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ABSTRACT

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Three different advice processes were distinguished, advice-seeking, solicited and unsolicited advice-giving. These processes were shown to be related to three areas of communication research, information seeking, altruistic behavior, and interpersonal influence, respectively. It was argued that the commonality between the processes was the result of similarities in message content. Therefore, advice referred to the content of advice messages. The problem in studying the content of advice messages was an extreme lack of empirical social science literature. To compensate for this deficiency, an alternative method of investigation was pursued. Dimensions of advice were extracted from philosophical studies of moral and prudential advice. From this literature primarily related to noncognitivist and good reasons philosophers, two dimensions were extracted, a prescriptive and an evaluative dimension. Indicators for the two dimensions were derived from the philosophical investigations.

The dimensionality of advice was tested by two types of confirmatory factor analysis. The two types were orthogonal factor analysis, and maximum likelihood factor analysis.

Maximum likelihood factor analysis was considered the strong test of dimensionality, since a Chi-square statistic could be calculated to test the dimensions. Orthogonal factor analysis required inspection of the factor loadings as evidence for the proposed relationships.

Chi-square values for the original model and several alternatives ranged between probability levels of 0.10 and 0.20. Therefore, the model was rejected in the strong test. Orthogonal and standard oblique factor analytic methods indicated that the dimensions were well represented. Diagnostic investigations suggested that the reference variable for the prescriptive factor was too highly correlated with a criterion variable from the evaluative factor. Specificity of instructions, the reference variable, was correlated with amount of information, a criterion variable for the evaluative factor. Correlations between linguistic characteristics of advice and the dimensions were not found to be significant.

Based on the clear differentiation of factors in the traditional factor analysis and diagnostic tests, two recommendations were made. Either recommendation represented a possible alternative for future research. A different reference variable could be selected and tested. Or, the advice instrument could be used by analyzing data with orthogonal factor analytic techniques. Future research concerning the situational factors surrounding the advice situations was also suggested.

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CHAPTER I

THE PHILOSOPHICAL MODEL OF ADVICE

If ordinary usage was an index of scientific knowledge about constructs, then advice would be one of the most clearly understood constructs in communication. Whether it's received from a bookie, a co-worker, a lover or spouse, no other type of communication holds such power for the giver or such comfort for the receiver as advice. For the perpetual advice-seeker the next fix is as near as tomorrow's gossip column. For the habitual advice-giver every person on the street is a potential victim. But unfortunately, a scientific understanding of the advice processes has eluded philosophers and communication researchers for some time.

Part of the confusion is due to the complex normative forces which surround advice situations. Societal norms often dictate which topics can be talked about, and which cannot. Other rules determine how advice can be given. Sometimes advice must be asked for by the advice-seeker. At other times, advice can be offered without solicitation. Manipulative communicators have been known to use the norms of advice-giving as a disguise for their persuasive attempts. The success of these attempts, and the effective use of

advice norms, is heavily influenced by the interpersonal relationship between advice-giver and advisee. It is through this interpersonal relationship that advice gains importance for the interpersonal communication researcher.

In addition to the interpersonal relationship between adviser and advisee, there are certain characteristics of advice which closely resemble two recent definitions of interpersonal communication. Gauthier (1963) suggested that advice-giving required an adviser to help an advisee solve a problem by offering judgmental information which is cast from the advisee's perspective. This other-orientation is evident in definitions of interpersonal communication which have been posited by Miller and Steinberg (1975), and Cushman and Craig (1976). Miller and Steinberg suggested that interpersonal communication occurred when the source of a message based predictions about the receiver on psychological data. Psychological data was acquired by differentiating the idiosyncracies of an individual receiver from normative cultural and sociological expectations. Cushman and Craig characterized interpersonal communication as those situations where the source of a message was able to take the role of the receiver when constructing messages. The final stage of role-taking [synesic] represented the most sophisticated level of information discrimination by the source of the message. All three definitions have implied a high degree of social perception skill by the source of the message. This skill is not unlike traditional conceptions of empathy (Dymond, 1949).

By virtue of the similarities between advice and interpersonal communication, a preliminary examination of advice could be justified. But, justification would not be complete unless advice could be related to other relevant constructs in human communication research. In order to make these connections, the processes and content of advice need to be distinguished more carefully. There are two advice processes--advice-seeking and advice-giving. Advice can be given under two conditions, with and without solicitation. The content of advice refers to the type of message content in an advice message. For convenience, the term "advice" will signify message content, rather than process in this paper.

Theoretical connections between the two advice processes and three separate areas of communication research could be developed. Advice-seeking could be related to types of information-seeking, which have been described by Chaffee and McLeod (1973). Solicited advice-giving appears to be similar in situational and interactional characteristics to those behaviors which have been labeled "altruistic" by social psychologists (Berkowitz & Friedman, 1967; Isen & Levin, 1972; Schwartz, 1976). Recipients of advice and altruism may possess a similar dependency upon the altruist or adviser. Unsolicited advice-giving, sometimes called exhortation by philosophers, most closely resembles persuasion. It is through this resemblance that unsolicited advice-

giving might provide insight into such diverse areas as, significant other influence (Haller, Woelfel, & Fink, 1968), negative effects of advice in counseling (Koehler, 1953), and word-of-mouth advertising (Arndt, 1967). In order for the advice processes to be scientifically interesting, they must maintain a unique characteristic which separates them from these other social processes. For example, if advice-seeking was identical to information-seeking, there would be no need to study advice-seeking separately. Similarly, there would be no reason to distinguish unsolicited advice-giving from persuasion if the two concepts were identical.

This dissertation will assert that the primary difference between the advice processes and the social processes described above is the content of the messages that are exchanged. In other words, advice is something different than information or persuasion. The assertion would be justified by an ordinary language philosopher, like J. L. Austin, through the suggestion that the mere presence of "advice" in language is indicative of its unique function (Furberg, 1963). But, instead of adopting the ordinary language justification for advice, an empirical demonstration of the uniqueness of advice will be attempted. Therefore, the central purpose of this dissertation will be an explication and test of the dimensions of advice. Of course, the examination of advice must consider its relationship to information and persuasion. This construct explication is a necessary prerequisite for

subsequent empirical analyses for two important reasons. First, if there are no differences between advice, information, and persuasion, further studies would be futile, since the separation of behavioral effects from each source of influence would be impossible. Second, once the dimensions of advice are explicated, more control of experimental manipulations of advice would be possible. This refined control would facilitate scientific explanations of the advice processes and other social processes to which advice is related.

Statement of the Problem

Traditionally, an empirical explication of advice would be performed in the following manner. The researcher would gather all of the empirical research findings about advice, then construct a "model" or characteristics of advice based on consistencies across experimental settings. An empirical test of the model, or of the hypothesized characteristics would follow. But, this traditional approach is untenable for advice, since most of the empirical research has failed to distinguish between information and advice. Both constructs have been considered equivalent. Because of this shortcoming, the empirical literature will only be of secondary importance in the examination of advice message content. An empirical purist faced with this lack of research data might engage in an intensive research program to elicit dimensions from a community of individuals.

Through in-depth interviews, segregation of relevant characteristics, factor analysis and testing, the empiricist could develop an instrument to measure characteristics of advice. While this approach could easily be justified, it requires an assumption that the dimensions are elicitable and known by a community. There is a third alternative which appears to be more expedient for the study of advice.

The alternative is to develop a theoretical model of advice, based on dialectical investigations by philosophers, which can be subjected to an empirical test. There are inherent advantages to this approach for advice. Advice has been a central object of interest and debate for ethical philosophers during several periods of history. As a result of these interchanges and reconceptualizations, advice was more precisely analyzed by the philosophers than it was by the more recent social scientists. To the extent that philosophical distinctions were based upon empirical reality, they should be equally verifiable in an empirical setting today. In addition, much of the attention directed toward advice by the philosophers has dealt with topics of special interest to communication researchers, e.g. how was advice different from information and persuasion? Pragmatically, the philosophical/empirical alternative shortens the research procedure by constructing theoretical propositions from dialectical, rather than empirical, arguments. If confirmed, the facilitative role of dialectical argument for empirical

research would be suggested for situations with little empirical data. Also, the approach strengthens philosophical distinctions by providing empirical support. In a sense, the combination of philosophical and empirical method maximizes the strengths of each method. The sequential dialogue about advice in the philosophical literature imposes an additional requirement on this analysis. The requirement is for the provision of an ethical framework which will show the relationship between advice and ethics, and which can be used to locate the various philosophical positions. This discussion and framework will be provided in the next section of this paper.

Ethics and Advice

Advice has been of special interest to ethical philosophers because of its potential for establishing a link between two major types of ethical inquiry. The two types, theoretical and normative, can best be illustrated by examining the kind of questions asked by each. For the theoretical ethicist, a fundamental question has been, "What are the criteria of goodness that people apply in making value-judgments?" With this question as the starting point, the theoretical ethicists have constructed various theories of morality and moral reasoning. The normative ethicist has been more interested in question like, "Using general moral principles, how does an actor or individual decide what to do in a given situation?" Normative ethicists, therefore,

have been concerned with determining the most correct behaviors for specific societal conflict problems. For example, the determination of whether or not a life-support machine should be turned off for comatose accident victims would be a typical topic of discussion for the normative ethicist. Discussions of advice have intersected both theoretical and normative issues. However, for this investigation theoretical ethics, or metaethics, will be most useful because the theorists have focused on the nature of advice.

The important tie between advice and theoretical ethics has been through the value-judgments and justification in advice. Metaethicists have argued that examination of judgments and justifications would provide insight into the criteria used to make the judgments, hopefully these criteria would be ultimate moral principles. In order to investigate moral reasoning in this manner, the philosophers had to make an important assumption. The assumption was that arguments, consisting of moral claims, judgments, and justifications, could be interpersonally validated. In other words, there had to be publicly knowable criteria for the evaluation of moral arguments. Because of the requirement for "objective" criteria for the evaluation of moral claims, these philosophers have been called objectivists. At least three other positions on justification have been identified--relativism, skepticism, and subjectivism. Relativists argued that procedures for determining which of two or more moral judgments

were justified did not exist. Skepticists argued that it was impossible to say with justification that something was good or bad, wrong or right. Subjectivist positions have been more diverse, but have generally agreed that the truth or falsity of moral arguments was based on interpersonal or cultural idiosyncracies. All three opposing positions suffered a common problem, which was frequently acknowledged by Kant (1875/1948). The problem was that without objectively justified moral reasoning normative ethics was an impossibility. Since intersubjective verification has been considered an important criterion for empirical science, empirical examination of advice logically entails the objectivist position.

Objectivists argued that there were four necessary conditions for moral judgments and discourse. Moral discourse had to be universal, autonomous, objective, and a form of practical discourse. Universality meant relevantly similar persons in relevantly similar situations would make similar moral judgments. Of course, several discussions have questioned the meaning of "relevantly similar." Autonomy was a weaker requirement, since some objectivists doubted its necessity. The condition of autonomy required that normative statements, e.g. "You should do x," not be derivable from factual statements. Two types of objectivist, the naturalist and intuitionist, did not accept autonomy as a necessary requirement for moral discourse. The reason for this rejection

will be evident when the philosophical positions are arrayed according to their stance on the status of moral facts. Objectivity required moral discourse to have a "publicly determinable procedure in which rational men could come to accept" moral judgments as valid (Abelson & Nielsen, 1967, p. 126). As a form of practical discourse, moral statements had to be action-guiding, rather than theoretical. In other words, moral statements had to tell people what to do, rather than describe certain conditions or events. The four types of metaethical theory to be described in the following paragraphs will be shown to vary in the extent to which they have met the required conditions for moral judgments. In addition, the relationship of empirical and moral facts to the theories has been an important distinguishing factor.

The four types of theory, which will be important for the discussion of advice, are naturalistic, intuitive, noncognitive, and "good reasons" theories. Most of the discussions of advice have emerged from the noncognitive and "good reasons" positions. However, an understanding of the naturalist and intuitionist positions will provide a useful contrast for outlining other philosophical approaches.

All of the advice philosophers rejected naturalism as an approach to morality. Naturalists believed that moral judgments were a type of empirical judgment; or, that moral statements could be reduced to statements with no moral terms. This reduction was possible because the naturalists held that

there were moral facts, and that moral terms represented empirically measurable properties. Because these moral facts were empirical, observers could verify the presence of the properties; hence, they could test the truth or falsity of moral statements. The strong dependence upon empirical observation guaranteed that the criteria of universality and objectivity were achieved by the naturalists.

However, a serious flaw for the naturalists was the status of moral statements as practical discourse. This requirement was not achieved because of the property-ascribing nature of moral statements. Since the statements were property-ascribing, they described what the case was, not what the case should be. As such, the statements denied the prescriptive nature of practical discourse. As noted earlier, the naturalists rejected the requirement of autonomy for moral statements. This rejection was definitionally required because moral and empirical statements were equivalent. G. E. Moore, in Principia Ethica (1903), seriously challenged the equivalency of moral and empirical terms in his famous "open-question argument." He suggested that if, after you had named a moral term (X), you could sensibly ask if (X) was good, right, or obligatory; then moral and empirical terms were not equivalent. Debate and counter-debate since Moore's attack on the "naturalistic fallacy" has reached a consensual agreement that the argument was a serious consideration, but not fatal to the naturalist position. It should be noted that,

if advice was cast from the naturalist position, an advisee would ask an adviser to state the "empirical facts" of a situation. Advice would be a description of empirically measurable properties.

Intuitionists, like the naturalists, also believed in the existence of moral facts. However, the nature and acquisition of these facts was quite different. Instead of relying on empirical facts, the intuitionists argued that moral facts were knowledge of what was good or obligatory, and that knowledge was intuited by all men. Because all men were capable of this intuition, universality was guaranteed. To the extent that moral facts were universal, an argument for objectivity could have been made. Practically, it would have been difficult to provide evidence of intersubjective verification as a result of generalized intuition.

The requirement for autonomy in moral discourse was achieved by the intuitionists through the conception of primitive ethical terms. Universality could be questioned on the basis of these primitive terms. Philosophers have used several different primitive ethical terms, including "good," "right," and others. Certainly, universal intuition would seem to guarantee selection of an identical primitive term by all philosophers.

Intuitionism, like naturalism, failed to preserve the action-guiding nature of moral discourse. Since both types of ethical theory established moral terms as symbols for

properties, moral statements remained theoretical rather than prescriptive. Therefore, intuitionists fell prey to the same problems as the naturalists, e.g. bridging the is/ought gulf in philosophy (Abelson & Nielsen, 1967). It should be noticed that if advice was cast from the intuitionist position, the advisee would be asking for intuited feelings of what was good or obligatory. Advice would be the intuited moral facts.

The existence of moral facts was denied by the noncognitivists. They did not believe that moral conflicts could be resolved through empirical observation or intuited knowledge. Instead, noncognitivists were especially interested in a functional analysis of moral discourse. Therefore, an emphasis was placed on the evaluative and prescriptive nature of moral language. Fundamental moral claims for the noncognitivists were expressions of attitude, decisions of principle, or declarations of intention. Because there was no "moral knowledge," per se, the requirements for universality and objectivity were less adequately achieved. Individual philosophers in the noncognitivist tradition developed compensatory mechanisms to insure universality and objectivity. In most cases, these philosophers required moral utterances to be generalizable decisions, resolutions, or subscriptions. This definitional was used to insure universality. The success of the mechanisms to insure universality has been questioned by several critics. As a result, some noncognitivists have been

labeled subjectivists or neosubjectivists.

