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C) Copyright by Abdallah Hasan Alabbadi 1981 NOMADIC SETTLEMENTS IN SAUDI ARABIA: A SOCIO-HISTORICAL AND ANALYTICAL CASE STUDY By Abdallah Hasan Alabbadi A DISSERTATION Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Sociology 1981 To the memory of As-Sayed Mohammad Tahir Aldabbagh 1891-1959, the pioneer in founding modern education in Saudi Arabia. He was the first to found Tahdheer Albelathat School in Makkah. To my mother, Fatimah, whose sacrifice and patience made this work possible, and to my wife Albatoul and my children, Manal, Hani and Mohammad. Together we have shared troubled and joyful times. ii ABSTRACT NOMADIC SETTLEMENTS IN SAUDI ARABIA: A SOCIO-HISTORICAL AND ANALYTICAL CASE STUDY BY Abdallah Hasan Alabbadi This study is a socio-historical investigation into the nomadic problem in Saudi Arabia. The central sociological problem addressed in this research is the adoption of social change on the part of a tradi- tional society. Specifically, the study focuses on the adoption of a sedentary life style by the Bedouins of Saudi Arabia. For some time nomadism in Arabia has been confronted with major economic and social structural problems. The Bedouin, linked closely to a harsh environ- ment, is attempting to resolve the problems that have arisen by trying out a more favorable, sedentary environment. Throughout the historical past, the Bedouins of the Arabian peninsula have proved to be a highly adaptable people and have successfully adjusted their way of life to the changes taking place in the desert. After characterizing the social and economic structure of Bedouin society, including the hgm§,the diggland other aspects of Bedouin life, the economic basis of Bedouin society before the discovery of oil is analyzed. We then examine the tribe as a political unit and the im- portance of tribal structure before the emergence of the modern Saudi state. Bedouin settlements in Saudi Arabia, are viewed as being either voluntary/spontaneous or planned/directed. Voluntary settlement refers Abdallah Hasan Alabbadi to the adoption of sedentary life as a result of free choice. Planned settlement refers to governmental plans and policies designed to en- courage Bedouin tribes to settle out. Both types of settlements have been explored, explained, and analyzed. The Saudi government, through different planned projects to settle out the Bedouins, did not have much success. We analyze the reasons behind the failure of these projects. The voluntary Bedouin settlement is the second type analyzed in this study. Most of the successful Bedouin settlements in Saudi Arabia and in neighboring Middle Eastern countries are of this type. The bulk are concentrated around urban centers and the oil fields. Several fac— tors have contributed to the success of spontaneous settlements, and at the same time resulted in a decline of nomadism. Environmental factors, such as the drought and the consequent reduction of pastures, as well as the termination of the hgma system, have encouraged the Bedouins to settle spontaneously. Political factors such as the growing power of the central government and the loss of the political functions of the tribe were responsible for Bedouins to quit nomadism. Economic factors, including the discovery and development of oil have had a major impact on the Bedouin way of life. Social and cultural factors have also led the Bedouins to join the mass migration to cities and the oil centers. The raiding of caravans or of other tribes for example, formerly a major source of income, has been abolished by the government. The change from camel raising to sheep raising occurred for a number of reasons. First, the camel lost its importance as a means of transportation and as a major food source. Second, the Ministry of Agriculture increased its efforts to provide pump-wells in tribal regions. And third, the introduction of the truck helped to make the camel obsolete. All the factors mentioned have played a major role in convincing the nomadic people to establish spontaneous settlements. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The educational experience of Third World students in American universities is very challenging. Throughout our stay in East Lansing, Michigan, my wife and children as well as myself had to struggle in order to overcome many problems. This study would not have been possible without the assistance received from many kind people. I wish to express my deep gratitude to my committee chairman, Professor J. Allan Beegle for his generous assistance, positive suggestions and supervision of this study. The support of Professor and Mrs. Beegle has been a source of encouragement and strength to me and my family during our stay at Michigan State Uni- versity. I feel very fortunate to have distinguished members of the Sociology Department as members of my Ph.D. committee. My special thanks and sincere gratitude go to Professors John Useem, Wilbur B. Brookover and James B. McKee for their advice, guidance and valuable suggestions and observations. I take this opportunity to thank the University of Riyadh for granting me a scholarship to complete my advanced studies. I wish to extend my thanks and gratitude to the former President of Riyadh Uni- versity, Dr. Abdalaziz Al-Fadda as well as to the current president, Dr. Mansour Al-Turki. I would also like to thank the following: Dr. Abdallah Al-Nafi, Dr. Homud Al-Badr, Dr. Saleh Al-‘Adhl, and Dr. iii Asad Abdo, all of the Riyadh University. A special expression of thanks is given Dr. Mansour Al-Hazmi, the former Dean of Faculty of Arts at Riyadh University and to my friends and colleagues in the Department of Sociology of the same university. Finally, I extend my gratitude to the members of the Saudi Arabian Educational Mission in Houston, Texas, especially to Mr. Sobhi Al-Harthy, Mr. Melyhan Al-Thebaity and Mrs. Moreen Wharton. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Page LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii Chapter PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Background of the Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 History of Settlement Projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Definition and Characteristics of Saudi Arabian Bedouins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 The Problem Focus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Methodology and Data Collection . . . . . . . . . . . 18 II. MODERN SAUDI ARABIA: A BRIEF BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . 22 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Geographical Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Human Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Social and Cultural Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Administrative Districts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Political and Economic Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 III. REVIEW OF LITERATURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 Western Literature on the Bedouins . . . . . . . . . . . 38 Arabic Literature on the Bedouins . . . . . . . . . . 52 Literature on the Impact of Modernization on Traditional Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 IV. BEDOUIN SOCIETY IN ARABIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 Who are the Bedouins? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 The Question of Bedouin Numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 Social Structure of the Bedouins . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 Bedouin Raiding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 Tribal Territory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 The Economic Base of Bedouin Society . . . . . . . . . 87 The Camel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 Other Animals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9O Chapter V. EARLY BEDOUIN SETTLEMENTS (Hijar 1912-1930) . . . Najd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ibn Abdal Wahhab and Wahhabism . . . . . . Origins of the Ikhwan Settlements . . . . . . . . . Social Life in the Hijar . . . . . . . . . . . The Military Aspect of the Settlements . . . . Reasons for Success and Failure . . . . . . The Wahhabi Movement and Other Similar Religious Movements in Libya and in the Sudan . . . . VI. RECENT BEDOUIN SETTLEMENTS 1938-1970 . . . . . . Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Al-Kharj Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Another Recent Settlement . . . . . . . . . Wadi Al- Sarhan Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Objectives of the Project . . . . . . . . . . Tabouk Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Organization of the Pastures Project . . . . . Reasons for Failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . Recent Hijar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Spontaneous Settlement Around Urban and Oil Centers . The Impact of Oil on Bedouin Life . . . . . . . . . Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VII. THE KING FAISAL MODEL SETTLEMENT PROJECT AT HARADH The Haradh Area Project . . . . . . . . The Objectives of the Haradh Project The Concept of the Project . . . . . . . . Stages of Haradh Project . . . . . . . . . Factors in Success or Failure . . . . . . . . . . . . The Al-Murrah Tribe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Historical Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Al-Murrah Territory . Social Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . Economic Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Al-Murrah Attitudes Toward Settlement . . . Final Thought on the Project . . . . . . . . Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VIII. EVALUATION OF HYPOTHESES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IX. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION . . . . . . . Summary and Conclusions . . . . . . . . . Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi Page 96 96 99 103 113 117 118 121 129 129 132 134 136 136 138 139 143 143 146 150 157 162 163 165 167 171 172 174 174 176 178 184 186 189 191 196 208 208 214 228 Table LIST OF TABLES Page Data Concerning the Number and Proportion of Settled and Nomadic Population in the Census of 1962-1963 . . . . . . 75 Data Concerning the Number and Percentage of Bedouins and Settlers in Saudi Arabia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 Percentage of Bedouins in Different Regions of saudi Arabia 0 O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 77 The Names of Some Tribes and Their Territories in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 The Number of People Who Will Settle in Tabouk Project . 139 vii Figure LIST OF FIGURES Page Physical Features of Saudi Arabia . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 Location of Major Tribes in Saudi Arabia . . . . . . . . 80 Location of the Major Early Hijar in Saudi Arabia, 1912-1930 c o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o 114 Location of Recent Bedouin Settlements in Saudi Arabia, 1939-1970 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140 General Map of the King Faisal Settlement Project at Haradh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166 The Dirah of the Al-Murrah Tribe . . . . . . . . . . . . 179 Lineages and Clans of the Al-Murrah Tribe . . . . . . . . 183 viii o h, a In the Name of Allah, the @ ME? Compassionate, the Merciful I And say: M y Lord! Increase me in knowledge—Quid» / PREFACE My desire to study Bedouin settlement was less a matter of choice than an effort to pursue my deep interest in Bedouin life going back to 1970 when I worked three years for the Central Planning Organization in Riyadh. During this period, I read a great deal of literature about nomadism, and I conducted research about the Bedouins. When the King Faisal Settlement Project at Haradh in Wadi as-Sahba was completed in 1970 (the project was initiated in the early 19605), I was offered the job of directing the project by the vice president of the Central Plan- ning Organization. I declined the offer on the basis of my belief that the project was insufficiently studied from a sociological point of view. Ironically, I have recently read two articles by one of the edi- tors of the Riyadh daily newspaper raising many questions about the failure of this project.1 Why had this project, considered one of the most ambitious, ex- pensive, and technically best—planned pilot projects in Bedouin settle- ment ever initiated by the government of Saudi Arabia, collapsed? Why was the largest and most sophisticated agricultural Bedouin settlement turned over to three commercial companies to become a mere commercial project producing milk and milk by-products? Most Saudi students, when planning to do field work about their country, would be eager to study this project. While many Saudi stu- dents wish to utilize their academic training in American universities to better understand their own culture and society, they meet many problems in conducting applied social research. Although the govern- ment of Saudi Arabia encourages students to do their research on their own country, problems develop in doing field research, among them the following: 1. Bureaucratic red tape may slow down the researcher. This is less likely if the research is built on an appraisal of, or is complimentary to the status quo, in which case the researcher can expect some help or cooperation. However, if the research is criti- cal or analytical, the researcher might hear a lot of excuses from the bureaucrats.2 Saudi Arabia is no exception among the Third World countries to the phenomenon of inadequate and in- accurate information and reliable statistics on population. This is especially true of statistics on Bedouins. It is not difficult for a researcher to locate some information, but at the same time, access problems arise from obstacles in the words, "confidential," "secret," and "top secret" data or information. One of the major problems facing the researcher is that Saudi Arabia represents terra incognita for sociological research. The last decade, however, has witnessed a changing direction toward this field of study. The nomads' romantic way of life, the camel, the fascination of the Arabian desert, and the mystery of the Empty Quarter (Al-Rub'a a1 Khali) to be sure, have captured the interest of western explorers and social historians, who have generally restricted their efforts to observing the Bedouins' daily life rather than conducting sociological studies about them.3 Still another problem is the absence of a national research center to collect and classify data and information for the purpose of research. The rela- tively young universities in Saudi Arabia have not tried to finance generously, or to motivate, scholars to conduct scientific research. The work of the National Center for Science and Technology is very limited and most of its emphasis is on natural science research and related subjects. Since it was founded in 1974, the High Council for Literature and Arts has contributed little to social research. FOOTNOTES lFozan Al Saleh Al-Dibybi, Al-Riyadh, No. 4648, Sunday, 10/5/80, p. 24; No. 4661, Monday, 10/27/80, p. 16. 21 have written to four top officials in Saudi Arabia requesting some information and data about my research without receiving any reply. Ironically enough, all four persons hold Ph.D. degrees from the United States. In 1979, I went to my country for the purpose of collecting my data. I visited the Central Planning Organization in which I had worked for three years to check a study cited by a Japanese author in her book Bedouin Village: A Study of a Saudi Arabian People in Transition; the study was entitled Bedouin Policy. This study was done by Stanford researchers in connection with the Saudi Development Plan. However, I was not able to see this study. 3The words nomads and Bedouins of Saudi Arabia in this study are used interchangeably. CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION Introduction Some western authors in recent years have joined the mass media in western countries in exploiting to an excessive degree the stereo- type of the Arabs. They try to express their anti-feeling by using some Bedouin characteristics in order to establish general propositions about the Arabs. In The Arab Mind, Patai points out "honor in the Arab world is a generic concept which embraces many different forms."1 In his book, he considers Arabic honor as limited to such aspects as hav- ing many sons, preferring some kinds of work over other work, being able to defend oneself against one's enemy, and being generous and hos- pitable. Patai goes on to indicate that the honor concept in Bedouin society is easily extended to the family and the tribe, as well as to the nation as a whole. The author's purpose in citing these examples from Bedouin society is to assert to the western reader that these are the most important values in the Arab world. He uses such examples as a fabricated story manipulated by the Israeli intelligence agency (Mosad) during the 1967 war, to prove his point. As a manifestation of Bedouin characteristics, he asserts, some Arab leaders had to tell lies about the war, this being a necessary thing in the Arab world. We know that in every Arab-Israeli war, some Arab countries made exag- gerated statements about the wars; on the other hand, the Israeli government never released the exact figures about their casualties either. "It is a mistake, however, to exaggerate the behavioral conse- quences of Arabism by reifying it into a set of character traits sub- sumed under appellations such as 'the Arab mind.'"2 Writers, generally, starting with Burckhardt3 in the eighteenth century to Polk4 in the twentieth century, have described the Bedouins as one of the most simple, honest and frank people in the world. Another western writer, in The Arabs,5 has cited a completely false story about the Bedouin people in Saudi Arabia. On his way from Jeddah on the Red Sea to Riyadh, the author's car broke down in the middle of his trip. A sheikh of a Bedouin tribe living in that area invited him, along with his companion (a translator originally from Armenia), to be his guests and a lamb was slaughtered for their dinner. Then the sheikh, as a part of his hospitality (according to Kiernan's story), sent his most favored wives to choose from, and when the guest turned the offer down, the sheikh sent his daughters. The author, if he is not writing fiction, should not be allowed to tell such lies about those simple and noble Bedouins who took care of him in the des- ert. No one, even those having very little knowledge about the Bedouins, would believe such untruths. But the average weStern student who always bears or reads stereotypical statements about the Arabs, like "white-robed camel riders," "religious fanatics," sheikhs with ' might accept the story as fact. all that oil, money, and women,’ It seems to me that certain writers, especially some very well- known orientalists, like to explore the idea of Bedouin characteristics as the explanation for many aspects of Arab culture in the world today. Unfortunately, we find this famous German orientalist, Caskel, who participated with Oppenheim in writing Die Beduinen, pointing out that the inheritance of anarchy from the Bedouins and the lack of a "Prus- sian discipline"6 causes the Arab people to never unite. Inspired by misunderstanding, some other western writers devel- oped an image of the Arab Bedouins as irrational people. For these writers, the Bedouins are irresponsible in their use of national re— sources. The "irrationality" of the Bedouins is sometimes exemplified by their tendency to keep many animals and to try to add even more, which might be destructive of the environment. Each Bedouin tries to increase his number of domesticated animals. Peppelenbosch put it this way, "Unfortunately, he does not necessarily associate this number with the conditions of the pastures. This leads often to harmful over- grazing and may ultimately bring about a serious devastation of the natural pastures."7 This attitude toward Bedouin society is a mis- understanding, on the part of these writers, of the function of Bedouin economy and political life. There are many reasons for Bedouins having large herds. First, a Bedouin's wealth and social prestige among other tribes depends to a great extent on the size of his herds. Second, the Bedouin believes, from experience with the desert, that too much of a good thing will not last long, and he must therefore prepare for the future. Third, a large herd is a means of building up capital assets and of saving herds in case of droughts and epidemic. The basis of the Bedouin pastoral economy from which the Bedouins gain their liveli- hood emanates from domesticating a large number of animals. The large herd is something indispensable in desert life. Background of the Problem The rapid incorporation of virtually every part of the world into the international political and economic "community," signals the inten- sification of radical changes in the isolated, exotic tribal communities around the world. The process of modernization is broad and includes a variety of transformations of traditional or pre-modern societies in— to the types of technology and associated social and economic institu— tions that characterize the "advanced," economically prosperous, and relatively politically stable societies. Except for the Bedouins, every group, whether villagers or settlers, in Saudi Arabia has been or is being helped through organized assistance programs managed by govern- ment agencies. The minimal governmental help the Bedouins have re- ceived, whether in the past or the present, has been no more than in- cidental aid given to ameliorate emergencies. One might think that the nature of governmental help for the Bedouins is really a reflection of the Bedouin's life. The past governmental aid to the Bedouins did not help them much--a condition that seems likely to continue. During the past several years, the government has given aid to the Bedouins in the form of outright gifts (Ar. Sharha), but naturally such aid helped very few nomadic people. It may have ameliorated the recipients' difficulties in specific places and at specific periods of time, but this help was transitory because: (1) the assistance was in- troduced to solve only the immediate difficulties, and (2) the Bedouin, full of joy upon receiving the little bit of money, thought that the government would not turn him down if he asked for the same amount next year. The kind of feeling that resulted from the direct gift if 8“) u, influenced the Bedouins' thinking and imagination. In some ways, the negative consequences of the direct gifts, economically speaking, have been greater than their positive consequences. Nomadic life in Saudi Arabia at present is a source of livelihood L///’ for at least an estimated one million persons. They are poor if we compare them with other segments of the Saudi Arabian population, but they seem happy. An outsider sees the Bedouin as suffering much hard- ship and obtaining very little return for his efforts. But even in his worst days, the Bedouin is proud to fight, not only for the necessities of life, but also to preserve a way of life he believes to be the best and most honorable. One might say that he is fighting to preserve his own history as well as that of all Bedouins. This commitment to pre- serve and defend his way of life is a significant barrier for the Bedouin in considering the abandonment of nomadic traditions for set- lx” tlement in villages or cities. The present Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which covers an area about one-fourth the size of the United States, was created by the late King Abdul-Aziz Ibn Saud (1932)9 from a group of territories that had had little unity since the days of early Islam. Prior to the creation of the Saudi kingdom, the Arabian peninsula was occupied mostly by nomad- ic people who fought protracted wars among themselves for the purpose of enlarging their territorial domains or increasing their wealth. Such tribal wars were possible in the absence of an effective central government. The country's efforts to establish political unity have always fallen short of achieving the goal. Since prehistoric times, geographical conditions have been a cause of separation and disunity among the various tribes who inhabited the land. The Arabian desert, which has unique geographical conditions, has been a factor in weaken- ing political development at different times. Each tribe has its own social system which constitutes social rules defining the individual's relations with the family, the tribe as a social unit, moral rules based on the Quran and the Sonnah (the proph- et's sayings and acts) and lastly, economic rules within the family, the tribe and other tribes. Nomadic life is facing a great challenge. Efforts are being made to settle a great proportion of the Bedouins in villages where they can practice agriculture. Even though many thou- sands still move about throughout the country in a planned and delib- erate pattern to take advantage of rain-filled wells and pastures for their herds, about twenty percent of the population live a nomadic life. This percentage is decreasing steadily as young Bedouins obtain education and shift to urban life. Moreover, Bedouin families are settling nowadays on the edges of towns and cities and gradually are becoming integrated into urban society where they adopt new norms and increasingly use new methods of transportation and housing. In treating the social structure of Bedouin life in Saudi Arabia and future Bedouin settlement, we should raise two questions. First: Is it possible for the nomadic Bedouin, who is not tied to the land by a permanent residence or by ownership, as is the villager (Fellah), to conceive of the alien idea of a "home?" A home, as known by the settlers, would provide the Bedouin with a living and give him protec- tion. In contrast, the way of life for most of the Bedouins of Saudi Arabia values constant movement between their territory and the neigh- boring friendly lands looking for good grazing. It is not easy for ‘l 10 these nomads to conceive of a sedentary home, practicing the cultiva- tion of crops, or engaging in other activities. The second question to be asked is this: Assuming that the government of Saudi Arabia is serious and willing to provide the capital, technology, and other human resources to settle all the Bedouin tribes, are the Bedouins themselves ready to abandon their way of life and to integrate with the rest of the population? Is it possible to envisage, as a result of such a process, the end of nomadic life in Saudi Arabia?10 Al Bashir, a Saudi scholar and now a top government official, also expresses the idea that a nomadic livelihood is, by the natural turn of events, vanishing. "Eventually nomadic life in Saudi Arabia will vanish; it will vanish despite all tears shed and false statements declared by those who ro- manticize nomads."ll History of Settlement Projects In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, the unify- ing movement gained recognition by conquest in northern Najd, which is now the central province of modern Saudi Arabia. By 1912, Ibn Saud (the founder of modern Saudi Arabia) was acknowledged ruler of Najd. With the twin aims of creating the basis of a centralized political organization and of reviving the ideals of unitarians, he established the Ikhwan, a religious organization modeled on the Unitarian move- ment.12 The Ikhwan (mostly Bedouin tribes) were established in settled oasis colonies known as Hijar settlements, where agriculture was to be the basis of economic life, and most important, the reformed religion was to be the basis of social and spiritual life. Ibn Saud, in his efforts to unite the country and to control the scattered Bedouin ll nomads, created the first planned Bedouin settlement in Saudi Arabia at al-Artawiyah, about 180 miles north of Riyadh. About 200 Hijar settlements were established, mainly in Najd, and some of them, like the one just mentioned, expanded to a population of over 10,000. While the major professed aim of the Hijar settlements was to enable the settlers to live a truly religious life, some students of Arabian af- fairs have stated the purposes of the settlements to be as much mili- tary and political as religious. However, it has been said that the tribes were settled partly because close supervision of tribal loyalty to Ibn Saud could be made and partly because a large army could be mobilized from the Hijar on short notice. It is noteworthy that Ibn Saud himself supervised the destruction of some of these Hijar settle- ments, when they revolted against him in the late 19205, in order to remove the threats to his authority which these communities represented and to preserve the political unity of his country which had just been achieved. The second government plan to settle the Bedouins began in 1958 when the Wadi Assarhan project was initiated near the Jordanian border. The primary objective of this project was to provide quick relief for the victims of the drought. At the beginning, the government distrib- uted large amounts of food items, clothing, and money among the Bedou- ins in that area. The Kingdom's budget of 1960 contained a large amount of money to be distributed among the Bedouins who were eligible for such relief. This kind of relief was terminated in 1961, and the government established an agricultural projectinstead of giving mone- tary relief. This deciSion was made in response to the National Economic Q Development Program which clearly stated that the aim of this program was to raise the standard of living of the whole population, settlers and Bedouins alike. With the government concentrating on this agricultural project and with the famous drought that hit the country at that time, the Bedouins did not have any other choice. However, this emphasis on sedentary agriculture went counter to some customs and traditions of the Bedouins. In addition, the Bedouins were not prepared to prac- tice agriculture, and the project was doomed to failure.13 The most recent settlement plan to which the government has de- ‘i~ voted much effort is the King Faisal Settlement Project at Haradh. The basic objectives of the project are to reclaim 4,000 hectares (around 8,000 acres) of desert land and to settle at least 1,000 Bedouin families on a permanent basis. Other objectives include train- ing Saudi Arabian agricultural experts and extension service workers, and establishing a model farm for experimentation and training of Bedouin settlers. The government allocated over 30 million dollarslh to convert this desert land into a modern, well-watered agricultural oasis. K)- Definition and Characteristics of Saudi Arabian Bedouins This section is devoted to our definition of Bedouins and their attributes. Most of the time words mean different things to different people, especially when they do not have a common medium of communica- tion. Badawah, the Arabic word, is a term used to define a group of people that changes its place of residence periodically according to the seasons of the year. Al-Badawah in Arabic means constant moving, 13 or not to settle down in a permanent place during the whole year. Some of these groups are forced to change their places of residence from time to time or from season to season looking for good grazing and better weather for their animals. This condition exists among people living in the Steppes and in the deserts. Some geographers restrict using this term to the groups who move regularly, but tribes or groups that wander aimlessly without having a territory to return to (such as gypsies or groups that earn their living by hunting and gathering), do not come under this term. Even though it is difficult to prove, there are some people that don't have a permanent residence at all.15 The Arabic philologists say that the word Albadu is derived from appearance and from it comes the verb Bada. The latter word means to appear or show, because Bedouins' tents are distinct, conspicuous, and prominent in the desert. Also the 2393 do not have fancy houses to hide in as the city people do. Coon defines Badu_as "pastoral nomads of Arabian blood, speech, and culture who live in the Arabian Peninsula. Unlike primitive hunting and gathering, pastoral nomadism is a sophis- n 16 ticated system of exploiting land incapable of cultivation. Morroe Berger, in the Encyclopedia Americana, writes: "Bedouin, a desert and steppe dweller of the Middle East and North Africa." The word is a French translation of the Arabic badawiyin, which literally means, from its root, "people who become visible" (as in an open area). Now in numerical and economic decline, the few million who still remain follow regular routes in their wanderings. "Bedouins are Arab and Muslim, but the Bedouin nomads of North Africa, mainly Berbers by origin, differ from those of the eastern Arab World."17 By l4 definition, then, a Bedouin in this study is the nomad who has the following characteristics: 1. Lives in a tent (Ar. Bayt Sha'ar) and moves from place to place looking for grazing for his camels and sheep. 2. Earns most of his living from raising camels or sheep. 3. Believes that kinship or blood relationship is the basis of community in social and political life. People who go hunting, however, or go for pleasure in the desert once or more every year, and people who live permanently in the cities or villages and go to spend a couple months in the desert (Ar. 31235) are excluded from this definition, even though some of them might come from Bedouin origin. The Problem Focus Nomads have held the attention of western writers for a very long time, and it is possible to compile a very long bibliography concerning nomadic peoples in several languages. However, the simple truth is that very little is known about human behavior in nomadic societies. Certainly much of what passes for knowledge about Arabia's Bedouins is in fact fiction, or quite misleading. In particular, very little is known about the Bedouin settlements in Saudi Arabia. The theme of Bedouin settlement is of importance to the Saudi Arabian government, which has never ignored its Bedouin population. The social dilemma facing the government, after spending many million dollars in projects which have failed, is to come up with a general system capable of pro- viding the Bedouins with the necessary help to settle out and to in- tegrate them into the whole society. If the Bedouins wish to abandon 15 their nomadic way of life, then we will examine the extent to which their social and economic traditions and their cultural heritage must undergo modification. We also wish to understand how these changes would affect the economic position of the settlers. The Bedouin set- tlement process has not been conceptualized in much of the literature on nomadism. The process of settling the Bedouins in Arabia has been studied much less than has the Bedouin way of life. Little attention has been paid to the impact of settlement on the Bedouins themselves, and on the social and economic changes resulting from Bedouin settle- ment patterns. The central sociological problem addressed in this research is the adoption of social changes on the part of a traditional society. Specifically, the focus is the adoption of a sedentary life by the Bedouins of Saudi Arabia. Our interest centers on two types of "settling out" on the part of Bedouins. The~£igst is voluntary, that is, the adoption of sedentary life as a consequence of free choice. The second is involuntary,or governmental attempts to create sedentary communities of Bedouins. In the Arabic language, Isteetan and tawteen suggest the distinction just made. The former word meaning "to settle" reflects the internal power within Bedouin society that induces them to become sedentary. The latter expression "to settle" denotes the existence of an external force leading to settlement. The sociological problem is one in which two social systems, each with its own social structure and value orientation, come into contact with and achieve or fail to achieve socio-cultural linkage. In the case of voluntary settling-out, the two systems (the dominant society and the Bedouins' society) have been in contact and have 16 interacted, but the settling out was not a consequence of directed action. In the case of government programs, the Saudi government is a change agent seeking to introduce change into the target system, the nomadic Bedouins. The Saudi government, dominant in the sense of power and authority, is viewed as seeking to "modernize" Bedouin so- ciety and otherwise incorporate minority elements into the ascendant social system. This study seeks to explore several hypotheses concerning the con- ditions leading to the voluntary abandonment of nomadic life. It also seeks to explore hypotheses concerning the divergent structure and value orientation of the government and the Bedouin's social systems. Hypotheses will be developed concerning the degree of success or fail- ure in relation to planning objectives and variations in the structure of settlement patterns. This study also seeks to attempt a socio- logical analysis of nomadic settlement, the resultant settlement proc- ess and pattern in one country, Saudi Arabia. Hypotheses As suggested in the literature review (chapter 3), the hypotheses relate to two sets of prevailing circumstances in Bedouin settlement. The first set is derived from Isteetan or the internal power within Bedouin society that induces them to settle--such change is termed "immanent change" by Rogers and Burdge, 1951: In this instance, the two relevant systems are the Bedouins involved in settling and the dominant Saudi society. It is assumed that the two systems have been in communication and that each possesses a social structure and value orientation that is unique to each system, at least in some respects. 17 The second set of hypotheses is rooted in tawteen or a settling out due to some external force. Rogers and Burdge call this type "directed change." In this instance, particular tribes or groups of Bedouins are viewed as the target system while the government of Saudi Arabia is the change agent system. Again, each system possesses struc- ture and objectives that are not fully shared by the two systems. The first set of hypotheses relate to voluntary settling (that is, Isteetan), and derive from an examination of existing literature, from personal experience, or from existing theory related to social change. The rate of voluntary settling out on the part of Saudi Bedouins has increased as Saudi Arabia itself becomes more modernized. The voluntary settling out on the part of Saudi Bedouins is characterized by an intermediate stage of semi-nomadism. Necessary pre-conditions for agricultural-based vol- untary settling out on the part of Saudi Bedouins are a reliable water supply, arable plots for agri- cultural production, and supplementary grazing lands. The voluntary settling out on the part of Saudi Bedouins (a) occurs primarily within their own tribal territories and (b) primarily at a short distance from their traditional nomadic range. Hijar settlements (composed of one or a few tribes and usually located apart from established Saudi centers) and Hilal settlements (composed of many tribes and usually located near urban centers) are expected to differ in numerous ways. It is hypothesized that: 5. characterized by: Hijar, in contrast to Hilal settlements, are a. less contact and interaction with Saudi Society, 18 b. more complete development of an independent structure and sustenance organization; and c. more successful boundary maintenance (main- tenance of "old ways" and resistance to ele- ments of the dominant society). The second group of hypotheses concern outside agency plans to influence settlement (that is tawteen). The following hypotheses are based upon the literature, personal experience, and theory related to change. 1. Saudi Arabian programs to settle nomadic Bedouins have failed to succeed, in part due to failure of inter-system communication and failure by government to secure the legitimization of the program by tribal leaders. 2. Saudi Arabian programs to settle nomadic Bedouins have failed to succeed, in part due to failure by government to teach Bedouins the fundamentals of sedentary agriculture and living. 