory of the Soul in the
Nicomachean Ethics

 

In order to present the theory of the soul that
Aristotle uses in the Ah, I will consider first what he
says about the soul in Ah I, 13. His opening remarks in
this chapter explain that since the student of politics is
interested in encouraging human good, happiness, and vir-
tue, then the student would do well to understand the soul,
because human happiness is an activity of the soul and be-
cause the kind of virtue CEZEEE) that is of interest to the

politician is the virtue or excellence of the soul (1102 a

109

15). What follows these opening remarks is an abbreviated
account of the soul, which Aristotle intended to be only
detailed enough to serve the interests of the student of
politics (1102 a 22-25).

According to the account that is given in I, 13, the

soul consists of two main parts: the irrational (to a10gon)

 

and the rational (to logon echon) parts. Aristotle says

 

that, with respect to the questions that are of interest

in politics, it is not necessary to determine whether these
two parts of the soul are separated, or whether they are
distinguishable only by definition (1102 a 26-32). To
contrast this with what he says in the De Anima, I might
point out that the question of the separability of the parts
of the soul is relevant in the De Anima (II, 2), where he
says that (except for the mind and the thinking faculty [hp

nous kai h? theorEtike, 413 b 24-27]) the faculties of the

 

soul are not separable (ouk ch3rista), although they are

 

different in definition (tEi de logEi hoti hetera, phaneron)
(413 b 27-29).

The irrational part itself has two "components."
Aristotle refers to one of these "components" as "that which
is vegetative in nature" (to phytikon);1 this "component"
exists in all living things and is the cause of their nu-

trition and_growth. Aristotle says that this faculty "in

 

1 . _ -
He also refers to thlS as a "faculty"--dynam1s
(1102 b 1, 5)

110

no way shares in the rational principle" (oudamas koianei

 

lEEEE: 1102 b 30), and that its excellence "seems to be
common to all species and not Specifically human" (1102 b
4, trans. Ross). The second "component" of the irrational
part of the soul is the desiderative "component," which
consists of the appetites and desires. Aristotle demon-
strates the existence of the desiderative "component" in

a way that is similar to the way in which Plato demonstrated
the existence of each of the three parts of the soul in
Republic, 436a-44lc (1102 b 13-28). On the one hand, the
desiderative element is different from the rational princi-
ple in the soul because it is "naturally opposed" to the

rational principle (1102 b 18, trans. Ross: para ton logon

 

pephukos) and resists it, as is evident in those who are
incontinent. On the other hand, the desiderative element
is different from the vegetative faculty because the desi-
derative element participates in the rational principle.
Aristotle explains that the desiderative element "partici-
pates in" or "Shares in" the rational principle in the
sense that it "listens to," "obeys," or "is in some sense
persuaded by" the rational principle (1102 b 28; 1102 b 30-
1103 a 3). That the desiderative element "obeys" the ra-
tional principle is evident in those who are continent.
The desiderative element's "obedience" to the rational
principle distinguishes it from the vegetative faculty in

the sense that the physiological processes involved in

111

nutrition and growth cannot be "persuaded" by the rational
principle in the way that the appetites and desires can be
"persuaded."

In VI, 1 we find that the rational principle of the
soul also consists of two parts. Aristotle does not ex-
plicitly refer to these as dyhameis, "functions," but

instead, he calls them duo ta logon echonta, "two parts

 

which grasp a rational principle," or ta noEtika moria,

 

"the intellectual parts" (1139 a 7, b 12, trans. Ross).
Aristotle assumes that there are in fact two different
parts in the rational principle. His reasons for this are,
first, that any part of the rational principle has the

knowledge it has in virtue of its likeness (homoiotEs) or

 

relationship (oikeiotEs) to its object of knowledge; and

 

second, that there are two different kinds of things that
can be contemplated: things whose principles cannot be
other than they are, and things whose principles could be
other than they are (1139 a 9-11). He calls these two

parts the scientific part (to epistemonikon), by which we

 

contemplate things that are invariable, and the calculative

part (to logistikon), by which we contemplate things that

 

are variable (1139 a 6-15). (Aristotle points out that
deliberation and calculation are the same thing [1139 a 13:
tosgar bouleuesthai kai logidzesthai tauton], and that the

calculative part [to logistikon] is one part of the ration-

 

al principle.)

112

The remaining chapters of Book VI consist of Aristotle's
examination of the five virtues of the rational faculty.
We can see from his discussion that the scientific faculty
is concerned with objects that are eternal and necessarily
existing, as well as with the first principles (archai)
from which we arrive at demonstrative knowledge about eter-
nal objects (Chaps. 3, 6). The virtues of the calculative
part arise from activities that involve things that could
be other than they are: the activity of making things
(techne, Chap. 4) and activity regarding things that are

conducive to a good life (phronEsis, Chap. 5). In order

 

to be virtuous, a person engaged in either of these kinds

of activities must use right reason.Z Thus, given this out-
line of Aristotle's explanation of the soul in the Ah, I
will examine next the extent to which his account of the
rational part in the Ah is consistent with his account of

it in the De Anima.

 

2In this discussion I have mentioned the five vir-
tues of the rational principle for the sake of complete-
ness. Nevertheless, in the following discussion I will
not be primarily concerned with the human being as a maker
or as a deliberator, even though these are important as-
pects of a human being. Instead, I will be primarily con-
cerned with the human being in general as a thinking
animal.

113

2. The Psychology of the Nicomachean Ethics
vs. the Psychology of the De Anima

 

(a) The Differences Between the
Psychology of the Nicomachean
Ethics and the Psychology of

the De Anima

 

Overall, I would say that Aristotle's account of the
rational part of the soul in the Ah is so different from
his account of the thinking faculty in the De Anima that
it is quite legitimate to ask whether he is using the same
concept of the rational part of the soul in both works.

By discussing some of the differences between his discus-
sions of the rational part of the soul in the Ah and the

De Anima, I will show that there is reason to believe that
he is using different concepts of the rational part. I

will concentrate on three main differences: (1) differences
in how Aristotle refers to the rational faculty, (2) dif-
ferences in the kinds of properties the rational faculty
has, and (3) differences in the parts that compose the
rational faculty.

First, Aristotle uses different terms to refer to
the thinking part of the soul in the Ah and the De Anima.

In the Ah he refers to it as to logon echon--"that which

 

is possessing reason" (or, according to Ross, "that which
has a rational principle," [1103 a 2] or "that which grasps
a rule or rational principle" [1139 a 5]). But in the As
Ahiha he often refers to the rational soul as hshs, as he
does, for example, in 111, 4 and 5, when he is discussing

the passive and active nous. The word 'nous' is used in

114

the Ah in several senses. First, in Book VI hshs is one

of the five states (hexeis) in virtue of which the soul
possesses truth (1139 b 12-17; VI, 6). This is a differ-
ent sense of 'hphs' from the sense in which it is used in
the De Anima. Second, hshs is "reason" (Ross) or "intel-
lect" (Rackham) (1139 a 18, 1168 b 35, 1177 b 30). This
second sense of 'hshs' seems to correspond more closely to
the sense in which 'hshs' is used in De Anima.3 Neverthe-
less, the account that Aristotle gives of this kind of £222
in the Ah does not correspond to the account that he gives
of £22§.in the De Anima. Thus, the differences between

the accounts of the rational faculty in the Ah and the As
Ahhha go deeper than a difference in the terms that
Aristotle uses to refer to it. I will consider these deeper
differences next.

Second, the rational principle in the Ah seems to have
different properties from the mind in the De Anima. For
example, in theAh Aristotle says of hshs that (1) "that
this is the man himself, then, or is so more than anything
else, is plain" (1169 a 2, trans. Ross; also 1166 a 17, 23,

1178 a 2-8); (2) its virtue is separable (kechdrismene,

 

 

3It should be pointed out that Aristotle uses 'nous'
in a third sense in Ah VI, 2, 1139 a 18, by which he refers
to the entire rational soul. See Rackham in The Nicomachean
Ethics, trans. H. Rackham (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1934), p. 328, n. a; and H. H. Joachim, Aristotle:
The Nicomachean Ethics, ed. D. A. Rees (Oxford: Oxford
UniverSity Press, 1951), p. 173, note on 1139 a 18.

 

 

115

1178 a 22, trans. Ross); and (3) its activity is contem-

plation (thedrdtikh, 1177 a 18) and most continuous (syn -

 

chestath, 1177 a 23). Aristotle does not say any of these
things about the mind in the De Anima. I will consider
each of these three properties in turn.

(1) Aristotle does not say in the De Anima that the
mind "is the man himself." In fact, far from "being the
man himself," one active mind in De Anima III, 5 seems to
be no different from any other active mind, since it is
separable and thinks all things. And as I pointed out in
Chapter II, when the active mind is separated from the
body there seems to be no way to individuate it from other
active minds--it has no personal identity, because it is
the same as the objects of thought. But to say that the
hphs "is the man himself" suggests a personal hphs, al-
though Aristotle does not say this explicitly.4 I will
discuss in more detail later Aristotle's view that reason
"is the man himself."

(2) In the De Anima he says that both the passive

and the active minds are separable (charistos, 429 b 4,

 

430 a 17), but he does not say this about nous in Ah. In

the Ah he says that the excellence of nous is separable

 

4I owe to Professor Craig A. Staudenbaur the sugges-
tion that the nous in the Ah is not the separate, imper-
sonal nous of the De Anima. H. H. Joachim discusses this
problem and proposes an explanation of it in his AriStOtle,
pp. 288-91.

 

 

116

(kechdrismenh), but this does not necessarily suggest that

 

hshs is separable. In fact, he seems to be using 'separa-
ble' in two different senses. In the De Anima the active
mind is separable in the sense that it can exist by it-

self in separation from the body. But in Ah X, 8 he seems

to be saying that the excellence of the nous is separable

 

in the sense that it is different from the virtues of our

 

"composite nature."

(3) In the De Anima Aristotle says that the essence
of the active mind is activity (energeia, 430 a 18) and
that it always thinks (hssh, 430 a 22). In the Ah, how-
ever, he does not say what the essence of BEBE is. He says

only that its activity is contemplative (thedrhtikh, 1177

 

a 18) and that its contemplative activity is the most con-
tinuous, "since we contemplate truth more continuously than
we gs anything" (1177 a 23, trans. Ross). This does not
necessarily imply that the hshs is always thinking.

Therefore, it seems that the properties that the
hshs has in Ah are not the same as the properties that the
mind has in the De Anima.

The third main difference between the accounts of
the rational faculty in the Ah and the De Anima concerns
the parts into which the rational faculty is divided in
each work. As I pointed out earlier, Aristotle says in Ah

I, 1 that the rational principle of the soul contains two

117

5. .—.. .
parts. F1rst, the sc1ent1f1c part (to ep1stemon1kon) 1s

 

the part by means of which we contemplate objects that ex-
ist of necessity (anangkéS) and hence are eternal (VI, 3).

Second, the calculative part (to logistikon) is the part by

 

means of which we contemplate variable things. Aristotle
distinguishes these two parts of the rational principle
on the basis of their objects:
for where objects differ in kind the part of the soul
answering to each of the two is different in kind,
Since it is in virtue of a certain likeness and kin-
ship with their objects that they have the knowledge
they have. (1139 a 9-11, trans. Ross)

If Aristotle is using the same concept of the ration-
al faculty in the Ah and the De Anima, then one would ex-
pect Aristotle to be able to maintain in both works that
the thinking faculty consists of the same two parts. I
Shall attempt to Show that, while the thinking faculty in
the De Anima is divided into two parts, there is reason to
believe that they are not the same as the scientific and
the calculative parts in the Ah. Hence, it will follow
that Aristotle does not use the same concept of the ration-
al faculty in both works.

In the De Anima (III, 4-5) the rational faculty is

divided into the active and passive minds. Since I dis-

cussed the difference between the active and passive minds

 

5The following discussion of the third main difference
owes much to suggestions from Professor Kotzin.

118

in Chapter II, I wish to point out here only the respect
in which they differ from the scientific and calculative
minds. The active-passive distinction is different from
the scientific-calculative distinction because of the basis
upon which the distinction is made. The active and pas-
sive minds are not distinguished on the basis of their
objects, for they seem to have the same objects of thought.
Instead, the active and passive minds are distinguished on
the basis of their activity and passivity. The active mind
is essentially activity, and its relation to the passive
mind is the relation of that which makes all things to that
which becomes all things. This is not the basis that
Aristotle uses for distinguishing between the scientific
and calculative minds in Ah.

One similarity that appears to exist between the ra-
tional principle in the Ah_and the mind in the De Anima
is that both have knowledge by being lihs their objects.
It is not clear, however, to what extent the similarity
holds, because Aristotle does not say in the Ah whether the
rational principle thinks by receiving the intelligible
forms of the objects of knowledge, as the mind does in the
De Anima.

So far, I have tried to Show that there are indica-
tions that Aristotle is not using the same theory of the
rational faculty in the Ah and the De Anima. Nevertheless,

the question whether he is using the same theory of the

119

soul in both works is a highly controversial question.
Having given reasons for the view that Aristotle is hss
using the same theory of the rational faculty in both works
(and hence, that he is not using exactly the same theory

of the soul in both works), I will consider the view that
he is using the same theory of the soul in both works.

(b) The View That the Psychologies

of the Nicomachean Ethics and
the De Anima Are the Same

 

One problem that arises is that Aristotle did not
discuss the parts of the soul in the De Anima in terms of
the rational and irrational parts, as he does in the Ah.
In fact, he says in De Anima III, 9 that there appears to
be an indefinite number of parts in the soul, and not only

the rational (to logon echon) and the irrational (to alogon)

 

 

parts, as some say (432 a 25-27). He also says that the

sensitive part (to aisthhtikon) "could not easily be set

 

down as either irrational or rational" (432 a 30, trans.

Hamlyn) and that the desiderative part (to orektikon) "might

 

seem to be different from all both in definition and in

capacity [kai logdi kai dynamei]" (432 b 4). Therefore,

 

his discussion in this passage of the De Anima suggests
that he does not accept the rational-irrational division
of the soul.

It might be argued that since Aristotle was primarily
interested in the nature of the soul in the De Anima, and

in its faculties in particular, a division of the soul into

120

parts that was too Simple would not be acceptable because
it would not adequately distinguish all of the differences
in power that one could find in the soul. Nevertheless,
since the student of politics is interested in the soul
only with respect to its role in human virtue, then a less
detailed analysis of the soul would serve. The conclusion
would be that even though the account of the soul in the Ah
is different from the account in the De Anima, this does
not necessarily imply that Aristotle is using a different

6 W. F. R. Hardie comes

theory of the soul in each work.
to a similar conclusion in his discussion of Ah 1102 a 23-32

in his Aristotle's Ethical Theory.7 Hardie points out that

 

when Aristotle says that "further precision is . . . more
laborious than our purposes require" (trans. Ross), "he is
not implying that there is anything erroneous in the doc-
trine as he states it. He is saying only that, in the
systematic study of the soul, much of the detail has no
relevance or interest for the Student of ethics" (P. 70).
One might also ask whether the theory of the soul
that is used in the Ah is Aristotle's BEE theory, because
he proposes to use the view of the soul that is held in

the exdterikoi logoi. According to the view of the

 

 

6After all, Aristotle does not say in the Ah that the
rational and the irrational parts-She the onl parts of the
soul. Perhaps he would still say that there is a sensi-
tive part in the soul also.

7(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), Chap. V.
All page references to Hardie's book will be_given in thetext.

121

exoferikoi logoi, the soul consists of the irrational and

 

rational parts, and in the De Anima he attributes this

view to "what some say" (432 a 26). (In the Magna Moralia

 

1182 a 23 this view is attributed to Plato.) So Aristotle
does not explicitly say whether he is using his own theory
or someone else's. The problem is made more acute by the
fact that, as Hardie points out (p. 69), Aristotle some-

times uses the term 'exdterikoi logoi' to refer to the views

 

of those "outside our school" (Physics 217 b 30-31, trans.
Ross), and sometimes he uses it to refer to his own works.8
Hardie says that among the various positions that have been

taken on the meaning of'bxhterikoi logoi' in Ah 1102 a 26,

 

one view is that Aristotle was referring to the Platonic
view of the soul that was held by the members of the
Academy.9 Hardie's own view seems to be that the conception

of the human being that is offered in the exdterikoi logoi

 

is a conception that Aristotle could consistently accept.

This is not to say definitely that Aristotle was proposing

 

8Met. 1076 a 28-29; Eud. Ethics 1217 b 22, 1218 b
32-34; Politics 1323 a 21-23; Ah 1140 a 1-3.

 

9Hardie says (pp. 69-70) that Burnet and Jaeger held
this position. See John Burnet, ed., The Ethics of Aris-
totle, with an introduction and notes (London: Methuen 8 Co.,
1900], pp. 58, 65, and John Burnet, ed. Aristotle on Educa-
tion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903),_p. 40,
n. I. See also Werner Jaeger's discussion of the exoterikoi
lo oi with respect to the Eudemian'Ethics in his AriStotle:
The Fundamentals of the HistOry'oleis Development, 2nd ed.,
trans. Richard Robinson (Oxford? OxfordIUniversity Press,
1948), pp. 246-58, 332-33.

 

 

 

 

 

 

122

exactly the same theory of the soul that he developed in
the De Anima, but it is also not to say that this is a
theory of the soul that Aristotle disagreed with. Hardie
says: "I do not wish to maintain that all of the doctrines
of the De Anima were in Aristotle's mind when he wrote the
Ah. I wish only to justify the opinion that, as regards
the specific nature of the human animal, the two works
broadly agree" (p. 73). Thus, Hardie rejects the view that
the theory of the soul in the Ah represents a view of the
soul that is intermediate between the Platonic view in the
Eudemus and the more mature view in the De Anima. Conse-
quently, with respect to his discussion of NE 1102 a 23-32,
Hardie says that "even if the De Anima had already been
written, Aristotle might prefer to use easier and more
accessible works" (p. 70). He concludes that "neither the
references to the 'exoteric discussions' nor the disclaimer
of detailed precision is to be understood as implying that
Aristotle would be willing to argue from psychological
premisses which he did not himself accept" (p. 71).

It seems to me that one difficulty with Hardie's posi-
tion as I have presented it so far is that it is not at all
clear that the theory of the soul in the Ah is consistent
with the theory of the soul in the De Anima. In the first
place, I have already shown that there are serious differ-
ences in the accounts of the rational faculties in the two

works. And in the second place, if Aristotle is using a

123

theory of the soul (viz., the theory of the exdterikoi

 

Asgsh) in the Ah which holds that the rational and irra-
tional parts are the 221K two parts of the soul, then this
is not consistent with his view in De Anima III, 9 that
the sensitive part of the soul does not belong to either
the rational or the irrational parts (432 a 30).

