A COMPARISON OF ARISTOTLE AND STRAWSON ON THE CONCEPT OF A PERSON

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ABSTRACT

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I intend to achieve two main goals in this dissertation. First, I intend to reconstruct Aristotle's theory of a (human) person. Second, I intend to compare Aristotle's theory of a person with P. F. Strawson's theory of a person in an attempt to assess the strengths and weaknesses of one theory as compared with the other.

I devote the first chapter to a consideration of two questions: "What makes an individual thing to be a person?" and "How can we decide when the concept of a human person applies to an individual thing?" Relying heavily on Aristotle's discussion of substance and essence in Metaphysics VII, I arrive at the conclusion that the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a person is an ensouled body. I also arrive at the conclusion that the necessary and sufficient condition for applying the concept of a person to an individual is that the individual have the essence of a person.

Since a necessary condition for the existence of a person is that it have a soul of a certain kind, I devote Chapter II to an examination of Aristotle's theory of the soul in the De Anima. I also give a critical analysis of his doctrines of the active and passive minds, and I investigate the extent to which Aristotle was a materialist.

Since Aristotle relies on a certain theory of the soul in the Nicomachean Ethics, I devote Chapter III to an examination of this theory of the soul and to Aristotle's discussion of reason in the Nicomachean Ethics. I also argue that Aristotle uses a theory of the soul in the Nicomachean Ethics that is different from the theory of the soul that he develops in the De Anima.

Having explored Aristotle's theory of a person, I devote Chapter IV to a critical analysis of P. F. Strawson's theory of a person. The source of my account of Strawson's theory of a person is Chapter III, titled "Persons," of his book Individuals. My discussion of Strawson's theory of a person touches on his views of descriptive metaphysics, basic particulars, and P- and M-predication. I consider criticisms that have been raised against various aspects of Strawson's theory of a person by Joseph Margolis, Roland Puccetti, Jerome A. Shaffer, and Bernard Williams.

Finally, I devote the last chapter to a comparison of Aristotle's and Strawson's theories of a person. I conclude that one advantage of Strawson's theory of a person is

that it recognizes the need to explain how we have non-observational knowledge of ourselves. An account of the inner, personal aspect of the person is missing, for the most part, from Aristotle's theory of a person. Nevertheless, I also conclude that Aristotle's account of a person is more successful than Strawson's account of the person in explaining the similarities and the differences between persons and other animals.

To My Wife, Brenda

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Chapter

INTRODUCTION

There are two primary goals that I intend to achieve in this dissertation. First, I intend to reconstruct Aristotle's theory of a human being. (Throughout my discussion of Aristotle, I will use the terms 'human being' and 'human person' interchangeably.) Second, I intend to compare Aristotle's theory of a human being with P. F. Strawson's theory of a person. While comparing these two theories, I will examine the points upon which they agree and disagree, and I will attempt to assess the advantages and disadvantages of one theory as compared with the other.

Since Aristotle did not devote any single work solely to a discussion of his views on the nature of a human being, his views on this subject must be distilled from his work in a wide variety of areas, including not only metaphysics and biology, but also logic, ethics, and politics. Thus, in order to uncover Aristotle's theory of a human being, I will devote Chapter I to his discussion of substance and essence in Metaphysics VII. This is necessary because a study of the essence of a human being will tell us what it is to be a human being. Since Aristotle holds that the essence of a human being is the soul as the formal aspect of the body, and since it is in being rational

that human beings are different from plants and other animals, I will devote Chapter II to a study of Aristotle's discussion of the soul in the De Anima. I will be especially interested in his discussion of the mind in the De Anima. In Chapter III, I will examine the theory of the soul that Aristotle uses in the Nicomachean Ethics. I will argue that the theory of the soul that Aristotle uses in the Nicomachean Ethics is different from the theory of the soul that he uses in the De Anima. In this chapter, I will also examine the question whether Aristotle would regard slaves, women, and children as human beings in his discussion of slaves, women, and children in the Politics.

Having examined some of the most important aspects of Aristotle's theory of a human being, I will devote Chapter IV to a critical analysis of P. F. Strawson's theory of a person. I will study Strawson's theory of a person as he presents it in Chapter III, titled "Persons," of his book Individuals. In examining Strawson's theory of a person, it will be necessary to consider his doctrine of basic particulars, and his doctrine of P- and M-predication. This is necessary because Strawson regards persons and material bodies as the only two types of basic particulars, and because persons are different from material bodies in that both P- and M-predicates are ascribable to persons.

After reconstructing Aristotle's theory of a human being and critically examining Strawson's theory of a

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person, I will devote Chapter V to a comparison of these two theories. Not only will I compare their concepts of a person, but I will also examine the extent to which Aristotle is doing descriptive metaphysics and the extent to which Aristotle could accept Strawson's concept of a basic particular.

By reconstructing Aristotle's theory of a human being, I hope to shed some light on his concept of a human being in a way that has not been done before. Also, by critically analyzing Strawson's concept of a person and comparing Strawson's concept of a person with Aristotle's concept of a human being, I hope to accent some issues that one should consider when one is proposing a concept of a person.

CHAPTER I

SUBSTANCE AND ESSENCE

My investigation of Aristotle is ultimately directed toward the goal of offering an account of the nature of the human being within the context of his philosophy. Consequently, it will be the purpose of this chapter to examine the concepts that Aristotle might have used in order to answer the questions "What makes an individual thing to be a human being?" and "How can we decide when the concept of a human being applies to a particular individual thing?" Some contemporary philosophers would attempt to answer these questions by trying to find necessary and sufficient conditions that must hold in order for an individual to be a human being (in the case of the first question) or in order that we might properly apply the concept of a human being (in the case of the second question). However, Aristotle did not use the term 'necessary and sufficient condition', and it should not simply be assumed that he would see the task of answering these questions as one of specifying the necessary and sufficient conditions. My approach here, then, will be to discuss first those concepts that would seem to be especially important in an attempt to state the nature

of the human being and the appropriate use of the concept of a human being from Aristotle's point of view. After discussing those concepts, I will try to show how Aristotle would use them to answer the two questions mentioned above. Consequently, the following discussion will be divided into four major parts. In the first part I will discuss briefly Aristotle's concept of substance. This is important because he regards human beings as being primary substances (Cat., Chap. 5). The second part will deal with his concept of essence, which is important because Aristotle holds that what a thing is by its nature is its essence (Met. 1029 b 13-16). And since the essence of a thing is expressed by its definition (Met. 1030 a 6), the third part will be concerned with his concept of a definition and with the method of arriving at a definition of a substance by means of divisions. Finally, in the fourth part I will explain how some contemporary philosophers would answer these two questions by means of necessary and sufficient conditions; and after showing how Aristotle would answer these questions, I will discuss the similarities and the differences between his approach and the contemporary approach.

A. Aristotle's Concept of Substance

In the Categories Aristotle says that "a substance--that which is called a substance most strictly, primarily, and most of all--is that which is neither said of a

subject nor in a subject" (2 a 11-13, trans. Ackrill, Ackrill's emphasis). Now, to say that X is "in a subject" (en hypokeimenōi) means that X "cannot exist separately from what it is in" (1 a 22-23, trans. Ackrill). An instance of white is an example of something that is in a subject; an individual white cannot exist apart from any particular object--it is always in some object or other. Also, to say that X is "said of" Y (kath' hypokeimenou legetai) means that X is related to Y as a genus to one of its members, so that the genus "human being" is said of an individual human being (1 b 10-15).[1] Consequently, the existence of an individual substance does not depend on its being in something else, and it does not bear to anything the relation that a genus bears to one of its members. Instead, he says that "all the other things are either said of the primary substances as subjects or in them as subjects. So if the primary substances did not exist it would be impossible for any of the other things to exist" (2 b 4-6, trans. Ackrill).

I have been concerned so far with what Aristotle refers to as primary substances (prōtai ousiai). But he also holds that there are substances that are substances only in a secondary sense (deuterai ousiai). These are the

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[1]This is pointed out in Sir David Ross, Aristotle, 5th ed. (London: Methuen & Co., 1949), p. 23, and in J. L. Ackrill, Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione, translated with notes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 75-76.

species and the genera to which the primary substances belong (2 a 13-18). To use Aristotle's example, the individual human being (a primary substance) belongs in the species "human being" (en eidei hyparchei tōi anthrōpōi), and both the individual human being and the species "human being" belong to the genus "animal." Thus, in terms of the discussion above, the secondary substances are said of (legetai) the primary substances, and yet, he argues further, they are not in any subject (3 a 6-21). Furthermore, the importance of the secondary substance is revealed when Aristotle says that "only they, of things predicated, reveal the primary substance" (2 b 30-31, trans. Ackrill). In particular, he says that if someone were to ask what the primary substance is, a more intelligible and proper (gnōrismōteron kai oikeioteron) answer would give the species instead of the genus (2 b 7-10). This is because the species is "nearer to the primary substance" (trans. Ackrill). A description of the species to which an individual belongs is a more complete description and a description that more effectively distinguishes the kind of individual that is of interest than a description of the genus is. To describe an individual in terms of its genus would be to give a description that would not distinguish the individual from individuals of other species of the same genus. This is because the genus consists in individuals that have certain attributes in common, and these attributes alone are

not sufficient to distinguish individuals of various kinds into species. For example, describing a particular human being in terms of the group of attributes that all and only human beings have in common (i.e., the attributes that characterize the species "human being") would yield a description that tells one more precisely what a human being is than describing a human being in terms of the genus "animal." The characteristics in virtue of which individuals are animals are too general to distinguish among various kinds of animals. Of course, to specify that a human being is an animal does give us some useful information; it tells us, for example, that a human being is neither a vegetable nor a mineral, and it tells us that human beings are similar to other animals in certain respects. This seems to be Aristotle's position, and it gives us some insight into what he would consider to be an appropriate account of a human being, viz., an account that is based on the species.

In Metaphysics VII Aristotle develops his concept of substance more fully. In Chapter 1 he points out that substance is the primary sense of 'being', and in this sense substance is what is referred to as "what a thing is" (ti esti) or a "this" (tode ti) (1028 a 10-15). As in the Categories, substance is still not said of (legetai) any other subject, while everything else is said of substances (1029 a 7-8, 1038 b 15). But in Metaphysics VII, 3

Aristotle considers the possibility that matter is the same thing as substance, since matter also is that of which everything else is said, while not itself being said of anything else (1029 a 7-26). Nevertheless, he rejects matter as a candidate for substance because of two features that belong especially to substance but not to matter: separability (to chōriston) and individuality (tode ti) (1029 a 27-29, 1017 b 25). The separability of primary substances refers to their existing apart from some other subject; this is to be contrasted with the particulars of other categories, such as qualities or quantities, whose existence is dependent on the existence of some subject of which they are predicated (Phys. 185 a 28-32; Met. 1040 b 22-27, 1069 a 25). Individuality also belongs primarily to substances (Cat. 3 b 10; Met. 1029 a 27-29, 1030 a 5), and Aristotle distinguishes the individual from the universal by pointing out that the universal is predicated of many subjects despite the fact that the individual is not predicated of any (De Interp. 17 a 38-40). Hence his remark in Metaphysics VII, 13 that a primary substance is a "this," while a universal attribute is a "such" (1038 b 34-1039 a 1, 1039 a 15-16).

It is also in Metaphysics VII that Aristotle develops the relation between the concepts of a thing's substance and its essence. This is of special importance because my attempt to determine the characteristic features of a human

being is an attempt to discover the essence of a human being. Furthermore, I think that an inquiry into the nature of a thing from Aristotle's point of view is best directed at an inquiry into its essence, because Aristotle holds that the essence of a thing is precisely what it is to be that thing. Concerning the relation between the essence and the substance of a thing, Aristotle says that essence belongs to substance "especially and primarily and simply" (1031 a 13); and in addition, for substances, the formula of a thing's essence is the definition of the thing (1031 a 12-14). In Chapter 6 Aristotle even argues that "each primary and self-subsistent thing is one and the same as its essence" (1032 a 5-6, trans. Ross).

Finally, I should point out that Aristotle uses the word 'substance' (ousia) in several different senses. In the Categories he uses 'primary substance' (hē prōtē ousia) to refer to the individual existing things to which I have been referring so far. These include individual human beings, horses, and houses. In Metaphysics VII, however, he uses 'primary substance' often to refer to the form (eidos) and the essence of each thing (to ti ēn einai hekastou) (1032 b 1), and the soul (hē psychē) (1037 a 5, 28-29). He sometimes uses 'primary substance' in Metaphysics VII to refer to the soul alone, in contrast with the material body and the concrete individual (hē synolos ousia) (1037 a 5-9, 25-b 2). In this context the concrete individual consists of a certain soul in a certain body;

that is, the concrete individual is the individual thing, such as Socrates or Callias. But he also uses 'substance' to refer to the essence of a thing (1017 b 22), the matter of a thing (hē hylē, 1042 a 32), and the form (1041 b 7-8). Sometimes he says that the substratum (to hypokeimonon) seems to be substance; this can be either the matter, the shape (hē morphē),[2] or that which is (a compound) of matter and shape (to ek toutōn) (1029 a 1-5, 1042 a 26-31; De An. 412 a 6-10).

The preceding discussion has been an attempt to give a brief account of Aristotle's theory of substance in order to examine its relation to other concepts that will be of use in determining what it is to be a human being from his philosophical point of view. As a result, I have concentrated on his discussion of substance in the Categories and in Metaphysics VII. In particular, I have established that his concept of substance involves the views that primary substance (as distinguished from secondary substance) is neither in nor said of any other subject; its characteristic features are individuality and separability; and it is one and the same as the essence of a thing. Since the essence of an individual primary substance is such an

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[2]Instead of shape (hē morphē), Aristotle also says "the outward appearance of the form" (to schēma tēs ideas, 1029 a 4), or the form (to eidos, 1029 a 6, 29; De An. 412 a 8), or the formula (ho logos, 1042 a 28).

important part of what it is to be that individual, an examination of Aristotle's concept of essence is invaluable to our study of his concept of a human being. This will be the subject of the next part.

B. Aristotle's Concept of Essence

1. A Paradox

In Metaphysics VII, 4 Aristotle says that the essence of a thing is what it is said to be kath' hauto or by its very nature (1029 b 13-16). Later, he says that the essence is what some this is (1030 a 2). But in Chapter 6, he proposes the paradoxical view that "each primary and self-subsistent thing is one and the same as its essence" (1032 a 5-6, trans. Ross), and in the first few lines of this chapter he suggests that this is true because "each thing seems not to be different from its substance and the essence is said to be the substance of each thing" (1031 a 15-18, trans. Ross). This is paradoxical because, as M. J. Woods has pointed out,[3] the statement 'Socrates is a man' becomes an identity statement. It is also paradoxical because, since 'Callias is a man' is an identity statement also, it would follow that Socrates and Callias were the same in some way. Woods reconstructs the steps that could have led Aristotle to this position as follows (p. 168):

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[3]M. J. Woods, "Substance and Essence in Aristotle," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 75 (1974-75): 167.

1. Callias is identical with his essence. Woods points out that, at Metaphysics 1022 a 24-27, when discussing the meanings of 'kath' hauto', Aristotle says that 'kath' hauto' "denotes the essence of each particular; e.g., Callias is in virtue of himself Callias and the essence of Callias" (trans. Tredennick).

2. The essence of Callias is what is expressed by the definition of Callias. At Metaphysics 1031 a 12 Aristotle says that "definition is the formula of the essence" (trans. Ross).

3. The only definition of Callias will be the definition of his species. In support of this, I would point out that at Metaphysics 1039 b 27-1040 a 7 Aristotle argues that there can be no definition of sensible individual substances "because they have matter whose nature is such that they are capable both of being and of not being" (trans. Ross).

4. The essence of Callias is the essence of the species "man." At 1030 a 11-13 Aristotle says that "nothing, then, which is not a species of a genus will have an essence--only species will have it" (trans. Ross; Ross's emphasis).

Therefore,

5. 'Callias is a man' is an identity statement.

Woods argues later in his article that Aristotle was motivated to identify an individual thing with its essence because he recognized that the non-identity of "what a predicate is said of, and that on the basis of which it is so said" was partly responsible for the Third Man Argument against Plato's theory of predication (pp. 169-70). Thus, it is his attempt to avoid this difficulty that at least partly explains why Aristotle raises this issue, according to Woods. Later (pp. 22-24), I will offer an interpretation of Aristotle's doctrine of an individual essence that will help resolve this paradox.

The remainder of my examination of Aristotle's concept of essence as it is discussed in Metaphysics VII will deal with two major issues: (1) the relation between essence, form, and matter, and (2) the difference between essence as it belongs to an individual thing and essence as it belongs to a species.

2. Essence, Form, and Matter

Regarding the first issue, Aristotle maintains that the essence of a thing is the same as the thing's form, which in turn is the same as its primary substance. At 1032 b 1-2 he says quite explicitly: "By form I mean the essence of each thing and its primary substance" (trans. Ross).[4] In the case of a living thing, the soul is its substance, form, and essence.[5] In Chapter 17 Aristotle explains in what sense the essence, form, and substance are the same. In this chapter he proposes to consider anew what substance is. When one asks "What is a man?" or "Why is a man a man?," one might be understood to be asking "Why is this material (flesh and bones) a man?" Aristotle says that in such an inquiry "plainly we are seeking the cause. And this is the essence (to speak abstractly), which in some cases is the end . . . and in some cases is the first

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[4]He says that the essence is the form or the substance also at Met. 1017 b 22-23, 1035 b 32, 1037 a 32-1037 b 1.

[5]Met. 1035 b 14-16, 1037 a 5, 1037 a 27-30.

mover; for this also is a cause" (1041 a 27-30, trans. Ross). Further on, Aristotle says:

> Since we must have the existence of the thing as something given, clearly the question is why the matter is some definite thing; e.g. why are these materials a house? Because that which was the essence of a house is present. And why is this individual thing, or this body having this form, a man? Therefore what we seek is the cause, i.e. the form, by reason of which the matter is some definite thing; and this is the substance of the thing. (1041 b 4-9, trans. Ross; Ross's emphasis)

Not only does this passage show that the essence, form, and substance of a thing are the same, but it also shows that it is this particular matter's having the essence or form that it has that makes the individual thing to be the kind of thing that it is by "giving" the matter a certain definite, coherent structure. As Aristotle explains in the remainder of this chapter (1041 b 11-33), it is the cause of the substance (or the essence) of a collection of elements that makes the elements, taken together, something more than just a disorganized heap--it makes them flesh (if they are fire and earth) or a certain syllable (if they are a and b).

Concerning the nature of the cause, in the case of artifacts (such as a bronze sphere) it is the efficient cause (the artisan) who imparts a certain form to the matter. But in human beings and other organisms the soul is the formal cause, final cause, and efficient cause.[6] It

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[6]Aristotle says that the soul is the form or formal cause at Met. 1035 b 14-16 and De An. II, 1; the final cause at De Part. An. 645 b 14-19; and all three causes at De An. 415 b 8-11.

is the presence of soul in some flesh that makes a particular thing to be a human being and to do the kinds of things that human beings do, probably the most significant of which is thinking.[7] In De Partibus Animalium Aristotle points out that a human being without its soul is not really a human being at all, but a dead body, a statue, or a sculpture--all of which are "human beings" in name only (640 b 17-641 a 33). In living things, then, it is the soul (which is the formal, final, and efficient causes) that is essential to the living thing if it is to exist as a genuine living thing.

Concerning the relation between the essence and the matter of a thing, it should be pointed out that it is not possible for the essence to exist separately from any matter, just as it is impossible for matter to exist without possessing some kind of form. As far as what actually exists is concerned, we will always encounter individuals that are "enmattered" essences or "informed" matters (with the exceptions of God and the intelligences that move the heavenly bodies). (It is possible, however, to discuss essence and matter in an abstract way as though they were separable.) In fact, Aristotle points out that the essence of a human being always appears in a certain kind of matter, viz., flesh (1036 b 3-6). Nevertheless, he always insists

[7] Ross makes a similar point in Aristotle, p. 173.

that an account of the essence of a thing does not contain a reference to its matter, or alternatively, the matter is not part of the form or formula of a thing (1032 b 14, 1036 a 26-1036 b 6, 1037 a 25-1037 b 5). It is important to keep this in mind, because when one is attempting to understand the nature of a thing, one way of doing this is to find its definition or an account of its essence, and one should keep in mind that an account of its essence will not involve its matter. Aristotle points out that this is not always obvious, because, as I have just mentioned, the form of a human being is always found in flesh, so one might be tempted to include flesh in an account of the essence of human beings (1036 a 26-1036 b 6). (I will return to this issue in the last part of this chapter.) Before proceeding further, it will be useful to consider briefly why one can only understand a thing through its essence and not its matter. Aristotle explains this in Metaphysics VII, 15, 1039 b 20-1040 a 7.

First, he assumes that there can be definition (horismos), demonstration (apodeixis), or knowledge (epistēmē) only of things that can be neither generated nor destroyed (1039 b 31-1040 a 5). Next, he states the two kinds of substances that he is going to consider: the whole together (to synolon) (i.e., matter and form together--individual sensible substances) and the formula entirely (ho logos holōs) (1039 b 20-21). (The formula here seems to be the

essence or the form, since it is "the being" of a thing.) The formula itself is neither generated nor destroyed, and hence would be something about which we could have knowledge. The manifestation of the formula in some matter, however, is something that can be created or destroyed (1039 b 25). Finally, he says that there can be no definition or knowledge of sensible substances, because they can be created and destroyed. The reason for this is that they have matter (hylē), and it is in virtue of having matter that sensible substances can exist or not exist (1039 b 27-30). What Aristotle seems to be assuming here (without stating it explicitly) is that having matter makes sensible substances capable of being created or destroyed, and hence undefinable and unknowable, because matter has the potential for having a certain form at one time and not having it at another time. The matter itself is never generated or destroyed, and the form (or formula) itself is never generated or destroyed. But the sensible substance--to synolon--as the manifestation of a certain form in a certain matter, can come into being or cease to exist, and it does this because of the matter's potential for coming to have, and ceasing to have, a certain form. Consequently, individual sensible substances cannot be defined; only the essence can be known. As H. W. B. Joseph points out, "we can only define then what is universal, or a concept. But . . . concepts are the natures of things; and therefore

in defining concepts, we may define things, so far as they are of a kind, but not as individuals."[8]

The preceding explanation of why matter is not a part of the essence of a thing was primarily concerned with the epistemic advantage of disregarding a thing's matter when giving an account of its essential nature. But I think that reasons can be given from a slightly different perspective for omitting matter from a description of a thing's essence.[9] An essential attribute of a thing is an attribute that cannot fail to hold of the thing while the thing persists as the kind of thing that it is (Post. An. 73 b 16-19). Thus, "having three linear sides" is an essential attribute of triangle, or of a triangle, because without this attribute there would be neither the concept of the triangle nor a concrete individual triangle. A triangle could not be made out of bronze unless three-sidedness were imparted to the bronze. "Being made of bronze," however, is not an essential attribute of triangle, because a triangle can exist in other kinds of matter. But an even stronger claim is being made, namely, that "being made of some kind of matter" is not an essential attribute, because one can describe the nature of a triangle and work with the

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[8]H. W. B. Joseph, An Introduction to Logic, 2nd ed., revised (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1916), p. 82.

[9]This account is based on Edwin Hartman's discussion in his "Aristotle on the Identity of Substance and Essence," The Philosophical Review 85 (Oct. 1976): 553-57.

concept of a triangle without mentioning any matter. These things could not be done if matter were an essential attribute of triangle.[10] Furthermore, even though the essence of triangle can be "enmattered" in a variety of different kinds of matter, it may well be that the essence of some things can only be "enmattered" in certain specific kinds of matter. Edwin Hartman suggests (pp. 554, 556-57) that an essence may place some constraints on the kind of matter in which it can appear. This may be why the essence of a human being, the soul, always appears in flesh and bones. Aristotle may argue that animality and rationality are essential attributes of human beings and that these attributes can only be manifested in flesh and bones. The human body is the kind of substance that is flexible, and yet it holds its shape; and so human beings are capable of moving, engaging in social activities, and trying to understand things by interacting with other things in their environment. In short, since Aristotle sometimes regards essence as involving the final cause, as well as the formal cause (1041 a 28-29, 1044 a 36-b 1), he might argue that a human being could only attempt to realize his or her end if his or her essence is in flesh and not in something as rigid as wood, for example. Even a triangle cannot appear in just <u>any</u> kind of matter; it could only appear in those kinds

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[10] Cf. <u>Met</u>. VII, 11.

of matter that were rigid enough to hold their triangular shapes. A triangle could not be made of water, for example.

3. Essence in Individuals vs. Essence in Species

Having discussed the relation between essence, form, and matter, I turn now to the second major issue, that of the difference between essence as it belongs to individual things and as it belongs to species. Much of Hartman's discussion in Part III of his paper will be particularly relevant here. Often in Metaphysics VII Aristotle suggests that individual things have their own individual essences. For example, in Chapter 6 he says: "Each thing itself, then, and its essence are one and the same in no merely accidental way . . . so that even by the exhibition of instances it becomes clear that both must be one" (1031 b 18-22, trans. Ross), and "clearly, then, each primary and self-subsistent thing is one and the same as its essence" (1032 a 5-6, trans. Ross). Later, in Chapter 13, he says that "the substance of each thing is that which is peculiar to it, which does not belong to anything else . . . for things whose substance is one and whose essence is one are themselves also one" (1038 b 9-15, trans. Ross). Hartman also points out that Aristotle's doctrine of the soul "makes it clear that each person has his own soul" (p. 550). As Hartman says, these cases suggest that Aristotle admitted

individual essences, or essences that are unique to individual things. In other places, however, Aristotle suggests that there are not individual essences. For example, he says that "nothing, then, which is not a species of a genus will have an essence--only species will have it" (1030 a 11-13, trans. Ross; Ross's emphasis). One problem with saying that only a species has an essence is that a species is a secondary substance, while essence is the same as a primary substance. So, it is not clear in what sense a species has an essence. The problem that I will address is how to explain these apparently different views of essence.

Hartman says that "to say that your essence is different from mine is not to say that you and I have different essential properties . . . that distinguish us each from all others" (p. 552). And when Aristotle said at 1030 a 11 "that only species of genus have essence, he means simply that it is the species . . . that determines what the essence of something is" (p. 552). Furthermore, Hartman explains that the essences of two individuals are to be distinguished in the same way that the two individuals are to be distinguished (since each individual is identical with its essence), and that is in virtue of their having numerically different portions of matter, which exist in different places. Hartman refers here to Aristotle's claim that the individuals Callias and Socrates "are

different in virtue of their matter (for that is different), but the same in form; for their form is indivisible" (1034 a 6-8, trans. Ross). This approach helps to resolve the paradox I discussed earlier (pp. 12-13) of claiming that Socrates and Callias are the same because they have the same essence (viz., "man"), and because each individual is the same as its essence. The paradox can be resolved because even though Socrates and Callias have the same form or essence, the form or essence of each is actualized or "enmattered" in portions of matter that exist in different places.

I would propose the following explanation of Aristotle's position on the relation of the essence to the species and to the individual. I would say that Aristotle can maintain that essence belongs to species, on the one hand, when one considers essence in the sense of an abstraction or a universal; and on the other hand, essence can be understood to belong to an individual when it is considered as the formal cause that is in the individual's matter. To explain this more clearly, consider first the claim that essence belongs only to species. It should be pointed out immediately that this cannot be understood as saying that species have essences in the same sense in which individual things have essences. For example, it would make sense to say that the essence of a triangle includes its having three sides, but it would not be proper to say that the

essence of the species "triangle" includes the species' having three sides. If this were true, Aristotle would be admitting the self-predication assumption that was partly responsible for causing the Third Man difficulty in Plato's theory of predication. However, when Aristotle says that only species have an essence, I think he can be interpreted as meaning that each member of the species has the same essential attributes. Since essence is "the what it was to be" some thing, a statement of "what it was to be an X" would be true for all X's. This is just to say that the definition of X applies to every X, since the "definition is the formula of the essence" (1031 a 12, trans. Ross; also Top. 101 b 38). For example, the attribute of having three linear sides belongs to the essence of a triangle; this attribute, as well as all of the other attributes that are essential to a triangle, would truly hold for all triangles in the species "triangle." If a thing did not have three sides, it would not be a triangle and it would not be included in the species "triangle." In short, to say that only species have an essence is to emphasize that all of the individuals of a certain kind have the same essential characteristics, because an account of "what it was to be" one of those individuals applies to all of those individuals, and it is in virtue of "what it was to be" such an individual that the particular individuals are individuals of the same kind. The differences among the

individuals arise because their essential characteristics occur in different portions of matter and because the individuals have different accidental attributes.[11] Evidence that Aristotle would accept this explanation is provided in the De Partibus Animalium when he says: "The individuals comprised within a species, such as Socrates and Coriscus, are the real existences; but inasmuch as these individuals possess one common specific form, it will suffice to state the universal attributes of the species, that is, the attributes common to all its individuals" (644 a 24-27, trans. Ogle).

Having explained the sense in which a species has an essence, let us consider the sense in which a living organism has an essence. In an individual organism the essence is the form (eidos, 1032 b 1-2, 1035 b 32). As the formal cause, the individual's essence consists in the individual's shape and structure. The form is the essence also in the sense that it constitutes what it is to be an individual of such a kind. This is expressed in the definition of a thing. The manifestation or realization of the essence in a particular individual is characteristic of individuals of its kind. In fact, the realization of the essences of

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[11] Accidental attributes could be other than they are for any individual, or they could cease to hold for any individual without destroying what it is to be that individual. (Top. 102 b 4-26)

various individuals in roughly the same way makes them individuals of the same kind, i.e., individuals of the same species.

It should be pointed out, further, that even though the essence of each of the individuals in a species is the same, this does not mean that all of the individuals in the species will be qualitatively identical. The individuals of a species may differ qualitatively because the matter of an individual may affect the extent to which the formal and final causes are developed in the individual. Thus, the matter in which the form exists may prevent the organism from achieving its end, and hence, the organism may not develop fully (De Gen. An. 778 a 29-778 b 6). Aristotle points out in Physics II, 8 that accidents occur in nature when an organism fails to achieve its end of being completely developed; this is because of the "corruption of the seed" from which the organism came to be or because of some impediment to its development (199 a 39-199 b 25). For example, because of a genetic defect--a defect in the matter (or, specifically, the seed)--a thing may not develop in the way in which things of that kind usually develop; or because of some external impediment, such as a lack of calcium in the food, a thing may not develop normally, but it could become deformed or its growth could be retarded. These differences are differences in individuals of a kind that are failures to develop normally. But there

may be differences among individuals that do develop normally, such as differences in eye, skin, or hair color, for example.

Nevertheless, I think that Aristotle would say that certain kinds of things can only differ in certain characteristic ways, as well as resemble each other in certain characteristic ways. Human beings, for example, may have different eye colors, and their growth may be stunted or abnormally increased, but humans usually do not develop gills, sprout wings, grow horns, or crystallize (see De Gen. An. 770 b 9-17). I will return to this point in the last part of this chapter.

I have pointed out that the essence, as the formal cause of an organism, is manifest in an individual that has a certain structure and performs certain functions that are characteristic of individuals of its species. I also hope to have shown the sense in which the essence belongs to species and the sense in which it belongs to individuals. These are not two completely different aspects of essence, but closely related ones.