3. Governmental goals to be achieved through the set- tlement of Bedouins have changed markedly through time; at no time have these goals been formulated jointly by governmental personnel and Bedouin sheikhs. Methodology and Data Collection This study is a qualitative one relying heavily on the existing literature, both in Arabic and English. In addition to published work, data on the nomadic settlement process in the Arabian peninsula was ob- tained through personal observation in the field. Data were obtained from various published and unpublished sources in Arabic and in English. Basic material for this study was visits to a number of libraries, including the Central Planning Organi- zation library, Institute of Public Administration library, and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor in Saudi Arabia. Additional 19 sources included the Aramco library in Dhahran, the Saudi Arabian Statistical Yearbooks, and The Arab League and United Nations' reports and documents. Relevant unpublished works such as Ph.D. dissertations about nomadism in general and in Arabia in particular have been con- sulted. Several field work visits for the purpose of observing Bedouin phenomena were made to Saudi Arabia in the past few years. This dissertation is organized into nine chapters. The introduc- tory chapter has stated the problem focus, the hypotheses and the na- ture of the data base. The second chapter provides an introductory survey of modern Saudi Arabia--its geographic, socio-economic, and poli- tical setting. Chapter 3 is devoted to a review of selected literature dealing with Bedouins and Bedouinism in Saudi Arabia. This is followed by a description of Bedouins in Saudi Arabia including an appraisal of estimated numbers, and description of their social structural, tribal territory, economic base, and way of life. The next three chapters (5, 6, and 7) are devoted successively to the early Bedouin settlements (Hijar, 1912-1930), to recent Bedouin settlements, 1938- 1970, and finally to the King Faisal Model Settlement project at Haradh. Chapter 8 is devoted to a consideration of the guiding hypotheses in light of the long and complex history of Bedouin settlement in Saudi Arabia. Finally, chapter 9 is devoted to a brief summary and conclu- sion. FOOTNOTES 1 Raphael Patai, The Arab Mind (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973), p. 90. 2Michael C. Hudson, Arab Politics (New Haven and London: Yale University Press), p. 52. 3John L. Burckhardt, Notes on the Bedouins and Wahabys (New York: Johnson Reprint Corporation, 1967). 4William Polk. Passing Brave (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973). 5Thomas Kiernan, The Arabs (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1975), pp. 107-112. 6Warner Caskel, "The Bedouinization of Arabia," in Studies in Islamic Cultural History, G. E. Von Grunebaum, ed., Memoir No. 76. The American Anthropological Assoc. 56, (April 1954), pp. 36-46. 7P. G. N. Peppelenbosch, "Nomadism on the Arabian Peninsula," Tijdschrift Voor Econ. En Soc. Geografie 59:6 (November-December 1968), pp. 335-346. 8F. Bashir, The Case of Nomadism: To Settle or Not to Settle (Riyadh: Central Planning Organization, 1969), pp. 1-3. This report published in Arabic by the author in Al-Jazeerah Newspaper, No. 2897, 5 July 1980, pp. 1-3 in The Malaf.- 9His full name is Abdul-Aziz Ibn Abdual Rahman Alfaisal A1 Saud the founder of Modern Saudi Arabia. Most writers refer to him as Ibn Saud, and this abbreviation will be used here and throughout this study. 10A. S. Helaissi, "The Bedouins and Tribal Life in Saudi Arabia," International Social Science Journal 11:4 (1959), pp. 532-538. 11F. Bashir, op. cit., p. 1. 121 prefer to use the term Unitarian movement instead of Wahhabi movement, even though the latter term is widely used by Westerners and 20 21 some Easterners as well. Shaikh Mohammad Ibn Abdul-Wahhab (for whom the movement is named) called for the return to true Islam, which must follow the prophet Mohammad's direction. See George Rentz, Muhammad Ibn Abdal—Wahhab (1703-1792 and the Beginning of the Unitarian Empire in Arabia (Ph.D. dissertation, Berkeley: University of California, 1948). To the best of my knowledge this is the best resource written in English about the subject. 13Delegation of Saudi Arabia, in Ri'ayat al-Badu Wa-Tahdeeruhum Watawtinuhum ('Sedentarization and Organization of the Bedouins') vol. 1 (Cairo: Dar attib'ah al-Hadithah, 1965), pp. 442-443. l4Uhlig Dieter, "King Faisal Settlement Project, Haradh/Saudi Arabia," (Riyadh: Saudi Arabia: Wakuti Consulting Co., n.d.). 15Yosef Tony, Dictionary of Geographical Terms (Cairo: Dar Alfikr Alarabi, 1964), p. 73. l6Carleton S. Coon, "Badu," in The Encyclopedia of Islam, H.A.R. Gibb and J. H. Kramers ed., (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1960 2nd edition) p. 872. 17Morroe Berger, "Bedouin" in The Encyclopedia Americana, Inter- national Editions, Vol. 3, 1979, p. 435. See also his article "Near Eastern Society 1, The Islamic Countries" in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 11, ed. David L. Sills (New York: The Macmillan Co. and The Free Press, 1968), pp. 90-101. 18Everett M. Rogers and Rabel J. Burdge, Social Change in Rural Societies (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1972). CHAPTER II MODERN SAUDI ARABIA: A BRIEF BACKGROUND Introduction Saudi Arabia became known to the west during the nineteenth cen- tury and the first half of the twentieth century through western travelers who were fascinated with the Empty Quarter and who stressed the challenge of desert living and the romantic life of the Bedouins. In the second half of the twentieth century, Saudi Arabia is known to the west for the wealth provided by the oil industry, for the leisurely life of its rulers, and for the backwardness of its people. In the last decade, the sudden wealth of the country has begun to slowly show some signs of reshaping the society, especially when the government started to channel some oil revenue into social and economic develop- ment. Saudi Arabia is still viewed by western scholars as one of the developing countries in the Middle East, primarily because its tra- ditional society remained isolated from the modern world until the last two decades.1 The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, as it became known officially in 1932, was created as a result of the conquest of the tribes in Najd, Al-Hasa and Asir and the defeat of the Hashemite Kingdom of the Hejaz between 1902 and 1930, by the late King Abdul Aziz Ibn Abdul Rahman Al-Saud (1881-1953). Before the discovery of oil in 1930, Saudi Arabia was not open to western influence, but in the last decade the 22 23 country has become one of the richest and largest oil producing coun- tries in the world. In the past few years, the country has undergone extremely rapid social and economic modernization. Due to the increas- ing demand for oil, Saudi Arabia is becoming more and more a power in international relations. Geographical Setting The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia covers most of the Arabian Peninsula which is located in southwestern Asia. It is a desert country with an official estimated area of 865,000 square miles (2,200,000 square kilo- meters) or about one-third the size of the Continental United States. It is bounded on three sides by the sea, on the east by the Gulf of Oman and the Persian (Arabian Gulf), on the west by the Red Sea, and on the south by the Indian Ocean. The people of the country generally call it Jaziratal—Arab or the "Isle of the Arabs," using the word jazirah, which is applied to peninsular as well as to insular areas. The Great Nafud in the north is an expanse of sand covering about 22,000 square miles and consisting of rolling sand dunes that support only sparse vegetation. The Nafud is such an effective desert barrier that it cuts off Saudi Arabia from the rest of Continental Asia, with the result that the land is of an insular character. Geographically, Saudi Arabia contains nine distinct regions. First, the gulf coastal region stretches from Kuwait to the United Arab Emirates and consists of shallow coast, salt flat (sabkhah) and flat gravel plains. The second region, called the Dahna, is an 800 mile long strip of desert stretching across the west side of Arabia from the Great Nafud to the Empty Quarter. The sands of this region 24 are reddish in color and several species of grazing plants are found there. The Dahna is a favorite grazing area for the Bedouins in winter and spring. The Dahna is separated from the coast by the third region, a 100 mile wide plain of hard rock, known as the Summa Plateau. The Ghawar oil field, the largest in Saudi Arabia, is in the middle of this arid, barren plateau. The escarpment area engulfing the Najd is the fourth geographic region in Saudi Arabia. The 500 mile long Tuwaiq escarpment is the largest in the region. The fifth region, a vast ex- panse of gravel and rock plains, extends from the Great Nafud Desert in the north to the borders of Jordan and Iraq. This area cuts across three countries and makes up a part of what is known as the Syrian Desert. The great sand areas constitute the sixth region. These desert areas encompass hundreds of thousands of square miles and include such legendary deserts as the Great Nafud in the north and the Empty Quarter in the south. Explorers such as Bertram Thomas, H. St. John, B. Philby and Wilfred Thesiger acquired lasting fame as a result of their travels through the Empty Quarter. The western mountains and the central pla- teau immediately to the east of these mountains are the seventh and eighth geographic regions. This area called Tihamah sometimes is di— vided into Tihamat Al-Hijaz, Tihamat Asir and Tihamat Al-Yaman. To the south of these two regions lie the mountains of southern Arabia, which separate Saudi Arabia from the Republic of North Yemen and the People's Republic of South Yemen, and from the Dhufar region of Sultanate of Oman. These mountains comprise the ninth region. These regions vary in elevation from 3,000 feet in the central plateau to more than 10,000 feet in the highest southern elevations. Dozens of towns and villages are located in the oases found here, and fertile land lies on the 25 mountain slopes and in the valleys. It is here that the government has the ambition and high hope to develop a modern agricultural system. There are no rivers in Saudi Arabia, but there are many valleys (Arabic: wadi). These gadig carry the floods (sail) after the rains occurring from some days or weeks of the year. The longest wadi in the country is Wadi Al—Rummah, which has a total length of 600 kilo- meters and originates near Al-Madinah and runs northeastward through the region of Al-Qasim to the Shatt Al-Arab. This wadi supports a large settled population in the Qasim region like the towns of Alrass, Unayzah, and Buraydah. The important wad; in Najd is Wadi Hanifah which runs in a southeasterly direction. The well known palm groves of Riyadh and actually those of the whole district of Al-Arid are en- tirely due to subsoil damage.3 The most important ggdis in the Hijaz are Bishah, Ranyah, and Tathlith. It is noteworthy here to point out that the wadig in Saudi Arabia have played a major role in determining land routes and lines of communication throughout the centuries. Their beds have from time immemorial served as natural routes for traders, travelers, explorers, Bedouins, and pilgrims. In a country in which most of its land is desert and arid, it is very important to have water along its traveled routes. Human Setting Saudi Arabia is no exception among most of the third world coun- tries in regard to the common phenomenon of inadequate information. For example, there is uncertainty over the population figures and un- certainty as to information relating to the labor force. As of 1980, since a national census had never been taken, demographic information 26 1.35.38 3 8.28. 8.25.. .p 23: I 27 is scanty and questionable. Population estimates range from 3 to 8 million. The Saudi government has used various estimates ranging from 6 million to 15 million. Authoritative foreign sources, including the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), accept 5 to 5-1/2 million as a reasonable estimate. In 1962-63 the Department of General Statistics of the Ministry of Finance and National Economy undertook a comprehensive survey of the population of five cities: Jiddah, Makkah, a1 Madinah, Taif, and Riyadh. As a result of this survey and later investigations, govern- ment statisticians estimated the population at about 3.3 million, but the government has not accepted this figure. In fact, the government officially repudiated the 1962-63 figures,results of the only census taken, as being too modest. Without a precise population census, a researcher faces difficulty in obtaining any general agreement as to the estimated population, and finds it even more difficult to determine the proportion of Bedouins in the total population. Here again, he must rely on the estimates of various sources. I think that one prob— lem causing disagreement among different sources as to the percentage of Bedouins in Saudi Arabia is that those who make the estimates do not define precisely what they mean by Bedouins. I cite two examples. First, the 1970 United Nations Yearbook described the population of Saudi Arabia as 85-90 percent Bedouins which was, of course, an in- accurate estimate. Second, a recently published study (originally a Ph.D. dissertation from Duke University) suggests that "it is probably safe to assume that fewer than 10 percent of the population is Bedouin 4 and that their number decreases at a rate of 2 percent a year." 28 The population of Saudi Arabia is mostly Arab and completely Muslim. Roughly 25 percent of the population are Bedouins who live in tribal organization, 25 percent are settled cultivators, and the re- maining 50 percent are urban dwellers who live in the growing cities. Approximately one-third are employed in agriculture, one-third in pub- lic service, and one-fourth in trade, finance, transportation and ser- vices. Only four percent are employed in the oil industry.5 Avail- able statistics indicate that during the last decade about 25 percent of the population live in cities within a population of 20,000 people, 25 percent in towns of 1,000 to 19,999, and the remaining 50 percent live in villages of less than 1,000.6 Social and Cultural Setting Although Saudi Arabian society is undergoing some social changes (especially after the discovery of oil), it still retains an essen- tially traditional character. The tribe is the main unit of social organization in the country. Kinship ties and recognition of mutual obligations within the kin group are principal norms in Saudi Arabian social organization. The family is the center of the social structure and loyalty to the family overshadows all other obligations. Individ- ual members participate in major family decisions, but the final answer to a question rests in the hands of the father, or the head of the family. Women are increasingly being consulted in the decision- making process. Bedouin women have a more influential role in the affairs of the family than their sisters in the city. The basic family is the extended family with descent traced through the paternal line. An individual's well-being is the responsibility of the whole family, 29 and the family's well-being is the individual's utmost concern. If the head of a household dies, his family is absorbed into the larger family group. The older children of the deceased usually join the household of the paternal grandfather, or that of the oldest surviving brother. The widow may stay in the husband's family or she may return to her own family, in which case she takes the younger children with her. Final responsibility for the individual members of the family does not necessarily rest with the patriarch. It is not unusual for a more distant relative to take in members of a family.7 Administrative Districts The country was divided into eight major districts during the King Abdul Aziz regime. Each district is ruled by a governor (Amir) and all cities, villages, and Bedouin areas of the district come under his jurisdiction. During King Faisal's regime there was an extensive study done concerning the country's districts with consultation from British expers, but this study has never been published. The dis- tricts are as follows: 1. Al-Hejaz was a Hashimate Kingdom until its fall at the hands of King Abdul-Aziz in 1924-25. The Hejaz includes most of the western part of Saudi Arabia, and sometimes it is called the western province, which contains Makkah, Al-Madinah, Taif, and Jeddah. Some of the Arab tribes that live in the Hejaz are: Harb, Juhaynah, Hudhayl, and Utaybah al-Hejaz. 2. Najd is the largest region in the peninsula, which in Arabic is called galb al-jazierah, the heart of the peninsula. It extends from the end of the Empty Quarter in the south to Qirayyat Almelh in the north. This area covers about 600,000 square miles. Najd contains Riyadh, the capital city of the country. Alkharj, Wadi al-Dawaser, and al-Aflaj are areas and cities in this region. Some of the tribes living in Najd are: Subay, Gahtan Najd and Utaybah Najd. 5. 6. 8. 30 Al-Ahsa is the richest region in the country be- cause of its oil and agricultural potential. In the old time it was called Hajr but its name now comes from the oasis of al-Ahsa. The main cities in this region include Dammam, Dhahran, al-Khobar, Qatif Oasis, and Tarout Island. Some of the Bedouin tribes who live in this district are: Al-Ujman, Bani Khalid, Bani Hajir, Al-Murrah, and Al Mansir. Al-Shamal (north). This district lies north of Hejaz and the principal towns include Tabuk, A1- jawf, Sakaka, Badanah, and Turaif. Some of the tribes living in this part of Saudi Arabia are: Anazah, Al-Huwaytat, al-Shararat, and Bani Atiyah. Asir runs along the lower Red Sea coast to the border of Yemen. In the Asir area, Jazan, a town on the Red Sea just north of Yemen, is the capital of the low-lying coastal district of Tihamah. Abha, some 8,000 feet above sea level, is the capital of the highland district of Asir proper.8 This part has more rain than any other part of the country due to the mountains bounding this district which force the winds coming from the west upward resulting in the release of sufficient rainfall. The average rate of rainfall does not exceed four inches per year in most of the country, but Asir receives more than ten inches of rain per year. Al-Qasim district is located in the northern part of Najd. Before the discovery of 011, this region had a very well-known trade with foreign countries, es- pecially India and Egypt. The Qasim with an abundant water supply and a cooler climate is a potential agri- culture area. The district is surrounded by a number of tribes such as Mutayr, Alujman, and Anazah, but a great proportion of the people in the central part of the district are now and always have been sedentary. Jabal Shammar is in the northern part of Najd, and takes the name from one of the most powerful tribes of the north. The principal city in this region is Hayl, the domain of the House of Al-Rashid, which during the second half of the century contended with Al-Saud for control over the interior of the Arabian Peninsula. The Shammar tribe predominates in most of this district. South district is the name given the low-lying central areas of Tihamah coming down from Asir's mountains. The main cities of this district are Jazan, a sea port 31 on the Red Sea, Abu Arish, and Farasan Island. Political and Economic Setting In discussing the country's political setting, we should bear in mind that Saudi Arabia has never been occupied by a colonial power. Saudi Arabia is a conservative monarchy ruled by a king whose power derives from a large royal family, an influential group of religious ulama, and the support of tribal chiefs. The constitutional basis of the government is manifested in Islamic law. This is clear in King Faisal's reply to any question on this matter in the following way: A constitution, what for? The Koran is the oldest and most efficient constitution in the world. Elections, 3 parliament? After the unfortunate ex- periments which have been attempted in neighboring countries, it is better to forget all about it. Be- lieve me, Islam is a sufficiently flexible and far- sighted religion to ensure the happiness of our people.9 Both King Abdul Aziz and King Faisal have ruled the people in the same way. The legitimacy of their rule was based on religion as well as charisma.10 Despite the economic and social modernization now taking place in the country, the political structure of the government remains the same except that a new group, the technocrats, now join the royal family, the ulama, and the tribal chiefs in making decisions. The allocation of values, economic, political, and/or social, is made by . ll "tiny minorities,‘ or an elite. The idea of the ruling elite is not new. Mosca, in The Ruling Class, points out: In all societies--from societies that are very meagerly developed and have barely attained the dawnings of civilization, down to the most advanced and powerful societies--two classes of people appear--a class that rules and a class that is ruled. The first class, always 32 \ the less numerous, performs all political functions, monopolizes power and enjoys the adVantages that power brings, whereas the second, the more numerous class, is directed and controlled by the first,-in a manner that is now more or less legal, or less arbitrary and violent.12 Pareto also talked about the universality of elitism: "Every people is governed by an elite, by a chosen element of the population."13 The power of the ruling class in the country comes from the positions they hold in the political structure which gives them control over the political, economic, and social activities of the country. Mills pointed out that: "To be celebrated, to be wealthy, to have power, re- quires access fo major institutions, for the institutional positions men occupy determine in large part their chances to have an to hold these valued experiences."14 The ruling elites of Saudi Arabia are found in special classes. The upper class in Saudi Arabia today still con- sists almost entirely of the royal family of the House of Saud (a1 Saud) and its collateral branches. A few leading tribal Shyakhs and top "ulama" [reli- gious learned men] from the Alshaykh family can also be considered upper class, along with a handful of wealthy members of successful merchant families who have attained an upper class lifestyle. But these latter three groups form the lower stratum of the upper class.15 Saudi Arabia's climate and vast arid desert have affected her economic condition through the ages. Throughout history, the economy of Saudi Arabia has been dominated by the extreme aridity of the greater part of the peninsula. Some four-fifths of the area receives less than 5 inches of rain a year, an amount insufficient for any form of cultivation. In fact, during the centuries, from the beginning of Islam up to the discovery of oil, there was little significant change in economic and social life of the Arabian peninsula. Pastoral 33 activities remained the basis of Saudi Arabia's economy, with the in- come of the bulk of the population rarely exceeding subsistence level. In 1945 the income of the kingdom was less than B 5 million, mainly from the pilgrim traffic to Makkah and Al-Madinah and even this was unstable and depended on uncontrollable circumstances outside Arabia.16 Ibn Saud, with advice from Philby, gave a concession in 1933 to the Standard Oil Company of California to discover oil resources in the eastern region of the country. He gave another concession in 1934 to a Canadian mining company to explore and develop the mineral resources of the Hejaz at Dhalam.17 Commercial production of oil in Damman began in September 1938, with shipment by barge to Bahrein for refining.18 But Dr. F. Badr in his dissertation argues that it was not until 1948 that oil revenues constituted a "mighty spending power"19 that shocked the stationary economy of Saudi Arabia. The economic implications of the rising revenues in oil open the way for more social and economic changes. The Development Plan of 1970-1975 was the first attempt by the government to provide a comprehensive approach to economic develop- ment in the country. The general objectives of this plan were to main- tain Saudi Arabia's "religious and moral values, and to raise the liv- ing standards and welfare of its people, while providing for national security and maintaining economic and social stability."20 The plan can best be seen as an attempt by the government to rationalize and modernize the economic basis of the country, alongside the attempt in the 19605 to modernize the administration.21 In the second Five Year Development Plan (1975-1980), the government allocated $142 billion to carry out the plan. The objectives were broader and may be expressed in the following goals: 34 1. Maintain the religious and moral values of Islam; 2. Maintain a high rate of economic growth by develop- ing economic resources, maximizing earnings from oil over the long term, and conserving depletable resources; 3. Reduce economic dependence on export of crude oil; 4. Develop human resources by education, training, and raising standards of health; 5. Increase the well-being of all groups within the society and foster social stability under circum- stances of rapid social change; and 6. Develop the physical infrastructure to support achievement of the above goals.22 In the Third Five-Year Development Plan (1980-1985), the Saudi Arabian government has allocated $285 billion to spend during the com- ing five years, hoping that it might contribute to the modernization of the country. The new plan seems to be designed as a readjustment of the means to achieve the major goals set out in the second plan, based upon the problems and constraints that arose from the first and second plan. The overall thrust in the third plan remains the diver- sification of national income and the freeing of the country from over- dependence on revenue from oil, which still forms the bulk of the national economy. The diversification of national income will come primarily from implementation of petrochemical projects located in the new industrial cities of Jubail in the Eastern Province and Yanbua in the Western Province. But to diversify, in my opinion, does not mean the establishment of new industries solely dependent on oil. Every time that Saudi Arabia increases its production of crude oil to offset a cut made by another oil producing country, (for example, when the war broke out between Iran and Iraq, Saudi Arabia increased its 35 production to more than 10 million barrels a day). This action seems to contradict the stated national objective of conserving depletable resources. Also, the policy of the country to spend many billions of riyals on establishing industries based on oil contradicts the third national objective in both plans, namely, to reduce economic dependence on oil exports. The new plan places special emphasis on developing Saudi Arabia's manpower in order to replace foreign workers to the maximum extent possible. Halliday estimated the number of foreign workers in Saudi Arabia in 1980 at 1.2 million workers.23 FOOTNOTES Tareq Y. Ismael, Governments and Politics of the Contemporary Middle East (Homewood, 111.: The Dorsey Press, 1970), p. 353. 2Arabian American Oil Company, Aramco Handbook: Oil and the Middle East (Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, 1968), pp. 208-219. 3Shaikh Inayatullah, Geographical Factors in Arabian Life and History (Sh. M. Ashraf: Lahore, 1942), p. 19. 4Fouad Al-Farsy, Saudi Arabia: A Case Study in Development (London: Stacey International, 1978), p. 13. 5Edmund Asfour, "Saudi Arabia," in The Middle East: A Handbook, Michael Adams, ed. (New York: Praeger, 1971), pp. 271—281; and Th3 Middle East and North Africa: 1974-1975 (London: Europe Publications, Ltd., 1974), pp. 587-608. 6Ramon Knauerhase, "Saudi Arabia's Economy at the Beginning of the 1970's," Middle East Journal, Spring 1974, p. 127. 7Ramon Knauerhase, The Saudi Arabian Economy (New York: Praeger, 1975), p. 70. 8Arabian American Oil Company, op. cit., p. 178. 9Gerald de Gaury, Faisal, Biography of a Great King (London: Arthur Barker, 1974), p. 148. 10See Max Weber, On Charisma and Institution Buildipg, S. N. Eisenstadt, ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977) and Reinhard Bendix, Max Weber,pAn Intellectual Portrait (New York: Anchor Books, 1962). 11Peter Bachrach, The Theory of Democratic Elitism (Boston: Little, Brown, & Co., 1976). 12Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class, translated by Hannah Kahn (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1939), p. 50. 36 37 13Vilfredo Pareto, The Mind and Society (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1935), p. 246. 14C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 9. 15William Rugh, "Emergence of a New Middle Class in Saudi Arabiaf' The Middle East Journal 27, No. 1 (Winter 1973), p. 7. See also, James A. Bill, "Class Analysis and the Dialectics of Modernization in the Middle East," International Journal of Middle East Studies 3, No. 4 (October 1972), pp. 417-434; Manfred W. Wenner, "Saudi Arabia: Survival of Traditional Elites," in Political Elites and Political Development in the Middle East, Frank Tachau, ed. (Boston: Shenkman Publishing Co., Inc., 1975), pp. 157-191; and George Lenczowski, Political Elites in the Middle East (Washington, D.C.: American Enter- prise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1975). 16Galal A. Amin, The Modernization of Poverty (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1974), p. 2. 17H. St. John, B. Philby, Arabian Oil Ventures (Washington, D.C.: The Middle East Institute, 1964). 18Ramond F. Mikesell and Hollis B. Chenery, Arabian Oil: America's Stake in the Middle East (Chapel Hill, N.C.: The University of North Carolina Press, 1949), p. 61. 19Fayez Badr, Development Planning in Saudi Arabia: A Multi- Dimensional Study (Ph.D. dissertation, Los Angeles: University of Southern California, 1968), p. 77. 20Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Planning, Second Develop- ment Plan 1395/1400 A.H. [1975-1980 A.D.] (Jeddah: Dar Okaz, 1975, p. 4. ' 21Helen Lackner, A House Built on Sand: A Political Economy of Saudi Arabia (London: Ithaca Press, 1978), p. 140. 22United States-Saudi Arabian Joint Commission on Economic Coop- eration, Summary of Saudi Arabian Five-Year Development Plan (1975- 1980 (Washington, D.C.: The Department of the Treasury, 23 October 1975), pp. l-2. 23Fred Halliday, "Migration and Labor Force in Oil Producing Countries of the Middle East," Journal of the Gulf and Arabian Penin— sula Studies Vol. 4, No. 13 (Kuwait University, January 1978), p. 59. CHAPTER III REVIEW OF LITERATURE The literature relevant to the problems to be investigated in this study is divided into three parts. The first part attempts to give historical background concerning the social structure, social sys— tem, manners and customs of the Bedouins, especially those in the Arabian peninsula. In this part, the most important and relevant works by western writers will be reviewed. As mentioned before, the Bedouins' way of life, the desert with camels, and the fantasy of the Empty Quarter have attracted many western writers. The second part attempts a brief survey of literature originating in diverse disciplines de- scribing and characterizing the Bedouins and their social organization. In this part, the focus will be on the major contributions concerning the Bedouins by Arab writers. The third part recognizes a vast litera- ture on the impact of modernization on traditional societies and on the appropriateness of social system theory and the change process. Western Literature on the Bedouins What most anthropologists in the 19405 and 19505 called the major characteristic of Bedouins, segmentary lineage systems (for instance, Bacon; Murphy and Kasdan),l is clearly brought out in Robertson Smith's book, Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia.2 In his second book, Smith postulates a distinctive pastoral religion in which groups "transferred to their herds the notions of sanctity and kinship which formerly belonged to species of wild animals." The result, according 38 39 to Smith, is "the way was opened for the formation of religious and political communities larger than the old totem kind."3 The mystery and the romance of the Arabian peninsula is a western conception that has been widely diffused by English explorers such as Burton, Doughty and Palgrave in the nineteenth century, and by Lawrence, Dickson, Bell, Glubb, Philby and Thesiger in the twentieth century. Other European travellers have contributed to the literature by record- ing the daily life of the Bedouins. The writers include Niebuhr, Guarmani, Burckhardt, Musil and Oppenheim. Many of the older as well as newer books about Bedouins deal with the racial history of the nomad, with descriptions of the manners and customs. These works treat mainly the nature of nomadism, the Bedouins' social system, the Bedouins' mode of life, political organization, economic activities, and problems. Burton's most important work, published in 1855, is an account of his penetration of Makkah and Al-Madinah, the holy cities of Arabia. His contact with Bedouins on the outskirts of Al-Madinah led him to ques- tion the meaning of civilization. The desert Bedouins as a people were not affected, Burton thought, with such "weeds of civilized growth" as "vulgarity, affection, awkwardness and embarrassment."4 He describes Bedouins' manners as free and simple. Burckhardt and Doughty describe the Bedouins as desert dwellers who lead an unsettled life and who are characterized by their constant movement and change of dwelling place. In Burckhardt's work published in 1831, we find an enumeration of the Bedouin tribes, their different local organizations, and their military force. He also gives an account of their unique manners, customs and institutions and their arts, dress and many other particulars. In the second part of his 40 work, Burckhardt compiled a precise history of the Wahhabys from orig- inal information, both written and oral. The account traces the Wahhabys from their first appearance in the late nineteenth century as reformers through all their wars with the Turks and other Arabs. Burckhardt reveals his view of the Bedouins in the following passage: "Whatever preference I might give in general to the European character, yet I was soon obliged to acknowledge, on seeing the Bedouins, that, with all their faults, they were one of the noblest nations with which I ever had an opportunity of becoming acquainted."5 Doughty's account of Bedouin life in Arabia in 1888 is well worth mentioning at this point. In the countries he visited, the tribes were suspicious of his intentions and motives. He wrote: "El-Beduw mayeta .2223, toil not (say they), that is not bodily; but their spirits are made weary with incessant apprehension of their enemies, and their flesh with continual thirst and hunger . . . The nomad's fantasy is high, and that is ever clothed in religion."6 Doughty suffered a series of health problems and additional "indignities and persecution" at the hands of some Arabians.7 The western writer most critical of the Bedouins is the contro— versial traveller, Palgrave. According to his observations, published in 1883, "vigorous governments have for years pressed on the Bedouins with a rod of iron, and reduced them to their normal condition, that of mere camel-drivers, and nothing more . . . The Bedouin does not fight for his home, for he has none; not for his country, that is any- where; not for his religion, he owns and cares for none."8 The impli- cation, of course, is that since these are the causes for which most 41 Europeans fight, everyone else must find in them reasons for violence. But Palgrave evidently forgot that the Bedouin fights to protect his tribe, his people, his herds, and his guests and companions when they travel with him. Musil's classic work should be mentioned although it is not rele— vant to our present discussion. This book, published in 1928, is an exhaustive account of the Rwala tribe, the most powerful of the tribes belonging to the Northern Anazah group.9 Among more recent authors, we find H. R. P. Dickson, who was an influential English political agent in Kuwait, assigned to protect British interests in the Middle East. His book, Kuwait and Her Neigh— 2255, (1949) contains much factual data as well as much amusing infor- mation about the way of life of the peOple of Kuwait and the adjacent parts of Iraq and Saudi Arabia. His accounts and descriptions form a valuable contribution to the social history of the region prior to the discovery of oil. Much of his second book, The Arab of the Desert, describes in detail the domestic and material life of the Bedouins. There are beautiful drawings and explanations of tents, camels, saddles, clothing and jewelry as well as translations of Bedouin tales, riddles and songs. As many critics of this book point out, the author fails to deal in any depth with the social and economic changes taking place at that time in the Arabian peninsula as a whole and Kuwait in parti- cular. Further, the writer fails to discuss the impact of the new oil industry on the area, and the rapid penetration of western innovations and new ideas into Arabia. Some trace this in part to the fact that Dickson was a political agent in Kuwait which placed constraints upon 42 his freedom to write on all matters. Also, experiences may have led him to deplore the disruptions of Bedouins' life caused by the mate- rialism following the impact of western habits.10 For Raswan, the lure of the Arab horse was the main reason that he went to live among the inhabitants of the Black Tents. In order to assimilate the habits and customs of the Bedouins, it was important for him to conform to their way of life.11 Some of the main contributors to the literature on nomadism are geographers and anthropologists. Among them, Daryll Forde has given a detailed and systematic treatment of pastoral groups.12 Capot-Rey observes nomadism not only as a way of life, but also as a form of social organization based on ties of family and allegiance. Although the nomadic tribes have sometimes been regimented and incorporated into a state like the Sherifian Empire, or have been linked to a religious movement like that of the Senusi in Libya, Capot-Rey concludes that: "Nomadism has always been linked, if not with insecurity (against which mobility and dispersion are not always an adequate protection) at least with the absence or impotence of the central government," and "the history of the Maghreb shows that nomadism only flourishes in a climate of liberty bordering on anarchy."13 As we have seen in the previous literature, most studies of nomad society in the Middle East, especially those of the Arabian peninsula, have lacked informative sociological data. The lack of statistical information on the Bedouin of the Arab countries limited Murphy and Kasdan in their study (1959) to a "mechanical model" when they at- tempted to analyze Bedouin social structure. 43 As Dyson-Hudson points out, after the 19505 "there appeared a corpus of material capable of transforming the study of nomadic soci- ' and he called some of those writers the unavoidable inheritors eties,‘ of the Malinowskian revolution. "They were consciously or not follow- ing his early programmatic exhortations ("Marriage," Encyclopedia Brittanica, 14th ed.) to record ordinary, day-to-day activities just as much as the exotic, and to search for explanations by way of the evident facts of observable behavior before invoking the weight of the past to account for the actions of the present."15 Some French and German thinkers have contributed a great deal to the literature on nomadism. Robert Montagne discusses the material aspect of Bedouin life by presenting a clear picture of the natural environment within which that life has evolved. He shows the important role played by rain in the Bedouins' life, and he portrays the camel as playing the leading role of shaping the culture of the Bedouins in Arabia. In his analysis of the Bedouins' material culture, Montagne begins with the tent as a basic unit, then discusses the family and the various groups beyond the tribe. He sheds light on the dynamics of tribal organization, including the roles played by the sheikh of the tribe, the rise and decline of tribal groups, and the significance of Bedouin nobility.16 Baron Von Oppenheim published the first volume of his classic German study, Die Beduinen, in 1939 with the collaboration of Erich Brafinlich and Werner Caskel. In 1952, Caskel published the second and third volumes of that work. Rentz writes, "This comprehensive study of the Bedouin tribes of the Near East upholds the best tradition of 44 German scholarship."17 The first volume contains detailed information about the origin of the Bedouins and their mobility. Oppenheim por— trays the Bedouins as noteworthy for their dignity, intelligence, gen- erosity and hospitality. The second volume describes the Bedouin tribes in Palestine, East Jordan, Sinai, and the Hejaz. The third volume provides information on the Bedouin tribes in the north and in the hinterland. The author provides details about each tribe and its political role in the shaping of events in the Arabian peninsula.18 The following observations regarding the approach of the Orien- talists to the study of Arab culture, and of the Bedouin culture in particular, should be noted: 1) Even though most of the Orientalists were competent linguistically, they failed to understand the culture of the people; 2) They were highly influential interpreters who left an impact on European and American thought about Arab and Bedouin cul- ture; and 3) the Orientalist approach to the study of Middle Eastern culture was carried on by many twentieth century western writers in their study of this region. Some of the contributors to the literature of nomadism have dis- cussed Bedouins in the context of larger themes, such as their place in history and in travel. A. Rihani provides a short historical account of early Bedouin settlements. He points out how psychological, geographical and economic conditions combine to create a difficult problem for the Bedouins and their leader, King Ibn Saud. The question facing Ibn Saud is what to do with these hardy, warlike Bedouins, with their fanatic, uncompromising creed, who inhabit an inhospital desert land which denies them any ease and comfort. The answer for Ibn Saud lies in the transformation of the nomads into peasants or townsmen. 