I have mentioned that Hardie believes that the views
of the human being that are given in the De Anima and the
Ah "broadly agree" (p. 73). His reasons for believing this
are as follows. In Chapter V Hardie explains what he calls
Aristotle's "entelechy theory" of the soul (p. 72). This
is the view, presented in the De Anima, that the soul is

the actuality (entelecheia) of the body. Thus, a human be-

 

ing is an embodied soul or an ensouled body, and the affec-
tions of the soul (except thought in the active hshs) are
associated with concomitant affections of the body (403 a
16-19). Hardie believes that there is evidence that
Aristotle accepts this theory in the Ah, even though he
does not set out this theory or explicitly refer to it.
Hardie points out, though, that there are passages in
which Aristotle refers to the bodily concomitants of emo-
tions. At 1147 a 14-18 Aristotle says that such passions
as anger and sexual appetites "manifestly change the body"

(epidhlds kai to sdma methistasin) (cf. 1147 b 6-9). And

 

at 1178 a 14-16, when writing about the moral virtues and

their relation to the passions, Aristotle says that "some

124

even seem to result from the body [symbainein apo tou

 

sdmatos]." Now, these passages do not depend on the "en-
telechy theory" in any obvious way; both passages would be
acceptable to one who held a Platonic theory of the soul.
And, while these passages do not explicitly say that there
is a concomitance between psychic states and bodily states,
Hardie would probably point out that neither do they SEEK
this. In 1128 b 10-15 Aristotle describes fear in a way
that is distinctly reminiscent of his description of the
emotions in the De Anima. Here, he says that the fear of
dishonor and the fear of danger "both appear to be in some
way bodily [sdmatika]." Consequently, even though Aristotle
does not explicitly discuss the emotions in the same way
that he did in the De Anima, Hardie says that "he might
have accepted and taken for granted the fact that 'psycho-
logical phenomena are psychophysical' without having come
to express the fact by saying that the soul is the form.
essence . . . or entelechy of the body" (p. 76).

I would say that the passages in the Ah that mention
a connection between the affections of the soul and con-
comitant affections of the body do not lend much support
to the view that Aristotle had the same theory of the soul
in both the Ah and the De Anima or that the theories of the
soul in each work are consistent. The reason why I would
say this is that Aristotle is so indefinite and tentative
about saying whether "psychological phenomena are psycho-

physical." Aristotle's claims in the Ah that the affections

125

of the soul "seem to result from the body" or "appear to

be in some way bodily" provide a marked contrast with his
firmer claims in the De Anima that "the . . . parts of the
soul are not separable, as some say; although that they

are different in definition is clear" (413 b 28-29, trans.
Hamlyn). Further, even if it could be shown that Aristotle
accepted in the Ah the view that the soul (except the mind)
is in fact the same as the body, this would still not be
enough to prove that the theory of the soul in the Ah is
the same as the theory in the De Anima. This is because
there would Still be a disagreement between the two works
on the parts of the soul. According to Aristotle's theory
of the soul in the De Anima, the soul is composed of the
rational, sensitive, and nutritive parts. But according

to his theory in the Ah, the soul is divided into different
parts. Therefore, even if we grant the inseparability of
soul and body, the theories of the soul in the Ah and the
De Anima still seem to be inconsistent because there is a
difference in the kinds of parts of which the soul is com-
posed.

The second argument that Hardie gives in support of
his view that Aristotle was presupposing the "entelechy
theory" in the Ah is based on Aristotle's reference to the
composite nature of human beings (1177 b 26-29, 1178 a 19-
21). Hardie's position could be represented as follows

(pp. 76-77). If Aristotle uses 'composite' (to syntheton)

 

126

 

in Ah as he does in the Metaphysics, then he is using the

doctrine (which he uses in the Metaphysics) that a human

 

being is a composite of form and matter. If he is relying
on the doctrine that a human being is a form-matter com-
posite, then he is assuming the "entelechy theory," since
the "entelechy theory" is just the theory that human be-
ings are composites of form (soul) and matter (body). Now,
Hardie says that scholars who have dealt with this question
(including Bonitz and J. A. Stewart)10 have agreed that
Aristotle is indeed using 'composite' as he did in the

Metaphysics. It follows, therefore, that Aristotle is as-

 

suming the "entelechy theory" in the Ah. Hardie concludes
that "the burden of proof lies on those who deny that
Aristotle in the Ah had in his mind the entelechy doctrine"
(p. 77).

The crucial issue here is whether Aristotle is indeed
referring to the union of soul (as form) and body (as mat-
ter) by his use of 'composite'. In 1177 b 26-29 and 1178
a 19-21 Aristotle distinguishes between the moral virtues,
which are the virtues of "our composite nature" (trans.

Ross), and the virtue of reason (nous), which he says is

 

10J. A. Stewart says: "h? _Synthetos ousia is the
concrete thing--the union of hyle and morphh, as distin-
sguished from the morphe which is ousia aneu hyles. Thus
zoon as psyche en somati is a synthetos ousia of which

5 che is the ousia aneu hyles or ti en einai: see Met. H.
3.1043 b. 29 sqq." (Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics of
Aristotle [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1892], vol{_2, p. 448,
note to EE.1177 b 28).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

127

separate (kechhrismenh, 1178 a 22). To say that the moral

 

virtues are virtues of our composite nature suggests that
Aristotle is referring to the composite of the human body
and the irrational soul, Since the moral virtues are those
involving the desiderative part of the soul (1103 a 3-6).
It seems to me, however, that the difficulty in re-
lying on Aristotle's reference to our composite nature in
Ah as evidence that he was using the "entelechy theory" of
the soul is that if he is using 'composite' in the same

sense in which he uses it in the Metaphysics, then this

 

presupposes that the soul is the form of the body. And if
the soul is the form of the body, then it is the same as
the body in fact. But I have already pointed out that
there is little unequivocal evidence in the Ah that indi-
cates that Aristotle held that the soul was the same as
the body in fact. The result is that the reference to our
composite nature is not strong enough evidence that
Aristotle was using the same theory of the soul in the Ah

as in the Metaphysics and the De Anima.

 

At the beginning of my discussion of Hardie's posi-
tion, I pointed out that he holds that "as regards the
specific nature of the human mind, the two works [i.e., the
Ah and the De Anima] broadly agree" (p. 73). This remark
and his discussion of Aristotle's statement that "further
precision [regarding the soul] is . . . more laborious

than our purposes require" (1102 a 25, trans. Ross) suggest

128

that he believes Aristotle to have been using basically

the same theory of the soul in the Ah and the De Anima.
Hardie's view seems to be that the only difference in the
account of the soul in the Ah is that it is less detailed
than the account in the De Anima. Nevertheless, I have
tried to Show that the differences between the two theories
are more fundamental than a mere difference in detail.11
If Aristotle were using in the Ah a less detailed version
of the De Anima theory of the soul, then there should be
some traces, at least, of some of the fundamental doctrines
in the De Anima theory of the soul. For example, the doc-
trines that the soul is the form of the body, that it is

the same as the body in fact, while different in definition,
and that the soul can be divided into the thinking, sensing,
and nutritive faculties are central to his theory of the

soul in the De Anima. Aristotle did not use these doctrines

in the Ah.

(c) Conclusion

I wish to point out, however, that I have Ash shown
that Aristotle did not accept the De Anima theory of the
soul while he was writing the Ah. I have only tried to
show that the theory of the soul that he uses or develops

in the Ah is not entirely the same as the theory of the

 

11This point was suggested to me by Professor Kotzin.

129

soul that he develops in the De Anima. There seem to me
to be fundamental differences between the two theories.
Nevertheless, I do not intend to suggest that the
theory of the soul that Aristotle uses in the Ah is in-
adequate for his discussion of ethical and political prob-
lems. It is a mark of Aristotle's insight into the role
of the human being in ethics and politics that he concen-
trated on the scientific, calculative, desiderative, and
vegetative parts of the soul. The scientific part is im-
portant because it enables a person to contemplate things
that are eternal, noble, and divine (VI, 3; 1177 a 15).
Contemplative activity is the best kind of activity that
a human being can engage in, and the life of contemplative
activity is the happiest life for a human being (1177 a
12-22, 1177 b 24). The calculative part is important be-
cause with it one can acquire the human virtues and intel-
ligently pursue those variable things that "conduce to the
good life in general" (1140 a 25-28, trans. Ross). The
desiderative part is important because it is an essential
factor in initiating locomotion and because it tends to
oppose the rational half of the soul. The student of ethics
and politics must take this part of the soul into account
because the truly virtuous and happy person is the person
whose calculative part can control and intelligently guide
the impetuous and rebellious desires. Finally, the vege-

tative faculty is important because its prOper functioning

130

helps to insure the survival of the individual human be-
ing, and because many of the objects by means of which the
vegetative faculty performs its function (such as food,
water, and so on) are also the objects of the desires,
which can be pursued continently or incontinently. So if
one is interested in how to bring about virtue and happi-
ness among the citizens of one's state, one should under-
stand shas the soul has these parts, hsh they function in
a human being, and the ways in which they function well

or badly (see VI, 2).

In this part I have explained the theory of the soul
that Aristotle uses in the Ah, and I have tried to show
that there is reason to believe that, with respect to the
rational faculty, at least, the theory of the soul in the
Ah is not the same as the theory in the De Anima. Whether
Aristotle does use the same theory of the soul in both
works is, nevertheless, a controversial issue. Thus, I
presented W. F. R. Hardie's view that there is broad agree-
ment between the theories of the soul in the two works.
However, I think that Hardie's position does not resolve
successfully enough some of the serious differences be-
tween the two accounts of the soul. In the next part I
will continue to explore Aristotle's theory of the human

being in the Ah by examining his view of human reason.

131

B. Reason
1. Reason and the Human Being

Reason is the ability that is most characteristic
of human beings in the sense that human beings are the only
living organisms that have the ability to reason. Further-
more, the activity of reasoning is an activity that humans
share with the gods. The importance of reason to the con-
cept of a human being is a theme that runs through much of
Aristotle's work, and it is especially apparent in the Ah
when he is discussing the role of the soul in human virtue.
Since reason is so important to the nature of a human be-
ing, it will be of interest to look more closely at what
Aristotle says about it in the Ah,

One passage that especially emphasizes the importance
of reason to the nature of a human being is to be found in
I, 7, in which Aristotle discusses the function (to ergon)
of a human being. At the beginning of this chapter he es-
tablishes that happiness is that which is chosen only for
itself (1097 b 1), and that it is happiness alone which
makes life desirable and lacking in nothing (1197 b 15).
Since Aristotle is interested in human happiness, he sug-
gests that a better account of happiness might be gained
by determining the function of a human being, because in
everything that has a function "the good and the well seem
to exist in the function" (1097 b 27). In his search for

the function, Aristotle says that he is interested in the

132

function of the human being as a whole, not just the func-
tion of one of the parts of the body (1097 b 31-32). He
also says that he is looking for that which is peculiar
(to idion) to human beings (1097 b 34) in the sense that
no other order of living organism has it. Consequently,
neither life nor nutrition nor perception will do, because
plants and other animals have one or more of these. Since
human beings are the only living organisms that have a
rational principle, Aristotle sees the function of a human
being to be the exercise of a rational principle. Thus,
the human being's function is "a certain activity of that

which has a rational principle" (praktikh tis tou logon

 

echontos, 1098 a 3) or "activity of the soul according to
a rational principle or not without a rational principle"
(estin ergon anthrdpou psychEs energeia kata logon E'mh

anou logou, 1098 a 7).

 

This passage shows how essential acting according to
a rational principle is to Aristotle's concept of the hu-
man being. To say that this kind of activity is peculiar
to human beings is to say that it is a kind of activity
that no other plant or animal engages in, and that it is
not part of their nature to engage in such an activity.
This result is consistent with my earlier conclusions that
the rational faculty is a necessary part of the human

being.

133

I might point out in passing that since having the
rational faculty is necessary for a human being, and since
this is a faculty that other animals do not have, then
there are some features that humans have in virtue of
having a rational faculty which set them apart from lower
animals. Happiness is one activity that humans engage in,
but which animals cannot engage in (1178 b 24-31). The
reasons for this, according to Aristotle, are that happi-

ness is a kind of contemplation (eih an h? eudaimonia

 

thedria tis, 1178 b 32) and that no other animal is happy,

 

because animals "in no way share in contemplation" (1178
b 27, trans. Ross). Another feature that human beings

have in virtue of possessing reason is choice (proairesis).

 

He explains in V1, 2 that the origin of choice is desire
(orexis) and "reasoning directed to some end" (logos ho

heneka tinos, 1139 a 32, trans. Rackham). He also says

 

that choice does not exist without intellect (hshs) and
thought (dianoia) (1139 a 33, 1112 a 16). It should be
pointed out that choice must involve the calculative part
of the rational half of the soul, since choice is made
about things that could be other than they are, and since
it is in some sense the origin of action. Consequently,
Since animals do not possess a rational faculty, they do
not share in choice (1111 b 7-9). As a result, humans
could not possess happiness or choice without having a ra-

tional faculty.

134

The importance of reason to Aristotle's theory of a
human being is also evident in certain passages in which

he says that reason "seems to be each man" (hekastos einai

 

Ashsh, 1166 a 17, 23; 1178 a 2-3, 8). In these passages
Aristotle does not explicitly say that reason simply is a
human being, and I shall argue that in these passages
Aristotle is not literally identifying a human being with
reason. I will also discuss the view of John M. Cooper,
who holds that Aristotle does identify the human being
with reason and that doing this leads Aristotle into seri-
ous difficulties.

In IX, 8, 1168 b 28-1169 a 5 Aristotle argues that
there is a sense in which the intellect is the human be-
ing. The argument that appears in the text is not com-
pletely stated in every detail, so my own reconstruction
of it is as follows:

1. In any composite whole_(s stEma) "that which is most
authoritative [to kuriotaton seems especially to

be" the whole [itself] (1168 b 31-32). (It is in
this sense that a sovereign is said to be the state.)

 

2. Man is a composite whole (to syntheton). (This is
a suppressed premise in this passage; it is stated
at 1177 b 26-29 and 1178 a 19-21.)

 

3. The most authoritative part of man "seems to be
[dokei einai]" the man himself. (From 1, 2)

 

4. Reason (ho nous) or the rational principle (to kata
10 on) is t e most authoritative part of a good man
(TIES b 34-35, 1169 a 1,18).

Therefore,
5. The intellect "seems to be" the good man himself
(1169 a 2-3). (From 3, 4)

135

It is important to keep in mind the context in which

12 In IX, 8 Aristotle is trying

this argument is given.
to prove that "the good man should be a lover of self

[philautos]" (1169 a 11-12, trans. Ross). The man who is

 

a lover of self most of all "gratifies the most authorita-
tive element in himself and in all things obeys this"

(1168 b 28-33, trans. Ross). Aristotle then points out

that a man has self-control only if his reason (ho nous)

has control (1168 b 33-34). The result is that reason con-
trols the actions of the lover of self, i.e., of the good
man. Since the good man's reason controls his actions,

then reason is the most authoritative part of him. Finally,
the argument that I have reconstructed above is used to
Show that Since any systematic whole is identified with its
most authoritative part, then the good man, who is a lover
of self, is identified with his reason. Thus, Aristotle
seems to be saying that when a man's reason controls his
actions and prevents him from "following his evil passions"
(1169 a 15, trans. Ross), then he has ssh: control; that is,
one part of him (his reason) controls the whole self.
Aristotle then identifies the man himself with the control-

ling part.13

 

121 am indebted to Professors Kotzin and Walsh for
calling this to my attention.

13This point was suggested to me by Professor Kotzin.

136

Having considered Aristotle's purpose for giving this
argument and the context in which it appears, it seems
that in this chapter Aristotle is hsi making a general
ontological point about human beings. That is, he seems
hsi to be saying that each man in himself is the same thing
as his reason. Instead, he seems to be saying that the
human being is_the authoritative part of himself, perhaps
in the sense of 'is' in which we say that "a person is what
he eats" or in the sense in which Louis XIV said, "L'état,

14

c'est moi." Therefore, Aristotle would probably say that

 

the incontinent man is his desires, Since his desires, ra-
ther than his reason, constitute the authoritative part of
him.

It also follows that since a man "seems to be es-
pecially that which is most authoritative in [him]" (1168
b 32), then Aristotle's claim that the man who obeys his
reason is his reason does not necessarily imply that reason
is a necessary condition for being human; it only implies
that obeying one's reason is a necessary condition for being
a gsph_human. This is because it would follow from the view

that a whole is identified with its most authoritative

 

14These senses of 'is' were suggested to me by Pro-
fessors Walsh and Staudenbaur, respectively.

137

element that the incontinent man is his desires. But an

incontinent man is still a human being.15

2. A Critical Analysis of
Cooper's Position
An interesting criticism of Aristotle's reasons for
holding that the intellect is the human being has been

raised by John M. Cooper in his book Reason and Human Good

 

in Aristotle (pp. 168-77).16 In discussing the passage at

 

Ah 1168 b 29-1169 a 3, Cooper notes that one reason why
Aristotle identifies a human being with the intellect is
that there is an analogy between a city and a human being
with respect to the relationship between the authority and
the organized whole (see premise l in my formulation of
Aristotle's argument, p. 134). Cooper points out that two
restrictions apply to this analogy. First, the analogy
can only be used to support the kind of identification
that Aristotle wants in the case of organized wholes that
have "a strongly hierarchical structure" (p. 171). An
organization that does not have such a structure (such as

the Congregational Church) is not identified with a

 

15The other passages in which Aristotle says that
reason "seems to be," or is, the man (1166 a 17, 23; 1178
a 2-3, 8) also seem to be concerned with the ethical point
that the ood man is his reason, rather than with the onto-
logical po1nt that a man literally is the same as his
reason.

16(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975). All
page references to Cooper's book will be given in the text.

