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Michigan Stave m ‘ a University ' f This is to certify that the thesis entitled AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF TWO PHILOSOPHICALLY DERIVED DIMENSIONS OF ADVICE presented by Keith Eugene Adler has been accepted towards fulfillment ‘ of the requirements for __2h.D. _degeekLCnmmunication Major professor Date Au ust 9 1978 0-7 639 A) , l %’ "' MAGICZ — ' ‘ ” ‘ Q t AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF TWO PHILOSOPHICALLY DERIVED DIMENSIONS OF ADVICE BY Keith Eugene Adler A DISSERTATION Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Communication 1978 6/06 77/ ABSTRACT AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF TWO PHILOSOPHICALLY DERIVED DIMENSIONS OF ADVICE BY Keith Eugene Adler Three different advice processes were distinguished, advice-seeking, solicited and unsolicited advice-giving. These processes were shown to be related to three areas of communication research, information seeking, altruistic behavior, and interpersonal influence, respectively. It was argued that the commonality between the processes was the result of similarities in message content. Therefore, advice referred to the content of advice messages. The problem in studying the content of advice messages was an extreme lack of empirical social science literature. To compensate for this deficiency, an alternative method of investigation was pursued. Dimensions of advice were extracted from philOSOphical studies of moral and prudential advice. From this literature primarily related to noncog- nitivist and good reasons phiIOSOphers, two dimensions were extracted, a prescriptive and an evaluative dimension. Indi- cators for the two dimensions were derived from the philo- SOphical investigations. The dimensionality of advice was tested by two types of confirmatory factor analysis. The two types were ortho- gonal factor analysis, and maximum likelihood factor analysis. Keith Eugene Adler Maximum likelihood factor analysis was considered the strong test of dimensionality, since a Chi-square statistic could be calculated to test the dimensions. Orthogonal factor analysis required inSpection of the factor loadings as evidence for the proposed relationships. Chi-square values for the original model and several alternatives ranged between probability levels of 0.10 and 0.20. Therefore, the model was rejected in the strong test. Orthogonal and standard oblique factor analytic methods indicated that the dimensions were well represented. Diag- nostic investigations suggested that the reference variable for the prescriptive factor was too highly correlated with a criterion variable from the evaluative factor. Specific- ity of instructions, the reference variable, was correlated with amount of information, a criterion variable for the evaluative factor. Correlations between linguistic char- acteristics of advice and the dimensions were not found to be significant. Based on the clear differentiation of factors in the traditional factor analysis and diagnostic tests, two recom— mendations were made. Either recommendation represented a possible alternative for future research. A different ref- erence variable could be selected and tested. Or, the advice instrument could be used by analyzing data with orthogonal factor analytic techniques. Future research concerning the situational factors surrounding the advice situations was also suggested. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I wish to express my appreciation and gratitude to my loving and patient wife, Carol, for her support, encour— agement, and sacrifices. Several faculty members deserve special thanks for the important part they have played in my education. Donald Cushman has been instrumental in teaching me what kind of questions are most fundamental. Gerald Miller has been helpful in directing the dissertation, offering needed advice, and serving as a model of profession- al achievement. My other guidance committee members, Erwin Bettinghaus, Hal Hepler, and Howard Teitelbaum also deserve praise for their contributions of time and effort to my studies. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter Page I THE PHILOSOPHICAL MODEL OF ADVICE . . . 1 Statement of the Problem. . . . 5 Ethics and Advice . . . . . 7 Noncognitivist Conceptions of Advice . 15 Charles L. Stevenson . . . . 17 R. M. Hare. . . . . . 20 P. H. Nowell— Smith. . . . . 25 Good Reasons and Advice. . . . . 28 W. D. Falk. . . . . . . 32 Paul W. Taylor. . . . . . 34 David P. Gauthier . . . 37 Advice from the Social Scientific Perspective . . . . . . 41 The Dimensionality of Advice . . . 44 II THE EMPIRICAL MODEL OF ADVICE AND ITS TEST . 50 The Operational Model of Advice . . 51 Operational method. . . . . 52 Reference variables . . . . 54 Criterion variables . . . 55 Operational model of advice . . 57 Methods and Procedures . . . . 59 Sample. . . . . . . . 59 Stimulus . . . . 59 Administration of the test instrument . . . . . . 61 Experimental Control and Validation . 63 Reliability . . . . . . 63 Validity . . . . . . . 64 Linguistic analysis . . . . 65 iii Chapter III RESULTS AND DISCUSSION . . . . . Sample adequacy. . Maximum likelihood test of the advice dimensions Reliability. . . Validity . Linguistic analysis. IV RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH The Operational Issues . . Relational Studies of Advice . . Advice- seeking . . . Solicited advice-giving. Unsolicited advice-giving Conclusion APPENDICES . . . . . . . . A - Pretest Means and Standard Deviations for Original Items . . B - Structural Equations for the Empirical Model of Advice, Including the Measurement Model . . C - Final Test Instrument — Validity Subsample . . . REFERENCES . . . . iv Page 68 68 69 83 83 89 94 94 98 99 101 102 103 104 104 107 108 124 Table 10 11 LIST OF TABLES VARIMAX rotated factor matrix for orthogonal factor analysis of advice variables . . . . . . . OBLIQUE rotated factor matrix for oblique factor rotation of the advice variables . . . . . . Pearson correlations for the advice variables by prescription and evaluation . . . . . . . Mean validity responses for the three different advice situations. . . Pearson correlations between the two divergent variables and predicted diverging variables. . . . . Pearson correlations between the two convergent variables and predicted converging variables . . . . Correlations between the total number of prescriptive and evaluative clauses in advice and other advice variables Correlations between total number of prescriptive and evaluative terms in advice, and other advice variables . Pretest means and standard deviations for original items . . . . . Means and standard deviations for final instrument items . . . . Intercorrelation matrix of the original test items . . . . V Page 79 80 82 85 87 88 91 93 104 105 106 Figure LIST OF FIGURES The operational model of advice with measurement model. Two factors are posited, prescription (El) and evaluation (52) . . . . . . Maximum likelihood estimates for the parameters of the operational advice model. The advice model without the variable (y ) o o o o o o o 3 The operational model of advice without the variable (y6) . . . . . . The operational model of advice without the variable (y3), and variable (y6) . Symbol reference . . . . . . vi Page 58 70 73 75 76 107 CHAPTER I THE PHILOSOPHICAL MODEL OF ADVICE If ordinary usage was an index of scientific knowl- edge about constructs, then advice would be one of the most clearly understood constructs in communication. Whether it's received from a bookie, a co-worker, a lover or spouse, no other type of communication holds such power for the giver or such comfort for the receiver as advice. For the perpetual advice-seeker the next fix is as near as tomorrow's gossip column. For the habitual advice-giver every person on the street is a potential victim. But unfortunately, a scientific understanding of the advice processes has eluded philosophers and communication researchers for some time. Part of the confusion is due to the complex normative forces which surround advice situations. Societal norms often dictate which topics can be talked about, and which cannot. Other rules determine how advice can be given. Sometimes advice must be asked for by the advice-seeker. At other times, advice can be offered without solicitation. Manipulative communicators have been known to use the norms of advice-giving as a disguise for their persuasive attempts. The success of these attempts, and the effective use of l 2 advice norms, is heavily influenced by the interpersonal relationship between advice-giver and advisee. It is through this interpersonal relationship that advice gains importance for the interpersonal communication researcher. In addition to the interpersonal relationship between adviser and advisee, there are certain Characteristics of advice which closely resemble two recent definitions of in- terpersonal communication. Gauthier (1963) suggested that advice-giving required an adviser to help an advisee solve a problem by offering judgmental information which is cast from the advisee's perspective. This other-orientation is evident in definitions of interpersonal communication which have been posited by Miller and Steinberg (1975), and Cushman and Craig (1976). Miller and Steinberg suggested that interpersonal communication occurred when the source of a message based predictions about the receiver on psychological data. Psycho- logical data was acquired by differentiating the idiosyncra- cies of an individual receiver from normative cultural and sociological expectations. Cushman and Craig characterized interpersonal communication as those situations where the source of a message was able to take the role of the receiver when constructing messages. The final stage of role—taking [synesic] represented the most SOphisticated level of infor- mation discrimination by the source of the message. All three definitions have implied a high degree of social per- ception skill by the source of the message. This skill is not unlike traditional conceptions of empathy (Dymond, 1949). 3 By virtue of the similarities between advice and interpersonal communication, a preliminary examination of advice could be justified. But, justification would not be complete unless advice could be related to other relevant constructs in human communication research. In order to make these connections, the processes and content of advice need to be distinguished more carefully. There are two advice processes--advice-seeking and advice-giving. Advice can be given under two conditions, with and without solici— tation. The content of advice refers to the type of message content in an advice message. For convenience, the term "advice" will signify message content, rather than process in this paper. Theoretical connections between the two advice pro- cesses and three separate areas of communication research could be developed. Advice-seeking could be related to types of information-seeking, which have been described by Chaffee and McLeod (1973). Solicited advice-giving appears to be similar in situational and interactional characteristics to those behaviors which have been labeled "altruistic" by social psychologists (Berkowitz & Friedman, 1967; Isen & Levin, 1972; Schwartz, 1976). Recipients of advice and a1- truism may possess a similar dependency upon the altruist or adviser. Unsolicited advice—giving, sometimes called exhortation by philosophers, most closely resembles persua- sion. It is through this resemblance that unsolicited advice- 4 giving might provide insight into such diverse areas as, significant other influence (Haller, Woelfel, & Fink, 1968), negative effects of advice in counseling (Koehler, 1953), and word-of—mouth advertising (Arndt, 1967). In order for the advice processes to be scientifically interesting, they must maintain a unique characteristic which separates them from these other social processes. For example, if advice- seeking was identical to information-seeking, there would be no need to study advice-seeking separately. Similarly, there would be no reason to distinguish unsolicited advice— giving from persuasion if the two concepts were identical. This dissertation will assert that the primary differ— ence between the advice processes and the social processes described above is the content of the messages that are ex- changed. In other words, advice is something different than information or persuasion. The assertion would be justified by an ordinary language philosopher, like J. L. Austin, through the suggestion that the mere presence of "advice" in language is indicative of its unique function (Furberg, 1963). But, instead of adOpting the ordinary language justification for advice, an empirical demonstration of the uniqueness of advice will be attempted. Therefore, the central purpose of this dissertation will be an explication and test of the di- mensions of advice. Of course, the examination of advice must consider its relationship to information and persuasion. This construct explication is a necessary prerequisite for 5 subsequent empirical analyses for two important reasons. First, if there are no differences between advice, informa- tion, and persuasion, further studies would be futile, since the separation of behavioral effects from each source of influence would be impossible. Second, once the dimensions of advice are explicated, more control of experimental man- ipulations of advice would be possible. This refined con- trol would facilitate scientific explanations of the advice processes and other social processes to which advice is related. Statement of the Problem Traditionally, an empirical explication of advice would be performed in the following manner. The researcher would gather all of the empirical research findings about advice, then construct a "model" or characteristics of advice based on consistencies across experimental settings. An empirical test of the model, or of the hypothesized char- acteristics would follow. But, this traditional approach is untenable for advice, since most of the empirical research has failed to distinguish between information and advice. Both constructs have been considered equivalent. Because of this shortcoming, the empirical literature will only be of secondary importance in the examination of advice message content. An empirical purist faced with this lack of re- search data might engage in an intensive research program to elicit dimensions from a community of individuals. 