Throughout the preceding discussion, I have mentioned that the definition of a thing is a formula of its essence (1031 a 12). Since my goal is to determine the essence of a human being, it will be especially useful to examine the procedures that Aristotle outlines for arriving at a definition of a thing. This will be the subject of the next part.

C. Definition

Before discussing one of the methods that Aristotle proposes for arriving at definitions, it should be pointed out that it is important to examine his theory of definition when one is trying to determine what his concept of a human being, or anything else, is. This is because the definition of something can tell us what it is to be the kind of thing that is being defined.[12] The definition tells us this because it states the essence of the definiendum.[13] Thus, Aristotle's view of what a definition is and how to arrive at one should be of considerable help in an attempt to determine what it is to be a human being in Aristotle's view. The following discussion will involve first a brief account of what a definition is for Aristotle, and then an account of the method of arriving at a definition by divisions.

1. What a Definition Is

A definition is a statement of the genus and the differentiae of the definiendum (Top. 103 b 16, 139 a 28, 153 b 14; Met. 1037 b 29). Aristotle says in the Topics that "genus is that which is predicated in the [category of]

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[12] Post. An. 93 b 29: horismos legetai einai logos tou ti esti.

[13] Post. An. 91 a 1, 90 b 30: ho horismos ti esti dēloi. Top. 101 b 38, 154 a 31: esti d' horos men logos ho to ti ēn einai semainōn. Met. 1030 a 6: to ti ēn einai estin hosōn ho logos estin horismos.

essence [ti esti] of more and different things" (102 a 31). Thus, a genus consists in individuals that are the same in kind. For example, if we were to define a human being as "an organism that has the capacity to reason," the genus to which humans belong is the genus "organism."

H. W. B. Joseph defines the differentia (hē diaphora) as "that part of the essence of anything--or, as we may say, of any species--which distinguishes it from other species in the same genus."[14] For example, in our hypothetical definition of a human being, "having the capacity to reason" would be the differentia. This differentia distinguishes the species of human beings from all other species in the genus "organism," because human beings have this capacity, while the individuals of other species do not have it. Another feature of differentiae is that they belong to a subject necessarily, in the sense that "it is impossible [for them] to belong to something and not to belong [to it]" (Top. 144 a 26). Thus, differentiae are not accidental attributes (symbebēkos 102 b 4-5).

In An Introduction to Logic H. W. B. Joseph explains that genus and differentiae together form a single concept and constitute the essence of a thing (p. 82). They provide this unity, according to Joseph, because the genus is "the general type or plan" and the differentia is "the

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[14]Joseph, p. 74. The following discussion owes much to pp. 82-88.

'specific' mode in which that [plan] is realized or developed" (p. 83). He says that the differentia "carries out as it were and completes the genus" (p. 86). Aristotle indeed suggests at Met. 1038 a 5-7 that the genus does not exist apart from the species and that the differentiae stand to the genus as form to matter. He also says that "the differentiae make the species . . . out of it [the genus]" (1038 a 7: hai diaphorai ta eidē . . . ek tautēs poiousin; my emphasis). Consequently, the picture that we get of the relation between genus and differentia is that together they form the species to which an individual belongs and the essence.[15] The genus "animal" is in one sense the same for human beings and for other kinds of animals. But it is different in the case of any single kind of animal (such as a human being), because it is "articulated" in a unique way through the differentiae (such as having a rational capacity) of that kind of animal. Consequently, not only do the genus and differentiae form a conceptual unity (as Joseph points out, pp. 82-83), which is captured in a definition or a statement of a thing's essence, but also, I would point out, they form an actual unity in a particular individual, thus making the individual to be the kind of individual that it is.

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[15]Joseph, p. 74.

2. How to Arrive at a Definition

Aristotle explains the method of arriving at a definition by divisions in Posterior Analytics II, 13 and Metaphysics VII, 12; I will consider each of these passages in turn. In Posterior Analytics II, 13 he proposes to consider "how to hunt for what is predicated in what a thing is" (96 a 23: ta en tōi ti esti katēgoroumena). Before explaining this method, he explains what we are looking for. First, we are looking for attributes "which always belong to each [subject]" (96 a 24: tōn hyparchontōn aei hekastōi). Regarding these attributes, Aristotle says: "One must take such things [attributes] up to the point where, while so many are taken in the first place each of which will belong to more [things], on the one hand, but on the other hand, all [of them] together will not belong to more [things]; for it is necessary that this be the substance [ousian] of the thing" (96 a 31-34). That is, we are looking for attributes, each of which belongs to more than the subject being defined, but which, taken together, do not belong to more subjects than the one being defined. Aristotle illustrates this with the example of the triad, whose essential attributes are that it is a number, odd, and prime in the sense of "not being measured by number and not being composed of numbers." Taken separately, each of these attributes belongs to other numbers, but all of them together belong only to a triad. Also,

together they constitute what it is to be a triad, and a statement of them is the definition of a triad (96 a 36-b 14).

Having explained the character of the attributes that are predicated in what a thing is, Aristotle turns to the method of arriving at a definition by divisions according to differentiae (96 b 25: hai diareseis hai kata tas diaphoras). He first alludes to an earlier discussion (Post. An. II, 5) in which he has argued that the definition that one arrives at through divisions is not an inference (syllogismos) and hence does not prove anything (96 b 25-26). Nevertheless, this method does insure that the parts of the definition are stated in the right order (96 b 31-35) and that nothing is omitted from the definition (96 b 36-97 a 5).

The rules that are to be followed are: (1) "to take what is predicated in what the thing is" (en tōi ti esti), (2) "to arrange these [predicates according to] what is first or second," and (3) "[to be sure] that these are all that there are" (97 a 22-25). The second rule is to be followed by being sure that that which is ordered first is that which follows all (ho pāsin akoluthei), but which is not followed by all (97 a 28-33). The third rule is to be followed by assuming

> . . . of the first term in the division that every animal is either this or this, and that this belongs to it, and again [you take] the difference of this whole, and [you assume] that there is no further

> difference of the final whole--or that straightway after the final difference this no longer differs in sort from the complex. (97 a 35-b 1, trans. Barnes)[16]

He then proposes a way of arriving at a definition by means of successive generalizations (97 b 6-25). He does not say whether this is part of what is involved in defining by divisions or whether this is a different method of arriving at a definition. Ross's view is that "in this chapter Aristotle describes well, though his meaning is not always easy to catch, the process of combined division and generalisation which actually is the true method of attaining correct non-causal definitions."[17] The procedure is, first, to look at things that are "similar and undifferentiated" (ta homoia kai adiaphora), and consider what they have in common. Second, the same thing is done with other species in the same genus. Finally, having considered what is common to each species individually, we then consider whether there is anything that is common to all of the species. When we arrive at a single expression (logos), "this will be the definition of the thing" (97 b 14). Aristotle points out that if we arrive at more than one expression, then more than one thing is being defined (97 b 14-25).

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[16]Aristotle discusses in more detail the method of arriving at a definition by divisions in Met. VII, 12. I will examine his discussion in Met. VII, 12 shortly.

[17]Ross, p. 53.

Aristotle says that "every definition is always of the universal" (Post. An. 97 b 26; Met. 1036 a 28). Joseph explains that

> We can only define then what is universal, or a concept. But we have already said that concepts are the natures of things; and therefore in defining concepts, we may define things, so far as they are of a kind, but not as individuals. (p. 82, Joseph's emphasis)

This is because a definition is a statement of the genus and differentiae (i.e., the species--Top. 143 b 8-10), which are not peculiar to only one individual, but common to many individuals. And it is in virtue of having the characteristics of the genus and differentiae in common that we say that these individuals are of the same kind.

In Metaphysics VII, 12 Aristotle is more specific about how the method of arriving at a definition by divisions according to the differentiae is to work. He says that we are to begin with what is called the first genus (to prōton legomenon genos, 1037 b 30) and divide it into a subgenus according to the differentia. The subgenus, then, is divided according to the differentia of the differentia, and so on. For example, the genus "animal" may be divided into a subgenus by the differentia "having feet." Next, the genus "animal having feet" must be divided into a subgenus with respect to the differentia "having feet," such as "cloven-footed." Aristotle says that this division is to be continued until one arrives at a species that contains no further differences (1038 a 15: ta adiaphora).

At this point, "the last differentia will be the substance of the thing and the definition" (1038 a 19; also 1038 a 26, 29-30).

Joseph points out (p. 131) the possibility that a certain genus might be divided by a differentia that is not a further specification of the differentia that was used just before. The genus "animal," for example, may be divided into the species "human being" by the differentiae "featherless" and "rational." In such cases, the species is constituted by more than one differentia. Aristotle says that dividing by a differentia that is not a differentia of the preceding differentia is dividing kata to symbebēkos, rather than kata ta orthon (Met. 1038 a 27-30). Nevertheless, Joseph says that

> The fullness and complexity of natural kinds constantly leads to the introduction of fundamentally new differentiae, especially where, as in the classificatory sciences often happens, our differentiae are intended as much to be diagnostic--i.e. features by which a species can be identified--as to declare the essential nature of a species. (p. 131)

Aristotle does not give a final definition of a human being. In Metaphysics VII, 12 he suggests that a human being is to be defined as an animal having two feet, but in the Topics he says that a human being is "by nature a civilized animal" (Top. 128 b 17: to zōon hēmeron physei). In other places he says that human beings have the properties of being "an animal receptive of knowledge" (Top. 132 a 20: zōon epistēmēs dektikon), a political animal (Pol.

1253 a 2), and naturally imitative (Poet. 1448 b 8). Not all of these properties belong to the essence; being "an animal receptive of knowledge," for example, is not part of the essence (and hence not part of the definition) of a human being; it is a property (idion) that "at the same time always belongs of necessity" to the human being (Top. 133 a 22: hama ex anangkēs aei hyparchei kai to anthrōpos).

It is difficult to decide what belongs to the essence of a human being, or any other organism, and what does not. Joseph addresses this problem, pointing out that "the problem of distinguishing between essence and property in regard to organic kinds may be declared insoluble" (p. 102). He explains that it is not possible to isolate a certain core of characteristics that are the essential characteristics of the individuals of a certain natural kind (p. 102). The reason why this is the case, he explains, is:

> The conformity of an individual to the type of a particular species depends on the fulfillment of an infinity of conditions, and implies the exhibition of an infinity of correlated peculiarities, structural and functional, many of which, so far as we can see . . . have no connexion one with another. There may be deviation from the type, to a greater or less degree, in endless directions; and we cannot fix by any hard-and-fast rule the amount of deviation consistent with being of the species, nor can we enumerate all the points, of function or structure, that in reality enter into the determination of a thing's kind. (p. 103)

The consequence of this for the definition of a human being is that "the essence cannot be comprised in the compass of a definition, or distinguished very sharply from the

properties of the subject. In these cases one must be content to do the best he can" (p. 111).

Even though we may not be able to express exactly and completely the essence of a human being in a definition, it is possible to identify at least some of the characteristics that are part of what it is to be a human being. I will attempt to do this in the next part.

D. The Nature and Concept of a Human Being

In order to specify the nature of a thing (in the sense of stating what it is to be that thing) and to state the means of deciding whether a particular individual is of a certain kind, a contemporary philosopher may try to formulate necessary and sufficient conditions as criteria for deciding which individuals belong to a certain kind and which do not. In this part I would like to compare Aristotle's approach with the approach of those who appeal to necessary and sufficient conditions as means of answering the questions "What makes this individual thing to be what it is?" and "How can we decide whether this individual thing belongs to this class or not?" Note that the first question is a question about the nature of the individual thing; answering it would involve stating only those factors that are responsible for making it the kind of thing it is, and it would not involve stating what makes it to be this particular individual, which is different

from other individuals of the same kind. The second question, however, is concerned with our knowledge about the individual thing in question; answering it would involve stating how we know that the individual thing is of a certain kind or deciding whether a certain concept applies to a certain individual thing.

1. Necessary and Sufficient Conditions

Consider first the views of some contemporary philosophers on necessary and sufficient conditions. Brian Skyrms says that A is a necessary condition for B if, and only if, whenever B is present, A is present. And A is a sufficient condition for B if, and only if, whenever A is present, then B is present.[18] Similarly, Richard Taylor says that A is a necessary condition ("essential") for B if B cannot occur without A (although he points out that it is logically possible for B to occur without A). And A is a sufficient condition for ("ensures") B if A cannot exist without B existing also (and he points out again that it is logically possible for A to occur without B).[19] For example, the presence of oxygen is a necessary condition for combustion, because combustion cannot occur without

[18]Brian Skyrms, Choice and Chance: An Introduction to Inductive Logic, 2nd ed. (Encino, Calif.: Dickenson Publishing Co., 1975), p. 85.

[19]Richard Taylor, Metaphysics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 58.

oxygen; but oxygen is not a sufficient condition for combustion, because oxygen can exist without combustion occurring. To take another case, ingesting cyanide is a sufficient condition for death, because ingesting cyanide cannot exist without death occurring; but ingesting cyanide is not a necessary condition for death, since death can occur without ingesting cyanide. Consequently, if A, B, and C are singly necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for D, then A, B, and C must all be present in order for D to occur; and if A, B, and C do exist, then D must occur.

Necessary conditions and sufficient conditions are often introduced in discussions of causation, where the word 'cause' can be taken to refer to either the necessary conditions, or the sufficient conditions, or both, of a certain effect.[20] Taylor points out that, for most contemporary philosophers, to say that certain causal conditions are necessary for the occurrence of an effect is not to say that they are logically necessary for the effect, but that if any of the conditions had not occurred, the effect would not have occurred.[21]

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[20]See Irving Copi, Introduction to Logic, 4th ed. (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1972), pp. 369-376; Skyrms, pp. 85-88; and Richard Taylor, "Causation," in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 2, ed. Paul Edwards (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1967), pp. 62-63.

[21]Taylor, "Causation," p. 62.

Consequently, I would say that an answer to the question "What makes X to be what it is?" could be given by stating the causally necessary and sufficient conditions for X, that is, by stating the circumstances that must exist in order for X to exist and which are such that if they exist, then X must exist. This, then, could be seen as a way of stating the cause of X.

The question "How can one decide whether this individual belongs to this kind?" or "How does one know whether a certain individual is an X?" are different from the question "What makes X to be what it is?" These first two questions are not concerned with specifying the conditions under which we can say that X exists, but instead they are concerned with specifying the conditions under which we can know that X is a certain kind of thing, or, one might say, with specifying the conditions in which we can correctly apply the concept of X.

This has been only a brief account of some contemporary views on necessary and sufficient conditions, but it will serve to enable us to compare these views with Aristotle's position on how one should answer the questions "What makes an individual thing to be what it is?" and "How can one decide whether a certain individual thing is an individual of a certain kind?" In what follows, I will be primarily concerned with these questions as they apply to human beings in particular.

2. What is a Human Being?

(a) Necessity

In Metaphysics V, 5 Aristotle defines five senses of the word 'necessity' (anangkaion). First, necessity is that "without which, as a joint condition, it is impossible to live" (1015 a 20-22). Second, necessity is that "without which it is impossible for good either to be or to come to be" (1015 a 22-26). Third, it is "the compulsory and compulsion" (1015 a 26-33: to biaion kai hē bia). Fourth, "that which it is impossible to be otherwise we say it is necessary to be so" (1015 a 34-b 5). Aristotle explains that "it is in relation to this sense of 'necessity' that all of the other senses of 'necessity' are said in some way" (1015 a 35). Finally, "demonstration is of things that are necessary [hē apodeixis tōn anangkaiōn], because it is impossible to be otherwise, if [a thing] has been proven absolutely [ei apodedeiktai haplōs]" (1015 b 6-8).

In De Partibus Animalium I, 1 and Physics II, 9 Aristotle discusses the concept of hypothetical necessity (ex hypotheseōs), which will be especially useful to our investigation of his views on the nature of a human being. Hypothetical necessity is such that *if* a certain object is to be produced or a certain end is to be brought about, *then* it is necessary that certain materials exist and certain motions occur in a certain order (De Part. An. 639 b 24-39; 642 a 1-13). For example, if a house is to be

produced, then it is necessary that bricks and wood exist first, and then that the bricks and wood be put together in certain ways by someone. Aristotle says that this same kind of necessity holds for natural phenomena as it holds for artifacts. In Physics II, 9 he says that the thing that is produced is not simply the outcome of a series of natural events which just accidentally produced it. I also wish to point out that the object which is produced is not the necessary outcome of the matter qua matter. Aristotle's view of hypothetical necessity is just that if a wall, for example, is to exist, then there must be some matter of the appropriate kind (i.e., the kind of material from which a wall can be built) available to the builder. There is nothing in the nature of the matter itself that makes it necessary that a wall will exist--i.e., the stones may never be used to build a wall.[22] (Aristotle makes this point at 200 a 25-27.) About a wall, Aristotle says:

> Whereas, though the wall does not come to be without these [i.e., the stones, earth, and wood of which it is made], it is not due to these, except as its material cause: it comes to be for the sake of sheltering and guarding certain things. Similarly in all other things which involve production for an end; the product cannot come to be without things which have a necessary nature, but it is not due to these (except as its material); it comes to be for an end. (Phys. 200 a 5-10, trans. Hardie and Gaye; Hardie and Gaye's emphasis)

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[22] D. M. Balme discusses the distinction between absolute necessity and hypothetical necessity in Aristotle's work. See D. M. Balme, Aristotle's De Partibus Animalium I and De Generatione Animalium I, translated with notes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), pp. 76-84.

It is clear from Aristotle's discussion in Physics II, 9 that certain materials are necessary only with respect to a purpose: "The necessary, then, is present only on the basis of some assumption, it is not there as an end" (200 a 14, trans. J. L. Creed). And there is further evidence in De Partibus Animalium I, 1 that Aristotle was not satisfied with a purely mechanistic explanation of how a thing came into existence, whether that thing be a living organism or an object made by an artisan (641 a 5-18). More than just a mechanistic explanation of how a thing was created, Aristotle asks for an explanation of why it was created. Thus, a complete account of an object's origin must include an account of its purpose.

It is also clear from his discussion in Physics II, 9 that his concept of hypothetical necessity is similar to the contemporary philosopher's concept of a necessary condition. The similarity is that, for Aristotle, an object such as a house could not exist without the bricks and wood that make up its matter (Phys. 200 a 25-29); the existence of some matter is a necessary condition for the existence of the house. Furthermore, Aristotle's discussion in this chapter suggests that the matter of a thing, while being the necessary condition for its existence, is not a sufficient condition for its existence. This is suggested when Aristotle says, with respect to the example of the wall mentioned earlier, "although the wall has not come

into being without these [i.e., the stones, earth, and wood], it has not come into being because of them [dia tauta]" (200 a 6, trans. Creed; my emphasis). He could be interpreted as saying here that it is not the case that whenever the appropriate matter is present, a wall is always present.[23] This is to deny that the appropriate material is a sufficient condition for the existence of a house, since one contemporary definition of 'sufficient condition' is that F is a sufficient condition for G if, and only if, whenever F is present, G is present also.[24] It should also be pointed out that Aristotle does not claim that matter of a certain kind is necessary for the production of a house (although, of course, only certain kinds of matter will serve the purpose--houses cannot be made of water, for example); I take him only to be claiming that some kind of matter is necessary.

In spite of the similarity between Aristotle's concept of hypothetical necessity and the contemporary concept of a necessary condition, Aristotle's concept differs from the contemporary concept in the importance of the final cause--the purpose for which the material is to be used. For Aristotle the matter is necessary on the basis of a

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[23] I made this point in a slightly different way at the beginning of my discussion of Physics II, 9 on p. 42.

[24] Skyrms, p. 85.

certain assumption or hypothesis about the end that is to be achieved (200 a 12-14). This purposive aspect is not emphasized in contemporary accounts of necessary conditions. However, I do not think that contemporary accounts of necessary conditions preclude a mention of purposes. One could say that the presence of oxygen, combustible material, and the appropriate heat are necessary in order to burn something.

Even though the preceding discussion has dealt primarily with objects that are made by human beings, such as walls and houses, these remarks apply equally well to natural phenomena. In De Partibus Animalium Aristotle says that because of what it is to be a human being, the human body has certain parts and the body develops in a certain way. Consequently, certain parts of the body and a certain pattern of development are necessary in order for there to be a human being (640 a 33-b 4). Further, I think that one can reasonably maintain that Aristotle regarded an ensouled body (or an embodied soul) as being necessary in order for a human being to exist. Having an ensouled body would be necessary in Aristotle's sense of hypothetical necessity, since if there is to be a normal, functioning human being, there must exist an ensouled body. In addition, having an ensouled body would be a necessary condition in the contemporary sense of that term, since a human being cannot exist if either the soul or the

body is lacking. That Aristotle would regard the soul as necessary for a human being to exist is evident in his discussion in De Partibus Animalium I, 1, where he says that

> a dead body has exactly the same configuration as a living one; but for all that is not a man. So also no hand of bronze or wood or constituted in any but the appropriate way can possibly be a hand in more than name. For . . . in spite of its name it will be unable to do the office which that name implies. (640 b 35-641 a 3, trans. Ogle)

This passage suggests that a human body or something looking very much like a human body cannot be said to be a human being (except in name only), because it is unable to function in the way that a human being normally functions. The body must have a soul in order to do this. A few lines later, he says, "as would seem to be the case, seeing at any rate that when the soul departs, what is left is no longer a living animal, and that none of the parts remain what they were before, excepting in mere configuration, like the animals that in the fable are turned into stone" (641 a 19-21, trans. Ogle). This suggests that the soul is necessary in order for a living thing to exist.

When Aristotle discusses hypothetical necessity in both Physics and De Partibus Animalium, he concentrates on the hypothetical necessity of certain kinds of matter for bringing about the end of a certain artifact--a house, a wall, or a saw. Nevertheless, he does say that "it is the same with things that come to be naturally" (De Part. An. 639 b 30, trans. Balme), which suggests that his remarks

about hypothetical necessity apply to organisms also. In addition, his general statement of what (hypothetical) necessity is seems applicable to organisms: "Necessity signifies sometimes that if there is to be that for the sake of which, these must necessarily be present" (642 a 32-33, trans. Balme; Balme's emphasis). In my preceding discussion I have urged that an ensouled body is hypothetically necessary, because if there is to be a functioning human being (an end), then the soul must necessarily be present. But it should be kept in mind that the soul is more than hypothetically necessary in order for a human being to exist. In the course of distinguishing between A's not coming into being without B and A's coming into being because of (dia) B, Aristotle says:

> Similarly with all other things in which purpose is present, they do not come into being without the things that possess the necessary nature, but they do not come into being because of them, except insofar as these things are matter; they, rather, come into being for a purpose. (200 a 7-10, trans. J. L. Creed)

It seems that it is because of the soul that a human being, or any other organism, exists.[25] An organism exists because of the soul in the sense that the soul enables the organism to perform its function. One way in which the soul does this is by directing the development of the organism; that is, by articulating the matter--giving it a certain form--in such a way that the organism will develop into a

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[25]The importance of the "because of" role of the soul was suggested to me by Professor Rhoda H. Kotzin.

normally developed, normally functioning organism. It is in this sense that the organism comes to be because of its soul. Therefore, the soul is not merely hypothetically necessary.

There is evidence in Aristotle's work to support this interpretation. First, in Physics II, 9, as I have already pointed out, he says that things in which there is a purpose (to heneka) could not have come into being without matter (hylē), but they came into being for a purpose (200 a 7-10). He also points out two further aspects of this purpose: first, he says that "necessity is in the matter, and that for the sake of which is in the formula" (200 a 15: en gar tēi hylēi to anangkaion, to d' hou heneka en tōi logōi); second, he says that "purpose is the cause of the matter" (200 a 32: aition gar touto [hē heneka] tēs hylēs). What he says about the soul in other works suggests that both of these aspects of the purpose are also aspects of the soul. In Metaphysics VII, 10 he says that "the soul of animals (for this is the substance of the living thing) is the substance according to the formula and the form and the essence of a body of such a kind" (1035 b 14-17).

Finally, in De Partibus Animalium I, 1 Aristotle says that

> nature as being . . . is also nature as moving cause and as end. And such, in the animal, is either its whole soul or some part of it. So in this way the

> student of nature will actually have to speak more about the soul than about the matter, in proportion as it is more due to soul that the matter is nature than the other way round. (641 a 28-32, trans. Balme)

This passage suggests that the soul is the end (to telos) in an animal, and that the soul, rather than the matter, is primarily responsible for determining the nature of an organism. With respect to the last sentence, Balme remarks that "matter enables soul to exist, but does not determine the animal's nature except accidentally. The matter can be said to be the animal only in the sense that it becomes it when organized by soul."[26]

Consequently, I believe that it is an accurate interpretation of Aristotle's position to say that an ensouled body is hypothetically necessary for the existence of an organism, and that it is also because of the soul that an organism exists and functions as it does.

I would maintain that it is consistent with Aristotle's position to say that the body is necessary for the existence of a living thing, because the soul must exist in a body in order for the body to develop in such a way that the living thing will be able to perform its proper functions (among which are nutrition, motion, and sensation in animals and human beings, for example). Evidence that the body is necessary can be found in Aristotle's discussion of hypothetical necessity with respect to a saw in Physics II, 9.

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[26]D. M. Balme, pp. 90-91.

In this chapter he says that a saw cannot fulfill its purpose unless it is made of iron, "for the necessity is in the matter" (200 a 11-15). His discussion in this passage also suggests, as I mentioned earlier, that the end or purpose of the saw could not be realized unless some matter of the appropriate kind (in this case, iron) were present (see also 200 a 19-29). The same would apply to living things, because Aristotle says that the soul qua final cause constitutes the nature of an animal (De Part. An. 641 a 25-28), and this final cause could not be realized unless it existed in the appropriate kind of matter.

So far, I have suggested, in part at least, how Aristotle might attempt to answer the question "What makes a thing to be what it is?" in terms of what is (hypothetically) necessary for the existence of a thing. I wish to point out further that not just any soul in any body will result in a human being. I discussed this issue earlier, when I pointed out that the soul of a human being could enable a human being to perform its function only if the soul existed in flesh, because only flesh has the kinds of properties that make it possible for a living human being to exist (p. 20). This issue has also been implicit in the immediately preceding discussion. Consequently, I would say that not only is an ensouled body necessary for the existence of a living thing, but I would also say that a certain kind of soul in a certain kind of body is necessary

for the existence of a certain kind of living thing. Aristotle could say that a certain kind of soul is necessary for the existence of a certain kind of thing because the soul is the essence or the nature of what it is to be that kind of thing (De An. 412 b 10-15). And what it is to be a human being would be significantly different from what it is to be some other kind of living thing. The souls of plants, for example, must have a nutritive faculty; animals must have souls with nutritive and sensitive faculties; and human beings must have souls with nutritive, sensitive, and rational faculties (De An. II, 3). Furthermore, Aristotle could say that a certain kind of body is necessary for the existence of a certain kind of thing, because each thing has an end, and it may be that its soul can only enable the thing to achieve its end if the soul exists in matter that has the appropriate properties. This is suggested in the Physics by Aristotle's discussion of the saw, which must be made of iron if its end (cutting) is to be achieved (200 a 11-13). And in De Partibus Animalium he says quite clearly that "just in the same way [as the axe], I say, the body, if it is to do its work, must of necessity be of such and such a character, and made of such and such materials" (642 a 10-14, trans. Ogle).

I would summarize the results of my discussion of necessity as follows. First, Aristotle's concept of hypothetical necessity is such that a certain thing is necessary

if a certain end or purpose is to be achieved. In his explanation of this in the *Physics* and *De Partibus Animalium*, Aristotle uses examples in which certain kinds of matter must be present *if* there is to be a house, a wall, or a saw. In the case of living things I think that Aristotle would say that the body is the matter that must be present (i.e., it is hypothetically necessary) *if* a certain organism is to exist. In this case the living, functioning organism is the end or purpose for which a certain kind of matter is necessary. For example, in *Physics* II, 9, after discussing the hypothetical necessity of certain matter for artifacts, he says, "it is clear, then, that necessity in natural things [*en tois physikois*] is that which is said as matter and the motions of this" (200 a 31-32). And since the final cause of an organism is the soul, then the existence of the body would be (hypothetically) necessary *if* the soul is to exist. That this is Aristotle's view is evident in *De Partibus Animalium* I, 5, when he says:

> Since every instrument is for the sake of something, and each bodily part is for the sake of something, and what they are for the sake of is an activity, it is plain that the body too as a whole is composed for the sake of a full activity. For sawing has not come to be for the sake of the saw, but the saw for the sawing; for sawing is a kind of using. Consequently, the body too is in a way for the sake of the soul, and the parts are for the sake of the functions in relation to which each has naturally grown. (645 b 14-20, trans. Balme)

Nevertheless, I would maintain that the soul, as the formal cause, is also hypothetically necessary in the sense

that it must exist (in some matter, of course) if a living, functioning organism is to exist. Hence, an ensouled body must exist if an organism is to exist.

The second point that I have made is that even though the soul is hypothetically necessary for the existence of an organism, its role is still more than this. It is because of the soul that an organism lives, develops, and functions as it is supposed to.

The third, and final, point is that an ensouled body seems to be a necessary condition for the existence of the organism in the contemporary sense of "necessary condition." Thus, whenever a living thing is present, the ensouled body is present. Nevertheless, I have pointed out that the contemporary concept of a necessary condition does not capture all that is involved either in the hypothetical necessity of the matter's presence in order that an end can be achieved, or in the "because of" role of the soul.[27] On the one hand, necessary conditions do not necessarily involve a consideration of an end to be achieved; and on the other hand, saying that the soul is a necessary condition for the existence of an organism does not bring out the role of the soul in making the organism a living, functioning organism. That is, it does not take into account the soul in its role as the final cause. But when Aristotle

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[27]This point was suggested to me by Professor Kotzin.

talks of necessity in the sense of that "without which it is impossible to live," he seems to have at least something like the contemporary sense of "necessary condition" in mind. Having compared Aristotle's concepts of necessity with the contemporary concept of a necessary condition, let us turn to the concept of a sufficient condition.

(b) Sufficiency

In order to show that Aristotle recognized that there were certain sufficient conditions that were satisfied whenever an animal existed, it would be required to show that Aristotle recognized a set of conditions such that whenever those conditions were present, then an animal was present (according to the contemporary concept of a sufficient condition). However, in spite of the abundance of information that Aristotle has given us on necessity, there is very little clear information on what we would call "sufficient conditions." Nevertheless, I think it is possible to say that what we might call the sufficient condition for the existence of an animal is the ensouled body. It must be kept in mind that this is imposing contemporary terminology and concepts onto Aristotle's philosophy, and one should be extremely wary of doing this, because one runs the serious risk of misinterpreting him. Consequently, I shall try not to assume too much about what Aristotle has or has not said when I discuss sufficient conditions in the context of his theory of cause and his views on the nature of living things.