138

dominating element (as the Roman Catholic Church might be
identified with the Pope). The second restriction is that
the authority with whom the whole organization is to be
identified must be one that formulates policy and makes
decisions "for the whole membership" (pp. 171-72). C00per
says that the consequence of what Aristotle says in this
passage is that the human being is identified "with that
in him which properly ought to decide what he is to do and
which controls and guides his inclinations and desires in
their job of moving his limbs and generating actions--in
short, with his practical reason" (p. 172). This would
indeed seem to follow from the analogy between a city and
a human being, which Aristotle appeals to in this passage.
The authoritative element in a city makes decisions with
the interest of the whole city in mind. Many of the deci-
sions it makes are intended to insure that the city func-
tions in an orderly way and in the best way for a city to
function. The same kinds of concerns would preoccupy the

authoritative element in the human being. That this ele-

ment must be the practical reason (phronhsis) is evident

 

because, as Cooper points out, Aristotle says that "prac-
tical wisdom issues commands, since its end is what ought
to be done or not to be done" (1143 a 8-9, trans. Ross).
Now, the excellence of scientific reason, or the in-
tellect, consists in contemplating invariable, eternal

things (VI, 3). It is not concerned with variable things,

139

and since variable things include things that are done
(1140 a 1), then the intellect is not concerned with what

17 But the topic

should be done or what should not be done.
in Ah IX, 8 is what the good man should do, and one point
that Aristotle supports is that the good man Should obey
his reason in all of his actions. Therefore, considering
that scientific reason is concerned with eternal things
and that practical reason is concerned with what is done,
Cooper is pointing out that the kind of reason that the
good man obeys, and with which the good man is identified,
must be practical reason, rather than scientific reason.
Surprisingly enough, in Ah X, 7 Aristotle seems to
have changed his position on the nature of the authorita-
tive element in a way that is incompatible with his posi-
tion in Ah IX, 8. Cooper says that "it is essential to the
underlying rationale of this theory of human identity that
the mind be thought of as what makes decisions and controls
the action-producing apparatus of the person" (p. 174).

He goes on to point out that in X, 7 Aristotle identi-

fies the human being with the intellect (still called nous

 

17One might point out that contemplating eternal
things is doin something, and hence, the intellect is con-
cerned wit something that is done. In response to fhis,
I would say that when Aristotle says that practical wisdom
is concerned with things that are done, he is referring
to the pursuit of certain variable things that are good for
a man (VI, 5). Thus, a person who manages a household or
a state well has practical wisdom (1140 b 8-11).

 

140

as in IX, 8).18 The intellect is that which is god-like
(theios, 1177 b 30), "superior to our composite nature"

(diapherei . . . tou synthetou, 1177 b 28, trans. Ross),

 

 

something whose excellence is separate from the excellence

that is connected with our composite nature (h? tou nou

 

'kechdrismenh, 1178 a 19-22), and "that which is authorita-

 

tive and better" (to kurion kai ameinon, 1178 a 2). But

 

Aristotle's discussion in 1177 b 26-1178 a 8 presents dif-
ficulties when it is compared with his discussion in 1168
b 28-1169 a 5. In both passages he identifies the human
being with the authoritative part. The difficulty is that
the argument in 1X, 8 would lead one to believe that the
authoritative part is the practical intelligence, but the
discussion in X, 7-8 would lead one to believe that the
authoritative part is the intellect. That Aristotle is

discussing contemplative reason rather than practical rea-

 

 

son in X, 7 is evident when he says, with respect to the
activity of the best thing in a man, "this activity alone
would seem to be loved for its own sake; for nothing arises
from it apart from the contemplating, while from practical
activities we gain more or less apart from the action"

(1177 b 1-4, trans. Ross). Cooper concludes (pp. 174-75)

 

18Cooper translates "nous" here as "intellect" or
"reason." This is the part of the rational principle_that
contemplates invariable things. He translates "phronesis"
as "practical wisdom." This is the part of the rational
principle that deliberates about variable things, and in
particular about things that are done.

 

141

that in X, 7 Aristotle cannot use the same argument he uses
in IX, 8 to show that a human being can be identified with
the intellect, simply because "the pure intellect is not
'authoritative' in the sense of exercising control over
anything" (p. 175). On the one hand, the intellect does
not deliberate about the desires or what the human being
ought to do, and so it does not exercise any authority over
the desires by controlling them. On the other hand, from
what Aristotle says in both 1177 b 26-1178 a 8 and 1178 a

9-14 it is clear that practical intelligence (phronhsis)

 

is associated with our composite nature (to syntheton),

 

which includes controlling the passions and instilling the
moral virtues. And even though he says that the practical
intelligence is connected with virtues that are human

(anthrhpika), it is not the same thing as reason, and hence,
19

 

it is not identical with the human being.
I would say that Cooper is correct in pointing out
that Aristotle has identified man with practical reason in
IX, 8 and with intellect in X, 7. However, I would dis-
agree with Cooper's belief that this is a difficulty in
Aristotle's work, or that Aristotle's positions are incon-
sistent. I believe that there is an interpretation of
Aristotle's theory of the human being in the Ah that makes

these chapters consistent.

 

19
345-55.

This difficulty has been discussed by Hardie, pp.

142

.First, with respect to the view that Aristotle ihsh-
tifies a man with his reason in X, 7, I would say that
Aristotle does not seem to be saying that a man is literally
identical with his reason in the sense that he is one and
the same as his reason. Aristotle only says that the intel-
lect (ho nous) "would seem . . . to be each man" and that
"[reason] especially is man" (1178 a 2, 8). Since he re-
gards the intellect as being the best part of a human be-
ing, and since human beings are the only animals that have
intellects, he seems to be saying that a man is primarily
what distinguishes him from all other animals. This is
not the 'is' of identity, but it is some other use of 'is'.
To repeat a point that I made (p. 136) about Aristotle's
discussion IX, 8 and in X, 7, he seems to be saying that
a man is his intellect in the sense in which we say that a
man is what he eats.

So far, I have tried to show that Aristotle is not
saying that a man is literally identical with either his
practical reason or his intellect. But the problem re-
mains how to reconcile Aristotle's view that a man is his
practical reason in IX, 8 and his view that a man is his
intellect in X, 7. I would offer the following interpre-
tation. I mentioned at the beginning of this section
(p. 132) that Aristotle believes that what is peculiar to
human beings is rational activity. This is what distin-
guishes human beings from plants and other animals. In

Ah I, 7 he says: "the function of man is an activity of

143

soul in accordance with reason, or at least not without
reason" (1098 a 7, trans. Wardman). I would point out
that his discussion in I, 7 is about rational activity in
general. He does not here distinguish between two dif-
ferent kinds of rational activity (contemplating divine
and invariable things on the one hand, and practical ac-
tivity governed by reason on the other hand). Thus,
Aristotle's view seems to be that what is most character-
istic of human beings, as opposed to what is most charac-

teristic of plants and other animals, is rational activity.

 

At this point, I think that Aristotle could say that a

man is his rational principle, since it is acting in accor-
dance with it that a man is a man. Consequently, a man who
is engaged in practical activity and obeying his reason

(as the good man who is a lover of self does, IX, 8) is
his practical reason; he is performing the function of a
man with respect to variable things. And a man who con-
templates divine things (as the person who is living the
happiest life does, X, 7) is his intellect; he also is per-
forming the function of a man, but with respect to invar-
iable things. So I would say that Aristotle can consis-
tently identify a man either with his practical reason or
with his intellect, because these are two parts of the

20

same rational principle. And it is acting in accordance

 

20I wish to emphasize that both the contemplative
reason (or the intellect) and the practical reason are parts

of the rational principle because both "grasp a rational

144

with this rational principle that distinguishes a man from
other animals more than anything else.

After discussing what he sees to be the difficulties
in Aristotle's identifying the human being with the intel-
lect, Cooper argues that in Book X Aristotle appeals to
the psychology of the De Anima inasmuch as he regards the
intellect as separable from the body (pp. 175-77). Cooper
notes that if Aristotle insists on sharply distinguishing
between the parts of the soul that ais_actualities of the
body, and the intellect, which is hsi the actuality of the
body, then Aristotle is committed to holding that the human
being has two souls and that the human being is not a
Single, complex organism (pp. 175-76). AS a result of
this, Cooper says that Aristotle's answer to the ques-
tion of what makes a human being to be a human being must
be the intellect, if we accept the position of De Anima III,
5 and Ah X (p. 176). Cooper argues that even though
Aristotle appeals to the De Anima view of the soul in Ah X,
"he does not decisively reject as false the more commonplace
conception which, refusing to separate the highest mental
functions from the remaining human life-powers, regards a

human being as at once and equally an intellectual and a

 

principle" (ta logon echonta, 1139 a 6, trans. Ross). That
is, both parts involve reasoning, although they differ in
the objects about which they reason. It is by means of

the contemplative part that we reason about invariable
things (1139 a 7-8), and it is by means of the practical
part that we reason about variable things that are good

for oneself (VI, 5).

 

14S

social being" (pp. 177-78). Cooper believes that the ap-
peal of this "common-sense view" of the intellectual ahh
the social nature of human beings is what influences

Aristotle to describe the life that contains the virtues

of both aspects as being happy (eudaimonia) (p. 178).

 

In response to Cooper, I would argue, as I did ear-
lier, that there is no clear evidence that Aristotle is
appealing to the psychology of the De Anima in Ah X. First,
there is no clear evidence that Aristotle relies on the
view that the soul is the form or the actuality of the
body. He does say at 1178 a 15 that some of the passions
"seem even to follow from the body" (enia de kai symbainein

apo tou sdmatos dokei). This resembles his claim in As

 

Ahiha I, 1 that "it seems that all the affections of the
soul are with a body" (403 a 16). Nevertheless, the doc-
trine that the soul is the actuality of the body is cen-
tral to the psychology of the De Anima, and one would ex-
pect Aristotle to use it in his discussion of the soul in
the Ah if he were using the psychology of the De Anima.
Second, there is no clear evidence that Aristotle be-
lieves in Ah X that the intellect is separable from the
body. He does say in X, 8 that "the excellence of the in-

tellect is separate" (h? de ton nou kechdrismenh, 1178 a 21).

 

But in the first place, this does not say that the intel-
lect itself is separable from the body. And in the second

place, it is not clear that 'separate' (kechdrismenh)

 

146

means spatially separated (or separable) from the body or

 

the rest of the soul. Aristotle could mean in this pas-

sage that the excellence of the mind is kechdrismenh in the

 

sense that it is different in nature from the moral vir-
tues. Since he is contrasting the excellence of the intel-
lect with the moral virtues in this passage, and since

the moral virtues are closely related to the emotions,
Aristotle may also be pointing out that the excellence of
the intellect is not involved with the emotions.

In this section I have been primarily concerned with
Aristotle's discussion of human reason in the Ah. In doing
this, I have pointed out that the function of a human be-
ing (i.e., that which is peculiar to human beings) is
rational activity. I have also discussed certain diffi-
culties that arise in interpreting Aristotle's view in IX,
8 that man is his (practical) reason, and his view in X, 7
that man is his intellect. My interpretation of Aristotle's
position is that he is not saying that a man is literally
identical with his practical reason or his intellect, but
that there is another sense in which he is either of these

things in virtue of having rational activity as his function.

C. The Contribution of the Politics

 

Throughout my investigation of Aristotle's theory of
the human being, I have concentrated on the kind of soul
that is possessed by what Aristotle would say is a mature,

normal, free, male human being. According to Aristotle,

147

there are human beings whose souls are significantly dif-
ferent from the soul of a free male; these are slaves,
women, and children.

In Politics 1, l3 Aristotle raises the question whether
slaves, women, and children can be virtuous, and if so,
whether their virtues are the same as those of adult, male
citizens (1259 b 21-34). This question is important be-
cause a state whose citizens are virtuous is efficient and
orderly. Beginning with the claim that the soul by na-

ture has a ruling part (viz., to logon echon) and a ruled

 

part (viz., to alogon), Aristotle says that "it is evident

 

then that it is the same way in the other cases" (1260 a
7-8). Consequently, the ruler-ruled relation exists be-
tween master and slave, male and female, and man and child
(1260 a 9-10). Aristotle suggests that the reason why
there are these different kinds of ruler-ruled relations
is that even though all of these people have the parts of

the soul, they possess them in different ways (enhparcheia

 

diapherontds, 1260 a 12). It will deepen our understanding

 

of Aristotle's theory of the human being to examine briefly
those whose souls are different from the soul of the free
adult male. In order to explain in what respect the souls
of free men, slaves, women, and children differ, Aristotle

chooses the faculty of deliberation (to bouleutikon). I

 

think the reason why he chooses to b6u1eutikon as that in

 

virtue of which these kinds of souls are different is that

148

he is concerned with virtue, and moral virtue depends on
correct deliberation about the kinds of things that are
conducive to human good (Ah VI, 5). Aristotle says that
"the parts of the soul are present in all [of them; i.e.,
slaves, women, and children], but they are present dif-
ferently; for the slave does not have the deliberative

faculty [to bouleutikon] at all, and the woman has it, but

 

it is without authority [akuron], and the child has it, but
it is undeveloped [ateles]" (1260 a 11-14).

The importance of what he says about the child tells
us that the deliberative faculty is a part of the soul
that must develop and mature in the human being who has
it. Later, Aristotle points out that, while anger (thymos),

will (boulhsis), and desire (epithymia) belong to children

 

at once from birth, reasoning (ho logismos) and intellect

 

(ho nous) develop in them as they mature (1334 b 21-24).
Aristotle's position on the humanity of a (free, male) child
in this passage seems to be consistent with his position

as I interpreted it in my Chapter I (pp. 63-64). That is,

part of the nature of a human being is to be developing as

 

human beings normally develop. Thus, even though being
rational is part of the essence of a human being, a child

is a human being, even though its rational faculty is unde-
veloped. I would interpret Aristotle's position as maintain-
ing that having the capacity to bec0me rational is also part

of the essence of a human being.

149

1. Women

In his book, Aristotle on Emotion, W. W. Fortenbaugh

 

offers an explanation of Aristotle's claim that to bouleu-

 

iihsh in women is akuron.21 He says, "at first glance it
may seem that Aristotle is referring to the subordinate
role of women (1259 b 2, 1260 a 23). A woman has reason,
but it does not prevail in the society of men" (pp. 58-59).
Fortenbaugh does not deny that Aristotle believed this,

but he claims that this interpretation "does not . . . do
justice to Aristotle's point" (p. 59). Fortenbaugh be-
lieves that Aristotle is attempting to explain "why dif-
ferent kinds of peOple have different functions or roles

in society" (p. 59). Thus, according to Fortenbaugh,
Aristotle is not simply stating a fact about the lack of
political influence that women have, but he is also explain-
ing why women have the role they have in the state (pp. 59-

60). Fortenbaugh maintains that to bouleutikon in women is

 

akuron in the sense that
Her deliberative capacity lacks authority, because it
is often overruled by her emotions or alogical side.
Her decisions and actions are too often guided by
pleasures and pains, so that she is unfitted for leader-
ship and very much in need of temperance. (p. 60)
AS Fortenbaugh points out, this does not mean that women
cannot deliberate just as well as men; all it means is that

the deliberative part of the woman's soul does not control

 

21(New York: Barnes and Noble, 1975). All page refer-
ences to Fortenbaugh's book will be given in the text.

150

her emotions and desires as effectively as the deliberative
part of the free man's soul (p. 60).

There is, however, a difficulty in Fortenbaugh's in-
terpretation of Aristotle. Fortenbaugh understandsAmistotle
to be making not only the sociological observation that
women generally had no role in the politics of the state,
but also the psychological point that it is part of any
woman's nature that her deliberative faculty is "often over-
ruled by her emotions." That this is Fortenbaugh's view
is suggested when he says that "in the case of women a
reference to their psychological make-up combined with their
bodily condition explains their role within the household
and therefore ultimately their peculiar kind of virtue"

(p. 59). The difficulty is that this interpretation con-
flicts with the fact that the deliberative faculty of most

22 If it were the

women is hsi overruled by their emotions.
case that it was part of the nature of women that their
deliberative faculties were overruled by their emotions,
then this would be true for almost all women almost all of
the time. That this is not the case is evidence that it
is not part of the nature of women that their deliberative
faculties are overruled by their emotions. Furthermore,

there are many free men who would fit Fortenbaugh's des-

cription of women; that is, their "decisions and actions

 

22
Kotzin.

This objection was suggested to me by Professor

151

are too often guided by pleasures and pains, so that [they
are] unfitted for leadership and very much in need of tem-
perance" (p. 60). Thus, Fortenbaugh's interpretation of
the nature of women also applies to many men.23
I believe that Aristotle's position on the nature of

women does allow him to say that they are human beings.

Their souls are complete--they have to bouleutikon--and they

 

can reason.

It would also seem that a (good, free) woman could
be identified with her practical reason in the sense of
being identified with one's reason that I discussed in
connection with Ah IX, 8. This seems to follow from
Aristotle's view that she has the deliberative faculty
(1260 a 13-14), and hence she can deliberate about how to
achieve what is good for herself and control her desires.
But in spite of the fact that women do exercise practical
reason and control their desires, Aristotle suggests in
Politics III, 4 that women do not have practical wisdom.
He says that "practical wisdom alone is a virtue peculiar
to a ruler . . . and indeed practical wisdom is not a vir-

tue of one who is ruled, but true opinion" (1277 b 25-28).24

 

73This point was suggested to me by Professor Walsh.

24h? de phronhsis archontos‘idiOS'aretE"monE .
archomenou de ge Ouk eStin areth’phrOnhsis, alla doxa
alethhs.

 

 

152

Since, then, the woman is ruled not only by the leaders of
a city, but also by her husband (1259 a 40), it would

seem that the woman does not have practical wisdom. Per-
haps what Aristotle means by this ishsi that women com-
pletely lack practical reason, but that they do not deve10p

an excellence in practical reasoning in rulingrelation-

 

ships. This would seem to be a sociological observation,
then, rather than a claim about the nature of a woman's
soul.

It would also seem that the (good, free) woman could
be identified with her intellect (contemplative reasoning)
in the sense of being identified with one's intellect that
I discussed with respect to the Ah X, 7. Aristotle does
suggest that the woman has an intellect, when he says at
Politics 1260 a 11 that the parts of the soul are present
in the female. Further, Aristotle never denies that women
can engage in contemplative activity, and there seems to
be nothing in her nature that would prevent our saying that

she has an intellect.

2. Natural Slaves
The humanity of natural Slaves is problematic in
Aristotle. In the Politics Aristotle often talks of natu-
ral slaves in a way that makes their status as human beings
questionable. In I, 4 he discusses slaves in connection
with the other kinds of possessions a person can own. He

says here that "the slave is a living possession [kthma

153

ehpsychon, piece of property)" (1253 b 31). In I, 5, when

 

discussing the difference between the ruler and the ruled,
he likens slaves to animals, saying that "the usefulness of
slaves diverges little from that of animals," because their
bodies are used to provide the things that are necessary
(1254 b 24-25, trans. Rackham). He also says that "nature
wishes" to make the bodies of slaves strong and not erect
(siiha), in contrast with the bodies of free men (1254 b
25-30). Thus, nature is inclined to make the bodies of
slaves like the bodies of the animals that are used to
perform heavy labor. So far, then, the slave seems to be
more akin to a living piece of property or an animal than
a human being.