45 Philby does much the same as Rihani in the context of presenting a history of modern Saudi Arabia. Actually, no one has contributed more to the knowledge of the Arabian peninsula than this explorer. In most of his books, he tells the story of the Saudis and the culmination in the reign of the late King Abdulaziz Ibn Saud, the founder of modern Saudi Arabia. He covers the history of the Wahhabi movement in central Arabia, its rise, and its fall. He treats the tribes in the peninsula, their social structure and organization.20 More recent western authors have devoted considerable attention to Bedouins and the problems of nomadic people and their social structure. I will select some of these recent studies for review. As is the case of earlier studies, most of those interested in studying nomads are anthropologists, geographers and historians. Sir Edward Evans-Pritchard, in his classic study of the Sanusi Islamic re- form movement in Libya during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, sheds a great deal of light on the participation of the Bedouins in religious reform movements. This study is very relevant to our subject, because the Sanusi movement resembles the Ikhwan movement in Saudi Arabia. The original success of the Sanusi Brotherhood in Libya was due primarily to the development of an organization of lodges that paralleled the segmentary structure of the Bedouin tribes in Libya. Each lodge was comprised of members of the Sanusi Brotherhood and attached to a particular section or lineage of a tribe. In this case, the lodges created the foundation for a supratribal national organiza— tion which did not try to change the basic tribal structure. At the same time the tribe was incorporated into a more universal structure, 46 that is, the Sanusi Brotherhood.21 Montagne, Sweet and Cole each studied one tribe in Arabia as the basic unit. The most relevant information from these authors concerns each tribe's organization which appears to be similar. Montagne, while studying the Shammar, one of the most prominent and powerful Northern Arabian tribes, discovered the pattern of the summer camp, where a sub- section or sometimes a section of the tribe, gathers around a well or wells. The section is the basic social and political unit in Bedouin society, a mini-state, led by a chief. It has territorial unity called figmé. It has a common single brand or Wasm. The tribes of Shammar comprised of 100,000 to 150,000 people, about 20,000 tents, and in- cludes the settled sections of the tribe.22 In her study, Sweet tries to analyze a relatively stable social unit smaller than a tribe among the Arruwalah, Shammar and Mutayr Bedouins. The tribal section, or division (Fakhd), she points out, "governs a number of the techniques and economics of camel pastoralism in North Arabia, and it shows features of corporate structure and process in relation to the control of productive resources."23 Within the Bedouin tribal territory, the grazing lands (Hema) within which herds are managed, are used by the people of the tribe. The functions of the tribal sections (Fakhd) are economic as well as political. These units organize raiding parties and are often viewed as petty chiefdoms. Finally, Sweet concludes that aside from the joint family there are three units of tribal organization which are functionally significant: the section, with a core of ranked lineages; separate or fixed lineages and sliding lineages. Sweet relates the flexi- bility in size and internal organization of the section to ecological 47 conditions. She also gives an estimate of the number of tents and members of each tribe. Cole studied the Al Murrah, one of the ancient, most aggil (noble) and powerful tribes in the Arabian peninsula. Cole follows the same type of analysis used by Montagne and Sweet in selecting the Fakhd as the basic unit of society. However, he calls the Fakhd "lineage." Lineages vary in size and status. Cole relates this variation to eco- logical limits. Al Murrah is divided into seven different clans, each of which includes four to six lineages. These lineages form the clan, which Cole calls gabila, and which averages nearly three hundred house- holds. In my opinion, Cole is incorrect in using the term clan instead of tribe, because the term for clan in Arabic is Alfasielah or Alashierah, which is a section or division of the tribe. Seven clans from the Al Murrah tribe total over two thousand households, or about 15,000 people. The A1 Murrah territories extend from the southern route, which connects Al Hasa and Riyadh, to the Kharj and Oqair areas. In addition, their territories include the Oases of Jafura and Jabrin up to the Empty Quarter. After the establishment of modern Saudi Arabia, the Bedouins' Hgma, or territory, no longer existed and the A1 Murrah freely shared with others.24 Cole and Ibrahim conducted a survey to assess the needs of Saudi Arabian Bedouins in 1978. The survey was carried out by questionnaire at four summer camps, but the authors fail to give details about the location of these camps. The sample is very small-—208, or about 0.01% of the total Bedouin population in Saudi Arabia, and according to the authors, drawn from all parts of the kingdom. Although the 48 authors claim that they are trying to determine Bedouins' needs in a scientific way, they use the terms, nomads and Bedouins interchange- ably, and they project western needs into a totally different culture. I question the validity of using Maslow's system to ascertain the needs of the Bedouins of Saudi Arabia. Throughout the book, the authors make the assumption that Bedouins must change their way of living to fit modern life. Why should not modern life be modified to fit the real needs of the Bedouins? The survey advocates that the Bedouins must be made to settle to fulfill townsmen's needs and to contribute to the 25 solution of the country's labor shortage. Johnson's Nature of Nomadism was based on documentary materials and was originally presented as a master's thesis in geography at the University of Chicago. One of the stated aims of this study of pas- toral nomadism was to review some of the literature on nomadism, re- stricted to certain ecological aspects of migrations among settled pas— toral tribes of southwestern Asia and northern Africa. The second aim of this study was to develop criteria for a classification of pastoral nomadism, based on the type of migratory movement. The two particular pastoral nomads studied are divided into two major groups, horizontal and vertical nomadism, according to the nature of the migration. If the migration of nomads is confined to pasture and water of the plains, Steppes or plateaus, the type is horizontal; if the migration leads nomads up and down hills and mountains, the type is vertical. This work can be criticized in that the author seems to want to be geo- graphical in the true sense.26 Another geographical study of Bedouin villages in the western part of Saudi Arabia is by a Japanese writer. Actually, the area 49 which was studied by the author is not really a typical nomadic settle- ment, since Wadi Fatima is a village rather than a nomadic settlement. It is noteworthy that many tribes in the western part of Saudi Arabia, especially in the Hejaz, have for some time settled down and have aban- doned nomadism. I have serious reservations as to the author's claim that during an uninterrupted period of twenty months she learned Arabic and mastered the local language, including its colloquial char- acteristics, and conducted her field survey. This is very clear, for throughout the book she has misspelled or misused many Arabic words. The first part of the book reports the general ecological, historical, and social setting of the village of Wadi Fatima, situated between Makkah and Jeddah. The second part deals with Bushur, one of the vil- lages in Wadi Fatima, which is the location of a community development center run by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor. With the joint effOrts of the Ministry of Agriculture, Health, and Education, the center has brought help, information, and social activities into Wadi Fatima. Some of the author's statistics may be inadequate because her stay was very short and her samples were small. This book raises the question of how to validate the work reported. A researcher faces the difficult problem of working with a predominantly illiterate population, attempts to generalize from a very small sample, and is an outsider in every sense. Regarding the question of when a Bedouin settlement can be considered a village, the author's answer lies in her definition of a village in Wadi Fatima as any settlement where residents have built a mosque and a cemetery. Two anthropological studies of nomads among the Arabs of the East and the Arabs of North Africa should be mentioned here. One study, 50 edited by Cynthia Nelson, is a collection of essays written by anthro- pologists, originally presented at the international conference on nomadism in the Middle East and North Africa and sponsored by the American University in Cairo in 1972. The general purpose of the con- ference was to analyze and describe the nomad, relations with sedentary people, and to develop a model for further testing of various hypothe— ses. Professor E. Gellner, in his introduction, "Approaches to No- madism," says: "Many of the papers in this symposium represent an at- tempt to develop a new conceptualization of nomadism." The editor, in her article, asserts that women wield much more power among nomadic people of the Middle East than has ever been admitted by most male authors. She argues that most male writers agree in their conception of nomadic society in the Middle East as being structured in terms of two separate worlds, "the private sphere of the tent (the woman's world) and the public sphere of the camp (the man's world)."28 The other anthropological study is entitled Literature and Vio- lence in North Arabia by M. E. Meeker. The study is a type of struc- turalist analysis of Bedouin tales and poetry. He argues that it is the combination of commercial urbanism and pastoral nomadism in the ancient Middle East that led the people of the deserts and steppes to invest heavily in resources of aggression, such as ammunition and weapons. He relates the violence in this region to the enticing power ' and to the camels which are of "personal instruments of aggression,‘ "vulnerable domestic wealth" and must be acquired by each tribe to be used in fighting with other tribes. The book actually concentrates on the two phrases just cited. Meeker tries to use tales and poems of war and camel raiding found in Musil's book, Manners and Customs 51 of the Rwala Bedouin, and derives generalizations from them. Social processes among Northern Arabians were far more complex, in my judgment, than assertions by the author. "Wars are not the result of the avail- ability of weapons, nor were social relations, interpersonal relations, uncertain in the North Arabian desert around 1900," because in fact the lines and struggles against western penetration and domination were very clear.2 The last study to be reviewed in this section, which deals with western literature on nomadism in the Arabian peninsula, is Habib's historical work on the Ikhwan of Najd and their role in the creation of the Saudi Kingdom, 1910-1930. The book is an historical study of the Ikhwan movement which arose in the heart of the Arabian peninsula in 1910, reached its peak in the 19205, and then declined in the early 19305. This social reform movement played a major role in the estab- lishment of modern Saudi Arabia under the leadership of King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud. The movement is considered to be the first nomadic settle- ment in the history of Saudi Arabia. Ibn Saud, with the twin aims of creating the basis for a centralized political organization and of reviving the ideals of Wahhabism, established the Ikhwan. They were established in settled oasis colonies known as Hijar settlements where agriculture was to be the basis of economic life. The book con- centrates on the role of the Ikhwan in creating the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia rather than "the religious and social implications . . . the economic, social disruptions which may have resulted from the settle- ment of these Bedouins on the land," as stated by the author in his 30 preface. 52 As stated before, some of the main contributors to the literature of nomadism are anthropologists, but because their studies relate little to the Bedouins in the Arabian peninsula, they will not be reviewed here.31 Arabic Literature on the Bedouins In the second part of the review of the literature, I will con- sider some of the Arabic literature devoted to Bedouin life, social and cultural characteristics, and the problems of nomadism and nomad settlement in Saudi Arabia. The ideas of Ibn Khaldun, the fourteenth- century Arabian scholar who is often hailed as one of the world's first sociologists, will be considered first. It was his premise that Bedouins are the basis of, and prior to, sedentary people. All Bed- ouins and sedentary people, he believed, are different in their social conditions and in their modes of living. Some clans are greater than others, and this is true as well of towns and cities. He considered the Bedouins to be braver, closer to being good, but less intelligent than sedentary people. The Bedouins are proud, dignified, and un- willing to yield to another's supremacy. According to Ibn Khaldun, the Bedouins are difficult to lead, unless the leader is a prophet or holy man. The restraining influence among Bedouin tribes comes from their sheikhs and leaders. The religious leader has the power to rally the Bedouins to forego their personal differences, to diminish their arro- gance, and to cease their tribal warfare. It is noteworthy to point out that Ibn Khaldun tried to develOp a model to explain how the Bedouins, during the early centuries of Islam, interacted with the town people, on one hand, and with the 53 central religious-political government, on the other. According to his model, the Bedouins interacted with the Hadhar (sedentary people) according to a cycle of five stages. During the first stage, the Bedouins unite in religious zeal with some of the sedentary population and establish themselves through conquest as the rulers of a certain area. Usually in this stage, the sedentary people (the Hadhar) take the political, religious and administrative offices, while the Bedouins' main job will be military. The second stage is one in which the ruler gains complete control over the subjects and is characterized by the continuation of a high degree of religious zeal. The third stage is one of leisure in which the fruits of royal authority are enjoyed. The Bedouins in the fourth stage begin to relax, their religious zeal becomes weak, and they begin to lose interest in the whole idea and return to pastoral activities. The last stage is a long one of general decline in the whole enterprise, and for this reason the Bedouins then abandon the state and return to their disorganized life in the desert.32 Following in the footsteps of Ibn Khaldun, numerous recent Arab authors have studied the Bedouins' social and economic problems and the problems of their settlement. We mention a few of the most impor- tant Arab authors who have contributed continuously to the literature on nomadism. We start with M. Awad. In his view, tribes and tribal groups are widely dispersed throughout the Middle East. Usually they do not constitute the whole population, and in most cases they are not even considered a majority in any political unit, except in Saudi Arabia. Bedouin groups in Saudi Arabia are estimated to be between 15 and 20 percent of the total population. According to Awad, tribal 54 groups are usually classified into nomadic, semi—nomadic, and sedentary tribes, but the essential characteristic among them is that their mem- bers identify themselves as belonging to a specific group, and not to a specific place, village or town. In Egypt, however, the term "Arab" is sometimes restricted to denoting only a tribal group, "whether no- madic, semi-nomadic or sedentary; and as long as they possess a tribal organization they are referred to as 'Arabs' to distinguish them from 'n33 the settled peasants or 'fellaheen. In Arabia, they use the term " or "Mozarea," instead of "fellah." "qarawi, Abou-Zeid studied the social and economic factors forced upon Bedouins to change their relationship to the land. According to this writer, because of an acute decline in the amount of rainfall, a fre- quent phenomenon in this area, the consequence is famine and death of large numbers of animals. Hence, the Bedouins have no choice but to look for more secure and stable means of living.34 Al-Tahir and Aljamil, two Iraqi scholars, provide valuable in- formation, including detailed descriptions of Bedouin tribes in the Arab countries, especially those of Iraq. Al-Tahir also discusses the projects of settlement advocated by the Arab governments to settle the nomads in various regions of the Arab land. He also points out some reasons behind the objection of the tribal leaders to the policy of settlement in Iraq.35 Al Wardi, an Iraqi sociologist, in his study of the Bedouins, draws upon Ibn Khaldun's study of civilization. Accord- ing to him, there are two main systems of social norms, those of badawa and hadara. Badawa's main norms are kinship, tribal loyalty, individualism and disdain for manual work. On the other hand, hadara 55 maintain none of these values. Because they are incompatible, we might expect conflict between these two social systems which leads to a cri- sis of social identity and a confusion of values.36 The literature reveals that the social aspects of Bedouin life are affected overwhelmingly by economic conditions. The Bedouin recog— nizes that his animals are the most important source of livelihood and that he must protect them against raiders and thieves. Social life, in general, has been characterized by mutual respect among the tribes- men, on one hand, and between the sheikh and the tribesmen, on the other. Bedouins are marked by their love of freedom and loyalty to the tribe. Al-Fawwal, in particular, notes that the Bedouin is coura- geous, generous, and loyal to his tribe.37 According to Al-Gassab, some writers, such as Burckhardt and Doughty, describe the Bedouins as people living in the desert in an unsettled life which has been characterized by their constant movement with their animals and the changing of their dwelling places from time to time. The French scholar, Capot-Rey, defines nomadism not only as an unsettled way of life, but also as a form of social organization based on ties of family and allegiance. In contrast, Beuermann, a German scholar, defines the Bedouin life in a completely different way. According to him, nomadism is an economic activity more than it is an unsettled system as a way of life. Beuermann assumes that ani- mal husbandry is the fundamental hub around which the Bedouin life ro- tates. Because the Bedouin does not practice agriculture, there is no settlement to attract his attention as his permanent dwelling. A1- Gassab considers that all previous definitions which give nomadism 56 economic or social meanings are not complete or accurate. For this reason, he offers his own definition of nomadism which he states as follows: "Al-Badiyah, in my opinion, is a concept which contains both economic and social aspects and together represent the cornerstone of the life of the desert pe0p1e."38 Wahba describes the life of the people, their religion and the history of the Saudi family. He discusses the Ikhwan, originally desert Bedouins, who about 1912 were persuaded by King Ibn Saud to settle in villages. They became religious fanatics and regarded those who did not follow their way of life to be infidels. He also describes their settlements and gives details about the names of the settlements, the tribe living in each one, and the names of their leaders.39 Hamzah has also devoted many pages to the Ikhwan and their settlements (Hijar) and tried to make a classification of the Bedouin tribes in Saudi Arabia. He lists each tribe, division and clan and describes the tribe's social status and places of residence.40 Al-Filali, a U.N. expert, visited Saudi Arabia in 1964 and conducted an extensive study dealing with the Bedouins' social and economic problems. During his three-month stay in the country, he offered some solutions and recom— mendations to the government of Saudi Arabia to deal with the Bedouins' problems."1 The tribes of Saudi Arabia today constitute a society, with its subcultures and unique social norms and values. As stated by the Saudi Arabian delegation to the ninth conference of Arab experts in social affairs held in Jerusalem in 1965, Saudi tribes possess the following characteristics: \/ 57 l. A feeling of belonging on the part of the whole tribe based on a common origin; 2. A feeling of solidarity among its members, with in— tense unity, common destiny, identical aspirations and goals-—the feeling of Asabiyyah; 3. The contribution of all members to the utilization of natural resources and to collective defense of tribal interests; 4. The work of all members to preserve the tribe's traditions and culture; 5. Maintaining the purity of Arab origin; 6. Recognizing the tribe's sheikh or chief as the sole representative of authority in the tribe. Only the sheikh has the righgzto speak for members and to rep- resent their views. Of the Arabic literature on Bedouins and problems of settlement, we must include the major contribution by the League of Arab States. This study is the result of the Ninth Conference on Social Affairs and Labor held in Jerusalem in 1965. The Arab League published a two- volume study entitled Sedentarization and Urbanization of the Bedouins. The study contains many articles on nomadism in the Arab countries by well-known Arab scholars in the fields of sociology, anthropology, social history, geography and social psychology. The study also in- cludes a documented report by each government delegation to the confer- ence about Bedouin problems in its own country.43 One of the most recent studies on Bedouin settlements in Saudi Arabia is Alshamekh's study entitled Spatial Patterns of Bedouin Settlement in Al-Qasim Region, Saudi Arabia. He states that the reason for Bedouin sedentarization in the early twentieth century had an im- portant religious component, while more recently that reason has been largely replaced by social and economic factors. Alshamekh, in his 58 study, developed a taxonomic model of settlement patterns, which in- cluded early Hijar, recent Hijar, and Hilal. These types could prob- ably be applied to areas of the Middle East other than Saudi Arabia. The author visited a total of ninety-six Bedouin settlements during two months in 1972. To quote, "At the end of the field work, a total of 6,000 kilometers had been traveled, much of which was over unim- proved roads and desert tracks."44 But this statement might lead us to question some of his statistics and findings because of the short time in relation to the large area covered, especially considering the difficulty of traveling desert roads and tracks. Finally, to conclude this part of the literature review, we refer to four unpublished studies dealing with nomadism in Saudi Arabia. Said, in "Saudi Arabia: The Transition from a Tribal Society to a Nation-State," tries to describe the historical stages of Saudi Arabia. He begins with the first stage, the Saudi state from 1745 to the fall of Dariyah in 1818. He then covers the second Saudi state from 1824 until the end of the nineteenth century, which witnessed the total de- feat and exile of the Saud family. In the third phase of the estab— lishment of Saudi Arabia, he describes the reign of King Abdul Aziz (1900-1953), King Saud (1953-1963) and King Faisal (1963-1975). He devotes one chapter in his study to the Bedouins-—a majority turned minority--and reports on their social organization and their relation— ship with the sedentary people.45 I Al-Malik, in his study, analyzes the social system of the Bedouins in Saudi Arabia. He also treats the government approach to the development of the Bedouins in relation to the problems of settling 59 in Saudi Arabia.46 El-Farra's geographical study is entitled "The Effects of Detribalizing the Bedouins on the Internal Cohesion of an Emerging State: The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia." He explains the policy advocated by the Saudi leadership to control the Bedouins and to gain their loy- alty. He also discusses how Ibn Saud injected a new revolutionary idea into the Bedouin society by detribalizing them in order to make them replace their loyalty to the tribe with loyalty to a political geo— graphic state with fixed boundaries."7 In his study "The In-Situ Development of the Bedouin Nomads," Al-Gain tries, even in the title, to suggest a belief in the viability of a traditional way of life. He stands in the middle between two ex- treme opinions: those who favor abandoning nomadism (or the modern- izers), and those who advocate a hands-off policy toward nomadism (the traditionalists). In his study, Al—Gain tries to avoid the temptation of either extreme. Thus, his study implies "the elimination of the inherent backwardness in a traditional system of livelihood without its abandonment." In other words, he suggests the modernization of some aspects of nomadism.48 Literature on the Impact of Modernization on Traditional Society In the third part of our literature review, it is necessary to recognize a voluminous literature concerned with the passing of tradi- tional society and the impact of modernization. This literature ema- nates from various disciplines, but especially from anthropology, eco- nomics, and sociology.49 It is not our purpose to review the entirety 60 of this vast literature, but rather only to cite a selection of works. Suffice it to say that the dissertation undertaken is in the tradition of such work, but is a narrowly-defined problem involving a specific change in a particular cultural setting. We now turn to a literature that aids in the conceptualization of the problem of Bedouin settlement. This literature concerns the identification of social systems and their elements, as well as the processes involving change. Rogers50 distinguishes two types of social change as follows: 1. Imminent change, or change that originates within the social system, with little or no stimulus from the outside. This type of change corresponds to the Arabic term Isteetan with respect to the origin of the force, including settlement. 2. Contact change, or change that is produced by sources external to the system. Rogers indicates two sub- types: a. Selective contact change, or change taking place when outsiders unintentionally com- municate new ideas within the system; and b. Directed contact change, or change result- ing from deliberate, planned programs ini- tiated to bring about change. Contact change corresponds to the Arabic term tawteen with respect to outside rather than internal forces, including settlement. Loomis and Beegle, and Rogers and Burdge,51 among others, draw a distinction between the change agent system and the target system. A change agent is seen as a professional who attempts to influence the direction of change that is deemed desirable by the change agent sys- tem, or that system of which he is a part. The target system, then, is the object (ordinarily a less "modernized" or less "developed" group or society) of the change agent system. The change agent and 61 target system terms. of course, imply that the change is of a directed contact type. While the term social system appears in the writings of Comte, Spencer and other early theorists, we draw primarily upon Parsons52 and others such as Loomis and Beegle,53 Loomis,S4 and Rogers and Burdge55 who have applied some of the concepts to social change. A social system is considered a collectivity of individuals oriented toward a common goal. Social systems may be large or small, highly solidified or loosely interrelated. However, all social systems pos- sess a structure and value orientation. The structural elements of social systems, as specified by Loomis and Beegle,S6 include the following: (1) status roles, or that which is expected in a given status or portion; (2) power, or the control over others; (3) social rank, or the standing of individuals based upon consensus as to what is to be rated high and low by the system; (4) sanctions, or the satisfaction-giving or depriving mechanism at the disposal of the sys- tem; (5) facilities, or the means used by the system to attain its end; and (6) territoriality, the spatial requirements of the system. The two components of the system's value orientation include: (1) norms, the rules and guiding principles that establish what is acceptable or unacceptable to the system; and (2) ends or objectives, the changes that members of the system hope to accomplish by the operation of the system. Important processes involved in social change are communication, decision making, boundary maintenance, and social-cultural linkage.57 Communication refers to the process by which information passes through a social system. In some instances this may be accomplished through 62 radio, TV, newsprint and other mass media circulation. In others, com- munication is primarily through face-to-face interaction. Decision making refers to the process by which alternative courses of action are reduced; that is, the process of eliminating numerous possible courses of action and settling upon an agreeable course. Boundary maintenance is the process by which a system retains its integrity and solidarity. Resistance to change from the outside is almost always ex- hibited by members of traditional societies. Finally, social-cultural linkage is the process by which the elements of the two interacting systems come to be articulated so that they come to function as a single system, at least in some respects. Becker comments upon the process of linkage among the nomads and suggests the intense resistance to change as well. He says, "Pastoral nomads do not change because of movement; nor do they change because of conflict; only when there is conquest, settlement among the conquered, and genuinely social rather than symbolic interaction (systemic linkage) does the nomadic cultural pattern undergo alteration."58 Lerner, in his study on the Middle East, indicates that partici- pation in mass media increases wants, thereby creating new ideas and developing political awareness. According to Lerner, a communication system is both an index and agent of change in a total social system. It is interesting enough to note that Lerner summarizes the important characteristics of the Bedouin society and the Bedouin personality like most of the western authors as follows: (1) day-to-day life is concentrated around the tribe, to be loyal to it and move with it, unlike the peasant who is tied by his land; (2) dismay in regard to the city which, in the Bedouins' view, is a soft life, and according 63 to Lerner includes the view of the communication media; and (3) igno- rance of the new modern world. The only news the Bedouin is interested in is that concerning his own or other tribes. Lerner's data were collected in 1950, and constant change has taken place among the Bedouins since that time.59 FOOTNOTES 1Elizabeth E. Bacon, "Types of Pastoral Nomadism in Central and Southwest Asia," Southwest Journal of Anthropology 10:1 (Spring 1954), pp. 44-68; Elizabeth E. Bacon, "A Preliminary Attempt to Determine the Culture Areas of Asia," Southwest Journal of Anthropology 2:2 (Summer 1946), pp. 117-132; R. Murphy and L. Kasdan, "The Structure of Parallel Cousin Marriage," American Anthropologist 61 (1959), pp. 17-29. 2W. Robertson Smith, Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia (Boston: Beacon Press, 1903). 3W. Robertson Smith, Lectures on the Religion of the Semites (KTAV Publishing House, Inc., 1969; first published in 1927), p. 355. 4Sir Richard F. Burton, Personal Narrative of a Pilgrimage to Al-Madinah and Meccah, Vol. 2 (New York: Dover Publications, 1964; first published in 1855), p. 85. 5John L. Burckhardt, Notes on the Bedouins and Wahabys, Vol. 1 (New York: Johnson Reprint Corporation, 1967; first published in 1831), p. 358; John L. Burckhardt, Travels in Arabia (London: Frank Cass & Company, Ltd., 1968). 6Charles M. Doughty, Travels in Arabia Deserta, Vol. 1 (London: Jonathan Cape, Ltd., 1936; first published in 1888), pp. 270-280. There is a recent 2-volume edition in 1979 by Dover Publications of New York. D. G. Hogarth, The Life of Charles M. Doughpy (London: Oxford Press, 1928); D. G. Hogarth, The Penetration of Arabia (London: Lawrence & Bullen, 1904). In this book, Hogarth admits that Doughty had "a certain prejudice against all things Semitic," but claims it was manifested "with a sympathy that has never been excelled" (p. 275). 7Robin Fedden, English Travellers in the Near East (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1958), p. 30. 8William Palgrave, Personal Narrative of a Year's Journey Through Central and Eastern Arabia (London: Macmillan & Company, 1967; first published in 1883). Palgrave was a Jesuit of Jewish extraction who in 1862 supposedly crossed the Arabian peninsula. See Peter Brent, Far Arabia: Explorers of the Myth (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1977). About the controversy, see Robin Bidwell, Travellers in Arabia (London: The Hamlyn Publishing Group, Ltd., 1976), p. 83. 64 65 9A. Musil, The Manners and Customs of the Rwala Bedouins (New York: AMS, 1978; first published in 1928). 10H. R. P. Dickson, The Arab of the Desert: A Glimpse into Badawin Life in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia (London: Allen & Unwin, 1951; first published in 1949); H. R. P. Dickson, Kuwait and Her Neighbours (London: Allen & Unwin, 1956). llCarl Raswan, Black Tents of Arabia (New York: Creative Age Press, 1947). 12C. Daryll Forde, Habitat, Economy and Society: A Geographical Introduction to Ethnology (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1961; first published in 1934). 13R. Capot-Rey, "The Present State of Nomadism in the Sahara," Paris Symposium on the Problems of the Arid Zone (Paris: UNESCO, Arid Zone Research, 18, 1962), pp. 301-302. 1"Murphy and Kasdan, op. cit. 15 Neville Dyson-Hudson and William Irons, eds., Perspectives on Nomadism (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1972), pp. 6-7. 16R. Montagne, La Civilisation du Desert (Paris: Hachette, 1947). See Afif I. Tannous, summary and review of the book, The Middle East Journal, Vol. 2, no. 3 (Washington, D.C.: The Middle East Institute, 1948), pp. 353—354. 7George Rentz, "Notes on Oppenheim's Die Beduinen," Oriens 10 (1957), pp. 77-89. 18Max Freiherr Von Oppenheim, Die Beduinen (Leipzig: Otto Harrassowitz, 1939); Mostafa Maher, "Summary and Review of Kitab Al Badw," Al 'Faisal 3:29 (Thu Algeadah 1399; October 1979), pp. 83-90. (In Arabic). 19Ameen Rihani, Maker of Modern Arabia--Ibn Saud of Arabia: His People and His Land (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1928). 20H. St. J. B. Philby, Saudi Arabia (New York: Arno Press, 1972; first published in 1955); H. St. J. B. Philby, Arabia (New York: Charles Scribner & Sons, 1930). 66 2 1Sir Edward E. Evans-Pritchard, The Sanusi of Cyrenaica (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1940). 2 R. Montagne, La Civilisation du Desert, op. cit., pp. 51-59. 23L. E. Sweet, "Camel Pastoralism in North Arabia and the Minimal Camping Unit," in Man, Culture and Animals: The Role of Animals in Human Ecological Adjustments, A. Leeds and A. P. Vayda, eds., (Washington, D.C.: American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1965), pp. 129-152. 2"D. Cole, Nomads of the Nomads: The A1 Murrah Bedouin of the Empty Quarter (Chicago: Aldine, 1975). See Richard L. Tapper "The Organization of Nomadic Communities in Pastoral Society of the Middle East," in Pastoral Production and Society, ed. L'Equipe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 43-65. 25D. Cole and S. E. Ibrahim, Saudi Arabian Bedouins: An Assess- ment of Their Needs (Cairo: American University of Cairo, Papers in Social Science, Monograph Five, 1978). See A. H. Maslow, Motivation and Personality (New York: Harper and Row, 1954). 26D. L. Johnson, The Nature of Nomadism (Chicago: The Univ. of Chicago, Dept. of Geography, Research Paper no. 118, 1969). 27M. Katakura, Bedouin Village: A Study of a Saudi Arabian People in Transition (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1977). 28Cynthia Nelson, ed., The Desert and the Sown: Nomads in the Wider Society (Berkeley: University of California, Institute of International Studies, Research Series No. 21, 1973), p. 46. 29Michael E. Meeker, Literature and Violence in North Arabia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Professor Louise E. Sweet, review of The Middle East Journal, Winter 1980, pp. 89-90. 30John S. Habib, Ibn Saud's Warriors of Islam: The Ikhwan of Najd and Their Role in the Creation of the Saudi Kingdom, 1910-1930 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1978). The book is the author's Ph.D. disser- tation from the University of Michigan in 1970, with a changed title. 31Morton H. Fried, The Notion of Tribe (Menlo Park, Ca1if.: Cummings Publishing Co., 1975); Marshal D. Sahlins, Tribesmen (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1968); L. G. Sweet, ed., Peoples and Cultures of the Middle East, 2 vols. (New York: The Natural History Press, 1970); and B. Spooner, "The Cultural Ecology 67 of Pastoral Nomads," in Current Topics in Anthropology, Vol. 8 (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1973). 32Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History, 3 vols., trans. from the Arabic by Franz Rosenthal (New York: Pantheon Books, 1958). 33Mohammed Awad, "Nomadism in the Arab Lands of the Middle East," Arid Zone Research 18 (1962), pp. 325-339. 3"Ahmed M. Abou-Zeid, "The Changing World of the Nomads," Medi- terranean Rural Communities and Social Change, ed, J. G, Peristiany (Athens: Acts of the Mediterranean Sociological Conference, July 1963). 35Makki Al-Jamil, Nomadism and Nomads in the Arab Countries (Cairo: Al-Nasr Press, 1962); Abd Al-Jalil Al-Tahir, Bedouins and Tribes in the Arab Countries (Cairo: Al-Itimad Press, 1954). 36Ali A1 Wardi, Social Aspects of the Modern History of Iraq, Vol. 1 (Baghdad: Al-Irshad Press, 1969). 37Salah M. Al Fawwal, Al-Badawah Al-Arabiah Wa—Tanmiyah [The Arab Bedouins and Development] (Cairo: Maktabat Al-Qahirah Al-Hadithah, 1967). 38Nafi Nasir Al-Qassab, "Geographic Aspects About the Sedentari- zation of Bedouin Tribes," The Journal of Iraqi Geographical Society 5 (June 1969), pp. 275-324. 39Hafiz Wahba, Arabian Days (London: Arthur Barker, Ltd., 1964). 4OFuad Hamzah, Heart of the Arabian Peninsula (Riyadh: Maktabat Al-Nasr Al-Hadithah, 1968). 41Mustafa A1 Filali, Project for Sedentarization and Urbaniza— tion of Bedouin Groups in Saudi Arabia (Riyadh: Central Planning Organization, 1964). 42League of Arab States, Ri'ayat a1 Badu Wa-Tahdirihum Wa- Tawtinihum (Cairo: Dar At-Tiba'ah Al-Hadithah, 1965), vol. 1, pp. 407-408. 43League of Arab States, Ri'ayat Al-Badu Wa-Tahdirihum Wa- Tawtinihum [Development and Sedentarization of the Bedouins], 2 vols. (Cairo: Dar At-Tiba'ah Al-Hadithah, 1965). 68 "AAhmed A. Shamekh, Spatial Patterns of Bedouin Settlement in A1- Qasim Regioni Saudi Arabia (Lexington, Kentucky: The University of Kentucky, Department of Geography, 1975). 45Abdul Rahman H. Said, Saudi Arabia: The Transition from a Tribal Society to a Nation-State (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Missouri, Columbia, 1978). 46Salih A. Malik, A Study of the Social System of the Bedouins: Its Relation to the Problems of Settling in Saudi Arabia (M.A. thesis, Wayne State University, Detroit, 1968). 47Taha O. El-Farra, The Effects of Detribalizing the Bedouins on the Internal Cohesion of an Emerging State: The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 1973). 48Abdu1bar A. Al-Gain, The In-Situ Development of the Bedouin Nomads: A Bayesian Decision Analysis (Ph.D. dissertation, The Univer- sity of Arizona, 1974). "9See the following general works and case studies: W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth (London: Cambridge University Press, 1960); Theodore W. Schultz, Transforming Traditional Agriculture (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964); Clifford Geertz, Peddlars and Princes: Social Development and Economic Change in TWO Indonesian Towns (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963); T. S. Epstein, Economic Development and Social Change in South India (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1962); Manning Nash, Machine Age Maya: The Industrialization of a Guatemalan Community (Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press, 1958); Aubrey L. Rechardo, Economic Development and Tribal Change (Cambridge: Heffer, 1954); and Clifton R. Wharton, Jr. Subsist— ence Agriculture and Economic Development (Chicago: Aldine, 1969). See especially Chapter 13, "Case Studies of Planned Change," pp. 387— 455. 