If the existence of an ensouled body is a sufficient condition for the existence of a living thing, then whenever a certain soul exists in a certain body, a certain living thing would exist. Now, if it is not the case that an ensouled body is a sufficient condition for the existence of a living thing, then an appropriate counterexample must be a case in which a soul exists in a body, but we would not say that a living thing exists. However, there seem to be no such counterexamples, because whenever something is an ensouled body, then it is a living thing. Two final points should be noted. First, in saying that the soul "exists in" a body, I am relying on Aristotle's view that the soul is in the body at least in the way form is in matter (as Aristotle suggests in De Anima II, 1); but more than this, the soul consists in the proper functioning of the body. I will discuss the nature of the soul and its relation to the body more fully in the next chapter. Second, I wish to argue here that an ensouled body is sufficient (in contemporary terms) for the existence of a living thing, inasmuch as the living thing is an individual (primary) substance (i.e., from an ontological perspective). But a living thing is also a biological organism that requires more than just an ensouled body in order to exist and in order to continue to exist. It needs, for example, such things as food, water, air, the appropriate range of temperature, and other environmental conditions.

So far, we have obtained the result that what some contemporary philosophers might refer to as the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a certain kind of living thing would be closely satisfied in Aristotle's philosophy by a certain soul existing in the appropriate kind of body.[28]

To sum up our results so far with respect to the question "What makes a thing to be what it is?," I have shown that some contemporary philosophers might answer it by giving the necessary and sufficient conditions that must be satisfied in order for the thing in question to exist. These necessary and sufficient conditions might be taken to be the causes of the thing's existence. Furthermore, I have explained that Aristotle's concept of necessity is similar in some respects to the contemporary concept of a necessary condition. But I have also pointed out that hypothetical necessity involves an end to be achieved and that the presence of the soul involves more than can be expressed in terms of the contemporary concept of a necessary condition. I have also tried to give some reason to believe that Aristotle could have accepted something like the contemporary concept of a sufficient condition. From

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[28] In his book Substance, Body, and Soul (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), Edwin Hartman argues that the essence is the necessary condition for the existence of a particular substance (pp. 59-64) and that it is also the sufficient condition for the existence of a particular substance (pp. 64-65).

Aristotle's standpoint the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a human being would be the existence of a certain kind of body and a certain soul that was capable of "directing" the development of the body (barring any impediments to the proper functioning of the soul) in a way that would bring about the end of a normally developed and functioning individual. In his account, then, the body is the material cause, and the soul is the efficient, formal, and final causes. Stating these causes would provide an answer to the question "What makes a human being to be a human being?"

3. How Do We Know That an Individual Is a Human Being?

Next, I will attempt to explain how Aristotle could answer the question "How can one decide (or how does one know) whether an individual thing is an individual of a certain kind?" As I indicated before (p. 40), this question could be seen as asking when the concept of what it is to be a certain kind of thing correctly applies. For Aristotle this would involve determining the essence of a particular individual. For example, if a certain individual is suspected of being a human being, then one would attempt to decide whether it is in fact a human being by checking to see if it has the essential characteristics of a human being. Furthermore, since the definition of a certain kind of thing is the statement of its essence (Met.

1031 a 12-13), then our attempt to determine whether the essence of a human being is possessed by a certain individual is also an attempt to determine whether the definition of a human being applies to this individual. So I would say that Aristotle's answer to the question how one is to decide whether a certain individual belongs to a certain kind of thing would involve a consideration of the essence. However, it should be pointed out that the essence of a human being (or any other organism) involves the soul as the formal and final aspects of the body, and not the body (the material cause) (Met. 1032 b 14, 1035 a 17-21, 1036 a 26-b 6, 1037 a 25-29). As a result, talking in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, the necessary and sufficient condition that must exist in order for a certain kind of individual to exist is the ensouled body. But the necessary and sufficient condition that must be satisfied in order for the concept of a certain kind of thing to apply to a certain individual, or to say that a certain individual is a certain kind of thing, is only the soul as the formal and final aspects of the body, and not the body.

(a) Necessity

Let us consider in more detail the issue whether an individual's having the essence of X is necessary and sufficient for applying the concept of an X to the individual. If the essence were not necessary, then it would be possible to apply the concept of a human being, for example, to an

individual that does not have the essence of a human being. But we would not apply the concept of a human being to an individual that did not have the essence of a human being, because it is in virtue of its essence that an organism is the kind of organism that it is. (I pointed this out in my discussion of essence, pp. 25-27.) It is in virtue of having a certain essence that an individual has the structure and function that it has. Consequently, it is necessary for an individual to have the essence of X in order for us to apply the concept of an X to that individual.

(b) Sufficiency

If an individual's having the essence of X were not sufficient for applying the concept of an X, then there could be an individual that has the essence of a human being, but which we would not say is a human being. A possible candidate might be a case in which the essence of a human being seemed to be present in a non-human body (a sophisticated machine, for example) or a body of a kind that was radically different from a normal human body. Aristotle's discussion in Metaphysics VII, 11 indicates that such an individual would still be a human being, because the particular kind of matter in which the essence is found is not part of the essence of the individual. After explaining that it is evident that matter is not part of the form of a circle, because a circle can exist in many different kinds of matter, he says:

> For example, the form of the human being [to tou anthropou eidos] always appears in flesh and bones and such parts; then are these parts of the form and the formula [tou eidous kai tou logou]? Or are they not, but matter [hylē], but because the form does not even come to pass [epigignesthai] in other things, are we unable to separate it? (1036 b 3-6)

I would conclude, then, that Aristotle's view is that an individual's having the essence of a human being is sufficient for applying the concept of a human being to that individual. So an individual's having a certain kind of material body (viz., flesh and bone) is not a sufficient condition for applying the concept of a human being to an individual. Therefore, I think it is reasonable to say that a thing's having the essence of X is necessary and sufficient for applying the concept of an X to that thing.

(c) Application of These Results

At this point, it would be worthwhile to illustrate how the position that I have reconstructed for Aristotle could be used to decide whether the concept of a human being could be applied in two cases in which an entity does not have a fully developed human body. The first case will be that of a severely deformed human being, and the second is that of a normal human infant. The answer to the question how we can decide whether these are indeed human beings could have important moral consequences.

In the case of a deformed human being, I think that Aristotle would say that the individual is indeed a human being. On his view, such "mistakes" occur in nature

sometimes, and he explains that what happens in such cases is that there is a "failure to achieve a purpose" in the organism (Phys. 199 b 4, trans. Creed). That is, the end result--an organism that is developed in a way that is normal for organisms of that species (human beings)--has not been completely attained because of some impediment to the organism's development (Phys. 199 b 18). One explanation that Aristotle gives of why "monstrosities" (ta terata) are produced is that "the formal nature has not mastered the material nature" (De Gen. An. 770 b 17, trans. Platt). This suggests that the matter of the body was prevented, for some reason, from becoming fully and normally "informed." Aristotle also explains that even though monstrosities are things that are contrary to nature, they still occur "always in a certain way and not at random" (De Gen. An. 770 b 13-15, trans. Platt). Thus, a human monstrosity may have two heads, or it may appear to have the head of a ram, but a human monstrosity never turns out to be actually a ram, for example (see De Gen. An. 769 b 11-18).

Since the essence or form of a human being includes its structure, its ability to function and develop in certain ways, and its rationality, then an individual that did not have one of these characteristics would not be a human being. As Aristotle says in De Anima II, 1, if the essence of an eye (viz., sight) were removed, then the eye would be an eye in name only (412 b 10-24). I believe

that the same view holds for the entire organism, because Aristotle goes on to say that "we must now apply to the whole living body that which applies to the part" and "just as the pupil and sight make up an eye, so in this case the soul and body make up an animal" (412 b 23-24, 413 a 2-3, trans. Hamlyn). Now, I would point out that the essence does not always appear in some individuals as "completely" as it appears in others of the same kind. To illustrate what I mean, some eyes do not have the power of sight to the degree that other eyes have the power of sight. I think that Aristotle would say that the reason why some eyes are deficient is that there is a defect in their matter (as suggested in Phys. 199 b 1-7). If the case of a human being as a complete organism is analogous to the case of an eye, then it would seem that the essence of a human being could be present in some human beings less "completely" than in others. On my interpretation of Aristotle's views, then, a monstrosity would be a human being in which the essence of a human being did not exist as "completely" as it exists in a normal human being. As in the case of the matter of a defective eye, the matter of a monstrosity's body is defective (or else there was some other impediment preventing the normal development of the individual). Nevertheless, I would say that as long as the eye had the power of sight to some degree, it would still be an eye and not merely an eye in name only. Also, as long as an

organism had to some degree the structure, ability to function and develop in certain ways, and rationality that constitute the essence of a human being, then it would be a human being and not merely a human being in name only. For these reasons, I believe that we could apply our concept of a human being at least to some monstrosities.

Consider, next, the case of a normal human infant, who is far from being the completely developed, fully functioning human adult, which I think Aristotle would consider to be the end of a human being. I think that Aristotle would say that an infant is a human being and that part of what it is to be a human being is to be developing in the way that human beings normally develop.[29] The necessary and sufficient conditions for applying the concept of a human being need not be given in terms of "static" conditions, such as having completely fulfilled a certain purpose, unless there is some impediment (Phys. 199 a 11, 199 b 8). Further, in terms of my previous discussion of when we can say that a certain kind of thing exists, to say that having an embodied soul is a necessary condition for the existence of a human being would involve having the capacity to develop in a certain way, or, in a less "static" sense, just to be developing in a certain

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[29]Aristotle says at Physics 193 b 13-14: "We also speak of a thing's nature as being exhibited in the process of growth by which its nature is attained" (trans. Hardie and Gaye).

way, unless there is some impediment. An individual has this capacity because of its form. Consequently, having a certain form may be a necessary condition for applying the concept of a human being, but this does not require that the individual be completely developed in order to apply the concept. It is only necessary that development be proceeding in a manner that is usually the case for human beings.

Again, as in the case of a deformed human being, we can apply the concept of a human being to an infant, because the formal cause is present. The value of considering the case of infants is that it emphasizes that one of the necessary conditions for applying the concept of a human being (as well as a necessary condition for the existence of a human being) is that the individual in question be developing in a way that humans usually develop. Thus, the criterion is not based on a "static" condition, but on a pattern of continuing development.

E. Summary and Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to discover how Aristotle could answer the questions "What makes an entity to be a human being?" and "How can we decide when the concept of a human being applies to a particular entity?" Before showing how these questions could be answered, however, it was necessary to discuss a number of the concepts

in Aristotle's philosophy that would be especially important in the answers that could be given to these questions.

In the section titled "Aristotle's Concept of Substance," I outlined some of the major points of Aristotle's theory of substance, concentrating on primary substance. Two characteristic features of primary substance are its separability, or the fact that its existence is not dependent on the existence of another individual (as the existence of a color, for example, depends on the existence of some object), and its individuality, which refers to the fact that a primary substance is not predicated of many individuals (i.e., it is not a universal, as a secondary substance is). I also pointed out that Aristotle refers to the primary substance sometimes as the essence of a thing, especially in Metaphysics VII.

In the section titled "Aristotle's Concept of Essence," I examined the nature and importance of the essence of a thing. Understanding the essence of a human being is the key to understanding the nature of a human being, because a human being could not be what it is without its essential attributes. In Metaphysics VII Aristotle says that the essence includes the form, but not the matter of a thing. He also maintains that the essence holds of a species, and I have explained that I take this to mean that a description of what it is to be a human being, for example, would apply to all individual human beings in the species

"human being." But at the same time, Aristotle argues in Chapter 6 that each individual primary substance is the same as its essence, and I have discussed this view in terms of the existence of the essence in some particular portion of matter.

Aristotle maintains that the definition of a thing is the formula of its essence, and so it would be a useful contribution to our study of the nature of the human being from an Aristotelian perspective if we can arrive at a definition of a human being. Consequently, in the section titled "Definition," I examined briefly his concept of a definition and the method of arriving at definitions by means of successively dividing a genus into mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive subgenera in order to ensure a complete and orderly definition of a thing. Aristotle does not give a complete definition of a human being, but on the basis of the examples he has suggested, I have tried to show that, even though it is extremely difficult to sort out exactly the features that belong to the essence of a human being, rationality is one feature that is part of the nature of a human being.

Finally, in the last section, titled "The Nature and Concept of a Human Being," I compared and contrasted the answers a contemporary philosopher and Aristotle would give to the two questions I posed at the outset. Some contemporary philosophers would attempt to answer these

questions in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions that must be satisfied in order to say that a human being exists and in order to apply the concept of a human being to a particular individual thing. For Aristotle, I attempted to show that what must be taken into account in answering the question "What makes a human being to be a human being?" is the nature of the ensouled body (or the embodied soul). His answer to the question how we can decide whether to apply the concept of a human being to a certain individual thing involves determining whether the essence of human beings applies to the individual in question.

Having arrived at the conclusion that the essence of a human being is the soul, and hence, that it is in virtue of the soul that a human being is a human being, the next step will be to examine carefully the nature of the human soul and its rational faculty (the mind) in particular. This will be the subject of the next chapter.

CHAPTER II

THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE DE ANIMA

Among the results of Chapter I were that (1) both the body and the soul are the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a human being, (2) the soul is the essence of a human being, and hence, necessary and sufficient for the concept of a human being, and (3) the mind, as a function of the soul, is an essential part of a human being. Aristotle's work in the De Anima reinforces these conclusions, and it is the purpose of this chapter to explore the contribution that the De Anima makes toward Aristotle's concept of the human being. Thus, the first part, "The Nature of the Soul," will give a brief discussion of the nature of the soul in general; the second part, "Mind--The Thinking Faculty," will contain a discussion of the mind and an examination of the importance of the soul; and the third part, "The Importance of the Body," will deal with the importance of the body to the human being from the point of view of the De Anima.

A. The Nature of the Soul

In Book II, Chapter 1 of the De Anima Aristotle proposes, as the "most common account" (koinotatos logos, 412 a 5-6) of the soul, that the soul is "the first actuality of a natural body which has organs" (412 b 5-6, trans. Hamlyn: entelecheia hē prōtē sōmatos physikou organikou). Broadly speaking, his discussion in this chapter shows that he will be concerned with the nature of the soul in living organisms. His discussion also shows that the soul is to be defined in terms of the ability (dynamis) of the body to perform not only its life-sustaining functions,[1] but also the kinds of functions that are characteristic of, and essential to, the particular kind of organism to which the soul belongs (this is suggested in 412 b 10-24). To define the soul thus in terms of the disposition of the organism to exercise its functions rather than the actual exercise of those functions allows Aristotle to maintain that organisms that are asleep (or dormant) are still living organisms (412 a 24-27, 412 b 25-413 a 3). At the end of this chapter, Aristotle says that the actualities of some parts of the soul are the actualities of certain bodily parts, so that these parts of the soul are inseparable from the body in fact. Nevertheless, he does suggest that some

[1] This seems to be the emphasis of 412 a 12-b 5, in which he says that "the soul must, then, be substance qua form of a natural body which has life potentially" (412 a 20-21, trans. Hamlyn).

parts of the soul are separable since they are not the actualities of any bodily parts (413 a 4-7). I will consider the question of the separability of the soul later.

In the second chapter of Book II, Aristotle lists the faculties whose origin is the soul; these are the faculties of nutrition, sensation, thinking, and movement (413 b 11-12). I will pass over the nutritive, sensitive, and motive faculties of the soul and turn directly to the thinking faculty (to dianoētikon), because, while plants and animals have the nutritive faculty, and animals have the sensitive faculty, only human beings ("and anything else which is similar or superior to man" [414 b 20, trans. Hamlyn]) possess the thinking faculty (II, 3). And furthermore, Aristotle maintains in the Nicomachean Ethics that the function (ergon) peculiar to a human being is "an activity of the soul according to reason" (1098 a 8). Consequently, his remarks in the De Anima and elsewhere indicate that he conceives of the thinking faculty as essential to a human being.

B. Mind--The Thinking Faculty

Since the ability to think is an essential part of a human being for Aristotle, we should consider carefully his remarks on the nature of the mind. In III, 5 (430 a 10-16) Aristotle says that there is an aspect of mind in virtue of which it is potentially all of the objects of thought, and there is an aspect of the mind in virtue of

which it makes all things. His discussion here suggests that the first, passive aspect of the mind is analogous to the matter of the sense organ, which has the capacity to become like each of its objects; the second, active aspect of the mind is a condition of the mind that is analogous to the efficient cause, and it produces all that can be known by actualizing the potentiality of the passive mind. I will consider each of these aspects in turn.

1. The Passive and Active Minds

(a) The Passive Mind

At the beginning of III, 4 Aristotle proposes to consider the distinguishing features of the mind and how it thinks (429 a 10-12). He discusses the potential or passive aspect of the mind in the rest of Chapter 4, and the active aspect of the mind in Chapter 5. The potential aspect of the mind is potential because it is nothing in actuality before it thinks, and because it is capable of receiving the intelligible forms of the objects of thought (429 a 15-17, 24). Early in this chapter, Aristotle compares thinking with perceiving, pointing out that the thinking part of the soul (to noein) and the sense organs are similar inasmuch as they are capable of receiving the forms of their objects without the matter,[2] and they are similar

[2]That is, in thinking, the mind receives the intelligible form of an object without the object's matter, and in sensing, the sense organ receives the sensible form of an object without the object's matter.

in that they are like their objects but not identical with them (429 a 13-17: dektikon de tou eidous kai dynamei toiouton alla mē touto). In short, he says that "just as that which is capable of perceiving is to perceivable things, so the mind is to intelligible things" (429 a 17: hōsper to aisthētikon pros ta aisthēta, houtō ton noun pros ta noēta). Nevertheless, Aristotle says that one difference between perception and thought is that the sense (hē aisthēsis) is not able to perceive when an object of sensation has been too intense, while the mind (ho nous) is better able to think about inferior things (ta hypodeestora) after having thought of highly intelligible things (429 a 29-b 4). So Aristotle recognizes that the analogy between thinking and perceiving is not perfect. Furthermore, the passive mind must be "unmixed" (amigē), because being blended with the body or anything that is foreign to it would impair its ability to receive the intelligible forms of the objects of thought (429 a 18-29). Consequently, by nature the passive mind is potentially like whatever is thinkable; however, it never becomes completely identical with the object of thought, because the passive mind does not assimilate the matter of the object (429 a 14-17)--it "receives" only the intelligible form.

Aristotle points out later (429 b 5-9) that the passive mind can be a potentiality in two respects. In one sense it is potential when it has never actually received

any intelligible forms. But in another sense the mind is a potentiality when it is not now actually like certain intelligible forms, but it is capable of becoming like them (i.e., thinking of the objects) of its own accord because it had received those forms at some time in the past.[3] The difference between these two kinds of potentiality would correspond to the difference between the state of mind of one who has never learned a foreign language, and the state of mind of one who knows a foreign language, but who is not presently using it. D. W. Hamlyn points out in his book, Aristotle's De Anima, Books II and III, that Aristotle is distinguishing here between the intellect as dynamis (the first sense of 'potential') and the intellect as hexis (the second sense of 'potential') (p. 137, note on 429 a 29-b 9).[4]

Aristotle's discussion of the passive mind does raise a difficulty, nevertheless. Throughout this chapter he has insisted that the mind is not mixed with the body and has no bodily organ of its own (429 a 23-27, 429 b 4). Being

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[3]A third sense of potentiality that Aristotle may also have in mind is potentiality in the sense in which the mind has received intelligible forms of a certain kind, but not of certain other kinds. This would be analogous to the mind of one who has learned French, but not German. (I am indebted to Professor Kotzin for calling to my attention this third kind of potentiality.)

[4]D. W. Hamlyn, Aristotle's De Anima, Books II and III (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968). All page references to Hamlyn's book will be given in the text.

mixed with the body would interfere with the passive mind's ability to receive the intelligible forms of thinkable objects. But the difficulty is that Aristotle does not explain how the passive mind receives the intelligible forms of what can be known. As I pointed out earlier (pp. 70-72), he says that as the faculty of sensation is to what is sensible, the mind is to what is thinkable (429 a 17). Nevertheless, sensation occurs when the sensible object causes motion or change in a medium, which is "communicated" by the medium to the sense organ (419 a 12-20, 25-31). As a result of this, the sense organ becomes qualitatively identical with the object of sense. Thinking could not occur in this manner because the passive mind has no bodily organ that could receive the form of the object of thought, and because there is no medium through which the intelligible form of the object could be "communicated" to the passive mind. Thus, it is not clear exactly how the intelligible form of the object of thought is "conveyed" to the passive mind in order that the mind might become like the intelligible object. (Hamlyn raises this problem briefly at pp. 135-40.) Consequently, thinking and perceiving are disanalogous in an important respect.

That the thinking faculty is closely related to the sensitive faculty is evident when Aristotle says that "we judge what it is to be flesh and flesh itself [to sarki einai kai sarka] either by means of something different or

by the same thing differently disposed" (429 b 12-13, trans. Hamlyn). He goes on to say that it is by means of the sensitive faculty that we judge the constituents of flesh, such as the hot and the cold, but it is by something else that we judge the essence of flesh. This "something else" is either different from the faculty of sensation or related to the faculty of sensation (429 b 13-17). Hamlyn says that this "tends to suggest that the intellect by which one judges essences . . . is not after all utterly distinct from the senses" (p. 138, note to 429 b 10). Nevertheless, Aristotle does not make it clear whether the passive mind is a distinct faculty or a different function of the sensitive faculty. It is clear, however, that he sees thinking to be closely related to perceiving. At 431 a 16 he says that "the soul never thinks without an image [phantasmatos]"; and at 432 a 6-8 he says that "unless one perceived things one would not learn or understand anything, and when one contemplates one must simultaneously contemplate an image" (trans. Hamlyn). Consequently, thinking, imaging, and sensing are closely related because thinking does not occur without imaging, and images are movements that result from sense perceptions (429 a 1). Aristotle does not explain, however, the nature of the relation between thoughts and images, or why one never thinks without an image.

(b) The Active Mind

The fullest account that Aristotle gives of the active mind is in III, 5. He begins this chapter with the observation that in nature as a whole everything has two aspects: matter (hylē), which is potentially all of the individuals of a certain kind; and a productive cause (to aition kai poiētikon), which "makes" (poiein) each of the individuals (430 a 10-13). He maintains that this same dichotomy applies to the mind and that the passive mind just discussed corresponds to the material aspect, which has the potential for becoming each of the objects of thought (430 a 14-15). Having discussed the passive mind, let us turn to the active mind.

Aristotle says that the active mind is an activity (energeia, 430 a 18) or a disposition (hexis, 430 a 15) that makes what is potentially known by the passive mind into what is actually known. He likens the active mind to light. Light consists in a medium's being actually transparent, and it is the presence of light that makes potentially visible colors to be actually visible (II, 7). Similarly, the active mind is an actuality that must be present in order for what is potentially known by the passive mind to become actually known. As D. W. Hamlyn points out, "the activity of the active intellect is a necessary condition of the actualization of the potentialities of the soul, especially the thinking of objects" (pp. 140-41).

Without the active mind the potentiality of the passive mind for becoming like its intelligible objects would not be actualized. Hamlyn also points out that the active mind is not a sufficient condition for actualizing the potentialities of the soul (p. 141). There must also be the passive mind, which is capable of receiving the intelligible forms of thinkable objects.

Aristotle also says: "And this mind is separable and unaffected and unmixed, being in substance activity" (430 a 17-18: kai houtos ho nous chōristos kai apathēs kai amigēs tēi ousiai ōn energeiai). Not only is the active mind separable (chōristos) from the body, but he says that "this alone is immortal and eternal" (430 a 23: kai touto monon athanaton kai aidion). Further, since it is "in essence an activity," the active mind is always thinking (430 a 22), and hence, it is identical with the objects of thought.

(c) Some Difficulties

Having briefly explained Aristotle's account of the passive and active minds, I will show how certain difficulties arise from his account.[5] First, I would say that both the active mind and the passive mind seem to be

[5]The following discussion owes much to suggestions that were made to me by Professor Rhoda H. Kotzin.

entities, because both are separable (chōristos, 430 a 17, 429 b 4) and both have an essence.[6] The difficulties arise as follows. At the beginning of III, 5, he says that in the soul there is a difference between "something which is matter to each kind of thing" (430 a 11) and "something else which is their cause and is productive by producing them all--these being related as an art to its material" (430 a 12-13, trans. Hamlyn). Thus, even though Aristotle does not say so explicitly, it seems that thinking involves the active mind acting on the passive mind. There are at least three difficulties that arise here.

First, it is not clear how the active mind acts on the passive mind. The analogy of the relation between an art and its material is imperfect, because the art exists in an artist who physically shapes the material. Neither the active mind nor the passive mind is material, so there could not be physical contact between them.

Second, it is not clear in what sense the passive mind is passive. Even though the passive mind is "matter" with respect to the active mind (the "efficient cause"), it is not a material substrate that actually exists and

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[6]He suggests that the active mind has an essence at 430 a 18, where he seems to use 'ousia' in the sense of essence (Met. 1017 b 22). He suggests that the passive mind has an essence when he says that the passive mind "must have no other nature [physin] than this, that it is potential" (429 a 22, trans. Hamlyn). It is not clear whether 'physis' here is used in the sense of 'ousia' that Aristotle points out at Met. 1014 b 35-1015 a 10.

can accept a variety of forms. In contrast with existing matter, which always has some form or other, Aristotle says that it is "in actuality none of the existing things before it thinks" (429 a 24, 429 b 31). Since our understanding of passivity is primarily with respect to some matter, it is not clear how we are to understand the passivity of the non-material passive mind.

Third, since the active mind always thinks (430 a 22), it is not clear why the passive mind does not always think also (i.e., it is not clear why the active mind does not always act on the passive mind).

I will not discuss how Aristotle could resolve these difficulties. I have only attempted to show how they arise from his account of the active and passive minds.

(d) The Philosophical Importance of the Active Mind

Having briefly considered Aristotle's rather sketchy account of the active mind in III, 5, one might reasonably ask what the philosophical importance of the active mind is. In order to answer the question of its philosophical importance, I will examine the role of the mind in Aristotle's theory of knowledge, because this will help us understand more clearly how the thinking faculty functions.

For Aristotle, Plato, and many others in the history of philosophy, the one aspect of human beings that is intrinsically valuable and serves to distinguish human beings

from all other ("lower") organisms is the capacity to think and reason. For Aristotle, acting according to reason is the very function (to ergon) of a human being (NE 1098 a 3, 7, 13-14); it is part of the essence of a human being. Consequently, having considered the nature of the mind (nous), I will consider the origin of knowledge.

Aristotle's explanation of the origin of knowledge (epistēmē) is as follows (Post. An. II, 13; Met. I, 1). First, when one perceives an individual thing, "the first universal is in the soul (for on the one hand one perceives the individual [to kath' hekaston], but on the other hand the perception is of the universal [tou katholou], for example, of man, but not of the man Callias)" (Post. An. 100 a 15-b 1). Second, after repeated perceptions and memories of particulars of a certain kind, one arrives at a more general concept of, say, an X, so that one can distinguish an X from a Y. Third, as a result of higher degrees of generalization, one grasps the species of a thing.[7] When "the whole universal has come to rest in the soul" (ek pantos ēremēsantos tou katholou en tēi psychēi), there is a principle of art and knowledge (technēs archē kai epistēmēs) (100 a 6-8). Further, Aristotle suggests at De Anima 429 b 5-10 that when the whole universal is in the

[7] Post. An 100 b 2-4: palin en toutois histatai, heōs an ta amerē stēi kai ta katholou, hoion toiondi zōon, heōs zōon· kai en toutōi hōsautōs.

soul, the mind is capable of thinking by itself, as the person who actually knows (hōs epistēmōn legetai ho kat' energeian) is able to exercise his capacity by himself. Finally, Aristotle suggests in De Anima 429 b 10-21 that it is with the mind, rather than the faculties of sense perception that we distinguish (krinei) an X from what it is to be an X. This activity of the mind seems to be different from its activity in any of the first three stages that I mentioned, because it seems to presuppose that the mind already grasps the essence of a thing in order that the mind can distinguish between the essence and a perceived individual which has the essence.[8]

To sum up, it is the sensing faculty that provides images of particular things in the soul, but it is the mind that discovers what is universal among the images, and this is necessary in order for one to have genuine knowledge. This capacity to "systematize" sense impressions of individuals and to recognize species and genera among the images that one can remember is possessed only by human beings and by no other animal. Being able to do this enables human beings to understand things and to engage in art (technē); and perhaps more importantly, it enables us to make the choices and judgments that are essential to moral

[8]My distinguishing the various stages by which the mind arrives at the universal owes much to suggestions from Professor Kotzin.

conduct. Indeed, Aristotle says that thinking does not occur without images (431 a 14-16, 432 a 2-8), but this does not require him to admit that thinking be confined to whatever image one happens to have. He points out in the De Memoria et Reminiscentia (449 b 30-450 a 9) that while the image is of a particular individual, it may be taken to stand for an entire species of things. In this way one can engage in abstract thought and reason about the characteristics that are held in common by all of the members of a species, while ignoring the characteristics that are peculiar to the individual one is imagining.

One notorious difficulty of such an imagistic theory of thought, however, is that it seems not to be able to explain our ability to think and reason about things which are not perceptible, such as the concepts of "democracy," "ambition," and "the future," for example.

An obvious contribution of the De Anima toward our understanding of Aristotle's concept of the human being is his discussion of the human mind. So far, I have explained what I see to be some of the most important features of his theory of the mind, and I have mentioned some problems in his theory. I intend now to discuss the importance of the soul in Aristotle's work.

2. The Importance of the Soul

It is necessary to understand the "importance" of the soul in the De Anima in at least two senses. First, the soul is important because of the high value that Aristotle places on it. And second, the soul is important because it is necessary for the existence of a human being. I will consider each of these in turn.

The intrinsic value of the soul, and the intrinsic value of the thinking faculty in particular, is prominent in the work of both Plato and Aristotle. In the Laws, for example, Plato says that "every man's most precious possession . . . is his soul" (731c, trans. A. E. Taylor). For Plato the soul is valuable because it is eternal, capable of reason, and the source of moral virtue. That Aristotle places a high value on the soul is apparent from the opening remarks of the De Anima, when he says that knowledge of the soul is especially worthwhile, partly because it is knowledge about a superior and remarkable thing (402 a 1-4). Just as for Plato, the rational capacity of the soul contributes to its value for Aristotle. The active mind is separable from the body, immortal, and eternal (430 a 17, 23-24); it is where reason and the formation of concepts occurs; and it is in virtue of this faculty that the soul knows all things and can understand reality. The rational soul is important to his ethical theory because he believes that happiness is the greatest good (NE I, 7),

and this consists in contemplative activity (NE 1177 a 18-22). It is in the Nicomachean Ethics, furthermore, where Aristotle says that it is an active life (praktikē) of reason (1098 a 3) that distinguishes human beings from the other animals, and that the function (to ergon) of a human being is "an activity of soul in accordance with reason [logos], or at least not without reason" (1098 a 7-8, trans. Wardman). I will return to this in the next chapter.

Perhaps another reason why Aristotle regards the soul as valuable can be found in De Anima 415 a 22-b 7, where he says that plants and animals can only partake in the eternal and divine (hina tou aei kai tou theiou metechōsin hēi dynantai) by helping to continue the existence of their species, not by the continuous existence of any individual plant or animal. They do this by means of the reproductive function of the nutritive soul. Of course, human beings also partake in the eternal and divine in this way, but humans differ from plants and other animals in having the active mind. The active mind itself is eternal and immortal (430 a 24), and because of this it seems that each human being itself shares in the eternal and divine.