Nevertheless, Aristotle does say that slaves are
human beings. In I, 4 he says that the natural slave is

a human being (anthrdpos) who belongs to another by nature

 

(1254 a 14-17). Further, in I, 5, even though slaves have
much in common with animals, they still are not just ani-
mals, because, unlike animals, slaves "participate in"

reason (koindndn logou, 1254 b 20-23). Finally, in Ah VIII,

 

11 Aristotle points out that one can be friends with a
slave, not qua slave, but qua man (1161 b 5-8). All of

this indicates that, while slaves are human beings, they are
naturally different in significant ways from free men and
women. Let us consider the nature of the Slave in more

detail.

154

In I, 13 Aristotle says that "slaves are human be-

ings and share in reason" (ontdn anthrdphn kai lagou koindn

 

ountdn, 1259 b 28). Nevertheless, "the Slave is entirely

without that which deliberates" (ho dOulos holds ouk ekei

 

to bouleutikon, 1260 a 13). Aristotle discusses the slave's

 

sharing in reason also in I, 6, where he says that "a slave
by nature is one who is able to be another's (and where-
fore he is another's) and who has a share in reason

[koindndn logou] only so much as to perceive it but not to

 

have it [tosouton hoson aisthanesthai alla m3 echein]"

 

(1254 b 20-21). Sharing in reason is what distinguishes
a slave from an animal, because "the other animals are not

perceiving reason [ou logd aisthanomena] but serve instincts

 

[pathhmasin hyphreteiJ" (1254 b 23).

 

Fortenbaugh's interpretation of what Aristotle means
when he says that slaves share in reason but do not have
it is that even though the Slave is not able to deliberate,
he is able to understand and act on the instructions of
the master. Fortenbaugh says that it is in this way that
a Slave "can be said to perceive or appreciate ipgps" (p.
54). Fortenbaugh points out further that "a slave can ap-
preciate the reasoned reflections of another and alter his
emotional responses accordingly. A slave's alogical side,
like that of any other person, is open to reasoned per-

suasion (hA 1102 b 33-4)" (p. 55).

155

One consequence of Aristotle's theory of the slave
is that the slave could not be identified with his prac-
tical reason, as the good free man is (Ah IX, 8). The
reason for this is that the slave has no deliberative fac-
ulty. And since practical reason involves deliberating
about what is good for oneself (Ah VI, 5), the slave would
not have practical reason (at least in the way that the
good free man has it). Furthermore, without practical rea-
son to control his desires, it would not seem possible for
the slave to be virtuous. But in Politics 1, 13 Aristotle
says that the slave can.have some small degree of virtue,
"just enough to prevent him from failing in his tasks owing

to intemperance [akolasian] and cowardice" (1260 a 35, trans.

 

Rackham). Nevertheless, it is not practical reason in the
slave that enables a slave to be temperate, but it seems
to be the practical reason of the slave's master that is
primarily responsible for the slave's minimal degree of vir-
tue. Aristotle says that "the master ought to be the cause
to the slave of the virtue proper to a slave" (1260 b 3-4,
trans. Rackham).

Another consequence of Aristotle's theory of the
slave is that the slave could not be identified with the
intellect (i.e., the contemplative reason), as the good free
man is (Ah X, 7). This is because the slave does not have
reason (isgss), but he only shares in it to the extent of
"apprehending" (aiSthanesthai) it (1254 b 20-22). Aristotle

 

156

does not explicitly say that the slave cannot engage in
contemplative activity, but his discussions of the slave
in Politics I, 5 and 13 indicate that the natural slave is
not capable of contemplation. Thus, in contrast with the
life of the good free man, the life of the slave would not
be the best and happiest life that is devoted to contempla-
tion. Consequently, Since the slave cannot devote his life
to contemplation, we cannot say that the slave is reason.

The question might be raised whether Aristotle's
claim that a Slave lacks deliberation is true. He says in
Ah III, 3 that one deliberates when one assumes an end to
be attained and then considers the most appropriate means
of attaining the end (1112 b 15-20). Now it would seem
that slaves could very well do this. For example, when a
slave is given an order to accomplish an end, the slave
might reasonably consider the various means of achieving
that end and then pursue the most appropriate means. Thus
it seems that Aristotle is at least overstating his posi-
tion when he says that the natural slave does not have the
deliberative capacity. The slave does not, after all, fol-
low the orders of his master in the same way that a trained
animal does. I do not intend to pursue or resolve this
problem; I intend only to note that this question might
reasonably be asked here.

Nevertheless, there is a difficulty in Aristotle's

theory of the natural slave that threatens the consistency

157

of saying that a slave does not have reason, while at the
same time maintaining that the slave is a human being, the
function of which is rational activity. This problem is
especially relevant to our study of Aristotle's theory of
the human being. This difficulty is set out by Ernest

Barker in The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle
25

 

(pp. 364-67), and my construction of the problem is as
follows.
First, Aristotle says that the natural slave "has a

share in reason [koindnoh logou] . . . but does not have it

 

[m3 echein]" (1254 b 21). However we are to understand

 

"koindndn logou tosouton hoson aisthanesthai," it is clear

 

that the slave is fundamentally different from a free man
in the sense that the slave does not "have" reason in the
sense that a free man does. And in addition, it is not
simply the case that the Slave has the capacity to reason,
which has not yet matured or developed sufficiently, as
one might say of a child. The Slave lacks this capacity

by nature. The slave is not an animal, because the slave

 

can "perceive" (aisthanesthai) reason, which animals cannot

 

do (1254 b 22). In fact, some scholars have concluded that

Slaves are a kind of animal sui generis, not fully human
26

 

beings and not lower animals.

 

ZS(_New York: Russell and Russell, 1959). All page
references to Barker's book will be given in the text.

26For example, see R. Schlaifer, "Greek Theories of
Slavery from Homer to Aristotle," Harvard Studies in Clas-
sical Philolggy 47 (1936): 192-99.

 

 

158

Second, Aristotle does say that a slave is a human

being (anthrhpos). In the Politics he says that a Slave,

 

"being a human being" (anthrdpos on), is also a possession

 

(1254 a 16), and that it would be unusual if slaves did
not have virtue, "being human beings and sharing reason"
(1259 b 28-29). Even more interesting is the passage in
the Ah in which he says that one cannot be friends with a

slave qua slave (hhi doulos), because a slave is a living

 

instrument (empsychon organon); but one can be friends with

 

a slave qua human being (hei anthrhpos), because the slave

 

"can share in a system of law or be a party to an agreement"
(1161 b 2-8, trans. Ross).

The difficulty that results is that Aristotle denies
that the slave possesses reason; and yet in saying that the
slave is a human being, he must maintain that the slave
does possess reason, because possessing reason is neces-
sary in order for an individual to be a human being. Fur-
thermore, Aristotle's view that the Slave does not have
reason conflicts with what appears to be the hash that
slaves ssh reason as well as free human beings reason.
Perhaps Aristotle could avoid the contradiction by saying
that the slave is a human being in virtue of sharing in
reason to the extent of being able to follow the instruc-
tions of a master.

It has not been my purpose to discuss here Aristotle's

justification for the institution of slavery, and it has

159

not been my purpose to criticize Aristotle's theory of
slavery on the grounds of its political and moral implica-
tions. I have only intended to show that his theory of
the nature of slaves leads to problems for his theory of

the human being.

D. Summary and Conclusion

 

My primary goal in these first three chapters has
been to reconstruct Aristotle's theory of the human being,
mainly on the basis of his discussions of the soul and the

body in Metaphysics VII, De Anima, and Ah. In Chapter I,

 

I examined Aristotle's concepts of substance and essence.
While a human being is a substance in the sense of being

a compOSite of matter and form, the essence of a human
being is the form, or more specifically, the soul as the
formal aspect of the body. Since the essence of a human
being consists of the attributes in virtue of which a hu-
man being is a human being, then I maintained that Stating
the necessary and sufficient conditions for applying the
concept of a human being would involve stating the essence
of a human being.

Having established that the essence of a human be-
ing is the soul as the formal aspect of the body, and keep-
ing in mind that rationality is part of the essence of a
human being, in Chapter II I turned to Aristotle's study
of the soul in the De Anima and to his account of the think-

ing faculty in particular. Aristotle's theories of the

160

soul in the De Anima and the Metaphysics agree to the ex-

 

tent that the soul is the form of the body. According to
the De Anima theory of the soul, the soul has three main
parts: the thinking, sensing, and nutritive parts. The
thinking part is further subdivided into the active and
passive minds. Aristotle holds that the active mind, in
contrast with the other parts of the soul, is separable
from the body. The other parts of the soul are the same

as the body in fact, but different from the body in defini-
tion.

In addition to the De Anima, the Ah is an important
source of information about Aristotle's theory of the soul.
One reason for this is that it is by means of the thinking
faculty of the soul that human beings are able to achieve
the highest kind of happiness--a life of contemplation.

In the Ah the soul is divided into the rational and the ir-
rational parts. I argued that the theory of the soul that
Aristotle uses in the Ah is not the same as the theory of
the soul that he uses in the De Anima, because there are
fundamental differences in the two theories. One view
that does seem to be common to the Ah and the De Anima is
that the thinking capacity is peculiar to human beings in
the sense that it distinguishes human beings from plants
and other animals. Finally, in this third chapter, I ex-
amined the question whether slaves, women, and children

are human beings. This question is important because in

161

the Politics Aristotle suggests that slaves, women, and
children are inferior to free men for various reasons.
The result was that both children and women are human be-
ings, because children have rational capacities that will
develop, and women have the rational capacities that free
men have. Slaves, however, seem not to be completely
human beings, because they do not have rational or delibera-
tive capacities.

To conclude, then, even though Aristotle seems not
to be using the same theory of the soul in the Ah and the
De Anima, some general observations can be made about his
theory of a human being. First, a human being consists of
a body and a soul. Even though the mind is separable from
the body and not mixed with the body, the rest of the soul
is the same as the body in fact, but different in defini-
tion (according to the De Anima theory of the soul). Second,
the human being is a biological organism. It has many fea-
tures in common with other biological organisms, such as
the nutritive and sensitive faculties. But, third, even
though human beings have many characteristics in common
with other living organisms, rationality is peculiar to hu-
man beings and distinguishes them as a species from plants
and other animals. It will be useful to keep these general
observations in mind as we study P. F. Strawson's theory
of the person in Chapter IV and compare Strawson's and

Aristotle's theories of the human being in Chapter V.

CHAPTER IV

P. F. STRAWSON'S THEORY
OF THE PERSON

Having examined Aristotle's theory of the human be-
ing, I will examine P. F. Strawson's theory of a person as

it appears in Chapter III of his book, Individuals.1 My

 

purpose in this chapter is to present and critically as-
sess Strawson's theory of a person; in the next chapter I
will compare Strawson's theory of a person with Aristotle's
theory of a human being. Ultimately, I will be interested
in determining the differences between these two theories
and in assessing the strengths and weaknesses of each
theory with respect to the other.

It is especially worthwhile to compare Strawson's work
in this area with Aristotle's, because Strawson sees him-

self to be approaching metaphysical questions in Individuals

 

in a way that is similar to the way in which Aristotle
approached metaphysical questions (xiii). If indeed

Strawson and Aristotle are taking the same kind of approach

 

1(London: Methuen & Co., 1959; Garden City, NY:
Doubleday 6 Co., Anchor Books, 1963). All page references
are to the paperback edition and will begiven in the text.

162

163

to the study of the person, then it would be interesting

to compare the results of these two similar approaches that
are so far apart in time. Perhaps there have been advances
since Aristotle's time that make Strawson's results more
satisfactory (in some sense) than Aristotle's, or perhaps
the results of Aristotle's study of the human being offer
some important considerations for contemporary studies of
the person. These are some of the issues that I will dis-
cuss in the next chapter. But first, in this chapter I
will study Strawson's theory of the person.

In the first section of the following discussion,
titled "Descriptive and Revisionary Metaphysics," I pre-
sent Strawson's distinction between descriptive and re-
visionary approaches to doing metaphysics. I also mention
what I see to be some problems with this distinction. In
the next section, "The Concept of a Person," I present
Strawson's theory of a person, concentrating on his view
that a person is a basic particular and that the concept
of a person is a primitive concept. I also discuss the
importance of the concepts of P- and M-predication to the
concept of a person, and I discuss some difficulties with
the concepts of P- and M-predication. In the final section,
titled "Criticisms of Strawson's Theory of a Person," I
consider Jerome A. Shaffer's criticism of Strawson's dis-

tinction between persons and material bodies, and Joseph

164

Margolis's objection that Strawson's concept of a person
is not primitive, but reducible to the concept of a mate-
rial body.

A. Descriptive and Revisionary
Metaphysics

 

 

Before we examine Strawson's analysis of the concept
of a person, it will be useful to consider his distinc-
tion between descriptive and revisionary approaches to do-
ing metaphysics, because he considers himself to be doing
descriptive metaphysics.

In the introduction to Individuals, Strawson says:

 

"Descriptive metaphysics is content to describe the actual
structure of our thought about the world, revisionary meta-
physics is concerned to produce a better structure" (xiii).
Broadly speaking, Descartes, Leibniz, and Berkeley are re-
visionary metaphysicians, according to Strawson, and
Aristotle and Kant are descriptive metaphysicians (xiii).
Descriptive metaphysics attempts "to lay bare the most
general features of our conceptual structure" of the world
(xiii). In particular, Strawson maintains that there is a
certain "central core" of categories and concepts in human
thought which do not change through human history and which
lie below the surface of language (xiv). Exposing the
structure and interrelations among the categories and con-
cepts in this "central core" is the primary concern of des-

criptive metaphysics (xiv).

165

This account of descriptive and revisionary meta-
physics is not intended to imply that they are two com-
pletely independent ways of doing metaphysics. Strawson
says that probably no metaphysician has ever done only
descriptive or only revisionary work.

In the next chapter I will discuss the extent to
which Aristotle was doing descriptive metaphysics. I will
also raise two problems with Strawson's explanation of the
purpose of descriptive metaphysics, and with his distinc-
tion between descriptive and revisionary metaphysics.
Briefly, these problems are, first, if a philosopher is do-
ing a descriptive metaphysical analysis of the concept of

a person in his own philosOphical idiom, then it is not

 

clear how we are to decide whether the concept of a person
the philosopher eventually describes is the same as the

concept of a person that is one of the unchanging concepts
in the "central core of human thinking." The second prob-

lem is, if the philosopher is doing metaphysics in his own

 

philosqphical idiom, then it is not clear when he is doing

 

descriptive metaphysics and when he is doing revisionary
metaphysics. This is because a philosopher's own idiom
usually involves certain terms and expressions that are
specialized and not part of our ordinary language. The
problem that I am suggesting, then, is that when a philos-
opher introduces such Specialized terms, he may be intro-
ducing new concepts or changing old ones, and hence, doing

some revisionary metaphysics.

166

Finally, having made it clear that he is going to be

doing descriptive metaphysics in Individuals, Strawson fo-

 

cuses his metaphysical investigations in the first part
of the book on the two categories of particulars that he
sees to be central to our conceptual framework--the cate-
gories of material bodies and persons (xv-xvi). In the
next section I will investigate Strawson's attempt to ex-
pose in his own "critical and analytical idiom" our con-

cept of a person.

B. The Concept of a Person

 

Perhaps it is best to begin with Strawson's own des-
cription of the concept of a person: "What I mean by the
concept of a person is the concept of a type of entity
such that hsih_predicates ascribing states of consciousness
ahh predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics, a
physical Situation 6c. are equally applicable to a Single
individual of that Single type" (97-98). Since it is essen-
tial to Strawson's concept of a person that both corporeal
characteristics and State-of-consciousness characteristics
are predicable of the same entity, it is necessary that we
examine in detail the importance of these two types of

predicate to the concept of a person.

167

l. P- and M-Predication

In order to characterize more clearly the type of
individual that a person is, Strawson describes the two
kinds of predicates that are ascribed to persons (100).
First, M-predicates are those predicates "which are also
properly applied to material bodies to which we would not
dream of applying predicates ascribing states of conscious-
ness." Strawson seems to include among MFpredicateS such
predicates as those ascribing physical characteristics
(height, color, shape, weight) and physical position (loca-
tion, attitude) (83). Second, P-predicates are "all the
other predicates we apply to persons" (100). Some of these
predicates are predicates that ascribe states of conscious-
ness, but not all of them do. What P-predicates have in
common, though, is that "they imply the possession of con-
sciousness on the part of that to which they are ascribed"
(101). P-predicates include such predicates as "is smil-
ing," "is going for a walk," "is in pain," and "is thinking
hard" (100-1).

Strawson regards persons as basic particulars in our
conceptual scheme (xv-xvi, 256). According to Strawson,
particulars that are "basic from the point of view of
particular-identification" belong to a category of par-
ticulars such that

it would not be possible to make all the identifying
references we do make to particulars of other classes,

unless we made identifying references to particulars
of that class, whereas it would be possible to make all

168

the identifying references we do make to particulars
of that class without making identifying references to
particulars of other classes. (28)
He says that "of the categories of objects which we recog-
nize, only those satisfy these requirements which are, or
possess, material bodies--in a broad sense of the expres-
sion" (29).

Persons are not, however, primarily material bodies.
Strawson says that "we are not, for example, to think of it
[the individual entity--the person] as a secondary kind of
entity in relation to two primary kinds, viz.a particular
consciousness and a particular human body" (101). Instead,
the suggestion seems to be, a person is a primary kind of
entity to which both M- and P-predicates are egually applied.

2. Criticisms of Strawson's Doctrine
of P- and M-Predication
(a) Bernard Williams

I would like to consider two criticisms that have been
raised against Strawson's distinction between P- and M-
predicates and his view that predicates of both of these
kinds are properly applied to persons. The first criticism
I wish to consider has been raised by Bernard Williams in

his review of Individuals.2 Williams criticizes Strawson's

 

distinction between P- and M-predicates. Williams points

 

2Problems of the Self, Chap. 7, "Strawson on Indivi-
duals" (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp.
120-26. All page references to Williams's book will be
given in the text in the form "(W, 120)."