50Everett M. Rogers, "Motivations, Values and Attitudes of Sub- sistence Farmers: Toward a Subculture of Peasantry" in Subsistence ‘Agriculture and Economic Development by Clifton R. Wharton, Jr. (Chicago: Aldine, 1969), pp. 111-135. 51C. P. Loomis and J. A. Beegle, Rural Social Systems (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1950); Everett M. Rogers and Rabel J. Burdge, Social Change in Rural Societies (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1972). 52Talcott Parsons, The Social System (Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press, 1951). 69 3Loomis and Beegle, Rural Social Systems, op. cit. 54Charles P. Loomis, Social Systems (New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1960); Charles P. Loomis and Zona K. Loomis, Modern Social Theories (New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1961). 5Rogers and Burdge, Social Change in Rural Societies, op. cit. 56C. P. Loomis and J. A. Beegle, Rural Sociology: The Strategy of Change (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1957). S7Ibid., pp. 17-19. 58Howard Becker, "Pastoral Nomadism and Social Change," Sociology and Social Research 15:5 (1931), p. 427. 59D. Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society (New York: The Free Press, 1967. CHAPTER IV BEDOUIN SOCIETY IN ARABIA Who Are the Bedouins? The primary task of this chapter is to examine Bedouin society in Saudi Arabia. We shall attempt to clarify the terms Bedouin and Bedouinism, to examine the question of Bedouin numbers and to name the major tribes of Saudi Arabia and their areas of residence. The social structure of Bedouin society and the characteristics of Bedouins, vil- lagers and city dwellers are discussed. The economic structure of the Bedouins, including the Mrsnge of the tribes, raiding, and the im- portant role played by the camel in the Bedouin life of the Arabian peninsula will be analyzed in detail. There is some confusion, especially among western writers and scholars, about the term Bedouin and related terms such as nomads, pas- toral nomadism, Arab and Arab el-dar. In fact, the designation of the people of the desert most familiar to western writers is Bedouin, Badwin, or Badu. We find different approaches among western scholars in their attempts to understand the historical evolution of pastoral nomadism. It is not appropriate here to detail the different hypoth- eses, but it may be useful to cite a few examples. Bobek, Johnson, and Lattimore1 agree that pastoral nomadism evolved from sedentary agriculture dependent upon rainfall in dry areas. Thurnwald2 offers a contrasting view, namely, that nomadism developed from specialized ‘ 70 71 hunting groups who, in pursuit of a particularly abundant animal, grad- ually developed a system to control the movement of the animals. If we view pastoral nomadism as a sustenance-seeking response to ecologi- cal conditions in which adaptation was achieved through the utilization of resources in the environment, then the origin of the history of nomadism must also relate to environmental conditions. In this matter, Johnson provides a good explanation when describing nomadism as a "specialized offshoot of agriculture that developed along the dry mar- gins of rainfall cultivation."3 Caskel4 offers another suggestion when he contends that the socioeconomic institutions of pastoral nomadism, in the case of the Bedouinization of Arabia, developed as a result of the collapse of the Arab trading kingdoms around AD 100. At that time the urban population of the Arabian Peninsula became nomadic, then gradually spread north and south throughout Arabia. While such factors as the collapse of the Arab trading kingdoms may have contrib- uted to a reinforcement of pre-existing nomadic society, they are in- adequate by themselves in explaining pastoral nomadism.5 Some Arab scholars have their own hypotheses concerning the origin of Arab Bedouinism. For example, Ibn Khaldun, the Arab histo- rian and sociologist of the fourteenth century, viewed the Bedouins as prior to sedentary people. Bedouins restrict themselves to the bare necessities of life while sedentary people like to enjoy more luxuries. Therefore, the existence of Bedouins, according to Ibn Khaldun, was prior to, and the basis of, the existence of towns and cities.6 Recent Arab writers view Bedouinism as a way of life for those who must constantly move to find pasture. The length of stay 72 in any area depends on three factors: 1. Abundance of pasture and grass for the animals; 2. Adequacy of technical means to be utilized; 3. The social and natural security existing in these areas.7 Al-Abd views Bedouinism as an advanced stage of human develop— ment, if compared with the hunting stage characterized by man's con- sumption of animals. In contrast, the stage of pastoralism came when productive activity began to embrace the breeding and care for animals. Mankind, then, began to use some tools in daily life, and to develop traditions and social norms to organize human behavior. This stage paved the way to the next one, namely, agriculture.8 The Bedouin, in my own view, is one who (1) lives in a regular tent or biyt sha'ar; (2) moves from place to place with his camels and/or sheep; and (3) earns most of his income from raising camels and/or sheep. But those who go to hunt or to enjoy the wilderness (Ar. Albar) on occasion and for short periods because they like to experience their old life, can- not be considered Bedouins even though they originally had Bedouin backgrounds.9 The Question of Bedouin Numbers From time immemorial, the inhabitants of Arabia have been known to be divided into two groups: nomadic people and settled people. Nomadism in most parts of the Arabian Peninsula was the dominant way of life before the discovery of oil. "If we trace the geographical distribution of the nomads and settlers of Arabia, we find that their distribution is in close conformity with the climatic and hydrographic 73 conditions of the regions which they inhabit."10 Where there is a fairly adequate amount of rain (as in the Asir and Yaman), or where stream water is available (as in some parts of Al-Hasa and Oman), people tend to engage in sedentary cultivation. In 1965, it was estimated in a government report that nomads ac- counted for 50 percent of the country's population. In the same report, the government estimated the total population of Saudi Arabia to be be- 11 Al-Abd, a United Nation's ex- tween seven and eight million people. pert from Egypt, presented a paper at the Ninth Conference for Social Affairs and Labor held in Jerusalem in 1965, in which he estimated that 30 percent of the 1965 population of Saudi Arabia was nomadic.12 In the only census ever taken by the Saudi Arabian government during 1962- 63, the population numbered 3,297,657, of which 2,611,459 (79.2 percent) were listed as sedentary, and 686,198 (20.8 percent) were classified as nomadic.13 As mentioned before, the census of 1963 was not published or accepted by the government. Governmental officials regarded the total population of about 3.3 million to be too low. Some argue that there is now both political and economic motivation for Saudi Arabia to exaggerate the size of the population.14 In any case, the count of Bedouins was carried out during the summer on the assumption that all Bedouin groups move around looking for pasture during the fall and winter from October to March, and come back to desert wells and oases to escape the desert heat of the summer season. However, we know that many tribes in Saudi Arabia do not have permanent wells or streams of water to which they return during the summer. This fact leads us to 15 assume that some of the Bedouins were excluded from the census. 74 As a result of Al-shamekh's field work in 1972, he believes that the nomadic and semi-nomadic people in Saudi Arabia do not exceed 25 percent of the total population. Under this assumption, there would have been around 1,375,000 Bedouins in 1972.16 Students of modern Saudi Arabia have evidence indicating that the number of Bedouin people has been declining rapidly. These observations suggest that the de- cline in the percentage of Bedouins from 62 percent in 1963 to about 25 percent in 1972 is real. As a Saudi official (now Deputy Minister of Industry and Electricity) wrote recently: Estimates made by Saudi officials early in 1977 suggest that there are probably no true Bedouins left, that is, there are no longer nomads who live a completely nomadic life. It is probably safe to assume that fewer than 10 percent of the population is Bedouin and that their numbers decrease at a rate of 2 percent a year.17 In spite of many of the shortcomings in the 1963 census, table 1 does show where the Bedouins in the country were concentrated. The Northern Province, by a wide margin, has the highest ratio of Bedouins, followed by the Middle Province (Najd). The lowest ratio of Bedouins are found in the west and southwest coastal regions. The ratio ranges from 78.2 percent in the Khasirah-Afif area in the Central Province to about 2.1 percent in Jizan in the Southern Province. Relying on this table, al-Gosaibi contends that this census has refuted all pre- vious estimates which assume that the majority of the population are still Bedouins. Professor Razqanah presents another set of data similar to table 1. Table 2 indicates the following concerning the size of Bedouin populations in Arabia: 75 Table 1.--Data concerning the number and proportion of settled and Nomadic population in the census of 1962-63 Total Province Population Settled Percentage Nomads Percentage Northern Province 406,383 128,672 31.8 277,714 68.2 Qurayat 20,933 5,799 27.7 15,134 72.3 Joaf 43,989 17,918 40.7 26,071 59.3 Hail 187,804 62,289 33.2 125,515 66.3 Northern boundaries 77,801 17,551 22.6 60,250 77.4 Northern 75,859 25,115 33.1 50,744 66.9 Eastern Province 306,605 267,603 87.3 39,002 12.7 Qatif 67,703 67,703 100.0 0 O Al-Hasa 158,023 126,763 80.3 31,260 19.7 Ras-Tanurah 80,879 73,137 90.5 7,742 9.5 Middle Province 797,946 621,219 78.0 176,727 22.0 Riyadh 539,692 442,896 82.1 96,794 17.9 Qasim 222,761 170,578 76.6 52,183 23.4 Khasirah-Afif 35,493 7,743 21.8 27,750 78.2 Western Province 986,118 892,733 90.0 93,385 10.0 Mecca 627,447 593,924 94.7 33,523 5.3 Medina 159,695 120,577 75.5 39,118 24.5 Biljershi—Ranyah 198,976 178,232 89.5 30,744 10.5 Southern Province 746,355 667,399 90.6 79,056 9.4 Asir 324,709 271,407 83.6 53,802 16.0 Jizan 365,063 357,337 97.9 7,726 2.1 Najran 56,583 38,555 68.1 18,028 31.9 Total population 3,297,657 2,611,459 79.2 686,198 20.8 Source: K. Al-Gosaibi, "The Program for Bedouins" (Riyadh: Central Planning Organization, 1963), p. 2. 76 Table 2.--Data concerning the number and percentage of Bedouins and settlers in Saudi Arabia Bedouin Settled Province Bedouins Percentage Settled Percentage Al-Hijaz 700,000 64.00 400,000 36.00 Asir 450,000 37.50 750,000 62.50 Najd 1,300,000 62.00 800,000 38.00 Al-Ahsa 299,000 67.00 100,000 33.00 The other provinces 350,000 70.00 150,000 30.00 Total 3,000,000 2,200,000 Source: I. Razqanan, "Causes of Nomadism and Its Size," in League of Arab States, Ri'ayat, op. cit., p. 341. l. Najd is the stronghold of Bedouins having by far the largest number, many of them living around oases (e.g., Wadi al-Dawasir, Al-Aflaj, Al Kharj, Alard, and al—Washm). 2. Asir, in the south, is an exception, in that the number of settled persons exceeds the number of Bedouins. 3. Social changes took place in Al-Ahsa as a result of the discovery of oil, which helped to establish new cities like Al-Khobar, Al-Dhahran, Al-Dammam, and Ras-Tanurah. The delegation of the Saudi Arabian government to the Jerusalem Conference, mentioned before, presented a different table indicating the percentage of Bedouins in the population as shown in table 3. This table shows, as did tables 1 and 2, that Najd and the Northern Province have the highest ratio of Bedouins while the Southern Province has the lowest ratio of Bedouins to the total population.‘ It should 77 Table 3.--Percentage of Bedouins in different regions of Saudi Arabia Province Sections Rank Percentage Najd Al-Khasirah 1 86.5 Northern boundaries 2 77.4 Afif 3 76.7 Al-Qurayat 4 72.3 Northern province 5 66.9 Hail 6 66.8 Al-Joaf 7 49.3 Najran 8 31.9 Ranyah 9 25.9 Qasim 11 23.4 Bishah 12 22.2 Riyadh 13 17.6 Western Medina 10 24.5 Province Asir 14 16.4 Mecca 16 5.3 Jizan 17 2.1 Eastern All sections 14 16.4 Province Source: League of Arab States, Delegation of Saudi Arabia in Ri'ayat, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 405. 78 be taken into consideration in reference to Bedouin distributions that Bedouins tend to consider certain areas to be their own territory, but that it is very difficult to draw a definite line around their resi- dences. Generally it may be said that the tribes move constantly in their own area looking for those sections having rainfall and pasture during the fall and winter. They then return to summer camps in areas close to the streams and oases. For this reason we find that the valleys (Arabic: wedyan) attract the Bedouins, as shown in table 4. Table 4 is used as an example, but it does not include all the major tribes in the country. It is very hard nowadays to tabulate the names of the tribes according to their number, wealth, power, and social position. Social Structure of the Bedouins The Arabs in Saudi Arabia live in three main types of communi- ties, each with some distinctiveness as to social and economic organi- sation. There are the city dwellers (Ar., hadhar), the villagers (fellaheen), and the nomads (Bedouins). The first group, those residing in cities and towns, live in fixed houses of mud and stone. The city and town dwellers are engaged in activities other than cultivation or pastoralism. The second group, those who live in villages, small settlements, and farms, earn their living by cultivating the land around them. Some of them practice animal husbandry--that is raising goats and cattle--in order to support themselves with animal products. The Bedouins, a small and declining people, still live in tents in the desert and practice nomadism as a way of life. They struggle in order to make a living in a harsh environment by raising herds of camels, 79 Table 4.--The names of some tribes and their territories in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Name of Tribe Area of Residence near Valleys Harb Anazah Qahtan Utaibah Hwaitat Al-Shararat Shahran Ujman Al-Dawasir Quraish Al-Bugoum Subia Al-Murrah Zahran Bani Malik Wadi Wadi Wadi Wadi Wadi Wadi Wadi Wadi Wadi Wadi Al-Rummah and Wadi A1 Hamdh Alsafra-Wadi Jareer Ar'ar-Wadi Aba Al gour Tathleith Al-Risha Fajja-Wadi Alghal Sirhan Bisha A1 Miyah Al-Dawasir Al-Mughmas Wadi Wadi Truabah Ranyah-Wadi Rimah Haradh and Jibreen From Rghwat Beir to Ruba Guraish In valley from slope from the north of Buthra Mountain Source: Leage of Arab States Delegation of Saudi Arabia in Ri'yat, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 406. (See figure 2) 80 £82 .88 5 8...: 3.2. .o 5..-8.. .u 2:9". p“... 1.3.}... _ , . .. \R .8 7\ .8 2¥fi>I=5m 3L . <_mo__.:m \ ..(Jv . .. . H \\ 55> 3 x .. . . v run-83.3.... \\ ///\/\M ”.1... ,. .. \xL gust-git. I‘ll .. . \-l\ 2<> . 5W. .... .. zvv .... < m3! 0 ... 5.... 2(ODW 0 : o a. . .7 .rfi s a, 2 J V410 $9095 9 LV imam $207 4313a 81 sheep and goats, wandering from place to place in search of green grazing areas, according to well established patterns. "Nomadism [here] does not mean aimless or whimsical wandering through desert and steppe. It is, rather, a highly rational adaptation of human life to a severe environment."19 A comparison of the characteristics of Bedouins and settled people in Saudi Arabia may be summarized as follows: 1. Bedouins are migratory, while settlers are sedentary and cultivate their fields or engage in activities other than agriculture. 2. The Bedouins live in portable tents, while the settlers have fixed houses of mud and stone. 3. Domestic animals are essential to the Bedouin economy, while this is not true for settlers. 4. The mobility of Bedouins makes it difficult to bring them under political control, while city dwellers are more subject to control. More than five hundred years ago, Ibn Khaldun described nomads as the least capable, among all people, of being governed.20 5. Small autonomous Bedouin groups tend to be a source of trouble to the central government and an obstacle to political development. On the other hand, the settled population is viewed as favoring a centralized government. Why Middle Eastern governments view the Bedouins as an obstacle to de- velopment is outside the scope of this dissertation. It should be the task of the sociology of knowledge to study this important phenomenon. Many Arab genealogists contend that all Arabs are descended from Abraham: those of the north through Ishmael, and those of the south through Yoktan (Ar., gahtan). Another view of genealogists sug- gests that the "true Arabs" (a1 Arab, al-Arbah) are the extinct tribes of Ad and Thamud, together with the tribes descended from Qahtan, and 82 that the Ishmaelite tribes represent the "Arabicised Arabs (al-Arab a1-Musta'ribah)." The name true Arabs, however, is also used for the Bedouin's, who speak the purest Arabic.21 Bedouins in Saudi Arabia are divided into two groups: (1) Noble or Sharif tribes (agil) and (2) inferior or non-Sharif tribes. Of these, the first claim descent from the patriarchs Qahtan and Ishmael. Some of the tribes best known as examples of the Egg; group are: Quraish, Anazah, Harb, Shammar, Mutayr, Al-Ujman, Bani Khalid, Bani Hajir, Adh-Dhafir, Al-Murrah, Qahtan, Utaybah, Ad-Dawasir, Subay, Al- Manasir, Al-Huwaytat and Al-Qawasim. It is interesting to note here that the Royal families of Al Saud (of Saudi Arabia), A1 Sabah (of Kuwait), and A1 Khalifah (of Bahrain), all claim descent from the Anazah tribe. Some of the non-asil tribes include: Al-Awazim who reside between Kuwait and on the Persian Gulf; Hutaym, a large and —e====' powerful group of tribes in north and west Arabia; and As-Sulabah, the _—_______ most despised of desert tribes, who are said to be descendants of the Christian Crusaders. They are found throughout the northern half of the Arabian Desert, roughly from a line drawn east and west through Madina and Riyadh in the south, to another line drawn from Aleppo to Mosul.22 There are two reasons for their origin or connection with the Crusades and Saracen Wars. First, the symbol of this tribe is the cross and second, the name of the tribe is derived from the words saleeb, which means "cross" in Arabic. This tribe is also the least integrated into the society, partly due to the fact that there is no intermarriage between this tribe and other tribes, and no pure Bedouin can marry a Sulubbah girl, because he might be put to death by his 83 tribe. Another reason for this tribe's lack of integration is that the tribe does not concentrate in one region but is spread throughout the northern part of Arabia. The individual Bedouin owes his allegiance to his tribe. Unlike the farmers and city residents, the Bedouins characteristically are either independent of the central government or bound to it by weak ties. That Bedouins should be organized in tribes is only natural in the law of the desert, because being completely independent, they have to provide political structure for their own society. "Political structure is needed since the nomad by definition migrates."23 Movement of the Bedouins depends on the seasonal availability of fresh water and good grazing. The family in the Bedouin society is an extended family. Many members of each family live together in a single household, work together, and share the responsibility for the whole family. The young Bedouin, when he gets married, does not move outside the family, as in the case of the city people. The family and the tribe play a major role in the socialization of the Bedouin child. The typical Bedouin family lives in relative isolation in the desert. The child here learns a set of rules, customs, and expectations. The Bedouin is frank and simple. He is outspoken in his antagonism and sincere in his love and devotion. Bedouins are famous for their love of freedom, especially free- dom of speech, and for their loyalty to the tribe and to friends. Generosity and hospitality are typical Bedouin characteristics re— lated to the strong pride of the individual nomad. The Bedouins of Arabia are hospitable, which does not confine itself to entertainment 84 only but includes the physical protection of their guests as well. The Bedouin takes pride in offering complete protection to anyone seek- ing refuge in his house. A host would protect his guest, even if the latter had killed the host's father or son. "In desert society it (hospitality) is connected with personal safety. The man who dwells in the desert cannot ignore others in it."24 Certain trades and occu- pations are anathema to the Saudi Bedouins. To be a carpenter, jeweler, tailor, blacksmith, or butcher would be beneath the Bedouin's dignity. Some of the nomadic people of the Arabian Peninsula, notably those who raise camels, despise agricultural work. Those who raise sheep and goats, however, like to engage in agricultural work. The reasons for these attitudes toward cultivation should be the subject of sociological studies. Bedouin Raiding. Among the Bedouins, camel raiding generally has been regarded as a man's sport, which may help to explain the great happiness when a baby boy is born to a Bedouin family. A male heir is at the root of the Bedouin tribal structure, for the number of sons is related to a family's power. Some western writers have looked upon raiding as feud- ing or as warfare that costs much in terms of human life. But those writers often fail to recognize its significance for the Bedouins. Burckhardt says of raids: It may almost be said that the Arab Bedouins are obliged to rob and pillage. Most families of the Anezes are unable to defray the annual expenses from the profits on their cattle, and few Arabs would sell cattle to purchase provisions; he knows from experience that to continue long in a state of peace, diminishes the wealth of individuals; war and plunder, therefore become necessary.25 85 Doughty noted an economic aspect of the Bedouin raids when he said, "Their ghrazzus [raids] and counter-ghrazzus are the destruction of the Arab. Reaving and bereaved they may never thrive; in the end of every tide it is but an ill exchange of cattle."26 Palgrave observes the following with respect to Bedouin raids: "Their feuds are continual, but at little cost of life, the main object of a raid is booty, not slaughter; and the Bedouin, though a terrible braggart, has at heart little inclination for killing or being killed."27 Even though raiding was a major activity of Bedouin life before the forma- tion of political states in the region, it was governed by a set of rules. It was not permissible for a Bedouin to raid or pillage other tribal members. While plunder was permitted against other hostile tribes, it was held a gross violation of tribal law if committed with- in the tribe. Few students of Bedouin life suggest that the main rea- son for the Bedouin pattern of raiding was the gain of additional wealth in terms of camels and sheep, or even arms. Rather, many Bedouins consider raiding a part of achieving self-respect, reputation, and prestige. Bedouins view raiding as a means of equalizing the wealth of animals among them. Poorer tribes have the opportunity to conduct more frequent raids than rich ones. In general, raiders are generous and share the wealth they gain from the raid with needy indi- viduals in their tribe to alleviate hunger and despair.28 King Ibn Saud, the founder of modern Saudi Arabia, abolished the raiding system in the 19203. He recognized the dangerous influence of raiding on the loyalties of his friendly tribes.29 Some Bedouin tribes objected to this action because raiding was the only source of 86 gain at that time. They had neither crops nor palm trees nor were they engaged in commerce or trade. The banning of raids was a major blow that damaged the Bedouin economic system. Only with the prohibition of raiding, were poor Bedouins for the first time reduced to hunger and despair.30 Tribal Territory Each tribe in the Arabian Peninsula had its own territory (girah) in which all members of the tribe moved freely to conduct their daily life. The Bedouin girah is not a strictly bounded and exclusively oc- cupied territory, but rather a customary one "wherein only the perma- nent wells and oases communities are specially claimed by the clan [tribe] sections."31 Only with agreement among the tribes could others freely pasture in the tribe's diggh. Any intrusion from a hos- tile tribe would often cause skirmishes and sometimes tribal wars. Usually the tribal territory encompassed one or more valleys.32 As we have said before, most of the tribes in Arabia live near a valley, but the size of tribal territory differs according to the power of each tribe. By power is meant a combination of wealth (in terms of the number of livestock owned) and bravery. The territory of some noble tribes like Utaybah, Anazah, Shammar, Harb, and Al- Murrah, comprises thousands of square kilometers. Some less impor- tant tribes have a much smaller size territory. ‘It is important to note that a tribe does not remain all the time in complete isolation in its own territory. When rain and graz- ing is plentiful, the tribe stays close to home. But when rain be- comes scarce, then the tribe must move in search of good grazing and 87 sometimes finds itself in the territory of its neighbors. The tribe must be very careful not to wander into territory of hostile tribes. It is customary in Arabia that some tribes form alliances with friendly tribes. As in the case of banning tribal raids, the Saudi Arabian gov- ernment took a major step to encourage settling out among the Bedouins by abolishing the Elma system in 1953.33 The hiya system which had prevailed in Arabia, gave tribes customary and traditional property rights to range land, including the right to keep other tribes out of it. The Economic Base of Bedouin Society The economic base of Bedouins in Arabia comes from raising herds of domesticated animals. In the harsh environment of the desert it is understandable that Bedouin tribes try to increase their wealth. Sev- eral factors support this phenomenon. First, the Bedouin's wealth and prestige among the tribes is judged by the size of his herds. Second, a factor which in my opinion is more important than the first, is that Bedouins depend almost exclusively on their herds to sustain life in the desert. Third, the Bedouins know from thousands of years of experience that the future under desert conditions is gloomy, in that there is persistent danger of drought and famine. These two natural enemies force the Bedouins to attempt, when possible, to increase the size of their herds. After the severe lO-year drought of 1957 to 1967, which was es- pecially severe in the northern part of Saudi Arabia, everything con— cerning Bedouins changed drastically. During the drought, pasture land deteriorated, most of the domesticated animals perished, and 88 many Bedouins became poverty-stricken. While Saudi Arabia was an ex- porter of livestock (camels and sheep) before 1964, the country started to import approximately 110 million Saudi riyals worth of meat.34 The consequences of that long drought were emphasized in the government delegation report to the Bedouins'Conference in 1965. The losses of animals cited in that Report were as follows: 1. In Qurayat Al-Milh, camels decreased from 22,000 to 2,000 for one herd. 2. In Domat Al-Jandal, camels decreased from 33,000 to about 2,000 in one herd. 3. In the Eastern Province, camels decreased from 100,000 to 1,600; cows from 60,000 to 8,000, and sheep from 270,000 to around 28,000.35 The long years of drought had a major impact on the Bedouins' economic and social life. Some of the Bedouins left the desert and migrated to the cities looking for jobs, and some turned to cultiva- tion with only moderate success. The consequences will be pursued in more detail in chapters 5 and 6. The Camel Until the 1960s, the camel was the main animal bred in the Arabian Peninsula. It appears that camels had been domesticated by the Bedouins from early times, and, in fact, the camel has been asso- ciated with the Arabs in general and the Bedouins in particular. This is due to the fact that the camel alone possesses unique qualities adapted to the geographical conditions of Arabia. The Arabian Penin- sula's climate is known for its extreme dryness and heat, and most of its land area is poor in water and grazing. The camel is remarkable in that it can overcome these disadvantages. For food, the camel 89 picks up what it can, living on the roughest grass and on thorny tamarisk (aghil),36 and this as the Bedouin's say, "is to the camel what flesh-meat is to a man."37 The camel is well-known for its ability to forego water for a long time. Even in the summer season, during the unbearable heat of the desert, the camel can withstand thirst for five or six days, and in the winter it can survive for weeks without water. The Bedouins think that the camel has a water storage reservoir which he ruminates when the need arises. This belief is reinforced by the fact that the camel consumes huge quantities of water when he drinks. Some writers report that a camel that has not had water for some days will drink as much as 27 gallons in ten minutes.38 Although the camel can remain without water for a long time, there is no evidence that the camel has a special water-storage organ.39 The camel serves the Bedouins as a general agent of transporta- tion, a function of great importance to them as a migratory people. The camel is capable of carrying 150 to 300 kilograms per animal.40 The Bedouins also hire out the camel for money to settlers and city people to be used in long journeys through the desert or to make the haj (pilgrimage). The camel's extraordinary patience, power of endur- ance, and physical strength make it highly suited for the hard life of the desert. The importance of the camel is well expressed in the following quotation from Doughty, "If God had not created the camel, Najd [the Arabs say] would have been without an inhabitant."41 90 Other Animals Sheep and goats are also raised by some Bedouin tribes in the Arabian Peninsula. The care of goats is less taxing than that of either camels or sheep. This is supported by the fact that Bedouins usually assign children to tend the goats, while camels and sheep re- quire effort from all members of the tribef'2 Sheep need water more frequently than goats, and sheep are highly selective in their grazing areas. Traditionally, the noble tribes of Arabia (agayl) are not herders of sheep or goats because of their inability to travel for long distances or to endure the desert without water. Nevertheless, some non-noble tribes do raise sheep and goats. Glubb Basha, who lived among Jordan's Bedouins for a long time, points out that the na- ture of camels and sheep necessitated the division of the Bedouins into two groups: Ra ai al-ibel [camel herder], and ash-shawiy ah [sheep herder]." He elaborates as follows: Camels and sheep, however, did not do well together. The camel migrated far and fast, crossing long stretches of waterless deserts which would have proved fatal to flocks of sheep. Camels, throughout most of the year, grazed on the desert shrubs, but sheep preferred grass.43 Although other animals, especially horses are also kept and raised in abundance, they form a small part of the Bedouin economy. Horses were used primarily for raiding (ghazu) and tribal war, and therefore have lost their importance after Ibn Saud abolished raiding among the tribes of the country. In summary, this chapter attempts to depict the social struc- ture and economy of the Saudi Arabian Bedouins today, and to high- light recent changes that have had an impact on Bedouin life. This 91 chapter clarifies residential patterns in Saudi Arabia and explicitly defines the meaning of Bedouinism. In the absence of definitive cen- sus counts, several estimates of the number and distribution of Bedouins are presented and evaluated. The social structure of Bedouin society, including raiding and territorial use patterns, is presented. The economy of Bedouin society and the crucial role played by the camel are explained in some detail. FOOTNOTES 1Hans Bobek, "The Main Stages in Socio—Economic Evolution from a Geographical Point of View," in Readings in Cultural Geography, Philip L. Wagner and Marvin J. Mikesell, ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago .Press, 1962); Douglas L. Johnson, "The Nature of Nomadison," Research Paper No. 118, (The University of Chicago, Department of Geography, 1969); and Owen Lattimore, Inner Asian Frontiers of China, 2nd ed. (New York: Capital Publishing Co., and American Geographical Society, 1951). 2Richard Thurnwald, L'économie primitive (Paris: Payot, 1937), quoted in Johnson, ibid., p. 2. 3Johnson, op. cit., p. 2. 4Werner Caskel, "The Bedouinization of Arabia," in Studies in Islamic Cultural History, G. E. Von Grunebaum, ed., Memoir No. 76 (American Anthropological Assn., 56, April 1954), pp. 36-46. 5Johnson, op. cit., p. 3. 6Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah, Vol. 1, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1958), pp. 252-253. 7Muhi Al-Din Sabir and L. K. Maleikah, Bedouins and Bedouinism (Egypt: Markaz Tanmiyat A1 Moj Tama, Sirs Allyyan, 1966), p. 8. 8Salah Al-Abd in League of Arab States, Ri'ayat Al-Baduwa- Tahd'irihum Wa-Tawtinihum (Cairo: Dar At-Tiba'ah Al-Hadithah, 1965) p. 375. 9Abdallah H. Alabbadi, Ra'yhawl Al-Badufi al Mamlakah—al- Arabiyyah al-Saudiyya [Opinion about Bedouins in Saudi Arabia] (Riyadh: Central Planning Organization, 1970), p. 2. 10Shaikh Inayatullah, Geographical Factors in Arabian Life and History (Sh. M. Ashraf: Lahore, 1942). p. 39. 11League of Arab States Delegation of Saudi Arabia, in Ri'ayat, Vol. 1, op. cit., p. 404. 92 93 12Al-Abd, in Ri'ayat, Vol. 1, op. cit., p. 378. 13Quoted in Ahmed A. Shamgkh, Spatial Patterns of Bedouin Settle— ment in Al-Qasim Region, Saudia Arabia (Lexington, Ky.: The University of Kentucky, Dept. of Geography, 1975), p. 35. 14Yusif A. Sayigh, The Economies of the Arab World Development Since 1945 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978), p. 182. 15Alabbadi, op. cit., p. 5. 16Shamekh, op. cit., p. 37. l7Fouad Al-Farsy, Saudi Arabia: A Case Study in Development (London: Stacey International, 1978), p. 13. 18Delegation of Saudi Arabia, in Ri'ayat, Vol. 1, op. cit., p. 406. 19Morroe Berger, The Arab World Today (New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1962), p. 60. 20Ibn Khaldoun, op. cit., p. 305. 21The Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd. ed., Vol. 1, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1960), pp. 372—373. 22H. R. P. Dickson, The Arab of the Desert (London: Allen & Unwin, 1951), pp. 112, 515. 23Carlton S. Coon, "The Nomads," in Social Forces in the Middle East, Sydney N. Fisher, ed. (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1955), p. 24. 2Z'Berger, op. cit., p. 67. 25John L. Burckhardt, Notes on the Bedouins and the Wahabys (New York: Johnson Reprint Corporation, 1967), pp. 71-72. 26Charles M. Doughty, Travels in Arabia Deserta (London: Jonathan Cope, Ltd., 1936), p. 391. I believe the r in ghrazzus should be omitted because the Arabic word for raid is ghazu. 94 27William Palgrave, Personal Narrative of a Year's Journey Through Central and Eastern Arabia (London: Macmillan & Company, 1967), p. 23. 28Sir John B. Glubb, War in the Desert (New York: W. W. Norton & Co. Inc., 1961), p. 25. 29Taha 0. El-Farra, The Effects of Detribalizing the Bedouins on the Internal Cohesion of an Emerging State: The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Geography, University of Pittsburgh, 1973), p. 41. 3OGlubb, op. cit., p. 25. 31Louise E. Sweet, ed., "Camel Raiding of North Arabian Bedouin: A Mechanism of Ecological Adaptation," in Peoples and Cultures of the Middle East, Vol. 1 (New York: The Natural History Press, 1970), p. 271. 32El Farra, op cit., p. 44. 33United National Economic and Social Office in Beirut, Nomadic Population in Selected Countries in the Middle East (New York, 1980), p. 114. 34Al-Abbadi, op. cit., p. 11. 35Delegation of Saudi Arabia, Op. cit., p. 411. 36Shaikh Inayatullah, op. cit., p. 58. 37Doughty, op. cit., p. 651. 38K. Schmidt-Nielson "The Physiology of the Camel," Scientific American 201 (1959), pp. 140-150. See also his article with others "Body Temperature of the Camel and Its Relation to Water Economy," American Journal of Physiology 188 (1957), pp. 103-112. 39Schmidt-Nielson, "The Physiology of the Camel," ibid., p. 141. 40Louise E. Sweet, "Camel Pastoralism in North Arabia and the Minimal Camping Unit," in Man, Culture, and Animals: The Role of Animals in Human Ecological Adjustments, A. Leeds and A. P. Vayda, ed. Washington, D.C.: American Anthropological Publication No. 78, 1960) p. 133. .95 41Doughty, op. cit., p. 292. See also Donald R. Hill, "The Role of the Camel and the Horse in the Early Arab Conquest," in Technology and Society in the Middle East, V. J. Parry and M. E. Yapp, ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1975); and Richard W. Bulliet, EDS Camel and the Wheel (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975). 42Abdulbar A. Al-Gain, The In-Situ Development of the Bedouin Nomads: A Bayesian Decision Analysis (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Arizona, 1974), p. 31. 