Since the noncognitivists had a more flexible conception of language, the requirements that moral statements be practical and autonomous were guaranteed. For the noncognitivist, moral language was more than an ascription of names to natural and nonnatural properties. Prescriptive and evaluative terms could be applied to anything commendable. Therefore, detailed analysis of the functions of language seemed to be the most profitable type of inquiry.

The "good reasons" approach to metaethics was an attempt to refocus ethical inquiry. Instead of investigating the nature of moral terms and statements, the "good reasons" philosophers were interested in the facts used to support moral arguments. They argued, from the later Wittgenstein, that the presence of strong cultural rules provided criteria for choice between conflicting moral judgments. Because the cultural rules were known by a language community, the moral reasoning processes could be verified. Hence, both objectivity and universality were strengthened. Since the "good reasons" approach preserved the evaluative and prescriptive functions of moral language, the requirements for practical discourse and autonomy were preserved. The position was not without flaws, however. Individual weaknesses in this approach will be discussed when the positions of individual philosophers have been arrayed.

In general, the advice philosophers to be described in this dissertation have taken similar positions regarding naturalism and the characteristics of moral language. They agreed with Moore that moral statements could not be derived from statements of fact. Because actors were free to make individual decisions, no moral choice or question of value could ever be guaranteed by logical rules. Moral language was more flexible than previously interpreted by naturalists and intuitionists. Instead of ascribing names to properties, moral language was used to evaluate or prescribe. In their prescriptive or evaluative role, moral terms could be used to commend or condemn anything. In order to insure a degree of universality, moral utterances were defined as generalizable decisions, resolutions, or subscriptions (Abelson & Nielsen, 1967).

The next section of this dissertation will attempt to extract dimensions of advice from the works of several noncognitivist and "good reasons" philosophers. Fortunately, the requirements for scientific inquiry and necessary conditions for moral judgments, as established by these philosophers, have provided a compatible basis for empirical research.

Noncognitivist Conceptions of Advice

Before examining the works of three noncognitivists--Stevenson, Hare, and Nowell-Smith--further clarification of the relationship between moral judgments and advice should

be provided. When moral judgments are given as advice, they are usually provided to resolve conflict or indecision resulting from the presence of two or more moral principles. This advice is often accompanied by reasons which are used to show the rational derivation of the recommendation from some more general principle. An important assumption in this analysis is that the mechanisms, processes, and dimensions of content for practical and moral advice are isomorphic. It could be argued that both situations are similar because they appeal first to obligatory principles for conflict resolution, then to other criteria of value. But, this argument will not be considered since Gauthier (1963) has provided a criterion for the separation of moral and practical advice which does not disturb underlying dimensions of content.

Because of the situational similarities for practical and moral advice, the examination of the works of the three noncognitivists must focus upon: (1) the philosopher's specific approach to the function of moral language; (2) subsequent attacks on the philosopher's position; (3) the derivation of a conception of advice which originates the philosopher's position. The three positions to be examined have been labeled emotivism, imperativism, and linguistic noncognitivism. Stevenson was labeled an emotivist because of his attempt to separate descriptive and emotive meaning from moral terms. An emphasis on the similarities between

moral judgments and commands, or imperatives, resulted in the label imperativist for Hare. Nowell-Smith attempted to describe multiple functions for moral words, hence the name linguistic noncognitivist.

Charles L. Stevenson. In Ethics and Language and Facts and Values, Stevenson attempted to show that moral expressions had the function of arousing emotions and attitudes. Following Ogden and Richards (1923), he distinguished two types of meaning, descriptive and emotive. The descriptive meaning of a sign was its ability to affect cognition through an elaborate conditioning process which was stabilized by linguistic rules. Emotive meaning was a power conferred upon a sign because of its history in emotional situations. Because of this emotional history, the word, when used in ethical judgments, had the power to alter attitudes by suggestion. Suggestive influence was contrasted with imperative influence by showing that emotive meaning led, rather than commanded, people to change attitudes (Stevenson, 1944).

The interaction between emotive and descriptive meaning was evident in Stevenson's description of the function of value words. These descriptions were called "patterns of analysis." As an ultimate goal, both of Stevenson's patterns of analysis were designed to secure agreement in attitudes. The first pattern was characterized as the situation where a value word had a definite descriptive meaning,

but the emotive meaning was most important. Later, in Facts and Values, Stevenson asserted that meaning for the first pattern was totally emotive. He demonstrated the first pattern by suggesting that "'This is wrong' means I disapprove of this; do so as well" (Stevenson, 1944, p. 21). 'I disapprove of this' was the descriptive meaning in the phrase; 'do so as well' was the emotive meaning. In a sense, the emotive meaning in this example was an implicit imperative to change attitudes.

In his second pattern of analysis, Stevenson described a difference between descriptive and emotive meaning. He termed this relationship the "persuasive definition." The persuasive definition altered the descriptive meaning of a word, "usually by giving it greater precision within the boundaries of its customary vagueness" (Stevenson, 1944, p. 210). Emotive meanings in the persuasive definition remained the same. The interaction between emotive and descriptive meaning caused a redirection of an individual's attitudes by attaching proven emotional arousal to a new descriptive definition.

With his emphasis on attitudinal agreement, it was not surprising that Stevenson would suggest a comparable persuasive role for reasons in ethical statements. He argued that reasons were used when the hearer of an imperative asked, "Why?" Supporting reasons were descriptions of the situation which the imperative sought to bring about, or the situation

to be altered. These facts were an attempt to eliminate hesitancy in the recipient. Or as suggested by Stevenson, ". . . reasons support imperatives by altering such beliefs as may in turn alter an unwillingness to obey" (Stevenson, 1944, p. 28). This role for reasons in moral judgments, and Stevenson's attitudinal emphasis have been the major focal points for attacks on his position.

McCloskey (1969) suggested that Stevenson's entire conception of morality was in error. He argued that since non-emotive words could be made emotive, and emotive words non-emotive through association with other variously valued symbols, there was a major problem. The problem was that emotive meaning was contingent upon the moral evaluation underlying it; therefore, emotive meaning could not be used to explain that evaluation. In addition, since Stevenson's approach centered on agreement in attitudes, the position was inconsistent with "live and let live" philosophies, and concepts like moral tolerance.

Bedford (1953) argued that Stevenson had chosen a path which was too irrational. He cited the psychological, rather than logical, connection between reasons and judgments as evidence of this irrationality. Both McCloskey (1969) and Bedford agreed that without logical criteria for the evaluation of moral judgments, it would be possible to judge an action moral on one occasion, immoral on the next. Thus, they claimed that Stevenson had destroyed the universality

of moral judgments. Bedford also claimed that providing reasons for judgments was a justification process. As such, individuals in the discussion rejected persuasive appeals as irrelevant to the argument. While the combined criticisms of Stevenson were quite severe, it is possible to construct a conception of advice from his position.

For Stevenson, advice would have taken the form of either the first or second pattern of analysis. Therefore, advice using the first pattern would rely on the emotive meaning of terms accompanying a value judgment. As with the case, 'This is wrong,' there would be an implicit imperative for the advisee to change attitudes. Using the second pattern of analysis for advice, an attempt to redirect the attitudes of an advisee would occur because of the manipulation of descriptive meaning in the statement. If McCloskey's criticism was correct, the evaluation would be an underlying attribute for both types of advice. Since Stevenson did not directly address the advice situation, the proposed model would be speculative. The next philosopher, R. M. Hare, did address the advice issues. In his work, he was the most careful philosopher in the group of noncognitivists to be examined.

R. M. Hare. In The Language of Morals and Freedom and Reason, Hare adopted a position quite different from that of Stevenson. While he remained a noncognitivist, Hare attempted to rid moral philosophy of persuasive concepts, like

emotive meaning. Hare rejected these concepts because he felt there was a considerable difference between telling someone to do something and persuading someone to do something. He claimed that earlier confusion in ethics had occurred because philosophers had mixed and confused two important distinctions. The distinctions were between the "language of statements and prescriptive language," and between, "telling someone something and getting him to believe or do what one has told" (Hare, 1952, p. 14). He did admit that failures to respond would probably be followed by persuasive attempts. Therefore, in his work, Hare emphasized the prescriptive function of moral statements and the evaluative function of moral words.

The major focus for Hare was imperatives or commands. Since he claimed that commands also had an indicative function, i.e. they communicated information, he argued that commands must be governed by logical rules. These rules would have to be analogous to the rules which governed the use of indicatives. He attempted to show the difference between indicatives and imperatives with the sentences, "You are going to shut the door" and "Shut the door." These sentences were restructured as follows:

> Your shutting the door in the immediate future, yes.
> Your shutting the door in the immediate future, please (Hare, 1952, p. 17).

In their new forms, the first part of each sentence were identical. Hare called this propositional part of the

sentence the phrastic. The latter part was called the neustic, meaning to nod assent. There was an important interrelationship between the two parts. This relationship was noted in the speaker's nodding assent to the indicative and imperative. For the indicative, the assent meant, "Yes, it is the case." Assent for the imperative meant, "Please, do it." Hare suggested that the neustic had different roles in indicative and imperative. In one sentence an affirmation meant the actor believed something to be the case. In the other, the actor resolved to do what he was told to do (Binkley, 1961). Based on the similarities, Hare argued that the logical rules were similar.

From this adoption of logical rules, Hare suggested that individuals reason from universal imperatives to decide how to behave. This logical derivation of behavior, or entailment, was governed by two rules.

> (1) No indicative conclusion can be validly drawn from a set of premisses which cannot be validly drawn from the indicatives among them alone. (2) No imperative conclusion can be validly drawn from a set of premisses which does not contain at least one imperative (Hare, 1952, p. 28).

This deductive relationship between imperatives was the groundwork for Hare's conception of morality. While individuals decided what to do by reasoning from universal imperatives, Hare believed these universals were more dynamic than other philosophers had suggested. The mechanism for this flexibility was in the individual actor. Hare

maintained that moral principles, or rules, were clarified and made more precise as an actor was required to make decisions about those rules. Therefore, justification could legitimately be made by connecting the decision to the ultimate moral principle, or by citing the consequences of anticipated events which would result from the decision. Both types of justification were appropriate, for Hare. In using this system, Hare established an unusual amount of individual responsibility for moral decisions. He claimed that this mechanism explained why in a well ordered society morality remained stable; but, at the same time was adapted to changing circumstances.

In his analysis of value words, Hare pointed out that almost all words could be used to condemn or commend. However, he argued that the primary function of "good," "right," and "ought," was evaluative. This function was primarily evaluative because "the evaluative meaning is constant for every class of object . . . and we can use the evaluative force of the word in order to change the descriptive meaning for any class of objects" (Hare, 1952, pp. 118-119). As words of condemnation and commendation, these words functioned to guide choices. With this distinction, Hare established the difference between commending and choosing. The clarity of Hare's distinctions and exposition of moral principles probably contributed to the heavy criticism of his position.

Braithwaite (1954) argued that Hare's distinction between telling and persuading was too absolute. He claimed

that Hare had thought too much of the sentence spoken when a command was uttered, and too little of the circumstances that led the hearer to regard it as a command. Therefore, Braithwaite suggested nine different neustics for Hare's system, including neustics which communicated information, requested assistance, and expressed moral injunctions. In a similar criticism, Binkley (1961) suggested that Hare had placed more importance on the similarity between commands and judgments, than on the similarity between commands and non-moral statements. This assertion was based on the common propositional phrastic in indicative and imperative sentences.

Two criticisms addressed Hare's conception of individual responsibility for morality. Ewing (1959) argued that other things being equal, Hare's system predicted that individuals do what they think they ought to do. He claimed this was a ceteris paribus conception of the imperative not found in traditional philosophy. McCloskey (1969) pointed out that this individual responsibility resulted in a more fundamental problem. If individuals chose, and could legitimately justify, their own moral action, then no right decision would be possible in the presence of conflicting principles. Hence, the moral system in Hare's philosophy was contrary to the Wittgensteinian conception of communal living.

When moral judgments appear in advice, it would be relatively easy to describe the content of advice for Hare. Message content could be descriptive, because commands and

imperatives have propositional phrastics. But, the primary component of advice would be a prescriptive nesutic. Evaluative information could be conveyed in the advice messages through the use of value words. All sentences in an advice message, for Hare, would have a factual component. The clarity in Hare's explication of moral language will not be duplicated in the work of the next philosopher, Nowell-Smith. But, unlike Hare, Nowell-Smith expended considerable effort describing characteristics of the advice-giving situation. These descriptions have been the most important part of Nowell-Smith's contribution to advice.

P. H. Nowell-Smith. Ethics, by Nowell-Smith, provided an interesting difference in investigatory rigor. While Hare had attempted to narrow the study of moral language to a single type of expression, Nowell-Smith chose to broaden the scope of moral language. With a combination of contextualism and multiple function moral words, he tried to combine parts of naturalism and intuitionism. Unfortunately, his attempts were disastrous. After the severe criticism, the most productive benefit to be gained from Nowell-Smith has been an insightful description of the norms surrounding the advice-giving situation. Because of the serious flaws in his philosophical position, only a brief outline will be presented.

In describing multifunction moral terms, called Janus words, Nowell-Smith referred to D (for descriptive), A (for aptness), and G (for gerundive) words. A and G words were

most characteristic of moral language. McCloskey (1961) described the analysis of A words as a process which required asking, 'What their use in this instance contextually implied?' Or, as stated by Nowell-Smith, 'What would it be logically odd to question?' Four elements were distinguished. They were a subjective, predictive, generalizing, and causal element.

To distinguish A words from G words, Nowell-Smith suggested that A words were more explicit concerning causal properties which were contextually implied; G words were explicitly for or against something. Because contextual implication and logical oddness were so nebulous, McCloskey (1961) substituted the following interpretation:

> I should wish to speak of what is suggested by the sentence, by the stating of the sentence, by stating of it in a particular context, what is presupposed by the possibility of its being true or false, and what it is reasonable to assume odd to question (McCloskey, 1969, p. 84).

For Nowell-Smith, "good" and "ought" sentences were impersonal expressions of pro attitudes. They were impersonal because they contextually implied that they were based on reasons. These reasons could be referenced to general rules, pro attitudes, and ultimate pro attitudes. Universality in his morality was achieved by relating reasons to ultimate pro attitudes because these attitudes were natural properties in men. But, reasons could vary with the context. This variance in contextually connected reasons resulted in an unusual

conception of deliberation. For Nowell-Smith deliberation was a process of sorting out attitudes. Moral pro attitudes were described as dominant, long range, overriding principles.

Like several philosophers to follow, Nowell-Smith claimed that advice was providing judgments from the advisee's perspective. He suggested that the adviser, in giving advice, was really attempting to help another individual solve his or her own problem. Therefore, the adviser was required to construct advice according to the pro attitudes of the advisee. The advisee could legitimately ask for justification from the adviser, hence, the importance of reasons. Nowell-Smith suggested that the contextual implications of advice-giving also made it possible to misuse advice as a persuasive device. In addition, advice could mistakenly be given by an adviser.