 

169

out that some of the predicates that would be classified

as M-predicates according to Strawson seem instead to be
predicates of the kind that we would not dream of ascrib-
ing to bodies. For example, it does not seem natural to
ascribe the predicate "is sitting down" to a body; this
predicate is ascribed more naturally to persons. In addi-
tion, the predicates "went red" and "is cold" are not as-
cribed only to bodies, but they are often ascribed in a way
that implies the possession of consciousness. Williams asks
if we are making the same predication when we say that a
human being's face went red as when we say that a piece of
litmus paper went red. He also suggests that the predica-
tion involved in "I am cold" is different from that involved
in saying that "this cup of tea is cold."3

Not only do some M-predicates seem to be ascribable

to persons in the sense that P-predicates are, but also, as

 

3It should be pointed out, however, that using the
same verbal expression to ascribe a predicate to persons
on the one hand, and to material bodies on the other
hand does not necessarily mean that the same predicate is
being ascribed. That the same verbal expression is used in
English (as in "I am cold" and "This cup of tea is cold")
may be a peculiarity of the language. In German, for exam-
ple, one says "Mir ist kalt," i.e., literally, "Cold is to
me" (or "[It is] cold to me") (in Hebrew also, one says
"[It is] cold to-me"). And in French one says that one
"has" cold. (I am indebted to Professor Kotzin for calling
to my attention the point that using the same verbal ex-
pression in English does not necessarily indicate that the
same predicate is being ascribed to persons and material
bodies. I am also indebted to her for pointing out that
translating an English expression, such as "I am cold,"
into another language may be a "test" for whether the same
predicate is being ascribed to persons and to material
bodies.)

 

 

 

 

170

Williams points out, some P-predicates are ascribable to
material bodies (W, 124). For example, we say that com-
puters "think" and that cranes "lift."

The consequence is that Strawson has not provided
clear criteria for distinguishing effectively between M-
and P-predicates. On the one hand, some of the predicates
that Strawson would classify as M-predicates on the basis
that they are properly ascribed to material bodies to which
we would not ascribe states of consciousness are actually
ascribed on some occasions in this way. On the other hand,
some of the predicates that he would classify as P-predicates
on the basis that they imply that the particular to which
they are ascribed possesses consciousness, are often as-
cribed to machines--things to which we would not dream of
ascribing states of consciousness.

In his discussion of the kinds of predicates that
are applied to persons, Strawson makes a remark about cer-
tain predicates that indicates how he might respond to
Williams's criticism.4 Strawson says that "if we want to
locate type-ambiguity somewhere, we would do better to lo-
cate it in certain predicates like 'is in the drawing room'
'was hit by a stone' 8c., and say they mean one thing when
applied to material objects and another when applied to

persons" (101). Thus, Strawson might point out that some

 

4This point was suggested to me by Professor Kotzin.

171

predicates are ambiguous: "went red," for example, would
be a predicate "ascribing a corporeal characteristic" if
it were ascribed to a piece of litmus paper that has turned
red, but it would be a predicate "implying the possession
of consciousness" if it were ascribed to a person who is
blushing. Another way to emphasize the ambiguity of some
predicates is as follows: one would be ascribing the predi-
cate "went red" as an M-predicate if one said that a per-
son went red because he or she had a fever, but one would
be ascribing the predicate "went red" as a P-predicate if
one said that a person went red because he or she is em-
barrassed.
Williams is aware of this response, but he does not
think it is adequate. He says:
Here it may be replied that the words are not ap-
plied to persons and to machines in the same sense:
that the two sorts of application are not applications
of the same predicate. But now some criterion is needed
for deciding when the same predicate is, and is not,
being applied. (124)

Williams's view, then, is that Strawson has not provided

a criterion for determining when the same predicate is or

 

is not being ascribed, as when we say "His face went red"
as opposed to "The litmus paper went red" (W, 124).
Williams maintains that this is a serious omission on
Strawson's part, because he could not provide a criterion
for the sameness of a predicate "without presupposing some
positions in the philosophy of mind" (W, 124). Williams

does not provide any further argument for this claim

172

except to point out that one must already have some concept
of the mental as opposed to the physical in order to say
that computers do not "think" in the same sense that per-
sons do. He concludes that Strawson's assumption that the
distinction between P- and M-predicates is given seems to

be "fundamentally misguided" (W, 124).

(b) Roland Puccetti

The second criticism I wish to consider is directed
against Strawson's characterization of our concept of a
person as the concept of a type of entity to which are
ascribed both P- and M-predicates. Roland Puccetti has
raised this criticism.5 The problem that Puccetti raises
is that, on the one hand, Strawson's concept of a person
is too broad, because some P-predicates (such as, "is
smiling" or "is going for a walk") are ascribable to dogs,
which are not persons (P, 322). On the other hand,
Strawson's concept of a person is too narrow, because M-
predicates are not ascribable to God, whom many (including
Aristotle) would consider to be a person (P, 323).

This criticism seems to me to raise difficult prob-
lems for Strawson. In response to the point that his con-

cept of a person is too broad because some P-predicates

 

S"Mr. Strawson's Concept of a Person," Australasian
Journal of PhilosOphy 45 (1967): 321-28. All page refer-
ences to Puccetti's article will be given in the text in
the form "(P, 321)." Joseph Margolis raises a similar ob-
jection in "On the Ontology of Persons," The New Scholas-
ticiSm 50 (Winter 1976):' 76-77.

 

 

 

173

are ascribable to some animals, Strawson could hsi reply
that such P-predicates are ambiguous, meaning one thing
when ascribed to animals, and meaning something else when
ascribed to persons. The reason why this response is not
adequate, it seems to me, is that we seem to ascribe many
P-predicates to animals implying that the animals to which
they are ascribed possess consciousness (in some form).

We say that animals sense things, obey commands, play, and
hunt for food. And yet we would not consider animals to
be persons.

Having discussed some criticisms that have been raised
by Bernard Williams and Roland Puccetti against Strawson's
concepts of P- and M-predication, I will consider next
Strawson's account of the basis on which P-predicates are
ascribed to persons.

3. The Basis for Ascribing
P-Predicates

After distinguishing between P- and M-predicates as
the two kinds of predicates that are properly ascribed to
persons, Strawson discusses the basis on which P-predicates
are ascribed to persons. He says that "it is essential
to the character of these predicates that they have both
first- and third-person ascriptive uses, that they are both
self-ascribable otherwise than on the basis of observation
of the behavior of the subject of them, and other-ascribable
on the basis of behavior criteria" (104-5). Strawson em-

phasizes that "in order to have this type of concept, one

174

must be a self-ascriber and an other-ascriber of such pred-
icates, and must see every other as a self-ascriber" (105).
He says that if we did not have this type of concept, we
would not have our concept of a person (105). Thus,
Strawson's view seems to be that the concept of a P-predicate
as the type of predicate that has both first- and third-
person ascriptive uses is logically necessary to our con-
cept of a person. He warns that if we do not recognize
that P-predicates have these two different uses, then we
risk getting into the philosophical difficulties of either
Skepticism (by taking the self-ascriptive use of P-predicates
as being self-sufficient) or behaviorism (by taking the
other-ascriptive use of P-predicates as beingself-sufficient)
(106-7).

Not only are persons basic particulars, but Strawson
argues that the concept of a person is a primitive con-
cept in the sense that it is not to be analyzed or explain-
ed in terms of the concepts of a pure individual conscious-
ness and a body (97-101). He says that we are not to think
of a person as an animated body or an embodied anima (99).
Instead, our concept of a pure individual consciousness is
secondary to our concept of a person (99-100).

But the objection might be raised that Strawson's
concept of a person is hsi a primitive concept, because it

is analyzable or explainable in terms of the concepts of

175

P- and M-predication.6 Consequently, the concepts of P-
and M-predication are primitive, and the concept of a per-
son is derived from these. It seems to me that one re-
sponse that Strawson could make to this objection is based
on the sense in which he says that the concept of a person
is primitive:
A11 I,have said about the meaning of saying that this
concept is primitive is that it is not to be analysed
in a certain way or ways. We are not, for example, to
think of it as a secondary kind of entity in relation
to two primary kinds, viz. a particular consciousness
and a particular human body. (101)
Thus, he indicates here that the concept of a person is
primitive in the sense that it is not analyzable into con-
cepts of other entities. Now, the concepts of P- and M-
predication are not more primitive than the concept of a
person in this sense, because the concepts of P- and M-
predicates are not concepts of other entities; they are
concepts of predicates that are ascribed to entities.

One might suppose that Strawson could say that the
concept of a person is primitive because we could not hays
the concept of P- and M-predicates without the concept of
a person. Strawson does say that "states of consciousness
could not be ascribed at all, unless they were ascribed to
persons" (98. I think that he would say the same thing
about M-predicates.) But I do not think that this warrants

the conclusion that the concepts of P- and M-predicates are

 

6This objection was pointed out to me by Professor

Kotzin.

176

derived from the concept of a person in the sense that we
could not hays the concepts of M- and P-predication without
the concept of a person. The reason why this conclusion is
not warranted, it seems to me, is because Strawson also
says, after explaining that P-predicates have both first-
and third-person ascriptive uses, "if there were no con-
cepts answering to the characterization I have just given

we should not have our concept of a person" (105).
I think he would also say that we would not have our con-
cept of a person without the concept of an M-predicate.
Thus, his view seems to be that, while we would not have
the concepts of P- and M-predication without the concept
of a person, we would not have the concept of a person
without the concepts of P- and M-predication. Thus, it
seems that Strawson would not say that either the concept
of a person or the concepts of P- and M-predication are
primitive in the sense that we could not have one concept
without the others.

4. Strawson's Criticism of the
Concept of a Pure Ego

Nevertheless, Strawson recognizes that there is the
temptation to take the concept of the pure ego to be pri-
mary and then to explain the concept of a person in terms
of it. He rejects this view, saying that the concept of
the pure ego, as the subject of experiences, "is a concept

that cannot exist; or, at least, cannot exist as a primary

177

concept . . ." (98-99). Strawson does not state in detail

his

argument against the view that states of consciousness

are ascribed to an ego, but drawing from his criticisms of

the
the

1.

10.

11.

concept of the ego (96, 98-99, 102), I would reconstruct

details of his argument as follows:

If one has an adequate concept of a person, then one
can ascribe states of consciousness both to oneself
and to others. (p. 105)

If one can ascribe states of consciousness to one-
self, then one can ascribe them to others. (pp. 94-96)

If one can ascribe states of consciousness to others,
then one can identify others as subjects of conscious-
ness. (p. 96)

If one can identify others as subjects of conscious-
ness, then one can distinguish subjects of conscious-
ness. (p. 100. Strawson's discussion of identifi-
cation in Part I suggests that identifying particulars
involves picking them out or distinguishing them.)

If one has an adequate concept of a person, then one
can distinguish subjects of consciousness. (steps
1-4)

Assume that the concept of the Cartesian ego is an
adequate concept of a person.

If the concept of the ego is an adequate concept of
a person, then one can distinguish egos as subjects
of consciousness. (steps 5, 6)

Only private experiences can be ascribed to egos.
(p- 96)

If the concept of the ego is an adequate concept of
a person, then one can use only private experiences
to identify egos. (steps 7, 8)

One cannot distinguish between oneself and others on
the basis of private experiences alone.

If one can use only private experiences to identify
others, then one cannot distinguish between one's own
private experiences and the private experiences of
others. (step 10)

178

12. If one cannot distinguish between one's own private
experiences and the private experiences of others,
then one cannot distinguish egos as subjects of con-
sciousness.

13. If the concept of the ego is an adequate concept of
the person, then one cannot distinguish egos as sub—
jects of consciousness. (steps 9-12)

14. One can distinguish egos as subjects of consciousness
and one cannot distinguish egos as subjects of con-
sciousness. (steps 6, 7, 13)

Therefore,

15. The concept of the Cartesian ego is not an adequate
concept of a person. (steps 6-14, reductio ad absur-
dum)

 

To sum up, Strawson seems to be assuming that an ade-
quate descriptive metaphysical account of our concept of
a person must allow us to distinguish persons from non-
persons, one person from another, and another person from
oneself, since we are able to do this in fact. Now the
only distinguishing mark of a pure ego is its private ex-
periences. But private experiences are such that one can
only know one's own; and even if one did have another's
private experience, one would not experience it as another's,
but as one's sAh_experience. Thus, if one could only know
one's BEE private experiences, then one would not be able
to distinguish between oneself and other subjects of con-
sciousness by means of private experiences. Further,
Strawson maintains, if one cannot distinguish between one-
self and others, then one cannot have a concept of others
or of oneself, "for to have the idea [of oneself] at all,

it seems that it must be an idea of some particular thing

179

of which he has experience, and which is set over against
or contrasted with other things of which he has experience,
but which are not himself" (83). Consequently, the concept
of the pure ego cannot be an adequate primitive concept of
a person, because we would not be able to distinguish egos.
Strawson did not state his argument in just this way,
and I have attempted to restate it in a way that makes ex-
plicit what seem to be his key assumptions. The reason
why I have considered Strawson's argument against the con-
cept of the ego is that one could argue that the concept
of the active mind in Aristotle's theory of the human being
is similar to the concept of the pure consciousness. I
will examine the bearing of Strawson's argument, as I have
reconstructed it, on Aristotle's concept of the active mind
in the next chapter.

C. Criticisms of Strawson's
Theory of a Person

 

 

1. Introduction

Criticisms of Strawson's theory of a person have fo-
cused on many different aspects of his theory. I have
already discussed Bernard Williams's criticisms of Strawson's
distinction between P- and M-predicates. And I have dis-
cussed Roland Puccetti's criticism of Strawson's concept
of a person on the grounds that characterizing a person as
the type of individual to which both P- and M-predicates

are ascribable leads to a concept of a person that is too

180

broad in some respects and too narrow in other respects.
Both of these criticisms were primarily directed against
Strawson's doctrine of P- and M-predication. In this sec-
tion, however, I will consider two objections that are
directed primarily against Strawson's doctrine that per-
sons and material bodies are two different types of basic
particular. My reason for considering objections that are
directed against this aspect of Strawson's theory of the
person is that it will involve a deeper study of the rela-
tion between the concept of a person and the concept of a
material body, and hence provide a basis for comparing
Strawson's and Aristotle's positions on this subject in the
next chapter.

First, I will consider Jerome A. Shaffer's objection
that Strawson has not made clear the difference between
persons' bodies and material bodies. In the next chapter,
I will compare the views of Strawson and Aristotle on the
difference between persons and material bodies.

Second, I will consider Joseph Margolis's objection
that Strawson's account of a person has not ruled out the
reductive materialist's position that persons are nothing
more than complex material bodies. This investigation of
whether Strawson's concept of a person can be reduced to
the materialist's concept of a person is intended to be the
counterpart of my investigation in Chapter II of the extent

to which Aristotle had a materialist concept of a human

181

being. Again, in the next chapter, I will compare Strawson's
and Aristotle's positions on the question whether a person

is the same thing as a material body.

2. Jerome A. Shaffer
In his book, Philosophy of Mind,7 Jerome A. Shaffer

 

presents Strawson's concept of a person as a basic entity,
just as a material body is, but which is different from a
body in that a person necessarily has hsih physical ahh
mental attributes, whereas a body has shiy physical attri-
butes (S, 55-56). Shaffer emphasizes Strawson's view that
persons are not derivatives of bodies; thus, one could not
correctly say that persons are bodies to which mental pre-
dicates just happen to be ascribed. Furthermore, as Strawson
points out, bodies are things "to which we would not dream
of applying predicates ascribing states of consciousness"
(100).

I would schematize Shaffer's criticism of Strawson's
distinction between persons and material bodies as follows
(8, 56-57):

1. Persons are essentially different from bodies (in
necessarily having both bodily and mental attributes).

2. Since persons are essentially different from bodies,
a person's "body" cannot be said to be a body in the
same sense that a material body is.

 

7(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968), pp.
52-57. All page references to Shaffer's book will be given
in the text in the form "(8, 55)."

182

3. If a person's "body" cannot be said to be a body in
the same sense that a material body is, then the laws
of nature, which apply to material bodies, cannot be
applied to persons' "bodies."

Therefore,

4. The laws of nature cannot apply to persons' "bodies."
(steps 2, 3)

That this absurd consequence follows from Strawson's
concept of the person indicates that there are serious dif-
ficulties in the relation between persons and bodies, ac-
cording to Shaffer (S, 56). For Shaffer, a person's body
(according to Strawson's theory) is "an abstraction, an
intellectual construction, rather than a reality," pre-
sumably because it is not subject to the laws of nature,
which operate within reality (S, 57). Only when the person
dies does the body become a material body, a part of real-
ity, that "to which we would not dream" of applying P-
predicates (S, 57).

Premise two in my reconstruction of Shaffer's argu-
ment seems correct. Strawson's view ssss seem to be that
persons are essentially different from bodies since they
necessarily have mental attributes, while bodies do not
have them. Therefore, Strawson cannot hold that persons
are essentially material bodies to which we ascribe men-
tal predicates, because this would make persons derivative
entities and not basic. Premise three, however, does not
seem to be true. I see no reason why Strawson could not

allow that among the M-predicates that are ascribed to a

person are included predicates indicating that a person's

183

body is subject to the laws of nature when he says that
"that which one calls one's body, is at least, a body, a
material thing. It can be picked out from others, identi-
fied by ordinary physical criteria and described in or-
dinary physical terms" (83-84). Whenever Strawson dis-
cusses M-predicates, it is clear that they include any of
the predicates that could be ascribed to any material body
(100). The result would be that a person's body is just
as much a part of reality as any material body.
Nevertheless, I think that Shaffer has isolated a
genuine difficulty in the relation between persons and
bodies in Strawson's metaphysics. In saying that a per-
son's body is "at least" a material thing, Strawson comes
close to saying that a person is a material body to which
we ascribe P-predicates. If this were the case, then a
person would not be a basic particular, but a derivative
of the more basic material body. The result would be that
Strawson's concept of a person would be a materialist con-
cept. Thus, our considerations of Shaffer's criticism of
Strawson has led to the conclusion that Strawson has not
made the relation between a person and a material body

sufficiently clear.

3. Joseph Margolis
The second criticism that I will consider has been

raised by Joseph Margolis in his article, "On the Ontology

184

of Persons" (M, 75-77).8 In this article Margolis argues
that even though Strawson maintains that both persons and
material bodies are basic particulars and that persons are
not derivatives of bodies, Strawson has not really argued
for this claim. In fact, all that he does say about per-
sons could be accepted consistently by one who favors a
reductive account of persons. A reductive account of per-
sons, according to Margolis, is the view that "persons are
nothing more than complex bodies" (M, 73). Before turning
directly to Margolis's criticism of Strawson's concept of

a person, I will explain briefly what the reductive mate-
rialist position involves, according to Margolis, and what
effect it would have on Strawson's view of a person. Ac-
cording to Margolis, a reductive materialist would say that
Strawson's concept of a person can be "analyzed reductively
in terms of the concept of a material body" (M, 76). What
Margolis seems to mean by this is that the reductive ma-
terialist would argue that Strawson's concept of a person
can be analyzed in terms of the concept of a type of entity
that is only different from a material body in being (phys-
ically) more complex than many material bodies. If the re-
ductive materialist were correct in this assessment of

Strawson's concept of a person, then the consequences for

 

'8The New Scholasticism 50 (Winter 1976): 73-84. All

page references to Margolis's article will be given in the
text in the form "CM, 73)."