43Glubb, Op. cit., p. 33. CHAPTER V EARLY BEDOUIN SETTLEMENTS (HIJAR) 1912-1930 It is the purpose of this chapter to investigate the socio- historical background of the early Bedouin settlements in Arabia. Be- cause Najd is considered the traditional home of the early Ikhwan colo- nies (1912-1930), it will be treated first. This is followed by a brief discussion of the Wahhabi movement, which inspired the nomadic people in Saudi Arabia to abandon their nomadic way of life and agree to settle out in communities called hijar, The Ikhwan movement and the experience in settling new agricultural communities is the focus of this chapter. The Ikhwan movement is one of the most discussed but least understood social movements of the Arabian Peninsula. The Wahhabi movement in central Arabia attempted expansion by combining religious teaching and jihad with an emphasis on Bedouin participation in the social and economic mainstream of settlements and an integra- tion into the cities' whole society. Najd Geographically, Najd is the highland heart of Arabia. Sometimes Arab historians call it the heart of the Arabian Peninsula, or as it is called in Arabic, galb Jazirat Al Arab. Najd is bounded by the Great Nafud to the north which separates the Jowf region from Najd, by the Empty Quarter to the south, by A1 Ahsa and the oil fields to the east and by the Hejaz to the west. Even though Najd is separated from 96 97 all surrounding regions, these barriers are not difficult to pass through. The land had always attracted nomads, pilgrims, and merchants and Bedouin warriors traverse this area. Indeed, much of this desert land, during the winter and spring of the year, provides the Bedouin tribes fresh herbage for their herds and flocks to graze and grow fat. Traditionally, Najd is divided into three subdistricts. The first is the southern district which contains the capital Riyadh which is the center of A1 Saud political power, both in the past and in the present. Most of the settlements and villages are located in the oases in the valley which cut through the Tuwayq Mountain. Riyadh is lo- cated in Al-Arid, where Wadi Hanifah is the principal valley. This wadi runs southward and then eastward to the city of Al—Kharj, the site of unusual spring-fed pools of water and a government farm.l Neverthe— less, the water of Al-Kharj has decreased substantially during the last decade and the government farm has been terminated. South of Riyadh are the oases of Al-Hawtah and Al-Hariq, the district of Al-Aflaj, and the long valley of Wadi Al-Dawasir which derived its name from a large tribe living in the region, with some of its members settled in eastern Arabia. The second, or northern district is known as Jabal Shammer and is named for one of the most powerful tribes in the north. The principal city of this district is Hayil, the center of the polit- ical power of the house of Al-Rashid, Which was in constant struggle with the house of Al-Saud for supremacy over the interior of the Arabian Peninsula before the former lost the struggle to Al Saud. The third subdistrict is the central district, known by the name of Qasim. This district, with an abundant water supply and with a milder, cooler 98 weather than Riyadh, is predominantly an agricultural area. Even though surrounded by a number of major tribes (e.g., Mutayr, Al-Ujman, and Anazah), a large proportion of the population in Qasim is, and always has been, sedentary. Very famous, talented traders who range from the Persian Gulf to India and Egypt reside in the large cities of Unayzah and Buraydah in the Qasim. If the Arabian Peninsula is the traditional home of Middle Eastern nomadism, then Najd is the heart of the peninsula to the nomads. Within this vast desert, marked with villages, small settlements, and palm oases, the great and noble Bedouin tribes of the Najd reside, namely, Utaybah, Shammar, Harb, Mutayr, Qahtan, and Dawasir "whose members of their endless migrations through the desert wove, as it were, the desert and the town into a common fabric."2 It is common among societies and nations that people look upon others stereotypically due to rivalry, misunderstanding and other fac- tors. In Najd, for example, the town people in general are famous for their courage and endurance. The people of Qasim, because they travel a great deal, engage in trade, and have contact with the settlers of the big cities of Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan, seem to be more friendly than the people of Al'Arid. The people of Qasim think of themselves as the elite of the Najd, because they are the best in- formed, best mannered, and best in handling industrial and commercial business. On the other hand, the people of Al'Arid consider themselves superior to all others in the Najd in courage, in endurance, in strict adherence to religion and in preserving Arab customs and traditions. Ahl (people) of Al-Arid have formed the core of the Arabian Peninsula 99 and have been well-known for their loyalty to the Wahhabi tradition and to the Al-Saud family. This loyalty has been their secret strength in the past and might be so in a future renaissance. The nomadic tribes of Najd live in isolation and austerity. The determining element in a Bedouin's life is rain. When rain comes, the Bedouin is happy, joyful, and optimistic, assured of his livelihood during the coming days. He looks forward to good grazing for his herd and flocks, which, in turn, means prosperity for his family and his tribe.4 But when the rains are delayed, he falls into despair, uncer- tain about the future. He asks God through his prayers for an end to the long drought. Several rainless years reduce the Bedouins to misery. As Harrison points out, "life in the villages and towns of Najd was ascetic, with few pleasures, that last only a short time."5 Ibn Abdal Wahhab and Wahhabism6 This important movement is very relevant to the establishment of the first Bedouin settlements in Saudi Arabia. The Bedouin tribes that left everything behind them and founded the colonies called Hijar, were very much under the influence of the Wahhabi movement. Ameen Rihani, in his book Modern Najd and Its Dependencies, gives this unique obser- vation: In Wadi Hanifah, appeared Musaylemah (the liar) who waged war against the Prophet Mohammed and Islam, but was defeated. . . . And in Wadi Hanifah,appeared Mohammed Ibn Abdal-Wahhab who fought against innova- tions and superstitions and was winner.7 The above quotation from Rihani gives us a clear-cut picture of the im- portance of Najd, as the birthplace of the movement which was a turning point in Islamic history. Ibn Abdal Wahhab had brought the peOple of 100 Najd back to the true spirit of Islam. Before that time, they had been stupefied by various superstitions which were not in the Prophet's Islam, but nonetheless spread over the Arabian Peninsula. Deviant religious beliefs led both city people and Bedouin tribes to drift away from the Islam of the Prophet Mohammad. They worshipped tombs, and rocks, and trees making vows to them, supplicating them for favours: they raised galis [saints] above Allah in their prayers; they no longer could or would read the Koran; they ceased to pay the zakat-money; and they cared not about true pilgrimage to Mecca.8 Mohammad Ibn Abdal Wahhab, the founder of this movement, was born in the year 1703 A.D. (1115 H) in the town of Al-Uyainah, located in the upper reaches of Wadi Hanifah of southern Najd. His father and grandfather before him, were qadi or judges, that is, the chief reli- gious figures, following the path of the Hanbalite School.9 Shaikh Ibn Abdal Wahhab, like most of the people of Najd at that time, was a townsman of Bedouin origin, for he traced his lineage back to the an- cient tribe of Tamim.lo He obtained his first education from his father, then traveled to A1 Ahsa, A1 Hejaz, and Basra in Iraq to in- crease his knowledge. He became an authority on the Hadith (the proph- et's sayings and actings), Arabic literature and theology. When he returned to Najd, he was determined to devote his time and his life to the revival of the Islamic religion and to stand firm in his opposi- tion to all kinds of superstitions and innovations which had swept the region. Ibn Abdal Wahhab's call for the return to true Islam was influ- enced by the works of Sheikh Al-Islam Ibn Taymiyah. The latter was born in 1263 and died in 1328 A.D. (the Muslim years 661 and 728 H). 101 The aims of Ibn Taymiyah were for the return to the Qur'an and Al Sunnah (the prophet's sayings), as well as the return to the early Moslems in their interpretation of the Qur'an and the Hadith. He took a firm stand against innovations and superstitutions, especially those that connect God with place or a person. His teachings prohibited any kind of prayers to anyone but God. He permitted no worship of trees or tombs of good Muslims. He also did not want too much personal im— portance given to the personality of the prophet. Instead, he asked for concentration and sincere devotion to follow his teaching and ex- ample. Also, he encouraged Ijtihad, that is, the original and individ- ual explanation of the Quaran and Sunnah by the Muslim religious thinkers. Ibn Abdal Wahhab did not preach a new religion. He wanted a re— turn to the source of Islam. He was a follower of Ibn Hanbal, one of the four Muslim Imams, who lived around the middle of the ninth century (A.D.) and whose teachings, to a large extent, were elaborated by Ibn Taymiyah and his student Ibn Al—Qayyim. The term Wahhabism (or Wahhabiyah) which is widely used by west- erners, obviously has been taken from the name of the founder of this movement. However, the term Wahhabiyah is literally unknown in Najd. The Wahhabiyah is a term invented by Turkish propaganda and diplomacy when most of the Arab countries were under Turkish rule. Their aim was to create antagonism toward the people of Najd by representing them, to the Islamic world, as the innovators of a new kind of reli- gion not in conformity with the religion taught by the four recognized schools of Islam. 102 The idea of establishing the first Saudi state began in Dariyah, about 10 miles from Riyadh, in 1741-1745. Amir Mohammad Ibn Saud of Dariyah, the first ruler of the present ruling family, had political ambitions to expand his territory beyond the limits of his mini city- state. But due to lack of resources, his ambition fell short, even though he was waiting for an opportunity to grab power. This chance came when Ibn Abdal Wahhab arrived in Dariyah and the alliance of reli- gion and politics was effected. The Amir entrusted the supervision of everything related to religious affairs to Ibn Abdal Wahhab, who re- mained in the city trying to rally people around his reform movement. It was a golden opportunity for both the Amir and the sheikh. The lat- ter possessed the ability to mobilize the people of the area through religious zeal and by creating a force so powerful that the people were willing to sacrifice their lives, families, and tribe for the cause of Islam. The two leaders agreed to carry out their decision to create a Saudi state and to make true Islam the official religion of the new state. The following quotation from Philby sheds light on this alliance: So the alliance of prince and priest was duly cemented that day of the year 1745; but Muhammad Ibn Saud sought assurances from the shaikh on two points. "I fear," he said, "that, if I help you and we win the world, you and I, you may leave me to seek your fortune elsewhere, and secondly I am entitled by the laws of my land to certain revenues on the earnings of my subjects from agriculture and trade and the rest. You will not ask me to forego this right." The shaikh replied: "As for the first matter, give me your hand on it. And as regards to the second, perchance Almighty God will con- quer you conquests [sic], and recompensate you with spoils of war far more ample than your present revenues."11 103 Origins of the Ikhwan Settlements Historically, there were numerous attempts on the part of politi- cal leaders and local amirs in the Arabian Peninsula to control the Bedouin nomads. The first attempt, just mentioned, was the alliance between Ibn Saud Amir A1 Dariyah and Sheikh Ibn Abdal Wahhab in 1745. Since that time Saudi leaders tried to make the Bedouins staunch fol— lowers of Wahhabism. After King Abdul Aziz conquered most of Najd and Riyadh fell under his control in 1902, he restored the Saudi dynasty to power in central Arabia. But he was not satisfied because Najd was a poor region, so he planned strategies to control Al Ahsa and Al— Hejaz. To do that successfully, he had to build a mobile, solid, and reliable military force. Most of the army which supported him in re- capturing Najd was composed of townsmen from Al Arid. Most of these people were engaged in trade and commerce and could not leave their shops and businesses for a long time in order to join the forces of Ibn Saud to march toward Al Ahsa and Al-Hejaz. Or as Habib explained, The villages of Najd were the most loyal citizens and most reliable soldiers, but they could not leave their field and shops for extended military service in cam- paigns far from their homes; on the other hand, the Bedouin in their nomadic state were too opportunistic and fickle in their loyalties to provide the depend- ability which an Arabian leader required for distant, long range conquests.12 -Ibn Saud, with a political vision for the future realized that it was not enough for him to control the tribes and make them Wahhabis. In order for him to found the new cohesive national state he dreamed of, he had to come up with new methods, as pointed out by Rihani: Three things had to be done to bring the Bedn within the pale of authority, to keep them there and make them behave: three things, two of which had been 104 tried by his great predecessors and were only tempo- rarily successful. So he could add a third, he would (1) conquer the Badu; (2) make good Wahhabis of them; and (3) chain them to the soil. 3 In order for Ibn Saud to reach his goal of expanding his realm of political influence, he had to convince the Bedouins to change their loyalty from their own tribe to a new state with fixed political bound- aries. Rihani refers to Ibn Saud's secret in controlling the Bedouins as due to his comprehension of the Bedouin mentality. Rihani cites the following quotation by the King Abdal Aziz: "We raise them [the Bedouins] not above us," he said, "nor do we place ourselves above them. We give them when we can; we satisfy them with an excuse when we cannot. And when they go beyond their bounds we make them taste of the sweetness of our discipline."14 It must be recalled that in the past, the Bedouins carried out raids plundered and robbed others. These kinds of activities were an essential part of the Bedouins' way of life. The Bedouin justification was simple: A11 worldly goods belong to God. Today they are mine, tomorrow they may be yours. This morning we were poor; by night-time we had become rich. The next morning we may wake up rich but by night we may have become poor again.15 Rihani, the Lebanese-American who visited the country at that time wrote: "The Bedouin were traditionally known for their fickleness and their political unreliability, characteristics of their inherent indi- vidualism."l6 Ibn Saud realized the tragic effect of the Egyptian expedition, sent at the order of the Ottoman Khalif, against the Wahhabis in the early nineteenth century to suppress the movement, which at that time was gaining momentum in Najd. The nomadic tribes of Najd and some of 105 Al-Hejaz as well, later withdrew their loyalty from A1 Saud family and joined the forces of Ibrahim Pasha, the leader of the Egyptian expedi- tion in his campaign against Al-Dariyah,the political center of A1- Saud. In fact, it was the brave villagers of Najd who stood firmly behind Al-Saud and played the major role in preventing the forces of the Egyptian from advancing.17 This incident was always in the mind of Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud. After Ibn Saud gradually conquered Najd and Alahsa after the Turks left the area he became the unchallenged ruler of central and eastern Arabia. From 1902 through 1915, the area pacified by King Ibn Saud was characterized by a number of emerging problems, which have been described as social dislocations. The nature of those social problems added a new burden to the magnitude of the task faced by Wahhabism, as well as by Ibn Saud in generating and implementing solu- tions to the problems. As stated before, there were many cases of defection from Ibn Saud to his enemies. Furthermore, the Bedouin tribes were generally unreliable. Also, tribal levies provided insufficient economic base to run the government. This financial problem not only involved the Bedouins but also was a problem in the more settled villages. For a long time, these villages were loyal to local ruling families and to some tribal sheikhs. Another social problem faced by Ibn Saud was the conflict of interests among tribes, especially in relation to grazing territory (dirah). There had always been the possibility of small or major wars because of this problem. If the central government was strong, tribes would have to observe the customary law of territories. That is, no tribe would dare to wander into the land that belonged to 106 a different tribe without permission. But if the central government is weak or totally absent, then "merry hell is let loose, and every tribe is at its neighbor's throat."l8 The Bedouins may consider this state of "merry hell" a good system for their desert life, but Ibn Saud found the idea to be damaging to his attempt to create a nation state. In order to better appreciate the problems faced by Ibn Saud, it is appropriate to briefly recall essential features of Bedouin life. Three factors are essential in determining his life style. First, the Bedouin is obliged to constantly look for fresh grazing; second, ade- quate wells are sparse; and third, extremes of heat and cold charac— terize the Arabian desert.19 Further, raiding is an important aspect of the Bedouin system. As Professor Sweet observed: "A continuously operating system of camel exchange clearly solves the fundamental eco- "20 me logical problems of survival of the camel herds in the desert. camel, of course, was very important in transporting goods as well as a resource of food, wool, leather, and other products.21 To summarize, The camel . . . is the only important marketable thing that the Bedouins have. Sold to itinerant traders, or in oasis markets, it pays for the weap- ons, clothing, and auxiliary food supplies that are carried into the desert.22 Ibn Saud was very much preoccupied with the changing loyalties of the tribes. The Bedouins changed their loyalties according to ad- vantages they acquired from the prince or the governor. "They feel practically no loyalty to rulers, and unashamedly transfer their alle- "23 This giance from one to another to further their own advantage. state of affairs among the Bedouins can hardly be considered fickle- ness, for it is much like changing jobs among the city dwellers. 107 Raiding among Bedouins, for example, was always considered a sport or gamble and Bedouins were reluctant to give it up at the order of rulers. In the raids, Some became rich, some were ruined; there was a net loss on the whole. But everybody lived in hope, and everybody always believed that the next time he would come home driving untold flocks and wealth.24 The majority of the population under Ibn Saud's control during his first regime was either disloyal or at some time could potentially defect to opponents. Ibn Saud was aware of the danger of the politi— cal and social problems arising from tribal disloyalty. For him to maintain power, everything depended upon the ability to deal with the life style of the Bedouins.25 To solve the problem of questionable loyalty of Bedouin tribes, Ibn Saud used his imagination and vision to create a new structure that would cut across tribal allegiance and create commitment to a politi— cal leader and state. Wahhabism, the uniting force of his ancestors, provided him with the basis for that structure. The movement was still alive in the minds and hearts of many people in Najd. Many years ago Ibn Khaldun had asserted that the Bedouins are difficult to lead except when they follow a prophet or holy man. In addition to its religious characteristics, Wahhabism could also be interpreted to include elements of political and social organization. Hence, Ibn Saud developed the Ikhwan movement.26 The term ikhwan is the plural of the word 95g, which means literally, brother or dear sincere friend. The Prophet Akha made brothers between his supporters Al-Aws and Al Khazraj, in Madinah, so that old feuds were forgotten. The Holy Qur'an refers to this incident in the verse: 108 Fortify yourselves by following the teaching of God, holding all together, and falling not away from one another. Remember the blessing of God on you in bring- ing your hearts together, so that you who were enemies are through His grace become brothers, and you who stood upon the brink of Hell have been saved from destruction.27 The term Ikhwan, as it was originally used by the Bedouins of Najd, signifies the brotherhood which they found through their common colonies, sharing the Islamic brotherhood relations, and putting them above family and tribal ties, as well as forgetting past feuds. To quote the Quaran: Cling all of you to the rope of God and do not separate and remember God's blessings, for you were enemies and he joined your hearts together and you became, by the grace of God, brothers.2 In later years, the word Ikhwan came to refer to the nomadic Bedouins of Arabia who accepted the fundamentals of the Hanbali Islamic school as taught by Ibn Abdal Wahhab and who abandoned their nomadic way of life and settled in villages and small communities. Their settlements were known as Hi ar or "departures" because the inhabitants departed from their old life to adopt a sedentary life. The inmigration (hijrah) of Bedouins from nomadic life to settled communities symbol- ized the early life of Prophet Mohammad when he migrated from Makkahtx> Al-Madinah to mark the dawn of the Islamic era. .Hija£_is the plural flu \. A ._ . zm2w> :58 \\ F d. ...J. . .. _. ..x t-ocizga I \ // x .flmp, \L agfiiggg \. I/.\/k ... . . \.11 a 5388 D . 111111111 lfiWHhflfi . . . . 6v . , .. 1 . z6m were used as a means to settle the Bedouins, the result would be the death knell of the natural pastures that cover a large fraction of the deserts. For that reason, the organization of pastures is a very im- portant feature to be incorporated in any policy attempting to improve and develop the potential of the nomads of Saudi Arabia. Most studies of nomadic people in Arabia, whether by United r-f ‘ Nations special experts or by Western, Arabian, and native scholars alike, indicate that it is not an easy task to mobilize the Bedouins ———-— in agricultural settlementsi__The United Nations experts concerned with Spasture organization and working with the Ministry of Agriculture and Water, have pointed out that it is conceivable that with organized pasture development, Saudi Arabia can restore favorable pasture condi- tions. Income from animal sources is very important to the national economy of Saudi Arabia, since it is the second most important resource after oil.15 The immense decrease of livestock after the long period of drought could provide the country with a very good opportunity to improve the pastures, because the limited number of animals would give time for the grass, shrubs, and other plants to increase. Some plants mature rapidly and it is possible for pastures to revive very quickly. In his report on developing pastures in Saudi Arabia, Dr. Draz advised the government to take action to prevent any further deterioration of pastures, as a result of unorganized grazing, cutting bushes and plants for fuel, soil erosion, and high salinity.16 Other methods to improve the conditions of pastures may be suggested, as: (l) Distributing water wisely, especially that around valleys and oases during the rainy season; (2) organizing and protecting pastures from excessive 142 use, and working to limit the size and movements of the herds; (3) storing of surplus food for the herds to be used in the event of suc- cessive years of drought; and (4) stabilizing of the sand dunes through the planting of grazing shrubs.17 Another recent study of the economics of pastures in Saudi Arabia indicated that 5 percent of the total pasture area (140 million hec- tares) is still in excellent condition, 10 percent is in good condi- tion, about 25 percent is in moderate condition, and the remaining 60 percent is deteriorated.l8 The deteriorated condition is due to ex- cessive grazing, especially around the water sources, excessive cutting of bushes and shrubs for use as fuel, and the migration of labor force from pasture areas to the oil and urban centers. The increase of population in the cities and the urban centers was rapid, especially after oil became the mainstay of the economy. During the last twenty years, these urban centers absorbed a large num- ber of Bedouins who came looking for jobs, often in the National Guard,' the Army, and the Internal Security Forces. The pastures of Saudi Arabia still have significance to the na- tional economy, because they provide nutrition for about 2.85 million sheep, 0.4 million cattle, 6 million camels, and 270,000 cows. The estimation of the animals wealth of the country is around 8.55 million livestock units, of which 6.35 million units depend on natural pas- tures.19 In Saudi Arabia, mutton is the preferred meat in the urban centers. Camel meat is highly preferred by the Bedouins, but some of the elite families, including the royal family prefer to eat camel meat. There are now private corporations that raise young camels for (1333/ consumption. Beef is preferred only by foreigners, especially those of Western origin. Reasons for Failure The success of any agricultural project to settle the Bedouins in Saudi Arabia depends on several factors: (1) abundancy of water; (2) availability of rich soil free from salinity; (3) preparation and training of Bedouins in use of agricultural machinery; (4) a well- planned campaign to educate the nomads on the importance of agriculture to their livelihood, (5) organizing and improving the conditions of pastures alongside the agricultural settlement; (6) the involvement of Bedouins by bureaucrats in decisions concerning agricultural settle- ments; and (7) accessibility of agricultural settlements to market centers. In applying these major factors to the previous agricultural pro- jects to settle the nomads, we find that none of these factors were taken into consideration in planning and executing the settlement pro- jects. The government acted in a hasty way with regard to all pro- jects. There was a lack of careful studies and social surveys of the social and economic conditions of the nomads who had been affected by the drought. The drought, of course, was among the major factors con- tributing to the failure of wadi al-Sarhan and Tabouk projects. Recent Hijar As we have seen in the previous agricultural projects, the Bedouins turned to agriculture because of drought and because no al- ternative was available to them. The emphasis on projects based on 144 agriculture contradicts traditions and customs of the Bedouins. As the report of the Saudi delegation stated: "The desire of some tribes to adopt agriculture and leave nomadism, at least temporarily, is the result of the successive years of drought and rain shortage."20 The failure of the agricultural settlements set out by the Saudi government in various types of projects does not mean in any way that all Bedouins of Arabia dislike agriculture or sedentary life. In fact, many Bedouins acted upon their desire to settle and to practice agriculture long before the government initated any program for settling out the Bedouins. Some Bedouins took the initiative by digging wells at their own expense in order to cultivate the land, even though their methods of cultivation were not particularly modern. A. Shamekh, in his study, Spatial Patterns of Bedouin Settlement in Al-Qasim Region of Saudi Arabia, states that the movement to found new hijaa in Qasim started in 1942, but the movement grew very slowly. Only five of 44 recenthija£_were founded between 1930 and 1952. It was the decade of the 19503 that showed a marked increase in Bedouin movement toward sedentarization. From 1952 to 1959, 28 new hijar were founded. The drought of 1952-53 in the region was a motivating factor behind the establishment of 14 new recent hijai. By the end of 1953, eight new hija£_were established. During the 19603, the number of new hijai declined to only 11. Shamekh indicates that the reason for the decline of new hijaa settlements in the 19603 was not in any way re- flective of a decline in Bedouin sedentarization. He indicated that the reasons were twofold: First, the evidence from his field study suggests that most tribes of al-Qasim region had already established themselves in their new hijar; second, some Bedouins were unable to 145 have their choice of land, and some failed to acquire permission from the authority to use an untested site.21 The early hijaa of the Ikhwan were inspired and motivated by re- ligious as well as political factors. In contrast, the motivation be- hind the recent nomadic hijai_sett1ements was purely economic, espe- cially after the famous drought that lasted for about seven consecu- tive years. The nomadic people recognized their way of life as vul- nerable, full of danger and risk, and they accepted the concept of settlement. Shamekh, in his study, reports that of the 41 recent hijaa in Qasim he visited, 20 were founded by settlers coming directly from nomadism. The remaining 21 settlements were established by Bedouin tribes that migrated from the early hijaa.22 Shamekh found the most important reasons for the Bedouins to settle in the newly created hijai communities was the amenities pro— vided by sedentary agricultural life, especially education, social ser- vices, and health facilities. He found that such amenities were the major factors for settlement in 56 percent of the recent hijah as com- pared to 5 percent in the early Wahhabi hijaa colonies. Religion was the dominant factor in the early Ikhwan hija; communities (83.8 per- cent), but only 39 percent in the case of Bedouins in the recent 'hijaa. The decline in the importance of religion as a major factor in the recent hijaa is very interesting, especially when we know that about one-half of these new communities were established by immigrants from the early Ikhwan ElliE colonies who abandoned their nomadic life for religious reasons. The increasingly difficult desert life, and the loss of considerable wealth in the form of animals were more 146 important factors in the recent hijar than in the early ones (22 per- cent and 9.8 percent, respectively). The difficult life of desert nomadism was a minor factor in the early Ikhwan hijar (2.7 percent), while the loss of animal wealth was not even considered a factor.23 Spontaneous Settlement Around Urban and Oil Centers This type of settlement, as well as the recent hijag just dis- cussed, and to some extent the early Wahhabi hijap discussed in chapter 5, are all derived from isteetan or the internal power within Bedouin society that moves them to settle. In fact, most of the successful Bedouin settlements in Saudi Arabia are of this spontaneous type. Some Arabian experts on nomadic settlements call these settlements voluntary, in the sense that no governmental, regional, or international organiza- tion was involved in planning and carrying out the concept of settle- ment, or in forcing the Bedouins to accept settlement. Others describe them as an adaptive form of settlement, which means that individuals or groups select their own place to settle out, without any outside influence. In fact, the decision to settle is mainly in response to their needs, which are largely economic. Needless to say, the bulk of Bedouin settlements which have been successful in neighboring Arab countries fall under the spontaneous variety of settlement. Spontaneous Bedouin settlements sometimes begin on an individu- alistic basis, but then turn into a group formed from internal migra- tion from nomadism to the cities and the urban centers. This happened in the case of the Bedouins of the western desert in Egypt who migrated to the cities to work mainly as street cleaners or servents in house- holds. In the Sudan, we find the Bedouins of Baggara working as guards 147 for the industrial complexes and government agencies. Another example of spontaneous settlement is evident in the Bedouins who migrated to the oil centers in Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia. They came to work for the oil companies and later sent for their kin to join them. These Bedouins became agents of change, whether they chose to continue to work for the oil companies or to go back to nomadism after several years. In either case, they have been affected by new methods and concepts about modern living. Al-Shamekh in his study on the Al-Qasim Region in Saudi Arabia has counted 18 spontaneous Bedouin settlements located around seven cities and towns in the Qasim core area. Al-Shamekh called this type of settlement hiiai. "The hiiai seem to be a recent phenomenon in Qasim. The average life of the hiiai is only thirteen years."25 Actually hiiai_are not restricted to the al-Qasim region, because they are to be found in every part of Saudi Arabia, especially in the western and southern provinces. The semi-nomadic Bedouin may be seen in settlements consisting of such temporary dwellings as palm huts. Generally speaking, the number of sheep and goats owned is small as compared with those belonging to some of the noble, purely nomadic tribes. Settlers plant and harvest some fruits and vegetables. Some Bedouins work as agricultural laborers for the settled farmers, and some of them find jobs in factories, construction, transportation, and civil services in cities, such as Jeddah and Makkah. Some of these spontaneous Bedouin communities may finally establish themselves in one place permanently. The Bedouins who have settled Spontaneously usually live in clay or cement houses formina a Qaryah (village or hamlet), with a mosque. 148 They keep only a few sheep and goats to support the household and not for the market. The settled Bedouins derive their income from selling their vegetables and fruit at the city market. They have accepted agriculture as a "way of living." Their enlarged agricultural activity utilizes water from artesian wells and springs as well as from rainfall. "Some of the settled Bedouins also work as agricultural laborers, find employment in the cities, and engage in the artisan manufacture of such products as fans and mattresses woven from palm leaves."26 Katakura here refers to the semi-nomadic people of Wadi Fatima, lo- cated between Jeddah and Makkah in the western province. Such volun- tary Bedouin settlements are scattered in the Hejaz region as well as in Tihama and Asir in the south. Spontaneous Bedouin settlement has been a continuous process in- fluenced by many major factors. One important factor in spontaneous settlement includes the tribe's loss of role as guardian and protector of caravan roads and trade routes, and the protection of other ignoble tribes or weaker villagers who paid regular tribute to the more power- ful and noble tribes. Although the long, serious, and continuous droughts of 1955-64 intensified the Bedouin movement toward spontaneous settlements, fewer and fewer attempted to settle at permanent water locations. The deterioration of pastures, with the resulting loss of herds, was recorded in a report by one of the International Labor Office experts on nomadic life. This report claimed the loss of tmore than fllpercent of the camel herds in the northern part of Arabia, ‘flith an even higher percentage in the eastern region. 149 It must be borne in mind that the momentum of the spontaneous settlements in recent years has been increasing, with Bedouins migrat- ing to Riyadh, Jeddah and the other urban centers, and to the oil towns of the eastern province in Saudi Arabia. These spontaneous Bedouin settlements reflect, to a large extent, the large-scale economic changes that are taking place all over Saudi Arabia. Increasing numbers of Bedouin tribes are abandoning their pastoralism and joining the labor force and are working for wages. They either sell their herds or leave them in the care of some relatives. The movement to the cities started in the 19503 and has increased in recent years. Many Bedouins have settled around the oil centers in shanty towns built of scrap metal (Ar. sanadig). Cole reports that "at least three such shanty towns belong to or are predominantly inhabited by members of the Al-murrah. Although some of them have developed some agricul- ture, all of them have settled because of their activities in indus- trial occupations."28 One of these shanty towns is located just off the Riyadh-Dhahran highway about five miles west of Abquaiq. It is composed of over thirty housing units, each one of which typically has an enclosed, subdivided yard and two or three rooms with separate, nonconnecting entrances. . . . All of the structures, including the wall encircling the yard, are made of tin and scrap lumber, much of which has been scavenged from oil company buildings no longer in use which have been torn down. 9 Such shanty towns are to be found not only around the Aramco oil centers but also extended into the neutral zone between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, where the oil concessions belong to Amin Oil, Getty (both are American companies) and the Arabian Japanese Oil Company. In 1962, while working with the Ministry of Labor and Social Arrairs, I was asked to go with another colleague to the neutral zone and collect data about the social and economic conditions of the work- ers for the oil companies in that troubled area. There were riots among Saudi laborers protesting their miserable conditions, including housing, wages, and medical facilities. The writer has seen many shanty towns occupied by Bedouins from different tribes who had origi- nally lived a nomadic life. These shanty towns were identical to those described by Cole in the previous quotation. The Impact of Oil on Bedouin Life In 1938, oil was discovered in Saudi Arabia, but it was not until 1948 that oil revenues contributed to the massive spending power of Saudi Arabia. By 1950, oil production amounted to more than 25 million tons per year. Saudi Arabia became the second largest oil producer in the Middle East, just under that of Iran with her 30 million ton out- put. As a result of this production level, the Saudi oil revenues rose to about $90 million in 1950. The impact of oil revenues was equally significant on both social and political levels. The sudden wealth had a revolutionizing effect on the internal condition of the country. This wealth helped Ibn Saud to carry out his plans for the development and modernization of the country. Ibn Saud intended to spend some of the oil wealth on technological development in the areas f of agriculture and water supply, transportation, schools, and hospi-_ ’1 tals, but agricultural development had first priority in his plans. _.-——.~—”"""‘°’.--—. _ .--- .-.-W“ 'n—l“ W _‘ He believed that moderniaiag the agricultural sector would be more h—i’__i’#-l beneficial to the welfare ofwhisflpeoplamihan spending money on I ... rnw—n.———--u .- ff l 5 1 .1" adddahign. This intention is reflected in one major agricultural ex- periment known as the Al Kharj Project started in 1942 by an American agricultural mission headed by Twitchell.30 By 1970, oil production had reached 1,386 million barrels, and oil revenues had risen to $1,150 million. Because of the quadrupling of oil prices in December 1973 and the subsequent increases, Saudi Arabia's revenue from oil reached the $25 billion level in 1976, while its reserves in foreign currency, earmarked for investments, attained the figure of $45 billion. In 1980, Saudi Arabia produced close to 10 million barrels a day and sold it at a lower price than most of the OPEC members. This policy of increasing production of crude oil, in fact, runs counter to two basic goals in the three five-year develop- ment plans. These two goals were stated clearly by the Saudi govern- ment as: (l) maximizing earnings from oil over the long-term and con- serving depletable resources (of which oil is certainly one) and (2) reducing economic dependence on the export of crude oil. Some writers consider that Saudi Arabia has indeed secured for herself "a better position with the world economy,"31 but that does not reflect markedly on her domestic economy or on the lives of most of the people of the country. One observes that lack of trained man- #— .power remains one of the maia_obstacles to rapidudayaiopment_in Saudi Arabia yet the government has "introduced more restrictions on female '"“"‘-—-._~. -. _“ —.—. . . . - - ‘ ‘ __——..- .._.-...-. v—w employment" and unemployment is high among nomads. This policy is seen .4——-——__‘_____ ‘ m as an attempt on the part of the government to develop the country "32 "without straining the existing political and social fabric. Another contradiction in the development plans is evident in the first two priorities of the Second Five-Year Plan. These are "to 152 maintain the religious and moral values of Islam" and "to insure the defense and internal security of the kingdom." A Saudi businessman ob- served that if these two goals are attained, then they defeat all others. "How can a nation determine to preserve Islam and its own in— ternal security and at the same time throw open its doors to foreign technology, manpower, and other influences?"33 Through its capital accumulation from international sales of oil, Saudi Arabia and most of the oil exporting countries have become integrated into the capitalist structure of the world market, whether they like it or not. As the Saudi Oil Minister Ahmad Z-Yamani has commented: "The oil exporting countries are themselves part and parcel of the western economic system."34 I think this statement by the oil minister explains the policy of increasing oil production, even if that practice contradicts the stated goals of the development plans. An- other social and economic implication of oil revenues on the country comes from the new technology and innovation of Aramco, the American oil company. As the former U. S. Ambassador H. Eilts pointed out, Aramco has launched Saudi Arabia on the process of social change. It exposed a heretofore languid Saudi society to a massive and powerful dosage of modern technology. It brought a wave of bustling Americans and other foreigners with strange ways and emphasizing productivity.