McCloskey (1969) pointed out two important inconsistencies in Nowell-Smith's theory. First, he used an example of a child to show that constructing moral advice from the attitudes of the advisee was a mistake. If advice was constructed from a child's attitudes, it would be based on immature attitudes. Therefore, the advice would reflect the immaturity of the advisee. Traditionally, morally immature individuals were the most likely targets for moral advice. With this attitudinal emphasis, it was also possible for similar individuals in similar situations to receive different advice.

The second criticism by McCloskey was that conflicting moral principles were problematic for Nowell-Smith's theory. When conflicts were present, they were conflicts of attitudes. Since the conflicts originated in the pro attitudes of the individuals, they could not be resolved. Both criticisms reflected the lack of consistency and rigor in Nowell-Smith's philosophy. With his system, of morality, good reasons and justifications could be changed simply by changing attitudes. This implied a temporally based morality that was unacceptable for most other philosophers.

Since there was a lack of rigor in his work, it would be difficult to construct a Nowell-Smith conception of advice. However, the content of advice from his perspective would probably be A and G sentences, with the function determined by contextual implication. Both functions could be described as evaluative in the advice setting. In progressing to the "good reasons" philosophers, advice will maintain the contextualism advocated by Nowell-Smith, but will acquire increased rigor in the justification procedures.

Good Reasons and Advice

In recent years, no book has had such a profound impact upon ethical inquiry as did Toulmin's. An examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics. As a result, there was a dramatic shift from the linguistic study of moral words to the study of good reasons for ethical judgments.

Some called the shift a revolution (Kerner, 1966). But after several additions to the position, including Baier's Moral Point of View and several articles by Kai Nielsen (1957; 1958; 1959; 1962a; 1962b), a large body of critical literature began to appear. One effect of the shift from moral language studies to investigations of reasons was a diminished emphasis on advice. However, three "good reasons" philosophers have made important contributions to an understanding of advice. Before examining the works of these philosophers, a short review of Toulmin's position will be provided. This review will attempt to outline the strengths and criticisms of his approach.

For Toulmin and Baier, the function of ethical judgments was to guide individual behavior in order to maximize satisfaction for the community. "What makes us call a judgment 'ethical' is the fact that it is used to harmonise people's actions" (Toulmin, 1950, p. 145). As Nielsen (1957) pointed out, Toulmin had a particular way of conceptualizing morality. It was not the attainment of social cohesion at all costs. Instead, it was to reduce suffering and allow achievement of individual wants, as long as this achievement didn't lead to suffering in others. Of course, in order to resolve the conflict of individual and societal interests, some form of moral reasoning was warranted. The function of this reasoning was to justify decisions on the basis of public criteria.

Toulmin was concerned with the criteria for distinguishing between good and bad reasons, and the limits which separated moral from other types of reasoning. He suggested two types of reasoning that were commonly applied by actors in problematic situations. The first was used in the presence of conflicting claims. In those situations, the actor would try to unambiguously apply a principle of the community. If that failed, the actor was driven to estimates of probable harm to the community for the various alternatives.

Toulmin's second type of reasoning was about the validity of a communal principle or practice. In this type of situation, the decision was obtained by estimating the probable consequences of retaining the practice, or of adopting an alternative. Both types of reasoning were the object of criticism by Dykstra.

Dykstra (1955) argued that Toulmin's two types of reasoning were not exclusive and exhaustive as he had implied. They were not distinct, lacked practical value, and were based upon a faulty premise. Dykstra cited an inconsistency in Toulmin's definition of the types of reasoning. Since both types eventually required an appeal to consequences, Dykstra claimed that different categories for consequences would have to be derived in order to claim distinctness for the reasoning types. More importantly, Dykstra questioned Toulmin's claim that reasoning about the rightness of action was different from reasoning about the rightness of

principles. This, he claimed, was untenable since individuals justify practices and principles by using more principles. In addition, individuals also justify choice of consequences with a principle. He argued that more correctly, all justification was based on principle, as Sidgwick (1874) had previously maintained. In statements reminiscient of the criticisms of economic utility theory, Dykstra asserted that individuals did not possess knowledge of all alternatives. Nor did they possess knowledge of community principles. That fact, he suggested, eliminated the practical utility of Toulmin's system. He also contended that it was "absolutely false" that individuals accepted conformity to community standards as the only criteria for the rightness of an act.

Other criticism, by Hall (1955), Hare (1951), Nakhnikian (1959), and Binkley (1961), questioned the validity of Toulmin's syllogism, his reintroduction of practical reason, and the tribal morality presumed by his approach. Several critics suggested that using Toulmin's conception of morality, it would be impossible for an outsider to ethically judge the rightness or wrongness of Adolph Hitler's persecution of the Jews. As a framework for advice, however, Toulmin's position was influential. His emphasis on rationality will be seen in discussions by Falk, Taylor, and Gauthier. Gauthier's discussion of advice has been the most complete.

Toulmin did not discuss advice in his works. However, from his emphasis on rationality in moral reasoning, a model of advice could be constructed. There would be two conditions for advice-giving which would influence the content of advice. The conditions would be whether or not a community principle could be unambiguously applied to the problem situation. When the principles were unambiguous, advice would be judgments which were based on community principles. In situations where there was ambiguity, advice would be judgments based on evaluations of the consequences which would result from each of the actor's alternatives. Both situations could legitimately incorporate reasons into the arguments. Toulmin's theory of moral reasoning was much more complete than the next theory to be discussed. Like others, W. D. Falk has been seriously criticized. Yet, one of his distinctions has provided insight for other discussions of advice.

W. D. Falk. In "Goading and Guiding" (1953), Falk attempted to examine the different persuasive functions of moral statements. His distinction was unfortunately connected to an untenable moral theory. Falk's theory bordered on subjectivism and was intuitionistic. This was evident in his statement that the natural man would make 'right' choices if he reflected into his heart. Several inconsistencies in Falk's moral theory were described by Nielsen (1962a). But, since his moral theory will not be relevant to this discussion,

these inconsistencies will not be discussed.

Falk illustrated his distinction between goading and guiding in the following passage.

> People are good at indirect pleading when they are apt at convincing others; good at direct pleading when they know how to speak with firmness, charm, or pathos . . . There is some measure of coercion in every direct telling or asking, even the mildest 'please'; one feels one is being goaded into responding. But coercive intention can be deemed of every indirect plea; he is not himself doing the urging, he is only 'letting the facts speak' for him (Falk, 1953, p. 151).

In direct pleading, or goading, Falk attempted to separate rational from non-rational methods. His discussion resembled earlier social scientific attempts to separate emotional from rational message appeals (Hartmann, 1936). With direct pleading, Falk suggested that reasons were created by the situation. "The situation would not contain it [reason] independently, as a pre-existing feature; it only will for the speaker's intervention" (Falk, 1953, p. 155). On the other hand, indirect pleading was different.

Falk contended that indirect pleading offered facts. These facts were used to persuade, but there was a difference in the method of presenting the facts. In direct pleading, there was no doubt about the source's attitudes toward the object of persuasion. With indirect pleading, the source could always deny an intention to persuade.

Falk claimed that advice was a special type of guiding. The distinguishing characteristic was its rational

basis. He suggested that only rational methods were accepted in the advice context. Therefore, the purpose of advice was to guide the actions of others. There was an ambiguity in stating facts as reasons, however. Falk proposed two interpretations for the use of facts. First, a fact could be calculated to act as a reason. Or, the source of the message could assert that 'if so considered, a certain fact would act as a reason.' As Nielsen (1962a) noted, Falk often stated his case as if it was a psychological observation. In fact, most of his distinctions were analytic, or definitional. Even with these drawbacks, Falk proposed a description of advice.

For him, advice was prescriptive and factual information which was divorced from the desires of the source or adviser. The facts included in the advice were used to point out characteristics which constituted reasons, or to make claims that they constituted reasons. Falk's emphasis on prescriptive language in advice will be duplicated in the work of the next philosopher to be discussed, Paul W. Taylor.

Paul W. Taylor. In Normative Discourse, Taylor used "ordinary language analysis" to develop another rational model of advice. His model was more similar to Toulmin than Falk. Before reviewing Taylor's major philosophical contribution, a short description of one problem inherent in "ordinary language analysis" should be provided. Falk,

Nowell-Smith, and later, Gauthier used this informal type of analysis. A major problem has been the correspondence between assertions about linguistic distinctions and actual language use in a community. Empirical methods have not been used by these philosophers to verify their assertions. The frustration of trying to extend conceptual definitions without verification was reflected in Edel's critique of Taylor. "My difficulty came from being unable to discover what his purposes were, other than to use those ordinary uses which he found useful and to neglect those he didn't" (Edel, 1963, p. 189).

Taylor's initial assertion has been cited as evidence for the weakness of his informal analysis. He claimed that the basic concepts of evaluative discourse were 'good' and 'right'; the basic concept of prescriptive discourse was 'ought.' 'Ought' was also thought to have evaluative uses. Many critics believed that informal analytical techniques were responsible for this philosophical oversimplification (Chopra, 1962; Cooper, 1964; Edel, 1963; Wellman, 1962). These same critics agreed that informal analysis was responsible for the best part of Taylor's work, his discussion of prescriptive discourse.

Four necessary conditions for prescriptive discourse were offered by Taylor. He suggested that: (1) statement had to be uttered in earnest and accepted by the speaker; (2) the person addressed had to be in a situation of choice;

(3) the person addressed had to be free to choose or not choose the alternatives of choice; (4) the person addressed had a legitimate right to ask for reasons to support any prescription. These conditions were helpful in differentiating prescription from commands and imperatives. Taylor argued that a command could not be legitimately questioned. This argument was later attacked by Bennet (1965) when Gauthier (1963) made a similar claim. Bennet suggested that some individuals are endowed with the power to question commands.

According to Taylor, the point of advice was to provide rational recommendations for behavior which were supported, or could be supported, by reasons. But Taylor's reasons were less directly connected to advice than either Falk or Toulmin had done. Taylor claimed that prescription did not include reasons why an individual should perform X. Instead, the reasons were suggested by the evaluations in value-judgments. For Taylor, there were important differences between prescriptions and value-judgments. Prescriptions were linguistic acts; value-judgments were mental dispositions. All prescription was done to guide behavior, not all value-judgments served such a purpose. Prescribing was not giving a reason for an act, whereas evaluating something required a reason. Taylor then introduced a four-step justification process for value-judgments. This process was similar to, but more complex, than Toulmin's justification

procedure. Value-judgments were first verified by comparing them to standards or rules. Rules were validated through association with higher standards or rules, and ultimately value systems. Since value systems only received 'pragmatic' justification, or vindication they had to be shown to possess instrumental or contributive value for a way of life. Finally, an enlightened, free, and impartial individual chose between ways of life according to rules of precedence. Every step in Taylor's justification process has been criticized in arguments similar to those lodged against Toulmin. Yet, Taylor's conception of prescriptive and evaluative discourse has not been directly attacked.

For Taylor, advice would be prescriptive or evaluative statements which were designed to guide behavior. Factual statements would be incorporated into value-judgments, or evaluative discourse. The prescriptions would have to meet Taylor's criteria for prescription. Therefore, reasons could be required by an advisee upon receiving a prescription. Taylor's discussion was especially relevant to advice since he was the first to attempt a logical separation between prescription and evaluation. Gauthier (1963), the next philosopher to be reviewed, will have similar functions for factual statements in advice.

David P. Gauthier. In Practical Reasoning: The Structure and Foundations of Prudential and Moral Arguments and Their Exemplification in Discourse, Gauthier provided

an insightful description of the advice processes. According to most critics, including Bennet (1965), Mayo (1965), and Thompson (1965), the major arguments of his book were faulty. The minor successes were Gauthier's discussion of advice, instruction, requests, exhortation, commands, duty and obligation. Only Gauthier's discussion of advice will be reviewed in this section of the paper.

According to Gauthier, the distinguishing characteristic for advice was the advisee's tendency to seek it from others, rather than having it offered without solicitation. In seeking this advice, the advisee was attempting to solve a particular problem. Gauthier suggested that this problem was a personal problem, at least until advice was sought. Because of its personal nature, the solutions offered by the adviser were required to be independent of the adviser's own wants. This characteristic differentiated a prudential problem from a moral problem; thus, moral advice from practical advice. Gauthier suggested that a moral problem required the adviser to take the viewpoint of the society, or to respond from the public good. He suggested that recommendations differed from advice in two ways. First, while advice was given from one person to another, a recommendation need not involve a one to one relationship. Second, instead of aiding another in making a decision, recommendations were based on another person's experience in similar situations. This distinction, developed from informal

analysis, would be empirically improbable.

Drawing heavily from Nowell-Smith, Gauthier concurred with the idea that advice was a rational social practice surrounded by normative expectations. These expectations often led to the misuse of advice as a persuasive instrument. In situations of this nature, Gauthier suggested that behavioral changes accomplished through the misuse of the language of advice were 'clearly parasitic' on its true function. Quite unlike other philosophers, Gauthier did not precisely analyze the content of advice. He chose another approach.

The approach he used was to examine the criteria individuals used to appraise advice. He thought that a knowledge of the criteria used to appraise advice would facilitate understanding of evaluations for practical arguments. Legitimate objects of criticism for the advisee could be either the source of the advice, the adviser, or the advice itself. Criticisms of the source were held to be questions of competence, title, or sincerity. Criticisms of advice could be directed at its applicability, soundness, or extrinsic factors which might lead to undesirable consequences.

Gauthier suggested that inapplicability of advice resulted when an adviser had misperceived the advisee's problem. When that happened, the advice would be rejected by the advisee. Unsound advice, or criticisms of unsoundness, resulted when there was faulty information, faulty

reasoning, or omitted information in the advice. He noted that this category was not precisely defined. When undesirable outside factors interferred with an advisee's willingness to accept advice, Gauthier called these factors extrinsic criticism of advice. In most cases, the advisee felt social responsibility which was stronger than the potential personal benefits to be gained from following the advice. From this approach to advice, a conception of advice could be derived.

For Gauthier, advice would be the presentation of practical arguments. These arguments might include prescriptions, evaluations, or factual information. But, prudential advice would be cast from the advisee's perspective; moral advice would be cast from society's viewpoint. All of the arguments presented in an advice message would have to be related to the specific problems of the advisee.

Gauthier, and all of the other philosophers reviewed, shared a common weakness. The weakness was a lack of empirical support for their conceptual distinctions. While empirical support was not a required condition for philosophers, some corroboration between empirical reality and their conceptions of advice would have facilitated later empirical research. Before extracting relevant dimensions of advice from the philosophical literature, social scientific evidence should be examined.

Advice from the Social Scientific Perspective

If the focus of investigation was the advice processes, rather than content, several bodies of literature would have been relevant. Advice-seeking was related to social exchange theory by Blau (1955) in a field setting, and several researchers studied the construct in medical settings (Zola, 1966; Kutner & Gordon, 1961; Stoeckle, et al., 1963). Solicited advice-giving could be linked to studies of altruistic behavior; unsolicited advice-giving to persuasion. But, in all of these studies there was no attempt to separate advice from information. Therefore, since advice was synonymous with information in these inquiries, it would be impossible to differentiate the content of advice from other types of message content using these studies.

Advice has been differentiated from information in only one body of literature outside philosophy, the psychotherapeutic counseling literature. Unfortuantely, the results from this literature have been primarily anectdotal, with little concern for statistical or experimental control. Yet, several interesting observations about advice have been made by these counselors.