The importance of the active mind for Aristotle is also apparent in his discussion of God and divine thought in Metaphysics XII. In Metaphysics XII, 7, for example, Aristotle suggests the following argument, which I have reconstructed from his discussion of thinking (1072 b 14-29):

1. "Mind and the object of thought are the same" (tauton nous kai noētou, 1072 b 22, trans. Creed). Aristotle explains here that when mind (nous) is active (energei) it receives the objects of thought (tou noētou) and the essences (tēs ousias) of things (1072 b 23-24). Further, this activity of receiving the objects of thought "seems to be the divine element possessed by the mind" (dokei ho nous theion echein, 1072 b 24, trans. Creed).

2. "Thought in itself is thought of what is best in itself, and what is fully thought is thought of what is in the fullest sense best" (hē de noesis hē kath' hautēn tou kath' hauto aristou, kai hē malista tou malista, 1072 b 18-19, trans. Creed).

3. We are capable of being in the good state of contemplating what is most pleasant and best (to hēdiston kai ariston, 1072 b 24-25). (God is always in a state that is even better than the good state we are in sometimes [1072 b 24-25, my emphasis].)

Therefore,

4. The mind is what is the best in itself.

In Chapter 9 Aristotle explains that the supreme mind thinks "of what is most divine and most valuable" (dēlon toinun hoti to theiotaton kai timiōtaton noei, 1074 b 26, trans. Creed), which is itself, since the supreme mind is the best of things (esti to kratiston, 1074 b 33-34, trans. Creed). The divine mind is in the best state "during the whole of eternity," but the human mind (ho anthrōpinos nous) "does not possess the good at this or that particular moment, but attains the best of things--which is something other than itself--over a whole period" (1075 a 7-10, trans. Creed).

Thus, I have shown that the soul, and the human mind in particular, are important for Aristotle because of the high value he places on them.

The second respect in which the soul is important in the De Anima is the sense in which the soul is necessary for the existence of a human being and the essence of a human being. I explained in Chapter I in what way the soul was necessary for the existence of a human being from the point of view of Metaphysics VII and Physics II. Drawing from Aristotle's discussion of the soul in De Anima II, 1 and 4, I will show that his views in the De Anima agree with his views in the Metaphysics and the Physics. That the soul is necessary for the existence of a human being (both in the sense of a "necessary condition" and in Aristotle's sense of "that without which it is not possible to live" [Met. 1015 a 20]) is strongly suggested in De Anima II, 1, 412 b 10-413 a 3. In this passage the examples he uses are an axe and an eye, but he makes it clear that his remarks are also intended to apply to the whole living body (412 b 23-24). I shall be concerned with human beings. Aristotle says here that it is the presence of the soul in a certain kind of natural body (physikou toioudi, 412 b 17) (viz., a natural body having organs [412 b 5]) that makes a living human being. Without the soul, the body would be a human body in name only (homōnymōs). Aristotle says that being alive involves self-nutrition, growth, and decay (412 a 14-16), so that without the soul the material of the body would not become a living human being. Both the nutritive and the sensitive faculties are

necessary for the proper functioning and survival of the human being. But an even more important faculty of the soul is the thinking faculty, which enables a human being to perform its function, namely, contemplation and rational activity. Consequently, without the soul, the human being could not survive and function as a human being. Further, Aristotle's discussion in 412 b 10-413 a 3 also strongly suggests that it is because of the soul that a certain body becomes a living human being. This is because the soul "enables" the body to perform the nutritive, reproductive, motive, sensitive, and rational activities that a normal human being performs. At 415 b 13 he says that the soul, as the substance, is the cause of the existence for everything (to gar aition tou einai pasin hē ousia). I conclude, then, that in the De Anima Aristotle's view of the soul as necessary for the existence of a human being agrees with this view of the soul in the Metaphysics and the Physics.

It is clear from the passage I have just discussed that the soul is the essence of a living thing. At 412 b 10-12 he says: "It has been said, then, in general what the soul is: substance according to the principle. Indeed this is the essence of a body of such a kind."[9] Further, he says later (415 b 8-27) that the soul is the

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[9] katholou men oun eirētai ti estin hē psychē· ousia gar hē kata ton logon. touto de to ti ēn einai tōi toiōidi sōmati.

cause (to aition) in each of three senses of 'cause': (1) it is the substance of living things (hē ousia tōn empsychōn sōmatōn) and the cause of their existence (to gar aition tou einai pasin hē ousia); (2) it is the final cause, or "that for the sake of which" (hou heneken), because "all natural bodies . . . exist for the sake of the soul"; and (3) it is the efficient cause, or "that from which motion in respect of place is first derived" (trans. Hamlyn). Therefore, I have shown that Aristotle's view of the soul as the essence or form of a living thing is the same in the De Anima as in the Metaphysics.

Consequently, the soul is an important part of a human being in Aristotle's work, not only because it is valuable, but also because it is necessary for the existence of a human being, and because it is the essence of a human being.

C. The Importance of the Body

1. Necessary and Sufficient Conditions

So far, I have attempted to explain the importance of the De Anima for understanding Aristotle's theory of the human being because of the account of the soul and the mind that it contains. In this part, I will examine what the De Anima reveals about the role of the body in his theory of the human being.

In the previous chapter, I concluded that the body was a necessary condition for the existence of a human being,

both in the contemporary sense of "necessary condition" and in Aristotle's sense of "necessity." I maintain that the De Anima reaffirms this conclusion. In II, 1 Aristotle says that every living natural body (such as a human being) is a substance in the sense of a compound (synthetē) of both matter and form (412 a 16). This means that the body is the substrate (hypokeimenon, 412 a 19) in which the soul exists as the actuality (entelecheia, 412 a 21) of the body. Now, in I, 1 he raises the question whether any of the functions or affections of the soul can exist independently of the body (403 a 3-12). The answer to this question will tell us the extent to which the body is necessary for the existence of a human being. His immediate response to this question is:

> It appears that in most cases the soul is not affected nor does it act apart from the body, e.g. in being angry, being confident, wanting, and perceiving in general; although thinking looks most like being peculiar to the soul. But if this too is a form of imagination or does not exist apart from imagination, it would not be possible even for this to exist apart from the body. (403 a 5-10, trans. Hamlyn)

Later, he says: "It seems that all the affections of the soul involve the body . . . for at the same time as these the body is affected in a certain way" (403 a 16-18, trans. Hamlyn), and "it is clear that the affections of the soul are principles [logoi] involving matter [enuloi]" (403 a 24, trans. Hamlyn). It is clear from these passages that the soul and its "affections" (pathēmata) depend upon the material body for their existence, inasmuch as they are enmattered principles.

Therefore, since the soul could not exist unless it were the actuality of a certain body, the body is also necessary for the existence of a human being. The body is necessary in the contemporary sense of a necessary condition, because a human being could not exist without its body. It is also necessary in Aristotle's sense of "that without which it is not possible to live" (Met. 1015 a 20). Furthermore, though Aristotle does not explicitly address the issue, his discussion in the De Anima seems to me to support the view that both the soul and the body are sufficient for the existence of a human being. If the soul and body are present together, then a human being is present--no third thing is needed.

Having shown that Aristotle's work in the De Anima supports the conclusion in my Chapter I that the soul and the body together are necessary and sufficient for the existence of a human being, I will now examine in more detail the relation between the soul and the body in the De Anima. It is important that we understand the relation between the soul and the body in order for us to understand his theory of the human being. It is also important that we address this issue in our discussion of the De Anima, because, in the first place, the De Anima contains Aristotle's fullest treatment of the soul. In the second place, Aristotle sometimes seems to have a materialist theory of the human being, as when he says that the soul is the

actuality of the body (I, 1; II, 1); and sometimes he seems to have a dualist theory of the human being, as when he says that the active mind is not mixed with the body and separable from it (III, 5). For these reasons, then, I will examine the relation between the soul and the body.

2. The Relation Between the Soul and the Body

Aristotle recognizes that it is necessary to deal with the question of the relation between the soul and the body, and he also recognizes that this is not an easy question (403 a 3-5). Nevertheless, it is necessary that he raise and attempt to resolve the problem of the relation between the soul and the body, because accounts of the nature of the soul that had been proposed by earlier philosophers had failed to resolve this question with any degree of unanimity. In the first place, there was disagreement among respectable and influential philosophers on the question whether the soul was composed of matter or whether it was incorporeal (404 b 30-405 b 20). Some philosophers, whose first principles were material, regarded the soul as material also (Empedocles, Democritus, and others); other philosophers, who recognized incorporeal first principles, regarded the soul as incorporeal (Heracleitus). In the second place, Aristotle remarks with amazement that while his predecessors were concerned with explaining the nature of the soul and how it was the source of movement, they

did not specify exactly what its relation was to the body (407 b 13-25). He says that the philosophers whose views he has discussed are in error, because

> Men associate the soul with and place it in the body, without specifying why this is so, and how the body is conditioned; and yet this would seem to be essential . . . But these thinkers only try to explain what is the nature of the soul, without adding any details about the body which is to receive it; as though it were possible . . . for any soul to find its way into any body. (407 b 14-17, 20-23, trans. Hett)

Consequently, it is the lack of agreement on the corporeality or incorporeality of the soul and the lack of any complete account of the relation between the soul and the body that forces Aristotle to consider these issues in the De Anima.

Some of Aristotle's remarks strongly suggest that the soul (except the mind) is nothing more than, or identical with, certain movements in the body or in certain parts of the body. His discussion of the affections of the soul in I, 1 suggest this, and so does his remark that "it is clear that the affections [of the soul] are enmattered principles" (403 a 24: dēlon hoti ta pathē logoi enuloi eisin). In II, 1 his general definition of the soul, as "the first actuality of a natural body which has organs" (412 b 5), also suggests that the soul is identical with a certain condition of a certain kind of body. Now Aristotle does not say explicitly that the soul is nothing more than, or identical with, a certain condition of the body, but his discussion of the faculties of the soul in

the De Anima do suggest this view. If this were his view, then Aristotle would have a materialist theory of the soul. Nevertheless, I think that Aristotle does not have a strictly materialist view of the soul, and it will be worthwhile to examine the extent to which he is a materialist and the extent to which he is not a materialist. This issue is particularly interesting and relevant because not only were some of Aristotle's predecessors materialists, but materialism is also attractive to many contemporary philosophers.[10]

In his discussion of the question whether psychic properties are all common to the body or not in I, 1, Aristotle talks mostly in terms of the emotions (403 a 7, 17, 25-b 19), but it is clear that he also includes perceiving and thinking within the scope of this question (403 a 7-10). In short, he says: "If then there is any of the functions or affections of the soul which is peculiar [idion] to it, it will be possible for it to be separated from the body. But if there is nothing peculiar to it, it will not be separable" (403 a 10-12, trans. Hamlyn, my emphasis). What Aristotle seems to mean here is that a function of the soul that is not "with," or "associated with," a certain body (meta sōmatos tinos, 403 a 16) is itself separable from the body; and if the soul is always

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[10]The following discussion is influenced by Edwin Hartman's Substance, Body, and Soul: Aristotelian Investigations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), Chapter 4, "The Heart, the Soul, and Materialism."

"with" the body, then it is not separable.[11] It should also be pointed out that 'separable from the body' need not be understood as being opposed to 'identical with the body', an identity materialist position; 'separable from the body' could be understood (and I think this is the way that Aristotle takes it) as being opposed to 'always present in a body (while not identical with the body)'. That this latter position is Aristotle's will be brought out in what follows.

In evidence of the fact that Aristotle does not identify psychic states with bodily states, I would point out that he usually does not explicitly say that psychic states are identical with, or the same as, certain bodily states. Instead, he says that "it seems that all the affections of the soul are with [meta, in accompaniment with] a body . . . for at the same time as these the body is affected in a certain way" (403 a 16-18, my emphasis), which suggests a relation between the soul and the body that is not as strong as identity. In addition, consider Aristotle's discussion of some "definitions" of anger (403 a 25-b 19). The physicist's (physikos) definition is: "being angry is a particular movement of a body of such and such a kind, or

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[11]This is Hamlyn's interpretation also (pp. 78-79). Also, it is not clear what it means to say that the soul is meta somatos tinos. Perhaps Aristotle means that the soul is "with a certain body" in the sense that "it is not affected nor does it act apart from the body" (403 a 6, trans. Hamlyn).

a part of potentiality of it, as a result of this thing and for the sake of that" (403 a 25-27, trans. Hamlyn). This definition includes a reference to the material cause (i.e., a certain kind of movement in a certain kind of body), but it also includes references to the efficient and final causes as well. In the passage immediately following this one, Aristotle points out that what counts as an acceptable definition depends on what one's interests are. In answer to the question "What is anger?," a doctor would prefer a definition that was given strictly in terms of the matter or the body, but the student of nature (ho physikos) would prefer a definition that mentioned not only the body, as the material cause, but the formal, efficient, and final causes also (403 a 29-b 17). The importance of this discussion of the definition of anger is that it indicates that anger is something over and above the movements in the body; it is "associated with" certain movements of the body, but it involves more than just those movements. This is not an "identity theory" of materialism.

Martha Craven Nussbaum supports this interpretation in her study of De Motu Animalium. When Aristotle says that anger "is" the boiling of blood around the heart, Nussbaum says that "the 'is' used in statements about the material cause is not the 'is' of identity, since we must leave open the possibility that these functions can be realized in other kinds of matter, or material processes"

(p. 147). (She has in mind Met. VII, 11.)[12] Instead, she says, Aristotle is using "the 'is' of realization or constitution" (p. 147), which means that this psychic function is usually realized in a certain bodily process. She concludes that "in this way Aristotle can consistently both make what appear to be general identity claims and also say, more loosely, that psychic processes are 'not without body' (DA 403 a 5-7), or 'always with some body' (a 15), that 'together with these the body undergoes some affection' (a 18-19)" (p. 148). She explains further that the point of these claims of Aristotle is not that there are two separate processes that are merely correlated, but that a psychic process is always realized in some bodily process, though not necessarily always in the same bodily process (p. 148, my emphasis).

There are at least three sources of evidence in the De Anima that Aristotle did not hold the view that the soul was nothing more than some matter. First, in I, 4 and 5 he explicitly rejects the views of those of his predecessors who identified the soul with parts of the body or with some kind of matter. This shows that Aristotle was aware of the view that the soul is just a certain kind of matter and that he rejected this view.

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[12]Martha Craven Nussbaum, Aristotle's De Motu Animalium (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978). All page references to Nussbaum's book will be given in the text.

Second, there are passages in which Aristotle says explicitly that the soul is not the body, matter, or substrate (422 a 19-22, 414 a 13-14). For example, at 414 a 19-22 he says that the soul is not itself a body, but it "belongs in a body, and in a body of a certain kind" (en sōmati hyparchei, kai en sōmati toioutōi). And even though the parts of the soul other than the mind (ho nous) are not separable, they are different in definition (tōi logōi hetera, 413 b 26-29).

Third, Aristotle maintains that not only are body and soul different in definition, but also in "being" (to einai heteron). For example, at 424 a 24-28 he says:

> The primary sense-organ is that in which such a potentiality [for receiving the sensible form without the matter] resides. These are then the same, although what it is for them to be such is not the same. For that which perceives must be a particular extended magnitude, while what it is to be able to perceive and the sense are surely not magnitudes, but rather a certain principle [logos] and potentiality of that thing. (trans. Hamlyn. See also 425 b 26-27)

I conclude, then, that it seems to be Aristotle's position that even though the faculties of the soul (other than the mind) always exist in some part of the body in fact, the faculties of the soul are not the same things as the parts of the body in which they exist. Instead, the soul is the form, essence, or actuality of the body, and as such, it is distinguishable from the body in definition and description, as well as in being. Consequently, Aristotle is not a materialist in the sense that he believes

that certain psychic states are identical with, or nothing more than, certain bodily states. But he is a materialist in the sense that the parts of the soul (except the mind) always exist in some matter and cannot exist without the appropriate kind of matter.[13]

The preceding discussion arose from what I characterized as the need for Aristotle to respond to the problems of the corporeality or incorporeality of the soul and of its relation to the body, which had not been satisfactorily solved, as far as Aristotle was concerned, by his predecessors. By explaining the soul as the actuality of a certain kind of body, Aristotle has attempted to explain the relation between the soul and the body more adequately than his predecessors did. In II, 1-2 Aristotle explains what the soul is, why it is in a body, what kind of body has a soul, and why there is not a haphazard combination of souls and bodies. These are questions that Aristotle attempts to answer more successfully than his predecessors did (407 b 13-25). I will not discuss Aristotle's answers to these questions here, but it should be pointed out that

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[13] In "Concepts of Consciousness in Aristotle" (Mind 85 [July 1976]: 388-411) W. F. R. Hardie briefly surveys the views of those who believe that the soul is nothing more than the way the body functions or that Aristotle was not (or could not have been) aware of the mind-body problem. Hardie argues against both of these views, claiming that there is a sense in which there is a mind-body distinction in Aristotle's work and that there is evidence that Aristotle was aware of body-mind and mind-body causation (pp. 410-11).

his answers to them depend on a concept of a soul that is neither strictly materialistic (in the sense that certain psychic states are identical to certain bodily states) nor extremely dualistic (in the sense that soul and body are two different kinds of entities that exist together).

3. Conclusion

What do these results tell us about Aristotle's concept of the human being? For Aristotle, a human being, as well as every other living organism (except God and the substances that move the stars), consists of an ensouled body. And for most of the faculties and affections of the soul--whether they be nutrition, sensation, or emotion--there is always some concomitant bodily organ, state, or process, the actuality of which is the soul. To this extent, human beings are not much different from the other animals. But human beings <u>are</u> different from the other animals because humans possess a thinking faculty. As I pointed out earlier, though, the thinking faculty is significantly different from the other faculties of the soul, because it is separable from the body and never mixed with the body, and because one part of it, the active mind, is <u>in essence</u> actuality.

Another clue to Aristotle's concept of the human being appears in I, 4, 408 b 5-17, in which he says that "it is surely better not to say that the soul pities, learns,

or thinks, but that the man does these with his soul" (trans. Hamlyn).[14] Aristotle's discussion in this passage reaffirms the close relationship between the soul and the body, and suggests the point that the human being is not to be identified with either the soul or the body alone. Nussbaum points out that "the precise way of speaking of soul and body . . . is to say that there are various life-activities of the creature, which we can characterize now functionally, now by specifying the usual material constituents" (p. 148). She interprets Aristotle as saying that the best way of describing what a human being does is to speak of the functioning organism, which is a complex of soul and body, rather than to speak solely in terms of either the soul or the body. D. W. Hamlyn points out, however, that Aristotle himself does not always follow this advice, because he often speaks of the senses (418 a 14) or of the soul (427 a 20) judging, instead of the person judging (p. 81, note to 408 b 5).

The intent of this part was to explore the importance of the body to Aristotle's theory of a human being in the De Anima. As a result of this discussion, we have seen that the body is important because it is the material substratum without which the essence, or the soul, of a human being could not exist.

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[14] beltion gar isōs mē legein tēn psychēn eleein ē manthanein ē dianoeisthai, alla ton anthrōpon tēi psychēi.

D. Concluding Remarks

In this chapter I discussed the contributions that the De Anima makes to our understanding of Aristotle's theory of the human being. These contributions include an analysis of the mind, an assessment of the importance and the role of the body in the theory of the human being, and an extensive discussion of the soul, which is the essence of the human being.

Throughout my discussion in this chapter, I have constantly referred to "Aristotle's theory of a human being," but D. W. Hamlyn points out that "the concept of a person or subject is generally missing from Aristotle's discussions of the problems in the philosophy of mind" (p. 81); that is, Aristotle "gives little attention to the role of the concepts of a person, the subject of consciousness and personal identity" (p. xiii; also pp. xiii-xv, 122). Indeed, in 408 b 13-15 Aristotle says that "perhaps it is better not to say that the soul pities or learns or thinks, but that the man does these things with his soul," but, as I mentioned earlier (p. 100), Aristotle does not often speak in the preferred manner himself. In the De Anima Aristotle seems to be primarily concerned with the "physical" nature of perception, i.e., with the natures of the objects of perception, the media, the sense organs, and the various changes which these things suffer. His study of the mind is devoted to the nature of the thinking part of the soul and the process by which thinking occurs; his

discussion here, as always, is in terms of actuality, potentiality, form, and matter. Now, I would agree that all of these things are undeniably essential parts of a human being, and that a complete account of what a human being is could not afford to ignore them. Furthermore, it certainly cannot be said that Aristotle has concentrated only on the various "pieces" of the human being--the mind, the eye, the soul, the body--to the exclusion of the whole organism of which they are parts. He has not forgotten the importance of the integrated, functioning, living organism, and it is a mark of the excellence of his work in the De Anima and elsewhere that he takes seriously the importance of the total organism and its relationship to its environment. Nevertheless, what is lacking in the De Anima is an acknowledgment of the inner, personal, or immediate quality of our psychic experiences. This aspect of our experience is what is important to the concepts of self-consciousness and the person. Occasionally, Aristotle seems to see the need for this, as in III, 2, in which he considers the question of how we are aware that we are sensing. Here, at 425 b 12-25 and 426 b 8-427 a 15, he studies the nature of the inner faculty that discriminates between the sensing of color and the sensing of sound, for example.[15] But in spite of his discussion of some of the properties of this

[15]See also Nicomachean Ethics, 1170 a 29-b 8.

faculty, he does not give a very complete account of it, and he does not seem to recognize how important a part of the person this faculty is. Consequently, even though Aristotle has given an admirable account of the human being, he has not given an adequate theory of the person.

It may be, however, that Aristotle did not discuss the nature of self-consciousness, because he did not see it to be a problem that should be addressed in the De Anima.[16] The De Anima is, after all, primarily concerned with the biological aspect of the soul, and not with "psychology" in our sense of the word. It may also be that Aristotle did not think that the nature of self-consciousness was a problem that needed to be addressed at all.[17] I do not intend to explore the complexities involved in these views; I intend only to note that they offer possible explanations of why Aristotle did not discuss self-consciousness.

In addition, as Hamlyn suggests in the quote above (from p. xiii), Aristotle's account of the various aspects of the human being does not include a theory of personal identity. Aristotle can be contrasted with Plato in this

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[16]The points raised in this paragraph were suggested to me by Professor Harold T. Walsh.

[17]It has also been suggested that Aristotle simply did not have a concept of consciousness. W. F. R. Hardie discusses this view in his "Concepts of Consciousness in Aristotle." Hardie, himself, argues that Aristotle did have a concept of consciousness.

respect. Aristotle and Plato agree that the mind is separable from the body, immortal, and capable of knowing all things, but they seem to have different views of what happens to the soul after death. Plato's discussions of the soul's experiences after death suggest that each person's soul retains its own identity and individuality; each person's soul would remember the experiences of its embodied life, and the same soul could be reincarnated in another body, while retaining its knowledge (though unactualized) of the reality it had experienced while it was separated from its body. Nevertheless, Aristotle does not describe the post-mortem existence of the active mind, and it is not clear whether each person's active mind retains its identity and individuality after death. Since the active mind is essentially activity, it would know all things, and hence, be actually identical with the objects of thought (431 b 18). But if every active mind were identical with all knowable things, then there would seem to be no way of individuating minds or of reidentifying any mind.

Aristotle points out (404 b 30-405 b 12) that his predecessors saw the soul as having a nature that was similar to the nature of their first principles (archai). He proposes his own theory of the soul in a similar vein, because he defines the soul and specifies the relation between the soul and the body in terms of concepts that are primary to his metaphysics, such concepts as the four

causes, especially form and matter, and the concepts of actuality and potentiality. These fundamental concepts not only help him explain the existence of, and the processes involved in the functioning of, the various faculties of the soul, but they also permit him to explain that the diverse activities of an organism (assimilating food, reproducing, sensing, thinking) are the various aspects of an integrated whole. To explain thus these diverse and complex activities, and to be able to explain them in a way that emphasizes their interrelationships, as well as their relation to the organism as a totality, is a major accomplishment.

Consequently, in spite of some inadequacies, the De Anima is important because it contains a detailed and carefully articulated theory of the soul. This is why the De Anima is so important for understanding his concept of the human being.

Finally, one of Aristotle's primary objectives in the Nicomachean Ethics is to determine what constitutes happiness, since happiness is the end at which human actions ultimately aim. In order to establish what human happiness consists in, it is necessary for Aristotle to discuss the nature of the human soul, and the rational faculty especially. Thus, in the next chapter, I will examine the contribution of the Nicomachean Ethics to our understanding of Aristotle's theory of the human being.

CHAPTER III

THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS AND THE POLITICS

In Chapter II I examined the contribution that the De Anima makes to Aristotle's theory of the human being. My discussion of the De Anima was primarily directed to the nature of the mind, and to the importance of both the mind and the body to his theory of the human being.

In this chapter I will investigate the contribution that Aristotle's work in the Nicomachean Ethics (hereafter, "NE") and the Politics makes toward his theory of the human being. One would expect the NE to provide some information on his theory of the human being, because Aristotle is primarily concerned with virtue and happiness, and with the means of bringing about these conditions in human beings. Since virtue and happiness depend essentially on certain conditions of the soul, Aristotle explains those parts of the soul which must be understood if one is to understand the nature of virtue. It will be useful to compare this explanation with his discussion of the soul in the De Anima. In addition, Aristotle's work in the Politics will be of interest, because in this work he discusses the

differences in the souls of free men, women, children, and slaves. Thus, both the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics will shed valuable light on his theory of the human being.

The first part of this chapter will contain my examination of the theory of the soul that emerges in the NE. I will also look at the similarities and the differences between the theory of the soul that appears in the NE and the theory that appears in the De Anima. By comparing the theories of the soul in the NE and the De Anima, I hope to determine whether the two accounts are consistent with each other, and whether they are in fact the same theory of the soul.

In the second part of this chapter, I will investigate the role of reason in Aristotle's theory of the human being in the NE. I will also investigate and attempt to explain Aristotle's claims in NE IX, 8 and X, 7 that reason seems to be the man.

After discussing Aristotle's account of reason in the NE, I will spend the third part of this chapter examining the respects in which children, women, and slaves are different from free men. Aristotle discusses this issue in Politics I. It is essential that we consider carefully what Aristotle says about children, women, and slaves in our attempt to uncover his theory of a human being, because Aristotle is sometimes understood as maintaining that, for various reasons, the rational part of the souls of children,

women, and slaves is inferior to the rational part of the souls of free men. If the rational parts of children, women, and slaves are indeed inferior, then they would not be fully human on Aristotle's view, since the rational part is necessary for being human. This consequence is important, because we certainly believe that children, women, and slaves are human beings in the same sense in which free men are human beings. If Aristotle does hold that children, women, and slaves are not fully human, then we should try to discover what led him to this view, which conflicts with our own perspective. Consequently, in this third part I will attempt to determine whether Aristotle did in fact hold this view, and if so, I will evaluate the strength of his position.

A. The Soul

1. The Theory of the Soul in the Nicomachean Ethics

In order to present the theory of the soul that Aristotle uses in the NE, I will consider first what he says about the soul in NE I, 13. His opening remarks in this chapter explain that since the student of politics is interested in encouraging human good, happiness, and virtue, then the student would do well to understand the soul, because human happiness is an activity of the soul and because the kind of virtue (aretē) that is of interest to the politician is the virtue or excellence of the soul (1102 a

15). What follows these opening remarks is an abbreviated account of the soul, which Aristotle intended to be only detailed enough to serve the interests of the student of politics (1102 a 22-25).

According to the account that is given in I, 13, the soul consists of two main parts: the irrational (to alogon) and the rational (to logon echon) parts. Aristotle says that, with respect to the questions that are of interest in politics, it is not necessary to determine whether these two parts of the soul are separated, or whether they are distinguishable only by definition (1102 a 26-32). To contrast this with what he says in the De Anima, I might point out that the question of the separability of the parts of the soul is relevant in the De Anima (II, 2), where he says that (except for the mind and the thinking faculty [ho nous kai hē theorētikē, 413 b 24-27]) the faculties of the soul are not separable (ouk chōrista), although they are different in definition (tōi de logōi hoti hetera, phaneron) (413 b 27-29).

The irrational part itself has two "components." Aristotle refers to one of these "components" as "that which is vegetative in nature" (to phytikon);[1] this "component" exists in all living things and is the cause of their nutrition and growth. Aristotle says that this faculty "in

[1]He also refers to this as a "faculty"--dynamis (1102 b 1, 5)

no way shares in the rational principle" (oudamōs koinōnei logou, 1102 b 30), and that its excellence "seems to be common to all species and not specifically human" (1102 b 4, trans. Ross). The second "component" of the irrational part of the soul is the desiderative "component," which consists of the appetites and desires. Aristotle demonstrates the existence of the desiderative "component" in a way that is similar to the way in which Plato demonstrated the existence of each of the three parts of the soul in Republic, 436a-441c (1102 b 13-28). On the one hand, the desiderative element is different from the rational principle in the soul because it is "naturally opposed" to the rational principle (1102 b 18, trans. Ross: para ton logon pephukos) and resists it, as is evident in those who are incontinent. On the other hand, the desiderative element is different from the vegetative faculty because the desiderative element participates in the rational principle. Aristotle explains that the desiderative element "participates in" or "shares in" the rational principle in the sense that it "listens to," "obeys," or "is in some sense persuaded by" the rational principle (1102 b 28; 1102 b 30-1103 a 3). That the desiderative element "obeys" the rational principle is evident in those who are continent. The desiderative element's "obedience" to the rational principle distinguishes it from the vegetative faculty in the sense that the physiological processes involved in

nutrition and growth cannot be "persuaded" by the rational principle in the way that the appetites and desires can be "persuaded."

In VI, 1 we find that the rational principle of the soul also consists of two parts. Aristotle does not explicitly refer to these as dynameis, "functions," but instead, he calls them duo ta logon echonta, "two parts which grasp a rational principle," or ta noētika moria, "the intellectual parts" (1139 a 7, b 12, trans. Ross). Aristotle assumes that there are in fact two different parts in the rational principle. His reasons for this are, first, that any part of the rational principle has the knowledge it has in virtue of its likeness (homoiotēs) or relationship (oikeiotēs) to its object of knowledge; and second, that there are two different kinds of things that can be contemplated: things whose principles cannot be other than they are, and things whose principles could be other than they are (1139 a 9-11). He calls these two parts the scientific part (to epistemonikon), by which we contemplate things that are invariable, and the calculative part (to logistikon), by which we contemplate things that are variable (1139 a 6-15). (Aristotle points out that deliberation and calculation are the same thing [1139 a 13: to gar bouleuesthai kai logidzesthai tauton], and that the calculative part [to logistikon] is one part of the rational principle.)

The remaining chapters of Book VI consist of Aristotle's examination of the five virtues of the rational faculty. We can see from his discussion that the scientific faculty is concerned with objects that are eternal and necessarily existing, as well as with the first principles (archai) from which we arrive at demonstrative knowledge about eternal objects (Chaps. 3, 6). The virtues of the calculative part arise from activities that involve things that could be other than they are: the activity of making things (technē, Chap. 4) and activity regarding things that are conducive to a good life (phronēsis, Chap. 5). In order to be virtuous, a person engaged in either of these kinds of activities must use right reason.[2] Thus, given this outline of Aristotle's explanation of the soul in the NE, I will examine next the extent to which his account of the rational part in the NE is consistent with his account of it in the De Anima.