 

185

Strawson's view would be that the concept of a person is
not primitive but analyzable in terms of the concept of
a material body. In addition to this point about the primi-
tiveness of the concept of a person, Margolis makes a Simi-

lar point about the ontological9 primitiveness of a person.

 

Interpreting Margolis's discussion of the reductionist's
views on the ontology of persons (M, 74-76), I would say
that the reductionist holds that persons ass ontologically
primitive, but only because they are nothing more than (or
different from) (physically) complex material bodies (M, 76).
I think that the reductive materialist would say that per-
sons and material bodies are the same type of entity. If
the reductive materialist were correct, then the conse-
quence for Strawson's view would be that a person would not
be a basic particular that is fundamentally different in
type from material bodies. This, then, is what seems to
be involved in the reductive materialist's attack on
Strawson's concept of a person. I will turn, now, to the
objection that Margolis raises from the reductive materi-
alist's point of view.

Margolis argues that Strawson has failed to show that
persons are more than complex bodies for three reasons.

First, Strawson's account of his concept of a person as the

 

9I am using the term 'ontological' to refer to the
nature of a thing as an existing thing.

186

concept of a type of entity to which both P- and M-predicates
are ascribable (97-98) could be accepted by reductivists
as well as nonreductivists (in fact, Margolis says, it is
even provisionally acceptable to Cartesians) (M, 75). Sec-
ond, in spite of Strawson's claim that "states of conscious-
ness could not be ascribed at all, unless they were as-
cribed to persons" (98), Margolis maintains that if a suc-
cessful reductive account of persons were found, then it
would still be possible to identify states of conscious-
ness "as part of the history of particular persons" (M, 75).
Margolis points this out in order to Show that ascribing
states of consciousness to persons in the way that Strawson
suggests does not necessarily imply that his concept of
a person is primitive. Third, Margolis argues that
"Strawson does not actually appear to demonstrate that per-
sons cannot be reduced to bodies" (M, 75-76). Strawson
only attempts to Show that both persons and bodies are
basic in our conceptual scheme. However, a reductionist
could also hold that both persons and bodies are basic,
because persons are nothing more than complex bodies.
Margolis concludes, then, that Strawson has not shown that
the concept of a person is primitive in the respect that
it cannot be reduced to the concept of a material body.
Consequently, in order to avoid the objections of
Shaffer and Margolis, Strawson would have to argue more ef-
fectively that a person as he describes it is basic and not

derivative of a material body.

187

In describing our conceptual scheme, Strawson indi-
cates that the relation between basic and derivative par-
ticulars in terms of identifying references is as follows
(2, 28):

1. It would not be possible to make all of the identi-
fying references that we make to derivative particu-
lars unless we make identifying references to basic
particulars.

2. It would be possible to make all of the identifying
references that we make to basic particulars without
making identifying references to derivative particu-
lars.

He defines an identifying reference roughly as an expression

that is used to refer to a particular in a way that distin-

guishes it (3). Thus, a pain, for example, is not a basic
particular because it cannot be identified without refer-
ringtxisome person who has.the pain (31-32). It is ssssh-
iiai to the identificatory force of an identifying refer-
ence to a pain that there be at least an implicit refer-
ence to the person who has the pain (32). Presumably,

Strawson would admit that this claim could be generalized

so that any identifying reference to a derivative particu-

lar would at least implicitly refer to some basic particular
upon which the existence of the derivative particular was
dependent. Consequently, the statement 'this pain is ter-
rible' is really "a kind of shorthand" for the statement

'the pain I am feeling is terrible' (31-32).

Given this account of Strawson's theory of basic and

derivative particulars and identifying references, if per-

sons really were nothing more than complex bodies, as the

188

reductivist would insist, then it is essential that any
identifying references to a person implicitly refer to a
material body. But it is clearly not the case that just
any identifying reference to a person implicitly refers to
a body. For example, the statement 'this person is happy'
does not implicitly refer to the Statement 'this body is
happy'. Therefore, Strawson can conclude that persons are
not just complex bodies.

The reductivist might respond to this argument by
pointing out that it proves the logical point that siaisf
hshis about persons do not always mean the same as siass-
hshis about bodies. But Strawson has still not proven that
persons are in fact something other than complex bodies in
spite of the differences in how we sometimes talk about,

10 Thus, the diffi-

and refer to, both persons and bodies.
culty remains for Strawson of proving that persons are basic
particulars and that the concept of a person is not reduci-
ble to the concept of a material body alone.

Perhaps Strawson could also respond to the objection
raised by Margolis by emphasizing that his own view is hsi
that persons ais_bodies, as the reductivist would maintain,

11

but that persons have bodies. As I have pointed out,

 

10Shaffer comes to a similar conclusion in his
PhiIOSOphy of Mind, pp. 53-54.

 

11The importance in Strawson's theory of a person of
the distinction between being a body and having a body was
pointed out to me by Professor Kotzin.

189

Strawson's view is that the concept of a person is the con-
cept of a type of entity to which both States of conscious-
ness and corporeal characteristics are equally ascribable
to an individual of that type (97-98). States of conscious-
ness are not ascribable to a body, but to the thing that
has a body--the person. Thus, I think that Strawson could
say that our concept of a person could not be reduced to
the concept of a body, because such a reduction would elim-
inate our concept of states of consciousness, which is es-
sential to our concept of a person. Strawson also says
that we "ascribe certain corporeal characteristics not Sim-

plyato the body standing in this special relation to the

 

thing to which we ascribe thought and feelings, 8c., but to

the thing itself to which we ascribe those thoughts and feel-

 

ings" (88, my emphasis). Thus, the corporeal characteris-
tics are ascribed not just to the body, but to the person.
Again, I think that Strawson could say that our concept of
a person could not be reduced to the concept of a body,
because his view seems to be that the ascription of cor-
poreal characteristics to persons is fundamentally differ-
ent from the ascription of corporeal characteristics to ma-

terial bodies.

D. Conclusion

 

Strawson's theory of the person is certainly an am-
bitious undertaking. The success of his theory would help

us avoid the problems involved in both materialist and

190

dualist theories of the person. Materialist theories, such
as the identity theory and behaviorism, have difficulties
explaining how mentalistic statements are logically related
to statements about material bodies or behavior. If
Strawson's theory were correct, however, there would be no
need to explain how statements containing P-predicates are
reduced to statements containing M-predicates. They are
two logically different kinds of statements. Furthermore,
by holding that both P- and M-predicates are ascribed to
the sahs_entity, viz., a person, Strawson would avoid the
difficulty of explaining how mental experiences are onto-
logically related to bodily states. Thus, if Strawson's
theory were successful, it would avoid both the linguistic
and the ontological problems that trouble materialist
theories.

If Strawson's theory of a person were successful, it
would also avoid the Cartesian problem of explaining the
relation between the mind and the body. On Strawson's view
there would be no relation to be explained because the
person itself is a basic particular and not derived from
two basic entities.

Even though Strawson's theory of a person promises to
solve some of the most perplexing problems in the philosophy
of mind, the criticisms that I have discussed show that his
theory has problems of its own, among which is the problem
that the Strawsonian person seems not to be essentially

different from the materialist's person.

CHAPTER V

A COMPARISON OF ARISTOTLE
AND STRAWSON

In the preceding chapters 1 have discussed both
Aristotle's theory of a human being and Strawson's concept
of a person. For Aristotle, what we would call the neces-
sary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a human
being were satisfied by an ensouled body. Furthermore, the
essence of a human being was determined by the soul as the
formal cause. For Strawson, a person was a basic particular
and the type of particular to which both corporeal charac-
teristics and characteristics implying the possession of
consciousness were attributed.

The comparison of these two theories, which will be
the primary concern of this chapter, will involve consider-
ing not only the similarities and differences that exist
between them, but also the extent to which Aristotle is ac-
tually giving a descriptive metaphysical analysis of the
same concept that Strawson is analyzing. Strawson sees
Aristotle to be doing metaphysics from the same descriptive

approach that he, himself, is taking in Individuals, even

 

191

192

though Aristotle is using his own idiomatic style (xv).1
Finally, in comparing these two theories of a human being,
I will attempt to assess the relative advantages and the
contributions of their views, and I will attempt to deter-
mine whether Aristotle's concept of a human being can avoid
some of the criticisms that were raised against Strawson's
concept of a person.

A. Descriptive vs. Revisionary
Metaphysics

 

 

Before turning directly to Aristotle's and Strawson's
theories of a human being, I will briefly examine the
broader methodological question whether Aristotle is doing
descriptive metaphysics.

Strawson says that the descriptive metaphysician at-
tempts "to describe the actual structure of our thought
about the world" (xiii), or to expose the structure of, and
interrelationships among, a certain core of concepts that
is common to human thought of all ages (xiv). This is what

Strawson proposes to do to a limited extent in Individuals,

 

and I have concentrated primarily on his treatment of just
one of those putatively unchangeable concepts--the concept

of a person. Our investigation of his concept of a person

 

1Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive MetaphySics
(London: Methuen 8 Co., 1959; Anchor Books, 1963). All
page references to Strawson and Aristotle will be given in
the text in parentheses. All references to Individuals are
to the paperback edition.

 

 

193

has resulted in our learning that he regards a person as

a basic particular to which both corporeal and mentalistic
characteristics can be ascribed. But the questions I now
wish to raise are: "Is Aristotle attempting to describe
'the actual structure of our thought' about the world?" and
"Is Aristotle attempting to expose the same concept of a
person that Strawson was trying to expose?" As I pointed
out in the last chapter (pp. 162-65), Strawson certainly
believed that Aristotle was doing descriptive metaphysics.2
In the following discussion, I will examine the question
whether Aristotle was doing descriptive metaphysics, and in
Section C ("Persons") I will compare Aristotle's concept of
a human being with Strawson's concept of a person.

Both Aristotle and Strawson seem to be engaged in
descriptive metaphysics in the sense that both seem to be
trying to describe our conceptual framework. Describing
the goal of descriptive metaphysics, Strawson says that
"descriptive metaphysics is content to describe the actual
structure of our thought about the world" and that its aim
is "to lay bare the most general features of our conceptual

structure" (xiii). Aristotle seems to be doing this,

 

2Edwin Hartman also says that both Strawson and
Aristotle are attempting to "describe the actual structure
of our thought about the world" in his SubStance Body, and
Soul (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 40.

194

especially in his Categories and other logical works.3
Nevertheless, Aristotle is doing more than just descriptive
metaphysics in Strawson's sense, because Aristotle is try-
ing to describe the structure of reality itself.4 This is
something that Strawson does not do, and he does not seem
to see this as the task of the descriptive metaphysician.

Strawson also believes that the study of language is
a useful, though limited, guide to understanding and expos-
ing our conceptual structure (xiii-xiv). Aristotle seems
to agree that the study of language can help us understand
our conceptual framework. Throughout his work, Aristotle
pays close attention to linguistic matters, and his lin-
guistic discussions are often intimately involved with his
logical and metaphysical investigations. Aristotle's ap-
proach to metaphysics differs from Strawson's approach, how-
ever, in that Aristotle seems to believe that the study of
language is useful for understanding the nature of reality,
as well as the way we think and reason about it. In the

Catsgories, for example, Aristotle opens with a discussion

 

of the grammatical subject and predicate, which soon be-
comes a discussion of the subject-predicate relation that

exists between substances and individuals of other categories.

 

3Sir David Ross points this out in his Aristotle, 5th
ed. (London: Methuen 8 Co., 1949), pp. 20-21.

 

4Ross, p. 23, and Hartman, p. 40

195

Even though Strawson says that the study of language cannot
tell us everything that we want to know about our conceptual
framework (xii-xiv), both Strawson and Aristotle seem to
believe that the study of our language is at least a useful
beginning in an attempt to reveal the ultimate nature of
the way we think and reason about the world.

For these reasons, then, I would say that Aristotle
appears to be doing some descriptive metaphysics in
Strawson's sense. But Aristotle also seems to be doing
more than descriptive metaphysics, because he is interested
in describing the nature of reality and not just our con-
ceptual framework.

It might be objected that even though sometimes
Aristotle appears to be doing descriptive metaphysics, in
fact he is not really doing this at all. His account of
a human being, for example, does not appear to result in
a description of ass concept of a human being. We do not
(and neither did Aristotle's contemporaries) think of a
human being in terms of Aristotle's four causes, and we do
not normally think of the soul as the actuality of a body
that is potentially living. Thus, in using such concepts
as the concepts of the four causes, actuality, and poten-
tiality, Aristotle seems to be doing revisionary metaphysics,
rather than descriptive metaphysics.

In response to this objection, I think that Strawson

would say that the investigation of, and the use of, our

196

ordinary language can only take us so far into the study of
our fundamental concepts. Beyond the point where ordinary
terms can take us, we must use other terms. Strawson says:
"Permanent relationships are described in an impermanent
idiom, which reflects both the age's climate of thought

and the individual philosopher's personal style of thinking"
(xv). Aristotle's account of the human being is cast in
terms and concepts that are different from those that we
would normally use, and they are different from the terms
and concepts that Strawson uses, but Strawson would say that
both he and Aristotle are attempting to give an account of
the sass concept of a person, viz., the concept that every-
one has. Both Aristotle and Strawson have found it neces-
sary to employ a technical vocabulary in order to give more
perspicuous accounts of our concept of a human being. So
Aristotle's use of technical terms does not in itself mean
that he is engaged in revisionary metaphysics.

I would point out, however, two further difficulties
that I mentioned in the last chapter (pp. 165-66). First,
if Aristotle and Strawson are describing our concept of a
person in their own philosophical idioms, using their own
terms, then the question could be raised whether they are
describing the sahs concept of a person that we have. A
philosopher's use of nonordinary terms to describe a con-
cept could indicate that he is in fact.describing a non-
ordinary concept. Second, it is not clear from what

Strawson says about descriptive metaphysics how we are to

197

tell whether the work that is done in a philosopher's own
idiomatic style is descriptive or revisionary. We may grant
that some use of nonordinary concepts and terms in the ac-
count of a human being, for example, is necessary for the
descriptive metaphysician. But it is difficult to specify
when the use of nonordinary terms ceases to be an aid in
doing descriptive metaphysics and becomes instead a piece

of revisionary metaphysics. As Strawson points out, no
philOSOpher has done purely revisionary or purely descrip-
tive metaphysics, and perhaps some of Aristotle's work is

revisionary.

B. Basic Particulars

 

If Aristotle is attempting to reveal the structure
of our thought about the world, as Strawson claims, then
one would expect Aristotle and Strawson to have at least
similar, if not the same, views on the nature of our con-
ceptual framework. In this section I will compare the con-
cepts of the particulars that are basic in the conceptual
frameworks of Aristotle and Strawson.

As I pointed out in the last chapter, for Strawson,
material bodies and persons are basic particulars. The
basic nature of these entities is established from the point
of view of identification and reidentification (46). That
is, a basic particular is such that (1) identifying refer-
ences can be made to it without making identifying refer-

ences to other types of particulars, and (2) identifying

198

references to other types of particulars cannot be made un-
less identifying references are made to basic particulars
(28). In addition to being identifiable, basic particulars
must also be reidentifiable. That is, it must be possible
to identify a basic particular on one occasion as being ihs
sass particular that was identified earlier (20). Strawson
maintains that these identifiability and reidentifiability
criteria are necessary to our conceptual scheme, because
the kind of conceptual scheme we have is based on a spatio-
temporal framework of four dimensions, which consists of
three-dimensional, enduring objects with reference to which
we can identify particulars. Material bodies and persons
are basic particulars in this framework (28-29, 45-47).
Even though Strawson is not primarily concerned with
the ontological status of basic particulars, he suggests
that material bodies and persons are (in some sense) onto-
logically primary. For example, in the "Conclusion" of

Individuals he says, taking into account the results of both

 

parts of Individuals, "we obtain perhaps, a rational account

 

of the central position of material bodies and persons

among individuals, i.e. among things in general" (256, my

 

emphasis). In contrast with Strawson's work in Individuals,

 

much of Aristotle's work in the area of metaphysics is de-
voted to a study of what exists. Because Aristotle dis-
cusses ontology, it is possible to discuss what is prior in

his ontology, as well as what Strawson would say is a

199

fundamental concept in Aristotle's conceptual framework.
I would say that all primary substances (as they are des-

cribed in the Categories, Chapter 5) are ontologically

 

prior and that some of them are also basic particulars (in
Strawson's sense of 'basic particular'). In what follows,
I will explain how all primary substances are ontologically
prior in Aristotle's sense and how some of them are basic
particulars in Strawson's sense.

In his discussion of substance in the Categories,

 

Chapter 5, Aristotle says that "all other things are in
fact either asserted of primary substances as subjects or
are present in them as subjects. If, therefore, there were
no primary substances, it would be impossible for anything
else to exist" (2 b 4-6, trans. Creed). Thus, the exis-
tence of particulars of other categories depends on the
existence of primary substances, but the existence of pri-
mary substances does not depend on the existence of any
other subject, because primary substances themselves are
neither present in nor said of any subject. That Aristotle
retains this view of substance in his later work is evi-

dent in his discussion of substance in Metaphysics VII.

 

Here, he says that "both separability [to chdriston] and

 

individuality [to tode ti] seem to belong especially to

 

substance" (1029 a 28-29). That being able to exist inde-
pendently of any other subject is a sense in which primary

substances are ontologically prior, according to Aristotle,

200

is evident in his discussion of the priority of substances.
In Metaphysics VII Aristotle says: "Now there are several

senses in which a thing is said to be first [t0prdton];

 

yet substance is first in every sense . . . . For of the
other categories none can exist independently, but only
substance" (1028 a 31-35, trans. Ross; see also Ass. 1077
b 1-8, 1019 a 1-4).