Benjamin (1969) suggested that advice was telling others what to do or not to do. It could be threatening, nonthreatening, direct or indirect. This definition resembled the prescriptionist definition of advice by Hare, and reflected the persuasive implications of Falk's distinction

between guiding and goading. Similarly, Arbuckle (1965) suggested advice as one of the most general means of controlling and directing force toward the patient. This force was considered so severe, counselors were repeatedly warned against making decisions and prescribing behavior for their clients (Colby, 1951; Hadley, 1958; Marzolf, 1956). Arbuckle contended advice was a faulty guide for client behavior modification, since it was often based on biased judgments or prescriptions. The power of advice in counseling situations was in part explained by the tenuous psychological condition of the patients. In this condition, clients were especially suggestible to prescriptions from a counselor. Samaan and Parker (1973) reported one of the few empirical studies of advice in counseling. They attempted to compare the relative differences between persuasive advice-giving and behavioral [reinforcement] counseling. While behavioral counseling was found superior, there was an inherent problem in the study. Their definition of advice was persuasive communication. Therefore, it contributed little to an understanding of differences in content for advice and other types of counseling messages.

From the counselor's perspective, there was a clear difference between advice and information. Advice was prescriptive, evaluative, and sometimes persuasive. This combination of advice and persuasion was understandable, since the counselors were attempting to correct problems in their

client's behavior. As a background for empirical research, this literature was provided only anectdotal support for the distinctions made.

Several studies from persuasion research could be used as evidence for the effect, or lack of effect, of advice. As positive evidence for the persuasive effect of advice, several studies reported significant relationships between the explicitness of conclusions in persuasive appeals and behavioral change (Hovland & Mandell, 1952; Thistlethwaite, et al., 1955; Weiss & Steenbock, 1965). There were interactive influences in two of the studies. Thistlethwaite's research suggested intelligence as an important antecedent for the relationship. Weiss and Steenbock found topic to be important. In their research examining receptiveness to a history of science course, Weiss and Steenbock reported stated conclusions as the most effective message manipulation with unfavorable subjects, i.e. against the course initially. Explicit conclusions in advice were included in descriptions by Hare, Taylor, and Gauthier. These conclusions resulted from the inclusion of a prescription or a practical argument in advice. The resulting prescription often represented the explicit conclusion of a practical argument.

As negative support for the importance of evaluation and prescription in advice, studies by Haskins (1966) and Klapper (1960) showed little behavioral effect resulting from the transmission of information, alone. Since these projects

used advertising and mass media channels, the results may be distorted findings for interpersonal channels. Yet, the philosophical investigators claimed less importance for factual information, than either evaluation or prescription, in advice.

The Dimensionality of Advice

Based on the previous review of advice philosophers and social scientists, this paper will make two claims regarding the content of advice. The first is that there are two important dimensions of content for all advice, prescription and evaluation. The second claim is that because these two dimensions are differentially related to other advice characteristics, an empirical model of advice can be constructed to test its dimensionality. Three analyses will be necessary to develop these arguments. (1) To establish the two-dimensional definition of advice, it must be differentiated from persuasion and information. (2) The interrelationship between the two dimensions must be evaluated. (3) Finally, the relationships of each dimension to other advice characteristics must be explicated.

From Hare, Nowell-Smith, Taylor, and Gauthier, a strict differentiation of advice from persuasion has been made. Persuasive content is eliminated from advice. This elimination is facilitated by the strong norms of advice-giving, and the requirement for consideration of the advisee's perspective in offering advice. All of these philosophers believed persuasion

could be disguised in the 'language of advice,' but this function is "clearly parasitic" (Gauthier, 1963, p. 54) on the true function of advice. Another justification could be made. To disguise persuasion effectively, the persuader would have to mimic the underlying dimensions of advice in order to have it accepted by the advisee. Therefore, persuasion or exhortation in advice situations should have the same dimensionality as advice. But, eliminating persuasive content from advice does not mean there will be no attributions of persuasion by the advisee. Quite the contrary.

This attribution of persuasion would be expected considering Falk's distinction between goading and guiding. For him, prescription or goading indicates the obvious desires of the source of the message. Therefore, if the connection between the source's desires and the advice are explicit or evident, an attribution of intent to persuade may be made by the advisee. Unlike guiding, goading cannot be denied by the adviser. With evaluation the position of the source will be irrelevant to the argument. In many cases, it will be difficult to identify the adviser's position from the evaluative information presented. In summary, while persuasive content has been eliminated, the advisee may attribute an intent to persuade to the adviser. The relationship of advice to factual information is quite different.

Advice contains information by virtue of its definition as a message. However, most philosophers believe this

information must be evaluative. Taylor suggests that factual information is only used for evaluation in advice. This allows separation of information and advice. Futhermore, a differentiation can be made between advice-seeking and information-seeking. This paper suggests that the information seeker has criteria for the evaluation of information from past experience. Therefore, his or her goal in seeking information is to learn more about an object in order to evaluate it using known standards. The advice seeker lacks criteria for evaluation or solutions to practical problems. Therefore he or she seeks criteria or decisions from an adviser. Because there is a deficiency in criteria for the evaluation of information, factual information lacks utility for the advice seeker. Reasoning from Taylor (1961), this paper suggests a comparable role for factual information, i.e. support of value judgments. While advice may have an information component, it is the evaluative function of the information which is important to the advisee.

The relationship between evaluation and prescription has been indirectly addressed in preceding paragraphs. Each dimension is related differently to autonomy in decision-making. From Taylor and the counselors, a prescription makes decisions for others. An evaluation is a mental judgment which could be related to a decision, but is not required to be so related. The relationship of evaluation and prescription to advice must be a contingent necessary relationship,

meaning either dimension is a necessary condition of advice. In most cases, one would expect to find both dimensions represented. However, the relationship is further confused by the nature of advice, itself. In some instances, a prescription may imply a previous evaluation and value judgment by the adviser. In other cases, an evaluation may imply a command to do something. Like autonomy in decision-making, several other characteristics of advice can be differentially related to evaluation and prescription.

From previous discussions, advice has been characterized as rational, other-oriented, and subject to criticisms of applicability and soundness. These characteristics can be related or reduced to the dimensions of advice. For the philosophers, rationality in moral advice required reasoning from general moral principles. Gauthier's conception of rationality was derived from his discussion of practical arguments. The conclusion of these arguments was a prescription, a linguistic act, telling an individual to do something. A more complete description of practical arguments can be found in von Wright's, Explanation and Understanding. If a prescription is given in advice, the advisee may presume a practical argument has been constructed by the adviser. When evaluations are presented, they represent the construction of a practical argument, as long as they are related to the advisee's problem. Depending on the clarity of the argument, these judgments or evaluations may imply a conclusion, or

prescription. Since reasons and justification are connected to the practical argument through evaluation, these reasons should be more closely linked to evaluation than prescription. The relationship of advice to other-orientation is much more complex.

Since both dimensions of advice are related differently to decision-making and persuasion, these characteristics can be used to evaluate other-orientation. Other-orientation is negatively related to the desires of the adviser and prescription. This assertion is based on Falk's distinction between goading and guiding. A positive relationship exists between other-orientation and evaluation. This positive relationship is through an indirect tie to autonomy in decision-making. When an evaluation is offered, there is no explicit connection between the desires of the adviser and the advisee's decision. Therefore, it would be less likely to be perceived as persuasion by the advisee. Conversely, it would be more likely to be perceived as an empathetic response. Two other relationships may be reduced to the other-orientation characteristic and rationality.

According to Gauthier, two legitimate criticisms of advice content can be made. These are criticisms of applicability and soundness. A criticism of applicability is raised when the adviser has misperceived the advisee's problem. As such, this criticism is related to other-orientation. Failure to perceive the advisee's specific situation would probably be

the lack of adequate social perception skills in the adviser. Because of this relationship to other-orientation, applicability of advice should be associated with the evaluative dimension of advice. Since Gauthier has considered soundness a rational criticism of advice, it too would be linked to evaluation.

In summary, two dimensions of advice have been related to perceived intent to persuade, autonomy in decision-making, other-orientation, factual information, reasoning, soundness, and applicability. Soundness and applicability have been reduced to rationality and other-orientation, respectively. A qualification is in order, however. These two constructs can only be reduced to rationality and other-orientation if they are defined exactly as Gauthier defined them. If they are included in an empirical model of advice, the inherent ambiguity in these words may cause serious empirical problems. Several other variables might also be associated with prescription through indirect linkages. Prescriptions may lead to perceptions of limitation on the advisee's choices, or to perceived attempts to control the advisee. In any case, there are enough variables associated with evaluation and prescription differentially to provide a suitable test of the two-dimensional advice definition. Arguments for an acceptable methodology and its implementation will be presented in the next chapter.

CHAPTER II

THE EMPIRICAL MODEL OF ADVICE AND ITS TEST

The development of a test for the dimensionality of advice requires a review of two previous assumptions. First, the dimensions of advice have been characterized as universally consistent across people and situations. Therefore, consistency would be expected in a sample, regardless of age or social context. Second, the major empirical task for this study is a theoretical verification of the dimensionality of advice. Therefore, the methodological technique employed should provide a statistical test of the posited dimensions. These two considerations will be shown to have an effect on the selection of a methodology, and choice of a sample.

Since theoretical verification requires a test of structure in the data, confirmatory factor analysis would be a suitable methodology (Nunnally, 1967). This methodology eliminates the selection of criteria for rotation of factors, a recurrent problem for exploratory factor analysis. The problem is eliminated because confirmatory techniques perform a direct fit of data to the posited theoretical structure. For this study, the Jöreskog maximum likelihood

technique of factor analysis will be used. The Jöreskog algorithm offers three advantages over Spearman's (1927) general factor solution, Holzinger's (1941) bifactor method, and the multiple-group methods described by Harman (1960). The advantages are: (a) the ability to estimate measurement error; (b) provisions for estimating the angle between factors, thus eliminating assumptions of orthogonality; (c) the use of a Chi-square test of fit for the entire theoretical model. Since multiple indicators for dependent variables are also used estimates of reliability can easily be obtained. In order to use the Jöreskog method of analysis, operationalization of the conceptual model must include operationalizations of: (1) reference variables for the two dimensions, or factors, of advice; and, (2) criterion variables which can be predicted from the two factors. These operationalizations will be described in the following section of this paper.

The Operational Model of Advice

From the discussion of advice in Chapter I, several relationships between the two content dimensions and other advice variables were posited. The prescriptive dimension was associated with perceived attempts to persuade, disclosure of the source's position on alternative actions, and perceived attempts to control the advisee. Evaluation was related to the other-orientation of the adviser,

rationality in the advice, reasons in the advice message, and amount of information. Variations in the amount of information were a secondary effect of supplying reasons for the advice. Factual information was used to support the value-judgments offered by the adviser. Before examining the separate operationalizations for these variables, a short description of the method used for generating and revising operational definitions should be provided.

Operational method. From a list of the two advice dimensions and their associated variables, ten pretest questions were written. Three of the ten questions required special attention. Two were attempts to operationalize Gauthier's concepts of soundness and applicability, and the third was a qualitative assessment of advice. The qualitative assessment of advice was not a required question for the empirical test, but was considered heuristically interesting. It was not a necessary question because the dimensions of advice should characterize both good and bad advice. Attempts to operationalize Gauthier's concepts were expected to be problematic because the terms were almost synonymous with good advice.

The pretest was administered to forty individuals. Twenty of these were from the projected sample. The other twenty people were divided equally between social scientists and high school graduates from a community outside the university. Social scientists and high school graduates were

included to provide a broader spectrum of interpretations for the pretest questions. Half of the pretest group were asked to respond to open-ended questions which asked what each item meant to the respondent. Coupled with observations of the standard deviations of the test scores, these open-ended questions were designed to detect ambiguity and lack of validity in the pretest items. As an additional copy check, all respondents were told to omit questions that were not clear. Two criteria were used to revise the operationalizations. The criteria were agreement about ambiguity or lack of clarity, and high standard deviations were defined as those above the mean of standard deviations for all questions.

Based on the copy test and analysis, two new questions were added to replace the operationalizations of soundness and applicability. One question about perceived restrictiveness of advice was dropped from the operational model of advice; but was included in the questionnaire as a measurement test item. The revised pretest questionnaire was then administered to twenty-five additional undergraduate students. Since these respondents noted no ambiguity or lack of clarity in the questions, no further revisions were made. Pretest and revised pretest results appear in Appendix A. Ordering of the questions for the final administration of the test questionnaire was changed to prevent biasing responses from the questions about the quality of advice. In the first pretest, some respondents had used the good/bad evaluation to

score other items on the questionnaire. This was evident because dichotomous choices corresponded to the good/bad response.

Reference variables. In order to use the Jöreskog factor analytic technique, two reference variables for the theoretical factors had to be developed. Of course, the inherent assumption for this selection is that the variance due to the true scores in the reference variables is a function of the posited theoretical factor. In operationalizing evaluation and prescription, the significant problem was trying to develop questions which distinguished one process from the other.

Prescription was operationalized as the specificity of the suggestions in the advice. Initially, clarity of suggestions was used for this purpose, but it proved problematic. Most respondents perceived clarity as whether or not the written advice could be easily understood. Specificity was perceived as the precision of suggestions. This precision did reflect what the advisee was told to do. One probable consequence of changing prescription to the precision or specificity of suggestions is the creation of a relationship between prescription and information. With increasing specificity of suggestions, an increase in the amount of information presented by the adviser could be expected. Therefore, the trade-off in operationalizing a more precise definition of prescription is a potential relationship with a variable

that should not be related to it. Instead, as noted earlier, information should be related to the evaluative dimension of advice. Hopefully, the magnitude of the relationship to evaluation will be greater than the magnitude of the relationship to prescription.

Evaluation was operationalized more easily than prescription. The operationalization for evaluation was, how completely the advice had talked about the good or bad points in the friend's situation. This question seemed to present no particular problem for respondents in either pretest. In order to test the two dimensions, several criterion variables had to be chosen.

Criterion variables. The purpose of the criterion variables is to find variables which can be predicted from one dimension, but not the other. Based on previous conceptual groundwork, and the pretest, two variables were selected for prescription; four were selected for evaluation. The number of variables selected reflects constraints upon the model by the mathematics of estimation and the desired strength of the theoretical verification. In order to identify the operational model, two criterions per reference variable are needed. But, the more criterions included, the more likely a specific structure will be rejected. Therefore, a compromise must be drawn between necessity and rigor in the model.

The criterion variables for prescription were perceived persuasion in the advice and disclosure of the adviser's

desires. An important secondary observation should be made at this point. While neither prescription nor evaluation should correlate with qualitative assessments of advice, prescription would probably be perceived as more negative than evaluation. If, as philosophers suggested, persuasion is inappropriate in advice situations, then an inference of persuasion by the advisee would probably be considered a negative attribute. Similarly, prescriptions by definition, and through autonomy in decision-making, exert more control on the advisee.