6 Through in-depth interviews, segregation of relevant char- acteristics, factor analysis and testing, the empiricist could develop an instrument to measure characteristics of advice. While this approach could easily be justified, it requires an assumption that the dimensions are elicitable and known by a community. There is a third alternative which appears to be more expedient for the study of advice. The alternative is to deveIOp a theoretical model of advice, based on dialectical investigations by philosophers, which can be subjected to an empirical test. There are in- herent advantages to this approach for advice. Advice has been a central object of interest and debate for ethical philosophers during several periods of history. As a result of these interchanges and reconceptualizations, advice was more precisely analyzed by the philOSOphers than it was by the more recent social scientists. To the extent that phi— 1050phical distinctions were based upon empirical reality, they should be equally verifiable in an empirical setting today. In addition, much of the attention directed toward advice by the phiIOSOphers has dealt with tOpics of special interest to communication researchers, e.g. how was advice different from information and persuasion? Pragmatically, the philosophical/empirical alternative shortens the research procedure by constructing theoretical propositions from dia- lectical, rather than empirical, arguments. If confirmed, the facilitative role of dialectical argument for empirical 7 research would be suggested for situations with little empirical data. Also, the approach strengthens philosoph- ical distinctions by providing empirical support. In a sense, the combination of phiIOSOphical and empirical method maximizes the strengths of each method. The sequential dia- logue about advice in the philOSOphical literature imposes an additional requirement on this analysis. The requirement is for the provision of an ethical framework which will show the relationship between advice and ethics, and which can be used to locate the various philosophical positions. This discussion and framework will be provided in the next section of this paper. Ethics and Advice Advice has been of special interest to ethical phi- loSOphers because of its potential for establishing a link between two major types of ethical inquiry. The two types, theoretical and normative, can best be illustrated by exam- ining the kind of questions asked by each. For the theo- retical ethicist, a fundamental question has been, "What are the criteria of goodness that peOple apply in making value- judgments?" With this question as the starting point, the theoretical ethicists have constructed various theories of morality and moral reasoning. The normative ethicist has been more interested in question like, "Using general moral principles, how does an actor or individual decide what to do in a given situation?" Normative ethicists, therefore, 8 have been concerned with determining the most correct be- haviors for specific societal conflict problems. For ex— ample, the determination of whether or not a life-support machine should be turned off for comatose accident victims would be a typical topic of discussion for the normative ethicist. Discussions of advice have intersected both theo— retical and normative issues. However, for this investiga- tion theoretical ethics, or metaethics, will be most useful because the theorists have focused on the nature of advice. The important tie between advice and theoretical ethics has been through the value-judgments and justification in advice. Metaethicists have argued that examination of judgments and justifications would provide insight into the criteria used to make the judgments, hopefully these criteria would be ultimate moral principles. In order to investigate moral reasoning in this manner, the philosophers had to make an important assumption. The assumption was that arguments, consisting of moral claims, judgments, and justifications, could be interpersonally validated. In other words, there had to be publicly knowable criteria for the evaluation of moral arguments. Because of the requirement for "objective" criteria for the evaluation of moral claims, these philos— ophers have been called objectivists. At least three other positions on justification have been identified--relativism, skepticism, and subjectivism. Relativists argued that pro- cedures for determining which of two or more moral judgments 9 were justified did not exist. Skepticists argued that it was impossible to say with justification that something was good or bad, wrong or right. Subjectivist positions have been more diverse, but have generally agreed that the truth or falsity of moral arguments was based on interpersonal or cultural idiosyncracies. All three opposing positions suf- fered a common problem, which was frequently acknowledged by Kant (1875/1948). The problem was that without objectively justified moral reasoning normative ethics was an impossi- bility. Since intersubjective verification has been con- sidered an important criterion for empirical science, empirical examination of advice logically entails the objec- tivist position. Objectivists argued that there were four necessary conditions for moral judgments and discourse. Moral dis- course had to be universal, autonomous, objective, and a form of practical discourse. Universality meant relevantly similar persons in relevantly similar situations would make similar moral judgments. Of course, several discussions have questioned the meaning of "relevantly similar." Autonomy was a weaker requirement, since some Objectivists doubted its necessity. The condition of autonomy required that normative statements, e.g. "You should do x," not be derivable from factual statements. Two types of objectivist, the naturalist and intuitionist, did not accept autonomy as a necessary re— quirement for moral discourse. The reason for this rejection 10 will be evident when the philosophical positions are arrayed according to their stance on the status of moral facts. Ob- jectivity required moral discourse to have a "publicly de- terminable procedure in which rational men could come to accept" moral judgments as valid (Abelson & Nielsen, 1967, p. 126). As a form of practical discourse, moral statements had to be action—guiding, rather than theoretical. In other words, moral statements had to tell people what to do, rather than describe certain conditions or events. The four types of metaethical theory to be described in the following para— graphs will be shown to vary in the extent to which they have met the required conditions for moral judgments. In addition, the relationship of empirical and moral facts to the theories has been an important distinguishing factor. The four types of theory, which will be important for the discussion of advice, are naturalistic, intuitive, non— cognitive, and "good reasons" theories. Most of the dis- cussions of advice have emerged from the noncognitive and "good reasons" positions. However, an understanding of the naturalist and intuitionist positions will provide a useful contrast for outlining other philoSOphical approaches. All of the advice philoSOphers rejected naturalism as an approach to morality. Naturalists believed that moral judgments were a type of empirical judgment; or, that moral statements could be reduced to statements with no moral terms. This reduction was possible because the naturalists held that 11 there were moral facts, and that moral terms represented empirically measurable properties. Because these moral facts were empirical, observers could verify the presence of the properties; hence, they could test the truth or falsity of moral statements. The strong dependence upon empirical ob- servation guaranteed that the criteria of universality and objectivity were achieved by the naturalists. However, a serious flaw for the naturalists was the status of moral statements as practical discourse. This re— quirement was not achieved because of the property-ascribing nature of moral statements. Since the statements were prop— erty—ascribing, they described what the case was, not what the case should be. As such, the statements denied the pre- scriptive nature of practical discourse. As noted earlier, the naturalists rejected the requirement of autonomy for moral statements. This rejection was definitionally required be- cause moral and empirical statements were equivalent. G. E. Moore, in Principia Ethica (1903), seriously challenged the equivalency of moral and empirical terms in his famous "open— question argument." He suggested that if, after you had named a moral term (K), you could sensibly ask if (K) was good, right, or obligatory; then moral and empirical terms were not equivalent. Debate and counter—debate since Moore's attack on the "naturalistic fallacy" has reached a consensual agree- ment that the argument was a serious consideration, but not fatal to the naturalist position. It should be noted that, 12 if advice was cast from the naturalist position, an advisee would ask an adviser to state the "empirical facts" of a situation. Advice would be a description of empirically measurable properties. Intuitionists, like the naturalists, also believed in the existence of moral facts. However, the nature and acqui- sition of these facts was quite different. Instead of rely- ing on empirical facts, the intuitionists argued that moral facts were knowledge of what was good or obligatory, and that knowledge was intuited by all men. Because all men were capable of this intuition, universality was guaranteed. To the extent that moral facts were universal, an argument for objectivity could have been made. Practically, it would have been difficult to provide evidence of intersubjective veri- fication as a result of generalized intuition. The requirement for autonomy in moral discourse was achieved by the intuitionists through the conception of primitive ethical terms. Universality could be questioned on the basis of these primitive terms. Philosophers have used several different primitive ethical terms, including "good," "right," and others. Certainly, universal intuition would seem to guarantee selection of an identical primitive term by all phiIOSOphers. Intuitionism, like naturalism, failed to preserve the action-guiding nature of moral discourse. Since both types of ethical theory established moral terms as symbols for 13 properties, moral statements remained theoretical rather than prescriptive. Therefore, intuitionists fell prey to the same problems as the naturalists, e.g. bridging the is/ ought gulf in philosophy (Abelson & Nielsen, 1967). It should be noticed that if advice was cast from the intuitionist position, the advisee would be asking for intuited feelings of what was good or obligatory. Advice would be the intuited moral facts. The existence of moral facts was denied by the non— cognitivists. They did not believe that moral conflicts could be resolved through empirical observation or intuited knowl- edge. Instead, noncognitivists were especially interested in a functional analysis of moral discourse. Therefore, an emphasis was placed on the evaluative and prescriptive nature of moral language. Fundamental moral claims for the noncog- nitivists were expressions of attitude, decisions of principle, or declarations of intention. Because there was no "moral knowledge," per se, the requirements for universality and objectivity were less adequately achieved. Individual philos- ophers in the noncognitivist tradition developed compensatory mechanisms to insure universality and objectivity. In most cases, these philoSOphers required moral utterances to be generalizable decisions, resolutions, or subscriptions. This definitional was used to insure universality. The success of the mechanisms to insure universality has been questioned by several critics. As a result, some noncognitivists have been 14 labeled subjectivists or neosubjectivists. Since the noncognitivists had a more flexible concep- tion of language, the requirements that moral statements be practical and autonomous were guaranteed. For the noncog- nitivist, moral language was more than an ascription of names to natural and nonnatural properties. Prescriptive and eval- uative terms could be applied to anything commendable. Therefore, detailed analysis of the functions of language seemed to be the most profitable type of inquiry. The "good reasons" approach to metaethics was an at- tempt to refocus ethical inquiry. Instead of investigating the nature of moral terms and statements, the "good reasons" philosophers were interested in the facts used to support moral arguments. They argued, from the later Wittgenstein, that the presence of strong cultural rules provided criteria for choice between conflicting moral judgments. Because the cultural rules were known by a language community, the moral reasoning processes could be verified. Hence, both objec- tivity and universality were strengthened. Since the "good reasons" approach preserved the evaluative and prescriptive functions of moral language, the requirements for practical discourse and autonomy were preserved. The position was not without flaws, however. Individual weaknesses in this ap— proach will be discussed when the positions of individual philosophers have been arrayed. 