So far I have shown that for Aristotle substances are
ontologically prior to the particulars of other categories.
As I pointed out earlier, Strawson does not discuss the
ontological status of material bodies and persons. In-
stead, Strawson is concerned with particulars that are
basic with respect to identification and reidentification.5
Aristotle does not explicitly discuss the issue whether
primary substances are identifiable and reidentifiable in
the sense in which Strawson says that basic particulars
are identifiable and reidentifiable. But I think that
Aristotle could say that most primary substances6 are basic
particulars with respect to identification. Primary sub-
stances certainly seem to be the type of particulars that
could be picked out without picking out particulars of other

categories, and it also seems that particulars of other

 

SProfessor Kotzin pointed out to me the distinction
between ontological priority in Aristotle's work and
basicality in Strawson's work.

6The exceptions are God and the intelligences that
move the stars.

201

categories could not be picked out unless primary sub-
stances were also picked out. I would say that the reason
for this is that in Aristotle's ontology particulars in
categories other than the category of substance cannot ex-
ist unless substances exist. This is suggested in Meta-
physics VII, 1, when Aristotle is discussing the ontological
priority of substances:
For this reason, people might wonder as to "walking,"
"being in good health," or "sitting down" whether any
of them exist; and they might do the same with any
other terms of this kind. For none of them exists on
its own, or can be separated from substance; if any-
thing, it is what is walking, or what is sitting down,
or what is in good health that exists on its own.
These clearly do more truly exist, since they have a
definite substratum, which is the substance and the
individual, as is clear in the way that we use the
terms. Neither what is good nor what is sitting down
can be referred to independently of a substratum.
(1028 a 20-28, trans. Creed)

According to Strawson the identification of particulars
involves locating them "in a unitary spatio-temporal frame-
work of four dimensions" (28). He argues that the only
objects that can constitute such a framework are those "which
are, or possess, material bodies," i.e., material bodies
and persons (28-29). This is why material bodies and per-
sons are basic particulars. If, as I have suggested above,
most primary substances are basic particulars in Aristotle's
metaphysics, then material bodies and human beings would
be basic particulars for Aristotle as they are for Strawson.
Nevertheless, Aristotle's position differs from Strawson's,

because Aristotle would include God and the immaterial sub-

stances that move the stars among things that are

202

ontologically prior. But God could not be a basic par-
ticular according to Strawson, because God does not have

a material body, it is not a three-dimensional object, and
hence it could not be identified in the sense of being lo-
cated "in a unitary spatio-temporal framework of four
dimensions."

Thus, I have shown that primary substances are onto-
logically prior in Aristotle's metaphysics, and that
AriStotle could agree with Strawson that material bodies
and persons are basic particulars with respect to identifi-
cation. But even though Strawson's identifiability and
reidentifiability criteria can be used to distinguish basic
particulars from nonbasic particulars in Strawson's meta-
physics, these criteria cannot be used to distinguish
ontologically prior individuals from ontologically secon-
dary individuals in Aristotle's metaphysics. This is be-
cause Strawson and Aristotle use different criteria for
distinguishing between basic and nonbasic particulars,
and ontologically prior and secondary individuals, respec-
tively. Strawson distinguishes between basic and nonbasic
particulars on the basis of identifiability and reidenti-
fiability. Aristotle distinguishes between ontologically
prior and secondary individuals on the basis of separability
and individuality. The result of this difference between
their views is that God and the intelligences that move

the stars are ontologically prior individuals (i.e., primary

203

substances) for Aristotle, but hpi_basic particulars for
Strawson. Having compared Strawson's concept of a basic
particular with Aristotle's concept of a primary substance,

I will compare Strawson's concept of a person withAmistotle's

concept of a human being next.

C. Persons

1 will begin my comparison of Aristotle's and Strawson's
concepts of a person by briefly recalling what their con-
cepts are. For Aristotle, a human being is an ensouled
body, and the essence of a human being is the soul as the
form of the body. I also pointed out that the rational
capacity is a necessary part of the essence of a human be-
ing. This is important because the rational capacity dis-
tinguishes humans from plants and other animals, and be-
cause it has important consequences for Aristotle's concept
of a natural slave. For Strawson, a person is the kind of
entity to which both P-predicates (implying the possession
of consciousness) and M-predicates (corporeal predicates)
are equally applicable.

As I have already pointed out, Strawson would say
that both he and Aristotle are referring to the same con-
cept in different terms: Aristotle in terms of 'soul',
'body', 'cause', 'actuality', and 'potentiality', and
Strawson in terms of 'P-predicate', 'M-predicate', and
'basic particular'. In short, when Aristotle refers to a

human being as an "embodied soul" or an "ensouled body,"

204

he need not be understood (and as I shall argue later, he

should not be understood) as referring to two distinct en-

 

tities that happen to exist together. The human being that
Aristotle describes is the kind of entity to which both M-
and P-predicates are ascribable. It is not the case that
M-predicates are ascribed only to the body and P-predicates
are ascribed only to the soul. Both kinds of predicates
are ascribed to the same individual substance, viz., the
individual human being. I wish only to point out here that
Aristotle's description of a human being as an ensouled
body does not necessarily mean that he does not have the
same concept of a human being that Strawson has.

Since human beings are primary substances for
Aristotle, they are basic particulars for him just as per—
sons are for Strawson. But an essential part of Strawson's
concept of a person is that it is primitive, and in compar-
ing Aristotle's concept of the person with Strawson's it is
necessary to determine whether Aristotle's concept is primi-
tive also. According to Strawson, the concept of a person
is primitive if, and only if, it cannot be explained or
analyzed in terms of concepts that are any more primitive,
such aS the concepts of a body or of a pure consciousness
(99, 101). He says that "the concept of a person is not to
be analysed as that of an animated body or of an embodied
anima" (99). Strawson doubts that the concept of the pure

individual consciousness can exist, but he says that if the

205

concept does exist, then "it can exist only . . . as a
secondary, non-primitive concept, which itself is to be
explained, analysed, in terms of the concept of a person"
(99).

At first glance, it seems that Strawson's insistence
that "the concept of a person is not to be analysed as that
of an animated body or of an embodied anima" would rule out
Aristotle's concept of a human being as an acceptable
primitive concept. Aristotle maintains that any individual
substance is a compound of form and matter (Ass, VII, 10,
11). And since the form and the matter of a human being
are its soul and body, respectively, then a human being
is an embodied soul or an ensouled body (Ash. 1037 a 5-6,
28-29). If Aristotle's concept of a human being were the
concept of an ensouled body, then the concept of a human
being would not be primitive, but analyzable in terms of
the concepts of a soul and a body. Further, if a human
being were thought of as an ensouled body, then the human
being would not be a basic particular in Strawson's sense
of 'basic particular'. In fact, no primary substance would
be a basic particular in Strawson's sense, since an indi-
vidual substance (except God and the immaterial celestial
intelligences) consists of form and matter.

Ignoring for now Aristotle's doctrine of the active
mind, I think that Aristotle's concept of a human being

is indeed primitive (in Strawson's sense) and not

206

analyzable in terms of the concepts of a soul and a body.
The reason why Aristotle's concept of a human being is
primitive, it seems to me, is that he does not see the soul
and the body as two separable and independent substances
which compose a human being when they exist together. As

I pointed out in my discussion of Aristotle's concept of

a human being in the De Anima (my Chapter II), Aristotle
believes that the soul and the body are not separable in
fact, though they are distinguishable in definition (hs_Ah.
413 b 28-29). To talk in Strawson's idiom, the concept of
the body alone is not more primitive than the concept of

a human being, because without the soul the body is not a
living human body, but it is a human body in name only.7
Furthermore, the concept of the soul is not more primitive
than the concept of a human being, because Aristotle's con-
cept of the soul is such that it does not seem possible to
conceive of the human soul (except the active mind) as
existing except as it exists in a living, functioning hu-
man being. Aristotle says that the soul is the actuality

and the form of a body (De An. II, 1), and that "the affec-

 

tions [of the soul] are enmattered principles" (dhlon hoti

 

tapathh logoi enuloi eisin, De An. 403 a 24). Hence, be-

 

ing in a body is necessary for the soul's very existence.

 

7See De An. 412 b 13-413 a 3; De Part. An. 640 b 35-
641 a 33; MetT‘TO3s b 24-25, 1036 b 30—31.

 

207

Therefore, I would say that Aristotle's concept of a human
being is primitive in the sense that it is not to be ana-
lyzed in terms of the concepts of the soul and the body.

Furthermore, I would say that a human being is a
basic particular (in Strawson's sense) in Aristotle's con-
ceptual scheme, because one could not pick out an affec-
tion of the soul or some aspect of the human body unless
one picked out the human being who "had" the affection of
the soul or the body. In addition, human beings can be
picked out without picking out some affection of the soul
or a particular in any other category other than the cate-
gory of substance.

Thus, I have tried to show that Aristotle's concept
of a human being is primitive in Strawson's sense of 'primi-
tive' and that a human being is a basic particular in
Aristotle's conceptual scheme in Strawson's sense of 'basic
particular'.

When I suggested in the preceding discussion that the
soul iS not a basic particular in Aristotle's conceptual
scheme and that the concept of a soul is not primitive, I
was concerned with all of the soul except the active mind.
The doctrine of the active mind causes Special difficulties
because Aristotle seems to hold that the active mind can

exist separately from the body (De An. 430 a 17, 23-25;

208

Ass. 1070 a 25-27). This raises the question whether the
active mind is a basic particular and whether the concept
of the active mind is a primitive concept.

If the active mind were a basic particular, according
to Strawson's concept of a basic particular, then the ac-
tive mind would be identified in the sense of being locata-
ble in a four-dimensional spatio-temporal framework.
Strawson says that only material bodies or things which
possess material bodies satisfy this requirement (28-29).
But Since the active mind is not itself a material body and
does not possess a material body (as persons do), it is not
identifiable in Strawson's sense. Consequently, the active
mind is not a basic particular in Strawson's sense of 'basic
particular'.

If the concept of the active mind were a primitive
concept, then Aristotle's concept of a human being could
be analyzed in terms of the concept of the active mind.
Aristotle sometimes seems to believe that the concept of
the active mind is primitive, especially when he says in

the Nicomachean Ethics that reason seems to be the man (1169

 

a 1, 1178 a 2, 7), and when he argues in the Metaphysics

 

that a thing is one and the same as its essence (the es-
sence of a human being includes the thinking faculty)
(VII, 6). When Strawson discusses "the full extent of the
acknowledgement one is making in acknowledging the logical

primitiveness of the concept of a person" (100), he says that

209

There would be no question of ascribing one's own
states of consciousness, or experiences, to anything,
unless one also ascribed, or were ready and able to as-
cribe, states of consciousness, or experiences, to
other individual entities of the same logical type as
that thing to which one ascribes one's own states of
consciousness. (100)

Further, he argues that one could not see oneself as a sub-
ject of experiences unless one could distinguish between
oneself and other subjects of experiences. One difficulty
with taking the concept of a pure ego as primitive is that
one would not be able to distinguish between oneself and
others on the basis of experiences alone. I presented in
detail Strawson's argument against the primitiveness of

the concept of a pure ego in the last chapter (pp. 177-78).
Now, it seems to me that Aristotle's concept of the active
mind would also be subject to Strawson's objection to the
primitiveness of the concept of the pure ego. As I men-
tioned in the concluding remarks to my Chapter 11, there
would be no way to distinguish active minds, because
Aristotle's concept of the active mind is the concept of a
type of entity that is always thinking and identical with
the object of thought (hsiAh. III, 5). This would be true
of all active minds, and so it would not seem possible to
distinguish one's own active mind from other active minds.
Consequently, the concept of a human being could not be
analyzed in terms of the concept of an active mind. There-

fore, it seems that Strawson's objection to the primitive-

ness of the concept of a pure ego also rules out Aristotle's

concept of the active mind as being primitive.

210

As the preceding discussion shows, there are many
similarities between Aristotle's conceptual scheme and
Strawson's conceptual scheme. There are, however, two
notable differences. First, Strawson's conceptual scheme
contains two different types of basic particulars: mate-
rial bodies and persons. But Aristotle's conceptual scheme
contains only one type of ontologically prior thing: pri-
mary substances. Primary substances include not only ma-
terial bodies ahh human beings, but also immaterial sub-
stances (God and the substances that move the stars). Ac-
cording to Strawson, the difference between persons and
material bodies is that both M- and P-predicates are as-
cribable to persons, whereas only M-predicates are ascriba-
ble to material bodies. According to Aristotle, though,
all primary substances, except God and the substances that
move the stars, involve both form and matter. Different
substances have different forms and different kinds of mat-
ter, but they are all equally primary substances in virtue
of having some matter and some form. In the case of living
organisms, the form is the soul and the matter is the body.
And God and the substances that move the stars consist of
form, but they are immaterial. This brings me to the sec-
ond major difference I wish to note between Aristotle's con-
ceptual scheme and Strawson's conceptual scheme. One con-
sequence of Aristotle's view that all living things (in-

cluding God and the celestial intelligences that move the

211

stars) have souls is that many P-predicates are ascribable
not only to human beings, but also to other animals and to
God and the celestial intelligences. According to Strawson,

P-predicates are ascribable only to (human) persons.

D. P- and M-Predicates

 

For Strawson both P- and M-predicates are ascribed
to a person. It is not the case that P-predicates are as-
cribed to a mind, which is a different type of entity from
the body, to which M-predicates are ascribed. Aristotle's
concept of a human being seems to be Similar to StrawSon's,
because both psychic attributes and bodily attributes be-
long to the same entity. There is evidence that this is
Aristotle's view in his discussion of the role of the soul
in movement in De Anima 408 b 1-17. At one point, Aristotle
says: "For it is perhaps better not to say that the sssi
pities or learns or thinks, but that the has does these by

virtue of the soul [tdipsychhi]" (408 b 14-15, my emphasis).

 

Furthermore, Aristotle's discussion of the affections
(paihh) of the soul in De Anima I, 1 shows that he does not
believe that all of the psychic attributes belong to a sin-
gle entity, such as a pure consciousness, that is different
from the body. He points out that "it seems that all the

affections of the soul involve the body [meta shmatos]--

 

passion, gentleness, fear, confidence, and, further, joy
and both loving and hating; for at the same time as these

the body is affected in a certain way" (De An. 403 a 16-17,

212

trans. Hamlyn).8 As I explained in my Chapter II, this
passage and others indicate that Aristotle is not an iden-
tity materialist, because his view is hsi that certain
psychic affections are nothing more than certain bodily
affections. In my discussion of the question whether
Aristotle was a materialist in Chapter II, I pointed out
that when Aristotle says that the psychic affections are

meta sdmatos, his view seems to be that, while psychic af-

 

fections (except those of the thinking faculty) in fact al-
ways exist in some part of the body, the psychic affec-
tions are not the same things as bodily affections. Psychic
affections and bodily affections are distinguishable in
definition and description (413 b 26-29), and their rela-
tion is that of form to matter.

Hence, for both Aristotle and Strawson the human be-
ing is the subject to which both P- and M-predicates are
ascribed. Nevertheless, there is a difference in their
treatments of P-predicates. Aristotle attempts to explain
the existence of some P-predicates as having a physical

basis. Thus, the basis for the existence of anger, for

 

example, is movement in a certain body or in a certain part

of a body. The explanation of anger, though, must involve

 

 

8The thinking faculty, however, seems to be an excep-
tion (403 a 8-10), because Aristotle suggests that it is
different from the rest of the soul (413 b 24-27) and that
it is not mixed with the body (429 a 25, 430 a 17). I dis-
cussed the nature of the thinking faculty and its differ-
ence from the rest of the soul in my Chapter II.

213

an account not only of the matter that is a condition for
its existence, but also of the form of a certain kind of
matter, of the efficient cause of the movement in this

matter, and of the end or purpose of the movement. Since
Strawson is primarily concerned with exposing our concep-

tual scheme in Individuals, he does not discuss the ontologi-

 

cal ground of P-predicates. Nevertheless, his discussion
of P-predicates suggests that, according to our conceptual
scheme, the ground for the existence of P-predicates is a
person, rather than a body or a pure consciousness. The

existence of P-predicates depends on the existence of a

 

person.
There is also a difference in Strawson's and Aristotle's
concepts of M-predicates.9 As I explained in the last chap-
ter, according to Strawson, M-predicates are predicates
"which are also properly applied to material bodies to which
we would not dream of applying predicates ascribing states
of consciousness" (100). M-predicates include predicates
ascribing physical characteristics (height, color, shape,
weight) and physical positions (83). I think that Aristotle
certainly would include predicates ascribing physical char-
acteristics and physical positions among M-predicates in

his conceptual framework. Nevertheless, I think that

 

9I owe to Professor Kotzin the suggestion that there
is a difference between Strawson's and Aristotle's concepts
of M-predicates.

214

Aristotle would include some predicates that Strawson would
not seem to include. Predicates ascribing potentiality and
actuality would be examples of M-predicates in Aristotle's
conceptual framework, but probably not in Strawson's con-
ceptual framework. The concepts of potentiality and ac-
tuality are important to Aristotle, because they help him
explain change. Consequently, even though there are simi-
larities between Strawson's and Aristotle's concepts of P-
and M-predicates, there are also some fundamental differ-
ences between them.

What Strawson does explain more fully than Aristotle
explains is the basis upon which we ascribe P-predicates
to persons. Indeed, explaining this basis is one of
Strawson's main goals in "Persons." He says thatPupredicates
are ascribed to others on the basis of their behavior, and
that some P-predicates are ascribed to oneself not on this
basis (102-7). With respect to the predicates describing
one's character, at least, I think that Aristotle would
agree with Strawson. In discussing moral virtue Aristotle
is interested in explaining how one becomes virtuous, and

one condition for becoming virtuous is that one performs

 

virtuous actions (ho prattdn) (Ah II, 4). But it is clear
from this discussion of moral virtue that he would say that
a person was virtuous on the basis of the person's actions
over a period of time. To see the movements of other human

beings as actions involves seeing them as movements of the

215

same kind as one's own and as involving intentions and goal-
directed behavior. This agrees with Strawson's explanation
of what it is in our experiences that gives us the concept
of a person that we have and which he is trying to articu-
late (108-9). Furthermore, in his discussion of happiness
Aristotle says that "we have practically defined happiness

as a sort of good life and good action [to en prattein]"

 

(1098 b 21, trans. Ross). It appears, then, that Aristotle
would agree that at least the P-predicates that are moral
predicates are ascribed to persons on the basis of their
behavior. One advantage that Strawson's account of the con-
cept of a person has over Aristotle's account is that in
explaining the first- and third-person ascriptive uses of
P-predicates, Strawson appreciates and tries to solve the
problem how one can have nonobservational knowledge of one-
self.10

I have explained that neither Aristotle nor Strawson
holds that mentalistic attributes are reducible to purely
bodily attributes. I have also explained in the last chap-
ter that Strawson would not say that P-predicate expressions
are reducible to M-predicate expressions. I think that

Aristotle would agree, because the concept of a psychic

attribute involves the concepts of the formal, final, and

 

16This advantage of Strawson's position was suggested
to me by Professor George C. Kerner.