Therefore, the following operationalizations for prescriptive criterion variables were made. Disclosure of the adviser's position was operationalized by asking the respondent to evaluate how easily he or she could ascertain what the adviser <u>really wanted</u> the advisee to do. A qualifier to use the wording of the advice was added to focus the respondent's evaluation on the advice itself, rather than the adviser. Perception of persuasion was operationalized as the <u>pressure to accept the advice</u>, as evidence in the wording and tone of the message. Pressure was substituted for an earlier term, control, because of frequent misunderstandings of control in the pretest. Another variable, restrictions on the advisee's choices, was dropped from the model because it was described as "abstract" and "confusing" in the open-ended questions. The question was left in the questionnaire as a check of simulated situations. This check will be examined later in

the chapter.

Operationalizations of the criterion variables for evaluation were generally less problematic than those for prescription. Since advice was related, through evaluation, to other-orientation, rationality, and factual information, indicators for these variables were used. Two criterion variables for rationality were derived. Respondents were asked how clearly reasons had been stated in the advice. They were also asked, how well thought out the advice was by the adviser. Since information was predicted to be related to rationality through the reasons provided by the adviser, the operationalization for information did not include reference to rationality or reasoning. Instead, respondents were simply asked how much information was included in the advice.

Other-orientation, which had been operationalized first as Gauthier's applicability of advice, was conceptualized as understanding for the advisee's position. This seemed to correct the inherent ambiguity of applicability. But like information, understanding might be more closely related to prescription because of the reference to specificity of suggestions. In combination, these operationalizations for prescription and evaluation constitute the operational model of advice.

Operational model of advice. Figure 1, illustrates the operational model of advice to be tested. Using Jöreskog notation, the structural equation form of the model is noted below.



Figure 1

The operational model of advice with measurement model. Two factors are posited, prescription (ξ_1) and evaluation (ξ_2).

Variable Index

x_1 = Specificity of suggestions
y_1 = Perceived pressure
y_2 = Source's desire

x_2 = Evaluation of good and bad points
y_3 = Understanding
y_4 = Explicitness of reasons
y_5 = Rationality of advice
y_6 = Amount of information

$$\beta\eta = \Gamma\xi + \zeta \qquad (1)$$

When a measurement model is included, as has been with this model, the equations include elements for measurement error.

$$y = \mu + \Lambda_y + \varepsilon \qquad (2)$$

$$x = \mu + \Lambda_x + \delta \qquad (3)$$

As Jöreskog (1972) has noted, the equations for confirmatory factor analysis require some changes using the LISREL algorithm. The (η) matrix is absent, so (η) is set equal to (ξ). The (β), and (Γ) are identity matrices, and (ζ) = 0. The (Φ) matrix is a correlation matrix, and (Θ_ε^2) and (Θ_δ^2) contain the unique variances of the tests. Compositions of the matrices for the operational model of advice are shown in Appendix B. In addition, more complete structural equations are included in that Appendix.

Methods and Procedures

While development of the measurement instrument for the dimensions of advice was discussed in the previous section, the experimental procedures and methodological issues will be discussed in this section. These topics will include a rationale for sample selection, a description of the experimental stimulus and its development, and an outline of the instrument administration procedures.

Sample. A sample of undergraduate students in communication classes at Michigan State University was selected for this study. From earlier discussions of the consistency of

advice dimensions, one would expect the dimensions to hold for students, as for adults. In fact, many of the students, especially those in late teens or early twenties, would be at a stage in life where advice-seeking and -receiving are rather common occurrences. The student sample would also be expected to be most familiar with research questionnaires. Since random selection of students was impossible, randomization controls were added to the stimulus distribution procedure. Stimulus selection will be described next.

Stimulus. In the first part of the advice questionnaire, students were asked to write advice for three decision situations. These situations required students to assume a 'close friend' had asked them for advice about a problem situation. This open-ended format was necessary in order to elicit a diverse sample of pieces of advice. Students were told to write the advice as if it was directly to the friend, i.e. in first-person. The situations were constructed in the following manner.

Sixty-eight undergraduates were asked to write out from ten to twenty problem situations or decisions they had encountered, and for which advice had been sought. They scaled each of the situations, using a comparative judgment ratio scaling technique (Torgerson, 1958). A list of the ten most frequently mentioned situations was compiled. The purpose of this list was to find topics which had a high degree of salience and believability for the respondents. In

a later section of the same questionnaire, respondents were asked to list several situations where they 'would never' give advice unless asked by the advisee. This list was developed to find those situations where the norms of advice-giving were enforced. From earlier discussions, it was shown that unsolicited advice-giving was contrary to most advice norms. The situations constructed were developed from the most frequent responses on both lists. Therefore, stimulus situations should reflect the most common advice situations, and situations where advice-giving would be most constrained by social norms. Hopefully, this would result in advice which could be characterized as the most typical type. The three most frequently mentioned problems were: deciding on a major or career, roommate incompatibility, and family problems. These three problems were also considered to be situations where advice would not be given, unless solicited. The three situations which were constructed, attempted to ask for advice about staying in school, solving a roommate problem, and helping with another person's family problems. Part 1, of the questionnaire required writing advice for the three situations. Part 2, was a group of test instruments for the variables of advice, as described in the operational model section of this paper. Part 3, was a section of demographic questions. Sample questionnaires appear in Appendix C.

Administration of the test instrument. The three-part test instrument was administered to undergraduate students in

communication classes at Michigan State University. Students were given approximately twenty minutes to write advice for the three stimulus questions. Then, Part 1, was collected and redistributed using a random redistribution schema. As a precaution, students were cautioned not to evaluate their own questionnaire. All students rated the three pieces of advice using the scoring instrument, Part 2. Then, Part 1, was again collected and redistributed. Students evaluated the second questionnaire using the same test instrument. After evaluating the pieces of advice, students completed Part 3, of the instrument. Approximate administration time for the questionnaire was one hour and ten minutes. Several controls were used to reduce demand effect, unreliability, and respondent errors in the questionnaires.

All items on the instrument, except one, were randomly assigned to a position. The only exception was the qualitative assessment of advice, which was placed at the end of each set of questions. This placement was used to reduce distortion in other scale responses because in previous administrations, students used the good/bad evaluation to rate other questions. Nine-point scales were selected to increase reliability over the ratio scaling technique used earlier. In addition, completion time was reduced by using the nine-point scales. This reduction in time was important because students were required to make approximately seventy judgments about three pieces of advice. Random redistribution schemes

were by rows or tables, rather than individuals. In addition to these questionnaire and administration controls, several procedures were incorporated to increase reliability and insure validity. These procedures will be described in the next section of this dissertation.

Experimental Control and Validation

Through the use of internal checks and a subsample, attempts were made to increase reliability, insure validity, and provide a tie between the subjective measures of advice and its linguistic structure. Of course, the principal control for reliability was the use of the Jöreskog estimating technique to estimate measurement error. Three types of validity were examined, face, internal, and external. Independent coders were used to examine the linguistic structure of advice. Reliability will be examined first.

Reliability. As previously discussed, nine-point scales were used to increase reliability. In addition, each piece of advice was rated by two different individuals. The two scores were averaged to obtain the final score. This averaging was necessary to meet the system constraints for the LISREL algorithm on the M.S.U. computer. Tests for differences between the two individuals showed no divergence. One technical addition to the nine-point scales was the placement of numbers under the blanks on the scale. One possible consequence might be the artificial establishment of a good/bad dimension using these numbers. However, the social

desirability of the items was not consistently located at the upper or lower end of the scales. Additional reliability was accrued from the college undergraduate sample. In the pretests, college undergraduates had lower standard deviations for all items. This result would be justified through the more frequent experience with these types of scale items.

Validity. Three types of validity were examined at different stages of research. In the pretest, semantic validity was tested by asking respondents to state what questions meant to them. While semantic validity is the most subjective type of validity, it is necessary for the construction of scale items which reflect ordinary language use in a population. In the final phase of test administration, external and internal validity was studied by extracting a validity subsample from the test sample. This group of twenty-eight undergraduates was given a separate questionnaire. The questionnaire included questions to verify the validity of the stimulus situations. These questions attempted to establish external validity by showing that the constructed situations were realistic, common, and within the constraints of advice norms.

Part 2 and Part 3 of the validity questionnaire asked respondents to evaluate randomly selected advice situations using the same instrument test sample respondents had used. Demographic data was also requested for the validity subsample. In Part 4 of the validity questionnaire, respondents were

asked to evaluate two pieces of advice using another instrument. The second instrument was constructed to evaluate convergent and divergent validity of the original test items. The two divergent questions asked how much the adviser was trying to persuade and how much knowledge had been gained from the advice. These should diverge from other-orientation and prescription, respectively. However, the change of prescription to how specific the suggestions had been would probably influence the relationship between knowledge and prescription. Convergent validity was examined by asking how well the adviser had analyzed the friend's situation, and how completely the adviser had discussed the consequences. The focus for all validity questions was perceptions of the adviser, rather than perceptions of advice. Hopefully, this would separate the validity and test instrument items to a greater degree. These tests were not designed to prove conclusively the amount of validity, since that objective would be ridiculous and futile. Instead, they were designed to reflect some degree of convergence and divergence in the data. Probably the most interesting relationships to be studied are those between the questionnaire items and the linguistic structure of advice.

Linguistic analysis. While it is neither reliability nor validity in a pure sense, the study of the linguistic structure of advice is important in several ways. The communication researcher would like to be able to analyze message

content in order to change the attitudes and behaviors of others. For advice, this would allow construction of messages which would result in the power of advice being associated with constructed messages. In addition, the correspondence between structure in advice and evaluations by respondents would allow greater predictability and explanation of effect. But, the attempt to relate structure to evaluations by respondents is not without problem. Craig (1973), following McKeon (1969), outlined an important problem in mixing levels of analysis. He suggested several types of experience, labeled the experiencer, experienced, and experiencing modes. The "er" mode was a subjective estimate of reality in the mind of the experiencer. The "ed" mode was an imposed reality where categories from the outside were overlayed on the actor's behavior. The "ing" mode was an agreed upon reality. In mixing modes, indeterminacy may result without an identity relationship between categories of experience. While mixing modes could not be ruled out as a possibility, the probability of finding determinate relationships decreases. There is another problem, however. Philosophical analyses of advice have indicated a flexibility in language which makes categorization difficult. Prescriptive words may be used to evaluate; evaluative words may be used to prescribe. In spite of difficulties, the potential gain from such an analysis warrants some further investigation. Therefore, the following linguistic studies were implemented.

The first analysis established the clause (with subject and predicate) as the unit of analysis. Clause identification eliminated problems with compound sentences and phrases. An English teacher from a local high school was asked to mark off clauses in all 156 pieces of advice. Then, two independent coders were asked to determine whether each clause was prescriptive, evaluative, or informative. For the second analysis, two different coders were asked to examine terms in the clauses. They were asked to count: (1) action verbs with either an explicit or implicit "you," implying a prescription; (2) comparative terms, like "better" or "worse," evaluative terms, like "should" and "ought," implying an evaluation. Since each clause would have a single verb, and evaluative terms would be restricted in a clause, information or factual statements were derived by subtracting the sum of prescription and evaluation from the total number of clauses in a piece of advice. This was used to establish terms as indicators for the dimensions of advice. In the following chapter the empirical results of these tests will be examined.

In addition, the following chapter will examine the sample, the statistical assumptions of the empirical model of advice, alternative models of advice, and the results from reliability and validity analyses. Interrelationships between the linguistic structure and scale items will be summarized.

CHAPTER III

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

This chapter will present several arguments, derived from the empirical test of advice, about the adequacy of the sample, the dimensionality of the advice construct, and the reliability and validity of stimulus and test instrument. These arguments will attempt to explore the relative strengths of the empirical tests, and their subsequent consequences in making inferences from the data. The first consideration will be the adequacy of the sample.

Sample adequacy. In the preceding chapters, attempts have been made to imply that advice content is universal across subjects, regardless of age, sex, or context. Since the respondents for this investigation were volunteers, there was relatively little control over composition of the sample. In fact, the sample was very homogeneous. This homogeneity can be seen in the five demographic variables which were included on the test instrument, age, sex, marital status, level in school, and grade point average.

When compared to an "average" college population, this sample was strongly skewed toward older, upper class individuals. For example, ages ranged from 20 to 33 years, with a

mean of 22.3 years. Eight-two percent of the sample were seniors, the remaining 18 percent were juniors. The average grade point of approximately 3.5 also reflected the skewed distribution of respondents. In addition to the skewedness resulting from age characteristics, the sample was also skewed with respect to sex and marital status. Sixty-six percent of the respondents were female; 34 percent were male. Eighty-six percent of the respondents were unmarried; 14 percent were married. This skewedness and homogeneity could be used to construct an argument about the ability of this sample to detect demographic differences in the data. However, with a relatively large sample size, N=150, the size of differences detected as significant at the p=.05 level would be quite small. In this sample, there were no significant correlations (p = .05) between the demographic variables and any other variables included in the investigation. Therefore, significant interrelationships between demographic characteristics and advice were held to be nonexistent. This conclusion, however, has not been subjected to a rigorous empirical test; so it can only be weakly supported. On the other hand, the empirical test of the advice model itself may have been too rigorous for the test instrument. That empirical test will be examined next.

Maximum likelihood test of the advice dimensions. Figure 2, shows the empirical relationships between the dimensions and variables of advice, as calculated using the LISREL algorithm.



Figure 2

Maximum likelihood estimates for the parameters of the operational advice model.

Variable Index

x_1 = Specificity of suggestions
y_1 = Perceived pressure
y_2 = Source's desire

x_2 = Evaluation of good and bad points
y_3 = Understanding
y_4 = Explicitness of reasons
y_5 = Rationality of advice
y_6 = Amount of information

As predicted, there was a strong correlation between the two dimensions (r = .661). This correlation reflects the linguistic flexibility of advice content; but also reflects the change in operationalizations for the prescriptive dimension. As noted in Chapter II, operationalizing prescription as the specificity of suggestions established an arbitrary connection between the informative variable of evaluation and prescription. This connection was probably partially responsible for the failure of the empirical model to be supported. The null hypothesis, H_o, for this empirical test was that the model represented in Figures 1 and 2, could be adequately reproduced by the data matrix. Since rejection of the hypothesis is undesirable, the goal of the researcher is to obtain a maximum probability for Chi-square, rather than achieving significance at the .01, or .001 level. Since the Chi-square (χ^2) for this model was 45.78, for 19 degrees of freedom, the resulting probability of finding a larger χ^2 was 0.0005. Of course, this was sufficient to reject the null hypothesis that the model could be reproduced by the data matrix. If the effect size to be detected is moderately large (0.15), then Cohen's (1969) formula for the power of χ^2 would predict the power of this test to be 0.855, for $\lambda = 23.0$. But, instead of using power as the final criteria for the diagnosis and evaluation of the advice model, several alternative techniques will be employed.

While the techniques will not be statistically valid post hoc tests, the resulting evidence will be used to support a claim that a relatively minor flaw in the operational model is responsible for its failure. First, several variables will be systematically eliminated from the model, and the resulting χ^2 using the LISREL algorithm will be compared. Since the procedure will be limited by the total number of criterion variables, three other techniques will be employed. These techniques will include an orthogonal factor analysis, an oblique factor analysis, and analysis of correlations for the variables in the advice model.