“35 The first impact of the oil industry on the Bedouin was espe- \/ t. ,3“- cially marked in Al-ahsa region, where the major oil fields are lo- cated. It is significant to note that in the early years of oil de- velopment, thousands of Bedouins constituted a sizable portion of the Aramco labor force and rapidly developed an ability to handle modern machinery.36 The company attracted the Bedouins due to the high wages 153 offered. At first Saudi workers benefited from the educational and health facilities provided by Aramco, but they were not allowed by order of the religious leaders, to mix socially with the Americans. This cultural separation did not last long as the Saudi workers grew in number and some began to occupy higher positions in the company and hence became more and more exposed to American culture.37 After completion of the major oil industry construction, the company needed more and more skilled workers. Today Aramco employs about 10,000 Bedouins. After having worked for the oil company and after having experienced regular wage labor and the advantages of a settled life, many Bedouins became reluctant to return to pastoralism. From a long time perspective, however, George points out that "while the social and economic forces triggered by the development of the oil industry have been the major factors encouraging Bedouin settlement, the movement towards a more sedentary life preceded the oil boom, and can be traced to the earliest days of the Saudi state."38 Other spontaneous settlements were formed when the Aramco Company, for technical reasons, dug water wells near most of the important oil fields. As a result, many Bedouin tribes have moved to the new loca- tions. This has led to p0pulation concentrations around the new water wells, and to an increasing demand for water by the movement of new Bedouin tribes. The settlement of the Bedouin tribes with their camels around the oil installations had endangered the activity of the oil company as well as the tribes themselves. For that reason, Aramco de- cided to collect information about the different tribes which had set- tled in the company's industrial centers. The company established a 154 research department to study the immigration of the Bedouin tribes and their original dirah. The company also sent social researchers to study the tribal structure and social organization and the geographical location of these tribes living in the Eastern Province where the oil— rich fields are located. For instance, the company studied Al Murrah, Bani Khalid, Bani Hajr, and Al Ujman. The provision of service for the oil industry by Bedouins also has contributed to their settlement, especially in northern Arabia and throughout the trans-Arabian pipeline. For example, in the course of constructing the trans- Arabian pipeline (tapline), a road was constructed alongside the pipe, and water wells were drilled at the intermittent oil pumping stations. Nomads settled per- manently around the new wells and the towns of Ar'ar, al-Qaysumah and Annuayriyah have developed from these Bedouin encampments, where only the desert existed before 1950.39 As a result of Saudi Arabia's economic growth and the changes brought to the country through its oil wealth, the Bedouins responded to the attraction of the new economic centers. As a consequence, a wave of evacuation and spontaneous massive migration from nomadic ter- ritories and rural areas to these new economic centers occurred. Cities like Al-Dhahran, Al—Dammam, Hofuf, Abqiq, and Ras Tannurah, became new destinations for the Bedouins. This process resulted in the deterioration of the pastoral economy. While up to 1944 Saudi Arabia was exporting livestock worth over $2 million per year, after 1952 the country became heavily dependent on imports. Frozen mutton and beef is imported from New Zealand, Australia, and Argentina, and herds of camels and sheep are shipped from Sudan and Turkey. 155 Two other types of Bedouin settlements can also be viewed as re- sulting from the economic and social changes brought by the oil wealth and the introduction of modern technology. The first type is the National Guard, founded as a counter to the armed forces after some military officers in the Middle East, during the 19503 and 19603, re- volted against the established regime. The idea of the National Guard goes back to the time of Ibn Saud when he tried, after the collapse of the Ikhwan movement, to rally the tribes and to obtain their allegiance. The practice of subsidizing tribal leaders to ensure their loyalty and cooperation has persisted. The members of the National Guard are chosen from the noble Bedouin tribes who are always loyal to the house of A1 Saud. The National Guard offers opportunities for the young Bedouins to learn new skills and participate in shaping the new society in a way very acceptable to them. Since the Guard does not demand full-time commitment, this allows the Bedouins freedom to go back pe- riodically to their livestock entrusted to relatives. The Guard also is desirable to the Bedouins, since most of them lack the level of education and required skills to work in the civil administration of the government. Since the foundation of modern Saudi Arabia, the tribes have been incorporated within the military structure of the state. Changes occurring to the tribes in the National Guard are that, instead of a direct relationship between a tribe and a village or a tribe and a market-town, all of the tribes have been incorporated into the National Guard which is commanded by and serves the interests of the centralized state of Saudi Arabia and thus the total nation. Payments are channeled to the Bedouin mainly through the National Guard by the central government.40 156 The National Guard is a military organization based on Bedouin tribal structure. However, the National Guard is not the only establishment that attracted the nomads. Large numbers of Bedouins also joined the armed forces, the Internal Security Forces, and the Coast Guard. Why does the Bedouin prefer the military service? The answer is that he believes that the positions of guard, military service, or security officer represent a continuation of the old position as hami alhima, or protector of the tribe and its territory. Also, he likes to have arms because armament was a necessity in the old days when the Bedouins encountered danger and risk. Still another typical Bedouin occupation is in the field of transportation. According to Cole, the area outside pastoraliam in which the Bedouins have achieved the most remarkable success is transportation. He points out that "most taxis in Saudi Arabia are owned and operated by Bedouins or recently sedentarized Bedouin.”1 Many Bedouins also own and operate trucks. Many work as chauf- feurs for important governmental officials in the Ministries and in other government agencies. Some work as private chauffeurs for members of the royal family, and others work as drivers for business firms and foreign companies. Here again, we find the Bedouin's choice of cer- tain jobs related to his view of traditional work. He prefers to work as a driver because he believes that the automobile is a kind of replacement for his camel and because he likes the freedom of movement that the car achieves for him. Distance was always the Bedouin's first enemy in the desert, and through the automobile he can overcome that challenge. 157 Summary In this chapter we discussed the socio-religious factors which were responsible for the decline of the early Bedouin settlements. We pointed out the Ikhwan's (the early settlers) main objections to Ibn Saud's policy which resulted in conflict, then a war between the two sides. The result of the war was in Ibn Saud's favor and marked the end of the Ikhwan rebellion. This brought an end to the Ikhwan settle- ments which had been either destroyed in the war or deserted. It was an historical round in the long struggle between the Bedouins and the settled people in Arabia. Then, the old type of voluntary settlement based on the reli- gious zeal to fight, to restore the true ideals of Islam, gave way to a new type of settlement with different objectives. As we have seen, the government tried unsuccessfully to settle the Bedouins in new set- tlement projects emphasizing agriculture. It was pointed out that the old spontaneous Bedouin settlement had emerged again, but with a new dimension. Unlike the early settlements which were motivated by reli- gion, these recent voluntary settlements emerged primarily for eco— nomic reasons and because of the attractiveness of sedentary life. Finally we emphasized the major role played by the discovery of oil in causing a drastic change within the Bedouin society. Many Bedouins, stimulated by the introduction of automobiles, radios, and other mod- ern inventions, began to look for work in the oil fields and urban centers . FOOTNOTES The mahmal is the frame borne by the camel which carries the Kiswah, a woven cloth donated by the people of Egypt annually as the covering for the Ka'bah at Makkah. The Ikhwan objected to the use of bugles by the Egyptian army which accompanied the mahmal, because it violated the spirit of Islam by the use of musical instruments during the Haj. 2Saud Ibn Hadhlul, Tarikh Muluk a1 Saud [History of the Kings of Al Saud] (Riyadh: Matabi Al-Riyadh 1390/1960), p. 136. 3Ibid., pp. 193-194. 4Mujahideen, persons who fought with Ibn Saud in founding his kingdom, and for that reason receive a monthly allowance from the government. 5Hedley V. Cooke, Challenge and Response in the Middle East (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952), p. 88. 6Ibid. 7George Kheirallah, Arabia Reborn (Albuquerque: The University of New Mexico Press, 1952), p. 211. 8Richard H. Sanger, The Arabian Peninsula (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1954), p. 59. 9Ibid. loAramco: The Standard Oil Company of California obtained the concession to explore for oil in Saudi Arabia in 1933 (A. H. 1352). In 1944 the American company came to operate under the name of the Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco). In 1947, the company sold shares to other American companies at huge profits. Since then, the company consists of the following: Standard Oil Company of California, 30 percent; Texas, 30 percent; Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, 30 percent; and Socony, 10 percent. The government of Saudi Arabia has obtained 50 percent of the company and is in the process of completing the whole ownership of the company. 11George Kheirallah, 0p. cit., p. 221. 158 159 12League of Arab States, Report of Delegation of Saudi Arabia, in Ri'yat, vol. 1, pp. 442-443. 13Ibid., pp. 443-444. 14Taha El-Farra, The Effects of Detribalizing the Bedouins on the Internal Cohesion of an Emerging State: The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 1973), p. 184. 15Report of Delegation of Saudi Arabia, op. cit., pp. 426-427. 16D. A. Draz, Raport About the Development of Pastures in Arabia, (Riyadh, 1965). 17"Report of Delegation of Saudi Arabia," op. cit., pp. 428-432. 18Hasan H. Hajrah, The Potentiality of Agricultural Development in Saudi Arabia (Riyadh: Ministry of Agriculture and Water, no date), p. 94. , 19Ministry of Planning, The Second Development Plan 1395-1400/ 1975-1980 (Riyadh, Saudi Arabia), p. 202. 20"Report of Delegation of Saudi Arabia,' op. cit., p. 444. 21Ahmed A. Shamekh, Spatial Patterns of Bedouin Settlement in Al-Qasim Region, Saudi Arabia (Lexington, Kentucky: The University of Kentucky, Department of Geography, 1975). See also his article "Bedouin Settlements," in Ekistic, 43 (258) (May 1977), pp. 249-259. 221bid., p. 171. 231bid., p. 184. 2"Al-Shamekh prefers the term hilal to refer to spontaneous Bedouin settlements. The term is derived from the Arabic verb halla which means to reside in one place or to become sedentary, in contrast to the verb irtahala which means to depart or move. "The two terms [halla and irtahala] are often used by the Bedouins in the context of sedentary and nomadic life respectively." See ibid., pp. 219-220. 25Ibid. 26M. Katakura, Bedouin Village (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1977), p. 31. 160 27 . Mustapha Filali, Settlement and Urbanization of Nomadic Tribes in Saudi Arabia (Geneva: International Labor Office, 1964), p. 23. 2 . 8Donald P. Cole, Nomads of the Nomads (Chicago: Aldine Pub- lishing Company, 1975), p. 153. 29Ibid. 3OGeorge Lenczowski, Oil and State in the Middle East (New York: Cornell University Press, 1960), p. 271. 31Fred Halliday, Arabia Without Sultans (London: Penguin Books, 1974), p. 25. 32Economist Intelligence Unit, Quarterly Economic Review of. Saudi Arabia, Annual Supplement, 1978, pp. 3-4. 33Quoted in Helen Lackner, A House Built on Sand: A Political Economy of Saudi Arabia, (London: Ithaca Press, 1978), p. 151. 34Quoted in Joe Stark, Middle East Oil and the Energy Crisis (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1975), p. 283. See also Enid Hill, Modernization of Labor in the Arab Gulf (Cairo: The American Univer- sity, 1969), pp. 32-50. 35Herman Eilts, "Social Revolution in Saudi Arabia," in Parameters: The Journal of the Army War College, Part 1, (1970), p. 11. 36Fatina A. Shaker, Modernization of the Developing Nations: The Case of Saudi Arabia, (Ph.D. dissertation, Purdue University, Lafayette, 1972), p. 131. For the Bedouins working for Aramco, see Grant C. Butler, Kings and Camels: An American in Saudi Arabia (New York: The Devin-Adair Company, 1960), pp. 87-100; Carlton S. Coon, "Operation Bultiste: Promoting Industrial Development in Saudi Arabia) in Hands Across Frontiers: Case Studies in Technical Cooperation, Howard M. Teaf, Jr., and Peter G. Frank, eds. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1955), pp. 307-361; and Roy Lebkicher, "The Training of Saudi Arab Employees, Arabian American Oil Company," reprinted from The Yearbook of Education (London: Evans, 1954). Aramco has mostly expatriates in skilled occupations, with Americans and Europeans holding the key positions, and other nationalities from urban back- ground lower down the company hierarchy in the less skilled jobs. Aramco has been slow to replace those expatriates with local Saudi labor despite its long history of activity in Saudi Arabia. See Randey Willson, The Economies of the Middle East (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers Inc., 1979), p. 43. 161 37See Grant C. Butler, ibid., pp. 125-126. 38George Allan, "Bedouin Settlement in Saudi Arabia," Middle East International (London), No. 51, (September 1955), p. 27. 39Ibid., p. 28. 40Cole, op. cit., p. 108. "lIbid., pp. 143-144. See also Fred Halliday, "Immigration and Labor Force in the Oil Producing Countries of the Middle East," Journal of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies 4,No. 13 (Kuwait University, January 1978), p. 52. CHAPTER VII THE KING FAISAL MODEL SETTLEMENT PROJECT AT HARADH This chapter is devoted to the last experiment by the government of Saudi Arabia to settle the Bedouins. The project was carried out with assistance from western organizations such as Aramco, the Ford Foundation, and the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO). These organizations contributed modern technology and sophisticated planning. The Saudi Arabian government, like other Middle Eastern governments, had tried several different projects designed by western experts, United Nations experts, or in some cases by native bureaucrats, to settle the Bedouins in agricultural communities. All of these agricultural pro- jects have either failed,or in a few instances, have met partial suc- cess. The partial success achieved does not justify the huge amount of money, energy, and time invested in these projects. The reasons for failure of the agricultural projects in Arabia are related to the ecology of the Arabian Peninsula. To settle the nomads in agriculturally-based communities is not an easy task, because agriculture is limited, due to a shortage of water, inadequate rainfall, infertile soil, and the absence of modern sophisticated technology. Where irrigation and rainfall are inadequate for crops, "soils are destined to remain useful for range forage production."1 This kind of land constitutes 98 to 99 percent of the whole kingdom, and there is no more than 1 or 2 percent that can be cultivated. 162 163 The Bedouins of Arabia, and perhaps other nomadic pastoralists in other Arab countries of the Middle East, are the least likely segment of the population to possess the patience or skills required for agri- culture. Throughout history, the Bedouins of the Arabian Peninsula, especially those living in the hinterland and the north, have tradition- ally despised agricultural work and they know virtually nothing about sedentary agriculture. The incentives for the Bedouins to abandon no- madism, apart from the religious zeal inspired by the Wahhabi movement in the early hijai, were not sufficiently strong to lead them to develop new, unproven agricultural communities. This is true despite the fact that these projects have been financed and supported generously by a wealthy Saudi Arabian government. The Haradh project is the continua- tion of government policy to provide a permanent agricultural settle- ment for some of the most needy Bedouin tribes. The Haradh Area Project This project is considered to be one of the most significant, am- bitious, technically well planned, and undoubtedly the most sophisti- cated agricultural settlement project in the history of Saudi Arabia. The project location is near Ain (well) Haradh in wadi a1 Sahba. The 'gadi is about seventy kilometers long and four kilometers wide. It stretches from the Dahna Sand and the Empty Quarter and extends to in- clude Jabrin Oasis in the southeastern part of the country. Haradh, the site of the project known as the King Faisal settlement project, is located 10 kilometers from Haradh railway station, 240 kilometers east southeast from the capital city Riyadh, about 170 kilometers east from the oasis of Alkharj, and 180 kilometers south from Hafouf City in the 164 Eastern Province. The project is planned to reclaim and develop an area of some 4,000 hectares (around 8,000 acres) of former grazing lands. This area was to be prepared for agricultural purposes and would provide an ex- perimental farm and agricultural training center at a cost of approxi- mately $30 million.2 The area of the project lies within the tribal territory of Al-murrah, one of the most truly nomadic tribes in the Arabian Peninsula. This tribe is loyal to the government of Saudi Arabia. The area of the project is well located in terms of communica— tion, because Haradh is linked to Riyadh, the capital city, and to the oil centers in the Eastern Province by rail. The project is located on desert land. Like most parts of the country, it does not have favor- able weather conditions. The nearest water is the Arabian Gulf, about 350 kilometers to the east. The main features of Haradh weather as cited by the FMC3 are as follows: Summer temperature range: 65° to 120° F (18°C to 49°C); Winter temperature range: 32° to 95° F (0°C to 35°C); Summer relative humidity range: 5% to 55% Winter relative humidity range: 10% to 100% Annual rainfall: 2-1/2 inches (63 mm); Peak wind velocity: 55 mph (89 km/hr); and Maximum average for 15 minutes: 40 mph (64 km/hr). Dust and sand storms occur 35 to 40 days per year. Also, devia- tions from the above recorded measures do occur and a temperature maxi- mum of 55°C and minimum of -7°C have been recorded. In spite of these climatic conditions, the new location for Bedouin settlement avoided many technical shortcomings that characterized the old settlements. Water has been found at two levels (900 feet and 3,500 feet), and it is very abundant and usable for an irrigation system. The land is 165 suitable for agriculture, because it is located in wadi Alsahba which is known for its fertile soil. Dahna provides very good pasture ranges. Some ten kilometers northeast of the location is an Aramco GOSP (Gas-Oil Separation Plant). This plant will supply all the natural gas required for development of electrical power and other uses.4 The site falls between three cities, Riyadh, al-Kharj, and Hafouf, which is im- portant for the Bedouin settlers to profitably market their products beyond the region. The Objectives of the Haradh Project The King Faisal Model Settlement Project includes the following objectives: 1. The settlement of a portion of the Bedouin tribes in the country, and the use of human resources by pro- viding job opportunities to raise social and economic welfare. 2. The utilization and development of natural and human potentialities in the area. 3. The achievement of self-sufficiency in the sector of agriculture by utilizing the natural resources in view of the knowledge that oil will not last forever. 4. Making the country able to sustain population growth in view of Saudi Arabia's extremely high birth rate. 5. The use of the agricultural training center in the project to train Saudi technical personnel to help with agricultural activities. Also the use of facilities to conduct agricultural research and to apply the results. 6. Bringing the Bedouins into the mainstream of the working force of the country by bridging the social and economic gap between the nomadic and the set- tled population. This objective also seeks to in- tegrate the Bedouins within the society, while at the same time preserving their self-identity and subcul- ture. It is hoped that this goal will make the Bedouins realize their role in a new, young country.S (see figure 5) 166 .«8. .53: ......2. vi 28.3.2 .o .535... Jan! .38 .o 885. :33: 812.28% .81... 683. 58.2.8 .8... .51.... .858 38...... a 8%... .5538 .33.. 9.... 2.. .o 9.... 3350 .... 2...... mm”... 50.5 ...... I ’ 812.. .8528 ...-.6 E... (is... .03.... ...... . .Mpmm . [.8 25.. ...... 1.... [J 8: .5. o 05.. 5.9.0.. .5. m1 o z c0302... 0...! £22 9.8 ._.\ o .. s Seam .6 an a...» \ 33:12 o... . ... r .. w \ I. ...m \ U \ \ \ 8:3... 8.9... 80k. 5:... oh gull] so '0‘“ IL 167 The Concept of the Project The Haradh project was started during the early 19603 at a time when most Arabian Bedouins had suffered heavy losses in their animal herds due to a drought of at least seven consecutive years. Losses were especially great among the previously wealthy northern tribes of Anazah, A1 Huwaytat, and Ashshararat. At the same time, the country witnessed an acceleration in the growth of urban centers as a consequence of gov- ernment spending to expand education, communication, health, and other social services. The benefits of the money derived from oil started to make its mark on the whole country. Due to the impact of oil and the long drought, an increasing number of young Bedouins began to abandon nomadism and to look for work mainly as unskilled workers in the cities. Typically, they joined the National Guard, the Army, and the Internal Security forces. Some of them left to seek jobs in the oil centers of the country and a few went to the various states of the Arabian Gulf, especially Kuwait, Qatar, and Abu Dhabi. The government of Saudi Arabia, after having spent generously on the major cities, became concerned about another part of its population, the nomadic people, many of whom had helped King Ibn Saud to found the modern kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The government felt that it was now urgent to do something for its no- madic people and so sought to improve their social and economic condi- tions. The fate of many nomadic people after the drought led the gov- ernment to seek a better solution, in order to establish a more secure subsistence than pastoralism afforded. As was discussed in the pre- vious chapter, the government tried various agricultural settlement projects in different parts of the kingdom. Even though those projects had been almost complete failures, the government had not given up the 168 idea of settling the Bedouins in agricultural communities. During its exploration studies for oil, Aramco called the atten- tion of the government to the availability of abundant water in the wadi a1 Sahba area. Aramco discovered a huge amount of water in two deep wells called the umm er Radhuma and wasia aquifers. After the dis- covery of the water, the area became a potential area for development and for irrigated cultivation. At the same time, while the standard of living of those living in the cities and.urban centers was rising due to oil, the standard of living of nomadic people was declining for reasons mentioned earlier. Hence, the development of projects to fit the Bedouin mode of life was very important on the government's prior- ity list. It was the government's aim to have oil wealth benefit all groups in the country, settlers, villagers, and nomads alike. The gov- ernment of Saudi Arabia considered the settling of the Bedouins a very significant objective in the overall economic development policy. The Haradh project was initiated by the government in response to and in accord with recommendations presented by the Ford Foundation.6 This report given to the Saudi government summarized the Haradh project development program objectives as a series of changes from: 1. kinship to citizenship; 2. isolated camp life to community life; 3. nomadic pastoralism to modern farming; 4. individualism to cooperative participation; 5. traditional technology to modern technology; and 6. tribal participation as a kinsman to national par- ticipation as a citizen.7 169 The report suggested that Bedouin development can be achieved through the social processes of socialization, sedentarization, and modernization. The report pointed out that these three processes are the important social means through which the Bedouin can become full participant members in the national society. But the report stopped short of specifying effective methods of achieving the processes men- tioned. The report stated that Bedouinism in Arabia had developed and had survived as the most efficient way to earn a livelihood under the harsh environmental conditions of the Arabian desert. On the other hand, the persistence of nomadism developed in Bedouin society a set of social norms and values that govern social conduct, role in the tribe, relationship to fellow members, and expectations the tribe demands from each other. These social values, customs, and traditions determine the Bedouin's behavior. Some of these social values contributed much to the Bedouin's security and safety in the past, but today, these patterns may be draw- backs to his development. Two examples are given in the Ford Foundation report to illustrate the problems of development among Bedouins in Saudi Arabia. First, the Bedouin's hospitality is limitless, and second, he is a "man who lives for the day and with no concern for tomorrow and who enjoys peace of mind."8 These two examples of the values of Bedouinism were seen by the rural development specialists of the Ford Foundation as drawbacks to development. Due to these attributes of social ethos, Bedouins would be prevented from accumulating wealth and saving for the future. Saving and investment are two elements consid- ered necessary for economic development in the highly advanced 170 technological countries, but they are not part of the Bedouin system of values. The authors of the Ford Foundation report are criticized by Cole, a western scholar, for their lack of understanding of Bedouin society. Cole spent eighteen months with A1 Murrah in the desert regions of eastern and southeastern Saudi Arabia, lived with the tribe, and even- tually became an honorary member. In Nomads of the Nomads, Cole states: While the author of this report [Ford Foundation] may have been a victim of his own cultural biases in favor of conscious citizenship (which may be said to be sorely lacking in the western world) and the primary family as the basic productive unit in a competitive, capitalistic economy, there is no reason to believe that any of the Saudi personnel involved in the program were consciously interested in creating alienated individualists out of the Bedouins.9 The aim of the personnel of the Ministry of Agriculture was altru- istic-—to change the insecure Bedouin pastoralism to a better way of life. The Ford Foundation report revealed to the Saudi government that very little data were available on the subject of Bedouinism and De- bedouinism. Despite the lack of important knowledge about the Bedouins of Arabia, nevertheless the report did not hesitate to recommend the expenditure of large sums to drastically change the economic and family structure of a major segment of Arabian society. This change in the Bedouin's life, deeply rooted in Bedouin ethos, was made without even consulting those to be subjected to dramatic change. "The models envisioned for this new 'debedouinized' society were taken directly [though perhaps unconsciously] from western "10 [American] society. After the discovery of oil and the introduction of western tech- nology, the country began to experience a major structural upheaval in 171 the economic activities of the population as well as in the social values of the society. At the same time, we find a significant number of the younger, educated generation consciously trying to preserve some cultural traits of a tribal, kin-oriented society. The westernized model for settling the Bedouins was criticized sharply by F. Bashir, Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Planning, who originally was a Bedouin himself. He made the statement that everything is imported in Saudi Arabia, and ironically, this even includes the ideas that the settlement of African tribes in Africa or American Indi- ans in the United States are applicable to Bedouin settlement in Saudi Arabia.11 This happened even though we know that there are sharp dif- ferences between Saudi Bedouin traditions, on the one hand, and African and American Indians, on the other. Stages of Haradh Project King Faisal's project for the settlement of Al-Murrah tribe in Haradh may be considered the first of its kind in Saudi Arabia and per- haps in neighboring countries as well. The significance of the project stems from the following two premises: 1. This project will be the first complete and inte- grated project aimed at transforming an important number of people from existing nomadic pastoralism to settled, agricultural life. 2. The project is a pilot project that could be copied on a limited scale in the settlement of larger tribes in the areas that fall under the influence of such tribes. The success or failure of this pilot project would have far-reaching effects on the future of settlement projects. The outcome of this ex— periment would undoubtedly affect the government's attitude toward its 172 policy concerning Bedouin settlements. If the project failed, it would mean that the country would continue to observe the exodus of Bedouins migrating in large numbers to the cities and urban centers. The conse- quences of such an exodus would be the draining of manpower resources from large areas, and adding new strains on the already congested cities and urban centers. Envisioned by the project is the development of a planned agricul- tural community to introduce a "green revolution" into the heart of the desert, capable of supporting a local community of several thousand per- sons. The project consists of three important stages: (1) the estab- lishment of an experimental farm covering an area of one hundred acres; (2) the establishment of an agricultural training center to train Saudi Arabians in technical matters concerning mechanized farming in the de- sert; and (3) the reclamation of 10,000 acres to absorb 1,000 Bedouin tribal families in the area.12 During this stage, the government plans to construct six model villages built along the gadi_on barren ground, well above the high water line, in case of floods which occur about every one-hundred years. One village is planned for each subtribe and one for the heterogeneous population.13 The purpose in the latter is to attract those Bedouins who are not yet ready for sedentary life in irrigated agriculture. Factors in Success or Failure As mentioned before, the four ecological conditions necessary to successful Bedouin settlement (abundant water, good soil, a range for grazing, and favorable location in terms of communication and markets) are all present at Haradh project. For these reasons the government 173 was ready to undertake this highly ambitious and sophisticated settle- ment project. Availability of water. The source of available water in the Haradh area is ground water. The Wakuti Consulting Company estimated that 12,000 acres would require at least 84,000 acre/feet of water per year. This volume is equivalent to 42,871,000 gallons every day (or 1,000,000 42-gallon barrels per day). For that reason the drilling of 50 deep water wells is necessary to meet this demand.14 The available water to be utilized in this agricultural project comes from two major aquifers which are present in the subsurface at a reasonable drilling depth. As the outcrop area is crossed from west to east, progressively younger sediments are encountered. This report indicates that: water table conditions are found on outcrop, and artesian conditions exist to the east. These artesian conditions range from non-flowing to flowing, as the topographic gradient is greater than the hydraulic gradient.1 The two aquifers utilized for the purpose of the project are umm er Radhuma and Waaia. The quality of both aquifers--as a result of the studies done by Aramco in the area--is considered very suitable for 16 agriculture. The irrigation area. The center of the Haradh area is the 40 km. long irrigation area in the wadi a1 Sahba. Wadi a1 Sahba starts just east of the Dahna dune belt. A total of 50 deep water wells equipped with electric submersible pumps, each with a capacity of 300 cbm/hour, pump the fresh water into two main canals and about 25 pumps are in- stalled on each side of the wadi. Lateral irrigation ditches run from both sides to the middle of the wadi. The irrigation canals are pre- fabricated concrete elements of parabolic forms, resting on saddles 174 above the ground.17 Three systems of irrigation are used in Haradh project, namely, open concrete canal systems, low-pressure pipe system, and sprinkler system. Wadi al-Sahba is known for its fertile soil and alfalfa is cultivated for cattle and sheep. Planting alfalfa in the area for a long time is one of the methods of enriching the soil. With alfalfa an essential, other crops grown will be barley and oats for fodder, and some rice. All kinds of vegetables are grown here, includ- ing tomatoes, melons, cucumbers, and carrots. For nomadic grazing, the location is excellent because the Dahna dune belt provides an excellent range and requires only a small yearly rainfall to produce good pasture. All the nearby important cities are connected to Haradh through rail- roads, highways, and airplanes which makes the site excellent in terms of communication. In addition to the natural resources just mentioned, another favorable factor in the Haradh project relates to human re- sources, namely the Al-Murrah tribe. Because of the importance of the human factor in the project, we will spend some time discussing the historical and social background of the Al-Murrah. The Al-Murrah Tribe Historical Background. The tribe traces its ancestry to Qahtan, the progenitor of the southern Arabs. It is one of the largest and most powerful tribes of the southern Arabian Peninsula. This tribe is a very hardy, noble nomadic people who are primarily dwellers in the sands. They are camel raisers and are well-known for their abilities as trackers and hunters.l8 Thomas, Harrison, Philby, Dickson, and Thesiger19 are among those who have written about this powerful but little known tribe. All of these writers make some mention of 175 Al-Murrah's mysterious habitat, its folklore, its fairy tales, and the amazing tracking abilities of its members. The Al-Murrah are a "wild" and proud people and have the reputation of being especially loyal sup- porters of the government of Saudi Arabia. This support has lasted ever since King Ibn Saud's family, in exile from Riyadh, sought and re- ceived asylum with the Al-Murrah tribe. There is no recorded incident of defection on the part of the tribe, nor have they ever joined a tribe hostile to the regime of King Ibn Saud. Current Statps. As is the case of modern Saudi Arabia, there is no accurate population census for the Bedouins or for this tribe. How- ever, the tribe is estimated to consist of about 10,000 persons, al- though some estimates go as high as 36,000. Cole estimated their num- ber to be about 15,000 people. Al-Murrah is one of the most noble (£1) and distinguished tribes in the Arabian Peninsula. They are very well-known for their devotion to true Bedouin traditions, and for their love of nomadism and the wild life of the Arabian desert. Most members of Al-Murrah originally raised camels, but due to declining importance of camels in transportation and the abolishing of tribal raids Al-Murrah, like other tribes, has changed to Sheep-raising. The change from camels to sheep and goats is directly attributable to the development of underground water resources by the Ministry of Agri- culture and Water through the drilling of deep wells operated by mechan- ical pumps. The Bedouins increasingly use trucks to move their herds from one pasture to another. In the past, the camel was the only ani- mal that could go for days and even weeks in search of grazing land. Sheep and goats do not have the ability to forego water for a long time 176 and, for that reason, must be kept close to springs and streams of water. The development of ground water resources and the introduction of trucks and pick-ups have contributed to the change from camel rais- ing to sheep and goat herding. Despite extremely difficult conditions faced in nomadic life, some Al-Murrah members broke with strong nomadic tradition and joined the masses of migrants to the cities and oil centers looking for work. Some Al-Murrah Bedouins work for the oil company (Aramco) at Abqaiq or Ras Tannurah, or for other industrial and agricultural projects in Dammam and Hafouf, or engage in the services of the government branches in the Eastern Province. The Al-Murrah Bedouins who engage in work outside their territory (dirah), return to their people during vacations to strengthen their ties with fellow members of their lineage and tribe. The Al-Murrah Territory The traditional territory of Al-Murrah is bordered in the west by the Sands of the Dahna, and runs south across the central part of the Empty Quarter (the Ruba'al Khali). Tribe members roam in the desert where they find water and good grazing from the southern edge of the Ruba'al Khali to al-Dhafrah. Some members of Al-Murrah tribe also live on the Qatar Peninsula. In the past, the Al-Murrah seldom ranged far- ther north than the trade route from Al-Uqair to Hafouf. But, since the establishment of the land peace policy by the late King Ibn Saud, the Al-Murrah have roamed as far as the Kuwait borders.20 The early home of the Al-Murrah tribe was in southwestern Arabia. Although the tribe has migrated (like some other southern tribes) in a northeastern direction, this tribe still has ties with kin groups in Najran area and 177 its vicinity. Cole, referring to dira£_Al-Murrah which is located with- in the national boundaries of the modern Saudi Arabia, covers around 250,000 square miles and this by far is the largest and less inhabited territory of any tribe in the Arabian Peninsula. The traditional north- ern boundary of diraht Al-Murrah is around Al-Ahsa in the eastern region, but during the winter and spring seasons, they move for pasture as far as Kuwait and southern Iraq. "Their own traditional wells, to which they claim exclusive rights, are located from immediately south of a1- Hasa all the way into the central sands of the Rub' al-Khali, with an- other set of wells in the Najran area."21 As we have mentioned in chapter 4, each Bedouin tribe has its own girgh, the only territory on which the members of the tribe can move and graze freely. Nevertheless, each tribal territory (dirah) is not strictly bounded, but rather is a customary territory. This means that each tribal shaikh and all members of the tribe know the approximate limits of their dirah. Each tribe's territory is recognized by the other tribes and any encroachment will be met by force. The most noble (Asil) tribes of Arabia have a large dirah, and less noble tribes, smaller territories. Some weaker tribes seek protection from the more powerful tribes and in this case they use the pastures of the latter tribe. In some cases, due to the failure of the pasture to provide the herds with fodder, the tribe might seek permission to pasture in another tribe's girah, In most cases such permission is granted. At the present time, the tribal boundaries are losing their sig- nificance. On one hand, this is due to the growth of a strong central government, which has an interest in creating a modern society builton peace and order for the welfare of all inhabitants. A strong central 178 government makes the old inter-tribal disputes over water and grazing rights practically impossible. 0n the other hand, it is due to the fact that the Bedouins increasingly realize that nomadic life has lost its former attraction. This has been brought about by the growing feel- ing that tribal allegiance has been undermined by the weakened politi- cal and economic functions of the tribe and the newly—growing feeling of national consciousness and solidarity. The dirah of Al-Murrah reaches across the gravel plains, contains water wells, clean sands, fresh air, and the best plants for their herds. Haradh and Jabrin oases, which are about sixty km. south of the Haradh settlement project, are considered by many members of the tribe to be the main areas of concentration. During the summer many members of Al- Murrah go back to the Jabrin oasis to plant trees. (see figure 6) Social Organization Few major Arabian tribes have been as greatly maligned and misunderstood as Al-Murrah. They have been charac- terized as savage, treacherous, predatory, and virtu- ally pagan; they have been accused of speaking a dia- lect unintelligible to other Arabs; and it has even been suggested that they are aboriginal survivors of pre-Arab inhabitants of the country. . . . "But perhaps their evil reputation," states one defamatory descrip- tion of them in a moment of honest reflection, "is due in some degree to the small knowledge of them possessed by the outside world."22 Kinship is the primary organizing principle of each tribe in Arabia. The normal family unit is the extended family, and several extended families form lineages. Lineages are related through common descent from a certain male ancestor. The lineages consist of extended families whose actual relationship is known and their common interests are very important. In this case, the lineage (Ar. Fakhd or Ashirah) is the 179 SE. 55.2.2 .6 .o 5.6 2F .o 2.6.". _ .8 8 SEE .8] £2 . pa>om ...: ._ u k . :1..,.L\.:._.