15 In general, the advice philosophers to be described in this dissertation have taken similar positions regarding naturalism and the characteristics of moral language. They agreed with Moore that moral statements could not be derived from statements of fact. Because actors were free to make individual decisions, no moral choice or question of value could ever be guaranteed by logical rules. Moral language was more flexible than previously interpreted by naturalists and intuitionists. Instead of ascribing names to properties, moral language was used to evaluate or prescribe. In their prescriptive or evaluative role, moral terms could be used to commend or condemn anything. In order to insure a degree of universality, moral utterances were defined as generaliz— able decisions, resolutions, or subscriptions (Abelson & Nielsen, 1967). The next section of this dissertation will attempt to extract dimensions of advice from the works of several non— cognitivist and good reasons" philosophers. Fortunately, the requirements for scientific inquiry and necessary con- ditions for moral judgments, as established by these philos— ophers, have provided a compatible basis for empirical research. Noncognitivist Conceptions of Advice Before examining the works of three noncognitivists-- Stevenson, Hare, and Nowell-Smith--further clarification of the relationship between moral judgments and advice should 16 be provided. When moral judgments are given as advice, they are usually provided to resolve conflict or indecision re- sulting from the presence of two or more moral principles. This advice is often accompanied by reasons which are used to show the rational derivation of the recommendation from some more general principle. An important assumption in this analysis is that the mechanisms, processes, and dimen- sions of content for practical and moral advice are iso- morphic. It could be argued that both situations are similar because they appeal first to obligatory principles for con— flict resolution, then to other criteria of value. But, this argument will not be considered since Gauthier (1963) has provided a criterion for the separation of moral and practical advice which does not disturb underlying dimensions of content. Because of the situational similarities for practical and moral advice, the examination of the works of the three noncognitivists must focus upon: (1) the philosopher's specific approach to the function of moral language; (2) subsequent attacks on the philosopher's position; (3) the derivation of a conception of advice which originates the philosopher's position. The three positions to be examined have been labeled emotivism, imperativism, and linguistic noncognitivism. Stevenson was labeled an emotivist because of his attempt to separate descriptive and emotive meaning from moral terms. An emphasis on the similarities between 17 moral judgments and commands, or imperatives, resulted in the label imperativist for Hare. Nowell-Smith attempted to describe multiple functions for moral words, hence the name linguistic noncognitivist. Charles L. Stevenson. In Ethics and Language and Facts and Values, Stevenson attempted to show that moral expressions had the function of arousing emotions and atti- tudes. Following Ogden and Richards (1923), he distinguished two types of meaning, descriptive and emotive. The descrip- tive meaning of a sign was its ability to affect cognition through an elaborate conditioning process which was stabili— zed by linguistic rules. Emotive meaning was a power con- ferred upon a sign because of its history in emotional situations. Because of this emotional history, the word, when used in ethical judgments, had the power to alter atti— tudes by suggestion. Suggestive influence was contrasted with imperative influence by showing that emotive meaning led, rather than commanded, people to change attitudes (Stevenson, 1944). The interaction between emotive and descriptive mean- ing was evident in Stevenson's description of the function of value words. These descriptions were called "patterns of analysis." As an ultimate goal, both of Stevenson's patterns of analysis were designed to secure agreement in attitudes. The first pattern was characterized as the situ— ation where a value word had a definite descriptive meaning, 18 but the emotive meaning was most important. Later, in Facts and Values, Stevenson asserted that meaning for the first pattern was totally emotive. He demonstrated the first pattern by suggesting that "'This is wrong' means I dig- approve of this; do so a§_wgll" (Stevenson, 1944, p. 21). 'I disapprove of this' was the descriptive meaning in the phrase; 'do so as well' was the emotive meaning. In a sense, the emotive meaning in this example was an implicit impera— tive to change attitudes. In his second pattern of analysis, Stevenson described a difference between descriptive and emotive meaning. He termed this relationship the "persuasive definition." The persuasive definition altered the descriptive meaning of a word, "usually by giving it greater precision within the boundaries of its customary vagueness" (Stevenson, 1944, p. 210). Emotive meanings in the persuasive definition remained the same. The interaction between emotive and descriptive meaning caused a redirection of an individual's attitudes by attaching proven emotional arousal to a new descriptive definition. With his emphasis on attitudinal agreement, it was not surprising that Stevenson would suggest a comparable persua- sive role for reasons in ethical statements. He argued that reasons were used when the hearer of an imperative asked, "Why?" Supporting reasons were descriptions of the situation which the imperative sought to bring about, or the situation 19 to be altered. These facts were an attempt to eliminate hesitancy in the recipient. Or as suggested by Stevenson, ". . . reasons support imperatives by altering such beliefs as may in turn alter an unwillingness to obey" (Stevenson, 1944, p. 28). This role for reasons in moral judgments, and Stevenson's attitudinal emphasis have been the major focal points for attacks on his position. McCloskey (1969) suggested that Stevenson's entire conception of morality was in error. He argued that since non—emotive words could be made emotive, and emotive words non-emotive through association with other variously valued symbols, there was a major problem. The problem was that emotive meaning was contingent upon the moral evaluation underlying it; therefore, emotive meaning could not be used to explain that evaluation. In addition, since Stevenson's approach centered on agreement in attitudes, the position was inconsistent with "live and let live" philosophies, and concepts like moral tolerance. Bedford (1953) argued that Stevenson had chosen a path which was too irrational. He cited the psychological, rather than logical, connection between reasons and judgments as evidence of this irrationality. Both McCloskey (1969) and Bedford agreed that without logical criteria for the evalua- tion of moral judgments, it would be possible to judge an action moral on one occasion, immoral on the next. Thus, they claimed that Stevenson had destroyed the universality 20 of moral judgments. Bedford also claimed that providing reasons for judgments was a justification process. As such, individuals in the discussion rejected persuasive appeals as irrelevant to the argument. While the combined criticisms of Stevenson were quite severe, it is possible to construct a conception of advice from his position. For Stevenson, advice would have taken the form of either the first or second pattern of analysis. Therefore, advice using the first pattern would rely on the emotive meaning of terms accompanying a value judgment. As with the case, 'This is wrong,’ there would be an implicit imperative for the advisee to change attitudes. Using the second pattern of analysis for advice, an attempt to redirect the attitudes of an advisee would occur because of the manipulation of descriptive meaning in the statement. If McCloskey's crit- icism was correct, the evaluation would be an underlying attribute for both types of advice. Since Stevenson did not directly address the advice situation, the proposed model would be speculative. The next philosopher, R. M. Hare, did address the advice issues. In his work, he was the most careful philosopher in the group of noncognitivists to be examined. R. M. Hare. In The Language of Morals and Freedom and Reason, Hare adopted a position quite different from that of Stevenson. While he remained a noncognitivist, Hare at— tempted to rid moral philosophy of persuasive concepts, like 21 emotive meaning. Hare rejected these concepts because he felt there was a considerable difference between telling someone to do something and persuading someone to do some— thing. He claimed that earlier confusion in ethics had occurred because philosophers had mixed and confused two important distinctions. The distinctions were between the "language of statements and prescriptive language," and be- tween, "telling someone something and getting him to believe or do what one has told" (Hare, 1952, p. 14). He did admit that failures to respond would probably be followed by per— suasive attempts. Therefore, in his work, Hare emphasized the prescriptive function of moral statements and the eval- uative function of moral words. The major focus for Hare was imperatives or commands. Since he claimed that commands also had an indicative func- tion, i.e. they communicated information, he argued that commands must be governed by logical rules. These rules would have to be analogous to the rules which governed the use of indicatives. He attempted to show the difference be- tween indicatives and imperatives with the sentences, "You are going to shut the door" and "Shut the door." These sentences were restructured as follows: Your shutting the door in the immediate future, yes. Your shutting the door in the immediate future, please (Hare, 1952, p. 17). In their new forms, the first part of each sentence were identical. Hare called this propositional part of the 22 sentence the phrastic. The latter part was called the neustic, meaning to nod assent. There was an important interrelationship between the two parts. This relationship was noted in the speaker's nodding assent to the indicative and imperative. For the indicative, the assent meant, "Yes, it is the case." Assent for the imperative meant, "Please, do it." Hare suggested that the neustic had different roles in indicative and imperative. In one sentence an affirmation meant the actor believed something to be the case. In the other, the actor resolved to do what he was told to do (Binkley, 1961). Based on the similarities, Hare argued that the logical rules were similar. From this adoption of logical rules, Hare suggested that individuals reason from universal imperatives to decide how to behave. This logical derivation of behavior, or en— tailment, was governed by two rules. (1) No indicative conclusion can be validly drawn from a set of premisses which cannot be validly drawn from the indicatives among them alone. (2) No imperative conclusion can be validly drawn from a set of premisses which does not contain at least one impera— tive (Hare, 1952, p. 28). This deductive relationship between imperatives was the groundwork for