[2]In this discussion I have mentioned the five virtues of the rational principle for the sake of completeness. Nevertheless, in the following discussion I will not be primarily concerned with the human being as a maker or as a deliberator, even though these are important aspects of a human being. Instead, I will be primarily concerned with the human being in general as a thinking animal.

2. The Psychology of the Nicomachean Ethics vs. the Psychology of the De Anima

(a) The Differences Between the Psychology of the Nicomachean Ethics and the Psychology of the De Anima

Overall, I would say that Aristotle's account of the rational part of the soul in the NE is so different from his account of the thinking faculty in the De Anima that it is quite legitimate to ask whether he is using the same concept of the rational part of the soul in both works. By discussing some of the differences between his discussions of the rational part of the soul in the NE and the De Anima, I will show that there is reason to believe that he is using different concepts of the rational part. I will concentrate on three main differences: (1) differences in how Aristotle refers to the rational faculty, (2) differences in the kinds of properties the rational faculty has, and (3) differences in the parts that compose the rational faculty.

First, Aristotle uses different terms to refer to the thinking part of the soul in the NE and the De Anima. In the NE he refers to it as to logon echon--"that which is possessing reason" (or, according to Ross, "that which has a rational principle," [1103 a 2] or "that which grasps a rule or rational principle" [1139 a 5]). But in the De Anima he often refers to the rational soul as nous, as he does, for example, in III, 4 and 5, when he is discussing the passive and active nous. The word 'nous' is used in

the NE in several senses. First, in Book VI nous is one of the five states (hexeis) in virtue of which the soul possesses truth (1139 b 12-17; VI, 6). This is a different sense of 'nous' from the sense in which it is used in the De Anima. Second, nous is "reason" (Ross) or "intellect" (Rackham) (1139 a 18, 1168 b 35, 1177 b 30). This second sense of 'nous' seems to correspond more closely to the sense in which 'nous' is used in De Anima.[3] Nevertheless, the account that Aristotle gives of this kind of nous in the NE does not correspond to the account that he gives of nous in the De Anima. Thus, the differences between the accounts of the rational faculty in the NE and the De Anima go deeper than a difference in the terms that Aristotle uses to refer to it. I will consider these deeper differences next.

Second, the rational principle in the NE seems to have different properties from the mind in the De Anima. For example, in the NE Aristotle says of nous that (1) "that this is the man himself, then, or is so more than anything else, is plain" (1169 a 2, trans. Ross; also 1166 a 17, 23, 1178 a 2-8); (2) its virtue is separable (kechōrismenē,

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[3]It should be pointed out that Aristotle uses 'nous' in a third sense in NE VI, 2, 1139 a 18, by which he refers to the entire rational soul. See Rackham in The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. H. Rackham (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1934), p. 328, n. a; and H. H. Joachim, Aristotle: The Nicomachean Ethics, ed. D. A. Rees (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1951), p. 173, note on 1139 a 18.

1178 a 22, trans. Ross); and (3) its activity is contemplation (theōrētikē, 1177 a 18) and most continuous (synechestatē, 1177 a 23). Aristotle does not say any of these things about the mind in the De Anima. I will consider each of these three properties in turn.

(1) Aristotle does not say in the De Anima that the mind "is the man himself." In fact, far from "being the man himself," one active mind in De Anima III, 5 seems to be no different from any other active mind, since it is separable and thinks all things. And as I pointed out in Chapter II, when the active mind is separated from the body there seems to be no way to individuate it from other active minds--it has no personal identity, because it is the same as the objects of thought. But to say that the nous "is the man himself" suggests a personal nous, although Aristotle does not say this explicitly.[4] I will discuss in more detail later Aristotle's view that reason "is the man himself."

(2) In the De Anima he says that both the passive and the active minds are separable (chōristos, 429 b 4, 430 a 17), but he does not say this about nous in NE. In the NE he says that the excellence of nous is separable

[4] I owe to Professor Craig A. Staudenbaur the suggestion that the nous in the NE is not the separate, impersonal nous of the De Anima. H. H. Joachim discusses this problem and proposes an explanation of it in his Aristotle, pp. 288-91.

(kechōrismenē), but this does not necessarily suggest that nous is separable. In fact, he seems to be using 'separable' in two different senses. In the De Anima the active mind is separable in the sense that it can exist by itself in separation from the body. But in NE X, 8 he seems to be saying that the excellence of the nous is separable in the sense that it is different from the virtues of our "composite nature."

(3) In the De Anima Aristotle says that the essence of the active mind is activity (energeia, 430 a 18) and that it always thinks (noei, 430 a 22). In the NE, however, he does not say what the essence of nous is. He says only that its activity is contemplative (theōrētikē, 1177 a 18) and that its contemplative activity is the most continuous, "since we contemplate truth more continuously than we do anything" (1177 a 23, trans. Ross). This does not necessarily imply that the nous is always thinking.

Therefore, it seems that the properties that the nous has in NE are not the same as the properties that the mind has in the De Anima.

The third main difference between the accounts of the rational faculty in the NE and the De Anima concerns the parts into which the rational faculty is divided in each work. As I pointed out earlier, Aristotle says in NE I, 1 that the rational principle of the soul contains two

parts.[5] First, the scientific part (to epistēmonikon) is the part by means of which we contemplate objects that exist of necessity (anangkēs) and hence are eternal (VI, 3). Second, the calculative part (to logistikon) is the part by means of which we contemplate variable things. Aristotle distinguishes these two parts of the rational principle on the basis of their objects:

> for where objects differ in kind the part of the soul answering to each of the two is different in kind, since it is in virtue of a certain likeness and kinship with their objects that they have the knowledge they have. (1139 a 9-11, trans. Ross)

If Aristotle is using the same concept of the rational faculty in the NE and the De Anima, then one would expect Aristotle to be able to maintain in both works that the thinking faculty consists of the same two parts. I shall attempt to show that, while the thinking faculty in the De Anima is divided into two parts, there is reason to believe that they are not the same as the scientific and the calculative parts in the NE. Hence, it will follow that Aristotle does not use the same concept of the rational faculty in both works.

In the De Anima (III, 4-5) the rational faculty is divided into the active and passive minds. Since I discussed the difference between the active and passive minds

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[5]The following discussion of the third main difference owes much to suggestions from Professor Kotzin.

in Chapter II, I wish to point out here only the respect in which they differ from the scientific and calculative minds. The active-passive distinction is different from the scientific-calculative distinction because of the basis upon which the distinction is made. The active and passive minds are not distinguished on the basis of their objects, for they seem to have the same objects of thought. Instead, the active and passive minds are distinguished on the basis of their activity and passivity. The active mind is essentially activity, and its relation to the passive mind is the relation of that which makes all things to that which becomes all things. This is not the basis that Aristotle uses for distinguishing between the scientific and calculative minds in NE.

One similarity that appears to exist between the rational principle in the NE and the mind in the De Anima is that both have knowledge by being like their objects. It is not clear, however, to what extent the similarity holds, because Aristotle does not say in the NE whether the rational principle thinks by receiving the intelligible forms of the objects of knowledge, as the mind does in the De Anima.

So far, I have tried to show that there are indications that Aristotle is not using the same theory of the rational faculty in the NE and the De Anima. Nevertheless, the question whether he is using the same theory of the

soul in both works is a highly controversial question. Having given reasons for the view that Aristotle is not using the same theory of the rational faculty in both works (and hence, that he is not using exactly the same theory of the soul in both works), I will consider the view that he is using the same theory of the soul in both works.

(b) The View That the Psychologies of the Nicomachean Ethics and the De Anima Are the Same

One problem that arises is that Aristotle did not discuss the parts of the soul in the De Anima in terms of the rational and irrational parts, as he does in the NE. In fact, he says in De Anima III, 9 that there appears to be an indefinite number of parts in the soul, and not only the rational (to logon echon) and the irrational (to alogon) parts, as some say (432 a 25-27). He also says that the sensitive part (to aisthētikon) "could not easily be set down as either irrational or rational" (432 a 30, trans. Hamlyn) and that the desiderative part (to orektikon) "might seem to be different from all both in definition and in capacity [kai logōi kai dynamei]" (432 b 4). Therefore, his discussion in this passage of the De Anima suggests that he does not accept the rational-irrational division of the soul.

It might be argued that since Aristotle was primarily interested in the nature of the soul in the De Anima, and in its faculties in particular, a division of the soul into

parts that was too simple would not be acceptable because it would not adequately distinguish all of the differences in power that one could find in the soul. Nevertheless, since the student of politics is interested in the soul only with respect to its role in human virtue, then a less detailed analysis of the soul would serve. The conclusion would be that even though the account of the soul in the NE is different from the account in the De Anima, this does not necessarily imply that Aristotle is using a different theory of the soul in each work.[6] W. F. R. Hardie comes to a similar conclusion in his discussion of NE 1102 a 23-32 in his Aristotle's Ethical Theory.[7] Hardie points out that when Aristotle says that "further precision is . . . more laborious than our purposes require" (trans. Ross), "he is not implying that there is anything erroneous in the doctrine as he states it. He is saying only that, in the systematic study of the soul, much of the detail has no relevance or interest for the student of ethics" (p. 70).

One might also ask whether the theory of the soul that is used in the NE is Aristotle's own theory, because he proposes to use the view of the soul that is held in the exōterikoi logoi. According to the view of the

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[6]After all, Aristotle does not say in the NE that the rational and the irrational parts are the only parts of the soul. Perhaps he would still say that there is a sensitive part in the soul also.

[7](Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), Chap. V. All page references to Hardie's book will be given in the text.

exōterikoi logoi, the soul consists of the irrational and rational parts, and in the De Anima he attributes this view to "what some say" (432 a 26). (In the Magna Moralia 1182 a 23 this view is attributed to Plato.) So Aristotle does not explicitly say whether he is using his own theory or someone else's. The problem is made more acute by the fact that, as Hardie points out (p. 69), Aristotle sometimes uses the term 'exōterikoi logoi' to refer to the views of those "outside our school" (Physics 217 b 30-31, trans. Ross), and sometimes he uses it to refer to his own works.[8] Hardie says that among the various positions that have been taken on the meaning of 'exōterikoi logoi' in NE 1102 a 26, one view is that Aristotle was referring to the Platonic view of the soul that was held by the members of the Academy.[9] Hardie's own view seems to be that the conception of the human being that is offered in the exōterikoi logoi is a conception that Aristotle could consistently accept. This is not to say definitely that Aristotle was proposing

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[8]Met. 1076 a 28-29; Eud. Ethics 1217 b 22, 1218 b 32-34; Politics 1323 a 21-23; NE 1140 a 1-3.

[9]Hardie says (pp. 69-70) that Burnet and Jaeger held this position. See John Burnet, ed., The Ethics of Aristotle, with an introduction and notes (London: Methuen & Co., 1900), pp. 58, 65, and John Burnet, ed. Aristotle on Education (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903), p. 40, n. 1. See also Werner Jaeger's discussion of the exoterikoi logoi with respect to the Eudemian Ethics in his Aristotle: The Fundamentals of the History of His Development, 2nd ed., trans. Richard Robinson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1948), pp. 246-58, 332-33.

exactly the same theory of the soul that he developed in the De Anima, but it is also not to say that this is a theory of the soul that Aristotle disagreed with. Hardie says: "I do not wish to maintain that all of the doctrines of the De Anima were in Aristotle's mind when he wrote the NE. I wish only to justify the opinion that, as regards the specific nature of the human animal, the two works broadly agree" (p. 73). Thus, Hardie rejects the view that the theory of the soul in the NE represents a view of the soul that is intermediate between the Platonic view in the Eudemus and the more mature view in the De Anima. Consequently, with respect to his discussion of NE 1102 a 23-32, Hardie says that "even if the De Anima had already been written, Aristotle might prefer to use easier and more accessible works" (p. 70). He concludes that "neither the references to the 'exoteric discussions' nor the disclaimer of detailed precision is to be understood as implying that Aristotle would be willing to argue from psychological premisses which he did not himself accept" (p. 71).

It seems to me that one difficulty with Hardie's position as I have presented it so far is that it is not at all clear that the theory of the soul in the NE is consistent with the theory of the soul in the De Anima. In the first place, I have already shown that there are serious differences in the accounts of the rational faculties in the two works. And in the second place, if Aristotle is using a

theory of the soul (viz., the theory of the exōterikoi logoi) in the NE which holds that the rational and irrational parts are the only two parts of the soul, then this is not consistent with his view in De Anima III, 9 that the sensitive part of the soul does not belong to either the rational or the irrational parts (432 a 30).

I have mentioned that Hardie believes that the views of the human being that are given in the De Anima and the NE "broadly agree" (p. 73). His reasons for believing this are as follows. In Chapter V Hardie explains what he calls Aristotle's "entelechy theory" of the soul (p. 72). This is the view, presented in the De Anima, that the soul is the actuality (entelecheia) of the body. Thus, a human being is an embodied soul or an ensouled body, and the affections of the soul (except thought in the active nous) are associated with concomitant affections of the body (403 a 16-19). Hardie believes that there is evidence that Aristotle accepts this theory in the NE, even though he does not set out this theory or explicitly refer to it. Hardie points out, though, that there are passages in which Aristotle refers to the bodily concomitants of emotions. At 1147 a 14-18 Aristotle says that such passions as anger and sexual appetites "manifestly change the body" (epidēlōs kai to sōma methistasin) (cf. 1147 b 6-9). And at 1178 a 14-16, when writing about the moral virtues and their relation to the passions, Aristotle says that "some

even seem to result from the body [symbainein apo tou sōmatos]." Now, these passages do not depend on the "entelechy theory" in any obvious way; both passages would be acceptable to one who held a Platonic theory of the soul. And, while these passages do not explicitly say that there is a concomitance between psychic states and bodily states, Hardie would probably point out that neither do they deny this. In 1128 b 10-15 Aristotle describes fear in a way that is distinctly reminiscent of his description of the emotions in the De Anima. Here, he says that the fear of dishonor and the fear of danger "both appear to be in some way bodily [sōmatika]." Consequently, even though Aristotle does not explicitly discuss the emotions in the same way that he did in the De Anima, Hardie says that "he might have accepted and taken for granted the fact that 'psychological phenomena are psychophysical' without having come to express the fact by saying that the soul is the form . . . essence . . . or entelechy of the body" (p. 76).

I would say that the passages in the NE that mention a connection between the affections of the soul and concomitant affections of the body do not lend much support to the view that Aristotle had the same theory of the soul in both the NE and the De Anima or that the theories of the soul in each work are consistent. The reason why I would say this is that Aristotle is so indefinite and tentative about saying whether "psychological phenomena are psychophysical." Aristotle's claims in the NE that the affections

of the soul "seem to result from the body" or "appear to be in some way bodily" provide a marked contrast with his firmer claims in the De Anima that "the . . . parts of the soul are not separable, as some say; although that they are different in definition is clear" (413 b 28-29, trans. Hamlyn). Further, even if it could be shown that Aristotle accepted in the NE the view that the soul (except the mind) is in fact the same as the body, this would still not be enough to prove that the theory of the soul in the NE is the same as the theory in the De Anima. This is because there would still be a disagreement between the two works on the parts of the soul. According to Aristotle's theory of the soul in the De Anima, the soul is composed of the rational, sensitive, and nutritive parts. But according to his theory in the NE, the soul is divided into different parts. Therefore, even if we grant the inseparability of soul and body, the theories of the soul in the NE and the De Anima still seem to be inconsistent because there is a difference in the kinds of parts of which the soul is composed.

The second argument that Hardie gives in support of his view that Aristotle was presupposing the "entelechy theory" in the NE is based on Aristotle's reference to the composite nature of human beings (1177 b 26-29, 1178 a 19-21). Hardie's position could be represented as follows (pp. 76-77). If Aristotle uses 'composite' (to syntheton)

in NE as he does in the Metaphysics, then he is using the doctrine (which he uses in the Metaphysics) that a human being is a composite of form and matter. If he is relying on the doctrine that a human being is a form-matter composite, then he is assuming the "entelechy theory," since the "entelechy theory" is just the theory that human beings are composites of form (soul) and matter (body). Now, Hardie says that scholars who have dealt with this question (including Bonitz and J. A. Stewart)[10] have agreed that Aristotle is indeed using 'composite' as he did in the Metaphysics. It follows, therefore, that Aristotle is assuming the "entelechy theory" in the NE. Hardie concludes that "the burden of proof lies on those who deny that Aristotle in the NE had in his mind the entelechy doctrine" (p. 77).

The crucial issue here is whether Aristotle is indeed referring to the union of soul (as form) and body (as matter) by his use of 'composite'. In 1177 b 26-29 and 1178 a 19-21 Aristotle distinguishes between the moral virtues, which are the virtues of "our composite nature" (trans. Ross), and the virtue of reason (nous), which he says is

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[10] J. A. Stewart says: "hē synthetos ousia is the concrete thing--the union of hylē and morphē, as distinguished from the morphē which is ousia aneu hylēs. Thus zoon as psychē en sōmati is a synthetos ousia of which psychē is the ousia aneu hylēs or ti en einai: see Met. H. 3. 1043 b. 29 sqq." (Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1892], vol. 2, p. 448, note to NE 1177 b 28).

separate (kechōrismenē, 1178 a 22). To say that the moral virtues are virtues of our composite nature suggests that Aristotle is referring to the composite of the human body and the irrational soul, since the moral virtues are those involving the desiderative part of the soul (1103 a 3-6).

It seems to me, however, that the difficulty in relying on Aristotle's reference to our composite nature in NE as evidence that he was using the "entelechy theory" of the soul is that if he is using 'composite' in the same sense in which he uses it in the Metaphysics, then this presupposes that the soul is the form of the body. And if the soul is the form of the body, then it is the same as the body in fact. But I have already pointed out that there is little unequivocal evidence in the NE that indicates that Aristotle held that the soul was the same as the body in fact. The result is that the reference to our composite nature is not strong enough evidence that Aristotle was using the same theory of the soul in the NE as in the Metaphysics and the De Anima.

At the beginning of my discussion of Hardie's position, I pointed out that he holds that "as regards the specific nature of the human mind, the two works [i.e., the NE and the De Anima] broadly agree" (p. 73). This remark and his discussion of Aristotle's statement that "further precision [regarding the soul] is . . . more laborious than our purposes require" (1102 a 25, trans. Ross) suggest

that he believes Aristotle to have been using basically the same theory of the soul in the NE and the De Anima. Hardie's view seems to be that the only difference in the account of the soul in the NE is that it is less detailed than the account in the De Anima. Nevertheless, I have tried to show that the differences between the two theories are more fundamental than a mere difference in detail.[11] If Aristotle were using in the NE a less detailed version of the De Anima theory of the soul, then there should be some traces, at least, of some of the fundamental doctrines in the De Anima theory of the soul. For example, the doctrines that the soul is the form of the body, that it is the same as the body in fact, while different in definition, and that the soul can be divided into the thinking, sensing, and nutritive faculties are central to his theory of the soul in the De Anima. Aristotle did not use these doctrines in the NE.

(c) Conclusion

I wish to point out, however, that I have not shown that Aristotle did not accept the De Anima theory of the soul while he was writing the NE. I have only tried to show that the theory of the soul that he uses or develops in the NE is not entirely the same as the theory of the

[11]This point was suggested to me by Professor Kotzin.

soul that he develops in the De Anima. There seem to me to be fundamental differences between the two theories.

Nevertheless, I do not intend to suggest that the theory of the soul that Aristotle uses in the NE is inadequate for his discussion of ethical and political problems. It is a mark of Aristotle's insight into the role of the human being in ethics and politics that he concentrated on the scientific, calculative, desiderative, and vegetative parts of the soul. The scientific part is important because it enables a person to contemplate things that are eternal, noble, and divine (VI, 3; 1177 a 15). Contemplative activity is the best kind of activity that a human being can engage in, and the life of contemplative activity is the happiest life for a human being (1177 a 12-22, 1177 b 24). The calculative part is important because with it one can acquire the human virtues and intelligently pursue those variable things that "conduce to the good life in general" (1140 a 25-28, trans. Ross). The desiderative part is important because it is an essential factor in initiating locomotion and because it tends to oppose the rational half of the soul. The student of ethics and politics must take this part of the soul into account because the truly virtuous and happy person is the person whose calculative part can control and intelligently guide the impetuous and rebellious desires. Finally, the vegetative faculty is important because its proper functioning

helps to insure the survival of the individual human being, and because many of the objects by means of which the vegetative faculty performs its function (such as food, water, and so on) are also the objects of the desires, which can be pursued continently or incontinently. So if one is interested in how to bring about virtue and happiness among the citizens of one's state, one should understand that the soul has these parts, how they function in a human being, and the ways in which they function well or badly (see VI, 2).

In this part I have explained the theory of the soul that Aristotle uses in the NE, and I have tried to show that there is reason to believe that, with respect to the rational faculty, at least, the theory of the soul in the NE is not the same as the theory in the De Anima. Whether Aristotle does use the same theory of the soul in both works is, nevertheless, a controversial issue. Thus, I presented W. F. R. Hardie's view that there is broad agreement between the theories of the soul in the two works. However, I think that Hardie's position does not resolve successfully enough some of the serious differences between the two accounts of the soul. In the next part I will continue to explore Aristotle's theory of the human being in the NE by examining his view of human reason.

B. Reason

1. Reason and the Human Being

Reason is the ability that is most characteristic of human beings in the sense that human beings are the only living organisms that have the ability to reason. Furthermore, the activity of reasoning is an activity that humans share with the gods. The importance of reason to the concept of a human being is a theme that runs through much of Aristotle's work, and it is especially apparent in the NE when he is discussing the role of the soul in human virtue. Since reason is so important to the nature of a human being, it will be of interest to look more closely at what Aristotle says about it in the NE.

One passage that especially emphasizes the importance of reason to the nature of a human being is to be found in I, 7, in which Aristotle discusses the function (to ergon) of a human being. At the beginning of this chapter he establishes that happiness is that which is chosen only for itself (1097 b 1), and that it is happiness alone which makes life desirable and lacking in nothing (1197 b 15). Since Aristotle is interested in human happiness, he suggests that a better account of happiness might be gained by determining the function of a human being, because in everything that has a function "the good and the well seem to exist in the function" (1097 b 27). In his search for the function, Aristotle says that he is interested in the

function of the human being as a whole, not just the function of one of the parts of the body (1097 b 31-32). He also says that he is looking for that which is peculiar (to idion) to human beings (1097 b 34) in the sense that no other order of living organism has it. Consequently, neither life nor nutrition nor perception will do, because plants and other animals have one or more of these. Since human beings are the only living organisms that have a rational principle, Aristotle sees the function of a human being to be the exercise of a rational principle. Thus, the human being's function is "a certain activity of that which has a rational principle" (praktikē tis tou logon echontos, 1098 a 3) or "activity of the soul according to a rational principle or not without a rational principle" (estin ergon anthrōpou psychēs energeia kata logon ē mē anou logou, 1098 a 7).

This passage shows how essential acting according to a rational principle is to Aristotle's concept of the human being. To say that this kind of activity is peculiar to human beings is to say that it is a kind of activity that no other plant or animal engages in, and that it is not part of their nature to engage in such an activity. This result is consistent with my earlier conclusions that the rational faculty is a necessary part of the human being.

I might point out in passing that since having the rational faculty is necessary for a human being, and since this is a faculty that other animals do not have, then there are some features that humans have in virtue of having a rational faculty which set them apart from lower animals. Happiness is one activity that humans engage in, but which animals cannot engage in (1178 b 24-31). The reasons for this, according to Aristotle, are that happiness is a kind of contemplation (eiē an hē eudaimonia theōria tis, 1178 b 32) and that no other animal is happy, because animals "in no way share in contemplation" (1178 b 27, trans. Ross). Another feature that human beings have in virtue of possessing reason is choice (proairesis). He explains in VI, 2 that the origin of choice is desire (orexis) and "reasoning directed to some end" (logos ho heneka tinos, 1139 a 32, trans. Rackham). He also says that choice does not exist without intellect (nous) and thought (dianoia) (1139 a 33, 1112 a 16). It should be pointed out that choice must involve the calculative part of the rational half of the soul, since choice is made about things that could be other than they are, and since it is in some sense the origin of action. Consequently, since animals do not possess a rational faculty, they do not share in choice (1111 b 7-9). As a result, humans could not possess happiness or choice without having a rational faculty.

The importance of reason to Aristotle's theory of a human being is also evident in certain passages in which he says that reason "seems to be each man" (hekastos einai dokei, 1166 a 17, 23; 1178 a 2-3, 8). In these passages Aristotle does not explicitly say that reason simply is a human being, and I shall argue that in these passages Aristotle is not literally identifying a human being with reason. I will also discuss the view of John M. Cooper, who holds that Aristotle does identify the human being with reason and that doing this leads Aristotle into serious difficulties.

In IX, 8, 1168 b 28-1169 a 5 Aristotle argues that there is a sense in which the intellect is the human being. The argument that appears in the text is not completely stated in every detail, so my own reconstruction of it is as follows:

1. In any composite whole (systēma) "that which is most authoritative [to kuriotaton] seems especially to be" the whole [itself] (1168 b 31-32). (It is in this sense that a sovereign is said to be the state.)

2. Man is a composite whole (to syntheton). (This is a suppressed premise in this passage; it is stated at 1177 b 26-29 and 1178 a 19-21.)

3. The most authoritative part of man "seems to be [dokei einai]" the man himself. (From 1, 2)

4. Reason (ho nous) or the rational principle (to kata logon) is the most authoritative part of a good man (1168 b 34-35, 1169 a 1, 18).

Therefore,

5. The intellect "seems to be" the good man himself (1169 a 2-3). (From 3, 4)

It is important to keep in mind the context in which this argument is given.[12] In IX, 8 Aristotle is trying to prove that "the good man should be a lover of self [philautos]" (1169 a 11-12, trans. Ross). The man who is a lover of self most of all "gratifies the most authoritative element in himself and in all things obeys this" (1168 b 28-33, trans. Ross). Aristotle then points out that a man has self-control only if his reason (ho nous) has control (1168 b 33-34). The result is that reason controls the actions of the lover of self, i.e., of the good man. Since the good man's reason controls his actions, then reason is the most authoritative part of him. Finally, the argument that I have reconstructed above is used to show that since any systematic whole is identified with its most authoritative part, then the good man, who is a lover of self, is identified with his reason. Thus, Aristotle seems to be saying that when a man's reason controls his actions and prevents him from "following his evil passions" (1169 a 15, trans. Ross), then he has self control; that is, one part of him (his reason) controls the whole self. Aristotle then identifies the man himself with the controlling part.[13]

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[12] I am indebted to Professors Kotzin and Walsh for calling this to my attention.

[13] This point was suggested to me by Professor Kotzin.

Having considered Aristotle's purpose for giving this argument and the context in which it appears, it seems that in this chapter Aristotle is not making a general ontological point about human beings. That is, he seems not to be saying that each man in himself is the same thing as his reason. Instead, he seems to be saying that the human being is the authoritative part of himself, perhaps in the sense of 'is' in which we say that "a person is what he eats" or in the sense in which Louis XIV said, "L'état, c'est moi."[14] Therefore, Aristotle would probably say that the incontinent man is his desires, since his desires, rather than his reason, constitute the authoritative part of him.

It also follows that since a man "seems to be especially that which is most authoritative in [him]" (1168 b 32), then Aristotle's claim that the man who obeys his reason is his reason does not necessarily imply that reason is a necessary condition for being human; it only implies that obeying one's reason is a necessary condition for being a good human. This is because it would follow from the view that a whole is identified with its most authoritative

[14]These senses of 'is' were suggested to me by Professors Walsh and Staudenbaur, respectively.

element that the incontinent man is his desires. But an incontinent man is still a human being.[15]

2. A Critical Analysis of Cooper's Position

An interesting criticism of Aristotle's reasons for holding that the intellect is the human being has been raised by John M. Cooper in his book Reason and Human Good in Aristotle (pp. 168-77).[16] In discussing the passage at NE 1168 b 29-1169 a 3, Cooper notes that one reason why Aristotle identifies a human being with the intellect is that there is an analogy between a city and a human being with respect to the relationship between the authority and the organized whole (see premise 1 in my formulation of Aristotle's argument, p. 134). Cooper points out that two restrictions apply to this analogy. First, the analogy can only be used to support the kind of identification that Aristotle wants in the case of organized wholes that have "a strongly hierarchical structure" (p. 171). An organization that does not have such a structure (such as the Congregational Church) is not identified with a

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[15]The other passages in which Aristotle says that reason "seems to be," or is, the man (1166 a 17, 23; 1178 a 2-3, 8) also seem to be concerned with the ethical point that the good man is his reason, rather than with the ontological point that a man literally is the same as his reason.

[16](Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975). All page references to Cooper's book will be given in the text.

dominating element (as the Roman Catholic Church might be identified with the Pope). The second restriction is that the authority with whom the whole organization is to be identified must be one that formulates policy and makes decisions "for the whole membership" (pp. 171-72). Cooper says that the consequence of what Aristotle says in this passage is that the human being is identified "with that in him which properly ought to decide what he is to do and which controls and guides his inclinations and desires in their job of moving his limbs and generating actions--in short, with his practical reason" (p. 172). This would indeed seem to follow from the analogy between a city and a human being, which Aristotle appeals to in this passage. The authoritative element in a city makes decisions with the interest of the whole city in mind. Many of the decisions it makes are intended to insure that the city functions in an orderly way and in the best way for a city to function. The same kinds of concerns would preoccupy the authoritative element in the human being. That this element must be the practical reason (phronēsis) is evident because, as Cooper points out, Aristotle says that "practical wisdom issues commands, since its end is what ought to be done or not to be done" (1143 a 8-9, trans. Ross).

Now, the excellence of scientific reason, or the intellect, consists in contemplating invariable, eternal things (VI, 3). It is not concerned with variable things,

and since variable things include things that are done (1140 a 1), then the intellect is not concerned with what should be done or what should not be done.[17] But the topic in NE IX, 8 is what the good man should do, and one point that Aristotle supports is that the good man should obey his reason in all of his actions. Therefore, considering that scientific reason is concerned with eternal things and that practical reason is concerned with what is done, Cooper is pointing out that the kind of reason that the good man obeys, and with which the good man is identified, must be practical reason, rather than scientific reason.