~v. . .44 ~4 . 180 unit within which most economic and social problems are to be dealt with. This unit gains its importance from the fact that some families form a solid and coherent unit as far as their movement and access to water rights is concerned. The classification of the Bedouin community into its units and the names and the sizes of these units are different from one tribe to another and from one region to another in the countries of the Middle East and North Africa. According to Baer,23 the following are the main units into which the Bedouin community is generally divided: 1. The extended patriarchal family, which is considered the basic unit of the Bedouin community. The name given to this unit is usually ahl, a'ilah, and ahl al-bait, with all these different terms being re- ferred to in English as "family." 2. A group of families having a common male ancestor five to seven generations ago is called by differ- ent tribes a hamulah, a ashirah, or a fakhd (which in Arabic means "thigh"). The latter term is used by Al-Murrah. The English term for this unit is "lineage." Among some Bedouin tribes this group is the unit of ownership of wells and land. This unit (Fakhd) camps during the summer as a group around its own wells. 3. The tribe is known in some of the Arab countries such as Iraq, as the ashirah, but this unit is referred to as the gabilah in Cyrenaica, Egypt, and Sudan. While members of one tribe consider themselves to be related cousins (Ar. awlad ala'm), the tribal unit is primarily political. Hence, the tribe will include refugees, emigrants from other weaker tribes, and per- sons under its protection. The whole tribe is held to- gether as a unit by common martial aims. It serves as the protector of an area of settlements which pay it Khuwa.24 Each tribe is headed by a shaikh or amir. His political power and social position is generally hereditary, within specific families, but it is not necessarily the position of the tribal head that passes from father to son. The shaikh is expected to settle conflicts and disputes which might arise within the tribe. He also carries out his responsibilities in making decisions in the affairs of movement, war, 181 and settling feuds with other tribes. In most impor- tant matters facing the tribe, such as declaring war on another tribe, the shaikh is advised by a group of wise and experienced elders from the tribe, that is, the council of the tribe (majlis). The shaikh also represents his group in external contacts and collects government taxes (zakat) from the tribe's members. 4. A coalition or federation of several tribes sometimes is formed under pressure of intertribal war. Examples of such protective federations, are: (a) Harb-Mutayr; (b) Dhafir-Shammar and Alawazim; and (c) Al-Ujman-Al- Murrah. These federations of tribes have blood rela- tionships in Bedouin tradition and law. 0f the Al- Murah tribe, Cole says: The most basic unit of their society is the patrilocal household composed of an old man and an old woman, their sons and their sons' wives, and their children. House- holds average about seven people. Above the level of the household is the lineage which includes all the people descended from a male ancestor who lived about five genera- tions ago; a lineage averages about fifty households. From four to six lineages unite, according to the patterns of patrilocal descent, to form clans. The Al-Murrah tribe, which includes all the descendants of Murrah, is composed of seven clans. Lineages of Al-Murrah are essentially equal in size, wealth, power, and social status. This equality Cole relates to ecological limits, the abundancy of water in the wells, and surrounding pastures to support herds and tents in certain numbers. Although size and locations of households may vary, they must share in the collective responsibilities with all members of the lineage. In the past, the lineage was a mili- tary unit, with a leader chosen from the lineage. Now tribal war be- longs to the past and the lineage now has no war leader and no council of elders. But the lineage has kept its own camel brand (wasm), war cry, and other symbols even though Al Murrah, like most tribes of Saudi Arabia, has been incorporated into the National Guard.. Apart from its division into households and lineages, Al Murrah is divided into seven 182 different clans. Four to six lineages form a clan for which A1 Murrah uses the term gabilah. This term is usually referred to as tribe in English. The clans are residual units and have no major role in the eco- nomic organization of Al-Murrah, but the clans are very important as political units. The political activities of the clan include, among others, to defend one's resources, to gain concessions from the govern- ment, to seek vengeance, and to solve legal disputes. All such activi— ties involve the support of the clan as a whole, and the amir takes his part in making decisions in all the previous activities. In any poli- tical matter, each Al-Murrah individual or lineage knows that he can count on the support of all lineages of the clan.26 Figure 7 shows the tribal social structure of Al Murrah tribe. As mentioned before, the A1 Murrah are very famous for their ability as trackers of humans as well as of game. It is said that Al Murrah skill is so great that in following the tracks of a human female, a tracker is able to say whether the person was married or single, and whether or not the woman is pregnant. Their ability to track is shown by the fact that a Marri tracker is assigned to a police department in Najd and in the Eastern Province. The individual footprint alone can provide the skilled tracker with much valuable information about that individual. He knows from the footprints whether the person was a man or a woman, old or young, 3 relative, or from another tribe. The Murrah can follow the faint tracks of men and animals over terrain that appears impressionless. In Saudi courts, the tracker's testimony is considered comparable to that of a fingerprint expert in the western 183 l l l Ali Ibn Murrah ] [. Shabib ] J I J Ghaithan Jarbu' (A1 Ghayathin) (Al-Jarabiah) (2) (1) (Al-Ghufran) . (3) Jabir . Bishr l (4) I - A I _ B h ih . B id Zibd m :2: ‘ 1 F , l Fuhaidah Adhbah (9) (8) Figure 7. Lineages and Clans of the Al-Murrah Tribe. (Source: Aramco Company, Al-Murrah (Report, n.d.), p. 15. 184 world.27 The Al-Murrah also are known for their remarkable sense of direc- tion. They roam the Arabian desert by identifying the stars and by knowing the location of the best areas for grazing. They know all geographical routes and features of their territory. They also know a great deal about the desert's natural resources and vegetation, and they can locate easily the best plants for camels and sheep. They are a very faithful and religious people, for they cannot live in harsh environ- ments without spiritual beliefs to reinforce their confidence and main- tain high morale.28 Economic Conditions The Bedouins of the Arabian Peninsula used to refer to themselves as ahl aljfbair, the people of the camel. This was true at least in the past, because of their almost complete dependence upon the camel for transportation, food, and other necessities of life (see chapter 4). This reference applies to Al-Murrah tribe more convincingly than it does to many of the other tribes of Arabia. Without camels, Al-Murrah could not live in the sands or even survive the harsh environment of the Empty Quarter, for camel milk was their principal (and often sole) food for months. In comparing the Al-Murrah wealth to some tribes of the northern parts of the Arabian peninsula such as Anazah, they seem to be a poor and wretched lot. The tents of the most important persons of the tribe are small and light, and their personal belongings are pitifully scant, despite the fact that Al-Murrah is among the richest in number of camels. But the declining importance of camels in recent years has 185 forced the Al-Murrah to seek other ways to increase their incomes. Due to the harsh environment in most of the Al-Murrah territory, production possibilities are very limited. The two major sources of income derive from herding and some agricultural activities, especially around Jabrin oasis. According to Cole: Herding is the main production and consumption unit in their economy, and what little exchange they engage in occurs between members of the household and the wider extra-tribal society through the medium of urban-based markets.29 From day to day, the Al—Murrah rely only on camels for livelihood. Camels give the tribes mobility; they sup- ply hair for ropes and wool for clothing; above all, each female with an offspring gives as much as a gallon of milk daily for eleven months out of the year.30 The diet of the Al-Murrah consists mainly of meat, milk, milk by- products, and dates. Most of the other major food items are now pur- chased with cash from markets at Hafouf, the bazaar center (sug) of the Bedouin tribes of the area in Al-Hasa region. The food items they pur- chase include rice, flour, coffee, tea, sugar, and spices. They also purchase incense, perfume and clothes. The money they use for purchas- ing food and other items comes from military pensions (Al Mujahideen, people whose fathers or grandfathers fought with Ibn Saud to establish his kingdom) and allowances for participation in the National Guard. In recent years, there is increasing money coming from wages especially from work for the oil companies, or for government agencies in the Eastern Province as guards, taxi drivers, and chauffeurs for govern— mental and business officials. During Cole's visit to Haradh project between 1968-70, he found about twenty Al-Murrah males working as coolies along with Germans, 186 Palestinians, and Jordanians. The workers who were always spoken of as "future, potential settlers," received monthly salaries that ranged y from $66 to $110, while their Bedouin foremen received approximately $222. The Palestinian and Jordanian supervisors made several times this amount, while the European elite made many times that amount.31 The second economic resource of Al-Murrah comes from agriculture at Jabrin Oasis. This oasis is considered by the tribe as the main sum- “‘ mer center, because all members of the tribe come to camp around the i‘ oasis. The only work they do is to collect dates. However, they neg- lect the palm trees most of the year, which reflects to some degree the Al-Murrah's attitudes toward agriculture. Al-Murrah Attitudes Toward Settlement The transformation of Saudi Arabia from a highly tribal society to a modern nation-state started after the decline of the Ikhwan hijar movement inspired by the Wahhabi teaching of true Islamic principles during the 1930s (see chapter 5). Although the discovery of oil has been a major factor in Ibn Saud's successful policy of detribalizing most of the Arabian Peninsula, the economic and social changes affect- ing the tribal social structure during the last decades of this century were responsible for inducing many Bedouins to take a second look at nomadism as the only way of life. The reasons for Bedouins to change 7~ "In. .rv ' or to adapt themselves to a new life are/numerous. It is quite enough here to mention several reasons for this change: severe, continuous droughts, declining importance of the camel as a means of transporta- tion and as a food resource, loss of the political and military power of the tribe as guardian and protector of caravan and pilgrimage routes, 187 and growing opportunities for wages in oil companies, the army, and National Guard. The Al-Murrah tribe is no exception in their desire for change. Like other Arabian tribes, they look for change, hOping that their desert life will become a better one. According to Cole, "most of them recognize that benefits can accrue from some aspects of settlement, and they desire to have some kind of participation in this general proc- ess."32 In 1964, the Ministry of Agriculture conducted a survey about the Bedouins' desire for settlement in the Haradh area. The survey showed that 90 percent desired to settle and 99 percent wanted to live in con— crete houses instead of traditional tents. During Cole's visit to the project area in 1970, most of the project's physical and technological features had been almost finished, the settlement site had become a lush green and ready for cultivation. At that point, there were only two minimal lineages of Al-Murrah taking an active part in the program designated for them. In addition, there were a few other Bedouins as- sociated with the Haradh project as salaried farm wage workers.3 When survival is not in jeopardy, Al-Murrah accepts settlers as long as social criteria are maintained. Al Jaber leaders (a lineage of the tribe) have voiced their objection to the idea of developing the oasis of Jabrin in any way similar to that at the King Faisal settle- ment Project at Haradh, located sixty km. to the north. Their objec- tion arose from their feeling that unwanted foreigners as well as non- tribal Hadhar people from the country would be brought into their ter- ritory. If that took place, it would mean an end to the oasis as one 1‘ _’l 1‘“ 188 of the few remaining centers for tribal gatherings. Some AléMurrah would accept settlement as long as one or more clans settle-out to- gether in one area. This indicates that the Al-Murrah views the line— age as the basis of their social structure. Politics also plays a role in the Al-Murrah attitudes toward settlement at Haradh. Some of the traditional leading men of the tribe fear full-time settlement as a means of facilitating poli- tical subservience of the tribe to the nation-state. Nomads, they reason, are not so easily coerced for poli- tical purposes if they migrate and are not tied to any specific piece of land.34 In another study, Dequin points out that Al—Murrah tribe, which claimed the first right to settle in the Haradh area because it lies within their dirah, is not ready to settle down to a sedentary life based on irrigation agriculture.35 The author also found that Bedouins in Saudi Arabia prefer some kind of sedentary life instead of their un- steady and insecure roaming and wandering in the desert. All the Bedouins interviewed by the author expressed their strong desire to en- gage in cultivation of the land, not as individual small families, but as larger tribal units, such as clans. This result is similar to that found by Cole in his study of Al-Murrah. Al-Fiar, a native, did his Ph.D. dissertation on the Haradh project. His sample of the population in the project area was small, 100 persons divided into three groups: (1) Al-Murrah (local nomads); (2) non-local nomads; and (3) villagers. The Al-Murrah comprised a relatively small percentage of his total sample. Even though the Al-Murrah Bedouin sample is very small, he found that nomads in general and local nomads in particular, expressed very strong dedication and seriousness toward settling down to engage in farming. He suggested that the Al-Murrah tribe would be the logical 189 choice to settle in the project area, not because the project site was located in their territory, but because they were most familiar with the environment and its surroundings. However, his conclusion is not iden- tical with that of Cole and Dequin concerning the desire of Al-Murrah to prefer settlement in groups such as lineages or clans.36 Final Thought on the Project One wonders why a well intentioned well designed project in terms of technical aspects, scientific facilities and organization, did not successfully fit Bedouin settlement requirements. Why did this highly sophisticated and costly Haradh settlement project fail to deve10p suc- cessfully for Al-Murrah (or other nomadic tribes in the vicinity of the project) at least as of 1980. The Ministry of Agriculture and Water as of December 10, 1980 formally declared that the Council of Ministers agreed to transfer the Haradh Settlement project to a company called the National Company for Agricultural Development. The government will own 20 percent of shares and the remaining shares will be owned by private corporations and individuals. Because the Bedouins are poor, compared to other segments of the society (even though their standard of living has risen recently), they Still will not be able to hold shares in the new company. Cole attributes the failure of the project to a crucial factor from the time of its inception in 1960, "a dearth of communication be- tween the nomads and the project planners and developers."38 communication has always existed between the nomadic populations and the bureaucrats who appear to be a rising force in the policy-making decisions in the country. This lack of communication has widened as A lack of 7 190 more bureaucrats have been committed to further industrialization, westernization, and rapid progress. Cole also states that "at no time were any of the Al—Murrah ever seriously approached to find out their feelings on the subject of sedentarization and how they would like to restructure their economy and society if they were given the opportu— nity."39 The Bedouins, of course, possess their own ideas as to the problem of nomadism and settlement, and it appears no effort was made to develop a dialogue with the Bedouins on subjects crucial to their way of life. The failure to communicate may be due to the fact that bureaucrats find it easiest to plan from their ivory tower, and to the fact that cul- tural barriers between the modernized bureaucrats and simple, tradi- tional tribal peoples are not easy to bridge. The basis of operation for Al-Murrah, was best explained by one of its representatives at the Riyadh court and quoted by Dequin: We must make use of the desert by herding our flocks and herds, but at the same time continue nomadic life, as distances are too large. You see the water trucks carrying water from far away. There are no possibili- ties for wells everywhere, but grass grows after rain everywhere. . . . We have to look for ways to overcome the hazards of droughts. Therefore, we need irrigated land to grow fodder for our camels and donkeys so that we have feed for them, when the desert does not give any feed.40 An Al Jaber clan leader at Jabrin Oasis voiced rejection to the idea of abandoning their tried, nomadic way of life when Cole visited in the summer of 1969. One of the leaders reasoned that throughout history, the Arabian Peninsula has been a sparse land but that nomads and sedentary peoples alike managed to live and adjust to the harsh environment of the desert. A dependence upon their herds and dates had 191 been enough for them to survive. But now the situation has completely’ I [/7" changed. The Bedouin leader said, »w The oil wells can be blown up in thirty minutes and, with no money, all those people in Dhahran and Riyadh would die from lack of food, why they would not even have enough gasoline to leave and go back to their _/‘ homelands.41 Summary In this chapter, we have focused on the King Faisal Model Settle- ment Project at Haradh. The importance of the project lies in the in- volvement of some well known western organizations such as Aramco, FAO, and the Ford Foundation in designing and planning the physical, tech- nical aspects of the project. In keeping with the government's contin- uous aim to find a better solution to the nomadic problem, the site of the project was selected in accordance with past governmental experi- ence in settlement of the Bedouins. The government tried to finance the project generously after careful study and planning. The settlement is located within the Al-Murrah tribal territory. :tif’ According to the plan, 1,000 Bedouin families were to be settled in the project area. Approximately 90 percent of the families were to come from Al-Murrah, with the remaining 10 percent to come from Qahtan, Al- Ujman and Al-Dawasir tribes. Since the Al—Murrah were most important numerically, the social and economic structure of that tribe was dis- cussed. This tribe is considered one of the most noble, truly nomadic . I v ‘u ' tribes of the Arabian Peninsula. The members of the tribe are very well known for their devotion to Bedouin traditions and for their love of nomadism. It is not a wealthy tribe, when compared with some of the ».I 1 ,_,. northern tribes such as Anazah, but it is loyal to the Al Saud ruling 192 family. For Al-Murrah, the basic unit is the lineage. Each lineage is essentially equal in size, wealth, power, and social status. This equality is related to ecological limits. Herding is the most important economic activity of this tribe. Additional income for members of the tribe comes from light agriculture and work in the oil centers. Some receive salaries from the National Guard, the Army, and other similar governmental agencies. The tribe originally was known for camel raising but recently has changed to sheep and goats. This change is related to the decline of the importance of the camels and is affected by the development of underground water resources. In the final part of the chapter we dealt with the problem of Bedouin attitudes toward settlement. While most Bedouins appear to be in favor of settlement, they have views that differ from those of gov- ernment planners. An attempt was also made to analyze the important human factors behind the failure of the project to become a model ex- periment for Bedouin settlement. We noted the transfer of the project to the National Company for Agricultural Settlement. FOOTNOTES 1Harold F. Heady "Ecological Consequences of Bedouin Settlement in Saudi Arabia," in The Careless Technology: Ecology and International Development, M. Taghi Farvar and J. P. Milton, ed. (Garden City, N.Y.: The Natural History Press, 1972), p. 686. 2Dieter Uhlig, King Faisal Settlement Project, Haradh/Saudi Arabia, (Riyadh: Wakuti Consulting Company, n.d.), p. 15. The cost of the project has risen sharply to a figure of about $300 million, because it has taken more than ten years to complete the project, and the costs of everything have risen rapidly after 1970. 3FMC Corporation, Land Reclamation and Development Haradh Project, Saudi Arabia, Vol. 1 (March 1965), p. 10. FMC (Food Machinery Corpora- tion of California) was awarded a contract by the Ministry of Agricul- ture in the spring of 1964 to study economic feasibility of Haradh project and evaluate its potential resources. 4R. Smither, The Haradh Project (Beirut: The Ford Foundation, Ms., 1966), p. 9. 5League of Arab States, "Report of Delegation of Saudi Arabia" in Ri'ayat Al-Badu Wa-Tahdir'uhum Watawtinihum (Cairo: Dar At-Tiba'ah Al-Hadithah, 1965), Vol 1, pp. 437-438. 6Ford Foundation came to Saudi Arabia in the 1960s to modernize the administrative system of the country. 7Smither, op. cit., pp. 18-19. 8Ibid., p. 19. 9D. P. Cole, Nomads of the Nomads: The A1 Murrah Bedouin of the Empty Quarter (Chicago: Aldine, 1975), p. 148. 101bid., p. 149. 11F. Bashir, The Case of Nomadism: To Settle or Not to Settle, (Riyadh, Saudi Arabia: Central Planning Organization, 1969), p. 6. 12Report of Delegation of Saudi Arabia, in Ri'ayat, op. cit.,p. 438. 193 194 13 See H. F. E. Dequin, The Challenge of Saudi Arabia (Hufuf: Saudi Arabia, 1976), p. 45. 4Aramco, Groundwater Resources, Proposed Wadi Sahba Agricultural Project, (Report, n.d.), p. 2. 15Ibid. 16For more details, see Wakuti Consulting Company, Summary of the Final Report (Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Agriculture and Water, November 1971), pp. 4-12. Also see H. Dequin, op. cit., p. 44; and M. H. Al-Fiar, The Faisal Settlement Project at Haradh, Saudi Arabia Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, Department of Geography, 1977), pp. 108-116. l7Dequin, op. cit., p. 44. 18 Aramco, Al-Murrah (Report, n.d.), p. l. 19Bertram Thomas, Arabia Felix (New York: Scribner's, 1932); Paul W. Harrison; The Arab at Home (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1924); John Philby, The Empty Quarter (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1933); H. R. P. Dickson, Kuwait and Her Neighbours (London: Allen and Unwin, 1956); and Wilfred Thesiger, Arabian Sands (London: Longmans, 1959). OAramco, Al-Murrah, op. cit., p. 1. 21 Cole, op. cit., pp. 28—30. 22 Aramco, Al-Murrah, op. cit., p. 2.. 23Gabriel Baer, Population and Societyiin the Arab East, trans. Hanna Sz3ke (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), pp. 122-125. Zeélkhuwa, is a kind of insurance tribute taken by powerful tribes from inferior ones and from trade caravans. When an inferior tribe happened to travel within the dirah of a superior tribe, the former paid the khuwa in cash or kind. See El-Farra, The Effects of Detribalizing the Bedouins on the Internal Cohesion of an Emerging State: The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 1973), p. 62. 25Cole, op. cit., p. 24. 26Ibid., pp. 85-93. 195 27Aramco Al-Murrah, op. cit., p. 6. 28A1-Fiar, op. cit., pp. 185-200. 29Cole, op. cit., p. 69. 30Donald P. Cole, "Al Murrah, Bedouin of Arabia's Empty Sands," Nomads of the World, (National Geographic Society, 1971), pp. 52-71. 31Cole, Nomads of the Nomads, op. cit., pp. 149-150. 32Ibid., p. 155. 33Ibid., p. 148. 34Ibid., p. 157. 35Dequin, op. cit., pp. 45-46. 36Al-Fiar, op. cit., pp. 156-158, 206. 37See Al Madina Newspaper, No. 5080, 3 Safar 1401/10 December 1980, p. 2. See also Al Jazeerah Daily Newspaper, No. 3025, 18 Muharram 1401/26 November 1980, p. 2, and No. 3042, l Safar 1401/13 December 1980, p. 5. 38Cole, Nomads of the Nomads, op. cit., p. 149. 39Ibid. 40H. Dequin, op. cit., p. 46. 41Cole, Nomads of the Nomads, op. cit., p. 155. CHAPTER VIII EVALUATION OF HYPOTHESES The purpose of this chapter is to recall the guiding hypotheses specified in the introductory chapter and to evaluate the evidence sup- porting or failing to support them. The previous three chapters have documented Bedouin settlements representing the isteetan and tawteen types. In addition chapter 4 details Bedouin society, including a long history of settlement in villages and towns. It will be recalled that our sociological framework envisaged two social systems, each with its own set of norms, values and objectives. The two systems are viewed as being in communication, thus ensuring some level of socio-cultural linkeage. Bedouin tribes in Saudi Arabia represent one system, the other being the government or settled popula- tion of that nation. Bedouin contact with the settled populatipgjand ...-.— indeed the central government had led some Bedouins for many years to leave their nomadic way of life. Further, the central government, in its desire to alleviate social and economic problems facing the Bedouins devised a number of plans to settle them. These contrasting situations lead to two types of circumstances culminating in settlement. As suggested in the introductory chapter, the guiding hypotheses relate to the two sets of prevailing circumstances in Bedouin settle- ment in Saudi Arabia. The first set is derived from Isteetan, or the internal power within Bedouin society, that induces the Bedouin people 196 197 to settle. Such change is termed "immanent change" by Rogers and Burge.l In this instance, the two relevant systems are those Bedouins who are involved in settling and the dominant settled Saudi society. It is assumed that the two systems have been in communication and that each possesses a social structure and value orientation that is unique to each system, at least in some respects. The first set of hypotheses relate to voluntary settling (that is, Isteetan),and derive from an examination of existing literature, from personal experience, or from existing theory related to social change. These hypotheses, as stated in chapter 1, are: l. The rate of voluntary settling out on the part of Saudi Bedouins has increased as Saudi Arabia it- self becomes more modernized. 2. The voluntary settling out on the part of Saudi Bedouins is characterized by an intermediate stage of semi-nomadism. 3. Necessary pre-conditions for agricultural-based voluntary settling out on the part of Saudi Bedouins are a reliable water supply, arable plots for agri- cultural production, and supplementary grazing lands, and the accessibility of the designated areas to marketing centers. 4. The voluntary settling out on the part of Saudi Bedouins (a) occurs primarily within their own tribal territories and (b) primarily at a short distance from their traditional nomadic range. Early hijar settlements (composed of one or a few tribes and usually located apart form established Saudi Centers) and recent volun- tary hilal settlements (composed of different tribes and usually lo- cated near urban centers) are expected to differ in numerous ways. It is hypothesized that: 5. Early hijar, in contrast to recent voluntary set- tlements, hilal, are characterized by (a) less 198 contact and interaction with Saudi society, (b) more complete development of an independent structure and sustenance organization; and (c) more successful boundary maintenance (maintenance of "old ways" and resistance to elements of the dominant society). Before considering the hypotheses related to Isteetan, it is necessary to review the many kinds of settlements in this category. The early hijar settlements inspired by the religious movement of Wahhabism, the recent hijar settlements especially around the Qasim and Najd regions, and the spontaneous and voluntary Bedouin settlements around the oil fields, the urban centers and those located around valleys and streams all fall under the Arabic term, Isteetan. In all these cases, there was no intervention by the local regional, or na- tional government nor by any international organization in the process of settlement. While we did not suggest it as a hypothesis, the evi- dence supports the proposition that spontaneous, voluntary Bedouin set- .9" tlements have been more successful than planned and directed settle- ments among Saudi Bedouins. In support of this proposition, we found that the early Ikhwan colonies (1912-1930) were established in perma- nent new communities, with populations ranging from 2,000 to 10,000 persons. The Bedouin tribes, motivated by religion in the form of the Wahhabi movement for the first time, freely abandoned nomadism, sold their herds and decided to settle out. The new hij§£_were located around water wells, in order to cultivate the land. They were relative- ly successful even though Ibn Saud attempted to break the backbone of Bedouin individualism and to replace the tribal loyalty with nation- state loyalty. The hijar are considered spontaneous since there is no clear cut evidence that Ibn Saud planned the Ikhwan hijar first. By 199 1930, there were approximately 200 hij§r_with an overall estimated population of a quarter of a million, representing most of the major tribes of Arabia. With strong social, political, and military purposes behind their establishment, many of them have been very successful while some others have failed. Apart from achieving political stability and economic improvement, Ibn Saud was to establish a new way of life for the Bedouins "more propitious to the enforcement of regular reli- gious observance and the preservation of authentic traditions."2 The Bedouin tribes, inspired by the teaching of the Wahhabi missionaries, sold their herds and tents to purchase farming material and seeds. This transition was described as leaving behind the jahiliyah, the state of ignorance, for Islam.3 The recent hijar and the voluntary settlement of Bedouins through- out much of Saudi Arabia (discussed in chapter 4) appears to be the major trend among nomadic tribes during the last two decades. The ac- celeration of this type of settlement seems to be due to a combination of environmental, political, economic and social reasons. All of these factors put pressure on the Bedouins to change their traditional way of life for a new, more secure and stable one. Some of these Bedouin tribal groups are totally settled out, and these settlements are scat- tered in the Hejaz region, as well as in Tihama and Asir in the south. Still some Bedouin groups live in tents and hut houses forming amall ar ah, (village or hamlet) that surround the urban centers. Other groups of Bedouins have adopted agriculture and cultivation in oases as a "way of living." Many of the settled Bedouin groups, however, have kept some form of tribal organization but these structures appear to be weakening. 200 We now turn to a consideration of the evidence supporting (or failing to support) the hypotheses concerning spontaneous settle- ment of Bedouins. The evidence derives from the analysis contained in previous chapters, from an examination of existing literature in both Arabic and English, and from personal and work experience in Saudi Arabia. As hypothesized, the evidence is overwhelmingly that the rate of voluntary settling out on the part of Saudi Bedouins has increased as Saudi Arabia it- self has become more modernized. The oil wealth, the introduction of modern technology, and the collapse of the Bedouins' tribal structure have been important factors in the increasing rate of settlement. This hypothesis is also supported by the rapid decline of nomadism. Until the 19508 the majority of the pop- ulation of Saudi Arabia (at least 55 or 60 percent) were Bedouin tribesmen. Today, the Bedouins consti— tute no more than 15 percent of the total population. The net decrease in the nomadic population is esti- mated to be 2 percent per year.4 That voluntary settling out on the part of Saudi Bedouins is characterized by an intermediate stage of semi-nomadism, as specified in the second hypothesis, is supported. Historically, many Bedouins first set- tle in villages where they acquire their first experi- ences in the settled society. This is especially true, for example, of Bedouin settlements in Wadi Fatimah and most villages in the Hejaz and Asir regions as well as many villages in Najd and Qasim regions. Lipsky's assertion is relevant when he said: "Except for the absence of a tribe in many villages, the village kin- ship system is of the same type as that of the nomads."5 The third hypothesis states that necessary precondi- tions for agricultural-based settling out on the part of Saudi nomadic population are a reliable water sup- ply, arable plots for agricultural production, sup- plementary grazing lands, and the accessibility of the designated areas to marketing centers. This hypothesis is supported by the finding that when these four condi- tions are present the possibility of success, or the degree of success, for Bedouin settlement is high. This is clear in the four major early hijar settle- ments, namely, Al—Artawiyah, Alghot Ghot, Dukhnah, 201 and Al-Ajfar. It was also found to be true of suc- cessful recent hijar settlements in Al-Qasim region, known for its abundant water supply, rich soil, and cooler climate. Furthermore, the success of spon- taneous Bedouin settlements around valleys and water wells in the Hejaz, Tihama and Asir regions is re- lated to the existence of the four conditions mention- ed in the hypothesis. 4. Hypothesis 4 predicts that the spontaneous settling out on the part of Saudi Bedouin tribes occurs: (a) primarily within their own tribal territories and (b) primarily at a short distance from their traditional economic range. This hypothesis is sup- ported by the finding that the first Bedouin settle- ment or hijrah in 1912 was started at Al-Artawiyah, the valley very well known among the nomads for its many wells, potable water, and for its good grazing lands with numerous trees.6 The valley is located within the dirah of Mutayr tribe, the first Bedouin tribe to settle out in this area. The site of the second early settlement, Al-Ghot Ghot lies within the territory of Utaybah tribe and was occupied by many members of this tribe. Al-Shameh7 in his recent study about Al-Qasim region finds that Bedouin groups desire to settle out within their own tribal dirah to avoid social and economic con- flicts and they desire to move a short distance only from the site of their settlement. Cole8 also finds the same desire among Al-Murrah tribe who prefer to settle out in Haradh or to practice some light agriculture in Jabrin oasis. Both sites fall within the range of their tribal territory. 5. The last hypothesis in this group postulates several differences between early hijar settlements and re- cent voluntary settlements (hilal). The former were usually located at some distance from urban cen- ters while the latter were usually located near urban centers and oil fields. The early hijar consisted of a single tribe while the recent voluntary settlements often comprised many tribes.9 Thus, it was hypothe- sized that early hijar in contrast to recent hilal settlements, (a) exhibit less contact and interaction 202 with Saudi society; (b) possess more complete de- velopment of independent structure and sustenance organization and (c) exhibit more successful boundary maintenance. The evidence is clear that the early hii§r_had less contact than the hilal settlements with Saudi society. Interaction for members of ‘hiiar settlements were fewer not only because of their remote locations but also because strangers were forbidden from entering the new hijar communities. Members of the more recent voluntary settlements, on the other hand, were in frequent contact with the nearby urban centers and oil fields. The evidence is strong that sustenance organization and structural independence were more complete in the early hija£_than in the recent voluntary settlements. The early hijar settlers were forced to become self-sustaining since they refused to purchase any product that they could not themselves produce. The ultimate aim of the early hijar set- tlements was religious--to liberate the Arabian peninsula from heretic Muslims. The recent voluntary settlements, on the other hand, were highly dependent upon the facilities of the nearby urban centers. These settlements were formed without the religious ideology of the early hijar settlements. Instead, they were formed for environmental, political, and economic reasons as well as for the advantages of seden- tary life. Finally, unlike the recent voluntary settlements, the early ‘hija£_had a military function which gave them a certain level of auton- omy. The Ikhwan communities, in addition to their religious and agri- cultural functions, had the duty of responding to the call of Jihad. In keeping with the hypothesis, the early hijar settlements were far more successful than recent voluntary settlements in their 203 boundary-maintaining operations. Since the early hijar settlements were remote from cities and since they shared a common religious zeal, interactions with outsiders were relatively rare and unwelcome. In contrast, the recent voluntary settlers were compelled to interact with urban residents at work as a matter of survival. The second group of hypotheses concern outside agency plans to influence settlement, that is, tawteen. Planned or directed tribal settlements refer to official government policy of Saudi Arabia to encourage the Bedouins to settle out. The following propositions are based upon the literature, personal experience, and theory related to change: 1. Saudi Arabian programs to settle nomadic Bedouins have failed to succeed, in part due to failure of inter-system communication and failure by government to secure the legitimization of the program by tribal leaders. The analysis found in previous chapters clearly supports this hypothesis. The failure of the Haradh project to become a successful Bedouin settlement relates to lack of communication between the bureaucrats and the nomadic peoples. Colelo reports the failure on the part of the project's planners to approach the Bedouins to find out their feelings and attitudes toward settlement. Al-Fiar11 who studies the Haradh projects, advocates the par- ticipation of tribal leaders and sheikhs in some of the decision-making process for settlement. 2. The hypothesis that Saudi Arabian programs to settle nomadic Bedouins in agricultural areas have failed to succeed, in part due to failure by government to teach the Bedouins the fundamentals of sedentary agriculture and living, finds extensive support. The failure of settlements, such as Wadi Assarhan and Tabouk discussed in chapter 6, relates to the fact that the Bedouins who were to settle were not prepared to participate effectively in these projects and most of them knew little about farming. 