Hare's conception of morality. While indi— viduals decided what to do by reasoning from universal im— peratives, Hare believed these universals were more dynamic than other philosophers had suggested. The mechanism for this flexibility was in the individual actor. Hare 23 maintained that moral principles, or rules, were clarified and made more precise as an actor was required to make decisions about those rules. Therefore, justification could legitimate- ly be made by connecting the decision to the ultimate moral principle, or by citing the consequences of anticipated events which would result from the decision. Both types of justifi— cation were appropriate, for Hare. In using this system, Hare established an unusual amount of individual responsibility for moral decisions. He claimed that this mechanism explained why in a well ordered society morality remained stable; but, at the same time was adapted to changing circumstances. In his analysis of value words, Hare pointed out that almost all words could be used to condemn or commend. However, he argued that the primary function of "good,“ "right," and "ought," was evaluative. This function was primarily evalu- ative because "the evaluative meaning is constant for every class of object . . . and we can use the evaluative force of the word in order to change the descriptive meaning for any class of objects" (Hare, 1952, pp. 118-119). As words of condemnation and commendation, these words functioned to guide choices. With this distinction, Hare established the differ— ence between commending and choosing. The clarity of Hare's distinctions and exposition of moral principles probably con— tributed to the heavy criticism of his position. Braithwaite (1954) argued that Hare's distinction be- tween telling and persuading was too absolute. He claimed 24 that Hare had thought too much of the sentence spoken when a command was uttered, and too little of the circumstances that led the bearer to regard it as a command. Therefore, Braith- waite suggested nine different neustics for Hare's system, including neustics which communicated information, requested assistance, and expressed moral injunctions. In a similar criticism, Binkley (1961) suggested that Hare had placed more importance on the similarity between commands and judgments, than on the similarity between commands and non-moral state— ments. This assertion was based on the common propositional phrastic in indicative and imperative sentences. Two criticisms addressed Hare's conception of indi- vidual responsibility for morality. Ewing (1959) argued that other things being equal, Hare's system predicted that indi- viduals do what they think they ought to do. He claimed this was a ceteris paribus conception of the imperative not found in traditional philosophy. McCloskey (1969) pointed out that this individual responsibility resulted in a more fundamental problem. If individuals chose, and could legitimately justify, their own moral action, then no right decision would be possible in the presence of conflicting principles. Hence, the moral system in Hare's philosophy was contrary to the Wittgensteinian conception of communal living. When moral judgments appear in advice, it would be relatively easy to describe the content of advice for Hare. Message content could be descriptive, because commands and 25 imperatives have propositional phrastics. But, the primary component of advice would be a prescriptive nesutic. Evalu- ative information could be conveyed in the advice messages through the use of value words. All sentences in an advice message, for Hare, would have a factual component. The clar- ity in Hare's explication of moral language will not be dup- licated in the work of the next philosopher, Nowell-Smith. But, unlike Hare, Nowell-Smith expended considerable effort describing characteristics of the advice—giving situation. These descriptions have been the most important part of Nowell- Smith's contribution to advice. P. H. Nowell—Smith. Ethics, by Nowell-Smith, provided an interesting differencejxiinvestigatory rigor. While Hare had attempted to narrow the study of moral language to a single type of expression, Nowell-Smith chose to broaden the scope of moral language. With a combination of contextualism and multiple function moral words, he tried to combine parts of naturalism and intuitionism. Unfortunately, his attempts were disastrous. After the severe criticism, the most produc- tive benefit to be gained from Nowell-Smith has been an in- sightful description of the norms surrounding the advice-giving situation. Because of the serious flaws in his philosophical position, only a brief outline will be presented. In describing multifunction moral terms, called Janus words, Nowell—Smith referred to D (for descriptive), A (for aptness), and g (for gerundive) words. A and G words were 26 most characteristic of moral language. McCloskey (1961) described the analysis of A words as a process which re— quired asking, 'What their use in this instance contextually implied?‘ Or, as stated by Nowell-Smith, 'What would it be logically odd to question?‘ Four elements were distinguished. They were a subjective, predictive, generalizing, and causal element. To distinguish A words from g words, Nowell—Smith suggested that A words were more explicit concerning causal properties which were contextually implied; g words were explicitly for or against something. Because contextual implication and logical oddness were so nebulous, McCloskey (1961) substituted the following interpretation: I should wish to speak of what is suggested by the sentence, by the stating of the sentence, by stating of it in a particular context, what is presupposed by the possi— bility of its being true or false, and what it is reasonable to assume odd to question (McCloskey, 1969, p. 84). For Nowell—Smith, "good" and "ought" sentences were impersonal expressions of pro attitudes. They Were impersonal because they contextually implied that they were based on reasons. These reasons could be referenced to general rules, pro attitudes, and ultimate pro attitudes. Universality in his morality was achieved by relating reasons to ultimate pro attitudes because these attitudes were natural properties in men. But, reasons could vary with the context. This variance in contextually connected reasons resulted in an unusual 27 conception of deliberation. For Nowell-Smith deliberation was a process of sorting out attitudes. Moral pro attitudes were described as dominant, long range, overriding prin- ciples. Like several philosophers to follow, Nowell—Smith claimed that advice was providing judgments from the advisee's perspective. He suggested that the adviser, in giving advice, was really attempting to help another indi— vidual solve his or her own problem. Therefore, the adviser was required to construct advice according to the pro atti- tudes of the advisee. The advisee could legitimately ask for justification from the adviser, hence, the importance of reasons. Nowell—Smith suggested that the contextual implications of advice—giving also made it possible to mis— use advice as a persuasive device. In addition, advice could mistakenly be given by an adviser. McCloskey (1969) pointed out two important inconsis- tencies in Nowell—Smith's theory. First, he used an example of a child to show that constructing moral advice from the attitudes of the advisee was a mistake. If advice was con- structed from a child's attitudes, it would be based on im— mature attitudes. Therefore, the advice would reflect the immaturity of the advisee. Traditionally, morally immature individuals were the most likely targets for moral advice. With this attitudinal emphasis, it was also possible for similar individuals in similar situations to receive differ— ent advice. 28 The second criticism by McCloskey was that conflict— ing moral principles were problematic for Nowell-Smith's theory. When conflicts were present, they were conflicts of attitudes. Since the conflicts originated in the pro attitudes of the individuals, they could not be resolved. Both criticisms reflected the lack of consistency and rigor in Nowell—Smith's philosophy. With his system, of morality, good reasons and justifications could be changed simply by changing attitudes. This implied a temporally based moral- ity that was unacceptable for most other philosophers. Since there was a lack of rigor in his work, it would be difficult to construct a Nowell-Smith conception of advice. However, the content of advice from his perspective would probably be A and g sentences, with the function determined by contextual implication. Both functions could be describ— ed as evaluative in the advice setting. In progressing to the "good reasons" philosophers, advice will maintain the contextualism advocated by Nowell—Smith, but will acquire increased rigor in the justification procedures. Good Reasons and Advice In recent years, no book has had such a profound impact upon ethical inquiry as did Toulmin's. An examina— tion of the Place of Reason in Ethics. As a result, there was a dramatic shift from the linguistic study of moral words to the study of good reasons for ethical judgments. 29 Some called the shift a revolution (Kerner, 1966). But after several additions to the position, including Baier's Moral Point of View and several articles by Kai Nielsen (1957; 1958; 1959; 1962a; 1962b), a large body of critical literature began to appear. One effect of the shift from moral language studies to investigations of reasons was a diminished emphasis on advice. However, three "good reasons" philosophers have made important contributions to an under- standing of advice. Before examining the works of these philosophers, a short review of Toulmin's position will be provided. This review will attempt to outline the strengths and criticisms of his approach. For Toulmin and Baier, the function of ethical judg— ments was to guide individual behavior in order to maximize satisfaction for the community. "What makes us call a judg— ment 'ethical' is the fact that it is used to harmonise people's actions" (Toulmin, 1950, p. 145). As Nielsen (1957) pointed out, Toulmin had a particular way of concep— tualizing morality. It was not the attainment of social co- hesion at all costs. Instead, it was to reduce suffering and allow achievement of individual wants, as long as this achievement didn't lead to suffering in others. Of course, in order to resolve the conflict of individual and societal interests, some form of moral reasoning was warranted. The function of this reasoning was to justify decisions on the basis of public criteria. 30 Toulmin was concerned with the criteria for distin- guishing between good and bad reasons, and the limits which separated moral from other types of reasoning. He suggested two types of reasoning that were commonly applied by actors in problematic situations. The first was used in the presence of conflicting claims. In those situations, the actor would try to unambiguously apply a principle of the community. If that failed, the actor was driven to estimates of probable harm to the community for the various alterna— tives. Toulmin's second type of reasoning was about the valid— ity of a communal principle or practice. In this type of situation, the decision was obtained by estimating the prob— able consequences of retaining the practice, or of adopting an alternative. Both types of reasoning were the object of criticism by Dykstra. Dykstra (1955) argued that Toulmin's two types of reasoning were not exclusive and exhaustive as he had implied. They were not distinct, lacked practical value, and were based upon a faulty premise. Dykstra cited an inconsistency in Toulmin's definition of the types of reasoning. Since both types eventually required an appeal to consequences, Dykstra claimed that different categories for consequences would have to be derived in order to claim distinctness for the reasoning types. More importantly, Dykstra questioned Toulmin's claim that reasoning about the rightness of action was different from reasoning about the rightness of 31 principles. This, he claimed, was untenable since individ- uals justify practices and principles by using more prin— ciples. In addition, individuals also justify choice of consequences with a principle. He argued that more correctly, all justification was based on principle, as Sidgwick (1874) had previously maintained. In statements reminiscient of the criticisms of economic utility theory, Dykstra asserted that individuals did not possess knowledge of all altern- atives. Nor did they possess knowledge of community prin— ciples. That fact, he suggested, eliminated the practical utility of Toulmin's system. He also contended that it was "absolutely false" that individuals accepted conformity to community standards as the only criteria for the rightness of an act. Other criticism, by Hall (1955), Hare (1951), Nakhnikian (1959), and Binkley (1961), questioned the valid- ity of Toulmin's syllogism, his reintroduction of practical reason, and the tribal morality presumed by his approach. Several critics suggested that using Toulmin's conception of morality, it would be impossible for an outsider to ethically judge the rightness or wrongness of Adolph Hitler's persecution of the Jews. As a framework for advice, however, Toulmin's position was influential. His emphasis on ratio— nality will be seen in discussions by Falk, Taylor, and Gauthier. Gauthier's discussion of advice has been the most complete. 