Jöreskog (1969) suggested that since the Chi-square distribution was biased by degrees of freedom, an index of the plausibility of a model could be determined by dividing the Chi-square value by degrees of freedom. Hence, for the empirical model of advice proposed earlier, the resulting χ^2 is 2.41, with a probability of approximately .17. In order to compare the test model with other models, it was necessary to develop a criterion for the elimination of variables. The criterion selected was the magnitude of the absolute value of the residuals. In other words, the rows and columns of the residual matrix were examined to determine which variable least fit the predicted model. Three other models were tested. In the first, Figure 3, the variable <u>understanding</u> was removed. The resulting χ^2 was 2.40, for one degree of freedom; approximately the same value as the original model. In the second



Figure 3

The advice model without the variable (y_3).

Variable Index
x_1 = Specificity of suggestions
y_1 = Perceived pressure
y_2 = Source's desire
x_2 = Evaluation of good and bad points
y_3 = Understanding
y_4 = Explicitness of reasons
y_5 = Rationality of advice
y_6 = Amount of information

model, Figure 4, information was removed. This removal could have been argued because of the connection of the predictive reference variable to information. The resulting χ^2 was 1.98 for one degree of freedom, an improvement over the original model. This χ^2 is still in the .10 to .20 probability range, a negligible improvement over the original model. The fourth model eliminated both information and understanding, Figure 5. Again, the χ^2 was not sufficiently different from the original advice model. It was 1.78 with one degree of freedom, with the same probability range as other models. Selection of the variables for deletion was hindered by the theoretical constraints on the model. It was hindered because the reference variables for the two factors could not be removed from the model without destroying the previous theoretical distinctions about the secondary importance of persausion to prescription. Because of these constraints on the (X) variables, two rotational algorithms were employed in a least squares type of factor analysis (SPSS/Varimax/Oblique).

The reasons for this selection were as follows. If the operational model for advice was incorrect, then some of the variables included in the model must be associated with variables that were predicted to be unrelated. Remember, the original model of advice predicted that perceived control and desires of the source would be associated with the predictive dimension. Understanding, reasons, information, and rationality would be associated with the evaluative dimension. If the



Figure 4

The operational model of advice without the variable (y_6).

Variable Index
x_1 = Specificity of suggestions
y_1 = Perceived pressure
y_2 = Source's desire
x_2 = Evaluation of good and bad points
y_3 = Understanding
y_4 = Explicitness of reasons
y_5 = Rationality of advice
y_6 = Amount of information



Figure 5

The operational model of advice without variable (y_3), and variable (y_6).

Variable Index	
x_1	= Specificity of suggestions
y_1	= Perceived pressure
y_2	= Source's desire
x_2	= Evaluation of good and bad points
y_3	= Understanding
y_4	= Explicitness of reasons
y_5	= Rationality of advice
y_6	= Amount of information

variables were not so related, a factor analysis done in the exploratory mode would be sort of cluster analysis for all of the variables. Two constraints were placed on the rotation. One was the type of rotation, orthogonal or oblique. The other was a specification to select only two factors. If the original specification of the advice model was nearly correct, then the two dimensions would account for a major portion of the variance. The two types of rotation were included to estimate the effect of forcing an arbitrary orthogonality on the dimensions. Of course, the prediction had always been that the factors were correlated. Table 1 and 2 show the factor matrix for the orthogonal rotation and the factor matrix after oblique rotation, respectively. In both cases, the tables also show which factor the specific variable would be predicted to load on, using the first variable as a reference for the factors. The factor matrix after rotation provides the best clustering reference for the nine advice variables. As shown, there is not a single inversion of the predicted factor loadings on either table. However, there is an interesting similarity in the two tables. The similarity is the relative magnitude of factor loadings for the specificity of suggestions in the advice. In both analyses, the relative magnitude of the factor loadings is much less than any of the other variables. Specificity of suggestions, the reference variable for the prescriptive dimension of advice, loads on both factors.

evaluative dimension. If the variables were not so related, a factor analysis done in the exploratory mode would be a sort of cluster analysis for all of the variables. Two constraints were placed on the rotation. One was the type of rotation, orthogonal or oblique. The other was a specification to select only two factors. If the original specification of the advice model was nearly correct, then the two dimensions would account for a major portion of the variance. The two types of rotation were included to estimate the effect of forcing an arbitrary orthogonality on the dimensions. Of course, the prediction had always been that the factors were correlated. Table 1 and 2 show the factor matrix for the orthogonal rotation and the factor matrix after oblique rotation, respectively. In both cases, the tables also show which factor the specific variable would be predicted to load on, using the first variable as a reference for the factors. The factor matrix after rotation provides the best clustering reference for the nine advice variables. As shown, there is not a single inversion of the predicted factor loadings on either table. However, there is an interesting similarity in the two tables. The similarity is the relative magnitude of factor loadings for the specificity of suggestions in the advice. In both analyses, the relative magnitude of the factor loadings is much less than any of the other variables. Specificity of suggestions, the reference variable for the prescriptive dimension of advice, loads on both factors.

Table 1

VARIMAX rotated factor matrix for orthogonal factor analysis of advice variables.

Variable	Factor 1	Factor 2	Predicted Factor
x_1	0.370	0.719	2
y_1	0.184	0.700	2
y_2	0.299	0.802	2
y_3	0.780	0.268	1
y_4	0.630	0.277	1
y_5	0.880	0.247	1
y_6	0.755	0.374	1
x_2	0.754	0.248	1

Variable Index

x_1 = Specificity of suggestions

y_1 = Perceived pressure

y_2 = Source's desire

x_2 = Evaluation of good and bad points

y_3 = Understanding

y_4 = Explicitness of reasons

y_5 = Rationality of advice

y_6 = Amount of information

Table 2

OBLIQUE rotated factor matrix for oblique factor rotation of the advice variables.

Variable	Factor 1	Factor 2	Predicted Factor
x_1	0.589	0.800	2
y_1	0.408	0.722	2
y_2	0.550	0.855	2
y_3	0.825	0.507	1
y_4	0.686	0.467	1
y_5	0.912	0.520	1
y_6	0.836	0.599	1
x_2	0.794	0.480	1

Variable Index

x_1 = Specificity of suggestions

y_1 = Perceived pressure

y_2 = Source's desire

x_2 = Evaluation of good and bad points

y_3 = Understanding

y_4 = Explicitness of reasons

y_5 = Rationality of advice

y_6 = Amount of information

While the loading is greater on the predicted factor, the heavy loading on the opposite factor probably explains some of the problems with the maximum liklihood test of the empirical advice model. Further evidence of this problematic relationship is provided in Table 3. Table 3 shows the Pearson correlations between the advice variables and the two reference variables. Again, the variable, specificity of suggestions, is quite highly correlated with the variables associated with the opposite factor. This seems to add further evidence to the case against the operational variable for the predictive dimension of advice.

In conclusion, the original model of advice was not substantiated; but the disconfirmation has been shown to be the result of a problematic operational variable. This problem could not have been predicted from the pretest, because the operational variable itself was changed and improved during the pretest. In addition, the empirical assessment of factor loadings, intercorrelations, and maximum likelihood estimates would have been an atheoretical technique which would have invalidated the empirical test. As it was, the operational model of advice accounted for approximately 70 percent of the variance in the variable system. Heuristically, most researchers would be content with the ability of factor loadings to predict the individual factors. But, the conclusiveness of the evidence would seem to allow effective alteration of the advice model in future research.

Table 3

Pearson correlations for the advice variables by prescription and evaluation.

Variable	(x_1) Prescriptive	(x_2) Evaluative	Predicted
y_1	0.569	0.335	1
y_2	0.693	0.376	1
y_3	0.514	0.630	2
y_4	0.377	0.609	2
y_5	0.492	0.700	2
y_6	0.548	0.666	2

Variable Index

x_1 = Specificity of suggestions

y_1 = Perceived pressure

y_2 = Source's desire

x_2 = Evaluation of good and bad points

y_3 = Understanding

y_4 = Explicitness of reasons

y_5 = Rationality of advice

y_6 = Amount of information

Reliability. Using the Jöreskog technique allowed examination of the measurement error in the sample data. These errors ranged from 0.297 to 0.707. Generally, measurement error was considerably high. Most values were approximately 50 percent of the variance around a path in the model. A comparison of the reliabilities can be made for any group of criterion variables by comparing their path coefficients in the path diagrams, Figures 2, 3, 4, and 5. The coefficient represents the square root of the variance accounted for by a particular path, in relation to the dimension (ξ). It quite difficult to predict methods of decreasing measurement error in the system, since the scales used were quite simple.

Validity. The validity subsample of 28 respondents was used to examine the validity of the stimulus questions and the variables of advice. External validity of the stimulus questions and a manipulation of the questions to examine the validity of the scales were included in the validity questionnaire. A sample of the validity questionnaire appears in Appendix D.

The three stimulus questions were different in three ways. First, a continuum was constructed according to the seriousness of the situations. Presumably, selecting a major, was less serious than roommate incompatibility, and family drug problems. Second, the situations allowed varying possibilities for advice. For example, in the first situation only two possibilities were present, the individual could be

advised to return to school or drop out. In the second situation, the choices were somewhat restricted by disallowing one option. The question asked, "How would you advise your friend to handle this problem, without telling the friend to move out of the house?" In the final situation, virtually unlimited options were available to the respondents. The situations were more idiosyncratic as they progressed from selecting a major to resolving a drug problem. In other words, the perceived frequency of occurrence would be expected to diminish across the continuum. Table 4, illustrates the respective decreases in means for perceived realism, perceived frequency, and expected frequency of offering advice without solicitation. The Pearson correlation for the relationship between situation and realism was $r = 0.380$ ($p < .01$). The correlation between situation and perceived frequency was also significant ($p < .01$) with $r = 0.367$. There was no significant correlation between perceived frequency of offering unsolicited advice and situation, but the means in Table 4 suggest a diminishing effect.

Using mean values as a guide for external validity, the absence of responses near the unreal and infrequent ends of the continuum would suggest that the constructed situations were more real than unreal. Two situations were rated as moderately frequent, 6.3 and 5.9 on a nine-point scale ranging from very often to never. The family drug situation was rated less frequent than either of the other two situations. In a

Table 4

Mean validity responses for the three different advice situations.

Variable	Situation 1	Situation 2	Situation 3
Perceived realism	7.1	6.3	5.3
Perceived frequency	6.3	5.5	5.0
Perceived frequency of offering advice	5.0	4.7	4.1

similar manner, the values for offering advice without solicitation also diminished. However, there were several reversals in the data. These reversals may have been caused by the seriousness of the problem. If respondents felt the problem extremely serious, then the advice norms might be suspended in those situations. While there was a lack of correlation between the perceived frequency of offering unsolicited advice and situation, there was an interesting correlation between one of the content dimensions of advice. Situation was signficantly correlated ($p < .001$) with the number of evaluative terms in the advice. Prescriptive terms were not related to situation. One would expect a respondent to offer more evaluation in more serious problem situations. Again, since the data was collected to examine gross effects of external validity, the empirical tests were probably strong enough to signal iolations of external validity in the stimulus situations.

This ability to detect important violations was not present in the tests for convergent and divergent validity, however. Table 5, shows the divergent variables and the correlations for the relationships which were predicted to diverge. Table 6, illustrates a similar set of correlations for the convergent variables. This failure to diverge and converge may have been a result of two different influences. First, because the sample size for the validity sample was small, $N = 28$, the size of correlations needed to approach significnce

Table 5

Pearson correlations between the two divergent variables and predicted diverging variables.

Divergent Variable	$\underline{r}$ with Persuasion	Divergent Variables	$\underline{r}$ with Knowledge
x_2	0.302	x_1	0.377
y_3	0.239	y_1	0.203
		y_3	0.135

Variable Index

x_1 = Specificity of suggestions

y_1 = Perceived pressure

y_2 = Source's desire

x_2 = Evaluation of good and bad points

y_3 = Understanding

y_4 = Explicitness of reasons

y_5 = Rationality of advice

y_6 = Amount of information

Table 6

Pearson correlations between the two convergent variables and predicted converging variables.

Convergent Variable	r with Analysis	r with Evaluation
x_2	0.187	0.239
Y_4	0.119	-.011
Y_5	0.004	0.057

Variable Index

x_1 = Specificity of suggestions
y_1 = Perceived pressure
y_2 = Source's desire
x_2 = Evaluation of good and bad points
y_3 = Understanding
y_4 = Explicitness of reasons
y_5 = Rationality of advice
y_6 = Amount of information

at the 0.05 level was quite large. This does not explain the presence of correlations where they were not predicted. A second confounding influence may have been the problematic reference variable in the advice model. Since it was highly intercorrelated with variables from both dimensions, the influence may have extend to the convergent/divergent variables. In order to construct a better test of internal validity, an independent instrument should be developed. However, an additional substantiation for internal validity can be found in the factor loadings for the oblique rotation of factors, Table 2. The absence of cross loading, except for x_1 would seem to support a claim of internal validity for the test instrument. This claim could only receive weak justification through this inspection of factor loadings, because it represents the major hypothesis to be tested in the investigation. Independent support would have been a stronger test of the relationships. In the next section, the results for the linguistic analysis of advice will be discussed.

Linguistic analysis. Two different operationalizations of the linguistic characteristics of advice were used. In a sense, these could be termed loose and rigid distinctions, respectively. In the first instance, independent coders were asked to categorize clauses in the advice into three categories: (1) prescriptive clauses which told an individual to do something; (2) evaluative clauses which judged something to be good or bad, right or wrong; and, (3) informative clauses

which were designed to convey only information. In most cases, the clauses were judged to be either prescriptive or evaluative. The intercoder reliability, calculated according to Guetzkow's (1950) formula was $\rho = 0.672$, with a 0.01 confidence interval of $\pm$ 0.15. Unreliability due to unitizing error was eliminated by having an independent judge establish the clauses to be categorized. Using these criteria, the correlations between total prescriptive and evaluative statements and the advice variables tended to support other research results. Table 7 illustrates the correlations between the linguistic categories and the advice variables. Three correlations are not consistent with other results, and theoretical predictions. These correlations are indicated in the table with an (*). Given the previous discussion of problems in changing the "mode" of analysis from respondent perceptions to imposed categories, the results seem to add a measure of support to the dimensionality of advice. Again, intercorrelations due to the variable specificity of suggestions appear to be important confounding factors for the unpredicted correlations.

The second linguistic coding scheme could be called the strong definition of prescription, since prescriptive terms were taken to be action verbs that stated "do this" to the advisee. Evaluative terms were comparative words, like "better" and "right," which judged the alternatives for the advisee. Guetzkow reliability for this categorization was

Table 7

Correlations between the total number of prescriptive and evaluative clauses in advice and other advice variables.

Variable	Prescriptive Clauses	Evaluative Clauses
x_1	0.311	-.103
y_1	0.221	0.107
y_2	0.169	0.052
x_2	0.239	0.247
y_3	0.298*	0.168*
y_4	0.026	0.369
y_5	0.353*	0.243*
y_6	0.335*	0.169*

*Asterisks represent a violation of theoretical predictions.