3. The third hypothesis in this group states that govern- mental goals to be achieved through the settlement of Bedouins have changed markedly through time; at no 204 time have these goals been formulated jointly by governmental personnel and Bedouin sheikhs. This hypothesis is supported by the finding that Saudi planned programs to settle nomadic Bedouins have failed to succeed, in part due to failure of the government to incorporate the tribe's leaders in the decision-making process for settlement. Bates has observed the effect of nomadic leaders to take part in the process of settlement to succeed in the case of Nogaylar in Turkey. He points out, "it is apparent that lineage leaders, not marginal herders, were instrumental in organizing the joint settle- ment."12 Another Saudi scholar advocates the par- ticipation of the Bedouins in the process of set- tlement Malik says: "the Bedouin must partake in the execution of the project (of settlement). Working in the project will familiarize him with it and he will accept it as his own."13 It is impor- tant for the success of any Bedouin settlement to approach the Bedouins themselves or their leaders to find out their feelings on the process of settle— ment. The Al-Murrah tribe who are considered to settle out at Haradh project have never been ap- proached by the modernized administrators to develop a serious dialogue with them.14 Two findings based upon our study, but not stated among the hy- potheses, are important. First, many Saudi Bedouins who have settled out on a voluntary basis in urban centers follow their traditional way of life. In many instances settled Bedouins select occupations remi- ' such as drivers, soldiers, policemen and niscent of their "old ways,' security guards. All of these occupational roles relate to the man's position in the old tribal structure. Second, despite the decline in the number of nomadic Bedouins, elements of Bedouins' ethos still per- sists in the society of Saudi Arabia. For example, the early tribal structural pattern, such as kinship and lineage, still remain as im- portant factors in shaping the social relations in Saudi Arabian so- ciety. Also, communal Bedouin values, such as mutual obligation, hos- pitality, and interdependence are still basic elements in the Saudi 205 social Structure- Why do the Bedouins of Saudi Arabia prefer certain jobs over others? Why is the Bedouin ethos so persistent in Saudi society, despite the declining number of people who can still be clas- sified as nomads? The answer to these important questions lie in soci- ological studies on the aftermath of acculturation. FOOTNOTES 1Everett M. Rogers and Rabel J. Burdge, Social Change in Rural Societies (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1972). 2J. Berque, "Introduction, Nomads and Nomadism in the Arid Zone," International Social Science Journal, Vol. 11, No. 4 (1959), pp. 493- 494. 3Hafiz Wahbah, Jazirat al'Arab Fi al-Qarn al-Ishrin (Cairo: Al- Nahdhah Al-Misriyyah, 1961), p. 126. 4Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Planning, The Second Develop- ment Plan for 1395-1400 AH - 1975-1980 A.D. (Riyadh: 1976), pp. 420-422. 5George A. Lipsky, Saudi Arabia - Its People, Its Society, Its Culture (New Haven: Harf Press, 1959), p. 82. 6Sulayman Al-Dakhil, "Al-ArtawiyahmawlBaldat jadidah Fidiyar Najd," Lughat Al-Arab (Baghdad), Jumada ll 1331/May 1913, p. 483. 7Ahmed A. Shamekh, Spatial Pattern of Bedouin Settlement in Al- gasim Region, Saudi Arabia (Lexington, Kentucky: The University of Kentucky, 1975). 8Donald P. Cole, Nomads of the Nomads: The Al-Murrah Bedouin of the Empty Quarter (Chicago: Aldine, 1975). 9The four major early hijar consisted of one tribe. The settlers of Al-Artawiyah come mainly from Mutayr tribe, the Bedouin groups of the second hijrah, Al-Ghot Ghot are mainly from Utaybah tribe, the nomadic members of Dukhnah belong to Harb tribe, and finally the set- tlers of Al-Ajfar settlement are from Shammar tribe. 10Cole, op. cit., p. 156. 11M. H. Al-Fiar, The Faisal Settlement Project at Haradh, Saudi Arabia: A Study in Nomad Attitudes Toward Sedentarization (Ph.D. dis- sertation, Michigan State University, 1977), p. 221. 12Daniel G. Bates, Nomads and Farmers: A Study of the Yoruk of Southeastern Turkey (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan, Museum of 206 207 Anthropology, Anthropological Papers No. 52, 1973), p. 197. l3Salih A. Malik, A Study of the Social System of the Bedouins: Its Relation to the Problems of Settling in Saudi Arabia (M.A. thesis, Wayne State University, Detroit, 1968), p. 93. 14Cole, op. cit., p. 149. CHAPTER IX SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION Summary and Conclusions This study is a socio-historical investigation into the nomadic problem in Saudi Arabia. The central sociological problem addressed in this research is the adoption of social changes on the part of a tradi- tional society. Specifically, the study focuses on the adoption of a sedentary life style by the Bedouins of Saudi Arabia. Nomadism in Arabia for some time has been confronted with major economic and social structural problems. The Bedouin, linked closely to a harsh environ- ment, is attempting to resolve the problems that have arisen by trying out a more favorable, sedentary environment. Throughout the historical past, the Bedouins of the Arabian penin- sula have proved to be a highly adaptable people and have successfully adjusted theirway of life to the changes taking place in the desert. Until 1950, most of the inhabitants of Saudi Arabia were Bedouins. Since that time, nomadism has been declining and sedentary living, es- pecially the voluntary and spontaneous type has been increasing, which has resulted in drastic changes in the economic and social organization of Bedouin society and in the relationship between man and his environ- ment. After characterizing the social and economic structure of the Bedouin society, including the hema, the dirah and other aspects of 208 209 Bedouin life, the economic basis of Bedouin society before the discovery of oil was analyzed. We then examined the tribe as political unit and the importance of tribal structure before the emergence of the modern Saudi state. Bedouin settlements in Saudi Arabia can be seen as being either voluntary/spontaneous or planned/directed. Voluntary or spontaneous settlement refers to adopting sedentary life as a result of their own free will. Planned or directed Bedouin settlement refers to govern- mental policies designed to encourage Bedouin tribes to settle out. In the first nomadic settlement in modern Saudi Arabia, the Ikhwan were established in settled oasis colonies known as hijar settlements. In these settlements, agriculture was to be the basis of economic life, and of even greater importance, the reformed religion was to be the basis of social and spiritual life. The first hijrah was established in 1912 at Al-Artawiyah, about 180 miles north of Riyadh. About 200 hijar_settlements were founded, especially in Najd, and some, including the one just mentioned, expanded to a population of over 10,000. The .hiiar settlements began on a voluntary basis when some Bedouin tribes sold their herds in Kuwait markets and decided to migrate to hijrah. (This act resembled the prophet Mohammad when he migrated from Makkah to Al-Madinah, a major landmark of the Islamic era). The Bedouin tribes abandoned their nomadic life, devoted them- selves to agriculture, and to learning the teachings of the unitarian movement (Wahhabbism). While some hijar settlements were compulsory, most of them were voluntary. The major professed aim of the settle- ments was to enable the settlers to live a truly religious life. 210 However, some observers have stated that the settlements had military and political as well as religious purposes. Others have argued that the tribes were settled so that tribal loyalty to Ibn Saud could be clearly watched and to ensure that a large army could be mobilized on short notice. Our research revealed that a major factor often overlooked in the decline of the Ikhwan was the widespread failure to successfully develop agriculture in the new communities. The nomadic pastoralists who set- tled had no knowledge of agriculture and little enthusiasm to learn about it. Moreover, the water resources were often insufficient to sup- port any large scale development. In the end, ecological factors forced many of the settled Bedouins to return to nomadism. This pioneer phase in Bedouin settlement lasted from 1912 to 1936. The second period of government planned projects to settle the Bedouins started with the Al-Kharj project in 1940. In 1958 the govern- ment initiated the Wadi Assarhan project near the Jordanian border. The Tabouk project in the northern part started in 1960. These two projects represented an attempt by the government to deal with the se- vere seven-year drought that hit the country, mainly in the northern region. All of these planned government projects to settle the Bedouins failed to properly develop agriculture and to organize and improve the pastures. These failures were also major factors in the demise of the settlements. The evidence shows that the success of any agricultural project to settle the Bedouins appears to depend on five things, namely, the abundance of water, the richness of the soil, the organization and ._._.' improvement of the pastures, the willingness and preparation of settlers r“ 211 to practice agriculture, and the availability of marketing centers. The government policy makers and administrators, due to hasty organiza- tion of the projects, failed to pay attention to the five factors men- tioned. Moreover, the Bedouins were not prepared psychologically and technically to participate effectively in the settlement projects. The last and most recent settlement plan to which the government has devoted much effort, time, and money is the King Faisal Settlement Project at Haradh. The objectives of the project are to reclaim 40,000 dunums of desert land, to settle 1,000 Bedouin families on a permanent basis, and to establish a model farm for experimentation and training of Bedouin settlers. The project was finally abandoned by the govern- ment as a settlement project for the Bedouins. In December of 1980, the Ministry of Agriculture and Water transferred the Haradh project to the National Company for Agricultural Development, to manage on a profit-sharing basis, with 20 percent of the shares to be owned by the government. The voluntary or spontaneous Bedouin settlement is the second type analyzed in this study. Most of the successful Bedouin settlements in Saudi Arabia and in neighboring Middle Eastern countries are of this type. The bulk are concentrated around urban centers and the oil fields. Several factors have contributed to the success of spontaneous settle- h_"- .,.— ..- ments, and at the same time resulted in a decline of nomadism. Environ- mental factors, such as the drought in the 19503 and in the 19603 and the consequent reduction of pastures, as well as the termination of the {PH V hema system, have encouraged the Bedouins to settle spontaneously. Political factors, such as the growing power of the central government 2.12 and the loss of the political functions of the tribe were responsible for Bedouins settling out. Economic factors, including the discovery and development of oil have had a major impact on the Bedouin way of life. At first, the oil producing centers attracted Bedouins to settle around the oil field areas, and increasingly, Bedouins joined the oil industry as laborers. The process by which Bedouins came to work for the oil companies was not a consequence of guidance or pressure from the government. Rather, the process clearly exemplifies the voluntary adaptation of the nomadic people to new environmental opportunities. This is an area of needed sociological research. Social and cultural factors have also led the Bedouins to join the mass migration to cities and to the oil centers. The raiding of caravans or other tribes, for example, formerly a major source of in- come, has been abolished by the government. The change from camel raising to sheep raising occurred for a number of reasons. First, the camel lost its importance as a means of transportation and as a major food source. Second, the Ministry of Agriculture increased its efforts to provide pump-wells in tribal regions. And third, the introduction of the truck helped to make the camel obsolete. All the factors men- tioned have played a major role in convincing the nomadic people to establish spontaneous settlements. The early hijar settlements (chapter 5), the recent Bedouin set- tlements around the Qasim and Najd regions, and the spontaneous settle- ments around the oil fields and urban centers, as well as those located around valleys and springs (chapter 6), all fall under isteetan,uwaning the internal power within Bedouin society that induces them to settle. 213 The first set of hypotheses relate to voluntary settling (that is, isteetan), and derive from the examination of existing literature both in Arabic and in English, from personal and work experience and from existing theory related to social change. The findings from this study lend support for the following propositions: l. The latter found that The rate of voluntary settling out on the part of Saudi Bedouins has increased as Saudi Arabia be— comes more modernized. The spontaneous settling out on the part of Saudi Bedouins is characterized by an intermediate stage of semi—nomadism. Many Bedouins settle first in villages where they acquire experience in settled society. The voluntary settling out on the part of Saudi Bedouins occurs (a) primarily within their own tribal territories and (b) primarily at a short distance from their traditional economic range. Early hijar settlements, composed of one or a few clans of a tribe and usually located apart from Saudi urban centers, were found to differ in numer- ous ways from the recent Bedouin settlements es- tablished after the discovery of oil. are composed mainly of lineages from certain tribes. It was early settlements, in contrast to recent settlements were characterized by: Less contact and interaction with Saudi society; More complete development of an independent struc- ture and sustenance organization; More successful boundary maintenace, that is mainten- ance of "old ways" and resistance to elements of the dominant society. The settlers in voluntary settle- ments on the other hand were more affected by the "new ways" in the urban centers. A major difference, of course, is that the early hijar settlements showed a common religious ideology while the recent settle- ments did not. 214 The Haradh project and the government projects discussed in chap- ter 6, all fall under tawteen, external influence to foster Bedouin settlement. Our evidence supports these propositions: 1. Saudi programs to settle Bedouins have failed to succeed, in part, due to failure of intersystem communication, especially between the nomadic peoples and the bureaucrats, and failure by the government to secure the legitimization of the program by tribal leaders. 2. Saudi programs to settle nomads have failed to suc- ceed in part due to failure by government to teach willing Bedouins the fundamentals of seden- tary agriculture. “ Two further findings from our study merit mention. First, those Bedouins who have settled in urban centers tend to select occupations that duplicate features of their traditional way of life, such as drivers, soldiers, policemen, and security guards. Second, the early tribal structural patterns, including kinship and lineage, still remain the essence of social relations. Certain communal Bedouin values, such as mutual obligation and interdependence, still persist. These obser- vations about the Bedouin's selection of jobs after settling out re- quire future studies of the culture and personality of nomadic people. Discussion The nomadic way of life is a very ancient form of adaptation to an arid and semi—arid environment. This form of adaptation of man to land started early in history, after the neolithic period and the do- mestication of plants and animals.1 There is no doubt that nomadism still provides a livelihood for substantial numbers in the Arab world in general and in Saudi Arabia in particular. Nomadism is clearly 215 related to the ecological environment in which it exists. The avail- ability of water and the condition of pastures are major factors de- termining the size of herds, the direction of migration and the type of animals raised. The Bedouin social system is also a form of adaptation affected by the environment of the tribe's territory. The kin group systems' norms and customs govern behavior and determine what is right or wrong. They also define the obligation of each member to his tribe. Each kin- ship group may include a number of cohesive lineages. It consists of several extended families whose relationship and obligation toward each other are normally recognized by members of the lineages. Mutual obli- gation and interdependence are related to the following facts, namely, "1) members of a lineage rely for their protection on their lineage kin group and/or the tribe at large, and 2) members of the lineage share common economic interests and, therefore, they are obliged to partici- pate and enhance the interest of their group."2 The high risk in desert living has always reminded the Bedouins of the danger of drought, famine, communicable disease and the threat of attack by other tribes. This in itself reinforced the interdepend- ence among tribes and strengthened relationships. Individualism does not exist in a tribal society because each member needs and depends on others. Capot-Rey, the French scholar understood this aspect of Bedouin life when he stated that "nomadism is not only a way of life, it is also a form of social organization based on ties of family and allegiance.3 "For centuries the Bedouins of Arabia have been a source of won- der to their sedentary neighbors and they still share something of the 216 awesome prestige of the desert."4 Amiran had the same idea about nomad- ism as a form of adaptation when he said: "Nomadism is the optimum adaptation of non-industrial populations to the occupance of fully arid areas outside of oases."5 Social and economic factors have forced the Bedouins to adapt to a new way of life because of the acute decline in the amount of rainfall and the scarcity of water in general in the Middle East area in recent years. The consequence, of course, is famine, deterioration of the pastures, and death of large numbers of animals. Such forces have left the Bedouins with no choice but to look for a more secure and stable means of livelihood. Most governments of the Middle Eastern countries view nomadism as an obstacle to the concept of a nation-state as well as to national economic development. Abou-Zeid, a leading anthropolo- gist in the Arab world, notes the hostile attitude toward nomadism on the part of some governments and regional and international organiza- tions. The hostility, he believes, is due to the following: First, nomadism in the modern nation-state system is something wasteful; .VM\ 7,; A #1 second, the continuous roaming of the herdsmen makes it difficult for _- the central authority to exercise control; and third, settlement of Bedouins makes it easier for the central government to collect taxes (or only zakat in the case of Saudi Arabia), to conduct general censuses, and to draft men for military duties. Further, the settlement of Bedouins will help the central authority to introduce a complete system of social services such as education, health, and sanitarian programs, and other services ordinarily not available to most nomadic people. Finally, the settlement of the Bedouins is regarded the most effective 217 way of integrating them with semi—Bedouins and urbanites into a single national state.6 - Why have the governments of the Middle Eastern countries looked upon settlement as the only solution to nomadism? Some students do not view settlement as the only way to solve the Bedouin's problems. Capot- Rey says: "The establishment of a settled dwelling-place, is not the end of the evolution which is bringing the pppp&§”lpta"ppaerp“épciety; these new villagers lack the qualities that make a peasant class love for the earth, farming experience, permanent presence on the planta- tions, a wealth of effort only equalled by the shortage of financial resources."7 Despite this view, in the Middle East, there have been Bedouins who have accepted a completely sedentary life, with agricul- ture as their main occupation. However, even though they have aban- doned their nomadic life, they retain their tribal organization. This condition calls for sociological study. Most central governments of the Middle East tend to look at Bedouin tribes as a form of mini-state within a state which endangers the political and economic stability of the country. Hence, the con- cern about nomads on the part of most governments is based on their desire to achieve an integrated, politically united state. In addition, Bedouins pose a serious problem to the administrators in finding a com- prehensive plan for the provision of education, health and other social services. For these bureaucrats the only solution to the nomadic troubles seems to rest in the form of enforced settlement. Cunnison points out the "anxiety" of many administrators that nomadism is a holdover from an irrational past, and therefore lacking "modern" ra- tional administration.8 218 In regard to forced settlement, Swidler points out "the attempt to settle forcibly large nomadic populations has been a repetitive his- torical occurrence in the Middle East, and such efforts have been met with considerable resistance."9 Some Middle Eastern states, especially Turkey and Israel, have been criticized for their policy in handling the affairs of :heir nomadic population. They are criticized, "par- ticularly for pursuing policies of forced sedentarization which show little consideration for the psychological upheaval consequent on over- rapid settlement."lo During the 1930's the late Shah of Iran tried to settle by force the nomadic tribes of Iran in order to destroy their tribal organiza- tion. The result of this policy was disastrous to the nomads as well as to the country. Barth, who did extensive studies on the nomadic people of Iran, has criticized the policy of enforced settlement. He states that "the policy of enforced settlement in Iran is not wise. Most of the Basseri of Iran were forcibly settled for some years, suf- fering a considerable loss of flocks and people."1 The soviets also attempted to force the nomadic Kazakh in Central Asia to settle out. They believed that nomadism did not help to spread socialist ideas, and the nomads were forced to settle in limited areas. But this policy resulted in the death of thousands of animals, and so- cial disruption and poverty among the tribesmen.12 Saudi Arabia does not really pursue a policy of forcing the Bedouins to settle out, as does the policy pursued by the governments of Russia, Turkey or Iran (during the era of the Shah). But in the Saudi Arabian settlement projects, the policy planners and administra- tors never tried to approach the Bedouins to know their feelings with 219 respect to settlement. The notion of viewing the Bedouins as an ob- stacle to the economic development of the country is prevalent. As A1 Helaissi points out: "So far tribel life in Saudi Arabia has had a delaying effect on the economic development of the country because of the virtual failure of the Bedouins to make any real contribution to it."13 As stated before, up until 1950 when the revenue from oil became the major contribution to the country's economy, the pastoral economy was the dominant economic factor in the history of SaudiAmabia. Today, nomadism in the Arabian peninsula is different from nomadism of the 19403, 19505 and even 19605, and it has been declining rapidly following the discovery of oil. The nomadic Bedouin portion of the Saudi Arabian population has never been ignored by the government. It was given special recognition as a part of the Second Development plan, 1975-1980. This plan in- cluded a realistic appraisal of the conditions among Bedouins. It cor- rectly noted the lack of access of Bedouins to social, educational and civil services and the increasing migration of Bedouins to urban areas and oil producing centers. The net annual decrease of the nomadic pop- ulation amounted to 2 percent per year. The third Development Plan for 1980-1985 attempts to correct some deficiencies of the previous plan. The current plan emphasizes the development of human resources through education and training.14 Such development could helpto reduce the 2 million Yemenites and a similar number of workers from other countries now in Saudi Arabia.15 Despite the millions of riyals spent on different types of settlement plans by the government, most of the plans, including King Faisal at Haradh, have been less than successful. 220 It would seem essential, based upon past experience, that new programs that consider the real needs and changing role of Bedouins in modern Saudi Arabia, are required to bring the nomadic people fully into the mainstream of society. Do the many different Bedouin settlement experiments attempted by the government and the different circumstances of spontaneous settle- ment explored in this dissertation enable us to reach a sound conclu- sion as to the nomadic problem? Is that "sound solution" one that the Bedouins themselves would approve? How can the old and most respected values and customs of Bedouin culture be seen in terms of success or failure in the adaptation to a modern way of life? A proper response to these questions lies in the conduct of more research. It would seem advisable to establish a Bedouin Research Institute, with the cooperation of the Departments of Sociology, Anthropology, Geography and other related departments in the universities of Saudi Arabia, with the assistance of outside scholars. In both Egypt and Israel, a Desert Research Institute has contributed much to the policy relating to some successful settlements of Bedouin tribes in those countries. However, some of these settlements were forced upon the nomadic people and for this reason, have been criticized. It is the writer's opinion that the government should encourage universities, through a program of special funds, to carry out research on the Bedouins and their economic and social structure. Ideally, the research studies would be formulated by native social scientists in cooperation with scholars from other countries specializing in the study of nomadism. This research should focus on many aspects of the 221 Bedouin problem, particularly on Bedouin social structure, factors in willingness to settle, their perception of settlement needs, and their views of social change. In the writer's opinion, any further spending on Bedouin settlement projects would be a waste of time and money with— out the benefit of the results from sociological and anthropological studies. As previously mentioned, most governments in the Middle East think that settled populations are more civilized and cooperative than nomadic people. M. Awad believes that the duty of any strong government "must be to carry out a policy of settling, either completely or partially, the nomad groups. Whether prompted by humanitarian, political, economic, strategic or administrative motives, such a course must be adopted and the desired results achieved, as quickly as possible."16 Of course, the strong voice of Arab and non-Arab alike behind settling the nomads is to promote national integration. However, one must ask just how such an effort, which in fact represents a great challenge to desert ecology, can succeed via nomadic settlement. One must also ask "whether such a result can be achieved without undue harshness" . . . and "whether such a success would not destroy psychological and cultural values, whose role, as a positive aspect of Islamic civilization and as a desirable contribution to world culture, should not be underesti- mated."l7 Settlement alone does not produce a magic solution for the Bedouins. It may only be considered one of the alternatives for the nomads, and only if they desire it. Professor Elphinston points out that: "to think that the future of the Bedouin can be satisfactorily 222 solved by land settlement alone is, however, an over simplification of the problem. In the first place it is not at all desirable that all the Bedouin should cease to be nomadic."18 The settlement of the Bedouins is not an easy task. Transform— ing the Bedouins to settled communities is a complicated process involv- ing time, money, experience and education. As Mahhouk points out with reference to Syria's experience: "settlement on a fixed plot of land will not in itself turn the Bedouin into a farmer or an artisan, for sedentarization is a process of gradual social development and not one of social will or action."19 Because the Bedouin adaptation in the Arabian peninsula evolved over thousands of years, attempts at settle- ment should take gradual steps involving transitional changes rather than radical and forced changes. The Saudi Arabian government should not attempt to force the nomadic people to abandon their traditional customs and values in a sudden transition to sedentary life. But for nomadic people who cannot make the transition, we should provide them with appropriate technology designed to improve their way of living without endangering or demoralizing their social values and norms. One of the major factors which contributed to the failure of all planned government projects to settle the Bedouins in Saudi Arabia, was the lack of communication between the planners and bureaucrats of these projects and the Bedouins who were the primary beneficiaries. Partici— pation of the Bedouins themselves, through voluntary cooperation, is necessary to any successful settlement project, with technical aspects being left to the experts of the central government. As Bates ob- serves in regard to Turkish nomads: "Most herders among the Yoruk today belong to a small number of patronymic or lineage groups, and 223 closely related families continue to move and rent pastures to- 2 gether." 0 Cole had the same observation about the Saudi nomads: "A lineage settlement, however, located at a convenient place on one's territory, inhabited either full-time or part-time by some of the line- age members and visited at least occasionally by nomads from one's own lineage is not only acceptable but ideal."21 The absence of the nomadic people or their leaders from the planning process of settlement was evident in the failure of all Bedouin settlement schemes in Saudi Arabia. The writer believes that if the Bedouins of Saudi Arabia desire to settle down and to practice agriculture, they should be encouraged to do so. The desire of some Bedouin tribes to settle and to practice farming during the last two decades has been supported by recent liter— ature (Cole, 1975 and Shamekh, 1975). The shaikh of Al-Murrah tribe, for example, presented his peoples' desire to settle for the following reasons: 1. The Bedouins wish to send their children to school and the government would provide schooling in the settlements; 2. No longer is nomadism considered by the nomads them- selves as a secure occupation in supplying basic needs; 3. Many Bedouins now realize the importance of health facilities which could be provided by the central government in settlements; and 4. Settlement gives the Bedouins a psychological feel- ing of self-respect since they can feel they are making a contribution to the whole society. This also will not depict them as depending on govern- mental charity.22 The Bedouins should be trained and prepared to use modern agri- cultural machinery and techniques. We should keep in mind that any 224 successful scheme to settle the Bedouins must incorporate livestock because of its importance to the economy. The government of Saudi Arabia recently recognized the importance of livestock as a major com- ponent of the national economy. Most of the animal wealth of the coun- try is owned and managed by the nomadic people. In recent years, the government through the Ministry of Agriculture and Water, has initiated a cash subsidy program to encourage and develop the pasture sector of the national economy.23 Since nomadism in Arabia is a very firmly established mode of life, it may be that some Bedouin tribes will not abandon nomadism com- pletely. For instance, members of the Al-Murrah tribe do not agree with either the westerners or the government bureaucrats, that Bedouin pastoralism is doomed in an increasingly industrialized world. "Rather, they are seeking ways--with little outside help as encouragement--to modernize their pastoralism and to become more actively involved in "24 Lancaster points out that "changes toward making modern society. nomadism easier, more productive and profitable is a line which has been almost totally ignored. Perhaps it should be tried? The Bedu are as adaptable, intelligent and willing as anyone to try out innova- tions."25 In the final analysis, perhaps improving pastures and the nomadic condition in general, will enable the Bedouins to play a major creative role in the development of their environment. To conclude this thesis, the question of modern education and its impact on the attitudes of the Bedouins of Saudi Arabia regarding set— tling out should be examined. Sociological studies should be carried out to know and understand the impact of education on the Bedouins decision to abandon nomadism. FOOTNOTES 1 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, "Nomadic Pastoralism as a Method of Land Use," in Arid Zone Research, the Prob- lems of the Arid Zone, proceedings of the Paris Symposium, (Paris: Unesco, 1962), p. 357. 2Ibrahim Al-Awaji, Bureaucracy and Society in Saudi Arabia (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia, 1971), pp. 57-58. 3R. Capot-Rey, "The Present State of Nomadism in the Sahara" in L. Dudley Stamp, ed., A History of Land Use in Arid Regions (Unesco: Arid Zone Research XVII, 1961), pp. 301-302. 4J. Berque, "Introduction, the Nomads and Nomadism in the Arid Zone," International Social Science Journal, Vol. 11, No. 4 (1959), p. 484. 5David Amiran, "Arid Zone Development: A Reappraisal under Modern Technological Conditions" in Economic Geography, Vol. 41, No. 3 (July, 1965), p. 190. 6Ahmed M. Abou-Zeid, "The Changing World of the Nomads," in J. G. Peristiany, ed., Mediterranean Rural Communities and Social Change, (Athens: Acts of the Mediterranean Sociological Conference, July, 1963), p. 280. 7R. Capot-Rey, op. cit., p. 307. 8I. Cunnison, "Nomadism in the 1960's," Inaugural Lecture, Uni- versity of Hull, England, 1967. See also Dawn Chatty, "The Pastoral _JH Family and the Truck," in Philip C. Salzman, ed., When Nomads Settle I (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980), pp. 80-94. 9Nina Swidler, "Sedentarization and Modes of Economic Integration in the Middle East" in Salzman. Ibid., p. 21. 10Allan George, "Egypt's Remaining Nomads," Middle East Interna- tional, No. 37 (July, 1974), p. 28. 11Fredrik Barth, Nomads of South Persia: The Basseri of the Khamseh Confederacy (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1961), p. 3. 225 FOOTNOTES 1 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, "Nomadic Pastoralism as a Method of Land Use," in Arid Zone Research, the Prob- lems of the Arid Zone, proceedings of the Paris Symposium, (Paris: Unesco, 1962), p. 357. 2Ibrahim Al-Awaji, Bureaucracy and Society in Saudi Arabia (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia, 1971), pp. 57-58. 3R. Capot-Rey, "The Present State of Nomadism in the Sahara" in L. Dudley Stamp, ed., A History of Land Use in Arid Regions (Unesco: Arid Zone Research XVII, 1961), pp. 301-302. 4J. Berque, "Introduction, the Nomads and Nomadism in the Arid Zone," International Social Science Journal, Vol. 11, No. 4 (1959), p. 484. 5David Amiran, "Arid Zone Development: A Reappraisal under Modern Technological Conditions" in Economic Geography, Vol. 41, No. 3 (July, 1965), p. 190. 6Ahmed M. Abou-Zeid, "The Changing World of the Nomads," in J. G. Peristiany, ed., Mediterranean Rural Communities and Social Change, (Athens: Acts of the Mediterranean Sociological Conference, July, 1963). P. 280. 7R. Capot-Rey, op. cit., p. 307. 81. Cunnison, "Nomadism in the 1960's," Inaugural Lecture, Uni- versity of Hull, England, 1967. See also Dawn Chatty, "The Pastoral ,{R Family and the Truck," in Philip C. Salzman, ed., When Nomads Settle I (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980), pp. 80-94. 9Nina Swidler, "Sedentarization and Modes of Economic Integration in the Middle East" in Salzman. Ibid., p. 21. 10Allan George, "Egypt's Remaining Nomads," Middle East Interna- tional, No. 37 (July, 1974), p. 28. llFredrik Barth, Nomads of South Persia: The Basseri of the Khamseh Confederacy (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1961), p. 3. 225 226 12"Stabilization of the Nomads," Central Asian Review, Vol. 7 (1959), pp. 226-227. l3A. Helaissi, "Bedouins and Tribal Life in Saudi Arabia," Inter- national Social Science Journal, Vol. 11, No. 4 (1959), p. 533. 14Ministry of Planning, The Second Development Plan for 1395-1400 AH, 1975-1980 A.D. (Riyadh: Saudi Arabia, 1976), pp. 420-422, and The Strategy for the Third Development Plan for 1980-1985, (Riyadh: Saudi Arabia, 1978). 15Al-Yamamah Magazine, Vol. 14, no. 620 (Friday 24 Thu Al Qe'adah 1400/3 October 1980), p. 12 (published in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia). I think the estimated number of foreign workers in Saudi Arabia given by the magazine is exaggerated. l6Mohamed Awad, "Settlement of Nomadic and Semi-Nomadic Tribal Groups in the Middle East," International Labor Review, Vol. 79 (January-June 1959), p. 35. 17J. Berque, op. cit., p. 497. 18W. Elphinston, "The Future of the Bedouin of Northern Arabia," International Affairs, 21-3 (July, 1945), p. 373. 19Adnan Mahhouk, "Recent Agricultural Development and Bedouin Settlement in Syria," The Middle East Journal, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Spring, 1965), p. 176. ' 20Daniel G. Bates, "Yoruk Settlement in Southeast Turkey" in Salzman, op. cit., p. 126. 21Donald P. Cole, Nomads of the Nomads: The Al-Murrah Bedouin of the Empty Quarter (Chicago: Aldine, 1975), p. 156. 22T. El-Farra, The Effects of Detribalizing the Bedouins on the Internal Cohesion of an Emerging StatezThe Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 1973), pp. 193-194. 23Donald Cole, "Pastoral Nomads in Rapidly Changing Economy: The Case of Saudi Arabia," in Tim Niblock, ed., Social and Economic Develop- ment in the Arab Gulf, (London: Croom Helm and Centre for Arab Gulf Studies, Exeter, 1980), p. 113. 24Cole, Nomads of the Nomads, op. cit., p. 24. 227 25W. Lancaster, "Saudi Arabian Bedouin: A Review," Commission on Nomadic Peoples, Newsletter, No. 5 (January 1980), p. 26. (pub- lished in Montreal, Canada). BIBLIOGRAPHY BIBLIOGRAPHY Abou-Zeid, Ahmad M. 1963 "The Changing World of the Nomads" in Mediterranean Rural Communities and Social Change, edited by J. G. Persistiany. Athens: Acts of the Mediterranean Sociological Conference. Alabbadi, Abdallah H. 1970 Ra'y Hawl Al-Badu Fi al-Mamlakah al-Arabiyyah al- Saudiyyah (Opinion about Bedouins in Saudi Arabia). 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(The Arabian Peninsula During Abd al-Aziz Reign), 3 vols. Beirut: Matabia Dar al-Qlam. 1978 Mara'aytu Wa Smi-atu (What I Saw and Heard). Taif, Saudi Arabia: Makatabat Dar Al-Ma'arf. VITA Abdallah Hasan Alabbadi was born in Alm'aabdh district, Makkah Saudi Arabia. He attended elementary schools in Makkah and Taif. He completed his secondary education at Alm'adh A1 Saudi in Makkah. In 1960 he graduated from Cairo University, Egypt with a Bachelor of Arts degree in Sociology. In the summer of 1960, he worked for the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. First, he conducted socio- logical studies with his colleague Abdallah Al'alawla about the Saudi labor conditions in the Arabian American Oil Company in the Eastern Region, and at the Arabian Japanese Oil Company and Getty Oil Company in the Saudi-Kuwaiti neutral zone. Second, he established and directed the labor office in Al-Madinah and Tabouk. In 1962 he was appointed Director of the Youth Welfare Department in the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor. He represented his country in several conferences held in the Middle East and Western Europe and dealt with youth prob- lems and sports activities. In 1964 he presided over the Saudi Arabian delegation to the first GANEFO held in Djakarta, Indonesia. In the summer of 1964, he came to the United States for graduate study and in 1967, he received his M.A. in Political Science and Sociology from Central Michigan University. In the summer of 1967, he returned home to work for the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor. First he worked as an advisor to the Social Affairs Agency and then as Assistant to the General Director of the Youth Department in the same Ministry. In 1968 he attended the Olympics in Mexico City as a member of the Saudi National Olympic Committee. From 1970-1972 he worked for the Central Planning Organization in Riyadh and participated with the Stanford Research Group in the formation of the first Five-Year Plan, 1970-1975. In 1972, he attended the Olympics in Munich, West Germany representing the Saudi Athletics Federation. When the University of Riyadh in 1973 decided to open the Soci- ology Department in the Faculty of Arts, he joined the new department as a lecturer. He taught for two years, Introductory Sociology and History of Social Thought in the College of Education and the Sociol- ogy Department of Riyadh University. He has frequently contributed to Saudi newspapers and magazines writing about social issues. He has travelled to most countries in the Middle East, Western Europe, Asia, North and South America. He is married to Albatoul T. Aldabbagh and she is enrolled in the Ph.D. program in Sociology at Michigan State University. There are three children: Manal, Hani and Mohammad. 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