32 Toulmin did not discuss advice in his works. How— ever, from his emphasis on rationality in moral reasoning, a model of advice could be constructed. There would be two conditions for advice-giving which would influence the con— tent of advice. The conditions would be whether or not a community principle could be unambiguously applied to the problem situation. When the principles were unambiguous, advice would be judgments which were based on community principles. In situations where there was ambiguity, advice would be judgments based on evaluations of the consequences which would result from each of the actor's alternatives. Both situations could legitimately incorporate reasons into the arguments. Toulmin's theory of moral reasoning was much more complete than the next theory to be discussed. Like others, W. D. Falk has been seriously criticized. Yet, one of his distinctions has provided insight for other discus— sions of advice. W. D. Falk. In "Goading and Guiding" (1953), Falk attempted to examine the different persuasive functions of moral statements. His distinction was unfortunately connect- ed to an untenable moral theory. Falk's theory bordered on subjectivism and was intuitionistic. This was evident in his statement that the natural man would make 'right' choices if he reflected into his heart. Several inconsistencies in Falk's moral theory were described by Nielsen (1962a). But, since his moral theory will not be relevant to this discussion, 33 these inconsistencies will not be discussed. Falk illustrated his distinction between goading and guiding in the following passage. People are good at indirect pleading when they are apt at convincing others; good at direct pleading when they know how to speak with firmness, charm, or pathos . . . There is some measure of coercion in every direct telling or asking, even the mildest 'please'; one feels one is being goaded into responding. But coercive intention can be deemed of every indirect plea; he is not himself doing the urging, he is only '1etting the facts speak' for him (Falk, 1953, p. 151). In direct pleading, or goading, Falk attempted to separate rational from non—rational methods. His discussion resembled earlier social scientific attempts to separate emotional from rational message appeals (Hartmann, 1936). With direct pleading, Falk suggested that reasons were created by the situation. "The situation would not contain it [reason] independently, as a pre—existing feature; it only will for the speaker's intervention" (Falk, 1953, p. 155). On the other hand, indirect pleading was different. Falk contended that indirect pleading offered facts. These facts were used to persuade, but there was a differ- ence in the method of presenting the facts. In direct plead- ing, there was no doubt about the source's attitudes toward the object of persuasion. With indirect pleading, the source could always deny an intention to persuade. Falk claimed that advice was a special type of guid- ing. The distinguishing characteristic was its rational 34 basis. He suggested that only rational methods were accept— ed in the advice context. Therefore, the purpose of advice was to guide the actions of others. There was an ambiguity in stating facts as reasons, however. Falk proposed two interpretations for the use of facts. First, a fact could be calculated to act as a reason. Or, the source of the message could assert that 'if so considered, a certain fact would act as a reason.‘ As Nielsen (1962a) noted, Falk often stated his case as if it was a psychological observation. In fact, most of his distinctions were analytic, or defini- tional. Even with these drawbacks, Falk prOposed a descrip- tion of advice. For him, advice was prescriptive and factual informa- tion which was divorced from the desires of the source or adviser. The facts included in the advice were used to point out characteristics which constituted reasons, or to make claims that they constituted reasons. Falk's emphasis on prescriptive language in advice will be duplicated in the work of the next philosopher to be discussed, Paul W. Taylor. Paul W. Taylor. In Normative Discourse, Taylor used "ordinary language analysis" to develop another rational model of advice. His model was more similar to Toulmin than Falk. Before reviewing Taylor's major philosophical con- tribution, a short description of one problem inherent in "ordinary language analysis" should be provided. Falk, 35 Nowell-Smith, and later, Gauthier used this informal type of analysis. A major problem has been the correspondence between assertions about linguistic distinctions and actual language use in a community. Empirical methods have not been used by these philosophers to verify their asser- tions. The frustration of trying to extend conceptual definitions without verification was reflected in Edel's critique of Taylor. "My difficulty came from being unable to discover what his purposes were, other than to use those ordinary uses which he found useful and to neglect those he didn't" (Edel, 1963, p. 189). Taylor's initial assertion has been cited as evidence for the weakness of his informal analysis. He claimed that the basic concepts of evaluative discourse were 'good' and 'right'; the basic concept of prescriptive discourse was 'ought.’ 'Ought' was also thought to have evaluative uses. Many critics believed that informal analytical techniques were responsible for this philosophical oversimplification (Chopra, 1962; COOper, 1964; Edel, 1963; Wellman, 1962). These same critics agreed that informal analysis was reSpon- sible for the best part of Taylor's work, his discussion of prescriptive discourse. Four necessary conditions for prescriptive discourse were offered by Taylor. He suggested that: (1) statement had to be uttered in earnest and accepted by the speaker; (2) the person addressed had to be in a situation of choice; 36 (3) the person addressed had to be free to choose or not choose the alternatives of choice; (4) the person addressed had a legitimate right to ask for reasons to support any prescription. These conditions were helpful in differen- tiating prescription from commands and imperatives. Taylor argued that a command could not be legitimately questioned. This argument was later attacked by Bennet (1965) when Gauthier (1963) made a similar claim. Bennet suggested that some individuals are endowed with the power to question commands. According to Taylor, the point of advice was to pro- vide rational recommendations for behavior which were sup— ported, or could be supported, by reasons. But Taylor's reasons were less directly connected to advice than either Falk or Toulmin had done. Taylor claimed that prescription did not include reasons why an individual should perform A. Instead, the reasons were suggested by the evaluations in value—judgments. For Taylor, there were important dif— ferences between prescriptions and value-judgments. Pre- scriptions were linguistic acts; value-judgments were mental dispositions. All prescription was done to guide behavior, not all value-judgments served such a purpose. Prescribing was not giving a reason for an act, whereas evaluating some- thing required a reason. Taylor then introduced a four—step justification process for value-judgments. This process was similar to, but more complex, than Toulmin's justification 37 procedure. Value-judgments were first verified by compar- ing them to standards or rules. Rules were validated through association with higher standards or rules, and ultimately value systems. Since value systems only received 'pragmatic' justification, or vindication they had to be shown to possess instrumental or contributive value for a way of life. Finally, an enlightened, free, and impartial individual chose between ways of life according to rules of precedence. Every step in Taylor's justification process has been criticized in arguments similar to those lodged against Toulmin. Yet, Taylor's conception of prescriptive and evaluative discourse has not been directly attacked. For Taylor, advice would be prescriptive or evalua— tive statements which were designed to guide behavior. Factual statements would be incorporated into value-judg- ments, or evaluative discourse. The prescriptions would have to meet Taylor's criteria for prescription. Therefore, reasons could be required by an advisee upon receiving a prescription. Taylor's discussion was especially relevant to advice since he was the first to attempt a logical sep— aration between prescription and evaluation. Gauthier (1963), the next philosopher to be reviewed, will have similar functions for factual statements in advice. David P. Gauthier. In Practical Reasoning: The Structure and Foundations of Prudential and Moral Arguments and Their Exemplification in Discourse, Gauthier provided 38 an insightful description of the advice processes. Accord- ing to most critics, including Bennet (1965), Mayo (1965), and Thompson (1965), the major arguments of his book were faulty. The minor successes were Gauthier's discussion of advice, instruction, requests, exhortation, commands, duty and obligation. Only Gauthier's discussion of advice will be reviewed in this section of the paper. According to Gauthier, the distinguishing character— istic for advice was the advisee's tendency to seek it from others, rather than having it offered without solicitation. In seeking this advice, the advisee was attempting to solve a particular problem. Gauthier suggested that this problem was a personal problem, at least until advice was sought. Because of its personal nature, the solutions offered by the adviser were required to be independent of the adviser's own wants. This characteristic differentiated a prudential problem from a moral problem; thus, moral advice from prac- tical advice. Gauthier suggested that a moral problem re- quired the adviser to take the viewpoint of the society, or to respond from the public good. He suggested that recom- mendations differed from advice in two ways. First, while advice was given from one person to another, a recommenda— tion need not involve a one to one relationship. Second, instead of aiding another in making a decision, recommenda- tions were based on another person's experience in similar situations. This distinction, developed from informal 39 analysis, would be empirically improbable. Drawing heavily from Nowell—Smith, Gauthier con— curred with the idea that advice was a rational social practice surrounded by normative expectations. These ex— pectations often led to the misuse of advice as a persua— sive instrument. In situations of this nature, Gauthier suggested that behavioral changes accomplished through the misuse of the language of advice were 'clearly parasitic' on its true function. Quite unlike other philosophers, Gauthier did not precisely analyze the content of advice. He chose another approach. The approach he used was to examine the criteria individuals used to appraise advice. He thought that a knowledge of the criteria used to appraise advice would facilitate understanding of evaluations for practical argu— ments. Legitimate objects of criticism for the advisee could be either the source of the advice, the adviser, or the advice itself. Criticisms of the source were held to be questions of competence, title, or sincerity. Criticisms of advice could be directed at its applicability, soundness, or extrinsic factors which might lead to undesirable conse- quences. Gauthier suggested that inapplicability of advice resulted when an adviser had misperceived the advisee's problem. When that happened, the advice would be rejected by the advisee. Unsound advice, or criticisms of unsound- ness, resulted when there was faulty information, faulty 40 reasoning, or omitted information in the advice. He noted that this category was not precisely defined. When undesir— able outside factors interferred with an advisee's willing- ness to accept advice, Gauthier called these factors extrinsic criticism of advice. In most cases, the advisee felt social responsibility which was stronger than the potential personal benefits to be gained from following the advice. From this approach to advice, a conception of advice could be derived. For Gauthier, advice would be the presentation of practical arguments. These arguments might include pre— scriptions, evaluations, or factual information. But, pru— dential advice would be cast from the advisee's perspective; moral advice would be cast from society's viewpoint. All of the arguments presented in an advice message would have to be related to the specific problems of the advisee. Gauthier, and all of the other philosophers reviewed, shared a common weakness. The weakness was a lack of empir— ical support for their conceptual distinctions. While empirical support was not a required condition for philos— ophers, some corroboration between empirical reality and their conceptions of advice would have facilitated later empirical research. Before extracting relevant dimensions of advice from the philoSOphical literature, social scientif- ic evidence should be examined. 