Variable Index

x_1 = Specificity of suggestions
y_1 = Perceived pressure
y_2 = Source's desire

x_2 = Evaluation of good and bad points
y_3 = Understanding
y_4 = Explicitness of reasons
y_5 = Rationality of advice
y_6 = Amount of information

$\rho = 0.625$, with a confidence interval of $\pm$ 0.19. Three of these correlations violated the theoretical predictions, also. Table 8 indicates the correlations between the total number of prescriptive and evaluative terms in a piece of advice and the advice variables. A major problem for both linguistic analyses was the difference between the presence of a prescription or evaluation and its meaning to the respondent. In several cases, the prescription was preceded by a conditional clause. In other cases, evaluations were included in prescriptions. The most common problem was for the category information. Information was included in virtually every type of sentence. For example, one respondent said, "Take your child to the East Lansing Drug Counseling Center." This statement told parents about the Center, yet it would be coded a prescription. In addition, the advice variables tended to evaluate the dimensions, rather than examine mere presence. Therefore, some inconsistency would be expected. In conclusion, the linguistic evidence about content of advice was encouraging, but contradictory. If congruence between the coder and respondent categorizations had been found, it would have been a strong empirical statement for the identity relation between judgment criteria. But, the presence of some correlations made additional research promising. In the next chapter the implications of these research results will be extended to future research about advice specifically, and about communication research in general.

Table 8

Correlations between total number of prescriptive and evaluative terms in advice, and other advice variables.

Variable	Prescriptive Terms	Evaluative Terms
x_1	0.272	-.171
y_1	0.128	0.069
y_2	0.222	-.014
x_2	0.122	0.178
y_3	0.218*	0.191*
y_4	-.009	0.165
y_5	0.299*	0.196
y_6	0.234*	0.177

*Asterisks indicate a violation of theoretical predictions.

Variable Index

x_1 = Specificity of suggestions

y_1 = Perceived pressure

y_2 = Source's desire

x_2 = Evaluation of good and bad points

y_3 = Understanding

y_4 = Explicitness of reasons

y_5 = Rationality of advice

y_6 = Amount of information

CHAPTER IV

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Since the determination of content dimensions was a necessary preface to relational studies, the implications of these dimensions on relational studies can only be hypothetically derived from the research results. Before those potential research areas can be explored, three operational issues need to be addressed. First the operational alternatives for specificity of suggestions needs to be examined, and resolved. Second, some attempt must be made to establish a more precise identity relation between linguistic or message content variables and the test instrument for advice dimensionality. Third, some consideration and assessment of the normative influences on advice must be made. These issues require resolution prior to further empirical research.

The Operational Issues

There are several alternatives for the elimination of problems caused by the variable, specificity of suggestions. The alternatives are: elimination of the variable from the empirical model of advice, use of the measurement instrument as it stands, or development of a new operational variable.

there are advantages and disadvantages to each alternative.

Omission of the variable from the model has two important consequences. It invalidates the maximum likelihood verification process because the empirical model would be underidentified. Therefore, estimation of the relative factor loadings would be hindered. More importantly, the model could not be empirically verified. In addition, the elimination of one of the indicators for the prescriptive dimension of advice would decrease the number of indicators for the prescriptive dimension; thus decreasing reliability in the measurement of that dimension.

An argument could easily be constructed to justify using the instrument as it stands. The advantage of this alternative is reduced research effort and time in modification and testing of any subsequent instrument. While in actuality the two dimensions correlate about 0.6, it is apparent from Table 1 that forcing orthogonality on the system results in a more heuristically useful picture of the dimensions. The orthogonal loadings are more widely separated than the oblique loadings. Orthogonal factors also represent a simpler mathematical adaptation of factor analysis because the computation of factor scores is not hampered by the oblique rotation. In comparing oblique and orthogonal factor loadings (Tables 1 and 2), there is virtually no in consistency in the relationship of test items to each factor. Therefore, orthogonal factor rotation of the test instrument

would allow immediate application for relational studies.

The final alternative, developing and testing a new operational indicator, is also a feasible alternative. The major goal in developing such an indicator would be the elimination of correlations between the prescriptive dimension and amount of information. One possibility would be the incorporation of the concept of language ambiguity by asking, how directly the adviser had told the friend what to do. Prescriptions would presumably be direct, evaluations and other information would be less direct. It would also be unrelated to amount of information because the question asks how a statement was made, rather than how much was given. As a solution to the operational problem, this alternative would require further verification using the same statistical techniques which were applied to the original operationalizations. An increase in reliability in the oblique and maximum likelihood analytical systems would add greater empirical support to the claim for the dimensionality of advice. The effect of all the operational alternatives on linguistic and message structure correlates could not be assessed without further testing.

Probably the most disturbing result of this investigation was the low correlation between linguistic characteristics and the defined dimensions of advice. Quite clearly, some other indicators of message content or structure are needed to correspond with the dimensions. These indicators

are needed in order to make the dimensionality pragmatically applicable to advice-giving situations. If message structure components could be found to correlate with the dimensions, then these components could be manipulated in relational studies or in professional advice-giving contexts.

The heavy factor loading of the qualitative assessment variable on the evaluative factor means that indivudal judgments about whether advice was good or bad is primarily a function of the evaluative variables. Evaluation is also the most important factor in terms of variance explained, but this is also a function of the number of test items per factor. Therefore, some effort should be expended in examining characteristics of evaluative information that would easily be measured in advice messages. These message content variables must be cast from a perspective which avoids normative constraints on evaluative language. Strong candidates may be clarity of arguments, structure and organization of the argument, or the justification strategies employed by individual communicators.

The final operational issue to be examined before suggesting a research program is the problem of normative constraints on advice, advice-seekers and advice-givers. From a speculative position it would appear that normative prohibitions against unsolicited advice obtain because of the prescriptive dimension. Prescription is a characteristic of many persuasive messages where the speaker is not necessarily

concerned with the receiver's welfare. Therefore, this resemblance between unsolicited messages and persuasive messages would violate the requirement for other-orientation in advice. From the research findings, there was a moderately strong implication that norms of unsolicited advice-giving did not always apply to all situations. In the constructed situation about family drug problems, many respondents stated that they would always give advice, even when not requested. The distribution of responses was bimodal. This may substantiate claims be interpersonal communication researchers that the rules of interpersonal relationships supersede cultural norms.

Relational Studies of Advice

From this research, some degree of confidence can be placed in the ability to measure the dimensions posited. In relational studies, experimental manipulations of the dimensions would be helpful, since some relationships may be related through only one dimension. For example, the competence of an adviser may be entirely dependent upon the evaluative dimension. Offering criteria for evaluation by this adviser may imply expertise to the advisee. Conversely, the ability to effectively prescribe behavior may be the mark of a successful corporate manager. Of course, the consequences of advice have been disregarded. Prior to experimentation, tests of the ability to manipulate the dimensions should be made. In

addition, all attempts to manipulate the dimensions should be followed with a manipulation check.

In order to briefly examine potential avenues for advice research, two heuristic category schemes will be overlapped. First, the discussion will be divided by advice process, advice-seeking and advice-giving. Within each category, the implications for three types of communication will be examined, mass, organizational, and interpersonal.

Advice-seeking. Because the dimensions of advice have been described as evaluation and prescription, most researchers would suggest little impact or applicability to mass communication research. Yet, several applications may be plausible. If individuals are in a situation of information uncertainty, then evaluative content in mass media messages may have an effect on a small segment of the population. But a more important consideration may be the effect of mass media establishing or providing criteria which an adviser uses to give advice to the advice-seeker. This would suggest a positive relationship between evaluative content in messages and the propensity to use those evaluations when transmitting information to others. In some instances, e.g. consumer product information, mass media messages may literally establish evaluation criteria for a product. This general statement, however, would be constrained by the technical sophistication of the product, and importance of the decision to the advice-seeker. As stated earlier, the process of advice-seeking seems to mean a shift

in interest to interpersonal sources of information.

In organizational settings, as Blau (1955) suggested, advice-seeking is an important activity for employees. An interesting comparison of information and advice networks might reveal differences in expertise in various levels of the organization. Employees often know what person in the organization can tell them what behavior is 'right' in all situations. The frequency of advice-seeking may be an important index of an individual's self-concept in the work environment.

The self-concept is also intertwined with interpersonal communication. A potential advisee often attempts to find evaluative inforamtion about the relationship between the self and an object. In some cases, the object to be evaluated is the self, as with the question, "Am I the kind of person who should do that?" Significant other research (Haller, et al., 1968), opinion leader studies (Rogers & Shoemaker, 1971), and word-of-mouth advertising inquiries (Arndt, 1967) seem to support evaluative searching by the potential advisee. One cannot deny that a few individuals use this same advice-seeking behavior to manipulate others. By conferring status on the adviser, the advisee hopes to gain relational benefits in return. In these situations, important differences may exist for the dimensional type of information requested by the advisee.

Solicited advice-giving. One would expect to see more prescriptions given when advice is solicited, than when it is not. This expectation would not be uniform, however. In therapeutic settings the professional counselor may rely on evaluations, while a physician counterpart may offer prescriptive information. There may be a relational neutrality for medical doctors in offering evaluations rather than prescriptions. Certainly, the doctor is more responsible for the patient's behavior when he or she says, "Have this operation within a week," than when the evaluative statement, "In my professional opinion you should have this operation within a week," is offered. This may be a question more suitable to the normative ethicist than the communication researcher, however.

In organizational settings, the adviser for solicited advice-seekers is in control. Therefore, an examination of the openness or closedness of the advice may indicate exerted power over another person in the organization. Single prescriptive statements may deny the advisee's ability to make crucial decisions; evaluative statements may imply that the advisee is capable of making the decisions. Solicited advice-giving would be difficult to study in natural settings because of the high frequency of information seekers searching for the same sources of information. There is certainly overlap between evaluative and informative information disseminators.

Interpersonal research with solicited advice-giving might examine the degree to which married couples solicit advice from each other, as opposed to advice-seeking from

outside the family system. The manner in which the solicited advice is delivered would be expected to indicate the status of the relationship. Prescriptive advice would imply a dependency in the relationship; evaluative advice an interdependent relationship.

Unsolicited advice-giving. Generally, advice has been distinguished from persuasion in the following manner. Advice is rational, evaluative or prescriptive information, which is cast from the receiver's perspective. It is usually sought by the advisee. When advice is given without solicitation, it cannot be differentiated from persuasion. Often the advisee cannot differentiate it. Yet, the propensity to give unsolicited advice may be an important indicator for several interpersonal communication variables. An overzealous advice-giver may be trying to control his or her environment more than others. Therefore, a relationship between desire for control, dogmatism, and several other variables may be related to unsolicited advice-giving. The ability of these advice-givers to successfully given unsolicited advice certainly requires the same social perception skills involved in successful interpersonal communication. These would be the perception of individual advisee's as idiosyncratic entities, rather than stereotypes. The directness of persuasion attempts could be related to the type of information provided by the adviser. Evaluative statements would be less direct attempts than prescriptive statements. In similar ways, the variables of

interpersonal persuasion--credibility, message organization, rational argument--may be related to unsolicited advice-giving.

Conclusion

In summary, an empirical model of advice was derived from dialectical arguments. While some of the ordinary language concepts did not translate and transfer to the empirical setting, the model performed quite well. A conservative estimate of the benefits might include, the explication of an empirical construct from a nonempirical literature as a method of investigating primitive phenomena, a better understanding of what others mean by advice, and 10 questions which describe two dimensions of advice. Critics would probably argue that the empirics alone destroy the richness of the advice construct. The liberal benefits may be a better understanding of fundamental communication phenomena, such as, the manner through which information sources are chosen, and the reinforcement of a fundamental connection between the philosophy of language and communication as a scientific discipline.

APPENDIX A

Pretest Means and Standard Deviations for Original Items

APPENDIX A

The following three tables indicate: (1) the pretest means and standard deviations for the original 10 instrument items, Table 9. Items with an (*) were changed prior to the revised pretest. Restrictiveness was dropped from the model; soundness and applicability were eliminated and other variables substituted. (2) Table 10 shows the revised pretest means and standard deviations for final instrument items. (3) Table 11 shows the intercorrelation matrix for the items.

Table 9

Pretest means and standard deviations for original items.

Variable	Mean 1	Std. Dev.1	Mean 2	Std. Dev.2
1. Suggestion clarity*	4.56	1.81	5.52	2.53
2. Perceived control*	4.56	1.59	4.50	2.25
3. Source's desires*	4.56	2.07	5.74	2.57
4. Explicitness reasons	4.00	2.29	4.11	2.72
5. Applicability*	6.22	1.20	6.33	1.57
6. Soundness*	6.44	1.88	6.54	1.68
7. Evaluation good points	3.44	2.13	3.69	2.20
8. Restrictiveness*	3.44	2.40	3.75	2.44
9. How good or bad	6.33	1.41	6.42	1.92
10. Amount of information	3.22	2.39	3.44	2.62

1 = test population
2 = social scientists and high school graduates

Table 10

Means and standard deviations for final instrument items.

Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation
x_1	5.52	1.60
y_1	3.89	1.82
y_2	4.69	2.17
y_2	3.01	2.01
y_3	5.92	1.63
y_4	4.22	2.19
y_5	4.28	1.42
y_6	2.89	2.31

Variable Index

x_1 = Specificity of suggestions

y_1 = Perceived pressure

y_2 = Source's desire

x_2 = Evaluation of good and bad points

y_3 = Understanding

y_4 = Explicitness of reasons

y_5 = Rationality of advice

y_6 = Amount of information

Table 11

Intercorrelation matrix of the original test items.

	VAR 1	VAR 2	VAR 3	VAR 4	VAR 5	VAR 6	VAR 7	VAR 8	VAR 9	VAR 10
VAR 1	1.000	.268	.654	.252	.439	.326	.002	.367	-.369	.256
VAR 2		1.000	.311	.301	.309	.082	.594	.682	.342	.180
VAR 3			1.000	.230	.361	.390	-.108	.462	-.180	.355
VAR 4				1.000	.458	.385	.319	.366	-.095	.351
VAR 5					1.000	.703	.319	.485	-.147	.693
VAR 6						1.000	.274	.359	-.316	.743
VAR 7							1.000	.465	.319	.090
VAR 8								1.000	.115	.168
VAR 9									1.000	-.270
VAR 10										1.000

VAR 1 = Clarity of suggestions
VAR 2 = Perceived control
VAR 3 = Source's desires
VAR 4 = Explicitness of reasons
VAR 5 = Applicability
VAR 6 = Soundness
VAR 7 = Amount of information
VAR 8 = Evaluation of good/bad points
VAR 9 = Restrictiveness
VAR 10 = How good or bad

APPENDIX B

Structual Equations for the Empirical Model of Advice, Including the Measurement Model

APPENDIX B

Structural Equations for the Empirical Model of Advice, Including the Measurement Model



$$Y_1 = \lambda_1 \xi_1 + \varepsilon_1$$
$$Y_2 = \lambda_2 \xi_1 + \varepsilon_2$$
$$y_3 = \lambda_3 \xi_2 + \varepsilon_3$$
$$y_4 = \lambda_4 \xi_2 + \varepsilon_4$$
$$y_5 = \lambda_5 \xi_2 + \varepsilon_5$$
$$y_6 = \lambda_6 \xi_2 + \varepsilon_6$$

$$x_1 = \lambda_7 \xi_1 + \delta_1$$
$$x_2 = \lambda_8 \xi_1 + \delta_2$$

Figure 6

Symbol reference.

APPENDIX C

Final Test Instrument
Validity Subsample

APPENDIX C

Two questionnaires are enclosed in this appendix. The first questionnaire is the final test instrument. The second is the questionnaire for the validity subsample.