Surprisingly enough, in NE X, 7 Aristotle seems to have changed his position on the nature of the authoritative element in a way that is incompatible with his position in NE IX, 8. Cooper says that "it is essential to the underlying rationale of this theory of human identity that the mind be thought of as what makes decisions and controls the action-producing apparatus of the person" (p. 174). He goes on to point out that in X, 7 Aristotle identifies the human being with the intellect (still called nous

[17] One might point out that contemplating eternal things is doing something, and hence, the intellect is concerned with something that is done. In response to this, I would say that when Aristotle says that practical wisdom is concerned with things that are done, he is referring to the pursuit of certain variable things that are good for a man (VI, 5). Thus, a person who manages a household or a state well has practical wisdom (1140 b 8-11).

as in IX, 8).[18] The intellect is that which is god-like (theios, 1177 b 30), "superior to our composite nature" (diapherei . . . tou synthetou, 1177 b 28, trans. Ross), something whose excellence is separate from the excellence that is connected with our composite nature (hē tou nou kechōrismenē, 1178 a 19-22), and "that which is authoritative and better" (to kurion kai ameinon, 1178 a 2). But Aristotle's discussion in 1177 b 26-1178 a 8 presents difficulties when it is compared with his discussion in 1168 b 28-1169 a 5. In both passages he identifies the human being with the authoritative part. The difficulty is that the argument in IX, 8 would lead one to believe that the authoritative part is the practical intelligence, but the discussion in X, 7-8 would lead one to believe that the authoritative part is the intellect. That Aristotle is discussing contemplative reason rather than practical reason in X, 7 is evident when he says, with respect to the activity of the best thing in a man, "this activity alone would seem to be loved for its own sake; for nothing arises from it apart from the contemplating, while from practical activities we gain more or less apart from the action" (1177 b 1-4, trans. Ross). Cooper concludes (pp. 174-75)

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[18] Cooper translates "nous" here as "intellect" or "reason." This is the part of the rational principle that contemplates invariable things. He translates "phronesis" as "practical wisdom." This is the part of the rational principle that deliberates about variable things, and in particular about things that are done.

that in X, 7 Aristotle cannot use the same argument he uses in IX, 8 to show that a human being can be identified with the intellect, simply because "the pure intellect is not 'authoritative' in the sense of exercising control over anything" (p. 175). On the one hand, the intellect does not deliberate about the desires or what the human being ought to do, and so it does not exercise any authority over the desires by controlling them. On the other hand, from what Aristotle says in both 1177 b 26-1178 a 8 and 1178 a 9-14 it is clear that practical intelligence (phronēsis) is associated with our composite nature (to syntheton), which includes controlling the passions and instilling the moral virtues. And even though he says that the practical intelligence is connected with virtues that are human (anthrōpika), it is not the same thing as reason, and hence, it is not identical with the human being.[19]

I would say that Cooper is correct in pointing out that Aristotle has identified man with practical reason in IX, 8 and with intellect in X, 7. However, I would disagree with Cooper's belief that this is a difficulty in Aristotle's work, or that Aristotle's positions are inconsistent. I believe that there is an interpretation of Aristotle's theory of the human being in the NE that makes these chapters consistent.

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[19]This difficulty has been discussed by Hardie, pp. 345-55.

First, with respect to the view that Aristotle identifies a man with his reason in X, 7, I would say that Aristotle does not seem to be saying that a man is literally identical with his reason in the sense that he is one and the same as his reason. Aristotle only says that the intellect (ho nous) "would seem . . . to be each man" and that "[reason] especially is man" (1178 a 2, 8). Since he regards the intellect as being the best part of a human being, and since human beings are the only animals that have intellects, he seems to be saying that a man is primarily what distinguishes him from all other animals. This is not the 'is' of identity, but it is some other use of 'is'. To repeat a point that I made (p. 136) about Aristotle's discussion IX, 8 and in X, 7, he seems to be saying that a man is his intellect in the sense in which we say that a man is what he eats.

So far, I have tried to show that Aristotle is not saying that a man is literally identical with either his practical reason or his intellect. But the problem remains how to reconcile Aristotle's view that a man is his practical reason in IX, 8 and his view that a man is his intellect in X, 7. I would offer the following interpretation. I mentioned at the beginning of this section (p. 132) that Aristotle believes that what is peculiar to human beings is rational activity. This is what distinguishes human beings from plants and other animals. In NE I, 7 he says: "the function of man is an activity of

soul in accordance with reason, or at least not without reason" (1098 a 7, trans. Wardman). I would point out that his discussion in I, 7 is about rational activity in general. He does not here distinguish between two different kinds of rational activity (contemplating divine and invariable things on the one hand, and practical activity governed by reason on the other hand). Thus, Aristotle's view seems to be that what is most characteristic of human beings, as opposed to what is most characteristic of plants and other animals, is rational activity. At this point, I think that Aristotle could say that a man is his rational principle, since it is acting in accordance with it that a man is a man. Consequently, a man who is engaged in practical activity and obeying his reason (as the good man who is a lover of self does, IX, 8) is his practical reason; he is performing the function of a man with respect to variable things. And a man who contemplates divine things (as the person who is living the happiest life does, X, 7) is his intellect; he also is performing the function of a man, but with respect to invariable things. So I would say that Aristotle can consistently identify a man either with his practical reason or with his intellect, because these are two parts of the same rational principle.[20] And it is acting in accordance

[20] I wish to emphasize that both the contemplative reason (or the intellect) and the practical reason are parts of the rational principle because both "grasp a rational

with this rational principle that distinguishes a man from other animals more than anything else.

After discussing what he sees to be the difficulties in Aristotle's identifying the human being with the intellect, Cooper argues that in Book X Aristotle appeals to the psychology of the De Anima inasmuch as he regards the intellect as separable from the body (pp. 175-77). Cooper notes that if Aristotle insists on sharply distinguishing between the parts of the soul that are actualities of the body, and the intellect, which is not the actuality of the body, then Aristotle is committed to holding that the human being has two souls and that the human being is not a single, complex organism (pp. 175-76). As a result of this, Cooper says that Aristotle's answer to the question of what makes a human being to be a human being must be the intellect, if we accept the position of De Anima III, 5 and NE X (p. 176). Cooper argues that even though Aristotle appeals to the De Anima view of the soul in NE X, "he does not decisively reject as false the more commonplace conception which, refusing to separate the highest mental functions from the remaining human life-powers, regards a human being as at once and equally an intellectual and a

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principle" (ta logon echonta, 1139 a 6, trans. Ross). That is, both parts involve reasoning, although they differ in the objects about which they reason. It is by means of the contemplative part that we reason about invariable things (1139 a 7-8), and it is by means of the practical part that we reason about variable things that are good for oneself (VI, 5).

social being" (pp. 177-78). Cooper believes that the appeal of this "common-sense view" of the intellectual and the social nature of human beings is what influences Aristotle to describe the life that contains the virtues of both aspects as being happy (eudaimonia) (p. 178).

In response to Cooper, I would argue, as I did earlier, that there is no clear evidence that Aristotle is appealing to the psychology of the De Anima in NE X. First, there is no clear evidence that Aristotle relies on the view that the soul is the form or the actuality of the body. He does say at 1178 a 15 that some of the passions "seem even to follow from the body" (enia de kai symbainein apo tou sōmatos dokei). This resembles his claim in De Anima I, 1 that "it seems that all the affections of the soul are with a body" (403 a 16). Nevertheless, the doctrine that the soul is the actuality of the body is central to the psychology of the De Anima, and one would expect Aristotle to use it in his discussion of the soul in the NE if he were using the psychology of the De Anima.

Second, there is no clear evidence that Aristotle believes in NE X that the intellect is separable from the body. He does say in X, 8 that "the excellence of the intellect is separate" (hē de tou nou kechōrismenē, 1178 a 21). But in the first place, this does not say that the intellect itself is separable from the body. And in the second place, it is not clear that 'separate' (kechōrismenē)

means spatially separated (or separable) from the body or the rest of the soul. Aristotle could mean in this passage that the excellence of the mind is kechōrismenē in the sense that it is different in nature from the moral virtues. Since he is contrasting the excellence of the intellect with the moral virtues in this passage, and since the moral virtues are closely related to the emotions, Aristotle may also be pointing out that the excellence of the intellect is not involved with the emotions.

In this section I have been primarily concerned with Aristotle's discussion of human reason in the NE. In doing this, I have pointed out that the function of a human being (i.e., that which is peculiar to human beings) is rational activity. I have also discussed certain difficulties that arise in interpreting Aristotle's view in IX, 8 that man is his (practical) reason, and his view in X, 7 that man is his intellect. My interpretation of Aristotle's position is that he is not saying that a man is literally identical with his practical reason or his intellect, but that there is another sense in which he is either of these things in virtue of having rational activity as his function.

C. The Contribution of the Politics

Throughout my investigation of Aristotle's theory of the human being, I have concentrated on the kind of soul that is possessed by what Aristotle would say is a mature, normal, free, male human being. According to Aristotle,

there are human beings whose souls are significantly different from the soul of a free male; these are slaves, women, and children.

In Politics I, 13 Aristotle raises the question whether slaves, women, and children can be virtuous, and if so, whether their virtues are the same as those of adult, male citizens (1259 b 21-34). This question is important because a state whose citizens are virtuous is efficient and orderly. Beginning with the claim that the soul by nature has a ruling part (viz., to logon echon) and a ruled part (viz., to alogon), Aristotle says that "it is evident then that it is the same way in the other cases" (1260 a 7-8). Consequently, the ruler-ruled relation exists between master and slave, male and female, and man and child (1260 a 9-10). Aristotle suggests that the reason why there are these different kinds of ruler-ruled relations is that even though all of these people have the parts of the soul, they possess them in different ways (enuparcheia diapherontōs, 1260 a 12). It will deepen our understanding of Aristotle's theory of the human being to examine briefly those whose souls are different from the soul of the free adult male. In order to explain in what respect the souls of free men, slaves, women, and children differ, Aristotle chooses the faculty of deliberation (to bouleutikon). I think the reason why he chooses to bouleutikon as that in virtue of which these kinds of souls are different is that

he is concerned with virtue, and moral virtue depends on correct deliberation about the kinds of things that are conducive to human good (NE VI, 5). Aristotle says that "the parts of the soul are present in all [of them; i.e., slaves, women, and children], but they are present differently; for the slave does not have the deliberative faculty [to bouleutikon] at all, and the woman has it, but it is without authority [akuron], and the child has it, but it is undeveloped [ateles]" (1260 a 11-14).

The importance of what he says about the child tells us that the deliberative faculty is a part of the soul that must develop and mature in the human being who has it. Later, Aristotle points out that, while anger (thymos), will (boulēsis), and desire (epithymia) belong to children at once from birth, reasoning (ho logismos) and intellect (ho nous) develop in them as they mature (1334 b 21-24). Aristotle's position on the humanity of a (free, male) child in this passage seems to be consistent with his position as I interpreted it in my Chapter I (pp. 63-64). That is, part of the nature of a human being is to be developing as human beings normally develop. Thus, even though being rational is part of the essence of a human being, a child is a human being, even though its rational faculty is undeveloped. I would interpret Aristotle's position as maintaining that having the capacity to become rational is also part of the essence of a human being.

1. Women

In his book, Aristotle on Emotion, W. W. Fortenbaugh offers an explanation of Aristotle's claim that to bouleutikon in women is akuron.[21] He says, "at first glance it may seem that Aristotle is referring to the subordinate role of women (1259 b 2, 1260 a 23). A woman has reason, but it does not prevail in the society of men" (pp. 58-59). Fortenbaugh does not deny that Aristotle believed this, but he claims that this interpretation "does not . . . do justice to Aristotle's point" (p. 59). Fortenbaugh believes that Aristotle is attempting to explain "why different kinds of people have different functions or roles in society" (p. 59). Thus, according to Fortenbaugh, Aristotle is not simply stating a fact about the lack of political influence that women have, but he is also explaining why women have the role they have in the state (pp. 59-60). Fortenbaugh maintains that to bouleutikon in women is akuron in the sense that

> Her deliberative capacity lacks authority, because it is often overruled by her emotions or alogical side. Her decisions and actions are too often guided by pleasures and pains, so that she is unfitted for leadership and very much in need of temperance. (p. 60)

As Fortenbaugh points out, this does not mean that women cannot deliberate just as well as men; all it means is that the deliberative part of the woman's soul does not control

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[21] (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1975). All page references to Fortenbaugh's book will be given in the text.

her emotions and desires as effectively as the deliberative part of the free man's soul (p. 60).

There is, however, a difficulty in Fortenbaugh's interpretation of Aristotle. Fortenbaugh understands Aristotle to be making not only the sociological observation that women generally had no role in the politics of the state, but also the psychological point that it is part of any woman's nature that her deliberative faculty is "often overruled by her emotions." That this is Fortenbaugh's view is suggested when he says that "in the case of women a reference to their psychological make-up combined with their bodily condition explains their role within the household and therefore ultimately their peculiar kind of virtue" (p. 59). The difficulty is that this interpretation conflicts with the fact that the deliberative faculty of most women is not overruled by their emotions.[22] If it were the case that it was part of the nature of women that their deliberative faculties were overruled by their emotions, then this would be true for almost all women almost all of the time. That this is not the case is evidence that it is not part of the nature of women that their deliberative faculties are overruled by their emotions. Furthermore, there are many free men who would fit Fortenbaugh's description of women; that is, their "decisions and actions

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[22]This objection was suggested to me by Professor Kotzin.

are too often guided by pleasures and pains, so that [they are] unfitted for leadership and very much in need of temperance" (p. 60). Thus, Fortenbaugh's interpretation of the nature of women also applies to many men.[23]

I believe that Aristotle's position on the nature of women does allow him to say that they are human beings. Their souls are complete--they have to bouleutikon--and they can reason.

It would also seem that a (good, free) woman could be identified with her practical reason in the sense of being identified with one's reason that I discussed in connection with NE IX, 8. This seems to follow from Aristotle's view that she has the deliberative faculty (1260 a 13-14), and hence she can deliberate about how to achieve what is good for herself and control her desires. But in spite of the fact that women do exercise practical reason and control their desires, Aristotle suggests in Politics III, 4 that women do not have practical wisdom. He says that "practical wisdom alone is a virtue peculiar to a ruler . . . and indeed practical wisdom is not a virtue of one who is ruled, but true opinion" (1277 b 25-28).[24]

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[23]This point was suggested to me by Professor Walsh.

[24]hē de phronēsis archontos idios aretē monē . . . archomenou de ge ouk estin aretē phronēsis, alla doxa alēthēs.

Since, then, the woman is ruled not only by the leaders of a city, but also by her husband (1259 a 40), it would seem that the woman does not have practical wisdom. Perhaps what Aristotle means by this is not that women completely lack practical reason, but that they do not develop an excellence in practical reasoning in ruling relationships. This would seem to be a sociological observation, then, rather than a claim about the nature of a woman's soul.

It would also seem that the (good, free) woman could be identified with her intellect (contemplative reasoning) in the sense of being identified with one's intellect that I discussed with respect to the NE X, 7. Aristotle does suggest that the woman has an intellect, when he says at Politics 1260 a 11 that the parts of the soul are present in the female. Further, Aristotle never denies that women can engage in contemplative activity, and there seems to be nothing in her nature that would prevent our saying that she has an intellect.

2. Natural Slaves

The humanity of natural slaves is problematic in Aristotle. In the Politics Aristotle often talks of natural slaves in a way that makes their status as human beings questionable. In I, 4 he discusses slaves in connection with the other kinds of possessions a person can own. He says here that "the slave is a living possession [ktēma

empsychon, piece of property]" (1253 b 31). In I, 5, when discussing the difference between the ruler and the ruled, he likens slaves to animals, saying that "the usefulness of slaves diverges little from that of animals," because their bodies are used to provide the things that are necessary (1254 b 24-25, trans. Rackham). He also says that "nature wishes" to make the bodies of slaves strong and not erect (ortha), in contrast with the bodies of free men (1254 b 25-30). Thus, nature is inclined to make the bodies of slaves like the bodies of the animals that are used to perform heavy labor. So far, then, the slave seems to be more akin to a living piece of property or an animal than a human being.

Nevertheless, Aristotle does say that slaves are human beings. In I, 4 he says that the natural slave is a human being (anthrōpos) who belongs to another by nature (1254 a 14-17). Further, in I, 5, even though slaves have much in common with animals, they still are not just animals, because, unlike animals, slaves "participate in" reason (koinōnōn logou, 1254 b 20-23). Finally, in NE VIII, 11 Aristotle points out that one can be friends with a slave, not qua slave, but qua man (1161 b 5-8). All of this indicates that, while slaves are human beings, they are naturally different in significant ways from free men and women. Let us consider the nature of the slave in more detail.

In I, 13 Aristotle says that "slaves are human beings and share in reason" (ontōn anthrōpōn kai logou koinōn ountōn, 1259 b 28). Nevertheless, "the slave is entirely without that which deliberates" (ho doulos holōs ouk ekei to bouleutikon, 1260 a 13). Aristotle discusses the slave's sharing in reason also in I, 6, where he says that "a slave by nature is one who is able to be another's (and wherefore he is another's) and who has a share in reason [koinōnōn logou] only so much as to perceive it but not to have it [tosouton hoson aisthanesthai alla mē echein]" (1254 b 20-21). Sharing in reason is what distinguishes a slave from an animal, because "the other animals are not perceiving reason [ou logō aisthanomena] but serve instincts [pathēmasin hypēretei]" (1254 b 23).

Fortenbaugh's interpretation of what Aristotle means when he says that slaves share in reason but do not have it is that even though the slave is not able to deliberate, he is able to understand and act on the instructions of the master. Fortenbaugh says that it is in this way that a slave "can be said to perceive or appreciate logos" (p. 54). Fortenbaugh points out further that "a slave can appreciate the reasoned reflections of another and alter his emotional responses accordingly. A slave's alogical side, like that of any other person, is open to reasoned persuasion (EN 1102 b 33-4)" (p. 55).

One consequence of Aristotle's theory of the slave is that the slave could not be identified with his practical reason, as the good free man is (NE IX, 8). The reason for this is that the slave has no deliberative faculty. And since practical reason involves deliberating about what is good for oneself (NE VI, 5), the slave would not have practical reason (at least in the way that the good free man has it). Furthermore, without practical reason to control his desires, it would not seem possible for the slave to be virtuous. But in Politics I, 13 Aristotle says that the slave can have some small degree of virtue, "just enough to prevent him from failing in his tasks owing to intemperance [akolasian] and cowardice" (1260 a 35, trans. Rackham). Nevertheless, it is not practical reason in the slave that enables a slave to be temperate, but it seems to be the practical reason of the slave's master that is primarily responsible for the slave's minimal degree of virtue. Aristotle says that "the master ought to be the cause to the slave of the virtue proper to a slave" (1260 b 3-4, trans. Rackham).

Another consequence of Aristotle's theory of the slave is that the slave could not be identified with the intellect (i.e., the contemplative reason), as the good free man is (NE X, 7). This is because the slave does not have reason (logos), but he only shares in it to the extent of "apprehending" (aisthanesthai) it (1254 b 20-22). Aristotle

does not explicitly say that the slave cannot engage in contemplative activity, but his discussions of the slave in Politics I, 5 and 13 indicate that the natural slave is not capable of contemplation. Thus, in contrast with the life of the good free man, the life of the slave would not be the best and happiest life that is devoted to contemplation. Consequently, since the slave cannot devote his life to contemplation, we cannot say that the slave is reason.

The question might be raised whether Aristotle's claim that a slave lacks deliberation is true. He says in NE III, 3 that one deliberates when one assumes an end to be attained and then considers the most appropriate means of attaining the end (1112 b 15-20). Now it would seem that slaves could very well do this. For example, when a slave is given an order to accomplish an end, the slave might reasonably consider the various means of achieving that end and then pursue the most appropriate means. Thus it seems that Aristotle is at least overstating his position when he says that the natural slave does not have the deliberative capacity. The slave does not, after all, follow the orders of his master in the same way that a trained animal does. I do not intend to pursue or resolve this problem; I intend only to note that this question might reasonably be asked here.

Nevertheless, there is a difficulty in Aristotle's theory of the natural slave that threatens the consistency

of saying that a slave does not have reason, while at the same time maintaining that the slave is a human being, the function of which is rational activity. This problem is especially relevant to our study of Aristotle's theory of the human being. This difficulty is set out by Ernest Barker in The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle (pp. 364-67),[25] and my construction of the problem is as follows.

First, Aristotle says that the natural slave "has a share in reason [koinōnon logou] . . . but does not have it [mē echein]" (1254 b 21). However we are to understand "koinōnōn logou tosouton hoson aisthanesthai," it is clear that the slave is fundamentally different from a free man in the sense that the slave does not "have" reason in the sense that a free man does. And in addition, it is not simply the case that the slave has the capacity to reason, which has not yet matured or developed sufficiently, as one might say of a child. The slave lacks this capacity by nature. The slave is not an animal, because the slave can "perceive" (aisthanesthai) reason, which animals cannot do (1254 b 22). In fact, some scholars have concluded that slaves are a kind of animal sui generis, not fully human beings and not lower animals.[26]

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[25](New York: Russell and Russell, 1959). All page references to Barker's book will be given in the text.

[26]For example, see R. Schlaifer, "Greek Theories of Slavery from Homer to Aristotle," Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 47 (1936): 192-99.

Second, Aristotle does say that a slave is a human being (anthrōpos). In the Politics he says that a slave, "being a human being" (anthrōpos on), is also a possession (1254 a 16), and that it would be unusual if slaves did not have virtue, "being human beings and sharing reason" (1259 b 28-29). Even more interesting is the passage in the NE in which he says that one cannot be friends with a slave qua slave (hēi doulos), because a slave is a living instrument (empsychon organon); but one can be friends with a slave qua human being (hei anthrōpos), because the slave "can share in a system of law or be a party to an agreement" (1161 b 2-8, trans. Ross).

The difficulty that results is that Aristotle denies that the slave possesses reason; and yet in saying that the slave is a human being, he must maintain that the slave does possess reason, because possessing reason is necessary in order for an individual to be a human being. Furthermore, Aristotle's view that the slave does not have reason conflicts with what appears to be the fact that slaves can reason as well as free human beings reason. Perhaps Aristotle could avoid the contradiction by saying that the slave is a human being in virtue of sharing in reason to the extent of being able to follow the instructions of a master.

It has not been my purpose to discuss here Aristotle's justification for the institution of slavery, and it has

not been my purpose to criticize Aristotle's theory of slavery on the grounds of its political and moral implications. I have only intended to show that his theory of the nature of slaves leads to problems for his theory of the human being.

D. Summary and Conclusion

My primary goal in these first three chapters has been to reconstruct Aristotle's theory of the human being, mainly on the basis of his discussions of the soul and the body in Metaphysics VII, De Anima, and NE. In Chapter I, I examined Aristotle's concepts of substance and essence. While a human being is a substance in the sense of being a composite of matter and form, the essence of a human being is the form, or more specifically, the soul as the formal aspect of the body. Since the essence of a human being consists of the attributes in virtue of which a human being is a human being, then I maintained that stating the necessary and sufficient conditions for applying the concept of a human being would involve stating the essence of a human being.

Having established that the essence of a human being is the soul as the formal aspect of the body, and keeping in mind that rationality is part of the essence of a human being, in Chapter II I turned to Aristotle's study of the soul in the De Anima and to his account of the thinking faculty in particular. Aristotle's theories of the

soul in the De Anima and the Metaphysics agree to the extent that the soul is the form of the body. According to the De Anima theory of the soul, the soul has three main parts: the thinking, sensing, and nutritive parts. The thinking part is further subdivided into the active and passive minds. Aristotle holds that the active mind, in contrast with the other parts of the soul, is separable from the body. The other parts of the soul are the same as the body in fact, but different from the body in definition.

In addition to the De Anima, the NE is an important source of information about Aristotle's theory of the soul. One reason for this is that it is by means of the thinking faculty of the soul that human beings are able to achieve the highest kind of happiness--a life of contemplation. In the NE the soul is divided into the rational and the irrational parts. I argued that the theory of the soul that Aristotle uses in the NE is not the same as the theory of the soul that he uses in the De Anima, because there are fundamental differences in the two theories. One view that does seem to be common to the NE and the De Anima is that the thinking capacity is peculiar to human beings in the sense that it distinguishes human beings from plants and other animals. Finally, in this third chapter, I examined the question whether slaves, women, and children are human beings. This question is important because in

the Politics Aristotle suggests that slaves, women, and children are inferior to free men for various reasons. The result was that both children and women are human beings, because children have rational capacities that will develop, and women have the rational capacities that free men have. Slaves, however, seem not to be completely human beings, because they do not have rational or deliberative capacities.

To conclude, then, even though Aristotle seems not to be using the same theory of the soul in the NE and the De Anima, some general observations can be made about his theory of a human being. First, a human being consists of a body and a soul. Even though the mind is separable from the body and not mixed with the body, the rest of the soul is the same as the body in fact, but different in definition (according to the De Anima theory of the soul). Second, the human being is a biological organism. It has many features in common with other biological organisms, such as the nutritive and sensitive faculties. But, third, even though human beings have many characteristics in common with other living organisms, rationality is peculiar to human beings and distinguishes them as a species from plants and other animals. It will be useful to keep these general observations in mind as we study P. F. Strawson's theory of the person in Chapter IV and compare Strawson's and Aristotle's theories of the human being in Chapter V.

CHAPTER IV

P. F. STRAWSON'S THEORY OF THE PERSON

Having examined Aristotle's theory of the human being, I will examine P. F. Strawson's theory of a person as it appears in Chapter III of his book, Individuals.[1] My purpose in this chapter is to present and critically assess Strawson's theory of a person; in the next chapter I will compare Strawson's theory of a person with Aristotle's theory of a human being. Ultimately, I will be interested in determining the differences between these two theories and in assessing the strengths and weaknesses of each theory with respect to the other.

It is especially worthwhile to compare Strawson's work in this area with Aristotle's, because Strawson sees himself to be approaching metaphysical questions in Individuals in a way that is similar to the way in which Aristotle approached metaphysical questions (xiii). If indeed Strawson and Aristotle are taking the same kind of approach

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[1](London: Methuen & Co., 1959; Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., Anchor Books, 1963). All page references are to the paperback edition and will be given in the text.

to the study of the person, then it would be interesting to compare the results of these two similar approaches that are so far apart in time. Perhaps there have been advances since Aristotle's time that make Strawson's results more satisfactory (in some sense) than Aristotle's, or perhaps the results of Aristotle's study of the human being offer some important considerations for contemporary studies of the person. These are some of the issues that I will discuss in the next chapter. But first, in this chapter I will study Strawson's theory of the person.

In the first section of the following discussion, titled "Descriptive and Revisionary Metaphysics," I present Strawson's distinction between descriptive and revisionary approaches to doing metaphysics. I also mention what I see to be some problems with this distinction. In the next section, "The Concept of a Person," I present Strawson's theory of a person, concentrating on his view that a person is a basic particular and that the concept of a person is a primitive concept. I also discuss the importance of the concepts of P- and M-predication to the concept of a person, and I discuss some difficulties with the concepts of P- and M-predication. In the final section, titled "Criticisms of Strawson's Theory of a Person," I consider Jerome A. Shaffer's criticism of Strawson's distinction between persons and material bodies, and Joseph

Margolis's objection that Strawson's concept of a person is not primitive, but reducible to the concept of a material body.

A. Descriptive and Revisionary Metaphysics

Before we examine Strawson's analysis of the concept of a person, it will be useful to consider his distinction between descriptive and revisionary approaches to doing metaphysics, because he considers himself to be doing descriptive metaphysics.

In the introduction to Individuals, Strawson says: "Descriptive metaphysics is content to describe the actual structure of our thought about the world, revisionary metaphysics is concerned to produce a better structure" (xiii). Broadly speaking, Descartes, Leibniz, and Berkeley are revisionary metaphysicians, according to Strawson, and Aristotle and Kant are descriptive metaphysicians (xiii). Descriptive metaphysics attempts "to lay bare the most general features of our conceptual structure" of the world (xiii). In particular, Strawson maintains that there is a certain "central core" of categories and concepts in human thought which do not change through human history and which lie below the surface of language (xiv). Exposing the structure and interrelations among the categories and concepts in this "central core" is the primary concern of descriptive metaphysics (xiv).

This account of descriptive and revisionary metaphysics is not intended to imply that they are two completely independent ways of doing metaphysics. Strawson says that probably no metaphysician has ever done only descriptive or only revisionary work.

In the next chapter I will discuss the extent to which Aristotle was doing descriptive metaphysics. I will also raise two problems with Strawson's explanation of the purpose of descriptive metaphysics, and with his distinction between descriptive and revisionary metaphysics. Briefly, these problems are, first, if a philosopher is doing a descriptive metaphysical analysis of the concept of a person in his own philosophical idiom, then it is not clear how we are to decide whether the concept of a person the philosopher eventually describes is the same as the concept of a person that is one of the unchanging concepts in the "central core of human thinking." The second problem is, if the philosopher is doing metaphysics in his own philosophical idiom, then it is not clear when he is doing descriptive metaphysics and when he is doing revisionary metaphysics. This is because a philosopher's own idiom usually involves certain terms and expressions that are specialized and not part of our ordinary language. The problem that I am suggesting, then, is that when a philosopher introduces such specialized terms, he may be introducing new concepts or changing old ones, and hence, doing some revisionary metaphysics.

Finally, having made it clear that he is going to be doing descriptive metaphysics in Individuals, Strawson focuses his metaphysical investigations in the first part of the book on the two categories of particulars that he sees to be central to our conceptual framework--the categories of material bodies and persons (xv-xvi). In the next section I will investigate Strawson's attempt to expose in his own "critical and analytical idiom" our concept of a person.

B. The Concept of a Person

Perhaps it is best to begin with Strawson's own description of the concept of a person: "What I mean by the concept of a person is the concept of a type of entity such that both predicates ascribing states of consciousness and predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics, a physical situation &c. are equally applicable to a single individual of that single type" (97-98). Since it is essential to Strawson's concept of a person that both corporeal characteristics and state-of-consciousness characteristics are predicable of the same entity, it is necessary that we examine in detail the importance of these two types of predicate to the concept of a person.

1. P- and M-Predication

In order to characterize more clearly the type of individual that a person is, Strawson describes the two kinds of predicates that are ascribed to persons (100). First, M-predicates are those predicates "which are also properly applied to material bodies to which we would not dream of applying predicates ascribing states of consciousness." Strawson seems to include among M-predicates such predicates as those ascribing physical characteristics (height, color, shape, weight) and physical position (location, attitude) (83). Second, P-predicates are "all the other predicates we apply to persons" (100). Some of these predicates are predicates that ascribe states of consciousness, but not all of them do. What P-predicates have in common, though, is that "they imply the possession of consciousness on the part of that to which they are ascribed" (101). P-predicates include such predicates as "is smiling," "is going for a walk," "is in pain," and "is thinking hard" (100-1).

Strawson regards persons as basic particulars in our conceptual scheme (xv-xvi, 256). According to Strawson, particulars that are "basic from the point of view of particular-identification" belong to a category of particulars such that

> it would not be possible to make all the identifying references we do make to particulars of other classes, unless we made identifying references to particulars of that class, whereas it would be possible to make all

> the identifying references we do make to particulars of that class without making identifying references to particulars of other classes. (28)

He says that "of the categories of objects which we recognize, only those satisfy these requirements which are, or possess, material bodies--in a broad sense of the expression" (29).

Persons are not, however, primarily material bodies. Strawson says that "we are not, for example, to think of it [the individual entity--the person] as a secondary kind of entity in relation to two primary kinds, viz. a particular consciousness and a particular human body" (101). Instead, the suggestion seems to be, a person is a primary kind of entity to which both M- and P-predicates are equally applied.