41 Advice from the Social Scientific Perspective If the focus of investigation was the advice process- es, rather than content, several bodies of literature would have been relevant. Advice—seeking was related to social exchange theory by Blau (1955) in a field setting, and several researchers studied the construct in medical settings (Zola, 1966; Kutner & Gordon, 1961; Stoeckle, et al., 1963). Solicited advice—giving could be linked to studies of altru- istic behavior; unsolicited advice—giving to persuasion. But, in all of these studies there was no attempt to separate advice from information. Therefore, since advice was syn— onymous with information in these inquiries, it would be impossible to differentiate the content of advice from other types of message content using these studies. Advice has been differentiated from information in only one body of literature outside philosophy, the psycho- therapeutic counseling literature. Unfortuantely, the re- sults from this literature have been primarily anectdotal, with little concern for statistical or experimental control. Yet, several interesting observations about advice have been made by these counselors. Benjamin (1969) suggested that advice was telling others what to do or not to do. It could be threatening, nonthreatening, direct or indirect. This definition resem— bled the prescriptionist definition of advice by Hare, and reflected the persuasive implications of Falk's distinction 42 between guiding and goading. Similarly, Arbuckle (1965) suggested advice as one of the most general means of control— ling and directing force toward the patient. This force was considered so severe, counselors were repeatedly warned against making decisions and prescribing behavior for their clients (Colby, 1951; Hadley, 1958; Marzolf, 1956). Arbuckle contended advice was a faulty guide for client behavior modi- fication, since it was often based on biased judgments or pre— scriptions. The power of advice in counseling situations was in part explained by the tenuous psychological condition of the patients. In this condition, clients were especially suggestible to prescriptions from a counselor. Samaan and Parker (1973) reported one of the few empirical studies of advice in counseling. They attempted to compare the relative differences between persuasive advice—giving and behavioral [reinforcement] counseling. While behavioral counseling was found superior, there was an inherent problem in the study. Their definition of advice was persuasive communication. Therefore, it contributed little to an understanding of dif— ferences in content for advice and other types of counseling messages. From the counselor's perspective, there was a clear difference between advice and information. Advice was pre— scriptive, evaluative, and sometimes persuasive. This combi— nation of advice and persuasion was understandable, since the counselors were attempting to correct problems in their 43 client's behavior. As a background for empirical research, this literature was provided only anectdotal support for the distinctions made. Several studies from persuasion research could be used as evidence for the effect, or lack of effect, of advice. As positive evidence for the persuasive effect of advice, several studies reported significant relationships between the explic— itness of conclusions in persuasive appeals and behavioral change (Hovland & Mandell, 1952; Thistlethwaite, et al., 1955; Weiss & Steenbock, 1965). There were interactive influences in two of the studies. Thistlethwaite's research suggested intelligence as an important antecedent for the relationship. Weiss and Steenbock found topic to be important. In their research examining receptiveness to a history of science course, Weiss and Steenbock reported stated conclusions as the most effective message manipulation with unfavorable sub— jects, i.e. against the course initially. Explicit conclusions in advice were included in descriptions by Hare, Taylor, and Gauthier. These conclusions resulted from the inclusion of a prescription or a practical argument in advice. The resulting prescription often represented the explicit conclusion of a practical argument. As negative support for the importance of evaluation and prescription in advice, studies by Haskins (1966) and Klapper (1960) showed little behavioral effect resulting from the transmission of information, alone. Since these projects 44 used advertising and mass media channels, the results may be distorted findings for interpersonal channels. Yet, the phi— losophical investigators claimed less importance for factual information, than either evaluation or prescription, in advice. The Dimensionality of Advice Based on the previous review of advice philosophers and social scientists, this paper will make two claims regarding the content of advice. The first is that there are two impor— tant dimensions of content for all advice, prescription and evaluation. The second claim is that because these two dimen— sions are differentially related to other advice characteris— tics, an empirical model of advice can be constructed to test its dimensionality. Three analyses will be necessary to develop these arguments. (1) To establish the two-dimensional definition of advice, it must be differentiated from persua- sion and information. (2) The interrelationship between the two dimensions must be evaluated. (3) Finally, the relation— ships of each dimension to other advice characteristics must be explicated. From Hare, Nowell—Smith, Taylor, and Gauthier, a strict differentiation of advice from persuasion has been made. Per— suasive content is eliminated from advice. This elimination is facilitated by the strong norms of advice—giving, and the requirement for consideration of the advisee's perspective in offering advice. All of these philosophers believed persuasion 45 could be disguised in the 'language of advice,‘ but this function is "clearly parasitic" (Gauthier, 1963, p. 54) on the true function of advice. Another justification could be made. To disguise persuasion effectively, the persuader would have to mimic the underlying dimensions of advice in order to have it accepted by the advisee. Therefore, per— suasion or exhortation in advice situations should have the same dimensionality as advice. But, eliminating persuasive content from advice does not mean there will be no attribu- tions of persuasion by the advisee. Quite the contrary. This attribution of persuasion would be expected con- sidering Falk's distinction between goading and guiding. For him, prescription or goading indicates the obvious desires of the source of the message. Therefore, if the connection be— tween the source's desires and the advice are explicit or evident, an attribution of intent to persuade may be made by the advisee. Unlike guiding, goading cannot be denied by the adviser. With evaluation the position of the source will be irrelevant to the argument. In many cases, it will be dif~ ficult to identify the adviser's position from the evaluative information presented. In summary, while persuasive content has been eliminated, the advisee may attribute an intent to persuade to the adviser. The relationship of advice to fac- tual information is quite different. Advice contains information by virtue of its defini— tion as a message. However, most philosophers believe this 46 information must be evaluative. Taylor suggests that fac— tual information is only used for evaluation in advice. This allows separation of information and advice. Futhermore, a differentiation can be made between advice—seeking and infor- mation—seeking. This paper suggests that the information seeker has criteria for the evaluation of information from past experience. Therefore, his or her goal in seeking infor— mation is to learn more about an object in order to evaluate it using known standards. The advice seeker lacks criteria for evaluation or solutions to practical problems. Therefore he or she seeks criteria or decisions from an adviser. Be— cause there is a deficiency in criteria for the evaluation of information, factual information lacks utility for the advice seeker. Reasoning from Taylor (1961), this paper suggests a comparable role for factual information, i.e. support of value judgments. While advice may have an information component, it is the evaluative function of the information which is important to the advisee. The relationship between evaluation and prescription has been indirectly addressed in preceding paragraphs. Each dimension is related differently to autonomy in decision— making. From Taylor and the counselors, a prescription makes decisions for others. An evaluation is a mental judgment which could be related to a decision, but is not required to be so related. The relationship of evaluation and prescrip— tion to advice must be a contingent necessary relationship, 47 meaning either dimension is a necessary condition of advice. In most cases, one would expect to find both dimensions repre- sented. However, the relationship is further confused by the nature of advice, itself. In some instances, a prescription may imply a previous evaluation and value judgment by the adviser. In other cases, an evaluation may imply a command to do something. Like autonomy in decision-making, several other characteristics of advice can be differentially related to evaluation and prescription. From previous discussions, advice has been character— ized as rational, other—oriented, and subject to criticisms of applicability and soundness. These characteristics can be related or reduced to the dimensions of advice. For the phi- losophers, rationality in moral advice required reasoning from general moral principles. Gauthier's conception of rationality was derived from his discussion of practical argu— ments. The conclusion of these arguments was a prescription, a linguistic act, telling an individual to do something. A more complete description of practical arguments can be found in von Wright's, Explanation and Understanding. If a pre— scription is given in advice, the advisee may presume a prac— tical argument has been constructed by the adviser. When evaluations are presented, they represent the construction of a practical argument, as long as they are related to the advisee's problem. Depending on the clarity of the argument, these judgments or evaluations may imply a conclusion, or 48 prescription. Since reasons and justification are connected to the practical argument through evaluation, these reasons should be more closely linked to evaluation than prescription. The relationship of advice to other-orientation is much more complex. Since both dimensions of advice are related differently to decision—making and persuasion, these characteristics can be used to evaluate other—orientation. Other—orientation is negatively related to the desires of the adviser and prescrip- tion. This assertion is based on Falk's distinction between goading and guiding. A positive relationship exists between other-orientation and evaluation. This positive relationship is through an indirect tie to autonomy in decision-making. When an evaluation is offered, there is no explicit connection between the desires of the adviser and the advisee's decision. Therefore, it would be less likely to be perceived as persua- sion by the advisee. Conversely, it would be more likely to be perceived as an empathetic response. Two other relation— ships may be reduced to the other—orientation characteristic and rationality. According to Gauthier, two legitimate criticisms of advice content can be made. These are criticisms of applic— ability and soundness. A criticism of applicability is raised when the adviser has misperceived the advisee's problem. As such, this criticism is related to other—orientation. Failure to perceive the advisee's specific situation would probably be 49 the lack of adequate social perception skills in the adviser. Because of this relationship to other—orientation, applic— ability of advice should be associated with the evaluative dimension of advice. Since Gauthier has considered soundness a rational criticism of advice, it too would be linked to evaluation. In summary, two dimensions of advice have been related to perceived intent to persuade, autonomy in decision-making, other—orientation, factual information, reasoning, soundness, and applicability. Soundness and applicability have been reduced to rationality and other—orientation, respectively. A qualification is in order, however. These two constructs can only be reduced to rationality and other—orientation if they are defined exactly as Gauthier defined