216

efficient causes, and not just the concept of the material

cause (De An. 403 a 25-27).

E. An Objection to Strawson

 

One objection that has been raised against Strawson's

distinguishing persons from bodies on the grounds that both

 

M- and P-predicates are ascribable to persons is that this
does not adequately account for the difference between per-
sons and animals.

I have already given (in Chapter IV) the objection
raised by Roland Puccetti that Strawson's concept of a per-
son is too broad because some P-predicates can be ascribed
to animals (at least some of which, presumably, Puccetti
does not regard as persons). A similar objection has been
raised by Bernard Williams in an article titled, "Are Per-

sons Bodies?" (66).11

According to Williams, if we assume
that Strawson means that persons are distinguished from
bodies on the grounds that say P-predicate is ascribable to
a person, while as P-predicate is ascribable to a body, then
it seems that we must recognize things to which M-predicates
and sshs P-predicates are ascribable, viz., animals.
Williams takes this result to reveal a serious difficulty

for Strawson's position, because the concept of a person is

based on the ascription of these two kinds of predicate.

 

11Chapter 5 in Problems of the Self (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1973). Page references to Williams's
work will be given in the text.

 

217

If there are some things to which M-predicates and some P-
predicates are ascribable, then there would seem to be at
least one other primitive concept, according to Williams.
Williams seems to be referring here to the concept of an
animal, which involves the ascription of some P-predicates
rather than any P-predicate.
Williams argues that this difficulty arises from a
certain general feature of Strawson's theory:
Neither Strawson nor Descartes shows much disposition
to relate persons to any classification of living
things; but 1t can scarcely be an insignificant fact
that our paradigm (to put it mildly) of a person is a
human being, and human beings form a sub-class of liv-
ing things. The neglect of the continuity of our as-
criptions of predicates to human beings and to other
animals is bound to produce an artificial (and highly
Cartesian) dichotomy between persons and everything
else.12
Williams has not worked out fully the difficulty
which the question of the class of animals raises for
Strawson, and I would like to explore this problem in more
detail here. Since Strawson is doing descriptive metaphysics

in Individuals, he is describing our concept of a person in

 

12Strawson says that "we sometimes refer identifyingly
to the particular experiences of animals" (31), and he
seems willing to include the class of animals along with
the class of persons in the type of particulars upon which
the class of "private particulars" (sensations, mental e-
vents, sense data) is dependent with respect to identifica-
tion. He does not, however, discuss the class of animals
in any more detail. Nevertheless, Strawson's including the
class of animals with the class of persons in the type of
particulars that are identifiability-independent does not
avoid Puccetti's objection that Strawson's concept of a
person is too broad because it applies to animals.

218

Chapter 111. Further, since he says that P-predicates "im-
ply the possession of consciousness on the part of that to
which they are ascribed" (101), and Since many animals are
conscious, at least to the extent that they have experi-

ences and are aware of things in their environment, then

we can truly ascribe many P-predicates to these animals.13
Nevertheless, our concept of a person is applied primarily

to human beings. Thus, Strawson has not given an adequate

description of our concept of a person. If we were to

 

 

"broaden" our concept of a person in order to include con-
scious animals (or even only very cognitively sophisticated
animals, such as chimpanzees), then we would be doing is-
yisionary metaphysics. If animals are not persons, it will
not do to place them in the category of mere material bod-
ies, because we see them as being fundamentally different
from material bodies. Even relatively simple animals, such
as insects or worms, which we might not say are conscious
(at least in the sense in which human beings are conscious),
are significantly different from mere material bodies. It

is not just that their bodily structures are different from

 

the structures of mere material bodies, but that they ex-
hibit goal-directed behavior, which mere material bodies

do not exhibit. Perhaps Strawson Should say that our concept

 

13Irecognize that we do not have a completely satis-

factory definition of 'consciousness', but all I need to do
here is rely on a rough notion of what consciousness is.

219

of a person is such that certain kinds of P-predicates are
ascribable only to persons. Such a P-predicate might be
'is able to ascribe P-predicates to itself and to others'i4
It seems to me a virtue of Aristotle's account of a
human being that it does not encounter these difficulties.
Since the basic particulars for Aristotle are primary sub-
stances, which include all living and nonliving things, and
since our concept of an individual substance involves the
concepts of the four causes that are jointly responsible
for making the existing individual what it is, he has pro-
vided a conceptual scheme that accounts for the "place"
that each individual occupies relative to the others in the
organic-inorganic kingdom. I would say that Aristotle's
conceptual scheme accounts for the "place" of each individ-
ual more effectively than Strawson's P- and M-predicates
do. For Aristotle individual substances (except God and
the substances that move the stars) consist of matter and
form (and hence, they are ontologically equal in this re-
spect), and it is the various kinds of matter and the vari-
ous ways in which the forms are manifest in the matter that
distinguish human beings, animals, plants, and inanimate
bodies. Thus, in response to Williams's objection to

Strawson's "artificial (and highly Cartesian) dichotomy

 

14Bernard Williams comes to the same conclusion in
"Strawson On Individuals," Chapter 7 of Problems of the
Self, pp. 122-23.

 

220

between persons and everything else," I would point out

that Aristotle has given us a way to distinguish various
kinds of substances that is more "natural," because it shows
us how human beings are different from all other substances
and yet closely related to all other substances. If one
criterion for the success of a descriptive metaphysical
account of our concept of a person is the extent to which
the account makes explicit much of what is implicit and un-
recognized in our concept, while at the same time leaving

us with an account that we can recognize as being an account

of our actual concept of a person, then I would say that

 

Aristotle's account has succeeded in this more than Strawson's

account has.

F. Do the Ohjections to Strawson
Also Apply to Aristotle?

 

 

Jerome Shaffer objected to Strawson's concept of a per-
son on the grounds that making persons fundamentally dif-
ferent from material bodies leads to the absurd consequence
that the laws of nature do not apply to persons.

Aristotle's concept of a human being is not open to
this objection because human beings are not fundamentally
different from material bodies in the way that Strawson's
persons are fundamentally different from material bodies.

I think that Aristotle would say that human beings have a
material aspect that is just as susceptible to the laws of

nature as any inanimate body is. The difference between

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221

human beings and material bodies, though, can be explained
in the following ways: human beings have bodies that are
composed of different matter (viz., flesh and bone) from
the matter of which inanimate bodies are composed; human
bodies have organs and a structure that is different from
the structure of inanimate bodies; and human beings have
different formal, final, and efficient causes from inani-
mate bodies. Further, human beings are different from many
other organisms in having bodies that are composed of flesh
and bone, rather than wood or scales, for example. Human
beings are also different from other organisms in having

a different essence. Finally, because they have material
bodies, human beings are different from God and the imma-
terial substances that move the stars. In this way, then,
Aristotle can avoid Shaffer's objection and still maintain
that human beings are different in some respects from all
other primary substances.

In Chapter IV, I raised Joseph Margolis's objection
that Strawson has not successfully shown that the concept
of a person is as: reducible to the concept of a material
body, instead of being fundamentally different from the con-
cept of a material body. Does this objection apply to
Aristotle's concept of a human being?

If we consider the active mind to be an essential
part of.a human being, and yet a part that is not "mixed"

with the body and capable of existing in separation from

222

the body, then Aristotle seems to be a dualist. In this
case, the concept of a human being would not be completely
reducible to the concept of a body.

If the active mind is not separable from the body,
then the consequence of Aristotle's position would hsi be

that the human being is in fact the same thing as a certain

 

material body. I argued in Chapter II (sec. C. 2) that
Aristotle was not an identity materialist, because even
though the soul always exists in a body in fact, the soul
is distinguishable from the body in definition, description,
and in being. In short, this means that a human being is
different from a marble statue not only in the matter of
which the human being consists, in having organs, and in
the complexity of its structure. But a living human being
is different from a mere material body because of its soul,
i.e., because of its formal, final, and efficient causes.
These are inseparable aspects of the living body and they
enable it to develop and function in a way that makes it
different from mere material bodies.

There is also a difference between Aristotle's con-
cept of a human being and his concept of a mere material
body. It is because of this difference that the concept
of a human being cannot be reduced to the concept of a mere
material body. The concept of a human being involves the
concepts of the formal, final, and efficient causes. And

because the role of these concepts in the concept of a

223

human being is different from the role of the concepts of

the formal, final, and efficient causes in the concept of

a material body, the concept of a human being cannot be
reduced to the concept of a mere material body. Conse-
quently, even if the thinking faculty of the soul is in-
separable from the body, the concept of a human being is

not reducible to the concept of a material body'iJiAristotle's

conceptual scheme.

G. Summary and Conclusion

 

This comparison of Aristotle and Strawson has shown
that there are similarities in their concepts of a person.
Both realize that the concept of a person is philosophically
important enough and problematic enough to be explained;
Aristotle often seems to be doing descriptive metaphysics,
as Strawson says; and both agree that a person is a basic
particular. There are, nevertheless, important differences.
Strawson's conceptual scheme involves two types of basic
particulars (material bodies and persons), and Aristotle's
involves only one type of basic particular (primary sub-
stances). I have also tried to show that Aristotle's con—
ceptual scheme can help us explain the ontological position
of human beings relative to the ontological positions of
other animals and inanimate bodies more effectively than
Strawson's conceptual scheme can. Finally, I have shown
that Aristotle's theory avoids some of the criticisms to

which Strawson's theory is susceptible.

 

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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

I have attempted to achieve two primary goals in
this dissertation. First, I have attempted to uncover
Aristotle's theory of a human being. Among the results of
this endeavor were that the necessary and sufficient con-
dition for the existence of a human being is an ensouled
body and that the necessary and sufficient condition for
applying the concept of a human being to an individual thing
is that it have the essence or form of a human being, which
includes rationality. The second primary goal of this
dissertation was to compare Aristotle's theory of a human
being with Strawson's theory of a person. Among the results
of this comparison were that Aristotle seems to be doing
some descriptive metaphysics, as Strawson claims that
Aristotle is, and that Strawson's argument against the pri-
macy of the concept of a pure ego applies to Aristotle's
concept of the active mind. There are, however, some note-
worthy differences between Aristotle's theory of a human
being and Strawson's theory of a person.

I believe that the results of this study of Aristotle's
and Strawson's theories of a person indicate some points

that should be taken into account when one attempts to work

224

225

out in detail a concept of a person. I will cite three of
these points here. First, an adequate concept of a person
should take into account the inner, personal aspect of a
person. This would require an account of the self and of
self-consciousness. I have pointed out that this is miss-
ing from Aristotle's account of a human being and that one
virtue of Strawson's account of a person is that he at-
tempted to account for the nonobservational knowledge that
one can have of oneself.

Second, I would say that any adequate concept of a
person that attempts to preserve our ordinary idea of a
person should be formulated in a way that does not include
animals as persons. I pointed out that one defect in
Strawson's concept of a person was that it does include
animals as persons, because we apply some P-predicates to
animals. Further, I would say that Aristotle's concept of
a human being avoids this problem, because part of the es-
sence of a human being is rationality, and no other animal
has rationality.

Third, I would say that a complete theory of a person
should account for the similarities as well as the differ-
ences between persons and other living organisms. This is
especially important not only because some other animals
are biologically similar to human beings, but also because
some animals seem to have intellectual capacities to some

degree. It might be useful to have a theory of a person

226

that allowed us to distinguish between persons and other
kinds of intelligent animals. I have argued that Aristotle's
account of a human being is more successful than Strawson's
account of a person in explaining the Similarities and the

differences between persons and other animals.

B IBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. Aristotle--Books

 

Ackrill, J. L. Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione.
Translated with notes. OifOid: Clarendon Press,
1963.

 

Aristotle. Analytica Posteriora. Translated by G. R. G.
Mure. In The Wofks of Aristotle, Vol. 1. Edited by
J. A. Smith and W. D. Ross. Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1928.

 

 

. Categoriae. Translated by E. M. Edghill. In
The Works of Aristotle, Vol. 1. Edited by J. A.
Smith and W. D. RdSs. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1928.

 

 

. The Categories. On Interpretation. Translated
hy Harold P. Cook. The Loeb Classical Library.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1938.

 

. De Anima. Translated by J. A. Smith. In The
Works of Aristotle, Vol. 3. Edited by J. A. Sm1th and
W. D. Ross. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1931.

 

. De Generatione Animalium. Translated by Arthur
Platt. In The Works oflAristotle, Vol. 5. Edited by
J. A. Smith and’W. D. Ross. Oxfdrd: Clarendon Press,
1912.

 

 

. De Partibus Animalium. Translated by William
Ogle. In The Worhs of Aristotle, Vol. 5. Edited by
J. A. Smith and W. D. Ross. Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1912.

 

 

. Ethica Nicomachea. Translated by W. D. Ross. In
The Works of Aristotle, Vol. 9. Edited by J. A. Smith
and W. D. Ross. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1925.

 

 

. Metaphysica. Translated by W. D. Ross. In The
Works of Aristotle, Vol. 8. Edited by J. A. Smith and
W. D. Ross. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1928.

 

 

227

228

. The Metaphysics, Books I-IX. Translated by Hugh
Tredennick. The Ebeb Classical Library. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1933.

 

. The Nicomachean Ethics. Translated by H. Rackham.
The Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1934.

 

. On the Soul. Translated by W. S. Hett. The Loeb
Classical Library. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1957.

 

. Ph sica. Translated by R. P. Hardie and R. K.
Gaye. In The Works of Aristotle, Vol. 2. Edited by
J. A. Smith and W. D. Ross. Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1930.

 

The Physics. Translated by Philip H. Wicksteed
and Francis M. Cornford. The Loeb Classical Library.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1921.

 

. Politica. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. In
The Worhs of Aristotle, Vol. 10. Edited by J. A.
Smith and W. D. Ross. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1921.

 

. Politics. Translated by H. Rackham. The Loeb
Cla531cal L15rary. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1944.

Posterior Analytics. Translated by Hugh
Tredennick. The Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1960.

 

. To ica. Translated by E. S. Forster. The Loeb
Cla551cal Library. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1960.

. To ica. Translated by W. A. Pickard-Cambridge.
In The Worhs of Aristotle, Vol. 1. Edited by J. A.
Smith and W. D. Ross. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1928.

 

Balme, D. M. Aristotle's De Partibus Animalium I and De
Generatione Animalium 1. Translated with notes.
Oxford: Clarendoanress, 1972.

 

 

Bambrough, Renford, ed. The Philosophy of Aristotle. New
translations by J. L. Creed and A. E. Wardman. New
York: New American Library, 1963.

 

Barker, Ernest. The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle.
New York: Russell and Russell, 1959.

229
Barnes, Jonathan. Aristotle's Posterior Analytics. Trans-
lated with notes. Oxford} Clarendon Press, 1975.

Burnet, John, ed. Aristotle on Education. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1903.

 

, ed. The Ethics of Aristotle. With an introduc-
t1on and notes. London: Methuen 6 Co., 1900.

 

Charlton, W. Aristotle's Physics, Books I and 11. Trans—
lated with introductiOn and notes. Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1970.

Cooper, John M. Reason and Human Good in Aristotle.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975.

 

Fortenbaugh, W. W. Aristotle on Emotion. New York: Barnes
and Noble, 1975f

 

Hamlyn, D. W. Aristotle's De Anima, Books 11 and III.
Translated with introduction and notes. Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1968.

Hardie, W. F. R. Aristotle's Ethical Theory. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1968.

 

Hartman, Edwin. Substance, Body, and Soul: Aristotelian
Investigations. Prihceton: Princeton Univer§ity
Press, 1977.

 

Jaeger, Werner. Aristotle: Fundamentals of the Histohy of
His Development. 2nd ed} Translated with the author's
corrections and additions by Richard Robinson. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1948.

 

Joachim, H. H. Aristotle: The Nicomachean Ethics. Oxford:
Oxford UniverSitylPress, 1951.

Joseph, H. W. B. An Introduction to Logic. 2nd ed., re-
vised. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1916.

 

Kirwan, Christopher. Aristotle's Metaphysics, Books G, D,
and E. Translated with notes. Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1971.

Nussbaum, Martha Craven. Aristotle's De Motu Animalium.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978.

Ross, W. D. Aristotle. 5th ed. London: Methuen & Co.,
1949.

 

230

. Aristotle's Metaphysics. Vol. 2. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1924.

 

Stewart, J. A. Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle.
Vols. 1 and 2. Oxfbrd: Clarendon Press, 1892.

 

B. Aristotle--Articles

 

Hardie, W. F. R. "Concepts of Consciousness in Aristotle."
Mind 85 (July 1976): 388-411.

Hartman, Edwin. "Aristotle on the Identity of Substance
and Essence." The Philosophical Review 85 (October
1976): 545-61.

 

Schlaifer, H. "Greek Theories of Slavery from Homer to
Aristotle." Harvard Studies in Classical Philology
47 (1936): 192-99.

 

Woods, M. J. "Substance and Essence in Aristotle." Pro-
ceedings of the Aristotelian Society 75 (1974-75):
167-80.

 

C. Strawson--Books

 

Shaffer, Jerome A. Philosophy of Mind. Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968.

 

Strawson, P. F. Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive
Metaphysics. London: Methuen 8 Co., 1959} Garden
City, N.Y.: Doubleday 6 Co., Anchor Books, 1963.

 

 

Williams, Bernard. Problems of the Self. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1973.

 

D. Strawson--Articles

 

Cornman, James W. "Strawson's 'Person'." Theoria 30 (1964):
145-56.

Margolis, Joseph. "On the Ontology of Persons." The New
Scholasticism 50 (Winter 1976): 73-84.

 

Puccetti, Roland. "Mr. Strawson's Concept of a Person."
Australasian Journal of PhiIOSOphy 45 (1967): 321-28.

 

231

B. On Necessary and
Suffidient’Conditions

 

 

Copi, Irving M. Introduction to Logic. 4th ed. New York:
Macmillan PubliShing Co., 1972.

 

Skyrms, Brian. Choice and Chance: An Introduction to In-
ductive Logic. 2nd ed. Encino, Calif.: Dickenson
Publishing Co., 1975.

 

 

Taylor, Richard. "Causation." In The Encyclopedia of
Philosophy. Vol. 2, pp. 56-66. Edited by Paul
Edwards. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1967.

 

 

. Metaphysics. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-
Hall, 1963.

 

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