2. Criticisms of Strawson's Doctrine of P- and M-Predication

(a) Bernard Williams

I would like to consider two criticisms that have been raised against Strawson's distinction between P- and M-predicates and his view that predicates of both of these kinds are properly applied to persons. The first criticism I wish to consider has been raised by Bernard Williams in his review of Individuals.[2] Williams criticizes Strawson's distinction between P- and M-predicates. Williams points

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[2] Problems of the Self, Chap. 7, "Strawson on Individuals" (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 120-26. All page references to Williams's book will be given in the text in the form "(W, 120)."

out that some of the predicates that would be classified as M-predicates according to Strawson seem instead to be predicates of the kind that we would not dream of ascribing to bodies. For example, it does not seem natural to ascribe the predicate "is sitting down" to a body; this predicate is ascribed more naturally to persons. In addition, the predicates "went red" and "is cold" are not ascribed only to bodies, but they are often ascribed in a way that implies the possession of consciousness. Williams asks if we are making the same predication when we say that a human being's face went red as when we say that a piece of litmus paper went red. He also suggests that the predication involved in "I am cold" is different from that involved in saying that "this cup of tea is cold."[3]

Not only do some M-predicates seem to be ascribable to persons in the sense that P-predicates are, but also, as

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[3]It should be pointed out, however, that using the same verbal expression to ascribe a predicate to persons on the one hand, and to material bodies on the other hand does not necessarily mean that the same predicate is being ascribed. That the same verbal expression is used in English (as in "I am cold" and "This cup of tea is cold") may be a peculiarity of the language. In German, for example, one says "Mir ist kalt," i.e., literally, "Cold is to me" (or "[It is] cold to me") (in Hebrew also, one says "[It is] cold to-me"). And in French one says that one "has" cold. (I am indebted to Professor Kotzin for calling to my attention the point that using the same verbal expression in English does not necessarily indicate that the same predicate is being ascribed to persons and material bodies. I am also indebted to her for pointing out that translating an English expression, such as "I am cold," into another language may be a "test" for whether the same predicate is being ascribed to persons and to material bodies.)

Williams points out, some P-predicates are ascribable to material bodies (W, 124). For example, we say that computers "think" and that cranes "lift."

The consequence is that Strawson has not provided clear criteria for distinguishing effectively between M- and P-predicates. On the one hand, some of the predicates that Strawson would classify as M-predicates on the basis that they are properly ascribed to material bodies to which we would not ascribe states of consciousness are actually ascribed on some occasions in this way. On the other hand, some of the predicates that he would classify as P-predicates on the basis that they imply that the particular to which they are ascribed possesses consciousness, are often ascribed to machines--things to which we would not dream of ascribing states of consciousness.

In his discussion of the kinds of predicates that are applied to persons, Strawson makes a remark about certain predicates that indicates how he might respond to Williams's criticism.[4] Strawson says that "if we want to locate type-ambiguity somewhere, we would do better to locate it in certain predicates like 'is in the drawing room' 'was hit by a stone' &c., and say they mean one thing when applied to material objects and another when applied to persons" (101). Thus, Strawson might point out that some

[4]This point was suggested to me by Professor Kotzin.

predicates are ambiguous: "went red," for example, would be a predicate "ascribing a corporeal characteristic" if it were ascribed to a piece of litmus paper that has turned red, but it would be a predicate "implying the possession of consciousness" if it were ascribed to a person who is blushing. Another way to emphasize the ambiguity of some predicates is as follows: one would be ascribing the predicate "went red" as an M-predicate if one said that a person went red <u>because</u> he or she had a fever, but one would be ascribing the predicate "went red" as a P-predicate if one said that a person went red <u>because</u> he or she is embarrassed.

Williams is aware of this response, but he does not think it is adequate. He says:

> Here it may be replied that the words are not applied to persons and to machines in the same sense: that the two sorts of application are not applications of the same predicate. But now some criterion is needed for deciding when the same predicate is, and is not, being applied. (124)

Williams's view, then, is that Strawson has not provided a criterion for determining when the <u>same predicate</u> is or is not being ascribed, as when we say "His face went red" as opposed to "The litmus paper went red" (W, 124). Williams maintains that this is a serious omission on Strawson's part, because he could not provide a criterion for the sameness of a predicate "without presupposing some positions in the philosophy of mind" (W, 124). Williams does not provide any further argument for this claim

except to point out that one must already have some concept of the mental as opposed to the physical in order to say that computers do not "think" in the same sense that persons do. He concludes that Strawson's assumption that the distinction between P- and M-predicates is given seems to be "fundamentally misguided" (W, 124).

(b) Roland Puccetti

The second criticism I wish to consider is directed against Strawson's characterization of our concept of a person as the concept of a type of entity to which are ascribed both P- and M-predicates. Roland Puccetti has raised this criticism.[5] The problem that Puccetti raises is that, on the one hand, Strawson's concept of a person is too broad, because some P-predicates (such as, "is smiling" or "is going for a walk") are ascribable to dogs, which are not persons (P, 322). On the other hand, Strawson's concept of a person is too narrow, because M-predicates are not ascribable to God, whom many (including Aristotle) would consider to be a person (P, 323).

This criticism seems to me to raise difficult problems for Strawson. In response to the point that his concept of a person is too broad because some P-predicates

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[5]"Mr. Strawson's Concept of a Person," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 45 (1967): 321-28. All page references to Puccetti's article will be given in the text in the form "(P, 321)." Joseph Margolis raises a similar objection in "On the Ontology of Persons," The New Scholasticism 50 (Winter 1976): 76-77.

are ascribable to some animals, Strawson could not reply that such P-predicates are ambiguous, meaning one thing when ascribed to animals, and meaning something else when ascribed to persons. The reason why this response is not adequate, it seems to me, is that we seem to ascribe many P-predicates to animals implying that the animals to which they are ascribed possess consciousness (in some form). We say that animals sense things, obey commands, play, and hunt for food. And yet we would not consider animals to be persons.

Having discussed some criticisms that have been raised by Bernard Williams and Roland Puccetti against Strawson's concepts of P- and M-predication, I will consider next Strawson's account of the basis on which P-predicates are ascribed to persons.

3. The Basis for Ascribing P-Predicates

After distinguishing between P- and M-predicates as the two kinds of predicates that are properly ascribed to persons, Strawson discusses the basis on which P-predicates are ascribed to persons. He says that "it is essential to the character of these predicates that they have both first- and third-person ascriptive uses, that they are both self-ascribable otherwise than on the basis of observation of the behavior of the subject of them, and other-ascribable on the basis of behavior criteria" (104-5). Strawson emphasizes that "in order to have this type of concept, one

must be a self-ascriber and an other-ascriber of such predicates, and must see every other as a self-ascriber" (105). He says that if we did not have this type of concept, we would not have our concept of a person (105). Thus, Strawson's view seems to be that the concept of a P-predicate as the type of predicate that has both first- and third-person ascriptive uses is logically necessary to our concept of a person. He warns that if we do not recognize that P-predicates have these two different uses, then we risk getting into the philosophical difficulties of either skepticism (by taking the self-ascriptive use of P-predicates as being self-sufficient) or behaviorism (by taking the other-ascriptive use of P-predicates as being self-sufficient) (106-7).

Not only are persons basic particulars, but Strawson argues that the concept of a person is a primitive concept in the sense that it is not to be analyzed or explained in terms of the concepts of a pure individual consciousness and a body (97-101). He says that we are not to think of a person as an animated body or an embodied anima (99). Instead, our concept of a pure individual consciousness is secondary to our concept of a person (99-100).

But the objection might be raised that Strawson's concept of a person is <u>not</u> a primitive concept, because it is analyzable or explainable in terms of the concepts of

P- and M-predication.[6] Consequently, the concepts of P- and M-predication are primitive, and the concept of a person is derived from these. It seems to me that one response that Strawson could make to this objection is based on the sense in which he says that the concept of a person is primitive:

> All I have said about the meaning of saying that this concept is primitive is that it is not to be analysed in a certain way or ways. We are not, for example, to think of it as a secondary kind of entity in relation to two primary kinds, viz. a particular consciousness and a particular human body. (101)

Thus, he indicates here that the concept of a person is primitive in the sense that it is not analyzable into concepts of other entities. Now, the concepts of P- and M-predication are not more primitive than the concept of a person in this sense, because the concepts of P- and M-predicates are not concepts of other entities; they are concepts of predicates that are ascribed to entities.

One might suppose that Strawson could say that the concept of a person is primitive because we could not <u>have</u> the concept of P- and M-predicates without the concept of a person. Strawson does say that "states of consciousness could not be ascribed at all, <u>unless</u> they were ascribed to persons" (98. I think that he would say the same thing about M-predicates.) But I do not think that this warrants the conclusion that the concepts of P- and M-predicates are

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[6]This objection was pointed out to me by Professor Kotzin.

derived from the concept of a person in the sense that we could not have the concepts of M- and P-predication without the concept of a person. The reason why this conclusion is not warranted, it seems to me, is because Strawson also says, after explaining that P-predicates have both first- and third-person ascriptive uses, "if there were no concepts answering to the characterization I have just given . . . we should not have our concept of a person" (105). I think he would also say that we would not have our concept of a person without the concept of an M-predicate. Thus, his view seems to be that, while we would not have the concepts of P- and M-predication without the concept of a person, we would not have the concept of a person without the concepts of P- and M-predication. Thus, it seems that Strawson would not say that either the concept of a person or the concepts of P- and M-predication are primitive in the sense that we could not have one concept without the others.

4. Strawson's Criticism of the Concept of a Pure Ego

Nevertheless, Strawson recognizes that there is the temptation to take the concept of the pure ego to be primary and then to explain the concept of a person in terms of it. He rejects this view, saying that the concept of the pure ego, as the subject of experiences, "is a concept that cannot exist; or, at least, cannot exist as a primary

concept . . ." (98-99). Strawson does not state in detail his argument against the view that states of consciousness are ascribed to an ego, but drawing from his criticisms of the concept of the ego (96, 98-99, 102), I would reconstruct the details of his argument as follows:

1. If one has an adequate concept of a person, then one can ascribe states of consciousness both to oneself and to others. (p. 105)

2. If one can ascribe states of consciousness to oneself, then one can ascribe them to others. (pp. 94-96)

3. If one can ascribe states of consciousness to others, then one can identify others as subjects of consciousness. (p. 96)

4. If one can identify others as subjects of consciousness, then one can distinguish subjects of consciousness. (p. 100. Strawson's discussion of identification in Part I suggests that identifying particulars involves picking them out or distinguishing them.)

5. If one has an adequate concept of a person, then one can distinguish subjects of consciousness. (steps 1-4)

6. Assume that the concept of the Cartesian ego is an adequate concept of a person.

7. If the concept of the ego is an adequate concept of a person, then one can distinguish egos as subjects of consciousness. (steps 5, 6)

8. Only private experiences can be ascribed to egos. (p. 96)

9. If the concept of the ego is an adequate concept of a person, then one can use only private experiences to identify egos. (steps 7, 8)

10. One cannot distinguish between oneself and others on the basis of private experiences alone.

11. If one can use <u>only</u> private experiences to identify others, then one cannot distinguish between one's own private experiences and the private experiences of others. (step 10)

12. If one cannot distinguish between one's own private experiences and the private experiences of others, then one cannot distinguish egos as subjects of consciousness.

13. If the concept of the ego is an adequate concept of the person, then one cannot distinguish egos as subjects of consciousness. (steps 9-12)

14. One can distinguish egos as subjects of consciousness and one cannot distinguish egos as subjects of consciousness. (steps 6, 7, 13)

Therefore,

15. The concept of the Cartesian ego is not an adequate concept of a person. (steps 6-14, reductio ad absurdum)

To sum up, Strawson seems to be assuming that an adequate descriptive metaphysical account of our concept of a person must allow us to distinguish persons from non-persons, one person from another, and another person from oneself, since we are able to do this in fact. Now the only distinguishing mark of a pure ego is its private experiences. But private experiences are such that one can only know one's own; and even if one did have another's private experience, one would not experience it as another's, but as one's own experience. Thus, if one could only know one's own private experiences, then one would not be able to distinguish between oneself and other subjects of consciousness by means of private experiences. Further, Strawson maintains, if one cannot distinguish between oneself and others, then one cannot have a concept of others or of oneself, "for to have the idea [of oneself] at all, it seems that it must be an idea of some particular thing

of which he has experience, and which is set over against or contrasted with other things of which he has experience, but which are not himself" (83). Consequently, the concept of the pure ego cannot be an adequate primitive concept of a person, because we would not be able to distinguish egos.

Strawson did not state his argument in just this way, and I have attempted to restate it in a way that makes explicit what seem to be his key assumptions. The reason why I have considered Strawson's argument against the concept of the ego is that one could argue that the concept of the active mind in Aristotle's theory of the human being is similar to the concept of the pure consciousness. I will examine the bearing of Strawson's argument, as I have reconstructed it, on Aristotle's concept of the active mind in the next chapter.

C. Criticisms of Strawson's Theory of a Person

1. Introduction

Criticisms of Strawson's theory of a person have focused on many different aspects of his theory. I have already discussed Bernard Williams's criticisms of Strawson's distinction between P- and M-predicates. And I have discussed Roland Puccetti's criticism of Strawson's concept of a person on the grounds that characterizing a person as the type of individual to which both P- and M-predicates are ascribable leads to a concept of a person that is too

broad in some respects and too narrow in other respects. Both of these criticisms were primarily directed against Strawson's doctrine of P- and M-predication. In this section, however, I will consider two objections that are directed primarily against Strawson's doctrine that persons and material bodies are two different types of basic particular. My reason for considering objections that are directed against this aspect of Strawson's theory of the person is that it will involve a deeper study of the relation between the concept of a person and the concept of a material body, and hence provide a basis for comparing Strawson's and Aristotle's positions on this subject in the next chapter.

First, I will consider Jerome A. Shaffer's objection that Strawson has not made clear the difference between persons' bodies and material bodies. In the next chapter, I will compare the views of Strawson and Aristotle on the difference between persons and material bodies.

Second, I will consider Joseph Margolis's objection that Strawson's account of a person has not ruled out the reductive materialist's position that persons are nothing more than complex material bodies. This investigation of whether Strawson's concept of a person can be reduced to the materialist's concept of a person is intended to be the counterpart of my investigation in Chapter II of the extent to which Aristotle had a materialist concept of a human

being. Again, in the next chapter, I will compare Strawson's and Aristotle's positions on the question whether a person is the same thing as a material body.

2. Jerome A. Shaffer

In his book, Philosophy of Mind,[7] Jerome A. Shaffer presents Strawson's concept of a person as a basic entity, just as a material body is, but which is different from a body in that a person necessarily has both physical and mental attributes, whereas a body has only physical attributes (S, 55-56). Shaffer emphasizes Strawson's view that persons are not derivatives of bodies; thus, one could not correctly say that persons are bodies to which mental predicates just happen to be ascribed. Furthermore, as Strawson points out, bodies are things "to which we would not dream of applying predicates ascribing states of consciousness" (100).

I would schematize Shaffer's criticism of Strawson's distinction between persons and material bodies as follows (S, 56-57):

1. Persons are essentially different from bodies (in necessarily having both bodily and mental attributes).

2. Since persons are essentially different from bodies, a person's "body" cannot be said to be a body in the same sense that a material body is.

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[7] (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968), pp. 52-57. All page references to Shaffer's book will be given in the text in the form "(S, 55)."

3. If a person's "body" cannot be said to be a body in the same sense that a material body is, then the laws of nature, which apply to material bodies, cannot be applied to persons' "bodies."

Therefore,

4. The laws of nature cannot apply to persons' "bodies." (steps 2, 3)

That this absurd consequence follows from Strawson's concept of the person indicates that there are serious difficulties in the relation between persons and bodies, according to Shaffer (S, 56). For Shaffer, a person's body (according to Strawson's theory) is "an abstraction, an intellectual construction, rather than a reality," presumably because it is not subject to the laws of nature, which operate within reality (S, 57). Only when the person dies does the body become a material body, a part of reality, that "to which we would not dream" of applying P-predicates (S, 57).

Premise two in my reconstruction of Shaffer's argument seems correct. Strawson's view does seem to be that persons are essentially different from bodies since they necessarily have mental attributes, while bodies do not have them. Therefore, Strawson cannot hold that persons are essentially material bodies to which we ascribe mental predicates, because this would make persons derivative entities and not basic. Premise three, however, does not seem to be true. I see no reason why Strawson could not allow that among the M-predicates that are ascribed to a person are included predicates indicating that a person's

body is subject to the laws of nature when he says that "that which one calls one's body, is at least, a body, a material thing. It can be picked out from others, identified by ordinary physical criteria and described in ordinary physical terms" (83-84). Whenever Strawson discusses M-predicates, it is clear that they include any of the predicates that could be ascribed to any material body (100). The result would be that a person's body is just as much a part of reality as any material body.

Nevertheless, I think that Shaffer has isolated a genuine difficulty in the relation between persons and bodies in Strawson's metaphysics. In saying that a person's body is "at least" a material thing, Strawson comes close to saying that a person is a material body to which we ascribe P-predicates. If this were the case, then a person would not be a basic particular, but a derivative of the more basic material body. The result would be that Strawson's concept of a person would be a materialist concept. Thus, our considerations of Shaffer's criticism of Strawson has led to the conclusion that Strawson has not made the relation between a person and a material body sufficiently clear.

3. Joseph Margolis

The second criticism that I will consider has been raised by Joseph Margolis in his article, "On the Ontology

of Persons" (M, 75-77).[8] In this article Margolis argues that even though Strawson maintains that both persons and material bodies are basic particulars and that persons are not derivatives of bodies, Strawson has not really argued for this claim. In fact, all that he does say about persons could be accepted consistently by one who favors a reductive account of persons. A reductive account of persons, according to Margolis, is the view that "persons are nothing more than complex bodies" (M, 73). Before turning directly to Margolis's criticism of Strawson's concept of a person, I will explain briefly what the reductive materialist position involves, according to Margolis, and what effect it would have on Strawson's view of a person. According to Margolis, a reductive materialist would say that Strawson's concept of a person can be "analyzed reductively in terms of the concept of a material body" (M, 76). What Margolis seems to mean by this is that the reductive materialist would argue that Strawson's concept of a person can be analyzed in terms of the concept of a type of entity that is only different from a material body in being (physically) more complex than many material bodies. If the reductive materialist were correct in this assessment of Strawson's concept of a person, then the consequences for

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[8] The New Scholasticism 50 (Winter 1976): 73-84. All page references to Margolis's article will be given in the text in the form "(M, 73)."

Strawson's view would be that the concept of a person is not primitive but analyzable in terms of the concept of a material body. In addition to this point about the primitiveness of the concept of a person, Margolis makes a similar point about the ontological[9] primitiveness of a person. Interpreting Margolis's discussion of the reductionist's views on the ontology of persons (M, 74-76), I would say that the reductionist holds that persons are ontologically primitive, but only because they are nothing more than (or different from) (physically) complex material bodies (M, 76). I think that the reductive materialist would say that persons and material bodies are the same type of entity. If the reductive materialist were correct, then the consequence for Strawson's view would be that a person would not be a basic particular that is fundamentally different in type from material bodies. This, then, is what seems to be involved in the reductive materialist's attack on Strawson's concept of a person. I will turn, now, to the objection that Margolis raises from the reductive materialist's point of view.

Margolis argues that Strawson has failed to show that persons are more than complex bodies for three reasons. First, Strawson's account of his concept of a person as the

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[9]I am using the term 'ontological' to refer to the nature of a thing as an existing thing.

concept of a type of entity to which both P- and M-predicates are ascribable (97-98) could be accepted by reductivists as well as nonreductivists (in fact, Margolis says, it is even provisionally acceptable to Cartesians) (M, 75). Second, in spite of Strawson's claim that "states of consciousness could not be ascribed at all, unless they were ascribed to persons" (98), Margolis maintains that if a successful reductive account of persons were found, then it would still be possible to identify states of consciousness "as part of the history of particular persons" (M, 75). Margolis points this out in order to show that ascribing states of consciousness to persons in the way that Strawson suggests does not necessarily imply that his concept of a person is primitive. Third, Margolis argues that "Strawson does not actually appear to demonstrate that persons cannot be reduced to bodies" (M, 75-76). Strawson only attempts to show that both persons and bodies are basic in our conceptual scheme. However, a reductionist could also hold that both persons and bodies are basic, because persons are nothing more than complex bodies. Margolis concludes, then, that Strawson has not shown that the concept of a person is primitive in the respect that it cannot be reduced to the concept of a material body.

Consequently, in order to avoid the objections of Shaffer and Margolis, Strawson would have to argue more effectively that a person as he describes it is basic and not derivative of a material body.

In describing our conceptual scheme, Strawson indicates that the relation between basic and derivative particulars in terms of identifying references is as follows (2, 28):

1. It would not be possible to make all of the identifying references that we make to derivative particulars unless we make identifying references to basic particulars.

2. It would be possible to make all of the identifying references that we make to basic particulars without making identifying references to derivative particulars.

He defines an identifying reference roughly as an expression that is used to refer to a particular in a way that distinguishes it (3). Thus, a pain, for example, is not a basic particular because it cannot be identified without referring to some person who has the pain (31-32). It is essential to the identificatory force of an identifying reference to a pain that there be at least an implicit reference to the person who has the pain (32). Presumably, Strawson would admit that this claim could be generalized so that any identifying reference to a derivative particular would at least implicitly refer to some basic particular upon which the existence of the derivative particular was dependent. Consequently, the statement 'this pain is terrible' is really "a kind of shorthand" for the statement 'the pain I am feeling is terrible' (31-32).

Given this account of Strawson's theory of basic and derivative particulars and identifying references, if persons really were nothing more than complex bodies, as the

reductivist would insist, then it is essential that any identifying references to a person implicitly refer to a material body. But it is clearly not the case that just any identifying reference to a person implicitly refers to a body. For example, the statement 'this person is happy' does not implicitly refer to the statement 'this body is happy'. Therefore, Strawson can conclude that persons are not just complex bodies.

The reductivist might respond to this argument by pointing out that it proves the logical point that statements about persons do not always mean the same as statements about bodies. But Strawson has still not proven that persons are in fact something other than complex bodies in spite of the differences in how we sometimes talk about, and refer to, both persons and bodies.[10] Thus, the difficulty remains for Strawson of proving that persons are basic particulars and that the concept of a person is not reducible to the concept of a material body alone.

Perhaps Strawson could also respond to the objection raised by Margolis by emphasizing that his own view is not that persons are bodies, as the reductivist would maintain, but that persons have bodies.[11] As I have pointed out,

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[10]Shaffer comes to a similar conclusion in his Philosophy of Mind, pp. 53-54.

[11]The importance in Strawson's theory of a person of the distinction between being a body and having a body was pointed out to me by Professor Kotzin.

Strawson's view is that the concept of a person is the concept of a type of entity to which both states of consciousness and corporeal characteristics are equally ascribable to an individual of that type (97-98). States of consciousness are not ascribable to a body, but to the thing that has a body--the person. Thus, I think that Strawson could say that our concept of a person could not be reduced to the concept of a body, because such a reduction would eliminate our concept of states of consciousness, which is essential to our concept of a person. Strawson also says that we "ascribe certain corporeal characteristics not simply to the body standing in this special relation to the thing to which we ascribe thought and feelings, &c., but to the thing itself to which we ascribe those thoughts and feelings" (88, my emphasis). Thus, the corporeal characteristics are ascribed not just to the body, but to the person. Again, I think that Strawson could say that our concept of a person could not be reduced to the concept of a body, because his view seems to be that the ascription of corporeal characteristics to persons is fundamentally different from the ascription of corporeal characteristics to material bodies.

D. Conclusion

Strawson's theory of the person is certainly an ambitious undertaking. The success of his theory would help us avoid the problems involved in both materialist and

dualist theories of the person. Materialist theories, such as the identity theory and behaviorism, have difficulties explaining how mentalistic statements are logically related to statements about material bodies or behavior. If Strawson's theory were correct, however, there would be no need to explain how statements containing P-predicates are reduced to statements containing M-predicates. They are two logically different kinds of statements. Furthermore, by holding that both P- and M-predicates are ascribed to the same entity, viz., a person, Strawson would avoid the difficulty of explaining how mental experiences are ontologically related to bodily states. Thus, if Strawson's theory were successful, it would avoid both the linguistic and the ontological problems that trouble materialist theories.

If Strawson's theory of a person were successful, it would also avoid the Cartesian problem of explaining the relation between the mind and the body. On Strawson's view there would be no relation to be explained because the person itself is a basic particular and not derived from two basic entities.

Even though Strawson's theory of a person promises to solve some of the most perplexing problems in the philosophy of mind, the criticisms that I have discussed show that his theory has problems of its own, among which is the problem that the Strawsonian person seems not to be essentially different from the materialist's person.

CHAPTER V

A COMPARISON OF ARISTOTLE AND STRAWSON

In the preceding chapters I have discussed both Aristotle's theory of a human being and Strawson's concept of a person. For Aristotle, what we would call the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a human being were satisfied by an ensouled body. Furthermore, the essence of a human being was determined by the soul as the formal cause. For Strawson, a person was a basic particular and the type of particular to which both corporeal characteristics and characteristics implying the possession of consciousness were attributed.

The comparison of these two theories, which will be the primary concern of this chapter, will involve considering not only the similarities and differences that exist between them, but also the extent to which Aristotle is actually giving a descriptive metaphysical analysis of the same concept that Strawson is analyzing. Strawson sees Aristotle to be doing metaphysics from the same descriptive approach that he, himself, is taking in Individuals, even

though Aristotle is using his own idiomatic style (xv).[1] Finally, in comparing these two theories of a human being, I will attempt to assess the relative advantages and the contributions of their views, and I will attempt to determine whether Aristotle's concept of a human being can avoid some of the criticisms that were raised against Strawson's concept of a person.

A. Descriptive vs. Revisionary Metaphysics

Before turning directly to Aristotle's and Strawson's theories of a human being, I will briefly examine the broader methodological question whether Aristotle is doing descriptive metaphysics.

Strawson says that the descriptive metaphysician attempts "to describe the actual structure of our thought about the world" (xiii), or to expose the structure of, and interrelationships among, a certain core of concepts that is common to human thought of all ages (xiv). This is what Strawson proposes to do to a limited extent in Individuals, and I have concentrated primarily on his treatment of just one of those putatively unchangeable concepts--the concept of a person. Our investigation of his concept of a person

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[1] Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics (London: Methuen & Co., 1959; Anchor Books, 1963). All page references to Strawson and Aristotle will be given in the text in parentheses. All references to Individuals are to the paperback edition.

has resulted in our learning that he regards a person as a basic particular to which both corporeal and mentalistic characteristics can be ascribed. But the questions I now wish to raise are: "Is Aristotle attempting to describe 'the actual structure of our thought' about the world?" and "Is Aristotle attempting to expose the same concept of a person that Strawson was trying to expose?" As I pointed out in the last chapter (pp. 162-65), Strawson certainly believed that Aristotle was doing descriptive metaphysics.[2] In the following discussion, I will examine the question whether Aristotle was doing descriptive metaphysics, and in Section C ("Persons") I will compare Aristotle's concept of a human being with Strawson's concept of a person.

Both Aristotle and Strawson seem to be engaged in descriptive metaphysics in the sense that both seem to be trying to describe our conceptual framework. Describing the goal of descriptive metaphysics, Strawson says that "descriptive metaphysics is content to describe the actual structure of our thought about the world" and that its aim is "to lay bare the most general features of our conceptual structure" (xiii). Aristotle seems to be doing this,

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[2]Edwin Hartman also says that both Strawson and Aristotle are attempting to "describe the actual structure of our thought about the world" in his Substance Body, and Soul (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 40.

especially in his Categories and other logical works.[3] Nevertheless, Aristotle is doing more than just descriptive metaphysics in Strawson's sense, because Aristotle is trying to describe the structure of reality itself.[4] This is something that Strawson does not do, and he does not seem to see this as the task of the descriptive metaphysician.

Strawson also believes that the study of language is a useful, though limited, guide to understanding and exposing our conceptual structure (xiii-xiv). Aristotle seems to agree that the study of language can help us understand our conceptual framework. Throughout his work, Aristotle pays close attention to linguistic matters, and his linguistic discussions are often intimately involved with his logical and metaphysical investigations. Aristotle's approach to metaphysics differs from Strawson's approach, however, in that Aristotle seems to believe that the study of language is useful for understanding the nature of reality, as well as the way we think and reason about it. In the Categories, for example, Aristotle opens with a discussion of the grammatical subject and predicate, which soon becomes a discussion of the subject-predicate relation that exists between substances and individuals of other categories.

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[3]Sir David Ross points this out in his Aristotle, 5th ed. (London: Methuen & Co., 1949), pp. 20-21.

[4]Ross, p. 23, and Hartman, p. 40

Even though Strawson says that the study of language cannot tell us everything that we want to know about our conceptual framework (xii-xiv), both Strawson and Aristotle seem to believe that the study of our language is at least a useful beginning in an attempt to reveal the ultimate nature of the way we think and reason about the world.

For these reasons, then, I would say that Aristotle appears to be doing some descriptive metaphysics in Strawson's sense. But Aristotle also seems to be doing more than descriptive metaphysics, because he is interested in describing the nature of reality and not just our conceptual framework.

It might be objected that even though sometimes Aristotle appears to be doing descriptive metaphysics, in fact he is not really doing this at all. His account of a human being, for example, does not appear to result in a description of our concept of a human being. We do not (and neither did Aristotle's contemporaries) think of a human being in terms of Aristotle's four causes, and we do not normally think of the soul as the actuality of a body that is potentially living. Thus, in using such concepts as the concepts of the four causes, actuality, and potentiality, Aristotle seems to be doing revisionary metaphysics, rather than descriptive metaphysics.

In response to this objection, I think that Strawson would say that the investigation of, and the use of, our

ordinary language can only take us so far into the study of our fundamental concepts. Beyond the point where ordinary terms can take us, we must use other terms. Strawson says: "Permanent relationships are described in an impermanent idiom, which reflects both the age's climate of thought and the individual philosopher's personal style of thinking" (xv). Aristotle's account of the human being is cast in terms and concepts that are different from those that we would normally use, and they are different from the terms and concepts that Strawson uses, but Strawson would say that both he and Aristotle are attempting to give an account of the same concept of a person, viz., the concept that everyone has. Both Aristotle and Strawson have found it necessary to employ a technical vocabulary in order to give more perspicuous accounts of our concept of a human being. So Aristotle's use of technical terms does not in itself mean that he is engaged in revisionary metaphysics.

I would point out, however, two further difficulties that I mentioned in the last chapter (pp. 165-66). First, if Aristotle and Strawson are describing our concept of a person in their own philosophical idioms, using their own terms, then the question could be raised whether they are describing the same concept of a person that we have. A philosopher's use of nonordinary terms to describe a concept could indicate that he is in fact describing a nonordinary concept. Second, it is not clear from what Strawson says about descriptive metaphysics how we are to

tell whether the work that is done in a philosopher's own idiomatic style is descriptive or revisionary. We may grant that some use of nonordinary concepts and terms in the account of a human being, for example, is necessary for the descriptive metaphysician. But it is difficult to specify when the use of nonordinary terms ceases to be an aid in doing descriptive metaphysics and becomes instead a piece of revisionary metaphysics. As Strawson points out, no philosopher has done purely revisionary or purely descriptive metaphysics, and perhaps some of Aristotle's work is revisionary.