them. If they are included in an empirical model of advice, the inherent ambiguity in these words may cause serious empirical prob— lems. Several other variables might also be associated with prescription through indirect linkages. Prescriptions may lead to perceptions of limitation on the advisee's choices, or to perceived attempts to control the advisee. In any case, there are enough variables associated with evaluation and prescription differentially to provide a suitable test of the two—dimensional advice definition. Arguments for an acceptable methodology and its implementation will be pre- sented in the next chapter. CHAPTER II THE EMPIRICAL MODEL OF ADVICE AND ITS TEST The development of a test for the dimensionality of advice requires a review of two previous assumptions. First, the dimensions of advice have been characterized as universally consistent across people and situations. There- fore, consistency would be expected in a sample, regardless of age or social context. Second, the major empirical task for this study is a theoretical verification of the dimen— sionality of advice. Therefore, the methodological tech- nique employed should provide a statistical test of the posited dimensions. These two considerations will be shown to have an effect on the selection of a methodology, and choice of a sample. Since theoretical verification requires a test of structure in the data, confirmatory factor analysis would be a suitable methodology (Nunnally, 1967). This methodology eliminates the selection of criteria for rotation of factors, a recurrent problem for exploratory factor analysis. The problem is eliminated because confirmatory techniques per- form a direct fit of data to the posited theoretical struc- ture. For this study, the Jereskog maximum likelihood 50 51 technique of factor analysis will be used. The Jareskog algorithm offers three advantages over Spearman's (1927) general factor solution, Holzinger's (1941) bifactor method, and the multiple—group methods described by Harman (1960). The advantages are: (a) the ability to estimate measurement error; (b) provisions for estimating the angle between fac— tors, thus eliminating assumptions of orthogonality; (c) the use of a Chi-square test of fit for the entire theoret— cial model. Since multiple indicators for dependent vari— ables are also used estimates of reliability can easily be obtained. In order to use the J6reskog method of analysis, operationalization of the conceptual model must include operationalizations of: (1) reference variables for the two dimensions, or factors, of advice; and, (2) criterion variables which can be predicted from the two factors. These operationalizations will be described in the following section of this paper. The Operational Model of Advice From the discussion of advice in Chapter I, several relationships between the two content dimensions and other advice variables were posited. The prescriptive dimension was associated with perceived attempts to persuade, dis— closure of the source's position 0n alternative actions, and perceived attempts to control the advisee. Evaluation was related to the other—orientation of the adviser, 52 rationality in the advice, reasons in the advice message, and amount of information. Variations in the amount of infor- mation were a secondary effect of supplying reasons for the advice. Factual information was used to support the value- judgments offered by the adviser. Before examining the separate operationalizations for these variables, a short description of the method used for generating and revising operational definitions should be provided. Operational method. From a list of the two advice dimensions and their associated variables, ten pretest ques- tions were written. Three of the ten questions required special attention. Two were attempts to operationalize Gauthier's concepts of soundness and applicability, and the third was a qualitative assessment of advice. The qualita- tive assessment of advice was not a required question for the empirical test, but was considered heuristically interest- ing. It was not a necessary question because the dimensions of advice should characterize both good and bad advice. Attempts to operationalize Gauthier's concepts were expected to be problematic because the terms were almost synonymous with good advice. The pretest was administered to forty individuals. Twenty of these were from the projected sample. The other twenty people were divided equally between social scientists and high school graduates from a community outside the uni- versity. Social scientists and high school graduates were 53 included to provide a broader spectrum of interpretations for the pretest questions. Half of the pretest group were asked to respond to open—ended questions which asked what each item meant to the respondent. Coupled with observations of the standard deviations of the test scores, these open—ended questions were designed to detect ambiguity and lack of va— lidityin the pretest items. As an additional copy check, all respondents were told to omit questions that were not clear. Two criteria were used to revise the operationalizations. The criteria were agreement about ambiguity or lack of clarity, and high standard deviations were defined as those above the mean of standard deviations for all questions. Based on the copy test and analysis, two new questions were added to replace the operationalizations of soundness and applicability. One question about perceived restrictive— ness of advice was dropped from the operational model of advice; but was included in the questionnaire as a measurement test item. The revised pretest questionnaire was then admin- istered to twenty-five additional undergraduate students. Since these respondents noted no ambiguity or lack of clarity in the questions, no further revisions were made. Pretest and revised pretest results appear in Appendix A. Ordering of the questions for the final administration of the test questionnaire was changed to prevent biasing responses from the questions about the quality of advice. In the first pre- test, some respondents had used the good/bad evaluation to 54 score other items on the questionnaire. This was evident because dichotomous choices corresponded to the good/bad response. Reference variables. In order to use the Jereskog factor analytic technique, two reference variables for the theoretical factors had to be developed. Of course, the in- herent assumption for this selection is that the variance due to the true scores in the reference variables is a function of the posited theoretical factor. In operationalizing eval- uation and prescription, the significant problem was trying , to develop questions which distinguished one process from the other. Prescription was operationalized as the specificity of the suggestions in the advice. Initially, clarity of sug- gestions was used for this purpose, but it proved problematic. Most respondents perceived clarity as whether or not the written advice could be easily understood. Specificity was perceived as the precision of suggestions. This precision did reflect what the advisee was told to do. One probable consequence of changing prescription to the precision or specificity of suggestions is the creation of a relationship between prescription and information. With increasing spec- ificity of suggestions, an increase in the amount of informa— tion presented by the adviser could be expected. Therefore, the trade-off in operationalizing a more precise definition of prescription iseapotential relationship with a variable 55 that should not be related to it. Instead, as noted earlier, information should be related to the evaluative dimension of advice. Hopefully, the magnitude of the relationship to eval— uation will be greater than the magnitude of the relationship to prescription. Evaluation was operationalized more easily than pre— scription. The operationalization for evaluation was, Agw completely the advice had talked about the good or bad points in the friend's situation. This question seemed to present no particular problem for respondents in either pretest. In order to test the two dimensions, several criterion variables had to be chosen. Criterion variables. The purpose of the criterion vari- ables is to find variables which can be predicted from one dimension, but not the other. Based on previous conceptual groundwork, and the pretest, two variables were selected for prescription; four were selected for evaluation. The number of variables selected reflects constraints upon the model by the mathematics of estimation and the desired strength of the theoretical verification. In order to identify the opera- tional model, two criterions per reference variable are needed. But, the more criterions included, the more likely a specific structure will be rejected. Therefore, a compromise must be drawn between necessity and rigor in the model. The criterion variables for prescription were per— ceived persuasion in the advice and disclosure of the adviser's 56 desires. An important secondary observation should be made at this point. While neither prescription nor evaluation should correlate with qualitative assessments of advice, prescription would probably be perceived as more negative than evaluation. If, as philosophers suggested, persuasion is inappropriate in advice situations, then an inference of persuasion by the advisee would probably be considered a neg- ative attribute. Similarly, prescriptions by definition, and through autonomy in decision-making, exert more control on the advisee. Therefore, the following operationalizations for pre- scriptive criterion variables were made. Disclosure of the adviser's position was operationalized by asking the respond- ent to evaluate how easily he or she could ascertain what the adviser really wanted the advisee to do. A qualifier to use the wording of the advice was added to focus the respondent's evaluation on the advice itself, rather than the adviser. Perception of persuasion was operationalized as the pressure to accept the advice, as evidence in the wording and tone of the message. Pressure was substituted for an earlier term, control, because of frequent misunderstandings of control in the pretest. Another variable, restrictions on the advisee's choices, was dropped from the model because it was described as "abstract" and "confusing" in the open-ended questions. The thHHQMOHHmmm n m m4> mumsm>fluoflubmmm n m m¢> mCOmmoH mo mmmsuHOHmem n v m¢> mpsflom Umn\©oom mo soaumsam>m u m m¢> mmuflmmc m.monsom u m m¢> COHUMEH0msH mo us508¢ u n m4> Houusoo cm>flmoumm n m md> mmmqusom n m m¢> mCOHummmmsm mo mafiumHU u a m4> ooo.H OH m<> chm.l ooo.H m m<> mma. mHH. ooo.H m m¢> omo. mam. mow. ooo.H n m¢> men. oam.| mmm. whm. ooo.H m m<> mam. svH.| mme. mam. mow. ooo.a m m¢> Hmm. mmo.| mom. mam. mmm. mmv. ooo.H v m<> mmm. oma.| New. moa.l omm. Hmm. 0mm. ooo.H m m¢> oma. mam. mmm. vmm. mmo. mom. Hom. Ham. ooo.a m m¢> mmm. mom.| mom. moo. mmm. mmw. Nmm. «mm. mom. ooo.H H m¢> OH m¢> m m<> w m4> b m4> m m¢> m m¢> v m¢> m m<> N m<> H m<> .mEmUH ammo Hmsflmflno may mo xflnbmfi coflumHmHHooumch HH OHQMB APPENDIX B Structual Equations for the Empirical Model of Advice, Including the Measurement Model 107 APPENDIX B Structural Equations for the Empirical Model of Advice, Including the Measurement Model 51 éz—q» 51 £1 £2 52 £2 £2 £1 £1 -+ + -+ + -+ + + A1 A7 51 42 A5 A8 52 A” As Figure 6 Symbol reference. APPENDIX C Final Test Instrument Validity Subsample 108 APPENDIX C Two questionnaires are enclosed in this appendix. The first questionnaire is the final test instrument. The second is the questionnaire for the validity subsample. Part 1 Instructions: WRITE ADVICE for several CLOSE FRIENDS 109 Part 1 Instructions 0n the next two pages you will be asked to WRITE ADVICE for several CLOSE FRIENDS. Please work carefully, but as rapidly as possible. STOP after you finish writing the three pieces of advice. PLEASE WRITE 50 OTHER PEOPLE CAN READ IT! 110 Advice 1 Your "close friend” is a Junior at Michigan State trying to decide whether to stay in school next year. This person has a grade point of 2.65. During the past year, the student has told you several times that it was hard to decide on a college major. WHAT ADVICE WOULD YOU GIVE THIS STUDENT? Advice 2 Another friend lives in a house off-campus. In this house, two people share a bedroom. Your friend likes all but one of the six people who live in the house. Unfortunately, the person disliked shares the same bedroom. During the past few weeks, the roomate has been obnoxious, unfriendly, and inconsiderate to your friend. How would you advise your friend to handle this problem, WITHOUT TELLING THE FRIEND To MOVE OUT OF THE HOUSE? 111 Advice 3 Two older friends of yours are having trouble with their teenage children. Their two teenagers have been involved with drugs in school and both are having trouble with coursework. The parents feel that since you are closer to the age of these children your suggestions would be helpful to them. WHAT ADVICE WOULD YOU GIVE THESE PARENTS? STOP! Do not work on the following pages. 