Part 1 Instructions:
WRITE ADVICE for several CLOSE FRIENDS

Part 1 Instructions

On the next two pages you will be asked to WRITE ADVICE for several CLOSE FRIENDS.

Please work carefully, but as rapidly as possible. STOP after you finish writing the three pieces of advice.

PLEASE WRITE SO OTHER PEOPLE CAN READ IT!

Advice 1

Your "close friend" is a Junior at Michigan State trying to decide whether to stay in school next year. This person has a grade point of 2.65. During the past year, the student has told you several times that it was hard to decide on a college major. WHAT ADVICE WOULD YOU GIVE THIS STUDENT?

Advice 2

Another friend lives in a house off-campus. In this house, two people share a bedroom. Your friend likes all but one of the six people who live in the house. Unfortunately, the person disliked shares the same bedroom. During the past few weeks, the roomate has been obnoxious, unfriendly, and inconsiderate to your friend. How would you advise your friend to handle this problem, WITHOUT TELLING THE FRIEND TO MOVE OUT OF THE HOUSE?

Advice 3 Two older friends of yours are having trouble with their teenage children. Their two teenagers have been involved with drugs in school and both are having trouble with coursework. The parents feel that since you are closer to the age of these children your suggestions would be helpful to them. WHAT ADVICE WOULD YOU GIVE THESE PARENTS?

STOP!

Do not work on the following pages.

Part 2 Instructions

Read each piece of advice. As you read it, put an (X) in the appropriate place on the scales below. There are 4 pages to score for each questionnaire you read (two).

PUT THE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER YOU ARE SCORING IN THE CIRCLE.

Advice 1

1. How SPECIFIC are the suggestions about what the friend SHOULD DO in this advice?

VERY SPECIFIC ____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ NOT SPECIFIC
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

2. From the WORDING and TONE of this advice, how much PRESSURE does it seem to put on the friend to do what the advice says?

MUCH PRESSURE ____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ NO PRESSURE
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

3. How much UNDERSTANDING does this advice show for the friend's problem?

MUCH UNDERSTANDING ____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ NO UNDERSTANDING
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

4. From WORDING alone, how EASY is it to tell what the adviser REALLY WANTS the friend to do?

VERY EASY ____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ VERY DIFFICULT
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

5. How COMPLETELY has this advice talked about the GOOD or BAD POINTS of the friend's CHOICES in this situation?

VERY COMPLETELY ____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ VERY INCOMPLETELY
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

6. How CLEARLY STATED are the REASONS for the advice that is given?

VERY CLEAR ____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ VERY UNCLEAR
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

7. How WELL THOUGHT OUT is this piece of advice?

VERY WELL THOUGHT OUT ____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ NOT WELL THOUGHT OUT
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

8. If this advice IS USED, how much will it RESTRICT the use of OTHER SOLUTIONS to the friend's problem?

VERY RESTRICTIVE ____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ VERY UNRESTRICTIVE
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

9. How much INFORMATION does this advice GIVE the friend?

MUCH INFORMATION ____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ NO INFORMATION
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1



Advice 2

1. How SPECIFIC are the suggestions about what the friend SHOULD DO in this advice?

VERY SPECIFIC ____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ NOT SPECIFIC
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

2. From the WORDING and TONE of this advice, how much PRESSURE does it seem to put on the friend to do what the advice says?

MUCH PRESSURE ____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ NO PRESSURE
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

3. How much UNDERSTANDING does this advice show for the friend's problem?

MUCH UNDERSTANDING ____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ NO UNDERSTANDING
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

4. From WORDING alone, how EASY is it to tell what the adviser REALLY WANTS the friend to do?

VERY EASY ____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ VERY DIFFICULT
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

5. How COMPLETELY has this advice talked about the GOOD or BAD POINTS of the friend's CHOICES in this situation?

VERY COMPLETELY ____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ VERY INCOMPLETELY
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

6. How CLEARLY STATED are the REASONS for the advice that is given?

VERY CLEAR ____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ VERY UNCLEAR
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

7. How WELL THOUGHT OUT is this piece of advice?

VERY WELL THOUGHT OUT ____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ NOT WELL THOUGHT OUT
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

8. If this advice IS USED, how much will it RESTRICT the use of OTHER SOLUTIONS to the friend's problem?

VERY RESTRICTIVE ____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ VERY UNRESTRICTIVE
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

9. How much INFORMATION does this advice GIVE the friend?

MUCH INFORMATION ____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ NO INFORMATION
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Advice 3

1. How SPECIFIC are the suggestions about what the friend SHOULD DO in this advice?

VERY SPECIFIC ____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ NOT SPECIFIC
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

2. From the WORDING and TONE of this advice, how much PRESSURE does it seem to put on the friend to do what the advice says?

MUCH PRESSURE ____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ NO PRESSURE
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

3. How much UNDERSTANDING does this advice show for the friend's problem?

MUCH UNDERSTANDING ____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ NO UNDERSTANDING
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

4. From WORDING alone, how EASY is it to tell what the adviser REALLY WANTS the friend to do?

VERY EASY ____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ VERY DIFFICULT
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

5. How COMPLETELY has this advice talked about the GOOD or BAD POINTS of the friend's CHOICES in this situation?

VERY COMPLETELY ____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ VERY INCOMPLETELY
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

6. How CLEARLY STATED are the REASONS for the advice that is given?

VERY CLEAR ____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ VERY UNCLEAR
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

7. How WELL THOUGHT OUT is this piece of advice?

VERY WELL THOUGHT OUT ____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ NOT WELL THOUGHT OUT
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

8. If this advice IS USED, how much will it RESTRICT the use of OTHER SOLUTIONS to the friend's problem?

VERY RESTRICTIVE ____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ VERY UNRESTRICTIVE
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

9. How much INFORMATION does this advice GIVE the friend?

MUCH INFORMATION ____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ NO INFORMATION
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Instructions Please go back and read each of the three pieces of advice again. Then, answer the following question for each piece of advice.

Advice 1

10. Considering the friend's problem, how GOOD or BAD is this piece of advice?

VERY GOOD ____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ VERY BAD
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Advice 2

10. Considering the friend's problem, how GOOD or BAD is this piece of advice?

VERY GOOD ____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ VERY BAD
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Advice 3

10. Considering the friend's problem, how GOOD or BAD is this piece of advice?

VERY GOOD ____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ VERY BAD
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Part 3 Instructions

Please write your age in the first blank, then put an (X) in the appropriate boxes (□).

1. AGE _____

2. SEX female □
   male □

3. MARITAL STATUS unmarried □
   married □

4. LEVEL IN SCHOOL Freshman □
   Sophomore □
   Junior □
   Senior □

5. APPROXIMATE GRADE POINT 4.0 □
   3.5 □
   3.0 □
   2.5 □
   2.0 □
   1.5 □
   1.0 □

Part 1 Instructions:
READ the SITUATIONS

Part 1 Instructions

Please READ the SITUATIONS, below. Then, place an (X) in the appropriate blank on the scales below the situation.

SITUATION 1. Your close friend is a Junior at Michigan State, trying to decide whether to stay in school next year. This person has a grade point of 2.65. During the past year, the student has told you several times that it was hard to decide on a college major.

1. How REALISTIC is this situation for students at M.S.U.?

VERY REALISTIC ____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ VERY UNREALISTIC
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

2. How OFTEN would you say that situations like this one occur?

VERY OFTEN ____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ NEVER
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

3. How OFTEN would you give advice to the friend in this situation, if you were NOT ASKED for it?

ALWAYS ____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ NEVER
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

SITUATION 2. Another friend lives in a house off-campus. In this house, two people share a bedroom. Your friend likes all but one of the six people who live in the house. Unfortunately, the person disliked shares the same bedroom. During the past few weeks, the roomate has been obnoxious, inconsiderate, and unfriendly to your friend.

1. How REALISTIC is this situation for a student at M.S.U.?

VERY REALISTIC ____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ VERY UNREALISTIC
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

2. How OFTEN would you say that situations like this one occur?

VERY OFTEN ____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ NEVER
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

3. How OFTEN would you give advice to the friend in this situation, if you were NOT ASKED for it?

ALWAYS ____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ NEVER
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

SITUATION 3. Two older friends of yours are having trouble with their teenage children. Their two teenagers have been involved with drugs in school and both are having trouble with coursework. The parents feel that since you are closer to the age of these children, your suggestions would be helpful to them.

1. How REALISTIC is this situation for a student at M.S.U.?

VERY REALISTIC ____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ VERY UNREALISTIC
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

2. How OFTEN would you say that situations like this one occur?

VERY OFTEN ____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ NEVER
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

3. How OFTEN would you give advice to the friend in this situation, if you were NOT ASKED for it?

ALWAYS ____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ NEVER
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Part 2 Instructions

Read each piece of advice. As you read it, put an (X) in the appropriate place on the scales below. There are 4 pages to score for each questionnaire you read (two).

PUT THE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER YOU ARE SCORING IN THE CIRCLE.

Advice 1

1. How SPECIFIC are the suggestions about what the friend SHOULD DO in this advice?

VERY SPECIFIC ____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ NOT SPECIFIC
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

2. From the WORDING and TONE of this advice, how much PRESSURE does it seem to put on the friend to do what the advice says?

MUCH PRESSURE ____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ NO PRESSURE
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

3. How much UNDERSTANDING does this advice show for the friend's problem?

MUCH UNDERSTANDING ____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ NO UNDERSTANDING
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

4. From WORDING alone, how EASY is it to tell what the adviser REALLY WANTS the friend to do?

VERY EASY ____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ VERY DIFFICULT
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

5. How COMPLETELY has this advice talked about the GOOD or BAD POINTS of the friend's CHOICES in this situation?

VERY COMPLETELY ____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ VERY INCOMPLETELY
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

6. How CLEARLY STATED are the REASONS for the advice that is given?

VERY CLEAR ____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ VERY UNCLEAR
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

7. How WELL THOUGHT OUT is this piece of advice?

VERY WELL THOUGHT OUT ____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ NOT WELL THOUGHT OUT
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

8. If this advice IS USED, how much will it RESTRICT the use of OTHER SOLUTIONS to the friend's problem?

VERY RESTRICTIVE ____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ VERY UNRESTRICTIVE
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

9. How much INFORMATION does this advice GIVE the friend?

MUCH INFORMATION ____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ NO INFORMATION
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1



Advice 2

1. How SPECIFIC are the suggestions about what the friend SHOULD DO in this advice?

VERY SPECIFIC ____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ NOT SPECIFIC
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

2. From the WORDING and TONE of this advice, how much PRESSURE does it seem to put on the friend to do what the advice says?

MUCH PRESSURE ____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ NO PRESSURE
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

3. How much UNDERSTANDING does this advice show for the friend's problem?

MUCH UNDERSTANDING ____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ NO UNDERSTANDING
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

4. From WORDING alone, how EASY is it to tell what the adviser REALLY WANTS the friend to do?

VERY EASY ____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ VERY DIFFICULT
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

5. How COMPLETELY has this advice talked about the GOOD or BAD POINTS of the friend's CHOICES in this situation?

VERY COMPLETELY ____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ VERY INCOMPLETELY
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

6. How CLEARLY STATED are the REASONS for the advice that is given?

VERY CLEAR ____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ VERY UNCLEAR
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

7. How WELL THOUGHT OUT is this piece of advice?

VERY WELL THOUGHT OUT ____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ NOT WELL THOUGHT OUT
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

8. If this advice IS USED, how much will it RESTRICT the use of OTHER SOLUTIONS to the friend's problem?

VERY RESTRICTIVE ____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ VERY UNRESTRICTIVE
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

9. How much INFORMATION does this advice GIVE the friend?

MUCH INFORMATION ____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ NO INFORMATION
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Advice 3

1. How SPECIFIC are the suggestions about what the friend SHOULD DO in this advice?

VERY SPECIFIC ____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ NOT SPECIFIC
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

2. From the WORDING and TONE of this advice, how much PRESSURE does it seem to put on the friend to do what the advice says?

MUCH PRESSURE ____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ NO PRESSURE
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

3. How much UNDERSTANDING does this advice show for the friend's problem?

MUCH UNDERSTANDING ____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ NO UNDERSTANDING
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

4. From WORDING alone, how EASY is it to tell what the adviser REALLY WANTS the friend to do?

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5. How COMPLETELY has this advice talked about the GOOD or BAD POINTS of the friend's CHOICES in this situation?

VERY COMPLETELY ____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ VERY INCOMPLETELY
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

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VERY CLEAR ____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ VERY UNCLEAR
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

7. How WELL THOUGHT OUT is this piece of advice?

VERY WELL THOUGHT OUT ____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ NOT WELL THOUGHT OUT
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

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VERY RESTRICTIVE ____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ VERY UNRESTRICTIVE
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

9. How much INFORMATION does this advice GIVE the friend?

MUCH INFORMATION ____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ NO INFORMATION
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Instructions Please go back and read each of the three pieces of advice again. Then, answer the following question for each piece of advice.

Advice 1

10. Considering the friend's problem, how GOOD or BAD is this piece of advice?

VERY GOOD ___:___:___:___:___:___:___:___:___ VERY BAD
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Advice 2

10. Considering the friend's problem, how GOOD or BAD is this piece of advice?

VERY GOOD ___:___:___:___:___:___:___:___:___ VERY BAD
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Advice 3

10. Considering the friend's problem, how GOOD or BAD is this piece of advice?

VERY GOOD ___:___:___:___:___:___:___:___:___ VERY BAD
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Part 3 Instructions

Please write your age in the first blank, then put an (X) in the appropriate boxes (□).

1. AGE _____

2. SEX female □
male □

3. MARITAL STATUS unmarried □
married □

4. LEVEL IN SCHOOL Freshman □
Sophomore □
Junior □
Senior □

5. APPROXIMATE GRADE POINT 4.0 □
3.5 □
3.0 □
2.5 □
2.0 □
1.5 □
1.0 □

Part 4 Instructions

USING THE QUESTIONNAIRE you've been given, score the second and third pieces of advice, USING THESE SCALES.

PLEASE WORK CAREFULLY!

Advice 2

1. How much does it SOUND like this adviser is TRYING TO PERSUADE the friend to do what is suggested?

VERY PERSUASIVE ____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ NOT PERSUASIVE
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

2. How well has the adviser ANALYZED the friend's situation?

VERY WELL ANALYZED ____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ NOT WELL ANALYZED
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

3. How COMPLETELY has the adviser discussed the CONSEQUENCES of the friend's choices in this situation?

VERY COMPLETELY ____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ VERY INCOMPLETELY
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

4. How much KNOWLEDGE about possible solutions to the problem did this friend receive from the adviser?

MUCH KNOWLEDGE ____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ NO KNOWLEDGE
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Advice 3

1. How much does it SOUND like this adviser is TRYING TO PERSUADE the friend to do what is suggested?

VERY PERSUASIVE ____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ NOT PERSUASIVE
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

2. How well has the adviser ANALYZED the friend's situation?

VERY WELL ANALYZED ____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ NOT WELL ANALYZED
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

3. How COMPLETELY has the adviser discussed the CONSEQUENCES of the friend's choices in this situation?

VERY COMPLETELY ____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ VERY INCOMPLETELY
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

4. How much KNOWLEDGE about possible solutions to the problem did the friend receive from the adviser?

MUCH KNOWLEDGE ____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ NO KNOWLEDGE
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

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