B. Basic Particulars

If Aristotle is attempting to reveal the structure of our thought about the world, as Strawson claims, then one would expect Aristotle and Strawson to have at least similar, if not the same, views on the nature of our conceptual framework. In this section I will compare the concepts of the particulars that are basic in the conceptual frameworks of Aristotle and Strawson.

As I pointed out in the last chapter, for Strawson, material bodies and persons are basic particulars. The basic nature of these entities is established from the point of view of identification and reidentification (46). That is, a basic particular is such that (1) identifying references can be made to it without making identifying references to other types of particulars, and (2) identifying

references to other types of particulars cannot be made unless identifying references are made to basic particulars (28). In addition to being identifiable, basic particulars must also be reidentifiable. That is, it must be possible to identify a basic particular on one occasion as being the same particular that was identified earlier (20). Strawson maintains that these identifiability and reidentifiability criteria are necessary to our conceptual scheme, because the kind of conceptual scheme we have is based on a spatio-temporal framework of four dimensions, which consists of three-dimensional, enduring objects with reference to which we can identify particulars. Material bodies and persons are basic particulars in this framework (28-29, 45-47).

Even though Strawson is not primarily concerned with the ontological status of basic particulars, he suggests that material bodies and persons are (in some sense) ontologically primary. For example, in the "Conclusion" of Individuals he says, taking into account the results of both parts of Individuals, "we obtain perhaps, a rational account of the central position of material bodies and persons among individuals, i.e. among things in general" (256, my emphasis). In contrast with Strawson's work in Individuals, much of Aristotle's work in the area of metaphysics is devoted to a study of what exists. Because Aristotle discusses ontology, it is possible to discuss what is prior in his ontology, as well as what Strawson would say is a

fundamental concept in Aristotle's conceptual framework. I would say that all primary substances (as they are described in the Categories, Chapter 5) are ontologically prior and that some of them are also basic particulars (in Strawson's sense of 'basic particular'). In what follows, I will explain how all primary substances are ontologically prior in Aristotle's sense and how some of them are basic particulars in Strawson's sense.

In his discussion of substance in the Categories, Chapter 5, Aristotle says that "all other things are in fact either asserted of primary substances as subjects or are present in them as subjects. If, therefore, there were no primary substances, it would be impossible for anything else to exist" (2 b 4-6, trans. Creed). Thus, the existence of particulars of other categories depends on the existence of primary substances, but the existence of primary substances does not depend on the existence of any other subject, because primary substances themselves are neither present in nor said of any subject. That Aristotle retains this view of substance in his later work is evident in his discussion of substance in Metaphysics VII. Here, he says that "both separability [to chōriston] and individuality [to tode ti] seem to belong especially to substance" (1029 a 28-29). That being able to exist independently of any other subject is a sense in which primary substances are ontologically prior, according to Aristotle,

is evident in his discussion of the priority of substances. In Metaphysics VII Aristotle says: "Now there are several senses in which a thing is said to be first [to prōton]; yet substance is first in every sense . . . . For of the other categories none can exist independently, but only substance" (1028 a 31-35, trans. Ross; see also Met. 1077 b 1-8, 1019 a 1-4).

So far I have shown that for Aristotle substances are ontologically prior to the particulars of other categories. As I pointed out earlier, Strawson does not discuss the ontological status of material bodies and persons. Instead, Strawson is concerned with particulars that are basic with respect to identification and reidentification.[5] Aristotle does not explicitly discuss the issue whether primary substances are identifiable and reidentifiable in the sense in which Strawson says that basic particulars are identifiable and reidentifiable. But I think that Aristotle could say that most primary substances[6] are basic particulars with respect to identification. Primary substances certainly seem to be the type of particulars that could be picked out without picking out particulars of other categories, and it also seems that particulars of other

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[5]Professor Kotzin pointed out to me the distinction between ontological priority in Aristotle's work and basicality in Strawson's work.

[6]The exceptions are God and the intelligences that move the stars.

categories could not be picked out unless primary substances were also picked out. I would say that the reason for this is that in Aristotle's ontology particulars in categories other than the category of substance cannot exist unless substances exist. This is suggested in Metaphysics VII, 1, when Aristotle is discussing the ontological priority of substances:

> For this reason, people might wonder as to "walking," "being in good health," or "sitting down" whether any of them exist; and they might do the same with any other terms of this kind. For none of them exists on its own, or can be separated from substance; if anything, it is what is walking, or what is sitting down, or what is in good health that exists on its own. These clearly do more truly exist, since they have a definite substratum, which is the substance and the individual, as is clear in the way that we use the terms. Neither what is good nor what is sitting down can be referred to independently of a substratum. (1028 a 20-28, trans. Creed)

According to Strawson the identification of particulars involves locating them "in a unitary spatio-temporal framework of four dimensions" (28). He argues that the only objects that can constitute such a framework are those "which are, or possess, material bodies," i.e., material bodies and persons (28-29). This is why material bodies and persons are basic particulars. If, as I have suggested above, most primary substances are basic particulars in Aristotle's metaphysics, then material bodies and human beings would be basic particulars for Aristotle as they are for Strawson. Nevertheless, Aristotle's position differs from Strawson's, because Aristotle would include God and the immaterial substances that move the stars among things that are

ontologically prior. But God could not be a basic particular according to Strawson, because God does not have a material body, it is not a three-dimensional object, and hence it could not be identified in the sense of being located "in a unitary spatio-temporal framework of four dimensions."

Thus, I have shown that primary substances are ontologically prior in Aristotle's metaphysics, and that Aristotle could agree with Strawson that material bodies and persons are basic particulars with respect to identification. But even though Strawson's identifiability and reidentifiability criteria can be used to distinguish basic particulars from nonbasic particulars in Strawson's metaphysics, these criteria cannot be used to distinguish ontologically prior individuals from ontologically secondary individuals in Aristotle's metaphysics. This is because Strawson and Aristotle use different criteria for distinguishing between basic and nonbasic particulars, and ontologically prior and secondary individuals, respectively. Strawson distinguishes between basic and nonbasic particulars on the basis of identifiability and reidentifiability. Aristotle distinguishes between ontologically prior and secondary individuals on the basis of separability and individuality. The result of this difference between their views is that God and the intelligences that move the stars are ontologically prior individuals (i.e., primary

substances) for Aristotle, but not basic particulars for Strawson. Having compared Strawson's concept of a basic particular with Aristotle's concept of a primary substance, I will compare Strawson's concept of a person with Aristotle's concept of a human being next.

C. Persons

I will begin my comparison of Aristotle's and Strawson's concepts of a person by briefly recalling what their concepts are. For Aristotle, a human being is an ensouled body, and the essence of a human being is the soul as the form of the body. I also pointed out that the rational capacity is a necessary part of the essence of a human being. This is important because the rational capacity distinguishes humans from plants and other animals, and because it has important consequences for Aristotle's concept of a natural slave. For Strawson, a person is the kind of entity to which both P-predicates (implying the possession of consciousness) and M-predicates (corporeal predicates) are equally applicable.

As I have already pointed out, Strawson would say that both he and Aristotle are referring to the same concept in different terms: Aristotle in terms of 'soul', 'body', 'cause', 'actuality', and 'potentiality', and Strawson in terms of 'P-predicate', 'M-predicate', and 'basic particular'. In short, when Aristotle refers to a human being as an "embodied soul" or an "ensouled body,"

he need not be understood (and as I shall argue later, he should not be understood) as referring to two distinct entities that happen to exist together. The human being that Aristotle describes is the kind of entity to which both M- and P-predicates are ascribable. It is not the case that M-predicates are ascribed only to the body and P-predicates are ascribed only to the soul. Both kinds of predicates are ascribed to the same individual substance, viz., the individual human being. I wish only to point out here that Aristotle's description of a human being as an ensouled body does not necessarily mean that he does not have the same concept of a human being that Strawson has.

Since human beings are primary substances for Aristotle, they are basic particulars for him just as persons are for Strawson. But an essential part of Strawson's concept of a person is that it is primitive, and in comparing Aristotle's concept of the person with Strawson's it is necessary to determine whether Aristotle's concept is primitive also. According to Strawson, the concept of a person is primitive if, and only if, it cannot be explained or analyzed in terms of concepts that are any more primitive, such as the concepts of a body or of a pure consciousness (99, 101). He says that "the concept of a person is not to be analysed as that of an animated body or of an embodied anima" (99). Strawson doubts that the concept of the pure individual consciousness can exist, but he says that if the

concept does exist, then "it can exist only . . . as a secondary, non-primitive concept, which itself is to be explained, analysed, in terms of the concept of a person" (99).

At first glance, it seems that Strawson's insistence that "the concept of a person is not to be analysed as that of an animated body or of an embodied anima" would rule out Aristotle's concept of a human being as an acceptable primitive concept. Aristotle maintains that any individual substance is a compound of form and matter (Met. VII, 10, 11). And since the form and the matter of a human being are its soul and body, respectively, then a human being is an embodied soul or an ensouled body (Met. 1037 a 5-6, 28-29). If Aristotle's concept of a human being were the concept of an ensouled body, then the concept of a human being would not be primitive, but analyzable in terms of the concepts of a soul and a body. Further, if a human being were thought of as an ensouled body, then the human being would not be a basic particular in Strawson's sense of 'basic particular'. In fact, no primary substance would be a basic particular in Strawson's sense, since an individual substance (except God and the immaterial celestial intelligences) consists of form and matter.

Ignoring for now Aristotle's doctrine of the active mind, I think that Aristotle's concept of a human being is indeed primitive (in Strawson's sense) and not

analyzable in terms of the concepts of a soul and a body. The reason why Aristotle's concept of a human being is primitive, it seems to me, is that he does not see the soul and the body as two separable and independent substances which compose a human being when they exist together. As I pointed out in my discussion of Aristotle's concept of a human being in the De Anima (my Chapter II), Aristotle believes that the soul and the body are not separable in fact, though they are distinguishable in definition (De An. 413 b 28-29). To talk in Strawson's idiom, the concept of the body alone is not more primitive than the concept of a human being, because without the soul the body is not a living human body, but it is a human body in name only.[7] Furthermore, the concept of the soul is not more primitive than the concept of a human being, because Aristotle's concept of the soul is such that it does not seem possible to conceive of the human soul (except the active mind) as existing except as it exists in a living, functioning human being. Aristotle says that the soul is the actuality and the form of a body (De An. II, 1), and that "the affections [of the soul] are enmattered principles" (dēlon hoti ta pathē logoi enuloi eisin, De An. 403 a 24). Hence, being in a body is necessary for the soul's very existence.

[7] See De An. 412 b 13-413 a 3; De Part. An. 640 b 35-641 a 33; Met. 1035 b 24-25, 1036 b 30-31.

Therefore, I would say that Aristotle's concept of a human being is primitive in the sense that it is not to be analyzed in terms of the concepts of the soul and the body.

Furthermore, I would say that a human being is a basic particular (in Strawson's sense) in Aristotle's conceptual scheme, because one could not pick out an affection of the soul or some aspect of the human body unless one picked out the human being who "had" the affection of the soul or the body. In addition, human beings can be picked out without picking out some affection of the soul or a particular in any other category other than the category of substance.

Thus, I have tried to show that Aristotle's concept of a human being is primitive in Strawson's sense of 'primitive' and that a human being is a basic particular in Aristotle's conceptual scheme in Strawson's sense of 'basic particular'.

When I suggested in the preceding discussion that the soul is not a basic particular in Aristotle's conceptual scheme and that the concept of a soul is not primitive, I was concerned with all of the soul except the active mind. The doctrine of the active mind causes special difficulties because Aristotle seems to hold that the active mind can exist separately from the body (De An. 430 a 17, 23-25;

Met. 1070 a 25-27). This raises the question whether the active mind is a basic particular and whether the concept of the active mind is a primitive concept.

If the active mind were a basic particular, according to Strawson's concept of a basic particular, then the active mind would be identified in the sense of being locatable in a four-dimensional spatio-temporal framework. Strawson says that only material bodies or things which possess material bodies satisfy this requirement (28-29). But since the active mind is not itself a material body and does not possess a material body (as persons do), it is not identifiable in Strawson's sense. Consequently, the active mind is not a basic particular in Strawson's sense of 'basic particular'.

If the concept of the active mind were a primitive concept, then Aristotle's concept of a human being could be analyzed in terms of the concept of the active mind. Aristotle sometimes seems to believe that the concept of the active mind is primitive, especially when he says in the Nicomachean Ethics that reason seems to be the man (1169 a 1, 1178 a 2, 7), and when he argues in the Metaphysics that a thing is one and the same as its essence (the essence of a human being includes the thinking faculty) (VII, 6). When Strawson discusses "the full extent of the acknowledgement one is making in acknowledging the logical primitiveness of the concept of a person" (100), he says that

> There would be no question of ascribing one's own states of consciousness, or experiences, to anything, unless one also ascribed, or were ready and able to ascribe, states of consciousness, or experiences, to other individual entities of the same logical type as that thing to which one ascribes one's own states of consciousness. (100)

Further, he argues that one could not see oneself as a subject of experiences unless one could distinguish between oneself and other subjects of experiences. One difficulty with taking the concept of a pure ego as primitive is that one would not be able to distinguish between oneself and others on the basis of experiences alone. I presented in detail Strawson's argument against the primitiveness of the concept of a pure ego in the last chapter (pp. 177-78). Now, it seems to me that Aristotle's concept of the active mind would also be subject to Strawson's objection to the primitiveness of the concept of the pure ego. As I mentioned in the concluding remarks to my Chapter II, there would be no way to distinguish active minds, because Aristotle's concept of the active mind is the concept of a type of entity that is always thinking and identical with the object of thought (De An. III, 5). This would be true of all active minds, and so it would not seem possible to distinguish one's own active mind from other active minds. Consequently, the concept of a human being could not be analyzed in terms of the concept of an active mind. Therefore, it seems that Strawson's objection to the primitiveness of the concept of a pure ego also rules out Aristotle's concept of the active mind as being primitive.

As the preceding discussion shows, there are many similarities between Aristotle's conceptual scheme and Strawson's conceptual scheme. There are, however, two notable differences. First, Strawson's conceptual scheme contains two different types of basic particulars: material bodies and persons. But Aristotle's conceptual scheme contains only one type of ontologically prior thing: primary substances. Primary substances include not only material bodies and human beings, but also immaterial substances (God and the substances that move the stars). According to Strawson, the difference between persons and material bodies is that both M- and P-predicates are ascribable to persons, whereas only M-predicates are ascribable to material bodies. According to Aristotle, though, all primary substances, except God and the substances that move the stars, involve both form and matter. Different substances have different forms and different kinds of matter, but they are all equally primary substances in virtue of having some matter and some form. In the case of living organisms, the form is the soul and the matter is the body. And God and the substances that move the stars consist of form, but they are immaterial. This brings me to the second major difference I wish to note between Aristotle's conceptual scheme and Strawson's conceptual scheme. One consequence of Aristotle's view that all living things (including God and the celestial intelligences that move the

stars) have souls is that many P-predicates are ascribable not only to human beings, but also to other animals and to God and the celestial intelligences. According to Strawson, P-predicates are ascribable only to (human) persons.

D. P- and M-Predicates

For Strawson both P- and M-predicates are ascribed to a person. It is not the case that P-predicates are ascribed to a mind, which is a different type of entity from the body, to which M-predicates are ascribed. Aristotle's concept of a human being seems to be similar to Strawson's, because both psychic attributes and bodily attributes belong to the same entity. There is evidence that this is Aristotle's view in his discussion of the role of the soul in movement in De Anima 408 b 1-17. At one point, Aristotle says: "For it is perhaps better not to say that the soul pities or learns or thinks, but that the man does these by virtue of the soul [tēi psychēi]" (408 b 14-15, my emphasis). Furthermore, Aristotle's discussion of the affections (pathē) of the soul in De Anima I, 1 shows that he does not believe that all of the psychic attributes belong to a single entity, such as a pure consciousness, that is different from the body. He points out that "it seems that all the affections of the soul involve the body [meta sōmatos]--passion, gentleness, fear, confidence, and, further, joy and both loving and hating; for at the same time as these the body is affected in a certain way" (De An. 403 a 16-17,

trans. Hamlyn).[8] As I explained in my Chapter II, this passage and others indicate that Aristotle is not an identity materialist, because his view is not that certain psychic affections are nothing more than certain bodily affections. In my discussion of the question whether Aristotle was a materialist in Chapter II, I pointed out that when Aristotle says that the psychic affections are meta sōmatos, his view seems to be that, while psychic affections (except those of the thinking faculty) in fact always exist in some part of the body, the psychic affections are not the same things as bodily affections. Psychic affections and bodily affections are distinguishable in definition and description (413 b 26-29), and their relation is that of form to matter.

Hence, for both Aristotle and Strawson the human being is the subject to which both P- and M-predicates are ascribed. Nevertheless, there is a difference in their treatments of P-predicates. Aristotle attempts to explain the existence of some P-predicates as having a physical basis. Thus, the basis for the existence of anger, for example, is movement in a certain body or in a certain part of a body. The explanation of anger, though, must involve

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[8]The thinking faculty, however, seems to be an exception (403 a 8-10), because Aristotle suggests that it is different from the rest of the soul (413 b 24-27) and that it is not mixed with the body (429 a 25, 430 a 17). I discussed the nature of the thinking faculty and its difference from the rest of the soul in my Chapter II.

an account not only of the matter that is a condition for its existence, but also of the form of a certain kind of matter, of the efficient cause of the movement in this matter, and of the end or purpose of the movement. Since Strawson is primarily concerned with exposing our conceptual scheme in Individuals, he does not discuss the ontological ground of P-predicates. Nevertheless, his discussion of P-predicates suggests that, according to our conceptual scheme, the ground for the existence of P-predicates is a person, rather than a body or a pure consciousness. The existence of P-predicates depends on the existence of a person.

There is also a difference in Strawson's and Aristotle's concepts of M-predicates.[9] As I explained in the last chapter, according to Strawson, M-predicates are predicates "which are also properly applied to material bodies to which we would not dream of applying predicates ascribing states of consciousness" (100). M-predicates include predicates ascribing physical characteristics (height, color, shape, weight) and physical positions (83). I think that Aristotle certainly would include predicates ascribing physical characteristics and physical positions among M-predicates in his conceptual framework. Nevertheless, I think that

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[9] I owe to Professor Kotzin the suggestion that there is a difference between Strawson's and Aristotle's concepts of M-predicates.

Aristotle would include some predicates that Strawson would not seem to include. Predicates ascribing potentiality and actuality would be examples of M-predicates in Aristotle's conceptual framework, but probably not in Strawson's conceptual framework. The concepts of potentiality and actuality are important to Aristotle, because they help him explain change. Consequently, even though there are similarities between Strawson's and Aristotle's concepts of P- and M-predicates, there are also some fundamental differences between them.

What Strawson does explain more fully than Aristotle explains is the basis upon which we ascribe P-predicates to persons. Indeed, explaining this basis is one of Strawson's main goals in "Persons." He says that P-predicates are ascribed to others on the basis of their behavior, and that some P-predicates are ascribed to oneself not on this basis (102-7). With respect to the predicates describing one's character, at least, I think that Aristotle would agree with Strawson. In discussing moral virtue Aristotle is interested in explaining how one <u>becomes</u> virtuous, and one condition for becoming virtuous is that one performs virtuous actions (<u>ho pratton</u>) (<u>NE</u> II, 4). But it is clear from this discussion of moral virtue that he would say that a person was virtuous on the basis of the person's actions over a period of time. To see the movements of other human beings as actions involves seeing them as movements of the

same kind as one's own and as involving intentions and goal-directed behavior. This agrees with Strawson's explanation of what it is in our experiences that gives us the concept of a person that we have and which he is trying to articulate (108-9). Furthermore, in his discussion of happiness Aristotle says that "we have practically defined happiness as a sort of good life and good action [to eu prattein]" (1098 b 21, trans. Ross). It appears, then, that Aristotle would agree that at least the P-predicates that are moral predicates are ascribed to persons on the basis of their behavior. One advantage that Strawson's account of the concept of a person has over Aristotle's account is that in explaining the first- and third-person ascriptive uses of P-predicates, Strawson appreciates and tries to solve the problem how one can have nonobservational knowledge of oneself.[10]

I have explained that neither Aristotle nor Strawson holds that mentalistic attributes are reducible to purely bodily attributes. I have also explained in the last chapter that Strawson would not say that P-predicate expressions are reducible to M-predicate expressions. I think that Aristotle would agree, because the concept of a psychic attribute involves the concepts of the formal, final, and

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[10]This advantage of Strawson's position was suggested to me by Professor George C. Kerner.

efficient causes, and not just the concept of the material cause (De An. 403 a 25-27).

E. An Objection to Strawson

One objection that has been raised against Strawson's distinguishing persons from bodies on the grounds that both M- and P-predicates are ascribable to persons is that this does not adequately account for the difference between persons and animals.

I have already given (in Chapter IV) the objection raised by Roland Puccetti that Strawson's concept of a person is too broad because some P-predicates can be ascribed to animals (at least some of which, presumably, Puccetti does not regard as persons). A similar objection has been raised by Bernard Williams in an article titled, "Are Persons Bodies?" (66).[11] According to Williams, if we assume that Strawson means that persons are distinguished from bodies on the grounds that any P-predicate is ascribable to a person, while no P-predicate is ascribable to a body, then it seems that we must recognize things to which M-predicates and some P-predicates are ascribable, viz., animals. Williams takes this result to reveal a serious difficulty for Strawson's position, because the concept of a person is based on the ascription of these two kinds of predicate.

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[11] Chapter 5 in Problems of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973). Page references to Williams's work will be given in the text.

If there are some things to which M-predicates and some P-predicates are ascribable, then there would seem to be at least one other primitive concept, according to Williams. Williams seems to be referring here to the concept of an animal, which involves the ascription of some P-predicates rather than any P-predicate.

Williams argues that this difficulty arises from a certain general feature of Strawson's theory:

> Neither Strawson nor Descartes shows much disposition to relate persons to any classification of living things; but it can scarcely be an insignificant fact that our paradigm (to put it mildly) of a person is a human being, and human beings form a sub-class of living things. The neglect of the continuity of our ascriptions of predicates to human beings and to other animals is bound to produce an artificial (and highly Cartesian) dichotomy between persons and everything else.[12]

Williams has not worked out fully the difficulty which the question of the class of animals raises for Strawson, and I would like to explore this problem in more detail here. Since Strawson is doing descriptive metaphysics in Individuals, he is describing our concept of a person in

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[12]Strawson says that "we sometimes refer identifyingly to the particular experiences of animals" (31), and he seems willing to include the class of animals along with the class of persons in the type of particulars upon which the class of "private particulars" (sensations, mental events, sense data) is dependent with respect to identification. He does not, however, discuss the class of animals in any more detail. Nevertheless, Strawson's including the class of animals with the class of persons in the type of particulars that are identifiability-independent does not avoid Puccetti's objection that Strawson's concept of a person is too broad because it applies to animals.

Chapter III. Further, since he says that P-predicates "imply the possession of consciousness on the part of that to which they are ascribed" (101), and since many animals are conscious, at least to the extent that they have experiences and are aware of things in their environment, then we can truly ascribe many P-predicates to these animals.[13] Nevertheless, our concept of a person is applied primarily to human beings. Thus, Strawson has not given an adequate description of our concept of a person. If we were to "broaden" our concept of a person in order to include conscious animals (or even only very cognitively sophisticated animals, such as chimpanzees), then we would be doing revisionary metaphysics. If animals are not persons, it will not do to place them in the category of mere material bodies, because we see them as being fundamentally different from material bodies. Even relatively simple animals, such as insects or worms, which we might not say are conscious (at least in the sense in which human beings are conscious), are significantly different from mere material bodies. It is not just that their bodily structures are different from the structures of mere material bodies, but that they exhibit goal-directed behavior, which mere material bodies do not exhibit. Perhaps Strawson should say that our concept

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[13] I recognize that we do not have a completely satisfactory definition of 'consciousness', but all I need to do here is rely on a rough notion of what consciousness is.

of a person is such that certain kinds of P-predicates are ascribable only to persons. Such a P-predicate might be 'is able to ascribe P-predicates to itself and to others'.[14]

It seems to me a virtue of Aristotle's account of a human being that it does not encounter these difficulties. Since the basic particulars for Aristotle are primary substances, which include all living and nonliving things, and since our concept of an individual substance involves the concepts of the four causes that are jointly responsible for making the existing individual what it is, he has provided a conceptual scheme that accounts for the "place" that each individual occupies relative to the others in the organic-inorganic kingdom. I would say that Aristotle's conceptual scheme accounts for the "place" of each individual more effectively than Strawson's P- and M-predicates do. For Aristotle individual substances (except God and the substances that move the stars) consist of matter and form (and hence, they are ontologically equal in this respect), and it is the various kinds of matter and the various ways in which the forms are manifest in the matter that distinguish human beings, animals, plants, and inanimate bodies. Thus, in response to Williams's objection to Strawson's "artificial (and highly Cartesian) dichotomy

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[14]Bernard Williams comes to the same conclusion in "Strawson On Individuals," Chapter 7 of Problems of the Self, pp. 122-23.

between persons and everything else," I would point out that Aristotle has given us a way to distinguish various kinds of substances that is more "natural," because it shows us how human beings are different from all other substances and yet closely related to all other substances. If one criterion for the success of a descriptive metaphysical account of our concept of a person is the extent to which the account makes explicit much of what is implicit and unrecognized in our concept, while at the same time leaving us with an account that we can recognize as being an account of our actual concept of a person, then I would say that Aristotle's account has succeeded in this more than Strawson's account has.

F. Do the Objections to Strawson Also Apply to Aristotle?

Jerome Shaffer objected to Strawson's concept of a person on the grounds that making persons fundamentally different from material bodies leads to the absurd consequence that the laws of nature do not apply to persons.

Aristotle's concept of a human being is not open to this objection because human beings are not fundamentally different from material bodies in the way that Strawson's persons are fundamentally different from material bodies. I think that Aristotle would say that human beings have a material aspect that is just as susceptible to the laws of nature as any inanimate body is. The difference between

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7. Do the Objections to Strawson Also Apply to Aristotle?

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human beings and material bodies, though, can be explained in the following ways: human beings have bodies that are composed of different matter (viz., flesh and bone) from the matter of which inanimate bodies are composed; human bodies have organs and a structure that is different from the structure of inanimate bodies; and human beings have different formal, final, and efficient causes from inanimate bodies. Further, human beings are different from many other organisms in having bodies that are composed of flesh and bone, rather than wood or scales, for example. Human beings are also different from other organisms in having a different essence. Finally, because they have material bodies, human beings are different from God and the immaterial substances that move the stars. In this way, then, Aristotle can avoid Shaffer's objection and still maintain that human beings are different in some respects from all other primary substances.

In Chapter IV, I raised Joseph Margolis's objection that Strawson has not successfully shown that the concept of a person is <u>not</u> reducible to the concept of a material body, instead of being fundamentally different from the concept of a material body. Does this objection apply to Aristotle's concept of a human being?

If we consider the active mind to be an essential part of a human being, and yet a part that is not "mixed" with the body and capable of existing in separation from

the body, then Aristotle seems to be a dualist. In this case, the concept of a human being would not be completely reducible to the concept of a body.

If the active mind is not separable from the body, then the consequence of Aristotle's position would not be that the human being is in fact the same thing as a certain material body. I argued in Chapter II (sec. C. 2) that Aristotle was not an identity materialist, because even though the soul always exists in a body in fact, the soul is distinguishable from the body in definition, description, and in being. In short, this means that a human being is different from a marble statue not only in the matter of which the human being consists, in having organs, and in the complexity of its structure. But a living human being is different from a mere material body because of its soul, i.e., because of its formal, final, and efficient causes. These are inseparable aspects of the living body and they enable it to develop and function in a way that makes it different from mere material bodies.

There is also a difference between Aristotle's concept of a human being and his concept of a mere material body. It is because of this difference that the concept of a human being cannot be reduced to the concept of a mere material body. The concept of a human being involves the concepts of the formal, final, and efficient causes. And because the role of these concepts in the concept of a

human being is different from the role of the concepts of the formal, final, and efficient causes in the concept of a material body, the concept of a human being cannot be reduced to the concept of a mere material body. Consequently, even if the thinking faculty of the soul is inseparable from the body, the concept of a human being is not reducible to the concept of a material body in Aristotle's conceptual scheme.

G. Summary and Conclusion

This comparison of Aristotle and Strawson has shown that there are similarities in their concepts of a person. Both realize that the concept of a person is philosophically important enough and problematic enough to be explained; Aristotle often seems to be doing descriptive metaphysics, as Strawson says; and both agree that a person is a basic particular. There are, nevertheless, important differences. Strawson's conceptual scheme involves two types of basic particulars (material bodies and persons), and Aristotle's involves only one type of basic particular (primary substances). I have also tried to show that Aristotle's conceptual scheme can help us explain the ontological position of human beings relative to the ontological positions of other animals and inanimate bodies more effectively than Strawson's conceptual scheme can. Finally, I have shown that Aristotle's theory avoids some of the criticisms to which Strawson's theory is susceptible.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

I have attempted to achieve two primary goals in this dissertation. First, I have attempted to uncover Aristotle's theory of a human being. Among the results of this endeavor were that the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a human being is an ensouled body and that the necessary and sufficient condition for applying the concept of a human being to an individual thing is that it have the essence or form of a human being, which includes rationality. The second primary goal of this dissertation was to compare Aristotle's theory of a human being with Strawson's theory of a person. Among the results of this comparison were that Aristotle seems to be doing some descriptive metaphysics, as Strawson claims that Aristotle is, and that Strawson's argument against the primacy of the concept of a pure ego applies to Aristotle's concept of the active mind. There are, however, some noteworthy differences between Aristotle's theory of a human being and Strawson's theory of a person.

I believe that the results of this study of Aristotle's and Strawson's theories of a person indicate some points that should be taken into account when one attempts to work

out in detail a concept of a person. I will cite three of these points here. First, an adequate concept of a person should take into account the inner, personal aspect of a person. This would require an account of the self and of self-consciousness. I have pointed out that this is missing from Aristotle's account of a human being and that one virtue of Strawson's account of a person is that he attempted to account for the nonobservational knowledge that one can have of oneself.

Second, I would say that any adequate concept of a person that attempts to preserve our ordinary idea of a person should be formulated in a way that does not include animals as persons. I pointed out that one defect in Strawson's concept of a person was that it does include animals as persons, because we apply some P-predicates to animals. Further, I would say that Aristotle's concept of a human being avoids this problem, because part of the essence of a human being is rationality, and no other animal has rationality.

Third, I would say that a complete theory of a person should account for the similarities as well as the differences between persons and other living organisms. This is especially important not only because some other animals are biologically similar to human beings, but also because some animals seem to have intellectual capacities to some degree. It might be useful to have a theory of a person

that allowed us to distinguish between persons and other kinds of intelligent animals. I have argued that Aristotle's account of a human being is more successful than Strawson's account of a person in explaining the similarities and the differences between persons and other animals.

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