112 Part 2 Read each piece of advice. As you read it, put an (X) in - the apprOpriate place on the scales below. There are 4 pages InStructlons to score for each questionnaire you read (two) . PUT THE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER YOU ARE SCORING IN THE CIRCLE. How SPECIFIC are the suggestions about what the friend SHOULD 00 in AdVice 1 ‘ this advice? VERY HOT SPECIFIC : : : : : : : : SPECIFIC From the WORDING and TONE of this advice, how much PRESSURE does it seen to put on the friend to do what the advice says? MUCH PRESSURE : : 9 5 7 How much UNDERSTANDING does this advice show for the friend's problem? MUCH NO UNDERSTANDING : : : : : : . : UNDERSTANDING From WORDING alone. how EASY is it to tell what the adviser REALLY WANTS the friend to do? VERY VERY EASY : : : z z : : : DIFFICULT 9 How COMPLETELY has this advice talked about the 6000 or IAD POINTS of tho friend's CHOICES in this situation? VERY VERY COMPLETELY : : : : : : . : INCOMPLETELY How CLEARLY STATED arc the REASONS for the advice that is given? VERY VERY CLEAR : : : . : : : : UNCLEAR 7. How WELL THOUGHT OUT is this piece of advice? VERY WELL THOUGHT OUT 8. If this advice IS USED, how much will it RESTRICT the use of OTHER SOLUTIONS to the friend's problem? VERY VERY RESTRICTIVE : : : : : : : : UNRESTRICTIVE 9. How ouch INFORMATION does this advice GIVE the friend? MUCH NO INFORMATION : : : : : : : : INFORMATION 1.1“3 Advice 2 How SPECIFIC are the suggestions about what the friend SHOULD DO in this advice? VERY NOT SPECIFIC : : : ' z : : : SPECIFIC 9 2 1 From the NORDING and TONE of this advice. how much PRESSURE does it seem to put on the friend to do what the advice says? MUCH NO .PRESSURE ' : : - ' - 3 5 How much UNDERSTANDING does this advice show for the friend's problem? MUCH NO UNDERSTANDING : t : : : : z : UNDERSTANDING 2 l From NORDING alone, how EASY is it to tell what the adviser REALLY WANTS the friend to do? VERY VERY EASY : : : : . : : . DIFFICULT 5. How COMPLETELY has this advice talked about the GOOD or BAD POINTS of the friend's CHOICES in this situation? VERY VERY COMPLETELY : : : : : : : : INCOMPLETELY How CLEARLY STATED are the REASONS for the advice that is given? VERY VERY CLEAR : : : : : : : : UNCLEAR 9 How HELL ITKRKETT OUT is this piece of advice? VERY HELL THOUGHT OUT "7?’""'"'7""""’17""""'3" If this advice IS USED. how much will 1: nesnuc-r the use of OTHER SOLUTIONS to the friend's problem? VERY VERY RESTRICTIVE : : : z : : . : UNRESTRICTIVE How much INFORMATION does this advice GIVE the friend? MUCH NO INFORMATION : : : : : : : : INFORMATION 114 Advice 3 How SPECIFIC are the suggestions about what the friend SHOULD DO in this advice? VERY NOT SPECIFIC : : : : : : : : SPECIFIC From the NORDING and TONE of this advice. how much PRESSURE does it seem to put on the friend to do what the advice says? MUCH NO PRESSURE : : : : : : z : PRESSURE 3. How much UNDERSTANDING does this advice show for the friend's problem? MUCH NO UNDERSTANDING : : : : : : : : UNDERSTANDING From NORDING alone. how EASY is it to tell what the adviser REALLY WANTS the friend to do? VERY VERY ' ' : : ‘ DIFFICULT How COMPLETELY has this advice talked about the GOOD or BAD POINTS of the friend': CHOICES in this situation? VERY VERY COMPLETELY : : : : : : : : INCOMPLETELY How CLEARLY STATED are the REASONS for the advice that is given? VERY VERY CLEAR : : : : : : : : UNCLEAR 7. How HELL THOUGHT OUT is this piece of advice? VERY NELL THOUGHT OUT 8. If this advice IS USED, how much will it RESTRICT the use of OTHER SOLUTIONS to the friend's problem? VERY VERY RESTRICTIVE : : : ' . : : : UNRESTRICTIVE 9. How such INFORMATION does this advice GIVE the friend? MUCH NO INFORMATION : : : : : : . INFORMATION 115 Instructions Please go back and read each of the three pieces of advice again. Then, answer the following question for each piece of advice. Adwce 1 10. Considering the friend's problen. how 6000 or BAD is this piece of advice? VERY Advice 2 10. Considering the friend's problem, how GOOD or BAD is this piece of advice? VERY GOOD Advice 3 10. Considering the friend's problem, how GOOD or BAD is this piece of advice? 116 Part 3 Please write your age in the first blank, then Instructions put an (X) in the appropriate boxes (0). 1. AGE 2. SEX femaleu maleD a. MARITAL STATUS unmarried D married 0 4. LEVEL IN SCHOOL Freshman D Sophomore 0 Junior 0 Senior 0 U1 APPROXIMATE GRADE POINT .00 4 3.50 3.00 2.50 2.00 1.50 1.00 Part 1 Instructions: READ the SI TUAT IONS 117 Part 1 Please READ the SITUATIONS, below. Then, place an (X) in the apprOpriate blank on the scales below the situation. Instructions SITUATION 1. Your close friend is a Junior at Michigan State, trying to decide whether to stay in school next year. This person has a grade point of 2.65. During the past year, the student has told you several times that it was hard to decide on a college major. I. How REALISTIC is this situation for students at M.S.U.? VERY. VERY REALISTIC :‘ : : : : : z : .UNREALISTIC 9 B 7 6 5 A 3 2 l 2. How OFTEN would you say that situations like this one occur? VERY OFTEN : z : : : : : : NEVER 9 8 7 6 5 E 3 2 “T" 3. How OFTEN would you give advice to the friend in this situation, if you were NOT ASKED for it? ALWAYS : : : : : r : : NEVER 9 8 7 6 5 A 3 2 A SITUATION 2. Another friend lives in a house off-campus. In this house, two people share a bedroom. Your friend likes all but one of the six people who live in the house. Unfortunately, the person disliked shares the same bedroom. During the past few weeks, the roomate has been obnoxious, inconsiderate, and unfriendly to your friend. I. How REALISTIC is this situation for a student at M.S.U.? VERY VERY REALISTIC : : : : : : : : UNREALISTIC 9 8 7 6 5 A 3 2 1 2. How OFTEN would you say that situations like this one occur? VERY OFTEN : : : : : : : : NEVER 9 8 1 6 S l 3 2 l 3. How OFTEN would you give advice to the friend in this situation, if you were NOT ASKED for it? ALNAYS : : : : : : : : NEVER 9 8 7 6 5 fl 3 2 1 SITUATION 3. Two older friends of yours are having trouble with their teenage children. Their two teenagers have been involved with drugs in school and both are having trouble with coursework. The parents feel that since you are closer to the age of these children, your suggestions would be helpful to them. I. How REALISTIC is this situation for a student at M.S.U.? VERY VERY REALISTIC : : : : : : : : UNREALISTIC 9 B 7 6 5 u 3 2 1 2. How OFTEN would you say that situations like this one occur? VERY OFTEN : : : : : : : : NEVER 9 8 7 ‘ 5 9 3 2 I 3. How OFTEN would you give advice to the friend in this situation, if you were NOT ASKED for it? ALWAYS : : : : : ' : : NEVER 118 Part 2 Read each piece of advice. As you read it, put an (X) in ' the a ro riate lace on the scales below. There are 4 a es Instructions 1"” p P H to score for each questionnaire you read (two). PUT THE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER YOU ARE SCORING IN THE CIRCLE. _ . How SPECIFIC are the suggestions about what the friend SHOULD DO in Advnce 1 "m “M“? VERY "07 SPECIFIC - - - ~ SPECIFIC From the WORDING and TONE of this advice, how much PRESSURE does it seem to put on the friend to do what the advice says? MUCH NO PRESSURE PRESSURE How much UNDERSTANDING does this advice show for the friend's problem? N0 UNDERSTANDING MUCH UNDERSTANDING From WORDING alone, how EASY is it to tell what the adviser REALLY WANTS the friend to do? VERY VERY EASY : : : : : : : DIFFICULT How COMPLETELY has this advice talked about the GOOD or IAD POINTS of the friend‘s CHOICES in this situation? VERY VERY COMPLETELY ' ' ' ' ' INCOMPLETELY How CLEARLY STATED are the REASONS for the advice that is given? VERY VERY CLEAR : : : : : : : : UNCLEAR How WELL THOUGHT OUT is this piece of advice? VERY HELL THOUGHT OUT If this advice IS USED, how much will it RESTRICT the use of OTHER SOLUTIONS to the friend's problem? VERY VERY RESTRICTIVE : : : : : : : : UNRESTRICTIVE How much INFORMATION does this advice GIVE the friend? MUCH NO INFORMATION : : : : : z : : INFORMATION 1.1.59 Advice 2 How SPECIFIC are the suggestions about what the friend SHOULD DO in this advice? VERY NOT SPECIFIC : : : : : : : : SPECIFIC From the WORDING and TONE of this advice, how much PRESSURE does it seem to put on the friend to do what the advice says? FIND! NO .mssuns - - - - - - How much UNDERSTANDING does this advice show for the friend's problem? MUCH NO UNDERSTANDING : : : z : : : : UNDERSTANDING From WORDING alone, how EASY is it to tell what the adviser REALLY WANTS the friend to do? VERY VERY EASY : : : : : : : : DIFFICULT How COMPLETELY has this advice talked about the GOOD or BAD POINTS of the friend's CHOICES in this situation? VERY VERY COMPLETELY : : : : : : : : INCOMPLETELY How CLEARLY STATED are the REASONS for the advice that is given? VERY VERY CLEAR : : : : : : : : UNCLEAR How WELL IIKNKETI OUT is this piece of advice? VERY WELL THOUGHT OUT 9 1 5 3 If this advice IS USED. how much 4111 it RESTRICT the use of OTHER SOLUTIONS to the friend's problem? VERY RESTRICTIVE How much INFORMATION does this advice GIVE the friend? MUCH NO INFORMATION : z 2 : : : : : INFORMATION 120 Advice 3 I. How SPECIFIC are the suggestions about what the friend SHOULD DO in this advice? VERY NOT SPECIFIC : : : : : . : : SPECIFIC From the WORDING and TONE of this advice, how much PRESSURE does it seem to put on the friend to do what the advice says? MUCH NO PRESSURE . : : . ' : : : PRESSURE How much UNDERSTANDING does this advice show for the friend's problem? MUCH N0 UNDERSTANDING : : : : . : : : UNDERSTANDING From WORDING alone, how EASY is it to tell what the adviser REALLY WANTS the friend to do? VERY VERY ' ' : ' ' ' DIFFICULT How COMPLETELY has this advice talked about the GOOD or BAD POINTS of the friend's CHOICES in this situation? VERY VERY COMPLETELY : : : : . : : : INCOMPLETE LY How CLEARLY STATED are the REASONS for the advice that is given? VERY VERY CLEAR : : : z : : : . UNCLEAR 7. How WELL THOUGHT OUT is this piece of advice? VERY WELL THOUGHT OUT 8. If this advice IS USED, how much will it RESTRICT the use of OTHER SOLUTIONS to the friend's problem? VERY VERY RESTRICTIVE : : : ' . : : : UNRESTRICTIVE How much INFORMATION does this advice GIVE the friend? MUCH N0 INFORMATION : : : : : : 2 . INFORMATION 121 Instructions Please go back and read each of the three pieces of advice again. Then, answer the following question for each piece of advice. AdVIce 1 lo. Considering the friend's problem. how GOOD or DAD is this piece of advice? VERY VERY GOOD : - ‘ - Advice 2 10. Considering the friend's problem, how GOOD or BAD is this piece of advice? VERY VERY GwD : 2 z 2 : : : : BAD Advice 3 VERY VERY GOOD : : : : : : : :_ BAD 1 122 Part 3 Please write your age in the first blank, then Instructions put an (X) in the appropriate boxes (0). l. AGE 2. SEX femalecJ maletl o. MARITAL STATUS unmarried CI married 0 4. LEVEL IN SCHOOL Freshman CI Sophomore Cl Junior 0 Senior Cl 0! APPROXIMATE GRADE POINT .00 4 3.50 3.00 2.50 2.00 1.50 1.00 123 Part 4 USING THE QUESTIONNAIRE you've been given, score the second and third pieces of advice, USING THESE SCALES. Instr u Ct Ion S PLEASE WORK CAREFULLY! Advice 2 I. How much does it SOUND like this adviser is TRYING TO PERSUADE the friend to do what is suggested? VERY . NOT PERSUASIVE : : : : : : : : PERSUASIVE 9 8 7 6 5 A 3 2 l 2. How well has the adviser ANALYZED the friend's situation? VERY WELL NOT WELL ANALYZED : : : : : 2 z : ANALYZED 9 6 7 6 5 A 3 2 l 3. How COMPLETELY has the adviser discussed the CONSEQUENCES of the friend': choices in this situation? VERY VERY COMPLETELY : : : : : : : : INCOMPLETELY 9 8 7 6 5 u 3 2 l 4. How much KNOWLEDGE about possible solutions to the problem did this friend receive from the adviser? MUCH NO KNOWLEDGE : : : : : : : : KNOWLEDGE Advice 3 1. How much does it SOUND like this adviser is TRYING TO PERSUADE the friend to do what is suggested? VERY NOT PERSUASIVE : : z : z : : : PERSUASIVE 9 8 7 6 5 u. 3 2 l 2. How well has the adviser ANALYZED the friend's situation? VERY WELL NOT WELL ANALYZED : : : : : : : : ANALYZED 9 8 7 6 S A 3 2 1 3. How COMPLETELY has the adviser discussed the CONSEQUENCES of the friend's choices in this situation? VERY VERY COMPLETELY : : : z : : : : INCOMPLETELY 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 l 4. How much KNOWLEDGE about possible solutions to the problem did the friend receive from the adviser? MUCH N0 KNOWLEDGE : : : : : : z : KNOWLEDGE REFERENCES 124 REFERENCES Abelson, R., & Nielsen, K. History of ethics. In E. Paul (Ed.), The encyclopedia of philosophy. New York: Macmillan, 1967. Arbuckle, D. S. Counseling: Philosophy, theory, and practice. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1965. Arndt, J. Word of mouth advertising. New York: Advertising Research Foundation, 1967. Baier, K. The point of view of morality. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 1954, 23, 104-135. Baier, K. The moral point of View. Ithaca, N. 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